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The Three Dimensionality Model Of State Security And Armed Conflict: Internal And External Dimensions And Lessons From The Middle East

Juri Kim

University of South Carolina

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THE THREE DIMENSIONALITY MODEL OF STATE SECURITY AND ARMED
CONFLICT: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS AND LESSONS FROM THE
MIDDLE EAST

by

Juri Kim

Bachelor of Arts
Ewha Womans University, 2006

Master of Arts
Ewha Womans University, 2008

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Collage of Arts and Sciences

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Accepted by:

Harvey Starr, Major Professor

Lee D. Walker, Committee Member

Katherine Barbieri, Committee Member

Timothy Peterson, Committee Member

T. David Mason, Committee Member

Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

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DEDICATION

To my parents, who have always supported my dream and believed in me,

To my husband, who has loved me with all his heart since we met,

To our son, who has made us happier than we could ever imagine.

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ABSTRACT

The primary objective of this research is to explore the dynamics in the development of civil conflict. Specifically, I attempt to explain the reasons for the occurrence of full-scale internal armed conflicts and the variation in intensity of those conflicts. Given that a substantial portion of previous studies in the field have taken rebel-centric and aggregate cross-country approaches, this research focuses on the state side and how the internal-external environments within which the ruling regime is situated affect its security decisions on rebellion.

The main argument is that internal armed conflict is a serious security problem of incumbent governments in the new states established in the twentieth century, and the occurrence and intensification of conflict depends on how ruling governments respond to rebellion. In the face of rebellion, a ruling regime has to decide whether to repress the rebels or compromise with them, based on consideration of internal and external dimensions of state security. That is, three dimensions of state security – domestic, regional, and international – influence the ruling regime’s choice between repression and compromise. This theoretical framework is called “the Three Dimensionality Model of state security and armed conflict.” When the ruling regime enjoys consolidated power status in domestic politics, is involved in intense rivalry relationship with a neighboring state, and is highly dependent on a superpower country that supports military options, the regime is more likely to repress a rebel group and thus the conflict is intensified.

Using the method of controlled comparison, this research conducts a set of comparative case studies to examine the theory. First, I compare the three different phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict: the 1961-1970 conflicts, the 1974-1975 conflict, and the 1985-1988 conflicts. The three cases differ in terms of outcomes and severity of conflicts. I analyze the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of the ruling regime's security considerations. The results show that when the power status of the ruling regime is consolidated, the relationship with Iran was more hostile, and the ruling regime relied less on superpowers, the regime did not accommodate the Kurdish rebels and repressed them more severely, resulting in intense conflicts. Second, applying the key findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases, I compare the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2011 Libyan civil conflict and analyze reasons for the divergent outcomes in the two countries in the wake of the so-called Arab Spring. The results also confirm the theory. The different internal-external circumstances in which the Mubarak and the Gaddafi regimes were situated led them to make different decisions in the face of uprisings, which resulted in a peaceful transfer of power in one country and a full-scale armed conflict in the other.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
ABSTRACT	vi
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xii
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW	7
2.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE ON CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET AND SEVERITY	7
2.2 LIMITATION OF THE REBEL-CENTRIC AND THE AGGREGATE CROSS-COUNTRY APPROACHES.....	12
CHAPTER 3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK.....	16
3.1 THE LOGIC OF OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS	17
3.2 CIVIL CONFLICT STUDIES AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY.....	19
3.3 DEFINITIONS OF THE KEY CONCEPTS: SECURITY AND CIVIL CONFLICT	20
3.4 HISTORY AS A CREATOR OF OPPORTUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIZATION AND DECOLONIZATION AND SETTINGS FOR INSTABILITY	23
3.5 MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPRESS	29
3.6 NEW OPPORTUNITY AFTER INDEPENDENCE: THE THREE DIMENSIONALITY MODEL OF STATE SECURITY AND ARMED CONFLICT	30
3.7 CONCLUSION.....	36
CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY	38

4.1 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES: RESEARCH QUESTION, THEORY, AND PURPOSIVE SAMPLING	39
4.2 THE METHOD OF CONTROLLED COMPARISON.....	40
4.3 ANALYTIC GENERALIZATION	42
4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN.....	43
CHAPTER 5 EMPIRICAL STUDY I: THE IRAQI-KURDISH CONFLICTS	50
5.1 COMPARING CASES	50
5.2 BRITISH RULE AND THE CREATION OF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERNAL INSTABILITY	53
5.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQI MILITARY AND ITS CAPABILITY	61
5.4 INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF STATE SECURITY	64
5.5 THE 1961-1970 CONFLICT	69
5.6 THE 1974-1975 CONFLICT	80
5.7 THE 1985-1988 CONFLICT	88
5.8 CONCLUSION.....	95
CHAPTER 6 EMPIRICAL STUDY II: THE 2011 EGYPTIAN UPRISING AND THE 2011 LIBYAN CIVIL CONFLICT.....	97
6.1 DOMESTIC DIMENSION	100
6.2 REGIONAL DIMENSION	107
6.3 INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION.....	113
6.4 CONCLUSION	123
CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION.....	125
7.1 FINDINGS.....	125
7.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS.....	127

7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT	131
REFERENCES.....	134

LIST OF TABLES

Table 4.1 Detailed Information on the Data Sources	47
Table 5.1 Comparison of Cases	52
Table 5.2 Militarized Disputes between Iraq and Iran	67
Table 5.3 Military Coup Attempts between 1958–1970	70
Table 6.1 US Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1948 – 2013	116
Table 7.1 Summary of Findings	128

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5.1 Trends in Iraqi Military Spending.....	63
Figure 5.2 Iraqi Armed Forces Expansion.....	63
Figure 6.1 US Foreign Assistance to Egypt	116

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Many parts of the globe have been suffering from severe internal armed conflicts. The occurrence of armed conflict within a state has outnumbered conflict between states, resulting in tens of thousands of casualties in the fighting each year, including innocent civilians.¹ The impact of civil conflict is not limited to a single state, however. Civil conflict in one country is often followed by regional instability by inviting the intervention from foreign states. A flow of refugees becomes a major problem in neighboring countries, or beyond as in many European states where the influx of refugees from the Middle East has caused serious social and political problems (Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010). Recognizing the importance of the issue in maintaining peace and security, the international community has been working to stop conflicts. Understanding the dynamics of the development of civil conflict is foremost in the world's effort to bring about peace. This research is an attempt to be part of this global endeavor.

The phenomenon of civil conflict is more prevalent in the new states that were established in the twentieth century, particularly since World War II. These states have suffered from persistent internal insecurity. Yet, it is interesting to observe that not all of

¹ For instance, 400,000 Syrians have been killed and another 70,000 have perished due to a lack of basics in five years of civil war (*Reuters*, February 11, 2016). <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-casualties-idUSKCN0VK0MQ> (accessed October 11, 2016).

the new states have experienced full-scale domestic armed conflicts, and even if they have, the severity and intensity of such conflicts varies. Why do we observe such differences? What are the factors that led states to take different paths after independence, and how did those factors play a role in bringing about violent conflict, and in making a difference in the severity of civil conflict? These are the questions that this research specifically asks.

While much of the contemporary literature on civil conflict in the field of international relations focuses on a rebel side, the main interest of this research is the government side. As definitions of civil conflict commonly demonstrate, at least one party is a state or a representative of a state. For instance, Mason defines (2009, 68) civil wars as “armed conflicts that take place within a nation that is a recognized member of the nation-state system.” Similarly, Collier and Hoeffler (2002, 3) define civil war as “an internal conflict with at least 1000 combat-related deaths, with both an identifiable rebel organization and government forces suffering at least five percent of these casualties.” These definitions indicate that although it is more likely that an organized non-state group triggers conflict, the development of the armed conflict is a result of interaction between a government and a rebel group. That is, a government’s set of decisions to deal with rebellion are key to understanding armed internal/anti-government conflict.

This research argues that internal armed conflict is a serious security problem of incumbent governments in the new states born in the twentieth century. In fact, the concept of security was originally defined in terms of violent external threats and the states’ response to these threats for the survival and integrity of the state. However, armed conflict within the border often becomes a more serious threat in the new states.

Policy decisions on internal armed conflict, therefore, should be understood as governments' security policy, and it is important to figure out the factors that influence the governments' decisions between suppression and accommodation.

The government of a state is set in a much more complex situation than the rebel group. As a member of the nation- state system, its policy decisions are affected by both domestic and international politics. This is especially true when the international status of the state is weak, so the state is more susceptible to external influences. Neither its foreign policy nor internal policy is free from external influences. Armed conflict, in particular, requires both sides to secure an enormous amount of resources, which often invites the involvement and intervention of other countries. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union formed alliances with new states by providing massive economic and military aid. Aid became a political leverage to force the recipient states to follow the superpower's stance. After the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States filled the power vacuum and expanded its influence. Regional politics also matters. When states compete for regional power status, domestic turmoil in rival states creates the opportunity to take advantage and solidify its regional power status. Governments can destabilize rival states further by assisting rebel forces, making a conflict longer and more intense. In this sense, internal armed conflict in the new states becomes a serious security problem to incumbent governments. The decisions regarding rebellion are influenced by not only political situations within the state border, but also by the external environment of the state. Thus, it is necessary to consider both internal and external factors when one studies the dynamics of the development of civil conflict. This research focuses on three

dimensions of state security – domestic, regional, and international dimensions – which I call “the Three Dimensionality Model of state security.”

This dissertation is a first attempt at presenting and doing research to evaluate the utility of the Three Dimensionality Model. To deal with what could be a quite complex model, with many conditions and variables, this first take will hold a number of conditions and variables constant. To make the investigation of this more complex version of the model more tractable, future development and evaluation of the model – as will be discussed in the last chapter – will involve adding more factors, more complicated typology, a broader set of cases, and utilizing other types of analyses.²

The following chapters consist of the review of the literature, the theoretical framework, empirical case studies, and a conclusion. In chapter two, I review the existing studies on civil conflict in the field of international relations. The literature is classified according to its main argument and focus. One group of researchers advocates that the relative deprivation of discriminated groups is a main reason of rebellion. In 1993, Gurr and his colleagues constructed the first a data set on politically mobilized communal groups and conducted a serious of large-N analysis of civil conflict. Their attempt was followed by the empirical studies that focus on the grievances of minority groups and the role of grievance in conflict onset and process. Doubts about the “grievance” argument, however, have led another group of researchers to focus on the influence of structural factors of the state. They emphasize states’ economic and political structures, such as the level of economic and democratic development, and the ethnic component of population. Lastly, horizontal inequality theorists content that “grievance” still matters. Constructing a new data set on all politically relevant ethnic groups and their

² Discussion on future developments will be fully developed in the concluding chapter.

access to state power in every country, this group of researchers argues that inequalities in access to the central authority among politically relevant ethnic groups and the struggle for state power are the main reasons for civil conflict. From the review of the literature, I outline the limitations of the rebel-centric and the aggregate cross-country approaches in the existing studies.

In chapter three, I construct a theoretical framework for this research – a model of the three dimensions of state security and armed conflict. I define the concept of security, arguing for the usefulness of the concept and the need for considering the multidimensional nature of security in studying internal armed conflict in new states. I point out that while the colonial experience and military capabilities of the state brings the “opportunity” for internal instability to the new states, governments make security decisions to deal with rebellion based on their domestic, regional, and international environments. That is, the choice between suppression and compromise is a result of the consideration of these three dimensions of the state security situation.

Chapter four introduces the analysis of comparative case studies. I provide a justification of using the method of “controlled comparison” as the main analytical tool of this research, along with the study’s research design. I particularly emphasize the reasons why I choose the cases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts and the two mass uprisings during the 2011 Arab Spring – the Egyptian uprising and the Libyan civil conflict.

Chapter five contains the main empirical studies of this research – the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts. The chapter presents the impact of British rule on the emergence of the Iraqi Kurdish movements and military capabilities of the Iraqi government as an opportunity of armed conflict. Pointing out differences in the onset of conflicts and the

extent, severity, and intensity of each case, I compare the three different time phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict: The 1961-1970 conflicts, the 1974-1975 conflict, and the 1985-1988 conflicts. I analyze the three cases on the basis of domestic, regional, and international dimensions of the ruling regime's security consideration. Then, I find how different internal and external circumstances in each phase brought about contrasting results in terms of the severity and the outcomes.

In chapter six, in order to make analytic generalizations, I conduct another set of comparative case studies, applying key findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases to the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2011 Libyan civil war. Although the two countries share a number of commonalities, the ruling regimes reacted differently when mass demonstrations erupted in 2011. While the Mubarak regime made concessions several times to ease the anger of demonstrators in streets, the Gaddafi regime almost immediately used force to repress protesters. These differences in governments' response brought about contrasting outcomes to the two states. I analyze and compare differences in domestic, regional, and international dimensions of the two states' security and how each dimension affected the regimes' decision on the uprising. Lastly, in chapter seven, I conclude with the findings and results, the implications of the results and contributions of this research, and the suggestions for future study.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Constructing cross-country data sets, international relations (IR) scholars have brought a new trend of research to the field of civil conflict studies. Research is not limited to a single or small number of case studies. Instead, the research is often global in scope. This broadened scope of research enables researchers to generate more generalizable theories of civil conflict. In this chapter, I review the literature on civil conflict onset and severity in the field of IR and describe how the discussion has evolved. Also, I point out the limitations of previous studies and how the present research can contribute to our understanding of civil conflict.

2.1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE ON CIVIL CONFLICT ONSET AND SEVERITY

2.1.1 Relative Deprivation Theories with a Large-Scale Data Sets

Gurr (1993) attempted the first large-N analysis of communal conflict by building a data set on politically mobilized communal groups throughout the world. The Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the world from 1975, focusing on ethnopolitical groups, or non-state communal groups³

³ Communal groups are defined as “those whose core members share a distinctive and persistent collective identity based on cultural and ascriptive traits that are important to them and to others with whom they interact” (Gurr 1993, 163).

that have “political significance” and who are selected based on the two following criteria: (1) The group collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society; (2) The group is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defense or promotion of its self-defined interests.⁴ Based on his relative deprivation theory and the new data set, Gurr studies ethnic minorities’ reactions to state-imposed discrimination, and presents the conditions under which mobilization of minorities turn violent (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Gurr 1993). He tries to make generalizable explanations for how minority groups who suffer from economic, political, and cultural discrimination could trigger protests and rebellions against the state.

The MAR dataset has allowed scholars to expand the scope of their research, move into new areas of research, and undertake a diverse set of quantitative studies of ethnic violence. Scholars have studied various subjects in ethnic conflict, including the relationship between a domestic environment of inequality with regard to ethnic minorities and the likelihood that a state will use violence internationally (Caprioli and Trumbore, 2013); how problematic domestic circumstances lead a country’s leaders to divert population discontent by launching military campaigns against ethnic minorities (Tir and Jasinski, 2008); the ethnoreligious minorities and the role of religion in civil conflict (Fox 2003; 2004); and the disparities in external support for ethnic groups in international relations (Saideman 2002).

Although the MAR data set allows scholars of civil conflict to broaden the scope of their studies enormously, it is often criticized for selection problems. Considering disadvantaged groups only results in sampling bias. This makes it difficult to detect the

⁴ <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/about.asp> (accessed October 11, 2016).

systematic relationship between discrimination and rebellion (Fearon 2002, 3). In addition, as Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) point out, those studies do not take into account countries where a minority ethnic group rules the state or countries with complex ethnic coalitions. These limitations have led scholars to doubt grievance theories of civil conflict and have motivated them to develop new data to better conceptualize and measure the ethnic diversity of states.

2.1.2 Research That Emphasizes Structural Factors

In contrast to the “grievance” tradition, some scholars contend that ethnic diversity or grievances along with ethnic groups is not a fundamental reason for rebellion, emphasizing the influence of structural factors of the state.⁵ Economic models of civil war onset and duration show that economic factors, such as a weak economic foundation of the state or economic incentives to rebel, are more directly associated with a higher likelihood of the outbreak of civil war than ethnic identity. These studies regard economic inequality as a main source of conflict and conflict escalation, arguing that low GDP per capita is a strong predictor of civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lacina 2006). Economic-centered studies show that weak economies perpetuate socio-economic inequalities and discrimination, and create conflictual circumstances. Specifically, using a low per capita income as a proxy for state capacity, Fearon and Laitin (2003, 75) argue

⁵ The extent of ethnic diversity of the state and its relationship with conflict are tested with a quantitative measurement. The most commonly used measure of aggregate ethnic diversity is the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index, which is defined as “the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a country are from different ethnolinguistic groups (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2002, 18). It implies that the higher a nation’s ELF score, the more fragmented the nation is (Mason 2009, 92). Researchers in this tradition include the ELF index in their empirical models as one of many independent variables to determine if there is a statistical relationship between the extent of ethnic fractionalization of a state and the probability of the outbreak of civil conflict.

that financially, organizationally, and politically weak central governments render insurgency more feasible due to inept policing and corrupt counterinsurgency practices. They insist that conventional beliefs about the influence of ethnic diversity on internal violence are not supported. In their study of economic conditions and the intensity of conflict, Chaudoin, Peskowitz, and Stantou (2015) find that the intensity of conflict is negatively related to GDP per capita. They argue that conflicts in economically poorer countries are more likely to be longer and more severe. Similarly, Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) find that low per capita income and high inequality lengthen conflict.

In the same vein, Collier and Hoeffler (2000) advocate the “greed” model of rebellion in contrast with grievance-based theories. Assuming that both “greed” and “grievance” can be reasons for uprising, they test two models of rebellion and find that civil war initiation depends more on the natural resource endowment and the opportunity cost of rebellion rather than on the unfair distribution of wealth. These two seminal empirical studies of civil war commonly argue that inequality in individual wealth distribution, which represents grievance, has no statistically significant affect on the likelihood of civil war onset (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011).

The other portion of civil conflict studies has turned its attention to the influence of regime type or the level of democratic development, and examined how democratic development or the stability of political regimes relates to domestic conflict. Many studies find that harsh coercive states and strong democracies experience fewer and shorter civil wars than intermediate regimes that score in the middle range on the democracy-autocracy index (Benson and Kugler 1998; Goldston, Bates, Gurr, Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder, and Woodward 2005; Gurr, Woodward, and Marshall 2005; Hegre,

Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001; Muller and Weede 1990). Because intermediate regimes lack both democratic mechanisms to solve the problem and sufficient coercive power to suppress people with grievances, there exists a statistically significant higher probability of violence in intermediate regimes than in either democracies or autocracies.⁶

2.1.3 Horizontal Inequalities (HIs) Theories

One group of scholars disagreed with the cross-national research based on structural factors, arguing that the rejection of grievances and inequalities is premature (Roessler 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011). Based on Stewart's (2008) notion of "horizontal inequalities (HIs)," scholars in this stream of research show that a disparity in the distribution of state power between ethnic groups promotes ethnic civil conflict. *Horizontal* inequalities are "inequalities between culturally defined groups or groups with shared identities" as opposed to *vertical* inequalities (VIs), which refer to inequalities among individuals, (Stewart 2008, 12).

Building on Stewart's theoretical model on HIs, Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) constructed a new data set of politically relevant ethnic groups and their political status – The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset. The latest version identifies all politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to 2010. 758 groups are included along with the degree to which their

⁶ Another major part of academic literature comprises studies that focus on geographic factors (Ragan 1996; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Buhaug, Gates, and Jufala 2009; Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009) and those that examine the effect of third party intervention (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Dorussen, 2007).

representatives held executive-level state power – from total control of the government to overt political discrimination.⁷

The central theme of HIs theories in IR is that civil conflict is the result of ethnic exclusion from state power and competition over control of the central government. That is, inequalities in access to the central authority among politically relevant ethnic groups and struggle over state power are the main reasons for ethnic conflict. Scholars in this stream challenge the notion that the grievances of ethnic groups are irrelevant in the outbreak of civil conflict (Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011).

The literature on HIs remedies some of shortcomings found in the early literature of relative deprivation theories. Scholars of HIs reveal how ethnic group dynamics in the center of state power can trigger internal violence. In addition, by including all politically relevant ethnic groups in their data set to supplement the MAR data set, their studies also show that not only minority ethnic groups, but also majority ethnic groups, including groups in power, can instigate conflict (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009).

2.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE REBEL-CENTRIC AND THE AGGREGATE CROSS-COUNTRY APPROACHES

By reviewing the existing research, I find two tendencies in studies of civil conflict in the field of IR. First, a significant portion of the literature mainly focuses on the rebel side. These studies emphasize the influence of economic and political inequality on motivations of discriminated groups to rebel. While this rebel-centric approach has revealed the determinants that influence the initial stages of conflict onset, it overlooks

⁷ <http://www.epr.ucla.edu/> (accessed October 11, 2016).

the active role that the state government plays in the course of conflict. It assumes that the state is merely a “place” in which conflict takes place, or a neutral actor. This assumption misses a simple but important point: conflict is an interaction between at least two groups, and the state is an active participant against rebel groups (Saideman 1998; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). In other words, this approach disregards the fact that the active interaction between the rebels and the government ultimately determines the intensity and the course of events in a conflict (DeRouen and Sobek 2004).

The second tendency is the aggregate cross-country approach. This approach considers the state as a whole, focusing on state attributes and structural factors such as the level of economic development, national resources, state capacity, and regime type (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). While the state’s attributes are important conditional factors for internal instability, this aggregate approach cannot reveal details of how those characteristics of the state contribute to conflict outbreak and development. Assuming that the state is a unitary actor, this approach misses the dynamics in states’ politics. Relying on simple indicators of states’ economy, capabilities, or government characteristics can only give superficial understanding on the phenomenon.

There are some studies that try to overcome these limitations by focusing on the state and specifying the characteristics of government. For example, Fjelde and Soysa (2009) argue for the need to specify state capacity. They provide three different notions of state capacity as a determinant of civil conflict and peace – coercion, co-optation, and cooperation. States’ coercive capacities are examined by the government’s ability to extract large amounts of taxes. Co-optation means the level of public goods provision.

Cooperative capacities are assessed by the degree of trust of economic agents in state institutions (Fjelde and Soysa 2009, 6). Their study finds that high level of government spending on public goods and trustworthy institutions are more positively related to civil peace than coercive capabilities. Hegre and Nygård (2014) explain why deprivation-motivated armed conflicts are less likely in democratic regimes by conceptualizing the concept of “good governance.” They specify the concept with seven aspects – bureaucratic quality, the rule of law, corruption, economic policies, military involvement in politics, political exclusion and repression, and formal political institutions – and show that the risk of conflict is diminished in countries characterized by good governance.

Although these studies elaborate more the relationship between states’ attributes and civil conflicts, they still do not fully explain the motivations or reasons for states’ actions in the course of conflict. As I mentioned, conflict is a result of interaction between a government and a rebel group. Therefore, the governments’ decision in dealing with internal insurgency is another key factor that heavily influences the development of conflict. Particularly, the extent of conflict intensity is highly related to how the state responds to rebellion because governments possess stronger and more sustainable military capacity than rebel groups in most cases.

Decision-making is a complex process. Decisions are made based on not only the government’s ability to cope with internal opposition groups but also the internal and external circumstances in which the state is situated. This is the case more for the Third World countries since they are more susceptible to both domestic and international environments. This research points out the need to include such complexity when we study civil conflict. Therefore, I move beyond the rebel-centric and the aggregate state

attributes approaches. I argue that governments' decisions in the face of conflict is a crucial determinant of civil conflict onset and intensification, and that the government makes a decision based on the consideration of internal and external environments as well as its capabilities. In the following chapter, I construct my analytic framework.

