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The American Donor: an Exploration of the Modern Individual Donor

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THE AMERICAN DONOR: AN EXPLORATION OF
THE MODERN INDIVIDUAL DONOR

by

Amanda Marie Frost

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science in
the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

August 2013

Thesis Supervisors: Associate Professor Pete Hatemi
Professor Emeritus Michael Lewis-Beck

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CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

PH.D. THESIS

This is to certify that the PhD. thesis of

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ABSTRACT

Traditionally political donating behavior has been explained using socio-demographic and socialization-based models. The dramatic increase in the number of donors between 2000 and 2008 and the virtual elimination of structural barriers that limited donating to a select few suggest that this explanation is no longer adequate. What differentiates individuals who donate from those who do not? To answer this question I expand the traditional funnel of causality to develop a theoretical model that integrates biological, psychological, political behavior, and rational choice approaches. Using five samples, three nationally representative and two population-based surveys collected in 1990 and 2008, I investigate each level of the new funnel of causality using empirical models. I find that the best predictors of political donating are personality and attitudes, with a small role of context in the form of direct contact from parties. This new model explains more of the variance in political donating than the traditional model, and represents the most theoretically and empirically complete models in the literature.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 2008 presidential election was unique and historic in many ways, not least of all because of record-breaking fundraising by the candidates in both the primary and general elections. By refusing public financing and focusing on donations from individuals, then-presidential candidate Barak Obama raised over \$600 million dollars. This amount was larger than that collected through private donations by all of the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in the 2004 election combined, and more than recorded in any previous election (Luo 2008b).¹ This record-setting fundraising was in large-part due to a large number of individuals making small-dollar campaign donations, largely over the internet (Luo 2008a). Indeed, 88% of the Obama campaign's total funds came from individual donations, the majority of which came from donors giving amounts of \$200 or less (Center for Responsive Politics 2009). For the first time in a presidential election, the average citizen had a greater and more direct influence on the fiscal viability of a presidential candidate than corporations and elites.

Previously, making political contributions (to either candidates or political parties) was a relatively rare activity among the general public. From 1952 to 2000 (prior to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, BCRA), the highest percentage of individuals reporting making a political donation in a national survey was under 13%, averaging less


¹ In addition to raising the most money in a presidential election (\$639.2 million, Barnet 2008), Obama also set a one month fundraising record in September of \$150 million (Luo 2008b), and attracted a record 3 million individual donors to his campaign (Cilliza 2008). Ron Paul also focused on individual donations and raised \$6 million in online donations, a new one day record (Gibson 2008).

than 10% per election during this period (American National Election Studies 2005).²

The number of donors remained stagnant from 1980-2000, as seen in Figure 1.1.

However, this number increased in the 2004 election to 13%, and in 2008 the number of individuals who donated doubled from 2000, to a record 17% of American adults (PEW Research Center for People and the Press 2008).

Figure 1.1: Individual Donations in Presidential Elections, 1980-2008



Note: Data for 1980-2004 from American National Election Study Cumulative Data File, data for 2008 from PEW Research Center for People and the Press (2008).

² The donation rate in 1976 was 16%, but the question used included contributions more generally and tax check-offs, rather than candidate or political party donations specifically, as was asked in other years.

An increase of the magnitude seen in 2008, 8% above average, is extraordinary considering the relative percent of individuals who reported making donations remained stagnant for nearly five decades. A rise in the number of individuals making donations such as this altered the political landscape and likely the outcome of the 2008 presidential election (Magleby 2008).

The mass media's focus on the importance of the individual donor during the 2008 election suggested their overnight emergence; however, this is not the case. The foundation of Obama's strategy to seek out individual contributors was, in part, an extension of John McCain's 2000 campaign and Howard Dean's 2004 campaign (Wilcox 2008). Dean may have been the first to effectively pursue a strategy of raising a majority of his capital from the public, and capitalize on individual small-dollar contributors (Magleby 2008). Although raising far less money than either George W. Bush or John Kerry, Dean raised 97% of his contributions from individual donors, with 61% of these coming from individuals giving less than \$200 (Center for Responsive Politics 2005).

This movement, largely by the Democrats, away from reliance on political action committees (PACs, the money-giving arm of interest groups), corporations, and large individual donations coincides with changes in campaign finance laws over the last decade. In 2002, the BCRA banned soft money donations to parties, while increasing the limits on hard money donations to candidates or campaigns to \$2000 per election (Malbin 2003). These changes were an explicit attempt to limit the influence of large donations by corporations and special interests to candidates and parties (Wilcox et al. 2003). Preliminary evidence suggests that BCRA has had some success in this regard, as the role of soft money decreased from almost a third of all campaign expenditures in 2000, to less

than 14% just four years later (Mandle 2008, 79), while the number of individual donors and the total dollar amount of donations by individuals increased (Patterson 2006). This is not to say that other avenues to funnel soft money into elections have not developed. The overall influence of BCRA remains in question, with the creation of 527 groups in the 2004 election (Smith and Smith 2010, 85) and the Supreme Court (see *Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.* 2007 and *Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission* 2010) altering the role of corporations, unions, PACs, and Super PACs (Corrado 2011, 54-64; Franz 2013).

Over the last decade, the structural changes that regulate donation activity, along with technological changes (foremost the internet), have made it more strategically feasible and advantageous for candidates and campaigns to pursue donations from individuals (Wilcox 2008). These elements set the “rules of the game” and create the global context within which individuals make the decision to participate. But within the game, there is a great deal of variation in how individuals operate. Identifying and profiling individual donors is now of great interest to scholars, political campaigns, and lobbyists.

Indeed, if current trends hold true, small-dollar donations by individuals will continue to have a major role in elections; this signals the need for a renewed and specific focus on these donors within the mass public. So far, the majority of the extant literature on donating pays scant attention to the general electorate and offers little information about small-dollar individual donors (Graf et al. 2006). Little is known about who is actually donating. This lack of attention to the mass public made sense through the 1990s because the majority of Americans did not donate, and the majority of money going to

political campaigns came from PACs, unions, corporations, and the wealthy (e.g., Biersack, Herrnson, and Wilcox 1994).

This is not to say there are no studies examining the individual decision to donate. Many of these investigations explore individual donating activity as a part of a larger participatory scale (e.g., Almond and Verba 1989 [1963]; Tolbert and McNeal 2003), and a non-trivial amount of work has explored the effects of income (Verba et al. 1995), partisanship (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 132), and issue-positions on donating (Francia et al. 2003, 40). That is, where making donations is explored, the majority of research in the extant political science literature focuses on a narrow set of indicators. However, political behavior research writ-large is experiencing a renaissance in psychological and neurobiological approaches.

Over the last 10 years, personality (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008), authoritarian values (e.g., van Hiel et al. 2004), altruism (e.g., Fowler 2006), trust (e.g., Sturgis et al. 2010), threat (e.g., Oxley et al. 2008), anxiety (e.g., Marcus, Neuman, and MacCuen 2000), fear (e.g., Jost et al. 2003), emotion (e.g., Civettini and Redlawsk 2009), hormones (e.g., McDermott et al. 2007), genes (e.g., Hatemi and McDermott 2012b), and neural pathways (e.g., McDermott 2004) have become critically important in categorizing political behaviors. Such behaviors include voting (Hatemi et al. 2007), general participation (Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008), and political attitudes and ideology (Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005; Verhulst et. al 2012). Such work has yet to be integrated into models with traditional socio-demographic and rational approaches with regard to political donating.

Current socio-behavioral models provide a good explanation of donating behavior through the 1990s, as well as a strong theoretical foundation for further research.

However, the import of the individual donor in modern elections, combined with the more than 100% increase in the relative number of individuals making donations since 1980, and a broadening use of interdisciplinary tools to explore political behaviors, necessitates a more detailed look at the American Donor.

Finally, recent work in electoral behavior has identified numerous contextual factors that influence important participatory behaviors such as turnout. These election-specific contextual factors are diverse, and include a state's status as a battleground (Gimple, Kaufmann and Pearson-Merkowitz 2007), mobilization (Holbrook and McClurg 2005), advertisements (Panagopolous and Green 2008), and electoral competition (Franklin 2004). Limited evidence suggests the merits of utilizing these variables in studies of donating; mobilization increases an individual's likelihood of making a donation nearly 7% (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 172). The contextual factors explored in this dissertation are those thought to be the most likely to influence individual donating.

In summary, identifying the American Donor is as critically important today as understanding the American Voter was in the mid-20th century. Who are the donors, why do they donate, and what contextual, election-specific factors influence these decisions? This dissertation addresses these lacunas and combines the theoretical foundations and empirical methods across the approaches described above. This begins with the creation of a baseline model of donating, comprised of socio-demographics and civic values identified in the political behavior literature. Dispositional attributes from the

psychological literature and electoral context from the rational choice and voting behavior literature are then added to expand the model. Finally, potential effects of genetic individual differences are considered. Below, the outline of the dissertation is detailed; this includes one theoretical and four empirical chapters.

Outline of the Dissertation

This dissertation proceeds in six chapters. Chapter 2 details the theoretical approaches and extant findings on donating behavior in political science, psychology, and neurobiology central to this line of research. This chapter begins with the research describing donating as an individual-level political behavior from the behavioral and rational choice literatures. Specifically, political behavior work focuses on two types of factors, long-term (e.g., socio-demographics) and short-term (election-specific), which influence donating behaviors in the population. Most studies focus on socio-demographic explanations of donating, finding that wealthy, well educated, white males are the mostly likely to donate (Wilcox 2008). This line of research has yet to be updated in light of the remarkable growth in the number of individual donors. It remains unknown if these new donors are an extension of the previous groups of donors, or if there are new characteristics that influence donating and are identifiable in this group.

The next two sections of Chapter 2 describe the research on donating behaviors outside of political science, and address dispositional traits presumed to be antecedents to political donating. Social-psychological approaches widen the focus in the study of the individual and include the import of personality, altruism, attitudes, and other psychological dispositions on donating behavior. The chapter then proceeds by detailing insights from neurobiological approaches on donating behavior. Political science

research has only recently incorporated biological factors into models. Including these approaches allows exploration of new avenues of individual variation (Fowler and Schreiber 2008).

The disciplines of political science, psychology, and neurobiology have so far studied donation activity separately, without regard to the contributions of the others. Therefore, the final section of this chapter discusses the insights from these fields in combination and introduces a modification of existing theories by merging these three previously disparate approaches into a unified model, including socio-demographics, electoral context, personality, attitudes, and genetics. This synthesis results in a modified funnel of causality, which allows for the inclusion of more recent developments in psychology and neurobiology into explicating donating behavior.

Chapter 3, *The Baseline Model: Socio-Demographics and Civic Values*, is the first empirical chapter. The chapter begins by creating a model of political donating by exploring the traditional socio-demographic model of political participation and political donating. This model is extended to include civic values, drawn mainly from the electoral behavior literature. These increase voter turnout, and may be expected to have a similar influence on political donating behavior. Explored within this chapter is the traditional political behavior model of donating analyzed using three nationally representative samples from the 2008 election, and two population-based kinship studies from 2008 and 1990. This allows observation of the explanatory power of traditional socio-behavioral models, given the modern political climate of increased political donating activity.

The psychological literature suggests that individual decisions to donate are as much due to one's disposition as their wallet. Chapter 4, *The Role of Personality and Attitudes*, addresses psychological factors in the study of political donations. The majority of the work on donating in psychology focuses on charitable donating (e.g., time, blood, clothing, and money; e.g., Bekkers 2006; Peterson and Duncan 1999). Nevertheless, the theories behind this research can inform the study of political donating.

Personality psychology suggests that not all individuals begin with an equal probability of making a donation; there can be wide variation across individuals' personality traits. This chapter explores the relationship between personality types, political attitudes, and donating using two population-based kinship studies and one nationally representative sample. These dispositional traits are not commonly included in political science studies of donating behavior but remain central to psychological studies, including Eysenck's Big 3 personality model (Eysenck and Eysenck 1985), the Five Factor model of personality (McCrea and Oliver 1992), and altruism, which is particularly associated with an increase in charitable donating (Piliavin and Charng 1990). There is strong reason to suspect that personality will predict political donating. Recent research has found personality to be related to both political attitudes (Jost et al. 2003; Verhulst et al. 2010), and various participatory activities (e.g., attending campaign events; Mondak and Halperin 2008), including general participation (Vecchione and Caprara 2009).

Chapter 5, *Electoral Context and Personality-by-Situation*, combines the insights gained in Chapters 3 and 4 and extends them theoretically and empirically. In this chapter, the empirical models merge knowledge about donating from political behavior

(socio-demographics and civic values from Chapter 3) and psychology (personality traits and political attitudes from Chapter 4) with the short-term electoral factors emphasized in rational and contextual approaches.

After investigating the potential direct effects of contextual factors, models will investigate the potential interactive effects of these contextual factors with the individual-level ones, examining the possibility that they influence each other, and exert interactive effects on behavior. This idea, similar to a feedback loop and labeled personality-by-situation, is analyzed using a nationally representative sample. This represents a more complete way to empirically model the new funnel of causality theory developed in this dissertation, and the most theoretically comprehensive model of political donating.

Chapter 6, *Genetic and Neurobiological Factors*, examines the possibility that making political donations is, in part, genetically influenced. In most ways, this is an extension of attitudinal, behavioral, and personality research, which finds attitudes and personality traits influence donating, each of which are genetically influenced (Bouchard and McGue 2003; Eaves et al. 1999; Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Rushton et al. 1986; Verhulst et al. 2012). This chapter builds on extant research, by suggesting that a similar relationship might be found for political donating. By comparing the co-twin correlations of monozygotic (MZ) twins with dizygotic (DZ) twins in two population-based kinship samples, this chapter will consider what portion, if any, of political donating is influenced by familial environments, person-specific experiences, and genetic influences.

The final chapter (7) concludes by summarizing the findings of the previous chapters. Each of the previous chapters presents a unique argument about who is making

political donations. The implications of this research on political donating behavior are discussed, along with potential extensions and applications.

In total, this dissertation will address the traditional literature in political behavior, identifying if the same predictors still influence donating behavior in 2008. Then it will extend the research on political donating by adding personality traits, political attitudes, electoral context, and genes into the model. This expanded model can help identify the nature of the relationship between these important individual-level factors and donating behavior.

CHAPTER 2

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT POLITICAL DONATING AND HOW WE KNOW IT: THEORY, FINDINGS, AND LIMITATIONS

The exploration of individual political donating behavior has most often been treated as one action in a larger participatory behavioral profile, rather than as a unique action warranting its own field of study. Further, traditional political behavior research has focused on two political behaviors of interest: voting behavior and political party choice. As discussed in the previous chapter, political donating is increasingly important to the political landscape, detailing the individuals that engage in this behavior is critical.

Extant models studying individual donating activity tend to rely on single dimensional approaches. However, environmental, sociological, neurological, psychological, and genetic approaches to study political phenomena are now emerging (Hatemi and McDermott 2012a), yet there has been little integration of these approaches into political behavior research. This is partly true because the theoretical underpinnings to integrate social, rational, psychological, and biological approaches toward donating behavior remain underdeveloped. This chapter addresses this lacuna, by first elucidating the extant theoretical approaches to studying donations and the history behind them across each discipline. Then a theoretical model of donating behavior that unifies these approaches is constructed and presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the creation and testing of empirical models in the following chapters.

Socio-Behavioral Approaches to Political Donations

The study of political behavior, donating activity included, has long relied on sociological and rational models. Perhaps the best-known model is Campbell et al.'s


(1960) “funnel of causality”.³ This funnel emerged during the behavioral revolution and is a social-psychological model of political participation. The model was originally applied to voting behavior, but has been applied to the study of nearly all facets of political behavior (Zuckerman 2006). At the top of the funnel are an individual’s socio-demographic characteristics, such as education and income, as well as all other familial influences, which are believed to be usually established temporally removed and prior to the decision to participate. One level below is what the authors considered the most important influence on voting, party identification (PID). The nuclear family is regarded to have the most prominent role in influencing PID; children tend to have similar partisanship to their parents.

The two bottom levels of the funnel, issues and candidates, are believed to play a lesser role in the preferences and behaviors of most individuals. In this model, the majority of the public has little to no understanding of political issues, and these play a very small role in the overall political decision-making process for most individuals (Campbell et al. 1960, 249). Basic conceptualizations of an individual’s own personal (especially financial) situations and PID are the basis for making political decisions, rather than evaluations of political issues or candidates (Campbell et al. 1960, 227-50).

Below, each level is explained in greater detail including the extant literature that has built upon this traditional model. Much of the work on political donating is built upon models designed to explain general participation or voting behavior. The following sections discuss this literature.

³ The concept of the funnel is presented in Chapter 2 of Campbell et al. (1960). For a discussion of the development of the concept see Converse (2006).

Figure 2.1: The Funnel of Causality



Note: Figure is based on Lewis-Beck et al.'s (2008, 23) *The American Voter Revisited*

Socio-Demographics

One of the oldest and most enduring explanations of political donating revolves around an individual's socio-economic status (SES). SES is typically constructed as an objective measure by some combination of three variables: income, education, and occupation. In general, higher incomes and more education are found to be associated with more political participation (e.g., Woodward and Roper 1950), and specifically with

a higher likelihood of making a political donation (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Verba et al. 1995).⁴

Both individual and parental measures of SES influence political participation (Smith and Baldwin 1974; Verba et al. 1995). For example, parents who are involved with voluntary organizations (donating both time and money) when their children are young, have children who are more likely to be involved in similar organizations, both while they are young and when they become adults (Bekkers 2005a). This process is hypothesized to influence both political and charitable donating in a similar manner. Additional socio-demographic variables are also influential, and explain a significant amount of the variance in donating behavior; these include age, sex, and ethnicity. In sum, having a higher income (explains 15.5% of the variance), education (10.9%), being older (10.4%), and male (2.6 %) is associated with a higher likelihood of making a political donation (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 286).

Party Identification

One level below socio-demographics in the funnel is party identification (PID). Through socialization, largely influenced by the parents, individuals develop their PID, often considered the most important predictor of voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1960). PID is developed during childhood and is generally stable throughout an individual's lifetime. Indirect influences arise from familial SES and include neighborhood and social class effects, while direct socialization operates through parents and peers (Brady, Schlozman and Verba 2006). For example, the SES of the family, represented by

⁴ Many newer studies leave out occupation (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 2003) or incorporate it as part of one large SES variable masking any independent effects of occupation (e.g., Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995).

education and income of the parents, creates the opportunities for the children that shape their early lives. This includes the schools the children attend, the peers they associate with, and the groups they engage in (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 22). All of which affect the general life orientation that in turn influences political orientation.

The influence of familial socialization on PID can be both implicit and explicit. Campbell et al. (1960) interpreted familial concordance as the effects of explicit, or active, socialization (i.e., direct contact) from the parents on the shaping of the PID of their children (146-49). Examples of this type of socialization include political discussions and inclusion of the child in political activities such as voting (Verba et al. 1995). The effects of implicit political socialization can be just as important, specifically through the transmission of values and attitudes such as patriotism and efficacy (Brady et al. 2006), which can themselves influence political behavior as discussed below. SES may also influence this socialization, as individuals with higher SES have higher levels of positive political attitudes and are more likely to engage in these socializing behaviors than individuals with low SES (Almond and Verba 1963; Brady et al. 1995).

The importance of PID also extends past voting to influence other forms of participation. For example, partisans are more likely to make political donations than are nonpartisans (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 132). This effect of partisanship seems to historically favor Republicans, as they were more likely to make political donations through the 1990s than were Democrats (Francia et al. 2003, 39).

Ideology and Attitudes

As noted above, the top two levels of the funnel, socio-demographics and PID, are given primacy in the funnel model as individuals are not sophisticated enough to

understand or utilize the remaining two levels, issues and candidates. Encompassed within the issues level of the funnel is ideology, which is comprised of attitude structures, and considered to be largely determined by familial socialization and, possibly, self-interest (Campbell et al. 1960, 192-204), which may increase the importance of held attitudes (Boninger, Krosnick and Berent 1995). Ideology is largely dismissed as unimportant within the funnel model, although later research has suggested it has an important role in influencing donating behavior (Francia et al. 2003; Ponce and Scarrow 2011).

Overall, individuals with higher incomes, the most likely to make political donations, tend to have the most economically conservative attitudes (Verba et al. 1995, 480). These attitudes seem to play a strong role influencing donating behavior, as the vast majority of Republican donors report holding such attitudes (Francia et al. 2003, 60). More wealthy Democrats tend to hold more conservative economic attitudes than less wealthy Democrats; however, this relationship is mediated by the strong effect of education, which leads Democrats (but not Republicans) to hold more economically liberal positions (Verba et al. 1995, 480). This results in the majority of Democratic donors to hold economically liberal attitudes (Francia et al. 2003, 60).

People with more liberal economic attitudes tend to favor policies related to spending money benefiting others and society, such as foreign aid programs. These attitudes may lead individuals to use their own money to benefit others, by donating to political groups and causes. Indeed, the majority of political donors who contribute large amounts of money cite purposive motivations for their donations (Francia et al. 2003; Webster et al. 2001), and the strength of preferences on issues (e.g., abortion and gun

rights) increases donations to groups associated with these causes (Schuman and Presser 1981). A similar relationship also holds for attitudes on social issues, as Democrats are more likely to hold pro-choice positions and donate to pro-choice groups, while Republicans are more likely to support and donate to pro-life groups (Francia et al. 2003). For example, the National Right to Life, which actively fundraises to support direct and indirect government lobbying on pro-life related issues. In other words, donors may make political contributions in order to advance rational goals, such as the election of a specific candidate or the advancement of a policy.

Additions to the Basic Model: Resources and Civic Values

Further research has kept the basic funnel model intact, while searching for mechanisms of socialization that link SES at the top of the funnel with the behavior at the bottom of the funnel. Perhaps the best examples of this, related to participatory and donating activity, are resources and civic values.

Time, money, and civic skills are the resources necessary to actively participate in politics (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995). These resources provide a mechanism that links SES, which strongly predicts political participation, with actual participation; explicating why factors such as income lead to more participation. Money, as a resource, is strongly related to both the income and educational aspects of SES. Time, however, is not related to SES; neither an increase in income nor educational attainment increases the amount of free time a person has. The amount of free time enjoyed is based on life circumstances, such as being married, having children, or being employed. Many political activities, especially political donating, require more money than they do free time, giving a participation advantage to those with a higher SES.

Civic skills mainly involve reading, writing, and comprehending, skills largely learned early in life through education, one piece of SES. These skills are translated into activities such as attending meetings, planning meetings, and giving speeches at work, church or in nonpolitical organizations (Putnam 2000). People who are comfortable engaging in these activities in nonpolitical arenas will also be able to do them in political spheres. This is strongly related to SES, as people with higher SES are more likely to participate in organizations than are people with low SES (Burns et al. 2001).

A basic framework of civic values relevant to political participation is considered in this dissertation (although this is not an exhaustive list): political interest, political efficacy, political trust, civic engagement (sometimes labeled civic awareness), and political knowledge (Nelson 1979; Verba 1965, 537-42). High SES, especially high educational attainment, leads to an increase in civic values, which in turn leads to more participation and a higher likelihood of making a political donation (Brady et al. 1995; Burns et al. 2001; Grant and Rudolph 2002; Milbrath 1965; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2008; Verba et al. 1995; Verba and Nie 1972). In general, higher levels of these civic values are related to higher levels of political participation; although there is some evidence indicating not all civic values translates into an increase in the likelihood of making a political donation (Citrin 1974; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 147-50; Verba et al. 1995).

Rational Models and Short-Term Influences:

Contextual Election-Specific Reasons to Donate

Short-term contextual factors are not explicitly labeled in the funnel; however, Campbell et al. (1960) suggests that electoral factors, such as voting restrictions and

ballot forms, also influence political behaviors of interest and may interact with each level of the funnel (275-82). Since the introduction of the funnel in *The American Voter*, numerous additional contextual factors that influence voter turnout have been identified (e.g., Bergan et al. 2005; Shaw 1999). Indeed, a great deal of attention has been given to short-term influences that revolve around an election (e.g., advertising by candidates) and the individual's location (e.g., state effects, battleground status). Campaigns and elections matter and influence individuals (Shaw 1999), and it may be rational for individuals to engage in participatory behaviors connected to them (i.e., vote). Such an approach may play a similar role in influencing political donating (e.g., Lipsitz 2009), but remains largely unexplored.

In the most basic terms, rational behavior can be thought of as the ability to order ones preferences and then choose the one that is most preferred (Riker and Ordeshook 1968), that maximizes the payoff (Simon 1955). The idea that individuals vote if it is in their best interest to do so has been a dominant idea in the voting behavior literature (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). This concept of self-interest can also be applied to the study of political donating through the possibility of influencing the outcome of the election. When people hear through the media their candidate or party is doing poorly, they may be spurred to make donations to improve the chances of electoral success (Mutz 1995). Individuals are more likely to make political donations when their money helps to achieve a goal, such as getting a candidate elected (Ray 1998). They may also choose to make political donations to gain benefits after the election, for example gaining influence with the elected representative. This type of benefit-motivated giving has been observed with donating to PACs (Brunell 2005), although it is questionable

whether individuals would believe their political contributions to candidates or parties would create that sort of benefit (Ansolabehere et al. 2003).

Self-interest may act as an important internal motivation to donate, and electoral forces alter the context within which the decision is made, influencing the likelihood the individual will donate. Context-specific electoral factors vary election to election, leading some elections to highly stimulate interest and participation, and other elections to provide little stimulus (Jackson 1997). The vast majority of electoral behavior work has examined the effects of context on voter turnout, but some research has shown an important influence of election-specific contextual factors on donating behavior. The two most important contextual influences identified in the literature are mobilization and competition. Both are broad categories of context, and can take different forms, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. Overall, mobilization may increase an individual's likelihood of donating by 6.7% (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 172), while a competitive electoral environment may increase it by about 7% (Lipstiz 2009).

Although they are often given primacy in the political science literature, the individual socio-demographic, contextual, and rational models discussed above represent only one component of behavior, and may not be the most influential to an individual's decision to make donations. Psychological models have long focused on dispositional differences across individuals that operate in both state and trait circumstances concerning donating behavior. Such a view however, has often been overlooked in political science explorations. It is to these psychological models of donating activity I now turn.

Psychological Models: Disposition and Personality

Scholars in psychology have long addressed the question of who donates, with a greater emphasis on donations to charitable organizations, as opposed to donations to political candidates, campaigns, or parties. Unfortunately, political scientists have only rarely recognized the usefulness of this work. This appears true for two reasons, the first concerns the commonly narrow view as to how a psychological approach might be useful to studies of political behaviors (see Winter 2003), and the second revolves around differences in disciplinary norms, and how psychological approaches differ from traditional political behavior models.

This is not to say psychology is absent in political behavior models. For example, the “Michigan Model” of behavior, on which the funnel model is based, relies on the belief that people build psychological attachments to parties and candidates, and that these attachments influence a wide array of political and participatory behaviors (Campbell et al. 1960). Far less explored and commented on, is Campbell et al.’s consideration of the explanatory power of personality on voting behavior. This may be in part due to the manner in which they advocate the inclusion of personality traits in socio-economic models (Campbell et al. 1960, 499) that differs in many regards from the personality psychology literature, which finds personality prior to socialization.

Specifically, Campbell et al. suggest personality may, in limited circumstances, exert an independent influence on a behavior indirectly, by influencing the manner in which individuals affiliate with a given party, or their PID (502-15). This view places a strict limitation on personality as a method of psychological attachment to a person or party. Whereas the psychological view of personality is much more permissive. That is,

personality is viewed as a genetically and environmentally informed psychological disposition, which guides nearly all behaviors in a somewhat stable manner (albeit in differing ways depending on the personality trait).⁵ In this way, personality may have a unique and direct influence on donating behavior as well as the previously hypothesized indirect influence on attachment and affiliation.

Personality

There are many ways to assess personality in humans and little agreement as to the best method to use. In this dissertation I use the term “personality trait” to refer to the primary factor scales created using factor analysis based on previously created survey-based personality inventory questionnaires (see Eysenck and Eysenck 1985, 15). One of the most common and popular personality assessments is the Five-Factor Model (FFM). The FFM organizes personality traits into five factors: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism (or its inverse, Emotional Stability), and Openness to Experience (McCrea and Costa 1985, McCrea and John 1992). One of the benefits for this model is that researchers have verified its applicability across diverse groups, spanning sex, age, and culture (Barbaranelli and Caprara 2002).

The FFM, however, is only one of the latest approaches to measure and categorize personality. Indeed, one of the foundations of the FFM is, in part, Hans Eysenck’s “Big 3” typology of personality (Eysenck 1947).⁶ This theory includes three components, Extraversion, Neuroticism, and Psychoticism (the P-scale), including subscales such as

⁵ This dissertation relies on the definition of personality as “...the complex organization of cognitions, affects, and behaviors that gives direction and pattern (coherence) to the person’s life. ...personality consists both of structures and processes that reflects both nature (genes) and nurture experience” (Pervin 1996, 414).

⁶ For a discussion of the development of the FFM see Digman (1990).

Social Desirability. For a description of the traits in each assessment see Chapter 4. In addition, numerous individual personality traits remain of great interest, such as trust, Altruism, and narcissism.

Thus, while disagreement exists between proponents of different models of personality traits (Zuckerman et al. 1993), there is evidence supporting the validity and usefulness of many approaches, therefore this dissertation is agnostic as to the superiority of one over the other. Instead, I take the position that both assessments provide interesting and important insights into the relationship between personality and donating. Furthermore, this is the first study, that I am aware of, that examines the influence of the Big 3 traits on political donating.

Much of the research examining the direct effects of personality on donating comes from the fields of social and personality psychology which often frame donating as a pro-social behavior (a behavior meant to benefit others, see Batson and Powell 2003), and explanations generally focus on specific personality traits that promote the interests of others. One of the most widely suggested traits associated with monetary charitable donating is Altruism (e.g., Clary and Snider 1991; Eckel and Grossman 1995; Piliavin and Charng 1990; Webb et al. 2000) – a behavioral “motivation with an ultimate goal of benefiting someone else (Batson and Oleson 1991, 62)”. This can be measured independently or captured in the FFM under Agreeableness (Costa, McCrea and Dye 1991), whereas under the Eysenck model it is most highly correlated with Extraversion (Rushton et al. 1989). Altruistic individuals may also be more likely to make political donations (Fowler and Kam 2007), although this relationship is underexplored in the literature.

In summary, research in social and personality psychology suggests personality traits can and do have an influence on the decision to make donations. The work on charitable donating behavior provides a framework with which to study political donating. This psychological model, positing direct effects of personality on behavior, is underutilized in political behavior research generally, and with regard to political donating specifically, but has proved informative when applied to the study of general political participation (Gerber et al. 2011b; Vecchione and Caprara 2009) and specific participatory behaviors (Mondak and Halperin 2008). The next section identifies a possible source for these dispositional traits, as well as an additional influence on behavior.

Biological Sources of Individual Differences

The potential biological bases for political behaviors are not explicitly modeled in the traditional funnel of causality. However, interdisciplinary research finds that the building blocks of each of the funnel levels are genetically influenced. For example, psychological dispositions, such as personality traits, have long been supposed to be neuro-biologically influenced (e.g., Eaves and Eysenck 1974), as are one's efficaciousness (Klemmensen et al. 2012a), and one's attitudes (see Hatemi et al. 2010). Until recently explicitly identifying and utilizing the biological components of behavior remained too far afield for political scientists. However, the last several decades have witnessed the emergence of this paradigm for the study of human behaviors and political preferences (Fowler and Schreiber 2008; Hatemi and McDermott 2012a).

Differences in political preferences that were once construed in purely social terms are no longer understood without reference to the role of genetic (Eaves, Eysenck

and Martin 1989; Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Hatemi et al. 2007; Hatemi 2010; Martin et al. 1986), physiological (Inbar, Pizzaro and Bloom 2009; Oxley et al. 2008; Tesser 1993; Vigil 2009), endocrinological (Madsen 1986; McDermott et al. 2009) and neurological processes (Amodio et al. 2007; Lieberman, Schreiber, and Ochsner 2003; McDermott 2004). The importance of these has been well established in the literature, and their absence represents a serious limitation of the traditional funnel model. The greatest portion of this research has so far focused on the genetic models, and thus the dissertation focuses on this area.

Modern research into biological sources of variation has its roots in early genetic research beginning with Mendel (1865) and later extended to include human heredity by Galton (1869), Pearson and Lee (1903) and many others. The contributions made by these early researchers led to the important discovery by Fisher (1918) that the expression of traits (the phenotype) does not perfectly correlate with the genetic makeup (the genotype) of an individual because of the intervening and mediating effect of the environment. The combination of these factors may create genes-by-environment and epigenetic interactions (GxE) in influencing human behavior. This relationship seems apparent in relation to a trait such as height, where genes (from one's parents) and the environment (e.g., diet) play an obvious role. This GxE relationship has been extended to social and political attitudes (Boardman 2011; Hatemi et al. 2011). In addition to the environmental (i.e., socialization) component, several studies have found a significant genetic influence on individual differences in various political attitudes, including liberalism and conservatism (Eaves et al. 1999; Martin et al. 1986). Political attitudes are

developed over an individual's lifetime, reflecting a strong socialization component during childhood but a genetic influence during adulthood (Hatemi et al. 2009).

