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Political Participation in Kosovo

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Political participation in Kosovo

by

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A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Major: Political Science

Program of Study Committee:
Amy Erica Smith, Major Professor
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Iowa State University

Ames, Iowa

2016

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this research to my families that reside in two continents: Kosovo and Iowa, United States. Without their support, love, and care I wouldn't have been who I am today and this research would have been impossible.

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NOMENCLATURE

AAK	Aleanca per Ardhmërinë e Kosovës
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
LDK	Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës
LVV	Lëvizja Vetevendosje
PDK	Kosovo Democratic Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

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ABSTRACT

What determines conventional and unconventional modes of political participation? Are they equally and positively related to social status and education? There are several factors that explain these two modes of participation. Using data collected under this study, UNDP data, and interviews, this thesis explains the factors that determine political participation in Kosovo. Eight hypotheses are tested, using both bivariate correlations and logistic regression analyses. Results indicate that party membership and social networks are very important in explaining both conventional and unconventional political participation in Kosovo.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent."

- E.E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People*

This quote by Schattschneider reveals a truth about the pluralist system democracy, and who actually has the voice in this system. Discourse on democracy has oftentimes been served to us by portraying all of us as equal. However, the truth is that we might be equal in theory, but not in practice. We may have the right to participate politically, but oftentimes, we lack the resources to participate. For several years, only institutionalized forms such as voting have been seen as democratic practices, and they have favored the upper class that has had better access to information. Democracy, however, has been reinvented and is still being reinvented, and the political repertoire of participation is expanding. What once was seen as undemocratic now is being seen as democratic.

Dating back to ancient Greece we know that political participation was determined by sex, wealth, and age; one had to be a male adult who owned land. As democracy has evolved, different factors influencing political participation have been examined. The research literature asserts that different countries show different patterns and different factors have different effects on political participation. There isn't one theory or specific variable that explains political behavior; every country has its own specifications.

In Kosovo, there has been no research concerning factors that motivate people to participate politically. There have only been polls that measure public opinion regarding political

issues, but no correlational research. This study aims to expand the research on political behavior in developing countries, specifically Kosovo, and to understand the patterns of political behavior there. The objective of this study is to uncover information on political behavior in Kosovo and to have a better understanding as to which factors lead to political participation in the light of its historical context.

Research Questions

As the objective of this research is to shed light on political behavior in Kosovo, the following research questions are posed:

R1: What factors influence political participation in Kosovo?

R1.1: Does the high unemployment rate and potential resulting citizen dissatisfaction affect protest participation?

R1.2: Do resources affect conventional and unconventional political participation?

R1.3: Does grievance outweigh resource mobilization in unconventional political participation in Kosovo?

R1.4: What is the role of nationalism in mobilizing people to participate politically in Kosovo?

To answer these questions, I have used both quantitative and qualitative methods. For my quantitative methods I have used data from the Kosovo Public Policy Pulse (October, 2015), and I have also collected a small sample of survey data in the capital city of Kosovo, Prishtina. To

complement my quantitative methods, I have conducted interviews with a small purposive expert sample.

Thesis Content

Chapter 2 will cover the historical context of Kosovo, which is critically important to understanding political participation. Chapter 3 will review relevant research literature covering various theories of political participation along with overviewing political participation research that has been conducted in various countries. Chapter 3 will also describe my hypotheses. Chapter 4 will describe the methodology that was used to conduct this research. Finally, Chapter 5 will cover the results of my data analysis and the limitations of this research.

CHAPTER 2

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Kosovo, with an area of 4,200 square miles and 1.7 million people, is located in the southeast of Europe and is a relatively new country, whose existence has been shaped by much political turmoil. Kosovo remained under political authority of either Yugoslavia or Serbia until 1999, when the United Nations assumed that authority.

During the era under the Serbian regime Kosovo wasn't equally recognized as a republic of Yugoslavia, like Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Kosovo was an autonomous province under Serbia; therefore, it didn't have rights equal to those of other republics. In 1989 the autonomy of the Province of Kosovo was annulled. Most Kosovo Albanians were no longer allowed to work in the public sector. Kosovo Albanians were excluded from schools and universities, health services, etc. Kosovo Albanians established a parallel political and economic system of their own, where they started schooling in Albanian, created an informal governance and taxation system as a means to resist the Milosevic regime's suppression, and Albanian doctors provided health services in their private houses (Clark, 2000). This period was characterized by much political turmoil and activism; several organizations were formed, including the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms. The Democratic League of Kosovo became a dominant force in the political scene and many Albanians became involved in street protests (*i.e.*, Trepca miners started a strike, etc.) (Clark, 2000). Slobodan Milosevic claimed that Kosovo's autonomy had to be annulled to protect the Serbian minority in Kosovo. He declared a state of emergency in Kosovo due to protests.

In 1990, Serbian authorities abolished the Kosovo Assembly. Kosovo Albanians organized against Milosevic's decisions by declaring the independence of Kosovo within Yugoslavia on July 2nd, 1990. Consequently, police repression intensified. Albanians held unofficial elections in 1992 for an assembly and president of the Republic of Kosovo. These attempts proved unsuccessful, as oppression increased more and more. As the situation was getting worse and Serbian forces took control over all the Kosovo territory and conflict erupted, a guerrilla force known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was founded. The KLA made their first appearance in 1997. The war broke off in 1998 after the Drenica massacre where 60 members of the Jashari family were killed. Adem Jashari, member of the Jashari family, was one of the founders of the KLA. After several attempts to capture Adem Jashari, Serbian paramilitary forces launched an attack against his home and committed the massacre. When the conflict radicalized, the international community intervened to prevent further violence (Visoka, 2011). The North Atlantic Pact tried to solve the conflict with peace talks held in Rambouillet, France. When the peace talks negotiated by NATO failed, NATO started a bombing campaign in Serbia. The military intervention was followed with an international civilian presence called the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), who exercised executive power such as agenda setting power, veto powers, and drafting of legislation (Visoka, 2011) until February 2008 when Kosovo declared its independence. However, international supervision in Kosovo lasted until September 2012.

During the post-war period, characterized by international civilian presence, there was not much space left for Kosovo citizens to participate in the political processes. Political participation shifted from peaceful resistance during the early 1990s to rebellion and armed conflict during the late 1990s. The 1990s were characterized by collective attempts to create a

nation-state, and this changed to low political participation during the decade of the international presence in Kosovo.

Kosovo – Serbia Negotiations

Facilitated by the European Union, Kosovo and Serbia started negotiations, or so-called “technical dialogue,” in 2011. These negotiations resulted in eight rounds and some agreements on regional cooperation, freedom of movement, and rule of law. Even then however, Serbia didn’t recognize Kosovo as an independent country, and recognized it as part of Serbia within its constitution.

The technical dialogues were followed by the 2013 Brussels Agreement which aimed to normalize Kosovo-Serbia relations. This agreement contained 15 points, including the creation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities. This association, which aims to integrate Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions, should have a president, an assembly, and its own police forces and police commander, with the membership limited only to ethnic Serbs. The association will be funded by the central (Kosovo) authority as well as by the Serbian authority.

Current Situation

Although Kosovo has declared its independence since 2008, the country is still going through the democratization process. As per the 2015 Freedom House Report, Kosovo is recognized as partially free. The progress that has been made until today is not to be neglected. However, the non-democratic nature of the international administration (Cocozzelli, 2013) and the succession of corrupt governments since the declaration of the independence inhibited proper democratic consolidation in Kosovo.

Citizen satisfaction with the government has declined over the years. A biannual poll done by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Kosovo shows that only 15% of respondents are satisfied with the Prime Minister's performance in 2016. Satisfaction with other governmental branches is not higher than 20%.

In the June 2014 legislative elections, when the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) won the most votes, opposition parties—including the self-identified anti-establishment movement, Lëvizja Vetevendosje (LVV); the first party formed during the 1998-1999 Kosovo and Serbia war, Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës (LDK); and two smaller parties, namely, Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës (AAK) and Nisma-unified with the aim of toppling the PDK-ruled government. The legislative branch faced great challenges and it was unable to complete the parliamentary procedures to hold session for a 6-month period. The new government was only formed in February 2015, when LDK broke the deal with the rest of the opposition parties and joined in coalition with PDK. Therefore, PDK and LDK formed the government, having the majority of the seats in the parliament, counting the votes of the Serbian minorities (Lista Srpska).¹ The following months were characterized by greater political challenges in ratifying laws that have invaluable importance for the state of Kosovo, such as the Special Court for War Crimes and the Association of Serbian Municipalities. These events were followed by massive emigration. The police estimated that the number of people Kosovo lost in the two-month period after the elections was approximately 50,000. A poll conducted by UNDP states that of respondents who had at least one family member or friend who had emigrated, the majority believed that migration occurred due to poor socio-economic conditions. Forty-five percent of

¹ Of the 120 seats in the parliament of the Republic of Kosovo, 10 are reserved for Serbs.

respondents believed that unemployment is the main reason for emigration, followed by poverty as a second reason (UNDP Kosovo, 2015).