CHAPTER 3

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

The overarching analytical framework of this research is based on Most and Starr (1989)'s "the logic of opportunity and willingness." The logic suggests that conflict possibly occurs when participating parties have both the opportunity and willingness to fight against each other. Focusing on a government side, this research attempts to examine how the government's opportunities – capabilities and environmental factors – affect its willingness to repress internal challenges and increase the risk of an armed conflict. While the logic of opportunity and willingness is the overarching analytical framework of this research, the concept of security is a substantive analytical tool to study the issue systematically. Arguing that the likelihood and the intensity of armed conflict depend on how the state reacts to internal challenges and that a state's decision to suppress the internal insurgency and launch military operations is the state's security policy decisions, this research emphasizes the internal and external dimensions of state security are the primary factors that affect its policy choice on military operations.

In the following sections, I first introduce the logic of opportunity and willingness. Second, I present the usefulness of the concept of security in civil conflict studies and define the key concept – security and civil conflict. Third, emphasizing the importance of historical factors in creating opportunities, I present how the periods of colonial rule and decolonization have created opportunities for instability in the new states forged in the twentieth century. Fourth, I present the role of military capabilities of

states in creating opportunity to suppress, which increase the possibility of conflict onset. Lastly, I explore the Three Dimensionality Model of state security concerns – domestic, regional, and international – and how it influences the government’s decision on military operations, which can bring about full-scale warfare between the government and a rebel group.

3.1. THE LOGIC OF OPPORTUNITY AND WILLINGNESS

Logical thinking is crucial to all research. It helps us to understand what to study, where we wish to go, and how we will get there to solve a “puzzle” (Most and Starr 1989). Logic provides researchers a clue of how to explain the phenomena of the world and which theory and methodology to use to help their explanation. One of the puzzles related to civil conflict is that there is a wide divergence between the paths new countries take after independence. Most of the newly-formed states of the twentieth century suffered from persistent internal insecurity after decolonization. Yet, not all the postcolonial states have experienced full-scale domestic armed conflicts, and even if they have, the severity and the intensity of conflicts vary. Why do we observe such differences? What are the factors that forced the state to take different paths after independence, and how did those factors interact with each other, bringing about violent conflict? I believe that the logic of opportunity and willingness can help solve this puzzle.

The components of the outcomes are results of a choice process within actors and interdependent interactions between actors. These choice processes are determined by the “opportunity” and “willingness” of actors (Most and Starr 1989). Opportunity is the possibility of interaction between parties so that it is possible for political events – armed conflicts in this research – to arise (Most and Starr 1989, 30). Following Sprout and

Sprout (1956, 1969)'s discussion on the relationships between the entity and environment, Most and Starr explain the two dimensions of opportunity: (1) the actual possibilities in the "objective" environment that creates and constrains the behavior of humans, and (2) the capabilities that permit the creation of opportunity. The environment in this research refers to the domestic and international environments in which the state and the insurgent groups are situated. I further argue that political events in the course of human history create new opportunities for participants by combining with the existing opportunities. Capabilities refer to the ability of parties to fight in a conflict. In this research, it mainly means military capabilities. Willingness, on the other hand, refers to "the choice (and process of choice) that is related to the selection of some behavioral options from a range of alternatives" (Most and Starr 1989, 23). This is related to the decision makers' calculation of advantage and disadvantage, which result from the choices they make.

These two pillars of opportunity and willingness are jointly necessary conditions for any political events, such as conflict, to occur. That is, a political phenomenon we observe is the result of interactions between actors who are constrained by the environment surrounding them and their capabilities to act. This logic of opportunity and willingness enables researchers to conduct cross-level analysis that helps explain how environmental factors affect an actor's behavior, and in turn, how actors' decisions shape their future environment. Although Most and Starr (1989) use interstate war and the foreign policy-making process to explain the logic of opportunity and willingness,⁸ I

⁸ Following Most and Starr (1989), Starr and his colleagues have shown how the logic of opportunity and willingness can be applied to intra-state conflict and the synthesizing capabilities of the framework. In his article on linkage between revolution and war, Starr (1994) pursues the use of a common logic for both domestic conflict (revolution) and international conflict (war). To

insist that this can also be utilized as a logical framework for analyzing intrastate conflict. It is because civil conflict is a result of participants' decision to fight, which is made based on their capabilities and the political environment surrounding them.⁹

3.2 CIVIL CONFLICT STUDIES AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

While the logic of opportunity and willingness provides the overarching analytical framework, the concept of security offers a substantive analytical tool for this research to study the issue systematically. Although the state usually has the upper hand in military capabilities compared to the opposition groups, it is set in a more complex situation. As a political entity that plays in multiple levels of domestic and international politics, the state has to take into account not only internal aspects, but also external circumstances when making a policy decision. Especially, because the newly established states are highly susceptible to regional and international environments, domestic affairs often invite external intervention and are often internationalized. Due to this susceptibility and permeability of these states, decision makers always have to consider any possible consequences of their decision. The external dimension of domestic issues and an internal-external linkage becomes magnified when the issue involves military operation. Applying the concept of security and security policy to the analysis of armed conflict in the postcolonial states is useful in a sense that internal threats and its multidimensionality are a major issue contributing to security problems of these states.

do so, he demonstrates analogies between revolution and war and finds commonalities in forms, components and processes, and sources of conflict. Similarly, Simon and Starr (1996) model the common logic of social conflict to explain internal and external security and state survival.

⁹ In the similar vein, Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand (2009) conceptualize civil war as a product of motive and opportunity in their studies of democracy and civil war.

The opportunity and willingness of the state is in many ways closely related to its security and policies regarding military operations. The domestic and international environment in which the state is situated can be related to different dimensions of state's security concerns. As the environmental aspect of opportunity creates and constrains the behavior of the state, so do the different dimensions of security concerns. The capability aspect of opportunity is the same as the ability of the state to secure the incumbent regime from internal threats. The willingness of the state to repress its opposition can be interpreted as being similar to the state's security policy decision regarding the use of military operations to deal with internal threats. Thus, if the opportunity and willingness framework provides a comprehensive perspective, the concept of security provides a tool to analyze the issue substantively. Both features of comprehensiveness and substantiality are necessary for conducting research on a complex social phenomenon and achieving a better understanding of the issue.

3.3 DEFINITIONS OF THE KEY CONCEPTS: SECURITY AND CIVIL CONFLICT

Thinking of civil conflict as a security problem for the states born in the twentieth century is not a new concept. Security studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s criticized the traditional concept of security based on the realist school because it overlooked complex security problems the Third World states faced, focusing only on the international aspect. New groups of scholars emphasized the importance of the domestic dimension of security, such as the legitimacy problems of a given regime in power and its relations with internal and external conflicts. For them, internal threats are as important as external threats, and thus security policies of these states must have involved in domestic considerations as well as their relationships with external considerations.

Despite their similarity and connectedness, it is surprising to find a disconnection between security studies and civil conflict studies in the field of IR. I believe that building a bridge between the two sub-fields will generate more comprehensive insights into the states' decisions in facing internal turmoil.

Despite its heavy presence in the literature, security is still a contested and underdeveloped concept that has a relatively short history (Buzan 1991; Thomas 1992). The concept was originally defined in terms of violent external threats and the states' response to these threats (Azar and Moon 1988). In response to the devastating World Wars, policy makers in the Western states made an effort to think of international politics more systematically and find ways to protect their country from threats. This traditional concept of security is based on a realist perception of international relations (Thomas 1992). The realist paradigm assumes that a state is a unitary and rational actor who plays a principal role in the anarchic international environment. Because it is a unitary actor, the internal dynamics of the state are not considered. As a rational actor, the state pursues uncontestable national interests and values. Relationships with other states are established based only on their interests. Therefore, the territorial integrity and political independence (sovereignty) of the state and the physical protection of the population from external adversaries are the most important values that should be preserved (Alagappa 1987).

Although there has been no clear agreement on how to define the concept of security, there are some common features that are included in the attempts to define it: the freedom from threats and the protection of a state's core values.¹⁰ In this research, I define security as "the ability or effort of the state to preserve and protect core values

¹⁰ For the list of the definitions from previous studies, see Buzan 1991, 17-18.

from threats.” The controversy over the interpretation of the concept arises from the “relative nature of threats and core values”. That is, the nature of threats and core values are relative in that they vary from state to state, across issue areas, and over time (Azar and Moon 1988, 2). Consequently, the concept of security can be interpreted differently depending on how the threats and values are identified and perceived by policy makers.¹¹

Applying the traditional realist approach to the non-Western countries, especially the postcolonial states, is problematic in this sense. Distinctive historical experiences plus the domestic and international situations surrounding these countries have brought about a much more complex nature of threats to the incumbent regime and different priorities in core values (Azar and Moon 1988). Accordingly, analyzing the security problems and policies of newly born states based on the Western perspectives provides us only fragmentary knowledge. Threats cannot be defined only externally in these countries. In fact, internal insurgencies and rebellion are perhaps the most serious security threats that the new states often face because it can directly jeopardize the incumbent’s survival. Not only is the range of threats diverse, they are also multi-dimensional and highly interconnected with each other. Because domestic politics are highly susceptible to international politics, ruling regime’s decision on domestic issues, including the insurgencies, cannot be free from the pressure for intervention from foreign powers who seek to take advantage of other states’ domestic instability. The multidimensionality of

¹¹ However, it does not mean that it is inherently inapplicable to the studies of state’s behavior. A group of states share common features and similar experiences that are crucial to their security. Most Western European countries share, for example, a period of an absolute monarchy and a process of nation-state building. Many of the Third World states share the experience of colonialism and political instability after the independence. These shared history and experience make it possible to have similar patterns in their security problems and security policy decisions.

the domestic affairs of the new states born in twentieth century is the reason why we need to have an alternative approach to security, especially when we are interested in the state's behavior. In terms of core values, the ruling regime in new states tends to prioritize regime security. The most important value to protect is regime survival rather than a state's overall well-being. Even if the regime insists on the protection of national values and make policy decisions in the name of national security, security decision are directly and indirectly designed to keep the regime in power (Alagappa 1987).

These differences in the meaning of security between Western countries and the new states require us to approach security issues of the latter states with a more comprehensive perspective. We need to understand that internal instability is a major security concern of the incumbent regime, and its multidimensionality further complicates the issue. In order to keep its power, the regime has to consider all of these aspects when making a decision. As a major security issue, civil conflict can be regarded as “an outcome of the state's decision to eliminate or reduce insecurity of the incumbent regime by repressing internal challenges and launching military operations against them.” The regime makes a decision based on the degree of interconnectedness between internal and external dimensions of the issue.

3.4 HISTORY AS A CREATOR OF OPPORTUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF COLONIZATION AND DECOLONIZATION AND SETTINGS FOR INSTABILITY

There is no doubt that history matters. An event that occurred in the past has influenced the present and an event occurring in the present will affect the future. Yet not everything has been influential on the present. Some events have had a greater impact than others (Harkness 2012). Colonization is such an event.

Colonial rule has had a profound impact on the fate of new states of the twentieth century by interfering with the gradual process of nation state building. The most crucial legacies of colonial rule are arbitrarily defined territories and populations. Colonial powers drew the lines of boundaries and divided the states based on their political and economic interests, not considering historic and ethnic divisions of the region. As a result, the region consisted of states that are artificial constructs of imperialism and colonialism and far from a natural product of human history. The artificiality of the postcolonial states has created opportunities for internal and external instability of the state in two ways: (1) It has resulted in the crisis of legitimacy of the ruling regime; and (2) It has created military capabilities by introducing the colonies to the modern military system and giving the indigenous people a “chance” to experience modern warfare through militarized anti-colonial movements.

Legitimacy is acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into line with the dictates of an external authority (Tyler 1990, 25). This should come from the moral grounds and principles on which power is based and/or the extent to which government satisfies the expectation of the people. If a government has a weak moral basis and fails to satisfy the people, hostility toward government will grow. Therefore, the lack of legitimacy of the ruling regime is at the core of rebellion.

Legitimacy of a central government cannot be discussed without referring to the development of the modern state. The state is the possessor of sovereignty over a given territory that emerged as a specific type of political entity in the modern era (Breuilly 1994, 369; Tivey 1981; Maybury-Lewis 2002). It is sovereign in a sense that it possesses indivisible authority to assert ultimate claims over the people within a consolidated

territory, and that, at the same time, it is recognized as autonomous and integral by the other states (Finer 1975). In order to maintain and exercise its sovereignty against internal and external threats, the state has developed an institutional structure, which delimits and justifies the claims attached to sovereignty (Breuilly 1994, 369). Therefore, if one's state-building was successful, there should be only a single centralized governing regime within the territory that controls its citizens so that, as a legal institution, only the state has legitimate authority to bind people by law and confer on them uniform rights and obligations (Smith 1986).

Securing legitimacy is crucial for the government since legitimacy is not only the foundation of governmental power, but also a source of public support. In fact, legitimacy of the state comes from a subjective judgment of members of the state. That is, to be legitimate, state actions should be perceived by the people as "just" or "reasonable" (Goldstone 2008, 285). Therefore, the extent of legitimacy of the state depends on how much governments enjoy public loyalty and support for government legislation and policies, along with international recognition of that support (Carment, Samy, and Prest 2008, 350). When a government is able to generate compliance from the population without the threat of coercion (that is, generate legitimacy), it can then function effectively (Jackman 1993, 36; Russett, Starr, and Kinsella 2009, 456). These processes should occur over a long period of time so that the state is able to gradually solve the problem of legitimacy.

State building in Western European countries in the modern era can be simplified as this long process of entrenchment and penetration of statist institutions, and monopolizing and concentrating the means of coercion in a given territory (Enloe 1980).

This was the process by which the apparatus of governance had been made more formally autonomous, differentiated from non-governmental organizations; more centralized; more internally coordinated; and more able to penetrate various geographic and functional sectors of society (Enloe 1980, 157-158). It was also accompanied by the peoples' acknowledgment of the state's legitimacy. As Tilly (1975) and Breuilly (1994) explain, in Europe too, the process involved strong resistance from existing authorities and the elimination of those rivals of the state. Also, the question of legitimacy of the state became a serious issue. Yet, over hundreds of years since the Treaty of Westphalia, most Western European states have solved the problem of legitimacy through deliberate efforts to homogenize their populations to construct a national identity¹², and finally achieve sole authority over the populations within their territories.¹³ That is, the idea of the sovereign state in Western Europe emerged gradually through a process of negotiation (Breuilly 1994, 373). In this sense, the ruling regime of the states in which this long process of negotiation is absent or failed would suffer from a lack of legitimacy, and jurisdiction over a population and a territory would not be universal (Perlmutter 1977). Accordingly, state-makers in such countries would face a fierce resistance from sub-authorities. Colonialism interfered with this gradual process of negotiation and development of nation-state building. The disharmony between a state and nation caused by artificial construction of the state is a common feature of postcolonial states. It has become a major

¹² Smith (1986) and Tilly (1975) argue that the state played a central role as the active principle of cultural change in Western European countries. State-makers deliberately attempted to homogenize the culture of the population through linguistic, religious, and educational standardization. Smith introduces it as the cultural and educational revolution in Western Europe. He also argues that the growth of mass conscription further facilitated the homogenization.

¹³ Here, I am not arguing that all countries on the globe should follow same path with Western countries. I am arguing that applying western formulas to the states where different culture, economy, and politics had been accumulated led to dysfunction in those states.

source of the legitimacy crisis of these countries, and created an environment conducive to internal instability of the country.

Colonialism “positively” influenced the creation of military capabilities as well. Although limited, colonial powers had developed modern military forces in the colonized country to keep statewide and regional order. Military officers were occasionally sent to military academies abroad to learn the modern military system, and soldiers were trained with modern armaments. When colonial powers left the country, the ruling regime generally inherited the colonial army and made it as national military forces. Although the regime had to redesign the national military, they at least had the basis of modern military structure and the knowledge of how it works.

Another factor that influenced the creation of military capabilities is armed struggle against colonial powers. In many countries, various types of anti-colonial struggles emerged, including armed struggle. Armed struggle against a common enemy gave the indigenous groups the chance to experience modern warfare with modern equipment. The inevitable consequence of anti-colonial warfare was the militarization of indigenous groups. When colonial powers ceded control of the former colonial territory to indigenous groups, it became problematic for the state that multiple military forces in a given territory existed. That is, the state did not have monopoly of the means of coercion – the armed forces – and inherited more than one force within their territory (Horowitz 1986).¹⁴

In the period of decolonization, the military divided between ex-colonial forces and anti-colonial forces, or between different units of the anti-colonial forces. Many of

¹⁴ The failure of new states to have a government with a monopoly of armed force is often considered as one of the major reasons of a “failed” state (See Iqbal and Starr (2008) for more discussion on failed state).

these military units transformed into political parties or were allied with politicians who share the same ethnicity or communal roots. This resulted in political parties that possessed military wings. Some armed organizations refused to take part in new state building, demanding for the independent state in the region. In this sense, warfare against the colonial power was a contributing factor to the creation of military capabilities for indigenous groups, including the group who came to power after independence.

In sum, colonial rule and the decolonization process have had profound effects on the path of new states of the twentieth century by interrupting the development of the nation state building. It has created opportunities for instability, which are favorable for internal armed conflict after independence. Environmentally, colonial powers established artificially defined territories and populations that do not reflect history and ethnic divisions of the region. This artificiality of the territories and the population increased internal instability of the state by causing the legitimacy crisis of ruling regime. Colonial rule has created military capabilities as well. Colonial powers developed modern military forces and trained them, and when they left the country, colonial military became the national military forces that had the modern military structure and knowledge. In addition, armed struggle for independence against colonial powers offered indigenous groups experience with experience modern warfare. It also brought about their militarization, which resulted in the existence of multiple armed forces within certain territory. In this sense, this period of colonization and decolonization has created the “right” setting, that is, “opportunity,” for eruption of internal armed conflict in the new states after their independence.

3.5 MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND OPPORTUNITY TO SUPPRESS

Most and Starr explain that some capabilities must be created or invented, so as to be a part of the possibilities available to actors. Yet, such capabilities are unevenly distributed among actors. Only those who have the capability can take action and become involved in certain situations (Most and Starr 1989, 32). This is the case in intrastate conflict as well.

When it faces such challenges, the regime has two options. One solution is to accept opposition groups' demands and ultimately strengthen the state by eliminating internal contradictions that may give rise to or exacerbate internal conflict (Alagappa 1987, 20). This includes enhancing political equality and participation, and social and economic development. This option can be a viable solution to the legitimacy crisis. However, it can undermine the power status of the incumbent regime and harm the political and territorial integrity of the state. The other way to deal with internal challenges is through means of suppression, which can be a more preferable option to the incumbent regime. Alagappa (1987) defines suppression as "a type of military policy and is designed to eliminate the dissidents and simultaneously entrench the position of the regime in power (1987, 21)." Although it is a short-term solution, it is a more effective and fast way to put down insurgencies.

After independence, leaders in new states hoped to emulate the military success of the Western countries by imitating Western institutional arrangement (Smith 1986). They wanted to enjoy the superior legal status of a nation-state with a strong army as their formal colonial power had. As a symbol of national independence and visible signs of sovereignty, strengthening the national military was the top priority in many postcolonial

states (Welch 1978). Especially when a ruling regime suffers from the legitimacy problem, it tends to invest heavily in military and security apparatus. Indeed, unlike the Western or developed countries where the national military is called upon and supposed to fight against foreign enemy, armed forces in new states have been frequently used to put down the domestic challengers. Therefore, sufficient military capability with a well-developed security apparatus is another important conditional factor that creates the opportunity for suppression.

In sum, the colonial experience and military capabilities of the state create the “opportunity” for internal instability in the new states. Yet in formulating security policies, governments make a decision between repression and accommodation based on the consideration of the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of state security. In the following section, I develop the Three Dimensionality Model of state security to explain governments’ decisions in the face of insurgency and the development of severe armed conflict.

3.6 NEW OPPORTUNITY AFTER INDEPENDENCE: THE THREE DIMENSIONALITY MODEL OF STATE SECURITY AND ARMED CONFLICT

Independence brought new opportunities to postcolonial states. The nature of the new environment was very dynamic and all aspects of their security were highly interconnected. In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign affairs. Domestic affairs are inevitably influenced by external factors and vice versa, and decisions in one arena could lead to an unexpected result in the other arenas. Therefore, decision makers of the state should consider the multi-dimensional nature of the issue when they make a decision. When it comes to a security

issue, decision makers have to think of the multidimensionality of the issue and the possible consequences more seriously since it is directly related to the survival of the incumbent regime. Knowing how international and regional security systems operate and how they influence the domestic affairs of the postcolonial states helps us to understand the context of civil conflict with a more comprehensive perspective. Based on the previous discussion of security in the new states born in the twentieth century, I develop a theory of the Three Dimensionality Model of state security to examine how domestic, regional, and international dimensions of security concerns affect the regime's policy of enacting military operations to deal with internal challenge.

3.6.1 Domestic Dimension

As discussed, many postcolonial states have suffered from the crisis of legitimacy and faced internal challenges to their authority. The insurgent may aim at throwing the incumbent regime from power, or require the succession of occupying a region to establish an independent state. In both cases, this can be a serious security problem for the incumbent regime.

Remaining in power is the first and foremost goal of the incumbent regime. Motives of certain decisions and behaviors of governments have been explained by this self-interested motive (Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand 2009).¹⁵ Regime change, whether peaceful or violent, brings about internal instability to some extent.¹⁶ While it can be an opportunity for rebel groups to make their demand, the level of internal instability may

¹⁵ Narrowly-defined self-interest is closely related to the assumption of the selectorate theory that political survival is the essence of politics and the key motivation of leaders (Buono de Mesquita et al. 2003).

¹⁶ "Stability," as a complex concept, has a number of dimensions and can be operationalized in a number of ways. In this research, I focus on political stability and operationalize it in terms of regime consolidation.

increase. Under this situation, a new government needs to consolidate its rule as efficiently as possible for longer tenure. Again, there are several options for a government to cope with the situation, but the choice of the government depends on the extent of its power status. When the regime's power status is weak, it suffers from a lack of hierarchical control over the elites who can be a potential adversary and control over the whole country. Because of its weak status, it needs support not only from internal elites groups but also from a sector in society in order to consolidate its rule.¹⁷ To reach an accommodation with a rebel group is one way to gain its support. However, unstable power status of the ruling regime tends to bring about recurrent instability in domestic politics because the fundamental reason of weak government power usually stems from a legitimacy problem, which cannot be solved easily. Conflicts between a government and a rebel group tend to be renewed over and over again since short tenure of incumbent regime and frequent regime changes render the promises of government invalidated.

Proposition 1. When domestic politics and the rule of an incumbent regime are stable, the regime is more likely to suppress a rebel group. On the other hand, when domestic politics are unstable and a ruling regime suffers from internal instability, the regime is more likely to avoid a military solution in response to a rebel group. It is because it needs internal support and the priority is to consolidate power through stabilizing internal affairs as soon as possible. Due to continued instability in internal politics, however, the government cannot have a firm basis for consistent policies in regards to the opposition group, which results in a cycle of conflict and cease-fire.

