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Protracted Social Conflict: A Reconceptualization and Case Analysis

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PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT: A RECONCEPTUALIZATION
AND CASE ANALYSIS

by

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ABSTRACT

What are the necessary components of protracted social conflict (PSC)? The works of Edward Azar have laid the theoretical foundation of how PSC is approached in modern scholarship by identifying four necessary components: effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity. However, do these components account for all of the descriptive and sustaining aspects of PSC? How are these components measured? Furthermore, testing and verification of these theoretically necessary components has been limited. Of specific interest to this project, then, is how the theory of PSC is organized and what its theoretically necessary components truly are. This dissertation reconceptualizes and tests the theoretic components of PSC using a historical-comparative approach with Boolean and confirmatory factor methods of analysis. A new theoretical framework is applied to the critical cases of the Arab-Israeli and Northern Ireland conflicts. The purpose of this research project, therefore, is to present, test, and justify a theoretical reconceptualization of the necessary components of PSC.

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CHAPTER 1

PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT AS A UNIQUE FORM OF VIOLENCE

INTRODUCTION

When contemplating violent conflict across the span of human interaction, there is an expectation that eventually, these conflicts will end and that “normal”, peaceful (non-violent) interaction between actors will ensue. There are, however, violent conflicts that violate the assumed norm that human interaction is predominately peaceful. As such, the tragedy of protracted social conflicts (PSCs) can be found in their capacity to amass tremendous loss of life, the destruction of property, hopes, and dreams of the individuals and societies that are forced to live in their midst. When prolonged violent conflicts occur, questions naturally arise inquiring as why certain conflicts end within a short or “reasonable” period of time and why others are prolonged. Questions are also asked as to what separates these extended conflicts from other forms of violent conflict. It is these very questions that this dissertation explores.

What is PSC? What are the components that are necessary for PSC to occur? What separates it from other types of conflict so that it is enduring in nature? Across scholarly literature, there is divergence in the conceptualization as to what PSC is. There are differing definitions, parameters, applications, and characteristics among researchers making a consistent, accurate, and precise conceptualization of what PSC is difficult to discern. Thus, my dissertation project revisits and elaborates on the “nature” of PSC. In

this dissertation, I present a theoretic conceptualization of PSC that has more conceptual clarity, is more measurable, and offers a more comprehensive and theoretically based conceptualization of PSC. Furthermore, I test the proposed theoretic structure to determine what the necessary components of PSC are.

The seminal work of Dr. Edward Azar (1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1988, 1990), has provided a theoretical conceptualization and foundation from which many PSC scholars have built. While other works have added to the theoretical foundation established by Azar through *descriptive* analysis, the further development of the theoretical foundation and conceptualization of PSC beyond his original work has been limited (Ramsbotham 2005). Much of the analysis of PSC in existing literature focuses on the attributes and events of PSC. It is my intention, therefore, to add to the body of scholarly knowledge by building on the work of Azar (and his colleagues) to present a more measureable and clearly organized theoretical conceptualization of PSC.

The foundation that Azar's theoretical work rests on is his conceptualization that PSC has four necessary components. These are: effective participation, security, self-identity, and group-identity (Azar, 1985, 29). Yet, does this conceptualization capture the nature of PSC? Do Azar's four necessary conditions accurately conceptualize all the components and conditions that support continued violent social behavior across time in the most valid manner given its intractable and multi-faceted traits? It is, therefore, the intention of this dissertation to answer these questions by engaging in the discourse as to what PSC is and to enquire as to what manner of conceptualization will provide a greater utility to scholars and practitioners alike.

In presenting a reconceptualization of the theoretic framework of PSC, I hope to add to the body of knowledge by presenting and testing a reconceptualization of the theoretically necessary components and conditions of PSC. In doing so, the utility of my research can be found in a fuller understanding of what PSC is and what its necessary components are. This could be of benefit to the further development of scholarship and to applied intervention in this prolonged form of violent conflict.

In the collective effort between scholars and practitioners to understand, manage, and eradicate PSC; an accurate conceptualization of what PSC is and what sustains it, is a tool that could prove to be invaluable. A natural place to begin the discussion of what PSC is, then, is to identify PSC as a specific and unique form of violent conflict by clearly elaborating how it differs from other forms of prolonged conflict.

PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT: A DISTINCT FORM OF LONG-TERM CONFLICT

Conflicts that endure over long periods of time can have tragic outcomes for the individuals and societies that must live in them. Hence, it is critical that scholars and practitioners have an accurate conceptualization. That being said, clarifying what protracted conflicts, enduring rivalries, and protracted *social* conflicts are, and what their necessary components are is the logical point of departure for this dissertation. To this end, this section establishes the term protracted conflict as a broader classification of conflicts that endure over time and that this broad group of conflicts has two components: enduring rivalries and PSCs. Furthermore, this section clarifies the separation between PSC from enduring rivalries and establishes it as a distinct form of long-term conflict. In doing so, the foundation of the justification and potential utility of this dissertation project is laid.

Often in protracted conflict literature, conflicts that have the attributes of PSCs have been called protracted conflicts (Azar 1983,198; Freidman 1999, 2002; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Schrodt 1983). While technically not inaccurate, using the terms protracted conflict and protracted *social* conflict interchangeably can result in a lack of conceptual clarity and can result in conceptual confusion. Enduring conflicts are seen as protracted conflicts whose conceptualizations can be synthesized through existing definitions as: *conflicts between two nation states with some degree of regularity over extended periods of time in which the stakes under contention are perceived by both parties are seen to be high and are inseparably linked to national, societal, and individual needs where the use of warfare, is used or considered therein* (Azar et. Al. 2000, 272; Colaresi and Thompson, 2002, 264, Diehl, and Goertz, 2001, 4). As a definition of a class of conflicts, this conceptualization of protracted conflict is problematic. One problem is the assertion that protracted conflicts are between nation states. As has been stated in PSC literature (and will be tested in this project), actors that participate in violence can be non-state actors (Azar, 1985, 31; Azar, 1990, 17; Azar et. al., 2000, 272; Boulding, 1989, 5; Coser, 1956, 49). This nation-state concept is also reinforced in using the term “warfare” in defining statements. The Merriam Webster dictionary defines “warfare” as, “an activity undertaken by a political unit (such as a nation) to weaken or destroy another” (Webster 2011). Hence, it is leaving a conceptual gap, through overgeneralization, when it states that protracted conflicts occur between state actors. To this end, this project offers a conceptual definition of the group of conflicts that endure over time- protracted conflict- as: *dyadic conflicts between actors with some degree of regularity over extended periods of time in which the stakes under*

contention are perceived by all parties to be inseparably linked to national, societal, and individual needs where the use of violent conflict is used or considered therein.

With a definition of protracted conflict that is more inclusive of the attributes of both enduring rivalries and PSCs, attention can now turn to how PSCs differ from enduring rivalries. Throughout the forthcoming section, attributes that are shared and are divergent between enduring rivalries and PSC are discussed. By clarifying some of the similarities and differences as members of the same class of conflict, justification for a clear separation of enduring rivalries and PSCs is realized.

HOW PSCS AND ENDURING RIVALRIES ARE SIMILAR

Enduring rivalries and PSCs do have similarities that make them easy to confuse. Enduring rivalries and PSCs are not the same type of protracted conflict, however. Each possesses unique qualities that substantiate the classification of each as a separate and distinct form of protracted conflict.

As evidenced by their names, the first attribute that is shared is that both forms of conflict extend over long periods of time (Azar, 1985, 2000; Diehl and Goertz 2002; Friedman 1999, Marshall 1999, Maoz and More 2002). Temporal considerations are among the primary characteristics that separate protracted conflicts, enduring rivalries and PSCs, from other forms of conflict. However, there are different conceptualization between PSC and enduring rivalries as to how long a conflict must endure to be considered a PSC or enduring rivalry. The theoretical minimum for a violent conflict to have endured to be considered a PSC is opaque (and will be addressed in this project), with no clear beginning or end-points (Marshall, 1999, 36). However, the minimum time requirements for a conflict to have existed before it is deemed an enduring rivalry can range from at least ten years to

twenty-five years (Diehl 2005; Wayman, 1996). Even though an exact theoretic criteria is not provided in PSC literature, a prolonged, conflictual nature is one feature that is shared between enduring rivalries and PSCs

Another similarity between both types of conflict is that they have repeated periods of time where tensions are higher than others. Rather than having conflict over time that is disjointed or unconnected, these “fluctuations in intensity” (Azar, 1985, 36) in PSCs and enduring rivalries tend to experience tensions over the same issue or groups of issues over time. While both share this characteristic, PSC conceptualizations are limited in offering a minimum criteria whereas enduring rivalry scholars offer a range from two to seven events as a theoretical minimum (Wayman 1982, Gochman and Maoz 1984).

Another key feature that PSC and enduring rivalries share is that they are both based in conflictual dyadic relationships. The relational aspect of these types of conflict focuses on the changes in the nature of the relationships between the actors. When conflicts of interest occur, the issue(s) of contention can change the nature of the relationship and the nature of the interaction between the two actors. Rivalry relationships are the same pairs of actors that are “competing with one another and [have] the expectation of a future conflict relationship with the same specific opponent” (Diehl and Goertz, 2001, 19). This conceptualization of a conflictual relationship is approximated in PSC literature (Azar, 1983, 90; Boulding, 1989, 5; Rapoport, 1974, 185) as well: “[C]onflict arises from specific demands within the relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants” (Coser, 1956, 49). In this, it is the prolonged conflictual relationship that forms the basis for the concept of protracted conflicts.

HOW PSCS DIFFER FROM ENDURING RIVALRIES

Though both forms of conflict have similarities that would seem to justify some conceptual overlap, the differences between them are substantive enough to justify clear distinction and classification as different forms of conflict within the classification of protracted conflict. In the forthcoming section, I identify the traits in which enduring rivalries and PSC diverge. As such, I provide conceptual clarity from which a new theoretical conceptualization of PSC can be built.

PSC possesses numerous characteristics that separate it substantively as a form of conflict from enduring rivalries. The first, and most important, distinction is found within the shared characteristic of an enduring, conflictual dyadic relationship. The initial distinction between PSCs and enduring rivalries is found in the actors that make up the conflictual dyad. The level/unit of analysis of these relationships differs greatly and forms the basis of the separation of these two forms of conflict. In enduring rivalries, the primary unit of analysis is the state (Diehl 1994; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Wayman, 1982, 1986). “Rivalries consist of the same pair of states competing with one another. . .” (Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 19). In PSC, however, the non-state actor is the primary unit of analysis, where the “identity group” is the most useful unit of analysis (Azar, 1985, 31). By highlighting the individual and group levels of analysis, the impact that non-state actors, be they one or many, can have on the continuation of violent conflict can be more fully recognized and examined. If analysis remains solely at the nation-state level, this important factor can confound research and diplomatic efforts. The distinction between enduring rivalries and PSCs in terms of the primary unit of analysis is pivotal to the conceptual understanding of each form of conflict.

In functioning within a Westphalian international system, conducting studies that focus on prolonged conflict based on the state seems a natural course of action. In utilizing the state-level of analysis, scholars can more easily quantify inter-state militarized disputes through battle deaths, military expenditures, state-level economic statistics, diplomatic efforts, and the like (see, for example, the Correlates of War Project). As such, deriving meaningful information and implications as to the contributors to prolonged conflicts can be more readily gleaned through a plethora of existing data sets. It is only natural to go for the low-hanging fruit. However, in limiting the unit of analysis to the state level, (or applying findings from state-level enduring rivalry analysis to PSC), the many contributions that non-state actors can make to the enduring nature of PSC can be over looked or erroneously minimized. In this, the assumption that there is a strong correlation between governmental policy (agreement in an enduring rivalry) and domestic support for governmental policy (agreement in PSC) cannot be taken for granted¹. When looking at PSC only from the perspective of the state-level actor (elite), measures that high politics enact through treaties, accords, and various forms of agreements can be frustrated by the behavior of non-state actors (masses). By refusing to end violent behavior, non-state actors can undermine the whole peace process that has been put into place by elite actors. When the role that non-state actors can play in prolonging a conflict in PSC is not fully realized, addressed, or is confused (used interchangeably with enduring rivalry), a vital component as to why a PSC is so enduring in nature could be missed.

Also, enduring rivalries measure casualties only in terms of battle deaths, because it is conceptualized as state-based. As casualties from violent conflict in PSCs can amass in

¹¹ In this, it is not being said that PSC does not or cannot have state actors. PSCs have had and do have states as an actor in the conflictual dyad. Rather, the point is that the non-state actor is included in the conceptualization and analysis.

fewer numbers, but in greater frequency over time; the actual cost of PSC in terms of human lives can be overlooked or underestimated. If the deaths from a conflict do not occur in a specific militarized battle and/or do not total the required casualty threshold, they are often not considered in databases such as Correlates of War (COW). Individual incidents of violence in PSCs can result in comparatively fewer deaths and in different locations over the same issues of contention. When compared to the state-sponsored militarized disputes of an enduring rivalry, in any one incident it is less likely that the casualties of a single violent PSC event will reach the required minimum thresholds of many conflict data sets. Hence, while the cost of PSCs in terms of human lives can equal or surpass that of an enduring rivalry, it may not be considered because the casualties occurred across time rather than in one battle or set of battles closely related in time. Similarly, as state-based militarized battles require greater amounts of organization, funding, and mobilization, battles can occur at a lower frequency than the violent incidents that occur in PSCs (where individuals can commit acts of violence with relatively low economic costs at a higher frequency). The result is that the actual economic and human costs of a PSC can go unrecognized because it is treated as an enduring rivalry and not as a unique form of violent conflict.

The final distinction between enduring rivalries and PSCs is the necessity of violence. Enduring rivalries are not necessarily violent and violence does not *have* to occur within the dyad. Enduring rivalries can be based in competition and be non-violent (Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 19, 23). As in the case of the Cold War between Soviet Russia and United States, there was a long-term, conflictual relationship yet no direct violent conflict erupted between the primary actors (Diehl and Goertz, 2001, 21-23, 32). Conversely, in the thirteen PSCs identified by Azar (1985), all cases included direct, violent conflict between the

primary actors. Though violent conflict can, and has, emerged in enduring rivalries, it is not a necessary component. Herein rests a substantive separation between enduring rivalries and PSCs.

In highlighting the relational rather than event aspects of enduring rivalries and PSCs, a clearer understanding of what drives each conflict type across time can be derived. While both enduring rivalries and PSCs share aspects such as long-term conflictual dyadic relationships, it is the nuances of this shared relational aspect where useful and discerning differences can be identified. As enduring rivalries focus on the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, a composite definition of enduring rivalries can be: *a prolonged conflictual relationship the same two nation-states over an extended period of time with fluctuations in regularity and intensity, over the same issue(s) of contention that are perceived by both nation-states to be inseparably linked to national, needs where the use of warfare, is used or considered therein* (Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 17-48 ; Maoz & Mor, 1996, 157). However, PSCs have distinguishing aspects and components that justify their classification as a distinct form of prolonged conflict. PSC can be defined as: *a prolonged conflictual relationship characterized by the intermittent violent interactions between at least one non-state actor and another entity over an extended period of time sufficient to have become fully embedded in to the social fabric of the conflict group(s) wherein issues of contention, that can remain the same or change over time, are perceived by both actors to be inseparably linked to national, individual, and/or, societal needs, and are considered to be non-negotiable* (Azar et. al. 1985, 1986; Fisher 2001; Friedman 1999; Ramsbotham 2008).

In the endeavor to conceptualize PSC in a manner that is useful, it is critical to evaluate it as a separate and distinct form of violent conflict. To this end, it is not only

useful to establish PSCs as a unique subset of protracted conflict, but also to clearly ascertain the separation between enduring rivalries and PSCs. The following is a pictorial representation of the class of conflict, protracted conflict and its two components: enduring rivalry and PSC: (see figure 1.1)




Figure 1.1: Components of Protracted Conflict

THEORETICAL STRUCTURE OF PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT

The enduring nature of PSC makes it a frustrating and enigmatic form of conflict to practitioners and scholars alike. The work of Edward Azar (et. al.) has, to date, provided the seminal body of literature relative to the theoretical conceptualization of PSC. However, does Azar's presentation of the theoretically necessary conditions of effective participation, security, self-identity, and group-identity (Azar 1985, 29) sufficiently capture the essence of PSC? In answer to this question, this dissertation proposes and tests a theoretical reconceptualization of PSC which builds upon the foundation laid by Azar and his collaborators while providing a clearer, better-developed, and testable conceptualization of PSC. Thus, using Azar's conditions as a starting-point, this dissertation justifies a two-tiered approach to the study of PSC.

In laying the groundwork for the presentation of a reconceptualization of PSC, my approach is a departure from most PSC scholarship. Across the literature, PSC is often framed from the perspective of events resulting in violent conflict. Rather than taking this view, my conceptualization of PSC is approached from the perspective that it can be an aspect of conflictual dyadic relationships. By shifting emphasis to the relational aspects of the actors rather than the evaluation violent disputes, the issues of conflict and/or contentions, as opposed to the outcomes of repeated violent conflict, can be emphasized.

In utilizing this approach, it is hoped that the whys of the theoretical aspects of PSC can be better understood. As introduced by Goertz and Diehl (1992), by looking at PSC as a conflictual dyad, the underlying issues that sustain violent conflict between the actors can be highlighted. In doing so, understanding of PSC beyond identifying what it is to grasping how it is sustained over time can be better understood. The relationship-based approach provides the underpinning for the second contribution that this project will make to the existing body of scholarly knowledge. When approached from a dyadic perspective, it is possible to separate out what the descriptive components of PSC are from the conditions that actually support and sustain PSCs over time. Hence, the first theoretical tier of PSC addresses the descriptive components and the second tier contains the components that sustain PSC.

The first “tier” builds upon Azar’s theoretical category of “effective participation”. It includes four specific explanatory components. In this tier, the definitional questions of who participates in PSC, when, and how are clearly identified. Thus, the necessary components for the first (descriptive) tier of necessary conditions for PSC are: (1) the participation on non-state actors, (2) a minimum of 20 years of violent

conflict, (3) a minimum of three violence/peace cycles, and (4) 500 or more deaths (directly related the conflict issues of the PSC). This presentation of four independently necessary components more fully elucidates Azar's classification of "effective participation" and provides clear, concise, and measurable criteria from which an long-term violent conflict can be evaluated to determine whether it is a PSC. While these components provide a better explanation of what is and is not a PSC from an observational point of view, they do not explain the mechanisms that lie beneath the empirical determinants. They fail to explain *why* PSCs endure over time. To clarify this, a second, theoretical tier is warranted.

To explain the underlying, supporting mechanisms of PSC, additional, theoretically necessary components are introduced. It is at this theoretic level that Azar's three remaining necessary conditions are utilized. The term "security" in conflict literature is often used to address the threat to finite resources such as territory, natural resources, or life (Azar, 1985, 33; Friedman, 1999, 39; Geller, 2000, 413; Pruitt and Kim, 2004, 21; Vasquez, 2000, 373-5). Yet, is the use of "security" alone sufficient to explain the competition for tangible *as well as* non-tangible assets in a long-term conflictual relationship (Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 23)? Tensions over non-tangible assets such as social, economic and political power, and revenge are seated firmly in the relational aspects of PSC yet, they are underutilized at the conceptual level. While mentioned in PSC literature (Azar, 1983, 89; 1985, 28; 1983, 90), when discussed theoretically, the role of non-tangible asset competition is minimized as emphasis is placed on competition for tangible assets (Azar, 1985, 60). Hence, the first sustaining theoretical categorically necessary component includes conflict over tangible as well as non-tangible assets. This

is the category of Competition-Based Conflict. By being conceptualized in this manner, conflict that can arise or is sustained from non-tangible assets can also be considered as to whether it is a sustaining component of PSC.

Similarly, the second necessary categorical component builds upon Azar's necessary components of self and group-identity. The category of Psychological Motivation includes Azar's identity components as well as the radial categories of emotion and perception as potentially necessary supporting components of PSC. While the contributions of these psychological components are given considerable attention in the literature, their role in the sustainment or continuation of PSC has been minimized (Azar, 1983, 90; Boulding, 1989, 5; Deutsch, 91; Deutsch & Schichman, 1986, 224, 230). As such, the introduction of psychological motivations as a categorically necessary component provides a substantive departure from existing literature on the theoretic aspects of PSC. By evaluating the concepts of self- and group-identity along with emotion and perception (as jointly necessary components) in a broader category of Psychological Motivation, a fuller examination of the role that psychological motivations play in the enduring nature of PSC can be conducted.

Reconceptualizing, testing, and justifying the theoretically necessary components of PSC through the lens of a conflictual dyadic relationship provides a substantive departure from existing scholarly conceptualizations of PSC. When emphasis is placed on the relationship between the actors rather than the events, the sustaining components of PSC, which may be more abstract (such as psychological motivations and competition for social and political power), can be evaluated more fully as to their contributing and/or supporting roles in the intractability of PSC.

To summarize, PSC is a unique form of conflict. As such, when considering a conceptual structure that best reflects the phenomenon, it must include components that are measurable, that accurately and comprehensively capture what it is, *and* why it endures. In presenting my reconceptualization of the theoretical structure of PSC, the descriptive attributes as well as the sustaining mechanisms are considered. To do otherwise, an incomplete conceptualization could be offered. This could result in the frustration of efforts in PSC management and/or hopes of its resolution.

RELEVANCE OF EXPLORING PSC THEORY

When presented as an enduring violent conflict, correctly identifying what it is and what its supporting aspects are is critical. Failure to do so could result in continued tragedies for the societies in which PSC occurs as well as touch lives and societies that are not directly involved in the conflict. Hence, my research is relevant for several reasons.

One reason why re-evaluating the theoretical components in PSC is of importance is because of the changing nature of international conflict. Since the end of the Cold War, the nature of warfare has become increasingly “internalized” and has moved progressively into areas that are populated by non-combatants or citizens. “Wars are no longer confined to definitive battlefields, but occur more often in populated areas. . .” (Bald, 2002, 2). Recent trends in violent conflict indicate that sixty to ninety percent of the conflict-related casualties are civilian (Bald, 2002, 2, Iqbal, 2006, 631; Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003, 199). Similarly, as violence becomes increasingly internalized, many have become targets because of their ethnic and/or communal identities.

In his work on children and human rights abuses, Machal found that:

In 1995, 30 major armed conflicts raged in different locations around the world. All of them took place within states, between factions split along ethnic, religious or cultural lines (Machal, 2002, 5).

Rather than being accidental casualties of a violent conflict, civilians are increasingly becoming targets because of their ethnic identities. As such, the recent trends in violent conflict are of particular importance to understanding the conceptually necessary components of PSC. Because PSC, by its nature, is violence at the social/local level, if the current trends in violent conflict continue (that is, being increasingly fought in populated areas), they run the risks of becoming PSCs. Thus, any hope in preventing PSCs lies in being able to correctly identify the components that describe and sustain them and applying appropriate intervention *before* the conflict sews itself into the social conscience.

There are other reasons why correctly conceptualizing the theoretical components of PSC is important, though. As current trends of violent conflict are increasingly along ethnic lines, long-lived violent conflict that has become part of the social fabric of the actors can have local, regional, state-level, and international ramifications. Ethnic/social conflicts are not bound by political borders. A political boundary does not necessarily equate to the boundary of an ethnic group, especially in today's increasingly mobile world. For example, in the Arab/Israeli conflict, murders and assassinations of actors associated with the conflict have taken place outside of the Palestinian region. On July 21, 1973, Mossad allegedly attempted to assassinate Hassan Salameh, a leader of Black September in retaliation for the 1972 Munich Olympic Games massacre (Time 1979). The assassination attempt was made in Lillehammer, Norway. Similarly, On August 21,

1983, Mossad shot and killed senior PLO official, Mamoun Meraish as he was riding in his car in Athens, Greece (Israeli News 2008). Also, even within the United States' political environment, there are pro-Palestinian and Israeli organizations that lobby Congress to gain support for their position². Thus, while violent conflict may be contained within a specific geographical region at a certain point in time, given the technological, mobility, and political realities of the current international environment there is risk of spill-over. Spill-over can threaten the security peoples and nations through the spread of violence. It can also threaten the stability of political structures and organizations as well as have a negative impact on human and economic development through human displacement and/or damage to infrastructure. Any one of these risks can occur from the local to international level.

Thus, presenting and testing PSC theory so that it more accurately reflects the actual phenomenon is no mere a trivial academic pursuit. The real-life costs of PSC have life and death, societal, political, and economic ramifications. Global conditions and our understanding of violent conflict in the world have changed since Azar's foundational works. It is, thus, useful to re-examine our theoretical understanding PSC and to fill any theoretical gaps that are identified in the currently accepted conceptualizations so that they reflect global changes, technological, and methodological advances in our scholarly development. Thus, the utility of this dissertation project can be found in providing a fuller, clearer, and more testable conceptualization of PSC.

² As an example, two of such groups are the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the American Association for Palestinian Equal Rights (AAPER) (Fazekas 2010)

DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION

The goal of this dissertation project is to introduce, test, and ultimately justify the theoretical reconceptualization of the theory of PSC. To this end, in addition to identifying the goals of this dissertation, the first chapter clarifies PSC as a sub-category of the conflict classification of protracted conflict. In doing so, the validity of studying PSC as a separate and distinct form of protracted conflict is established. Next, the proposed theory of PSC is introduced. Finally, the utility and scholarly justification for this project is elaborated.

The second chapter of the dissertation includes the literature review. This chapter begins with a discussion of the question of rationality in PSC. Based Rapoport's conceptualization of conflict as a fight, a game, or a debate, the first part of the chapter engages the debate as to whether the rational actor model can be automatically assumed in PSC. The remainder of the second chapter discusses in detail the inclusion of each of the proposed necessary components. The literature review uses existing PSC, psychological, and conflict literature. In the existing literature, many of the components that I propose as necessary components of PSC are discussed at length. However, they are not discussed as necessary components. Thus, using existing literature, I build a case that supports their inclusion in PSC theoretical conceptualizations as necessary components.

The third chapter presents the theoretical framework that my dissertation builds upon. It is in chapter three that the primary research questions and hypotheses of the project are presented. Again, this dissertation builds off the work of the late Edward Azar. While my theoretical proposition puts forth a modification of Azar's original

theory, it is my hope that my research endeavors are complimentary to a pioneer whose work laid the foundation for current PSC scholarship and that my theoretical presentation is complementary to his original theory. My efforts are not meant to displace or disprove Azar's writings. Rather, it is my hope that my findings will add to the excellent foundation that he laid by presenting a conceptual model of PSC that is solidly founded in Azar's theoretical structure, but presented in a more measurable and comprehensive manner.

Chapter four is the methods chapter where I discuss how I plan to conduct my research. I discuss the "critical" cases that will be investigated. I also discuss how I plan to collect data, how the data will be organized, and how it will be analyzed.

Chapters five and six present the two cases studies: Israeli-Palestinian and Northern Ireland. In these chapters, I discuss the roots and development of each case from a historical, narrative perspective using the statements of the actors. In using quotes, it is the actual actors in the conflict that are telling the "story" of their conflict. Finally, the last section of each chapter I analyze my findings in each case. In this part of each chapter, I assess what the necessary components of PSC are, according to each case.

Chapter seven is the analysis chapter where I compare the findings of the two critical PSC cases. I assess each of the proposed components to determine whether or not they are necessary components of PSC. Finally, determination is made as to whether the proposed theoretic reconceptualization is supported by the study's findings.

The final chapter of this dissertation summarizes the final findings of this project. The conclusion reveals whether the theory that is proposed by this project is supported by the findings.

The weaknesses and challenges of this project are also addressed. Lastly, the implications for further study based on this dissertation's findings are discussed.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

When reading existing literature on the subject of PSC, differences in conceptualizations and nuances of definitions are readily apparent. Scholars often use general or differing parameters, place different emphases on components, or place concepts in differing places in theory. This creates a conceptual quagmire as to what PSC is and what it is not. A more glaring challenge to the establishment of “normalized” theoretical parameters of PSC, however, is that most PSC literature is descriptive in nature. The problem of having primarily explanatory components when explaining violent conflict is also noted by Stephen Brush when he noted that “[m]ost publications focus on describing a particular event or the experience of a particular country rather than explaining the phenomena in general terms” (Brush, 1996, 537). The descriptive nature of PSC scholarship coupled with differences in theoretical applications can result in ambiguity concerning what PSC is, how it differs from other forms of (prolonged) conflict, and it can yield findings that lack meaningful utility when applied to real-life PSCs³. This raises the question, then: can the necessary components of PSC be gleaned from existing PSC and germane literature so that a robust and parsimonious conceptualization of PSC can be formulated and tested? To this end, the ensuing

³ In today’s environment, where the benefit of Political Science research is called into question by Congress, having an accurate conceptualization of PSC so that it is applicable and useful to applied practitioners of Political Science is of particular merit.

literature review utilizes existing scholarly knowledge to build a theoretical reconceptualization that explains the phenomenon of PSC in a more inclusive and comprehensive manner.

When any discussion relevant to the theoretical approach of PSC is engaged, it is beneficial to begin with the seminal work of Edward Azar. In 1985, Azar identified four theoretically necessary components in his conceptualization of PSC. These components are: effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity (Azar, 1985, 29). These components are the foundation from which this literature review is built. As such, this literature review is presented as an exploration of existing PSC literature to determine the descriptive aspects of PSC: (1) the actors that participate in PSC, (2) how the actors participate, (3) time considerations within and across PSCs; and (4) the sustaining mechanism of PSCs: (4.1) asset competition between the actors, (4.2) the psychological motivations of the actors. Thus, the presentation of my literature review in this manner, while still embracing the original intent of Azar (and his collaborators), lays the foundation for the theoretical model of PSC that I propose and test in this dissertation.

Hence, this literature review will be divided into four sections. In the first section, I discuss the challenges that PSC poses to international relations theories and provide a theoretical introduction as to why the theoretical approach to PSC needs to be reexamined, as well as why psychological motivations need to be explored in more depth. In the second section, titled “Effective Participation”, I discuss: (1) who participates in PSCs; (2) time considerations- including how long conflicts must endure to be considered PSCs, how long there must be no violence for it to be considered “ended”; (3) the

intensity of violence in PSC (how often); and (4) cycles of violence. The third section, “Security”, discusses asset-based competition as an enduring struggle for control over tangible and non-tangible assets. The final section, “Psychological Motivation”; which includes Azar’s self- and group-identity components, discusses the role of cognition in conflict (in general) as well the sustaining, motivational forces that emotion, perception, self-identity, and group-identity can be in sustaining PSCs.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT

A hallmark of PSC is that the conflict lingers over a long period of time. This presents two specific challenges to international relations theorists. The first problem is that peace is assumed to be the prevailing norm in international relations.

Most international relations theory assumes that the international system and the nations within it are characterized by peace, with violent conflict an anomaly. In PSCs, however, conflict becomes the norm, with peace the exception (Schrodt, 1983, 101).

Because PSCs do not follow the “normal” conceptualization of the nature of relationships- that being that continual or prolonged violent conflict is the exception rather than the “rule” in the normal give and take of the relationships between states and international actors, traditionally useful methods of conflict mediation and resolution are frustrated as violent conflicts continue to erupt between actors.

The second challenge builds upon the first. This is the failure to resolve the mechanism that is sustaining the conflict. A measure of conflict is considered to be part of the “normal” relations between humans (Pruitt & Kim 2004, 9). However, when conflict occurs between actors, it is also expected that it will be resolved within a “reasonable” amount of time. PSC violates this norm. In “normal” conflict (if conflict escalates to the point that political violence occurs), resolution and/or the cessation of

violence can occur when there is a clear “winner” and a clear “loser” in the conflict, or when the cost of continuing the conflict is greater than the cost compromising or mediation (Pruitt & Kim 2004). When actors lack the capacity to dominate or control the outcome of the conflict or the cost of compromise is higher to the actors than the cost of continuing in the conflict (as in cosmic conflicts), however, violence can continue. “The fact that protracted conflict continues over a long period of time would imply that a certain mechanism is maintaining it” (Schrodt, 1983, 101). Hence, another aspect of PSC that is problematic to traditional international relations theories and approaches as it applies to violent conflict is the failure to resolve the issue(s) driving or sustaining the conflict. As such, clearly identifying the mechanism *or mechanisms* that are maintaining the violent conflict in PSCs- those that are obvious and those that are more opaque and are more difficult to measure and/or ascertain-- is the foundation in developing an accurate theoretical conceptualization of PSC.

In attempting to identify the elements that maintain conflict over longer periods of time, it is useful to identify the conflict type. Kenneth Boulding defines conflict as, “a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of the potential future positions in which each party wishes to occupy” (Boulding, 1962, 5). In situations of conflict, it is perceived that mutual, conflictual aspirations cannot be obtained simultaneously. Thus, recognizing the issues of contention between the actors can be a starting point in identifying the most fundamental ways in which specific types international conflict can occur.

Yet, in ascertaining what the specific issues of contention between the actors, what they are competing and conflicting over, there is an assumption that the actors are

acting in a logical and/or rational manner in their approach to the conflict. This assumption takes for granted that if the actors are in conflict for the control of a natural resource or land, that the actors will act in a predictable manner to achieve their goal and once the contention over the specific source of conflict has been resolved, the conflict will end. Can conflict, and specifically PSC, however, *always* be considered a strategic, value-maximizing endeavor where actors base their behavior on territorial or economic motives? If this were true, then there would be limited utility in the examination of psychological factors in the study of PSC. If examples of psychological motivations are found to be present in PSC, independent of extrinsic stimuli, however, then justification for studying psychology's role, from a theoretical stand point, can be supported. In reference to the role of psychological factors in human decision-making, Marcus cites 44 different studies that support the premise that logic and emotion have an antagonistic relationship in decision-making (Marcus, 2003, 184-7), which prompts him to state: "We can discard the normative and empirical combinations that seek to preclude emotion from the human experience, for humans cannot function without their emotional capacities" (Marcus, 2003, 187). Thus, when examining how or why humans engage in violent conflict, the exploration cannot be complete or comprehensive if psychological motivations are not taken into consideration.

Conflict can be classified in several ways. One way it is classified is dichotomously, realistic and unrealistic. In realistic conflict, "conflict arises from specific demands within the relationship and from estimates of gains of the participants" (Coser, 1956, 49). Realistic conflict is characterized by rational, calculated actions that are taken to achieve specific desired results. Rational theories typically view conflict as a result of

competition for control of physical assets such as resource competition or territorial disputes. Realistic conflict theory “assumes that conflict can always be explained by some tangible (like territory, money, prizes) or intangible (like power, prestige, honor) resource that is desired by both groups and is in short supply” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 28-29). This type of conflict can be likened to Anatol Rapoport’s games and debates where the focus of the conflict is on the goal of winning the contest through using superior logic or strategy. “In a game, the potentialities and eventualities of alternative outcomes must be taken into account”. A game “is idealized as a struggle in which complete “rationality” of the opponent is assumed” (Rapoport, 1960, 10). In a rational conflict, rational, goal-driven behavior is used where the focus is on achieving a desired goal.

In unrealistic conflict, however, emphasis is placed on the interaction between opponents rather than the actual issue of the conflict itself. The attention of the actor(s) is placed upon the need for the release of tension resulting from an issue of contention. In this case, the focus of anger or tension can displace the original issue of the conflict as a result of the lack of a suitable resolution. Because the object of frustration is placed on actors instead of the issue of conflict, functional alternatives replace objective options. Rapoport’s concept of a fight is useful to illustrate this point.

A fight . . . involves no calculations, [and] no strategic considerations. Each adversary simply reacts to others and to his own actions. . . Even the one discernible goal-to harm the opponent- is sometimes absent. Such is the much-quoted and much misunderstood “struggle for existence” in the universe of competing species (Rapoport, 1960, 10).

As such, the utility of logic and rationality to predict behavior can be undermined by human desires and impulses. “Emotion has been conceived as separate from reason and forceful not only with respect to the *misuse* of reason but also because *it is able to wrest*

control of behavior away from reason” (Marcus, 2003, 184) (italics used for emphasis).⁴

The use of rationality- calculation and analysis- to achieve a specific goal by besting or out-witting an opponent in a realistic conflict, as opposed the desire to harm the opponent being the goal in unrealistic conflict, are primary differences in conflict and how conflict can be approached.

Coser’s and Rapoport’s concepts of realistic conflicts being like games and debates, and unrealistic conflicts being like fights, can be applied to international conflict. The separation of PSC from “rational” conflicts, such as enduring rivalries, is a commonly agreed-upon distinguishing feature of PSC by scholars (Freidman, 1999, 40-41). This position would seem to be supported by Azar as he identifies the nature of PSC through the following statements:

Protracted social conflict entails a vicious cycles of fear and hostile interactions among the communal contestants. With the continued stress of such conflict, attitudes, cognitive processes and perceptions become set and ossified. War culture and cynicism dominate. Meaningful communication between or among conflicting parties dries up, and the ability to satisfy communal acceptance needs is severely diminished (Azar, 1990, 17).⁵

It is not the abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development but rather the identification of the participants with the contending social groups. The immediate criterion of identification may be several stages removed from the original issue (Azar et. al., 1978, 51).

Thus, key to the concept of PSC, and its potentially unrealistic nature, is that over time the original issues of contention can be lost to the actors as games or debates spiral

⁴ The inclusion of a non-rational component is not a rejection of the rational-actor model or indicative of the belief that behavior cannot be strategic in the presence of emotion or other psychological factors. It is merely the recognition that rationality cannot be automatically assumed in the study of this unique form of conflict.

⁵As with many quotations throughout the literature review; aspects of these quotations can be applied in several sections. While dissecting the quotations and parsing them out to the “appropriate” section, could be useful, leaving quotations in the contextual entirety is also useful as it speaks to the complexity of this exercise of distinguishing the many potential causal components of PSC.

negatively where actors are no longer satisfied in “winning” with superior logic or strategy; interest now lies in “hurting” through the fight.

Though controversial and challenging to substantiate, identifying PSC as a potentially unrealistic conflict could provide some understanding as to why conflicts of this nature have such enduring qualities- they are not necessarily based on a rational model of behavior or a rational model of expected utility. Rather, PSCs, regardless of how they started could be unreasonable conflicts that contain, or have come to contain, “malicious motivations” (Azar, 1983, 91). If this is so, understanding why PSCs frustrate “traditional” models of international relations theories and conflict intervention techniques that concentrate on conflict management and mediation through the sole lens of the rational actor, is not as difficult to understand- because PSC actors may operate, in part or entirety, from an unrealistic rather than realistic perspective.

EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

In conceptualizing PSC as an enduring, negative, dichotomous relationship, clearly identifying who the actors are and how they interact is critical to building a useful theoretical framework. Building on Azar’s primary category of “effective participation” (Azar, 1985, 29) in this section I use existing scholarly literature to identify who the actors are in PSC, how long a conflict must endure to be considered a PSC, how long violent conflict must be absent for a PSC to be considered ended, and the nature or cycles of the violent interaction between the actors. As such, this portion of the literature review utilizes the existing theoretic frame to lay the foundation for a more comprehensive examination of exactly what “Effective Participation” means by clarifying who the actors in PSCs are and how they engage in violent conflict.

Who Participates

Determining who the participants are in a PSC is critical to the theoretical understanding and conceptualization of PSC as a unique form of conflict. In fact, identifying the actors is a defining characteristic that separates PSC from other forms of conflict. Because of this, Azar considers the actors to be the most useful unit of analysis.

The most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict situations is the identity group- racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others. It is more powerful as a unit of analysis than the nation-state, the reason is that 'power' finally rests with the identity group (Azar, 1985, 31).

Foundational to the concept of PSC, then, is that the units of analysis are not necessarily elite actors who function as emissaries of the state (state or elite actors). Actors in PSCs include individuals who are non-elite, non-state actors (masses).

. . . the conflicts involve whole societies and acts as agents for defining the scope of international identity and social solidarity. . . . Hatred is visible . . . and massacres [are] carried out by the populations themselves (Azar et al, 1978, 50).

This theoretical separation of PSC from other forms of violent conflict by including the non-state actor does not preclude the state as an actor, however. What the inclusion of non-state actors does, however, is introduce new levels of analysis that separate the study of PSC from solely state-based conflict analysis, as in the analysis of enduring rivalries that only considers the state as an actor. Another level of analysis that is included in the study of PSC is group membership, where the actors are participating in violence on behalf of a group that they have an identity, affiliation, or sympathize with.

These conflicts are often protracted in nature; they are perceived by the antagonists as conflicts about the continued existence of the group, the nation, or the state; they have been marked, time and again, by violence against civilians (Kelman, 2000, 273).

Thus, the inclusion of the masses (individuals and groups) with the elite or state entity, allows the introduction of a key independent component in the attempt to identify why PSC is so tenacious in nature. This is that the actors in PSC can be inclusive of several levels of analysis; the individual, the group, and the state.

Considerations of Time

It is explicit in the term “protracted social conflict” that the prolonged nature of a conflict is a primary attribute. The tendency of scholarly literature when describing PSC is to describe the conditions that create prolonged conflict rather than identify the length of time that a conflict must endure before being considered a PSC or establish time parameters within PSC (Azar, 1985, 28; Friedman, 1999, 52; Kelman, 2000, 273).

Monty Marshall best sums the common consensus among theorists concerning the time-frame of PSC: “These hostile interactions involve sporadic episodes of warfare that have no clear beginning or end; when they periodically erupt into warfare, it is fought without rules or standards of conduct” (Marshall, 1999, 36). Therefore, a clear theoretical parameter of a minimum lapse of time that is required for a conflict to be considered a PSC is not explicit in current PSC literature. Similarly, because of its unique attributes, Azar offers the following warning about the attempt to clearly identify time parameters in PSC:

Because conflicts fluctuate in intensity over time, we tend to make assertions about starting and end points which may be of limited utility for an understanding of the inertia embedded in some conflict situations.
(Azar, 1985, 36).

While this warning is merited and there is a danger in using too narrow a scope concerning time constraints in PSC research, there can be utility in establishing theoretical time parameters. In identifying enduring rivalries, Diehl and Goertz (2000)

categorize two stages of conflict “development” before a conflict is categorized as an enduring rivalry. These are isolated conflicts that have 1-2 disputes (over the same issue) in less than 10 years, proto-rivalries that have 3-5 disputes in 10-20 years, and when a conflict has had 6 or more conflicts over the course of 20 years or more, it is considered an “full” enduring rivalry. Currently, PSC theory has no similar organizational structure. It is categorized dichotomously. Either a conflict is a PSC or it is not. Utility in using this sort of pre-PSC stratification can be found in conflict mediation or other types of conflict intervention. For example, if there is a conflict that has many of the characteristics of a PSC, but has been only been a “violent conflict” for 10 years, it would not be classified as a PSC. Using a concrete measure of time to determine that a social conflict has endured long enough to run the risk of becoming a PSC can spur action that could prevent the conflict from seeding itself into the social fabric of the actors⁶ and becoming a “full” PSC. Thus, deriving more concrete theoretical time parameters could have real-life implications in the evaluation, intervention, mediation, prevention, and/or resolution of PSCs.

How Long

The sporadic nature of violent conflict in PSC makes clearly delineating time parameters challenging. However, the question must be asked: How long must a string of “sporadic episodes” occur between the same actors over the same or similar issues of contention for it to be considered a PSC? Central to conceptualizing how long a conflict must endure before it is considered a PSC lies in capturing these “sporadic episodes” as part of a single, continual conflict (Schrodt, 1983, 103). The tendency for scholars to

⁶ To be more fully explained later in the identity section.

treat conflictual events as discrete episodes, in order to more easily measure and quantify conflict, can lead researchers to miss larger, more far-reaching trends (and the underlying sustaining mechanisms) of violent conflict that are (or are leading to) PSC. Lacking clearly delineated theoretical time minimums in existing PSC literature, it is necessary to look outside of PSC literature to answer the question of what is a reasonable amount of time for a series of related violent events to occur to be considered a PSC.

As PSC is conceptualized as an enduring conflicting social relationship, it is reasonable to reference literature that focuses on the enduring nature of conflict as well as on its social aspects. The time parameters for enduring rivalries (ER), a form of prolonged conflict that shares several attributes with PSC, is referenced to ascertain conflict duration parameters of ERs . Various scholars have used a range of 15 to 25 years as ER theoretical minimums (Diehl & Goertz 2004). Diehl & Goertz have used a minimum duration for a conflict to endure to be an ER as 20 years (Diehl & Goertz, 2004, 44). Therefore, identifying a range of 15 to 25-years for a conflict to endure to be considered a PSC could be justified using ER literature and is an adequate point of departure when ascertaining time parameters for PSCs.

The second aspect of considering the potential minimum time duration for a conflict to be considered a PSC is the social component of PSC. As non-state actors are a hallmark of PSC, the question of how long a conflict needs to continue before it seeds itself into the fabric of society is useful to consider. Prolonged exposure to violence can impact a society through emotional health, identity, and generational chosen trauma⁷ (Aronson 1999, Gass & Seiter 2003, Pruitt & Kim 2004). “Chosen traumas can keep

⁷ “Chosen trauma” is the shared, intergenerational mental representation of an event that becomes an identity marker for a large group (Volkan 2004)

hostility alive across many generations to come” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 13). Similarly, in Toynbee’s War Weariness theory, wars occur in 100-year cycles, wherein people who have fought in wars are hesitant to submit their children to the same horrors that they have experienced. As subsequent generations mature, the children of the generation that engaged in violent conflict have children that have never experienced war. Hence, “they are much more inclined than their elders to test the waters of combat” (Cashman, 2000, 152) because they lack the personal experience and knowledge of how terrible violent conflict can be. A key difference, however, is that wars are not always fought in PSCs and violent conflict is often expressed through sporadic, cyclical episodes of violence. Thus, the same level of intensity of conflict that is experienced in war may not be experienced by an elder generation. This difference could be a mitigating factor, reducing the aversion to violent conflict in the elder generation that Tonybee’s theory suggests. As a result, aversion to violent conflict may not vary as greatly across generations in PSC, making it more socially acceptable to continue the lower-intensity violence of previous generations.

. . . given that the protracted conflict is central for significant others, later generations of individuals will be socialized by significant others for whom the external conflict is highly salient (Friedman, 1999, 52).

In these examples, the concept of the generation is used by scholars to measure societal forces across time as it is related to violent conflict. Thus, when considering a theoretical minimum duration of time for PSC, it is reasonable to consider two measure of time: (1) the actual time that a violent conflict has endured; (2) the time that it takes for a conflict to seed itself into a society by using the concept of generation (Staub and Bar-Tal, 2003,

711). In doing so, the participation of the non-state actor- the social aspect, is included in the time consideration of protracted *social* conflict.

Another time consideration of how long PSCs endure is the question of determining when a PSC has ended. As with the problem of when a violent conflict is considered to be a PSC, the literature is also limited as to when a PSC can be considered ended. In combination, the sporadic and enduring nature of PSCs coupled with the common lack of overt military mobilization and formal treaties, plus the participation of the masses, can indeed make the determination of when a PSC has ended opaque. Given the lapse of time between the violent spikes of conflict, what is a reasonable amount of time to have passed for it to not be considered a “normal” lapse in the cyclical nature of PSCs but an actual end or resolution of the conflict itself?

While they may exhibit some breakpoints during which there is a cessation of overt violence, they linger on in time and have no distinguishable point of termination (Schrodt, 1983, 101).

These conflicts are not terminated by explicit decisions, although cessation of overt violence may defuse tensions somewhat. They tend to linger on in time and gradually cool down, become transformed, or wither away (Azar, 1983, 89).

With the understandable hesitance and ambiguity in existing literature as to clear, testable termination parameters, what, then, is a reasonable length of time for no violent conflict have to occurred for a PSC to be considered terminated? Again, it is useful to reference literature on of enduring rivalries. Wayman, Diehl, and Jones each determine that ten years without a “dispute over [the] same unresolved issue” is a sufficient lapse of time for an enduring rivalry to be considered concluded (Goertz and Diehl, 1993, 162). However, given the presence of non-state actors and how PSC can seed itself into the identification of the actors, how long does it take for the

actors, themselves, to lose or shed the conflict identity⁸ and embrace in non-violent behavior? As mentioned above, the concept of a generation has been used by scholars to measure societal forces in conflict over time (Cashman, 2000, 152). If it is reasonable to ascertain that a protracted conflict has threaded itself into the fabric of a society after a generation of violence through “chosen traumas” over the same conflict, then is it not also reasonable to determine that a PSC has terminated if a generation has passed with no cycles of violence?

Though not explicit in the literature on PSC, the concept of the generation has been utilized by scholars to measure changes in societies. Thus, it is reasonable to measure the beginning and ending of protracted conflict not only by using time parameters, but also through the concept of the generation.

How Often

As noted in the above section, another attribute of PSC is that it is not fought like a war in that violence does not occur within a single window of time⁹. Rather, the literature points to periods of non-violence and outbreaks of violence, or, cycles of violence.

Protracted social conflict entails a vicious cycle of fear and hostile interactions among the communal contestants (Azar, 1990, 17).

[Protracted conflicts are] hostile interactions which extend over long periods of time. . .[T]hey linger on in time. . .[and] are not specific events or even clusters of events at a point in time; they are processes (Azar et al., 2000, 272).

As in the previous quotations, when the cyclical nature of violence is discussed, description rather than clear and measurable parameters are given (Azar et al, 1978.

⁸ Conflict identity will be developed further in the identity section.

⁹ Although, as in the Palestinian/Israeli PSC, “official” wars have been fought.

50; Azar, 1983, 89; Azar, 1985, 29). Hence, for a conflict levels to meet the minimum theoretical criteria of PSC, how many cycles of violence and peace are necessary and what is the necessary minimum time lag between violence spikes? As the literature describes these cycles, but does not specify the number of violence/peace cycles and frequencies that are necessary, what is a minimum standard from which a theoretical framework can be built and justified? The Nedler-Mead mathematical model for minimums suggests that at least three points are necessary to begin to identify a pattern. In this, at least three points are needed to “find the minimum of a function of n variables” (Matthews and Fink, 2003). Thus, to establish a theoretical minimum for a pattern of violence/peace cycles in protracted conflict, three complete cycles are a reasonable minimum. To establish a more robust theoretical minimum, however, the Cox and Steward (T60) sine test for trend model states that six data points are necessary to establish a trend (Randall, 1998, 71 & 146). Thus, to establish a lower theoretical threshold, a minimum of three cycles of violence can be supported using scholarship outside of PSC scholarship, but using a minimum of six cycles is a stronger criteria as it establishes a trend rather than a pattern.

Another consideration of the cycles of violence is the time that separates one violent cycle from another. In considering the necessary amount of time between violent spikes, PSC literature is more descriptive in nature and does not clearly delineate minimum criterion for lapses in violence to be considered separate cycles. Thus, what is a reasonable minimum amount of time that must elapse between violent spikes so that they are not considered as the same violence episode? The mathematical models of the

Nedler-Mead minimum for a pattern or the Cox and Steward minimum for a trend can serve as threshold guides.

Summary of Effective Participation

Azar's category of PSC of effective participation includes four separate aspects of PSC: who participates in PSC, how they participate, how long violent conflict must endure to be considered a PSC, and cycles of violence. When exploring who that actors in PSC are, literature reveals that the participation of non-state actors (individuals and groups), while not precluding the state actor, are a fundamental attribute of PSC. Similarly, when considering how long a violent conflict must endure to be considered a PSC, PSC scholarship notes that PSCs endure over long periods of time; but is hesitant to deliver measurable criteria to use to determine what conflicts have endured long enough to be considered PSCs and when violence has been absent long enough for the PSC to be considered ended. What PSC literature does communicate in terms of the enduring nature of PSC, however, is that violent behavior can be passed on from one generation to another which addresses the social component of PSC. Also, when seeking a minimum duration of time that a violent conflict can exist to be considered a PSC, literature on enduring rivalries, a similar form of prolonged conflict, is consulted. Using enduring rivalry scholarship, the use of a minimum duration spanning from 15 to 25 years can be supported. When addressing how violent acts are committed in PSC, the literature reveals that the actors of PSC engage in peace/violence cycles with lapses of time between each cycle. PSC scholarship is limited on a criterion that clearly delineates how many peace/violence cycles or how long the lapses between the cycles are necessary to meet a theoretically minimum threshold, however. When literature outside of PSC is

consulted, support can be found for using three and/or six data points to establish theoretical minimums using mathematical theories.

