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Nationalism and state legitimation in contemporary China

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NATIONALISM AND STATE LEGITIMATION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

by

Benjamin Joseph Darr

<u>An Abstract</u>

Of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

December 2011

Thesis Supervisor: Professor Wenfang Tang

ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the process of through which the government of the

People's Republic of China ostensibly produces popular legitimacy by inculcating an

attachment to Chinese national identity among the public. It seeks to understand the

theoretical connections between national identity and support for the state and to learn

which groups of people are most affected by the state's influences in this regard.

A basic two-step process is theorized, in which the first step is the state's attempt

to shape the public's concept of Chinese national identity and the public's attachment to

the nation. The bulk of the dissertation addresses this part of the process at the individual

level. Two main mechanisms of state influence on national identity are examined: the

educational system and the mass media. The main method of research used is the

analysis of survey data. The analysis here comes from three survey datasets: the 2005-

2008 wave of the World Values Surveys, the 2006-2007 Chinese Ethnicity Survey, and

the 2008 China Survey. In the investigation of Chinese education, survey data analysis is

supplemented by field research conducted in two middle schools in China, including

classroom observation and informal conversations with teachers and students. A brief

analysis of a middle school Chinese history textbook is also included. These qualitative

investigations are able to show the mechanisms through which education produces an

attachment to Chinese national identity. The last chapter of the dissertation turns to the

second step in the process: nationalism's relationship with support for the state at the

individual level. Survey data are again used to investigate this relationship.

This dissertation finds evidence that the state is able, to a certain extent, to

influence national identity among the public, both in terms of the elements of Chinese

national identity, and in terms of the strength of people's attachment to the nation. A person's level of exposure to the media and his or her level of education are both shown to be significant predictors of their levels of attachment to Chinese national identity, and these relationships look just as the theory would expect. With respect to the second part of the process, strong evidence is found that those who cling more tightly to Chinese national identity are more supportive of the state. In addition to this relatively unsurprising finding, however, we find that this relationship is the strongest among Han Chinese, and among those with particular ideas about the social purposes of China.

From these findings it is concluded that the process of state legitimation through nationalism—an oft-mentioned but rarely examined process—does, to some extent, work. Levels of education and media consumption are some of the most powerful predictors of national attachment, and national attachment itself is the most powerful predictor of state support. However, while these are statistically significant relationships, they are not to be overstated. Most of the variation at the individual level, both in Chinese national identity and in state support, remains unexplained: both are difficult to successfully predict based on the models. The state, while it does have a 'nationalizing' impact through the media and the educational system, does not by any means have control over popular levels of nationalism or state support.

Abstract Approved: _____

Thesis Supervisor

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Title and Department

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Date

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

This is to certify that the Ph. D. thesis of

Benjamin Joseph Darr

has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the
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INTRODUCTION

China's long and rich history as a civilization provides a strong foundation for a

sense of national pride among its people. The 2008 Beijing Olympics demonstrated this

national sentiment in a grand fashion, with extraordinarily lavish opening ceremonies that

displayed to the world China's ancient traditions alongside its recent modernization and

technological achievements. After the opening ceremonies came unprecedented levels of

success for Chinese Olympians, which naturally filled China's airwaves and printing

presses, further swelling the public's national pride. In my own experience in China

during the Beijing Games, many people with whom I talked said they were especially

proud to show the world how developed China had become. It seemed that for Chinese

people, the Beijing Olympics were about clearing up foreign misconceptions that life was

still backwards in China. The 2008 Olympics were the long-awaited and hard-earned

chance to show the world that China was at the cutting edge of progress, economically as

well as athletically.

Meanwhile, in the Western press, a very different story was being told. Aside

from frequent (if typical) stories warning of lead paint in toys from China and other

dangers of sundry Chinese exports, people were reading and watching stories about

Beijing's still unsatisfactory smog levels and being warned of human rights abuse within

the country. Coverage of the Olympic Games was less about gold medals and more

about how Chinese athletes may have cheated to get them, whether by disobeying age

requirements or by use of performance-enhancing drugs. Reports also highlighted other

incidents that seemed to question Chinese integrity, including the computerized faking of

the footprint-shaped fireworks over Beijing. They scrutinized the replacement of a child

singer with a more photogenic little girl who instead lip-synched over the original

singer's recording of "Ode to my Country" at the opening ceremonies.

This contrast in journalistic coverage of the Beijing Olympics calls attention to a

broader point: while for many Chinese the Olympics were about proudly displaying their

nation's achievements, many in the West perceived the Beijing Games more cynically.

One source of this cynicism is an underlying suspicion that the Chinese Communist Party

lacks legitimacy in the eyes of its own people. Thus the pomp and circumstance of the

Olympics was perceived as a nationalist parade of sorts, part of a larger attempt by the

Chinese government to foster national sentiment among the population. Moreover, the

purpose of this directed increase in nationalism was to bolster the legitimacy of the

Chinese Communist Party in order for the party to remain in power. Such a depiction

was made quite explicit in an editorial by April Rabkin that appeared both in the *New*

York Times and the *International Herald Tribune*, which stated bluntly that:

> Rulers fear revolution, and just as strongly, so do the people. And nationalism is
> the dominant strategy for preventing it. With a well-run Olympics, the Chinese
> Communist Party can prove its legitimacy and its continued mandate (Rabkin
> 2008).

The above editorial sparked one overseas Chinese to write in with her contrasting

perspective:

> Rabkin ignores the deep feelings of ordinary Chinese about today's China. I can
> only agree with my family, friends and colleagues that current economic and
> political conditions are 20 to 30 times better than they were 20 years ago. Having
> the Olympics in Beijing makes us very happy because it symbolizes all of these
> improvements. Who cares about the government's strategy? Patriotism and
> nationalism don't need to be incited. In any case, they aren't necessarily bad
> (Embree 2008).

This exchange shows the contrast between Chinese and Western perceptions of the Beijing Games. Another *New York Times* journalist likens the Beijing Games to an earlier Olympics to make a similar argument as the above editorial: "the Olympics generally don't undermine governments. Historically, strong regimes have used the Games to foment nationalism and become stronger, the most infamous example being Hitler and the 1936 Summer Games in Berlin" (Longman 2008). A third article, regarding the crackdown on protests in Tibet leading up to the Olympics, says: "playing to national pride, and national insecurities, the party has used censorship and propaganda to position itself as defender of the motherland, and at the same time to block any examination of Tibetan grievances or its own performance in the crisis" (Yardley 2008). These articles and editorials from the Western press reveal a common perception that Chinese nationalism is something that the party has strategically encouraged in order to support its claims to governmental legitimacy, and that the Olympics are a part of this larger strategy.

This account of state-sponsored nationalism as a means to popular legitimacy is equally common in academic treatments of China and Chinese nationalism, and the basic idea is present even in textbooks on Chinese politics. As Anthony Saich argues in *Governance and Politics of China*: "[CCP] legitimacy is currently based on the capacity to deliver the economic goods and the leadership is casting around for other sources. Thus, we see the strident appeals to nationalism and patriotism and the fascination with neo-Confucianism" (Saich 2004, 347). Kenneth Lieberthal's *Governing China* offers this prognosis: "By 2020, China may become an authoritarian, one-party system that is closely linked to domestic business elites and attempts to keep the lower classes

quiescent by promoting ardent nationalism.... The most likely way to maintain social peace in a system that basically serves the interests of the wealthy political and economic elite is to encourage nationalism" (Lieberthal 2004, 334-5). As these are both major Chinese politics textbooks, it seems that the idea of state-led, state-legitimating nationalism is commonly taught in college classrooms in the United States.

Although these textbooks speak to the legitimizing role of nationalism, not enough effort has been made to analyze just how this process works. One piece of the puzzle has been particularly neglected: how the necessary conditions are created for national pride to produce government legitimacy. For this process of legitimation through nationalism to work, there must be a link between national pride and support for the state at the individual level. Using survey methods, Jie Chen' (2004) addresses this question empirically as part of a systematic examination of the sources of diffuse support (for the regime) and specific support (for leaders) at the individual level among Beijing residents. Precious little else has been written on this crucial individual-level link in the process. The project of this dissertation is to examine the mechanisms of this process of the construction of national identity and state legitimation in more detail using more recent survey data, supplemented at points by qualitative methods of inquiry.

Toward this end, I ask three broad questions. First, in looking at the mechanisms of national identity construction, how are the meanings of Chinese national identity associated with the party-state? Answering this question will require examining, to use the terminology of Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2006), the *content* of the identity of being Chinese. The way such identities are presented in educational programs and in the popular media are important in addressing this question. A second question

regards what groups of people are more likely to respond to such 'nationalizing' and state-legitimating influences. What are the characteristics of the people who are more likely to internalize the various components of national identity and nationalist sentiment? Thirdly, under what conditions does this construction of national identity succeed in accomplishing its alleged goals? More specifically, how and among whom does national identity provide the state and its leaders with political support?

The analysis of this dissertation proceeds in six chapters. Chapter 1 begins with an explanation of why understanding Chinese nationalism is important. The discussion then turns to a review of the relevant recent literature on the topic, pointing out the limits of this existing scholarship as well as how this project seeks to fill those gaps.

Chapter 2 presents the theoretical argument that structures the rest of the book and guides its analysis. Drawing on David Easton's (1965) framework of state support, Abdelal et al.'s (2006) concept of group identity, and several classic theories of nationalism, the chapter outlines a theory of nation-building in which the state aims to produce in its population an attachment to national identity with the hopes that national sentiment will overflow into state support.

The mass media and the educational system both represent crucial mechanisms by which the state ostensibly does this. Using data from the 2005 wave of the World Values Surveys and from the 2008 China Survey, Chapter 3 examines the connection between mass media consumption and levels of national attachment at the individual level. It presents a comparison of this relationship in China to the same relationship in the United States, and examines the divergent correlations of different types of media consumption with national sentiment.

Chapter 4 turns to the mechanism of education. First, utilizing data from the 2008 China Survey, this chapter statistically analyzes the effects of education on levels of attachment to national identity. Second, the chapter identifies and examines elements of formal education that foster Chinese national consciousness and support for the state. This is done by visiting and observing two Chinese middle schools and by analyzing a middle-school Chinese history textbook.

Staying within the purview of education, Chapter 5 addresses the topic of ethnic minorities in China, specifically those in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. If the Chinese state is trying to instill Chinese national identity in the population in order to bolster its legitimacy, the people they need to reach most effectively are the minority groups that largely inhabit the western periphery of the country. Recognizing the special importance of such groups with respect to the question of nation-building, this chapter examines the effectiveness of the state's efforts to construct Chinese national identity among minority groups. Using data from Wenfang Tang's 2006 survey of high school students in Xinjiang, the chapter aims to discover whether the use of Mandarin as the language of instruction in schools actually does shape ethnic and national identities of minorities who speak different languages.

Whereas the previous chapters seek to explain variation in different dimensions of national identity, Chapter 6 turns finally to the question of nationalism's relationship with political support for the national government. Once again using data from the 2008 China Survey, the chapter first looks at the strong relationship between these two attitudes. The analysis then focuses on how the contents of one's national identity--not

just the attachment to it—can structure the relationship between national sentiment and state support.

The overall findings of the dissertation and their implications are then summarized in a brief conclusion. Generally speaking, this project has found support for the idea that Chinese popular nationalism is at least in part state-led. The state's avenues for producing national identity—the media and education—are found to have significant impacts on individuals' attachment to Chinese national identity. Furthermore, national identity is found, in Chapter 6, to have significant and complex ties to state support. However, these relationships are not overwhelming, as most of the variance in the statistical models remains unexplained. Nonetheless, we cannot overlook the fact that two of the factors with the biggest impact on levels of nationalism and levels of state support—the media and education—are those over which the state, in China, has a great deal of control.

I would like to thank my advisor Wenfang Tang in general for his aid and commonsense recommendations throughout the project, and in particular for his help in arranging my trip to Beijing. Vicki Hesli was indispensable as an advisor in the early stages of the writing of this book. I am also grateful to Michael Lewis-Beck, Cameron Thies, and Judy Polumbaum for their willingness to be a part of the project and for their comments. Benjamin Read was also very helpful in offering comments on the dissertation proposal.

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CHAPTER 1: THE STUDY OF CHINESE NATIONALISM

The task of this chapter is to review recent scholarly research on Chinese nationalism and, more importantly, to identify the gaps in this literature that this dissertation aims to fill. Before dealing with this, however, an important question remains: why study Chinese nationalism?

The Importance of Chinese Nationalism

An urgent need exists for a deeper understanding of nationalism and national identity in China, for three main reasons. First, nationalism does serve to undergird the Chinese government's legitimacy, which, given China's size and importance, is cause enough for scholarly attention. Second, Chinese nationalism has considerable impact on China's foreign policy. Third, the use of nationalism as a legitimating ideology by China's authoritarian government has parallels in other parts of the world, and thus is relevant not just to China studies but to comparative politics as well.

Scholars have expended a great deal of effort in studying the nature of Chinese nationalism because it is widely seen as a critical pillar of the current regime's legitimacy. As numerous other scholars have noted, nationalism became a critical pillar of regime legitimacy in the post-Mao era, when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began to abandon the legitimating ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (e.g. Whiting 1983; Strecker Downs and Saunders 1996; Zheng 1999). This was especially true after the June 1989 suppression of the Tiananmen Square protests in Beijing, when the Party effectively equated patriotism with support for the government and its policies (Zhao 2000, 20). While some scholars argue that nationalism has been a critical pillar of legitimacy at least since the founding of the People's Republic of China

(PRC) in 1949, and while there is much debate on the nature of Chinese nationalism, there is widespread scholarly consensus that nationalism today is an essential piece of the CCP's legitimacy. If nationalism—and thus the national identity that it relies on—is so critical to the legitimacy of the Chinese party-state, it scarcely needs to be mentioned that the party-state's legitimacy itself is worth concern. To risk putting the point too dramatically, the political fate of the full fifth of humanity within China's borders directly hinges on the legitimacy and stability of this particular government.

A second indication of Chinese nationalism's importance is that, in addition to its legitimating role, it may have other consequences. Much has been written on nationalism's impact on Chinese foreign policy, whether this national pride exists at the popular or elite level. In fact, it seems that the majority of the scholarly literature that addresses Chinese nationalism is mainly concerned with its foreign policy consequences. A central proposition in this literature is that popular Chinese nationalism—particularly its more anti-foreign strains—limits the options of the Chinese government in its foreign relations, pushing policy in a hawkish direction. Of course, the extent to which this actually has affected and will affect foreign policy has been debated vigorously (see Whiting 1983, 1995; Oksenberg 1986; Shambaugh 1996; Strecker Downs and Saunders 1997; Zhao 2000, 2004; Fewsmith and Rosen 2001; Cheng and Gnok 2004; Shue 2004; Shirk 2007; Shirk 2011).

Aside from foreign policy consequences, nationalism—or more accurately, the clash of nationalisms—also drives social conflict within China's borders and thus affects the stability of domestic minority relations (Mackerras 2004; Ma 2006; Kolås 1996). The continued episodes of social unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang over issues of political

autonomy illustrate the contemporary relevance of national identities in China. When nationalism and national identity assume narrower ethnic definitions in a multiethnic state, this holds the potential for worrisome consequences in domestic politics.

Thirdly, although China's size and its growing prominence on the world stage justify the study of China with an 'area studies' approach, it should be stressed that this project is valuable not only for its contributions to the understanding the case of China alone. Recognizing the value of comparison with and generalization to other political systems, the conclusions and implications of this study will go beyond China's national borders. The construction of national identities is a process political scientists have observed in countries all over the world. In other authoritarian systems, most notably in Latin America, the political legitimacy of the state is frequently said to rest on nationalist sentiment among the population. There is nothing uniquely Chinese about such a political environment; many authoritarian governments find themselves in situations that largely correspond to this. Therefore, understanding state legitimation through nationalism at the individual level will have implications for many political systems.[1]

What Recent Scholarship Has Told Us

As many have observed, academic interest in Chinese nationalism has only recently developed into a substantial body of research. Allen Carlson (2009) notes that this corresponds with the rise in nationalism, or at least the rise in the visible manifestations of nationalism, that came in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, when the government "turned to the promotion of 'patriotism' (*aiguo*) in an attempt to shore up the legitimacy of its rule" (Carlson, 20). Chinese nationalism itself is

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[1]Generalizing even more broadly, nationalism is a legitimating force not simply for authoritarian states, but plays a similar supplementary role in legitimation in democratic regimes (see Billig 1995 on this point).

not a new phenomenon, and has historical manifestations as far back as the May Fourth

Movement of 1919, the revolution of 1911, and even the late-Qing era Self-Strengthening

Movement (Fewsmith and Rosen 2001, 158). Many scholars even argue that Chinese

nationalism existed in some form prior to this (e.g. Duara 1996). However, the study of

Chinese nationalism experienced a flurry of scholarship in the 1990s, in response to

developments in Chinese popular culture, China's growing international importance, and

the government's new legitimating strategy. While some of this research focused on the

nature and origins of Chinese nationalism itself, other work focused on its consequences.

While these two questions are necessarily related, each will be discussed in turn.

Scholarly discussions on the nature of Chinese nationalism have frequently

paralleled the debate between 'China comparativists' and 'China exceptionalists'. That is

to say, the discussion has often been about how well the Chinese case conforms to

broader theories on nationalism, and thus how applicable such theories are in China. An

example of this is the debate about whether nationalism in China has come through

imitation of earlier Western nationalisms. This is the mainstream consensus on the cause

of non-Western nationalisms, as exemplified by Gellner (1983), Anderson (1983), and

Smith (1983). Such a view of Chinese nationalism sees it as a relatively recent historical

development deeply connected with modernization and with the encounters and (failed)

competition with the nation-states of the Western powers. Most scholarship on Chinese

nationalism tells a similar story with respect to China, as most scholars trace

nationalism's history in China back no earlier than the late 19th century (Pye 1996; Zhao

2004; Fitzgerald 1996). Some, however, claim that the turn to nationalism at that point in

time is overstated. Duara (1996) argues that political identities under Imperial China

constituted something that was not far off from a nation, and that Gellner's and Anderson's theories exaggerate the change brought about by modernization, at least in the case of China. Disagreements like this among China scholars also reflect the larger debate about how long the idea of the 'nation' has been around.[2]

However, even among those who date nationalism as a recent phenomenon, it is an open question to what extent Chinese nationalism is comparable to nationalisms in other parts of the world. After all, while most non-Western nation-states gained their nation-state status due to revolutions against imperialism and colonialism, China was never colonized to an extent comparable to most parts of the third world.

An even more important difference is that China stands as a unique instance of an empire-turned-nation-state, or as Lucian Pye calls it, "a civilization pretending to be a nation-state" (Pye 1996, 109). For Pye, Chinese nationalism has little content besides an appeal to the legitimation of the ruling powers, and this provides the reason why. In China, as opposed to other modernizing countries, "nationalism has not been forged out of the dynamic of competitive politics; rather, it has been based on the ideals associated with an imposed moral order. This has meant that Chinese nationalism has been almost indistinguishable from the partisan interests of the rulers" (112).

In contrast to Pye, some argue that China's long history and its weighty imperial legacy make Chinese nationalism today stronger, not weaker. Indeed, this seems a more intuitive conclusion than Pye's. Scholars who study both policymaking elites (e.g. Johnston 1998) and popular nationalism (e.g. Gries 2004a) maintain that the strength and appeal of Chinese nationalism comes precisely from the past glory of the Chinese empire,

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[2] This closely parallels old debates within the nationalism literature between 'primordialists' and 'instrumentalists'.

and the desire to retain this after a 'century of humiliation' by the West. However, both Pye and these scholars are alike in insisting on the uniqueness of the Chinese situation and the nationalism it has produced.

James Townsend (1996) examines an important idea that, although old, still frequently surfaces (e.g. Ma 2006) in discussions of the origins Chinese nationalism. He calls this the "culturalism-to-nationalism thesis" (Townsend 1996, 2). Originally articulated by Joseph Levenson (1964), the main idea of the thesis is that the traditional Chinese self-image is based not on ethnic identity or the political idea of the nation state, but primarily on culture—customs, beliefs, and ways of life. This explains why foreign rule of the empire by Mongols (1271-1368) and, later, Manchus (1644-1911), could be accommodated by the Chinese. Related to the idea of Chinese uniqueness discussed above, this thesis also purports to explain the unique nature of Chinese nationalism. Because "there was no concept or need for nationalism in [a] world devoid of cultural or interstate competition" (Townsend 1996, 2), the shock that led to the turn toward nationalism did not happen until the 19th Century when the European powers began their attempts to colonize China. Townsend claims that this thesis exaggerates the differences between culturalism and nationalism, arguing that Chinese nationalism (and indeed, other nationalisms) is still largely culturalist.

The question of the origin of Chinese nationalism is strongly tied to questions of its nature today, and the task of many scholars has been to simply chart the course of Chinese nationalism since its inception around the turn of the 20th century. There have been a wide variety of characterizations of Chinese nationalism since the phenomenon gained scholarly notice in the 1980s. Allen Whiting (1983) described Chinese

nationalism of the time as 'assertive', later being careful to note that this did not amount to 'aggressive' nationalism, nor was it merely 'affirmative' nationalism (Whiting 1995). Michel Oksenberg (1986) contrastingly characterized it as 'confident' nationalism. David Shambaugh (1996) later reinforced this interpretation with yet another modifier: defensive nationalism. Also wishing to emphasize that nationalism is not dangerous to other countries, Suisheng Zhao (2000; 2004) later asserted that pragmatic nationalism dominates in China today.

One could continue in this fashion, but we already have a running tally of six different adjectival descriptors of modern Chinese nationalism, which demonstrates Carlson's (2009) point that the study of Chinese nationalism has been dominated too much by the desire to classify the 'type' of nationalism to be found in China. More important, however, is what each of these descriptors is intended to do. First, nearly all are intended as descriptors of the nationalism of Chinese *policymakers* and not the Chinese public, and if they do describe popular opinion, they are only relevant if these nationalisms somehow affect makers of foreign policy. Second, they are meant as a counterweight to alarmist accounts of the rise of a belligerent Chinese nationalism that is prone to war. Both of these observations indicate an assumption in the literature that elite policymaking is the domain in which nationalism is worthy of study, and that the threat of aggressive Chinese foreign policy is the reason scholars should be concerned with nationalism in China.

This leads to a more general point, which is that much of the scholarly literature on Chinese nationalism has been written with an eye toward China's foreign policy. This literature is marked by a concern that China's foreign policymaking may be unstable and

prone to war, or at least that it may be potentially destabilized by nationalist pressures, both from the public and from elites. In his examination of policymaking elites, Alastair Iain Johnston (1998) has argued that China's foreign policymaking can be explained by "status inconsistency": the discrepancy between China's status and the status that its leaders' think it ought to have. In this line of reasoning, sentiments of national pride drive foreign policy in a very direct way: policymakers' nationalist frame of reference influences their behavior in situations of international conflict. As China's international status has risen sharply in the last decade, status inconsistency for policymakers may not be as relevant as it once was.

Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen (2001) note that nationalism is one of the most important ways public opinion is expressed in China (158). These authors identify different phases of nationalism among the Chinese intelligentsia (what they call the subelite level), moving from 'pragmatic' Dengist nationalism in the 1980s to neo-leftist nationalism in the post-Tiananmen era (159-60). However, Johnston's status inconsistency argument and Fewsmith and Rosen's claim about the importance of subelite nationalisms are each separate from the claim that *popular* nationalism influences foreign policy.

While Fewsmith and Rosen focus on the role of subelite nationalism, they also emphasize the dangers that popular nationalist fervor poses to future policymaking, concluding that "public opinion seems destined to play a more important—and more difficult—role in Chinese foreign policy in the future" (186). Writing about the protests in China after the May 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by the U.S., the authors declare that: "Nationalism in China is very much a double-edged

sword; if students and others had not been permitted to vent their feelings against the United States, they no doubt would have found release through criticism of the Chinese government" (182).

The basic observation that the CCP has painted itself into a nationalist corner is a common theme in the literature. As Vivienne Shue (2004) expresses this notion, "Chinese leaders can never afford to be outflanked by social forces that portray themselves as more ardently patriotic than the government. Yet the government's own intense official nationalism...often only serves to raise the ante where the passionate defense of national glory is concerned" (Shue 2004, 35). In other words, the propagation of nationalism as a strategy of state legitimation has a tendency to backfire in the form of anti-foreign protests that can turn against the state if it is viewed as conciliatory to foreign aggressors or imperialists. Some examples from Chinese history illustrate this possibility, such as the May Fourth Movement of 1919, which brought down the warlord government in Beijing in response to its appeasement of Japan's claims against Chinese sovereignty.

Perhaps this idea of nationalism as a 'double-edged sword' is best illustrated by Susan Shirk, in her noteworthy book, *China: Fragile Superpower* (2007). According to Shirk, "what the Chinese leaders fear most is a national movement that fuses various discontented groups—such as unemployed workers, farmers, and students—under the banner of nationalism" (62). Shirk regards nationalism as dangerous for political stability in two ways: as an instigator of protests that can turn against the state when officials tell protestors to desist, and also as possibly the only issue that can unite separate groups of people with diverse grievances against the state. Shirk also points out that CCP leaders

recognize the danger in nationalist protests, which frequently are—either initially or eventually—directed against a government that is perceived to be weak in the face of foreign aggression (67). At the same time, however, Shirk argues that the core message of the CCP's Central Propaganda Department continues nonetheless to be a message of uninterrupted nationalism (84).

Shirk pays particular attention to popular nationalism in the fourth chapter of the book, in which she shows that government and party officials pay attention to newer sources of public opinion like the television news program *Global Times,* news websites, and chat rooms (102). Although the 'blowback' from these sources comes overwhelmingly from the small minority of extreme nationalists, the party cannot afford to ignore it. This is because, as Shirk argues, China's leaders, unlike democratically elected leaders, are not concerned with the opinion of the average voter, but only with the opinions of the few who are willing to organize a protest and upset the political status quo. Thus, party leaders are particularly sensitive to the nationalist extremists in the public.

Furthermore, these public forces come into play most often in the arena of foreign relations, since domestic politics does not arouse Chinese nationalist passions to nearly the same level. Therefore Shirk's main concern is with nationalism's foreign policy implications: "The CCP's ability to control the information that reaches the public is declining at the same time as the country's military capabilities are improving. And these two trends combine dangerously to intensify the pressure to use force to defend China's honor" (104). The main thesis of Shirk's book is that China's domestic sources of instability—particularly nationalist protests—may drive China's insecure leaders to take

hostile stances, especially toward Taiwan, Japan, and the U.S., which may ultimately lead

to international conflict, and even war. If popular nationalism is as dangerous to the CCP

as Shirk (2007) argues, then it seems paradoxical that the party should continue to stoke

its fires through the media, as her findings indicate. However, if the party ceases to

embrace popular nationalism, its legitimacy among the public would erode. This tension

puts the Chinese state in a very difficult position.

Suisheng Zhao (2000; 2004) looks at many of the same events as Shirk and yet

comes to a different conclusion, arguing that the Chinese state is able to find a sort of

'middle way'. In his book, *A Nation-State by Construction* (2004), Zhao uses two case

studies to argue that the fear that popular nationalism will lead to antagonistic foreign

policy is unsubstantiated, and that foreign policymakers have made prudent decisions

even in the face of mass nationalist reprisals on the domestic front. Citing Beijing's

handling of the crisis caused by the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May

1999, as well as that of the 2002 midair collision of a Chinese fighter plane and an

American spy plane over the South China Sea, Zhao observes that Chinese leaders were

able to resolve these problems diplomatically even as anti-American nationalism surged

beneath them at the popular level. The author also highlights a territorial dispute with

Japan over the Diaoyu islands, wherein the government effectively discouraged anti-

Japanese popular rumblings in order to maintain harmonious economic ties with Japan

(see also Strecker Downs and Saunders 1999 for a similar conclusion concerning this

territorial dispute).

Noting Beijing's willingness to negotiate and restructure formal relations with

Taiwan, Zhao concludes that "despite nationalist rhetoric, Beijing's policy is not

particularly irrational or inflexible" (288). Following David Shambaugh (1996), Zhao characterizes the nationalism of Chinese policymakers as 'defensive nationalism' (Zhao, 289): while popular nationalism may be anti-foreign, official nationalism exhibited by state policy only seeks to preserve China's territorial integrity under the status quo. Thus Zhao concludes that fears that Chinese nationalism will produce more hostile foreign policy are unfounded. Rather, Zhao sees the prospect of the delegitimation of the state in times of economic hardship as the real pitfall of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Therefore, the difference between Zhao and Shirk is that Zhao doubts that the connection between anti-foreign popular nationalism and state legitimacy is strong enough to push the state to bend its foreign policy to the whims of extreme nationalists in the public.

Zhao's perspective on the content of Chinese national identity is useful. He discusses many different manifestations of nationalism in China, each of which is historically specific and often specific to certain groups or political actors. For instance, the defensive nationalism of foreign policy leaders contrasts with the often more aggressive nationalism of protestors. Zhao's book is structured on three main types of nationalism—liberal, ethnic, and state—each of which has dominated different eras of Chinese politics. Zhao's acknowledgement of the variety and dynamic nature of nationalism is useful for an understanding of the historical development of nationalism and national identity in China, as well as for understanding how the collective identity that undergirds nationalism is contested. However, Zhao's analysis remains at the collective national level, and he is more concerned with variation across history than with variation among individuals or segments of the population.

The most important of Zhao's types of nationalism—because it is dominant today—is a pragmatic brand of state nationalism, the aim of which is to develop the economy to match that of a modern industrialized nation-state.

> The most important feature of this pragmatism is the state's emphasis on the instrumentality of nationalism for rallying support in the name of building a modern Chinese nation-state. It is therefore not surprising that Chinese pragmatic nationalism is essentially contextual, without a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content" (Zhao 2004, 209).

Seeing the state and political elites as the driving force behind the construction of nationalism, Zhao here argues that pragmatic nationalism is intended to be flexible to serve the needs of state legitimation, and is in fact flexible enough to withstand popular nationalism's challenges. Zhao's 'state-led nationalism' (a characterization shared by Shirk) stands in contrast to the approach used by scholars such as Peter Hays Gries (2004a), who argues that popular Chinese nationalism has its own sources and is less state-driven than is commonly assumed.