¹⁷ One might ask under what conditions a "sector" becomes the insurgent group. Possible answers are possession of an armed wing due to the failure of state's monopoly of military apparatus, external military support to this sector, the absence of democratic means to act against the government, and forming an anti-government alliance of sectors. This is certainly an interesting question, but requires separate in-depth research.

3.6.2 Regional Dimension

Although suppression is a preferable option, due to its susceptibility to external influence, the regime should consider the external dimension of internal conflict when making a final decision. The external dimension consists of two levels: regional and international. The regional dimension involves the competition for regional power between neighboring states and attempts of intervention from regional competitors in domestic issues.

The departure of the colonial powers created a regional power vacuum in which there was no absolute preeminent regional power. In the absence of an absolute regional power center, the interstate tensions have escalated. States not merely compete for regional power but also try to maintain a favorable external environment. The stronger states attempt to preserve a favorable status quo while its principal challengers try to change the prevailing balance in their favor (Ayoob 1995, 50).

Intervening in neighboring states' domestic affairs is the most common way of attempting to preserve or change the regional balance of power. States weaken the neighboring regional competitors by supporting the secessionist movement or movements for regime change. Strong external military assistance is vital for the insurgents of course. Yet, this strategic relationship is beneficial for external supporters as well since it is an effective way to exhaust rivalry states. Therefore, when the competition for regional power intensifies, the extent of military support to the insurgencies in the rivalry states is more likely to increase.

For the incumbent regime, intervention from regional competitors in domestic affairs is a serious security problem. It disturbs internal order and the survival of the

regime. Besides, it jeopardizes the regional power status of the country. Thus when it finds that the regional competitor attempts an intervention through military support, the regime is more likely to launch a large-scale military operation to put down the insurgents. In other words, when the insurgencies invite external military support from the regional competitor, and it threatens the regional power status of the state, the level of the military operation will be intensified.

Proposition 2. A decision on military operations against insurgents is affected by regional power competition. When the regime finds that domestic instability invites external intervention from rival states and it endangers the regime's domestic and regional power status, the government is more likely to suppress the insurgents more heavily.

3.6.3 International Dimension

The new states of the twentieth century are permeable to global politics as well. The international dimension stresses systemic factors such as polarity and the superpower competition, and the pressure from “patron” states. The Cold War (and the end of Cold War) opened a new chapter of global politics. Politically motivated intervention from the powerful states in domestic and regional issues has become common in the post World War period.

The bipolarity of the global balance of power started with the end of World War II. The colonial powers were replaced with the superpowers that sought political, economic, and military advantages in a region. The superpowers aggressively approached the new states for their interests with the enormous economic and military resources, and intruded into the domestic and regional affairs of these states. The most significant means of intervention from the superpowers is control of arms supply and various types of military and economic aids (Buzan 1988). Especially, the asymmetric relationship

between the superpowers and these states gave superpowers diplomatic leverage to influence the policies of the “client” states.

External arms supply and weapons technology transfer is essential for the new states of the twentieth century (Ayoob 1995). Artificially defined territorial boundaries and the arbitrary allocated state population affect not only internal instability of the states, but also regional instabilities. The contiguous states often disputed over contested territories and populations. The regional instability, together with the competition for the dominant regional power with neighboring states, required expending efforts in strengthening military power. Regional arms races accelerated accordingly. It facilitated the possession of high capability weapons and brought about a significant expansion of the size of military forces. However, a lack of military infrastructure and financial resources has led the states to find external assistance from the great powers. Armed conflicts bring about a massive increase in military spending and resources. For the state that lacks internal capabilities, therefore, support from the outside is critical. This makes the states vulnerable to changes in international politics and superpower policies toward the region and themselves. Thus, the superpowers’ stance on domestic affairs regarding the insurgencies is important in the regime’s decision on military operations.

Proposition 3. Superpower competition affects the military capabilities of the postcolonial states. Politically-motivated arms supplies and aid from the superpowers improve the capabilities of the state, yet client-patron relationships with the superpowers make the state vulnerable to its patron state’s political and military strategy in the region and their country. Therefore, as the dependency on the superpower is high, the regime is more likely to follow the patron state’s policy.

3.7 CONCLUSION

The Three Dimensionality Model of state security and armed conflict can be summarized below:

Government decision on repression or compromise = Domestic stability (measured as the extent of regime consolidation) + Regional power competition (measured as regional intervention and supports to the insurgent group) + Superpower preference (measured as the extent of dependency on the superpowers and superpower preference for military solution)

Readdressing the propositions, I argue that an incumbent regime is more likely to repress when the rule of an incumbent regime is stable, when there is external intervention from rival states, and when the regime relies less on superpowers or superpowers support the regime's decision regarding military operation.

One thing that should be pointed out is that the theoretical model of this research is confined to authoritarian regimes and applies less to new democracies. There are several reasons for this. The model mainly tries to explain the outbreak of intensive armed conflict according to a government's response to an insurgency. It assumes that when the government represses the insurgent group with armed forces, there is a high chance that we observe civil conflict. Yet, a heavy military operation to suppress its nationals is usually the least preferable option in democratic countries. Even if the incumbent administration wants to choose that option, the government should form a social consensus on a military action first, and the decision has to be approved by other parts of state institutions such as the legislature. A weak bond between the military and the incumbent regime in new democratic states also renders a military option less preferable. These different domestic circumstances and political mechanisms may lead democratic regimes to deal with internal opposition groups in a more peaceful way.

Limiting the applicability of the model to democracies does not reduce the explanatory power of the theory since the phenomenon of civil conflict is more prevalent in non-democratic countries and the intensity of conflict varies across these countries.

The following chapter introduces a methodology and research design of the present research. The chapter describes some features of comparative case studies and justifies the choice of the method of “controlled comparison.” Then, the chapter introduces a research design of this research

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

“Virtually all empirical social research involves comparison of some sort” (Ragin 1987, 1). Comparison enables researchers to make statements about empirical regularity and an interpretation of their study relative to theoretical criteria (Ragin 1987). A case is “an instance of a class of events (George and Bennett 2005, 17).” Classes of events, such as revolutions and wars, are not simply given by history, but the social construction of political actors and the researchers who define the concepts (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 8). Comparison of a set of cases based on theoretical parsimony provides a solution to the problem of relying on correlations of variables in support of claims of causality. This is a common criticism of large N cross-national research. Conducting intensive studies on a few cases allows for the investigation of causal mechanisms, which clarifies the reasons of correlations between the variables (Gerring 2007; Goertz and Mahoney 2012). In this chapter, I introduce comparative case studies. I describe some features of comparative case studies and justify the choice of the method of “controlled comparison” as the main analytical tool of this research. Then, I present a research design with a special emphasis on a case selection.

4.1 COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES: RESEARCH QUESTION, THEORY, AND PURPOSIVE SAMPLING

The selection of methodology should be decided based on a research question and theoretical propositions. One should think carefully about what kind of methodology can be best to answer one's research question and examine the propositions. In this sense, the choice of methodology is highly related to the nature of a research question and theory. Yin (2014) explains that case studies are most likely to be appropriate for "how" and "why" questions:

"How and "why" questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of a case study, history, or experiment as the preferred research method. This is because such questions deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence (Yin 2014, 10).

Similarly, George and Bennett (2005) argue that "case studies remain much stronger at assessing *whether* and *how* a variable mattered to the outcome than at assessing *how much* it mattered" (25). Therefore, the important task in choosing methodology is to clarify the nature of research questions and theoretical arguments (Yin 2014).

In most qualitative research, cases are deliberately selected. Unlike quantitative research for which a large sample of cases is randomly selected, a few cases are chosen on the basis of theory. Theory and theoretical propositions are a guide to the selection of cases, and thus sampling is purposive and non-probabilistic (Patton 2002; Merriam 2009; Yin 2014). Purposive and nonprobability sampling contribute to the inferential process by enabling researchers to choose the most appropriate cases for a given research strategy, which contributes to the inferential process (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 295-296).

Purposive and nonprobability sampling, as opposed to probability sampling, is based on the assumption that the researcher must deliberately select a sample that helps to gain plentiful information and insights (Merriam 2009). Therefore, the cases that will yield the most relevant and ample data should be selected. These cases are called information-rich cases (Yin 2016, 93; Patton 2002). In order to identify the most relevant and information-rich cases for purposive sampling, it is critical to determine the selection criteria. In creating a set of such criteria, researchers should also justify why the criteria are important (Merriam 2009).

4.2 THE METHOD OF CONTROLLED COMPARISON

Among the various methods of comparative case studies, I choose the method of “controlled comparison,” which is the comparison of “most similar” cases. Comparative case studies are highly related to the usage of experimental or quasi-experimental logic in social science research. One of the main goals of every study is to explain the influence of a variable(s) on a phenomenon of interest. A key issue in achieving this goal is to control the effect of other possible variables. Experimental logic assumes that we can isolate the effect of a variable of interest by controlling the other factors that might affect the outcome in a certain setting. In this sense, the experimental method is the ideal method for scientific explanation (Lijphart 1971, 683). As Singer (1977) points out, however, it is impossible to completely control the effect of other possible explanatory variables, even in the laboratory or field experiments.

The issue of “controlling” is central to Lijphart (1971)’s discussion on the “many variables, small N” problem of the comparative method. While the former is a common problem in all social science research regardless of the particular method, the latter is

particularly more problematic to the comparative method (Lijphart 1971, 685). One way to deal with the “many variables, small N” problem is to focus the comparative analysis on “comparable” cases. Cases are “comparable” because they are similar in a large number of characteristics, which are treated as constants, but dissimilar in a few variables. The strength of the comparative method is that while the total number of variables cannot be reduced, it enables researchers to study the relationship between variables of interest under controlled conditions (Lijphart 1971, 687).

Comparing “most similar” cases is a specific mean to establish control. Selected cases are similar in all background conditions except the variable(s) of interest (Seawright and Gerring 2008). The variable(s) of interest is thought to account for different outcomes (George and Bennett 2004, 81). Thus, it is a useful method when two or a small number of cases look similar, but the outcomes are different. There are two easy but efficient ways to maximize comparability. One is to adopt the area approach as a basis of selection. Cases from the same area share not only geographic proximity but also socio-cultural similarities. The other is to conduct a diachronic analysis. That is, the same unit of analysis can be compared at different times. A researcher can take maximum advantage of using the method of controlled comparison when a longitudinal case is divided into two or more sub-cases and compared (Lijphart 1971).

This method of controlled comparison is appropriate for a confirmatory mode of analysis in a hypothesis-testing research design, where the research design begins with a set of hypotheses and the analysis is conducted deductively (Gerring 2008).

4.3 ANALYTIC GENERALIZATION

While researchers can gain in-depth knowledge and comprehensive understanding by conducting single case studies, research that relies solely on one case suffers from the problem of representativeness (Seawright and Gerring 2008). Critics of case studies point out that it is hard to make an inference and generalization from one case. Comparative cases studies have an advantage in this regard since studying multiple cases allows researchers to achieve analytic generalization. Analytic generalization is a manner of generalizing the finding of a study to other situations that were not studied based on logical argument, theory development, or replication (Yin 2016, 333). In contrast to statistical generalization, the purpose of which is to generalize the results of the research from the sample to populations on the basis of probabilistic claims, the purpose of analytic generalization is to generalize findings of the study from a selected case to other situations on the basis of analytic claims (Yin 2016).

Analytic generalization can be achieved by replication logic. There are two ways of establishing replication logic: a literal replication and a theoretical replication. For literal replication, selected cases have similar settings and are expected to predict similar results. For a theoretical replication, on the other hand, cases that have different settings are selected and expected to predict contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (Yin 2014, 57).

4.4 RESEARCH DESIGN

4.4.1 Cases of Iraqi-Kurdish Conflicts: Justification of Case Selection and the Method of Controlled Comparison

Regarding the nature of research questions and theoretical propositions, comparative case studies can be the most appropriate for this research. As discussed, this research aims at explaining *why* civil conflict occurs in some countries, *why* we observe differences in the severity and intensity of conflict, and *how* the three dimensions in a state's politics influence the government's security decisions on rebellion, resulting in violence conflict.

For purposive sampling, I list a set of criteria. The first criterion for this research is that the state where conflict takes place is located in the region in which the dynamics of international and regional politics are manifested. This research emphasizes the important impact of colonial experience on internal instability in postcolonial states. Also, it tries to investigate the influence of superpowers and the state's regional competition on the ruling regime's decision regarding insurgency. Variation and changes in external environment and foreign politics of a state can help examine whether or not and how these factors make a difference in the course of conflict development. Second, the state in which conflict takes place has experienced ups and downs in its domestic politics. This criterion ensures that we can examine how the extent of stability in internal politics affects the regime's response to rebellion. Third, there should be multiple conflict episodes between the government and rebel forces over the same issue, and each episode should be different in terms of the level of severity. Studying and comparing a series of conflicts with the same rebel group over a long period of time helps to focus intensively

on the influence of changes in internal and external circumstances on the severity of conflict more accurately since it allows assuming that other factors are more or less constant. In this way, I can establish controls in the experimental manner as discussed earlier.

Based on these criteria, I choose the set of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts as the main cases to compare. Iraq satisfies the listed criteria in many aspects. The Middle East region has been susceptible to international politics. It was the place in which superpower countries have been fiercely pursuing their political and economic interests. In the late 1800s and early 1900s, the region was divided into several countries and mandated by Britain and France. After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union competed for hegemony in the region by pouring enormous aid along with establishing alliances. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been directly and indirectly interfering in domestic and regional affairs of the countries in the region. Regional relations among the countries are also dynamic. Many states are engaged in enduring rivalry relations. International and intra-national conflicts often occur, rendering the region more conflictual than other regions in the world. The geographic location of Iraq satisfies the first criterion very well in this regard. Iraq satisfies the second criterion as well. Since independence, Iraqi domestic politics have shown a broad spectrum in levels of stability from maximum instability caused by a series of military coup d'état to minimum instability based on strong authoritarianism. The Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts also fulfill the third criterion. The Iraqi-Kurdish conflict began in the early stages of Iraqi statehood. Advocating the independent Kurdish state in Iraq, the Kurdish rebel groups have constantly provoked armed conflict against the ruling regime. In the dynamic

political environment inside and outside, the regime has been dealing with the Kurdish rebellion with various ways. The difference in intensity among conflict episodes between the Iraqi regime and the Iraqi Kurds allows me not only to obtain much information on context of conflict but also to investigate how the three dimensions in state security affairs influence the state's decision and the severity of conflict.

As mentioned, the method of controlled comparison is appropriate when the cases are comparable in all respects except for the variable(s) of interest (George and Bennett 2004, 81). On the basis of the method of controlled comparison, I compare the three phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict: The 1961-1970 conflict, the 1974-1975 conflict, and the 1985-1988 conflict. Three critical junctures in Iraqi modern history – the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, the 1968 military coup d'état and the emergence of the Baath regime, and the emergence of Saddam Hussein's totalitarian regime in 1979 – are criteria for dividing the phases. Each phase represents one case. One of the criticisms on the method of controlled comparison is that it is hard to expect that background settings and control variables will remain constant in the real world. Yet, comparison of different phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts help to handle the criticisms since it has the same effect of controlling the influence of other factors. Historical background, aims of the Kurdish, and actors in conflict remained the same while the main interests of this research – domestic, regional, international circumstances – differed in each phase. As for collecting evidence, this research primarily relies on documentation such as government documents, reports, and official letters. Archival records, such as organizational records, interviews, and newspapers, and secondary sources are also important sources.

4.4.2 Cases of the 2011 Arab Spring: Selecting the 2011 Arab uprising in Egypt and Libya for Analytic Generalization

In searching for analytic generalization through replication logic, I conduct a set of comparative studies to see whether and how the findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases work in other situations. There are also selection criteria used to choose these cases. First, the event to be studied should have occurred in the same region with Iraq. States in the same region share similar history and culture to some extent. Limiting the location of an event helps minimize the background effect that comes from cultural and societal differences. Second, while the aims of movements are more or less similar, two chosen cases should display contrasting outcomes, where a severe conflict takes place in one case, but only a minor clash breaks out in the other case. This criterion allows me to conduct both literal and theoretical replication. Third, a recent event is more preferable. Studying a recent event gives an opportunity to evaluate the usefulness of my theoretical framework by seeing if it can explain political phenomena regardless of time period.

Based on the above criteria, I choose the so-called Arab Spring. In 2011, unexpected mass uprising swept the entire region. Starting from a small town in Tunisia, it soon spread across the Middle East and North Africa. Protestors shouted slogans against ruling regimes and demanded democratization in their respective countries. While the aims and reasons of the uprising were similar, the results of the uprising in each country varied.

Among the countries in which the Arab Spring occurred, I select Egypt and Libya to compare. I apply key findings from the cases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflict to the 2011 Arab uprising in Egypt and Libya, and see whether and how the findings from the Iraqi-

Kurdish cases work in the two more recent events that took place in the region. Egypt and Libya were the first two countries after Tunisia that experienced the Arab Spring. Although the two popular uprisings have the same purpose – toppling the ruling regime – and broke out in the states that share some commonalities, the outcomes were totally different. In Egypt, the ruling regime resigned without a major clash within a few days after the uprising began, while in Libya, a severe armed conflict occurred between the government and the opposition groups, lasting for several months. Investigating the factors that brought about such differences, based on the key findings of the Iraqi-Kurdish cases, will contribute to analytic generalization of this research’s theoretical framework. I use same types of data as the Iraqi-Kurdish cases for the cases of Egyptian uprising and Libyan civil conflict. Table 4.1 presents detailed information on the data sources used in the case studies.

Table 4.1 Detailed Information on the Data Sources

Government Documents
Documents published by the Iraqi Baath Regime (Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973)
Documents released by Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Online documents of Kurdistan regional government representative to the United States
The United States’ Government Documents
Circular Airgrams from the Department of State
Congressional Bills
Congressional Research Service Report
Country Studies of Iran, Iraq, and Libya
Intelligence notes from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Letter from the Ambassador to Iran to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Memorandums
Online document of the Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
Online document of U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security
Presidential Remarks
Telegrams from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State
Reports from Governmental and Non-governmental Organizations

Human Rights Watch
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Stockholm International Peace Research Institution (SIPRI)
The United Nations

Magazines

Arab Report and Record published between 1976-1978
Middle East Record 1961

Speeches

Winston Churchill (a speech given in the House of Commons on 14 June 1921)

Articles, Letters, and Memoirs by British Officers in Iraq

Memoir from Wallace Lyon (a British officer who was stationed in Iraq in the early 1990s)
Article by T.E Lawrence (a British military officer who took part in the Great Arab Revolt)
Letters from Gertrude Bell (a powerful official of the British administration in Baghdad after the First World War)

Data Set

Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset
Powell and Thyne (2011) Military coup dataset
The World Bank

News Media

Aljazeera
BBC News
CNN News
Guardian
New York Times
Petroleum Press Service
Prava
Radio Baghdad
Reuter
Truthout News
The Washington Post

The following two chapters contain empirical studies. In chapter five, I conduct comparative case study of three phases in the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts. In chapter six, I analyze and compare the two Arab uprisings that occurred in Egypt and Libya to find out

whether and how the findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts work in the other two cases.

CHAPTER 5

EMPIRICAL STUDY I: THE IRAQI-KURDISH CONFLICTS

5.1 COMPARING CASES

This chapter compares three phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts from 1961 to 1988: The 1961-1970 conflicts, the 1974-1975 conflict, and the 1985-1988 conflicts.

These conflicts differ in terms of the number of casualties, duration, and the outcomes.

The first Iraqi-Kurdish war erupted in 1961 and occurred intermittently until March 1970, when the March Agreement was reached. During the ten years of fighting, the conflict often ended in a stalemate without a clear winner, and the two parties often reached a provisional compromise. According to the Correlates of War Project handbook, during this time there were three conflicts between Iraq and the Kurds, and each conflict ended with a cease-fire agreement (Sarkees and Wayman 2010). Partial autonomy was granted to the Kurds, at least for a certain amount of time, and the intensity and severity of the conflicts was relatively low.

The second Iraqi-Kurdish conflict broke out in March 1974 and lasted until April 1975. Iraq launched an offensive against the Kurds when the leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Mullah Mustafa Barzani, rejected Iraq's final offer for Kurdish autonomy. The conflict was fiercer and bloodier than the previous first phase conflict. The number of casualties was higher in a short period of time. Iraq employed conventional combat methods. Advanced weaponry and the military were committed to

the battle (Bengio 2012). The Iraqi government did not offer a compromise at this time and the Kurdish rebel forces were quelled. The third Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts occurred from 1985 to 1988. It was the most brutal and tragic episode in the history of Iraqi-Kurdish conflict. The Kurds launched an offensive against Iraq in 1985 during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraq operated a counterinsurgency campaign against the Kurds, which included the Anfal genocidal campaign and a poison gas attack on the town of Halabja. The Anfal campaign started with chemical weapon attacks on April 15 1987, which were the first of at least forty documented chemical attacks on Kurdish targets over the succeeding eighteen months.¹⁸ The campaign was the last step in a three-stage program of village clearances or collectivization by the Baathist regime. More than 700 villages were destroyed by the first and second operation from April 21 to June 20 1987. The full destruction was carried out by the third stage, which took place between February 23 and September 6, 1988. During the Anfal campaign, tens of thousands of Kurds died. Precise numbers of the casualties are not available, but Human Rights Watch roughly estimates somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000 rural Kurds died during Anfal.¹⁹ In March 1988, Iraqi government airplanes dropped chemical weapons on the town of Halabja, and between 4,000 and 5,000 people were killed in one such assault.²⁰

Why did the conflicts occur? Why did the Iraqi regime decide to go to war instead of compromising? Why do we observe such differences in the course of the conflicts in each phase? In the following sections, I will analyze and compare the opportunities of the

¹⁸ Human Rights Watch. 1993. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFALPRE.htm> (accessed October 11, 2016).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Kurdistan Regional Government-Iraq: Representation in the United States. <http://www.us.gov.krd/faqs/general-information/important-events-in-modern-history/> (accessed October 11, 2016).

Table 5.1 Comparison of Cases

	Dates	Casualties	Outcome
The Conflicts in the 1960s (1961-1970)	September 11, 1961 – November 22, 1963	Kurds: 2,000 Iraq: 500 (Battle-related deaths)	Stalemate: The conflict ended when the new Baath government announced that it would seek a negotiated settlement to the war. A cease-fire was signed in February 1964 that generally held until fighting resumed in 1965.
	April 3, 1965 – June 21, 1966	Kurds: 2,500 Iraq: 500 (Battle-related deaths)	Compromise: A cease-fire was arranged after the army lost several battles against the Kurdish Peshmerga. The fighting had ended in a stalemate and in the subsequent agreement the Kurds were recognized as part of a binational state and their rights were to be ensured.
	January 3, 1969 – March 11, 1970	Kurds: 3,200 Iraq: 800 (Battle-related deaths)	Compromise: In March 1970 the conflict ended when the government again guaranteed Kurdish rights (The March Agreement)
The Conflict of 1974-1975	March 18, 1974 – April 3, 1975	Kurds: 13,000 Iraq: 7000 (Battle-related deaths)	Iraq wins: The Kurds were able to resist the attack of Iraq's 100,000-troop army, but after Iranian and U.S. aid was withdrawn, the Kurds were quickly defeated.
The Conflict of 1985-1988 (Including the Anfal campaign and a chemical attack on Halabja)	January 1985 – September 6, 1988	Battle-related deaths were unknown. Tens of thousands of Kurdish civilians and fighters were killed.	Iraq wins: In the Anfal campaign, 50,000 by the most conservative estimate and possibly twice that number were killed and disappeared. Between 4,000 and 5,000 were killed in Halabja. 60,000 Kurds fled to refugee camps in Turkey and Iran, and hundreds of thousands forced into exile.