After the failure of ratification on the first attempt in August 2015, with international pressure, the Kosovo Parliament ratified constitutional amendments that allowed the creation of a Special Court that would be mandated to investigate alleged war crimes committed from 1998 to 1999. This court will operate with internationally appointed judges and prosecutors. The ratification of the constitutional amendments met contrasting reactions by the citizens of Kosovo. While there were people supporting the court with the hopes that war criminals will be prosecuted, protests were organized on the streets of Prishtina to oppose the creation of a Special Court. Citizens opposed the creation of this Court for various reasons. Some of the reasons, based on the declaration given by the LVV, who openly opposed it and based on declaration of Kosovo veterans, emphasize that this court undermines the war of Kosovo Liberation Army, and the state of justice in Kosovo.

Recently the Parliament has tried to ratify the Association of Serbian Municipalities, which was required by the Brussels Agreement. So far this attempt has failed. The unified opposition parties initially blocked this attempt by throwing tear gas in the parliamentary sessions. The assembly then forbade the opposition parties from the parliamentary session and ratified the law on the creation of the Association of the Serbian Municipalities unanimously.

The opposition then started a petition to counter the creation of this association and demarcation with Montenegro. A total of 200,000 citizens signed this petition. However, members of the opposition were stopped by security in their attempt to submit the petitions to the assembly. Later, the Speaker of the Assembly said that the opposition didn't respect legal procedures in submitting the petition. On December 23, 2015, the Constitutional Court ruled that

on principal the creation of the Association of Serbian Municipalities was constitutional but that aspects of the ratified legislation were unconstitutional. Meanwhile, the opposition organized protests, which resulted in several arrests and violence. The biggest protest yet to be held after the war was that of January 9, 2016, organized by opposition parties against the government.

The historical context of Kosovo is very important when talking about political participation. The collective memory of Kosovo Albanians has been shaped by their attempts to create and establish their own state. Hence, participation was a necessary tool to achieve the collective aspirations for a nation. A decade after the war and eight years after independence Kosovo still faces great socio-economic issues. While the official Statistical Agency of Kosovo states the unemployment rate in Kosovo is 35%, the World Bank states the figure as 47%. World Bank data also asserts that 45% of the population in Kosovo lives below the national poverty line, while 17% of the population lives in extreme poverty. Encountering these great economic challenges, having a very young population, and considering the historical context, one can see the importance of the political participation rooted in the culture of Kosovo.

CHAPTER 3

LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Overview

Much scholarly work has been conducted on democracy, but there is little agreement among scholars on the definition of democracy. Empirical data reveals that democracy has been invented and reinvented throughout the years (Dahl, 1998). Nevertheless, a very important component of democracy that most scholars agree upon is the necessity of political participation for its endurance and functionality. A country's level of democracy is determined by the extent to which the state behaves in conformity to the demands of its citizens (Tilly, 2007); therefore, participation is a necessary and a required tool for an existing order of democracy (Dahl, 1998). However, quantitative data show an alarming decline in political participation through conventional channels in many countries (Norris, 2002). In aggregate, citizens are not interested in politics and only a minority of citizens participates actively in politics. However, the patterns of political behavior vary between countries, and no single theory explains it. Schlozman *et al.*, (2012) give three reasons for the lack of civic participation in politics: citizens do not participate because a) they don't want to, b) they can't and c) because nobody asked them. It is evident that there is an underrepresentation of the disadvantaged (poor citizens) in political activities. Studies show that apart from being underrepresented, the disadvantaged have different policy concerns when compared to the advantaged (Verba *et al.*, 1993).

Various studies have been conducted examining the factors that motivate people to participate in political activities. Earlier studies measured political participation by accounting only for conventional modes, especially voting, as a basic tool used by citizens to convey their

political preferences. However, as modes of political activism have been reinvented, contemporary scholars have expanded their scope by accounting for unconventional forms of political participation as well. Besides conventional participation (voting and partisan participation such as donating money to parties, campaigning for a candidate, etc.) scholars have measured political participation using various other, unconventional, forms of political activities (protest, signing petitions, union membership, demonstrations, strikes, hanging posters, boycotting products for political reasons, etc.), ranging from peaceful activities to violent street blockades.

Conventional political activities are voting, campaigning for political parties or candidates, and donating money to parties. Unconventional political activities are protesting, taking part in demonstrations or strikes, signing petitions, occupying buildings, and/or boycotting.

The factors that lead people to participate politically are age, gender, socio-economic status, educational level, political information, ideology, risk attitudes, mobilization, and others. However, these factors have different effects in different countries.

Levels of analysis

Scholars researching political behavior focus on three levels of analysis; macro, micro, and multi-level analysis. In the macro level the authors concentrate on political systems and societal characteristics (Gabriel *et al.*, 2012). In micro level analyses, authors focus on individual antecedents of individual political participation (Gabriel *et al.*, 2012). Multilevel analysis focuses on individual characteristics within societal and institutional context (Gabriel *et al.*, 2012). In micro level analysis, studies suggest that socio-economic status, race (Verba and Nie, 1972;

Schlozman *et al.*, 2012; Smith-Lovin, 1979), age, education (Norris, 2002; Gallego, 2007; McVeigh and Smith 1999; Dalton *et al.*, 2010), political information (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), resources (Kaase, 2010), political ideology (Barnes and Kaase, 1979), networking (Beeghley, 1986), risk attitudes (Kam, 2012; Brooks, 2014), and mobilization (Verba *et al.*, 1978; Piven and Cloward, 1977) play an important role shaping and affecting political participation behavior. In this thesis, I focus on the micro level, and in particular on three approaches: the SES model, the rational choice model, and grievance theories.

The SES Model

The socio-economic status model (SES), one of the prominent theories in political behavior, tries to explain the causal relation between socio-economic status and political participation. This model measures civic orientation, consisting of psychological involvement in politics, a sense of political efficacy, information about politics, and sense of contribution to the community. Findings from empirical studies based on the SES model suggest that there is a significant linkage between civic orientation and upper-class status. Hence, citizens with higher SES are more likely to participate politically, because they have the necessary resources for political participation, such as, time, money, political skills, and political knowledge (Verba and Nie, 1972). Since these factors are distributed unequally, this contributes to unequal political voice (Schlozman *et al.*, 2012). Another study points out that although the rich have higher education, higher status jobs, and they hire people to work for them, they have the same amount of spare time as those with least skilled jobs, suggesting further that time availability varies due to life circumstances rather than wealth. People of upper strata are more likely to participate in both conventional and unconventional activities. Even in systems with equal opportunities, more

affluent citizens are more highly educated, and they have the advantage of well-educated and affluent parents who pass on civic culture to them (Scholzman, 2012; Nalecz, 1997).

Findings regarding education as a determinant of political participation are controversial. McVeigh and Smith (1999) claim that education makes individuals skeptical of the political process; therefore, they prefer to participate in social protest rather than donate time or money. Individuals who declared that they had educated themselves politically, according to McVeigh and Smith, were more likely to engage politically in both institutional politics and protest, relative to no action. Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980) findings suggest that voters were well educated and non-poor. The authors further claim that there is a correlation between education and voting, because the educated have a sense of civic duty, a better understanding of politics and are capable of handling bureaucratic challenges when registering to vote. A ceiling effect is also evident among studies when it comes to the SES model, suggesting that primary and secondary educations are important, as they equip people with cognitive skills. However, at the country level growth in the proportion of the population going to *college* and further increase in wealth does raise turnout (Norris, 2002).

Political information

One way SES can shape participation is due to the ease of acquiring political information. Political information is an important factor that shapes political participation. Cognitive participation, which refers to political participation through obtaining information while watching TV, listening to news on the radio, reading magazines, talking to friends and similar activities, is another form of participation that is advantageous to the rich. Individuals with higher educational levels have higher political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). The

rich have more access to intellectual media, have more time to take part in such activities, and they are surrounded by the upper-class, who is also more informed (Beeghley, 1986). Ideological conceptualization is also correlated with higher social status. In most of the European countries the weight of education and motivation in predicting ideological conceptualization is about the same; whereas in the United States, education plays a greater role (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Although ideological conceptualization is an important factor for predicting participation in conventional political activities, the same cannot be said about participation in unconventional political activities (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Individuals who declared that they had educated themselves politically, are more likely to engage in institutional politics and protest (McVeigh and Smith, 1999).

The SES model suggests that disadvantaged people have little voice in pluralist democracy; their income predicts their education, political knowledge, competence, skills, and resources, thus affecting their political engagement. Electoral processes in most countries (e.g., registration requirements and voting procedures) have also shown less favorability towards the poor. Additionally, contemporary voting procedures require greater knowledge and reading skills, which ultimately affects the poor (Beeghley, 1986). Nevertheless, the studies that deal with SES mostly measure political participation by accounting only for conventional political activities. Barnes and Kasse (1979) suggest that protesters, whose portfolio is limited to direct political action, have lower levels of education. So people from lower strata are politically active and their participation is through unconventional channels. Protest activities are not predicted by income in Brazil (Brooks, 2014).

Rational choice theory

Rational choice theory states that individuals participate in political activities because they expect benefits from their participation. Hence, their participation is calculated by measuring the cost associated with the action taken. Ultimately, the benefit has to outweigh the cost (Gabriel *et al.*, 2012).

