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THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: TRANSFORMING NORTHERN IRELAND

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ABSTRACT

The main goal of this project is to gain a better understanding of the process of conflict transformation. More specifically, I wish to examine what are the circumstances that push Dual Wing Resistance Organizations (DWRO), and particularly, the Irish Provisional Republican Movement to behave in one of four different ways: convergent towards violence, convergence towards cooperation, divergence and confusion.

My main argument is that in order to understand conflict transformation processes and what pushes an organization to behave in a particular way one must look into the interaction between factors at three levels of analysis: the context, organizational dynamics and leadership. Beyond this claim, my analysis focuses on answering a couple of other questions as well: Can studying a process and not just snap-shots in time lead to better understanding of organizational decisions? Can any one particular factor be responsible for every type of behavior? Can any one factor be relevant in the same way in all types of cases? Are some factors more relevant in leading to some types of behaviors over others? Can any one level of analysis explain all types of behaviors? and lastly, what is the role of leaders in conflict transformation processes? particularly, what role did Adams play in the process, what type of a leader was he and did he change over time?

To answer my questions, I process traced the Northern Ireland conflict from the end of 1983, when Gerry Adams became the president of Sinn Féin and until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in May 1998. I divided my timeline into 24 cases, ten cases of convergence towards cooperation, three cases of convergence towards violence, eight cases of divergence and three cases of confusion. For each case, I examined the four-months period leading up to the studied behavior.

I looked for actions by the British (government, military, court and police), the Irish (government, military, court and police), Unionists (political parties, as well as loyalist paramilitaries), intermediaries, promoters of peace and spoilers. I also looked into the potential role elections and agreements had to play. I then looked into the state of organizational dynamics in the period leading to each of my cases, what was going on within the organization, was there preference divergence between leadership and rank and file? Was there preference divergence between the two wings? Was there preference divergence between leaders? At that point I looked more closely into the workings of Adams – was he being sensitive to the context? Was he pushing his own agenda forward and bringing the organization with him or was he letting the organizational constraints dictate his behavior?

This process helped me in answering my questions, but also to understand whether factors from the different levels of analysis interacted with each other in leading to particular behaviors over others. I found that it is indeed illuminating to look into a process as a whole. Studying single-snap shots of behaviors can never tell the entire story. Looking into particular cases without considering past interactions between the various actors relevant in the conflict environment may lead to misunderstandings. I also found that the organizational decision to behave in one way or another is determined by the interaction of factors from the various levels.

However, I also found that even the same type of organizational behavior can be driven by different organizational goals. Meaning, sometimes the organization chooses to diverge out of necessity and fear of splintering, whereas in other times it is a tactical decision. In any case, the choice is not determined by the organizational dynamics alone, but by the context and the leadership as well. Meaning, both divergence and convergence can be driven by an organizational need to survive, but it is the context and the leadership that will determine which

of the two behaviors will be adopted. The other side of the coin is that the same organizational motivation can lead to different behaviors, depending on the context and the leadership.

When it comes to the particular contextual factors, I found that the British were relevant in all of the cases studied. Additionally, the British played a significant role in pushing the organization towards convergence, whereas the Unionists were found to be much more active during times of divergence, but not necessarily relevant for organizational decision making per se. The context as a whole mostly helped in explaining the choice between violence and cooperation. The particular factors within the context level were far less straight-forward in their effect. All factors were found to have both positive and negative effects. Promoters of peace were mostly acting in positive ways, but even they had some actions that were seen as negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. The Irish Republic was mostly negative in cases of divergence and only negative in cases of convergence towards violence and elections were found to be significant more in times of divergence than in time of convergence. When the context could not explain particular behaviors, organizational dynamics and leadership helped filling in the gap.

Lastly I found Gerry Adams to be a strategic leader that was hugely central in the progress of the conflict transformation process, due to his unique position within the organization, his leadership skills, his sensitivity to information, his long-windedness, his political skills and his charisma. He may not have been central in every organizational decision that was taken, and he may have been pulled by his own organization towards positions that were contrary to his agenda, but he nonetheless was central for the transformation of the movement from violence to cooperation and for the conflict transformation process as a whole.

THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT: TRANSFORMING NORTHERN IRELAND

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I cannot even express how much I have waited for this moment. I am not going to lie, I have been counting the days. But with all seriousness, being able to write my acknowledgment means that I am finally done! It took me longer than I originally planned, but that is water under the bridge now. Because I am done! And I have sooooo many people to thank for.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In October 1984, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the military wing of the Republican Movement in Ireland attempted to kill British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, alongside members of her conservative party. Sinn Féin, the political party of the same Republican Movement stood behind it and supported the attack (The Express, October 5th 2005; The Guardian, October 13th 1984). In December 1987 the Sinn Féin entered into talks with the SDLP, its political rival that was known for its condemnation of violence. At the same time, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the military wing of the same republican party, launched its own version of the ‘Tet offensive’ (Moloney, 2002). In August 1994, the Provisional IRA announced a ceasefire and the Sinn Féin entered negotiations with the British and Irish governments (Coogan, 1995).

These various organizational behaviors raise some interesting questions. When do Dual Wing Resistance Organizations (DWRO) act in unison towards violent or non-violent actions and when do the different wings disagree? What are the factors that push the adoption of different behaviors and can patterns be detected over time? In essence, I am interested in learning whether it is a specific factor in the conflict environment, in the organizational setting or about its leadership or perhaps a combination of several factors from the various levels of analysis that leads to a DWRO acting in one way rather than in another. Additionally, I wish to learn what are the broader implications of such patterns for the understanding of conflict transformation processes.

In my dissertation I try to answer these questions by focusing on the behavior of one DWRO - the (Provisional) Irish Republican Movement and the way its two main wings, namely

the Provisional Irish Republican Army on the one hand and the Sinn Féin on the other, behaved over time. My framework looks at the interaction between various factors at different levels – environmental, also known as context, organization and individuals. I use my framework to study the organizational behavior of the movement, to explain the different signals the Republican Movement sent and the way it received signals sent to it by others, during the (last) fifteen years of conflict in Northern Ireland. More importantly, I use the framework to explain the transformation the movement went through over those years and how it enabled the conflict to reach its peaceful end.

The conflict in Northern Ireland may have reached a peaceful agreement in the form of the Good Friday Agreement in April 1998 (also known as ‘the Belfast Agreement’), but there is much that remains unknown. Although many scholars have provided great insights into the workings of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement (Moloney, 2002), (O'Brien, 1999); of the negotiation, and of the other parties to the conflict (Silke, 1998), to the best of my knowledge no scholar has adopted a levels-of-analysis framework (looking into the role played by factors from the context, the organization and the individual separately and into the interaction between them) that hones in on the inter-level dynamics of the process itself and the evolving changes of that interaction over time. Nor has anyone given sufficient attention to the uniqueness of a DWRO or to the role of leaders in them.

The Provisional Irish Republican Movement provides us with multiple cases of fluctuation in its behavior, as the group is notorious for its alternating adoption of political and violent means, which at times were adopted simultaneously (Moloney, 2002); (Coogan, 1995). However, (at least) part of this behavior can be explained if one was to look into the operating of the two wings along-side each other, in the context of the broader conflict. Furthermore, it is also

important to note, that at least for the outside observer, Northern Ireland is one of the most important contemporary success stories of conflict transformation. Even though many in Northern Ireland would claim the conflict is certainly far from being over, since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, violence has dramatically been reduced.¹ Not only that, but the Republican Movement has also been an active (and quite successful) participant in the political process.

I claim that specific patterns in the behavior of the movement can be detected over time, and that when considering the process as a whole, those patterns can in fact be explained. Other than shedding light on previously puzzling organizational decisions, these patterns also have explanatory and predictive power in relations to other groups under similar conditions.

Several guiding and inter-connected assumptions were at the basis of my work. First, conflict transformation is a process and as such, single snap-shots of behavior do not tell the whole story and on their own, can in fact offer a skewed depiction of reality. If we were to focus only on incidents in which the Provisional IRA used violence, we would be missing all those instances in which the movement chose to cooperate with the system. We would then reduce the Provisional IRA to a terrorist organization, and would discard all other actions it took over the years. Furthermore, if we were to focus only on one action it took, say its agreement to sign the Good Friday Agreement, we would miss out on all the nuanced interactions within the movement and between the movement and the other actors in the conflict that led the movement to that specific decision.

¹ Several of the conversation I have had with experts from different fields of work who were involved in the negotiation process or are involved now in the post-conflict reconciliation processes claim that the conflict is not over, nor is it peaceful. Nonetheless, one cannot deny that the level of violence has diminished greatly since 1998.

Second, no one factor can possibly be responsible for every type of behavior or every change in the process. It certainly cannot be the case that it was similar British actions that led the Provisional IRA at a specific moment to adopt violence and in another to act in cooperation. Third, no one level of analysis can be responsible for all types of behaviors. Similar to my second assumption, I argue that even if we look at all of the factors that are relevant in the context level, we would still miss out on some explanatory factors from other levels of analysis, namely, the organization and leadership. Fourth, some factors will be found to have more significance in leading to certain behaviors than to others. Elections might have more explanatory power on their own than say, actions taken by the Irish government. However, more importantly elections may have more explanatory power when looking into cases in which the organization chose to behave cooperatively than cases in which it chose to act violently.

Fifth, a DWRO's behavior is determined by the interaction of factors from the context, organizational dynamics and leadership signals and behavior. Lastly, leaders play a central role in the transformation of conflicts. However, only at certain points in time, when the context allows it, and only when they hold specific powers within the organization such as the respect and control of both wings, do leaders in fact have the power to influence the behavior of the organization. Leaders do not operate in a vacuum. They need somebody to give them a chance and the settings should be right in order for their power to matter. Nevertheless, strong leaders who are open to information and are sensitive to context can in fact work to change the settings within which they are working. Strategic leaders serve as the linking chain between the organization and the context. They have a goal to achieve but they can only advance towards it under specific circumstances. Those circumstances push the incremental progress in the conflict process.

This chapter will begin by introducing the debates within the conflict transformation literature, the strengths that led me to choose it and the gaps I aim to fill in it. As part of this discussion, I will clarify the importance of looking into a process and not just single snapshots in time while also stressing the need to look into leadership, organizational dynamics and various factors within the context simultaneously in order to understand the process, rather than focus on one actor or one factor at a time. I will then explain what I mean by DWRO and present the four organizational behaviors I'm interested in learning. I will close this chapter by discussing what the rest of the dissertation entails of.

Studying the process of 'Conflict Transformation'²

The first order of business is to understand conflict transformation better. Beyond the introducing of the concept and its meaning, this section is also about explaining why this concept is appropriate for my study, but more importantly, why I chose to focus on process rather than on specific snapshots of time.

Lederach defines conflict transformation as being about constructive change that goes “beyond the resolution of specific problems” (Lederach, 2003, p. 4). He explains that conflicting parties tend to sense conflicts as a series of peaks and valleys – conflicts as a series of challenges and failures, whereas the real sense of underlying issues in the conflict tend to disappear (Lederach, 2003).

Lederach uses a metaphor of lenses to explain what conflict transformation is all about. Using reading glasses to see at a distance or using far sight glasses for reading are both useless tasks – each lens is supposed to bring one aspect of reality into perspective. However, modern

² While I am using the literature of conflict transformation as the baseline for the framework I offer, I use only its theoretical part, as opposed to the more practical based parts it offers.

glasses are multifocal, they hold multiple lenses in one frame, and that is the essence of conflict transformation. When one aspect is brought into focus, the others get blurry, but it does not mean they are not there (Lederach, 2003). Conflict transformation is thus one approach that understands not only that reality is complex, but that in order to better understand it, the different aspects of reality are in a relationship with each other: “I need each lens to see a particular portion of reality and I need them to be in relationship to see the whole” (Lederach, 2003, p. 10).

This perspective is exactly what I wish to advance in my dissertation, however in a different manner. The point I wish to make is that each level of analysis is important in and of itself, but we must hold them all together and use all of them to understand the process in its fullest. Additionally, we must understand how each of the levels affects the others and what perspective is given to whatever is in the background, in order to better understand the dynamic process of conflict transformation.

“Transformation seeks to create a framework to address the content, the context and the structure of the relationship” (Lederach, 2003, p. 12). The way I use conflict transformation is for its understanding of conflict and change. I stop short of applying a transformational framework to conflict which is a central aspect of the approach, but I do offer some policy prescriptions that might be used for that purpose in my conclusion chapter.

Lederach mentions that conflict transformation “is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real life problems in human relationships” (Lederach, 2003, p. 14). Though I do not discuss conflict transformation practices (how to bring forth change), I still point to areas that create such opportunities for constructive change, studying how they are dealt with by parties and what can

be done by third parties seeking to help. Conflict is filled with opportunities for growth, which are not always taken advantage of. My research tries to understand what those opportunities are, when do they arise, and why they are sometimes passed on. Focusing on the process itself, Lederach explains that “a transformational approach seeks to understand the particular episode of conflict not in isolation, but as embodied in the greater pattern (of conflict)” (Lederach, 2003, p. 16). And that is what I try to do.

Conflict transformation thus focuses on the process. Specifically, it “focuses on the dynamic aspects of social conflict... the approach includes, but is not driven by, an episodic view of conflict” (Lederach, 2003, p. 19).

Nonetheless, Lederach mentions that since the term of conflict transformation is still developing, people afford it different meanings. Similarly to Lederach, Miall too points to inconsistencies in the way concepts and terms within the theory are used (Miall, 2004). Seeking to tackle the question of whether a theory of conflict transformation even exists, Miall provides us with a useful distinction between theories of conflict transformation and practices of conflict transformation (Miall, 2004). I focus on the former, rather than the latter.

Miall finds that a theory of conflict transformation indeed exists, but that it is still developing. Building on Lederach and Galtung (1996), alongside contributions from non-violent conflict literatures, Miall argues that the new emerging theory of conflict transformation, despite drawing from many of the familiar concepts of conflict resolution and conflict management and resting on the same theoretical traditions, is nonetheless unique. At the minimum, it should be seen as “a re-conceptualization of the field in order to make it more relevant to contemporary conflicts” (Miall, 2004, p. 5).

The value of conflict transformation theory lies in its ability to offer a better framework for the understanding of the complex contemporary protracted and asymmetrical conflicts, unlike the somewhat simplistic theories offered so far. He describes conflict transformation as “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourse and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict” (Miall, 2004, p. 4). This approach not only sees constructive conflict as “a vital agent or catalyst for change” but also recognizes that “conflicts are transformed gradually, through a series of smaller or larger changes as well as specific steps...” (Miall, 2004, p. 4).

In his seminal work, Galtung (1996) defined several of the core concepts relevant for this discussion. Galtung sees conflicts as emanating from contradictions in the structure of society, having both life-affirming and life-destroying aspects. Conflicts can undergo several processes of transformation: articulation or dis-articulation, conscientisation or de-conscientisation, complexification or simplification, polarization or de-polarization, escalation or de-escalation (Galtung, 1996, p. 90).

This perception of conflict and their transformation processes is already wider than what scholars of terrorism studies or social movements usually tend to see. The literature of conflict transformation can thus inform other fields of study, just like it can benefit from considering the insights from other approaches. Some progress in synthesizing the insights from various approaches and fields of study has been made in recent years, however, there remains a gap that needs to be overcome if we are to better understand the differences and similarities between and across conflicts, but most importantly their dynamic nature and the way they can be pushed away from violence. Using conflict transformation as the basis for my framework while adding to it insights from other fields is another step in this call for synthesis.

Galtung's work promotes the view that the reduction of violence and de-escalation is not the only goal or treatment conflicts should receive but that it is merely one part of the story. As such, dealing with on-going conflicts cannot be only about promoting de-radicalization or the promotion of non-violent methods of resistance, but requires a far deeper engagement with the parties, promoting compromise and minimizing the contradictions between the parties on these different issues.

In his effort to offer a more comprehensive theory of conflict transformation, Miall mixes the seminal works of conflict transformation (especially Galtung and Lederach) with several seminal contributions from theories on non-violence. He stresses the view offered by Vayrynen (1991) who promoted a conflict theory that is based on transformation rather than settlement. Vayrynen emphasized the dynamic nature of conflicts: "The issues, actors and interests change over time as a consequence of the social, economic and political dynamics of societies" (Vayrynen, 1991, p. 4)

Azar (1990) who studied protracted social conflicts is also brought in as someone who contributed greatly to the theory of conflict transformation. Azar focused on patterns of destructive and constructive conflicts based on the relationships between the parties. His theory suggests that the dynamics of conflicts operate by creating different options, or opportunities, that lead to either benign or malignant spirals of conflict (Azar, 1990).

Miall stresses that despite a common trend of conflict "to broaden (suck in new issues), widen (suck in new actors) and intensify (suck in new victims)", it is also possible for conflict to be transformed. Transformation happens "as parties shift positions and adopt new goals, new actors emerge and new situations develop allowing for new relationships and changed structures" (Miall, 2004, p. 7). But what are those new situations? How do they develop and do the new

relationships always emerge or do they depend on other factors beyond the structure? Such questions have not been answered yet by scholars of conflict transformation and are at the basis of my work.

Adherents of the method talk of conflict as a source of violence but also of opportunities for development. It is up to the conflicting parties, together, to share responsibility and to move away from violence and towards development, usually with the help of third parties (Galtung, 2000). Together should be the point to emphasize here. Conflict transformation is not a one sided process. It is not enough for one party to work towards conflict resolution, if the other party does not cooperate with such efforts. Understanding that conflicts are dynamic and that they involve a long non-linear process, means that transformation is about constant re-evaluation and adjustment (Dudouet, 2013). It is up to the parties themselves, sometimes with the help of others, to re-evaluate their own position in the conflict, to re-evaluate the position of their adversaries, and to adjust their behavior accordingly.

Like Dayton and Kriesberg (2009), Miall further distinguishes between context, relationship and memories. He sees context as including the society, but also the wider regional and international levels. Relationship involves the interaction between the society and between the society and other societies. Lastly, memories are part of the way each party in the conflict understands the situation, shaped by culture and learning, discourse and belief (Miall, 2004). A useful way of thinking about these three issues is to see context as part of the present and the future, relationships as part of the present and the past, and memories as part of the past. Combined, the three factors only exacerbate the need to look into conflicts as long-term processes and to understand episodes of de-escalation or escalation as linked to each other. But

more importantly, this understanding of the conflict environment guided the selection of relevant factors for my framework, as will be explained below.

Miall's last contribution to a theory of conflict transformation builds on a synthesis of Vayrynen's approach together with Galtung and Lederach's views. He distinguishes between five types of transformations: context, structure, actor, issue and personal/elite transformations. As I explain in chapter three, I reframe these five transformations into three levels of analysis: context and structure are combined to explain the overall opportunity structure of the conflict dynamic, whereas actor and issue transformation are combined under the organizational level of analysis and personal/elite transformation is dealt with in the individual level of analysis. Similar to my claim, Miall too agrees that "personal changes of heart or mind within the individual leaders or small groups with decision making power at critical moments may be crucial" (Miall, 2004, p. 10).

Referring to the disagreements and controversies within the field of conflict studies about the best practices to bring forth peace, Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse emphasize that those who study conflict, whether they call it conflict resolution or conflict transformation are driven by "a commitment to the core assumption that aggressive win-lose styles of engagement in violent conflicts usually incur costs that are not only unacceptably high for the conflict parties, but also for world society in general". For them this means that by and large the defining goal of it all is "a search for ways of transforming actually or potentially violent conflict into peaceful processes of political and social change", however one chooses to do so (Miall, Ramsbotham, & Woodhouse, 2011, pp. 63-64). I could not agree more with this point. At the end of the day, it really does not matter how we call it, as long as we do all that we can to promote peace and reduce violence.

Miall ends with a call for “a more finely-grained, differentiated approach” for conflict transformation that breaks the process into “a sequence of changes in the conflict structure, the parties’ goals and into issues over time” (Miall H. , 2004, p. 16). This dissertation aims at answering this call and hopes to fill in the existing gap in our understanding of conflict transformation processes. The framework of conflict transformation is thus relevant for this study due to its focus on change and the emphasis of the process itself. It gives agency to the conflicting parties to take advantage of opportunities, to signal their behavior, and to create the necessary change in an incremental process of shifting conflict dynamics.

Defining Dual-Wing Resistance Organizations (DWRO)

Introducing the concept of *Dual Wing Resistance Organization (DWRO)* and their relevance for the study of conflict is thus the next order of business. Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) challenge many of the existing works within terrorism and conflict studies and emphasize the danger in overestimating the unity of actors in conflict. “Analytical frameworks that accurately reflect the messy realities on the ground (of non-state actors who are far from unitary) can more readily produce inferences about causal processes and reliable strategies for conflict resolution policy”. As a result, they highlight the necessity for more nuanced information about the fragmented character of actors in conflict (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012, p. 12).

In her own work, Pearlman (2010) introduces the ‘composite-actor’ approach that “entails disaggregating political collectives into categories of individuals” (p. 198). Pearlman disaggregates movements into elite, aspirants and the masses. She claims that organizational behavior is driven by the dynamics between these composite actors (Pearlman, 2010). By focusing on who is making the decisions and how their choices affect the organization rather than why a group chooses to use violence or not she shows that groups should be disaggregated

and not looked at as unitary actors (Pearlman, 2010). I take Pearlman's call to explore "different categorizations" for groups as composite-actors but I disaggregate my movements of interest in a different way, taking note of the dual wing structure of these organization.

As such, DWRO are defined here as *resistance movements which employ both violent and non-violent tactics and sustain a military wing that is, at least on paper, separate from a political or social wing.*³ The logic behind sustaining two connected by separated wings has received very scant attention in security studies⁴. The meaning of them for conflict transformation processes has been so far almost entirely ignored.

It is important to emphasize that DWRO share an overarching goal and ideology and (strive to) coordinate their behavior and take advantage of each other's advantages and (temporal) successes. They are two sides of the same struggle and the same movement, despite having separate tactical preferences, separate (at least partially) membership and even separate leadership structures, (at least on paper). For a movement to be considered a DWRO the leadership structures must at the minimum coordinate behavior. A higher threshold is when the same leaders have a role to play in the two separate leadership structures. The movement discussed here, the Irish Provisional Republican Movement fulfills this higher threshold. In the words of Berti (2013, p. 9-10):

"In the case of the 'Republican Movement', there has always been a formal separation between its military and political wings, the IRA and Sinn Fein, with distinct leaderships and

³ Some resistance organizations have more than two wings, however, in the case under study here, as well as in other cases that are beyond the scope of my work, these two are the ones that represent the organization the most and if there are other wings for the organization, they do not last or they are directed by one of the two central wings under study.

⁴ Unique in this regard are Siqueira in his article from 2005, Benedetta Berti in her book from 2013 and Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger in their book from 2009. These studies, their strengths and their short-comings are discussed in chapter three.

*structures. In reality, there was also a level of integration between IRA and Sinn Fein, especially in the first decades of operation of the group, wherein the Army Council de facto oversaw all political and military activities. Furthermore, double-membership within the IRA and Sinn Fein, including at the leadership level, ensured unity of purpose and organizational cohesion”.*⁵

The existence of both wings offers the DWRO alternative courses of action that do not have to be violent, but also do not have to conform with the norms of behavior under the existing institutions either. Scholars have listed several of the potential benefits a political wing accrues from forming, promoting or supporting a violent wing. One of these benefits has to do with better outbidding strategies (Findley & Young, 2012).⁶ Other potential benefits are an increased opportunity for voice under severely restrictive autocratic settings, a way to express ideological aversion to the existing state institutions or a way to legitimize violence as expression of public will following a failure in electoral processes (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009).⁷ Lastly, armed wings can also prevent fractionalization and provide an outlet for preference divergence that might stem from generational changes (Shapiro, 2013).⁸

⁵ I wish to emphasize this view of Dual Wing Resistance Organizations especially when it comes to the movement under study. When it comes to the Republican movement in Ireland, several scholars treat the IRA and the Sinn Fein as completely separate organizations (see for example, Krause, Peter, forthcoming). However, in my view there is enough evidence to claim that at least during the years under study here, such a distinction and separation is artificial. See for example Moloney (2002); Coogan (1995); O’Brien (1999); Berti (2013) and others. Academia aside, Martin McGuinness, one of Sinn Fein’s most senior members, an elected MP, the former education minister for Northern Ireland and current deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland, admitted in 2001 to having been a member of the senior leadership of the IRA during the Troubles (The Irish Times, May 2nd 2001).

⁶ Outbidding happens when groups fight over representations of constituents. When it comes to groups which are willing to use violence, the argument goes that competition leads to escalation of violent tactics. If we connect it to the discussion of DWRO, the political party can potentially benefit from being associated with a militant organization, if it feels that the public is supportive of increased violence.

⁷ The argument here goes that when a party does poorly in its electoral campaign, a political wing can claim that the system is fraudulent, and thus misrepresents the real level of public support. As the system is rigged to begin with, violent means are then legitimized as the ‘only’ option to pursue the movement’s goals (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009, p. 23).

⁸ Usually those are the younger generations that push for more violence, whereas the older generation of leaders, especially in war-fatigued societies pushes towards more cooperation. Adopting a military wing helps a movement to accommodate the younger, more eager generation while still saving face and being able to participate in the institutional process (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009, p. 24). Fractionalization and preference divergence

But there are also benefits for a militant organization to develop, promote or support a political party. Some of those benefits are an opportunity to better convey a political message, achieving greater popular sympathy and acceptance, both locally and globally (Berti, 2013). In essence, DWRO must balance between militancy and respectability. Each one of those options comes with a cost (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009). Sustaining both wings, while creating new problems and complicating decision making as the empirical chapters show, nonetheless allows for such balancing effort to bear fruits.⁹

Benefits aside, the fact of the matter is that DWROs exist, over long periods of time and with changing levels of success in goal attainment. Not only that, but the relationship between the two wings is dynamic in and of itself, as Pearlman emphasizes: “The internal relationships and interactions driving conflict behavior change over time... specifically, the factors responsible for an initial turn to violence differ from those that sustain it” (Pearlman, 2010, p. 202). The dynamic relationship evolves as a response to organizational interactions, vertical and horizontal, but also as a response to the external environment (Pearlman, 2010, p. 215).

This realization drives the questions in this dissertation and the focus on my ‘outcome’ of interest. When does conflict transform? But more specifically, what makes DWRO act more in cohesion, and when does this cohesion turns violent or away from violence? Or as Pearlman says it: “(t)he coherent status of a movement should be treated as a research question to be explored, not an assumption to be taken for granted” (Pearlman, 2010, p. 202).

between members of the organization, whether horizontally (between different leaders) or vertically (between leaders and foot-soldiers) leads to what Shapiro calls ‘the Terrorist’s dilemma’ (Shapiro, 2013, p. 9).

⁹ Respectability and militancy are not necessarily contradictory, though they can be. Sometimes respectability can be maintained together with militancy, usually depending on the type of targets. Such was the case of Hezbollah in Lebanon, but more importantly, for the movement under study in this dissertation for much of the period under investigation.

Disaggregation under the framework of a levels-of-analysis framework, as will be shortly explained, takes into consideration the way internal dynamics affect organizational behavior while also allowing for my emphasis on the role of leaders in these dynamic processes as well as the role of the environment. In a sense, this is an extension of the horizontal and vertical categories discussed by Dudouet (2015)¹⁰.

DWROs thus represent the universe of cases from which I choose my own case. They also set the limits of generalizability for the framework I offer. But I do not study all DWROs, nor do I study everything about them. Once again, I am interested in understanding what leads such organizations to make different strategic choices between contention and cooperation over time and how do past interactions affect current and future ones.

But contention and cooperation are not necessarily like black and white. Like others, I claim that armed and un-armed resistance are in fact non dichotomous (Dudouet, 2015). Furthermore, the focus here is on the strategic choice made by a movement regarding the way it chooses to voice its contention (Hirschman, 1970). I speak of a *movement between contention and cooperation*, which can be seen along a continuum, as movements can employ violent and non-violence resistant tactics alongside their decision to cooperate with the system within which they are operating. Meaning, at the farthest end, cooperation is no longer contentious and in fact lacks elements of resistance. At this end, a movement chooses to become and is accepted by the other parties to the conflict as an integral and equal participant in the political process. However,

¹⁰ Speaking on relevant factors for conflict transformation at the intra-group level, Dudouet differentiates between horizontal group dynamics (between group members) and vertical relationships with the group's social surrounding (Dudouet, 2015). As will be explained in more details in chapter 3, I see horizontal group dynamics to be on two levels – one between leaders of the two wings and one between members of the two wings. Vertical relationships have to do not only with the relationship between the group and its constituency but also between leaders of each wing and their members, as well as the leaders of the group as a whole and the group's members.

the way a movement manages the transformation from contention to cooperation can take various forms and is most definitely not a linear process.

The point of my hypotheses generating exercise is thus to understand the various Republican Movement strategic behaviors. In order to do so, I divided their possible behavior into four-types. Generally, most cases are those in which clear behaviors of both wings at the same time were detected (a maximum of a month apart). Cases that are based on the behavior of only one wing are those in which the wing was acting contrary to its' 'expected' behavior, meaning the military wing was acting in cooperation with the system or the political wing was supporting violence explicitly.

The four types of behaviors are thus:

1. **Convergent Cooperation:** in these cases, the DWRO is sending a clear unified message and it is a message of cooperation and willingness to compromise. As explained above, the interesting part in these cases is when the armed wing is being explicitly and non-violently supportive of political action.¹¹
2. **Convergent Violence:** in these cases, the DWRO is again sending a unified message and it is a violent one. The interesting part of these cases is the political wing that is moving away from cooperation and compromise, moving away from legitimate political action and towards supporting armed struggle.¹²

¹¹ When the armed wing is willing to fund political efforts, which means there will be less funds for the armed struggle, it is enough to be considered as cooperating with the system.

¹² The support for armed struggle does not have to be active, but it can be done with words. It is enough that a political party is not condemning specific acts of violence, but is even supporting it, to be considered as a case for convergent violence.

3. Divergent: in these cases, the DWRO is sending a mixed signal – the political wing is cooperative and compromising, while the military wing is violent. These are by far the most interesting cases that accentuate the operational problems of DWRO.
4. Confused (split) armed wing: in this last type of cases, the military wing itself is sending mixed messages, simultaneously acting in violence and cooperating with the political system. In these cases the focus is on the armed wing. These cases are different than the divergent cases as the armed wing itself is the one that is sending mixed signals, and not the organization as a whole.¹³

Two more types of behaviors were not studied. Instances where the armed wing is acting violently and the political wing is not doing anything to support the violence were not studied, as those were considered to be the ‘expected’ behavior of the wing, and as such, do not raise a question on their own for the purposes of my study. Similarly, instances where the political wing is acting in cooperation with the system and the military wing has no relevant behavior at the same time were not considered as cases.

How can this variation in behavior be explained? What is the most ‘popular’ choice the organization has made? Are there patterns that can be detected in the choice of the Republican Movement between these four types of behaviors? In order to answer these questions, I built a levels-of-analysis framework that will allow me to generate hypotheses.

I argue that different combinations of factors from three levels of analysis, the conflict context, the organization itself, and leaders, lead to different behaviors of these DWROs. These

¹³ The behavior of the political wing is also examined for these cases. However, the focus is on the armed wing as it is acting in two different behaviors at the same time. Meaning, even if the political wing is silent at the time of the conflicting behaviors, it is still considered to be a case.

‘strategic’ decisions by DWRO, or by either of its wings, then result in various developments in the conflict process/dynamic itself, specifically making the environment more or less conflict prone. Particularly, some combinations of factors will lead the DWRO to converge around violence, while other combinations of factors will lead it to converge around cooperative behavior.

Yet, a third possible scenario is when a specific combination of factors leads a DWRO to diverge in its strategy, which then results in what may seem to be conflicting behavior, as one arm of the movement adopts violence while the other chooses cooperative behavior or when the DWRO is simply confused, when one arm alone is sending mixed signals. This ‘conflicting’ behavior offers a unique opportunity for those wishing to advance the process of conflict towards resolution, whether from within the DWRO or from outside of it. It is an opportunity to stand with and empower the more cooperative elements within the DWRO and to enable a positive push in the conflict dynamic.

Building a levels-of-analysis framework

Before presenting you with more details of the case and its history, the third order of business is to briefly discuss the main assumptions that stand at the base of the research and analysis.

As already mentioned, given the many failures of conflict transformation and resolution processes, I found the relative success of the Northern Ireland peace process intriguing. Beyond the basic questions that have to do with the causes of the conflict, I was fascinated by the process of transformation. What needs to happen for a conflict to find a peaceful resolution? What happened in Northern Ireland that can teach us about other conflicts? Is it at all comparable? But

other than that, I was truly fascinated by the Republican Movement. Seeing that it chose to use various tactics, I started to investigate its behavior more closely. Was the Provisional IRA truly the most violent group in the conflict? Was it always violent? If it was violent all the time, then how did the conflict reach an end? If it was not violent all the time, what led it to cease violence or change its targets at certain moments but not in others? What was the Sinn Féin doing while the IRA was being violent? How did the armed struggle fit in with its political stance? What is the true connection between the two wings of the organization?

With these questions in mind, I delved into the history of the conflict and particularly that of the Republican Movement. All of my questions can be summed up in a question. *Under what circumstances do DWROs change their behavior and how does that affect the process of conflict transformation?* In my hypotheses generating exercise I thus saw the need to utilize a *levels-of-analysis* framework (Singer, 1961). The framework examines whether and in what ways the interaction between individual leaders, organizational dynamics and structural constraints and opportunities ('the environment') leads to changed behavior by the various actors in the conflict. I sought detectable patterns both in the behavior of the movement but also in the conflict as a whole. Furthermore, I hoped to learn more about organizational dynamics of such DWRO's and the way they act and react in the process of conflict.

Another benefit of this framework is that it places emphasis on the process of conflict itself and not on particular moments in it. All factors included in the different levels have been found to have explanatory power or relevance in at least one of the literatures examined for this hypotheses generating process.¹⁴

¹⁴ Most recently, V. Dudouet in her edited volume on Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation (2015) provides a framework that also considers similar factors in the different levels of analysis, though in a different way than the

But I was also most interested in the role leaders have to play in conflict transformation processes, and specifically, the role Gerry Adams played in this particular conflict. In order to better understand conflict transformation processes, special attention, within and beyond the levels-of-analysis framework, should be given to leaders. Particularly, I argue that leaders are immensely important for conflicts to find resolution, but it is only through this process of examination of the conflict dynamics that we can indeed learn in what ways and at under what circumstances. Just like the gap in synthesizing different literatures in the study of conflict processes, so has the role of leaders in these DWROs and the push and pull factors that influence decision making processes in such organizations received very scant attention in the literature despite being vastly important. As such, in this dissertation I wish to provide a humble push forward on this issue.

But before we move on to the more detailed analysis, one should first get some familiarity with the conflict in Northern Ireland and with the Republican Movement. Chapter two fulfills this goal by setting the stage. In this chapter I present the history of the conflict in Ireland, with particular reference to the specific conflict in the North known as ‘the Troubles’. Chapter two also includes an introduction of the populations living on the Island and their various identity groups. It provides an introduction of the Republican Movement, discussing its development in the short period between the end of the Irish civil war in 1923 and the beginning of ‘the Troubles’ in 1969. It then moves on to discuss the split in the movement, and the birth of the Provisional Republican Movement which is at the focus on my work. Chapter 2 ends with a

one offered here and, due to a different perspective and focus, without the insights from the different fields of study, especially terrorism and civil war studies. Nonetheless, the framework offered by Dudouet only strengthens the arguments advanced in this dissertation.

short introduction of Gerry Adams who is one of the main protagonists in the story of the Provisional Republican Movement and in its transformation process.

In chapter 3 I present my research question and my framework for analysis. I discuss the ways in which conflicts have been studied in the past. To do that, I bring together works of scholars from various fields, spanning from conflict studies and civil wars, through terrorism studies to decision making. I argue that there is a need to better synthesize the findings from these various literatures in order to better understand conflict transformation processes. Particularly, I show how much the quite separated fields of conflict transformation (writ-large) and that of terrorism studies (again, writ large) have to gain from a deeper engagement with each other, as well as with other fields of interest.¹⁵ I show how we, as scholars and as policy makers interested in understanding conflicts and learning from the different processes, have much to gain from blurring the delineating boundaries between fields of study and from looking at the full picture through the multiple lenses provided by each of these fields. To fulfill this goal, I review the different relevant literatures and point to discrepancies, gaps and misunderstandings that could be alleviated by better synthesis.

Based on this call to synthesize insights from different fields, I draw on the different factors discussed by these various literatures to offer a more wholesome and unified framework for the study of conflict transformation processes. By basically asking '*How do conflicts transform*' I try to understand what are the conditions under which sides to an enduring conflict manage to overcome their differences and create a more cooperative environment for dialogue,

¹⁵ In fact, a first step is to actually illuminate the field of terrorism studies with the nuanced understandings of insurgency and civil war studies, before one can delve into the more conflict process oriented literature, as I have claimed elsewhere (Moghadam, Berger, & Beliakova, 2014). Other literatures I take into considerations are from the fields of social movements, political psychology and organizational dynamics.

agreement and even peace. In essence it is a *levels-of-analysis* framework. It examines the interaction between individual leaders, organizational dynamics and structural constraints and opportunities in leading to one of four possible behaviors of a DWRO. It also emphasizes the process of conflict itself over particular moments in it. I show that all factors included in the different levels have been found to have explanatory power or relevance in at least one of the literatures examined for this hypotheses generating process.

Chapter 4 discusses in more details the process of generating hypotheses. Specifically, I discuss the process I went through in building my levels-of-analysis framework for the study of my particular case, the Provisional Republican Movement. In this chapter I begin to tell the story of the Republican Movement as a process of action and re-action and give you a preliminary glimpse into the details of the specific cases I study. In it, I present the methods I used in my analysis and discuss the manner in which they were used. The chapter begins by discussing case selection, goes through the process of building a chronology, data collection and coding rules. During my discussion of the stages of analysis, I also present the sources I used, and why I chose these specific methodologies over others.

Chapters 5 and 6 are case-study chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on the cases of convergence, whether it is towards cooperation or towards violence, while chapter 6 discusses the cases of divergence and the cases of confusion. In both of these chapters I provide a more detailed analysis of the various factors from the different levels. By moving from theory to practice, I show the results of the coding and of the stages of analysis. In doing so, I point to patterns that immediately emerge from over-viewing the entire data, and from differentiating between two general types of organizational behavior: convergent and divergent.

Chapter 7 is my conclusion. In it I take a step back, looking at the entire process once again, and discuss the patterns that have emerged and the things I have learned in this process. I also discuss how these findings can be used by others and offer some avenues for further research.

Chapter 2

Setting the Stage: The Conflict in Northern Ireland

The Troubles that began in 1968 and ended (at least technically) via a peace agreement signed on Good Friday, April 10th 1998 can be described in many ways. Some say it is a religious conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Some say it is a conflict between Unionists and Nationalists. Others say it is between Republicans who seek “Ira Nura” or a “United Ireland” and the loyalists who support the 1921 British partition of the six Northeastern counties of Ireland from the rest of Ireland and leaving it under British Rule. Some say it is a struggle for equality based on economic factors stemming from oppression and discrimination against the minority Catholic population (Cairns & Darby, 1998). All are correct. The conflict in Northern Ireland has many faces (Hume, 1996).

Before delving into the modern portrayal of the conflict, it is important to note the relationship, or difference if you will, between the different terms used to describe the populations in the North. Religious affiliation marks the biggest identity groups – with Catholics on the one side and Protestants on the other. The mid-level of identity groups has to do with self-identification with a nation. On the Catholic side we have the Nationalists who identify themselves with the Irish state, see themselves as Irish and at the minimum would have liked to see an independent North (from British influence) if not a reunification with the rest of the island. Unionists on the other hand see themselves as British and support the Union with Britain. They would like to continue being a part of the United Kingdom and at the minimum are happy with the status quo in which Northern Ireland is a separate entity from the rest of the island.

The smallest of identity groups is also ‘the hardest one’ - the one that justifies the use of violence to attain one’s goals (Hultman, 2007). On the Catholic side we have the Republicans and on the Protestant side we have the Loyalists. The Republicans see themselves as the only ones who represent the ‘true republic’, the united Ireland that was partitioned at the end of the Irish Independence war of 1921. Any institution that was established and sustained as a result of partition is an illegitimate institution in their eyes (Coogan, 1995). Most people who joined the Republican movement did it for one simple reason: they believed that only armed struggle would force the British out of Ireland (Moloney, 2002). Loyalists on the other hand are loyal to the queen of England and this loyalty is what justifies their use of violence, hoping that violence will ensure British involvement in the North. Not all Republicans nor all Loyalists used violence to attain their goal, but they were part of a general movement that did not oppose the use of violence. Each of these groups can be broken into smaller groups representing an even smaller public, as was the Provisional Irish Republican Movement.

At its base, the modern portrayal of this conflict is in the different views each community holds as per its political power and rights in the space which they share (Cairns & Darby, 1998). The partition created what the Nationalists call ‘a sectarian state’ in which they have been treated as “second class citizens” by processes of gerrymandering that ensure Protestant rule even in areas in which the majority of inhabitants is catholic (Gilligan, Hainsworth, & McGarry, 2011). As a result of this political tactic, resources, lots for houses and jobs have been allocated unfairly. Repeated eruptions of violence and a very flammable situation were the consequence.

And how did we get there to begin with? Years of oppression by the Protestant and Anglican colonists and rebellions by the Irish led to the Easter Rising of 1916, launched by the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a precursor to the Irish Republican Army and a key event in

Irish history, and more importantly, in Republican ethos. The rebellion, led by Patrick Pearse and James Connolly, was quashed by the British military. However, the British massive reaction to the rebellion brought the Republican goal of a united and free Ireland into center-stage (English, 2003). Support for Irish independence grew and in 1918 the Sinn Féin was extremely successful in elections to the British Parliament in Westminster. However, instead of taking its seats, Sinn Féin established the ‘Dail’ (Irish parliament) and declared independence. Their declaration resulted in the outburst of the Irish *war of independence*, also known as ‘the Anglo-Irish war’, lasting from January 1919 to July 1921. The war was fought between the British forces and the IRA led by Michael Collins as military commander and Eamon De Valera and Arthur Griffith as political leaders (English, 2003).

In July 1921 the two sides agreed to a truce that resulted in the *Anglo-Irish treaty* signed in December of that year. The treaty brought into power a British act from May 1921 that partitioned the Island into two parts (Perry, 2010). The act meant that the six northern counties were to be ruled effectively by the British Government while the remainder of the island was to become ‘the Irish Free State’ (Cairns & Darby, 1998). In June 1922, disagreements among Republicans regarding the Anglo-Irish Treaty led to the *Irish Civil war*. Disagreement centered around partition and the two former allies Collins and De Valera turned against each other. Collins, who represented the rebels in the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish treaty and was now heading the new Free State represented the Irish nationalists. De Valera represented the anti-treaty forces, the ‘Irregulars’, also known as the Republican Irish Army, which saw partition as betraying the idea of the Irish Republic (English, 2003).¹⁶

¹⁶ Some claim that in fact De Valera tasked Collins with heading the negotiations because he knew that there is not enough support for the forming treaty within the Republican movement and he did not want to be the one who will be blamed for it. See for example Dorney (2010). It is quite a contested issue amongst scholars of Irish history,

The civil war ended in May 1923 with the victory of the Free State forces, who were backed by Britain and partition remained in place. Partition meant that the North would remain under British control and Britain allowed it to maintain a devolved government in Stormont, with little interference from London (Coogan, 1995). It also meant that the government in the North was run by the Protestants.

Regularly held census in both the North and the South provide some help in understanding at least the demographic situation. The Catholic population in the South comprised 94.86% of the local population in 1961 while comprising 35.3% of the population in the north that same year. 10 years later, in 1971 the Catholic population comprised 93.87% of the south and 36.8% of the North. In quite the linear trend, the percentages of the Catholic population in the south declined (though remaining around 90%) while its percentages in the North increased (The Central Statistics Office, 2011). By 2011 people self-describing themselves as Catholics comprised 45.14% of the Northern population (Department of Finance and Personnel, December 2012).

In the late 1960's the Catholics were inspired by human rights movements in the US and started protesting against their discrimination. In 1967 the nationalist public established NICRA (Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association). NICRA called for equal rights and attempted to mobilize the public by organizing peaceful marches and sit-ins. In June 1968 the first sit in took place. The sit-in was not well received by the Protestant community. The police failed in preventing Unionists and Loyalists from attacking the protesters (CAIN, Ongoing).

especially since Collins died shortly after (shot dead by anti-treaty forces on August 22nd 1922). See for example the varying accounts provided by Coogan (1995) as compared to that of Regan (1999) or Kissane (2005).

Strengthened by their success in drawing attention to their cause, NICRA, together with the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), Sinn Féin's political rival, organized for peaceful marches for civil rights. The first march took place on March 24th 1968. Once again, the march was not received well by the Unionist community, and since it had control over security forces, neither was it handled well by the police (Coogan, 1995).

Another March in 1969 in Derry led to a harsh reaction by the Unionist population. Eventually the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) could not maintain order (Thornton, 2007). In July 1969 loyalist paramilitary groups began attacking Catholics in their own neighborhoods, setting entire streets on fire. Catholic groups retaliated and the police lost the final façade of control over the situation (Moloney, 2002). The Stormont government thus asked Britain to send in troops to handle the situation.

The Troops were brought in to protect the Catholic community from Loyalist attacks. However, due to lack of a unified command, problematic civilian control and general unfamiliarity with the situation, the British military was left to its own, made several mistakes and only exacerbated the situation, by turning against the Catholic population, while trying to contain violent factions within the Protestant one.¹⁷ Things got worse when in March 1972, the British government decided Stormont cannot have powers any more, dissolved the government

¹⁷ At the beginning at least, the troops were welcomed by the Catholic population. But there were still control issues between the two governments that further complicated the situation. Westminster wanted to avoid the implication of the extended use of soldiers, and it certainly did not want to be seen as "giving" the soldiers to Stormont. Westminster refused Stormont's demand to have full control over the deployed soldiers and the two governments issued a communique outlining the details of the division of responsibility over the security forces that represented a compromise (Kennedy-Pipe & McInnes, 1997). The army ended up being left without much political direction and caught between "two masters", the Stormont government in Belfast and the British one in London.

and administered direct rule over Northern Ireland, while obviously increasing its military presence in the area (Kennedy-Pipe & McInnes, 1997).¹⁸

'The Troubles'

“The Troubles” were by far the most violent period in the entire history of the conflict. Over 3,000 people were killed in the 30 years of the Troubles (Coogan, 1995). Attempts at solving the conflict, disarming the paramilitaries on both sides, bringing about ceasefires and peace have failed over the years due to the convoluted and tractable nature of the conflict.

Several groups have taken part in the fighting, some were factions of the IRA on the Republican side and the Ulster Defense Regiment on the Loyalist side. Some were independent, having different reasons to partake in the violence. Adding to the mix was the intervention of the British army in the situation which to some extent, only deepened the rift between the parties. The existence of many groups with different agendas in a small space, which were (and still are) supported by outside groups such as the Irish Diaspora in the United States and different groups who have no necessary direct ties to the conflict have made the situation even more combustible (Gilligan, Hainsworth, & McGarry, 2011).

The early years of the Troubles were marked by confusion, more than anything else, both military and political. The Catholic community felt that the British Army that came in to protect it from Protestant agitations was not in fact on its side. It began on June 27th 1970 with the Siege of St. Matthews, when the British army allowed Protestant marches to go through Catholic areas.

¹⁸ During Direct rule the British government was still distancing itself from the practical aspects of military policy, leading to the inconsistent exploitation of the political utility of the military. This created a fundamental defect in civil-military relations (Bennett, 2010). After almost three years of a more unified command but one that was still lacking, Secretary of State to Northern Ireland Marilyn Rees led to a shift in British security policy, scaling down the role of the military to providing military assistance to the police as and when required (Edwards, 2010).

The marches soon deteriorated into violence and the British military did nothing to stop the Loyalist mobs from attacking the Catholics in their areas. Shortly after, the military decided to impose a curfew on the Falls area, a tiny and very crowded Catholic area in West Belfast. Over 3,000 soldiers were deployed to the area, conducting house to house searches and destroying everything on their way (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

Repeated attacks and growing violence led to the resignation of Cheister-Clark, the Prime Minister of Stormont in March 1971, only to be replaced by another Ulster Unionist Party leader. In April 1971, Provisional IRA launched its bombing campaign in Northern Ireland, in its attempt to push the British military into a hasty action. In August 1971, the British indeed announced internment will begin, which only pushed the levels of violence to record heights (McClung Lee, 1981).

