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Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts

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MILITARY STRATEGY: THEORY AND CONCEPTS

By

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MILITARY STRATEGY: THEORY AND CONCEPTS

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Military strategy was long described as atheoretical—an art that could only be fully comprehended by military genius. This contention is no longer held, as military staffs, comprised of experts and specialists, are able to formulate strategy aided by mini-theories of strategy and a process that takes advantage of collective wisdom rather than singular genius. But the mini-theories of strategy remain underdeveloped and an overarching theory of military strategy does not yet exist. In this dissertation I build a grand theory of military strategy, consisting of a simple two-pole, physical and psychologically oriented framework, mini-theories of military strategy, and additionally, concepts of employment that describe conceptual actions that can be employed by military means to achieve military objectives. Mini-theories of military strategy, consisting of the five basic military strategies of extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation and subversion, are woven together into a coherent military strategy theoretical framework. Additionally, I expose the principles of war as a myth, instead proffering concepts of employment as the actionable elements of strategy, which are used in the conceptual direction of military means to achieve military objectives in support and amplification of the five basic military strategies. The strategies offered are the result of a comprehensive meta-data analysis, hermeneutical analysis, and comparative meta-analysis of the works of past strategy theorists, rather than the case study methodology employed in most military strategy scholarship. This dissertation provides a baseline theory from which further military strategy hypotheses can be generated and tested in order to advance our understanding of military strategy.

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PART I: PRELIMINARIES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards.”

Sir William Francis Butler

There is some truth to the old military adage that “God always favors the big battalions”.¹ Military history provides many examples of the bigger and richer side winning in war. In a study of 40 wars from 1815 to 1945, Rosen (1999) found that two powerful predictors of victory were the wealth of a nation (79% of the cases) and population size (which explained 70% of the cases). But these are not the cases that captivate and intrigue us. David beating Goliath, Alexander the Great and his 30,000 Macedonians defeating Darius and his Persian force of over 100,000 at Issus, Hannibal and his 50,000 troops annihilating Terentius Varro and 87,000 Romans at Cannae are just a few examples of battles within wars that remain conspicuous for the simple fact that the smaller force defeated the larger. For warfare theory to have any traction with practitioners of war, it must account for cases such as these. The question that beckons is how the little guy beat the big guy.

The answer lies in the confluence between capabilities, resolve and strategy. Qualitative superiority in capabilities can sometimes overcome numerical advantage. Other factors being equal, greater resolve can occasionally result in outlasting an enemy. On the other hand, imaginative and focused strategy can be used to prevail when, on paper, all other factors point to a decisive defeat. Whether singly or in combination,

¹ This quotation has been variously attributed to Napoleon, Voltaire, Frederick the Great, and Turenne. See Ralph Keyes, (2006), *The Quote Verifier*, St. Martin’s Press: New York.

capabilities, resolve and strategy are critical to victory, with strategy especially important to the weaker side of a conflict. Strategy can be the difference between victory and defeat.

The Problems

The term “strategy” originally referred to what we now know as “military strategy.”² It is derived from the ancient Greek word, *strategia* (στρατηγία), which referred to generalship. The enormous number of rational and irrational factors that went into the creation of strategy in war, bereft of any certainty, was thought to be beyond systemic calculation by the average man, leading many to conclude that strategy and war were atheoretical. Strategy was initially believed to be an enigmatic art that could only be fully comprehended by military genius.

The Age of Enlightenment, with its attendant questioning of traditions and faith, encouraged scholars and practitioners of war to approach the topic with reason and the scientific method. While the development of theory as a positive doctrine for war and strategy was looked at with extreme skepticism, theory was deemed acceptable in the more limited role as a general guide to action. Nonetheless, the sheer complexity of war was still thought to demand the skills of a genius. The great military theorist Carl von Clausewitz devoted an entire chapter to the topic of military genius in his book, *On War* (Clausewitz, *On War* 1976, rev.1984), stating, “what genius does is the best rule, and theory can do no better than show how and why this should be the case” (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 136).

² See the appendix for a short description of the etymology of strategy.

In more modern times, the role of military genius has been downplayed, with military staffs, comprised of experts and specialists, able to formulate strategy through a process that takes advantage of collective wisdom rather than singular genius. Additionally, a modest set of individual theories of military strategies have been proffered that can aid commanders and their staffs in the formulation of strategy. The acceptance of military theories of strategy by military professionals, however, has been slow to take. In its capstone doctrinal manual, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Joint Staff 2013), the U.S. military still only recognized two theories of military strategy, annihilation and erosion, formally proposed by Clausewitz in the early 1800's and refined by Hans Delbrück in the latter part of the same century.³ Other military strategies also exist, but have either not been developed into full-blown theories or accepted into the military lexicon. Moreover, there is no overarching theory of military strategy to describe the relationships between individual military strategies. Even the definition of strategy lacks consensus, with various theorists defining it to suit their own purposes rather than addressing it in a rigorous, systematic way.

Carl Builder, a former RAND analyst, stated that, "Strategic thinking by the American military appears to have gone into hiding. Planning on the tactical and operational levels flourishes, but the strategic level is largely discussed in historical terms rather than as current art." Coupling Builder's lament with Sir William Francis Butler's observation of the danger of a demarcation between fighting men and thinking men, it is high time that political scientists engage in strategy theorizing.

³ The concepts of annihilation and erosion were not new, however—others discussed them for thousands of years before Clausewitz and Delbrück. However, Clausewitz and Delbrück more fully developed them into theories of strategy.

If military strategy theory is to advance and become more useful to practitioners, then it must be addressed more systematically. Theories of strategy other than annihilation and erosion need to be further explicated and made germane to practitioners. Furthermore, an overarching theory of strategy is required that explains the differences and the relationships between individual strategies.

Purpose

The purpose of this qualitative study was to build a grand theory of military strategy.

The following research questions guided the formulation of the theory:

- What is military strategy?
- What basic military strategies currently exist?
- How do basic military strategies relate to one another?
- Can an all-encompassing continuum of military strategy be built from basic strategies?
- What other concepts guide strategy?
- How does strategy relate to the different types of warfare?

Due to the lack of consensus on a definition of strategy and the conceptual stretching of the concept, a reconceptualized definition of military strategy was first required in order to answer the question, “What is military strategy?” Sartori’s “Guidelines for Concept Analysis” (Sartori 2009c), was used as a guide to develop a definition of military strategy as “a plan that describes how military means and concepts

of employment are used to achieve military objectives.” The process and logic of crafting this definition is shown in the appendix.

The research design and methodology used in this study is described in chapter 2. Chapters 3-8 tackled the question of basic military strategies that existed through an analysis of military strategies discussed by some of the most renowned military strategy theorists of all time. Similarly, chapter 9 explored other concepts that guided strategy. In the process of tracing the concepts of strategy, the myth of the existence of principles of war was exposed, replaced by concepts of employment (discussed in chapter 10) as the building blocks of military strategy theory. Concepts of employment were found to better describe the conceptual actions that could be employed by military means to achieve military objectives.

From the concepts of employment, five basic military strategies, discussed in chapter 11, were discerned that covered the full range of military operations.⁴ The five basic military strategies of extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation, and subversion were found to be related through a two-pole framework, the first being the physical object that consisted of destroying an adversary’s means of making war and a second psychological object that consisted of breaking the adversary’s will to continue fighting over the political objective. These five “mini-theories” of military strategy, were then woven together into a coherent, military strategy theoretical framework. With the two poles and five basic military strategies serving as a framework, a basic military

⁴ The strategies proffered were the result of a comprehensive meta-data analysis, hermeneutical analysis, and comparative meta-analysis of the works of past strategy theorists, discuss in chapter 2.

strategy continuum provided a foundation for an overarching, integrated theory of military strategy, described in chapter 12.

Limitations and Delimitations

This study is limited to the general concept of strategy and military strategy. The conceptual definition of strategy was explored in the appendix, but largely in the interest of defining military strategy as a classificatory derivative of the more general concept of strategy. The concept of strategy is also discussed as it pertains to the general actions that connect means with ends, which also transcend the levels of war, to include strategic, operational, and tactical (discussed more in depth in chapter 12).

Restricting the scope of this study to military strategy also means that grand strategy was not explored. This is an area I intend to explore more in depth later, in the development of a theory of grand strategy.

Significance

This study takes an important step towards furthering military strategy as a science rather than as an enigmatic art of genius. As a theory of military strategy, it provides an integrated framework that explains the relationships between the five basic military strategies of extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation and subversion, and concepts of employment, which together form the basis for the development of unique military strategies conducive to a strategic situation. Consequently, it provides a more definitive guide to the strategy practitioner, aiding in the formulation of better strategy. It also provides for a more testable theory, from which scholars can test hypotheses and further the theoretical development of military strategy.

CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

“If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants.”
Sir Isaac Newton, 1676

As discussed in the introduction, the purpose of this dissertation is to build a grand theory of military strategy. In this chapter, I first discuss theory building in a general sense. I then explain and justify the research design and methodology used in this dissertation for building a theory of military strategy.

The research design and methodology employed for this dissertation is unique. It incorporates and integrates elements from concept development, meta-study, grounded theory and content analysis. This is driven by the nature of the research problem and the evidence available. Fundamental to a theory of military strategy is a clear, unambiguous understanding of strategy as a concept. Methodologies from concept development, meta-study, content analysis and grounded theory can all contribute to the construction of a more concise definition of strategy in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions. Although the methodologies employed have many commonalities, they also offer differences in their approaches that collectively better address the research problem.

These approaches also provide a way to address the unique challenge posed by the nature of the evidence available. A gifted few have provided insight into military strategy; most were practitioners of war, some were scholars, and a few were both. The writings of these masters of strategy, that span the annals of recorded military history, contain many high quality, analytically derived concepts of strategy derived through the case study methodology. My approach is different. With the writings of the master strategists as data and using the methodologies of concept development, meta-study, and

grounded theory, I develop a holistic, overarching theory of military strategy. An explanation and justification of why I chose these particular methodologies follows. The discussion begins with a review of theory building from the perspective of the philosophy of science.

Theory Building and the Philosophy of Science

A number of definitions exist for theory. In its scientifically oriented definition, theory is described as “a scheme or system of ideas or statements held as an explanation or account of a group of facts or phenomena; a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment, and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts; a statement of what are held to be the general laws, principles, or causes of something known or observed” (Oxford English Dictionary 1989). In simpler terms, a theory is defined as “a set of statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts or constructs” (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010). This latter definition suffices for this dissertation.

There are a number of approaches for building theories. The simplest and perhaps best-known approach is induction. The inductive approach to theory building begins with observations from which patterns are discerned and made into a theory. Reasoning is employed to answer whether the observation “*is a particular case of a more general factor*, or how the observation *fits into a pattern of a story*” [emphasis in original] in an attempt to make sense out of the observation (de Vaus 2005, 6). Observations are analyzed and aggregated to develop propositions from which inferences are developed and made into theory (8). De Vaus described this approach as *ex post facto* theorizing, given that theory production follows observations (6). Examples of approaches that use

induction to construct theories include Grounded Theory, used extensively in sociology, and Emergent Theory, used in anthropology (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010, 256). Similarly, through the case study methodology, many historians have used induction using events as raw data, then devising explanations of the causal connections between those events in order to answer the “how” and “why” questions (Trachtenberg 2006, 17). Much of the first order theories of military strategy were developed using this inductive, historical approach.

However, in the social sciences, this ideal process is not always necessary, practical, or even possible. In the case of research within an existing body of theory, it makes little sense to “reinvent the wheel,” time and time again. Additionally, if all research were conducted using only the inductive approach, there would remain the problem of knowledge aggregation, leaving disciplines even more fragmented and chaotic than they already are. Moreover, as Claude Lévi-Strauss, a French structural anthropologist, described, the belief that a theoretical explanation can be found through the accumulation of more and more data and cases is an “inductivist illusion” (Waltz 1979, 4).

In his *Theory of International Politics*, Kenneth Waltz observed that, “theories can not [my underlining] be constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be invented, not discovered” (5). He added, “To claim that it is possible to arrive at a theory inductively is to claim that we can understand phenomena before the means for their explanation are contrived” (7). Waltz saw a conundrum in that, “knowledge, it seems, must precede theory, and yet knowledge can proceed only from knowledge” (8). Waltz instead described theory building as a creative and intuitive

process that began with the creation of theoretical notions. He noted that these notions often relied upon concepts proffered and debated over time. The case of the theory of motion illustrated this process. Theoretical concepts became bolder as scholars such as Aristotle, Galileo and Newton defined and refined concepts such as point-mass, acceleration and force—concepts that in each successive step were further removed from sense experience—that successively built upon their predecessors work. Basically, theory was built like a stone wall, starting with a theoretical foundation, with successive levels of stones adding to higher levels of knowledge. This approach was illustrated in Newton’s famous statement, “If I have seen further it is only by standing on the shoulders of giants.”

This does not imply that induction was refuted as a research method. Rather, it simply required some modification as a theory-building construct in cases where extant theory was pertinent. For example, in the case of war termination theory, H. E. Goemans (2000) described his methodology as *backward induction*. He combined rational choice theory and other theories and concepts garnered from a literature review to develop a theoretical “overarching framework” that provided “a *rationalist baseline explanation* for the causes of war termination” [emphasis in original] (13). Like Waltz, Goemans eschewed the classic method of induction for a theory-building process that began with a theoretical foundation.

Juxtaposed against induction is deduction. Deduction as an approach begins with a premise or theory, then uses logical argument to show that the conclusion is true if the premise is true. An approach that uses deduction is the deductive-nomological model, also known as the covering law model, developed by Carl Hempel. The covering law

model begins with statements of the initial conditions (C) for an event (E). The general laws (L) that govern the relationship between (C) and (E) are then stated. This results in an explanation of the event (E) that follows without fail from the initial conditions (C) and general laws (L). In the hypothetico-deductive model, a hypothesis is tested in an effort to see if it can be falsified. Karl Popper stated that it was this falsifiability feature of testing a hypothesis or theory that made it scientific. The coupling together of the hypothetico-deductive model and the deductive-nomological model constitutes the scientific method. (de Vaus 2005, 85)

The use of deduction is also reflected in Imre Lakatos' description of theory building as a series of both theoretically and empirically progressive problem shifts (1970). Lakatos suggested that metaphysics were central to theory building. General, metaphysical ideas were the essence of a research program and represented its hard core of theories—the beginning point from which attempts at falsification followed. Lakatos described the hard core set of beliefs as a *heuristic*, with non-revisable portions of it representing a *negative heuristic* and revisable, or modifiable beliefs representing a *positive heuristic*. Theories that constituted the positive heuristic represented a protective belt around the hard core. Theory building in a research program occurred within the positive heuristic. In his criterion of sophisticated methodological falsificationism, Lakatos stated:

A scientific theory T is falsified if and only another theory T' has been proposed with the following characteristics: (1) T' has excess empirical content over T: that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbable in the light of, or even forbidden by T; (2) T' explains the previous success of T, that is, all of the refuted content of T is included (within the limits of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated.

In simple terms, Lakatos suggested that new theories were built upon old theories and were viable when they did a better job of predicting facts than a previous theory did, while also predicting the same old facts that the old theory got right, with additional evidence to support the new features of the new theory (Diesing 1991, Lakatos 1970). This iterative, theory building process essentially described an evolutionary process of theory improvement. However, while Lakatos provided an explanation of how theories were improved, like many other philosophers of science before him, he was largely silent on the role of creativity, the process of concept development and methodologies used in creating theories in the first place.

Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science also included this evolutionary process of theory building, while also accommodating revolutionary advances in his conception of paradigms and how new ones are formed. A paradigm essentially constituted a shared set of beliefs amongst scientists. Kuhn referred to the paradigm as "normal science," and defined paradigms as "models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research" (Kuhn 1970, 10). A paradigm was championed by a founding theorist and supported by followers to form a discipline, which was established around the principle theory and its interpretations. As research centered on the theory progressed, members of the discipline discovered anomalies that the theory was not able to accommodate. When new theories were proposed to account for the anomalies, but without success, this resulted in a stage of crisis for the discipline (although sometimes this crisis stage was skipped). This crisis spurred a scientific revolution. Eventually, a scientist would create a new theory that accounted for the anomalies. Kuhn described the process of building a new theory as essentially creative, often involving a synthesis of

theories and concepts outside of the discipline, resulting in a better explanation than its theoretical competitors (Diesing 1991, Kuhn 1970).

Two points can be taken from this discussion. First, as Lakatos, Kuhn, and others proffered, new theories can also be built *horizontally*, providing better explanations than theories that preceded it. Second, as Waltz pointed out, new theories can be built *vertically* upon existing theories. Old theories act as the foundation for new theories, allowing them to climb the ladder of abstraction and provide higher order understanding. This latter type of theory building is known as meta-theorizing and will be discussed in more depth later.

Concepts

Concepts lie at the heart of theory construction. As R. K. Merton noted, “A good part of the work called ‘theorizing’ is taken up with the clarification of concepts—and rightly so. It is in this matter of clearly defined concepts that social science is not infrequently defective” (Sartori 2009b, 97). As stated previously, theory, in simple terms, is a set of statements about the relationship between two or more concepts. Weak, ambiguous concepts make for vague, obscure theories. Yet, with the exception of a noted few scholars such as Sartori, Collier, Gerring and Goertz, social science researchers have paid little attention to formal concept formation in the construction of their theories (Goertz, *Special Science Concepts: A User's Guide* 2006).

Theory-building requires definitions of concepts that are clear and parsimonious, while also setting the boundaries between “what is” and “what isn’t” the concept of interest. In this dissertation, I used Giovanni Sartori’s definition of a concept. According to Sartori, a concept is defined as, “the basic unit of thinking. It can be said that we have

a concept of A (or of A-ness) when we are able to distinguish A from whatever is not A” (Sartori 2009b, 135).

Sartori identified four types of definitions, two of which are germane to theory-building. A *denotative* definition sets the concept’s boundaries for inclusion-exclusion. But some denotative definitions have fuzzy boundaries, requiring an augmentation of properties to establish tighter boundaries. In this case, the extra specificity of the denotative definition transforms it into a *precising* definition. (Sartori, 107)

Concerned with the conceptual stretching of concepts into ever more vague and amorphous reconceptualizations, Sartori advocated that researchers not only needed to pay more attention to the semantics of concepts (Sartori 2009a), but he also provided guidelines for doing so (Sartori, Guidelines for concept analysis 2009b), shown in Table 2.1. He focused attention on the intention (connotation) and extension (denotation) of concepts, noting that the level of abstraction of a concept increased as its extensional properties decreased. He also provided a method of reconceptualizing a concept through the analysis of extant and historical definitions of the concept under review. Given that concepts of strategy already exist, Sartori’s rules 4 through 6 are germane. Also of note, Sartori’s definitional approach largely consisted of the classical “necessary and sufficient condition” framework, originally developed by cognitive psychologists to categorize phenomena (Goertz 2006, 29).

More recently, Gary Goertz picked up the conceptual reform standard, though from an ontological, realist and causal perspective, rather than semantic. Goertz provided more structure to the ladder of abstraction, proffering that there are three levels of concepts, varying by their degree of abstraction.

Rule 1. Of any empirical concept always and separately, check (1) whether it is ambiguous, that is, how the meaning relates to the term; and (2) whether it is vague, that is, how the meaning relates to the referent.

Rule 2a. Always check whether the key terms (the designator of the concept and the entailed terms) are defined; (2) whether the meaning declared by their definition is unambiguous; and (3) whether the declared meaning remains, throughout the argument, unchanged (i.e., consistent).

Rule 2b. Always check whether the key terms are used univocally and consistently in the declared meaning.

Rule 3a. Awaiting contrary proof, no word should be used as a synonym for another word.

Rule 3b. With respect to stipulating synonymities, the burden of proof is reversed: what requires demonstration is that by attributing different meanings to different words we create a distinction of no consequence.

Rule 4. In reconstructing a concept, first collect a representative set of definitions; second, extract their characteristics; and third, construct matrixes that organize such characteristics meaningfully.

Rule 5. With respect to the extension of a concept, always assess (1) its degree of boundedness, and (2) its degree of denotative discrimination vis-à-vis its membership.

Rule 6. The boundedness of a concept is remedied by increasing the number of its properties; and its discriminating adequacy is improved as additional properties are entered.

Rule 7. The connotation and the denotation of a concept are inversely related.

Rule 8. In selecting the term that designates the concept, always relate to and control with the semantic field to which the terms belongs—that is, the set of associated, neighboring words.

Rule 9. If the term that designates the concept unsettles the semantic field (to which the term belongs), then justify your selection by showing that (1) no field meaning is lost, and (2) ambiguity is not increased by being transferred into the rest of the field set.

Rule 10. Make sure the definition of a concept is adequate and parsimonious: adequate in that no accompanying property is included among the necessary, defining properties.

Table 2.1. Sartori's guidelines for concept formation.

The first level, or basic level, as Goertz defines it, is the cognitively central definition of a concept used in theoretical propositions (Goertz 2006, 23). Goertz recommended the use of fuzzy logic and set theory to identify the key properties or premises of a concept. Aristotelian logic with dichotomous variables is then employed through the use of the “AND” function to generate the necessary and sufficient conditions that make up a basic definition.

While Sartori and Goertz provided methods for concept formation, they did not provide qualitative standards for constructing “good” concepts. John Gerring (1999, 367) provided eight criteria for “conceptual goodness,” shown in Table 2.2. In Gerring’s view, these criteria represented a set of tradeoffs, with some criteria more germane to the concept-at-hand than others. These criteria were useful in refining the concept of strategy in conjunction with Sartori’s methodology. As Sartori, Gerring and Goertz pointed out, concept formation is an important starting point for theory development. Without clear, unambiguous concepts, theory devolves through conceptual stretching into what Sartori described as “a diaspora of language” and a frenzy of “novitism”—resulting in an academic “Tower of Babel” (Sartori 2009c).

Meta-study

A meta-study is basically a study of other studies (Zhou 1991, 377). Both qualitative and quantitative approaches exist for meta-studies. However, as Zhou explains, meta-study isn’t necessarily limited to extant research on a question of interest as it was looked at previously. It can also synthesize other theories, new ideas and concepts into it. There are basically two types of meta-studies: (1) those that study the

same phenomenon previously studied, and (2) those that study the results and processes of previous studies. This research utilized both types of meta-study, as the object of the research was to develop a metatheory of military strategy, as studied previously by other military strategy theorists, integrating their insights with my own into a coherent, holistic theory of military strategy.

1. Familiarity	How familiar is the concept (to a lay or academic audience)?
2. Resonance	Does the chosen term ring?
3. Parsimony	How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes (the intension)?
4. Coherence	How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances and attributes?
5. Differentiation	How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from other most-similar concepts)? How bounded, how operationalizable, is the concept?
6. Depth	How many accompanying properties are shared by the instances under definition?
7. Theoretical Utility	How useful is the concept within a wider field of inferences? How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes?
8. Field Utility	How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and attributes?
Table 2.2. Criteria of Conceptual Goodness (from Gerring, John. "What Makes a Concept Good? A Critical Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences." <i>Polity</i> 31, no. 3 (1999): 357-393.	

It should be noted that the definition of metatheory currently lacks consensus, as it varies by discipline. In a metastudy of metatheory, Steven Wallis (2010) found 21 different definitions of metatheory, in disciplines ranging from Philosophy, Psychology, and Sociology, to Information Processing, Health, and Management. After analyzing the various definitions for similarities, Wallis proffered a consolidated definition;

“Metatheory is primarily the study of theory, including the development of overarching combinations of theory, as well as the development and application of theorems for analysis that reveal underlying assumptions about theory and theorizing” (78).⁵

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the variance in its definitions, metatheory has been shrouded in controversy, proposed by some as the potential savior of a fragmented discipline, given its function as an integrator of theory (Abrams and Hogg 2004, Chernoff 2002, Fuchs 1991, Kaplan 2003, Overton 2007, Ploeger 2010, Ritzer 1990, Szmataka and Lovaglia 1996, Turner 1990, Wallis 2010). However, it has also been criticized by others as poorly defined, ideological, vague, lacking rigor, and that it doesn't provide systematic and explanatory theory (Collins 1986, Skocpol 1987, Turner 1985). The same has been true to some extent of other overarching and holistic theories similar to metatheory, such as Integral Theory, Grand Theory, Consilience, General Systems Theory, and the Tree of Knowledge System. Nonetheless, some who were quick to criticize metatheory later acknowledged its utility. For example, Jonathan Turner changed his position on metatheory, noting its potential usefulness for building better, more parsimonious, abstract and useful explanatory theories, as long as it wasn't used as an end unto itself (Turner 1990). Additionally, acceptance of metatheory has grown in recent years as scholars have developed more rigorous research methods for metatheorizing (Wallis 2010). In short, metatheorizing is growing as a accepted research methodology for two reasons; it is needed in order to aggregate an ever-expanding body of mini-theories into knowledge in many disciplines, and secondly, better, more rigorous methods make

⁵ I have adopted Wallis's definition of metatheory for the purposes of this dissertation.

metatheorizing more scientifically attractive as a way to answer questions that other methods can not.

According to George Ritzer, there are three types of metatheorizing: (1) metatheorizing as a means of attaining a deeper understanding of theory (M_U); (2) metatheorizing as a prelude to theory development (M_P); and, (3) metatheorizing as a source of perspectives that overarch ... [a discipline's]⁶ theory (M_O) (Ritzer 1990, 4). Simply put, M_U is used to produce a better understanding of extant theory, M_P for new theory, and M_O for an overarching perspective of some part or of a collection of theories. This research utilized the first and third types of metatheorizing.

Meta-data-analysis, defined as “the study of the results of data analysis” (Zhou 1991), is a method used in the construction of metatheory. Unlike data analysis, where raw data is analyzed, meta-data-analysis processes previously “processed data.” For example, in the case of military strategy, rather than analyzing the same battles and wars that theorists like Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart did, a meta-data-analysis of their works would examine the theories and concepts that they derived from the data. Meta-data-analysis does not analyze the same raw data using different procedures or for different purposes, instead, it analyzes the results of the previous analysis, constituting an “analysis of analyses” (Glass 1976, Zhou 1991).

According to Zhou, there are three ways in which meta-data-analysis is conducted (1991). The first consists of studying the underlying assumptions of various data-analytic procedures. In this research, the assumptions upon which the theories of military strategy

⁶ Ritzer wrote specifically about metatheorizing in Sociology. I have substituted “a discipline’s” for “sociological,” used in the original by Ritzer, to make this type of metatheorizing more generic.

are based are studied, however, less emphasis is placed upon an analysis of the previous procedures used, though they are identified. The second way of meta-data-analysis consists of a comparison of different forms of data for their quality and utility. This form of analysis is an important part of this research, as identifying how strategies are different, how they are similar, and how they are related, is critical to synthesizing them. The last way that meta-data-analysis is done occurs when a range of related research studies of the same phenomenon are synthesized, one of the objectives of this research. While meta-data-analysis can be done either quantitatively or qualitatively, this research design used a qualitative approach due to the conceptual nature of the data.

Grounded Theory

Grounded theory has many similarities to meta-study. As one grounded theorist proffered, “grounded formal theorizing is a form of meta-synthesis and can capture the different effects of inter-study variations on outcomes of interest” (Kearney 2007).

Grounded Theory is a general, qualitative research strategy that consists of systematic, inductive and comparative methods of data collection and analysis for the purpose of building theory from data (Bryant and Charmaz 2007, Charmaz 2006, Corbin and Strauss 2008, Glaser and Strauss 2011). As Bryant and Charmaz noted (2007, 3), there is some ambiguity associated with the term Grounded Theory, as it has come to mean both method and the result of method. However, the meaning can normally be construed through context.

Concepts are at the core of Grounded Theory. As originally noted by Blumer (Corbin and Strauss 2008, 51):

Throughout the act of scientific inquiry, concepts play a central role. They are significant elements in the prior scheme that the scholar has of the empirical world; they are likely to be the terms in which the problem is cast; they are the categories for which data are sought and in which data are grouped; they usually become the chief means of establishing relations between data; and they are the anchor points in interpretation of findings. (26)

While the goal of Grounded Theory is to develop theory out of concepts derived from data, grounded theorists often start their studies with *sensitizing* concepts—that is, general, extant concepts from the literature that serve as a point of departure from which to initially categorize and analyze the data. Sensitizing concepts provide a vantage point from which to develop ideas about processes defined in the data. In the course of developing a grounded theory, sensitizing concepts may either be maintained or abandoned, depending upon the data. (Charmaz 2006)

Concepts are generated from the data in grounded theory through a multi-level process of analysis and integration. Lower-level concepts are developed through a process of data analysis and coding. These, *initial* codes often consist of both the sensitizing concepts and new concepts that emerge from the data. Sensitizing concepts are not always used, and some grounded theorists avoid their use until the end of the research process on the grounds they may bias the study towards a *status quo* answer to the research problem. In initial coding, constant comparisons are made between data that help to refine and focus concepts and distinguish when new ones are necessary. (Charmaz 2006)

After the initial coding has been completed, the next step consists of *focused* coding whereby higher-level concepts are generated. Focused coding occurs at a higher level of abstraction, with the more frequent and significant codes used in the initial

coding synthesized to explain larger segments of data. Focused coding also serves as a check on the initial coding, potentially allowing new insight to emerge from the data.

Theoretical coding occurs at the highest level of abstraction. Theoretical codes conceptualize how the focused codes relate to one another in an integrated theory. (Charmaz 2006) Theoretical codes are then categorized into a conceptual framework conducive to developing a theory.

Insights garnered during and after the process of coding are captured in memos. Memos summarize the concepts cultivated from the analysis. Successive memos are written as the researcher advances from lower level to higher levels of analysis. As Charmaz (72) explains, “memos give you a space and place for making comparisons between data and data, data and codes, codes of data and other codes, codes and category, and category and concept and for articulating conjectures about these comparisons.”

Grounded Theory methodology can utilize a wide range of data sources for the development of theory. As Corbin and Strauss discussed, sources of data can include “interviews, observations, videos, documents, drawings, diaries, memoirs, newspapers, biographies, historical documents, autobiographies,” and others (2008, 27). A single type of source can be used, or they can be used in combination.

Extant texts are a form of document used by grounded theorists as evidence. Extant texts include public records, government reports, organizational documents, mass media, literature, autobiographies, personal correspondence, and even internet discussions. Extant texts differ from most other types of evidence used in grounded theory as researchers are not involved in their construction. This can serve as an advantage or disadvantage in their use. Researchers cannot guide the direction of the flow

of discussion, as they can in interviews, which may serve as a disadvantage in terms of data relevance but an advantage in terms of limiting the introduction of bias into the research. An important consideration in using extant texts is that they must be situated in their contexts. This is especially true when extant texts differ in geographical locations and the time frames they were written. Secondary sources that “tell the story behind other texts” (39) may be required to fill in the context. (Charmaz, 37-40)

One important attribute of data sources is their quality, to include scope and depth. Charmaz notes that studies based upon “rich, substantial, and relevant data” are more likely to stand out. In fact, it is better to use fewer quality sources than a large number of sources of inferior quality. According to Glaser and Stern, small samples and limited data are not necessarily problematic as the goal of grounded theory is the development of conceptual categories whereby the function of data is to describe the properties categories and the relationships between them (Charmaz 2006, 18). The end result of the process is an interpretive theory that qualitatively “emphasizes *understanding* rather than explanation,” giving priority to showing patterns and connections rather than explanation and prediction, as is the case in quantitative theories that seek to explain and predict (Charmaz 2006, 126).

Research Design

Before proceeding into the research design used in this dissertation, it should be noted that some social science scholars of the past half-century have eschewed practitioner observations and advice, viewing their largely historical approach as traditional and non-scientific, resulting in an “impressionistic and propagandist investigation of war [that] has produced a large number of intuitively pleasing, equally

plausible, but often contradictory hypotheses about the determinants of international war ... that is practically useless” (Bremer, 375). However, while impressionistic their insights may be, useless they are not. Many of the military theorists and practitioners had combat experience, and although their observations might be impressionistic, they represent a valuable contribution formed from the crucible of combat. Indeed, they are rooted in observations; and observations make for empirical study. Their theoretical insights serve as the foundation for a meta-theory of military strategy. Moreover, their writings constitute data from which a theory of military strategy can be inductively constructed using the methodologies discussed above.

Research design is driven by the research questions asked and the evidence needed to answer those questions (de Vaus 2005, 9). As de Vaus noted, “The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the initial question as unambiguously as possible” (2005, 9). In a sense, a research design is a strategy—a way of answering the desired end, formulated as a research question, with the means, represented by the data either available or potentially obtainable. The research questions asked in this study along with the evidence available to answer them were best addressed through a qualitative approach.

A qualitative approach allows one to uncover the relevant factors of a phenomenon. It is also useful for building theory, rather than testing it. A qualitative approach is also suitable when a complex, detailed understanding of a research problem is needed. According to John Creswell, “We use qualitative research to develop theories when partial or inadequate theories exist ... or existing theories do not adequately capture the complexity of the problem we are examining” (Creswell 2007, 40).

As mentioned in the introduction, the research questions of this study consisted of: What is military strategy? What basic military strategies currently exist? How do the basic military strategies relate to one another? Can an all-encompassing continuum of military strategy be built from basic strategies? What other concepts guide strategy? How does strategy relate to the different types of warfare?

As discussed above, fundamentally, giants in the philosophy of science have described theory building as a creative process. However, while theories can be built inductively solely from observations, such as with grounded theory, most theories are largely built upon the backs of others. New ideas or concepts are synthesized with extant theories within a given discipline, or when outside ideas and concepts cross over from another discipline and are synthesized with theories in a given discipline.

While the ends for this research were not necessarily any more problematic to deal with than any other study, the available and potentially obtainable data severely restricted the research design.

An experimental study of military strategies was largely out of the question for two reasons. First, the stakes involved disallow tinkering mistakes with military strategy. Second, the ethics of experimenting with war plans with lives on the line is amoral. Many scholars have also used game theory to test basic strategies in a laboratory setting. While this type of research has provided some insights into strategy, it, too, suffers from problems that excluded it for this particular research. In my opinion (based upon my own combat experience), game theory has questionable external validity when it comes to war—the incentives and punishments, such as living and dying, cannot be replicated in a

laboratory. Second, while one might devise a bold strategy in a game, the stakes involved in real war might drive a strategist to a much more conservative strategy or vice versa.

Another research design that has often been employed in the study of military strategy is the case study. Case study provides an excellent way of testing military strategy against real world cases. Almost all of the theorizing on military strategy has been accomplished through this methodology. However, given the objective of this research, it couldn't serve as a way of building a higher order theory of military strategy.

While there are certainly other research designs that might have been employed to answer the research questions of this study, I chose to merge two extant designs, meta-study and grounded theory, with the methods of concept formation and content analysis, into a hybrid design I refer to as conceptually grounded meta-theory. I combined these approaches for the following reasons. First, all of these approaches are specifically crafted for *building* theory. While meta-study constitutes a research design particularly suited for integrating and synthesizing extant theory as data into an overarching theory, its method for doing so is somewhat unstructured. On the other hand, grounded theory provides a structured, qualitative approach to theory development, but hasn't (to my knowledge) been used to unify extant theory. Combining both of these research designs into one makes up for the weaknesses of each approach while utilizing their strengths in the context of military strategy. There exists a limited body of extant theory on military strategy, written by some of the greatest strategists of all time. Their writings served as primary data, which was coded and developed into a comprehensive, overarching theory of strategy for this dissertation.

Methodology

The first step of this research required a better definition of military strategy. Military strategy is a contested concept, with no consensus on a definition. I used Sartori's "Guidelines for Concept Analysis" (Sartori 2009c) as a way to first refine a definition of strategy, from which a complementary definition of military strategy could be created. While the use of Sartori's methodology was tedious and laborious (thus relegated to an appendix), it did provide a more rigorous and defensible way of producing a conceptual definition.

The next step consisted of a combination of meta-data, content, and hermeneutical analysis of the major works on strategy. The sources were selected on the basis of whether they were written as first-hand accounts of strategy while also containing overt strategies and strategic concepts. I coded and analyzed the works as primary sources. Rather than simply providing short summaries of their theories and concepts, as one would do in a literature review, I have provided long summations with many direct quotes along with my analysis. The reasons for this were threefold. First, many readers are unfamiliar with some of the theorists and their works, so I have included their major strategy concepts in one document in order to shorten the learning curve. Second, even for readers familiar with the works analyzed, most have neither the time nor inclination to again wade through volumes of text to winnow out the germane aspects of strategy in the sources selected. The third reason was to provide both laymen and scholars with a transparent view of the meta-data and hermeneutical analyses so that individuals could determine for themselves whether the concepts I derived from the works were accurate, thereby providing a roadmap for the former and an easier process trace by the latter with

regard to reliability. It should be noted that the strategy meta-data and hermeneutical analysis sifted through much more than what is included in chapters 3-8; but because some were long on history and short on theory, they were excluded. Not shown in the dissertation are the 126 pages of content analysis of strategies and concepts. I coded strategies and strategic concepts in an Excel spreadsheet, which allowed for their sorting, thematic integration and identification.⁷

A hermeneutical analysis⁸ of the works reviewed was required in order to account for differences in the knowledge of strategy and science across time. As Moustakas (1994, 9) noted, “hermeneutic science involves the art of reading a text so that the intention and meaning behind appearances are fully understood.” It is a reflective-interpretative process whereby the interrelationships between the direct description of experience and the underlying dynamics or structures that account for that experience “provide a central meaning and unity that enables one to understand the substance and essence of the experience” (9).

An example of the need for this step was reflected in the writings of Clausewitz, who wrote extensively about the importance of emotion and the “moral” forces in war, going so far as to state, “One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral forces are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade” (Clausewitz 1976, rev.1984, 185). Yet, rather than analyzing these all-important moral forces, Clausewitz followed this statement with a huge caveat:

⁷ My intention is to publish the strategy and concepts quotes as a separate document.

⁸ It should be noted that this application of the hermeneutic approach is different from that normally employed, as it didn't so much start with raw data, but instead began with insights developed by the authors from their observations.

We might list the most important moral phenomena in war, and, like a diligent professor, try to evaluate them one by one. This method, however, all too easily leads to platitudes, while the genuine spirit of inquiry soon evaporates, and unwittingly we find ourselves proclaiming what everybody already knows. For this reason, here even more than elsewhere, to treat the subject in an incomplete and impressionistic manner, content to have pointed out its general importance and to have indicated the spirit in which the argument of this book are conceived.

Only by putting Clausewitz's statement into historical context does this somewhat puzzling explanation become clear. Simply put, there was no science of psychology in Clausewitz's time. The science of psychology had to wait decades for the birth of Sigmund Freud before psychology would emerge as an academic discipline. It wasn't that Clausewitz thought the evaluation of moral phenomena was trivial or unimportant; it was that the lexicon and science of psychology simply weren't yet developed. While psychologists still have a lot to learn about the "moral forces," they have, nonetheless, made much progress since Clausewitz time. Moreover, these insights can and should be incorporated into a theory of strategy, where appropriate.

A hermeneutical approach was also important in that it allowed a theoretical foundation for strategy and concepts to be baselined from such expert practitioners and theorists such as Clausewitz, B. H. Liddell-Hart, Mao Tse-Tung, Colonel John Boyd, Colonels Liang and Xiangsui, and others. Strategy concepts that differed in word but not connotation, due to lexical differences across time, were unified. Similarly, strategy concepts that were the same in word but differed by connotation across time were differentiated.

The third step of the methodology involved a comparative meta-analysis of the baselined strategies and concepts. Theoretical notions were analyzed for what they had in common and what made them unique. The principles of war were dropped as a

theoretical construct due to irresolvable conceptual differences-in-kind, as some principles described physical characteristics of the means of war while others described the ways in which those means could be employed (discussed in chapter 9). Instead, I developed the idea of concepts of employment, which focused on the actions that dictated what to do with military means in order to achieve military objectives. Of the concepts of employment, five basic military strategies were found to be necessary and sufficient, either singly or in combination, to explain a wide range of ways in which military means were utilized to achieve war objectives (discussed in chapter 11). The five basic strategies and concepts of employment were then organized in relation to the two objects of strategy; the first being the physical object of diminishing an adversary's corporeal means of making war and the second being the psychological object of breaking his will to continue fighting over the political objective. This resulted in a two-pole strategy framework, between which fit the five basic military strategies and the concepts of employment. I have dubbed the framework, concepts of employment, and strategies the basic military strategy continuum (see chapter 12). As a check of the utility of the basic military strategy continuum, I also looked at how the framework related to various hypothesized types of war, such as genocide, guerrilla warfare, terrorism, etc., and found the two to be completely consistent with one another.

While the case study methodology is an effective way of developing individual theories of strategy, it is not conducive to building a unified theory from them. Driven by the need to broaden the scope of theorizing beyond the mini-theory stage of strategy development, the methodology employed in the creation of the basic military strategy continuum and concomitant theory was necessarily eclectic and unique. Employment of

this methodology, which I have termed conceptually grounded meta-theorizing, resulted in the development of a grand theory of military strategy, the goal of this dissertation.

**PART II: STRATEGY ACCORDING TO STRATEGY
THEORISTS AND PRACTITIONERS**

CHAPTER 3: THE MASTER STRATEGISTS

A great struggle for hegemony between the seven powerful states of ancient China (Qin, Han, Wei, Zhao, Qi Chu, and Yan) occurred during China's Warring States period (403-221 B.C.), with Qin ultimately emerging as victor. It was a time when strategic thought flourished. With armies of hundreds of thousands engaging in combat, the greatest of skill of was required to lead. The fate of a state often relied upon the ability of a general to deliver victory even though his army might be outmanned, inferior in arms, or both. Fame, fortune and sometimes rule were the rewards for those with the greatest strategic skill.

With so much at stake, knowledge of strategy was often a secret of the state, with the writings of the greatest military minds guarded and read by only a few elites. Captured within the recovered texts of *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China* (Sawyer 2007), are the stratagems and strategies that proved effective during China's ancient wars. Often, ruses, including guile and deception, were key factors in achieving victory. Other times, sheer overwhelming power was employed. The ancient Chinese Masters employed a full spectrum of strategies, from extermination and the conventional warfare strategies of annihilation and exhaustion, to irregular warfare strategies of subversion and intimidation.

Sun Tzu and The Art of War

“For to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Sun Tzu

Although the attribution remains controversial, Sun Tzu is generally credited as the author of *The Art of War*. He is believed to have been a great general under the

emperor of Wu during China's Warring States period. Whether Sun Tzu actually ever existed, lived outside of the Warring States period, unduly received credit as the sole author, or represented a collection of authors, *The Art of War* nonetheless stands on its own as a classic of military theory and strategy.⁹

Sun Tzu developed a hierarchy of preferred strategic aims that sought to maximize the benefits of conquest while at the same time minimizing costs. His hierarchy of offensive aims began with taking the state intact, with the least damage possible (Sun Tzu 1971, 77). Next best was to employ a strategy that captured the enemy's army, which he deemed superior to destroying it. Accomplishment of both of these aims without fighting represented the highest achievement in strategic skill. It required an understanding of the enemy's strategy, which could then be used against him. In both cases, maximum benefits with minimal costs were achieved by taking the objective through means other than fighting. Sun Tzu then went on to list the disruption of alliances, attacking the enemy army, and lastly, the least preferred option of attacking the adversary's cities, as alternate strategic aims in order to achieve the primary political objective, the downfall of the enemy state.

Sun Tzu followed his hierarchy of strategic aims with discussion of strategy prescriptions and guidelines for achieving them. Most of these prescriptions described situations for the employment of troops, such as surrounding an enemy when holding a

⁹ Samuel B. Griffith, translator of the cited text, provides an excellent discussion of the controversy surrounding Sun Tzu as the author of *The Art of War* in the introduction of the book. Lionel Giles and Ralph D. Sawyer also provide excellent translations of *The Art of War* into English. While there are subtle differences between the three translations, they are slight in the context of strategy, germane for this chapter. The use of the Griffith translation for this dissertation is more a matter of personal choice and does not reflect any qualitative differences between the translations.

ten-to-one numerical advantage, attacking him when five times his strength, dividing him when holding a two-to-one advantage, engaging him when equally matched, and being prepared to withdraw when outnumbered. To Sun Tzu, good strategy required a general to establish a superior situation conducive to victory. He also provided cautions for the sovereign, lest he inadvertently introduce confusion and misfortune by attempting direct employment of troops rather than more general political objective guidance through the military expertise of his generals. (77-84)

It is important to note that Sun Tzu's strategies were expressed in the whole of the text rather than in individual statements and segments. While Sun Tzu described what later strategists would call a strategy of annihilation in conventional army-against-army fighting, he also outlined three strategies for achieving the highest aim, taking the state intact without fighting.

The first strategy, applicable to a very powerful, or hegemonic state, can be found in the chapter, The Nine Varieties of Ground. According to Sun Tzu, the ruler of such a state, relied "for the attainment of his aims on his ability to overawe his opponents" (138). The strategy of "overawing" a foe entailed building the perception of an overwhelming quantitative and/or qualitative show of power to the degree that all hope of resistance was seen as futile. Psychological factors played heavily in overawing an opponent, with deception sometimes used to amplify the demonstration of power. Overawing power could be used not only to cause an adversary to back down, but to prevent potential allies of the adversary from entering the mix, as well. This described a strategy in which a trumped-up *perception* of one's forces was used to compel

capitulation, “overawing” an opponent through recognition of inferiority and certain loss. In more modern terms, Sun Tzu had described a *strategy of intimidation*.

The second strategy was more overt and straightforward, described in his chapter on “Offensive Strategy”. This consisted of capturing cities by all but surrounding them, leaving a small escape corridor open by which the enemy could escape. Complete encirclement was to be avoided as desperate troops would fight to the death. Once the adversary began the retreat, the channelized and unorganized enemy could easily be captured. This constituted a two-part strategy of exhaustion and annihilation. By first starving the enemy, his means of resistance were weakened. Once the enemy embarked on an escape, his forces were annihilated—decisively crippling his means of further resistance. The adversary had little choice but to capitulate due to no longer possessing the means to resist.

A third strategy for taking a state intact required synthesizing information from two otherwise disparate sections. In his chapter on Estimates, Sun Tzu stated that moral influence was the foremost enemy factor that had to be determined. He described moral influence as “that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril” (Sun Tzu 1971, 64). Moral influence could be discerned through the use of secret agents (discussed in his section on the Employment of Secret Agents). He described no less than five types of secret agents—consisting of native, inside, doubled, expendable and living agents (Sun Tzu 1971, 144). Inside agents were enemy officials under one’s employ who, as one commentator, Tu Mu, explained, could be used to “create cleavages between the sovereign and his ministers so that these are not in harmonious accord” (145).

Expendable agents were those given false information that could also be used to sow discord and break the moral influence between the sovereign, his advisors and the people. Thus, while not explicitly stated, Sun Tzu alluded to a strategy of subversion that could be used to help take a state intact.