Source: Sarkees and Wayman 2010; Human Rights Watch 1993; BBC News²¹; Kurdistan Regional Government-Iraq.

²¹ "Iraqi Kurdistan Profile – Timeline," *BBC News*, August 1, 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15467672> (accessed October 11, 2016).

state of Iraq and the Iraqi regimes – its capabilities and internal and external circumstances – and to see how these factors affected development of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts and brought about the differences in the course of the three phases. First, emphasizing the importance of historical context, I will argue that colonial rule and the experience under the British regime created a source of internal instability in Iraq. I then explore Iraq's military development and its increasing military capabilities over time, and how it is related to Iraq's policy of suppression. Lastly, considering the political dimensions – domestic, regional, and international – of the new states in their security policy decisions, I will compare the difference of these three levels, and analyze how their differences affected Iraq's policy towards the Kurds and influenced the course of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts.

5.2 BRITISH RULE AND THE CREATION OF AN OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERNAL INSTABILITY

5.2.1 Arbitrarily Established Territories and Populations

The state of Iraq was created under British mandate from the League of Nations. Its borders included the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. Known as Mesopotamia historically, these provinces were occupied during World War I by the British forces. They captured the Basra province in the south in the fall of 1915, and Baghdad in the center in March 1917. Finally, Mosul province in the north was captured in November 1918. Despite its differences in culture, language, and ethnicity, the British included the Mosul province in the new state's borders because of its promising oil deposits (Keegan 1983, 283). These arbitrarily defined borders have become a fundamental cause of ongoing conflicts between the Iraqi regimes and the Kurds.

In the military campaign in Mesopotamia during World War I, Britain concluded the secret Sykes-Picot agreement with France, which divided the large part of the Ottoman territories into five zones and placed them under the two countries' control. Britain and France argued that the agreement was made to create and protect the Arab states, but it only served the interests of the two countries. They were allowed to establish direct or indirect administration as they wanted. Also, it gave Britain and France the guarantee of freedom of transit of their goods through some of the main ports, such as Alexandria and Haifa in the region. In addition, it gave Britain the right to build, administer, and solely own a railway connecting Baghdad and Haifa.²²

This secret agreement between Britain and France was discussed at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, and it was completed in April 1920 at the San Remo Conference. The Allies approved the framework of the Treaty of Sèvres, which abolished the Ottoman Empire and provided independence to nations in the old Ottoman provinces. For the provinces of Syria and Mesopotamia, two mandates were created instead of their being granted independence right away. It was mandated that France would govern the areas of what is now Syria and Lebanon on the modern map. Britain would have the mandate for Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq. Britain particularly wanted to include Iraq in their territories because of Iraq's proximity to India and its oil production (Holden 2012).

The decision over the mandate territories and the plan to establish the Iraqi nation-state including all of the three provinces of Mesopotamia ignored the diversity of the population within the three provinces and their distinct religious and cultural differences – especially, for the Kurds in the Mosul province who not only had a different

²² “The Sykes-Picot Agreement,” *BBC News*, November 29, 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1681362.stm (accessed October 11, 2016).

ethnicity, language, and history, but also had a long tradition of struggling for independence. As one of the largest ethnic groups without their own country, they inhabited Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The largest population was the Turkish Kurds, but it is Iraqi Kurds who have been most active politically (Metz 1988).

In fact, the Kurds were promised their autonomy from the allied powers when the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920 was concluded. The Kurds had sent representatives to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference where the Treaty of Sèvres was discussed. This promise, however, was invalidated by Britain at the Cairo Conference in 1921. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed and the areas in which the Kurds had inhabited were awarded to Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The aspiration of the Kurds for their independent state was frustrated again. In sum, the British decision to include the Kurds of the Mosul province in the new Iraqi state was made without consideration of the Kurds' ethnic and historical differences from the Arabs, and only based on Britain's interest in the large oil deposits of the province. This decision became a main source of instability in Iraq as well as the region.

Another source of instability stemmed from the Britain's establishment of a monarchy and the imposition of King Faisal as a leader of the new Iraqi state. Assuming that they could transfer the Indian model of colonial rule to Iraq, the British neither associated with local elites nor exercised authority through local institution. Instead, they exercised the policy of direct rule at first (Holden 2012, 53). With little knowledge about the provinces, however, this policy brought about strong antipathy against the British, and resulted in the 1920 Iraqi revolt. In the *Review of Civil Administration of Mesopotamia*, Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary in Iraq, portrayed the Iraqi people's

reaction to the mandate, and how the Sunni and Shi'i religious sectors, as well as tribes, cooperated with each other for the first time in the modern history of Iraq:

The announcement that Great Britain had accepted the mandate for Mesopotamia was made on 3 May...The announcement spurred the nationalists to fresh activity...the deep prejudices which separate the Sunni and Shi'ah sects were temporarily overcome...the political significance of the reconciliation became apparent.²³

The outbreak of the Iraqi revolt in 1920 brought about a negative response from British public to the British mandate of Iraq and the policy of direct rule between the British leadership and the public. In order to reduce costs and decrease anti-imperial sentiments of the Iraqis, Britain gave up the policy of direct rule. Instead, they decided to switch to indirect rule, establishing a constitutional monarchy, the regime that would be a "friend" of Britain. That is, it was not a genuine attempt to improve Iraq's statehood, but a tactical gesture to pacify the Iraqi people. In a speech given in the House of Commons on 14 June 1921, Winston S. Churchill, colonial secretary in 1921, made their intention and new policy toward Iraq clear:

Our policy in Mesopotamia is to reduce our commitments and to extricate ourselves from our burdens while at the same time honourably discharging our obligations and building up a strong and effective Arab government which will always be the friend of Britain.²⁴

Britain's idea of establishing the monarchy in Iraq reveals its ignorance of the province they were ruling again. The framework of Britain's indirect rule was discussed at the 1921 Cairo conference. At the conference, Faisal bin Hussein was selected as Iraq's first king, who was a descendent of the family of the Prophet Muhammad and whose

²³ The review is taken from *Documentary History of Modern Iraq*, edited by Stacy E. Holden (2012).

²⁴ The speech is taken from *Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963*, edited by Robert Rhodes James (1974).

ancestors had held political authority in the cities of Mecca and Medina. Also, the British thought that the Iraqi nationalists would accept him as a legitimate leader of the Iraq state because of his role in the 1916 revolt against the Ottomans (Metz 1988). However, the decision of establishing a monarchy aroused strong opposition since the monarchy was regarded as a creation of the British Empire. It suffered from a legitimacy crisis from the beginning. Moreover, the elected constituent Assembly was neither popular nor representative. It was almost entirely composed of members of the Sunni Arab urban communities who were a minority and formed less than 25 percent of the total population (Sluglett 2007, 6).

As a discriminated ethnic minority, the Kurds found the imposition of Faisal as King of Iraq unacceptable. Although it was said to be a free election, the Kurds in the Mosul province were ordered to vote for Faisal. A British officer, Wallace Lyon, described how British officers were commanded to direct the Kurdish people in the election. He was stationed in Arbil – a large city fifty miles east of Mosul – at the time of the election of Faisal:

... The next notification published the fact that the British government's candidate for the election was Amir Faisal, and to all of us Political Officers there came a top secret coded telegram instructing us to use all our influence, personal and official, to persuade the people to elect Faisal. For me this was a tough assignment, as the great majority of the people were Kurds who cared little for any Arab prince, and like all hill men despised the dwellers of the plains... The tribal chiefs and city elders were gathered together and asked to sign the petition for Faisal... They were reluctant and asked about other candidates.²⁵

Combined with the failed aspiration to be an independent state, establishing the new leader, who did not have any connection with the Kurds, worsened the Monarchy's

²⁵ The Memoir is taken from *Documentary History of Modern Iraq*, edited by Stacy E. Holden (2012).

legitimacy, specifically in the northern part of Iraq. The Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts were perhaps inevitable consequences of British rule in the early days of Iraq.

5.2.2 Colonial Experiences and the Creation of Military Capabilities

Colonial rule set a basis for the modern military in Iraq. The Iraqi Army was officially founded in January 1921 and began with a Headquarter Staff of ten Iraqi officers, but its primary role and substantial structure was decided at the Cairo Conference in March 1921 (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama 2008, 20; Metz 1988). In the beginning, its role was limited. The British limited the Iraqi Army's function to internal affairs whose main task was to suppress anti-government and anti-British activities in the country. In spite of its limited role, the Iraqi Army was trained by the British and equipped with modern armaments. The first Iraqi Military College opened in 1921 and the directors and instructors were British. The instructional materials were also British military training manuals translated into Arabic (Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama 2008, 27). At the college, future Iraqi officers had the chance to learn a modern military system, mainly the British system.

In addition, the Iraqi people and the indigenous groups had experienced modern warfare through organized struggle against British rule. As briefly mentioned above, the announcement of the mandate evoked strong opposition among the Iraqi people. The Iraqi revolt against the British began in June 1920. It started as peaceful demonstrations, but soon the revolution turned violent. Not only Sunni tribes in Baghdad but also Shi'i tribes in the south and Kurdish tribes in the north opposed the British. Britain responded with the use of ground forces and air power to put down the rebellion. During the first week of July there was fierce fighting between the British and the rebels. Churchill told

the Cabinet on 7 July that they successfully attacked the Iraqi rebels with bombs and machine guns from aeroplanes and ground forces (Omissi 1990, 39). T.E Lawrence, famously known as the celebrated “Lawrence of Arabia,”²⁶ denounced British oppression during the revolt in his article written to *Sunday Times* on 22 August, 1920:

Things have been far worse than we have been told, our administration more bloody and inefficient than the public knows. It is a disgrace to our imperial record, and may soon be too inflamed for any ordinary cure. We are today not far from a disaster...Our government is worse than the old Turkish system. They kept fourteen thousand local conscripts embodied, and killed a yearly average of two hundred Arabs in maintaining peace. We keep ninety thousand men, with aeroplanes, armoured cars, gunboats, and armoured trains. We have killed about ten thousand Arabs in this rising this summer...The Government in Baghdad had been hanging Arabs in that town for political offences, which they call rebellion...How long will we permit millions of pounds, thousands of imperial troops, and tens of thousands of Arabs to be scarified on behalf of colonial administration which can benefit nobody but its administrators?²⁷

As it turned out, armed revolt had been costly to the British in both manpower and money (Metz 1998). The revolt developed into a full-scale battle in which Britain had to use its ground forces as well as air power to quell an armed resistance from organized groups. The British government lost 500 troops in suppressing the rebellion and needed to spend 40 million pounds, which was a high cost for Britain which had been fighting World War I for four years (Tripp 2007; Holden 2012, 62). The revolt was ultimately put down after three months. Ironically, Iraqi people were able to experience modern warfare through the 1920 revolt.

²⁶ He helped to organize the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire during World War I, working with many Arab men from the three provinces of Mesopotamia (Holden 2012).

²⁷ The article is also available at <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/169/36377.html> (accessed October 11, 2016).

Another consequence of the revolt was that it militarized indigenous groups. In her letter written on November 29 1920, Gertrude Bell argued that it would necessary but must be a difficult task to make the tribes surrender their arms.

We are greatly hampered by the tribal rising which has delayed the work of handing over to the Arab Govt. Sir Percy, I think rightly, decided that the tribes must be made to submit to force. In no other way was it possible to make them surrender their arms or teach them that you mustn't lightly engage in revolution, even when your holy men tell you to do so ... Without the lesson and without drawing their teeth by fines of arms (impossible to obtain except by force) we should have left an impossible task to the Arab Govt.²⁸

As described, although the revolt was put down, the tribes still possessed arms and tribesmen were strongly engaged with their tribes. In 1922, there was a debate over universal conscription. The idea behind the plan to build an army based on conscription was to undermine the tribes' military strength to resist the government by drafting tribesmen of fighting age into the state's military (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008). The plan was postponed until 1934 when the Conscription Law was introduced. The enforcement of universal conscription in 1934 brought about strong opposition from Iraqi tribes, especially Shi'i and Kurdish tribes who opposed a Sunni-dominated government of the new Iraqi state. Also, even if tribesmen were forced to join an army, their loyalty to the military was low. In sum, the armed revolt against the British colonial rule resulted in militarization of the Iraqi tribes who opposed to not only colonialism but also the new Iraqi government. Military capabilities of oppositionist groups and the existence of multiple military forces within the territory became one of the bases of armed rebellion in Iraq.

²⁸ Gertrude Bell was a powerful official of the British administration in Baghdad after the First World War. Her letters are available at <http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks04/0400461h.html> (accessed October 11, 2016).

5.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQI MILITARY AND ITS CAPABILITY

The capacity of the Iraqi military steadily increased after independence. As a continuation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, Britain agreed to assist the development of the Iraqi military when they left the country. Thus, although Britain withdrew all of its troops from Iraq by October 1947, British airplanes were still based in Iraq and Britain continued to supply armaments to Iraq (Schmidt 1991, 4). Joining the Baghdad Pact in 1955 created another opportunity for Iraq to advance its military equipment. The pact reaffirmed Iraq's close ties to the West. Iraq was backed by not only Britain but also by another Super Power, the United States. Yet, when an anti-Western and anti-imperialist regime came to power as a result of the Iraqi Revolution in 1958, the Soviet Union substituted for the Western countries. With external support from the super powers, the Iraqi military forces gradually expanded.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Iraqi military underwent quantitative and qualitative changes in its size and structure. Increase in revenues from the oil industry and the regime's consolidation of power allowed the Baath party to expand the military. The increased defense budget enabled the regime to equip the military with advanced technology and to enlarge the size of the armed forces. The size of military forces also increased. The Increase in the defense budget financed universal conscription. The military forces were expanded from 80,000 to 100,000 between 1968 and 1973 and then over 2,000,000 by 1978 (Schmidt 1991, 7, originally cited in Nyrop 1985, 239). This was the fastest and largest expansion in the Arab world during these years (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 123). The regime also created an ideological paramilitary unit, the People's Army. (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008). Formed on February 8, 1970, it grew rapidly, and

by 1977, around 50,000 active members served the People's Army (Metz 1998). A restructuring of the army occurred at this time as well. The regime constructed a dual structure of the army, creating a regular army and the Republican Guard. The Republican Guard was developed into a fully-fledged corps with advanced weapons, then further expanded into two corps stationed in the north and the south of Iraq (Jabar 2003, 117).

The diversification of suppliers of military equipment also contributed to Iraq's military advance. The Soviet Union was still Iraq's primary supplier of military equipment throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Especially, after signing a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1972, more weapons and armaments were delivered to Iraq. At the same time, however, Iraq did not rely solely on the Soviet Union anymore. The Baath regime tried to diversify its arms trading partners and started importing weapons from the Western countries such as France, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. France, in particular, was the second largest country who exported various armaments to Iraq.²⁹ The influx of Western armaments and technology helped modernize the military of Iraq.

Figures 5.1 and 5.2 display the trend in military expenditures and the increased size of Iraqi armed forces over time. The figures show a steady increase in both the expenditure and the military forces during the 1960s, and a rapid development in the 1970s and 1980s. A drastic change during the 1980s was attributed to the Iraq-Iran War of 1980, yet the war certainly led Iraq to devote more efforts and resources to strengthen its military.

In conclusion, since its independence, there had been steady advances in the Iraqi military both quantitatively and qualitatively. As the fastest growing and the most advanced institution of the Iraqi state, Iraqi regimes had enough military capabilities to

²⁹ www.sipri.org (accessed October 11, 2016).




Figure 5.1 Trends in Iraqi Military Spending




Figure 5.2 Iraqi Armed Forces Expansion

put down its internal insurgences. Throughout the expansion of the army, a Kurdish rebellion had been the most serious threat to the security of Iraqi regimes. Understandably, it could be beneficial for the regimes to conduct a large-scale military operation to quell the Kurds as soon as possible. This is why there had been constant militarized confrontation between the two parties. However, as presented previously, the responses of the Iraqi regimes differed in each phase, resulting in distinctive consequences in terms of severity and its final results. Relative differences in the military capabilities and the size at different time periods could partly explain such differences, but it does not explain the whole. As a security policy decision, the regime had to consider its internal and external political environments when such insurgences occurred. That is, the different domestic, regional, and international circumstances in which each regime was situated led them to make different policy decisions in regards to the Kurdish problem.

5.4 INTERNAL-EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: DOMESTIC, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF STATE SECURITY

The domestic dimension is discussed based on three critical junctures in Iraqi modern history and taken into consideration the different levels of instability in domestic politics over three decades. The three phases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts coincide with three critical junctures in Iraq's domestic politics: the 1958 Iraqi Revolution, the 1968 military coup d'état and the emergence of the Baath regime, and the emergence of Saddam Hussein's totalitarian regime in 1979. Each event separates certain time periods that had distinctive features in domestic politics. The 1960s in Iraq can be defined as a transitional period that witnessed the reoccurrence of military coups. Military regimes did

not stay in power long and were soon overthrown by another military coup. The 1968 coup by the Baath regime initiated civilian rule in Iraq, but the regime suffered from a lack of legitimacy and a base of support in its early days. The 1970s was the period of one-party rule by the Baath regime. The Baath regime consolidated its power during this time and was the sole ruling. As Saddam Hussein emerged as a powerful force in the party and became President of Iraq in 1979, the regime turned into a personalized totalitarian regime. Accompanied by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the political environment of Iraq was completely changed in the 1980s.

The regional dimension is mainly dealt with based on the rivalry between Iraq and Iran. The hostile relationship between the two countries created constant tension in the Gulf region, and it heavily influenced Iraq's policy decisions. The overthrow of the Iranian monarchy by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 brought about an especially great tension between the two countries. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)'s study on international rivalry provides a useful theoretical basis for analyzing Iran and Iraq's relationship.

Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006) regard rivalries as possessing four dimensions. The first dimension of rivalries is spatial consistency that revolves around the character and number of actors. Actors in rivalries are states and they are *dyadic*. A second dimension is their duration. This includes both longer (enduring rivalries) and shorter-term rivalries. A third dimension is the severity of the competition. Rivalry relationship is a particular subset of 'international relations.' This leads them to focus on *militarized* and *conflictual* relations in particular. When states are rivals, they compete over conflicting goals and tangible or intangible goods. Klein, Goertz, and Diehl limit their research to

competitions that take a military turn. The fourth dimension is linked conflict, referring to conflicts that are related by space and time. Two conceptual links exist between disputes: the ‘pull of past’ and ‘expectations of future conflict.’ This means that the initial interactions in a rivalry influence present and future behaviors and confrontations. Also, the expectations of mutual disputes, crises, and war in the future condition current policy choices (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006, 332-335).

The relationship between Iraq and Iran features all of these four components. They are a pair of states. They have engaged in militarized disputes since their early statehood. As I will present in detail in the later sections, conflicts between the two countries were related to one another, and the regimes in power made policy decisions based on their experiences and expectations. Accordingly, in Klein, Goertz, and Diehl (2006)’s rivalry dataset, Iraq and Iran are identified as enduring rivals. According to their dataset, Iraqi-Iranian rivalry continued for sixty-five years, from 1934 to 1999. During this period, the two countries engaged in militarized disputes twenty-six times.³⁰ With one exception, all were dyadic disputes.³¹

The Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) dataset contains useful indicators that measure the levels of hostility between states. Except for one dispute in 1961 when there was only the threat to use force, Iran and Iraq used their military forces to confront each other. However, measure of the fatality rate, duration, and highest actions varied in each decade.

Table 5.2 displays descriptive analyses of militarized disputes between Iraq and Iran. During a transitional period between the first military regime in 1958 and the early

³⁰ Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset. <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs> (accessed October 11, 2016).

³¹ Dispute number 122 occurred in 1961.

Table 5.2 Militarized Disputes between Iraq and Iran

	Year	Fatality	Duration (Days)	Highest Action	Hostility Level
A transitional Period	1959	1-25 deaths	122	Attack	Use of force
	1961	None	73	Show of force	Display of force
	1965	1-25 deaths	26	Clash	Use of force
	1966	None	1	Attack	Use of force
	1969 (April)	None	69	Attack	Use of force
	1969 (September)	26-100 deaths	1	Clash	Use of force
The Baath rule	1970	None	17	Seizure	Use of force
	1971 (April)	1-25 deaths	48	Clash	Use of force
	1971 (November)	1-25 deaths	187	Clash	Use of force
	1973	26-100 deaths	61	Clash	Use of force
	1974 (January)	26-100 deaths	118	Clash	Use of force
	1974 (August)	101-250 deaths	213	Clash	Use of force
	1979 (February)	None	113	Attack	Use of force
1979 (October)	26-100 deaths	176	Clash	Use of force	
Personalized authoritarian rule by Saddam Hussein	1980	More than 999 deaths	2916	Begin interstate war	War

Source: Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 4.1.

stage of the Baath party rule (1958-1970), there were seven militarized disputes. Except the September 1969 dispute, the fatality level was low: there were no fatalities or less than twenty-five deaths. Duration was also shorter compared to the other time periods as the average duration of conflicts was about forty-four days. The longest duration was 122

days in 1959, but the fatality rate was low and it did not develop into an armed clash. The highest actions in disputes were also mixed because only two of them developed into armed clashes. Under the consolidated Baath party rule in the 1970s, the relationship between the two turned into more hostile one. Except for the February 1970 dispute, confrontations resulting in armed clashes were more frequent and the death toll was higher. The average duration of disputes was about 131 days, which was much longer than in the transitional period. Lastly, the hostility between the two countries reached its apex in 1980 when the Iran-Iraq War broke out. The conflict, which continued until 1988, resulted in enormous losses and damage to both states. Different features of disputes, especially regarding their severity reflect the changes in the levels of hostility between Iraq and Iran. Increasing hostility suggests that competition between the two increased over time.

The international dimension is discussed based on the changes in the relationship with the Soviet Union. Since the establishment of the republic in 1958, the Soviet Union was the primary arms supplier of Iraq. Until the early 1970s, Iraq relied almost solely on the Soviet Union for military imports. Yet, Iraq's policy of diversification of arms providers, which followed from enormous oil wealth and the Baath regime's consolidation of power in internal politics, reduced Iraq's reliance on the Soviet Union. These changes in the importance of the Soviet Union in Iraq's foreign relations had a certain impact on its domestic as well as foreign policy decisions.

I argue that these political events as well as the different internal and external political landscapes surrounding Iraq influenced Iraq's domestic and foreign policies. In particular, Iraq's policy toward the Kurdish rebellion was heavily influenced by such

changes because of its multinational nature. This resulted in different developments in the three phases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts. The following sections will analyze in detail the political environment in which Iraqi regimes were situated and the impact of the political environment on the regimes' policy decision toward the Kurds.

5.5 THE 1961-1970 CONFLICT

5.5.1 Domestic Dimension

Domestic politics of Iraq in the 1960s can be described as a turbulent period and a time of confusion. On July 14, 1958, the Hashemite monarchy was abolished by a military coup executed by Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd as Salaam Arif, and a new republic was established. Although the 1958 Revolution was universally welcomed by Iraqi people who had great hope and optimism for their new government, it brought a decade of instability and military dictatorship (Marr 2004; Farouk-Lsuglett and Sluglett 2001).