Internment meant that civilians were lifted out of their home in the middle of the night and brought for questioning. However, as Provisional IRA expected, the growing unionist pressure on the British led to internment being introduced prematurely, without sufficient intelligence. 300 people were lifted at 4 am from their home, all were Catholic, almost none was a Provisional IRA member. It was employed in such a one-sided way that the Republican Movement only gained from it (Moloney, 2002). The Nationalist communities on both sides of the border began supporting Provisional IRA and it went on the offensive (O'Brien, 1999).

In January 1972 one of the most memorable attacks in Irish Catholic history took place – Bloody Sunday. It was the zenith of British military battle against the Derry Catholic population when soldiers opened fire on a NICRA march, killing 13 unarmed men, none of which was a Provisional IRA member. Any qualms the Nationalist community had about supporting Provisional IRA up until that moment disappeared (Moloney, 2002). In March 1972 the British

government decided to abolish the independent government in Stormont and to enforce direct rule on the North (as in, it would be ruled from Westminster) (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). It showed that the British were able to take steps that would not necessarily benefit the Unionist community of the North (O'Brien, 1999).

In June 1972 a short bilateral ceasefire was announced and a secret meeting was held between representatives of Provisional IRA, Gerry Adams, a current prisoner, was among them, and the current British Secretary of State to Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw. The meeting was inconclusive and led to the breakdown of the ceasefire (O'Brien, 1999). However, this short ceasefire is important to mention for two reasons. First of all, it is proof that the British were willing to talk to Provisional IRA even during the early days of the conflict. As early as 1972, the British government saw Provisional IRA as a valid and recognized group to negotiate for Northern Ireland (O'Brien, 1999). Second, it points to the centrality of Gerry Adams, then in his early twenties, in the movement, and to the process of dialogue.

But the ceasefire broke in July and on July 21st 1972 came the Provisional IRA's reply to Bloody Sunday with Bloody Friday – 26 bombs that were planted all across Belfast. (Alonso, 2001). The bombs killed 9 people (White, 1997). As conflicts are in fact processes of action and re-action, Bloody Friday obviously called for a British reaction. It came on July 31st 1972 with 'operation Motorman' in which hundreds of soldiers entered Provisional IRA areas, also known as 'no-go' areas, in Belfast and in Derry, severely decreasing the Provisional IRA's operational capability and improving British intelligence immensely (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

On March 1973, Provisional IRA embarked on a bombing campaign on mainland United Kingdom, bringing the troubles to the heart of the British people. (Bowden, 1976). In June 1973, the Sunningdale agreement was signed between John Hume (SDLP), Brian Falkner (UUP) and

the British. The agreement aimed at ending direct rule and establishing a power-sharing government in the North. The Provisional IRA, as well as loyalist paramilitaries, opposed it, but it was signed nonetheless. However, it collapsed 6 months later in May 1974 (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). On the day it collapsed, the UVF, a Loyalist paramilitary group, attacked in The Republic of Ireland, killing 33 people and injuring more than 300 – the highest number of casualties in one day during the Troubles (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). Direct rule was resumed quickly thereafter.

Violence continued to escalate throughout 1974 until the Provisional IRA leadership received word that the British were willing to talk in return for a ceasefire. On Christmas Eve the Provisional IRA announced a ceasefire, which lasted for over two weeks (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). Adams was strongly opposed to the ceasefire claiming it will only allow the British to gather more intelligence on the movement, while the loyalist paramilitaries only increased their attacks, leaving the Catholic community with no one to defend it (Moloney, 2002). And he was right. The trauma the failure of this ceasefire left on the movement helped him later in his rise in the ranks of the movement.

Another ceasefire was announced in February 1975. This time the British were indeed willing to negotiate, but the distance between the positions of the Republican Movement and that of the British was still too big (O'Brien, 1999). Nevertheless, it is another example in which the British were willing to give the Republican Movement the place and the opportunity to voice its demands. While the ceasefire was still in place, in July 1975 Britain announced the legalization of Sinn Féin as a political party (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). But the hardliners in the movement still saw participating in elections as surrendering. Perhaps as a political tactic, perhaps it was indeed his opinion at that time, but Adams supported the hardliners on this matter and blamed the leadership in running down the military wing (Moloney, 2002).

But apart from the internal pressure from within the movement to end the ceasefire we must not forget the external pressures. The Provisional IRA might have announced a ceasefire, but the loyalist paramilitaries did not, and the attacks against the Catholic community continued, eventually leading to the collapse of the ceasefire when the Provisional IRA began retaliating for loyalist attacks, and even assassinated the British Ambassador to Ireland (O'Brien, 1999).

Once the talks and the ceasefire collapsed the Republican Movement had time to assess their damage. Not only did it lose some of the support of the Catholic community for choosing to talk to the British over protecting it, it also led to deep rifts within the organization that meant that another ceasefire was not likely in the near future. And in any case, the British announced that they will not talk to either Provisional IRA or Sinn Féin as long as the armed campaign is still in place. Yet another result of the collapse of the talks was the adoption of the harshest security regimes against the movement, providing the police with greater powers, ending political status for Republican prisoners and embarking on a hunt and defeat tactics (such as 'shoot-to-kill' as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6) (O'Brien, 1999).

The following years are marked with violent attacks by Republicans and Loyalists alike, with increased security measurements and intervention by the British military. However, they were not all negative and were also marked by political actions by various actors relevant in the conflict that might have been regarded as positive by the Republican Movement. In April 1978, current British Prime Minister Callaghan announced increased representation to Northern Ireland in Westminster. In August, the Catholic Primate visited Republican Prisoners in the Maze prison who were protesting and reported their unhuman living conditions. In February 1979 the 'Shankill butchers', 11 Loyalist paramilitaries, were sentenced to life (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). All of these actions show that the context in which the Republican Movement was operating was

not always bleak and negative, and that sometimes, the Catholic community was being recognized and not just shoved under the carpet for larger political agendas.

In May 1979 Thatcher took up office. Whatever slim chances there were for a ceasefire with the former government, they evaporated with her elections, as she was known for her sympathy towards Unionists and her aversion to anything Republican (Moloney, 2002).

And with Thatcher in power, the Provisional IRA saw no reason to stop its armed campaign, on the contrary. Her years in power were marked by an increased sectarian and retaliatory violence, but they were also marked by more political efforts by the Provisional IRA. Hunger strikes and successful political campaigns increased the support for Sinn Féin and helped push the Republican Agenda forward. It forced the British to agree to some concessions along the process, but it also pushed the British and the Irish Governments closer together. Political success did not however, move the Provisional IRA away from violence altogether, and it certainly did not push the other armed groups away from it.¹⁹

In June 1983, Adams won a seat in Westminster for West Belfast and Sinn Féin managed to get 43% of the nationalist vote (Moloney, 2002). At the end of the day, it meant that only one seat went to Sinn Féin (one for the SDLP and the remaining 15 seats went to Unionist parties). Nevertheless, and regardless of the fact Adams had no intention of actually taking up his seat given the Republican Movement's position of abstention,²⁰ winning a seat in the Westminster elections won the Republican Movement world-wide respectability. "The republican movement

¹⁹ Obviously much has happened during these years, details of which have filled entire books. For a more detailed description of events, please see the Chronology I built, available online at ronitberger.com.

²⁰ Abstention was the refusal to take one's seat in a political institution that is deemed illegitimate by the Republican Movement. It will be discussed in more details below.

had finally demonstrated that it could fight an armed struggle and win elections at the same time. Most importantly, they could prove that they had a mandate” (O'Brien, 1999, p. 126).

Chapters 5 and 6 discuss in more details the events that transpired following these elections of 1983 and how they in fact influenced the Republican Movement’s decision making and behavior. However, before we can discuss these cases in details, it is time to get to know the Republican Movement a little bit better.

The Birth of the (Provisional) Republican Movement


Many attempts at political and social change over the years, mainly from the side of the minority Catholics, have failed and have only led to each side’s entrenchment in his corner. It also led to increased support for violence. Many groups have emerged, most notably was the PIRA (The Provisional Irish Republican Army), also known as the IRA (Cairns & Darby, 1998).

Organizational structure

The IRA as a paramilitary group goes back to 1883, operating in all of Ireland and outside of it whereas the Sinn Féin was founded in 1905 (Coogan, 1995). Following their defeat in the Irish Civil war in 1923, the IRA switched its focus to try and get rid of partition. Using mainly propaganda the IRA tried to convince society that partition is the true cause of the economic depression (Patterson, 1997). The Sinn Féin meanwhile at this period was doing quite poorly as a political party. Most importantly, it too suffered from a split when De Valera failed to pass a vote to drop abstentionism in 1926, and ended up quitting the party and forming a new one instead – Fianna Fail, taking the great majority of Sinn Féin with him, as well as much of the American funds that came with it (Coogan, 1995).

But before delving into the development of the movement over the years, some aspects of its organizational structure should be explained. The Republican movement is in fact a rather complicated organization. I speak of a dual-wing structure which has two central wings – the armed one and the political one, but each of these wings, especially the military one, can be broken down into various units. Furthermore, though separate, the wings share membership in the most important sub-unit of them all, the Army Council. Figure 1 below is an organizational chart of the organization, as brought by Horgan & Taylor (1997). It should be emphasized at this point that many of these organizational units only rarely have a direct effect on the organization's strategic thinking, which is by and large determined by the Army Council as will be explained shortly. Nevertheless, they were part of the organization, complicated decision making at times, and at others, played a role in (or manipulated into) building coalitions in support of one view over another when it was time to make an organizational decision.

Figure 2.1: Republican Movement Organizational Chart (Horgan & Taylor, 1997)



Going from large to small, the first important organ to mention is the General Army Convention (GAC). GAC is an organized meeting of delegates, usually 100-200 from the other structures within the organization, mostly the military wing, and not the political one. It is not a distinct body with members of its own (Horgan & Taylor, 1997). The GAC elects the Army Executive which in turn elects the Army Council (O'Brien, 1999). For major decisions regarding the conclusion of peace, a GAC must be assembled. 48 hours before a meeting takes place, each unit, battalion and brigade holds a mini conference to decide on delegates and motions to raise at

the meeting. One member is chosen as a delegate for every 10 IRA members (Moloney, 2002). GAC are quite rare, as it is a logistical nightmare to arrange for them due to security measures. Between 1969 and 1990, the GAC met only twice – in 1970 and in 1986 (O'Brien, 1999).

The Executive Council is another important organ to discuss. The Executive Council is a 12-member body that is elected by the GAC. Usually they are very senior and experienced veterans of the military wing (Horgan & Taylor, 1997). The executive council chooses the members of the Army Council and selects replacements when there are vacancies. It acts as the voice and conscience of the ordinary IRA volunteers (Moloney, 2002).

The most important organ to discuss is the Army Council (AC). A seven-member committee chosen by the Executive Council that is the de-facto decision maker for the Republican Movement as a whole (political and military together). According to PIRA constitution, this is “the supreme authority when the general army convention is not in session”, which as we know, is most of the time. The AC has the authority to “conclude peace or declare war when a majority of the council so decides”.²¹

Seven people have votes in the council and an additional three can be permanent members in the meetings, as long as they are approved by the Executive Council. However, the constitution allows the AC to invite ‘visitors’ to its meetings without the approval of the Executive Council, a power which Gerry Adams used to his advantage over the years, as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6. The AC selects who amongst its members will be the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff is the overall decision maker and has veto power over operations. Technically he can be one of the three permanent members that do not have a vote (Moloney,

²¹ The constitution is brought in Horgan & Taylor, 1997.

2002). One permanent seat on the council is saved for the Sinn Féin president, though more Sinn Féin members can serve on the council, especially as visitors (Horgan & Taylor, 1997). Another vote is usually given to the Quartermaster General, who heads the quartermaster general (QMG) department as well as to the head of the security department within general headquarters (GHQ).

Traditionally, since the Executive Council sees itself as the repository of Republican conscious, and the Army Council sees itself as having the authority to decide for all Republicans, the relationship between these two organs has been filled with friction (Moloney, 2002). The AC itself also suffered from many personality clashes over the years, especially once Adams' power grew. It can be thought of as representing two camps – the 'soldiers' represented a firm belief in armed struggle and found politics repulsing while the 'Adams camp' pushed for dialogue (Moloney, 2002). Since decisions in the AC are made with a simple majority rule, the AC itself was rife with drama. The battle within the AC was about the majority – which camp was bigger.

In an effort to bypass the 'soldiers' on the Army Council challenging his view, Adams managed to push for the establishment of a separate body – the Think-Tank. The think-tank started developing in the early 1980s with the politicization of local communities and of women. It was born in Cage 11, where Adams was imprisoned. Even though I claim Adams was important to the peace process, he could not have single handedly carry out his plan. As such, he used close allies and friends to not only help him rise to the highest positions within the IRA and the Sinn Féin, but also when it was time to convince the Army Council to take his view, rather than the Soldiers' one. The Think tank mainly served as an advisory body to the Army Council, mostly about political matters. Once negotiations began, the Think Tank took charge of the process. The Army Council did not have the time or the resources to give the peace process enough attention. As such, the exhaustive process of drafting position papers to be presented to

the British and the Irish was done by the think tank who presented it to the Army Council, giving it very little time to deliberate before being forced into a decision (Moloney, 2002).

General Headquarters (GHQ) and its various departments are responsible for regulating and executing the AC's decisions. It is based in Dublin and contains ten departments. Each department head reports back to the Chief of Staff. The largest department within GHQ is the quartermaster's department, which accounted for roughly 20% of the organization. The next department in terms of importance is the engineering department, then the operation department and then the remaining six: finance, training, political education, internal security, and publicity. The Adjutant General (AG), the second in command after the Chief of Staff oversaw GHQ as well, and had a seat on the AC. The AG traditionally has more day to day contact with the rank and file of the movement than anyone else in the leadership (Moloney, 2002).

Two remaining organs to discuss are Northern and Southern Command. In November 1976 another change that was pushed for by Adams and other members from the North of Ireland took life. After having suffered many losses due to security breaches and infiltrations, the movement decided to re-organize into a cell-based movement and to split into two commands. The GHQ was thus divided into Northern and Southern command, when the leadership of Northern Command was in fact more closely connected to the AC and the Belfast Brigade was in effect in power over the entire organization (Moloney, 2002). Since the north was where most operations took place in any case, this was part of the attempt of the movement to remain in control (Horgan & Taylor, 1997). Northern Command took over 11 counties, the 6 northern ones plus 5 border counties while the southern command took over the remainder of the island (O'Brien, 1999). Each command is comprised of Active Service Units (ASU), Operational

commanders and Brigadiers. The Southern command was basically reduced to act as the ‘logistical support base’ for the north (Horgan & Taylor, 1997).

The re-organization also called for the radicalization of the political wing of the movement. It was tasked with “agitate around social and economic issues which attack the welfare of the people... all sections of the Republican movement must be streamlined, must have set tasks towards set ends, must be overseen, and must be under real Army control and direction” (O’Brien, 1999, quoting the Staff Report)²².

The first three organs discussed, the GAC, the Executive Council and the Army Council have all existed from the formation of the Republican Movement, and their roles have been set in the original organizational constitution. The rest of the organs discussed, the think-tank, the GHQ, Northern and Southern commands were later developments that came with the re-organization that the Provisional movement specifically went under in the 1970s and later. As was discussed, we can trace Adams’ influence in pushing for their establishment and for the re-organization of the movement. But before I present Adams in more details, there is still a need to describe the process by which the Republican Movement split into the Provisional and Official movements.

Overall, both wings share the same goal, uniting Ireland and getting rid of British influence. However, their view with regards to the best way to achieve their goal varies. The military wing sees armed struggle as the only way to attain their goal while Sinn Féin sees political and social efforts as the best solution. Since they are both of the same organization, the

²² The Staff report was an internal organizational document found in 1977 in the house of the acting Chief of Staff, Seamus Twomey, upon his arrest (O’Brien, 1999). For detailed accounts of organizational structure of the movement, please see O’Brien, 1999; Horgan and Taylor, 1997; Coogan, 1995 and Moloney, 2002.

two wings must balance between these two views. At certain points in time, one must bow before the other, or at the minimum, tolerate the other point of view. The leadership of the movement, and especially Gerry Adams and his followers, is the one that determines which of the two views (politics or violence) will take precedence, and when the two can in fact co-exist.

Developments leading up to 'the Split'

In 1956, the IRA launched operation 'harvest', also known as the border campaign, which lasted for 5 years.²³ It was the first 'large scale' operation (in relative terms) since 1923. It was a guerilla warfare aimed at eliminating partition and uniting Ireland. Despite having lasted for five years, it was clear from the beginning that the leadership was in fact divided about the viability of a guerilla campaign that is carried out amidst a hostile population. The success of a guerilla warfare lies with the population. Without it, the rebels have no support to sustain them (Galula, 2006). And at that time, the IRA did not have the support. Sinn Féin on its part was lagging behind as its platform was seen as weak on social issues.

In 1959, Sean Garland was the first Northern IRA man to be chosen to head the Belfast campaign, when the Southern leadership realized it was losing control. Up until that point, the Belfast IRA was hardly involved in any of the actions, or the decisions, as men from Belfast were too known to get in trouble. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Garland was soon arrested and prisoned with other IRA members, where he was received with resentment for the failure of the operation (Patterson, 1997).

²³ The Republican movement was not idle during the 40 odd years between partition and the beginning of the Troubles. With its leadership mostly safe in the Republic of Ireland, the army attempted to reunite the island via the use of force, but was largely unsuccessful, so much so that IRA became known to stand for 'I Ran Away' (Coogan, 1995). It also grew weaker in the North and its leadership was seen as detached from the people for whom it was claiming to fight, the Catholic minority of the North.

With growing military failures, inability to garner wide support but more importantly, growing anger in the North regarding the Southern leadership, the leadership agreed to convene a special GAC in 1964. The GAC came out with a 9-point pragmatic statement that included involvement in economic and social agitations and the creation of trade unions. The only point that did not pass by vote was chief of staff Goulding's suggestion to end abstention from both the Irish and the British parliaments (Patterson, 1997).

By 1966 members of the movement began to understand that something in the strategy of the IRA needed to change, realizing that armed struggle will not be sufficient to rid of the British from Ireland. The IRA published a document announcing the transformation of the IRA from a rigid army of militarists into a revolutionary army of the people – no longer an elitist force “divorced” from the popular struggle (Patterson, 1997). As a result, they also established a special military council to plan a new northern campaign. Part of the campaign was to embark on a civil-rights strategy (Patterson, 1997).

But the civil-rights campaign went on without the movement, led by NICRA and the SDLP. Cracks in the integrity of the organization started appearing. The old intra-republican cleavages regarding the form a Free Ireland should take resurfaced in the Executive Council. Alongside disagreements regarding the nature of the Free Irish State, they also disagreed about tactics and strategy. The divisions that have been festering since the early 1960s became public in October 1968 (Bowden, 1976).

By 1969, following the sit-ins, marches, the loyalist attacks and most importantly the entry of the British military to the scene, The IRA, especially in the North, realized three things. First, in its current pitiful situation it was unable to provide its own community with security, as its funds, membership, organization and arsenal were heavily depleted. Second, the same

community it claimed to represent did not even see it as its guardian angel. Third, even if it wanted to operate, support will not come from the south (Patterson, 1997). The Belfast IRA specifically understood that they will need to break with the Dublin leadership in order to get support in the region for action. By December 1969 there was already a nucleus of the PIRA (Kenna, 1990).

In January 1970 Ruiairi O Bradaigh, president of Sinn Féin at the time, issued the statement announcing the Split of the political party from the Republican movement. His initial statement mentioned five reasons for the split from Goulding, the IRA Chief of Staff: 1. Goulding's support for recognizing the Irish and the British parliaments; 2. Goulding's move towards extreme socialism; 3. The adoption of illegal internal disciplinary methods; 4. The failure to defend Belfast; 5. The policy of defending Stormont (Moloney, 2002, 79). Goulding tried to push for these politics while he was being criticized for running down the IRA and not protecting the Catholic community of the North.

Shortly thereafter, the Provisional IRA was born. The first Provisional Army Council meeting on January 1970, devised a three stage strategy beginning with a focus on the need to defend the catholic community in Belfast, then moving to a mixture of defense and retaliation and then an offensive war that will force Britain to come to the negotiating table and agree to withdraw its forces (Moloney, 2002). These three steps were in fact the ultimate guerilla warfare strategy. It was almost like they read David Galula's handbook for successful insurgencies.²⁴ The new IRA, the Provisionals, were united in their distrust of politics, especially parliamentary, and their uncompromising belief in armed struggle (Moloney, 2002).

²⁴ Galula who was a French commander fighting in Algiers wrote his book on counter-insurgency, but in it he also spelled out the terms for successful insurgency campaigns (Galula, 2006).

Following the split

In the 1970s, when they were established, the relationship between the two wings of the Provisional Republican Movement was defined in simple and traditional terms: “the military wing, the IRA, was in charge, and Sinn Féin would obey and be subservient to the army council” (Moloney, 2002, p. 79).

“The real subordination of the “political wing” to the army (at least until Gerry Adams took over) meant that ‘real’ membership of the republican movement dictated membership of the IRA” (Patterson, 1997, p. 99). But the new leadership of the movement understood that the group can no longer be only a military force, but needs to base itself on theoretical thought that pushed the view of anti-imperialist struggle (Patterson, 1997). Despite being subordinated, Sinn Féin still received a bigger role in the hierarchical structure of the republican movement while the role of the General Army Convention (GAC) was downgraded. It was not well accepted by some members of the IRA (Patterson, 1997).

Furthermore, notwithstanding the split and the desire to separate from the Southern leadership, the PIRA leadership still had elements from the South. Out of the seven members of the Army Council, three were from the South. These three held key positions within the organization: Ruairi O Bradaigh was Sinn Féin President, Sean MacStiofain was the Chief of Staff and Daithi O Connell was the Quartermaster General (QMG). The remaining four members of the Army Council were from the North (O'Brien, 1999).

However, the old structure of a single command based in Dublin did not hold for long. Growing discontent in the North by decisions made by the ‘detached’ leadership and the rise of key figures in the North such as Gerry Adams pushed for the establishment of a separate Northern Command (O'Brien, 1999).

The Belfast leadership that came to power in the 1970s was “longsighted, bright, talented, dedicated, determined, pragmatic, cunning and all too often duplicitous. They were also utterly ruthless in their mission, which above all else was to survive and prosper, and were devoted to their leader and inspiration, Gerry Adams” (Moloney, 2002, xvi).

On June 15th 1977, during the Bodinstown commemoration service²⁵, the message that came out from the leadership, was that in order to sustain the war, the movement should become more politically active in the north and increase its support base (Moloney, 2002). The 1977 Bodinstown speech delivered by Jimmy Drumm, a member of the Executive Council is important for our understanding of Adams as a leader. It is a key moment for two reasons. First of all, it is the first time where a call for more political involvement is made since the split. Increased political involvement would naturally take away from the war effort. It was one of the main reasons behind the split that took place less than a decade before.

Second of all, it shows us just how politically astute Adams is. Even though he was not the official head of the movement just yet, he nonetheless had the ears of others, others who had the support of the members. He knew that the message will not go far coming from him, but will be much more accepted coming from a renowned IRA leader. He also understood that it was all in the framing. He managed to spin it so that increased political support would in fact enable the movement to intensify and sustain the war effort and not the other way around (Moloney, 2002). So who is Gerry Adams and how did he become such a significant figure in the movement, and in the conflict process as a whole?

²⁵ Commemorating one of the Republican Movement’s founding fathers – Theobald Wolfe Tone, who died in 1798 and was interestingly enough a Protestant.

Introducing Gerry Adams

Adams grew up into an IRA family, surrounded by family members who fought for the Republican cause on both his sides (Kenna, 1990). “Republican involvement tended to be inherited rather than an acquired activity due to the risk and potential burdens”. Adams inherited his view from everyone around him (Moloney, 2002, p. 41).

At 16, he dropped out of school to become an apprentice bartender at none other than a Protestant pub on the Shankill road. His career at the IRA began at age 18 in 1968, when he was sworn into the D Coy (Company) of the Belfast Brigade (where his father served). With internment, as older and more senior Belfast Republicans were being arrested, more and more responsibility fell on Adams (Kenna, 1990). He became a central figure Republican families looked up to when making their decision about which camp to join during the Split (Kenna, 1990). When he saw who was going to which camp, he threw his weight behind the Provisionals. And by early 1972 the Provisional IRA has developed the capacity to mount its campaign of violence against the British, while also succeeding in promoting Republican and Nationalist sentiments (Kenna, 1990). The key to Adams’ rise was not his combat skill, but rather his attainment of the skills of a ruthless general with amazing strategic dexterity (Moloney, 2002).

He was arrested on March 14, 1972 and was brutally interrogated for over 48 hours. But he would not tell them anything, not even his name. he was then interned (Kenna, 1990). In June 1972, Adams was released from prison, to join the IRA delegation to London to negotiate the terms with the British, a signal to his high status within the movement. It was MacStiofain, Chief of Staff, who demanded his release (Kenna, 1990). Adams was intent on ending the ceasefire as soon as possible, as he feared the British were trying to drag the IRA into a long cessation. The IRA’s guard was dropping, members were too much out in the open to Adams’s liking and he

needed that to stop before the British would gain too much of an advantage (Moloney, 2002). He simply did not believe the British were ready to leave the North. He thought the reasons they wanted to meet and discuss a truce was so that they could identify top republicans and so that the Provisional IRA will be weakened, as unlike a regular military force, a guerilla force that stops fighting, will find it very difficult to rally its members again (Kenna, 1990). The truce barely held for a week, and Adams was now a wanted man on the run.

On July 18th 1973 he was arrested again, together with two other senior leaders of the Belfast brigade. The three were transferred to Long Kesh imprisonment camp (Moloney, 2002). Adams was moved from cage 6 of internment to cage 11 of imprisonment after 2 failed attempts of breakout and immediately was appointed as 'OC' (officer in command) of the cage by the prisoners (Kenna, 1990). Once he was there, he began to conceptualize the long war strategy, which was officially adopted by the army council in June 1977, a few months after his release from prison in February of that year. The same view that was presented by Jimmy Drumm during the commemoration service at Bodenstown on June 15th 1977.

From his jail cell, he regularly published in Republican News, under the pen-name of Brownie. During that time his main contention was the politicization of the movement, which will allow the movement to fight a long war without losing the support of the public. Alongside some educational materials, he wrote a book in which he outlined the 'British Problem' and alternative solutions for it. In September 1976 he wrote a pamphlet titled 'Peace in Ireland' in which he claimed that the root cause of the violence was indeed the political institutions, north and south (Kenna, 1990). At the point in time, following yet another failed truce, members' morale was low and their frustration with the leadership was high. Brownie's columns served as 'an alternative leadership voice' (O'Brien, 1999, p. 107).

The 18-months long truce that took place entirely during his imprisonment and the devastating effects it had on the Republican Movement provided Adams with enough leverage within the movement to push forward some radical organizational changes. In 1976-1977 he pushed for the establishment of the “revolutionary council” a mini-convention that will be big enough to allow for more connection between the rank and file and the leadership, but small enough to allow for security. He knew that his prison years have given him enough power and respect exactly among the rank and file, that such a body would work for his benefit when time comes (Moloney, 2002). It was also Adams’ idea to increase control over the rank and file by requiring them to read and understand the ‘Green-Book’, “a cross between a political manifesto and a training manual” (Moloney, 2002, p. 154).

Another controversial idea he pushed for in order to increase control over the organization was the division between Northern and Southern commands. The division was opposed by several on the Army Council, who feared it would lead to another split as happened less than 10 years before. However, Adams’ allies, family friends, and cage 11 former cell-mates, managed to convince most of the Belfast IRA with Martin McGuinness bringing around the Derry and other three vital brigades (Moloney, 2002).

In spring 1977, Adams was released from prison. Twomey, chief of staff during that time, wanted Adams to join the Army council, but there was no vacancy. He decided to take advantage of a loophole in the IRA constitution that did not say explicitly that the chief of staff must be an Army Council member. He was ready to resign formally and remain a non-voting chief of staff, so that Adams could have a place on the council. This decision marked the beginning of Adams’ takeover of the IRA leadership (Moloney, 2002, p. 164). But it also marked the birth of Sinn Féin as an actual party and not just a protest and support organization (Kenna, 1990).

When he first joins the Army council, he has two friends who will prove their loyalty to him – McGuinness and Keenan. The rest however, were obstacles to his further ascent to power or simply ideological foes. Daithi O Conaill and Ruairi O Bradaigh were the most serious obstacles (Moloney, 2002, 165). It is important to note that at this time, Adams is pro violence, and his rise to power is enabled by the failure of the ceasefire which was promoted by Ruairi O Bradaigh and Daithi O Conaill. It is only later that he understands that violence might not be the way, but he needs to have control over the leadership first to see it.

In order to strengthen his position within the council, Adams took advantage of yet another loophole in the IRA constitution that allowed the Council to nominate people to fill vacancies, as long as the executive ratified the appointment. This is how he was able to bring in two close allies – Ivor Bell, his old friend from the Second Battalion and Danny Morisson – the astute editor of Republican News and the movement's public relations guru. The problem was the executive ratification was never actually sought for these two appointments, which only furthered the internal divisions in the movement (Moloney, 2002, 166).

But on February 18th 1978 he was arrested once again following the La Mon House Bombings (Kenna, 1990).²⁶ He ended up being charged for membership in the IRA but when the trial was held, eight months after his arrest, the judge found the evidence insufficient and he was released (Kenna, 1990). Upon his release from prison he took up the role of Northern Commander. His release from prison marked an upsurge in IRA violence (Moloney, 2002, 173).

²⁶ One of the most horrific attacks in the Troubles. An IRA unit placed a bomb at the La-Mon Hotel window on February 17th 1978 and failed to call it in on time. That night 700 people were staying at the hotel and two functions were going on. 12 people died in the explosion and many more were injured, some of them burnt horribly (Kenna, 1990).

Adams' interpretation of Thatcher's willingness to faceoff the hunger-strikers in 1982 convinced him that the British had no intention of leaving Ireland. In a sense, it reinforced the traditional republican view of Britain's as protecting its own interests in Ireland and that only force will make it go away. However, it also made him understand that on their own, through power or through politics, the republican movement would never achieve a British withdrawal if it worked alone. It was this understanding that convinced Adams he must push for electoral participation in the South, and reaching a broad nationalistic audience (O'Brien, 1999, p. 124). In November 1982 he managed to bring a change to Sinn Féin constitution and in November 1983 he was elected as Sinn Féin president. "As a sharp political strategist, Adams came to the job of president with the broadest of credentials, experience and respect within the movement" (O'Brien, 1999, p. 113).

Despite his success in ousting his opponents and consolidating his control over the movement, both in the IRA and in Sinn Féin, in the early 1980s' the IRA was no nearer its goal to expel the British out of Northern Ireland than it was when it began its struggle in 1969. The IRA could not be defeated, but neither could the British. Military stalemate was obvious and it was under these conditions that Adams decided that in order to break the stalemate, a complete and extraordinary change in policy was needed. The main aspect of such a policy shift was the decision to give elections the same priority as the armed struggle (Moloney, 2002). As a result, the move to the left he initiated to get rid of the old guard in Sinn Féin was reversed, the opposition to federalism faded, and the opposition to electoral politics forgotten (Moloney, 2002).

Adams' leadership style was very clear from the minute he became Sinn Fein president in November 1983. He was 'unstoppable'. He was the one who will bring together arms and

politics. Such a position, the armalite and the ballot box, stood in sharp contrast to the former Sinn Féin president O'Bradaigh's view who kept a strict distance between the two wings, at least in public (O'Brien, 1999).

Already in his first speech as president to the Sinn Féin delegates at the Ard Fheis, Adams set the new tone – “electoral advancement was the new priority. But there would be no fudging on support for armed struggle. The two were part of the whole” (O'Brien, 1999, p. 116). In his speech Adams said: “I would like to elaborate on Sinn Féin's attitude to armed struggle. Armed struggle is a necessary and morally correct form of resistance in the Six Counties against a government whose presence is rejected by the majority of the Irish people. There are those who tell us that the British would not be moved by armed struggle, as has been said before, the history of Ireland and of British colonial involvement throughout the world tells us that they will not be moved by anything else. I am glad therefore of the opportunity to pay tribute to the freedom-fighters, the men and women volunteers of the IRA” (Adams, 1983).

This view of the legitimacy and necessity of violence is something that Adams supported at times and completely rejected at other times, as the conflict progressed. This view changed almost as dramatically as his view of politics did. Just like he was completely opposed to electoral campaigns when it were O'Bradaigh and Goulding who were steering the Republican Movement and moved to be the greatest supporter of it when he took power, so did his view of the legitimacy of the armed campaign shift with the circumstances. The empirical chapters present these changing circumstances in more detail and analyze whether it was his view that was pushing the movement towards particular behaviors over others, or whether it was the circumstances themselves that were pushing for change in his own view. I show that in some

instances it was indeed his changing attitude towards armed struggle that in fact determined not only much of the movement's decision making but also the progress in the conflict process itself.

Chapter 3

Studying Conflict Transformation Processes: How has it been done?

As can be understood from the introductory chapter, I am interested in learning more about the dynamic process of conflict transformation. More specifically, I look into the process by which the Republican Movement and its status within the conflict transformed. Conflicts are varied, complicated, filled with nuances and most importantly, are extremely dynamic. As a result, the study of conflicts should be informed by multiple approaches from different fields of study. Some progress in synthesizing the insights from these various approaches and fields of study has been made in recent years, however, there remains a gap that needs to be overcome if we are to better understand the differences and similarities between and across conflicts, but most importantly their dynamic nature and the way they can be pushed away from violence.

Studying a process is a challenging endeavor. When analyzing a process, one cannot just look at one, or even multiple, snapshots of reality and seek to understand what led to them. On their own, single snap-shots can in fact offer a skewed depiction of reality. If we can agree that it is the process that is important to study in order to better understand conflict transformations, and that the process itself offers many opportunities for the involved parties, it is time to look into what these opportunities look like and how they actually affect and are affected by other factors that play a part in the process. By performing a levels-of-analysis examination of an entire process I argue that one can arrive at a more accurate depiction of what was going on. That is the purpose of my hypotheses generating exercise.

Research Question

My question has to do with the different strategic choices the Republican Movement has made over the years. As was established in the introduction, an organization is not necessarily a unitary actor. The Republican Movement has two wings that are technically in charge of two separate sets of behaviors: the armed wing focuses on violent behaviors and the political wing focuses on political action and cooperation with the system. The Provisional IRA is mostly famous for its violent behavior. But was it really the case? Was it violent all the time? What was the Sinn Féin doing when the Provisional IRA was acting violent?

Since I am interested in learning more about the factors that push DWRO's into adopting different strategic behaviors I ask when do DWRO act in unison towards violent or non-violent actions and when do the different wings disagree? What are the factors that push the adoption of different behaviors and can patterns be detected over time? By answering these two questions I hope to learn *when do conflicts transform* and *what are the conditions under which conflict transformation processes advance from contention to cooperation*.

The framework offered here is based on the study of factors from three levels: The context, the organization and the individual. My studied outcomes, the four types of behaviors, can be thought of as dependent variables. However, when I speak of the factors from the three levels, it should be clear that I do not see them as independent variables. When examining a process, no variable is in any way truly independent, each of them is part of a process of action and reaction. Nonetheless, it is important to first clearly define what each of the levels consists of, how it has been looked at by others, how I will use it and the rationale behind these decisions.

The first level of analysis: Context-level factors

I begin with the context level of analysis. Dudouet mentions that different literatures have found various factors to have an effect on movements' behavior.²⁷ She divided those factors into three levels: societal, state and international (Dudouet, 2015, pp. 12-15). These factors are all embedded within my understanding of the context.

As a starting point, I claim that an open political opportunity structure, an open context, is needed for positive change in the conflict process to be possible. It is not a sufficient condition, but it is nonetheless a necessary one. Before we can answer what makes for an open political opportunity structure, we must first define political opportunity structures and understand their role in conflicts.

When discussing political opportunity structure, we enter the realm of social movement theory and it is important to first discuss whether and in what ways the social movement literature is relevant to my story. The theory offered does not speak of social movements per-se. Nonetheless, political and armed non-state actors do indeed fit Tarrow's economical definition which sees social movements as consisting of "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities" (Tarrow, 1994, pp. 3-4).

Thinking of the Provisional IRA, or even about the Republican Movement more generally, it is clear how one can see it as a social movement. A group of people with common purposes and solidarity, based on their religious affiliation (Catholicism), their desire to reunite

²⁷ Dudouet specifically refers to political opportunity structure which is part of the social movement theory, state reactions to terrorism and policies which is part of security studies and geopolitical dynamics which are part of international relations scholarly work.

with the rest of Ireland and their fight against British colonialism, as they would define it, managed for decades (and centuries, if one was to look at the past iterations of the movement) to challenge elites, opponents and authorities, British, Protestant and Irish at once.

Zald and Useem mention that social movements usually lead to the creation of counter-movements that in turn might even lead to the creation of a new social movement that is different from the original one (Zald & Useem, 1987). Again, if we look at the Northern Ireland conflict, it is in fact unclear who is the movement and who the counter-movement is, as some loyalists were attacking Catholic communities before the Provisional IRA gained its power, but it can hardly be denied that a movement and a counter-movement indeed played a role in the conflict.

How has political opportunity structure been studied and how does it relate to my work? The Tillyian view of political opportunity structure refers to the relative costs of certain actions (Tilly, 1978). Governments, or other institutional actors, can repress or facilitate collective action by altering those costs. When repression is the applied policy, the political opportunity structure closes, but when facilitation is the chosen policy, the political opportunity structure opens. Meyer and Staggenborg emphasize that “(o)f critical importance here is the recognition that movement development, tactics, and impact are profoundly affected by a shifting constellation of factors exogenous to the movement itself” (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996, p. 1633).

The view above hints to the importance of looking into the process and into the interaction between the various levels. It also explains the choice of several of my contextual factors, namely: *the British government* (and its various institutional organs), *the Irish governments* (and its various institutional organs) and *agreements* signed between the two.

The political opportunity structure is a dynamic aspect of politics. McAdam explains that challenges to the political system lead to a shift in the political opportunity structure (McAdam, 1982). Once again Meyer and Staggenborg explain that “the relevant aspects of opportunity are a function of the particular challengers and issues under concern” (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996, p. 1634). It is usually referred to as either open or closed. Tilly and Tarrow show that the choice of the policy and the opening or the closing of the political opportunity structure offers the challenger movement a choice between giving up or continuing its actions, which in turn leads to more pressure on the system and so on and so forth (Tilly & Tarrow, 2006). It can be understood that there are different strategies various actors can adopt to affect the political opportunity structure, and there are issues over which a challenger will choose not to fight further once being blocked by other actors, for various reasons.

For example, in 1981, shortly after the beginning of the hunger strike of Republican prisoners in their attempt to gain special status as political prisoners, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, refused to even discuss the issue. As the campaign by and for the hunger strikers was growing, hunger strikers managed to garner enough support to win local elections. As a result, the British government changed the electoral rules, preventing convicted prisoners from running to office. Not long after, the Republican movement agreed to end the hunger strike (Coogan, 1995). It was blocked by the government and decided to discontinue the campaign.

And what about a case in which the context in fact opens? When the British government decided to allow Sinn Fein’s elected officials full access to the Northern Ireland Office ministers in 1982, the Provisional IRA voted to drop its long held policy of abstentionism²⁸ in order to

²⁸ A policy of fielding candidates in various elections but never taking the seat if in fact elected as a sign for the movement’s disapproval of the existing institutions.

allow Sinn Fein members to actually take advantage of this new opportunity and to provide better representation for their supporters.

But one can talk of other examples in which the Movement chose not to bow down when presented with a new opportunity. One such example is from the end of 1982. Shortly after the British government announced the coming into power of the Fair Employment Act, a central issue in the Republican political platform, the Republican movement began a new violent campaign against the employer class and soon thereafter, voted to officially adopt 'the long war' policy (O'Brien, 1999). The act was simply not enough to convince the movement it is worth relinquishing violence, it needed more. In these two examples, the British government made a move to 'open' the context of the conflict, either by allowing a new opportunity for the movement to voice its contention via elections and a seat at the table, or by acceding to one of its demands, but only in one of them did the movement actually change its policy and moved closer to cooperation whereas in the other, it grew more violent.

These examples clarify that the changing of the context alone may not be sufficient in bringing change in the conflict dynamic, and that there are other aspects of the conflict that should be examined. Furthermore, they suggest that other things might be taking place in the background in leading to change, regardless of a change in the context, for better or for worse, and even when the context has not changed.

To strengthen this last point, Gamson and Mayer explain that in fact there are some aspects of the political opportunity structure that are quite stable, while others are more volatile. Actions by the British or the Irish governments, or any of their institutional organs are varied and can take many forms, but agreements do not change often.

Furthermore, political opportunity is not just something that affects the choices and behavior of movements but can also be affected by their actions (Gamson & Meyer, 1996). It would be difficult to claim that the Republican Movement as a whole had no effect on British actions, on Irish actions or even on Unionist actions. The Provisional IRA may have had less of an effect on the British military as an institution, but it certainly had a great effect on the British military policies in Northern Ireland, mostly in militarizing the area further, which in effect changed the context, or the structure of opportunities and constraints for the Republican Movement (and for everybody else for that matter).

A closer look into contextual factors 1, 2 and 4: The British, The Irish and Agreements

From the discussion above it is clear that if we want to take a more careful look into the context within which the Republican Movement was making its decisions, a central actor in shaping that context is Britain, on its various organs. The behavior of the British government in this conflict can be divided into three sub-categories. First, terrorism related legislation and court decisions (such as the decision to enforce 'internment' from August 1971). It also includes significant British court decisions such as what is seen as significantly severe or easy verdicts against different actors in the conflict, both Republican and Loyalist.

Another part of this factor is the establishment of new offices and the entry into power of key figures, especially 'Secretary of State for Northern Ireland' and of course, 'British Prime Minister'. The third part are British officials' announcements and papers regarding the situation or the other parties to the conflict.

But under the British Government factor I also include the British military and security forces actions. Being on the ground and acting as a foreign police force and not just as a

traditional military, affected the relationship between the military and the civilian population, both Catholic and Protestant (Kennedy-Pipe & McInnes, 1997). Regardless of whether British actions were planned by the government or not, they were perceived by the Republican Movement as representing British policy. The British military actions that were included were either traditional military actions or the more police oriented work of domestic order maintenance. Under these two we can find actions such as administering a curfew, like the one placed in July 1970 or Operation Motorman from July 1972. It also includes signals by the British military such as the closing or opening of borders or the decision to equip soldiers with soft hats instead of helmets from October 1994 (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) are the last organ that is included under this rubric. The RUC was the local police force and despite being local and not from England, under direct role which was imposed in 1972, it was an organ of the British State. The various organs that operate on behalf of the British entity in Northern Ireland were thus all collated under one factor for my study of the process.

Agreements are also an institutional arrangement, but one that is more 'static' than the British Government or military. Nevertheless, they too are part of the political opportunity structure. Depending on the identity of the signatories to them, and the terms they stipulate, they have the power to close or open the context for any particular actor. They are seen as a separate factor of the context because the signing of agreements is a dramatic shift in the context dynamic, as much as its collapse. However, during the period under investigation in this dissertation, only 3 agreements were signed, the final one basically ending the conflict.

The Irish government's actions are also included in the context of the Republican Movement. Not only did Sinn Féin run for elections in the Republic, much of the base of the

Republican Movement existed in the Republic, away from British security forces. The Republic of Ireland's government and security forces' actions are thus central to the shaping of the environment for the Republican Movement. Just like with the British entities, here as well all of the organs of the Irish government are collated under one rubric.

It would be difficult to argue that the republic of Ireland is merely a typical third-party actor in this conflict. Actions by the government, the military and the police of the Republic of Ireland were significant in shaping the dynamics of the conflict process, and those are accounted for in this factor. Since its agreements were already accounted, here the focus is more on official announcements regarding the situation in the North, and pressures and calls for more or less cooperation with the British, which in essence mark a shift towards or away from Sinn Féin. It also includes legislation of new laws pertaining to security, refuge, borders and the status of the Northern Ireland communities vis-à-vis the republic.

In terms of political, legal and diplomatic actions attention was given to inner politics - everything that has to do with scandals within the Republic's government and the coalition formation – and foreign policy, if you can call it that, regarding its relationship with Britain and with the North. This includes but not limited to TDs (Irish Parliament Members) visits to the Maze Prison during the hunger strikes, expressing pressure on the British government to ban Sinn Fein, forced resignations and coalition formation activities that changed Sinn Fein's status and electoral success chances etc.

Military and police action are also included, and they are not many. These include some limited military successes in capturing weapons and a few intelligence successes that led the Irish police to find caches of weapons. There are also legal aspects that matter such as the Extradition Act or the change of the Irish constitution.

A closer look into contextual factor #3: Unionist actions

Also important to note when discussing the effects of context on conflict dynamics is the fact that despite being somewhat constrained in their choices, movements still have an array of tactics they can use to affect the political opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1993). Depending on the state of affairs, a movement has a choice about how it will challenge the system, sometimes using violence, and sometimes using peaceful means, at times even using both simultaneously. As such, depending on the state of affairs, the republican movement chose to challenge the system with bombs at some instances and through elections at others, sometimes, using multiple violent and non-violent tactics simultaneously.

The choice of violence is related to several elements that underlie political conflicts and have to do with the context. According to Duffy, under the rationality assumption, leaders will not choose to use violence unless they believe they or their constituents are threatened by an adversary (Duffy, 2009). Duffy's definition of (lack of) security is rather broad: "a threat to self-determination in all its manifest forms" (Duffy, 2009, p. 108). He uses the conflict in Northern Ireland as a case in point portraying how basically everyone felt insecure. The perception of threats to self-determination shapes the opportunity structure for the movement. In effect, a group's sense of security is driven by the context and that sense of security or lack of it plays a role in shaping the contentious posture of the group. Duffy explains that when groups have the opportunities to voice their aspirations through democratic institutions, without fear of reprisal and when the regime has the infrastructural capacity to create the conditions that make such aspirations attainable, they will feel secure (Duffy, 2009).

This sense of security is what stands behind the choice to use violence or not. This view again hints at the connection between group behavior and the context within which it is

operating. It also hints at the dynamic nature of context – a shifting context changes the opportunities for a group to voice its contention and thus informs its cost-benefit analysis as to the use of force.

The Unionist/Loyalist community is as much as important in this story as any other party. Just like with the analysis of the Republican movement, not every attack by the Unionist/Loyalist side is accounted for in my data. Only incidents that were found to be significant by at least two commentators studying the conflict are included. These include but are not limited to extremely violent attacks by any of the paramilitary forces, marches, rallies, strikes and ceasefires. It is important to mention here that loyalist killings have received far less attention in the media and in the literature than republican killings even though they too are responsible for about a third of the dead in the conflict and in many senses, were far more violent and cruel than the IRA (O'Brien, 1999, 26).

Again, just like the republican movement, the Unionist community also had several different organizations operating on its behalf, some violent and some political. In my dataset, actions by all the different ones are accounted for together, as the Unionist community is not the focus of my analysis. However, the data is there and could be easily separated between the different movements and their respective wings if one were to shift the focus away from the Republican movement and onto the Unionist community, or even just one of its organizations.

It is worth noting that the opportunity structure can also relate to material, economic, educational and employment opportunities available, and does not necessarily have to revolve around political opportunities (Atashi, 2009). Once again, this discussion proposes that the movement's choices between various contentious postures and their tactical and strategic

behaviors are inherently related to contextual factors. As such, the two should not be looked at separately if one were to try and understand the process of conflict transformation.

I claim that the context can play a role in determining group behavior. But in what ways? Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger discuss the specific conditions that will push political parties to use violence, and the conditions that will lead violent organizations to enter competitive party politics (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009).²⁹ These conditions inform the way in which I look into the context and the way I study not only its interaction with the two other levels, but also its progress throughout the process.³⁰

My emphasis on the need to look into the process and not just at snap-shots of time is also supported by the authors' claim that groups operating within the context of a broad movement may go through a full life cycle (from terrorism to peaceful party politics and back to terrorism) depending on the temporal conditions and incentives to behave in one way or another at a given moment (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009, p. 127). This point is a motivating factor for my hypotheses generating exercise.

By better understanding these life cycles, and what prompts the switches between violence and political participation, or at the minimum cooperation with the prevailing order and participation in negotiations, we might be able to better understand conflicts. As mentioned before, these life cycles are indeed dependent on the context, but they also have to do with

²⁹ Under conditions that promote violence they mention crises of national integration; crises of disintegration; crises of legitimacy and problems of niche parties in multiparty systems. Under conditions that promote violent groups to stop using violence and become more cooperative (either by adopting a separate wing or by transforming into one) they mention a transformation in the prevailing political order; state repression; problems of clandestinity; and government amnesty and forgiveness (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009, pp. 18-22).

