Summer 2013

Take Two on Race and Politics: Reexamining the Origins and Consequences of Electoral Structures in American Cities

Natasha Ernst Altema McNeely
University of Iowa

TAKE TWO ON RACE AND POLITICS: REEXAMINING THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF ELECTORAL STRUCTURES IN AMERICAN CITIES

by

Natasha Ernst Altema McNeely

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Doctor of
Philosophy degree in Political Science
in the Graduate College of
The University of Iowa

August 2013

Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Rene R. Rocha

Graduate College
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

_____

PH.D. THESIS

_____

This is to certify that the Ph.D. thesis of

Natasha Ernst Altema McNeely

has been approved by the Examining Committee
for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Political Science at the August 2013 graduation.

Thesis Committee: _____
Rene R. Rocha, Thesis Supervisor

_____
Caroline J. Tolbert

_____
Tracy Osborn

_____
Erica Townsend-Bell

_____
Charles Connerly

To my parents and husband, for continuing to inspire me to persevere and never stop reaching for the stars.

But we maintain that the internal dynamics of American racial orders and their interactions with each other and with other aspects of American political life, have so often been so important that the question of what role race may be playing should always be a part of political science inquiries.

Desmond S. King and Rogers M. Smith
"Racial Orders in American Political Development"

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee. My dissertation advisor, Rene R. Rocha, provided guidance and encouragement throughout my graduate education. I am very grateful that he pushed me to persevere through my frustrations and celebrate my victories. I would also like to thank Caroline J. Tolbert, Tracy Osborn, Erica Townsend-Bell, and Charles Connerly for their membership on my dissertation committee, as well as their comments and recommendations that they gave to me throughout the dissertation process and throughout my time at the University of Iowa.

I would like to express my eternal gratitude to my "sisters": Cassandra Erbe Williams, Marice Fernando, Amy Yates, Allison Hamilton, Amanda Frost, Erin Olsen-Telles and Jennifer Lin Foster Razel Reitzel. I would also like to thank the "Grill Crew": Saurav, Swagata and Rohan Pandit; Zeferino, Lisa, Joaquin, and Elias Gomez; Tim Gupton; Matt Gibson; and Mike Ridge. I would also like to thank my Colombian Family, Alfredo Duplat-Ayala, Sandra Castaneda-Medina, Juana and Samuel for adopting me into their family and looking out for me throughout this journey.

I would like to express my gratitude and love for my family. My father (Ernst Altema) and mother (Ginette B. Altema) inspire me to achieve my dreams and to believe in my ability to succeed. I am forever grateful for their unending support and words of encouragement. I would also like to thank my father-in-law (Reverend Bruce McNeely) and mother-in-law (Carol McNeely), my brothers and sisters-in-law, and nephews for embracing me into their wonderful family. I would like to thank my husband (Drew) for his love, encouragement, and support. We made an awesome team as both of us sought to complete our graduate educations.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive explanation of how race continues to affect the origins and consequences of electoral structures in American cities. The existing literature presents few answers regarding how race, specifically the racial context, affects attempts to modify the existing electoral structures at the local level. Although scholars have examined how electoral structures affect African American and Latino representation on city councils, few studies have evaluated how electoral structures determine the emergence of African American and Latino candidates in these elections. I address these gaps in the literature by providing a comprehensive examination of how race affects attempts to modify existing electoral structure and how once they are adopted, certain electoral structures affect both the decisions of minority candidates to run for city council seats and their success. I examine the following questions in my analyses: what is the impact of racial diversity upon attempts to change existing electoral structures? How do electoral structures affect minority candidate emergence and the outcomes during city council elections? I use several types of data including a public opinion survey, a nationwide survey of city officials and city council election data to complete my analyses. I conclude that race and electoral structures continue to share a unique relationship where one factor continues to affect the other at the expense of African American and Latinos throughout cities in the U.S.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Table

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

CHAPTER I:

WHY RACE CONTINUES TO MATTER FOR ELECTORAL STRUCTURES AND DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN U.S. CITIES

Introduction

The impact of institutional reforms upon minority representation has continued beyond the Progressive Movement. Nonpartisan reforms including at-large elections and commission forms of government have been shown to limit representation and political influence of racial and ethnic minority groups at the local level (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Latimer 1979; Leal, Meier, and Martinez-Ebers 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005). At-large elections lower the likelihood of minorities being elected to city councils, school boards and other institutions. In contrast, ward-based elections have been shown to increase the descriptive representation of minorities by limiting the contests to districts instead of the entire city. Council-manager systems decrease the influence of minorities by allowing the city-managers to constrain the actions of the mayor. In contrast, cities with strong-mayor systems have executives that pursue the goals of their political constituencies, including racial and ethnic groups.

Although scholars have examined how electoral and council structures affect African American and Latino representation at the local level, the literature presents few answers regarding how race, specifically the racial context, affects attempts to modify the existing electoral structures in American cities. In my dissertation, I answer the following research questions: how does racial diversity determine the origins of electoral structures at the local level? In other words, what is the impact of racial diversity upon attempts to change electoral structures in cities? How do electoral structures affect Latino candidate

emergence in city council elections? How do electoral structures continue to determine favorable or unfavorable outcomes for African American and Latino city council candidates? I present three empirical examinations in my dissertation (see figure 1.1). First, I evaluate the impact of racial diversity upon attempts to modify electoral structures. Racial diversity provides clear incentives for white political leaders to pursue certain electoral structures, specifically at-large elections, in their attempts to protect their access to power, in this case, seats on city councils. Second, I examine how electoral structures affect minority candidates' decisions to compete in city council elections. Third, I evaluate electoral structures that have been shown to affect the descriptive representation of African American and Latinos on city councils.

In the existing literature, scholars demonstrate how electoral structures affect race, specifically minority officeholding. My examination will contribute to the existing literature by demonstrating how racial diversity affects the origins of local institutions. I argue that traditional understandings of how racial diversity affects white preferences are no longer accurate because racial diversity and white elites' attempts to protect their power vary in a nonlinear fashion. I demonstrate that the attempts to change electoral structures are more likely to occur in predominantly white cities that have a significant minority population. Attempted reforms would also occur in predominantly African American and significant white cities. I find that whites in predominantly white, significant Latino cities would attempt to modify electoral structure reforms, noncitizenship reduces the likelihood that attempted reforms would occur in predominantly Latino cities. Although I do not find evidence supporting my expectation that electoral structures, specifically at-large, partisan and concurrent elections, actively

affect Latino candidates in California, I find support that these and other institutions affect African American and Latino candidate success. My data consists of several datasets, including the 1996, 2001, and 2006 International City Management Association Form of Government Survey (ICMA), the spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll, the Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) from 1995-2011, and U.S. Census data from 1990-2010.

In the next section, I discuss the historical origins of the electoral and council structures, including the goals of Progressive reformers, the types of reforms and the consequences for the political parties and racial and immigrant groups. The chapter concludes with an overview of the chapters of my dissertation.

The Progressive Movement

Scholars debate the duration of the Progressive Movement. Some highlight the fact that within the literature, a consensus about when the movement started and ended does not exist (Filene 1970; Gould 1974). Proposed timelines include 1897 to 1921, 1906 until World War I and 1893 to 1920 (Filene 1970; Gould 1974; Holli 1974). Another point of contention is whether the Progressive Movement qualifies as a social movement. Filene (1970) analyzes the movement according to the definition of social movements used in sociology; he writes that a social movement is "…a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist change in the society" and that there is "…more organization, sustained activity and more defined purpose than a fad, riot or other kind of mass behavior" (20). Regarding the goals, there is "…more diffuse following, more spontaneity and broader a purpose than a cult, pressure group, political party or other voluntary association" and that the participants "…consist of persons who share a

knowing relationship to one another" (Filene 1970; 20). Using this definition leads him to argue that middle and upper class whites were not the only supporters of the proposed reforms; in fact, members of the working class and party machine bosses gained advantages from the proposed reforms. He also argues that the leaders did not share cohesive goals; many supporters focused on reforms for the government, while others wanted social reforms (see also Holli 1974).

Filene's criticisms of the Progressive Movement is not shared by other scholars as most agree that the movement was led by middle and upper class whites who favored policies that targeted political party machines as well as immigrant and racial groups (Bridges 1997; Buenker 1977; Burnham 1977; Gould 1974; Lineberry and Fowler 1967). In many cities, middle and upper class citizens joined organizations including the Conference of Good Government, National Municipal League, Good Government Club, and the City Charter Committee in order to create and gain support for the proposed reforms (Bridges 1997; Burnham 1977; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Holli 1974). Many scholars associate efforts to create reforms with native-born, middle and upper class whites in urban areas (Bridges 1997; Burnham 1977; Gould 1974; Knoke 1982). Nativist biases against foreign-born, non-white groups influenced Progressive leaders' efforts to reform the existing institutions**.** Reform leaders argued that the middle and upper class citizens were ideal constituents because they held few interests that did not require the redistribution of wealth (Bridges 1997; Bridges and Kronick 1999). In contrast, working class, immigrant and racial groups had multiple interests that competed against those of the middle and upper class citizens in urban areas. Examples of the conflicting interests were experienced in the Southwest. Bridges (1997) notes that reform leaders were upset

because immigrant and racial groups wanted more low-income housing, open busing and for segregation and police brutality to end. She finds that the reform and local government leaders ignored these requests and introduced reforms that reduced these groups' abilities to pursue their interests in a political setting.

Reformers throughout the United States pursued several goals (Burnham 1977; Holli 1974). A primary goal was to make the government operate more efficiently. Progressives who wanted to reform the government viewed business corporations as models for governing; corporations would increase efficiency and remove corruption from the government (Adrian 1952; Bridges 1982; Burnham 1977; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Holli 1974). Reformers also believed that operating the government as a corporation would reduce government spending (Buenker 1977). However, not all Progressive leaders shared this view. Other reform leaders wanted social reforms and viewed business corporations as sources of corruption that were detrimental to family life (Holli 1974). These leaders sought to minimize the influence and power of business elites in their efforts to support social reforms. They wanted the existing social institutions to focus more on the family (Burnham 1977; Holli 1974).

Other reform leaders focused on changing the governing institutions, specifically, political party machines (Bridges 1997; Bridges and Kronick 1999; Burnham 1977; Cutright 1968; Gould 1974; Jones 1976; Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Political party machines were problematic for several reasons. First, native-born white elites did not like that political party machines provided opportunities for immigrants, working class members and racial groups to gain political influence (Bridges 1982; Buenker 1977; Davidson and Fraga 1988; Gould 1974; Holli 1974; Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Party

machines needed the support of immigrant and racial groups in order to remain in power. Party bosses provided basic services including legal aid, charity, and patronage to their constituents (Gordon 1968). They used patronage to gain enough funds and resources to provide the services (Bridges 1997; Buenker 1977). Reformers argued that political party bosses relied on ward-based elections in order to remain in power (Gordon 1968). Party machines were also associated with corruption and selfish interests which did not appeal to reform leaders' efforts to increase morality among politicians (Burnham 1977; Gould 1974; Holli 1974). Progressives argued that reforms would force politicians to focus on the interests of their constituents instead of their own professional goals.

A favored solution among reform leaders was the introduction of nonpartisan reforms. They would increase the efficiency of municipal governments, while weakening the relationship between the political party machines and their supporters by removing the sources of patronage (Bridges 1997; Davidson and Korbel 1981). The main characteristic of nonpartisan reforms is the removal of party affiliation from political offices at the local level (Adrian 1952; Bridges 1982; Burnham 1997; Cutright 1968; Davidson and Fraga 1988). Some nonpartisan politicians pursued the interests of favored constituents, for example businessmen, through the use of slating groups (Davidson and Fraga 1988). These groups focused on their constituents' interests at the expense of minority and working class groups.

Several conditions that were favorable for adopting nonpartisan elections included cities in noncompetitive states, weak party attachment, one-party rule, and the lack of class and religious cleavages (Cutright 1968). Because these factors varied across regions, nonpartisan reforms were not uniformly adopted (Bridges 1997; Bridges and

Kronick 1999). Reforms were not adopted in northern and midwestern cities due to the large number of immigrant groups, strong attachments to the political parties, and high rates of political participation among the cities' residents. However, reforms were adopted in southern cities due to one-party rule, low rates of participation and fewer immigrant groups. In the west, reformers found success in areas where the political parties were poorly organized. Some proposals suggested the use of at-large elections and separate elections for national, state, and local races (Holli 1974). There were several types of nonpartisan reforms including at-large elections, city-manager plans, and commission forms of government.

Commission Form of Government

Commission form of government and city-manager plans were adopted throughout the south including in Galveston, Texas (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Knoke 1982). A commission form of government consists of five or more commissions who are assigned to lead individual departments within the city government (Gould 1974; Holli 1974; Knoke 1982). Commissions and city-manager plans were used with at-large elections (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Lineberry and Fowler 1967). Knoke examines 267 cities to understand why this form of government was adopted and then abandoned between 1900 and 1942. He concludes that among several factors, the regional adoption percentage demonstrated the strongest correlation with adopting this form of government (Knoke 1982). Reform leaders argued that commissions not only resembled the corporations that they viewed as ideal models, but they allowed governments to operate

more efficiently (Gould 1974). Another advantage was the belief that commissioners would be more responsive to their constituents' interests (Gordon 1974).

City-manager Plan

A purpose of municipal reforms, primarily city-manager or council-manager plans, was to end the relationship between strong mayor councils and immigrant groups. Gordon (1968) analyzes the adoption of city-manager plans in 268 cities between 1933 and 1960. He finds that the proportion of immigrant populations correlated with the adoption of strong-mayor council forms of government. In contrast, the proportion of the population that was native-born correlated with the adoption of city-manager plans. In response, Knoke (1982) rejects Gordon's conclusion and argues that city-manager plans were proposed by the middle class and elites, but adopted by working class populations (see also Filene 1970). In other words, the social class that would have received the least amount of benefits from nonpartisan reforms actively embraced them. Knoke also disagrees with Gordon's finding that nativism increased support for nonpartisan reforms.

Several conditions allowed Progressive leaders to successfully adopt city-manager plans (Bridges 1997; Bridges and Kronick 1999; Cutright 1968). Cutright (1968) finds that city-manager plans and other nonpartisan reforms were challenged in cities with competitive elections and high levels of party loyalty. In contrast, nonpartisan reforms were adopted in cities with non-competitive elections and low levels of party loyalty. In her analysis of institutional reform throughout the Southwest, Bridges (1997) notes that "big city reform" began with the adoption of city-manager plans in the mid-1900s and ended with the adoption of district-based elections in the 1960s and 1970s. She argues

that reform leaders were successful in the Southwest due to the lack of party attachment among the middle and upper class citizens, lack of party organization and lack of competitive elections. In another analysis of city-manager adoption in the southwest, Bridges and Kronick (1999) conclude that cities with a large immigrant population and high turnout rates were less likely to adopt city-manager plans. In contrast, city-manager plans were adopted in areas where the turnout rates and the immigrant populations were low. They also found that city-manager plans were adopted in cities with large numbers of higher socioeconomic status and native-born citizens.

Political party leaders found some advantages to pursuing the adoption of city-manager plans. Burnham (1997) offers a case study of Cincinnati, Ohio where Republicans successfully gained support to change the city charter and adopt the city-manager plan in 1957. It replaced a city-manager plan that consisted of a 9-member council that was elected using at-large elections under the Hare Proportional Representation plan (Burnham 1997). The original plan was supported by the City Charter Committee (CCC) which consisted of members from the Republican, Democrat, and Independent political parties who felt that the Republican Party machine was corrupt and needed to be eliminated (Burnham 1997). Race had an important role in the incentives to change the city charter. CCC leaders felt that including the Hare PR system would allow immigrant and racial groups to gain political representation on the city councils. Although CCC leaders convinced African American voters to leave the Republican Party, they did not actively endorse African American candidates on their ticket. However in 1940, the CCC finally endorsed an African American candidate who became the first African American councilmember. Throughout this period of time,

Republican leaders unsuccessfully attempted to win support for their efforts to change the city charter. However, as the CCC lost support due to its alliance with a "radical" candidate and the lack of economic growth during its leadership, the Republicans gained more support from white voters for their effort to change the charter in 1957. Burnham notes that race may have been a deciding factor due to white fears that resulted from the integration of Little Rock High School in Arkansas and racial conflicts between whites and African Americans in Cincinnati. The new form of the city-manager plan retained the at-large elections, but no longer included a PR plan, thus decreasing the likelihood that African Americans would win election to the council.

Consequences

There were several consequences associated with nonpartisan reforms. Middle and upper class whites were satisfied with the reforms because politicians pursued their interests. Politicians rewarded their constituents with access to parks and libraries, resources for schools in their areas, and other benefits (Bridges 1997). Political parties lost members and opportunities to offer patronage to their supporters (Adrian 1952; Bridges 1997; Bridges and Kronick 1999). Turnout rates in cities with nonpartisan reforms, commission, and city-manager forms of government decreased drastically (Bridges 1997). The removal of party labels caused more difficulty in party leaders' attempts to recruit candidates, because candidates did not want to associate with a specific political party or adhere to a specific party platform (Adrian 1952). Despite these challenges, there is some evidence that political parties were successful in areas where nonpartisan reforms were adopted (Welch and Bledsoe 1986). In an analysis of

1000 council members, Welch and Bledsoe find that the city size, number of minority groups and levels of competition determined how successful Republican and Democratic Party members would be (1986). Democrats encountered the least amount of success in small cities with small immigrant and racial group sizes. Neither party gained benefits from being in a competitive city. Democrats were successful in wealthy cities that adopted nonpartisan reforms. Republicans were very successful in cities that used at-large elections and other nonpartisan reforms.

Nonpartisan reforms also affected party machine supporters; primarily working class, immigrant and racial groups. The reforms removed political representation, access to basic services, and opportunities to participate for immigrant and racial groups (Bridges 1997; Bridges and Kronick 1999; Davidson and Fraga 1988; Holli 1974). Elites felt that non-white, foreign-born groups threatened white interests and made government operations less efficient (Banfield and Wilson 1967; Bridges 1997; Bridges and Kronick 1999; Davidson and Korbel 1981). Methods of reducing political access for these groups included voter registration, literacy tests, poll taxes, and other methods. In the Southwest, schools, parks, and libraries in areas where non-white groups lived were poorly maintained. Residents in these areas did not have access to basic city services, including water and trash removal (Bridges 1997). Overall, reform governments focused on the interests of their favored constituents, middle and upper class whites, at the expense of non-white, foreign born groups. The use of at-large elections, commission form of government, and city-manager plans affected the level of descriptive representation and political influence of minority groups (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Latimer 1979;

Leal, Meier, and Martinez-Ebers 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005).

Chapter Outlines

In chapter 2, I present my theory for the empirical portions of my analysis. I provide an explanation of how the racial context, specifically racial diversity, affects the origins of electoral structures, and then I continue with an explanation of how the electoral structures continue to affect minority office seeking and holding at the local level. I begin the chapter with a discussion of the racial threat hypothesis, upon which the first part of my theory is based. I include a discussion of why it provides a problematic explanation of where attempted modification of electoral structures would occur. I argue that the racial threat hypothesis would expect attempts to protect white access to power and racial diversity to vary in a linear fashion. I argue that the size of the African American population would cause whites in cities where they are the predominant racial group to attempt to modify existing electoral structures in order to protect their access to city council seats. Although I expect Latino diversity to produce similar affects, I also assess the impact of noncitizenship to affect this relationship.

I continue this chapter by presenting the second portion of my theory, which explains how electoral structures are expected to impact minority candidate emergence and success in city council elections. I evaluate how at-large, partisan and concurrent elections affect Latino candidates' decisions to compete for city council seats. I also explain my theoretical expectations regarding how these electoral structures affect

African American and Latino membership on city councils. I conclude the chapter with an overview of the empirical chapters.

The research questions of interest in chapter 3 are what is the impact of racial diversity upon electoral structure reform? Also, how does racial diversity affect attitudes toward electoral structure reform at the local level? This chapter will contribute a detailed understanding of how racial diversity causes a reduction of representation for minorities as a result of electoral structural change at the local level. As part of this analysis, I rely on data from the International City Management Association Form of Government Survey or ICMA and the U.S. Census. I also examine the spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll in order to evaluate public opinion regarding these reforms. I find that electoral structure reforms are more likely to occur in areas where a dominant majority group (whites) and a significant minority group (African Americans) reside. I also find evidence that residents in predominantly white, significant African American cities express more desire for the existing electoral structure to be modified. Similar results were found among residents in predominantly African American, significant white cities. I evaluate the impact of noncitizenship upon the effect of Latino group size on attempted modifications and find that noncitizenship reduces the nonlinearity of the proposed relationship.

Chapter 4 is the first of two chapters that examine how electoral structures affect minority candidates' decisions to compete in city council elections and their success. In this chapter, I analyze how electoral structures affect Latino candidates' decisions to compete in city council elections in California. I examine previous scholars' expectations that at-large and partisan elections reduce Latino candidate emergence, while concurrent elections would increase Latino incentives to compete in local races. The data that I

analyze is the Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data compiled by Melissa Marschall and Paru Shah. This portion of the dataset includes California city council elections that occurred during 1995-2011, data from the ICMA and U.S. Census. I find little support for my expectations.

Chapter 5 examines how electoral structures affect African American and Latino candidate success. I measure candidate success as membership on city councils. I examine data from the ICMA and U.S. Census. I find support for previous scholars' expectations that at-large elections reduce Latino and African American representation on city councils. The majority size of Latinos mitigates the negative effects of at-large elections. I do not find support for previous conclusions that majority-African American populations overcome the negative effect of at-large elections upon African America representation on city councils. I find some evidence that partisan elections increase representation for Latinos, while reducing representation for African Americans. I find some evidence that concurrent elections increase representation for Latinos and reduce African American representation.

In Chapter 6, I summarize the results from the previous chapters. I explore the implications for Latinos and African Americans as constituents and potential candidates for city council elections. I conclude with a discussion of methods for improving the analyses and suggestions for future research.

Figure 1.1: Explaining the Origins and Impact of Electoral Structures using Race



CHAPTER II:

ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF RACIAL DIVERSITY AND ELECTORAL STRUCTURES AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

Introduction

As mentioned in the previous chapter, an objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate that modification of electoral structures continues to occur due to the presence and growth of minority groups in U.S. cities. Another objective is to examine how electoral structures affect whether or not minority candidates choose to compete in city council elections. A final objective is to continue this analysis by revisiting established conclusions regarding how electoral structures affect minority candidate membership on city councils. Establishing a theoretical foundation will allow me to achieve these objectives. Therefore, I begin this chapter by explaining how racial diversity is expected to affect attempted modifications. This discussion consists of an examination of arguments used to explain white attitudes including the racial threat hypothesis. I continue my discussion by examining the literature related to the effect of racial diversity upon policy positions held by whites and other groups. The theory that I present is based upon the racial threat hypothesis, however, I address limitations associated with how racial threat would explain where attempted modifications would occur. After I establish how racial diversity affects electoral structure reform, my theory explains how electoral structures affect candidate emergence and success among minority candidates at the local level. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the empirical chapters.

Background: The Racial Threat Hypothesis

Racial Threat Hypothesis

Scholars have used racial diversity to explain white attitudes toward minorities. Notable scholarship on the racial threat theory has found that the size of the African American population threatens whites' socioeconomic status and political power in the South (Blalock 1967; Giles and Buckner 1993; Key 1949). Key's (1949) seminal work first established the argument that the presence of African Americans created a sense of threat among whites. Specifically, this argument posits that whites living in areas where there is a large or growing concentration of African Americans feared that the presence of this group would challenge their access to political and socioeconomic resources. In his analysis, Key examines gubernatorial elections in 1948 among southern states with one-party rule (Georgia and Arkansas) and two party rule. His analysis demonstrates that political elites in one-party rule states were more likely to feel threatened by the large concentration of African Americans in the area. This sense of threat caused the political elites to pursue policies that limited the potential political influence and power of the African American population. In contrast, political elites in North Carolina where African Americans lived in smaller concentrations and where the Republican and Democratic parties were in power were not threatened by the presence of the African American population.

Blalock (1967) argues that discrimination against African Americans increases among whites as a result of the growth of the African American population. Similar to Key, Blalock argues that white elites perceive that the presence of a large African American population will result in competition over political power and/or economic

resources. He finds that whites living in areas with a small concentration of African Americans will not pursue discriminatory policies targeting this group, however, discriminatory policies will be supported by whites living in areas where the African American population is large. In other words, more tolerance will occur in areas where the size of the minority group is small, but will decrease in areas where the minority group size is bigger. Not only does the increasing presence of African Americans in an area lead to discriminatory policies, but scholars have also found evidence that it leads to the election of non-minority friendly political elites (Giles and Buckner 1993). In their examination of support for David Duke, a racist senatorial candidate from Louisiana, Giles and Buckner (1993) demonstrate that Duke won votes from whites living in parishes where the African American population was large.[1]

Throughout these analyses, racial diversity is primarily measured as the percentage of the total population that is African American. However, scholars have also found that the size of other minority groups, including Latinos, have influenced policy positions of whites and African Americans (Hood and Morris 1997; Tatalovich 1995; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). The size of the Latino population in an area has influenced white support for ballot initiatives which advocated for English-only legislation and the elimination of affirmative action in California and other states (Tatalovich 1995; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). Overall, white opposition toward minorities was directly

[1] Under the racial threat argument, it would be expected that rates at which African Americans are imprisoned would be significantly higher in the south, especially in areas where the African American population is large. However, Yates and Fording (2005) do not find evidence that the large concentration of African Americans in an area leads to an increase in their imprisonment rate. They argue that the ideology of the legislators matter more than the size of the African American population in states. The authors find evidence that African American imprisonment rates are higher in conservative states.

proportional to the size of the minority groups. Hood and Morris (1998) find that whites hold more favorable attitudes toward immigration as the amount of legal immigrants in an area increases. However, white attitudes become more negative as the amount of illegal immigrants increases.[2] In a departure from previous examinations of white attitudes, Hood, Morris, and Shirkey (1997) evaluate attitudes toward immigration policies among Latinos instead of whites. They find that factors including living in areas with large concentrations of illegal immigrants, "levels of acculturation, and perceived economic threat" cause Latino respondents to express negative positions on legal immigration policies.