Olson's (1965) famous work asserts that when considering whether to take part in collective action, many individuals believe that their participation would have little effect on the success of the action; however, if the change for which that action is taken occurs, then those who haven't participated can't be denied the benefit. Hence the free-rider problem arises. The rational individual will not participate and will benefit from the participation of others (Olson, 1965). Olson suggests that selective incentives will solve the free-rider problem. In protest participation, selective incentives sometimes may be as simple as social acceptance, or they can be material and psychological.

Finkel and Muller (1998) test rational choice theory as an explanation of protest behavior. Their model predicts future protest participation based on one's dissatisfaction with the public provision of goods, perception of success, and perceived importance of personal participation. However, when they add selective incentives to the model, they assert that those incentives add very little to the explanatory power.

Clientelism

Clientelism provides selective incentives, and is an essential factor when talking about political participation in Kosovo. Clientelism refers to the trade between parties and voter, where parties offer material benefits in exchange for the recipient's vote (Stokes *et al.*, 2013).

Risk attitudes

Another important variable that explains political behavior is risk attitudes. Risk accepting individuals seek novelty and excitement; therefore, they are more likely to engage in political activities (Kam, 2012). As insecurity reduces risk acceptance, citizens who are less secure withdraw from political participation (Brooks, 2014). Risk attitudes relate to rational choice theory, because people's perceptions of benefits and costs are affected by their attitudes towards risk.

Grievance theories

Prominent among grievance-based theories, the theory of relative deprivation proposes that citizens protest when their expectations are not met and their grievance level and deprivation increases (Gurr 1970; Turner and Killian 1972; Berkowitz 1972). This leads citizens to respond to collective mobilization and can lead to violence (Jessop, 1971). A sudden grievance increases political participation and it operates at a collective level. For instance, people are inclined to protest about unemployment, regardless of their employment status (Kern *et al.*, 2015).

Klandermans and Stekelenburg (2013) suggest that when the personal becomes political (that is, when one bases one's personal experience on a group experience) one is more inclined to protest.

Relative deprivation, which refers to tension that develops when there's a discrepancy between one's expectations and value capabilities (Gurr, 1970), increases one's potential to participate in collective action. As described by Gurr (1970), value capabilities are goods that people believe they have a right to or are entitled to. The greater the discrepancy the greater the discontent.

Policy implications that create discontent among citizens also mobilize people to participate in collective action (Finkel et al, 1989). Besides these, certain events impose a feeling of obligation on people that they have to do something to promote change (Opp and Gern, 1993). Political changes may increase positive incentives to participate in unconventional political activities (Opp and Gern, 1993).

Relative deprivation, political alienation, and political dissatisfaction are principal psychological determinant that explain participation in unconventional political activities (Barnes and Kaase, 1979; Finkel et al., 1989; Gurr, 1970).

The emergence of social movements and other organizations has had an impact, as well, and has led to a reshaping of political engagement. Collective actions through peaceful channels have become generally a way to express political grievance (Norris, 2002). A lengthy process of mobilization sometimes leads people to protest (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013). Political parties and social movements sometimes play the role of the catalyst to mobilize people for protest participation and they minimize the role resources play in political participation. Movements affect protest participation by disseminating information and mobilizing citizens (Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2013).

Groups with rising expectation have higher protest potential than groups whose expectations are stable. Therefore, education does not play as a great role among the less affluent if they have high grievance and deprivation levels. Protest activities are not influenced by a dislike of the office holder per se, but rather by the motive to challenge issue agendas and policy dissatisfaction (Barnes and Kaase, 1979). Dalton *et al.* (2010), analyzing World Bank data, state that national economic and political conditions affect protest participation and that protests are more likely to occur in developed democracies. Booth and Seligson (2009) propose an opposing

theory that states that political alienation produces higher participation rates, and citizens of countries with low levels of legitimacy participate actively in communal activism, civil society, and protest. Demographics are important in protest participation. Demographics interact with the preexisting social conditions, such as unemployment and declining or stagnated economic development, and aggravate them by causing conflict (LaGraffe, 2012). Literature on youth bulges² suggests that when the labor market can't secure jobs for the flood of youth who are seeking jobs, this large population of young people with unmet expectations is more likely to cause political violence (LaGraffe, 2012; Nordas and Davenport, 2013).

As different findings in different countries propose different theories, it is evident that there isn't one single variable that predicts political behavior in any given country. In addition, determinants of protest vary from country to country. There is interconnectivity between different variables. Conventional and unconventional modes of political participation are both related to many determinants besides social status and education, and the two modes are complementary to each other (Barnes and Kaase, 1979).

There is little to no data concerning political participation in Kosovo, so these relevant theories are used as a starting point for this study.

Theory

There are several factors that lead people to participate actively in conventional or unconventional political activities. I theorize that political participation in Kosovo has a different pattern compared to other countries. As a country in transition, the above-mentioned factors have

² Youth bulges refer to the increasing size of population with large cohorts of youth due to high birth rates over time (LaGraffe, 2012).

different effects in shaping political behavior, in comparison to the countries that have well-nourished democracies (*e.g.*, with free elections, fewer or no human rights violations, free media, etc.). In Kosovo, I argue, socio-economic status does not play as much of a role as it does other countries. Instead, socio-economic status has an opposite effect. In Kosovo, people who have lower incomes are more likely to participate in both conventional and unconventional activities, as a consequence of rising grievances. The underdeveloped economy and stagnated democracy have led to increasing grievance of Kosovo citizens. As the unemployment rate is increasing, it is leading to the frustration of the youth (Feltes, 2013).

I predict that people with lower incomes are more likely to participate in unconventional political activities, since their unmet expectations include daily needs and are more immediate. Moreover, I predict that they use unconventional activities as complementary actions to conventional activities; because the poor have basic human needs, and they see the election processes as taking too long (*i.e.*, every four years), thus they use unconventional activities to apply pressure to politicians and to have their demands met. Although studies suggest that the more educated the citizens are, the more critical they are of the government, I argue that the less affluent in Kosovo have very high grievances, and are as critical of governmental performance as the educated.

As the high unemployment rate in Kosovo has led to frustration among youth, my theory suggests that the youth tend to have higher expectations and higher grievance levels; therefore, the youth in Kosovo are more likely to participate in political activities. Considering that Kosovo has a very young population, youth bulges are present and they have increasing demands by entering a market that doesn't offer jobs, which further increases their grievance. Economic

instability, I argue, causes a feeling of insecurity and increases political participation, rather than decreasing it.

The latest available data indicates that 45% of the Kosovo population lives below the national poverty line. With a great percentage of the population living under the poverty line and yet being politically active, I predict that mobilization by political parties serve as an equalizer for participation of citizens who lack resources. Political parties disseminate information and provide some of the resources that are essential for people to participate politically. Besides information, these resources could be things such as transportation. Although education is usually highly correlated with political information, I expect to find that in Kosovo due to a highly politicized media, the population, in aggregate, is highly informed politically, including the uneducated or less educated. Political parties and other organizations also serve as agents to inform citizens politically.

When it comes to ideological conceptualization, I argue that citizens in Kosovo lack ideological identification. This is also due to the fact that parties in Kosovo are mainly catch-all parties. Nevertheless, protest activities are issue oriented, and do not occur because of dislike of the government or dissatisfaction, per se.

Kosovo citizens still have a collective memory around the years of the resistance during the Serbian regime and the war; therefore, I hypothesize that national identity and issues regarding the statehood of Kosovo still represent very sensitive issues for the citizens of Kosovo. Due to the historical context of Kosovo, nationalistic sentiments are still very likely to mobilize people for protest participation. If the issues arising are related to the national identity, I argue they tend to increase protest potential in Kosovo, especially national issues concerning the war and after-war period.

Political parties in Kosovo are salient in mobilizing people to be engaged politically and help people overcome their lack of resources. As parties in Kosovo are catch-all, I assume that they target people from all socio-economic strata, but they especially aim to attract people from the lower strata, because people from the lower strata constitute the highest percentage of citizens in Kosovo. Party membership in Kosovo is high. Therefore, my theory further suggests that partisanship is strong among the poor, and the parties mobilize them, the political engagement of the poor is high in Kosovo. Clientelism serves as a selective incentive to vote; where the poor are given material goods in exchange for their votes. Party loyalty is rewarded with a job or governmental position.

In summary, I expect there are several factors that shape political participation in Kosovo. These factors are not mutually exclusive but intertwined with each other. I argue that historical context has had great influence in affecting political behavior in Kosovo. Other factors that are invaluable in shaping political engagement in Kosovo are the high grievance level and governmental dissatisfaction. Moreover, the political system and political parties' proactive approach in mobilizing people are evident factors that explain political engagement in both conventional and unconventional political activities.

Hypotheses

H1: The poor in Kosovo (i.e., those with incomes less than 250 Euros per month) are more inclined to participate in both conventional and unconventional political activities, compared to individuals with higher incomes.

H2: Youth in Kosovo are more inclined to protest compared to older citizens.

H3: Individuals with lower government satisfaction are more inclined to participate in unconventional political activities, compared to individuals who have neutral feeling towards government or higher government satisfaction.

H4: Education doesn't have a significant, positive correlation with political information; therefore, the uneducated, on average, are as politically informed as the educated.