³⁰ Meaning, by studying the process and the behavior of all sides to the conflict, I can in-fact detect those crises of legitimacy, increased state repression or problems of clandestinity. This process is explained in more detail in the following chapter and in the codebook that is attached as appendix.

internal organizational dynamics, as Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger (2009) allude to, and with the individuals who lead the parties. But before we can discuss those, we must finish the discussion of context and the ways it may be affected by movements operating within it.

Beyond the choice between violence and cooperation, movements can also affect the context by creating or amplifying attention given to critical events (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996, p. 1638). In essence, when a group is successful in bringing an issue to the fore, it simultaneously mobilizes supporters while encouraging more opposition to it. It is only logical that when one group sees an issue as critical (and succeeds in getting attention to it), its opponents will treat it as critical as well, and mobilize to challenge the movement. Further success will depend on the interaction between the movement and those who oppose it, which clearly points to the movement's power in changing the context. Think again of the example brought up earlier of the hunger strikes. The Republican movement was able to bring to the fore the issue of political status to prisoners. The issue became so critical that it created mass mobilization behind the Republican movement, so much so that it pushed the British government to change electoral laws (McAllister, 2004).

Since some issues are larger than others, are more threatening to the interests of others, and do not depend necessarily on a critical event taking place, or on catalysts for mobilization, movements will have different levels of success or different effects on the context and the structure of opportunities over time. Unlike with the political status for prisoners, which was a short-term and highly successful issue to mobilize around, the issue of national self-determination remained constant for the Republican Movement over time but mobilization around it was different over the years, in correlation with different factors, both in the context, and within the movement, as I explain in the empirical chapters.

The point that is important to make here is that social movements have opened the way for other non-state actors to challenge existing structures and change the political opportunity structures within which they operate. These non-state actors however have a wider array of tactics to choose from, as they do not necessarily remain within the legal and political arena in their activities. The choice of tactic nonetheless is affected by the changing political opportunities, by the context, and by the reaction to the movement's actions (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996).

Political structures are thus understood as the broader context of the conflict. From the view point of one actor in the conflict, the context includes all *relevant* factors that *may* affect said actor's behavior. The context is thus different for each of the parties in the conflict. When I talk of the opening or closure of the political opportunity structure (or, for simplicity, *context*), I mean that at a certain stage in the process of conflict transformation, an actor has a better or worse opportunity to voice contention – the context is thus either more permissive (more open) or more restrictive-dismissive (closed) from the point of view of the specific contentious actor.

Now that we understand how political opportunity structures are conceived of and their connection to the level of context, we should also discuss other less-institutional factors that are part of the context and have an effect on movements' behavior. The two factors that will be discussed are the roles played by third parties on the one hand and public opinion and support for the movement on the other.

A closer look into contextual factors 5, 6 and 7: Third parties (intermediaries, promoters of peace and spoilers)

Third party intervention has been found to have the power to transform conflicts when it is employed by specific actors and under specific conditions (Kriesberg & Dayton, 2012). I divide third party intervention into three distinct categories. First are the intermediaries, traditionally operating in contexts of conflict transformation processes. However, I use the term ‘intermediary’ in its literal sense – intermediaries in this project are facilitators, go-betweens, and not necessarily in the sense afforded to the word in the literature, due to two central limitations of the prevalent understanding of the role in the conflict literature. An explanation is in order.

Dayton defines intermediaries as “actors that intervene in conflict situations with the intent to help the conflicting actors transform their conflict from a negative to a more positive state” (Dayton, 2009, p. 62). Dayton explains that intermediaries perform six different functions when it comes to violent conflicts: they use coercion to stop violence; they mediate agreements; they transform relationships between communities; they address the structural sources of the conflict; they provide consultation or conflict resolution services and; they provide early warning and post-conflict monitoring services (Dayton, 2009). He finds that intermediaries can be successful only in specific ripe moments, when the parties to the conflict have already decided to engage with each other and are less committed to violence.

However, intermediaries in the Northern Ireland case were not only involved in the process from a very early point when the Republican Movement was very much committed to violence, but they were also relatively successful and definitely significant in such early moments. Intermediary successes are not necessarily about reaching an agreement, “but they are not insignificant either... they may provide just enough incentive to settle or, more subtly, just

enough change in perceptions and attitudes to tip the balance from a contentious to a cooperative approach” (Princen, 2014, p. 3).

Those who worked as intermediaries in the Northern Ireland case definitely helped in such tipping of the balance, but more importantly, worked hard to improve the communication and understanding between the conflicted parties from an early stage and for that they deserve to be included in the discussion if one was looking to better understand the processes of conflict transformation (Princen, 2014).

In order to overcome another challenge that has to do with the traditional definition of intermediaries, I give my second category a different name – Promoters of Peace. Princen explicitly defines intermediaries as “actors with incentives to be involved but without direct interests in the disputed issue” (Princen, 2014, P. 3). Once again, in the case of Northern Ireland, such a definition will exclude the important work of John Hume, leader of the Nationalist SDLP party and that of Father Alec Reid and other religious figures who provided good services of facilitation between the sides to the conflict.

It would be difficult to claim that these did not serve as the quintessential intermediaries, despite having a clear and direct interest in the conflict. Furthermore, Princen himself understands that ‘by virtue of being in the middle, intermediaries gain information which they can use to promote their own idea of a good settlement or, simply to promote their own interests’ (Princen 2014, P. 11). Moreover, he emphasizes that “intermediaries are often described as mediators, conciliators, facilitators, go-between, third party and peace makers. The literature does not offer definite precise definitions to all of these and the different terms are used interchangeably with overlapping meanings” (Princen, 2014, p. 227).

So, if they are already known for having their own interests, there is no real logic behind prohibiting those with the most to gain from a settlement due to their direct involvement in the conflict from serving (or at least, being considered as) intermediaries. But to give them the credit they deserve, I will simply refer to them as ‘promoters of peace’. These are all those actors who cannot be truly defined as third parties or intermediaries as they have a stake in the conflict while at the same time, they are also different from spoilers who seek to destroy any progress towards conflict resolution. As their label clearly suggests, promoters of peace are those who work to promote peace and were immensely important to the process, as will be discussed in more details in the empirical chapters.

The conflict in Northern Ireland drew a great deal of attention from varied third parties, from individuals, to states, to local, governmental and international organizations. The most important third party to play the role of a promoter of peace is the SDLP and its leader John Hume. Announcements, meetings and actions of John Hume and of his party are mentioned and analyzed.³¹ In terms of the more traditional third parties, I look into the Catholic Church, the American Government, particularly President Bill Clinton and John Mitchell, the EU and different institutions within it and any attempt of intervention or involvement in Northern Ireland. The opening or the closing of the structure is never determined solely based on the work of intermediaries, but their actions have varying effects on the dynamic of conflict. As such, even clear interventions of third parties on behalf of the movement are weighted in relation to the context at that time.

³¹ As far as the other promoters of peace, such as Father Reid, information regarding their services was more difficult to attain, as they worked behind the scenes, and is referred to only when it was corroborated by more than one source.

Spoilers are the third category of third party intervention. As their name hints, spoilers are those actors who feel their interests are not being taken into account in a process of negotiations and try to spoil any progress (Stedman, 2008). Spoilers come at different forms and emerge at different times in the conflict process. Most of them emerge when they sense a shift in the status quo is coming (Greenhill & Major, Winter 2006/07). In our terminology, this means that spoilers are more likely to appear when they sense the opportunities the context affords them are about to change or be taken away. Pearlman explains that the changing context in fact pushes the group to decide whether to act as a spoiler or not in the first place (Pearlman, Winter 2008/09).

In the Northern Ireland conflict, the shifting context may explain why specific groups who acted as spoilers at some point, such as the splinter Republican group INLA, agreed at a later point in time to lay-down their arms, only to resume violence at a later point when the context shifted yet again. Since I am examining the process from the point of view of the Republican Movement, spoilers, like all the other actors in the conflict, serve as part of the context. Several of the Unionists groups can also count as spoilers, but since they are all treated under one umbrella term of Unionists, they are excluded from this category.

Spoilers are in a sense the exact opposite of intermediaries, as they do not wish to promote peace or even to support one party to the struggle, but they go against the notion of peace in its entirety. From the view-point of the Provisional Republican movement, these are the other nationalist paramilitaries, republican or not. These have worked to not only challenge the British and the Unionists but against the Provisional movement as well. Just like with intermediaries, their affect was never sufficient to determine any outcome in the conflict dynamic, but their operations are necessary to look into nonetheless.

A closer look into contextual factor #5: Elections

Lastly within the context level-of-analysis, I look into public support which is measured through electoral success. Since I focus on non-state actors that are willing to employ violence to advance their goals, public support here is significant as it has the power to affect decisions between violence and non-violence, for those groups that operate in the political scene alongside the use of violence. In Northern Ireland, four sets of elections are relevant: local district elections, Westminster elections, Republic of Ireland elections and European Parliament elections (Walker, 1992).

Aksoy (2014) finds that the likelihood of increased use of terrorism in proximity to elections is dependent on the type of the electoral democracy – systems that offer more proportional representation, are more permissive, will suffer less from heightened terrorism than those that are less permissive. These findings show that approaching elections will lead to more terrorism exactly in those systems that have a closed political opportunity structure and little to no voice options for minorities. Is it truly the case in Northern Ireland? Do approaching elections truly have such an effect on the behavior of the Republican Movement?

Essentially, this is about the pressure from the bottom on the movements' actions and goals (Atashi, 2009). Heger (2015) explains that "attacking civilians is not good for political business" (p. 32). In essence, she claims that "groups that participate in politics are more constrained by their constituents' preferences" and constituents do not appreciate violence against civilians (Heger, 2015, p. 33). At the end of the day, violence against civilians is merely one of the various tools groups can employ to build their reputation (Tokdemir & Akcinaroglu, 2016). Similarly, elections are one tool a group can use to upgrade its reputation. The strategic choice a group will make during these times depends on its goals at the moment. The Republican

Movement was certainly worried about its reputation, but its goals as a movement shifted over time. Looking into the levels of public support through elections might aid us in understanding the movement's shifting behavior.

Elections are also examined in another manner. All election results for the Republic of Ireland, Westminster and Stormont were tracked for the conflict period. Elections are significant because they change the structural opportunities available for the movement. If a conservative party comes to power in Westminster, and there are clear statements by its members against the movement, then it surely affects the ability of the movement to voice its opinion which then affects its decision to adopt more or less violence. Elections results were thus examined not only based on the 'dry numbers' but speeches and statements of the different parties' members regarding the Northern Ireland conflict and the Republican movement more particularly were collected and analyzed.

Based on the discussion above, it can be assumed that conflicts can only move forward when there are opportunities for voice (Hirschman, 1970). When there are few opportunities for a movement to express its discontent with the system, or few chances for it to achieve its goals by following the rules of the games within the system, it will seek to operate outside of the institutional setting. In this, a supporting public and the attention of third party intermediaries, whether local or international, play a significant role in the perception of the structure itself, and in the pressure that is put on the government in power to change its behavior. nevertheless, third parties and a supportive public might be necessary for conflict transformation, but still insufficient on their own.

Various terrorism studies and political violence studies (to mention a few) as those that were discussed above touch on the dynamic between the group and the context in determining

movements' behavior and their choice between violence and other forms of resistance, which is why context is so important to look into. These studies and others that offer similar arguments advance our understanding of conflicts processes, but are short of providing us with a useful wholesome framework.³² Not only do they focus on specific aspects of conflicts, but they also tend to ignore arguments pertaining to the same issues from other literatures that may enrich their analysis and our understanding. This gap is something I wish to address.

This section surveyed the literature on the role of context in conflict transformation. As we can see, context is a rather complicated level, encompassing several factors that interact with each other, as well as with factors from other levels. Together these interactions lead to an action (or re-action) by the movement (and the counter-movements). But before we move on to discuss the interaction, it is also important to look into the two other levels of analysis.

The second level of analysis: The Organization

Pearlman and Cunningham explain that “opportunities and constraints are not solely a product of the interaction between the non-state actor and its external environment. Rather, opportunities emerge and vacillate in accord with the divided character of the non-state actor itself” (Pearlman & Cunningham, 2012, p. 7).

DWRO's as already defined are inherently divided. It is that division that challenges their ability to speak in a united message. Each wing has different ways to go about pursuing their shared goals, but they are nonetheless constrained in their behavior by the other wing, or by the entire movement they work under.³³ How do two wings of the same organization work together?

³² And I would emphasize that they do not make the connection between the levels of analysis explicit.

³³ And if they are not constrained then the movement is in a greater problem, as there are splits within the organization.

Do they even work together? How are they affected by the context and what are their decision making procedures? These questions are at the center of this section.

Dudouet mentions that a set of variables can be identified at the intra-group level that might have an impact for conflict transformation dynamics. She talks of three sub-categories: idiosyncratic and cognitive factors (leadership's traits and motivations); horizontal in-group dynamics and socio-organizational processes (between group members); and vertical relationships with the group's constituency and social surrounding (Dudouet, 2015). The theory suggested here also incorporates factors from these three sub-categories.

I find the distinction between vertical and horizontal processes particularly helpful. It strengthens the point made by Pearlman that these organizations do not necessarily act as unitary actors and are sometimes driven by internal dynamics as much as, if not more, their external environment (Pearlman, 2010). Furthermore, when it comes to vertical relationships, those can be found not only between the group and its constituency but also within the group between leaders and lower ranking members, as Shapiro suggests when talking about challenges in terrorist organizations that suffer from preference divergence between the leadership and the soldiers (Shapiro, 2013).

Shapiro discusses two tradeoffs leaders face when running clandestine political movements in his attempt of explaining organizational dynamics. The first tradeoff is between operational security and financial efficiency, and the second is the tradeoff between operational security and tactical control. The tradeoffs are more or less meaningful for the group (or harder to solve) based on four variables: 1. Discrimination: How discriminate the group needs to be in the use of violence given its political goals; 2. Uncertainty: How much uncertainty is there over what operatives should do given their point of view and experience on the ground; 3. Preference

Divergence: How much divergence there is in the underlying preferences of the group; 4.

Government counterterrorism efforts: The level of security pressure the group is under from authorities (Shapiro, 2013, p. 57). As he puts it: “Terrorist organizations cannot at once be reliable, resilient, and secure while also under the perfect control of their leadership” (Shapiro, 2013, pp. 101).

Shapiro’s tradeoffs are important for our understanding of organizational dynamic as they point to the challenges these groups face, not only from the context, but from their own internal dynamics. Below I explain how I consider these issues when looking into the behavior of the Republican Movement over time.

Emphasizing the important of those internal dynamics in shaping groups’ behavior, Berti asks what conditions lead the political wing of a movement to become the primary one, which ultimately leads to the relinquishment of violence (Berti, 2013). Ultimately is a key word in this question, as I would claim that even when the political wing takes charge so to speak, it is still constrained by the organizational setting and its movement towards a complete renouncement of violence is painfully slow and incremental. Nonetheless, the conditions she recognizes in her study are very much relevant to this study.

Building on Weinberg, Pedahzur and Perliger (2009), as well as on Van Engeland and Rudolph (2013)³⁴, Berti challenges the linear view of violence versus politics that has been evidenced in the terrorism studies literature which tends to see the two forms of political struggle as mutually exclusive. Alternatively, she emphasizes the “systemic and reciprocal relations

³⁴ The book focuses as well on the dynamic of political wing formation, arguing that a group’s commitment to politics, measured as a combination of four factors, is the determining factor in the shift towards constitutional politics. Their four factors are political will, political ideology, concrete set of policies and relationships with other domestic and international political parties (Van Engeland & Rudolph, 2013).

between armed and political organizations” (Berti, 2013, p. 5). Importantly, she uses the Republican movement (amongst others) as an example for the real, complicated and far from linear connection between armed struggle and political participation.

Berti’s research stresses the importance of “the internal balance of power within the group”. Her working hypothesis is that “the internal power distribution and the type of relationship existing between the group’s political group and its military apparatus are a key variable” (Berti, 2013, p. 7). She measures the inequality of structure, resources, role and specialization, capacity to exert power and interests for the wings. She uses these inequalities to determine the level of internal conflict which is measured by the levels of coordination, cohesion and unity of purposes of both wings (Berti, 2013).

Where my research diverges from Berti is at this point. Like Berti, I too claim that the internal organizational dynamics are indeed central. However, for Berti, these are central to a movement’s process of moderation and strategic change, whereas I claim that they are central for the larger conflict setting and can only be understood when one examines the conflict over time. For Berti, the organizational dynamic will determine whether the movement is ripe for transitioning towards politics.³⁵

Siqueira too talks of the importance of the internal dynamics between wings and uses a game-theory model to examine three types of possible relationships: cooperation and strategic complement, competition driven and a mixed case when one wing’s action supports the other whereas the actions of the latter are harmful for the first one. The mixed type of relationship can

³⁵ Berti does not ignore the political opportunity structure - the ripeness of a movement for transition is not analyzed in a vacuum. Nonetheless, the dynamic nature and the fact that the internal group dynamics have the power to influence the external environment is missing from her discussion.

lead to either the armed wing harming the operation of the political one or vice-versa (Siqueira, 2005).

Unlike Siqueira, I break the first type of relationship into two possible scenarios: either cooperation towards violence or cooperation towards more accommodation and participation in the institutional setting. I see strategic complement as being part of some divergent cases, when the two wings operate in contradicting ways, but not necessarily in all of them, when there is in fact true divergence. His mixed cases are what I see as divergent cases, but also the confused cases. But in order to understand when is divergence the result of a pre-meditated strategic complement and when it is the result of true disagreement, I claim that one must conduct a more in-depth analysis that is beyond the abilities of game theoretic models.

Building on Siqueira, Berti claims that a radical transformation in group behavior is dependent on the duration, intensity and organizational pervasiveness of internal conflict (between the two wings). The radical change she seeks to explain is one of four scenarios: the movement splits permanently, a new equilibrium between the two wings is created due to a temporal reconciliation, the group ‘regresses’ to its armed struggle phase or establishes the primacy of the political wing (Berti, 2013). Berti explains that the last scenario is only likely to occur under very specific conditions: when the political wing has “a high degree of autonomy and the capacity to spearhead internal change, along with organizational legitimacy and relevance within the political arena” (Berti, 2013, p. 23).

First, though I agree that in the overall conflict transformation process, resorting to armed struggle may be seen as a ‘regression’ in tactics, I would claim that it is a natural part of the long process of transformation, which is not necessarily ‘radical’. As such, it should not be considered as regression, if one is to focus on the movement’s point of view. Furthermore, it is possible that

a decision to resort to violence is taken mutually by the two wings and is not necessarily the result of a power struggle in which the armed wing came on top. Secondly, Berti chooses to disregard the role leaders may play in such power struggles and the centrality of their framing efforts of the environment, both internally and externally.³⁶

Nevertheless, Berti agrees that “armed group’s involvement in politics will lead to cycles where the political strategy is given primacy within the organization, to be followed by cycles where armed struggle becomes the preferred option” (Berti, 2013, p. 7). By looking into these cycles through my levels-of-analysis lens, I can better understand the way internal dynamics work not only for specific decisions made, but over time. It will shed light on the ways in which these cycles are connected to each other and what changes in the conflict dynamic in between. It also allows me to see how internal dynamics affect and are affected by context and by leadership more closely.³⁷

Indeed, internal dynamics are a thing. And they are a thing that matters in processes of conflict transformation. But how they matter exactly and how they are affected by the two other levels of analysis is still to be determined. Some specific connections have already been discussed as I present below.

³⁶ She finds the role of leaders “although relevant, is considered insufficient to explain larger trends” (Berti, 2013, p. 24). Instead, apart from the political opportunity structure, Berti considers organizational commitment to change, institutional pressures to expand and grow and a shift in the resource mobilization structure. Unlike her, I consider all three factors as part of the organizational dynamics.

³⁷ Despite the common trends and the overarching goal of advancing our understanding of internal dynamics of groups that sustain military and political wings, it is important to note that my work differs from Berti’s in many more aspects than those mentioned here, including case-selection, methodology, and most importantly: central argument and question. Berti seeks to learn what pushes the political wing to overcome the militant one, whereas my outcome of interest is what leads the two wings to act in accordance with each other or not. Furthermore, I wish to dig deeper into the connection between such dynamic interaction between the wings over time to better understand the way it affects the conflict dynamic as a whole with a focus on the process and not just cycles of behavior.

Going back to elections, they have a role to play not only in changing the context, but also in affecting internal group dynamics. At the end of the day, voting affords the public with leverage (Heger, 2015). For that leverage to have any effect on the movement, it must have a political wing. Civilians have much to lose from supporting, even tacitly, terrorist organizations. For starters, civilians are the one that are put at risk as they bear the brunt of governmental retaliatory anti-terrorism tactics. The quintessential example for such price paid by civilians for support of violent organizations is the Second Anglo-Boer War, when an entire ethnic minority was collectively punished (Downes, 2011). Civilians also often become the prime targets of civilian paramilitary groups of competing or opposing groups (Goodwin, 2006). This was clearly the case in Northern Ireland, when Loyalist paramilitary groups targeted Catholic civilians.

However, though I agree that elections have a role to play in the decision to use violence, it is only part of the story, just like any other factor I examine. Not only can they not fully explain the choice between violence and cooperation, they also fall short in explaining why a group chooses to use one type of violence over the other, or when a group changes the level of violence it uses. Groups that participate in elections can decide to temporarily not target civilians while remaining quite violent against other targets, which are deemed more 'legitimate' or 'moral' in their constituents' view. The Provisional IRA continued attacking British military posts even during elections, but was willing to cease kidnapping civilians for ransom due to public pressure and their desire to succeed more in their electoral campaign.

I claim that the decision whether to use violence or not is dependent on many aspects, some of which have to do with the context, while others have to do with the organizational dynamics and with leadership. Acosta (2014) for example found that political violence has limited productivity for goals' achievement. When organizations reach that limit, they will seek

to join the political system. However, such a view of the utility of violence cannot explain the decision to adopt violence even after a movement has entered the political system, as the Republican Movement did.

Acosta further explains that two barriers stand in the way of successful transformation from a violent organization into a political one: the constituency's preference for violence and credibility deficiencies (Acosta, 2014). If the movement has wide support even when using violence, there is no real incentive to cease or employ a different tactic. A similar claim is made for the reputation of the movement. Violence is used as a bargaining chip for mobilization purposes and to establish a credible threat (Acosta, 2014). But the argument is still limited. As was already discussed above, organizations can choose under certain conditions to transition to political parties but the transition does not have to be complete. A militant organization can adopt some aspects of political participation without forming an official party, and without relinquishing its violent activities completely (Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Perliger, 2009).

In essence, Acosta highlights the dynamic aspect of the conflict transformation process. He emphasizes the point that only after achieving some goals (violently), but not all goals, do militants have a chance to convince their existing constituency to support a transition away from violence. Without some initial goal achievement, militants will not have the power to convince their supporters to move away from violence (Acosta, 2014). I built on Acosta and advance his argument to claim that a successful transition depends not only on these initial goal achievements, but also on a savvy party leadership that is able to not only convince its constituents of the benefits in adopting party politics over violence, but is also capable of going through with such a transition, and joining that same system it challenged and critiqued as illegitimate up until that point. This understanding of the relationship between the two wings, but

also between them and the leadership becomes evident only when looking into the process over time and only when focusing on the behavior of the leaders themselves, as I do in the empirical chapters.

Survival is the primary and most important goal of any organization, even if it is one that used violence to attain its goals. However, in order to survive, the organizational setting must be flexible. An inflexible organization will find it difficult to adapt to changing circumstances and will struggle to survive as a result. Specifically, when it comes to DWRO, a divided movement or one in which the leadership does not have the full support of its members, will be unable to push for big changes in the conflict processes, especially when it comes to a movement away from violence and towards cooperation. Additionally, only in organizational settings in which decisions are taken by a predominant leader or by a very small coalition can a positive change take place. These points are related to the third level of analysis discussed below, of leadership.

Within organizational dynamics, it is also important to talk about organizational culture, including goals and attitude towards violence, alongside decision making mechanisms. Dudouet explains that the list of factors relevant for our understanding of collective violence “would not be complete without delving into the ‘black box’ of decision making and organizational dynamics” (Dudouet, 2015, p. 8). Decision making processes lead to a reevaluation and adjustment of tactics (Dudouet, 2012). As will be discussed below, decision making procedures have to do both with organizational culture, but also with personalities of leaders, and with the willingness of particular leaders to take risk-embracing acts of political leadership (Read & Shapiro, 2014).

It is important to understand that even strong leaders are constrained by decision making mechanisms (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010). These mechanisms are part of the reevaluation and

adjustment of tactics these movements go through (Dudouet, 2012). Conflict is pervasive in organizational decision making. Whether the decision is taken by a predominant leader, a coalition or a small group (Hermann, *How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework*, 2001), decisions are driven by conflicting interests (Shapira, 2002). As mentioned, the existence of two linked but separated wings further complicates the decision making mechanisms and processes as the conflicting interests are even further apart.

Internal dynamics are thus important to discuss when one wishes to better understand conflict processes. It is by far less well researched than the other issues I cover here, so I wish to add to our understanding of it by looking more closely into the interaction between this level and the two others. I do so by examining the behavior of both wings more closely in the times leading up to any of the organizational behaviors.

The third level of analysis: Leaders

The last necessary but insufficient factor in successful conflict transformation processes to be discussed is leadership. Chiozza and Goemans claim that “Leaders and their political incentives make a difference” (Chiozza & Goemans, 2011, p. 2). The claim here is that leaders are a central aspect in the success of conflict transformation processes, but only when they are of a particular type, a strategist, only when they hold a specific understanding of the conflict (wanting peace), only when they are sensitive enough to read the signals being sent in the context of conflict and only when they are powerful enough within their own organization to push forward for change.

When it comes to the importance of studying leaders, many studies in political psychology claim that individual level factors are important to understand policy making and

distinctive individual characteristics play crucial roles in it, meaning that under the same set of circumstances different leaders might reach different decisions or simply behave differently (Dyson, 2006). Post et al. cite Greenstein who wrote in 1969 that leaders' personalities matter under four conditions: "when the actor occupies a strategic location, when the situation is ambiguous or unstable, when there are no clear precedents or routine role requirements, and when spontaneous or especially effortless behavior is required" (Post, Walker, & Winter, 2005, p. 2). Such perception of leadership strengthens the claim that leaders are constrained by the environment in which they are operating. In their Book, Kaarbo et al. support this notion and mention that the character of the leader is generally more important when the situation is ambiguous, uncertain and complex or when the leader is involved in the actual decision making rather than delegating his authority to advisors (Kaarbo, Lantis, & Beasley, 2002).

Building on these claims, Hermann actually found how specific personality traits work in these situations (Hermann, 1979). In her great contribution to this literature and to our understanding of leaders Hermann studied everything from leadership personalities, their motivations, their respect of constraints, the relevance of different traits to their behavior, their leadership style, openness to new information, reliance on advisors, willingness to compromise and more (Hermann, 1994). Hermann and others have also explained how and under what conditions all of these matter in the study of leadership and of decision making. I use these studies of leadership to guide me in my analysis of Gerry Adams, one of the only constant (in the sense of relevance, not necessarily behavior) figures in the conflict. By focusing on his behavior over time and on the specific conditions under which he made decisions, I draw conclusions about Adams' leadership, but also about the role of leaders in conflict processes more generally.

Political psychology studies of leadership also touch on conflict studies. Bar Tal tells us that “from the psychological perspective of conflict analysis, outbreaks of conflicts are dependent on the appearance of particular perceptions, beliefs, attitudes, and motivations, all of which must change for conflict resolution to occur” (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. 352). Bar-Tal sees leaders as role models for their followers: “their open support and promotion of reconciliation, expressed in deeds and words, helps to maintain the process and mobilize the support of in group members” (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. 362). A similar claim is brought forth by Haslam and Hopkins, who rely on Weber’s early works on charismatic leaders and claim that leaders have transformational and creative powers and that they can change the behaviors and attitudes of others (Haslam & Hopkins, 2005).

Similar to these claims, I also claim that leaders have the power to create change in the process by setting an example. I show it by looking into one leader over time. I show that not only can a leader have an influence on how his followers behave, and even his adversaries, but contrary to some beliefs, a leader can also change over time, and his personal change in itself has ramifications for the process of conflict transformation.

In a paper presented at a conference in 2010, Hermann et al. show that some leaders are indeed capable of changing over time. Most of them will not change but some will. The authors show that changes in leadership style are affiliated with three general contexts: scheduled elections or other kind of selection period; while the leader is working to consolidate his power; and when the group is engaged in serious negotiations (Hermann, Sakiev, & Smith, 2010). Read and Shapiro (2014) claim that leaders play a central role in the transformation of a conflict from a zero-sum to a positive sum, when they are willing to take risk-embracing acts of political leadership, which they call “strategically hopeful action” (Read & Shapiro, 2014, p. 40-41).

Within the broader realm of conflict transformation, Miall discusses ‘actor transformation’ as well as ‘personal/elite transformations’ and claims that “personal changes of heart or mind within individual leaders or small groups with decision making power at critical moments may be crucial” (Miall, 2004). Miall adds that “conciliatory gestures by leaders, which express personal changes, would play an important role” (Miall, 2004).

More importantly, Miall explicitly says that no significant progress in the conflict transformation process could happen “without significant changes of mind at the individual and elite level” (Miall, 2004, p. 11). Similarly, looking into the peace process in Burundi, Wolpe and McDonald found that “democracy becomes possible and peace secure only when leaders of a divided society realize that, whatever their conflicting interests, they share still more important interests in common” (Wolpe & McDonald, 2006). They emphasize the central and necessary role of leaders in transforming violent conflicts, and indicate that part of it is based on leaders’ ability to change and to effect change in others (Wolpe & McDonald, 2006). These studies thus prove without a doubt that leaders indeed matter and that sometimes it is their changed perceptions and behaviors that matters most.

These studies guide me in my analysis of Adams. I examine how he behaves at any point in time, and show the circumstances under which we see change and risk-embracing behaviors. By looking into the conflict over time, and by looking into the three levels of analysis together the true ability of Adams to personally change, and the circumstances under which he does change are illuminated.

Clearly, even from gleaning over the various literatures, one gets the sense that all these levels are intertwined. It is difficult to discuss organizational dynamics without referring to the decision making process of the organization itself. Similarly, it is quite challenging to discuss

such organizational dynamics or the adoption of cooperation over violence without referring to the context that either enabled or hindered it, but in any case had an influence.

And thus, I offer a more nuanced understanding of the dynamic of conflict transformation, one that refers to the dynamic interaction between factors from the different levels of analysis, while also referring to the temporality of both circumstances and behaviors. Such temporality is itself a product of the dynamic interaction between the levels, as a change in one level, leads to a change in the other, which then affects the first. To put it more clearly, it is the process that we should focus on.

Generating Hypotheses

The factors at the three levels interact with each other in different ways, leading to one of four types of behaviors: congruence towards violence, congruence towards cooperation, divergence and confusion. I would like to learn whether it is specific interaction between the factors in the context, the organizational dynamics and the leadership that leads to one type of organizational behavior over others. In order to know which combination of factors, if at all, lead to each of the behaviors, a more in-depth analysis should be conducted. Below I present the assumptions that stand at the basis of my analysis. Chapter 4 will delineate the manner in which the analysis was conducted.

Guiding questions

Based on my understanding of group dynamics, especially those groups willing to use violence to achieve their goals, and of conflict processes more generally, my hypotheses generating process was driven by several questions.

First of all: Context matters. But how? Most if not all actors in a conflict must be on board for the conflict transformation process to progress. Actors have the power to change the context and the other actors' contention position by sending out signals. From the point of view of a particular actor, the Republican Movement in our case, these signals can either be enabling or constraining. The meaning is that some actions taken by other actors make the conflict environment more enabling for the Republican Movement to be heard while others make it more challenging.

But context is the amalgamation of several factors. From the Republican Movement's point of view, I take these factors to be anything that is outside of the group. Looking specifically at the conflict in Northern Ireland and based on the literature discussed above, I found the following factors to be part of the context: The British Government, The British Military (and its various branches), security forces operating in Northern Ireland (whether those are British or Northern Irish), agreements signed between parties relevant to the conflict, actions taken by unionist, whether parties or paramilitaries organizations, the Republic of Ireland's government (The Irish Government), elections results, intermediaries, promoters of peace and spoilers.³⁸ This understanding leads me to my first assumption: *No single contextual factor can be responsible for all types of behavior observed.*

I expect to find that all factors from the context level will matter at some point or another. As a result, I assume that no single factor will be the sole catalyst of all organizational behaviors observed. Had one factor been responsible for all types of behaviors alone, then we should see no

³⁸ The church, though some would claim a significant actor in and of its own, is included within 'intermediaries' as it fits the definition provided in this chapter.

variation in the behavior of the Republican Movement when this factor is in place. A related assumption is thus: *The British Government will be the most important contextual factor.*

Out of the seven contextual factors that I look into, I assume that the British Government will be the most important, both in the sense that it will be relevant in most cases and in the sense that it might even be sufficient in leading to a specific behavior. The British Government was the biggest actor in this conflict. It was the main adversary of the Republican Movement and its behavior had a great effect on the Republican Movement's decision making process. The British Government may be seen in fact as the one setting the tone of the conflict process. It too is subjected to changing circumstances and to signals being sent by the other actors in the conflict, but it is nonetheless the one with the power.

A few guiding assumptions are relevant at the two other levels of analysis as well. *Organizational dynamics matter in as much as they minimize a leader's operation space and infringe on his decision making power.* The studied behavior in my dissertation is the one by the organization as a whole, as such, it is affected by actions taken by both of its wings. Though both of the wings' actions matter, they cannot on their own lead to a change in the organization's behavior. However, their actions affect both the context and the leadership, which is why they matter in this story. More importantly, organizational dynamics matter especially as a frame of reference for the leadership.

Leaders are key in transforming the conflict. I operate with the assumption that leaders matter. The way in which they matter however is something that will be understood only once the analysis is done. Leaders play a central role in the transformation of conflicts, but they do not operate in a vacuum. Leaders are constrained by both the context of the conflict and by their own organization. This claim is not only relevant to the leadership of the Republican Movement but

to all the leaders involved in the conflict. In order to remain in the game, a leader must stand in between the movement he represents and the context, all the while, knowing when to push forward his own view of how things should go. Think of Putnam's (Summer 1988) two level game. Putnam talks about decision makers having to balance between domestic and international pressures. In a similar way, the leadership of the Republican Movement must balance between the needs and desires of its own constituency and what it can get from its external environment. So the two levels are not domestic and international but organizational and contextual in a sense.

Putnam even considers that the chief negotiator may have some priorities of his own. A chief negotiator may have a veto over possible agreements. I wish to push that notion of personal priorities further than Putnam and complicate his two-level game into a multiple levels one as I believe that leaders have their own agendas beyond those of the organization they represent and their role in any sort of negotiation, or in the process of conflict transformation, their role is not only in relaying messages but in shaping them as well. More than that, I do not see leaders as motivated by political gain alone. Some leaders are in fact willing to take those 'risk-embracing acts' that are not necessarily about personal political gain (Read & Shapiro, 2014).

This is not about survival per se, but has to do with personality. Adams tried to push a policy very similar to what former Republican leaders have tried in the past, but it was him that managed to do it without losing the organization, due to his own personality and leadership style. The other side of this coin has to do with those who would not take any step for personal reasons. Thatcher may have had her domestic politics in mind, but she also had a strong aversion from everything Republican. As such, the fact that it was her who was making the decisions on behalf of the British government, was a determining factor on its own.

A leader thus stands at the center of all levels: in between the two wings, in between the organizational decision making apparatus and the members, and in between his organization and the external environment. A leader must use his own power to paint a particular picture, of his own organization towards its adversaries, and of the outside to his own organization.

Despite all the constraints they face, I suspect that leaders can overcome challenging circumstances if they are being strategic. Strategic leaders “know where they want to go but proceed with incremental steps, forever testing the waters to see if the time is right for action” (Hermann & Hagan, Spring 1998, p. 132). Hermann and Gerard further explain: “Their goals are set but the means to achieving such goals vary with the context and what constituents will support – political timing is critical” (Hermann & Gerard, 2009, p. 33). Such a leader is different from an ideologue who will go about achieving his goal in any way possible, or from pragmatic leaders who change their goals based on the current wishes of their constituents (Hermann & Gerard, 2009). Was Adams strategic in his behavior? Did he have a goal but was willing to only take incremental steps when the context was right? I assume that he was indeed strategic.

Additionally, I assume that *Strategic leaders can and do change*. Astute leaders can tailor their behavior to the changing context within which they are working. But more so than tailoring behavior, leaders (and organizations) have the ability to learn and with experience comes wisdom. Such wisdom can in fact lead leaders to alter their own perceptions of their movement, their goals, their adversaries and their chances of success. And when a leader changes his own perceptions, he can create a change in the conflict dynamic as a whole. However, as I already noted, these changes take time, and they are far from being linear. Transformation is incremental by default. A leader cannot just decide he wants peace and push for it out of the blue. It must be done incrementally or no one will buy it.

Leaders cannot be the sole catalysts of progress in the conflict process. The context itself can influence leaders' decisions and lead to progress in the conflict process. The context can influence the organizational dynamics which pressures the leader to move in one way or another. The leader is the point. If he is strong enough. And if he is smart enough. Once he loses the support of his own organization and the minimal trust and respect of others, he cannot move, and the conflict cannot move.

The above points culminate in the broader goals of my hypotheses generating exercise. I wish to find support for my assumption that it is the interaction between factors from the various levels of analysis that prompts a DWRO to behave in one way over another. What does that interaction look like and does it even exist? That is what I wish to learn. The following chapter discusses in more detail the way in which I conducted my research based on these initial questions and the methodologies I used for my analysis.


Chapter 4

The Story of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement as a Process of Action and Reaction

In this chapter I begin the analysis of the Provisional Irish Republican Movement (hereinafter: ‘*Republican Movement*’) from the end of 1983 until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement by Sinn Féin in May 1998. The analysis focuses on the Republican Movement. The hypotheses generated in this research could be then applied to the other parties in the conflict, and more generally, to the analysis of other processes of conflict transformation elsewhere. By telling their story, I will also explain how snapshots of time were chosen, what data were collected for the analysis and what was the process by which the snapshots and the process as a whole were analyzed.

Figure 4.1 below describes the process by which I collected and analyzed data. The six steps will be described in more detail below.

Figure 4.1: Data Analysis and Coding Process



Step 1: Case-selection

My analysis begins when Gerry Adams becomes the President of Sinn Féin in November 1983 and ends with the Signing of the Good Friday Agreement by Sinn Féin in May 1998. Though he was definitely involved in the Republican Movement even before he became the Sinn

Féin president, he was not the official spokesperson for the movement. Furthermore, the claim put forth is that Adams was indeed a key actor in the conflict transformation process and that without him, the process would not have looked the same. As for the ending of my time-line, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, the Good Friday Agreement may not have ended the conflict, but it is certainly a point that marks a serious reduction of violence.³⁹

As explained in the previous chapter I am interested in understanding what led the Republican Movement to behave in different ways. Thus the first step was to clearly identify the cases for analysis. To do so I looked for clear behaviors of both wings of the movement along the defined time-line. Going over several sources as will be discussed below in the sources section, every time two sources mentioned the same behavior, it was marked down. I then defined as a case only incidents that met the conditions I set: i.e., both wings acted at approximately the same time (a maximum of one month apart) and if only the behavior of one wing was recognized, it was the non-trivial one (meaning that the political wing was in fact supporting violence or that the military wing was cooperating in some way).⁴⁰

Based on this decision, many of the actions taken by either of the wings were marked but not considered as cases. Not every attack by the Provisional IRA is coded as a case. First of all because the decision making process for every specific attack cannot be traced, and second of all, because multiple attacks on the same day or during a short period of time consist of a policy when they are observed together, but do not say much on organizational dynamics on their own.

³⁹ Decommissioning only took place in 2005, but the period between the Good Friday Agreement and complete decommissioning was marked mostly by cooperation and negotiation and the nature of the Republican Movement was definitely different following its approval of the Good Friday Agreement.

⁴⁰ Cooperation was defined quite broadly for this goal – any behavior that is not outright violent was considered.

Additionally, at least four months had to pass between each of the cases.⁴¹ Based on these rules, twenty-four cases were identified. Each case represents a clear action (behavior) by the Republican Movement out of the four types of possible organizational behaviors. It is worth clarifying that all behaviors of the Republican Movement were first identified.⁴² Out of all identified behaviors, only those that fit the criteria I set were chosen as cases.

As I am working towards a theory to explain a specific set of phenomena within conflict transformation processes, it is only after learning what in fact leads to such behaviors that I am able to study the non-cases, when a specific set of variables should have led to an outcome of interest but did not (Geddes, 1990). But that is not possible, before first digging deep into the process that preceded those behaviors I am indeed studying – convergence towards cooperation, convergence towards violence, divergence and confusion.

After recognizing the behaviors to study, the next logical step was to code them for their type. First of all, I focused on cases where Sinn Féin was doing something. When its leaders, mainly Adams, were speaking and supporting armed struggle as a valid strategy, the cases were coded as convergence towards violence. There were three clear cases of that. The first was during Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in 1983, when the organization voted to elect Adams as its president. In his presidential address, he devoted a significant part of his speech to supporting the armed struggle and continuing the resistance to British rule in Northern Ireland. The second case was in October 1984, following an attack on the Conservative Party's annual convention in Brighton. It

⁴¹ The choice of four months, rather than a longer or a shorter period is based on the understanding that organizational decisions take time to reach, communicate and execute, especially in clandestine organizations. As such, a shorter period of time might miss key events in the chronology that are directly connected to the examined behavior in the case. A longer period on the other hand might lead to the inclusion in the analysis of factors that are in fact unconnected to the examined behavior.

⁴² Even the 'expected' behaviors where the Provisional IRA was violent and Sinn Féin was cooperative were marked down regardless of whether or not there were corresponding behaviors of the other wing at the same time.

was coded as a case of convergence towards violence when Adams and other Sinn Féin members did not condone the attack but instead justified the violence and the Provisional IRA's actions. The next and last case came at the end of 1988 when Sinn Féin decided to break off talks with the SDLP due to the SDLP's refusal to support armed struggle. Sinn Féin chose armed struggle at this point over dialogue.

The rest of the Sinn Féin behaviors were easily coded as cooperative. But before a case could be coded as either convergence towards cooperation or divergence, I had to examine the Provisional IRA behavior at and around that time. When the Provisional IRA was choosing clear violence, cases were coded as divergent. When the Provisional IRA chose to either announce a ceasefire or send out a signal of cooperation, it was coded as convergent towards cooperation. Ten cases of convergence towards cooperation and eight divergent cases were thus coded. Lastly were cases of confusion. I looked into periods where the Provisional IRA itself was sending both messages of cooperation while acting in violence. I determined those to be cases of confusion and not out-right divergence as it was the Provisional IRA which was acting in both ways, not the Sinn Féin, though the Sinn Féin behavior at that time was cooperative. Three clear and consecutive cases of confusion were found.

Table 4.1 below presents the details for each of the identified cases:

Table 4.1: Details of Behavior

Time	Behavior	Details of behavior	Type of case	Period examined
13 November - 17 December 1983	Adams calls for disciplined IRA violence, IRA kidnaps Tidey and bombs Harrods	In his Presidential address to SF AF Adams justifies armed struggle as necessary and morally correct. The IRA kidnaps American supermarket executive Don Tidey from Dublin and kills 8 at an attack on Harrods store in London	Convergent Violent	July 1983 - December 1983
12 October 1984	Brighton Bombing	IRA tried (and failed) to kill Thatcher by placing a bomb in the hotel where she (and the rest of her party) were staying. They killed 5 and demolished the hotel. SF does not condone the attempt. Quite the contrary.	Convergent Violent	June 1984 - October 1984
February 1st 1985	IRA offers Hume to meet	The meeting between Hume and representatives of the IRA was held on February 23rd but was very short lived, when Hume refused to the IRA request to video tape the meeting.	Convergent Cooperation	12 October 1984 - February 1st 85

Time	Behavior	Details of behavior	Type of case	Period examined
September - November 1986	Dropping abstention in the South	A special GAC votes in September to drop abstentionism. The price for such agreement was to field positions at the AC with hard liners to make sure the armed struggle is not dropped. A former vote in February failed SF AF votes similarly in November.	Convergent Cooperation	June 1986 - November 1986
April - May 1987	Funerals are demilitarized and SF publishes its scenario for peace	McGuinness convinces the AC to demilitarize funerals and take other measures of cooperation. The IRA continues with attacks, but tries to be more selective and careful in its behavior.	Convergent Cooperation	January-April 1987
December 1987 - January 1988	SF begins talks with SDLP while AC launches Tet Offensive	negotiations. Important: after Enniskillen Adams criticized the IRA. In November 87, IRA also launches a violent period using the Libyan arms that were not caught. It goes quite poorly for them.	Divergent	August - December 1987
May 1988	AC gives up its demand for a quick British Withdrawal	McGuinness in a speech in Bodestown's commemoration admits IRA cannot drive the British out immediately.	Convergent Cooperation	January- May 1988
September 1988	SF ends the talk with SDLP due to disagreements regarding the necessary use of force	SF ends the talks with the SDLP despite agreeing on what is needed, they failed to agree on how to get it. SF still supports the IRA over negotiating at any price.	Convergent Violent	June - September 1988
March 1989	IRA and Adams issue conflicting statements on the same day regarding the killing of 2 civilians in Coagh, Co. Tyrone.	Adams speech leads to suspicions regarding a split in the movement. In his speech Adams announces that he is seeking a "non-armed political movement to work for self-determination". The IRA admitted the two were killed by mistake, but refused to apologize.	Divergent	November 1988 - March 1989
November 1989	Sinn Fein re-launches its 'scenario for peace' while the IRA continues its violent campaign	SF re-launches its 'scenario for peace' document from May 1987 in which it calls for British withdrawal before peace can happen. At the same time, the IRA continues its violent campaign	Divergent	July - November 1989
February - march 1990	IRA states it is prepared to start talks and McGuinness gives an interview supporting it	In its statement, the IRA said that a cease-fire was not immediately on the agenda, but could be implemented 'within hours'. McGuinness then says explicitly that 'we are prepared to be part of a peace process'	Convergent Cooperation	Nov 17th 1989 - March 4th 1990
December 1990	IRA announces a Christmas ceasefire	On Dec 23rd the IRA announced a 3 day ceasefire, for the first time in 15 years. It is significant also due to the meaning of the term 'cease-fire' for the org and shows a change in thinking.	Convergent Cooperation	August - December 1990
January - February 1992	SF publishes Towards a Lasting Peace while the IRA continues bombing (Teebane massacre)	While the IRA is in the midst of a violent campaign, SF comes out with its 'towards a lasting peace statement'.	Divergent	September 1991- February 1992
June 1992	SF hints at a need to move away from the armed struggle while IRA is still bombing	Gibney's speech at the annual commemoration at Bodestown shows a great shift in thinking amongst SF but not necessarily within the movement as a whole.	Divergent	March-June 1992
December 1992	Adams uses the media to have a conversation with Mayhew while the IRA is bombing everything possible	Mayhew gave a famous speech in which he said SF could potentially be included in talks, and Adams gives a speech in reply that answers Mayhew with clear terms. Meanwhile, the IRA continues its bomb campaign.	Divergent	August - December 1992
April - May 1993	IRA gives Britain pointers for negotiation while continuing its bomb campaign	Britain sends the IRA its pointers in March, while it continues its bombing campaign, the IRA nonetheless replies to Britain with 11 points of its own. Meanwhile the secret Adams-Hume talks are published and a joint statement is given.	Confused IRA	January 10th - May 10th 1993
October 1993	IRA announces it 'welcomes the Hume-Adams initiative but remains violent	Once the Adams-Hume initiative was published, the IRA endorsed it publically. Nonetheless, it continues its violent campaign, as with the Shankill bomb which led to a public relation disaster. Meanwhile, Adams continues talks w/ UK and Hume	Confused IRA	June 1993 - October 1993
February - March 1994	AC agrees to consider a cease fire and enters negotiations with Reynolds but continues bombing (Heathrow). then IRA announces a 3 cease-fire for Easter	The IRA agrees to consider a cease-fire but is still violent and seems to be sending mixed signals. On March 31st it agrees to a 3-day ceasefire for Easter.	Confused IRA	November 1993 - March 1994

Time	Behavior	Details of behavior	Type of case	Period examined
August 1994	IRA announces a ceasefire with no time limitation	On August 31st 1994 the IRA announces its cease-fire	Convergent Cooperation	May - August 1994
December 1994	IRA reviews the cease-fire and decides against resumption of violence	When it is time to decide whether to sustain the cease-fire or not, the organization decides to keep the peace for now, despite and even because of some loyalist attacks.	Convergent Cooperation	Sep - Dec 1994
January - February 1996	SF supports the Twin track solution and the Mitchell commission, but Army Council announces the end of the cease-fire	Based on its support of the Mitchell principles for decommissioning parallel to talks, SF begins a round of talks with both the Irish and the British governments. At the same time, the IRA announcement blamed Major and the British gov in the failure of the talks. An hour after the announcement the first bomb in London went off and the cease-fire was over.	Divergent	Oct 1995 - Feb 9 1996
October 1996	IRA attacks in NI for the first time since August 1994 while Adams preaches for peace and dialogue	IRA continues its violent attacks, and is quite verbose at the time justifying its violence by Britain's lack of cooperation. At the same time, SF is trying hard to be included despite it all and to send out a peaceful message. Adams says nothing to justify armed struggle.	Divergent	June - October 1996
July 1997	AC votes to resume cease-fire and to accept Irish and British terms for negotiations	After a short period of relative quiet and continued calls for another cease-fire, the IRA finally agrees to cooperate in order to allow SF to get a seat at the negotiation table. The open arms with which the cease-fire is accepted this time allows the process to move forward quite rapidly afterwards, and by October SF signs the Mitchell Principles and the GAC votes in favor.	Convergent Cooperation	April - July 1997
April - May 1998	SF signs GFA and drops abstention in the North	On April 10th 1998 SF signs the Good Friday Agreement. A month later the party votes to drop abstention in the North. IRA does not agree to decommission quite yet, but keeps its cease-fire going.	Convergent Cooperation	January - May 1998

Table 4.2 below presents the identified cases by type.