So far, few if any studies have investigated the possibility of genetic influences on political donating behavior, specifically. However, other political participatory behaviors and the antecedents of donating do appear to be genetically informed. Both voter turnout and general political participation were found to have significant genetic components (Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Verhulst 2012). In addition, genetic differences appear to have a part in voluntary time donations to charitable organizations (Son and Wilson 2010), general pro-social behaviors (Rushton 2004), and Altruism (Rushton 2004; Rushton et al. 1989; Rushton et al. 1986), one of the strongest personality predictors of charitable donating.

Previous research has also identified genetic, as well as environmental, influences on dispositional differences thought to predict political donating. These include political attitudes (Verhulst et al. 2010; Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005), ideology (Eaves et al. 1999; Martin et al. 1986), and personality (Bouchard and McGue 2003; Eysenck and Eysenck 1985), which have been linked to political participation (Vecchione and Caprara 2009). These findings suggest a mutual genetic influence operates on personality, attitudes, and donating and support the need to investigate potential genetic influences on political donating.

Research within the fields of political science, social and personality psychology, and behavioral genetics provide much insight on political donating behavior, yet these approaches have remained disparate in the literature. Therefore, the remainder of this

chapter is dedicated to a modification of the funnel of causality that unites the insights from each of these fields.

A Unified Model of Political Donating

Emerging research over the last twenty years gives reason to expand the traditional funnel model, which continues to provide a strong foundation from which to begin studies on political behaviors. Personality, psychological dispositions, and biology have long been overlooked and understudied in political science, but have the potential to expand our understanding of political behavior. For example, the renewed attention on personality gives reason to add to the model discrete psychological concepts beyond attachment to party. In addition, the growing field of biology and political behavior also gives cause to add a biological approach, further focusing on individual dispositions. These approaches focus on different factors leading to individual donating, this dissertation seeks to integrate and combine them within the traditional funnel of causality.


In order to achieve this goal and provide a more comprehensive understanding of political donating activity, this theory advocates a new twist on a traditional concept. Here, I present a modified and updated version of the funnel of causality (Figure 2.2). This new funnel begins with the individual-level indicators at the top, and works down towards political behavior.

Like its predecessor, this funnel is broad-based and it is useful to further inform each of the levels and the behavior itself. Here, the new funnel shows individual predictors through multiple levels, each of which have some role in an individual's decision to donate. Work in political science has mainly focused on the bottom two

levels of the funnel; however, recent work has shown the foundations for political behavior begin long before adulthood (Hatemi et al. 2009). The top two levels in the funnel, biology and psychology, influence individuals prior to the effects of SES and rational choice. This is not to say that the top two levels of the funnel do not have a continuing and lasting influence over donating behavior.

The updated funnel includes a more modern view of human behavior. However, such a figure is not intended to fully capture how the specific factors within the levels interact and are integrated into a comprehensive model. That is, the linear relationship implied in the *American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) is not viewed as complete. Rather,

Figure 2.2: An Updated Funnel of Causality




the predictors represented at every level in the funnel affect behavior both directly and indirectly through influencing predictors at lower and higher levels. Each stage, while being a general antecedent to the next, also works as a feedback mechanism and influences the trait of interest. For example, the personality trait Neuroticism has a direct effect on general political participation (Vecchione and Caprara 2009). It also has a genetic influence (Eaves and Eysenck 1974) and is related to political attitudes, specifically economic liberalism (Verhulst et al. 2012). Therefore, the updated funnel should be seen only as a general guide, and only considered when viewed alongside more detailed theoretical conceptions of relevance in combination with empirical models, which operationalize the relationship the researcher wishes the study. Below, I provide a more detailed theoretical path model to provide an example and to ground the empirical analyses in the following chapters.

The stages included in this model (Figure 2.3) are drawn from the three fields of research discussed previously: biology (Stage 1), psychology (Stage 2), and political behavior (Stages 3 and 4). This model is a complex network of relationships, both between the stages and the behavior, and among each of the stages. As detailed in a vast body of literature, each of these stages acts and interacts to influence the others in important and often complex ways.

The path model proceeds in stages, graphically illustrated in Figure 2.3, beginning with the factors farthest removed from the behavior, and ending with the behavior of interest, making political donations. A review of the literature in political behavior gives the appearance of a division into two halves, long-term factors and short-term factors. Long-term factors are those that are set well in advance of an election or campaign

(personality, income, education, etc.), they tend to be stable, and influence the experiences and events that happen later in life (Miller and Shanks 1996). Whereas short-term factors include events and influences specifically connected to an election, these are often highly variable across elections.

Figure 2.3: A More Detailed Conceptual Model of Donating Behavior



The empirical methods to capture each of these processes simultaneously do not yet exist. Nevertheless, we can discuss the pieces in a systematic way and conduct several forms of analysis that speak to many of these pathways. Some of these relationships are outside of the scope of this dissertation, and are not investigated in any of the empirical chapters. Here, this dissertation focuses on what might be considered the most important of these relationships as identified from the extant literature.

The first stage of the model includes work relatively new to political scientists, but long established in the life sciences and psychology. These biological and neurological processes have yet to be explored for political donating; however, work focusing on similar behaviors suggests the importance of genetic influences on donating. Additionally, the indirect influence of genes can lead to differences in an individual's personality and held attitudes, which the extant literature suggests have their own influences on behavior.

Psychological and cognitive neuroscience approaches often focus on individual dispositional differences. Much of this work, studying charitable donating, links personality traits such as Altruism to donating behavior. In addition to personality traits, attitudes may also influence the decision to donate. Some scholars argue that personality leads to attitude formation, while others believe they develop together (see Verhulst et al. 2012). This dissertation remains agnostic on this point, and so includes them both in Stage 2 and Stage 3. The knowledge accumulated by these studies can inform the study of political donating, as similar psychological mechanisms may lead to political, as well as charitable, donating.

Political science approaches generally focus on population differences, such as socio-demographics, civic values, and engagement, included in Stage 3 of the model. An alternate, but not contrasting, model to investigate is the context-specific factors that might influence the decision to donate. The short-term factors (Stage 4) affecting donating occurs during an election cycle and are the closest in time to the decision to participate. This stage includes the specific context within which an individual makes the decision to donate. Most political donations occur during an election (although,

individuals can donate to many different political groups, at any time), the specific and distinctive environment created during these elections may have a unique influence on the decision to donate. These context-specific factors often vary across locations (such as states) which may lead to variations in individual behavior. The types of variations that have been shown to influence political behavior include a state's battleground status (Gimpel et al. 2007; Panagopoulos 2009), the number of candidate visits (Shaw 2006, 85-89), amount of media coverage (Gerber et al. 2007), and electoral competition (Franklin 2004). The electoral context may lead individuals to act strategically in choosing to make political contributions based on their specific environment. The specific contextual features will change with every election, and may not influence the same individual in the same manner across elections.

Summary and Guide to the Empirical Chapters

This study merges these three branches of research; combining the socio-demographic and context-specific factors identified by political scientists with individual-specific ones emphasized by psychologists and neurobiologists. The following chapters detail the major contributions of each of these branches of research and the approaches each take in answering who and why people donate money. While the theoretical model presented in Figure 2.2 is ideal, no single sample or method allows for its empirical testing. Rather, the chapters operationalize each piece of the theoretical model in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of donating behavior. The previous chapter laid out the theoretical foundations for each of the chapters, here I will discuss the empirical operationalization of each piece of the model.

In viewing the modified funnel model there is an important point regarding the ordering of traits. Traditional political science literature has always considered SES as a causal predictor to all other traits, including personality. Current psychological literature, and all disciplines that study social behavior, place psychological traits as causally prior to other traits knowing that they are biologically informed. Overall, the effects of personality and SES are largely independent of each other. While there may be a small causal relationship between personality and SES, the causal arrow points from personality to SES, as demonstrated in the modified funnel.

The trait ordering in the modified funnel places biology at the top, and continues down with personality, and then the effects of SES. It would appear that beginning at the top of the funnel with biology and discussing the effects of each level by continuing down the funnel would be the most logical order. However, following this top-down ordering would be difficult for many readers to follow, given the level unfamiliarity with psychological and biological approaches. Rather, the ordering of the chapters is based on a historical timeline of research, from traditional political behavior research through more modern approaches. Therefore, the empirical chapters begin by investigating the SES model of participation because this is the research most familiar to political scientists and forms the basis for our understanding of political donating behavior.

Chapters 3-5 use regression analyses to empirically model the individual decision to make a political donation. Regression analysis is not the only empirical method available to analyze the relationships diagrammed in Figure 2.3. However, many alternate methodological techniques, such as structural equation modeling, require strict assumptions about causality. The substantive relationships and causal arrows between

SES, personality, and context were unknown prior to this work. Thus, I rely on regression analysis because it provides a first step in identifying both the relationships of the variables with political donating, but also the relationships between the variables.

The first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, explores level 3 of the new funnel model, socio-demographics and civic values. These are represented in the path model (Figure 2.3) by Stage 3, and examine the direct effects of these on donating behavior. The empirical models developed in this chapter are common to the political behavior literature, and will constitute a baseline model for the proceeding chapters.

Chapter 4 examines the potential direct effects of psychological attributes including personality traits and political attitudes (level 2 of the funnel model, Stage 2 of the path model). These empirical models build on to the models developed in Chapter 3 by adding the psychological attributes into the socio-demographic models favored by political behaviorists. This allows us to investigate the value of introducing these attributes into the theoretical and empirical models.

Chapter 5 builds on the work in the two previous chapters by exploring the potential pathway and interactive effects between Stages 2, 3, and 4, and by adding the bottom level of the funnel, short-term electoral context, into the empirical model. This model is the most comprehensive model of political donating to date, combining levels 2, 3, and 4 of the modified funnel of causality.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 6, considers the most foundational of dispositional influences, the potential genetic influences on donating (Stage 1). In this chapter, I rely on twin models to estimate the source of individual differences on

donating behavior to include social and familial influences, unique experiences, and genetic heritability.

CHAPTER 3


THE BASELINE MODEL: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS AND CIVIC VALUES

The traditional political behavior approach to answering the question of who donates originally centered on socio-demographics, and was later expanded to include a plethora of civic values. These represent the third level of the modified causality funnel presented in Chapter 2 and are the focus of this chapter (i.e., the direct effects of the socio-demographic and civic values on making a donation, see Figure 3.1). This socio-demographic model has provided the only explanation of individual donating behavior for decades, but remains narrow in focus (i.e., Campbell et al. 1960; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995). Yet, beginning with these models is important for three reasons. First, the empirical models developed in this chapter provide a reference point from which the new theoretical aspects of the model can be evaluated, as described in Chapter 2. Second, the models can evaluate if the traits found to be influential through the 1990s are still important in 2008. Finally, these models can provide a type of validity test for the samples utilized in this dissertation.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. First, the political behavior literature that links relevant socio-demographics and civic values to political donating behavior is reviewed including the predictions generated from this research. Second, the five studies utilized in this chapter, and the rest of the dissertation, which include random and population-based samples from the 1980's through the 2008 election, are described along with the variables used in the empirical models in this chapter. Third, the results of the

analyses are discussed. Finally, implications from the models are discussed, including what can be learned from these models and theoretical and empirical extensions.

Figure 3.1: A New Funnel of Causality – Relationships Investigated for Chapter 3



Note: Black arrows represent direct effects.

Who Donates: A Political Behavior Approach

In order to discuss the numerous influences on political donating behavior that have been investigated in political behavior research, the variables will be discussed in two parts. First, socio-demographic traits that are often given primacy in the political behavior literature are reviewed. Second, will be a discussion of civic values thought to influence political participation and making political donations (Nelson 1979). The

models developed in this chapter, including socio-demographics and civic values, will constitute a baseline for further investigations of influences on making political donations for the subsequent chapters.

Socio-Demographics

Traditionally political donating behavior has been explored as part of an amalgamated measure of general political participation (e.g., contacting elected officials, donating money to a party, working for a party; e.g., Almond and Verba 1989 [1963]; Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Woodward and Roper 1950). In such studies, making donations has not been explored in detail; rather, research has focused on participation generally. Later work has separated these participatory behaviors to examine political donating as its own behavior of interest. The strongest predictor of making political donations identified in the literature is the socio-economic status (SES) of the individual, specifically income and education (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Smith and Baldwin 1974; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995). Income has often been seen as the primary, and sometimes only, explanation of making political donations (Verba et al. 1995, 361). In this view, education plays an important, yet supporting role, reinforcing the effects of income, by generally raising it (Verba et al. 1995). This SES model is a simple, yet powerful and enduring, explanation of making political donations, and no study would be complete without its inclusion.

Three additional socio-demographic variables are also frequently identified as significant predictors of political donating, though the effects of these variables remain less important than those of SES (Verba et al. 1995). The earliest studies on political participation found a significant relationship between participation and age, with older

individuals more likely to participate than younger ones (Woodward and Roper 1950). However, later works identified a parabolic relationship between age and participation; participation increases through the forties and fifties, and then begins to decline (Milbrath 1965, 134). There have been several explanations for this trend advanced in the literature, and scholars do not yet agree on the exact nature of, and the reason behind, the relationship. Overall, the literature suggests that younger people are less likely to make political donations than older persons, all else being equal (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 136-141).

Sex is an equally important correlate to participation activities. The trends in participation for men versus women vary by type of participation. Since 1992, women are more likely to vote than are men (Francia, Green, Herrnson, Powell, and Wilcox 2003, 29). In general, women are less likely to participate than men in most political activities, although these differences are often not statistically significant. Studies consistently find that women are less likely to make political donations than are men (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Francia et al. 2003, 29; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 133; Verba et al. 1995, 254); this is most likely due to the difference in the level of resources, specifically income, held by women compared to men (Schlozman et al. 1994).

In general, whites, as opposed to all other minority groups, are thought to have the highest rates of participation (Burns et al. 2001; King 2009; Milbrath 1965; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Uhlaner, Cain and Kiewiet 1989; Verba et al. 1995; Woodward and Roper 1950). However, there is no consensus on the question of whether members of minority groups are less likely to make donations than whites. Some research has suggested that African-Americans, Asian-Americans, and Hispanics are no less likely to

make donations than are whites, while controlling for other factors (Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Nakanishi 1991). Although this question is far from settled, the preponderance of the evidence suggests minorities are less likely to make political donations than are whites.

The last two socio-demographic variables, marital status and church attendance, are not always included in models of political participation; however, the literature gives cause to include them in a baseline model of making a donation. In general, individuals who are married have higher rates of participation (Conway 2000, 22). The influence of the spouse is often strong, altering the participation rates of the individual (Stoker and Jennings 1995). This may specifically be true for making donations, as income – the most important predictor of making a donation (Verba et al. 1995, 361) – is strongly related to marital status (the smallest correlation between marital status and income in the samples used here is 0.345 in the CCES2008 sample, see below).

Individuals who are married tend to have higher income and more financial stability and this is especially true for women (Hoffman 1977). Spousal influence may be particularly important for participatory activities that involve spousal resources, as opposed to individual resources (i.e., money versus time; Stoker and Jennings 1995). In much of this research, it is not the state of matrimony that is the most significant influence on the decision to participate, but the change in marital status, such as marriage or divorce (Hoffman 1977; Stoker and Jennings 1995). Even with these positive associations, there is little evidence to suggest that marital status influences making a political donation. Many studies either do not include it in the model (e.g., Brady et al 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003), or find no relationship (e.g., Ponce and Scarrow

2011). Marital status is included in here in the baseline model because it is an important predictor of general political participation; however, it is possible no relationship between marital status and making donations will be found.

Finally, churches are a source of civic engagement, and may provide a setting where individuals can learn values and skills that make participating in politics easier and more likely, as well as have exposure to frequent requests for political activities (Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995, 519). In addition to promoting civic skills, clergy often speak publicly on political messages (Djupe and Gilbert 2002) and promote political agendas (Djupe and Grant 2001). These political messages and the political recruitment long occurring in churches and increasing over time (Djupe and Gilbert 2008; Djupe and Gilbert 2003, 95-96; Verba et al. 1995, 519) may influence individuals to make political donations. Individuals who attend church weekly are more likely to make political donations, regardless of their religious affiliation (Francia et al. 2003, 30-31).

Although not strictly socio-demographics, I discuss the influences of party identification (PID) and ideology here as important components of the baseline model as they are included in the original funnel of causality, as described in Chapter 2. For more detailed descriptions and analyses regarding the import of PID and ideology on donating, see Chapters 2, 4, and 5. Partisanship exerts a strong influence on political behaviors, individuals who self-identify as strong partisans are the most likely to participate, including making political donations (Brown et al. 1995, 39-40; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 155). This effect of partisanship seems to favor Republicans, as they have been found to be more likely to make political donations than Democrats (Francia et al. 2003,

37-39), possibly due to a disparity in SES among partisans (Verba and Nye 1972, 226).

This finding, while corroborated in many studies, may not prove correct in this dissertation, utilizing data collected in 2008. The record amount of funds Obama raised suggests anecdotally that Democrats may be just as likely as, or more likely than, Republicans to make political donations in 2008.

Some studies link the concepts of PID and ideology in studies of donating, arguing that active Republican donors hold extreme conservative beliefs (Francia et al. 2003; Verba and Nye 1972, 227-28; Verba et al. 1995). However, many studies of political donating do not include ideology in the models (e.g., Brady et al. 1999; Brown et al. 1995; Graf et al. 2006; Grant and Rudolph 2002; Francia et al. 2003; Rosestone and Hansen 2003; Verba et al. 1995); in effect, this omission often leaves untested the proposition that holding more conservative values leads to a higher likelihood of donating. Few studies empirically test this relationship, and contrary to the assumptions of previous literature studies have found either no ideological differences (Boatwright and Malbin 2005) or that liberals are more likely to donate than conservatives (Ponce and Scarrow 2011).

For the majority of the socio-demographic traits discussed, the literature is clear as to the nature of their relationship with making donations. Overall, the predicted donor according to the socio-demographic model is a wealthy, well-educated, white, married Republican male, who attends church weekly, and is (possibly) conservative.

Civic Values

The next generation of research added civic values, “attitudes..., of psychological involvement in politics, and a feeling of obligation to participate”, into the basic socio-

demographic model (Verba and Nie 1972, 13-14). However, not all scholars believe these influence the decision to make donations, arguing the main influence is income, with little else playing any role (Verba et al. 1995, 364).

The socialization process leads to the development of political ideas and civic values such as partisan identification (Campbell et al. 1960; Niemi and Jennings 1991), political interest and knowledge (Jennings, Stoker and Bowers 2009), and to specific donating behaviors (Bekkers 2005a). The attitudes and behaviors towards participation developed by the parents, strongly influenced by their SES, are passed on to their children through socialization, such as through the discussion of politics inside the home (Verba et al. 1995, 20), and are a significant predictor of participation later in life (Smith and Baldwin 1974). A similar pattern holds true for the development of donating behaviors. Parents who engage in civic activities, including donating time and money, have children who are more likely to engage in similar behaviors (Bekkers 2005a), which in turn increases political participation in the children when they become adults (Hanks and Eckland 1978; McFarland and Thomas 2006). Bekkers (2005a) finds this to be especially true for females, who reported more volunteering as adults, largely due to the influence of their parents and activities as youths.

Overall, the literature conveys consistent findings about the positive role of socialization on making donations; more socialization leads to a higher probability of making a donation (Bekkers 2005a; Hanks and Eckland 1978; McFarland and Thomas 2006). Related to the idea of socialization is the discussion of politics, this exchange of ideas is a continuation of an important form of early direct familial socialization. The predictors of having frequent political discussions are similar to those of making political

donations, including income, political interest, and political knowledge (Verba et al. 1995, 363), and it is positively related to general political participation (McClurg 2003). Therefore, there should be a positive relationship between frequently having political discussions and making political donations.

As discussed in Chapter 2, there are a large number of civic values identified in the political behavior literature. Those chosen for study here are ones identified as the most influential for political participation, following Nelson (1979; adapted from Verba 1965, 537-42). The most commonly cited of these is political interest. Politically interested individuals are those “who follow politics, who care about what happens, who are concerned with who wins and loses (Verba et al. 1995, 345).” Individuals who are interested in politics are the most likely to participate in political activities (Burns et al. 2001; Milbrath 1965; Zaller 1990) and make political donations (Brady et al. 1995; Grant and Rudolph 2002; Verba et al. 1995, 361-63). Closely related to political interest is political knowledge, an indication of an individual’s connection to and awareness of the political process (Zaller 1992, 42-43). More political knowledge may increase an individual’s likelihood of making a political donation (Grant and Rudolph 2002; Verba et al. 1995, 363).

The first scholars to create a measure of political efficacy were Campbell, Gurin, and Miller (1954), they defined it as “the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one’s civic duties (187).” This led to the development of a four-item survey

index, later expanded and separated into internal and external efficacy (Balch 1974)⁷.

Scholars generally agree that higher levels of efficacy lead to higher levels of participation (e.g., Valentino, Gregorowicz, and Groenendyk 2008; Verba and Nie 1972); however, findings on the effect of efficacy on making political donations are mixed. Some studies find no relationship between political efficacy and political donations (Grant and Rudolph 2002; Verba et al. 1995), while others find positive effects of internal (Mondak et al. 2010) and external efficacy on making donations (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 144).

Trust may also be an important influence, and it is important to distinguish between two related but discrete types of civic trust that may influence political behaviors. Social trust, the feeling that others will generally do what is right most of the time, is strongly related to a sense of community, civic mindedness, and engagement (Uslaner 1999). Social trust itself may not be predictive of political participation (Uslaner and Brown 2003); however, it does lead to increases in volunteering, charitable contributing, and participation in community organizations, which may influence the decision to make a political donation (Putnam 2000, 136-37). Social trust may also lead to the development of political trust (Fennema and Tillie 2001), the feeling that the government is generally doing what is right. However, while political trust may make for better citizens and better governments – as suggested by thinkers such as John Locke and James Madison (Newton 1999), it may not be related to political participation (Citrin 1974; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 147-50).

⁷ For a discussion on the differences between internal and external efficacy, see Abramson (1983, Chapter 8).

Finally, civic engagement is the idea that a person is involved in activities such as being a member of a formal organization (e.g., Rotary Club), or attending community events (e.g., public meetings), or even political activities such as signing a petition or writing a letter to a public official (Putnam 2000). These activities connect an individual to others and the community at-large, and also teach individuals skills that increase the likelihood they will participate in the political process (Verba et al. 1995, 304-05, 337-42). Studies that examine the effect of this type of civic engagement on making political donations have found null results, finding instead that income almost entirely accounted for the decision to make a donation (Brady et al. 1995; Verba et al. 1995). However, people who make political donations tend to be involved with many community and political organizations (Francia et al. 34-36). Additionally, group meetings often solicit donations from members and suggest alternative donation recipients. Based on this, individuals who are involved in civic and political groups may be more likely to make donations than those who are not.

The majority of the literature has examined political participation generally, rather than political donating specifically, as discussed above. Research studying political donating has, for some civic values, produced mixed results. Based on this literature, the predicted donor profile is individuals who experienced socialization from their family, frequently discuss politics, have higher levels of political interest, political knowledge, external and internal efficacy, social and political trust, and are involved in civic and political organizations.

Methods

Five studies are utilized in this chapter, three are nationally representative surveys conducted in 2008, and two are family-based population samples, one conducted in the months preceding the 2008 general election and one conducted between the 1988 and 1990 elections. Using these studies allows for comparison of effects across samples, and they include a wide array of socio-demographic, dispositional, and contextual factors. Not every variable predicted to be important is measured in each survey. Variables are included in the models when they are available, and models are estimated as consistently as possible to maximize the comparability across models and samples.

CCAP2008: The Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) survey was conducted in six waves from December 2007 to November 2008. This is a nationally representative sample, comprised of 20,000 respondents from every state; 16,525 of whom received the questions about donating in the post-election wave.

The dependent variable is donating behavior in every model, it is measured in this survey by the question, “Thinking about the presidential candidates and their campaigns, did any of the following things happen to you yesterday: donated money to a presidential candidate?” The variable has a value of 1 if the respondent reported making a donation, and 0 otherwise. The questions used from this survey to create the dependent variable are unique because they ask the respondents at each wave whether the individual made a donation the previous day. This leads to a lower number of reported donors than those found by PEW (and in the other samples). For this reason the dependent variable is whether an individual reported donating at any wave, with all waves pooled together,

leading to a 12.31% overall donating rate in this survey. This presents the opportunity for an interesting, and conservative, test of the predictions.

The other variables included in the models are the predictors used in the extant scholarship focused on participation and donating activity, including income, education, PID, and ideology (Campbell et al. 1960). The first three of these are measured by self-report in the survey. Partisanship is a 3-point index, 1 for Democrats, 2 for “independents”, and 3 for Republicans. Ideology is also a 3-point index, 1 for liberals, 2 for moderates, and 3 for conservatives. Later work on donating has added age, sex, marital status, church attendance, and race as variables of interest (e.g., Verba et al. 1995), all measured here by self-report. Age is a scale ranging from the minimum (18) to the maximum (93) values in the sample; sex is a dichotomous variable with male coded as 1 and female coded as 0; marital status is dichotomous; and church attendance is a 5-point ordinal scale ranging from no church attendance (0) to attendance several times a week (5). There are several dichotomous variables that measure race, whether an individual is African-American, Hispanic, or identifies as any other racial or ethnic minority, excluding individuals who identify as white as the reference category. The only civic value included in this survey is political interest, which is measured on a 3-point ordinal scale ranging from low interest to high interest. Variables in all samples were coded in this way to maximize comparability, unless otherwise stated.

Frequencies for these variables and their question wording are shown in Appendix Table A1, including information about missing data. Due to the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, logit models are estimated for all CCAP2008, CCES2008, and

ANES2008 models, and are clustered by state to control for non-independence.⁸ Values for missing observations were estimated for income in the CCAP2008, CCES2008, and ANES2008 with multiple imputation using the ICE (Imputation by Chained Equations) method in Stata 10.0.⁹ Income had the most missing observations, 21.28%, a common problem with survey data. The values are estimated for missing observations, but the results were substantively similar when the data was left uncorrected; the coefficients differed slightly across models, but the significance and relative import of the predictors did not change.

CCES2008: The second survey used in this chapter is the Comparative Cooperative Election Study (CCES), completed in two-waves, in October and November 2008, and included 26,368 respondents in the post-election survey, which included the questions about donating behaviors. The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure created from the question, “During the past year did you: donate money to a candidate for president?” It is given a value of 1 if the respondent reported making a donation, and 0 otherwise. The self-reporting of donation behavior in this study, 25.41% reported donating to presidential candidates, is much higher than the donation rate of 17% reported by PEW (2008). This large sample of donors allows us an in-depth study of the behavior of this group, and provides an excellent comparison to the models created with the CCAP2008 data.

⁸ Probit models were also estimated; however, logit models were chosen as they provided the best fit to the data.

⁹ Income was imputed using information from age, marital status, sex, and education level; this technique was used for the income variables for all CCAP2008, CCES2008, and ANES2008 models.

The predictor variables included in the models are: income, education, PID, ideology, age, sex, marital status, church attendance, race, and political interest. Each of these variables are coded in the same manner as the variables in the CCAP2008 sample. Appendix Table A2 shows the frequency tables and question wording for the CCES2008 variables.

ANES2008: The American National Election Study Panel Study (ANES) is a telephone-recruited internet panel survey conducted in six waves from January to November, 2008 (for information on the NSF grant funding and study PIs see DeBell 2009). There were 3,049 survey respondents from all 50 states, who were recruited through random digit dialing (RDD). The dependent variable was developed from the question, “Did you give money to an individual candidate running for public office?” The variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if the respondent reported making a donation, and 0 otherwise, with an overall donating rate of 8.85%.

The explanatory variables income, education, PID, ideology, age, sex, marital status, church attendance, and race are coded consistent with the CCAP2008 variable coding. Three additional civic values are included in these models. Socialization for donating behavior, while important in the funnel of causality model (Campbell et al. 1960), is not well-defined in the literature. However, Bekkers (2005a) finds that individuals whose parents donated money are more likely to donate money themselves. To measure this impact of socialization respondents were asked if there were family or close friends who would be willing to lend them money if they really needed it. This is a dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if the respondent agreed with the statement, and 0 if they did not. Internal and external efficacies are summed totals created from responses to

the two-part efficacy questions (see Abramson 1983). Social trust is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the respondent agreed that most people could be trusted, and 0 otherwise, consistent with Uslaner (1999).¹⁰ For question wording and frequencies for all ANES2008 variables see Appendix Table A3.

MN2008: In response to the need for publicly available twin data for political scientists, the National Science Foundation funded the collection for a new political study during the run up to the 2008 election (PIs Hibbing, Alford, Hatemi, Smith; see Smith et al. 2012). The respondents were selected from the Minnesota Twin and Family Registry. This registry is birth-based, and contains approximately 8,000 twin pairs born between 1936 and 1995. All of the twins included in the survey sample were recruited from 1983-1990, and age between 53 and 61 years (see Lykken et al.1990; Kreuger and Johnson 2002). The survey was completed by over 1300 individuals, including 900 twin pairs.¹¹ For most of the respondents the survey was completed over the internet, with 93 completing paper versions because their internet access was limited. Respondents were originally contacted by letter through US Mail, and were offered \$35 compensation for participating. The length of the survey ran 30-40 minutes, and the completion rate was

¹⁰ For the external efficacy and social trust questions, the ANES split the sample to test the effects of question wording. Both versions of the question were combined into a single measure for both variables. To test for question wording effects a dummy variable is included in the regression model (coded 1 if respondent received alternate question wording and 0 otherwise), if the dummy variable is not significant there are no significant question wording effects and the model can be re-estimated with the dummy variable (for a description of issues with question wording and split-sample designs see Presser et al. 2004; Schuman and Presser 1981). There were no question wording effects found for either external efficacy or social trust in the models.

¹¹ Data collection was supported by a National Science Foundation grant (#SES-0721378) to the study authors (John R. Hibbing, PI).

61%.¹² All surveys were completed between July 24, 2008 and December 22, 2008. For the bulk of respondents, the survey was completed during the early period of the fall 2008 presidential election campaign. A total of 84 out of 1202 respondents completed the survey after the general election in November.

The dependent variable in the MN2008 study is dichotomous and developed from the question, “Have you ever done [each of] the following: contributed money to a political party or candidate or to any other political cause?”¹³ This is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if an individual reported making a donation, and 0 otherwise, with an overall donating rate of 45.58%. Although not asking specifically about behavior related to an election, the survey was given during the 2008 presidential election, which may cue people to think more about their political behavior.

In the MN2008 sample income, education, PID, ideology, age, sex, marital status, church attendance, and political interest are coded in the same manner as the variables in the CCAP2008 variables. A series of additional civic values are measured in this study. External efficacy is coded consistently with the ANES2008 sample, using a summed total created from responses to the two-part efficacy questions. Political trust is a 3-point ordinal scale, ranging from low political trust to high political trust. To measure political knowledge, respondents were asked five questions about the US political system, the number of correct answers is summed to create a knowledge score. Political discussion is

¹² The cooperation rate is based on the total number of individuals completing the survey divided by sum of the total requests sent minus the number of non-contacts from return to sender or recently deceased.

¹³ All regression models are run in Mplus version 5.0 using probit regression, and are clustered by family.

a 3-point ordinal scale, measuring how often respondents have political discussions with others. Political and community group memberships are coded as 0 if respondents report not being members of any groups, 1 if they are members but not active in the groups, and 2 if they are active members of any of the respective groups.

The frequencies of all MN2008 variables are shown in Appendix Table A4.

Probit regressions are estimated¹⁴ and all MN2008 and VA1990 models are run in Mplus version 5.0, and clustered by family to control for non-independence. Values for missing observations were estimated for the socio-demographic variables, except age, using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Estimation (Enders 2010) in Mplus 5.0, for all MN2008 and VA1990 models.

VA1990: The VA1990 sample used here is a follow-up survey of a large population of kinships, from the Mid Atlantic Twin Registry (MATR) that includes twins and, when available, their nuclear family members (i.e., co-twin, spouse, non-twin sibling, parents). Respondents ($n \sim 30,000$) answered a Health and Lifestyle Questionnaire (HLQ) in 1988 that measured a large array of social and behavioral traits, to include personality, parental giving, and attitudes. Two years later, a subset of respondents over age 40, also took part in a Health, Habits and Opinion (HHO) survey follow up to the MATR and a Health and Personality Survey, including approximately 4,200 twins aged 40-93 completed this survey ($\mu=64$, $\sigma=7.9$; 27.2% males), which assessed donating activity. This subsample consists of national mailers sent to AARP members, with respondents distributed across the US. These surveys include attitudes, demographics, and other personal information about each of the respondents, including

¹⁴ Logit models were also estimated for all VA1990 and MN2008 models; however, the probit models were selected as they provided a better fit to the data.

personality questionnaires and donating behaviors. All analyses are based upon this subset of respondents.