Additionally, moral conduct and harmony in war were also extended to strategy with regard to prisoner policy. According to Sun Tzu, prisoners were to be treated well, so that their allegiance could be gained. Subsequently, they would be allowed to join Sun Tzu's army, a practice he called 'winning a battle and becoming stronger' (76). Not only could an enemy army be weakened this way, but one's own force could be strengthened, as well. This constituted a strategy of subversion in which the enemy's means of resistance were reduced while buttressing one's own. The winning of "hearts and minds" extended not only to enemy combatants, but the people, as well. Sun Tzu also described methods of taking advantage of psychological weaknesses of army commanders, another way of attacking an enemy's will to resist.

The next best approach was to attack the enemy's strategy and thwart his plans. Sun Tzu advised that alliances were to be broken, leaving the state alone and weaker as a result, a strategy consisting of isolation and possibly deprivation. Only if victory was unattainable through the aforementioned approaches should one aim to beat the enemy by fighting and defeating his army. Finally, attacking cities, the least favored of Sun Tzu's strategic aims, should be considered, though he cautioned that it was to be avoided if at all possible (78).

Sun Tzu viewed this strategic hierarchy as a more efficient way of achieving victory, not just as a result of losing fewer troops and resources in the process, but in the

gains, as well, by virtue of less destruction associated with the objective. Stratagems were instrumental to his way of war, though they were extremely difficult to employ. Thus they represented the ultimate achievement in warfare—the acme of skill, as a way to “to take all-under-Heaven intact” (79). Blunt force against blunt force was sure to yield carnage. Real skill lay in out-thinking the enemy, achieving strategic objectives through the orchestration of maneuver, deception, sedition and guile to induce a state of psychological demoralization and eventual defeat in the mind of enemy. Samuel B. Griffith, who translated *The Art of War* into English, succinctly summed up Sun Tzu’s strategic approach as follows:

“The master conqueror frustrated his enemy’s plans and broke up his alliances. He created cleavages between sovereign and minister, superiors and inferiors, commanders and subordinates. His spies and agents were active everywhere, gathering information, sowing dissension, and nurturing subversion. The enemy was isolated and demoralized; his will to resist broken. Thus without battle his army was conquered, his cities taken and his state overthrown (39).”

Psychological manipulation and subversion were instrumental to Sun Tzu’s way of war. While deception was a fundamental tenet to his strategic approach, as illustrated in his assertion that “all warfare is based upon deception” (66), Sun Tzu’s psychological scheming was much more devious than merely using feints and bluffs to build false expectations in the mind of the enemy. He also advocated guile, deceit and subterfuge to take advantage of psychological traits of the enemy—which were also potentially calamitous traits if part of the character of one’s own commanders. As Sun Tzu noted (114-115):

There are five qualities which are dangerous in the character of a general. If reckless; he can be killed; if cowardly; captured; if quick-tempered you can make a fool of him; if he has too delicate a sense of honor you can calumniate him; if he has a sense of a compassionate nature you can harass him.

Sun Tzu's psychological way of war even extended to deducing the intentions and psychological state of the enemy based upon his disposition and maneuvers. A few examples in his section of Marches illustrate:

When at night the enemy's camp is clamorous, he is fearful. When his troops are disorderly, the general has no prestige. When his flags and banners move about constantly, he is in disarray. If the officers are short-tempered they are exhausted. (121)

These weakened psychological states of the enemy represented vulnerabilities that could be exploited.

Sun Tzu also argued the use of both the direct and indirect approaches of maneuver, depending upon the balance of forces and the strategic context. According to Sun Tzu,

Nothing is more difficult than the art of maneuver. What is difficult about maneuver is to make the devious route the most direct and to turn misfortune to advantage. Thus, march by an indirect route and divert the enemy by enticing him with a bait. So doing, you may set out after he does and arrive before him. One able to do this understands the strategy of the direct and indirect.

The duration of conflict and its impact on the probability of victory was also not lost on Sun Tzu. Sun Tzu noted that longer campaigns necessitated greater resource demands on the state. Even though the state might win the current war, resource depletion left the state vulnerable to other potential enemies. As Sun Tzu observed,¹⁰

Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged. For there has never been a protracted war from which a country has benefited. (73)

¹⁰ In the main, Sun Tzu's claim is correct in that both states end up weaker the longer a conflict goes on. However, later strategy theorists (most notably, Mao Tse Tung), discussed later, would amend this contention, noting that protracted war can sometimes be an effective defensive strategy.

In summary, a careful reading of *The Art of War* reveals a sophisticated discussion of strategy and strategic concepts, coupling direct and indirect and physical and psychological approaches to a hierarchical set of strategic aims. Even though most of Sun Tzu's advice consisted of concepts employed in strategy rather than strategy itself, strategies, such as the strategy of subversion and the strategy of annihilation, can nonetheless be gleaned. More than merely advocating the use of deception in war, Sun Tzu proposed the use of stratagems through the harmonic use of both psychological and physical means against psychological and physical targets to achieve victory with an economy of force. Sun Tzu's strategic guidance is also powerful, if not mendacious, for its guileful and treacherous nature. Not only was Sun Tzu's guidance manifest in its own right, his thoughts had a profound effect on later strategists.

Ancient Chinese Military Classics and the Thirty-Six Stratagems

“Lure your enemy onto the roof, then take away the ladder.”

The Thirty-Six Stratagems, Author Unknown

While Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* garners most of the attention regarding ancient Chinese military strategy, a number of other classics also deserve serious deliberation. Along with Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, the *Six Secret Teachings*, *Ssu-ma Fa (The Methods of the Minister of War)*, *Wu-tzu*, *Wei Liao-tzu*, *Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung*, and *Questions and Replies Between T'ang T'ai-tsung and Li Wei-kung* constitute the other writings that make up the seven military classics of ancient China (Sawyer 2007).

As Sawyer notes, a great deal of uncertainty surrounds both the authorship and the time periods of the seven military classics (17). Some of the same guidance can be found in many of them, with historical anomalies further complicating their order and genesis (36-37). For example, the Martial Secret Teaching section of the *Six Secret Teachings* contained a passage similar to Sun Tzu's "to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill" (Sun Tzu 1971, 77), with T'ai Kung maintaining that, "If you can attain complete victory without fighting, without the great army suffering any losses, you will have penetrated the realm of ghosts and spirits. How marvelous! How subtle!" (Sawyer 2007, 53). Wei Liou-Tzu also alluded to achieving victory without fighting, through a subversive strategy involving the use of spies, preparatory planning and the undermining of morale (262).

Similar to the dangerous psychological traits that should be screened out of generals mentioned by Sun Tzu, T'ai Kung provided consonant traits needed in generals, although they were positively oriented rather than negative. As T'ai Kung explained, "If he is courageous he cannot be overwhelmed; if he is wise he cannot be forced in to turmoil; if he is benevolent he will love his men; if he is trustworthy he will not be forced to be deceitful; if he is loyal he will not be of two minds" (62) In effect, T'ai Kung described the other side of the same "psychological trait" coin that Sun Tzu had expounded. Similar guidance in the *Three Strategies of Huang Shih-Kung*, described how to employ the wise, courageous, greedy, and stupid (300):

The wise take pleasure in establishing their achievements. The courageous love to put their will into effect. The greedy fervently pursue profits. The stupid have little regard for death. Employ them through their emotions, for this is the military's subtle exercise of authority.

Wu Tzu also discussed important characteristics needed in a general, principally courage, along with the ability to regulate, prepare and commit troops, maintain caution when doing so, and keep things simple (217). Like Sun Tzu, Wu Tzu advocated taking advantage of an enemy general and his army's weaknesses: (218):

A commanding general who is stupid and trusting can be deceived and entrapped. One who is greedy and unconcerned about reputation can be given gifts and bribed. One who easily changes his mind and lacks real plans can be labored and distressed. If the upper ranks are wealthy and arrogant while the lower ranks are poor and resentful, they can be separated and divided. If their advancing and withdrawing are often marked by doubt and the troops have no one to rely on, they can be shocked into running off. If the officers despise the commanding general and are intent on returning home, by blocking off the easy roads and leaving the treacherous ones open, they can be attacked and captured.

Clearly, ruses and psychological warfare were fundamental tenets of ancient Chinese military strategy, given the penchant for both the use of and defense against psychological measures.

The use of spies, encouraged in *The Art of War*, was also advocated in the *Ssu-ma Fa* (Sawyer, 135) and *Wu Tzu* (218). *Wu Tzu* also noted that the intentions and vulnerabilities of an adversary could be estimated through their dispositions (210-214), similar to Sun Tzu's contentions.

The other military classics also amplified guidance to simple assertions found in *The Art of War*. T'ai Kung was more explicit in how subversion could be used in strategy to conquer an adversary from within. Specifically, T'ai Kung provided twelve subversive measures that could be employed against an enemy sovereign (Sawyer, 56-57):

First, accord with what he likes in order to accommodate his wishes. ... Second, become familiar with those he loves in order to fragment his awesomeness. ... Third, covertly bribe his assistants, fostering a deep relationship with them. ... Fourth, assist him in his licentiousness and indulgence in music in order to dissipate his will. ... Fifth, treat his loyal officials very generously, but

reduce the gifts you provide [to the ruler]¹¹. ...Sixth, make secret alliances with his favored ministers, but visibly keep his less-favored outside officials at a distance. ... Seventh, if you want to bind his heart to you, you must offer generous presents. To gather in his assistants, loyal associates, and loved ones, you must secretly show them the gains they can realize by colluding with you. Eighth, [externally control him by gifting] him with great treasures, and [making] plans with him. Ninth, honor him with praise. ...Tenth, be submissive so he will trust you, and thereby learn about his true situation. Eleventh, block up his access by means of the Tao. Twelfth, support his dissolute officials in order to confuse him.

The formulation of strategy was a key function of the military staff and deemed important enough to institutionalize it in staff numbers, focus and responsibilities. In the “Dragon Secret Teaching,” T’ai Kung described the numbers and responsibilities of various staff planning cells, as sophisticated as those found in modern military staffs, if not more so in the use of psychology and subversive strategy. A few examples follow (60-61):¹²

“Planning Officers, five; responsible for planning security and danger; anticipating the unforeseen; discussing performance and ability; making clear rewards and punishments; appointing officers; deciding the doubtful; and determining what is advisable and what is not.

... “Topographers, three; in charge of the army’s disposition and strategic configuration of power when moving and stopped [and of] information on strategic advantages and disadvantages; precipitous and easy passages, both near and far; and water and dry land, mountains and defiles, so as not to lose the advantages of terrain.

“Strategists, nine: responsible for discussing divergent views; analyzing the probable success or failure of various options; selecting the weapons and training men in their use; and identifying those who violate the ordinances.

... “Officers of Authority, three: responsible for implementing the unorthodox and deceptive; for establishing the different and unusual. Things that people do not recognize; and for putting into effect inexhaustible transformations.

¹¹ Brackets by Sawyer.

¹² Brackets as indicated in Sawyer, 2007.

... “Feathers and Wings, four: responsible for flourishing the name and fame [of the army]; for shaking distant lands [with its image]; and for moving all within the four borders in order to weaken the enemy’s spirit.

“Roving officers, eight: responsible for spying on [the enemy’s] licentiousness and observing their changes; manipulating their emotions; and observing the enemy’s thoughts in order to act as spies.

“Officers of Techniques, two: responsible for spreading slander and falsehoods and for calling on ghosts and spirits in order to confuse the minds of the populace.

Additional planning cells included logistics, medical, accounting, liaison, engineering, signals, and personnel.

The *Ssu-ma Fa*, *Wu-Tzu* and *Three Strategies of Huang Shih-Kung* all detailed the importance of maintaining “hearts and minds” through righteousness and humane government of the people (119).¹³ According to the *Ssu-ma Fa*, the payoff for benevolent rule was that the government gained “the love of the people, the means by which it can be preserved” (126). Wu Tzu explained that without harmony in the state, the fielding of the army could result in disaster (207), though there were ways to manipulate the people during hard times (208). In the *Three Strategies of Huang Shih-Kung*, the power of the sovereign, government and state derived from the people, as indicated in the statement, “The essence of the army and state lies in investigating the mind of the people and putting into effect the hundred duties of government” (293). Moral factors in the conduct of war, along with a righteous cause, were looked upon as essential elements to maintaining both martial and civil support.

¹³ As Sawyer (2007) noted, this may have reflected more of the cultural values associated with the time and region when both the *Ssu-ma Fa* and *Wu-Tzu* were written. Elements of Confucianism and the Tao appear in several of the classics.

Another important ancient Chinese strategy classic was *The Thirty-six Stratagems* (Tung and Tung 2010, Verstappen 1999, Yuan 1991). *The Thirty-six Stratagems* consisted of 36 four-word phrases, known as chengyu (or sayings, in English) that described a set of strategic heuristics (Tung and Tung, 6). The original author of *The Thirty-six Stratagems* is unknown, but many of the stratagems are believed to have originated around the Warring States Period of Chinese history.

The thirty-six stratagems are listed in Table 3.1, along with my general description of what they mean in contemporary strategic terms. A few points deserve mention. First, a great amount of guile, deception, and subversion were inherent within many of the stratagems. Second, there was also continuity between the seven military classics and the thirty-six stratagems. A product of the same approximate period as the seven military classics of ancient China, the thirty-six stratagems represented an easily mastered list of strategic heuristics for strategic planners and tacticians, in consonance with the seven military classics. They were all associated with historic battles and wars, meaning they had practical utility at least in one situation and time. Also, the guidance ranged from the grand strategic (such as the Strategy to Sow Discord) to the tactical level of war (such as Shed Your Skin Like the Golden Cicada), with some of the stratagems applicable to more than one level of war. Finally, the use of both psychological and physical measures, with some stratagems using means in one domain to achieve an effect in the other, or the integration of means in both domains, were used to achieve a given objective.

This strategem legacy lives on in China. The Thirty-Six Stratagems are still a part of Chinese popular culture today, learned at an early age by children.

Strategem	Description
Fool the Emperor to Cross the Sea	Lull the adversary into complacency, then strike with surprise.
Besiege Wei to Rescue Zhao	Attack a weakly defended, valued, enemy objective to draw the enemy main force into an ambush.
Kill with a Borrowed Sword	Subvert or plant false information to cause internal enemy conflict.
Await the Exhausted Enemy at Your Ease	Engage the adversary at a time and in terrain of one's own choosing. Use feints to exhaust the enemy.
Loot a Burning House	Attack an adversary when it is weak from domestic strife or international conflict.
Clamor in the East, Attack in the West	Deceive the enemy into believing you'll attack in one place, then attack in another.
Creating Something From Nothing	Use multiple acts of deception followed by real attack.
Openly Prepare the Walkway, Secretly March to Chencang	Attack from two axes, one openly direct and the other secretly indirect.
Observe the fire on the Opposite	Stay out of wars between other states until an opportunity arises to achieve a desired political objective.
Hide Your Dagger Behind a Smile	Charm and ingratiate yourself to your enemy. When you have gained his trust, move against him in secret.
Sacrifice the Plum Tree in Place of the Peach	Sacrifice a lesser interest in order to keep an important one.
Seize the Opportunity to Lead a Sheep Away	Take advantage of unanticipated opportunities.
Beat the Grass to Startle the Snake	Conduct a feint to discover an adversary's plans.
Borrow a Corpse to Raise the Spirit	Conduct psychological warfare to undermine an adversary's morale.
Lure the Tiger Down the Mountain	Do not engage a strongly placed adversary. Instead, lure him to ground of your choosing.
To Catch Something, First Let It Go	Leave an adversary with the appearance of an escape route to overcome the spirit of "desperation" (fighting to the death).
Toss Out a Brick to Attract Jade	Use bait to lure the enemy into a trap.
To Catch the Bandits First Capture Their Leader	Defeat the commander(s) to leave the adversary leaderless (only in the case of paid vice loyal troops—who will continue fighting out of vengeance).
Steal the Firewood from	Attack the enemy's center of gravity.

Under the Cauldron	
Trouble the Water to Catch the Fish	Conduct an unexpected operation to confuse the enemy.
Shed Your Skin Like the Golden Cicada	Create a diversion to escape or retreat.
Shut the Door to Catch the Thief	Largely encircle the enemy but with a small escape route open to him—when he attempts escape, close the trap and destroy him.
Befriend a Distant Enemy to Attack One Nearby	Befriend the enemies of your enemy and work with them to destroy your enemy.
Borrow the Road to Conquer Guo	Borrow the resources of an ally to attack an enemy and/or the ally.
Replace the Beams with Rotten Timbers	Deny the enemy use of his normal tactics, techniques and procedures, thus taking away his physical and moral foundation.
Point at the Mulberry and Curse the Locust Tree	Strengthen one's own position through use (punish or reward) of a scapegoat.
Feign Madness, But Keep Your Balance	Lull an adversary into underestimating your ability, then attack.
Lure Your Enemy Onto the Roof, Then Take Away the Ladder	Lure the enemy onto a terrain that hinders his abilities while helping your own.
Tie Silk Blossoms to the Dead Tree	Use deception to conceal your plans; to make something of no value appear valuable, of no threat to appear dangerous, of no use, useful.
Exchange the Role of Guest for That of Host	Infiltrate the enemy's forces through subversion, discover his weakness and strike against his strength.
The Strategy of Beautiful Women	Send your enemy beautiful gifts to cause jealousy, envy and discord within his camp.
The Strategy of Open City Gates	In a desperate situation, do something unexpected to arouse suspicion and doubt in the mind of the enemy.
The Strategy of Sowing Discord	Undermine your enemy's ability to fight by secretly causing discord between him and his friends, allies, advisors, commanders, soldiers and population
The Strategy of Injuring Yourself	Feign injury to lower your opponent's guard.
The Strategy of Combining Tactics	Use several strategies simultaneously.
If All Else Fails, Retreat	When your side is losing, there are only three choices remaining: surrender, compromise, or escape. As long as you are not defeated, you still have a chance.
Table 3.1. The Thirty-Six Stratagems.	

CHAPTER 4: THE EARLY ANNIHILATORS

The French Revolution unleashed one of the greatest generals of all time—Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon aimed for quick, decisive results on the battlefield, ably leading large field armies, raised through the *levée en masse* and innovatively organized for combined arms support, to victories over France's enemies.

Military officers and scholars watched and studied Napoleon's ways with fascination during the late-18th and early-19th centuries. Two, in particular, Carl von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini, built theories of strategy and war based upon what they learned from Napoleon's way of war. Clausewitz's perspective was from the receiving end. As a Prussian officer, he had tasted defeat firsthand from Napoleon. Contrarily, Jomini's viewpoint was from the giving end—he was a member of Napoleon's staff.

While the two theorists disagreed on much pertaining to strategy and war theory, they were in agreement on at least one thing—the effectiveness of the strategy of annihilation as executed by one of the greatest “annihilators” of all time, Napoleon. Both theorists discussed other strategies, but they were so enamored with Napoleon's genius that they championed annihilation somewhat to the neglect of other strategies.

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

“No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.”

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*

Clausewitz's strategic thought was grounded in both history and contemporary events. While his strategic writing reflected keen insight into the practice of warfare

across military history, it was influenced more by the sea change in military affairs brought about by Napoleonic War, something he had experienced directly as a Prussian officer. As Gat noted, “the mass armies which had been introduced by the Revolution and had been infused with patriotism had enabled Napoleon to achieve decisive results against the whole of Europe” (2001, 392). Clausewitz appreciated the distinctions between wars in different ages, noting (593):

... [E]very age had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held its own theory of war, even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on scientific principles. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the light of its own peculiarities.

Nonetheless, Clausewitz still believed that theorists could and should uncover universal theoretical propositions about war. In Napoleonic warfare, Clausewitz saw a new element emerge whereby “war attained the absolute in violence” (593). This did not necessarily render the more limited practice of war in the past obsolete; rather, it required a modification to theory that reflected both the new and old practices of war. Any universal theory of war had to accommodate the variety of contexts and situations associated with the conflict, governed by the particular characteristics of the belligerents, their aims, the “spirit of the age and to its general character,” and the nature of war itself (594).

Clausewitz not only devoted an entire book to his thoughts on strategy in Book Three of *On War* (out of eight total books that constitute the manuscript), but also discussed it in the rest of the work (for example, Book One, Chapter Two, “Purpose and Means in War”, Book Six, “On Defense” and Book Seven, “On Offense”). He summed

up his ideas on strategy and policy guidance in his final book, “War Plans,” designed, in his words, to provide practical guidance for strategists and statesmen (70).

It wasn't until the opening page of the book on strategy (Book Three, Chapter One), that Clausewitz defined what he meant by strategy, “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war” (Clausewitz 1976, rev.1984, 177). Clausewitz did not limit his definition of an engagement to just the fighting between two belligerents. He also considered the *threat* of a fight as an engagement as well, justified in that it, too, in certain circumstances, could achieve the same effect as an actual engagement (181). Engagements could be either *direct* or *indirect*, depending upon whether they were used to achieve an intermediary objective (such as the possession of territory, city, road, etc.) or final objective (such as the destruction of the enemy fighting force) (181). Furthermore, Clausewitz cautioned that the gains made in both direct and indirect engagements were not important in and of themselves; rather, they were linked to one another in the way they led to the larger war aim (182).

The construction of strategy began with identifying the war's aim, as “the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it ...” (177). Astutely, Clausewitz recognized that in strategic planning, assumptions would have to be made. Follow-on events would reveal erroneous assumptions, which would require modifications to strategy, as they were determined. According to Clausewitz, “Strategic Theory, therefore, deals with planning; or rather, it attempts to shed light on the components of war and their interrelationships, stressing those few principles or rules that can be demonstrated” (177).

To Clausewitz, even though strategic planning required the understanding of a host of factors, strategic principles and rules helped to make planning a relatively easy affair compared to the execution of strategy in the field. Clausewitz contended that because of the complexity and number of strategic factors that a commander was required to manage in the dynamic environment of battle, genius was required to keep “the whole picture steadily in mind” (177).

Clausewitz described five elements of strategy: moral, physical, mathematical, geographical, and statistical (183). According to Clausewitz, “The first type covered everything that is created by intellectual and psychological qualities and influences; the second consists of the size of the armed forces, their composition, armament and so forth; the third includes the angle of the lines of operation, the convergent and divergent movements wherever geometry enters into their calculation; the fourth comprises the influence of terrain ... ; and finally, the fifth covers support and maintenance” (183). While each of these elements could be studied individually, he noted it was important to look at these elements holistically.

Clausewitz considered the moral elements to be among the most important in war, despite their enigmatic nature at the time (a science of psychology did not yet exist). He asserted, “They constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will is itself a moral quality” (184). Moral elements had to be considered in consonance with physical and other psychological elements of strategy. As Clausewitz noted, “The effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes” (184).

Moreover, “One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the precious metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade” (185). Chief amongst the moral elements were the skill of the commander, the experience and courage of the troops, and their patriotic spirit. Clausewitz considered boldness to be an important strategic element needed in both the commander and his troops (192), with perseverance a key characteristic of the commander.

Another important, although not indispensable, strategic element was superiority in numbers (194-197). Clausewitz realized that most would view this as an obvious and unnecessary platitude. However, in view of historical examples where states that could have fielded superior numbers didn’t (instead believing there was some optimum limit of troops in an army), Clausewitz felt compelled to advise the fielding of the largest army possible. He noted anomalies in military history where smaller forces had defeated larger ones through the skillful employment of space and time, but attributed this to the application of relative superiority at the decisive point, along with “the correct appraisal of the opposing generals, willingness to oppose them for a time with inferior forces, energy for rapid movement, boldness for quick attacks, and the increased activity which danger generates in great men” (197). Thus, Clausewitz concluded (197):

Relative superiority, that is, the skillful concentration of superior strength at the decisive point, is much more frequently based on the correct appraisal of this decisive point, on suitable planning from the start; which leads to appropriate disposition of forces, and on the resolution needed to sacrifice nonessentials for the sake of essentials—that is, the courage to retain the major part of one’s forces united.

In follow-on chapters, Clausewitz would similarly advocate the concentration of force in space and the unification of forces in time as complimentary principles (204-205). These

principles were interrelated. Concentration of forces in time enabled an army to always be strong, in general, and then at the decisive point, with relative superiority over the enemy (204). The unification of forces in time referred to applying forces simultaneously, resulting in the concentration of force in a single action at a single, rather than successive, moment (209).

These principles were also reflected in Clausewitz's view on economy of force (213) and the role of a strategic reserve (210). While Clausewitz supported the idea of tactical reserves, he felt that "it was an absurdity to maintain a strategic reserve that is not meant to contribute to the overall decision" (211). Rather than holding a force in reserve for some unanticipated strategic circumstance, Clausewitz advocated that those forces would be better employed at the decisive stage of a decisive battle.

Clausewitz also advocated a continuity of action in war—that is, continually fighting and pressing the enemy as much as possible until the objective was achieved, rather than suspending action. He observed that "*immobility and inactivity* are the normal state of armies in war, and *action is the exception*" [italics in original] (217). This resulted from the psychological effect of uncertainty in the mind of commanders, with fear and indecision leading to caution, and in turn, leading to pauses taken to observe and evaluate the enemy's actions. Additionally, Clausewitz viewed the defense as the stronger form of war. Shifts from the defensive to the offensive led to a transfer of the inherent strength of the defensive to the enemy (218):

The additional strength of the defensive is not only lost when the offensive is assumed, but is transferred to the opponent. Expressed in algebraic terms, the difference between $A + B$ and $A - B$ equals $2B$. It therefore happens that both sides at the same time not only feel too weak for an offensive, but that they really are too weak.

This led to a period of time with both sides on the defensive, observing each other. However, pauses would eventually evaporate, as the more motivated side would eventually take to the offensive.

Clausewitz noted that periods of active warfare were characterized by the pursuit of a positive aim by one side that resulted in a state of tension when resisted by the other. While periods of equilibrium were important for their preparatory activity, states of tension were paramount. He referred to this as the “dynamic law in war”, important in that, “In a state of tension a decision will always have greater effect; partly because greater willpower and greater pressure of circumstances are involved, and partly because everything is already prepared for major action” (221). He advised commanders to be cognizant of this situation, as it held the potential for the greatest pay-offs from battle.

Clausewitz considered the use of surprise as an overrated element of strategy. While he conceded that surprise, with its psychological benefit of confusing an enemy and lowering his morale was a force multiplier at the tactical level (198), the long lead times between planning and execution at the higher levels of strategy and the secrecy needed to pull it off made for tenuous success, with friction further dampening its effectiveness. Moreover, while surprise had been effective in the past, he observed, “Modern armies are so flexible and mobile that a general today will not shrink from retreat even in full view of the enemy” (246). Also, strategies that depended upon surprise were often frustrated by chance or unanticipated actions by the enemy, leaving a force vulnerable to unexpected losses, if not defeat.

Similar to surprise, Clausewitz was equally cynical of cunning as an element of strategy. By cunning, he meant deceit, rather than persuasion. He viewed its use as overrated and not that effective in most situations, relegating its use to desperate situations, only. Nonetheless, and perhaps somewhat contradictorily, he appreciated its potential, stating, “The use of a trick or stratagem permits the intended victim to make his own mistakes, which, combined in a single result, suddenly change the nature of the situation before his eyes” (202). If strategy were to be defined in terms other than engagements, Clausewitz noted, “no human characteristic appears so suited to the task of directing and inspiring strategy as the gift of cunning” (202). But for Clausewitz, strategy was exclusively concerned with engagements, and, according to Clausewitz, cunning had not appeared prominently in engagements in the history of war (202). The problem, as he saw it, was that the gains derived from deceiving the enemy were not commensurate with the time and effort invested in doing so. Moreover, strategic feints ran the risk of keeping troops away from where they might be more needed. In desperate situations, however, where the chances of victory otherwise looked bleak, Clausewitz encouraged the use of cunning, along with daring and boldness, to possibly turn the fortune of war (203).

Clausewitz also placed geometry—defined as the form or pattern used in the deployment of forces—in the overrated category. Clausewitz acknowledged that geometry formed the basis of tactics, with its tactical significance reflected in the effectiveness of the flanking maneuver. However, the real power of a flanking maneuver resulted not from its geometrical alignment, but from the psychological effect that the threat of envelopment conjured in the enemy (214). Additionally, the higher one went up the strategic ladder, the less significant geometry was as a factor. Thus, Clausewitz

reasoned, “In consequence, we do not hesitate to consider it an established truth that in strategy the number and scale of the engagements won are more meaningful than the pattern of the major lines connecting them” (215).

While the above discussion was said to summarize Clausewitz’s thoughts “On Strategy in General” (the title of Book Three), it actually reflected his strategic principles,¹⁴ though he didn’t necessarily refer to them as such. Previously, in his discussion, “On the Theory of War” (Book Two, Chapter Two), Clausewitz had criticized other theorists for banal and overly simplistic principles that failed to accommodate the complexities of strategy (134-147). Clausewitz instead concluded, “in the field of strategy ... theory will be content with the simple consideration of material and psychological factors ...” (147). While Clausewitz’s principles were different in form from other military theorists, they were, nonetheless, concepts of employment, albeit oriented more towards the moral and physical domains than the geometrical.¹⁵ Moreover, Clausewitz argued against dogmatic adherence to laws and principles, instead arguing that experience, knowledge and intuition had to govern them, appropriate to the specific, and perhaps unique, situation.

Clausewitz explained his concept of strategy in the next book (Book Four, The Engagement), in his discussion of the engagement. He began by reiterating his contention that the engagement was “at the root of all strategic action, since strategy is the use of force, the heart of which, in turn is the engagement” (227). It was through the

¹⁴ Clausewitz had also written on the *Principles of War* earlier in his career (Carl von Clausewitz, 2003). However, his earlier writing was much more tactically oriented and not as fully developed, as in *On War*.

¹⁵ Some scholars have taken Clausewitz’s criticism of previous theorist’s principles of war as reflecting a rejection of the utility of principles, which clearly was not the case.

engagement that the enemy was defeated, defined as “the destruction of his forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means—either completely or enough to make him stop fighting” (227). Clausewitz then went on to counter contrary arguments that other means could be employed to achieve defeat (228):

How are we to prove that usually, and in all the most important cases, the destruction of the enemy’s forces must be the main objective? How are we to counter the highly sophisticated theory that supposes it possible for a particularly ingenious method of inflicting minor direct damage on the enemy’s forces to lead to major destruction; or that claims to produce, by means of limited but skillfully applied blows, such paralysis of the enemy’s forces and control of his willpower as to a [sic] constitute a significant shortcut to victory? Admittedly, an engagement at one point may be worth more than at another. Admittedly, there is a skillful ordering of priority of engagements in strategy; indeed that is what strategy is all about, and we do not wish to deny it. We do claim, however, that direct *annihilation* [my italics] of the enemy’s forces must always be the *dominant consideration* [italics in original]. We simply want to establish this dominance of the destructive principle.

Herein, Clausewitz alluded to a strategy of annihilation, one he clearly championed. He would go on to advocate the strategy of annihilation throughout the rest of the manuscript.

Annihilation referred as much to an opponent’s moral forces as his physical forces. Often, it was the crushing of the enemy’s spirit, more than physical losses, which led to defeat. According to Clausewitz (231):

Physical casualties are not the only losses incurred by both sides in the course of the engagement: their moral strength is also shaken, broken and ruined. In deciding whether or not to continue the engagement it is not enough to consider the loss of men, horses and guns; one also has to weigh the loss of order, courage, confidence, cohesion, and plan. The decision rests chiefly on the state of morale, which in cases where the victor has lost as much as the vanquished, has always been the decisive factor.

Clausewitz observed that while victory buttressed the morale, courage, vigor and energy of the winner in battle, defeat resulted in a detrimental spiral of physical and psychological effect with the enemy. According to Clausewitz (253):

The outcome of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser than on the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other.

These psychological effects on morale and resolve were not limited to generals and their armies; they also extended to the belligerent states, as well. Clausewitz noted the cascading effect of a series of defeats (255):

The effect of all of this outside the army—on the people and on the government—is a sudden collapse of the most anxious expectations, and a complete crushing of self-confidence. This leaves a vacuum that is filled by a corrosively expanding fear which completes the paralysis.

Thus, Clausewitz concluded, “The major battle is therefore to be regarded as concentrated war, as the center of gravity¹⁶ of the entire conflict or campaign” (258).

Clausewitz felt nothing but contempt for those who thought otherwise. The notion was anathema to Clausewitz, reflected in his observation (260):

We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.

Clausewitz clarified his conceptual ideas on strategy in his final book on “War Aims” (Book Eight), after an exploration of defense and offense in the two preceding books (Book Six on Defense and Book Seven on Offense). Though he still felt the book

¹⁶ Clausewitz defined what he meant by center of gravity later in the manuscript (Book Eight, Chapter Four) as “the hub of all power and movement upon which everything depends” (595-596).

on “War Aims” would require some revision (along with the two preceding books), it nonetheless reflected a clearer and more mature reflection of his strategic thought.

Indeed, he described the chapters in “War Aims” as not only dealing with war as a whole, but that they covered “its dominant, its most important aspect: pure strategy” (577).

For Clausewitz, in order for a theory of war to be universal, it had to satisfy two criteria: first, it had to accommodate the essential nature of war that, in its extreme, drove it to absolute war; and, second, it had to demonstrate war in actual practice, as reflected in the oftentimes limited aims and means reflected in history (593). As Clausewitz noted, this was necessary in order to avoid a theory that was only applicable to a time period analyzed, reflecting only the unique practices of a historical age.

The aim of war in the absolute was to disarm the enemy. The best way to go about this, according to Clausewitz, was to focus and direct one’s energies at the enemy’s center of gravity—his source of power and movement (596). Examples of centers of gravity included the opponent’s army (in the case of Alexander the Great and Frederick the Great), a state’s capital (in countries suffering domestic strife), the personalities of leaders and popular opinion (in cases of popular uprisings), or the army of the strongest power in an alliance, with the first three the most important. While it wasn’t always possible to distill an enemy’s source of power to one center of gravity, particularly when opposed by more than one adversary, Clausewitz still felt it was the rare case when this reduction couldn’t be accomplished (597).

According to Clausewitz, all of one’s strength should be employed against the enemy center of gravity, without pause or respite. A quick and decisive victory constituted the shortest and most direct path to winning the political objective, thus

yielding the maximum benefits with the fewest losses (597). While Clausewitz only obliquely referred to it as such, he nonetheless described and maintained a *strategy of annihilation* as the most direct path to victory.

Clausewitz realized that often a state did not possess either the physical or moral means required, or was unwilling to accept the amount of risk necessary to pursue a strategy of annihilation. In this case, he advocated the pursuit of one of two aims, either to seize some of the enemy's territory for bargaining purposes or to hold out for better circumstances (93, 601). He described the first as an offensive war with limited aim and the second as defensive war (602), both of which he considered as types of limited war. Both of these types of war reflected the limited aims associated with actual war in practice, based upon his observation that "war is simply a continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means" (605).

In the case of an offensive war with limited aims, territorial seizure conferred both advantages and disadvantages that had to be carefully weighed. On the one hand, conquest of territory denied the adversary of resources and provided the conqueror with a valuable bargaining piece for negotiation. In effect, seizure of the territorial military objective enabled a *strategy of bargaining*,¹⁷ to be accomplished at the level of the political objective. On the other hand, the seizure of territory required an occupation force, diminishing one's own overall fighting power and putting the occupying forces at risk of counterattack, particularly when the geography of the territory formed an exposed

¹⁷ While Clausewitz did not explicitly label it as such, he did, nonetheless, explain the relationship between the conquest of territory as a means to achieve peace through the use of territory as a bargaining piece at the negotiation table.

salient. Clausewitz cautioned that territorial seizures required careful consideration in that one could lose more in the occupation than was gained in the conquest (612).

In the case of a defensive war, Clausewitz recognized that, theoretically, an enemy could be worn down through a *strategy of exhaustion*¹⁸ (93, 613). However, Clausewitz reasoned that a defender was at a severe disadvantage when one considered the relative exhaustion of forces on both sides. The defender was normally the weaker side in the first place, with fighting only further weakening him relative to the attacker. Second, the defender was also deprived of the territory and resources conquered by the attacker. Nonetheless, Clausewitz recognized that, in practice, there were examples in history where exhaustion of the stronger side resulted in peace, largely due to half-hearted effort and limited aims. Clausewitz considered defense in the form of waiting for better circumstances, such as an ally weighing in on one's own side, the disruption of the enemy's alliance, or raising the resources necessary to mount a counteroffensive, a more appropriate aim of defensive war.

Clausewitz provided perhaps the most succinct summary of his strategic thought in an unfinished note (believed to be written in 1830), describing his plans for the revision of *On War*, health permitting (70). Discussing the propositions he felt he had identified with confidence, Clausewitz described them thusly (71):

... [D]efense is the stronger form of fighting with the negative purpose, attack the weaker form with the positive purpose; that major successes help bring about minor ones, so that strategic results can be traced back to certain turning-points; that a demonstration is a weaker use of force than a real attack, and that it must therefore be clearly justified; that victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces,

¹⁸ Again, Clausewitz did not label this as a strategy of exhaustion, though he did describe it in terms of a means to an end.

which is usually not attained until the enemy is pursued after a victorious battle; that success is always greatest at the point where the victory was gained, and that consequently changing from one line of operations, one direction, to another can at best be regarded as a necessary evil; that a turning movement can only be justified by general superiority or by having lines of communication or retreat than the enemy's; that flank-positions are governed by the same consideration; that every attack loses impetus as it progresses.

As mentioned previously, Clausewitz was heavily influenced by his observations and analysis of Napoleonic War. However, his perspective of Napoleon was that of an outsider (his time as a French prisoner of war, notwithstanding), rather than from an insider, as was the case with Jomini (discussed next). When the French finally came around to discovering *On War*, Azar Gat noted that it was with “a realization that the Clausewitzian conception was in fact a simplistic, if not crude, model of Napoleonic strategy” (Gat 2001, 392). Nonetheless, Clausewitz's *On War* is still regarded by many as the zenith of theoretical thought on war.

Baron De Jomini

“Correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, will form a true school of instruction for generals.”

Jomini, *Précis de l'Art de la Guerre*, 1838

Antoine-Henri Jomini was a Swiss who grew up on the French frontier in the late 18th century. He observed the French Revolution and Napoleon's epic battles at close range—they were so influential on Jomini that he gave up his banking apprenticeship to pursue the study of strategy and a military career. It was for his writings on strategy that he was most known, as he served on staffs, but never commanded in war. According to John Shy, “Jomini, more than Clausewitz, deserves the dubious title of founder of modern strategy.” (Shy 1986, 144)

For Jomini, strategy was at the heart of the art of war. Of the six distinct branches that he theorized constituted the art of war, two-thirds were grounded in strategy. Jomini divided generic strategy into four levels of analysis—statesmanship, strategy, grand tactics and minor tactics (Jomini 2005, 9). He described Statesmanship in policy terms, that is, of the various political objectives for which a war might be waged. According to Jomini, states went to war (10):

- To reclaim certain rights or defend them;
- To protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufactures, or agriculture;
- To uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary either for the safety of the government or the balance of power;
- To fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances;
- To propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out, or to defend them;
- To increase the influence and power of the state by acquisitions of territory;
- To defend the threatened independence of the state;
- To avenge insulted honor; or,
- From a mania for conquest.

Jomini's construct of Statesmanship in terms of political objectives also served as the basis for his typology of war.¹⁹ Regardless of the political objective or type of war, however, Jomini advocated that war was to be waged in accordance with the principles of war, though some latitude was afforded to context and specific circumstances (11).

Jomini realized the importance of just war, with wars to reclaim rights (12) the most just of all. On the other hand, he deemed wars of conquest a crime against humanity (18). He viewed wars of opinion—that is, conflicts over political and religious dogma—as deplorable due to the cruelty and vindictiveness perpetrated by both sides against the other. Jomini astutely observed that dogma was usually only a pretext for some

¹⁹ Jomini was very vague in his definitions of the types of war, if he bothered to define them at all.

underlying political objective. Nonetheless, the intensity of the passions evoked by dogma was such to make for fearful and bitter conflicts. Rather than engaging an overly excited and exasperated people, Jomini advised waiting for the passions to calm before taking military action. In his words, “it is better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater than to try to prevent it and to perish in the attempt” (20). Wars of opinion also belonged to another class of war, wars of intervention, as they resulted from one state seeking to impose its doctrine on another, or alternately, to crush another state’s heretical dogma. Additionally, he also viewed wars of opinion as sharing characteristics with national wars and civil wars, though he never made the distinction between the types of wars clear.

This ambiguity within Jomini’s typology was also reflected in his statesmanship-level strategic prescriptions. For example, in attempting to distinguish strategies for wars of opinion and national wars, Jomini offered the following (21):

The military precepts for such wars are nearly the same as for national wars, differing, however, in a vital point. In national wars the country should be occupied and subjugated, the fortified places besieged and reduced, and the armies destroyed; whereas in wars of opinion it is of less importance to subjugate the country; here great efforts should be made to gain the end speedily, without delaying the details, care being constantly taken to avoid any acts which might alarm the nation for its independence or the integrity of its territory.

Thus, Jomini described two different statesmanship-level strategies for two very similar types of war, without providing any clear-cut distinctions between the two. In fact, Jomini went on to describe the French Revolution as at once “a war of opinion, a national war, and a civil war” (21), further confounding his statesmanship-level typology and prescriptions.

Similar to Sun Tzu's admonition to "know thy enemy," Jomini also advocated comprehensive intelligence of the adversary's military policy,²⁰ to include "the passions of the nation to be fought, their military system, their immediate means and their reserves, their financial resources, the attachment they bear to their government or their institutions, the character of the executive, the characters and military abilities of the commanders of their armies, the influence of cabinet councils or councils of war at the capital upon their operations, the system of war in favor with their staff, the established force of the state and its armament, the military geography and statistics of the state which is to be invaded, and finally, the resources and obstacles of every kind likely to be met with, all of which are included neither in diplomacy or strategy" (30).

Jomini defined strategy as "the art of properly directing masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion" (9), or, alternately, as "the art of making war upon the map" (54).²¹ The output of strategic planning resulted in a campaign plan. He was very explicit in the steps to be followed in crafting strategy, which he described as (53):

1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits.
2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations.
3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations.
4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive.
5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations.
6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.

²⁰ Military policy also referred to the best practices for maintaining one's own military forces.

²¹ Similarly, he also defined it as "the art of bringing the greatest part of the forces of an army upon the important point of the theater of war or of the zone of operations" (259).

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different maneuvers necessary to embrace all possible cases.
8. The eventual bases of operations and the strategic reserves.
9. The marches of armies, considered as maneuvers.
10. The relation between the position of depots and the marches of the army.
11. Fortresses regarded as strategical means, as a refuge for an army, as an obstacle to its progress: the sieges to be made and to be covered.
12. Points for intrenched camps, têtes de pont, &c. [sic]
13. The diversions to be made, and the large detachments necessary.

Contrary to his discussion of Statesmanship, Jomini was very clear in defining terms associated with campaign planning, resulting in a lexicon that still survives in military planning, in many respects, to this day. He also took care in distinguishing the relationships and differences between concepts, as illustrated in his distinction between grand tactics, logistics and strategy (54):

Grand Tactics is the art of posting troops upon the battlefield according to the accidents of the ground, of bringing them into action, and the art of fighting upon the ground, in contradistinction to planning upon a map. Its operations may extend over a field of ten or twelve miles in extent. Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; grand tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops.”

With regard to the principles of war, Jomini placed the “fundamental principle,” described as throwing the mass of one’s forces upon the decisive point, as the most important one. It was the hallmark of Napoleonic warfare. As one might expect, Jomini’s description of the fundamental principle fit perfectly within the construct of annihilation, described by Clausewitz, also a student of Napoleonic warfare. In order to comprehensively articulate the fundamental principle, Jomini further described it in four maxims (55):

1. To throw by strategic movements the mass of an army, successively, upon the decisive points of a theater of war, and also upon the communications of the enemy as much as possible without compromising one's own.

2. To maneuver to engage fractions of the hostile army with the bulk of one's forces.
3. On the battle-field, to throw the mass of the forces upon the decisive point, or upon that portion of the hostile line which it is of the first importance to overthrow.
4. To so arrange that these masses shall not only be thrown upon the decisive point, but that they shall engage at the proper times and with energy.

Jomini distinguished between several types of decisive points associated with his fundamental principle of war. First, he described *decisive strategic points* as those “which are capable of exercising a marked influence either upon the result of the campaign or upon a single enterprise. All points whose geographical position and whose natural or artificial advantages favor the attack or defense of a front of operations or of a line of defense are included in this number; and large, well-located fortresses occupy in importance the first rank among them” (68). He described all capitals as *strategic points* as they served as both the centers of power of states and centers of communications (69). *Decisive geographic points* and lines consisted of permanent features of a country that possession of which would confer control of large areas, such as valleys, and the chief lines of communication in a country (68). He also described *decisive points of maneuver* as “the flank of the enemy upon which, if his opponent operates, he can more easily cut him off from his base and supporting forces without being exposed to the same danger” (69). Finally, Jomini described *decisive political points*, which could be found in the bindings of coalitions or that otherwise dwelled in the operations and plans of cabinets (72). Jomini was circumspect of this type of decisive point, however, as he felt it was often pursued for irrational reasons, resulting in strategic mistakes.

While Jomini consistently referred to the fundamental principle (also referred to as the general principle) in nearly all of his writings, he was criticized for a lack of clarity

and inconsistency in describing the rest of them (Alger 1982, 21). Responding to criticism by Napoleon's Chief of Staff, Alexander Berthier, Jomini published a separate conclusion in the 1807 edition of his *Traité de grande tactique*, entitled, "Resumé of the General Principles of the Art of War," in which he listed ten principles that supported the fundamental principle (22-23):

1. The first means is to take the initiative of movement. The general who succeeds in gaining this advantage is the master of the employment of his forces at the place where he chooses to take them. On the other hand, the general who waits for the enemy can make no strategical decision since he has subordinated his movements to those of his adversary and since he does not have time to stop the troops that are already in motion. The general who takes the initiative knows what he is going to do; he conceals his movements, surprises and crushes an extremity or a weak point. The general who waits is beaten at one point before he learns of the attack.
2. The second means is to direct movement against the most important weak point of the enemy's forces. The selection of this point depends upon the position of the enemy. The most important point will always be the point that offers the most favorable opportunities and the greatest results: for example, positions that may lead to the severing of the line of communications between the enemy force and his base of operations.
3. The result of the preceding truths is that if preference is given to the attack of the extremities of a line, then care must be taken not to attack both of the extremities at the same time....
4. In order to be able to act in a combined effort on a single point, it is important to hold your forces in an area that is very nearly square so that they will be highly dispatchable. Large fronts are as contrary to good principles as broken lines, large detachments and divisions isolated beyond supporting distance.
5. One of the most efficacious ways to apply the general principle is to make the enemy commit errors that are contrary to the principle....
6. It is very important when one takes the initiative to be well informed of the positions of the enemy and of the movements that he is capable of undertaking. Espionage is a useful means....
7. It is not sufficient for success in war to skillfully bring masses to the most important points; it is necessary to know how to employ them there. If a force arrives at a decisive point and is inactive, the principle is forgotten; the enemy can counterattack....
8. If the art of war consists of bringing the superior effort of a mass against the weak points of the enemy, it is undeniably necessary to pursue actively a beaten army....