H5: Mobilization influences citizens in Kosovo to participate actively.

H6: Individuals in Kosovo are more inclined to protest about social and economic issues, such as education, healthcare, and the high unemployment rate, rather than the political situation.

H7: Nationalism serves as a strong mobilizer of political protests in Kosovo.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

In order to answer my research questions regarding political participation in Kosovo, I use mixed methods: both quantitative and qualitative. I analyze data from two surveys: a survey I deployed to a small sample of respondents in Kosovo, and data from a survey conducted by UNDP Kosovo in the October, 2015 Public Pulse poll. In addition, I conducted four qualitative interviews based on a purposive sample³, as means to complement the quantitative data.

Quantitative Data

Surveys in Kosovo

Before acquiring data from UNDP Kosovo, I started collecting surveys in Kosovo. Due to the budgetary limitations, this survey represented a small sample of 350 respondents. The data are used in this research to complement the UNDP data and to analyze questions that are unavailable in the UNDP Kosovo Public Pulse survey.

Sampling

The surveys were conducted in the Prishtina District, which is the capital city of Kosovo. According to the Statistical Agency of Kosovo (SAK), 198,897 people live in the Prishtina

³ The IRB Approval for this Research can be found in Appendix E

district; 81.32% in urban areas and 18.67% in rural areas. With a 5% margin error and 95% level of confidence, a population of 198,897 required a sample size of 384⁴.

Following the practice of the SAK, I divided Prishtina into the city of Prishtina and 41 surrounding villages. As divided by the Municipality of Prishtina, the city of Prishtina was further separated into the following 4 divisions: Kryqezimi I Taukbahces (East); Dardania (West); Xhamia e Llapit (North); and Upliana (South).

From the 41 villages that are under administration of the Municipality of Prishtina, the following five villages were picked randomly using an internet based random number generator: Ballaban, Grashtice, Kolovice, Makoc, and Matican.

The surveys were conducted during a period between November, 2015 and January, 2016, based on the divisions mentioned above. The starting house was chosen by using the starting point method in urban areas, where after numbering the blocks, one was selected at random. The corners of the chosen blocks were assigned letters, one of which was also selected at random. Moving in a clockwise direction from that corner, all houses up to the next corner were numbered and one of these were also be chosen randomly and that was the first household to be interviewed. From there onward, every fifth household was included in the sample (UNICEF, 2008). If one house did not respond, the survey was distributed to the next fifth house. Based on the percentage of people living in urban areas and in rural areas, 312 questionnaires were distributed in the urban areas as follows: East (which covers 168 streets); West (which covers 50 streets); North (which covers 130 streets); and South (which covers 77 streets). The

⁴ The sample size was chosen by using the online survey software, Raosoft, which uses the formula as follows: $x = Z(c/100)^2 r(100-r)$; $n = N x / ((N-1)E^2 + x)$; $E = \text{Sqrt}[(N - n)x / n(N-1)]$, where N is the population size, r is the fraction of responses that you are interested in, and Z(c/100) is the critical value for the confidence level c.

number of the questionnaires that were distributed in each division depended on the number of the streets that the division covers, and 72 questionnaires were distributed in 5 villages mentioned above. The survey number in each village was determined by the size of the village. The starting point in the village was chosen by going to some central location within the community such as a market, a church, or a health facility. The direction then was chosen at random by spinning a bottle, and moving in a straight line in that direction. All the houses that were passed were counted until the edge of the community was reached. All houses were numbered and then one of these numbered houses was selected at random to form the starting point for the survey (UNICEF, 2008).

An informed consent notice was attached to the questionnaire. The participants were asked to read the informed consent information first and then proceed with the self-completed questionnaire. For those who had trouble reading, the informed consent was presented orally and the questions were read aloud and explained. The questionnaires requested no personal information; therefore, there it is impossible to track down the respondents by any means.

These survey questions examined gender, age, socio-economic status (*e.g.*, occupation, income, education), and political information. Moreover, as stated above, questions focused on participation in both conventional and unconventional political activities.

UNDP Public Pulse Data

The UNDP Public Pulse data come from an opinion poll conducted in Kosovo during September, 2015. They use multistage random probability sampling and their sample consists of 1,306 respondents of age 18 and older, from both sexes, covering both rural and urban areas

(UNDP Kosovo, 2015). The sample includes 896 Kosovo Albanians, 210 Kosovo Serbians, and 200 Kosovo non-Serbian minorities (namely Turkish, Bosnian, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali, and Egyptian). Minorities are oversampled, because the UNDP Public Pulse disaggregates data by ethnicity (UNDP Kosovo, 2015).

The UNDP data present some limitations, however. Their measure of protest participation doesn't directly measure participation, rather the "protest potential"; as they ask the respondents if they would participate and not if they have participated.⁵ Moreover, since the UNDP data oversampled minorities, weights were used. The UNDP data was received with calculated weights, which then were included in each analysis.

Qualitative Data

Interviews

The interview sample represents nonprobability (*i.e.*, purposive) sampling, and represents the group that is already politically active or involved in politics, directly or indirectly, and it does not represent the whole population of Kosovo.

Four individuals that represent the above-mentioned group were interviewed.

- Dardan Molliqaj is the secretary of the Self-Determination Movement. The Self-Determination movement is center-left and identified as an anti-system movement. It has organized the majority of the protests in Kosovo since after the war. The Self-Determination Movement is the biggest opposition party in the Parliament of Kosovo.

⁵ This is further explained in the results chapter.

- Atdhe Hetemi is a UNDP project manager in Kosovo. He is in charge of Public Pulse, which is a biannual poll conducted since 2007 that measures public opinion and political satisfaction in Kosovo.
- Petrit Zogaj is the Director of the Fol Movement. The Fol Movement is among the most credible non-governmental organizations in Kosovo. They were founded on 2008 and they conduct credible research.
- Ramadan Ilazi is a well-known political activist. He cofounded the Fol Movement. He joined the Democratic Party of Kosovo during the 2014 elections. Ramadan was appointed as the Vice Minister of European Integration after the PDK won the elections. Ramadan was interviewed because both the civil society and government perspectives.

Specific questions from the surveys were asked of the interviewees. However, analysis of the interviews identified a similar set of variables as the factors identified in analysis of the quantitative survey data.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

To explore conventional and unconventional political participation in Kosovo, I begin by introducing some frequencies for independent variables measuring political participation in Kosovo. Then I run logistic regression analysis to answer my main research question and test my hypotheses.

Measures of conventional and unconventional political participation in the UNDP**Data**

Unfortunately, the UNDP 2015 data does not fully measure unconventional or conventional political participation. However there are two sets of variables that partially measure these two concepts. UNDP data measures protest participation by asking respondents whether they *would* take part in mass public protest regarding education, policy issues, low wage, unemployment, and public utilities. As this question doesn't directly ask citizens whether they *have* participated, but rather if they would participate in the future, an index of protest potential, rather than protest activity itself, was created as a score of these indicator variables (dummy variables) for the five types of protest. The UNDP Data also has another measure asking citizens whether they supported a contentious political activity (*e.g.*, petition, protest) of a civil society organization. However, this question only measures participation in unconventional political activities that are *organized by nongovernment organizations*. Twenty percent of citizens answered that they supported a contentious political activity of a civil organization.

Measures of conventional and unconventional political participation in the ISU study in Kosovo

To measure conventional political participation of citizens of Kosovo using the ISU study, a scale was created by adding indicator (i.e., dummy) variables for the following five activities: 1) getting informed through newspapers, 2) discussing political issues, 3) persuading others to support a candidate, 4) participating in party meetings, and 5) helping a candidate or political party. Missing answers were ignored in the analysis. Another measure of conventional political participation in this data was voting in the national elections.

Unconventional political participation is measured using a question asking about participation in protest. Respondents chose whether they (1) had protested, (2) had not protested but would, (3) were undecided, (4) “might,” or (5) would never protest. To simplify analysis, I focus on those who chose the first or fifth categories, and collapse the second, third, and fourth categories into a single category.

Grievances

In order to get a better sense of the level of grievances in Kosovo, measures from both the ISU study and UNDP data were used.

Table 1. Satisfaction with the current political direction in Kosovo

	Freq.	Percent
Very Satisfied	16	1.27
Satisfied	88	6.98
Neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied	330	26.19
Dissatisfied	432	34.29
Very dissatisfied	394	31.27
Total	1,260	100

Source: UNDP Data, 2015

The UNDP Data shows that citizens' dissatisfaction with the current political direction in Kosovo is very high; 66% of citizens said that they are either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. Also, a large number of respondents (over 75%) said that they are dissatisfied with the economic direction in Kosovo at present.




Figure 1. Responsibility on the current political situation in Kosovo (UNDP 2015)

Figure 1 shows that as many as 65% of Kosovo citizens believe that the Kosovo government is responsible for the current political situation. When asked if they would join

public protests that might be organized due to the current political situation, a relatively large number of respondents (44%) said that they would. Fifty percent of citizens believe that their vote cannot change the situation in Kosovo. Acknowledging that recently Kosovo has had a great flux of emigration, eighteen percent of citizens said that they had plan to emigrate from Kosovo, 43% of whom said that unfavorable economic situations in the family would be the reason for their emigration; 38% said that they would emigrate to seek a better future for their family and 6% said because of their dissatisfaction with the current political situation in Kosovo.