Scholars who are primarily concerned with political legitimacy in China, as opposed to nationalism per se, put less emphasis on the necessity of nationalism for state legitimation. Vivienne Shue (2004) argues that the base of governmental legitimacy in China still rests on the same pillars as in the dynastic era: truth, benevolence, and glory (Shue, 30-31). Although the symbolic forms assumed by these have changed since the days of Imperial China, the basic substance remains the same. Instead of holding a monopoly on ethical and cosmological truth by controlling the Confucian examination system, the CCP now maintains and embodies scientific, pragmatic, and materialistic standards of truth: "the transcendently positive ethical value attached to the teleology of attaining modernity suffused the scientific empiricism accepted and promoted as the only

allowable epistemology by the Chinese state today" (Shue, 33). Second, the Communist Party's efforts to be seen as the instigator of charitable relief are meant to symbolize its benevolence. The third pillar of legitimacy is national glory, under which nationalism plays its part in legitimation.

Shue's formulation recognizes that nationalism is only a legitimizing force insofar as it focuses on regaining China's past glory. Both the national pride in China's recent economic miracle and in China's newfound international power and status are fundamentally about reacquiring and displaying the past glory of Chinese civilization. Emphasizing that the sources of legitimacy are many, Shue notes that "some observers have been tempted into believing...that patriotic sentiment has become the only popular value on which the contemporary state now bases its appeals for legitimacy" (Shue, 34). By contrast, Shue identifies several sources of legitimacy, of which nationalism is only one small part.

Rather than simply noting that nationalism can be a double-edged sword, Shue thus identifies a framework that more fully explains this frequent observation. Drawing on the work of James Scott (1985), she argues that whatever claims are made in order to provide governmental legitimacy consequently provide grounds for contestation of legitimacy (Shue, 28). Thus, if the state's legitimacy claims are based on the regaining of national glory, then this provides grounds for contestation: a counter-claim that the government is failing to bring national glory can be seen as a 'legitimate' questioning of this legitimacy. This framework provides a clear way of conceptualizing nationalism's dual roles in state legitimation and in inspiring protest. These dual roles have often been noted but rarely situated clearly in a theoretical framework. Seen in this light, the fact

that many protests against the government are nationalist protests can be interpreted, somewhat paradoxically, as evidence for the importance of nationalism and national identity in legitimating the state. After all, nationalist protests turn against the state for breaking its promise to stand up to Western countries and other perceived anti-China forces. Thus it appears that it the government's legitimacy is founded, at least in part, on this promise.

The Limits of Existing Scholarship

Having familiarized ourselves with the literature on Chinese nationalism, we can now discuss the problems inherent in the existing research. There are three main shortcomings of existing studies that need to be addressed. First, for better or worse, existing research seems pinned to a baseline of alarmism. That is to say, whether it is answered in the affirmative or the negative, the question most of the extant research strives to answer is whether Chinese nationalism is dangerous, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. This may not seem problematic, but I argue that there are several things wrong with this as *the* driving question of scholarship in this area. Second, the literature places a definite emphasis on elite discourse and neglects mass opinion. This is partially due to the fact that the literature is only very sparsely populated with quantitative studies, which has resulted in a body of research that tells us very little about variation in national sentiments and identities among individuals within the population. Third is its reliance on the concept of nationalism, a concept with varying and often unclear meanings. Along with Carlson (2009), I argue that a framework centered on the concept of national identity will be more productive. I will discuss each of these in turn.

The first is an issue of which questions get asked about Chinese nationalism. The above review of the literature clearly indicates that most research is aimed at the question: is Chinese nationalism threatening? Answers to this question range from alarmism to optimism, coming from scholars whom Gries calls 'dragon-slayers' and 'panda-huggers,' respectively (Gries 2004a, Introduction). My critique is not aimed specifically at the alarmists here, but simply at the question being asked in the first place.

The first thing that is wrong with an emphasis on this question is that it assumes that Chinese nationalism is dangerous while making no such assumptions about Western nationalisms that are equally supportive of the state. A focus on nationalism as a source of protest and instability serves to reify harmful stereotypes of Chinese nationalism, which is often portrayed in Western media as disruptive, aggressive, and even frightening. For instance, the idea that popular nationalism constrains the CCP to a more belligerent foreign policy belies an assumption that Chinese popular nationalism—unlike popular expressions of nationalism seen in the West—is dangerous for political stability. An emphasis on nationalism's destabilizing manifestations also seems to be at odds with established empirical findings that individuals who have more nationalistic attitudes are *more* supportive of the Chinese government (Chen 2004). It seems that outside of exceptional circumstances of 'crisis nationalism' like the 1999 embassy bombing in Belgrade, and for the vast majority of Chinese (as opposed to nationalist elites and extremists), attitudinal support for the government is an appropriate expression of national sentiment and national identity. This supportive relationship between nationalism and the state is overlooked by the arguments of Shirk (2007) and others who sound alarm bells. Zheng (1999), and Zhao (2004) have effectively argued against this

idea, but even these scholars seem to be studying Chinese nationalism precisely because of its potential impacts on foreign policy.

This focus on the foreign policy consequences of nationalism separates the study of Chinese nationalism from the broader study of nationalism. As in many areas of research, China's unique position as a quickly rising world power has led to a scholarly approach to Chinese nationalism that is woefully disconnected from comparative studies of nationalism. While there is a bountiful literature on nationalism as a cause of conflict and war, there is also research into the effect of nationalism and national identity on political behavior at the individual level. In the case of China, the latter type of research questions have not yet received the scholarly attention they are due. Moreover, because of the focus on nationalism's consequences, less attention has been paid to the understanding of the processes by which national identity and nationalism are cultivated, particularly at the individual level of analysis.

This brings us to the second weakness in the literature: it has been preoccupied with elite discourse at the expense of an understanding of the phenomenon at the individual level. The vast majority of the work that has looked at the formation of national identity has relied almost entirely on textual methods of analysis and/or particular historical events (Whiting 1983, 1995; Zhao 2000; Gao 2001; Liu 2001; Gries 2004a; Gries 2004b; Cheng and Gnok 2004; Hillman 2004; Wang 2005). Such studies are immensely valuable in the understanding of Chinese nationalism and national identity formation, but this methodological approach has several faults. First, it overemphasizes elite sources of nationalism at the cost of neglecting actual indicators of popular nationalism among the public. Studies that aim to understand popular nationalism and

national identity must study the populace and not the discourse of elites in media outlets.

Second, it reinforces stereotypes of Chinese politics as a completely top-down affair, with

the public playing a passive role of obedience and submission. Third, it overemphasizes

historical moments of piqued nationalism, such as the 1990 and 1996 disputes with Japan

over the Diaoyu Islands, the May 1999 U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in

Belgrade, and the 2002 collision of a Chinese fighter jet and a U.S. spy plane over

Chinese airspace. This narrow focus on moments of extreme nationalism overlooks the

'normal' times of everyday Chinese nationalism.

Fourth, textual and historical analysis does not capture variation among

individuals in their perceptions of and responses to such processes. While scholars have

succeeded in documenting the historical evolution of Chinese nationalism and the

'national identity' of China as a collective body, this has come at the expense of a better

understanding of national identity at the individual level. Indicative of this shortcoming

is a tendency to examine variation in China's national identity across time and to

overlook variation in what this identity means to different individuals. In examining

Chinese national identity as a collective attribute of the nation, this approach treats China

as a monolith rather than a population of people differentiated by class, gender, age,

ethnicity, and other attributes. By contrast, examining Chinese national identity at an

individual level can be effectively done through surveys and statistical methods.

However, quantitative analyses of Chinese national identity have been relatively scarce.[3]

This is partly due to the paucity of survey data available from China, an unfortunate

circumstance which has only recently begun to change.

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[3] For another notable exception to this trend, Tang and He (2010) have examined national versus ethnic identity in China using survey data.

Jie Chen (2004) found that citizens who score higher on measures of nationalist sentiment are more likely to display diffuse support for the political regime (108), an effect which remained significant after controlling for a variety of other factors (114).[4] Although the survey was drawn from Beijing only, there is little reason to believe this relationship is exclusive to that particular city. In this book Chen, like Shue (2004), is concerned mainly with state legitimacy rather than nationalism, and catalogues nationalist sentiment as only one element among many that produce political support for the state. Thus, while Chen's book provided much-needed empirical support for this frequently hypothesized relationship, an in-depth analysis of Chinese national identity and nationalist sentiment and their relationships with state support is still needed. Nationalism is represented by one variable in a much larger multivariate analysis, and since his research question is so broad, Chen can afford to devote just a few pages to a discussion of nationalism and national identity. However, pursuing Chen's basic hypothesis in new directions would be profitable. For instance: for what groups is nationalist sentiment a more important element of support for the Chinese state? How does this relationship operate outside of urban centers like Beijing, or in more ethnically diverse areas of China? Most importantly, how might this relationship vary depending on different meanings of Chinese identity among different individuals?

Finally, Carlson (2009, 24-5) argues that scholars have been overly focused on the question of what 'type' of nationalism exists in China, and that this has led to endless attempts to give a name to Chinese nationalism (as chronicled above on page 14). This in turn has created a confusing labyrinth of terminology, with many different 'types' of

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[4] In line with Chen's own expectations, nationalism did not have a comparable effect on his measure of specific support.

nationalisms, many of which often mean the same thing. Carlson recommends a move

away from nationalism and toward an analysis of national identity instead. While this

may seem like putting old wine into new wineskins, I believe that, with a clearly

articulated conceptual framework of group identity, such a shift from ideology towards

identity will prove worthwhile.

Researchers have analyzed the topic in terms of identity before, but scholarship

that has focused on the process of national identity-building in China often suffers from a

lack of clearly-specified analytical frameworks. Peter Hays Gries's (2004a) book

China's New Nationalism illustrates this point. The central thesis of this book is that

Chinese national identity has dynamically evolved to emphasize two things: the

narratives of China's past, and China's relations with foreign countries, especially

China's two most important rivals, Japan and the United States. The book has important

contributions to make: most notably, Gries's critical reflection on the scholarly debate in

China studies between alarmist 'dragon-slayers' and optimistic 'panda-huggers' is

particularly insightful, and his analysis of the importance of victim narratives as a driving

force behind popular Chinese nationalism is fruitful. However, Gries does not clearly

articulate a theoretical framework that guides his analysis. While he successfully

highlights the importance of the Chinese idea of saving face (*mianzi)*, the lack of clear

definitions for the concepts of nation and nationalism makes these contributions more

difficult to interpret.

While Gries offers a definition of national identity as "that aspect of *individuals'*

self-image that is tied to their nation together with the value and emotional significance

they attach to membership in the national community" (2004a, 9, emphasis added), he

does not investigate the self-images of any particular individuals, but rather conducts his analysis at the collective level through textual analysis. Gries's book also stops short of addressing the broader theoretical literatures on group identity and its formation.[5] Since the methods used are primarily historical and textual, insight into the national identity of everyday Chinese citizens is limited. While Gries does examine the *process* of nationalism's evolution, he does so at the societal level by examining historical events and texts produced by intellectual and political elites.

In summary, most academic research on Chinese nationalism has: 1) focused on its consequences (which are often portrayed as worrisome or even sinister) at the expense of understanding the prior process of national identity formation and state legitimation; 2) ignored the nationalism of everyday Chinese people and has instead examined nationalism at the elite level; and 3) languished within nationalism's conceptual jungle in the face of clearer alternative frameworks of national identity. Due to the late arrival of survey research to China, national identity and nationalist sentiment in China have only rarely been thoroughly investigated at the individual level, and such investigations of the relationship of nationalism to state support have not used national samples and have only touched on nationalism as one variable among many (e.g. Chen 2004).

This dissertation seeks to remedy these gaps in the literature. The first step in doing so is to outline a theoretical framework for the study of national identity in China. The next chapter aims to accomplish this task.

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[5] Gries's book is certainly not unique in this regard. Indeed, this points to a broader and frequently voiced complaint that the study of Chinese politics is too disconnected from comparative politics more generally.

CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE PROCESS OF STATE

LEGITIMATION

Our review of the literature suggests that the study of Chinese nationalism can be enriched by looking through new analytical frameworks.   Hearkening back to the work of Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (1993) on national identity, Allen Carlson (2009) argues for "replacing the predominant fascination with 'nationalism' with a broader survey of the construction of national identity in China" (Carlson, 27). This dissertation will take this call seriously by examining the process of Chinese national identity formation as well as its consequences in the realm of state legitimation. The first section of this chapter will define and articulate the key theoretical concepts of the dissertation. The second section will summarize two classic theories of nationalism in order to build a framework for qualitative variation in national identity in the third section. Having discussed the foundations of national identity, the fourth section adopts and builds upon David Easton's (1965) framework of political support in an effort to assess how national identity is related to regime legitimacy. The main argument of the dissertation, concerning how the state is legitimated through national identity, is recapped in the final section.

Central Concepts

This section will define our most important concepts: group identity, national identity, nation, and national sentiment.

Group Identity

As a theory of group identification that operates at the individual level, social identity theory (SIT) is a useful starting point for a discussion of national identity. At the

core of this theory is "the assertion that the simple designation of group boundaries leads to social identity", although the research focus since the articulation of SIT has been primarily on its utility in explaining ingroup bias (Huddy 2001, 133).[6]

The theory posits that an individual works to maintain a positive social identity by comparing her groups favorably to outgroups (Brown 2000). Thus, a person has two types of strategies to increase her positive social identity: to convince herself that to be a member of her group is better than to be a member of other comparable groups, or to join a different group. Since in many important cases the latter strategy is not possible (one's ascriptive group membership, such as ethnicity, is typically impossible to change), SIT focuses on ways that individuals pursue the first type of strategy. In this scheme membership in the group is a given, and the drive for a positive self-image leads group members to consider their group as better than outgroups.[7]

In discussing social identity theory, it must be noted that 'identity' as it is used here is shorthand for *group identity*, meaning an individual's identity as a member of a group of people. Simon and Klandermans (2001) are careful to make a similar distinction between collective (i.e. group) identities and social identities, arguing that for individuals, social identity comes in more forms than group membership, and other forms of identity are not necessarily asocial (320). From here, Simon and Klandermans go on to define collective identity as an "inclusive self-definition that is focused on a particular group membership" (2001, 321).

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[6] SIT was originally expounded by Henri Tajfel and John Turner (Tajfel 1969; Tajfel and Turner 1986).

[7] As Rupert Brown (2000, 747) notes, although there are problems with the measurement of self-esteem, there are few other convincing explanations for the ingroup bias consistently found in 'minimal group' experiments, where group membership is determined solely and transparently by random assignment (e.g. Rabbie and Horwitz 1969)

If we are to understand the process of the development of national identity, this concise definition of identity may be too simple. Starting from the same core definition of identity as self-categorization into a group, Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott (2006) elaborate a considerably more complex definition of identity as a concept which provides measurable variation both in the content (or meaning) of group identity and in the contestation of such content. For these authors, the content of a group identity comes in four different types, so contestation can take place over four different areas of content: *constitutive norms* of the group, which determine who counts as a group member; *social purposes*, or the goals shared by group members; *relational comparisons*, which are important in defining the group as opposed to outside groups; and *cognitive models*, which determine group members' understanding of the political world (Abdelal et al, 696). This nuanced picture of identity will prove more useful for this project, which seeks, among other things, to investigate the process of national identity formation through contestation.

National Identity

Having settled on a core definition of identity as a categorization of oneself into a group, and having recognized that the content of identity varies along and is contested in several dimensions, we can now define an individual's national identity as self-identification with a nation, although *what this means* to different individuals will vary in the four ways described above. Therefore, national identity varies not only in *which nation* one finds an identity, but more importantly in *what meaning* one attributes to that identity. That is, what the concepts of 'China' and 'Chinese' means will be different among different people who hold this identity. We can think of identity as, in the words

of one scholar, "a vessel whose content remains to be filled" (Gunn 2003, 391).[8] A

substantial part of this project is concerned with variation in the content of national

identity among individuals and its ramifications.

It should be noted that this definition of national identity differs in scope from

some other definitions. In their excellent introductory chapter to *China's Quest for*

National Identity, Dittmer and Kim (1993) define national identity as "the relationship

between nation and state that obtains when the people of that nation identify with the

state" (Dittmer and Kim, 13). This notion of national identity as a relationship between

nation and state points to a concept visible only at the collective level, literally a *nation's*

identity, rather than a person's identification to the collective of the nation.

In examining identity at the individual level, the definition used here necessarily

differs from that of scholars concerned with a nation's collective identity. A focus on

national identity at the individual level offers an even starker contrast when compared to

how nation-building is approached by theorists of international relations. For instance,

John Breuilly (1993) argues that the existence of the sovereign state is the sole reason for

the idea of the nation. For Breuilly, the nation exists only because of its effectiveness in

legitimating the power of the modern state. Other prominent scholars of international

relations, such as Alexander Wendt (1999), also approach national identity as a collective

phenomenon to be analyzed at the state, or even inter-state, level. This focus on the

state's central role in nation-building may be theoretically justified in addressing the

question of the ultimate origin of the idea of the nation. However, from the perspective

of the individual citizen, the sources of national identity formation extend beyond direct

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[8] Gunn here is writing about Islamic identity in central Asia after seventy years of religious repression
under the Soviets.

instruments of the state to include socialization through family, friends, and coworkers, religion, gender roles, and a variety of other variables. This "bottom-up" analysis of nation building differs widely from the "top-down" conception of nation-building that permeates the study of national identities in international relations scholarship.

Nation

With respect to the definition of a nation, Dittmer and Kim offer an insight that must not be ignored. "A nation is not merely a megacollectivity; it is a 'nation-state,' defined only partly by the dimensions of the group, partly also by the group's subordination to sovereign authority" (Dittmer and Kim, 6). In other words, the state is inescapably tied to the nation. Indeed, nationhood is inherently a *political* claim to self-governance. This observation draws an important distinction between national identity and ethnic identity. Although both of these identities are based in a belief in common ancestry or common culture, national identity carries a necessarily political dimension that ethnic identity lacks. Thus, in the tradition of Max Weber (1958), we can functionally define a nation as a group of people tied to the political objective of self-governance.

An important caveat to this definition remains. While nations can be distinguished from ethnic groups by their political status, this distinction in each particular case is most certainly a political question, and many such disputes still exist today and often cause violent conflict. China, where we have witnessed ethnic independence movements in Tibet, Xinjiang, and elsewhere, is no exception to this. As Ernest Renan noted in 1882, a nation is fundamentally determined by who identifies as part of it: "If doubts arise regarding [a nation's] frontiers, consult the populations in the

areas under dispute" (Renan, 54). This early endorsement of survey methods for

addressing questions of nationality rings true today, and national identity among

individuals within China's borders varies not only in what a Chinese national identity

means, but also in the nation in question. In other words, the national identity of some

individuals in China is not Chinese national identity, but Tibetan or Mongolian national

identity.

That being said, the particular identities on which this study focuses are *Chinese*

national identities. While China is most certainly a multiethnic state, the government's

project is to build a certain *Chinese* national identity which has its own content and seeks

to span interethnic divides (Zheng 1999). It is important at this point not to specify the

content or meaning of this national identity by calling it cultural, political, ethnic, or any

other qualifier, because the content of what it means to be Chinese will vary by individual

(Abdelal et al. 2006). One of the aims of this dissertation is to investigate the extent to

which ethnic identity and the broader national identity overlap among Han Chinese as

well as minority groups.

Many might criticize this conception of the nation as too closely tied to the state.

Walker Connor (1978) has argued that the nation as a kinship-based entity and the state

as a political entity must be held as conceptually distinct. While not denying that the idea

of the nation is etymologically and mythologically based on kinship ties rather than

political sovereignty, it should be emphasized that the state does play a critical role in the

development of the national identity with which we are concerned here.[9] The tools the

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[9] Concerning etymology, Walker (1978) points to the Latin root of the word 'nation', *nasci*, which means
to be born, and is also the root of words such as neonatal, native, and nativity. In the realm of political
language, only 'nationality' seems to have retained the original meaning, while 'nation' now usually refers
to a state and its territory and population regardless of its ethnic makeup, as in 'state of the nation' or

state has at its disposal for the formation of national identity include, but are not limited to, the state-run media and the educational system. At the individual level, then, national identity ostensibly leads to attachment to and support for the state. The important point here is that although over nine tenths of Chinese are Han in ethnicity, one's national identity as Chinese and the meaning of this identity are theoretically separate from one's ethnic background.

National sentiment or national attachment

The next concept to clarify is that of national sentiment. Dekker, Malova, and Hoogendoorn (2003) offer a useful framework for theorizing the relationship between national identity and national sentiment as distinct concepts that can be measured at the individual level. Putting both concepts under the umbrella of national attitude, these authors conceptualize national identity—what they term a national feeling of belonging— as a neutral form of national affect that serves as the baseline for nationalism. Once this national identity is established, five subsequent types of national attitudes can exist: *national liking, national pride, national preference, national superiority,* and finally, what these authors term *nationalism*, which is marked by a desire to keep the nation pure and by the perceived need for a national state, whether such a state exists or not (347). This list of national attitudes is sequential and cumulative: each attitude cannot exist without the existence of all the preceding attitudes. For example, an individual cannot have national pride without first having national liking, and one cannot display nationalism without displaying national superiority.

'national politics'. While some definitional sticklers bristle at the widespread misuse of the term 'nation' and the resulting confusion of blood ties with political ties, the fact that nation and state have become so conflated in everyday language points to the power nation-building efforts by states across the world.

Rather than adopt this theoretical framework in its entirety, we will borrow some of its basic insights. The first is that national sentiment, in contrast to national identity, is something that varies by degree. In other words, some individuals have stronger attachment to the nation than others. However, this framework does not imply that there are no qualitative differences between individuals as to how they picture the nation itself. Secondly, as Dekker et al. suggest, affect toward the nation can be either positive or negative (Dekker et al, 347).[10] Therefore one's national identity may lead to positive as well as negative affect toward the nation. This typology provides a useful definition of national sentiment and identifies particular manifestations of it that are readily measured through survey methods. Following these authors, we can define national sentiment, or national attachment, as affect toward the nation—whether positive or negative. This definition keeps national sentiment analytically separate from support for the state or its leaders, but in line with previous research, we can expect that empirically these will be correlated.[11]

A great deal of survey research has relied on the concept of national sentiment, since it is readily and easily measurable through a survey instrument. However, this approach often overlooks the underlying importance of national identity and the many ways it can vary in meaning. While it is entirely appropriate to use survey measures to capture national sentiment, variation among individuals in these attitudes are most likely manifestations of deeper and more fundamental variations in the meaning of national identity to these individuals. Dekker et al. (2003) should be applauded for integrating the

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[10] Dekker et al.'s corresponding negative forms of national affect are national alienation, national shame, national disgust, and national hate (347).

[11] This dissertation will use the term national attachment more frequently than national sentiment, as the word 'attachment' reminds us that there is a conceptual target—the nation—for this sentiment.

concept of national identity into their framework. However, recognizing the potential for qualitative variance in the meaning of national identity, we cannot follow these authors in stipulating that national identity is merely an either/or question that allows for national sentiment to take root. Rather, different forms that national identity takes—different conceptions of the nation—should manifest in different sentiments toward the nation.

A second point at which we must part ways with these authors is their use of the term *nationalism*. Rather than use this word to represent an attitude toward the nation, this term will be reserved for the ideology which sees the nation as the natural and proper political unit into which people should be grouped, and which drove the spread of nations around the globe.[12] We now turn our attention toward two such theories of nationalism

Gellner's and Smith's Theories of Nationalism

Although we wish to move away from the language of nationalism and start afresh with a new framework of national identity, it would surely be foolhardy to abandon the contributions of the classic works on nationalism. The following section summarizes and draws insight from two of the most important theorists of nationalism.

Central to the works of both Anthony D. Smith (1983) and Ernest Gellner (1983) is the claim that the idea of the nation itself is primarily a product of nationalism. Gellner is particularly adamant regarding this point, asserting that "it is nationalism which engenders nations, not the other way round" (Gellner 1983, 55). Similarly, Smith treats nationalism as an ideology that necessarily gives rise to the idea of the nation, rather than an attitude or sentiment directed toward an already existing nation. He delineates seven logical propositions that comprise the "core nationalist doctrine" (Smith 1983, 20-1), a

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[12] In later chapters, and in the context of individual-level analysis, I use the term *nationalism* interchangeably with national sentiment and national attachment. It is sensible (and less wordy) to call someone nationalistic if they have a high level of national sentiment.

doctrine which Gellner succinctly reflects in his definition of nationalism as "a political principle which holds that the [sovereign] political and the national unit should be congruent" (Gellner 1983, 1). Similarly, nationalism's seven propositions according to Smith are as follows:

1. Humanity is naturally divided into nations
2. Each nation has its peculiar character
3. The source of all political power is the nation, the whole collectivity
4. For freedom and self-realization, men must identify with a nation
5. Nations can only be fulfilled in their own states
6. Loyalty to the nation-state overrides other loyalties
7. The primary condition of global freedom and harmony is the strengthening of the nation-state (Smith 1983, 21).

This basic formulation, held in common by these authors, sets them both apart from those who see nations as natural and nationalism as an emotional attachment to the nation.[13] For both Smith and Gellner, nationalism is the ideological spark that drives people to form nations.

Though this basic formulation is clear, what then explains the rise of nationalism (and thus the proliferation of nations)? On this point both Smith and Gellner point primarily to industrialization and its economic, social, and psychological ramifications, known collectively as modernization. For Gellner, the key transition is from an agrarian to an industrial society. Whereas agrarian society operates with clearly and rigidly differentiated social strata, life in industrial society requires mass literacy and the economic mobility of individuals within the population. In this way the industrialization of a society leads to its 'nationalization'. Gellner elucidates this fundamental change:

> There is very little in the way of any effective, binding organization at any level between the individual and the total community. This total and ultimate political community thereby acquired a wholly new and very considerable importance, being

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[13] One example of this conception of nationality is that of Joseph Stalin, who took great pains to draw a distinction between mere peoples and actual nations.

linked (as it seldom was in the past) both to the state and to the cultural boundary. The *nation* is now supremely important, thanks both to the erosion of sub-groupings and the vastly increased importance of a shared, literary-dependent culture (Gellner 1983, 63).

For Gellner, the unifying of political boundaries with cultural boundaries (something that we tend to take for granted today), is what gives the nation its psychological power, as the cultural and political dimensions of life are suddenly unified under nationalism's banner.

Smith tells a similar story, although in contrast to Gellner's emphasis on uniform literacy and education in a national language, Smith's theory emphasizes the roles of science and the intelligentsia. "Key to my analysis is the concept of the '*scientific state'*...[which is] a polity which seeks to homogenize the population within its boundaries for administrative purposes by utilizing the latest scientific techniques and methods for the sake of 'efficiency'" (Smith 1983, 231). When the intelligentsia[14] is faced with a choice between loyalty to the technologically advanced, scientific state and to the traditional order, the scientific state eventually proves irresistible. Scientific and technological progress is the chief reason for the spread of the sovereign interventionist state from Western Europe across the globe: it is the reason elites turn toward the sovereign state model. As Smith puts it, "the rulers' justification for intervention on this scale [of the scientific state] is the promise of man-made salvation" (236). Combining this with nationalism's nostalgic reverence of a mythical national golden age results in nationalism performing what Smith calls "dual legitimation" (Smith 1983, 236). Both Gellner and Smith frequently note this point and its irony: while nationalism is brought

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[14] For Smith, the intelligentsia includes all those who have been exposed to higher education, whether scholarly, clerical, or professional (Smith, 237).

about by profound and revolutionary changes to the social order, it hearkens back to a past that is to be somehow restored by bringing glory to the nation.

The major contention that divides Smith and Gellner is the criteria that define a nation. Gellner does not draw absolute definitional lines, pointing to the historical contingency of such an idea as the nation (Gellner 1983, 6), but he does place a heavy emphasis on culture, and particularly on a common language. As Gellner argues, "when general social conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify" (55). Smith argues that Gellner incorrectly equates culture with language: "it would be misleading to consider [linguistic homogeneity] either a sufficient or a necessary mark of the ethnic nation" (185). Moving away from language and other particular criteria, Smith's own definition of the nation is useful: "a large, vertically integrated and territorially mobile group featuring common citizenship rights and collective sentiment together with one (or more) common characteristic(s) which differentiate its members from those of similar groups with whom they stand in relations of alliance or conflict" (Smith 1983, 175).

Having outlined these two theories of nationalism, what relevance do they have for this project? First, both authors' view of nationalism as the driving force behind the creation of nations (rather than simply an attitude toward one's nation), and particularly Gellner's stress on the role of the educational system in engendering identification with the nation, served as a theoretical inspiration for this dissertation. Most important is a fundamental point about nationalism that we have yet to fully elucidate. In his

introductory chapter, Gellner argues that "nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and , in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state...should not separate the power-holders from the rest" (Gellner 1983, 1). Similarly, as mentioned above, Smith argues that nationalism provides a dual legitimation for nationalist rulers. Clearly, for both authors, one of nationalism's most important functions—likely its central function, in fact—is to provide legitimacy to rulers. As this basic relationship is of primary interest to this project, both Smith and Gellner provide a solid theoretical foundation for formulating hypotheses about this relationship. We will return to this theme of legitimation later in this chapter.

National Identity's Components

While the insights from both these authors are extremely valuable, neither book discusses in detail the relation of the nation to personal identity, and rarely does either book contain the language of 'identity' when speaking of nations or nationalism. This is largely because scholarly interest in the concept of identity did not spike until after the writing of these books. In fact, Smith later published a book entitled *National Identity* (1991), in which he presents a similar theory in terms of national identity.

For Smith, national identity is but one of many identities an individual carries: "human beings have multiple collective identifications, whose scope and intensity will vary with time and place" (Smith 1991, 175). He claims that national identity inspires stronger and more durable loyalty than other collective identities, and this book is an attempt to show why this is so. Instead of asking why the nation, or nationalism, has risen to prominence, here Smith aims to explain why national *identities* have become and

remain so powerful as to inspire loyalty. His main explanations here are the psychological need for some sense of immortality (which a national identity provides), the ability of states to construct intelligible and inspirational ethno-histories, and the internationally held expectation for a state to legitimate itself as the representative of a nation (and the resulting drive for the state to homogenize their populations) (Smith 1991, 176).[15]

Smith's major argument in this book is that nations have grown out of ethnic cores, but these ethnic cores (*ethnies)* develop in one of two different ways: laterally and vertically (Smith 1991, 52). In Western Europe, the first place that nations—as Smith defines them (see below)—arrived, the lateral route to nationhood was taken. A lateral *ethnie* is developed from the upper class and gradually grows to include the middle and lower classes, by a process of bureaucratic incorporation led by the state.