SECURITY/ COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT

In identifying the necessary components of PSC, Azar identified the need for security as one of the four components that must be present for a long-term conflict to be classified as a PSC (Azar, 1985, 29). While territorial issues are an oft-mentioned aspect of the security issues that arise in PSC (Azar 1985; Friedman 1999), existing literature also references other aspects of security that actors can be in conflict over. As such, actors compete with each other to gain control over limited resources or assets (tangible and intangible) so that they can *gain or preserve* security. With the achievement or preservation of security as the end goal, what, then, does existing literature reveal that the actors in PSCs enter into violent conflict over? In answer to this question, the following section examines the actors' need for security through competition for finite resources that can be tangible or intangible in nature.

Competition for control or power over limited resources can take many forms in contributing to PSC. It is often the point of conflict in which reasonable conflicts begin and can be the first phase in the development of a PSC¹⁰. Conflict often arises as a result of competition over basic “[h]uman needs and long-standing cultural values . . . [that] will not be traded, exchanged, or bargained over. They are not subject to negotiation” (Azar, 1985, 61). These basic needs can include, but are not limited to food, shelter, physical safety and well-being, access/control over resources, territory, identity, autonomy, self-esteem, and a

¹⁰ It is important to note, however, that while there may be an overlap of psychological elements in competition-based conflict, it is the conflict over control of an asset and not the legitimacy of the actors themselves that is the unit of analysis in this section.

sense of justice, (Kelman & Fisher, 2003, 316; Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 15). Thus, competition for basic needs can be expressed in two categories that are consistent with scholarly work - competition for control of tangible assets, such as territory, economic resources, and natural resources; and competition for control of non-tangible assets such as societal, cultural, and political power (Keohane & Nye, 2001, 273; Diehl & Goertz, 2001, 23).

When framing competition for scarce tangible and/or non-tangible assets in a conflictual dyadic relationship, it is useful to consider the role spatial proximity of the actors to the probability of violent conflict. Starr (2005) found that the probability for violent conflict increases proportionally to the spatial proximity of the actors. The role geographic attributes, resources, territorial lines, and spatial contiguity have been found to be positively related to the willingness of actors to engage in violent conflict (Hagan 1994, Hensel 2000, Huth 2000, Starr 1994). As actors compete for the same finite resources and/or assets while living in close proximity, or are spatially intermingled; the probability for conflict increases. When actors find themselves in a relationship where highly-valued resources are or become limited, a rivalry for these resources can occur when the actors begin to compete for control of the assets.

Competition over a scarce item also makes it seem even more valuable, increasing the likelihood of conflict (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 21, 26).

The source of protracted conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need (Azar, 1985, 60).

In a finite system, the proximity of the actors exacerbates the scarcity of a resource or asset can create a threat to security or survival which can be a precursor of conflict. Thus, competition for a finite resource by actors living together or within the same geographic region can be a source of violent conflict.

How can conflict over a limited resource become a PSC, though? A possible sustaining mechanism of PSC relative to asset competition is changing issues of contention. When this occurs, a conflict that started over one issue, may or may not be the central issue of contention as time continues and subsequent generations become actors. As time passes and the original contention that began the conflict remains unresolved, the conflict can become a process where the originating issue(s) central to the conflict can change to take on additional components or nuances of contention (Azar et. al., 2000, 272).

It is not the abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development . . . The immediate criterion of identification may be several stages removed from the original issue (Azar et. al., 1978, 51).

As one subject of dispute replaces another or neither actor is able to definitively beat the other forcing a final outcome (as discussed previously), “inertia” can set in (Azar, 1985, 36). With conflict between the actors continuing over time, the conflict can become seeded into the society and become a PSC. Hence, PSCs can take on complex, multi-faceted characteristics, from the issues of contention and actors, making causal components difficult to identify and resolve.

Tangible Assets

Conflict as a result of competition for control of physical assets or resources is well-established in PSC literature (Azar, 1985, 33; Friedman, 1999, 39; Geller, 2000, 413; Pruitt and Kim, 2004, 21; Vasquez, 2000, 373-5). These include competition for physical security, resources, and territory In a finite system, many quarrels over tangible assets are zero-sum conflicts where the loss of a resource can mean literal life and death for the actors placing them in a position where they have nothing to lose by engaging in violence to

retain or gain control the asset (Pruitt & Kim 2004). For example, the loss or gain of land has ramifications across all levels of government and society. Control of a fixed and secure geographic region gives governments and people the opportunity to extract resources, build economies, and achieve personal, societal, and governmental security. Hence, the impact of conflicts over borders, geographical formations, or other natural resources can have an impact economic, demographic, and spatial security issues (Starr, 2005, 288-9; Wilkenfeld & Brecher, 2000, 286-7). Violence can occur as the competition unfolds and actors become ensnared by conflict spirals as they defend or attempt to gain control of scarce resources to ensure survival. The result of this type of competition is a security dilemma wherein actors fear each other's willingness to use force to secure "needed" tangible assets. As each party attempts to resolve their security dilemma by being "more prepared" to defend their "right" to control the resource (Cashman 2000; Pruitt & Kim 2004; Russett & O'Neal 2001; Wilenfeld & Brecher 1998), a negative conflict spiral can ensue (Cashman, 1993, 280; Vasquez, 2000, 376-7). A threat to security and/or survival through limited physical resources can compel actors to act by engaging in violent conflict to overcome the threat or scarcity of a tangible asset.

Non-Tangible Assets

While conflict over tangible assets is well-supported in conflict and PSC literature, competition for control over limited non-tangible assets is supported as well. Control of power is another source of competition-based conflict. Conflicts over control for power can include the struggle for economic, ideological, political, and social power. Azar defines these concepts as basic social needs in the following manner:

The economic structure of a society is determined by the state of development of its productive forces and its position within the international division of labor. Political structure is built on the relative access to power of contending social forces. Ideology is the conduit through which economic and political interactions shape images and perceptions of social forces; ideology organizes society in the economic and political arenas (Azar, 1983, 89).

Conflict in these areas can be manifested as an attempt to change the balance of power or address the unequal distribution of power (Azar, 1985, 28; 1983, 90). When societal competition fails to rectify inequalities over time, what begins as a “reasonable” conflict to address perceived social injustice (Gurr 1970) can lead to a shift in the direction of frustration resulting in violent conflict.

Because aspects of power, such as social power, economic opportunity, political legitimacy, or ideological legitimacy are non-tangible, their measurement can be relative. Hence, the determination of whether actors have sufficient power is more susceptible to measurements based on perceptions of the actors¹¹. When an attempt to address social injustice is not fruitful, violence can be justified as a means of forcing the desired change to occur (Gurr 1970, Nacos 2011).

Inequality in the social structure is largely responsible for overt hostile behavior, especially in protracted social conflicts. It is the product of political and economic inequality and ideological domination of one social group over another (Azar, 1983, 90).

¹¹ Though the concepts of perception and (relative) deprivation are germane to competition for non-tangible assets, they will be developed more fully in the Psychological Motivation section of the literature review.

Collective violence varies directly with inequality. . . Inequality, moreover, is the major social characteristic that differentiates conflict structures associated with unilateral collective violence from those associated with bilateral (or reciprocal) forms such as feuding and warfare. . . [B]ut unilateral violence is not likely to arise where the parties are equal in size and resources. As the vertical distance between antagonists increases, unilateral collective violence becomes more likely (Senechal de la Roche, 1996, 113).

The attempt to change the status quo on the part of one actor, or group of actors, often elicits a response from those who benefit from maintaining the disputed structures/practices the way they are (McPhail 1994). This response can be violent or can lead to violence as actors demand and do not realize change or conciliation. “The escalating reciprocal spiral of disturbance and resistance yields a struggle . . . that results in violent injury or death” (McPhail, 1994, 22-23).

As escalating cycles of resistance and/or tit-for-tat violence ensues, it is reasonable to understand how the “self-perpetuating process” (Azar et al., 1978, 50; Marshall, 1999, 36) or the protracted nature of PSC can occur.

Summary

Fundamentally, every actor’s primary concern lies in survival and security- whether an individual, a group, or a governmental entity. Yet, it is not security in and of itself that drives PSCs. Rather, it is the prolonged failure to gain or ensure security and survival because of competition that drives it. Hence, competition-based conflict is a more useful theoretical categorization as it better captures the fact that the actors are *competing* for security as well as survival. Whether the competition is over tangible or non-tangible assets; violent conflict can occur as actors struggle gain or retain control of a

resource that they feel they cannot survive without. Failure on the part of the actors to resolve this competition can lead to PSC.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION

Psychological motivations are one of the key factors that separate PSC from other forms of conflict. While many forms of conflict remain “realistic conflicts,” it is the development of emotions over time toward the conflict and the actors involved in the conflict that could begin the downward spiral where a realistic conflict becomes an unrealistic conflict or an emotion-based fight. As such, are the two identity components—self and identity— as delineated by Azar, sufficient to explain the entire spectrum of the potential psychological motivations that can make up PSC? In answer to this question, the following section uses established PSC, conflict, and psychology literature to build the argument that, while important, identity issues are a subset of a part of a larger group of psychological motivations that are present in PSC.

While there is extensive discussion as to the various contributions of psychological motivations of PSC, beyond identity-based motivations, other aspects are not listed as necessary components to the theory of PSC. However, the argument for the addition of psychological motivations to a broader theoretical frame is supported.

We are brash enough to advance the view that the social psychological perspective provides a useful framework for considering the processes involved in conflict, whether the conflict is interpersonal, intergroup, or international” (Deutsch and Shichman, 1986, 219).

Human needs are often articulated and fulfilled through important collectivities such as the ethnic group, the national group, and the state. Conflict arises when a group is faced with nonfulfillment or threat to the fulfillment of basic needs: not only such obvious material needs as food, shelter, physical safety, and physical well-being but also, and very centrally such psychological needs as identity, security, recognition, autonomy, self-esteem, and a sense of justice (Kelman & Fisher, 2003, 316).

Thus, the following section examines emotion and perception in addition to self-identity and group-identity as literary justification for exploring and expanding the role of psychological factors of PSC.

Laying a Foundation - Cognition

Can psychological factors play a role in PSC? Scholars who subscribe to the rational-actor model of conflict minimize the role that psycho-social factors can play in violent conflict. Political psychologists and those who embrace a cultural model of political science disagree, however.

I think it is astounding that most of the political science literature seems to put aside the notion that at least some wars are fueled by passions and that one reason they are so hard to conclude is that people have come to hate each other and to find the notion of compromise repulsive (Jervis, 1989, 488).

How people make decisions and behave are functions of their cognitive processes. These cognitive processes, both “logical” and “emotional,” organize the world in which we live and places stimuli into a more understandable context from which to operate. However, an “ideal” rational model requires that three conditions hold: (1) the thinker has access to complete, accurate, and useful information; (2) the thinker has unlimited resources with which to process data; and (3) the thinker has unlimited time in which to assess the information (Aronson, 1999, 119).

Earlier studies of decision-making retained the presumption as it was applied to rationality, that is, efficient and prudent linkage of means to ends (Janis, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). But problems began to arise. The influential work of Daniel Kahneman, Richard Nisbett, and so many others, which demonstrated how substantially humans depart from the rational decision-making judgments, has serious and far-reaching consequences, inasmuch as it confirmed these ancient presumptions about

the limitations of human nature. . . Humans do not normally weigh the evidence fairly and accurately, consider all points of view, or accurately evaluate the outcomes under consideration” (Marcus, 2003, 185).

In the absence of ideal conditions people increasingly rely on cognitive sources (existing schemas and cognitive short-cuts) to help them make decisions (Aronson, 1999, 156-7). These include (but are not limited to) values, beliefs¹², personality, cognitive complexity, the need for cognitive consistency, group think (peer pressure), images or symbols, and leadership style (Burlison & Caplan, 1998, 233; Byran, 2002, 3-4; Conover & Feldman, 2004, 206; Feldman, 2003, 480; Levi, 125-32; Rosati & Scott, 2006, 292-5 ; Viotti & Kaupi, 1998, 207-8; Winter, 2003, 124). People can make. . .

. . . generalizations about how decision-makers perceive others’ behavior and form judgments about their intentions. These patterns are explained by the general ways in which people draw inferences from ambiguous evidence and in turn, help explain seemingly incomprehensible policies. They show how, why, and when highly intelligent and conscientious statesmen misperceive their environments in specified ways and reach inappropriate decisions” (Jervis in Viotti & Kauppi, 1998, 207).

In the light of this, Herbert Simon’s concept of bounded rationality can help explain how thought processes can be “rational” despite the absence of ideal circumstances. Because actors can lack the ability and/or resources to achieve preferred solutions, they can apply “rational thought” only after having greatly simplified the choices available. Thus, the decision-maker becomes a “satisficer” in that they seek a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal one (Simon 1991). In evaluating the role of psychological motivation in PSC,

¹² Values and beliefs are non-transient in nature and are viewed as the “underpinnings of attitudes” (Bem 1970) “Value” is defined as an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state existence” (Feldman, 2003, 480). Similarly, “belief” is defined as “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence” (Converse, 2004, 181).

while a rational actor cannot be automatically assumed, it is equally “irrational” to summarily dismiss (bounded) rationality. In other words, when seeking to ascertain a comprehensive conceptualization of the necessary components of PSC, potential, previously unexamined motivations cannot be automatically dismissed. Exploring the possibility of additional sustaining psychological motivations of PSC could prove to have utility in understanding what is supporting or maintaining the intractable nature of this form of violent conflict.

Emotion

Emotions can be defined as “short-lived, biologically-based reactions to stimuli that reflect appraisals of ongoing events. They can manifest themselves in subjective experience, expressive behavior, or through physiological responses (Richards, 2002, 309). Theory suggests that emotion occurs at the juncture of two cognitive processes—associative and declarative memory. As a stimulus is processed through the cognitive filter, the facts of the stimulus (declarative memory) are compared to existing schemata, preferences, and prior behaviors to similar or the same stimuli (associative memory) (Marcus, 2003, 197). Yet, it is not the stimulus itself that causes emotion. “[I]t is the interpretation of events rather than the events per se that determine which emotion will be felt” (Roseman, 1984, 14). The formation of each basic emotion (such as surprise, fear, anger, anxiety, sadness, hatred, and the like (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 101)), then, is the result of the reaction that the individual has of the stimulus.

Negative emotions can contribute to violent conflict. Though often transient in nature, “emotions can lay the foundation for passions that are not transient, are deeply buried, and unless set aside by heroic action, have enduring effects throughout the life of

a person” (Marcus, 2003, 189). It is these deep-seeded emotions that can form attitudes that may lead to violent conflict.

[Attitudes] tend to generate, reinforce, or intensify mutual images of deception. They tend too, to increase the likelihood of confusion in the direct and indirect communications between the parties. . . (Azar et, al, 1978, 51).

“Hatred often plays a far more significant role in the case of endogenous conflicts . . .Such hatred is engendered by an internalization of the distinction between “us” and “them” (Rapoport, 1974, 185).

Negative emotions can encourage the desire to hurt, to take revenge, to punish in the hope of teaching “other” a lesson, and reduce the legitimacy of the opposing party (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 103). They can turn a game or debate into a fight (Rapoport 1960). Thus, negative, emotion-driven behavior, can start a negative spiral of violent conflict that can lead to PSC.

Because of the role that emotion can have on behavioral choice, the uncertainty (Cioffi-Revilla & Starr, 1995, 449) that the human actor can bring to PSC through cognitive processes cannot be fully captured with the existing theoretic frame. Thus, it is expedient that the conceptualization of PSC be modified to include a more inclusive concept of the role of psychological motivation beyond identity alone to include the psychological motivation of emotion.

Perception

Attitudes and perceptions, whether factually accurate or not, are notoriously long-lived. The perception of wrong-doing can produce emotions that motivate violent behavior. Hence, perceptual issues have the potential to be major contributors to the psychological motivations of PSC.

One manner in which the concept of perception can contribute to PSC is from prolonged feelings of relative deprivation¹³. Deprivation can be decremental when the ability to achieve declines but expectation remains high, aspirational when expectations rise but the ability to achieve remains static, or progressive when the ability to achieve indeed increases but at a slower rate than expectation (Gurr, 1970).

The basic frustration–aggression proposition is that the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration. . . The primary causal sequence in political violence is first the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors (Gurr, 1970, 9).

Feelings of deprivation (real or imagined) can arise from historical context, emotions, attitudes, social issues, civil rights issues, level of knowledge of an issue through selective information processing, an incorrect interpretation of attitudes and events, developmental inequality, political inequality, resource competition, reconstructive memory, illusory correlation, self-fulfilling prophecy, rationalization, or attribution distortion (Aronson, 1999, 143, 146,159; Boulding, 1989, 5; Deutsch & Shichman, 1986, 221, 224, 230; Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 12, 103,104). The exacerbation or enduring presence of any one or more of these perceptual components can lead to violent conflict as actors feel they are denied the opportunity to achieve, at the expense of another party, that they feel they have a right/are entitled to.

Structural victimization is perceived to affect some groups disproportionately or to benefit other groups. It is at this juncture of actual physical and psychological deprivation that structural

¹³ Relative deprivation is defined as, “a perceived discrepancy between men’s values expectations and their value capabilities” and has three distinct patterns: decremental, aspirational, and progressive deprivation (Gurr, 1970, 13, 56).

victimization bursts into hostile and violent actions and interactions (Azar, 1983, 90).

The perception of wrong-doing or victimization -whether through immediate, structural means (as in the perceptions of the Palestinians and Israelis over who is entitled to Palestine/Israel); or through a process that leads to the loss of legitimacy¹⁴ can be an impetus for violence. When a divergence or incompatibility of interest between actors results in one group failing to achieve what it considers to be a reasonable or deserved goal, the losing group can feel that they have been deprived of a reasonable goal in comparison to the winning group. As such, the ensuing disillusionment can lead to violence. “Discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation is the basic, instigating condition for participants in collective violence” (Gurr, 1970, 9). The feeling of wrongful deprivation, if left unresolved, can be a motivation for violence through the “psychology of the slippery slope”; where failed attempts to rectify perceived injustices are used to justify subsequent intensification of behavior leading to violence (McCauley, 2004, 47-48). “There is nothing quite as motivating as feeling that one has been deprived relative to a legitimate standard” (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 20). When extended over time, as in the nature of PSC, perceptions can become internalized, leading to a psychological structural change within a society; where perceptions leading to anger, fear, and blame can be used to justify conflict escalation (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 102-104). Once perceptions are internalized into the fabric of society; frustration, and ultimately violence, they can be difficult to exterminate.

¹⁴ Legitimacy is defined as “the implication of the existence of right, . . . based on such criteria as its popular acceptance, the legal or constitutional processes that brought it to, or maintains it in a position of authority. . . (Viotti & Kauppi, 1999, 484) or a particular rule or norm that enjoys the support from a relevant set of actors (Gelpi, 2003, 14). The process of loss of legitimacy (Gass & Seiter 2003) is explained more fully in the identity section of this literature review.

Misperception is another aspect of perception that can lead to violent conflict. An incorrect interpretation of events, motives, or behaviors can occur for many reasons. The first aspect of misperception is the incorrect evaluation of events, self, and/or others. Over or under estimating the abilities and importance of the actors, affinity or aversion to risk, attributional distortion¹⁵, categorization, stereotyping, established operational codes, failure in informational tools, mirror image assumption¹⁶, over simplification of causal inferences, stress and time constraints, a tendency to overindulge in pessimistic and/or wishful thinking, or using historical analogies are some of the ways in which the misperception of reality can occur (Jervis, 1976, 319-357; Levy, 2003, 257-270 Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 159; Rosati, 2006, 293-5). When misperception occurs, actors can justify violence based on an erroneous assessment or assumption. “When both parties to a conflict attribute malevolent motivations to each other, it breeds a vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecies” (Azar, 1983, 91). As such, an “incorrect definition of the situation” (Levy, 2003, 258) can elicit the perception of threat from actors from the out-group (explained and developed more fully in the next section) and thereby increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. Because of this, misperception can be a sustaining component of PSC.

As perception, misperception, and emotion are reinforced by the actions and reactions of both parties, sentiments are justified. Whether the (mis)perception began as factually accurate or not has minimal importance. (Mis)perception becomes reality to the actors and to them, it is fact/truth. Over time (mis)perceptions can be generalized into

¹⁵ Attributional distortion occurs when one draws causal inferences about why other people behave as they do.

¹⁶ Mirror image occurs when actors hold diametrically opposed views of each other. If “self” is positive and good, then “other” must be evil and malevolent.

unrelated areas, creating a “complicated causal network that makes these conflicts difficult to solve” (Azar, 1983, 85). Because of this, misperception can play a role in the intractable nature of PSC.

Identity

Identity is the way that we, as humans, define ourselves and others. Whether individually or collectively, the sum of our attributes, experiences, influences, beliefs, and values inform us about who we are (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 234). When conceptualizing what identity is, Erikson identified four critical aspects: (1) a sense of uniqueness, (2) a sense of inner sameness and continuity with what one has been in the past and what one anticipates being in the future, (3) a sense of inner harmony and wholeness, and (4) a sense of inner solidarity with the ideals and values of one’s social context (Erikson, 1980, 109; Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 223).

Identity issues unarguably make a large contribution to the psychological motivations of PSC. As humans, “we define ourselves according to what we are and are not” to form our concepts of identity and self (Brinkerhoff, 2008, 73). The concept of identity includes individual and group identities; which are inclusive of the social and individual perceptions of self. When any of the components of the concept of identity are challenged or threatened, the threat to the self or social image, ensuing anger or bitterness, and/or fear can be an impetus to conflict. As such, violence can have utility as a function of identity, in two ways: offensively- in retaliation or to take an asset away from another actor, or defensively- to preserve or prevent the loss of an asset or value. If unresolved, the relationship between identity and conflict (as conflict can be used to

restore or secure identity) can endure across generations, perpetuating itself through self and group image.

The conflict itself can become embedded in the social fabric of the actors, one person at a time as actors begin to identify themselves through the conflict. Violence can be used as a defensive measure to protect or restore a positive image of self or the group that one identifies with. Challenges to identity can arise from many sources including immigration, emigration, changing civil society, and interpersonal or inter-group conflict (Brinkerhoff 2008) where a person can be directly confronted with the weaknesses that their concept of identity holds. Whether the result of a sudden event or the result of societal evolution; “threat[s] to identity are likely to enhance solidarity and [the] potential for mobilization (Esman 1986). This reasoning has been used to explain Fundamentalist Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East (Beaudoin 2006). As people who have built their self-image from time-honored and established traditional Muslim practices see an influx of modernization and westernization into their homeland, an identity crisis has ensued. Seeing the norms and morés that they define themselves with disappear, replaced, or marginalized, Muslims are motivated to take action to restore the “world” they know and define themselves by (Stout 2004, McCauley 2004, Viviano 2003). It is this motivation to defend and restore the positive self (or group) image that can be an impetus for violence (Aronson, 1999, 234-5). As such, the violence that is used to restore, protect, or maintain a positive image (of self or the group), if not accomplished in a “short” period of time, could be a sustaining mechanism of PSC.

Another example of how violence can be a defensive instrument to protect identity is through attempts to keep the violent conflict going when it is believed that the

conflict may be ending. In long-lasting violent conflicts such as PSC, the conflict can become part of individual and group identity. Growing up in a violent environment, children's identity formation can be influenced by the prospect of continual violence; actual violent events, social influence from the reaction to violent events, and their own ultimate participation in violence. Because of the constant bombardment of violence, the conflict can become part of individual and group identity. When it appears, then, that the violent conflict may end, actors that have incorporated the conflict into their identity face the potential loss of how they define their being. The prospect of peace undermines Erikson's third and fourth aspects of identity (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 222-223). The actors' identities are no longer secure and an identity crisis may ensue¹⁷- If the conflict is gone, who will we (I) be? How will we define ourselves? How will we be unique or our existence have meaning? Thus, to preserve the established identity that is supported by the continuation of violence, actors may be compelled to act to ensure the continuation of the conflict. Identity crisis and confusion (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 234) can be an instrument of defensive violence where the actors attempt to ensure the continuation of violent conflict.

Self-Identity

Self-identity issues, as contributors to the psychological motivations sustaining PSC, are well-supported in PSC literature. The concept of self-identity includes the concept of individual religious, ideological, cultural, ethnic, tribal, linguistic, economic, and/or regional perception/definition of self (Lijphart, 1977, 3-4, 14, 142). When any of the components of the concept of personal identity are challenged or threatened, the

¹⁷ An identity crisis occurs when the continuity or the continuation of the sameness of one's believed personal or social role is called into question, threatened, diminished, or disappears (Fadiman & Frager, 2002, 234).

threat to (positive) self-image can occur. Theorists posit biological, psychodynamic, cognitive, and social factors (Osborne & Frost 2004) as potential motivations for violent behavior in individuals based on self-identity.

When searching for potential psychological motives for violent behavior in individuals, theorists postulate that violent behavior can be based upon instinctual, biological drives. In their article, “The Anatomy of Hatred”, Osborne and Frost (2004) explain that when survival is threatened, the biological impulse to “fight or flight” will engage instinctively. As such, Osborne and Frost attribute the American reaction to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, engaging in “unwarranted military action” against actors not related to the terror incident, as an application of biological psychology’s theory explaining how violent behavior in humans can be explained as a reaction to the (perceived) threat to survival:

Although anger, sadness, and other emotions certainly enter into the 9/11 experience, it is our contention that the most primal emotion involved in that episode is fear. . . Essentially, we may say that the brain is more vigilant in its scanning for triggers associated with fear. As citizens of the United States now double-take a man of Middle Eastern descent who boards an airplane, because of 9/11, we have now come to identify people from this region as a possible threat to survival. This elicits a fear response that could be acted upon from an instinctual need for survival (Osborne & Frost, 9, 2004).

When an individual perceives that their physical well-being or survival is threatened, according to the biological theory of psychological motivation, the individual may engage in violent behavior that is motivationally founded in self-preservation rather than malice. This theory is supported by the work of Stephen Barber concerning youth who lived through the Intifada. In his study, Barber found that Palestinian youth who personally experienced or witnessed violence against Palestinians at the hands of Israelis

experienced greater occurrences depression and antisocial behavior. Also, they were more likely to become actively religiously and to become active in the Intifada themselves (Barber 2001). Thus, those who personally experienced an assault or witnessed one being afflicted on someone that they personally identified with, were more apt to engage in behaviors that increased the ability to defend them physically as well as defend their sense of individual identity.

Psychodynamic theory is another potential explanatory theory for violent behavior in individuals. This theory explaining violence maintains that the internal human need to express disturbing thoughts is tempered by societal morés and norms- even the fear of death. Aspects that can influence individuals to engage in acts of violence, from this psychological perspective, include: (1) a sense of rootlessness or lack of connection with others within the community or society (this is especially salient among migrant populations [Brinkerhoff 2008]); (2) rapidly changing value structures within one's social/societal structure; (3) rapid changes that creates an increased sense of uncertainty about the future; (4) an economic or political system that makes it "difficult for young people to assume a responsible role in society"; (5) an increased awareness of oppression, perceived hypocrisies, injustice and/or structural violence; and (6) an easy access to munitions and other forms of contraband (Halleck, 1978, 328-329). When an "injustice" has occurred, the ensuing inner turmoil (surprise, dread, guilt, embarrassment, anger, etc) can spur violence (Spencer & Myer 2006). In an unjust or threatening environment, individuals can act independently or communally to create or preserve an internally acceptable reality to alleviate the threat to self-identity.

Cognitive theories of individual violence have a divergent perspective, however. Cognition-based explanations of violence rest in empirical and perceptual cognitive filters. As the human mind develops- from the earliest sensorimotor state to the final formal operational state, learning and behavior is built progressively. As such, the more reinforced a perception or behavior is through the various stages of development, the more difficult it is to eradicate and the more apt an individual is to act to defend their learned self-concept. In the process of forming a sense of self-identity, the people and events that surround us have an impact on the development of norms and values.

Children learn patterns of hatred very early in life, by as young as 4 or 5 according to some researchers- while still thinking pre-operationally. Where patterns of hatred are formed early in childhood, and are registered neurologically during a period of brain development that is highly plastic, then the likelihood of altering these early categories of hate later in life is a daunting one (Osborne & Frost, 2004, 12).

As we grow, experiential and perceptual learning molds our cognitive process. When a person identifies a stimulus, especially one that is contrary to established cognitive patterns, it is easier to rely on established schemata and to generalize engaging cognitive filters as a short cut (cognitive rigidity) than to engage in cognitive dissonance by re-evaluating opinions, values, and beliefs. Thus, a challenge to the image that one identifies with is more easily outright rejected (cognitive rigidity & shortcuts) or taken as a threat than re-evaluating established schemata and risking negative consequences to the self-image (Azar, 1983, 90; 1985, 29; Hermann, 2003, 294). As such, it is particularly salient PSC.

Social factors and roles can also contribute to an individual's willingness to engage in violent behavior. As people are exposed to conflict, especially from childhood,

deprivation or bias against one's member-group can have a profoundly negative impact on the image of self.

We may thus postulate a positive relationship between conflict duration and the proportion of the population influenced by the conflict in their formative years. . . given that the protracted conflict is central for significant others, later generations of individuals will be socialized by significant others for whom the external conflict is highly salient. This dynamic can be viewed as a function of the protracted property of the conflict (Friedman, 1999, 52).

As children grow, the opinions and values of the people who raise them are ingrained through observation, conversation, and socialization. Thus, as the individual is raised amidst chronic conflict, the conflict becomes part of self-identity- as it did in the prior generation.

Repression and deprivation have a negative identity impact on individuals as well. The need to obtain or retain a positive image and identity is common to all people and groups. Deprivation or bias against one's member group can also have a profoundly negative impact on the image of self with the ensuing effort to restore a positive self-image leading to violence. As the negative image conflicts with the positive self-image, motivation to restore the positive self-image (ego defense) and alleviate cognitive dissonance will emerge (Aronson, 1999, 234-5; Feldman, 2003, 490).

Our self-conceptions are our most valuable possessions and we ordinarily make every effort to present our self-identities in a favorable manner and to defend those identities against attack. . . .When one individual is insulted by another the former seeks verification and then, to save face, requests cessation or an apology from the latter. The latter often refuses because to do so would be to lose face him or herself. That refusal increases the disturbance to the former who then increases or varies his action to eliminate or oppose that disturbance. The escalating reciprocal spiral of disturbance and resistance yields a struggle between the two individuals that results in violent injury or death (McPhail, 1994, 22-23)

As such, the need to resolve this cognitive dissonance and restore a positive self-image can be a driving force behind PSC (Gass & Seiter, 2003, 64-8; Jervis, 1976, 396-399, 404). Because no other identity of self, other than that of the negative image generated from social or deprivational forces is known, the need to generate a positive self-image is frustrated over time. Thus, the effort to build a positive self-image also takes on enduring qualities. Hence, violent conflict can become embedded, one individual at a time, into the collective social fabric of the actors as each individual attempts to justify their own positive self-image. Over time, as actors strive and fail to achieve a positive self-image by justifying their “rightness” in the conflict, the quest to prove or defend a positive self-image can become a sustaining aspect of violent conflict.

Group-Identity

Groups often form as a result of common material interest, status, congenial, or symbolic interests (Stout, 2004, 61; Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003, 9). Just as in self-identity; group identification can be based on religious, ideological, cultural, ethnic, tribal, linguistic, economic, and/or regional factors. Membership in such cooperative organizations can provide individual, group, and societal legitimacy as actors identify themselves as members of a group that they share goals, values, or characteristics with. As such, groups can have considerable influence on the values and beliefs of the actors within the groups. This is because humans have a powerful psychological need to belong (Huddy, 2003, 514; Maslow, 1943, 380; Snyder, 1996, 247). The more a person identifies with and internalizes a group’s values¹⁸ (as opposed to merely complying to

¹⁸ The process of value integration includes three steps. The first step is compliance, when a person goes along (conforms) to another’s wishes motivated by external reinforcement (carrots & sticks). The second step is identification, where one sees the wisdom/value of desired action/position. Last, is internalization

them), the more likely they are to integrate the group's identity as part of their own (Aronson, 1999, 33-6). It is from this need to belong, to create an in-group¹⁹, that group identity has several potential ways that it can contribute to PSC.

Inter-Group Dynamics

The first way that group-identity can play a role in PSC is in how the group identifies itself, internally. In plural or heterogeneous societies, where people from different social or ethnic backgrounds live side-by-side, differences between identity groups can become a rallying point for violent conflict (Lijphart 1977). Because certain social, ethnic, language, and religious characteristics are deeply-seeded in many societies and are reticent to change, violent conflicts based on divergent group identities and interests can occur.

“Group identity formation and protracted social conflicts are inextricably linked. Ethnicity is an acute awareness that there is a bond between people of similar culture, language, religion, beliefs, customs, habits, and –most importantly—life perspectives. The shared perceptions encompass all of life's core values and issues” (Azar, 1983, 21).

If a group's identity is organized according to deeply- seeded societal cleavages, where compromise is looked upon as immoral or unfavorable; the conditions for protracted violent conflict can be present.

. . .the crucial characteristic of human feuds is that they are culturally transmitted, so that the distinguishing characteristics of the enemy may be anything: family membership, social class, nationality, religion, or ideology. The conflict is a self-perpetuating process. . . [wherein] positive feedback predominates (Azar et al, 1978, 51).

when a person takes the desired action/value as their own and motivation rests in internal, self-generated impulses (Aronson 1999).

¹⁹ In-group: “a group with which one feels a sense of solidarity or community of interests”. Out-group: a group that is distinct from one's own and so usually an object of hostility or dislike (<http://www.merriam-webster.com> (6/12/12)).

Because of the importance of group identity in these societies, violent conflict can occur based on the implications of the social/ethnic differences (cleavages) (Lijphart 1977). This can occur as the homogeneity effect²⁰ causes members of one group to generalize the same (negative) characteristics about the members of another (identity) group. When violent conflict is perpetuated and in turn positively reinforced by the in-group, cleavage-based conflict can be a sustaining component of PSC.

An extension of how groups identify themselves internally is the role of how identity issues impacts relationships between groups. This social categorization can be conceptualized as in-group/out-group thought, where perceptions and relationships are based on group membership and identity rather than on an individual or an individual-merit basis. “It is only when others are not seen as individuals but are categorized as members of social groups or categories that negative intergroup attitudes can be activated toward them” (Duckitt, 2003, 559). Identification based on group identity can increase the likelihood of violent conflict through: (1) over emphasizing the positive (benevolent and moral) traits of the in-group, (2) minimizing or justification of the negative or “challenging” attributes (and actions) of the in-group, (3) blaming the out-group for negative events (scapegoating), (4) decreasing the incidence of positive and meaningful dialog between groups, (5) increasing zero-sum thinking, (6) negative stereotypes of the out-group, (7) suspicion of (hostile) intent of out-group, (8) lower tolerance of the differences of the out-group in comparison to the in-group, (9) de-individuation and de-humanization of out-group by seeing the out-group as “deficient in moral virtue”, and

²⁰ Homogeneity effect.- “The tendency to perceive members of an out-group as “all alike” or more similar to each other than members of the ingroup” (Baron, Byrne, Branscombe, 2006, 11th edition).

(10) de-legitimization of the out-group by suggesting that the out-group violates basic human norms, (12) denial of the humanity of the out-group (Huddy, 2003, 525-6; Lijphart, 1977, 27; Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 60, 106-112; Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003, 720-1). As such, group identity can provide the perception of a moral justification to positions, which can be used to justify violence against the out-group (Horowitz, 2000, 201-2, 204, 215, 226-7). Thus, the out-group can come to be seen as the “mortal enemy” of the in-group and “the identity of one’s own group as partly defined by its enmity to the other” (Staub, 2003, 721). “When both parties to a conflict attribute malevolent motivations to each other, it breeds a vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecies” (Azar, 1983, 91). It is this sort of in-group/out-group antagonism, group-based conflict, that is associated with group identity that can give violent conflict an intractable nature.

Intra-Group Dynamics

The dynamics within groups can also have an impact on the likelihood of violent conflict. One feature of a group that can contribute to violent conflict is the level of the group’s homogeneity. A group that is more heterogeneous is more likely to hold moderate, accommodating positions that encourage the peaceful participation of actors (Lijphart, 1977, 100-104). Though a benefit of group solidarity (homogeneity) is that there is a lower probability of within-group dissent or conflict, a higher degree of cohesion within a group can create an environment that is hostile to dissenting opinions increasing the likelihood of group-imposed conformity through groupthink²¹ or the embracing of extreme positions and/or policies.

²¹ Groupthink- “the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive in-group that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action (Aronson, 1999, 18)

. . . a group that, from its inception, is conceived as a struggle group is especially prone to engage in violent heresy-hunting; and its members are obliged to participate continuously in the selection and reselection of those who are “worthy,” that is, those who do not question or dissent, precisely because its very existence is based on the “purity” of its membership. Such groups must continuously engage in self-purification drives, and so they must constantly breed heresy and schisms. . . Their social cohesion depends upon total sharing of all aspects of group life and is reinforced by the assertion of group unity against the dissenter. The only way they can solve the problem of dissent is through the dissenter’s voluntary or forced withdrawal (Coser, 1956, 100-101, 103).

Thus, higher percentage of group homogeneity increases the probability of the occurrence of risky or extreme behavior through the overestimation of the competency and/or morality of the group (Aronson, 1999, 18-9; Gass & Seiter, 2003, 146-7). Similarly, the more alike groups are in their values or beliefs, the more opportunity there is for smaller differences to be disproportionately emphasized- which can contribute to intolerance and violent conflict (McCauley, 2004, 48). The degree to which a group is hetero- or homogenous can have an effect on how averse or prone the group is to engaging in violent behavior.

Summary

The literature on the role of psychology in violent conflict and PSC is large. Through a review of the existing literature, it is clear that there is theoretical support for the proposition that there are more psychological motivations present in PSC than just identity components. Clearly, the justification for including the testing of emotion, perception, self-identity, and group-identity as jointly necessary components of PSC is well supported in existing literature. Thus, my proposition that there are psychological motivations underlying, sustaining mechanisms of PSC can be supported, from a theoretical/literary perspective.

CONCLUSION

During the course of the literature review, I have prepared a foundation from which I will present my theoretic conceptualization of PSC from in the next section. While Azar's theory still provides utility in understanding what PSC descriptively, measurable criteria are limited and categories need to be narrowed and broadened to better capture what PSC is and what its necessary components are. As such, the category of Effective Participation, as conceptualized as the inclusion non-state actors, time considerations, and cycles of violence can be supported using PSC, conflict, and other germane scholarly works. Similarly, Azar's category of Security, as conceptualized as asset-based competition for tangible and non-tangible assets can be supported in the literature as well. The categories of Social Recognition of Identity and Distinct Identity, as presented in the broader category of Psychological Motivations, present my greatest departure from Azar's established theory, but are well-supported in existing literature.

The theoretical implications of psychological motivations, as identified by emotion, perception, self-identity, and group-identity, though all are not currently listed as necessary components, can all be strongly supported in existing scholarly literature. The theoretical benefits of expanding "identity" issues to include emotion and perceptual considerations introduce potentially broader and further reaching components that could result in a better understanding of the sustaining components of PSC. If supported by my findings, a new theoretic framework could have utility in the academic and applied realms of international relations and conflict resolution.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF PSC

INTRODUCTION

When encountering a puzzle, researchers attempt to discover what, how, and why an event has occurred. In taking what is known or observed, theoretical explanations can be built in an attempt to explain what is not known, through analysis of what is (Bernard, 2002, 61-2; Lichbach and Zuckerman, 2009, 23; KKV 1994). Theories, then, are “good ideas about how things work” (Bernard, 2002, 60-61) that attempt to explain the association between the known and the unknown. This chapter approaches the existence of PSC as a theoretical puzzle. By using what is known and observed about PSCs, I lay out a theoretical explanation of what PSC is, how it occurs, and why it is such an intractable form of violent conflict.

To explain why PSC occurs in addition to what it is, theory is needed. Grounded theories, then, are attempts to develop theories from an analysis of the patterns, themes, and common categories discovered in observational data” (Babbie, 2006, 296).

To transform specific explanations into general theoretical terms, the researcher’s theoretical framework must be broad enough to capture the major elements of the historical context. That is, the set of independent and intervening variables must be adequate to capture and record the essentials of a causal account of the outcome in the case (Bennett and George, 2005, 92-93).

Theory attempts to capture the essential components of a phenomenon in the most comprehensive and parsimonious manner that retains measurability. As I demonstrate in this chapter, I assert that the existing theoretical conceptualizations of PSC are too broad in some areas and too narrow in others to comprehensively capture the theoretical nature of PSC.

Building these fundamental aspects of theory, Most and Starr (1989, 71) note that, “theories are important for understanding and explaining why wars occur, and a critical component of those theories is specification of the logical connectiveness”. What is the “logical connectiveness” in PSC that makes it endure? What is different about PSCs that makes them defy conventional wisdom in international relations theory and literature concerning violent conflict and war (as was presented in the literature review)? In response to these questions, to find the “connectiveness” in the theoretical aspects of PSC, my dissertation strives to answer two fundamental questions about the nature of PSC. The first question is: “What are the patterns, themes, and categories that are necessary for PSC to occur?” This first question addresses the “what” and “how” aspects of explaining PSC. The second question attempts to answer *why* PSC occurs: “What are the sustaining mechanisms of PSC?”

In asking these two research questions, I am inquiring as to the fundamental theoretical aspects of PSC. I propose a two-tiered framework that is inclusive of the components that can quantify the descriptive components of PSCs *as well as* propose what could be the underlying, supporting apparatuses that can make them so enduring in nature. The ensuing theory and conceptualization is designed to complement the existing

theoretical frame while providing clarity, measurable parameters, and fill-in theoretical gaps as to the necessary and sustaining components of PSC.

THEORY

Protracted social conflict can be defined as *a conflictual dyadic relationship characterized by intermittent violent interactions between non-state actors and another entity for a sufficient length of time to have become fully embedded in the social fabric of the conflict groups wherein issues of contention, while they can change over time, remain of such importance to the actors that they are considered non-negotiable*. Though a definition of a PSC is useful to differentiate it from other forms of conflict, what it does not answer is *why* PSC occurs in the first place. To answer why PSC occurs, a theoretic frame must be built.

As identified in the literature review, the work of Dr. Edward Azar has been the foundation of recent PSC research. It is the theoretical frame that appears to be used most often by PSC scholars. According to Azar, the four necessary components that explain the occurrence and protracted nature of PSC are effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity (see Figure 1). However, are each of these necessary conditions sufficiently (categorically) global in nature to conjointly capture the phenomenon of PSC in a parsimonious manner? Is there another way that the theoretic framework can be organized so as to more clearly conceptualize PSC and make it more comprehensive and testable?




Figure 3.1: Azar's Conceptualization of PSC

It is the purpose of my dissertation to introduce a complementary framework to the theory of PSC that embodies the spirit of the existing frame while filling in theoretical gaps, provide clarity to concepts, place components at a more useful level of analysis, and provide clear and measurable parameters to derive a more robust theoretical frame from which knowledge and understanding can be discovered. In this dissertation project, I propose that PSC has six jointly necessary components. The first four components- the participation of non-state actors, a minimum of 20 years of violent conflict, a minimum of three violence-peace cycles, a minimum of 500 directly relatable deaths entail the descriptive elements of PSC. These four components are a development of Azar's component of Effective Participation and explain some of the descriptive aspects of PSC- who participates and how. The last two categorical components of my theory, Completion-Based Conflict, and Psychological Motivation address the sustaining mechanism(s) that causes violent conflict to endure over time. As will be discussed in the

next section, Competition-Based Conflict is conceptualized as competition for tangible and/or non-tangible assets and Psychological motivation is conceptualized as violence motivated by emotion, perception, self-image, and/or group image. It is upon these theoretical propositions that the theoretical framework is built.

The theoretic framework that my dissertation presents addresses the descriptive aspects of PSC as well as the sustaining mechanisms. In proposing that the categories of Non-state Actors, ≥ 20 years of violent conflict, \geq three violence-peace cycles, ≥ 500 directly relatable deaths, Competition-Based Conflict, and Psychological Motivations as jointly necessary components of PSC, a more comprehensive theoretic frame of the necessary components is presented.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

By using the building-block strategy to address identified gaps in the currently accepted theoretic construct, a more comprehensive conceptualization for the theoretic framework of PSC is presented. “This approach to theory development is a ‘building block’ approach. Each block, a study of each subtype, fills a ‘space’ in the overall theory or in a typological theory” (George & Bennett, 2005, 78). While adapting existing theoretical constructs to new concepts, careful diligence must be exercised so as to avoid “conceptual traveling” or distortion from the original theoretical concept. Thus, a classical approach to concepts is employed through the use of the “ladder of generality” (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 845-7; Goertz, 2005, 55-57). As such, the primary categorical designations remain true to Azar’s original theory. The ensuing theoretical framework is built upon the concepts established by Azar. What the theoretic frame also includes, however, are other components that are mentioned in Azar’s and others’ works that are

deemed important or fundamental to the conceptualization of PSC but are not included as necessary components. This is done through reorganizing and increasing the intension or extension of the categories so that the theoretical conceptualization of PSC is more inclusive and/or measurable.

By moving up and down the ladder of generality towards a more general or narrow conceptualization, the original defining categories are preserved within new theoretical ones. For example, Azar's category of "Effective Participation" is too broad to capture in a measurable way who participates and how. Therefore, this category is divided into four separate categories that are more discretely measurable but conceptually consistent with Azar's original concept of determining who participates and how through the category of "Effective Participation". Likewise, "distinctive identity, and "social recognition of identity" are addressed in the broader, more inclusive, category of "Psychological Motivations" (Goertz, 2005, 63). Similarly, the category of "Security" will be included in the broader category of "Asset-based Competition". When conceptualized in this manner, each "new" category is now more measurable. Components can be measured and tested to justify their inclusion as necessary aspects of PSC. "The possibility of encompassing more cases through the elaboration of secondary categories can allow for considerable flexibility regarding the meaning and application of the category" (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 850). With this "flexibility" to explore "family resemblances", components within each categorical family can be tested to determine necessity within the theoretic frame of PSC.

What is of importance to this endeavor is establishing the theoretic existence (and possible necessity) of the components of PSC. To achieve this goal, intension, extension,

secondary, and radial categorization are all utilized in the forthcoming conceptual structure as components are organized into discrete categories. In this, the general concepts and necessary components that pertain to PSC in existing literature will be theoretically preserved while being updated, clarified, and tested.

EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION

What is “effective participation” and how is it measured? As an independent category, “Effective Participation” is too broad to capture or measure who participates in PSC and how. As conceptual reorganization moves down the ladder of generality toward a more specific conceptualization, Azar’s category of “Effective Participation” is separated into four independently necessary categories. These categories more clearly identify who participates (effectively) and how. These categories are: Non-State Actors, ≥ 20 years of violent conflict, ≥ 3 violence-peace cycles, and ≥ 500 directly relatable deaths (See figure 2).




Figure 3.2: Expansion of Azar's Category of Effective Participation

Component X₁, "Non-State Actors" defines who the specific actors are in PSC. This secondary category of effective participation is in conceptual compliance with Azar and other scholars' literature on protracted conflict. Often in violent conflict, and particularly in enduring rivalries, the state is the primary unit of analysis. This is not the assumption in PSC, however. The participants of the conflict, the conflict group, are the primary unit of analysis (Pruitt & Kim, 2004, 114). As stated in the literature review, a defining characteristic of PSC is that it is not limited to dyadic, state-level, elite versus elite conflict. Rather, in PSC, non-state actors (masses) are the primary unit of analysis. Non-state actors include individuals and conflict/identity groups such as ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic groups that exist as actors in violent conflict, separate from any state affiliation. This does not preclude the inclusion of the state as an actor in PSC, however.

The theoretic mandate is that, there *must* be a non-state actor present in a violent conflict for it to be considered a PSC. Thus, conceptual extension of Azar's conceptualization of a category of Effective Participation, the first necessary component of PSC, must be that the conflict includes non-state actors.

Components X_2 and X_3 identify the necessary time parameters of PSC. These concepts are also an extension of Azar's original category of Effective Participation and include a minimal time for the entire conflict to have existed, a minimum number of violence/peace cycles in the conflict, and minimum time duration of peace between violent spikes. Though existing literature acknowledges the "protracted nature" and generational qualities of protracted conflict, clarification of the concept of this secondary category must be narrowed to become measurable. Thus, movement down the ladder of generality to provides a narrower, more precise conceptualization.

Component X_2 defines the minimum time that a violent conflict must exist to be considered a PSC. The existing literature is not explicit as to any criteria of time in which a conflict must endure before being considered a protracted conflict. Thus, a radial categorical concept must be included to address minimum time criteria. Before a society can enter into a "war culture" mentality (Azar 1990, 17), a sufficient amount of time must elapse for the conflict to become part of the fabric of the societies that the violent conflict has occurred in. The literature supports the concept of one generation as a useful measure of time in which the actors can internalize (socialization) a culture of violence into their self and cultural identity. In this application, though, there are both familial and cultural definitions of a generation. The familial definition commonly utilizes birth cycles, such as the average time elapsed between the birth a mother's first offspring and the birth her

daughter's first offspring (Bennett, 1960, 11). However, as noted by Strauss and Howe across time there is no "one universal lifecycle". Thus, using biological parameters, the teen years into the thirties, according to stages of civilizational and technological development, cultural factors, the availability of health care, and mortality rates, could be applicable. In short, in today's world, a biological generation can be as little as ten to thirteen years or as many as thirty or more.

Another way to conceptualize a generation is through the social cohort. A cultural generation is defined as a cohort of individuals whose development has been impacted or shaped by particular events or trends (Berger, 1960, 10) or as a "special cohort-group whose length approximately matches that of a basic phase of life, or about twenty-two years over the last three centuries" (Strauss & Howe, 1991, 34). This concept of a generation is more germane to the theoretical goals of this dissertation and it offers a more precise number of years in which a generation can be measured. Therefore, the concept of a generation will be defined as a period of twenty years. This duration of time approximates the cultural generation definition used by Strauss and Howe while still falling within the parameters of a familial generation offered by Bennett. Furthermore, it remains true to the premises in existing literature that PSC is enduring in nature and has generational qualities.

Having established one generation of twenty years as a theoretical minimum duration for the establishing of a violent conflict as a PSC, what, then, is a reasonable period of time without violence to consider a PSC to have ended? As indicated in the literature review, there is no distinguishable "point of termination" (Schrodt, 1983, 101) in PSCs. As in establishing time parameters for the classification of a PSC being the

length of time necessary for a violent conflict to become part of a cultural consciousness, it would stand to reason that the standard of time, a generation of twenty years, would also be a useful measure to determine whether the PSC has absented itself from the social fabric of the actors as well. Therefore, a lapse in violence between the actors equal to or greater than twenty years is sufficient to determine that a PSC has ended.

In PSC, there can be durations of time where there is no violence between actors only to have violent conflict erupt again at a later time over the same issue or stimulus. Component X_3 addresses the minimum number of violence/peace cycles theoretically required for a conflict to be considered a PSC. Because the minimum patterns of violence are not identified in existing PSC theory, it is necessary to add to this secondary category by adding a radial sub-category (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 848; Goertz, 2005, 58). Thus, a violence/peace cycle can be defined as a rise in tension among actors to the level wherein the actors of one group commit an act of violence and it is reciprocated in kind, or it is increased in intensity by the opposing group, or it is committed by both groups simultaneously resulting in at least one directly-relatable death. The Nedler-Mead model indicates that a minimum of three data points is necessary to begin to form a pattern. Therefore, a minimum of three violence/peace cycles is used to set a minimum parameter.

Finally, scholarly literature is also not clear as to minimum time duration between violent spikes. As indicated in the literature review, time measured in years as used in enduring rivalries, is insufficient to account for the unique attributes and participants in PSC. Because non-state actors do not necessarily need time to finance, arm, train, and mobilize armies or have similar structural restraints, it is conceivable that they can act

more quickly than states in engaging in violent behavior. What, then, is a reasonable lapse of time between violence spikes to establish a theoretical minimum that can account for the participation of non-state actors? With limited PSC and conflict literature to use as a resource, the Nedler-Mead minimum of three data points seems reasonable to apply as criteria for a lapse of time between violence spikes. If three months pass after the completion of a violence spike without another violent incident, then a non-violent trend may be emerging. Thus, a minimum of three months of time seems to be a reasonable duration of time between episodes of violence is useful measure.

Component X_4 refers to the number of casualties as a result of PSC. Given the ambiguity concerning intensity criteria in existing PSC literature I have refined the concept by referring to related scholarship on violent conflict. By doing so, the proposed conceptualization retains the spirit (family resemblance) of existing theory while introducing measurable parameters (Collier & Mahon, 1993, 847).