Participants responded to the question, “Please check all groups to which you have made a donation in the past year: church/synagogue, political organizations, religious charities, other charities, animal rights groups, environmental groups, pro-life groups, pro-choice groups, medical research, local welfare groups, TV evangelists, or other.” Donations to political groups were selected as they are the most important to politics and elections in general, and the focus of this dissertation. A dichotomous dependent variable is created from this question, taking the value of one if the individual reported making a donation to a political group(s) and zero otherwise, with an overall donating rate of 27.61%.

For the VA1990 survey income, education, age, sex, marital status, and church attendance are coded consistently with the variables in the CCAP2008. Because the survey instrument was not designed by political scientists or for use in political behavior models the PID and ideology are variables are constructed differently in this sample. Partisanship is a 3-point index, 1 for Democrats, 2 for “varies”, and 3 for Republican. There is no question asking about self-identified ideology in the survey. Therefore, ideology in this study consists of a 28-item Wilson-Patterson (1968) issue index, providing a liberal to conservative ideological scale created using confirmatory factor analyses. Factor loadings and RMSEA for this factor is displayed in Appendix Table A6.¹⁵ To measure the impact of socialization respondents were asked if the people in their lives (his or her twin, children, parents, other relatives, and friends) would be

¹⁵ All CFAs were performed in Mplus version 5, and were clustered by family.

willing to lend them ‘a few hundred dollars’ if they really needed it. These responses are summed, to create a measure of the culture of giving money a respondent lives in.

Frequencies for all VA1990 variables are shown in Appendix Table A5.

Analysis and Results

Socio-demographic Models

Tables 3.1 and 3.2 display the estimates from the socio-demographic regression models for the CCAP2008, CCES2008, ANES2008, MN2008, and VA1990; the correlation matrices for the variables used in the models are presented in Appendix Tables A7-A13. The relationships between the socio-demographic variables and making a donation are consistent across the surveys and support the expectations set forth above. As predicted by the basic SES model, income and education have positive and significant influences on donating in every model. Similarly, the effect of age on donating is positive and significant, as expected.

In all of the models except the ANES2008 models men are significantly more likely than women to make donations, as expected, and being male is the best predictor of donating behavior in the CCAP2008 and MN2008 models. Marital status, while fairly consistent across models, does not perform as expected given previous literature, which finds that individuals who are married are more likely to participate (Conway 2000, 22). However, there is no evidence of such a relationship in these models. Marital status has a negative influence on donating in the CCAP2008 and CCES2008 models, but not in the models using the ANES2008, MN2008, or VA1990 samples. The correlations between marital status and making a donation show that in the ANES2008 and MN2008 data there

are positive correlations, and insignificant correlations for the other samples (see Tables A3.7-A3.11).

Table 3.1: Logit Analysis of Probability of Making a Political Donation, Random Samples, Socio-Demographic Models

	Model CCAP3.1	Model CCAP3.2	Model CCES 3.1	Model CCES 3.2	Model ANES 3.1	Model ANES 3.2
Ideology	-0.169***	-0.172***	-0.363***	-0.364***	-0.192	-0.182
Liberal-	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Conservative						
Democrat-	-0.049	-0.034	-0.164***	-0.163***	-0.152	-0.190
Republican	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Male	0.370***	0.365***	0.250***	0.252**	0.054	0.028
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.19)	(0.20)
Age	0.028***	0.029***	0.028***	0.028***	0.025***	0.030***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Married	-0.245***	-0.241***	-0.262***	-0.259***	-0.123	-0.074
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.17)
Income	0.225***	0.226***	0.344***	0.343***	0.310**	0.273**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.14)	(0.12)
Education	0.192***	0.191***	0.367***	0.366***	0.638**	0.629***
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Church	0.086***	0.083***	0.024*	0.024***	0.029	0.063
Attendance	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.06)
African-		0.102		0.017		-0.024
American		(0.12)		(0.06)		(0.20)
Hispanic		0.192*		-0.095		-0.728***
		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.20)
Other Minority		0.382**		0.098		0.253
		(0.17)		(0.12)		(0.57)
Intercept	-4.495	-4.594	-3.457	-3.450	-5.718	-5.742
Pseudo-R ²	0.059	0.060	0.113	0.113	0.129	0.141
N	12324	12324	23896	23896	1914	1904

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

This suggests that there is no direct relationship between marital status and making a donation. Marital status is related to age in the CCAP2008 and CCES2008 models; when age is removed from the models, marital status becomes insignificant.

This may indicate that older individuals, who may be unmarried due to loss of a spouse, are more likely to respond to national phone surveys, as this relationship was not observed in the other studies.

Table 3.2: Probit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, Population-Based Samples, Socio-Demographic Models

	Model MN3.1	Model VA3.1
Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.136*** (0.05)	-0.252*** (0.04)
Republican-Democrat	0.031 (0.06)	0.088*** (0.03)
Male	0.293*** (0.08)	0.234*** (0.05)
Age	0.031** (0.02)	0.012*** (0.00)
Married	0.029 (0.10)	-0.049 (0.05)
Income	0.133*** (0.03)	0.200*** (0.03)
Education	0.254*** (0.04)	0.169*** (0.02)
Church Attendance	0.083 (0.03)	0.032 (0.02)
Intercept	-3.204	-3.208
pseudo-R ²	0.195	0.134
N	1321	3967

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

The effects of ideology and partisanship, although generally consistent across studies, are inconsistent with the previous literature. The literature finds Republicans are more likely than Democrats to make donations (e.g., Francia et al. 2003), and this is true in model VA3.1, a survey collected in 1990. However, this is not true in any of the models using surveys collected in 2008. These models find either no partisanship differences or, in the CCES2008 models, a Democratic advantage in making donations.

This finding, though inconsistent with donating studies dating from the 1990s, is compatible with the descriptive evidence about Democratic advantages in fundraising during the 2008 election (Magleby 2008).

These differences in the effects of partisanship over time may reflect a change in the global context, within which individuals make the decision to donate. Through the 1990s this global context, of large money donations from few individuals, favored Republican fundraising, and led to more Republicans making donations than Democrats. Various changes in this context occurred throughout the 2000s, including the use of the internet to attract large amounts of low-dollar donors, as described in Chapter 1. The specific influences of these changes are not investigated here, but their overall effect seems clear; economic and structural changes allow for Democrats and Republicans to have an equal likelihood of making a donation holding all other forces constant.

Ideology, too, is consistent across models, samples, and with the partisanship findings described above. The prior literature described donors as being largely Republicans, who hold extreme conservative values. Thereby assuming, yet rarely testing, that conservatives are more likely to donate than liberals. In every model, except the ANES2008 models where there is no relationship between ideology and donating, liberals are more likely to make donations than are conservatives, and this is the best predictor in the CCAP2008 and MN2008 models. This may not be a surprising finding in the 2008 models, as Democrats were either no less likely or more likely than Republicans to make a donation, and could suggest that partisanship is driving this relationship. If it were true that partisanship is motivating the relationship between making donations and ideology, as suggested by the previous literature, conservatives would be more likely to

make donations than Democrats in the VA1990 models. This is not the case, suggesting differences in the underlying processes for partisanship versus ideology, a relationship further investigated in Chapter 4. Across samples and time periods individuals who are more liberal are more likely to make donations.

One caveat to this is that the VA1990 models use the attitude-based Wilson-Patterson index to measure ideology, while all of the other samples utilize self-reported ideology measures. The VA1990 survey instrument did not include a question about self-reported ideology, so I am unable to include it in the model. It is possible, though extremely unlikely, that although the respondents hold more liberal attitudes, they self-identify as conservatives, which would lead to altered results (in the direction of the previous literature) in model VA3.1. The correlation between the Wilson-Patterson index and PID in this sample is 0.225, indicating a strong relationship between conservative ideology and self-reporting as a Republican (Table A13).

There is limited evidence that frequent church attendance increases the likelihood of making a donation. There is a positive relationship in the CCAP2008 and CCES2008 models, but no significant correlations between church attendance and making a donation for any of the samples. The prediction receives some support, although church attendance does not seem to be a large influence in the decision to make a donation.

The addition of the race variables into the socio-demographic models is the only difference between the 3.1 and 3.2 models for the CCAP2008, CCES2008, and ANES2008 samples. The effects of race on making political donations could only be investigated in these studies because the vast majority of respondents were white in the MN2008 and VA1990 samples. The effects of race change across all three sets of

models, making any conclusions questionable. This may in large part be due to the differences in sample populations. The ANES2008 sample included a much larger proportion of minorities than did the CCAP2008 or CCES2008 samples. The correlations in Table A7 between the race variables and making a political donation do not show significant relationships, except for a negative correlation between Hispanics and making a donation in the ANES2008 study. Overall, there is not enough evidence to make any conclusions as to relationships between race and making a donation.

Overall, the explanatory variables in the socio-demographic models perform as expected based on the previous literature. The effects of race and marital status are inconsistent and difficult to draw conclusions about based on the results presented here, but this is not unexpected given the inconclusive findings of the previous literature discussed above. The socio-demographic profile for donors based on surveys conducted in 2008 is high income and education, older, male, and liberal. The next section adds civic values to the socio-demographic models.

Civic Value Models

The socio-demographic models with the additional civic value measures are presented in Tables 3.3 (CCAP2008, CCES2008, and ANES2008) and 3.4 (MN2008 and VA1990). Not all of the civic values measures are included in every model, as many were not included in the original survey instruments, as discussed above.

Political interest has a strong positive effect on making a donation, as expected, as evidenced in the CCAP2008, CCES2008, and MN2008 regression models and correlations. The effect of political interest in the regression models is so large that its inclusion alters the effects of other variables.

Some of the socio-demographic attributes become insignificant in the models; for example, sex in model CCES3.3. The inclusion of political knowledge (ANES3.4, and MN3.2-3.4) has a similar effect in the models, it is positive and significant. The large correlations between political interest, political knowledge, and making a donation highlight their import as influences, and this influence is larger than that of the socio-demographic factors. Interestingly, there are differing effects for the efficacy variables across samples. In ANES3.4 internal efficacy has a positive and significant effect in the model, while external efficacy is insignificant. However, across all of the MN2008 models external efficacy has a significant positive effect on making a donation.

The effects of socialization (ANES3.4 and VA3.2), operationalized here as the family willingly lending money to the individual, also has a positive effect on making a donation, as hypothesized. Both the regression models and correlations indicate that while significant, this only has a small influence on making a donation. The small role of socialization on adult behavior is consistent with work in political behavior arguing that familial socialization has its largest impact in adolescence and early adulthood (Beck and Jennings 1991).

Social and political trust, although related conceptually, have differing effects in the models (ANES3.4 and MN3.2-3.4). The previous literature has mixed expectations about the influence of social trust on political participation, with Putnam (2000) finding evidence in favor and Uslaner and Brown (2003) against. In model ANES3.4 and the correlations find a strong positive impact of social trust on making a donation. Political trust, however is not significant in the MN2008 models, nor is it significantly correlated with making a donation. This finding is not unexpected as the previous literature found

Table 3.3: Logit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, Random Samples, Civic Values Models

	Model CCAP3.3	Model CCES 3.3	Model ANES3.3	Model ANES3.4
Political Interest	1.493*** (0.12)	1.670*** (0.05)		
Lend Money			0.427* (0.218)	0.366* (0.22)
Internal Efficacy				0.281*** (0.07)
External Efficacy				0.073 (0.06)
Social Trust				0.404* (0.24)
Ideology	-0.150*** (0.05)	-0.356*** (0.03)	-0.199 (0.13)	-0.142 (0.12)
Liberal-Conservative				
Republican-Democrat	-0.063 (0.05)	-0.173*** (0.03)	-0.221** (0.11)	-0.237** (0.12)
Male	0.172*** (0.06)	0.026 (0.04)	-0.103 (0.21)	-0.269 (0.21)
Age	0.023** (0.00)	0.020*** (0.00)	0.026*** (0.01)	0.024*** (0.01)
Married	-0.201*** (0.07)	-0.268*** (0.04)	-0.116 (0.17)	-0.035 (0.18)
Income	0.177*** (0.03)	0.286*** (0.01)	0.321** (0.13)	0.240* (0.13)
Education	0.123*** (0.04)	0.275*** (0.02)	0.638*** (0.08)	0.517*** (0.09)
Church Attendance	0.070*** (0.02)	-0.003 (0.01)	0.040 (0.06)	0.016 (0.06)
African-American	0.230* (0.13)	0.084 (0.06)	-0.002 (0.31)	-0.005 (0.30)
Hispanic	0.269** (0.13)	-0.042 (0.14)	-0.641*** (0.21)	-0.545** (0.25)
Other Minority	0.498*** (0.19)	0.066 (0.10)	-0.147 (0.57)	-0.037 (0.52)
Intercept	-7.961	-6.920	-5.982	-7.666
pseudo-R ²	0.111	0.1912	0.1412	0.1717
N	12267	23832	1882	1874

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table 3.4: Probit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, Population-Based Samples, Civic Value Models

	Model MN3.2	Model MN3.3	Model MN3.4	Model VA3.2
Political Interest	0.633*** (0.06)	0.537*** (0.07)	0.502*** (0.07)	
Lend Money				0.045** (0.02)
External Efficacy	0.174*** (0.03)	0.169*** (0.03)	0.140*** (0.03)	
Political Trust	-0.077 (0.08)	-0.033 (0.08)	-0.060 (0.09)	
Political Knowledge	0.265*** (0.03)	0.255*** (0.03)	0.245*** (0.03)	
Political Discussion		0.206*** (0.06)	0.152** (0.07)	
Political Group Membership			0.385*** (0.07)	
Community Group Membership			0.207*** (0.05)	
Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.031 (0.05)	-0.021 (0.05)	-0.032 (0.06)	-0.252*** (0.04)
Republican-Democrat	-0.045 (0.06)	-0.041 (0.06)	-0.035 (0.06)	0.087*** (0.03)
Male	0.086 (0.09)	0.088 (0.09)	0.070 (0.09)	0.234*** (0.05)
Age	0.009 (0.02)	0.008 (0.02)	0.007 (0.02)	0.012*** (0.00)
Married	0.131 (0.10)	0.132 (0.10)	0.137 (0.11)	-0.044 (0.05)
Income	0.099*** (0.03)	0.099*** (0.03)	0.106*** (0.03)	0.192*** (0.03)
Education	0.104** (0.05)	0.098** (0.05)	0.083* (0.05)	0.166*** (0.02)
Church Attendance	0.066** (0.03)	0.070** (0.03)	0.025 (0.03)	0.032** (0.02)
Intercept	-4.312	-4.375	-4.238	-3.318
pseudo-R ²	0.400	0.407	0.453	0.136
N	1320	1319	1319	3967

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

no evidence that higher political trust is related to political participation (Citrin 1974; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 147-50).

Involvement in both community and political organizations are associated with a higher probability of making a donation, as predicted. This is related to the findings that frequent church attendance and higher social trust are positively related to making a donation. All of these are pieces of civic engagement, thought to be strongly predictive of political participation (Putnam 2000). The model that accounts for the most variance is MN3.4, with a pseudo- R^2 of 0.453, due to the inclusion of numerous civic values. In the MN2008, CCAP2008, and CCES2008 models the best predictor of making donations is political interest. Across the MN2008, CCAP2008, and CCES2008 models the civic values are the best predictors, rather than socio-demographics, as predicted by political behavior research (Verba et al. 1995). This is not to say that socio-demographics are not important predictors of donating, in model ANES3.3 the best predictor is education. Overall, civic values increase the explanatory power of the models, but they do not supplant the influence of socio-demographics. The civic value donor profile identified by these models is an individual with high political interest, knowledge, efficacy, social trust, that is engaged in community and political groups, frequently discuss politics, and were socialized into giving money by their families.

Discussion

The empirical models, developed based on the previous literature and composed of socio-demographics and civic values, perform consistently with expectations and found in the political behavior literature is that donors hold conservative ideological beliefs. This was not found here, as liberal ideology predicted donating in all but the

across surveys and time periods. With only one notable exception, ideology, the socio-demographic variables influence making a donation as expected. The assumption often ANES2008 models (where no relationship was found between ideology and donating). When civic values are included in the models, they somewhat alter the model results. In some cases the influence of the civic value, such as political interest, is so large it masks the effects of the socio-demographics. In general, however, the effects of these variables remain consistent when the civic values are included in the model. The magnitude of the change across models is due both to the number of civic values being added to the model, and which civic values are being added.

This is clear in Table 3.5, where the inclusion of political interest in the CCAP2008 and CCES2008 models, the only difference between the 3.2 and 3.3 models, increases the explanatory power of the models by 88% and 69% respectively. In comparison, the inclusion of socialization, external efficacy, and social trust in the ANES2008 model only increases the explanatory power of the model by 22%. The small role of socialization is mirrored in the VA1990 models, as the inclusion of this variable only increases the power of the model by 2%. For the MN2008 models there is a 132% increase in the explanatory power of the model when adding civic values. Of the civic values added to the MN2008 base model, political interest has the largest effect, increasing the explanatory power of the model by 68%. The substantial 132% increase provides strong evidence in favor of the civic value theory of political behavior. Some scholars have argued for a very narrow role for civic values (e.g., Verba et al. 1995) with SES variables, specifically income, almost completely explaining an individual's

decision to make a political donation. This study finds strong evidence that, while important, SES plays a smaller role than this literature suggests.

Table 3.5: Change in Pseudo-R² across Models

	Socio-Demographic Model	Civic Value Model	Absolute Change	Relative % Change
CCAP2008†	0.059	0.111	0.052	88%
CCES2008†	0.113	0.191	0.078	69%
ANES2008	0.141	0.172	0.031	22%
MN2008†	0.195	0.453	0.258	132%
VA1990	0.134	0.136	0.002	2%

†- Include political interest

This is not to say that the socio-demographic variables do not play an important role in the decision to make a donation. The relative import of the socio-demographics is clear and consistent across surveys and time periods. The socio-demographics that influence making a political donation in 1990 also influence donating in 2008. The one important exception to this stability is partisanship. Republicans are more likely to make donations in 1990, consistent with previous studies from the 1990s (e.g., Brown et al. 1995). This is no longer true in the 2008 samples, as Democrats are either more likely or no less likely to make a donation than Republicans. This relationship between donating and partisanship in 2008 may reflect a change in the global context, represented in part by mobilization efforts by candidates and parties (specifically by Obama), as much as individual changes within Democrats. The differing effect of partisanship across time periods is an important and previously unreported finding, and it will be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

The models presented here, including both socio-demographics and civic values, represent the baseline model of political donating. The average donor profile identified in the baseline model is of a high income, well-educated, liberal male, who is highly interested, knowledgeable, and efficacious, and is civically engaged in the community. These socio-demographics and civic values, while important, offer only minimum information on the numerous and important differences between individuals. If the behavior of interest varies at the individual level, the explanatory measures should similarly vary between individuals. Thus, the dissertation now turns to theories and models developed in social and personality psychology that allow for the identification and measurement of dispositional attributes unique to each individual. The following chapter extends the baseline model developed in this chapter by adding psychological attributes.

CHAPTER 4

THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY AND ATTITUDES

The vast majority of research on political donating behavior focuses on an individual's socio-demographics, specifically income. This is an intuitive explanation for donating behavior; those who have money to donate are the most likely donors.

However, individuals vary markedly on a wide variety of dispositional traits, including personality and attitudes, and the differences across individuals on these traits are associated with differences in behaviors, including political behaviors.


Recent studies have incorporated personality traits into models examining political participation (i.e., Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010); however, the focus has not been on donating specifically (i.e., Mondak and Halperin 2008). Although this research expands the theoretical and explanatory power of behavioral models, it remains limited. This chapter extends this emerging area of research in two important ways. First, I add political attitudes as predictors of making donations into the model. Political attitudes differ at the individual-level and are related to personality, party identification (PID), and ideology (Verhulst et al. 2012), and have proven important in predicting a wide array of behaviors, and appear important in predicting donating behavior. Second, this chapter considers several personality traits that have been implicated in donating behavior, but have remained absent in the study of political donating, to include Altruism, Social Desirability, and Eysenck's P. Indeed, explorations of political donating and personality have so far been limited to the Big 5 personality assessment (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008). A multi-discipline approach combining traditional political behavior measures

with psychological dispositional attributes is not new, but remains an underutilized method for studying political donating behavior.

The current chapter continues to develop this line of research, while grounding it in the framework developed by traditional political behavior theories. Returning to the modified funnel, this chapter focuses on the investigation of the psychological level, and its effects on both the SES level below it and on the decision to make a donation (Figure 4.1). That is, I expand the theoretical focus of the funnel of causality by including the dispositional traits of personality, attitudes, and ideology, which results in a more detailed explanation of those who choose to make a donation. These traits are considered together in this chapter because they share a basic structure of transmission, one that is genetically and environmentally informed, culminating in a world view that guides behavior (Eaves and Eysenck 1974; Eaves et al. 2011; Verhulst et al. 2010).

The chapter begins by detailing the previous studies that have linked personality, attitudes, ideology, and PID with political behavior generally, and when available, political donating specifically. The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to the development and estimation of empirical models to test this theoretical model. The empirical models in this chapter add measures of dispositional traits to the baseline socio-demographic models identified in the previous chapter. I first address the question, do personality and attitude traits influence an individuals' likelihood of making a donation? And if so, do these traits increase the explanatory power of the model above that of the socio-demographic traits identified in Chapter 3? The empirical models are estimated using three samples compiled at two different time periods, 1990 and 2008, which also allows consideration of the possibility of change in predictors over time.

Figure 4.1: A New Funnel of Causality – Relationships Investigated for Chapter 4



Note: Black arrows represent direct effects.

The Importance of Psychological Attributes

Personality is a combination of an individual's identity and experiences, which guides behavior, given the appropriate situation, and is important in understanding and explaining differences in behavior across individuals (Cooper 2010, 2).¹⁶ The "aim of psychology is to describe, explain and predict the behavior of organisms (people)" (Cooper 2010, 1), and personality is an important tool aiding in that goal. This is not to say that personality traits are fixed or unmalleable, or that they are not complex or

¹⁶ There are many different methods of measuring personality. The most common approach, and the one used here, relies on a taxonomical trait approach. That is, the numerous attributes that comprise one's personality are organized into a set of correlated traits that describe an individual's profile on several dimensions.

context dependent (Caprara and Cervone, 11). During the Behavioral Revolution, political scientists often saw little use for personality in studies of politics, rather viewing political behavior as the result of social and cultural influences (Pye 1965; Verba and Nye 1972, 13-15). Personality psychologists saw the usefulness of the incorporation of personality into participation models, as the decision to participate is complex with personality interacting with social and cultural influences, as opposed to each being mutually exclusive (Greenstein 1967; Levinson 1958).

There are numerous multi-trait assessments designed to evaluate the personality of individuals, including those used here, the Five Factor Model or Big 5, and the Big 3. The most widely used assessment in the literature over the last decade is the Five Factor Model (FFM; John et al. 2008; Costa, McCrae and Dye 1991). The traits measured in this assessment are Openness to Experience (intellectual curiosity and adventuresome tendencies; McCrea 1994), Conscientiousness (ambition and responsibility; De Raad and Perugini 2002), Extraversion (engagement – lively and sociable including affiliation, and impulsiveness – sensation-seeking and venturesome; Eysenck and Eysenck 1985), Agreeableness (desire to build and maintain positive relations with others; Graziano and Tobin 2002), and Neuroticism often modeled as Emotional Stability (anxiousness, depression, and feelings of guilt; Eysenck and Eysenck 1985).

An older, but equally valid assessment is Eysenck's Big 3, which provided a base for the development of the Big 5 traits. Eysenck's Big 3 includes Extraversion, the P-scale (authoritarianism, low openness to experience, and tough-mindedness), and Neuroticism, with additional sub-scales, including Social Desirability or the degree to which an individual 'lies' about engaging in socially acceptable behavior (Altemeyer

1996; Eysenck and Eysenck 1985; Francis 1991). Some overlap between the assessments is obvious, namely the inclusion of Extraversion and Neuroticism super-factors (Eysenck and Eysenck 1985). However, additional overlap may also exist; Eysenck (1992) theorizes that Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, rather than being separate high-level factors are actually two primary factor components of a third super-factor, P. Many scholars disagree with this idea (e.g., Costa and McCrae 1992), and the evidence for it remains mixed (Saggino 2000). Settling this question is outside of the scope of this dissertation, so both assessments are used in order to more fully investigate the role of personality in the decision to make a donation.

The Effects of Disposition on Donating

The literature studying political participation is vast, and often utilizes indices, comprised of multiple political behaviors. However, there are few studies of political participation that include personality (Mondak 2010, 11), and there are fewer still that have used personality to study political donating. These studies, using empirical models, can be classified into three general types.

First, studies that combine multiple political participatory behaviors into one index, which includes making a political donation as one of the behaviors. These studies advance the study of political participation in general, and are useful in deriving hypotheses; however, they do little to inform the study of making political donations. The results of these studies mirror those examining other participatory behaviors and those using indices not including donating. Higher scores on the traits of Openness to Experience and Extraversion are associated with higher levels of participation (Gerber et

al. 2011b; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), and higher Conscientiousness is associated with lower levels of participation (Gerber et al. 2011b).

Second, are two studies that empirically model the direct effects of personality on an individual's decision to make a political donation using a multiple-trait assessment, the Big 5 (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). The two studies show fairly consistent results, as they use the same data source. Both studies find little evidence of direct effects of any personality traits on making a political donation.

Both studies find small positive direct effects of Openness to Experience and Emotional Stability on political donating (Mondak 2010; Mondak et al. 2010). Mondak et al. (2010) also find negative direct effects of Conscientiousness in bivariate models; however, the significance of these three traits disappears when civic values are included in the model. People who score highly on Conscientiousness tend towards inflexibility and resistance to change (Mondak and Halperin 2008), and this is believed to lead them to be resistant to requests for donations, a common reason people choose to make donations (Bryant et al. 2003).

The negative relationship between Emotional Stability may be due to highly stable people having "solid grasps of their wallets (Mondak 2010, 161)". However, Neuroticism (the inverse) is characterized by anxiousness and worrying (McCrae and John 1992) and politics in general may feel threatening and undesirable to people who score highly on this trait, leading them to avoid participating and donating. In support of this thesis, Gerber et al. (2011b) found a small negative relationship between Neuroticism and a participation index including donating; however, this result did not replicate across samples. Neuroticism is also negatively correlated with Altruism (Rushton et al. 1989)

which may strongly influence donations. Therefore, the expectation here is for a negative relationship between Neuroticism and making a donation.

These two studies find no relationship between Extraversion and donating, inconsistent with studies on general participation and various specific participatory behaviors (e.g., Mondak and Halperin 2008; Vecchione and Caprara 2009). Due to this, Extraversion has presented a small puzzle in participatory models (Gerber et al. 2011a). Individuals who are more extraverted are more likely to engage in political activities that include a social aspect allowing engagement with others (Mondak 2010, 157). Making a political donation is often lumped into the group of passive participatory behaviors that extraverts are unlikely to engage in (e.g., Gerber et al. 2011a). Despite these previous null findings, a positive relationship is expected between Extraversion and making a political donation. The context within which an individual makes a donation is unknown, and may include a social component. Donations may be made in the privacy of one's home or while attending a campaign event, a behavior often associated with Extraversion (Mondak 2010, 158; Mondak et al. 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008). Additionally, Extraversion is strongly and positively correlated with Altruism (Rushton et al. 1989).

There is no evidence of a relationship between Agreeableness and political donations in the literature. However, this trait is commonly related to Altruism (McCrae and John 1992), and is positively related to time donations to political groups (Bekkers 2005b). Therefore, individuals with a higher score on the Agreeableness scale may be more likely to make a donation.

The two Big 3 traits not included in the Big 5 assessment, the P-scale and Social Desirability, are difficult to form expectations about, as no study has yet examined their

relationship with political participation, or incorporated these traits in one model focusing specifically on donating. However, high scores on the P-scale may lead to less donating, as this trait is associated with lower levels of Altruism (Rushton et al. 1989) and less Agreeableness. Social Desirability is highly context-dependent (i.e., what is desirable in one location or time may not be in another), which makes it difficult to create expectations about its influence on donating. However, it has been found to be correlated with economic liberalism (Verhulst et al. 2010) which may itself be correlated with donating, and is a motivation for making charitable donations (Piliavin and Charg 1990). Therefore, it is expected that Social Desirability is positively associated with making a donation.

Finally, there are studies examining donating as the behavior of interest, but focusing on the importance of a single personality trait. This approach was relatively common among political scientists for many decades before the use of multiple-trait personality assessments became widespread (Mondak 2010, 11-12; Sniderman 1975, 16). A link between Altruism and non-political donating is the best documented. People who are more altruistic are more likely to make donations in general. The majority of the research focuses on charitable donating (e.g., Piliavin and Charg 1990); however, Altruism, and Generativity (desire to provide for the next generation and closely related to Altruism, Erikson 1950), may also be associated with political donating (Fowler and Kam 2007; Peterson and Duncan 1999). These findings are significant because they highlight the importance of personality traits in studies of political donating. They also help guide future studies by suggesting which traits may be influential; for example, other

personality traits that are associated with higher levels of Altruism may also influence the decision to make a political donation.

It is important to note that concept of Altruism is not without controversy across disciplines. Different definitions of Altruism exist, and some scholars argue that Altruism does not exist, cannot be measured, or that no behavior is truly altruistically motivated (for a discussion see Batson 1987). While this debate is outside the scope of this dissertation, the motivations for political donating may be more likely to be self-interested, purposive (Francia et al. 2003) or participatory (Ansolabehere et al. 2003). Therefore, rather than considering Altruism as a primary motivator for political donating, it is more likely that a subset of individuals who make political donations may also be more Altruistic.

In addition to measures of personality, it is also useful to include ideology (as discussed in Chapter 3), political attitudes, and party identification (PID) in models of political donating. These traits predict, or at least are related to, policy preferences and political behaviors (Mondak 2010; Verhulst et al. 2010). However, attitudes, ideology, and PID present some difficulty to interpret and include in behavior models. Attitudes can be measured discretely; for example, attitudes on abortion can be explored in relation to donations to pro-life groups. Attitudes can also be measured as a summary scales to measure the broader concept of ideology (Treier and Hillygus 2009; Wilson and Patterson 1968). Alternatively, ideology can also be measured by a self-identified left-right likert-type scale, as utilized in Chapter 3. This concept may be a good representation of the individual's overall ideological disposition and identity, but may have little relation to the underlying attitudes. Finally, PID is a combination of

attachment to parties and candidates, general political orientation, underlying political attitudes, and local and electoral context. Recognizing these concerns, attitudes, ideology, and PID provide critical predictors across a wide array of traits. Thus, I now turn to the literature on discrete attitudes, summary attitude scales, self-reported ideology, and PID, their relationships with personality, and as potential influences on donating behavior.

Attitudes

Attitudes are an important dispositional component of affiliation and from a behavioral standpoint there is a deep-seeded connection between personality and attitudes. Some posit these may be, to some degree, different representations of the same underlying trait (Eaves and Eysenck 1974; Verhulst et al. 2012). In order to discuss these political attitudes in a systematic manner they are divided into three latent attitude dimensions (specific operationalization and measurement is discussed below; e.g., Verhulst et al. 2012): economic attitudes, social attitudes, and defense/military attitudes.

Studies using the Big 5 assessment find Extraversion, Conscientiousness, and Emotional Stability predict more conservative social and economic attitude positions, Openness to Experience predicts more liberal social and economic attitude positions, and Agreeableness predicts more liberal economic attitude positions and more conservative social attitude positions (Carney et al. 2008; Gerber et al. 2010; Gerber et al. 2011a). More recent work finds that personality and attitudes develop together, suggesting a correlation between them rather than causation (Verhulst et al. 2012). Thus, the previous focus on causation rather than correlation suggests that the potential effects of political attitudes in political donating models are underexplored.

As discussed in Chapter 3, work in political behavior has found significant ideological differences among political donors (Francia et al. 2003), which may be more apparent when examining the underlying political attitudes of ideology. People with more liberal economic attitudes tend to favor policies such as foreign aid, immigration, welfare spending, and often oppose tax cuts. These policies are related to spending money to the benefit of others and society and may also lead individuals to use their own money to benefit others through donating.