The other route to nationhood is typically taken by populations who were subjects of foreign rule (62). As Smith writes, "the vertical type of *ethnie* was more compact and popular.... a distinctive historical culture helped to unite different classes around a common heritage and traditions, especially when the latter were under threat from outside" (53). Vertical *ethnies* thus developed into nations by a different—yet still elite-led—process: that of vernacular mobilization, in which an ethnic intelligentsia "mobilize a formerly passive community into forming a nation around the new vernacular historical culture that it has rediscovered" (64).

Smith does not intend for this to be a strict dichotomy, but rather two ideal-types between which national identities can vary. Both of these ideal-types fit within the

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[15] This last explanation is more fully elaborated in the English school of international relations (see Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society*) as well as constructivist approaches to IR (see Alexander Wendt's *Social Theory of International Politics*).

broader definition of the nation that Smith uses, but they emphasize different components of nationhood. Thus these two types of ethnic cores produce two different routes to nationhood as well as different ideas of the nation and national identity. For our purposes, Chinese national identity seems to contain elements of both of these routes to nationhood. Both bureaucratic incorporation (of rural peasants by literate imperial administrators loyal to a ruling house) and, later, vernacular mobilization (against Western oppression) are seen in China's history.

Arguing that all nationalisms—from the most ethnic to the most civic/territorial—have certain things in common, in this book Smith adopts the following, more fully specified definition of the nation: "a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members" (Smith 1991, 14). From this definition of the nation comes the corollary that national identity—at the individual level, an identification as a member of the nation—"is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single element" (14). These elements, for Smith, are as follows:

1. an historic territory, or homeland
2. common myths and historical memories
3. a common, mass public culture
4. common legal rights and duties for all members
5. a common economy with territorial mobility for all members (Smith 1991, 14).

Each element of the nation (territory, myths and memories, culture, economy, and rights and duties) thus translates as one component of national identity.

Qualitative Variation in National Identity

Smith's approach to national identity provides an interesting contrast to Abdelal et al.'s (2006) approach to the study of identity, which sees group identities (including national identity) as composed of four components: constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models (Abdelal et al. 2006). Instead of starting with identity and bringing in the nation, Smith begins with the nation and its components, and then discusses national identity in terms of psychological attachment to those components. His components of national identity, instead of corresponding with the elements of social identity, rather correspond with the elements of the nation.

What relevance, does this contrast have? In providing another way to conceptualize the components of national identity, Smith seems to have presented an alternate theory of how this identity should affect political behavior and attitudes, particularly the link between nationalism and legitimacy. So which matters more in a given individual's conception of national identity: how they see the nation, or how they formulate their identification with it?

However, it may be more accurate to say that Smith's (1991) approach to national identity is simply a different way to discuss the same variation that Abdelal et al. (2006) discuss? The two conceptions are clearly different, but an example can show how they might relate. Territory and culture, two of Smith's components, can be seen as constitutive norms for a national identity, determining who is 'in' and who is 'out'. At the same time, culture (along with economy) might also be seen as a social purpose for the nation, while the myths and memories of a nation can provide cognitive models of the world and of history.

These examples indicate that Smith's and Abdelal et al.'s frameworks for the analysis of national identity, though quite different, are not incompatible. We might even say that Smith's five elements of national identity provide the 'national' substance to fill in the framework of identity provided by Abdelal et al. Each of the five elements can play a role in determining the constitutive norms, the social purposes, the relational comparisons, and the cognitive models of Chinese national identity. However, the relative importance of each national element and each element of identity can vary among individuals.

With Smith's (1991) conception of nation putting the meat on the bones of Abdelal et al.'s (2006) conception of identity, we arrive at a framework for analyzing variance in the content of national identity for different individuals. As indicated above, the constitutive norms that determine who 'counts' as part of the nation may depend on territorial residence, or on cultural criteria, or, perhaps less likely, on inclusion in the national economy or legal system. Second, the social purposes of China as a nation may be seen by individuals as developing the national economy, or as righting the wrongs of the 'century of humiliation' in Chinese historical memory, or as preserving China's historical territory or its culture. Third, relational comparisons as against other nations, can take place on any of these dimensions: cultural, territorial, economic, historical, or legal.

Fourth, cognitive models of the social world, which perhaps represent the most complex component of identity, are structured by national myths and historical memories, and thus have their closest ties with this particular element of the nation. At the same time, the idea of the nation itself provides a powerful cognitive model of the

political world, which is nearly universally held today. A glance at any classroom world map shows that countries (or nations) are widely held to be the building blocks of the world. One way in which individuals' cognitive models may vary is in whom these nations are composed of (constitutive norms), what they are trying to achieve (social purposes), and in how they compare to each other (relational comparisons). In this sense the cognitive model overarches the other components of group identity, and thus cannot be inserted into our framework all that neatly.

An additional element of the nation that is not on Smith's list is the idea of ethnicity. As Smith specifies, this is because not all nations are ethnic or descent-based—recall that some nations deemphasize ethnic criteria and stress more strongly civic, legal, and territorial criteria. It is an open question, however, to what degree individuals see China as an 'ethnic' nation. So, we can add a descent-based ethnic element to our conception of national identity and measure variation here as well. Thus, some constitutive norms and relational comparisons may be descent-based. Relational comparisons may be made on this basis as well, and cognitive models may also be structured by ethnic ideas of the nation, as opposed to territorial or legal ones.

Legitimacy: The Goal of the Nation-Building Project

Having laid out a framework for analyzing variation in national identity at the individual level, we turn to the question of national identity's effect on state support, and more specifically, on the belief in the legitimacy of the political regime. Although its basic definition is relatively uncontroversial, regime legitimacy is a broad concept and has provided the theoretical basis for a variety of survey measures. Seymour Martin Lipset's definition provides a good starting place: the public's belief that the political

institutions currently in place are the appropriate ones to govern that particular society (Lipset 1981, 64). Other definitions of legitimacy do not stray far from this relatively simple one. Here we will examine a few interpretations of legitimacy that are relevant to this dissertation, with a special emphasis on David Easton's (1965) discussion of legitimacy and regime support.

The Importance of Legitimacy

First, however, the relevance of legitimacy, particularly to the Chinese context, should be assessed. According to Seymour Martin Lipset (1981, first published 1960), crises of legitimacy—points in time when legitimacy drops dangerously low—"are primarily a recent historical phenomena" (64) that have occurred "during the transition to a new social structure" (65), and are accompanied by political instability at the least, and revolution at the most. Only when groups consider the existing regime illegitimate will there be action taken to change it. In other words, a crisis of legitimacy is the most typical cause of political revolution and internal regime change.

Whether post-reform China has recently experienced a crisis of legitimacy is a topic of much scholarly discussion. What is not in doubt, however, is the fact that problems of legitimacy have caused China a certain degree of political instability. The May 1989 protests, the brief but frequent rise of separatist groups in Xinjiang and Tibet, and even the ongoing 'Taiwan question' all demonstrate that legitimacy can be insufficient at certain times and places in the PRC. The cases of Xinjiang, Tibet, and especially Taiwan also point to a second type of legitimacy. While we are mainly concerned with legitimacy in the hearts and minds of individual Chinese, or what we might call *internal* legitimacy, international legitimacy, or *external* legitimacy, is also

critically important. Moreover, the interaction between the two is critically important. In the Tibetan case, a certain degree of international legitimacy for the Dalai Lama as the rightful political ruler of Tibet—even if this does not amount to official diplomatic recognition—has led to international misgivings about PRC rule in Tibet and also to the bolstering of recognition of the Dalai Lama *within* Tibet. The PRC's past relations with the Republic of China (Taiwan) also display China's difficulties with international legitimacy. Not until international derecognition of the Republic of China in the 1970s was the PRC, rather than the ROC, seen by the West as the legitimate government of China. Even now recognition is vague: for instance, U.S. policy does not assert that the PRC is the legitimate government of Taiwan, but neither does it make this claim about the ROC.

Whether speaking of the internal or external variety, the most striking property of legitimacy is that it is fundamentally a matter of perception, in that the public's (or the international community's) perception of regime legitimacy functionally equates to regime legitimacy itself. While this may be unacceptable to political philosophers, for whom the question of what makes one obligated to obey the state (in other words, what make makes a state legitimate) is foundational, for empirically concerned political scientists what matters is not state legitimacy in this strict sense, but simply the *belief in* legitimacy, regardless of whether this belief is justified. Therefore, the empirical measurement of political legitimacy is a question of whether the public believes the existing state is the rightful governing state. To return to Lipset's definition on this point, he writes: "Legitimacy involves the capacity of the system *to engender and maintain the belief that* the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society"

(Lipset 1981, 64, emphasis added). Lipset goes on to say that "groups regard a political system as legitimate or illegitimate according to the way in which its values fit with theirs" (64). In this classic definition, it is clear that the *inherent* legitimacy of the state is important only insofar as it affects the ability of the state to sustain a *belief* in its legitimacy.

While there are a variety of ways to go about measuring a concept like legitimacy, its theoretical importance should be noted. For Lipset, the importance of legitimacy is contingent on the *effectiveness* of governance: No system can tolerate a lack of both legitimacy and effectiveness (Lipset 1981, 64). In the short-term, effectiveness is more important to political stability, but most governments need legitimacy to survive. While Easton points out a few exceptions to this, he would concur that most political systems survive largely on popular beliefs in the government's legitimacy. Regardless of whether legitimacy is an absolutely necessary element of a stable political system, it is undeniable that a political system is much more fragile without a widespread belief in the appropriateness of the existing regime or government.

Easton's Diffuse Support and Legitimacy

However, this broad definition (originally set forth by Lipset in 1960) is unclear in what exactly is meant by 'existing political institutions' and by 'the society'. David Easton (1965) provides a more specified and comprehensive framework, wherein legitimacy has two levels of political objects or targets: existing political authorities, and the political regime (Easton 1965, 287). According to this scheme, each of these components is deemed by individuals to be legitimate or otherwise. This distinction is critically important in the event of a legitimacy crisis. If only the authorities are seen as

illegitimate, they can be replaced without changing the regime (the values, norms, and structures of authority). However, if the regime itself is seen as illegitimate, structural change is necessary in order to regain governmental legitimacy. In addition to applying to these different political objects, legitimacy can come from three sources: "from underlying ideological principles, from attachment to the structure and norms of the regime as such, or from devotion to the actual authorities themselves because of their personal qualities" (287). Belief in the regime's legitimacy can lead to belief in the legitimacy of the incumbent authorities, and vice versa, a phenomenon which Easton calls 'overflow' (Easton 1965, 287, Table 3). We will return to this important concept of overflow later.

Easton keeps legitimacy separate from the broader concept of political support, which is more important in his framework. As Easton notes, this support may be exhibited through attitudes or through behavior (what he calls covert and overt support, respectively, 159). For Easton, the more important distinction is between specific support and diffuse support. He makes this distinction quite clear:

> specific support flows from the favorable attitudes and predisposition stimulated by outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or in anticipation. The specific rewards help to compensate for any dissatisfactions at failing to have all demands met. But simultaneously, members are capable of directing *diffuse* support toward the objects of a system. This forms a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effect of which they see as damaging to their wants (Easton 1965, 273).

Here diffuse support functions as a safety net of political support should specific support fail (much like the relationship between Lipset's concepts of legitimacy and effectiveness). Specific support alone is insufficient to keep a regime stable (Easton 1965, 269). Diffuse support is more constant and more reliable: "since [diffuse support]

is an attachment to a political object for its own sake, it constitutes a store of political good will. As such, it taps deep political sentiments and is not easily depleted through disappointment with outputs" (274). Both diffuse and specific support, it should be noted, can be aimed at three possible political objects: the political community, the regime, and the authorities.

The belief in legitimacy for Easton is a narrower concept than diffuse support, as it is but one way to supply diffuse support for the regime or the political community. Easton's own definition of the legitimacy of the regime and the authorities, respectively, is "the conviction on the part of the member [of the political system] that it is right and proper for him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the regime" (278). Thus, a belief in legitimacy, although the most effective device, is but one device by which a regime can garner diffuse support.

The Overflow of Diffuse Support

The regime and the authorities can both hold legitimacy in the people's eyes, but due to Easton's narrow definition of legitimacy, he does not see the political community as a political object subject to questions of legitimacy. Easton's idea of the political community corresponds to what Lipset, in his (above) definition of legitimacy, simply calls the 'society'. Easton defines the political community as "that aspect of a political system that consists of its members seen as a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor" (177). As noted above, in Easton's framework the political community is one of the three political objects toward which diffuse support can be directed.[16] However, Easton excludes the political community as an object of legitimacy

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[16] Indeed, Easton devotes an entire chapter to this topic (Chapter 21: Diffuse Support for the Political Community).

(Easton 1965, 286-7, see Table 3). While one might easily say that a given political community and its boundaries can be considered legitimate or illegitimate in common usage, this usage is ruled out by Easton's narrow definition of the belief in legitimacy as the belief that it is right to accept *and obey* the authorities and the regime (278). Since Easton sees legitimacy as a matter of obedience, it follows that he leaves out the possibility of a legitimate political community, which would imply that a political community must be obeyed or abided by. Since, absent a regime, a political community in itself has no inherent authorities to obey and no inherent requirements by which to abide, to speak of the legitimacy of the political community would amount to nonsense.

Instead Easton discusses diffuse support for the political community, and in doing so he emphasizes the importance of the sense of political community created by the system and its division of political labor. "The degree of conflict, cleavage, and output failure compatible with the persistence of a political community is in part a function of the extent to which the system is able to generate in its members a strong sense of mutual political identification" (Easton, 326). Although Easton does not discuss national identity, his reference to mutual political identification gets at the same idea. In an Eastonian framework, national identity can be considered as a means of supplying diffuse support to the political community. In other words, because of the political dimension of the idea of the nation, identification with the nation of China and the Chinese national group provides support to the idea of China as the appropriate political community.

If this is so, then one of the main questions of this dissertation can be put into Eastonian language: how does diffuse support for China as the political community translate into diffuse support for the existing regime and its leaders? In everyday

language, we can ask: how does identification with the nation of China translate into political support for the current Chinese political regime? Easton would term such a phenomenon 'overflow', since support for one object (the political community) overflows into support for a related object (the political regime).[17] Easton's framework, as well as his concept of overflow, has provided us with a way to think about a relationship between identification with the nation and regime legitimacy. However, by what mechanisms might this relationship operate?

Identity and Legitimacy

Easton considers three sources of legitimacy: ideologies, regime structure, and personal charisma (1965, Chapter 19). Easton puts a great emphasis on ideology: he attributes a political community's 'sense of community' to communal ideology, just as he attributes regime legitimacy in part to a legitimating ideology. Regime structure can legitimate a regime as well: the ideas of representation and accountability are the usual mechanisms for this, as seen in the structures of most democracies and the 'official' structures of many nondemocratic regimes. Personal charisma can also work in either of these types of systems, and usually serves to legitimate specific authorities (persons), but can overflow into regime legitimacy, especially under the rule of an enormously popular and charismatic leader.[18]

Easton's framework for thinking about legitimacy has been useful thus far, but at this point we need to introduce the more contemporary idea of social identity. It is unclear where a concept like social identity might fit into Easton's picture, as his focus on

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[17] Easton discusses the tendency for mutual overflow between regime legitimacy and the legitimacy of the authorities, but does not use this term himself in discussing diffuse support for the political community.

[18] Perhaps the quintessential example of this comes from Chinese history in the popularity and power of Mao Zedong.

legitimating mechanisms seems to leave out this idea. More recent work in social psychology and other social sciences suggests that group identities are more foundational than ideology or belief systems. Perhaps the process of regime legitimation is not primarily ideological but social-psychological. The conclusion of this chapter will outline this process in more detail.

Easton's influence in the literature

Easton's theoretical structure has been adopted by China scholars in the past. The most relevant instance for our purposes is Jie Chen's (2004) study of political support in China. Chen uses an Eastonian framework of analysis by dividing political support into two dimensions: diffuse support and specific support. Chen applies Easton's original framework as follows: support for the regime — "the values, habits, and institutions of the government" (Chen 2004, 3) — is regarded as diffuse support, while specific support consists of positive evaluations of particular policies of the government. In the case of China, Chen identifies diffuse support for the regime as "Chinese citizens' supportive attitudes toward the fundamental values that the current, post-Mao regime advocates, and the basic political institutions through which the regime rules the country" (Chen 2004, 4). Recall that in Easton's original work, both diffuse and specific support can be given to all three political objects. An individual can offer diffuse support not only to a regime, but also to a particular authority, or even to the political community in general. Chen's adaptation of an Eastonian framework is straightforward and parsimonious, and works well for the tasks he undertakes. One unfortunate consequence of his application of Easton's framework, however, is that Chen's analysis seems to ignore diffuse support directed towards authorities and toward the political community.

In terms of survey questions, attitudinal support for political leaders or the political regime can be measured in a variety of ways. For instance, some authors incorporate trust in government into the idea of political support (e.g. Miller 1993), while others argue for a theoretical distinction between these two concepts (see for instance Muller and Jukam 1977). To measure diffuse support, Chen uses a six-item index that is designed to accord with Muller and Jukam's (1977) threefold operationalization of Easton's conception of regime legitimacy. The three parts of Muller and Jukam's (1977, 1566) operationalization include affect regarding three things: 1) "how well political institutions conform to a person's sense of what is right"; 2) "how well the system of government upholds basic political values in which a person believes"; and 3) "how well the authorities conform to a person's sense of what is right and proper behavior". Examining this threefold operationalization, two things are immediately apparent. First, the third part seems to measure support for the authorities rather than for the regime. Second, and more important, it quickly becomes apparent that there are many different possible measures of this seemingly simple concept. To further illustrate the variety of possible measures, Chen's index includes (but is not limited to) such items as: "I am proud to live under the current political system", "I feel that the basic rights of citizens are protected", and "I feel that my personal values are the same as those advocated by the government". In terms of question wording, there are a multitude of possibilities, some more valid measures than others.

Some scholars have found it more useful to discuss the reverse of politically supportive attitudes: political alienation. Arthur H. Miller (1993) takes a broad view of this concept when studying political legitimacy in the former Soviet republics. He

attempts to study political support for leaders as well as the regime. In addition to incorporating trust in Soviet leaders into his index of political alienation, Miller includes affective ratings of specific institutions, including the Soviet military, the CPSU, and the Supreme Soviet. The index also contains items that ask respondents if a multiple parties would be good for the system, and even an item in which the respondent selects whether an orderly society or freedom to demonstrate is more important (Miller 1993, 100-101, Table 5.1). With such a variety of measures in this index, it is clear that Miller takes a broad view of political alienation along with a similarly broad view of political support.

For the case of China, the relevance of Miller's (1993) study of legitimacy in the former USSR is shown by his findings about the consequences of political alienation. Miller's results showed that politically alienated citizens were more likely than politically supportive citizens to engage in most types of political behavior, including joining a party, signing a petition, and most significantly, to participate in a political rally (117, Table 5.6). Given the recent rise in the number of protests in China (see Shirk 2007), it is apparent that political support and its counterpart political alienation are worthy objects of study. Alienation is most likely an engine of these protests, as it was in the USSR in the late 1980s. Like Miller (1993), Chen's (2004), work with survey data from Beijing also finds that political support has behavioral consequences. Specifically, diffuse support leads to a higher likelihood of participating in local People's Congress elections (Chen 2004, 177).

Conclusion: From National Identity to Regime Legitimacy

It is often argued that national sentiment in China is a state-supported and even state-induced phenomenon. For the state, the purpose of strong national sentiment is

ultimately to bolster the legitimacy of the authorities and the regime. Chen (2004) found

that levels of nationalist sentiment had a strong link to diffuse support for the Chinese

political regime, but failed to produce higher levels of specific support for the Chinese

authorities. Chen's methods and analysis were certainly sound, but this finding supplies

only a basic picture of this relationship. It makes sense to expect national sentiment to

lead to support for the Chinese state, so Chen's results come as no surprise. However,

how and why does this relationship work? Theoretically, what is it that provides this

link?

Table 2.1. Key Theoretical Concepts

Concept	*Definition*
National Identity	An individual's recognition of membership in a nation, the meaning of which is determined by the four components below
Constitutive Norms	Perceptions of rules determining who counts as a group member
Social Purposes	The perceived goals of the social group
Relational Comparisons	Outside reference groups with which the group is contrasted and compared
Cognitive Models	Conception of the world that is structured by the group identity
National Attachment (i.e. National Sentiment, or Nationalism)	An individual's degree of psychological and emotional attachment to the nation (i.e., the political community).
State Support (i.e. Regime Support)	Favorable dispositions toward the existing political regime, which, taken in the aggregate, give popular legitimacy to the state

The argument presented here is that the mechanism structuring this relationship is not just national sentiment but national identity. That is to say, an individual's manifestations of national sentiment are determined by his or her concept of national identity, which, following Abdelal et al. (2006), is comprised of a combination of constitutive norms, social purposes, relational comparisons, and cognitive models. Since this chapter has covered a good deal of theoretical ground, Table 2.1 provides definitions for the key concepts discussed above.

At the most basic level, we can hypothesize that as long as national identity provides diffuse support for the political community (which may be measured in terms of national attachment), it will also have an overflow effect on support for the regime and the authorities themselves. Here Easton's overflow effect provides a rough theoretical mechanism between national sentiment and regime support. To put it into blunt language, a stronger sense of national identity will lead one to believe in the legitimacy of the regime, simply because the regime is *the* national regime. In the case of China, certain forms of Chinese national identity should—in addition to giving rise to national sentiment—give rise to the belief that the Chinese state is legitimate because it is legitimately Chinese.

In this form the hypothesis appears simplistic, but elaborating the components of national identity (Abdelal et al. 2006) will allow us more nuanced hypotheses along this line of thought. First, constitutive norms of Chinese national identity, or a person's idea of who and what *counts* as Chinese—in other words, who and what comprises 'China', should be determined somewhat by socioeconomic and demographic factors, and should have an effect on both national sentiment and regime support. The same can be said

about variance across individuals in the social purposes of Chinese national identity, or what one believes are the national goals. Likewise, for differences in relational comparisons—for instance, whether one conceives of China in relation to the West, or China in relation to Japan, or China in relation to Tibet—we can say the same thing.[19] Similarly, insofar as one's national identity is composed of a cognitive model of the political world, it should also have a deep influence on national sentiment and belief in regime legitimacy.

The idea of a cognitive model is a more complicated concept, and can vary in many ways. However, this concept corresponds with Easton's conception of ideology as a belief system. Insofar as cognitive models serve to bolster the legitimacy of the existing regime, they play the role of legitimating ideology that Easton discusses. In their role in the process of legitimation, then, cognitive models have been studied extensively by theorists of nationalism. For example, one can think of Anthony D. Smith's idea of dual legitimation as a type of cognitive model that is commonly associated with a national identity. However, while previous theorists (Easton 1965; Smith 1983; Gellner 1983) treated the legitimation of the state as an ideological enterprise, this dissertation argues that ideological legitimation is secondary to considerations of identity. In other words, legitimating belief systems (cognitive models) must be built into a group identity that has real and personal meaning to its holders.

The remainder of the dissertation is structured around the process of state legitimation through national identity construction. The two chief means of state-led national identity construction analyzed in the remaining chapters are the education

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[19] Relational comparisons seem to be more transient than the other elements, as they can be easily produced by simple changes of context or frame. For instance, a question that primes respondents to think about China in relation to Japan is an easy way to bring to mind that particular relational comparison.

system and the media. While Chapters 4 and 5 will address questions related to the

educational system, Chapter 3 will turn to the effectiveness of the media in the process of

building national identity.

CHAPTER 3: CHINESE MEDIA AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

What role do the media play in the construction of an individual's sense of national identity? Many scholars have addressed this question, but relatively rarely has systematic empirical evidence been brought to bear on it. Many theorists, such as Karl Deutsch (1966), have observed that communications media constitute the fundamental avenue through which states engage in nation-building. Conversely, due to the rise of cable television and the internet, media in recent years are often characterized as forces that work against monolithic national identities, instead segmenting such identities and bringing about a less nationalistic and more cosmopolitan identity (e.g. Barker 1999). Scholars remain divided on the question of the overall impact of the media on national identity. This chapter's main aim is to empirically address this question at the individual level in the case of China. Overall, the findings presented here suggest that communications media serve not only to strengthen an individual's national identity, but to shape the meaning of this identity as well.

Two Conceptions of the Media

Theoretical expectations for the effect of media consumption on national attachment can go in two opposite directions. First, many scholars have argued that national media, along with the educational system, is one of the most powerful instruments states have for the construction of national identity. This basic idea has been expounded upon in numerous ways in many now-classic works on nationalism (Deutsch 1966; Gellner 1983; Smith 1991). Sometimes such effects are direct and obvious, and can be attributed to successful propaganda efforts. However, scholarship has often pointed out that, even for societies in which media are free from government control,

subtle streams of nationalism work to promote national identity and attachment to it.

Benedict Anderson (1991) pointed to the construction of national identity as it occurred

subtly through newspapers, and other studies have continued to find these undercurrents

in contemporary newspaper coverage of topics that are seemingly unrelated to

nationalism (Brookes 1999; Billig 1995). Deutsch (1966) earlier expressed a similar idea

when he developed the idea of national consciousness, which he defines as "the

attachment of secondary symbols of nationality to primary items of information moving

through channels of social communication, or through the mind of an individual" (p.

146). The bottom line here is that, as media are 'nationalized', so too do they

'nationalize' an individual's sense of identity and loyalty. In other words, whether

deliberately conceived and executed by propagandists or simply unconsciously imagined

through subtle subtexts of the nation, consumption of media builds and maintains an

attachment to a particular conception of national identity.

Contrasting with this 'nationalist' conception of the media are those whom we

might call 'globalists', who emphasize the liberative or globalizing effects of media, and

especially of more recently developed media, such as cable television and the internet.[20]

For example, Barker (1999) argues that television produces a medium through which

ideologies compete, and that television audiences actively interpret televised messages

rather than passively receive them. Moreover, as is especially true in the developing

world, television programming is often internationally imported, resulting in increased

exposure to foreign (usually Western) cultures and behaviors. Therefore it may be that

media consumption reduces one's attachment to national identity, instead replacing this

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[20] The labels 'nationalist' and 'globalist' here are my own, as is responsibility for any inaccuracy attributed to them.

identity with global identities segmented not by nation but by markets. Garnham (1993) succinctly expresses this idea: "the growth of an increasingly integrated global market and of global media systems appears to be undermining...the nation-state" (p. 251).

The tension between these two streams of thought has carried over into scholarly treatments of Chinese media. Currently it is unclear whether the overall effects of communications media are constructive or destabilizing of national identity. Many scholars, such as Brady (2008), still see the Chinese media fundamentally as an instrument of state policy. After all, the party-state has retained the overall institutional structure of its propaganda apparatus. In the past, however, propagandists had more ideological tools at their disposal to legitimate the party-state, namely Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. However, if Brady's conception of the Chinese media today is accurate, and if nationalism is now the fundamental legitimating ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (as claimed by Fitzgerald 1996; Zhao 2005; and Shirk 2007, among others), then we should expect this propaganda effect to work primarily through national attachment, and media consumption should play a powerful role in the construction and maintenance of an individual's national identity.

The findings of previous research have supported a nationalizing conception of the Chinese media. For instance, Tang (2005), using survey data from the 1990s, found that media consumption is weakly correlated with nationalist sentiment and, more strongly, with regime support. Findings from other methods of scholarly inquiry also accord with the general direction of these hypotheses. Fu (2009) found that nationalist messages saturated practically all Chinese media content related to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Other studies of media content have found similarly nationalistic themes in all

sorts of media, and far earlier than the 2008 Olympics. For instance, Chang et al. (1994),

using content analysis of both China Central Television (CCTV) and the official CCP

newspaper *People's Daily*, found two persistent themes that occurred throughout news

stories far more often than any other themes: national development and economic reform.

Among domestic news in particular, "the leading picture since the late 1970s has been

China's drive toward a market-oriented economy and modernization efforts" (p. 59).

With nearly all of China's news focusing on changes at the national level, the nation

becomes the 'subject' of the news. Seeing the news as a story being told, it is clear that

the nation is the main character. The authors argue for a framework in which the news is

considered a form of social knowledge rather than an economic product (p. 54), but one

need not adopt this perspective to conclude from their work that the news media are

potent shapers of national identity.

In another example of content analysis, Chang (2002) compares CCTV's

domestic news with its international news and concludes that the latter is presented as far

more conflictual:

> In the domestic setting, the news is largely anchored by central government officials
> in action, burgeoning institutions and ongoing social progress that assure a sense of a
> normal, stable, and communal world. In the foreign context, the world is filled with
> news of a few powerful countries and hot spots, which projects a contested
> geopolitical landscape overshadowed by anomalies, uncertainty and volatility among
> nations (Chang, 2002, p. 282-3).

This observation also points to the profound effects news media can have on how an

individual's conceptions of the world and the nation are formed.

Hillman (2004) also uses discourse analysis to identify media mechanisms that

build up national identity and national sentiment. He specifically examines *People's*

Daily in the wake of the accidental US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in

1999. Hillman identifies four prominent themes in the newspaper's coverage of this event, all of which use strong nationalist frames: nation-building and national unity, nationalist appeals to the past, nationalist appeals to Greater China (including the overseas Chinese community), and a pitting of China against the West. This is not just a phenomenon of official media outlets like *People's Daily*. Cheng and Ngok (2004) examine several other Chinese newspapers in the wake of the bombing and reach a similar conclusion: "in the 1990s, unofficial, voluntary nationalism in China reached a new peak, and the Chinese authorities consciously managed this nationalism to maintain domestic solidarity and stability" (p. 101). The bottom line is that national identity is constructed through the media—whether official or unofficial—and ultimately used to generate state support.

Then again, returning to the globalist stream of thought, there are also reasons to expect the opposite. For instance, James Lull (1991) argues that television, through its transmission of Western cultural practices, has served to accelerate the decline of traditional Chinese values, thus blurring the line between Chinese and Western values. Hong (1998), focusing on reform-era party policy that allowed an increase in imported television, makes a similar argument. These particular claims apply specifically to television, but since television is by far the most popular source of news and information for most Chinese, and that similar arguments can be made about the advent of the internet in China, this caveat becomes less important. In any case, this logic turns on its head the conception of the media as a nationalizing force.

Thus far our treatment of the concept of national identity has been somewhat loose, and it is essential at this point to formulate a more fleshed out conception. In this

chapter, two elements of national identity are examined: 1) the *strength of attachment* to one's national identity, the straightforward and familiar idea of how important one's national identity is to oneself; and 2) the *constitutive norms* (Abdelal et al., 2006) of the nation.