Over time, scholars have demonstrated that the effect of racial threat is conditioned by region and levels of political efficacy (Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1985). There is some evidence that the relationship between black population percentage and levels of hostility toward African Americans among whites is more pronounced in the south compared to other regions (Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1985). Giles (1977) and Giles and Evans (1985) argue that the southern subculture promotes an environment of racial hostility toward African Americans which is not found in other regions. They argue that outside of the south, racial discrimination may result from socioeconomic differences, rather than the presence and size of the African American population. Levels of political efficacy demonstrated a stronger impact upon perceived threat, compared to the fear of economic competition with African Americans (Giles and Evans 1985). Giles and Evans (1985) examine the impact of the size of the African American population

[2] Rocha and Espino (2009) find some evidence that the presence of English-speaking Latino immigrants demonstrates some effect upon reducing white support for English-only legislation.

upon racial hostility and group solidarity among whites. They propose the following two-step process: first, "external threat" or the size of the African American population in a county creates "perceived" threat among whites. Second, this perceived threat increases levels of solidarity among whites. They find conditional support for this two-step process among whites who expressed lower levels of political efficacy.

Scholars have also examined the role of socioeconomic factors as an explanation of white racial attitudes. White sense of threat seems to be reduced by the high socioeconomic status among blacks (Giles and Evans 1985). There is evidence that African Americans and whites living among members of their own racial groups in low-income areas express more negative attitudes toward members of the opposing groups (Marschall and Stolie 2004 and 2005; Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003). Asian respondents proved to be the exception; the authors find evidence that Asians living among other Asians are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward other groups (Oliver and Wong 2003). Some scholars have found that socioeconomic factors provide stronger explanations for white attitudes than racial threat. Shafer and Johnston (2006) argue that the primary cause of Republican realignment was changing economic conditions.

Residential segregation affects the full impact of the minority group size upon white sense of threat (Leighley 2001; Rocha and Espino 2009). Leighley (2001) finds evidence that the presence of minorities is not an incentive for whites to engage in political participation. In fact, she argues that whites are more likely to participate if they are mobilized by someone they know and if they live in areas where their neighbors are white. This result contradicts the racial threat hypothesis' expectation that whites living

in areas with large African American population would be more likely to be mobilized to vote as a method for protecting their interests. Rocha and Espino (2009) argue the impact of the size of a Latino group in an area upon white support for English-only legislation and negative attitudes toward Latino immigrants is conditional upon the level of residential segregation of that area. They find that whites living in segregated areas where the Latino population was growing were more likely to support English-only policies. However, this level of support was reduced among whites living in integrated areas.

Social Contact

In contrast to the residential segregation argument, the social contact theory argues that increased contact will increase tolerance between an in-group (whites) and out-groups (minorities) (Allport 1954; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Welch, Sigelman, Bledsoe, and Combs 2001). Scholars have examined the social contact theory against the racial threat hypothesis and have found more support for the former than the latter (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Marshall and Stolle 2004 and 2005). Oliver and Wong (2003) find that living in integrated areas reduces the negative stereotypes and sense of competition held by whites, Latinos and African Americans toward opposing groups. Research about social interactions between blacks and whites living in Detroit has demonstrated interesting conclusions (Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman, and Combs 1995; Sigelman et al 1996; Welch et al 2001). Living in integrated areas can lead to a reduction of solidarity among African Americans (Bledsoe, Welch, Sigelman, and Combs 1995). However, there is evidence that informal interactions between African Americans and members of other groups increases levels of trust among African

Americans (Marshall and Stolle 2004 and 2005). Although social contact has helped increase positive attitudes between African Americans and whites, the type of contact determines the types of relationships that form between members of the groups (Sigelman et al 1996). Welch and her colleagues find that interaction between African Americans and whites in Detroit has created more positive attitudes toward members of the other group (2001). There is some evidence that the impact of social contact is conditioned by the socioeconomic status of individuals (Branton and Jones 2005). Branton and Jones (2005) find that social contact has a conditional impact upon the nature of interactions and attitudes held by individuals toward other groups. The authors argue that although more social contact increases positive attitudes toward other groups, its effect is reduced if the interaction occurs among individuals from different socioeconomic backgrounds.

Overall, the racial threat hypothesis and social contact theory have provided two distinct explanations of white attitudes. In the following section, I discuss the role of racial diversity in determining policy positions and racial attitudes. Afterwards, I discuss how the racial threat hypothesis would explain where attempted reforms would occur and why the linearity assumed is problematic.

Racial Diversity in the Literature

Scholars have demonstrated that racial diversity can cause positive and negative political consequences for minorities at the state and local levels (Hill and Leighley 1999; Tolbert and Hero 2004 and 2005). Hill and Leighley (1999) demonstrate that higher levels of racial diversity in states reduce voter turnout, weakens mobilizing institutions, and increases the use of more stringent voter registration requirements. There is some

evidence that social context, measured as racial diversity, has some impact upon perceptions of government responsiveness (Hero and Tolbert 2004 and 2005). Hero and Tolbert (2004 and 2005) find that attitudes about government responsiveness, measured as political efficacy, vary across whites, African Americans, Latinos and Asians. They argue that whites and Latinos express positive attitudes, while African Americans and Asians express less optimistic attitudes regarding the responsiveness of the government. They find that these attitudes were affected by the presence of ballot initiatives, while racial diversity did not demonstrate a significant effect.

Racial diversity has also been associated with policies that have had helpful and detrimental effects for minorities (Hero and Tolbert 1996;; Hero 1998; Rocha and Hawes 2009; Tolbert and Hero 1996 and 2001). Hero and Tolbert (1996) and Hero (1998) divide racial diversity into the following categories: "homogenous" areas contain a majority white population and very small minority population, "bifurcated" areas are divided between minority groups and whites, and "heterogeneous" areas contain a predominant white and "moderately sized" minority groups. Hero and Tolbert (1996) and Hero (1998) find that at the aggregate level, bifurcated contexts adopt the least amount of education and social welfare policies that are minority-friendly. However, disaggregating their analyses by race leads them to conclude that homogenous states have policies that provide the least favorable outcomes for minorities. However, the most favorable policy outcomes for minorities were found in heterogeneous states.

Tolbert and Hero (2001) examine white support for four ballot initiatives that directly affected minority groups in California. They find that whites living in bifurcated and homogenous areas were more likely to support the policies. However, whites living

in heterogeneous areas expressed less support for the policies. Similar results are found at the local level (Rocha and Hawes 2009; Tolbert and Hero 1996). Tolbert and Hero (1996) find that at the county level, whites living in homogenous counties and bifurcated countries were more likely to support Proposition 187, which removed access to health and social services for illegal immigrants in California. Rocha and Hawes (2009) find that higher levels of racial diversity decrease the amount of second-generation discrimination experienced by African American and Latino students. They also find evidence that similar socioeconomic status between whites and minorities reduces white support for discriminatory education policies.[3]

Where Attempted Electoral Structures Reform Would Occur

Proponents of the racial threat theory argue that racial diversity, specifically minority group size, causes whites to fear that their political privileges and power are threatened (Blalock 1967; Giles and Buckner 1993; Key 1949; Tatalovich 1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). At the local level, it is possible to argue that as the population size of minorities increase, whites will attempt to adopt electoral structures that protect their access to city council seats from minority group interests. However, this theory has a significant limitation: first, it assumes that power and group sizes vary in a linear fashion. Second, it assumes that presence of minority groups elicits fear and threat among whites across all cities, thus causing them to attempt to alter the electoral structures. The racial

[3] Branton and Jones (2005) argue that whites hold more liberal and minority friendly policies in areas where their socioeconomic status is similar to the minority groups in those areas.

threat hypothesis does not distinguish between racially bifurcated cities, homogenous cities and cities where whites are the predominant racial group.

The theory that I present builds upon the racial threat hypothesis. I address the first limitation found in racial threat by demonstrating that the relationship between minority group size and power is nonlinear. I address the second limitation by applying Hero and Tolbert's (1996), Tolbert and Hero (1996), and Hero's (1998) racial diversity categories in my analysis. I make slight modifications to their categories by dividing their heterogeneous categories in two: predominantly white, significant minority cities, and predominantly minority, significant white cities. Minority group size affects white preferences differently in racially bifurcated cities than it does white preferences in homogenous cities and cities where whites are the predominant racial group. In homogenous white cities, minority group size will not cause whites to attempt to change the existing electoral structures because all of the members on the city council (and other boards) will be white. In racially bifurcated cities where the population consists of 50% whites and 50% African Americans, neither group will attempt to change the electoral structures due to uncertainty about the outcomes of elections. In these cities, the city council seats will be divided evenly among African Americans and whites if ward-based elections are used. If at-large elections are used, then either group has a fifty percent chance of winning all of the city council seats. Minority group size will have a significant effect upon the preferences of whites who are the predominant racial group, but the size of a minority group is significant. In these cities, some whites who fear that the minority group (for example African Americans) threatens their privileges will favor electoral structures that reduce the representation and influence of the minority group. In contrast,

the African Americans in that city will oppose these changes or will support the adoption of electoral structures that allow more African Americans to be elected to city councils. The outcomes of these attempted changes will protect or hurt the distribution of power for the numerically dominant group. Minority group size produces a significant effect upon the attempt to modify electoral structures in certain types of cities.

In the next section, I discuss the factors that have affected potential candidates' decisions to compete in national, state legislature, and local races. Following this section is my presentation of my theory regarding how electoral structures are expected to affect candidate emergence among minority candidates at the local level.

Candidate Emergence

Emergence in National Elections

Scholars have examined the role of ambition as a factor that causes potential candidates to become actual candidates (Canon 1990 and 1993; Prewitt and Nowlin 1969; Rohde 1979; Schlessinger 1966). Schlessinger (1966) examines the political opportunity structures available to candidates for nine offices in 58 states between 1914 and 1958. He argues that when in office, candidates remain ambitious in their examination of factors that would allow them to advance to higher political offices. Therefore, their ambition to win a higher office determines the types of actions they engage in while they hold their current position. He also argues that candidates have a consistent level of ambition that changes in a predictable manner. Prewitt and Nowlin (1969) and Prewitt (1970) confirm his argument. Critiques of Schlessinger's theory include his assumption that the level of ambition would not be affected by candidates' fear of risk, periods of "electoral

upheaval", and other factors beyond the candidates' control (Black 1972; Brace 1984; Canon 1990 and 1993; Rohde 1979). Rohde (1979) expands upon the ambition theory by arguing that U.S. House members evaluate the risks associated with pursuing higher offices, specifically a seat in the U.S. Senate or a governorship. He finds that House members are more likely to pursue the Senate compared to governorships. He also finds that House members are more likely to run for U.S. Senate seats if their probability of winning is high, if the seats are open, and if the opposition party is not guaranteed to win the elections. Brace (1984) finds that age, redistricting and incumbent vulnerability determine the level of ambition among members of the U.S. House. Canon (1990 and 1993) contributes the concept of amateurs to the ambition theory. He identifies ambitious amateurs as holding similar career goals to experienced officeholders; policy amateurs pursue policy goals and hopeless amateurs compete in races that they are not expected to win. Canon (1990) examines the presence of amateur candidates in U.S. House elections. He finds that the presence of amateur candidates causes experienced officeholders to reassess their strategies for achieving their career goals. Canon (1993) distinguishes between "ambitious" and "experience-seeking" amateurs who seek to challenge incumbents in the U.S House. He argues that ambitious amateurs choose to compete in open-seat races and run against vulnerable incumbents. In contrast, experience-seeking amateurs are less strategic and compete in races that they are not likely to win.

Scholars have also examined the role of strategy in challengers' evaluations of whether or not they should run for office (Hetherington, Larson, and Globetti 2003; Jacobson 1989; Jacobson and Kernell 1983; Krasno and Green 1988). Jacobson and Kernell (1983) and Jacobson (1989) argue that national political conditions demonstrate

the strongest impact upon elites' decisions to run for office or recruit candidates. Hetherington, Larson, and Globetti (2003) find that redistricting cycles and other national political conditions affect challengers' decisions to run for office. They argue that quality challengers are less likely to compete in elections that occur at the end of redistricting cycles. Krasno and Green (1988) identify several factors that determine the likelihood that challengers will view running for office as their best strategic option: high likelihood of winning victory, local political conditions or the incumbent won by a small margin of victory in the previous election, and whether or not the incumbent raised a large amount of campaign funds. They also find that the vote margins of the incumbent are the strongest predictor of the quality of the challenger.[4] Henson and Gimple (1995) find evidence that challengers must evaluate many factors including district, geographical, partisan support, and support from the political party in their decisions to challenge incumbents.

A strategic factor that challengers examine in their decision to compete for office is their decision to run for open seats or challenge incumbents (Canon 1990; 1993; Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert 1997). Canon (1990 and 1993) argues that ambitious amateurs are more likely to run for open seats, compared to hopeless and experience-seeking amateurs. Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert (1997) examine U.S. House races from 1976-1984 and find that experienced challengers are more likely to compete in open seat races. Pritchard (1992) argues that challengers at the state level are more likely to choose to compete against incumbents if the incumbent competed against a challenger in the previous

[4] This result is confirmed by Bond, Covington, and Fleisher (1985).

election. She also argues that challengers are less strategic in primary elections and more strategic in their decision-making during general elections.[5]

Candidates in U.S. Senate races encounter similar strategic decisions. Potential challengers in Senate elections choose not to compete if they perceive the incumbent as having strategic resources including name recognition and strong personal qualities (Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004). In his assessment of Senate races from 1952-1990, Lublin (1994) argues that quality challengers' decisions to run for office are determined by national and state political conditions. Potential challengers in U.S. Senate races are most influenced by the size of the candidate pool within their party, as well as their party's likelihood of winning the election (Adams and Squire 1997). Adams and Squire (1997) examine candidate emergence in the 1992 U.S. Senate elections. They argue that incumbent vulnerability did not have as large of an effect upon the decision to run by high-quality challengers. The authors suggest that compared to House races, the candidate emergence process for Senate races is different due to fewer seats being available for elections, more candidates for seats, and larger constituencies. Carson (2005) finds evidence that experienced challengers in both House and Senate elections races choose to run against incumbents who vote along party lines on salient roll-call votes.

An obstacle encountered by challengers is competing against incumbents' war chests (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Carson 2005; Goodliffe 2001). Scholars have found some evidence that experienced challengers are deterred from running against U.S.

[5] Bernstein (1986) examines the presence of female candidates in U.S. House primary races during the 1960s and 1970s. He finds that although more female candidates faced younger, male opponents in open seat races, this was not the case for female candidates competing as challengers.

House incumbents due to the size of their war chests (Box-Steffensmeier 1996; Carson 2005). However, challengers in Senate races are not deterred by the amount of money spent by the incumbent (Carson 2005). An examination of U.S. House elections from 1984-1998 demonstrates that challengers are not intimidated by incumbents' war chests (Goodliffe 2001).

There is evidence that political parties demonstrate some impact upon candidate emergence. Seligman (1961) finds evidence that candidate recruitment by political parties varies by whether or not they are in power. The majority party chooses not to recruit candidates for races that have incumbents from that party. In contrast, the minority party actively recruits candidates to compete against the incumbent. Examining party recruitment strategy in Chicago, Nowins (1966) found that the Democratic Party machine and the Republican Party used different recruitment strategies. The Democratic Party machine dominated inner cities and recruited candidates from its ranks. Suburban Chicago was dominated by the Republican Party which recruited candidates who had personal resources. Herrnson (1986) finds that candidates identified their local party organizations as having the biggest impact upon their decisions to run for office. However, at the national level, the Republican Party seemed to exert more influence upon candidates' decisions to run for Congress if they were facing a Democratic incumbent in a competitive district (see also Kazee and Thornberry 1989). Once recruited, Hernson (1986) finds that both Democratic and Republican party organizations provide viable specific candidates with fund-raising, campaign management and other campaign tools. Kazee and Thornberry (1989) reexamine the role of the political parties by interviewing candidates who ran for Congress in 1982. Their sample includes thirty-six candidates

who ran in competitive districts. They find that party recruitment is indirect; several candidates who ran for office had been involved with the party organizations prior to their decision to run for office. Some candidates expressed that they were contacted by party leaders after they had decided to run for office. Other candidates expressed that they had not been involved with either parties prior to their candidacy. Overall, very few of the candidates in the sample expressed that they had been recruited by either party directly. The authors conclude that party involvement had the largest impact upon candidates' decisions to run for office. Jacobson (1989) finds that political parties are strategic in their support of candidates. Specifically, national conditions affect the parties' decisions of which candidates to support. Jacobson finds that during periods when the national political conditions increase the likelihood of victory, party elites will encourage quality challengers to run on the parties' tickets against incumbents. An examination of potential challengers in U.S. House races in 1994 reveals that potential challengers were deterred from running if they thought their chances of winning the party nomination was low and if they did not already hold an elective office (Maisel and Stone 1997). There is evidence that potential challengers in House and Senate elections choose not to compete if the incumbent won by a large vote margin in the previous election, if the election is not competitive (Carson 2005).

Emergence in State Legislature Races

Several of the strategic factors that are considered by candidates competing in national elections are evaluated by candidates in state legislature races. There is evidence that members of the state house who decide to compete for state senate seats are very

strategic (Francis 1993). He argues that candidates who choose to compete against senate incumbents evaluate their chances of winning, their career preferences, and consequences of losing the elections. He argues further that this selectivity increases the challengers' chances of winning. La Raja (2007) examined survey responses from potential candidates and political participants who were informed, but not likely to run for office in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. His analysis reveals that potential candidates were deterred from competing for state legislature seats when they had to raise funds for their campaigns. However, the availability of public funds increased the number of ambitious candidates who emerged to compete for the legislature seats.

Revisiting Schlessinger's argument that ambition is static, Maestas, Fulton, Maisel, and Stone (2006) find that state legislators' level of ambition is affected by their assessment of costs and benefits associated with running for Congress. If the existing national and local political conditions decrease the costs of running for Congress, then state legislators are more likely to have higher levels of ambition. However, the authors find that ambitious candidates are more likely to run for higher office. Maestas, Stone, and Maisel (1999) examine the impact of legislative professionalism upon candidates' evaluation of the costs and benefits of running for Congress. Their sample consists of a national survey of state legislators in 200 Congressional districts in 1998. They find that legislators in professional legislatures were less likely to run for election to Congress if they had to run against a strong incumbent or if their legislative career was more secured than a career in Congress. In contrast, legislators from unprofessional legislatures were more likely to run against strong incumbents. Factors other than ambition are also considered by potential candidates. Squire (1988) finds the type of legislature, the level

of pay, and chances of winning higher office are factors that legislators consider in their decision to pursue higher office or a seat in the U.S. House. Squire argues that legislators in "springboard" legislatures who view their likelihood of success as high are more likely to run for higher office. In comparison, legislators in "career" legislatures are more likely to choose to continue their careers in the legislature. Members of "deadend" legislatures neither want to stay nor do they view opportunities to advance their careers in a higher office.

Emergence at the Local Level

Local level candidates demonstrate strategic and ambitious decisions. Black (1972) revisits Schlessinger's (1966) conclusions in his examination of city council members in the San Francisco Bay area. Black examines council members' decisions to retire, run for other offices, or to run for reelection. He argues that candidates' level of political ambition is determined by factors beyond their control, including political and demographic characteristics of the areas in which they were elected (see also Hernson and Gimple 1995). He ultimately concludes that council members will determine their actions by assessing the costs and benefits of their efforts. For example, if the costs of running for a different office are high, then they will pick the least costly alternative (either run for reelection or retire). However, they will run for a different office if they associate more benefits than costs with running for that office.

Similar to findings for state legislature races, scholars find evidence that political parties are strategic in their recruitment decisions (Feld and Lutz 1972; Prewitt and Eulau 1971). In an examination of San Francisco Bay area councilmen, Prewitt and Eulau

(1971) argue that the social and political characteristics of an area determined the types of candidates that were recruited to run for office. In other words, candidates who are more likely to win their election, are already politically and civically active and have personal resources are more likely to be recruited for office. Feld and Lutz (1972) examine recruitment decisions for city council elections in Houston. They find evidence that political party elites do not actively recruit candidates at the same rates as candidates for state legislature races.

The types of electoral structures in place and the demographic context affect the quality of candidates who decide to compete for seats on city councils (Krebs 1999). Krebs (1999) examines data from all of the wards in Chicago from 1979 to 1995. His sample includes fifty wards. He argues that experienced candidates are more likely to run for seats held by vulnerable incumbents and open seats. He also finds that the number of experienced African American candidates increases in wards that have large African American populations. Experienced candidates are less likely to compete against incumbents who had large vote margins in the previous elections, or in wards that are controlled by a strong party machine culture.

Female Candidate Emergence

Across all levels of government, female candidates are deterred from running for office due to several factors (Bernstein 1986; La Raja 2007; Merrit 1977). Pressure to balance political aspirations and family obligation deter women from running for office (Lawless and Fox 2010; Jaramillo 2008). Female candidates may choose not to run against incumbents when they have difficulty raising campaign funds, and lack name

recognition (Carroll 1994). However, the availability of public funds does not increase the number of female candidates who run for state legislature. (La Raja 2007). Merrit (1977) finds that at the local level, female city council candidate success is associated with their ability to demonstrate leadership in civic organizations. For men, their success in city council elections is associated with being recruited by political elites.

Another factor that hurts female candidate emergence is a lack of political ambition (Jacobson 1980; Bernstein 1986). Being perceived as lacking political ambition has been shown to reduce the likelihood that political parties will recruit female candidates (Bernstein 1986; Jacobson 1980; Lawless and Fox). A source of the lack of ambition is the difference in how men and women are socialized (Lawless and Fox 2010). Lawless and Fox (2010) examine a sample of potential female candidates and find the lack of ambition exists among female participants who were politically successful, but chose not to run for office. They conclude that women are more likely to become candidates if they are recruited. Sobanmatsu (2002) finds evidence that compared to the Republican Party, Democratic elites are more likely to recruit female candidates from social eligibility pools (when they exist). However, once they are recruited, female Democrats are more likely to face more challengers in professional state legislatures that are controlled by Democrats.

Minority Candidate Emergence

Across all levels of government, scholars have examined the presence of non-traditional African American candidates who attempt to pursue interests that appeal to voters of all races. Canon, Schousen, and Sellers (1996) and Canon (1999) propose the

Supply-Side Theory of Racial Redistricting which argues that the districts have traditionally contained African American candidates who promote "politics of difference" and focus on issues that are primarily important to African American voters, but alienate white voters. However, the creation of new districts has led to the emergence of "politics of commonality" candidates who focus on issues that benefit African American and white voters in districts. Both analyses find evidence that "commonality" candidates could win support from moderate whites and African Americans in the majority-minority districts that were created after 1992.

Another strategy used by minority candidates is deracialization. At the local level, Ardrey and Nelson (1990) examine the use of deracialization as a campaign strategy during the mayoral primary in 1989 in Cleveland, Ohio. Deracialization describes the effort by minority candidates to deemphasize their race and ethnicity in order to gain non-minority voters. One of the five candidates was George Forbes, who is recognized as using race as a tool for winning support from African American voters. During his tenure on the city council, Forbes gained black support by pursuing racial interests, which alienated white voters. Another primary candidate was Michael White, who chose to deracialize his campaign by focusing on issues that benefitted every citizen, not just a specific group. The authors note that his strategy made him an example of the "new Black politicians" (150). As a result, White gained enough crossover votes from whites to become Cleveland's mayor. Gonzalez-Juenke and Sampaio (2010) tests the concept of deracialization in the context of contests for seats in the U.S. House and Senate. The authors acknowledge that deracialization has been used to examine local level elections and that their analysis is the first to apply it to a different context. This strategy is used in

areas where the minority group of the candidate has not reached majority size. In their analysis, Gonzalez-Juenke and Sampaio examine the campaigns of Ken and John Salazaar who ran for seats in the U.S. Senate and House respectively in 2004. Their analysis demonstrates the brothers deracialized their respective campaigns because many of the voters in Colorado were rural Republicans. Some strategies that they used included not associating themselves with vote drives aimed toward Latino voters, visiting voters in rural areas and other methods.

Scholars have assessed how factors including electoral structure, the size of minority groups in districts and other factors have affected African American and Latino candidates' decisions to run in election at all levels of government. In an examination of U.S. House primary elections between 1994 and 2004, Branton (2008) argues that the growth of African Americans and Latinos in a district increases the number of African American and Latino candidates who compete in Democrat and Republican primary elections. It also increases the number of quality- challengers who are members of these groups and makes Democratic primary races more competitive. Casellas (2007) examines factors that affect Latino candidates' chances of being elected to the California state legislature. He confirms previous findings that that candidates (including Latinos) are more likely to compete for a legislative seat where there are open seats, when incumbents retire at the end of their terms and if they are able to raise campaign funds (see also Fowler & McClure 1989; Maisel and Stone 1997). The availability of public funds did not increase the likelihood that female, minority or working-class candidates would run for office (La Raja 2007). Among potential Latino candidates in non-Latino majority wards, Krebs (1999) finds that Latino candidates were less likely to run for office in

districts where they would have to build a coalition of support in order to win a city council seat.