Using battle deaths is a common standard of measure for inter-state violent conflict. However, given the sporadic and individual nature of PSC, using the standards for formalized military action is challenging. “Use of armed force” refers to “the use of arms by parties in order to promote the parties’ general position in the conflict, resulting in at least 25 deaths in a year” (Wallerstein, 2006, 4-5). Because periods of violence and non-violence are a hallmark of PSC, requiring 25 deaths to per year may be too stringent for a theoretical requirement for a type of conflict that is known to have periods of non-violence. However, over the twenty-year span presented as a minimum time frame, the same rate of 25 deaths per year totals 500 deaths. If a total of 500 deaths within each 20-year window is used as a conceptual minimum, it is inclusive of the 25 deaths per year

rate, but allows for the periods of non-violence that is common in PSC. Thus, a total of 500 deaths over a consecutive 20-year window of time is used as a reasonable number to set as a minimum threshold for deaths in PSC.

COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT

Azar's theory of PSC includes a category called, "Security". I am inclusive of Azar's secondary category of security when I conceptualize my secondary category as "Competition-Based Conflict" (X_5) and add two secondary radial categories, "Competition for Tangible Assets" (X_{5a}) and "Competition for Non-Tangible Assets" (X_{5b}) (See figure 3). Conflicts over tangible assets are conceptualized by discovering whether a conflict is over issues concerning physical security, resources, or territory. This includes when actors are concerned with physical harm or death, the denial of natural or man-made resources, the denial of property, or a threat to sovereign territory. Similarly, conflict over non-tangible assets includes conflict over power. Power-based conflict is conceptualized by identifying whether a conflict is regarding a struggle for economic, social, or political power. This includes influence from material wealth, that is ethnicity-based, or power achieved through achieving social or political position. Violent conflict as a result of continual competition for an asset can become a sustaining mechanism over time, turning a conflict into a PSC. As such, continual, unresolved competition-based conflict could explain *why* PSC endure.

As noted in the literature review, violent conflict often begins as a conflict over tangible and/or over non-tangible assets. However, my conceptualization of Competition-Based Conflict does not mandate that both must be present for PSC to occur. Therefore, my revision treats the presence of competition as a necessary component, but one that can

fulfilled in either of two substitutable ways: over tangible asset and/or non-tangible assets. Hence, the presence of only one of the components is needed to satisfy the theoretical requirements of my theoretic frame (as in Figure 3).




Figure 3.3: Conceptualization of Competition-Based Conflict

PSYCHOLGOICAL MOTIVATION

The final theoretical component is “Psychological Motivation” (X_6). Existing theory includes the components of distinctive identity and social recognition of identity as the necessary components of PSC that explain any psychological motivation. When the components are conceptualized as distinctive identity and social recognition of identity, it is not clear what aspects(s) of identity an actor, actors, or group of actors are seeking from identity distinction. In fact, these conceptualizations can apply to both the individual and the group. Furthermore, because the theoretic frame under examination is relative to social or inter-communal violence, both distinctive identity and social

recognition identity are directed toward wanting acceptance from the external world (sociological) not the internal (psychological). As such, both components are very similar- actors want others to recognize and accept who they are and what makes them different. As conceptualized, these two components do not capture the different psychological and sociological factors that could be sustaining PSC.

The final component of my theoretic conceptualization of PSC is the secondary category of “Psychological Motivation. This category is divided into four radial categories: emotion (X_{6a}), perception (X_{6b}), self-identity (X_{6c}), and group-identity (X_{6d}). Emotion is conceptualized as behavior that is motivated by love, hate, anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and the like. Similarly, perception is conceptualized as actions that arise from feelings of deprivation, historical context, social issues and context, misperception, attribution distortion, and rationalization. Self and group-identity are both conceptualized as behaviors that are founded in ethnicity, culture, religion, and language. Action based on self-identity is motivated from how an actor defines/sees him/herself, individually whereas behavior based in group-identity is based on how an actor defines themselves relative to any group affiliation or membership.

As with Competition-Based Conflict, the individual components within the radial category of Psychological Motivations are considered to be jointly sufficient to capture the role of psychological motivation in PSC (see Figure 4). At least one, but not necessarily all, of the psychological components must be present to satisfy the categorical theoretical minimum. Finally, the category of Psychological Motivation, like Competition-Based Conflict, is conceptualized as a sustaining category. Rather than

explaining who participates in PSC and how, it can explain *why* actors engage in violence and *why* PSC is enduring in nature.




Figure 3.4: Conceptualization of Psychological Motivation

CONCLUSION

My proposed theoretical framework presents six independently necessary components of PSC as seen in Figure 5: ≥ 20 years violent conflict, the participation of non-state actors, ≥ 3 violence/peace cycles, ≥ 500 deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation. These components are reinforced by other necessary and sufficient radial components that provide a clear and measurable theoretical

conceptualization of PSC. The following is a pictorial representation of the proposed conceptualization:




Figure 3.5: Proposed Conceptualization of PSC

The proposed conceptualization of the-theoretic framework of PSC retains the essence of the characteristics identified in the existing literature. The creation of radial categories to complement existing concepts retains family resemblances to Azar's

original conceptualization while providing a clearer model on which to test and study the phenomenon of PSC. This two-tiered approach not only presents a more comprehensive and measurable conceptualization of PSC, it also provides descriptive and sustaining components. As such, I directly engage in the discussion as to why PSC endures across time on a theoretic level.

CHAPTER 4

CASE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGIES

INTRODUCTION

The primary objective of my dissertation is to present a modified and testable theoretic conceptualization of the theory of PSC. To accomplish this, specific cases relevant to PSC are selected and analyzed. A set of systematic empirical methodologies are utilized. While this is a multi-method research project, because of the overall research design, the principal methodology of my dissertation is comparative case study. Thus, my dissertation is qualitative in nature and Charles Ragin's Boolean truth table is the primary tool of analysis.

The comparative historical approach, through the use of case studies (George & Bennett, 2005, 93), is the approach of qualitative discovery that will be employed. Qualitative methods can be useful when the unit of analysis is categorical rather than numerical, the research agenda contains historical components, research puzzles are philosophical rather than empirical, samples are insufficient for a large-N study, or when the goal of inquiry is in understanding the larger implications rather than gaining insight in one aspect of a phenomenon (Agresti and Finlay, 2009, 12; King, Keohane, and Verba (KKV), 1994, 5). "[T]he best way to understand a particular event may be by using the methods of scientific inference also to study systematic patterns in similar parallel events" (descriptive inference) (KKV, 1994, 34). "Interpretivists seek to explain the

reasons for intentional action in relations to the whole set of concepts and practices in which it is embedded” (KKV, 1994, 37). Qualitative approaches can build, reject, modify, clarify, or fill gaps or omissions in theory (Babbie, 2006, 298; KKV, 1994, 99-109). As such, the qualitative, an historical case study approach can provide significant utility to the research goals of my dissertation.

Historical analysis can be used to gather information to test theories across and within historical cases. The “historical macro-analysis” method seeks to comprehend and explain the causal mechanisms of political phenomena (Büthe, 2002, 481). This approach provides valuable contextual and inferential insight as to the causal and sustaining mechanisms of a phenomenon. Historical analysis can be used (1) in parallel demonstration of theory- where multiple historical cases are examined to determine whether a theory “repeatedly demonstrate[s] its fruitfulness-its ability convincingly to order the evidence- when applied to a series of relevant historical trajectories”; (2) with contrast of contexts- to test if a theory holds from case to case; or (3) by controlling comparisons through determination of whether key variables change before or after an event (G&B, 2005, 81; Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 175-8). Because of this, an historical approach combined with comparative case analysis is useful in investigating the theoretic aspects of PSC.

Because PSCs are long-lived conflicts, using a historical research design is an optimal methodology for discovering the necessary and sufficient components of PSC. As I am seeking to identify causal inference, Skocpol and Somers’ (1980) inductive, macro-causal approach provides utility. Histories of PSCs can be assessed for their similarities and difference (Mills [1888] 1970, Büthe 2002), across and within cases, and

to identify necessary components. Because of this, the extended case method is used to test the theoretic components of PSC. The extended case method is where “case study observations are used to discover flaws in and to improve existing social theories” (Babbie, 2006, 298; Buraway, 1998, 9).

In clearly identifying what a researcher expects to find before discovery, Buraway conceptualizes the utility of extended case methods in not discarding theory, but in rebuilding or improving on existing theory by filling “theoretical gaps and silences” (Buraway, 1998, 10). Buraway’s statement perfectly captures the goal of my dissertation and the reasons why I am using case-based methodologies.

CASE SELECTION

In determining which histories are to be analyzed, purposeful selection of cases must occur. George and Bennett define cases as “instance[s] of a class of events” such as revolutions, regimes, or economic systems (2005, 17). Cases can be identified by selecting all the cases that contain the variable (component) of interest, selecting samples from the population of cases, or by using specific criteria to purposively select cases (Singer, 1977, 9-10). Using specific criteria, such as key components, is an example of purposeful selection. Cases can also be selected because they are critical examples in the puzzle under study (G & B, 2005, 80; Gerring, 2007, 233-238). Additionally, researchers can choose cases that are most similar (method of agreement); most different (method of difference), or because they are negative cases where the components are present but the outcome is different (Mahoney and Goertz, 2004; Mill, [1888], 1970, 206; Singer, 1977, 9-10; Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 183). By using purposeful selection, researchers can identify previously unknown components that are relevant, determine which components

are necessary- “a condition that must be present for the effect to follow”, which component(s) is (are) sufficient- “a condition that if present, guarantees the effect in question” (Babbie, 2006, 93) to explain the phenomenon, and/or identify causal mechanisms (Brady and Collier, 2004, 23-24; Skocpol and Somers, 1980, 183). From this, researchers are able to generalize observed commonalities and test the theories of the puzzles they are attempting to solve.

Because my goal is to test and modify theory, how I go about the purposeful selection of cases is critical to success. To build his theory, Azar selected PSC 13 cases, (Azar, 1983, 87). While it is my hope to eventually include all of Azar’s cases and add others that may be PSCs, the time-consuming research method of content/discourse analysis makes an extensive list of cases prohibitive at this time. Thus, in my case selection, controlled comparison is utilized where specific selection criteria are used to avoid selection bias and provide the most useful critical cases to initially test my theoretical conceptualization. Hence, four cases are selected.

The first two cases that are selected are the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Northern Ireland PSCs²². These two cases currently represent the more “troublesome” and “hopeful” PCS cases. Presently, the Arab-Israeli conflict is the most intractable and least likely PSC to reach any sort of resolution in the near future. Conversely, the Northern Ireland case appears to be in the process of resolving its enduring conflict. Thus, of the currently identified PSCs, it appears to be the most “promising” case of ending their PSC.

²² While at prima-facie it may appear that using these two “hallmark” cases introduces selection bias, however, it is the theoretic structure that is being tested *and not* the cases themselves. Thus, selecting critical PSC cases offers the greatest utility in theoretic evaluation. If the propositions of my dissertation do not stand up to the empirical evidence presented by two well-established PSCs, then the premise of the project is flawed. These cases are selected because the focus of inquiry is on the theory presented, not the testing of the cases themselves.

Hence, both the Arab-Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs are selected through the use of critical case criteria.

The third case is selected because it has “most similar” attributes which are its conflict patterns and the prolonged length of the conflict. This is the Kashmir conflict. Control of the region of Kashmir (an area abutting the states of India, Pakistan, and China) has been under dispute since the end of British rule in South Asia in 1947 (Husain 2009). This case is salient to this study because it has several similar attributes to the Arab-Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs such as being enduring in nature, the participation of non-state actors, and violence/peace cycles. Thus, it is selected as a “most similar” case.

Finally, a negative case is selected because it has many of the same components as recognized PSCs, yet no violent conflict has emerged to the point where any scholar or entity has classified it as a PSC. Thus, this case will be used to test for the theoretical sufficiency and necessity of specific components in my theoretic frame. The negative case will be Post World War II Belgium. After World War II, Belgium experienced deep cultural discord between its predominantly Walloon (French speaking) and Flemish (Dutch speaking) citizens. Yet, no violent conflict emerged. Thus, the case of post-World War II Belgium is selected because it has many similarities to other PSCs without the presence of violent conflict.

The use of case studies is useful for providing an understanding of how variables act and interact with each other (Gurr, 1970, 20). By selecting four cases; two critical cases, one most similar case, and a negative case, I strive to determine what components

are truly necessary (and sufficient) to explain PSC. If successful, a better understanding of what the necessary components of PSC will be discovered.

METHODOLOGY: DATA SOURCES AND DATA COLLECTION APPROACH

Data collection techniques in this dissertation are designed for the purpose of conducting content and discourse analysis to determine the necessary components of PSC. By analyzing the content and quotes within newsprint, it is hoped that the descriptive and supporting aspects of PSC are identified. To this end, the following section reveals the how the data collection methods are approached and what sources are used to collect the data for this project.

Identifying the parameters of how data will be collected is the first step in planning data collection. In PSC, this begins with the clear identification of the dates, actors and the originating issue(s) of contention. As the nature of PSC can change and spill-over to include other actors and issues through time, identifying and using the original actors keeps the research and measurement attuned and maintains a measure in internal validity. While historical antecedents are critical to understanding conflict, the enduring nature PSC can introduce ambiguity through time as actors and issues of contention change. For example, because of the historical context of the Jewish people, the Crusades, the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the colonial relationship between Great Britain with both the Arab and Israeli people, issues and events can spill-over to include other actors and new topics of contention. To avoid the challenges that this can present to the data collection process and the validity to the project as a whole, data collection for the Arab-Israeli case will begin with the establishment of Israel as a state on May 14, 1948; data collection on the Northern Ireland protracted conflict will

begin with the establishment of Ireland as an independent state from Great Britain on December 2, 1922; data collection in the Kashmir conflict will begin starting with the end of British colonial occupation of the region in 1947; and the October 20, 1945 vote rejecting Belgian re-unification with France in favor of autonomy will be the beginning data of data collection for the Belgian case. Only events occurring in the actual conflict territories will be considered.

It is not the intention to dismiss or diminish the importance of historical context from this study, however. Indeed, historical narrative is included in this project to provide the much-needed context that surrounds these conflicts. Historical narrative, therefore, will be the first part of the discussion of each case. Each cases' historical narrative contains the contextual background as well as events during the times where violent conflict did or should have occur(ed).

To examine the presence of PSC over time, data is collected in each case in five-year intervals for a period of 12 months at the beginning of each five-year period. For example, as Israel became a sovereign state in 1948, data is collected for the months in 1948 that it was a sovereign state and then in 1953. Data is collected from January 1 through December 31 during 1953. The next interval where data is collected in the Israeli/Arab case is 1958, where data is also collected for that calendar year as well. Thus, the years in which information is sought in the Arab-Israeli conflict are: 1948, 1953, 1958, 1963, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. The same time-interval procedure is used for all the cases.

At each twenty-year bench mark, each individual case is assessed. Independent components within each case are evaluated to determine its presence or non-presence

using the theoretical minimums identified within this dissertation. If all of the six proposed necessary components are present, then that conflict will be coded as being a PSC for that 20-year window. For example, the Palestinian/Israeli case will be evaluated to determine if it is a PSC in 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, and 2008. In measuring for the presence of individual components, various sources of information are utilized. To identify who the actors in PSC are (masses or elite), the deaths as a result of PSC, the conflict-issue, and determine the psychological motivation of actors, direct quotes and information is gathered from newsprint. Databases with newspaper archives, such as ProQuest and Lexus Nexus, are the primarily sources of newspaper reports concerning the cases under investigation. The New York Times is the primary/preferred news outlet that information is gathered from. This is because the New York Times is the paper of record for the United States. When the Times has insufficient data (articles) on a case, the Times of London is utilized next.

DATA COLLECTION

Because content and discourse analysis methods are being utilized, measures are taken to ensure the reliability of the data that is collected. This is accomplished by: (1) creating a set of codes prior to beginning data collection²³, (2) applying these codes systematically to the data collected, (3) testing the reliability of the codes and coding methods by re-examining the coding used, and (4) analyzing the data systematically (Bernard, 2002, 476).

²³ Please find established coding parameters in the Appendix, table 1. Additionally, a dictionary of psychological motivation has also been built throughout this dissertation's process. It is organized into four sections: emotion, perception, self-, and group-identity. Prior to beginning data collection, the dictionary was "filled" with words that communicate psychological motivation in each category. Words added to the dictionary during the data collection process include citations for justification and collaborative purposes. Please refer to Appendix, table 2 for a sample of the dictionary

Each article reported from each case is analyzed to determine whether there was an act of violence that occurred, when it occurred, who perpetrated the act, who the victim(s) were, if there were injuries in the violence, if there were deaths in the violence, and which actors died in the violence. Other information collected includes whether there were direct quotations in the report and their sources, which group of actors made the statement, and whether it was a member of the masses or a member of the state government elite²⁴. Direct quotes from the actors are analyzed to ascertain the source of the violent conflict (over tangible or non-tangible assets) as well as any psychological components that may be present (emotions, identity, and perceptions) as it pertains to the violent conflict. Key words and phrases are identified and coded that communicate the presence of the identified components. Verbs, adjectives, and context within quotes are analyzed to determine whether they communicate psychological attributes. A statement such as, "Israeli fighter jets released bombs on civilian populations in the Golan Heights" would be coded as no psychological motivation or conflict source content identified as this is a statement of fact. However, consider the following quotes:

Waad Hussein Massaad, a pretty 12-year-old, vowed to blow herself up in an attack against Jews as rage over Israeli actions swept through the Arab world yesterday. "I have nothing to fight with but my flesh. . . I want to die with Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. I hate the Jews; I want to kill them," she said. . . (Washington Times 2002).

They want to hunt us (New York Times 1973).

²⁴ An elite, in this project, is conceptualized as an actor who acts as an official representative, spokesman, or leader of a governmental body. For example, an Israeli officer speaking in uniform, in an official capacity, is coded as "elite", where leaders of non-state organizations such as Hamas or Hezbollah were coded as "masses".

The content of communication will be analyzed for indications of motivations²⁵ for violent conflict on the part of the actors. As in the examples above, the quote from Waad Hussein Massaad, if used, would be coded as being a quote from a Palestinian, a member of the “masses”, and has having the psychological motives of emotion (“hate”) and self-identity (“I”) present. Similarly, the second quote is from another Palestinian youth. Thus, this quote would be coded as being from a Palestinian, from the masses, and as having the psychological motivations of perception (“want”) and group-identification (“They”, “us”). Words that contain psychological motivation identified from a dictionary of terms that communicate psychological motivation.²⁶ This dictionary contains the definition of the word and what psychological motivation it communicates.

MEASUREMENT: THE BOOLEAN METHOD

In measuring the components of PSCs, a building-block approach is used as each identified conceptual sub-type of PSC is applied to fill in the existing theoretical gaps (George & Bennett, 2005, 79). This begins by measuring identified components using pre-determined coding. As concepts are being measured only for their presence, they are coded using a dichotomous nominal scale: 1= phenomenon is present, 0 = phenomenon is not present. Each of the identified components is designated as either present or not present as determined by their presence in each news report. Because I am building an original dataset, to ensure the internal reliability of my data collection, I employ the following techniques: (1) When data collection on each case is completed, I wait for a

²⁵ Statements that contain too few words to definitively determine meaning or are ambiguous, though are coded for a quote being present in the report, are not coded as containing competition-based or psychological motives. Meaning or motive inferred or directly stated from the author of the article are also excluded. For a full set of exclusions, please refer to the appendix.

²⁶ Because no pre-existing dictionary or collection of adjectives or verbs that communicate motivation has been located, I am building this dictionary myself. Though every effort is being made to maintain reliability and objectivity, not having an independent and external resource is a weakness of my project.

minimum of one month and return to the data to double-check the coding. (2) For each case, every tenth article entry in my dataset is selected for review, (3) I return to the original article, re-read it, and re-code the article. (4) I compare the original coding to the second coding to ensure that coding has been consistent over time. (5) The articles that are re-checked are marked indicating that they were used to check coding reliability.

Once data collection and coding is completed, the deductive approach to theory testing is applied through the use of a Boolean truth table. The individual components being measured are classified as independent components with the dependent variable being the binary determination of the presence of PSC (Ragin, 1987, 85-88). Utilizing a binary truth table enables the independent components to be sorted in “logical combinations of values” (Ragin, 1985, 87).

Truth tables provide all the possible combinations of independent variables to indicate whether a phenomenon is present by having as many rows as there are combinations of variables. As there are six different components being tested there will be 256 possible combinations. The following truth table, based on the model by Ragin, demonstrates the format and coding that will be used in evaluating the proposed theory of protracted conflict:

Table 4.1: Sample of Boolean Truth Table

Condition						PSC Outcome
X₁	X₂	X₃	X₄	X₅	X₆	Y
a/0	B/1	C/1	D/1	E/1	F/1	0
A/1	B/1	C/1	D/1	E/1	F/1	1

- Key: 1= Phenomenon is present
 0= Phenomenon is not Present
 A= (any capital letter) Phenomenon is present²⁷
 a= (any small-case letter) Phenomenon is not present
X₁ = Existence of non-state actors in violent conflict
X₂ = 20 years or more duration of violent conflict
X₃ = Minimum of three violence/peace cycles
X₄ = 500 or more deaths directly related to same violent conflict
X₅ = Competition-based Conflict
X₆ = Psychological Motivation

Thus, when radial categories are collapsed so that only the secondary categories are measured, there is only one possible combination of components to fulfill the necessary conditions for PSC to be present, when all of the components are present. This is represented by the Boolean combination $A+B+C+D+E+F= PSC(1)$. When all of the radial categories are expanded and included, however, as there are thirteen components there are over five thousand positive PSC combinations ($13!-6!=7!$). Boolean designations for the components tested are: A= Non-state actors, B= 20 Years, C= 3 Violence/Peace Cycles, D= 500 deaths, E= Territory, F= Resources, G= Physical Security, H= Political Power, I= Social Power, J= emotion, K= Perception, L= Self-identity, M= Group-identity. Positive Boolean combinations for PSC must comply with the following structure: $A+B+C+D+ (E \text{ or } F \text{ or } G \text{ or } H \text{ or } I) + (J \text{ or } K \text{ or } L \text{ or } M) = PSC$

²⁷ Alphabetical representation of concepts are used only for demonstration of Boolean Algebraic combinations.

(1)²⁸. Hence, when all the radial categories are included as Boolean positive outcomes, *some* of the positive outcomes could be represented by: *ABCDeFGHIJKIM*, *ABCDEfGHIJKLm*, *ABCDeFgHIJklm*, *ABCDeFGhiJKIM*, or *ABCDEfGHIJkLM*. When compared against this Boolean structure, the criteria for what cases are and what cases are not PSCs becomes clear. As additional cases are applied to the proposed theoretical frame, they will be compared to the Boolean matrix to determine if the cases correspond to any one of the Boolean combinations that equate to a positive condition for the presence of PSC.

Using this formatting, cases will be examined for the presence of each of the thirteen components by applying them to a Boolean truth table. For example, while examining the information for the Arab-Israeli Conflict, if it is found that there were 500 or more deaths during the 20-year window of 1968-1988, then component X_2 will be coded as “1” meaning that the existence of that variable was present during that particular span of time. If, however, the actual deaths were found to be lower than 500 between 1968 and 1988, the variable X_2 would be coded as “0”. This would indicate that the variable was not found to be present.

Because the Arab-Israeli, Northern Ireland, and Kashmir conflicts are all established PSCs, each conflict must have conflict patterns that match one of positive Boolean combinations to support my theoretic frame. If any of these cases are found to have conflict patterns other than the combinations of components that positively identify violent conflicts as PSCs, then my proposals cannot be supported.

²⁸ Note that component s A, B, C, and D (the four descriptive components of Azar’s effective participation) are present all the time.

APPLYING BOOLEAN ALGEBRA

At this point in the project, for Boolean Analysis to be used to establish theoretical minimums, it is necessary to record only the presence or lack of presence of each component. Hence, when an instance of competition-based conflict over physical security is noted in a direct quote, the existence of that particular component will be coded as a “1”. At the end of each calendar month, the following components are tallied to determine if they meet the Nedler-Mead model’s minimum of three data points to begin to form a pattern: violent incidents; presence of non-state actors; conflict over tangible assets of territory, resources, and security; conflict over non-tangible assets such as political power, and social power; and psychological motivations of emotion, perception, self-identity, and group-identity. If there are less than three events in each of these components within a one-month period, the category is coded as “not present” (0) for that month on a Boolean Truth table.

At the end of each calendar year, the monthly sums of each component are calculated. Components that are present for at least three of the twelve months (25%) are coded as present in a Boolean Truth table for that year. Next, to determine if each component is present consistently over time, annual totals are assessed over a twenty-year window (the [proposed] minimum time that violent conflict must be present for a violent conflict to be considered a PSC). At the end of each twenty-year cycle, each

component is evaluated for its presence in that particular cycle. If the component is present in at least three of the one-year increments (75%), then a pattern is emerging and it is coded as present. Then, each of the six proposed necessary components of PSC are assessed for their presence within each 20-year cycle. If *all* of the components are present, then that twenty-year cycle is coded as present for PSC.

All of the components are now assessed to determine necessity and sufficiency. “A cause is defined as necessary if it must be present for a certain outcome to occur” (Ragin, 1987, 99). If each component is found to be present in each of the three positive PSC cases, then it is determined that, that component is a necessary component of PSC (Ragin, 1987, 100). Finally, the components of the negative (Belgian) case are analyzed to determine whether any components are sufficient to “cause” a PSC. Sufficiency is assessed by determining which component are and are not present in the negative case as opposed to the positive cases (Ragin, 1987, 99). If one or more components are found to be absent in the negative case but are present in the three positive cases, then a strong argument can be made that these components are a sufficient component of PSC.

The exceptions in using the Nedler-Mead model as minimum criterion are with the components that measure minimum time duration and directly relatable deaths. Because using a 20-year minimum for a violent conflict is supported in enduring rivalry and generational literature (the social component of PSC), any violent conflict that has

lasted less than 20 years is automatically coded as “not present” (0). Similarly, any violent conflict that has endured more than 20 years over the same issue or set of issues, and the other “necessary” components are coded present, it will be coded as “present” *unless* there has been a continuous break in hostilities (over the same issue[s]) that totals 20 years or more. In this case, the “clock” will start over again, and the violent conflict will be coded as “not present” (0) until it once again reaches the 20-year mark of violent conflict. The other exception to using the Nedler-Mead model of minimums is with 500 or more directly attributable deaths over each 20-year cycle. Using this criteria, there must be at least two deaths per month for a month to be coded as “present” for deaths and 25 deaths per year for the year to be coded as present (1).

THE CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD

Utilizing Boolean approaches to analyzing categorical data is particularly useful in honing combinations of components to clarify theoretical matrices. In studies such as mine, it is particularly useful in identifying which components should be eliminated or added in the consideration of the theoretically necessary components of PSC. Limits to using Boolean methodologies, however, can be found in discovering the underlying patterns in the data that could help to explain the “relatedness” of observed data (Tchernova, 2006, 4). As I propose that there are sustaining categorical components (Competition-Based Conflict and Psychological Motivation) within PSC (and that there are individual components within each category that are jointly necessary components of

PSC), analyzing how components vary and cluster can add further clarity as to which components contribute to PSC. Thus, factor analysis is employed.

Factor analysis is a statistical method that reduces observed, correlational data to determine the relatedness of the data. It assesses whether variations in the data are a reflection of other latent variables that are not readily (or have not been) observed. This is done by reducing the variables used in the study into a smaller number of derived variables (factors). Factor analysis uses existing, observed data and compresses the data into a single variable called a factor or a single typology (Ragin, 1987, 149-50; Torres-Reyna 2012). This creates indices that contain variables that measure “similar things” conceptually to explore the structure of a set of variables or to confirm a specific set of hypotheses (Torres-Reyes 2012). Using no outcome variable, factors show how variables are correlated or interrelated through their variation patterns (clustering) (Ragin, 1987, 149-50).

Using confirmatory factor analysis, I assess whether PSC has a single common factor for all of the components being measured or if it has more than one factor. In essence, I confirm whether the data fits/supports my proposed conceptual model. By analyzing factor scores, valuable theoretical insight can be gained by showing how components should be categorized.

CONCLUSION

For the analysis of my theory, I choose four different cases. Each case represents a different aspect of PSC. The Palestinian case is a critical case because it is currently

deemed the most “unsovable” PSC case. Similarly, the Northern Ireland case is a critical case because it is currently “working” towards resolution and towards no longer being classified as a PSC. The Kashmir case is utilized because it has “most similar” attributes to the critical cases. Lastly, the Belgian case is selected as a negative case. This is because, like the Kashmir case, it has many similar components to the critical cases, yet, no violent conflict has occurred. In selecting these four cases, a cross-section of PSCs is identified and is tested determine what the necessary (and hopefully sufficient) components of PSC are.

To gather the data to test my theory, I utilize content analysis of newsprint reports as my primary source of information. This is done to be able to capture the continual episodic violence that can fail to meet the minimum criteria for selection in more formal, large scale conflict data sets. More importantly, though, it allows me to capture and analyze the statements of the actual actors involved in each violent conflict as the events actually occur. In doing so, I hope to glean a more accurate portrayal of the motivational factors compelling the actors to violence.

Lastly, I use both qualitative and quantitative methods to interpret the data that I collect. Boolean analysis is used to determine the necessary and sufficient components of PSC. Though limited, through the use of a logit regression, I can determine if there is a statistically significant relationship between the proposed necessary components and PSC

and glimpses of the strength of their relationships can be seen as well. By using a mix of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in my dissertation, I drive at not only what are the descriptive components of PSC, but what are the necessary, sustaining components as well.

CHAPTER 5

THE ARAB/ISRAELI CASE

“If love of your land is a crime, all of history is criminal” – inscription found on a wall in Joya, Lebanon.¹

INTRODUCTION

To determine the necessary components of PSC, I begin by identifying the components of the Arab/Israeli PSC by tracing the historical development of the Israeli state qualitatively. I establish who the critical actors are in the dyad and how the conflict had developed over time. Focus is placed on components that can clarify the descriptive aspects of PSC and on identifying supporting components that could play a role in the enduring nature of PSC. This is accomplished by examining the major conflicts/wars that have occurred in the dyad and by examining the statements of the actors that are involved in the conflict to assess glean explicit and implicit motives for the continuation of violent behavior²⁹.

The cornerstone of contention in the modern Arab/Israeli PSC is the territory that the Israeli government and people now claim as their sovereign territory³⁰. “The core of

²⁹ Search criteria for the Arab/Israeli cases includes: Israel, or Israeli, and Palestinian, or Arab, and dead, or killed, (and) or casualties. For other coding rules, examples of coding, and a sample of how the data set is organized, please refer to Appendix 1 at the end of the dissertation.

³⁰ The question over which group has the greater/more compelling territorial claim in this case is an issue of great importance and contention to more people than just the actors directly involved in this PSC. Because of this realization, it is my hope that if there are statements and information in this dissertation that are found to be distasteful to readers that favor one side over the other, that they are mitigated/balanced by other statements and information. Every effort is made to be as neutral and intellectually honest as possible. The goal of this dissertation, and in every case analyzed herein, is not to place an evaluative judgment on

any set of actors as to their “rightness” or “wrongness”, but to determine as accurately and as comprehensively as possible necessary components of PSC.

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the claim of two peoples to the same piece of land” (Dowty, 2008, 4). This conflict, however, did not start with the establishment of the state of Israel. Whether the state of Israel should exist and be a home for the Jewish people has been a source conflict between the Arab and Jewish people for more than a century. Because of this, a historical analysis of the how the Arab/Israeli PSC began could provide context and qualitative support to efforts to understanding the necessary components of PSC. Though a compelling argument can be made that the roots of this conflict spans centuries of contention and conflict over the same territory, because of space limitations, only the conditions that played a role in the establishment of the state of Israel, a cornerstone contention in this PSC, are developed. Thus, the development of this case begins with the events that played a role in the development of the Arab/Israeli PSC and the establishment of the Israeli state.

Beginning with the events and actors surrounding with the origins with the of the Zioint movement, I trace the events that led up to the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948. Then, from 1948 through 2012, I used data collected from 13 evenly-spaced, one-year time windows and the major wars fought between the dyad to trace the conflict through the eyes of the actors. This provides snapshots of the actors’ actions, statements, and motivations across the development of the conflict. Finally, in the analysis section, I assess the components measured across the span of the conflict to determine which (if any) of the components that were measured are significant to this critical PSC case.

NO PLACE TO CALL HOME – THE RISE OF ZIONISM

During the second half of the 19th century, Jewish sentiment for establishing a home state began to coalesce across Europe. This was for two reasons. Because Judaism

is a non-proselytizing religion, many Jews feared that the liberal policies of Western Europe would lead to assimilation, threatening the very existence of the Jewish faith. Also, Jewish sentiment for a homeland grew due to increasing persecution at the hands of Tsarist Russia and in Eastern Europe.

Though persecution of the Jewish people is documented throughout time, in Western Europe in particular, this particular historical period saw large-scale massacres (pogroms) of the Jewish people in Poland and other Tsarist regions- an area that reportedly held over 50% of the European Jewish population (Dowty, 2008, 2-3, 9, 27; Garner, 1994, 12). To flee persecution and preserve their faith, the Jewish people began to immigrate to their ancestral homeland of Palestine (Filastin), an area which was located completely within the Turkish Ottoman Empire.

The pogroms began with the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in March of 1881. Upon Tsar Alexander's death, reforms that had benefited the Jewish people in Tsarist Russia were immediately reversed. By the end of the year, approximately 250 pogroms had been carried out and over the next four decades, an estimated 4 million Jews fled Russia (Aronson, 1980, 28; Ettinger, 1976, 881-888). At that particular time, only 2% of Jewish refugees fled to the "Holy Land". Overwhelming majorities fled into Western Europe. Once in Europe, however, Jewish immigrants faced similar anti-Semitic sentiments that they endured under the new regime. Jewish migrants hoped to assimilate into a new home and a new country in Western Europe. The predominantly young and well-educated (because of Tsar Alexander II's reforms) Jewish migrants faced rising exclusivist nationalist sentiment across Europe, however (Öke 1982). They were not wanted where they came from and they were not wanted where they were going to. It is

in this environment that the prospect of immigration into Palestine began appeal to the Jewish people. The Zionist movement began to grow as Jewish immigration into Palestine increased and the idea of a Jewish home state began to take root.

Initial attempts by Zionists to bring the Jewish plight to the attention of international actors failed, however. It was not until Austrian journalist and philosopher, Theodor Herzl, published, *The Jew's State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution to the Issue of the Jews* in 1896 and *Der Judenstaat* in 1897, and the First Zionist Congress in 1897 that Zionism³¹ began to grow (Dowty, 2008, 36). Herzl asserted that Jews should be “granted sovereignty over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation” (Öke, 1982, 329). When Herzl tried to establish a Jewish colony within the Ottoman Empire, though, Jewish liaison, Philip de Newlinski was told by the Ottoman grand Vizier, Halil Rifat Pasa, to relay the following message:

If Mr. Herzl is as much your friend as you are mine, then advise him not to take another step in this matter. I cannot sell even a foot of land, for it does not belong to me, but to my people. My people have won this empire by fighting for it with their blood and have fertilized it with their blood. We will again cover it with our blood before we allow it to be wrested away from us (Öke, 1982, 330).

Initial Zionists efforts to establish a homeland were not fixated on Palestine, however. Attempts to establish settlements in British Uganda, Cypress, South Africa, and the US, were also made (Kornberg, 1980, 242). Though the thought of a homeland was well-received by Jews in principle, it was not until a fresh wave of persecution upon the Jewish people that occurred in Russia and Poland (1904-13) that the Jewish people began to take an active interest in a Jewish home state in Palestine (Gerner, 1994, 16).

³¹ Though there are many different tenets in Zionism, it can be generically conceptualized as the claim/belief that the goal of reestablishing the historic homeland of the Jews, Eretz Israel, is a legitimate goal of the Jewish people.

The second wave of Jewish immigration (aliyot) eventually formed the backbone of the drive to establish a Jewish state in Palestine. They did not want to live as a minority, being assimilated into Arab communities. Many of Israel's emergent political leaders, such as David Ben-Gurion came from this wave of immigrants into Israel (Gerner 1994)³².

During this period, the beginning of the twentieth century prior to World War I, as persecution increased, Jews began to lobby the international community to gain support the establishment of a Jewish home state (Lalmbroza 1987). Additionally, groups were founded to assist Jews wanting to immigrate and to aid new settlers already in Palestine. These organizations included the Jewish National Fund which purchased land in Palestine in the name of the Jewish people, the Keren Hayesod which helped to finance agricultural and settlement efforts in Palestine, the Jewish Agency which aided immigration and settlement establishment, and Hadassah which funded medical institutions in Palestine (Gerner, 1994, 17).

To understand a measure of why the Arab community had such a strong reaction to the prospect of a Jewish state, perspective is needed. In its hey-day, in the 17th century, the Ottoman Empire spanned across all of Northern Africa, including the Arabian Peninsula, and reached up into Eastern Europe through the Caspian and Black Seas (Dowty, 2008, 15; Lewis, 1980, 29). In a less than a century (1830-1911), however, the Ottoman Empire lost half of the territory that it had possessed at its height to European,

³² In the interest of intellectual honesty, it is only fair to point out that there were divisions in the Zionist movement regarding the establishment of a Jewish home state. Early immigrants of the first aliyot, like Agudat Yisrael, did not favor establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. Revisionist Zionists envisioned a homogenous Jewish state restored to its furthest historic boundaries. Labor Zionists felt that a Jewish home state should be built organically, from the ground up. Finally, Brith Shalom (political Zionism) believed that Palestine was a land of two people and that both peoples should work together to establish one state for all (Gerner, 1994, 19-21).

colonial powers (Dowty, 2008, 15-16; Lewis, 2002, 68). Additionally, due to their defeat in the Crimean War, the Ottoman government was forced to make religious concessions granting equal and non-discriminatory status to non-Muslims throughout the remaining Ottoman Empire. This was done to suit the interests of colonial powers (Dowty, 2008, 17). Thus, by the time that Jewish immigration began to increase at the end of the nineteenth century and the Zionist movement emerged upon the international consciousness, the Ottoman Empire was already reeling from the embarrassing loss of half of their land and forced religious-based concessions.

When Jewish immigration into the Holy Land began, because of the Islamic tradition of accepting D'immi³³ (Y'eor 1985), Jews were accepted and accommodated in Muslim society. The expectation was that immigrants would be assimilated into the host culture. However, as levels Jewish immigration increased, Ottoman leaders understood the potential implications of mass-Jewish immigration and instituted conditions on immigration policies to stem the rising tide of Jewish immigrants. This included that Jews could immigrate into any area of the Ottoman Empire *except* the Palestinian region; Jews could immigrate only as individuals, not as part of an organized political entity; and that once in the Ottoman Empire, Jews could not purchase land (Dowty, 2008, 42-44).

However, the lack of ability to enforce these policy changes and attempts at modernization led to unwanted and unforeseen consequences.

The Land Law reform of 1858 was part of the Tanzimat-- an attempt made by the Ottoman Empire to modernize and reform Palestine and other parts of the Empire by "regularizing" land ownership through a series of reforms that included registration of

³³ D'immi/Dhimmi- non-Muslim, but faith-based individuals and groups, living within Muslim-dominated territories.

land ownership and taxation (Abu-Manneh, 1990, 261-262; Thompson, 1993, 471-472). These reforms, however, had unforeseen and dire consequences on the peasant farmers who had lived on and farmed these lands for generations. With no prior legal claim to the land they occupied, many tenant farmers and their families had no way to pay for new registration fees and taxes. What was intended to protect the Palestinian people's property and interests actually ended up causing them to lose the lands that they had held for generations. When their properties were sold to often-absent (and Jewish) parties, they were displaced and homeless when the new owners came to claim "their" new land (Thompson, 1993, 461). Resentment against Jewish immigrants at the local level began to increase.

Initial migration into Palestine met with minimal resistance at the "national" level, however. At first, Ottoman leaders saw the cultural and economic influence/interference of colonial powers as a much larger threat than a few Jewish migrants. Thus, when Jewish immigration began, it received only minimal resistance. This initial "acceptance" of Jewish immigrants led to the assertion that;

[i]f Jews fleeing the pogroms (racial massacres) of late nineteenth-century Tsarist Russia had entered the Ottoman Empire seeking no more than the right to live as a minority practicing its own religion, there would have been no Arab-Israeli conflict (Dowty, 2008, 3).

As immigration increased and more Palestinian land was purchased by Jewish settlers, however, violent conflict between Jewish settlers and Palestinians began.

As immigration continued to increase, and Herzl's repeated requests (and subsequent denials) for the establishment of a Jewish settlement within the Empire came before the Vizier, the Ottomans began to take more aggressive action to stem the flow of Jewish immigration. They tried (and failed) to persuade European powers to limit Jewish

emigration, imposed severe entry restrictions on Jewish immigrants. Jews that were allowed to enter the Ottoman Empire were issued visitor permits (Red Tickets) that required that they leave after three months, and they tried to stop the legal purchase of land by foreigners that the 1858 reforms had allowed (Öke, 1982, 334-336). By 1908, however, the Jewish population in Palestine had tripled from its 1882 levels, and Jews had purchased 156 square miles of land, establishing 26 colonies (Öke, 1982, 336).

The beginning of the twentieth century, prior to World War I, marked a time where both Jewish and Arab nationalist sentiment began to grow. It was a time when Zionists began aggressively working towards establishing a “permanent” home in Palestine and Palestinians began to aggressively work to keep the Zionist threat to their homeland at bay (Dowty, 2008, 66-67)³⁴. In the following statements by local Arab leaders just prior to 1900, it is clear that the Arab community realized even at this early stage that a conflict over territory was forming.

But to establish Jewish colonies is another question. The Jews have the financial capacity. They will be able to buy many tracts of land, and displace the Arab farmers from their land and their fathers’ heritage. However, we did not conquer this land from you. We conquered it from the Byzantines who ruled it then. We do not owe anything to the Jews. The Jews were not here when we conquered the country (Ruhi al-Khalidi in Mandel, 1976, 66).

. . . Good Lord, the world is vast enough, there are still uninhabited countries where one could settle millions of poor Jews who may perhaps become happy there and one day constitute a nation. That would perhaps be the best, the most rational solution to the Jewish question. But in the

³⁴ Also in the interest of intellectual honesty, it must be stated that because Jewish immigrants came predominantly from Western states, they travelled to Palestine with the concept of territorially-based nationalism and statehood already in their consciousness. At this time, the concept of territorially-based allegiance was not present in the Palestinian collective. Arab nationalism was expressed as a desire to remove Ottoman rule rather than by territorial loyalty (Gerner, 1994, 21; Oren, 2003, 3-4). “The distinction of Palestinians from the main Arab population emerged as a reaction to the conflict with Jewish settlers. It did not exist before the Zionist movement, it was one of the results of it” (Dowty, 2008, 2).

name of God, let Palestine be left in peace (Yusuf Diya al-Khalidi in Mandel, 1976, 47-48).

As Arab nationalism grew from the Zionist threat, in-group/out-group sentiment grew as well. In a poem published in *filastin* in 1913, it is clear that group bias was developing over the land of Palestine.

Jews, sons of clinking gold, stop your deceit;
We shall not be cheated into bartering away our country!
Shall we hand it over, meekly,
While we still have some spirit left?
Shall we cripple ourselves?
The Jews, the weakest of all people and the least of them,
Are haggling with us for our land;
How can we slumber on?
We know what they want- and they have the money, all of it. . . .
And you, O Caliph, guardian of the faithful,
Have mercy on us, your shield. . .
Bearer of the Crown, does it please you
That we should witness our country
Being bought from us, wrenched from us (Mandel, 1976, 175-176)?

Written within this poem are not only statements about the growing threat of the land of Palestine being taken from the Arabs, language also communicates an “us versus them” mentality as well: “We shall not be cheated. . . haggling with us for our land. . .”

Perceptual statements are also present. The writer of this poem, Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji, communicates that he believes that Jews are rich, deceptive, cheaters, weak, and lacking the respect of others. He also indicates that he believes that the Arab people are demoralized, have broken spirits, have a sense of learned helplessness, and need the help of a higher power to preserve their land. Other statements by Palestinians during the period prior to World War I share the same sentiments. Over 600 articles were written voicing development of a negative sense of we/they thought; a growing frustration with the actions of Jewish settlers; and negative perceptions of Jewish intentions, legitimacy,

and character (Khalid, 1997, 122-124). Thus, at the onset of World War I, the foundation for a PSC over the Palestinian territory (competition-based conflict), including with the participation of state and non-state actors, episodes of violence with directly relatable deaths, and the presence of psychological motivations were already being established.

WORLD WARS I AND II – AND ANOTHER WAR IN THE MAKING

Throughout World War I, Zionist efforts continued. Zionist lobbyists, David Ben-Gurion and Yitzak Ben-Zvi travelled to Istanbul to seek an increase in immigration into Palestine. Facing internal pressure and placing the war as a higher priority than Jewish immigration, the Ottoman Empire was hostile to the prospect of increased Jewish immigration and deported many “existing” Jewish immigrants (Dowty, 2008, 70).

The end of World War I brought the end of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire was divided amongst Western European allies with Transjordan (today’s states of Israel and Jordan) being under British control. On November 2, 1917, the Balfour Declaration was issued.

His Majesty’s government views with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and politics status enjoyed by Jews in any other country (Balfour 1917).

Similarly, on July 22, 1922, the League of Nations entrusted Great Britain with the Mandate of Palestineⁱⁱ - a plan to establish a homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine³⁵. The purpose of the Mandate was to allow Britain a period of approximately

³⁵ A dual referencing system is used for the remainder of the chapter. Though atypical, my citation style remains in compliance with APSA citation guidelines and serves a unique purpose (in keeping sources clearly identified and differentiated) that complements my research goals. In-text citation indicates information retrieved from “traditional” scholarly sources (APSA, 2006, 18-24). Because newspaper articles are to be referenced in a notes section rather than as “traditional” references, (“Information on citations of newspaper articles, interviews, and personal communications should be included in the notes, not the

twenty years in which to establish functional, autonomous Israeli and Palestinian states while recognizing “the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine”. However, Arabs who been promised independence and self-determination by the British once free of the “Turkish yolk” found themselves facing the prospect of betrayal by colonial powers. Their land had been “mandated” away from them and they were defined as “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world” and would be subjected to “tutelage. . .until such time as they are able to stand alone” in Article 22 of the League of Nations’ Mandate of Palestine (League of Nations 1924). In September of 1922, the League of Nations and Great Britain declared that the Jewish national home would not extend to the area east of the Jordan River. The territory east of the Jordan River (approximately 77% of the British-controlled territory), Transjordan was given to Abdullah ibn Husayn³⁶ to rule and the remaining 23% of the territory was to be divided between the “indigenous” Arab Palestinians and the Jewish people (Dowty, 2008, 72).

Palestinian resistance to the prospect of a Jewish homeland was immediate. During this time of transition, conflicts between Arabs and Jews were numerous as Palestinians fought to retain their homelands and Jews fought to establish a home state. Jewish foreign ministers were assassinated, Arabs held riots and demonstrations, synagogues were burned, and Jewish and Palestinian civilians were murdered in numerous terrorist incidents (Dowty 2008). Similarly, economic conflict occurred as

references” (APSA, 2006, 24)), the citation for each quote referenced from newsprint is included at the end of the chapter. Actor quotes are a foundation of my data-collection technique and each chapter can contain well over 100 references to newspaper articles. Therefore, a dual referencing system is utilized to distinguish news print information from other sources. This method of citation also aids in the ease of data verification because articles that are cited in each case are referenced at the end of each chapter rather than in one large section for all the newsprint quotes in the appendix.

³⁶ The spelling of the King of Jordan’s name varies. For the sake of consistency, the spelling that is used in the first reference cited is used.

well. Products were boycotted by both sides. Palestinians were denied jobs in Jewish-dominated areas (and vice versa). Additionally, as immigration continued to increase as a result of increased persecution between World War I and World War II³⁷, violence between the actors increased as well (Samuel 1920). Arab diplomatic pressure caused Britain to try to limit the number of immigrants and land purchases through the Passfield White Papers of 1930 and the British White Papers of 1939. Despite this, the percentage of the Jewish population in Palestine grew, from eleven percent in 1922 to thirty-three percent in 1947 (608,000) (Bard 2004).

The increase in Jewish immigration to Palestine between World Wars I and II stemmed from two primary causes. The first reason was that Zionism presented the first real promise of a home state for the Jewish people in almost two millennia. The second reason for increased Jewish immigration into Palestine was that persecution of European Jews (in Germany and Poland in particular) was increasing during the 1920s through the early 1940s and “traditional” havens that were previously open to Jewish immigrants had closed their gates (Dowty, 2008, 73-4; Stone, 1997, 177). Consequently, Palestine offered the only hope of refuge and a home for displaced European Jews.

As the Jewish population increased in Palestine through each aliya, violent conflicts increased throughout the 1920s as Palestinians fought against further Jewish immigration into their homeland (Gerner, 1994, 25; Oren, 2003, 3; Yiftachel, 2006,122)^{iii,iv,v}. Among the most infamous violent events between Jews and Palestinians that occurred during this time period is the Hebron Massacre. In 1929, after a series of mutually inflammatory incidents^{vi,vii}, Palestinian-led riots broke out in Jaffa and

³⁷ One aliya was from 1920-1923 as Jews fled Russia. Another was during the mid-1920s when Jews fled Poland. The last aliya was during the mid to late 1930s when Nazism compelled German and Austrian Jews to flee their homes (Dowty, 2008, 74).

Jerusalem on August 23^{viii}. The next day, 96 Jewish students were murdered by Palestinian peasants in Hebron^{ix, x}. The subsequent riots, clashes, and terrorist attacks between Arab peasants, armed Bedouin groups, and Jewish settlers left an additional 196 dead by the end of August^{xi, xii}. One Jewish woman who witnessed the Hebron Massacre, made the following statement:

How shall I describe the sight of those awful corpses? Who could believe such barbarous acts could be committed in the twentieth century? There was not one body that had been struck with only one blow. Each victim had been tortured to the limit. It was deliberately planned beforehand. The best proof of this is that the form of death was fitted to the profession of the victim. For instance, a baker's head was tied to a lighted stove and literally baked. . .^{xiii}.

This woman's statement communicates her emotional and perceptual reaction to the massacre. This woman's dismay of having witnessed Palestinian aggression is evident by her reference to the dead as "awful bodies" and called the Palestinians' behaviors "barbarous acts". Also, note that this woman had the perception that the deaths and method of death of specific Jewish settlers had been pre-planned and that she had the perception that twentieth-century human development has progressed beyond the behaviors that she witnessed. To the Palestinians, however, the Jewish immigrants were exclusivist, arrogant, too Western, too modern, too aggressive, practiced economic discrimination, saw the Jews as taking advantage of their economic troubles by purchasing land that they (the Palestinians) were forced to sell, and (most importantly) the Palestinians were offended by the Jewish settlers' attitudes that they (the Jews) had a "right" to establish a Jewish state in Palestine (Dowty 2008; Gerner 1994).

By the mid 1930's both the Jews and Palestinians realized the gravity of the conflict that they were in. Both groups within the dyad were playing a zero-sum game

over the Palestinian territory as we/they mentalities solidified: “We and they want the same thing. We both want Palestine” (Ben-Guiron 1936). In this conflictual environment, Palestinian organizations such as the Black Hand, the Arab Higher Committee, and Jewish organizations such as Lehi (the Stern Gang), Irgun, and Haganah were established (Gerner, 1994, 20; Oren, 2003, 3). In November 1935, the Arab Higher Committee issued to their colonial “overseer”, Great Britain, demands to counter the increasing Jewish presence in Palestine. These were: (1) that a popularly elected Palestinian governmental council be established, (2) that Jewish immigration be completely halted, (3) and that the purchase of Palestinian land by Jews be prohibited (Haim, 1978, 211). Though the British agreed to the demands in principle, the structure of the council and the conditions and controls that the British government dictated prompted both the Zionists and Palestinians to reject the plan (Haim 1978). Subsequent plans and negotiation attempts also failed. These failures to bring compromise and consensus, and ever-increasing Jewish immigration, set the stage for the 1936-39 Arab Revolt.