Among the citizens who said that they would emigrate because of the unfavorable economic situations in their family, 82% think that the Government of Kosovo is responsible for the current economic situation in Kosovo.

In the ISU study in Kosovo as many as 36% of respondents said that they have participated in protest activities and 39% have participated in signing a petition. When it comes to conventional political participation, 72% of citizens in the ISU study stated that they have voted in the national elections and 69% of the citizens who voted said that they did so because it's their civic duty, while 13% said that they didn't like the previous prime minister and they did not want him to be re-elected. One of the interviewees also suggested that "citizens of Kosovo rather than considering voting as a right, they consider it an obligation. This is highly associated with the fact that citizens of Kosovo were oppressed for a long time and did not have this




Figure 2. Responsibility for the current economic situation, among those who said would emigrate because of the unfavorable economic situation (UNDP 2015)

fundamental right. Now they see it as something that shouldn't be taken for granted." Interviews with the key stakeholders also suggest that besides seeing it as an obligation, citizens of Kosovo participate in voting to keep a particular party in power, because they benefit directly from them.

Table 2 shows that from a scale of zero to five, the mean of conventional political participation in Kosovo is 2.49.

Table 2. Mean of the conventional political participation index

Mean	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval
2.49	0.04	2.41-2.57

Source: ISU study in Kosovo

Table 3. Participation in conventional political activities

	Read about politics in newspaper	Discuss politics with other people	Try to convince friends to vote as same as you	Attend political meetings or rallies	Spend time working for a political party or a candidate
Very Often	28.69	18.28	3.24	2.41	2.15
Often	27.61	31.72	6.22	7.24	5.11
Sometimes	25.2	26.61	18.65	13.14	10.22
Rarely	10.19	18.55	23.24	23.59	23.12
Never	8.31	4.84	48.65	53.62	59.41
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

When looking at the percentages of participation in each conventional political activity as shown in table 3, it is evident that reading about politics in newspapers is high, where 56% of the citizens said that they engage in this activity very often or often, and 25% said that they read about politics in newspapers sometimes. While discussing politics with other people is among activities with high participation, other activities are relatively low: trying to convince friends to vote the same, attending political meetings or rallies, and spending time working for a political party or a candidate.

H1: The poor in Kosovo (that is those with incomes less than 300 euros) are more inclined to participate in both conventional and unconventional political activities, compared to individuals with higher incomes.

Table 4. Unconventional political participation: protest by income

Protest participation		
Income	Have done	Would never do
150-300 euro	35.4	13.27
300-500 euro	38.02	11.57
500-700 euro	37.50	15.62
750- more than 1000 euro	38.89	22.22
	36.97	13.38

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Table 4 shows protest activity is the highest among people who earn 750-1000 euro, and not people who earn 150-300 euros per month.

Table 5. Voting in national elections by income

Voting in national elections			
Income	Yes	No	Total
150-300 euro	64.22	35.78	100
300-500 euro	89.92	10.08	100
500-700 euro	90.62	9.38	100
750- more than 1000 euro	61.11	38.89	100
Total	78.06	21.94	100

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

When looking at conventional political participation, voting is relatively high among all income categories; however, voting is the highest among the middle income: those who earn 300-500 euros per month and those who earn 500-700 euros per month.

The other component of SES, education doesn't explain protest participation. The correlation between education and protest participation is 0.04 ($p=0.40$). However, education explains voting participation. The correlation between voting and education is 0.29 ($p=0.00$).

H2: Youth in Kosovo are more likely to protest and vote compared to older citizens

The results in table 6 show that voting activity is very high among all age groups and it's heterogeneous; however the higher the age group the higher the participation in voting, with little difference between the age groups 36-50 and 51-81.

Table 6. Voting in national elections by age

Voting in national elections			
	Yes	No	Total
Age			
18-25	57.53	42.47	100
26-35	78.89	21.11	100
36-50	90.54	9.46	100
51-81	88.68	11.32	100
Total	74.1	25.9	100

Source: ISU study in Kosovo

When it comes to protest participation potential (measured by using UNDP Data), table 7 shows that citizens aged 18-35 have the highest protest potential. However, when looking at

actual participation in protest activity, citizens aged 18-25 and aged 51-84 have the highest protest participation. Correlation between voting and age is 0.29 ($p=0.00$).⁶ However, the logistic model shows that age is significant when it comes to voting.⁷

Table 7. The mean of protest potential index by age

Variable	Mean
Protest potential index if age 18-25	0.56
Protest potential index if age 26-35	0.57
Protest potential index if age 36-50	0.49
Protest potential index if age 51-84	0.38

Source: UNDP Data 2015

Table 8. Participation in unconventional activities: protest by age

Protesting		
Age	Have done	Would Never do
18-25	41.3	11.59
26-35	31.46	13.48
26-50	36.62	11.27
51-84	43.4	20.75
Total	38.18	13.39

⁶ Find it in Appendix C

⁷ Ibid

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

H3: Individuals with lower government satisfaction are more inclined to participate in unconventional political activities, compared to individuals who have a neutral feeling towards government or higher government satisfaction.

To measure dissatisfaction the satisfaction with the government work on policy issues variable was reverse coded. This variable has five measures as follow: satisfaction with the government work fighting poverty, providing a good education, providing equal rights for ethnic minorities, looking after elderly, and creating job opportunities for everyone. These five measures then were divided by five, and dissatisfaction with the government index was created.

The correlation between dissatisfaction and a dummy variable for protest is $-.07$ ($p=.16$). This can also be seen in Table 9 (below), where the mean of government dissatisfaction with those who have protested and those who haven't is about the same.

Table 9. Dissatisfaction with government, by protest participation

Protest	Mean
Didn't protest	3.68
Protested	3.81
<hr/>	
Total	3.73

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

H4: Education doesn't have a significant, positive correlation with political information; therefore, the uneducated, on average, are as politically informed as the educated.

To measure political information, a scale of political information was formed based on answers to questions 28-32 in the ISU study in Kosovo:

1. Please write how long is the term for Prime Minister and MPs.
2. Please write the unemployment rate in Kosovo.
3. Which are the four biggest political parties in Kosovo?
4. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not?
5. Which party has the most seats in the Parliament?

Missing and wrong answers were coded as zero, while right answers were coded as 1.

On a scale of 0-1, citizens' mean level of political information in Kosovo is 0.75.

The literature asserts that resource mobilization is highly important for political participation, hence SES is critically important and affects whether people possess political information, time, and other relevant resources. The results show that people in Kosovo generally have high political information.

Table 10. Mean level of political information in Kosovo

Mean	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval
0.75	0.02	0.72-0.77

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Further, to test this hypothesis I assessed the correlation between income and information. The correlation between these two variables is 0.034, which shows that there's no correlation between information and income. Table 11 shows the mean information index is almost the same within each income category, with the exception of the group with incomes 750-1000 euros per months, where the information index is somewhat lower.

Table 11. Information index by each income category

	Mean	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval
150-300 euros per month	0.75	0.02	0.71 - 0.79
300- 500 euros per month	0.76	0.02	0.73 - 0.80
500-750 euros per month	0.78	0.04	0.69 - 0.86
750 – more than1000 euros per month	0.68	0.09	0.47 - 0.87

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

The important results when it comes to political information and income, is that income does not determine political information in Kosovo. However, the same cannot be said about education. Although Table 12 shows the correlation between education and political information is low, when looking at the mean of the political information index within each education category, one can tell that as education increases, so does political information (see Table 13). All of the stakeholders who were interviewed asserted that Kosovo citizens are informed about political issues in Kosovo, but most of the time the information that they receive is biased. One of the interviewees suggested the citizens only read the headlines of the news and don't read the

content of the news. Two other interviewees suggested “citizens in Kosovo are informed about the political situation in Kosovo but most of the time this information is either one-sided or biased.” Correlation between education and information index is 0.06 ($p=0.35$).

Table 12. Information index by each education category

	Mean Information Index	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval
No schooling completed	0.43	0.13	0.10 - 0.76
Primary school or less	0.63	0.06	0.51 - 0.75
Some high school but no diploma	0.59	0.06	0.47 - 0.70
High school, with diploma	0.70	0.03	0.64 - 0.77
Some courses in college/vocational training	0.71	0.03	0.65 - 0.76
Bachelor's degree	0.78	0.02	0.73 - 0.82
Master's degree or PhD	0.79	0.02	0.73 - 0.85

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

H5: Mobilization influences citizens in Kosovo to participate actively.

Considering that political parties are the main organizers of protests in Kosovo, party membership has been used as a measure of mobilization for protest activities. The same measure will also be used for voting, as clientelism is high in Kosovo and because it is very common for political parties to mobilize their supporters during the electoral campaign. Party membership

was measures by using the following survey question: *Are you affiliated with any political party or political organization?* Yes was coded as 1 and No was coded as zero.