In formulating hypotheses about how media consumption will affect the content of national identity, Abdelal et al.'s (2006, p. 696) notion of the constitutive norms of a group identity—the norms that determine who counts as part of the group—is useful. Townsend's (1996) discussion of Chinese culturalism (outlined in the previous chapter) provides an example of how the constitutive norms of the nation can vary, and how they might be affected by the state through the media. Culturalism represents a constitutive norm of Chinese identity in that it identifies criteria that determine who 'counts' as Chinese: culturalism claims that being Chinese is a cultural, rather than ethnic, identity. Thus 'Chineseness' is determined not by descent or blood ties, but by common customs and culture.

This broadens the concept of 'Chineseness' to include people who are not ethnically (i.e. by descent) Han, so long as they adopt the traditional practices and ways of life of Han Chinese, and see themselves as rightful subjects under Chinese rule. This last requirement represents the political dimension of culturalism: one cannot be Chinese without abiding by the rules set down by Chinese authority.

It is a commonplace in both the academic literature and in the western press that, since the beginning of the reform era, and especially since the events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has witnessed a shift in its legitimating ideology. Over this period the party has increasingly promoted Chinese

nationalism as a legitimating ideology in an effort to replace the old legitimating ideologies of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought (Whiting,1983; Strecker Downs and Saunders 1999; Zheng 1999; Wan 2003). Moreover, the CCP retains a large degree of control over the Chinese press and still uses it to propagate this new legitimating ideology (Brady 2008). Scholars have also noted that the CCP has promoted a neo-Confucian sense of national identity which emphasizes Chinese culture and customs, and downplays ethnic or descent-based elements of Chinese identity (Fitzgerald 1996; Townsend 1996; Zhao 2004). The official position of the party that China is a "multinational state" even goes beyond the culturalism that Townsend discussed, as it implies that Han culture—though foundational in China's past and still important—is not a necessary element of being Chinese. While many party leaders may privately think otherwise, this is the position represented in official media (Zhao 2004). The languages and customs of China's minority groups are officially held to be just as Chinese as Han language and customs, because all of these groups recognize themselves as under the cultural-political domain of China. This is important to the state because a cultural-political identity, unlike an ethnic one, can be learned and adopted by other groups, a property which is indispensable in the party-state's effort to legitimate its rule over areas and peoples that are sometimes seen as ethnically non-Chinese, such as Tibetans, Uyghurs, and even Taiwanese.

These observations lead us to our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *News media use will be positively correlated with constitutive norms that define Chinese national identity mainly in cultural-political terms, rather than ethnic or racial terms.*

In addition to the content of national identity, we are also interested in variation among individuals in the strength of their psychological *attachment* to this identity. This, combined with the above observations, leads us to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *As news media use increases, so will the strength of national attachment.*

Both of these hypotheses stem from the 'nationalist' theory of the media, which as discussed above, conflicts with the 'globalist' perspective. Thus we could just as easily formulate alternative hypotheses stemming from globalist theory, expecting the reverse effect of media.

While the above hypotheses are both concerned with media effects on individuals, we are also interested in broader systemic considerations. Specifically, do we expect media exposure to have the same effects in countries with different media systems? In Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm's (1956) classic work on relations between the press and the state, the authors point to two diametrically opposed models of the press.[21] In the *authoritarian model* the state controls the media in order to preserve the political status quo; in the *libertarian model* the press is free from state influence. Both of these models are ideal-types, but close-fitting cases can be found in the real world. The U.S. corresponds most closely with the ideal-type of the libertarian model of the press, while China approximates the authoritarian model.[22] At the very least, it is established that Chinese media are more state-controlled than U.S. media. Combining this once again

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[21] These authors' categorization of models of the press has received criticism on the grounds that it ignores the interference of market forces in the press (see Campbell, 2004), but that critique is not particularly relevant to the task at hand here.

[22] In the past, China would qualify under the authors' typology as a *communist model*, but the Chinese system today seems to better fit the authoritarian model. In any case, the theoretical distinction does not affect our expectation of the difference between the two cases.

with the observation that the CCP actively promotes nationalism through the media, we arrive at our third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *The link between news media use and national attachment will be stronger in China than it is in the United States.*

It should be noted that, unlike the first two hypotheses, this one has little to do with the tension between media nationalists and media globalists, but is instead designed to determine the difference between differently structured systems of media and society.

Another concern of this chapter is the type of medium through which information is transmitted. The three above hypotheses all deal with the media in general, but which types of media are more effective in transmitting national identity? We shall hypothesize here that:

Hypothesis 4: *The relationships established in hypotheses 1 and 2 will be stronger for television use than for use of print media.*

The first reason for such an expectation is that television is by far the most common source of information for the Chinese public, with newspapers following as a distant second (see Figure 3.1 below). Secondly, there are many reasons to believe that messages conveyed through television are more powerful than those conveyed through print. This is not only because of the instant impact of television images, which are more readily absorbed and interpreted than the printed word (and require no literacy), but also because television proceeds at its own pace, demanding the viewer to keep up. By contrast, the newspaper reader can take in information at his or her own speed, pausing to question a particular message or rereading an article to clarify ambiguities. Neither the television viewer nor the radio listener is given time out to do these things, which makes

these media particularly powerful avenues for conveying subtler and more implicit

messages. Messages about who counts as Chinese are nearly always subtle and implicit,

as are messages meant to strengthen the bond between individual and nation. Finally,

especially when compared to newspapers and the internet, television in China is still

largely under the ownership and supervision of the state. The most-viewed network,

CCTV, which broadcasts nineteen channels at the time of writing, is owned and operated

by the state.

The above hypotheses will require us to measure and examine two dependent

variables in this chapter: cultural-political constitutive norms and national attachment.

We will also need to operationalize and measure our independent variables. The next

section addresses these tasks.

Data and Measures

To test the above hypotheses, the 2005 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS)

is a valuable resource. Since this wave of the WVS includes China and the United States,

it allows for a cross-national comparison that is required by the third hypothesis. It will

also prove useful for testing hypotheses 1, 2, and 4, as the China sample is large and

intended to be representative of the Chinese population. The WVS in China was

conducted through Peking University from March into May 2007. The survey was

administered door-to-door, and researchers used "GPS/GIS Assistant Area Sampling", a

technique designed to address sampling problems due internal migration (Landry and

Shen 2005). The sample was stratified on the basis of the seven official regions of China,

and then post-stratified on the basis of age, gender, and level of education. As a result,

the sample of 1,991 completed interviews is roughly representative of China's population as a whole (Shen and Yan 2007).

The WVS also contains useful measures for media use and national attachment. What is most fortuitous is that it includes questions that can be treated as measures of the perceived constitutive norms of the nation, measures which are integral for testing the second hypothesis. A set of questions asks respondents what requirements are important for someone to be a citizen of China: having ancestors from China, being born on Chinese soil, adopting Chinese customs, and obeying Chinese laws. These questions provide an especially valuable tool to measure a person's idea of who 'counts' as Chinese.

For a measure of politico-cultural constitutive norms of the nation, the latter two of these items are combined into an additive index. Thus the first component of this index is a respondent's evaluation on a three-point scale of the importance of "adopting the customs of my country", while the second component is the respondent's evaluation of the importance of "abiding by my country's laws".[23] The resulting five-point index is termed *politico-culturalism*, and serves as the dependent variable for cultural constitutive norms. Respondents who have a particularly cultural and political idea of what it means to be Chinese have a high score on this index. The distribution of this variable is seen in Figure 3.1.

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[23] The two survey items are part of a series that begins with the question "What should be the requirements for somebody seeking citizenship of China?" The two answers in the index are "Adopting the customs of my country" and "Abiding by my country's laws." Respondents can choose Very Important (coded 3), Rather Important (2), or Not Important (1). The two items were added together into a six-point index, the lowest point of which contained no observations (this is the reason there are only five bars in Figure 3.1). The two items are significantly correlated: Kendall's Tau-b = 0.47.

Figure 3.1. Distribution of politico-culturalism index in China

Note: Index produced by the survey items described in footnote 23.

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

In addition to measures of constitutive norms, the survey also contains items that can be used to measure the strength of one's feeling of attachment to the nation. These include how proud one feels to be Chinese, and to what degree one sees oneself as a citizen of China. Similarly to the first dependent variable, these measures are combined into an additive index that serves as an indicator of the intensity of one's sense of national identity. For these two items the question wordings are "how proud are you to be Chinese?", and "I see myself as a citizen of China," with each eliciting a response on a four-point scale.[24]

Other items from the survey also aim to serve as indicators of nationalist sentiment more broadly, such as how willing a respondent is to die for his or her country, and the priority a respondent gives to fighting world poverty as opposed to solving

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[24] These two items are also significantly correlated, although not as strongly as for the *culturalism* index: here Kendall's Tau-b = 0.31

similar problems within China's borders. However, other elements besides national

identity, such as approval of violent conflict resolution and exclusivism, find their way

into such measures. While other measures were available, the two used here are the most

valid measures of the concept of attachment to national identity developed above. The

resulting two-part additive index is termed *national attachment* and its distribution is

shown in Figure 3.2, alongside the same measure in the U.S.[25]

Figure 3.2. Distribution of national attachment index in China and the U.S.

Note: Index produced by summing the items discussed in the above paragraph.

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

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[25] One intuitive name for this variable would be *national identity*, but I refrain from using this name on the grounds that identity is a broader and richer concept than can be measured on a single numerical scale. Indeed, the concept of constitutive norms is just one indicator of the variety of meanings that can be attributed to such a complex psychological concept as a group identity. Given the many meanings of national identity *national attachment* seems a more accurate name for this variable, which is one's level of attachment to his or her Chinese national identity, regardless of what that identity means to them.

Figure 3.2 presents an interesting comparison of levels of national attachment in China and in the U.S. It appears that Americans are much more strongly attached to their national identity than are Chinese. This simple comparison alone casts some doubt on Western fears of belligerent Chinese nationalism.[26] But although national attachment is not as strong as it is in the U.S., it is still relatively high, and Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show that both cultural constitutive norms and national attachment in China are noticeably skewed in the high direction. However, this skewing does not constitute a serious methodological difficulty, as indicated by the skewness statistic in each case (-0.35 and -0.33, respectively). By comparison, national attachment is strongly skewed in the U.S. sample (-1.30), indicating that using regression to explain its variance may be problematic.

For the purposes of our key independent variable, the WVS also contains many questions on media use. However, each of these questions is dichotomous, asking the respondent whether she or he, "used [the following] last week to obtain information": newspaper, print magazines, books, internet or email, broadcasts on TV or radio, or in-depth reports on TV or radio. Because they are yes/no answers, these measures are relatively blunt. If the week prior to taking the survey is unrepresentative of a respondent's long-term media consumption pattern, then this sort of measurement error is at least randomly distributed throughout the sample, still leaving us with reliable measures.

Even within the parameters of traditional survey research, more sensitive measures of news media consumption are available, as evidenced by research in various

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[26] According to most measures in the latest wave of the World Values Surveys, the U.S. and China rank first and second, respectively, among all surveyed countries in levels of nationalism.

areas (e.g. Althaus 2002; Dowler 2003; Chiricos et al. 2006). It is possible to gather

more specific information on the amount of exposure to various types of media, as well

as what sorts of purposes—information or entertainment—toward which one's media

consumption is directed. However, each of the measures used here does provide a rough

indication of those who are more exposed to information through media and those who

are less exposed to media information   Figure 3.3 displays the percent of

respondents who answered 'yes' to each of the six items in both China and the U.S.

While both countries' most popular form of informational media is television/radio,

Americans look to newspapers, magazines, and the internet far more frequently than

Chinese do. In fact, media use is higher in the United States than China by every one of

these six measures.

Figure 3.3. Percentage of respondents who have used media in the last week

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

When combined into an additive index, these items can provide a more sensitive measure of exposure to informational media. This index is termed *media use*, and will serve to test all three hypotheses. Figure 3.4 displays this variable's distribution in both China and the U.S. The most notable characteristic of the figure is the vast difference in the average amount of media use between the two countries: the modal score in the U.S. is five out of a possible seven, whereas in China it is only three out of seven.[27]

Figure 3.4. Distribution of media use index in China and the U.S.

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

With measures established, we can now examine the relationships between our dependent variables and media use. At the bivariate level, *media use* is significantly and

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[27] It should also be noted that for China, this measure is more skewed than the dependent variables. This skewing is in the negative direction, indicating a low overall level of media exposure. However, as the skewness statistic (0.70) does not surpass 0.8 in absolute value, so it does not present serious problems for analysis. Thus it is best to leave the variable as is rather than to collapse categories or to make any other transformations in an attempt to avoid this skewness (Bourke and Clark, 1992, p. 69 [cited in Lewis-Beck, 1995, 16]).

positively correlated with both *culturalism* ($r = .11$) and *national attachment* ($r = .15$).

These are certainly not strong correlations, but they are both statistically significant at p <

0.001, indicating that the expected relationships, although weak, do exist at the bivariate

level. The third hypothesis would lead us to expect that the correlation between *media*

use and *national attachment* would be nonexistent or at least weaker in the case of the

U.S. We do see a positive correlation, but it is considerably weaker, with $r = 0.05$.

Furthermore, this correlation does not achieve conventional levels of significance (p =

0.07). Thus the bivariate relationships indicate some support for the first three

hypotheses. The next step is to subject these relationships to statistical controls through

multiple regression analysis.

Multivariate Regression

In building a statistical model to explain attitudinal variables such as *culturalism*

and *national attachment*, it is important not to specify other attitudes as explanatory

factors. Were we to do so, we would be regressing attitudes on attitudes, making the

specification of causal relationships nearly impossible, since it is not clear which attitudes

come first.[28] With this caution in mind, we can proceed to develop a model that uses

attributive characteristics and behaviors to explain both *culturalism* and *national*

attachment.[29]

Age is one obvious variable that must be included as a control, since younger

people consume more media.[30] Since the effects of age on national identity may be

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[28] Such a model would most likely be overspecified, negatively affecting the significance of many of the model's variables.

[29] In many cases the causal relationship between behaviors (like media use) and attitudes (like national attachment) is unclear. This does present a problem in interpreting our results. This will be addressed later in the chapter.

nonlinear, both *age* and *age^2* are included in the model, allowing the model to accommodate a U- or inverted-U-shaped relationship with age. Theoretical expectations for this relationship vary. On one hand, because of the patriotic education campaign of the 1990s, which has explicitly adopted a nationalistic educational project in order to legitimate the state (Zhao, 1998), we may expect the young to be the most attached to their national identity, and to be more committed to the government-sponsored culturally-constituted Chinese identity. Conversely, we may expect a life-cycle effect in which older generations, due to their long-term exposure to socializing influences, demonstrate higher scores on both dependent variables. A third alternative is to accept and combine both of these hypotheses, which would result in the middle-aged generation being lower on both counts than older and younger cohorts.

Gender is another obvious candidate for inclusion in the model, although its expected relationship to the dependent variables is not clear. One could theorize that men will demonstrate a stronger attachment to national identity than women on the vague grounds that nationalism and xenophobia are seen as masculine traits, but here we will remain agnostic regarding this hypothesis and simply include gender as a dichotomous control variable.

Given that media use is likely to be higher for wealthier respondents, it is useful to control for socioeconomic status so we can separate the effects of class from the effects of media. Thus, a five-point measure of self-reported socioeconomic status is included as a control in the model. An individual's level of education is another clear choice for a control variable. Again, however, theory points both ways. It makes sense to expect that as one becomes more educated, one becomes less attached to a national

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[30] Age is correlated with *media exposure*, with $r = -0.25$.

identity, especially an identity based on loyalty to the state. In the Chinese case and elsewhere, college students and intellectuals have routinely served as the vanguard of political opposition, so much so that the party-state has historically looked down upon intellectuals as "the old stinking ninth" category (臭老九 *chòu l ǎ o ji ǔ*) (Goldman 1999). However, not all education leads to opposition, and one could even hypothesize, in light of the post-Tiananmen "patriotic education campaign", that education may have the reverse effect on loyalty and attachment to Chinese national identity. It may well be that these two mechanisms are both at work, in which case education's effect may be nil in both national attachment and constitutive norms.[31] Much like the effect of age, a null result here does not necessarily mean that the influence of education is irrelevant. The measure used for this variable is a respondent's self-reported level of education, which falls into five ordinal categories.

Having exhausted the conventional socio-demographic control variables, there are a few more that may be relevant to our dependent variables. First, a person with a professional identity that is tied to the government may be more likely to have a stronger national attachment by nature of professional affiliation. Therefore, a dichotomous indicator of whether someone works for the government or a public organization (coded 1, all else coded 0) is used as a control variable here and termed *government worker*. A similar effect might be expected from Communist Party members, or even those who identify as members without official membership. A dichotomous measure of party membership (*party member*) is included in the model.[32]

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[31] Another alternative is to expect a nonlinear relationship, similar to the effect of age. This will be explored in the next chapter.

The final control variable included in the model is *religious*, which is a dichotomous indicator of a respondent who, when asked about the importance of religion in his or her life, chose anything but "not important at all".[33] Although nationalism is often thought of as a secularizing force, it makes just as much sense to theorize that religion builds onto national identity. Moreover, respondents who recognize a role for religion in their lives might hold a more culturally constituted idea of the nation, since they should see observance of certain customs (and arguably observance of laws) as important for group identity more broadly.

The dependent variables are both ordinal, rather than continuous, variables. Thus ordered logistic regression is technically the proper method for testing our model. However, because of the flexibility and the ease of interpretation of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, I present the results of OLS estimation in Tables 3.1 and 3.2. Ordered logistic regression was also performed, and the results do not differ in any meaningful way. In addition to this robustness check, I also strengthen the tests of the first and second hypotheses by two other means. First, I use robust standard errors, and second, I cluster by province.[34] The results of these checks are not shown, as they do not differ in any notable way from the results presented here.

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[32] The question used in the survey is simply "whether you are a member of a political party." People who identify as members (whether active or inactive) are coded as 1, with all other responses coded 0.

[33] This operationalization of this variable was chosen in order to minimize missing data, and also because in China, 35% of respondents say that religion is not important at all in their lives, making it the modal response.

[34] These tests are achieved by the *robust* and *cluster* options in STATA 10. All combinations of all three robustness checks were performed on the tests of the first and second hypotheses, with little to no difference in results: both hypotheses are supported just as strongly in all cases.

Table 3.1 displays the results of the OLS regressions performed on both dependent variables among the 2007 China sample of the WVS.[35] The left side of the table shows regression on politico-*culturalism*. The first thing to note in this model is the significance of the *media use* coefficient, indicating support for the first hypothesis. It appears that despite the presence of the control variables, media consumption's positive relationship with cultural constitutive norms remains robust. The substantive effect of media exposure can be inferred as well: as *media use* rises from its minimum to its maximum, a respondent's score on *culturalism* will increase approximately 12%. This is not an overwhelmingly strong effect, but it is just as strong as the bivariate correlation prior to adding the statistical controls. Although the first hypothesis is confirmed, the performance of the overall model urges us to interpret this finding cautiously. As is common with survey data, the R-squared is low, with only 1.5% of variance in the dependent variable explained. *Media use* is the only variable to achieve conventional levels of significance, while only two others (*female* and *party member*) approach this mark. Interestingly, party members and women are less likely to hold politico-cultural conceptions of China.

The right half of Table 3.1 presents results of the same model applied to the other dependent variable, *national attachment*. Here, we can see that the second hypothesis is supported: the effect of media consumption on *national attachment* is positive and significant, even when other factors are taken into account. Looking again at the

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[35] The number of observations is smaller in the right half of Table 3.1 because there were fewer observations for the national attachment index than for the politico-cultural constitutive norms index. Missing data were coded to certain values when it was appropriate to do so (e.g. missing data on *party member* were coded as a 0 on the high probability that the respondent is not a party member, and DK/NA responses were coded as the neutral value on a scaled item when this was appropriate). See Table A.1 in the appendix for the number of observations of each variable.

standardized coefficient, the effect is similar in magnitude to that of the first regression, with *media use* accounting for about 13% of the variance explained by the model. For this dependent variable, however, the model's performance as a whole is better, with an R-squared that indicates that 3.2% of variance is explained. We can also see from the rightmost column that age is responsible for most of the variance explained by the model. Interpreting these coefficients substantively, it appears that the informal hypothesis conjectured above is correct, and the relationship is U-shaped: the youngest and oldest people in the sample have a stronger attachment to national identity than do the middle-aged.

Table 3.1. OLS models (WVS China)

Variable	Polit.-Cult. Constitutive Norms			National Identity Attachment		
	Coef.	SE	Std. Coef.	Coef.	SE	Std. Coef.
Media use	0.109***	(0.026)	0.118	0.085***	(0.019)	0.134
Age	0.000	(0.003)	0.011	-0.004*	(0.002)	-0.323
Age^2	0.000	(0.000)	-0.015	0.000*	(0.000)	0.373
Female	-0.023†	(0.012)	-0.046	-0.013	(0.009)	-0.039
Education	-0.012	(0.022)	-0.016	0.015	(0.016)	0.029
SE Class	-0.005	(0.027)	-0.004	-0.021	(0.020)	-0.027
Gov. Worker	-0.011	(0.018)	-0.016	0.001	(0.012)	0.002
Party Memb.	-0.034†	(0.018)	-0.047	0.016	(0.013)	0.034
Religious	0.015	(0.012)	0.029	-0.006	(0.009)	-0.017
Constant	0.705***	(0.066)	.	0.77***	(0.047)	.
N	1771			1590		
R^2	0.015			0.032		

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

To test the third hypothesis using multivariate regression, the same model was used to predict *national attachment* among the 2006 United States sample of the WVS.

The results of this regression are presented in Table 3.2. If the third hypothesis is correct, then we would expect no relationship between *media use* and *national attachment* in the U.S. As Table 3.2 indicates, this is indeed the result, with the coefficient for *media use* not even approaching statistical significance. This is true despite the overall improved performance of the model (R-squared = 0.077) when compared to the same model's performance in the China sample. Other notable findings in the American context include the importance of education, which substantially reduces national attachment, and religiosity, which has the opposite effect.

Table 3.2. OLS model explaining national attachment (U.S.)

Variable	Coef.	SE	Std. Coef.
Media exp.	0.014	(0.019)	0.022
Age	0.004*	(0.002)	0.377
Age^2	0.000	(0.000)	-0.173
Female	0.000	(0.009)	0.000
Education	-0.143***	(0.032)	-0.145
SE Class	0.025	(0.022)	0.036
Gov. Worker	-0.013	(0.015)	-0.026
Party Memb.	0.007	(0.010)	0.020
Religious	0.061***	(0.017)	0.101
Constant	0.802***	(0.039)	.
N	1120		
R^2	0.077		

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data
   File v.20090901, 2009.

It should be noted here that while this is a valuable test of this particular hypothesis, it is not by any means a stringent test of the theory behind it. First of all, the

United States is the prototypical example of the libertarian model of the press, and when

comparing the U.S. to China the effects of the vastly different traditions of the press and

media seem almost too obvious. Second, a more rigorous test of this theory would

include more cases than two. After all, although it seems intuitive to surmise that the

difference we have found is due to the different media systems, there are many other

differences between the U.S. and China that may be driving this result. One such

alternative explanation is that higher levels of overall media exposure in the U.S. wash

out the impact of media use on national attachment among the population. Or perhaps

the difference in types of media that are used in each country explains the difference in

media's effect between the two countries (see Figure 3.4). Including a broader set of

country cases would help to ease suspicions of alternative explanations, but this goes

beyond the scope of our objectives here.[36]

We can, however, look at different types of media for differential media effects in

the U.S. Table 3.3 displays the coefficients of each type of media when it is substituted

for *media exposure* in Table 3.2. As the table shows, using television and radio sources

of information is correlated with national sentiment. Newspaper usage is very weakly

correlated with the dependent variable, while reading books has the opposite effect.

Meanwhile, magazine readership and Internet usage have no significant effects on

national attachment. While these are blunt, dichotomous measures, the results shown in

Table 3.3 suggest that we must look at what *type* of media people use in order to see what

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[36] Another critique of this test is that the severe skewing of the dependent variable in the U.S. sample
makes this an unfair test. However, the higher R-square in the U.S. case stands as evidence against this
critique: if the null result is due to the skewed dependent variable, then we would expect the model to
perform poorly overall. Instead we see a model that performs better in the U.S. than in China (the R-
squared is more than double that of the same model in China) despite this skewing.

relationship media use has with national attachment. The test of the fourth hypothesis

does just this in the China sample.

Table 3.3. Coefficients for type of media, U.S.

Variable	Coef.	S.E.
Newspapers	0.017†	(0.010)
TV & Radio	.025**	(0.007)
Magazines	0.015	(0.010)
Books	-.020*	(0.010)
Internet	-0.010	(0.011)

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

Note: Each coefficient is produced by replacing
media exposure in the model shown in Table 3.2.

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File
     v.20090901, 2009.

Table 3.4. Controlled effects of different types of media on Chinese national identity

	Cultural Constitutive Norms			National Identity Attachment		
Variable	Coef.	SE	Std. Coef.	Coef.	SE	Std. Coef.
Media exposure index	0.109***	0.000	0.118	0.085***	0.000	0.134
TV/Radio broadcasts	.043**	0.014	0.074	.059***	0.010	0.144
TV/Radio In-depth Reports	0.049***	0.012	0.098	.049***	0.009	0.142
Newspapers	0.013	0.015	0.023	.018†	0.011	0.048
Magazines	0.038*	0.016	0.059	0.014	0.012	0.032
Books	0.030†	0.016	0.049	0.005	0.011	0.011
Internet	0.033	0.020	0.042	-0.008	0.014	-0.017

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

Note: The coefficients, standard errors, and standardized coefficients here are produced by
substituting each variable for the media use index in Table 3.1. See Table 3.1 for the control
variables. Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

Just as was done for the U.S. sample, in the China sample the overall media use index was removed from the model and replaced by each constituent component. Table 3.4 presents the coefficients for each of the separate types of media.[37] The results support the hypothesis that television is the strongest driving force behind the relationship between media consumption and national identity. Neither exposure to newspapers, books, nor the internet showed any statistically significant effect on either dependent variable. Magazine readership does show an observable effect on cultural constitutive norms, but has no effect on national attachment. Nor is its effect on constitutive norms as strong or as statistically significant as either measure of television/radio consumption. By contrast, television's relationship with both the content and the strength of national identity is undeniable.[38]

In sum, we have found limited support for each of our hypotheses. *Media use* has a positive and significant relationship with both *culturalism* and *national attachment* even when other factors are taken into account, and *media use*'s relationship with *national attachment* is, by contrast, weaker and more conditional in the United States. The first two findings are statistically robust, but, given the preliminary nature of the cross-national test used here, the finding concerning the difference between the United States and China is the most tentative. The relationship between media usage and national attachment is weaker in the U.S., but we cannot say definitively that the different media system is the main reason for this. Finally, more than any other type of media (and in both the China and U.S. samples), television is the workhorse that drives the relationship

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[37] Each coefficient is taken from a separate regression model in which the component of the index replaced the media exposure index.

[38] Although this measure includes television and radio, we must assume that television is the real driving force here, as television viewers far outnumber radio listeners in China. See also footnote 40 below.

between media consumption and national identity. The findings of the different effects of different types of media consumption are unambiguous.

The 2008 China Survey: A Second Opinion

In many areas where the 2007 World Values Survey is lacking, the 2008 China Survey complements it nicely. The China Survey is a project of the College of Liberal Arts at Texas A&M University, in collaboration with the Research Center for Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University. In addition to being conducted more recently than the WVS, the China Survey has a larger sample, with over 3900 observations, and uses spatial sampling to achieve a representative sample of the population in both urban and rural areas. Because of its focus on China and its sampling method, it also has more useful measures of ethnic identity and population density. Moreover, it has more detailed measures of media consumption and national attachment. On the other hand, the World Values Survey is, of course, more readily amenable to cross-national comparison required by hypothesis 3. It also has fuller measures of constitutive norms, making it ideal for testing hypothesis 1. However, the China Survey is useful in subjecting our second and fourth hypotheses to stricter tests.

The China Survey offers equivalents of all of the key independent variables available in the World Values Survey. Measures of media exposure here are more detailed, with each respondent reporting the number of hours they spent the day prior watching television, reading newspapers, reading magazines, or on the internet. Combining these four indicators with whether a respondent listens to the radio (daily, often, sometimes, or never), we arrive at a five-item index of media use. These broad measures of media consumption are more appropriate to our theoretical expectations here

than are specific measures of particular news programs. For instance, to use measures of exposure to particular programs, like the daily CCTV news broadcast, would be to test for a very specific effect of news media. Recall that many of the undetected ways that national media shape and promote national identity may be found in nonobvious places like commercials, sporting events, and the historical dramas that so abundantly populate Chinese television. If we want to capture these more subtle nationalizing effects of media use, a broader measure of television use should be used.

The control variables are also duplicated—and often improved upon—in the China Survey. Measures of education and income are more sensitive, with education measured in years and income measured using a combination of several survey items.[39] We are also able to construct a more complete model with these data, as this survey allows us to control for ethnic minority status and community type (urban or rural). We include a dummy variable for those self-reporting as a Han Chinese and a dummy variable for rural residents, with the reference categories being all non-Han minority groups and urban-dwellers, respectively.[40]

While the WVS is better-equipped with measures of constitutive norms, the China Survey includes many useful indicators of national attachment. Here an equally-weighted additive index is made from five indicators. Four of these are measured on a five-point scale of agree strongly to disagree strongly: 1) I would rather be a citizen of China than of any other country in the world; 2) the world would be a better place if

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[39] When a respondent did not provide a figure for annual income, imputation was based on the respondent placing their family in one of several income brackets. When neither of these options produced a figure, imputation was based on the respondent's categorization of their family into a level of income on a scale of 1 (low-level) to 10 (high-level). If all of these failed, the interviewer's assessment of the economic class of the family was used.

[40] The category of rural includes respondents whose *hukou* registration is rural, as well as those with urban *hukou* who live in rural districts.

people from other countries were more like the Chinese; 3) when my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be Chinese; and 4) one should sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of the country. The fifth is a dichotomous response to the following question: emotionally, do you think of yourself first as a Chinese, or a [province-person] (e.g., Beijinger, Sichuanese)?