After the revolution, there were seven military coups until 1970, three successful coup attempts and four unsuccessful coup attempts (Powell and Thyne 2011). Even if the coup was successful, a ruling group was not able to keep their power for long, and was soon overthrown by another group. The first regime after the revolution led by Abd al-Karim Qasim was threatened by an ongoing confrontation between the Communists and the Baathists, and was overthrown by the Baath party on 8 February 1963 (Al-arashi and Salama 2008, 85). In November of the same year, another coup occurred and ousted the short-lived Baath party from power. The Baath party seized power again after its second

successful coup in 1968. Table 5.3 briefly summarizes military coups and coup attempts since the Iraqi Revolution.

Table 5.3 Military Coup Attempts between 1958–1970

	Executed By	Verification of attempt
July 14, 1958 (Revolution)	Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif	Successful
March 7, 1959	Colonel Abd al-Wahhab Shawwaf	Unsuccessful
February 8, 1963	Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr (The head of the Baath Party's Military Bureau) and Abd al-Salam Arif	Successful
November 18, 1963	Abd al-Salam Arif	Successful
September 16, 1965	Brigadier Arif Abd al-Razzaq	Unsuccessful
June 30, 1966	Arif Abd al-Razzaq	Unsuccessful
July 17, 1968	The Baath military group	Successful
January 20, 1970	Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarrai	Unsuccessful

Source: Powell and Thyne (2011) Military coup dataset³²; Al-Marashi and Salama (2008)

As a newly established state, Iraq needed to achieve its territorial and political integration as soon as possible. The Kurdish problem was one of the most threatening factors to the regimes' efforts for consolidation and the state's security. Having different ethnicity and language, and a unique culture and history, the Iraqi Kurds kept pursuing their independent state. Especially when the new Iraqi state was first established, the Kurds dreamt about the creation of a Kurdish state, one like other new states in the region. As seen in the previous section, the first step was the Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed on August 19, 1920 and had provided a promise for the creation of a Kurdish

³² The data set is available at <http://www.jonathanmpowell.com/coup-detat-dataset.html> (accessed October 11, 2016).

state. However, the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and the allied powers in 1923 invalidated this promise, which led leaders of the Kurdish people to organize movements for independence. These movements developed into violent conflicts against a central government.

Recurring provocations by the Kurds in the northern territory required Iraq's ruling regime to create consistent policies toward the Kurds. Yet, continued instability in internal politics in the 1960s made it difficult for the ruling regimes to do so. The regimes suffered from a lack of consolidated power and legitimacy, and, therefore, they needed internal support. For a new regime, stabilizing internal politics became the first priority, so this led the new regime to avoid a military solution to the Kurds and so they made a cease-fire agreement. However, because of a lack of consistency in their politics in relation to the Kurdish problem, the agreement was often unfulfilled and conflict was resumed. This explains why conflict between the Iraqi government and the Kurds continued intermittently in the 1960s.

Cease-fire agreements and attempts to reach a compromise that followed after every regime change supports the above idea as well. When Qasim came to power after the overthrow of the monarchy, the Kurds demanded administrative autonomy. Although Qasim rejected their demand, he granted extensive concessions to the Kurds during the first two years of his rule (Bengio 2012, 16). Similarly, when the first Baath regime came to power in 1963, the Kurds attempted to gain autonomy in Kurdish populated areas in the northern part of Iraq again: the provinces of Erbil, Sulaymaniyya, Kurkuk, and the districts and subdistricts in Kiyala and Mosul (Bengio 2012). Similarly, when Arif seized power, a cease-fire was announced. Finally, when the Baath party came to power for the

second time in 1968, the regime concluded a long running battle with the Kurds by offering a new autonomy plan for the Kurds. Learning from previous failures, the Baath government sought a conciliatory policy toward the Kurds in the early years (Shemesh 1992). As a result, the March Agreement was declared on 11 March 1970, which was the only agreed-upon statement of Kurdish autonomy acceptable to both Iraq and the Kurds (1996). From these recurring patterns in the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts, it can be assumed that the turbulence of Iraq's domestic politics in the 1960s was responsible for a frustrating resolution of the conflicts and influencing the regimes' decisions on ceasefire agreements.

5.5.2 Regional Dimension

Before the 1958 Revolution, Iran and Iraq shared common features. Both countries were monarchies and pro-Western. Monarchical Iraq still maintained a close relationship with Britain, and was dependent on the West for its defense. Joining the Baghdad Pact in 1955 openly brought the two countries into a Western regional security alliance and it created a friendly atmosphere in their bilateral relations (Marr 2001, 189; Milani 2006). The period of Iran-Iraq cooperation did not last long, however, for the 1958 revolution in Iraq introduced tension in Iraqi-Iranian relations.

The 1958 revolution in Iraq had a huge impact on its bilateral relationship with Iran. A year later, Iraq ceased its participation in the Baghdad Pact in 1959, and turned to the Soviet Union as a substitute for Britain and the United States (Marr 2001). A series of confrontations between the two after the revolution reflects tension between Iraq and Iran after the establishment of a new republic in the Gulf region

However, during the 1960s, both countries acted cautiously (Bakhashi, 2004, 16). Only low-level incidents and clashes occurred on the joint frontier as Table 5.2 displays. Also, the issue was limited to territorial disputes – the control of and access to the Shatt al-Arab waterway (Abdulghani 1984). Although Iraq and Iran competed for their national interests in this period, neither state openly displayed ambition for regional power in the Gulf at this time. The primary interest of Iraq’s military regimes in this period was to consolidate their power in domestic politics and, thus, foreign relations were of secondary importance. In addition, the shah of Iran was not involved in inter-Arab politics at this time. In these circumstances, the possibility of intense competition for regional hegemony between the two Gulf States was very low (Bakhashi 2004).

Rather, the two countries made an effort to ease the tension over the Shatt issue and improve their relationship in general. High-level visits and negotiations occurred in the later 1960s, and it led to the first official visit by an Iraqi president since 1958 revolution. President Abdul-Rahman Arif of Iraq visited Iran on 14 March 1967, and the shah warmly hosted him (Bakhashi 2004, 17). Returning to Iraq, President Arif stated that he had “found full response from the Shah and good feelings toward us. He (the Shah) wishes peace and stability to Iraq.”³³ In return, Iran’s Prime Minister Tahir Yahya visited Iraq in June 1968. On this visit, Iraq and Iran agreed to form mixed commissions for the Shatt issue, and to report their findings in order that decisions might be taken on them (Abdulghani 1984, 21). Again, maintaining a good relationship with Iran was necessary for Iraqi regimes that had no consolidated power status internally. Indeed, Iraq was hoping to have friendly relations with its neighboring states of Turkey and Iran so

³³ Cited in Abdulghani, Jasim M. 1984. *Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 21.

that it could devote itself to the main task.³⁴ The lack of hostility between the two countries had an impact on the triangular relationship between Iraq, Iran, and the Iraqi Kurds.

The Iraqi Kurdish issue has been a consistently useful tool for Iran. Whenever the relationship deteriorated, Iran incited the Kurds more often as a means to destabilize the Iraqi government and to extract concessions over a conflicting goal (Abdulghani 1984). Yet the relaxed relationship between the two and the absence of power struggles in the Gulf region made the Iraqi Kurds less useful to Iran. Accordingly, the intervention of Iran in Iraqi affairs using Kurdish issue was limited in the 1960s. Therefore, it can be argued that limited intervention from the rival country, that is Iran, led the Iraqi regime to conduct minor military operations that were often concluded in compromise.

In fact, there is no official data on how much aid from Iran flowed to the Iraqi Kurds in this period. Yet, US government documents reveal that Iranians provided only limited aid to Iraqi Kurds in the early and mid-1960s. A Memorandum from the Special Group meeting in the Department of State in May 1963 states, “the Shah is giving some aid and comfort to the Kurds but that material assistance is not significant.”³⁵ This tendency did not change in the late 1960s either. On August 19, 1966, The US embassy in Iraq reported to the Department of State that Iran gave limited help to the Kurds for limited objectives.³⁶ Iran’s limited policy toward the Iraqi Kurds damaged the relationship between Iran and the Iraqi Kurds and created distrust between the two.

According to the note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on

³⁴ Circular Airgram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, March 2, 1963. Subject: Interim policy guidelines for dealing with Iraq and with the implications for the Middle East of the recent Iraqi coup.

³⁵ Memorandum for the Record. Minutes of the Special Group (CI) Meeting, May 16, 1963.

³⁶ Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, August 19, 1966.

September 1, 1967, the Iraqi Kurds distrusted the new Prime Minister of Iran, Tahir Yahya, because they felt that he played them false in earlier dealings. The appointment of Abd al-Fattah al-Shali as the new Kurdish minister in the Cabinet deepened the Kurds' distrust since the new Kurdish minister was soft on Barzani's rival faction of Jalal Talabni. The note concludes that the Iranian government was pursuing a slow and delicate rapprochement with Iraq.³⁷

The pressure from the US would also affect Iran's limited support toward and involvement in the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq. In the 1960s, the US government adhered to the position of not intervening in the Kurdish problem.³⁸ The US considered the Kurdish problem in Iraq as a domestic issue and therefore, foreign countries should not interfere in the problem. Yet, at the same time, the US did not want to see the establishment of an independent Kurdish state in Iraq because it could invite the Soviet Union's presence in the Gulf region. The US hoped to see compromise between Iraq and the Kurds as soon as possible. A Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, in August 1963 reveals the US position on the Iraqi Kurdish issue:

As a long term goal, the US should continue efforts to promote assimilation of the Kurds within national boundaries, and granting of a measure of local self-government in predominately Kurdish regions. However, prolongation of the conflict in Iraq engenders instability, and provides an opportunity for communist exploitation of the Kurdish problem in Iraq and in neighboring countries. A firm Iraqi military position, coupled with a willingness to accommodate to legitimate Kurdish grievances, appears to be the most promising avenue for an early end to hostilities and advancement of internal stability in Iraq. To this end, the US

³⁷ Intelligence note from the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rusk, September 1, 1967.

³⁸ Circular Airgram from the Department of State to Certain Posts, March 2, 1963.

should give favorable consideration to reasonable Iraqi requests for equipment and seek to use resultant influence to urge moderation on the Iraqi government.³⁹

As presented, prolongation of the conflict with the Kurds was not in the US's interest at all. Thus, the US government warned Iran several times not to intervene in Iraqi affairs and to keep their hands off.⁴⁰ As the US was Iran's biggest ally since World War II, Iranian leaders actively cultivated the relationship with the US to protect their country from political pressure from the Soviet Union (Metz 1987). For instance, in his meeting with President Eisenhower, the shah emphasized the geopolitical and strategic importance of Iran as a gateway, saying "if you control Iran, you control the Middle East."⁴¹ In these circumstances, the shah would not be able to conduct policies that cross the US position, including the Iraqi Kurds issue.

Another reason for limited intervention and support of the Kurds by Iran was the possibility of an uprising among Iranian Kurds who were affected by news of the successful activities of Iraqi Kurds. In fact, the Iranian Kurds were indeed influenced by the development of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. The US Embassy in Iran reported in 1966 that there was increasing activity among the Iranian Kurds after reaching the negotiated settlement of the Kurdish revolt in Iraq. According to the ambassador to Iran, the expectation that the Iraqi Kurds would gain certain advantages and privileges from their acceptance of the cease-fire set in motion a latent nationalist fervor among the

³⁹ Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, August 15, 1963. Subject: US assistance for Iraq.

⁴⁰ Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, March 1, 1963.

⁴¹ Memorandum of conference with President Eisenhower, June 30, 1958.

Iranian Kurdish group.⁴² Thus, the shah feared that a successful Kurdish rebellion in Iraq might have a spill-over effect on Iranian Kurds (Abdulghani 1984). This led the shah to hesitate to fully support the Kurdish revolt in Iraq.

In sum, it is true that Iran provided aid to the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, yet it was limited and Iranian intervention was minimal in this period. It can be argued that this rendered the issue relatively less urgent for the Iraqi regime and led the Iraqi regimes to conduct minor military operations. This is why the severity of conflict was low and conflicts often ended in compromise during the 1960s.

5.5.3 International Dimension

In the early years of its statehood, Iraq was a pro-Western country. The monarchical Iraq was still dependent on Britain and the West while there was almost no relationship with the Soviet Union. Iraq even severed its diplomatic relationship with the Soviets in January 1955 (Shemesh 1992, 1). When the monarchy was overthrown by a military coup led by 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim however, Iraq's foreign relations completely changed. As soon as Qasim seized power, he restored diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in order to reduce Iraq's dependence on Britain. In response, as it did for Egypt, the Soviet Union extended economic and military assistance to Iraq (Shemesh 1992).

Except when the first Baath regime was overthrown on 18 November 1963, the relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union was amicable during the late 1950s and 1960s.⁴³ For Iraqi regimes in these time periods, economic and military assistance and

⁴² Letter from the Ambassador to Iran (Meyer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Hare), Tehran, October 22, 1966.

⁴³ On 12 March 1963, Radio Baghdad announced the trial of 51 Communists – officers, soldiers, and civilians – who in the following month were sentenced to death (Ro'i 1974, 361).

political support from the Soviet Union were essential for its survival. Accordingly, its internal policies, as well as foreign policies, were highly influenced by the Soviet's opinion. Regarding the Kurdish problem, the Soviets had sympathy toward the Kurdish rebellion and took a moderate position. They valued the Kurdish rebels because they shared the Iraqi Communists' goal of establishing a coalition regime in Baghdad (Shemesh 1992, 14). Thus, the Kurds were considered as a mean to promote the interests of the Soviet's "internal ally," the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP).

During the first three years of its rule, the Qasim regime was hostile towards the Kurds. The Soviets protested against Qasim's stance on Iraqi Communists and the Kurds, and from the end of 1960, the Soviet media began to publish critical comments about Qasim's policies.⁴⁴ For instance, the first secretary of the Iraqi Communist Party, Salam Adil criticized Qasim's regime openly at the 22nd Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) congress in October 1961.⁴⁵ He argued that "the national oppression of the Kurds should be ended at once and they should be granted self-government within the framework of the Iraqi Republic." At the end of his speech, he stressed "the importance of common struggle," and said that it should be based on the demand for recognition of the national rights of the Kurds and their right to self-government.⁴⁶ The fact that the CPSU authorities authorized everything said at the CPSU Congress beforehand tells us that the Soviets opposed harsh treatment of the Kurds and they supported Kurdish autonomy. The Soviets' stance did not change during the course of the conflict. On 13

⁴⁴ *Middle East Record* 1961. The article is taken from Ro'i (1974), *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in the Middle East, 1945-1973*.

⁴⁵ The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a major political party of the Soviet Union since the Russian Revolution, existed from 1917 to 1991.

⁴⁶ His speech was published in *Prava*, the newspaper published by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union – and reproduced in the *World Marxist Review* in March 1962.

January 1965, *Pravda*⁴⁷ published the article about the Soviet Union's opposition to a military solution to the Kurds:

The Soviet Public has always been and is against unjust wars, such as the bloody anti-Kurdish venture has been and for a peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem in the interest of the problem in the interests of both Arabs and Kurds.⁴⁸

Moreover, a series of articles published in *Pravda* in September 1968 expressed open sympathy for the "struggle of the Kurds to assure their rights within the framework of a united state with the Arabs." It concluded that the Kurdish question must be solved by peaceful means (Shemesh 1992, 22). Accordingly, whenever Iraq and the Kurds reached a compromise to end confrontation, the Soviets welcomed it. Sometimes arms supply followed a cease-fire as a reward. For instance, when the Abd al-Salam Arif regime and the Kurds signed a cease-fire in February 1964, Abd al-Rahman Arif, the Iraqi Chief of General Staff and President Arif's brother, told *Baghdad News* that the Soviet Union had agreed to supply arms to Iraq (Ro'i 1974, 403).

Moscow's stance on the Kurdish issue and Iraq's reliance on the Soviet Union explains part of the story about why the conflicts in the 1960s were not as fierce as later conflicts in the 1970s and 1980s. It also explains why Iraq did not or could not put down the Kurdish insurgency harshly and why the conflicts were often concluded with a stalemate or a ceasefire agreement.

The 1970 March Agreement that ended the 10 year-long conflicts between Iraq and the Kurds was possible in these circumstances. As President al-Bakr proclaimed in 1968, the Soviet Union occupied the first place in the Second Baath Party's foreign

⁴⁷ *Pravda* was the newspaper published from 1918 to 1991 by the official organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

⁴⁸ Evgenii Pimakov, "Provocations in northern Iraq," *Pravda*, 13 January, 1965. The article is taken from Ro'i (1974).

policy (Shemesh 1992, 24).⁴⁹ In fact, the Soviet Union was the only superpower that Iraq could rely on. Iraq severed its diplomatic relationship with the United States after the Third Arab-Israeli War in 1967. Another superpower, Britain, was planning to leave the region, evacuating its military and other key administrative departments. In addition, the Soviet Union was Iraq's major arms supplier whereas arms imports from the West and other countries were insignificant. Under the conflictual circumstances, arms supplies from the Soviet Union were essential to the Baath regime. Moreover, the Soviets persuaded the Baath regime to halt the offensive against the Kurds (Shemesh 1992). In order to seek Soviet support, the Baath regime needed to show their intention of solving the Kurdish issue peacefully. Under these circumstances, it seems true that Iraq was not able to conduct foreign policies that would upset the Soviet Union, and that made Iraq take moderate policies toward the Kurds.

5.6 THE 1974-1975 CONFLICT

5.6.1 Domestic Dimension

Iraq's domestic politics in the late 1960s and early 1970s can be described as the mixture of consolidation of the Baath Party's authority and the emergence of a strong leader after the internal power struggle between al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. After political chaos caused by several military coup attempts, the Baath Party finally stood up as a sole authority of Iraq. When constitutional and administrative changes transformed regime into a quasi-presidential regime through which power was concentrated in the hands of al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein (Bengio 2012, 28). Saddam was appointed as an

⁴⁹ The Baath Party came to power in 1968 for the second time after its successful military coup.

acting president and the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which provided him with a platform for becoming a sole leader of Iraq.⁵⁰ Subsequently, the domestic political situation began to stabilize, and the regime accelerated the consolidation of its power. Unlike the previous regimes, the Baath regime was able to conduct more consistent policies, including the Kurdish problems.

The power struggle between al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein in the early 1970s and Saddam's upper hand on al-Bakr was responsible, in part, for the 1974-1975 episodes. While al-Bakr did not want to deteriorate the relationship with the Kurds any further and adopted a cautious stand, Saddam Hussein and his followers adhered to a strong stance on the Kurdish issue. He revealed his stance in an interview with the *New York Times* in 1973, that the Baath Party would not concede any of its authority to the Kurds and that no Kurds would be included in the Revolutionary Command Council.⁵¹ As Saddam Hussein emerged as a strong leader of the Baath regime, the voice of advocating for the use of violence to the Kurds became stronger.

Saddam strengthened his position further by completing the nationalization of oil industry on 1 June 1972, which brought massive revenues to Iraq. As Saddam strengthened his position in the regime, people close to Saddam were placed in top-ranking positions. On the contrary, al-Bakr and his faction lost their power (Bengio 2012). The military also supported Saddam and his position toward the Kurdish issue. Saddam's successful visit to the Soviet Union in February 1972, which concluded in technical assistance and arms deals, further consolidated his position in the regime. After his visit, Iraq and the Soviet Union signed the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty on 9

⁵⁰ The Revolutionary Command Council was the top decision-making body of the state. As the supreme organ of the state, it exercised both executive and legislative power (Metz 1988).

⁵¹ Cited in Bengio (2012, 99).

April 1972. With the strong leadership, in 1973, a year before the 1974-1975 conflict, the Baath regime seemed more self-confident and wielded more power than ever under the leadership of Saddam Hussein (Bengio 2012).

On the Eighth Regional Congress held in January 1974, Saddam was recognized as a de facto leader of Iraq. Saddam's stance toward the Kurdish problem is reflected in the political report of the Eighth Congress, *Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973*, which he played a main role in formulating. The report recognized the Kurdish movement as a legitimate movement, yet it emphasized that it is legitimate "so long as it works within the framework of national rights for the Kurdish people within the Republic of Iraq."⁵²

Also, it emphasized the territorial unity of the Iraq state several times:

The Kurdish question has been the most difficult problem confronting the Party and the Revolution in past years...The party had to find a solution...that would satisfy the national aspirations of our Kurdish masses while protecting the territorial unity of the land and the unity of the national progressive movement without conflicting with the aims of the Arab struggle.

As from the report, the regime preferred a federalist solution to the Kurdish problem, which was not acceptable to the Kurds.

On 11 March 1974, on the fourth anniversary of the March Declaration, the Baath regime promulgated the Autonomy Law and gave the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) only fourteen days to assent to the law. The KDP rejected the law because only 60 percent of what the KDP considered as Kurdish lands were actually included in the autonomous region. In addition, the question of oil and mineral rights in KirKuk area was not clearly resolved by the law (Hannum 1996, 193). The 1974 Autonomy Law was perceived as a mean to weaken the 1970 March Agreement.

⁵² <https://www.marxists.org/history/iraq/baath/index.htm> (accessed October 11, 2016).

The fact that the Baath regime arbitrarily proclaimed the autonomy law and forced the Kurds to concede it reflects that the regime was ready for another military confrontation with the Kurds. Domestically, the regime solidified its authority with a strong leader, Saddam Hussein, who took a strong stance on the Kurdish problem. Under these circumstances, the regime was able to form its strong stance toward the Kurds more clearly. It contributed to the outbreak of the 1974-1975 conflicts and made the conflict more severe and intensified compared to the 1961-1970 episodes.

5.6.2 Regional Dimension

The Baath Party during its first few years suffered from isolation abroad, especially among the Middle Eastern countries. Because of internal instability in its early times in power, the regime had to put its energy toward stabilizing domestic politics while showing little interest in its foreign relations (Bengio 2012). The relationship with Iran, in particular, was the most severe one and it had a huge impact on Iraq's policy towards the Kurds.

Iran and Iraq's competition for regional hegemony began in earnest in the first years of the Baath regime. It began to be exacerbated in 1968 when Britain declared its intention to complete the evacuation of its forces from the Gulf region by late 1971 (Bengio 2012, 30). The expected power vacuum after the evacuation of British forces led to the competition between the two countries. The conflict over the Shatt al-Arab waterway in 1969 was the starting point of a fierce rivalry between Iraq and Iran. The hostile relationship between the two countries lasted until the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975, which settled the territorial dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway and brought about a short-lived amicable relationship between the two.

The political and military vacuum after the British evacuation led to an apparent competition for regional power between Iraq and Iran. Both countries thought itself as the guardian of Gulf security. The shah, who did not show political ambition in the Gulf region, now publicly announced Iran's role as the sole guardian after Britain. In his interview with *Guardian* on 9 October, 1971, he stated that "the Persian Gulf must always be kept open – under Iranian protection – for the benefit of not only my country but the other Gulf countries and the world."⁵³ The shah's ambitious posture on regional politics disturbed Iraq. The Baath regime considered itself as protector of Arab nationalism against the Persian nationalism of Iran and Western imperialism. It accused Iran of being a puppet country of the West and the defender of Western interests. Iran, on the other hand, saw the Iraqi Baath regime as a dangerous and radical regime. That is, Iraqi-Iranian rivalry was the clash between conservative, status quo-oriented monarchic Iran and the revolutionary, ideological regime of Iraq (Abdulghani 1984, 100).