Shah and Marschall (2011) examine the conditions that affect the presence of African American candidates in races for seats on school boards, city councils, county and state offices in Louisiana from 1989-2011, using the Local Election in American Project (LEAP) dataset and candidate information from the Louisiana Secretary of State. The authors conclude that African American candidates' decisions to run for office are influenced by the number of seats that are available, their likelihood of running in future elections, whether or not they had competed in a previous race, and the voting strength of their voting base. They also find that higher numbers of African American candidates competed for seats on school boards, city councils or county commissions, and in ward-based elections.

In their examination of surveys of 1,860 black elected officials at the local level, Conyers and Wallace (1976) find evidence that black city councilmembers were more likely to run for office in order to pursue policies that would address issues important to the black community including social injustice. In comparison, the authors find evidence that white council members were more likely to identify wanting the position in order to increase their personal gains as their incentive for running for office.

Minority Candidate Emergence in City Council Elections

How do electoral structures affect minority candidates' decisions to run for city council seats? Previous examinations of candidate emergence among minorities have examined factors including the presence of open seats, the effect of term limits,

likelihood of running in the future and other factors (Casellas 2007; Shah and Marschall 2011). However, there has been little focus upon the impact of electoral structures as primary explanations of why minorities choose to run or not to run for office at the local level (Krebs 1999) Krebs (1999) finds evidence that more African American candidates compete in city council elections in cities where ward-based elections are used, and where the African American population is large. I build upon his conclusion by continuing to examine the impact of multiple electoral structures including at-large elections, partisan elections, and concurrent elections. I also evaluate how the size of the minority population mitigates the positive or negative effects of these forms of elections.

Regarding candidate emergence, at-large elections and partisan elections are expected to reduce the presence of minority candidates, specifically Latino candidates, in city council elections. Previous scholarship has demonstrated that quality candidates will not compete in contests that they feel they cannot or will not win (Canon 1990 and 1993; Krasno and Green 1988). Scholars have also shown that Latino candidates are less likely to win city council elections in cities where at-large and partisan elections are used (Jones-Correa 1998; Welch 1990;). Therefore, I examine the expectation that at-large and partisan elections, respectively, would attract fewer Latino candidates. There is evidence that concurrent elections are expected to increase the representation of minorities at the local level (see Allan and Plank 2005; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005 and 2010), therefore, I expect that more Latino candidates would be willing to compete in areas where concurrent elections are used. The foundation for this expectation is that Latino candidates would choose to run in these elections because they would view their likelihood of wining as more favorable.

I build upon these baseline expectations by evaluating them in both cities where the minority group is less than the majority of the total population and cities where they are the majority-sized group. I expect that the effects of at-large and partisan elections remain detrimental to minority candidate emergence in cities where the minority population is not the majority-sized group. However, concurrent elections should continue to increase the amount of minority candidate in city council elections, regardless of the size of the minority population.

Electoral Structures and Descriptive Representation

Progressive reformers tried to argue that at-large elections would provide adequate representation for the residents of the city as a whole (Banfield and Wilson 1967). However, research has shown that white candidates received more representation since white candidates were more likely to win city council seats. Returning to ward-based elections were solutions used in vote dilution cases (Davidson and Korbel 1981). Their purpose was to allow citizens in districts to vote for representatives from those districts, as opposed to the entire city (Karnig and Welch 1982). Supporters of the use of district elections argued that district representatives would address the interests of the residents instead of the interests of the residents in the entire city.

This portion of the literature review will provide a discussion of how electoral structures affect descriptive representation for African Americans and Latinos on city councils and school boards. I begin with a discussion of how electoral structures affect representation of African Americans and Latinos on city councils. It is followed by a

discussion of how electoral structures affect representation of both groups on school boards.

City Councils

Some scholars find evidence that African Americans are more likely to win seats on city councils if partisan elections are used (Banfield and Wilson 1967). In contrast Cole (1974) finds that some black councilmembers won nonpartisan elections. He analyzes twenty-seven elections in sixteen New Jersey cities and finds that African American mayors and councilmembers were sometimes elected there with nonpartisan reforms and primarily in at-large elections. He also argues that areas where white residents earn higher levels of income are more receptive to electing African American candidates. Overall, Cole's findings argue against the assumption that blacks have to be at least half of the total population of an area and that they must be included on a party ballot in order to win council seats. In her analysis of 243 cities, MacManus (1976) argues against the conclusion that at-large elections hurt descriptive representation for minorities. She concludes that at-large elections provide more equity in representation for blacks than district-based elections. Cole and MacManus' conclusions about at-large elections have caused other scholars to reassess their analyses (Karnig 1976); Karnig and Welch 1982; Davidson and Korbel 1981). Karnig questions Cole's ability to generalize about the effects of at-large elections due to his analysis of twenty-seven municipal elections in New Jersey. Karnig analyzes 139 cities with at least 25,000 residents and black population of at least fifteen percent or more. He concludes that at-large elections hurt black representation on city councils. Criticisms of MacManus include her

measurement of black representation and her treatment of electoral structures as a dichotomous variable (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Karnig and Welch 1982).

Although he argues that at-large elections cause blacks to be underrepresented on councils, Jones (1976) acknowledges that examining disaggregated data demonstrates that in some areas, blacks are overrepresented due to at-large elections. Latimer (1979) finds that having a near black majority and white electoral support helps black representation in at-large elections. Davidson and Korbel (1981) find that African American city council candidates in Texas were able to win seats in at-large elections if there was a large minority population and if white elites endorsed the minority candidates (see also Kramer 1971). Karnig and Welch (1982) argue that blacks can win at-large elections when they are the majority population in a city (see also Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle and Polinard 2005).[6] Welch (1990) examines cities in the 1980s and finds that blacks continue to receive more representation through ward-based elections; however, their level of representation through at-large elections has increased over time. She also finds that majority black populations increase the likelihood of black candidates winning at-large elections.[7] Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard (2005) find

---

[6] Although some evidence that blacks and Latino representation increases with the use of district elections, some scholars note that blacks have more electoral success in district elections than Latinos (MacManus 1978; Taebel 1978; Karnig and Welch 1982; Lublin 1997). At the national and local levels, black populations are contained to more concentrated areas than Latino populations. This advantage allows black candidates to gain more support from their black constituents, compared to Latino candidates. A solution for Latino representation in districts is for the size of the council to increase (Taebel 1978). There is some evidence that smaller Latino populations receive representation under mixed elections (Welch 1990).

[7] Although blacks have been shown to receive representation from mixed elections in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars find that blacks only receive adequate representation through mixed elections if they are less than twenty percent of the population (MacManus 1978; Latimer 1979; Karnig and Welch 1982; Welch 1990)

that blacks receive representation on school boards in proportion to the size of their population in an area.

Within the literature, scholars have found that at-large elections reduce the likelihood that minority candidates will win office (Ashkinaze 1991; Davidson and Korbel 1981; Davison and Fraga 1988; Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Jones 1976; Latimer 1979; Leal et al 2004; Meier et al 2005; Orfield). Jones (1976) examines a sample of cities that had a population of at least fifty thousand residents and whose black population was at least five percent and finds that increasing the number of ward-based elections will increase the number of blacks elected to city councils. Karnig and Welch (1978) confirm this finding, but argue that ward-based elections only increase the number of black men, not black women, who are elected to city councils. Latimer (1979) finds that black representation in the south is affected by the size of the black population. Engstrom and McDonald (1981) find that at-large elections affect the likelihood of black candidates winning seats on city councils when the black population reaches ten percent of the total population. Karnig and Welch (1982) argue that district elections or the use of at-large elections that require candidates to live in a district help increase black representation on city councils.

Scholars have found evidence that several other factors affect minority office holding. Higher socioeconomic status of residents throughout cities in New Jersey increased the likelihood that black candidates would win seats on city councils (Cole 1974). He argues that smaller cities and suburban areas would contain more educated and higher income level whites who were more willing to vote for black candidates. MacManus (1976) argues that the socioeconomic status of residents demonstrated a

stronger effect upon black candidate success than the form of election used. Engstrom and McDonald (1982) find that the likelihood that black candidates would win city council seats was determined by the size of the black population and the number of city council seats in at-large elections (see also Jones 1976; Latimer 1979; Marschall, Ruhill, and Shah 2010). They argue that city councils that used district elections had more seats than at-large elections. Robinson and Dye (1978) analyze a sample of 243 cities with a black population of at least fifteen percent. They argue that blacks in their sample received two-thirds of the representation they deserve compared to their size of the population in the cities. They determine that levels of black education, region, and city size demonstrated some affect upon black representation on city councils. Blacks and Latinos are underrepresented in the south and southwest, smaller cities, and areas where the residents are less educated (Robinson and Dye 1978; Taebel 1978).

For Latino representation, the size of the council has a stronger effect than the type of election that is used (Taebel 1978). Taebel (1978) argues that at-large elections and small council sizes decrease descriptive representation for blacks and Latinos. Karnig (1976 and 1979) meanwhile, cite the following factors as explanations of low black representation in city councils: the number of seats in a district, region, electoral structure and economic resources that are possessed by blacks. Latimer (1979) finds that black representation on city councils is determined by the electoral structure and by the level of organization and turnout of black voters in these elections. She also finds evidence that education and income demonstrate some effect upon black representation in the south. Engstrom and McDonald (1981) argue that black representation would increase if at-large elections were changed to ward-based elections, if the number of seats

in council elections increased, and if the size of districts were reduced. Marschall, Ruhill and Shah (2010) argue that in order for black representation on city council sand school boards to increase, the black population threshold must reach approximately 40% under at-large elections, and 25% under ward-based elections.

School Boards

School board members are elected through at-large elections, district elections or they are appointed (Leal, Meier, and Martinez-Ebers 2004). The type of election that is used to elect school members is important for African American and Latino descriptive and substantive representation. Having at-large or ward-based elections can determine the number of minorities on school boards, and the number of African American and Latino administrations (Meier et al 2005). They also find that the size of the black and Latino population in an area only affects school board membership among minorities and the number of black and Latino administrators and teachers in schools. Meier et al (2005) find that substantive representation of blacks might suffer because black school board candidates may ignore minority interests in order to appeal to the median voters, who are white. As a result, the black community does not gain significant substantive representation. This finding is similar to arguments made by Davidson and Korbel (1981) and Burnham (1997) who argue that political parties pick "safe" minority candidates to compete in at-large elections. Leal et al (2004) and Meier et al (2005) find that at-large elections reduce the amount of Latino members on school boards and consequently reducing descriptive representation. Meier et al (2005) find that at-large elections lower Latino candidates' chances of being elected to school boards, but find that blacks do win

at-large elections. However, they conclude that at-large elections hurt school board membership which lowers the number of minority administrators and teachers for both blacks and Latinos. Rocha (2007) finds that African Americans can win more seats on school boards in areas where African Americans and Latinos form a majority. He does not find evidence that African Americans gain more descriptive representation through ward-based elections.

As was seen for minority candidates in city council elections, minority school board candidates' chances of winning elections is limited by the use of at-large elections vs. ward-based elections. There is some evidence that blacks school board candidates can win at-large elections, however, black constituents gain more descriptive and substantive representation from district elections (Meier et al 2005). Latino population and school board membership vary in a nonlinear fashion; school board membership is affected when the Latino population reaches 5.2% threshold (Leal et al 2004; Meier et al 2005). Latinos can win at-large elections when they are the majority population (Leal et al 2004). Overall, Latinos gain descriptive and substantive representation from district elections (Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990; Leal, Meier, Martinez-Ebers 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005; Meier 1993). Stewart, England, and Meier (1989) find that school board representation for blacks is affected by an interaction between black population size and the type of election that is used.

African American and Latino Candidate Success

Once, minority candidates choose to compete in city council races, how do electoral structures affect their success? Many scholars have demonstrated how at-large

elections have hurt descriptive representation for African Americans and Latinos on both city councils and school boards (Krebs 1999; Latimer 1979; Leal et al 2004; Meier et al 2005). Other scholarship demonstrates the problematic effects of partisan elections (Jones-Correa 1998) for minority candidates and the potential benefits of concurrent elections (Allen and Plank 2005). I build upon these conclusions by evaluating all three forms of elections upon minority candidate success, measured as council membership. I also evaluate their effects in the context of the minority group population in cities.

For Latinos and African Americans, the negative impact of at-large elections upon representation is expected to remain in cities where neither group reaches majority status. For African Americans, however, scholars including Latimer (1979) and Welch (1990) argue that at-large elections do not reduce their representation on city councils in cities where they are the majority population. In contrast, other factors including the size of the council are expected to demonstrate a stronger impact upon representation for Latinos due the fact that Latino communities tend to be more spread out compared to African Americans who live in more concentrated areas (Taebel 1978). Although there are fewer cities where the Latino population is concentrated, I argue that at-large elections will increase Latino representation in areas where the majority of the total population consists of Latinos. I expect both groups to be negatively affected by partisan elections in cities where they are not the majority populations. However, this effect should be reversed in majority-Latino and majority-African American cities. Latino and African Americans who choose to compete in city council elections should benefit from the use of concurrent elections regardless of the size of their racial groups. Having the municipal, school, and national elections held at the same time should increase the turnout rates of minority

populations which would increase the likelihood that the minority candidates will win their elections.

Conclusions

My objective for this chapter was to discuss the components of my theory. I revisit the racial threat hypothesis and examine why it is not an adequate explanation of where attempted modifications will occur. I explain how whites' attempts to protect their power and racial diversity vary in a non-linear fashion. In chapter 3, I discuss and analyze expectations regarding where attempted electoral structure reform will occur. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate how the racial context, specifically racial diversity, is the primary incentive for white elites to attempt to modify the existing forms of elections in order to protect their access to power at the local level. Chapters 4 and 5 provide empirical analyses of how electoral structures affect candidate emergence among Latino candidates and success among Latino and African American candidates. Chapter 4 presents expectations of how at-large, partisan, and concurrent elections increase and decrease the likelihood that Latino candidates will compete in city council elections in California. Chapter 5 presents expectations of how these electoral structures increase and decrease Latino and African American membership on city council elections.

CHAPTER III:

THE IMPACT OF RACIAL DIVERSITY UPON ELECTORAL STRUCTURE REFORM

Introduction

Although electoral structure reform originated during the Progressive Movement, the impact of the reforms upon minority representation has extended beyond the Progressive movement. Nonpartisan reforms including at-large elections and commission forms of government limit representation and political influence of racial and ethnicity minority groups (Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Latimer 1979; Leal, Meier, and Martinez-Ebers 2004; Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Wrinkle, and Polinard 2005). At-large elections lower the likelihood of minorities being elected to city councils, school boards and other institutions. In contrast, ward-based elections increase the descriptive representation of minorities by making it easier for them to win elections. In the existing literature, scholars demonstrate how institutional structures affect race, specifically descriptive representation. However, the literature presents few answers regarding how race, specifically the racial context, affects attempts to modify the existing electoral structures in American Cities. I answer the following research question: what is the impact of racial diversity upon attempts to change institutional structures in cities? I argue that racial diversity provides clear incentives for white political leaders to pursue certain institutional structures, specifically at-large elections.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the strength of racial diversity controlling for alternative explanations. I will present a theoretical explanation of how racial diversity causes elites to attempt to alter electoral structures at the local level (see

figure 3.1). I argue that the impact of racial diversity is seen in predominantly white cities that have significant minority group populations. In other words, as the size of a minority group grows, elites will view this growth as a threat and will attempt to alter electoral structures in order to protect their preferences. In this chapter, I will provide an empirical examination of the nonlinear relationship between racial diversity and electoral structure reform. My data consists of several datasets, including the 1996, 2001, and 2006 International City Management Association (ICMA), the spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll, and Census data from 1980-2010. As my analysis will demonstrate, black populations and Latino population cities demonstrate different effects upon attempts to alter electoral structures. Attempted electoral reforms are more likely to occur in predominantly white cities with significantly black and Latino populations. However, this effect is not seen in cities with Latino majority populations.

Theoretical Expectations

The theory for this portion of my analysis builds upon the racial threat hypothesis. Proponents of the racial threat hypothesis argue that the sense of fear and competition among whites increases as a result of the growth in the size of African American populations (Blalock 1967; Giles and Buckner 1993; Key 1949). In areas with large African Americans populations, whites supported laws that prevented African Americans from gaining political and economic benefits. Giles and Buckner (1993) find that as the number of blacks increased, white voters in Louisiana increased their support for David Duke, a racist senatorial candidate. However, scholars have argued that this relationship is more prominent in the south (Giles 1977; Giles and Evans 1985). The sense of threat

has been shown to translate into negative policy positions and attitudes toward African Americans and Latinos (Tatalovich 1995; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). Tatlovich (1995) finds that the increasing population size of Latinos caused levels of nativism to increase among working class African Americans and whites. As a result, both groups in California (and other states) supported English-only legislation. Tolbert and Grummel (2003) find that racial diversity increased the likelihood that whites in California to support Proposition 209, which ended affirmative action programs and policies.

In the context of attempted electoral structure reform, proponents of the racial threat hypothesis would argue that the size of minority groups will increase the sense of threat to white elites' access to power, in this case city council seats, which would lead to attempts to modify the existing electoral structures. However, I argue that this explanation is inadequate due to the assumption that the presence of minorities across all cities would cause whites to fear that their access to city council seats was threatened. Therefore, I argue that the fear of threat to elites' power and racial diversity (measured as the size of the minority group), vary in a nonlinear fashion. I use Hero and Tolbert's (1996), Tolbert and Hero (1996) and Hero's (1998) categories of racial diversity in my analysis; homogenous cities, bifurcated cities, and heterogeneous cities. "Homogenous" areas contain a majority white population and very small minority population, "bifurcated" areas are divided between minority groups and whites, and "heterogeneous" areas contain a predominant white and "moderately sized" minority groups (Hero and Tolbert 1996; Tolbert and Hero 1996; Hero 1998). However, I modify their categories by dividing the heterogeneous category into two additional categories: predominantly white, significant minority cities and predominantly minority, significant white cities. I also

include a homogenous minority category for cities where the majority racial group is either African American or Latino. These modifications are beneficial for my analysis because the authors originally focused upon the impact of white diversity upon attitudes toward various policies. Distinguishing between predominantely white and predominantely minority, as well as, homogenous white and homogenous minority cities allows me to evaluate how white attitudes and actions vary as the level of minority group diversity varies.

Minority group size affects white preferences differently in racially bifurcated cities than it does white preferences in homogenous cities and cities where whites are the predominant racial group. In homogenous or overwhelmingly white cities, where the African American population is less than ten percent of the total population, minority group size will not cause whites to desire to change the existing electoral structures because all of the members on the city council (and other boards) will be white. In racially bifurcated cities where the African American population is between forty and sixty percent, neither whites nor members of the minority group will attempt to change the electoral structures due to uncertainty about the outcomes of elections. In these cities, the city council seats will be divided evenly among the minority group and whites. Racial diversity will have a strong effect upon the preferences of whites who are the predominant racial group and the minority group population is between ten and forty percent. In these cities, whites who feel that the minority group (for example African Americans) threatens their preferences will attempt to adopt electoral structures that reduce the representation and influence of the minority group. In contrast, the African Americans in that city will oppose these changes or will support the adoption of electoral

structures that allow more African Americans to be elected to city councils. Overall, this theory confirms that the justification for altering electoral structures continues to be highly racialized. It demonstrates that the racial context matters. Minority group size produces a significant effect upon the desire to alter electoral structures in certain types of cities.

Hypotheses – Attempted Electoral Structure Change

My theory leads to several expectations regarding where attempted changes are expected to occur. Figure 3.2 summarizes my expectations regarding the relationship between racial context and attempted modifications of electoral institutions. The figure assumes that blacks and whites will be neutral regarding the use of reformed structures, such as at-large elections, in overwhelmingly white cities. As the size of the black population grows, whites will become increasingly likely to support the use of at-large elections, while blacks will support a ward-based system as their probability of achieving descriptive representation will be low under an at-large system. This high level of support for reformed structures by whites and opposition by blacks is what makes regular attempts to alter the status-quo likely regardless what structures are currently in place. The preferences of both groups become increasingly neutral as the city becomes equally divided between blacks and whites, making attempted modifications less likely. When blacks become the majority group, Figure 3.2 suggests that they will support the use of at-large elections, while whites will now favor the use of unreformed institutions. I again expect to see regular attempts to modify electoral rules in this type of city. Homogenous black cities, like homogenous white and racially bifurcated cities, are characterized by

neutral attitudes regarding the use of reformed institutions, thereby limiting efforts to deviate from the status-quo.

H1: Few attempts to change electoral structures will occur in cities with homogenous white populations

H2: More attempts to change electoral structures will occur in cities with predominantly white, significant African American populations

H3: Few attempts will occur in racially bifurcated cities

H4: More attempts to change electoral structures will occur in cities with predominantly African American, significant white populations

H5: Few attempts to change electoral structures will occur in cities with homogenous African American populations

Hypotheses – Racial Attitudes toward Electoral Structure Reform

Although my hypotheses examine how racial diversity affects attempted electoral structure reform, I also evaluate the impact of racial diversity upon racial attitudes toward electoral structure reform. I expect that the racial context would cause whites to express desire for the existing electoral structures to be changed. However, similar to my expectations for attempted electoral reform, I posit that racial diversity and expression of desire for change to vary in a nonlinear fashion. My expectation is that desire for electoral structure reform would be expressed by residents in predominantely white, significant African American cities, as well as predominantely African American, significant white cities.

H1: Whites living in homogenous white cities would express less desire for the electoral structures to be changed.

H2: More expression of desire and support for electoral structure change would be found among whites in predominantly whites, significant African American cities.

H3: Whites living in racially bifurcated cities would express less support and desire for electoral structure change.

H4: More expression of desire and support for electoral structure change would be found among African Americans in predominantly African Americans, significant white cities.

H5: African Americans living in homogenous African American cities would express less desire for the electoral structures to be changed.

Data and Methods

I present two types of analyses in this chapter. First, I evaluate how African American diversity affects white racial attitudes toward electoral structure reform at the individual level. Controls include socioeconomic factors. The second analysis examines how African American and Latino diversity affect white attempts to modify electoral structures at the aggregate level. I control for council structures, electoral structures, and population size among others. The datasets used to conduct my analyses are the Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll, the International City Management Association Forms of Government Survey and the U.S. Census.

Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll

The first dataset that I use is the Hawkeye Poll from spring 2011. It was in the field from April 4-11, 2011. It is a national sample with 867 respondents. In order to be representative, the results are weighted by state population and age. It was conducted by the Hawkeye Poll Cooperative, which consists of faculty and graduate students in the Political Science department at the University of Iowa. The Hawkeye Poll Cooperative collaborates with the Iowa Social Research Center which is directed by Dr. Kevin Leicht, a Sociology professor at the University of Iowa. The faculty advisors for the Hawkeye Poll are Dr. Frederick Boehmke and Dr. Caroline Tolbert. The poll is funded by the University Of Iowa College Of Liberal Arts and Sciences and the Office of the Provost. The purpose of the Hawkeye Poll is to provide a teaching, research and service tool for the Political Science department at the University of Iowa. I supplement the Hawkeye Poll with 2010 Census data for all of the zip codes that were featured in the poll.

International City Management Association (ICMA)

I also use the Internal City Management Association Form of Government Survey (ICMA).[8] It is a questionnaire that is mailed to city clerks in cities with a population of at least 25,000 residents. The ICMA has been compiling this data for more than thirty years. On average, the response rate is sixty percent. This survey is ideal because it provides

[8] The ICMA defines a mayor as "… chief elected official of the local government. The person may be called the president, boardchair, etc.". A council is defined as an elected body whose members may be called council members, aldermen, selectmen, freeholders, trustees, commissioners, or a similar title." A mayor-council is an "… Elected council or board serves as the legislative body. The chief elected official is the head of government, generally elected separately from the council, with powers that may range from limited duties to full scale authority for the daily operation of the government."

information about forms of government as well as election systems, recall / referendum provisions, term limits, and characteristics about local governments. Specifically, I use a pooled dataset of ICMA questionnaires from 1996, 2001, and 2006 which results in 7,000 cases. The response period for the three surveys varied between "as soon as possible" (1996) to 3 weeks (2001) and six months (2006). I also supplement data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census for all of the cities in the ICMA.

Including these datasets allows me to analyze how racial diversity affects individual-level attitudes toward electoral structural reform and how it affects the attempted reforms at the aggregate-level. In the Hawkeye Poll model, I perform a logistic regression to evaluate how racial diversity affects respondents' desires for the existing electoral structures in their cities to change. In the ICMA models, I also use a logistic regression to predict whether a community attempted to alter its method of conducting city elections in the last five years. My focus is on proposed or attempted changes rather than successful modifications because my hypotheses argue that diversity creates incentives for change, not necessarily that those initiatives will ultimately succeed. Attempted change is a relatively infrequent event, occurring in slightly over 10% of the city-years included in my data.

In order to evaluate the impact of Latino group size upon attempted electoral structure reform, I account for the proportion of Latino non-citizens within the population. I propose that noncitizenship may cause the nonlinearity I propose for African American diversity and attempted reform, to differ for Latino diversity. I argue that it is possible that noncitizenship causes attempted electoral structure reforms to occur in racially bifurcated areas, as well as predominately white, significant Latino areas.

Overall, the issue of citizenship complicates the relationship between Latino group size and attempted changes, a subject I discuss in greater detail below.