Table 4.2: Cases by Type

Case Type	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10
convergent cooperation	February 1985	September 1986	April-May 1987	May 1988	February-March 1990	December 1990	August 1994	December 1994	July 1997	April 1998
convergent violence	November-December 1983	October 1984	september 1988							
divergent - SF cooperation, IRA violent	December 1987-January 1988	March 1989	November 1989	January-February 1992	June 1992	December 1992	January-February 1996	October 1996		
confused (split) IRA	May-April 1993	October 1993	February-March 1994							

Patterns

Some patterns are immediately visible from the table. These patterns suggest that a deeper look into the conflict process is needed if one is to try and reach some conclusions about the meaning of these patterns, in this specific conflict transformation process, but also to learn which of them are particular to the movement and which of them might be applicable to other

conflicts. First of all, there are far more cases of convergence towards cooperation (10) and cases of divergence (8) than there are cases in which there was convergence towards violence (3) and in which the armed wing was acting confused (3).⁴³ The fact that over time there are so many more cases in which the armed wing is in fact acting in convergence with the political wing and not necessarily using violence is not a trivial point to make. The image of the Provisional IRA is one of a terrorist organization, of a violent movement that targets civilians to achieve its cause. But what we learn from looking at the table above is that the story is not that simple. The provisional IRA was not only violent, just like Sinn Féin did not always cooperate. Even more so, the Provisional IRA made more moves towards cooperation than it did towards violence.

It should be emphasized here, that indeed cases in which the armed wing acted violently and there was no observed behavior by the political wing were not included in the analysis. This means that I am certainly not claiming that the Provisional IRA was more cooperative than violent overall. This is merely to stress the point that when looking at the organization as a whole, there were more instances in which the Provisional IRA was willing to ‘toe the line’ of Sinn Féin, and even more likely, decided that the ‘preferred’ organizational behavior will be more cooperative rather than violent, than cases in which as an organization, violence was the ‘preferred’ organizational behavior.

For example, already in February 1985, the Provisional IRA (and not the Sinn Féin) approached John Hume requesting a meeting.⁴⁴ This was quite a signal from the armed wing.

⁴³ There were more cases of convergence towards violence in the period that came before Adams’ presidency. As will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, the fact that most actions in the studied period are more towards the cooperation end of the spectrum can teach us about Adams’ leadership and power within the movement. Once in power, he manages to steer the organization away from violence, in a long and arduous process. As for confused cases, there were more of those after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement but since the organization changed in many ways in that time, and Adams role within it changed as well, they are beyond the scope of the dissertation.

⁴⁴ Hume agreed and the meeting indeed took place, but was very short, as the PIRA insisted on video-taping the meeting, and Hume refused (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

John Hume was a known pacifist and supporter of peace and dialogue. He was also the leader of the SDLP, a political party that competed with Sinn Féin for the support of the Catholic-nationalist community. Furthermore, Hume had the ears and the respect of both the British and the Irish governments and was even respected by Unionist leaders.⁴⁵ The fact that the Provisional IRA is reaching out to him is a big deal. The armed wing is not only signaling it is willing to enter into dialogue by inviting Hume for a meeting, it is also showing it is not blind to the political context. The movement knows Hume is currently the most (if not the only) sympathetic political figure that will be willing to listen to them, and it knows talking to him helps their public image, especially given the nearing local elections.⁴⁶ To be fair, they were not completely innocent in their approach to him, as the meeting did end due to their insistence on video-taping it. Nevertheless, the fact that they do reach out to a political figure is something worth noting.

Almost two years later, in October 1986, the General Army Convention (GAC) of the Provisionals voted on dropping abstention in the Republic of Ireland. The meaning of such a vote was that the Republican Movement relinquished a long-held view and one of the key tenants of Republicanism: Abstentionism “was the defining characteristic of Irish Republicanism and it was written in legal stone in the constitutions of both IRA and Sinn Féin” (Moloney, 2002, p. 56). The government in the Republic of Ireland, the Dáil, was seen as a partitionist body (a result of the 1921 partition of the island) and as such illegitimate in the eyes of the Republican Movement. The IRA constitution determines that anyone taking a seat in a partitionist body would be automatically dismissed or expelled from the Movement. Former Republican leaders

⁴⁵ And he was indeed criticized heavily for agreeing to meet with the armed wing of the Republican Movement. His continued willingness to jeopardize his own name which only grew stronger over the years only goes to show how committed he was to promoting peace (CAIN, Ongoing).

⁴⁶ In which Sinn Féin won 59 seats (Elliott & Flackes, 1999)

had tried to promote the dropping of abstention in the past but failed. The last attempt led to the split of the Republican Movement and to the birth of the Provisionals in 1969 (O'Brien, 1999).

As such, this is yet another major decision by the organization, but most importantly, by its armed wing and it signals its willingness to cooperate with the system. By dropping abstention, Sinn Féin will be able to not only run for elections in the South (the Republic of Ireland) but to also actively participate in its governing bodies. Up until now, even when Sinn Féin members were elected, they chose to 'abstain' from taking their seats.⁴⁷ Participating in elections and actually taking seats was perceived as a cardinal sin (O'Brien, 1999). By agreeing to take their seats, they are in essence accepting the legitimacy of the institutions and committing what was perceived in the past as such a grave evil. The fact that the leadership, Adams specifically, is willing to take the risk of split once again, has a lot to tell us about his leadership character, but also about organizational dynamics and about the distance the movement has travelled since the beginning of this round of conflict.

Together, the two examples begin to paint a complex picture in which factors from various levels of analysis come together in leading to the adoption of one organizational behavior over another. However, the way in which these factors in fact come together is still a question that needs to be addressed, which is the point of this research.

A second pattern that emerges from the table above is that in a third of the cases studied (8 cases out of 24), the Republican movement could not, or would not, overcome internal struggles and as a result was sending mixed signals.⁴⁸ However, unlike other actors in this

⁴⁷ As they will continue to do in the other two governing bodies they can participate in – Stormont in Northern Ireland and Westminster in London.

⁴⁸ The Republican Movement was certainly not the only one in the conflict sending mixed signals. The British government, the Irish government and at a later stage the Unionist groups as well were all sending mixed signals.

conflict, when it comes to the Republican Movement this pattern by which the two wings of the organization often diverge is related to one of the most central goals of organizations – survival (Crenshaw, 1987). However, whether it is driven by the movement itself, or by any of its wings separately is unclear and calls for further examination.

Divergent behavior can be about genuine disagreement within the organization. Such disagreements can lead to a pseudo-split where each wing is trying to promote its own interests, without necessarily considering the benefit of their actions for the movement as a whole. These cases might be thought of as ‘preference divergence’ (Shapiro, 2013). The preference divergence in and of itself may suggest a loss of control over the organization which results in unsanctioned actions of lower ranking units in defiance of a policy they disagree with.

Once there is preference divergence, the first question we must ask is whether the leadership is aware of it or not. If it is not, then there is no surprise diverging behavior happened. The leadership is out of tune with its own organization and is failing in ‘leading’. The diverging behavior, that in cases of DWROs involves violence, is a wake-up call for the leadership and for the organization as a whole. It provides ‘an occasion for decision’ (Hermann, 2001) that if not dealt with properly, could lead to an organizational split. Will the organization try to overcome its internal disagreement, regain its unity of message and try to repair its image or will it take advantage of the new situation that has been created by its behavior to gain more leverage in the conflict process?

If the leadership was well aware of preference divergence prior to the behavior, then one must ask what stands behind a decision to send mixed signals. In such cases, divergence is in fact a tactical move, and does not necessarily suggest an organizational weakness. As was discussed in the previous chapter, when the two wings of the organization diverge in strategy and tactics,

they cater to the different goals and audiences the movement actually has. It is the movement's way of showing it is still in the game, it should still be taken seriously and be given a chance, even if nothing has been settled yet. In several cases the organization had to portray diverging behaviors in order to remain relevant. Being too cooperative may cost it its hardline supporters whereas being too violent might persuade its adversaries (or partners in the peace process) that the organization is indeed nothing more than a reprehensible terrorist organization.

In this sense, the diverging behavior can be thought of as 'mediated reinforcement'.⁴⁹ In these cases the leader plays the most important role, mediating between the organization and the context as the chief negotiator in a two level game (Putnam, 1988).

One notable example of divergent behavior is in January-February 1996. At this point in time, Sinn Féin decided to support the 'Twin-Track Solution' and the Mitchell report.⁵⁰ As a result, it was invited to all-party talks. However, not two weeks later, the Provisional IRA announced the end of its ceasefire, blaming the British Prime Minister John Major for the failure of the negotiation progress. It immediately began a new bombing campaign in London (Brams & Togman, 1998). The end of the ceasefire also led to the ending of contacts with the Sinn Féin. Is this case one of preference divergence that got out of control or of mediated reinforcement to allow the leadership to gain leverage in the negotiations process? It is only by looking at the factors from the three levels of analysis and the interaction between them over time that one can

⁴⁹ Meaning that the divergence in tactics is in fact planned and orchestrated by the leadership. The two wings strengthen the survival chances of the organization as a whole by acting in what may seem a contradictory manner.

⁵⁰ George Mitchell was US President Clinton's 'peace envoy' to the conflict (his official role was 'special economic advisor on Ireland'). The point of the Twin-Track was to hold all-party preparatory talks alongside an independent international commission that would deal with decommissioning (CAIN, Ongoing). Before the first meeting under the 'twin-track' was held on January 29th, Mitchell produced his report on decommissioning which stipulated six conditions the parties have to agree to in order to enter negotiations (Mitchell, January 24th 1996). The most important point of the report was that it determined that decommissioning should take place alongside negotiations and not before as the British government has been insisting until that moment.

understand the true motivation behind this case of diverging behavior, as needs to be done with all other cases.

A third noteworthy pattern that emerges from looking at the table is that the three cases in which the Provisional IRA were confused are consecutive. We are looking at a period of 13 months in which the armed wing was unsure of what would be the best strategy to pursue, and this period comes after a year in which the Republican Movement was very clearly divergent, with Sinn Féin making efforts to be included and the Provisional IRA being violent.⁵¹

In January 1991, following yet another cooperative step from the Provisional IRA with the first Christmas ceasefire in over 15 years, the armed wing begins a campaign of excessive violence. All throughout 1991 the Provisional IRA carries out numerous attacks, while Sinn Féin remains silent. Throughout 1992, the violent campaign of the Provisionals continues while Sinn Féin becomes more active. It launches its manifesto 'Towards a Lasting Peace',⁵² it gives thick hints about the need to move away from the armed struggle and it begins an indirect conversation with the British government through the media. But the Provisionals continue with their bombing campaign. In 1993 however, a change in the conflict dynamics can be detected when the armed wing itself begins to simultaneously send cooperative signals while being violent.

For over a year the armed wing can be described as nothing else but 'confused'. The Provisional IRA at this time is maintaining contact with the British government, sending it

⁵¹ It should also be mentioned that during 1991 no 'case' was found for the organization. The military wing was carrying on with its violent campaign, while the political wing was silent, neither supporting nor condemning violence.

⁵² Towards a Lasting Peace was presented to the 1992 Sinn Féin Ard Fheis. It aimed to "inform the debate within the party and the wider public debate about how best to develop a strategy for peace in Ireland" (Sinn Fein Ard Chomhairle, 1992). In his presidential address, presenting the policy paper Adams said that it "is one of the most important documents Sinn Fein will debate at this, or any other, Ard Fheis. In it we declare Sinn Fein's overwhelming desire for peace" (Adams, February 17th 1992).

pointers for discussions and showing a willingness to commit to a short ceasefire to enable dialogue. It even suspends violence for a short period (without calling it a ceasefire) and announces its support for the Adams-Hume initiative.⁵³ All throughout, bombs go off everywhere. In March 1994, the organization announces it is committed to peace and it is willing to enter negotiations with the Irish Government, and yet, the bombing still continues, and the organization attacks the London Heathrow airport (CAIN, Ongoing).

Such confused behavior raises many questions. If the armed wing is unwilling to relinquish violence, why does it insist it is committed to peace? If it sees the Irish government as a partitionist body that lacks legitimacy, why is it willing to enter into negotiations with it? But most importantly, why does it continue with the violence alongside these cooperative measures all throughout this period? As with the previous examples, these behaviors can in fact be explained by looking into the various levels of analysis, as will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. What is worth mentioning nonetheless regarding this confused behavior are two things: first of all, the Republican movement (or even just its military wing) was certainly not the only actor in the conflict that was sending mixed signals. Secondly, history played a very important role in determining the choice of tactics during this period. The armed wing was afraid of making too big of a commitment or take too big of a step forward based on past experience and their skepticism towards the British and their intentions.⁵⁴


⁵³ During this period, the secret talks between Adams and John Hume are exposed and as a result the two come out with a joint statement. In their statement they announce their engagement in “a political dialogue aimed at investigating the possibility of developing an overall political strategy to establish justice and peace in Ireland” (Hume & Adams, April 24th 1993). They also announce that both of their parties have been informed of the talks and have given their approval for them.

⁵⁴ The organization remembers past rounds of negotiations with the British government where it was willing to make concessions only to be left hanging, usually ending the ceasefire worse off than it entered it. A ‘scarring’ moment in organizational memory is the last time it announced a ceasefire in order to enter into talks with the British Government in 1975. Not only did that ceasefire not lead to peace, but it severely jeopardized the survivability of the

Following these 13 months of confusion, of violence that is peppered with cooperation, whether it is by being in contact with the British government or whether it is by supporting Gerry Adams' and his talks with SDLP's John Hume, we have a case of convergence towards cooperation. And not just cooperation, but the ultimate announcement of a ceasefire which was seen by the Republican Movement as the utmost signal of willingness to cooperate and compromise. However, even that ceasefire was not the end of the story, and it too collapsed, leading to yet another case of divergence between the two wings of the organization. Which brings us to the fourth and last notable point about the process by which the Republican movement moved from violence to cooperation. It was far from linear. The following figure portrays the non-linearity of the process.

Republican movement, allowing the British Government to gather important information on operatives, infiltrating the organization but most importantly, leading to harsh internal divisions within the movement.

Figure 4.2: Contention and Cooperation over time



Step 2: Building a Chronology and collecting more data

Once the potential cases were selected, I proceeded to gather information on the factors representing the levels-of-analysis. For each case, a period of one year was initially examined. For the duration of that year, I re-created a chronology of events and actions by the various

relevant actors in the conflict.⁵⁵ The decision to look into the process for a year before each case was taken with the understanding that conflicts are slow in progressing and that reaction to changing circumstances might not be swift. From the realization that a change needs to be made, to the planning and the implementation of it, a year can pass.

However, I quickly learned that during one year there would be more than one case, which meant that the examination of factors would overlap between cases and complicate my ability to make any inferences regarding the value of either the factors or the levels studied. Thus, a period of four months was decided upon as the appropriate period to look into for each case. When two observations were less than four months apart, the later one was included in the analysis for the dissertation, with reference to the previous one as part of the process itself.⁵⁶

Several sources of different types were used to construct the chronology. These were divided into secondary and primary sources. Beginning with the secondary sources, four main categories of sources can be discussed. First, books that were published on the conflict by known journalists who were actively reporting on the conflict in time. These journalists, such as Ed Moloney (2002) or Tim Pat Coogan (1995) spent the years of the Troubles working for one of the newspapers in Northern Ireland,⁵⁷ have met with the different people relevant to the conflict and have provided their point of view on matters taking place as they were happening. At a later stage of their career, they also authored books based on their experiences.

⁵⁵ Only those that were mentioned by at least two of the sources I used to build the chronology, or that were corroborated by additional sources beyond the main chronologies, if needed.

⁵⁶ There were four cases that were dropped based on this decision (from 28 to 24).

⁵⁷ Moloney worked for The Irish Times and the Sunday Tribune during the Troubles and continued to publish several books. Coogan was the editor of the Irish Press during the early years of the Troubles and later wrote several books and biographies related to the conflict.

Secondly, I have used books and manuscripts authored by those who took part in the conflict or in its process of transformation. Several books authored by former IRA operatives were used, such as former IRA chief of Staff Sean MacStiofain (1979) despite what can be described gently as their biased views. These books were used not as absolute truths, but in order to learn more about events that took place and were significant enough to merit mentioning. Only events that were mentioned in more than one source were added to the time line. When it comes to the specific views of the authors on different events that took place, I note specifically that it is according to the author that something was said to have a specific effect or result.

Under this rubric I also add books that were authored by the different leaders who are relevant to the conflict. Several autobiographies of Gerry Adams (1986), (1988) (1994) and of John Hume (1997), (1996) were surveyed, as well as some of their biographies (Kenna, 1990). I also used George Mitchell's book on the transformation process (Mitchell, 2000).

A third category of sources that was used is specific chronologies that were constructed by authors studying the Northern Ireland Conflict (Elliott & Flackes, 1999), (Sutton, 1994), (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). Those chronologies were used to ascertain specific dates that were unknown or not corroborated before, to serve as an external validity mechanism to what was reported by others, especially when those others took part in the conflict and were not mere bystanders. Not everything that was mentioned in the different chronologies was used, as not everything was relevant. Specifically, information that did not pertain to the three levels of analysis and to the different factors of the levels, did not find its way into the research.⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Such as when the Irish Taoiseach went to the United States to celebrate Saint Patrick's Day in March 1986, or when Bob Cooper was appointed as the head of the new Fair Employment Commission in April 1989, to name just a few (CAIN, Ongoing).

A fourth category of sources that was used are articles that were written on the conflict, by different scholars, journalists and academics. These articles merit a separate category here only because they usually seem to have a very specific point to make that is not necessarily one that can be found in books. Whether it is the specific story of IRA funding by Horgan and Taylor (1999, 2003) or whether it is the more general point of what differentiates terrorists from warlords of Mair (2003), these articles too provided valuable information to the understanding of the process of conflict transformation.

The next sources are of the primary kind and were mostly collected during field work in Northern Ireland in 2014 and 2016. These sources can be divided into four broad categories. First, I collected numerous newspaper articles pertaining to the conflict. The newspapers I surveyed were: Irish News and the Belfast Telegraph from Belfast, The Sunday Independent, Irish Times, Evening Herald and Irish Independent from Ireland and Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, Sunday Times, The Independent and Evening Standard from London. I made sure to survey newspapers from mainland United Kingdom, from Northern Ireland and from the Republic of Ireland as they project different views and speak to different audiences. The various newspaper thus helped paint a picture that is less biased and includes the various dispositions.

I also looked into An Phoblacht which is the Republican Movement's own newspaper. I began by looking only for those specific articles on specific dates when I already knew something important took place based on the previous surveying of the conflict through the other sources used. I then collected additional reports and articles in those newspapers I was already looking into. These sources include not only reports by journalists but also announcements by the different groups and leaders related to the conflict. Newspapers also helped in gathering speeches and interviews of leaders. For each four months' period looked into for a case, I used

lexis-nexis to search all newspaper articles in the above mentioned newspapers that mention either IRA or Sinn Féin. I scanned between 1,000 and 1,500 newspaper articles for each case, refining the search to Adams.

Speeches and interviews were also collected mainly during field work. I collected 177 interviews and speeches from the Linen Hall Library in Belfast of all leaders related to the conflict. To what I have found at Linen Hall I added interviews and speeches I found online, on C-SPAN, on Youtube, on CAIN, on the British Government website and in the newspapers. These speeches and interviews were another way of gathering information about the specific cases, and the way the various leaders were viewing the context at particular moments in time.

Third, Sinn Féin party platforms and publications were used to strengthen the analysis and to better understand the processes that were taking place within the organization. Several of these publications such as 'Loyalism' (1984) or 'Economic Resistance' (1984) delineate clearly party goals, while others such as 'setting the record straight' (1994) include correspondences with the British Government from which I was able to gauge the party's positions at various points in time. Others were official publications related to the conflict such as 'a Scenario for Peace' (1987) and 'Towards a Lasting Peace' (1992). Internal official documents of the Provisional IRA such as the Green Book were also studied. From these official and more secret internal documents I could learn about particular policy and goal changes. Furthermore, looking into the broader map of the conflict, these, together with the other data pointed at specific moments in time when the movement was not acting unanimously, or when rifts between the different leaders were opening, as well as how it was truly affected by the context.

Fourth are personal conversations I held with several SDLP leaders during the conflict and people who were involved in the peace process such as Father Garry Donegan and Sean Paul

O'boyle from Mediation Northern Ireland, Eilish Rooney from Ulster University and Christine Bell from the University of Edinburgh. I was interested in peeling away additional layers of information and secrecy to better understand the process that took place, and to gauge whether my understanding of the conflict and the processes underlying it is correct.⁵⁹

CAIN – Conflict Archive on the Internet - deserves a special category. The website collects information from many sources regarding the particularities of the conflict. Most importantly, it has its own chronology but also primary documents and analyses. I used the information from the website for corroborating information found in other sources, for finding official reports, statements, agreements and almost anything I needed but could not find somewhere else, except for some internal IRA documents.

All these various sources served for my chronology building, especially with regard to the context. For the four months examined for each case, I marked down factors from the context, the organization and the leadership levels that were directly connected to the conflict. Particularly, based on the literature, on the specific nature of the conflict and the identity of its various actors, the context included eight factors and the organizational level included two factors (one for the behavior of each wing). As for leadership, I marked instances when leaders gave speeches and interviews and when changes in leadership took place.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Most of these conversations, as well as meetings I have held with police officers in Belfast, were extremely helpful for my understanding of the conflict, but also off the record.

⁶⁰ Context: British Government, military and security forces actions – all coded as one factor, as there were not enough particular actions by any of the actors to allow for significant analysis. In any case, from the point of view of the Republican Movement, all of these actors are part of a single entity – the British government; agreements; Unionist actions – since the focus is on the Republican Movement, all unionist and loyalist groups, whether political or paramilitary were collated under one factor; elections; Irish Republic actions; Promoters of peace; Spoilers; intermediaries. At the organizational level, I looked into PIRA actions and decisions and into Sinn Féin actions and decisions. The leadership level was difficult to separate from Sinn Féin as I looked mainly into Adams' speeches and interviews, but as mentioned, I also included cases where leadership changed (there were not many).

Information regarding internal dynamics is more difficult to find and corroborate. As such, factors related to organizational dynamics such as changes in stated goals or in decision making procedures and leadership apparatuses, though definitely meaningful for the process, were kept out of the analysis of the process itself, unless they were reported by the group itself in a public statement. They are discussed in more details in the particular cases analyzed in the empirical chapters. When information regarding such internal dynamics was reported by the group itself, it is included in the analysis table under the relevant wing, or it is in fact the behavior studied in the case itself. For example, when the PIRA decides to demilitarize funerals it is announced by Martin McGuinness in a speech and that organizational decision is the case to be studied – prompted by the question of what leads to such a decision. Nevertheless, the Provisional IRA also did several things during the four months leading up to that decision that are also meaningful for the development of the conflict dynamic at that time and the push towards the demilitarization of funerals.

Methodology

In order to understand the process of analysis, one must first discuss methodology. I use content analysis, and mainly through process tracing. According to George and Bennett (2005) process tracing can be used to assess which of the independent variables identified can or cannot be ruled out. Process tracing can also shed light on important variables that may have been left out in the initial comparison of the cases (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 113-115).

Process tracing differs from a pure narrative in three ways: It is focused, dealing selectively with only certain aspects of a phenomenon; it is structured as the researcher is developing an analytical explanation based on a theoretical framework identified in the research design; and its ultimate goal is to provide a narrative explanation of a causal path that leads to a

specific outcome (Vennesson, 2008). Process tracing can only work if one has a sufficiently accurate and reliable data, forcing the researcher to acquaint with various methods of investigation techniques as well as find sufficient time and resources for the collection and treatment of the data (Vennesson, 2008). Checkel refers to the issue of data collection and explains that it should be conducted in several stages. Such a way of collecting data informs the researcher what data are still missing, how the data collection process should change and most importantly, when enough data have been collected to enable the construction of a plausible argument (Checkel, 2008).

Good process tracing is grounded in a philosophical base that is methodologically plural. It uses pluralism both to reconstruct and to not lose sight of broader structural discursive ethical contexts, it develops and justifies a set of proxies and it takes equifinality (there are multiple ways to reach the same outcome) seriously (Checkel, 2008). Bennett and Elman (2007) suggest that explicit attention should be given to alternative explanations, that there should be sustained focus on the question of “what else must be true” and that there should be relentless empirical research, using a variety of sources, while considering the potential and motivated informational bias of each source.

Process Tracing is based on careful description that looks at “static” descriptions by “taking good snapshots at a series of specific moments”. They also pay attention to sequences of “independent, dependent, and intervening variables” (Collier, 2011, p. 824). Collier makes the point that the researcher should have “careful, analytically informed specification of hypotheses” for selecting and interpreting pieces of evidence but also in weighing those pieces of evidence against each other (Collier, 2011, p. 825). He suggests to start with a good timeline or a narrative that lists the sequence of events. Only after those, can the researcher explore the causal

hypotheses and consider the available evidence that may confirm or disconfirm such hypotheses (Collier, 2011).

Steps 3 – 5: Coding and detecting patterns

Once the chronology was there, it was time to look at the data for each case specifically. As a first step, I marked down every factor that was relevant in a case. This stage allowed me to examine which of the factors are relevant across the cases, and which are relevant in only a few, if at all. From this stage I learned for example that there were not enough British Military actions to mark independently or the significance of the British military's role in this conflict process will vanish. Based on that, I decided to collate all 'organs' of the British government, whether it is government decisions, Secretary of State to Northern Ireland speeches and actions, British Army actions or RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary) actions under the same rubric.

Understanding which of the factors is in fact relevant in the cases is a good start, but it is certainly not the end. I am interested after all in the way the different factors affect the behavior of the Republican Movement. Surely factors can sometimes have a positive influence and sometimes a negative one. As such, the next step was to code each of the factors for its actual effect. From the point of view of the Republican Movement, was a specific action or occurrence a positive thing, a negative thing or a neutral thing? I marked positive and negative signs along each of the factors that appeared for each case.

The positive and negative signs allowed me to examine whether factors are mostly positive or mostly negative (or mostly neutral), but it also allowed me to see whether the context as a whole for a case was mostly positive or mostly negative. What it did not allow me to see is how much one thing is negative or positive in comparison to another. Meaning, some actions by

the British government were seen as far more negative and challenging from the Republican Movement's point of view than others. Think of the difference between sending in more troops and beginning a massive campaign of arrests. For this reason, a deeper examination of the particularities of each case was needed.

Naturally, there is no point in coding the 'value' of factors that have to do with the organization itself. The organization's behaviors were noted only as present or absent. The significance for each case was examined for the period as a whole – was the organization acting in a consistent manner during the entire four months examined? Was it being exceptionally violent or cooperative? The organization's actions thus are part of the story to be analyzed for each particular case. By looking into the organization in a particular period we might get better insights into the decision it took at the end of it.

But before such a deep examination was done, patterns could still be detected from coding the relevance and from coding of positivity versus negativity. This was for example how I learned that agreements are not central (per se) to the process of conflict transformation or that more actors became more active (and more relevant to the Republican Movement's decision making) as the time line advanced. Several patterns were detected both from the coding of mere relevance and from the coding of value as is discussed in more details in the following chapters. However, I found that the patterns on their own still do not explain in full the differences between the cases, and between the choice of behavior, requiring further and deeper analysis.

Step 6: A closer look into cases and into levels

The final step in the analysis was a closer look into the data. Beyond the patterns that emerge, I was interested in learning whether I could find genuine similarities or significant

differences between the various cases, especially those that are part of the same type of behavior, that go beyond the dry existence of factors. This relates to the problem mentioned above, about the difficulty in discerning how negative a negative code is. Were there specific actions taken by the British or the Americans that meant a great deal more than others? And what was Adams' role in all of it? In order to answer such questions, a more thorough analysis of the cases was conducted, as I discuss in the following chapters.

In this chapter I reviewed the process of analysis and the various sources that were used in support of it. In the following two chapters, I present the empirical findings and discuss the factors, the levels and the cases in more details.

Chapter 5

Acting in Convergence - A Unified Message by a Unified Movement?

What were the result of the detailed analysis? In this chapter I focus on all the cases in which the Republican Movement acted in convergence, whether it was towards violence or cooperation. Can we detect any patterns in the context, the organization or the leadership that preempted the decision to act in convergence? Can we discuss any interactions between the various levels? I begin by exploring all the convergent towards violence cases and move on to discuss the more prevalent convergence towards cooperation cases. I end with discussing some overall patterns that can be found in both types of convergence cases.

Overall, I expect to find that a negative context will lead the movement to converge towards violence whereas a positive, or open, context, will lead the movement to converge around cooperation. I claim that organizational dynamics are affected by the context (and have an influence on it, of course). A wholly negative context, a closed opportunity structure, does not necessarily push the organization to do anything beyond acting in violence. A positive context however may threaten the organizational integrity, creating rifts between those who support violence and those who prefer more accommodative behaviors. Under such circumstances, it will come down to the leader to assess the context and the organizational preferences before either pulling it towards a particular behavior or standing behind a decision that has already been taken.

Brothers in Arms – converging around violence: Overall Patterns

Table 5.1 below presents the details of all cases of convergence towards violence:

Table 5.1: Convergence towards violence details

Time	13 November - 17 December 1983	12 October 1984	September 1988
Behavior	Adams calls for disciplined IRA violence, IRA kidnaps Tidey and bombs Harrods	Brighton Bombing	SF ends the talk with SDLP due to disagreements regarding the necessary use of force
Details of behavior	In his Presidential address to SF AF Adams justifies armed struggle as necessary and morally correct. The IRA kidnaps American supermarket executive Don Tidey from Dublin and kills 8 at an attack on Harrods store in London.	IRA tried (and failed) to kill Thatcher by placing a bomb in the hotel where she (and the rest of her party) were staying. They killed 5 and demolished the hotel. SF does not condone the attempt. Quite the contrary.	SF ends the talks with the SDLP despite agreeing on what is needed, they failed to agree on how to get it needed. SF still supports the IRA over negotiating at any price.
type of case	Convergent Violent #1	Convergent Violent #2	Convergent Violent #3
Period examined	July 1983 - December 1983	June 1984 - October 1984	June - September 1988
Context - British government, military and security forces	July 83 - death penalty is brought up for a vote but rejected; Sep 83 - 4 RUC stand for trial re shoot to kill policy; Dec 83 - the FEA finds Catholics to be under-represented in civil service	July 84 - The NIF report was officially rejected by Prior; Aug 84 - RUC attacks NORAID march in Belfast ('Belfast's Bloody Sunday'); Sep 84 - Hurd replaces Prior as Secretary of State for NI;	June 88 - police asks for simultaneous internment in NI and the Republic; July 88 - disciplinary proceedings against 20 RUC for shoot to kill; Aug 88 - SAS kills 3 IRA men
Context - agreement			
Context - Unionist		July 84 - the Organe order parade creates conflict; leaders reject the NIF report	
Context - Irish Republic	July 83 - Irish Foreign Minister tells Westminster that an increased SF vote undermines democracy	Sep 84 - intercepts a massive arms shipment	
Context - Elections	June 1983 - UK general elections - Adams wins a seat for SF in W. Belfast, SF wins 43% nationalist vote (which means 1 seat for Westminster, like SDLP);	June 84 - European Parliament elections - Paisley, Taylor and Hume are elected (Hume wins over Morrison)	
Context - intermediaries	Aug 83 - Livingstone compares the UK to Hitler	June 84 - Reagan visits the Republic of Ireland, stating that the US policy was not to interfere in NI, but supported the NIF; Oct 84 - EU parliament called BG to ban the use of plastic bullets	
Context - Promoters of peace			June 88 - Meets w/ SF; Aug 88 - Hume defends his talks w/ SF; Sep 88 - talks with Hume break down, even after Hume repeatedly defended them
Context - spoilers	Nov 83 - The Darkley Killings		Aug 88 - IPLO bomb in Belfast, RIRA's Omagh bombing
Org- PIRA	July 83 - Kills 4 UDR soldiers; Sep 83 - mass escape from Maze prison; Oct 83 - kills 2 RUC reservists; Nov 83 - Bombs Ulster University, killing 2	June 84 - IRA kills 2 UDR soldiers	June 88 - Lisburn Killings, shooting down a helicopter; July 88 - couple of huge bombs, two in Germany; Aug 88 - first bomb in Britain since Brighton, cont' bombings, Ballygawoley bombing - killing 8 soldiers
Org - SF	Nov 83 - O'Bradaigh quits, votes for Adams to become SF president	SF publishes its paper on Economic Resistance where it justifies the work of the IRA	June 88 - enters talks w/ SDLP; Aug 88 - McGuinness praises the IRA
Adams' actions	Nov 83 - Adams' presidential address supports violence	June 84 - pre-elections, Adams calls for less violence due to decreasing public tolerance (but not no violence at all)	Sep 88 - Adams justifies the armed struggle, stresses national self-determination and the push for a united Ireland.

The context level of analysis

At the first step of my analysis, I coded the above information in terms of relevance.

Which of the various contextual factors were relevant for the different cases? Table 5.2 below shows the relevance (presence or absence) of factors.

Table 5.2: Convergence towards Violence – contextual factors' relevance

Time	November - December 1983	12 October 1984	September 1988
type of case	Convergent Violent	Convergent Violent	Convergent Violent
Context - British government, military and security forces	√	√	√
Context - agreement			
Context - Unionist		√	
Context - Irish Republic	√	√	
Context - Elections	√	√	
Context - intermediaries	√	√	
Context - Promoters of peace			√
Context - spoilers	√		√

Already from looking at the process this way, we can see some patterns about relevance of contextual factors in Convergent violence cases. The British government and its various organs were relevant for all three cases and it is the only factor that was relevant in all three cases. Agreements on the other hand were relevant in none, and as will be discussed later, agreements were in fact the least relevant factor that was examined.⁶¹

⁶¹ A word of clarification about agreements. Agreements do matter quite a lot when it comes to organizational decision making. However, at the end of the day, when looking into a process, agreements are quite the rare event. Throughout the entire process, we can speak of four agreements that were signed between the two governments in the conflict, three within the period covered in this paper. Though they are certainly key events in the conflict, and are a part of the dynamic interaction between the different parties to it, on their own they cannot explain the movement's behavior. Agreements may have a strong effect on group behavior when they are about to be signed, but once they are a fact of life, they are more difficult to deal with. As such, if an agreement is in power for over 10 years I find that it is hard to claim it still has the same effect on decision making as it did when it was not signed yet. At least from the Republican Movement's point of view – if an agreement is in power, it does not change the context for the better or for worse when it is time to decide between violence and cooperation.

Both Unionists and promoters of peace were only relevant in one of the three cases, whereas the rest of the factors examined here were relevant in two of the three. However, it is not only a matter of factors being relevant in a time period, but the way they were relevant that might teach us more about the broader environment that led to each decision studied, and in this case, the decision to use violence. Table 5.3 below presents the way each of these factors was in fact relevant.

Table 5.3: Convergence towards violence - positive and negative contextual factors

Time	November - December 1983	12 October 1984	September 1988
type of case	Convergent Violent	Convergent Violent	Vonvergent Violent
Context - British government, military and security forces	(+)/(+)/(+)	(-)/(-)/(+)	(-)/(+)/(-)
Context - agreement			
Context - Unionist		(-)/(-)	
Context - Irish Republic	(-)	(-)	
Context - Elections	(+)	(-)	
Context - intermediaries	(+)	(+)/(+)	
Context - Promoters of peace			(+)/(+)
Context - spoilers	(-)		(-)/(-)

The British

First of all, we can see that the British government is not only the only factor that is relevant in all cases, but it is in fact relevant in more than one way in each of the cases, sometimes in a positive way and sometimes in a negative one. Overall, across the three cases, the British government was acting five times in a positive way and four times in a negative way. Three relevant actions in each case and slightly more positive than negative overall, if one was just to count actions, and not look into their meaning to the group.

One coding decision that deserves mention has to do with the appointment of a new secretary of state for Northern Ireland. I code Hurd's replacement of Prior as Secretary of State to Northern Ireland as a positive thing as from the Irish Republican movement's point of view, it

means that a new perspective, new blood is entering the equation. Prior was quite opposed to any sort of progress in the conflict that would sit well with the Movement. Having a new person in charge might mean that a new perspective will be adopted by the British Government. At this point in time, it is thus a positive change in the context.

What are some of the others ways in which the British government contributed to the context during these cases? In the first case of convergence towards violence, the British were actually behaving solely in a positive way from the point of view of the Republican Movement. First, they vote against the use of the death penalty, then they actually prosecuted four RUC officers for an alleged 'shoot-to-kill' policy and lastly, a government agency, the Fair Employment Agency admits that Catholics are underrepresented in the higher levels of civil-service (CAIN, Ongoing). All of these can be seen as positive developments from the Republican Movement's point of view. The fact that procedures were put in place to prosecute members of the security forces for their targeting of Catholic civilians means that somebody was in fact listening. Same goes for the FEA's findings. The rejection of the death penalty makes Provisional IRA members' lives, especially prisoners, a bit easier.

In the two other cases, the British were acting in a more negative than a positive way overall. In the second case, the British government officially rejected the New Ireland Forum's report that offered some sort of a federation of the two parts of the Island with joint authority options (CAIN, ongoing). This goes clearly against the Republican Movement's core aspiration of a united Ireland. Then RUC attacked a march in Belfast organized by NORAIID (The Irish Northern Aid Committee, an American organization) (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). Catholics in Belfast referred to the incident as 'Belfast's Bloody Sunday', connecting it to the British Army attack on a civil rights march in Derry in 1972 in which 14 civilians were killed (Coogan, 1995).

Clearly, it was perceived as a direct attack against the community in a similar way to Bloody Sunday and was negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. The last thing the British did was to replace James Prior with Douglas Hurd as I have already discussed above.

In the third case we find two negative actions and one positive yet again. First, the police federation called for interment on the entire island, north and south, which was an obvious negative act for the Republican Movement as its members were already being arrested and interrogated in high numbers. The British Special forces (SAS) also killed three Provisional IRA members. On the bright side, the British were showing that they were taking allegations of 'shoot to kill' seriously by announcing disciplinary proceedings against 20 RUC officers (CAIN, ongoing). All in all, except for the first case, the British were in fact sending mixed signals by acting in various positive and negative way. Nevertheless, British actions are mostly negative from the Republican Movement's point of view in these two cases. Being that the British were the largest and most important actor in this conflict, I did expect that if they are sending more negative than positive signals, it will push the Republican Movement towards violence. In two of these cases, this assumption holds.

Spoilers

Other patterns are clear as well. All actions by spoilers and by the Unionists in these three cases are coded as negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. When it comes to spoilers it should come as no surprise. Beyond the fact that any added violence to the conflict is negative, when it is done by other republican movements, it certainly does not help the Provisional Republican Movement to gain more popularity, either with the governments or with the people. Violence by other republican groups helps the government make a case against 'all republicans'. When it comes to the civilian population and public opinion, such violence by

spoilers jeopardizes the Catholic community, increasing its (rather legitimate) fear of retaliation and as a result, adds pressure on the Republican Movement to act, since it claims to represent the Catholic community and operate in its name. Having said that, since spoilers' actions will always be negative from the Movement's point of view, I do not expect them to have a strong effect on the behavior of the Republican Movement on their own. However, alongside other negative actions, they close down the context even more.

Unionists

The two Unionists actions, which took place at the same time, were both perhaps not completely negative, but they were negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. This is important to note as Unionist actions are not always negative necessarily. Some unionist actions in fact make the Republican Movement's life better, increase their voice options, or at the minimum, make them look like 'not the only extreme one in the neighborhood'. In this case however, they are nevertheless negative. The Orange Order, a unionist body, organized a demonstration to oppose the New Ireland Forum report. The Unionists obviously rejected the report, as it suggested more power to the Irish government in Northern affairs, and their demonstration led to violence, directed mainly at security forces (though one Catholic family was targeted as well) (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

Those were definite negative actions from the Republican Movement's point of view as its own community was being attacked and because the NIF was opposed to. Like with Spoilers, I expect Unionist actions to have a weak influence on Republican behavior, unless it raises the feeling of insecurity and threat significantly (Duffy, 2009). However, when it joins with an already negative context, it does make things worse for the Movement's voice options.

Irish Republic

What might be a bit more surprising is that both of the times in which the Irish Republic was relevant in the cases, it was relevant in a negative way from the Republican Movement's point of view. In the first case, Peter Barry, the Irish Foreign Minister, spoke at Westminster following the relative success of Sinn Féin in the elections and warned the British parliament. In his speech Barry claimed that the increased support for Sinn Féin, which won 43% of the nationalist vote in the North (and received as a result a seat in Westminster, for Gerry Adams), undermines democracy in the North (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). If we think of actions as either enabling or restricting the Republican Movement's opportunities to voice its contention, then this is a clear attempt to restrict it from using its voice. In the second case, the Irish security forces intercepted a shipment of arms meant for the Provisional IRA. Seven tons of arms were uncovered, the largest uncovering of arms in the Republic of Ireland since 1973 (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). If the Provisional IRA was planning to use these weapons, their ability to do so was severely reduced, which from their point of view, was quite negative.

I expect the Irish Republic actions to matter for the Republican Movement, more than several of the other contextual factors such as Unionist actions. Though the Republican Movement sees the government of the Irish Republic (the Dáil) as an illegitimate partitionist body and the parties in the Republic as 'sell-outs' who bowed in front of the British, the Dáil and the parties still represent the nationalist community of the South, a population the Republican Movement seeks the support of. When the Irish Republic acts contrary to the Republican Movement's interests, it hurts it more than when others do. And as we see, in two of the three cases of convergence towards violence, the Irish Republic indeed acted negatively.

Elections

What about elections? Relevant in two cases, once in a positive way and once in a negative way, elections played a role not only for the Republican Movement's decision making but for the decision making of the other actors in this conflict as well. The positive was already discussed – in the general elections to Westminster, Gerry Adams managed for the first time to overcome the SDLP candidate and win a seat in the British parliament. Sinn Féin in general fared quite well in the elections and managed to get almost half of the nationalist vote in the North, minimizing the gap between it and the SDLP.⁶² Succeeding in these elections won the movement and the IRA worldwide respectability – the movement “finally demonstrated that it could fight an armed struggle and win elections at the same time. Most importantly they could prove that they have a mandate” (O'Brien, 1999, p. 126). I noted above how some elements within the Irish government saw public support for Sinn Féin (damaging to democracy). And in fact, Sinn Féin's success played a part in pushing the Irish and British governments closer together during this period. Their increased contact culminated in the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

Elections were relevant in the second case as well, but in a negative way. Nevertheless, the negativity of these elections deserves some qualification. This time the elections were for the European Parliament. In these elections, the entirety of Northern Ireland was treated as a single region. Eight candidates from the North contested the elections, competing over three seats. Paisley, Hume and John Taylor of the UUP were the three elected MEP (members of European Parliament). Danny Morrison of the Sinn Féin did not get enough votes. Despite losing, Adams still referred to the election results as “steady progress with a useful injection of reality” (Adams,

⁶² This still meant that Sinn Féin won only 1 seat in the parliament, and one seat went to the SDLP. The remaining 15 seats for Northern Ireland in the Westminster parliament went to the Unionist parties (CAIN, Ongoing).

1984). The Republican newspaper chose to emphasize the positive aspects of the elections, such as increasing the Sinn Féin share of the vote in the Republic, and not on its failure. However, no matter how you spin it, Sinn Féin received only 4.88% of the vote in the Republic of Ireland, and only 13.34% of the vote in the North (An Phoblacht, June 21 1984).

Intermediaries and Promoters of Peace

Intermediaries are relevant in the first two cases but not in the third and only in a positive manner, whereas promoters of peace, namely John Hume, are relevant only in the last case and also in a positive way. The first intermediary action mentioned is when Ken Livingstone, a Labour party member who was the head of the Greater London Council at the time (the mayor of London) compared British actions in Northern Ireland to the Nazis (CAIN, Ongoing). Apart from his controversial saying, he also invited Adams to London on numerous occasions, providing him with a stage to voice the Republican Movement's point of view in official settings. By standing with the Republican Movement in its struggle against the British, Livingstone was definitely intervening in a manner that was seen as positive from the Republican Movement's point of view.⁶³ It is always nice to know that somebody is on your side, even if he does so in quite the eccentric manner.

In the second case, I coded two actions by intermediaries. First, US President Ronald Reagan, during a visit to the Republic of Ireland supported the New Ireland Forum Report. Second, the European Parliament called the British Government to ban the use of plastic bullets. Both actions are positive from the Republican movement's point of view. First of all, because it means they managed to grab the attention of the international community, which has potential

⁶³ The name might sound familiar as recently in 2016, Livingstone referred to Hitler once again, this time claiming he was a Zionist (Al-Othman, September 7th 2016).

leverage over British policy. But also as any support for the NIF is welcomed, even more so if it comes from the United States President. Any critique of the British government and the way it operates in Northern Ireland is also welcomed, as it brings attention to the Republican cause.

And what about John Hume? We do not hear from him during the first two cases. Silence is not necessarily a positive sign, but it is certainly not a negative one. In the third case he gets involved. Hume remains involved and relevant to the process almost consistently all throughout with a growing influence on the process as we proceed. However, for now, I focus on the fact that in June 1988 he begins a round of talks with Adams and a delegation of Sinn Féin members. In August 1988, when he is heavily criticized for having contact with the movement despite growing Provisional IRA violence, he defends his contacts with Adams (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). However, these two positive behaviors by Hume are cancelled out when eventually the talks break down. Despite agreeing on the right of the Irish people to self-determination, the two parties and their leaders could not agree about the manner in which self-determination would be achieved, with Adams supporting the armed struggle and Hume opposing it.

Context overall

All in all, except for the first case, in the two other cases, the context was in general more negative than positive, which might explain the movement's decision to act in violence. Six negative factors compared to three positive ones in the second case and four negative factors compared to three positive ones in the third case make the context more negative than positive. What is it about the first case that pushes the movement to act in violence despite the relatively positive context? It is only by looking into the other levels of analysis that we might get an answer. We must see what the two wings of the organizations and Adams are doing during these times and whether the organization and Adams change their behavior in relation to the context.

Organizational level of analysis

As we can see from table 5.1 above, both wings of the Republican Movement were active in the period leading up to all three cases. I see the need to emphasize it here, as it is not true for all cases. The organization was going over some changes in the period leading up to the first case. The electoral success of the hunger strikes the year before and the scars the deaths of 11 hunger strikers left on the public were catalysts for the movement's support in Adams over the old guard (Moloney, 2002).

Adams replaced Ruairi O Bradaigh, who was the president of Sinn Féin for 17 years. The movement was ready for a change, and with the electoral successes of the recent past, the time was ripe for a new leader to come to the fore. Not only was the movement made aware of the potential benefits in contesting elections, but it was also under duress, as in the months leading up to Adams' election, two members of the Army Council were arrested, forcing the movement to promote people into its hierarchical organizational setting (Horgan & Taylor, 1997).