In addition, Iran's consolidation of the military superiority in the Gulf region fueled Iraq's fear. The influx of oil revenue and the US aids to Iran contributed to Iran's military superiority that caused the arms race between Iraq and Iran.⁵⁴ That is, the rivalry relationship between two was Iraq's motive behind a large increase in military budget. It reflected the competition over regional hegemony and was an indicator of deepening rivalry relationship between the two.

Since the rivalry manifested, Iran used every means to weaken Iraq domestically as well as internationally. For Iran, the Kurds were a useful tool to destabilize its' neighboring rival, which could help Iran avoid direct military confrontation with Iraq.

⁵³ Cited in Abdulghani (1984, 75).

⁵⁴ The Nixon Doctrine aimed at having Iran as a credible ally of the US in the region.

Although Iran did not admit to its involvement with the Iraqi-Kurdish relationship about that time, evidence exists. CBS news noted on 1 November 1975 that the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee had discovered that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had shipped ‘millions of dollars worth’ of arms to the Kurdish rebels in Iraq at the request of the Shah of Iran. It further alleged that when President Nixon visited Iran in May 1970, the Shah had asked him to supply untraceable arms for the Kurdish rebels to “help to keep the Iraqi Government off balance,” and tens of millions of dollars worth of Soviet arms were delivered to Iran for the purpose.⁵⁵ A Memorandum sent to Henry Kissinger in June 7, 1972 from Harold H. Saunders, the National Security Staff, also reveals that Iran was indeed supporting the Iraqi Kurds to weaken the Baath regime. The memorandum contains the fact that the Shah of Iran requested the US to meet Kurdish representatives of Barzani and support the idea of Iraqi Kurds as a source of instability in Iraq.⁵⁶

The frustration of Iran’s involvement in Iraq’s domestic affairs is seen in *Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973*, the political report adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath Party in 1974:

We felt that the leadership (of the Kurdistan Democratic Party) was intensifying emergency patterns in its dealings with the government and making suspect relations with foreign powers... The influential separatist, suspect, client and reactionary elements and tendencies in the leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party were not on the decline to the degree anticipated before and after the March announcement. These elements committed large scale sabotage and conducted propaganda activity against the Party and the Revolution at home and abroad... They are still to this day openly cooperating with the reactionary states and imperialist forces in the area to weaken and destroy the Party and the Revolution. These trends and elements are now forming the primary reserve for the forces of imperialism and regression in Iraq.

⁵⁵ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 21, 1975.

⁵⁶ https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/virtuallibrary/documents/mr/060772_iraq.pdf (accessed October 11, 2016).

Although it did not mention specific countries with which the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was cooperating, Iran was circumstantially providing military and financial aids to the Iraqi Kurds with help of the U.S. The Kurds and Iran shared the same objective of destabilizing the Baath regime, and it made the Iraqi Kurds a useful tool for Iran to do so. In this situation, it can be assumed that it was crucial for the Baath regime to remove the “internal enemy” by suppressing them harshly. This explains the increased intensity and severity of the 1974-1975 conflicts.

5.6.3 International Dimension

In the early and mid 1970s, the Soviet Union was still the most important country in Iraq’s foreign relations. In the period between 1968 and 1975, the Soviet Union still accounted for over 95 percent of all conventional military transfers to Iraq (Svet 2015, 176). The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed on 9 April 1972 was the summit of the Soviet-Iraqi relationship. Ironically, however, Iraq’s needs for the Soviet Union started to decline from 1973, and it was the Soviet Union who wanted to continue having a close tie with Iraq.

There were two main reasons that increased the Soviets’ interests in Iraq. First, geopolitically, the Persian Gulf became a focus of the Soviets’ global strategy (Ro’i 1974, 564). It was due to the expected power vacuum after the evacuation of British forces from the Gulf and the increasing Soviets’ interests in the Indian Ocean and sub-continent. Since Britain had declared in 1968 that it was considering evacuating its forces from the Gulf by 1971, the superpowers, especially the US and the Soviet Union, intensified their efforts to fill the power vacuum left by Britain. Besides, a close tie between Iran and the U.S. and worsening of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in the 1970s

increased the importance of tightening the diplomatic relationship with Iraq. Second, economically, it was considered that importing oil from Iraq was increasingly economical for the Soviet Union (Ro'i 1974).⁵⁷

On the other hand, Iraq tried to reduce its dependency on the Soviet Union. The enhanced stability in domestic affairs and economic wealth from nationalized oil production helped such efforts. In his interview with the *New York Times* in July 1973, Saddam Hussein emphasized that Iraq refuses to be “a political or economic satellite of anyone, including the Soviet Union.”⁵⁸ His interview reveals Iraq’s intention to avoid the Soviets’ involvement in Iraq’s affairs. In Chapter Nine of the Political Report of the Eighth Congress, *Revolutionary Iraq 1968-1973*, International Policy, the Baath regime demonstrated its intention of opening a friendly relationship with the West:

The Western capitalist world is not composed totally of enemies and imperialists. Some countries take relatively moderate stands toward the Arabs. Some other countries are not in conflict with us thus making it possible to establish normal relations with them. Our independent attitudes and the requirements of modern times call for good relations with all peoples and countries. This can help us to benefit from their technological and scientific advances and at the same time it can help strengthen our position internationally.⁵⁹

Accordingly, Iraq tried to diversify its diplomatic relationships and arms trading partners. The rise of oil prices also created favorable circumstances for improving Iraq’s economic and political links with the West (Shemesh 1992, 96). For instance, in 1974, Iraq restored diplomatic relations with West Germany and Britain. Iraq’s imports from

⁵⁷ In February 1971, Deputy Minister of Oil Extraction of the Soviet Union stated that oil imports from Middle Eastern countries in exchange for equipment and technical assistance might become increasingly economical for the Soviet in view of the high cost of transporting oil from Siberia to the consuming areas of European Russia (*Petroleum Press Service*, February 1971, p. 64, cited from Ro'i (1974).

⁵⁸ *New York Times*, July 15 1973, cited in Shemesh (1992, 111).

⁵⁹ <https://www.marxists.org/history/iraq/baath/index.htm> (accessed October 11, 2016).

Western countries also tremendously increased in this year while imports from the Soviet Union grew moderately, which meant the portion of the Soviet Union in Iraq's imports decreased (Shemesh 1992).

It can be assumed that the decrease of the Soviet's importance in Iraq's diplomatic relations influenced the Baath regime's policy towards the Kurds and its military operations of the 1974-1975 Iraq-Kurdish conflicts. The Soviet's stance on Iraqi Kurds was less critical at this time. Therefore, Iraqi foreign relations determined less of Iraq's decisions regarding the Kurdish problem. Without pressure from the Soviet Union, who advocated a moderate and peaceful solution, the Baath regime was able to conduct a heavy military operation on the Kurdish rebels. This explains why the 1974-1975 conflicts could be much more severe and brutal than the previous episodes in the first phase, and concluded without compromise.

5.7 THE 1985-1988 CONFLICT

5.7.1 Domestic Dimension

A suppression of the Kurdish rebellion and signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975 further solidified the Baath regime's authority and the one-party system in Iraq. At the same time, economic prosperity and the growing revenues from a nationalized oil industry further enhanced the regime's power in both domestic and regional politics. The best time of the Baath party did not last long, however. Power of the state was increasingly concentrated and accumulated in the hands of one person, Saddam Hussein. The country became a more personal autocracy since the late 1970s (Marr 2004, 180).

After the successful military campaign against the Kurds and the conclusion of the Algiers Agreement with Iran in 1975, Saddam Hussein's position in the Baath party strengthened. By concluding these events, Saddam made it possible for the Baath to extend its control over the entire country. It consolidated his position as a de facto leader in the party. On July 17, 1979, Saddam Hussein officially became President of Iraq when Al-Bakr resigned from his post. Hussein also served as secretary-general of the Baath Party Regional Command, chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, and commander-in-chief of the military.

Although he became officially the head of Iraq in 1979, the process of consolidation of power to Saddam Hussein was already under way. It took place in two areas: an administrative sector and a security sector. In the administrative aspect, the most significant event was the absorption of the Baath Regional Command into the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in September 1977. All members of the Regional Command were appointed as members of the RCC, which made these two bodies indistinguishable. Since the Regional Command was the core of party leadership and the top decision-making body of the Iraqi Baath Party, it signified the end of the Baath party as an independent body (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 207-208; Metz 1988). It degraded to a symbolic institution that asserted the authority of Saddam Hussein.

In the security sector, various internal security apparatuses were developed to protect Saddam Hussein and to closely monitor a plot and anti-opposition activities against him. In order to eradicate remaining power of al-Bakr, Saddam Hussein dismantled the old guard within the security organizations, and created new bodies from

the bottom up (Baram 2003, 99). The Special Security Organization (SSO), established in 1982, was the most important security body in Iraq. Its main responsibility was to protect the president. Another presidential protection force was the Himaya. General Security and Military Intelligence monitored Iraq's military for signs of dissent.⁶⁰ They were also involved in monitoring, arresting, and torturing civilians who were against Saddam Hussein's regime. The Republican Guard was responsible for protecting Baghdad, stationing outside the city. It was supposed to protect the city from an external attack, but it protected the president against the regular army. The Special Republican Guard was a well-trained force that was allowed into Baghdad and provided security for the president (Baram 2003). The creation and development of the People's Army also became one of the foundations of Saddam's rule.⁶¹ The aim of building the People's Army as an 'anti-army' was to neutralize the regular army's potential as a source of opposition to Saddam (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 2001, 207). The Tikritis, and especially members of Saddam Hussein's tribe, the Albu-Nasir, occupied most of the key positions in these security forces and institutions, which gave Saddam Hussein more security.

The decision to launch a brutal attack against the Kurds between 1985 and 1989 could be made under these domestic circumstances. As discussed in the previous section, Saddam Hussein took a strong stance on the Kurdish problem and insisted for a military solution. And in fact, it was Saddam who decided on the use of chemical weapons (Bengio 2012, 180). Without any obstacles in his decision making process, he presumably was able to command genocidal attacks against the Kurds.

⁶⁰ "Forces: Iraq/Army," *CNN*. <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2003/iraq/forces/iraq/army/> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁶¹ The name is cited as the Popular Army or People's Militia (Metz 1988).

5.7.2 Regional Dimension

It was expected that the Algiers Agreement between Iran and Iraq in 1975 would bring peace to the Gulf region. The two countries made further progress in their relationship after signing the agreement. The Iranian Prime Minister, Abbas Hoveida, visited Iraq from 26 to 29 March 1975, and a joint communiqué was issued on 29 March. According to *Reuters*, it outlined political issues, trade and economic relations, and ease of access to each other's country.⁶² In return, Saddam Hussein visited Iran in May of the same year. In a joint statement, both states affirmed their "firm determination" to continue with the full implementation of the Algiers Agreement.⁶³ President al-Bakr's speech on 17 July, 1975 further raised expectations about regional peace. He described the Iraq-Iran agreement as "one of our most important achievements in the field of foreign relations" and claimed that it had "the deepest positive effect on the Arab Gulf area."⁶⁴

However, these positive expectations completely collapsed when the Iranian Revolution occurred in 1979. The Shah of Iran was ousted from power, and Ayatollah Khomeini established the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has been the most conservative Shi'i regime in the Middle East. The balance of power between Iraq and Iran collapsed. The establishment of the radical Shi'i country in neighboring countries became a real threat to Iraq and a fiercer rivalry for regional power between the two countries began again.

⁶² *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 6, 1975.

⁶³ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 9, 1975.

⁶⁴ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 14, 1975.

The Iran-Iraq war was the climax of rivalry between the two countries. It was obvious that the winner of the war could be a leader of the region. Thus, the two countries used every possible way to win the war. Iran, again, used the Kurds to destabilize Saddam's regime. For minorities and opposition groups in Iraq, too, the Iran-Iraq war was an opportunity to secure their rights to state power, and possibly overthrow the Iraqi regime. Particularly, for the Iraqi Kurds, the external warfare of the regime gave them another chance to fight for independence. Having militarized organizations and experienced leaders, they knew how to conduct anti-governmental warfare. In fact, among minority groups, only the Kurdish group developed the popular uprising into a military confrontation with the Saddam's regime.

Iran and the Kurds often carried joint attacks on Iraq. During the war, Iran invaded northern Iraq with assistance from the Kurds. The Kurds, too, launched an offensive against Iraq with the help of Iran. The joint attempts of Iran and the Kurds were a serious problem for Iraq since it could divert the Iraqi Army's attention away from the main battle zone. It made the Kurdish problem more serious than any other time. Thus, it would be urgent for Iraq to remove the Kurdish threat as soon and efficiently as possible. It explains why Iraq launched a chemical attack on Halabja shortly after the joint forces of Iran and the Kurds had succeeded in expelling the Iraqi forces from Halabja and occupying it (Bengio 2012). Therefore, it can be argued that serious security threats from the Kurds' joint action with Iran led Iraq to conduct a cruel military campaign against the Kurds. It is because further advances of the joint Iranian-Kurdish forces did not only threaten the regime's survival but also put placed the power status of Iraq in the Gulf region in danger.

5.7.3 International Dimension

The influence and role of the Soviet Union was considerably reduced from the late 1970s as the Baath regime and Saddam Hussein put more energy to diversify Iraq's foreign relations. They started to set up economic and military relationships with the West.⁶⁵ They also tried to improve the relationship with the Arab state. In the interview of with the *Cairo Daily Al-Ahram* published on 21 and 22 February 1975, Saddam Hussein said, "We are ready to discuss the establishment of a joint defence plan with Saudi Arabia, including the formation of a joint navy." Saddam also mentioned in the interview with the *Washington Post* on 25 April, 1975 that "Iraq would soon consult Iran and other Gulf states on the possibility of establishing 'security structures' to replace foreign military alliances."⁶⁶ President al-Bakr's speech on 17 July 1975 also reveals the regime's willingness to expand its diplomatic ties with the Arab countries.⁶⁷

Indeed, the regime made progress in breaking its diplomatic isolation. Iraq concluded a series of economic and border agreements with Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait.⁶⁸ Also, Iraq improved relations with the Western countries. For instance, Saddam Hussein visited France in September 1975 to discuss the nuclear technology and development contracts. As the *London Times* reported, Iraq had sought French technological assistance for the development of a nuclear energy program. Iraq expected France to build an experimental nuclear power station in Iraq and to give training to Iraqi

⁶⁵ For example, Iraq had set up an aluminum company with the French firm in February 1975. *Agence France Press* reported on 7 February 1975 that the company, which will have a capital of \$285 million, would be based at Nasiriya in southern Iraq. The project will have an output of 30,000 tons a year and will start production in 1977 (*Arab Report Record*, Issue 3, 1975).

⁶⁶ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 8, 1975.

⁶⁷ President al-Bakr said that Iraq had sought to 'deepen understanding with the Arab countries in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia.'

⁶⁸ Iraq reached air agreements with Saudi Arabia and Jordan in July 1975

scientists and technicians. A summit meeting between the two countries led to a framework of a nuclear co-operation agreement, which was expected to be signed in October.⁶⁹ Iraq also allowed Western governments and companies to invest in Iraq.⁷⁰

The regime even expressed its willingness to restore diplomatic relations with the U.S. In the interview with the *Cairo Daily Al-Ahram*, Saddam Hussein mentioned that “if the U.S.A wishes to establish new relation with us on the basis of joint interest and non-interference in our affairs, it will find the doors wide open.” In fact, the commercial relationship between Iraq and the U.S. grew quickly. The *International Herald Tribune* reported on 11 April 1975 that US-Iraqi trade had jumped from less than \$20 million a year to nearly \$300 million a year. It further quoted words from a diplomat in Baghdad that Iraq was ‘just waiting for the right time’ to announce a resumption of diplomatic relations with the USA.⁷¹ As Iraq had become the fastest-growing market for American goods in the Middle East, the direct investment of American firms in Iraq also increased.⁷²

On the other hand, although Saddam emphasized the importance of the alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in his interview with the *Cairo Daily Al-Ahram* published in February 1975, the Soviet’s influence in Iraq was clearly waning. The *International Herald Tribune* on 11 April 1975 quoted a Western diplomat as saying

⁶⁹ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 17, 1975.

⁷⁰ The French Agriculture Ministry announced that France would carry out nine agricultural projects in Iraq involving a total investment of 6,000 million francs (about \$1,143 million) (*Arab Report and Record*, Issue 5, 1975). The West German Fischer Company had won a DM 128-million (about \$50 million) turnkey contract to set up an integrated textile plant in Iraq, the *Paris Moniteur Officiel du Commerce International* reported on 17 November 1975 (*Arab Report and Record*, Issue 22, 1975).

⁷¹ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 7, 1975.

⁷² *Reuter* reported on 19 June, 1975 that the U.S. and Canadian firms, Banister Price International would build the 212-mile Iraqi section of the 40-inch crude-oil pipeline between Iraq’s Kirkuk oilfield and Dortyol on the Turkish coast (*Arab Report and Record*, Issue 12, 1975).

that the Soviet Union had ‘lost their monopoly in everything but the supply of arms,’ to the extent that ‘virtually every new major project in the past two years has gone to the West.’⁷³ Although the Soviet Union was still a major supplier of arms, Iraq sought other routes for importing arms. In his interview with the *Washington Post* on 25 April 1975, Saddam said, “Iraq would be prepared to buy arms from countries other than the Soviet Union.”⁷⁴ The Soviet Union expressed its discontent, and suspended arms shipments to Iraq in July 1975.⁷⁵

As Iraq tried to be less dependent on the Soviet Union by diversifying its foreign relations, the influence of the Soviet Union began to decline in the late 1970s. In the 1980s, its influence rapidly waned and its role in the Iraq politics was hardly found. Therefore, it can be assumed Iraq would be able to make policy decisions without pressure from the Soviets. This explains another aspect why the 1985-1988 military campaign became the most brutal one in the history of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts.

5.8 CONCLUSION

The three phases of the Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts from 1961 to 1988 differ in terms of their severity, duration, and outcomes. I have tried to compare and analyze how different opportunities that the Iraqi regimes had in each phase affected Iraq’s policy towards the Kurds and influenced the course of the conflicts. British colonial rule provided an initial source of instability and Iraq’s increasing military capabilities created a possibility of brutal suppression. Yet, the different internal and external political environments in which each regime was situated led them to make different security

⁷³ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 7, 1975.

⁷⁴ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 8, 1975.

⁷⁵ *Arab Report and Record*, Issue 13, 1975.

policy decisions in regards to the Kurdish problem. Specifically, the level of political instability and consolidation of power in domestic politics, changes in the extent of hostility between Iraq and Iran in regional politics, and changes in the relationship with the Soviet Union in international politics brought differences regarding Iraq's decisions. These findings support my theoretical arguments over the development of civil conflict and a state's decision on internal insurgency. In the next chapter I apply the key findings from the cases of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts – the three dimensions of state security – to the cases of two Arab countries that have experienced so-called “Arab Spring” – Egypt and Libya – and what made a difference in the state's response to a popular uprising, resulting in markedly dissimilar consequences.

CHAPTER 6.

EMPIRICAL STUDY II: THE 2011 EGYPTIAN UPRISING AND THE 2011 LIBYAN CIVIL CONFLICT

From an in-depth study of the set of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts, I have delineated three important factors at play in a state's security decision making and the course of conflict: domestic, regional, and international dimensions of a state's security decisions on internal affairs. The domestic dimension includes the level of instability in domestic politics. The regional dimension searches for the extent of a competitive relationship with a rival country in the region. The international dimension includes the influence of Superpower countries in a state's politics. Analyzing Iraq's decisions in dealing with the Kurdish problem based on these three aspects over time, I have found that differences in domestic, regional, and international circumstances affect the state's security decision making and the development of conflict.

In this chapter, I apply the key findings from the previous chapter to the two Arab countries with divergent outcomes in the wake of so-called Arab Spring: Egypt and Libya. It is not easy to compare these two countries with the Iraqi-Kurds conflict because of the differences in the nature of uprising and internal and external circumstances. Unlike the Kurdish rebellion that aimed at establishing the independent Kurdish state, a main goal of the Arab uprising in most countries was democratization and liberalization of the states. In addition, as many scholars have pointed out, the role of technology was vital in the spread and the development of uprising. Also, intense competition between

Superpowers in third world countries have decreased since the end of the Cold War, which also affected the rivalry relationships between countries in many regions as well. Additionally, because the 2011 uprising is a relatively new and ongoing event, it is difficult to find clear evidence.

Nevertheless, it is worth studying the Arab uprising in terms of the framework of a state's security decision-making outlined in the present study. The Arab Spring was a unique and unexpected political event that swept over the Middle East and North Africa in a short period of time. Scholars have been trying to explain why and how such a phenomenon simultaneously happened in many authoritarian states in the region. Most studies only focus on domestic circumstances, such as economic hardship and political inequality, for explanations. While those conditions certainly played a pivotal role in the occurrence of the 2011 uprising, they do not satisfactorily explain the differences in the development of uprisings in these countries. In some cases, incumbent regimes were replaced without a major clash. In other cases, peaceful demonstration developed into a bloody civil conflict. Why do we observe such differences? Based on the three-factor framework used to study the Iraq-Kurd conflict, I argue that the initial responses of the governments made considerable difference, and considering regional and international aspects in security decision-making of each regime can provide another insight into the event.

Among the countries that have experienced the Arab Spring, I chose the cases of Egypt and Libya. The two countries share some commonalities. Both countries were regarded as enduring authoritarian regimes, each with its a leader had held power for decades. The movements in Egypt and Libya were so large that thousands of people

participated in the protests once they occurred. However, in Egypt, although protestors and the security forces clashed in the beginning of the uprising, the Egyptian government did not respond with heavy-handed repression. Rather, the Mubarak regime made concessions several times to ease the anger of demonstrators in the street. After eighteen days, Mubarak and the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) stepped down when the vice-president, Omar Suleiman, announced the resignation of Mubarak as president on February 11. By contrast, the Gaddafi regime almost immediately used force to repress protestors. Within a week, Gaddafi's security forces had killed at least 1,000 unarmed protestors (Lynch 2011, 112). The uprising soon evolved into a full-scale conflict, which last until October of that year when Gaddafi was killed in his hometown. As demonstrated in these two cases, difference in the governments' response to protest brought about different consequences. That is, the level of violence by the incumbent regime made a key difference between Egypt and Libya.⁷⁶ Why did Mubarak and Gaddafi make different choices? Applying a theoretical framework of security decision-making, I analyze and compare the domestic, regional, and international dimensions of Egypt and Libya, and how differences in the three aspects may have influenced the regimes' choice in the face of the 2011 uprising.

⁷⁶ Stephen Zunes, "History of US-Libya Relations Indicates US Must Tread Carefully as Uprising Continues," *Truthout News*, 24 February, 2011. <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/2:history-of-uslibya-relations-indicates-us-must-tread-carefully-as-uprising-continues> (accessed October 11, 2016).

6.1 DOMESTIC DIMENSION

6.1.1 Egypt

Egypt was considered as one of the most enduring authoritarian states in the world (Kassem 2004). President Hosni Mubarak was in power for thirty years beginning in 1981, establishing an exceptionally strong model of presidential government (Champman 1983). Mubarak had had the longest tenure of power among the three Egyptian rulers since the 1952 coup. State power was concentrated in the hands of President Mubarak, and the ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), occupied more than ninety percent of seats in the assembly. Accordingly, it was a shock when he stepped down so quickly in the face of civilian protest.