Table 3.5. OLS models comparing the effects of TV and newspapers on national attachment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Variable	*Coef.*	*Coef.*	*Coef.*	*Coef.*
Media Use	0.018	---	---	---
TV Use	---	0.094**	---	---
Newspaper Use	---	---	-0.120*	---
Internet Use	---	---	---	-0.107*
Age	0.005***	0.005***	0.004***	0.004***
Age^2	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
Female	-0.012*	-0.013*	-0.012*	-0.012*
Education	0.007***	0.006***	0.007***	0.007***
Income	-0.050***	-0.050***	-0.049***	-0.048***
Public Worker	-0.037	-0.037	-0.034	-0.036
CCP Member	0.042***	0.040***	0.043***	0.0435***
Religious	0.010	0.011	0.010	0.010
Rural	-0.006	-0.006	-0.008	-0.008
Han	0.058***	0.058***	0.058***	0.058***
Constant	0.548***	0.545***	0.554***	0.560***
N	3865	3865	3865	3865
R^2	0.068	0.070	0.068	0.069

***$p<.001$; **$p<.01$; *$p<.05$; †$p<.10$

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

Table 3.5 presents the results of the regression models predicting the index of national attachment. At first glance the results appear to refute the first hypothesis, since the media use index has no effect on national attachment in Model 1. However, in Model

2 television use is included instead, and we see a significant positive effect on national attachment. Even more interestingly, Models 3 and 4 show that newspaper use and internet use both have a *negative* effect on national attachment. As a result, the effect of media-in-general is canceled out, even though particular media have strong effects.

These results support the claim of the fourth hypothesis that television does the real work in constructing national identity.[41] However, the claim of hypothesis 2 is not supported: media use in general has no effect on national identity. Furthermore, consumption of some types of media actually seems to work against the nation-building project. One alternative explanation for the effects of newspapers and the internet here is that newspaper readers and internet users are simply more politically interested. However, once political interest is added as a control variable in the models shown in Table 3.5, the results do not change in any significant way.[42] Barring other relevant omitted variables, it seems that the effects of these three types of media are robust.

The results from the China Survey also affect how we can interpret our findings from the WVS. While hypothesis 1, regarding the effects of general media consumption, was supported in WVS tests, the results from Model 1 in Table 3.5 urge caution in this regard, as media exposure in general has no effect on national attachment. Obviously, there are many ways to construct an index of media consumption, and using different measures can obtain different results.

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[41] A fifth model was also tested for radio (not reported in Table 3.5), wherein the effects of radio-listening on national attachment were not significant. Being unable to differentiate television from radio in the WVS, we can now say with confidence that this effect is due to television, not radio.

[42] Political interest was excluded from the original model on the grounds that it is not independent of national attachment nor of other explanatory variables in the model, but it is appropriate to include it here in order to address this objection. In fact, political interest is significantly positively correlated with national attachment.

Conclusion

Before going any further, one potential alternative explanation of the findings must be addressed. It is obvious that individuals' use of media is based on their interests, attitudes, preferences, and identities, and that people *choose* to consume media. Because of this, it is not possible to demonstrate causation simply through the correlations shown here. It seems that we must admit that causation in this case may work both ways. While we may have to live with this possibility, there are some good arguments for interpreting these results as the effects of media. First, it is difficult to make an argument that reverse causation can explain *all* of the findings presented here. For instance, while it is perhaps plausible that individuals with a stronger attachment to Chinese national identity may consume informational media more often out of personal preference, it seems somewhat less plausible to explain the correlation with politico-cultural constitutive norms in the same way. It makes little sense to argue that people who have a more culturally-constituted idea of the Chinese nation are more likely to watch television or read a newspaper, because the mechanisms through which national identity is constructed in the media work at an unconscious level that is undetected by people as they consume informational media.

Second, the argument that national attachment causes increased exposure to media would be much more convincing if our analysis were applied to particular television programs, newspapers, magazines, or websites. However, the findings here are about media usage on the whole, and at the most specific level, about usage of a particular medium. To argue that reverse causation explains these findings, one must accept that people with a stronger national identity must have a stronger preference not

only for particular types of media, but for informational media consumption *in general*. This argument seems very difficult to make, and even if one accepts such an argument, the results here at the very least indicate that national identity and media use are significantly related.

Third, it is unlikely that the all of the correlations observed above are spurious—that there is a third factor that is responsible for the variation in both national sentiment and in media usage. The above statistical tests controlled for a great variety of factors. Given the many variables for which we have controlled statistically, it is difficult to determine what omitted variable might be the source of a possible spurious relationship. We cannot get rid of the possibility of reverse causation, but given these arguments, it seems reasonable to conclude that the effects of the media on individual-level nationalism are stronger than the reverse effects of national sentiment on media consumption.

To summarize the findings presented here, hypothesis 1 is supported: media consumption does work to mold the content of national identity. Hypothesis 2, that media consumption affects the strength of national attachment finds only mixed support: it is supported by one set of measures (WVS) but finds no support by another (China Survey). Hypothesis 3 was tested less rigorously, and is weakly supported: the 'nationalizing' effect of media appears to be stronger in China than in the U.S., although the pattern of which types of media have this effect is similar.

The most important finding we have discovered, however, concerns Hypothesis 4, which is strongly supported across all tests. When examining the effects of media consumption on national identity, the particular medium matters. Television, the most common medium in China, is still, more than any other medium, under the control of the

state. For most Chinese, a large portion—in some cases a majority—of available television channels are those of state-owned CCTV. This is perhaps the main reason that television is so able to shape the content and the strength of national identity in China. By contrast, developments in the newspaper industry have resulted in the state releasing its grip on newspapers in general. Many of the most popular newspapers, be they national, regional, or local, are independent from the state. And while the government has been surprisingly adept at regulating the internet, there is simply far too much information on the web for the government to exercise the degree of control it does in television. But since television is by far the most popular medium in China, the effects of media consumption are more often than not what the state wants them to be. Since the phasing out of Marxism-Leninism, this has meant building a strong Chinese national identity based on politico-cultural constitutive norms.

This chapter has established that media consumption has an important relationship with Chinese national identity at the individual level. It appears that the state is able to build a stronger sense of national identity in the public, and even to shape this identity's content, through the informational media, and especially through television and radio. Furthermore, the results suggest that this effect may not be as strong in a society in which the press is less susceptible to government influence. With respect to the case of China, the overall results support the 'nationalizing' conception of the media and stand as evidence against the idea of a 'globalizing' media. Newspapers and the internet, however, do appear to be forces working against nationalization, and are important exceptions to this general trend.

Finally, not only do people who consume more media have a somewhat stronger attachment to their Chinese national identity, they are also more likely to define Chineseness in a way that accords with the CCP's broadcasted image of China. While not all alternative explanations of these findings can be completely ruled out, and while the results can be explained through processes outside of centrally controlled propaganda, this certainly resembles what we would expect the effects of propaganda to look like.

CHAPTER 4: EDUCATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

The mass media can be a powerful force in shaping national identity, but an arguably even more important nation-building force is a state's system of formal education. While the role of the state with respect to the production of media content varies across countries, in the contemporary world the state nearly always has a say in how its citizens are to be educated. The supervisory role of the state in education, unlike in the realm of mass media, largely goes unquestioned, even in liberal democracies. Thus, in any society, education represents an effective mechanism of nation-building, and regardless of the other purported goals of education, this function of nation-building is always present.

This chapter examines education's impact on national identity formation. The first section reviews previous scholarship on education and its links to nationalism and national identity, both in the general literature and in research done on China. The second section provides a statistical overview of education in China, while the third presents some hypotheses about how different components of national identity are presented in the Chinese educational system, particularly through the teaching of Chinese history. The fourth section presents the results of classroom observation in two Chinese middle schools as well as an analysis of a middle school Chinese history textbook. The final section summarizes the main findings of the chapter and offers suggestions for further research.

Existing Literature Linking Nationalism and Education

Many authors have noted the importance of modern educational systems in the nation-building process. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) referred to schools as the

modern equivalent of churches, arguing that they served to legitimate structures of authority just as organized religion had done in the past. The intelligentsia, the class constituting the central actor in Smith's (1983) theory of nationalism, were precisely those who had been through some higher education, whether scholarly, clerical, or professional. Green (1992) argues that the process of state formation was the fundamental driving force behind the development of mass education in the U.S. and Europe.

More than any other scholar, however, Ernest Gellner's work emphasizes the importance of the educational system in the process of nation-building. Most theories of nationalism acknowledge a certain role for formal education, but for Gellner, the educational system constitutes *the* key link in the sequence that leads from industrialization to nationalization. Gellner's overall theory was outlined in chapter two, so here the discussion will be limited to the place of education in the nation-building process detailed by Gellner.

As an agrarian society transitions into an industrial society, a supply of literate and mobile citizens must be produced, and sorted according to abilities, in order to ensure the society's capacity for continued and efficient industrialization. An educational system fulfills these goals of mass literacy and sorting (Gellner 1983, 63). Furthermore, in Gellner's view, the necessary size of an effective mass educational system puts a lower limit on the size of an effective industrial society, such that smaller ethnic or cultural enclaves often find themselves absorbed into the educational and bureaucratic domain of a larger, more efficient state. [43] Gellner's own hypothetical scenario of Ruritanians

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[43] This overall process as described by Gellner has been critiqued as functionalist, but as the historical development of national education systems is not our primary concern, this critique is not addressed here.

fighting absorption into Megalomania exemplifies this trend, with the possible outcomes of Ruritanian independence or absorption into Megalomania. Which outcome is resultant depends on Ruritania's own size and capacity to employ its professional class within Ruritanian institutions. In other words, if Ruritania can produce its own self-sustaining literate 'high culture' (Gellner's term), only then can Ruritania retain its independence in the industrial world.

An educational system is most often the only way to produce such a nationalizing high culture. Thus in Gellner's account, the nationalization of culture, and especially the standardization of language, is the impetus as well as the fundamental purpose of the modern educational system. Put bluntly, the main mission of standardized education is to produce standardized nationals. While Gellner may overstate this point at the expense of education's other, more forthright goals (training for a productive and rewarding life, cultivation of virtue, etc.), this socializing and legitimating role of any system of basic education is difficult to deny.

Scholars have found no difficulty in confirming this role of education in the case of China. In his 1932 study of Chinese education, Cyrus H. Peake asserted that "the dominant motive and aim of those Chinese, who have been responsible for the introduction of modern education into China in the course of the past seventy years, was to build a strong nation resting on military power and capable of existing in a world of warring nations" (Peake 1932, p. xi). Tsang disagreed with the proposition that nation-building was the sole purpose of the installation of a modern educational system, but still emphasized the importance of nationalism among education's multifaceted purposes (Tsang 1933).

More recent studies have taken more nuanced approaches to obtain similar findings about early-twentieth-century China. Zheng Yuan (2001) examines the content of curriculum in China from 1901 to 1949, spanning three political regimes. Yuan specifically focuses on the status of Confucianism in education as a barometer for the state's political control over education, and finds that even while the legitimating ideologies of the regimes shifted, school curriculum was a constant driving force for the legitimation of traditional autocratic government (p. 212). It did this by inculcating deference to authority under the auspices of Confucianism. Thogerson (2001) also notes that the growth of the Chinese educational system largely represented an attempt to by state leaders to strengthen the nation-state by producing loyal citizens (p. 187).

One of the most notable characteristics of the nationalism in Chinese education is its explicit, straightforward, and transparent acknowledgement by leaders, educators, and administrators. This has not changed in recent years, as Chinese education's nation-building ends have been quite straightforwardly presented to the public. Suisheng Zhao (1998; 2004) has written on the extensive 'patriotic education campaign' (爱国主义教育运动) that followed the widespread protests of 1989. This campaign was not a hidden agenda lurking behind Chinese education but a publicly presented and accepted campaign with the explicit goal of making students more patriotic. In addition, the campaign's ongoing educational policy spreads beyond the formal educational system, with campaign policies implemented in the military, in entertainment, at historical sites, and in neighborhood committees as well as in schools. For instance, Rana Mitter (2005) has written on the importance of museums in building Chinese national identity, especially museums devoted to the 1937-1945 war with Japan (抗日战争). These policies aside, it

should be kept in mind that the patriotic education campaign's emphasis was on youth, and its profoundest effects were felt in the educational world. [44]

Especially when dealing with minority populations, teaching courses using Mandarin Chinese is another avenue through which the state can make nationals of students. However, there is disagreement amongst scholars as to what extent Chinese educational policy forces minorities to assimilate in this way. Scholars such as Naran Bilik (2005) and Arienne Dwyer (2005) both see the system as strongly assimilationist to minorities, while Yu (2010) and Tang and He (2010) argue that in terms of how they are implemented, China's educational policies, including language-of-instruction policies, are favorable toward minorities. The next chapter will go into substantially greater depth on this topic.

Allen Chun (2005), in a study of Taiwanese middle schools in 1990, makes an important contribution to the literature by noting the importance of mundane elements of school life, such as the physical environment and structure of the school building, the strictness of a student's daily routine, and the hierarchical social structure of schools. These elements all play subtle but significant parts in habituating students to accept and submit to systems of authority, especially that of the nation-state. As Chun puts it himself, "while one cannot doubt the purely utilitarian aspects that seem to characterize the institutional backbone of this educational system, one cannot ignore either the evolution of modern Asian education as part of the process of nation-building and its socializing functions" (p. 60).

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[44] Even many of the non-school policies were aimed primarily at children. For instance, Mitter (2005) reports that at the Beijing museum on the war with Japan, 60% of visitors in 1994 were schoolchildren. Even museum projects have youth as their primary target audience.

The Context of Chinese Education

As shown in the previous section, scholars have long noted the importance of nation-building in Chinese education. However, we have yet to introduce some of the basics of the current system of formal education in China. This is especially important because the system differs from Western educational systems.

Nine years of education is compulsory for all Chinese. This includes the six years of primary school (grades one through six) and the three years comprising lower secondary school (grades seven through nine). After this, students may go on to academic high schools for grades ten through twelve, or instead go to a vocational school for career training.

One important characteristic of the system is the emphasis on standardized examinations. The most notable of these is the *gaokao* (高考), the high school graduation exam, which effectively serves as the nationwide college entrance exam. This examination, which can take two to three days, includes Chinese language, mathematics, physics, chemistry, history, geography, biology, and English (Wang 2003, p. 136). The pressure from this examination is felt intensely by students, and suicides resulting from failure on the exam are not uncommon.

A related characteristic of Chinese education is the seriousness with which students compete academically, particularly during the high school years. Wang (2003) provides examples of lower secondary school students whose daily schedules have them studying from 6 am to 10 or 11 pm, with breaks only for meals, and only slightly more free time on weekends. Moreover, secondary students typically stay at their schools from 7 am to 7 pm (Wang 2003, p. 139-40). Although educational policy has attempted to

address the problem of heavy student workloads, the problem still persists, especially at the upper secondary level.

Table 4.1 displays levels of education among the Chinese population according to age group. We will look first at the bottom row of the table, which shows the overall statistics for everyone age 15 and over. The bolded numbers in each row add up to 100%. This tells us that 6.5% of Chinese have had no formal education, and that 30.6% (6.5 + 24.1) of Chinese have not gone beyond primary school (grade six). Approximately 46% of the population has completed high school (grade twelve), and about 5% have earned a postsecondary degree.

The stated minimum level of education required by current government policy is to complete middle school (grade nine), and the table shows us that, among the youngest cohort, 85.8% have had some secondary education (grades seven through twelve), while 79% have completed high school. This means that 80% to 85% of Chinese youth have met the official requirement by graduating from middle school. While this is not perfect, it is certainly an improvement, even when comparing to the next youngest cohort (20-24).

In fact, the most striking trend shown by Table 4.1 is not the level of education of the overall population, but the steady progress Chinese education has made in the years since the founding of the PRC. Starting at the bottom of the rightmost column of the table and proceeding upwards, we find a consistent generational rise in average years of education as we look at younger cohorts. Rates of tertiary education also have risen dramatically, just as rates of dropping out in primary school have fallen. In the same way, we see from the column marked "No Schooling" that very few Chinese in younger cohorts have gone without formal education, whereas this was a far more common

scenario even among those in their thirties. China seems to be working effectively

toward its fundamental educational goals, as rates of education are rising steeply for each

subsequent generation.[45]

Table 4.1. Educational attainment in China by age group, 2010

Age Group	No schooling	Primary		Secondary		Tertiary		Average Years of schooling
		Total	Completed	Total	Completed	Total	Completed	
		(% of population aged 15 and over)						
15 19	0.1	0.0	0.0	85.8	79.1	14.1	2.0	11.111
20 24	0.1	6.6	4.2	67.2	67.2	26.0	9.6	10.780
25 29	0.1	9.3	5.9	75.5	75.5	15.2	8.8	10.374
30 34	1.7	17.2	10.9	72.5	72.5	8.6	5.1	9.487
35 39	2.3	24.0	15.1	67.0	67.0	6.7	4.5	8.764
40 44	2.8	29.1	18.2	62.5	62.5	5.5	3.7	8.410
45 49	3.3	25.2	15.7	66.1	52.2	5.4	3.6	8.279
50 54	6.0	32.5	20.1	57.5	26.4	3.9	2.6	7.228
55 59	9.5	45.2	27.7	42.2	11.2	3.1	2.1	6.206
60 64	13.1	52.0	31.9	32.0	8.5	2.8	1.9	5.627
65 69	20.1	47.4	26.2	29.6	7.3	2.9	2.0	5.113
70 74	31.0	43.9	24.3	21.5	5.3	3.5	2.3	4.340
75 +	53.6	32.1	10.0	12.5	3.1	1.8	1.2	2.562
15 +	6.5	24.1	15.0	60.4	46.0	9.0	5.2	8.167

Source: Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset (derived from 2010 China Census).
Compiled by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee. Available at: http://barrolee.com.

Hypothesis and Statistical Tests

Given the sharply rising rates of education in China, this chapter's central

question becomes all the more important: how does education contribute to the formation

of national identity and national sentiment? To observe statistical evidence of

[45] By way of comparison, India is in a similar situation, although its average years of schooling for the 15-19 age cohort is approximately 7, well short of China's 11.1 years for the same age group (Source: Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset).

education's impact on national identity, the most obvious approach is to test the statistical relationship between the two. In other words, we might hypothesize that those who have had more education will correspondingly display more national sentiment.

However, there are also theoretical reasons to expect the opposite relationship. Level of education is an important component of class identity, and it is in this sense that we usually find that education level is negatively correlated with measures of nationalism. In the United States, for example, this relationship consistently turns up. More educated people pay more attention to politics and are often more critical of government and its policies. Educated people are also more likely to know and work with people from other countries, which may work against feelings of national superiority or xenophobia. In short, educated people generally turn out more cosmopolitan rather than more nationalist.

This particular characterization of education, though, comes largely from Western experience, and it is worthwhile to examine the effects of education in China before we assume too much. Results from the previous chapter on the relationship between education and national sentiment in China were mixed. Findings from the World Values Survey showed no statistically significant relationship between education and attachment to national identity, as well as no effect of education on holding politico-cultural constitutive norms. On the other hand, results from Texas A&M's China Survey indicated a small but strongly significant positive relationship between education and national attachment. While there is a significant negative relationship between education and national attachment in the U.S., the mixed results from China show that if there is a relationship, it is small and perhaps even in the opposite direction.

This is puzzling given that college students in China, particularly since the May Fourth movement in 1919, have a reputation for protest that equals or even exceeds that of college students in Western countries. This legacy certainly constitutes much of the reason that intellectuals during Mao's era were termed the 'old stinking ninth' category (臭老九 *chòu lǎo jiǔ*) and were despised as insubordinate upper-class snobs. Despite this reputation, however, the data indicate that the educated are not significantly less nationalist than the relatively uneducated.

Perhaps this difference between China and the U.S. merely indicates the current disparity in levels of education—rather than the meaning of education—between the two countries. We could theorize that the early years of education are when national identity and obedience to authority are inculcated in students, and that the later years, by contrast, ingrain a habit of questioning and independent thinking. If this were true, we would expect the effect of education on nationalism to be nonlinear: nationalism might peak at a certain level of education and decline thereafter. Might this account for the difference between the results in China and the U.S.?

We find theoretical reason to expect such a relationship in a debate between two competing theoretical models of education. By far the dominant mainstream interpretation of education is to see it as a *process of learning*, in which students learn knowledge and skills that they can later use to improve their station in life. However, a less commonly held interpretation of education is frequently discussed in the field of economics. Instead of a process of learning, in this school of thought education is seen as a *process of sorting* or screening (Spence 1974; Stiglitz 1975). In this view, the value of education is not in what you have learned, but in the distinction of having been sorted

into a higher educational group, which serves as a social indicator of a person's merit, skills, intelligence, and ultimately social status.

Each of these interpretations of education is partially true (Weiss 1983), but the tension between them highlights one reason to expect a nonlinear relationship with respect to education's effect on national sentiment. In early education, students are implicitly introduced to the fundamental ideas and concepts of nationalism (nations, languages, governments, leaders) as well as how these concepts interact with one another (the world is divided into nations, governments and leaders represent these nations). Moreover, most of this is learned through the example of China itself, building a national identity upon which later learning of historical events will be structured and interpreted. In these early years, lasting into middle school (the last required level of education), the learning model of education provides a simple mechanism of nation-building through education. Thus, here we can expect education to produce a strong sense of national identity, and those who miss out on formal education at this early level should have a weaker sense of national identity than others.

In high school and beyond, however, we might expect just the opposite on the grounds of the sorting model. At this level in the educational process, beyond the mandatory nine years of schooling, students begin to be 'sorted' into or out of school on the basis of their academic merits. Whether a student is sent into a preparatory high school or into a vocational school is the beginning point of this sorting, while the college entrance exam, the *gaokao*, represents another important sorting mechanism.

On its own, this has little relevance to the relationship between education and nationalism. However, it is at this point that the oft-cited intellectual incoherence of

nationalism as a doctrine (Smith 1983; Anderson 1991) becomes important. Benedict

Anderson observed that one of the central paradoxes for those who study nationalism is

> the 'political' power of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even
> incoherence. In other words, unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced
> its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes or Webers. This
> 'emptiness' easily gives rise, among cosmopolitans and polylingual intellectuals, to a
> certain condescension (Anderson 1991, p. 5).

Relatively few people in mass publics ever question the 'realness' of the nation.   When it

does happen, critical questioning of nationalism comes almost exclusively from highly

educated intellectuals, while most of the public never imagines that humanity is not

naturally divided into nations. Most people without a college education would never

think to question this idea.

This is, in part, the result of skills learned from education, such as abstract

thought and critical questioning. It is also, however, a result of sorting: those with better

ability and more interest in engaging in these activities are the ones who have not been

sorted out of the educational system. Thus even if we assume that national-identity-

building mechanisms are present at all levels of the educational process, those who

continue on to higher education are, by selection, the type of people to whom

nationalistic sentiment has less appeal, because of the 'philosophical poverty of

nationalisms'. Thus, even if education at higher levels promotes nationalism just as

much as lower levels do, we should expect the nation-building functions of education to

produce diminishing returns—or perhaps even reverse effects, as students grow more

advanced.

To sum up: we can expect nation-building to be successful in the early years of

education. However, because of the intellectual shakiness of the central doctrines of

nationalism, those students who are likely to be most successfully 'nationalized' tend to eventually be sorted out of the educational system. Thus, we expect that the relationship between education and attachment to one's national identity will be negative, rather than positive, at higher levels of education.

> *Hypothesis: The correlation between level of education and level of national attachment will be positive among the lower-education population and negative at higher levels of education.*

In other words, we can expect the relationship to be nonlinear, in the shape of an inverted U. We now turn to a test of this hypothesis.

Figure 4.1. Mean national attachment by educational group

Note: See pages 82-83 in Chapter 3 for dependent variable coding.

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

The simplest test here is to look at levels of national attachment in groups with different educational attainment. Figure 4.1 displays the average levels of national attachment at six different groups. Those with no formal education score the lowest on national attachment, while the group with the highest scores on this measure is that group of people who have finished middle school (grade 9), but not high school (grade 12). Those who have finished high school and those who have some higher education both score lower than the two groups in the center of the chart. Our hypothesis is supported here, as education's effect seems to be in somewhat of an inverted U-shape. The next step is to see if this relationship holds up when controlling for other variables in a multivariate model.

One common and straightforward method of testing for a nonlinear relationship in a multivariate model is to include both the variable of interest and its mathematical square. This is commonly done with respondent age in the literature on political participation, as it is typically found that middle-aged people are more likely to vote or otherwise participate in politics than are either the young or the elderly (e.g. Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Here we will do the same for education.

Table 4.2 presents the results of an OLS multiple regression predicting levels of national attachment.[46] Although most of the terms in the model are statistically significant, the R-squared is low, as is common when attempting to explain variation in national attachment (see Chapter 3 above as well as Kennedy 2009). Both terms for education—years of education and years of education squared—have highly statistically significant effects. Moreover, the effects are each in the expected direction. The linear

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[46] National attachment is measured by a five point additive index of survey items. For details on the measurement of this and other control variables, see the appendix and the discussion in Chapter 3.

term's coefficient is positive, while that of the squared term is negative, indicating an increase in nationalism at lower educational levels and a decrease at higher levels. The most striking result is in the rightmost column of the table, where the standardized coefficients indicate the relative strengths of the variables' effects in the model. It appears that education's impact on nationalism is the strongest predictor in the model, with respondent age a close second, with a similar nonlinear effect.

Table 4.2. OLS model depicting education's nonlinear effect on national attachment

Variable	Coef.	S.E.	Std. Coef.
Yrs ed.	0.018***	(0.002)	0.488
$[\text{Yrs ed}]^2$	-0.001***	(0.000)	-0.348
Age	0.004***	(0.001)	0.37
Age^2	-0.000**	(0.000)	-0.292
Female	-0.008	(0.005)	-0.026
Income	-0.045**	(0.013)	-0.053
Public Worker	-0.023	(0.024)	-0.015
CCP Member	0.049***	(0.010)	0.083
Religious	0.011	(0.007)	0.025
Rural	-0.011†	(0.006)	-0.03
Han	0.056***	(0.008)	0.119
Media Use	0.032	(0.021)	0.026
Constant	0.541***	(0.025)	---
N		3865	
R^2		0.081	

***$p<.001$; **$p<.01$; *$p<.05$; †$p<.10$. See Chapter 3 for measures.

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

In summary, the hypothesis arrived at above is supported by these results. Education's effect on national attachment is indeed nonlinear. It seems from these results that basic education is an effective national-identity-building project, but that this effect

cannot be extrapolated to higher levels of education. This is not to say that higher education is not important to overall nation-building, but only that at the individual level, national attachment is brought about by the earlier years of education.

The next section turns to a slightly different question. While we have just examined *what* some of the nation-building effects of education are, and on *whom* they are effective, we will now turn to *how* education develops national identity. In other words, what educational mechanisms are in place to produce this statistical relationship?

The Educational Mechanisms of Nation-Building

Answering a question of *how* requires a different methodological approach than a question of *what*. In January 2011 I observed classes in two Chinese middle schools. One school was in Beijing, and the other was north of Beijing in Hebei province. In addition to observing classes in history and politics, I was able to speak with teachers and students about the content of history classes and the relationship of history classes to Chinese national identity. I was also graciously given a copy of a textbook of modern Chinese history. The next subsection contains an analysis of the textbook, while the following subsection discusses observations made from the school visits themselves.

An Eighth Grade History Textbook and the 'Century of National Humiliation'

Content analysis of history textbooks is a common method of evaluating the nation-building functions of education. In some cases such analyses are critical of textbooks, arguing that the picture of national identity presented by textbooks is unsatisfactory, or that history as presented by textbooks excludes important elements or overemphasizes unreliable stories.[47] Peake (1932) made this sort of argument about

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[47] One example of such a review of textbooks is James W. Loewen's 1995 book *Lies My Teacher Told Me* (New York: Touchstone Press), which critically examines American history textbooks.

Chinese history textbooks in 1932. My aim here is not to present a critique of Chinese history as it is told through this particular textbook, but simply to note what events it stresses in Chinese history, and discover how it presents these events in a way that establishes what it means to be Chinese and what the Chinese nation's *social purposes* are (to use a term from Abdelal et al., 2006).

Simply titled *China's History* (中国历史*Zhongguo Lishi*), the textbook was published by the People's Education Publishing House (PEP) in 2001 and is intended as course material for the first semester of the eighth grade. It covers the period known as modern Chinese history, beginning at the opening of the Opium War in 1839 and concluding at the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949. The book is broken into seven units, each of which contains several chapters. The first five units are titled, in sequence, "Aggression and Resistance", "Exploration of Modernization", "The New Democratic Revolution", "The Chinese People's War Against Japan", and "Victory in the War of the People's Liberation".[48] The two remaining units are devoted to the economic, social, technological, and cultural developments that occurred in this period. In total there are twenty-two chapters, and each is three to four pages in length.

Before going into the analysis, a note on textbook selection is in order. While this particular book was given to me by a teacher at one of the middle schools I visited, I cannot claim to have methodically selected the textbook for analysis. However, the publisher of the book, People's Education Publishing (PEP), is the official educational press of the government, under the direct leadership of the Ministry of Education.[49] While not all middle schools in China use the PEP textbook series, most of them still do.

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[48] Translation of the original Chinese from the textbook is my own.
[49] More information on PEP can be found at www.pep.com.cn.

Until 1986, when textbook production was opened, PEP held a monopoly on textbook production. Since then, although a few municipalities have begun using textbooks specially suited to their own student populations, the vast majority of middle schools still use the PEP textbooks.[50] Furthermore, since the Ministry of Education carefully screens any proposed alternative history textbook, any substantive variation in content produced by textbook pluralization of the last twenty years is minimized (Jones 2008, 112). Thus, the PEP textbook analyzed here is the most appropriate book to analyze if we are concerned with the generalized impact of middle school history textbooks, as it is the most common, and the most representative of the Ministry of Education's content standards.

Scholars of China have often noted the importance of the 'century of national humiliation' (百年国耻 *bainian guochi*) to modern Chinese national identity. The basic concept is that, from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth, China suffered greatly at the hands of Western powers and Japan, succumbing to unequal treaties and partial colonization, until it finally 'stood up' (站起来了*zhanqilaile*, in the words of Mao) in 1949 with the Communist victory over the Nationalists. Gries (2004a) argues that the 'victim narrative' produced by this period of history—in particular the 1937 Rape of Nanjing by the Japanese army—is a core piece of Chinese identity that, when contested, still stirs controversy among Chinese. Throughout *China's History* this narrative of Chinese victimhood is a central theme. Indeed, no history of this period could ignore the economic, political, and cultural impact of foreign powers on China, but

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[50] According to Schneider (2008, 165), there are a total of eight sets of middle school history textbooks on the market, although the PEP books effectively retain their monopoly in all but a few localities.

both the organization of middle school history courses and the textbook's framing of Chinese interactions with foreign powers draw special attention to the injustices of this period of history.