It can be said that the organizational behavior supporting violence in the first case has to do with Adams personally. At this point in time, Adams was just elected by the movement to be its president. He needed to make sure he had a broad base of support and to do so he came out supporting violence. At this point in time, the context did not matter to him. He could not have pushed for a great policy change, promoting politics alongside armed struggle (if not above it) without making sure he would not lose the movement by doing so, as others before him had.

In the second case of convergence around violence, we see a rather quiet Provisional IRA. So quiet that several of its members begin to fear that the political agenda has taken over the armed struggle (Moloney, 2002). Amongst those was the Belfast Brigade, one of the

strongest units in the armed wing. The Belfast Brigade decided in 1983 to fight the political agenda with all its might. In this case, preference divergence within the organization also contributed to increased violence. Once violence took place, Sinn Féin had to make a decision. Given the rather negative context, the legitimacy of the target and the lack of public outcry against the attack, Sinn Féin decided to stand by its armed wing (Matesan & Berger, 2016).

But even without the Brighton bombing, Sinn Féin published during this period its paper on Economic Resistance where it justified the armed struggle. The document opens with: “the republican movement seeks to establish a 32 county democratic socialist republic. Its two largest constituents, the I.R.A. and Sinn Fein, strive to hasten the institution of such a republic where ‘all the children of the nation will be cherished equally’. Both the I.R.A. and Sinn Fein play different but convergent roles in the war of national liberation. The Irish Republican Army wages an armed campaign in the occupied six counties while its elements in the 26 counties play a supportive role. Sinn Fein maintains the propaganda war and is the public and political voice of the movement. While Sinn Fein must support the war effort by nationalising the struggle in political terms, the organisation has a responsibility to advance the movement’s social aims” (Sinn Fein , 1984).

This is an important document, like the other papers in this series, for two reasons. First, in them Sinn Féin presents itself indeed as one branch of a Republican Movement, with the IRA being the other branch. Secondly, it opens by stressing the unity of message by the movement as a whole, armed struggle being a valid and central part of that message.⁶⁴ Clearly at this time the Sinn Féin stands behind the armed struggle, so much so that it is willing to reject John Hume’s

⁶⁴ Many of these papers in which Sinn Féin supported the armed struggle were published in the 1970s, before the period studied here. However, none were published after this one that held the same opening message.

offers of support. Is it doing so because it needs to mollify its own members that are unhappy with the increased attention given to politics or is it doing it due to a negative context? I claim that as a movement that is being led by an astute leader who is reading the signs correctly, it is in fact the interaction between the two levels that prompts it to support violence. If the context was more permissive and the movement felt the political effort was actually succeeding, it might have moved away from violence (as it did at a later time) and found another way to appease its members. At the same time, if it was just the negative context, but the movement was supportive of more cooperative behavior, it would have no reason to push for violence. However, the two combined made the choice of violence over cooperation the only one that would keep the movement not only intact but also relevant in the political game.

In the third case, the context is negative, but very few actors are in fact active. The two Unionists actions are negative, as they often are. Meanwhile, the only other actors relevant are Hume who is talking with the movement and the British government which is sending mixed signals. The Army Council had already agreed in May of that year to give up its demand for a quick British withdrawal (see in convergent towards cooperation discussion) which was a huge shift in its policy (Moloney, 2002).

By June, Adams managed to convince the Army Council that supporting Pan Nationalism and entering into talks with the Irish government would benefit the armed struggle. First it would isolate the British and would push the Irish government away from supporting internment in its areas. An isolated Britain might give up faster. As a result of this claim, the Army Council instructed its units to focus on British military personnel instead of the locally recruited RUC officers (Moloney, 2002). This might seem like a small matter, but in fact the change in targets is part of what made the support for armed struggle easier for Sinn Féin. The organization was

trying to move away from its label as a terrorist or a sectarian organization. If it attacked only military personnel, considered as legitimate targets during war, it would help with public support, perhaps even ‘across the aisle’, gaining support of Protestants who are also suffering from the militarization of their home (O'Brien, 1999). But more than that, it would also add more pressure on Britain, especially domestically if it loses more of its soldiers (Moloney, 2002).

And the Provisional IRA followed orders. On June 15th it killed six soldiers with one bomb in Lisburn. On June 23rd, it shot down a military helicopter. In July it attacked a British military base in Germany and on August 1st it attacked military barracks in North London with its first bomb on the mainland since 1984. On August 20th it killed eight British soldiers by a bomb attack on their bus (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). To name just a few. During this period there were only two Provisional IRA attacks that were not aimed at the British military. One was when they targeted a judge that was notorious for his anti-Provisional IRA judgments (but killed a couple and their child by mistake) and the other was a bomb that exploded in Belfast city center (Bew & Gillespie, 1999). The organization was quite unified, the units were following the orders of the Army Council and focusing their efforts on ‘legitimate targets’.

However, with growing attacks by the Provisional IRA, against military or not, so was the pressure growing on Hume to end the talks with the movement. His party was not standing behind him anymore and he was risking his own political career by continuing the talks. It was this violence that led to the end of the talks when the Sinn Féin stood with the Provisional IRA campaign, with Martin McGuinness, Sinn Féin vice-president praising the ‘continental battalion of the IRA’ (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). So was this a case of a negative context that pushed the movement towards violence or did internal preference divergence played a role too?

I claim that there was no real preference divergence. On the contrary, as long as the Provisional IRA was willing to focus on what the Sinn Féin defined as ‘legitimate targets’ and given the losses of the recent past (see in the divergent cases discussion), Sinn Féin had no problem standing behind the armed struggle at this point. It also strengthened its position and resolve for the next round of talks with Hume. Meanwhile, hitting the British where it hurts was just an added benefit.

The power of the settings in determining group behavior will become clearer once all types of cases are examined alongside each other as will be done in chapter 7. However already from looking into these three cases, we can see that the details tell us a different story than the numbers can teach us. Yes, two of the cases had a negative context while the third had a positive one. And yet all three cases are such in which there is support for violence. As such, it cannot be just the context that explains the decision to support violence, at least not at face value.

Individual level of analysis: Adams

A discussion of this type of cases will not be complete without referencing Adams’ personally. Although I have already mentioned some of his actions throughout the organizational level of analysis, more attention to his role in leading to any of these cases is needed. I do so by looking more closely into three elements of his behavior. First, given the organizational dynamic at the time, does he fear the organization might split? Second, how necessary were his actions to the outcomes of each of the cases? Third, was he being pulled by the organization in these situations or was he pulling the organization behind him? Meaning, was he letting the organization call the shots or was he the one responsible for deciding between violence and cooperation?

In the first case, Sinn Féin, and as such, the Republican Movement, is nominating a new president. Big changes such as that may in fact lead to fractioning in the organization, as has happened in the past. If the members do not support the new leaders, they might not see a reason to stay in the organization. Adams at this point had to make sure the organization will stay intact. The Movement at this point was supporting violence, as I discussed above, and in order to win the elections, and make sure the organization remains intact, he needed to come out supporting it too. At this point he was thus being pulled by the organization, or at the minimum, he was playing the organization to fit his own interests.

In the second case there is still some fear of an organizational split, due to the Belfast Brigade's sense of being over-ridden. He was working behind the scenes to get the Army Council to direct the brigades to use violence discriminately and he succeeded relatively. However, he was also seeing that the context is negative and knew that pushing for no violence would not be well taken by the movement, nor will it in fact improve the Movement's position in the conflict. So supporting violence at this point did not come at a great price. On the contrary, once the Provisional IRA attacked Thatcher, he could more comfortably stand behind it. At this point in time he is again being pulled by the organization more than he is doing the pulling, his actions were not necessary for the outcome, but in any case, they fit his overall goals.

In the third case, Adams sees that the context is more negative than positive once again, the organization is also rather unified, the Army Council gave orders and the foot-soldiers were following closely. He knew he had the support of the Sinn Féin as they allowed him to begin talks with the SDLP. But with the negative context and with a successful armed campaign, neither the organization, nor the context were ready for a push away from violence. He thus uses

it to push forward the Republican Agenda and break away with Hume, at least publically. It gave him more credit with the organization, and that was his interest at the moment.

All in all, Adams in these cases is supporting violence because he understands the context and the organization are not ripe for a movement away from it (Zartman, 2000). Had he tried to push the organization, he was risking a split, and the context was not offering a very bright future to make such a risky move worthwhile.

Interaction between levels - discussion

A deeper examination of the details teaches us that the first case was more about a leader making a stand than anything in the context or in the organization. The second and third cases are the result of organizational dynamics interacting with context but in different ways. In the second case, an overly negative context combined with overly negative organizational dynamics pushed the movement to support violence. In the third case, however, organizational dynamics were not conflicting or challenging ones. At this point the benefits of violence outweighed its costs. First, it had the advantage of raising the morale of the movement, especially after 1987. But more so than that, with the context being what it was, not overtly negative but definitely not positive, violence could not be that harmful for the movement as a whole in the grander scheme of events. It was not exactly the most open political opportunity structure (nor was it the most closed), but supporting violence meant keeping the group active and happy. Targeting the British military was just the icing on the cake. In the following section a similar analysis will be conducted on all cases of convergence towards cooperation. At the end of this chapter I will discuss some of the shared patterns between the two types of convergence.

Extending an arm in peace – converging around cooperation: overall patterns

Table 5.4 below presents the details of all cases of convergence towards cooperation.

Table 5.4: Convergence towards Cooperation - details

Time	February 1st 1985	September - November 1986	April - May 1987	May 1988
Behavior	IRA offers Hume to meet	Dropping abstention in the South	Funerals are demilitarized and SF publishes its scenario for peace	AC gives up its demand for a quick British Withdrawal
Details of behavior	The meeting between Hume and representatives of the IRA was held on February 23rd but was very short lived, when Hume refused to the IRA request to video tape the meeting.	A special GAC votes in September to drop abstentionism. The price for such agreement was to field positions at the AC with hard liners to make sure the armed struggle is not dropped. A former vote in February failed. SF AF votes similarly in November.	McGuinness convinces the AC to demilitarize funerals and take other measures of cooperation. The IRA continues with attacks, but tries to be more selective and careful in its behavior.	McGuinness in a speech in Bodenstown's commemoration admits IRA cannot drive the British out immediately.
type of case	Convergent Cooperation #1	Convergent Cooperation #2	Convergent Cooperation #3	Convergent Cooperation #4
Period examined	12 October 1984 - February 1st 85	June 1986 - November 1986	January-April 1987	January- May 1988
Context - British government, military and security forces	Nov 84 - Thatcher's 'out, out, out!' speech at an Anglo-Irish summit; Dec 85-SAS shoots 2 PIRA in Derry; Court charges for the first time a soldier with murder of a civilian in the conflict;	June 86 - the NIA dissolved; July 86 - RUC forbids loyalists during the 12th parade to pass through Catholic areas; fires 200 plastic bullets at loyalist rioters; Sep 86 - Est. together w/ Irish Gov the Intl Fund for Ireland;	Jan 87 - Leader of the British Labour party visits NI and refuses to meet w SF; Feb 87 - A poll finds that 61% of British citizens support withdrawal from NI; March 87 - RUC announces that the union Jack could be illegal to flag;	Feb 88 - British soldiers kill a Catholic civilian; March 88 - SAS kills 3 unarmed IRA man in Gibraltar; Tony Benn, Labour MP publishes a bill to end British rule in NI;
Context - agreement				
Context - Unionist		July 86 - 6 consecutive nights of rioting due to RUC decisions re parades; loyalists attack policemen homes; 4000 loyalists led by Paisley and Robinson protest against the AIA;	Feb 87 - UFF plants 18 bombs in the Republic of Ireland, petition against the AIA; March 87 - Announce intention to establish alternative system of gov; April 87 - illegally march through Belfast in protest of the AIA;	March 88 - Milltown cemetery killings; May 88 - UVF attack a Belfast bar, kills 3
Context - Irish Republic			Jan 1987 - FitzGerald government falls. Haughey becomes new Taoiseach in Feb	Jan 88 - finds more weapons in the Republic
Context - Elections				
Context - intermediaries	Oct 84 - EU commission on Human Rights finds the use of plastic bullets in riots by BA justified		March 87 - Reagan authorizes 50\$ million for the international fund for Ireland	
Context - Promoters of peace	Feb 1st 85 - Hume accepts IRA offer to talk			Jan 88 - SDLP constituency supports Adams-Hume initiative; Feb 88 - Hume agrees to talk with King (sec. on devolution); March 88 - SDLP exchanges letters with SF; May 88 - Mallon asks IG not to deploy Royal Irish Rangers in NI;
Context - spoilers			Jan 87 - INLA shoots DUP councillor; Jan-March 97: INLA and IPLO kill 11 as result of feud	
Org- PIRA		July 86 - IRA threatens any civilian working for RUC or the BA. Another warning was issued on August 5th and 27th 86; Oct 86 - Issues a statement supporting SF in ending abstentionism	March 87 - bombs a joint BM-RAF in germany; April 87 - largest funeral attendance since the hunger strikes, Adams present; sends letter bombs to Thatcher's office; Announces it will no longer fire volleys of shots in funerals; Kills lord justice Gibson and his wife	Feb 88 - cooperates with Garda; March 88 - kills a protestant woman by mistake; kills 2 british corporals; May 88 - kills 2 RAF men; McGuinness acknowledges that a quick British withdrawal is unrealistic
Org - SF		Oct 86 - O'Bradaigh and Doherty push for dropping abstention	May 1st 87 - published 'scenario for peace'	Jan 88 - Begins talks with SDLP; Feb 88 - SF executive permits Adams to resume talks w/ Hume officially;
Adams' actions	Nov 84 - Adams calls Hume to join in on a pan-nationalist Agenda	Oct 86 - Adams calls for the dropping of abstention		Feb 88 - Stresses SF position that ending partition, British disengagement from Ireland and national self-determination are the only solutions to ending the conflict

Time	February - march 1990	December 1990	August 1994
Behavior	IRA states it is prepared to start talks and McGuinness gives an interview supporting it	IRA announces a Christmas ceasefire	IRA announces a ceasefire with no time limitation
Details of behavior	In its statement, the IRA said that a ceasefire was not immediately on the agenda, but could be implemented 'within hours'. McGuinness then says explicitly that 'we are prepared to be part of a peace process'	On Dec 23rd the IRA announced a 3 day ceasefire, for the first time in 15 years. It is significant also due to the meaning of the term 'cease-fire' for the org and shows a great change in thinking	on August 31st 1994 the IRA announces its cease-fire
type of case	Convergent Cooperation #5	Convergent Cooperation #6	Convergent Cooperation #7
Period examined	Nov 17th 1989 - March 4th 1990	August - December 1990	May - August 1994
Context - British government, military and security forces	Dec 89 - A poll shows that 51% of British people want withdrawal from Ireland; another poll found that 8% of Protestant in NI and 41% of Catholics support the AIA; Jan 90 - Arrests Danny Morrisson; Brooke seeks to restore devolved power; another 'shoot-to-kill' allegation against British military; Feb 90 - Brooke rejects IRA offer and clarifies no SF in talks before IRA cessation of violence; first British-Irish interparliamentary body meets in London;	Aug 90 - Brooke attempts to re-launch talks; oct 90 - British military shoots 2 PIRA men and arrests 3 more; the Anglo-Irish inter-gov conference meeting failed to find a formula for talks; Nov 90 - a poll finds that 56% of Catholics in NI favor unification; Brooke 'neutrality speech', Thatcher resigns, replaced by John Major, additional troops; Dec 90 - Broadcasting ban is extended;	May 94 - Announces SF will not be required to fully accept the DSD to be included in talks, answers SF questions w/ great detail; June 94 - transfers 40 prisoners from England to NI; AIC meeting, demands a change to Irish constitution; Aug 94 - RUC says prolonged IRA ceasefire will lead to reduction of foot patrols;
Context - agreement			May 94 - UVF and UFF multiple attacks against Catholic civilians; kill an IRA member two tried to stop them from bombing SF offices; show signs of disunity; June 94 - kick out the only non-unionist member of Belfast council; retaliatory attacks for INLA attack, killing 9 civilians; July 94 - continued attacks against Catholic civilians, announce they would follow an IRA cease-fire; Aug 94 - multiple attacks against civilians, including a pregnant woman, abducts and kills a catholic civilian after IRA announcement as well; Paisley announces DUP will not partake in talks;
Context - Unionist	Jan 90 - UUP calls to end the Unionist boycott of NIO; Feb 90 - UUP announces resumption of connection w/ British gov.		
Context - Irish Republic			June 94 - Reynolds sets terms for change of constitution; Aug 94 - Massive rally in support of peace;
Context - Elections			June 94 - European elections - Paisley, Hume and another UUP member are elected;
Context - intermediaries	Dec 89 - European community grants a 100 M pounds for NI transportation;	Aug 90 - European court of Human Rights rules against the UK for breaching 'reasonable suspicion' requirements for arrests;	Aug 94 - a delegation led by former US congressman meets w/ SF
Context - Promoters of peace	Dec 89 - Hume opposes the suspension of the AIA; Feb 90 - Hume meets w/ Brooke;		Aug 94 - another joint statement by Hume and Adams
Context - spoilers			June 94 - INLA kills 3 UVF members
Org - PIRA	Nov 89 - IRA kills 3 British soldiers; Dec 89 - IRA kills 2 British soldiers; Feb 90 - IRA announces its ready to begin talks	Oct 90 - Human bombs	May 94: Attacks Protestant civilians and soldiers, kidnaps and kills a RIR off-duty member; July 94: attacks soldiers and DUP party members; Aug 94 - Multiple attacks in London and Belfast
Org - SF	Feb 90 - SF rejects preconditions for talks; March 90 - McGuinness hints at openness to talks;		May 94 - Sends out 20 Qs regarding the DSD to the BG; July 94 - holds a special conference re DSD;
Adams' actions	Feb 90 - Adams admits in an interview of the need to plan for a longer strategy; also admits the contradiction b/w the bullet and the ballot		

Time	December 1994	July 1997	April - May 1998
Behavior	IRA reviews the cease-fire and decides against resumption of violence	AC votes to resume cease-fire and to accept Irish and British terms for negotiations	SF signs GFA and drops abstention in the North
Details of behavior	when it is time to decide whether to sustain the cease-fire or not, the organization decides to keep the peace for now, despite and even because of some loyalist attacks	After a short period of relative quiet and continued calls for another cease-fire, the IRA finally agrees to cooperate in order to allow SF to get a seat at the negotiation table. The open arms with which the ceasefire is accepted this time allows the process to move forward quite rapidly afterwards, and by October SF has signed the Mitchell Principles and the GAC supports	On April 10th 1998 SF signs the Good Friday Agreement. A month later the party votes to drop abstention in the North. IRA does not agree to decommission quite yet, but keeps its cease-fire going
type of case	Convergent Cooperation #8	Convergent Cooperation #9	Convergent Cooperation #10
Period examined	Sep - Dec 1994	April - July 1997	January - May 1998
Context - British government, military and security forces	Sept 94 - Major kicks Paisley out from a meeting for claiming Major struck a secret deal with the PIRA; British military switches to soft berets; lifts the broadcasting ban and opens 16 border roads; Major announces exploratory talks with SF could begin by Christmas if ceasefire holds; Oct 94 - RUC begins patrolling w/o BA, Major lifts exclusion orders against Adams and McGuinness, BA stops patrols in Derry, RUC in Belfast loses bullet-proof vests; Nov 94 - BG pulls out 150 soldiers from Maze, NIO meets w/ McGuinness; new aid package to NI.	April 97 - BBC refuses to broadcast SF political platform; April 97 - Major reaffirms that ceasefire=invitation of SF to talks, with 'some' decommissioning; May 97 - Blair offers SF exploratory talks. talks begin on May 21st. June 97 - joint British-Irish Aide-Memoire - agrees on gradual 'mutual decommissioning' and sets 5 terms for SF entry to talks; July 97 - BG promises SF access to ministers following a PIRA ceasefire	Jan 98 - both govts come out with 'heads of agreement'; Blair meets w/ SF; expels UDP from talks; new inquiry into Bloody Sunday; Feb 98 - SF is expelled from talks until March; March 98 - decides against extraditing McAuliskay; Blair meets Adams in London; First official St. Patrick's day parade in Belfast; April 98 - Parades commission rules against the apprentice boys, The talks extend beyond the deadline; GFA is signed; Blair clarifies terms of agreement, releases IRA prisoners and transfers others into prisons in the North and the South; SF delegates meet Blair in London; May 98 - releases
Context - agreement			GFA
Context - Unionist	Sep 94 - continued loyalist violence - kills a Catholic civilian, bombs SF offices in Belfast; CLMC demands assurances for a cease-fire; deputy leader of UUP announces he believes PIRA ceasefire is real; UVF attempts to bomb the Dublin-Belfast train; Oct 94 - cease-fire, conditional on IRA continued cease-fire; Dec 94 - Paisley threatens to bring down any new assembly; DUP leader says decommissioning is unrealistic; paramilitaries kill a Catholic man;	June 97 - UUP proposes to ignore decommissioning as SF remains out of talks, repeated loyalist attacks on a Catholic church leads to services being suspended; July 97 - Drumcree III, orange order leadership promise to reroute contested parades	Jan 98 - loyalist prisoners withdraw their support from the peace process, paramilitaries continue killing Catholics despite being on 'ceasefire' - 4 Catholic civilians are killed in 10 days; 5 more are killed in 4 other incidents; UUP rejects govts' 'heads of agreement' March 98 - Poyznpass killing, rally against the peace process and attacks against Catholic and mixed couples; LVF supports Paisley and threatens those 'colliding' with the peace process; April 98 - UUP rejects Mitchell's principles but is convinced by Blair, LVF kills another Catholic civilian; DUP launches a No campaign; continued loyalist attacks; UDA and UFF support the GFA; loyalist attack against a Catholic owned pub; May 98 - a United Unionist Front against the GFA is launched
Context - Irish Republic	Sep 94 - Reynolds shakes Adams' hands publicly; Oct 94 - opens the 'forum for peace and reconciliation'; Nov 94 - promises no const. change w/o consent; Dec 94 - Reynolds says decommissioning before talks is not sensible; Reynolds is forced to resign. Bruton new Taoiseach, shakes Adams' hands;	April 97 - Bruton calls on Nationalists to not vote SF; May 97 - Adams meets reps of Irish gov.; May 97 - Spring supports SF; May 97 - Bruton demands to halt all contacts with SF; June 97 - Gov falls, new gov sends AC their own terms for cease-fire, commits to support SF in talks	April 98 - signs GFA, launches a Yes campaign, releases 9 IRA prisoners, passes amendment to constitution;
Context - Elections		May 97 - Blair is elected British PM, SF gets highest ever support 16.1%, becomes third largest party in NI; local NI elections gives SF even higher support 16.9%, Unionist lose control over Belfast city council for the 1st time ever, SDLP loses control over Derry to SF	
Context - intermediaries	Sep 94 - EC increases support for NI, calls all paramilitary groups to cease-fire; US grants Adams a visa, cancels its policy prohibiting contact with SF; Nov 94 - Clinton increases support for INI; Dec 94 - George Mitchell is appointed, Adams meets w/ USA senior officials, more EU money;		January 98 - US senator Kennedy visits Derry; March 98 - EU increased monetary support; Mitchell sets deadline for talks; UN human rights commission accuses RUC of intimidation;
Context - Promoters of peace	Nov 94 - Joint statements w/ Adams. Calls to accelerate the peace process;	April 97 - SDLP rejects Adams' offer for electoral pact; May 97 - Hume meets w/ Spring, convincing him to support SF; July 97 - Hume joins with Adams in calling for an IRA ceasefire	
Context - spoilers		RIRA debut	Jan 98 - INLA kills a UDA commander; Feb 98 - CIRA bombs, INLA attacks RUC; April 98 - INLA kills former UVF prisoners
Org - PIRA	Nov 94 - kills a post-office employee and apologizes	April - AC orders a 'tactical period of quiet'; June 97 - kills 2 RUC officers for the first time since Feb 96; July 97 - AC votes to resume a ceasefire	Jan 98 - IRA contacts BBC to clarify its lack of involvement in recent CIRA bombings and to deny a split in the org, IRA rejects 'heads of agreement'; Feb 98 - uses DAAD as a cover to kill drug-dealers; April 98 - statement sort of rejecting the GFA and saying no to decommissioning;
Org - SF	Oct 94 - McGuinness says cease-fire will end unless satisfactory progress will be made;	June 97 - McGuinness calls to remove decommissioning as an obstacle to talks; July 97 - Adams and McGuinness call on the IRA to announce a cease-fire	Jan 98 - SF welcomes govts' heads of agreement doc; SF agrees to re-join the talks; March 98 - publishes 'Bridge into the future'; April 98 - reports 12 members quit due to continued support of the peace process; May 98 - supports the GFA and launches a yes campaign, votes to drop abstention in the North
Adams' actions	Cct 94 - Adams blames BG for reducing the momentum for peace;	April 97 - Adams calls on SDLP for an electoral pact; June 97 - Adams Shows up uninvited to Stormont talk, demanding to participate regardless of IRA ceasefire;	Jan 98 - Adams reaches out to Trimble; March 98 - in a speech about 'Bridge into the future' Adams admits no prospect for united Ireland in the near future but reassures SF commitment to Republican goals

The context level of analysis

As with the former analysis of cases of convergence towards violence, the first step of my analysis was to code the above information in terms of relevance. Which of these various factors were relevant for the different cases? Table 5.5 below shows the presence or absence of factors.

Table 5.5: Convergence Towards Cooperation - factors' relevance

Time	Feb 1st 1985	September - November 1986	April - May 1987	May 1988	February - march 1990	December 1990	August 1994	December 1994	July 1997	April-May 1998
type of case	Convergent cooperation	Convergent Cooperation	convergent cooperation	convergent cooperation?	convergent cooperation	convergent cooperation	Convergent Cooperation	convergent Cooperation	Convergent Cooperation	Convergent Cooperation
Context - British government, military and security forces	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Context - agreement										√
Context - Unionist		√	√	√	√		√	√	√	√
Context - Irish Republic			√	√			√	√	√	√
Context - Elections							√		√	
Context - intermediaries	√		√		√	√	√	√		√
Context - Promoters of peace	√			√	√		√	√	√	
Context - spoilers			√				√		√	√

Patterns

What are some of the patterns that emerge from comparing the 10 cases of convergence towards cooperation? As with convergence towards violence, the British government and its various organs were relevant in all cases, and as will be discussed in more details in chapter 7, the British government was in fact a key factor in determining Republican behavior in all cases studied in this dissertation. Agreements are once again less relevant, appearing only in the last case. Once the Good Friday Agreement was signed, by Sinn Féin as well, it was quite impossible for the Provisional IRA to back out, so it is the process that led to the signing of that agreement that mattered more in determining group behavior than the signing of the agreement per se.

The second most relevant factor, at least in terms of actions taken during the periods studied in the various cases are unionist actions. Relevant in 80% of the cases, I find that this requires a closer look. What were the Unionists doing at this time? Were their behaviors seen as positive or negative by the Republican Movement?

The next most relevant factors are intermediaries (70% of the cases) followed by the Irish Republic and promoters of peace (60% of the cases). A last pattern to point to before delving into the details is the number of relevant factors in these cases. It is already clear, and will become clearer in the following section, that as the conflict progresses, more and more factors, at least from the context level are relevant. More is happening. If in the first case only three factors from the context level were relevant and two for the second case, in the last four cases, no less than five were relevant. And yet, if cooperation by the Republican Movement happens even when very few factors in the context are involved, naturally it requires looking deeper into the way these factors were indeed relevant. Table 5.6 below presents whether the Republican Movement viewed these factors as positive or negative.

Table 5.6: Convergence towards Cooperation - positive and negative Contextual factors

Time	Feb 1st 1985	September - November	April - May 1987	May 1988	February - march 1990	December 1990	August 1994	December 1994	July 1997	April-May 1998
type of case	Convergent cooperation	Convergent Cooperation	convergent cooperation	convergent cooperation	convergent cooperation	convergent cooperation	Convergent Cooperation	convergent Cooperation	Convergent Cooperation	Convergent Cooperation
Context - British government, military	(-)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(+)	(-)/(+)/(+)	(-)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(+)	(-)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(+)
Context - agreement										(+)
Context - Unionist		(-)/(+)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(-)	(-)/(-)	(+)/(-)		(-)/(-)/(+)/(-)/(-)	(-)/(-)/(-)	(-)/(-)/(-)/(+)	(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)
Context - Irish Republic			(+)	(-)			(+)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)	(-)/(+)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)
Context - Elections							(-)		(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)	
Context - intermediaries	(-)		(+)		(+)	(+)	(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)		(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)
Context - Promoters of	(+)			(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)/(-)	(+)/(+)		(+)	(+)/(+)	(-)/(+)/(-)	
Context - spoilers			(-)/(-)				(-)		(-)	(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)
Org- PIRA		+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Org - SF	+		+	+	+		+	+	+	+

Table 5.6 paints a very interesting picture. Even if we focus only on these 10 cases of convergence towards cooperation, we can see very clearly that there is progress in the process. As time passes, the conflict becomes much more dynamic. It is not only that more of the different factors are relevant, but that they are relevant in more ways, particularly, in more positive ways.

In 80% of the convergence towards cooperation cases, the context was more positive than negative. This is no small matter. Given that these are cases in which the Republican Movement chose cooperation over violence, one can see how the fact that the context was overtly positive in the majority of the cases is in fact related to the decision to use less violence and in fact cooperate with the system. Two cases however are less clear cut. The first case is one in which the context was more negative than positive, though not by much and in the second case, the context was equality as negative as it was positive. These cases in fact prove that we must look into the details more carefully, but more than that, that we must look into organizational dynamics and the leadership in order to better understand the organizational choice. Before we do that, several of the coding decisions deserve some attention.

The British and the Irish Republic

We begin with the British government. Over all 65 actions by the British government and its various organs were coded. Out of those 63, 52 were positive for these cases, and only 13 were negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. That is, 80% of the British government's behavior during times leading up to convergent cooperation cases were positive. Given the centrality of the British in creating the context within which the Republican Movement was cooperating, the fact that they were sending far more positive signals than negative ones is huge. It might not be able to explain the Republican Movement decision making in its entirety

but it definitely helps to understand under what conditions DWRO's might choose cooperation over violence. What are some of these actions by the British that might help us to better understand the process?

Like with anything else, some of the negative British actions were overtly negative, while others were subtler. When Thatcher gave her famous 'out, out, out' speech in November 1984 at the Anglo-Irish summit she made it very clear that Republican goals would not be achieved easily.⁶⁵ By refusing to accept any of the proposed solutions to the situation in the North, Thatcher was certainly not giving the impression that she was willing to talk or listen to anything the movement, or anybody else for that matter, had to say. Another negative action was the attack of British special forces on the Provisional IRA in Derry. The only thing that is positive during this time when it comes to British behavior is the charging of a soldier for murder of a Catholic civilian (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). This is the first time a British soldier was in fact charged for murder of a civilian. By doing this, the British sent a message that soldiers are not above the law, which is positive from the Republican Movement's point of view – their constituents are not necessarily transparent or, even worse, targeted on purpose.

Anything that has to do with the relationship between the British and Irish governments (that was coded under British, as it is the stronger entity in the case) requires some elaboration as well. In September 1986 the two governments established the International Fund for Ireland (CAIN, ongoing). This is a positive move from the Republican point of view, as it means that more money will be coming in. Cooperation in general between the two governments is overall

⁶⁵ The 'out, out, out' referred to potential solutions to the conflict in Northern Ireland and the offers made by the New Ireland Forum. Thatcher said: "I have made it quite clear - and so did Mr. Prior when he was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland - that a unified Ireland was one solution. That is out. A second solution was confederation of two states. That is out. A third solution was joint authority. That is out" (Thatcher, 1984).

positive. First of all, since the Republican Movement is interested in changing the current status quo on the Island, the fact that the two governments are talking (as long as they are not reaching any decisions without it) is positive. It might lead to a change. But more important than that, the Irish government represents the pan-nationalist vote, the Catholic population, which are part of the natural constituents of the Movement.

From a political point of view, if the Irish government would be able make progress, it would benefit the same people that movement claims to represent. The movement can only gain from such processes. More than that, the Republican Movement was known to be in contact with the Irish government before it was in contact with the British government (O'Brien, 1999). The more communication between the two governments also meant more inside information for the movement, more knowledge about the limits of the British Government and how much it would be willing to work for peace. As such, when the British and Irish governments met in February 1990 but also when their meeting failed to find a formula for talks in August 1990, both incidents were coded as positive from the Republican point of view.

But what about Irish government actions that were coded as negative? There were not many of those. Overall, Irish Republic actions were coded 19 times, only 3 of which, about 15% of their total behavior, were negative. One such action is when the Irish police found the movement's weapons in January 1988. Finding their weapons not only harmed the group's ability to fight, but it also had the potential to hurt any potential cooperation between the Republican Movement and the government of Ireland. The other two actions that were coded negatively were towards the end of the conflict, when in April 1997 John Bruton, the current Taoiseach called on nationalists to not vote for Sinn Féin and in May demanded members of his government to halt all contacts with Sinn Féin (CAIN, ongoing). But Bruton did not stay

Taoiseach for very long. His government fell in June 1997 and the new Taoiseach Bertie Ahern immediately entered into discussions with the Army Council and publically committed to support Sinn Féin in the negotiations with the British Government (Moloney, 2002).

Unionists

Unionist actions are interesting to examine more closely for these cases. The Unionists are the second most active actor in these periods,⁶⁶ with 47 actions coded, 16 of which were coded as positive (34% positive). Even though most of the Unionist actions were coded as negative, I was surprised myself to find that 34% of their behavior could in fact be seen as positive from the Republican Movement's point of view. And how might that be? What can the Unionist groups possibly do that will help the Republican Movement? This goes back to a discussion about the nature of the targets (Matesan & Berger, 2016). When Loyalist paramilitary groups attack the homes of police officers, as they did in July 1986, they are in fact helping the Republican cause in more than one way. First of all, they are not targeting Catholic civilians at the moment, their wrath is directed at someone else, alleviating the fear within the Catholic community which is naturally positive from the point of view of the Republican Movement. Second, is the fact that they are targeting the police. By doing so, they are grabbing the attention of the security forces, diverting them away from the Republican Movement and its operations. But more importantly, they are proving that the Republican Movement is not the only extreme faction around.

If the Unionists are acting in violence and are not getting punished for it, it helps the Republican Movement to claim they are, in fact, being unfairly targeted, persecuted and

⁶⁶ Stressing, again, that I collated all Unionist and loyalist groups under one 'actor' in my study.

discriminated against. As long as they are not attacking the Catholic, Nationalist, Republican community of the North, and the movement's constituents, the Unionists' actions can be spun in a positive light. Clearly, any violence is negative to the process as a whole, but since we are focusing on the Republican Movement's point of view, violence that is carried out by others, violence that cannot be pinned on the movement (such as in the case of spoilers) and violence that is carried out against other targets than the movement's natural constituents helps painting the Republican Movement in a more positive light and strengthens its bargaining position.

But apart from violence, some political actions by Unionists can also be seen as positive from the Republican Movement's point of view. For example, when the Unionists petitioned against the Anglo-Irish Agreement in February 1987 it is marked as positive, as the Republican Movement could only benefit from the cancelation or change of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. If it is not the one that is painted as the trouble-maker around this issue, even better. Similarly, when Paisley, leader of the DUP announced in August 1994 that his party would not take part in talks if Sinn Féin was invited to the table, it is coded as a positive occurrence for the Republican Movement. Paisley is making demands while Sinn Féin has been doing everything it could imagine to just be invited to the table. DUP is thus making Sinn Féin look like the more cooperative party at the moment, which helps the Republican cause.

Similar patterns of behavior by Paisley and by the loyalist paramilitaries repeat also in the months leading up to December 1994, when the Provisional IRA agrees to prolong the ceasefire (Moloney, 2002). When loyalist paramilitaries attempt to bomb the train between Dublin and Belfast in September 1994 it paints the Republican Movement in a brighter light, especially given the fact that they have announced a ceasefire and kept to it. When the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CMLC) announces a ceasefire that is conditional on a continued Provisional

IRA ceasefire (CAIN, ongoing), it is also coded as positive, as it reduced the threat level in the Catholic community. When Paisley threatened to bring down any new assembly, it is coded as positive, as he made Sinn Féin that was not making any demands but to be invited to talks look better and when the DUP announced decommissioning is unreasonable in December 1994 it is yet again coded as positive, as it was the same claim Sinn Féin was making. The fact that someone else was making the same claim, especially from the Unionist side, strengthened the Sinn Féin position.

Indeed, however, the Unionists' actions were coded as negative almost twice as much as their actions were coded as positive (31 negative actions compared to 16 positive actions). The fact that some of their behavior could help Republican claims is important to stress. The world is not always black and white, especially when there are so many actors in one place. Sometimes the enemy of my enemy is in fact my friend, or at the minimum, perhaps an unaware and even unwilling ally, but an ally nonetheless. It goes to show how important it is to look into the details, not just who is acting, but who is doing what, and at what time? The actions of one are affected by the actions of the other, but are also affected by the internal organizational processes.

It is plausible to claim that the CMLC (Combined Loyalist Military Command) would not have called a ceasefire had the Provisional IRA not called one beforehand. At the same time, much of the loyalist violence was retaliatory, reacting to actions by both the British security forces and by the Provisional IRA. Politically, actions of politicians are rarely made in a vacuum. Paisley would not have organized mass protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreement if the agreement was not in place, or if the two governments were not talking about amending it. Thus, even when we focus only on one level of analysis, the actions of the various actors in the conflict (the overall context of the Republican Movement), are part of a process of action and reaction.

Elections

When it comes to elections, there is not much to say. They were only relevant in 20% of the cases, once in a negative way and once in a very positive way. Similar to the last case of convergence towards violence, when elections to the European Parliament were held in June 1994, Sinn Féin did not succeed in getting elected once again. Ten years had passed and it still did not manage to gain enough votes to overcome the support for Hume or Paisley. It is certainly a negative sign. However, one must not forget that the party still represented a minority constituency in the north, and the north is treated as one area in these elections. Nevertheless, the three candidates that Sinn Féin fielded all won around 3% of the total votes in the north, which is low by any mean. As I will discuss below, this can be tied to the current level of violence.

The general elections for Westminster in May 1997 however had a completely different result for the movement. In these elections Sinn Féin got 16.1% of the votes in the North, the highest ever level of support for the party. It became the third largest party in the North. In local elections in the North, the good news kept coming. Sinn Féin received even higher support with 16.9% of the vote. It managed to take over Derry from the SDLP and the Unionists lost their control over the Belfast City Council for the first time (CAIN, Ongoing). The public had clearly changed its mind about the party by this time. How come? Elections are naturally only part of the story. It could be the very low level of violence by Provisional IRA compared to the increased violence of the Loyalist paramilitary groups. It would also be the positive signals the British government was sending at the time by clarifying that Sinn Féin would be invited to talks if a ceasefire was resumed officially. The public was willing to give the movement a chance, and the movement reacted by announcing another ceasefire.

Spoilers

Turning to spoilers, they only have a negative effect on the conflict process, and on the movement itself, as it needs to make more of an effort to differentiate itself from the violence, while at the same time convince the world it has not and will not split due to the progress made in the peace process. The movement was, in fact, so worried about the reputation cost of spoiler attacks that in January 1998 the Provisional IRA contacted the BBC to emphasize it was not responsible for recent attacks, while also stressing that it had not split (CAIN, ongoing).

Intermediaries and promoters of peace

Both intermediaries and promoters of peace are quite relevant in the background to these cases of convergence towards cooperation, and overwhelmingly in a positive way. Both intermediaries and promoters of peace had only one action each that was coded as negative while the rest of their actions (15 for intermediaries and 12 for promoters of peace) were coded as positive. The Republican Movement was finally being given a real chance to participate and to voice its positions, by varied respected entities. From the United States that grants Adams a visa to enter the United States, cancels its policy of prohibiting any connection with Sinn Féin or sending a delegation of United States senators to meet with Sinn Féin, to the European community that sends in more money and support. Even the one third party action that is coded as negative, the European Commission on Human Rights which finds the British use of plastic bullets in riots justified from October 1984 (CAIN, ongoing), was not taken against the Republican Movement, but was due to RUC trouble in handling Unionist protests. It is nevertheless a decision that gives the British Army power and legitimacy to operate in the North, which is negative from the Republican Movement's point of view.

As before, Hume plays a very central role in bringing Sinn Féin, Adams in particular, to the negotiation table. Hume was the only one that consistently over the years valued peace over anything else and was willing to give anybody a chance if that would help the process. Despite his opposition to armed struggle, he agreed to meet with the Provisional IRA when they offered, and even went to speak with members of the Army Council, by invitation from Adams, to try to convince them to announce another ceasefire when it was at risk in 1997. He spoke on Sinn Féin's behalf with both the Irish and the British governments and issued joint statements with Adams over the years in an attempt to find a solution to the conflict. He convinced his party and his constituency to stand behind him in these varied efforts and at the elections of 1997 even paid the price for it when SDLP lost control over Derry to Sinn Féin. The only action that was coded negative here from the Republican Movement's point of view was when he refused Adams' offer of an electoral pact in April 1997. Such a refusal is understandable as at the end of the day, Hume was still a politician heading a pacifist party and competing with Sinn Féin over the same electorate. Accepting an electoral pact with Sinn Féin would have hurt his chances of pushing a nationalist pacifist agenda more than running alone and faring less well than Sinn Féin would have since it would have cost him more of his voters.

Context overall

Overall the context was 67% positive (117 actions) during these cases and 33% negative (58 actions). It also grew far more 'active' and more positive as the conflict transformation process progressed. The first case of convergence towards cooperation had five actions coded, which is also the lowest number of context coded actions in convergent towards cooperation cases, whereas the last case had 42 actions (25 of which were positive). Tables 5.7 and 5.8 below present the overall counts of factors in the context level, once per factor and once per case.

Table 5.7: convergence towards cooperation: total codes per contextual factor

	Positive	Negative	Total
BG, military and security	52 (80%)	13 (20%)	65
agreement	1(100%)	0	1
Unionist	16(34%)	31 (66%)	47
Irish Republic	16 (84%)	3 (16%)	19
Elections	5 (83%)	1 (17%)	6
intermediaries	15 (94%)	1 (6%)	16
Promoters of peace	12 (92%)	1 (8%)	13
spoilers	0	8 (100%)	8
Total	117 (67%)	58 (33%)	175 (100%)

Table 5.8: Convergence towards cooperation: Negative and positive codes per case

Time	Feb 1st '85	Sep - Nov '86	April - May '87	May '88	Feb - march '90	Dec '90	Aug '94	Dec '94	July '97	April-May '98
Positive	2 (40%)	5 (83%)	6 (55%)	5 (50%)	8 (67%)	6 (67%)	12 (60%)	31 (89%)	17 (68%)	25 (60%)
Negative	3 (60%)	1 (17%)	5 (45%)	5 (50%)	4 (33%)	3 (33%)	8 (40%)	4 (11%)	8 (32%)	17 (40%)
Total	5 (100%)	6 (100%)	11 (100%)	10 (100%)	12 (100%)	9 (100%)	20 (100%)	35 (100%)	25 (100%)	42 (100%)

These findings support a couple of my initial assumptions. When the structure affords you with opportunities, you have more of an incentive to cooperate with it than to oppose it. When valid voice options exist for those who wish to express their discontent, when they are given a chance to voice their concerns, they will take the chance rather than keep fighting. At the minimum, they will signal their wish to cooperate by utilizing either less violent or, at the least, less discriminative actions. Furthermore, it is rarely just one factor that pushes the organization to converge around cooperation and the various factors are, in fact, part of a process of action and reaction. Such findings have great implications for the conflict transformation process as will be discussed in more details in chapter 7.

The Organizational level of analysis

However, other questions that I have raised have yet to be either supported or rejected and those have to do with the role of organizational dynamics and the way they interact with these contextual factors in pushing the movement towards cooperative behavior. What were the

two wings doing in the months leading up to each of the cases? What role do organizational dynamics play in pushing convergence over divergence and most importantly, can organizational dynamics explain the two cases of convergence towards cooperation in which the context was not overtly positive, namely the first case in February 1985 and the fourth case in May 1988?

The Provisional IRA was very active in the times leading up to all of these cases of convergence towards cooperation except for the first case. Sinn Féin was active in the period leading up to 80% of the cases of convergence towards cooperation, first cases included. And, indeed, in November 1984, during the Sinn Féin annual conference, Adams called on Hume to establish a united nationalist front (Adams, Presidential Address, November 7th 1984). But his call on Hume was too early in the process. Adams has yet to prove that he could bring the Provisional IRA to the table, so he requested the Army Council to reach out on its own to Hume.

The movement was not yet a firm believer in politics. But it was not vehemently opposing it either. The recent past experience with election campaigns had been relatively positive, as we have already discussed, and the Army Council was willing to give this strategy a try. The Green Book of the movement does state as one of the movement's goals to "gain support ... by national and international propaganda and publicity campaigns" (The Republican Movement). Reaching out to a fellow nationalist, even if a pacifist one, might help the cause. It did not last long however, as the members of the Army Council who attended the meeting wanted to video tape it and Hume refused (Moloney, 2002). But Adams proved that the movement was willing to cooperate, despite some initial glitches. Shortly thereafter, Hume and Adams began talking, and were even interviewed together at the end of February by the BBC.

Hume is again very central to setting the context leading up to the fourth case of convergence towards cooperation in May 1998. Indeed, if we were to count positive versus

negative factors, we get a tie – five negative versus five positive factors in the context. However, four of those five positive factors are all Hume and his party standing behind the joint initiative the two leaders were working on. The period leading up to this case was a harsh time for the movement. The loss of the Eskund and all it meant to the movement (not only a copious amount of sophisticated weapons but the element of surprise), as well as the backlash the Enniskillen attack brought upon it were still fresh in members' mind. But the few months right before McGuinness reveals an Army Council realization that the movement in fact will not be able to bring about a quick British withdrawal were even harsher on the movement and its supporters.

Heavy losses due to attacks from both British forces and the RUC who tightened security after Enniskillen, alongside increased attacks by Loyalist paramilitary groups, led the group to feel haunted. Adding to it was the less recent drama of the vote on abstention, as it turned out that “a significant minority of the Army had dissented from the abstention vote and, while staying onboard, made certain that their dissent was recorded” (O'Brien, 1999, p. 152). The Army Council was trying to keep its soldiers content, but alive. All throughout the period leading up to McGuinness's announcement at Bodenstown, the army council was sending small signals of cooperation, that were kept mostly secret from the members.

For example, in February 1988 the Army Council cooperated with Irish Gardai (police) in the investigation of the murder of a young Catholic man by the British military, despite traditional Republican dogma that forbade cooperation with Irish security forces (Moloney, 2002). In March of that year, the organizers of the annual Easter Republican parade officially asked the RUC for permission to march. These were clear signs of cooperation, but they were aimed at the external world, not the organization's own members, who were left in the dark. In his speech, McGuinness decided it was time to portray the new flexibility adopted by the Army

Council. He nonetheless did so during a very militant speech where he stressed that “the movement has the capability and the means to bring about the defeat of the British forces” and that they “have the ability to sicken the British forces of occupation” (McGuinness, 1988).

In his speech he thus catered both to the militants in the organization who were disappointed by the recent adoption of politics as well as to the outside world. The militants might have missed the significance of his message as it was, but for those who paid attention, it was a very serious signal of flexibility that came after a few small signals. The problem was that Thatcher was definitely not listening at this point. Which is why in the following month, some very huge attacks took place and the organization converged around violence. It reached out, granted carefully, in order to maintain its organizational integrity, but nobody took it seriously. Nobody apart from Hume, but even that did not last and the talks with him broke down.

When looking into Provisional IRA actions in the times leading up to these cases of convergence towards cooperation, only in two of them were they indiscriminately violent, attacking civilians and not just what the leadership sees as legitimate targets – military and security personnel. This is not to say they are not violent at all, they are, but the quality of their violence is definitely different than in cases of convergence towards violence or, as will be discussed in the following chapter, cases of divergence or confusion. Organizational dynamics help us better understand the violence that preceded the two cases in which violence was in fact used indiscriminately, namely the December 1990 case and the August 1994 case. One is the last case of convergence towards cooperation before the movement went into a long period of divergence and confusion, and the other is the first case of convergence towards cooperation that came at the end of said period.

Both of these cases in which violence was used in such a way were cases that resulted in a ceasefire, a short Christmas ceasefire and the first true ceasefire that lasted for 16 months. The movement had to hit rock bottom in terms of violence in order to be able to send one of the strongest cooperative signals – a ceasefire. In October 1990 the Northern Command approved a plan by the Derry brigade of using ‘human bombs’ – the Provisional IRA’s version of suicide bombing in which the bomber was a civilian forced to drive a car filled with explosives into an army base while his family was kept hostage. Three such bombs were used on the same day, one led to the death of the civilian and five soldiers, the second one killed one soldier and the third bomb failed to explode (O’Brien, 1999).