In April of 1936, the Palestinians launched a country wide revolt against the Mandate regarding the Jews and against British rule over Palestine. The revolt had two phases. The first phase lasted a little less than a year and was a well-organized, regional effort by Arab leaders to rid Palestine of both the British and the Jews (Gershoni, 1987, 368-370; Oren, 2003, 3). Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, supported the Arab Revolt and he praised the efforts of Palestinians as a “heroic struggle” where the Palestinians were “our brave Palestinian brothers who with a single heart are defending the holy places of Islam [against] the Jewish injustice (Gershoni, 1986, 371).

The first wave of the Arab revolt was defeated within a year by British colonial forces and many of the political leaders who led the revolt were exiled (Sufian, 2008, 38; Oren, 2003, 3). The first wave of the Arab revolt shows a coordinated effort by Arab elite and non-elite (non-state) leaders to counter the growing Jewish presence and influence in Palestine.

The second wave of the Arab revolt lasted from 1937 through 1939. This portion of the rebellion was led and carried out by the Arab peasantry (non-elite). When the first phase of the revolt was defeated, Britain sent the Peel Commission to Palestine to find out what led to the revolt. The Commission found that “[t]he underlying causes of the disturbances of 1936 were: (1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence; (2) their hatred and fear of the establishment of the Jewish National Home” (Peel et. al. 1937). They also found that the conflict was driven by two rival groups, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency. In their report, the Commission concluded that,

[t]he evidence submitted by the Arab and Jewish leaders respectively was directly conflicting and gave no hope of compromise. . . The grievances and claims of the Arabs and Jews as regards the Courts cannot be reconciled and reflect the racial antagonism pervading the whole Administration. . . As regards Jewish suspicions as to the conduct of criminal prosecutions, the Commission points to the difficulties of the Legal Department in a land where perjury is common and evidence in many cases, particularly in times of crisis, [is] unobtainable, and [we] conclude that the animosity between the two races, particularly in times of crisis, has shown its influence to the detriment of the work of a British Senior Government Department (Peel et. al. 1937).

Recognizing the irreconcilable interests (territory) and growing animosities (emotion) between the Jewish and Palestinian peoples, the Commission recommended a partition plan that would grant the Jews a home land, but retain the vast majority of the territory for the purpose of establishing a Palestinian home state as well (see map 5.1).



Map 5.1: Map of Palestinian Partition Plan as Presented by the Peel Commission in July, 1937^{xiv}

The Palestinians summarily rejected the granting of any territory for the establishment of a Jewish home state. The Jews, unwilling to give up any part of the land of Palestine also rejected the recommendation (Smith, 2010, 138). In a personal letter, David Ben-Gurion wrote regarding the Peel Commission’s proposal: “No Zionist can forgo the smallest portion of the Land of Israel. . .” (Ben-Gurion 1937). As fighting increased between the Jews and Palestinians, the Peel Commission’s partition proposal was rejected as being “impracticable” (Woodhead 1938)^{xv}.

The second phase of the revolt was marked by increased violence and terrorist attacks between Jews and Palestinian Arabs (Norris, 2008, 25). During this time, violent acts such as sniping, arson, sabotage, and kidnapping were reported as “routine

incidents”^{xvi}. Furthermore, when studying local depictions of the 1936-39 revolt, Sandy Sufian found that newsprint representations of actors showed negative body distortions (inferring corruption, malice, and dishonesty), the dehumanization of the “enemy”, and the portrayal of enemies in animal form. Similarly, self-depictions confirmed moral and political superiority. Sufian (2008) also found that in- and out-group stereotypes intensified as the revolt developed over time. When the revolt finally ended in 1939, approximately 5000 Arabs and 300 Jews had been killed (Hughes, 2009, 348-49; Levenberg, 1993, 74).

The Arab Revolt brought about changes in both the Jewish and Palestinian communities. The Yishuv (Jewish residents in Palestine) had grown stronger in numbers and determination, Palestinian leadership was now lacking due to banishment, and the revolt had a negative impact on the Palestinian economy (which was fragile even before the Revolt began) (Oren, 2004, 3). However, the overall outcome of the Arab Revolt cannot be categorically called a “victory” for the Jewish settlers. Though the British military was able to subdue both waves of the Arab rebellion, with the prospect of a second pan-European war looming before them, the British government was motivated to placate the Arab community. Colonial Britain attempted to address Palestinian demands by effectively nullifying the Balfour Declaration and by issuing the White Paper of 1939. The White Paper called for an independent Palestinian state, the restriction of Jewish immigration, and the protection of Palestinian land rights (Sufian, 2008, 38). Britain also assisted in the formation of the Arab League during World War II (Oren 2004).

Just prior to the end of World War II, the Arab League formed as a pact between Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq to “promote Arab security and interests” (Arab League 1944; Arab League 1945). In the charter, the Alexandria Protocol, the League clearly stated that though it denounced the “treatment of Jews by dictatorial European states,” it firmly supported the Palestinian Arabs’ right to preserve their homeland, achieve independence, and called for the cessation of Jewish immigration. They also asserted that:

The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of various religions and denominations” (Arab League, 1947, 5.A).

Affirming their collective opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, the Arab League also clearly stated that if a Jewish state were to be instituted, it would be considered an injustice towards Palestinian Arabs. Furthermore, in a supplementary document, the Pact of the League of Arab States, issued on March 22, 1945, the Arab League stopped just short of declaring Palestine a sovereign Arab state.

At the end of the last Great War, Palestine, together with the other Arab States, was separated from the Ottoman Empire. She became independent, not belonging to any other State.

The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her fate should be decided by the parties concerned in Palestine.

Even though Palestine was not able to control her own destiny, it was on the basis of the recognition of her independence that the Covenant of the League of Nations determined a system of government for her.

Her existence and her independence among the nations can, therefore, no more be questioned *de jure* than the independence of any other Arab States.

Even though the outward signs of this independence have remained veiled as a result of force majeure, it is not fitting that this should be an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the League.

Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine's special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual independence (Arab League 1945).

In this statement, the Arab desire for Palestine to have political and territorial sovereignty is evident. As the Arab League grants Palestine a delegate to their organization, they attempt to give Palestine the same rights and privileges in the organization as other Arab states. In doing so, they directly assert that the land of Palestine should be regarded as an independent and sovereign Arab/Palestinian state.

Thus, it is evident that even prior to World War II, elements of PSC began to emerge. From the beginning of the twentieth century elite and non-elite Arab actors took part in organizing and carrying out measures to prevent further Jewish influx into "their land". Also present by the end of World War II was evidence of territorial-based conflict and the emergence of emotional motivations, perceptual attributions, and group bias.

POST WORLD WAR II – WHO GETS WHAT, WHERE, WHEN AND HOW

In light of the horrors of the Holocaust, the idea of granting the Jews a home state became more appealing to Western powers after World War II. "As the dimensions of the horror became known, shock and guilt shaped attitudes toward 'the Palestine issue'" (Dowty, 2008, 82). Post war economic and political realities, however, played a large role in the development of the establishment of the Israeli state, and subsequently the Palestinian/Israeli PSC. Britain was decimated economically by World War II. Because of this, it no longer possessed the capacity or will to exert colonial control over Palestine and India. (Dowty, 2008, 82-83). Furthermore, when initial efforts to resolve the Palestinian "problem" after World War II failed, Britain's willingness to handle the issue

unilaterally waned as well. Arabs refused to acknowledge a Jewish state that had any jurisdiction over Arabs, Jews were pushing even more aggressively for a home state in Palestine in light of the Holocaust, and American President, Harry Truman, “hounded” them to side with the Zionists (Oren, 2002, 4-5). Thus, in line with withdrawing from its leadership role in the international community, Britain passed the responsibility for the “Palestinian issue” to the United Nations (UN) in early 1947.

When Britain handed control of the Palestinian “problem” over to the UN, A committee of eleven nations was tasked to study the conflict and suggest a solution. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), considered three options: (1) a one-state plan where Jews and Palestinians would share the state and governance, (2) a two-state plan where the land of Palestine would be divided between the Jewish and Palestinian people, and (3) a one-state plan with consociational provisions granting Jews limited, local self-governance (Dowty, 2008, 83). Amidst dissent, the UNSCOP committee presented the two-state Partition Plan to the General Assembly.

Before the decisive UN vote, Jewish Agency representatives, David Horowitz and Abba Eban, attempted to negotiate with the Arab League’s Secretary, Azzam Pasha, independently to reach a mutual solution on September 16, 1947. Pasha’s response was:

The Arab world is not in a compromising mood. It’s likely, Mr. Horowitz, that your plan is rational and logical, but the fate of nations is not decided by rational logic. Nations never concede; they fight. You won’t get anything by peaceful means or compromise. You can, perhaps, get something, but only by the force of your arms. We shall try to defeat you. I am not sure we’ll succeed, but we’ll try. We were able to drive out the Crusaders, but on the other hand we lost Spain and Persia. It may be that we shall lose Palestine. But it’s too late to talk of peaceful solutions (Bard, 3, 2004).

Similarly, Jamal Husseini, spokesman for the Arab Higher Committee, to the UN said that if the UN passed the Partition vote that the Palestinians would “drench the soil

of our beloved country with the last drop of our blood” (Hurewitz, 1976, 308). Arab leaders insisted upon a single, unitary Arab state from the UN. The Partition Plan divided Palestine West of the Jordan into Arab and Jewish territories (see Map 5.2).



Map 5.2: United Nations' Partition Plan for Palestine in 1947^{xvii}

The Partition Plan (GA Resolution 181) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 27, 1947 by a vote of 33 to 13, with 10 abstentions (including Britain) (United Nations 1947).

Upon hearing that the Partition Plan had passed, the Jewish people immediately reasserted their right to statehood.

Our right to independence has now been confirmed in principle, [it] must be translated into fact by the building of a progressive state whose high standard of democracy and culture will compensate for the smallness of its size and for the complicating conditions besetting its inception -Leumi, Vaad^{xviii}.

As wide-spread celebration by Jews began, the reaction by Arab leadership was also immediate. The Arab League issued the following statement:

. . .The Arab delegations to the United Nations solemnly state their conviction that the vote in regard to the partition of Palestine has been given under great pressure and duress, and that this makes it double invalid. Such a vote does not and could not give real expression either to the sincere views of the delegations or to world opinion at large.

We sincerely believe that the hearts of the world are with us, we believe as firmly that the conscience of the world will not tolerate the dire consequences which will inevitably follow if nothing is done to remedy the unequal injustice that has been meted to the Arabs.

It is worthy of attention that those who did not support this fantastic resolution include all the nations of the East who are directly concerned in this matter and whose number amount to over one thousand million people.

We trust that through the steadfastness of our people and through our belief in God and the justice of our cause our right will prevail^{xxix}.

The reaction to the passage of the Partition plan amongst the Palestinian masses was also immediate and violent. Riots and strikes against Jews^{xx, xxi}, resulted in numerous Jewish deaths across Palestine from terrorist attacks^{xxii} which occurred within hours of the plan's passage. Demonstrators in Iraq called for a "Jihad for Palestine" as Emir Abdul Ilah addressed a throng of demonstrators saying, "I will lead volunteers and fight with my blood in Palestine"^{xxiii}.

This level of tension and violence remained elevated for the remainder of 1947. From the date of the partition vote in the UN until February 1, 1948, there were 2,748 Jewish and Palestinian deaths and injuries (Bard 2004). On December 31, 1947, Emile Ghory, a member of the Arab Higher Committee, stated that "[o]nly a change in policy can stop" the violence between the Jews and Palestinians^{xxiv}. The same article reported 43 Jewish deaths within a 24-hour period. Also, when asked about the robberies of several Jewish supply trains, Ghory replied, "We do not consider them robberies. They are stopping supplies from reaching the enemy, just as the Allies kept them from the Germans during the war." In this statement, Ghory legitimizes the actions of the in-group

to the international community by equating the robberies to “virtuous” actions taken by the Allies in World War II.

While it would be convenient to lay the entire responsibility for the bloodshed at the feet of Arab Palestinians, it would be disingenuous to ignore Jewish-led violence. On January 2, 1948, the *New York Times*, reported that Jewish organizations, such as Haganah, had carried out attacks leading to the death of four Palestinians^{xxv}. Similarly, on April 9, 1948, the Dier Yassin massacre was orchestrated and led by the Jewish “paramilitary” organizations Irgun and Lehi. They were responsible for the deaths of over one hundred villagers- including women and children (Oren, 2003, 4; Gebler, 2006, 311).

Though acts of barbarism can legitimately be brought against the Jews and Arabs alike, the Arabs willingly accepted responsibility for the violence that occurred in the season immediately preceding the establishment of the Israeli state. On April 16, 1948, Jam Husseini, spokesman for the Arab Higher Committee, told the UN Security Council that,

[t]he representative for the Jewish Agency told us yesterday that they were not the attackers, that the Arabs had begun the fighting. We did not deny this. We told the whole world that we were going to fight (Bard 2004).

Even prior to the establishment of a state for the Jewish people, elements of a PSC were present. Violent conflict between the actors had been present for more than 20 years, there were cycles of heightened tension and violence, there were *far* more than the proposed theoretical minimum deaths across the first half of the twentieth century, statements containing territorial motivation for conflict were present, and statements indicating the presence of psychological motivation were present as well. Because of the

presence of these elements, it is not a stretch to question whether a PSC existed even before the state of Israel received international recognition.

1948: THE STATE OF ISRAEL/OCCUPIED PALESTINE

When Jewish leaders declared Israel a sovereign, independent state on May 14, 1948, the conflict took on a new component, state-based militarized conflict. Immediately after declaring its independence; Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq invaded Israel (Rowley and Taylor, 2006, 79). The Israeli War of Independence/The Catastrophe claimed approximately 8000 military casualties (Singer 1972, Eckhardt 1987). Violence occurred between non-state actors after the official end of the 1948 war, however. After the official end of the 1948 war, there were over 100 violent incidents that resulted in approximately 1450 deaths. Non-state organizations were referenced 22 times as having participated in violence or as being associated with violence or the PSC. Overall, there were 61 quotes identified from the 1948 articles. These groups include: the Stern Group and Irgun Zvai Leumi (prior to their incorporation into the Israel Army/disbandment)^{xxvi}, Fighters for the Freedom of Israel^{xxvii}, the Arab Legion^{xxviii}, Fawzi el Kawukji^{xxix}, and individual immigrants^{xxx}. Individual immigrants were labeled as a hostile group by Arab leaders.

There were twenty-seven quotes that clearly stated why violent acts were being committed in 1948. Territorially-based conflict statements were referenced 19 times and was cited more than the other motives combined³⁸. Security motivated-statements had seven references and resource-based quotes had six.

³⁸ The number of quotes from each year and the actual components measured from the quotes may not be equal. This is because numerous articles utilized more than quote from more than one actors. Also, quotes can have more than one components present at the same time.

As soon as we rid ourselves of the enemy in our midst, we shall work for the liberation of Palestine and hand it back to its inhabitants –General Naguib^{xxxix}.

The truce has not come into effect today in Palestine. This day, as far as operations were concerned, was just the same as yesterday. And let me say this, that no Jewish force broke the truce- Alexis Ladas, Haganah Chief^{xxxix}.

Nevertheless we reserve the right to defend ourselves, and if attacked shall reply. We demand that the Arabs withdraw from positions they occupied in No Man's Land during the cease-fire period –Dov Joseph, Israeli military Governor^{xxxix}.

These quotes by Arab and Israeli actors reflect territorial and security motivations of the actors. General Naguib refers to liberating Palestine while Dov Joseph demands that the Arabs withdraw from land that they occupy. Alexis Ladas makes a reference to security-motivated violence when he states that if the Arabs violate the truce, the Israelis will respond. Similarly, Dov Joseph asserts the Israeli right to self-defense (physical security) if provoked by the Arabs.

There were 49 statements that contained psychological motivation in the Israeli/Arab PSC. There is a virtual three-way tie between statements that reveal emotion, perception and group-identification, with 25-27 statements in each radial category. Self-identification statements were made only three times.

. . . although they come to Palestine as immigrants, are in reality nothing but trained fighters –Arab civilian^{xxxix}.

The enemy turns his eyes toward Jerusalem, the eternal seat of our eternal people. It will be a savage and merciless battle without retreat. Our fate will be victory or annihilation. We shall fight to the last man among us- David Shealtiel, Israeli military Commander^{xxxix}.

You are not wanted here! –Israeli civilian^{xxxix}.

By calling each other “enemies” Commander Shealtiel and the Arab soldier are assigning a de-humanizing and negative connotation to the out-group. Also, both men use we/they language revealing group-identification. Perceptual components are present as well. The Arab civilian believes that Zionists have trained and sent soldiers into Palestine as covertly as immigrants. This person also infers malicious intent on the part of the UN Security Council, believing that the cease-fire is intended to give Israelis time to reinforce their positions. The Israeli civilian reveals emotion when he shouts, “You are not wanted here”! Also, the use of the word “shall” by General Naguib and Dov Joseph (in the conflict quotes) reveal the emotion of resolve.

The 1949 armistice marked the beginning of an “inter-war” period, bringing militarized conflict to a temporary end. Contentious political issues remained unresolved, however. Primary concerns to the Arabs were that Israel no longer retained 56% of the Mandate’s land allocation. It now possessed 78% (Dowty, 2008, 87-92). By the end of the period and events that immediately surrounded the 1948 Israeli War of Independence; Palestinian refugees had poured into neighboring Arab states, Israel had achieved international recognition, Jewish immigration continued, and the Arab community saw a ceasefire agreement as a detriment to their interests and a boon to the Israelis’. Though the “official” war had ended, physical violence continued through non-state actors and verbally through elites. Diplomatic tensions remained high and skirmishes occurred between Israel and neighboring states. Violence continued to exist, not only through 1948, but also into 1953 as well.

1953

In 1953, every month (except September) had violent conflicts that resulted in death. In all, there were 23 violent incidents that resulted in over 180 Palestinian and Israeli deaths. Of the quotes that communicated reasons why acts of violence were committed, territorial motivations were the most frequently listed, followed by physical security, and then resources. There were no non-state organizations referenced in the articles analyzed in 1953. Similarly, all the quotes were from elite actors³⁹.

It is to be expected that the foreign ministers will address their attention to the only cause of the intolerable state of affairs along the Israel-Jordan border, which is marked nightly by incursions from Jordan into Israel of armed bands perpetrating brutal murders, attacking life and attacking traffic and completely undermining the security of life and property in the area and which is further exemplified by the unwillingness or inability of the Jordan authorities to stem this tide of lawlessness in fulfillment of their clear obligations under the Armistice Agreement –unnamed Israeli Foreign Ministry Spokesman^{xxxvii}.

. . .centers of the murderous gangs. . . All the responsibility rests on the Jordan Government, which for years has tolerated and thereby encouraged acts of murder and pillage –David Ben-Gurion^{xxxviii}.

While these statements reveal emotion, perception, and group-identification on the part of the Israelis, statements presenting the Arab perspective on Israeli goals and behaviors were equally accusatory:

The Jordan armed forces have been instructed to use force as from today in repulsing any further acts of aggression of the Jews along the 700-kilometer-long armistice line between the two countries –Jordanian Defense Minister, Aswar Nusaibeh^{xxxix}.

As soon as we rid ourselves of the enemy in our midst, we shall work for the liberation of Palestine and hand it back to its inhabitants- General Muhammad Naguib of the Egyptian Army^{xl}.

Motivations for political or social power and revenge were not mentioned in the quotes that were gathered in 1953.

³⁹ I noted that the referencing of elite more than non-elite actors was a common occurrence in the earlier years of this conflict.

There were 13 statements made that revealed psychological motivation. Of these statements, emotional and perceptual sentiments were used equally (six times) and group-identification was mentioned one time. Self-identification was not mentioned at all.

. . .centers of the murderous gangs. . . All the responsibility rests on the Jordan Government, which for years has tolerated and thereby encouraged acts of murder and pillage against the inhabitants of Israel. . .The Government rejects with all vigor the absurd and fantastic allegation that 600 men of the Israeli defense forces took part in the action against Kibya village. . We cannot conceive that the United Nations would seek consciously to apply different standards in their judgment of acts of violence which have been going on for the last five years along the borders of Israel. . . . They denied them homes in their countries and compelled the Arab refugees to subsist on the charity of the United Nations and kept them deliberately in the vicinity of Israel's frontiers for these pernicious purposes – David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel^{xli}.

Monstrous murder –Herut Newspaper in reaction to the murder of a blind Israeli^{xlii}.

. . . criminal immigrants from European ghettos – John Glubb, Chief of Staff of the Arab Legion^{xliii}.

Seven of the statements that had psychological content were from elite actors.

1958

The same pattern of conflict continued through the 1958 time windows. In 1958, there were 12 violent events (one every month except January) resulting in approximately 71 deaths. Of the 110 articles examined, twelve articles contained direct quotes from the actors. All of the quotes were from elite actors. There were four statements that revealed competition-based motives for the conflict. Two statements were about territory and two, like the statement below, focused on political power.

The state arose not through the decision of the UN but through the determined will of the Jewish people and the heroism of the nation's precious sons and daughters who defended Israel's independence- David Ben- Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel^{xliv}.

Specific non-state organizations that were associated with the conflict were referenced three times. The Arab Federation was specifically mentioned as an organization that either supported or sponsored violent acts. Similarly, “unorganized” groups of Arab farmers and Shiite Muslims were also named as having participated in violence resulting in death.

Fourteen statements revealed psychological content. All but one of the quotes came from elite actors. Of these, five contained emotional components, five had perceptual statements, and four contained group- identification sentiments.

Arab nationalism will emerge triumphant and the occupation forces will quit Jordan and Lebanon. We shall certainly not waiver in offering any sacrifice for the sake of liberating these two countries- Gamal Nasser, President of Egypt^{xlv}.

. . . act of war. . .grave repercussions . . before the chain of violence is renewed and extended . . . All that is required from the Syrian forces is that they leave us alone, and stop using their topographic advantage to interfere with life and work in the valley below –Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations^{xlvi}.

President Nasser reveals the emotion of determination by using the words “shall” and “certainly”. Ambassador Eban shows perception when he says that he believes that the Arabs have a tactical advantage and are purposely using it to hinder Israeli interests. Both actors use we/they language that reveal group-identification.

1963

The *New York Times* (NYT) recorded only 32 articles on the Arab/Israeli conflict in 1963. In these articles, ten acts of political violence were recorded- all of them were attributed to Arab actors. There were 25 deaths recorded, with 20 of them being Palestinian. There were no non-state organizations referenced. Also, there were only

three quotes that revealed competition-based conflict and there were eight statements that showed psychological motivation. The statements that showed competition-based conflict reflected territorial-based and security related sentiments. In statements that contained psychological content, perception was the motivation that was present most often (6) followed equally by emotion and group-identification (5). There was one self-identify-motivated statement. Of the articles read from 1963, only elite actors were quoted and no non-state actor groups were identified. Unfortunately, most of the quotes were surrounding the same set of events. Because of this, 1963 is reported as a development of this particular exchange between Israel, Syria, and Lebanon. Though this is a departure of the way that I report time windows in this case, it does exemplify the sentiments of both sides of this PSC.

After an increase in armed clashes in the demilitarized zone that separated Israel and Syria both sides saw the other as the aggressor. Arab agents were infiltrating into farming communities along the Lebanese and Syrian borders and committing acts of terrorism. When Israeli troops entered the demilitarized zone to stop the infiltrations after an alleged ambush left two Israeli farmers dead (Syria claimed that this attack was an Israeli “fabrication”), Syria saw this as an act of Israeli aggression: “[o]ur armed forces are standing by to crush any new Israeli aggression- Major General Abdullah Ziadiah, Syrian Defense Minister^{xlvii}. Similarly, Israel accused Syria (which reciprocated in kind) of aggression before the United Nations on August 20, 1963. After a series of violent exchanges, the Israeli Cabinet labeled the attacks as “a grave threat to peace” and Israeli Foreign Minister, Haim Yehiel made the following statement regarding Israeli security: “We feel there is a real danger to peace if the Syrian actions do not stop”^{xlviii}. In his

testimony before the U.N. Security Council, Michael S. Comay stated that the two farmers “were butchered for the express purpose of fomenting tension. . .” and asserted that “[w]e are not prepared to be the whipping boy for the Arab world, and to have its tensions and turmoil seek facile outlets across our borders”^{xlix}. Beyond the who did what, who started what, the when’s, how’s, and where’s of what actually happened, this exchange touches on the nature of PSC. It demonstrates how territorial and security concerns can become fully entangled (and can even become lost) in endless circles of finger-pointing, tit-for-tat behaviors, perceptual conclusions, and emotional escalations. Within these exchanges both actors see threats to their security. However, these concerns are overshadowed by emotive and perceptual statements (“crush”, “whipping boy”, “grave threat”, “aggression,” “were butchered for the express purpose. . .”). In this exchange, psychological and “other” issues (“. . . to have its tensions and turmoil seek facile outlets across our borders”) compete with territorial and security conflict. Because of this, it can serve as an example of Azar’s point that as a conflict endures over time, the originating issues of contention can become lost or change: “It is not the abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development . . . The immediate criterion of identification may be several stages removed from the original issue” (Azar et. al., 1978, 51).

Overall, reporting on the Arab/Israeli conflict is limited in 1963. Even so, utility in understanding the nature of PSC can be realized by examining the information that is provided. At this point, the conflict had been going on for more than 20 years, 25 deaths were recorded from the conflict, Palestinians (non-state actors) were attributed with having initiated 10 violent incidents, the “row” between Israel and Syria over the terrorist incidents and the Israeli incursion into the demilitarized zone are an example of the

cycles of violence in PSC, there were conflict statements present in the quotes reported, and the statements also reveal the presence of psychological components. Though data is limited in this particular year, there is evidence that all of the components that are being measured for theoretical necessity are present at this time point of the conflict.

SIX-DAY WAR

The period of time between the 1963 and 1968 windows marked an escalation in non-state-initiated violence between the Israelis and Arabs and contained the Six-Day War. Palestinians grew weary of waiting for reticent state actors (elites) to come to their aid. . .

We cannot use force today because our circumstances will not allow us; be patient with us, the battle of Palestine can continue and the battle of the Jordan is part of the battle of Palestine. For I would lead you to disaster if I were to proclaim that I would fight at a time when I was unable to do so. I would not lead my country to disaster and would not gamble with its destiny – Gamal Nasser, President of Egypt, 1964 (Oren, 2003, 19).

. . . and began to seek other “solutions”. As Fawaz Turki wrote in his “Journal of Palestinian Exile”:

My generation of Palestinians, growing up alienated, excluded, and forgotten, rejected this legacy (of waiting for others to act); yet when we looked around us we could see either the desert to shed our tears in or the whole world to hit back at. Having nothing and with nothing to lose, we proceeded to do the latter (Turki, 1972, 16).

As the Palestinian/Arab masses began to increase their involvement, attacks against Israelis increased. Al-Fatah (Fatah) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) formally organized and carried out cross-border raids/attacks, from Jordan and Egypt (Beaudoin 2006). In 1966, “Israel recorded –ninety-three border incidents- mines,

shooting, sabotage- while the Syrians boasted seventy-five guerrilla attacks in a single month [February]” (Oren, 2003, 27).

Meanwhile, Egyptian President Nasser (1956-1970), was attempting to unite the in-fighting Arab states (Pan-Arabism) calling for them to put aside their differences to unite against Israel under the United Arab Republic. On January 14, 1964, Nasser came close to achieving his goal with the creation of the United Arab Command (UAC) at a conference in Cairo among Arab leaders. The UAC’s directive was to protect Arab states and to prepare for an offensive campaign (Oren, 2003, 20). Also approved at this conference, was the diverting of the Jordan River at its source so to reduce Israel’s water supply. This was a calculated move based on the assumption that “Israel would not watch passively while their country dried up” (Oren, 2003, 20) and would be the first to strike in an attempt to preserve their water supply.

In the months leading up to the Six-Day War, tensions between Israeli and Arab actors increased. In April of 1967, there were fourteen violent “incidents” perpetrated against Israeli citizens (Eshkol 1967). These attacks prompted Israeli Prime Minister, Levi Eshkol to state in a speech that, “Israel will continue to take action to prevent any and all attempts to perpetrate sabotage within her territory. There will be no immunity for any state which aids or abets such acts” (Eshkol 1967). Similarly, on May 19, 1967, in the face of the withdrawal of peace-keeping troops and the prospect of a blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, Eshkol made the following statements:

Israel will not initiate hostilities. . . until or unless (Egyptian forces) close the Straits of Tiran to free navigation by Israel (Eshkol 1967).
Israel would stop at nothing to cancel the blockade. It is essential that President Nasser should not have any illusions (Eshkol 1967).

Similarly, Israel's position that it acted defensively was summarized in a televised broadcast on June 14, 1967:

Wars are not always begun by shots. They are often begun by action and the action which really created the state of war in an acute sense was the imposition of the blockade. To try to murder somebody by strangulation is just as much attempted murder as if you tried to murder him by a shot, and therefore the act of strangulation was the first violent, physical act which had its part in the sequence. But also on that Monday morning we acted against the movement of forces. The Egyptian air force had been making incursions into Israel before, whether for reconnaissance or for other reasons, but there had been a pattern of encroachment. One never knows when aircraft come towards you what their intention is- Abba Eban, Foreign Minister of Israel, June 14, 1967¹.

These quotes by Israeli leaders are an excellent example of how perception can play a role in sustaining PSC. Eshkol's statements communicate a heightened perception of threat to Israeli security and Eban's statements show how Israel reacted to the perceived threat. While it is obvious throughout *this* case, that Israel's perceptions of threat were not unfounded, it is the perception of threat, not whether there actually is a threat that can be the motivation for violence. To the actor, their perception is always correct. Thus, it is the perception of threat, more than the fact that there really is one, that can be a motivating factor in the participation of violence and the *continued* perception of threat can be a contributing component of PSC.

Similarly, in the month leading up to the Six-Day War, the following statements from multiple Arab state/"elite" and non-state/"masses" actors clearly reflects the Palestinian/Arab sentiments towards Israel:

The existence of Israel has continued too long. We welcome the Israeli aggression. We welcome the battle we have long awaited. The peak hour has come. The battle has come in which we shall destroy Israel - Cairo Radio, May 16, 1967^{li}.
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse any aggression, but to initiate the act ourselves, and to explode the Zionist presence in the

Arab homeland of Palestine. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united. I believe that the time has come to begin a battle of annihilation.”- Hafez Assad, Defense Minister of Syria, May 20, 1967^{lii}. All of the Arab armies now surround Israel. The UAR, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and Kuwait. . . .There is no difference between one Arab people and another, no difference between one Arab army and another – Hussayn bin Talāl - King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, May 30, 1967^{liii}.

The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear - to wipe Israel off the map – Abdul Rahman Aref, President of Iraq, May 31, 1967^{liv}.

Taking over Sharm el Sheikh meant confrontation with Israel (and) also meant that we were ready to enter a general war with Israel. The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel - Gamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt, May 26, 1967^{lv}.

Those who survive will remain in Palestine. I estimate that none of them will survive- Ahmed Shukairy, Chairman of the PLO in Jordan, June 1, 1967^{40, lvi}.

These statements no longer speak only of liberating the Palestinian homeland from Jewish settlers or occupation. The statements also include the political existence of Israel (a subtle but calculable difference from the territorial dispute) and the complete “annihilation” of the Jewish people in Israel/Palestine as motives for violence.

The Six-Day War began on June 5, 1967 with a pre-emptive Israeli strike against Egypt. By the end of the war, Israel had gained control of the Golan Heights in northern Israel from the Syrians, the Gaza Strip in southwestern Israel along the Mediterranean from the Egyptians, the West Bank including East Jerusalem from the Jordanians (Oren, 2003, 111-112), and had between 675 and 775 Israeli casualties^{lvii, lviii}. Calculations of Arab casualties range from over 9000 to approximately 25,000 (El Gamsay, 1993, 69; FindTheData.org 2012; Gerner, 1994, 113; Herzog, 1982, 183).

⁴⁰ This quote is Shukairy’s response to a question asked in a news interview about what will happen to the Israelis if there is a war.

The elite Arab response to their loss of Six-Day war was to accuse Israel of “deliberate genocide” by allowing “tens of thousands” of Egyptians soldiers to die in the Sinai Desert without food, water, or medical treatment at the U.N. Egyptian diplomat, Dr. Hussein Khallaf, demand the return of lands taken/won by the Israelis during the war^{lix}. “What we are interested in now is the withdrawal of the forces of the Israeli aggressor from our territory,” said Awad el-Kony of the Egyptian delegation to the U.N.^{lx}. Also, the reaction of non-state-level Arabs to the loss of the War is reflected in the statement of an unidentified “Lebanese moderate” who said, “[this] means that there will be no real peace now. Maybe we will have to have a war every 10 years”^{lxi}.

1968

The violence between the Israelis and Arabs continued throughout 1968 with 76 separate violent incidents. Of these, two-thirds were reported as initiated by Arab actors and resulted in approximately 1014 deaths (726 of which were Palestinians). Of the 318 articles analyzed in 1968, 76 articles contained quotes. Twenty-five conflict statements were noted, with the majority coming from elite Israeli actors. Territorial motives were mentioned 21 times, followed by security (8), then political power (3), resources and social power were referenced one time, and revenge as a motive for violent behavior was mentioned one time. Also, elite actors were quoted twice as often as non-elite actors. The following quotes reflect the sentiments of the actors concerning conflict at this time:

As I bear responsibility for the leadership of my country and people, I shall not agree to permit anyone to provide the enemy of my homeland with more excuses to inflict more harm than the enemy has already done. . .to liberate the occupied areas, including Jerusalem, which is holy to Arabs and Moslems. . .either we do this or become martyrs in the process – Hussayn bin Talāl, King of Jordan^{lxii}.

It's our last wall, our last ditch. The Arab soldiers, the Arab fellahin, they don't understand why they are sent to Sinai or to Yemen to fight—whereas, we know this is our last stay. It's either/or—either be driven into the sea or be massacred or killed – or fight for your mere existence. . . We didn't ask for this war, God knows, god is my witness, we didn't ask for this war. . . We don't want to continue to live in a warlike situation. . . We are a people dispelled, tortured, massacred during centuries let's try once again. Let's try once to come back- to return to the Promised Land to ours. . . to where we were born as a nation. . . Levi Eshkol, Prime Minister of Israel^{lxiii}.

These statements contain psychological components as well conflict statements. In both statements, King Hussayn and Prime Minister Eshkol demonstrate group-identification (“our homeland,” “We are a people dispelled” . . .). Hussayn refers to Israelis as the “enemy” (emotion) and Eshkol makes perceptual statements (It's either/or—either be driven into the sea or be massacred or killed – or fight for your mere existence. . .)⁴¹. It is interesting to note, however, that while Hussayn makes reference to himself and his role as king, it is not in direct reference how he personally is connected to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. Therefore, it is not an example of an actor identifying self with the conflict. Other quotes from non-state actors in 1968 that contain conflict statements and reflect the presence of psychological motives:

Over there the Arab commando's blood has been mixed with the earth, they are the men who are trying to liberate their homeland; they must fight on. . . Israelis strike us now because they want to expand; they want to displace Arabs on this land. . . It is not their land, we want vengeance - Ahmed Nazzal, Barley Farmer^{lxiv}.

⁴¹ As noted in the literature review, there can be overlap in psychological motivation and words could be coded different ways. For example, the use of the word, “enemy” that this footnote references could be coded as an emotive or perceptual statement *depending on the context in which it is used in the sentence*. In this instance, because the actor (King Hussayn) uses the word, “enemy” in a negative or pejorative manner and uses other negative language in the quote *towards* the outgroup, it is a rejection of the legitimacy of the outgroup. Thus, it is an emotive statement. If, however, he had used the same word in an externally directed context (i.e. “the Israelis see us as the enemy”), it would have been coded as a perceptual statement. To avoid “double dipping” (coding the same word twice or for multiple motives) and inconsistent coding for this and other components analyzed in this study, clear coding rules have been developed and are found in the appendix for reference.

The homeland of the Palestinian is the entire world- In Jerusalem, in Tel Aviv. . . For as long as the Palestinian is without a homeland, the entire is his. His home is where the enemy is- Al Nahar Newspaper ^{lxv}.

Overall, group-identification had the most incidents (45) followed by emotion (38) and perception (29).

There was a noticeable increase in the mention of specific organizations that participated or sponsored violence in 1968. These included the Fadayeen, Fatah, the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Arab Nationalist Movement, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Arab Legion, and the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA). These organizations were mentioned 63 times in the articles assessed. This is more than the previous years combined.

1973 AND THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

Five hundred forty-seven articles were examined in 1973. There were approximately 18 violent incidents recorded throughout the year resulting in approximately 126 deaths⁴². There were 46 quotes in all that came from Israeli or Palestinian/Arab actors. These statements contained eight references to competition-based conflict. The statements were evenly split between elite and non-elite actors. Of the conflict statements, seven were over territorial issues.

. . . To accomplish the historical and sacred mission of liberating occupied Arab territory . . . the new aggression is part of the collusion between Israel and United States imperialism against the Arab people – Damascus Radio, Lebanon^{lxvi}.

What are we to do? Let a Libyan plane roam at will through our airspace? How could we guarantee that it wasn't a kamikaze plane loaded with explosives headed for an Israeli city? – Unidentified Israeli Army Officer^{lxvii}.

⁴² Deaths resulting from international terrorist events, or Arab/Israeli-led incidents that occurred in states other than the “original” states that participated in the 1948 war of Israeli independence are not included annual totals. Incidents from the Lebanese Civil War and deaths resulting from the Yom Kippur War, which occurred in 1973, are also not included.

Though these quotes contain perceptual elements, they also contain conflictual statements. The Arab actor referenced the liberation of occupied Arab territory and the Israel actor referenced security motives for action.

Also, as in 1968, there was a quote that revealed that revenge was a motive for violence. Revenge as a motive for violence did not escape the notice of a Lebanese newspaper editor when he wrote:

"Is, in fact, the recovery of Palestine still the goal, or has the revolution reached such a point of despair as to be without logic-namely, to carry out commando action for its own sake?" – Ghassan Tueni, editor and publisher of Al Nahar newspaper in Lebanon^{lxviii}.

Until 1968, revenge as a motive for violence had been inferred in the articles analyzed, but it had not been directly declared. However, revenge was specifically stated in both 1968 and 1973- first by an individual and then by a newspaper. Did the motivation of revenge escalate to the point where it finally reached the level of public consciousness by 1973? If this is so, did the question that Mr. Tueni asked his readers to consider indicate that there had been an acknowledgement by the actors that there had been a substantive change in the attitude of the actors? If this is indeed the case, this quote supports my position that the components of Azar's theory are not sufficient to explain the enduring nature of PSC. It can also support the theoretical positions that conflict can devolve into fights (Cosser & Rapoport) where logic is overcome by emotion (Marcus 2003; Pruitt & Kim 2004; Rapoport 1974) and that the motivations for violence can change or take on additional components over time (Azar 1980).

Non-state groups were mentioned 32 different times. Specific groups identified were the PLO, Fatah, Black September, the Arab League, PLFP, Fedayeen, the Druse⁴³, and the Lebanese Revolutionary Guard. There were also 44 quotes that contained psychological motivation. As in previous years; emotion (28), perception (18), and group-identification (25) were present at high levels and statements that had self-identification-based remarks were barely present at all (2). However, contrary to previous years, there were as many statements by non-elite actors as elite- especially Palestinian non-elites.

Arab threats and hatred of Israel drew inspiration directly from the Nazis-Israel Yeshayahu, Speaker of the Parliament^{lxix}.

They want to hunt us –wife of Kamal Adwan, executive committee member of al-Fatah in reaction to his assassination by Israeli commandos before her eyes^{lxx}.

. . . To accomplish the historical and sacred mission of liberating occupied Arab territory", "the new aggression is part of the collusion between Israel and United States imperialism against the Arab people – Damascus Radio, January 8, 1973^{lxxi}.

In the early 1970's Egypt, Syria, and Jordan had attempted to negotiate land back from Israel that was lost in the Six-Day War. They were unsuccessful (Gerner, 1994, 115).

Anwar Sadat, Nasser's successor was determined to regain their lost territory, however.

I used to tell Nasser that if we could recapture even 4 inches of Sinai territory. . . and establish ourselves there so firmly that no power on earth could dislodge us, then the whole situation would change- east, west, all over. First to go would be the humiliation we had endured since the 1967 defeat (Sadat, 1979, 244).

On October 6, 1973, on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous, coordinated, surprise attacks in the Sinai Peninsula and in the Golan

11 While the Druse were primarily actors in the Lebanese Civil War, one member was sentenced by an Israeli court for spying against Israel (NYT 5/4/73).

Heights. The attack caught the Israeli completely by surprise and they suffered early territorial losses. The determination that Arab elites showed to regain Palestine by Arab leaders in invading Israel was shared by non-elite Arabs as well:

We must never again let our forces be disengaged from the Israeli forces. A game of fire and cease-fire can no longer be played. . . No one should underestimate our determination to get our land back and to stay in the Sinai - Mohammed Hassaniein Keydal, Editor of Al Ahram Newspaper in Egypt^{lxxii}.

Every time the Fatah fights, they fight for me. We cannot help them. It is too difficult. But we want our freedom, and we are not free without an independent Palestine republic – Unidentified young, Arab, male high school student^{lxxiii}.

These quotes demonstrate the continued sense of self- and group-identification of the Arab community concerning Palestine. These quotes also show a sense of the perception of self-helplessness and that territorial issues remained a motivation for violence.

Israeli non-elite reaction to the Yom Kippur War was different, however. The Ha'aretz, Israel's leading independent daily newspaper, which had at one time advocated for more moderate to liberal foreign policies, changed its position in response to the attacks when they printed: “. . . cut not merely the fingers but the hand which was raised against us” (Ha'aretz, Israeli newspaper^{lxxiv}). Similarly, an unidentified Israeli soldier communicates that he is weary of the killing and worries for his son:

I don't care about the Suez Canal, about Ismailia, about Suez, about winning or losing. We have got to stop these mindless cycles of having a war with the Arabs every five or ten years, followed by a hate-filled cease-fire and then another war. We have got to find the key to peace. . . I simply cannot accept the idea that my son, who is 5 now, will have to go through this after me. . . We have got to learn to live with them. If we do, this war will have been worth it. If we don't, it will have been mass murder for no reason - Unnamed Israeli soldier^{lxxv}.

Though initially successful for the Arabs, by the end of the violence of the Yom Kippur War (October 25, 1973), the Israelis had regained the land they lost in the first days of the war and had secured land from both Egypt and Syria (Dowty, 2008, 119). Israel experienced over 2500 casualties and the Arab forces lost approximately 8000 lives (Garwich, 2006, 243; Liebman, 1993, 400; Tzabag, 2001, 205)⁴⁴.

1978

Analysis of 1978 included 416 articles. Of these articles, many focused on the Lebanese Druse/Christian civil war and on international terrorist events. In the articles that were germane to my research agenda, there were 23 violent incidents between the Israelis and Arabs that resulted in approximately 390 deaths. However, no incidents were reported in January, February, July, September, and October. Also, non-state organizations were mentioned 37 times in relation to the violence.

There were 58 quotes from actors directly related to the Israeli/Arab conflict. Ten contained conflict statements. Territorial motives remained the most frequently referenced reasons for committing acts of violence (5) followed by security and revenge respectively. Resources, political power, and social power were not mentioned as motives for committing an act of violence. Interestingly though, nine of the ten statements came from non-state actors. This is change from the elite-actor dominance in quotes in previous time windows (1973 had an equal amount of elite to non-elite actor quotes).

We don't have any interest or desire to stay in southern Lebanon. We are interested only in our security – an un-named Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman^{lxxvi}.

⁴⁴ These sources vary as to the exact amounts of casualties. Therefore, the numbers of deaths reported are the minimum numbers.

The escalation of our armed struggle against the Zionist enemy inside our occupied homeland – In a statement released by Fatah claiming responsibility for terrorist event in Israel that killed 20 people^{lxxvii}.

In the article, the Israeli actors stated that they entered into Lebanon in defense of Israeli (citizens') security. Fatah claimed responsibility for a terrorist attack because they were defending their homeland.

There were 44 quotes in 1978 that revealed psychological motivation. Group-identification was the most often psychological component used with 36, emotion had 23, perceptual comments were made 22 times, and self-identification was not used at all. Non-elite quotes that contained psychological motivation also out-numbered elites quotes for the first time:

"We have gone through all this before. I don't even want to turn on the radio. We all seem trapped in the same old problem – an "ordinary resident of Jerusalem" in reaction Menachem Begin's peace efforts^{lxxviii}. Give them to us! . . . Death to the Arabs! . . . Let's murder them! – Shouts by an Israeli mob in reaction to a bombing in Tel Aviv that killed one and injured 50^{lxxix}.

It is not so much this soldier as the Government of Israel going on trial. We will be judging Israeli aggression through Private Amram. There is no question of him being sentenced to death as a war criminal, because we have no firm evidence he killed or tortured anybody – an un-identified Arab "guerrilla leader"^{lxxx, 45}.

All those dead were not for nothing. About 100 people died for them and the whole world screamed. They made the Palestinians refugees- and the world and the United States don't respond. . . We left because we were afraid for the lives of the children. When they start screaming and crying, what do you do? –Ahmed Fawas, Arab farmer and refugee^{lxxxii}.

In/out-group identification (we/they language) is present in all four quotes. Also, the quotes show that out-group perception is present in both sides of the conflict. Israelis

⁴⁵ Private Abarham Amram, an Israeli reservist was released by the Lebanese government on March 14, 1979 in exchanged for the release of 76 Palestinians being held by the state of Israel (No Author. "Israel Exchanges 66 Palestinians for Soldier Captured in Lebanon." *New York Times*. 15 March, 1979, A14.

express sentiments of the perception of the futility at the thought of trying to make peace with the Arabs and the Palestinians perceive Private Amram as a war criminal without gathering evidence. Emotion is also present in these quotes. While implicit in the first, third, and fourth quote, it is blatant in the second Israeli quote. The bombing of a crowded Tel Aviv market on August 3, 1978 prompted spontaneous riots by Israelis. Through actions and words, the demonstrators openly displayed strong emotional sentiments. However, by not stopping at, “Death to Arabs” and including, “Let’s murder them” reveals the strength of Israeli feelings. “Murder”, as a word-choice in this context, communicates that the actors were aware that in killing the suspects, they would be bringing lives to an illegitimate end.

1983

There were 443 articles assessed from 1983. In these articles, there were 23 violent exchanges between Arab and Israeli actors; each month had at least one act of violence that resulted in over 190 deaths. Twelve acts of violence were attributed to the Palestinians and eleven to the Israelis. Non-state organizations were referenced 33 times throughout the year. There were some new organizations mentioned, though. These included: the Haj Amin, Mufti, Saiqa, Gush Emunim, Moslem Jihad, and the (Islamic) Amal.

There were numerous quotes in 1983 that revealed conflict motivations. There were nine conflict statements, and statements were equally distributed between Arabs Israelis, and elite and non-elite actors.

But we will certainly take steps whenever we feel that our security is threatened. We have a good army. We don't like to go to war. We don't like to pay the price of going to war. But whenever we feel we must take a military action in order to avoid a far worse situation developing in a short

period of time, we will act, no question about it. – Moshe Arens, Israeli Defense Minister^{lxxxii}.

[And what is her dream in life?] To get back our land . . . We can't accept the presence of the Israelis here. We must do everything we can to put fear in them, to make them get out, violent or not – Eleven-year-old Amal Abu al-Jamiyya in interview with David Shipler^{lxxxiii}.

Territory and security concerns dominated conflict statements with four quotes each. One quote, used below (under emotion) contained languages that revealed the motivation of revenge. Similarly, there were numerous quotes in this time window that showed the presence of multiple psychological motivations:

Emotion:

Ansar is Auschwitz! You are Nazis! You are Nazis! P.L.O.! Israel must go!. . . When Begin said about us- animals on two feet- doesn't it bring an echo of what Hitler said about the Jews?- Salah Taamri, PLO officer imprisoned in Ansar Prison in Israel^{lxxxiv}.

We are a people of joy and love, but there comes a time for vengeance, and that time is now- Rabbi Moshe Levinger, calling for retaliation over an Israeli woman's death^{lxxxv}.

Perception:

They have to be afraid of us. . . To tell the truth, we want them to leave. And if they stay, they have to accept that this is a Jewish country, not an Arab one. They will have to accept being ruled by us – An un-identified Jewish mother of four^{lxxxvi}.

When you say, 'Jew,' they immediately think of a violent policeman. If you ask a Jew, 'What do you think of an Arab?' they think terrorist or worse - Khalid Samaar, the principal of an elementary and junior high school in an Arab village in the Galilee.^{lxxxvii}

Identity:

Then I found out what racism was. How many times I heard 'dirty Arab' from her parents, friends. . . even my own girlfriend said to me once, 'This will teach me to get close to you barbarians' - Zohar Endrawos, a young Arab man who dated an Israeli^{lxxxviii}.

"He looked like a nice boy. . . I could see him clearly and I also saw, when I hit him, how he doubled up in the car. I shot with a big rifle and that's it. I saw him and I was sorry for him. I was sorry for myself, too, in that situation. . . I saw that he was wounded, but he continued to drive. He held on to his last seconds. He succeeded in doing what he wanted to do" – An un-identified Israeli soldier stationed in Lebanon^{lxxxix}.

"The Arabs take a life for a life, I say the Jews deserve credit for not killing any Arabs. . . – Miriam Levinger, Israeli civilian^{xc}.

Most of these quotes reveal overlapping psychological components of emotion, perception, and identity. Of particular interest though, is how individual actors attempted to reconcile their individual and group identities while living side by side with members of the out-group. The first man was willing to try to overcome inter- and intra-group bias and date a Jewish woman. However, he encountered open bias and antagonistic language from the very people that he was trying to establish relationships with. The second man—the Israeli soldier, while he performed his duty in trying to stop the boy from committing an act of terrorism, his word choices indicate that he encountered cognitive dissonance. The soldier thought that the “boy” seemed like a nice person, he was killing someone that he regarded as a child (boy, not man), it bothered him that he was the one that shot the boy, “I hit him” with his “big rifle”, and he regretted being in the position of killing him. He also indicated that he admired the boy because the boy continued to drive. Conversely, Miriam Levinger made no efforts to overcome the perceptions, justifications, generalizations, and sentiments of moral superiority that are hallmarks of contentious in-group/out-group conflict.

1988

In 1988, there were 473 articles analyzed. There were 56 violent incidents resulting in approximately 516 deaths. Thirty-one incidents were attributed to have been started by the Arabs, whereas the Israelis reportedly initiated 25. Non-state organizations were referenced 59 times. New organizations mentioned include the Party of God, Army of God, and Shabiba. Of the 101 quotes gathered from the year, 33 of them had conflict statements. Twenty of these statements were made by elite actors and the Israel to Palestinian conflict statement ratio was approximately even. Again, territorial and security issues were the two most frequently referenced reasons stated for conflict. Security and revenge were a distant third with four quotes each.

God is great. We will free you, Palestine – Demonstrators leaving the Al Aksa Mosque in Jerusalem^{xci}.

The PLO's policy is land for peace. . . – Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO^{xcii}.

We will not abandon the land because murderers want it –Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister of Israel^{xciii}.

Forget about the media. Forget about the world. We have to hurt the Israelis. That's what's really important . . . - An un-identified Palestinian leader^{xciv}.

The first three quotes show that competition for land remains a central contention for both actors in the dyad. The last quote shows revenge as a motivation for violence.

When assessing articles for components of psychological motivation, 71 statements with psychological content were found. Group-identity- based statements were the most frequent with 53 quotes followed by perception with 30, and then emotion which had 27 quotes:

They are animals not soldiers – Shadi Abdullah, Arab man beaten by Israeli soldiers in Ha’aretz, Israel^{xcv}.

It is good to have this bad image... That way, the Arabs are frightened of us. If they weren't frightened of us, they'd kill us – Meir Indor, Israeli settler^{xcvi}.

It’s miserable. But at the same time, to be in daily touch with your enemy, and to do everything against him, makes you feel very good. –Asman Khroob, a 24 year-old Arab woman^{xcvii}.

. . . he was startled to hear them shouting rhythmically, “*In baladna, yahud kalabna*” – In Arabic, “This is our country and the Jews are our dogs.” “I went over to a woman whose son I helped get out of jail. . . I said, ‘Samiha, this is me, Victor. Samiha, am I your dog?’ She wouldn’t even look at me. She was in a kind of ecstasy. . . Believe me, I’m not afraid of the Arab countries. I’m not afraid of the West Bankers. I’m afraid of the Israeli Arabs. They hate our guts” – Victor Tayar, a leader of the Israeli Black Panthers^{xcviii}.