Justification for Limiting My Analysis

In my analyses of minority group size, I choose to examine cities where African American and Latino populations are ten percent of the total population. Previous scholars who have examined how at-large elections affect minority representation on city councils chose to restrict their analyses to cities where the African American population was between five (Jones 1976; Welch 1990), ten (Dye and Renick 1981; Karnig and Welch 1982) and fifteen (Karnig 1976; Robinson and Dye 1978) percent of the total population.

I choose to examine the impact of African American and Latino diversity separately because the literature about coalition formation provides a justification for examining white interactions with single minority groups. Although scholars find that coalitions between blacks and whites can occur, they also identify factors which affect the likelihood that these groups will become coalition partners (Hadley1996; Sonenshein 1993; Stone 1989). Stone (1989) and Sonenshein (1993) find that electoral coalitions between African American and liberal whites have been formed in Los Angeles and in Atlanta. However, Hadley (1996) argues that the likelihood that African Americans and whites in the Democratic Party in the South will become coalition partners depends upon whether or not economic issues and affirmative action are salient issues. During periods when these issues are salient, coalition formation between these groups is less likely to occur. Kaufmann (2007) argues that coalition formation between whites and blacks is

hurt by competition over jobs, housing, and political power. In his examination of coalition formation during school board elections, Rocha (2007) finds that whites and African Americans are more likely to become coalition partners in areas with large noncitizen Latino populations.

The literature about coalitions between African Americans and Latinos provide a less than optimistic picture that these groups will work together to gain mutual goals. Although there is evidence that African American teachers actively reduce the levels of second-generation discrimination experienced by African American and Latino students (and vice versa), other research has found that coalitions between these two groups are not likely to occur due to various factors (Rocha and Hawes 2009). The main factor that prevents electoral coalition formation between African Americans and Latinos from occurring is the view, by both groups, that whites are their ideal coalition partners (Meier and Stewart 1991; McClain et al 2006; Rodrigues and Segura 2007; Kaufmann 2007). Meier and Stewart (1991) examine the likelihood that rainbow coalitions will form during school board races. They argue that African Americans and Latinos are more likely to view whites as ideal coalition partners, at the expense of the other group. They find evidence that Latinos are more likely to form electoral coalitions with whites, than they are with blacks. The authors also argue that as the population size of Latinos increases, descriptive representation decreases for African Americans. McClain et al (2006) examine survey responses from whites, Latinos and African Americans and find that although Latino respondents indicated that they felt closer to whites, white respondents indicated that they felt closer to African Americans than Latinos. African American respondents indicated that they viewed themselves as sharing more in common with

Latinos than whites. This result is confirmed by Rodrigues and Segura (2007) who find that despite demonstrating policy agreement, Latinos feel closer to whites than to African Americans. In contrast, African Americans feel close to Latinos due to perceived shared experiences. Kaufmann (2007) shows that African Americans and Latinos pursue whites as coalition partners in order to gain short-term benefits because minority mayors have not been able to provide many benefits for their constituents due to the constraints placed on them by their white regime partners She also argues that whites view Latinos more favorably than African Americans, which makes it more likely that these two groups will pursue benefits at the expense of African Americans (see also Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1990). In order to prevent this, African Americans and Latinos should use coalitions to pursue more long term goals.

Other scholars have identified economic and employment competition as factors that decreases both groups' incentives to cooperate and form coalitions (McClain 1993; Meier, McClain, Polinard, and Wrinkle 2004 and Rocha 2007). McClain and Karnig (1990) argue that as either African Americans or Latinos achieve mutual political benefits, the other group also receives these benefits. Both groups reap the benefits at the expense of whites (see also McClain 1993). They also find some evidence that Latino socioeconomic and political status tend to be lower in areas with large African American population. Yet, there is evidence that competition over municipal employment opportunities between African Americans and Latinos occurs (McClain 1993). She finds that Latinos have less municipal employment opportunities in cities where there is a black population majority, a black mayor is in office, and in areas where the African American work force size increases. However, African American employment chances

are not hurt by increases in the Latino work force or population. Although there is some evidence that African American and Latino students mutually benefit from the efforts of minority teachers to increase their students' tests scores, there is evidence that competition over administration and teaching positions continue hurt cooperation between these groups (Meier, McClain, Polinard, and Wrinkle 2004; Rocha 2007). Meier et al (2004) and Rocha (2007) demonstrate that African Americans and Latinos compete for limited school administration and teacher positions in a zero-sum game. Specifically, the studies as more Latinos become school administrators and teachers, then the number of African Americans in these positions decreases (and vice versa).

Overall, the literature demonstrates that coalition formation between African Americans and Latinos are plagued by challenges including access to resources. Therefore, I cannot combine minority populations and assume that rainbow coalitions will form. As a result, I will study African American and Latinos separately.

Variables

This section describes the variables that are used in both portions of my analysis.

Hawkeye Poll (Racial Attitudes Model)

This section provides details about the variables that are used in the models. Table 3.1 lists the variables and their sources. Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in this model. The dependent variable for the racial attitudes model

(Hawkeye Poll) is respondents' desire for the existing electoral structure in their city to be changed. It is a dichotomous variable and is coded as 0 for "no" and 1 for "yes".[9]

The modal number of elected council seats within a city is 5. Thus, a typical ward would contain 20% of a city's population and 10% of the population would be needed in order to win a seat on the council. Scholars have found evidence that racial diversity has some influence upon representation and the type of elections that are used to elect city councilmembers. Taebel (1978) finds that increases in black population size increased representation inequity on city councils for African Americans. Engstrom and McDonald (1981 and 1982) confirm Taebel's conclusion when they find that at-large elections hurt African American representation on city councils once their total population in a city reaches ten percent. Latimer (1979) and Karnig and Welch (1982) find that at-large elections do not hurt African American representation once African Americans become the majority in a city. For both the Hawkeye Poll and ICMA models, I classify cities as homogenous white if the black population is under 10%. Cities are categorized as being predominantly white but having a significant black minority are those with a black population between 10% and 40%. Racially bifurcated cities are those with a black population between 40% and 60%. Cities categorized as being predominantly black but having a significant white minority contain a black population between 60% and 90%. Homogenous black cities are those with a black population that is greater than 90%.

---

[9] The dependent variable was one of three questions related to electoral structures at the local level on the Hawkeye Poll. The first question asked respondents to identify the type of elections that are used in their city council elections. The second question asked if the respondents wanted the type of election to change. If they said yes, then the final question asked what type of election they would like to see used to elect city council members.

Several standard demographic controls are included in this portion of my analysis including socioeconomic status, age, if the respondent was male, if the respondent voted in the 2008 presidential election.[10] I also control for social capital.[11] Among the socioeconomic status variables, income and education were found to have some influence upon underrepresentation of minorities on city councils. Engstrom and McDonald (1981 and 1982 find that in areas with low amounts of African Americans, income equality between African Americans and whites improves representation for African Americans on city councils.[12] However, this effect decreases in areas with large African American populations because changing at-large to ward-based elections improves representation for African Americans. African Americans are more likely to win council seats in areas with high socioeconomic status residents or when the African American population attains higher socioeconomic status (Cole 1974; Jones 1976; Karnig 1976; Karnig and Welch 1978; Latimer 1979; MacManus 1978). Some research has found that having higher levels of education improves African American representation on city councils (Robinson and Dye 1976).[13] There is also some evidence that socioeconomic status is a stronger predictor of the form of government within region (Dye and MacManus 1976). I

---

[10] The sample included 410 female and 390 male respondents. The average age of the respondent was 59 years of age.

[11] Schneider, Teske, Marschall, Mintrom, and Roch (1997) find that at the local level, institutions, measured as being able to choose the school their children would attend, had higher levels of social capital. My expectation is that respondents who had social capital would have an active interest in the forms of election that are used.

[12] Respondents were asked to indicate their household income for 2010. Options ranged from "Less than $10,000" to "$150,000 or more". The mean income level was between $50,000 and $75,000.

[13] Respondents were asked to share their level of education. Options ranged from "Less than 8th grade" to "Post undergrad". The mean education level was "some college".

control for whether the respondent voted in the 2008 presidential election in order to account for the respondents' interest in politics.[14] It allowed me to control for citizens who did not about the election structure that was used in their city.

ICMA (Attempted Electoral Structure Reform Model)

The variables and their sources used for this portion of the analysis are listed in table 3.3. Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics. In addition to collecting data on attempted modifications, the ICMA Form of Government Survey also collects information regarding existing electoral and governing institutions, allowing me to control for the structures which are already in place within a city. I control for various types of "reformed" institutions, including the use of partisan elections, the percentage of council members who are elected at-large, and the presence of a council-manager system.[15] Previous research finds that at-large elections hurt representation for African Americans and Latinos on city councils (Engstrom and McDonald 1981 and 1982; Jones 1976; Karnig 1974; Karnig and Welch 1976; Latimer 1979; Robinson and Dye 1976). The use of nonpartisan elections has been shown to hurt the political influence and representation of minorities (Banfield and Wilson 1967; Davidson and Fraga 1988; Lineberry and Fowler 1967; Robinson and Dye 1976). Davidson and Korbel (1981) find that council-manage plans and commission forms of government were linked with the use

[14] 677 respondents reported that they had voted in the 2008 presidential elections.

[15] Partisan elections and council-manager plan variables are dichotomous variables. Out of the pooled sample, 2,530 cities use partisan elections. Council-manager plans were used in 6,322 cities.

of at-large elections in the south and southwest, which contributed to underrepresentation of African Americans and Latinos in those regions.

Attempts to modify electoral structures may be lower in cities with competitive elections. Therefore, I control for the percentage of incumbents who sought and won reelection to the city council in the previous election. Larger cities may be more likely to produce frequent attempts at institutional reform, since larger populations may result in the presence of more organizations seeking to alter the distribution of political power at the local level.[16] Scholars have found conflicting results regarding the impact of the size of a city's population. Some scholars argue that larger cities may contain more residents who have higher socioeconomic status levels who are willing to vote for African American city councilmembers (Engstrom and McDonald 1981). Others argue that this affect is seen in smaller cities (Cole 1974; MacManus 1978) Previous works also indicate that structures tend to have distinctive impacts in different regions (Dye and MacManus 1976; Engstrom and McDonald 1982; Karnig 1976; Mladenka 1989; Robinson and Dye 1976) therefore, I insert a regional control for the south when looking at cities of varying black group size.[17]

Studying the role of context in Latino areas is complicated by the issue of citizenship. The presence of a large non-citizen population dilutes the voting strength of Latinos. However, the effect of an a large non-citizen population is lessened in municipalities that rely on ward based systems, as districts in those areas are likely to be drawn on the basis of overall population size without accounting for citizenship status. In

[16] The largest city in my sample had a population of approximately 3.7 million people.

[17] There were approximately 3,419 cities were in the south.

all but the most homogenous contexts, Latinos will see their voting strength increased by the use of wards and Anglo influence will be greater in cities with at-large elections. The result is an incentive for one group to attempt to modify existing electoral institutions in areas with a large Latino non-citizen population, obscuring the non-linear relationship between context and attempted modifications that I predict for cities of varying black group size. In order to account for this possibility, I interacted my measure of ethnic context with the portion of the Latino population that is non-citizen. I expect the elevated level of attempted modifications which I hypothesize exists in cities where one racial group is numerically dominant but where there also resides a significant minority population will be lessened if the Latino population contains a large number of non-citizen residents.

Results

This section discusses the result for both portions of my analyses. I find support for my proposed hypotheses.

Racial Attitudes toward Electoral Structure Reform

Table 3.5 displays the results from the Hawkeye Poll data. It demonstrates support for my expectation about the impact of racial attitudes upon the desire for the existing electoral structure to change. White respondents living in areas where they are the predominant racial group were more likely to express desire for their current electoral structure to be reformed. This sentiment was also expressed by respondents living in

predominantly African American areas. There was some indication that respondents in homogenous African American areas wanted the electoral structure to be changed.

Figure 3.3 displays the predicted probabilities for the impact of racial diversity upon the expression of desire and support for electoral structure reform. White respondents in homogenous white cities had a .08% likelihood of expressing desire for the current electoral structures to be changed. The likelihood increased among whites in predominantly white, significant African American cities (.33%) and decreased to .06%. African American respondents in predominantely African American, significant white cities had a .58% likelihood of favoring changes being made to existing electoral structures. The likelihood decreased to .24% among respondents in homogenous African American cities.

Attempted Electoral Structure Reform (ICMA)

The results presented in Table 3.6 offer support for my argument regarding the relationship between racial context and the attempted modification of electoral institutions, at least when looking at the effect of black group size. Cities containing a significant (numerical) minority population are more likely to see attempted modifications than are racially homogenous or bifurcated cities.[18] This is true regardless of whether the numerical minority group consists of blacks or whites.

I also see that cities with highly competitive elections experience less attempted modifications. A high level of turnover among elected officials offers the possibility of

[18] Approximately 80% of the cities in the ICMA data are classified as homogenous white. Including the relatively small number of homogenous black cities in the reference category does not substantively change the results.

different coalitions achieving electoral success within the current structure. Attempted modifications are also less likely to occur in cities employing at-large and partisan elections, while the use of a council-manager system has no effect. Thus, it does not appear that reformed institutions are more or less likely to produce calls for modification. In line with my expectations, attempted electoral structure changes occur more frequently in larger cities, possibly because urban areas have a greater organizational capacity.

Calculating a series of predicted probabilities allows me to better understand the substantive impact of racial context on attempts to reform electoral institutions. The predicted probabilities for this model are shown in figure 3.4. Holding all other variables at their mean or modal levels, the probability of a homogeneous white city seeing a call for some form of electoral reform is .12. In predominantly white cities with a significant African American minority, that probability grows to .16. In racially bifurcated cities, the probability falls to .10. In predominantly African American, significant white cities, the probability increases to .18. Finally, the probability of attempted reform in homogenous African American cites with a significant white minority population is .22.

Table 3.7 examines the relationship between Latino group size and attempted modifications. There is evidence that cities with a numerically dominant non-Latino white population and a significant Latino minority are more likely to see reform efforts. Also in line with my predictions, this elevated level of attempted modifications is lower in cities where the Latino population is heavily non-citizen. I find no evidence that there is an elevated level of attempted modifications in predominantly Latino, significant white cities. The proportion of the Latino population that is noncitizen does appear to affect this relationship. In sum, my results indicate that attempted modifications to electoral

structures vary in accordance with racial context in a predictable manner, at least in cities where the population is spilt mainly between blacks and whites. There is some evidence that the size of the Latino population produces similar effects, although this may not be true in Latino majority cities.

Overall, I find support for my expectations regarding the impact of African American diversity upon attempted electoral reform. However, I only find some support regarding my expectations of the impact of Latino diversity upon attempted electoral structure reform.

Conclusions

Why do local governments change electoral and governing institutions? Frederickson, Johnson, and Wood (2003) argue that many changes can largely be explained on the basis of technocratic and politically-neutral criteria. Yet, a number of works find that progressive-style attempts to depoliticize local governance simply redistribute benefits in ways that typically advantage privileged groups, such as Anglos, while limiting the political influence of racial/ethnic minorities (Davidson and Fraga 1988; Meier, Stewart, and England 1989; Rocha 2007). I am similarly skeptical about the contention that changes to the electoral structure of local governance are race-neutral.

In their recent analysis of several prominent works within the field of American political development, King and Smith (2005) argue that scholarship within political science often suffers from an inattention to the "unseen" impacts of race on politics. Similarly, Hero (1998) argues for a racial/ethnic interpretation of politics at the sub-national level. My argument is not that electoral changes are solely the product of

racial/ethnic politics. However, one can draw significant links between racial/ethnic conflicts and attempts to modify local governance which scholars need to recognize.

The importance of racial/ethnic cleavages are regularly recognized at other points in the policymaking process, such as policy adoption (Canon 1993; Haynie 2001; Lublin 1997; Owens 2005; Preuhs 2006), implementation (Hindera 1993a, 1993b; Meier 1993; Selden 1997), and even the formation of policy preferences (Hood and Morris 1997; Rocha and Espino 2009; Welch et al. 2001). Moreover, electoral rules are regularly emphasized by scholars because of their impact on different racial/ethnic groups. What remains deemphasized in a literature which otherwise gives due credence to the importance of race/ethnicity is the role of diversity in shaping electoral structures.

My findings show that rather than being a product of electoral institutions, racial/ethnic politics works to shape the rules and structures that are in place in urban areas across the United States. While homogenous contexts are unlikely to be characterized by regular attempts to modify institutions, cities where whites are numerically dominant but where there also resides a significant black or Latino population are the most likely to experience reform efforts. While the relationship between context and reform is more predictable in cities that are divided between white and black populations, there is some evidence that the presence of Latinos produces a similar set of outcomes. However, studying the Latino population offers some additional challenges, such as accounting for immigration and citizenship status. My results imply that citizenship may play an important role in moderating the relationship between racial/ethnic context and efforts to reform electoral structures. More research is clearly needed on this point.

The effect of racial/ethnic context on regular attempts to change electoral structures is an understated theme within the literature. This piece is a small attempt to remedy this void in the literature. The ongoing regarding the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act makes it certain that electoral institutions will continue to be monitored and manipulated in the future, making such knowledge imperative for those involved in the political discourse pertaining to race, representation, and electoral systems.

Figure 3.1: Using Racial Diversity to Explain the Origins of Electoral Structures



Figure 3.2: Where Attempted Electoral Reforms Will Occur



Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Table 3.1: Variables and Sources for the Racial Attitudes Model

Dependent and Independent variables (including controls) for the racial attitudes model	**Source**
Dependent variable	
Desire to change the type of election that is used	Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll
Independent variable	
Racial diversity (Percent of total city population that is African American)	U.S. Census (2010)
Control Variables	
Demographic variables (education, income, partisanship, and ideology)	Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll
Social capital	Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll
Whether or not the respondent voted in the 2008 Presidential election	Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll

Note: Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll and U.S. Census (2010)

Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of Racial Attitudes Model

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Desire for electoral structure to be changed	810	.100	.300	0	1
Predominantly white, significant African American	867	.060	.238	0	1
Racially bifurcated	867	.021	.143	0	1
Predominantly African American, significant white	867	.008	.090	0	1
Homogenous African American	867	.143	.350	0	1
Household income	671	5.587	2.219	1	9
Education	807	4.828	1.553	1	7
Age	804	58.901	16.715	18	96
Male	805	.484	.500	0	1
Social capital	836	.336	.473	0	1
Whether or not the respondent voted during the 2008 Presidential election	848	.798	.401	0	1

Note: Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll and U.S. Census (2010)

Table 3.3: Variables and Sources for the Electoral Structure Reform Model

Dependent and Independent variables (including controls) for the institutional change model	**Source**
Dependent variable	
Attempted electoral change	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Independent variable	
Racial diversity (percent black and percent Latino of total population in cities)	U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)
Control variables	
Competitiveness (Percentage of incumbents who sought and won reelections to the city council in the previous election)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
% of seats elected at-large	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Use of partisan elections	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Presence of council-manager plans	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Population size of cities	U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)
Region	U.S Census (1990 and 2000)
2001 and 2006 (ICMA years)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for Attempted Electoral Change Model (ICMA and U.S. Census)

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Attempted electoral change|	9314	.112	.315	0	1
Predominantly white, significant black	9506	.145	.352	0	1
Racially bifurcated	9506	.041	.197	0	1
Predominantely black, significant white	9506	.015	.123	0	1
Homogenous black	9506	.003	.052	0	1
Competitiveness	8076	.866	.248	0	7
% of seats elected at-large	8625	.719	.406	0	3.333
Partisan elections	9221	.245	.430	0	1
Council-manage plan	9506	.493	.500	0	1
Population size	9506	16677.37	35607.58	23	951270
South	9506	.275	.447	0	1
2001	9506	.350	.477	0	1
2006	9506	.271	.445	0	1

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Table 3.5: The Impact of Racial Diversity upon the Desire for the Existing Electoral Structures to be Modified

	b/se
Types of City	
Predominantly White, significant African American	1.722**
	(0.600)
Racially bifurcated	-0.327
	(1.176)
Predominantly African American, significant white	2.788**
	(1.392)
Homogenous African American	1.281*
	(0.698)
Control Variables	
Family income	-0.040
	(0.142)
Education level	0.068
	(0.171)
Age	0.016
	(0.013)
Male	0.928*
	(0.484)
Social Capital	0.423
	(0.464)
Voted in the 2008 presidential election	-0.397
	(0.619)
Constant	-3.866**
	(1.300)
Number of observations	640
Log likelihood	-6.222e+07

Note: Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll National Sample Survey and U.S. Census. Logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

Table 3.6: The Impact of African American Diversity upon Attempts to Alter Existing Electoral Structures

	b/se
Type of City	
Predominantly white, significant black	0.345**
	(0.130)
Racially bifurcated	0.140
	(0.205)
Predominantly black, significant white	0.743**
	(0.313)
Homogenous black	0.979*
	(0.518)
Control variables	
\Competitiveness	-0.658**
	(0.147)
% seats elected at-large	-0.246**
	(0.097)
Partisan elections	-0.329**
	(0.098)
Council-manager plan	-0.006
	(0.080)
Population size	0.000**
	(0.000)
South	-0.401**
	(0.107)
2001	-0.399**
	(0.088)
2006	-0.605**
	(0.105)
Constant	-1.023**
`	(0.168)
Number of observations	7123
Log likelihood	-2376.413

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and US Census (1990 and 2000). Logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

Table 3.7: The Impact of Latino Diversity upon Attempted Electoral Structure Reform

	b/se
Type of City	
Predominantely white, significant Latino	0.520**
	(0.242)
Racially bifurcated	-0.260
	(0.529)
Predominantely Latino, significant white	-0.127
	(0.708)
Homogenous Latino	1.674
	(1.041)
Proportion of Latinos who are Non-Citizens "X"	
Proportion of Latino population that is non-citizen	0.440
	(0.288)
Predominantely white, significant Latino * non-citizen	-2.558**
	(0.892)
Racially bifurcated * non-citizen	0.484
	(1.932)
Predominantely Latino, significant white * non-citizen	0.349
	(2.573)
Homogenous Latino * non-citizen	-5.389
	(5.125)
Control Variables	
Competitiveness	-0.648**
	(0.176)
% of seats elected at large	-0.414**
	(0.121)
Partisan elections	-0.277**
	(0.135)
Council-manager plan	-0.055
	(0.102)
Population size (000s)	0.000*
	(0.000)
South	-0.147
	(0.128)
2001	-0.479**
	(0.108)
2006	-0.616**
	(0.136)
Constant	-1.004**
	(0.215)
Number of observations	5107
Log likelihood	-1623.969

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and US Census (1990 and 2000). Logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities for Desire for Electoral Structure Reform



Note: Spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll and U.S. Census (2010). 95% confidence interval displayed by dashed lines

Figure 3.4: Predicted Probabilities for Attempted Electoral Structure Reform



Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000). 95% confidence interval displayed by dashed lines

CHAPTER IV:

LATINO CANDIDATE EMERGENCE IN CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS IN CALIFORNIA

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined the relationship between electoral structure reform and racial diversity. Specifically, I evaluated how levels of racial diversity determine attempts to alter existing electoral structures at the local level. I confirmed that this relationship is nonlinear and that homogenous white cities demonstrated few attempts to alter existing electoral structures. I also found that political elites in racially bifurcated cities did not attempt to alter existing electoral structures. The impact of racial diversity upon attempts to alter existing electoral structures is evident in predominantly white cities that have a significant African American population. I argued that political elites in these cities were more likely to view the size of the African American population in these cities as a threat to their political preferences. As a result, political elites in these cities sought to reduce this perceived threat by attempting to introduce new electoral structures, mainly at-large elections. In the previous chapter, I demonstrated how the racial context determined the origins of electoral structures that political elites attempted to adopt in local cities.

In this chapter, I examine how electoral structures and other institutions affect minority candidates' decisions to pursue political office (see figure 4.1). My research question is how do electoral structures affect minority candidates' decisions to run for city council seats? Specifically, I examine how institutions (including term limits, concurrent elections and at-large elections) affect the emergence of Latino candidates in

city council elections in California. In my next chapter, I will examine how institutional structures affect the likelihood of success by the Latino candidates in city council elections. Previous scholars have identified and evaluated the impact of strategic factors and ambition upon candidate emergence (Jacoobsen and Kernell 1983; Maisel and Stone 1997; Schlessinger 1966). However, I simply focus on how institutions affect candidate emergence of Latino candidates. My research question that I examine is: what is the impact of institutions upon Latino candidate emergence in city council elections in California?

Building upon previous research, I argue that institutions that are found in city council elections increase and lower the likelihood that minority city council candidates will choose to run for office (Krebs 1999; Shah and Marschall 2010). I use California city council elections data from the Local Elections in America Project (LEAP). This portion of the dataset that was created by Melissa Marschall and Paru Shah using information from the California Election Data Archive (CEDA). I examine the impact of electoral structures upon Latino candidate emergence. I focus on Latino candidates because I can identify their race using their surnames as well as information from the Smart Voter website. The purpose of the database is to provide information about municipal, legislative, and executive races at the local level. I also examine data from the International City Management Association's Forms of Government survey (ICMA FOG). Upon completing my analysis, I did not find statistical significance. In other words, despite my expectations, institutional structures did not demonstrate an impact upon Latino candidates' decisions to pursue seats on the city councils. I find some evidence that electoral structures would demonstrate some impact upon minority

candidate emergence, but the variables do not reach statistical significance. I conclude by revisiting my results and discussing ideas for future research.