Table 13. Protest participation, by party membership

Protest participation			
Party membership	Haven't Protested	Protested	Total
Yes	52.56	47.44	100
No	61.69	38.31	100
Total	59.51	40.49	100

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Table 14 shows that 47% of the citizens who are party members protested, and only 38% of citizens who are not party members protested. Still, 53% of party members and 62% of non-party members have *not* protested. These results indicate that there is a 9% gap between party members and non-party members in protest - party membership raises protest participation by 9%, thus it can be concluded that political parties are important in mobilizing people to participate in protest activities.

“Discussing political issues with others” was used as another measure of social network mobilization. The correlation between the dummy variables for “protested” and for “discussed politics” is 0.22 ($p=0.00$).

H6: Individuals in Kosovo are more inclined to protest about social issues and economic issues, such as education, healthcare, and the high unemployment rate, than the political situation.

To measure social issues and economic issues, means of three variables have been used from the ISU study in Kosovo. First variable is the belief that the economy and unemployment are under threat; second, the belief that political situation is under threat and the third variable is the satisfaction with the current education policies.

As stated previously, Kosovo has undergone a lot of political/institutional issues in the past decade. Just after the recent national elections, Kosovo's institutions were blocked (unable to hold sessions) for a period of six months. One of the interviewees said, "This political blockage that lasted for 6 months paralyzed the institutional work that affected the economic activity. People saw this as political war between parties who only cared for their party interests, and not the well-being of the citizens." However, it's hypothesized that people don't protest over such issues, but rather over issues that seek more tangible results: better education, better health services etc.

Table 15 shows the mean of those who think that the economy and unemployment pose a national threat to Kosovo (on a scale from 1 to 10) is pretty high among both groups that have protested and those who said that would never protest. The mean is somewhat higher among those who have protested.

Table 14. Mean belief that the economy and unemployment are under threat, by protest participation

Protest	Mean
Didn't protest	8.59
Protested	8.70
<hr/>	
Total	8.63

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Table 15. Mean belief that the political situation is under threat, by protest participation

Protest	Mean
Didn't protest	7.75
Protested	8.04
Total	7.86

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Table 16. Mean satisfaction with current education policies (1-5 scale), by protest participation

Protested	Mean
Didn't protest	2.39
Protested	2.34
Total	2.37

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

The mean perception that the political situation is a national threat is 0.62 higher among those who have protested compared to those who haven't (See Table 15.) Whereas the satisfaction (on a 1-5 scale) with the government is low in both groups, but it is somewhat lower among those who have protested compared to those who haven't by .052 (see Table 16.)

The index of political protest in the UNDP data shows that both satisfaction with the political direction in Kosovo and satisfaction with the economic direction in Kosovo have negative correlations with the protest potential index. The correlation between protest potential

and satisfaction with the political direction in Kosovo is $-.221$ ($p=0.00$). The correlation between protest potential and satisfaction with the economic direction in Kosovo is heading towards and protest potential index is $-.0204$ ($p=0.00$). The results show that the lower satisfaction, the higher the protest potential index.

H7: Nationalism is a strong mobilizer of political protests in Kosovo.

Considering the history of Kosovo and understanding that post-war issues are still fresh, it is hypothesized that nationalism plays a great role in mobilizing people to participate in protest activities in Kosovo. To measure nationalism, respondents were asked to rate from scale 1-10 the extent to which they believe that Serbia poses national threat to Kosovo. Table 18 shows that perception Serbia is a national threat is 0.15 higher among those who have protested than those who haven't protested. Correlation between dummy variable of protesting and the measure of nationalism this correlation is 0.03 ($p=0.63$).

Table 17. Mean belief that Serbia is national threat, by protest participation

Protest	Mean
Didn't protest	7.03
Protested	7.19
Total	7.09

Source: ISU Data in Kosovo

To validate these findings, I used a second question from the UNDP data to measure nationalism: "To the extent that you know, against what individuals will the Special Court issue

indictments?” Table 19 shows that protest potential is higher among those who think that this Court will decide against Kosovo Albanians, including current politicians who committed crimes.

Table 18. Mean of Protest Potential Index by opinions on indictments against what individuals will Special Court decide

Opinions on indictments against what individuals will Supreme Court decide	Mean
Against Kosovo Serbs, including politicians who committed crime	0.49
Against Kosovo Albanians, including current politicians who committed crimes	0.57
Against those who committed crimes in the war in 1990 regardless of their ethnicity	0.49

Source: UNDP Data 2015

Logistic Regressions

To conduct logistic regression, a dummy variable for protest was used as a measure of unconventional political participation. A dummy variable for voting was used as a measure of conventional political participation. The following independent variables were tested in the model: age, income, education, satisfaction with the government, information index, party membership, nationalism, and discussing politics with others.

Table 19. Model 1 - Logistic regression model of protest

Protest	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Income	-0.06	0.16	-0.38	0.71	-0.38	0.26
Education	0.45	0.08	0.56	0.57	-0.09	0.23
Age	0.04	0.13	0.33	0.74	-0.21	0.29
Satisfaction with government	-0.02	0.18	-0.10	0.92	-0.36	0.33
Information Index	-0.77	0.66	-1.15	0.25	-2.07	0.54
Party Membership	0.16	0.32	0.49	0.67	-0.48	0.79
Nationalism	-0.01	0.01	-0.47	0.64	-0.03	0.02
Discussing Politics	0.48	0.14	3.37	0.00	0.20	0.76

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

This model has only 237 observations. Table 19 shows that the only variable that is significant in explaining protest participation is discussing politics with others. Party membership is a variable that significantly explains voting (see Table 21), but not protest participation according to the model on table 20; thus another model was created to test the relationship between party membership and protest participation (See Table 20).

Table 20. Model 2- Logistic regression model of protest

Protest	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Discussed Politics with others	.45	.11	3.98	0.00	.23	.66
Party Membership	.24	.27	0.88	0.38	-0.29	.76

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Note: Number of observation n=326 ; *p < .01.

When looking at the pairwise correlation coefficients, more variables explain protest participation. Statistical significance may be lacking in the regression model due to low numbers of observation.

Table 21. Logistic regression model of voting

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Income	0.05	0.22	0.20	0.84	-0.39	0.47
Education	0.44	0.11	4.03	0.00	.23	.65
Age	0.73	0.19	3.68	0.00	.34	1.11
Satisfaction with Government	0.11	0.25	0.43	0.67	-0.38	0.59
Information Index	.53	0.86	.062	0.54	-1.16	2.23
Party Membership	1.69	0.66	2.57	0.01	0.41	2.97
Nationalism	-0.00	0.01	-0.23	0.82	-0.02	0.18
Discussing politics	0.21	0.18	1.14	0.26	-0.15	0.57

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Note: Number of observation n=232 ; *p < .01.

Several variables explain voting: education, age, and party membership, all have statistically significant positive correlations with voting. Looking at the pairwise correlation between voting and other independent variables it's observed that the following variables have significant statistical correlations: income .13 (p=0.03); education 0.029 (p=0.00); age 0.299 (p=0.00) information index .17 (p=0.00); and party membership 0.19 (p=0.00).

A model using the UNDP data, in which unconventional participation is measured with the protest potential index, shows that satisfaction with the country's economic direction

explains this index (See Table 22). However, when looking at the pairwise correlation log of income has a correlation of -.05 ($p=0.09$); education has a correlation of 0.09 ($p=0.00$); satisfaction with the country's political direction -0.22 ($p=0.00$); and satisfaction with the country's economic direction -0.02 ($p=0.00$).

Table 22. Regression model of protest potential index

Protest Potential Index	Coefficient	Standard Error	t	P>t	[95% Confidence Interval]	
Log Income	-.01	.01	-1.63	0.10	-0.02	0.00
Education	0.03	0.02	1.65	0.10	-0.01	0.06
Satisfaction with Political Direction	-0.00	0.00	-3.27	0.00	-0.00	-.00
Satisfaction with economic direction	-0.00	0.00	-0.77	0.44	-0.01	.00
Special Court	-.015	0.00	-3.43	0.00	.47	-.01

Source: ISU Study in Kosovo

Note: Number of observation $n=1,134$; * $p < .01$.

Since in both of the modes of political participation social networks were significant in explaining participation, further analyses were conducted to see what leads to social networks (discussing politics with others); therefore social networks were treated as depended variables.

There is no significant correlation between social networks and age, or satisfaction with the government. However there's a significant correlation between information and social networks of 0.17 ($p=0.00$) and income and social networks 0.16 ($p=0.00$). Also, the correlation between party membership and social networks is 0.13 ($p=0.02$).

The results from the ISU Study in Kosovo show that there are really two main variables that explain political participation in Kosovo: party membership and social networks. These two variables explain both modes of participation: conventional and unconventional. Party members have higher voting and protest participation rates when compared to the non-party members. Likewise, citizens who discuss politics with others have higher protest and voting rates, and this shows the importance of social networks. Social networks and parties serve as the main mobilizer for political participation. As other variables didn't really explain political behavior in Kosovo, it can be assumed that parties and networks serve as catalyzers and reduce the need for resources in order to participate in political activities.