These statements reveal the intensity of the emotional sentiment that both the Israelis and Palestinians have towards each other. The emotional components of fear and anger are blatantly present. Also, the perceptual statement by the Israeli settler that the Arabs fear the Jews also reveals his personal fear of the Arabs. He is afraid that the Arabs will kill him if they lose the fear that he believes they have of Israelis. As in all the windows examined thus far in the Arab/Israeli PSC, emotion, perception, and group-identification are strongly represented in the statements of the actors.

1993

There were 718 articles assessed in 1993⁴⁶. Fifty-three violent incidents in the articles analyzed. Of the 319 deaths, 231 were Palestinian and 88 were Israeli. Non-state organizations were mentioned 108 times. New organizations mentioned include Holy Islamic War, Qassam Brigades, The Committee for Security on the Roads, and Red

⁴⁶ Many of the articles were on the Somalia genocide and the U.S. Twin Tower bombings but referenced the Israeli/Palestinian PSC.

Eagle. There were 23 direct conflict statements. The majority of which came from elite (13) Israeli (15) actors. Territorial issues were mentioned 12 times; security 11 times; and revenge was referenced 4. Resources, political power, and social power had only one reference between them.

We have confrontations every day, and always on the days when the Army goes by on patrol. I support the stone-throwing because otherwise we don't have anything to fight with. We throw stones at them to make them get out. But they don't get out. What's the point? At least we show the world that we don't accept this occupation at all. . . .In the long term it should not exist [Israel]. . . It's either Israel or Palestine. It's hard to have both of us. Ask yourself: If somebody takes over your home by force, are you willing to give him a room, or two rooms? The land of Palestine is very small. You can't divide it into two countries – Wael Abd al-Jawad, Palestinian youth (17 years old)^{xcix}.

We are not seekers of adventure. . . Neither are we shell absorbers. So if there's shooting, we'll return fire, and do whatever is necessary to protect the area -Shimon Peres, Israeli Foreign minister^c.

I thought the children would protect me from the army. . . The girl was 4 years old. She never picked up a stone or held a gun. Nobody had attacked the Jews. They just wanted to kill. They fired at a car full of children. They hate us . . .I want the Israelis to know that this is precisely what leads people to go out and stab Israeli citizens and soldiers – Ishak Siyaj, an unemployed Palestinian carpenter whose child was killed when he failed to stop at an army checkpoint. He was rushing to take his mother to the hospital^{ci}.

The quote by the Palestinian youth shows that territorial issues remain salient in the Israeli/Palestinian PSC. Similarly, the statement by Shimon Peres also demonstrates that security concerns remain a primary aspect of the conflict. The quote by Ishak Siyaj shows how misperception can lead to a tragic event that prompts such strong emotions and perceptions that they can become motives for violence through revenge.

There were 77 statements made in articles analyzed from 1993 that contained psychological motivation. While there were slightly more elite and Israeli quotes,

statements by non-elite actors and Palestinians were well represented. In this particular window, group identification had the highest frequency of references with 65, followed by perception with 51, and emotion was next with 30 references. Self-identification statements were a distant fourth with six quotes.

We have no intention of exercising restraint when faced with the firing of Katyushas at the north. . . There will be no compromise. If they continue to attack our towns we will pursue them everywhere and not one of them will be immune. We will attack them without mercy and without pause – Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel^{cii}.

Let the word go out: The Jewish people will not tolerate this! Punish our neighbors for what they have done to us! – an un-identified speaker at the funeral of a father and son who were shot to death by Palestinian gunmen^{ciii}.

He who seeks to kill us, we will seek to kill him – Sheik Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, spiritual leader of the Party of God^{civ}.

Each of these quotes reflects sentiments of group-identification on the part of the people making the statements. In addition to this, Rabin reveals the emotions of resolve and elements of anger (without mercy, without pause) in his statement. Similarly, the man at the funeral clearly demonstrates strong emotion as he calls for revenge. Lastly, Sheik Fadlallah's statement shows that he has the perception that Israelis want to kill Arabs/Muslims and that he wants to reciprocate.

1998

There were over 800 articles assessed in 1998. Of the articles germane to the Arab/Israeli conflict, 23 violent incidents were recorded. There were 209 deaths as a result of these incidents, with 114 being Israeli and 95 that were Palestinian. Non-state-based groups were mentioned 26 times during this time window. The groups of Amal, Kach, and Qssam were mentioned for the first time. Of the 15 conflict statements,

territorial motives were mentioned seven times followed by revenge, which was mentioned five times, and then security-based motives were mentioned four. Political and social power motives were mentioned one time each and resources were not mentioned at all.

I have nothing to be sorry for. Everything I did was for love of the land of Israel - Tatania Suszkin, who placed anti-Muslim posters on the doors of Arab shops in the West Bank, setting off days of clashes^{cv}.

Once again the resistance has fulfilled its promise to protect our territory and our civilians. Violence must be answered with violence. Their blood must be spilled for ours – a statement released by Hezbollah claiming responsibility for an attack to avenge “the deliberate killing” of a Palestinian woman^{cvi}.

They are not just laying a cornerstone, these are the gravestones of any kind of peace. On the ground they are burying it – Hanan Ashrawi, Palestinian Cabinet member in reference to Israeli settlement expansion ceremony in Palestinian- dominated Ramallah^{cvi}.

As in years before, territory remains the primary issue of contention between the actors. This is especially true in the time window of 1998 as this issue is exacerbated by the onset of Israeli developments in Palestinian areas. In the first two quotes, however, while the issue of territory is used, inconsistencies make it questionable whether it is really the behavioral motive. If Tatania Suszkin was motivated by her love for the land of Israel, why did she post anti-Muslim papers? Similarly, when Hezbollah took responsibility for their attack, while they began their statement stating that they were defending territory and civilians, it becomes clear that the real motive for violence is revenge.

There were 50 statements with psychological content in 1998. Statements were split approximately evenly between Palestinian and Israeli actors and elite and non-elite actors. There were 29 group-identification statements, 25 perception, 24 emotion, and four self-identification statements.

It is clear that the Arabs are not the ones who kill peace and the peace process, but the Israelis. The whole world knows and says that the Arabs cling fast to the peace process; others do not – Hafez al-Assad, President of Syria^{cviii}.

I think this is a very appropriate response to the murder that was committed. The murderers and those who sent them should know: You murder people, we will build. We won't be defeated – Yoel Tzur, Israeli whose wife and son were killed by Palestinian gunmen^{cix}.

This demonstrates the terrorist mind of the Zionists. If they kill Khaled Meshal, they will pay a very high price – Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, Hamas spokesman in Gaza^{cx}.

Though the statement made by Assad does not relay group-identity, what it does communicate is the perception not only that the Israelis do not want peace, but that the world knows that. Yoel Tzur's statement shows emotion in using the word "murder". It also reveals group-identity sentiments by using "we/they" word choices. Al-Rantisi's statement has an emotional component. By using the word "demonstrates", he is communicating that prior to this statement he has rejected the legitimacy of Zionists (Israelis) and that Sharon's threat to assassinate Meshal^{cxii} is a justification of his position. A further rejection of Israeli legitimacy (showing emotive content) is the refusal to call the out-group Israelis but Zionists. Lastly, by using the word "terrorist", al-Rantisi is attributing malicious intent upon the Israelis. Thus, his statement has a perceptual component. Al-Rantisi's and Yoel Tzur's statements both have group-identification components. Tzur's statement also reveals emotion as he uses the word "murder" (an illegitimate act) and resolve by using an if/then statement.

2003

Many of the 1283 articles analyzed in 2003 were about the Iraq war and only mentioned the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in passing. Because of this most of the articles were not

germane to my research However, there were 99 violent incidents reported in the Israeli/Palestinian PSC resulting 726 deaths. Sixty-three of the incidents were reportedly initiated by Palestinian actors. Non-state organizations were mentioned 147 times. Organizations mentioned for the first time were the Aksa Martyrs Brigade and the Popular Resistance Committee. Of the 204 quotes analyzed, 28 contained conflict statements. Palestinian to Israeli and elite to non-elite statements were approximately equal. Interestingly, security and revenge surpassed territorial motives for violence. There were three incidents where actors cited territory as a motive for violence whereas security was mentioned 17 times and revenge 13.

They are trying to stamp our movement with the brand of inhumanity for the killing of innocent civilians. . . These operations aim to create a balance of fear. As long as the Israelis kill our civilians, we will respond by targeting their civilians – un-named spokesman for the al-AksaMartyrs Brigade^{cxii}.

Sharon, prepare the coffins. Revenge is coming soon, in Tel Aviv and Jaffa – yelled through loudspeakers during a funeral procession for a Hamas leader killed by Israeli forces^{cxiii}.

If indeed there is calm, and there is no terror, Israel will make every effort to avoid taking action against terrorists. If the terror attacks continue, Israel, feeling itself responsible for the security of its citizens, will surely take action – Ariel Sharon, Israeli Prime Minister^{cxiv}.

You cannot build a fence on our land, to cage us like chickens and hope all is well. The conflict will continue, the fire will burn, terror will increase, nobody will benefit – Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority^{cxv}.

In addition to a perceptual component, the statement made by spokesman for the al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade clearly communicated that revenge would be a motive for violence. Revenge is also the motive of the funeral attendees in the second quote. Sharon states that Israel will act to defend its security and the prime minister asserted that land remained a reason to commit acts of violence.

There were 169 statements that had the psychological components in 2003. Palestinian quotes slightly outnumbered Israeli at 91 to 80. Similarly, non-state actor quotes were used a little more than the statements of elite actors in the articles. Perceptual comments were the most frequent at 107, followed by group-identification at 103. There were 74 emotive and six self-identification statements.

Clearly we are going to be very circumspect in the choice of targets in the moment that we pick. But when we have this clear and present danger- that the human missile is already about to be launched- we will disrupt the launching – Raanan Gissin, to aid to Ariel Sharon^{cxvi}.

Instead of a comprehensive incursion, the Israelis will hit the areas one by one, so they can avoid great losses - Kayed al-Ghoul, a leader of PFLP^{cxvii}. She has done what she has done, thank God, and I am sure that what she has done is not a shameful thing. She has done it for the sake of her people. . . I don't want to talk about my feelings, my pain, my suffering. But I can tell you that our people believe that what Hanadi has done is justified. Imagine yourself watching the Israelis kill your son, your nephew, destroying your house-they are pushing our people into a corner, they are provoking actions like these by our people – parents of Hanadi Jaradat, an Arab (female) suicide bomber (affiliated with Islamic Jihad)^{cxviii}.

Janadi Jaradat was a 27-year-old Palestinian attorney. Her suicide bombing killed 14 “Jews”, including three children and it was one of more than 100 suicide bombings that occurred between 2000 and 2003^{cxix}. The statements made by her parents clearly reveal group-identification, in-group/out-group justification, and emotional sentiments. Also, by using the words “pushing our people into a corner” and “provoking”, they are communicating that they have the perception that the Israelis are trying to get the Palestinians/Arabs to commit acts of violence. The statement by Kayed al-Ghoul also communicates the perception that the Israelis are moving in a calculated manner so that

they can take more Palestinian land with the least number of casualties^{cxx}. Lastly, al-Ghoul's and Sharon's statements reveal group-identification sentiments by using dichotomous we/they word choices.

2008

The final time window where data was collected for analysis was 2008. There were 471 articles examined during this window. There were 20 violent incidents recorded with culpability ascribed to the Israelis in 13 of the events and to the Palestinians in seven. There were no violent events recorded in May. Five hundred thirty-nine deaths reported in this year alone. Though there were no new non-state-based organizations mentioned, previously identified organizations were referenced 32 times. There were 34 quotes identified, but only four of the statements revealed conflict motivation content. Three of these statements were from Israelis and from elite actors. All four statements were founded in revenge.

I'm prepared to live like this for months, as long as the Army continues this aggressive line. [The Gazans] have to understand that if we get hit, they get hit –Oren Idelman, 33, and Israeli investment adviser^{cxxi}.
Yesterday, in Bethlehem, we again proved that the state of Israel will continue to hunt and to strike any murderer who has Jewish blood on his hands, and those who sent him. It is unimportant how much time has elapsed, Israel's long arm will reach him – Ehud Barak, Israeli Defense Minister^{cxxii}.

While the statement of Oren Idelman shows the tit-for-tat mentality that is common the desire for revenge, the comment by Ehud Barak is a blatant revenge statement from an elite Israeli actor. There are no references to territory, resources, or security in his statement, only the motivation of revenge.

There were 29 statements made that had psychological components, 12 were made by Palestinians and 18 were made by Israelis. There were slightly more elite

statements (18) than non-elite (12). Eighteen quotes had perceptual components, 15 had emotive aspects, and 14 reveal feelings group-identification among the actors. None of the quotes had the self-identification component.

These barbaric crimes reveal the true face of Israel, which speaks loudly about peace and security all the while committing murderers and execution against our people – statement by the office of Mahmoud Abbas, President of Fatah^{cxxiii}.

It was a clear provocation, a thousand percent. – Hanna Tibi, Israeli resident of Acre, Israel^{cxxiv}.

During Yom Kippur of 2008, the city of Acre, Israel experience four nights of violent clashes between Israelis and Palestinians. In sharing her memories of these events, Hanna Tibi said that she felt that the Palestinians did things to provoke the Jews to retaliate. By saying this, she communicates her perception that the Palestinians orchestrated events that would evoke Israeli retaliation. In the statement released the office of Mahmoud Abbas, in addition to calling the Israelis hypocrites by saying one thing and doing another; their word choices of “barbaric,” “murder”, and “execution” reveal negative emotional sentiments by the Arabs towards the Israelis.

CASE ANALYSIS

Analysis of the data in the Arab/Israeli and case provides a wide variety of quotes from the people that were, and are, personally involved in the conflict. In this section of the Israeli/Arab case, I use the statements that I have collected from these actors and the information provided in the articles to determine whether the components that I am assessing are indeed necessary components of this PSC. The first four components (≥ 20 years of violent conflict; ≥ 3 cycles of violence and peace; ≥ 500 deaths; and the participation of non-state actors) are the descriptive aspects of the Israeli/Arab PSC. The

last two components- (competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation) are conceptualized as the supporting aspects.

DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PSC

Conflict For Twenty or More Years

That violent conflict must be present for an extended period of time for a PSC to be present is a given. The minimum time that a violent conflict must be present to be considered a PSC is 20 years in this study. This duration was chosen so that the lapse of time would be inclusive of the biological and social concepts of a generation.

Though data collection began in 1948 with the establishment of the Israeli state, the conflict between Zionists/Israelis and Palestinians/Arabs began long before, with the onset of violence occurring in April 1920 (Gerner, 1994, 25). Because of this, a reasonable argument can be made that a PSC already existed when data collection began. Even so, violent conflict between the Israelis and Arabs has been present in every time window examined from 1948 through to 2008. Because violent conflict is present in every five-year increment that was measured, it is obviously present in 20-year increments as well. Thus, Boolean analysis (see table 5.4) of the Palestinian/Israeli PSC supports the theoretical establishment of a minimum of 20 years of violent conflict as a necessary component of PSC.

Violence Cycles

PSC is marked by vacillations in violence between the actors. There can be durations of time in a PSC where there is no violence between the actors only to have violent conflict erupt again at a later time over the same issue or stimulus. A minimum of three months between violent episodes or spikes was established to be consistent with the

Nedler-Mead model of three data points to begin a pattern of non-violence. Violent incidents were measured using the dates that individual, non-governmental Palestinian or Israeli or government-based attacks were reported.

In the time-windows examined in this case, violence was consistent across all time windows on an annual basis and far surpassed theoretical minimums (See figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1: Violent Incidents Reported in Arab/Israeli Conflict

There were three years out of the 13 examined where violent conflict was not reported in every single month- 1953, 1958, and 1963. Of these, only 1963 had more than two consecutive months without a violence incident. There five consecutive months, from January until June where no violent conflicts were reported. 1953 had two months where no violent incidents were recorded, but they were not consecutive (September and December). Similarly, 1958 had three non-consecutive months where no violence-related deaths were reported.

Though every year had more than the minimum of three incidents of violence, fluctuations in the rates of violence were present. For example; 1968, 1988, and 2003 all had over 50 violent events, but the distributions of these events are different (see figure 5.2). 1968 has one month where over 20% (19 of 92) of the year's violent events occur in one month and the rest of the year's incidents are spread more evenly throughout the year. 1988 has a cluster of events in the summer months, June through August, that account for almost a third of the year's violent encounters (15 of 52). Finally, in 2003, one of the years that had the most incidents, the pattern of violence is distributed more evenly.




Figure 5.2: Israeli/Arab PSC- Distribution of Violent Incidents in 1968, 1988, and 2003

Because there are a substantial number of violent events and only one three-month window where violence was not reported, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of violence cycles as a necessary component of (see figure 5.2).

Casualties

Because violent events are sporadic and tend to have low rates per violent incident in PSCs, they are harder to measure than militarized conflicts and other event-driven research. To account for these particular features of PSC but provide measurable criteria, I have modified Wallerstein' (2006) parameters for militarized conflicts of 25 deaths per year to 500 deaths over a 20-year time span. In doing so, the actual number of casualties required for a theoretical minimum remains the same, but the time restraints are adjusted in consideration of the sporadic and cyclical nature of PSC.

Even when removing the deaths from militarized conflicts (the 1948 Israeli War of Independence, for example), there were more than 25 deaths in every year examined (see figure 5.3).




Figure 5.3: Arab/Israeli Case PSC-Related Casualties

As every year analyzed met or exceeded 25 deaths, the number deaths exceeded the 500 theoretical minimum at every 20-year PSC bench-mark as well. Therefore, Boolean analysis supports the establishment of a minimum threshold of 500 directly-relatable deaths within a 20-year period of time as a necessary component of PSC. In summary, Boolean supports the inclusion of 500 or more directly-relatable deaths within a 20-year time-frame as a necessary component of PSC in the Arab/Israeli case.

Participation of Non-State Actors

The participation of non-state actors includes individuals and groups that are not affiliated with a state that have participated in acts of violence. The minimum theoretical threshold for a positive Boolean outcome requires that there has to be at least six PSC – related events that involve the participation of non-state actors for the year coded positively for having had non-state actors’ participation in the PSC. Lastly, for the case to be coded positively for having the participation of non-state as a necessary component of PSC, there had to be at least six years that were coded positively for the participation of non-state actors. Ten of the 13 years examined resulted in a positive Boolean outcome in non-state actor participation (See figure 5.4).




Figure 5.4: References to Non-state Actors -Arab/Israeli Case

Though analysis shows Boolean support for the participation for non-state actors as a necessary component of PSC, it is interesting to note that the frequency that non-state actors are referenced or make statements themselves increases over time.

SUPPORTING COMPONENTS OF PSC

The supporting components of PSC are components that are not readily observed, but could be the components that are actually responsible for the enduring nature of these conflicts. In this and the other cases analyzed in this dissertation, the components from which data is gathered and assessed are organized into two categories. These are competition-based conflict and psychological motivation. This is operationalized by assessing actor statements to determine behavioral motivation⁴⁷. By assessing the statements of the actual actors in the conflict, the reason why PSCs are enduring in nature could be realized.

⁴⁷ For further explanation of coding rules for content analysis, please refer to the appendix.

COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT

The components tested in competition-based conflict are territory, resources, security, political power, social power, and revenge. Theoretical minimum criteria for coding the presence (positive Boolean outcome) for each component included a minimum of three quotes in a year where the actors stated that an individual component was the reason they committed or would commit an act of violence. For the case to be coded as positive for the existence of competition-based conflict there had to be at least six years throughout the course of the case that clearly revealed that competition-based conflict was the motivation for behavior.

Using these parameters, ten of the 13 years analyzed coded positive for the presence of competition-based conflict (see table 5.2). Thus, Boolean analysis supports it as a necessary component of PSC. Because Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of the category of competition-based conflict as a necessary component of PSC, each individual component is assessed to determine their role in supporting PSC. In doing so, determination can be made as to which (or all) components, when combined, make competition-based conflict a necessary component of PSC. Analysis of these components revealed that some could be supported as necessary components of competition-based conflict and others could not.

Tangible Assets: Territorial Conflict

The minimum theoretical threshold for coding a year as positive for the presence of territorially motivated conflict (and other competition-based components) is three or more references to land/territory in the year. The component had to be present six or more years for the case to be coded positively for each component. Statements about

territorial rights were approximately equal at the beginning of the case. As the case progressed, however, statements made by Arab actors about territorial rights trended upwards slightly whereas territorially-motivated statements made by Israelis trended downwards (see figure 5.5).




Figure 5.5: Territorially-Motivated Statements - Arab/Israeli Case

The inclusion of territorial conflict as a necessary component of competition-based conflict can be supported using Boolean analysis (see table 5.2). Statements reveal that territorial conflict as a motivation for violent behavior are sufficiently present in 10 of the 13 years analyzed to be coded positively and territorial motives account for 44.7% of all competition-based conflict statements given in the case. References are repeatedly made about territory focusing on physical possession and the right of possession of land. Lastly, though there are vacillations in the frequency of the statements and the overall trend is downward, territorial motivation is represented consistently throughout the Israeli/Arab PSC (see figure 5.6).




Figure 5.6: Territorially-Based Violence Statements- Arab/Israeli Case

Resources

The resource conflict that was most frequently mentioned in the Arab/Israeli PSC is water. Even so, though violence over a resource is mentioned in six of the thirteen windows analyzed, only one year has resources mentioned frequently enough for it to be coded as present (1948). Resource competition statements represented 4.3% of all conflict statements. Thus, the inclusion of resources, as a necessary component of competition-based conflict, cannot be supported using Boolean analysis.

Physical Security

When security is mentioned by the actors in the Israeli/Arab PSC as a motivation for violence it is most often made by Israeli actors. Overall, security-based statements comprise 29.6% of all competition statements and are present in eight of the thirteen time-windows (see table 5.2). Finally, security-based violence is consistent over the duration of the case and trending upwards over the course of the case (see figure 5.7).




Figure 5.7: Security-Based Violence Statements- Arab/Israeli Case

Non-Tangible Assets: Political Power

Statements that included political power as a motive for violence often included the lack of representation that Arab citizens have in Israel or the lack of legitimacy of the state of Israel as a political entity. Political power, as a motive for violence was referenced in 6.1% of all conflict statements and was not coded as present in any of the thirteen years analyzed. Therefore, it cannot be supported as an individually necessary component of the competition-based conflict.

Social Power

Statements that referenced social power in the Arab/Israeli conflict have increased in the in the last 20 years of the conflict with eight of the ten quotes occurring in 1998 or after. Many of these quotes include religious motives on the part of the Muslim Arabs. Social-power quotes represented 4.18% of all conflict statements, and are coded as present in two of the thirteen years analyzed (see table 5.2). Thus, Boolean analysis

reveals that conflict over social power cannot be supported as an individually necessary component of competition-based conflict.

Revenge

Revenge was first mentioned as a motivation for violence in 1973 (see table 5.2). Revenge motives for previous actions by the out-group are stated as motives for violence by state and non-state actors and by Israelis as well as Arabs. Revenge-based statements account for 13.9% of all conflict statements and are present in five of the thirteen year-long windows analyzed (see table 5.2). Thus, it falls just short of being supported as an individually necessary component of competition-based conflict. However, the frequency in which revenge is cited as being a motive for violence is trending upwards over the life of the conflict (See figure 5.8).




Figure 5.8: Revenge -Based Violence Statements- Arab/Israeli Case

Summary

Competition-based conflict is conceptualized as one of six categorically necessary components of PSC. Furthermore, in this dissertation, I proposed that the category of competition-based conflict that is supported by six sufficient components - territory, resources, security, political power, social power, and revenge. In this portion of the chapter, I used Boolean methodologies to determine whether the data collected supports the proposition that competition-based conflict and its sub-components are necessary components of PSC.

The observation of the changing role of revenge as a motivation for violence raises an important point about the nature of PSC that merits discussion. Across PSC scholarship and in the literature review, references are made about the changing nature of PSC in that the issue(s) of contention between conflictual dyads can change or take on additional components over time (Marcus 2003; Pruitt & Kim 2004; Rapoport 1974). When comparing the trend lines of revenge and territory as motivations for violent behavior, they appear to have an inverse relationship. Similarly, revenge and security-based comments appear to increase along similar trajectories (see figure 5.9). While it is premature to make broader implications as to the nature of PSC in general from this one case, the appearance of a strong negative correlation (inverse relationship) between revenge and territory and a positive correlation between revenge and security could be supportive of the assertion that issues of contention can change and take on additional components over time.




Figure 5.9: Comparison of Territory, Revenge, and Security as Motivations for Violence - Arab/Israeli PSC

Overall, Boolean analysis shows support for the proposition that competition-based conflict is a necessary component of PSC, in the Arab/Israeli case. Similarly, territorial and security-based conflict is supported as significant components of competition-based conflict and account for 71.9% of all conflict-based statements (see table 5.2). The radial categories of resources, political power, and social power; however, fall well short of the established theoretical minimum individual and account for 14.3% of all of the conflict statements combined. The final radial category, revenge, falls just short of individual Boolean support, accounting for 13.9% of all conflict statements. It will be interesting to follow the frequency of revenge-related violence in the future (in this and other PSC cases) to see if this component plays an increased role in violence motivation in PSC. In summary, Boolean analysis supports the category of competition-based conflict as a necessary component of PSC in the Arab/Israeli case.

Boolean analysis also supports the inclusion of territory and security concerns as jointly necessary components of competition-based conflict. The role of revenge, while not supported by Boolean analysis at this time, is increasing in frequency as a motivation for violent behavior. Thus, additional monitoring/study of this component, within this case and in other cases over time, is merited.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION

Statements that reveal psychological motivation in PSC are well-supported across time. Through Boolean analysis, the justification for the inclusion of psychological motivation as a necessary component of PSC is strongly supported in this case.

Statements that revealed presence of psychological motivation in the Arab/Israeli PSC passed minimum theoretical criteria in all of the thirteen years analyzed (see table 5.3).

Thus, in the Arab/Israeli case, analysis supports my proposition that psychological motivation is a necessary component of PSC. When analyzing each of the components individually, however, the results are not as clear-cut.

Emotion

The proposition that the presence of emotion is a necessary component of the psychological motivation of PSC can be supported using Boolean analysis. Emotionally-charged statements are present in approximately 27.4% of all quotes that contained psychological sentiments. Boolean analysis shows that emotion is coded as present in 11 of the 13 years analyzed. Thus, it is supported as a necessary component of the category of psychological motivation in PSC. Emotive statements are consistent across the duration of the conflict and trend slightly positive (see figure 5.10).




Figure 5.10: Frequency of Emotive Statements- Arab/Israeli Case

Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of emotion plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout the course of the Arab/Israeli conflict could indicate that the role of emotion increases as the PSC endures over time.

Perception

There is an average of 28 statements per year by actors indicating the presence of perceived motivational, characteristic, or behavioral attributes of the out-group. Of the total quotes that contain psychological motivation, quotes that reveal perceptual motivations on the part of the actors are present in 31.4% of all quotes from the Israeli/Palestinian case (see table 5.3). In the Arab/Israeli case, 12 of 13 years are coded positively for the presence of perception in PSC. This is double the required theoretical minimum for an overall positive outcome for the presence of perception as a component

of psychological motivation in PSC (see table 5.3). Finally, the presence of perceptual statements increases over the duration of the Arab/Israeli PSC (see figure 5.11).




Figure 5.11: Frequency of Perceptual Statements – Arab/Israeli Case

Boolean and logistic analyses support the proposition that the psychological motivation of perception plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout the course of the Arab/Israeli conflict could indicate that the role of perception increases as the PSC endures over time.

Self-Identity

Self-identification is one of the original four necessary components of PSC listed by Azar. However, of the psychological motivations evaluated, it has the lowest incidence having an average of only 2.8% of the psychologically motivated statements (see table 5.3). Boolean analysis fails to support the inclusion of self-identity as a necessary component of psychological motivation in PSC, as quotes that reveal self-identity motivations in the Arab/Israeli PSC case is sufficient to elicit a positive outcome

in only two of the thirteen years measured. This is one-third of the required theoretical minimum. Because of this, the proposition that self-identity individually contributes to PSC in a significant manner or is a necessary component of the category of psychological motivation in PSC cannot be supported.

Group-Identity

According to PSC theory (Azar), self and group-identity are the primary psychological motivations that contribute to the enduring nature of PSCs. Analysis of the data supports the inclusion of group identity as a major component of the psychological motivations measured. Inclusion of group identity as a necessary component of the psychological motivations supporting PSC is supported by Boolean analysis and logistic analysis. Group-identity-based statements are specifically mentioned in 37.6% of the quotes that communicated any type psychological motivation and are the most cited psychological component in the Israeli/Palestinian case. Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of group identity as a sustaining psychological motivation in PSC with 10 of the 13 years being coded positively for its presence (see table 5.3). Lastly, statements that reveal group-identity are present over the duration of the Arab/Israeli PSC (see figure 5.12). The frequency of group-identification statements increases over the life of the conflict as well.




Figure 5.12: Group-Identification Statements – Arab/Israeli Case

Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of group-identification plays a supportive role in PSC⁴⁸. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout the course of the Arab/Israeli conflict could indicate that the role of group-identity increases as the PSC endures over time.

Socialization in PSC

The role of socialization as a possible component that sustains PSC is referenced in scholarly literature (Freidman 1999). Examples of how the Arab/Israeli PSC has impacted the youth that grow up within its shadows are observed across the process of this conflict and have been used in the quotes throughout this chapter. One year in particular, though, showed the impact that prolonged exposure to violence can have on children. This is 1973. Thus, the focus on the role of socialization as a supporting aspect of the protracted nature of PSC, as it impacts children, will center on the quotes made by

⁴⁸ Though incidents of group-identification statements decreases in 2008, this is more the result of fewer overall articles that met search criteria than an actual decrease in group-identification revealing statements.

Israeli and Arab actors in 1973. The first quote, used in the historical section of this chapter, takes place immediately after the Yom Kippur War where a father shares his worries about his son if the conflict endures into the child's adulthood:

I don't care about the Suez Canal, about Ismailia, about Suez, about winning or losing. We have got to stop these mindless cycles of having a war with the Arabs every five or ten years, followed by a hate-filled cease-fire and then another war. We have got to find the key to peace. . . I simply cannot accept the idea that my son, who is 5 now, will have to go through this after me. . . We have got to learn to live with them. If we do, this war will have been worth it. If we don't, it will have been mass murder for no reason - Unnamed Israeli soldier^{xxxv}.

Though this father demonstrates an aversion to continued violence, the fact that children are exposed to violence at an early age could indicate that they are socialized into violence despite the resistance of their parents.

This statement is a real-life example of Toynbee's War Weariness theory. As discussed in the literature review, parents who have seen the horrors of war are less prone to submit their children to the same exposure to violent conflict as they have had to endure. Thus, it takes approximately 100 years for the cycle to come "full circle" where new leaders lose their aversion to war because of a lack of first-hand experience (Cashman, 2000, 152). In light of Toynbee's theory, it is not surprising that the Israeli soldier stated that he did not want his son to "go through" what he had. However, if exposure to the horrors of violent conflict decreases willingness to continue or engage in future violence, why do PSCs have enduring qualities? In discussing Toynbee's theory, Cashman points out a limitation of the theory that may be a salient separation between war and PSC: "War weariness has relevance for *initiation* but not necessarily for war *involvement*" (Cashman, 2000, 153; emphasis in original). According to Cashman, while first-hand knowledge of the human costs of violent conflict may be sufficient to deter the

initiation of violence, it may not be enough to stop violence once it has begun. This may help to explain why a soldier may continue to fight (so that his child will not have to), but it is limited in aiding in the explanation as to why violent conflict can become protracted.

Toynbee's opus was published in a 12-volume series between 1934 and 1961 (Toynbee 1961). During the same period of time, the nature of warfare and political violence was in a process of change. War "internalized" and moved into areas that are populated by "non-combatants". "Wars are no longer confined to definitive battlefields, but occur more often in populated areas. . ." (Bald, 2002, 2). In light of this, the following quotes (also from 1973) could help to shed light as to why PSCs endure:

They play at war a lot and are a little more nervous –Shula Wexler, who ran an Israeli kindergarten^{cxxvi}.

My little one, who is four, is constantly killing. He kills all the time. When a plane flies overhead, he runs out with his revolver and tells us not to worry, he'll shoot it down – Marcel Bressier, Israeli whose child attended the kindergarten run by Shula Wexler^{cxxvii}.

The behavior that the children exhibited in playing war games indicates that they have been personally exposed to violence in their environments at very young ages.

Similarly, the four-year-old who acts in a protective manner demonstrates that: (1) he has been exposed to the threat of violence, (2) has witnessed defensive violence, and (3) has been the recipient of/ has witnessed attempts to comfort fears stemming from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

As "war" is removed from the traditional battlefield and occurs within the "civilian realm" in PSC, children are personally exposed to violence and to the reactions to the violence by the adults in their lives during their formative years.

What we see as very young children, what is modeled for us from the significant adults in our lives, is what we learn. It is how we see the world,

how we learn to see the world, and how we interact with it. . . In a war culture, where violence is in the whole society, everything changes. It is more than what they learn; it becomes who they are (McAllister 2012).

Thus, could it be that a key component separating PSC from other forms of violent political conflict be found in explaining *who* experiences the violence and *when* (developmentally)?

While the above quotes may shed light into how and why individuals may become willing to participate in acts of violence, they only touch on modeling as a potential aspect of the role of socialization in the generational attributes of PSC. Consider the following quote where a Syrian novelist wonders at the reaction of Arab mothers who have lost their sons to the Arab/Israeli conflict: “It is amazing to see that nobody cries. Even the mothers say that they are proud to have given a son who died for the cause” (Colette Khoury, Syrian novelist^{cxviii}). In the article and the quote, the novelist communicates the perception that the sacrifice of young men has become a societal norm. Clearly, the Syrian community that this woman was commenting on felt that the death of young is an acceptable “sacrifice” in the Arab community’s battle against Israel.

However, this quote has another extraordinary feature that goes beyond the socialization of “acceptable death”. This is the reference to the pride of the Arab mothers. How deep/strong must the anger and/or commitment (emotionally or through social compliance) be for a mother not only to be willing to let her child die or be killed for a cause, but to be proud of it? Is the loss of land that occurred twenty-five years in the past (at the time of the Yom Kippur war when this statement was published) sufficient for a mother to embrace a child’s sacrifice? Are affronts to self or group-identity sufficient? Currently accepted theory indicates that it is so (Azar 1985). The nature of the bond

between a mother and a child is so strong that it is one of the strongest, most compelling relationships known to man. In this light, the statement that identity issues alone are sufficient to explain psychology's role in the protracted nature of PSC is an extraordinary one. There *must* be other motives present for a mother to be willing to irrevocably sever one of the most precious relationships that she will have in her lifetime. The competing cause, therefore, *must* have a greater pull/attachment if it is to overcome the love that a woman has for her child. It is, therefore, reasonable to assert that other psychological motivations, such as emotion, are sustaining components of PSC.

The above quotes concerning the behavior of children, society, and parents towards the Arab/Israeli conflict substantiates the following statement made by conflict scholar, Gil Freidman about the role of socialization and generational influences on PSC:

We may thus postulate a positive relationship between conflict duration and the proportion of the population influenced by the conflict in their formative years. . . given that the protracted conflict is central for significant others, later generations of individuals will be socialized by significant others for whom the external conflict is highly salient. This dynamic can be viewed as a function of the protracted property of the conflict (Friedman, 1999, 52).

Given the reactions of the Israeli and Arab parents towards their children and the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, three possible contributing components as to why PSCs may endure are presented. First, even though Israeli parents may have indicated that they wanted the conflict to end, their children have been socialized into having the conflict being a central part of their core identity because they have been exposed to the violence of the conflict *repeatedly* from a young age. Thus, when they are old enough to make the decision whether or not to commit acts of violence or not, violent behavior is already a

part of them. Second, the social acceptance of the Syrian community of allowing their young men to become “lambs for the slaughter” indicates a social acceptance (and possibly expectation) that the “next generation” will contribute to /participate in their society’s struggle. Finally, the intensity of the emotional investment into the conflict is so strong that it overcomes the natural maternal impulse to protect the lives of those most dear in favor of defeating a hated enemy. As such, in using the quotes from just this one year alone, it can be seen how psychological motivation could be a reason why PSC endures over time.

Summary of Psychological Motivation

Analysis of the four proposed jointly necessary components found that emotion, perception and group identity can be jointly and individually supported as necessary components of psychological motivation in PSC using both qualitative and quantitative methodologies (in the Arab/Israeli case). Quotes that revealed emotional, perceptual and group identity motivations in PSC were sufficient to justify positive/significant outcomes using Boolean analysis. Hence proposing that emotion, perception, and group identity are positively jointly necessary components of the category of Psychological Motivation, a sustaining component of PSC, can be supported in this case. The inclusion of self-identity, as an individually contributing component of Psychological Motivation in PSC, cannot be supported in the Arab/Israeli conflict, however.

Emotion, perception, and group-identification each demonstrated trends of increasing in frequency over the course this case (see figure 5.13).




Figure 5.13: Statements That Reveal Psychological Motivation – Arab/Israeli Case

The increase in psychologically motivated statements in this case could be tangible support for assertions that PSC changes and takes on additional components and issues of contention over time⁴⁹.

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS

While Boolean methods can aid in determining theoretical necessity and sufficiency, what it cannot inform is the relatedness of the components that are being studied. Because of this, confirmatory factor analysis is used. The six primary categorical components were initially assessed to determine how many factors best reflects the data of the Arab/Israeli case. After running a maximum likelihood model and a three-factor model, the maximum likelihood analysis showed that a two-factor model best reflected the data and the three-factor model encountered Heywood errors. This indicates that there

⁴⁹ As with group-identification statements, decreases in incidents that communicate overall psychological motivation in 2008 are more the result of fewer articles that met search criteria than an actual decrease in psychologically-motivated statements.

are problems with negative (co)variance estimates and that three-factor model is not a fit for the data (Lolenikov and Bollen 2012). Thus, a two-factor model is used in the Arab/Israeli case (see figure 5.14).




Figure 5.14: PSC Factor Viability Scores in Arab/Israeli Case

Using the two-factor model, the first factor accounts for 71.5% of the total variance found in the model (see table 5.4). In fact, all of the components vary together (having component scores $>+0.5$), loading on factor 1- with the exception of conflict duration. Conflict duration has a factor score of 0.18 and is the most unique component measured (0.71) (see table 5.4).

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion
Factor 1	2.68	1.61	0.7147
Factor 2	1.07	-	0.2853

Table 5.4: Two Factor PSC Viability Model (unrotated) - Israeli/Palestinian Case

Accordingly, the second factor, which accounts for 28.5% of the model variance, is needed to account for conflict duration in this PSC case. The single, underlying dimension of factor one accounts for 50% of the variation in non-state actors, 52% of the variation in deaths, 81.6% of the variation in violent incidents, 80% of the variation in conflict statements, and 90% of the variation in psychological statements (see table 5.5). Similarly, most of the components in factor 2 load minimally (<0.5 to >-0.5).

	Two Factor Model		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Violent Incidents	0.8162	0.3358	0.2210
Conflict Duration	0.1842	-0.5058	0.7102
Deaths	0.5197	0.6735	0.2763
Non-State Actors	0.5032	-0.4118	0.5772
Conflict Statement	0.8048	0.0883	0.3444
Psychological Motivation	0.9035	-0.2711	.1102

Table 5.5: Factor Loadings for PSC Viability Model - Israeli/Palestinian Case

To summarize Factor analysis in this case, violent incidents, deaths, non-state actors, conflict statements, and psychological statements load together on factor one and only minimally on factor two. As factor one accounts for 71% of the variation in the model, the analysis suggests that the components of factor one are rightly associated with PSC.

Descriptive Components

Throughout the Arab/Israeli case, quotes and statistics support the inclusion of the descriptive components of PSC proposed in this dissertation. Logistic regressions also showed support for their inclusion as necessary components except for the participation of non-state actors. This statistical outcome could be explained by the nature of news reporting, however.

Supporting Components of PSC: Competition-Based Conflict

Currently accepted PSC theory posits that unresolved security issues (specifically, territorial conflict) explains the enduring nature of PSC. In testing whether this is the case, I included other components that, when left unresolved, could also contribute to the enduring nature of PSC. These include conflict over tangible assets such as territory and resources; and conflict over non-tangible assets such as security, political power, social power, and revenge.

As a category, competition-based conflict was coded present in 11 of the 13 years assessed. Therefore, the proposition that competition-based conflict is a necessary component of PSC is supported by Boolean analysis. This particular outcome could be explained by the parameters that I established before I began collecting information and reporting methods used by news agencies.

When assessing individual conflict components, though, only territory and security are supported as individually necessary components of competition-based conflict. Resources, political power, and social power (even combined) are not sufficient to justify their inclusion as necessary components. While the frequency of revenge statements also (narrowly) failed to be supported using Boolean analysis, the increase in statements that claim that it is a motive for violent behavior warrants further attention to this particular component. The increasing rates in which revenge is being cited as a motive for violence could provide tangible support for theoretical assertions that the issues of contention in PSCs can change and take on additional components. This could also be an explanation as to why territorial-based violence trends downward over the course of the conflict.

Psychological Motivation

Boolean analysis of psychological motivation as a categorically necessary component of PSC is supported. Psychologically-motivated statements were present at sufficient levels for every year in this case to be coded positively. Similarly, emotion, perception, and group-identity were individually supported as jointly necessary components of the category of Psychological Motivation. Self-identity, however, was not. It is interesting to note that emotion, perception, and group-identity have trended upward (positively) over time in a manner that is similar to that of the component, revenge (an emotion-based motive). Could it be that the longer a conflict lasts, the greater the role psychological motivation plays in its continuation? While this cannot infer causation, what these findings could speak to is the role that psychological motivation could play in supporting long-term violence. As such it could be a vital supporting component of PSC.

It will be interesting to see how development of the role of psychological motivation, over time, trends in other PSC cases.

SUMMARY

After analyzing the Arab/Israeli case using historical analysis, Boolean analysis, and Factor analysis, the proposal that the necessary components of PSC ((1) ≥ 20 years of violent conflict; (2) ≥ 3 violence/peace cycles; (3) 500 deaths; (4) the participation of non-state actors; (5) competition-based conflict, and (6) psychological motivation) are supported. Similarly, conflict over territory and security are supported as jointly necessary components of competition-based conflict. Lastly, emotion, perception, and group-identity are supported as jointly necessary components of Psychological Motivation in PSC. Resources, political power, social power, revenge, and self-identification failed to meet the minimum requirements for theoretical necessity.

Therefore, as attention turns to examination of the Northern Ireland PSC, final analysis of the Arab/Israeli case shows a slightly different structure of the theoretically necessary components of PSC that presented in the theory chapter (see figure 5.16).




Figure 5.16: Necessary Components of PSC – Arab/Israeli Case

Table 5.1: Boolean Analysis for the Israeli/Palestinian PSC

Year	≥ 20 Years ⁵⁰		Non-state Actors ⁵¹		≥ 3 Violence/Peace Cycles ⁵²		≥ 500 Deaths ⁵³		Competition-based Conflict ⁵⁴		Psychological Motivation Statements ⁵⁵		Presence of PSC	
	0	Y	96	Y	108	Y	7848	Y	36	Y	83	Y	0	N
1948	0	Y	96	Y	108	Y	7848	Y	36	Y	83	Y	0	N
1953	0	Y	0	N	23	Y	187	Y	6	Y	13	Y	0	N
1958	0	Y	3	Y	12	Y	71	Y	4	N	14	Y	0	N
1963	0	Y	0	N	10	Y	25	Y	12	Y	17	Y	0	N
1968	1	Y	116	Y	78	Y	1014	Y	34	Y	118	Y	1	Y
1973	1	Y	38	Y	18	Y	126	Y	10	Y	73	Y	1	Y
1978	1	Y	54	Y	23	Y	1114	Y	9	Y	81	Y	1	Y
1983	1	Y	46	Y	23	Y	1210	Y	9	Y	64	Y	1	Y
1988	1	Y	90	Y	56	Y	516	Y	32	Y	113	Y	1	Y
1993	1	Y	146	Y	53	Y	319	Y	28	Y	152	Y	1	Y
1998	1	Y	42	Y	23	Y	209	Y	18	Y	83	Y	1	Y
2003	1	Y	210	Y	98	Y	726	Y	37	Y	290	Y	1	Y
2008	1	Y	39	Y	20	Y	539	Y	4	N	48	Y	1	Y
Outcome	9/13 =Y	13/13 =Y	-	11/1 3=Y	-	13/13 =Y	-	13/13 =Y	-	11/13 =Y	-	10/13= Y	-	9/13 =Y

⁵⁰ Criteria: Y = Violent conflict has been occurring between the actors ≥ 20 years.

⁵¹ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Non-state actors ≥ 6 references to non-state actors committing acts of violence/year.

⁵² Criteria: Y = Overall presence of conflict is ≥ 3 violent incidents/year.

⁵³ Criteria: Y = Casualties must ≥ 25 deaths/year (equaling 500 deaths over a 20-year window).

⁵⁴ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Competition-based Conflict Components are ≥ 6 incidents/ year.

⁵⁵ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Psychological Components are ≥ 6 incidents/year.

Table 5.2: Boolean Analysis: Table of Competition-based Conflict Statements – Arab/Israeli Case

Year	All Conflict Quotes ⁵⁶		Territory ⁵⁷		Resources		Security		Political Power		Social Power		Revenge	
1948	36	Y	19	Y	6	Y	7	Y	3	N	1	N	0	N
1953	6	Y	3	Y	1	N	2	N	0	N	0	N	0	N
1958	4	N	2	N	0	N	0	N	2	N	0	N	0	N
1963	3	N	1	N	0	N	2	N	0	N	0	N	0	N
1968	34	Y	21	Y	1	N	8	Y	3	N	1	N	0	N
1973	10	Y	7	Y	0	N	1	N	1	N	0	N	1	N
1978	9	Y	5	Y	0	N	3	Y	0	N	0	N	1	N
1983	9	Y	4	Y	0	N	4	Y	0	N	0	N	1	N
1988	32	Y	11	Y	1	N	9	Y	4	N	3	Y	4	Y
1993	28	Y	12	Y	1	N	11	Y	0	N	0	N	4	Y
1998	18	Y	7	Y	0	N	4	Y	1	N	1	N	5	Y
2003	37	Y	3	Y	0	N	17	Y	0	N	4	Y	13	Y

⁵⁶ Criteria: Y= ≥ 6 incidents of competition-based related quotes as a reason for violent behavior in the year.

⁵⁷ Criteria: Y= ≥ 3 incidents of quotes from each individual component as a reason for violent behavior in the year.

2008	4	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	4	Y
SUM	238	-	95	-	11	-	68	-	14	-	10	-	33	-
% / Boole an Outco me	-	10/13 = Y ⁵⁸	103/23 8= 43.3%	10/1 3 = Y	10/238 = 4.2%	1/13 = N	68/238 = 28.6%	8/13 = Y	14/238 = 5.9%	0/13 = N	10/238 = 4.2%	2/13 = N	33/238 = 13.9%	5/13 = N

Table 5.3: Boolean Analysis of Psychological Motivation – Arab/Israeli Case

Year	All Psy. Quotes ⁵⁹		Emotion ⁶⁰		Perception		Self-Identity		Group-Identity	
1948	83	Y	27	Y	25	Y	3	N	28	Y
1953	13	Y	6	Y	6	Y	0	N	1	N
1958	14	Y	5	N	5	N	0	N	4	N

⁵⁸ Criteria: Y = ≥ 6 positive outcomes for the presence of competition-based related quotes over the duration of the conflict.

⁵⁹ Criteria: Y = ≥ 6 quotes revealing psychological motivation in PSC.

⁶⁰ Criteria: Y = ≥ 6 quotes revealing psychological motivation in each individual component in PSC.

1963	17	Y	5	N	6	Y	1	N	5	N
1968	118	Y	38	Y	29	Y	6	N	45	Y
1973	93	Y	28	Y	18	Y	2	N	25	Y
1978	81	Y	23	Y	22	Y	0	N	36	Y
1983	64	Y	13	Y	22	Y	2	N	27	Y
1988	113	Y	27	Y	30	Y	3	N	53	Y
1993	152	Y	30	Y	51	Y	6	Y	65	Y
1998	83	Y	25	Y	25	Y	4	N	29	Y
2003	290	Y	74	Y	107	Y	6	Y	103	Y
2008	48	Y	15	Y	18	Y	0	N	15	Y
SUM	1160	-	316	-	364	-	33	-	436	-
% / Outco me		13/13 = Y	316/116 0 = 27.4%	11/13 = Y	364/11 60 = 31.4%	12/13 = Y	33/116 0 =	2/13 = N	436/11 60 = 37.6%	10/13 = Y

CHAPTER 6

THE NORTHERN IRELAND CASE

INTRODUCTION

The Northern Ireland conflict is a critical PSC case in that it appears to be in the process of achieving long-term, peaceful resolution. Because of this, the behavioral patterns of the actors and the presence (or lack, thereof) of certain components could provide information critical to the discovery of the necessary components of PSC. Thus, analyzing the components that are present in the case and how they change over time could be a key to discerning what the actual supporting mechanisms are. Pursuant of this goal, I trace the historical development of the Northern Ireland PSC from a narrative perspective through to the negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. From this point, I utilize quotes from the actors and the information provided from articles in the New York Times to determine whether the components under analysis are present in this particular PSC.

Starting with the year 1922, the New York Times' historical archives are searched looking for articles relevant to the Northern Ireland PSC. In five-year increments, I analyze one calendar year of articles that are germane to the conflict. Thus, the years analyzed in this case include: 1922, 1927, 1932, 1937, 1942, 1947, 1952, 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012. The search criteria that

I use to identify articles in this are: Northern Ireland, or IRA, or Irish Republican Army, and deaths, or killed, (and) or casualties⁶¹.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PSC

Seeds of the Northern Ireland PSC can be found in how the island was first populated. The western and southern parts of Ireland (Cannaught) were populated by the Gauls (later to be called the Celts by the Greeks), who came from the European mainland (Bardon 1992). The northern part of Ireland, specifically in the six county Ulster region, was originally populated by immigrants from the regions in northern Britain. Just prior to 1215, the English began to exert (marginal) political control over Ireland by extending the liberties that were written into the Magna Carta to their Irish “subjects” and by eventually establishing a parliament in Dublin in 1297 (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 98-99; Bardon, 1992, 44-47). It was not until the Anglican break from the Catholic Church under King Henry VII, however, that the components of the Northern Ireland conflict began to foment.

The Protestants- A Land United Now Divided

When the 16th century ushered in the Protestant Reformation and creation of the Anglican Church by King Henry VIII of England, Ireland became a key interest to Britain. Up till this point, the English crown had maintained only minimal interest and control over the Emerald Isle. When Henry broke away from the Roman Catholic Church, solidifying control over Ireland became a religious, political, and security

⁶¹ For specific exclusions and other information on and collection parameters, please refer to the appendix.

imperative. Because Ireland's population was divided between those who identified with mainland Europe (Catholicism) and others who were sympathetic to the English (Protestantism), The English crown feared that the Pope and European leaders (French and Spanish) would use Ireland to undermine the crown or as a launching-pad for invasion (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 101; Bardon, 1992, 68-72). Over the next century, the internal political turmoil that England faced over religion also played out in Ireland. Land was seized from those who opposed the policies of the English crown and was given to English cronies. This, in turn, resulted in rebellions and uprisings by displaced Irishmen (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 101-2).

The Catholic/Protestant conflict came to a head in Ireland in July of 1690. William of Orange, a Protestant loyal to King William led a group of young men (the Apprentice Boys/Orange Men/Williamites) against forces loyal to Catholic King James (Jacobites) at the Battle of Boyne (Cain 2011; Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 102). The battle and the war was a decisive victory for the Protestants.