Theoretical Expectations

The examination of the candidate emergence literature creates several expectations about Latino candidates in city council elections in California. Previous scholarship demonstrates that minority candidates are more likely to compete in city council elections if ward-based elections are used (Krebs 1999). Scholars have also shown that candidates will not compete in races if they believe the costs are too high or they perceive their chances of winning are low (Black 1972). This leads to my first expectation that Latino candidates will be less likely to run for city council seats in cities that use at-large elections. I restrict this portion of my analysis to cities where the Latino population is less than the majority of the total population. My second hypothesis examines the interaction of at-large elections with the Latino population in cities where Latinos are less than the majority. Krebs (1999) and Branton (2008) find that minority candidates are more likely to compete in local and national level races in areas where their racial groups form a large portion of the total population. Therefore, this interaction term allows me to evaluate if the size of the Latino population can overcome the detrimental effect of at-large elections upon Latino presence in city council races. My third and fourth hypotheses examine the impact of at-large elections and their interaction with the Latino population in cities where Latinos have reached the majority of the total population. Previous research demonstrates that African American representation is not affected by at-large elections once the African American population becomes the

majority (Latimer 1979; Welch 1990). I examine if this result is applicable to Latinos and their decisions to run for office at the local level.

Although scholars find evidence that political parties endorse and recruit viable candidates, there is some evidence that minority candidates do not feel supported or encouraged to run by political parties (Jones-Correa 1998). Scholars also argue that political parties recruit candidates that are likely to win their contests, have their own personal resources and actively participate in civic organizations (Prewitt and Eulau 1971). Therefore, it is possible to argue that Latino candidates may not be actively recruited by political parties in their cities if they are not likely to win or if they are perceived to be civically inactive. This leads to my fifth expectation that cities where partisan elections are used are less likely to feature Latino candidates on the ballot. I also examine the possibility that partisan elections would increase the likelihood that Latino candidates will run for office in cities where the Latino population is the majority. I test this possibility by interacting partisan elections with the Latino population. Concurrent elections have been shown to increase turnout rates in local elections (Allan and Plank 2005; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005 and 2010). These findings lead to my seventh expectation that concurrent elections would increase the likelihood that Latino candidates will run for office because they may view their chances of winning as higher due to anticipated turnout levels among minority voters. Lastly, I examine the expectation that concurrent elections will increase the number of Latino candidates regardless of the size of the Latino population. I include an interaction of concurrent election with the Latino population.

H1: Fewer Latino candidates will compete in at-large, city council elections in cities where the Latino population is less than the majority of the total population.

H2: At-large elections and a small Latino population will reduce the amount of Latino candidates in city council elections.

H3: Fewer Latino candidates will compete in at-large, city council elections in cities where the Latino population is the majority of the total population.

H4: At-large elections and a large Latino population will reduce the amount of Latino candidates in city council elections.

H5: Fewer Latino candidates will compete in partisan, city council elections.

H6: More Latino candidates will compete in partisan, city councils in cities where the Latino population is the majority.

H7: More Latino candidates will compete in city council elections if they are held at the same time as national elections.

H8: More Latino candidates will compete in concurrent elections, regardless of the size of the Latino population.

Data and Methods

The dataset used in my analysis consists of the Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) and the International City Management Association Forms of Government Survey (ICMA FOG). Combining both datasets is beneficial because the LEAP data contains information about the candidates and elections, while the ICMA data provides information about city councils. I supplement both datasets with data from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Census. I use logistic regression to conduct my analyses. The unit of analysis

is the elections, therefore I collapse the data using the "race_id" variable which was an individual identification number assigned to each contest.

LEAP Data

I am using a portion of the LEAP data, specifically information about city council elections in California. I chose to analyze city council elections in California for the following reasons. First, the Latino population is approximately 38.1% of the total population.[19] Second, Latino officials hold prominent offices at the local level. Third, the dataset contained information about the approximately 5,900 races and 27,056 candidates.[20] The elections occurred between 1995 and 2011. The source for information about the city council elections came from the California Election Data Archive (CEDA). Details included in the data are districts and counties where the elections occurred, candidates' names, the identification number used for each contest, the names of the candidates and whether or not the candidate won the election.

International City Management Association (ICMA)

I also use the International City Management Association Form of Government Survey (ICMA FOG). It is a questionnaire that is mailed to city clerks in cities with a population of at least 25,000 residents. The ICMA has been compiling this data for more

---

[19] Source U.S. Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts. Data derived from Population Estimates, American Community Survey, Census of Population and Housing, State and County Housing Unit Estimates, County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html. Accessed: June 4, 2013.

[20] 3,646 or 7% of the candidates were Latino or of Latino descent.

than thirty years. On average, the response rate is sixty percent. This survey is ideal because it provides information about forms of government as well as election systems, recall / referendum provisions, term limits, and characteristics about local governments. Specifically, I use a pooled dataset of ICMA questionnaires from 1996, 2001, and 2006 which results in 7,000 cases. The response period for the three surveys varied between "as soon as possible" (1996 ICMA) to 3 weeks (2001) and six months (2006). I also include data from the 2000 Census for all of the cities in the ICMA.

Variables

Table 4.1 lists the variables that I include in my models. The table also lists the sources for each variable. Table 4.2 displays the summary statistics for the variables used in this portion of my analysis. The dependent variable in my analysis is the presence of a Latino candidate in a city council election. I coded the Latino candidates using their surnames and the Smart Voter website.[21] It is a dichotomous variable that is coded 0 for "non-Latinos" and 1 "Latino" candidates.

In order to evaluate the impact of electoral structures upon the presence of Latino candidates, I examine six independent variables in my analysis. The first two hypotheses evaluate the impact of at-large elections in cities where the Latino population is less than the majority of the total population. My first independent variable is the percentage of seats that are elected using at-large elections. The second independent variable is an interaction between % of seats elected at-large and the Latino population variable. The

[21]This is a website that provides information for voters and allows candidates to list details about their policy positions and campaign websites. Contributors include the League of Women Voters and state election officials.

third and fourth hypotheses evaluate the effect of at-large elections and the interaction term upon Latino candidate emergence in cities where the Latino population reaches majority status. The fifth hypothesis examines the impact of partisan elections. Partisan elections are dichotomous, with 0 being coded as "nonpartisan" and 1 "partisan". I also interact partisan elections with the Latino population variable in order to examine the sixth hypothesis. The seventh hypothesis evaluates the effect of concurrent elections upon Latino candidate emergence. The concurrent elections variable is also dichotomous with 0 being coded as "staggered" and 1 "concurrent" elections. The final hypothesis evaluates the eighth independent variable as an interaction between concurrent elections and the Latino population variable.

I include the several control variables in my models. First, is the competitiveness variable which describes the number of incumbents who ran and won reelection during the previous city council elections. Scholars including Canon (1990 and 1993) as well as Bond, Fleisher, and Talbert (1997) find that ambitious amateurs and experienced challengers were more likely to compete in open seat contests. Krebs (1999) also finds that city council candidates choose to avoid competing against incumbents who had large victory margins. Therefore, my expectation is that elections that are anticipated to be competitive would deter potential Latino candidates from running for office. I also control for the population size of the cities. Taebel (1978) argues that the size of the council demonstrated the strongest impact upon Latino representation. He argued that small council sizes decreased Latino representation. Therefore, I control for the number of members on the city council. My expectation is that larger councils will attract more Latino candidates. Powell (2000) finds evidence that term limits increase the likelihood

that state legislators will choose to run for Congress. There is evidence that term limits are used throughout districts in California (Hajnal and Trounstine 2003). Therefore, I include a dichotomous variable for the use of term limits.

Results

Table 4.3 displays the results for the first four hypotheses. The at-large variables are omitted from the models, thus I do find support for the first four hypotheses. I find no effect for the remaining electoral structure variables. Table 4.4 displays the results for the remaining hypotheses. Although I find some indication that partisan elections would increase Latino candidate emergence in California, the variable does not reach statistical significance. I also find some similar support for the next hypothesis, which includes the interaction between partisan elections and the Latino population variables. If the variables had been significant, these results would have posed an interesting contrast to previous conclusions that partisan elections hurt minority candidates. They do demonstrate to some degree that partisan elections may not be completely detrimental to minority candidate aspirations at the local level. The concurrent elections variable in the seventh model, and the interaction variable in the last model do not reach statistical significance, thus demonstrating no effect upon Latino candidate emergence. However, the direction of the variables is unexpected. It implies that if these variables reached statistical significance, then they would demonstrate the opposite of my proposed effect. The concurrent elections would diminish Latino candidates' incentives to run for city council seats. None of the control variables reached statistical significance in the models.

Overall, although I found some evidence that certain electoral structures could affect candidate emergence among Latino city council candidates, none of the electoral structure variables reach statistical significance.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to evaluate the impact of electoral structures upon candidate emergence among Latinos in city council elections in California. I examine the impact of at-large elections with the expectation that they would reduce the likelihood of Latino candidates choosing to compete in city council election. I also expected the effect to at-large elections to remain negative in cities where the Latino population was less than the majority and when this form of election was interacted with the Latino population variable. Despite my expectations, I did not find evidence of an effect upon candidate emergence, across any of the Latino contexts. I posited that partisan elections would reduce Latino candidate emergence in general, but would increase emergence in cities where the Latino population was the majority. I did not find evidence that partisan elections demonstrated any significant effect upon Latino candidates' decisions to run for city council. I drew similar conclusions from my evaluations of concurrent elections upon Latino candidate emergence.

The results demonstrate that other factors may have a more significant impact upon Latino candidates' decisions to run for office. Some of the factors may include the candidates' gender, their socioeconomic status and age. Jaramillo (2008) evaluated Latina political candidates and found that their attempts to balance political careers with family obligations was a significant factor in many Latinas' decisions to run for office or not to

run at all. Characteristics of the constituents may also demonstrate more of an effect upon Latino candidate emergence. Prewitt and Eulau (1971) find that political parties recruited candidates who had higher levels of education and income. Second, the results demonstrate that although electoral structures, especially at-large elections, have been shown to reduce Latino representation on city councils, they may not be why Latinos are deterred from running the first place.

Figure 4.1: Explaining the Impact of Electoral Structures upon Latino Candidate Emergence



Table 4.1: Variables and their Sources for the Latino Candidate Emergence Model

Variables	**Source**
Dependent variable	
Presence of Latino candidate	LEAP data (1995-2011)
Independent variables	
% of seats elected at-large (Latino minority cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
% of seats elected at-large*Latino population (Latino minority cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
% of seats elected at-large (Latino majority cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
% of seats elected at-large*Latino population cities (Latino majority cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
Use of partisan elections	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Partisan elections*Latino population	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
Number of concurrent elections	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Concurrent elections*Latino population	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
Control Variables	
Size of the Latino population (percent Latino of total population in cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Competitiveness (Percentage of incumbents who sought and won reelections to the city council in the previous election)	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Population size of cities	Census (1990 and 2000)
# of council members	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Whether or not term limits are used	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)

Note: LEAP data (1995-2011), ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Latino Candidate Emergence Variables

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Presence of Latino candidate	27056	.135	.341	0	1
% seats elected at-large	37038	.920	.251	0	3.333
Interaction*	37016	.221	.124	0	.983
Partisan elections	37683	.067	.250	0	1
Interaction**	37661	.003	.027	0	.981
Concurrent elections	38247	.053	.224	0	1
Interaction***	37938	.002	.024	0	.973
Latino population	38000	.222	.124	0	.989
Population size	38022	11551.190	42668.040	23	3694820
Council-manager	38022	.856	.351	0	1
Competitiveness	36245	.962	.145	0	7
Term limits	38267	.029	. 167	0	1
# of council members	37828	5.381	1.222	2	50
y2001	38022	.112	.315	0	1
y2006	38022	.778	.416	0	1

Note: LEAP data (1995-2011), ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Interaction*: % of seats elected at-large*Latino population

Interaction**: partisan elections*Latino population

Interaction***: concurrent elections*Latino population

Table 4.3: The Impact of At-large Elections upon Latino Candidate Emergence in City Council Elections in California (1995-2001)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	b/se	b/se	b/se	b/se
% of seats elected at-large	pfp	pfp	pfp	pfp
% of seats elected at-large*Latino population		3.952		-0.316
		(6.425)		(2.463)
Latino population	0.093	-3.854	-1.659	-1.327
	(1.858)	(6.691)	(2.159)	(3.373)
Competitiveness	pfp	pfp	pfp	pfp
Term limits	0.075	0.089	0.713	0.696
	(0.412)	(0.414)	(0.539)	(0.554)
# of members on city councils	0.046	0.045	-0.076	-0.085
	(0.200)	(0.202)	(0.230)	(0.238)
Population size	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
y2001	0.840**	0.828**	0.790	0.797
	(0.367)	(0.369)	(0.664)	(0.667)
y2006	0.942*	0.934*	-0.217	-0.202
	(0.482)	(0.482)	(0.698)	(0.707)
Constant	-1.856	-1.845	1.287	1.295
	(1.179)	(1.190)	(2.256)	(2.256)
Number of observations	5867.000	5867.000	71.000	71.000
Log likelihood	-3783.971	-3783.786	-44.028	-44.020

Note: LEAP data (1995-2011), ICMA FOG Survey (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000). Variables collapsed to their maximum values by the contest identification variable. Unstandardized logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10. pfp: predicts failure perfectly.

Model 1: % of seats elected at-large in minority-Latino cities

Model 2: % of seats elected at-large*Latino population (minority-Latino cities)

Model 3: % of seats elected at-large (majority-Latino cities)

Model 4: % of seats elected at-large*Latino population (majority-Latino cities)

Table 4.4: The Impact of Partisan and Concurrent Elections upon Latino Candidate Emergence in City Council Elections in California (1995-2001)

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
Partisan elections	1.004	0.438		
	(0.836)	(1.730)		
Partisan elections*Latino population		1.131		
		(3.143)		
Concurrent elections			-0.364	-2.432
			(0.984)	(2.775)
Concurrent elections*Latino population				4.092
				(4.838)
Latino population	0.579	0.539	0.744	0.638
	(0.679)	(0.689)	(0.670)	(0.680)
Competitiveness	2.943	2.956	2.934	2.779
	(2.116)	(2.119)	(2.118)	(2.117)
Term limits	0.276	0.282	0.329	0.366
	(0.313)	(0.313)	(0.309)	(0.312)
# of members on city councils	0.034	0.030	0.022	0.022
	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.144)	(0.143)
Population size	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
y2001	0.830**	0.839**	0.817**	0.830**
	(0.286)	(0.287)	(0.284)	(0.285)
y2006	0.633*	0.627*	0.624*	0.657*
	(0.362)	(0.362)	(0.362)	(0.364)
Constant	-4.550**	-4.526**	-4.525**	-4.371**
	(2.202)	(2.204)	(2.209)	(2.213)
Number of observations	5945	5945	5945	5945
Log likelihood	-3832.592	-3832.524	-3833.346	-3832.919

Note: LEAP data (1995-2011), ICMA FOG Survey (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000). Variables collapsed to their maximum values by the contest identification variable. Unstandardized logistic regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

CHAPTER V:

AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF ELECTORAL STRUCTURES UPON LATINO AND AFRICAN AMERICAN CITY COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I examined the impact of electoral structures upon Latino candidate emergence in city council elections in California. I argued that electoral structures including at-large elections, partisan elections, and concurrent elections would demonstrate different effects upon Latino candidate emergence in city council elections. I expected that fewer Latino candidates would choose to compete in races where at-large and partisan elections were used. I also expected that more Latino candidates would choose to compete during concurrent elections. Overall, I did not find support for my expectations.

The purpose of this chapter is to reexamine established conclusions regarding the impact of electoral structures upon Latino and African American city council candidate success. (highlighted in bold in figure 5.1). Scholars have demonstrated that at-large elections hurt Latino and African American descriptive representation on city councils (Jones 1976; Latimer 1979; Welch 1990). However, there is evidence that at-large elections would not affect African American representation in majority African American cities (Welch 1990). I examine if these conclusions also apply to Latino representation in Latino majority cities. Although there is evidence that partisan elections are not always favorable for minority candidates (Jones-Correa 1998), others have found that partisan elections help African American city council candidates (Banfield and Wilson 1967; Robinson and Dye 1978). Although there is also evidence that concurrent elections are

favorable for African American candidates, some scholars argue that the size of the council provides more benefits for Latino representation on city councils Taebel 1978; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). I test these conclusions using the International City Management Association's Forms of Government Survey (ICMA FOG) from 1996, 2001, and 2006. I find some support for the expectations that electoral structures continue to matter for Latino and African American representation on city councils.

Descriptive and Substantive Representations

Prior to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, minorities encountered many forms of institutionalized racism. Section five of the VRA required approval from the Department of Justice for states that wanted to change laws that affected voting (U.S. Department of Justice 2010). This section was especially significant for southern states, where racism and discrimination were prevalent. A proposed solution for discriminatory laws was the creation of majority-minority or single-member districts. A purpose of the majority-minority districts was the expectation that majority African American and Latino populations living in these districts would be able to elect minority representatives to the United States Congress, with the added benefit of gaining substantive representation.[22] Over time, researchers have identified several benefits that underrepresented groups (including minorities) gain from descriptive representation

[22] The first scholar to distinguish between descriptive (or physical) and substantive representation was Pitkin (1963). Descriptive representation consists of being represented by someone who shares a physical quality with his or her constituent. The expectation is that sharing the same physical characteristics increases his or her ability to represent the constituents' interests. Substantive representation focuses on being represented by someone who will pursue constituents' interests, regardless of his or her physical characteristics or gender.

(Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2002). Mansbridge argues that racial and gender-defined groups gain several benefits from descriptive representation. First, descriptive representation can increase the level of trust the groups have for their representatives.[23] They are more confident in their representative's ability to pursue their interests due to their shared characteristics. Second, representatives are able to articulate concerns that were not clearly defined. Third, descriptive representatives can dispel previous stereotypes about the groups including assumptions that the group was "unfit to rule". Fourth, as the number of minority representatives increases, their constituents feel as if they are active participants. In her analysis, Dovi argues that not only can descriptive representation provide adequate representation for underrepresented groups, but subgroups can (and should) receive adequate representation as well. She encourages the representatives to actively pursue relationships with members of the subgroups in order to demonstrate that their interests will also be pursued. The next section presents a literature review that begins with a discussion of benefits and costs of descriptive representation at the national and state levels. Scholars have demonstrated that there is a debate regarding whether or not African Americans and Latinos receive benefits from descriptive representation at the national and state levels. It concludes with a discussion of how electoral structures reduced minority representation on city councils and school boards.

[23] Gay (2002) argues against Mansbridge's (1999) assertion that majority-minority districts increase levels of trust among minorities for their representatives. She operationalizes trust as how often blacks and whites interact with their white and black Democratic representative and how they rate their performance while they are in office. She argues that whites are more likely to rate white representatives more favorably than black representatives, whites are more likely to recall the efforts of white representatives and they are more likely to approve of their job performance. Descriptive representation has less of an impact upon levels of trust for blacks. However, they are more likely to contact their black representatives more often.

National and State Levels

National Government

At the national level, scholars have engaged in a debate about the merits of descriptive representation gained through majority-minority districts. Mansbridge (1999) suggests that descriptive representation should occur through the "most fluid" of methods including proportional representation and affirmative action policies. In contrast, she identifies majority-minority districts and quotas as the "least fluid" strategies. Casellas (2009**)** finds that at the national level, African American and Latino representatives are more likely to be elected from majority-minority district. There are mixed results regarding the impact of descriptive representation upon levels of turnout among African American voters (Gay 2001; Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004). In her analysis of voter turnout levels in eight states and 102 districts, Gay (2001) concludes that majority-minority districts do not affect turnout rates for blacks, but decreases turnout for whites. In their cross-national analysis of political empowerment, Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (2004) find that descriptive representation increases knowledge about and contact with representatives among minorities in the United States. Descriptive representation also causes the Maori to evaluate government responsiveness more favorably and participate at higher levels during elections in New Zealand.

Some scholars argue that although majority-minority districts increase descriptive representation and turnout, African Americans do not gain substantive representation (Guinier 1991, Lublin 1997; Swain 1995). Guinier (1991) argues that majority-minority districts result in the election of "unauthentic" African American representatives who are "tools" of the white institutions. She also argues that even if authentic blacks were

elected to Congress, they would not be able to function in the majoritarian institution because their voices would not be heard by their white counterparts. Swain (1995) examines how black representatives voted on legislation related to black interests in the 100th Congress. She contends that blacks who are elected to Congress from the majority-minority districts do not actively pursue their constituents' interests because they believe they are guaranteed reelection. Lublin (1997) uses Poole-Rosenthal scores to analyze representatives' ideologies and interest group ratings of roll call votes. He finds that majority-minority districts lower substantive representation in the south because white Democratic and Republican representatives (from surrounding districts) become more conservative due to the wishes of their white constituents. Also, majority-minority districts cause a loss of Democratic seats in Congress, which hurts substantive representation for African Americans and Latinos. Thus, as suggested by Guinier, minority representatives' voices are not heard once they get to Congress. In the north, white representatives tend to vote for policies that are favorable to minorities. He also argues that when African American and Latino populations are less than forty percent in a district, white representatives become more aware of his or her minority constituents' concerns. They will also adopt more liberal positions on issues that are important to minorities. This finding is supported by Hutchings (1998), who argues that representatives pursue minority interests if their districts consist of some minorities.[24] The common solution promoted by Guinier, Swain, and Lublin is for minorities to gain substantive representation from white Democratic representatives.

[24] Griffin and Newman (2006) provide a counter-argument to Lublin. Their analysis of roll call votes demonstrates that white representatives' roll call votes are more complimentary to white ideological views and that black ideological concerns are ignored.

On the other side of the debate, scholars argue that African Americans gain substantive representation through descriptive representation (Canon 1996 and 1999). Canon argues that Guinier, Swain, and Lublin's dependence on roll call votes and interest group ratings of these roll call votes only provides a partial understanding of black representatives' actions in Congress. Although he acknowledges that roll call votes are easy to find, they do not provide a comprehensive understanding of what representatives accomplish in Congress. Also, the interest group ratings of the roll call votes are not always representative of the minority groups they claim to represent. Canon demonstrates that the views of the Leadership Conference of Civil Rights (LCCR) do not always match the views of the black community. In some cases, the LCCR even offered low ratings for votes that they opposed but were important to blacks (Canon 1999). Canon examines the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) as a counterexample to the LCCR. He uses data from roll call votes, interest group ratings of the votes, data about members' leadership positions, their memberships on committees, interviews with their staffs and other forms of data to analyze the CBC. He concludes that CBC members were "authentic" representatives because they pursued policies that were important to blacks and also non-racial issues that benefited whites, blacks, Latinos, etc. His Supply-Side Theory promotes the idea that "commonality" or moderate blacks could be supported by whites and blacks in the majority-minority districts (Canon 1999). He thereby refutes Swain's concern that black representatives became lazy while in office. Canon also disagrees with Lublin, asserting that white representatives often ignored their minority constituents' interests when they comprised less than twenty-five percent of the districts.

In their examination of Latino representation, scholars have identified several benefits associated with majority-minority districts (Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon 2000). Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon (2000) confirm previous findings that Latino politicians increase the amount of employment opportunities, teachers and political empowerment. Another benefit is that descriptive representation reduces the barriers of participation for Latinos and reduces political alienation among Latinos (Affigne 2000; Arviszu and Garcia 1996; Baretto 2007; Baretto, Segura and Wood 2004; Pantoja and Segura 2003). Affigne (2000) notes that political participation rates are declining steadily among Latinos. Barreto, Segura and Wood (2004) analyze voter registration records for counties in California and finds that majority-minority districts increase Latino turnout, while decreasing white turnout. Barreto (2007) examines voters in 6,776 precincts and find that Latino voters have higher turnout rates and more support for Latino candidates in co-ethnic elections. Pantoja and Segura (2003) find evidence that descriptive representation decreases the level of political alienation felt by Latinos in the US. However, they find evidence that other factors including socioeconomic and political factors also reduce political alienation.

One of the first examinations of how Latino members of congress provide substantive representation for their constituents was completed by Welch and Hibbing (1984). They analyze roll call votes for white and Latino members of congress whose districts have large Latino constituencies. They find that Latino representatives provided strong substantive representation for their Latino constituents. Latino representatives demonstrate more liberal positions than their white peers. Overall, Latinos receive substantive representation from Latino representatives and white democratic

representatives. Their conclusions were re-examined by Hero and Tolbert (1995) who reached different conclusions. They mailed a survey to members of the 100th Congress; asking them how they would vote on issues that were important to Latinos. They conclude that Latino constituents gained more substantive representation from having a Democratic representative outside of the Southwest, than from having a Latino representative. Casellas (2002) builds upon Hero and Tolbert. Although he finds support for their conclusions about Latino representatives from the 100th Congress, his analysis of the 87-104th Congresses demonstrates that Latinos receive some substantive representation from their Puerto Rican and Mexican-American representatives as well as from Democratic representatives. In an analysis of scorecards from the National Latino Leadership Agenda for Latino members of congress from the 108th Congress, Knoll (2009) finds support for the conclusion that Latinos gain substantive support from Democratic representatives.

Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures

At the state level, a factor that affects minorities' chances of winning election is their population within a state (Casellas 2007; Casellas 2009**)**. Casellas finds that when the Latino population in a state is interacted with legislative turnover rates and legislative professionalization, states with high turnover rates and citizen legislations increase Latinos' chances of winning office (Casellas 2009). In his examination of the California state legislature, he finds that partisanship does not increase the likelihood of a Latino candidate being elected (Casellas 2007).