In the results it was evident that political information was relatively high among all income groups, but there was some variation in political information by levels of education. Although citizens who have no education have mean political information index of .043, as the level of education increases so does the level of political information. It can be said that in general, people in Kosovo are informed about political issues regardless of their education. Both the ISU study in Kosovo and UNDP 2015 data show that the grievance level in Kosovo is very high. People are dissatisfied with the economic and political direction that Kosovo is heading towards. Although in the ISU study satisfaction with the government was not statistically significant in explaining political participation, the same is not the case in the UNDP data. Dissatisfaction with the political and economic direction in Kosovo are statistically significant in explaining the protest participation index in the UNDP data. However, the protest potential index measure the "will" to protest and not the activity itself; therefore, the UNDP data has limitation for drawing conclusions regarding the determinants of protest participation.

This research failed to falsify my hypothesis that mobilization influences citizens in Kosovo to participate actively. Moreover, this research failed to confirm the following hypothesis:

H1: The poor in Kosovo (i.e., those with incomes less than 250 Euros per month) are more inclined to participate in both conventional and unconventional political activities, compared to individuals with higher incomes.

Participation in voting is more common among the middle class, while protest participation is the highest among the more affluent.

H2: Youth in Kosovo are more inclined to protest compared to older citizens.

The higher the age group the higher the participation in voting; whereas protest participation is the highest among the youth and the elder.

H3: Individuals with lower government satisfaction are more inclined to participate in unconventional political activities, compared to individuals who have neutral feeling towards government or higher government satisfaction.

As governmental satisfaction is very low, it doesn't explain the protest participation. Governmental satisfaction was very low among those who have protested, and those who haven't.

H4: Education doesn't have a significant, positive correlation with political information; therefore, the uneducated, on average, are as politically informed as the educated.

The results show that as education increases, so does the political information. However, income doesn't predict information, even individuals with low income had high political information. People with no schooling, had mean information of .43 which one can argue that is relatively high.

H6: Individuals in Kosovo are more inclined to protest about social and economic issues, such as education, healthcare, and the high unemployment rate, rather than the political situation.

Results showed that protest participation was high among both those who protest for economic issues and political issues.

H7: Nationalism serves as a strong mobilizer of political protests in Kosovo.

The results from the issue data fail to confirm this hypothesis. However, the UNDP data fails to falsify this hypothesis, where protest participation potential is higher among those who think that the Special Court will decide indictment Against Kosovo Albanians, including current politicians who committed crimes.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

As mentioned earlier, there are no set variables that explain political behavior in different countries. Literature suggests several theories that try to describe the patterns of political behavior. Kosovo has a historical context, which throughout the years, empirically, it has shown to be influencing political participation. As suggested by the interviewees – people in Kosovo think that the right to vote shouldn't be taken for granted; as for several decades they were disfranchised.

Neither grievance, nor resource mobilization, solely, can explain political participation in Kosovo. One theory does not outweigh another; rather they are complementary to each other. For example it is evident that grievance - dissatisfaction with government is high in Kosovo, however it doesn't seem to have direct effect on political participation. Among the dissatisfied, there are people who protested and people who didn't; numbers don't vary to a large extent – those who protested are .2 higher than those who haven't. It may be that dissatisfaction has led some to participation and some to political alienation. Grievance, however, indicated high protest potential. On the other hand, when looking at the resource mobilization, it appears that networks - discussing politics with others reduces the importance of having “material means” for participation (as the SES models suggests) and it influences people in participating in unconventional political activities. Networks serve as agents in influencing people to participate, and income, and education fail to explain unconventional political participation when accounting for social networks. It is also found that although income and education matters when it comes to conventional political participation, mobilization serves as an agent that influences people to

participate in such political activities. This could be explained by high clientelism, which exists in Kosovo. Political parties mobilize people during the election periods. Party militants then influence “their people” in their network, as this activity is then reward - party loyalty is rewarded.

Kosovo has a multi-party system and political parties influence political participation in Kosovo. As the governmental coalition changes, so do party alliances. For example, before the 2016 PDK-LDK government was formed, LDK belonged to the VLAN coalition (now a group of opposition parties formed from Vetevendosje, AAK and Nisna) and its militants were influenced to participate in the anti-government protests. Now that LDK is part of the government, most of the LDK activists didn’t join the recently organized anti-government protests. As the governmental coalition change, political participation in Kosovo shifts. However, this mostly can be said about unconventional political participation; as when it comes to voting political parties mobilize their networks to have higher turnout. This can also be seen by high voting participation that was measured in this survey.

This research itself had its limitations, as the ISU Study in Kosovo didn’t have a great sample size and this was especially evident when conducting regression analysis. By contrast, the UNDP data included a great number of observations, but had no measure of conventional political participation and only a protest potential measure when it comes to unconventional political participation. The UNDP data results showed that satisfaction with economy, satisfaction with government and nationalism, which in this case they only measured the answers on the Supreme Court, showed that have high influence on protest potential. A suggestion would be to ask citizens directly whether they have participated in a protest rather than if they would participate; because in a country with great social problems, such is Kosovo, the grievance

appears to be high and citizens claim that they would participate, because they have high grievance level. However, having high grievance not necessarily is translated into political activity. Also, it would be interesting to see whether people who have high grievance and participate in unconventional political activities, do so because political parties or other agents help translate this grievance in participation.

Research on political participation in Kosovo is lacking. A future study with larger sample size, that would include both measures of political participations and possibly expand them, would be beneficial to the general knowledge and in better understanding political participation pattern in Kosovo.

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APPENDIX A
SURVEY QUESTIONS

1. Sex
1. Male 2. Female
2. Age: _____
<p>3. What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently enrolled, highest degree received.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1.No schooling completed; 2.Primary School (or less);</p> <p>3.Some high school, no diploma; 4.High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">5.Some college credit, no degree; 6. Trade/technical/vocational training;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">7.Associate degree; 8.Bachelor's degree;</p> <p>9. Master's degree; Professional degree; or Doctorate degree; 10.Other _____</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">4. Employment Status: Are you currently...</p> <p>1.Employed for wages; 2.Self-employed; 3.Out of work and looking for work;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">4.Out of work but not currently looking for work; 5.A homemaker;</p> <p>6.A student; 7.Military; 8.Retired; 9.Other _____</p>
<p>5. If not employed, for how many months/years have you been unemployed? Please write the number and circle one of the options.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">_____ Months / Years</p>
<p>6. If you are employed, which of the following most closely matches your job type?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1.Manual labor; 2.Skilled labor; 3.Other _____</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">7. How many hours per week do you usually work?</p> <p>1.35 hours a week or more; 2.Less than 35 hours a week; 3.I am not currently employed;</p> <p style="text-align: center;">4.Other _____</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">8.What category best describes your monthly income?</p> <p>1.150 – 300euro; 2. 300 – 500 euro; 3. 500-750 euro; 4.750-1000 euro; 5. more than 1000 euro</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">The following questions are regarding your political participation in conventional and unconventional activities, and we will ask your opinion regarding the efficacy of these political activities.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">9. Have you voted in the last national elections?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1.Yes 2.No</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">10. What motivated you to vote? (Circle as many as applicable)</p> <p>1.Because I liked a candidate; 2.It's my civic duty; 3.I disliked the previous prime-minister/mayor, so I didn't want him to be re-elected; 4.Because my vote is expression of my choice; 5.Because my vote, along with other, can affect the outcome of the election; 6.I Don't know</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">11. Do you believe that voting makes a difference?</p> <p style="text-align: center;">1. Yes 2. No</p>

12. Please circle which option best represents your political activity.	1. Very often	2. Often	3. Sometimes	4. Seldom	5. Never
How often do you read about politics in the newspaper?					
How often do you discuss politics with other people?					
How often do you try to convince friends to vote the same as you?					
How often do you attend political meetings or rallies?					
How often do you spend time working for a political party or a candidate?					
13. Are you affiliated with any political party or political organization? 1. Yes 2. No					
14. Which of the political ideologies below do you belong to? 1. Far right 2. Right 3. Center 4. Left 5. Far left 6. I don't belong to a political ideology					
15. Please check one of the options for each question below showing your approval of other people engaging in these activities for these political activities:	1. Strongly approve	2. Approve	3. Neither approve nor disapprove	4. Disapprove	5. Strongly disapprove
Petition					
Protest					
Boycotts					
Strikes					
Painting Slogans					
Occupying Buildings					
16. Please check one of the options for each question below showing your participation in these unconventional political activities:	1. Have done	2. Haven't done but would do	3. Undecided	4. Might Do	5. Would never do
Petition					
Protest					
Boycotts					
Strikes					
Painting Slogans					
Occupying Buildings					
17. Please check one of the options for each question	1. Very effective	2. Effective	3. Somewhat	4. Not very effective	5. Not at all