Protestant Supremacy and Catholic Repression

The victorious Protestants, though a minority of the population, secured political supremacy and legislated privileges for themselves with the aid of the British. They prohibited non-Protestants from holding public office, from serving in the military, demanded loyalty oaths to the crown, prohibited formal education, prohibited land ownership, prohibited weapon ownership, and denied legal defense (Cain 2011; Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 103). Thus, when direct British control over Ireland began to wane

towards the end of the eighteenth century, fearing that the Catholics were stock-piling arms, northern Protestants created local “groups” called the Peep-O-Day Boys. The “Boys” broke into Catholic homes in search of arms (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 103). In response, the Defenders and the Whiteboys were organized by the Catholics to protect their homes and families from Protestant aggression and economic exploitation (Cohen, 1994, 4; Hoppen, 1994, 601; Kenney, 1998, 13). Attacks against wealthy Protestant land owners and reciprocal violence marked relations between Catholic and Protestant Irishmen as tit-for-tat violence between the (non-state) groups endured throughout the eighteenth century. In response to Catholic aggression, the Orange Boys (also known as Orange Men), named after William of Orange, was established in 1795 (Cain 2011)⁶². Fueled by a failed Catholic uprising to gain independence in 1798, the British and Irish Parliaments voted to unite Ireland under Britain’s rule (Bardon, 1992, 238-9). In an attempt to relieve tensions between Catholics and Protestants, the legislation included reforms. Catholic/Protestant tensions continued throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, though. As Catholics attempted to gain religious, political, and economic parity with Protestants; the Catholic Association was formed for the purpose of achieving Catholic emancipation in Ireland (Cain 2011). The ensuing riots and violence between Catholics and Protestants resulted in further legislative attempts to stem the violence.

As the Great Famine of 1845-1850 approached, however, the overwhelming majority of business and land owners remained Protestant. Protestants retained their

⁶² By 1835, there were over 200 Orange lodges in County Down⁶² alone. County Down is one of six counties in Northern Ireland (Cohen, 1994, 5).

superior social status as many were land and business owners, shopkeepers, professionals, skilled-laborers, and lower-level managers. Catholics were subsequently the poorest demographic, making livings as subsistence farmers who rented plots and homes from absent landlords, low-skilled laborers, innkeepers, and barmen (Cohen, 1994, 6). There was little opportunity for advancement for the Catholic population. According to a “former machine boy” and labor union organizer at Dunbar McMaster & Co, “[y]ou wouldn’t have been told you weren’t getting it [a job] because you were a Catholic. It was concealed. You’d a been told you hadn’t got the job . . . it wasn’t openly told to you, but everyone, of course, knew the reason” (Cohen, 1994, 7). In this environment of discrimination, the Ribbonmen⁶³ were established^{cxxix} (Cain 2011). The Ribbonmen were rural, agrarian Catholics who organized in response to attempts to commercialize cattle farming (the reallocation of crop land) and to the deplorable living conditions that they, as tenant farmers and rural workers, were forced to endure (Garvin, 1982, 135; Kee, 1972, 299).

On the eve of the potato famine, many Irish Catholics still made their livings from tenant farming where the potato was not only a staple crop for their landlords to export, but it was also a cornerstone of the subsistence-level diet for the tenant farmers. As crops failed and tenants were unable to pay rents, absent landlords re-allocated fields and tenant lands to crops that were not impacted by the blight. Tenant farmers were evicted when they were unable to pay rent or were displaced by crop reallocation, faced starvation, and

⁶³ Also spelled “Ribandmen”.

got little to no help from Britain. Those who survived were faced with the choice of continuing to struggle through the famine on their own or immigrate.

While Catholics suffered in the southern parts of Ireland, Northern Ireland, which was predominantly Protestant, was not impacted by the potato blight to the extent of their southern countrymen. Rather than send food and aid, however, they exported their crops for cash (White, 2012, 191). Thus, in the wake of the Irish Famine, Catholic sentiment was that of “hatred of Britain, often with convictions that the use of revolutionary violence was justified” (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 105). As they emerged from the potato famine, the resentment of Irish Catholics, from perceived exploitation and discrimination, was blatant:

The facts, in bare outline are as follows: at various periods between the English invasion and the end of the 17th century, the English without a shadow of moral right, confiscated the land of Ireland, giving it to their soldiers and adventurers for services against the Irish people. The new landlords and their successors, as the body, never came really to regard themselves as Irishmen. In their dealing with the Irish people, they acted as alien conquerors whose interest was to bring you as much as they could from their tenants. By means of extortionate rents, they kept the tenants at the barest subsistence level. They gave no security of tenure, and whenever it seemed to suit their selfish interests. They evicted the rightful owners of the land by the thousands, indifferent to the fact that in most cases there was no hope of alternative means of livelihood in the country- Sean T. O’Kelly, head of the Irish Free State Delegation^{xxxx, 64}.

⁶⁴ A dual referencing system is used for the remainder of the chapter. Though atypical, my citation style remains in compliance with APSA citation guidelines and serves a unique purpose (in keeping sources clearly identified and differentiated) that complements my research goals. In-text citation indicates information retrieved from “traditional” scholarly sources (APSA, 2006, 18-24). Because newspaper articles are to be referenced in a notes section rather than as “traditional” references (“Information on citations of newspaper articles, interviews, and personal communications should be included in the notes, not the references” (APSA, 2006, 24)), the citation for each quote referenced from newsprint is included at the end of the chapter. Actor quotes are a foundation of my data-collection technique and each chapter can contain well over 100 references to newspaper articles. Therefore, a dual referencing system is utilized to

From the Irish Catholic perspective, to rectify the illegitimacy of British exploitation, Ireland had to become a free and independent state.

The Rise of Non-state Organizations

During the last half of the nineteenth century, the Catholic Peep-O-Day Boys and Protestant Orangemen were joined by other organizations as violence continued in the Northern Ireland conflict. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (the Fenians) was established in 1858 with one goal in mind- independence from Britain (Hoppen, 1994, 601; Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 105). Similarly, the Royal Black Institution was organized during the same time to counter emergent Catholic organizations (Cain 2011). As expected, violence erupted. Protestant Orangemen would (provocatively) march each July in commemoration of the Battle of Boyne and violence would ensue. Depending on the year, days, weeks, or months of rioting, home burnings, incarcerations, injuries, and deaths would lay in the wake of July parades. In 1886, the July Orangemen parade led to sporadic violence that lasted through to mid-September and resulted in at least 31 deaths (Cain 2011). During this time support for home rule amongst the Catholic population grew as the Irish Republican brotherhood carried out bombing campaigns in Ireland and England and assassinated many political leaders (White, 2012, 194).

distinguish news print information from other sources. This method also aids in the ease of data verification because articles that are cited in each case are referenced at the end of each chapter rather than in one large section for all the newsprint quotes in the appendix.

In 1905, the Catholic Sinn Féin was organized in support of home rule⁶⁵ (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 108) and Catholic lobbying for home rule increased⁶⁶. Most Protestants (Loyalists), especially in the north, did not support home rule, though. They preferred to remain British citizens (White, 2012, 191-2). However, Britain, facing its own internal political crisis, began to warm to the prospect of Irish home rule. A bill for was brought before the British House of Commons in 1914. The divisive bill had a tumultuous course through parliament as it failed initially, then was passed, but then had its implementation postponed due to the onset of World War I⁶⁷.

Upon the delay of the implementation of home rule, Irish Catholics placed their hopes on the Irish Republican Brotherhood to fight for their freedom. The Easter Rebellion⁶⁸ occurred between April 24 and April 30, 1916 (Wilson, 2/28/32, NYT). It was led by the Irish Republican Brotherhood and Cumann na MBan^{69, cxxxii}. By the end of the conflict, a minimum of 450 people had lost their lives in the conflict (Bardon, 1992, 452). The British executed the male leaders of the rebellion and imprisoned the females. Executed leaders, such as Patrick Pearce and James Connolly, became martyrs for the cause of Irish independence and (Catholic) public sympathy for Irish autonomy increased dramatically (White, 2012, 194). Sinn Féin ran on an “Irish Republic” platform of an

⁶⁵ Sinn Fein literally means “we ourselves” or “ourselves alone” (Shivers & Bowman, 1984, 108).

⁶⁶ Home rule meant that Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom and citizens would swear allegiance to the British Crown. Autonomy would be exercised through an independent legislative body and Prime Minister (White, 2012, 191).

⁶⁷ As Ireland was already preparing for civil war, the onset of World War I served only to delay the inevitable (Bowman, 1984, 109; Purcell 1982).

⁶⁸ The Easter Rebellion has also been referred to as the Easter Rising and the Sinn Fein Rebellion.

⁶⁹ Cumann na MBan was a Catholic women’s para-military organization formed in 1914.

independent Ireland and made dramatic political gains (Beiner, 2007, 378; Bowman, 1984, 109).

Towards an “Independent” Irish State

Though the Easter Rebellion was put down, violence between Catholics and Protestants continued through to the war that led to Irish independence⁷⁰ in 1921. Michael Collins organized the IRA and began to carry out selective, purposeful assassinations and terror attacks against government buildings, governmental officials, policemen, and police buildings (Bardon, 1992, 462-476). The British response to the violence was to send hastily assembled and prepared soldiers to Northern Ireland to control the violence. The lack of preparation on the part of the British resulted in officers wearing “non-uniform” uniforms. Some were black and others were tan. Hence, the name the Black and Tan War of 1920 (White, 2012, 196).

Ultimately, the British failed to suppress the impending revolution. Non-state violence continued in the interim months between the end of the Black and Tan War and the signing of the Anglo-Irish treaty. In the months leading up to the Anglo-English Treaty, “one horrific incident followed another” as non-state actor violence left 109 dead (Bardon, 1992, 483). Thus, when the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed on December 6, 1921, though the Irish Catholics achieved their goal of home rule, they knew that knew that the treaty would not bring the peace they desired.

⁷⁰ The Irish War of Independence actually began in 1919 with the Anglo-Irish War. It was also called the Black and Tan or The Tan War (White 2012).

. . . and now came the final treaty of peace. Would it be signed? . . . unutterably wearied Ministers faced the Irish delegation themselves in actual desperation, and knowing well that death stood at their elbows- David Lloyd George, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 1916-1922 (Bardon, 1992, 483).

The treaty designated 26 counties of Ireland as part of the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland would remain a protectorate of the British Crown. Counties that remained under British protection included Down, Antrim, Armagh, Fermanagh, Tyrone, and Londonderry (Bowman, 1984, 110) (see map 6.1). Sinn Féin, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had rejected previous proposals that included partitioning Ireland. To get the leaders of Sinn Féin to agree to the partition, the British made a provision that allowed for a boundary commission to be established.



Map 6.1: Map of 1921 Partition of Ireland (Europa 2012)

While Irish politicians saw the reality of the violence that lay before them, British politicians had the perception that the treaty would bring peace to Ireland.

I am overjoyed to hear the splendid news you have just sent me. I congratulate you with all my heart on the successful termination of these difficult and protracted negotiations which is due to the patience and conciliatory spirit which you have shown throughout, and I am indeed happy in some small way to have contributed by my speech in Belfast to this great achievement –King George of the United Kingdom^{cxxxii}.

That is good news. . . I think Ulster will accept. The blockade had done a great deal of harm to trade in the north of Ireland. Belfast used to be the centre for shipping goods to England and abroad, but it has been doing practically nothing. This is one reason why I think Ulster will fall into line. The business people there are tired of the blockade and the political squabbling – Earl Ganard of the United Kingdom^{cxxxiii}.

British politicians failed to recognize the deep-seated division between Loyalist and Unionist sentiment in Ireland. While the provision of a land commission granted a political victory in getting the Sinn Féin to agree to a divided Ireland, it left Protestant Loyalists convinced that it would be used to wrest the Northern counties out of their control. Thus, they rejected the agreement.

. . . contemporaneously with the functioning of the Treaty, Loyalists may declare independence on their own behalf, seize the Customs and other Government Departments and set up an authority of their own. Many already believe that violence is the only language understood by Mr. Lloyd George and his Ministers – Captain Charles Craig (Bardon, 1992, 483).

A surrender is always a surrender and a betrayal a betrayal and a condonation of a crime a participation in the sin of the criminal, though these things be called peaceful settlements and hope for the future and dawning of a new era and so forth. The event of yesterday is but the culmination of the steady policy of yielding to threats and of intriguing with rebels. It is hailed as a co-triumph we wish we could join in these very natural, but deluded transports – The Morning Post, United Kingdom^{cxxxiv}.

Similarly, though the political leaders of Sinn Féin had agreed to the treaty, many hard-liners within the organization rejected the agreement wanting nothing short of full Irish autonomy.

The agreement between the Irish representatives and the British Cabinet simply amounts to a promise of increased power to Ireland over her

domestic government- home rule, in other words, with Northeastern Ulster still in a position to destroy the unity of Ireland if England wants Craig further to play that game. With Irish coastal fortifications under British control, with power in the hands of the English Government to appoint a Governor-General for Ireland, with the Irish Government restricted in a dozen different ways by England, the use of the term “Irish Free State” is an insult to the dead who died fighting for an independent Irish Republic. It is also an insult to the intelligence of the living men and women in Ireland who will still continue to fight for absolute separation from England and to . . . – Diarmuid Lynch, National Secretary of the Friends of Irish Freedom^{cxxxv} .

At the end of 1921, when Ireland was granted (semi) autonomy by the British government, the political leaders hoped that the concessions and political compromise would bring peace to the Emerald Isle. However, Protestants in the north feared a political take over from their southern, Catholic brothers and felt betrayed by the British government. Similarly, Catholics living in the Ulster region would settle for nothing less than full autonomy for Ireland and rejected the political compromise that Sinn Féin leaders had made.

Summary

As Ireland emerged as an “autonomous” state, it was already fully immersed in the conflict between Catholic unionists and Protestant loyalists. At this point in the development of the Northern Ireland conflict, violence between the same groups of actors has already spanned centuries. From the qualitative development of this particular case thus far, violent conflict could be attributed to religious differences, economic discrimination, political discrimination and disagreements over the legitimacy of rule.

MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NORTHERN IRELAND PSC

1922 and the War of Independence

As Ireland struggled to achieve sovereignty throughout 1922, the year brought violence and civil war to the fledgling state. By the end of January, the Boundary Commission was at an impasse and the Separatists and Unionists were on the brink of outright war (Bardon, 1992, 486). In the months leading up to the official declaration of war (January through May), 236 people had died in Belfast alone (Bardon, 1992, 494). The Irish Civil War officially began in June of 1922 and lasted ten months. Modest estimates attribute approximately 3000 military and civilian deaths in the Irish Civil War (Hopkinson, 1988, 273; Walsh 1998).

There were 454 articles analyzed in 1922. Six violent incidents were reported and Separatists⁷¹ were attributed to having been entirely responsible for initiating the violence. In all, 16 deaths were reported for the year. Non-state organizations and groups were referenced 16 times. Among those mentioned were the Irish Republican Army (IRA)/Sinn Fein, Republicans, Representatives of Ulster, Irregulars, and Orangemen.

There was one conflict statement made in 1922. It was made by, Liam Cosgrave. Cosgrave turned to politics after he fought in the Easter Rising in defense of the Catholic/ Separatist position (Bardon 1992). Serving as a member of Sinn Féin, once in office as

⁷¹ Separatists can include Catholics, the IRA, IRA derivative organizations, and those acting to achieve complete autonomy for *all* of Ireland. The term Unionist can include Protestants, Orangemen, similar derivative organizations, and those acting to preserve Northern Ireland's protectorate relationship with Great Britain.

Prime Minister, he denounced political violence and supported the death penalty against his former comrades that continued to fight for Catholic equality (Jordan, 2006, 63-4).

. . . continue indefinitely if the nation was to live. The irregular leaders made no secret of the fact that the production of chaos was the means they look to, to make the Government impossible and to prevent the Free State from being finally established. The Dail Elreann, therefore, resolved to set up military courts empowered to inflict the death penalty for specific offenses. But, before these courts were operated, amnesty was offered to all willing to surrender arms before a certain date. A long period was allowed to elapse before any sentences were carried out – William Cosgrave, President of the Dáil Éireann^{cxvvi}.

In his statement, Cosgrave communicates two reasons for the execution of the IRA members. First, in using the words, “chaos” and “nation was to live”, he shows that the government’s actions were motivated by the need for physical security. Secondly, Cosgrave also references the state: “. . . to make the Government impossible and to prevent the Free State from being finally established”. This shows that the executions were motivated by the need to establish or maintain political power. When referring to Catholic fighters, Cosgrove called the Irregulars. Other groups mentioned include the Republicans, Representatives of Ulster, IRA, and Orangemen. In all, non-state organizations were referenced 16 times in 1922.

Overall, there were 13 quotes that contained psychological motivations. They were split approximately evenly between mass and elite actors. However, only three of the quotes were from Separatist/Catholic actors. The overwhelming majority of the

quotes were from Protestant/Unionist actors⁷². Perceptual and group-identification-revealing comments were the most numerous with eleven references each. Emotive statements followed with nine incidents. There were no self-identification statements made in the articles analyzed from 1922.

To the simple, common people of Ireland, whose good-will is being assailed and resisted, who are the martyrs and victims not of aliens or of invaders, but of a contumacious minority that have shown themselves prepared to go to any length, and to adopt any methodology in their determination to wreak vengeance on their countrymen for having refused to accept their domination – quoted from The Irish Times^{cxxxvii}.

Through the choice of words, the Irish Times (located in Dublin) showed emotion, perception, and group-identification as they praised the IRA/Catholic cause. By using word such as martyrs and victims in describing the IRA/Catholics, they demonstrate positive emotion towards them. Similarly, the statement, “have shown themselves prepared to go to any length and to adopt any methodology in their determination to wreak vengeance” communicates a two-fold perception of motive on the part of the Protestants. It is the perception of the Irish times that the Protestants will go to “any length”, a perception of willingness, and to wreak vengeance, a perception of intent. Finally, in using “their countrymen” the Irish Times shows in/out-group categorization of the Protestants.

⁷² Because many organizations arise, splinter, and re-organize under different names in the Northern-Ireland case, for the sake of clarity, they will be presented dichotomously by their position in the conflictual dyad. Actors (individuals and groups) that are sympathetic to the separatist or Catholic position will be referred to as IRA/Catholics. Actors who are sympathetic to the unionist or Protestant position will be referred to as the Protestant/British. Individual organizations are discussed when their name first appears as an actor in the conflict. and are subsequently referenced only by the frequency of their name being mentioned in association with the conflict.

1927

Of the 752 articles that the search criteria identified, only four articles were found to be directly related to the Northern Ireland conflict. As such, only one violent incident was recorded. Culpability was attributed to the IRA and nine deaths were reported as a result of the violence. There were two articles that had germane quotes. Neither of the quotes had conflict statements and only one non-state organization (the IRA) was mentioned. The two quotes had psychologically-motivated content and both were made by elite British actors.

This crime will fail in its object. We will meet at this form of terrorism as we meet other forms of terrorism, and we shall not falter until every vestige of it is wiped out from the land – Irish President Liam Cosgrave in response to the assassination of Irish Vice President Kevin O’Higgins^{cxxxviii}.

We have at all times endeavored to arrange, while safeguarding our national status and rights of action, a policy which would promote friendly relations. Our policies based on the belief that there can be no real reunion of Ireland until there is better understanding in greater friendship between the peoples, until old hatreds are allowed to die out and Northern Ireland, of its own volition, recognizes that this island is too small an entity to be divided, and that our peoples of the North and South possess a common heritage. A policy of irritation and nagging toward the North won't bring that about - Irish President Liam Cosgrave^{cxxxix}.

When responding to O’Higgins’ murder, Cosgrave showed strong negative emotion by using the words “crime” and “terrorism”. Similarly, he showed the emotion of resolve by using absolute language (“shall not falter”). In the second quote, Cosgrave pleads for national unity. Here, he shares his perception that Ireland cannot realize unity until hatreds are removed from the public consciousness. In both of these quotes, though,

Cosgrave uses the terms “we” and “our” in the context of Ireland as a whole. Thus, they are not coded positively for the presence of group-identification statements.

1932

There were six violent incident recorded in 1932. IRA/Catholic actors were reportedly responsible for four of the incidents. There were a total of two deaths that were directly attributable to the Northern Ireland conflict. Non-state groups were referenced five times. The only new group mentioned was the Order of the Hibernians (Sean Ordú na nÉireannach), an Irish, Catholic patriarchal organization.

There were twelve quotes that were germane to the conflict in 1927. Two contained conflict statements. While both statements were made by mass-level actors, there was a statement made from each side of the dyad. Both conflict statements contained language that revealed that motives were based in the desire to retain political and social power.

...our determination to maintain inviolate the ties of the Empire and to resist by every means in our power. Any attempt to force us into the Free State, the majority of whose people have shown [that] they are not in sympathy with us, either politically or religiously –Viscount Craigavon, Prime Minister of Northern Ireland addressing some 50,000 Orangemen gathered for their annual parade^{cx1}.

In this statement, the viscount states that the Orangemen’s motivation for violence is to prevent their forced inclusion in a unified, predominantly Catholic, Irish state. As framed, because he references politics and religion, this is a statement motivated by the desire to maintain political and social power.

There were 12 statements that had psychological components. Seven were made by IRA/Catholic actors and five were made by British/Protestants. Quotes that were made by masses-level actors versus elite actors were distributed evenly. There were eight perceptual, seven emotional, and six group-identification statements. Again, there were no self-identification statements made.

...steps to be taken to voice the national League resentment at the latest English act of defiance of the rights and liberties of the Irish people in a further attempt to stabilize the partition – statement issued by Sinn Féin about the forthcoming visit by the Prince of Wales^{cxli}.

Boycott British Goods. We will crown De Valera King of Ireland – on banners displayed in streets of Dublin as police “battled mobs of young hooligans”^{cxlii}.

These quotes show elements of emotion, perception, and group-identification. Sinn Féin showed emotion by using the word “resentment” in their statement. Similarly the “hooligans” communicated that they rejected the legitimacy of the British crown and British goods. The motivation of perception is demonstrated as Sinn Féin stated that the British had acted in defiance of the rights of the Irish. Finally, in using we/they language, the “hooligans” showed that they communicating as a group (group-identification).

1937

In 1937, there were three violent incidents in the Northern Ireland conflict. All of which were reportedly perpetrated by the IRA. No deaths were reported. Non-state actor groups were referenced six times. However, no new groups were referenced.

While there were 10 quotes germane to the conflict, none of them were conflict statements. Nine of the statements revealed psychological impetus. Eight of which were made by British/Protestant actors. The elite to non-elite ratio was approximately even with four elite and five masses-level statements. Perceptual statements were the most prevalent with six followed by emotion and group-identification statements, which had five each. Yet again, self-identification –based statements were not reported.

We will never yield or betray our birthright. I tell him today he will be disappointed. We will ever remain citizens of the United Kingdom and the Empire. Act as he may, de Valera will find [that] the loyalists will stand firm. We do not care about his propaganda drive and it will not influence us. I do not believe Britain will ever desert us – John M. Andrews, acting Premier of Northern Ireland^{cxliii}.

In this statement, Andrews is responding to Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Eamon de Valera’s, public efforts to bring Ulster into the Irish Republic. He reveals strong emotion in his word choices, “. . .never yield or betray our birthright”. He also shows his perceptions about the Unionists when he states that de Valera is attempting to propagandize and influence his in-group. Interestingly, though, he also reveals his perceptions about his own in-group when he asserts that they will “stand firm”. Andrew’s group-identification is clear in his quote as he uses we/they language several times.

1942

Ireland saw an increase in violence in the Northern Ireland conflict in 1942. There were eleven violent incidents reported and 14 deaths. By this time, the IRA had been made illegal^{cxliv}. However, though Ireland was officially neutral in WWI, there was

a growing effort to put down/control the violence in Northern Ireland for fear of IRA/Nazi collaboration and to protect the American soldiers that were billeted in Ireland^{cxlv, cxlvi}. The majority (eight) of the incidents were reported to have been instigated by the British/Protestants. Though there were eight quotes from the year, none of them contained conflict statements. The IRA was referenced 18 times and was the only non-state organization that was mentioned in reference to the violence.

There were three articles that contained statements that revealed psychological motivation in the conflict. The following quote was a note that was seized and used as evidence against IRA militants:

Let me know as soon as you get the present strength of all British and American forces in the north. Give me approximate figures on: (a) British, and colonial forces; (b) American troops; (c) auxiliary armed police forces; (d), the total armed enemy forces in the north." Reply communiqué includes: 'I received the information Saturday night that JJ will be in Dublin tomorrow night. This presents an opportunity for holding a meeting. AC this is to inform you that such a meeting will be held tomorrow night. The notification is very short, but it's the best we can do under the circumstances' – Note used as evidence in the trial of Henry Lunberg^{cxlvii}.

While the quote is too lengthy to include in its entirety, the portion of the note that is used shows emotional and group-identification components. The way that the IRA used the word "enemy" reveals a rejection of legitimacy rather than a perceptual assessment of intent. It is therefore, coded as an emotive statement. Also, there is use of group-identification terminology when the note said, "it's the best we can do."

1947

After World War II, with many of the IRA's leadership in prison, IRA membership and activities declined^{cxlviii}. There were no violent incidents or deaths as a result of the Northern Ireland conflict reported in 1947. Similarly, only one non-state group, the IRA, was mentioned and it was referenced only one time. Of the 76 articles examined, articles mentioned the hunger strikes of imprisoned IRA members, their deaths (in 1946), the political pressure the British government received as a result of the deaths, and the success of this strategy on gaining the release of David Fleming^{cxlix, cl}.

There were two quotes reported. While neither was a conflict statement, both contained psychologically revealing statements. Both were made by IRA/Catholic actors. One statement was from an elite actor. Perceptual and group-identification quotes occurred twice, and emotion-revealing statements occurred once. Self-identification statements were not reported.

. . . [The freedom of Northern Ireland can be achieved only⁷³] by the use or the threat of force. . . England's difficulty is our opportunity. We don't want a country which is a hanger-on of a decadent Republic. . . under the impelling threat of a superior force. England, by subsidy or otherwise, has maintained this partition over the voice of the overwhelming majority of the people of Ireland- Partrick Maxwell, member of the Northern Ireland Parliament^{cli}.

Maxwell's quote has numerous perceptual statements. It is his perception that only force, or the threat of force, will free Ireland from Britain, that they threaten Ireland, and that Britain muzzles the voice and will of the people of Ireland. He also uses group-identification language in using terms such as "our" and "we".

⁷³ These are the word of the author or the article.

1952

There was one violent incident reported in 1952, but no deaths that were related to the Northern Ireland conflict. The conflict occurred on St. Patrick 's Day as anti-partitionists attacked police, injuring nine in the process^{clii}. While no new organizations were identified, non-state organizations were mentioned three times. There was one quote that was relevant to the conflict, but it did not reveal conflict or psychological motive.

1957

There was a resurgence of violence in Northern Ireland in 1957. There were 33 violent incidents throughout the year that resulted in nine deaths. Culpability was assigned to the IRA/Catholics in all but one of the incidents. Non-state organizations were referenced 42 times. Questions regarding Sinn Féin's knowledge of and/or complicity in the violence were also raised^{cliii}.

Of the articles analyzed, ten contained quotes related to the Northern Ireland conflict. None of them were conflict statements, however. Seven statements revealed psychological motivation. Five were made by British/Protestant actors and all of the statements, but one, were made by non-elite actors. Five perceptual and group-identification and four emotive statements were made. There was one self-identity statement reported.

Within the past week, three young Irishmen have been killed in the course of attacks on police stations in the six-county area. Two men from the twenty-six counties, the third was a young policeman in the service of the

six-county authorities. The consequences that would follow a continuance of these attacks must be now clear to the whole nation. It is the earnest conviction of my colleagues in the government and myself that partition cannot and never will be ended by force. We believe that even if it were practicable to subdue by arms and hold to in subjection, those Irishmen who wish to remain apart from us, the resentment that they would feel would thereafter divide us more deeply and more lastingly than ever before. No self-appointed group has any shadow of right to decide on a policy of war. We could not have a second body, assuming to his self the prerogative of government, deciding national policy in maintaining an armed force to carry out its dictates - Republic of Ireland Prime Minister, John A. Costello, in reaction to raids^{cliv}.

Costello statements about the deaths of the policemen are descriptive and do not reveal emotional content. Similarly, though the adjective “earnest” could be coded as emotion, in this context, it is in reference to his perceptual belief. Thus, it is not coded as a statement that contains emotion, either. However, when he states that, “No self-appointed group has any shadow of right to decide on a policy of war,” he is rejecting the legitimacy of the out-group to make policy because he sees them as self-appointed. Thus, *this* is an emotive statement. He shows perception in stating that the conflict will not end with force as resentment and deeper division will ensue. Finally, by saying that he, personally, and the members of his in-group reject the violence of the out-group, he is making a self- and group-identifying statement.

1962

Of the 185 articles that matched the search criteria in 1962, not a single article contained incidents of violent conflict related to the Northern Ireland conflict and no deaths were reported. At this point, the Northern Ireland PSC and the IRA appeared to be

in decline. The majority of the articles focused Irish trade and textiles. The IRA was mentioned in two articles. The first article was in reference to IRA members being released from prison^{clv}. The second article, titled, *Curtains for the IRA*”, announced the (original) IRA’s decision to end their “campaign of sabotage and violence”^{clvi}. The article discusses the decline of Sinn Féin and public indifference to the IRA’s agenda. The final statement by article’s anonymous author states, “Let us put a wreath of red roses on their grave – and move on”^{clvii}.

1967

Like 1962, 1967 reported no deaths in the Northern Ireland conflict. There were three violent incidents recorded, however. The (Protestant) Orangemen held an annual parade in July commemorating the Battle Boyne. The Orange Walks would often increase tensions in Northern Ireland and end in violence. As a preventative measure, the Northern Irish Parliament passed legislation (The Public Order Act) forbidding the annual parade and outlawing 40 organizations that they saw as extremist. Reverend Ian Paisley was identified as a leader among extremist Protestant organizations^{clviii}. This action by the Northern Irish government sparked a clash between youth and fire fighters in March^{clix}, simultaneous bombings of Army Reserve bases as the Duke of Edinburgh visited Northern Ireland in May^{clx}, and George Forrest, a member of the Northern Irish Parliament, was injured as he was heckled from a crowd that grew violent during his speech at the (illegal) Orangemen Parade on July 12^{clxi}. While there were violent incidents reported, the articles did not contain quotes.

The Troubles

Though dyadic tension was present in Northern Ireland after World War II by the early 1960's it appeared that the conflict was coming to an end. In the late 1960's, though, the intensity of the conflict increased dramatically with a vast increase in violent incidents and deaths. This period of time, through to the signing of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement in 1998 is known as "The Troubles". Approximately 3,480 people died in the Troubles. This is an average of 116 per year (Sutton & Melaugh 2012).

In response to perceived economic and political discrimination against the Catholic population in Northern Ireland in the mid 1960's, organizations, such as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) began to form to take corrective action. These Catholic/Unionist organizations enjoyed initial success in bringing attention to their plight. This motivated Protestant/Loyalist organizations, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force, to form and take counter measures. In October of 1968, as Catholic protesters marched through a traditionally Protestant neighborhood, Protestants/Loyalists saw the presence of Catholics/Unionists as a provocation⁷⁴. The ensuing conflict was televised. Catholics saw the police's efforts to separate the two groups as police brutality and yet another attempt to silence their voices. From these incidents, violence in the Northern Ireland conflict began anew. From 1969 through to the end of 1971, 213 people were killed in the troubles (Sutton & Melaugh 2012).

⁷⁴ Marches by both sides of the dyad were scheduled for the same day and for the same parade route. Attempts were made by the Northern Ireland government, to no avail, to avert conflict by banning both parades (Thomas, 1999, 36-38).

1972

There were 230 violent incidents resulting in 530 deaths in 1972. The IRA/Catholics were reported as being responsible for initiating 151 or 65% of the violence. Non-state actors were mentioned 222 times in the New York Times as being associated with the violent conflict in Northern Ireland. Organizations mentioned for the first time included the Official IRA, Provisional IRA, Irish of Bay Bridge, Protestant Unionist Party, Protestant Ulster Vanguard, Real IRA, People's Democracy, Tartans, Taigs, Willowfield Youth Club, Loyalist Association of Workers, IRA Keighley, Protestant Ulster Defense Association, Ulster Volunteer Force, and Catholic Ex-Servicemen's Association.

There were 226 quotes germane to the conflict. Twenty-three contained conflict statements. Of these statements, 16 were made by IRA/Catholic actors. All but one of the quotes were made by non-elite actors. Political power was mentioned ten times, security seven, revenge six, and social power twice. Territorially-based violence was mentioned one time. Conflict over resources was not mentioned at all.

Our purpose is to unite workers throughout Ireland behind the struggle for the reconquest of their country – Statement released by the Official IRA^{clxii}.

They keep threatening to take more money from me and it's a bloody shame. We are in this strike because of the internment. I've got two relatives interned. No trial, nothing, just internment. It breaks my heart. Everyone knows someone who's been interned, either a relative or a friend. It strikes so deep in the heart of the community. The damages are irrevocable. Our aim in this strike is purely and simply to smash

internment and abolish legislation that made internment possible –
Kathleen O’Sullivan, no affiliation or other information provided^{clxiii}.

Because the language of the first quote is framed in terms conquest and country, it is a conflict statement based in the desire to gain political power. The second quote revealed two conflict components that motivated Irish Catholic/Unionist behavior. According to O’Sullivan the internments had social and political implications. She indicated that the damage that the internments had caused to her community were irrevocable, hence her motivation to “smash internment”. Second, she clearly stated that the second goal of the strike was to abolish the legislation that made the internments possible. This is a statement motivated in the desire to gain sufficient political power to control (internment) policy.

There were 193 statements made that reveals psychological motivation in 1972. The statements were divided approximately evenly between IRA/Catholic and British/Protestant actors. The number of masses-level statements far out-numbers those of elite actors with 162 statements as opposed to 34. There were 137 incidents of perceptual language, 131 incidents of group-identification, 68 emotion-revealing statements, and nine comments that revealed that the actor personally (self) identified with the conflict.

Our trust is completely broken. This situation is desperate. The only alternative is mass pressure, and this is what's taking place - Kevin McCorry, organizer for the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association^{clxiv}.

I have no comment to make at the moment. I am in too violent a temper to comment. We may issue an official statement in the next day or two –
Sean MacStiofain, Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA^{clxv}.

In the first quote, McCorry shows the psychological motivation of perception when he states that there is only one solution to the conflict, that the trust of his entire in-group is broken, and that situation of his in-group is desperate. Also, by using the term “our”, he is revealing that he identifies himself as part of a group. In the second quote, MacStiofain is clearly showing emotion by saying that he is too angry to comment. He is also showing that he is personally upset by the arrest of seven IRA members. This reveals self-identification relevant to the conflict.

1977

There were 104 deaths in 1977 as a result of 38 violent incidents. Non-state organizations were mentioned 32 times. No new organizations were referenced in relation to the violence. Below, is the one quote that was coded as a conflict statement for 1978. It was made by the Provisional IRA as it claimed responsibility for a string of London bombings.

The Provisional IRA claims responsibility for the bombings in London. The campaign will continue throughout England until the British Government announces a declaration of withdrawal of its army out of Northern Ireland –Statement released by the Provisional IRA^{clxvi}.

On January 29, 1977 thirteen bombs detonated at 4:45AM⁷⁵ in London’s shopping district. On the same day, 17 others went off in cities across Northern Ireland. Thirteen

⁷⁵ It has been noted that actors in the Northern Ireland conflict have made it a point to injuring people who were not explicitly involved or related to the conflict. In this, active belligerents, government actors, and

others were discovered and defused. This particular date marked the fifth anniversary of “Bloody Sunday” where British troops shot and killed 13 Irish Catholics at a protest. Thus, revenge as a motive for the bombings is probable. However, as the quote does not specifically state revenge as a motive for the bombings, it is not coded as such. What the statement does communicate, though, is the desire to gain territory. The note specifically states that the Provisional IRA will continue to commit acts of violence until the party that they see as possessing their territory (Northern Ireland) leaves.

Of the articles analyzed in 1977, 16 psychologically-motivated statements were noted. Six were made by IRA/Catholics and 10 by British/Protestant. Similarly, six statements were made by elites and 10 by masses-level actors. In all, there were 14 perceptual, nine group-identification, three emotive, no self-identification-based statements made.

England takes out Irish wealth. She is here for profit. What IRA can do is cut that profit. Instability creates a lack of confidence in capital here. People are not interested in investing if they know their investment is going to run dry on them – A “spokesman” at the Republican Press Center^{clxvii}.

They can do whatever they want over there. They wanted us to react to come over there so we will be perfect targets for snipers. That's just an invitation to aggro- to trouble. So that's exactly what we won't do –Major Nick Jenkins^{clxviii}.

The assertion by the IRA spokesman that Britain is in Ireland purely for money is a perceptual statement. Similarly, the language choice by Major Jenkins about a stand-off

government buildings have typically been the targets of selective terrorism. The timing of the detonation would indicate support of this assertion (White, 2012, 196).

between British and IRA forces relates his perception that the IRA's behavior is calculated to elicit a specific response. He also communicates group-identification sentiments by using we/they language.

1982

In 1982, there were 30 violent incidents resulting in 67 deaths. The IRA was attributed responsibility in all but four of the incidents. Non-state organizations were referenced 39 times. New organizations referenced included the Red Hand Commandos, Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), and the Official Unionist Party.

There were 23 articles with quotes about the Northern Ireland conflict. Two of them contained conflict statements. Both were made by masses-level IRA members. One statement revealed revenge as a motive for violence and the other was a statement revealing that violence was used to gain political power.

[Thomas Cochrane] was executed for involvement in a number of serious crimes- anonymous caller to a Belfast radio station claiming responsibility for Cocharane's death^{clxix}.

According to the article, Cochrane's "execution" was one in a series of the tit-for-tat kidnappings that had, to that date, claimed three lives. Cochrane's murder had been in response to the killing of Peter Corrigan a few days prior. The same day, reportedly in response to Cochrane's kidnapping, Catholic Joseph Donegan was kidnapped and found slain^{clxx}.

There were 23 statements made that revealed psychological impulses. Three of them were made by IRA/Catholic actors and 20 were made by British/Protestant actors.

The elite to non-elite actor statement ratio was approximately even. There were 20 perceptual, 10 emotive, eight group-identification, and one self-identification comments made.

. . .The IRA is here to stay. The words of the chief Constable cost lives- Reverend Ian Paisley^{clxxi}.

I feared something like this and I am satisfied that it is the intention of the terrorists to continue with their killings. My immediate reaction is one of or in sadness. Those men were the victims of debased tribalism- Jack Hermon, chief constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary^{clxxii}.

At the time of this statement, Free Presbyterian minister Ian Paisly had been a leader in the Loyalist movement for a number of years. The article highlights the ambush-style shootings and deaths of three British soldiers by IRA members. According to the article, the IRA killings were in response to Constable Hermon's statement that the IRA was on the decline. Thus, it is the perception of (Protestant) Reverend Paisly that the actions of the IRA were to make a statement about their resolve or vitality. Similarly, Constable Hermon's reaction to a bombing reportedly perpetrated by the IRA reveals perceptual and emotive attribution. It is his perception that the IRA's violent behavior will continue and by calling the behavior of IRA "debased tribalism," he is revealing his personal negative emotions towards the organization.

1987

There were 12 violent incidents reported in 1987. Six were reported to have been perpetrated by IRA/Catholics and two by British/Protestant actors. There were 82 deaths.

Non-state organizations were mentioned eight times. There were no new organizations mentioned, however. Of the 11 quotes germane to the Northern Ireland conflict, none were conflict statements.

There were seven separate quotes that revealed psychological components. Six were made by British/Protestant actors and all of them were made at the masses-level. Emotive and perceptual components were mentioned five times each and group-identification had four incidents. There was no language that revealed self-identification to the Northern Ireland conflict in 1987.

Why don't you interview Sinn Fein? We are fed up with condemning this.
Let's see the guilty men come down the steps and answer your questions.
The whole world wants to see that – Ray Ferguson^{clxxiii}.

The blatantly hostile comment made by Ferguson was directed at reporters who were trying to get a statement for him about a bombing that killed 11 and wounded 61. The IRA claimed that the bomb had gone off prematurely and that it was intended for “security forces”. Ferguson’s anger towards Sinn Féin was shared by the Protestant community as bystanders shouted “murders” as they entered the Ulster town hall to discuss the bombing^{clxxiv}. He also shows group-identification by using we/they language and perceptual thought by assuming that the whole world found the IRA/Sinn Féin guilty for the bombings.

1992

In 1992, there were 29 violent incidents that were reportedly responsible for 134 deaths. Culpability was attributed to the IRA/Catholics for 19 of the incidents while the

Protestants/British were reported as responsible for 10. Non-state organizations were mentioned twelve times with the Protestant and Ulster Freedom Fighters being mentioned for the first time.

Of the 60 quotes reported regarding the Northern Ireland, only two of them were conflict statements. The first article contained statements made by each side of the dyad. Both statements were made from masses-level actors. One attributed violence to the desire for political power where the other showed revenge as a motivation.

Over the past 48 hours active service units of the IRA have struck on three occasions in the very heart of the British capital. These attacks signal our determination and resolve to focus the government's attention on their war in Ireland. As they face a general election, our volunteers will continue to force their occupation of part of our country into the British political agenda – IRA statement released regarding London bombings^{clxxv}.

Because the IRA stated that their behavior was specifically to impact/influence Britain's policies and elections, it is coded as violence to gain political power.

There were 52 psychologically motivated statements in 1992. Seventeen were made by IRA/Catholics, 35 were made by British/Protestants. The elite to masses ratio of statements made was approximately equal. There were 36 perceptual, 26 emotive and group-identification, and two self-identification statements.

Sheer luck prevented our operation from bringing you a fiery Christmas. You will not be so lucky in 1993. We will bring in 1993 with a bang – A statement released by the (Protestant) Ulster Freedom Fighters^{clxxvi}.

If we made it through the blitz during World War II, I can guarantee you this: we are not going to be brought down by this sorry lot of ignorant terrorists – Frank Smith, Christmas donation collector interviewed in downtown London^{clxxvii}.

In the first quote, the Ulster Freedom Fighters show emotion, by saying, “you will not be so lucky” as it communicates, in context, clear intent to inflict harm. They also show group-identification by communicating with we/they language. Smith also shows group-identification with the same language usage in the second quote. He also reveals the presence of the perception of resolve on the part of his in-group against the out-group when he talks on behalf of the British/Protestant by saying that he believed that his in-group would not “be brought down”. Finally, he shows emotion by labeling the IRA/Catholics as “ignorant terrorists.”

1997

In the year before the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the agreement that marked the intent to end the conflict by political actors, there were 33 violent incidents resulting in 20 deaths. Twenty-five of the incidents were attributed to IRA/Catholic actors and eight to the British/Protestants. Non-state groups were mentioned 67 times. The Shankhill Butchers and the Catholic Continuity Army Council were mentioned for the first time. Of the 85 quotes collected, none of them contained conflict statements.

There were 69 quotes that contained psychological components. The IRA/Catholics made 24 of these statements and the Protestant/British made 45. Masses-level actors made 40 of the statement while elites made 29. There were 56 perceptual, 27 group-identification, 24 emotive, statements made. There was also one self-identification statement made.

. . .an evil mafia. . . [Adams and McGuinness] have for over 25 years, been active with in the IRA as activists, commanders, and presently as godfathers. . . Today begins the trial of New Labor on the charge that it has diminished democracy; sacrificed the freedom of the people of Northern Ireland to the terrorist and elevated an evil Mafia to the status of what would shame any other country in Western Europe. . . - Ken Maginnis, Irish Member of Parliament^{clxxviii}.

We have no allusions about the character of Sinn Fein. We did not invite them to the table, but we are not afraid of them and we're not going to run away. We are not here to negotiate, but to confront and expose the fascist character of Sinn Fein- David Trimble, head of the (Protestant) Ulster Unionist Party^{clxxix}.

Maginnis' statement reveals emotive components by calling the IRA and its leaders "evil", "godfathers," and "terrorist". Similarly, Trimble's defiant language and labeling the IRA as fascist reveals his emotions. He also showed group-identification by using we/they language.

2002

In 2002, the first time window analyzed after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, there were a total of 12 violent incidents and 34 deaths reported. Eight of the incidents were attributed to British/Protestant and four to IRA/Catholic actors. There were 21 non-state organizations referenced in 2002. However, there were no new organizations noted. While there were 41 quotes relevant to the Northern Ireland Conflict, none of them were conflict statements.

There were 40 statements that revealed psychological components. Twenty-six of the statements were from British/Protestant actors and 14 were from people associated with the IRA or Catholicism. Masses-level quotes accounted for 25 of the statements

made. There were 31 perceptual, 17 emotive, and 15 group-identity motivated sentiments revealed.

We accept that Sinn Fein's good intentions and the long distance they've come in bringing the Republican movement into politics. But we now have charges in three different jurisdictions that stand in direct contrast with these intentions, and it is undermining everyone's confidence. The time it is taking to rein in this kind of activity is taking longer than any of the other parties in the power-sharing arrangement can reasonably be asked to bear – John Reid, Secretary of Northern Ireland^{clxxx}.

. . . mindless thugs. Children should not have to pay the price for the failure of adults to live together – Jane Kennedy, Britain's Security Minister for Northern Ireland.

The assertion by Secretary Reid that the charges against Sinn Féin have compromised “everyone’s confidence” is a perceptual statement. The claim that time that was needed to control rogue actors was unreasonably long is also a perceptual statement. Minister Kennedy’s emotive statements of “mindless thugs” and “should not have to pay the price. . . “ were in reaction to violence perpetrated against Catholic parents they brought their daughters to school.

2007

There was one violent incident reported in 2007. It was reportedly initiated by British/Protestant actors and resulted in ten deaths. Non-state organizations were mentioned two times. No new organizations were referenced. Though there were only four articles about the Northern Ireland conflict for the year, there was one quote reported.

The quote was made by a masses-level British/Protestant actor and it reveals the psychological components of perception and group identification. “They will be judged by their actions, not their words”- Shaun Woodward, British Secretary to Northern Ireland^{clxxxix}. The statement was made in response to the announcement that the (Protestant) Ulster Defense Association had decided to disband all of its armed units. However, they made their decision conditional on the IRA continued commitment to not commit acts of violence. To that end, they stated that they would keep their armaments. By using “wait and see” language, Secretary Woodward reveals that he is not convinced that the Ulster Defense Association is acting in good faith. His statement shows his perception that that they cannot be completely trusted. Also, his use of we/they language reveals group-identification sentiments.

2012

The search parameters of the project identified 19 articles for analysis. However, none of the articles contained information that was relevant to my research agenda. Thus, 2012 provided no useful analysis information.

Summary

Looking back over the Northern Ireland PSC at the end of the qualitative component of the case, though data was collected starting in 1922, it is clear that this is not when the conflict actually began. In reality, this particular PSC can trace some of its roots back to the Protestant Reformation. Thus, many of the components of PSC that are

being tested in this project were already present before the Ireland became a sovereign state.

Over the duration of this case, however, some of the descriptive and supporting components, such as deaths and conflict statements, are present in some of time windows and not at all in others. Other components, like self-identification, are absent an overwhelming amount of the time. Because of this, and the indications that this particular PSC is in the process of resolution, seeing which components are supported and which are not in this case will be particularly salient in forming a theoretic conceptualization of PSC.

CASE ANALYSIS

Analysis of the data in the Northern Ireland PSC provides a wide variety of quotes from the people that were personally involved in the conflict. In this section of the chapter, I use the statements that I have collected from these actors and the information provided in the articles to determine whether the components that I am assessing are indeed necessary components of this PSC. The first four components (≥ 20 years of violent conflict; ≥ 3 violence and peace cycles; ≥ 500 deaths; and the participation of non-state actors) are the descriptive components of the Northern Ireland PSC. The last two components (competition-based conflict and psychological motivation) are conceptualized as the supporting components.

DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PSC

Duration of Violent Conflict

Equal to or Greater Than Twenty Years

The length of time that a conflict endures is a distinguishing component of PSC. The minimum time that a violent conflict must be present to be considered a PSC is 20 years in this study. This duration was chosen so that the lapse of time would be inclusive of the biological and social concepts of a generation. Though data collection began in 1922 with the establishment of the Irish state, the conflict between Unionists and Loyalists began long before. Because of this, a PSC may have already been in place when data collection began.

The data shows that there were lapses in time of time between violent incidents. However, the presence of violent conflict is sufficient to support the theoretical conceptualization of a minimum of 20 years for violent conflict to have existed to be considered a PSC. In the window from 1922 through 1942, there were 16 violent incidents. In every 20-year increment examined, there were sufficient violent incidents (a minimum of six) to code each window positively for the presence of violent conflict over that span of time. However, because data collection started in 1922, the first four five-year time windows were coded negative automatically. Because Boolean analysis recorded 15 of the 19 time windows positively for the presence of 20 years or more of violent conflict, it can be supported as a component of PSC (see table 6.1). My proposal that this component is a necessary component of PSC can be supported in this case.

Violence Cycles

PSC is marked by vacillations in violence between the actors. There can be durations of time in a PSC where there is no violence between the actors only to have violent conflict erupt again at a later time over the same issue(s) or stimuli. A minimum of three months between violent episodes or spikes was established to be consistent with the Nedler-Mead model of three data points to begin a pattern of non-violence. Violent incidents were measured using the dates that individual, non-governmental actors or government-based attacks were reported.

There were three time windows in the Northern Ireland case where no violent incidents occurred at all. These years were 1947, 1962, and 2012. Even with the three years that had no violent incidents, 13 of the 19 years examined coded positively because the frequency of incidents surpassed the minimum threshold of three incidents per year that were at least three months apart (see figure 6.1). In the time-windows examined in this case, violence was present across time and on an annual basis, it surpassed theoretical minimums.




Figure 6.1: Violent Incidents Reported - Northern Ireland Conflict

While there were ten years where there were three month gaps in violence (1927, 1937, 1942, 1947, 1952, 1962, 1967, 2002, 2007, and 212), when violent incidents did occur, they occurred in high enough frequencies to result in an average of 23.63 violent incidents per year. Even on an annual level, cycles of violence are evident and showed marginal increase over time (see figure 6.1). The increasing pattern is demonstrated in the trend line in figure 6.1 as it shows that violent incidents increase over the life of the case. Even when removing the year with the highest number of violent incidents as a possible outlier, the average violent incidents per year was 11.52. This by far exceeds the proposed theoretical minimum of 3. Thus, Boolean analysis supports my proposition that a three or more violent/peace cycles are a necessary component of PSC.

Casualties

In PSCs, violent events tend to be sporadic and can have lower death rates per violent incident as compared to militarized conflict. Thus, they are harder to measure than militarized conflicts in event-driven research. To account for these particular features of PSC but provide measurable criteria, I have modified Wallerstein's (2006) parameters for militarized conflicts of 25 deaths per year to 500 deaths over a 20-year time span. In doing so, the actual number of casualties required for a theoretical minimum remains the same, but the time restraints are adjusted take into consideration of the sporadic and cyclical nature of PSC.

In six of the 19 years examined, the directly relatable deaths in the Northern Ireland conflict met or exceeded the 25-person minimum (see table 6.1). Thus, Boolean analysis support my proposition that an average of 25 casualties per year within a 20-year window are a necessary component of PSC. The number of casualties just barely met the proposed theoretical minimum, however.

It is interesting to note that the number of deaths in every year up to the Troubles (1972) failed to meet the minimum criteria (see figure 6.2).




Figure 6.2: Casualties- Northern Ireland Case

As noted earlier in the chapter, it is documented that actors in the Northern Ireland PSC have historically made a concerted effort to avoid inflicting casualties on people that are not directly involved in the conflict. The majority targets in planned terrorist events in this case have been active participants in the conflict, governmental officials, buildings, and commodities. The fact that the number of casualties across time meets the minimum (proposed) theoretical criteria even when there was a conscious effort to specifically avoid the shedding of “innocent” blood, could speak to the true intensity of this conflict. It could explain why violent incidents exceed the minimum threshold by nearly four-fold, but barely met theoretical minimums in casualties.

Participation of Non-state Actors

The participation of non-state actors includes individuals and groups that are not affiliated with a state that have participated in, or are associated with, acts of violence. There is a moderate increase over time in the referencing of non-state actors as a party to the violence in the Northern Ireland PSC (see figure 6.3). The minimum theoretical threshold for a positive Boolean outcome requires that there has to be at least six PSC – related events where non-state actors are referenced in the violence for the year coded positively for having had non-state actors’ participation in the PSC. Lastly, for the case to be coded positively for having the participation of non-state as a necessary component of PSC there had to be at least six years that were coded positively for the participation of non-state actors. In the Northern Ireland case, 12 of the 19 years examined were coded positive for the presence of non-state actors. Thus, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of the participation of non-state actor as a necessary component of PSC.




Figure 6.3: References to Non-State Actors - Northern Ireland Case

Supporting components of PSC

The supporting components that this project proposes are components that are not readily observed, but could be the components that are actually responsible for the enduring nature of PSC. In this and the other cases analyzed in this dissertation, the components from which data is gathered and assessed are organized into two categories. These are competition-based conflict and psychological motivation. This is operationalized by assessing actor statements to determine behavioral motivation⁷⁶. By assessing the statements of the actual actors in the conflict, the reason why PSCs are enduring in nature could be realized.