Attitudes about social issues often engender strong feelings, and may lead individuals to seek out candidates or groups that represent these views. The strength of preferences on salient issues, such as abortion, increases an individual's likelihood of making a donation to groups associated with those interests (Schuman and Presser 1981, 240-47). For example, holding conservative positions on evolution or abortion may lead people to donate to candidates or groups with conservative political agendas, while attitudes that are more liberal may lead people to donate to groups that suit these agendas. There is no evidence in the literature that would suggest an association between militarism attitudes and making a political donation. Therefore, no relationship is expected for militarism attitudes and donating in this dissertation.

Ideology

In political behavior research, ideology is generally conceptualized as a shared framework based around social and economic topics that can be used to evaluate candidates, campaigns, and issues (Conover and Feldman 1981). Psychologists agree that ideology is a shared framework (Jost et al. 2009), although the basis for this framework differs. One of the most influential theories of liberalism-conservatism

suggests that it is another dimension of personality, organized around the political and social attitudes discussed above (Jost et al. 2009; Wilson 1973, 1-2). In this view, ideology is much more stable and deeply held than political behaviorists theorize (e.g., Converse 1964). A single continuum of ideology can be empirically measured, and individuals placed upon it systematically, through the creation of a single factor of attitudes, identified as either liberal or conservative (Wilson and Patterson 1968). The relationship between this Wilson-Patterson ideology scale and personality shows a large correlation between conservatism and the P-scale, and liberalism and Social Desirability (Verhulst et al. 2010).

This view and measurement of ideology is narrower in scope, although complementary, to the operationalization of ideology used in political behavior research. Those measures of ideology are based on individuals' self-reported position on a three or seven-point likert scale. Scholars continue to debate whether individuals can adequately understand and apply these labels in order to appropriately place themselves on the scale (Treier and Hillygus 2009). However, despite the controversy, this measurement technique is still the accepted standard in individual-level political behavior research.

Several studies by political scientists have attempted to predict self-identified ideology using the Big 5 personality assessment. These studies have been consistent in their findings, Openness to Experience is associated with more liberal ideologies (Gerber et al. 2010; Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003; Jost et al. 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; McCrae 1996; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, and Richter 1993; van Hiel, Kossowska, and Mervielde 2000; van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez 2004) while Emotional Stability and Conscientiousness are

associated with more conservative ideologies (Gerber et al. 2010; Mondak 2010, 128-30; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Riemann et al. 1993). As found in Chapter 3, being more liberal makes an individual more likely to make a donation. Additionally, a more liberal self-reported ideology is positively associated with Altruism (Zettler and Hilbig 2010; Zettler, Hilbig and Haubrich 2011).

Party Identification

Closely related to ideology in the political science literature is the concept of party identification (PID). The concept of PID is considered extremely influential on political behavior, and reflects the deeply held feelings of attachment that individuals hold for a political party (Campbell et al. 1960). Early conceptualizations of PID focused exclusively on the social and cultural influences, largely rejecting any role of psychological attributes (Campbell et al. 1960; Niemi and Jennings 1991). Political behavior scholars have only recently become interested in the potential association between personality and PID.

The majority of this work has searched for direct effects of personality on an individual's PID using the Big 5 assessment. Agreeableness and Openness to Experience predict affiliation with parties on the left, while Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Extraversion predict affiliation with parties on the right (Barbaranelli et al. 2007; Caprara et al. 1999; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Rentfrow et al. 2009). Expanding this idea, Gerber et al. (2012) find that Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Openness to Experience predict the degree of attachment to parties.

In summary, the previous research clearly demonstrates important relationships between ideology, attitudes, PID, and personality. The potential influences of these traits

on political behavior are understudied, although the literature does offer a set of testable expectations about their relationship to political donating. No study has yet included all of these dispositional traits in a theoretical or empirical model; the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to this task.

Methods

Three samples are utilized for comparison in this chapter; the VA1990 and MN2008 population-based studies of kinships, and the nationally representative CCAP2008. For specific information about each sample, see Chapter 3. The VA1990 survey was given before the significant increase in individual political donations, whereas the other samples were collected at the (current) peak. Comparison across these surveys allows assessment of changes that may have occurred in the predictors of donations during this time period. This is important as the election-specific context surrounding the 2008 surveys may also lead to a change in predictors.

Additionally, as mentioned above, studies examining the relationships between donating and personality have thus far utilized only one personality assessment – the FFM. In the VA1990 models, I utilize an older but equally valid personality assessment, Eysenck's Big 3. This allows for the inclusion of previously unexplored personality traits, the P-scale and Social Desirability, into the donating models. Two versions of the FFM personality assessment are also utilized, a 44-question Big 5 Inventory (BFI) version (John, Donahue and Kentle 1991) in the MN2008, and a shortened Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003) in the CCAP2008. Models are estimated using the same techniques, and dependent and explanatory variables described in Chapter 3. Only personality and attitude variables used in this

chapter are described below. All other variables used in the models, including information about the dependent variables and specific estimation techniques are detailed in Chapter 3. Each of the models estimated in this chapter are built on the baseline models that account for the most variance identified in Chapter 3; these are models VA3.2, MN3.1, and CCAP3.2.

VA1990: The personality assessment utilized in this survey is the revised, shortened Big 3 Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (the EPQ-R-S), that measures Extraversion, P, and Neuroticism (Eysenck 1947), with a subscale that measures Social Desirability (Eysenck and Eysenck 1975). A separate measure of Altruism was also assessed in this study by the Interpersonal Reactivity Scale (Davis 1980). Traits were created using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and items were dropped if they did not significantly contribute to the trait in order to maximize empirical validity (see Appendix Table B1).

As discussed in Chapter 3, ideology is measured in the VA1990 with the 28-item Wilson-Patterson (1968) attribute index, providing a liberal to conservative ideological scale. Previous explorations of the Wilson-Patterson index have reduced this scale to three attitude dimensions, defense/military attitudes, social-sexual attitudes, and economic attitudes (Verhulst et al. 2010); confirmatory factor analyses, including factor loadings and RMSEA for these factors are shown in Appendix Table B2.¹⁷ All attitude traits are coded from liberal to conservative; for correlation and regression coefficients a negative sign would indicate the importance of liberal values, while a positive sign would indicate the importance of conservative values.

¹⁷ All CFAs were performed in Mplus version 5, and were clustered by family.

MN2008: This sample uses the 44-question version of the Big 5 personality assessment with scales created for the traits of Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience (John, Donahue and Kentle 1991; John and Srivastava 1999). Ideology is measured using the Wilson-Patterson ideology index and three corresponding attitude subscales created as described above for the VA1990 data. Factor structures for all personality and attitudes scales are shown in Appendix Tables B3 and B4.

CCAP2008: Personality is measured in this survey using the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) questionnaire based on the FFM personality assessment (Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann 2003). Each trait is measured with two questions using a seven-point scale for each, these responses are then used to create a mean score for each individual for each trait. Altruism, in this survey, is measured using behavioral questions, asking how the respondents would have reacted in situations requiring altruistic behavior. There are four behaviors included in the altruism measure and a mean score is created for each respondent. See Appendix Table B5 for components and frequencies for each trait. No attitude measures are available in this survey, so the self-reported ideology measure is used, as described in Chapter 3.

Analysis and Results

The analysis proceeds in three sections. First, the significant correlations between donating behavior and the personality and attitude measures are identified and compared across studies. Second, regression models simultaneously explore the effects of the traditional socio-demographic predictors and the personality and attitude traits

(when available) on the decision to make a donation, for each of the samples. Finally, the possibility of comparisons across models is discussed.

Correlations between the donation variables, personality traits, and attitudes are displayed below for each study. Only correlations with coefficients above 0.1 are displayed in the table below, due to the difficulty of interpreting correlations below this value (Cohen 1988; for correlations between all variables used in the models see Appendix Tables B6-B9).

Not all of the trait-donation correlations reach significance, the ones that do conform to expectations. Liberal economic attitudes show a consistent relationship to making a donation. This relationship is also found for liberal social-sexual attitudes and

Table 4.1: Significant Correlations between Political Donations, Personality, and Attitudes

	VA1990	MN2008	CCAP2008
Social Desirability	0.105 (0.074 0.136)		
Wilson-Patterson Index (Liberal- Conservative)	-0.110 (-0.141 -0.080)		
Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.142 (-0.172 -0.111)		
Economic Attitudes	-0.229 (-0.258 -0.199)	-0.102 (-0.155 -0.049)	
Openness to Experience		0.138 (0.084 0.190)	
Neuroticism		-0.109 (-0.162 -0.055)	
Altruism			0.166 (0.150 0.181)

Note: Higher scores on the personality factors denote higher levels of the trait, higher scores on the attitude factors denote more conservative positions. Relationships above 0.1 are displayed; correlations not shown are not significant. Point biserial correlations are used for dichotomous-continuous pairs. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals.

ideology more generally in the form of the Wilson-Patterson index. Regarding personality, Openness to Experience and Altruism are both significantly correlated with making a donation. These two variables have the strongest evidence supporting a relationship with making donations in the prior literature, and the correlations are in the expected direction.

Regression Analyses

The regression analyses are presented in the following tables; only the personality and attitude traits that reached statistical significance are displayed in the tables, full models with all variables can be found in Appendix Tables B10-B15. Consistent with the correlations presented in Table 4.1 and the expectations, several of the personality traits

Table 4.2: Probit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, VA1990

	Model VA4.1	Model VA4.2	Model VA4.3
Altruism	0.166** (0.05)	0.068 (0.05)	0.124*** (0.05)
Altruism*W-P Index			0.097 (0.07)
Neuroticism	-0.091** (0.04)	-0.018 (0.04)	-0.090** (0.04)
P-Scale	0.961*** (0.18)	0.472** (0.21)	0.964*** (0.18)
Extraversion	0.111*** (0.04)	0.115*** (0.04)	0.112*** (0.04)
Social Desirability	0.378*** (0.05)	0.211*** (0.05)	0.379*** (0.05)
Wilson-Patterson (Liberal- Conservative)	-0.241*** (0.04)		-0.238*** (0.04)
Economic Attitudes		-0.394*** (0.06)	
Republican- Democrat	0.076*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)	0.076*** (0.03)
Intercept	-3.237	-3.099	-3.113
pseudo-R ²	0.160	0.179	0.180
N	3950	3950	3950

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

reach statistical significance indicating an important influence on making a political donation.

An important finding in across models is the positive and significant effect of Altruism, corroborating research in psychology on making charitable donations. Consistent with the VA1990 models and the correlations in Table 4.1, individuals with greater scores on the Altruism measure are more likely to donate. This finding holds true across all CCAP2008 models. The relative influence of Altruism in these models is much larger compared to the influence of the trait in the VA1990 models. This may be due to the difference in measurement. In the VA1990 it is measured using a traditional

Table 4.3: Logit Analysis of Probability of Making a Political Donation, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP4.1	Model CCAP4.2
Altruism	0.408*** (0.03)	0.356*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.092** (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.028 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.153*** (0.04)	0.139*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.074** (0.03)	0.072** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.047 (0.03)	-0.064** (0.03)
Ideology Liberal- Conservative (self-placement)	-0.149** (0.06)	-0.127** (0.06)
Political Interest		1.267*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.038 (0.06)	-0.058 (0.06)
Intercept	-5.012	-7.668
Pseudo-R ²	0.091	0.126
N	10101	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

trait assessment scale, whereas in the CCAP2008 it is measured using an altruistic behavioral scale. While both specifications are valid, the version used in the CCAP2008 is in part measured by participation in other behaviors considered to be altruistic, so it is more likely to find a significant relationship with making donation, and find that influence to be very large.

As predicted, Openness to Experience has a positive influence on political

Table 4.4: Probit Analysis of Probability of Making a Political Donation, MN2008

	Model MN4.1	Model MN4.2	Model MN4.3	Model MN4.4
Openness to Experience	0.215*** (0.06)	0.220*** (0.06)	0.221*** (0.06)	0.024 (0.07)
Neuroticism	-0.265*** (0.08)	-0.272*** (0.08)	-0.270*** (0.08)	-0.156* (0.09)
Conscientiousness	-0.194** (0.09)	-0.182** (0.09)	-0.185** (0.09)	-0.181* (0.10)
Wilson-Patterson Index (Liberal-Conservative)	-0.221** (0.09)			
Economic Attitudes		-0.550** (0.23)		-0.471* (0.26)
Ideology Liberal- Conservative (self-placement)			-0.112** (0.05)	
Political Interest				0.551*** (0.07)
Discuss Politics				0.224*** (0.06)
Trust in Government				-0.045 (0.08)
Political Knowledge				0.249*** (0.03)
Political Efficacy (external)				0.159*** (0.03)
Democrat-Republican	0.001 (0.05)	-0.009 (0.05)	0.027 (0.06)	-0.046 (0.06)
Intercept	-3.512	-3.532	-3.346	-4.562
Pseudo-R ²	0.221	0.221	0.222	0.418
N	1322	1322	1321	1319

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

donating in the CCAP2008 and MN2008 models. People who score higher on this trait seem likely to participate in politics generally (Mondak and Halperin 2008; Vecchione and Caprara 2009), and this relationship extends to political donating. Openness, however, is no longer significant when political interest is added to model CCAP4.2, consistent with findings reported by Mondak et al. (2010). One interpretation of this finding is that Openness to Experience has only an indirect influence on individuals' decision to donate. An alternative explanation is that the impact of political interest is very large and masks the influence of variables that have a smaller impact. This view is consistent with findings on interest and socio-demographics in Chapter 3.

Extraversion, consistent with the expectations here but contrary to other work predicting political donating (Mondak et al. 2010), has a positive and significant effect across the VA1990 and CCAP2008 models. Based on the combined literatures, making a political donation seems unlikely to be a “passive activity” engaged in by introverts, though such is suggested in the recent political science scholarship (Gerber et al. 2011a). The specific context of the donation, as suggested above, may reconcile disparate findings and more in-depth explorations of the effects of this trait on donating behavior may shed more light on the relationship between trait and behavior.

There are significant findings for Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness as expected; however, these effects are not consistent across studies. Neuroticism performs as predicted in the MN2008 and Model VA4.1 models, being negatively related to donations. Individuals scoring higher on this trait tend to be anxious, nervous, and shy, which may lead them to stay away from politics. For Agreeableness, there is a positive relationship with making a donation in the CCAP2008

models consistent with expectations and a general understanding of the trait, but no evidence of an association in the MN2008 models.

The relationship between Conscientiousness and making a donation is negative as expected and previously found in the literature. Conscientiousness is characterized by dependability and organization, and individuals who score high on this trait may prefer the status quo to change (Mondak and Halpern 2008). Politics is often characterized by change, and may be unappealing to people who are very conscientious or it may seem like their efforts make little difference in the overall process (Mondak 2010), explaining the negative relationship between this trait and participation, including donating.

Model VA4.1 uses the Wilson-Patterson liberal-conservative index to measure ideology. The more liberal an individual, the more likely they are to make a donation, consistent with predictions and the findings in Chapter 3. The positive significant finding for Altruism is consistent with the hypotheses, but the very large beta and positive finding for the P-scale is opposite of expectations. Including an interaction term between Altruism and the Wilson-Paterson Index in Model VA4.3 provides some explanation of these findings. The interaction term is not significant in the model, but the positive sign that remains for Altruism suggests that Altruism influences the decision to donate when ideology is at its average point, which in this sample is slightly conservative. This is as opposed to liberals, who are in general more likely to make a donation than conservatives. This is also consistent with the positive effect of the P-scale in the model, which is strongly correlated with conservatism (0.260 in the VA1990 sample), specifically conservative social-sexual attitudes (0.370 in the VA1990 sample; Verhulst

et al. 2010). Overall, Model VA4.3 suggests that Altruism may have a stronger impact on conservatives than liberals.

In order to compare with previous work, a traditional three-point self-reported ideology scale is substituted for the Wilson-Patterson ideology index in Model MN4.3 and is used in the CCAP2008 models. The finding that liberals are more likely to donate than conservatives is consistent across models, time periods, and populations, and is robust to specification.

When the Wilson-Patterson ideology scale is broken into three subscales in Models VA4.2 and MN4.2, the source of the relationship between making a donation and ideology becomes clearer. Rather than being ideologically liberal in general, donors tend to be economically liberal specifically. These economic attitudes include favorable positions on government spending for federal housing and foreign aid, both issues about giving money for general welfare purposes. In the models only one of the attitude factors is significant, this suggests a more complex relationship between donating and ideology than is captured by a simple self-identified ideology measure.

Contrary to the expectations and the significant correlation reported in Table 4.1 social-sexual attitudes are not significant. Because the effect of economic attitudes in the model is so large, it may be masking the effects of the other attitudes in the model. To investigate this possibility separate models are estimated with each of the attitudes individually (Table 4.5).

Model VA4.6, with only economic attitudes in the model, mirrors the results for Model VA4.2, with all three attitudes included. The influence of economic attitudes in the model is large, and significant. When economic attitudes are replaced with

defense/military and social-sexual attitudes in the models (VA4.4 and VA4.5) three interesting findings appear. First, Altruism is positive and significant in both of the models, but not in model VA4.6. This suggests that Altruism is a consistent and important influence on the decision to donate, but is not related to liberal economic attitudes. Second, Neuroticism is significant in VA4.4, suggesting a limited and conditional role in influencing donations. This also explains why it is significant in Model VA4.1 but not in Model VA4.2. Third, contrary to expectations liberal militarism attitudes do play a small yet significant role in influencing the decision to donate for some individuals. Models with only one of the attitude variables are also estimated with

Table 4.5: Probit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, VA1990

	Model VA4.4	Model VA4.5	Model VA4.6
Altruism	0.115** (0.05)	0.139*** (0.05)	0.055 (0.05)
Neuroticism	-0.138** (0.04)	-0.061 (0.04)	-0.022 (0.04)
P-Scale	0.826*** (0.18)	1.206*** (0.18)	0.298* (0.18)
Extraversion	0.112*** (0.04)	0.106*** (0.04)	0.117*** (0.04)
Social Desirability	0.412*** (0.05)	0.372*** (0.05)	0.193*** (0.05)
Militarism Attitudes	-0.078** (0.04)		
Social-Sexual Attitudes		-0.353*** (0.04)	
Economic Attitudes			-0.452*** (0.04)
Republican-Democrat	0.064** (0.03)	0.096*** (0.03)	0.085*** (0.03)
Intercept	-3.245	-3.290	-3.057
pseudo-R ²	0.157	0.169	0.179
N	3950	3950	3950

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

the MN2008 data, and the results are substantively identical (see Table B14).

Overall, each of these models shows the influence that liberal attitudes have on the decision to donate. Models VA4.1, MN4.1, and the CCAP2008 models suggest liberals in general are the most likely to make donations. Breaking this into separate attitude scales suggests that while economic attitudes have the largest influence, both social-sexual and militarism attitudes also play a role. Additionally, for individuals with these attitudes, different personality traits are also influencing the decision to make a donation. Taking this one step further, the models also suggest that conservatives are less likely to make a donation in general. However, when they do so the underlying motivations may be different for conservatives versus liberals.

The more important predictor in the VA1990 models is the P-scale. In Model VA4.1 the P-scale has the largest effect, however, when the political attitudes are included in Model VA4.2 the size of the effect of the P-scale drops significantly. In Model VA4.6, when economic attitudes are the only attitude measure used in the model, economic attitudes have a larger effect on donating than does the P-scale. Additionally, Altruism is no longer significant in this model, suggesting Altruism is not a motivation to donate for economic liberals. Including economic attitudes in the model reduces the magnitude of the effect of the P-scale, but switching social-sexual for economic attitudes in the model (VA4.5) increases the effect the P-scale has on donating. The P-scale and economic attitudes are the most significant influences on donating in the VA1990 models. This may represent two different groups of donors with different underlying motivations, the tough-minded economically liberal donors, and the tough-minded socially conservative, altruistic donors. Together, this supports the idea of a more

complex relationship between attitudes, personality, and donating than suggested in the previous research.

There are also important differences in the effects of partisanship across the models. The positive sign on the partisanship variable in the VA1990 models indicates Republicans are more likely to make political donations than are Democrats, compatible with previous literature about this time period (Francia et al. 2003, 39). This is seemingly contradictory with the finding that ideologically liberal individuals are more likely to donate, but consistent with work arguing for strong differences in the underlying processes of partisanship and ideology (e.g., Carmines and Berkman 1994; Hatemi et al. 2009; Huber 1989), and with the effects of the personality and attitude traits across the models, as discussed above. There are no partisanship effects in the MN2008 or CCAP2008 models, consistent with the findings in Chapter 3. In other words, neither Democrats nor Republicans are more likely to make a donation than is the other group. This may indicate an important role for electoral context in the theoretical model, as one explanation for PID being a significant predictor of making a donation in 1990, but not in 2008.

The other variables in the models perform as expected and are consistent with the findings in Chapter 3. Older men, with higher incomes and education, who attend church more frequently are more likely to make political donations. To further investigate the nature of the sex differences, models using the VA1990 data are estimated including interaction terms between sex and the significant personality and attitude variables show that these may be the source of the sex differences (Appendix Table B15). The significance of the constitutive terms of the interactions and the lack of significance of

the interactions themselves suggests that personality and economic attitudes may have a larger effect on females, when they make a donation, than on males.

The final model in Table 4.4 includes the civic values identified as important in Chapter 3. Model MN4.4 shows that higher political efficacy, more political knowledge, and discussing politics with one's family during childhood (a form of socialization) increase the likelihood an individual will make a donation. These variables are important, doubling the explanatory power of the model (the pseudo- R^2 increases from approximately 0.2 to 0.4). Importantly, the personality traits and ideological attitudes that are significant in models MN4.1-MN4.3 remain significant in model MN4.4. Personality and deeply held attitudes are significant and previously unidentified as factors in individual decision-making, in addition to the socio-demographics and civic values long identified in the political behavior literature. Personality traits and attitudes are not just influential in the models, they are more influential than the socio-demographic variables.

Limitations

Two points may help to explain the differences in personality findings across studies. First, the sample populations for each of the studies are very different. The CCAP2008 utilizes a large-N representative national sample, while the MN2008 has a small-N geographically limited family sample. Both were assessed directly prior to the 2008 election. Given these differing populations, some differences in the results across samples are expected. Second, while both samples use FFM personality assessments, the differences in measurement technique are significant. The MN2008 survey uses the 44-question version, which measures traits using short descriptive phrases (John et al. 2008),

widely considered a valid and preferred measurement of the FFM. The CCAP2008 survey uses the TIPI, which measures traits using adjective pairs (Gosling et al. 2003). There is however concern that questions on assessments utilizing adjectives are less consistently answered than those using short phrases or descriptions, and the correlation between the TIPI and more standard FFM measures can be quite meager (Goldberg and Kilkowski 1985; John et al. 2008).

The CCAP2008 is ideal for representativeness, but at the expense of asking in-depth and complex questions, as demanded by personality assessments such as the Altruism scale and the 44-item FFM. When these types of assessments are used, smaller samples involving individuals better able to answer long, comprehensive questionnaires are used such as those utilized in the VA1990 and MN2008 studies. However, the limited and kinship nature of the two populations sacrifices generalizability. This population versus measurement issue presents a tradeoff to researchers. Here I have chosen to use all available studies, but results obtained from less accurate measurement techniques must be evaluated cautiously. Future research using new and better data is needed to further investigate this potential problem.

Summary of Multivariate Models

Across the models, several dispositional traits show consistent relationships to making political donations. The best predictors across the models are liberal ideology, liberal economic attitudes, and the P-scale; individuals who are more liberal and more tough-minded are the most likely to make donations. Those who favor government programs that allocate money (i.e., individuals who hold liberal economic attitudes) are more likely to give away their own money. More generally, liberal ideology, in all three

Table 4.6: Regression Analysis of Probability of Making a Political Donation – Best Fit Models

	Model VA4.2	Model MN4.4	Model CCAP4.2
Altruism	0.068 (0.05)		0.356*** (0.03)
Neuroticism	-0.018 (0.04)	-0.156* (0.09)	-0.006 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.115*** (0.04)	0.000 (0.08)	0.139*** (0.04)
P-scale	0.472** (0.21)		
Social Desirability	0.211*** (0.05)		
Openness to Experience		0.024 (0.07)	0.042 (0.04)
Agreeableness		-0.083 (0.10)	0.072** (0.03)
Conscientiousness		-0.181* (0.10)	-0.064** (0.03)
Wilson-Patterson Index (Liberal-Conservative)			
Militarism Attitudes	0.005 (0.05)	0.079 (0.21)	
Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.087 (0.07)	0.259 (0.10)	
Economic Attitudes	-0.394*** (0.06)	-0.471* (0.26)	
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)			-0.127** (0.06)
Discuss Politics		0.224*** (0.03)	
Trust in Government		-0.045 (0.07)	
Political Knowledge		0.249*** (0.03)	
Political Efficacy (external)		0.159*** (0.03)	
Political Interest			1.267*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	0.094*** (0.03)	-0.046 (0.06)	-0.058 (0.06)
Intercept	-3.099	-4.562	-7.668
Pseudo-R ²	0.179	0.418	0.126
N	3950	1319	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family or state.

sets of models, using three different specifications – discrete attitudes, summary attitude scales, and self-reported ideology – is associated with a higher probability of making a donation, and this is consistent with the expectations and the findings in Chapter 3.

Maybe the most important finding is the positive and significant influence of Altruism, true across trait specifications, model specifications, time periods, and studies. This is a relatively novel finding in the political behavior literature, which has generally focused on the Big 5 personality traits. The significance of Altruism as a predictor of donating behavior may indicate that political donating has more in common with charitable donating than it does with political participation.

The significance and substantive import of personality in predicting political donating is not entirely consistent across samples. The P-scale has an especially large effect although it is not measured in the MN2008 or CCAP2008 studies, rather two component pieces of P, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, are influential, though to a lesser degree. There are also important influences of Extraversion, Openness to Experience, and Neuroticism. Individuals who are more extraverted, more open, and less neurotic have a higher likelihood of making a donation, although the effects of these variables are less influential than are those of ideology and the P-scale. The influence for some traits is greater than that of the socio-demographic variables. This is important, as previous research has found the relationship between personality traits – specifically Openness – and making a donation disappears with the addition of civic value variables (specifically efficacy and political knowledge) to the model (Mondak et al. 2010). This finding was not replicated in these models, even when civic values with very large direct effects are added to the model.

The findings for personality do raise important questions about the magnitude and constancy of the effects on political donating, and previous studies finding such inconsistent results are right to ask such questions. The evidence from the models presented here finding significant direct effects of personality across trait assessments, populations, sample types, and time periods suggests the answer is unlikely to be that personality has no influence on the decision to donate. Rather, the answer may lay in a combination of three areas. First, differences across samples and populations. Second, differences in measurement and potential measurement error of the personality assessments. Third, that the role personality plays in the decision to make a donation is more complex than the direct effects hypothesized and tested for in previous studies. Only additional research can investigate these areas in order to better address this question. The first two are outside the scope of this dissertation, while the third is the subject of the following chapter.

Discussion

Both the personality traits and attitudes are substantial and consistent predictors of political donating in 1990 and 2008. Traditional political behavior models, such as those presented in Chapter 3, are unable to account for this type of individual variation.

Table 4.7: Change in Pseudo-R² across Models

	Base Model	Full Model	Absolute Change	Relative Change	Base Model	Best Model	Absolute Change	Relative Change
VA1990	0.134	0.160	0.026	20%	0.134	0.179	0.045	34%
MN2008	0.195	0.221	0.026	13%	0.195	0.418	0.023	114%
CCAP2008	0.059	0.091	0.032	54%	0.059	0.126	0.067	113%

Note: Pseudo-R² for base models from Chapter 3.

Adding dispositional traits to the model increases the explanatory power of the models over the baseline models by at least 13% (Table 4.7). In the VA1990 models adding both personality and attitude traits increases the explanatory power by up to 34%, and the addition of just personality traits increases the explanatory power of the CCAP2008 models by up to 113%.

The donor profile described in the previous chapter was based around socio-demographic traits; older males, with higher incomes and education are the most likely to donate. However, when dispositional traits are added to the model, a different donor profile emerges. As noted above, being more liberal and more tough-minded in general leads to a higher likelihood of making a donation. Further investigation reveals that there are two distinct types of ideologically oriented donors. First, the tough-minded economically liberal donors who are not influenced by altruistic tendencies; they appear pragmatic and may have higher incomes and education, making seemingly strategic donations to groups or politicians that match held attitudes. Second, the tough-minded socially conservative donors, who are altruistically motivated (correlated at 0.167 in the VA1990 sample) and tend to be Republicans who frequently attend church.

This finding of two different types of donors helps to reconcile the previous conflicting findings about the role of ideology on donating. Some studies found that donors hold ideologically conservative values (Francia et al. 2003; Verba and Nye 1972, 227-28) while others found ideologically liberal individuals were more likely to make donations (Ponce and Scarrow 2011). The attitudes included in the models presented here allow for a more nuanced view of individual ideological differences; while the majority of donors tend to be liberal, there is a small, yet important, group of

conservative donors. The best predictors in the models are dispositional attributes rather than socio-demographics, and these vastly enlarge our theoretical understanding of donors and the decision-making process by expanding the traditional funnel model (presented in Chapter 2). The global context, often the presence of an election, sets the overall number of individuals who choose to make a donation, but disposition influences which specific individuals make this decision.

Comparing donors in 1990 to 2008 suggests both continuity and change over time. In these models, personality and attitude traits remain constant across contexts, while other traits do not. An area that has yet to be explored with regard to donating behavior is electoral context, represented by the lowest level of the new funnel model presented in Chapter 2. The electoral context created during the 2008 election may help account for the contradictory finding for the role of partisanship in the models. It is to this topic the dissertation now turns.

CHAPTER 5

ELECTORAL CONTEXT AND PERSONALITY-BY-SITUATION


The previous chapters have examined dispositional traits that are generally stable through an individual's lifetime. These literatures have largely remained agnostic to the context within which individuals act, and how that context might interact with the dispositional traits. This chapter turns to this subject of identifying state contextual indicators that may have an important role in if an individual donates. By addressing three specific questions: 1) Does electoral competition alter the probability of donating? 2) Does an increase in elite mobilization alter the probability of donating? And 3) Do psychological dispositions operate differently across electoral contexts, or are the influences of one's personality stable regardless of context?

The contextual effects investigated in this chapter make up the last stage of the model, that a specific event can move an individual towards donating (see Figure 5.1). Within the rational approach context and salience are the most important indicators of behavior, specifically operationalized in this chapter as competition and mobilization. I discuss the basic literature for each, first for general political participation, with an emphasis on voting because this is the topic most explored by those who study contextual effects, and then review the literature on donating and context, though this literature is far less developed and remains in its infancy.

Based upon the extant literature I develop predictions of the effects of competition and mobilization on the probability of donating. Overall, an increase in competition and

mobilization should increase an individual's likelihood of making a donation during the 2008 election. The chapter then turns to the specific personality-by-situation approach

Figure 5.1: A New Funnel of Causality – Relationships Investigated for Chapter 5



Note: Black arrows represent direct effects, red arrows represent interaction effects.

common in psychological studies to explore interactions between context and disposition (Magnusson and Endler 1976). While no study has yet utilized this approach to examine political donating as the outcome of interest, this literature can be used to craft hypotheses for how the electoral context indicators may interact with personality and identity traits to influence donating. The data support that the only contextual factor that

influences the probability of donating is an increase in direct mobilization by elites, and there is very little interaction between context and personality.

Rational Models and Electoral Context

The rational choice literature on participation is vast; however, empirical study has generally focused on voting behavior, and only rarely expanded the focus of these models to include donating behavior. Yet this literature can be used as a baseline for studying donating because theoretically they tap into the same underlying process. Donating and voting are both participatory activities, with many of the same individual-level predictors (Verba et al. 1995, 363); contextual factors may offer similar explanatory power for donating as they do for voting.

The majority of rational actor voter participation studies are built, in some form, on the work of Downs (1957), and often represent an expansion of this basic rational model. Simply stated, individuals engage in behaviors, such as voting, if they believe it is in their self-interest to do so (Downs 1957, 271-272). That is, an individual is more likely to vote when they think that their vote might decide the outcome of the election (Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Elections provide the context within which individuals make the decision to participate and its importance as a motivator of participatory behaviors is well documented, as discussed in detail below. In this chapter, the 2008 election represents the specific context within which individuals decide to make a political donation. In order to logically organize this literature it will be discussed in two general parts, competition and mobilization. This is not to say this is an exhaustive discussion of potential electoral contextual effects, rather these are the most important as identified in the voting behavior literature (Blais 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).

Electoral Competition

The closer the election, the higher the likelihood an individual's vote will decide the outcome (Blais 2000, 57). At the aggregate level, this translates to the closer the outcome of the election, the more people turn out to vote (Barzel and Silberberg 1973; Grofman et al. 1995; Seidle and Miller 1976). In other words, more electoral competition should translate to a higher voter turnout (Blais 2006).