On the surface, the domestic political circumstance of Mubarak's Egypt looks similar to Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Muammar Gaddafi's Libya in which a strong man had governed the state for decades. Yet when one takes a closer view, Egyptian domestic politics and the power status of Mubarak's regime were far less stable than Iraq under Hussein and Libya under Gaddafi.

Although Mubarak inherited power from two strong leaders, Nasser and Sadat, his power status was not as strong as his predecessors. One of the reasons was the nature of political elites. Unlike Saddam Hussein as well as Nasser and Sadat, Mubarak did not structure a client group. As described in the previous chapter, Saddam Hussein established a strong connection with his advisors based on kinship. Nasser and Sadat organized the clusters of presidential clients that were assigned social, economic, and political responsibilities (Springborg 1989). Hussein, Nasser and Sadat maintained a close but subordinate relationship with his supporting elites by using both punishment

and reward. Also, the inner core of elites under the three leaders was homogeneous in composition and the relationship with their leader was intimate. On the other hand, Mubarak relied more on the standard bureaucratic change of command. The failure of establishing a strong patronage relationship with the core political elites resulted in the decline of presidential power (Springborg 1989, 32).

Another factor that weakened Mubarak's power was his attempt to turn over presidency to his son, Gamal Mubarak. Since the early 2000s, Mubarak had paved way for Gamal Mubarak to succeed his father as president. He appointed Gamal Mubarak as the general secretariat of the NDP in February 2000. At the NDP internal congress held on September 2002 under the slogan of "A New Way of Thinking," Gamal created the Policies Secretariat (Lesch 2011). The Policies Secretariat was a 123-member core group of economic and academic elites who were close to Gamal but had no background in politics (El-Ghobashy 2003). Gamal was promoted to head the Policies Secretariat at the congress. The role of the Policies Secretariat was to transform the NDP into a party that is managed by a new generation of technocrats. However, rather than making an effort for a genuine transformation of the NDP, the Policies Secretariat was used as a vehicle for succession (Langohr 2000; Arafat 2009). When the NDP performed poorly in the 2000 Parliament election, Gamal removed members of the old-conservative faction in the NDP and the cabinet, and replaced them with his associates (Arafat 2009).

The opposition to Gamal's succession of his father had been growing both inside and outside the NDP.⁷⁷ The old-conservative faction did not welcome Gamal's semi-

⁷⁷ Aljazeera, September 15, 2010.

<http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2009/12/2009126113730937103.html> (accessed October 11, 2016).

liberalized neoconservative faction and opposed Gamal's campaign to bring new and young figures into the ruling party (Arafat 2009). More importantly, the Egyptian public did not support Gamal either. Along with economic and political depression and adverse public sentiment toward the Egyptian stance on the Iraq War in 2003, Gamal's rapid political promotion produced public grievances against Mubarak's regime from the beginning. Many scholars have pointed out that the widespread fears that Gamal was the appointed successor were one of the motives behind the Egyptian uprising in 2011.

Gamal did not gain trust from military generals either for several reasons. First of all, unlike other Egyptian leaders since the 1952 coup, Gamal did not have a military background. More importantly, there had been tension between the interests of the military that had controlled many parts of Egyptian industry and the advocates around Gamal who benefited from economic reform (Gelvin 2015, 69-70). Thus, Gamal and his factions' orientation toward market reform and the privatization of controlled commercial enterprises was not acceptable to the military officers (Rutherford 2013). Under this situation, the Egyptian military's loyalty to the President faded. When the Arab Spring spread throughout Egypt, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces decided not to fire on demonstrators, emphasizing that their loyalty was to the nation, not to the president (Lesch 2012, 39). Withdrawing their loyalty, the military played a critical role in ousting Mubarak in 2012.

Internal Islamist opposition groups were another key factor that threatened Mubarak's regime. The Islamist movement had reached its peak in the early 1990s (Houdaiby 2012, 135). About eighty-six percent of the casualties resulting from civil strife since 1953 and up to 1993 occurred during the Mubarak era (Cassandra 1995, 19).

This striking figure shows the relative weakness of Mubarak's regime compared to the two previous regimes.

Egypt's Islamic movement was diverse and complex (Fandy 1994, 607). Amongst Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood is perhaps the most well known. Established in 1928, Muslim Brotherhood is the Egypt's largest opposition group and the world's oldest Islamist group (Houdaiby 2012, 126). Although some factions in the Muslim Brotherhood have become radicalized, it renounced violence several times, and in 1987, the Mubarak regime gave permission to form a political party and legally participate in national politics (Gelvin 2015). However, as public support for the Muslim Brotherhood rose rapidly, Mubarak and the NDP repressed the Muslim Brotherhood by arresting its members and obstructing election of its candidates through electoral fraud in the parliamentary elections.

While the Muslim Brotherhood was more a political party than an extremist movement that played as the opposition party in political affairs, militant Islamists, such the Islamic Jihad, Jamaat Islamiya (Islamic Group), and Vanguard of Conquest, constitute terrorist attacks and insurgency against Mubarak regime (Cordesman 2006). Their activities were a sporadic and limited terrorist campaign in the beginning, but it evolved into a widespread and low-level insurgency. As the lower classes continued to join, and the movements reflected their interest accordingly, the Islamist movement has further radicalized and intensified. These groups are not only capable of intermittent acts of violence, but also constituting an insurgency against the government (Cassandra 1995, 20-21).

In sum, although Mubarak's regime was widely considered an authoritarian regime, he and his regime did not enjoy absolute power to the extent found with Hussein or Gaddafi. Mubarak did not have a strong client group based on kinship or patronage. His ambition to turn over the presidency to his son was facing opposition from all sectors of the country including the NDP and the military. Islamist opposition groups were still attempting to destabilize the regime. Under these circumstances, it can be argued that President Mubarak's relatively weak power status and unstable domestic affairs (due to strong oppositionists at the time of the 2011 uprising) prevented an arbitrary decision to use heavy repression in dealing with protestors. This is one of the reasons why he was forced to make concessions, and finally resigned his presidency only eighteen days after the uprising began.

6.1.2. Libya

Compared to Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi enjoyed absolute power as leader of the country.⁷⁸ Gaddafi came to power through a military coup on September 1, 1969. He and the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), the leadership of the 1969 coup, abolished the short-lived Libyan monarchy and established the new authority that advocated direct democracy, pan-Arabism, and anti-imperialism. The Gaddafi regime's domestic and foreign policies were made and implemented on the basis of these ideologies. Ironically however, Gaddafi's advocacy of direct democracy contributed to the establishment of his absolute power status in Libya.

⁷⁸ He was one of the longest ruling heads of state in the Arab World at the time of the uprising. The other two were Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen and Sultan Qaboos of Oman (Gelvin 2015, 86).

The unique Libyan political system is based on Jamahiriya, which means, “rule by the masses” or “state of the masses.” It is a system of direct popular democracy that was drawn from Gaddafi’s “Third Universal Theory,” which advocates a decentralized and participatory government. The formal system of Libyan democracy is based on three foundations: the Basic People’s Congresses, the Peoples’ Committees, and the Professional Organizations (Mattes 2008, 58-9). The Basic People’s Congresses are local legislative organs of Libya. All Libyan people are eligible to participate. Members of the People’s Committees, which are the local level of executive organs, are elected at the Basic People’s Congress. Another organization that composes the Libyan democracy is the Professional Organization. The employed were requested to join the Professional Organization and were encouraged to express their opinions on the state’s national and foreign developments. These are fundamental organizations of direct democracy of Libya. The representatives of the national legislative body, the General People’s Congress, are nominated by these three organizations. The General People’s Congress nominates the members of the national level of the executive body, the General People’s Committee. Although this system was modified in 1998 and resulted in the creation of twenty-six regional units positioned between the basic and national levels, the basic system has not been changed since the Declaration of Authority of the People of March 1977 (Mattes 2008; Blanchard and Zanotti, 2011).

Because it is based on a theory of a direct rule by all Libyan people, the Jamahiriya system dismisses the need of representative institution and the role of political parties in politics. It requires all Libyans to participate in the political decision making process (Joffé and Paloetti 2010). Indirect democracy is unjust under this system. It

rejects party pluralism and parties were considered as a threat to unity of Libya because they pursue group interests only. Accordingly, all political parties were banned in 1972. For the same reason, popular organizations, associations and unions, and active civil society groups were prohibited and very few associations received permissions to form and act (Mattes 2008). This is why there were no opposition political parties and unions by the time of the 2011 uprising (Gelvin 2015, 90).

The Jamahiriya system was a utopian ideal. In reality, direct democracy did not work. The state's revolutionary sector was the real ruling body of the Libyan political system. The revolutionary sector consisted of Gaddafi and the Revolutionary Committees. Members of the Revolutionary Committees were involved in every state's institutions and no action could be taken without their permission. More importantly, however, it was Gaddafi who made important internal and external policy decisions in Libya. Personal access to the leader, such as family links and patron-client relationships, were most important in influencing and participating in policy formulation. This extremely personalized process was Libya's striking feature of policy decision-making process in both domestic and foreign politics (Joffé and Paloetti 2010).

This feature is also highly related to what Mattes (2008) called the "re-tribalization" of Libya. Mattes defines the terms as "the intensified reversion to members of one's own tribe in order to shore-up the regime" (Mattes 2008, 98). As in many Middle Eastern and African countries, tribes have huge influence on Libyan society. Emphasizing the welfare of the whole of Libya and unity of Libyan society, Gaddafi and his revolutionary government opposed tribalism and family influence in politics. Yet, Gaddafi himself had relied on his family, members of his tribe, and even members of

allied tribes by appointing his own kinsmen to important positions. Re-tribalization was manifested especially in security agencies. Members of Gaddafi's extended family and close associates who filled positions in security agencies closely monitored anti-Gaddafi activities and punish opponents (Gelvin 2015).

In conclusion, unlike Egypt, Gaddafi enjoyed a high level of absolute power that led to stability in domestic politics. He developed a unique direct participatory democracy based on his Third Universal Theory. Yet his version of direct democracy did not work in the real world and rather it resulted in an extremely strong authoritarian regime. Any active political parties and social organizations could not emerge under this system, which can be latent opposition groups. The absence of opposition forces made it possible for the regime to use arbitrary power in the country's policy making. Besides, as Saddam Hussein did during his rule, Gaddafi established a strong supporting group by appointing family members and relatives, and members of his tribes and allied tribes to key positions. The absence of opposition groups, the concentration of decision-making power to the president, and strong supporting group based on kinship brought about the differences between Egypt and Libya. Libyan domestic politics and Gaddafi's power status were much more stable than Egypt and Mubarak. This is one possible explanation how Gaddafi's regime almost immediately opened fire against protestors.

6.2 REGIONAL DIMENSION

6.2.1 Egypt

Israel has been a traditional rival of Egypt. The two countries confronted each other in all of the major Arab-Israeli conflicts in the 1900s, and Egypt always played a

major role in every Arab-Israeli conflict. Military confrontation between the two ended in the 1970s with the United States' involvement in Egyptian politics after the 1973 October war. In fact, both the United States and Egypt found each other beneficial. The United States was seeking more allied states in the Middle East to control the expansion of the Soviet's influence in the region. The Sadat regime perceived that only the United States could contain Israel in the long run (Chapman 1983, 212). After the two disengagement agreements in 1974 and 1975, Egypt and Israel signed the Camp David Accords in 1979 under the United States' mediation. This was the first peace agreement with Israel in the Arab world.

Maintaining peace with Israel has been a major security problem of Egypt. Unexpected political crises or strategic shifts could make Israel a threat to Egypt (Cordesman 206, 200). Moreover, as one of the only countries that have made a peace agreement with Israel in the region, Egypt has often been in a difficult place whenever the Arab-Israeli relationship becomes chilled.⁷⁹ Protracted conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians have been a politically as well as emotionally sensitive issue in Egyptian politics. The Egyptian mass' sympathy for the Palestinians clashed with the Mubarak regime's firm stand on maintaining peace with Israel. It threatened the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime.

Despite the ongoing rivalry between Egypt and Israel, it is hard to expect the two countries to engage in military confrontation. The probability is constrained significantly by the United States, which wants peace in the region. As long as the two countries receive political, economic, and military aid from the United States, both countries would not attempt to destabilize each other's internal affairs. In addition, for Egypt, economic

⁷⁹ Israel and Jordan signed a full peace treaty on October 26, 1994.

development was a top priority. Thus they had sought a way out of the Israeli war trap (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 152).

In fact, it was the desire for Israel to maintain the status quo with its relationship with Egypt. Mubarak's regime was one of the few governments that were not hostile to Israel. Any changes in Egypt were more likely to negatively affect the relationship with Israel. The Egyptian uprising became a serious concern for Israel since there was a high probability that Islamic groups would come to power. Islamic radicalism has been spreading in many parts of the region, including Egypt. For Israel, it can cause a serious security problem because a new radical Islamic regime could seek to renegotiate the 1979 peace treaty.⁸⁰

Since the uprising occurred in Egypt, Israel has expressed its concern about the possibility of an emerging radical Islamist government in Egypt. At the weekly Cabinet meeting on 30 January 2011, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu emphasized that the maintenance of the current relationship with Egypt is crucial for Israel's security:

“We are anxiously monitoring what is happening in Egypt and (elsewhere) in our region...Our efforts are designed to continue and maintain stability and security in our region...I remind you that the peace between Israel and Egypt has endured for over three decades and our goal is to ensure that these relations continue.”⁸¹

In talks with diplomatic officials on 2 February 2011, the Prime Minister mentioned again Israel's interest in maintaining peace with Egypt.⁸² Therefore, in his remarks at the Knesset on 2 February 2011, he condemned the Western countries' support of the

⁸⁰ *Guardian*, November 24, 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/24/israel-netanyahu-attacks-arab-spring> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁸¹ <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/Cabinet-communique-30-Jan-2010.aspx> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁸² http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_situation_Egypt_1-Feb-2011.aspx (accessed October 11, 2016).

Egyptian movement, arguing that it would bring to power extreme Islamist elements that abuse the rules of democracy and impose anti-democratic regimes in the region.⁸³ More seriously, a successful transformation of Egypt to the Islamic state may give hope to other Islamic groups. Eli Shaked, a former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, said “It is expected that the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist parties will dominate the government, and we are concerned that their success will encourage other Islamic radical parties in the Middle East to act more openly to achieve their goals.”⁸⁴

Since it is not in Israel’s interest to see the triumph of anti-governmental protesters, Mubarak’s regime would not expect Israel to intervene in the 2011 event in Egypt to destabilize the regime’s status in domestic and regional politics. This can be one of the possible reasons why the Egyptian regime did not react violently to protesters.

6.2.2 Libya

Libya has had rival relationships with several countries in the region. It had military conflicts with Chad over the Aouzou Strip, a territory in northern Chad with uranium deposits (Thompson and Dreyer 2012, 237). During Sadat’s years in Egypt, the Gaddafi regime competed with Egypt for regional power. Most recently, Libya has interfered in the Sudanese Darfur problem, supporting the Darfur rebel movements that aim at replacing the incumbent regime in Sudan. In this section, I focus on the rivalry between Libya and Sudan because it is an ongoing relationship that led Sudan to involve itself in the 2011 conflict in Libya.

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http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2011/Pages/PM_Netanyahu_addresses_Knesset_situation_Egypt_2-Feb-2011.aspx (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁸⁴ *Guardian*, November 24, 2011.

Libya's relationship with Sudan has been frequently antagonistic. The relationship between the two states resembles the one between Iraq and Iran in that they used a policy of intervention in internal affairs to destabilize the other country. Like Iraq and Iran, Libya and Sudan often attempted to destabilize the other's domestic politics by supporting oppositionist groups. Most notably, Libya supported the Darfur rebel movements in Sudan, providing military and financial aid. The largest group among the Darfur rebels is the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) that have been pursuing armed struggle to change the al-Bashir regime since its establishment in 2003. The Gaddafi regime was a main external supporter of the JEM. According to officials of Sudan, Gaddafi armed the JEM with recoilless rifles and anti-aircraft guns, and provided vehicles and fuel.

According to Ahmed (2013), one of the possible motives behind Gaddafi's intervention in Sudanese internal affairs was that he feared stability in northern Sudan would result in an increase in Sudan's influence in Libya and the North Africa region. With its abundant oil and domestic stabilization of the country, he might have thought that there was a high possibility that Sudan would attempt to destabilize his regime. In addition, it would weaken Libya's regional status as a leading country in the region.

Witnessing the two leaders in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, it was not impossible for Sudan to imagine the fall of Gaddafi. Gaddafi may have recognized that it must have been a chance for Sudan to intervene to remove Gaddafi's regime that had been a great supporter of JEM. It turned out Gaddafi's concern became realized. When the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 1970 (2011) on 26 February 2011, Sudan joined a multinational coalition led by NATO. President al-Bashir said the forces, which

entered Tripoli, were all Sudanese. In his remarks that were broadcasted live on state television on 26 October 2011, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir said, “our God high and exalted, from above the seven skies, gave us the opportunity to reciprocate the visit.”⁸⁵ What he meant was that Sudan armed Libyan rebels during the Libyan civil conflict in 2011 in response to Gaddafi’s support for Sudanese rebels that attacked Khartoum in 2008 using Libyan arms and money. The head of Libya’s interim ruling council also confirmed Sudanese involvement. On his first official visit to Sudan on 25 November, 2011, Mustafa Abdel Jalil, a chairman of the Libyan National Transitional Council, said Sudan sent weapons and ammunition through Egypt to support Libyan rebels, helping them to oust Gaddafi and take control of the country. At a conference of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party, he said “if not for Sudanese military assistance, it would not have been possible to liberate Kufra,” which is a district in southeast Libya.⁸⁶

In sum, the fact that Libya and Sudan were in an active rivalry relationship at the time of the 2011 uprising is one of the differences between Egypt and Libya. Considering a high possibility of external intervention from the neighboring rival, military operation against the uprising may have been better option for Gaddafi.

⁸⁵ James Copnall, “Sudan Armed Libyan Rebel, Says President Bashir,” *BBC News*, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15471734> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁸⁶ *Reuters*, November 25, 2011. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-libya-weapons-idUSTRE7AO1R020111125> (accessed October 11, 2016).

6.3 INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

6.3.1 Egypt

Since 1979, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of US foreign assistance (Sharp 2011, 17), and the only Arab country bordering Israel that has been able to compete in arms imports during the 1990s (Cordesman 2004, 173). The influx of US aid into Egypt occurred in return for the 1979 Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. Since then, Egypt's dependence on US aid has been growing heavily. When the uprising broke out in Egypt, the Obama administration publicly pressured Mubarak to resign from the presidency. The Mubarak regime's excessive dependence on US aid may have prevented Mubarak from repressing the protestors rigorously.

The United States has given Egypt about \$71.6 billion in bilateral military and economic aid between 1948 and 2011.⁸⁷ Also, the United States is Egypt's largest bilateral trading partner, and the second-largest foreign investor in Egypt (Sharp 2011, 23). The two countries are engaged in bilateral science, business, and technological cooperation as well. In December 2011, the Obama administration launched the President's Global Innovation through Science and Technology (GIST) program in Egypt. Egypt has been participating in the Global Entrepreneurship Program (GEP), which is designed to assist entrepreneurs in Muslim communities (Sharp 2011, 21). In addition, the United States has provided funds for democracy promotion in Egypt, supporting activities of Egyptian and international NGOs.

⁸⁷ Brad Plumer, "The U.S. gives Egypt \$1.5 billion a year in aid. Here's what it does," *The Washington Post*, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/07/09/the-u-s-gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-what-it-does/> (accessed October 11, 2016).

At the initial stage of the uprising, the Obama administration supported the Mubarak regime. On January 18, 2011, the White House released a statement that President Obama spoke with President Mubarak on the Arab issues including the Arab uprising in Tunisia, and discussed ways to end violence and the establishment of an interim government for holding free and fair elections. This conversation occurred only a week before the outbreak of the Egyptian uprising. Soon after, however, the Obama administration changed its stance and strongly demanded Mubarak to resign (Nepstad 2013, 342-343). On February 1, 2011, President Obama made it clear that a transition must be “meaningful,” which meant Mubarak’s immediate resignation. He also mentioned that a new government should be installed through free and fair elections:

We have spoken out on behalf of the need for change. After his speech tonight, I spoke directly to President Mubarak...What is clear – and what I indicated tonight to President Mubarak – is my belief that an orderly transition must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now. Furthermore, the process must include a broad spectrum of Egyptian voices and opposition parties. It should lead to elections that are free and fair. And it should result in a government that’s not only grounded in democratic principles, but is also responsive to the aspirations of the Egyptian people.⁸⁸

President Obama also urged the Egyptian military to allow peaceful protests. As some scholars argue, the US stand on the Egyptian uprising may have driven the Egyptian military’s decision in the uprising because the military would want to maintain its biggest supplier of arms and military aids (Nepstad 2013). As we witnessed, the Egyptian military’s decision of siding with the protestors was key for the Egypt’s bloodless democratic transition in 2011.

⁸⁸ Presidential remarks, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/01/remarks-president-situation-egypt> (accessed October 11, 2016).

The Egyptian military leadership was the largest beneficiary of US aid toward Egypt. As Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1 show, a significant amount of US aid is allocated for military purposes. One third of Egypt's military budget is made up by US aid. On average, the United States has provided \$1.3 billion of military aid per year since 1987 plus much of the military equipment to Egypt. It covers almost 80 percent of the Egyptian Defense Ministry's weapons procurement costs.⁸⁹ In addition, Egypt is one of the countries that receive Excess Defense Articles (EDA) administered by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Department of Defense of the United States.⁹⁰ EDA provides partner state defense equipment at a reduced price or grant for the modernization of partner forces.⁹¹ It has assisted Egypt in replacing Egypt's Soviet weaponry with US equipment. Another benefit that Egyptian military officers have received from the alliance with the United States is they are invited to the International Military and Education Training (IMET) program at a reduced rate (Sharp 2011).

As the largest beneficiary from the United States-Egyptian alliance, the Egyptian military had a great deal to lose if it turned against the United States. This may have led them to defect from Mubarak and his regime and accommodate the protestors (and thus side with the United States). Without support from the military, suppression by force was not an option that was available to Mubarak in the face of uprising.

In conclusion, since the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the United States has provided a huge amount of US assistance to Egypt. When the Arab uprising spilt over into Egypt, the Obama administration publicly urged President Mubarak to resign without

⁸⁹ The Washington Post, July 9, 2013.


⁹⁰ <https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/strategic-industries-and-economic-security-sies/excess-defense-articles-program> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁹¹ <http://www.dsca.mil/programs/excess-defense-articles-eda> (accessed October 11, 2016).