The human-bomb tactic was a public affairs’ disaster. Was this a case of loss of control by the leadership and preference divergence between rank and file and the leadership? It was not. In fact, it was approved, and even devised by the same leadership that was trying to win political electoral support. How can that be explained then? It is a mix of internal dynamics, secret diplomacy and a changing context that we should be looking into. The abhorrent attacks led many of the republican supporters to move away from the movement, but at the same time it also weakened the voices of the militants in the Army Council (O’Brien, 1999). ‘You wanted to escalate the violence? Fine, but now we all must pay the price’. Hitting rock bottom in fact “fortified the peace camp within the Provisionals” (Moloney, 2002, p. 349).

The harsh public reaction to the tactic pushed the Army Council into a mini-peace process in Derry. Modelled after Cold War GRIT diplomacy (Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension Reduction), the IRA in Derry and the British military de-escalated in phases, signaling to each other their willingness to increase the trust and end the war (Moloney, 2002). The fact that the Army Council and the Derry brigade agreed to such a move was a huge

deal. The Derry Republicans were different than the Belfast Republicans. Their entire *raison d'être* was defending the Republican community from the British forces in a mixed city. Their battle was not sectarian as it was in Belfast (O'Brien, 1999). Cooperating to such a degree with the British forces was a signal that showed the Army Council was reconsidering its tactics.

And the British were listening this time around. Shortly after, Brooke, Secretary of State, gave his famous neutrality speech in which he reassured his audience that Britain has no selfish economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland and would not oppose unification if it was voted for by the people of the island. He also clarified that Sinn Féin will get complete political access once violence stopped (Brooke, 1990).

The Army council got the message. Violence would not push the British out, but dialogue might. A couple of days later a major obstacle for peace was removed – Thatcher was forced to resign (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). For the Republican Movement this meant the world. The peace camp in the Army Council, Adams, McGuinness and some others, knew that they would not be able to sell a much needed ceasefire to the ‘soldiers’ of the Army Council or to the movement itself as long as Thatcher was in power. Given her attitude towards the movement throughout the years, and especially her refusal to back down during the hunger strikes, any accommodation made by the movement would be perceived as utter surrender. Thatcher’s replacement, John Major, had no known positions on the Northern Ireland issue, which meant he might be more open to giving the movement a voice. The change in leadership thus required a big message of cooperation from the movement if any progress was to be made.

We must also remember that behind the scene the peace camp of the Army Council was in fact conducting secret talks with the British via intermediaries (Moloney, 2002). Once the human bombs disaster happened, the militants on the Army Council were weakened, and with

Brooke's public promise of neutrality, the Army Council had to reciprocate and signal its own willingness to be reasonable. Furthermore, the peace camp, mainly McGuinness and Adams embarked on direct, but secret talks, with the British (Sinn Fein, January 5th 1994).

But a big signal that would allow the British to save face, and facilitate the talks to remain a secret for now, was still needed. As such, McGuinness asked the Army Council to vote on announcing an official ceasefire for Christmas. The Movement almost always put down its arms around the holiday, but it never called it a ceasefire as the term had such a heavy meaning for the movement (O'Brien, 1999). McGuinness convinced the Council that the ceasefire was not about backing down or pushing for peace, but it was to signal to the nationalist community that the movement is still reasonable after the tactical mistake of the human bombs. At the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis in February 1991 however, Adams admitted that the ceasefire was indeed about signaling the British that the movement was willing to stop the violence for the right incentives (The Irish Times, Feb 4th 1991).

This case marks the beginning of the true peace process. Some members of the Army Council, namely Adams and McGuinness, who were also Sinn Féin leaders, were talking with the British while the remainder of the Army Council which was more military oriented and not in Sinn Féin, were trying to figure out how far they were willing to go in the process without losing their own identity and without losing control over the organization. This is why the next three years were marked by divergence and confusion, as I discuss in the next chapter.

In the period leading up to the ceasefire announcement of August 1994, we also see a Republican Movement that is attacking civilians and plants multiple bombs in England and in Northern Ireland and then announces an official ceasefire with no time limit. The announcement read: "Recognising the potential of the current situation and in order to enhance the democratic

process and underlying our definitive commitment to its success, the leadership of the IRA have decided that as of midnight, August 31, there will be a complete cessation of military operations. All our units have been instructed accordingly” (The Provisional IRA , 1994). The statement did not include the word ‘permanent’ which led the conservative British government to be suspicious of it and drag its feet before actually talking to Sinn Féin, demanding decommissioning as another term for inclusion in talks (Brams & Togman, 1998).

However, the announcement nevertheless included the words ‘complete cessation’, which was a big enough signal from the Republican Movement. Once again, it is internal dynamics that were influenced by the external context that help us better understand the decision. By mid-1994 the Army Council had no choice but to discuss the terms of a ceasefire. Pressure from all levels led it towards cooperation and away from violence. Not only were the British saying that they were willing to treat Sinn Féin with respect and give it voice, the public was showing its support for peace, not violence, Hume kept cooperating with Adams and issuing joint statements, and even members of the American Congress were willing to meet with Sinn Féin. Rejecting the idea of a ceasefire was simply not an option at that moment.

Adams was the one who raised the topic cautiously, framing an exploratory ceasefire as only beneficial to the movement. He managed to convince the Council that it will be a test for British and Irish willingness to in fact negotiate with Sinn Féin and that if they drag their feet, then they will be the ones that will be blamed for the failure of the peace, while painting the Republican Movement in a cooperative and positive light. The Army Council thus allowed Adams to begin exploring the options of a ceasefire with the Irish government, not the British one. The Council was more interested at this point in pan-nationalism than it was in British withdrawal (Moloney, 2002).

The exploratory talks with the Irish Reynolds government led to a 14-points proposal that was put in front of the Army Council for a vote. In the proposal the Irish government promised to implement some groundbreaking initiatives in return for a ceasefire. Not only was Reynolds promising to treat Sinn Féin as any other political party, he also promised to use his power to persuade the British government to stop isolating Sinn Féin and to convince the American Government to give Army Council members a visa to the US in order to allow them to get the Irish-American public behind the notion of a ceasefire (Moloney, 2002).

The fact that Reynolds was willing to push the Irish government for the inclusion of the Movement was a big selling point for the Army Council. It was being taken seriously and given a voice by an official government. It was a step in the right direction. The ceasefire was voted on by the Army Council but the formal announcement of it came only after one of the Army Council members indeed flew to the United States to talk to the movement's supporters in the US (Moloney, 2002). Reynolds proved that his words carried water, so the Army Council had no choice but to agree to a ceasefire. It just could not agree to a permanent one. The rank and file would not vote for a ceasefire without any British declaration of withdrawal, it would go against their 'Green Book'. So the soldiers on the committee made sure to keep weapons and training going as usual and the rank and file were in fact kept out of the decision. Most of them heard of the ceasefire from the media, and not from their leaders. The Army Council explained it by reassuring them that they should trust their leaders who have smuggled weapons and were willing to use them and claimed that dissent and critique of the leadership would only play into the British' hands. And so, a ceasefire that lasted for 16 months began.

Similar internal dynamics and an effort to reassure the rank and file, as well as the 'soldiers' of the Army Council that the ceasefire was not permanent marked the following

months as well. By the time the movement realized the ceasefire had failed and resumed violence, it was too weak to succeed in making any real demands, and in fact the resumption of violence only gave the leadership more leverage and more international support in the next round of talks.

In any case, by February 1996 it became clear that both the British and the Irish were not taking Sinn Féin seriously enough and in order to avoid a split in the organization, the leadership had to allow violence to be picked up again, even if publically it said it was committed to peace. When the next ceasefire was announced in 1997, the Army Council made sure to go through the ‘official democratic process’ of meeting with the Executive Council regularly and even holding a General Army Convention that saw the growing support for Adams and his peace camp and thus voted in favor of the ceasefire and the peace process. It did lead to a mass resignation from the executive bodies of the movement and to the birth of the Real IRA, but the Provisionals nevertheless managed to sustain most of their organizational integrity and survive a peace process from which the Republican Movement came out on top, albeit smaller and far weaker.

We can see from the discussion of organizational dynamics that any decisions that marked a shift from republican traditions were not taken lightly and required a thorough internal process of convincing and well, manipulating. Organizational dynamics and ethos constrained the leaders who believed in peace from moving faster in the process, but they could not prevent the progress towards peace with the changing circumstances that were occurring around them. A willing British government, a supportive Irish government, an involved Clinton administration and the constant pushing and support from promoters of peace and from the public eventually affected the minds of even the staunchest supporters of violence. At a minimum, it convinced them to give the leadership a chance. Those who were disillusioned by peace left, but the

movement managed to survive the splintering due to exactly the same Republican ethos, strong public support and astute leaders all around it (not just the Republican ones).

Individual level of analysis: Adams

As can be gleaned from the above discussion, Adams played a central role in most of the cases of convergence towards cooperation. If we think about the three dimensions of his actions that were looked upon in the previous discussion of his leadership (under convergence towards violence), we can see that in all of the cases of convergence towards cooperation he was pulling the movement towards his goals, and not being pulled by it. In almost all of those cases he was also extremely necessary for the outcome. Without him, the Provisional IRA would not necessarily cooperate and the Army Council would have taken the view of the ‘soldiers’.

In the first case, February 1985, he was necessary for the outcome, but not sufficient. As was already mentioned, at this point, there was no fear of any split in the organization, but his call on Hume to join in on a pan-nationalist agenda failed. He still needed to prove that he can bring the Provisional IRA, so he did. He convinced the Army Council to reach out to Hume.

He is again central to the outcome and pulling the organization his way when it comes to the vote on Abstention in 1986. Now that he was fully on board of the political agenda, it was time to get the organization there as well. He was pushing for it with all his power, all the whilst knowing that there is a risk of a splinter in the movement, as happened in the past. When the Army Council gives up its demand for a quick British withdrawal it is again being pushed by Adams. To reassure his movement, he stressed publically that the only solution to the conflict is the end of partition and British disengagement from violence. Nevertheless, by that time, he already knew that it will take time, and was pulling the organization to understand that as well.

In the next case of convergence towards cooperation, in early 1990, he repeats the need to plan for a long strategy once again, and even admits that the armalite and the bullet box might not be working as well as they were supposed to anymore (Adams, 1990). He stays quiet publically for the next two cases, but he is working hard within the organization to get the Army Council to support a ceasefire. In both of these cases he senses that the organization is not facing a potential splintering, so he need not make public announcement.

He is most involved and definitely necessary for the outcome of the last two cases of convergence towards cooperation. In both of them there is a real fear of organizational collapse and he must intervene both internally and externally to make progress possible. He can see the light at the end of the tunnel, an end to violence and a place at the table, finally the British are cooperating, and even the Army Council was almost convinced of his view, but not everybody is onboard. In both of these cases he is pulling the organization behind him and does everything to show that he is serious about peace, and that he can indeed bring the Provisional IRA to the table, from calling on the Provisional IRA to announce a ceasefire publically (Adams, 1997), through showing up uninvited at Stormont and demanding a place at the table, to reaching out to UUP leader Trimble (Adams, 1998).

All the while, he reassures his public that Sinn Féin is still very much committed to Republican Goals, to Irish right to self-determination, the need to end partition and British withdrawal (Adams, 1998). But he is also reading the context, he sees that the British are finally listening and willing, whether it was genuine or by virtue of George Mitchell's pressure did not matter. The time was right for the strategic leader to push his organization forward, and so he did. In the final case, he even made sure to do it 'the right way', by a vote in the Army Council, in the Executive Council and in the General Army Convention (Moloney, 2002).

Interaction between levels - discussion

All in all, the context at the background of most of these cases was positive. And still, it was not enough to explain the decision to cooperate. The process of conflict transformation is a complicated one, and has many moving pieces in it. It was not enough that the British were willing to talk, nor was it enough that Hume was willing to support the Movement, it was the fact that the British were willing to talk to Hume that made a difference as well.

In a similar way, all of these would not have mattered unless the Movement was sure of its integrity, meaning that there are no factions that are unhappy and planning to break away if they see too big of a movement towards cooperation and away from violence. Furthermore, in several of these cases, when there was in fact a fear of such fractioning, progress in the conflict process towards cooperation was dependent on the leaders.

Adams was central in pulling the movement towards cooperation, but obviously he was not alone in it. He needed McGuinness, he needed Gibney, he needed Hume, he needed Blair and Brooke and many other leaders to give him a chance. But he was patient, always re-assessing his context, who is facing him, what is facing him, and who is standing behind him. It allowed him to plan for long and to move incrementally, sometimes he needed to use more of his charm and charisma to push the organization, sometimes the organization was already there on its own. Factors from all of these levels came together in determining group behavior. Context was almost enough, but it was not enough for all. organizational dynamics and leadership though fill the gap in our understanding of organizational behavior.

Preferring a unity of message over anything else

This chapter surveyed the cases in which the movement chose convergence over divergence, referring both to cases in which it chose violence and to those in which it chose cooperation. What do we learn from examining both types of convergence alongside each other?

Indeed, the context was overall more negative when the movement chose violence and more positive when it chose cooperation. When examining the particular cases in which this was not the case, organizational dynamics help us to better understand some of the story. It is clear that the movement was not operating in a vacuum. It was affected by the context around it, it was listening to what was being said, but it also had its organizational red lines it could not cross. However, under the right conditions, it was willing to push the boundaries of such red lines.

The British government was by far the actor with the most influence on Republican behavior, but it was not the sole one. The combined effect of British government interaction with other actors in the conflict, most notably the Irish government and the Unionists also influenced Republican decision making. At the end of the day, the Republican Movement was regularly busy assessing its position in the conflict process compared to its adversaries. What attention was the British government giving it? Was it positive or negative attention? But alongside these matters, the Republican Movement was also looking into the attention the British Government was giving to the Unionists and to their paramilitary groups. It was also looking at the Irish Government and assessing its potential support at all times, especially during times in which the two governments were talking to each other.

When the British government was taking Republican and nationalist claims and concerns seriously, when it was willing to punish Unionists and loyalists for the same behaviors for which

it would punish the Republican movement, the Republican movement had more of an incentive to send positive and cooperative signals. When it felt like everyone were against it, the Republican movement had less of a problem sticking to its armed struggle.

The role of Hume as a promoter of peace, together with some intermediaries, should not be overlooked. Intermediaries and promoters of peace may not have affected the choice between cooperation and contention per se, but their support of the Republican Movement led others to change their attitude towards the movement. If Hume had not stood with Adams in difficult times, the British government would not have made an effort to accommodate any Republican wishes. A similar argument can be said about the Irish government. Hume acted as the true go-between, alongside Father Alec Reid who carried messages back and forth between the Republican leadership and the two governments.⁶⁷

Organizational convergence depended a great deal on Adams's intervention between the movement and the context. He was there to translate the true meaning of messages to the movement and he was there to explain mixed organizational messages to the world. His explanations sometimes required some creative framing, often some manipulation, but above all, the support of strong people, both within and outside of the organization and the right context. Just like a convergent organization depended on all of these factors coming together, so did progress in the conflict as a whole.

The next chapter looks into the context and the organizational dynamics behind cases in which the organization was diverging. It will point to patterns that push the organization to diverge and send mixed messages, it will compare and contrast two types of diverging behavior -

⁶⁷ Hume just did it publically whereas Father Reid was somewhat of a secret attaché and as such there is far less information regarding his contribution.

a confused military wing and an overall divergent organization. It will also contrast these patterns with the patterns found in this chapter to allow for a more thorough understanding of the circumstances under which the organization not only acts in convergence, but chooses cooperation over contention.

Chapter 6

Divergence and Confusion – A Great Tactic or Organizational Breakdown?

Out of the 24 cases studied, eight (a third) were divergent and three were confused. Together they make up 11 cases, which is almost 50% of the studied behavior in which the organization was not sending a clear unified message. What are the circumstances that push DWROs towards divergence or confusion? It is time to delve into the divergent cases. Unlike the previous chapter, I open here by discussing the more prevalent divergent cases and then move on to discuss the three confused cases. In a similar way to the previous chapter, I will end by discussing some patterns that are shared by the two types of divergence, though this time, I will also compare these patterns to the ones that were found in the previous chapter as well.

Overall I expect to find that a confusing context will lead the movement to send mixed signals itself. Whether it will be diverging or confused will depend on organizational dynamics and on the intervention of Adams in the process.

You will do your thing and I will do mine – two wings in disagreement?

The details of the different cases are presented in Table 6.1:

Table 6.1: Divergence - details

Time	December 1987 - January 1988	March 1989	November 1989	January - February 1992
Behavior	SF begins talks with SDLP while AC launches Tet Offensive	IRA and Adams issue conflicting statements on the same day regarding the killing of 2 civilians in Coagh, Co. Tyrone.	Sinn Fein re-launches its 'scenario for peace' while the IRA continues its violent campaign	SF publishes Towards a Lasting Peace while the IRA continues bombing (Teebane massacre)
Details of behavior	Adams and Hume meet for the first time to set the terms for negotiations. Important: after Enniskillen Adams criticized the IRA. In November 87, IRA also launches a violent period using the Libyan arms that were not caught. It goes quite poorly for them.	Adams speech leads to suspicions regarding a split in the movement. In his speech Adams announces that he is seeking a "non-armed political movement to work for self-determination". The IRA admitted the two were killed by mistake, but refused to apologize.	Sinn Fein re-launches its 'scenario for peace' document from May 1987 in which it calls for British withdrawal before peace can happen. At the same time, the IRA continues its violent campaign	While the IRA is in the midst of a bombing campaign, SF comes out with its 'towards a lasting peace statement'.
type of case	Divergent #1	Divergent #2	Divergent #3	Divergent #4
Period examined	August 1987 - January 1988	November 1988 - March 1989	July - November 1989	September 1991-February 1992
Context - British government, military and security forces	Sep 87- a gov offer to force electoral candidates to publically declare their opposition to the use of violence; 11 Unionist MPs are summoned for hearings under a new public order law for participating in illegal marches; Nov 87 - AIC meets, agrees on increased security measures and a suggestion to outlaw SF; Thatcher joins 7000 people in a rearranged Enniskillen service; RUC arrest 40 SF activists; Jan 88 - Tony Benn publishes draft for British withdrawal from NI;	Nov 88 - meets with Irish Rep to widen review of AIA; Dec 88 - New Fair Employment Bill, London police finds PIRA bomb factory.	July 89 - Peter Brooke is appointed as new Secretary of state for NI; Aug 89 - RUC kills a catholic teenager with plastic bullet; Sep 89 - AIC meets in Dublin; Oct 89 - 28 UDR men are arrested regarding collusion b/w security forces and loyalist groups; another AIC meeting; Nov 89 - Brooke admits IRA cannot be defeated militarily and that he will consider talking w/ SF if violence ended	Sep 91 - Brooke tries to restart talks process; Nov 91 - increases security measures; Dec 91 - freezes spending on projects in NI; AIC meeting; Jan 92 - admits substantive talks are impossible; Feb 92 - Gov meets w/ NI party reps, no SF, extra battalion is sent in, Army kills 4 IRA, RUC attacks SF office
Context - agreement				
Context - Unionist	Aug 87 - call for end of British-Irish cross border intel cooperation; Nov 87 - Paisley and Molyneux march against the AIA	Nov 88 - small protests against the AIA; Feb 89 - Begin campaign of SF councillors killings, begin w/ killing a Catholic solicitor Finucane, then kills SF Councillor Davey	Aug 89 - UFF kills a catholic civilian, led to accusations that were confirmed of cooperation b/w loyalist groups and security forces; Nov 89 - protest against AIA drew small crowds;	Sep 91: UFF kills another SF councillor; bombs catholic areas, attacks the GAA. bombs everywhere; Nov 91 - UFF attacks a football match; burn a Catholic mother and her son; UVF kills 3 civilians, apologize only for the Protestant one; Jan 92 - continues extra ordinary violence - retaliate for Teebane, killing 5 civilians
Context - Irish Republic	Nov 87 - Passes a new extradition law (which requires prima-facie evidence); finds the Libyan arms (with the help of the French), Dec 87 -begin an 'unprecedented national search' for more arms and finds 2 caches of weapons;		July 89 - Haughey is re-elected as Taoiseach, first Fianna Fail coalition in history	Nov 91 - Bars SF from Dublin Mansion House; Jan 92 - Government drama, suspends talks
Context - Elections	increases its vote, SF and all the unionist parties fell; Oct 87 - SF wins seats for Belfast city council in By elections		June 89 - elections for European parliament - SF received only 9% of the vote; elections for Dail - SF receives a meager 1.2% of the vote	Aug 91 - Belfast City Council by-elections, SF wins, becomes 2nd largest party on the council
Context - intermediaries	Nov 87 - Irish church goes against the IRA following Enniskillen	Nov 88 - European Court of human rights rules against Britain		Sep 91 - US delegation visit to NI, refuses to meet with SF; Nov 91 - UN criticizes Britain
Context - Promoters of peace	Aug 87 - SDLP blames SF for election fraud; Nov 87 - Hume calls on Unionists to negotiate; Jan 88 - Agrees to talk with SF	Jan 89 - Hume invites unionists for talks	Nov 89 - Hume calls IRA to lay down their arms, appeals Unionists to join talks in Dublin	
Context - spoilers	Nov 87 - IPLO attacks a loyalist activist; Dec 87 - Libya cancels money transfers following the capture of the Eskund	Dec 88 - PLO formally denies contact to PIRA		
Org- PIRA	Aug 87 - tries to kill King (sec.); Nov 87 - Enniskillen bombing; Dec 87 - bombs a judge's house	Dec 88 - End of Year msg explicitly warns British politicians and the royal family; Jan 89 - announces the disbanding of the West Fermanagh brigade due to the killing of an innocent man mistaken as RUC informer;	July 89 - kills a British soldier in Germany; Sep 89 - kills a German civilian woman, Bombs the Royal Marines School of Music, killing 10 musicians; Nov 89 - kills 3 soldiers;	Nov 91 - bombs the military wing at a hospital, series of attacks on Belfast, bombs the loyalist wing at Crumlin prison. Dec 91 - huge bomb in central Belfast, several bombs in London and NI over 7 days officially announces a Christmas ceasefire; Jan 92 - violence is resumed, Teebane explosion killing 8 Protestant civilians
Org - SF	Aug 87 - Jim McAllister leads a march against 'spy cameras'; Jan 88 - begins talks with SDLP	Feb 89 - SF legally challenges the broadcast ban;	Sep 89 - launches the 'Irish National Congress' in Dublin; Nov 89 - re-launches its 'scenario for peace'	Feb 92 - launches 'Towards a lasting peace'
Adams' actions		Jan 89 - Adams urges the IRA to avoid civilian casualties; March 89 - Adams states that he is seeking a non-armed movement	Sep 89 - emphasizes that in the past BG talked to SF during IRA campaigns, so it in fact does not want to talk.	Feb 92 - calls for the British to leave and for Irish reunification, calls for the UN and EU to intervene

Time	June 1992	December 1992	January - February 1996	October 1996
Behavior	SF hints at a need to move away from the armed struggle while IRA is still bombing	Adams uses the media to have a conversation with Mayhew while the IRA is in the midst of a bombing campaign	SF supports the Twin track solution and the Mitchell commission, but the Army Council announces the end of the cease-fire	IRA attacks in NI for the first time since August 1994 while Adams preaches for peace and dialogue
Details of behavior	Gibney's speech at the annual commemoration at Bodenstown shows a great shift in thinking amongst SF but not necessarily within the movement as a whole...	Mayhew gave a famous speech in which he said SF could potentially be included in talks, and Adams gives a speech in reply that answers Mayhew with clear terms. Meanwhile, the IRA continues its bombing campaign	based on its support of the Mitchell principles for decommissioning parallel to talks, SF begins a round of talks with both the Irish and the British governments. At the same time, the IRA announcement blamed Major and the British gov in the failure of the talks. An hour after the announcement the first bomb in London went off.	IRA continues its violent attacks, and is quite verbose at the time justifying its violence by Britain's lack of cooperation. At the same time, SF is trying hard to be included despite it all and to send out a peaceful message. Adams says nothing to justify armed struggle
type of case	Divergent #5	Divergent #6	Divergent #7	Divergent #8
Period examined	March-June 1992	August - December 1992	Oct 1995 - Feb 9 1996	June - October 1996
Context - British government, military and security forces	April 92 - Mayhew replaces Brooke, Talks at Stormont recommence; May 92 - M15 gets involved, British soldiers attack civilians in two incidents; June 92 - talks reach deadlock;	Aug 92 - UDA proscribed, London police finds 12 tons of IRA explosives; Sep 92 - Brooke/Mayhew talks are resumed; Nov 92 - NIO offers to fully fund Catholic schools, talks end; AIC resumed; Dec 92 - Mayhew says SF can be included in future talks;	Nov 95 - NIO publishes the Building blocks paper, later publishes the joint communique, Changes law on remission of sentence - releases 83 prisoners; 600 soldiers leave; Jan 96 BG and IG meet w/ SF at Stormont, Mayhew confirms all party talks will begin in Feb;	June 96 - Stormont talks begin, but SF is not invited; joint statement blames the lack of a cease fire; SF is excluded from NIF; July 96 - 1000 more British troops (to support RUC during Drumcree); RUC backs down, allows orange marches in Catholic areas; Oct 96 - Major says IRA ceasefire is insufficient for SF to enter talks;
Context - agreement				
Context - Unionist	April 92 - UFF kills a Catholic woman;	Sep 92 - DUP walk out of talks; returns when articles 2 and 3 are discussed; UUP goes to Dublin for talks; Nov 92: UFF Extends its campaign to 'all republicans', kills 3 Catholic civilians, UUP tries to save the talks; Dec 92: UFF plants 7 bombs in the Republic; UDA threatens to increase its campaign of violence;	Sep 95: Unionist leaders meet Taoiseach; Oct 95 - Trimble calls for a new NIA, agrees to talk to SF if they will not abstain; Dec 95 - Trimble refuses to endorse the two track approach	July 96 - Drumcree II - riots until RUC backs down, Unionist parties pull out of Stormont talks over it;
Context - Irish Republic		Nov 92 - gov falls.	Sep 95 - cancels summit with BG due to disagreement on decommissioning ; Oct 95 - Bruton says SF is sufficiently committed to peace;	
Context - Elections	April 92 - Westminster Elections - Adams loses his seat to SDLP and SF does poorly	Nov 92 - Republic of Ireland - SF does extremely poorly.		May 96 - NIF elections - SF gets 15.5% - its best ever result
Context - intermediaries			Sep 95: European court on Human rights found SAS in Gibraltar breached the human rights convention; Oct 95 - US delegates meet w/ party delegates, SF included; Nov 95 - Clinton visits NI; Jan 96 - The Mitchell report; Feb 96 - European court on Human rights finds British legislation in violation	
Context - Promoters of peace		Sep 92 - Hume calls NI 'unnatural entity'	Nov 95 - SDLP conference does not rule out electoral pact w/ SF; Feb 96 - Hume joins Adams in a meeting with AC members	July 96 - SDLP pulls out of Stormont talks
Context - spoilers	March 92 - Libya breaks ties with IRA; April 92 - INLA shoots a BA Sergeant in Derby	Aug 92 - IPLO internal feud; Nov 92 - IPLO disbands		CIRA debut, INLA GHQ disbands
Org- PIRA	March 92 - 3 bomb attacks in London and Ireland; April 92 - The Baltic Exchange Bombing; May 92 - bomb attack kills British soldier;	Sep-Dec - massive campaign of attacks; Dec 92 - 3 days Christams ceasefire;	Sep 95: IRA rejects notion of decommissioning; Dec 95 - statement blaming the BG of ludicrous demands;	June 96 - Adare Attack; Manchester Bombing; Oct 96 - Lisburn attack - first bomb in NI since ceasefire, blaming BG for it; GAC votes for a new AC and Adams is even more in the lead than before
Org - SF			Aug 95 - McGuinness shows a different view than Adams; Sep 95 - special AF in Dublin, supports leadership view that 'there is no other way but peace'; Dec 95 - meets with the int'l commission on decommissioning; makes proposals to Mayhew for all party talks; Jan 96 - meets British and Irish gov's;	
Adams' actions		Dec 92 - Adams call the exclusion of SF from talks undemocratic and offers the UN and EC will have an increased role in finding a solution	Aug 95 - Adams confirms the movement is ready for compromises; Oct 95 - Adams says SF is committed to a democratic and peaceful process; Nov 95 - Adams announces talks with BG failed; blames BG for subverting the peace process; Feb 96 - brings Hume to a meeting w/ AC	Oct 96 - Adams calls the gov's to include SF before the entire process breaks down; blames Major for strangling the peace and for not wanting real peace. Says dialogue and negotiations are the only way to solve conflict and that he, and SF, are fully committed to peace

The Contextual Level of analysis

In table 6.2 below I present the existence of factors. Which of these various factors were relevant for the different cases?

Table 6.3: Divergence – relevance

Time	December 87 - January 1988	March 1989	November 1989	January - February 1992	June 1992	December 1992	January- February 1996	October 1996
type of case	divergent	divergnt	divergent.	divergent	Divergent	divergent	Divergent	Divergent
Context - British government, military and security forces	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Context - agreement								
Context - Unionist	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Context - Irish Republic	√		√	√		√	√	
Context - Elections	√		√	√	√	√		√
Context - intermediaries	√	√		√			√	
Context - Promoters of peace	√	√	√			√	√	√
Context - spoilers	√	√			√	√		√

Patterns

What are some of the patterns that are immediately visible? First and foremost, the British government once again is relevant in all of the cases. But unlike in the cases of convergence where it was the only factor that was relevant in all of the cases, in divergent cases the Unionists are also relevant in all of the cases. This is an interesting distinction from cases of convergence.⁶⁸ Can it be that increased unionist action or that the interaction between unionists and the British pushes the Republican Movement to diverge? In order to answer this question, we need to look more closely into the way these various factors were relevant in each case. But first, some more patterns.

We can see that agreements are once again not present, technically. Perhaps it is time to emphasize once again that no signing of an agreement in the four months that came before each of the cases does not mean that agreements did not have any effect on Republican thinking and decision making. However, for the purpose of my dissertation, it is hard to assess the true effect of agreements when they are rare on the one hand and omnipresent on the other.

What is also noticeable at first glance is that many factors were operating in the background of each case. The case with the least significant factors, June 1992, still has four actors in the context. I will remind you that when we looked at cases of convergence towards cooperation there was a case in which only two factors from the context were relevant and two cases in which only three factors from the context were relevant. In Convergent cases (both towards violence and cooperation) four factors were relevant on average per case, whereas in

⁶⁸ In convergence towards cooperation Unionist actions were indeed relevant in 80% of the cases, which is not a small amount. It is not 100%, however, like here (and in confused cases).

divergent cases (even including confused cases as will be discussed below), more than five factors are relevant per case on average.

Elections and promoters of peace were both relevant in 75% of the cases (6 out of 8), whereas both the Irish Republic and Spoilers were relevant in 63% of the cases (5 out of 8). The least relevant factor in diverging cases is intermediaries, which were only relevant in 50% of the cases (4 out of 8). Does this mean that third party intervention is a significant factor in a movement's decision to converge and cooperate (it was more relevant in those cases than here)? Or does it mean that the influence of third parties on a movement's decision whether to converge or diverge is not independent and in fact dependent on the existence of other factors alongside it? And perhaps it has to do with the identity of the third party and the way in which it was relevant. Table 6.3 below begins the process of closer examination by looking into the way each of the factors was relevant.

Table 6.4: Divergence - positive and negative contextual factors

Time	December 87 - January 1988	March 1989	November 1989	January - February 1992	June 1992	December 1992	January- February 1996	October 1996
type of case	divergent	divergnt	divergent	divergent	Divergent	divergent	Divergent	Divergent
Context - British government, military and security forces	(-)/(+)/(-)/(-)/ (-)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(-)	(+)/(-) /(+)/(+)/(+)/(+)	(+)/(-)/(-) /(+)/(+)/(-)/ (-)/(-)/(-)	(+)/(+)/(-)/(+)	(+)/(-) /(+)/(+)/(+)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(+)/(+) (+)/(+)	(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)
Context - agreement								
Context - Unionist	(+)/(+)	(+)/(-)/(-)	(-)/(-)/(+)	(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)/ (-)/(-)/(-)/(-)	(-)	(+)/(+)/(+)(-)/ (-)/(+)(-)/(-)	(+)/(+)(-)	(-)/(+)
Context - Irish Republic	(-)/(-)/(-)		(-)	(-)/(-)		(-)	(+)/(+)	
Context - Elections	(-)/(+)		(-)/(-)	(+)	(-)	(-)		(+)
Context - intermediaries	(-)	(+)		(-)/(+)			(+)/(+)/(+)/(+)	
Context - Promoters of peace	(-)/(+)/(+)	(+)	(-)/(+)			(+)	(+)/(+)	(+)
Context - spoilers	(-)/(-)	(-)			(-)/(-)	(-)/(+)		(-)/(+)

Table 6.3 paints an interesting picture. Unlike the convergence towards cooperation cases, where we saw more factors operating in different ways as the time line advanced, here it seems as though many factors were relevant already from the first case. The context is simply more active and complex, which might explain the different organizational decisions. On average however, fewer factors were present, either positively or negatively, per case than in convergence towards cooperation (14.8 per case here, 17.5 per case there). Nevertheless, they seem more evenly distributed among the cases here.

All in all, 119 actions were coded for cases of divergence, with the scale tipping slightly towards the negative side of things. Sixty-two negative versus fifty-seven positive actions (or occurrences) of the various contextual factors makes the context 52% negative and 48% positive. This is compared to a context that was 67% positive and 32% negative in convergent towards cooperation cases. Another sign that context indeed matters. Having a more negative context may begin to explain what pushes a movement to diverge in its behavior.

If we look into the specific cases, only in 50% of them the context is truly more negative than positive. In one of them it is split in the middle and in the remaining three cases, it is, in fact, more positive than negative. Clearly, and as we have already gathered from the previous chapter, the context on its own cannot explain the entire story behind the organizational decision to converge or diverge. In any case, if the context were overwhelmingly negative we would not have expected the movement to diverge necessarily, but rather to act in violence. As such, the fact that the context is complex and not straight forwardly one way or the other sits well with my research question. The movement is struggling to determine its exact position in the conflict, it is getting mixed signals from all the various actors which leads it to be less clear about the best

strategy to employ. It thus requires us once again to look into the actual details of the cases, as well as into organizational dynamics and leadership.

The British

Resembling the analysis from the previous chapter, several of the coding decisions deserve some explanation.⁶⁹ I begin once again with the British government and its organs. Overall 45 actions of the British were coded, 25 of which (55%) were coded as positive from the Republican Movement's point of view. Two specific coding decisions deserve more attention. In Divergent case #4, that took place in early 1992, Brooke, current Secretary of State to Northern Ireland admits that substantive talks are currently not possible (CAIN, ongoing). This instance is coded as a positive sign from the Republican Movement's point of view because it is an admission by the government that it is in fact stuck. Since Sinn Féin was still not included in the talks, it sees this as a positive sign. No decision that has to do with Sinn Féin's future will be taken without it, or at least not in the near future.

In the next case, in June 1992, another British action regarding the talks is coded as positive. Similarly, it is when the talks reach a deadlock once again. Even though by this time Patrick Mayhew had taken over from Brooke as the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and the talks re-commenced, they still did not manage to make any great progress in the peace process, while Sinn Féin was not included. I will again remind you that during this time, the British government was in fact holding secret talks with members of the Republican Movement (Sinn Féin, January 5th 1994). But to the outside world, Sinn Féin was completely excluded from

⁶⁹ When occurrences were in fact similar to things that were already explained in the previous chapter, I do not provide additional explanation here. The same logic was followed in the coding. What was considered as positive before is still considered positive here. It is only the new types of actions that are explained here.

talks, and could claim that the talks are stuck because it was not being given voice. It is positive from the Republican Movement's point of view, as once again, no decision that has to do with its future will be taken without Sinn Féin's official input.

The rest of the British actions at this time were quite clearly positive or negative from the Republican Movement's point of view, even though, as before, how positive or negative any particular action was varied.⁷⁰ There is no doubt that in the months leading up to cases of divergence the British were sending very mixed signals. Only in the last two cases of divergence were the British consistent in their behavior. Before February 1996 they were sending only positive signals, such as releasing prisoners, sending soldiers home, meeting with Sinn Féin and scheduling a date to begin all-party negotiations. Before October 1996 the British were sending only negative signals such as not inviting Sinn Féin to the all-party talks that began, bringing in 1000 more troops, backing down to Unionist demands and announcing that even a ceasefire will be insufficient to include Sinn Féin in the talks (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). These are quite the opposite messages that are being made less than a year apart. In order to understand why the British changed their behavior so dramatically, we must look into the rest of the context, including the doings and sayings of the Republican Movement.

Before we move to discuss these two cases in more details, a quick look into the details of British behavior in the six other cases reveals some interesting truths that go beyond the plus or minus marks that the table shows. Look, for example, into divergent case #6, December 1992. In it, the British are mostly positive. The only negative thing that happens is that they uncover an arms cache of the Republican Movement. Clearly losing its weapons is a negative thing for the

⁷⁰ It should be emphasized that the variation in how much a particular action is seen as positive or negative is related not only to the action itself but also to the timing and to whatever else is happening around it. Not agreeing to talk with Sinn Féin before a ceasefire is not as negative as not agreeing to talk with it after a ceasefire, for example.

Republican Movement, but it is not a real sign of negative attention by the British, the police were simply doing their job. Uncovering weapons is quite different for the British regarding the Republican Movement than refusing to talk to Sinn Féin.

A similar case in which the British were mostly sending positive signals and only had one negative action is Divergent case #3, November 1989. The negative action there was when a RUC officer killed a Catholic teenager with a plastic bullet (Sutton, 1994). It is definitely a negative action by those who represent the British interest in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, and without minimizing the severity of the act, it was a mistake and not part of a policy. Just like the Provisional IRA made mistakes and expected to be forgiven, so did the British. A month later the British arrested 28 UDR men for charges of collusion with loyalist paramilitary groups which was a hugely positive signal and shortly after. Brooke, secretary of state at that time even admitted that the Provisional IRA could not be defeated and said he would consider talking to Sinn Féin if violence ended (CAIN, Ongoing).

In the other cases of divergence, the British behavior was more mixed and its negative acts cannot be brushed off as 'mistakes'. Arresting 40 Sinn Féin activists in November 1987, increasing security measures in November 1991 or assigning M-15 (British Secret Services) to investigate the movement in May 1992 are all part of the more negative signaling the British were making during these times.

The positive signals the British were sending during these cases are not all directly related to the Republican Movement, but it nonetheless benefitted from them, which is why they were coded as positive. For example, summoning Unionist parliament members for a hearing due to their participation in illegal marches in September 1987 does not have to do with the Republican Movement, but it is a positive signal in the sense that it shows the Catholic

population that Unionists are not immune from disciplinary actions for breaking the law. Similarly, resuming talks with the Irish government or agreeing to review the Anglo-Irish Agreement are two other signals that the British are sending that are not directly related to the Republican Movement, but benefit it nonetheless.

What I wish to stress at this point, is that one must look into the details of each actor's behavior in order to assess the nature of their behavior. Even more so, each action should be examined in relation to the timing, as similar actions may have a different meaning at different points in time. We thus must look into the interaction of the various actors in the conflict to get a better idea of the process as a whole. All in all, when it comes to the British, who are easily the most influential part of the context, it should come as no surprise the Republican Movement could not portray a unified message, when the British were unable to do so themselves.

The Unionists

Some clarifications regarding the coding are in order here as well. When Unionists called to end cross-border intelligence cooperation between Irish police and RUC in August 1987, it was perceived as a positive thing by the Republican movement (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). After all, less cooperation between the two forces meant that Provisional IRA would have an easier time operating. When Unionists organize marches against the Anglo-Irish Agreement in November of that year, it too was seen as a positive occurrence by the Republican Movement as it held the same opinion of the agreement (O'Brien, 1999). It is coded positive because someone was doing the dirty job for the Republican Movement. Even more than that, that someone else, the Unionists, were also attracting all the bad publicity that came with such protests and diverted attention away from the Republican Movement as a result. When two years later another march against the Anglo-Irish Agreement drew small crowds (Bew & Gillespie, 1999), it was still

positive. Yes, the Republican Movement wished the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not in place, but the fact that the Unionists failed in bringing the masses to their event also meant that the public was getting tired of their constant protests. It was a positive sign for the Republican Movement. Under such circumstances, the public might actually support it.

All in all, 30 actions by Unionists were coded for these cases, 19 of which (63%) were coded as negative and 11 (37%) as positive. Only once were the Unionists' actions completely positive, in the first case, as was just discussed above. In divergent case #6, December 1992, their actions are split between negative and positive. However, it is worth noting that their positive actions are once again not necessarily directed towards the Republican Movement, though the Republican Movement benefits from them indirectly.

When the DUP (Democratic Unionist Party) walks out of the talks in September 1992 and then walks back in when the topic fits its agenda it was heavily criticized for its behavior (CAIN, ongoing). Both of these actions are seen as positive by the Republican Movement simply because any critique of the Unionists by the two governments helps its cause. The actions are diverting negative attention away from the movement. When the UUP (Ulster Unionist Party) goes to Dublin to have talks with the Irish government and when it makes an attempt to save the talks by agreeing to talk to Sinn Féin in November 1992 this is also seen as a positive sign by the Republican Movement as the UUP shows itself as a reasonable party that is open to dialogue. It is a potential voice opportunity. And the Republican Movement could use any chance it gets.

Nevertheless, when Unionist actions were coded as negative, they were really negative. From Loyalist paramilitaries targeting Sinn Féin councilors to repeated attacks against Catholic civilians, the Unionists were raising the fear amongst the Republican, nationalist and Catholic communities and increasing the pressure on the Republican movement to show results. The way

the Republican movement chose to react to such attacks was very much dependent on the rest of the context at the time, but also on organizational dynamics and the preference divergence between the rank and file and the leadership, and even between the peace camp and the soldiers on the Army Council, as will be explained below.

The Irish Republic

And what about the Irish government? Nine actions were coded over all divergent cases, seven of which were coded as negative. The two positive actions were both in the same case, in January 1996. First, the Irish government canceled a meeting with the British Government due to disagreements regarding the demand for Provisional IRA decommissioning and then Bruton, the current Taoiseach, announced that Sinn Féin has proven it is committed to peace (CAIN, ongoing). In both of these, the Irish government took the side of the Republican Movement. In all other actions during these periods of divergence however, its actions were coded as negative from the point of view of the Republican Movement, from the passing of a new extradition law in November 1987 and the ‘unprecedented search’ for more arms,⁷¹ through the barring of Sinn Féin from using the Mansion House in Dublin for its annual convention due to Provisional IRA violence, to the fall of the government and the election of Fianna Fail, which was not about to stand with the Republican Movement as its predecessor did (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

Whether the Irish Government was helpful or detrimental to the Republican cause was thus a result of who was standing at its head, the state of the talks with the British and the level of Republican violence. It was as affected by the context as any other actor in this conflict, and it was reacting to external pressures while trying to maintain the integrity of the government. In

⁷¹ After the capture of the Eskund, both governments realized there are far more weapons around. Their efforts paid off and two huge caches of weapons were found, together with safe houses (O’Brien, 1999).

these cases, politics in Ireland were quite turbulent which was negative from the Republican Movement's point of view, as it could not count on any government with which it was talking to retain its power long enough to fulfill its part of whatever deal was struck.

Spoilers

Spoilers were also coded nine times, two of which were positive and the rest were negative. As explained in the previous chapter, when other republican movements use violence, it toughens the life of the Provisionals. It not only increases the level of fear within the Catholic community, but it also helps the two governments in legitimizing their efforts against the Republican cause. During these times of divergence, however, two of the negative spoilers' actions did not have to do with republican movements. In the first case of divergence Libya, which was supporting the Republican Movement with funds and ammunition, decided to cancel its support due to the capture of the Eskund (Moloney, 2002). This was a definite negative development in the conflict process from the Republican Movement's point of view.

Another international actor that is coded as a spoiler is relevant in the second case. This time it is the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) that denied its connection to the Provisional IRA (CAIN, ongoing). Besides the fact that many have looked into the very real connection between the two,⁷² this particular incident is coded as negative because it paints the Provisional IRA as too radical to be associated with.

The only times in the entire conflict process that spoilers' actions are regarded as positive by the Republican Movement are when two splinter groups, INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) and IPLO (Irish People Liberation Organization) announce their disbandment, one in

⁷² See for example Alexander & Sinai (1989) .

November 1992 and the other in September 1996. Their disbandment means that the level of violence will decrease and together with it, the pressure on the Republican Movement. In general I find that spoilers were not necessary nor sufficient to explain Republican decision making in any of the types of behaviors.⁷³

Elections

Elections are quite relevant in these times of divergence. Eight elections were relevant in six of the cases. Five of those eight elections had quite the negative results for the Republican Movement. A little bit early in the time-line but important to note nonetheless are the local elections that were held in June 1987. In these elections, the SDLP actually managed to increase its share of the vote in West Belfast, a known Republican area, though Adams maintained his seat (Walker, 1992).⁷⁴ Still in the period leading up to the first case of divergence, on October 23rd 1987, Sinn Féin received a boost from the public when it won Belfast City council by-elections in two areas – upper and lower falls (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

In the second case of divergence, elections were held in the Republic of Ireland. In them Sinn Fein received only a meager 1.2% of the vote and Fianna Fail managed to build its first ever coalition. Continuing the trend, in the elections to the Dail (Irish Parliament) that were held at the end of November 1992, Sinn Féin received so little support it in fact became irrelevant in the south (O'Brien, 1999). When elections were held for Westminster on April 9th 1992, Adams lost the seat for West Belfast he had held since the 1983 elections to the SDLP candidate, Hendron

⁷³ This conclusion is based on the reading of many organizational documents, in which those who are considered as spoilers here are rarely, if ever, mentioned.

⁷⁴ In 1983, Adams received 16,379 votes out of a local electorate of 59,750 (27%) while Hendron, the SDLP candidate for West Belfast received 10,934 votes (18%). In 1987 Adams received 16,862 votes out of an electorate of 59,400 (28%) while Hendron received 14,641 votes (25%). All in all, an increase of 7% in support for Hendron in a staunch Republican area is something the movement would take note of. In other areas, Sinn Féin, as well as the Unionist parties fared less well than they did in 1983, while SDLP's overall share of the vote grew (Walker, 1992).

(Whyte, 2002). Clearly, Sinn Féin was doing quite poorly in the elections during times of divergence.

Intermediaries

Intermediaries were relevant eight times, in four cases, and mostly in a positive way. The two negative actions are when the Catholic church harshly criticized the movement following Enniskillen. It was not the only intermediary that condemned the Provisional IRA's action, but it was definitely the harshest (Matesan & Berger, 2016). The second instance in which a third party's action was coded as negative is in September 1991, when a delegation of US senators visited Northern Ireland, and held meetings with all political parties apart from Sinn Féin. Clearly, being left out did not provide the movement with the sense it had a voice in the process, especially when such a powerful third party is involved.

Four of the intermediaries' actions that are marked as positive are critiques of British policies in Northern Ireland by the United Nations and by the European Court on Human Rights. The other two positive ones took place in October and November 1995, when delegates of the United States congress this time agreed to meet with Sinn Féin, and when Clinton visited Northern Ireland. Being the first sitting American President to visit the area was a huge sign of support not only for the Republican Movement, but for the conflict process as a whole, as it drew international attention to it. Obviously, Clinton's efforts ended up being extremely significant for the peace process and for the Republican Movement.

Promoters of peace

Last but definitely not least are promoters of peace, or simply in these periods, John Hume and his party. Unsurprisingly, 80% of their actions in the period leading up to divergent

cases are positive. After all, if his behavior was mostly negative, it would have been hard to label Hume as a promoter of peace. The first of his actions coded as negative is in the first case of divergence, when following the June 1987 Westminster elections, members of SDLP accused Sinn Féin of election fraud (CAIN, ongoing). Despite having brushed off the claims immediately, it still drew negative attention to Sinn Féin and its campaign, and only aggravated the sense of failure. The second action coded as negative comes in June 1989, when Hume calls on the Provisional IRA to lay down their arms while appealing to unionists to join talks (CAIN, ongoing). It is coded as negative in this context mainly due to the fact that from the Republican Movement's point of view, they are once again being left on the margins because they will not lay down their arms while Unionists who are also using violence do get invited. Apart from these two, Hume maintains his open line of communication with the Republican Movement and stands by its side almost consistently, sometimes in secret but mostly in the open.