When empirically modeling competition, there are two general types of measurements, measures that are ex ante to the election and ones that are ex post to the election (Geys 2006). The most common ex ante competition measure is a state's status as a "battleground". States gain battleground status if candidates and parties view them as electorally competitive prior to the election, and then actively campaign in them (McClurg and Habel 2011, 206). Individuals who live in battleground states tend to have higher levels of political knowledge (Benoit et al. 2004), and are more likely to turn out to vote (Bergan et al. 2005; McDonald 2004) specifically individuals with low SES (Gimpel et al. 2007), as these states are more likely to receive resources and information, such as advertisements and candidate visits (Shaw 2006, 107-109). Individuals are also more likely to engage in other forms of non-electoral political participation (Lipsitz 2011, 147) including donating when they live in battleground states (Lipsitz 2009).

More commonly found in the extant literature are measures of competitiveness that are ex post to the election (Geys 2006). When the margin of victory between the first and second place candidates is very small, indicating a competitive election, aggregate voter turnout is higher than in elections where the margin of victory is large. This relationship has been found at every level of American elections, whether presidential,

congressional, state, and even in many European countries (Barzel and Silberberg 1973; Blais 2000, 31; Buhmann and Freitag 2006; Fauvelle-Aymar and Francois 2006; Franklin 2004; Franklin and Evans 2000; Grofman et al. 1995; Holbrook and VanDunk 1993; Kau and Rubin 1976; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Seidle and Miller 1976; Silberman and Durden 1975).

Limited evidence suggests this link between competition and turnout also operates at the individual level; in other words, individuals living in districts or states with close vote margins, indicating high levels of electoral competition, are more likely to vote than individuals who do not (Franklin 2004; Frohlich et al. 1978). Based on the voting behavior literature, competition should influence donating in a similar manner to voting, as discussed above; that is, an increase in competition should increase an individual's likelihood of making a donation. In other words, individuals living in battleground states and states with small margins of victory between the presidential candidates should be more likely to make donations.

Elite Mobilization

Directly related to electoral competition is elite mobilization, which may act as a mechanism connecting competition and voter turnout. Competition alters the behavior of party elites before and during an election (Key 1949). More specifically, when elites (i.e., party officials, candidates) believe that an election will be competitive, they increase their mobilization efforts, which in turn increases turnout (Cox and Munger 1989; Denver and Hands 1974; Geys 2006; Hill and McKee 2005; Matsusaka 1993). An actor has mobilized an individual when they have increased the individual's likelihood of participating (Tilly 1978, 69). These mobilization strategies are one of the most

important predictors of political participation (Brady et al. 1999; Grant and Rudolph 2002; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). The vast majority of work in this area has focused on voter turnout, and mobilization of partisans and independents. In this study, following Rosenstone and Hansen (2003, 25-29), elite mobilization strategies are considered in two categories, indirect mobilization and direct mobilization.

In this dissertation indirect mobilization is conceptualized as strategies by parties and campaigns to increase participation, but is not targeted at specific individuals (Hug 1990, 648). These indirect mobilization strategies are typically targeted at competitive races, campaigns focus larger amounts of resources on states they consider battlegrounds (Gimpel et al. 2007). This indirect mobilization can take many forms, including more visits by candidates and more campaign spending, mostly on media advertising (Shaw 2006, 75-89). Increased campaign spending (Bullock et al. 2002; Chapman and Palda 1984; Jackson 1993; Patterson and Caldeira 1983; Settle and Abrams 1976), more television advertising (Freedman, Franz and Goldstein 2004; Hillygus 2005; Holbrook and McClurg; Shaw 1999), and more visits by candidates (Hill and McKee 2005; Jackson 1996; Jackson 1997; Shaw 1999) lead to an increase in voter turnout. Following this literature on voting behavior, increases in these indirect mobilization strategies by elites should also lead to an increase in political donating.

Direct mobilization strategies are targeted towards specific individuals, asking them to engage in a specific action (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 26).¹⁸ Direct contact from candidates and parties significantly increases voter turnout (Gerber and Green 2000;

¹⁸ Much of this research focuses on connecting the decline in voter turnout over time to the decline in political party mobilization strategies (i.e., Goldstein and Ridout 2002, Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).

Nickerson, Freidrichs and King 2006; Rosentone and Hansen 2003, 130-33; Wielhouwer 2000; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). Additionally, direct mobilization increases the likelihood an individual will make a political donation (Brady et al. 1995; Bryant et al. 2003; Verba et al. 1995; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). Specifically, an individual who is contacted by a party during a presidential election campaign is 6.7%, and during a midterm election is 10.4%, more likely to make a donation than someone who is not contacted (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 172).

However, mobilization works differently for different categories of the electorate. Political parties tend to engage in highly targeted direct mobilization strategies, focusing on individuals who have participated in the past (Goldstein and Ridout 2002), exacerbating the SES bias in participation (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1999). For example, those with a higher level of education (Schlozman, Verba and Brady 1999; Verba et al. 1995) or income (Bryant et al. 2003) are more likely to make a donation, in part because they are more likely to be asked to do so. Overall, it is expected that being contacted by a party or candidate during an election will increase an individual's likelihood of making a donation.

Personality-by-Situation

The personality-by-situation approach utilizes two often distinct approaches to the study of behavior within psychology, a personality trait approach as utilized in personality psychology, and a situational approach generally utilized by social psychologists (Tracy, Robins and Sherman 2009). The trait approach to the study of behavior is discussed and utilized in Chapter 4. The situational approach focuses on the environment and specific external stimuli as important influences on behavior

(Magnusson and Endler 1977). In early work on trait theory, Eysenck (1970), Cattell (1957), and Guilford (1959) argued for an inclusive state-trait approach to the study of behavior. While arguing that situational measures should be included in theoretical frameworks of behavior, these scholars also believe situations are only important insofar as they interact with traits to produce “states” (Eysenck and Eysenck 1980). Expansions of this work generally take a more balanced, integrated approach (Webster 2009). Much research has found that personality traits and situations are linked (Magnusson and Endler 1977); behavior is the product of the interactional relationship of an individual’s disposition and the environment (Magnusson and Endler 1976). In other words, fully specified behavioral models include both measures of personality and measurable variation across situations.¹⁹

The body of literature in psychology utilizing this interactional framework is vast (e.g., Bowers 1973; Reynolds et al. 2010); however, very little of this work has examined political behaviors, and none of these studies have focused on political donating. Studies have utilized this approach to connect the Big 5 personality traits with pro-social behaviors across various situations, a theoretical framework similar to the one used here. The level of Agreeableness alters the probability an individual will engage in pro-social behavior (such as desire to help others) within different situations (Caprara et al. 2009; Graziano, Bruce, Sheese and Tobin 2007; Graziano, Habashi, Sheese and Tobin 2007).

¹⁹ Many scholars have been highly critical of this theory, arguing against its theoretical and empirical usefulness (e.g., Hogan 2009). Early critiques generally focused on the lack of consistency of both personality traits and situational behavior (Mischel 1968; 1977). There are many responses to both critiques (e.g., Block 1977; Eysenck and Eysenck 1980), and this is outside the scope of this dissertation. A related critique is how ill-defined is the concept and measurement of the situation (Hogan 2009). This is not an issue for this study, as within the theoretical model developed here the situation is well-defined. An election, as a specific situation that influences behavior, is well-described, measured, and evaluated in the field of political science.

In other words, Agreeableness interacts with the situation to alter the likelihood of the behavior. In predicting the number of participatory events an individual will engage in during a campaign, Mondak et al. (2010) find that an interaction between Conscientiousness and perceived importance of the activities, predicts political participation.

Overall, there is very little work on political behaviors using this approach, and generating predictions for the relationship between electoral context and personality traits remains somewhat exploratory. Based on the nature of specific traits, and work examining their relationship to specific participatory behaviors (see Chapter 4), some traits may be expected to interact with context to influence donating. Of the Big 5 traits examined in this chapter, three seem the best candidates for such interactional relationships. Agreeableness measures inter-personal relations, including an individual's desire to build and maintain positive relations with others (Graziano and Tobin 2002), and is characterized by generosity and sympathy for others (McCrea and John 1992). It appears likely that individuals higher in Agreeableness will have a greater response to direct mobilization techniques; that is, individuals who are more agreeable will be more likely to make a donation when they are contacted by a party. This trait, however, should not be related to competition or indirect mobilization.

Individuals who are more conscientious tend to be more dutiful, leading to inflexibility and resistance to change and may dislike the political process (Costa and McCrae 1998; Mondak 2010). Thus, it is expected that individuals who are more conscientious may be less likely to make a donation when competition increases or when more indirect or direct mobilization is present. Finally, Openness to Experience is a

combination of intellectual curiosity and adventuresome tendencies across various facets of life (McCrea 1994). Elections may appeal to individuals who score higher on this trait, as these individuals are more likely to participate in politics (Vecchione and Caprara 2009). More competitive elections and more mobilization are expected to increase their interest in the election, thereby making them more likely to make a donation.

In addition to potential interaction effects of electoral context and personality traits, context may also interact with identity variables, specifically party identification. There is no specific study that suggests competition will affect Democrats versus Republicans differently; however, there may be significant differences across types of mobilization, specific to any given election. For example, from January 1, 2007 – November 4, 2008 Obama spent \$310 million dollars on television advertising across states, one type of indirect mobilization, while McCain spent only \$135 million on television advertising (Election Center 2008). This differential in mobilization tactics by party was related to measurable variations in behavior; that is, more Democrats turned out to vote and more people voted for Obama (United States Elections Project 2008). Therefore, it can be expected that Democrats may be more likely to make a donation given increased indirect mobilization than Republicans in the 2008 election. There are also party differentials in the amount of direct mobilization during the 2008 election. More Americans reported being contacted in 2008 than in any other election, and more Democrats reported contact than Republicans (Panagopoulos and Francia 2009). Thus, it is expected that this increase in contact increases the probability of Democrats making a donation.

As the literature discussed above makes clear, the personality-by-situation approach is well-developed and utilized in psychology, but it has rarely been applied to political behaviors. Yet the study of political participatory behaviors is well-situated for this type of approach. The situation is fully defined both theoretically and empirically, as work on electoral context has been developed over the course of many decades. Similarly, the use of personality traits has proved insightful to the study of many political behaviors (see Chapter 4). The remainder of this chapter is dedicated to the specification and testing of these empirical models.

Methods

The first set of models estimated in this chapter is built on a framework from political behavior research. These models examine the potential direct effects of electoral context factors on political donating, following a multitude of work in electoral behavior (e.g., Lipsitz 2009; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). The framework developed here to study potential interaction effects of the situation and disposition on making a donation combines the electoral effects described in this chapter with the personality taxonomy described in the previous chapter. The specific environmental stimuli are operationalized with 2008 electoral competition and mobilization factors as defined in the political science literature (measurement of variables is described in detail below). These models utilize the TIPI version of the Big 5 personality assessment, using the CCAP2008 sample.

Studies in psychology utilizing a personality-by-situation approach typically use small-N formalized experiments, rather than the survey data utilized here. The models here are estimated using logit models, which include the situational, personality traits, and interactions of the traits and situational variables (e.g., Smithikrai 2008), created by

multiplying the trait by the situation (Jaccard 2001, 12-15). The models in this chapter build on Model CCAP4.2 presented in Chapter 4, adding the contextual and interaction terms. The context indicators included in these models are discussed below, additional information can be found in Chapters 3 and 4.

CCAP2008: the sample contains three operationalizations of competition commonly found in the literature: a state's battleground status, the state's presidential vote margin, and the respondent's House district vote margin. Battleground states were identified prior to the survey going into the field (December 2007), and include: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and Wisconsin (Jackman and Vavreck 2009). Two vote margin variables are included in the analyses, one at the state-level measuring the presidential vote margin, and the other at the district-level measuring the House vote margin in a respondent's district. Both are calculated as a range from 0 (uncontested) to 1 (maximally competitive) in the manner of Huckfeldt et al. (2007, 802). Indirect mobilization is measured with candidate visits and candidate spending on television advertising. The number of visits from candidates is the total number of times the presidential and/or vice presidential candidates visited a state during the entire electoral period, January 1, 2007 through November 4, 2008.²⁰ The spending variables are the dollar amount spent by Obama and McCain on television advertising by state for the same time period.²¹ Direct mobilization is measured as the sum of the

²⁰ Data for candidate visits and spending are from the cnn.com Election Center 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008>.

²¹ Total dollar amount is multiplied by 1×10^7 to properly scale it to be comparable with the other variables.

number of times a respondent reported being contacted by a party across survey waves. Frequencies for these variables can be found in Appendix Table C1.

Analysis and Results

The results for the empirical models are shown in the tables below. For each of the models, only the personality traits, contextual variables, and interaction terms included in the model are presented in the table. For complete model results and correlation matrices for the electoral context variables used in the models see Appendix Tables C2-C10.

Electoral Competition Models

Electoral competition has little to no effect in the models (Table 5.1). Similarly, the correlations between the competition variables and making a donation are not significant (Table C2). To further investigate this relationship between competition and donating, the models are estimated with two alternative specifications of the competition variable following the McDonald and Tolbert (2012) study on competition and voter turnout. Both of these variables are dichotomous, measuring if the respondent's House district had a competitive race measured through the vote margin at 5% and 10%.²² Again, neither of these variables are significant in the models (Table C5).

The personality and ideology measures included in the models remain significant with the addition of the contextual variables, consistent with the models presented in Chapter 4. As noted in that chapter, Openness to Experience is not significant when political interest is included in any of the models, but is significant when interest is not included (Table C5). The results for these models are nearly identical to those for Model

²² They are coded as 1 if the presidential vote margin variable equals 0.95 or 0.90, respectively, and 0 otherwise.

CCAP4.2. Contrary to the predictions generated from the electoral behavior and rational choice literatures, there is no relationship between electoral competition and making a donation for the 2008 election.

Mobilization Models

Neither of the indirect mobilization factors, total presidential visits or total

Table 5.1: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Competition Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.1	Model CCAP5.2	Model CCAP5.3
Battleground State	-0.086 (0.07)		
Presidential Vote Margin		-0.515 (0.47)	
House District Vote Margin			-0.108 (0.15)
Altruism	0.357*** (0.03)	0.356*** (0.03)	0.366*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.042 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)	0.047 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.140*** (0.04)	0.140*** (0.04)	0.139*** (0.03)
Agreeableness	0.072** (0.03)	0.072** (0.03)	0.067** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.063** (0.03)	-0.063** (0.03)	-0.065** (0.03)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.129** (0.06)	-0.126** (0.06)	-0.124** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.264*** (0.13)	1.267*** (0.13)	1.270 (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.058 (0.06)	-0.057 (0.06)	-0.064 (0.06)
Intercept	-7.645	-7.242	-7.608
Pseudo-R ²	0.126	0.126	0.128
N	10066	10066	9962

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

amount of spending by presidential campaigns, is significant in the models (Table 5.2).

When alternative specifications of these variables are used in the models, separating them by candidate and by party, there is similarly no effect of indirect mobilization on making a donation (Table C7).

Table 5.2: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Indirect Mobilization Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.4	Model CCAP5.5
Total Presidential/Vice Presidential Visits	-0.003 (0.00)	
Total Presidential Spending		-0.031 (0.02)
Altruism	0.356*** (0.03)	0.356*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.042 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.005 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.139*** (0.04)	0.140*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.072** (0.03)	0.073** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.063 (0.03)	-0.062** (0.03)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.129** (0.06)	-0.128** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.266*** (0.13)	1.264*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.058 (0.06)	-0.058 (0.06)
Intercept	-7.624	-7.634
Pseudo-R ²	0.126	0.126
N	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

There is a strong relationship between direct mobilization and making a donation, as shown in Table 5.3. The addition of the contact variable increases the pseudo- R^2 by 0.06. The more times an individual is contacted by a party the higher their likelihood of making a donation. Importantly, the influence of the personality and ideological variables is not altered by the inclusion of this contextual variable. Direct mobilization adds to the explanatory value of the model, rather than supplanting the influence of social and psychological traits. In Table C9 a dichotomous variable measuring whether a respondent was contacted by a party at any point during the election cycle is used, rather than the sum of the amount of contact used in Model CCAP5.6. The effect of any contact on making a donation is very large, nearly as large as the effect of political interest in the model. However, this model provides less information about the relationship between direct mobilization and donating, and has a lower pseudo- R^2 than Model CCAP5.6; therefore, additional models utilize the summed contact variable.

This direct mobilization variable, the sum of the amount of contact from a party, has a large range, and the relationship between this variable and making a donation may not be strictly linear, as is assumed by the model. To investigate the possibility that the relationship is quadratic or cubic, squared and cubed contact terms are added to the model (Model CCAP5.7). In general, more contact increases the probability of making a donation, while the negative sign on the squared term indicates that there is a point at which more contact stops increasing the probability of making a donation.

Importantly, the model implicitly assumes that contact is totally independent from whether the individuals are likely to be donors. This is arguably not a realistic assumption, given the way parties build contact lists and decide who to contact.

Although the sample respondents were contacted at random, parties do not contact potential donors randomly. They generally contact registered voters, individuals who

Table 5.3: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Direct Mobilization Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.6	Model CCAP5.7
Contacted by Party	0.334***	0.539***
(Sum)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Contact Squared		-0.036***
		(0.01)
Contact Cubed		0.001
		(0.00)
Altruism	0.257***	0.257***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.024	0.021
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.007	-0.010
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	0.153***	0.155***
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	0.080**	0.080**
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.078**	-0.080**
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.114**	-0.112**
(self-placement)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Political Interest	1.133***	1.114***
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.073	-0.075
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Intercept	-7.263	-7.316
Pseudo-R ²	0.184	0.186
N	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

have already made a donation, and individuals who have made donations to similar candidates or groups as identified through donor list sharing previously, in order to maximize the payoff from these efforts (Brown et al. 1995; Goldstein and Ridout 2002).

Therefore, in order to add confidence to the approach, it is useful to explore the connection between the time respondents are contacted and the time they made their first donation to investigate if contact is temporally prior to donating, consistent with the model assumption.

Table 5.4 compares the wave a respondent first reports being contacted to the wave they made their first (or only) donation. Of the respondents who reported making a donation, nearly 40% reported being contacted in a wave prior to the one in which they made a donation. More than 30% reported donating the same wave they reported being contacted. Ideally there would be more detail on this group who reported contact and donating in the same wave; that is, some means to identify which occurred first, but unfortunately this is not available. It is possible individuals in this group made their donation just prior to being contacted; however, the most plausible scenario suggests that contact is temporally prior to donating for these individuals. If this assumption is accepted, 71% of donors were contacted prior to making a donation. If only 50% of that group is considered in this manner, 54% of donors, a majority, were contacted prior to donating. For the vast majority of respondents contact occurs before donating, and does seem to be motivating donating, with the important qualification of party-induced selection effects. Given this, I feel comfortable that there is a causal connection between

Table 5.4: Comparison of First Wave Contacted and First Wave Donated, Percent of Total Donors

Contact and Donation Timing	Contacted Before Donated	Contacted Same Wave as Donated	Contacted After Donated	No Contact and Donated
% Who Donated	38.40%	32.63%	14.75%	14.22%

contact and donating, that the model's assumption of independence between the two can be accepted.

Personality-by-Situation Models

Table 5.5 displays the personality-by-situation interaction models, only the contact from parties variable is interacted with the personality variables. Interaction models were planned for all of the electoral context variables; however, with the exception of contact, these variables are not significantly related to the decision to make a donation, thus any interaction terms including them would not be meaningful and cannot be appropriately interpreted. Only interaction models using direct mobilization, summed contact, are presented in Models CCAP5.8-9.

Contrary to the predictions, there is only one significant interaction term in Model CCAP5.8. A positive relationship was expected with the Agreeableness-contact variable, and a negative relationship with the Conscientiousness-contact variable. These predictions are grounded in theory and previous literature, but no evidence of such relationships exists in the models in these data. The one significant interaction term in the model, Openness-contact, has a negative association with donating, opposite of what was expected. The constitutive terms for this interaction are both significant and have a positive effect in the model. For contact, this is interpreted as, an increase in the number of times an individual is contacted increases the likelihood that individual will make a donation, when Openness is at its zero-point, here a value of one (Jaccard 2001). In these data, for Openness, people who score higher on this trait are more likely to make a donation, when they receive no contact from a party (contact equals zero). Figure 5.2

Table 5.5: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Interaction Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.8	Model CCAP5.9
Altruism X Contact	0.008 (0.02)	
Openness to Experience X Contact	-0.029*** (0.01)	
Neuroticism X Contact	0.013 (0.15)	
Extraversion X Contact	-0.014 (0.14)	
Agreeableness X Contact	0.007 (0.01)	
Conscientiousness X Contact	0.008 (0.01)	
Democrat-Republican X Contact		0.038** (0.02)
Contacted by Party (Sum)	0.631*** (0.15)	0.476*** (0.05)
Contact Squared	-0.037*** (0.01)	-0.039*** (0.01)
Contact Cubed	0.001 (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)
Altruism	0.232*** (0.06)	0.257*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.103** (0.05)	0.021 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.046 (0.06)	-0.011 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.193*** (0.06)	0.154*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.059 (0.04)	0.080** (0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.098** (0.05)	-0.080** (0.04)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.106* (0.06)	-0.113** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.107*** (0.13)	1.112*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.080 (0.06)	-0.176** (0.08)
Intercept	-7.561	-7.124
Pseudo-R ²	0.187	0.187
N	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

graphs the marginal effect of contact on making a donation, across the range of the Openness trait scale.²³ As the negative sign on the interaction term suggests, the effect of contact declines as the score on the Openness trait scale increases. However, the marginal effect graph, while displaying the relationship, is difficult to directly interpret.

Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of Amount of Contact on Making a Donation, across the Range of Openness to Experience





Figure 5.3 displays the predicted probabilities of making a donation, across the range of contact for low, medium, and high values of Openness.²⁴ The full range of the

²³ Graph was created using the `grinter` command in Stata 10.

contact variable is 0-17; however, the vast majority of the respondents fall between 0-8 contacts. Therefore, the range of the graph is restricted to this amount of contact. A histogram of the frequency of the contact variable can be seen in Appendix Figure C1. Contact generally increases the probability of making a donation, but the effect of contact is much larger for individuals with low and medium levels of Openness. For a small amount of contact (0-2), the probability of making a donation is nearly equal for all levels of Openness. However, by 3 party contacts, the lines begin to diverge as the level of

Figure 5.3: Predicted Probabilities of Making a Donation across the Reduced Range of Contact, for Low Medium, and High Values of Openness to Experience



²⁴ Graph was created using predicted probabilities generated, with all other variable held to their means, with the `prvalue` and `praccum` commands from the `Spost` post-estimation package in Stata 10, then graphed using the `two-way scatter` command.

contact effects each differently. Overall, by 4 party contacts individuals with a high level of Openness are much less likely to make a donation than are those with low or medium levels.


The majority of respondents experience contact between 0-2, the range at which the effect of contact is equal across levels of Openness. Given this, the effects of this interaction are quite small, and effect few individuals. Generally the effected individuals are at the margins of the contact range, and have a higher probability of donating, regardless of the level of Openness, than those who experience little or no contact. A graph of the predicted probabilities across the full range of the contact variable can be seen in Appendix Figure C2. This graph shows the leveling off effect that occurs with high levels of contact, also reflected in the negative sign on the contact squared variable in the model.

Chapter 3 establishes that while Republicans are more likely to donate in the models utilizing the 1990 sample, there are no partisanship effects for the models using any of the 2008 samples. In other words, Democrats were no more or less likely to donate in 2008 than were Republicans. However, descriptive evidence from the 2008 elections finds that many more Democrats made donations to Obama than Republicans made to McCain (Center for Responsive Politics 2009). In order to further investigate the effects of PID on donating within the context of the 2008 election, interaction terms are created between PID and the sum of party contact. These results are displayed in Model CCAP5.9 in Table 5.5. As originally predicted in Chapter 3, there is an important and significant relationship between PID and donating. The constitutive PID term is negative and significant; Democrats are more likely to donate than Republicans when

they are not contacted by a party. The probability of making a donation for a Democrat when there is no contact is 0.06, and 0.04 for a Republican. The positive relationship between the interactive term and donating, suggests that contact has a larger influence on Republicans than it does on Democrats.

Figure 5.4 displays this interaction effect.²⁵ The graph shows the change in the probability of making a donation for different levels of contact. As discussed above, at zero contact Democrats have a higher probability of donating than do Republicans. This is true until contact equals 5, when the probability of donating is higher for Republicans

Figure 5.4: Predicted Probabilities of Making a Donation across the Reduced Range of Contact, for Democrats and Republicans



²⁵ Graph was created using predicted probabilities generated, with all other variable held to their means, with the `prvalue` and `praccum` commands from the `Spost` post-estimation package in Stata 10, then graphed using the `two-way scatter` command.

than for Democrats. A graph displaying the change in probability of making a donation across the full range of the contact variable is shown in the Appendix (Figure C3). As with Openness, when the number of times an individual is contacted is very high (above 12) there is no effect of additional contact. Here, this is due to every respondent in the sample reporting that level of contact also reporting that they made a donation. This may also be due in part to selection effects in who parties contact, as discussed above.

Discussion

The vast majority of the electoral context variables perform poorly in the models, regardless of methodological specification. None of the competition variables are significantly related to donating, the socio-psychological variables are the only variables that explain donating in those models. Similarly, there is no significant relationship between the indirect mobilization variables and making a donation. As they are not statistically significant, interpretation of these variables is impossible; however, any effect they may have on donating seems to be negative, rather than the predicted positive effect. Additionally, there is no increase in the explanatory power of the models with the inclusion of the contextual variables (Table 5.6). Despite the claims of rational choice scholars (i.e., Blais 2006, 119; Riker 1995) and the predictions generated from this literature, these variables do not provide a complete, or even adequate, explanation of donating behavior, and in most instances have no significant influence of their own.

Including the direct mobilization measure, party contact, in the model increases the explanatory power by 48%. This is the only electoral context variable that has a significant effect on making a donation, and this relationship is strongly supported by the literature. The influence of contact on donating is important, but it is never the best

Table 5.6: Change in Pseudo-R² across Models

	Model CCAP4.2	Model CCAP5.1	Absolute Change	Relative Change	Model CCAP4.2	Best Model	Absolute Change	Relative Change
CCAP 2008	0.126	0.126	0.000	0%	0.126	0.187	0.061	48%

Note: Pseudo-R² for comparison models from Chapter 4.

predictor in the model. Overall, these findings suggest that, as predicted, specific differences in the situation (context) within which individuals make donations has different, and measureable, effects across individuals.

These results also suggest questions about the specific role contact plays in the decision to donate. On one hand, contact may serve as an important motivator of behavior; individuals do not decide to make a donation until after they are asked to do so. On the other hand, contact may simply increase the salience of the issue; individuals have already considered making a donation but are encouraged or reminded to do so when they are contacted. Fully answering this question is outside the scope of this dissertation. But it is clear that contact is not the only or most important influence on donating. Dispositional factors explain more of the variance than contact, and contact does not change the importance or magnitude of the effects of personality. These effects of disposition are independent of those of contact, which is more evident when examining the interaction models. There are small effects of contact on partisanship, but there is generally no interactional relationship between contact and personality.

This differential effect of contact on partisans is yet unexplored in the literature. It is not until the context of the donation, here the 2008 election, is considered that differences in donors by PID emerge in the models. Republicans are more likely to donate than Democrats when they are contacted by a party, while Democrats are more

likely to donate than Republicans when there is no contact. Being contacted is significantly related to living in a battleground state (Panagopoulos and Francia 2009), correlated here at 0.102, and battleground states receive more elite mobilization than do non-battleground states (Shaw 2006, 107-109). Yet, living in a battleground state does not, in and of itself, increase the likelihood of making a donation (Model CCAP5.1). It takes direct mobilization by parties to increase an individual's probability of donating, and within the context of the 2008 election individuals were much more likely to experience no contact than they were to experience any contact (see Figure C1). This helps explain the descriptive finding that more Democrats made donations to Obama than Republicans did to McCain (Center for Responsive Politics 2009). The McCain campaign was able to collect donations in states where individuals were directly mobilized, while the Obama campaign was able to attract individual donors across states.

This chapter represents the most theoretically and empirically complete models in the literature, and focuses on every level in the new funnel except the top level. This level cannot be added into the empirical models presented in this chapter, as the methods to estimate all of these influences in one model do not yet exist. As described in Chapter 2, genetic models offer a novel way to further consider dispositional influences on donating. Such models help explain variation in donating behavior, beyond any models currently utilized in the political behavior literature. These models are the subject of the final empirical chapter.

CHAPTER 6

GENETIC AND NEUROBIOLOGICAL FACTORS

The traditional approach to understanding political behaviors has been a focus on environmental effects, specifically social and cultural variation and influences, as described in the previous chapters. The previous chapters find personality, political attitudes and ideology are the largest influences on why individuals differ in their choice to make a donation. The sources of these traits, however, are biologically influenced. Indeed, a plethora of work across multiple disciplines now recognizes that behavioral differences reflect a combination of biological and environmental influences (i.e., Eaves and Eysenck 1974; Hatemi, Byrne and McDermott 2012; Lumsden and Wilson 1981). Genetic, physiological, hormonal, and neurological factors have a significant role on the formation of political preferences, attitudes, and behaviors (Alford, Funk and Hibbing 2005; Fowler and Dawes 2008; Eaves, Eysenck and Martin 1989; Hatemi et al. 2007; Martin et al. 1986; Oxley et al. 2008; Madsen 1986; McDermott et al. 2009). That is, individuals vary in systematic and identifiable ways, and biological differences provide important information for why individuals act differently when raised the same, or are presented with similar situations and stimuli (Hatemi and McDermott 2012a).


Neurobiological approaches appear important in explicating political donating, because as identified in the previous chapters the best predictors of donating (personality, ideology, and attitudes) are dispositional traits that arise, in large part, from biological influences. They are partially heritable. It is plausible, therefore, that political donating behavior is also in part heritable, a proposition which is yet to be tested in the literature.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the theory and literature from behavioral genetics, which focuses on individual differences. Of the multitude of ways to model neurobiological differences, I focus on behavioral genetics because the greatest portion of research utilizing biological approaches to explicate political traits focuses on genetic models (for a review see Hatemi et al. 2011; Hatemi and McDermott 2012b). Genetic models allow exploration of the possibility that a given political behavior is influenced by a combination of genetics, familial environment, and personal experiences. This type of approach has been fruitful in studying a variety of behaviors similar to political donating, including traits identified as predictors of donating, such as Altruism.

Models utilized in the social sciences generally examine predictors of behaviors and differences in means, while assuming that all predictors and dependent variables are socially and culturally influenced. A behavioral genetics approach examines the variance of a trait in a population, assuming that this is influenced by any combination of genetics and the environment. This method is used to estimate the amount of variance in the behavior that is heritable, or the amount of variation in the trait of interest (the phenotype) that is due to genetic variation (the genotype; Visscher, Hill and Wray 2008). There are many books (e.g., Neale and Cardon 1992) and articles (e.g., Medland and Hatemi 2009) that review biometric theory in detail, including the assumptions and limitations. The analyses follow and rely on two population based family studies that include twin pairs that are ideal to explore the nature of individual differences in political donating. Specifically, by allowing for the decomposition of the variance in political donating behavior into genetic and environmental components, a detailed description of

the methods is provided below. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the results and their implications for political donating research.

Figure 6.1: A New Funnel of Causality – Relationships Investigated for Chapter 6



The Link between Biology, Personality and Donating

The previous chapters have identified that donating behavior is associated with many personality traits, and these psychological dispositions are some of the strongest predictors of donating. Importantly, but not previously discussed, is that these personality traits that have been linked to political participation and political donating in the previous literature and the prior chapters, are at least moderately heritable. This

includes all of the Big 5 traits (see Bouchard and McGue 2003) and the Big 3 traits (Eysenck 1967; Eaves and Eysenck 1974). For the Big 5 traits, one study finds heritability estimates of Extraversion=0.57, Agreeableness=0.51, Conscientiousness=0.52, Neuroticism=0.58, and Openness to Experience=0.56 (Loehlin et al. 1998), and these results are consistent with heritability estimates utilizing other populations (Bouchard and McGue 2003).

Traits specifically linked to donating, including Altruism (0.51), and prosocial attitudes and behaviors (0.42) also are genetically influenced (Dawes et al. 2012; Dovidio et al. 2006; Rushton 2004; Rushton et al. 1986). In addition, genetic differences appear to play some role in donating behaviors more directly in voluntary time donations to charitable organizations (0.11 for males, and 0.30 for females; Son and Wilson 2010), and general political participation (0.60; Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Verhulst 2012). Across these studies, shared genetic and unique environmental components are influential, while there tends to be very little influence of the shared familial social environment (i.e., Fowler et al. 2008; Son and Wilson 2010). Familial socialization influences are very small, and do not explain why people in the same family differ with regards to their participatory behavior. A large part of why individuals differ is dispositional.