The first year of middle school (seventh grade) history classes starts at the ancient Xia dynasty (2070 B.C.), and concludes in the mid-Qing dynasty in the early nineteenth century. Eighth grade history picks up here and begins with the Opium War in 1839, which is commonly considered the beginning of China's century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. The first semester concludes with the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, signifying the end of the century of humiliation. In the second semester of eighth grade, students are taught the history of China after liberation by the Communists and up to the present day. World history is then studied in ninth grade, the last year of middle school.

The overall structure of middle-school Chinese history classes (grades seven and eight) follows a familiar three-segment pattern of dramatic narrative. In the first segment, protagonists are introduced, along with their ways of dealing with problems and crises. In line with this, in the first year of study ancient China is introduced, as are the ways in which it deals with problems such as defense against barbarians and the rise and fall of dynastic regimes. In the second segment, the protagonists are placed into a desperate situation as they are pitted against powerful and unsympathetic antagonists and subjected to their cruelty. This of course lines up neatly with China's century of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers, which is covered in the first semester of eighth grade. The final act sees the protagonists finally overcome the villains, although not without bearing great costs. After China 'stood up' in 1949, it was able eventually to

improve its international standing as well as its people's standard of living, and is now reclaiming its rightful place in the world as a respected civilization. The mistakes made along the way, such as the Cultural Revolution, represent the costs of overcoming China's past weakness through strong leadership.

While I have only examined classes and texts from the second stage in this pattern, in my conversations with teachers and students I realized that this basic structure is how Chinese history is frequently understood and taught in school. The middle school history teachers with whom I discussed this seemed to conceive of Chinese history in three large parts—ancient (古代 *gudai*, ending with the first Opium War), modern (近代 *jindai*, 1840 to 1949), and contemporary (现代 *xiandai*, 1949 until present). This cognitive structure fits well with the above interpretation of Chinese history as a three-part dramatic narrative.

The emphasis on the humiliation of China at the hands of foreign governments is visible in the details as well as in the structure of the book. The way Chinese history is framed in the textbook itself testifies to this. This is immediately evident in the first chapter, which covers the Opium War. The chapter is broken into two sections, the first of which discusses the rise of the British opium trade and its subsequent banning by Lin Zexu, a high-ranking Chinese official. The second section covers the resulting war and the concluding Treaty of Nanjing. I choose this chapter because of its priority as the first chapter, its importance in Chinese history, and its significance for each student who reads it. Aside from a few stories that she may have encountered in primary school, this represents each student's first in-class study of China being dominated by a Western power.

The chapter opens with this sentence: "In the mid 19th Century, Great Britain became the most powerful capitalist country. In order to open the international market, to sell manufactured goods, and to plunder cheap industrial raw materials, Great Britain pointed the spearhead of aggression towards China." (Wang 2010, 2).[51] The book goes on to discuss in more detail the reasons for the British smuggling opium into China: to get silver out of China and to intensify China's weakness. The second alleged objective of Britain, to make China weaker, is a particularly strong manifestation of the theme of humiliation. Under this interpretation, not only was China humiliated in the Opium War, but one of the real purposes of the British importation of opium was explicitly to weaken China to begin with. Note also how the book immediately adopts an interpretation of historical events implicitly based on Lenin's theory of the capitalist drive toward international imperialism, and on a larger Marxist framework of historical materialism. Britain's main objective is, in the end, an economic one.

The chapter then tells of Lin Zexu's successful plea for the emperor to ban opium, and his subsequent destruction of large amounts of opium on the beach at Humen. "The Humen smoke abatement was the Chinese people's great victory in the struggle to ban opium, and it showed the strength of the Chinese nation's will to resist foreign encroachment. Lin Zexu, in leading this long struggle, remains a national hero with a spotless reputation" (Wang 2010, 4). This characterization of Lin Zexu stands in contrast to that of Emperor Daoguang himself, who was seemingly unaware of the problem until informed by Lin, and who was "utterly terrified" (p. 4) of the British when they later fought their way up the coast to the doorstep of Beijing.

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[51] All translations from this text are my own.

Next the book recounts the war itself and the resulting Treaty of Nanjing. There is a special text box on the story of Guan Tianpei, the famous Chinese admiral who pulled out his sword and fought to the death in order to defend his stronghold from British forces. It is worth noting that Guan Tianpei and Lin Zexu, both Han Chinese, stand out in the chapter as the heroes of the Opium War, in stark contrast to the Manchu Qing government, who put up a "hollow defense" (防务空虚 *fangwu kongxu*) north of Fujian, "lost their dignity" (有失尊严 *youshi zunyan*) over the course of the war, and "humiliated the nation and forfeited its sovereignty" (丧权辱国 *sangquanruguo*) by signing the Treaty of Nanjing (p. 4). While the book overall may portray China's minority groups in a positive light, this chapter's Han Chinese heroes stand out against the backdrop of a cowardly Manchurian dynasty. Thus, while educational materials explicitly and officially recognize that minority groups are equally Chinese, in this chapter there appear to be messages under this surface that implicitly glorify Han Chinese at the expense of minorities, influencing student perceptions of what it means to be Chinese.

The overwhelming theme of the chapter on the Opium War, however, is China's wrongful humiliation at the hands of a Western power. The chapter ends with a telling statement on the long-term significance of the war: "After the Opium War, China gradually was reduced from a feudal society to a semi-colonial, semi-feudal society. The Opium War was beginning of Chinese modern history." In other words, the Opium War marks the start of the century of humiliation. This concluding thought situates the war within the broader dramatic structure of middle school Chinese history. China was thrust unwillingly into the crucible of international conflict, and found itself outgunned by

foreign powers. In short, China faced challenges and enemies the likes of which it had never met before: the second and darkest part of China's three-part story was about to be told.

School visits

Along with the analysis of textbooks, observation of the classroom environment naturally presents itself as a straightforward way to understand the mechanisms through which education develops national identity. Toward this end, I visited two middle schools in January 2011.[52] At the first, in Hebei province, I sat in on two classes—a Chinese history class and a politics class—and had conversations with the history teacher and several students. The second middle school was in Beijing. I observed one history class and discussed Chinese history with the teacher afterwards.

The aim of the case selection here was to get a sample of a wealthy, urban school, as well as a sample of a less developed school in the setting of a smaller town. This method not only allows us to get a sense of the differences between the two schools, but also allows us to generalize more than we could from a sample of a single school of either type. The contrast between the two schools was striking. It was quite evident that, although both were public schools, the middle school in Beijing had many more resources than the Hebei school. In Hebei I was surprised to discover that the school building was unheated (except for the body heat of a full classroom), while in contrast it was comfortably warm in the classroom in Beijing, even though it was just as cold outside. While class in Beijing was taught using presentation software, a computer, and a ceiling-mounted projector, the Hebei middle school had no such technology in the

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classroom, and the blackboard was used exclusively. This reflects the economic disparity between Beijing and its outlying areas (or more broadly speaking, between China's large cities and its less developed areas).

This is not to say that the Hebei school was left behind in all areas. In fact, administrators in Hebei were pleased to announce that their school was one of a select few to try a new, experimental teaching model, which put students to work in small groups in class, and included themes of exploration in which students, rather than teachers, were to ask critical questions (质疑栏 *zhiyi lan*, or 'challenge the board'). At the middle school level in China, student-led teaching methods like this are novel, as the traditional method of rote memorization is still dominant. The reforms were indeed being proudly implemented: even though the teacher confessed that she was unprepared and did not know I was coming, the small group method was used extensively in the classes I observed.[53] This produced quite a different classroom session than what I observed at the Beijing school.

Although there was a great deal of discussion among the students, the teacher still held absolute authority in the classroom. When the bell rang, marking the end of the period, the teacher was still speaking to the students, and no student made any move to begin leaving the classroom until the teacher dismissed them a few moments later. In my own school experience in the U.S., students usually immediately left the classroom at the sound of the bell, and the teacher made sure to quickly wrap up once the bell rang. The authority of the Chinese teacher, however, demonstrates how schools tend to train

[53] It should also be noted that when I visited in early January the fall semester was about to close, and classes were reviewing for exams.

students to obey authority figures (Chun 2005).[54] In Beijing, where the traditional model of teaching was in use, the authority of the teacher was equally apparent, although in different ways. Students would only speak when asked a question by the teacher, and then only after raising a hand, being called on by the teacher, standing to speak, and remaining standing until dismissed by the teacher.

While socializing students to accept authority may produce acceptance of the state's authority, cultivating obedience is not the same as the process of legitimation though *national identity* construction. The textbook discussed above proved a rich resource for evidence of the promotion of Chinese national identity. In the classroom, however, one traditional Chinese educational practice showed the construction of national identity in a straightforward and striking fashion. When I walked into the history class in Hebei, class had already begun, and students were reading aloud from a text in unison. While I did not obtain the text from which they were reading, it included a list of the following propositions: "3. Only the Communist Party can save China; only Marxism can save China. 4. Only the leaders of the proletariat....can save China." This being the first thing I heard when I arrived in the classroom, it appeared to be simple indoctrination into the principles of Maoism. However, the students were reading one of Chairman Mao's speeches, as explained by the teacher immediately afterwards. While the main aim of having the class read this aloud may have been to familiarize them with a famous speech of modern Chinese history, it is difficult to argue that this does not serve other purposes: to familiarize the students with the terminology of Marxism-Leninism, to

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[54] Using Max Weber's typology of authority, one might even conjecture that this difference (if it is not merely anecdotal) points to a rational-bureaucratic pattern of authority in the U.S., in which authority comes from rules and formal requirements (i.e., the bell marking the end of the period), compared to perhaps a more traditional pattern of authority in China, wherein traditional authority figures (teachers) are obeyed rather over and above the rules themselves.

encourage the students to understand history through a Marxist lens (much as the textbook does), and to develop a conception of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party as, first and foremost, the saviors of the country. Thus, here we see legitimation of the Communist Party simultaneously based on the old Marxist political ideology, and at the same time based on the image of the Party as those who saved China from its century of weakness and humiliation. Based on these observations, declarations that the old ideology is dead as a legitimating force may be premature.

Obvious elements of nation-building were also present in the physical environment of the classroom. In one classroom in Hebei, above the blackboard were the characters奋发图强 (*fenfatuqiang*), meaning "go all out to make the country strong", with the national flag immediately to the right of the characters.[55] This juxtaposition scarcely needs interpretation: it makes clear to students that the primary purpose of their education is to make China stronger.

In addition to classroom observation, I was also able to have conversations with the two history teachers whose classes I observed concerning their attitudes about national identity and teaching history. Ms. Li, the teacher in at Beijing No. 27 middle school, said that learning Chinese history was important because no nation should forget its own history.[56] Chinese history and world history, according to her, are equally important, but to understand world history one must first build a foundation on an understanding of the history of one's nation. When I asked her about the relationship between teaching history and national identity, she emphasized that Chinese history is not

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[55] This is the translation of this phrase from WenLin electronic dictionary. Nciku, an online dictionary, offers the simpler, less nationalistic translation "work hard for success". The placement of the national flag directly next to the phrase, however, predisposes readers toward the former interpretation in this particular case.

[56] The names of the teachers have been changed here for the sake of anonymity.

Han history, but a story of many nationalities coming together to found the People's Republic. She stressed that Chinese history is the history of the multicultural, multiethnic Chinese nation (中华民族 *zhonghua minzu*). On the topic of patriotic education, she said it permeates the teaching of Chinese history: it can be found in the content, in the characters, and in the connections made in history. Ms. Li's responses indicate a broad concept of patriotic education and a frankness in recognizing the connections between patriotic education and national history curriculum.

Ms. Wu, the teacher in the Hebei school, when asked why learning history was important, responded by saying that we need to study history to learn from the mistakes that past leaders have made and not make them ourselves (she specifically referred to Mao Zedong as someone whose mistakes should not be repeated). She said that the most important thing the students can learn from Chinese history is that China's recent success did not come easy, but was hard-earned (来之不易 *laizhibuyi*). She hopes that learning China's tumultuous history inspires students to study hard and to learn more about their homeland. When I asked her about the relationship between learning Chinese history and developing a national consciousness in students, she said that this was a very important task of the history teacher. In answering this question she specifically discussed the idea of the century of humiliation, saying that because students' lives today are so easy, they need to learn about China's humiliation in the past so that they realize that it has taken a great deal of sweat and tears to get China to where it is today. Like Ms. Li, Ms. Wu also displayed a straightforward recognition that one of the fundamental purposes of teaching history is the building of Chinese national consciousness and national sentiment in students.

Lastly, at Hebei I had the opportunity to discuss similar matters with three eighth-grade students. When I asked what their favorite parts of Chinese history were, the replies I received were General Cao Cao in the ancient Warring Kingdoms Period, the 'rejuvenation' of the Chinese people in 1949, and the War to Resist Japan (during WWII).[57] When asked what parts of Chinese history made them proud to be Chinese, one student, after first establishing that he indeed was very proud to be Chinese, explained that the Chinese people are strong, and in the past China flourished. Since then its path has been very tortuous, but it is finally returning to its past status, so it a very proud moment for China. This general idea of a return to China's past stature has been noted by some scholars as the reason for the Communist Party's continued legitimacy (e.g. Shue 2004). This middle-school student makes it remarkably clear that this is what makes him proud of his country. Presumably this national pride should translate into political support for the government, but that is a question for the sixth chapter.

Conclusion

This paper has examined education's relationship with Chinese nationalism through three methods: statistical analysis of survey data, field visits at Chinese middle schools, and analysis of curricular material. While these methods are widely divergent, they all point to the fundamental importance of education in building national identity.

The statistical results here have shown that more educated people are more likely to have a stronger attachment to Chinese national identity, but that this relationship reverses at higher levels of education. This nonlinear relationship can be explained by the sorting model of education, in which education serves primarily to filter students rather than to teach skills and develop human capital. In fact, the peak of this curve

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[57] I have translated and paraphrased the students' responses for the purposes of accuracy and succinctness.

occurs at approximately nine years of education, which is currently the minimum educational requirement for Chinese citizens.[58] Analysis of a middle-school history textbook revealed the 'century of humiliation' as an important mechanism through which national consciousness is developed in education. Discussions with educators and students confirmed this, while observation of classes suggested that neither the cultivation of respect for authority nor the ideology of Marxism has yet died out as a means of legitimating the state in the classroom. These last two means are not to be confused with legitimation through nationalism per se.

While the next chapter keeps the spotlight on education, it turns its attention to China's ethnic minorities, particularly those that inhabit the remote western Xinjiang Autonomous Region. Since minority-populated areas are of particular concern to the state when it comes to maintaining its popular legitimacy, and since many of the major debates in Chinese educational policy surround questions of the appropriate language of instruction in minority areas, Chapter 5 will address questions of the effectiveness of educational nation-building among China's minorities.

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[58] This was obtained by performing locally weighted bivariate regressions of years of education on the national attachment index.

CHAPTER 5: EDUCATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AMONG ETHNIC

MINORITIES

What are the determinants of an individual's attachment to national identity and

ethnic identity? This question has puzzled social scientists and theorists in political

science and elsewhere. Theorists of nationalism asked a related question: what are the

origins of the idea of the modern nation? Answers to this question have been quite

diverse, ranging from instrumentalist accounts in which the idea of the nation is primarily

a belief in common descent constructed by political elites controlling the state (Brass

1991), to so-called primordialist accounts in which the idea of the nation is powerful

precisely because it is rooted in our most basic instinct to care for our kin (van den

Berghe 1978).

The debates of such theorists were in large part concerned with nationalism as an

ideology, and often focused their discussions on this central concept. This concern with

nationalism also spread from general theory to specific area studies communities. The

field of China studies witnessed a flurry of scholarly work on Chinese nationalism in the

late 1990s, as the political events of the time, such as the U.S.'s May 1999 accidental

bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the resulting anti-American protests

across China, made Chinese nationalism salient in the eyes of both the press and the

scholarly community.

More recently, China scholars and social scientists alike are moving away from a

concern with nationalism as an ideology and toward an interest in the concept of national

identity. Allen Carlson (2009), critiquing the literature on Chinese nationalism, suggests

a move away from theories of nationalism and toward an approach centered on national

identity instead. In the spirit of this recommendation, this chapter adopts a framework of Chinese national identity, and group identity more broadly, in order to find the factors that determine individuals' attachment to national identity and to ethnic identity. Applying explanatory ideas from social identity theory as well as state-based theories of nation-building, this chapter will test hypotheses concerning the importance of religion, ethnicity, language used at home, and language of instruction in school.

Data from China's Xinjiang (pronounced *shin-jahng*) province are used to address these questions, since national and ethnic identities in this region are diverse and still contested. Xinjiang is China's largest region, and constitutes a sixth of China's territory. It is also an important and strategic international crossroads, with eight bordering countries (Tang and He 2010). The largest ethnic group in Xinjiang is the Uyghurs. However, while 45% of Xinjiang's population is Uyghur, the number of Han Chinese is estimated at 41%.[59] Other minority groups include the Kazakh (7%), the Hui (5%), the Kyrgyz, and Mongol (each at about 1% of the population). Aside from the Hui, who speak Mandarin, each of these groups speaks its own language; and aside from the Buddhist Mongols, each of these minority groups is predominantly Muslim. With the exception of some brief periods of independence during times of internal Chinese conflicts, Xinjiang has been under Chinese control since 1765, when Qing rulers conquered the northwest territories. To date, there continue to be struggles for independence, although a majority of Uyghurs oppose ethnic separatism (Yao and Ma 2005).

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[59] These figures come from the China Statistical Yearbook (2005), published by the National Bureau of Statistics of China.

There is need for a deeper understanding of national identity, particularly in the case of China, because of likely links to governmental legitimacy. As pointed out in Chapter 1, researchers have gone to great efforts to understand the consequences of Chinese nationalism because it is often seen as a critical pillar of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (see Shirk 2007, Zhao 2004, and Chen 2004 for different approaches to this idea).

Additionally, and especially relevant given the data source employed in this study, the clash of ethnic identities with a Chinese national identity apparently drives social conflict within China's borders and thus affects the stability of domestic minority relations. The recurrent episodes of social unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang over issues of political autonomy illustrate this point. The consequences of competition between rival national identities and loyalties are witnessed in these sometimes violent events. For these reasons, the issue of national identity is more than an interesting theoretical question for political scientists: it is equally relevant to real-world politics, especially in the minority-inhabited periphery of China.

Theory and Hypotheses

The central concepts in this investigation are national identity and ethnic identity. At the individual level these are best thought of as one's identity as a member of a nation, and one's identity as a member of an ethnic group, respectively. How an individual comes to acquire a national identity is a process that is addressed—sometimes indirectly—by many theories of nationalism. We will construct hypotheses by examining Ernest Gellner's theory of nation-building. As a theory of group identification that operates at the individual level, social identity theory is also useful in formulating

hypotheses about individual attachment to ethnic and national groups. This section will

provide a summary of these basic theoretical frameworks and then lay out four testable

hypotheses.

Social identity theory is attributed mainly to the work of Henri Tajfel (1969).

Tajfel and Turner (1986) later laid out social identity theory as a full theory of group

identity, and at its core is "the assertion that the simple designation of group boundaries

leads to social identity," although the research focus since the articulation of SIT has

been primarily on ingroup bias (Huddy 2001, 133). The theory posits that social identity

(as opposed to personal identity) is rooted primarily in group membership, and that an

individual works to maintain a positive social identity by comparing her group favorably

to outgroups (Brown 2000).

In this theoretical vein, both national identity and ethnic identity are recognized as

competing group identities. For our purposes, the competition of group identities is

social identity theory's most pertinent element. Rather than simply another form of

identity, though, national identity is a special case of group identity since it is backed by

the political authority of the state, or at least aspirations to statehood. As mentioned in

Chapter 2, Max Weber (1958) argued that nationhood is in itself a political claim of the

right to self-governance, which draws an important distinction between national and

ethnic identities. Both are based in a belief in common ancestry or common culture, but

national identity automatically carries a political dimension while ethnic identity lacks

this.

Attachment to national identity among individuals within China's borders may

vary not only in its strength or intensity but also in *which* national identity one is attached

to. Recognizing this, the definition of national identity used for this project must be tied to the state which defines the idea of 'China' as a political and geographical entity. Therefore, as was indicated in Chapter 2, Chinese national identity is here defined as an individual's identification with, and attachment to, China.

As Abdelal et al. (2006) and others have convincingly argued, variation in the content or meaning of a group identity is a fundamentally important characteristic of identity. Recognizing the existence of this variation, our task here is a more modest one of explaining the level of attachment to certain group identities, while leaving aside the interpretive question of what these identities mean to each individual.

For our purposes, there is one particularly important element of what national identity means, and that is its relationship to ethnicity. Hans Kohn (1944) formulated an important distinction between different types of nationalism that still holds sway today. Examining nationalism's development in Europe, Kohn argued that western European states displayed *civic* nationalism while the nationalisms of eastern Europe were of the *ethnic* variety. To sum this up concisely, nationalisms of the West emphasized citizenship, territory, and equality, while the nationalisms of the East stressed culture, religion, and markers of descent. Such a conceptualization is also easily transported from the nationalism literature to the study of national identity, since it directly applies to what it means—and what it takes—to be a member of a nation. Other influential scholars have since worked with a similar framework, such as Anthony D. Smith (1991), who has argued for a conceptualization in which the ethnic and civic types of nationalism embody ideal types at the ends of a continuum. Smith argues that "Every nationalism contains civic and ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms" (Smith 1991, 13). This

broad idea of an ethnic-civic dichotomy is related to our hypotheses below, which taken together test the proposition that one's ethnicity and one's membership in the broader nation are at odds with each other for minority ethnic groups in China.

Social identity theory, along with other theories of identity competition outlined above, would predict that membership in minority ethnic groups, since these groups compete with the state for identity and loyalty, should play a role in mitigating the strength of identification with the nation writ large. This hypothesis has been corroborated in various contexts (Huddy and Khatib 2007 in the US; Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005 in the Netherlands), and should hold especially true for groups based on long-lasting historical identities such as language, and even more so for ethnic groups that might have kin-based nationalist claims of their own.

By the same logic, groups differentiated by religion also should be less likely to embrace an overarching national identity. Jeffrey Seul (1999) has convincingly argued that religion provides a particularly deep source of group identity because the content of religious identity addresses basic psychological needs better than nonreligious group identities. In interviewing Tibetans, Kolås (1996) found that religious belief is the primary marker of the Tibetan identity. This example suggests that religious identity should play a particularly important role in China, since the communist state, although it has recently projected a more tolerant attitude, has traditionally been hostile to religion and religious groups. Also, in addition to the Tibet survey, the Xinjiang survey was designed to gather significant samples of "China's religious minorities": Uighurs, Kazakhs, Huis, and Mongolians (Tang and He 2010, 18).

These theoretical observations on language, ethnicity, and religion lead us to three basic hypotheses regarding national attachment:

N1. Possession and use of a native language other than Mandarin Chinese will result in lower levels of Chinese national attachment.

N2. Membership in a minority ethnic group will result in lower levels of Chinese national attachment.

N3. Identity as a member of a religion or a religious group will lead to lower levels of Chinese national attachment.

Since these hypotheses emphasize the competition of ethnic and national identities, along with them comes the corollary that each of these three factors (nonstandard language, ethnic minority membership, religion) will lead to higher levels of attachment to one's ethnic group (excluding, of course, individuals in the dominant Han Chinese ethnic group). These can be formalized as follows:

E1. Among non-Hans, possession and use of a native language other than Mandarin Chinese will result in higher levels of ethnic group identity.

E2. Membership in a minority ethnic group will result in higher levels of ethnic group identity.

E3. Among non-Hans, identity as a member of a religion or a religious group will lead to higher levels of ethnic group identity.[60]

Another area of concern for us is the role of the state in identity formation. Although the work of Ernest Gellner (1983) is focused mainly on European nationalisms, his emphasis on the role of education in the process of nation-building is relevant here.

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[60] Hypotheses concerning national identity are labeled with N, while those concerning ethnic identity are labeled with E.

With respect to identities, a state's educational system is a powerfully formative institution. For Gellner, high (national) culture comes to replace low (local) culture even in the more peripheral areas of a state's domain, and a nationwide educational system is the crucial mechanism behind this process. It is especially necessary for the state to make its subjects literate in the national language, and the nation-state survives only insofar as it can successfully do this (Gellner 1983, 55). A similar idea can be derived from the thought of Karl Deutsch (1966). To use Deutsch's terminology, the extent of the diffusion of the national language has a direct bearing on the cohesiveness of the communications network that defines the extent of the nation itself. Again, the educational system is a critical link in this framework. Gellner's theory is especially fitting in the case of Xinjiang as Arienne Dwyer (2005) describes it:

> Uyghur families faced a more difficult choice [than Han families]. By choosing Uyghur schools, Uyghur parents hoped to sustain their children's ethnic identity by learning to read and write well in Uyghur. But enrolling their children in Han classrooms ensured that their children would have a higher competence in Chinese and better integration into Han society (37-8).

Although Dwyer does not reference Gellner, this closely mirrors his description of the fictional Ruritanians who discover powerful economic incentives to linguistically integrate into the larger state of Megalomania (Gellner 1983, 58-70). In the aggregate these incentives result in assimilation, or alternately, a nationalist movement that begins with Ruritanian elites.

Another landmark theory of nation-building is that of Benedict Anderson (1991). Like Gellner, Anderson places a strong emphasis on language, but he is more explicitly concerned with the formation of national identity in the consciousness of the individual. When print-capitalism spurred the publishing of books and newspapers in vernacular

languages to reach growing literate audiences, readers were able to 'imagine communities' of people like them, reading the same books and newspapers in the same language. In other words, the creation of distinct and discrete national languages—again, promulgated by massive statewide education in the national language and nationwide communication systems—resulted in people being able to 'think' the nation and thus to imagine national communities (Anderson 1991, 22).

Other work done on the formation of identities also points indirectly to the power of the state. In his study of the construction of the identity of 'Russian-speaking people', David Laitin, following the work of Erik H. Erikson (1968), argues that people are able to select their own identities. However, this identity selection is limited to "the prevalent typologies of identity that surround them" (Laitin 1998, 20). In a similar line of reasoning, Nazroo and Karlsen (2003) point to Bourdieu's concept of *habitus*—the "unconscious principles...which determine 'reasonable' and 'unreasonable' conduct" (Bourdieu 1977, 77; cited in Nazroo and Karlsen 2003, 906)—as performing the same role of limiting the menu for the selection of identities. Recognizing the countervailing forces of individual choice of identities and the role of one's culture and environment in limiting these choices, it is easy to see that the state can play a pivotal role even when individuals are able to choose and adopt their own group identities. For instance, by providing education in a particular language, the state presents this language as a representation of an identity situated around, and sanctioned by, the state. In another example, Gladney (1994) argues that the Chinese state, through its leading role in "the exoticization and representation of minorities" in the public sphere, a task which is "central to [the state's] nationalization and modernization project," brought about "the

homogenization of the majority at the expense of the exoticized minority" (p. 95).

Identity-building projects are especially pertinent in China's western regions, as many of the populations in which the state needs to build political support most effectively are the minority groups that largely inhabit this western periphery. These groups not only have competing (non-Han) ethnic identities, but also have religious identities that clash with the official secularity of the Chinese state, and in most cases, languages distinct from Chinese in both writing and speech. Recognizing the special importance of such groups with respect to questions of national identity, the data used in this study allow us to assess the effectiveness of state efforts at nation-building, whether by building up a Chinese identity, or by distancing minorities from their ethnic identity. In this way we can see in what ways the state may or may not have influence over these identities.

The Chinese government is engaged in an identity-building project through its use of Mandarin as a language of instruction in schools in minority-inhabited areas. According to Dwyer (2005), educational language policy in Xinjiang has undergone a strong assimilationist shift towards monolingual education in Mandarin Chinese, even going so far as to end instruction in the Uyghur language at Xinjiang University and to teach courses on Uyghur poetry in Mandarin Chinese (pp. 39-40).

However, while such a shift in policy may have taken place, there is still a great deal of variation in the implementation of school language policies, due in part to disagreements within the Chinese bureaucracy. According to Tang and He (2010), this is in part the result of bureaucratic turf wars: "the Ministry of Education is in favor of Mandarin education but the State Ethnic Affairs Council supports the use of ethnic languages" (20). The resulting implementation of the policy, then, is highly inconsistent.

Indeed, Tang found through these surveys that Tibetans, Uyghurs, and Kazakhs are all significantly less exposed to Mandarin Chinese in school than their Han counterparts (Tang and He 2010, 20-21, see also Figure 1). While Dwyer argues that "today, Chinese instruction in Xinjiang begins in the first grade" (37), according to Tang's survey results, we know that there is much variation with respect to exactly when—or even if—Mandarin becomes the language of instruction for students in ethnic minority regions.

Following the general thrust of the work of Gellner and Anderson on the importance of education and literacy in the process of building national identity, we arrive at a fourth, more novel hypothesis:

N4. Schooling conducted in Mandarin Chinese will lead to higher levels of attachment to Chinese national identity.

Put somewhat crudely, this hypothesis asks if national identity formation through the channel of education really does work. As often as theories of nation-building are tested, direct tests of the mechanisms at work in this process are relatively uncommon. This hypothesis is intended to do just this. Again, this hypothesis has a corollary concerning ethnic identity:

E4. *Among minority groups, schooling conducted in Mandarin Chinese will lead to lower levels of attachment to ethnic group identity.*

The overarching idea behind the six hypotheses so far listed is that national identity and ethnic identity are in competition in a zero-sum game: there is only so much attachment to go around, and national and ethnic identities compete with each other for this attachment, with the result that an increase in one should lead to a decrease in the other. We must be careful to recognize this explicitly, as many studies of ethnic and

national identity tacitly assume a natural opposition between these two identities.[61] Miles

and Rochefort (1991), in their study of identities in Africa, assumed a static hierarchy in

which some identities are more salient than others. This is evidenced by their survey

design, which forced respondents to prioritize their national, ethnic, village, and other

identities (Mill and Rochefort 1991, 395). While national and ethnic identities may be in

competition in certain contexts and circumstances, this is an empirical question, and it

must not be assumed that the two are necessarily opposed. Rather than assume such a

relationship here, the results of testing the above hypotheses will allow us to judge the

accuracy of this broad conception of identity competition. The next section describes the

data used to conduct these tests.

Data, Measures, and Descriptive Statistics

This chapter uses data from the survey undertaken by Wenfang Tang in northwest

China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region as part of the 2006-2007 Chinese Ethnicity

Surveys.[62] The Xinjiang survey is a stratified, non-probability sample of middle school

and high school students, and is not intended to represent the general population of China

or Xinjiang. The survey was designed, rather, with the objective of understanding

national and ethnic identities in the ethnically diverse borderlands of the PRC. In

addition to Han Chinese, four of China's minority ethnic groups—Uyghurs (the majority

in Xinjiang), Huis, Kazakhs, and Mongols are all represented in large numbers in the

sample. These four minority groups were chosen because each of them is distinct from

the Han Chinese in religion, with Uyghurs, Huis, and Kazakhs practicing Islam, and

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[61] This is possibly owing to the popularity of Kohn's (1944) ethnic vs. civic framework of nationalisms discussed earlier.