9. In order to make superior shock of a mass decisive, the general must give care to raise the morale of his army....

10. By this rapid review, it is seen that the science of war is composed of three general activities, which have only a few subdivisions and few opportunities of execution....The first is to hold the most favorable lines of operations....Second is the art of moving masses as rapidly as possible to the decisive point....Third is the art of simultaneously bringing the greatest mass to the most important point on the field of battle.

Later, in the 1816 edition of his *Traité*, Jomini would add two additional principles (Alger 1982, 206):

11. Orders of battle, or the most suitable dispositions for conducting troops to combat, should have for their object to secure at the same time mobility and solidity....

12. In ground difficult of access ... the defensive order of battle should be composed of troops deployed in two ranks, and covered by numerous companies of riflemen. But troops intended for the attack, as well as the reserve, should be arranged in columns of attack on the center.... [F]or the reserve having to fall upon the enemy at the decisive moment, it should be done with force and rapidity, that is to say, in columns. A part of the reserve can be kept deployed until the moment of falling on the enemy, for the purpose of imposing upon him an appearance of numbers.

Jomini's major contributions weren't necessarily in the realm of what we today call strategy. As Delbrück would later note, "Jomini sought the nature of strategy in the lines of operation and tested the advantages of the inner and outer lines of operation" (Delbrück 1990, 453).²² Instead, he contributed by providing a language of operations and campaign planning, along with some principles of war.

²² On the other hand, Delbrück would go on to say that Clausewitz, "recognized that bases and lines of operation and other aspects pertaining to them were, to be sure, very useful concepts to be understood and to clarify situations but that rules for plans and decisions could not be derived from them, because in war all the elements of action are uncertain and relative" (453).

CHAPTER 5: THE EXHAUSTERS

Frederick the Great and Hans Delbrück were both well aware of the strategy of annihilation and they advocated it when the situation was right. However, unlike some theorists who were myopically fixated upon annihilation, regardless of the strategic situation, Frederick the Great and Hans Delbrück also saw utility in a strategy of exhaustion, particularly when an opponent made himself vulnerable to it through overextension or when the adversary possessed such superiority in capabilities that employing a strategy of annihilation against him would be suicidal.

Frederick the Great

“War is decided only by battles, and it is not finished except by them.”
Frederick the Great, *The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His General*

Frederick II, King of Prussia from 1740 to 1786, was more commonly known as Frederick the Great for good reason—he doubled the size of Prussia, brought prosperity and enlightenment during his reign, and was one of the finest military practitioners of recorded history. Napoleon considered him one of the greatest generals of all time, and ranked his audacity above all others. Frederick effectively ruled and led Prussia as both sovereign and military leader during the tumultuous European wars of the 18th century, to include the Seven Years War. (Frederick 1985).

Frederick the Great wrote *The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His Generals* in 1747 at the age of 35. The manuscript, considered a state secret, was of such military import that its distribution was limited to 50 officers, whereby, “A cabinet order enjoined each recipient on his oath not to take it with him in the field and to take care that on his death it would be handed over to the King again well sealed” (Frederick 1985, 310).

Frederick proffered general tactical and strategic maxims and principles for his generals. Similar to Sun Tzu, he put great emphasis on intelligence, advising that “One should know one’s enemies, their alliances, their resources, and the nature of their country in order to plan a campaign” (314), while also knowing the same of one’s self and allies.

In waging war, numerical superiority was not required, although being outnumbered by more than a third made campaigning impractical (314). He was skeptical of deep penetrations into enemy territory as it not only weakened one’s forces, but also made the maintenance of lines of communication problematic. Rather than deep penetrations, logistical concerns made for cycles of limited advances followed by the consolidation of gains before pushing on again. Frederick placed major emphasis on logistical planning with it permeating all aspects of campaign planning. Frederick favored the offensive over an absolute defensive as he feared envelopment, the cutting off of lines of communication (particularly with regard to sustenance) and the erosion of troop morale associated with holding or giving up ground.²³

Frederick provided a campaign-planning template for his generals, explained in several scenarios. First, a general was to begin by collecting intelligence, taking note of terrain to determine one’s initial staging area, best line of advance and logistical support planning. It was also important to assess the terrain from the perspective of the enemy, where he might ambush the force or otherwise employ “ruses and chicanery” (316). This included defensive measures and the placement of troops to protect one’s own key

²³ During Frederick’s time, desertion was a huge problem, particularly when giving up ground.

vulnerabilities. If the enemy was in the field, Frederick generally preferred that the enemy be engaged and beaten, force ratios permitting. Ruses of one's own might be needed to draw the enemy into a favorable location for battle. Lines of communication were to be secured while driving on to the enemy capital and then expelling the enemy from the country.

Like Sun Tzu, Frederick had his own version of the "acme of skill," but it was based upon exhaustion rather than subversion. For Frederick, "The greatest secret of war and the masterpiece of a skillful general is to starve his enemy. Hunger exhausts men more surely than courage, and you will succeed with less risk than by fighting" (321). This could be accomplished by intentionally allowing the enemy to penetrate into one's own country, then cutting off his lines of communication and reducing him to the defensive. In this form of defensive war, Frederick noted, "It is essential to gain the rear of the enemy, or to surprise them in camp, or to cut them from their country by a forced march" (323).

Frederick cautioned against myopically focusing on what one intended to do against an enemy. He also had to account for the adversary's potential courses of action. In his words (323):

... a general in all his projects should not think so much about what he wishes to do as about what his enemy will do; that he should never underestimate this enemy, but he should put himself in his place to appreciate difficulties and hindrances the enemy could interpose; that he will be deranged at the slightest event if he has not foreseen everything and if he has not invented the means with which to surmount obstacles.

Frederick was a great advocate of what he called the ancient rule of war, concentration of force. According to Frederick, a general should, "hold your forces

together, make no detachments, and when you want to fight the enemy, reassemble all your forces and seize every advantage to make sure of your success” (344). The only exception to this rule was the use of detachments to protect one’s lines of communication. He observed that although the use of detachments was largely employed in defensive wars, he cautioned that the practice should be minimized (345),

Petty geniuses attempt to hold everything; wise men hold fast to the most important resort. They parry the great blows and scorn the little accidents. There is an ancient apothegm: he who would preserve everything, preserves nothing. Therefore, always sacrifice the bagatelle and pursue the essential! The essential is to be found where the big bodies are. Stick to defeating them decisively, and the detachments will flee by themselves or you can hunt them without difficulty.

Also like Sun Tzu, Frederick found certain characteristics important in a general. First, the general should be inscrutable and stoic, able to hide his true thoughts and appear most tranquil when he is most occupied. He should not only be secretive, but also able to deceive his own officers of his true intentions, if required. In planning, he needed the ability to plan operations under alternative pretexts in order that advance preparations could be made without divulging the real plan until the moment of execution. A general also had to be both kind and severe in his dealings with his officers and troops, depending upon the situation. He should be industriousness in his work habits, skeptical in security, imaginative in his ruses, and circumspect of the enemy’s intentions.

Another similarity between Frederick and Sun Tzu was the advocacy of deception. According to Frederick (351-352):

Ruses are of great usefulness. They are detours which often lead more surely to the objective than the wide road which goes straight ahead. Animals have only one method of acting, but intelligent men have inexhaustible resources.

... Their object is to hide your veritable design and to catch the enemy in the trap you have prepared for him. ... If it is a question of capturing cities, you

encamp in a place which makes him fearful for two or three of his cities at the same time. If he hastens to one flank, you throw yourself on the other. If there are no cities to be taken butt some defile you wish to seize, your ruses should tend to draw the enemy away from it, giving the appearance that you are moving in some other direction.

Frederick, like Sun Tzu, also supported the use of spies (245). He viewed the best spies as those that served on the enemy commander's staff. Officers could be bribed for intelligence information, but clergy could be used as well, if their observations were tempered, as Frederick noted, "Catholic priests are the best spies that one can use, but they and the common people are so accustomed to lying that they exaggerate everything, and their reports cannot be depended on" (355).

Frederick also realized the value of propaganda, particularly with regard to building alliances, and subversion. Religion, a major source of division at the time, was particularly useful. According to Frederick (356):

In neutral countries it is necessary to make friends. If you can win over the whole country so much the better. At least form a group of your partisans! The friendship of the neutral country is gained by requiring the soldiers to observe good discipline and by picturing your enemies as barbarous and bad intentioned. If the people there are [of a different religion]²⁴, do not speak of religion; if they [are of the same religion]²⁵, make the people believe that a false ardor for religion attaches you to them. Use priests and the devout for this purpose. Religion becomes a dangerous arm when one knows how to make use of it. However, move more carefully with your partisans and always play a sure game.

The principle of surprise was also not lost upon Frederick, either. In his view, "Everything which the enemy least expects will succeed the best" (364). Frederick observed that achieving surprise was difficult when up against a well-led adversary who

²⁴ I have substituted [of a different religion] instead of using Frederick's reference to Catholic.

²⁵ Similarly, I have substituted [are of the same religion] instead of using Frederick's reference to Protestant.

took proper precautions, but nonetheless understood its value and advised his generals to be on the lookout for an opportunity to employ it (371).

Frederick was well aware of friction in war. Frederick advised his generals to not only expect misfortune in war, but to plan for it. Frederick warned the following (392):

When a general conducts himself with all prudence, he still can suffer misfortune; for how many things do not cooperate at all with his labors! Weather, harvest, the officers, the health or sickness of his troops, blunders, the death of an officer on whom he counts, discouragement of the troops, exposure of your spies, negligence of the officers who should reconnoiter the enemy, and finally, betrayal.

In summarizing Frederick's *The Instruction of Frederick the Great for His General*, one cannot help but notice its similarities with Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*. Like Sun Tzu, Frederick realized the importance of good intelligence information. He advised the use of deception in operations and the use of spies in the collection of intelligence. He advocated the use of propaganda and subversion. Similar to Sun Tzu, Frederick also counseled being aware of and thwarting the enemy's plans.

Yet, Frederick was different than Sun Tzu in his advocacy of a strategy of exhaustion as the epitome of skill. Cutting off an enemy's lines of communication and starving it decreased its morale and drove it into surrender.

Frederick's guidance, and that of the other great strategists, must be tempered in the context of warfare in its era. As Azar Gat noted, "Eighteenth-century warfare, shaped by the character of the absolutist state and cabinet politics, had been indecisive and dominated by sieges, maneuvers, and finances" (Gat 2001, 392). The French Revolution would provide a quite different political context that would change the way armies were raised and unleash a nationalistic allegiance of the people to their state. Nonetheless, it is

remarkable to see as much consensus on strategic principles and strategies to this point in history.

Hans Delbrück

“The natural principle of strategy is ... assembling one’s forces, seeking out the enemy’s main force, defeating it, and following up the victory until the loser subjects himself to the will of the victor and accepts his conditions....”

Hans Delbrück, *The Dawn of Modern Warfare*, 1920

Hans Delbrück, a 19th century German military historian, contributed greatly to our understanding of strategy, expanding upon and further testing Clausewitz’ concepts of the strategies of annihilation and exhaustion in Delbrück’s four volume *History of the Art of War* (Gat 2001, 374). He is also remembered for his contribution of *Sachkritik*, a scientifically-oriented, historical verification methodology by which wildly inaccurate historical eyewitness accounts could be corrected through the testing of battlefield, geographical capacities and knowledge of the tactics and capabilities of the time (Craig 1986, 332).²⁶ Through the use of *Sachkritik*, Delbrück was able to provide revised accounts of battles and new insights in his *History of the Art of War*. Delbrück’s aim in writing the book was to illustrate “the mutual interaction between tactics, strategy, national organization, and politics” to throw light “on the relationships of these subjects to universal history...(Delbrück, *The Dawn of Modern Warfare* 1990).”

Delbrück made a theoretical distinction between two basic strategies for conducting war: *Niederwerfungsstrategie*, the strategy of annihilation (literally translated

²⁶ *Sachkritik* was the methodology by which Delbrück validated the accuracy of past battles. It was a landmark contribution that shattered many historical myths, particularly in terms of the size and scope of battles. By the simple techniques of visiting battle sites and calculating the number of troops a site could accommodate, Delbrück was able to whittle down eyewitness reports of exaggerated troop strengths to more reasonable numbers, giving more accurate accounts of historic battles.

as the “thrashing” strategy); and *Ermattungsstrategie*, the strategy of exhaustion (alternately translated as a strategy of attrition by Walter J. Renfro). The basis for these strategies were found in Clausewitz’ *On War*, which had deeply influenced Delbrück.

The strategy of annihilation, which dominated the thinking of military theorists in both Clausewitz’ and Delbrück’s time, stipulated an aim in war to annihilate the enemy’s forces through decisive battle. According to Delbrück, it was the “first natural principle of all strategy” to “assemble one’s forces, seek out the main force of the enemy, defeat it, and follow up the victory until the defeated side subjects itself to the will of the victor and accepts his conditions” (Delbrück 1990, 293). It was a single-pole strategy focused entirely upon battle (the other pole being maneuver), which favored the side with military superiority. (Craig 1986, 341-342)

Delbrück, however (as did Clausewitz, though only in passing), offered that in some cases, whether due to limited aims or inadequate military means, a strategy of exhaustion could not only be used, but was preferable in some situations. As Delbrück noted, “One may not so much place his hopes on completely defeating the enemy as on wearing him out and exhausting him by blows and destruction of all kinds to the extent that in the end he prefers to accept the conditions of the victor, which in this case must always show a certain moderation” (Delbrück 1990, 294). In this approach, battle and maneuver, described as the two poles of military strategy, were employed over the course of time to exhaust the enemy. *Decisive* battle was avoided, as the expected outcome of the battle at that particular time and place might be deemed inadvisable; but battle, nonetheless, was still a part of the strategy of exhaustion. Great foresight was needed in choosing to accept battle, as a victory with unacceptably high losses was pyrrhic.

Through the strategy of exhaustion, a number of means were effective in helping to exhaust an enemy, to include territorial occupation, attrition, “slash and burn” operations, and blockade.²⁷ (Craig 1986, 341-342)

Like Clausewitz, Delbrück held little regard for a strategy of maneuver. As Delbrück saw it (Delbrück 1990, 294):

The possibility of forcing the enemy to such an extent, even without battle, that he accepts the conditions sought by our side leads in its ultimate degree to a pure maneuver strategy that allows war to be conducted without bloodshed. Such a pure maneuver strategy, however, is only a dialectical game and not any real event in military history. Even if one side should actually propose such a method of waging war, it still does not know whether the other side is thinking in the same way and will continue with such ideas. The possibility of a decision by battle therefore always remains in the background, even with those commanders who wish to avoid bloodshed....

Throughout his *History of the Art of War*, Delbrück first validated the history of great battles before turning his attention to an evaluation of the strategies employed, from the wars of antiquity, beginning with the Peloponnesian War, to modern war, ending with the Napoleonic wars. For example, he was praiseful of Pericles’ use of a strategy of exhaustion against Sparta in the first Peloponnesian War. Delbrück maintained that Pericles was correct to avoid decisive battle with the superior land power of Sparta, instead engaging in a “war without decision, through simple attrition”(Delbrück 1990, 135). He described the end game of the strategy as dependent upon “who first became exhausted,” with everything depending “on who first reached the point of no longer being able to bear the pain” (136).

²⁷ Attrition and exhaustion were used interchangeably in referring to the strategy of exhaustion in this translation (by Walter J. Renfro). However, many contemporary scholars and practitioners consider the strategies of exhaustion and attrition to be distinct strategies in their own rights, which will be discussed in length in a follow-on chapter.

In spite of the historical evidence supporting Delbrück's description of the strategy of exhaustion, his contemporaries and military practitioners at the time vociferously decried it as a revisionist account that not only misread history, but that also advocated a dangerous, if not wrong, alternative to the true and preferred strategy of annihilation (Gat 2001, 376).

Nonetheless, Delbrück had widened the opening for thought on strategies other than annihilation following the Napoleonic era.

CHAPTER 6: THE SUBVERTERS

Sun Tzu and the ancient Chinese masters of strategy (discussed in chapter 3) developed and employed the strategy of subversion hundreds of years before it found its way into modern revolutionary theory, coup d'états and guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, it was the Communists who developed it not only into a strategy, but further inculcated it into ideology, as well. Communist revolutions were built using the strategy of subversion as a foundation. Armed with an idealistically attractive, albeit practically flawed ideology, communists sought to subvert a populace and turn it against its “bourgeois oppressors” in a class war. As a strategy, it was cunning and potentially bloodless, but slow to materialize and difficult to implement. The subversion of a population was no easy task, and its effectiveness depended upon not only avoiding the watchful eye of the incumbent government, but certain societal conditions, as well. But through subversion, an army could be built from nothing more than an idea, gaining the allegiance of a people, captured by mere words and images.

While the ideology that Marx, Engels and Lenin developed would eventually wither, the strategy of subversion that served as its instrument would be found useful in other popular war strategies. Chief amongst them was Mao Tse Tung's Protracted Popular War strategy. Later, the KGB would refine subversion into a long-term strategy that sought to overcome the prerequisite societal conditions necessary for a revolution to foment by manufacturing them instead. The KGB's strategy of subversion was released in the west by a Soviet defector, Yuri Bezmenov.

This chapter begins with the subversive revolutionary strategy of Marx, Engels and Lenin, before turning to Mao Tse Tung's theory of protracted popular war and the KGB's four stage strategy of subversion.

Marx, Engels, and Lenin

Marx, Engels, and later, Lenin, developed a revolutionary ideology and strategy for the subversive overthrow of the world order into a communist, classless system. The roots of their ideology and strategy ran deep, following over a hundred years of revolutionary rhetoric and activity.

The French Revolution had generated great turmoil and upheaval in the 18th century European governmental order. While the fuel for the revolution was largely economic, resentment towards class differences, made conspicuous by the ideas of rights and equality brought about by the enlightenment, caught fire, too. A confluence of revolution and political change for the betterment of the people ignited a transformative period in the concept of government and how to achieve it. The fire would burn down to embers with the fall of Napoleon and the last gasps of the Bourbon monarchy before igniting again in 1830. As Martin Malia explained (Malia 1998):

The real turn towards radicalism ... was the Paris Revolution of July 1830. This worker's revolt was immediately captured by the upper classes who established the 'bourgeois monarchy' of Louis-Philippe, with a property suffrage enfranchising no more than a fraction of the population. It was now quite painfully clear to the 'people' that equality before the law did not produce genuine, human equality; behind the 'citizen' there in fact stood merely the 'bourgeois'.

The Paris Commune of 1871, on the other hand, provided an example of a successful, albeit short-lived, revolutionary overthrow by the proletariat. The theoretical architect of the revolution was Louis Auguste Blanqui, who had written extensively on

revolution. The Paris Commune and Blanqui's writings excited the likes of Marx and Engels, who gleaned lessons applicable to their theory of communism and the transition from a bourgeois, class system to a proletarian-run classless system. France had just been defeated by Prussia in a war that included the siege and bombardment of Paris. In its aftermath, Paris workers, disgruntled in defeat and by shortages of food, led a proletarian revolution that resulted in a city government run by a 92 member "Communal Council." However, the Commune only stayed in power for two months. In Marx and Lenin's opinion, the newly installed government failed to stay in power due to its adoption of social democracy (rather than working bodies of soviets) and its failure to smash the bourgeois, ready-made state machinery and gradually replace it with a new one run by the proletariat (Lenin [1917] 2009). Nonetheless, this event illustrated that a proletarian revolution was possible, while also providing lessons that could be applied to improve Marxist theory and strategy.²⁸

Marx and Engels had already developed their political ideology of communism and laid out its inevitable rise as the highest, final form of stateless society. The political ideology consisted of an emancipated form of classless government whereby the workers (proletariat) would share in the ownership of the means of production rather than merely serving the labor needs of the capital-owning, upper-class bourgeoisie. Private property, "profit" and markets would be done away with; instead (theoretically), all

²⁸ In Chapter 3, "Experience of the Paris Commune of 1871", in the *State and Revolution*, Lenin discussed the impact of the Paris Commune on Marx and Engels' thought, resulting in an 1872 correction to the *Communist Manifesto*. One of the chief lessons of the Paris Commune was that the pre-existing state machinery could not be used to govern. Workers had to smash the bureaucratic-military machine of the old state in order for the proletariat to stay in power.

would collectively share in a system, described in a letter by Marx as, “From each according to his ability, to each according to his need”(Marx 1875).

Marx and Engels laid out their ideology and initial strategy in *The Communist Manifesto* (Marx and Engels [1848] 1998), during the growing pains of the industrial revolution. The manifesto began with a theoretical interpretation of civilized history that noted the incidence of class distinctions with the “haves” exploiting the “have-nots” since the formation of the earliest societies. It was a brilliant and compelling exposition of rhetoric and propaganda, identifying the injustice of current systems of governments and economics, identifying the bourgeoisie as the source of oppression, and the proletariat as the rightful instruments of change against oppression and the ultimate heirs of a stateless, communist world.²⁹ Moreover, the strategy for achieving the political end state was embedded within the ideology.

Marx and Engels laid out their strategic aims in the second section of *The Communist Manifesto*, “Proletarians and Communists.” They explained, “The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: Formation of the proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat” (66). The catalyst for the overthrow was theorized to be the implosion of capitalism, marking the time during which the proletariat would spontaneously rise and seize power. Once the overthrow was accomplished, the proletariat would “use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., of

²⁹ This is, of course, an overly simplistic summary of Marx and Engels’ brilliant essay, but nonetheless serves the scope of this chapter.

the proletariat organized as the ruling class, and to increase the total productive forces as rapidly as possible” (74).

Marx and Engels followed their open expression of communist aims with a bold appeal to the proletariat across the world, unequivocal in their call to violence with the ultimate aim being global communism (91):

The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a communist revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.

In the opening years of the 20th century, Lenin would contend that Russia, with its burgeoning capitalist system, was ripe for revolution. Lenin observed in *What Is to Be Done?* however, that the working class would be unable to move beyond trade unionism and a spontaneous revolt without the guidance of a vanguard comprised of organized, professional revolutionaries. Additionally, he advocated temporary alliances with other groups also interested in overthrowing the status quo. (Pipes 2003, 31-32)

World War I and the emergence of nationalism foiled the communist strategy, at least temporarily. Rather than uniting the proletariat in an international class war against their oppressors, the proletariat instead sided with their own states. Nationalism won out over communism. It wasn't until 1917, after the abdication of the throne by Nicholas and a short period of ineffective government by a Provisional Government that shared power with soviets of workers and soldiers, that Lenin and his Bolsheviks initiated a second successful coup and installed a “dictatorship of the proletariat” to oversee the communist transformation.

Contrary to their theory, the communists had come into power via a coup and not in the revolutionary form foretold by Marx and Engels. As Richard Pipes confirmed, “Communism thus did not come to Russia as the result of a popular uprising: it was imposed on her from above by a small minority hiding behind democratic slogans” (39). The coup was reinforced through a combination of agitation, terror and propaganda in the towns and countryside to cement the seizure of government through both coercion and popular support.

In control of Russia, Lenin and his communist vanguard turned their attention to spreading communism internationally. In January of 1919, Lenin and his comrades sent invitations to European, American and Australian communist parties for the First Congress of the Third Communist International (Bolshevikov 1919). The invitation proposed that, “The task of the proletariat now is to seize State power immediately. The seizure of State power means the destruction of the State apparatus of the bourgeoisie and the organization of a new proletarian apparatus of power” (Bolshevikov 1919).

In the Statutes of the Communist International, adopted at the Second Comintern Congress, members (to include delegates from the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany) accepted the aim of the Comintern that (Comintern 1920, 163):

It is the aim of the Communist International to fight by all available means, including armed struggle, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transitional stage to the complete abolition of the State. The Communist International considers the dictatorship of the proletariat the only possible way to liberate mankind from the horrors of capitalism. And the Communist International considers the Soviet power the historically given form of this dictatorship of the proletariat.

Rather than waiting for capitalism to fail, the new strategy called for the immediate overthrow of non-communist governments through subversion and revolution.

This was to be initiated through both legal and illegal agitation of the proletariat by propaganda and the instigation of strikes, protests and demonstrations. Moreover, it was to be accomplished through the efforts of citizens of the targeted states, who by joining the Communist Party, switched their allegiance to the Communist Party rather than the state of their citizenship. In August of 1920, the Comintern published 21 conditions, drafted by Lenin, for admission to the Communist International, to include illegal, subversive activity in home states. The third through fifth conditions of membership included subversive instructions as follows (Comintern 1920, 169):

- In practically every country of Europe and America the class struggle is entering the phase of civil war. In these circumstances communists can have no confidence in bourgeois legality. They are obliged everywhere to create a parallel illegal organization which at the decisive moment will help the party to do its duty to the revolution. In all those countries where, because of a state of siege or of emergency laws, communists are unable to do all their work legally, it is absolutely essential to combine legal and illegal work.
- The obligation to spread communist ideas includes the special obligation to carry on systematic and energetic propaganda in the army. Where such agitation is prevented by emergency laws, it must be carried on illegally. Refusal to undertake such work would be tantamount to a dereliction of revolutionary duty and is incompatible with membership of the Communist International.
- Systemic and well-planned agitation must be carried on in the countryside. The working class cannot consolidate its victory if it has not by its policy assured itself of the support of at least part of the rural proletariat and the poorest peasants, and the neutrality of part of the rest of the rural population. At the present time communist work in rural areas is acquiring first-rate importance. It should be conducted primarily with the help of revolutionary communist urban and rural workers who have close connections with the countryside. To neglect this work or to leave it in unreliable semi-reformist hands, is tantamount to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

Special emphasis was placed upon turning the military to the side of the Communists. Lenin clearly recognized that the military and police represented the strong

arm of the state and without their coercive power, revolution was doomed to failure. Additionally, the peasantry played an important part as the junior partner to the proletariat. The proletariat would lead in the vanguard with the peasantry adding power as an augmentation to the masses.

Conciliatory efforts by the bourgeoisie, such as wage agreements and benefits, were a particular threat to be guarded against, as they constituted “selling out” the revolution. The Bolsheviks were so concerned that the social democrats, reformists, and centrists would fall prey to bourgeoisie appeasement that they excommunicated them from the Comintern (Koenen 1921). This was addressed in the thirteenth condition of Comintern membership, which stated, “Communist parties in those countries where communists carry on their work legally must from time to time undertake cleansing (re-registration) of the membership of the party in order to get rid of any petty-bourgeois elements which have crept in” (Koenen).

The agents of agitation consisted of both Communist Party citizens of the state and Soviet intelligence agents who worked from embassies in the host countries. As Phillip Taylor noted, “Comintern agents were included in the staff of Soviet diplomatic missions....” (Taylor 1995, 204). Comintern Communist Party members and Soviet intelligence agents served two purposes, which shifted depending upon the political needs of the Soviet Union and the political and economic conditions of the targeted state. They focused on agitation when host state conditions were ripe for revolution. When Soviet agitation was met with push-back from the international community, the focus shifted to espionage. Not surprisingly, revolutionary agitation was unwelcome in targeted countries, and the Soviet Union feared that foreign antagonists might go to war over Soviet

subversion in their state. Soviet policies such as “peaceful coexistence” resulted, but all the while, Soviet intelligence agents and Comintern Communist Party members still quietly went about their subversive work (Walt 1997).

While the Comintern strategy would spark revolutionary action in Hungary and Germany, both revolutions would ultimately collapse. In fact, the overarching strategy was so ineffective that the formation of other communist states wouldn’t occur until after WW II.

Mao Tse Tung and Protracted Popular War

Political power comes out of the barrel of a gun.

Mao Tse Tung, 1938

Mao Tse Tung was born into a peasant family in the rural region of the Hunan province in 1893 (Chang and Halliday 2005, 4). Notwithstanding, Mao would receive a good education by the standards of the day. He had a voracious reading appetite that he maintained throughout his life and was self-schooled in the writings of the masters of war, to include Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, both of whom he quoted often.³⁰ He was also a student of military history, analyzing military operations in past wars for what made them successful and what did not. Mao wrote *On Guerrilla Warfare* (also known as *Yu Chi Chan*) in 1937, followed by *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* and *On Protracted War* in 1938, in which he articulated the strategy the Chinese should employ against the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese War. The three-stage strategy he developed would apply equally well to his war against the Kuomintang, fought later, and other communist revolutionary struggles with similar conditions around the world.

³⁰ For example, in *On Guerilla Warfare*, Mao quoted Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Lenin.

Early on, before the war with Japan, Mao realized that the communist revolutionary strategy as laid out by Moscow would not work in China. The industrial workers weren't the oppressed class; rather, it was the 400 million peasants, many of who were landless and barely able to eke out an existence (Tse Tung, *On Guerilla Warfare* [1937] 2000). In his 1927 *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan*, Mao championed the peasant, rather than the worker, as the engine of communist revolution in China (Tse Tung, *Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan* 1975):

All talk directed against the peasant movement must be speedily set right. All the wrong measures taken by the revolutionary authorities concerning the peasant movement must be speedily changed. Only thus can the future of the revolution be benefited. For the present upsurge of the peasant movement is a colossal event. In a very short time, in China's central, southern and northern provinces, several hundred million peasants will rise like a mighty storm, like a hurricane, a force so swift and violent that no power, however great, will be able to hold it back. They will smash all the trammels' that bind them and rush forward along the road to liberation. They will sweep all the imperialists, warlords, corrupt officials, local tyrants and evil gentry into their graves. Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide. There are three alternatives. To march at their head and lead them? To trail behind them, gesticulating and criticizing? Or to stand in their way and oppose them? Every Chinese is free to choose, but events will force you to make the choice quickly.

While intentionally overstated for political reasons, Mao's faith in the peasantry would ultimately prove well-founded. Mao realized that this enormous, disenfranchised body was ripe for political exploitation. After some initial, sporadic successes and failures with guerrilla warfare, however, the Communist revolution in China was put on hold when the Japanese invaded in July 1937.

Mao's appraisal of China's war-making capacity against the Japanese was more circumspect. His overall assessment was as unflattering as it was accurate. While the

peasants would again play an important role in his strategy, he was well aware of the asymmetric disadvantage China faced in fighting the more advanced Japanese. He assessed China's prospects relative to their Japanese aggressor thusly (Tse Tung [1937] 2000, 68):

China is a country half colonial and half feudal; it is a country that is politically, militarily, and economically backward. This is an inescapable conclusion. It is a vast country with great resources and tremendous population, a country in which the terrain is complicated and the facilities for communication are poor. All these factors favor a protracted war; they all favor the application of mobile warfare and guerilla operations.

Opinions of Chinese leaders on how to fight the Japanese invaders were divided, with many opting for a regular war of army vs. army. Based on his strategic assessment of the situation, Mao, however, advocated a hybrid strategy that included guerilla warfare. In an effort to convince others to adopt this strategy, Mao wrote extensively and convincingly on the mechanics and merits of his strategy. Well versed in the teachings of previous masters of war, Mao began with the political objective, which he described as “the basic political principle of China's War of Resistance Against Japan, i.e., its political aim, is to drive out Japanese imperialism and build an independent, free and happy new China” (Tse Tung 1938a). In order to achieve this aim, he noted that there was but one basic, guiding principle, from which all others derived, that was paramount in the war against the Japanese: “to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy” (Tse Tung 1938a).

Six supplemental principles supported his basic principle: (1) the use of initiative, flexibility and planning in conducting offensives within the defensive, battles of quick decision within protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line

operations; (2) co-ordination with regular warfare; (3) establishment of base areas; (4) the strategic defensive and the strategic offensive; (5) the development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare; and (6) correct relationship of command. (Tse Tung 1938a)

Mao not only explained his six principles, but did so in “Yin and Yang” terms that, arguably, even Sun Tzu would have appreciated. In describing “the relationship between the defensive and the offensive, between protractedness and quick decision, and between the interior and exterior lines”, Mao explained the virtues of his hybrid strategy (Tse Tung 1938a):

The enemy forces, though strong (in arms, in certain qualities of their men, and certain other factors), are numerically small, whereas our forces, though weak ... are numerically very large. Added to the fact that the enemy is an alien nation invading our country while we are resisting his invasion on our own soil, this determines the following strategy. It is possible and necessary to use tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, to fight campaigns and battles of quick decision within a strategically protracted war and to fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. Such is the strategy to be adopted in the War of Resistance as a whole. It holds true both for regular and for guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is different only in degree and form. Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks. Although surprise attacks can and should be employed in regular warfare too, the degree of surprise is less. In guerrilla warfare, the need to bring operations to a quick decision is very great, and our exterior-line ring of encirclement of the enemy in campaigns and battles is very small. All these distinguish it from regular warfare.

Mao divided his overarching strategy of protracted war against the Japanese and Kuomintang into three overlapping stages, the strategic defensive, strategic stalemate (preparation for the counter-offensive) and the counter-offensive. These stages were specifically designed to counter the enemy stages of strategic offensive, consolidation and strategic retreat, respectively (Tse Tung 1938b).

The first stage of Mao's protracted war strategy, the strategic defensive, consisted of political and military mobilization of the people through subversion and limited fighting in the form of mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Mao considered mobilization the key feature of the first stage of protracted war (Tse Tung 1938b):

This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparable from the mobilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like wishing to "go south by driving the chariot north", and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

To Mao, political mobilization had to be total, not just in terms of reaching the entire population but also in the scope of the political indoctrination and the means by which it was to be spread. In Mao's words (Tse Tung 1938b):

What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for every soldier and civilian to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns him. The political aim of the war is "to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality"; we must proclaim this aim to everybody, to all soldiers and civilians, before we can create an anti-Japanese upsurge and unite hundreds of millions as one man to contribute their all to the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to explain the aim to them; the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a political program. We already have the Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political programme it is impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole people to carry the war against Japan through to the end. Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books and pamphlets, through plays and films, through schools, through the mass organizations and through our cadres. What has been done so far in the Kuomintang areas is only a drop in the ocean, and

moreover it has been done in a manner ill-suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed. Fourthly, to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political program to the people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

As Benjamin Schwartz observed, Mao's strategy involved "the imposition of a political party organized in accordance with Leninist principles and animated by faith in basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism onto a purely peasant mass base" (Schwartz 1968, 189). Mao was able to meld communist ideology with the wants of the people through the use of propaganda, by carefully integrating the grievances expressed in the exoteric appeals of the intelligentsia and masses with the ideological fixes promised in the esoteric appeals of the communists (O'Neill 2005, 99-103).³¹ As Mao would later go on to state (Tse Tung 1943):

In all the practical work of our Party, all correct leadership is necessarily "from the masses, to the masses". This means: take the ideas of the masses (scattered and unsystematic ideas) and concentrate them (through study turn them into concentrated and systematic ideas), then go to the masses and propagate and explain these ideas until the masses embrace them as their own, hold fast to them and translate them into action, and test the correctness of these ideas in such action. Then once again concentrate ideas from the masses and once again go to the masses so that the ideas are persevered in and carried through. And so on, over and over again in an endless spiral, with the ideas becoming more correct, more vital and richer each time. Such is the Marxist theory of knowledge.

Through political indoctrination and the cultivation of support through more humane treatment of non-combatants, Mao extended political mobilization to transform his overarching strategy of "protracted war" into "protracted *popular* war." By building a

³¹ O'Neill provides a brilliant analysis of the Marxist/Leninist/Maoist propaganda process of integrating esoteric and exoteric appeals.

common ideological foundation and a harmonious relationship between military troops and the people, mutual support was gained with the people providing logistical and intelligence support to the troops with the troops doing the fighting. In order to establish and maintain this “unity of spirit” between troops and local inhabitants, Mao established “The Three Rules and the Eight Remarks” for the conduct of troops with civilians (Tse Tung [1937] 2000, 92):

Rules

1. All actions are subject to command.
2. Do not steal from the people.
3. Be neither selfish nor unjust.

Remarks

1. Replace the door when you leave the house.
2. Roll up the bedding upon which you slept.
3. Be courteous.
4. Be honest in your transactions.
5. Return what you borrow.
6. Replace what you break.
7. Do not bathe in the presence of women.
8. Do not without authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest.
- 9.

The comprehensiveness of the political indoctrination and civilian-military cooperation effort was such that it not only moved the people to support the war, but to also buy further into the communist ideology and the political end game. Whatever allegiance the people held for their government was completely subverted.

Political mobilization was also the foundation upon which guerrilla warfare was built. While Mao included mobile and positional warfare with guerilla warfare in the first stage, its primary aim was the building of a guerrilla warfare capability. Mao described guerrilla warfare as “a weapon that a nation inferior in arms and military equipment may employ against a more powerful aggressor nation” (Tse Tung [1937] 2000, 41). In

guerrilla warfare, “terrain, climate, and society in general,” were used as obstacles in resisting and defeating an enemy (41). In terms of execution, he described it in “Yin and Yang” terms (46):

In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.

In terms of strategy, Mao described guerrilla warfare as being “based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack”(Tse Tung [1937] 2000, 46). In guerrilla warfare, the enemy's rear, flanks, and other vulnerable spots were key military objectives, to be “harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted and annihilated” (46).

Surprise was an essential principle in guerrilla operations, more so than in regular warfare. Only through surprise could operations be brought to a quick decision, given the thin margins of local superiority that the guerrillas could generally muster over the Japanese (46).

Mao also advocated twin principles of dispersal and concentration in the conduct of guerrilla operations. As Mao stated (Tse Tung 1938a):

Because of its dispersed character, guerrilla warfare can spread everywhere, and in many of its tasks, as in harassing, containing and disrupting the enemy and in mass work, its principle is dispersal of forces; but a guerrilla unit, or a guerrilla formation, must concentrate its main forces when it is engaged in destroying the enemy, and especially when it is striving to smash an enemy attack. "Concentrate a big force to strike at a small section of the enemy force" remains a principle of field operations in guerrilla warfare.

Mobile warfare was also a key feature in the first stage of protracted war. Mao described mobile warfare as (Tse Tung, On Protracted War 1938b):

quick-decision offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the framework of the strategy of interior lines, protracted war and defense. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage quick-decision offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it includes "mobile defense", which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defense in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

In the first stage of protracted war, in both guerilla and mobile operations, battle was only to be sought when the Chinese had a numerical superiority, with conditions suitable for a surprise attack, and the anticipated outcome was estimated to yield a quick decision. In Mao's words (Tse Tung 1938b):

[W]e should not only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against interior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack a moving and not a stationary enemy. We should concentrate a big force under cover beforehand alongside the route which the enemy is sure to take, and while he is on the move, advance suddenly to encircle and attack him before he knows what is happening, and thus quickly conclude the battle. If we fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy force or the greater part or some part of it, and even if we do not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we could win one sizable victory like that at Pinghsingkuan or Taierhchuang, not to speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our own forces and evoke international support. Thus our strategically protracted war is translated in the field into battles of quick decision. The enemy's war of strategic quick decision is bound to change into protracted war after he is defeated in many campaigns and battles.

Mao also considered positional warfare as necessary in the first stage, but strategically auxiliary and secondary to guerrilla and mobile warfare. Mao described positional warfare in terms of the attack and defense of fixed positions and strategic points, to include "defense works with deep trenches, high fortresses and successive rows of defensive positions" (Tse Tung 1938b). Positional warfare was the work of armies, requiring more sophisticated munitions than could be fielded by relatively untrained

guerrilla forces until later in the war, when more training and experience, greater numbers, more hierarchical organization, and better weapons provided through external support, increased their fighting capacity.

The growth of a politically mobilized population in the first stage of protracted war resulted in the capacity of guerrilla warfare to emerge as the preeminent form in the second stage of strategic stalemate, supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. Mao described his vision of how guerrilla warfare would unfold in the second stage of protracted war as follows: (Tse Tung 1938b):

Except for the troops engaged in frontal defense against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and coordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy him in mobile warfare.... The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and if it is well conducted the enemy may be able to retain only about one-third of his occupied territory, with the remaining two-thirds in our hands, and this will constitute a great defeat for the enemy.... In the second stage, we will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, we will have to oppose splits and systematically improve fighting techniques, reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people and prepare for the counter-offensive....

In the third and final stage of the strategic offensive, Mao saw China shifting from primarily guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare to recover lost territories. However, Mao realized that China was too weak to fight Japan alone, and would need allies to overcome them. He foresaw that a shift from fighting defensively along strategically interior lines to an offensive fight along strategically exterior lines would be required. Guerrilla warfare would shift to provide a strategic support function, supplementing both mobile and positional warfare. (Tse Tung 1938b)

In terms of strategy, Mao had devised a mixed strategy that by the third stage, simultaneously incorporated the strategies of subversion, exhaustion and annihilation. In describing political mobilization, Mao effectively laid out the mechanics of a strategy of subversion, although he never used the term. Mao was quite clear in his explanation of the strategies of exhaustion and annihilation, explaining their relationship as follows (Tse Tung 1938b):

To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese war is at once a war of [exhaustion] and a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still exploiting his strength and retains strategic superiority and strategic initiative, and therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce his strength and break his superiority and initiative. We still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavorable position. Hence campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic [exhaustion]. In this sense war of annihilation is war of [exhaustion]. It is chiefly by using the method of [exhaustion] through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.³²

Mao's protracted popular war strategy would prove effective in not only helping defeat the Japanese, but in ultimately seizing power in China against Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang. It was a strategy that was also exportable to many other communist revolutionary movements.³³ Not only did Mao devise a brilliant hybrid strategy integrating the three strategies of subversion, exhaustion and annihilation into protracted popular war, he also illustrated how strategies could be nested across levels of analysis.

³² I have replaced "attrition" with "exhaustion" in this passage in the interest of continuity and in order to avoid confusion resulting from different theorists using both terms to refer to the same thing.

³³ For an excellent description of Mao's exportable version of Protracted Popular War, see Bard O'Neill's *Insurgency and Terrorism* (2005), Potomac Books: Dulles, VA (49-55).

Regardless of Mao's failings as a political leader, Mao was a master strategist, arguably, the best of the 20th century.

Yuri Bezmenov and the KGB

Yuri Bezmenov, a former Soviet KGB operative who defected to the West, described the process of subversion used by the KGB during the Cold War, in *Love Letters to America*, a book he published under his pen name, Tomas Schuman (Schuman 1984). The KGB's strategy of subversion consisted of four stages, demoralization, destabilization, crisis, and normalization.

The first stage, demoralization, consisted of KGB "active measures" against an adversary—that is, the use of overt and covert propaganda, "agents of influence," KGB-created phony "international forums" to promote legitimacy for Soviet policy, the provocation and manipulation of mass demonstrations and assemblies, rumor-spreading from alleged "reliable" Politburo "insiders," faked U.S. Information Service press releases and local media stories, and KGB-subsidized tabloids and advertising agencies for the promulgation of radical and subversive propaganda (Schuman 1984, 23). In effect, demoralization consisted of breaking the cohesion of a targeted society by causing it to question its faith in its national ideology, opening the door for the communist ideology. In conjunction with this massive propaganda effort, assassinations were sometimes used against those blowing the whistle on KGB "active measures," in order to establish an environment of fear to keep others silent. A less violent method of silencing critics was to publicly discredit them. (Schuman 1984)

KGB "agents of influence" targeted influential but pliable intellectuals, celebrities and government officials for ideological conversion. These influential targets eventually

became advocates of the subverter's ideology, more effective as domestic propagandists than foreign "agents of influence," by virtue of their native and celebrity status. The same techniques used to "influence the influencers" were used in mass propaganda on a wider scale, but without the personal touch. According to Bezmenov, the demoralization phase took 15-20 years to demoralize a state as it took that much time to "educate" a generation of students in the targeted country. (Schuman 1984, 24)

A key step of the conversion process was getting the target to accept that other ideologies deserved a fair and impartial evaluation. Once this was accepted, the target's national ideology was discredited by illustrating its problems and issues, while the subverter's ideology was promoted through carefully prepared propaganda and coaxing. This conversion took place on three levels: the level of ideas, the level of structures, and the level of life. Conversion at the level of ideas, the highest level of subversion, sought to replace old ideas with new ones, based upon faith and a new belief system rather than reason and knowledge. The realm of converted ideas included beliefs about religion, culture, education, and the media (Schuman 1984, 26).

The second level of subversion occurred at the sociological/political/ economic structural level. Structures targeted for confidence weakening and de-legitimization were institutions within the judicial, social, security, defense and foreign policy institutions, along with political parties and groups. Confidence in the justice system was eroded through the promotion of criminals as victims of a cruel and heartless society while the real victims of crime, the citizens upon which criminals preyed, were rendered defenseless. Law enforcement officers were demonized as fascists supporting a police state. Intelligence and counterintelligence agencies were trumpeted as more egregious

than the entities they were created to counter. The military was painted as warmongers, baby-killers, and the lackeys of foreign policy institutions serving the interests of greedy, profit seeking capitalists. Socially, citizens were encouraged to selfishly focus on individual rights without regard to any societal obligations. (Schuman 1984, 36-37)

The third level of subversion occurred at the life level, described by Mezdenov as the fracturing of family life, health services, interracial relations, and labor relations. The break-up of families involved the fracture of family loyalty, which was then transmuted to nation. Health was enfeebled through the encouragement of spectator sports rather than actual participation in sports. The socialist promotion of universal health care resulted in inefficient, substandard care for the majority. Racial and ethnic issues were played up as being a western-only problem, while it was actually much worse in the Soviet Union. Labor unions were encouraged to use adversarial techniques such as the blackmail of necessary public services to undermine confidence in critical infrastructure providers rather than the use of negotiations to improve working conditions and wages.

The second stage of KGB-style subversion was destabilization. The targets of destabilization were the social and political institutions of the country. Institutional inefficiency and difficulty in dealing with complex social issues were highlighted, instigating demands for change through “grass-root” organizations. These grass-root organizations were structurally modeled along Soviet lines, with the organizations fed socialistic and communist institutional “fixes,” planted by KGB agents. As these Soviet-styled organizations grew in power, they pushed for “reform” conducive to control by totalitarian leadership. In foreign relations, the targeted country was pushed towards the Soviet Union, or, if that was too big of a leap, into isolationism, first. Foreign relations

miscues of the targeted country were highlighted, particularly any questionable examples that were contrary to international law, in order to paint the targeted state as a “rogue,” while ignoring the same kinds of gaffs committed by the Soviet Union. The destabilization stage was thought to take 2-5 years, depending upon its geo-political and domestic circumstances.

With the first two stages completed, the subversion timeline accelerated. The third stage, crisis, was thought to take as little as 2 to 6 months. It consisted of the mobilization of radicalized subvertees and Soviet sleeper agents to take over the instruments of power, as quickly and ruthlessly as possible. The catalyst for change might consist of a naturally occurring crisis in the by now demoralized and destabilized country, or one manufactured by the KGB. The form of the change could occur through a coup d'état, revolution, or civil war. With the citizenry demoralized and lacking faith in its old institutions, most would not object to the change, with some even welcoming it by that time.

The fourth and final stage of subversion was normalization. This stage consisted of destroying any resistance to the implementation of Soviet rule. Dissidents were to be either locked away or eliminated. “Law and order” was reestablished either by the host state under the boot of the Soviets or by Soviet soldiers. Rather than being rewarded for their complicity, domestically subverted agents of influence were also eliminated, as their allegiance was deemed questionable in that they had taken treasonous action against their own nation during the subversion process.