Furthermore, political attitudes are also genetically influenced, and just as heritable as personality traits²⁶ (Bouchard et al. 1990; Verhulst et al. 2009), and while they share a common genetic influence with personality traits, the majority of the genetic

²⁶ Verhulst et al. (2012) finds additive genetic influences for economic attitudes for males of 0.32 and females 0.40, for social-sexual attitudes for males 0.35 and females 0.32, and for militarism attitudes for males 0.44 and females 0.30.

influence is independent (Eaves and Eysenck 1974; Verhulst et al. 2012). For example, social trust (0.33 for males, 0.39 for females), political efficacy (0.38), and political interest (0.43), all significant predictors of political donating – specifically political interest – are all in part heritable (Klemmensen et al. 2012a; Klemmensen et al. 2012b; Littvay et al. 2011; Oskarsson et al. 2012; Sturgis et al. 2012).

Political donating behavior may show a similar pattern as the traits discussed above, of both environmental and genetic influences. The specific behavioral genetics approach applied here allows for estimation of the genetic and environmental influences on political donating, as described in detail below. This is not to say I expect genetic variation to account for most of the influence. Rather, previous explorations of political participation generally find a greater import of unique environmental influences over genetic influence (e.g., Verhulst et al. 2012). Therefore, I expect a similar finding regarding political donating, the majority of the influence will be due to unique environmental influences, with little influence by shared familial influences. These influences might also vary by sex, as it is well documented both in the previous literature and in the models presented here that women are less likely to make political donations than are men (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001; Francia et al. 2003, 29; Rosenstone and Hansen 2003, 133; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994; Verba et al. 1995, 254).

Methods

In exploring the import of genetic and environmental influences on differences in donating behavior, I rely on the classical twin design (CTD), a common first step in neurobiological studies. This method is used to explore the source of individual differences and latent pathways of transmission for political donating (Medland and

Hatemi 2009; Hatemi, Byrne and McDermott 2012). Two samples are utilized in this chapter, the VA1990 and the MN2008. These are family-based genetically informative population samples composed of monozygotic (MZ) and dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs that were raised together. The specific questions utilized for these analyses are the questions about political donating from each sample. The VA1990 sample asks respondents, “Please check all groups to which you have made a donation in the past year,” with political groups as an option. The MN2008 sample asks respondents, “Have you ever contributed money to a political party or candidate or to any other political cause?”

Table 6.1 provides the number of twin pairs included for each sample.

Table 6.1: Number of Twin Pairs by Sample

	MZM	MZF	DZM	DZF	DZOS
VA1990	146	630	64	313	214
MN2008	156	238	95	184	

Note: MZM = monozygotic male; MZF = monozygotic female; DZM = dizygotic male; DZF = dizygotic female; DZOS = dizygotic opposite sex.

MZ twins are genetically identical developing from a single fertilized egg, while the DZ twins develop from two different eggs fertilized by two different sperm and share, on average, 50% of their chromosomal sequence, no more than any non-twin siblings. This difference in genetic similarity is the basis of the twin model, and the co-twin correlations provide the critical information to estimate if variation on a trait is due to genetic or environmental influence. If the correlation on the trait for the MZ pairs is substantially greater than the correlation for the DZ pairs this suggests a potential for genetic influence, $r_{MZ} > r_{DZ}$. Specifically, two times the difference between the MZ and DZ correlations suggests 0.50 of the variance is due to additive genetic influences (A),

$r_{MZ} > 2 * r_{DZ}$ (Neale and Cardon 1992; Posthuma et al. 2003). If the correlations for the twin pairs are roughly equal, than no genetic influences are indicated, $r_{MZ} = r_{DZ}$.

Structural equation modeling provides a more formal test of heritability and allows for inclusion of covariates and missing data (Medland and Hatemi 2009; Posthuma et al. 2003). In the CTD variance is decomposed into three latent factors, additive genetic (A), or the amount of the variance that is explained by genetic heredity; common or shared environment (C), the experiences shared by both twins and their family, including socialization and family norms; and unique environment (E), or the pre- and post-natal life experiences each twin encounters in their lives independent of their co-twin. E also includes measurement error. Commonly dubbed ACE variance decomposition, the model assumes the phenotype or trait of interest can be evaluated by the expression $P = A + C + E$, where the individual factors are unobserved but the proportional variance can be decomposed into the three components that sum to 1. Details about the specific methods and algebraic expressions are detailed in Medland and Hatemi (2009).

Analysis and Results

Table 6.2 displays the correlations for political donating for the twin pairs by zygosity. In the VA1990 sample for females and both sexes in the MN2008 sample the MZ twins have a substantially higher correlation than the DZ twins, indicating at least moderate heritability of the trait. For example, for male twin pairs in the MN2008 sample: $0.694 > 2 * 0.280$. The only exception is males in the VA1990 sample, the correlations for MZ and DZ twins are roughly equal, suggesting no genetic influences.

Univariate ACE models are estimated using structural equation modeling (SEM) in OpenMx for both samples (Tables 6.3 and 6.4). In the VA1990 sample there are strong sex differences in the variance components. For males, there is very little additive genetic influence ($A=0.09$), with a confidence interval indicating this effect is not distinguishable from 0. Instead, the majority of the variance is explained by the unique environment and measurement error, $E=0.63$. The modest, but significant, amount of variance explained by the common environment ($C=0.27$) also suggests only a small influence of familial socialization, as predicted by the literature. This is also consistent with the regression results in Model VA4.1, as Social Desirability is a significant predictor of political donating and is the only Big 3 personality trait that has a C component of its own (Verhulst et al. 2010).

Table 6.2: Twin Correlations for Making Political Donations

	MZM	MZF	DZM	DZF	DZOS
VA1990	0.327 (0.091 0.562)	0.481 (0.359 0.604)	0.377 (-0.028 0.782)	0.261 (0.018 0.504)	0.383 (0.218 0.548)
MN2008	0.694 (0.488 0.900)	0.416 (0.223 0.609)	0.280 (-0.031 0.591)	0.152 (-0.091 0.394)	

Note: MZM = monozygotic male; MZF = monozygotic female; DZM = dizygotic male; DZF = dizygotic female; DZOS= dizygotic opposite sex. Numbers in parentheses are 95% confidence intervals. Tetrachoric correlations are used, confidence intervals calculated using the bootstrap method.

For females, however, there is a significant influence of genetics on political donating; approximately 32% of the variance within females in the population is accounted for by additive genetic influences. The differences in the variance components across sexes suggest one reason for differences in the political donating behavior of men and women identified in the regression models (Chapters 3 and 4) and previous literature.

Males in this sample have very little variance explained by genetics (A) as donating appears a matter of unique environment, while females have a large latent factor for A, suggesting it is a matter of personal disposition.

Table 6.3: Standardized Variance Components Sex Limitation Model Fitting for Donations (95% Confidence Intervals), Thresholds Corrected for Age and Sex, VA1990

	Additive Genetic	Common Environment	Unique Environment
Females	0.32 (0.09-0.57)	0.15 (0.00-0.15)	0.52 (0.41-0.65)
Males	0.09 (0.00-0.36)	0.27 (0.00-0.52)	0.63 (0.44-0.83)

There is no evidence of sex differences in the MN2008 sample. The variance decomposition shows a similar pattern as for females in the VA1990 sample. Interestingly, there is no role for the common environment (i.e., familial socialization). Rather, the unique environment of each twin, composed of personal political experiences including campaign effects that influence donating as described in the previous chapter, play a large role in donating behavior ($E=0.47$). Genetic factors (A) explain 53% of the population variance in political donating. In other words, genetic variation is an important explanation of why individuals differ in their donating behavior. Overall, for both samples, genetic and environmental factors influence the individual decision to make a political donation.

Table 6.4: Standardized Variance Components Sex Limitation Model Fitting for Donations (95% Confidence Intervals), MN2008

	Additive Genetic	Common Environment	Unique Environment
Both Sexes	0.53 (0.18-0.65)	0.00 (0.00-0.29)	0.47 (0.35-0.60)

Limitations

The CTD includes a specific set of assumptions and limitations, which are detailed in numerous studies (see Medland and Hatemi 2009). The most important of these assumptions is that MZ and DZ twins are not differentially influenced to donate based on their zygosity. There is no indication this would be the case, and so far studies which explore unequal environments by zygosity have found no evidence of this regarding political attitudes or behaviors (Hatemi et al. 2009). The population-based samples utilized here are ideal to explore individual differences within a population and to identify specific mechanisms (Hatemi and McDermott 2012b) and include measures not typically found in most political science studies (personality, political attitudes, familial discussion of politics, etc.). Findings using these types of samples are often not generalizable, because underlying meanings and specific genetic and environmental characteristics are population specific (Hatemi, Bryne and McDermott 2012). However, as the findings here are comparable across time periods and populations, and are supported by regression analyses using nationally-representative random samples, there is reason to have confidence in the results.

Discussion

As smaller-dollar individual donors appear to have displaced large corporate donors as primary sources of campaign funding the integration of influences to more fully categorize donating behavior has become increasingly important to the study of the political landscape. Through the literature and empirical models presented in the previous chapters, an overall donor profile has emerged. However, those models were unable to consider the potential genetic influences on donating. The unique population-

based samples utilized here allows for investigation of biological sources for variation in behavior. Similar to other political behaviors, political donating is found to have genetic as well as environmental influences.

There are two important findings in the variance decompositions across samples. First, in the VA1990 sample, for males, there is virtually no genetic influence, as opposed to females and both sexes in the MN2008 sample. Second, there is little to no role for the common environment (C) in either sample. Both of these findings, the importance of A and E and the minimal influence of C, are consistent with previous studies utilizing ACE models to examine general political participation and predictors of donating such as efficacy and political interest (Fowler et al. 2008; Klemmensen et al. 2012a; Klemmensen et al. 2012b; Verhust 2012). These findings in combination with the regression models, describing predictors of donating behavior, can help further explicate the nature of political donating.

Political donating in the 1980s and 1990s was confined to a small segment of the population, as described in Chapter 1; this group was generally composed of wealthy, white males (Francia et al. 2003). The constraining influence of this environment, specifically with regard to males, leads to unique environmental influences accounting for the vast majority of the variance ($E=0.63$) for males in the VA1990 sample. This is less of an influence on females, as they were generally excluded from the donor pool and therefore less constrained by these environmental forces, allowing them, when they choose to donate, to do so for other reasons. These reasons seem to be largely dispositional, as evidenced by the large genetic influence ($A=0.32$) and the regression

models interacting sex and disposition, finding that personality and political attitudes have a larger effect on women's decisions to donate than men's (Appendix Table B15).

Large-scale structural changes (as discussed in Chapter 1) result in a vastly different global environmental context operating in 2008 as in 1990. When the barriers of the environment are lifted, individual differences and personal disposition become the primary influences on the decision to donate ($A=0.53$ for MN2008). The effect of the electoral environment remains important ($E=0.47$), but its influence is restricted to specific factors, as discussed in Chapter 5. The importance of E and A favor both contextual-based and genetically influenced explanations, respectively, of political donating. The small influence of C supports the finding in Chapter 4 that the traditional socially-based understanding of donating behavior is limited, and is incomplete without the inclusion of individual differences.

Prior to the 2000s, the global context did not allow for individuals to select into becoming donors; however, the possibility for genetics to influence behavior is available in 2008. It is clear that the influences on behavior are not static; when there is a high barrier of entry the environment is the primary influence, once that is removed individuals are able to act consistently with their dispositions. The global environment dictates what is possible, while individual differences influence the variations in behavior.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

The global environment, both structural and electoral, within which individuals choose to participate changed drastically during the 2000s. The largest changes in the global context were likely the advent and popularization of internet donating (and campaigning) and legal changes such as BCRA, which correspond with the 114% increase in the number of donors between 2000 and 2008. The ability to donate as little as \$1 on the internet is an enormous shift from the \$1000-a-plate invitation-only fundraising dinners (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995) that were common during the 1980s and 1990s. At one such dinner during the 1992 election, George Bush raised \$8 million from 4,300 attendees, who paid anywhere from \$1,500-\$400,000 to attend (Wines 1992). In contrast, during the 2008 election, 3 million individuals made 6.5 million donations online to the Obama campaign, totaling over \$500 million (Vargas 2008).²⁷ In discussing the campaign's online strategy Julius Genachowski, the chief technology advisor for the 2008 Obama campaign, said "The technology now has made it a lot easier for everyday people to participate (Vargas 2008)." These structural changes significantly altered the rules that govern donating behavior, but provide no information about why some individuals donate and others do not given the same context.

These structural changes explain why overall more people donate, as the barriers to donate have all but disappeared. Given this change, the traditional SES-based political behavior model does not explain why some people donate and others do not. The

²⁷ There is some controversy surrounding the Obama campaign's collection of small-dollar donations over the internet during the 2008 election, including the definition of a "small donor" and contributions made using unverifiable pre-paid credit cards (see Malcolm 2008; Mosk 2008).

traditional explanation of donors being wealthy white males is no longer an adequate explanation. The population did not become significantly wealthier or more male during this time period.

Equally important, over the last several decades the techniques to study why individuals differ have expanded greatly. Behavioral scholars now use personality, context, and biology to understand political behaviors (e.g., Fowler, Baker and Dawes 2008; Lipsitz 2009; Mondak and Halperin 2008; Verhulst et al. 2012). In light of the increased importance of individual political donating in elections, the incompleteness of the traditional model, and the groundbreaking work in other disciplines, a new explanation of political donating is needed. The theoretical model I present here builds on the traditional funnel of causality by expanding it to include new understandings of individual differences and situational influences. And I have shown throughout this dissertation that this new model allows for empirical study that explains more of the variance on why individuals choose to make political donations than the SES and socialization-based models currently used in the literature.

What differentiates those who donate from those who do not? The most important finding of the new model is that the best predictors of political donating behavior are personality and attitudes. In many cases these explain more than half of the variance and remain the largest predictors even with the inclusion of contextual factors, such as being contacted by a campaign. This is a new finding in the literature, as traditional models have generally downplayed or discounted the influence of these traits. Chapter 4 develops dispositional profiles that predict political donating behavior, the most important traits include economically liberal attitudes, tough-mindedness, and

political interest. At the same time, this understanding of donating behavior does not preclude rational action. It is the preferences behind the actions that are driven by disposition, and influences the decision to donate and the choice of donation recipients. That is, individuals appear able to match their held attitudes (economically liberal, socially conservative, etc.) to groups, candidates, and causes, and then make donations accordingly.

The best example of this is a group of donors to political groups previously uncategorized in the literature. These individuals are tough-minded, altruistic, socially conservative donors, who tend to be Republicans and attend church frequently. It is quite rational for these individuals to try to affect political change to match their socially conservative beliefs. The most extreme version of this may be Pat Robertson, who publicly requested his followers join a “prayer offensive” to ask God to remove Supreme Court justices, arguing “One justice is 83 years old, another has cancer, and another has a heart condition (Robertson 2003)”, so conservative justices could be appointed. He routinely makes requests for monetary donations for his Christian Broadcasting Network (the 700 Club) and similar causes. The methods he employs may be extreme, but by understanding the underlying preferences the behavior seems rational.

This type of tough-minded altruistic donating is not limited to conservative ideologues; people who donate to environmental groups, for example, tend to be tough-minded, militant, altruistic liberals (Frost and Hatemi 2010). In comparing the group of socially conservative political donors to the liberal environmental donors, it is not the socio-demographic characteristics of these groups (individuals who have more money are still more likely to donate) nor the rationality of the donating behavior (individuals in

both groups are trying to affect change in accordance with their preferences) that differ markedly. Rather, it is the preferences themselves, and the corresponding dispositional differences, which distinguish these groups. Specifically, this political donor group is largely motivated by conservative social attitudes, while the environmental donors are mainly motivated by liberal social and militarism attitudes. The attitudinal and personality predictors explain more of the variance in regression models than do SES factors, and they also provide a much more nuanced understanding of donors and their choices.

Dispositional traits are the primary influence on donating, but environmental context also influences political donating behavior. I find context generally plays a small role in the decision to donate, but it matters in two important ways. First, prior to the large-scale structural changes the environment acted as a barrier to donating, largely limiting donors to wealthy males invited to donate. Because of this, for males, the environment was the primary influence on donating, rather than disposition. With the removal of these barriers, anyone is now able to donate any amount of money at any time. Second, during the 2008 election most election-specific factors did not significantly influence political donating, with one exception, direct party contact. The influence of contact found here suggests that it likely acts by increasing the salience of the behavior for those already inclined to donate, based on their disposition.

The most important contribution that this dissertation provides to understanding political donating behavior, and other political behaviors for that matter, may be the new theoretical model, which integrates biological, dispositional, social, cultural, and environmental influences. As a result of this model, this dissertation presents the most

theoretically and empirically complete models of political donating that I am aware of. However, this study should not be viewed as the end of research on political donating, but as a new starting point for answering questions of interest.

Donating behavior is complex, and as the path model presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2.3) shows, there are hundreds of potential pathways between the various biological, psychological, social, and environmental influences. This dissertation only investigates a handful of these potential pathways and only in a static model. The theoretical model allows for flexibility, each stage can be expanded to include new traits, values, attitudes, contexts, or situations that may be considered important. The model also allows for longitudinal studies and models that specify a strict chain of causality. One next step may be the use of structural equation models (SEM), now that some of the causal paths are better identified. While the methods to investigate every component of behavior in a single empirical model are not yet available, the new funnel allows researchers to begin to include pathways previously overlooked, such as the import of hormonal release triggered by an emotional state induced by a party message. This type of theoretical model integrated with new empirical approaches provides a new baseline for studies of political donating specifically, and political behavior more generally.

APPENDIX A: CHAPTER 3

Table A1: Frequency Distributions for Variables Used, CCAP2008

Age	
Minimum	18
Maximum	93
Mean	49.22
Std. Deviation	15.24
Sex	
	Percent
Male	47.29
Female	52.71
Missing	0
Church Attendance	
>1 x per week	7.67
1 x per week	15.29
Monthly	8.16
A few times a year	17.13
Rarely	11.42
Never	17.00
Missing	23.33
Educational Attainment	
Post-college	12.18
4+ years of college	23.06
1-3 years of college	38.40
High school degree	23.94
Did not finish HS	2.42
Missing	0
Marital Status	
Married/living together	56.29
Single/not living together	29.30
Missing	14.41

Table A1 Continued

Income	
0-25K	10.65
25-50k	20.75
50-70K	14.78
70-100K	15.67
100K +	16.87
Missing	21.28
Race	
White	82.44
Black	7.49
Hispanic	5.97
Other Minority	4.36
Missing	0
Political Identification	
Republican	33.25
Democrat	36.10
Independent	29.92
Missing	0.74
Ideology	
Conservative	39.37
Liberal	27.81
Moderate	30.53
Missing	2.29
Political Interest	
Very much interested	46.16
Somewhat interested	25.10
Not much interested	5.93
Missing	22.81

Dependent Variable

Made a Political Donation	
Donated	12.31
Did Not Donate	87.45
Missing	0.25

Thinking about the presidential candidates and their campaigns, did any of the following things happen to you yesterday: donated money to a presidential candidate?

Table A2: Frequency Distributions for Variables Used, CCES2008

Age	
Minimum	18
Maximum	93
Mean	50.34
Std. Deviation	14.83
Sex	
	Percent
Male	50.83
Female	49.17
Church Attendance	
>1 x per week	10.94
1 x per week	19.67
Monthly	9.40
A few times a year	15.86
Rarely	23.99
Never	19.32
Missing	0.82
Educational Attainment	
Post-college	9.39
4+ years of college	20.52
1-3 years of college	30.94
High school degree	35.73
Did not finish HS	3.43
Missing	0
Marital Status	
Married/living together	67.08
Single/not living together	32.92
Missing	0
Income	
0-25K	14.35
25-50k	26.15
50-70K	17.44
70-100K	17.16
100K +	18.20
Missing	6.60

Table A2 Continued

Race	
White	75.72
Black	10.43
Hispanic	8.47
Other Minority	5.38
Missing	0
Political Identification	
Republican	38.43
Democrat	47.44
Independent	10.94
Missing	3.19
Ideology	
Conservative	34.77
Moderate	35.50
Liberal	21.71
Missing	8.02
Political Interest	
Very much	65.25
Somewhat	26.26
Not much	7.39
Missing	1.10
<u>Dependent Variable</u>	
Made a Political Donation	
Donated	25.41
Did Not Donate	54.99
Missing	19.60
During the past year did you: donate money to a candidate for president?	

Table A3: Frequency Distributions for Variables Used, ANES2008

Age	
Minimum	18
Maximum	93
Mean	47.37
Std. Deviation	17.38
Sex	
	Percent
Male	42.26
Female	56.28
Missing	1.45
Church Attendance	
>1 x per week	12.31
Every week	11.88
Almost every week	10.34
Once or twice a month	16.50
A few times a year	13.97
Never	33.93
Missing	1.07
Educational Attainment	
Advance degree	6.50
4+ years of college, BA degree	14.57
1-3 years of college, AA degree	30.43
High school degree	32.65
Did not finish HS	14.62
Missing	1.24
Marital Status	
Married/living together	41.67
Single/not living together	56.97
Missing	1.37
Income	
0-11K	12.31
11-22K	14.57
22-45K	24.70
45-100K	27.99
100K +	11.84
Missing	8.59

Table A3 Continued

Race	
White	51.20
Black	25.09
Hispanic	19.02
Other Minority	3.25
Missing	1.45
Political Identification	
Republican	27.91
Democrat	58.33
Independent	11.28
Missing	2.48
Ideology	
Conservative	48.42
Moderate	10.43
Liberal	35.34
Missing	5.81
Would People Lend Money	
Yes	67.52
No	30.30
Missing	2.18
Internal Efficacy	
Minimum	1
Maximum	10
Mean	6.131
Standard deviation	1.717

Sometimes, politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.

How often do politics and government seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on?

I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. (reverse coded)

How well do you understand the important political issues facing our country?

Table A3 Continued

External Efficacy	
Minimum	1
Maximum	10
Mean	5.84
Standard deviation	1.894
Public officials don't care much what people like me think. How much do public officials care what people like you think? People like me don't have any say what the government does. How much can people like you affect what the government does?	
Social Trust	
Generally trust people	32.95
Generally can't trust people	65.64
Missing	1.41
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Generally speaking, how often can you trust other people?	
<u>Dependent Variable</u>	
Made a Political Donation	
Donated	8.85
Did not donate	80.90
Missing	10.26
Did you give money to an individual candidate running for public office?	

Table A4: Frequency Distributions for Variables Used, MN2008

Age	
Minimum	53
Maximum	62
Mean	56.34
Std. Deviation	2.58
Sex	
	Percent
Male	37.49
Female	62.51
Church Attendance	
>1 x per week	6.39
1 x per week	30.43
Monthly	20.81
A few times a year	14.43
Rarely	30.43
Never	6.39
Missing	0.83
Educational Attainment	
Post-college	16.83
4+ years of college	20.96
1-3 years of college	44.18
High school degree	14.80
Did not finish HS	1.65
Missing	1.58
Marital Status	
Married/living together	78.29
Single/not living together	20.44
Missing	1.28
Income	
0-20K	3.76
20-40k	10.89
40-60K	15.93
60-80K	14.58
80-100K	11.95
100K +	19.83
Missing	23.07

Table A4 Continued

Political Identification	
Republican	30.88
Democrat	38.09
Independent	30.88
Missing	0.75
Self-reported Ideology	
Liberal	27.27
Moderate	29.53
Conservative	42.45
Missing	0.75
Discuss Politics	
All the time	11.72
Sometimes	36.44
Not too often/Not at all	51.09
Missing	0.75
During the time you were growing up, how often did you and your family members (other than your twin) discuss politics.	
Trust in Government	
Just about always	0.90
Most of the time	33.66
Only some of the time	64.69
Missing	0.75
How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?	
Political Knowledge	
Minimum	0
Maximum	5
Mean	3.541
Std. Deviation	1.523
1. Who has the final responsibility to decide if a law is constitutional or not?	
2. Whose responsibility is it to nominate judges to the Federal Courts?	
3. Which of the political parties is more conservative than the other at the national level, Democrats or Republicans?	
4. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?	
5. What is the main duty of the U.S. Congress?	
External Efficacy	
Minimum	2
Maximum	8
Mean	4.901
Std. Deviation	1.383
1. Public officials don't care much about what people like me think.	
2. People like me don't have any say in what the government does.	

Table A4 Continued
Dependent Variable:

Made a Political Donation	
Donated	43.58
Did not donate	55.60
Missing	0.83
Have you ever: Contributed money to a political party or candidate or to any other political cause?	

Table A5: Frequency Distributions for Variables Used, VA1990

Age	
Minimum	40
Maximum	93
Mean	63.90
Std. Deviation	7.94
Sex	
	Percent
Male	27.02
Female	72.14
Missing	0.84
Church Attendance	
>1 x per week	19.73
1 x per week	34.60
Monthly	8.79
A few times a year	13.89
Rarely	15.40
Never	5.79
Missing	2.15
Educational Attainment	
4+ years of college	29.37
1-3 years of college	24.22
High school degree	33.23
Did not finish HS	10.90
Missing	2.28
Marital Status	
Married/living together	71.87
Single/not living together	27.17
Missing	0.97
Income	
0-20K	17.14
20-35k	21.62
35-50K	14.04
50K +	17.76
Missing	29.45

Table A5 Continued

Political Identification

Republican	40.71
Democrat	28.58
Varies	25.98
No answer/prefer not to answer	4.73

The response options are: always support Republicans, usually support Republicans, varies, usually supports Democrats, always supports Democrats, other. This unique question format makes interpretation and coding of the “varies” response option difficult. We have chosen to not include respondents who have chosen this response in the analysis, the results are substantively the same when they are included.

Would People Lend Money

Minimum	1
Maximum	5
Mean	3.62
Std. Deviation	1.07

Dependent Variable:**Made a Political Donation**

Donated	27.61
Did not donate	71.51
Missing	0.84

Question wording: Please check all groups to which you have made a donation in the past year.

Table A6: Confirmatory Factor Structure of Wilson-Patterson Ideology Index, VA1990

RMSEA = 0.124		Wilson-Patterson
Military Drill		0.74
The Draft		0.68
Nuclear Power		0.18
Death Penalty		0.48
Abortion		0.65
Women's Liberation		0.67
Gay Rights		0.93
Liberals		0.94
Living Together		0.65
Moral Majority		0.56
Censorship		0.45
School Prayer		0.72
Foreign Aid		0.57
Federal Housing		0.48
Property Tax		0.23
Immigration		0.56
Capitalism		-0.37

Table A7: Correlations of Explanatory Variables and Making a Political Donation

	CCAP2008	CCES2008	ANES2008
Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.030 (-0.044 -0.016)	-0.156 (-0.168 -0.144)	-0.069 (-0.112 -0.025)
Republican-Democrat	-0.017 (-0.031 -0.003)	-0.125 (-0.137 -0.113)	-0.006 (-0.049 0.037)
Male	0.137 (0.115 0.159)	0.140 (0.121 0.159)	0.019 (-0.074 0.113)
Age	0.137 (0.123 0.150)	0.150 (0.139 0.162)	0.106 (0.063 0.148)
Married	0.027 (-0.005 0.059)	0.036 (0.017 0.055)	0.103 (-0.004 0.211)
Income	0.111 (0.096 0.0126)	0.239 (0.227 0.250)	0.176 (0.134 0.218)
Education	0.106 (0.092 0.120)	0.269 (0.258 0.280)	0.225 (0.184 0.265)
Church Attendance	0.026 (0.010 0.042)	-0.015 (-0.027 -0.003)	0.018 (-0.025 0.061)
African-American	0.032 (-0.006 0.069)	0.013 (-0.014 0.040)	-0.089 (-0.208 0.030)
Hispanic	0.047 (0.009 0.086)	-0.088 (-0.122 -0.055)	-0.249 (-0.374 -0.123)
Other Minority	0.047 (-0.002 0.096)	0.035 (0.002 0.068)	0.039 (-0.151 0.230)
Political Interest	0.236 (0.221 0.251)	0.341 (0.330 0.352)	-----
Lend Money			0.130 (0.030 0.231)
Internal Efficacy			0.184 (0.142 0.225)
External Efficacy			0.071 (0.029 0.114)
Social Trust			0.317 (0.245 0.390)

Table A8: Correlations of Explanatory Variables and Making a Political Donation

	MN2008	VA1990
Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.090 (-0.143 -0.036)	-0.110 (-0.141 -0.080)
Republican-Democrat	-0.001 (-0.055 0.053)	0.066 (0.034 0.097)
Male	0.173 (0.076 0.270)	0.146 (0.087 0.206)
Age	0.072 (0.018 0.125)	0.069 (0.038 0.100)
Married	0.136 (0.38 0.235)	0.062 (0.006 0.118)
Income	0.266 (0.208 0.322)	0.174 (0.138 0.209)
Education	0.285 (0.235 0.334)	0.204 (0.174 0.233)
Church Attendance	0.093 (0.040 0.147)	0.004 (-0.027 0.035)
Political Interest	0.377 (0.330 0.422)	-----
Lend Money	-----	0.083 (0.052 0.115)
External Efficacy	0.252 (0.201 0.302)	
Political Trust	-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	
Political Knowledge	0.379 (0.332 0.425)	
Political Discussion	0.311 (0.261 0.359)	
Political Group Membership	0.303 (0.253 0.352)	
Community Group Membership	0.208 (0.155 0.259)	

Table A9: Full Correlation Matrix, CCAP2008

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1.Donate						
2.Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.061 (-0.075 -0.047)					
3.Republican-Democrat	-0.017 (-0.031 -0.003)	0.657 (0.649 0.665)				
4.Male	0.137 (0.115 0.159)	0.105 (0.092 0.119)	0.105 (0.092 0.119)			
5.Age	0.137 (0.123 0.150)	0.147 (0.133 0.160)	0.078 (0.064 0.091)	0.033 (0.020 0.047)		
6.Married	0.027 (-0.005 0.059)	0.143 (0.116 0.145)	0.131 (0.116 0.145)	0.124 (0.102 0.146)	0.141 (0.126 0.155)	
7.Income	0.111 (0.096 0.126)	0.037 (0.022 0.052)	0.037 (0.022 0.052)	0.177 (0.162 0.191)	0.002 (-0.013 0.017)	0.356 (0.343 0.369)
8.Education	0.106 (0.092 0.120)	-0.130 (-0.144 -0.116)	-0.046 (-0.060 -0.032)	0.112 (0.098 0.126)	-0.090 (-0.104 -0.077)	0.007 (-0.008 0.022)
9.Church Attendance	0.026 (0.010 0.042)	0.331 (0.317 0.345)	0.221 (0.206 0.236)	-0.042 (-0.058 -0.026)	0.076 (0.060 0.091)	0.105 (0.088 0.122)
10.African-American	0.032 (-0.006 0.069)	-0.082 (-0.096 -0.068)	-0.197 (-0.210 -0.184)	-0.046 (-0.083 -0.008)	-0.061 (-0.074 -0.047)	-0.265 (-0.295 -0.235)
11.Hispanic	0.047 (0.009 0.086)	-0.051 (-0.065 -0.037)	-0.059 (-0.073 -0.045)	-0.006 (-0.043 0.032)	-0.096 (-0.110 -0.083)	-0.015 (-0.057 0.026)
12.Other Minority	0.047 (-0.002 0.096)	-0.007 (-0.021 0.007)	-0.008 (-0.022 0.006)	0.012 (-0.026 0.049)	-0.054 (-0.068 -0.040)	-0.066 (-0.102 -0.030)
13.Political Interest	0.236 (0.221 0.251)	0.038 (0.022 0.053)	0.062 (0.046 0.078)	0.251 (0.236 0.266)	0.180 (0.164 0.195)	0.060 (0.042 0.077)

Table A9 Continued

	7	8	9	10	11	12
8.Education	0.331 (0.317 0.344)					
9.Church Attendance	0.021 (0.003 0.038)	0.057 (0.042 0.073)				
10.African- American	-0.052 (-0.067 -0.038)	0.025 (0.011 0.039)	0.067 (0.051 0.082)			
11.Hispanic	0.003 (-0.012 0.018)	0.018 (0.004 0.031)	0.000 (-0.016 0.016)	0.000		
12.Other Minority	-0.004 (-0.019 0.011)	0.030 (0.016 0.044)	-0.001 (-0.017 0.014)	0.000	0.000	
13.Political Interest	0.182 (0.165 0.198)	0.203 (0.188 0.218)	0.038 (0.022 0.053)	-0.005 (-0.067 -0.036)	-0.005 (-0.021 0.010)	-0.005 (-0.021 0.011)