Context overall

In summary, on the whole, out of the seven contextual factors I have looked into, four were more negative than positive and three were more positive than negative. Even when we consider that sometimes what is coded as negative, is only somewhat negative, the factors from the context cannot on their own tell us exactly why the movement chose to diverge in its behavior. We must look into the way the different factors interacted with each other, but more importantly, into the organizational dynamics in reacting to such occurrences. Obviously, leadership plays an important role as well in reacting to everything that is going around.

The Organizational level of analysis

So what were the two wings doing while the context was clearly confusing? The first case of divergence follows one of the Provisional IRA's greatest mistakes. Perhaps in their attempt to rush into an attack to raise group morale, perhaps by mistake, on November 8th 1987, Provisional IRA planted a bomb at a war memorial in Enniskillen (Elliott & Flackes, 1999). 1987 was the bloodiest year for the Movement, losing 13 people (either by the British forces or by their own mistakes). The capture of the *Eskund* (the ship that was carrying the Libyan arms) was merely one failure in a recent hurting list that brought down the movement's morale even further (Matesan & Berger, 2016).

The bomb was set off during a Remembrance Day ceremony, killing eleven people and wounding over sixty. It was the highest death toll in a Provisional IRA attack in over five years (Alonso, 2004). The attack led to a massive upheaval against the organization: "The national and international outrage was such that the Republican Movement was rocked to its foundation" (O'Brien, 1999, p. 142). The Provisional IRA immediately admitted its responsibility for the attack but apologized for it only later, when it had a chance to assess the reputational damage the attack had caused.

Sinn Féin on its part refused at the beginning to condemn the attack when a spokesman read an official statement stating: "I believe that the IRA should and will, I hope, take even more precautions in future, that the bombs which they plant will not endanger civilian life" (Hearst, Nov 11th 1987). However, shortly after, members of Sinn Féin began publically criticizing the Provisional IRA for the incident. Sinn Féin maintained its line of strong critique against violence from November 1987 and all throughout the period. In January 1988, Sinn Féin entered into talks

with their rival party the SDLP while the Provisional IRA launched and continued with its version of ‘the Tet Offensive’, a massive violent campaign.⁷⁵

When thinking of a process of action and re-action, the Enniskillen incident was a major catalyst of reactions. Beyond the public-relations disaster it brought on the movement, and the political price Sinn Féin paid for it at the polls, the Enniskillen attack (also known as ‘Poppy-Day Ceremony’) also began a chain of reactions by both the British and Irish governments (Matesan & Berger, 2016). One such reaction was the adoption of harsher counter-terrorism measures and the re-consideration of the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The British government even began discussing the outlawing of Sinn Féin as a political party (Matesan & Berger, 2016).

Due to these reactions, the movement had to send a cooperative signal. However, as was the situation in the background in most of these cases of divergence, the movement was not willing quite yet to give up violence, especially after the year it just had. The Provisional IRA had to prove that they could still operate, that the capture of the Eskund and the killing of several of their good men did not bring them down to their knees. More importantly, the Army Council had to prove to its rank and file that the political strategy that was adopted less than two years before was not dismantling the movement completely and that armed struggle had not been

⁷⁵ The Tet Offensive was an attempt by the Provisional IRA to drag the British to the same kind of war based on surprise attacks against military and security personnel as did the North Vietnamese and the Viet-Kong to the South Vietnamese and the United States. Determining the time in which the Irish Tet Offensive was actually officially decided upon within the Army Council is difficult. Several of the chronologies and histories of the conflict name November as starting date, while others talk of March. Pruitt (2007) and English (2003) both claim that it started at the same time as the talks with the SDLP. “It is somewhat difficult to reconcile IRA planning for the “Tet offensive” with Sinn Féin’s peace initiative, which took place at the same time. Adams, McGuinness, and other leaders of Sinn Féin must surely have known about this planned escalation” (Pruitt, 2007, p. 1528). I choose to go with November as a starting point for the Tet Offensive because it makes more sense, as I discuss in more detail in the case. However, whether the Tet Offensive officially started in November or in March, both are still within the two months’ period that can count for a case in my dissertation. In any case it is a period of clear divergence as Sinn Féin is stable throughout the period in opposing violence openly, while the Provisional IRA is clearly using violence.

abandoned. Having to prove so many people wrong meant that the movement had to go big, or it would become irrelevant.

At the same time, Sinn Féin had to make a point of its own. If it had not reached out to a legitimate party, if it had not made an ally, it would have soon found itself not on the sidelines, but outside of the court completely. The SDLP might have been its political rival as the two parties were competing over the same electorate, but at the end of the day, it was also its only friend and the two parties shared similar goals and views. They just differed in the way to achieve those goals. Divergence in this case was thus a tactical decision to allow for the organizational survival of both of its wings - one through a military campaign and one through political dialogue. At that moment, the bullet and the ballot box were still going hand in hand.

Another interesting case of diverging behavior took place in January and February 1992. At this time, the Provisional IRA was still carrying a campaign of bombing in both Britain and Northern Ireland while the Sinn Fein came out with its 'Towards a Lasting Peace' statement. By June 1992, while the Provisional IRA is still attacking, Sinn Féin increases its efforts at signaling its desire for peace through a speech Jim Gibney of Sinn Féin gave during a commemoration service. To continue this trend, in December 1992, Adams communicates with British Secretary of State Mayhew over newspapers and both present their terms for negotiations while the Provisional IRA is still sticking to its guns.

What do organizational dynamics have to tell us about these cases and how are they affected, if at all, by the challenging context around the Republican Movement? Already in 1988, it became clear to the peace camp within the Army Council that the ballot would not work with the bullet for long. However, knowing their audience, Adams and his allies on the Army Council understood it would take them a while to convince the organization to stand behind a ballot

strategy at the price of abandoning the bullet. And so, there began (mostly) Adams' subtle journey towards changing Republican goals. He was to stand between his organization and the outside world. He was to convince, slowly but surely, his own organization to change its mind about several key Republican beliefs, while convincing the environment to listen to him. As long as both the bullet and the ballot box were the official strategy, mixed signals by the movement were bound to happen.

Bennett (1992) put it quite clearly: "As a politician, there are things Adams can and cannot say publicly. Like all politicians, he must bear his own constituency in mind". Referring to an interview Adams gave in 1990 where he said that if the British government was to offer talks 'the Republicans would not be found wanting', Bennett claims that "we're used to decoding subtler messages from the other parties, and this one was a great deal more straightforward. Adams was saying that, while Sinn Féin could not speak for the IRA, he believed a ceasefire was likely following meaningful talks. This should have been a historic moment. But Adams's words were ignored, both in the media and, publicly at least, by the politicians. No one picked them up and said: 'Look, there might be a chink of light here.' No one listened" (Bennett, January 22nd 1992).

But it was more than the fact that the environment 'did not pick it up'. The organization itself was not yet ready. That interview Bennett is referring to angered the Army Council, who then had to convince the foot-soldiers that Adams was merely playing word games (Moloney, 2002). A couple of days after his interview, representatives of the Army Council delivered a hardline speech supporting a strong military strategy and the bombing campaign. Adams was forced to save face and declared that the military struggle will continue until the British left Ireland (Moloney, 2002).

‘Towards a Lasting Peace’ was the next public announcement. The document itself is worded so skillfully that one has to read it very closely to see that Sinn Féin was, in fact, agreeing to give the Unionists a right to consent about the future of Northern Ireland, a major republican faux-pas for decades. In his speech at the annual Ard Fheis launching the initiative, Adams made sure to frame it as Sinn Féin’s own commitment to peace. This is merely one example in which Adams is clearly tailoring his speech to his audience. When he is in front of the Republican hard-liners, he speaks in favor of armed struggle. But when he is trying to be heard by his political opponents he speaks of peace.

Since ‘Towards a Lasting Peace’ was not received with the open arms it was expected to be received with, Sinn Féin had to up their game. This time, the message was delivered by Jim Gibney, a respected member of Sinn Féin with Republican credentials,⁷⁶ during a Republican event – the annual Bodenstown commemoration service.⁷⁷ Organized by Sinn Féin and attended by all republicans, the more politically oriented alongside the more militarily oriented, it is a perfect place to be heard by the entire spectrum of the movement, and gauge their opinion of new ideas.⁷⁸ Lastly, the message was also stronger, some would even say more specific. This is no longer a vague commitment for peace, but a more direct reference to negotiations.

In the speech Gibney says that British withdrawal might come only after a ceasefire and not before (Gibney, 1992). The meaning of this statement is huge. British withdrawal has always

⁷⁶ Though he did not come from a Republican family, he was born in Belfast, which gave him initial respect by group members. He was interned in the 1970s for suspicion of IRA membership, like many others. However, he was then imprisoned in the 1980s on murder charges, where he served with Gerry Adams in the same ‘Cage 11’ (Taylor, 2014). This is where the two met and became friends and confidants.

⁷⁷ Every June the Republican Movement gathers in Bodenstown, where Wolfe Tone, an Irish revolutionary who is deemed as the father of Irish republicanism is buried (Coogan, 1995).

⁷⁸ It was also not the first time Adams used the stage at Bodenstown to change republican views by having others speak his words. In 1977 he wrote a speech for Jimmy Drumm, a known and well respected republican figure, where he pushed for the broadening of the campaign from the North to the South (English, 2003).

been the goal, and the Republican Movement has always said that the armed campaign will continue until Britain will withdraw from the island. Now Gibney is saying to a Republican crowd that it might have to in fact cease the armed campaign for British withdrawal to even be discussed.⁷⁹

Gibney's speech was not approved by the Army Council beforehand as was the norm in Bodenstown addresses. The way by which an unsanctioned speech was delivered had to do with internal organizational mechanisms, particularly, the Think Tank. The Think Tank grew as an advisory body to the Army Council, especially with regards to political matters, though also with regards to military strategy. During 1992 it 'came into its own' (Moloney, 2002, p. 403). The Think Tank gave the peace camp on the Army Council an advantage over the rest of the Army Council members as it was completely loyal to Adams.

It was the Think Tank that framed the debate in the Army Council by 'data-dumping' the members of the Army Council, generating copious amounts of paperwork before each meeting. In trying to avoid lengthy discussions (which also meant security risks for its members), the Army Council gave Adams, McGuinness, and sometimes, other members of the Think Tank permission to approve Think Tank drafts without even having read them. These drafts included communications on behalf of the movement with the British and the Irish governments (Moloney, 2002).

It was through this process that Gibney's speech received approval. But it did not go quietly with the movement. Once the speech was given, the hardliners on the Army Council came out against it. However, it was too late, the media has already caught on to the message,

⁷⁹ Not to mention that the terms of such withdrawal have also been softened.

and so did the other parties to the conflict. Soon thereafter John Hume agreed to put his name on one of the Think Tank's drafts for talks, which later became known as 'the Hume-Adams Document' (that served as the basis for the Downing Street Declaration). (Moloney, 2002).

The only option facing the 'soldiers' on the Army Council was to continue the bombing campaign. An unsanctioned message like the one given by Gibney challenged a key tenant of Republican thought. If they are not fighting for British withdrawal, what are they fighting for? Divergence in these three consecutive cases is thus less of a genius tactic and more of a survival mechanism. It is helped by the context, but it is mostly driven by a segment of the leadership that does not see eye to eye with the rest of the organization, leaders and rank and file alike. Organizational dynamics and a slow process of takeover of decision making mechanisms by Adams' peace camp is what led to the diverging behaviors at this time.

Fast forward to February 1996, organizational dynamics are illuminating once again. With a context that is almost completely positive, with Sinn Féin being included, only the organization and its leaders can be responsible for the change in tactics. Already in Easter 1995 there was growing discontent amongst the rank and file. The peace process was clearly not going anywhere. Opposition to Adams and his allies grew and the Executive Council decided to intervene. The 12-member Executive of 1994-1996 was quite unhappy with the Army Council already, as they were excluded from the negotiations prior to the Downing Street Declaration (that was based on the Adams-Hume initiative) as well as those that led to the ceasefire (Moloney, 2002).

As the British were not showing any signs of withdrawal, the number of the executive council members opposing Adams and his peace strategy grew. By the summer of 1995, 10 out of the 12 members opposed Adams. The executive was promoting quite a simple argument –

with no movement from the British, the longer the ceasefire lasts, the weaker the movement becomes, both militarily and politically (Moloney, 2002). By early 1996, the ceasefire was coming to its unavoidable end. The executive thus met in January 1996 and decided to assemble an extraordinary General Army Convention (GAC). Fearing the resolution of the GAC and the potential it would vote to replace Adams, the Army Council announced the end of the ceasefire.

By ending the ceasefire, the movement avoided a potential split, or at a minimum, a potential leadership change. It was obviously influenced by Adams, a leader with specific aspirations who was standing in the middle trying to assess the situation both within the organization and outside of it. At least Adams was astute enough to realize he was about to lose control over his own organization. Divergence thus was once again about survival more than anything else, the survival of a leader and not necessarily the organization.

When we get to October 1996 the context has changed completely, which should not come as a surprise since violence was prevalent once again. The context was clearly not conducive to announcing another ceasefire and was overwhelmingly negative. The only way to get another ceasefire and bring a reluctant Provisional IRA to the table would have been by getting the British government to offer something much more substantive. But the British government refused to even talk to Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin's only option was thus to speak about their commitment to peace and hope someone heard and heeded their requests. But the British government was not listening.

Thus, the Provisional IRA had no real reason to cease its violence. On the contrary, no positive sign was being sent its way, and everything around (the peace process) seemed to be collapsing with all the parties pulling out. Sinn Féin did not, could not, and should not, have come out against Provisional IRA violence and risk further splintering (The Continuity IRA had

already appeared). So it did not. But at the same time, it did not express any support for the armed struggle. Sinn Féin was not about to give up. It finally knew what it felt like to be included after all these years. Having come so far in the process to just divert back to war was a depressing notion. A hopeful peace camp, with growing public support and a strong ally in Hume decided to stick to the plan. Elections would come eventually and a new British government might restart the process. Sinn Féin thus had to stay committed if it was to be included in the next round. Divergence in this case was not about preference divergence per-se, each wing was doing what it was supposed to do and the two were supporting each other. It was a tactic more than a survival mechanism.

Looking into organizational dynamics helps us better understand why the movement chose to diverge even when the context was not necessarily negative (in any case, in any of these cases was the context overtly positive). It only strengthens the point that one must look into various factors from different levels of analysis in order to get a more accurate picture of the process. As was discussed, even the same decision to diverge, can be based on different goals or reasons.

Individual level of analysis: Adams

It is also important to look into Adams during these times. As can already be understood from the discussion of organizational dynamics, he is quite central in the decision making processes that led to these diverging behaviors and his work is difficult to separate from that of the organization. I will nevertheless emphasize a few points regarding his leadership, by going back to the three aspects of his behavior (was he fearing organizational collapse, was he necessary and was he being pulled or pulling the organization?).

In all of these cases, Adams was necessary for the decisions to diverge. In all of them he was simultaneously being pulled by the organization and insisting on doing some pulling himself, which also helps to explain the diverging behavior. What changes is the organizational stability he fears that drives his behavior. Thinking of case #1 and case # 8, in both the decision to diverge was a tactical decision more than a survivalist one. However, in the first Adams was fearing organizational collapse, whereas in the last, he was not. In the first case it was both the overly negative context and the low group morale that forced him to live with a continued armed campaign. However, he was already in the midst of talks, and he was not about to quit. In the last case he was not fearing collapse, but he was seeing what the end of the ceasefire did to the context. If in January 1996 the context was positive and yet not enough for the movement, a negative context such as the one he was staring at by October of that year was never going to be enough, so armed struggle needed to be supported, though it did not mean he could not preach for cooperation.

In January 1992 Sinn Féin is still excluded from talks, so Adams makes an effort to gain some political credit by launching 'Towards a Lasting Peace', he cannot bring the Provisional IRA to stop its violent campaign, so he is clearly being pulled by the organization, 'Towards a Lasting Peace' was him doing some pulling on his own. When it did not work, he sent Gibney to say all the things he could not say himself, so again he was being pulled by the organization, while still not giving up the pulling. In December Sinn Féin remains rather silent, so it is his job to send all the messages. He understands he cannot get the organization to move away from violence, so he is being pulled by it, but he is definitely making some progress in pulling it a bit towards his way of things, when the Provisional IRA announces the short Christmas ceasefire. In

those three cases of 1992 he does not fear the organization will collapse if he pulls it, but he advances cautiously, as that is the type of leader he is.

Interaction between the various levels – a discussion

Clearly it is hard to separate between Adams and his own organization, his behavior is driven by the shape of organizational dynamics at every point in time. At the same time, he uses his influence within the organization to pull it incrementally away from violence and towards cooperation. However, he can only do so when the context allows him. He is reading the signs the context is sending him and using them to the advantage of his own interests, and sometimes, to the advantage of his organization's interests. The organization itself is clearly affected by the context. When the armed wing sees the way Sinn Féin is being treated by the British, when it sees its community being attacked relentlessly by Unionists, it affects its commitment to continuing the armed struggle.

A mixed context created a more complex decision making environment for the movement and for its leaders. It was harder to justify one strategy over the other when the cards were not painting a clear enough picture of what the costs and benefits of each strategy will be. So the context definitely matters, and within it, the British actions are pivotal. But on their own, they cannot explain the organizational decision, or necessity, to diverge. However, before some bigger conclusions are made however, we should look into the last cases of organizational mixed messages - those in which the military wing on its own was confused, or was it?

“If you want to shoot – shoot, don’t talk, it is confusing” – a confused Provisional IRA

The details of the three cases in which the Provisional IRA was confused are presented in table 6.4 below. Table 6.5 that follows presents the relevance of the different contextual factors.

Table 6.5: Confusion – details

Time	April - May 1993	October 1993	February - March 1994
Behavior	IRA gives Britain pointers for negotiation while continuing its bomb campaign	the IRA announces it 'welcomes the Hume-Adams initiative but remains violent.	AC agrees to consider a cease fire and enters negotiations with Reynolds but continues bombing (Heathrow)
Details of behavior	Britain sends the IRA its pointers in March, while it continues its bombing campaign, the IRA nonetheless replies to Britain with 11 points of its own, so willing to cooperate with the talks. Meanwhile the secret Adams-Hume talks are published and a joint statement is given.	Once the Adams-Hume initiative was published, the IRA endorsed it publicly. Nonetheless, it continues its violent campaign, as with the Shankill bomb which led to a public relation disaster. Meanwhile, Adams continues talks w/ UK and Hume	the IRA agrees to consider a cease-fire but is still violent and seems to be sending mixed signals. Nonetheless, a clear movement towards cooperation and a great step in the process
type of case	Confused IRA #1	Confused IRA #2	Confused IRA #3
Period examined	January 10th - May 10th 1993	June 1993 - October 1993	November 1993 - March 1994
Context - British government, military and security forces	March 93 - Mayhew says UK is neutral about the position of NI. The BG secretly sends pointers to the IRA. AHC agrees to increase security measures; public opinion poll in the UK shows 56% don't want NI to remain in the UK; April 93 - Mayhew begins a new round of bilateral talks;	June 93 - Fresh set of bilateral talks, Opshall report, Major meets w/ Reynolds, both call for resumption of talks, RUC prevents Orange parade; Sep 93 - Mayhew's speech saying SF could only join after a ceasefire; Oct 93 - 72% support for the Adams Hume Initiative, Adams banned from entering UK	Nov 93 - Major rejects the Adams-Hume initiative, talks with SF are exposed, Mayhew insists on ceasefire before talks; Jan 94 - Major refuses to provide clarification for DSD
agreement			Dec 93: Downing Street Declaration
Context - Unionist	Jan 93 - UDA threatens the entire Nationalist camp; March 93 - UFF kills more SF councillors and 5 civilians in 3 separate attacks; April 93 - UUP threatens to boycott talks. DUP boycotts them. 2 more UFF attacks, against a shop and against a SF councillor. UVF threatens Republic politicians.	Aug 93: UFF kills a Catholic civilian, beat another civilian to death, Sep 93: UVF shoots two, UFF bombs the home of 4 SDLP councillors; Oct 93 - UFF attacks in a pub, UVF attacks SF office in Belfast, UFF kills a Catholic civilian (10 Catholic civilians in 2 months); UUP and DUP Reject Adams-Hume initiative, retaliation for Shankill	Nov 93 - DUP and UUP refuse to talk w/ SDLP, loyalist groups warn of war; Dec 93: UFF kills 2 civilians; Paisley organizes rallies against DSD; Jan 94 - UFF attacks SF councillors' houses and offices, UVF and UFF kill 2 civilians; Feb 94 - 5 separate attacks on civilians by UVF and UFF; March 94 - another attack on a Catholic civilians;
Context - Irish Republic	Feb 93 - Spring shows flexibility on Irish constitution; April 93 - Reynolds defends the Irish constitution;	June 93 - Reynolds gives Major the Adams-Hume initiative, Irish president shakes Adams' hands; Oct - Reynolds says if full agreement is reached, constitutional change is possible	Nov 93 - Spring outline 6 principles for peace; Nov 93 - Reynolds says peace could begin by end of the year; Jan 94 - Reynolds agrees to provide clarification for DSD; Jan 94: Broadcast Ban is lifted
Context - Elections		May 93 - local elections in NI - SF increases its share of the vote, but is still far from SDLP	(Nov 93 - mass rally in support of Hume-Adams initiative)
Context - intermediaries	May 93 - USA refuses Adams' visa.	June 93 - Amnesty int'l criticizes Britain;	Jan 94 - USA allows Adams a visa to participate in a conference in the USA
Context - Promoters of peace	March 93 - Hume suggests to impose a blueprint for settlement; April 93 - secret talks with Adams become public, issues statement;	Sep 93 - Hume continues to support Adams; SDLP members support Hume-Adams initiative; issues another joint statement; Oct 93 - Hume meets w/ Reynolds & Spring, reports on his meetings w/ Adams; Addresses House of Commons	Nov 93 - Hume's another joint statement; Feb 94 - Calls for clarification of the DSD; March 94 - speaks w/ Adams and Alderdice in NY
Context - spoilers			Feb 94 - INLA kills a Protestant civilian
Org - PIRA	march 93: bombing campaign - warrington killing two boys; April 93 - cont. violence - Bishopsgate bomb killing one; May 93 - Oxford bomb; answers the BG with 11 pointers, willing to commit to a short cease-fire	July 93: bombs Derry; Aug 93 - several bombs in London, and in Starbane; Sep 93 - huge bomb in Armagh; bombs in Belfast; unofficial suspension of violence, resumption of violence through Oct; Oct 93 - Supports the Adams-Hume initiative; continue violence - 3 bombs in London on Oct 2 and 5 bombs in London on Oct 4, Shankill bomb	Nov 93 - IRA rep says the PIRA would not agree to a unilateral cessation of violence; Dec 94 -kills 2 RUC; 3 day ceasefire followed by attacks: kills a BA soldier; Jan 1st 94 - 11 bombs in Belfast, attacks RUC/BA station; bombs in London; AC votes to reject the DSD, but keeps it secret; Feb 94 - 3 more attacks; March - multiple attacks on Heathrow and London
Org - SF	Jan 93 - INC re-opens boarder roads;	Aug 93 - McGuinness's speech at the inter-party talks mentions 'interim arrangements' Sep 93 - McGuinness gives an interview, talks of national self-determination;	Jan 94 - McGuinness calls for complete withdrawal, SF publishes 'setting the record straight';
Adams' actions	Jan 93 - Adams calls for inclusive talks; Feb 93 - insists SF needs to be part of dialogue; March 93 - critiques IRA for Warrington, but claims they will not stop until he has a real political solution to bring to them - partition is the reason for the armed struggle.	July 93 - Adams suggests Republicans willing to accept joint authority; Oct 93 - Adams says a British acknowledgment of Irish right to self-determination would lead to a cease-fire. Mentions he will go to the IRA with a real British offer but not before. Meanwhile, he will work for peace with SF. Admits SF has updated its goals, taking more seriously the needs of the Unionists, while still pushing for a united Ireland	Nov 93 - Adams rejects Springs' principles; Dec 93 - Adams calls for direct and unconditional dialogue; Jan-Feb 94: Adams seeks clarification of DSD; warns of the struggle continuing for 25 years more; Feb 94: SF AF Adams admits DSD is significant change in British policy but clarifies IRA will not unilaterally cease

The context level of analysis

Table 6.6: Confusion – relevance of contextual factors

Time	April - May 1993	October 1993	February - March 1994
type of case	confused IRA	confused IRA	confused IRA
Context - British government, military and security forces	√	√	√
Context - agreement			√
Context - Unionist	√	√	√
Context - Irish Republic	√	√	√
Context - Elections		√	√
Context - intermediaries	√	√	√
Context - Promoters of peace	√	√	√
Context - spoilers			√

A first thing to notice is that unlike any of the other types of behaviors studied so far, in cases of confusion almost all factors in the context level are relevant. Elections and spoilers (and agreements of course) are the only two that are not relevant for all three cases. This means that the environment that is confusing the Provisional IRA is rather active. The question though still remains, active in what way? Was it more positive or more negative and in what ways? Table 6.6 below helps us decipher these ideas in more detail.

Table 6.6: Confusion - positive and negative contextual factors

Time	April - May 1993	October 1993	February - March 1994
type of case	confused IRA	confused IRA	confused IRA
Context - British government, military and security forces	(+)/(+)/(+) (-)/(+)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(+)/(+) (-)/(+)/(+)	(-)/(+)/(+)/(+)
Context - agreement			(-)
Context - Unionist	(-)/(-)/(-)/(-) (+)/(+)/(+)/(+) (-)	(-)/(-)/(-)/(-)/(-) (-)/(-)/(-)/(-)/(-) (-)	(+)/(+)/(+)/(+) (-)/(-)/(-)/(-)/(-) (-)
Context - Irish Republic	(+)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(+)	(-)/(+)/(+)/(+)
Context - Elections		(+)	+
Context - intermediaries	(-)	(+)	(+)
Context - Promoters of peace	(+)/(+)	(+)/(+)/(+)/(+) (+)	(+)/(+)/(+)
Context - spoilers			(-)

The British

As we can see, the British and the Unionists are quite active in these cases. Promoters of peace and the Irish government are also active. When it comes to the British, 16 actions were coded, 11 of which (69%) were positive but five (31%) were negative. The single negative action of the British in the first case is its decision to increase security measures, due to the Provisional IRA's increased bombing campaign. In the second case of confusion, two actions by the British are considered as negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. The first is Secretary of State Mayhew's speech in which he announces that Sinn Féin will only be invited to the new round of talks following a ceasefire and not before. The second is a governmental decision to ban Adams from entering the United Kingdom (CAIN, ongoing). The third case opens with the British rejection of the Adams-Hume initiative and ends with Major's refusal to provide clarification for the Downing Street Declaration despite Adams' repeated requests.

But the British were also sending very positive signals during these three cases. In the first case Mayhew gave a speech in which he reaffirmed Britain's neutral position regarding Northern Ireland. Additionally, the British Government sent the Provisional IRA clear pointers regarding negotiations (Moloney, 2002). In the second case, the RUC prevented Unionist marchers from passing through Catholic areas.⁸⁰ In the third case, the secret communication between the British and the Provisional IRA were exposed, proving that the British were in fact lying about being in contact with the Republican Movement. It was seen as positive by the

⁸⁰ What might seem like a small issue is in fact the source for many riots and violence. Every July Unionists march in commemoration of King William of Orange's victory (which is why they are also known as 'Orangemen'). Due to demography and population increase the marchers now pass through Catholic areas. For years they have done so uninterruptedly. However, with growing tensions between the communities, the marchers have been known to attack the local Catholic population and the local Catholic populations attacked back. On several occasions the RUC have decided to lock Catholics in their homes to prevent clashes. But this time, it actually diverts the path of the march away from the Catholic areas. It sent a message of support for the Catholic population, to the effect that they were no longer feeling discriminated against by the security forces.

movement as it proved they were part of the game, and had been for quite some time. More than that, the British were caught in a lie.

The Unionists

The Unionists are the most active in these three cases, with 30 actions, 25 of which (83%) are coded as negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. Their actions consist of almost half of all actions in these cases. These negative actions relate mainly to paramilitary attacks against Sinn Féin councilors and against the Catholic population. The sheer volume of attacks during these months only increased their negative effect. The Catholic community was in panic. Every attack led to a counter-attack by the Provisional IRA and other Republican paramilitary groups only increasing the cycle of violence.

But a few of the unionist actions were, in fact, positive from the Republican Movement's point of view. When the unionist parties threatened to boycott the talks in the first case, their intransigence made Sinn Féin look like a more cooperative and reasonable partner for peace. When the loyalist paramilitaries threatened Republic of Ireland politicians, the Republican Movement could see how such behavior worked in its favor. Violence is negative, but its effects are indeed dependent on the identity and type of the targets. Threatening Republic of Ireland politicians pushed those politicians to stand by Sinn Féin. In case #3, when both the DUP and the UUP refuse to talk with the SDLP, they are once again portrayed as too stubborn and unreasonable, shedding a more positive light on Sinn Féin, who would speak to SDLP, and with anyone for that matter. Lastly, similar to the protests against the Anglo-Irish Agreements, Unionists protests against the Downing Street Declaration were once again seen as positive from the Republican Movement's point of view. They were viewed as the DUP is doing the dirty work

for us by drawing negative attention to an agreement Sinn Féin was not a party to anyway and would like to see changed.

Irish Republic

And what about the Irish government? Nine actions were coded for these three cases, just like nine actions were coded for the eight cases of divergence. Relatively, during this period the Irish government was far more active. Exactly opposite to its behavior during the divergent periods, where most of its actions were coded as negative, during confused times most of the Irish government's actions are coded as positive. The first action that is coded as negative is in the period leading up to the first case and has to do with the mixed signals the government was sending. In February 1993, Tanaiste (deputy prime minister) Spring shows flexibility on articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution.⁸¹ However, two months later, Taoiseach Reynolds defends the integrity of the Irish constitution and contradicts Spring's words (CAIN, ongoing).

The second negative action by the Irish government comes in the last case and once again relates to the mixed messages Spring and Reynolds were sending. This time it was Spring who outlined his six principles for peace in November 1993 while Reynolds was saying peace talks could begin in December. The reason Spring's principles are coded as negative is because they were rejected by the Republican Movement immediately (CAIN, ongoing). Apart from these two actions, however, the Irish government is in fact working with Sinn Féin or at least representing its interests in several instances.

⁸¹ That make the claim that the entire island makes up one national territory.

Promoters of peace and intermediaries

John Hume is coded for 10 actions, all of which are positive. Quite consistently and despite the increasing Provisional IRA violence, Hume keeps talking with Adams, and when the fact of their talks become public, he stands with Adams, issues joint statements, comes out with the Adams-Hume initiative and serves as a mediator between the Republican Movement and the Irish government (Elliott & Flackes, 1999).

The two intermediaries relevant for these three cases are the United States which refused to grant Adams an entry visa in May 1993 but granted him one in January 1994, and Amnesty International that criticized Britain in June 1993. The visa business was far more meaningful to the movement, but as explained before, any critique of Britain and any international attention to its operations in Northern Ireland was welcomed by the Republican Movement.

Elections

In terms of elections, they were marked twice in the table.⁸² In May 1993, local elections in Northern Ireland showed a relatively successful Sinn Féin with an increased share of its vote compared to the previous campaigns. However, the gap in support between Sinn Féin and the SDLP was still quite large (O'Brien, 1999). The second entry in the table, in the third case is in fact not elections but having to do with the public nevertheless. In November 1993 a mass rally took place in support of the Adams-Hume initiative (Moloney, 2002). The fact that the public stood behind Sinn Féin and the two leaders at this point, despite the raging violence was a positive signal by the public that was perhaps as important as the elections.

⁸² The second time is in fact not counted in the analysis (in terms of adding to the positive or negative equation).

Spoilers

Lastly are spoilers which were only relevant in one action, when a competing republican movement, (a splinter) INLA, kills a Protestant civilian (CAIN, ongoing). It is marked as negative as any other attack by the competing republican movements as was explained in the previous chapter.

Context overall

Overall, there are almost the same number of positive and negative actions in these three cases. 35 negative actions versus 36 positive ones (49%-51%). Only in the last case is the context indeed more negative than positive, whereas in the first case, the context is almost as positive as it is negative. It can be claimed, therefore, that the context itself was confusing. However, even a confusing context is not necessarily sufficient in explaining the Provisional IRA's behavior. It is thus time to look into its behavior during this period.

The Organizational level of analysis

Looking into organizational dynamics in these three confused cases helps to better understand how the context interacted with what the organization was doing. In March 1993, the British sent the Army Council its pointers for negotiations. The Army Council only replied on May 10th with its own 11 points. It took it two months to reply as it needed to consider everything that was going on. It also needed to reach some sort of an organizational consensus, at least amongst the leadership before sending out a message. In the message, the Provisional IRA showed willingness to consider a ceasefire in return for meaningful talks. However, it also retained the Provisional IRA demand that Britain needed to commit to withdrawing from Northern Ireland and cancel the Unionist veto on decisions regarding Northern Ireland. These

demands were quite different and far from what the British government had been hearing from Father Reid, the promoter of peace who served as a go-between and delivered messages from the Movement to the Government and back, and from its communications with several of the Army Council members who were secretly talking with them, as it turned out (Molony, 2002).

The Army Council's reply led the British to discontinue the communications at that point in time. Discontinued or not, the fact of the matter was that the Provisional IRA was communicating with the British government. It was doing so while continuing its bombing campaign, but it was communicating nonetheless. This is no small matter. The Provisional IRA was taking the lead in communicating with the British, in order to allow for meaningful talks to take place. Sinn Féin was not able to make any significant progress in this respect as long as the armed wing did not signal any sort of commitment. This was its way to commit. Anything more than that could have meant a splintering in the movement.

The Army Council needed to make sure a ceasefire would be adequately reciprocated. Past experience with the British government had left scars on the Republican Movement. The 'soldiers' of the Army Council bore these scars on their skins and on their souls. They were against dialogue because of these scars, as well as their true conviction that armed struggle and not dialogue was the only way to achieve their goals. But beyond the Army Council, the lower ranking members in the organization were not part of the decision to communicate with the British government. Whether they still needed convincing or whether they just needed updating is another issue. It was clear not everybody in the Republican Movement supported dialogue.

This organizational dynamic can explain the mixed signals and confusion the Army Council is showing at this point in time. Some truths are beginning to come out in this period and the preference divergence between the leaders and between some within the leadership and the

rest of the organization are emerging. On April 10th, after the British had already sent their document, but prior to the Army Council's reply, the secret talks that had been going on between Adams and Hume were exposed (Moloney, 2002).

The South Armagh brigade, known for its hardline republican stands blew up a huge bomb in London's financial district on the same day the Adams-Hume connection became public.⁸³ Following that bomb, the Army Council voted to hold off on the bombing campaign to give some chance to the political initiative (Moloney, 2002).

The fact that Adams and Hume managed to maintain a secret dialogue for five years was a great surprise to many within the movement (O'Brien, 1999). It also meant that an important initiative was under way. John Hume saw the potential in dialogue with Adams and once the cat was out of the bag, he did not shy away from contacts. On the contrary, once the talks became public, it seemed as though Adams and Hume only grew closer, with the two issuing four joint statements. On April 24th the first joint statement was made in which Adams and Hume called for 'national self-determination' and emphasized the support of both of their parties in the continuance of the talks (Adams & Hume, April 24th 1993). On that day the Provisional IRA carried out another huge bomb attack in London, killing one man (CAIN, ongoing). Clearly, not the entire organization was supporting the dialogue with Hume. The Army Council was feeling the change in the air, but was still weighing its options.

And so, this case shows an opening in the context, more open dialogue and even direct communications between the Army Council and the British government. But the time is not quite right for pushing a ceasefire and encompassing negotiations because the people, the

⁸³ It was the Provisional IRA last big bomb in London (at least until the end of the ceasefire in 1996).

paramilitaries, the political parties and the governments were all not ready for it yet. Decades of conflict had led all the parties involved to be cautious with their signals. Nobody wanted to be perceived as the weakest, especially when there were so many actors in the conflict and when so much was at stake.

It was not only the Republican Movement that was sending mixed signals, but everybody around it was doing the same. Confusion here is thus a sign of movement forward in the greater scheme of events for the conflict transformation process. The armed wing is showing signs of reconsideration. Perhaps there is merit in dialogue. But the decision has not been made yet and there will be continued confusion for more than a year to come.

In October 1993 (case #2) more confused signals were being sent out by the movement. The period revolved around the publication of the Adams-Hume initiative.⁸⁴ Despite having publically welcomed the Adams-Hume initiative, the Provisional IRA continued its bombing campaign. In the next confused case from February and March 1994 (case #3), the Army Council agreed to consider a ceasefire. Their announcement read “There is an urgent need to refocus attention and move the peace process forward. We, our supporters and activists have a vested interest in achieving a just and lasting peace in Ireland. We are prepared to be flexible in exploring the potential for peace” (O’Neill, March 16th 1994).⁸⁵ Having said that, the violent campaign continued. The announcement was directly related to the events that spiraled after the last confused case and from the developments in between the two cases. Which is why they need to be examined together.

⁸⁴ The Adams-Hume initiative was the two parties’ blue-print for peace (Moloney, 2002).

⁸⁵ All official announcements by the Provisional IRA were signed “P. O’Neill, Republican Publicity Bureau”.

1993 and the unveiling of the Hume-Adams initiative meant a historic change in Irish nationalism. This was no longer about a win for the Provisional IRA, the only thing that was on the table was a compromise. Irish national self-determination exercised by consent replaced the old policy of ‘Brits out’.⁸⁶ “Through a slow twisting process the Republican movement arrived in the 1990s with a more chastened view of itself... it was part of their pragmatic acceptance of reality and of the need for compromise” (O’Brien, 1999, p. 28). That slow and twisting process O’Brien refers to is exactly the confused behavior the Provisional IRA was exhibiting.

The public outrage spurred by the events that transpired in October 1993,⁸⁷ pushed the Provisional IRA to begin to toe the line, changing its position towards willingness to consider a ceasefire and enter negotiations. However, despite diminishing the intensity of the violent campaign compared to the months before, it still did not give up violence altogether and attempted bombing Heathrow airport three times in March 1994. Following the bombs, the Provisional IRA came out with a statement saying that it was committed to peace, yet continued with attacks even after that.

In order to explain such confusing signals we must look into the dynamics of conflict over time, and study the behavior and signal making of all relevant actors in the conflict while also examining the interaction between the context, the organization and the leadership. In between these two cases many things happened. Most importantly was the revelation of the fact that the British government had been having secret talks with the Republican Movement for

⁸⁶ In August 1993, McGuinness spoke at Bodenstown and was already showing signs of compromising on the traditional demand of ‘brits out’, talking instead of ‘interim agreements’ (McGuinness, August 1993). The speech was accepted by the movement, because there was already the realization that ‘Brits out’ was simply not achievable. However, armed struggle could not have been abandoned until the public stopped supporting it altogether. The pressure was bound to come from the ‘streets’ (Atashi, 2009), as it did, after ‘Shankill’.

⁸⁷ The Shankill bomb led to a massive surge in violence and 23 people died in 10 days. In one incident called ‘the Greysteel killing’ the UFF killed 6 Catholic civilians and one protestant civilian sitting in a pub (Johnson, Oct. 23rd 1997).

years. The secret was kept from most of the British government, most certainly from the British security forces, but more importantly, it was kept from the lower ranking members of the Republican Movement itself.

The Shankill bomb on October 7th 1993 forced the organization to re-examine the merits of violence once again and provided the peace camp with the necessary and sufficient conditions to push towards a ceasefire. However, such a huge change did not happen overnight as the leadership still needed to make sure the organization, on all of its parts, was fully behind the initiative to negotiate. Since it was still not the case, the Heathrow bombings took place.

Interesting to note about this case is the fact that Sinn Féin was the one that published the extent of the communications between the movement and the British government. For over three years, the British government was in fact talking to Sinn Féin behind the scenes. All this time, it was insisting publically it would not speak with Sinn Féin until the Provisional IRA ceased the violence, and yet it was talking to them all along. However, it was so secret, that it was not known by all British government members, let alone the British security forces, which might explain the mixed messages on behalf of the British Government during all these years.

The Individual level of analysis – Adams

Was Adams as central for the outcomes we are seeing during these times as he was in the others? I would claim that less so. In these three cases he does not sense a great risk of organizational collapse, but the fact that the Army Council was hiding its deliberations from the rank and file means that the members of the Army Council as well knew the organization was not fully behind dialogue.

The Army Council was trying to decide what the best strategy will be, and Adams was vital in pulling it towards more cooperation, though he was not strong enough to pull it all the way, and the fact that violence continued meant that he was also being pulled by the movement. In the second case of confusion, this was especially the case. The Army Council was forced to announce it ‘welcomes the Hume-Adams initiative’ to reject any sort of claims insinuating an organizational split or a weakened Provisional IRA. But just like it was forced to welcome the announcement, it was also forced to show it still has the capability and the mandate to sustain the armed struggle, especially with the increased loyalist attacks at that time. The fact that the British did not seem to be willing or able to stop loyalists and protect the community added pressure on the Republican Movement to retaliate and made a relatively neutral context feel more negative.

But Adams was reading the context. He knew the British were open to talking, mainly because they *were already* talking. He knew the Army Council would even support such talking, but used the loyalist attempts to try and improve Sinn Féin’s entry point into talks. By distancing himself and Sinn Féin from the violence that spiraled, and by speaking of the party’s commitment, as well as his own, to peace and dialogue at any price, he was trying to show everybody around that they should offer something better to the other side. He knew the public supported his joint initiative with Hume, he knew the Irish Republic was behind the initiative, so he also knew violence at this point was not too costly, up until the Shankill bomb which changed the setting dramatically and turned the context more negative and more violent.

By March 1994 he managed to convince the Army Council to not reject the Downing Street Declaration and to consider a ceasefire so he was clearly doing some pulling of the organization towards the cooperative side. However, once again, the fact that the Army Council chose to hide such decisions from the rest of the organization meant that the organization was

still not fully behind such initiatives, and Adams was being pulled by it as much as he was pulling.

The context was challenging at this point. The Adams-Hume initiative on which he had worked for so long was rejected by the British, despite having significant support in the public. On the other hand, the British were just caught in a lie. And ‘Setting the Record Straight’ improved Sinn Féin’s position in no small manner. His intervention was more necessary for the outcome of this case than it was in the other two. He managed to pull the Army Council his way, though he knew how far he can go, and relinquishing violence was not an option, at this particular moment, though it could become one very soon, as long as the context improved. And the context indeed improved right after this case.

As such, Adams is central in these cases as well, but not necessarily successful in getting the movement fully behind him. At the minimum, he was willing to let things evolve naturally and incrementally, as he already had the inside information since he was talking to the British and to the Irish and knew a ceasefire was indeed a matter of time. He was just waiting for the right moment to push for it, and that moment was not during these three cases, where he needed the organization to reach that same conclusion on its own, with some help, of course.

Interaction between the various levels – a discussion

A few words to summarize the ‘confused’ period are in order. All in all, it marked a period of transition. The slow process by which the military wing of the movement re-examined its commitment to violence, alongside several of its central republican tenets (can be thought of as ‘demands’ in this setting) was marked by quite the confused setting altogether. The two things that contributed most to the confusion of the military wing were the mixed signals sent by both

the British government and the Irish government, and the truths that were coming out regarding communications. Not only were the British not really sending any clear message of willingness to cooperate, but they also lied about being already involved in talks. Furthermore, even if the communications were a known fact within the leadership of the organization (they were not), they were certainly not known to the lower ranking members and their discovery challenged the standing of the leadership.

The period is marked with increased cooperation between the British and the Irish governments, to the detriment of the unionists. Alongside the increased cooperation between the two governments, the security forces also turned against the loyalist paramilitaries, while the Irish government decided to lift the ban against Sinn Féin which allowed it to voice the Republican Movement's point of view far more frequently and directly to a wider audience. Together with these positive signs, John Hume continued to support Adams, not only meeting with him and issuing joint statements, but also by relaying messages from Adams to others decision makers.

But then the Shankill bomb was a colossal mistake. It threatened to cancel all the positive progress that had been made and push Sinn Féin further away from the table. Even though violent attacks were taking place all the time, this was of a different scale and it sparked fear in the Unionist community that was starting to doubt Britain's commitment to its interests.⁸⁸

Following the bomb, both the British and the Irish governments issued a joint statement in which

⁸⁸ Mayhew's repeated claims of British neutrality towards Northern Ireland already made the Protestant community feel abandoned. The direct attack on the community (Provisional IRA usually targeted security forces and when targeting civilians, it did so in less sectarian settings whereas the Shankill road was a staunch Protestant area) only increased the community's fear, which pushed it to support the paramilitaries, and, as a result, the level of violence quickly got out of hand.

they announced that they would not endorse the Adams-Hume initiative, and also committed to refrain from engaging in any secret deals (Moloney, 2002).

The set back and the turning of the context against the movement, pushed the Think Tank to the fore once again. By February 1994, the Think Tank was basically in-charge of the armed wing's strategy and it decided to draft the ceasefire agreement in case one was called. The Think Tank came up with TUAS. Activists were told it stood for 'Tactical Use of Armed Struggle', whereas those that were involved in the peace process heard it stood for 'Totally Un-Armed Strategy' (Moloney, 2002, p. 423).

The document, which was only published to the outside world in April 1995 stipulated that leverage on the British would be applied by the pan-nationalist parties, north and south, with the help of the Irish-American lobby (The Republican Movement, 1994). But TUAS could not hide the disagreement between the 'pan-nationalist' parties. The Republican Movement was still pushing for Irish unity whereas the SDLP and Taoiseach Reynolds were more interested in stability and an end to the violence (Moloney, 2002).

Shortly thereafter, the British and Irish governments came out with the Downing Street Declaration. The Republican Movement had to decide what to do, in the midst of yet another cycle of violence, with public opinion supporting the declaration, with Sinn Féin being relatively successful electorally for a change and enormous international pressure on the movement to accept the declaration. The 'soldiers' of the Army Council voted to reject the declaration. Nevertheless, they were convinced (by Adams and McGuinness) to keep the decision secret and make it look like they were still considering. By not saying 'no' outright, the movement in essence accepted the declaration. Adams was bidding for time. He did not want the Republican Movement to be seen as the one who blew up the entire peace process. The fact that the

Movement's opinion regarding the declaration was even sought after was a huge signal of support in his view. Rejecting it altogether would have sidelined him and his movement.

The members of the Army Council who supported peace, led by Adams, embarked on a plan to delay any decision. First, Adams went around and demanded clarifications from both the British and the Irish governments as to the meaning of the document. Speaking in the United States and giving many interviews all around, he blamed the British government for refusing to provide clarifications on the document (Adams, February 3rd 1994). He was showing the Army Council, but also the foot-soldiers, that he was not so soft on the British government, and that he would not sell them out for peace. Reynolds meanwhile, agreed to provide such clarifications while Major kept refusing (CAIN, Ongoing).

Second, Pat Doherty,⁸⁹ Adams' ally and close friend, began conducting 'a peace commission' – Doherty was to go around Ireland and hold hearings with the Republican public to gather their opinion about a possible ceasefire.⁹⁰ Martin McGuinness, who was still the chairman of the Army Council was in charge of appeasing the grassroots. McGuinness spoke in hardline language, promising the grassroots that there would be no ceasefire. The members of the Think Tank were busy doing the same thing (Moloney, 2002).

By March 1994, the Army Council had no choice but to discuss a ceasefire. Pressure from all around was pushing it towards cooperation and away from violence. Not only were the British finally willing to treat Sinn Féin with respect and give it a voice, the public was

⁸⁹ Doherty was an exclusively Sinn Féin member (not a member of the Provisional IRA) who was in charge of building Sinn Féin relations in the south. He made himself important to the Army Council by being the person who was in charge of finding venues for meetings. As such, he was present in Army Council meetings, though not having a vote.

⁹⁰ The commission gave its report to the Army Council only in June, and more than half of the submissions to the commission were in favor of a ceasefire, which added even more pressure on the Army Council (Moloney, 2002).

supporting peace over violence, the Republic of Ireland was making concessions with its cancellation of the ban on public appearances and Clinton was willing to put his weight behind Adams and allow him entry into the United States. From within the movement, the Army Council made sure that the grassroots would not walk away at the mere mentioning of a ceasefire and used the 'peace commission' to show there is wider support for the idea than they would have imagined. On top of it all, Adams framed the ceasefire as an exploratory one. As he put it, if the Provisional IRA agreed to a short ceasefire and then the British refused to discuss withdrawal from the North, then it would be the British that would be blamed for the failure of the process and not the Republican Movement ((Moloney, 2002).