Conclusion

Both the Communist Party and KGB's strategies of subversion obviously failed to subvert the American people away from democracy and towards communism. Whether

that was because the strategy was flawed or too complex to implement in practice (requiring the acme of skill in the terms of Sun Tzu), we will probably never know.

However, it must be kept in mind that Mao Tse Tung's strategy of subversion, as a phase of protracted popular war, did succeed, suggesting that strategists must be knowledgeable about the strategy of subversion lest they fall prey to Samuel B. Griffith's warning, "Historical experience suggests that there is little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement *after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant portion of the population*" [italics in original] (Tse Tung [1937] 2000).

CHAPTER 7: THE MODERN ANNIHILATORS

The sheer destruction and horrors of the First World War pushed practitioners and strategy scholars to re-evaluate strategy in its wake. Even Clausewitz's *On War*, previously considered unassailable, was reconsidered and critiqued in the effort to find out what had gone so terribly wrong. B.H. Liddell-Hart was one such critic who laid a great deal of blame on Clausewitz and his theory of war.

In Liddell-Hart's view, many a general had been led astray by Clausewitzian aphorisms, such as, "The bloody solution of the crisis, the effort for the destruction of the enemy's forces, is the first born son of war"; "Only great battles and general battles can produce great results"; "Blood is the price of victory"; and, "Let us not hear of generals who conquer without bloodshed" (Liddell Hart [1954] 1991, 208). He claimed that Clausewitz incited generals "to seek battle at the *first* opportunity, instead of creating an *advantageous* opportunity," resulting in mutual mass slaughter resulting from blind adherence to the direct approach (209). Liddell-Hart eschewed Clausewitz's direct approach for an indirect approach and built his theory of strategy around it. Central to his theory was the psychological dislocation made upon the mind of the enemy.

Another twentieth century strategic thinker, John Boyd, would similarly question warfare theory after a foreign war with dubious political objectives. After the Vietnam War, Boyd turned his attention to warfare theory upon his retirement from the U.S. Air Force in 1975 (Hammond 2001, 118). Like Liddell Hart before him, Boyd, too, would advocate focusing upon the impression made on the mind of the enemy rather than his physical being.

Both theorists still theorized about the strategy of annihilation, but with a different object. Rather than seeking to defeat the adversary in decisive battle through attrition, Liddell-Hart and Boyd advocated defeating the enemy through dislocation and the breaking of his cohesion.³⁴

B.H. Liddell Hart

“Man in war is not beaten, and cannot be beaten, until he owns himself beaten.”

B. H. Liddell-Hart, *Thoughts on War*, 1944

Captain Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart, a British practitioner-theorist, would return to an old strategic concept, first championed by Sun Tzu, in *the indirect approach*. With personal experience and deep enmity for the carnage associated with the static warfare of World War I, Liddell-Hart ([1954] 1991) looked to history for an alternative to the meat-grinder attrition style of warfare he attributed to the influence of Clausewitz (339). Seeking strategic enlightenment, Liddell Hart conducted an “extensive study of hundreds of military campaigns, during which:

“... One impression became increasingly strong—that, throughout the ages, effective results in war have rarely been attained unless the approach has had such indirectness as to ensure the opponent’s unreadiness to meet it. The indirectness has usually been physical, and always psychological (5).”

Of particular interest was Liddell Hart’s analysis of Hitler’s strategy in World War II. Liddell Hart claimed that Hitler had departed from traditional, Clausewitzian-based German military thinking, with its singular focus on decisive battle. Liddell Hart included a statement by Hitler captured in an interview with Hermann Rauschning

³⁴ It should be noted that, in truth, Clausewitz also advocated attacking the “mind and body.” However, the complexity of Clausewitz’ argument, using a modified form of Hegel’s dialectical approach, and some of his aphorisms, led many to misinterpret his theory of war as strictly attrition-based.

(author of *Hitler Speaks*), in which Hitler opted for a more open conception of strategy

(Liddell Hart [1954] 1991, 209):

‘People have killed only when they could not achieve their aim in other ways.... There is a broadened strategy, with intellectual weapons.... Why should I demoralize the enemy by military means if I can do so better and more cheaply in other ways? Our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself.’

Liddell Hart assessed Hitler’s highest aim of war as to “produce capitulation of the hostile armies without a battle” (210), the same aim as proclaimed by Sun Tzu thousands of years earlier. Means other than, and in addition to, the military could be used for this purpose. Hitler also used economic pressure, propaganda and diplomacy to achieve his ends.

In analyzing Hitler’s use of strategy, Liddell Hart felt that Hitler had intentionally violated Clausewitz’ guidance to attack the enemy’s center of gravity—rather, he had striven to strike at relative weakness. Liddell Hart summarized this weakness-based strategy aim as follows (212):

It should be the aim of grand strategy to discover and pierce the Achilles’ heel of the opposing government’s power to make war. And strategy, in turn, should seek to penetrate a joint in the harness of the opposing forces. To apply one’s strength where the opponent is strong weakens oneself disproportionately to the effect attained. To strike with strong effect, one must strike at weakness.

In striking at weakness, Liddell Hart saw an advantage in reduced costs to one’s own side and less spoilage of the gains to be had, reaped through the nonlinear effects of disarming the enemy through panic and fear. As Liddell Hart explained (212):

It is thus more potent, as well as more economical, to disarm the enemy than to attempt his destruction by hard fighting. For the ‘mauling’ method entails not only a dangerous cost in exhaustion but the risk that chance may determine the issue. A strategist should think in terms of paralyzing, not of killing. Even on the lower plane of warfare, a man killed is merely one man less, whereas a man

unnerved is a highly infectious carrier of fear, capable of spreading an epidemic of panic. On a higher plane of warfare, the impression made on the mind of the opposing commander can nullify the whole fighting power that his troops possess. And on a still higher plane, psychological pressure on the government of a country may suffice to cancel all the resources at its command—so that the sword drops from a paralyzed hand.

The way to accomplish this strategy was not through a traditional, military, direct approach that tended to harden an enemy's resolve, but rather through an indirect approach—an approach that Hitler had grasped and used in claiming control of Germany, and later in conquering Poland and France with lightening speed. As Liddell Hart summarized (212-213):

... [T]he analysis of war shows that while the nominal strength of a country is represented by its numbers and resources, this muscular development is dependent on the state of its internal organs and nerve-system—upon its stability of control, morale, and supply. Direct pressure always tends to harden and consolidate the resistance of an opponent—like snow which is squeezed into a snowball, the more compact it becomes, the slower it is to melt. Alike in policy and in strategy—or to put it another way, in the strategy of both diplomatic and the military spheres—the indirect approach is the most effective way to upset the opponent's balance, psychological and physical, thereby making possible his overthrow.

Liddell Hart observed that Hitler was adept at throwing an opponent off balance in the purely psychological sphere. As Liddell Hart noted, Hitler had closely observed Bolshevik revolutionary propaganda and subversion techniques and employed them prior to war. He summarized Hitler's use of subversion and infiltration as follows (218-219):

To prepare the way for his offensive, he sought to find influential adherents in the other country who could undermine its resistance, make trouble in his interest, and be ready to form a new government compliant to his aims. Bribery was unnecessary—he counted on self-seeking ambition, authoritarian inclination, and party spirit to provide him with willing and unwilling agents among the ruling classes. Then, to open the way, at the chosen moment, he aimed to use an infiltration of storm-troopers who would cross the frontier while peace still prevailed, as commercial travelers of holiday-makers, and don the enemy's uniform when the word came; their role was to sabotage communications, spread

false reports, and, if possible, kidnap the other country's leading men. This disguised vanguard would in turn be backed up by airborne troops.

Liddell Hart followed his analysis of Hitler's strategy with his own theory of strategy. He began by critiquing Clausewitz' definition of strategy.³⁵ He claimed that Clausewitz' definition intruded too much into the sphere of policy and that it was too narrow in its focus on battle (219). Instead, Liddell Hart defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy" (321). He justified his expansion of the definition in that strategy involved more than the mere movement of forces, it was also concerned with its effects as they related to the ends.

Liddell Hart argued that there were three levels of strategy; grand strategy, strategy and tactics, distinguished by their level of analysis. Grand strategy connected policy—the political object of war—with the means of achieving it through the coordination and direction of all of a nation's resources. Its scope extended beyond war to include the way to achieve and maintain peace in its aftermath. Liddell Hart described the range of national resources to be employed through grand strategy as follows (322):

Grand strategy should calculate and develop the resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources—for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy—which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not the least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. A good cause is a sword as well as armour. Likewise, chivalry in war can be a most weapon in weakening the opponent's will to resist, as well as augmenting moral strength.

³⁵ Strategy was defined by Clausewitz as "the art of the employment of battles as a means to gain the object of war."

Liddell Hart described strategy (which he also called pure, or military strategy) as the “art of the general” (322). Successful strategy employed “*the calculation and co-ordination of the ends and the means*” [italics in original] through a measured economy of force. In other words, a balance had to be struck between the value of the objective and the means employed to achieve it. Calculation of this economy was easier at the level of strategy than at the lower level of tactics, because the human will, which he viewed as the chief incalculable, manifested itself as resistance and was more operative at the lower level of war.

Liddell Hart eschewed Clausewitz’ dictum that the aim of strategy was the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces, instead describing it as the establishment of advantageous circumstances for the ensuing battle. Instances in history whereby commanders had established such circumstances that resulted in relatively bloodless disarming, surrender or abandonment of the military objective by the opposing forces illustrated that the perfection of strategy was to “produce a decision without any serious fighting” (324). In this sense, dislocation was the true aim of strategy, with its sequel “either the enemy’s dissolution or his easier disruption in battle” (325).

The purpose of strategy was to diminish resistance through the physical sphere of movement (calculated in terms of time, topography and force transport capacity) and the psychological sphere of surprise (a much more difficult calculation), thus resulting in dislocation of the enemy (323). In the physical sphere, dislocation (defined as a strategically advantageous situation which inevitably produced a decision) was produced through maneuver which, either singly or in combination,

- “(a) Upsets the enemy’s dispositions and, by compelling a sudden ‘change of front’, dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces;
 (b) Separates his forces;
 (c) Endangers his supplies;
 (d) Menaces the route or routes by which he could retreat in case of need and re-establish himself in his base or homeland (326).”

These physical effects, in turn, resulted in the psychological dislocation of the enemy commander. Dislocation was enhanced if the physical effects were imprinted swiftly and unexpectedly in the mind of the commander, leaving him with the impression he was trapped. Liddell Hart attributed the success of flank and rear attacks to dislocation as a natural consequence of an individual’s cognitive sensitivity to a menace at one’s back. In his words (327):

An army, like a man, cannot properly defend its back from a blow without turning round to use its arms in the new direction. ‘Turning’ temporarily unbalances an army as it does a man, and with the former the period of instability is inevitably much longer. In consequence, the brain is much more sensitive to any menace to its back.

In contrast, to move directly on an opponent consolidates his balance, physical and psychological, and by consolidating it increases his resisting power. In the case of an army it rolls the enemy back towards its reserves, supplies, and reinforcements, so that as the original front is driven back and worn thin, new layers are added to the back. At the most, it imposes a strain rather than producing a shock. According to Liddell Hart (327):

Thus, a move round the enemy’s front against his rear has the aim not only of avoiding resistance on its way but in its issue. In the profoundest sense, it takes the *line of least resistance*. The equivalent in the psychological sphere is the *line of least expectation*. They are the two faces of the same coin.... [italics in original]

Liddell Hart’s concept of dislocation provided an alternative, volition-focused approach to the strategy of annihilation. Rather than achieving victory in decisive battle

through local military superiority over an enemy, Liddell Hart offered that a decisive victory could also be achieved through psychological dislocation, springing from surprise. Liddell Hart's alternative approach to the strategy of annihilation was through the psychological sphere and breaking the enemy's resolve rather than through a contest of numbers. In other words, Liddell-Hart described a volition-based strategy of annihilation by dislocation, with a focus on breaking the resolve of the enemy. In contrast, Clausewitz had described a more balanced physical and psychological approach, though it was often interpreted as a corporeally focused strategy of annihilation through attrition, focused on overwhelming the enemy at the decisive point through superior mass and firepower. Both constituted strategies of annihilation, but were directed at quite different objects, one the physical and the other mental.

If the explanation provided by Liddell Hart sounded strangely reminiscent of Sun Tzu, it was not by accident. Liddell Hart was greatly influenced by Sun Tzu's ideas on war.³⁶ Like Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart inculcated psychological factors into his theory of war.

John Boyd

“Machines don't fight wars, Terrain doesn't fight wars. Humans fight wars. You must get into the minds of humans. That's where the battles are won.

John Boyd, “Patterns of Conflict”

A fighter pilot by trade, John Boyd was a U.S. Air Force Colonel who some regard as the most important strategist of the twentieth century (Osinga 2007, 3). Considered brilliant if not a little whacky, he was also outspoken, arrogant and profane

³⁶ See B.H. Liddell Hart's foreword to Samuel B. Griffith's translation of Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* for the high esteem for which he held it.

(Hammond 2001). He was a polarizing figure in the Air Force, with his fellow servicemen either loving or hating him. His irreverence and intensity were often off-putting to his seniors. In spite of Boyd's colossal contributions to air combat with his OODA (Observation-Oriented-Decision-Action) Loop and energy maneuverability theories that dramatically changed U.S. Air Force fighter design, he was treated as a pariah by the Air Force. The U.S. Marine Corps thought different, adopting Boyd as an honorary Marine for his contributions to strategy theory (Hammond 2001). On Boyd's passing in March of 1997, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General C.C. Krulak, paid homage to Boyd in an open letter, noting "He was a towering intellect who made unsurpassed contributions to the American Art of War" (Hammond, 3).

Boyd published his theory of strategy as a five-part briefing entitled, *A Discourse on Winning and Losing* (Boyd 1987), rather than a book. The brief was terse and abbreviated, with much of the material demanding familiarity with some of the major battles of military history and strategy theory by theorists such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Jomini and Liddell-Hart. As a result, a mystique surrounds Boyd's theory, similar in respects to Clausewitz's unfinished manuscript, *On War*.³⁷ Nonetheless, Boyd's thoughts on strategy had great influence upon the U.S. Marine Corps fighting doctrine, forming the basis for "maneuver warfare."

In the abstract of the document, Boyd described the major section of his briefing, "Patterns of Conflict," as "a compendium of ideas and actions for winning and losing in a highly competitive world" (Boyd, 1). In the same vein as Sun Tzu and Liddell-Hart,

³⁷ In order to provide a clearer picture of Boyd's theory, I rely not only on Boyd's briefing, but on secondary sources as well, supplementing content by those who heard his briefing, talked with about strategy matters, and knew him well.

Boyd viewed psychological disruption as the key to triumph. Like Liddell-Hart before him, Boyd analyzed the great battles of military history to discern the essence of victory. He also read the great strategists. Boyd developed an eclectic form of maneuver warfare that synthesized aspects of previous theory and warfare styles designed to “destroy the adversary’s moral-mental-physical harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse his will to resist (Boyd 1987).” Lethal effort, in the form of attrition, was utilized to “tie-up, divert, or drain away an adversary’s attention and strength, as well as (or thereby) overload his critical vulnerabilities and generate weaknesses.” Maneuver-type warfare was used to “subvert, disorient, disrupt overload, or seize those vulnerable yet critical connections, centers, and activities as basis to penetrate, splinter, and isolate remnants of adversary organism for mop-up or absorption.” Moral warfare was used to “create an atmosphere of fear, anxiety, and alienation to sever human bonds that permit an organic whole to exist.” In the aggregate, this resulted in a synthesized warfare style that, in Boyd’s words, would:

“Penetrate [an] adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse [an] adversary’s will to resist (133).”

Boyd’s focus was clearly on defeating the enemy mentally, destroying his will to resist rather than his means of resistance. The physical instruments used in war were most important in the effects they imparted on the mind, though diminishing the physical body also worked against the mind as well. He had borrowed heavily from previous theorists

such as Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, Marx, Engels and Lenin, J.F.C. Fuller, Heinz Guderian, and Mao Tse Tung to develop a monolithic, concepts-based theory of strategy.

Boyd realized that the subversive strategy employed by the Communists was effective in destabilizing an opponent through agitation of the masses, division of the workers from the elites, focusing hatred on leaders, and creating indecision in government (Hammond, 139). Nurturing insurrection was but one element of Boyd's strategy, however. He also borrowed infiltration and isolation from blitzkrieg and guerrilla warfare. Infiltration was used to shatter the enemy society through propaganda exploiting the internal frictions, contradictions, and differences of opinion in order to foment distrust and discord (Hammond, 139). Propaganda was also used to isolate the enemy from potential allies.

Three of the central concepts of Boyd's strategy were surprise, speed and tempo, also borrowed from his reading of German WW II operational thought. Attacks were to be carried out with surprise and speed in order to confuse and disorient the enemy, with high tempo, follow-up operations preventing the enemy from recovering. In this way, the enemy's will to resist was shattered through both destruction and disruption. This necessitated decentralized command, with lower-level commanders given more freedom to carry out mission orders, using their initiative to exploit opportunities once the battle devolved away from the opening moves of a battle plan. These high tempo operations, in which one's own OODA loop was decidedly quicker than the opponents, translated into always being one step ahead of a confused and demoralized enemy (Hammond, 142).

Boyd's theories have formed the foundation of U.S. Marine Corps fighting doctrine for well over a decade. Institutionalized as the Marine Corps way of war since

1997, Boyd's theory of "maneuver warfare" has guided Marine Corps fighting philosophy through its seminal doctrinal manual, *Warfighting* (U.S. Marine Corps 1997).

In *Warfighting*, the Marines define maneuver warfare as follows (U.S. Marine Corps, 73):

Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. For the Marines, the "maneuver" in "maneuver warfare" refers to both time and

space. Maneuver was described in *Warfighting* as a multi-dimensional construct (U.S.

Marine Corps, 73):

The traditional understanding of maneuver is a spatial one; that is, we maneuver in space to gain a positional advantage. However, in order to maximize the usefulness of maneuver, we must consider maneuver in other dimensions as well. The essence of maneuver is taking action to generate and exploit some kind of advantage over the enemy as a means of accomplishing our objectives as effectively as possible. That advantage may be psychological, technological, or temporal as well as spatial. Especially important is maneuver in time—we generate a faster operating tempo than the enemy to gain a temporal advantage. It is through maneuver in all dimensions that an inferior force can achieve decisive superiority at the necessary time and place.

It should be noted that the concept of maneuver in strategy is still evolving, with many practitioners claiming that cyberspace represents another of its dimensions.

As for Boyd, his contributions as a strategist will likely dim with time.

Unfortunately, Boyd's thoughts on strategy exist only in his hard-to-come-by briefing book, in books on Boyd written by his disciples, and Marine Corps doctrine. Nonetheless, although his legacy as a strategist may suffer as a result, his ideas should live on.

CHAPTER 8: THE UNRESTRICTED

Early military strategists focused on separate and distinct theories of strategy, such as annihilation, exhaustion and subversion, as ways to achieve policy objectives, but bounded by the customs and rules of war. The “unrestricted” strategists took a slightly different view, more eclectic in their approaches and willing to challenge the old rules and customs of war. They realized that the advent of new technologies made for different ways of employment that were not possible with the older engines of war. Traditional ways of forging of strategy did not take advantage of the capabilities afforded by new technologies.

It should be noted that the “unrestricted” strategists discussed in this chapter were not the only ones to think creatively about strategy given advances in the means for fighting wars. Others before them did the same—in fact, it is part of the evolution of strategy made possible by the confluence of new technologies and ideas about how to take advantage of them. However, these theorists are important in that they provided fresh and innovative approaches to strategy given the means that can be employed in “unrestricted” ways.

André Beaufre

André Beaufre was a French Army general and leading strategic practitioner and theorist during the mid-20th century. A combat veteran of World War II, Beaufre had extensive experience in planning military operations. He also was a strategy theorist and scholar of note, publishing *An Introduction to Strategy*, *Strategy and Deterrence*, and *Strategy of Action*. In the preface to *An Introduction to Strategy*, B. H. Liddell Hart

described Beaufre's book as "an outstanding contribution to thought about the fundamentals of war" (Beaufre, *An Introduction to Strategy* 1966).

Beaufre viewed strategy as "a *method of thought*, the object which is to codify events, set them in order of priority and then choose the most effective course of action" (Beaufre, 13). Strategic thinking required analysis and synthesis of both psychological and material data into multiple courses of action from which the best one could be selected.

He defined strategy as "the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute" (22). He believed that strategy had to be specially developed for each situation, as a given strategy that might work best in some situations would be the worst in others. The aim of strategy was "to fulfill the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of the resources available" (23). According to Beaufre, "The outcome desired is to force the enemy to accept the terms we wish to impose on him. In this dialectic of wills, a decision is achieved when a certain psychological effect has been produced on the enemy: when he becomes convinced that it is useless to start or alternatively to continue the struggle." (23)

Like Clausewitz and others before him, Beaufre placed great emphasis on psychological factors in war and felt that they were fundamental to any theory of strategy (13). For example, he argued that Lenin's oft-quoted deviation from Clausewitz that "the soundest strategy in war is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders a mortal blow both possible and easy" was perhaps appropriate for revolutions (as a sort of psychological artillery preparation), but wrong in the instance of defeating a military (23). Beaufre sided with Clausewitz, stating his view in the form of a

guiding strategic rule, that “the decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation resulting in sufficient moral disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose upon him” (24).

Strategy Pattern	Importance of Objective	Resources Available	Freedom of Action	Rationale
Direct Threat	Moderate	Large		Threat may lead to capitulation
Indirect Pressure	Moderate	Inadequate to exert a decisive threat	Limited	Insidious methods required (political, diplomatic, or economic)
Series of Successive Actions	Major	Limited	Restricted	Series of successive actions combining direct threat and indirect pressure with limited application of force
Protracted Conflict (low level of military intensity)	Far greater for one side	Inadequate	Large	Wear down the enemy’s morale and tire him out
Violent conflict aiming at military victory	Not completely vital to the enemy	Sufficient (military)		Rapidly destroy enemy armed forces (annihilation)

Table 8.1. Beaufre’s patterns of strategy.

Beaufre was an advocate for *total* strategy—that is, in addition to the use of the military to achieve ends, political, economic and diplomatic means also needed to be included (13). The means of strategy also included both material and moral capabilities, combined to produce the psychological pressure needed to achieve the desired moral effect. Beginning with the decisive moral effect to be achieved, one’s own capabilities were set against an adversary’s vulnerabilities until the means available were isolated to

those adequate to achieve the desired end state. Given the dialectical nature of strategic planning, possible enemy reactions to the strategy were then calculated with provisions developed to guard against them. Just as one's own side employed diplomatic, economic, military, and psychological means, enemy counteractions had to be assessed for their efficacy in these arenas, also. (24-25)

Beaufre illustrated his conception of how strategy was formulated through five patterns of strategy, shown in Table 8.1. These five courses of action were not meant to be an exhaustive categorization. Rather, they showed that many formulations of strategy were not only possible, contrary to the "one-strategy-fits-all" theories proposed by other strategists, but also necessary in order to accommodate unique situations faced (29).

His *direct threat* pattern was suitable when a state with limited freedom of action sought to achieve moderate interests with threats backed up by superiority in resources. The pattern of *indirect pressure* referred to limited freedom of action situations where moderate interests were at stake but the resources were inadequate to constitute a decisive threat. In this case, more insidious methods were required, whether political, economic or diplomatic. *A series of successive actions* might be required for restricted freedom of action situations involving high stakes and limited resources. The successive actions would combine direct threats and indirect pressure with a limited application of force (26). Another pattern was *protracted struggle at a low level of military intensity* (more popularly known as Protracted Popular War), developed by Mao Tse-Tung, useful when freedom of action was large but resources inadequate to achieve a military decision. This pattern required considerable moral endurance and was very effective in wars of liberation (27). Beaufre described his final pattern as *violent conflict aiming at military*

<p><u>Lenin and Stalin</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In total war the country and the army must be closely knit together psychologically • The rear areas are of vital importance • Psychological action must pave the way for military action 	<p><u>Liddell Hart</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Force enemy to disperse through an indirect approach • Achieve surprise by selecting an unforeseen course of action • Action in strength against the enemy's weak points • Achievement of a decision by action in secondary theaters (if necessary) 	<p><u>Mao Tse-Tung</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concentric withdrawal in face of an enemy advance • Advance if the enemy withdraws • Strategically one to five suffices • Tactically five to one suffices • Live off the enemy • Close cohesion between the army and the civil population
<p><u>Clausewitz</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concentration of effort • Action in strength against the main enemy forces • Decision in battle in the main theater of operations 	<p><u>Modern American</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Graduated deterrence • Flexible response 	<p><u>Foch</u></p> <p>Economy of force Freedom of action</p>
<p>Table 8.2. Beaufre's interpretation of the rules of strategy by the "best known writer's on strategy" (Beaufre 1966, 33-34).</p>		

victory, for situations where a state had sufficient military strength to seek a quick, decisive military victory best conducted when the opponent's interests were not completely vital. Beaufre noted that if this Clausewitzian-Napoleonic strategy did not end quickly, it had a tendency to devolve into a war of attrition out of proportion to the interests at stake, such as World War I (28).

Total strategy was hierarchical in nature, under the control of the government, which dictated how it was to be conducted (30). It was subdivided into political, economic, diplomatic and military categories, each of which had its own *overall strategy*, with tasks unique to each field assigned and coordinated. Beaufre lamented that in the past, the fields of political, economic and diplomatic strategy had not been effectively coordinated, but needed to be under the guidance of the appropriate minister (30). The

hierarchy descended downward below each field to the operational level where “concept and implementation meet, when the optimum must be adjusted to the possible in the light of technical limitations” (31). For example, in the case of military operational strategy, tactical and logistical factors had to be taken into account, which dictated the form of warfare (static or maneuver, annihilation or attrition) that could be pursued.

Beaufre conducted an evaluation of the principles of strategy by the best-known theorists of the past (shown in Table 8.2) against his own theory of total strategy. He determined that only the rules of Foch (economy of force and freedom of action) constituted real strategic rules. The rest were merely general guidelines for particular situations rather than universal principles (34). This was a result of the dialectic nature of conflict in which two opposing wills used force to resolve their dispute. According to Beaufre (34):

In this battle of wills two broadly similar systems will confront each other; each will try to reach the other’s vitals by a preparatory process, the object of which will be to strike terror, to paralyze and to surprise—all these objects are psychological. . . . In any strategy, therefore, there are two distinct but equally important vital components: 1) *Selection of the decisive point* to be attacked (this depends on the enemy’s vulnerable points), and, 2) *Selection of the preparatory maneuver*, which will enable this decisive point to be reached. Victory will go to the side that which succeeds in blocking his enemy’s maneuver and carrying his own to its objective.

Beaufre concluded that this was the essence of Foch’s notion of “preservation of freedom of action.” Battle was simply a struggle for this freedom of action with each side attempting to preserve its own and deny it to the enemy. Allocating one’s resources to accomplish this efficiently comprised *economy of force*. In the end, attainment of the objective broke down to reaching the decisive point through “freedom of action gained by sound economy of force”(35).

Continuing down the strategy hierarchy, Beaufre went on to describe the methods by which economy of force and freedom of action were achieved. He noted that a strategic decision was made within the confines of not only “time, space, and the size and morale of forces available,” but also through the factor of maneuver, which governed “the order of and inter-relationship of successive situations” (36). He described maneuver as “the direct product of the dialectic of the conflict” (36). He likened the forms of action and reaction of combat to the postures and decisions of fencing, to include eight offensive postures (attack, which may be preceded or followed by threat, surprise, feint, deceive, thrust, wear down and follow-up), six defensive postures (on guard, parry, riposte, disengage, retire, and break-off), with five possible types of decisions (concentrate, disperse, economize, increase, and reduce). Beaufre associated all of these actions and reactions with freedom of action, intended to either gain, regain or deprive the enemy of it. Additionally, these actions illustrated that freedom of action was essential to maintain the initiative, another fundamental factor in maneuver.

Beaufre contended that doctrines governed the choices of action and reaction available for maneuver. The *doctrine of the rational application of force* provided guidance for choosing a course of action that would permit forces to exert their maximum effect against an enemy’s main force in decisive battle, given stronger forces available as the entering argument (42). Alternately, the *doctrine of guile* guided the choice of a course of action that would best throw the enemy off balance, disorientate, and deceive him through psychological effect. This meant attacking an enemy’s weak points with strength, as opposed to attacking an enemy’s strong points in the *doctrine of the rational application of force*. Neither doctrine was universally valid. The *doctrine of the rational*

application of force was better suited for situations in which one held a relative strength advantage or when an enemy of superior strength was dangerously dispersed. The *doctrine of guile* was best used when one was inferior in strength. The situation dictated which doctrine was best to employ (43).

Modes of strategy referred to general postures that emerged from either of these doctrines. The *direct strategy mode* utilized military force as the principal weapon to achieve victory. The *indirect strategy mode* primarily used less direct methods through the use of political, economic or diplomatic means. Military means could also be used, but they were subservient to political negotiations. Beaufre considered these two modes to be complementary, particularly in the Cold War era. The nuclear dialectic represented the direct strategy mode, which sought to “neutralize the great economic and industrial potentials on each side” (44). The indirect strategy mode was manifested in the political dialectic that ran concomitant to the system of nuclear deterrence.

Beaufre recognized that strategy had to be dynamic. He encapsulated this need for changes in strategy in his variability factor, which he described as resulting from the variability of resources available and the circumstances surrounding their employment. This factor necessitated the discarding of “rigid and dangerous hypotheses like some recent theories, mostly of American origin, which are based on a mathematical evaluation of probabilities.” Instead, Beaufre offered that they needed to be “based on a whole gamut of possibilities” (45), meaning that periodic forecasts were required in order to guard against surprise and keep up with changes. The variability factor was of such import that Beaufre declared that “preparation is now of more consequence than execution” (45).

Implementation of strategy required a close linkage with tactics, with tactics subservient to strategy (47). Beaufre noted that many writers on strategy had turned this relationship upside-down, with tactics driving strategy, based upon technical innovations. However, Beaufre observed that the advantage of technical and tactical superiority could be rendered ineffective if used under the umbrella of an erroneous strategy. Indeed, “the choice of tactics is in fact strategy” (48). According to Beaufre (48):

It is strategy which decides the form in which the conflict is to be waged, whether it is to be offensive or defensive, whether it will use force or subversion, whether force is to be used directly or indirectly or in stages, whether the main battle is to be political or military, whether atomic weapons are to be used, etc., etc.

... The choice of tactics is not however the only task of strategy. It must also direct the evolution of tactics so that they can play their proper part in reaching a decision. ... Strategy must therefore lay down the aim which the inventions of the technicians and the research of the tacticians should strive to achieve. Only then shall we be able to direct evolution into profitable channels, channels which lead towards the objective of any conflict—a decision.

Beaufre summed up his theoretical discussion of strategy by closing the loop between strategy, tactics, policy and ideological philosophy:

... [S]trategy is no more than a means to an ends. It is for policy to lay down the aims to be achieved by strategy, and policy is basically governed by the philosophy which we wish to see prevail. The destiny of the human race depends upon the philosophy which it chooses and upon the strategy by which it tries to ensure that the philosophy will prevail.

The previous discussion summarized Beaufre’s original theory of strategy, published in *Introduction to Strategy* in 1962. After a decade, Beaufre returned to his theory of total strategy, discussed in his 1972 book, *Strategy for Tomorrow*, with some additional ideas on strategy.

Beaufre came to realize that two changes forced a renaissance towards limited war. First, the haunting specter of pyrrhic nuclear annihilation pushed politicians to avoid

escalation towards unlimited war (Beaufre 1974, 2). Second, the development of mass media delivered a capability to sway public opinion either for or against war, depending upon the political orientation of those who wielded it. News programs that focused on the horrors of war were “inevitably pacifist and defeatist” (1974, 4). On the other hand, news media that provoked nationalistic sentiment stirred a hawkish influence upon the public. According to Beaufre, the media intensified the effects of public opinion on policy (4):

This domestic involvement of the mass media is crucial because it molds public opinion to the point where war is acceptable to the public and it also demoralizes the public and makes compromise possible. Compromises are the only type of result possible in limited war.

However, Beaufre also realized that the increased efficacy of the media was subject for use as a propaganda tool. Not only was it used for garnering domestic support, it was also used to push governments to intervene in other conflicts through moral suasion or to restrain governments from certain actions (5). Beaufre referred to this ability of public opinion to restrain government as *moral deterrence* (5). In the case of world opinion, this effect was only crucial if it undermined an antagonist’s will to fight.

While Beaufre is more known for his theories on deterrence, he should be credited for his contributions to total strategy and his attempt to tie together what others had considered to be disparate styles of warfare (such as guerilla, nuclear and conventional warfare) under one rubric. Additionally, with his five patterns of strategies, dependent upon the strategic situation, laid the groundwork for a strategy theoretical framework, discussed later.

PLA Colonel's Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* and PLA General's Peng and Yao, *The Science of Military Strategy*

There are stratagems in numbers, and there are numbers in stratagems. The yin and the yang are coordinated.

Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui

In 1999, two PLA Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, published their analysis for defeating a technologically superior adversary in their book, *Unrestricted Warfare*. Meaning literally, “warfare without bounds,” the title of the book accurately reflected a strategic focus on “using all means, including armed force or un-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests.”

Reflecting upon the implications of a revolution in military affairs and highlighted by the technological military superiority of the U.S. during DESERT STORM, Liang and Xiangsui did not offer a specific strategy for defeating a militarily superior adversary. Rather, they focused on the means and methods that could be employed through strategy in the strategic context of war without military boundaries. They forecast that technologically inferior states and non-state actors would need to use asymmetric means against their technologically superior enemies. To accomplish this, the traditional boundaries between the military and civilian spheres would have to be crossed.

Liang and Xiangsui postulated that “non-military war operations,” which included Trade War, Financial War, New Terror War, and Ecological War, would increasingly gain favor by those state and non-state actors unable to keep up with the vast technologically-superior, conventional military capability of states such as the United States. Trade War involves “the use of domestic trade law on the international stage; the

arbitrary erection and dismantling of trade barriers; the use of hastily written trade sanctions; the imposition of embargoes on exports of critical technologies; the use of Special Section 301 law; and the application of most-favored-nation (MNF) treatment, etc., etc.” (Liang and Xiangsui 2002, 38). Devaluation of a state’s monetary system and stock market crashes are just a couple of examples of easily concealable, Financial War that could be waged in “a form of non-military warfare which is just as terribly destructive as a bloody war” (39). New Terror War would extend the destructiveness and scope of traditional terrorism through weapons of mass destruction and hacking of bank and media networks, stealing stored data, deleting programs and disseminating misinformation (41). Ecological War involves the use of technology to “influence the natural state of rivers, oceans, the crust of the earth, the polar ice sheets, the air circulating in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer”(42).

Additional non-military means and methods of warfare, such as “Psychological Warfare, Smuggling Warfare, Drug Warfare, Network Warfare, Technological Warfare, Fabrication Warfare, Resources Warfare, Cultural Warfare and International Law Warfare” (see Table 8.3) also entailed many methods not characterized by the force of arms, military power or casualties and bloodshed (Liang and Xiangsui 2002, 42). These forms of warfare could be interwoven into a comprehensive strategy that coupled all available means to a state or non-state actor to achieve their political goals. Thus, although Liang and Xiangsui did not directly discuss strategy, they most certainly

provided a menu of options available in various forms of warfare to craft it.

It is interesting to note the consistency of Chinese strategic thought, from Sun Tzu and the other ancient military classics to Mao Tse Tung, Liang and Xiangsui, and Peng and Yao in the modern era. Chinese strategy has long included guile, deception and subversion as legitimate means to the political objective in war, preferred for their relatively bloodless potential. In Peng and Yao's more recent compendium on strategy, *The Science of Military Strategy* (Peng and Yao 2005), which consists of essays on strategy by scholars at the Chinese Academy of Military Science, this consistency and

Means and Methods of War	Description
Psychological Warfare	Spreading rumors to intimidate the enemy and break down his will.
Smuggling Warfare	Throwing markets into confusion and attacking economic order.
Media Warfare	Manipulating what people see and hear in order to lead public opinion along.
Drug Warfare	Obtaining sudden and huge illicit profits by spreading disaster in other countries.
Network Warfare	Venturing out in secret and concealing one's identity in a type of warfare that is virtually impossible to guard against.
Technological Warfare	Creating monopolies by setting standards independently.
Fabrication Warfare	Presenting a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy.
Resources Warfare	Grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources.
Economic Aid Warfare	Bestowing favor in the open and contriving to control matters in secret.
Cultural Warfare	Leading cultural trends along in order to assimilate those with different views.
Financial Warfare	Entering and subverting banking and stock markets and manipulating the value of a targeted currency. A country can be subjugated without a drop of blood being spilt.
International Law Warfare	Seizing the earliest opportunity to set up regulations.

Table 8.3. Means and Methods of Warfare (from *Unrestricted Warfare*, Liang and Xiangsui, 2002, p. 42-43.)

legacy of strategic thought is reflected in the following passage:

Although ... Chinese military classics have not yet separated strategy from the traditional art of war and have generally referred strategy to "stratagem," "planning," "contemplation," "estimation," "arranging," "calculation," "secret teaching," "scheme," "tactics," and other terms such as "temple calculation," "temple estimation," "temple competition," "devising plan," "overall plan," "military plan," "martial plan," "general's plan," and "stealth plan," yet in theory they are roughly involved in various main levels of the realm of strategy. Many concepts of strategic thinking with an anciently Eastern tinge appeared in these books such as "subdue the enemy without fighting," "Make planning before fighting," "move when stratagem is determined," "Know the enemy and know yourself; and in a hundred battles you will never be in peril," "attack the enemy's alliance and attack his strategies," "befriend distant states while attacking those nearby," "first make yourself invincible and then await the enemy's moment of vulnerability," "examine your preparations closely and fight the enemy cautiously," "be vigilant in peace time," "win victory by surprise," "use force by unorthodox methods," "provide adequate food to make soldiers strong," "rely for provisions on the enemy," "keep our forces concentrated while the enemy must be divided," and "avoid the enemy's strengths and attack his weaknesses," etc. Even today their strategic thinking still gleams with an abiding light of wisdom and contains profound philosophy with great attraction. (4-5)

While Liang and Xiangsui's had postulated a way in which a technological inferior force could defeat a superior one through the innovative use of all available means, to include non-traditional and non-military means in total strategy, Peng and Yao viewed the answer more in terms of strategy associated with two contrasting styles of warfare. Both the colonels and the generals adhered to classical Chinese strategic thinking, but Peng and Yao stayed closer to Sun Tzu's advice on the use of stratagems over the direct use of force as a more efficient way of war:

Stratagem type strategic thinking emphasizes winning by stratagem and force type strategic thinking emphasizes winning by strength. The idea of winning victory by stratagem has always been the main idea of traditional Chinese strategic thinking. It means the use of limited force to achieve victory or realize the aim of war. "The best is to attack the enemy's strategy" has always been the key to China's traditional thinking. Traditional Chinese strategic thinking advocates "do not try to strive for All Under Heaven with forces." What it strives for is the ideal of "subdue the enemy without fighting," winning others over with

awesomeness and virtue and defeating the enemy with wisdom and stratagem." It values military virtue in the fighting, advocates "righteous war" and opposes unrighteous war. (135)

“Total” strategy was still advocated, but with greater attention paid to countering the enemy’s strategy and avoiding direct confrontation unless one held a significant advantage. Attending to the moral high ground was also important in order to gain and maintain popular support.

Peng and Yao contrasted this classic Chinese use of strategy against the Clausewitzian approach, characterized by its single-minded use of force.

The Western strategic thinking pays more attention to the contest of strength, emphasizing direct confrontation. On War by Clausewitz is a representative work of Western force type strategic thinking, with "unlimited violence" as its theoretical cornerstone. Though it also attaches importance to the wisdom of commanders and the application of strategy and tactics, generally speaking, its major point is still on strength. (135)

While Peng and Yao weren’t implying that one way was superior to the other, they were suggesting that a stratagem-based approach could be successful against a force-type approach. Peng and Yao described the force-type approach as characteristic of American strategy, though they grudgingly admitted that the United States was attempting to move away from it. As Peng and Yao described it:

The modern American strategy is a typical strategic thinking model of force type, with superior military strength as its basis. It pays more attention to the ratio between military strength and weapons. Starting from the American Revolution War until the Korea War, what the US armed forces pursued was generally the doctrine of "firepower attrition"—the theory of struggle between strength. Since the Korean War, especially the Vietnam War, the US armed forces has undergone a process of changing its strategic thinking, trying to combine the wisdom of Sun Zi with the understanding of Clausewitz into one system, turning stressing strength to stressing both strength and wisdom. Although in summarizing the experience of the 1991 Gulf War, the US military would like to talk with relish about the application of the theory of wisdom of Sun Zi's *Art of War*, the US

strategic thinking has not shaken off its traditional model of attaching importance to strength and technology. (136)

While force characterized the American approach to war, it also included psychological warfare as an important means of coercion. Chinese thought on psychological warfare was more comprehensive in scope. Psychological warfare was to be used against one's own population to garner domestic and international popular support, and was also to be used equally towards against an enemy's entire population and military forces to undermine their will. This element of strategy had its roots in Chinese history, when Mao Tse Tung instituted mass political indoctrination to institutionalize communism. The most important target of psychological warfare, however, was the enemy's leadership. According to Peng and Yao:

Modern psychological warfare is not only directed at the enemy troops, it also aims at the whole population of the hostile nation. Meanwhile, it shoulders the responsibilities of educating domestic servicemen and civilians, increasing the cohesion of people and morale of the army, helping people maintain psychological composure. However, its chief target is the enemy's strategic decision-making staff, i.e. to influence by all means the thinking, faith, will, emotion and cognition system the enemy strategic decision-makers, so as to induce them to make mistakes in perception, judgment and decision making, shake their ideology, conviction and the will to resist, and to achieve the purpose of subduing the enemy without a fight. (372)

Modern Chinese strategic thought has evolved into "total" strategy while staying true to its subversive roots. It considers all means of coercion and persuasion as fair play in war. Its preference for efficiency in war—that is, being as bloodless as possible while still achieving the political objective—lends itself more to stratagem than force-on-force. But preference is a far cry from dogma, and one would do well not to assume stratagem as the only way of Chinese war.

**PART III: CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE
MYTH OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

CHAPTER 9: THE PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS OF WAR

Concepts are part of the building blocks of strategy. They provide guidelines for the conduct of war by explaining *how* military means are to be used to achieve objectives. They must be executable within the means at one's disposal and against the means of the enemy, dovetailing into an overarching strategy. Guided by shared concepts of how forces are to be employed, combatants are then able to work together to achieve desired objectives. In short, concepts provide a shared, overarching vision of how military means are to be employed against an adversary for a given situation.

Strategists have used concepts as guidance in the conduct of war for ages. Over two thousand years ago, Sun Tzu wrote about the virtues of *awesomeness*, *deception*, *surprise*, *maneuver*, *morale*, and *local superiority* in war. Two millennia later, these same concepts remain salient, in spite of great changes in technology. New concepts have also arisen to take advantage of entirely new means of warfare, such as aircraft and nuclear weapons, while other concepts, such as those associated with swords and castles, became obsolete. Nonetheless, practitioners and scholars have maintained that within given periods of warfare, a precious few concepts were so fundamental and universal that they deserved recognition as *principles*³⁸ of war.

This elevation of concepts to universal principles of war began two centuries ago. The complexity of war and the evolution of science had driven practitioners and theorists alike to search for simple, war-winning formulas. Convinced that science could be

³⁸ Principle is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “A fundamental truth or proposition on which others depend; a general statement or tenet forming the (or a) basis of a system of belief, etc.; a primary assumption forming the basis of a chain of reasoning.”

applied to what had formerly been viewed as an enigmatic art of generals, fundamental principles of war were proposed. It was accepted that military principles could be applied similar to the way principles and laws were used in the physical sciences. Furthermore, it was surmised that their application would increase the probability of victory—ignoring them would end in defeat.

This chapter reviews the history of principles and concepts that have been proffered and debated since the Napoleonic-era. Also discussed is doctrine, in which principles and concepts authoritatively prescribe how a military will fight. The lion's share of the principles and concepts are American, though some other country's principles and concepts are also discussed in order to address universality. The chapter finishes with some conclusions about principles and concepts of war.

Principles and Concepts of War—a Napoleonic Heritage

The great Napoleon provided credibility for the existence of fundamental principles of war when he stated, “The principles of war are those which have directed the great Commanders whose great deeds have been handed down to us by History” (Foch 1918). Though Napoleon was said to have lamented to Marshall Cyr, “if he ever had the time he would write a book in which he would demonstrate the principles of the art, in so clear a manner, that they would be within the comprehension of every military man” (Alger, *The Origins and Adaptations of the Principles of War* 1975), Napoleon did not leave a list of his own principles. Others, however, enthusiastically took up the challenge.

Both Antoine-Henri Jomini and Carl von Clausewitz, students of Napoleonic warfare, were proponents of principles of war. Jomini believed that, “There exists a

small number of fundamental principles of war, which could not be deviated from without danger, and the application of which, on the contrary, has been in almost all time crowned with success” (A. H. Jomini 1987, 437). However, Jomini also cautioned “To reduce war to geometry would be to impose fetters on the genius of the greatest captains and to submit to the yoke of an exaggerated pedantry” (A. H. Jomini 1987, 478).

Clausewitz, too, wrote a treatise on principles of war, differentiating between principles for strategy, offense, defense, the use of troops and the use of terrain. However, he grew more circumspect as to the utility of principles of war between the time he wrote his “Principles of War”³⁹ in 1812, and *On War*, published posthumously by his wife in 1832.⁴⁰ In the end, while he believed a positive doctrine for the conduct of war was not possible, he still maintained that theory could aid a commander (Clausewitz, 140).

Practitioners and theorists who followed Clausewitz and Jomini in the ensuing decades proposed more definitive lists of principles of war, supported by case study analysis. Practitioners and theorists championed their own sets of principles based upon self-selected wars, campaigns, and battles, advocating that they were won due to adherence to fundamental principles identified by the author.⁴¹ Various principles and concepts were debated in the military journals, but without much impact other than on

³⁹ Clausewitz’s “Principles of War” was actually titled, “The most important principles of the art of war to complete my course of instruction for his Royal Highness the Crown Prince.”

⁴⁰ See Book Two, Chapter Four, “Method and Routine,” in Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, rev.1984), for a discussion on how Clausewitz distinguished between laws, principles and rules.