Table A10: Full Correlation Matrix, CCES2008

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1.Donate						
2.Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.156 (-0.168 -0.144)					
3.Republican-Democrat	-0.125 (-0.137 -0.113)	0.684 (0.677 0.690)				
4.Male	0.140 (0.121 0.159)	0.061 (0.061 0.072)	0.061 (0.050 0.112)			
5.Age	0.137 (0.123 0.150)	0.134 (0.123 0.145)	0.107 (0.096 0.118)	0.064 (0.053 0.075)		
6.Married	0.036 (0.017 0.055)	0.136 (0.125 0.147)	0.052 (0.033 0.070)	0.052 (0.033 0.070)	0.150 (0.140 0.161)	
7.Income	0.239 (0.227 0.250)	0.084 (0.073 0.095)	0.147 (0.137 0.158)	0.147 (0.137 0.158)	0.064 (0.053 0.075)	0.345 (0.335 0.354)
8.Education	0.106 (0.092 0.120)	-0.113 (-0.124 -0.102)	-0.045 (-0.056 -0.034)	0.127 (0.116 0.138)	0.052 (0.042 0.063)	0.037 (0.026 0.048)
9.Church Attendance	-0.015 (-0.027 -0.003)	0.296 (0.285 0.306)	0.220 (0.210 0.231)	-0.059 (-0.070 -0.048)	0.047 (0.036 0.058)	0.107 (0.097 0.118)
10.African-American	0.013 (-0.014 0.040)	-0.102 (-0.113 -0.091)	-0.241 (-0.252 -0.231)	-0.149 (-0.168 -0.129)	-0.124 (-0.177 -0.156)	-0.266 (-0.292 -0.240)
11.Hispanic	-0.088 (-0.122 -0.055)	-0.043 (-0.054 -0.031)	-0.052 (-0.063 -0.041)	-0.005 (-0.027 0.016)	-0.167 (-0.177 -0.156)	-0.039 (-0.062 -0.016)
12.Other Minority	0.035 (0.002 0.068)	-0.023 (-0.034 -0.012)	-0.007 (-0.018 0.004)	-0.035 (-0.065 -0.005)	-0.070 (-0.080 -0.059)	-0.051 (-0.077 -0.026)
13.Political Interest	0.052 (0.033 0.070)	0.024 (0.012 0.035)	0.050 (0.039 0.061)	0.227 (0.217 0.237)	0.013 (0.002 0.023)	0.074 (0.063 0.085)

Table A10 Continued

	7	8	9	10	11	12
8.Education	0.378 (0.369 0.387)					
9.Church Attendance	0.047 (0.036 0.058)	0.073 (0.062 0.083)				
10.African- American	-0.070 (-0.081 -0.059)	0.013 (0.002 0.023)	0.120 (0.109 0.131)			
11.Hispanic	-0.022 (-0.033 -0.011)	-0.039 (-0.050 -0.029)	0.010 (-0.001 0.021)	0.000		
12.Other Minority	0.012 (0.001 0.023)	0.042 (0.031 0.053)	0.001 (-0.010 0.012)	0.000	0.000	
13.Political Interest	0.241 (0.231 0.251)	0.274 (0.264 0.284)	0.080 (0.069 0.091)	-0.045 (-0.056 -0.034)	-0.070 (-0.081 -0.060)	0.014 (0.003 0.025)

Table A11: Full Correlation Matrix, ANES2008

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.Donate							
2.Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.069 (-0.112 -0.025)						
3.Republican-Democrat	-0.006 (-0.049 0.037)	0.397 (0.361 0.432)					
4.Male	0.019 (-0.074 0.113)	0.027 (-0.015 0.121)	0.080 (0.039 0.121)				
5.Age	0.106 (0.063 0.148)	0.092 (0.050 0.134)	0.092 (0.050 0.134)	-0.029 (-0.071 0.012)			
6.Married	0.103 (-0.045 0.211)	0.093 (0.052 0.135)	0.148 (0.107 0.188)	0.106 (0.033 0.178)	0.101 (0.060 0.142)		
7.Income	0.176 (0.134 0.218)	0.206 (0.166 0.245)	0.029 (-0.013 0.071)	0.085 (0.044 0.125)	-0.051 (-0.092 -0.010)	0.407 (0.373 0.441)	
8.Education	0.225 (0.184 0.265)	-0.074 (-0.115 -0.032)	0.098 (0.057 0.139)	-0.016 (-0.057 0.025)	-0.062 (-0.103 -0.021)	0.103 (0.063 0.143)	0.431 (0.397 0.464)
9.Church Attendance	0.018 (-0.025 0.061)	0.162 (0.121 0.203)	0.053 (0.012 0.094)	-0.121 (-0.161 -0.081)	0.193 (0.153 0.232)	0.094 (0.054 0.135)	0.002 (-0.039 0.042)
10.African-American	-0.089 (-0.207 0.030)	-0.065 (-0.107 -0.024)	-0.333 (-0.369 -0.296)	-0.058 (-0.124 0.008)	-0.029 (-0.070 0.121)	-0.381 (-0.452 -0.309)	-0.246 (-0.284 -0.207)
11.Hispanic	-0.249 (-0.374 -0.123)	-0.044 (-0.086 -0.002)	-0.079 (-0.120 -0.038)	-0.021 (-0.081 0.039)	-0.122 (-0.162 -0.081)	0.160 (0.094 0.226)	-0.039 (-0.080 0.002)
12.Other Minority	0.040 (-0.151 0.230)	-0.017 (-0.059 0.024)	-0.016 (-0.057 0.025)	0.162 (0.027 0.297)	-0.025 (-0.066 0.016)	0.012 (-0.109 0.134)	0.051 (0.010 0.092)
13.Lend Money	0.130 (0.030 0.231)	0.004 (-0.038 0.046)	0.068 (0.026 0.109)	0.085 (0.031 0.139)	-0.164 (-0.204 -0.123)	-0.013 (-0.084 0.058)	0.121 (0.080 0.161)
14.Internal Efficacy	0.184 (0.142 0.225)	-0.036 (-0.078 0.006)	0.023 (-0.019 0.063)	0.135 (0.095 0.175)	0.009 (-0.032 0.050)	0.052 (0.011 0.092)	0.146 (0.106 0.186)
15.External Efficacy	0.071 (0.029 0.114)	0.019 (-0.022 0.061)	0.013 (-0.028 0.054)	-0.015 (-0.056 0.026)	-0.075 (-0.116 - 0.034)	0.023 (-0.018 0.064)	0.071 (0.030 0.111)
16.Social Trust	0.317 (0.245 0.390)	-0.022 (-0.064 0.019)	0.123 (0.082 0.163)	0.007 (-0.034 0.048)	0.100 (0.059 0.141)	0.084 (0.043 0.124)	0.229 (0.190 0.268)

Table A11 Continued

	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
9.Church Attendance	0.062 (0.021 0.103)							
10.African-American	-0.144 (-0.184 -0.104)	0.154 (0.114 0.194)						
11.Hispanic	-0.151 (-0.190 -0.110)	0.022 (-0.019 0.063)	0.000					
12.Other Minority	0.072 (0.031 0.113)	-0.023 (-0.064 0.018)	0.000	0.000				
13.Lend Money	0.122 (0.081 0.113)	0.036 (-0.005 0.077)	-0.100 (-0.172 -0.029)	-0.078 (-0.166 0.011)	0.074 (-0.059 0.208)			
14.Internal Efficacy	0.245 (0.206 0.282)	0.068 (0.027 0.108)	0.031 (-0.010 0.072)	-0.028 (-0.069 0.013)	0.003 (-0.038 0.044)	0.061 (0.020 0.102)		
15.External Efficacy	0.113 (0.073 0.153)	0.053 (0.012 0.094)	0.019 (-0.021 0.060)	0.046 (0.005 0.086)	0.008 (-0.033 0.049)	0.080 (0.039 0.120)	0.108 (0.068 0.148)	
16.Social Trust	0.275 (0.059 0.141)	0.035 (-0.005 0.076)	-0.189 (-0.228 -0.149)	-0.105 (-0.145 -0.064)	0.054 (0.013 0.095)	0.104 (0.063 0.145)	0.163 (0.123 0.202)	0.047 (0.006 0.088)

Table A12: Full Correlation Matrix, MN2008

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1.Donate							
2.Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.085 (-0.138 -0.031)						
3.Republican-Democrat	-0.001 (-0.055 0.053)	0.604 (0.569 0.637)					
4.Male	0.173 (0.076 0.270)	0.055 (0.001 0.109)	0.091 (0.037 0.144)				
5.Age	0.072 (0.018 0.125)	-0.048 (-0.101 0.006)	-0.068 (-0.121 -0.014)	0.041 (-0.013 0.094)			
6.Married	0.136 (0.038 0.235)	0.092 (0.038 0.145)	0.092 (0.038 0.145)	0.060 (-0.048 0.168)	-0.014 (-0.068 0.040)		
7.Income	0.266 (0.208 0.322)	-0.058 (-0.119 0.003)	0.049 (-0.012 0.110)	0.148 (0.087 0.207)	0.023 (-0.039 0.084)	0.350 (0.295 0.403)	
8.Education	0.285 (0.235 0.334)	-0.143 (-0.196 -0.089)	0.004 (-0.051 0.058)	0.119 (0.065 0.172)	0.038 (-0.016 0.09)	-0.006 (-0.061 0.040)	0.389 (0.336 0.440)
9.Church Attendance	0.093 (0.040 0.147)	0.249 (0.198 0.299)	0.227 (0.176 0.278)	-0.012 (-0.066 0.042)	0.033 (-0.021 0.087)	0.150 (0.097 0.202)	0.017 (-0.045 0.078)
10.Political Interest	0.377 (0.330 0.422)	-0.124 (-0.177 -0.071)	-0.046 (-0.099 0.008)	0.069 (0.015 0.122)	0.097 (0.043 0.150)	-0.026 (-0.080 0.028)	0.143 (0.083 0.203)
11.External Efficacy	0.252 (0.201 0.302)	-0.054 (-0.107 0.000)	0.031 (-0.023 -0.085)	-0.040 (-0.094 0.014)	0.016 (-0.038 0.070)	0.017 (-0.037 0.071)	0.220 (0.161 0.278)
12.Political Trust	-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	0.057 (0.003 0.111)	0.024 (-0.030 0.077)	-0.032 (-0.086 0.022)	-0.043 (-0.097 0.011)	0.036 (-0.018 0.090)	0.027 (-0.034 0.088)
13.Political Knowledge	0.379 (0.332 0.425)	-0.085 (-0.138 -0.031)	0.065 (0.011 0.119)	0.250 (0.199 0.300)	0.096 (0.042 0.149)	0.070 (0.016 0.123)	0.304 (0.248 0.359)
14.Political Discussion	0.311 (0.261 0.359)	-0.160 (-0.212 - 0.107)	-0.076 (-0.130 - 0.022)	0.077 (0.023 0.130)	0.078 (0.024 0.131)	0.000 (-0.054 0.055)	0.121 (0.061 0.181)
15.Political Group Membership	0.303 (0.253 0.352)	-0.089 (-0.142 - 0.035)	-0.047 (-0.100 0.007)	0.086 (0.032 0.139)	0.037 (-0.017 0.091)	0.008 (-0.046 0.062)	0.108 (0.047 0.168)
16.Community Group Membership	0.208 (0.155 0.259)	0.052 (-0.002 0.105)	0.054 (0.000 0.108)	0.008 (-0.046 0.061)	0.037 (-0.017 0.090)	0.068 (0.014 0.122)	0.078 (0.017 0.138)

Table A12 Continued

	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
9.Church Attendance	0.037 (-0.017 0.091)							
10.Political Interest	0.221 (0.169 0.272)	0.032 (-0.022 0.086)						
11.External Efficacy	0.217 (0.165 0.268)	0.140 (0.087 0.192)	0.194 (0.141 0.245)					
12.Political Trust	-0.058 (-0.112 -0.004)	0.058 (0.004 0.112)	-0.034 (-0.088 0.020)	0.326 (0.277 0.373)				
13.Political Knowledge	0.448 (0.403 0.490)	0.040 (-0.014 0.094)	0.257 (0.206 0.307)	0.207 (0.154 0.258)	-0.089 (-0.142 -0.035)			
14.Political Discussion	0.205 (0.152 0.256)	-0.044 (-0.097 0.010)	0.511 (0.470 0.550)	0.136 (0.082 0.188)	-0.131 (-0.183 -0.077)	0.258 (0.207 0.308)		
15.Political Group Membership	0.145 (0.092 0.198)	-0.011 (0.395 0.0482)	0.266 (0.215 0.150)	0.131 (0.077 0.183)	0.003 (-0.051 0.057)	0.081 (0.027 0.135)	0.274 (0.223 0.323)	
16.Community Group Membership	0.146 (0.093 0.199)	0.440 (0.395 0.482)	0.097 (0.043 0.150)	0.216 (0.164 0.266)	0.086 (0.032 0.139)	0.081 (0.027 0.134)	0.081 (0.027 0.134)	0.157 (0.104 0.210)

Table A13: Full Correlation Matrix, VA1990

	1	2	3	4	5
1.Donate					
2.Ideology Liberal-Conservative	-0.110 (-0.141 -0.080)				
3.Republican-Democrat	0.066 (0.034 0.097)	0.251 (0.222 0.281)			
4.Male	0.146 (0.087 0.206)	-0.019 (-0.050 0.012)	0.041 (0.009 0.072)		
5.Age	0.069 (0.038 0.100)	0.040 (0.009 0.071)	-0.011 (-0.043 0.021)	0.050 (0.019 0.081)	
6.Married	0.062 (0.006 0.118)	0.010 (-0.021 0.041)	0.042 (0.010 0.073)	0.386 (0.335 0.438)	-0.180 (-0.210 -0.150)
7.Income	0.174 (0.138 0.209)	-0.194 (-0.229 -0.158)	0.079 (0.042 0.116)	0.111 (0.075 0.147)	-0.312 (-0.345 -0.278)
8.Education	0.204 (0.174 0.233)	-0.310 (-0.338 -0.282)	0.067 (0.035 0.098)	0.132 (0.101 0.162)	-0.051 (-0.021 0.043)
9.Church Attendance	0.004 (-0.027 0.035)	0.303 (0.274 0.331)	0.060 (0.029 0.092)	-0.061 (-0.092 -0.030)	0.095 (0.064 0.126)
10.Lend Money	0.083 (0.052 0.115)	-0.122 (-0.154 -0.091)	0.014 (-0.018 -0.047)	0.008 (-0.024 0.040)	0.011 (-0.021 0.043)

	6	7	8	9
7.Income	0.358 (0.325 0.389)			
8.Education	0.028 (-0.003 0.059)	0.326 (0.293 0.359)		
9.Church Attendance	-0.018 (-0.049 0.013)	-0.133 (-0.169 -0.097)	-0.024 (-0.055 0.007)	
10.Lend Money	-0.000 (-0.032 0.032)	0.186 (0.149 0.222)	0.138 (0.106 0.169)	-0.020 (-0.053 0.012)

APPENDIX B: CHAPTER 4

Table B1: Confirmatory Factor Structure of the Big 3 and Altruism Personality Traits, VA1990

RMSEA = 0.038	P-Scale	Extraversion	Neuroticism
Do you prefer to go your own way rather than act by the rules?	-0.65		
Do you stop to think things over before doing anything?	0.46		
Do you enjoy cooperating with others?	0.54		
Do good manners and cleanliness matter much to you?	0.46		
Would you like other people to be afraid of you?	-0.68		
Is it better to follow society's rules than go your own way?	0.27		
Are you a talkative person?		0.65	
Are you rather lively?		0.72	
Do you enjoy meeting new people?		0.75	
Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party?		0.71	
Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends?		0.73	
Can you easily put some life into a rather dull party?		0.82	
Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions?		-0.81	
Do you like mixing with people?		0.81	
Do you often take on more activities than you have time for?		0.23	
Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you?		0.58	
Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people?		-0.79	
Do other people think of you as being very lively?		0.80	
Can you get a party going?		0.80	
Would you call yourself happy-go-lucky?		0.50	
Does your mood often go up and down?			0.68
Do you ever feel 'just miserable' for no reason?			0.64
Are you an irritable person?			0.58
Are your feelings easily hurt?			0.59
Do you often feel 'fed-up'?			0.66
Would you call yourself a nervous person?			0.86
Are you a worrier?			0.77
Would you call yourself tense or 'high-strung'?			0.79
Do you suffer from 'nerves'?			0.84
Do you often feel lonely?			0.66
Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt?			0.64
Question wording: "Please answer each question by putting a circle around the Yes or No following the question." Higher scores indicate higher levels of the personality trait.			

Table B1 Continued

	Social Desirability	Altruism
If you say you will do something, do you always keep your promise?	-0.42	
Were you every greedy by helping yourself to more than your share?	0.67	
Have you ever blamed someone for what was really your fault?	0.64	
Are <i>all</i> your habits good and desirable ones?	-0.62	
Have you ever taken anything that belonged to someone else?	0.69	
Have you ever broken or lost something belonging to someone else?	0.56	
Have you ever said anything bad or nasty about anyone?	0.68	
As a child, were you ever 'fresh' towards your parents?	0.48	
Have you ever cheated at a game?	0.67	
Have you ever taken advantage of someone?	0.77	
Do you always practice what you preach?	-0.10	
Do you sometimes put off until tomorrow what you ought to do today?	0.34	
I enjoy helping people even if I don't know them well		-0.57
I take care of myself before I think of others needs		0.40
I would like to devote myself to the service of others		-0.47
I am a rather selfish person		0.69
I am very kindhearted		0.66
I try to get out of helping people if I can		0.65
Altruism question wording: "In this next set of questions please circle the number (1 to 4) which describes how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. Answer options: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree."		

Table B2: Confirmatory Factor Structure of Political Attitudes, VA1990

RMSEA = 0.038	Militarism	Social-Sexual	Economic
Military Drill	0.96		
The Draft	0.90		
Nuclear Power	0.53		
Death Penalty	0.67		
Abortion		0.74	
Women's Liberation		0.69	
Gay Rights		0.94	
Liberals		0.94	
Living Together		0.72	
Moral Majority		0.59	
Censorship		0.49	
School Prayer		0.78	
Foreign Aid			0.87
Federal Housing			0.61
Property Tax			0.50
Immigration			0.82
Capitalism			-0.68

Note: Higher values on attitude factors indicate positions that are more conservative.

Table B3: Confirmatory Factor Structure of Big 5 Personality Traits, MN2008

RMSEA: 0.100	Openness to Experience	Extraversion	Neuroticism
I see myself as someone who original, comes up with new ideas.	0.75		
I see myself as someone who curious about many different things.	0.68		
I see myself as someone who ingenious, a deep thinker.	0.64		
I see myself as someone who has an active imagination.	0.65		
I see myself as someone who is inventive.	0.79		
I see myself as someone who values artistic, aesthetic experiences.	0.61		
I see myself as someone who prefers work that is routine.	-0.37		
I see myself as someone who likes to reflect and play with ideas.	0.74		
I see myself as someone who has few artistic interests.	-0.49		
I see myself as someone who is sophisticated in art, music, or literature.	0.55		
I see myself as someone who is talkative.		0.75	
I see myself as someone who is reserved.		-0.66	
I see myself as someone who is full of energy.		0.71	
I see myself as someone who generates lots of enthusiasm.		0.77	
I see myself as someone who tends to be quiet.		-0.76	
I see myself as someone who has an assertive personality.		0.70	
I see myself as someone who is sometimes shy, inhibited.		-0.71	
I see myself as someone who is outgoing and sociable.		0.83	
I see myself as someone who is depressed, blue.			0.67
I see myself as someone who is relaxed, handles stress well.			-0.72
I see myself as someone who can be tense.			0.59
I see myself as someone who worries a lot.			0.62
I see myself as someone who is emotionally stable, not easily upset.			-0.74
I see myself as someone who can be moody.			0.69
I see myself as someone who remains clam in tense situations.			-0.69
I see myself as someone who gets nervous easily.			0.73

Table B3 Continued

	Agreeableness	Conscientiousness
I see myself as someone who tends to find fault with others.	-0.49	
I see myself as someone who is helpful and unselfish with others.	0.66	
I see myself as someone who starts quarrels with others.	-0.58	
I see myself as someone who has a forgiving nature.	0.60	
I see myself as someone who is generally trusting.	0.53	
I see myself as someone who can be cold and aloof.	-0.64	
I see myself as someone who is considerate and kind to almost everyone.	0.71	
I see myself as someone who is sometimes rude to others.	-0.63	
I see myself as someone who likes to cooperate with others.	0.57	
I see myself as someone who does a thorough job.		0.62
I see myself as someone who can be somewhat careless.		-0.49
I see myself as someone who is a reliable worker.		0.62
I see myself as someone who tends to be disorganized.		-0.53
I see myself as someone who tends to be lazy		-0.73
I see myself as someone who perseveres until the task is finished.		0.72
I see myself as someone who does things efficiently.		0.71
I see myself as someone who makes plans and follows through with them.		0.70
I see myself as someone who is easily distracted.		-0.58

Table B4: Confirmatory Factor Structure of Political Attitudes, MN2008

RMSEA Wilson-Patterson: 0.134 RMSEA Attitudes: 0.063	Wilson-Patterson	Militarism	Social-Sexual	Economic
Stop Illegal Immigration	0.43	0.50		
Death Penalty	0.49	0.59		
Iraq War	0.72	0.96		
Protect Gun Rights	0.61	0.80		
Increase Military Spending	0.67	0.83		
Allow Warrantless Searches	0.37	0.43		
Small Government	0.45	0.51		
Allow Torture of Terrorism Suspects	0.55	0.63		
Abortion Rights	0.76		0.90	
Women's Equality	0.45		0.28	
Gay Marriage	0.83		0.94	
Premarital Sex	0.41		0.89	
Abstinence Only Education	0.67		0.79	
Biblical Truth	0.76		0.89	
Evolution	0.74		0.85	
Stem Cell Research	0.66		0.84	
School Prayer	0.70		0.82	
Foreign Aid	0.25			0.39
Increase Welfare Spending	0.40			0.61
Globalization	-0.52			0.81
Lower Taxes	0.45			0.75
Strict Pollution Control	0.34			0.61

Table B5: Description of Personality Traits, CCAP2008

Altruism	
Minimum	1
Maximum	6
Mean	2.783
Std. Deviation	0.955
“In the last 12 months have you: given money to a charity, done volunteer work for a charity, given directions to a stranger, looked after a person’s pet?”	
“Please rate the extent to which you agree that the pair of traits apply to you, even if one applies more than the other.”	
Openness to Experience	
Minimum	1
Maximum	7
Mean	5.236
Std. Deviation	1.170
Complex, Conventional	
Conscientiousness	
Minimum	1
Maximum	7
Mean	5.637
Std. Deviation	1.170
Dependable, Careless	
Extraversion	
Minimum	1
Maximum	7
Mean	3.420
Std. Deviation	0.905
Enthusiastic, Reserved	
Agreeableness	
Minimum	1
Maximum	7
Mean	5.299
Std. Deviation	1.149
Critical, Sympathetic	
Neuroticism	
Minimum	1
Maximum	7
Mean	2.887
Std. Deviation	1.338
Anxious, Calm	

Table B6: Correlations for Personality and Attitude Traits with Making a Political Donation

	VA1990	MN2008	CCAP2008
Altruism	0.027 (-0.005 0.058)		0.156 (0.141 0.172)
Neuroticism	-0.087 (-0.117 -0.056)	-0.109 (-0.162 -0.055)	-0.066 (-0.080 -0.052)
P-Scale	0.014 (-0.017 0.045)		
Extraversion	0.079 (0.048 0.110)	0.073 (0.019 0.127)	0.052 (0.038 0.066)
Social Desirability	0.105 (0.074 0.136)		
Openness to Experience		0.138 (0.084 0.190)	0.075 (0.062 0.089)
Agreeableness		-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	0.034 (0.020 0.048)
Conscientiousness		-0.016 (-0.070 0.038)	0.031 (0.017 0.45)
Wilson-Patterson (Liberal-Conservative)	-0.110 (-0.141 -0.080)	-0.090 (-0.143 -0.036)	
Militarism Attitudes	0.015 (-0.016 0.046)	-0.079 (-0.132 -0.025)	
Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.142 (-0.172 -0.111)	-0.077 (-0.131 -0.024)	
Economic Attitudes	-0.229 (-0.258 -0.199)	-0.102 (-0.155 -0.049)	

Table B7: Full Correlation Matrix, VA1990

	1	2	3	4	5
1.Donate					
2.Altruism	0.027 (-0.005 0.058)				
3.Neuroticism	-0.087 (-0.117 - 0.056)	-0.067 (-0.097 - 0.036)			
4.P-Scale	0.014 (-0.017 - 0.056)	0.287 (0.259 0.316)	-0.383 (-0.409 - 0.356)		
5.Extraversion	0.079 (0.048 0.110)	0.289 (0.261 0.317)	-0.262 (-0.291 - 0.233)	-0.095 (-0.125 - 0.064)	
6.Social Desirability	0.105 (0.074 0.136)	-0.333 (-0.361 - 0.305)	0.216 (0.186 0.245)	-0.577 (-0.597 - 0.056)	0.053 (0.022 0.083)
7.Wilson-Patterson	-0.110 (-0.141 - 0.080)	0.078 (0.047 0.108)	0.072 (0.041 0.103)	0.260 (0.231 0.289)	-0.060 (-0.091 - 0.029)
8.Militarism Attitudes	0.015 (-0.016 0.046)	-0.031 (-0.062 0.000)	-0.170 (-0.200 - 0.139)	0.303 (0.275 0.331)	0.081 (0.050 0.112)
9.Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.142 (-0.172 - 0.111)	0.167 (0.136 0.197)	0.072 (0.041 0.103)	0.370 (0.343 0.397)	-0.090 (-0.120 - 0.059)
10.Economic Attitudes	-0.229 (-0.258 - 0.199)	-0.057 (-0.088 - 0.026)	0.287 (0.258 0.315)	-0.135 (-0.165 - 0.104)	-0.086 (-0.116 - 0.055)
11.Republican- Democrat	0.066 (0.034 0.097)	-0.003 (-0.035 0.028)	-0.079 (-0.111 - 0.048)	0.149 (0.118 0.180)	-0.023 (-0.055 0.008)
12.Male	0.146 (0.087 0.206)	-0.081 (-0.112 - 0.050)	-0.134 (-0.164 - 0.103)	-0.057 (-0.088 - 0.026)	-0.006 (-0.037 0.025)
13.Age	0.069 (0.038 0.100)	-0.007 (-0.038 0.024)	-0.034 (-0.065 - 0.003)	0.070 (0.039 0.101)	-0.043 (-0.074 - 0.011)
14.Married	0.062 (0.006 0.118)	0.015 (-0.016 0.046)	-0.032 (-0.063 - 0.001)	0.024 (-0.007 0.055)	0.059 (0.028 0.090)
15.Income	0.174 (0.138 0.209)	0.015 (-0.022 0.051)	-0.112 (-0.148 - 0.076)	-0.017 (-0.053 0.020)	0.071 (0.034 0.108)
16.Education	0.204 (0.174 0.233)	-0.029 (-0.060 0.002)	-0.172 (-0.202 - 0.141)	0.003 (-0.028 0.034)	0.022 (-0.009 0.054)
17. Church Attendance	0.004 (-0.027 0.035)	0.151 (0.121 0.182)	-0.027 (-0.058 0.004)	0.227 (0.197 0.257)	0.046 (0.015 0.077)
18.Lend Money	0.083 (0.052 0.115)	0.034 (0.001 0.066)	-0.148 (-0.179 - 0.116)	0.027 (-0.006 0.059)	0.115 (0.083 0.146)

Table B7 Continued

	6	7	8	9	10
7.Wilson-Patterson	-0.215 (-0.244 -0.185)				
8.Militarism Attitudes	-0.009 (-0.040 0.022)	0.577 (0.556 0.598)			
9.Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.289 (-0.317 -0.261)	0.935 (0.931 0.939)	0.463 (0.439 0.487)		
10.Economic Attitudes	-0.241 (-0.270 -0.211)	0.633 (0.614 0.651)	-0.045 (-0.076 -0.014)	0.562 (0.541 0.583)	
11.Republican-Democrat	-0.023 (-0.054 0.009)	0.251 (0.222 0.281)	0.265 (0.235 0.294)	0.235 (0.205 0.265)	0.044 (0.013 0.076)
12.Male	0.124 (0.093 0.154)	-0.019 (-0.050 0.012)	0.129 (0.098 0.159)	-0.065 (-0.096 -0.034)	-0.076 (-0.107 -0.045)
13.Age	-0.125 (-0.156 -0.094)	0.040 (0.009 0.071)	0.014 (-0.017 0.045)	0.057 (0.025 0.087)	0.016 (-0.015 0.047)
14.Married	0.024 (-0.007 0.055)	0.010 (-0.021 0.041)	0.059 (0.028 0.090)	0.005 (-0.026 0.036)	-0.035 (-0.066 - 0.004)
15.Income	0.100 (0.063 0.136)	-0.194 (-0.229 -0.158)	0.002 (-0.034 0.039)	-0.218 (-0.253 -0.183)	-0.238 (-0.272 - 0.203)
16.Education	0.175 (0.145 0.206)	-0.310 (-0.338 -0.282)	-0.020 (-0.051 0.012)	-0.309 (-0.337 -0.281)	-0.399 (-0.425 - 0.373)
17.Church Attendance	-0.066 (-0.097 -0.035)	0.303 (0.274 0.331)	0.138 (0.107 0.168)	0.423 (0.397 0.448)	0.011 (-0.020 0.042)
18.Lend Money	0.047 (0.015 0.079)	-0.122 (-0.154 -0.091)	0.034 (0.002 0.066)	-0.121 (-0.152 -0.089)	-0.184 (-0.215 - 0.153)

Table B8: Full Correlation Matrix, MN2008

	1	2	3	4	5
1.Donate					
2.Openness to Experience	0.138 (0.084 0.190)				
3.Neuroticism	-0.109 (-0.162 -0.055)	-0.266 (-0.315 -0.215)			
4.Extraversion	0.073 (0.019 0.127)	0.483 (0.441 0.523)	-0.428 (-0.471 -0.383)		
5.Agreeableness	-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	0.191 (0.138 0.242)	-0.522 (-0.560 -0.482)	0.315 (0.266 0.363)	
6.Conscientiousness	-0.016 (-0.070 0.038)	0.261 (0.210 0.311)	-0.490 (-0.530 -0.448)	0.402 (0.356 0.446)	0.608 (0.573 0.641)
7.Wilson-Patterson	-0.090 (-0.142 -0.036)	-0.185 (-0.237 -0.133)	-0.024 (-0.077 0.030)	-0.034 (-0.087 0.020)	0.009 (-0.045 0.062)
8.Militarism Attitudes	-0.079 (-0.132 -0.025)	-0.132 (-0.185 -0.079)	-0.026 (-0.080 0.028)	-0.002 (-0.005 0.052)	-0.039 (-0.093 0.015)
9.Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.077 (-0.131 -0.024)	-0.195 (-0.246 -0.142)	-0.011 (-0.064 0.043)	-0.055 (-0.109 -0.002)	0.050 (-0.004 0.103)
10.Economic Attitudes	-0.102 (-0.155 -0.049)	-0.155 (-0.207 -0.102)	-0.023 (-0.077 0.031)	-0.012 (-0.065 0.042)	-0.022 (-0.076 0.031)
11.Self-Identified Ideology	-0.085 (-0.138 -0.031)	-0.144 (-0.197 -0.091)	-0.033 (-0.087 0.021)	-0.020 (-0.074 0.034)	-0.027 (-0.081 0.027)
12.Republican-Democrat	-0.001 (-0.055 0.053)	-0.067 (-0.120 -0.013)	-0.085 (-0.138 -0.031)	-0.019 (-0.073 0.035)	-0.024 (-0.078 0.029)
13.Male	0.173 (0.076 0.270)	0.013 (-0.041 0.067)	-0.096 (-0.149 -0.042)	-0.054 (-0.107 -0.000)	-0.179 (-0.231 -0.127)
14.Age	0.072 (0.018 0.125)	0.015 (-0.039 0.068)	-0.107 (-0.160 -0.054)	0.036 (-0.018 0.089)	0.106 (0.052 0.159)
15.Married	0.136 (0.038 0.235)	-0.050 (-0.104 0.004)	-0.017 (-0.071 0.037)	-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	0.034 (-0.021 0.088)
16.Income	0.266 (0.208 0.322)	0.108 (0.047 0.168)	-0.149 (-0.209 -0.089)	0.079 (0.018 0.140)	-0.012 (-0.073 0.049)
17.Education	0.285 (0.235 0.334)	0.187 (0.134 0.238)	-0.146 (-0.199 -0.093)	0.027 (-0.027 0.081)	0.007 (-0.048 0.061)
18. Church Attendance	0.093 (0.040 0.147)	-0.073 (-0.127 -0.019)	-0.098 (-0.151 -0.044)	0.006 (-0.048 0.060)	0.146 (0.093 0.198)