Scholars have found conflicting results regarding the benefits gained from descriptive representation. Bratton and Haynie (1999) find that black legislators, as well as white female legislators were more likely to introduce legislation that supported each other's constituents (as well as their own). However, this cross-introduction did not guarantee that proposals related to minority interests would become laws. Owens (2005) argues that the increasing presence of black legislators led to changes in spending priorities; more attention was given to issues and interests that were important to blacks. Preuhs (2006) finds that black voters gain substantive representation from the presence of black legislators. They can influence policies that benefit their constituents by holding leadership positions on committees. The presence of Latino legislators increases the introduction of policies that are important to Latinos including health-services and education (Bratton 2006**).** In states where the Latino population is higher than ten percent, the presence of Latino legislatures reduces "backlash" toward Latino interest policies (measured as welfare policies**)** (Preuhs 2007). Although minority constituents can receive substantive representation from their minority legislators, there is evidence that minority legislators face many challenges once they are elected. Hawkesworth (2003) finds that minority congresswomen in the 103rd and 104th encounter "racing-gendering" in response to their efforts to introduce and gain support for welfare reform legislation. Hawkesworth argues that white members of Congress challenge their efforts to introduce successful legislation through disrespect and efforts to spin their legislation as bills that promote the interests of a specific group.

The preceding discussions have demonstrated that scholars identify both costs and benefits of descriptive representation at the national and state levels. Across both levels,

descriptive representation has been shown to provide substantive representation, while some scholars have shown that it reduces substantive representation.

Local Level

Although descriptive representation has been shown to provide some substantive representation at the national and state levels, scholars have found that minorities receive many benefits at the local level. First, the presence of minorities in government bureaucracies increases the likelihood that minorities will gain access to resources and that minority-friendly policies will be pursued, without hurting the interests of whites (Hindera 1993a; Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999; Meier, Doerfler, Hawes, Hicklin, and Rocha 2006; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998).

Second, African American mayors have been shown to increase levels of trust and satisfaction among African American residents (Keller 1978; Abney and Hutcheson 1981, Hall-Saltzenstein 1989; Marschall and Shah 2007; Marschall and Ruhill 2007). In an analysis of levels of trust among blacks and whites in Atlanta, Abney and Hutcheson (1981) find that the election of Maynard Jackson, the first black mayor of Atlanta, increased levels of trust in the government among black residents. They also find that the decline of trust among whites did not differ from patterns found in national trends. Mayor Jackson's efforts to appeal to black and white voters reduced the likelihood that either group viewed him as providing preferential treatment to blacks. Marschall and Shah (2007) demonstrate that black residents have higher levels of trust in local governments in cities where the mayors are black and where the mayors have actively pursued favorable policing policies including increasing the number of blacks on the police force

and creating civilian review boards. They also find that these policies increase trust in local government among whites. Marschall and Ruhill (2007) conclude that having black representatives on city councils and school boards and black mayors in office increased blacks' satisfaction with their neighborhoods, the police forces, and public schools. Keller (1978) examines urban expenditure data for six cities in order to determine if black and white mayors have different spending preferences. He finds that black mayors spend more on police and fire departments. He also finds that white mayors focus more on efficiency rather than spending. He concludes that expenditures by black mayors are constrained by the composition of the city council and the political environment that exists while he or she is in office. Mayors in cities with majority white councils are more conciliatory to the wishes of the council members; in contrast, black mayor sin cities with majority black city councils are less constrained. Some black mayors in cities with all-white councils are combative and fight with the council. Hall-Saltzenstein (1989) examines the impact of black mayors upon the passage of favorable policies for the African American community, in this case, police department issues. Her sample includes 105 municipal governments. She finds that black mayors increased the number of police officers who are black, and created civilian review boards.

Third, African American council members and mayors have been shown to affect levels of political participation and efficacy among minority constituents (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Chambers 2002; Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002; Marschall and Ruhill 2007; Spence, McClerking, and Brown 2009). Within the literature, scholars argue that factors including socioeconomic factors reduce participation costs and cause groups including African Americans to participate more (Verba and Nie 1972). Bobo and Gilliam (1990)

examine the impact of black empowerment, measured as cities that have black mayors, upon minority representation. They find that cities with black mayors had a black population that was more likely to be politically active. In an analysis of "roll-off voting" or voting in the primary election, but not the runoff, Vanderleeuw and Liu (2002), examines how often blacks in New Orleans voted during city council elections between 1965 and 1998. They find that blacks voted in primary and runoff elections if the races were competitive, if they were mobilized by black candidates, or if a majority of city council members were black. Chambers (2002) finds that efforts by a non-minority mayor and board of trustees to control the authority of school boards in Chicago, the lack of minority school board members and the absence of educators in the board of trustees, hurt minority parents' efforts to participate in the decision-making process. She examines two reforms, the first, adopted in 1988, increased opportunities for black and Latino parents to determine the types of policies that were adopted by school boards. However, a reform adopted in 1995 attempted to solve financial concerns that resulted from the 1988 reform. Unlike the first reform, the 1995 reform placed more authority in Mayor Daley and a Board of Trustees. As a result, it reduced opportunities for minority parents to contribute the decision making process. It also reduced the responsiveness of the mayor's office and the board to the minority parents. However, tenure in office by black mayors has been shown to hurt levels of black political participation (Spence, McClerking, and Brown 2009). They find that African Americans tend to participate less over time, the longer an African American mayor is in office. This occurs because African American mayors are less likely to mobilize blacks to vote once they are in office. However, black participation increases as their population size increases.

Fourth, the presence of minorities and females on city councils increases the number of minorities and female municipal employees (Dye and Renick 1981). For blacks and Latinos, their likelihood of getting administrative, professional, and protective jobs depend upon their proportion of the population in cities and the number of blacks and Latinos on city councils. For female job candidates, their likelihood of being employed in administration and professional jobs decrease in cities with highly educated residents and in larger cities. Mladenka (1989) finds that African American and Latino membership on the city council increases municipal employment opportunities for African Americans and Latinos, however, having a minority mayor in office does not. He also finds that the size of the black population, electoral structures, forms of government and level of racial discrimination affect municipal opportunities for African Americans. Latino municipal employment is affected more by Latino membership on the city councils. Having an African American mayor has some effect on increasing civil service employment opportunities for African Americans (Eisinger 1982). However, he also finds that the population size of African Americans in cities provides the strongest explanation for African American employment. This finding is confirmed by Hutchins and Sigelman (1989). Other factors that determine employment opportunities for blacks are the socioeconomic conditions of the cities where they work and the regions in which they live (Hutchins and Sigelman 1989). They argue blacks gain better employment opportunities in affluent areas and cities outside of the South. Dye and Renick (1981) provide some evidence that having blacks and Latinos on city councils increases the likelihood that they will gain administrative or professional jobs. However, they also find

that the size of the black population in a city demonstrated a positive effect on the likelihood blacks would receive these types of jobs.

Fifth, Scholars have found that minority membership on school boards provide benefits for African Americans and Latinos. In general, minority board members have been shown to increase the numbers of minority administrators which has increased the number of minority teachers in classrooms (Meier, Gonzalez-Juenke, Polinard and Wrinkle 2005). For African Americans, black school board members increase the numbers of black teachers which reduces the levels of second generation discrimination experienced by African American students (Meier and England 1984). Similar results are also seen for Latinos (Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria 1990; Meier 1993; Leal, Meier, Martinez-Ebers 2004). Having African Americans and Latinos school board members increases the number of minority administrators, which increases the number of minority teachers who help minority students tests scores, reduces second generation discrimination rates, and provide other benefits (Meier 1993; Polinard, Wrinkle, Longoria 1990; Leal et al 2004; Meier and England 1984; Meier, Doerfler, Hawes, Hicklin and Rocha 2006; Rocha and Hawes 2009). Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard (1999) analyze whether minority students could gain benefits from minority teachers at the expense of white students. Analyzing standardized test scores from 350 school boards in Texas, they conclude that white students had higher test scores if they had minority teachers. However, minority students' test scores were only improved if the teaching staff consisted of 22% of minority faculty. Meier and England (1984) argue that having black members on school boards increases the likelihood that minority-friendly educational policies will be adopted. However, this is a conditional relationship. In order for blacks to

gain substantive representation on school boards, black board members must first share the black community's preference. The black community must also show interest in these educational policies. For Latinos, school board membership affects the number of Latino administrators that are hired in schools (Meier et al 2005). Meier et al (2006) confirm previous findings that minority and low-income students are benefitted from having minority teachers. Rocha and Hawes (2009) find that African American and Latino teachers reduce the amount of second-generation discrimination experienced by African American and Latino students.

Electoral Structures and Descriptive Representation

Within the literature, scholars have found that at-large elections reduce the likelihood that minority candidates will win office (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Engstrom and McDonald 1981; Jones 1976; Latimer 1979; Leal et al 2004; Meier et al 2005). Jones (1976) argues that increasing the number of ward-based elections will increase the number of blacks elected to city councils. Karnig and Welch (1979) confirm this finding, but argue that ward-based elections only increase the number of black men, not black women, who are elected to city councils. Hajnal and Trounstine (2005 and 2010) and Allan and Plank (2005) argue that blacks would win more city council seats if cities moved from at-large elections to concurrent elections. Leal et al (2004) and Meier et al (2005) find that at-large elections reduce the amount of Latino members on school boards reducing descriptive representation as a consequence. Meier et al (2005) find that at-large elections lower Latino candidates' chances of being elected to school boards, but find that blacks do win at-large elections.

Cole (1974) counters the previous observations in his analysis of sixteen New Jersey cities. He finds that several African American mayors were elected despite nonpartisan reforms and at-large elections. He also argues that white residents who earned higher levels of income were more receptive to electing African American candidates. MacManus (1979) argues against the conclusion that at-large elections hurt descriptive representation for minorities. She argues that this finding is a result of two incorrect assumptions: first, that all at-large elections are equal and demonstrate the same impact upon minorities; and second, that cities holding the same form of elections share similar levels of descriptive representation. Karnig and Welch (1981) find some evidence that ward-based elections are just as unrepresentative for minorities as at-large elections.

Although at-large elections are widely cited as reducing descriptive representation for blacks and Latinos, scholars also identify other factors that could produce the same effect. Taebel (1976) argues that at-large elections and small council sizes decrease descriptive representation for blacks and Latinos. Engstrom and MacDonald (1976) analyze electoral forms and the socioeconomic conditions of blacks and whites in the South in order to determine which factors decrease descriptive representation the most. They find that at-large elections demonstrate the strongest effect. Karnig (1976 and 1979), meanwhile, cite the following factors as explanations of low black representation in city councils: region, electoral form and economic resources that are possessed by blacks. Latimer (1979) finds that black representation on city councils is determined by the election forms and by the level of organization and turnout of black voters in these elections.

The discussion of the previous literature leads to several expectations about how electoral structure affect Latino and African American membership on city councils.

Theoretical Expectations

Research exploring the impact of electoral structure upon minority candidate success creates several expectations. First, previous research demonstrates that at-large elections reduce Latino and African American representation on city councils and school boards (Engstrom and McDonald 1981 and 1982; Jones 1976; Latimer 1979; Leal et al 2004; Meier et al 2005). Therefore, I expect at-large elections will continue to reduce the likelihood of Latino and African American city council membership, especially in cities where neither group is the majority the majority of the total population. In order to test this expectation, I restrict models one and two in tables 5.3 and 5.4 to cities where the Latino population and African American population not reached the majority of the population. The second model contains an interaction between the at-large and minority group population variables (included in both tables). My expectation is that both Latino-minority and African American-minority cities, the population of either group will not reduce the negative impact of at-large elections upon minority membership in city councils.

There is evidence that at-large elections do not affect the likelihood of African American candidate success in city council elections when the African American population reaches majority size (Latimer 1979; Welch 1990). For African American-majority cities, I expect that the size of the minority group will help to increase minority membership, despite the use of at-large elections. Therefore, I test this expectation by

restricting the model to African-American majority cities. I also include an interaction term between at-large and the proportion of the cities' population that is African American. Latino representation in this context is more difficult to predict. Scholars have shown that Latino groups live in less concentrated areas than African Americans (Taebel 1978; Welch 1990). [25] However, Leal et al (2004) find that Latino candidates can win at-large elections in Latino-majority cities. Therefore, I expect that Latino council membership will not be reduced in areas where Latinos are the majority population. The fourth model in table 5.4 also includes an interaction term between at-large elections and the Latino population variable.

Scholars including Banfield and Wilson (1967) find that partisan elections are beneficial for candidates, including minorities because candidates from different groups are included on the ballot. However, their inclusion is contingent upon the voting strength of the groups living in cities. There is some evidence that partisan elections increase the likelihood that African Americans will win city council seats (Kramer 1971; Robinson and Dye 1978; Karnig and Welch 1981; Bledsoe and Welch 1984). However, other scholars argue that political parties would avoid choosing minority candidates that are not considered "safe" or guaranteed to win (Davidson and Korbel 1981; Burnham 1997; Jones-Correa 1998; Meier et al 2005). In his examination of state legislature races, Casellas (2007) finds that partisan elections did not affect the likelihood of Latinos winning their elections because most voters used race as a voting cue. Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) found some evidence that partisan elections reduced the likelihood that

[25] Smaller, less concentrated Latino populations can receive representation through mixed elections (Welch 1990).

Latino candidates would win seats on city councils.[26] This leads to my expectation that partisan elections will increase the likelihood of African American success. However, I expect that partisan elections would reduce Latino representation on city councils. I also examine the possibility that partisan elections would not reduce the likelihood of Latino and African American candidates' success in cities where the Latino and African American populations are the respective majority groups. I test this possibility by interacting partisan elections with the Latino population, as well as another interaction term between partisan elections and African American population.

Concurrent elections have been shown to increase turnout rates in local elections (Gordon 1970; Allan and Plank 2005; Hajnal and Trounstine 2005 and 2010).[27] These scholars also demonstrate that minority constituents gain more beneficial policies as a result of higher turnout levels among minority voters. These findings create the following expectation: African American and Latino candidates are more likely to win council seats during concurrent elections. I also posit that this result is likely to hold regardless of the population sizes of either group. I examine this expectation by interacting concurrent elections with the population sizes of each group.

Expectations for Latino City Council Representation

H1: Latino candidates competing in minority-Latino cities are less likely to win seats on city councils where at-large elections are used

[26] The partisan election variable was negative, but did not reach statistical significance.

[27] Hajnal and Trounstine (2005and 2010) argue that district elections and on-cycle elections (held at the same time as presidential elections) would increase descriptive representation for blacks on city councils (more than higher rates of turnout).

H2: At-large elections will reduce the amount of Latino city council members in minority-Latino cities, despite the size of the Latino population.

H3: More Latino council members are likely to be found in majority-Latino cities, despite the use of at-large elections.

H4: The size of the Latino population will increase the amount of Latino candidates on city councils in majority-Latino cities, despite the use of at-large elections.

H5: Latino candidates are less likely to win city council seats during partisan elections.

H6: Latino candidates are more likely to win partisan elections in Latino-majority cities.

H7: Latino city council candidates are more likely to win concurrent elections.

H8: Latino city council candidates are more likely to win concurrent elections regardless of the size of the Latino population.

Expectations for African American City Council Representation

H1: African American candidates competing in minority-African American cities are less likely to win seats on city councils where at-large elections are used

H2: At-large elections will reduce the amount of African American city council members in minority-African American cities, despite the size of the African American population.

H3: More Latino council members are likely to be found in majority-African American cities, despite the use of at-large elections.

H4: The size of the African American population will increase the amount of African American candidates on city councils in majority-African American cities, despite the use of at-large elections.

H5: African American candidates are more likely to win city council seats during partisan elections.

H6: African American city council candidates are more likely to win partisan elections in majority-African American cities

H7: African American city council candidates are more likely to win concurrent elections.

H8: African American city council candidates are more likely to win concurrent elections regardless of the size of the African American population.

Data and Methods

The dataset used in this chapter is the ICMA FOG surveys from 1996, 2001, and 2006. I use ordinary least squares regression to conduct my analysis.

Variables

Table 5.1 displays the variables and their sources. The summary statistics are displayed in table 5.2 and 5.3. My dependent variables are Latino and African American descriptive representation. I measure Latino and African American representation as the percentage of council members who are Latino and the percentage of council members

who are African American.[28] There were 984 Latino council members and 2,233 African American council members in the pooled ICMA dataset. I evaluate the impact of electoral structures upon Latino membership separately from African American council membership.

I examine six independent variables in my analysis of Latino council membership. In order to evaluate the impact of at-large elections upon the presence of Latino candidates, I include the percentage of seats that are elected using at-large elections. I include an interaction term between this variable multiplied by the proportion of the total city population that is Latino. The third hypothesis examines the impact of partisan elections. Partisan elections are dichotomous, with 0 being coded as "nonpartisan" and 1 "partisan" elections. I also interact partisan elections with the Latino population variable. The concurrent elections variable is also dichotomous with 0 being coded as "staggered" and 1 "concurrent" elections. My final independent variable is an interaction between concurrent elections and the Latino population variable. The analysis of African American council membership includes interactions of the electoral structures with the proportion of the total city population that is African American.

I include several control variables in my models. I include a control for cities that use council-manager plans. Davidson and Korbel (1981) argue that commissions and council-manager plans were viewed as tools to reduce the influence of blacks in southern and southwestern cities as well as increase the efficiency of city governments. The expectation is that council-manager plans would decrease the likelihood of Latino and

---

[28] The survey included the following question: "How many of your present members are:". City clerks received the following options: American Indian, Hispanic, Asian or Pacific Islander, White / Not of Hispanic Origin, and Black / Not of Hispanic Origin.

African American success in city council elections. The competitiveness variable which describes the number of incumbents, who ran and won reelection during the previous city council elections, is expected to reduce Latino and African American success during city council elections. I control for Latino and African American population variables (Engstrom and McDonald 1982).[29] Scholars have found that cities where the size of the African American and Latino populations have reached specific thresholds, are expected to have more minority candidates on the city councils (Marschall, Ruhill, and Shah 2010). Cole (1974) and MacManus (1976) find that African Americans are more likely to be elected to city councils in smaller cities, therefore I control for the population size of the cities. Taebel (1978) that the size of the council demonstrated the strongest impact upon Latino representation. He argued that small council sizes decreased Latino representation. Engstrom and McDonald (1982) also argue that African American representation would increase if the number of seats on the councils increased. Therefore, I control for the number of members on the city council. I also include a regional control variable (south). Scholars have shown that Latinos and African Americans have been consistently underrepresented in southern states (Robinson and Dye 1976; Taebel 1978).

Results

I separated the analyses of % Latino and % African American city council members into two tables. Many of the results support previous findings from the literature. I find support for expectation that at-large elections reduce membership for

[29] Although the percentage of Latinos in a district or state has been shown to affect Latino candidates' chances of winning election, it does not demonstrate having an impact upon how Latino representatives vote on policies once they are in office (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Casellas 2002**;** Knoll 2009**)**.

African Americans and Latinos. I also found evidence that partisan elections and concurrent elections increase Latino membership, but I found mixed evidence for African American city council membership.

Latino Representation on City Councils

Table 5.4 displays the results for the first four models examining the impact of at-large elections upon the percentage of city council members who are Latino. The primary independent variable in model 1 is percentage of seats that are elected using at-large elections. In order to run the model, I restricted my analysis to minority Latino cities or cities where the Latino population was less than fifty percent of the total population. I find support for my first hypothesis. The at-large variable reaches statistical significance in the expected direction. It confirms previous results that at-large elections reduce Latino representation; specifically, at-large elections reduce the likelihood of Latino council membership. It also supports Taebel (1978) and Welch (1990) and who argued that Latinos in Latino-minority cities could gain more representation through other types of electoral structures. Among the control variables, the Latino population variable demonstrates that as the amount of Latino residents increase, the likelihood that the amount of Latino council members increases by thirty-two percent. The population size variable reaches statistical significance in the expected direction and implies that the amount of council members who are Latino increases as the size of the Latino population increases. The regional variable confirms previous conclusions that Latino representation remains low in the south (Bridges 1997; Welch 1990).

Model 2 included the % at-large and the interaction term. This model was restricted to Latino minority cities. I find support for my expectation that despite the size of the Latino population, at-large elections would continue to reduce the amount of Latino council members. The Latino population variable continues to demonstrate that Latino council membership increases as an increase in the size of the Latino population. There continue to be less Latino council members in the south.

Model 3 evaluated the impact of at-large elections in Latino-majority cities. Although the direction of the variable is in the proposed positive direction, it does not reach statistical significance. This result demonstrates that other factors, including the size of the Latino population, may contribute a bigger influence upon Latino representation even when they are the majority population in an area. Among the controls, the size of the Latino population continues to increase Latino council membership, while the level of competitiveness reduces it.

Model 4 includes the % seats elected at-large as well as the interaction term between it and the Latino population variable. In order to run this model, I restricted my analysis to majority Latino cities. The at-large elections variable reached statistical significance in the unexpected direction. It demonstrates that at-large elections reduce the amount of council members who are Latino. However, the interaction term is positive and it reaches statistical significance. It reconfirms previous research which argued that Latino representation is not affected by at-large elections in cities where the Latino population is greater than fifty percent (Leal et al 2004). Among the control variables, competitiveness reaches statistical significance in the expected direction. It demonstrates that the amount of Latino council members is reduced when more incumbents ran and

won reelection. It implies that not only does competitiveness contribute to the reduction of Latino representation on city councils, but it also may imply that Latino candidates may prefer to run in open-seat races when the level of competition increases. The population size variable demonstrates that larger cities are more likely to have more Latino council members.

Table 5.5 displays the results from the remaining hypotheses. Model 1 examines the impact of partisan elections upon the amount of council members who are Latino. Although partisan elections variable is positive, it does not reach statistical significance. Several of the control variables reach statistical significance in the expected directions. The Latino population confirms previous findings that as the Latino population in cities increase, the amount of Latino council members is expected to increase by fifty-nine percent. Both the council-manager plan and competitiveness variables indicate support for the expectation that that are fewer Latino council members in council-manager cities, nor are there many Latino council members who are elected during competitive elections. The regional variable reconfirms that fewer Latino candidates are elected in southern cities.

Model 2: The independent variables of interest in this model are the partisan election and interaction term between partisan elections and Latino population. Neither variable reaches statistical significance, therefore I do not find support for my sixth hypothesis. Many of the same controls from the previous model reach statistical significance in the expected directions in this model. Cities where the Latino population is a larger proportion of the total population have more council members who are Latino. In contrast, council-manager plan cities and competitiveness continue to reduce the

amount of council members who are Latino. Southern cities continue to have fewer Latino council members.

Model 3: the independent variable of interest in this model is concurrent elections. It reaches statistical significance in the expected direction, thus demonstrating support for my seventh hypothesis. I find support for my expectation that the amount of Latino council members would increase as a result of concurrent elections. Among the control variables, Latino population, council-manager plan, competitiveness, and the regional variable reach statistical significance in the expected directions The Latino population variable demonstrates that larger Latino population cities increase the amount of Latino council members by fifty-nine percent. In contrast, fewer council members are Latino in council-manager plan cities, and southern cities. Also, competitiveness reduces the amount of Latino council members. The city population size variable is negative, which demonstrates that there are fewer Latino council members in larger cities. This result differs from results in model 1 in which the population size variables demonstrated that larger cities are more likely to have more Latino council members.

Model 4: the primary independent variables of interest are the concurrent election variable and the interaction between concurrent elections and the Latino population variable. Although concurrent elections reach statistical significance in the expected direction, the interaction term does not reach statistical significance at all. The amount of Latino council members continue to increase in cities with larger Latino populations, while council-manager plan and cities with more incumbents competing and winning elections continue to have fewer Latino council members. Southern cities continue to have fewer Latino council members.

Overall, my analyses present mixed support for my expectations. I find support for the expectation that at-large elections reduce the amount of Latino council members. I also find support for previous conclusions that this affect is mitigated in Latino majority cities. Although there is some evidence that partisan elections would increase the amount of Latino council members, the variable does not reach statistical significance, preventing me from confirming my expectation. Nor is there support for my sixth hypothesis which posited that partisan elections would help increase the amount of Latino council members in cities with larger Latino population. I find support for my seventh hypothesis which tested previous expectations that concurrent elections increased the election of Latino council members to city councils. I do not find support for the eigth hypothesis which posited that concurrent elections would continue to increase Latino candidate election to city councils in cities with larger Latino populations.

African American Representation on City Councils

Table 5.6 displays the models for the at-large elections hypotheses (1-4). Model 1 examines the impact of at-large elections upon the amount of African American council members. I restrict my analysis to cities where the African American population is less than fifty percent. I find support for previous conclusions that at-large elections reduce African American representation on city councils. I find that as the amount of seats that are elected at-large increase, the amount of African American city council members decreases by two percent. Among the controls, the size of the African American population is positive and statistically significant. It demonstrates support for the expectation that the amount of African American council members is higher in cities with

larger African American populations. The city population size variable is positive and reached statistical significance. It demonstrates that the amount of African American council members is higher in larger cities.

Model 2 displays results from an analysis of the at-large and African American population interaction term. This model was restricted to African American minority cities. Although the at-large variable was not significant, the interaction term demonstrated that African American council membership is reduced by at-large elections, despite the size of the African American population. Among the controls, the African American population confirms that African American council membership increases as the African American population increases. Larger cities continue to have more African Americans on the city councils.

Model 3 examines the impact of at-large elections in African American-majority cities. The direction of the at-large variable demonstrates that African American council membership continues to be reduced by at-large elections, even in cities where African Americans are the majority. This result differs from Welch (1990) who found that African Americans could win at-large elections in African American majority areas. Areas with more African Americans will have more black council members. As is expected, there are fewer African American council members in the south.