⁴¹ For an excellent history on the principles of war, see John I. Alger, *The Origins and Adaptations of the Principles of War*, Thesis (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975).

individual readers. If the principles were to have any systematic, institutional influence in the military, they would have to make their way into service doctrine.⁴² Doctrine describes how a service will conduct its missions, often explaining the underlying theory, concepts, and principles that drive its tactics, techniques and procedures.⁴³

J.F.C. Fuller, a British Army officer and theorist, was influential in the codification of principles into fighting doctrine, specifically, the British Army's Field Service Regulations, which were eventually also adopted into doctrine by the U.S. Army. In "Training Officers for War," Fuller initially proposed *Objective, Mass, Offensive, Security, Surprise* and *Movement* as principles that, if correctly applied in conjunction with one another, would reduce the enemy "to such a state of disorganization and demoralization that he is unable either to strike out or guard himself" (Fuller 1914, 43). Along with *economy of force* and *cooperation*, Fuller's principles of war were adopted in the 1920 edition of the Field Service Regulations (Fuller 1926, 16). However, Fuller was constantly revising his principles. In an article published anonymously in the Journal of

⁴² The term "doctrine" is a contested concept. Since its acceptance into the military lexicon in the early 20th century, some have viewed it as authoritative while others have viewed it as suggestive. This debate continues today. For discussions on the development of doctrine in Small Wars, see Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 1860-1941* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2009), and Keith B. Bickel, *Mars Learning: The Marine Corps' Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001).

⁴³ By doctrine, I mean, "that body of knowledge disseminated through officially approved publications, school curriculums, and textbooks that represents an military's approach to war and the conduct of military operations." Derived from Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations 1860-1941* (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2009).

the Royal United Service Institution, titled, “The Principles of War with Reference to the Campaigns of 1914-1915,” Fuller discussed eleven principles of war that included not only the eight listed above as “strategical principles,” but also the “tactical principles” of *demoralization, endurance* and *shock* (Fuller 1916). By 1926, insisting that the principles of war were amenable to a scientific breakdown, Fuller attempted to develop a more comprehensive and scientific theory of war centered around the principles (Fuller 1926), but the effort failed. Embellished upon his earlier principles, the result was such a complex tapestry of questionable interrelations, metaphysical assertions and hierarchical artificialities that any simplifying utility was lost in the morass. However, his original principles of war survived and remained a staple of British military doctrine.

The British list of principles received a great deal of scrutiny both domestically and abroad. By the 1930’s, a great deal of skepticism over the existence of principles of war surfaced in British military writings. For example, in *British Strategy: A Study of the Application of the Principles of War*, Sir Frederick Maurice concluded that there were no fixed laws or rules of the art of war and principles changed over time (Maurice 1940). A debate ensued, with the principles suffering a brief hiatus from British doctrine in the ‘30s and early ’40s, before making a comeback after WW II (Alger 1975, 39).

Internationally, principles were received with a wide range of both acceptance and dismissal. The German Army debated their existence, but did not see fit to publish a set of principles in doctrine (Alger 1975, 42). The debate reflected an underlying belief amongst German officers that war was such an art that it demanded the greatest of flexibility by its practitioners—an art that would be hamstrung by codification of a fixed and limited list of principles.

The French Army flirted with fundamental principles, but their acceptance into doctrine varied in time, largely depending upon the political fortunes of their champion. In Marshall Foch's 1918 publication of *Principles of War*, written for students of the *École de Guerre*, Foch devoted entire chapters to the principles of *economy of force* and *freedom of action*, while also highlighting *surprise* and *security*. However, Foch's political fall from grace with Clemenceau affected the acceptance of his principles within the French Army (Alger 1975, 42). Later, however, Fuller's list of eight principles were adopted as doctrine under General Buat's tenure as Chief of the French General Staff, but were subsequently removed again by Marshal Pétain in 1930. In the main, the French largely eschewed the publication of a definitive list of principles of war.

Fuller's list of principles (see Table 9.1) made their way into the U.S. Army initially through the lectures and efforts of Hjalmar Erickson, an officer at the General Staff College (now the U.S. Army War College) in 1920 (Alger 1975, 56). Erickson championed Fuller's list, both in his teachings at the General Staff College and also as proposed to the Army General Staff. By 1921, as a result of Erickson's urgings, Fuller's principles were inculcated into U.S. Army training regulations. It didn't take long, however, for doubt about the efficacy of the principles to emerge within the practitioner community. As Lieutenant Colonel Marshall Fallwell observed, "Most early objections were based on the grounds that the principles were a mere list of nouns or noun substantives, which could be interpreted in many ways. Some wanted to expand the list. Others—appealing to dictionaries—wished to discard all that were not basic to every situation." (Fallwell 1955, 53)

TR 10-5 (1921)	Field Service Regulation (1923)	Field Manual 100-5 (1939)	Field Manual 100-5 (1944)	Field Manual 100-5 (1949)
Principals of War	General Principles of Combat	General Principles for Conduct of War	Doctrines of Combat	Principles of War
Objective	Objective	Objective	Objective	Objective
Offensive	Offensive	Offensive (Mobility)	Offensive	Offensive
Mass	Concentration of Superior Forces	Concentration of Superior Forces (Economy)	Concentration of Superior Forces	Mass
Economy of Force	Economy of Force			Economy of Force
Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise	Surprise
Simplicity	Simplicity	Simplicity	Simplicity	Simplicity
Security	Security	Security	Security	Security
Movement				Maneuver
Co-operation		Unity of Effort	Unity of Command	Unity of Command
	Quality		Quality	
	Fire Superiority			

Table 9.1. U.S. Principles of War 1921-1949 (from Fallwell, Marshall L. "The Principles of War and the Solution of Military Problems," *Military Review*, May 1955, pp. 48-62.

Later critics attacked the principles on firmer ground. While not denying their value as concepts, they claimed the principles were not stated properly—that is, the relationship between cause and effect was not shown; that doctrine and method were being confused with principle; and that the label “principle” had misled some commanders to believe that these concepts were basic rules to be applied to every situation.

Nonetheless, over the years, while the U.S. Army debated the bounds of what it meant to be a principle of war, the principles of *Objective*, *Simplicity*, *Unity of*

Command/Unity of Effort, Offensive, Maneuver, Mass/Concentration of Forces, Economy of Force, Surprise and Security remained privileged concepts of doctrine for combat forces of the U.S. Army (also shown in Table 9.1).

Strategy and the Principles

The validity of the principles of war to forms of warfare other than conventional warfare was also debated. Doctrinally, the British and U.S. principles of war were limited to a niche in the spectrum of conflict—conventional war, also known as regular war. Additionally, the principles reflected an underlying predilection for the strategy of annihilation within the spectrum of strategy. Fuller addressed this limitation obliquely in his discussion of his first principle, the *objective*, when he stated, “Our objective ... is that force of the enemy’s troops the existence of which is essential to his self-preservation as a nation” (Fuller 1916, 5). In other words, the enemy’s means of resistance, his army, was to be engaged and disarmed in decisive battle. This was not only a part of a Clausewitzian legacy, but other factors as well.

During the period around WW I, the strategy of annihilation had taken center stage as the *strategy de jour* in wars fought between conventional armies. Not surprising, the cases that Fuller had drawn from for his principles were conventional wars, campaigns, and battles, in which the strategy of annihilation was used. Annihilation became more than a strategy, it was the way wars were *supposed* to be fought. *Proper* wars were fought against professional armies on the field of battle, not in the shadows by the rabble, armed with pitchforks and shovels. Additionally, given that a conventional war against a powerful enemy constituted the gravest danger to the state, it was quite reasonable for militaries, first and foremost, to concentrate on ways to win regular wars.

It was reasoned that if an army could defeat a professionally armed military on the field of battle, then surely it could handle the lesser contingency of a people in arms. The same principles of war that were the keys to success in conventional war were assumed to be just as applicable to other types of conflict.

Additionally, a “cult of the offensive” also prevailed amongst practitioners and theorists at the time (Van Evera 1984). Fuller had listed the *offensive* as his second principle of war. The cases that Foch used in his analysis were decisive battles that used the strategy of annihilation during the Napoleonic era and the Franco-Prussian War. Other principle of war advocates largely followed the same methodology used by Fuller—selected case studies of regular battles and wars.

Although the principles of war had been developed with an eye towards regular warfare, some practitioners also saw their utility in other types of conflict. As General Pershing noted, “The principles of warfare as I learned them at West Point remain unchanged. They were verified by my experience in our Indian wars, and also during the campaign against the Spaniards in Cuba. I applied them in the Philippines and observed their application in Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War.” (Fallwell 1955, 52)

The Principles in Small Wars

In spite of Pershing’s endorsement, however, this was not a universal view. The U.S. Army made a distinction between conventional war and “small wars,” which included counter guerrilla warfare, pacification, and overseas constabulary and contingency operations (Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency

Operations 1860-1941 2009). Like the principles of war, the sobriquet “small wars”⁴⁴ and its methods were borrowed from the British Army, in particular, Colonel Charles E. Callwell. Callwell had published a very influential book on small wars that was also popular in the United States. He described small wars as (Callwell 1906, 21):

all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops. It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilized races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.

Callwell conducted case study analysis of selected small wars, drawing from irregular cases in starkly different environments, to include Africa and India, illustrating a number of differences in the ways they were fought compared to regular war. Callwell recognized that the methods used by guerrillas reflected a different mindset about battle (Callwell 1906):

They revel in stratagems and artifice. They prowl about waiting for their opportunity to pounce down upon small parties moving without due precaution. The straggler and camp follower are their natural prey. They hover on the flanks of the column, fearing to strike but ready to cut off detachments which may go astray.

Callwell also noted that irregulars benefited from the poor intelligence gathering capability of regulars, a result of support for the irregulars by the indigenous population. The indigenous peoples not only remained close-lipped about irregular troop movements, but also lied and deceived regulars. Coupled with the ability to move fast over long distances, lightly armed irregular warriors were able to exploit uncertainty with a mobility advantage exacerbated by better intelligence.

⁴⁴ The term “guerrilla” is a Spanish word for “small war.”

Although Callwell understood that small wars required a strategic approach fundamentally different from that of conventional war, his approach to counterstrategy was colored in the racism of the day. He realized that a strategy of annihilation was doomed to failure against a small wars-type enemy intent upon avoiding decisive battle. As Callwell noted about guerrilla warfare in general, “no amount of energy and skill will at times draw the enemy into risking engagements, or induce him to depart from the form of warfare in which most irregular warriors excel and in which regular troops are almost invariably seen at their worst” (Callwell 1906, 125). Given that the opportunity to use a strategy of annihilation, though favored, was unlikely, Callwell instead advocated a strategy of intimidation, evidenced in his statement, “in choosing the objective, the overawing and not the exasperation of the enemy is the end to keep in view” (Callwell 1906, 42). In terms of the racism prevalent at the time, he observed, “The lower races are impressionable. They are greatly influenced by a resolute bearing and a determined course of action. ... The spectacle of an organized body of troops sweeping forward slowly but surely into their territory unnerves them” (Callwell 1906, 72).

In support of a strategy of intimidation, Callwell proffered *initiative* as a principle of small wars, stating, “it is a cardinal principle in the conduct of warfare of this nature that the initiative must be maintained, that the regular army must lead while its adversaries follow, and that the enemy must be made to feel a moral inferiority throughout” (Callwell 1906, 72). He added, “Dash and audacity displayed at the right moment have given rise to episodes flavoring the tedious operations which are characteristic of, and inevitable in, warfare of this nature, with a spice of romance. Handfuls of men have overawed a host. Mere detachments have wrested historic

strongholds from the grasp of potentates with warlike races at their beck and call” (Callwell 1906, 81).

Curiously, Callwell’s strategy of intimidation included *deprivation*,⁴⁵ in his advocating the destruction of the supporting population’s livestock and homes.

According to Callwell (Callwell 1906, 145):

The adoption of guerilla methods by the enemy almost necessarily forces the regular troops to resort to punitive measures directed against the possessions of their antagonists. It must be remembered that one way to get the enemy to fight is to make raids on his property—only the most cowardly of savages and irregulars will allow their cattle to be carried off or their homes destroyed without making a show of resistance.

However, this ethnocentric guidance went against long-standing partisan warfare⁴⁶ advice as it had been practiced for centuries between Europeans. Johann Ewald noted the importance of showing humanitarian behavior towards the indigenous population, including peasants, and the prevention of subordinate troops from pillaging villages or even entering houses when making inquiries about the enemy during the

⁴⁵ Caldwell did not use the term, *deprivation*. I use it as the title of the concept he described.

⁴⁶ Partisan warfare is generally considered to be synonymous with guerrilla warfare. The difference between the two, according to Francis Lieber, is that guerrillas are considered to be “self-constituted sets of armed men in times of war who form no integral part of the organized army, do not stand on the regular payroll of the army, or are not paid at all, who take up arms and lay them down at intervals and carry on petty war (guerrilla) chiefly by raids, extortion, destruction, massacre, and who cannot encumber themselves with many prisoners and will generally give no quarter,” while partisans are considered to be soldiers belonging to an army, who fight in the same manner as guerrillas, with the exception that they generally follow the laws of war. Put simply, the distinction between guerrillas and partisans is that, although both engage in irregular warfare, partisans are state-constituted troops while guerrillas are self-constituted. Both groups may or may not follow the laws of war. See Francis Lieber, “Guerrillas in International Law,” in *The Guerrilla Reader*, 101-106 (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1977).

conduct of irregular warfare, based upon his experience as a Hessian *jäger* captain in the American Revolutionary War. (Ewald 1991, 76)

Although theory for irregular warfare existed prior to the imperial era, as it did for regular warfare, Callwell fell in with Clausewitz' advice of only using examples from modern history (Clausewitz 1976, rev.1984, 173). The consequence of Callwell's focus on imperial small wars pushed him against the grain of some previous theory, strategy, and doctrine of guerrilla and partisan warfare. Moreover, the lack of a deeper understanding of irregular warfare from the perspective of a positive doctrine may have caused Callwell to address it symptomatically from a negative, counter-irregular perspective. Denis Davydov, a Russian cavalry officer, had previously addressed this issue in his 1821 essay, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. Davydov had attempted to correct the erroneous impression that many had of guerrilla warfare while also identifying the theory behind guerrilla warfare and the strategy of exhaustion that supported it (Davydov 1977):

Guerrilla warfare consists neither of quite minor enterprises nor of those of the first order of magnitude, for it is not concerned with the burning of one or two granaries, nor with smashing pickets, nor with striking direct blows at the main forces of the enemy. Rather, it embraces and traverses the whole length of the enemy lines, from the opposing army's rear to the area of territory assigned for the stationing of troops, provisions, and weapons. Thus, guerrilla warfare stops up the source of the army's strength and continuing existence and puts it at the mercy of the guerrillas' own army while the enemy army is weakened, hungry, disarmed, and deprived of the saving bonds of authority.

Davydov went on to explain the theoretical logic behind guerrilla warfare in terms of depriving the army of the fundamental resources it needed to fight—in short, a description of the concept of *deprivation*, though he never termed it as such. In answer to his query, “What consequences will we not see when the success of guerrilla detachments leads to their winning over the entire population of regions in the enemy rear and what

news of the horror sown along the enemy's lines of communication is broadcast among the ranks of its army?" Davydov alluded to the concepts of demoralization and popular support within the strategy of exhaustion used in small wars. Exhaustion of the enemy forces resulted in psychological consequences for both sides in the form of demoralization of the enemy and a moral boost to one's own side for both the troops and popular support (Davydov 1977, 57).

Callwell saw both similarities and differences in the principles that guided regular and irregular warfare. While regular troops sought opportunities to apply the principle of mass in battle, irregular warriors eschewed it, seeing it as a risky way to lose many of their precious few warriors in one fell swoop. Irregulars preferred to fight against detachments in the enemy rear and against his lines of communication, where they had local superiority and the element of surprise, such as in ambushes. A principle of dispersal guided irregulars when faced against larger numbers of massed regular troops. Nonetheless, Callwell found the concepts of *objective* (Callwell 1906, 34), *offensive* (75), *surprise* (240), *security* (442), and *mobility* (401) just as applicable to small wars as conventional wars, though Callwell did not refer to them as principles of war.

Callwell's conclusions dovetailed with those of the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps, both of which had experience in small wars prior to and after WW I. After the American Civil War, the army had conducted constabulary duty against the American Indians out in the western states, a task General William T. Sherman described as "the hardest kind of war" (Birtle 2009, 58). The army had learned during the Civil War that "the best way to win a 'people's war' was to strike at the foundation of resistance—the enemy population" (Birtle 2009, 60). If the Indians couldn't be joined in decisive battle,

then the army would attack their social and economic resources by destroying their homes and food supplies, at times engaging in the extermination of tribes. Despite the laws of war prohibiting such harsh measures, they were rationalized as not being applicable to “aboriginal peoples,” such as the American Indians (Birtle 2009, 62). The Army also gained experience in civil-military affairs when it was assigned reservation pacification duties when the Indian Bureau proved incapable or the level of violence required it (Birtle 2009, 77). The lessons learned by the Army during the Indian campaigns included “the necessity of close civil-military coordination of a pacification campaign (preferably under military control), the establishment of a firm-but-fair paternalistic government, and the introduction of economic and educational reforms to uplift a benighted people” (Birtle 2009, 85).

These lessons were subsequently applied in the 1898 victory in the Spanish-American War, which required the Army to administer “governance of over ten million Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, and Guamanians (Birtle 2009, 100)” until civilian control could be established, resulting in the development of nation building, pacification and counterinsurgency warfare skills and regulations in the Army. Initially, the Army attempted benevolent measures in order to win the “hearts and minds” of the Filipino people. However, the measures used by the Army, meant to attract the people, were instead viewed as “alien and offensive” to the Filipinos. Culture mattered. Confounded by a benevolent approach, the Army switched to a malevolent one. The Army instituted a policy of punishment in retaliation for ambushes—burning homes and villages in reprisal. This approach was effective in the case of the Philippines, as the costs of insurrection became too much to bear for the indigenous population. (Kretchik 2011, 101)

The Spanish-American War also ushered a period of small wars involving the U.S. Marine Corps. Euphemistically known as the “banana wars” because of their connection to the commercial interests of American fruit companies in South America and the Caribbean, small wars kept the Marines busy prior to and after World War I as “the force of choice” for interventions (McMonagle 1996, 19). The Marines picked up a great deal of constabulary, pacification, counterinsurgency, and contingency operational experience in China, Panama, Cuba, Nicaragua, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Honduras and Mexico. While the experience would not be translated into doctrine until 1936, small war lessons were shared throughout the Marine Corps through training led by experienced Marines, school-house textbooks, the publication of lessons learned, and professional magazines such as the *Marine Corps Gazette*.

Of particular note were two articles written about small wars in the *Marine Corps Gazette* (McMonagle 1996). Major E. H. Ellis, USMC, who would later become revered as one of the Marine Corps most innovative thinkers, wrote the first article entitled “Bush Marines,” describing how the Marine Corps should conduct small wars. Ellis realized that the days when intimidation and harsh methods could be used to quell a small war were gone with the codification of the laws of armed warfare and greater press scrutiny made more powerful with the ubiquitous, near-instantaneous dissemination of international news. He felt that only the first of the four measures below remained viable (Ellis 1921):

- (1) Kill or wound the individuals concerned and destroy their property.
- (2) Destroy the property of people who aid or abet the enemy.
- (3) Lay waste to entire sections inhabited by people generally supporting the enemy.
- (4) Remove and disperse women and children living in an area of unrest.

According to Ellis, “All of the above-named measures with the exception of the first have the great disadvantage in that their application is likely to exasperate the people as a whole and tend to forfeit their friendship permanently” (Ellis 1921, 11). In some cases, Ellis thought that even the first measure might be too much, reasoning that, “When Uncle Sam occupies the territory of a small nation he wants to enforce his will but he does not want any trouble—that is, any stir that may cause undue comment among his own people or among foreign governments. He wants to interfere as little as possible with the lives of the people—in fact, he wants to be considered the good angel (that he really is) by the nation that he is cleaning up” (Ellis 1921, 11). To Ellis, the era of the malevolent approach was over.

Ellis instead proffered a general small wars strategy that combined the strategies of exhaustion and annihilation through attrition. He devised a generic course of action that included securing bases from which to conduct operations, depriving the irregulars of external support, hunting down and destroying guerrilla forces, and at least maintaining, if not winning, the hearts and minds of the populace. Ellis’ measures included (Ellis 1921):

- (1) Land simultaneously and take over the important seaports to secure the doors of the country.
- (2) Establish a line of fortified posts in the interior to cover production areas, steady the wavering and faint-hearted population and serve as bases for supply and rest for the operation of mobile troops.
- (3) Drive with flying columns into isolated districts and mop up.

While Ellis did not state them as such, the concepts of *objective*, *deprivation*, *security*, *restraint*, *popular support*, *attrition* and *offensive* were key to his strategy.

The second article was a reprint of a small wars conference report by Major Samuel M. Harrington, USMC, in which Harrington summarized small war lessons from the American Indians, Nicaragua (1912), Haiti, (1915) Santa Domingo (1916) and Vera Cruz (1914), with a generic course of action consisting of six measures (Harrington 1921, 477):

- (1) Seizure of ports or border towns commanding routes of trade and entrance.
- (2) Seizure of interior cities commanding the resources of the territory and the establishment therein (or at other suitable points) of bases and supply.
- (3) Division of the theater of operations into military districts.
- (4) Operations based on a captured city or fortified base of supplies against the remaining opposition.
- (5) Seizure of livestock and supplies.
- (6) Seizure of all arms.

Harrington's underlying generic strategy was similar to the one devised by Ellis, but with more emphasis on exhaustion. Harrington's plan also largely mirrored the same concepts of employment alluded to by Ellis, but with heavier emphasis on *deprivation*. By controlling livestock, supplies, and arms, along with the central nodes of the lines of communication, irregulars could be deprived of the means they needed to resist. Harrington, like Ellis, was particularly concerned with *restraint* (though he did not term it as such) in dealing with the indigenous population. Harrington pointed out that great care had to be "taken not to offend peaceful inhabitants or to commit injustices" in order to avoid instigating greater support of the irregulars (Harrington 1921, 479). He also overtly endorsed *offensive*, *surprise*, and *security* as three principles of tactics essential for success in small wars (Harrington 1921, 486).

In 1935, the Marine Corps published doctrine in the form of *Small Wars Operations*, which was subsequently revised in 1940 and entitled the *Small Wars*

Manual. The *Small Wars Manual*⁴⁷ was the result of Major General Commandant Thomas Holcomb's desire to codify the previous four decades of small war experience into doctrine. While the lion's share of doctrine development in the Marine Corps was focused on amphibious landing operations in anticipation of U.S. entry into the Second World War, Holcomb had the foresight to assign a four-man team of officers to document the lessons that had been learned the hard way—by trial and error and in Marine blood—even though regular war would consume the U.S. military in the ensuing years. (McMonagle 1996, 59)

In spite of the many differences between regular and irregular warfare that drove the development of separate doctrine, the Marine Corps stuck with the traditional principles of war in the *Small Wars Manual*, reasoning, “Although small wars present a special problem requiring particular tactical and technical measures, the immutable principles of war remain the basis of these operations and require the greatest ingenuity in their application” (U.S. Marine Corps 1940, 8).

The Spectrum of Conflict Expands

The Second World War brought the main focus of the services back to the traditional, annihilation-based principles of war, given the largely regular nature of the

⁴⁷ Small Wars were defined in the manual as “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory”. The assistance rendered in small wars ranged from the peaceful assignment of an administrative assistant to the “establishment of a complete military government supported by an active combat force,” while also varying by degree “from simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war.” U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940).

fighting.⁴⁸ Though the Army Operations Field Manual of 1944 did contain a chapter on Partisan Warfare, nuclear weapons and German *blitzkrieg* tactics dominated doctrinal modifications.⁴⁹ The principle of *maneuver* was added to U.S. doctrine after the war, driven partially by the success of German *blitzkrieg* tactics. The blitzkrieg-like maneuver principle consisted of an amalgamation of surprise, superior mobility, penetration, exploitation, and envelopment with combine arms warfare (Kretchik 2011, 139). However, the advent of nuclear weapons received only light doctrinal treatment—*mass*, the concentration of superior forces, remained unchanged as a principle, while the chapter on *security* contained only a paragraph on *dispersion* as a way to reduce the effect of atomic weapons. At that time, a nuke was just considered a bigger bomb, thus the comment that “increased dispersion of units and installations up to the limits of effective control will reduce the effect of atomic weapons” (Department of the Army 1949, 60).

However, by 1950, nuclear weapons proved to be more than just bigger bombs. When the Korean War broke out, the U.S. military would not receive permission from President Truman to use nuclear weapons against Chinese airbases harboring North Korean aircraft, even though their use was spelled out in doctrine. Nuclear weapons were too destructive to be justifiable in limited war. In the years after the Korean War, a controversy erupted over whether nuclear weapons remained viable weapons of regular


⁴⁸ Partisan Warfare was fought against the Axis during WW II, but it was not decisive, in spite of the exhortations and myths propagated by many partisan leaders. Nonetheless, while the importance of Partisan Warfare was exaggerated, it did have some impact in the war, if for no other reason than keeping some Axis forces away from the fronts, conducting pacification duty. See Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare*, Eighth Printing (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2010), pp. 232-238.

⁴⁹ By the 1949 version of FM 100-5, Partisan Warfare was reduced to a couple of pages. See Walter E. Kretchik, *U.S. Army Doctrine* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011), pp. 160-163.

war, given their increasing yields and numbers. Eventually, nuclear weapons would outstrip their utility as means useful in a strategy of annihilation, as they crossed the lethality threshold into means of extermination. A new type of war, nuclear warfare, was created, underpinned by the strategy of intimidation and the concept of deterrence. Nuclear warfare and deterrence eventually earned their own niche in the spectrum of conflict—a quixotic type of warfare that could only be won if it was never fought.

During the Cold War, a conventional war between the United States and the Soviet Union was deemed too risky because of the doomsday potential of escalation. Instead, proxy wars were fought between smaller nations embroiled in either interstate or intrastate conflicts, with the United States and the Soviet Union backing sides that aligned with their interests. Additionally, revolutions and wars of liberation began to outnumber interstate wars, as the binds of colonialism were shed. As Figure 9.1 shows, the number of intrastate conflicts grew after WW II, dwarfing interstate conflict during the last half of the 21st century.

As the Cold War continued into the 1960s, President Kennedy became concerned that force structure and doctrine ignored the exigencies of small wars—he pushed the services to focus more on irregular warfare. With the Army tasked to address the full “spectrum of war” (as the Army called it in the 1962 version of Field Manual (FM) 100-5), to include nuclear, regular and irregular war, doctrine was forced to embrace the concepts of *flexibility* and *adaptability* in its keystone doctrine publication, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Department of the Army 1962). However, rather than adopting Kennedy’s approach of developing specialized forces for the different types of warfare within the spectrum of war, Army leadership preferred to pursue a “jack of all trades” approach,



with conventional soldiers thought equally capable of mastering fighting in a nuclear environment and small wars. Nonetheless, President Kennedy was still instrumental in expanding the numbers and roles of special forces.

FM 100-5 included full chapters on Unconventional Warfare and Military Operations Against Irregular Forces. The Unconventional Warfare chapter was written from the perspective of Army units being used as guerrilla forces in augmentation to conventional forces, rather than as counter-guerrilla forces. However, it was evident that at least in the case of the doctrine writers, much had been forgotten about small wars doctrine in the intervening years. In describing the primary mission of guerrilla forces “to interdict enemy lines of communication, installations, and centers of war production in support of conventional operations,” FM 100-5 writers had confused partisan warfare with guerrilla warfare (Department of the Army 1962, 130).

Additionally, the unconventional warfare doctrine was written to accommodate nuclear war, with both regular and irregular warfare conducted within it. In the section on Guerrilla Warfare, this mishmash of warfare types displayed a confused vision of the future battlefield, centered on conventional warfare, augmented by nuclear and unconventional warfare (Department of the Army 1962, 130):

In nuclear war the fluidity of operations and dispersion of units increase the difficulty of maintaining authority over the population in an area and may create opportunities for development and effective employment of guerrilla forces. The unrestricted scale of use of nuclear weapons facilitates guerrilla operations because of the severely reduced effectiveness of enemy security forces due to destruction of communications, records and other facilities.

In its chapter on Military Operations Against Irregular Forces, FM 100-5 explained that counter-irregular war was a mission for conventional forces rather than special forces. Along with combat operations directed at the guerrilla forces, the winning of popular support from the people, security for the people, and the isolation of external support by outside powers were described as important parts of counter-irregular war (Department of the Army 1962, 139). However, the Army remained myopically fixated on its traditional principles of war, *objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise* and *simplicity*,⁵⁰ a result of Army leadership's shortsighted focus on conventional warfare.

This shortsighted focus on conventional warfare principles was all the more curious as guerrilla warfare had not only achieved pop culture status in the early 1960s,

⁵⁰ Other operational concepts were also included in Chapter 5, "The Principles of War and Other Operational Concepts," to include psychological, electronic, barrier and denial operations. In comparing nuclear to nonnuclear operations in Chapter 6 (Conduct of Battle) of FM 100-5, the concepts of dispersion, mobility, fire and maneuver, and tempo were also discussed. See pp. 46-58, Department of the Army, *Field Service Regulations: Operations* (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1962).

but also growing interest within both the academic and military communities. Che Guevara's iconic image was plastered on t-shirts and walls across the globe as a symbol of rebellion. His book on Guerrilla Warfare, written in 1960, explained the Cuban brand of guerrilla warfare, *focoism*, which proposed that it was not necessary to wait for the right conditions to launch a guerrilla-style war—they could be created instead, with military victories against regime forces drawing the people to the cause. Mao's writings from the late-1930s on guerrilla warfare and protracted popular war were translated and published into English in 1961 by Samuel B. Griffith, a retired Marine Corps general.

Mao's first principle of annihilation, "to strive to the utmost to preserve one's own strength and destroy that of the enemy" (Tse Tung 1938a), reflected the end stage of protracted popular war, when guerrilla operations would transform into conventional operations to destroy the enemy's means of resistance and achieve final victory. In support of his first principle, his supplemental principles and operational concepts included *protractedness*, *initiative* and *flexibility* (in tactical offensives within the strategic defensive), *speed* and *surprise* to achieve quick decisive battles, exterior-line operations within interior-line operations, *coordination*, base areas, mobile warfare, and command relationships. Not included in this list of principles was *political mobilization*, perhaps the single most important concept within his three-phased strategy. *Political mobilization*, in which recruits and the people were indoctrinated into the political aims and ideology of the communists during the first phase, melded politics with war in an insidious, largely non-violent fashion that turned hearts and minds to the cause of the guerrillas while the gaze of the government was elsewhere. The significance of this principle was conspicuous, as Griffith remarked, "Historical experience suggests that

there is little hope of destroying a revolutionary guerrilla movement *after it has survived the first phase and has acquired the sympathetic support of a significant segment of the population*” (Tse Tung 2000, 27).

In the academic realm, British historian John Keegan wrote a biting article, “On the Principles of War,” in the influential military journal, *Military Review* (Keegan 1961). Taking a historian’s approach, Keegan showed how the principles had been derived from and then stuck in Napoleonic warfare concepts. He also summarized much of the criticism directed at the principles; the most common grounds for objection were obscure meaning, categorization, exclusiveness, inclusiveness, internal contradictions, and historical invalidity (64). For example, he pondered such questions as, “Did the principle of *concentration* refer to firepower or numbers; was it directed at the enemy’s strength or weakness, flank or center?” In the case of categorization, he noted that principles differed in kind, with some directed at the will while others were not. Exclusiveness questioned the selection of the principles that made the list as opposed to many other deserving concepts, such as subversion or intelligence, which, while equally viable, did not. The list of principles was also lambasted for its internal contradictions, such as *maintenance of the aim* being at variance with *flexibility*. Keegan then went on to excoriate the principles in terms of their lack of historical validity, pointing out that none of the advocates of principles had conducted systematic, empirical research in support of their lists.

The Principles of War Abide in Spite of Contrary Concepts

But the traditional list of principles lived on, though other concepts did receive more attention. In the 1968 version of FM 100-5, the Army recognized the concept of

political mobilization as subversion and formulated doctrine to address it.⁵¹ Subversion was defined as “covert and clandestine actions by resistance groups to reduce the military, economic, psychological, or political potential of an enemy” (Department of the Army 1968, 11-6), to include infiltration, espionage, propaganda, sabotage, or terrorism. Subversion was used to “undermine the confidence and disrupt social institutions to achieve a desired political objective,” ... “designed to probe and exploit such potential vulnerabilities as widespread popular grievances and dissatisfaction; corrupt, corrupt, oppressive, or weak governments; economic underdevelopment; social inequities; power vacuums, or premature nationalistic ambitions of the people or their leaders” (11-6). The Army offered a positive doctrine of “internal defense and internal development” as a counter to subversion (13-1). The approach required more than traditional military means; paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and sociological actions were needed, as well. However, rather than consisting of “fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war” (5-1), used to describe the traditional principles of war, the section entitled “principles” instead consisted of guidance that was both tautological and largely motherhood (13-1 to 13-2):

- a. The primary task of military assistance in the internal defense and internal development of a friendly country is to help protect the local government from subversion. Particularly dangerous are those subversive elements that gather their strength from the support of external powers.
- b. In a country suffering from the problems of insurgency, the cost of internal defense may arrest the rate of internal development to the point that the government of the host country steadily loses the confidence of its citizens, To

⁵¹ Along with guerrilla warfare and evasion and escape, subversion was one of the three fields that constituted unconventional warfare. See Department of the Army, *Operations of Army Forces in the Field* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968).

relieve the host country of much of this heavy load, U.S. internal development assistance may be required.

c. The extent of Army commitment to a host country usually stems from a U.S. internal defense plan. This plan is a U.S. blueprint for assisting the host government in achieving its objectives through internal defense and internal development. Thus, the internal defense plan provides guidance for the coordinated commitment of resources and the delineation of responsibility between the various U.S. departments, agencies, and Military Services. In-country coordination of the plan is accomplished by the country team.

d. To attain its objective of establishing a peaceful climate for permitting modernization, military assistance and operations are directed to strengthening the host country's military capabilities, to include the invigoration of its regular and paramilitary forces and, in some instances, the civil police organizations.

e. Successful accomplishment of Army assistance missions for internal defense and internal development requires the integration of highly complex psychological, social, economic, political, and military actions.

Thus, while the Army recognized the importance of opposing subversion, doctrinally, it offered little in the way of countering it, particularly in the realm of general principles. Other than *security* and *objective*, the traditional principles were not of much use as guidance in countering subversion, as illustrated in Vietnam.

In all fairness, the late arrival of the U.S. and its perception of outsider in the conflict between North and South Vietnam mitigated its chances of success—subversion had already metastasized. Moreover, the Army's 1966 study, "A Program for the Pacification and Long-Term Development of South Vietnam" (PROVN) (Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations 1966), contained interagency recommendations for pacification that were largely ignored by other departments of the U.S. Government (Birtle 2008). However, a lack of interagency support was not a reason for the Army to dismiss the plan—the Army still could have executed much of it. For example, the Marine Corps' Combined Action Program, in which 14-man teams,

augmented by local militia, lived full-time in villages, were able to deny guerrilla access while also building bonds with the local inhabitants—village-level action that the PROVN plan purported to address.⁵² The lessons of the Banana Wars, archived in the *Small Wars Manual*, had not been lost to the Marines. However, the Army appeared to consider non-military action as largely outside of the Army's role and the responsibility of other U.S. Government agencies (Kretchik 2011).

Annihilation-based Doctrine and Operational Concepts

After the Vietnam War, rather than refining irregular warfare doctrine to address lessons learned, the Army instead turned away from it. The 1976 version of FM 100-5 (Department of the Army 1976) focused exclusively on conventional and limited nuclear war. There were no sections on irregular war, nor was there a list of the traditional principles of war, though some of the principles were included in the narrative in sections detailing how to fight the land battle. The doctrine was effectively a training manual, more tactical than strategic, with graphs of weapon system capabilities and discussions of how to employ them. The doctrine reflected the thoughts of its champion, General William E. Dupuy, a McNamara acolyte enamored with systems analysis (Kretchik 2011, 202).

The 1976 version of FM 100-5 was highly controversial within the Army, with major criticism directed at its dismissal of the principles of war as guides to strategy rather than tactics. One of the foremost critics was General Donn A Starry, commanding general of the Training and Doctrine Command from 1979 to 1981 (Kretchik 2011, 202). Starry was a student of history and a believer in the principles of war. Not only did he

⁵² Interestingly, the PROVN plan called for the Marines to cease enclave operations.

United States	Great Britain and Australia	Soviet Union	France	People's Republic of China
				Political Mobilization
Objective	Selection and Maintenance of Aim	Advance and Cooperation		Selection & Maintenance of the Aim
Offensive	Offensive Action	Offensive		Offensive Action
Mass	Concentration of Force	Concentration	Concentration of Effort	Concentration of Force
Economy of Force	Economy of Effort	Economy of Force		
Maneuver	Flexibility	Maneuver & Initiative		Initiative or Flexibility
Unity of Command	Cooperation	Combined Arms		Coordination
Security	Security	Adequate Reserves		Security
Surprise	Surprise	Surprise and Deception	Surprise	Surprise
Simplicity				
	Maintenance of Morale	Morale		Morale
		Annihilation		
	Administration			
			Liberty of Action	Freedom of Action
				Mobility

Table 10.2. International Principles of War circa 1981 (from Starry, Donn A. "The Principles of War, *Military Review*, September 1981, pp. 2-12.)

direct that the principles of war be added to the 1982 version of FM 100-5, but he also published an article in *Military Review*, explaining their purpose while revising them to bring them up to date for modern warfare (Starry 1981). To Starry, the value of the principles lay in "their utility as a frame of reference for analysis of strategic and tactical issues," as planning interrogatives for the strategist and an operational framework for the

tactician (3). Starry acknowledged that the principles were neither immutable nor causal, nor could they be applied with mathematical precision. He also noted the Napoleonic heritage of the principles of war and their annihilation basis, to which he attributed the international congruence of the principles (see Table 10.2).

Backed by the principles of war, Starry's version of FM 100-5 included AirLand Battle, described as the Army's "basic operational concept." An operational concept was described as the core of an army's doctrine, explaining the way the army fought its battles and campaigns, including tactics, procedures, organizations, support, equipment and training (Department of the Army 1982, 2-1)

The tenets of AirLand Battle doctrine were *initiative*, *depth*, *agility*, and *synchronization*. However, the difference between a tenet and a principle was not explained, vexing, as the two are synonyms for one another. Ostensibly, the tenets were limited to Airland Battle; they did not have the universal scope of the traditional principles of war. Yet, in the case of the tenet, *initiative*, and the principle, *offensive*, there was another clear tautological overlap—*initiative* implied "an offensive spirit in the conduct of all operations" (Department of the Army 1982, 2-2).

The 1982 version of FM 100-5 dispensed with the weapon system graphs and instructions, and returned to the operational level of doctrine. For the first time, the three levels of war were explained in doctrine (Department of the Army 1982, 2-3). The strategic level was the realm of military strategy, where the armed forces were employed to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force. The operational level of war was where military resources were used to attain strategic goals within a theater of war. It was associated with campaign planning and conduct. The

tactical level was where battles and engagements occurred. The boundaries between the three levels were fuzzy, but all three were guided by the same principles. The major focus of the doctrine was still on regular warfare—the Soviet Union was seen as the greatest threat—with some discussion on fighting in a nuclear or chemical environment. But no mention was made of irregular warfare. Only four pages of the manual were allocated to “contingency operations,” which were not defined in terms of missions (Department of the Army 1982, 16-1).

Airland Battle doctrine remained the focus of the 1986 revision of FM 100-5 (Army 1986). It explained that Airland Battle doctrine, as an operational concept, was “rooted in time-tested theories and principles, yet forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies, threats, and missions” (6). As an operational concept, it had to be “definitive enough to guide operations, yet versatile enough to accommodate a wide variety of worldwide situations” (6).

The 1986 version of AirLand Battle doctrine, coupled with dramatic technological improvements made in U.S. military capabilities throughout the 1980s, was vindicated during Operation Desert Storm, against Saddam Hussein’s forces in Kuwait. While Airland Battle doctrine had been primarily written as an operational concept for a confrontation with the Soviet Union, its efficacy was nonetheless demonstrated in a conventional, albeit smaller, war. The attribution of decisive victory to Airland Battle doctrine spurred greater interest in operational concepts along with a proliferation of new ones (Fastabend 2001). However, not only was no attempt made to clarify the differences between operational concepts, principles and tenets, the definitions became increasingly vague as a way of glossing over the lack of definitional precision.

Additionally, operational design concepts, to include *center of gravity*, *culminating point*, and *lines of operations*, were added as new forms of concepts in an appendix to FM 100-5, in an effort to encourage an understanding of operational art. The concepts were not new—Clausewitz and Jomini originally developed them—but it was the first time they had been included in Army doctrine.

Conceptual-based changes in doctrine were not limited to Army doctrine. A dramatic change in doctrine occurred within the Marine Corps in 1989. The Marine Corps published its capstone doctrinal publication, *Warfighting* (United States Marine Corps 1989), describing a shift in warfare style based upon the theories of John Boyd. The Marine Corps shifted from an attrition style of warfare to maneuver warfare—described as “a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope” (59). The aim of maneuver warfare was different from attrition warfare; it sought “to render the enemy incapable of resisting by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole rather than to destroy him physically through incremental attrition, which is generally more costly and time consuming” (59). Even though attrition and maneuver warfare were both based upon the same strategy of annihilation, they differed in their focus on either the physical or psychological object, respectively, to compel defeat.

Maneuver warfare had its own set of concepts for the employment of military capabilities. There was no mention of the principles of war, though some of them were the same. *Speed*, *boldness* and *surprise* enabled *maneuver*, which further enabled the

concentration of strength against weakness. *Decentralization* enabled a quicker *tempo*. The combination of these concepts into maneuver doctrine focused on shattering the enemy's cohesion, organization, command, and psychological balance as its object.⁵³

War and Operations Other Than War

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 spurred a sea change in doctrine and the principles of war within the Army. The evaporation of the only substantial threat to American survival interests pushed Army leaders to open their aperture and view the lesser threats in greater detail. The 1993 version of FM 100-5 returned to the spectrum of conflict, describing it as a range of military operations, consisting of three parts, war, conflict and peace. War involved the use of force in combat operations against an armed enemy. The traditional principles of war provided “general guidance for the conduct of war at the strategic, operational and tactical levels” (Department of the Army 1993, 2-4). In addition, the tenets of Army operations, introduced with the 1982 version of AirLand Battle, were broadened. *Versatility*—the ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements—was added to *initiative*, *agility*, *depth* and *synchronization*, as a basic truth essential to victory (2-6). The tenets were not limited to combat operations; they were also applicable to operations other than war (OOTW) and across the three levels of war.

Operations other than war consisted of Army activities conducted during both conflict and peacetime. Conflict was characterized as hostilities short of war to secure strategic objectives, while peacetime activities were described as influence operations.

⁵³ Although the Marines would update *Warfighting* in 1997, the concepts inherent within maneuver warfare remained the same. See United States Marine Corps, *Warfighting* (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1997).

The addition of OOTW recognized changes in the types of conflict in the post-Cold War era and the Army's role in them.

While the inclusion of OOTW and its lexicon were new to Army doctrine, most of the missions within it were not. Missions within the OOTW portion of the spectrum ranged from support to "U.S., state, and local governments, disaster relief, nation assistance, and drug interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, noncombatant evacuation, and peace enforcement" (Department of the Army 1993, 13-0). OOTW had its own list of principles—some were the same as the traditional principles of war (*objective* and *security*), some were not (*legitimacy*, *perseverance*, and *restraint*), and one was a twist on an old one (*unity of effort* was the desired result from *unity of command*). The principles of OOTW consisted of and were defined as follows (13-3):

- Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.
- Unity Of Effort: Seek unity of effort toward every objective.
- Legitimacy: Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.
- Perseverance: Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.
- Restraint: Apply appropriate military capability prudently.
- Security: Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.

Implicit within the OOTW principles was the recognition that a different set of concepts was needed for conflicts and operations that did not pit armies against armies. Not recognized, however, despite an understanding by at least some historians of the

strategy of annihilation and its associated Napoleonic-era principles, was *why*. The strategies used in OOTW were not annihilation-based; subsequently, different counterstrategies and concepts of employment were called for. As discussed earlier, a strategy of exhaustion normally avoids a quick, decisive campaign, favoring a protracted conflict instead. In such a case, *perseverance* is required to counter it. In a strategy of subversion, where a battle is fought over *legitimacy* and the hearts and minds of the populace, *restraint* is required in order to avoid tipping rectitude and popular support to the enemy. These “new” principles constituted old wine in new bottles, in that they reflected lessons initially learned during the constabulary period of operations prior to WW I.

American involvement in a number of third world incidents, such as in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia, put the new OOTW doctrine to the test. Some Army leaders found the doctrine wanting, in that it wasn't definitive nor detailed enough to provide practical guidance. Others were confused by it, unable to distinguish between war and OOTW and the appropriate guidance to follow. Still others ignored it altogether, stuck in a conventional warfare mindset, built upon a belief that armies were for fighting wars, not ancillary operations. (Kretchik 2011, 232-242) Another group dogmatically stuck to the list of traditional principles of war as a panacea for all Army operations, deriding the OOTW principles as unnecessary.


Joint Doctrine Becomes Authoritative

In 1996, with the publication of *Joint Vision 2010* (Joint Staff 1996), a seemingly new set of operational concepts made their way into the debate on operational concepts. *Joint Vision 2010* was the conceptual template for how the services would fight jointly in

the early part of the 21st century. It included four operational concepts: *dominant maneuver*, *precision engagement*, *full dimensional protection*, and *focused logistics*, that together were to achieve *full spectrum dominance* against America's enemies. *Joint Vision 2010* also referred to *power projection*, enabled by *overseas presence*, as a strategic concept. What constituted a strategic concept was not defined in either *Joint Vision 2010* or the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Joint Staff 2001), nor was the term operational concept defined. Despite its lack of rigor and thinly veiled repackaging of *maneuver*, *offensive*, *security*, and *sustainment* as operational concepts, beefed up through the use of adjectives, *Joint Vision 2010* was still a powerful document from the standpoint of authoritative service doctrine. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act had increased the authority of the Joint Staff over the other services, mandating "jointness" in everything from doctrine and warfighting to acquisition and systems integration. Future service doctrine also had to dovetail into joint doctrine.

The next revision to FM 100-5, redesignated FM 3-0 to comply with the joint doctrine numbering system, didn't emerge until 2001. OOTW was renamed Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in order to coincide with Joint Pub 3-0, *Operations*, which was released in 1995 (Joint Staff 1995). Similarly, FM 3-0 deferred to the joint definition of MOOTW, described in JP 3-0 as "an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace" (Joint Staff 1995, vii). The lion's share of MOOTW missions consisted of stability and support operations, as illustrated in Figure 9.2. The other two types of operations were mostly applicable to the war portion of the spectrum and some small-scale contingencies.