⁷⁶ For further explanation of coding rules for content analysis, please refer to the appendix.

Competition-based Conflict

The components tested in competition-based conflict are territory, resources, security, political power, social power, and revenge. Theoretical minimum criteria for coding the presence (positive Boolean outcome) for each component included a minimum of six quotes in a year where the actors stated that an individual component was the reason they committed or would commit an act of violence. For the case to be coded as positive for the existence of competition-based conflict there had to be at least six years throughout the course of the case that clearly revealed that competition-based conflict was the motivation for behavior.

Using these parameters, only one of the 19 years analyzed coded positive for the presence of competition-based conflict (see table 6.2). Also, no single component was present sufficiently to justify its inclusion as a necessary component of the category of Competition-Based Conflict in PSC. Even with the spike in competition-based conflict quotes in 1972, the trend line for this component remains flat. When 1972 is removed, the trend line is negative (see figure 6.4)⁷⁷.

⁷⁷ To test whether trends across this case were due to the unusually high frequency of incidents in 1972, I removed the year from consideration from all of the components tested. All components still showed overall trends of increasing over time, except for competition-based conflict statements. Thus, I put 1972 back into final tables.




Figure 6.4: Conflict-Based Violence Statements - Northern Ireland Case

The components measured for competition over tangible assets included territory, control over resources, and physical security. Not a single one of these components were present sufficiently to be coded as being present in the Boolean analysis. Together, they were mentioned nine times across nineteen, one-year, data-collection windows that spanned the duration (ninety-years) of the conflict. Security-motivated violence was the most highly mentioned tangible asset with eight references, seven of which were in 1972 (one territorial reference was also made in 1972). Conflict over resources was not mentioned a single time as a motive for violent behavior.

Components measured for competition over non-tangible assets included political power, social power, and revenge. Though there was a higher frequency of reference to

non-tangible assets being a motive for violence, they were still insufficient to be coded positively for their overall presence in the Northern Ireland conflict. Conflict to gain political power and revenge were both coded positively once (in 1972). Throughout the span of the case, violence to gain political power was mentioned 24 times. This is 51.1% of all of the competition-based motivated statements for violence and it has three times the references made about any other competition-based conflict motivation. (The next most frequent references were revenge and physical security with eight references each.) Violent behavior to gain social power was mentioned a total five times across in the case.

Competition-based conflict is proposed as one of the six categorically necessary components of PSC. In this case, however, that proposition cannot be supported. With over half of the statements that *were* reported being about violence acts that were committed to gain political power, the role of competition-based conflict and politically-motivated violence should not be summarily dismissed, though. The failure of Boolean methods to support my proposition may be more the result of data collection criteria, the nature of the data that I am collecting, and reporting practices, though. In this project, I have made a concerted effort to let the words of the actors who are directly involved in the conflict to speak for themselves. In this case in particular, there were many articles where the author told readers in their own words what the motivation for the violence was. They either did not use any quotes or used quotes to illustrate other points that they were making. Because the reason given for the violence was written in the author's instead of the participants' voices, it was not included in the data. Also, committing acts

of terrorism is considered a criminal act and many of the non-state organizations that participated in (or were associated with) the conflict were outlawed. Hence, actors in illegal organizations may not have been as readily available to give statements. Similarly, as members of illegal organizations, they may not have been given the opportunity/access to media that would have been needed for me to gather more information. Any of these limitations may have impacted the results of this component.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION

Through Boolean analysis, the justification for the inclusion of psychological motivation as a necessary component of PSC is strongly supported in the Northern Ireland PSC. Statements that revealed presence of psychological motivation passed minimum theoretical criteria in 11 of the 19 years analyzed (see table 6.3). Thus, in the Northern Ireland case, analysis supports my proposition that psychological motivation is a necessary component of PSC. When analyzing each of the components individually, however, they were not all supported as necessary components.

Emotion

The proposition that the presence of emotion is a necessary component of the psychological motivation of PSC can be supported using Boolean analysis. Emotionally-charged statements are present in approximately 23.14% of all quotes that contained psychological sentiments. Boolean analysis shows that emotion is coded as present in eight of the nineteen years analyzed. Because the theoretical minimum of six years is surpassed, it is supported as a jointly necessary component in the category of

psychological motivation in PSC. Also, emotive statements are consistent and trend slightly positive across the duration of the conflict (see figure 6.5).




Figure 6.5: Emotive Statements - Northern Ireland Case

Even with the large gaps in violent behaviors across the case, the overall trend in the frequency of emotive statements increases over time. The positive trend in frequency throughout the course of this case conflict could indicate that the role of emotion increases as the PSC endures over time.

Perception

Of the total quotes that contain psychological motivation in the Northern Ireland case, 42.93% are statements that reveal perceptual motivations (see table 6.3). Ten of the nineteen years are coded positively for the presence of perception in PSC. Finally, the

presence of perceptual statements increases over the duration of the Northern Ireland PSC (see figure 6.6).




Figure 6.6: Perceptual Statements - Northern Ireland PSC

Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of perception plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout the course of this case could indicate that the role of perception increases as the PSC endures over time.

There were well over 1000 articles that my search criteria identified in 1932 in the Northern Ireland Conflict. A large number of these articles fell into two categories that do not coincide directly with the components that I am researching, but they are noteworthy. Both sets of articles spoke to the perceptions of the actors in the Northern Ireland

conflict. The first set of articles focused on a disagreement between the Irish and the British governments regarding how the British government handled the issue of land annuities when Ireland gained its independence in 1922. Though the ensuing quote is lengthy, it shows the (continuing) Irish resentment of (perceived) British imperialism and profiteering. It also demonstrates how the conflict within the dyad has a very long history that remained salient to the actors:

As this is a matter of life and death to the Irish Free State, I would like to explain that Mr. Wilson has not told the whole story. It is not true that the financial equities seem to be clear in favor of the British government. Neither in history, nor in law is there a solid basis for the British claim to the land annuities. The facts, in bare outline are as follows: at various periods between the English invasion and the end of the 17th century, the English without a shadow of moral right, confiscated the land of Ireland, giving it to their soldiers and adventurers of every war for services against the Irish people. The new landlords and their successors, as the body, never came really to regard themselves as Irishmen. In their dealing with the Irish people, they acted as alien conquerors whose interest was to bring you as much as they could from their tenants. By means of extortionate rents, they kept the tenants at the barest subsistence level. They gave no security of tenure, and whenever it seemed to suit their selfish interests. They evicted the rightful owners of the land by thousands, indifferent to the fact that in most cases there was no hope of alternative means of livelihood in the country. Ultimately, these conditions and the resolve of the people to regain possession of the land led to the 'land war' of 50 years ago. The land war resulted in the passing of various land-purchase acts. The landlord's interests were bought out by means of state credit. The tenants became owners of their holdings are subject to annual payments to the state intended to cover the interest and sinking fund of the stock issued to finance the purchase schemes. (The state was the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.) In 1920, the Government of Ireland Act, passed by the United Kingdom Parliament, made the interest in sinking fund of

land stock a charge on the revenues of Great Britain alone and gave the land annuities unconditionally to the two Irish Parliaments created by the act. (The annuities in the six counties of Northern Ireland have ever since been collected and retained by the parliament of that area.) The sole financial liability toward Great Britain imposed by the treaty was contained in article V, which was made. The Irish Free State liable for upper portion of the United Kingdom public debt and war pensions to be determined by agreement or arbitration, having regard to any just claims of Ireland by way of set-off or counterclaim. Article V was canceled in December 1925, by the boundary agreement, which was subsequently ratified by both Parliaments. The cancellation ended all legal financial obligations of the Irish Free State to the British Government, with the exception of a payment of £250,000 a year, which was imposed by the boundary agreement itself, and which is now in dispute. I think it will be clear from this brief summary of the facts that we are simply refusing to allow the British Government to fasten upon the Irish Free State, the cost of undoing an injustice done to our country in the past by its British rulers: we are refusing to pay a debt which is not ours, a debt which the Parliament of the United Kingdom, overwhelmingly British in its membership, solemnly placed upon Great Britain herself in 1920 – Sean T. O’Kelly, Head of the Irish Free State Delegation in response to statements made by P.W. Wilson^{clxxxii}.

In this and other articles during 1932, the Irish were taking the British to task over their perception of history concerning land seizure, land use, annuities, and unfair debt burdens.

The second groups of articles are about economic discrimination by Protestants in Northern Ireland towards the Catholic community. Because no casualties, quotes, or other information that I was coding was reported, the majority of this important

component of the dyad's conflict, was not included in my data. However, the frequency that economic discrimination/disparity was mentioned in the articles gives me pause⁷⁸.

Out of the road with this! It is only an emblem of hypocrisy. I will not stand here and allow this sort of thing to continue – John Beattie, Member of Irish Parliament, in reaction to Parliament's refusal to accept a motion to discuss unemployment^{clxxxiii}.

Beattie was so angered by the Parliament Speaker's decision to refuse to accept his motion to discuss unemployment that he threw a mace across the room and had to be forcibly removed^{clxxxiv}. Similarly, on October 6, there was a riot in Belfast that the New York Times attributed to anger from unemployment and economic discrimination against Catholics^{clxxxv}.

The actors in both sets of articles show great emotion over their perceptions of unfair economic practices. Though outside of the pre-determined search criteria, because of how the events unfolded and how they were reported, these two sets of articles show emotion and group-identity sentiments that are based in their perceptions of reality concerning their economic well-being. While these could be supportive of the proposition that the perception of economic discrimination/disparity could be a sustaining component of PSC, could this actually reveal a "deeper" truth about the nature of PSC? Could it be that enduring perceptions of reality, whether based fact or not, are what drives emotion

⁷⁸ Though the issue of economic discrimination and disparity brought-up in the Northern Ireland case, I also noted several articles in the Arab/Israeli case about the same issue. There were several articles where Palestinians stated that they believed that they did not get jobs or certain positions in the Israeli economy because of their ethnic identity.

and identity as rallying points for violent behavior? Could perception be *the* vital component that sustains the psychological component of PSC?

Self-Identity

Self-identification is one of the original four necessary components of PSC listed by Azar. However, of the psychological motivations evaluated, it has the lowest incidence. Overall, self-identification statements were an average of only 1.67% of all of the psychologically motivated statements in the Northern Ireland PSC (see table 6.3). Boolean analysis fails to support the inclusion of self-identity as a necessary component of psychological motivation in PSC in this case. Only one of the nineteen years analyzed was coded positively for its presence. Because of this, the proposition that self-identity individually contributes to PSC in a significant manner or is a necessary component of the category of psychological motivation in PSC cannot be supported in the Northern Ireland case.

Group-Identity

In the Northern Ireland case, group-identity-based statements are specifically mentioned in 32.26% of the quotes that communicated any type psychological motivation. Eight of the nineteen years assessed were coded positively for the presence of group-identity. Because only six years were needed, to fulfill the minimum theoretical requirements, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of group identity as a sustaining

psychological motivation in PSC (see table 6.3). Lastly, statements that reveal group-identity are present over the duration of the Northern Ireland PSC and the frequency of group-identification statements increases over the life of the conflict (see figure 6.7).




Figure 6.7: Group-Identification Statements - Northern Ireland PSC

Boolean analysis supports the proposition that the psychological motivation of group-identification plays a supportive role in PSC. Also, the positive trend in frequency throughout the course of the conflict could indicate that the role of group-identity increases as the PSC endures over time⁷⁹.

Summary of Psychological Motivation

⁷⁹ To test whether the increasing trend was due to the unusually high frequency of incidents in 1972, I removed the year from consideration. The table still showed a clear trend of increasing over time.

Analysis of the four proposed jointly necessary components found that emotion, perception and group identity can be supported as jointly necessary components of psychological motivation in PSC in the Northern Ireland case using Boolean analysis. Hence, proposing that emotion, perception, and group identity are jointly necessary components of the category of Psychological Motivation, a sustaining component of PSC, can be supported in this case. The inclusion of self-identity, as an individually contributing component of Psychological Motivation in PSC, cannot be supported in the Northern Ireland PSC, however.

Emotion, perception, and group-identification each demonstrated trends of increasing in frequency over the course this case (see figure 6.8).




Figure 6.8: Statements that Reveal Psychological Motivation – Northern Ireland Case

The increase in psychologically motivated statements in this case could be tangible support for assertions that PSC changes and takes on additional components and issues of contention over time.

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS

While Boolean methods can aid in determining theoretical necessity and sufficiency, what it cannot inform is the relatedness of the components that are being studied. Because of this, confirmatory factor analysis is used. The six primary categorical components were initially assessed to determine how many factors best reflects the data of the Northern Ireland case. A maximum likelihood model, two-, three-, and four-factor models were assessed. The maximum likelihood analysis showed that a (retained) two-factor model best reflected the data. Thus, a two-factor model is used in this case (see figure 6.9).




Figure 6.9: PSC Factor Viability Scores - Northern Ireland Case

Using the two-factor model, the first factor accounts for 88.51% of the total variance found in the model (see figure 6.10).

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion
Factor 1	2.55	1.95	0.8851
Factor 2	0.61	0.48	0.2102

Figure 6.10: Two Factor PSC Viability Model (unrotated) – Northern Ireland Case

In fact, all of the components vary together (having component scores $> +0.5$), loading on factor 1- with the exception of conflict duration and deaths. The single, underlying dimension of factor one accounts for 83% of the variation in non-state actors, 76% of the variation in deaths, 81.6% of the variation in violent incidents, 84% of the variation in conflict statements, and 84% of the variation in psychological statements (see figure 6.11). The components that load in factor 1 load only minimally in factor two (<0.5 to >-0.5).

	<u>Two Factor Model</u>		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Violent Incidents	0.8335	0.0454	0.2618
Conflict Duration	0.0905	-0.3702	0.8506
Deaths	0.3109	0.5228	0.6131
Non-State Actors	0.7593	-0.3370	0.3074
Conflict Statement	0.8430	0.2636	0.4197
Psychological Motivation	0.8430	-0.3370	.3074

Figure 6.11: Factor Loadings for PSC Viability Model – Northern Ireland Case

The second factor accounts for 21% of the model variance. Conflict duration and deaths load on factor two. Thus, the second factor is needed to account for conflict duration and deaths in the Northern Ireland PSC. Conflict duration has a factor score of 0.09 and is the most unique components measured (0.85). Similarly, the component, “deaths”, has a factor score of 0.31 and is the second most unique component (0.61) (see figure 6.11).

The components that load on factor one - violent incidents, non-state actors, conflict statements, and psychological statements; load together very strongly and only minimally on factor two. As factor one accounts for over 88% of the variation in the model, and the majority of the individual components load strongly on factor one, analysis suggests that the components of factor one are rightly associated with PSC.

CONCLUSION

The Northern Ireland PSC is a conflict that has seen the same sets of actors engage in periods of violence for over 400 years. In the last two decades, however, this PSC has made significant strides towards resolution. Though this dissertation focuses more on the theoretic aspects of what the components are that sustaining conflict, identifying the (behavioral) patterns of those components could inform how PSCs can end.

Boolean analysis showed that 20 or more years of conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more directly relatable deaths, and psychological motivation can be supported as necessary components of PSC.

However, the inclusion of competition-based conflict as a necessary component cannot be supported in this case. While there are potential reasons why this particular component failed to be supported as a necessary component, the data did reveal items of interest about the conflict statements that were identified. Of the reported statements that contained competition-based sentiments, 51% of them were about gaining political power. Though this particular category failed to be supported by Boolean Analysis, the fact that nearly half of the statements that were identified were about gaining political power speaks to what issue(s) are driving the violent behavior. Also, factor analysis indicates that competition-based conflict is rightly associated with PSC. As such, the component cannot be summarily dismissed in this case.

When assessing the potential psychological motivations in the Northern Ireland PSC, all but one of the proposed individual components are supported as contributing to the conflict. Boolean analysis supports the proposition that emotion, perception, and group-identification are jointly necessary components of the Northern Ireland conflict. Self-identification fails to have the necessary minimum frequency of references to justify its theoretical inclusion. Overall, self-identification-revealing statements represent only 1.67% of all of the statements that revealed psychological impetus in this conflict.

Factor analysis shows that violent incidents, non-state actors, competition-based conflict statements, and psychological motivation all load on the same factor and account for almost 90% of the variation in this case. Conflict duration and deaths load on a second factor. This demonstrates that violence, the participation of non-state actors,

conflict statements, and psychological motivation are predictive of PSC and are rightly associated with PSC.

The theoretical role that competition-based conflict plays as a sustaining component of the Northern Ireland PSC cannot be clearly determined using Boolean analysis in this case. However, using factor analysis, it does load strongly on factor 1 (0.84) indicating that it plays a role in predicting conflict duration and deaths. Thus, the role that competition-based conflict plays in PSC cannot be clearly determined in this case. Even so, 20 or more years of conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more directly relatable deaths, and psychological motivation can be. Thus, the best pictorial representation of the (pre) theoretically necessary components of PSC in the Northern Ireland conflict is as follows:




Figure 6.12: Necessary Components of PSC – Northern Ireland Case

Table 6.1: Boolean Analysis for the Northern Ireland PSC

Year	≥ 20 Years ⁸⁰		Non-state Actors ⁸¹		≥ 3 Violence/Peace Cycles ⁸²		≥ 500 Deaths ⁸³		Comp.-based Conflict Stat. ⁸⁴		Psychological ⁸⁵		Pres. of PSC
	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	
1922	0	N	16	Y	6	Y	16	N	1	N	31	Y	N
1927	0	N	1	N	1	N	9	N	0	N	3	N	N
1932	0	N	5	N	6	Y	2	N	3	N	21	Y	N
1937	0	N	6	Y	3	Y	0	N	0	N	16	Y	N
1942	1	Y	18	Y	11	Y	14	N	0	N	8	Y	N
1947	1	Y	1	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	15	Y	N
1952	1	Y	3	N	1	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1957	1	Y	42	Y	33	Y	9	N	0	N	14	Y	N
1962	1	Y	2	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	3	N	N
1967	1	Y	7	Y	3	Y	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1972	1	Y	222	Y	230	Y	530	Y	27	Y	345	Y	Y
1977	1	Y	32	Y	38	Y	104	Y	1	N	26	Y	N
1982	1	Y	39	Y	30	Y	67	Y	3	N	39	Y	N
1987	1	Y	8	Y	12	Y	82	Y	2	N	14	Y	N
1992	1	Y	12	Y	29	Y	134	Y	2	N	90	Y	N
1997	1	Y	67	Y	33	Y	20	N	0	N	107	Y	N
2002	1	Y	21	Y	12	Y	34	Y	0	N	63	Y	N
2007	1	Y	2	N	1	N	10	N	0	N	2	N	N
2012	1	Y	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	0	N
Boolean Outcome ⁸⁶	15/19 = Y		12/19 = Y		13/19 = Y		6/19 = Y		1/19 = N		11/19 = Y		1/19 = N

⁸⁰ Criteria: Y = Violent conflict has been occurring between the actors ≥ 20 years (as determined by the presence of violent incidents and of deaths)

⁸¹ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Non-state actors is six or more references to non-state actors (individuals and organizations) committing acts of violence or being made in reference to the violence/year.

⁸² Criteria: Y = Overall presence conflict cycles is three or more references to violent behavior that are at least three months apart/year.

⁸³ Criteria: Y = Casualties must equal 25 or more deaths/year (and equal 500 or more deaths over a 20-year window).

⁸⁴ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Competition-based Conflict Components are six or more incidents/year.

⁸⁵ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of Psychological Components are six or more incidents/year.

⁸⁶ Criteria: Y = Overall presence of each component must be present in six or more windows analyzed.

Table 6.2: Boolean Analysis: Competition-Based Motives Conflict Statements- Northern
Ireland PSC

Year	Territory		Resources		Security		Political Power		Social Power		Revenge		Conf. Pres.
	0	N	0	N	1	N	1	N	0	N	0	N	
1922	0	N	0	N	1	N	1	N	0	N	0	N	N
1927	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1932	0	N	0	N	0	N	2	N	2	N	0	N	N
1937	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1942	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1947	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1952	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1957	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1962	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1967	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1972	1	N	0	N	7	Y	19	Y	2	N	6	Y	Y
1977	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1982	0	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	N
1987	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	0	N	N
1992	0	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	N
1997	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2002	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2007	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2012	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
Sum/Outcome	0/19 = N		1/19 = N		1/19 = N		1/19 = N		0/19 = N		1/19 = N		1/19 = N
% of Conflict Statements	1/14 = 2.1%		0/47 = 0.0%		8/47 = 17.0%		24/47 = 51.1%		5/47 = 10.6%		8/48 = 17.0%		

* Criteria: Y = Minimum threshold for coding the presence of individual Competition-based Conflict components in given year is ≥ 6 incidents/ year. For each component to be coded positively of its overall presence in the conflict there must be ≥ 6 positive Booleans outcome from annual summaries.

Table 6.3: Boolean Analysis: Psychological Motivation - Northern Ireland PSC

Year	Emotion		Percep.		Self-ID		Group-ID		Psy. Pres.
1922	9	Y	11	Y	0	N	11	Y	Y
1927	1	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	N
1932	7	Y	8	Y	0	N	6	Y	Y
1937	5	N	6	Y	0	N	5	N	Y
1942	1	N	3	N	0	N	0	N	N
1947	1	N	2	N	0	N	2	N	N
1952	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1957	4	N	5	N	0	N	5	N	Y
1962	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1967	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1972	68	Y	137	Y	9	Y	131	Y	Y
1977	2	N	14	Y	0	N	9	Y	Y
1982	10	Y	19	Y	1	N	8	Y	Y
1987	5	N	5	Y	0	N	4	N	Y
1992	26	Y	36	Y	2	N	26	Y	Y
1997	24	Y	56	Y	1	N	27	Y	Y
2002	17	Y	31	Y	0	N	15	Y	Y
2007	1	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	N
2012	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
Sum/Outcome	180	8/19 = Y [']	334	10/19 = Y [']	13	1/19 = N [']	251	8/19 = Y [']	11/19 = Y*
% Psychological Statements	180/778 = 23.1 %		334/778 = 42.9%		13/778 = 1.7%		251/778 = 32.3%		

* Criteria: Y = Minimum threshold for coding the presence of individual components in the category of Psychological Motivation are six or more recorded incidents/ year.

' Criteria: Y = For each component to be coded positively for its overall presence in the conflict, there must be six or more positive Boolean outcomes from that component's annual summaries.

CHAPTER 7

ANALYSIS OF PSC CASES

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I use the data that is collected from the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs to determine which proposed components assessed are supported as necessary components of PSC. Boolean analysis is the primary method used for the determination of necessity. Factor analysis is also used to assess the relatedness of the components measured. By using two critical PSC cases, it is hoped that the support for the sustaining elements of PSC can be identified.

Analysis of these cases is done in two sections. The first section assesses the descriptive components of PSC. These are 20 or more years of conflict, the participation of non-state actors, 500 or more deaths that are directly relatable to the PSC, and three or more violence/peace cycles in the conflict. The second section assesses the proposed supporting components of PSC. These are components that may not be readily observed, but could contribute to the enduring nature of PSC. These components are conceptualized as competition-based conflict and psychological motivation. Competition-based conflict is conflict over tangible assets (territory, resources, or physical security) and/or non-tangible assets (social and political power or revenge). Finally, I will be assessing the components in the category of psychological motivation (emotion, perception, self-identification, and group-identification) to determine whether any or all of the proposed psychological components can be supported as necessary components of PSC.

DESCRIPTIVE COMPONENTS OF PSC

Twenty or more years of violent conflict

Though data was collected for less than 100 years in each case, dyadic violence in both the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland conflicts has spanned centuries. Twenty-four of the 32 time-windows evaluated had six or more violent incidents within the past 20 years. Thus, Boolean analysis supports the presence of 20 or more years of violent conflict as a necessary component of PSC (see tables 5.1 and 6.1). Even with data collection parameters that did not cover the entire time-span of the conflicts, conflict patterns clearly demonstrated contiguous and cyclical conflict that exceeds the theoretical minimums (see figure 7.1)⁸⁷. The patterns of violent incidents in the two PSC cases analyzed support the proposition twenty or more years of violent conflict is a necessary component of PSC.

⁸⁷ In this chapter, the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases are charted together unless the differences between the cases are so great that being charted together will result in obscuring the findings in one of the cases.




Figure 7.1: Violent Incidents in PSC Cases

Violence/Peace Cycles

Nineteen of the thirty-two time-windows assessed for cycles of violence and peace met or exceeded the minimum theoretical threshold using Boolean analysis. Thus, my proposal that three or more violence/peace cycles are a necessary component of PSC can be supported. In almost 60% of the years analyzed, there were violent incidents that occurred at least three months apart from each other. While violent incidents were more numerous in the Arab/Israeli case and violence was more consistent across time, there are spikes and low-points in the violence pattern (see figure 7.2). 1948, 1968, and 2003 experienced marked increases in violence.




Figure 7.2: Violence/Peace Cycles- Arab/Israeli Case

Similarly, the Northern Ireland conflict experienced cyclical violence. In this case, however, the frequency of violence is much lower (see figure 7.3). With the exception of 1972, there were no years saw more than 50 violent incidents (as opposed to the Arab/Israeli conflict that had five years with more than 50 violent incidents and also had a shorter data collection time-span). There were two years in the Northern Ireland conflict, prior to the Good Friday Agreement, that saw no violence at all (1947 and 1962), only to have violence resume in subsequent time windows.




Figure 7.3: Violence/Peace Cycles- Northern Ireland Case

Even given the differences in the frequency in which violent events occurred in these critical cases, the cyclical nature of the violence patterns is evident.

Casualties

The proposed theoretical minimum deaths that are directly-attributable to PSC is an average of 25 deaths per year over any given 20-year period of the PSC. Of the 32 time-windows analyzed, 19 of the years were coded positively of more than 25 deaths per year (see figures 7.4 and 7.5).




Figure 7.4: Casualties – Arab/Israeli Case




Figure 7.5: Casualties – Northern Ireland Case

Overall, the Arab/Israeli case had a mean rate of 1,111 deaths per year and the Northern Ireland case had an average of 54. The Arab/Israeli case experienced large casualty rates than the Northern Ireland case. In the Arab/Israeli case, casualties are more consistent

across time. In the Northern Ireland case, however, casualty patterns are more clustered. This difference could be a critical.

As discussed in chapter six, in the earlier years of the Northern Ireland conflict, actors who committed acts of violence made efforts to exact “surgical” strikes, hitting only governmental officials and buildings. They would give advance warning so that no “innocent life” was lost. During the troubles, however, warnings before bombings decreased and actors started accusing each other of ethnic cleansing (Barnes, 2005, 148). This change in policy is evident in the comparison in the pattern changes of violent incidents to casualties across the conflict (see figure 7.6).




Figure 7.6: Change in Violence and Death Patterns - Northern Ireland Conflict

Using a three-period moving average, the overall trend of violent incidents to number of deaths showed that violent incidents were approximately equal to or surpassed the

number of deaths⁸⁸ prior to The Troubles. During the troubles, however, where efforts to avoid the loss of “innocent” life were not specifically avoided, the number of deaths far surpassed the number of violent incidents. In this, the violent incidents to deaths pattern more closely resembles the ratios of the Arab/Israeli conflict (see figure 7.7)⁸⁹.




Figure 7.7: Change in Violence and Death Patterns in the Arab/Israeli Conflict

What prompted this change and how is it relevant to understanding the supporting mechanisms of PSC? In the Arab/Israeli conflict, Arab/Palestinian actors reject the legitimacy of the Israeli people to establish the land of Israel/Palestine as a homeland. While this PSC began over a territorial dispute, chapter five clearly demonstrates existing animosity between the two groups (as evidenced by the stated increase in the motivation of revenge in violence and the emotionally, perceptually, group-identification charged

⁸⁸⁸⁸ In this figure, data from 1972 was not included so that the trend lines of violent incidents and deaths in years with lower intensities/frequencies can be better examined.

⁸⁹ As with the Northern Ireland PSC, the casualty levels for 1948 in the Arab/Israeli conflict were so high, that if they were included, the patterns in other years with lower conflict intensity would not be as discernible. Therefore, 1948 is not included.

statements). Chapter six also reveals increasing trends in revenge-based violence and emotional, perceptual, and group-identification sentiments. If Bane’s statements that (non-state) actors in the Northern Ireland conflict stopped showing concern for the loss of innocent life in the out-group and that ethnic cleansing was being attempted are correct, this shows a change in the psychology of the actors where the legitimacy of the out-group to exist is now rejected. If accurate, this could indicate that psychological motivation plays a strong role in supporting the continuation of PSCs.⁹⁰

Non-State Actors

In both PSCs analyzed, non-state actors were referenced in relation to the conflict and violence consistently across time. In fact, the references of non-state actors increased over time in both cases. However, the rate of increase is greater in Arab/Israeli case than the Northern Ireland case (see figures 7.8 and 7.9).




Figure 7.8: Participation of Non-State Actors- Arab/Israeli Case

⁹⁰ If changes in the psychology of the actors can help explain the increases in violent incidents and deaths in the Northern Ireland conflict during The Troubles, can it help explain why this particular PSC looks like it is ending? Though this question is beyond the scope of this particular project, it is a fascinating question to ponder. If unexplored, would be an excellent follow-on project.




Figure 7.9: Participation of Non-State Actors- Northern Ireland Case

Of the 32 windows assessed, 23 years had sufficient references to the participation of non-state actors in conflict to be coded positively. Because this surpasses the minimum theoretical requirement of 12 references, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of non-state actors as a necessary component of PSC. Existing scholarly literature asserts that the participation of non-state actors is a distinguishing quality of PSC. The actual frequency of non-state actors that are coded positively in Boolean analysis is almost double the theoretical minimum. This lends support to the scholarly position that non-state actors are a necessary component of PSC.

SUPPORTING COMPONENTS OF PSC: COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT

Competition-based conflict is measured based on the statements of the actual actors in each PSC analyzed. As with other components, 12 or more of the 32 year-long windows had to be coded positively for this category to be considered a necessary component of PSC. There were exactly 12 time-windows between the two cases that were coded positively for the presence of competition-based conflict. Therefore, Boolean

analysis supports my proposition that competition-based conflict is a necessary component of PSC. However, not all of the components in the sub-categories of conflict over tangible and non-tangible assets were supported.

The incidence of conflict statements that directly identified why acts of violence were committed were limited in relation to the total number of quotes that were collected. Of the 1275 quotes that were analyzed, only 16.9% (216) of them contained conflict statements. This is an average of 6.75 statements per year across the 32 time-windows assessed in the two cases. Thus, with a minimum theoretical threshold being six quotes, for any single component to achieve the minimum theoretical threshold is a challenging task.

Before analyzing specific radial components, possible reasons as to why there were so few conflict statements must be addressed. The low incidence for conflict statements could be for several reasons. First, as a design feature of this project, I purposely let the words of the actors who are directly involved in the conflict speak for themselves. Thus, if an actor was not completely clear as to why an act of violence was committed or if a reporter paraphrased or gave the reason for a violent act, it was not included in the data. Because of this, there were numerous articles in both cases that were rejected. Another possible reason for a lower number of conflict statements could be access to the actors committing the acts of violence. A large amount of the violence that was committed in both cases was committed by non-state actors such as Fatah, Hamas, Hezbollah, the IRA, or the Orangemen. Because of this, these actors may not have had the same access to news outlets as state actors. This is particularly true of the Northern Ireland case where both sides of the dyad (especially in the later years) had active non-

state actor components (see figure 7.11). In the beginning windows in the Arab/Israeli case, the number of state-level actors (elites) that had their statements published outnumbered the non-state (masses-level) actors. During this time, Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and (Trans-) Jordan were involved in the conflict. Over time, much of the conflict, on the Palestinian side of the dyad, has been largely sustained by non-state organizations. Thus, as the case progressed the number of non-state actor statements that revealed reasons for violence increased (see figure 7.10).




Figure 7.10: Elite to Non-Elite Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case




Figure 7.11: Elite to Non-elite Conflict Statements- Northern Ireland Case

Yet another potential reason why the number of conflict statements is low is that committing acts of violence (terrorism) is considered a criminal act and many of the non-state organizations that participated in (or were associated with) the conflicts were outlawed or considered illegitimate to state actors. Hence, actors in illegal or targeted organizations may not have been as readily available to give statements. While any or all of these reasons could help explain why the numbers of conflict statements are limited, the fact that conflict statements are not as numerous as I had hoped is a limitation to my project.

Tangible Assets

Conflict statements that revealed that acts of violence were committed over control of tangible assets included statements that referred to violence to gain control of land (territory), physical resources, and physical security.

Territory

Territorially motivated conflict was strongly represented in the Arab/Israeli PSC. Ten of the 13 years analyzed were coded positively for the presence of territorially-motivated violence. Of all the conflict statements, territorially-based conflict accounted for 43.3% of all the conflict statements in the Arab/Israeli PSC. In the Northern Ireland conflict, however, not a single year met the minimum theoretical threshold. In 1972, the year with the most violence was recorded of the years analyzed, there was only one conflict statement that reflected territorial sentiments and it represented only 2.8% of all conflict-based statements that year. Hence, conflict over territorial control does not play the same role in the Northern Ireland conflict as it does in the Arab/Israeli PSC. Because territorially-motivated statement failed to reach the theoretical minimum of 12 positively coded windows, Boolean analysis does not support the inclusion of territory as an independently contributing component of competition-based conflict in PSC. However, the fact that it accounts for 43.3% of Arab/Israeli conflict statement cannot be ignored. Thus, it is included as a jointly necessary component of the category of competition-based conflict.

Of interest, though, is that the trend of claims that territory is a motive for violence in the Arab/Israeli case decreases over time (see figure 7.12).




Figure 7.12- Territorially-Based Conflict Statements -Arab/Israeli Case

As territorial claims have been (and remains) a central point of contention between the Palestinians and Israelis since before the period of time that I began collecting data, why do territorially-based conflict statements decrease as the conflict progresses over time?


The answer may be found in analyzing the conflict patterns of the next component, security.

Security

Of the 32 time windows, nine years were coded positively for the presence of security-related conflict statements. Thus, security cannot be supported as an individually supporting component of competition-based conflict in PSC.

However, it was referenced as a motive for violent behavior across both cases.

Also, its presence increased as time progressed in the Arab/Israeli case (see figure 7.13) and was supported as an individually significant component of competition-based conflict in the Arab/Israeli PSC.



7.13: Security-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case

What is of interest is that as territorially-based conflict statements decreased in the Arab/Israeli Case security-based conflict statements increased (see figure 7.14).




Figure 7:14: Changes in Trends in Security and Territorially-based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case

The change in these patterns of conflict statements are found primarily in changes that are made by the Israeli actors. As time progressed, the number of Israeli statements that asserted that violence was committed to gain or protect land decreased.

However, the number of acts of violence over territory by Palestinian actors remained roughly the same over the course of the conflict (see figure 7.15).




Figure 7.15: Territory-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli PSC

Similarly, the number of statements made by Israeli actors claiming that they committed an act of violence to protect their physical security had a marked increase while security-based violence statements made by Palestinians remained approximately the same (see figure 7.16).




Figure 7.16: Security-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli PSC

Boolean analysis fails to support security as an individually supporting component of PSC across the cases. However, the increase in the conflict pattern of security-motivated violence in a critical PSC cannot be readily dismissed out of hand. Thus, the potential role that violence for the sake of physical security plays in the supporting the enduring nature of PSC needs further exploration. Until other PSC cases are analyzed, security is considered a jointly necessary component of competition-based conflict in PSC.

Non-tangible Assets: Political Power

Violent incidents that were attributed to the desire to gain political power failed to be supported as an individually supporting component of competition-based conflict using Boolean analysis. Its occurrence was present sufficiently to be coded positively in

only one of the 32 time-windows⁹¹. Even so, it was the most frequently referenced reason given for acts of violence in the Northern Ireland PSC. Because of this it merits closer attention. Violence that was committed for the sake of gaining political power represented 16.9% of all the conflict statements. It made up only 5.9% of the conflict statements in the Arab/Israeli conflict but it accounted for 51.1% of all of the conflict statements in the Northern Ireland conflict. Over half of the statements in the Northern Ireland conflict that clearly communicated why an act of violence was committed claimed that it was to gain political power. While quotes revealing political power as a motive for violence spiked during The Troubles, it was also referenced in 1922, 1932, 1982, and 1992. 1992 was the last year that any competition-based violence statements were noted in the articles analyzed. Also, only political power and revenge-related violence statements were found in the quotes by the actors in 1992.

While Boolean analysis does not support the inclusion of violence to gain political power as an independently supporting component of conflict competition, because of the strength of its presence in the Northern Ireland conflict, it cannot summarily dismissed. Until further PSC cases can be assessed, the role that politically motivated violence plays in PSC cannot be rightly determined. Thus, it will be considered as a jointly necessary component until further information can be gathered and assessed.

Social Power


Conflict to gain social power failed to be coded positively in any of the years analyzed. There were only ten references to social power as a motive for violence of and accounts for only 0.78% of all conflict statements across both cases. Thus, it cannot be

⁹¹ Even when adjusting the minimum criteria to three incidents per year and three positive years across each case (so that it indicates a pattern rather than a trend), the overall outcome remains the same.


supported as an individually supporting component of competition-based conflict in PSC and will not be included as a jointly necessary component at this time.

Revenge

At the beginning of the data collection phases of both PSC cases, revenge was not mentioned as a motive for violence. It was not until at least two decades into the data collection that the actors began to cite revenge as a motive for violent behavior (see figures 7.17 and 7.18).



7.17: Revenge-Based Conflict Statements- Arab/Israeli Case



7.18: Revenge-Based Conflict Statements - Northern Ireland Case

While both graphs show positive trend lines, it is interesting to note that revenge-motivated violence is virtually flat and was not mentioned in the Northern Ireland PSC until 50 years after data collection started. It is the spike in The Troubles that gives revenge any presence at all as a motive for violence in the Northern Ireland case. Why is this?

Before The Troubles began, the conflict had low-intensity violence and low death rates in comparison to the Arab/Israeli PSC. The revenge-based conflict statements started with The Troubles -the same time that scholars assert that actors set aside regard innocent life. Could The Troubles represent a fundamental shift in how the conflict was viewed by the actors? If so, this could be another component that supports Azar’s (and his collaborators) assertions that PSCs change and take on components over time. In addition to this, could this be a real-life example of Rapoport’s (1960) “Fights, Games, and Debates”? Before The Troubles, the “game” of war was played between the Unionist and Loyalists and the “game” had rules that they followed. One of these rules was that only those who were active participants (and their property) were fair targets in the conflict. Women, children, and those who were not directly associated with the out-group

were “off limits” to the violence. Once this barrier was removed and loved ones became casualties of the conflict, the “game” became a “fight” and revenge became a motive for violence.

While idea that the Northern Ireland conflict devolved from a game to a fight is plausible, it cannot be proven in this project. What the proposition does speak to, though, is the deeper meaning of stating that revenge is a motive for violence and how it can be a sustaining component of PSC. Though it is categorized as part of competition-based conflict because actors specifically stated that they perpetrated an act of violence in retaliation for a previous act, the deeper truth is that revenge is a behavior that stems the psychological motivation of emotion. Across time in both cases, acts of violence were increasingly committed to punish or get-back at the out-group for perceived wrongs. As such, revenge-motivated violence may speak to the role that psychological motivation plays in supporting the enduring nature of PSC.

Revenge, as a motive for violence, failed to achieve the minimum number of years required for Boolean support. Overall, statements that revealed revenge-motivated violence represented 13.9% of all conflict statements. However, of the years that had revenge-motivated violence statements, the proportion was much higher (see table 7.2). What is also of interest is that revenge-motivated violence statements decreased in the waning days of Troubles leading up to the Good Friday Agreement. The rise and fall of revenge-based violence statements coincides with the rise of the most violent period of the Northern Ireland conflict and the agreement to end it. As such, more exploration into the role that revenge could play in the sustaining of PSC is merited.




Figure 7.19: Revenge Statements – Across PSC Cases

Because the frequency of revenge statements increases as the cases progress through time and they are a significant proportion of conflict statements in the latter windows of the cases, its potential role in sustaining PSC warrants further examination. As such, it should not be summarily dismissed as a theoretical component of PSC. Examination of other PSC cases may shed further light into the role that revenge plays in PSC. Until such time, it is included as one of the jointly necessary components of PSC.

SUMMARY OF COMPETITION-BASED CONFLICT

Across the PSC cases analyzed, Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of the category of competition based conflict as a sustaining component of PSC. When analyzing the individual components, however, no single component has the required frequency to justify their inclusion as an individually contributing component. Looking within each case, however, territory and security-based conflict statements are supported as necessary components in the Arab/Israeli case but not the Northern Ireland case (see tables 5.2 and 6.2). Together, they account for 63.2% of all the conflict statements

between the two cases analyzed. As such, they are considered as jointly necessary components of the PSC category of competition-based conflict.

In the Northern Ireland conflict, violence that is attributed to the quest for political power is the most oft cited reason for committing an act of violence. While failing to meet theoretical minimums for necessity, it accounts for 51.1% of all Northern Ireland's conflict statements and 13.3% of all of the conflict statements across the cases. As the Northern Ireland conflict is a critical PSC case, the potential role that conflict for political power could play in the enduring nature of PSC cannot be ignored. Further examination of other PSC cases are needed to fully determine what role, if any, conflict for political power plays as a sustaining component PSC. Until such time, it is considered a jointly necessary component of PSC because of its role in the Northern Ireland conflict.

Finally, the component of revenge failed to have the required frequency to be supported as an individually sustaining component of competition-based conflict. However, it narrowly missed individual support in the Arab/Israeli case and increased over time in both cases, particularly in the latter years of the cases. Because its presence increased in actor quotes in both cases as conflicts progressed over time, and it narrowly missed individual Boolean support, it is included as a jointly necessary component of PSC.

There is another aspect frequency patterns of the components in this theoretical category that merits mention. Over time, the frequency in which territory, security, and revenge are referenced as motives for violence changes. While territorially-based conflict statements show an overall decrease in the in the Arab/Israeli case, security and revenge statements increase over time. Similarly, in the Northern Ireland conflict, revenge, as a

motive for violent behavior, increases. While identifying how conflict patterns in PSC change is not a primary goal of this project, this finding does speak to the changing nature of PSC that Azar and his compatriots alluded to when they said, “[i]t is not the abstract “issue” that guides the conflicts in their development . . . The immediate criterion of identification may be several stages removed from the original issue” (Azar et. al., 1978, 51). Though slightly beyond the scope of this project, finding empirical support for theoretical assertions is useful in that it could add to the body of knowledge on PSC. As such, it is worthy of note.

In conclusion, Boolean analysis supports the theoretical necessity of the category of competition-based conflict in PSC. Conflict that was attributed to gaining resources or social power was not supported within or across cases and did not show evidence of increasing in frequency. Hence, at this time, they are rejected as sustaining components competition-based conflict in PSC. Territory, security, political power, and revenge were either supported individually within cases or showed increases in frequency sufficiently to warrant support their inclusion as jointly necessary components of competition-based conflict in PSC.

PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION

Analysis of the data in the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases reveal a plethora of quotes that reveal psychological motivation in PSC. In both cases, over 80% of the quotes contained statements that revealed psychological impetus. When using Boolean analysis, the justification for the inclusion of psychological motivation, categorically, as a necessary component of PSC is supported (See tables 7.1 and 7.3).

When analyzing each of the components individually, however, the results are not as clear-cut.

Emotion

The proposition that the presence of emotion is a necessary component of the psychological motivation of PSC can be supported using Boolean analysis. In both cases, analysis indicates a positive outcome for the presence of emotion and has a mean of 15.4 incidents per month, per year. This is more than double the incidents needed to satisfy the minimum theoretical threshold. Both cases reveal that emotionally-charged statements account for 27.4% of all quotes that contained psychological sentiments. Interestingly, in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, emotional motives coded positive for 84.6% of the years surveyed, as opposed to the Northern Ireland conflict that had a rate of 47.4% (see table 7.3) Also, emotional motivations were more consistently represented over time in the Arab/Israeli case than that of Northern Ireland's (see figure 7.20).




Figure 7.20: Emotive Statements - Across PSC Cases

While the trend lines clearly show that emotive statements increased over time in both cases, the frequency in which the emotive statements increased in the Arab/Israeli case is much greater. A difference was also noted during data collection, as well. There was also a difference in the intensity of the statements. The actors in the Northern Ireland conflict made statements that reflected their anger over perceived wrongs, but legitimacy of the out-group to exist was largely not addressed. The actors in the Arab/Israeli case communicated a sense of anger, frustration, and even hatred at times⁹² with an intensity that was not present in the Northern Ireland case. There were statements made in the Arab/Israeli conflict where the legitimacy of the out-group to exist was rejected.

Give them to us! Death to Arabs! Let's murder them! – Israeli mob demanding the release of 6 Palestinian being held for questioning in relation to a bombing that killed one and injured 50^{clxxxvi}.

Death to Arabs! - Israeli mob in reaction the stabbing of six youth while at school^{clxxxvii}.

Death to Israel. Death to America! – Palestinians marching in opposition to Israeli/Palestinian peace talks^{clxxxviii}.

Statements of this intensity were not noted in the years analyzed in the Northern Ireland conflict. While this is a subjective observation, the difference in the strength of emotion between the two cases is also alluded to in figure 7.19. The Arab/Israeli conflict is a critical PSC case because it is considered to be the most “unsolvable” PSC in the current international environment. The Northern Ireland conflict is a critical PSC case because it appears to be ending. Given that both are critical PSC cases, the difference in their emotive trend lines could be informative as to a component that sustaining PSC. As emotive statements increase dramatically overtime in the Arab/Israeli case, could

⁹² They communicated the intensity of their emotion through the use of stronger language in their word choices and the adjectives they used.

emotion be a key supporting component in the enduring nature of PSC? While this is an interesting and potentially valuable question, two cases, even critical cases, are too few to make a determination. Given the findings of this project, however; the question as to emotion's role as a sustaining component of PSC merits further exploration.

While this is an interesting observation, there are some differences between the cases that could account for the differences in the intensity of language. First of all, is that in the Arab/Israeli case there is a language barrier that does not exist in the Northern Ireland case. The reason that this may be important is that language can be a barrier to communication. When there is contention between two groups, if there is no language barrier, as in the Northern Ireland case, everything that is said is understood by the in-group and the out-group. This may have a moderating effect on language and word choice in that language that is meant for private communication can be more easily used in the public arena and could be used against the actor(s) (Dubinsky 2013). When there is a language barrier between the two groups the probability of this occurring is lower. Thus, there is less self-censorship and when actors are "amongst one's own." Language is "more hyperbolic than what would be said to the outside world" (Dubinsky 2013).

Another potential reason why the Arab/Israeli PSC has more "colorful" language is that there are cultural differences in rhetoric between the two cases. According to Stan Dubinsky, Professor of Linguistics at the University of South Carolina, it is well-known that the Arabic language is more "colorful" than the English language. Because of this, "you start out with the volume being higher in the first place."

Language barriers and cultural communication differences could account for some of the differences in intensity in language choices between the two cases. The

cultural rhetoric of the Arab/Israeli case could indeed play a role in the intensity of word choices between the actors. As such, it should not be ignored. However, on a fundamental level, the actors in both cases are human. They “feel” in a similar matter. I am doubtful that language barriers and differences in cultural rhetoric can fully account for the open and overt hatred that the Arab/Israeli actors repeatedly expressed towards each other.

Perception

Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of perception as an individually supporting component of the supportive category of Psychological Motivation in PSC. Twenty-two of the 32 years analyzed are coded positively for the presence of perception. Also, there is an average of 20.97 perceptual statements per year. As the minimum threshold is six incidents per year, the fact that the frequency of perceptual statements is actually more than three times the minimum theoretical requirement could speak to the strength of this particular component as a supporting component of PSC. Actor statements that reveal perceptual sentiments center on the motivational, characteristics, and/or behavioral attributes of the out-group. Of the total quotes that contain psychological motivation, quotes that reveal perceptual motivations on the part of the actors are present in 30.12% of all quotes from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict and in 42.93% of all the quotes in the Northern Ireland case. Boolean analysis shows that the Israeli/Palestinian case has more quotes that contained perceptual attributes across time with 76.92% and that the Northern Ireland case has 52.36% (See tables 7.1 and 7.2). The majority of the perceptual statement made in the Northern Ireland case occur in The Troubles, the time where the most violence and deaths occurred in the Northern Ireland

conflict (see figure 7.21). In fact, though perceptual statements are present at the beginning of case, both show signs of significant increases as the cases progress.

Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of perception as a psychological motivation in PSC and both trend lines show an increase in the frequency of perceptual statements. Thus, at this time perception is included as a necessary component of the sustaining category of psychological motivation in the theoretical conceptualization of PSC.




Figure 7.21: Perceptual Statements - Across PSC Cases

Self-identity

Self-identification is one of the original four necessary components of PSC listed by Azar. However, of the psychological motivations evaluated, self-identity has the lowest incidence with an average of only 2.36% of the psychologically motivated statements. Furthermore, Boolean analysis fails to support the inclusion of self-identity as a necessary component of PSC in either case. In fact, quotes that reveal self-identity

motivations in the two PSC cases are sufficient to elicit a positive outcome in only three of the 39 years measured –on quarter of the required minimum. Because of this, the proposition that self-identity individually contributes to PSC in a significant manner cannot be supported.

Group-identity

According to PSC theory, self and group-identity are the primary psychological motivations that contribute to the enduring nature of PSCs. The data supports the inclusion of group identity as a necessary component of the category of psychological motivations in PSC using Boolean analysis. In total, 21 of the 39 windows analyzed were coded positive for the presence of group-identity sentiments. This is almost double the 12 required for the theoretical minimum. In both individual cases, the inclusion of group identity as a necessary component is supported by Boolean analysis and is specifically mentioned in 35.4% of the quotes that communicated any type psychological motivation (see tables 7.1 and 7.3). The Israeli/Palestinian case shows a slightly stronger affinity to group-identity with 37.6% of the quotes containing language that communicated in-group/out-group identification as opposed to Northern Ireland's 32.3%. Also, group-identity is the most cited psychological component in the Israeli/Palestinian case and is consistent across time with 76.92% of the years examined coded positive for its presence. Similarly, the Northern Ireland case coded positively for group identification in 47.37% of the years. Likewise, the mean frequency of quotes containing group-identity sentiments was 30.37 per year. This is five times the theoretical minimum.

The patterns of group-identification statements differ between the two cases, however. While both cases have trend lines that show increases over time,

the increase is much more pronounced in the Arab/Israeli case (see figures 7.22).

Also, the presence of group-identification quotes is more consistent across the Arab/Israeli than it is in the Northern Ireland conflict. Perceptual statements tend to be more clustered in The Troubles in the Northern Ireland conflict.




Figure 7.22: Group-Identification Statements - Across PSC Case

Summary of Psychological Motivation

Boolean analysis supports the inclusion of emotion, perception, and group-identification as individually supporting components the sustaining category of Psychological Motivation in PSC. The inclusion of self-identification as an individually contributing component to the category of Psychological Motivation cannot be supported, however. The frequency in which it was referenced failed to meet theoretical minimums in cases individually and across cases. Beyond determining whether the category of psychological motivation should be considered as a necessary, supporting component of PSC, other potentially valuable information about the nature of PSC in general and the

role that psychological motivations may play in enduring nature of PSC may have been identified as well.

Though the determination that emotion, perception, and group-identity can be supported as jointly sustaining components of PSC, when a closer look is taken at how each of these components “behave” over time, it becomes clear that the presence of each one of these components increases as the conflict progresses. Each component, in both cases increases over time without exception (see figures 7.20, 7.21, and 7.22). Because an increase in frequency is found in all three components across both PSC cases, this finding could be supportive of Azar et. al’s (2000) assertion that PSCs change over time by altering or taking on additional nuances and/or issues of contention. The role of psychological motivation in PSC has been minimized beyond identity in PSC scholarship. Thus, the discovery that specific psychological components increase in presence over time may provide insight as to what components are actually supporting the intractable nature of PSC⁹³.