[62] Please contact Professor Tang at the University of Iowa regarding access to this data.

Mongols Buddhism (Tang and He 2010, 17).[63] By contrast, Han Chinese by and large claim no religion.

The sample of the survey deserves special attention here, since it is not a typical random representative sample. The survey was conducted in high schools in seven regions and cities in Xinjiang, and the sample is stratified on the basis of ethnic composition, language of instruction, gender ratio, and school grades (7th through 12th) (Tang and He 2010, 16-17). This dataset cannot be seen as representative of other parts of China, or of an adult population, but it does offer a valuable window into national identity formation among a population of respondents that is ethnically, religiously, and generationally opportune for just such a study. Furthermore, as Manion (1994, 747) argues, "data from local samples can yield reliable answers generalizable to a population beyond the sample, to a crucial category of questions—those about relationships between variables" (quoted from Chen 2004, 18). In other words, while we may not be able to generalize accurately from descriptive statistics provided by a sample such as this, it is still useful in examining between-variable relationships, which are more generalizable.

This study seeks to explain individual-level variation in two main concepts: first is the strength of an individual's identification with China (national attachment), and second is the one's attachment to ethnic identity – that is, identification with one's ethnic group. The survey contains a series of items on identities that are designed to match those of the International Social Survey Program's (ISSP) National Identity Surveys, which unfortunately were never done in China. For our purposes, these items ask respondents how close they feel to their country as well as how close they feel to their

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[63] Professor Tang administered a similar survey in Tibet in 2006, but since different sets of questions were used, especially in regard to national identity, the data from Tibet are not analyzed here.

ethnic group. Choices include *not close at all* (coded 1), *not very close* (2), *close* (3), and *extremely close* (4).   Our measure for national attachment is the question: "How close do you feel to China (中国 *zhongguo*)?" This is a common measure of national identity, and provides us with our first dependent variable. The same question wording is used for our second dependent variable, ethnic attachment: "How close do you feel to your ethnic group (民族 *minzu*)?"

Table 5.1. Distributions of feelings of closeness to political objects

	Hometown	Ethnic group	China	Asia
Extremely close	83.3%	78.0%	74.1%*	44.3%
Fairly close	13.0%	16.0%	21.9%	32.2%
Not very close	2.9%	5.3%	3.1%	18.4%
Not close at all	0.8%	0.7%	0.9%	5.1%
N	*1103*	*1093*	*1091*	*1064*

Note: Respondents were asked: How close do you feel to each of the following?

*This response is used as a dichotomous dependent variable in Table 4.

Source: Tang, Wenfang. Chinese Ethnicity Surveys, Xinjiang sample, 2006-2007.

    Table 5.1 displays the relative frequencies of respondents' levels of attachment to their hometown, their ethnic group, China, and Asia, respectively, in the order in which they were asked of the respondent. The first thing to note here is that all distributions are heavily skewed in the positive direction, reflecting a general tendency for respondents to identify strongly with all four political objects. Identification with Asia appears to be weakest, but even here the modal response was "extremely close". China and one's ethnic group are equally strongly identified with, while identification with one's hometown is the strongest of all. This skewing presents a problem for statistical analysis

because one category contains nearly three-quarters of respondents in each of our dependent variables. For this reason, each of these items is collapsed into two categories for the purposes of multiple regression (see Table 5.5).

More important, however, are the substantive implications of these skewed distributions. Clearly, this skewing reflects the tendency of respondents to express high levels of both national and ethnic identity. In examining the same data, Tang and He note that high levels of identification with China are not simply driven by the Han Chinese (only 26 percent of the sample), but rather that this national identity is high in all ethnic groups, at comparable levels to ethnic identity: As Tang and He put it, "it is understandable that the Hans were highly nationalistic, but it is surprising that minority students also showed a high level of national identity" (Tang and He 2010, 36).

This finding is corroborated by another survey item that asks respondents to choose between two identities by selecting one of five choices that best describes him or her: *only a Xinjianger* (coded 1); *first a Xinjianger and second a Chinese* (2); *equally a Xinjianger and a Chinese* (3); *first a Chinese and second a Xinjianger* (4); or *only a Chinese* (5). Indeed, even among Uyghurs, who scored the lowest of all ethnic groups on this item, the number of respondents favoring Chinese identity nearly is nearly double the number favoring Xinjiang identity. However, the most popular response among Uyghurs was to equally affirm both identities (44 percent).

The popularity of equally affirming both Chinese and Xinjianger identities (32 percent of respondents in the entire sample) points to an important caveat. While it may be intuitive to theorize that ethnic and national identities compete with one another for the hearts, minds, and loyalties of individuals, we must remain open to the possibility that

there is room for high levels of both ethnic and national identities. For instance, instead of using separate measures for each identity, we might, with the theory of competing identities in mind, construct a comparative measure that taps the relative strength or importance of each of these identities in a given individual.

Two points warn against this kind of measurement, however. Firstly, as has often been noted, the relative salience of different identities will vary by social context: one identity may come to the fore in the presence of one group of people, while another identity will become dominant when in the context of another group. As David Laitin puts the point, "a resident of Harlem might identity himself as a black in the context of New York politics but as an American in the context of international affairs (Laitin 1998, 23). Laitin argues that only when choice between identities becomes politically necessary do people give priority to one identity over another. At all other times, the respective salience of competing identities can be constantly in flux, rendering the measurement of this relative salience suspect. The Chinese state has made many rhetorical efforts to officially and publicly embrace its minority ethnic groups, and to proclaim itself a multiethnic state.[64] As a result, to the minorities in China, the choice between ethnic and national identity may not be necessary.

The second point that warns us against attempting to measure the relative strength of two identities comes directly from the data. Not only are ethnic identity and Chinese national identity both very deeply held by respondents, the two are also *positively* correlated (as Table 5.4 below shows, the bivariate coefficient of correlation is .281). Furthermore, this correlation holds when controlling for other factors, and remains

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[64] However, Gladney (1994) is right to point out that the state's recognition and exoticization of minorities has also worked to implicitly establish the Han Chinese as the normal, mundane culture, thus creating a conception of China that is more Han-centric than it officially appears.

statistically significant at the .001 level.[65] While the fact that the two items appear one after the other on the survey may play a role here, it is clear that these identities are not competing in a zero-sum game. If that were the case we would expect to see a negative correlation between them, or at least a null result.

This result bears a striking resemblance to Janmaat's (2006) study of Eurobarometer and ISSP survey data, wherein ethnic and civic ideas of national identity were found to be complementary rather than competing. According to Janmaat, "the inference we can draw from this [particular correlation] is that people apparently see *ancestry* and *rights,* and all the other items in both... surveys, more as non-competitive complementary concepts than as mutually exclusive identity markers" (Janmaat 2006, 61). Janmaat concludes from this that "when applied to popular notions of nationhood this framework [of ethnic versus civic nations] cannot be conceived as a dichotomy... nor... as a continuum" (61). In the same way, the correlation between ethnic group attachment and attachment to China compels us to conclude that these two identities do not compete, but are rather complementary, at least in this context.[66]

Turning to our four key independent variables, most of the measures are relatively simple. Religion, ethnic group, and language spoken most frequently at home are all self-reported measures in the survey. The respondent is simply asked what his or her ethnic group is, what his or her religious belief is, and what language he or she speaks

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[65] In fact, when ethnic identity is added to the multivariate model with national identity as the dependent variable, it retained its statistical significance (p < .001), explained more variance than any of the other independent variables, and dramatically increased the goodness of fit of the model.

[66] Here we must be careful to keep in mind that the sample is not intended to be representative of China itself, so the relationship between ethnic and national identity may be different among older Chinese. However, given Janmaat's (2006) similar findings, there is little reason to assume so without evidence.

most often at home (coded here as 1 for Mandarin, 0 otherwise). These variables will

allow us to test our first three hypotheses.

Table 5.2. Cross-tabulation of ethnic and religious groups

Religion	Han	Kazakh	Uyghur	Hui	Other	Total
None	259	4	100	8	9	380
	91.5%	3.1%	19.3%	12.9%	12.0%	35.6%
Daoist	----	1	4	1	----	6
	----	.8%	.8%	1.6%	----	.6%
Catholic	----	1	4	----	----	5
	----	.8%	.8%	----	----	.5%
Muslim	4	124	409	53	11	601
	1.4%	95.4%	79.0%	85.5%	14.7%	56.3%
Christian	5	----	----	----	1	6
	1.8%	----	----	----	1.3%	.6%
Buddhist	12	----	1	----	54	67
	4.2%	----	.2%	----	72.0%	6.3%
Other	3	----	----	----	----	3
	1.1%	----	----	----	----	.3%
Total	283	130	518	62	75	1068
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Note: Lambda = .509, significant at p < .001.

Source: Tang, W. Chinese Ethnicity Surveys, Xinjiang sample, 2006-2007.

The distribution of ethnic groups in the sample is displayed in Table 5.2. The

Xinjiang survey captures sizeable samples of students from the Han, Uyghur, Kazakh,

Hui, and Mongol ethnic groups. The table also shows that the survey respondents

represent a variety of religious (and nonreligious) traditions. There are large numbers of

respondents in three categories: Muslim, Buddhist, and no religion. Finally, Table 5.2

demonstrates the expectedly strong association between religion and ethnicity. For

instance, over 90% of Han Chinese claim no religion, while the vast majority of Uyghurs,

Huis, and Kazakhs are Muslims. Moreover, the 'other ethnicity' category, in which the vast majority of respondents are Mongols, is predominantly Buddhist. Unsurprisingly, there is a strong overall association between ethnicity and religion, as demonstrated by a symmetric Lambda value of .51.

Table 5.3. Cross-tabulation of ethnic groups and language spoken at home

Ethnic Group	Home Language		
	Mandarin	Other	Total
Han	216	70	286
	75.5%	24.5%	100%
Kazakh	33	91	124
	26.6%	73.4%	100%
Uyghur	11	523	534
	2.1%	97.9%	100%
Hui	21	41	62
	33.9%	66.1%	100%
Other	11	63	74
	14.9%	85.1%	100%
Total	292	788	1080
	27.0%	73.0%	100%

Note: Lambda = .419, significant at $p < .001$.

Source: Tang, W. Chinese Ethnicity Surveys, Xinjiang sample, 2006-2007.

Table 5.3 shows a similar (and similarly expected) association between language spoken at home and ethnicity (a Lambda of .42). Most strikingly, only 2% of Uyghurs speak Mandarin at home, compared to three-quarters of Han respondents. Overall, just 27% of respondents speak Mandarin at home, while the remaining 73% of students speak a local dialect or their ethnic group's language at home. Of course, there are significant

empirical ties between home language and ethnicity (Lambda = .42), and between home language and religion as well (Lamba = .27, significant at the .001 level).

The survey asks respondents in what grade they began using Mandarin Chinese in math class (coded 1 for first grade, 2 for second, and so on). When this value is subtracted from the respondent's current grade, we obtain a measure of how many years a student has taken mathematics in Mandarin Chinese (*math in Mandarin*). Math class is a good indicator of a student's exposure to Mandarin Chinese as a language of instruction in school. This measure varies in the sample from twelve years to zero years (meaning the respondent has not taken math in Mandarin).[67]

Data Analysis

As a preliminary test of our hypotheses, Table 5.4 contains a bivariate correlation matrix of the most basic forms of our key independent and dependent variables. *Minority* (coded 0 for Han ethnicity and 1 otherwise), *religion* (coded 0 for "none" and 1 otherwise), and *Mandarin at home* (1 for Mandarin spoken at home and 0 otherwise) are simple dichotomous variables representing our first three variables. The simple bivariate relationships already suggest that our independent variables have more impact on ethnic identity than on national identity. *Religion* seems to have the strongest relationships with national identity, but even in this case its relationship with ethnic identity is stronger. Once again, Chinese national identity and ethnic identity are not playing a zero-sum game: the factors that strengthen ethnic identity do not necessarily decrease national identity.

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[67] Summary statistics for the independent variables in the multivariate model are displayed in Table A1.

Table 5.4: Bivariate correlations (Pearson's *r*)

	Religion	Mandarin at home	Years of Mand. Math	*National Attach.*	*Ethnic Attach.*
Minority	.702**	-.655**	-.328**	.012	.357**
Religion		-.478**	-.337**	-.076*	.226**
Mandarin at home			.297**	.004	-.246**
Years of Mandarin math				-.027	.186**
National Attachment					.281**

*p < .05; **p < .01; two-tailed tests; lowest N = 1034.

Note: *Minority, Religion,* and *Mandarin at home* are dichotomous variables.

Source: Tang, W. Chinese Ethnicity Surveys, Xinjiang sample, 2006-2007.

Going beyond bivariate correlations, a multivariate model was specified in order to introduce statistical controls. In this model, ethnicity is broken into dummy variables for each of the major ethnic minority groups – *Uyghur*, *Hui*, *Kazakh*, and *other ethnicity* (the majority of whom are Mongolians). *Han* is the reference category for this series of dummy variables. Additionally, a measure of the frequency of religious attendance was included in the model as a substitute for religious identification. Both of these measurement changes help to reduce the amount of collinearity in the model.[68] In addition to our key independent variables, two additional control variables were added: gender and family income.

As indicated above, the dependent variables *national attachment* and *ethnic attachment* are transformed into dichotomous variables. Since most of the respondents feel "very close" to both China and their own ethnic group, this variable is coded 1 for

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[68] Collinearity is not a serious problem in the model, as the highest correlation between any of the independent variables is *r* = .56.

this response and 0 otherwise. This transformation reduces the skewness of these

variables, and it also makes logistic regression the appropriate method of analysis here.

Table 5.5. Explaining national and ethnic attachment

Variable	Binary Logit "Very close to China"	Binary Logit "Very close to my ethnic group"	OLS Index of National Identity	OLS Index of ethnic/local identity
Mandarin exposure in class	-.16	-.99**	.03	-.04**
	(.31)	(.41)	(.02)	(.02)
Non-Mandarin at home	-.24	-.27	.00	.03**
	(.23)	(.24)	(.02)	(.01)
Uyghur	-.19	1.99***	-.01	.12***
	(.29)	(.33)	(.02)	(.02)
Hui	-.26	.90**	-.05*	.04*
	(.37)	(.38)	(.03)	(.02)
Kazakh	-.37	1.86***	-.01	.11***
	(.30)	(.38)	(.02)	(.02)
Other non-Han ethnicity	-.22	1.43***	-.02	.10***
	(.34)	(.38)	(.03)	(.02)
Religious attendance	.61**	.02	.04*	.02
	(.30)	(.38)	(.02)	(.02)
Family income	-.83**	-.12	-.06**	.02
	(.36)	(.42)	(.03)	(.02)
Female	.20	-.42**	.01	-.02**
	(.15)	(.17)	(.01)	(.01)
(Constant)	1.74***	1.18***	.87***	.83***
	(.36)	(.43)	(.02)	(.02)
N	959	959	907	951
R^2	.013 (Pseudo)	.141 (Pseudo)	.015	.208

 *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01. All independent variables are coded such that they vary from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1. The first two columns display the results of logistic regression on a dichotomous variable, while the third column displays OLS regression results. Han is the reference group for the ethnicity dummy variables.

Source: Tang, W. Chinese Ethnicity Surveys, Xinjiang sample, 2006-2007.

The first two columns of Table 5.5 present the results of the logistic regressions for each dichotomous dependent variable. The first thing that is evident in examining these results is that the model explains variance in levels of ethnic identity much better than it does for national identity. While most coefficients are statistically significant in predicting ethnic identity, only two variables attain significance in the national identity model. The vast difference in model performance is demonstrated by the difference in pseudo R-squared: .013 to .141. These are both fairly low values, generally speaking, so the conclusion to draw here is not that the ethnic identity model performs especially well, but rather that the national attachment model performs very poorly (leftmost column), suggesting that results here should be interpreted cautiously. Somehow levels of attachment to national identity are very difficult to explain.[69]

Turning to more specific results, the only two factors that determine the likelihood of feeling extremely close to China are religious attendance, for which the effect is opposite of our hypothesis, and family income, which as it increases makes one less likely to identify strongly with China. Curiously, neither of these variables has a significant effect in the ethnic identity model. In this model, significant predictors include math in Mandarin, all four ethnic group dummy variables, and female. Notably, classroom exposure to Mandarin makes one significantly less likely to feel close to one's ethnic group, while speaking a language besides Mandarin at home has no measurable effect. Female students are significantly less likely to identify strongly with their ethnic group than their male classmates. That the ethnic categorical variables explain so much of the variance is unsurprising, and in line with our theoretical expectations. For

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[69] This low degree of variance explained is not an artifact of dichotomizing the dependent variable, as both OLS and ordered logit models for the full four-category dependent variable have even lower (pseudo) R-squares.

whatever reason, female students are significantly less likely to identify strongly with their ethnic group than their male classmates.

In order to ensure that the results of these models are not simply due to the particular survey questions or method of regression used, two factor indexes were created as alternate measures of national and subnational identity attachment. The national attachment index was created from two items that use a four-point agree/disagree scale. The first is the following statement: "Even if one could choose any country in the world, I would still want to be a Chinese citizen." The second item is: "For the good of the country, an individual should make whatever sacrifices one can." The subnational attachment factor index is constructed from the original ethnic identity item ("How close do you feel to your ethnic group") and from the corresponding item, "How close do you feel to your hometown?" The hometown identification measure was used here not only because it is correlated with ethnic group identification (r = .39), but also because it makes theoretical sense to use another form of subnational identity given our hypotheses about nation-building. Competing loyalties may come from ethnic or other regional forces, and the state's integrative project ostensibly aims to overcome any type of subnational loyalty that may stand against national identity. In addition to providing alternate measures to verify the findings, these indexed measures also allow us to use ordinary least-squares regression, as they much more closely approximate interval variables.

The third and fourth columns of Table 5.5 present the results of the OLS regressions for each factor index variable. On the whole, the results conform to the pattern of the two logistic regressions: attachment to national identity is difficult to

explain, while attachment to ethnic identity is readily explained. Despite the completely different measure of national identity, the new results for the national identity model are nearly identical to those of our first measure, with just one exception: the Huis in the sample are slightly less attached to Chinese national identity than the other minority groups, the rest of which are just as nationalistic as the Hans.[70] Besides this minor deviation, however, the overall results of this model, in conjunction with the first logit model, indicate that there is little to no difference between ethnic groups in their level of attachment to China. All of the ethnic groups, including the Han, are roughly equally Chinese in sentiment.

It seems that our model has much more to say about ethnic identity than about national identity, and this is not simply a result of peculiarities of a particular measurement of national attachment. The results for the subnational attachment index are similar to the earlier ethnic attachment results. All significant coefficients have effects in the expected direction. Mandarin exposure in class is again significant, and here the language spoken at home is also a significant predictor of attachment to subnational identities. Interestingly, Huis do not identify with their ethnic group or with their hometown as strongly as Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Mongols. In this case Huis are more similar to Hans (the reference category) than the other groups, which makes sense given that, unlike the other groups, Huis do not speak a separate language.

One possible objection to the analysis so far is that, aside from the ethnic group dummy variables—an obvious and unsurprising association—the model performs just as poorly for subnational attachment as it does for national attachment, and thus is a poorly

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[70] The coefficient for Hui is significant only at the marginal level of $p<0.10$, so this effect should not be overstated.

specified model. Indeed, the coefficients indicate that most of the variance is explained by these variables. However, when the four ethnic group dummy variables are removed from the subnational identity model, the variance explained does drop (R-squared drops from .208 to .165), but not nearly to the low levels of the model for national identity (.015). Thus the ethnic group model's performance does not hinge entirely on ethnicity.

Another objection to the above analysis has to do with the measurement of a key independent variable, *math in Mandarin*. Note that neither age nor grade level is included as a control variable. This is because of a potential collinearity problem: the measure of *math in Mandarin* is formulated by subtracting from the respondent's current grade level the grade level in which he or she began taking math in Mandarin. As a result, *math in Mandarin* and grade level (or age) cannot be included in the same model.

It is difficult, even conceptually, to disentangle Mandarin exposure in school from exposure to school in general. The longer students have been in school, and the longer they have taken school in Mandarin, the less likely they are to identify strongly with their ethnic group. To say that one or the other is the real force in explaining ethnic attachment here is problematic, given that the theoretical mechanism driving the relationship could very well be the same either way. The bottom line is that education, especially when conducted in Mandarin, loosens students' attachments to their subnational ethnic group.

Conclusion

There are two broad conclusions to be drawn from the results here. The first is that national identity is more difficult to explain than ethnic identity. The most likely problem with our models in explaining national identity is omitted variable bias: there are

probably variables that do explain a respondent's level of identification with China that are not in the model. Alternately, the poor performance of the models explaining national attachment may reflect some fundamental difference between ethnic and national identity. For whatever reason, by any measure used here, ethnic identity is more easily statistically predicted than national identity.

The second conclusion is that in these data we find a visible effect of the state's language policy on individuals' levels of attachment to their ethnic identity. Here we see the state's power in the formation of identities, as the more education one has had in Mandarin (as the language of instruction), the less strongly one identifies with his or her ethnic group. However, we fail to find the corresponding effect of education in Mandarin promoting an attachment to China and Chinese national identity. This is probably related to the poor performance of the model in predicting national identity in general, but it also points to a familiar conclusion: ethnic identity and a broader national identity are not necessarily opposing forces. Even for ethnic minorities, the things that increase one's sense of ethnic group identity are not always the same things that decrease one's sense of a larger national identity. Indeed, the results indicate that there is a weak link, if any, between one's ethnicity and one's attachment to Chinese national identity.

This second conclusion supports Gellner's theory of nation-building through education, and it substantiates Gellner's emphasis on the power of language to form and reform identities. According to Gellner, "when general social conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities a situation arises in which well-defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of unit

with which men willingly and often ardently identify" (1983, 55). If we treat this assertion as a hypothesis about what drives the process of identity formation, the results here offer this hypothesis qualified support. Although we see no effect on national identity, education in Mandarin does result in a lessened sense of ethnic identity. It is most likely more difficult to see this phenomenon in an individual-level snapshot than in a larger historical narrative such as Gellner examined. Still, we can see glimpses of this process in action among individuals when we take into consideration how thoroughly they have been educated in the standardized national language.

CHAPTER 6: NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SUPPORT FOR THE STATE

The overall process of state legitimation through popular nationalism is the central focus of this dissertation as well as its organizing principle. While the third, fourth, and fifth chapters examined key mechanisms at the disposal of the state for the formation of national identity, this chapter turns to the intended consequences of individuals' national identity and attachment to it. Specifically, it looks at the role of national identity and national attachment in producing popular support for the state.

From the state's perspective, this is the crucial endpoint of the entire process, the reason for building national identity. Even if state channels like the media and the educational system effectively develop national identity, the effort is a waste of state resources unless this national identity effectively translates into support for the party and the current political system. Viewing the process from this top-down angle, state support is the *point* of nationalism. The findings from the previous three chapters offer a good deal of support to this state-led interpretation of Chinese nationalism, as Chinese national identity has been shown to be shaped by the state through various means. As mentioned earlier, the Chinese state's insistence on the term 'patriotism' (爱国主义 *aiguozhuyi*, literally 'love country doctrine') also indicates an intentionally strong link between national sentiment and state support.

Before continuing, a caveat is in order. Lucian Pye (1996) has argued on similar grounds that Chinese nationalism is essentially bankrupt, especially when compared with the nationalisms of the West. Instead of emphasizing political values like democracy and independence, Chinese nationalism, in Pye's view, appears to mean little other than support for the current state and its policies. While in other countries the substantive

content of national identity can be brought to bear as a critique of the government and its policies, in China nationalism is "reduced to merely the sum of current policy preferences" (Pye 1996, 107). Thus, according to Pye, no critique of the state can be made on the grounds of nationalism, since this is inherently contradictory to the meaning of Chinese nationalism.

The preceding chapters, along with the works of other scholars, have shown that Chinese nationalism is to a certain extent state-led. This does not necessarily justify Pye's claim, however. I contend that there is in fact substantive content to Chinese nationalism—specifically, a meaningful group identity (although the meaning is of course not universally agreed upon) with a shared history and a narrative of national suffering followed by a rise to regain national glory, led by a set of historical hero-figures. This fits the template of nationalism found in the developing world, and does not differ greatly from the nationalisms of the developed world. Perhaps the only thing missing from Chinese nationalism is the Western political ideal of liberal democracy as the means to achieve national liberation. However, Chinese nationalism does not lack political ideals altogether. On the contrary, one can argue that economic development and the re-attainment of China's past international status have been the ends that Chinese nationalism has cherished. In the case of the United States, nationalism has often meant the idea that the U.S. be a shining beacon to lead other countries by example. This makes sense given the early modernization and subsequent international dominance of the United States. In its glory days Chinese emperors also thought the same of China. But as a developing country that is still modernizing, China's national mythology cannot now carry this meaning. Instead, it must first catch up in economic development, so *that* is the

current thrust of its national story. To point out this difference between U.S. nationalism and Chinese nationalism as a lack of meaning on the part of Chinese nationalism is misguided.[71]

So, while it is true that Chinese national identity is to a certain extent successfully molded by the state, this does not mean that Chinese national sentiment equates with support for the Chinese state and its policies. However, nationalism and state support are two separate concepts, and this chapter explores the relationship between them. Moreover, even if a strong and robust relationship is found here, this does not lead us to the conclusion that Chinese nationalism has no independent meaning. Hopefully the previous chapters have already dispelled the reader of this notion.

The first section below explains what is meant by state support and shows how much support the Chinese government currently enjoys by means of a number of survey measures. It also introduces the measure of state support used as a dependent variable. The second section reviews the relevant literature on the link between nationalism and state support in China and describes the measures used for nationalism and other explanatory variables, and the third section presents a multivariate analysis of this link. The fourth section explores how the content of an individual's national identity can serve as a condition under which the link between nationalism and state support may be strong or weak, and summarizes the findings of the chapter. A final section serves as a conclusion to the dissertation, offering a summary and interpretation of its overall findings.

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[71] Furthermore, Pye's claim that Chinese nationalism is simply support for state policy is directly contradicted by many protests in the name of nationalism *against* state policy. When the state is seen by the public as too conciliatory to foreign interests, nationalist protests against the state often arise (Gries 2004a; Zhao 2004; Shirk 2007). If Pye's claim were true, Chinese nationalists would by definition support state policy.

State Support in Contemporary China

Nationalism is often interpreted as being synonymous with support for the state. After all, it is in a state's interest to blur the distinction between nation and state, in order to harness national sentiment for its own ends. What it means to 'love one's country' is often interpreted, knowingly or not, as support for the government's policies. Thus Pye's argument, explained above, that Chinese nationalism basically amounts to support for current state policy, rings true to a certain extent in many societies, insofar as love of country is confused with love of the state. So how can these two concepts be usefully disentangled? In chapter 2, David Easton's (1965) framework of diffuse support was reviewed as a way of conceptualizing regime support as apart from national sentiment. To review, Easton argues that political support can be either specific (related to specific government outputs or accomplishments) or diffuse (a generalized reservoir of support). Each type of support can be directed to one of three targets: 1) the authorities, or incumbent leaders in office; 2) the political regime, or the set of institutions that structure authority; and 3) the political community, or the people(s) and territory that the state claims. These are not completely separate targets, however, and support often overflows from one to the other.

We can think of support for the political regime as state support, and by the same logic, support for the political community can be conceived of as one's attachment to Chinese national identity. Thinking within Easton's framework, then, the question of interest for this chapter is how support for the political community overflows into support for the regime.

Easton's distinction between diffuse support and specific support is also useful. However, this distinction is based on the *sources* of political support and not its targets.[72] As we are interested in explaining individuals' overall support for the current political and institutional regime of the party-state, the sources of this support should not to be assumed to be either specific or diffuse. Put another way, this chapter's dependent variable is political support for the regime, and whether that support is diffuse (caused by generally supportive sentiment) or specific (a result of policy decisions) is an empirical question.

Existing work on regime support in China has found it to be high. To be fair, this recurring conclusion is largely due to the fact that expectations for regime support in an authoritarian state are typically low. However, the main puzzle that has driven research on this topic is the existence of an unequivocally authoritarian system of government with high marks of approval from the Chinese public.

Figure 6.1 displays the mean levels of trust in government from the countries included in the 2005 World Values Surveys. Respondents were asked whether they trust the government in their nation's capital a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or not at all. By the resulting four-point scale, Chinese people trust their government more than citizens of all the other countries except for Jordan and Vietnam. Trust of government in China surpasses that of any of the developed democracies on the list by a substantial margin. Similar results obtain if we look at other measures of political trust, such as trust

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[72] Easton does indicate (as do later scholars) that specific support is more often directed at particular authorities, while diffuse support is more often associated with regimes and political communities. As Kennedy (2009) points out, surveys in China very rarely ask about specific support of particular political leaders. This is another consideration which makes the distinction between diffuse and specific less relevant in China.

Figure 6.1. Citizen trust in national government by country

Figure 6.2. Citizen evaluations of 'democraticness' by country

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

in parliament and trust in the civil service. In each of these measures, China is second

only to Vietnam.[73]

Interestingly, even survey measures of 'democraticness' have China scoring well.

Figure 6.2 shows that, when respondents are asked to evaluate "how democratically this

country is being governed today" on a ten-point scale, China is still above average,

scoring higher than democracies such as the United States, Italy, Mexico, and Brazil. The

2008 China Survey also contains useful measures of this. One striking result from this

survey is that 57% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that "a

system with just one main party is most suitable to China's current circumstances."

Taking all of these measures at once, it is hard not to be surprised at just how much

popular support the Chinese government enjoys.

A broader conclusion to draw from Figures 6.1 and 6.2 is that, when compared to

state support in democratic societies with freer media systems and less state control over

education, support for authoritarian states is strikingly high. As the previous chapters

have suggested, this may be an intended result of state policy through the state's strong

influence in the media and education (Kennedy 2009). Pippa Norris (2011) has studied

the opposite side of this coin: the lack of popular support for democratic governments.