Stability operations were said to be conducted to “promote and protect US national interests by influencing the threat, political, and information dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis” (Department of the Army 2001, 1-



15), while support operations employed Army forces “to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepared for or responded to crises and efforts to relieve suffering.” In offensive operations, the aim was to destroy or defeat an enemy, with the purpose of imposing US will on the enemy. The aim of defensive operations was “to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations,” with a purpose of creating conditions for a counteroffensive in order to allow

Army forces to regain the initiative. (Department of the Army 2001, 1-15 to 1-16)

The traditional principles of war and the tenets of Army operations, also described in the previous version of FM 3-0, were recounted as representing the “foundation of Army operational doctrine” (Department of the Army 2001, 4-11 to 4-19). However, there was some overlap of the principles and tenets in the description of the characteristics of offensive and defensive operations. *Surprise, concentration, tempo, and audacity* were said to *characterize* the offense. On the defensive side, preparation, security, disruption, massing effects, and flexibility were described as characteristics of successful defensive operations. In the cases of stability and support operations, however, conceptual-level principles were not used to characterize operations; instead, they were characterized by environmental factors. Rather than clearing up the conceptual confusion between principles and tenets, the 2001 version of FM 3-0 instead further obfuscated the issue with the addition of characteristics, which were neither differentiated from one another nor accurately explained individually. Moreover, MOOTW principles were not mentioned at all in either Joint Pub 3-0⁵⁴ or the Army’s FM 3-0. Instead, separate joint doctrine on MOOTW existed in Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, which also included the MOOTW principles (Joint Staff 1995).

The U.S. Marines had also fallen in line with joint MOOTW doctrine, including it in their *Marine Corps Operations* doctrine, MCDP-1 (United States Marine Corps 2001). The doctrine was written for Marine forces at the component and Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) levels. MCDP-1 shared some aspects of the Army’s FM 3-0 in its

⁵⁴ The next revision to JP 3-0 in September of 2001, however, would list the MOOTW principles. JP 3-0 was published after FM 3-0, which was published in June of 2001.

discussion of offensive and defensive operations, with principles and tenets included in the characteristics the operations. However, it did not refer to stability and support operations, instead addressing them as MOOTW in a separate chapter, while also referring to the *Small Wars Manual*. The principles of MOOTW were included in the Marine doctrine; the principles of war were not.

Infatuation with Operational Concepts

Meanwhile, infatuation with operational concepts continued. While a definition of what exactly constituted an operational concept was lacking,⁵⁵ it did not stop the services from pumping them out like rounds from a machine gun. As Colonel David A. Fastabend noted, “The term *operational concept* pervades the media as a colloquial expression but is sorely missing as a rigorous legitimate term of military art” (Fastabend 2001, 38). The proliferation of concepts mutated into a host of different types, to include umbrella concepts, functional concepts, capstone concepts, overarching concepts and integrating concepts (40).

In an attempt to bring some order to the morass of operational concepts, John F. Schmitt, a former Marine Corps officer and author of several Marine Corps’ doctrinal publications, spearheaded a project to develop a framework for military concepts and to provide practical guidelines for their development (Schmitt 2002). Schmitt developed a hierarchical scheme with four levels of *military concepts*: *institutional concepts*, which described military institutions; *operating concepts*, which described how military forces would operate; *functional concepts*, which described the performance of individual

⁵⁵ The term operational concept was not defined in Joint Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 2001).

military functions or sub-functions; and *enabling concepts*, which described the capabilities required in order to perform military functions or sub-functions (Schmitt 2002). Operating concepts were further divided into three levels: strategic concepts, operational concepts, and tactical concepts, coinciding with the levels of war. Additionally, he described the most fundamental operating concepts as *capstone operating concepts*. Schmitt's construct eventually made its way into joint and service doctrine, providing some order to the plethora of military concepts that were generated. However, there was a critical piece missing from the operating concepts—the connection to strategy. Additionally, there was a lack of transparency with regard to the specific conditions foreseen for their application. The operating concepts either made assumptions or ignored altogether how a specific adversary would fight in a particular situation and environment. Operating concepts represented generalized solutions to general warfighting problems, acting as templates for likely scenarios within a given strategy or style, such as the strategy of annihilation or maneuver warfare. If the given adversary, his strategy, and the situation fit the assumptions inherent within the operating concept, then positive results were achievable. If not, then a strategy-concepts mismatch resulted, with inappropriate doctrine applied with negative results.

A second war with Iraq in 2003 provided another opportunity to test U.S. doctrine, while also illustrating the problem associated with a strategy-concepts mismatch. The annihilation-based doctrine and capability of U.S. forces initially showed their efficacy during a quick and near-decisive defeat of Iraqi conventional forces in the first three phases of the war, conducted in March and April of 2003. The fourth phase, however, which focused on the stabilization, recovery and transition of Iraq back to the

Iraqis, did not go so well, instead growing into a full-blown insurgency. There were many reasons given for the failure of phase IV to stabilize Iraq. Two of them were beyond the scope of doctrine to fix; because strategy and doctrine are subordinate to policy, errors in policy can seldom be corrected by changes to strategy or doctrine. The Bush Administration's policies of debathification and the dismissal of the entire Iraqi military disenfranchised important segments of Iraqi society (Gordon and Trainor 2006, 479-483). Additionally, planners had not considered an insurgency as a potential outcome following the first three phases. Even if they had, the 2001 version of FM 3-0 was largely silent with regard to guidance on countering an insurgency. An insurgency was considered a function of Foreign Internal Defense (FID), a niche in the MOOTW spectrum best thought handled by Special Operations Forces (SOF) or joint forces (Department of the Army 2001). It was a subject that warranted a little over one page in FM 3-0, instead referring to Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Joint Staff 1995), or FM 100-25, *Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces* (Department of the Army 1999), neither of which provided much more in the way of specifics for countering an insurgency.

While some commanders did understand and attempt to win "hearts and minds," most others did not, instead employing "seek and destroy" tactics against insurgents without much regard for the populace. Additionally, planners had counted on the Iraqi Army to fill the shortfall in U.S. troop numbers, necessary in order to establish an environment of security. The shortage of numbers may also have exacerbated the "kinetic" mindset of U.S. troops (Benson 2006). According to Major General Peter Chiarelli, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and Task Force Baghdad, the Cold War

combat mindset that still permeated Army culture was particularly problematic, with the MOOTW principle *restraint* anathema in a setting where insurgents were shooting at U.S. troops (Chiarelli and Michaelis 2005):

With a firm grasp of the complexity of the Arab culture and the value placed on extreme concepts of “honor above all,” the task force concluded that erosion of enemy influence through direct action and training of Iraqi security forces only led to one confirmable conclusion—you ultimately pushed those on the fence into the insurgent category rather than the supporter category. In effect, you offered no viable alternative. Kinetic operations would provide the definable short-term wins we are comfortable with as an Army but, ultimately, would be our undoing. In the best case, we would cause the insurgency to grow. In the worst case, although we would never lose a tactical or operational engagement, the migration of fence-sitters to the insurgent cause would be so pronounced the coalition loss in soldiers and support would reach unacceptable levels.

Counterinsurgency Doctrine

By 2005, two key Army and Marine Corps leaders were in positions to effect major changes in doctrine. Army Lieutenant General David Petraeus and Marine Corps Lieutenant General James Mattis joined forces to publish a joint Army/Marine Corps manual on *Counterinsurgency* (COIN), designated FM 3-24 for the Army and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5 for the Marine Corps (Department of the Army 2006, Kretchik 2011). In the opening paragraph of the introduction, the COIN manual recognized the strategy-concept mismatch that had handicapped ongoing efforts in Iraq. According to the manual, America’s enemies, unable to compete conventionally on the battlefield, would “try to exhaust US national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support” (Department of the Army 2006, ix). The insurgency was recognized as partly being fought using a strategy of exhaustion. On the other hand, the counterinsurgency had been fought with a strategy of annihilation, without much success.

The manual defined an insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict” (Department of the Army 2006, 1-1). The aim of both the insurgents and constituted government was “to get the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate” (1-1); in effect, supporting legitimacy as a principle of MOOTW, at least in the case of an insurgency.

The COIN manual identified a number of different approaches taken by insurgents, from revolution and coup de ètat, to guerrilla warfare and identity-focused movements. The coup de ètat was described as a conspiratorial approach, citing Lenin’s Bolshevik Revolution as an example. Three types of guerrilla warfare were also identified as insurgent approaches, to include Che Guevara’s *focoism*, Carlos Marighella’s urban guerrilla warfare and Mao Tse Tung’s protracted popular war, with examples including Cuba, Latin America and China, respectively. Finally, an identity-focused approach was described as a movement in which mobilization, based upon common identity or religious affiliation, was used to instigate rebellion. Approaches weren’t just limited to these approaches individually; they could also be combined into composite approaches. (1-7 to 1-8) Rather than addressing each approach individually, the COIN manual ambitiously attempted to address all of them through their common characteristics. However, this disregard for the different strategies upon which many of the approaches are based constituted an overreach—concepts needed to counter strategies of annihilation, exhaustion, intimidation and subversion are unique to each strategy.

Additionally, instead of addressing counterinsurgency from the perspective of joint doctrine—specifically, Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other*

Than War (Joint Staff 1995)—the COIN manual instead referred to the offensive, defensive, stability construct developed in the 2001 version of FM 3-0, *Operations* (Department of the Army 2001). All COIN operations were said to include varying amounts of offensive, defensive and stability operations, depending upon the situation.

The COIN manual also listed a set of principles for counterinsurgency, which included the following (1-21):

- Legitimacy is the main objective
- Unity of effort is essential
- Political factors are primary
- Counterinsurgents must understand the environment
- Intelligence drives operations
- Insurgents must be isolated from their cause and support
- Security under the rule of law is essential
- Counterinsurgents should prepare for a long-term commitment

All of the old MOOTW principles were evident in the list, although no mention or reference was made to them as MOOTW principles. Intelligence, the environment, and isolation were evidently added as principles.

The COIN manual also included a new conceptual set in what it labeled *imperatives*. A definition of an imperative was not offered, nor was a distinction made between imperatives and principles. Unanswered was whether an imperative, normally considered as preemptory or obligatory, trumped the principles. The imperatives consisted of the following (1-24):

- Manage information and expectations
- Use the appropriate level of force
- Learn and adapt
- Empower the lowest levels
- Support the host nation

The COIN manual received mixed reviews, with some exhorting its appropriateness to the situation in Iraq while others viewed it as too dogmatic and that it overemphasized theories about nation building (Kretchik, 267). Nonetheless, along with the additional insurgency experience that the Army garnered in Iraq, the COIN manual would become influential in the next revision to FM 3-0 in 2008 (269).

An Expanded List of Principles of Joint Operations

Meanwhile, the Joint Staff had also put together a revision to JP 3-0, renamed *Joint Operations* (Joint Staff 2006). The new version consolidated JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, and JP 3-0 formally titled *Doctrine for Joint Operations*. The term and acronym for Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) was discontinued, however, the three unique MOOTW principles of *legitimacy, restraint, and perseverance*, were added to the traditional principles of war as “other principles.” The combined list was referred to as the 12 principles of joint operations, which were described in an appendix. The 2006 revision to JP 3-0 also changed the range of military operations, described simply as war and MOOTW in the 2001 version, to three categories, consisting of (Joint Staff 2006, 1-11):

- Major operations and campaigns
- Crisis response and limited contingency operations
- Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence

The utility of splitting the range of military operations into three categories was questionable, as seven different types of operations were listed within the three category titles. Moreover, the categories provided little in the way of distinguishing characteristics from which simplified, generalizable guidance could be made. Major operations and campaigns were characterized by their complexity and the simultaneous inclusion of

offense, defense and stability operations throughout all phases of an operation. Crisis response and limited contingency operations were more limited in scope, scale, and objective than major operations, and were conducted to protect US interests and prevent surprise attack or further conflict. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations were designed to “shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence” (Joint Staff 2006, ix). In short, the descriptions of the three categories described more of a hierarchy of operations based upon complexity, scope, and scale than a range.

The Army published an updated version of FM 3-0 in September of 2008. Hailed by the Army as a “revolutionary departure from past doctrine,” the doctrine claimed revolutionary status by virtue of its operational concept, titled *full spectrum operations*, “where commanders employ offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results” (Department of the Army 2008, Foreword). In truth, however, the same concept had been proffered in the 2006 version of JP 3-0. Offensive, defensive, stability and civil support operations comprised the elements of full spectrum operations, which were further broken down into tasks and purposes. For example, offensive tasks were described as movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. The purposes of offensive operations were listed as (Department of the Army 2008, 3-9):

- Dislocate, isolate, and destroy enemy forces
- Seize key terrain
- Deprive the enemy of resources

- Develop intelligence
- Deceive and divert the enemy
- Create a secure environment for stability operations

In the case of stability operations, the tasks included civil security, civil control, restoration of essential services, support to the government, and support to economic and infrastructure development (3-13). The purposes of stability operations were identified as (3-14):

- Provide a secure environment
- Secure land areas
- Meet the critical needs of the populace
- Gain support for host-nation government
- Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success

While the lists of purposes contained more definitive intent with regard to the tasks advocated, they also included concepts that could be plugged into strategy. For example, in the case of offensive operations, *deception*, *dislocation*, *isolation*, and *deprivation* are key concepts used in both annihilation and exhaustion strategies. In the case of stability operations, *security* of the populace and *popular support* are key concepts used to counter a strategy of subversion.

The new version of FM 3-0 followed JP 3-0 in its listing of the now 12 principles of war and operations in an appendix, with *perseverance*, *legitimacy* and *restraint* described as additional principles of joint operations. Rather than following joint guidance with regard to the range of military operations, however, the Army stuck with the spectrum of conflict, redefined in terms of increasing levels of violence, consisting of stable peace, unstable peace, insurgency, and general war. Within the spectrum of conflict, operational themes, consisting of major combat operations, irregular warfare,

peace operations, limited intervention, and peacetime military engagement, further described the general character of operations.

While the principles of war were limited to an appendix, elements of operational design were prominently discussed as conceptual guidelines of operational art used in the planning of operations. Effectively, operational art was strategy formulated at the operational level of war, described as, “the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war” (Department of the Army 2008, 6-1).

Operational design was described as the bridge between the strategic end state and the execution of tactical tasks, which helped a commander clarify and refine his concept of operations by providing a framework to describe operations. Major design conceptual elements included center of gravity, decisive points, operational reach, tempo, simultaneity and depth, culmination and risk (Department of the Army 2008, 6-1 to 6-19). Operational design elements were limited to the operational level of war, distinguishing them from the more general principles of war. However, while operational design elements were fully discussed on how they were to be used in operational planning, the principles of war were not. While the principles of war still maintained their exalted status as principles, the fact that they had literally been banished to the back pages of doctrine spoke otherwise.

Conclusion

The critics were right. The principles of war are not principles of war at all. While the designation of concepts such as *objective*, *offensive*, *mass*, *economy of force*, *maneuver*, *unity of command*, *security*, *surprise*, and *simplicity* as principles may have been appropriate within the context of the annihilation-based strategy of the Napoleonic-era, they do not (and never did) pass the universality test across the spectrum of conflict, required for the appellation of principle of *war*. While a case can be made that they were, in fact, “principles of Napoleonic-era annihilation,” the point is moot and of only historical significance. More important is the understanding that concepts may or may not be appropriate for given strategies and situations. While generalizations can be made with regard to certain strategies and situations, overgeneralizations and simplifications are problematic.

Identification of the concepts as principles, which encouraged theorists and war planners to apply them dogmatically, contributed to their inappropriate application in situations where annihilation was malapropos while suppressing consideration of alternate concepts more fitting for a better counterstrategy. The use of the term principle needs to be dropped from the military lexicon as it has caused more problems than it solved. It has been an albatross around the neck of strategy. So what to do with the erstwhile principles? In the next chapter, I will discuss how the aforementioned principles, tenets and operational design concepts, which I will call *concepts of employment*, fit into a theory of strategy, organized in accordance with the objects of war.

The same is true of operating concepts. Operating concepts pre-package concepts of employment with means for use in situations as pre-formulated components of

strategy. The operating concepts are often explicit with regard to the means utilized, but seldom so for the strategies and situations for which they may or may not be applicable. Operating concepts cannot be dropped haphazardly into strategies—they must be tailor-fit for the strategies employed by the antagonists and the situation.

A theory of military strategy must describe and explain the way in which military concepts, means, strategy and objectives are linked. This is explained in the following chapters.

PART IV: A THEORY OF MILITARY STRATEGY

CHAPTER 10: CONCEPTS OF EMPLOYMENT

Be audacious and cunning in your plans, firm and persevering in their execution, determined to find a glorious end, and fate will crown your youthful brow with a shining glory, which is the ornament of princes, and engrave your image in the hearts of your last descendants.

Carl von Clausewitz, 1812

Without concepts of employment, there can be no strategy. Concepts of employment describe the “ways” of military strategy⁵⁶—that is, they provide the *action* required of military means to achieve military objectives. In this chapter, I will describe concepts of employment, how they are different from the principles of war, discussed in the preceding chapter, and the theoretical relationship between the concepts of employment and strategy.

Principles and Operational Concepts

As the previous chapter demonstrated, the principles of war were a misnomer—they were neither fundamental truths nor universal across the spectrum of conflict. Additionally, as many previous critics suggested, the principles were plagued by differences-in-kind that resulted in an awkward amalgamation of concepts, consisting of organizational prescriptions of military means (*unity of command* and *economy of force*), a planning prescription (*simplicity*), the desired outcome (*objective*), a psychological effect (*surprise*), along with the actions of *offensive*, *mass*, *maneuver*, and *security*. While the non-actionable concepts had value in describing various aspects of war and war planning, they did not provide an actionable bridge between the means of war and their objectives.

⁵⁶ Military strategy is defined as “A plan that describes how military means are utilized through concepts of employment to achieve military objectives.”

More recently, the services have produced a number of operational concepts, ranging from warfighting doctrine, such as Airland Battle, to acquisition and training guidance such as *Joint Vision 2010*. In both cases, the operational concepts were stylized types of war, based upon military means, either current or desired, respectively, and a given strategy—annihilation. In both cases, the inclusion of concepts different-in-kind was not necessarily problematic, as long as the operational concepts were used in situations befitting a strategy of annihilation. Unrecognized, however, was the strategy limitation this imposed. Use of a strategy other than annihilation could potentially suffer a strategy-concepts mismatch. The concepts, whether physical and psychological characteristics of the means or actions describing their employment, could be completely wrong in a strategic context different from the one envisioned in the operational concept.

It should also be mentioned that there is nothing inherently wrong with the selected principles and concepts individually—indeed, they represent important characteristics of, and actions for, military forces. Criticism is simply directed at the limitation this imposes upon strategy and the confusion that combinations of concepts different-in-kind can have within the realm of strategy.

Strategy describes how military means are to be employed to achieve objectives through *actionable* concepts. Concepts that describe the physical and psychological *characteristics* of military forces and the forces themselves represent givens—that is, entering arguments—for the concepts of employment to link to military objectives, whether given or chosen. Physical characteristics do not describe how military forces are to be employed. For example, in a strategy of annihilation, advantage might be taken of a military's firepower, speed and mobility superiority in armored forces, by tasking them to

maneuver against the rear of an opponent, *demoralizing* and *intimidating* the enemy forces into surrender. The physical characteristics of firepower, speed and mobility were inherent within the armored forces. The concepts of employment of *maneuver* and *demoralization* gave action to a substrategy of intimidation, causing local forces to surrender, in support of the larger strategy of annihilation. With regard to the physical characteristics, the armored forces were either built to go fast or not—concepts of employment did not grant them speed. They took advantage of it. The armored forces were either mobile or they were not—concepts of employment did not make them so. The armored forces either had extensive firepower or not—concepts of employment did not instill it in them.

While strategy must consider the physical and psychological characteristics of military means in order to take advantage of them and employ them, *strategy can only take the characteristics of military forces as givens*. This does not mean that pre-formulated operational concepts are not useful. They are—but strategists must be careful to note their strategy limitations before blindly plugging them into a strategic context. An annihilation-based operational concept will not succeed against a subversion-based insurgency.

One of the virtues of using concepts of employment in the crafting of strategy is that they transcend the levels of war, whether strategic, operational, or tactical. This results in a leaner lexicon. As descriptors of action, concepts of employment simplify the planning process, as the same terms can be used across the levels of war.

Selected Concepts of Employment

Military strategy has been defined in this dissertation as “a plan that describes how military means are utilized through concepts of employment to achieve military objectives.” Concepts of employment describe how military means are to be employed in order to achieve objectives. They are the verbs of strategy—they indicate the performance of *action* towards a causal end.

Table 11.1 shows the concepts of employment selected through content analysis of the strategy writings of notable practitioners and theorists of strategy, to include: Sun Tzu, Wu-Tzu, Huang Shih-Kung, T'ai Kung, Wei Liao-tzu, T'ang T'ai-tsung, Li Weikung, Carl von Clausewitz, Antoine Jomini, Frederick the Great, Hans Delbrück, Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels, Vladimir Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, Yuri Bezmenov, B. H. Liddell-Hart, John Boyd, André Beaufre, Qiao Liang, and Wang Xiangsui. While the authors proffered many additional principles and concepts, only actionable concepts were selected.⁵⁷ It should be noted that the list of concepts of employment in Table 11.1 is not exhaustive—there exists a multitude of other actionable concepts that are useful in the employment of military means. As technology has advanced and proliferated since the aforementioned theorists and practitioners of strategy wrote their treatises, so too has the set of useful concepts of employment.⁵⁸ Additionally, the role of creativity and imagination in the application of concepts not generally considered appropriate for

⁵⁷ The initial coding of the writings resulted in 824 entries of guidance on strategy and concepts. The data was reduced to the items listed by consolidating common items and synonyms and the elimination of non-actionable concepts.

⁵⁸ The development of a comprehensive set of concepts of employment was beyond the scope and research design of this dissertation.

military means should not be discounted. Nonetheless, concepts in Table 11.1 suffice as an exemplar for the purpose of theory development.

The concepts are categorized by their province of employment—that is, whether the concept pertains to the physical, organizational, or psychological domain. The entries with two concepts contain the actionable concept, identified first, followed by the term it is more commonly referred to in the strategy literature (definitions of the concepts are in the glossary). Some of the concepts are listed as both physical and psychological concepts, italicized for easier identification, as they are applicable in both the physicals and psychological domains. The definitions of the concepts are given in the glossary. Physical concepts are distinguished from organizational and psychological concepts of employment in that their action is directed in the physical domain. They are often used in strategies directed against an enemy's means of resistance or, in the case of the strategy of extermination, the population itself. Similarly, psychological concepts of employment are actions directed against an enemy's attitudes, beliefs, and resolve through cognitive, emotional, and volitional processes. Organizational concepts of employment, on the other hand, are used to coordinate and systematize actions. Several concepts, italicized in Table 11.1, are actionable in both the physical and psychological domains.

Concepts as Strategies

The concepts of *exterminate*, *exhaust*, *annihilate*, *intimidate*, and *subvert*, bolded in the table, are special as high-order concepts that also serve as strategies.

There are a number of reasons that mark these concepts as suitable as both strategies and concepts of employment.

Physical	Organizational	Psychological
Annihilate; Annihilation	Cooperate; Cooperation	<i>Control</i>
Assassinate; Assassination	Decentralize; Decentralization	Deceive; Deception
Attrite; Attrition	Economize; Economy of Force	Deter
<i>Control</i>		Demoralize; Demoralization
Deprive; Deprivation	Assess; Net Assessment	<i>Dislocate; Dislocation</i>
<i>Dislocate; Dislocation</i>	Protract; Protractedness	Exhaust; Exhaustion
Disperse; Dispersion	Simplify; Simplicity	Intimidate; Intimidation
Exhaust; Exhaustion	Synchronize; Synchronization	Legitimize; Legitimacy
Exterminate; Extermination	Time; Timing	Lure
Freedom of Action	Unify; Unity of Command	Persevere; Perseverance
Isolate	Unify; Unity of Effort	Persuade; Persuasion
Maneuver		Mobilize; Political Mobilization
Mass		Restrain; Restraint
Offense; Offensive (Attack)		Subvert; Subversion
Paralyze; Paralysis		Surprise
Secure; Security		Terrorize; Terror
Sustain; Sustainment		
Table 11.1 Concepts of employment organized by physical, organizational, and psychological actions.		

First, several of them have already been institutionalized as the bases of military strategies. Given the importance of maintaining the semantic field of an area of study as much as possible when re-conceptualizing concepts for theory (Sartori, Guidelines for Concept Analysis 2009c), it is prudent to abide by contemporary terminology if there is no compelling reason to change it. The strategies of annihilation and exhaustion are already mainstream mini-theories of military strategy. While the strategy of extermination is seldom discussed in terms of strategy, its outcome as genocide has

received a great deal of attention, particularly since the holocaust. Similarly, intimidation as a strategy has not necessarily been termed as such, but two types of warfare, deterrence and terrorism, are based upon it. The same is true of subversion, upon which revolutionary warfare, coup d'états, and the first phase of guerrilla warfare are based. In the cases of intimidation and subversion, these concepts-as-strategies accurately and succinctly describe the strategies upon which deterrence, terrorism, revolutionary warfare, coup d'états, and guerrilla warfare are based, filling a high-level, semantic void in the military strategy lexicon.

Second, the concepts of *exterminate*, *exhaust*, *intimidate*, *annihilate*, and *subvert* are conclusive actions in terms of stopping the enemy from fighting for some period of time. For example, subverting an enemy into believing that further resistance is futile can cause him to cease hostilities and accept a political solution. Similarly, exhausting an enemy or annihilating an enemy's means of resistance can result in the same belief and the same end. Intimidating an enemy can prevent the enemy from fighting at all, compelling him to surrender the political objective with only a threat of violence. However, as Clausewitz noted, a permanent peace may not be won with these strategies—the enemy may just wait for a better opportunity to recommence fighting. Nonetheless, this conclusiveness feature towards the objects of strategy, even if only temporary, distinguishes these high-order concepts as strategies in that they can directly link military means to an end state.

It should be noted that the two strategies at the ends of the military strategy continuum, *extermination* and *subversion*, are different in that they are the most likely to achieve a permanent end state. The most radical and criminal of the concepts is to

exterminate an enemy, which will eliminate a group as a threat once and for all. Indeed, it is “the “final solution.” When a strategy of subversion is successful in changing the belief system of a people towards final acceptance of a political end, it is also unique in its capacity to win a peace.

Third, the five concepts as strategies are necessary and sufficient to account for a wide range of hybrid strategies and warfare types (discussed in more detail in chapter 13), to include genocide, protracted popular war, guerrilla warfare, maneuver warfare, attrition warfare, deterrence, shock and awe, terrorism, revolution, and the coup d'état. While most of the warfare types are based upon single concepts as strategies, protracted popular war illustrates the power of combining strategies through phasing, which may be appropriate for certain situations. For these reasons, these concepts are designated as the five basic military strategies, discussed in depth in the following chapter.

The five basic military strategies provide general strategy templates for connection to the means and ends of war. The inclusion of lower order concepts of employment within each of these strategies makes them unique and fitting for a given situation. Concepts of employment provide conceptual solutions to particular situational problems posed by mismatches in one's own and the enemy's capabilities, the environment, and other situational factors.

The Physical Concepts of Employment

Physical concepts of employment describe how military means are employed in the physical domain in order to support or achieve objectives. Physical concepts of employment embody strategy as “the art of making war upon the map” (B. D. Jomini

2005), describing the physical actions to be conducted by military forces to defeat an enemy.

Although physical concepts are employed in the physical domain, obviously, they can and often do result in psychological outcomes. Indeed, with the exception of the strategy of extermination, the entire point of the destruction and killing in war is to achieve acquiescence of the political objective from the living. An enemy that maintains a means to resist is likely to also maintain a will to resist. Dead men have no will—but the threat of death provides the living, which do possess a will, a reason to acquiesce. Thus, while the ultimate goal is psychological in compelling an enemy to submit to one's will, physical acts of violence are often necessary to lead to a decision to submit. Such is the fundamental logic of war. Thus, physical concepts of employment, which focus on ways to diminish an enemy's means of resistance in the corporeal realm, are necessary to describe how such action is to be carried out by military means.

Physical concepts can be used in any of the five basic military strategies, though some concepts align more naturally with certain strategies. For example, *dispersion* and *isolation* are key concepts of employment in a strategy of exhaustion, whereas *mass* and *attrition* are fundamental to the strategy of annihilation. Sustainment is a critical concept of employment in both strategies of annihilation and exhaustion. In the case of a strategy of exhaustion, sustainment is important as a counter concept in frustrating an enemy from affecting a stranglehold on its intended victim. In a strategy of annihilation, sustainment must be sufficient to support an offensive before reaching the point of culmination. Assassination is often employed in a strategy of intimidation (such as in terrorism), but infrequently in a strategy of annihilation. *Paralysis*, *isolation*, and *attrition* are key

features of a strategy of extermination, but may not be applicable in a strategy of subversion. However, there is nothing that prohibits the inclusion of a physical concept of employment in any basic military strategy—the needs of the situation dictate which concepts of employment should be used.

Just as substrategies can be hierarchically tiered in support of basic strategies, concepts of employment can also be tiered in different combinations in support of substrategies. For example, in Protracted Popular War, Mao described campaigns of annihilation as the means of attaining strategic attrition (Tse Tung, *Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan* 1938a). In other words, a strategy of annihilation could be used as a substrategy at the operational level of war within an overarching strategy of exhaustion at the strategic level. While perseverance would be a key concept of employment in an overarching strategy of exhaustion, attrition in the form of an extended series of local, quick and decisive battles at the operational level would still support the objectives of the higher order strategy of exhaustion.

Psychological Concepts of Employment

Psychological concepts of employment are directed against an enemy's attitudes, beliefs, and resolve in order to induce capitulation. They do so by taking advantage of perception and the cognitive, emotional, and volitional processes that lead to changes in attitudes, beliefs and resolve.

Psychological concepts of employment are not new. However, their efficacy has increased as psychology has grown into a science rather than a set of platitudes, as Clausewitz described them during his era (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 185), coupled with the advent of new technological means through which to employ them. A

new age of psychological manipulation began in 1896, with three key innovations that increased the speed and reach of propaganda on an unprecedented scale (Taylor 1995). Daily newspapers achieved overnight, worldwide mass circulation with *The Daily Mail*, a British newspaper. The wireless telegraph, invented by Guglielmo Marconi, brought news not only to the literate, but illiterate listeners as well. The advent of cinematography, combining audio and visual mediums, brought news to people through local theaters in an even more powerful and persuasive form. The invention of television in the mid-20th century provided propagandists with yet another powerful tool of persuasion. With survival interests at stake during two world wars, any moral misgivings about the use of powerful techniques of psychological manipulation were unshackled, with propagandists given license to use them against not just the enemy, but one's own people, as well.

Some psychological concepts of employment are triggered by physical acts. For example, *terror* can be induced through a display of death and destruction. Psychological *dislocation* and *surprise* can be achieved through the *maneuver* of troops from an unexpected direction and *massed* at a decisive point against the enemy, possibly intimidating the enemy into surrender. The *isolation* and physical *exhaustion* of military forces can *demoralize* them. In cases such as these, while physical concepts of employment are used against physical forces, the ultimate objects are the minds of the living—more specifically, the will to further resist—achieved through the employment of psychological action. In other words, physical actions can be catalysts for psychological triggers that can evoke desired changes in attitudes, beliefs or resolve.

Psychological concepts of employment can also be used directly against the resolve of an enemy. For example, propaganda can be used to *deceive, demoralize, delegitimize, persuade, mobilize, restrain* or *subvert* an enemy, all purely within the psychological domain, without resort to violent physical action. This can be done through the dissemination of ideas and words, images and sounds—sometimes insidiously, oftentimes bypassing the enemy’s means of resistance altogether. For example, news of the Vietnam War was broadcast straight into the living rooms of the American people, occasionally delivering unfiltered enemy propaganda directly to a psychologically defenseless public.

Most of the psychological concepts of employment have both negative and positive applications that are often at the core of action. For example, in an insurgency characterized by an insurgent group’s use of a strategy of subversion, insurgents may attempt to *delegitimize* a government while the government does everything it can to *legitimize* its rule. Insurgents may attempt to provoke the government into violent action against the people while the government responds with *restraint*. Alternately, insurgents may seek to *mobilize* the people to action against the government through propaganda, while the government attempts to *demobilize* them.

Deception and *luring* are two important psychological concepts that take advantage of cognitive and emotional processes. *Deception* is used to mislead an adversary, getting him to believe in a false state of affairs from which to take advantage of him. *Luring* goes one step further, baiting an enemy into entrapment.

Organizational Concepts of Employment

Organizational concepts of employment provide form and cohesiveness between military means and concepts of employment in order to achieve objectives. They provide important management tools for leaders to bind individuals to collective goals. They also enable a division of labor between elements within the group, detailing the “who, what, when and where” with the “how” provided by the physical and psychological concepts of employment.

One of the most important organizational concepts of employment is the *net assessment*.⁵⁹ A net assessment is “an appraisal of military balances” (Cohen 1990). It involves a “comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations (DoDD 5111.11 2009). It includes both quantitative and qualitative evaluations of both the physical and psychological capabilities of the antagonists involved in the conflict. Initially reductive in scope, it is holistic in its end form, with tactical level capabilities integrated so that the fighting capabilities of the whole can be understood at the strategic level. It also includes the goals and objectives of the adversary that, when coupled with his capabilities, can give insight into the strategy an enemy might likely employ.

In the physical domain, both side’s weapon systems, such as rifles, tanks, ships, aircraft, are initially assessed in terms of their fighting characteristics, such as speed,

⁵⁹ Arguably, a case can be made that *net assessment* is more accurately categorized as a *pre-organizational* concept of employment, as it establishes an understanding of the component pieces of military means from which organizational concepts can then be employed in the formulation of strategy. While an assessment requires a certain amount of organization, it is also a precursor for organizational action. Thus, although classifying *net assessment* into its own special category might be more accurate, the virtue of simplicity offsets this technicality.

range, explosive yields of ordnance, etc., in order that comparisons can be made to determine which has an advantage in a given situation. But the effectiveness of such weapon systems also depends upon the quality and training of their operators and the doctrine and operational concepts that guide their employment. Additionally, the environment in which weapon systems are used can have a tremendous impact on their effectiveness. Consequently, these factors must also be added to the assessment. An assessment must also look beyond mere comparisons of tanks vs. tanks, aircraft vs. aircraft, etc.; it must also look at asymmetric combinations of weapon system employment, such as aircraft and infantry used against an enemy's tanks.

The net assessment extends beyond a state's war *fighting* means, it also includes its war *making* means. A country's economy represents its engine of war—it is the source for the production of its war fighting machines and the sustainment of its armies and population. An assessment of an adversary's economy can provide an indication its key resource deficiencies, critical industries, and endurance.

Psychological assessments are also important, at both the individual and group levels. An individual military commander's ability to lead impacts the fighting capability of units under his command, not just in terms of the competent employment of his forces, but with regard to their morale, resolve and fighting spirit. Psychological weaknesses of leaders, as Sun Tzu pointed out, can also be exploited with great asymmetric effect. An enemy political leader's true political goals, to include what he will and will not accept, are also important insights that need to be assessed for input into strategy. Additionally, knowing who has influence over a leader may provide an alternate way to influence or

coerce him. The structure of an adversary's government and its bureaucratic processes are also important as they also factor into the decision-making process.

Understanding the culture of an enemy population is also critical, to include its history and long standing animosities, and the role of religion and ideology in society and the government. While an understanding of an enemy's culture is particularly crucial to strategies of subversion and intimidation, it is also useful as an indicator of how a people may react to losses incurred, such as when strategies of exhaustion or annihilation are used. It is particularly important in determining whether or not a population may be intimidated into submission following defeat of its military forces through annihilation.

A net assessment not only provides the inputs for strategy formulation, it also suggests organizational constructs for it. By identifying strengths and weaknesses, it identifies potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited through other concepts of employment detailed in strategy. It also identifies the focal object of strategy, the center of gravity, in Clausewitz's terms (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 595). The focal object is the defeat mechanism of the adversary, either a key aspect of his physical means of making war, or a critical psychological feature underlying his resolve. The focal object must be causally connected to the political object of war in the strategy that ensues from the net assessment. The net assessment is special amongst the concepts of employment, given its leading role in the organization and formulation of strategy.

The other organizational concepts of employment provide more traditional guidance in the management of capabilities. *Economy of force* and *unity of effort* describe the efficient allocation of capabilities and the cooperation between them needed to achieve objectives. *Unity of command* is a centralizing organizational concept that

describes the hierarchical authority that is often necessary to achieve *unity of effort*.

Decentralization, on the other hand, is useful in situations in which the direction of local commanders by a higher authority is inappropriate, such as in situations where the action is fast and fluid, necessitating the exercise of initiative by local, subordinate commanders.

Timing and *synchronization* describe the organization arrangement of capabilities in time and space to achieve aims. Similarly, protractedness expresses the drawing out of operations in time, conceptually important to a strategy of exhaustion.

The concept of *simplicity* is basic to strategy due to the difficulty inherent in the execution of operations, accurately characterized by Clausewitz as friction (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 119). Keeping strategy as simple as possible increases the probability that plans and operations will be conducted as intended. The preparation of clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders helps to limit mistakes and avoid unnecessary friction.

Conclusion

Concepts of employment are critical elements of strategy. They provide the action between the means and ends of war. Discarding non-actionable concepts eliminates confusion introduced by concepts different-in-kind. Identifying actionable concepts as concepts of employment provides a cleaner, clearer military lexicon that enhances rather than confuses our understanding of strategy.

Organizing concepts of employment in accordance with the objects of war, either physical, in the case of addressing an enemy's means of resistance and disarming him, or psychological, in the case of engaging an enemy's will to resist and breaking his resolve, also provides simplicity and coherency to the strategy planning process. Connecting

concepts of employment to the objects of strategy also helps to prevent strategy-concept mismatches.

CHAPTER 11: THE FIVE BASIC MILITARY STRATEGIES

In this chapter, I explain the five basic military strategies of extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation and subversion. The strategies proffered are the result of a comprehensive meta-data analysis, hermeneutical analysis, and comparative meta-analysis of the works of past strategy theorists (described in chapters 3-8). I also describe them in terms of concepts of employment, developed in the previous chapter. The five basic military strategies and concepts of employment are fundamental to a theory of military strategy as they, along with the two objects of strategy (physically disarming the adversary or psychological diminishing his resolve to resist) provide the foundation for a strategy framework. I define each of the strategies and give examples of their use in order to explicate their key features. I also describe the interrelationships between strategies in examples from past wars and conflicts

The Strategy of Extermination

By strategy of extermination, I mean “a plan that describes how military means and concepts of employment are used to achieve the extirpation of a group of people.”

The strategy of extermination is seldom, if ever, described as a legitimate strategy in books or articles on strategy, for good reason. As strategy, it is considered amoral in modern times, and is contrary to international law. In truth, it is about as unimaginative a strategy that one could conceive—it takes little in the way of innovation or skill to create and implement other than the decision and justification to kill everyone and take what’s left. Nonetheless, as a strategy, it should not be overlooked simply because of its simplicity, as it is still used on occasion and, though despicable, needs to be understood

in theoretical terms as not only a key part of the basic military strategy continuum, but in order to develop counter strategies.

Strategy theorists have largely avoided the strategy of extermination in their discussions of strategy and war theory. Clausewitz did give it a mention, while also alluding to a war aims continuum. Clausewitz stated,

Generally speaking, a military objective that matches the political object in scale will, if the latter is reduced, be reduced in proportion; this will be all the more so as the political object increases in predominance. Thus it follows that without any inconsistency wars can have all degrees of importance and intensity, ranging from a war of extermination down to simple armed observation. (81)

Instead, extermination has more often been described in the telling of history.

The strategy of extermination has a long, ugly history in warfare although it is still used in contemporary times. In ancient times, the strategy of extermination was used either to take territory and its associated resources, to eradicate a hated enemy, or in a two-part strategy of conquest. In the first two cases, two versions of the strategy were employed. In the extreme version (which I will refer to as “absolute extermination”), the entire population occupying a desired territory or comprising a hated group was killed, to include all men, women and children. In the less extreme version (which I will refer to as “selective extermination”), the men were killed, but the women and children were either sold into slavery or assimilated, according to the tradition of the period.

Both of these versions of extermination can be found in the Bible, with God, perhaps shocking to some, attributed as the source of the strategy of extermination. The strategy of absolute extermination can be found in the old testament of the Bible, with God directing the Israelites to exterminate the Amalek, a hated enemy of the Jews (The Holy Bible, Samuel 15:3):

3 Now go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass.

An example of selective extermination (albeit somewhat contradictory in whether to kill women or to spare them, but leave them unmarried) can also be found in the Bible (The Holy Bible, Deuteronomy 7:1-3):

1 When the LORD thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou goest to possess it, and hath cast out many nations before thee, the Hittites, and the Girgashites, and the Amorites, and the Canaanites, and the Perizzites, and the Hivites, and the Jebusites, seven nations greater and mightier than thou;

2 And when the LORD thy God shall deliver them before thee; thou shalt smite them, and utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor show mercy unto them:

3 Neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son.

The Romans also used the strategy of extermination when it suited their purpose, as was the case against Carthage. The Punic Wars consisted of three wars fought between Rome and Carthage between 264 BC and 146 BC. The first two wars were won by Rome, but at great expense and only temporary resolution. Both sides sought Mediterranean hegemony. Cato the Elder, a Roman statesman, visited Carthage in 153 BC to check on the status of the Carthaginians, expecting them to be downtrodden and poor due to the harsh terms the Romans had imposed after the Second Punic War. Instead, he found a vibrant and wealthy city, an army, and a navy. Cato, alarmed by the resurgence of the hated Carthaginians, began a political mobilization campaign to end the threat once and for all, calling for the extermination of Carthage. In every speech he made in the Senate, regardless of the subject, Cato would end it with “Carthage must be destroyed!” In 146 BC, the Romans eventually laid siege to Carthage, destroying it and

killing a great number of men, women and children. The rest were sold into slavery. (Le Bohec 2011, Polybius and Hulsch 1889)

In a third case, extermination was coupled with intimidation in a sequential, two-phased approach (which I will refer to as “extermination-intimidation”) to support an overarching strategy of intimidation, illustrating how basic military strategies can also be used as substrategies. Genghis Khan used this strategy quite effectively in conquering Central Asia and China. Khan would ride up with his army to a city or locale and offer that the people could either submit to his will and live under his rule peacefully, paying tribute, or resist, in which case Khan would wage a war of extermination upon the populace. When an adversary chose to resist, Khan fulfilled his threat, destroying the populace except for a few, who were freed to tell others of the fate that awaited those who would resist Khan. When Khan would march on the next city, which had by then heard of the extermination, its people were intimidated into surrendering to Khan’s will rather than risking almost certain death at the hands of the mighty Mongol army.

(Morgan 1986, 93) The extermination-intimidation approach had the dual benefit of taking cities and tribute-payers intact, while also suffering no losses to one’s own forces.

Genghis Khan was neither the first or last to use the approach of extermination-intimidation. Thucydides famously documented the use of the approach by the Athenians against the Melians in *The History of the Peloponnesian War* (Thucydides 2007). The Athenians threatened the Melians with selective extermination if they wouldn’t join Athens in an alliance. When the Melians refused, the Athenians laid siege to Melos, killing all of the men and enslaving the women and children. The strategy of *intimidation*

though extermination failed, forcing the Athenians to selectively exterminate the Melians as a matter of prestige.

The extermination-intimidation approach survived as a legitimate way of war up until the American Civil War and the institutionalization of the Lieber Code. Francis Lieber had drafted a code of conduct in war that, among other things, forbade the practice of “no quarter.” President Lincoln signed it as a general order for Union forces. Eventually, this prohibition would make its way into the Hague Regulations and the laws of war in international law.

The strategy of extermination was also condemned in a United Nations resolution after the Holocaust of World War II. In 1944, a Polish lawyer, Raphael Lemkin, had described the strategy of extermination in terms of genocide, a word coined from the Greek term *genos* (race) and the Latin term *cide* (to kill). He broadened the definition of extermination with genocide described as a crime committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group.” Lemkin submitted a draft resolution for the prevention of genocide, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948. (Ford 2008) Yet, in spite of international law prohibiting genocide, its practice continued well into the late 20th and early 21st centuries, with genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sudan.

Strategy of Exhaustion

According to the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military (2004), the strategy of exhaustion is defined as, “A strategy emphasizing the gradual and often indirect erosion of the enemy's military power and will to resist.” Its utility is described as being limited to certain situations, as, “when a nation is unable or unwilling to apply

the force necessary to achieve its objectives through annihilation of the enemy but risks high casualties and materiel losses and a protracted war, either of which may be politically unacceptable” (The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the US Military 2004)

The strategy of exhaustion is a favorite of the weaker sides in conflict, as it does not require a preponderance of force. However, it does demand perseverance and a great deal of resolve, as the strategy seeks to avoid decisive battle, except when local conditions point to a clearly advantageous situation whereby victory can be achieved. Otherwise, the weaker side engages in “death by a thousand cuts,” physically and psychologically weakening the adversary over the course of time.

The strategy of exhaustion is one of the oldest in warfare. Wu-Tzu, one of the great ancient Chinese masters of strategy, described its use at the tactical level of war through the conduct of a series of hit-and run raids (Sawyer 2007, 211):

Ch'u's character is weak, its lands broad, its government troubling [to the people], and its people weary. Thus while they are well-ordered, they do not long maintain their positions. The Way [Tao] to attack them is to suddenly strike and cause chaos in the encampments. First snatch away their ch'i-lightly advancing and then quickly retreating, tiring and laboring them, never actually joining battle with them. Then their army can be defeated.

At the operational level, Clausewitz saw exhaustion as a way to turn the tide of a war, reducing a stronger side to one of relative weakness. He viewed the strategy of exhaustion as initially useful while on the defensive, as a way to diminish the enemy's means and will to resist, while also buying time until an offensive could be mounted. He advocated a retreat into the interior of the country, which provided the indigenous army with the advantage of the first draw on resources, while denying the same to the

opponent, stretching and weakening his lines of communication and culminating his fighting strength. According to Clausewitz (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 469):

...[A] voluntary withdrawal to the interior of the country [i]s a special form of indirect resistance--a form that destroys the enemy not so much by the sword but by his own exertions. Either no battle is planned, or else it will be assumed to take place so late that the enemy's strength has already been sapped considerably. (469)

Clausewitz also considered the use of the strategy of exhaustion in certain situations at the strategic level, such as when the defeat of an enemy's army was not possible, the political aims did not justify the expenditure of force, or as a way to buttress a diplomatic strategy (such as breaking up an enemy alliance or building one's own). The key was to make the war more costly to the enemy. Clausewitz postulated that this could be done in three ways (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 93):

... [T]here are three other methods directly aimed at increasing the enemy's expenditure of effort. The first of these is invasion... simply to cause general damage. The second method is to give priority to operations that increase the enemy's suffering. The third, and far the most important method ... is to wear down the enemy. ... Wearing down the enemy in a conflict means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance. [*italics in original*]

The use of a strategy of exhaustion is dictated by the situation. The decision to use a strategy of exhaustion should be driven by an accurate net assessment of the forces available to both sides within the context of the geo-strategic situation and the desired political ends. It is a strategy well suited to a country outmatched in the means of war against an invading or occupying enemy. However, it is often a strategy of second resort, used when a country's primary means of resistance—that is, its standing forces—prove incapable of overcoming or withstanding an opponent through a failed strategy of annihilation. The strategy of exhaustion is typically more effective when a country's

survival interests are at stake, as the entire population can be mobilized in either combat or supporting roles, contributing to the resistance. Nonetheless, for an invaded country with meager means of resistance, the strategy of exhaustion is often the strategy of choice.