While emotion, perception, and group-identification trend positively in both cases, there is a distinct difference between the cases in how much they increase. In the Northern Ireland case, each component increases at a moderate rate over time. In the Arab/Israeli case, however, increases in the presence of psychologically-motivated sentiments are at a greater rate for each of the three components. The most dramatic of which is the increase in emotive statements (see figure 7.20). There difference in the rates of increase is sizeable. Emotive statements are followed by group-identification

⁹³ This observation is in no way intended to infer causation of PSC. Rather, as time passes and the presence of psychologically-motivated statements increases, the “arrival” of negative psychological stimuli (a component that was not salient at the beginning of the conflict) could become a sustaining component of a PSC. Hence, support for the changing nature of PSC.

statements that have a moderate increase over that of Northern Ireland's quotes that contain group-identification-revealing sentiments (see figure 7.22). The component in the Arab/Israeli conflict that differs least from that of Northern Ireland is that of perceptual statements (see figure 7.21). Given the differences in the statuses of these two critical cases, could the categorical component of psychological motivation, which has received limited theoretical consideration up to this point, be a key component in the enduring nature of PSC?

CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS

While Boolean methods can aid in determining theoretical necessity and sufficiency, what it cannot inform is the relatedness of the components that are being studied. Because of this, confirmatory factor analysis is used to determine the relatedness of the components assessed in the two critical PSC cases. The six primary categorical components are initially assessed to determine how many factors best reflects the data in the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases. After running a maximum likelihood model and a three-factor model, the maximum likelihood analysis showed that a two-factor model best reflects the data. The three-factor model encounters Heywood errors. This indicates that there are problems with negative (co)variance estimates and that three or more-factor models are not a fit for the data (Lolenikov and Bollen 2012). Thus, a two-factor model is used (See figure 7.23).




Figure 7.23: PSC Factor Viability Scores - Across PSC Cases

Using the two-factor model, the first factor accounts for 77.4% of the total variance found in the model (see table 7.4).

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion
Factor 1	2.69	1.91	0.7737
Factor 2	0.79	0.64	0
			.2263

Table 7.4: Two Factor PSC Viability Model (unrotated) Across PSC Cases

Component	Combined Cases			Arab Israeli Case			Northern Ireland Case		
	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
Violent Incidents	0.84	0.00	0.29	0.82	.34	0.22	0.83	0.045	0.26
Conflict Duration	0.08	-0.34	0.87	0.18	-0.51	0.71	0.09	-0.37	0.85
Deaths	0.37	0.59	0.51	0.52	0.67	0.28	0.31	0.52	0.61
Non-State Actors	0.77	-0.44	0.29	0.50	-0.41	0.58	0.76	-0.34	0.31
Conflict Statement	0.73	-0.34	0.36	0.81	0.09	0.34	0.84	0.26	0.42
Psych. Motiv.	0.85	-0.12	.27	0.90	-0.27	0.11	0.84	-0.34	.31

Table 7.5: Factor Loadings for PSC Viability Model –Across and Within Cases

Of the components measured, violent incidents, conflict statements, non-state actor involvement, and psychological statements vary together on factor one (having component scores $\geq +0.5$) (see figure 7.5). Factor one accounts for 84.8% of the variation in psychological motivation, 84% of the variation in violent incidents, 77.5% of the variation in non-state actors, 72.6% of the variation in conflict statements, and 37% of the variation in deaths (see figure 7.5).

In the Arab/Israeli case, deaths loads primarily on the first factor with all of the components save conflict duration. In the Northern Ireland case, however, deaths loads more strongly on factor two than it does on factor one. A reason for this change could be because the comparatively lower intensity of the Northern Ireland conflict and the fact

that they purposely avoided the shedding of “innocent” blood” for the vast majority of the conflict.

Note that there appears to be an inverse relationship between deaths (0.67) and conflict duration (-0.51) in the second factor of the Arab/Israeli case but is mitigated in the combined cases’ second factor (see figure 7.5). This is a perplexing finding. An explanation for this finding could be found in the timing of intense periods of violence in both cases. In the Arab/Israeli conflict, the years that have the most PSC deaths are 1948, 1968, 1973, and 1983 (see figure 5.3). These roughly coincide with Israeli War of Independence, Six-Day War, Yom Kippur War, and the Israeli/Lebanese “Conflict”. Also, the year that has the most casualties is 1948. In this case, a greater numbers of deaths occur in the initial years in which data is collected. Of the 60-year window analyzed in the Arab/Israeli case, the vast majority of deaths occurred in the first 35 years of the conflict. Thus, the casualties in this case are skewed towards that beginning of data collection and could explain why there appears to be an inverse relationship between the two components.

In the Northern Ireland case, however, the greatest numbers of casualties are during The Troubles. 1972, 1978, 1982, 1988, and 1992 reflect the highest number of casualties in the Northern Ireland case (see figure 6.2). As I started collecting data in this case in 1922, The Troubles are decidedly in the latter years of the data collected. As the Arab/Israeli case has more intense violence over the course of the conflict, the conflict patterns and casualties from the Northern Ireland conflict could explain why Northern Ireland mitigated but did not “correct” the inverse relationship in Arab/Israeli PSC. As such, the differences in the timing and the intensity across each conflict, as demonstrated

by the number of deaths, could explain why deaths and conflict duration appear to have an inverse relationship in the Arab/Israeli case.

While factor one accounts for 37% of the variation in deaths, it also accounts for over 77% of all variation in the model. Thus, the second factor is needed to account for the remaining variance in deaths across the two critical PSC cases (see tables 7.4 and 7.5). Conflict duration, however, loads minimally on factors one and two. It has a score of 0.08 and it is the most unique component in this model (uniqueness score = 0.87) (see table 7.5). As violent incidents, non-state actors, conflict statements, and psychological motivations load together strongly on factor one and that deaths loads on both factors one and two suggests that the components of factor one (and two) are predictive of the component that does not load on either factor- conflict duration. As factors one and two account for approximately 99% of the variation in the model, the analysis suggests that the components of: non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation are predictive of conflict duration and are rightly associated with PSC.

CONCLUSION

The Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs have seen violence that spans generations. However, the actors, the intensity and frequency of their violence and the issues of conflict differ between the two cases. Yet, they are both hallmark PSC cases. Thus, when striving to build a theoretical conceptualization of what PSC is and what its necessary components are, the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases are a natural point of departure. Using Boolean analysis and factor analysis methodologies, I now present a

theoretical structure of the necessary components of PSC that is based on empirical findings.

According to Boolean analysis, the proposition that twenty or more years of violent conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more deaths, competition-based conflict and psychological motivation can be supported. Each categorical component had or surpassed the theoretical minimum requirements to support its inclusion as a necessary component of PSC. The first four components, the descriptive components, have no radial categories that required further examination. However, the two sustaining categorical components, competition-based conflict and psychological motivation contain radial categories that are presented as jointly necessary components of PSC.


Competition-based conflict is conceptualized as statements that are made by actors in a conflict that clearly communicate why an act of violence has been committed. It is divided into two radial components, conflict over tangible resources and conflict over non-tangible resources. Tangible resources includes: territory, security, and natural resources. Conflict over non-tangible resources includes: political power, social power, and revenge. While factor analysis reveals that competition-based conflict is rightly associated with PSC, of the components tested, only territory, security, political power, and revenge were referenced sufficiently by the actors to warrant their inclusion as *jointly* necessary components of the sustaining category of competition-based conflict across the two PSC cases.

Psychological motivation in PSC is conceptualized as statements that are made by the actors in each conflict that reveal emotion, perception, self-identification, and group-

identification sentiments in relation to the conflict. Factor analysis shows that these four components, when measure together categorically, are rightly associated with PSC.

However, when examined individually using Boolean analysis only emotion, perception, and group-identification are found to be supported as contributing components of the category of Psychological Motivation in PSC. Self-identification was not represented in sufficient quantities to merit its inclusion.

Based on Boolean and factor methods of analysis the following model represents the necessary components of PSC as determined by the two critical PSC cases, the Arab/Israeli conflict and the Northern Ireland conflict (see figure 7.24):



Key:

- - Theoretical Necessity Supported
- - Theoretical Necessity Undetermined
- - Descriptive Component
- - - - Supporting Component
- - Boolean “and”
- ◆ - Boolean “or”

Figure 7.24: Model of Theoretically Necessary Components of PSC- Across Cases

Appendix

Table 7.1: Boolean Analysis - Across PSC Cases

Year	Case #	≥ 20 Years		Non-state Actors		≥ 3 Violence / Peace Cycles		≥ 500 Deaths		Comp.-based Conflict Stat.		Psych. Motivation Stat.		Pres. of PSC
		0	Y	96	Y	108	Y	7848	Y	36	Y	83	Y	
1948	1	0	Y	96	Y	108	Y	7848	Y	36	Y	83	Y	N
1953	1	0	Y	0	N	23	Y	187	Y	6	Y	13	Y	N
1958	1	0	Y	3	Y	12	Y	71	Y	4	N	14	Y	N
1963	1	0	Y	0	N	10	Y	25	Y	12	Y	17	Y	N
1968	1	1	Y	116	Y	78	Y	1014	Y	34	Y	118	Y	Y
1973	1	1	Y	38	Y	18	Y	126	Y	10	Y	73	Y	Y
1978	1	1	Y	54	Y	23	Y	1114	Y	9	Y	81	Y	Y
1983	1	1	Y	46	Y	23	Y	1210	Y	9	Y	64	Y	Y
1988	1	1	Y	90	Y	56	Y	516	Y	32	Y	113	Y	Y
1993	1	1	Y	146	Y	53	Y	319	Y	28	Y	152	Y	Y
1998	1	1	Y	42	Y	23	Y	209	Y	18	Y	83	Y	Y
2003	1	1	Y	210	Y	98	Y	726	Y	37	Y	290	Y	Y
2008	1	1	Y	39	Y	20	Y	539	Y	4	N	48	Y	Y
1922	2	0	N	16	Y	6	Y	16	N	1	N	31	Y	N
1927	2	0	N	1	N	1	N	9	N	0	N	3	N	N
1932	2	0	N	5	N	6	Y	2	N	3	N	21	Y	N
1937	2	0	N	6	Y	3	N	0	N	0	N	16	Y	N
1942	2	1	Y	18	Y	11	Y	14	N	0	N	8	Y	N
1947	2	1	Y	1	N	0	N	0	N	5	N	15	Y	N
1952	2	1	Y	3	N	1	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1957	2	1	Y	42	Y	33	Y	9	N	0	N	14	Y	N
1962	2	1	Y	2	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	3	N	N
1967	2	1	N	7	Y	3	Y	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
1972	2	1	Y	222	Y	230	Y	530	Y	27	Y	345	Y	Y
1977	2	1	Y	32	Y	38	Y	104	Y	1	N	26	Y	N
1982	2	1	Y	39	Y	30	Y	67	Y	3	N	39	Y	N
1987	2	1	Y	8	Y	12	Y	82	Y	2	N	14	Y	N
1992	2	1	Y	12	Y	29	Y	134	Y	3	N	90	Y	N
1997	2	1	Y	67	Y	33	Y	20	N	0	N	107	Y	N
2002	2	1	Y	21	Y	12	Y	34	Y	0	N	63	Y	N
2007	2	1	Y	2	N	1	N	10	N	1	N	2	N	N
2012	2	1	Y	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	0	N
Outcome *	-	28/32 = Y		23/32 = Y		26/32 = Y		18/32 = Y		14/19 = Y		21/32 = Y		-

*Positive outcome criteria- For components to meet minimum criteria in individual cases (except for three or more violence/peace cycles and deaths), a minimum of six incidents were required for the year to coded positive. For the component to be coded positively across the duration of the conflict, at least six years must be coded positively for all components. Because multiple cases are being examined at this point, having minimum criteria of six incidents is too lenient. As there are two cases being examined, the theoretical minimum criteria will be doubled. Therefore, a minimum of 12 years must be coded as present for ≥ 20 years, non-state actors, \geq violence/peace cycles, deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation to be coded as positively across PSC cases.

Table 7.2: Boolean Analysis: Competition-Based Conflict - Across PSC Cases

Case #	Year	Territory		Resources		Security		Political Power		Social Power		Revenge		Conf. Stat. Pres.
1	1948	19	Y	6	Y	7	Y	3	Y	1	N	0	N	Y
1	1953	3	Y	1	N	2	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	Y
1	1958	2	N	0	N	0	N	2	N	0	N	0	N	Y
1	1963	1	N	0	N	2	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	Y
1	1968	21	Y	1	N	8	Y	3	Y	1	N	0	N	Y
1	1973	7	Y	0	N	1	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	Y
1	1978	5	Y	0	N	3	Y	0	N	0	N	1	N	Y
1	1983	4	Y	0	N	4	Y	0	N	0	N	1	N	Y
1	1988	11	Y	1	N	9	Y	4	Y	3	Y	4	Y	Y
1	1993	12	Y	1	N	11	Y	0	N	0	N	4	Y	Y
1	1998	7	Y	0	N	4	Y	1	N	1	N	5	Y	Y
1	2003	3	Y	0	N	17	Y	0	N	4	Y	13	Y	Y
1	2008	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	4	Y	N
2	1922	0	N	0	N	1	N	1	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1927	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1932	0	N	0	N	0	N	2	N	2	N	0	N	N
2	1937	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1942	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1947	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1952	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1957	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N

2	1962	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1967	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1972	1	N	0	N	7	Y	19	Y	2	N	6	Y	Y
2	1977	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1982	0	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	N
2	1987	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	0	N	N
2	1992	0	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	N
2	1997	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	2002	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	2007	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	2012	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
Bool.	-	11/32		2/32 =				3/32		3/32		6/32		13/32
Out.		=		N		9/32 =		=		=		=		=
		N				N		N		N		N		Y
% of all Conf. State.	-	104/257		10/257		76/257		17/257		12/275		38/257		-
		=		=		=		=		=		=		
		40.5%		4.0%		29.5%		6.6%		4.4%		14.8%		

Table 7.3: Boolean Analysis: Psychological Motivation - Across PSC Cases

Case #	Year	Emotion		Perception		Self-Identity		Group-Identity		Psy. Pres.
1	1948	27	Y	25	Y	3	N	28	Y	Y
1	1953	6	Y	6	Y	0	N	1	N	Y
1	1958	5	N	5	N	0	N	4	N	Y
1	1963	5	N	6	Y	1	N	5	N	Y
1	1968	38	Y	29	Y	6	N	45	Y	Y
1	1973	28	Y	18	Y	2	N	25	Y	Y
1	1978	23	Y	22	Y	0	N	36	Y	Y
1	1983	13	Y	22	Y	2	N	27	Y	Y
1	1988	27	Y	30	Y	3	N	53	Y	Y
1	1993	30	Y	51	Y	6	Y	65	Y	Y
1	1998	25	Y	25	Y	4	N	29	Y	Y
1	2003	74	Y	107	Y	6	Y	103	Y	Y
1	2008	15	Y	18	Y	0	N	15	Y	Y
2	1922	9	Y	11	Y	0	N	11	Y	Y
2	1927	1	N	1	N	0	N	1	N	N
2	1932	7	Y	8	Y	0	N	6	Y	Y
2	1937	5	N	6	Y	0	N	5	N	Y
2	1942	1	N	3	N	0	N	0	N	N

2	1947	1	N	2	N	0	N	2	N	N
2	1952	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1957	4	N	5	N	0	N	5	N	Y
2	1962	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1967	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
2	1972	68	Y	137	Y	9	Y	131	Y	Y
2	1977	2	N	14	Y	0	N	9	Y	Y
2	1982	10	Y	19	Y	1	N	8	Y	Y
2	1987	5	N	5	Y	0	N	4	N	Y
2	1992	26	Y	36	Y	2	N	26	Y	Y
2	1997	24	Y	56	Y	1	N	27	Y	Y
2	2002	17	Y	31	Y	0	N	15	Y	Y
2	2007	1	N	0	N	0	N	1	N	N
2	2012	0	N	0	N	0	N	0	N	N
Outcome	-	18/32 = Y		22/32 = Y		3/32 = N		18/32 = Y		21/32 = Y
% Psy.		497/1928 = 25.8%		698/1928 = 36.2%		46/1928 = 2.3%		687/1928 = 35.6%		-

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This study endeavors to contribute to the body of knowledge on PSC by presenting and testing a clearer, more measurable and comprehensive conceptualization of the theoretically necessary components of PSC. Protracted social conflict has distinct actors and patterns of violence that separate it from other forms of enduring conflict. Because of these unique features, conceptualizing PSCs or approaching PSC intervention with the same methods and approaches that are used in other forms of conflict could have limited benefit or be a waste of time. Thus, clearly determining what PSC is and how it is sustained is no mere, trivial academic exercise. The real-life economic and human costs are too great to form policy and conduct research based conceptualizations that fit other forms of long-term conflicts or on assumptions that have not been vetted. In an ever-changing and developing world, if there is ever to be a “solution” to PSC, it must *first* be conceptualized correctly. Thus, this study has taken the currently accepted theoretical components (effective participation, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and security), expressed them in more concrete and measurable terms, and tested them to determine whether any or all of the proposed components are indeed necessary for a PSC to occur.

To achieve this, I built an original data set. Using data from newsprint, I collected information and quotes from each case as they were reported in the *New York Times*.

Data was gathered from two critical PSC cases, the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland conflicts. Only statements of fact and quotes from the actors directly involved in the conflicts were used. The data was used to test assertions as to what the descriptive and supporting aspects of PSC are. Descriptive aspects assessed were: who participates, how they participate, when they participate, and how many deaths were a direct result of the PSC. To discover sustaining components, quotes from the actors in each conflict were analyzed to discern *why* the PSC is enduring in nature.

I used qualitative and quantitative methodologies in my analysis of the cases. Boolean methods were used to determine which components were present across cases sufficiently to be considered as necessary components of PSC, and which components were not. While Boolean methods can help to determine necessity and support or refute theory, it is limited in its utility to show the relatedness of the components that are being assessed. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis was used to determine whether the variations in the components over the duration of the conflicts were related and whether they are associated with PSC.

In assessing the descriptive aspects of PSC, I proposed that there are four independently necessary descriptive components. These are: participation in twenty or more years of conflict, three or more violence/peace cycles, five hundred or more directly-relatable deaths, and the participation of non-state actors. Boolean analysis supports my proposition that each of these components is an independently necessary component of PSC. As such, they explain the “effective participation” (Azar, 1985, 29) of the actors in that they explain what being is seen when a PSC is being observed. What these components fail to explain, however, is *why* PSCs are enduring in nature. To gain

theoretical understanding as to what component(s) is/are sustaining PSC over time two other components are assessed- competition-based conflict and psychological motivation.

The component of Competition-Based Conflict is conceptualized as conflict over control of tangible assets (territory, [physical] security, and [natural] resources) and non-tangible assets (political power, social power, and revenge). Analysis supports the proposition that the categorical component of competition-based conflict is a necessary component of PSC. However, tangible and non-tangible assets were found to be jointly necessary components of competition-based conflict rather than individually supporting components. Statements that reflected violence that was motivated over resources and social power were not sufficient in quantity to be found to be playing a significant role in supporting the continuation of PSCs. As such, only territory, security, political power, and revenge were found in sufficient quantities to be considered as jointly contributing components to conflict-based competition in PSC.

The categorical component of Psychological Motivation was conceptualized as emotional, perceptual, self-identification, and/or group-identification-based sentiments in PSC. As psychological impetus is not readily observed, it is conceptualized as a supporting component. Analysis supports my proposition that Psychological Motivation is a necessary component of PSC. However, self-identification is not supported as a sustaining component of Psychological Motivation. The frequency of self-identification statements across both cases accounted for only 2.3% of all psychologically motivated statements. Emotion, perception, and group-identification were found to be present across the cases in sufficient amounts for each to be included as necessary components of the category of Psychological Motivation.

The categorical inclusion of Psychological Motivation into the theoretical structure of PSC marks a departure from existing PSC theory literature. While current scholarship identifies self- and group-identity as necessary components, the potential role that emotion and perception could play, as far as their necessity, is limited in PSC theory literature. Thus, the finding that emotion, perception and group-identity could be components that are sustaining PSC may be a significant finding. Also the finding that self-identification plays only a minimal role in PSC could also be informative if intervention is being built around currently accepted theoretical parameters.

Another significant and potentially useful finding is that when data collection began, the presence of statements that revealed revenge as a motive for violence and emotion, perception, and group-identification- based comments were minimal. As the cases progressed through time, the presence of these components, *in both cases*, increased in frequency. They increased to the point that all but revenge reached the level of individual necessity and revenge fell just short. This speaks to Azar and his collaborators' (2000) assertions that PSC can change and/or take on additional components or issues of contention over time. What is particularly salient, though, is that this project has potentially revealed one of the ways in which a PSC changes and takes on additional components, through psychological impetus. What this could mean in real-life or in applied terms is that while attention is given to mitigating contentions over land, physical security, or political power, attention must also be given to the emotive, perceptual, identification impact that both groups have on each other. As such, my findings could have real-world utility.

Factor analysis of the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases found that violent incidents, non-state actors, competition-based conflict, psychological motivation, and (to a lesser extent) deaths all load on one factor. This one factor is responsible for 77% of all of the variation across the two PSC cases. Because conflict duration is a hallmark component of protracted *social* conflict, and it loads on its own factor, it can be asserted that the aforementioned components are predictive of how long a conflict endures and by extension the duration of a PSC. At least, in the critical cases evaluated. As such, they are rightly associated with PSC.

The primary proposition of this dissertation is that 20 or more years of violent conflict, the participation of non-state actors, three or more violence/peace cycles, 500 or more directly attributable deaths, competition-based conflict, and psychological motivation are each necessary components of PSC. Findings using appropriate qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Boolean analysis and factor analysis) support my proposition in two critical PSC cases- the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland conflicts. Each of the primary categorical components assessed (descriptive and sustaining) is supported as a necessary component of PSC. However, analysis of radial components within each of the sustaining components (competition-based conflict and psychological motivation) finds that while the presence of some the radial components are supported as jointly necessary components (emotion, perception, and group-identification), other radial components (territory, security, political power, and revenge) cannot be determined with confidence without examining other PSC cases. Finally, the necessity of resources, social power, and self-identification are not supported at all. Therefore, analysis of the two critical PSC cases reveals the following theoretical structure of PSC:




Figure 8.1: Model of Theoretically Necessary Components PSC- Across Cases

WEAKNESSES AND CHALLENGES

No research structure is without its challenges. This section of the conclusion discusses the weaknesses, limitations, problems, and challenges of my research project. First and foremost, is that this dissertation includes only two case studies. While the findings of this project are encouraging, making generalized statements about the nature of PSC or its theoretical components using only two, albeit critical, cases is reckless. To address this weakness, it is advisable to analyze other PSC cases. This includes a negative case so to discern not only necessity, but sufficiency as well.

Also, prima facie, it can appear that selection bias has occurred. In this project, though, the object of analysis is the conceptual structure that I present rather than the cases themselves. The cases are not the objects of scrutiny, the theoretically based reconceptualization that I have presented is. Therefore, the purposeful selection of critical

PSC cases was made so that the proposed structure would have to be held up to the “standard bearers” of PSC. If the structure does not match the patterns of the two critical PSCs, it is the reconceptualization that must be rejected, not the cases. Thus, the selection of critical PSC cases is a necessary point of departure in methodologically and scientifically determining the necessary components of PSC. As the conceptualization is supported by the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland PSCs, the natural progression is to apply the conceptual model to other known PSC cases and other enduring social conflicts.

A fundamental challenge to any qualitative case study is that while it can support or disprove theory, it cannot indicate causation. Though quantitative methods have been incorporated into this study to account for this structural weakness, the appropriate methodology, confirmatory factor analysis, can only discuss the relatedness of the other components. Hence, the qualitative limitations of this study are mitigated but not fully-averted. As this study has only *begun* to examine the necessary components in PSC, no generalizable inference can be made at this point, except to say that the proposals put forth by this study, have been generally supported by the two critical PSC cases.

Another weakness of this study is found in my data collection parameters. While limiting certain aspects of the data collection so that only direct actors are quoted is a strength in that it allows for the actors that are directly involved in PSCs to speak for themselves, it also introduces limitations. This limitation was most evident in the categorical component of competition-based conflict. There were more than 14,000 articles that met the project’s search parameters. However, with 882 violent incidents recorded across both cases, there were only 285 articles that contained statements that

clearly communicated any reason why the acts of violence were committed. Also, the overwhelming majority of these conflict statements were from the Arab/Israeli case (see figures 8.1 and 8.2). As noted, this could be for several reasons. The first possible reason is that news media is reactive in nature. Writers of articles need to report on a violent event within limited time-frames and they must relay the critical information in a concise manner. Because of this, emphasis can be placed on who, what, where, and when a violent event happened rather than why. Sufficiently answering questions as to why violent behavior has occurred may be too time-intensive to explore fully when writing to a deadline. The realities of newsprint may also have informed the reporting patterns that I noticed. Also, at the beginning of each case, I noted that reporting styles tended to be more narrative in nature and that when quotes were given, they were more apt to be given by state-level or elite actors. As the non-state actor is a key component of PSC (Azar et. al., 1978, 50; Kelman, 2000, 273), a primary driving force in the continuation of violence may not have been given a public voice to communicate why they were committing acts of violence. I also noted that article authors would often paraphrase non-state actors' reasons why they committed acts of violence rather than let the actor speak for themselves. Therefore, while my pre-established data collection parameters were intended to add strength to my findings by allowing only the statements of the actual actors in each conflict to be considered, this decision coupled with the reporting styles and practices may have impacted the findings by limiting useable information.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

When I first began my doctoral studies, I worried that I would not find an area of study in international relations that interested me and that needed further study and development. Now, as look towards the completion of my dissertation and the beginning of my professional career, I am no longer concerned whether I will have anything to study. Rather, my thoughts now turn to whether or not I will have enough time to fully explore all of my research questions and puzzles before the time allotted to me has passed. The subjects of PSC and terrorism have ignited my intellectual curiosity. Why do PSCs refuse to end? Why do individual-level actors choose to commit acts of (political) violence? These questions form the foundation of my research interests and form the basis of the follow-on study ideas that this dissertation has spawned.

As mentioned earlier, the first follow-on project to this dissertation is to expand the number of cases that are analyzed to better determine what the necessary and sufficient components of PSC are. By examining other established PSC cases (Azar, 1978, 46), I may be able to make more generalizable statements about its components. I would like to increase the number of PSC cases that are studied to include cases such as the Kashmir, Cyprus, and Sri Lankan conflicts. I would also like to include a negative case, the post-World War II Belgian case, to determine sufficiency⁹⁴.

There are also other incidents of enduring social conflict that I would examine through the PSC theoretical lens. Of particular interest to me would be to examine cases in Latin America and Africa where societal violence has occurred. If conflicts are found to have all of the necessary components of PSC, and have not been previously

⁹⁴ Post World War II Belgium experienced tension between the ethnic Walloon and Flemish populations. Though many of the conditions that are present in PSCs were present in Belgium, no violence erupted.

unidentified as such, the realization that these cases are, or were, PSCs could provide valuable insight. If a conflict that is currently ongoing is identified as a PSC, the approach and management of the conflict could be adjusted. If a PSC is identified that is no longer active, analysis could provide insight into how it started, what sustained it, and what changed to bring it to an end.

This dissertation focuses primarily on what PSCs are and how they are sustained. How PSCs are managed or how they end has not been fully explored in this exercise. Thus, another research project that I would like to engage upon is how the conceptual structure that I have proposed can aid in PSC management and/or resolution. For example, in the two critical cases that I have analyzed, the Arab/Israeli case consistently shows higher frequency and intensity in its violence patterns. Also, it is currently considered to be one of the least “solvable” PSCs. The Northern Ireland conflict appears to be on its way to resolution and throughout time the frequency and intensity of violence is comparatively much less than that of the Arab/Israeli conflict. Could the differences in the patterns of the six components measured in my dissertation be informative as to why one PSC is nearing resolution and the other appears to be dead-locked in conflict? Dedicating a separate study to analyzing the differences between these two critical PSC cases could provide valuable insight as to why PSCs end and why they continue on despite best efforts.

This dissertation also revealed patterns that both the Arab/Israeli and Northern Ireland cases shared. For example, in both cases, revenge statements and emotion, perception, and group-identity sentiments increased over the life of the conflict. As the cases progressed across time, psychological engagement also increased. As I mentioned

previously, revenge, emotion, perception, and group-identity sentiments grew in both cases as the conflicts endured over time. It is also true that there was a measurable decrease in references to territory as a reason for violent behavior and a measurable increase in violence to protect physical security in the Arab/Israeli case as time progressed. These findings could provide empirical support for Azar and his collaborators' assertions about the changing nature of PSC. Similarly, Pruitt and Kim (2004, 101-120) discuss psychological changes in conflict spirals as part of their structural change model of conflict. I would like to study this and how it applies to PSC more fully. I would like to examine my data to determine *how* psychological motive changes or increases throughout the course of a PSC. Are there patterns, specific triggers, or antecedents that can be predictive of meaningful changes in actor sentiments and behaviors?

In the literature review and in chapter 5 (the Arab/Israeli case), I spent some time examining the socialization aspects of PSC. Because PSC endures across generations and children are socialized into PSC, I am curious as to which specific actors within a group have the greatest impact on young peoples' decisions to participate in violence. Is it parents, the social cohort, siblings, or the (social) in-group? I would like to conduct a survey-style qualitative research project and ask actors in PSCs who had an influence on their decisions to participate in violence.

In 2000, Diehl and Goertz published "War and Peace in International Rivalry". In their book, they categorize enduring rivalries into three categories: Isolated conflicts, proto rivalries, and enduring rivalries. Their categorical distinctions are based on the number of years that enduring rivalries have been going on. Though PSCs are distinct

forms of long-lasting conflict and should not be referred to as inter-changeable with enduring rivalries, I find the idea of categorizing and/or stratifying PSC based on time, intensity, or some other criteria a potentially useful prospect. Right now, PSCs are conceptualized in a binary manner. Either they are a PSC or they are not. When it endures over time, though, a PSC can ingrain itself into the social fabric of the actors. Thus, when resolution-oriented intervention is introduced into the conflict, the actors could resist any effort to ending the conflict because the conflict has become part of their individual and social identity (conflict identity). As I discovered in my research, any potential role that psychology plays in the continuation of PSC is not immediate. Rather, it develops over time. Stratifying PSC in terms of levels of intensity or in increments of duration could allow for earlier recognition and intervention in a violent social conflict *before* it become fully incorporated into the social consciousness. This could be an exciting project!

When I made my decision concerning the selection of my data source, I purposely chose the New York Time. My assumption was that the reporting of the New York Times would be unbiased and provide a “fair” representation of the issues at play in each case. Now, I would like to conduct a follow-on study using local news sources. By using sources that are closer to the conflict and that represent the positions of the actors (in each side of the dyads), a clearer picture of actual components that are descriptive of and are sustaining PSC could be realized. There may also be utility in examining the findings of the data gained form the New York Times comparatively against the findings from the local news media.

There are also other nuances of PSC that caught my attention that I would be interested in researching in the future. Another area of potential interest is how external

actors and entities influenced PSC actors and PSC outcomes. In the Arab/Israeli case, there were numerous references to foreign diplomatic support and pressure, financial assistance, and military assistance. In the Northern Ireland case, references to these types of support were much more limited. Why was this? The Northern Ireland case had approximately 20 more years of analysis, yet there were fewer references to external actor participation. Could external actors actually be a factor in why certain PSCs are so intractable? It would be interesting to examine the Cold War proxy wars in Latin America and Africa from this perspective.

In developing and analyzing the dataset for my dissertation, I now find that I have more questions than answers regarding PSC. Clearly, there is more work that needs to be done. However, a clear and accurate conceptualization of the theoretically necessary components *must* be identified before any further, meaningful research and discovery is made. Otherwise, I am building on an untested and untried foundation that could crumble like a house of cards. Though I am excited about my future research agenda, these initial findings *must* be supported by other PSC cases so that they are more generalizable. Otherwise, I am guilty of the same offense that I am raise about current PSC scholarship; I would be building my research off an unvetted conceptualization.

CONCLUSION

This dissertation project set out to fill gaps in the theoretical knowledge of PSC. In 1978, noted scholar Dr. Edward Azar published a seminal work on PSC where he presented his theoretical conceptualization of PSC. His theoretical model contained four necessary components: effective participation, security, distinctive identity, and social recognition of identity. Since that time, some PSC cases have received rigorous scholarly

attention, and studies have been built from Azar's theoretical conceptualization. The exploration and vetting of *any* of PSC's theoretical underpinnings have been minimal. Because Azar's necessary components made logical sense, they were accepted.

Thus, this dissertation has set forth to the test theoretical components of PSC. Additionally, I proposed that and while Azar's original theoretical concept of PSC filled a necessary theoretical gap in its time, some of the components tend to be more abstract and are difficult to measure while others are too narrow in scope. For example, what is "effective participation"? What is "security"? Is it physical security, or is a sense of well-being? Similarly, do distinctive identity and social recognition of identity sufficiently incorporate all of the possible psychological motivations that may be significant in PSC?

To address these challenges in Azar's model, I presented and tested a theoretical model of PSC that was based squarely in Azar's foundational work while offering a more concrete and measurable conceptualization of the necessary components of PSC. My conceptual model contains six independently necessary categorical components, with jointly necessary radial components, that when tested can clarify what components are necessary for PSC to occur (See figure 8.1). Using two critical PSC cases, I have found that the six proposed categorical components can be supported as necessary components of PSC. While my initial findings are encouraging, basing a theoretical structure off from only two cases is not sufficient to make generalizable assertions. As such, more cases must be assessed before any meaningful and supportable theoretical assertions can be made.

In an ever-changing world, understanding what PSC is, what is necessary for it to occur, and what separates it from other forms of conflict is critical to any hope of

resolution. By taking Azar's theoretical structure and addressing its obscurities, making components more concrete and measurable, filling in gaps were needed, and testing the modified structure, a more comprehensive and supportable conceptualization of the theoretically necessary components are realized. As such, our knowledge of PSC is enhanced.

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%20capacity.%20They%20will%20be%20able%20to%20buy%20many%20tracts%20of%20land%20and%20displace%20the%20Arab%20farmers%20from%20their%20land%20and%20their%20fathers%20heritage.%20However%20we%20did%20not%20conquer%20this%20land%20from%20you.%20We%20conquered%20it%20from%20the%20Byzantines%20who%20ruled%20it%20then.%20We%20do%20not%20owe%20anything%20to%20the%20Jews.%20The%20Jews%20were%20not%20here%20when%20we%20conquered%20the%20country%22&f=false. (Accessed November 5, 2012).

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APPENDIX

DATA COLLECTION PARAMETERS

The following is a list of parameters that were used to gather data for analysis:

1. Data Sources:
 - a. New York Times via ProQuest Historical Newspapers (1851-2012)
2. Search Criteria:
 - a. Arab/Israeli PSC- Israel, or Israeli, and Palestinian, or Arab, and dead, or killed or casualties
 - b. Northern Ireland PSC- Northern Ireland, or IRA, or Irish Republican Army, and dead, or killed, or casualties
3. Assumptions:
 - a. All articles reported are accurate and unbiased
 - b. If the perpetrators of a violent act or identified, unless clearly indicated otherwise, it is assumed that the deaths are members of the out-group
 - c. If a violent act is perpetrated within a geographical area known to be part of a certain group, if unclaimed, it is assumed that members of the out-group perpetrated the act of violence
4. Coding rules:
 - a. Quotes from one actor in different parts of the article are coded as the same entry

- b. Quotes from different actors within the same article are coded as separate entries
 - c. Political actors (members of political parties) that are not acting or speaking on behalf of the state are coded as non-state actors
 - d. In the event different reportings of the same incident, self-reporting will be used.
 - i. In the event that that deaths are reported without specific numbers of casualties, the event is coded for deaths being present, but no deaths are attributed to either actor
5. Data/information that is rejected:
- a. Within-group disagreements and violence not relevant to the PSC
 - i. Internal disagreement over policy
 - b. Quotes with too few words to understand the intent of the speaker independent from journalist commentary
 - c. Assignment of motive from the journalist's point of view
 - d. Statements from journalist that give the journalist's opinion of behavioral intent or motivation
 - e. Editorial articles
 - f. Statements of actors that are not directly related to the PSC
 - i. Statements of foreign diplomats and political leaders
 - ii. Statements of lobby groups
 - g. Quotes and information that is used in previously recoded articles

6. Data validity/verification:

- a. Ten percent of all of the data will be rechecked and verified for accuracy and coding. Approximately every ten articles, an article will be selected and verified.

DATA CODING DEFINITIONS

- Perpetrator: Actor attributed to having initiated violence
- Injuries: Incidence of people being injured as a result of violence, not including deaths
- Casualties: The number of deaths reported that are the result of PSC-related violence
- Quote in incident: There was a statement in the article that was germane to the PSC
- Conflict quote: There was a statement in the article that revealed a reason why an act of violence was perpetrated
- Competition-based conflict: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was perpetrated to gain access or control of a finite resource or commodity
- Actor coding:
 - Arab/Israeli Case-
 - P = Actors associated with the Arab or Palestinian side of the dyad
 - I = Actors associated with the Israeli side of the dyad
 - Northern Ireland Case-
 - B = Actors associated with the British, Protestant, or Separatist side of the dyad

- I = Actors associated with the IRA, Catholic, or Unionist side of the dyad
 - Masses- individuals, groups, or organizations not officially affiliated with any governmental entity
 - Elite- Individuals, groups, or organizations affiliated with or speaking on behalf of a governmental entity
- Territory: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was committed to gain or gain control of territory
- Resources: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was committed to gain or gain control of a natural resource
- Security: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was committed to protect or gain physical security or survival
- Political Power: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was committed to increase their political legitimacy, to gain control of governmental policy, or to gain control of government
- Social Power: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was committed to increase influence or control over their social environment
- Revenge: There was a statement in the article that revealed that violence was committed in a reactionary manner to respond to the behavior and actions of the out-group
- Psychological quote: There was a statement in the article that revealed psychological impetus towards the PSC

- Emotion: Statements that reveal an affective state of consciousness where internal understandings and reactions to stimuli are expressed
- Perception: Statements that reveal actors' belief, understanding, comprehension, or attributions of the out-group's motives, attributes, or legitimacy
- Self-identification: Statements that reveal personal sentiment, connection or conceptualization of self with, or as opposed to, another person, group, or thing
- Group-identification: Statements that reveal collective sentiment, connection, belonging, or conceptualization of the group with, or as opposed to, another person, group, or thing

APPENDIX C –DATA CODING

The following is the coding format used in the Arab/Israeli PSC. The same format is used for the Northern Ireland conflict, except that IRA and British actors are used in place of Palestinian and Israeli actors:

Category	Explanation of Category	How it is Coded
Date of Event	Date recorded within article that the event took place	Actual date of incident
P Perp.	Palestinians were the perpetrators of the event	Yes =1 No = 0
I Perp.	Israelis were the perpetrators of the event	Yes =1 No = 0
Injuries	Were there injuries in the event	Yes =1 No = 0
D in Incident	Were there deaths in the event	Yes =1 No = 0
P Death	Number of Palestinian deaths	Actual numbers of deaths reported
I Death	Number of Israeli deaths	Actual numbers of deaths reported
Quo. in incid.	Was there a quote in the article sufficient to glean the intent of the speaker independently:	Yes = 1 No =0

Confl. Stat.	Was there a statement made that revealed that asset competition is the reason why the actor engaged in violent behavior	Yes = 1 No =0
P C Statem.	Was there a statement by a Palestinian actor that revealed the asset competition reason why the actor engaged in violent conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
I C Statem.	Was there a statement by an Israeli actor that revealed the asset competition reason why the actor engaged in violent conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
P/I	Actor who made the conflict statement	P = Palestinian I = Israeli
E C Stat.	Was it an elite actor that made the statement	Yes = 1 No =0
M C Stat.	Was it a masses actor that made the statement	Yes = 1 No =0
Mass/Elite	Who made the conflict statement E= elite M= Masses	E= elite M= Masses
Territ.	Did the statement reveal territorially-based conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
Resources	Did the statement reveal Resource-based conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
Security	Did the statement reveal security-based conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
Pol Pow.	Did the statement reveal Political power competition-based conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
Soc Pow.	Did the statement reveal competition for social power-based conflict	Yes = 1 No =0
Revenge	Did the statement reveal revenge as a specific motive for conflict	Yes = 1

		No =0
Psy. Stat.	Did the statement reveal the presence of a psychological emotion or condition	Yes = 1 No =0
Emot.	Did the statement reveal the presence of the psychological emotion/condition of emotion	Yes = 1 No =0
Percep.	Did the statement reveal the presence of the psychological emotion/condition of perception	Yes = 1 No =0
Self Id.	Did the statement reveal the presence of the psychological emotion/condition of Self-identity	Yes = 1 No =0
Group Id.	Did the statement reveal the presence of the psychological emotion/condition of Group identity	Yes = 1 No =0

DATA SAMPLE

Because there are over 2000 individual lines of coding, the following is a sample of the data collected from each PSC

case:

Arab/Israeli PSC⁹⁵:

Windows	Date of event	E C Stat.	M C Stat.	Mass/ Elite	Territ.	Resources	Security	Pol. Pow.	Soc. Pow.	Revenge
1963	4/23/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
(32)	6/2/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	6/24/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/18/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/18/1963	1	0	E	0	0	1	0	0	0
	8/20/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/19/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/20/1963	1	0	E	0	0	1	0	0	0
	8/20/1963	1	0	E	1	0	0	0	0	0
	11/16/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	11/16/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1963 Totals	-	3	0	-	1	0	2	0	0	0

⁹⁵ 1963 in the Arab/Israeli case is selected because it has the least number of entries of all the years examined with several of the components that are measured being present. However, it is still too long to fit all of the data on a single page. Thus, the gap between August 20 and November 16 signifies that data has been omitted from the table. This page and the ensuing four pages are data from the same articles.

Windows	Date of event	Psy Stat.	P Stat.	I Stat.	P/I	El. Psy. Stat.	Mass Psy. Stat.	Mass/ Elite
1963	4/23/1963	1	1	0	P	1	0	E
	6/2/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	6/24/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/18/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/18/1963	1	1	0	P	1	0	E
	8/20/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/19/1963	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8/20/1963	1	0	0	I	1	0	E
	8/20/1963	1	1	1	I	1	0	E
	11/16/1963	1	0	1	I	1	0	E
	11/16/1963	1	1	0	I	1	0	E
1963 Totals	-	8	5	3	-	8	0	-

Wind.	Date of Event	Emot.	Percep.	Self -id	Group -id	Statements
1963	4/23/1963	0	1	0	0	"Israel might choose this particular time for action against all Arabs"
	6/2/1963	0	0	0	0	
	6/24/1963	0	0	0	0	
	8/18/1963	0	0	0	0	
	8/18/1963	0	1	0	1	"Our armed forces are standing by to crush any new Israeli aggression"
	8/20/1963	0	0	0	0	
	8/19/1963	0	0	0	0	
	8/20/1963	1	1	0	1	". . . a grave threat to peace. We feel there is a real danger to peace if the Syrian actions do not stop"
	8/20/1963	1	1	0	1	". . . were butchered for the express purpose of fomenting tension. . . We are not prepared to be the whipping boy for the Arab world, and to have its tensions and turmoil seek facile outlets across our borders"
	11/16/1963	1	0	0	1	"We are not afraid, except perhaps for Iraq, the other Arab states won't back them up."
	11/16/1963	0	1	1	1	". . . because Nasser won't give up. Nor will he risk war again until he's sure he can win. That means atomic weapons- and he has a large desert in which to test. We can't test here"
1963 Total s	-	5	6	1	5	-

Windows	Date of Event	Source	Non-state	Name of Non-state	Article Title
1963	4/23/1963	NYT	-	0	Ousted Ministers Jailed in Jordan
	6/2/1963	NYT	-	0	Israel Reports Arab Attack
	6/24/1963	NYT	-	0	3 Arabs Slain by Israelis As Infiltrators From Gaza
	8/18/1963	NYT	-	0	3 Border Intruders Killed By Israelis
	8/18/1963	NYT	-	0	3 Border Intruders Killed By Israelis
	8/20/1963	NYT	-	0	Middle East War and Peace
	8/19/1963	NYT	-	0	4th Border Intruder in 3 Days Is Slain by Israelis in Negev
	8/20/1963	NYT	-	0	Israel Asks UN To Meet on Syria
	8/20/1963	NYT	-	0	Israel Asks UN To Meet on Syria
	11/16/1963	NYT	-	0	Foreign Affairs
	11/16/1963	NYT	-	0	Foreign Affairs
1963 Totals	-	-	-	0	-

Windows	Date of event	Article Date	Page #	Verified
1963	4/23/1963	April 24, 1963	1	Verified
	6/2/1963	June 3, 1963	3	-
	6/24/1963	June 25, 1963	4	-
	8/18/1963	August 19, 1963	6	Verified
	8/18/1963	August 19, 1963	6	Verified
	8/20/1963	August 20, 1963	31	-
	8/19/1963	August 20, 1963	2	-
	8/20/1963	August 21, 1963	1	Verified
	8/20/1963	August 21, 1963	1	Verified
	11/16/1963	November 16, 1963	21	-
	11/16/1963	November 16, 1963	21	-
1963 Totals	-	-	-	-

PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATION LANGUAGE DICTIONARY

The following are samples of the Psychological motivation dictionary used to classify statement made by actors as emotional, perceptual, self-identification, and group-identification –based motivations.

Emotion: an affective state of consciousness that communicates the feelings of an actor toward a stimulus or another actor

Word	Gram.	Definition ⁹⁶	Article ⁹⁷	Date
Antipathy	N	settled aversion or dislike		
Abhor	V	to regard with extreme repugnance		
Abomination	N	extreme disgust and hatred		
Admire	V	To regard with wonder, pleasure, or approval	For All the Bombs, the IRA Is No closer to Goals	13-Dec-92
Affection	N	tender attachment		
Affection	N	a moderate feeling or emotion		
Agony	Adj	Intense pain of mind or body		
Anguish	N	Extreme pain, distress, or anxiety		

⁹⁶ Definitions are retrieved from: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/>

⁹⁷ Emotive words that are not taken from articles were retrieved from: <http://www.psychpage.com/learning/library/assess/feelings.html> or <http://www.psychpage.com/learning/library/assess/feelings.html>

Animosity	N	ill will or resentment tending toward active hostility : an antagonistic attitude		
Animus	N	a usually prejudiced and often spiteful or malevolent ill will		
Antagonism	N	actively expressed opposition or hostility < <i>antagonism</i> between factions>		

Perception: is an awareness that is derived from sensory processes while a stimulus is present

Perceptual statements are unlike emotive sentiments in that they may not be determined by the use of a single word. Rather they can be determined by the context of several words put together. They are statements that express one’s belief of the out-groups’ motives, belief of the out-group’s opinion of the in-group, communicates self-perception of the out-group, or communicate an assessment of the PSC. The following are samples of perceptual statements that were identified in the Arab/Israeli case:

Statement	Actor	Source	Article	Date/pg. #
“... a Holy War Against Israel”	Israelis	NYT	War in Fog	May 23, 1948/E1
“...forcing the enemy out of resistance pocket...”	Palestinians	NYT	Israeli Men Win 2 Villages as Latrun Battle Develops	May 29, 1948/1
"This is an eleventh hour attempt, . . ."	Palestinian	NYT	Arab Legion is Held Off	May 31, 1948/1
". . .the workers fired first and "forced Arab forces to shell that part to silence Jewish fire stations.”	Palestinians	NYT	Jewish Workers Fired On	June 9. 1953/9
"The enemy turns his eyes toward Jerusalem, the eternal seat of our eternal people. It will be a savage and merciless battle without retreat. Our fate will be victory or annihilation. We shall fight to the last man among us.”	Israelis	NYT	Bitter Fight Predicted	July 7, 1948/7
“...here is no international law which can justify the presence of invading armies in a country that does not belong to them...”	Israelis	NYT	Former Irgun Leader Sees Palestine Unity	November 30, 1948/5

			With Brotherhood Among Jews and Arab11/30	
"...Destroy the political and territorial integrity of state state..."	Israelis	NYT	Negeb Fight Rages in Air and on Land	December 27, 1948/1
"The Jordan armed forces have been instructed to use force as from today in repulsing any further acts of aggression of the Jews along the 700-kilometer-long armistice line between the two countries"	Palestinians	NYT	Arab's Incursions Worrying Israelis,	February 2, 1953/12
"...repulsing any further acts of aggression of the Jews..."	Palestinians	NYT	Arab's Incursions Worrying Israelis,	February 2, 1953/12
"Israeli provocations and propaganda: territorial ambition, the psychological release of the urge to bully others after having suffered bullying for centuries, endeavor to maintain the flow of financial support from the United States by keeping the appearance of the Arab menace. . . criminal immigrants from European ghettos"	Palestinians	NYT	Glubb Accusation Incenses Israelis	June 20, 1953/4
"It is to be expected that the foreign ministers will address their attention to the only cause of the	Israelis	NYT	Israelis Take Measures	October 18, 1953/1

<p>intolerable state of affairs along the Israel-Jordan border. . . perpetrating brutal murders, attacking life and attacking traffic and completely undermining the security of life and property in the area and which is further exemplified by the unwillingness or inability of the Jordan authorities to stem this tide of lawlessness in fulfillment of their clear obligations under the Armistice Agreement."</p>				
<p>". . .centers of the murderous gangs. . . All the responsibility rests on the Jordan Government, which for years has tolerated and thereby encouraged acts of murder and pillage against the inhabitants of Israel. . .which have been trying for five years to wreck the Jewish state by . . . They denied them homes in their countries and compelled the Arab refugees to subsist on the. . .and kept them deliberately in the vicinity of Israel's frontiers for these pernicious purposes</p>	<p>Israelis</p>	<p>NYT</p>	<p>Ben-Gurion Charges Jordan Proved Raid by Villagers</p>	<p>October 20, 1953/1</p>

Endnotes

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- ⁱⁱⁱ No Author, "Nine Jews, Three Arabs Killed; 110 Injured, In Clash Blamed on Moselms." *New York Times*, 24, August, 1929, 1.
- ^{iv} No Aurthor, "Three Killed by Gang On Palestine Highway," *New York Times*, 7 April 1931, 7.
- ^v Levy, Joseph M. "Jerusalem Scene of Arab Rioting: 3 Killed, 70 Hurt," *New York Times*, 30 October 1933.
- ^{vi} No Author, "Arrest Ten Arabs for Attack on Jews." *New York Times*. 18 August, 1929, 24.
- ^{vii} No Author, "Wailing Wall in Jerusalem- Another Incident." *The Times*. 19 August, 1929, 11.
- ^{viii} No Author, "Nine Jews, Three Arabs Killed 110 Injured In Clash Blamed on Moslems in Jerusalem, *New York Times*, 24 August, 1929, 1.
- ^{ix} No Author, "Arabs Opened Attack After Noon Prayers." *New York Times*. August 25, 1929, 5.
- ^x No Author, "Arabs Attack Jaffa, Thirty are Killed." *New York Times*. August 26, 1929, 6.
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- ^{xii} No Author. "Dead Now Put at 196." *New York Times*.
- ^{xiii} Levy, Joseph M. "Troops Seize Arab Chiefs at Gates of Jerusalem." *New York Times*. 30 August, 1929, 1.
- ^{xiv} Isreal & Judiasm Studies. 2012. "Peel Commission Partition Plan 1937." *Isreal & Judiasm Studies*. www.ijs.org/Peel-Commission-Partition-Plan-1937/default.aspx. (Accessed 10/3/12).
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- ^{xxi} No Author. "Shot From Ambush," *New York times*, 1 December, 1947, 8.
- ^{xxii} No Author, "Strike Starts in Nablus," *New York Times*, 1 December, 1947, 1.; No Author, "Shot From Ambush" *New York Times*, 1 December, 1947, 8.
- ^{xxiii} No Author. "Holy War Demanded." *New York Times*. 4 December, 1947, 5.
- ^{xxiv} Brewer, Samuel P. "Arab Chief Warns of Worse Fighting," *New York Times*. 1 January, 1948, 16.
- ^{xxv} No Author. "Jews Active in Raids." *New York Times*. 2 January, 1938, 6.
- ^{xxvi} Currivans, Gene. "Arab Legion Is Held Off." *New York Times*. 31 May, 1948, 1.
- ^{xxvii} Meltzer, Julian Louis. "Ersalem Truce Halts Israeli Push to Retake Old City." *New York Times*. 18, July, 1948, 1.
- ^{xxviii} Currivan, Gene. "Arab Losses Heavy." *New York Time*. 22 July, 1948, 16.
- ^{xxix} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxx} *Ibid.*
- ^{xxxi} No Author. "Arab's Incursions Worrying Israelis." *New York Times*. 2 February, 1953, 12.
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