Model 4: The primary independent variable of interest continues to be the amount of seats that are elected at-large and an interaction term between the at-large elections and African American population variables. I restrict my analysis to cities where the African American population was larger than fifty percent. Neither the at-large election nor the interaction term reaches statistical significance. The African American population

variable remains positive and statistically significant, thus confirming that a higher amount of African American council members occurs in cities with large African American population. The council-manager plan variable confirms that fewer African Americans are elected to city councils in council-manager plan cities. The population size variable confirms that more African Americans are elected in larger cities. The regional variable confirms that city councils in southern cities consist of fewer African Americans.

Table 5.7 displays the results for the partisan and concurrent elections hypotheses. Model 1: The independent variable of interest is partisan elections. Although there is some evidence that partisan elections would increase the amount of African American city council members, the variable does not reach statistical significance. Among the control variables, the African American population variable confirms that as the African American population increases, the amount of African Americans on city councils increases. City councils in council-manager plan cities have fewer African American council members. There are more African American council members in larger cities and fewer in southern cities.

Model 2: the independent variables of interest are the partisan elections variable and the interaction term between partisan elections and African American population. Unlike the previous model, the partisan elections variable reaches statistical significance. It demonstrates that contrary to previous expectations, partisan elections reduce the amount of African American council members. However, the interaction term is statistically significant and positive. It demonstrates that partisan elections that occur in cities with large African American populations are more likely to result in the election of African American council members. The African American population variable

demonstrates that the amount of council members who are African American increases in cities with larger African American populations. More African American council members are found in cities with large populations. Fewer African American council members on city councils are found in council-manager plan cities as well as southern cities.

Model 3 contains many unexpected results. In contrast to my expectation, the concurrent elections demonstrate that fewer African American candidates will successfully win council seats during concurrent elections. Among the control variables, fewer African American council members are elected in cities with a larger African American population, while more council members will be African American in council-manager cities. Competitiveness continues to reduce the amount of city council members who are African American. The use of term limits will increase the amount of African Americans on city councils. Smaller city councils will have more African American council members. As expected, more council members will be African American in larger cities. However, the last unexpected result is that more council members are African American in southern cities.

Model 4: The independent variables of interest are the concurrent elections variable and the interaction term. Although the concurrent elections variable continues to demonstrate that concurrent elections will result in fewer African American council members, the variable does not reach statistical significance. However, the interaction term demonstrates that a higher amount of African American council members will occur as a result of concurrent elections in cities with a large African American population. Cities with large African American populations will have council members that are

comprised of a higher amount of African Americans. Council-manage plans continue to reduce the amount of African Americans on city councils. Larger city councils are shown to have more African American council members. City councils will consist of more African American council members in larger cities. Southern cities continue to have fewer African Americans on the city councils.

In sum, my analyses find mixed support for my expectations. I find support for the expectation that at-large elections reduce the amount of African American council members in African American-minority cities. I do not find support for previous conclusions that this affect is mitigated in African American majority cities. Although there is some evidence that partisan elections would increase the amount of African American council members, the variable does not reach statistical significance, preventing me from confirming my expectation. The interaction term demonstrated support for my fourth hypothesis which posited that partisan elections would help increase the amount of African American council members in cities with larger African American population. Unexpectedly, I do not find support for my fifth hypothesis which tested previous expectations that concurrent elections increased the election of African American council members to city councils. I also do not find support for the sixth hypothesis which posited that concurrent elections would continue to increase Latino candidate election to city councils in cities with larger Latino populations.

Conclusions

The purpose of this chapter was to examine previous conclusions regarding the impact of electoral structures upon Latino and African American representation on city

councils. I find support for my expectation that at-large elections reduced Latino and African American council membership in cities where neither group was the majority. However, I only found support that the impact of at-large was mitigated in Latino majority cities, thus confirming Leal et al (2004). However, I do not find support for Welch's (1990) expectation that the effect of at-large elections upon African American council representation is mitigated in African American majority cities. The partisan elections variables did not reach statistical significance in either analysis, thus I cannot confirm Banfield and Wilsons' (1967) expectation that minority candidates gain favorable outcomes during partisan elections. I find limited support for my expectation that minority candidates would gain favorable outcomes through partisan elections in African American majority cities, but not Latino majority cities. Although I find support for the expectation that concurrent elections increase Latino representation, the opposite effect was noted in the African American models. My sixth hypothesis was not confirmed in either analysis. Overall, I find some support that electoral structures continue to affect minority representation on city councils.

Figure 5.1: Explaining the Impact of Electoral Structures upon Latino and African American Membership on City Councils



Table 5.1: Variables and Sources for the Latino and African American City Council Membership Models

Variables	**Source**
Dependent variable	
% of city council members who are Latino / % of city council members who are African American	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)
Independent variables	
% of seats elected at-large (Latino minority / African American minority cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)
% of seats elected at-large (Latino minority / African American minority cities*Latino / African American population cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
% of seats elected at-large (Latino majority / African American majority cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)
% of seats elected at-large (Latino majority / African American majority cities*Latino / African American population cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
Use of partisan elections	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)
Partisan elections * Latino population	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
Number of concurrent elections	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)
Concurrent elections * Latino population	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and Census (1990 and 2000)
Control Variables	
Size of the Latino population (percent Latino of total population in cities)	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)

Table 5.1: Continued

Percent of incumbents who sought and won reelections to the city council in the previous election	ICMA (1996, 2001, 2006)
Population size of cities	U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)
# of council members	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)
Whether or not term limits are used	ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006)

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Table 5.2: Summary Statistics for Latino Council Membership Model

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
% Latino members	11801	.026	.113	0	1
% at-large	10817	.725	.403	0	3.333
Interaction*	10795	.058	.123	0	.983
Partisan elections	11462	.221	.415	0	1
Interaction**	11440	.010	.049	0	.981
Concurrent elections	12026	.168	.374	0	1
Interaction***	11717	.007	.043	0	.973
Latino pop.	11779	.074	.136	0	.989
Council-manager plan	11801	.536	.499	0	1
Competitiveness	10024	.863	.250	0	7
Term limits	12046	.091	.288	0	1
# council members	11607	6.240	1.950	2	50
Pop. size	11801	22239.1	75501.06	23	3694820
South	11801	.290	.454	0	1
y2001	11801	.360	.480	0	1
2006	11801	.285	.451	0	1

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Interaction*: % of seats elected at-large*Latino population

Interaction**: partisan elections*Latino population

Interaction***: concurrent elections*Latino population

Table 5.3: Summary Statistics for African American Council Membership Model

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
% Black members	11801	.052	.135	0	1
% at-large	10817	.725	.403	0	3.333
Interaction*	10795	.045	.102	0	1.143
Partisan elections	11462	.221	.415	0	1
Interaction**	11440	.019	.081	0	.989
Concurrent elections	12026	.168	.374	0	1
Interaction***	11717	.023	.092	0	.986
Black pop.	11779	.078	.144	0	.989
Council-manager plan	11801	.536	.499	0	1
Competitiveness	10024	.863	.250	0	7
Term limits	12046	.091	.288	0	1
# council members	11607	6.240	1.950	2	50
Pop. size	11801	22239.1	75501.06	23	3694820
South	11801	.290	.454	0	1
y2001	11801	.360	.480	0	1
2006	11801	.285	.451	0	1

Note: ICMA (1996, 2001, and 2006) and U.S. Census (1990 and 2000)

Interaction *: % of seats elected at-large*African American population

Interaction**: partisan elections*African American population

Interaction***: concurrent elections*African American population

Table 5.4 : Impact of At-Large Elections upon Latino City Council Membership

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
% elected at-large	-0.005**	0.000	0.079	-0.632**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.055)	(0.227)
% of seats elected at-large*Latino population		-0.092**		1.065**
		(0.017)		(0.330)
Latino population	0.319**	0.386**	1.026**	0.265
	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.144)	(0.275)
Council-manager plan	0.001	0.002	-0.052	-0.058
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Competitiveness	-0.002	-0.002	-0.176**	-0.161**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.072)	(0.071)
Term limits	0.002	0.002	0.066	0.072
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.063)	(0.061)
# of members on city councils	-0.001	-0.001	-0.031	-0.029
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Population size	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
South	-0.006**	-0.007**	0.014	0.005
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.039)	(0.038)
y2001	-0.010**	-0.009**	-0.050	-0.058
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.052)	(0.051)
y2006	-0.007**	-0.006**	-0.056	-0.067
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.053)	(0.053)
Constant	0.010**	0.007*	0.094	0.581**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.176)	(0.229)
Number of observations	8937	8937	255	255
R2	0.199	0.201	0.255	0.286

Note: ICMA FOG Survey 1996, 2001, and 2006 and U.S. Census: 1990 and 2000. Ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

Model 1: % of seats elected at-large in minority-Latino cities

Model 2: % of seats elected at-large*Latino population (minority-Latino cities)

Model 3: % of seats elected at-large (majority-Latino cities)

Model 4: % of seats elected at-large*Latino population (majority-Latino cities)

Table 5.5 : Impact of Partisan and Concurrent Elections upon Latino City Council Membership

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
Partisan elections	0.003	0.003		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Partisan elections*Latino population		-0.019		
		(0.020)		
Concurrent elections			0.006**	0.006**
			(0.002)	(0.002)
Concurrent elections*Latino population				-0.009
				(0.021)
Latino population	0.589**	0.592**	0.591**	0.592**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Council-manager plan	-0.006**	-0.006**	-0.005**	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Competitiveness	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.008**
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Term limits	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
# of members on city councils	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Population size	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
South	-0.004**	-0.004**	-0.005**	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
y2001	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.014**	-0.013**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
y2006	-0.011**	-0.011**	-0.011**	-0.011**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Number of observations	9732	9732	9852	9852
R2	0.484	0.484	0.488	0.488

Note: ICMA FOG Survey 1996, 2001, and 2006 and U.S. Census: 1990 and 2000. Ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

Table 5.6 : Impact of At-Large Elections upon African American City Council Membership

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
% of seats elected at-large	-0.017** (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.081** (0.035)	0.116 (0.173)
% seats elected at-large*Black population		-0.243** (0.016)		-0.305 (0.262)
African American population	0.678** (0.008)	0.817** (0.013)	1.043** (0.117)	1.218** (0.191)
Council-manager plan	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.049 (0.030)	-0.054* (0.030)
Competitiveness	-0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	-0.038 (0.058)	-0.044 (0.059)
Term limits	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.030 (0.077)	-0.033 (0.077)
# of members on city councils	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.013 (0.011)	0.012 (0.011)
Population size	0.000** (0.000)	0.000** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000* (0.000)
South	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.073** (0.036)	-0.074** (0.036)
y2001	-0.003** (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	0.012 (0.035)	0.015 (0.035)
y2006	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.040 (0.038)	0.042 (0.038)
Constant	0.012** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.131 (0.136)	-0.232 (0.162)
Number of observations	8908	8908	281	281
R2	0.523	0.535	0.310	0.314

Note: ICMA FOG Survey 1996, 2001, and 2006 and U.S. Census: 1990 and 2000. Ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

Table 5.7 : Impact of Partisan and Concurrent Elections upon African American City Council Membership

	Model 1 b/se	Model 2 b/se	Model 3 b/se	Model 4 b/se
Partisan elections	0.001	-0.007**		
	(0.002)	(0.002)		
Partisan elections*Black population		0.101**		
		(0.013)		
Concurrent elections			-0.011**	-0.001
			(0.003)	(0.003)
Concurrent elections*Black population				0.051**
				(0.012)
Black population	0.777**	0.750**	-0.062**	0.754**
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Council-manager plan	-0.006**	-0.006**	0.012**	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Competitiveness	-0.002	-0.002	-0.017**	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)
Term limits	-0.003	-0.004	0.015**	-0.004
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
# of members on city councils	0.001*	0.001*	-0.004**	0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Population size	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
South	-0.007**	-0.006**	0.013**	-0.007**
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
y2001	-0.004**	-0.004**	0.004	-0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
y2006	0.001	0.001	0.010**	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)
Constant	-0.006	-0.004	0.052**	-0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)
Number of observations	9732	9732	9852	9852
R2	0.668	0.670	0.027	0.664

Note: ICMA FOG Survey 1996, 2001, and 2006 and U.S. Census: 1990 and 2000. Ordinary least squares regression. Standard errors in parentheses. p < **.05 *.10.

CHAPTER VI: BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER

Introduction

The purpose of the analyses is to present a comprehensive examination of how race continues to matter for electoral structures in U.S. cities. My analyses are divided into two parts. The first part examines how racial diversity affects attempted electoral structure reform. The second portion examines how electoral structures affect minority candidate emergence and success in city council elections. This comprehensive project is beneficial because it demonstrates how race affects the origins of electoral structure reforms, and then proceeds to demonstrate how electoral structures affect the likelihood that minority candidates will participate in city council elections and will actually win city council seats. My project presents an original examination of electoral structure reform and reexamines established arguments related to the impact of electoral structures upon minority candidate emergence and success at the local level.

My theoretical argument builds upon the racial threat hypothesis which argues that the presence of minority groups in an area causes whites to fear that their access to power and resources will be threatened. In the context of electoral structure reform, I speculate that the racial threat hypothesis would posit that whites would attempt to alter the existing electoral structures in areas where the African American or Latino population was of a significant size or larger. However, this argument is problematic because it assumes that whites in all types of cities are equally threatened by the presence of minority groups. In contrast, I argue that the fear of threat to power, or access to city council seats, and racial diversity vary in a nonlinear fashion. I apply a modified version of the division of racial diversity created by Hero and Tolbert (1996), Tolbert and Hero

(1996), and Hero (1998). I argue that attempted modifications are likely to occur among whites in predominantly white, significant minority cities and among minorities in predominantly minority, significant white cities. Although my theory primarily focuses on the impact of racial diversity upon attempted electoral structure reform, I provide some theoretical expectations regarding the second and third portions of my analyses: how electoral structures affect Latino candidate emergence and the success of Latinos and African Americans in city council elections.

Summary of Results

I divided my analyses into three empirical chapters. In chapter 3, I focused on how racial diversity, measured as the size of African American and Latino populations, caused white political elites to attempt to modify existing electoral structures. Chapter 4 examined how electoral structures, specifically at-large elections, partisan elections, and concurrent elections affected the presence of Latino candidates in city council elections in California. Chapter 5 examined how these forms of elections affected the amount of Latinos and African Americans on city councils.

Electoral Structure Reform

This chapter presents two different analyses; the first examines racial attitudes toward electoral structure reform at the individual level and the second examines attempted modifications at the aggregate level. The individual attitudes model evaluated how African American diversity affected respondents' desire for the existing electoral structures to be changed. The dependent variable was a dichotomous variable based on a

question which asked respondents if the existing election that is used should be changed. This portion of the analysis used data from the spring 2011 Hawkeye Poll. I found support for my expectation that whites living in predominantely white, significant African American cities were more likely to express that the existing electoral structures should be modified. Similar results were found among African American respondents living in predominantly African American, significant white cities.

For the aggregate portion of my analysis, I examined attempted modifications to electoral structures, which was a dichotomous variable. I found evidence that attempted modifications occurred among whites in predominantly white, significant African American cities, as well as among African Americans living in predominantly African American, significant white cities. Although I find some evidence that attempted reforms occurred among whites in predominantly white, significant Latino cities, I also find that this proposed relationship was affected by noncitizenship. The interactions between the Latino diversity and proportion of the Latino population that is noncitizen demonstrated that noncitizenship changed the nonlinear variation that I found for African American diversity and electoral structure reform.

Latino Candidate Emergence in City Council Elections

In this chapter, I examine several expectations regarding how electoral structures affect the presence of Latino candidates in city council elections in California. I posited that at-large and partisan elections would reduce the likelihood that Latino candidates would compete in city council elections. I also posited that concurrent elections would increase this likelihood. I evaluated if at-large and partisan elections would negatively

affect Latino candidate emergence in cities where Latinos are less the majority or majority of the total population. Concurrent elections were proposed to increase the likelihood of Latino candidates regardless of the size of the Latino population. I used data from the LEAP dataset and ICMA to complete my analysis. I found no support for my expectations. However, the partisan elections variable and the interaction with the Latino population were positive which demonstrated some evidence that partisan elections increase the likelihood that Latino candidates will compete in city council elections. There is also some evidence that contrary to my expectations, concurrent elections would reduce the likelihood that Latino candidates would compete. This finding holds when concurrent elections are interacted with Latino population.

Latino and African American City Council Membership

This chapter examines how electoral structures affect Latino and African American success, measured as council find membership. I tested previous conclusions including the expectation that at-large elections and partisan elections reduced Latino and African American council membership, while concurrent elections were expected to increase membership for both groups. I find support for the expectation that at-large elections reduce Latino and African American council membership in both minority-Latino and minority-African American cities. These results remained when at-large elections was interacted with Latino and African American populations in cities where either group was the minority of the total population. I found support for expectations that at-large elections do not negatively affect Latino representation in cities where the Latino population reaches the majority of the total population. Although there is some

evidence that partisan elections increase Latino membership, the variable did not reach statistical significance. I found evidence that concurrent elections increase Latino council membership. I find evidence that at-large elections continue to reduce African American representation, even in cities where the African American population is the majority of the total population. In accordance with my expectations, I found that partisan elections, when interacted with the African American population increases African American council membership. I also unexpectedly find that concurrent elections reduce African American council membership. However, the opposite is found when it is interacted with African American population.

Implications

There are several implications from the results. First, the presence of African American and Latino populations in cities will continue to elicit a sense of threat among some whites. Thus, even if attempted electoral reforms may vary over the years, these white elites will continue to view it as a plausible method for protecting their interests and access to political power. Second, regarding African American and Latino representation on city councils, minority candidates will continue to be negatively affected by the use of certain electoral structures in city council elections. Maybe Latino and African American candidates can overcome the negative effects of electoral structures (regardless of the size of their groups' population) through deracialization. Ardrey and Nelson (1990) and Gonzalez-Juenke and Sampaio (2010) describe city council and state legislative candidates who chose not to emphasize issues based on their racial importance gained support from both white and minority voters. It is possible to

argue that this method could appeal to both white and minority voters by emphasizing issues that would benefit all voters, and not just specific groups.

Third, African American candidates may continue to be challenged by certain electoral structures, regardless of the population size of their group in a city. Contrary to Welch (1990) findings, evidence from the candidate success chapter demonstrated that African American city council candidates may continue to be challenged by the negative effects of at-large elections even in African American majority cities. Therefore, the majority status of the African American population may not help African American candidates overcome at-large elections. Also, contrary to Allen and Plank (2005) and Hajnal and Trounstine (2005 and 2010), concurrent elections seem to reduce, not increase, African American representation on city councils. Fourth, I find evidence that Latino candidates tend to be more successful in at-large elections if they occur in Latino-majority cities and they also tend to be more successful in concurrent elections. The concurrent elections result is interesting because Hajnal and Trounstine (2005 and 2010) expected concurrent elections to matter less for Latino representation, and more for African Americans. However, I find evidence that Latino representation on city councils increases due to concurrent elections. In sum, I found evidence that supported and contradicted previous expectations held by scholars in the literature.

Overall, as African American and Latino candidates continue to encounter challenges related to decisions to compete, strategies to use in their campaigns and other frustrations, they must also figure out how to overcome the potential outcomes determined by the types of elections that are used.

Future Research

The analyses presented in this project can be improved by expanding my examinations, using different data sources and other options. My discussion occurs in the context of each empirical chapter.

Electoral Structure Reform

My empirical analysis in this chapter examines whether or not attempted electoral structure reform occurred. I would expand my analysis by examining the impact of racial diversity upon the type of reform that was attempted. For example, scholars have found evidence that at-large elections reduce the likelihood that African Americans and Latinos will win city council elections (Jones 1976, Latimer 1979; Meier et al 2005). Therefore, I could test the expectation that racial diversity would cause white politicians to attempt change the existing ward-based elections to at-large elections, and vice versa, using the ICMA data. Disaggregating the data by each of the ICMA years would allow me to evaluate how the attempted modifications varied across the years.

For my analysis of racial attitudes at the individual level, I would consider placing the electoral structures questions that were featured on the Hawkeye Poll, onto larger sample public opinion surveys such as the Comparative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) or Cooperative Congressional Election Survey (CCES). Using either of these surveys would be beneficial because I would gain a much larger sample of respondents compared to the Hawkeye Poll. I would also be able to assess whether or not my results from the Hawkeye Poll would remain.

Latino Candidate Emergence

I can strengthen my analysis by controlling for district demographics including the constituents' ages, levels of education, income, forms of occupation and gender. In an examination of city council candidates in the San Francisco Bay area, Prewitt and Eulau (1971) find that candidates were recruited from pools of people who were well-educated, had high income levels and were already politically and civically involved at the local level. In their study of state legislature and city council candidates, Feld and Lutz (1972) find evidence that younger candidates were more ambitious than older city council candidates. Younger candidates were more likely to run for state legislative seats, while older, more established candidates choose to compete for city council seats. The authors also find evidence that legislative candidates typically were more educated and held higher status occupations. City council candidates were more likely to hold less lucrative and less prestigious occupations. They also were less educated compared to state legislature candidates.

Latino and African American Council Membership

I could expand my analysis of Latino and African American council membership by including other states. It would be interesting to compare my results to Latino candidate emergence in other states. My analysis would also benefit from evaluating how electoral structures affect African American candidate emergence in city council races.

REFERENCES

U.S. Census Bureau: State and County QuickFacts. Data derived from Population Estimates, American Community Survey, Census of Population and Housing, State and County Housing Unit Estimates, County Business Patterns, Nonemployer Statistics, Economic Census, Survey of Business Owners, Building Permits

1974. *The Progressive Era*, edited by Louis L. Gould. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Abney, F. Glenn., and John D. Hutcheson Jr. 1981. "Race, Representation and Trust: Changes in Attitudes after the Election of a Black Mayor." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*. 45:91-101.

Adams, Greg D., and Peverill Squire. 1997. "Incumbent Vulnerability and Challenger Emergence in Senate Elections." *Political Behavior.* 19:97-111.

Adrian, Charles R. 1952. "Some General Characteristics of Non-Partisan Elections." *American Political Science Review*. 46:766-776.

Affigne, Tony. 2000. "Latino Politics in the United States." *PS: Political Science and Politics.* 33:520-527.

Allen, Ann., and David N. Plank. 2005. "School Board Election Structure and Democratic Representation." *Educational Policy*. 19:510-527.

Allport, Gordon. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Beacon Press.

Ardrey, Saundra C., and William E. Nelson. 1990. "The Maturation of Black Political Power: The Case of Cleveland." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 23:148-151.

Arviszu, John R., and F. Chris Garcia. 1996. "Latino Voting Participation: Explaining and Differentiating Latino Voting Turnout." *Latino Journal of Behavioral Sciences.* 18: 104-128.

Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2004. "Minority Representation, Empowerment, and Participation." *The Journal of Politics.* 66:534-556.

Banfield, Edward., and James Q. Wilson. 1967. *City Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Barreto, Matt A. 2007. "Si Se Puede! Latino Candidates and the Mobilization of Latino Votes." *American Political Science Review*. 101:425-441.

Barreto, Matt A., Gary M. Segura, and Nathan D. Woods. 2004: "The Mobilizing Effect

of Majority-Minority Districts on Latino Turnout*." The American Political Science Review*. 98:65-75.

Bernstein, Robert A. 1986. "Why are there so few Women in the House?" *The Western Political Quarterly*. 39:155-164.

Blalock, Hubert. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-group Relations*. New York: Wiley.

Black, Gordon S. 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." *The American Political Science Review*. 66:144-159.

Bledsoe, Timothy., Susan Welch, Lee Sigelman, and Michael Combs. 1995. "Residential Context and Racial Solidarity among African Americans." *American Journal of Political Science.* 39:434-458.

Bobo, Lawrence., and Franklin D. Gilliam Jr. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical, Participation, and Black Empowerment." *American Political Science Review*. 84:377-393.

Boehmke, Frederick., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 2011. "University of Iowa Hawkeye Poll".

Bond, Jon R., Richard Fleisher, and Jeffrey C. Talbert. 1997. "Partisan Differences in Candidate Quality in Open Seat House Races, 1976-1994." *Political Research Quarterly*. 50:281-299.

Bond, Jon R., Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher. 1985. "Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections." *The Journal of Politics.* 47:510-529.

Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M. 1996. "A Dynamic Analysis of the Role of War Chests in Campaign Strategy." *American Journal of Political Science.* 40:352-371.

Brace, Paul. 1984. "Progressive Ambition in the House: A Probabilistic Approach." *The Journal of Politics.* 46:556-571.

Branton, Regina P. 2008. "The Importance of Race and Ethnicity in Congressional Primary Elections." *Political Research Quarterly*. 62:459-471.

Branton, Regina P., and Bradford S. Jones. 2005. "Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship between Diversity and Socioeconomic Environment." *American Journal of Political Science.* 49:359-372.

Bratton, Kathleen A., and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." *The Journal of Politics*. 61: 658-679.

Bratton, Kathleen. A. 2006. "The Behavior and Success of Latino Legislators: Evidence from the States." *Social Science Quarterly*. 87:136-157.

Bridges, Amy B. 1982. "Another Look at Plutocracy and Politics in Antebellum New York City." *Political Science Quarterly*. 97:57-71.

Bridge Amy B. 1984. *A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bridges, Amy B. 1997. *Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bridges, Amy B. 1997. "Textbook Municipal Reform." *Urban Affairs Review.* 33:97-119.

Bridges, Amy B., and Richard Kronick. 1999. "Writing the Rules of the Game." *Urban Affairs Review.* 34:691-706.

Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall and David H. Tabb. 1990. *Racial Politics in American Cities*. White Plains: Longman.

Buenker, John D. 1973. *Urban Liberalism and Progressive Reform*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Buenker, John D., John C. Burnham, and Robert M. Crunden. 1977. *Progressivism.* Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Company, Inc.

Burnham, Robert A. 1997. "Reform, Politics, and Race in Cincinnati: Proportional Representation and the City Charter Committee, 1924-1959." *Journal of Urban History.* 23:131-163.

Canon, David T. 1990. *Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Canon, David T. 1993. "Sacrificial Lambs or Strategic Politicians? Political Amateurs in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science.* 37:1119-1141.

Canon, David T., and David J. Sousa. 1992. "Party System Change and Political Career Structures in the U.S. Congress." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 17:347-363.

Canon, David T. 1999. *Race, Redistricting, and Representation: The Unintended Consequences of Black Majority Districts*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Carroll, Susan. 1994. *Women as Candidates in American Politics [Second Edition]*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Carson, Jamie L. 2005. "Strategy, Selection, and Candidate Competition in U.S. House and Senate Elections." *The Journal of Politics.* 67:1-29.

Casellas, Jason P. 2002. “Latino Representation in the U.S. Congress: To What Extent Are Latinos Substantively Represented?” Presented at the 2002 Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Savannah, Georgia, November 6-9, 2002.

Casellas, Jason P. 2007. “The Election of Latinos to the California Legislature Pre- and Post-2000 Redistricting.” *California Politics & Policy*. 11:21-38.

Casellas, Jason P. 2009. “The Institutional and Demographic Determinants of Latino Representation.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 34:399-326.

Casellas, Jason P. 2009. “Coalitions in the House? The Election of Minorities to State Legislatures and Congress.” *Political Research Quarterly*. 62:120-131.

Cassel, Carol A. 1985. “Social Background Characteristics of Nonpartisan City Council Members: A Research note.” *Western Political Quarterly*. 38:495-501.
Chambers, Stephanie. 2002. “Urban Education Reform and Minority Political Empowerment.” *Political Science Quarterly*. 117:643-665.

Cole, Leonard A. 1974. “Electing Blacks to Municipal Office: Structural and Social Determinants.” *Urban Affairs Quarterly*. 10:17-39.

Cutright, Phillips. 1968. “Nonpartisan Electoral Systems in American Cities.” *Comparative Studies in Society*. 212-226.

Davidson, Chandler., and George Korbel. 1981. “At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A Re-examination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence.” *Journal of Politics*. 43:982-1005.

Davidson, Chandler and Luis Ricardo Fraga. 1988. “Slating Groups vs. Parties in a Non Partisan setting.” *The Western Political Quarterly*. 41:373-390.

Dovi, Suzanne. 2002. “Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black or Latino Do?” *American Political Science Review* 96:729-743.

Dye, Thomas R., and Susan A. MacManus. 1976. “Predicting City Government Structure.’ *American Journal of Political Science.* 20:257-279.

Dye, Tomas R., and James Renick. 1981. “Political Power and City Jobs: Determinants of Minority Employment.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 62:475-486.

Eisinger, Peter K. 1982. “Black Employment in Municipal Jobs: The Impact of Black Political Power.” *American Political Science Review*. 76:330-392.
Engstrom, Richard., and Michael D. McDonald. 1981. “The Election of Blacks to City Councils: Clarifying the Impact of Electoral Arrangements in the Seats / Population Relationship.” *American Political Science Review.* 75:344-354.

Engstrom, Richard., and Michael McDonald. 1982. “The Effect of At-Large Versus District Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities.” In *Electoral Laws and their Political Consequence,* edited by Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphard. New York: Agathon Press.

Feld, Richard D., and Donald S. Lutz. 1972. “Recruitment to the City Council.” *The Journal of Politics.* 34:924-933.

Francis, Wayne L. 1993. “House to Senate Center Movement in the U.S. States: The Significance of Selectivity.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 18:309-320.

Filene, Peter G. 1970. “An Obituary for the Progressive Movement.” *American Quarterly*. 22:20-34.

Frederickson, H. George., Gary Johnson and Curtis H. Wood. 2003. *Adopted City: Institutional Dynamics and Structural Change.* Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Gay, Claudine. 2001. “The Effect of Black Congressional Representation on Political Participation.” *The American Political Science Review.* 95:589-602.

Gay, Claudine. 2002. “Spirals of Trust: The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship between Citizens and Their Government.” *American Journal of Political Science.* 46:717-732.

Giles, Michael W. 1977. “Percent Black and Racial Hostility: An Old Assumption Reexamined.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 58:412-417.

Giles, Michael W., and Arthur S. Evans. 1985.”External Threat, Perceived Threat, and Group Identity.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 66:50-66.

Giles, Michael W., and Melanie Buckner. 1991. “David Duke and Black Threat: An Old Hypothesis Revisited.” *Journal of Politics.* 55:702-713.

Gilliam, Frank D. Jr. 1996. “Exploring Minority Government: Symbolic Politics, Governing Coalitions and Traces on Political Style in Los Angeles.” *Journal of Political Science*. 40:56-81.

Goodliffe, Jay. 2001. “The Effect of War Chests on Challenger Entry in U.S. House Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science.* 45:830-844.

Gordon, Daniel L. 1968. “Immigrants and Urban Governmental Form in American cities, 1933-1960.” *American Journal of Sociology*. 158-171.

Hadley, Charles D. 1996. “Blacks in Southern Politics: An Agenda for Research.” *The Journal of Politics*. 56:585-600.

Hajnal, Zoltan., and Paul G. Lewis. 2003. "Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in Local Elections." *Urban Affairs Review*. 38:645-668.

Hajnal, Zoltan., and Jessica Trounstine. 2005. "Where Turnout Matters: The Consequences of Uneven Turnout in City Politics." *Journal of Politics*. 67:515-535.

Hajnal, Zoltan., and Jessica Trounstine. 2010. "Transforming Votes into Victories: Turnout, Institutional Context, and Descriptive representation in Local Politics."

Hall-Saltzenstein, Grace. 1989. "Black Mayors and Police Policies." *Journal of Politics*. 51:525-544.

Hayes, Kathy., and Semoon Chang. 1990. "The Relative Efficiency of a City-Manager and Mayor-Council Forms of Government." *Southern Economic Journal*. 57:167-177.

Haynie, Kerry L. 2001. *African American Legislators in the American States.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Hays, Samuel P. 1964. "The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive Era*." Pacific Northwest Quarterly*. 55:157-169.

Herrnson, Paul S. 1986. "Do Parties Make a Difference? The Role of Party Organizations in Congressional Elections." *The Journal of Politics.* 48:589-615.

Hero, Rodney. 1987. "The Election of Latinos in City Government: An Examination of the Election of Federico Pena as Mayor of Denver." *Political Research Quarterly*. 40:93-105.
Hero, Rodney E. 1998. *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1995. "Latinos and Substantive Representation in the U.S. House of Representatives: Direct, Indirect, or Nonexistent." *American Journal of Political Science*. 39:640-652.

Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 1996. "A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the U.S." *American Journal of Politics Science*. 40: 851-871.

Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 2004. "Minority Voices and Citizen Attitudes about Government Responsiveness in the American States: Do Social and Institutional Context Matter?". *British Journal of Political Science*. 34:109-121.

Hero, Rodney E., and Caroline J. Tolbert. 2005. "Exploring Minority Political Efficacy: Considering the Impact of Social and Institutional Context." In *Diversity in Democracy: Minority Representation in the United States.*, edited by Gary M. Segura and Shaun Bowler. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Hero, Rodney E., F. Chris Garcia, John Garcia and Harry Pachon. 2000. "Latino Participation, Partisanship, and Office Holding." *PS: Political Science and Politics*. 33: 529-534.

Hetherington, Marc J., Bruce Larson, and Suzanne Globetti. 2003. "The Redistricting Cycle and Strategic Candidate Decisions in U.S. House Elections." *The Journal of Politics.* 65:1221-1234.

Hill, Kim Quaile., and Jan E. Leighley. 1999. "Racial Diversity, Voter Turnout, and Mobilizing Institutions in the United States." *American Politics Research*. 27:275-295.

Hindera, John J. 1993a. ''Representative Bureaucracy: Imprimis Evidence of Active Representation in the EEOC District Offices.'' *Social Science Quarterly.* 74:95-108.

———. 1993b. ''Representative Bureaucracy: Further Evidence of Active Representation in the EEOC District Offices.'' *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.* 3:415–29.

Hood, M.V. III., and Irwin L. Morris. 1997. "Amigo o Enemigo?: Context, Attitudes, and Anglo Public Opinion Toward Immigration." *Social Science Quarterly*. 78:309-323.

Hood, M.V. III., and Irwin L. Morris. 1998. "Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor…But Make Sure They Have A Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion Toward Immigration." *Political Behavior.* 20:1-15.

Hood, M.V. III., and Irwin L. Morris, and Kurt A. Shirkey. 1997. "Quedate o Vente!: Uncovering the Determinants of Latino Public Opinion toward Immigration." *Political Research Quarterly*. 50:627-647.

Holli, Melvin G. 1974. "Urban Reform in the Progressive Era." In. *The Progressive Era,* edited by Lewis L. Gould. 133-151. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Hutchins, Marvin., and Lee Sigelman. 1989. "Black Employment in State and Local Governments." *Social Science Quarterly.* 62:79-87.

Jacobson, Gary C., and Samuel Kernell. 1983. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1980. *Money in Congressional Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-1986." *The American Political Science Review*. 83:773-793.

Jaramillo, Patricia A. 2008. "Understanding Nuances of Latina Candidate Emergence: A Study of Latinos in San Antonio." *Research Report No. 40*. 1-12.

Jones, Clinton B. 1976. “The Impact of Local Election Systems on Black Political Representation." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*. 11:345-356.

Jones-Correa, Michael. 1998. *Between Two Nations: The Political Predicament of Latinos in New York City*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Juenke, Eric Gonzalez., and Anna Christina Sampaio. 2010. “Deracialization and Latino Politics: The Case of the Salazar Brothers in Colorado.” *Political Research Quarterly*. 63:43-54.

Karnig, Albert K. 1976. “Black Representation on City Councils: The Impact of District elections and Socioeconomic Factors. *Urban Affairs Quarterly.* 12:223-256.

Karnig, Albert K., and Susan Welch. 1978. “Electoral Structure and Black Representation on City Councils: An Updated Examination.” Presented at the annual convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.

Karnig, Albert. 1979. “Black Resources and City Council Representation.” *Journal of Politics*. 41:134-149.

Karnig, Albert K. 1979. Sex and Ethnic Differences in Municipal Representation.” *Social Science Quarterly.* 60:465-481.

Karnig, Albert K., and Susan Welch. 1980. *Black Representation and Urban Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Karnig, Albert K., and Susan Welch. 1982. “Electoral Structure and Black Representation on City councils.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 63:99-114.
Kaufmann, Karen M. 2004. *The Urban Voter*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan.

Kaufmann, Karen M. 2007. “Immigration and the Future of Black Power in U.S. Cities.” *Du Bois Review: Social Science and Research on Race*. 4:79-96.

Kazee, Thomas., and Mary Thornberry. 1990. “Where’s the Party? Congressional Candidate Recruitment and American Party Organizations.” *The Western Political Science Quarterly*. 43:61-80.

Keller, Edmond. 1978. ‘The Impact of Black Mayors on Urban Policy.”. *Annuals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* 439:40-52.

Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

King, Desmond S., and Rogers M. Smith. 2005. “Racial Orders in American Political Development.” *American Political Science Review*. 99:75-92.

Klevit, Alan. 1972. “City Councils and their Functions in Local government.” In *The Municipal Yearbook*. Washington: International City-managers Association.

Knoke, David. 1982. “The Spread of Municipal Reform: Temporal, Spatial and Social Dynamics.” *American Journal of Sociology*. 67:1314-1339.

Knoll, Benjamin R. 2009. “¿Amigo de la Raza? Reexamining Determinants of Latino Support in the U.S. Congress.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 90:179-195.

Kramer, John. 1971. “The Election of Blacks to City Councils: A 1970 Statistical Report and a Prolegomenon.” *Journal of Black Studies*. 1:443-476.

Krebs, Timothy B. 1998. “The Determinants of Candidates’ Vote Share and the Advantages of Incumbency in City Council Elections.” *American Journal of Political Science.* 42:921-935.

Krebs, Timothy B. 1999. “The Political and Demographic Predictors of Candidate Emergence in City Councils and Elections.” *Urban Affairs Review.* 35:279-300.

Latimer, Margaret K. 1979. “Black Political Representation in Southern Cities: Election Systems and Other Causal Variables.” *Urban Affairs Quarterly.* 15:65-86.

La Raja, Raymond L. 2007. “Candidate Emergence in State Legislature Elections: Does Public Funding Make a Difference?” Paper presented for delivery at the Temple-IPA State Politics and Policy Conference, Philadelphia, PA. May 30-31, 2008.

Lawless, Jennifer., and Richard Fox. 2010. *It Still Takes a Candidate Why Women Don’t Run for Office*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Leal, David L., Valerie Martinez-Ebers and Kenneth J. Meier. 2004. “The Politics of Latino Education: The Biases of At-large Elections.” *Journal of Politics.* 66:1224-1244.

Leighley, Jan. 2001. *Strength in Numbers?: The Political Mobilization of Racial and Ethnic Minorities*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lineberry, Robert., and Fowler, Edmond. 1967. “Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities.” *American Political Science Review.* 701-716.

Lublin, David. 1994. “Quality, Not Quantity: Strategic Politicians in U.S. Senate Elections, 1952-1990.” *The Journal of Politics.* 56:228-241.
Lublin, David. 1997. *The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and Minority Interests in Congress.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

MacManus, Susan A. 1978. “City Council Election Procedures and Minority Representation: Are They Related?” *Social Science Quarterly.* 59:133-161.

Maestas, Cherie D., Sarah Fulton, L. Sandy Maisel, and Walter J. Stone. 2006. "When to Risk It? Institutions, Ambitions, and the Decision to Run for the U.S. House." *The American Political Science Review*. 100:195-208.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes'." *Journal of Politics* 61:628-657.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Dietlind Stolle. 2004. "Race and the City: Neighborhood Context and the Development of Generalized Trust." *Political Behavior*. 26:125-153.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Dietlind Stolle. 2005. "Seeing or Living Diversity – Contact with Diverse Others and the Development of Generalized Trust." Presented at the Canadian Political Science Association Annual Meeting in London, Ontario, June, 2005.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Amirudh V.S. Ruhill. 2006. "The Pomp of Power: Black Mayoralties in Urban America." *Social Science Quarterly*. 87:828-850.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Amirudh V.S. Ruhill. 2007. "Substantive Symbols: the Attitudinal Dimension of black Political Incorporation in local Government." *American journal of Political Science*. 51:17-33.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Paru R. Shah. 2007. "The Attitudinal Effects of Minority Incorporation: Examining the Racial Dimensions of Trust in Urban America." *Urban Affairs Review*. 42:629-658.

Marschall, Melissa J., and Dietlind Stolle.and Paru R. Shah. 2010. "The New Racial Calculus: Electoral Institutions and Black Representation in Local Legislatures." *American Journal of Political Science*. 54:107-124.

McClain, Paula D. 1993. 'The Changing Dynamics of Urban Politics: Black and Latino Employment – is There competition?" *Journal of Politics.* 55:399-414.

McClain, Paula D., and Albert K. Karnig. 1990. "Black and Latino Socioeconomic and Political Competition." *The American Political Science Review*. 84:535-545.

Meier, Kenneth J. 1993. "Latinos and Representative Bureaucracy: Testing the Thomson and Henderson Hypothesis." *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. PART*. 3:393-414.

Meier, Kenneth J., and Robert E. England. 1984. "Black Representation and Educational Policy: Are They Related?" *American Political Science Review*. 78:38-49.

Meier, Kenneth J., and Joseph Stewart, Robert E. England. 1989. *Race, Class, and Education: the Politics of Second Generation Discrimination*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Meier, Kenneth J., and Joseph Stewart. 1991. *The Politics of Latino education*. New York: SUNY Press

Meier, Kenneth J., Robert D. Wrinkle, and J.L. Polinard. 1999. "Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity: Addressing the Hard Question." *The Journal of Politics.* 61:1025-1039.

Meier, Kenneth J., Paula D. McClain, J.L. Polinard, and Robert D. Wrinkle. 2004. "Divided or Together?: Conflict and Cooperation between African Americans and Latinos." *Political Research Quarterly*. 57:399-409.

Meier, Kenneth J., and Eric Gonzalez Juenke, and Robert D. Wrinkle, and J.T. Polinard. 2005. "Structural choices and Representation Biases: The Post-Election Color of Representation." *American Journal of Political Science.* 45:758-768.

Merritt, Sharyne. 1977. "Winners and Losers: Sex Differences in Municipal Elections." *American Journal of Political Science*. 21:731-743.

Mladenka, Kenneth d. 1989. "Blacks and Latinos in Urban Politics." *American Political Science Review*. 83:165-192.

Nelson, William Jr. E. 1982. "Cleveland: The Rise and Fall of the New Black Politics." In *The New Black Politics: The Search Political Power, edited by* Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr. and Paul Puryear. 135-155. New York: Longman.

Oliver, J Eric., and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. "Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science.* 44:574-589.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Janelle Wong. 2003. "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings." *Journal of Political Science.* 47:567-582.

Orfield, Gary., and Carole Ashkinaze. 1991. *The Closing door, Conservative Policy and Black Opportunity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago press.

Owens, Chris T. 2005. "Black Substantive Representation in State Legislatures from 1971-1994." *Social Science Quarterly*. 86:779-791.

Pantoja, Adrian D., and Gary M. Segura 2003. "Does Ethnicity Matter? Descriptive Representation in Legislatures and Political Alienation among Latinos." *Social Science Quarterly.* 84:441-460.

Perry, Huey L. 1983. "The Impact of Black Political Participation on Public Sector Employment and Representation on Municipal Boards and Commissions." *Review of Black Political Economy.* 12:203-17.

Pitkin, Hanna Penichel. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Polinard, J.L., Robert D. Wrinkle, and Thomas Longoria. 1990. "Education and Governance: Representational Links to Second Generation Discrimination*." Western Political Science Quarterly*. 43:631-646.

Polinard, J.L., Robert D. Wrinkle, and Thomas Longoria, and Norman Binder. 1994. *Electoral Structure and Urban Policy: The Impact on Mexican American Communities.* Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Powell, Richard J. 2000. "The Impact of Term Limits on the Candidacy Decisions of State Legislators in U.S. House Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 25:645-661.

Preston, Michael B. 1982. "Black Politics and Public Policy in Chicago: Self-interest Versus Constituent Representation." In *The New Black Politics: The Search Political Power,* edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr. and Paul Puryear. 45-70. New York: Longman.

Preuhs, Robert R. 2006. "The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation: Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States." *Journal of Politics.* 68:585-599.

Preuhs, Robert R. 2007. "Descriptive Representation as a Mechanism to Mitigate Policy Backlash: Latino Incorporation and Welfare Policy in the American States." *Political Research Quarterly.* 60:277-292.

Prewitt, Kenneth. 1970. "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability." *The American Political Science Review*. 64:5-17.

Prewitt, Kenneth., and Heinz Eulau. 1971. "Social Bias in Leadership Selection, Political Recruitment, and Electoral Context." *The Journal of Politics.* 33:293-315.

Prewitt, Kenneth., and William Nowlin. 1969. "Political Ambition and the Behavior of Incumbent Politicians." *The Western Political Science Quarterly*. 22:298-308.

Pritchard, Anita. 1992. "Strategic Considerations in the Decision to Challenge a State Legislative Incumbent." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 17:381-393.

Robinson, Theodore P., and Thomas R. Dye. 1978. "Reformism and Black Representation on City Councils." *Social Science Quarterly.* 59:133-141.

Robinson, Theodore P., and Robert E. England. 1981. "Black Representation on Central City School Boards Revisited." *Social Science Quarterly.* 62:495-502.

Rocha, Rene R. 2007. "Black-Brown Coalitions in Local School Board Elections." *Political Research Quarterly*. 60:315-327.

Rocha, Rene R., and Rudolfo Espino. 2009. "Racial Threat, Residential Segregation, and the Policy Attitudes of Anglos." *Political Research Quarterly*. 62:415-426.

Rocha, Rene R., and Daniel P. Hawes. 2009. "Racial Diversity, Representative Bureaucracy, and Equity in Multiracial School Districts." *Social Science Quarterly*. 90:326-344.

Rohde, David W. 1979. "Risk-bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science*. 23:1-26.

Schafer, Byron E., and Richard G. C. Johnston. 2006. *The End of Southern Exceptionalism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Schneider, Mark., Paul Teske, Melissa Marschall, Michael Mintrum, and Christine Roch. 1997. "Institutional Arrangements and the Creation of Social Capital: The Effects of Public School choice." *The American Political Science Review*. 91:82-93.

Schexnider, Alvin J. 1982. "Political Mobilization in the South: The Election of a Black Mayor in New Orleans." In *The New Black Politics: The Search Political Power,* edited by Michael B. Preston, Lenneal J. Henderson, Jr. and Paul Puryear. 20-45.New York: Longman.

Schlessinger, J.A. 1966. *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.* Chicago: Rand McNally.

Selden, Sally Coleman. 1997. *The Promise of Representative Bureaucracy: Diversity and Responsiveness in a Government Agency.* New York: M.E. Sharpe Press.

Selden, Sally Coleman., Jeffrey L. Brudney, and J. Edward Kellough. 1998. "Bureaucracy as a Representative Institution: Toward a Reconciliation of Bureaucratic Government and Democratic Theory." *American Journal of Political Science.* 42:717-744.

Seligman, Lester G. 1961. "Political Recruitment and Party Structure: A Case Study." *The American Political Science Review*. 55:77-86.

Sigelman, Lee., and Susan Welch. 1993. "The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Interaction and Positive Racial Attitudes." *Social Forces*. 71:781-795.

Sigelman, Lee., Timothy Bledsoe, Susan Welch, and Michael W. Combs. 1996. "Making Contact? Black-White Social Interaction in an Urban Setting." *American Journal of Sociology*. 101:1306-1332.

Sobanmatsu, Kira. 2002. "Political Parties and the Recruitment of Women to State Legislatures." *Journal of Politics.* 64:791-809.

Sonensheim, Raphael, Jr. 1993. *Politics in Black and White Race and Power in Los Angeles*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Spence, Lester K., Harwood K. McClerking, and Robert Brown. 2009. "Revisiting Black Incorporation and Local Political Participation." *Urban Affairs Review.* 45:274-285.

Squire, Peverill. 1988. "Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 13:65-82.

Stewart, Joseph Jr., Robert E. England and Kenneth J. Meier. 1989. "Black Representation in Urban School Districts: From School Board to Office to Classroom." *The Western Political Quarterly.* 42:287-305.

Stone, Clarence N. 1989. *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988.* Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.

Stone, Walter., and L. Sandy Maisel. 2003. "The Not so-simple Calculus of Winning: Potential U.S. House Candidates' Nominations and General Election Prospects." *Journal of Politics.* 65:951-977.

Stone, Walter., L. Sandy Maisel and Cherie D. Maestas. 2004. "Quality Counts: Extending the Strategic Politicians Model of Incumbent Deterrence." *American Journal of Political Science*. 48:479-495.

Swain, Carol M. 1995. *Black Faces, Black Interests: The Representation of African Americans in Congress.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Taebel, Delbert. 1978. "Descriptive representation on City Councils: The Impact of structure on Blacks and Latinos.*"* Social Science Quarterly. 59:142-152.

Tatalovich, Raymond. 1995. *Nativism Reborn?* Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Tolbert, Caroline J., and Rodney E. Hero. 1996. "Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California's Illegal Immigration Initiative." *The Journal of Politics.* 58:806-818.

Tolbert, Caroline J., and Rodney E. Hero. 2001. ''Dealing with Diversity: Racial/Ethnic Context and Social Policy Change.'' Political Research Quarterly 54:571–604.

Tolbert, Caroline J., and John A. Grummel. 2003. "Revisiting the Racial Threat Hypothesis: White Voter Support for California Proposition 209." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*. 3:183-202.

Trounstine, Jessica., and Melody E. Valdini. 2008. “The Context Matters: The Effects of Single-Member Versus At-Large Districts on City Council Diversity." *American Journal of Political Science.* 52:554-569.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2006. “Dominant Regimes and the Demise of Urban Democracy.´ *Journal of Politics*. 68:879-893.

Trounstine, Jessica. 2008. *Political Monopolies in American Cities: the Rise and Fall of Bosses and Reformers.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Vanderleeuw, James. M., and Baodong Liu. 2002. “Political Empowerment, Mobilization and Black Voter Roll-Off.” *Urban Affairs Review*. 37:380-396.

Welch, Susan. 1990. “The Impact of At-large Elections on the Representation of Blacks and Latinos.” *Journal of Politics*. 52:1050-1076.

Welch, Susan., and Timothy Bledsoe. 1986. “The Partisan Consequence of Nonpartisan Elections and Changing Nature of Urban Politics”. *American Journal of Political Science*. 30:128-139.

Welch, Susan., Lee Sigelman, Timothy Bledsoe, and Michael Combs. 2001. *Race & Place: Race Relations in an American City*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Welch, Susan., and John R. Hibbing. 1984. “Latino Representation in the U.S. Congress.” *Social Science Quarterly*. 65.328-335.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and John Osgood Field. 1966. “Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government.” *The American Political Science Review.* 60:306-326.