She has argued that the relatively low levels of popular legitimacy in democratic

countries are due to three factors: "growing public expectations, negative news, [and]

failing government performance" (Norris 2011, 5). A related interpretation of this

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[73] It is often argued that survey results on questions such as these lack validity in authoritarian contexts such as China, where respondents may fear giving answers that criticize the government. If this political fear did affect survey measures, we would expect a larger proportion of respondents who respond with "don't know" or otherwise refuse to give answers. However, in the WVS, there is no such spike in nonresponses. This fits into the broad scholarly consensus that the effect of political fear on survey responses in China is weak, and no greater than the universal effect of social desirability (Tang 2009, Yang and Tang 2010).

phenomenon is that democratic elections promote the airing of criticisms of political

leaders. Democracy decreases trust in leaders precisely because it increases

transparency. This is evident when comparing state support in democracies with that of

autocracies, and it is also evident when we compare support for local government

officials in China to that of central government officials. Support is lower for officials at

the local level (Li 2004), the only level at which elections are used to select leaders.

Perhaps democracy itself inherently reduces regime support.

I construct an index of seven separate items from the 2008 China Survey in order

to measure regime support. In the first item the respondent is asked to agree or disagree,

on a five point scale, with the statement that "I am generally satisfied with government

policies". The second, third, and fourth items are all responses on a ten-point scale of

how satisfied or unsatisfied the respondent is with each of the following: the central

government, the county or urban district government, and village or urban sub-district

government. The final three items ask the respondent how much he or she trusts officials

at each of these three levels of government. Each of these seven measures is equally

weighted and added together with the others to form an index that varies from 0 to 1.

I use these particular items because as an index these variables provide a high

reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha = .79), indicating a single underlying dimension

of political support for the existing regime. One possible objection to grouping these

items together is that Chinese citizens make a sharp distinction between local government

and the central government in Beijing, and that therefore it is useless to lump these into

one category of state support. Tang (2009) has shown that Chinese citizens generally are

more trusting of central officials, and less trusting of local officials, due in part to

stronger perceptions of corruption at the local level. The data from the China Survey do show that people are more trusting of, and more satisfied with, central officials than local officials. However, the correlations between the variables in the index mean that someone who trusts the central government is also more likely to be trusting of local government as well, and vice versa. This points to an underlying current of support toward the political regime more generally, which is exactly the concept that we aim to measure.


Figure 6.3. Distribution of state support index

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

Figure 6.3 displays a histogram of the distribution of the state support index. Like the national attachment index, this variable is also somewhat skewed toward the higher end.[74] In addition to the peak at 0.7, there is another peak at the highest possible score. In fact, the most common score on the seven-point index is the maximum of 1. This variable corroborates other evidence in demonstrating China's high levels of state support, but it also showcases plenty of variation to explain at the individual level.

Explaining State Support

The main concern of this chapter is finding the causes of regime support at the individual level: who are the people that are more likely to support the state? More specifically, in what ways and under what conditions do sentiments of national identity produce state support?

First we shall address the more general question of the factors that produce state support. A variety of explanations have been offered for the high levels of regime support in China. The two key arenas of nation-building examined in this dissertation, education and mass media, have already been shown to have direct relationships with political support. Similar to findings concerning education's impact on national sentiment in Chapter 4, Kennedy (2009) shows that one's level of education has an effect on regime support, but that this effect drops off at higher educational levels. At the same time, Chen (2004, p. 114) found a monotonic relationship in which diffuse support for the state simply decreased as education increased.

The findings with respect to media exposure have been mixed. Xueyi Chen and Tianjian Shi (2001) found that media exposure actually had a negative correlation with

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[74] This skewness is not a statistical problem, however, as the skewness statistic of -.40 falls well short of the critical level of -.7.

political support for the state, concluding that the state-led process of legitimation through the media had failed. However, others (Li 2004; Bernstein and Lu 2000; Kennedy 2009) have found just the opposite: that those who consume more media are more likely to support the state. The findings on television viewing from Chapter 3 also corroborate this finding.

Of course, other basic demographic attributes have impacts on state support. Age has been shown to impact regime support, as older citizens show more support (Chen et al. 1997). Men have also been shown to be more politically supportive than women (Chen 2004). Income and occupation also matter: those with higher economic status and those with occupations tying them to the state have higher levels of state support.[75] Unsurprisingly, members of the Communist Party are also more likely to be supportive (Chen 2004, 116).

Attitudinal factors also have been shown to influence individual-level support for the state. These include evaluation of state policies, life satisfaction, interest in politics, and fear of sociopolitical chaos (Chen et al.1997), as well as ideology and satisfaction with economic reform (Tang 2005). Other attitudinal correlates of regime support include democratic values, support for reform (Chen 2004), as well as a hierarchical orientation (Shi 2001).

Of course, the attitude we are most concerned with here is national sentiment, or an individual's sense of attachment to their Chinese national identity. The link between nationalist sentiment and state support has been documented before. Jie Chen (2004) includes an index of nationalist sentiment in his model explaining support for the state in

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[75] Corroborating this, Zhengxu Wang (2005) found an economic connection to levels of state support in the aggregate: economic development produced government support in the short term.

urban China. Using survey data, he finds that nationalism's effect on diffuse support for the state is small but statistically significant. Surprisingly, few other studies have directly examined the effect of national sentiment on political support. While attitudes such as life satisfaction, fear of sociopolitical chaos, democratic values, and hierarchical social orientation are often included in models that explain state support, nationalism is often left out (Chen et al. 1997; Shi 2001; Chen and Shi 2001; Chen et al. 2007; Yang and Tang 2010). In still other cases, attitudinal variables are completely left out of models explaining political support or trust (Li 2004).[76]

The dearth of measures of nationalism in empirical examinations of state support is particularly confusing when one reads the literature on Chinese nationalism, where the idea that nationalism produces popular support for the state seems to be an omnipresent theme (Zhao 2004; Gries 2004b; Strecker Downs and Saunders 1999). What is equally striking is that the existing quantitative literature on Chinese nationalism does not seem to directly address this question either. One exception is Tang and Darr (2011), who analyze nationalism's relationship with attitudes toward democracy, trust toward the central government, and political tolerance, and find that, overall, nationalism works against the prospect of democratization in China and promotes the legitimacy of the current regime. While the attitudes measured are all closely tied to state support, the analysis lacks a full and dedicated measure of this concept. Although survey studies of Chinese nationalism are relatively new, the central proposition that connects nationalism to state legitimacy still has only scarcely been put to the test.

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[76] There is some methodological justification for this: presuming that some attitudes are the causes of other attitudes is theoretically problematic.

So, in order to put this proposition to the test, the measure of nationalism from the 2008 China Survey introduced in Chapter 3 will again be used. This time, however, the index will serve as the main independent variable rather than the dependent variable. The index includes responses to the following five survey items: "I would rather be a citizen of China than of any other country", "China is a better country than most other countries", "When my country does well in international sports it makes me proud to be Chinese", "How proud are you to be Chinese?", and "one should sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of the country". All of these items are meant to measure a respondent's attachment to their Chinese national identity. Like the state support index, this index is reliable: all its components correlate strongly, showing an underlying dimension of national attachment (Cronbach's alpha = .70). Like state support, it is skewed in a positive direction: as we saw in Chapter 3, the Chinese, generally speaking, have a lot of national sentiment.

The bivariate correlation between the measures of nationalism and state support is .30. In other words, as nationalism goes from its minimum to its maximum, it produces a 30% rise in state support. This is evidence of a positive relationship which is solid but not overwhelmingly strong. The fact that the correlation is not stronger is evidence that, contrary to Pye (1996), Chinese nationalism means something besides support for the state and its policies. In fact, this bivariate statistic surely overestimates the strength of the relationship. Other relevant variables must be considered and controlled for in order to see exactly how much influence national sentiment has on state support. Using multiple regression, the next section does just this.

Multivariate analysis

A number of control variables are included in the model in order to parse out the effect of national attachment. Number of years of education will be included alongside its mathematical square in order to test for a nonlinear effect. Chapter 4 demonstrated that education had a nonlinear diminishing effect on nationalism, and it would make sense to leave this model open to the same possible effect. In Chapter 3, we saw that media effects on nationalism differ depending on which type of media is consumed, so the model here will control for the two main types of media consumed. *TV news* is a measure of how many days of the past week the respondent received political information from various television sources. *Newspaper* is a dichotomous measure indicating that the respondent reads a newspaper. A dummy variable for Communist Party membership is also included, as is a dummy variable for those who profess a religious affiliation. Demographic variables are included as well to control for gender, family income, ethnic minority status, and residence in a rural area.

Political attitudes also have effects on state support, and several attitudinal measures are controlled for in the model. Political interest has been shown to increase state support, as has life satisfaction (Chen et al. 1997), and a direct survey measure for each of these is included. Preference for social stability over economic growth is included in the model. Sometimes conceived of as fear of political chaos or as a major part of political conservatism or traditionalism, a preference for stability has a strong relationship with support for the existing political regime (Chen et al. 1997; Chen 2004; Tang 2005). Of course, the multivariate model operates on the assumption that national attachment is causally prior to state support, rather than vice versa. However, it is

possible to argue that there is an endogeneity problem in the model, in that a person's state support might affect his or her national attachment. The theoretical relationship between these two concepts has already been discussed at length in the second chapter, but the most powerful and concise response to this objection is that attachment to one's national group is a much more stable and foundational political attitude than support for the state, which is more likely to change in response to unfolding events.[77]

The column marked "Model 1" in Table 6.1 shows the results of the full model. The results demonstrate the impact of national attachment on support for the state, even when other relevant factors are taken into account. The other three attitudinal variables—political interest, life satisfaction, and a preference for stability—also have positive significant effects on state support. Results from Models 2 and 3 are shown in order to show the predictive power of national attachment in comparison to the other attitudinal variables in the model. Model 2 excludes the other three attitudinal variables, while Model 3 excludes national attachment. Comparing these two models' R-squares, it seems that the model performs better when only national attachment is included than when all three other variables are included instead.

These results show that nationalism is the most powerful attitudinal predictor of state support among the attitudes considered here. This finding is also supported by comparing the variable coefficients. Since each variable is coded on a scale that varies from 0 to 1, we can compare the coefficients of the variables to interpret the size of their individual effects. The coefficient for *national attachment* is the largest of all the

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[77] There are empirical methods, such as intermediating variables, designed to address endogeneity problems, but this is ultimately a question for theory. Statistical methods can show evidence of correlation, but the attribution of causation is always, in the end, a matter of theoretical interpretation.

Table 6.1: OLS models explaining state support

Variable	Model 1 Coef. S.E.	Model 2 Coef. S.E.	Model 3 Coef. S.E.
National Attachment	0.262***	0.325***	---
	0.019	0.019	---
Political Interest	0.057***	---	0.080***
	0.010	---	0.010
Life Satisfaction	0.124***	---	0.143***
	0.011	---	0.011
Prefer Stability	0.016*	---	0.028***
	0.008	---	0.008
Years of Education	-0.109**	-0.108**	-0.051
	0.035	0.035	0.035
Years of Ed. Squared	0.071	0.067	-0.013
	0.042	0.043	0.043
TV News Exposure	0.011	0.033***	0.018†
	0.010	0.010	0.010
Newspaper reader	-0.020**	-0.011†	-0.027***
	0.006	0.006	0.006
Age	-0.002	-0.012	0.018
	0.045	0.046	0.046
Age Squared	0.086	.118*	0.071
	0.052	0.053	0.053
Party Member	0.001	0.008	0.008
	0.010	0.010	0.010
Religious	-0.010	-0.005	-0.005
	0.008	0.008	0.008
Female	0.008	0.006	0.013*
	0.005	0.006	0.006
Family Income	-0.009	-0.002	-0.024†
	0.014	0.014	0.014
Han Ethnicity	-0.043***	-0.039***	-0.028***
	0.009	0.008	0.008
Rural	0.013*	0.017**	0.012†
	0.006	0.006	0.006
N	3183	3253	3317
R^2	0.182	0.135	0.128

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10.

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

variables in the model. Introducing control variables has not substantially changed the strength of the bivariate relationship between national attachment and state support.

Continuing to compare coefficients, the second strongest effect is that of education. Two coefficients were estimated for education in order to test for nonlinear effects. The simple term, *years of education*, has a strong and significant negative effect, while the squared term has no significant effect. This result suggests that education's effect on state support, unlike its effect on national identity, is largely negative. Interestingly, education's negative effect is not statistically significant when national attachment is dropped in Model 3. This result some support for the idea of education legitimating the state through its overall positive impact on national sentiment. The direct effect of education on state support is negative (Models 1 and 2), but when we do not control for national attachment (Model 3) this effect washes away because education's positive indirect effect on state support through national attachment 'cancels out' the direct effect.

Another thing to note from Table 6.1 is the effects of media consumption. One clear finding is that newspaper readers, all else being equal, are less likely to support the state than those who do not read newspapers. By contrast, the more television news a person watches, the more likely she is to support the state. This relationship is not significant in the Model 1, but keep in mind Chapter 3's finding that television news watchers also have stronger nationalist sentiment. The presence of national attachment and the other attitudinal variables, as possible intervening variables, may be 'soaking up' the effect of television news in Model 1. The significance of TV news exposure in Model 3 is compatible with just such an interpretation. Television news watchers have

stronger national sentiment, and it is for this reason that they are more likely to support the state. Outside of the intervening effect of nationalism and other attitudes, any direct effect on state support is weak or nonexistent.

Another interesting finding from Table 6.1 is the difference between Han Chinese and minority groups in levels of state support. Contrary to what one might expect, Han Chinese are significantly less supportive of the state than minority groups. This effect is not substantively large, but it holds true despite controlling for confounding factors such as family income, religiosity, education, and rural community type, and regardless of which model we examine. This calls attention once again to a key lesson from Chapter 5: that China's ethnic minorities do not necessarily feel less Chinese than their Han counterparts. Here we see a similar observation reflected in levels of state support. As Tang and He (2010) have argued, ethnic minorities in China are separate but loyal.

The Content of National Identity and State Support

In addition to having corroborated many of the findings from previous chapters, the analysis so far has shown that attachment to Chinese national identity does indeed translate into state support at the individual level. In addition, we have seen evidence that the effects of education and media exposure on state support hinge on a relationship to national attachment. The next question we must ask is: under what individual-level conditions is national attachment most likely to produce this state support?

There are a number of probable conditions we can test for. The most interesting of these have to do with the nature of each individual's Chinese national identity. Using Abdelal et al.'s theory of group identity, we can specify several such conditions. First, it is possible that the relationship between national identity and state support is stronger

among Han Chinese than minorities. This hypothesis naturally arises if we recall that those who represent the government at high levels are predominantly Han Chinese. Thus, having a strong national attachment will have more of an effect on Han Chinese than on ethnic minorities who do not share the same ethnic link to those at the most uppermost visible levels of the party-state. Han Chinese are probably more likely to hold constitutive norms of 'Chineseness' that are drawn along ethnic lines, while minorities are more likely to have a broader idea of Chinese national identity.[78] The finding that minorities are more supportive of the state than Han Chinese is not incompatible with the idea that the effect of national attachment on state support would be stronger for Hans than for ethnic minorities.

Another one of the ways national identity varies among individuals is in its social purpose. Abdelal et al. (2006) define the social purpose of a group identity as "the goals that are shared by members of a group" (p. 696). However, these goals are contested as much as they are shared, and ordinary Chinese people may disagree as to what the fundamental goal of China really is. Some may see economic development as China's main purpose, while others may see the regaining of China's international stature—whether that means military security or international prestige—as the most important purpose for China. Still others may see China's purpose in less material terms. For example, some may see the Chinese nation's main social purpose as enabling its citizens to exercise their self-expression or political rights.

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[78] Unfortunately, this proposition has had to go untested in the third chapter due to the limitations of both the WVS and the 2008 China Survey. In the absence of a more direct measure of constitutive norms in the China Survey, ethnicity here is being used as an indirect measure to test for the effects of constitutive norms.

Social purposes offer another way to look for the conditions under which national attachment leads to state support. One way of thinking about this relationship is in terms of performance evaluations: a citizen should express support for the government if the government has aimed at what that citizen considers to be China's most important goals. A person's attachment to their national identity will positively affect their support for the state if she believes the state to value the same national goals that she does.

The China Survey offers useful measures of social purposes. Democratic social purposes can be measured by respondents who choose, when asked which goal should be the first priority for a society: "give the people more say in governmental decisionmaking" or "guarantee freedom of speech". Alternatively, those who select "maintain public order" here believe that keeping order is the main social purpose of the nation.

The fourth and final alternative available to respondents is to "control rising prices", which might serve as an indicator for people who believe in economic development as China's social purpose; however, another question contains a more valid measure of this. This item asks respondents to choose which of four responses is "the most important goal for China." The first is "a high level of economic growth", which is a more appropriate measure for the social purpose of economic development. The three alternatives to this response are: "seeing that people have more say about how things are done on their jobs and in their communities", "trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful", and "making sure this country has strong defense forces". The last of these will serve as a good indicator for those who believe that regaining international power is the most important goal of China.

In total, we have hypothesized five conditions that might affect the relationship between national identity and state support: Han ethnicity, democratic social purposes, order-keeping social purposes, economic social purposes, and defensive international social purposes. The full model was tested again, this time including dichotomous variables for each of the five concepts above, as well as terms in which each was interacted with national attachment. Separate models were tested for each variable in order to allow for full specification of each interactive term and its corresponding constitutive term. Testing separate models avoids overcomplicating one model with too many interaction effects and it also avoids multicollinearity problems that might stem from this.

Table 6.2 displays the results of this analysis. Notably, the independent effect of national attachment remained strong in all models, indicating the robustness of the effect. The above hypothesis that there is a stronger link between national attachment and state support among Han Chinese is supported by these results. To interpret the results of Model 4, Han are less supportive of the state than minorities, but nationalism brings up support among the entire sample, and this effect on state support is indeed stronger among the Han.

Turning to the four measures of China's social purposes, in Models 5 and 7 we see that democratic social purposes and economic social purposes have no statistically significant effects, interactive or otherwise. However, in Models 6 and 8, both the constitutive terms and their interactions with national attachment are significant. The results can be interpreted similarly to the results concerning state support among the Han Chinese. Perhaps somewhat counterintuitively, those who see the chief social purpose of

Table 6.2. OLS models demonstrating conditional effects of national identity

Variable	Model 4 Coef. S.E.	Model 5 Coef. S.E.	Model 6 Coef. S.E.	Model 7 Coef. S.E.	Model 8 Coef. S.E.
National Attachment	0.143***	0.265***	0.228***	0.281***	0.228***
	0.041	0.02	0.023	0.023	0.022
Han	-0.152*	-0.04	-0.038	-0.038	-0.039
	0.035	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008
Han * Nat. Attach.	0.151*	---	---	---	---
(Interactive term)	0.045	---	---	---	---
Social Purposes					
Democracy	---	-0.034	---	---	---
	---	0.046	---	---	---
Democ. * Nat. Attach.	---	0.015	---	---	---
	---	0.058	---	---	---
Order	---	---	-0.067*	---	---
	---	---	0.03	---	---
Order * Nat. Attach.	---	---	0.103**	---	---
	---	---	0.037	---	---
Economic growth	---	---	---	0.042	---
	---	---	---	0.029	---
Growth * Nat. Attach.	---	---	---	-0.041	---
	---	---	---	0.037	---
National Defense	---	---	---	---	-0.12***
	---	---	---	---	0.032
Defense * Nat. Attach.	---	---	---	---	0.135***
	---	---	---	---	0.039

***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05; †p<.10

Note: Though not shown, all models include the remainder of the variables shown in Table 6.1. Estimates are produced using OLS multiple regression.

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

China as keeping order in society are less likely to support the state, all else being equal.

The same can be said for those who see China's central social purpose as building up a

strong national defense.[79] However, for each of these two groups of people, national

sentiment has a stronger effect in producing state support than it does among other

groups, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficients for the respective

interactive terms.

We can conclude from these findings that qualitatively varying features of

Chinese national identity—such as people's ideas of who 'counts' as Chinese and their

conceptions of China's main goals—can structure nationalism's relationship with state

support. While attachment to one's national identity does tend to produce support for the

regime, how effective it is at doing this depends on the substance and meaning of each

individual's national identity. It is apparently most effective among Han Chinese, and

among those who believe China's main priorities are national defense and the

preservation of order. We might venture to say that the state gets the most political

support 'bang' for its nationalism 'buck' among those who hold to these conservative

social purposes.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that nationalism does indeed produce support for the

state. While this finding is unsurprising, the strength of this relationship compared to that

of other factors is striking: national attachment is the most powerful predictor of state

support in the model tested here (see Table 6.1). The fact that nationalism's impact on

state support is not substantially reduced by controlling for other important variables

demonstrates the robustness of its effect. However, given the bivariate correlation and

the overall performance of the multivariate model, it is clear that the relationship is not

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[79] It should be noted that when the same models are specified without the interactive term, the effect of both *Order* and *National Defense* is positive.

overwhelming, and that Chinese national sentiment means more than simply supporting the state.

We have also found evidence that the effects of education and media use on state support work through the mechanism of national identity attachment. If we control for national attachment, the effects of education and the media seem to wash out. However, if we leave remove national attachment from the equation, educational and media effects appear strong. We can conclude that nationalism is the mechanism through which these relationships work.

Moreover, the different meanings that individuals attribute to their own Chinese national identities have effects on this relationship. How nationalism affects support for the government is conditional on an individual's own interpretations of his or her national identity. However, we should not take this conclusion too far: the constitutive term for national attachment had a strong effect on state support for the entire sample in all models. Nonetheless, these interactive effects cannot be denied: the relationship between national identity attachment and state support does depend on what an individual's national identity means to that individual.

CONCLUSION

Having looked at each part of the process of legitimation through national identity construction, a brief conclusion is in order. Here I will summarize the contributions and findings of each chapter and also comment on the broader picture of the dissertation's findings as a whole.

The first chapter's contributions lie in its wide view of the existing scholarly literature on Chinese nationalism and state support, and its identification of the limitations of that body of research. It is my hope that this chapter has broadened readers' understanding of this field of scholarly research. I also hope that this dissertation has served to fill in some of the gaps left open by previous studies of Chinese nationalism. At the very least it has provided a good deal of needed quantitative analysis in an area in which most existing studies are qualitative.

The main contribution of Chapter 2 is theoretical. By integrating some of the seminal theories of nationalism, legitimacy, and group identity, this chapter aims to produce a broad theory of the process of state legitimation through national identity construction. The theory attempts to go beyond simplistic ideas of national identity towards a conception of national identity in which there is room for variation in the *content* of an individual's national identity as well as an his or her degree of *attachment* to that identity.

Chapter 3 showed us that media exposure has a strong relationship both with people's levels of national attachment and with their constitutive norms for China: their ideas of what makes a person Chinese. However, the relationship between national

attachment and media use depends greatly on what types of media people use, with television viewers being much more likely to strongly identity with the nation.

Chapters 4 and 5 found evidence of an equally complex relationship between education and nationalism. Chapter 4 showcased the diminishing returns of education's relationship with nationalism: early schooling (up to the ninth grade) produced an increase in national attachment, but this effect leveled off and even reversed at higher levels of education. Through visits to Chinese middle schools and analysis of a middle school history textbook, Chapter 4 also revealed the mechanisms of educational nation-building at the ground level, establishing, among other things, the importance of the century of national humiliation as part of the dramatic national narrative.

Chapter 5 offered useful insights on the relationship between ethnic and national identities, finding in particular that the two identities are not necessarily in conflict, and that ethnic minorities are just as attached to the Chinese nation as Han Chinese. This chapter also found evidence of the loosening effect of education—and in particular, that of education in Mandarin Chinese—on minority students' levels of attachment to their ethnic identities.

Chapter 6 followed the process to its final step of producing state support. National attachment indeed proved to be the strongest predictor of support for the state at the individual level. Furthermore, this chapter found that the effect of nationalism on state support was to a certain extent conditional on an individual's sense of what the most important social purposes of the Chinese nation are.

The popular understanding of Chinese nationalism—as well as some scholarly theories of it—pictures Chinese nationalism as something that the state has simply

engrained into its citizens in order to provide popular support for the legitimation of the authoritarian regime. Two key assumptions underlie this conception. The first is that the state is able to produce a national identity and to induce attachment to that identity in ordinary citizens. The second is that emotional attachment to one's national identity does indeed overflow into political support for the party-state.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 found evidence that high levels of national attachment in China are due in large part to the nationalizing forces of education and the media, both of which remain under the control of the state (even if that control is loosening in some areas). Thus, the first assumption—that the state can effectively 'produce' nationalism through the media and the system of education—seems credible upon further analysis. This is not to say that popular Chinese nationalism is simply the brainchild of the government, but that the government can and does exercise an ability to instill a certain national identity in their citizens.

The findings presented in Chapter 6 provide the last piece of the puzzle by showing that those with stronger national attachment also show higher levels of state support. This is evidence in support of the second assumption: producing national sentiment does, on the average, increase levels of state support. Both assumptions have shown themselves to be tenable.

However, these findings should not be overstated. The models in Chapter 6 explaining state support had the highest measures of goodness-of-fit among all of the models presented in the dissertation. However, even these models cannot be said to have explained the majority of the variation of their dependent variable. On the contrary, most

of the variation in national identity and in state support remains unexplained in the error term.

There are real and substantial links between education and national identity, media use and national identity, and national identity and state support. But in no way does this mean that Chinese national identity and state support are mainly state-produced. It is very difficult to explain the attributes of a given individual's sense of national identity, and this tells us something about the limitations of the state's ability to build a nation.

APPENDIX: TABLES OF SUMMARY STATISTICS

Table A.1. Statistics of variables in Chapter 3 (WVS China)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Categories
Nat. Id. Attachmt.	1740	0.73	0.17	0	1	7
Polit-Cult. C. Norms	2015	0.71	0.25	0	1	5
Media exp.	1985	0.33	0.26	0	1	7
Age	2015	44.76	13.32	18	70	Interval
Female	2015	0.54	0.50	0	1	2
Education	1990	0.41	0.33	0	1	5
SE Class	1822	0.34	0.22	0	1	5
Gov. Worker	2015	0.15	0.36	0	1	2
Party Memb.	2015	0.13	0.33	0	1	2
Religious	2015	0.65	0.48	0	1	2

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

Table A.2. Statistics of variables in Chapter 3 (WVS U.S.)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	Categories
Nat. Id. Attachmt.	1182	0.86	0.17	0	1	7
Polit-Cult. C. Norms	1249	0.83	0.23	0	1	5
Media exp.	1146	0.61	0.26	0	1	7
Newspapers	60579.00	0.75	0.434889	0	1	2
TV & Radio	60579.00	1.56	0.594996	0	2	3
Magazines	60579.00	0.34	0.473322	0	1	2
Books	60579.00	0.45	0.497879	0	1	2
Internet	60579.00	0.52	0.499494	0	1	2
Age	1249	47.96	17.03	18	91	Interval
Female	1249	0.50	0.50	0	1	2
Education	1249	0.60	0.17	0.25	1	5
SE Class	1182	0.47	0.23	0	1	5
Gov. Worker	1249	0.10	0.30	0	1	2
Party Memb.	1249	0.51	0.50	0	1	2
Religious	1249	0.92	0.27	0	1	2

Source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009.

Table A.3. Statistics of variables in Chapter 3 (China Survey)

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nat. attach. index	3922	0.747042	0.164172	0.1	1
Media use	3991	0.101273	0.13206	0	1
TV hours	3991	0.092364	0.088552	0	1
Newspaper hours	3991	0.013568	0.044165	0	1
Web hours	3991	0.014087	0.063601	0	1
Age	3989	45.98646	15.63274	18	92
Age^2	3989	2359.076	1538.065	324	8464
Female	3991	0.517414	0.499759	0	1
Years education	3946	6.390015	4.24929	0	18
Family Income	3981	0.193963	0.193462	0.000143	1
Public employee	3991	0.012528	0.11124	0	1
CCP member	3991	0.082686	0.275442	0	1
Religious	3972	0.155337	0.362272	0	1
Rural	3991	0.694563	0.46065	0	1
Han	3991	0.853921	0.353229	0	1

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

Table A.4. Statistics of variables in Chapter 4

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nat. attach. Index	3922	0.747042	0.164172	0.1	1
Years education	3946	6.390015	4.24929	0	18
Age	3989	45.98646	15.63274	18	92
Female	3991	0.517414	0.499759	0	1
Family income	3981	0.193963	0.193462	0.000143	1
Public employee	3991	0.012528	0.11124	0	1
CCP member	3991	0.082686	0.275442	0	1
Religious	3972	0.155337	0.362272	0	1
Media use	3991	0.101273	0.13206	0	1

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

Table A.5. Statistics of variables in Chapter 5

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Nat. attach. (binary)*	1091	0.740605	0.438504	0	1
Ethn. attach. (binary)*	1093	0.779506	0.41477	0	1
Nat. attach. index*	1032	0.872269	0.16665	0	1
Subnat. attach. index	1084	0.91779	0.154199	0	1
Math in Mandarin	1067	0.581147	0.286265	0	1
Grade level	1081	0.442368	0.234954	0	1
Non-Mandarin at home	1093	0.732845	0.442676	0	1
Uyghur	1105	0.496833	0.500216	0	1
Hui	1105	0.056109	0.230236	0	1
Kazakh	1105	0.117647	0.322336	0	1
Other minority	1105	0.068778	0.253191	0	1
Religious behavior	1069	0.423605	0.3525	0	1
Family income	1093	0.526075	0.211032	0	1
Female	1100	0.52	0.499827	0	1

*Indicates dependent variables from Table 5.5 (in order).

Source: Tang, Wenfang. Chinese Ethnicity Survey, 2006-2007.

Table A.6. Statistics of variables in Chapter 6

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
State supt. index	3445	0.689412	0.164086	0	1
Nat. attach. Index	3733	0.791897	0.151947	0.233333	1
Political interest	3921	0.454221	0.308712	0	1
Life satisfaction	3912	0.591155	0.256321	0	1
Prefer stability	3991	0.653303	0.316869	0	1
Years education	3946	0.355001	0.236072	0	1
TV hours	3990	0.334465	0.277553	0	1
Newspaper hours	3991	0.353295	0.478053	0	1
Age	3989	0.378195	0.211253	0	1
CCP member	3991	0.082686	0.275442	0	1
Religious	3972	0.155337	0.362272	0	1
Female	3991	0.517414	0.499759	0	1
Family Income	3981	0.193963	0.193462	0.000143	1
Rural	3991	0.694563	0.46065	0	1
Han	3991	0.853921	0.353229	0	1
Democ. purpose	3820	0.075655	0.264479	0	1
Order purpose	3820	0.359686	0.479971	0	1
Econ. growth purpose	3991	0.344776	0.475355	0	1
Defense purpose	3991	0.269607	0.443811	0	1

Source: The China Survey, Official Data File, 2008.

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