It worked. The Army Council was willing to consider a ceasefire, the terms of which would be negotiated with Reynolds, not the British. However, the grass-roots still needed reassurance, which led to the series of bombings at Heathrow, followed by a 3-day ceasefire for Easter. The mixed signals at the end of this period are not the result of true confusion, but of preference divergence (Shapiro, 2013). It was not only Adams and the Think Tank that wanted to enter negotiations, the Army Council wanted it too. Well, wanted is a strong word, but at least, the Council understood that it was just the next logical step in the process. But the grass-roots were not convinced quite yet. As such, the Army Council, especially given the 'soldiers' on it, allowed for the Heathrow attacks.

Confusion here was thus about maintaining the integrity of the organization and preventing a split from taking place. It was a necessary price to pay to survive organizationally, and politically. With all the progress that was made, with the support of Hume and Reynolds and with the international attention to the conflict, violence and a confused message would in fact not jeopardize the participation of Sinn Féin in talks, as long as a ceasefire was actually announced.

and indeed, after more than two years of diverging and confusing behavior, the Republican Movement finally converged around cooperation and announced a ceasefire.

Diverging for survival

Overall, it can be said that in divergent cases, including the cases of confusion, the context is slightly more negative than positive (97 negative versus 93 positive or 51% negative versus 49% positive). The context is not necessarily positive but it is also not really negative. A central reason the context is indeed more negative than it was during cases of cooperation is related to the increase in loyalist paramilitary attacks. The negative Unionist behavior affected the Republican Movement's decision making, and especially, the Provisional IRA. It was important not only due to the increased violence but also because it was not condemned nearly as much as any action the Provisional IRA took, which only added to the frustration with the system and the lack of belief in the British. Nevertheless, the British were still talking, first in secret, and later in the open. It is what they were not doing, when it comes to loyalist attacks, that was the most confusing part of the context for the Republican Movement.

Divergence and confusion were, thus, neither a tactic nor a sign of organizational breakdown, they were a little bit of both, and they were very much influenced by the context, and by the interaction between the context, organizational dynamics and Adams' own wishes. When we talk of divergence, it was sometimes indeed a tactic, a way for the organization to stay relevant, both in its competition over the Republican vote, but more broadly, the nationalist vote. Whereas in other cases, it was a tactic of survival. When there was growing divergence amongst the leadership or between the leadership and the rank and file of the Movement, violence was approved, as long as it was accompanied by cooperation.

Confusion was not a tactic nor was it really a sign of organizational breakdown. For most of the period in which the Provisional IRA acted in confusion, it was just that, confused. Only towards the end of the confused period, did it become a tactic to maintain organizational cohesion and prevent the rank and file from breaking away. Confusion was also a sign of organizational learning, when there is already an understanding that violence might not be the answer and that dialogue has some chance. But that understanding was not enough to push for complete cessation of violence. After decades of armed campaigns, it would not have been given up on easily. Confusion was as a result the external manifestation of an internal learning process.

I go back to this discussion of the interaction between the various factors and levels of analysis in the following concluding chapter, where I assess one last time the power of each factor on its own and of their interaction in determining Republican decision making.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

The main goal of this project was to gain a better understanding of the process of conflict transformation. More specifically, I wanted to understand what are the circumstances that push Dual Wing Resistance Organizations (DWRO), and particularly, the Irish Provisional Republican Movement to behave in one of four different ways: convergent towards violence, convergent towards cooperation, divergent and confused. My main argument was that in order to understand conflict transformation processes and what pushes an organization to behave in a particular way over another one must look into the interaction between factors at three levels of analysis: the context, organizational dynamics and leadership.

Beyond this claim, my analysis focused on answering a couple of other questions as well: Can studying a process and not just snap-shots in time lead to better understanding of organizational decisions? Can any one particular factor be responsible for every type of behavior? Can any one factor be relevant in the same way in all types of cases? Are some factors more relevant in leading to some types of behaviors over others? Can any one level of analysis explain all types of behaviors? and lastly, what is the role of leaders in conflict transformation processes? particularly, what role did Adams play in the process, what type of a leader was he and did he change over time?

To answer my questions, I process traced the Northern Ireland conflict from the end of 1983, when Gerry Adams was elected as President of Sinn Féin and until the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in May 1998. I divided my timeline into 24 cases, ten cases of convergence towards cooperation, three cases of convergence towards violence, eight cases of divergence and

three cases of confusion. For each case, I examined the four-months period leading up to the studied behavior.

I looked for actions by the British (government, military, court and police), the Irish (government, military, court and police), Unionists (political parties, as well as loyalist paramilitaries), intermediaries, promoters of peace and spoilers. I also looked into the potential role elections and agreements had to play. I then looked into the state of organizational dynamics in the period leading to each of my cases, what was going on within the organization, was there preference divergence between leadership and rank and file? Was there preference divergence between the two wings? Was there preference divergence between leaders? At that point I looked more closely into the workings of Adams – was he being sensitive to the context? Was he fearing a split in the organization? Was he pushing his own agenda forward and bringing the organization with him or was he letting the organizational constraints dictate his behavior? Was he even necessary for the outcome in each case (the chosen behavior)?

In chapter one I discussed what conflict transformation is and how it was used in the building of my framework. I introduced DWROs and discussed the importance in not only distinguishing between two wings of the same movement, but also the need to look into the relationship between them. I then presented the behaviors that I was interested in studying more closely, namely convergence towards violence and towards cooperation, divergence and confusion. Lastly, I presented my levels of analysis framework for the study of conflict transformation processes and the arguments that supported it.

In chapter two I presented a short history of the conflict and the processes that led to the birth of the Provisional Republican Movement. I also introduced Gerry Adams and presented his career prior to becoming the president of Sinn Féin. In Chapter three I surveyed the ways in

which conflict transformation processes have been studied so far and pointed to gaps in the literatures. I used the literatures to substantiate my choice of factors in my levels of analysis framework and explained how each factor was defined and looked into. Chapter four described the process by which I collected and analyzed the data. I discussed case selection, the way chronology was built and what sources were used, I presented process tracing as the central methodology used, I then presented how cases were coded and patterns were detected and ended by emphasizing the need to take a closer look into cases, levels and factors.

Chapters five and six presented my analysis and the patterns I found. Chapter five focused on all cases of convergence, both towards violence and towards cooperation while chapter six discussed all cases of divergence, including confusion. In both chapters I have discussed some patterns having to do with particular factors, particular levels and particular behaviors (comparing convergence towards violence with convergence towards cooperation, divergence with confusion, and all four behaviors to each other).

Main Findings

Table 7.1 presents in brief the main questions I have asked to generate hypotheses in my research and the main findings of this project:

Table 7.1: Main Findings

Main Themes (questions)	Key Findings
Does examining the process and not just snap-shots of time leads to better analysis?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indeed, looking at the process as a whole, I found that the behavior of the Republican Movement was linked to past behaviors and signals sent by other actors in the conflict process. • Similar organizational decisions may be driven by different organizational motivations – survival versus tactics.

Main Themes (questions)	Key Findings
Can any one factor be responsible for every type of behavior?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A DWRO's choice of behavior is the result of the interaction of factors from multiple levels in most cases. • Sometimes it was mainly the British that were pushing organizational decision making, but not in all cases and it could not explain all types of behaviors.
Can any one factor be relevant in the same way throughout the process?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All factors were coded at least once as negative and at least once as positive. • Even the Unionists and Spoilers, two challenging actors in the conflict, had some actions that were coded as positive. • Promoters of peace were mostly positive, apart from two cases of divergence and one case of convergence towards cooperation.
Are some factors more relevant in leading to some behaviors than to others?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The British were found to be relevant in all cases. • The Unionists were found to be more relevant in leading to cases of divergence and confusion than in cases of convergence (either towards violence or cooperation). • Agreements, due to their small number, were not found to be truly significant in leading to any type of behavior over another. • The Irish Republic was mostly negative in cases of divergence, except for one case. It was only negative in convergent towards violence periods. • Elections were only relevant in 20% of convergence towards cooperation cases, but in 75% of divergence cases. • Intermediaries were relevant and sending positive signals in 60% of convergence towards cooperation cases, but were also relevant and sending positive signals in 66% of convergent towards violence cases.
Can any one level of analysis explain all types of behaviors?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The context level can explain most convergence cases, but not all. It is insufficient in explaining divergence and confusion cases. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ However, when the context was mostly positive, the organization tended to converge around cooperation. ○ When the context was mostly negative, the organization tended to converge around violence. ○ When the context was mixed, the organization tended to diverge.

Main Themes (questions)	Key Findings
Can any one level of analysis explain all types of behaviors? (cont.)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organizational dynamics cannot explain any type of behavior on their own. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ The choice between divergence and convergence can be driven by the same organizational goal, that interacted with a different context and leadership. • Leadership, namely Adams, is central, but cannot explain any type of behavior on its own.
Are leaders really necessary in conflict transformation processes?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leaders are necessary, but insufficient for the outcome. • Leaders are the least necessary in leading to cases of confusion. • Leaders can change. Their behavior is determined by the context and by the organizational settings. • If a leader is strategic, he will pull the organization towards particular behavior depending on the context and on his fear of organizational collapse. • Leaders, of whatever type, cannot succeed on their own. They need other leaders to be willing to give them a chance. • Leaders are bound by their organization and by the context.

One may ask, is the context doing all the pulling? Perhaps it is enough to look into state policies when one tries to understand processes of conflict and organizations' decisions to act in violence and in cooperation. Based on my analysis, I claim that that is certainly not the case. The analysis presented here was meant to present a new understanding of levels of analysis and of the interaction between them.

Overall I found that the only way to understand the circumstances that push a DWRO to act in cooperation is to look into the three levels of analysis together, and over time. The context might explain a lot, but it cannot explain it all. It might explain when a movement will choose to act in violence, but it cannot explain when a movement is convergent around violence or

divergent, with one wing being violent, but not the other. It certainly cannot explain those cases in which the military wing of the movement is confused.

Similarly, the context might help us understand when the movement will prefer cooperation, but once again, it cannot tell us when convergence around cooperation takes place and when divergence in tactics happens. To understand those, we must look into both organizational dynamics and leadership. But more importantly, we must look at the interaction between the various levels.

Pulling all the cases back together and looking back at the process helps in painting a better picture of those factors that push a DWRO to act in one way rather than another. No contextual factor is sufficient for explaining either choice of behavior on its own, but they are found to be correlated with particular behaviors. Even the context as a whole is insufficient in explaining all types of behaviors.

British actions are definitely necessary but never sufficient in explaining the choice of behavior by the Republican Movement. Nevertheless, positive signals by the British are indeed related to more cooperative behavior by the movement. Mixed signals by the British are correlated with mixed behavior by the movement, whether confused or divergent. The Irish government is mostly negative during divergent cases but overtly positive during confused ones. It was only negative during times of violence but mostly positive during times of convergence towards cooperation. All in all, it can be said that Irish government's actions are necessary for understanding the DWRO's behavior, but insufficient. We cannot look at it alone, but we must examine their actions in light of other actors' actions at the same time.

Promoters of peace on their own are insufficient but it will be hard to claim they were unnecessary, especially for cases of cooperation and divergence. Unionist actions are also telling, but definitely insufficient on their own. They are overwhelmingly negative for confused and violent cases, but almost a third of their actions during convergence towards cooperation and divergence are positive. It could be said that when the level of loyalist violence rises to an extreme, and it is combined with lack of responsiveness by the British authorities, it doubles the effect of the attacks and pushes the Republican Movement towards more violence. But when the British are sending more positive signals at times of increased Loyalist violence, such interaction leads the Republican Movement to act in confusion.

Elections are central as they represent levels of support for the DWRO. A strong movement will be able to learn from electoral losses, but will flourish following an electoral success. As we saw, during times of convergence towards cooperation, election results were mainly positive, whereas during times of divergence, they were mostly negative. Electoral losses strengthened the militant wing over the political agenda, but we see divergence and not convergence around violence because the movement is still committed to trying the political route despite losing. An electoral loss teaches the militant wing that violence should be re-considered while it teaches the political wing to put more of an effort in electoral campaigns, hence, the diverging behavior.

Intermediaries were mostly positive during times of convergence towards cooperation, but they were only positive during times of convergent towards violence. They were also mostly positive during times of divergence. As such, they do not explain much. It only goes to show that more attention should be given to the identity of these intermediaries and the actions they actually take. There is a clearly a difference between the United States' president sending a

special envoy and a condemning message of British tactics by Amnesty International. Both are positive from the Republican Movement's point of view, but they do not carry the same weight when it comes to the Movement's choice of behavior.

When it comes to internal organizational dynamics and leadership, we also see that specific organizational situations affect the behavior of leaders. But different types of leaders might react differently to the same set of circumstances. In the case of Adams, a strategic leader, he knew when to push and when to let the organization pull him. Challenging organizational dynamics, threats of splintering and a growing discontent among rank and file were the constraining factors within the organization that a cautious leader knew not to push further. Had Adams been a more pragmatic leader, or 'worse', an ideologue, the process would have looked completely different.

From these findings I can say that it is indeed illuminating to look into a process as a whole. Studying single-snap shots of behaviors can never tell the entire story. Looking into particular cases without considering past interactions between the various actors relevant in the conflict environment may lead to misunderstandings. Furthermore, it may blind us from the interaction between the different factors and its relevance in pushing the organization to choose one behavior over another.

Particular factors, such as the British, have more explanatory power than others such as promoters of peace, but even the British cannot tell the entire story of why the Republican Movement cooperated at a particular point in time. It is only by examining how factors from the context interacted with each other, with organizational dynamics and with leadership that a particular choice by the organization could be understood.

Nevertheless, some patterns indeed emerged from the analysis, as table 7.1 points to. I found that even the same type of organizational behavior can be driven by different organizational goals. Meaning, sometimes the organization chooses to diverge out of necessity and fear of splintering, whereas in other times it is a tactical decision. In any case, the choice is not determined by the organizational dynamics alone, but by the context and the leadership as well. Meaning, both divergence and convergence can be driven by an organizational need to survive, but it is the context and the leadership that will determine which of the two behaviors will be adopted. The other side of the coin is that the same organizational motivation can lead to different behaviors, depending on the context and the leadership.

When it comes to the particular contextual factors, I found that the British were relevant in all of the cases studied. Additionally, the British played a significant role in pushing the organization towards convergence, whereas the Unionists were found to be much more active during times of divergence. The context as a whole mostly helped in explaining the choice between violence and cooperation. The particular factors within the context level were far less straight-forward in their effect. All factors were found to have both positive and negative effects. Promoters of peace were mostly acting in positive ways, but even they had some actions that were seen as negative from the Republican Movement's point of view. When the context could not explain behaviors, organizational dynamics and leadership helped filling in the gap.

I also found Gerry Adams to be a strategic leader that was central in the progress of the conflict transformation process, due to his unique position within the organization, his leadership skills, his sensitivity to information, his long-windedness, his political skills and his charisma. He may not have been central in every organizational decision that was taken, and he may have

been pulled by his own organization towards positions that were contrary to his agenda, but he nonetheless was central for the movement's transformation from violence to cooperation.

Specific Findings and policy implications

I have also reached some conclusions beyond what the table shows us that I would like to share. I will discuss them from the most particular, to the more general and touch upon policy implications as I go. At the end of this section I will present a 'user's guide to process tracing a DWRO' and specific hypotheses that should be tested in such an analysis.

Leaders, and Gerry Adams in particular

In a poll conducted for the Irish Times and for the Guardian across the British Isles shortly after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (and prior to the referendum) it was found that “Credit for the deal was given to Tony Blair (22%), John Hume (21%), David Trimble (18%) and George Mitchell (14%). Just 4% said Gerry Adams should get the credit, although 56% rated him as "helpful" in brokering an agreement” (Connolly, 1998).

So the people did not find Adams to be that central to the peace. Was that really the case? Would the Good Friday Agreement have been signed when it was signed if it were not for him? Was Adams really only ‘helpful’ but not that central to the peace process? I claim that is not really the case. The agreement would not have been signed without him. At least not when it was signed. The agreement would not have been signed without John Hume who was willing to take a chance on Adams and extend a hand to him, while putting his own name on the line. It would not have been signed without Blair, who was willing to give a chance to Adams and to Sinn Féin while taking a step back from the unconditional request to decommission.

All of these leaders mattered. David Trimble mattered, as did Bill Clinton and George Mitchell. But Adams was at the center of the transformation process. He was the one all the others had to agree to talk with and it was his greatest achievement to convince all of them to give him and the Republican Movement a chance. The only way he was able to do so while maintaining the support of his own organization, both wings, was by being sensitive to the circumstances and the signals that were being sent around. At the same time, he also had to be knowledgeable concerning the constraints within which he was working and to know when it was okay to push the boundaries and when it was better to remain within them.

He did so by adapting his behavior and speech to match the audience and the circumstances. As was aptly put by Eamonn O'Neill who interviewed him shortly before the Good Friday Agreement was signed: "Gerry Adams is, for better or worse, changing. In that sense he's like the rest of us. He simply can't be the same person he was last week, last month or last year. All I could do was sketch a portrait of someone who appeared to be in transition. The man I saw a month ago won't be the same man this time next year. He's a man of many shades, and I saw only a selection of his faces" (O'Neill, 1998).

I found that Adams was extremely central to the process by which the Republican movement moved from contention to cooperation. If it were not for him, we would have perhaps seen a successful conflict transformation process, but it would have taken far longer and have cost more lives. Nonetheless, even if he believed violence is not the answer, he was still constrained by his own organization. He was sensitive enough to know when a certain move towards cooperation would not be well received by his own organization and, at those moments, he needed to sit and wait until the context and the organization changed. A three level game with

Adams in the center. His importance and his role in translating the context to the movement and the movement to the other actors in the context are the clearest during divergent cases.

I am certainly not the first one to claim that leaders matter in conflict transformation process. Nor am I the first one to claim that Gerry Adams personally played a significant role in the dynamics of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. However, I am the first one to examine not only what he did to matter so much, but also what it was about his personality that made him so central to the peace process. As I assumed from the beginning, Adams was, and still is, a strategic leader.

He could not have succeeded if he was of a different personality and holding a different vision. It was his long-windedness, understanding that change takes time, and allies, that allowed him to stay relevant throughout the process and to keep his spot, both in the organization, and in the process. Adams could not have succeeded had he not worked hard to gain the support of important promoters of peace, such as Hume and Father Alec Reid. But he could not have succeeded had he not kept his real plan secret from the organization until the moment was ripe. He particularly needed McGuinness from the inside (of the Movement) and Hume from the outside, to succeed. McGuinness allowed him to maintain the façade of militancy and to keep the support of radicals within the organization while Hume allowed him to push peace forward.

Lastly, I would take note of his refusal to admit he was ever a member of Provisional IRA. Yes, it is quite unbelievable. However, tactically, by refusing to admit of his membership, he helped British leaders, the leaders of the Irish Republic and even Bill Clinton and any other cooperative entity to save face. They were negotiating with him, but he was not a terrorist. And for that as well, he should be given credit.

Moving on to Hume. He was a key actor in the process, and his unwavering push for peace eventually worked out. However, on his own, he could not have pushed the process forward. He needed the Republican Movement to move from its position and he was willing to risk his name for that purpose. If it was just Adams and Hume, we might have seen a quicker progress in the process, but reality was more challenging than that. Nevertheless, he deserves special mentioning as his role was pivotal in pushing the Republican Movement, even though he did it from the outside, all the while maintaining his opposition to armed struggle.

Leaders are thus important in conflict transformation processes. they are important in playing two and even three level games, when they communicate with each other, to push their own agendas, their organizations' agenda, their constituents' agenda and their national and international agenda. In order to understand conflict transformation processes, we must look into how these different agendas come together and which one of them trumps the others and under what circumstances.

So what kind of specific types of leadership behavior should we look for when we are studying conflicts? As a starting point, if you have a leader that keeps claiming he is interested in peace, you should probably give him a chance and hear him out, even if violence has not ceased. Not giving such leaders a voice, even if they are untrustworthy, may leave them no choice but to support violence. Ignoring those who speak of peace means that the moderate voices, or those that can be taught moderation, are being silenced.

Look for leaders that have particular goals, that have the support of the movement, and that speak on its behalf. Try to read in between the lines and pay attention to how they speak of their adversaries versus the way they speak of their group. More importantly, pay attention to whether they are tailoring their words to specific audiences. If they are able to send different

messages based on different contexts and varied audiences, if they are reactive to the context within which they are operating, then you want to listen to them. Based on such understanding, it is important to gauge the reasons behind leaders' specific messages. Sometimes they have to say things they do not necessarily believe in to protect the group they are representing.

If a pragmatic leader is standing in front of you (Hermann & Gerard, 2009), their signals should be taken as representing their group's wishes. A change in such a leader's message should be taken seriously, as it means the movement they are representing has changed its views on the conflict. It opens up opportunities for more constructive dialogue, or at the minimum, for a better understanding of the other side. If an ideologue is the one who is leading, know that his words do not always necessarily represent the movement he is leading. Accommodation in such cases can result in splintering. Generally, no matter what type of leader you are facing, reaction to his messages should be tailored and measured.

Dual-Wing Resistance Organization

In my work I have tried to contribute to our understanding of the internal dynamics of militant organizations in general, and the complex relationship between separate wings of dual-wing resistance organizations in particular. I have adopted a definition that is both analytical and descriptive. Both wings of the movement are actors in the conflict process, but they are also part of an overarching organization that shapes their behavior. The Republican Movement is merely one example of such an organization, but more exist, within the Northern Ireland conflict, but in other known, protracted and stalemated conflicts.

The participation of Dual-Wing Resistance Organizations in conflict transformation processes further complicates an already tough situation. These organizations face a challenge in

trying to send a unified message. They also face greater difficulties in overcoming divergence between leaders and between leaders and their followers. As such, it requires their adversaries, as well as third parties to be more patient with them and to not over-react to any individual event. It requires policy makers to try and understand what organizational dynamics were behind the action and tailor their reaction to it. Not every action taken during the process of conflict transformation is meant for the adversary. As I have tried to show in this dissertation, sometimes actions, especially violent ones, are about trying to keep your house in peace.

This is not to condone violence in anyway, but it is, however, to say that not all violence is an end in and of itself, sometimes it is a mean. Violence is sometimes employed due to organizational breakdown, sometimes it is employed in an effort to prevent the organization from breaking down. At other times still, it is a mistake, or an un-sanctioned action (by the leadership) and despite having clear ramifications for the organization, it should be dealt with accordingly.

As I have tried to show in my dissertation, dual-wing organizations that are in the process of adopting politics over violence have more incentives to cooperate with the system when the various actors that make the context in which they operate send positive signals and are willing to give them a chance. Dialogue is the answer. Not at any price, and not under all circumstances, but overall, it is a better solution than continuing the cycle of violence.

Furthermore, DWRO, by their mere nature, have leaders that seek dialogue, or at the minimum, a chance to voice contention non-violently. As such, policy makers should make an effort to strengthen those leaders within the organization and not treat the entire organization as one. Leaders have the ability to overcome even the most challenging circumstances and even the most constraining organizational dynamics if they have a genuine desire in peace and patience to see it through. Those leaders are exactly those that need to be supported by third parties,

intermediaries, promoters of peace and even adversaries. To know whether a leader is right for the job however, he must first be given a chance, and dialogue should take place. Policy makers thus need to make an effort to create an open context and dialogue, even under challenging circumstances. Once again, not at every price, but nevertheless, without giving any leader a chance, no progress in the conflict transformation process could ever take place.

The Northern Ireland conflict transformation process

When does a conflict process turn into a conflict transformation process? My answer is that such turning happens once we can detect a meaningful effort of cooperation by the biggest protagonists of the story. In the Northern Ireland case, this first effort took place already in June 1972, when several leaders of the Republican Movement, Adams included, were flown to London to meet with British officials to discuss a cease-fire. The time-line for this work begins in 1983, meaning that the transformation process has already begun.

The process of transformation was marked by its non-linearity. What I mean by that is that the movement from contention to cooperation was definitely not straight-forward and many of the actors involved, not just the Republican Movement kept switching back and forth from violence to sending out positive and cooperative signals. Nevertheless, the more positive the context was, the more there was a push for cooperation, the harder and pricier it became to resort back to violence. As we can clearly see from the tables in chapters five and six, towards the end of the conflict, most of the factors in the context were relevant and most of them were relevant in a positive way so much so that even negative actions could not stop the movement towards cooperation and peace.

The Good Friday Agreement was not the end of the conflict, but it is nonetheless a historically significant moment. Technically the Provisional IRA was on a ceasefire even before it was signed. Perhaps from the Republican movement's point of view the ending point of the conflict is indeed the 1997 ceasefire but as history showed, no one could have known it would lead to the peace agreement. Perhaps in the Republican Movement's eyes the 1997 ceasefire only became permanent when the IRA agreed to decommission their arms in 2005 and the Good Friday Agreement was just another part of the process. And perhaps, as many people claim, the conflict is not over and the Provisional IRA ceasefire can still be revoked. Nonetheless, it will be hard to deny that the situation in Northern Ireland prior to the Good Friday Agreement and the level of violence was very different than those following it. Even though splinter groups still exist and operate, the level of violence is far lower. And the Provisional Republican Movement is not the one it was before.

Additionally, the Sinn Féin is no longer the fringe radical political party that was forced to remain on the sidelines. It has been an active, central and quite a large part of the governing body since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, with Martin McGuinness serving as the Deputy First Minister alongside a Unionist First Minister since 2007. His political success, along with that of others in the party also reflects the huge significance of the Good Friday Agreement.

Lastly about the Good Friday Agreement, I would like to stress that it was indeed a culmination of processes undertaken and experienced by various actors in the conflict and not necessarily only by the Republican Movement. Nevertheless, the fact that the Provisional IRA did not resume violence in order to support the agreement, that Sinn Féin actively voted to endorse it, even while other parties such as the DUP were still opposing it, shows that it was a

key moment in the process for the Republican Movement as much as it was a key moment in history. This is one of the reasons I included it as one of my cases of analysis.

Conflict transformation processes more generally

Lastly, I wish to stress the importance of looking into all the levels of analysis, when trying to design policies during conflict transformation processes. It is not enough to focus on the leadership of an organization, just like it is not enough to study just the organization itself, or just the context. One must first understand how factors from the various levels interact with each other and create a chain of actions and re-actions. Connected to this point is the need to examine the process as a whole and to not get caught up in single events over time. Additionally, one must also understand that processes take time. Even when there is a will to change and a true interest in peace, old habits are hard to break, especially in movements that have a propensity towards violence.

Policy makers that are side to a conflict, especially the bigger adversaries, such as Britain and the Irish Republic in this case, must also take a good and deep look at themselves. It will be difficult to ask any organization to send a unified and peaceful message if you are not doing so yourself. Policy makers should be more attentive to the different points of view their counterparts to a conflict process hold. Always be diligent in asking – what message is this action sending to my adversaries? Do we, as a whole, stand behind this message? How were our recent and past actions seen by our adversaries and what reactions did they lead to? Lastly, what can be done to mollify the reactions of the other sides to the conflict, what is the message we truly wish to send?

As part of this requirement to look into one's own behavior, sides to processes of conflict transformation must also acknowledge their own role in prolonging the conflict and in maintaining the cycle of violence going. It takes two to tango (or three or four, depending on the conflict), it is never just one side's entire responsibility. Only when each side will acknowledge its own role, would the sides to the conflict be able to move forward.

An example from the conflict under study is in order. During the 1994 ceasefire the British government might have believed that they were doing all in their power to create progress in the conflict and that if the Provisional IRA was not cooperating, it was on them and on them alone. However, based on their past experiences, the Republican Movement found it difficult to trust in the British government and as such, needed to see first whether the British government would actually fulfill any of their commitments. It was not only the Republican Movement's 'fault' for not moving the process forward, it was also the British government's fault for not being explicit enough in a way that will overcome past experiences.

Prolonged and protracted conflicts tend to increase each side's bias against the other. Such bias is blinding. The bias against the Republican Movement blinded the British media, but more importantly, it blinded decision makers and third parties from taking responsibility for their own part in the continued violence in the conflict. as such, I will end by calling policy makers that are involved in conflict transformation processes to check their bias, how much of their perception of the other side is rooted in reality and how much of it is based on misperceptions and miscommunications. By removing the blindfolds of bias, better policies could be designed.

A User's Guide to process tracing a DWRO

Before delving into the steps of analysis one last time, I would like to stress the importance of interactive analysis via process tracing. In my analysis, I have tried to argue that a better understanding of conflict processes depends on tracing factors operating at different levels, and interacting with each other dynamically, over time. Another point that should be stressed is that it is important to examine everything that happens from specific participants' point of view. As it stands, my dissertation attempts to explain the behavior of the Republican Movement, not the conflict in its entirety. But the same process of analysis can be conducted for the other actors in the conflict.

In order to examine the applicability of this sort of analysis and to test the hypotheses on other DWROs and on other cases, one must follow a few particular steps:

1. Identify a Dual-wing Resistance Organization (DWRO), and examine its central grievances, adversaries and goals.
2. Identify for you chosen DWRO the organizational structure, decision making units and decision making mechanisms/procedures.
3. Identify the leaders of your DWRO – Who speaks on behalf of the DWRO? Is there one leader that can be identified as a predominant leader?
 - a. If yes, who is he (or she) and how did he rise to power? What is his first act in power (that will be the time to start process tracing the conflict)? Was he replaced at some point?
 - b. If no, who are the main speakers for the group? Is it a small group or a coalition? How and when did they rise to power? How do they share power? Is there a period for which the same leaders share power? In the case of multiple leaders, a first step

- will be to determine their unity of message. If they do not have unified messages, it adds another layer of analysis in between the leadership and the group dynamic that must be examined as well.
4. Identify the main adversary for your DWRO (usually the state that the DWRO is fighting).
What is the source of rivalry/ disagreement/ conflict between the strong adversary and the DWRO? What are the claims of the main adversary? What are the main organs by which the main adversary is acting (in relation to the conflict and to the DWRO)?
 5. Identify all other actors in the conflict. Separate between those that are deemed as ‘enemies’ by your DWRO, those that are deemed as ‘spoilers’ by your DWRO and those that can be seen as ‘promoters of peace’. These other actors can be other DWRO’s operating in the area, but also other revolutionary groups, political parties, and even strong civilian organizations.
 6. Identify third parties that have been known to intervene in the conflict.
 7. List all relevant elections for your case and their results, especially when it comes to your DWRO.
 8. Once all of your actors are identified, begin constructing your time-line. Process tracing is a long process in which we go back and forth in our search for more evidence, but we must start somewhere. Start with the earliest case of behavior you know for your DWRO or around the time your leader or group of leaders came to power.
 9. With the help of the time-line, identify the clear cases of behavior and code them for their type: convergent cooperation, convergent violent, divergent and confused. Be clear about what counts as cooperation for your DWRO (it is not necessarily obvious and requires a deeper understanding of the goals, the history and the modus operandi of the group).

10. For each case, look into the 4 months preceding it and code the actions and occurrences in the context level as either positive or negative from the point of view of your own DWRO.

Justify your coding decisions.

a. For each case, is the context more negative or positive?

b. For each case type, does the context fit the behavior for all the cases of that type?

(Negative context for violence, positive context for cooperation and mixed context for divergence and confusion)?

11. For each case, identify whether the two wings of the DWRO are united or not (are they diverging for strategic reasons or is it due to real disagreements)

12. For each case, identify whether the leader(s) is(are) more in support of violence or cooperation during that time, whether they are fearing an organizational split, were they necessary for the behavioral outcome and whether they were being pulled by organizational dynamics or pulling the organization behind them to fit their own goals.

13. Identify patterns of interaction for each of the behavioral types. Interactions can take place between various factors within the context level, between a particular factor or actor in the conflict and the DWRO, between the context as a whole and the DWRO, between a particular factor or actor in the conflict and the leader(s) of the DWRO and between the DWRO's and the leadership itself (in the sense that the context actually does not explain the chosen behavior). Many interactions can also take place simultaneously.

Following these steps will allow a researcher to paint a fuller picture of the DWRO she is studying, and the conflict she is interested in understanding. It will allow her to understand whether one factor, one particular actor or one type of actions lead to specific behaviors. It will

allow her also to understand how the context as a whole interacts with DWRO's behavior.

Lastly, it will also allow her to understand the true role of the leaders of the DWRO.

Specific hypotheses to consider when looking into other cases of DWROs (as a first step) can be formalized based on my findings and on the above steps. It should be noted that such hypotheses can only be tested once one conceptualizes the relevant contextual factors for a specific DWROs (it will no longer be the British government but it will be a different strong adversary). Future research should thus begin with the following hypotheses regarding context. In general, it can be said that:

H1-a: when the biggest contextual actor is sending out positive signals, DWROs will be either cooperative or divergent. Alternatively:

H1-b: when the biggest contextual actor is sending out negative signals, DWROs will be mostly violent or divergent. And:

H1-3: when the biggest actor in the conflict is sending mixed signals, the DWRO will be divergent or confused.

However, in order to know more accurately which of the various options will be the correct one in each of the above hypotheses, we must examine the interaction between the variables in the other levels. It is insufficient to look into the context, let alone, one contextual factor within it.

This is not to say that other factors in the context do not matter, but on their own, they cannot explain a DWRO's choice of behavior. It is only by interacting with each other and with factors at the other levels that they gain their power.

When it comes to organizational factors as determining behavior, a guiding rule should be to examine the relationship and decision making mechanisms within DWROs. The way they matter is by minimizing a leader's operation space and infringing on his decision making power. However, even here more specific hypotheses can be thought of.

H2: When a DWRO is unified, convergent cases are more likely to take place.

Leaders, their behavior and their impact on group behavior are the last level of analysis I looked into. I began my analysis with the understanding that leaders matter, but it was unclear in what way they indeed matter. Following the empirical analysis, specific hypotheses regarding the role of leaders in determining organizational behavior can be reached.

H3: Strategic leaders can overcome a negative contextual environment.

H4: Leaders who have been in power for long periods of time will be more successful at manipulating their environment and will advance more moderate views.

There is no point in backing leaders who have not reached positions of power, but once they have, there is benefit in standing behind those who have the power, and advance moderate views. Attention should be given to leaders' public announcements and careful examination of their words with regards to peace and violence should be done. Lastly is the need to look into the interaction not only within the levels but also between them.

H5-a: when both the context and the organizational dynamics are negative, the DWRO will be convergent towards violence. Similarly,

H5-b: when both the context and the organizational dynamics are positive, and a strategic leader is in place, the DWRO will be convergent towards cooperation.

H5-c: when the context is negative, but the organizational dynamics are positive (unified), the DWRO is more likely to be convergent towards cooperation or divergent.

H5-d: when the context is negative, but the organizational dynamics are positive, and there is a moderate strategic leader in place, the DWRO is more likely to be convergent toward cooperation.

H5-e: when the context is negative, but the organizational dynamics are positive, and there is no moderate strategic leader in place, the DWRO is more likely to be divergent.

H5-f: when both the context and the organizational dynamics are negative, the DWRO is more likely to be convergent towards violence.

H5-g: when the context is positive, but the organizational dynamics are negative, the DWRO is more likely to be divergent or confused.

H5-h: when the context is positive, but the organizational dynamics are negative, and there is a moderate strategic leader in place, the DWRO is more likely to be divergent.

H5-i: when the context is positive, but the organizational dynamics are negative, and there is no moderate strategic leader in place, the DWRO is more likely to be confused.

The more cases we study via this form of analysis, the more we will be able to say about the dynamic nature of conflicts, the nature of DWROs and the true role of leaders in transforming conflicts and advancing peace and reconciliation. The more we know about the leader and understand the way he sees the world, the more we will be able to tailor the process of transformation. Actions by the DWROs will be judged in a different light and more careful consideration will be given to both action and reaction by the rest of the actors in the conflict.

Future research

My dissertation looked into the Republican Movement but it has wider implications. Two avenues of further research that will further my own work and our understanding in the field are worth mentioning. These two steps extend the question of the importance of leaders and the operating of dual-wing structures of armed non-state actors in different directions.

First, there is a need to apply the levels-of-analysis framework to other conflicts. appropriate cases are the Basque struggle in Spain, the Kurdish struggle in Turkey and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to name just a few. Particularly, in each conflict, one would focus on one dual-wing organization: the PKK in the Kurdish conflict, ETA in the Basque struggle and Hamas in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. For each organization, the framework would be applied to cases of convergence and divergence between the two wings. Extending my framework to other cases will allow me to determine several things: whether my dynamic levels-of-analysis framework and my hypotheses generating exercise holds in other conflictual settings beyond the Northern Ireland case, whether or not similar patterns are detected; and what might be possible explanations for variation.

Furthermore, it will also determine whether leaders play a similar role or not in these other settings, whether there are similarities among the leaders of these different organizations, and whether push and pull factors work in similar ways in different dual-wing organizations. These are all significant queries that deserve more attention, as they can prove that religion, region, or a unique individual are not necessarily always the most appropriate explanatory arguments when it comes to long-lasting conflicts.

A second avenue of further research focuses on the role of leaders in bringing forth change. In it, there is a need to delve deeper into the analysis of Gerry Adams, using his speeches and interviews over the years, analyzing them by conflict setting, audience, timing, topics, and organizational setting (whether the organization was convergent or divergent at the time of the speech).

Once reaching more nuanced insights regarding Adams's leadership style, his propensity to change, his centrality in pushing the Republican Movement towards peace and in the conflict transformation process as a whole, his leadership and personality could be compared to other leaders of different organizations, from social movements, to terrorist organizations, to states. A comparative analysis of leaders will allow to examine further whether leaders can in fact change over time, in what ways and under what conditions.

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CURRENT POSITION

Post-Doctoral Fellow, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, October 2016-

EDUCATION

PhD Candidate (ABD) in Political Science (IR/CP), Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 2011-2016 **Defense – October 6th 2016**

MA in Political Science, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, 2011-2012

MA in Government: Diplomacy and Conflict Studies, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya, Israel, 2008-2009

Bachelor of Laws (LL.B), Buchman Law School, Tel Aviv University, Israel, 2004-2008

Bachelor of Arts (B.A) in History of the Arts, Tel Aviv University, Israel, 2005-2008

DISSERTATION

The Dynamics of Conflict – Transforming Northern Ireland

I develop a levels-of-analysis framework which examines the interaction between individual leaders, organizational dynamics and structural constraints and opportunities. I conduct a detailed sequential tracing of the conflict transformation process in Northern Ireland with a particular focus on the Provisional Irish Republican Movement. The analysis relies on extensive archival sources and interviews conducted during field work. I argue that organizations sustaining both a political wing and a military one operate in one of four ways: dual-wing convergence towards violence, dual-wing congruence towards cooperation, divergence and confusion. The specific organizational behavior is determined by the interaction between factors at the three levels of analysis. I show that when acting as mediators in a multiple-levels game, leaders can overcome challenges, create opportunities and drive divergence to fit their own political interests.

Committee: Margaret G. Hermann (Chair), Miriam F. Elman, Assaf Moghadam, Seth K. Jolly, Audie Klotz

PUBLICATIONS

Blunders and Blame: How Armed Non-State Actors React to Their Mistakes (2016)– *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* (forthcoming, available online since July 2016) - With Ioana Emy Matesan

Say Terrorist, Think Insurgent: Labeling and Analyzing Contemporary Terrorist Actors (2014) – *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 8 (5) - With Assaf Moghadam and Polina Beliakova.

Book review: Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to Nonviolent Struggle by Véronique Dudouet, ed., *Democracy and Security* (2016)

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Profiling Gerry Adams: The Role of Leaders in Conflict Transformation

Journal manuscript in preparation

The Threatening Aspects of Territory: Are Some Territories Simply Non-Negotiable?

Journal manuscript in preparation

RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS

International Security and Conflict Processes

Leaders, Decision Making and Foreign Policy Making

International Relations

Comparative Politics

Social Movements, Insurgencies and Terrorist groups

Israeli and Irish politics

OTHER PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Carnegie Scholars Project, Carnegie Corporation of NY, policy scholar, 2015 –

Bridging the Gap: One of thirty-five policy scholars from a five universities consortium that is working on building a program that will train scholars in the creation of policy relevant documents in order to bridge the gap between academia and the policy community.

Institute for Qualitative and Multi Method Research (IQMR), Syracuse University, Associate director, 2014

Responsible for organizing and managing the two-weeks long institution. Tasks included but were not limited to: coordinating with different service provides within and outside of Syracuse University; communicating with professors; organizing class materials; ordering food and beverages; organizing social events, providing on-site assistance.

The Remaking of Eastern Borders in Europe Workshop, The European Cooperation in Science and Technology Association (COST), held at the IDC Herzliya, Administrative Assistant, 2010

Responsible for managing the workshop. Tasks included but were not limited to: coordinating with different service provides; organizing materials; organizing social events, providing on-site and off-site assistance.

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

The Dynamics of Conflict Transformation Processes: Understanding Northern Ireland
Transforming Intractable Conflicts: Their Restructuring and Framing Conference, the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and Collaboration (PARCC) of the Syracuse University Maxwell School and The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research of Tel Aviv University, Syracuse NY 2016

What drives terrorist leaders and how different are they from state leaders?

American Political Science Association (APSA) annual conference, Philadelphia, PA 2016

The Future of Terrorism Studies

The World Summit on Counter-Terrorism - ICT 16th international conference, Herzliya, Israel, (invited talk – declined)

The Dynamics of Conflict – Transforming Northern Ireland
International Studies Association (ISA) annual conference, Atlanta GA 2015

Dynamics of Conflict Transformation
International Security Studies Section of ISA and International Security and Arms Control of APSA (ISSS-ISAC), Springfield MA 2015

Blunders and Blame: Why Armed Non-State Actors Admit to Making Mistakes
ISSS-ISAC, Springfield MA 2015

Profiling Gerry Adams: The Role of Leaders in Conflict Transformation
International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP), Rome, Italy, 2014

Mistakes as Occasions for Decisions: Decision Making Processes in the Irish Republican Movement
ISPP, Herzliya, Israel, 2013

The Power of Territory: Are Some Territories Simply Nonnegotiable?
ISA Annual Conference, San Francisco, CA, 2013; New York Political Science Association (NYPSA) Annual Conference, Syracuse, NY, 2013

Urban refugees in Israel: Applying the Bureaucratic Politics Model to the Oscillating Israeli Policies
ISA, San Francisco, CA, 2013

Transitional Justice in Post-Conflict Communities
6th Annual Graduate Conference at Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 2010

AWARDS

Dissertation Completion Award, Syracuse University (\$18,000), 2015
Year-long fellowship awarded by the Political Science Department

Teaching Assistantship, Syracuse University (\$16,000), 2011- 2015
Year-long fellowship awarded by the Political Science Department (used only for 2011-2013)

Research Fellowship, Syracuse University (\$8,000), 2014
Semester-long fellowship awarded by the Political Science Department for working with Professor Margaret G. Hermann

Betsy and Allan Cohn Award, Syracuse University (\$6,000), 2014
Awarded by the Political Science Department for best External Grant Application, in support of dissertation research and field work

Moynihan Institute of Syracuse University research grant (\$1,500), 2016
Awarded by the Moynihan Institute in support of dissertation field-work research

Moynihan Institute of Syracuse University research grant (\$1,000), 2016
Awarded by the Moynihan Institute in support of participation in the PSRP summer school in Edinburgh, Scotland

Roscoe Martin Award, Syracuse University (\$500), 2014
Awarded by the Maxwell School in support of dissertation research, used for field-work

ISA travel grant (\$500), 2016
Awarded by the International Studies Association in support of conference participation

Syracuse University Graduate Student Organization grant (\$300), 2016, 2015, 2014, 2013
Awarded by the graduate school in support of conference participation

APSA travel grant (180\$), 2016
Awarded by the American Political Science Association in support of conference participation

Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award, Syracuse University, 2013
Campus-wide award given by the Graduate School, based on faculty nominations and student evaluations

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Principle Research Assistant and Research Coordinator, The Interdisciplinary Center
Assaf Moghadam's book project on terrorist cooperation, 2013-2015

Responsible for collecting materials for theoretical and empirical chapters of the book. Tasks included but were not limited to coordinating and providing quality control of eight research assistants, proof-reading and editing draft chapters.

Research assistant, The Interdisciplinary Center

Lesley Terris's book project on the effects of rebel leadership changes on conflict resolution and civil war termination, 2009-2011

Responsible for building a new dataset of all civil wars since the end of WWII that includes details on rebellious groups and their changing leaderships.

Hani Zubida and Robin Harper's (CUNY) project on community life of immigrant workers in Israel, 2009-2011

Responsible for holding interviews with immigrant workers in Israel, writing field notes and helping in creating a dataset of answers.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Post-Doctoral Fellow – Undergraduate level, IDC Herzliya, Israel (Fall 2016-Spring 2017)
Comparative Politics (Intro to Government); Introduction to International Relations

Post-Doctoral Fellow – Graduate level, IDC Herzliya, Israel (Fall 2016-Spring 2017)
Qualitative Research Methods; Political Leadership

Instructor, Syracuse University (May 2015)
PSC 300.m301: Mass Violence: Civil wars, insurgencies and terrorism

Designed and conducted an intensive two-week, three-credit course, combining theory with films and based on extensive student participation.

Instructor, IDC Herzliya, Israel (Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010)
Research Methods

Taught a weekly class on conducting research using SPSS. Was responsible for creating a syllabus and for designing assignments, as well as for grading and for assessing students' overall performance. Was also responsible for helping students in office hours and beyond, depending on each student's special needs.

Teaching assistant and discussion leader, Syracuse University (Fall 2011- Spring 2014)
Supreme Court in American Politics (Fall 2011), Ethics in International Relations (Spring 2012);
Introduction to International Relations (Fall 2013, Spring 2013); Political Conflict (Spring 2014)

Responsible for creating a discussion-section syllabus, for helping with the design of assignments, for grading and for assessing students' overall performance, in class debates and written assignments. Also responsible for helping students in office hours and beyond, depending on each student's needs.

Teaching assistant - Graduate level Courses, IDC Herzliya, Israel (Fall 2009- Spring 2015)
Insurgencies and Civil War (Fall 2013, Fall 2014); International Law and Conflict (Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010, Fall 2014); Conflict Analysis (Fall 2010, Spring 2010, Spring 2011, Spring 2015);
International Mediation (Spring 2010, Fall 2010); Israel National Security (Fall 2010); Approaches to Political Science (Fall 2010)

Teaching assistant - Undergraduate level courses, IDC Herzliya, Israel (Fall 2009-Fall 2014)
Civil Wars and Ethnic Conflicts (Spring 2011, Fall 2013, Fall 2014); Greed, Grievances and Civil Wars (Spring 2011); Israel Governance (Spring 2010, Spring 2011, Summer 2012); Public Administration and Policy in Israel (Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010, Spring 2011)

Responsible for teaching several topics during the semester, for helping with the design of assignments, for grading and for assessing students overall performance, in class debates, in written assignments and in general. Also responsible for helping students in office hours and beyond, depending on each student's special needs and for holding group meetings with students on group projects and before assignments are due. Helping students with finding topics for final assignments, with finding sources and with structuring academic papers.

Guest Lectures, IDC Herzliya, Israel

Israel National Security and Human Rights Law (Fall 2010); Justice Versus Conciliation in Post Genocidal Societies (Spring 2011); Public Policy in Israel (Fall 2010), Truth and Reconciliation Commissions and their Role in Post Conflict Transformation (Spring 2011); Greed versus Grievances in Civil Wars (Fall 2014), Ethnic Conflicts and the case of Northern Ireland (Fall 2014), The Dynamics of Conflict Transformation – explaining Northern Ireland (Fall 2014)

OTHER EXPERIENCE AND SERVICE

Inclusive Political Settlements (PSRP) Summer School, Global Justice Academy, University of Edinburgh – June 2016

Assistant Director of the Qualitative Data Repository Search Committee, Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, Syracuse University, member, 2015

Comparative Politics Search Committee, Political Science Department, Syracuse University, non-voting member representing the Graduate Student Association, 2015

Field-work study, Northern Ireland, October 2015, February 2016

Eddie Lazar Advocates and Notary, Pre-internship, Internship, Attorney at law, 2005-2009

Timlul, LTD., Court Stenographer and translator of legal documents, 2003-2008

MILITARY AND VOLUNTEER SERVICES

The Clinic for the Rights of Refugees at Tel Aviv University, 2006-2007

Preparation of victims' claims to the ICC, 2006-2007

Joint effort of the Clinic, HIAS Organization and ASSAF Organization to gather complaints and evidence from Sudanese refugees in Israel relevant to the case against the Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir

Founding member, ASAF Organization (Aid Organization for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Israel), 2006-2007

Sergeant, Israel Defense Forces, 2002-2003

LANGUAGES

Hebrew and English: fluent speaking, writing and reading; extensive translating experience

French – working knowledge of speaking, writing and reading

Italian – working knowledge of speaking and reading

REFERENCES

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