The strategy of exhaustion is sometimes referred to as the Fabian strategy, after Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, nicknamed the Cunctator (“delayer”) after his delaying tactics. Fabius had been given the dubious honor of leading Rome’s army against the great and brilliant Carthaginian general, Hannibal Barca during the Second Punic War. In an initial case of strategy overcoming numbers, Hannibal had skillfully employed the strategy of annihilation against the Romans. Hannibal had led devastating attacks against the Romans at the battles of Trebia and Lake Trasimene. At Trebia, Hannibal had lured the Romans into an ambush, allowing them to cross the Trebia River before pushing them back into the river in a rout. At Lake Trasimene, Hannibal again set an ambush for the Romans, this time along the bank of Lake Trasimene, which served as a pass between the lake and a large, tree-lined hill. Hannibal and his men executed the ambush to perfection, killing approximately 15,000 Romans while losing only 1,500 of their own. In battles fought by both adversaries intent upon annihilation, Hannibal reigned supreme. The road to Rome was open to Hannibal and his forces. However, Hannibal did not attack Rome, instead he attacked the periphery of Rome, attempting to sever the loose loyalties of Rome’s followers and gain more allies for a final, decisive attack on Rome. However, in not attacking Rome, Hannibal gave Rome time to raise another army, led by Fabius. (Pennell 1890)

Instead of immediately marching to engage Hannibal in another decisive battle, Fabius altered Rome's strategy from annihilation to exhaustion. Fabius initially shadowed the Carthaginians, waiting for advantageous situations to strike. Intelligence about the enemy was critical. While shadowing Hannibal, Fabius maintained his own freedom of action, giving his forces a way out of potential traps set by Hannibal. When Hannibal would offer battle, Fabius would refuse it, escaping along an alternate route. He would harass and attack Hannibal's scouting and foraging parties, setting up situations of local superiority, in order to inflict losses on Hannibal's forces in limited but steady acts of attrition. Additionally, Fabius executed a scorched earth policy around Hannibal's army, in order to deprive the Carthaginians of food and to further wear them down. Hannibal's forces were unable to receive supplies or reinforcements from Carthage. Moreover, they were dependent upon local allies with questionable allegiances, who were worn down and demoralized by the constant Roman harassment and attrition. Time was a friend to Rome, allowing it to regain its strength, while slowly exhausting Hannibal's army. (Pennell 1890)

However, even though the strategy of exhaustion had provided Rome with a chance to regroup, it was not popular with the people or the Roman Senate, who viewed it as too passive and not a strategy befitting of a great empire. The protracted nature of the strategy required patience and persistence, two properties in short supply. Gaius Ternetius Varro, who quickly led the Roman army into decisive battle with Hannibal at Cannae, replaced Fabius. Hannibal devastated Varro and the Roman army in one of the most studied and storied battles of all time, using a double envelopment to annihilate a

Roman army made up of 16 Legions (8 Roman and 8 Allies), killing or capturing close to 70,000 troops (Delbrück 1990, 327).

Appalled by the defeat, Rome finally saw the wisdom of the Fabian strategy and reinstated it. Rome recovered its strength and, switching back to a strategy of annihilation, attacked and defeated Carthage, ending the Second Punic War.

Another example of a switch to the strategy of exhaustion necessitated by failure implementing a strategy of annihilation occurred in the American Revolution. George Washington, trained in the conventional strategies and tactics of the British during the French and Indian War, initially sought out decisive battle with his “dual army,” consisting of Continental regulars and militiamen, against the British army, only to lose many of those battles. The British army was simply qualitatively and quantitatively superior to the American army. The militiamen, while effective in harassing British foraging or patrolling detachments, were often as much a liability as an asset in conventional warfare. The militiamen were natural guerilla fighters, but they had neither the training nor discipline for set piece, European style warfare. However, the British were fighting far from home. Attrition of British forces required a long, five-week journey across the Atlantic for reinforcements. Additionally, the British Empire had great demands for its military elsewhere, as Britain also faced France, Spain and the Dutch Republic in a global war, concurrent with the American Revolution.

After a series of costly victories and defeats in the north, the Americans effectively settled into a strategy of exhaustion. Washington had learned the hard way that decisive battle with the British needed to be avoided, unless the circumstances were overwhelmingly in his favor. Instead, it was more important to keep the Continental army

intact as a force-in-being, only fighting the British in limited engagements where success was all but insured. British garrisons in towns such as Trenton, New Jersey, offered situations in which Washington could achieve local superiority against the British. At Trenton, Washington and his force of 2,400 men surprised a 1,500 man garrison, capturing or killing almost 1,000 of the Hessians. When General Cornwallis responded with 6,000 troops in an attempt to decisively engage and destroy the Americans, Washington and his men slipped away, and instead attacked and defeated a smaller British force at Princeton. Security, good intelligence and the maintenance of freedom of action were critical in allowing Washington to hit the enemy and evade a larger force pressing in on him. (Millett and Maslowski 1984, 69)

While Washington's new strategy was logical given the disparity in quantity and quality between the opposing armies, it also suffered from one of the strategy of exhaustion's key drawbacks—demoralization. By avoiding decisive battle, the war could be stretched out to eventually wear down the enemy. But protracted conflict is a double-edged sword—it can be as demoralizing to one's own forces and population as it is to the enemy's. Avoiding decisive battles and limiting the fighting to small raids, skirmishes, and the destruction or capture of supplies risked demoralization amongst Washington's troops and war weariness in the American people, who could just as easily view the avoidance of decisive battle as cowardice and indecision, rather than a strategy tailor-made for the situation. Washington understood this. Yet, he was able to persevere and convinced others to stay with the strategy by picking his battles and achieving just enough in the way of victories to maintain morale. (Millett and Maslowski 1984)

The French entry into the war in 1778, followed by the Spanish in 1779 and the Dutch in 1780, changed the strategic calculus. Britain had more to worry about with a world war than just a colonial rebellion. After a period of strategic stalemate, the Americans, augmented by French troops, supplies and her Navy had the means necessary to implement a strategy of annihilation, which culminated in Yorktown on October 17, 1781 with Cornwallis' surrender. (Millett and Maslowski 1984)

The Strategy of Annihilation


Hans Delbrück defined the strategy of annihilation as a strategy “which sets out to attack the armed forces and destroy them and to impose the will of the conqueror on the conquered (Delbrück 1990, 109). Delbrück's definition, largely influenced by Clausewitz, pointed out the dual nature of the strategy of annihilation, consisting of both physical and psychological objects, though his theoretical framework did not make this distinction.⁶⁰ (Clausewitz, *On War* [1832] 1976, rev.1984)

Underlying the strategy of annihilation is the assumption that as long as the enemy has the means to resist, it will maintain the will to resist. Clausewitz explained the logic thusly (77):

The worst of all conditions in which a belligerent can find himself is to be utterly defenseless. Consequently, if you are to force the enemy, by making war on him, to do your bidding, you must either make him literally defenseless or to at least put him in a position that makes this danger probable. It follows, then, that to overcome the enemy, or to disarm him--call it what you will--must always be the aim of warfare.

⁶⁰ The reader is again reminded about the differences in the way that “poles” are used in this framework and Delbrück's framework. According to Delbrück, the strategy of annihilation consisted of a single-pole, battle, while the strategy of exhaustion consisted of the two poles of battle and maneuver. In this framework, battle and maneuver occur in the physical pole, with the other pole psychological.

The strategy of annihilation can be used to obtain virtually any political objective that an adversary has within his power to concede. The strategy normally requires a preponderance of force when accomplished through attrition. It does not necessarily require absolute superiority at the strategic level of war—though it does require at least local superiority at the operational and tactical levels of war when accomplished through attrition. However, surprise can substitute for some combat power when used to psychologically dislocate an enemy and break his cohesion.



As the above discussion illustrates, there are two approaches to the strategy of annihilation—*annihilation through attrition* and *annihilation through dislocation*, aimed at either the physical object or psychological object, respectively. In the strategy of annihilation through attrition, the focus is on physically destroying the enemy's fighting force to the point it no longer has the physical capability to fight. In the strategy of annihilation through dislocation, the focus is on breaking the cohesion of the enemy's fighting force so that it no longer maintains the will to fight.

The distinction between the two may seem trite at first glance, but it is not. In both cases, the enemy is disarmed, setting the stage for capitulation. The way in which the enemy is disarmed, however, is quite different in the two versions of the strategy. In the strategy of *annihilation through attrition*, the objective is to seek out and physically destroy the enemy, killing his troops and destroying his military equipment. It employs a straightforward approach, normally involving direct engagement of the enemy without wasting time or resources on attempts at surprise or deception, which, according to Clausewitz, arguably rarely achieved much anyway, in the balance between the benefits derived from the extra effort expended.

Annihilation Through Attrition.

One example of the strategy of annihilation through attrition occurred during the American Civil War. The situation that confronted U.S. Grant after his appointment as Commanding General of the Army by Abraham Lincoln necessitated a strategy of annihilation. The North was effectively fighting a war of conquest, with reunification the main policy objective and the freedom of slaves an ancillary goal. However, Northern support of the political objectives was divided, with some viewing the aggressive nature of the Union cause as unconstitutional and others quite happy to let slavery continue. Additionally, while the Union had been able to put more troops and equipment in the field, the protracted nature of the conflict had weighed heavily on the morale of the Northerners, who were becoming increasingly war weary as the conflict dragged on. The situation dictated a strategy that could achieve victory within the shortest time possible, before support for the war was lost. (Weigley 1977)

Grant understood this. He set out to defeat the two principle armies of the Confederacy, the Army of Northern Virginia, led by Robert E. Lee, and the Army of Tennessee, led by Joe Johnston. Grant directed George Meade, in charge of the Army of the Potomac, to destroy Lee's Army of Northern Virginia, using a potential attack on Richmond to force Lee to fight. Grant similarly ordered William Tecumseh Sherman, in charge of the Army of the Tennessee, Army of the Cumberland, and Army of the Ohio, to defeat Johnston's Army of Tennessee and take "the heart of Georgia" (Grant [1885] 2000), meaning Atlanta, a major Southern logical hub. Grant consolidated his Union forces, moving as much of his garrisoned forces and border defenses to his field armies as he could afford. The approach of both Meade and Sherman was to be direct; they were to remain engaged with the enemy using the concepts of concentration and mass to pound the confederate forces unrelentingly. This was made clear in Grant's direction to Meade, "Lee's Army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also" (Grant [1885] 2000).

The defeat of the Southern forces in a decisive battle was the goal; Grant realized, however, that it would take a string of battles, to wit, a decisive campaign, to disarm the two main Southern armies, though Grant held a significant numerical advantage.⁶¹ Nonetheless, each battle was approached with the goal of defeating the Southern armies decisively. The enemy's flanks were attacked repeatedly, with the strategy of annihilation

⁶¹ It should be noted that Grant's strategy of annihilation through attrition was modified in the South to include elements of exhaustion and terror during Sherman's march. See Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977), for a more in depth analysis of Grant's strategy.

through dislocation used as a tactical-level sub-strategy to the overarching campaign strategy of annihilation through attrition. Though the Southern forces were not disarmed in a single decisive battle, the attrition over the course of the battles finally took its toll. The two main Southern armies were bled dry. (Weigley 1977)

With the bulk of the Southern main armies defeated, the South faced the decision to either continue a guerrilla war or to capitulate. Many in positions of leadership advocated guerilla warfare, with Lee's Chief of Artillery, General Porter Alexander, among them. Alexander implored Lee to direct his troops to take to the woods and report to their governors rather than surrender to Grant. Lee, seeing nothing but more anguish, destruction and hardship in this, replied:

... "[Y]ou and I as Christian men have no right to consider only how this would affect us. We must consider its effect on the country as a whole. Already it is demoralized by the four years of war. If I took your advice, the men would be without rations and under no control of officers. They would be compelled to rob and steal in order to live. They would become mere bands of marauders, and the enemy's cavalry would pursue them and overrun many sections they may never have occasion to visit. We would bring on a state of affairs it would take the country years to recover from. (Alexander 1908, 605)

It wasn't that Lee was personally intimidated into surrender—he wasn't—but the prospect of continuing the fight through a guerrilla campaign with only more carnage to show for it was an intimidating vision for both the South and the North to the foresighted Lee. Grant's generous terms also contributed to the surrender decision.

Annihilation Through Dislocation.

In the strategy of *annihilation through dislocation*, the object is to break the will of the enemy's fighting forces through psychological dislocation. Psychological dislocation normally entails the use of an indirect approach, attacking along a line of least expectation, surprising and confusing the enemy, and instilling fear and panic to break

the cohesion of the enemy fighting force (Liddell Hart [1954] 1991). In this way, an enemy is more likely to surrender or abandon an objective, with less total destruction in the effort. B.H. Liddell Hart and John Boyd were advocates of this approach. Maneuver Warfare doctrine, adopted by the U.S. Marine Corps, is essentially a style of warfare that employs the strategy of annihilation through dislocation, as it focuses on breaking the cohesion of the enemy fighting force. According to Marine Corps doctrine (U.S. Marine Corps 1997):

Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy “system”—to incapacitate the enemy systemically. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as part of a cohesive whole (37).

... The aim is to render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his components, which is generally more costly and time-consuming (73).

Rather than forcing capitulation through the physical destruction of the enemy’s means of resistance, the strategy of annihilation through dislocation compels it in a more efficient manner by breaking the will of the resistors to continue fighting, though they may still possess the physical means of further resistance. The German defeat of the French in World War II is a case in point.

The situation that Germany faced in May of 1940 looked promising, even though the clouds of world war hung heavy over Europe. Hitler had used subversion, deceit and intimidation in not only retaking much of what the Germans had lost in the Treaty of Versailles, but more, with the lightning quick defeats of Austria, Czechoslovakia,

Poland, and Denmark, with Norway soon to follow. (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart, Strategy [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

Hitler had seemingly fallen into a strategic pattern. He would first surreptitiously mobilize his forces on the border of his intended victim, often justified by some phony infraction committed against the indigenous Germanic peoples of the targeted country. Once Hitler's forces were ready to begin the attack, he would deliver an eleventh hour ultimatum to the targeted country. But the die was already cast. Hitler's forces would march before the terms of the ultimatum had been reached without regard to the deadline. The targeted country would quickly surrender or fall, lacking the time to mobilize its forces and mount a defense. The strategy was deceitful in that Hitler would break treaties or lie about his intentions to attack, feigning defense of his own countryman or the safeguarding of a country's neutrality as his motive. (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

In directing his military plans for each targeted country, Hitler would emphasize that each country needed to be taken quickly and decisively in order to present a *fait accompli* to frustrate any potential intervention by outside powers. The strategy had worked magnificently, but when Hitler started making threats towards Belgium and Holland, the western states were onto it. They were resolute that they wouldn't let it happen again. They intended to intervene and engage the German forces at the outset when the Germans stepped off ... which was exactly what Hitler and his military wanted. (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart, Strategy [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

On May 10, 1940, the Germans notified the Belgium and Netherlands that German troops were entering their countries to "safeguard their neutrality." If any

opposition was offered, the Germans threatened that resistance would be crushed and the responsibility for it would rest with Royal Belgium and Royal Netherlands governments. It appeared that Hitler was once again following his strategic bullying pattern directed at Belgium and the Netherlands.

The Allied Supreme Command expected that the Germans would attempt some version of the Schlieffen plan, with an attack through northeastern Belgium towards the English Channel before wheeling south towards the border of France. Quickly occupying the English Channel coasts of Belgium and the Netherlands, the Germans would disrupt British-French links, while also providing ports and airbases from which to attack Britain. The Allied Supreme Command thought that the eastern part of Belgium was largely impenetrable by mechanized forces due to the rugged Ardennes Forest, while the impregnable Maginot line defended the northeastern border of France from an attack from Germany, directly. Based upon these expectations, the Allied Supreme War Council devised "Plan D," in which the British Expeditionary Force and the French First and Ninth Armies would race to defensive positions along the Dyle and Meuse rivers in the defense of Belgium. The French Seventh Army was also to head north to Holland in order to help defend the Dutch. Quantitatively, the French, British, Belgium and Dutch forces, with 135 divisions, were equally matched to the German forces, with 136 divisions. (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart, *Strategy* [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

If the Germans had stuck to their original Schlieffen-like plan, the Allied defense might have fared better, as it would have matched their expectations. But the Germans had made a major change to Operation *Fall Gelb* (Case Yellow). While the Germans still wanted to deny the French and British the defensive use of Belgium and the Netherlands,

they would do so by first allowing the French and British to occupy much of it, ensnaring them in a trap, before annihilating them. Rather than wheel down from the north and roll back the Allied forces, the Germans had changed Operation *Fall Gelb* to feign an attack from the northeast in order to draw and hold the Allied forces there, while still taking key objectives. However, the main effort consisted of a completely unexpected armor attack from the Ardennes Forest across the north of France, catching the Allies by surprise and trapping them in the north. One witness to the offensive noted, “There can be no doubt ... that it was the collapse of the Armies of the Meuse and at Sedan which, by uncovering the rear of the troops engaged in Belgium, led to the complete failure of the entire scheme” (Bloch 1999, 41). Additionally, the speed of the German advance was so rapid, that the French leadership’s will to resist cracked. On May 15th, Premier Paul Reynaud of France called Churchill and told him: “We have been defeated! We are beaten!” (Shirer, 720) Yet, the French still maintained effective military forces in the field.

The Belgians surrendered on May 28, 1940, dealing another blow to French morale. The British and French forces in Belgium, consisting of nine BEF divisions and 10 French divisions, attempted to fight their way south, but were caught between the hammer of Bock’s Army Group B and an anvil consisting of the Runstedt’s Army Group A, with its seven tank divisions. However, due to an inexplicable temporary halt order given by Hitler, by June 3rd, the British were able to evacuate 338,000 British and French soldiers from Dunkirk. The Germans captured the remaining 40,000 French troops on June 4th. (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart, Strategy [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

Operation *Fall Gelb* had worked as planned, setting the stage for the next operation, *Fall Rot* (Case Red), designed to defeat the remaining French and British

mainland troops and take France. *Fall Rot* was initiated on June 5th, with the Germans advancing over the Somme River towards the Seine. This was followed by the main effort, directed towards the center over the river Aisne, flanking and rolling back the Maginot Line. The tempo of the new offensive completely broke the French High Command. Generals Pétain and Weygand had given up any hope of defending France (Shirer, 738). The rollback snowballed, and the French surrendered on June 22nd. (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart, *Strategy* [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

The combination of tempo, terror and surprise of the German offensive was devastating. The French were never able to recover, even though they were able to withdraw from engagements and attempt to reorganize their defenses. But the French were stuck in the old doctrine of time-distance that was no longer applicable given the greater tempo made possible through mechanized warfare. Marc Bloch, a French staff officer who participated in the initial defense of Belgium and evacuation at Dunkirk, described it thusly (Bloch 1999, 38):

“The truth of the matter was that the Germans advanced a great deal faster than they should have done according to the old rules of the game. ... It was perfectly obvious that as soon as the Army of the Meuse had been broken, and the enemy began to show signs of becoming active on our front, the only hope of re-establishing the general situation lay in our ‘disengaging,’ and establishing a new defensive line sufficiently far back to ensure that it would not be overrun before it had been organized.”

The strategy of annihilation through dislocation was well matched to the material means and doctrine that the Germans had innovated. While the Allies deployed their tanks for infantry support and thinly spread their tanks along their defensive front in a

static approach to the defensive,⁶² the Germans employed their tanks together in armored divisions in a more dynamic approach that could pierce defensive lines and operate in the deep rear of the enemy. The Germans also combined their armor attacks with Stuka dive-bombers, linked by radio communications, in a combined arms approach. The Stukas had been outfitted with sirens, nicknamed the “Horns of Jericho,” that wailed as the bombers dove, emitting a terrifying sound that unnerved and panicked those on the ground, augmenting the psychologically dislocation the enemy. According to Bloch (Bloch 1999, 54),

Nobody who has ever heard the whistling scream made by dive-bombers before releasing their load is ever likely to forget the experience. It is not only that the strident din made by the machines terrifies the victim by awakening in his mind associated images of death and destruction. In itself, and by reason of what I may call its strictly acoustic qualities, it can so work upon the nerves that they become wrought to a pitch of intolerable tension whence it is a very short step to panic.

Bloch also detailed the dislocating effects of tempo and surprise he witnessed (Bloch 1999), lending credence to Liddell-Hart’s description of dislocation:

It can be seen from what I have said that the war was a constant succession of surprises. The effect of this on morale seems to have been serious. ... Men are so made that they will face expected dangers in expected places a great deal more easily than the sudden appearance of deadly peril from behind a turn in the road which they have been led to suppose is perfectly safe. Years ago, at the Battle of the Marne, I saw men who the day before had gone into the line under murderous fire without turning a hair, run like rabbits just because three shells fell quite harmlessly on a road where they had piled arms.... ‘We cleared out because the Germans came.’ Again and again I heard that said in the course of last May and June. Analyzed, the words mean no more than this: ‘Because the Germans turned up where we didn’t expect them and where we had never been told we ought to expect them.’ Consequently, certain breakdowns, which cannot, I fear, be denied, occurred mainly because men had been trained to use their brains too slowly. Our soldiers were defeated and, to some extent, let themselves be too easily defeated, principally because their minds functioned far too sluggishly.”

⁶² An infantry division was normally supported by a battalion of about 100 tanks.

The Strategy of Intimidation

The strategy of intimidation is defined as the compulsion of or deterrence from some action by the threat or violence.”

Thomas Schelling (Schelling 1966) perhaps best described the relationship between physical force and the psychology of intimidation:

It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted, or that a victim believes can be withheld or inflicted. The threat of pain tries to structure someone’s motives, while brute force tries to overcome his strength. Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it. Whether it is sheer terroristic violence to induce an irrational response, or cool premeditated violence to persuade somebody that you mean it and may do it again, it is not the pain and damage itself but it’s influence on somebody’s behavior that matters. It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all.

The strategy of intimidation is most effective when it is used to take an objective intact without fighting. Effectively, the enemy is bullied into giving up the political objective without a fight or intimidated against the taking of an objective through a fight. The enemy’s perception of the fighting forces he faces does not necessarily need to comport with reality. Indeed, in many cases intimidation occurred through the skillful use of deception, making one’s forces appear more threatening than they actually were. However, the use of deception to induce a perception of fighting force that doesn’t exist carries with it a great deal of risk if the enemy calls one’s bluff.

As discussed previously, sometimes the strategy of intimidation requires a demonstration of physical power to achieve credibility in the mind of the enemy. This demonstration can range from a military parade, tactical battlefield success, to the test

firing of a nuclear weapon. In this way, a strategy of extermination, exhaustion, or annihilation can be linked to the strategy of intimidation through the establishment of a credible threat of more damage to come.

There are two versions of the strategy of intimidation—compellence⁶³ and deterrence. Compellence generally seeks to intimidate an enemy into giving up a political objective, preferably without a fight, based upon the threat of action—that is, physical force. It is normally employed as an offensive strategy. Deterrence generally seeks to intimidate an adversary into inaction—that is, from seeking a political objective, through the threat or use of force. It is normally employed as a defensive strategy. Both versions of intimidation use threats—in compellence, the threat seeks to coerce an adversary *to do* something, while in deterrence, the threat seeks to dissuade the adversary *from doing* something. Compellence may involve the partial use of force to be effective. In deterrence, the use of force is considered a failure of the strategy.

The strategy of intimidation through compellence was illustrated in Hitler's conquest of Denmark in 1940. Hitler was very specific about how the intimidation was to take place. On March 1, 1940, Hitler issued the following directive (Shirer 1990, 681):

The development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and Norway. This operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia and the Baltic. Further it should guarantee our ore base in Sweden and give our Navy and the Air Force a wider starting line against Britain.

In view of our military and political power in comparison with that of the Scandinavian States, the force to be deployed in "Weser Exercise" will be kept as

⁶³ The term compellence was coined by Thomas Schelling. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), for more on the genesis of the term.

small as possible. The numerical weakness will be balanced by daring actions and surprise execution.

On principle, we will do our utmost to make the operation appear as a *peaceful* occupation, the object of which is the military protection of the neutrality of the Scandinavian States. Corresponding demands will be transmitted to the Governments at the beginning of the occupation. If necessary, demonstrations by the Navy and Air Force will provide the necessary emphasis. If, in spite of this, resistance should be met, all military means will be used to crush it....

On April 9, 1940, the Germans delivered their ultimatum at 4:20 AM, demanding that the Danes instantly accept the “protection of the Reich” without any resistance (Shirer 1990, 697). A German ship, the *Hansestandt Danzig*, had landed at Langalinie Pier at about the same time, carrying German troops into Copenhagen. They quickly took the Danish garrison at the Citadel without resistance. During its approach, the ship had sailed unchallenged by the fort protecting the harbor, and was allowed to land a Battalion near the headquarters of the Danish Army. More German troops were landed at Gedser, Nyborg and Korsøer. Paratroopers had also taken the Storestroems bridge and fortress at Masnesoe. The Danes, caught sleeping, nonetheless still considered whether to resist the occupying Germans. While the King of Denmark and his advisors discussed their options with the Danish Army Chief, General William Prior, formations of German bombers overflew the city, dropping propaganda leaflets calling for peace while a negotiation was conducted between the Danish and German Governments. The display of German air power and the vision of Copenhagen being destroyed from the air, coupled with German troops in the city, intimidated the Danish King and his advisors, against the counsel of General Prior. The Danes conceded to the German demands, though they did register a protest. The Danes had been intimidated and compelled to surrender (Shirer 1990, Liddell Hart, *Strategy* [1954] 1991, Liddell Hart 2002)

Terrorism is another form of warfare based upon the strategy of intimidation through compellence. Terrorism has been described as “the deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of the innocent to inspire fear for political ends.”⁶⁴ Terrorism consists of two parts—a terrorizing act of “propaganda of the deed” and a political message consisting of “propaganda by word,” which describes the desired political end-state that the targeted population should adopt in order to avoid further bloodshed. Intimidation is established through an act of violence, which demonstrates the killing power of the terrorists, with the threat of more death and destruction of innocent victims to come. The indiscriminate nature of the killing increases the scope of the threat to a wider potential target set.

The attacks by Al Qaeda against the World Trade Center and Pentagon illustrate how the strategy of intimidation through compellence is used as the basis for terrorism. In his 1998 fatwa (bin Laden 1998, bin Laden 1998), Osama bin Laden gave notice of his political objective to rid Islamic lands of American presence through the killing of Americans. In his fatwa, bin Laden stated:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.

... We—with God's help—call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We also call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youths, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson.

⁶⁴ This definition of terrorism was adopted by The Jonathan Institute in a 1979 conference on international terrorism.

The indiscriminate killing of Americans was meant as “a lesson” to others to intimidate them from supporting U.S. presence in Islamic lands. The threat implied that Americans would be killed until the al-Aqsa Mosque, the holy mosque and Islamic lands were “liberated.”

The attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon gave the impression that Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, the source of the threat, were more powerful than they actually were. The lethality and reach of the attack provided credibility to the threat that more killing was on the horizon if the United States did not pull out of the Middle East. However, the United States was not intimidated by Al-Qaeda, did not pull out of the Middle East, and embarked on a campaign to destroy Al-Qaeda, illustrating one of the risks associated with the strategy of intimidation when it fails.

Deterrence seeks to intimidate an adversary from seeking a political objective through the threat of force. The *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* defines deterrence as, “The prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits” (Joint Publication 1-02 2012). Underlying the strategy of intimidation through deterrence is the psychological make-up of the actors. The psychology of deterrence is based upon a dyadic assessment of beliefs—the deterring side must project it *values* the political object with the *intent* to back up the threat of force if the challenger attempts to gain the political objective; the challenger must *believe* that the deterring side has both the *power* to do costly harm out of proportion to the potential gain associated with the objective and the *intent* to do so. Complicating this

psychological calculus is that the *value* that each side *perceives* the other as placing upon the political objective—that is, the costs and benefits of the objective under conflict—may be quite different, leading to potential miscalculations. (Wagner 1982) Moreover, the specter of bluffing adds even more risk of misperception into the psychological calculus. Credibility, both in the power behind the threat and the intent to use it, is of critical importance in the strategy of intimidation through deterrence.

An example of the strategy of intimidation through deterrence was illustrated in the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April of 1949 established a collective defense policy between the United States and Western Europe against the growing Soviet threat. Article 5 of the treaty stated, “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or America shall be considered an attack against them all” (Pedlow 1997). Fearful of the Soviet Union’s overwhelming military superiority on the borders of the European NATO states, the NATO Military Committee drafted a nuclear deterrence policy for the defense of Europe, detailed in “The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area” (Pedlow 1997). One of the key provisions of the draft document was that the United States needed to “insure the ability to deliver the atomic bomb promptly.” In subsequent revisions, the language was changed to state the alliance needed to “insure the ability to carry out strategic bombing promptly by all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception,” with strategic bombing meant to include nuclear bombs (Pedlow 1997). The United States National Security Council (NSC) backed up the NATO plan, stating in NSC 162/2, “The major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the United States to

use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory power if the area is attacked.” (Pedlow 1997) Soviet aggression against a NATO state was to be deterred by the threat of a nuclear strike by the United States. The two nuclear bombs dropped on Japan to end World War II underscored credibility for a strike. While the efficacy of the intimidation strategy is difficult to assess as the beliefs and intentions of policy-makers cannot be known for sure, the Soviet Union did not attack any of the NATO states, though it did occupy other non-NATO European states during the Cold War.⁶⁵ (Lebow and Stein 1995)

The Strategy of Subversion

The strategy of subversion has been defined as, “the undermining or detachment of the loyalties of significant political and social groups within the victimized state, and their transference, under ideal conditions, to the symbols and institutions of the aggressor” (Blackstone 1964, 56). The underlying assumption behind the strategy of subversion is that it can be used to diminish a public’s political and class loyalties to the state and its leaders. Once public loyalties are penetrated, the disintegration of political and social institutions can then be conducted. This enables the transfer of the loyalties of citizens to the political or ideological cause of the aggressor. According to Blackstone, the strategy requires the active support of some elites, with at least passive acceptance by the masses, if not their partial or full support. Prime targets for subversion are elites controlling the coercive elements of state power, such as the police, military and intelligence services. (Blackstone 1964)

⁶⁵ For a good discussion of deterrence efficacy during the Cold War, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence and the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 157-181.

The strategy of subversion is a high reward-low cost strategy in that it can potentially return a political objective, anywhere from a favorable trade policy up to the political control of an entire state, at the cost of the establishment and maintenance of influence agents and propaganda institutions. Its low cost in terms of manpower and support money, particularly when compared to the use of armed forces, make it an attractive strategy to aggressors with limited resources, though it has been used quite often by major powers. However, as a strategy, it can take a very long time to achieve a political objective, as noted by Bezmenov in the case of the Soviet Union and its use against the United States during the Cold War, and can have unintended long-term consequences. It is best implemented as a covert strategy—if it is uncovered, with proof in the form of a document or admittance of guilt, it can be publicized by the target, with political costs to the aggressor steep in the form of international diplomatic reprobation and/or domestic violence. Additionally, the strategy of subversion is less effective when the target is aware of it and implements a counterstrategy to defend against it. Overall, it is a difficult strategy to implement, especially if the necessary conditions for success must be built rather than pre-exist. Perhaps surprisingly, the strategy of subversion is as popular with aggressors possessing superior military power as it is with weaker states and actors (discussed more below), particularly in cases where it can be conducted covertly.

The strategy of subversion provides the foundation for three types of conflict—revolution, the coup d'état, and guerilla warfare. Revolution is defined as the “overthrow of an established government or social order by those previously subject to it; forcible substitution of a new form of government” (Oxford English Dictionary 1989). A coup d'état is “the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is

then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder” (Luttwak 1979). Guerrilla warfare is defined as “Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces” (Joint Publication 1-02 2012).

In a revolution, the masses are politically mobilized towards collective action to overthrow an existing government. The primary instrument of subversion in the case of revolution is propaganda. Subversion in the form of ideological conversion often takes advantage of disenfranchisement with an existing government or resource scarcity. Illegitimate acts by the government, frustration with conditions of economic deprivation, social injustice and class inequalities are a few of conditions that prime a people ripe for subversion and revolution. (Tilly 1978)

A coup d'état is the most efficient of the three subversion-based types of warfare. In a coup d'état, emphasis is placed upon the subversion of a few key officials who can control the instruments of state power. These key officials, as elites in the armed forces, state security forces, and police, are important in that they must have the prestige to at least neutralize any opposition to the takeover, if not actively aid in its accomplishment. While ideological conversion of key officials is most desired, bribes, blackmail, and intimidation can also be effective in gaining neutrality or support. (Luttwak 1979)

In guerrilla warfare, subversion of the masses is used gradually in the first phase, consisting largely of political indoctrination to mobilize segments of the population into action against the enemy. It includes describing the aims of the movement, while also inculcating ideological conversion to that of the guerrillas, such as in the case of communist guerrilla movements. In order to be successful, all three types require the use

of subversion to establish the conditions from which revolution, a coup d'état, or guerrilla warfare can take place. All three types of subversion are best served when ideological conversion is conducted covertly in order to prevent an adversary from stopping it in its infancy. However, the assassination of some key opponents may be required to intimidate others from resisting, tipping off the government to the subversion underfoot.

The strategy of subversion has a long history, first exalted by the ancient Chinese strategy masters as a way to take “all under Heaven intact”—however, they also warned that it required the acme of skill to pull off. T'ai Kung, in his *Six Secret Teachings*, laid out 12 measures for mounting a civil offensive against an adversary (discussed in Chapter 3), which included bribing and influencing the sovereign's “assistants,” “loyal officials” and “favored ministers” (Sawyer 2007). Stratagems such as “Raise a Corpse from the Dead (Coup),” “Replace the Beams and Timbers with Rotten Timber,” “Exchange the Role of Guest for That of Host,” from the Thirty-six Stratagems, also included elements of subversion. In more modern times, the Communists used the strategy of subversion as the basis for their ideologically driven revolution.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union used the strategy of subversion during the Cold War. The two ideologically divided superpowers were unable to settle their differences on the battlefield, haunted by the specter of war escalating to an all out nuclear exchange, devastating both countries in an ultimate lose-lose scenario. A zero-sum ideological bifurcation of the world ensued, with ideological alignment viewed as either for or against the two adversaries. Proxy wars were fought between third party states, backed by the two superpowers. However, subversion was favored over fighting,

as it was more economical, and involvement more deniable. Both sides used the strategy of subversion to shift the loyalties of states to their own.

Subversion in the form of a coup d'état was a favorite strategy of the United States during the Cold War, despite its high failure rate. The United States was involved in coups in Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Cuba (1961), Dominican Republic (1961), Panama (1989), and Iraq (1990). (Hosmer 2001)

The coup d'état against Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq was a carefully planned CIA operation, codenamed TPAJAX, conducted jointly with the British Intelligence's MI6.⁶⁶ The U.S. was interested in preventing Iran from falling into the Communist camp, a key concern of the newly elected Eisenhower Administration, though some historians have suggested it was really about Iranian oil. The nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) by Mohammad Mossadeq, who had been elected as Prime Minister in a democratic election, was seen by the US as a socialist maneuver.

A feasibility study for a coup, entitled, "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq," was completed on April 16, 1953, indicating that a coup had a good chance of success, if certain key actions could be executed. Particularly important was whether large mobs could be assembled in support of the coup, deceiving people into believing popular support and legitimacy existed. Additionally, the Tehran garrison had to be isolated from carrying out Mossadeq's orders (Wilber 1954, 3).

⁶⁶ Details of the formerly secret plan were released under the Freedom of Information Act to the New York Times in 2000, providing a rare glimpse into the world of covert operations.

The draft operational plan consisted of four parts: 1) Preliminary support of opposition to the Mossadeq government; 2) development of the Shah's role as a focal point of the opposition to Mossadeq; 3) An arrangement with General Zahedi as the leader of the opposition; and 4) development of an organization to mount the coup. The first part of the plan called for the bribing of General Fazlollah Zahedi, picked to be Mossadeq's replacement. Zahedi was to be given \$60,000, but the source of the money was to be made to look like the Shah provided it.

In the second part of the plan, the Shah was to be co-opted through his sister, Princess Ashraf (Wilber 1954, B-3). Ashraf was tasked to "convince the Shah that the United States and the United Kingdom have a joint aim in Iran, and at the same time to remove his pathological fear of the 'hidden UK hand' (Wilber, B-4). Her meeting was to be followed by a British group to assure the Shah that the UK and US had common aims in Iran, wanting only to support him in getting rid of Mossadeq. General Schwarzkopf, former head of the US Military Mission to the Iranian Gendarmerie, known and admired by the Shah, also was to assure the Shah that the US and UK wanted to help keep Iran from falling into Soviet hands, something that Mossadeq was allegedly enabling. Mossadeq had to be removed; otherwise the US would no longer send financial aid to Iran. Schwarzkopf was to convince the Shah that the oil issue, to which an acceptable settlement was to be offered, was of only secondary importance—the real issue was the survival of Iran. The UK and US viewed the Pahlevi dynasty as the best hope for Iranian national sovereignty. These points were to be repeated in a second phase of subversion, but in a more threatening manner to underscore the seriousness of the UK and US. A third stage of the co-opting of the Shah turned back to his sister, Ashraf, who was to

obtain his signature on three documents: 1) a royal decree naming Zahedi as the Chief of Staff; 2) a royal decree appealing to all ranks to support the Chief of Staff; and 3) an open letter to all loyal officers to cooperate with the bearer of the letter in efforts to reestablish the prestige of the Army, to restore their own self-respect and to show devotion to the Shah and country.⁶⁷ This last letter was to be given to General Zahedi. (Wilber, B-7)

Following the commitments from the Shah, the next part of the plan called for General Zahedi to recruit officers to cooperate with Zahedi, using the letter from the Shah as proof of his support. General Zahedi was to be assured that he had full US and UK covert support prior to initiation of the coup, even if the Shah was to back out. He was advised that minimal military action was key in obtaining follow-on legal, national, and international support for the coup (Wilber, B9-B10).

The final part of the plan addressed the coup organization. Zahedi was to set up a military secretariat, which would see that the details of the plan were implemented. They would oversee the seizure of the “general staff headquarters, army radio station, Radio Tehran, the houses of Mossadeq and his entourage, police and gendarmie headquarters, post and telegraph offices, telephone exchange, the Majlis [Parliament of Iran] and its printing press, and the National Bank and its printing press” (Wilber, B11-B12). They would also coordinate the arrests of key Mossadeq supporters in government, the army, and newspaper editors. Black propaganda in the form of phony Central Committee of the

⁶⁷ The number of letters for the Shah’s signature would later be reduced to two—one firman naming Zahedi as Chief of Staff and the second denouncing a referendum on the dissolution of the Majlis as an illegal proceeding.

Party pamphlets was to be distributed in order to confuse and prevent the massing of Tudeh members.

Another organization was to be set up to instigate maximum public opposition to Mossadeq. Zahedi was given \$150,000 through which he was to bribe key people for their support, the most important of which was a director of press and propaganda.

Propaganda directed against Mossadeq was to include a number of themes (Wilber, B16-B17):

- 1) Mossadeq favors the Tudeh Party and the USSR;
- 2) Mossadeq is the enemy of Islam;
- 3) Mossadeq is deliberately destroying Army morale and its ability to maintain order;
- 4) Mossadeq is fostering the growth of separatist movements within Iran, making it easier for a Soviet takeover;
- 5) Mossadeq is leading the country into economic collapse;
- 6) Mossadeq has been corrupted by power and is turning into a dictator; and
- 7) Mossadeq is the victim of unscrupulous, ambitious advisors.

The propaganda was to continue after the coup, with the director of press and propaganda directed to spread the new government's program through Radio Tehran, posters, pamphlets, etc., the briefing of foreign correspondents and publicity of UK and US statements.

Other actions included the bribing of key Majlis deputies to lead a vote legitimizing the new government, the use of street gangs to support the coup in counter to any potential protests against it, giving voice to religious leaders leading anti-Mossadeq demonstrations, a terrorist group to take action against pro-Mossadeq supporters, and merchant support in the way of anti-Mossadeq rumors spread in the bazaars.

The coup was initiated on August 15, 1953, but initially looked like it would fail for two reasons: 1) Mossadeq and his Chief of Staff, General Riahi, found out about the

coups when it was postponed by one day, and 2) the Tehran CIA station lost contact with Zahedi's Chief of Staff due to the lack of a radio and was unable to give directions (Wilber, 39). Riahi was able to send detachments of troops to defend many of the people scheduled for arrest and to place troops in the streets. While some of the key figures targeted for arrest were picked up by Zahedi's men, many were not because some of the army officers lost heart when they found out General Riahi had found out about the coup. Additionally, Radio Tehran had not been seized, and on August 16th, it announced the failed coup attempt.

Nonplussed, the coup conspirators kept their heads and redoubled their efforts on the morning of the 16th. While General Riahi's troops lined the streets, there was still a sense of calm in the city. A rumor began circulating that the countercoup efforts of Mossadeq and Riahi were actually staged by them in order to overthrow the Shah. CIA propaganda agents pushed the rumor to the press, which printed it in newspapers. Propaganda efforts were aided by a critical Mossadeq mistake—he released a statement announced over Radio Tehran, that the Majlis was dissolved. This convinced the public that Mossadeq was going to overthrow the Shah. (Wilber, 44-48)

Mossadeq further pushed the anti-Shah rumor with speeches by political elites to crowds assembled in the Majlis Square on the morning of the 17th. At 10:00 AM, secure that the coup had been defeated, Mossadeq ordered the return of army troops back to their barracks. However, Mossadeq's efforts were countered by foreign radio reports stating that the Shah, safe in Baghdad, denied that a coup had been attempted, that he had ordered the dismissal of Mossadeq as Prime Minister, appointing General Zahedi in his place. By the evening of the 18th the public took to the streets. Mossadeq ordered the

police to clear the streets, but fighting ensued. Nonetheless, even though the public was beginning to mobilize in favor of the coup, the CIA and SIS were demoralized to the point of drafting messages calling for the cancelling the operation. (Wilber, 50-64)

The Shah's announcement coupled with news of the letters signed by the Shah naming Zahedi as Prime Minister made the papers on the 19th. Additionally, thousands of flyers containing the letter were distributed in the streets. By late morning, pro-Shah crowds were assembling in the bazaar. Coup conspirators quickly took charge of the crowd and led them in the ransacking of anti-Shah newspapers and political organizations. Troops dispatched to reinstitute order refused to fire on pro-Shah supporters. Soon, troops began to support the protesters, now armed with tanks and truckloads of troops. Throughout the day, more and more supporters aligned with the Shah and the coup conspirators. By afternoon, they held Radio Tehran. By the evening, the coup was triumphant. Zahedi had replaced Mossadeq as Prime Minister. (Wilber 1954, 68-74)

The proximate result of the successful coup was that the government of Iran was changed from a constitutional monarchy to an authoritarian regime headed by the Shah. Iran became a client state of the United States until the Shah's fall in 1979. The United States was also cut in on Iranian oil, with five American companies provided drilling access. However, some scholars have suggested that, while the proximate results were a success, the distal consequences were disastrous—anti-American sentiment ran rampant throughout the third world as a result of covert operations such as TPAjax, and others like it.

Conclusion

The five basic military strategies discussed in this chapter provide a foundation for a theory of military strategy. The basic military strategy continuum, discussed in the next chapter, links the five basic strategies to the two objects of strategy. Coupled with the concepts of employment, the basic military strategy continuum provides a virtually unlimited set of strategy variations.


CHAPTER 12: A GRAND THEORY OF MILITARY STRATEGY

The objective of this dissertation is to develop an overarching, grand theory of military strategy. While previous theorists have contributed mini-theories of individual strategies and types of warfare, none have proffered an overarching, grand theory of military strategy.⁶⁸ Indeed, current U.S. military doctrine still only recognizes Delbrück's two fundamental strategies of annihilation and exhaustion (Delbrück 1990, 439).⁶⁹ Additionally, the relationships between mini-theories have been vague, at best, with the *ways* of strategy left piecemeal and underspecified.

With a theory defined as “a set of statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts or constructs” (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010); a grand theory of military strategy should explain the conceptual relationships between the mini-theories of strategy and the styles of warfare. This entails developing a conceptual system of military strategy that explains the ways of strategy, providing attachment points to which the military means and military objectives can be employed and achieved, respectively. One way of depicting a conceptual system is through the use of a model, which represents a simplified version of a theory—the goal of this chapter.

⁶⁸ The Army War College credits Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. with the development of a rudimentary theory of strategy in his description of strategy as the relationship between ends, ways and means. Lykke observed that risk ensues when ends, ways, and means are not in balance. Lykke's concept of strategy did provide a basic definition of strategy and met the minimum qualifications of a theory by describing the relationship between ends, ways, and means. His concept provides a firm foundation for building a theory of military strategy.

⁶⁹ The strategy of exhaustion has been renamed the strategy of erosion, defined as “using military force to erode the enemy leadership's or the enemy society's political will.” Joint Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff, 2013).



In this chapter I offer five specific ways, which together are both necessary and sufficient to explain the full breadth of military strategy. The five basic military strategies, consisting of extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, subversion and intimidation (discussed in the previous chapter) resulted from a comprehensive meta-data analysis, hermeneutical analysis, and comparative meta-analysis of the works of past strategy theorists. Virtually all of the military strategies used in the course of history have either used one of these strategies, or a combination of them, in the pursuit of military objectives. In this chapter, I take the next step, integrating the concepts and relationships into a conceptual framework I describe as the Basic Military Strategy Continuum.

The Basic Military Strategy Continuum

The five basic military strategies are shown in Figure 12.1. All of the five basic military strategies have the common feature of describing the ways, in terms of action, that military means are employed to achieve military objectives, in support of grand strategy ends and policy. However, each of the basic military strategies is unique in the type of action that it directs against an object (either the enemy's war making means or resolve with respect to the political objective). In a strategy of extermination, the action is to exterminate, directed at the physical embodiment of the enemy. In a strategy of

exhaustion, the action is to either exhaust the enemy's war making means, the enemy's will to continue fighting over the political object, or both. A strategy of annihilation seeks to strip an enemy of his war making means in decisive battle through either physical attrition or the breaking of his psychological cohesion through dislocation. In a strategy of intimidation, the action is to intimidate an opponent through the threat of violence, either psychologically compelling him to do something or, alternately, deterring him from doing something. The action in a strategy of subversion is to subvert the attitude or beliefs of an adversary in order to break the enemy's resolve and adherence to the political objective. Thus, another commonality between the five basic military strategies is that they all exist between two poles, one physical and the other psychological. These two poles, as the objects of military strategy, provide an integrating framework for military strategy.⁷⁰

Military strategies pass through at least one of these objects on their way to the military and political objectives. The strategy of extermination is unique in that its object is always physical; consequently, it is always uni-polar. The sole object of the strategy is the physical extermination of a people; their resolve and will to capitulate is largely irrelevant. In the case of the other four strategies, while the initial object may be physical, such as disarming the adversary, the ultimate object always reverts to the psychological pole in order to achieve capitulation of the political object—something that only the

⁷⁰ Clausewitz provided an organizational clue for the continuum with his description of the object of war, though he never developed it further. According to Clausewitz, the theoretical object of war in the abstract is to disarm the enemy such that the fighting forces "are put in such a condition that they can no longer carry on the fight," effectively accomplished by diminishing his means of resistance (91). But Clausewitz also recognized that a war could not be considered over "so long as the enemy's will has not been broken" (91).

living can do. Given that extermination, in its purest form, has a purely physical object, and subversion, in its purest form, has a psychological object, these two concepts bracket the basic military strategy continuum, while exhaustion, annihilation and intimidation, which can have physical and/or psychological objects, are distributed between them.