below showing your opinion on the effectiveness of these political activities:		e	effective		effective					
Voting										
Petition										
Protest										
Boycotts										
Strikes										
Painting Slogans										
Occupying Buildings										
In this part of the survey we are interested to know your satisfaction with your life and with the government, so the following questions will be measuring your grievance.										
18. How much do you trust government to do what is right? 1.Always 2.Very often 3.Sometimes 4.Rarely 5.Never										
	1.Very Satisfied	2.Satisfied	3.Somewhat satisfied	4.Dissatisfied	5. Very Dissatisfied					
19. All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life in Kosovo?										
20. .Please check one of the options for each question below showing your satisfaction with the government work on the policy issues.										
Fighting Poverty										
Providing a good education										
Providing equal rights for ethnic minorities										
Looking after elderly										
Creating job opportunities for everyone										
21. If you had a chance, would you migrate from Kosovo? 1. Yes 2. Maybe 3. No										
22. On scale 1-10, to what extent do you believe that each of these is a threat that Kosovo is facing?										
Economy and unemployment	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Serbia	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Corruption	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Political Situation	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Other social issues (crime, drugs etc.)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Religious Extremism	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Other _____	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
The following questions are regarding your nationality and ethnicity.										
23. On a scale from 1-10, 1 meaning that it does not at all describe you and 10 meaning that it describes you completely, to that extent does each nationality describe you?										
Kosovar	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Albanian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Serbian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Turkish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Bosnian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Other _____	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
24. From scale 1-10, 1 being the lowest and 10 the highest, what ethnicity describes you the best?										
Kosovar	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Albanian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Serbian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Turkish	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Bosnian	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Other _____	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
25. Do you agree with the term Kosovo describing your nationality?										
1. Yes 2.No 3.I don't know										
The following questions are regarding political information and political knowledge.										
26. How often do you use the following sources	1. Every day		2. Once a week		3. Few times a week		4. Few times a month		5. Never	
Radio										
TV										
Newspaper										
Internet										
Friends and Family										
Meetings										
27. How informed do you believe you are about politics?										
1. Very well informed; 2.Informed;										
3. Somewhat informed;										
4.Not informed; 5. Not informed at all										
Now we would like to know how much information people in Kosovo are able to get about public affairs. Without looking it up, please answer the following questions. If you don't know the answer, just leave the question blank										
28. Please write how long is the term for Prime Minister and MPs.										

29. Please write the unemployment rate in Kosovo. _____										

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

- 1) Based on your research and observations, are Kosovo citizens overall well informed politically?
- 2) What are the main political messages that tend to mobilize citizens to vote? What do you believe are the main factors that lead citizens to vote?
- 3) What do you believe are the reasons for low voting turnout? Why?
- 4) Why do people in Kosovo protest? What do you believe are the main factors that lead citizens to protest?
- 5) What are the main political messages that tend to mobilize citizens to protest, take part in demonstrations, or sign petitions?
- 6) Do socio-economic factors have an impact on political participation in Kosovo?
- 7) To your assessment, how satisfied are Kosovars with governmental performance?
- 8) What is the impact of satisfaction with the governmental performance on political participation?
- 9) What do you believe are the main causes of the out flux of emigration?
- 10) What is your opinion regarding nationalism in Kosovo? To what extent does the term Kosovar appeal to the national identity of people living in Kosovo?
- 11) What do you think most people perceive as the biggest threat to our national identity? To what extent do you think these threats motivate people to participate in political activities?

APPENDIX C

CORRELATIONS AND CHI SQUARE TESTS

1. Correlations

Correlation between protest and all independent variables

Protest participation	
Income	r=0.03
Education	r= 0.04
Age	r= -0.01
Satisfaction with government	r= -0.07
Party Membership	r = 0.08
Information Index	r=0.01
Nationalism	r= 0.03
Discussing politics	r= -0.21

Correlation between voting and all independent variables

Voting in national elections	
Income	r= -0.11
Education	r= 0.29F
Age	r= -0.29
Satisfaction with government	r= - 0.09
Party Membership	r= -0.19
Information Index	r= - 0.13
Nationalism	r= 0.08
Discussing politics	r= 0.02

2. Chi Square Tests

Chi Square Tests between protest and all independent variables

Protest participation	
Income	Pearson chi2(4)= 1.46 Pr=0.83
Education	Pearson chi2(6)= 4.94 Pr=0.55
Age	Pearson chi2(3)= 3.45 Pr=0.33
Party Membership	Pearson chi2(1)= 2.05 Pr=0.15
Information Index	Pearson chi2(5)= 0.91 Pr=0.97
Nationalism	Pearson chi2(8)= 22.04 Pr=0.00

Discussing politics	Pearson chi2(5)= 20.06 Pr=0.00
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Chi Square Tests between voting and all independent variables

Voting in national elections	
Income	Pearson chi2(4)= 27.93 Pr= 0.00
Education	Pearson chi2(6)=46.22 Pr =0.00
Age	Pearson chi2(6)=46.22 Pr =0.00
Party Membership	Pearson chi2(1)=12.77 Pr =0.00
Information Index	Pearson chi2(5)=14.94 Pr =0.01
Nationalism	Pearson chi2(9)= 11.58 Pr=0.24
Discussing politics	Pearson chi2(5)=20.166 Pr =0.00

APPENDIX D

LOGISTIC REGRESSION FOR EACH VARIABLE

Logistic regressions of protest

Protest and Income

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
income	0.04	0.13	0.33	0.74	-0.22	0.31

Protest and Age

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Age	-0.01	0.01	-0.62	0.53	-0.02	0

Protest and Education

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Education	0.06	0.07	0.84	0.4	-0.08	0.19

Protest and Party Membership

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
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Party Membership	0.37	0.26	1.43	0.153	-0.14	0.89
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Protest and Satisfaction with government

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Satisfaction with government	-0.18	0.13	-1.39	0.16	-0.44	0.08

Protest and Nationalism

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Nationalism	0.02	0.04	0.48	0.63	-0.05	0.09

Protest and Information Index

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Information Index	0.12	0.45	0.26	0.79	-0.77	1.01

Protest and Discussing politics

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Discussing politics	-0.39	0.10	-3.94	0.00	-0.59	-.20

Logistic regressions of voting*Voting and Income*

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
income	0.34	0.18	1.89	0.06	-0.01	0.69

Voting and Age

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Age	0.07	0.01	5.33	0	0.04	0.09

Voting and Education

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Education	0.42	0.08	5.23	0	0.26	0.58

Voting and Party Membership

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
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Party Membership	1.41	0.42	3.36	0.001	0.59	2.23
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Voting and Satisfaction with government

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Satisfaction with government	0.28	0.15	1.83	0.07	-0.02	0.58

Voting and Nationalism

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Nationalism	-0.06	0.04	-1.41	0.16	-0.15	0.02

Voting and Information Index

Voting	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
Information Index	1.17	0.49	2.42	0.02	0.22	2.13

Voting and Discussing Politics

Protested	Coefficient	Standard Error	z	P>z	[95% Confidence Interval]	Interval]
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Discussing politics	-0.42	0.11	-3.82	0.00	-0.64	-.21
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APPENDIX E

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL

IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Institutional Review Board
Office for Responsible Research
Vice President for Research
1138 Pearson Hall
Ames, Iowa 50011-2207
515-294-4500
FAX 515-294-4207

Date: 7/14/2015

To: Alisa Hasani
Hwy F24 W
Baxter, IA

CC: Dr. Amy Erica Smith
503 Ross Hall

From: Office for Responsible Research

Title: Is political participation the tool of the rich?

IRB ID: 15-264

Study Review Date: 7/13/2015

The project referenced above has been declared exempt from the requirements of the human subject protections regulations as described in 45 CFR 46.101(b) because it meets the following federal requirements for exemption:

- (2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey or interview procedures with adults or observation of public behavior where
 - Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects cannot be identified directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; or
 - Any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could not reasonably place the subject at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to their financial standing, employability, or reputation.

The determination of exemption means that:

- **You do not need to submit an application for annual continuing review.**
- **You must carry out the research as described in the IRB application.** Review by IRB staff is required prior to implementing modifications that may change the exempt status of the research. In general, review is required for any modifications to the research procedures (e.g., method of data collection, nature or scope of information to be collected, changes in confidentiality measures, etc.), modifications that result in the inclusion of participants from vulnerable populations, and/or any change that may increase the risk or discomfort to participants. Changes to key personnel must also be approved. The purpose of review is to determine if the project still meets the federal criteria for exemption.

Non-exempt research is subject to many regulatory requirements that must be addressed prior to implementation of the study. Conducting non-exempt research without IRB review and approval may constitute non-compliance with federal regulations and/or academic misconduct according to ISU policy.

Detailed information about requirements for submission of modifications can be found on the Exempt Study Modification Form. A Personnel Change Form may be submitted when the only modification involves changes in study staff. If it is determined that exemption is no longer warranted, then an Application for Approval of Research Involving Humans Form will need to be submitted and approved before proceeding with data collection.

Please note that you must submit all research involving human participants for review. **Only the IRB or designees may make the determination of exemption**, even if you conduct a study in the future that is exactly like this study.

Please be aware that **approval from other entities may also be needed**. For example, access to data from private records (e.g. student, medical, or employment records, etc.) that are protected by FERPA, HIPAA, or other confidentiality policies requires permission from the holders of those records. Similarly, for research conducted in institutions other than ISU (e.g., schools, other colleges or universities, medical facilities, companies, etc.), investigators must obtain permission from the institution(s) as required by their policies. **An IRB determination of exemption in no way implies or guarantees that permission from these other entities will be granted.**

Please don't hesitate to contact us if you have questions or concerns at 515-294-4566 or IRB@iastate.edu.