Table B8 Continued

	1	2	3	4	5
19.Political Interest	0.377 (0.330 0.422)	0.268 (0.217 0.318)	-0.110 (-0.163 -0.057)	0.203 (0.151 0.254)	0.064 (0.010 0.117)
20.External Efficacy	0.252 (0.201 0.302)	0.078 (0.024 0.131)	-0.167 (-0.219 -0.114)	0.103 (0.050 0.156)	0.122 (0.068 0.174)
21.Political Trust	-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	-0.055 (-0.109 -0.002)	-0.054 (-0.108 -0.000)	-0.007 (-0.061 0.047)	0.069 (0.015 0.122)
22.Political Knowledge	0.379 (0.332 0.425)	0.155 (0.102 0.207)	-0.146 (-0.199 -0.093)	-0.004 (-0.058 0.049)	-0.059 (-0.113 -0.005)
23.Discuss Politics	0.311 (0.261 0.359)	0.230 (0.178 0.281)	-0.116 (-0.169 -0.063)	0.179 (0.127 0.231)	0.052 (-0.002 0.106)
24.Political Groups	0.303 (0.253 0.352)	0.144 (0.091 0.196)	-0.045 (-0.098 0.009)	0.088 (0.043 0.141)	-0.008 (-0.061 0.046)
25.Community Groups	0.208 (0.155 0.259)	0.058 (0.005 0.112)	-0.107 (-0.160 -0.053)	0.059 (0.005 0.112)	0.122 (0.068 0.175)

Table B8 Continued

	6	7	8	9	10
7.Wilson-Patterson	0.027 (-0.027 0.080)				
8.Militarism Attitudes	0.040 (-0.013 0.094)	0.800 (0.780 0.819)			
9.Social-Sexual Attitudes	0.035 (-0.019 0.088)	0.878 (0.865 0.890)	0.714 (0.686 0.739)		
10.Economic Attitudes	0.039 (-0.015 0.093)	0.834 (0.817 0.850)	0.902 (0.892 0.912)	0.808 (0.788 0.826)	
11.Self-Identified Ideology	0.049 (-0.005 0.103)	0.617 (0.583 0.650)	0.588 (0.551 0.622)	0.576 (0.539 0.611)	0.590 (0.554 0.624)
12.Republican-Democrat	0.047 (-0.007 0.101)	0.530 (0.490 0.567)	0.552 (0.514 0.589)	0.479 (0.436 0.519)	0.530 (0.490 0.568)
13.Male	-0.102 (-0.155 -0.049)	0.093 (0.039 0.146)	0.126 (0.073 0.179)	0.042 (-0.012 0.095)	0.085 (0.031 0.138)
14.Age	0.078 (0.025 0.132)	-0.080 (-0.133 -0.026)	-0.032 (-0.086 0.021)	-0.045 (-0.098 0.009)	-0.029 (-0.082 0.025)
15.Married	0.053 (-0.001 0.106)	0.123 (0.069 0.176)	0.103 (0.049 0.156)	0.138 (0.084 0.190)	0.109 (0.055 0.162)
16.Income	0.107 (0.046 0.167)	-0.129 (-0.189 -0.069)	-0.096 (-0.156 -0.035)	-0.146 (-0.205 -0.085)	-0.144 (-0.204 -0.084)
17.Education	0.040 (-0.014 0.094)	-0.271 (-0.320 -0.220)	-0.257 (-0.307 -0.206)	-0.264 (-0.314 -0.213)	-0.291 (-0.340 -0.241)
18. Church Attendance	0.093 (0.040 0.147)	0.408 (0.362 0.452)	0.213 (0.161 0.264)	0.512 (0.471 0.550)	0.286 (0.235 0.334)
19.Political Interest	0.084 (0.030 0.137)	-0.123 (-0.176 -0.070)	-0.064 (-0.117 -0.010)	0.138 (-0.190 -0.085)	-0.092 (-0.145 -0.038)
20.External Efficacy	0.059 (0.005 0.112)	-0.083 (-0.137 -0.030)	-0.095 (-0.148 -0.042)	-0.068 (-0.121 -0.014)	-0.141 (-0.193 -0.088)
21.Political Trust	0.012 (-0.042 0.066)	0.031 (-0.023 0.085)	0.031 (-0.023 0.085)	0.057 (0.003 0.111)	-0.003 (-0.057 0.051)
22.Political Knowledge	-0.008 (-0.062 0.046)	-0.132 (-0.185 -0.079)	-0.097 (-0.150 -0.043)	-0.150 (-0.202 -0.097)	-0.123 (-0.176 -0.070)
23.Discuss Politics	0.080 (0.026 0.134)	-0.149 (-0.201 -0.096)	-0.102 (-0.155 -0.048)	-0.161 (-0.213 -0.108)	-0.104 (-0.158 -0.051)
24.Political Groups	0.013 (-0.041 0.067)	-0.059 (-0.113 -0.005)	-0.060 (-0.114 -0.006)	-0.069 (-0.123 -0.015)	-0.085 (-0.138 0.103)
25.Community Groups	0.057 (0.003 0.111)	0.126 (0.072 0.179)	0.051 (-0.003 0.105)	0.165 (0.112 0.217)	0.049 (-0.005 0.103)

Table B9: Full Correlation Matrix, CCAP2008

	1	2	3	4
1.Donate				
2.Altruism	0.156 (0.141 0.172)			
3.Openness to Experience	0.075 (0.062 0.089)	0.140 (0.124 0.156)		
4.Neuroticism	-0.066 (-0.080 -0.052)	-0.150 (-0.165 -0.134)	-0.228 (-0.241 -0.214)	
5.Extraversion	0.052 (0.038 0.066)	0.111 (0.095 0.127)	0.138 (0.124 0.151)	-0.015 (-0.029 -0.001)
6.Agreeableness	0.034 (0.020 0.048)	0.092 (0.076 0.108)	0.201 (0.188 0.215)	-0.399 (-0.410 -0.387)
7.Conscientiousness	0.031 (0.017 0.045)	0.070 (0.054 0.086)	0.188 (0.174 0.201)	-0.350 (-0.363 -0.338)
8. Self-Identified Ideology	-0.030 (-0.044 -0.016)	0.098 (0.082 0.113)	-0.192 (-0.205 -0.178)	-0.087 (-0.101 -0.073)
9.Republican-Democrat	-0.017 (-0.031 0.033)	0.111 (0.096 0.127)	-0.111 (-0.125 -0.097)	-0.088 (-0.102 -0.074)
10.Male	0.137 (0.115 0.159)	0.052 (0.0362 0.068)	0.021 (0.007 0.035)	-0.073 (-0.086 -0.059)
11.Age	0.137 (0.123 0.150)	0.064 (0.048 0.080)	-0.062 (-0.076 -0.048)	-0.113 (-0.127 -0.099)
12.Married	0.027 (-0.005 0.059)	0.110 (0.092 0.127)	-0.017 (-0.032 -0.002)	-0.039 (-0.054 -0.025)
13.Income	0.111 (0.096 0.126)	0.199 (0.182 0.216)	0.094 (0.079 0.109)	-0.127 (-0.142 -0.122)
14.Education	0.106 (0.092 0.120)	0.214 (0.199 0.230)	0.155 (0.142 0.169)	-0.105 (-0.119 -0.091)
15. Church Attendance	0.026 (0.010 0.042)	0.331 (0.315 0.346)	-0.075 (-0.090 0.059)	-0.096 (-0.112 -0.080)
16.African-American	0.032 (-0.006 0.069)	-0.072 (-0.088 -0.056)	0.042 (0.028 0.056)	-0.050 (-0.064 -0.036)
17.Hispanic	0.047 (0.009 0.086)	-0.015 (-0.031 0.000)	0.026 (0.012 0.040)	-0.011 (-0.025 0.003)
18. Other Minority	0.047 (-0.002 0.096)	0.036 (0.020 0.052)	0.038 (0.024 0.052)	-0.000 (-0.014 0.013)

Table B9 Continued

	5	6	7
6. Agreeableness	-0.299 (-0.312 -0.286)		
7. Conscientiousness	0.006 (-0.008 0.020)	0.278 (0.265 0.291)	
8. Self-Identified Ideology	0.039 (0.025 0.053)	-0.001 (-0.015 0.013)	0.105 (0.091 0.119)
9. Republican-Democrat	0.048 (0.034 0.062)	-0.015 (-0.029 -0.001)	0.075 (0.062 0.089)
10. Male	0.123 (0.109 0.137)	-0.207 (-0.220 -0.193)	-0.035 (-0.049 -0.021)
11. Age	-0.010 (-0.024 0.004)	0.153 (0.193 0.166)	0.129 (0.115 0.142)
12. Married	0.043 (0.028 0.058)	0.009 (-0.006 0.024)	0.088 (0.073 0.103)
13. Income	0.111 (0.096 0.125)	-0.019 (-0.034 -0.004)	0.099 (0.084 0.114)
14. Education	0.059 (0.045 0.073)	-0.013 (-0.027 0.001)	0.021 (0.007 0.035)
15. Church Attendance	0.025 (0.009 0.041)	0.120 (0.104 0.136)	0.062 (0.046 0.078)
16. African-American	0.002 (-0.011 0.016)	0.039 (0.026 0.053)	0.042 (0.028 0.056)
17. Hispanic	0.019 (0.005 0.033)	-0.005 (-0.019 0.009)	-0.008 (-0.022 0.006)
18. Other Minority	0.016 (0.002 0.030)	-0.016 (-0.030 -0.002)	-0.027 (-0.041 -0.014)

Table B10: Probit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, VA1990

	Model VA4.1	Model VA4.2	Model VA4.3
Altruism	0.166** (0.05)	0.068 (0.05)	0.124*** (0.05)
Altruism*W-P Index			0.097 (0.07)
Neuroticism	-0.091** (0.04)	-0.018 (0.04)	-0.090** (0.04)
P-Scale	0.961*** (0.18)	0.472** (0.21)	0.964*** (0.18)
Extraversion	0.111*** (0.04)	0.115*** (0.04)	0.112*** (0.04)
Social Desirability	0.378*** (0.05)	0.211*** (0.05)	0.379*** (0.05)
Wilson-Patterson (Liberal- Conservative)	-0.241*** (0.04)		-0.238*** (0.04)
Militarism Attitudes		0.005 (0.05)	
Social-Sexual Attitudes		-0.087 (0.07)	
Economic Attitudes		-0.394*** (0.06)	
Lend Money	0.031 (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)	0.031 (0.02)
Republican- Democrat	0.076*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)	0.076*** (0.03)
Male	0.181*** (0.05)	0.173*** (0.05)	0.184** (0.05)
Age	0.015*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)
Married	-0.064 (0.05)	-0.061 (0.06)	-0.063 (0.05)
Income	0.192*** (0.03)	0.181*** (0.03)	0.193*** (0.03)
Education	0.142*** (0.03)	0.110*** (0.03)	0.141*** (0.03)
Church Attendance	0.014 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	0.014 (0.02)
Intercept	-3.237	-3.099	-3.113
pseudo-R ²	0.160	0.179	0.180
N	3950	3950	3950

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

Table B11: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP4.1	Model CCAP4.2	Model CCAP4.3
Altruism	0.408*** (0.03)	0.356*** (0.03)	0.407*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.092** (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)	0.093** (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.028 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)	-0.034 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.153*** (0.04)	0.139*** (0.04)	0.154*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.074** (0.03)	0.072** (0.03)	0.074** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.047 (0.03)	-0.064** (0.03)	-0.049 (0.03)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.149** (0.06)	-0.127** (0.06)	-0.144** (0.06)
Political Interest		1.267*** (0.13)	
Democrat-Republican	-0.038 (0.06)	-0.058 (0.06)	-0.065 (0.06)
Male	0.306*** (0.07)	0.157** (0.07)	0.315*** (0.07)
Age	0.027*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)	0.026*** (0.00)
Married	-0.306*** (0.08)	-0.271*** (0.08)	-0.318*** (0.08)
Income	0.199*** (0.03)	0.165*** (0.04)	0.198*** (0.04)
Education	0.135*** (0.04)	0.101** (0.04)	0.135*** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.013 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.007 (0.02)
African-American	0.224** (0.11)	0.333*** (0.12)	
Hispanic	0.244** (0.12)	0.306** (0.13)	
Other Minority	0.354* (0.18)	0.480** (0.20)	
Intercept	-5.012	-7.668	-4.843
Pseudo-R ²	0.0906	0.1256	0.089
N	10101	10066	10101

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table B12: Probit Analyses of Making a Political Donation, MN2008

	Model MN4.1	Model MN4.2	Model MN4.3	Model MN4.4
Openness to Experience	0.215*** (0.06)	0.220*** (0.06)	0.221*** (0.06)	0.024 (0.07)
Neuroticism	-0.265*** (0.08)	-0.272*** (0.08)	-0.270*** (0.08)	-0.156* (0.09)
Extraversion	0.020 (0.07)	0.027 (0.07)	0.016 (0.07)	0.000 (0.08)
Agreeableness	-0.084 (0.09)	-0.113 (0.09)	-0.097 (0.09)	-0.083 (0.10)
Conscientiousness	-0.194** (0.09)	-0.182** (0.09)	-0.185** (0.09)	-0.181* (0.10)
Wilson-Patterson Index (Liberal-Conservative)	-0.221** (0.09)			
Militarism Attitudes		0.132 (0.19)		0.079 (0.21)
Social-Sexual Attitudes		0.133 (0.09)		0.259 (0.10)
Economic Attitudes		-0.550** (0.23)		-0.471* (0.26)
Ideology Liberal- Conservative (self-placement)			-0.112** (0.05)	
Political Interest				0.551*** (0.07)
Discuss Politics				0.224*** (0.06)
Trust in Government				-0.045 (0.08)
Political Knowledge				0.249*** (0.03)
Political Efficacy (external)				0.159*** (0.03)
Democrat-Republican	0.001 (0.05)	-0.009 (0.05)	0.027 (0.06)	-0.046 (0.06)
Male	0.230*** (0.08)	0.228** (0.08)	0.222*** (0.08)	0.041 (0.09)
Age	0.029* (0.02)	0.032** (0.02)	0.030** (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)
Married	0.078 (0.10)	0.081 (0.10)	0.060 (0.10)	0.151 (0.10)
Income	0.134*** (0.03)	0.133*** (0.03)	0.137*** (0.03)	0.108*** (0.03)
Education	0.231*** (0.04)	0.234*** (0.04)	0.234** (0.04)	0.091** (0.05)
Church Attendance	0.101*** (0.03)	0.099*** (0.03)	0.093** (0.03)	0.057 (0.03)
Intercept	-3.512	-3.532	-3.346	-4.562
Pseudo-R ²	0.221	0.221	0.222	0.418
N	1322	1322	1321	1319

Table B13: Probit Analyses of Making a Donation to Political Group, Single Attitude Models, VA1990

	Model VA4.4	Model VA4.5	Model VA4.6
Altruism	0.115** (0.05)	0.139*** (0.05)	0.055 (0.05)
Neuroticism	-0.138** (0.04)	-0.061 (0.04)	-0.022 (0.04)
P-Scale	0.826*** (0.18)	1.206*** (0.18)	0.298* (0.18)
Extraversion	0.112*** (0.04)	0.106*** (0.04)	0.117*** (0.04)
Social Desirability	0.412*** (0.05)	0.372*** (0.05)	0.193*** (0.05)
Militarism Attitudes	-0.078** (0.04)		
Social-Sexual Attitudes		-0.353*** (0.04)	
Economic Attitudes			-0.452*** (0.04)
Lend Money	0.035 (0.02)	0.029 (0.02)	0.022 (0.02)
Republican- Democrat	0.064** (0.03)	0.096*** (0.03)	0.085*** (0.03)
Male	0.181*** (0.05)	0.174*** (0.05)	0.173** (0.05)
Age	0.014*** (0.00)	0.015*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)
Married	-0.067 (0.05)	-0.056 (0.06)	-0.064 (0.06)
Income	0.195*** (0.03)	0.184*** (0.03)	0.183*** (0.03)
Education	0.157*** (0.02)	0.124*** (0.03)	0.113*** (0.03)
Church Attendance	0.005 (0.02)	0.036** (0.02)	0.010 (0.02)
Intercept	-3.245	-3.290	-3.057
pseudo-R ²	0.157	0.169	0.179
N	3950	3950	3950

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

Table B14: Probit Analyses of Making a Political Donation, Single Attitude Models, MN2008

	Model MN4.5	Model MN4.6	Model MN4.7
Openness to Experience	0.220*** (0.06)	0.224*** (0.06)	0.211*** (0.06)
Neuroticism	-0.265*** (0.08)	-0.260*** (0.08)	-0.268*** (0.08)
Extraversion	0.023 (0.07)	0.015 (0.07)	0.024 (0.07)
Agreeableness	-0.098 (0.09)	-0.077 (0.09)	-0.097 (0.09)
Conscientiousness	-0.185** (0.09)	-0.198** (0.09)	-0.184** (0.09)
Militarism Attitudes	-0.208** (0.08)		
Social-Sexual Attitudes		-0.099* (0.06)	
Economic Attitudes			-0.266*** (0.09)
Democrat-Republican	-0.015 (0.05)	-0.012 (0.05)	-0.001 (0.05)
Male	0.235*** (0.08)	0.218*** (0.08)	0.232*** (0.08)
Age	0.031* (0.02)	0.031** (0.02)	0.031** (0.02)
Married	0.072 (0.10)	0.077 (0.10)	0.080 (0.10)
Income	0.136*** (0.03)	0.134*** (0.03)	0.133*** (0.03)
Education	0.241*** (0.04)	0.235*** (0.04)	0.234** (0.04)
Church Attendance	0.087*** (0.03)	0.102*** (0.03)	0.093*** (0.03)
Intercept	-3.512	-3.532	-3.538
Pseudo-R ²	0.218	0.220	0.220
N	1322	1322	1321

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

Table B15: Probit Analyses Donations to Political Groups, with Sex Interactions, VA1990

	Model VA4.7	Model VA4.8	Model VA4.9	Model VA4.10
Altruism	0.068 (0.05)	0.068 (0.05)	0.068 (0.05)	0.067 (0.05)
Neuroticism	-0.018 (0.04)	-0.019 (0.04)	-0.018 (0.04)	-0.017 (0.04)
P-Scale	0.440* (0.23)	0.471** (0.21)	0.472** (0.20)	0.472** (0.21)
P-Scale*Male	0.098 (0.28)			
Extraversion	0.115*** (0.04)	0.101** (0.05)	0.115*** (0.04)	0.116*** (0.04)
Extraversion*Male		0.045 (0.07)		
Social Desirability	0.212*** (0.05)	0.212*** (0.05)	0.227*** (0.06)	0.209*** (0.05)
Social Desirability*Male			-0.046 (0.08)	
Militarism Attitudes	0.005 (0.05)	0.005 (0.05)	0.005 (0.05)	0.003 (0.05)
Social-Sexual Attitudes	-0.086 (0.07)	-0.087 (0.07)	-0.068 (0.07)	-0.084 (0.07)
Economic Attitudes	-0.394*** (0.06)	-0.393*** (0.06)	-0.393*** (0.06)	-0.414*** (0.07)
Economic Attitudes*Male				0.058 (0.08)
Lend Money	0.023 (0.02)	0.022 (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)	0.023 (0.02)
Republican-Democrat	0.094*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)	0.094*** (0.03)
Male	0.176*** (0.05)	0.173** (0.05)	0.179*** (0.05)	0.178*** (0.05)
Age	0.014*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.00)	0.014*** (0.01)
Married	-0.062 (0.06)	-0.062 (0.06)	-0.062 (0.06)	-0.061 (0.06)
Income	0.182*** (0.03)	0.182*** (0.03)	0.182*** (0.03)	0.181*** (0.03)
Education	0.110*** (0.03)	0.110*** (0.03)	0.109*** (0.03)	0.110*** (0.03)
Church Attendance	0.016 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)	0.016 (0.02)
Intercept	-3.098	-3.093	-3.099	-3.105
pseudo-R ²	0.179	0.179	0.179	0.180
N	3950	3950	3950	3950

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by family.

APPENDIX C: CHAPTER 5

Table C1: Description of Electoral Context Variables, CCAP2008

Battleground	
Minimum	0
Maximum	1
Mean	0.495
Std. Deviation	0.500
Presidential Vote Margin	
Minimum	0.549
Maximum	0.999
Mean	0.869
Std. Deviation	0.084
House District Vote Margin	
Minimum	0
Maximum	0.998
Mean	0.673
Std. Deviation	0.235
Total Presidential/Vice Presidential Visits	
Minimum	0
Maximum	50
Mean	16.611
Std. Deviation	14.925
Total Presidential Spending	
Minimum	0
Maximum	6.174
Mean	1.707
Std. Deviation	1.826
Contacted by Party (Sum)	
Minimum	0
Maximum	17
Mean	1.443
Std. Deviation	1.712

Table C2: Correlations for Electoral Context Variables with Making a Political Donation

	CCAP2008
Battleground	-0.059 (-0.073 -0.045)
Presidential Vote Margin	-0.027 (-0.041 -0.013)
House District Vote Margin	-0.010 (-0.024 0.004)
Total Presidential/Vice Presidential Visits	-0.018 (-0.032 -0.004)
Total Presidential Spending	-0.036 (-0.050 -0.023)
Contacted by Party (Sum)	0.268 (0.255 0.281)

Table C3: Correlation Matrix Electoral Context Variables, CCAP2008

	1	2	3	4
1.Donate				
2.Battleground	-0.059 (-0.073 -0.045)			
3.Presidential Vote Margin	-0.027 (-0.041 -0.013)	0.489 (0.479 0.500)		
4.House District Vote Margin	-0.010 (-0.024 0.004)	0.208 (0.194 0.221)	0.204 (0.191 0.218)	
5.Total Presidential/Vice Presidential Visits	-0.018 (-0.032 -0.004)	0.569 (0.559 0.578)	0.501 (0.491 0.511)	0.199 (0.185 0.212)
6.Total Presidential Spending	-0.036 (-0.050 -0.023)	0.739 (0.732 0.745)	0.659 (0.651 0.667)	0.234 (0.221 0.247)
7.Contactd by Party (Sum)	0.268 (0.255 0.281)	0.102 (0.089 0.116)	0.109 (0.095 0.123)	0.111 (0.097 0.125)
		5	6	
6.Total Presidential Spending		0.839 (0.835 0.844)		
7.Contactd by Party (Sum)		0.117 (0.104 0.131)	0.119 (0.105 0.132)	

Table C4: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Full Competition Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.1	Model CCAP5.2	Model CCAP5.3
Battleground State	-0.086 (0.07)		
Presidential Vote Margin		-0.515 (0.47)	
House District Vote Margin			-0.108 (0.15)
Altruism	0.357*** (0.03)	0.356*** (0.03)	0.366*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.042 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)	0.047 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)	-0.003 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.140*** (0.04)	0.140*** (0.04)	0.139*** (0.03)
Agreeableness	0.072** (0.03)	0.072** (0.03)	0.067** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.063** (0.03)	-0.063** (0.03)	-0.065** (0.03)
Ideology Liberal- Conservative (self-placement)	-0.129** (0.06)	-0.126** (0.06)	-0.124** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.264*** (0.13)	1.267*** (0.13)	1.270 (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.058 (0.06)	-0.057 (0.06)	-0.064 (0.06)
Male	0.160** (0.07)	0.157** (0.07)	0.161** (0.07)
Age	0.023*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)
Married	-0.269*** (0.08)	-0.267*** (0.08)	-0.267*** (0.08)
Income	0.163*** (0.03)	0.162*** (0.03)	0.164*** (0.04)
Education	0.102*** (0.04)	0.102** (0.04)	0.101*** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.010 (0.02)	-0.015 (0.02)
African-American	0.315** (0.12)	0.326*** (0.12)	0.335*** (0.11)

Table C4 Continued

Hispanic	0.292** (0.13)	0.296** (0.13)	0.314** (0.13)
Other Minority	0.470** (0.19)	0.472** (0.20)	0.468** (0.20)
Intercept	-7.645	-7.242	-7.608
Pseudo-R ²	0.126	0.126	0.128
N	10066	10066	9962

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table C5: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Alternative Competition Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP-A5.1	Model CCAP-A5.2	Model CCAP-A5.3
5% Competition Dummy	-0.096 (0.08)		
10% Competition Dummy		-0.112 (0.08)	
Presidential Vote Margin			-0.490 (0.48)
Altruism	0.357*** (0.03)	0.357*** (0.03)	0.408*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.043 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)	0.092** (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.006 (0.04)	-0.023 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.140*** (0.04)	0.141*** (0.04)	0.154*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.073** (0.03)	0.072** (0.03)	0.074** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.063** (0.03)	-0.063** (0.03)	-0.046 (0.03)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.126** (0.06)	-0.126** (0.06)	-0.147** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.266*** (0.13)	1.267*** (0.13)	
Democrat-Republican	-0.058 (0.06)	-0.056 (0.06)	-0.037 (0.06)
Male	0.161** (0.07)	0.159** (0.07)	0.307*** (0.07)
Age	0.023*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)	0.027*** (0.00)
Married	-0.269*** (0.08)	-0.267*** (0.08)	-0.301*** (0.08)
Income	0.163*** (0.04)	0.162*** (0.03)	0.197*** (0.03)
Education	0.102*** (0.04)	0.102** (0.04)	0.136*** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.012 (0.02)
African-American	0.325*** (0.11)	0.330*** (0.11)	0.218** (0.11)

Table C5 Continued

Hispanic	0.297** (0.13)	0.294** (0.13)	0.234* (0.12)
Other Minority	0.474** (0.20)	0.474** (0.20)	0.347* (0.18)
Intercept	-7.668	-7.656	-4.607
Pseudo-R ²	0.126	0.126	0.091
N	10066	10066	10101

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table C6: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Full Indirect Mobilization Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.4	Model CCAP5.5
Total Presidential/Vice Presidential Visits	-0.003 (0.00)	
Total Presidential Spending		-0.031 (0.02)
Altruism	0.356*** (0.03)	0.356*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.042 (0.04)	0.042 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.005 (0.04)	-0.005 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.139*** (0.04)	0.140*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.072** (0.03)	0.073** (0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.063 (0.03)	-0.062** (0.03)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.129** (0.06)	-0.128** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.266*** (0.13)	1.264*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.058 (0.06)	-0.058 (0.06)
Male	0.158** (0.07)	0.159** (0.07)
Age	0.023*** (0.00)	0.023*** (0.00)
Married	-0.271*** (0.08)	-0.270*** (0.08)
Income	0.164*** (0.04)	0.164*** (0.03)
Education	0.101*** (0.04)	0.102** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)
African-American	0.324*** (0.12)	0.318*** (0.12)
Hispanic	0.293** (0.13)	0.290** (0.13)
Other Minority	0.470** (0.20)	0.467** (0.20)

Table C6 Continued

Intercept	-7.624	-7.634
Pseudo-R ²	0.126	0.126
N	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table C7: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Alternative Indirect Mobilization Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP-A5.4	Model CCAP-A5.5	Model CCAP-A5.6
Presidential Visits	-0.011		
Democrat	(0.01)		
Presidential Visits	-0.000		
Republican	(0.01)		
Presidential+Vice		-0.008	
Presidential Visits		(0.01)	
Democrat			
Presidential+Vice		0.000	
Presidential Visits		(0.01)	
Republican			
Obama Spending			0.052
			(0.07)
McCain Spending			-0.193
			(0.15)
Altruism	0.356***	0.356***	0.357***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Openness to	0.042	0.042	0.042
Experience	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Extraversion	0.140***	0.140***	0.139***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Agreeableness	0.073**	0.073**	0.072**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Conscientiousness	-0.062**	-0.062**	-0.061**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ideology Liberal-	-0.128**	-0.128**	-0.131**
Conservative	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
(self-placement)			
Political Interest	1.266***	1.266***	1.263***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.058	-0.058	-0.058
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male	0.158**	0.160**	0.159**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	0.023***	0.023***	0.023***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Married	-0.272***	-0.271***	-0.269***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Income	0.165***	0.164***	0.163***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)

Table C7 Continued

Education	0.102*** (0.04)	0.101*** (0.04)	0.101*** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.011 (0.02)	-0.010 (0.02)
African-American	0.325*** (0.11)	0.323*** (0.11)	0.312*** (0.12)
Hispanic	0.293** (0.13)	0.291** (0.13)	0.275** (0.13)
Other Minority	0.471** (0.20)	0.470** (0.20)	0.464** (0.19)
Intercept	-7.625	-7.624	-7.630
Pseudo-R ²	0.126	0.126	0.126
N	10066	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table C8: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Full Direct Mobilization Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.6	Model CCAP5.7
Contacted by Party (Sum)	0.334*** (0.02)	0.539*** (0.05)
Contact Squared		-0.036*** (0.01)
Contact Cubed		0.001 (0.00)
Altruism	0.257*** (0.03)	0.257*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.024 (0.04)	0.021 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.007 (0.04)	-0.010 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.153*** (0.04)	0.155*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.080** (0.04)	0.080** (0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.078** (0.04)	-0.080** (0.04)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.114** (0.05)	-0.112** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.133*** (0.13)	1.114*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.073 (0.06)	-0.075 (0.06)
Male	0.178** (0.08)	0.179** (0.08)
Age	0.011*** (0.00)	0.001*** (0.00)
Married	-0.324*** (0.08)	-0.326*** (0.08)
Income	0.161*** (0.04)	0.159*** (0.04)
Education	0.097*** (0.04)	0.090** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.001 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)
African-American	0.330*** (0.12)	0.348*** (0.12)

Table C8 Continued

Hispanic	0.302** (0.12)	0.308** (0.12)
Other Minority	0.353 (0.22)	0.361** (0.21)
Intercept	-7.263	-7.316
Pseudo-R ²	0.184	0.185
N	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Table C9: Logit Analysis of Making a Political Donation – Alternative Direct Mobilization Model, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP-A5.7
Contacted by Party (Dichotomous, Any Contact)	1.079*** (0.08)
Altruism	0.324*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.035 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.012 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.152*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.079** (0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.075** (0.03)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.125** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.181*** (0.12)
Democrat-Republican	-0.055 (0.06)
Male	0.189*** (0.07)
Age	0.018*** (0.00)
Married	-0.307*** (0.07)
Income	0.163*** (0.03)
Education	0.085** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.007 (0.02)
African-American	0.401*** (0.12)
Hispanic	0.312** (0.13)
Other Minority	0.035** (0.20)
Intercept	-7.952
Pseudo-R ²	0.147
N	10066

Table C10: Logit Analyses of Making a Political Donation – Full Interaction Models, CCAP2008

	Model CCAP5.8	Model CCAP5.9
Altruism X Contact	0.008 (0.02)	
Openness to Experience X Contact	-0.029*** (0.01)	
Neuroticism X Contact	0.013 (0.15)	
Extraversion X Contact	-0.014 (0.14)	
Agreeableness X Contact	0.007 (0.01)	
Conscientiousness X Contact	0.008 (0.01)	
Democrat-Republican X Contact		0.038** (0.02)
Contacted by Party (Sum)	0.631*** (0.15)	0.476*** (0.05)
Contact Squared	-0.037*** (0.01)	-0.039*** (0.01)
Contact Cubed	0.001 (0.00)	0.001* (0.00)
Altruism	0.232*** (0.06)	0.257*** (0.03)
Openness to Experience	0.103** (0.05)	0.021 (0.04)
Neuroticism	-0.046 (0.06)	-0.011 (0.04)
Extraversion	0.193*** (0.06)	0.154*** (0.04)
Agreeableness	0.059 (0.04)	0.080** (0.04)
Conscientiousness	-0.098** (0.05)	-0.080** (0.04)
Ideology Liberal-Conservative (self-placement)	-0.106* (0.06)	-0.113** (0.06)
Political Interest	1.107*** (0.13)	1.112*** (0.13)
Democrat-Republican	-0.080 (0.06)	-0.176** (0.08)

Table C10 Continued

Male	0.172** (0.08)	0.178** (0.08)
Age	0.010*** (0.00)	0.010*** (0.00)
Married	-0.326*** (0.08)	-0.321*** (0.07)
Income	0.159*** (0.04)	0.159*** (0.04)
Education	0.092*** (0.04)	0.091** (0.04)
Church Attendance	-0.000 (0.02)	-0.001 (0.02)
African-American	0.337*** (0.13)	0.341*** (0.12)
Hispanic	0.293** (0.13)	0.307** (0.12)
Other Minority	0.366* (0.22)	0.358** (0.21)
Intercept	-7.561	-7.124
Pseudo-R ²	0.187	0.187
N	10066	10066

*p<0.1, **p<.05, ***p<.01

Note: Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses and probabilities based on two-tailed tests, observations clustered by state.

Figure C1: Frequency Histogram of Summed Party Contact




Figure C2: Predicted Probabilities of Making a Donation across the Full Range of Contact, for Low, Medium, and High Values of Openness to Experience





Figure C3: Predicted Probabilities of Making a Donation across the Full Range of Contact, for Democrats and Republicans



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