While the strategy of extermination is a single-pole, physical strategy, the strategy of exhaustion is a two-pole, physical and psychological strategy.⁷¹ It is a strategy that normally aims to both physically diminish an adversary's means of resistance, while also psychologically eroding the adversary's will to resist through protracted conflict. Use of violence in the physical sphere is also used to induce exhaustion in the psychological sphere, where the adversary finally concedes the political objective.

The strategy of annihilation consists of two objects. The first object, the destruction of the enemy's fighting potential through decisive battle, is actually an intermediate objective, in that it seeks to disarm the enemy, setting the stage for the second object, capitulation of the political objective. The ultimate object is psychological in nature, aimed at the intimidation of remaining fighters, elites and the general population. Further resistance is undercut through the threat of more violence to come. In this way, brute force in the physical domain is combined with coercion in the psychological domain to impart the perception that emotionally, there is no hope in

⁷¹ The reader is cautioned about a key difference in the way that poles are used in this framework, vs. Delbrück's framework. Delbrück's framework consisted of the two poles of battle and maneuver, both in the physical sphere, while the Basic Military Strategy Continuum is bookended by physical and psychological poles.

further resistance, or rationally, that conceding the political objective is the only sound course of action, or both.⁷²

At the middle-right of the basic strategy continuum is the strategy of intimidation. The object of the strategy of intimidation is psychological—it seeks to achieve the political objective through the psychological manipulation of the *threat* of force rather than the *use* of force, using fear as its lever. While the focus of the strategy is psychological in that it seeks to manipulate the enemy's *prediction* of the outcome of fighting, it is predicated on the enemy's *perception* of the physical means of force and his inability to overcome it. It sometimes requires a display of violence in order to provide credibility to the threat of more violence to come. The strategy of subversion is a single-pole, psychological strategy that seeks to alter the political beliefs of a targeted segment of an adversary's population to those conducive to the aggressor and his political objective. In its purest form, the strategy is used to subdue an enemy insidiously, without fighting, though practically, it is more often used to provoke the overthrow of an adversary government through violent means, through either instigation of revolution, guerrilla warfare or through the conduct of a coup d'état. It can also be used to diplomatically isolate countries from the international community or instigate hostilities between other countries. Subversion can be used in combination with other basic military

⁷² This two-part approach means that technically, the strategy of annihilation is actually a dual strategy of annihilation-intimidation, as the psychological object cannot be attained without the intimidation of the enemy, similar to the extermination-intimidation strategy. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, while the strategy of extermination exists in its own right, the strategy of annihilation does not, meaning that at best annihilation should be a concept of employment with the annihilation-intimidation combination constituting a version of the strategy of intimidation. Nonetheless, the strategy of annihilation has such a strong and long legacy in the annals of military strategy, it is best to leave it as a basic strategy, the discussion above notwithstanding.

strategies such as annihilation and intimidation. The strategy of subversion can also be used by domestic elements to achieve domestic political change, or by state actors to achieve their political objectives. One of the more prevalent uses of the strategy of subversion in warfare is the political mobilization of a people in order to garner public support, legitimize a cause or regime, or instigate violence or regime change.


The Basic Military Strategies and the Concepts of Employment

The five basic military strategies are further differentiated by the concepts of employment used to take advantage of particular capabilities of the means made available for war. As a result, in practice, no individual strategy is like another of its type as the means exercised, the concepts of employment used, the objectives towards which they are directed, and the situational context makes them *sui generis*.

Concepts of employment provide additional actions by which the means of war can be used to accomplish military objectives within the five basic military strategies and their combinations. Just as the five basic strategies can be used in different combinations, so too can the concepts of employment. Some concepts of employment are particularly well suited to support individual basic military strategies, described below.

Strategy of Extermination.

Several concepts of employment have found favor in the strategy of extermination. *Mass* was a favorite concept of employment in antiquity when overwhelming force was used to overcome and destroy a population. In more modern times, *intimidation* (as a concept of employment or substrategy) of the population has often been employed in order to achieve *control* and *isolation* of those selected for extermination. *Deception* in the form of a ruse was also used to keep a targeted



population compliant while keeping intentions secret. From there, the population was exterminated through *attrition*, the persistent and systematic killing of those targeted, over time.

Strategy of Exhaustion.

The strategy of exhaustion is a strategy that aims to either physically diminish and exhaust an adversary's means of resistance, psychologically erode his will to resist through protracted conflict, or both. Most often, the use of violence in the physical sphere is used to induce exhaustion in the psychological sphere, where the political objective is conceded. It is a strategy well suited for the weaker side of a conflict, particularly in the case of defense of the homeland.

With desperation often driving the choice of exhaustion as a strategy, it is not surprising that a wide range of both physical and psychological concepts of employment are embedded within it, given its two pole nature. Attrition has been used to slowly wear down the opponent through "death by a thousand cuts." Detachments of an enemy's troops have been isolated from the mass by luring them into ambush. Maneuver and surprise have been used in sub-strategies of annihilation in local offensives to dislocate and annihilate detachments of enemy forces in support of a larger strategy of exhaustion. Destroying and robbing an enemy of supplies has been used to demoralize an enemy and deprive him of warfighting resources, while providing sustainment to one's own side.

Being outmanned and outgunned often requires a strategist to think more creatively, accepting greater risk in return for potentially more productive outcomes. For example, on the physical side, dispersion risks having one's military means defeated piecemeal slowly over time. However, by avoiding mass, dispersion prevents one's forces from being defeated decisively in one fell stroke. On the psychological side, political mobilization takes time and resources away from combat training and operations. However, its returns in raising morale and popular support often make up for it.

Strategy of Annihilation.

The physical concepts of employment are fundamental to the strategy of annihilation through attrition. Obviously, attrition is the driving concept, with other concepts used in its support. Maneuver is employed to place an enemy in a position of disadvantage with mass used to overwhelm him. Psychological concepts are used as well, though, in the case of annihilation through attrition, they are employed with the overarching object of physical destruction. By attacking from a line of least expectation an enemy can be physically dislocated—resulting in surprise, psychological dislocation and their attendant effects—culminating in greater attrition.

With the object of the strategy of annihilation through dislocation being to destroy the cohesion and will to resist of the adversary's military forces, psychological concepts of employment are central to it. Persuasion in the form of psychological operations and deception can be used to intimidate or demoralize an enemy. Surprising and entrapping an enemy through a lure can psychologically dislocate him, if not terrorize him, compelling him to surrender. Just as psychological concepts can be used in a strategy of annihilation through attrition, a strategy of annihilation through dislocation can take advantage of physical concepts of employment. Rapid and mass attrition, isolation or physical paralysis of an enemy can also break the cohesion of fighting forces.

Strategy of Intimidation.

Terror has long and often been used as a concept of employment in the strategy of intimidation. The fear of death and destruction to come can either compel an adversary to acquiesce a political object or deter the adversary from embarking on a course of action in pursuit of a political objective. Other concepts of employment that can induce terror

are also commonly used in the strategy of intimidation. Isolation from contact with the larger body of other armed forces can induce fear of being overwhelmed, leading to surrender. Because the strategy of intimidation relies on perception, it often incorporates deception as a concept of employment. Surprise in the form of the enemy appearing along a line of least expectation can also induce panic. Assassination of key leaders can similarly sow the seeds of terror and lead to the collapse of a government and subsequent giving up of the political objective.

Strategy of Subversion.

The strategy of subversion leans most heavily on psychological concepts of employment. Persuasion is a particularly important concept of employment in a strategy of subversion. Persuasion is used to change attitudes and beliefs. Persuasion can vary from the ideological conversion of a population, such as towards communism, to the simple shift of an attitude of a population, such as the illegitimacy of the war in Vietnam, which occurred in the United States. It is also useful in solidifying perseverance and morale. Political mobilization, another psychological concept of employment, can stir a population to participate in and support war.

Horizontal Combinations of the Five Basic Military Strategies

While a basic strategy can be used by itself, it is not uncommon for strategies to be combined horizontally, as discussed in chapter 11. They can be combined sequentially or simultaneously, separated by time or space. Sequentially, a strategy can be used to establish the credibility of a follow-on strategy, such as when the strategy of extermination is used to lend credence to a strategy of intimidation. Strategies may also be sequenced in phases, such as the three phases of protracted popular war, consisting of

the strategy of subversion in the strategic defensive phase, the strategy of exhaustion in the strategic stalemate phase, and the strategy of annihilation in the strategic offensive phase. Sequential strategies can also be used when an original strategy is not effective, such as when a strategy of annihilation is switched to a strategy of exhaustion due to losses or stalemate. A sequential strategy may also be used when conditions change to the point a different strategy is deemed more appropriate.

Strategies can also be used simultaneously in different geographical areas or war fighting mediums. For example, a strategy of annihilation might be used in one locale where local superiority can be achieved, while the rest of the forces are engaged in a strategy of exhaustion due to inferior numbers in a geographic area or theater of operations. In the case of different mediums, superiority in aircraft might warrant a strategy of annihilation in the air while naval forces pursue a strategy of exhaustion at sea as was the case in the Pacific Campaign during World War II, where U.S. submarines isolated and deprived Japan of vital war making resources while U.S. air power decisively reduced Japanese air power to ineffectiveness.

Vertical Linkages and Levels of the Basic Military Strategy Continuum

Strategies can also be employed simultaneously in vertical combinations through the use of substrategies, with a strategy at a lower level of war used to support a strategy at a higher level. For example, annihilation might be used locally at the operational level of war in support of an overarching military strategy of exhaustion at the strategic level of war.

The vertical linkage of sub-strategies occurs across the three levels of war. These three levels of war (as recognized by the U.S. military) consist of the strategic,

operational, and tactical levels, which together link tactical actions at the lowest level to achievement of national objectives at the highest. They are described as follows (Joint Staff 2013, I-7):

Strategic Level. At the strategic level, a nation often determines the national (or multinational in the case of an alliance or coalition) guidance that addresses strategic objectives in support of strategic end states and develops and uses national resources to achieve them.

Operational Level. The operational level links strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives. It sequences tactical actions to achieve objectives.

Tactical Level. The tactical level of war is where battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or joint task forces (JTFs). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and enemy to achieve combat objectives.

These three levels provide depth to the basic military strategy continuum. As the definitions indicate, the levels of war are important in the making of strategy, offering distinctive planning levels that differ in objectives, resources, scope and scale.

Individually, strategy planning for a particular level takes into account the unique net assessment factors specific to it, such as geography, one's own and enemy capabilities, etc. However, planning must also be coherent between all three levels in order to ensure that the objectives pursued at lower levels dovetail into strategic level objectives, in support of the overarching political objective. This is accomplished through the promulgation of specific missions by strategic-level leadership to subordinate commanders. It is critically important that an audit trail of strategies be accomplished in order to ensure that objectives assigned to subordinate levels do not stray away from their support of higher-level objectives, that sufficient resources are allocated to commanders

at each level to accomplish those missions, and that strategies at each level mesh together and do not conflict with strategies at other levels. In simple terms, strategies and sub-strategies must be integrated holistically in order to achieve strategic cohesion and reap efficiency benefits from the allocation of limited war fighting resources.

A key consideration on the use of sub-strategies is that they should be limited to

		Strategies				
		Extermination	Exhaustion	Annihilation	Intimidation	Subversion
Warfare Type	Genocide	X				
	Guerrilla Warfare		X			
	Protracted Popular War		<u>Stage II</u>	<u>Stage III</u>		<u>Stage I</u>
	Maneuver Warfare			X		
	Attrition Warfare			X		
	Deterrence				X	
	Shock and Awe				X	
	Terrorism				X	X
	Revolution					X
	Coup					X

Table 12.2. Types of warfare are stylized from single strategies and combinations of strategies.

only those necessary. The organizational concept of employment of *simplicity* should be kept in mind in the design and application of sub-strategies.

Types of Warfare

As discussed previously in chapter 11, different types of warfare exist that are

either implicitly or explicitly based upon one or more of the five basic military strategies. Examples of types of warfare and the strategies they are based upon are shown in Table 12.2. Included are genocide, guerrilla warfare, protracted popular war, maneuver warfare, attrition warfare, deterrence, shock and awe, terrorism, revolution, and the coup d'état, though there may also be others.

Genocide is based entirely upon the strategy of extermination while the strategy of intimidation often uses extermination to provide credibility to its threats. Guerrilla warfare uses the strategy of exhaustion as a way to erode the will of an adversary over time. Both maneuver warfare and attrition warfare are based upon the strategy of annihilation, however the former does so by breaking the psychological cohesion of the adversary while the latter seeks to disarm him by destroying his means to make war. In other words, maneuver warfare uses a strategy of annihilation through its major concept of employment, dislocation, while attrition warfare uses a strategy of annihilation through the use of its major concept of employment, attrition. Deterrence, terrorism and “shock and awe” are all types of warfare based upon the strategy of intimidation, with deterrence used to intimidate an enemy from taking some action while terrorism and shock and awe seek to compel an adversary into some sort of action. While the violence used in terrorism is designed to intimidate people into complying with a political objective, terrorism also uses propaganda in an effort to advertise the political objective and subvert people towards it. Revolutions and coup d'états are also based upon the strategy of subversion, depending upon support from the people and/or key elements of government to seize power. Protracted popular war uses three different strategies, to include subversion, exhaustion and annihilation, phased over time.

Many operational concepts are also based upon or assume one or more of the five basic military strategies. The Army's Airland Battle and Joint Staff's *Joint Vision 2010* are cases in point (both are discussed in chapter 9). Both assume a strategy of annihilation.

Types of warfare are also stylized around concepts of employment in order to take advantage of key military capabilities and characteristics. For example, while maneuver warfare is based upon the strategy of annihilation through its major concept of employment, dislocation, it takes advantage of the physical characteristics of speed and mobility in order to employ maneuver, surprise and dislocate an adversary to break his cohesion.

The use of pre-formulated types of warfare has both advantages and disadvantages. An advantage of using a type of warfare is that it stylizes and melds strategy, doctrine and capabilities, affording a military an opportunity to achieve synergistic excellence in its execution. If the type of warfare is appropriate for the strategic situation, then it provides a well-thought out and practiced strategy better able to overcome the fog and friction of war. However, the key disadvantage of a pre-formulated type of warfare is the potential for a strategy-concepts mismatch, whereby the style of warfare is not appropriate for the strategic situation.

As discussed previously, a theory of military strategy must not only explain strategy, but it must also describe the relationships between its constituent parts. In this chapter, the relationships between strategy, concepts of employment and types of warfare have been explained in a simple model.

Conclusion

This dissertation is unique in that it provides a grand theory of strategy. While other theorists have proffered individual strategies such as annihilation and exhaustion, which constitute mini-theories in the context of military strategy, none, to my knowledge, have endeavored to comprehensively integrate these mini-theories into an overarching grand theory of strategy. Additionally, this dissertation alone proposes concepts of employment as the elemental, actionable concepts that link means and ends, while also breaking the myth of principles of war. The basic military strategy continuum provides an object-based framework and foundation for a grand theory of military strategy, while the five basic military strategies and the concepts of employment further provide for a virtually unlimited set of strategy variations.

This dissertation provides a testable grand theory of military strategy useful for scholars and practitioners alike. For the scholar, hypotheses can be generated and tested to determine the validity and reliability of the theory. For the practitioner, the theory provides a guide to strategy. In the words of Clausewitz (Clausewitz [1832] 1976, rev.1984, 141):

Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of war, to distinguish precisely what at first seems fused, to explain in full the properties of the means employed and to show their probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thoroughly critical manner. Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls.

Admittedly, this theory requires refinement in order to have maximal practical utility. It will only get better with constructive criticism. In the end, it may prove to be

incorrect. Such is the life of a theory. But until then, I humbly proffer this theory until a better one comes along.

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APPENDIX: WHAT IS MILITARY STRATEGY?

Military strategy is a concept—and concepts are the building blocks of theory. Given that a theory is defined as “a set of statements about the relationship(s) between two or more concepts or constructs” (Jaccard and Jacoby 2010), it is important that the concepts, as the foundation of theory, be as clear and parsimonious as possible in describing the phenomenon of interest. The better the articulation of the underlying concepts and relationships between them in a theory, the better the theory. This is especially true in the case of military strategy.

Military strategy is also an *abstract* concept—it cannot be touched, seen, heard or tasted—which subjects it to much ambiguity. Nonetheless, in order to be a scientifically useful concept, its properties must ultimately be quantifiable if the theory is to be testable. But as Sartori points out, “*concept formation stands prior to quantification*” (2009a, 18). This necessitates an initial qualitative phase in which the properties of a concept are described in natural language, identifying what belongs to, and what does not, the phenomenon of interest. In other words, the first stage of concept formation consists of a classificatory process of identification, bound by the rules of logic (Sartori 2009a, 18).

Given that the overarching goal of this dissertation is to develop a grand theory of military strategy, it is critically important to define military strategy not only in terms upon which a theory can be built, but in a way that does the least semantic damage to the existing field of strategy. This entails an understanding of the concept from its inception, detailed in the etymology of strategy.

Etymology of Strategy

Etymologists attribute the source of the term “strategy” to the ancient Greek word, *strategia* (στρατηγία), which referred to generalship—that is, “the art of the general” (Liddell and Scott 1940). In the sixth century, however, the Byzantines made a level-of-analysis distinction between “tactics” (*taktiké*)—meaning, “the science which enables one to organize and maneuver a body of armed men in an orderly manner”—and “strategy,” as “the means by which the general may defend his own lands and defeat the enemy’s”.⁷³ In this hierarchical conception, tactics were related to strategy, but subordinate in scope and scale. Strategy, nonetheless, was distinguished from tactics by this level-of-analysis property, with both tactics and strategy still maintaining a military property. In *Taktiká*, Emperor Leo VI later repeated this level-of-analysis distinction between strategy and tactics. However, widespread adoption of the two different terms didn’t occur in the West until the 1700’s, when *Taktiká* was translated into French and German. (Heuser, 4-5)

In his opus, *On War*, Carl von Clausewitz opened the door for both an even higher-level definition of strategy and a broader, more general, conceptual definition. Although Clausewitz maintained a definition of strategy with both military and level-of-analysis properties, his definition of strategy as “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war” (Clausewitz 1976, rev.1984, 177) led to the connection of strategy to policy through the *purpose* of war. Clausewitz identified the purpose of war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (75). This act of compellence derived from

⁷³ Beatrice Heuser, in *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present*, provides an excellent history of the evolution of strategy, to include its etymology.

policy—the driving force of war, with war defined as “the continuation of policy by other means” (87). Thus, Clausewitz identified an even higher level of strategy, superordinate to his own definition in both its military and level-of-analysis properties. This higher level of strategy would later become known as “grand strategy.” Grand strategy would come to define the gap between policy and strategy at the strategic level-of-analysis.

Clausewitz’s identification of strategy as a servant to policy indicated that regardless of the level-of-analysis, ultimately, all conceptions of strategy were tied to some political end. This enabled a more general, conceptual definition of strategy that was able to include all definitions containing disparate level-of-analysis properties, from tactics to grand strategy. Moreover, this more general approach allowed for other types of strategy to be included (such as diplomacy and economics), rather than just military, by dropping the military property. This also had the effect of paving the way for a typology of strategy. An example of such a typology is shown in Figure A.1 (and will be explained in more detail later).

It wasn’t until after World War I, however, that strategy practitioners and theorists began to overtly specify “ends” as a key property in their definitions, associating it with its highest order objective, policy, following Clausewitz’s lead. In 1927, Alexandr Svechin defined strategy as “the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the *goal* set by the war for the armed forces,” with the goal set by policy (Svechin 1992). In 1941, B. H. Liddell Hart defined strategy (in one of his three definitions) as, “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the *ends* of *policy*” (Liddell Hart 1991, 321). More recently, Colin Gray followed the lead of his countryman, Liddell Hart, by also overtly including the ends of policy in his definition of

strategy as, “the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy” (Gray 1999, 17). J. C. Wylie also referred to the property of ends in his definition of strategy as “a plan of action designed in order to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment” (Wylie 1967, 14).

The Frenchman, André Beaufre, also included the “ends” property as policy, but more obliquely, by describing it in terms of the “aim” of strategy instead of in his definition of strategy. He proffered that the aim of strategy was “to fulfill the objectives laid down by policy, making the best use of resources available” (Beaufre 1965, 23). However, his description of the aim was not directly coupled to his definition of strategy, nor did he include “ends” or “policy” in his definition. He defined strategy as “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute” (Beaufre 1965, 22). More recently, Beatrice Heuser also used political “aims” as an ends-based property of strategy in her definition of it as “the link between political aims and the use of force, or its threat” (Heuser 2010, 3). Follow-on theorists largely followed Liddell Hart’s lead in including “ends” as a property of strategy, though some have used its synonyms, shown in Table A.1.

The “means” of strategy have been implied more often than overtly stated. Given that early concepts of strategy were actually that of what we now call “military strategy,” it followed that the means were, too. In ancient times, military means were largely limited to land and sea forces, but over the course of history expanded to include air and space, as well. These means were the instruments of “force,” sometimes used in definitions of strategy.

More specifically, previous definitions of the means in strategy have used the terms “means,” “resources,” and “instruments.” For example, in simplifying a long-winded Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of strategy, Michael Handel (Handel 2000, 381) defined strategy in terms of resources as, “the development and use of all *resources* in peace and war in support of national policies to secure victory.” Alternately, the Department of Defense defined strategy in terms of instruments of national power in its definition as, “A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the *instruments* of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives” (Joint Publication 1-02 2012).

While previous definitions of strategy were largely clear in the articulation of ends and means as properties, the relationship between the two was not so translucent. Indeed, it is this relationship that forms the operative part of strategy’s definition. This relationship between ends and means has been variously described as “to create situations” (Tzu) “distributing and applying” (Liddell Hart), “coordinating” (Liddell Hart), a “plan of action designed in order to achieve” (Wylie), “development and use” (Handel), “use” (Gray), “link” (Heuser), “employing ... in a synchronized and integrated fashion ” (DoD), “ways (courses of action)” (Lykke), and “way” (courses of action) by the Army War College. Left unclear is whether strategy employs disparate ways in its connection of “means” and “ends,” is *the* way in which the two are connected, or both.

The Traveling Problem of Strategy

Unfortunately, concept definitional problems are common within the social sciences and have not gone unnoticed by scholars dismayed by the diaspora of concept meanings. Hew Strachan recently lamented the lost meaning of strategy, noting that,

“The word ‘strategy’ has acquired a universality which has robbed it of meaning, and left it only with banalities” (Strachan 2005). In acknowledgement of Strachan’s argument, J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr., of the Army War College identified the root of the problem stemming from the concept’s etymology (Bartholomees 2010, 13):

Part of the problem is that our understanding of strategy has changed over the years. The word has a military heritage, and classic theory considered it a purely wartime military activity—how generals employed their forces to win wars. ... [The] purely military concept has given way to a more inclusive interpretation.

This definitional problem is not just limited to strategic studies; it also extends across the entire field of political science. According to Gio)anni Sartori, this problem initially originated when old terms were forced to accommodate ever more disparate cases due to the need for concepts to travel across international borders (2009a, 14). This was followed by a “frenzy of novitism,” in which concepts were modified and reconceptualized to suit the interests of individual scholars who were rewarded for “new” and “original” conceptualizations through publication in journals (Sartori 2009b). Sartori referred to this problem as “conceptual stretching,” with the result being that gains in extensional coverage were being matched by losses in connotative precision (15). As a result, many of the definitions were stretched beyond conceptual utility, no longer specifying concepts in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions that make for a good conceptual definition.

Fortunately, Sartori did not stop at merely identifying the problem; he developed a methodology to correct it as well. Sartori described his methodology as a strategy of conceptual analysis, which included 12 “Guidelines for Concept Analysis” (Sartori 2009c). The first thing needed in clarifying our understanding of strategy is a simple,




Figure A.1. Conceptual map of strategy.

declarative definition that describes the fundamental meaning of the term, strategy, in ontological terms. Once the declarative meaning is established, the concept of strategy can be modified to provide classificatory definitions such as *military* strategy and hierarchical definitions, such as tactics (for level-of-analysis purposes).

Key Terms

Two of Sartori's twelve guidelines provide a starting point for the analysis and reconceptualization of strategy in the formulation of a declarative definition, specifically (Sartori 2009c):

Rule 4. In reconstructing a concept, first collect a representative set of definitions; second, extract their characteristics; and third, construct matrixes that organize such characteristics meaningfully.

Rule 2a. Always check whether the key terms (the designator of the concept and the entailed terms) are defined; (2) whether the meaning declared by their definition is unambiguous; and (3) whether the declared meaning remains, throughout the argument, unchanged (i.e., consistent).

	Military	Ends	Ways	Means	Plan	Relation-ship	Comments
(Sun Tzu, c. 400 B.C.) Having paid heed to the advantages of my plans , the general must create situations which will contribute to their accomplishment .	X	X		X	X		“To create a situation” in support of a “plan” implies the directing (an unspecified way) of means to an end.
(Clausewitz, 1832) 1. Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war . 2. This term means the combination of individual engagements to attain the goal of the campaign or war.	X	X		X			This is a nested definition. The purpose of war is to compel the enemy to do our will. The level of war is the operational level, when taken with definition 2.
(Jomini, 1838) Strategy is the art of making war upon the map , and comprehends the whole theater of war.					X		This definition implies that strategy is a plan, but it is still too ambiguous.
(Svechin, 1927) Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed forces .	X	X	X				“Achieving” implies a way. “Goal” = means. “Armed forces” = military.
(Mao, 1936) The science of strategy, the science of campaigns and the science of tactics are all components of Chinese military science. The science of strategy deals with the laws that govern the war situation as a whole. The science of campaigns deals with the laws that govern campaigns and is applied in directing campaigns. The science of tactics deals with the laws that govern battles and is applied in directing battles.	X		X				“Laws that govern” implies ways.
(Liddell Hart, 1941) 1. the term 'strategy' is best confined to its literal meaning of ' generalship '--the actual direction of military force , as distinct from the policy governing its employment and combining it with other weapons: economic, political, psychological. 2. 'the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy '. 3. 'the art of the general '.	X			X			“Direction” is an unspecified way. The inclusion of “military” makes this definition one of military strategy rather than strategy. Liddell Hart went on to add, “Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound <i>calculation and coordination of the end and the means.</i> ”

(Beaufre 1965, 22) the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute .	X	X	X	X			“Forces” implies military means, which, with a dispute over ends, implies military strategy. Beaufre later states the aim of strategy is “to fulfill the objectives laid down by policy” (23)
(Wylie, 1967) A plan of action designed in order to achieve some end ; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.		X	X			X	A “plan of action” is a way. This is the only definition that includes metrics.
(OED, 1989) 2.a. the art of projecting and directing the larger military movements and operations of a campaign .	X		X				The inclusion of “military” increases the intension of this definition towards military strategy rather than strategy. Campaigns are conducted at the operational level of war, further increasing the intension of this definition towards “operations” rather than strategy. “Projecting and directing” are ways.
(Lykke, 1989) Strategy equals ends (objective towards which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved).		X	X	X			The Army War College adopted a slightly modified version of Lykke’s definition of strategy.
(Handel, 1996) The development and use of all resources in peace and war in support of national policies to secure victory.		X	X	X			“Development and use” are ways.
(Gray, 1999) The use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.	X	X			X		“Force” implies military. “Use” is an way. “Means,” it is implied in “force.”
(Guangqian and Youzhi 2005) Strategy is a general plan to prepare and direct the preparation and implementation of war.			X			X	“Prepare” and “direct” are ways.
(Heuser, 2010) the link between political aims and the use of force , or its threat .	X	X			X		“The use of force” implies military and a way. “Aims” is a synonym of ends in this case.
(DoD, 2010) A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives . (JP 3-0)		X	X	X		X	“Instruments of national power” consists of more than military means. “Employing” in a “synchronized and integrated fashion” is a way.
(AWC, 2010) the relationship between ends , ways , and means .		X	X	X		X	
Total:	9	11	10	10	4	3	
Table A.1. Strategy definitions.							

Beginning with Rule 4, a representative sample of strategy definitions was collected, shown in Table A.1, from notable and authoritative sources, including the Oxford English Dictionary, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the Army War College, Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, Baron de Jomini, B. H. Liddell Hart, André Beaufre, J. C. Wylie, Michael Handel, Arthur F. Lykke Jr., Colin Gray and Beatrice Heuser. Next, the key characteristics of the definitions were identified, choosing the most common, denotatively-accurate, accepted terms which were subsequently aligned in column headings. Some of the key terms were implied by context, noted in the comments section of the table. Synonyms were baselined to the most connotatively appropriate term in order to limit lexical damage to the semantic field while also maintaining the proper level of abstraction (Sartori 2009b).

From the nineteen definitions (Clausewitz and Liddell Hart offered more than one), five key properties, shown in the column headings in Table A.1 were selected for analysis (The military property was dropped, discussed below). The frequency of these key terms and their synonyms, both explicitly stated and implied, were summed (shown at the bottom of the table), with “ends,” “ways” and “means” occurring the most often.⁷⁴ The next most frequent key term used was military. This term was deemed not appropriate for a declarative definition of the overarching concept of “strategy” as military is just one of many potential classifications of the base concept of strategy (others being diplomatic, economic, naval, space, etc.). Four of the definitions defined

⁷⁴ Of note, “ends,” “ways” and “means” were more often implied than stated explicitly. This necessitated an explication of the referent term for means. For example, force cannot be accomplished without a means behind it. Thus force implicitly refers to means.

“strategy” in terms of a plan, while three of them also referred to the relationship between properties as an important aspect of strategy.

Next, the key terms were analyzed in accordance with Sartori’s Rule 2a. Few of the previous authors’ definitions of strategy defined the key terms, as most of the terms were well known within the semantic field at the time the definitions were crafted. Arthur Lyyke defined his key terms, with “ends” referring to the “objective towards which one strives,” “ways” referring to “courses of action,” and the “means” being the “instruments by which some end can be achieved” (Lykke 1989).

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines these key terms as follows:

End: An intended result of an action; an aim, purpose (End).

Means: (not defined in this context in the OED)

Way: A course of action (Way).

Plan: an organized (and usually detailed) proposal according to which something is to be done; a scheme of action; a strategy; a programme, schedule (Plan).

Relationship: the state or fact of being related; the way in which two things are connected; a connection, an association (Relationship).

The Oxford English Dictionary did not provide a definition of “means” in a context applicable to strategy. However, Lykke’s definition did describe means as “instruments by which some end can be achieved.” Moreover, Lykke’s definition of “means” is consistent with the existing semantic field of strategy.

Of the nineteen definitions, the Army War College’s definition of strategy (very similar to Lykke’s definition) provided the best starting point for a conceptual definition of strategy (Bartholomees 2010, 15). Defined as “the relationship between ends, ways, and means,” the definition is indeed parsimonious. “Ends,” ways,” and “means” are

properties which are complementary at a high level of abstraction,⁷⁵ in consonance with Rule 8 of Sartori's guidelines, which states, "in selecting the term that designates the concept, always relate to and control with the semantic field to which the terms belongs—that is, the set of associated, neighboring words" (Sartori 2009c).

Continuing with Sartori's rules as a guide, a test of ambiguity was applied through Rules 2b and 3a, which state (Sartori 2009c):

Rule 2b. Always check whether the key terms are used univocally and consistently in the declared meaning.

Rule 3a. Awaiting contrary proof, no word should be used as a synonym for another word.

Rules 2b and 3a point to a potential problem with the terms "way" and "relationship." A relationship is defined as "the *way* in which two things are connected." Substituting this definition of relationship within the definition of strategy would yield "the *way* in which *ways*, ends, and means are connected." Formulation of the definition of strategy in his manner illustrates a potential for ambiguity. As a definition, it's not wrong, but it is not as clear as it could be. In order to clear this up, it should be noted that the point of using the term "relationship" in the definition of strategy is that it "connects" ends, ways and means. Additionally, Lykke used "way" to mean "courses of action."

Other theorists used "plan" in the same sense. A plan can describe how means are utilized to accomplish an end, in effect, explaining the relationship between them. Additionally, use of plan in the conceptual definition of strategy also infers *intentionality*. Few would argue that the unguided, haphazard letting loose of means to achieve an

⁷⁵ The extension of a word refers to the class of things to which the word applies while intension refers to the collection of properties applicable to the word.

outcome by happenstance would constitute a strategy—even a poor one. Conceptually, a strategy is something that is designed with forethought, even in the heat of battle, to achieve an end with the means at hand, in some way. Intentionality in strategy also infers cause and effect, which are also germane, with means and ways employed to cause a desired outcome, or end. Thus, adding “plan” to the definition in order to capture the “course of action” aspect of strategy with the connecting connotation of relationship (rather than the term “relationship” itself) yields “a plan that describes how means and ways are used to achieve ends.” Note that “connected” has been replaced by “used,” resulting from “plan” providing the connecting device between “means” and “ways.” This produces a less ambiguous conceptual definition, but one that is still awkward in terms of “ways.”

Unmentioned in the discourse thus far has been a discussion of the principles of war (discussed in chapter 9), which are neither universal, and thus not principles, nor limited to war. In a lesser known and earlier essay, “Principles of War” (Clausewitz 2003), Clausewitz made an effort to distinguish between principles of war and principles of strategy. His principles of strategy never caught on, however, and the notion was dropped both in his later writings and from the war theory lexicon. Instead, after Clausewitz, a polemical pursuit of general war principles ensued, with a host of practitioners proffering their own sets, which were finally arbitrated and adopted by individual states as their guiding principles for the conduct of war. In actuality, the fact that countries differed in their chosen principles illustrated that either the principles were not universal, or that other countries simply got them “wrong.” But as was discussed more in chapter 9, the argument should have been over *concepts of employment*, which

differ by strategy, rather than principles of war. For example, a different set of concepts of employment is used in a strategy of annihilation than in a strategy of exhaustion (discussed in chapter 12). Different concepts of employment yield different strategies in the way that means are used to accomplish ends. Another benefit of describing “ways” in terms of “concepts of employment” is that it is more generic than principles of war. Many of the principles of war are also applicable in peacetime. However, by referring to them as *war* principles confuses their conceptual application in categories of strategy other than military. Reference to “ways” as “concepts of employment” opens the connotation to peacetime and other categories of strategy, as well.

On the other hand, the substitution of “concepts of employment” for “ways” adds a needed distinction between strategy and the more general concept of plan. In terms of Sartori’s guidelines, this satisfies Rule 5 that states, “With respect to the extension of a concept, always assess (1) its degree of boundedness, and (2) its degree of denotative discrimination vis-à-vis its membership (Sartori 2009c, 117). Strategy is a special type of plan—not only does it connect the ends with the means needed to accomplish them, but it does so through the use of concepts that focus and identify the way in which the means are used. Indeed, the concepts of employment are a key distinguishing property of strategy—the “magic,” if you will, that marks strategy as something altogether different from a laundry list of steps to be accomplished to achieve a goal.

Finally, substituting this more specific articulation of “concepts of employment” for the “ways” used in strategy yields a clearer conceptual definition of strategy as “a plan that describes how means and concepts of employment are used to achieve ends.”

It should be noted that the principles of war were not used in previous definitions of strategy. However, they are such an integral part of strategy that the change in terminology from principles of war to concepts of employment does require justification. According to Sartori's guidelines, Rule 9 states, "If the term that designates the concept unsettles the semantic field (to which the term belongs), then justify your selection by showing that (1) no field meaning is lost, and (2) ambiguity is not increased by being transferred into the rest of the field set" (Sartori 2009c). The discussion above illustrates that although the term *concept of employment* may unsettle the semantic field, it is justified by decreasing the ambiguity associated with ways.

Figure A.2 is a conceptual map of strategy. In satisfaction of Rule 2a of Sartori's guidelines, the key terms used in this reconceptualization of strategy are defined as follows:

Ends: The intended results of an action; its aims, purpose (End).

Plan: an organized proposal according to which ends are to be achieved; a scheme of action (Plan).

Means: The instruments utilized to achieve ends.

Concepts of Employment: The concepts that describe how means are employed to achieve ends.


Strategy: A plan that describes how means and concepts of employment are used to achieve ends.

With the exception of concepts of employment, all of the key terms are consistent with both the semantic field of strategy and contemporary usage of the terms as defined in the Oxford English Dictionary.

The final check recommended in Sartori's guidelines is Rule 10 that states, "Make sure the definition of a concept is adequate and parsimonious: adequate in that no accompanying property is included among the necessary, defining properties." In order to check whether an accompanying property was included that wasn't necessary to the definition, each of the key terms were removed to see if the definition remained adequate. The definition of the concept of strategy was rendered inadequate when a key term was removed. Thus, in terms of Rule 10, the key terms used in the conceptual definition of strategy were both necessary and sufficient in defining strategy as, "A plan that describes how means and concepts of employment are used to achieve ends."

Military Strategy Defined

Given the conceptual definition of strategy from above, defining military strategy is a relatively easy task. However, while Sarori's guidelines were effective in the reconceptualization of an ontological definition of strategy as a concept, they don't provide much help in defining more specific classes of strategy down the ladder of abstraction. For this task, Gary Goertz's three-level concept structure was used (Goertz, *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide* 2006).



Goertz's structure begins with a basic level concept that ontologically describes the phenomenon of interest. It specifies the phenomenon at the highest level of abstraction, articulating the conditions sufficient to constitute the concept (Goertz 2006, 6). Specific classes and types of the phenomenon of interest are derived from the basic

level concept by moving down the ladder of abstraction, accomplished by adding to the intension of the concept through the addition of secondary-level dimensions.⁷⁶ This enables a set of multidimensional and multilevel concepts that are logically and hierarchically linked to the basic level, universal conceptualization of the phenomenon of interest. In Figure A.1, an example of a typology of strategy is shown which illustrates multilevel and multidimensional dimensions inherent in secondary level concepts of strategy. While a complete discussion of the strategy typology is beyond the scope of this Appendix, Figure A.1 does show the relationship between the basic level concept of strategy and the secondary level concept of military strategy.

As Goertz describes, the most common way of adding dimensions to a concept is by attaching adjectives to it (Goertz 2006, 75). Adding “military” to the definition of strategy will obviously reduce the extension of the concept to military-only manifestations of the concept. Curiously, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms does not define military. The Oxford English Dictionary, however, provides the adjective definition of military as, “of or relating to warfare or defense” (Military). Adding this property of military to the definition of strategy yields the following definition of military strategy as, “A plan that describes how military means and concepts of employment are used to achieve ends.”

⁷⁶ Sartori used Salmon’s description of the difference between extension and intension, which states, “The extension of a word is the class of things to which the word applies; the intension of a word is the collection of properties which determine the things to which the applies” (as quoted in Giovanni Sartori, “Concept misinformation in comparative politics,” in *Concepts and Method in Social Science*, ed. David Collier and John Gerring, 13-43 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009a).

Applying the same logic to the “ends” portion of the definition would yield the following: “A plan that describes how military means are utilized through concepts of employment to achieve military ends.” While “military ends” would be appropriate, “military objectives” better satisfies Sartori’s rule of limiting semantic damage to the strategy lexicon, as “objective” has gained wide acceptance as the end of strategy.

Finally, this results in a definition of military strategy as:

Military Strategy: “A plan that describes how military means and concepts of employment are used to achieve military objectives.”

This definition is both parsimonious and clear. By using “military means” rather than “force,” (as done in some of the definitions shown in Table A.1) this definition allows for the use of military strategy in peacetime. For example, “deterrence,” which is defined as “The prevention from action by fear of the consequences” (Joint Publication 1-02 2012), is a military concept for the *prevention* of war. Similarly, psychological operations, defined as, “planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals” (Joint Chiefs of Staff Pub 3-13 2006), are also a military means that can be used short of war.

Given this ontological definition of military strategy—that is, a conceptual definition that describes what military strategy *is*—it is now possible to build a theory upon this foundation.

GLOSSARY OF MAJOR CONCEPTS

Concept	Definition
Adaptability	Altering or modifying combat operations, in order to find, force, and/or exploit opportunities in consonance with localized conditions, at all levels on the battlefield. Source: Adapted from Dickerson, Brian (2003), “Adaptability – A New Principle of War,” U.S. Army War College: Carlisle, PA.
Agility	The ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy and is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. Source: FM 100-5, 1993
Annihilate	The destruction of the enemy’s forces, whether by death, injury, or any other means—either completely or enough to make him stop fighting. Source: Adapted from Clausewitz, Carl von, 1984, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, (227)
Assassination	[Peacetime]: Murder of a targeted individual for political purposes. [Wartime]: A decision by the President to employ clandestine, low visibility or overt military force would not constitute assassination if U.S. military forces were employed against the combatant forces of another nation, a guerrilla force, or a terrorist or other organization whose actions pose a threat to the security of the United States. Source: DAJA (27-1A) 02 November 1989, Memorandum of Law, Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Army.
Attrition	A gradual and piecemeal process of destroying an enemy’s capability. Source: Malkasian, Carter (2002) A History of Modern Wars of Attrition, Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport, CT, (1)
Audacity	Bold departure from the conventional form; daring originality. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Awesome; Awesomeness	Showing or characterized by reverence, admiration, or fear; exhibiting or marked by awe. Source: Random House Dictionary, Random House, Inc. 2013.
Balance	Adjust your end to your means. Source: B.H. Liddell-Hart, 1991, 335
Bold; Boldness	Courage, daring, fearlessness. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.

Concept	Definition
Cohesion	The bonding together of members of a unit or organization in such a way as to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their unit, and the mission. Source: Defense Management Study Group on <i>Military Cohesion, Cohesion in the US Military</i> . (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1984), ix.
Control	The function or power of directing and regulating; domination, command, sway. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Cunning	Skill employed in a secret or underhand manner, or for purposes of deceit; skilful deceit, craft, artifice. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Decentralization	Delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. Source: JP 3-30
Deception, Military	Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization (VEO) decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. (MILDEC) Source: JP 3-13.4, Military Deception, 26 January 2012.
Decisive; Decisiveness	Characterized by decision; unhesitating, resolute, determined. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Demoralize; Demoralization	To lower or destroy the power of bearing up against dangers, fatigue, or difficulties. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Deprive; Deprivation	To divest, strip, bereave, dispossess of a possession. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Depth	Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, and resources. Source: FM 3-0, 2008
Deter	To discourage and turn aside or restrain by fear; to frighten from anything; to restrain or keep back from acting or proceeding by any consideration of danger or trouble. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Dislocation, Physical	The result of a move which (a) upsets the enemy's dispositions and, by compelling a sudden 'change of front', dislocates the distribution and organization of his forces; (b) separates his forces; (c) endangers his supplies; (d) menaces the route or routes by which he could retreat in case of need and re-establish himself in his base or homeland. Source: B.H. Liddell-Hart, 1991, 326

Concept	Definition
Dislocation, Psychological	The impression on the commander's mind of being trapped, resulting from the effects of physical dislocation. Source: B.H. Liddell-Hart, 1991, 326
Disperse; Dispersion	To cause to separate in different directions. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Economy of Force	Expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Energy	Vigor or intensity of action. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Exhaust; Exhaustion	To drain of strength or resources. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Exterminate; Extermination	To destroy utterly, put an end to, to root out, extirpate. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Firepower	The total effectiveness of the fire of guns, missiles, etc., of a military force. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Flexibility	Ensure that both plan and dispositions are flexible--adaptable to circumstances. Source: B.H. Liddell-Hart, 1991, 336
Freedom of Action	The freedom to do what we will (Source: Rogers Albritton, 1985 presidential address to APA Western Division, "Freedom of Will and Freedom of Action"); to be free of external constraints.
Initiative	The willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Source: FM 3-0, 2008, (3-3)
Intelligence	The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. Source: JP 1-02, 2012
Intimidate; Intimidation	To render timid, inspire with fear; to overawe, cow; in modern use esp. to force to or deter from some action by threats or violence. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Isolate	Deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable the exercise of coercion, influence, potential advantage, and freedom of action. Source: FM 3-0, 2008

Concept	Definition
Legitimacy	Maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Lure	To allure, entice, tempt; To set a trap for (another). Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Maneuver	Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Mass	Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Mobility	The ability of a military force or its equipment to move or be moved rapidly from one position to another. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Morale	A positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, British Defence Doctrine, (3rd Edition), August 2008, p. 2-3.
Net Assessment	The comparative analysis of military, technological, political, economic, and other factors governing the relative military capability of nations. Source: DoDD 5111.11, December 23, 2009
Objective	Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Offensive	Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Paralysis	The state of being powerless; a condition of helplessness or inactivity; inability to act or function properly; an instance of this. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Perseverance	Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Persuasion	The addressing of arguments or appeals in order to induce cooperation, submission, or agreement. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Political Mobilization	The use of persuasion, coercion and other subversive techniques to indoctrinate and arouse the people to support a political program.
Popular Support	Support of the populace.
Position; Positional	A site chosen for occupation by an army or detachment of troops, usually as having strategic value. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press

Concept	Definition
Protracted; Protractedness	Lengthened, extended, prolonged in time. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press.
Resolve	Firmness or steadfastness of purpose; determination. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press
Restraint	Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Security	Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Shock	(a) A sudden and violent blow, impact, or collision, tending to overthrow or to produce internal oscillation in a body subjected to it; (b) A sudden and disturbing impression on the mind or feelings. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press
Simplicity	Increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Speed	Quickness, promptness, or dispatch in the performance of some action or operation. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press
Subvert; Subversion	Actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority. Source: JP 1-02
Superiority; Moral, Physical, Local	The condition of being stronger than or prevailing over someone or something; supremacy over a person, nation, etc. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press
Surprise	Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Sustainment	The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. Source: JP 3-0, 2011
Synchronization	Arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point. Source: FM 100-5, 1993
Tempo	Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. Source: FM 3-0, 2008
Terror	(a) The use of organized repression or extreme intimidation; terrorism. (b) The state of being terrified or extremely frightened; intense fear or dread. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press

Concept	Definition
Timing	The choice or judgment of when something should be done, especially so as to maximize the chances of achieving one's aims. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press
Uncertainty	The state of not being definitely known or perfectly clear; doubtfulness or vagueness. Source: OED Online, December 2012, Oxford University Press
Unity of Command	The operation of all forces under a single responsible commander who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those forces in pursuit of a common purpose. Source: JP 1-02, 2012
Unity of Effort	Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. Source: JP 1-02, 2012
Versatility	The ability of units to meet diverse mission requirements. Source: FM 100-5, 1993