Table 6.1 US Foreign Assistance to Egypt, 1948 – 2013 (\$ in millions)

	Economic	Military	IMET	Total
FY1948-FY1997	\$23,288.6	\$22,353.5	\$27.3	\$45,669.40
FY1998	\$815.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.0	\$2,116.0
FY1999	\$775.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.0	\$2,076.0
FY2000	\$727.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.0	\$2,028.3
FY2001	\$695.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.0	\$1,996.0
FY2002	\$655.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.0	\$1,956.0
FY2003	\$911.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.2	\$2,212.2
FY2004	\$571.6	\$1,292.3	\$1.4	\$1,865.3
FY2005	\$530.7	\$1,289.6	\$1.2	\$1,821.5
FY2006	\$490.0	\$1,287.0	\$1.2	\$1,778.2
FY2007	\$450.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.3	\$1,751.3
F20Y08	\$411.6	\$1,289.4	\$1.2	\$1,702.2
FY2009	\$250.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.3	\$1,551.3
FY2010	\$250.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.9	\$1,551.9
FY2011	\$249.5	\$1,297.4	\$1.4	\$1,548.3
FY2012	\$250.0	\$1,300.0	\$1.4	\$1,551.4
FY2013	\$241.0	\$1,234.3	\$1.7	\$1,477.0
Total	\$31,320.3	\$41,809.2	\$44.5	\$73,170

Source: Congressional Research Service Report (Sharp 2016)



Source: Congressional Research Service Report (Sharp 2016)

Figure 6.1 US Foreign Assistance to Egypt (\$ in millions)

any violence against protesters. As one of the largest recipients of US aid, it can easily be imagined that the Mubarak regime could not resist pressure from its patron state. Also, when the Egyptian military that has benefited the most from US aid turned against the regime and stood with protesters, Mubarak lost the means with which to repress the uprising. This explains why Mubarak did not, or could not, respond to the uprising with heavy arms and the uprising did not develop into severe civil conflict in Egypt.

6.3.2 Libya

There was an obvious contrast between Egypt and Libya in terms of international relations. As discussed earlier, Egypt heavily relied on foreign aid from the United States. Notably, Egypt was dependent on the United States for military assistance and other aspects of strategic cooperation (Zunes 2011).⁹² Egyptian elites, especially the military who played a major role in the overthrow of Mubarak's regime, did not want to lose their connection with the United States, and therefore, were reluctant to go against the United States' stand. On the other hand, Libya has not relied on any external powers. Except for a short period of time when Libya approached the Soviet Union for strategic reasons in the 1980s, Libya did not build any "patron-client" relationships with other countries. In fact, Libya had been internationally isolated for decades since the accusation of sponsoring terrorism and planting weapons of mass destruction. The country reappeared in the international community in 2003 when it normalized its diplomatic relationship with the Western countries.

⁹² Stephen Junes, "History of US-Libya Relations Indicates US Must Tread Carefully as Uprising Continues," February 24, 2011. <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/2:history-of-uslibya-relations-indicates-us-must-tread-carefully-as-uprising-continues> (accessed October 11, 2016).

In the early stage of statehood, Libya was one of the Pro-Western countries among Middle Eastern and North African countries. King Idris who became the head of the federal monarchy of Libya in 1951 maintained close ties with the Western powers rather than joining anti-Western and pan-Arabism in the 1950s (Alterman 2006). A friendly relationship with the West did not last long, however. After the military coup led by Colonel Gaddafi, who proclaimed anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, the relationship between Libya and the West, especially the United States, became strained. Libya declared neutrality in the superpower competition, condemning the United States as the leader of Western imperialism and capitalism (Metz 1987).

In 1970, as soon as he seized power, Gaddafi severed diplomatic relations with the West, including the United States by terminating the presence of foreign troops and foreign governments. The US Wheelus Air Force Base, which was built by the Italian airforce and captured by the British during World War II, near Tripoli was closed. It had been used by the US military since 1943.⁹³ Since it was the most overt symbol of the Western aggressive imperialist legacy, the Gaddafi regime's announcement of evacuating the Wheelus Air Force Base was a clear indication of the hostile posture of the new Libyan leader to the West (Ronen 2008, 10).

The relationship between the United States and Libya worsened during the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1979, the United States designated Libya a sponsor of terrorism. The two countries kept attacking each other's military personnel, aircrafts, and naval ships. In 1981, the President Ronald Reagan began taking actions against Libya, ordering the close of Libyan governmental offices and the freeze of Libyan assets in the United State as a

⁹³ <http://www.aljazeera.com/focus/2008/09/20089313243374690.html> (accessed October 11, 2016).

part of economic sanctions against Libya (Metz 1987). The tensions between the two peaked in 1986 when a Libyan terrorist group bombed a nightclub in West Berlin, which was frequented by United States service personnel.⁹⁴ Two people were killed and more than 200 people were injured. In response, President Reagan ordered attacks on Libyan military bases and residential areas of Tripoli and Benghazi. Gaddafi escaped injury, but dozens of people were killed, including Gaddafi's adopted daughter. In 1988, Libya was suspected of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in Scotland, killing 270 people including 180 US nationals. A series of bombings and terrorist attacks continued into the 1980s, and Libya's diplomatic relations with the United States was further damaged. Only modest commercial and economic ties maintained. The United States imposed more economic sanctions on Libya. On January 8 1986, the Reagan government froze the Libyan government's assets in US banks, including deposits held in foreign branches of the banks.⁹⁵ In addition to this, the administration ordered a total trade embargo with Libya that required all Americans living in Libya to leave the country.

Unlike Egypt, the Libyan leader did not succumb to US pressure. In his interview at the Babl el-Azzazir military barracks in Tripoli with the Western reporters in January 1986, Gaddafi criticized the US sanctions as "crazy and face-saving measures," and the decision was a "silly and emotional" response that would have no adverse effect on Libya. He also warned, "with regard to the American threat, there will be more cooperation between Libya and the Soviet Union." Using Cuba as an example, he added

⁹⁴ http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/april/5/newsid_4357000/4357255.stm (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁹⁵ <https://piie.com/publications/speeches-and-papers/case-78-8-and-92-12> (accessed October 11, 2016).

that his country could be transformed into a communist state if the United States continued to pose a threat.⁹⁶

In 1991, the United States and Britain officially announced that Libya was responsible for the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103. It was followed by a series of UN-imposed sanctions against Libya in 1992 and 1993. UN Security Council Resolution 748 on 31 March 1992 banned air travel and the supply of any aircraft to Libya, prohibited arms sales and technical advice or assistance to the country, and reduced the number and the level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts. UN Security Council Resolution 883 on 11 November 1993 froze Libya's overseas funds and financial resources, and banned sales or supplies of oil and oil projects. Together with UN-imposed sanctions, US Congress passed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) in 1996.⁹⁷ The bill was originally introduced to impose sanctions on Iran in 1995 in response to Iran's nuclear program and its support to terrorist organizations (Katzman 2006).⁹⁸ An amendment was added to the bill, which applied all the provisions of the bill to Libya. The sanctions banned investments in oil development and natural resources in Libya and the export of weapons or technology to Libya. The ILSA was renewed in 2001 for another five years. In sum, hostility between the two countries continued in the 1980s and it brought about a series of economic sanctions from the US-led international community as well as the United States' government against Libya.

⁹⁶ Judith Miller, "Qaddafi Says the Sanctions Could Turn Libya to Soviet," *The New York Times*, January 10, 1986. <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/01/10/world/qaddafi-says-the-sanctions-could-turn-libya-to-soviet.html> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁹⁷ <https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/3107/text/enr> (accessed October 11, 2016).

⁹⁸ <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66441.pdf> (accessed October 11, 2016).

Diplomatic relationships between the two countries were slowly restored in 2003 when Libya renounced terrorism and expressed its intention to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program. The Gaddafi regime accepted responsibility for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing of the Pan Am flight and agreed to pay compensation to the victims' families. Motives behind the regime's shift include both domestic and international factors. Domestically, Gaddafi needed foreign investments for its oil-based economy (Ronen 2008, 66). The rents of Libya's total natural resources (percent of GDP) dropped to 32.9 percent in 2000 and 30.3 percent in 2001.⁹⁹ In rential states like Libya, a heavy portion of state income is derived from natural resources. Decrease in total natural resources rent, therefore, would have brought about economic hardship to the country. In addition, since the ILSA prohibited US companies to invest in the Libyan oil industry, technological development was halted. The one way to break through the situation was to normalize the relationship with the United States so that sanctions could be lifted.

International events also affected changes in Gaddafi's stance. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world system was restructured around the United States. The Middle East was heavily influenced by the reshuffle in the world order since the region was the locus of intense U.S.-Soviet competition. Middle Eastern countries were divided into two groups under the two super powers: the pro-Soviet and the pro-United States. Gaddafi had advocated anti-imperialism and neutralism in his early days in power, but his regime became close to the Soviet Union during the 1970s and he received political and military support from the Soviet. The regime's hostility toward the United States and its antagonistic allies – Egypt and Sudan – made Libya more dependent on the Soviet Union

⁹⁹ The World Bank. Data available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?end=2015&locations=LY&start=2000&view=chart> (accessed October 11, 2016).

(Ronen 2008). The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the diplomatic isolation of Gaddafi's regime. It required Gaddafi to find a way to survive in a changed international circumstance, and he chose to normalize his relationship with the West. Another key event that affected Gaddafi regime's shift was the 2003 Iraq War. The world witnessed how Saddam Hussein's regime was toppled by the Western powers. Since the United States had the rationale to oust Gaddafi's regime as it had for Iraq, Gaddafi would have feared that same thing could happen to his regime. Renouncing terrorism and disclosing and dismantling weapons of mass destruction program was only way to remove the United States' rationale for military actions against Libya. In response, the United States resumed full diplomatic relations with Libya on May 31, 2006.¹⁰⁰

Dynamics in the diplomatic history between the United States and Libya shows how Gaddafi's regime strategically behaved for its survival in an ever-changing international environment. Although sanctions imposed by the United Nations and the United States brought Libya economic hardship for some time and led Gaddafi's regime to shift its stance toward the West, it does not mean that Libya was economically, militarily, or politically dependent on the United States as Egypt. At the time of the 2011 uprising, Libya and the United States were more or less equal in their bilateral relationship. On 20 May 2010, the two countries signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement at Tripoli. Expanding commercial relations with Libya was beneficial not only to Libya but also to the United States due to Libya's abundant oil and gas reserves. US oil companies welcomed this step. The United States gained strategic benefits as well. A successful transformation of Libya from an adversary state to a partner would have been a useful precedent in the international community (Mack

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5425.htm> (accessed October 11, 2016).

2011)¹⁰¹. As Gaddafi learnt from the fall of Saddam Hussein, the United States can expect that leaders in remaining hostile states, such as Kim Jong Un of North Korea, have lessons from the Libyan case.

In conclusion, Gaddafi's Libya and Mubarak's Egypt were situated in different diplomatic circumstances. Economic and political support from the United States had been essential to Egypt. Thus, when the Obama administration officially urged not to suppress the 2011 movement, it would not have been easy for Mubarak and his regime to challenge the United States. On the other hand, bilateral relations between Libya and the United States were on equal terms. A "patron-client relationship" was not established between the two, and therefore, Gaddafi and Libyan elites would not need to consider the United States' standpoint on an internal issue. As soon as the uprising occurred, Gaddafi moved quickly and suppressed the rebel side. The demonstration escalated into a full-scale war, which lasted for six months.

6.4 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I have analyzed the two Arab movements that occurred in Egypt and Libya during the 2011 Arab Spring by applying the key findings delineated from the Iraqi-Kurdish conflict cases. The analysis shows that a theory based on the Three Dimensionality Model of state security – domestic, regional, and international dimensions – can explain the differences between the Egypt uprising and the Libyan armed conflict. In terms of the domestic dimension, there was a difference in the extent of the ruling regime's power and stability in domestic politics. Although both regimes

¹⁰¹ <http://www.mei.edu/content/us-and-libya-normalization-stormy-relationship> (accessed October 11, 2016).

were regarded as authoritarian regimes, Gaddafi enjoyed a higher level of absolute power and stability in domestic politics than Mubarak's regime. Regionally, although Egypt and Israel have been traditional rivals of each other, there was a very low possibility that Israel may intervene in the 2011 events in Egypt. In contrast, Libya and Sudan were in an active rivalry relationship at the time of the 2011 uprising. In terms of the international dimension, while Egypt was clearly in a "patron-client relationship" with the United States, Libya's relationship with the United States was on equal terms. I argued that these differences led the two regimes to make different choices in the face of uprising, resulting in contrasting outcomes.

Illuminating the Arab Spring in terms of the Three Dimensionality Model of state security provides us another way of understanding the phenomenon. Since these events occurred, scholars and policy makers have been trying to explain them in various ways. However, most studies limit their scope of analysis to the domestic circumstances of the country and only explain why people rebel against the government. By looking at both the internal and external environments and their influence on the security policy decisions of the regimes, this research contributes to a cumulation of understanding about the development of internal violence. I will develop this discussion more fully in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

7.1 FINDINGS

The primary objective of this research was to explore the dynamics in the development of civil conflict. Specifically, I tried to explain the reasons for the occurrence of full-scale domestic armed conflicts and the variation in the intensity of that conflict. Given that a large portion of the previous studies in the field have taken the rebel-centric and aggregate cross-country approaches, this research has focused on the state side and how the internal-external environments within which the ruling regime is situated affect its security decisions on rebellion. The main argument of this research is that the occurrence of severe civil conflict depends on how ruling governments respond to rebellion. In the face of rebellion, a ruling regime has to make a decision whether it crushes the rebels or compromises with them based on the consideration of its internal and external dimensions of state security.

In order to conduct a systematic analysis, I built a theoretical framework in chapter three – the Three Dimensionality Model of state security. Based on Most and Starr's willingness and opportunity framework, I pointed out the importance of exploring both capabilities and environmental factors in studying the governments' decision in the face of rebellion. Next, I explained the usefulness of the concept of security to shed light on the phenomena of civil conflicts. I moved on to emphasize the importance of historical

factors in creating opportunities for the occurrence of conflicts. Then I discussed the Three Dimensionality Model of state security with its domestic, regional, and international dimensions, and how these three dimensions influence the ruling regime's decision between compromise and repression. I argued that when the ruling regime enjoys a strong power status in domestic politics, gets involved in intense rival relationships with a neighboring state, and has patron-client relationships with a superpower country, they are more likely to suppress a rebel group. Specifically, I first argued that a high level of stability in domestic politics and regime's power status tends to lead the ruling regime to suppress rebellion rather than make a compromise. In terms of a regional dimension, I insisted that governments are more likely to suppress the insurgents when it finds that domestic instability invites the intervention from neighboring rival states. Lastly, I emphasized the role of patron-client relationships between the state and superpower. I argued that the high dependency on the superpower increases the likelihood that the government follows the patron state's stance on internal affairs.

In chapter five, I analyzed the set of Iraqi-Kurdish conflicts by applying the theory developed in the previous chapter. The comparative case analyses supported the idea that the state's security decisions made on the basis of its opportunity direct the course of conflict development. Specifically, the cases showed that while Iraq's colonial experience and military capacity created "opportunity" for internal instability and the occurrence of conflict after Iraq's independence, it was the changes in domestic, regional, and international security circumstances that brought about variations in conflict onset and variation in the intensity of conflict. When domestic politics were stable and the Iraqi

ruling regime enjoyed an absolute power status, the rival relationship with Iran was more hostile, and the ruling regime relied less on superpowers, the regime did not accommodate the Kurdish rebels and repressed them more severely, resulting in intense conflicts.

In chapter six, I applied the key findings from the Iraqi-Kurdish cases to the 2011 Egyptian uprising and the 2011 Libyan civil conflict. I found that although both Mubarak's regime and Gaddafi's regime were widely considered as strong and enduring authoritarian regimes, they were situated in different internal-external circumstances at the time of the Arab uprising. Gaddafi enjoyed a higher level of absolute power than Mubarak who lost support from both the elites and Egyptian public. Regionally, Egypt's rival relationship with Israel was more or less stable and inactive whereas Libya was still in an intense rivalry relationship with Sudan. Internationally, Egypt heavily relied on the United States who was officially pressing Mubarak to resign and settle the protest peacefully. In contrast, Libya did not engage in any clear patron-client relationships with other countries. The chapter argued that these differences influenced the two regimes to make different choices in handling the 2011 movements. While Mubarak made several concessions and finally resigned, Gaddafi harshly repressed the protestors from the beginning, which resulted in a full-scale conflict. Table 7.1 summarizes the findings across the five cases for each aspect of the theoretical model of this research.

7.2 IMPLICATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS

Throughout this research, I took a systematic and empirical approach to analyze the variations in onset and severity of civil conflict, conducting a set of comparative case studies. The findings supported my arguments, reflecting the

Table 7.1 Summary of Findings

Cases	Three Dimensions of State Security		Outcomes
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict 1 st Phase	Domestic	Domestic politics was unstable and power status of the ruling regimes was weak due to reoccurring military coup d'état	Confrontation often ended with stalemate or compromise; Low or intermediate level of conflicts persisted
	Regional	Iranian aid to the Kurdish rebellion was limited, and the intervention from Iran was minimal	
	International	Iraq's political, economic, and military dependency on the Soviet Union was high; The Soviet Union opposed military action against the Kurds and supported Kurdish autonomy	
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict 2 nd Phase	Domestic	The mixture of consolidation of the Baath Party's authority and the emergence of a strong leader, Saddam Hussein	The number of casualties was much higher than the first phase in a short period of time; The regime quickly defeated the Kurds
	Regional	Iraqi-Iranian rivalry became manifested; Iran evidently provided military and financial aid to the Kurds	
	International	Iraq's dependency on the Soviet Union was reduced	
Iraqi-Kurdish Conflict 3 rd Phase	Domestic	Domestic politics was stable as Saddam Hussein consolidated his power as a leader	The most intense conflicts between Iraqi government and the Kurds; The Iraqi regime brutally repressed the Kurds
	Regional	Regional competition between Iraq and Iran became intense after the 1979 Iranian Revolution; The Iran-Iraq War was the climax of rivalry between the two	
	International	The influence of the Soviet Union was rapidly reduced	

Egyptian Uprising	Domestic	The power status of President Mubarak was weak due to the absence of supporting group, his attempt to turn over presidency to his son, and the existence of strong oppositionists	President Mubarak made several concessions, and finally resigned
	Regional	The rival relationship between Egypt and Israel was stable and inactive; Both countries wanted to maintain the status quo	
	International	Egypt's political, economic, and military dependency on the U.S. was extremely high; The U.S. officially urged President Mubarak to resign without any violence	
Libyan Civil Conflict	Domestic	Gaddafi enjoyed absolute power as a leader	President Gaddafi immediately took military actions and the demonstration evolved into civil conflict
	Regional	Libya and Sudan were in an active rivalry relationship at the time of the 2011 uprising	
	International	Libya did not rely on superpowers; Bilateral relations between Libya and the U.S. were on equal terms	

explanatory utility of the Three Dimensionality Model of state security. By shedding light on the role of governments and the factors that influence their security decisions regarding internal opposition groups, this research fills a gap in the literature, which mainly has taken a rebel-centric and aggregate cross-country approaches. Specifically, the results demonstrated that it was the states' response to rebellion that made a difference in conflict occurrence and severity. The findings also suggest that explaining conflict phenomena only by the countries' aggregate attributes misses the influence of the dynamics of internal and external political change on the states' decision in the face of

rebellion. In this sense, this research helps to provide a more *comprehensive* view of the development of civil conflict and understanding the dynamics of such conflict.

In addition, this study attempted to reconcile theories of two sub-fields in the discipline of political science, IR and CP. Although civil conflict studies have drawn the attention of IR scholars for more than twenty years, there has been a lack of collaboration with the field of CP, in which political violence has been one of the major sub-fields and in which a number of insightful theories of civil violence have been developed. While research in international relations has sought to develop general explanations for trends in civil conflict worldwide through large-N empirical analyses, the CP literature has provided a more in-depth understanding on the origins and processes of civil conflict in specific countries based on case study research. Synthesizing the studies in the two sub-fields enabled me not only to develop the Three Dimensionality Model of state security but also to contribute to the “integrative cumulation (Zinnes 1976a)” of our knowledge on civil conflict (as cited in Most and Starr 1989, 1).

This study is also of value to policymakers in a sense that the findings provide clues about bringing peace to countries that suffer from bloody civil conflicts. In particular, I found that external pressure could effectively lead incumbent regimes to take a more peaceful path in dealing with internal opposition. This implies that not only superpowers but also the international community can affect decisions of the incumbent regimes. Armed conflicts always involve human rights issues. For instance, a military assault on civilians and displaced refugees are major issues in most internal conflicts. The international community has made an effort to prevent the occurrence of such events. As members of the global community, states cannot be free from the operations of

international norms and pressure. Especially when a state receives aid from the international community, it will be more difficult for it to escape from international pressure. The internationalization of a state's domestic conflict may be a way to solve the problem more peacefully. The influence of the international community might be relatively less powerful than the impact of a superpowers' direct interference. Yet, it can warn the state regarding inhumane actions against their populations and impose limitations on the state's violent behavior by regulating international aid.

7.3 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

There are several directions for future study. One way to elaborate the theory developed in this research is to develop it into a typological theory using the three dimensions of state security and conflict. The logic behind typological theorizing is that different combinations of variables are assumed to have effects on an outcome that vary across types (Gerring 2007, 98). "Types" are specified conjunctions or configurations of the variables (George and Bennett 2005, 235). For instance, I can start with classifying different domestic, regional, and international dimensions according to the level of political stability, hostility between rival states, and reliance on external support respectively. Then, I would set out conjunctions based on the classification that lead to the typology, and see how different types of state security situations are related to conflict onset and development. This new information can be used to construct a large-N data set.

The second related endeavor is to conduct a large-N statistical analysis by constructing a new data set or using existing data sets. Domestic instability could be operationalized as the levels of legitimacy and state fragility, which allows me to use existing data sets. Regional competition and intervention could be measured as the levels

of rivalry relationships and foreign support flow to rebel groups.¹⁰² International influence could be measured as the level of state reliance on foreign aid.

Third, I can develop the discussion on the influence of colonization further. To do so, I can investigate the different colonial background conditions of the states in the case studies, either to help with creating typology, or as a variable in designing a possible large-N study.

Third, I can utilize a formal model. Formal modeling is particularly useful when one studies political behavior and political processes. Therefore, constructing a formal model to analyze a leaders' decision between suppression and accommodation will enhance the theory's explanatory power further.

Fourth, although the main focus of the present research is the state government, I can expand the scope of the research to the rebel side by examining the influence of insurgent group's goals on state decision. For instance, I can measure the goals of an insurgent group as 1) removing incumbents; 2) creating an independent state; 3) reforming the state, and then see how the incumbent regimes respond differently depending on the rebel's goals. In this way, I can construct a more comprehensive model to explain a state's decisions in the face of internal armed conflict.

Fifth, I can conduct additional case studies. One possible new case could be the post-Gulf War Iraqi-Kurdish conflict. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the war with an international coalition of forces changed Iraq's internal and external political environment completely. Strong criticism from Arab countries and international

¹⁰² The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database contains information on all transfers of major conventional weapons from 1950 to the most recent full calendar year. The database provides information on arms transfers not only between countries but also between a country and a rebel group.

opposition to the invasion weakened not only the international status of Iraq but also Saddam Hussein's domestic power status. Under different environment, economic, and political hardships, followed by the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein's regime may have made different policy decisions toward the Kurds. The Iraqi-Kurdish case studies could be re-done to incorporate the Shi'i uprising in Iraq as well, either as separate case studies or as additions to the existing ones. It is also possible to break down the Egyptian and Libyan cases by different time periods. Conducting additional case studies can be a good way to increase the validity and reliability of the theoretical argument of this research.

Lastly, I can apply the theory to the other Arab countries that have experienced the Arab Spring, and see how well the theory explains the other cases. For instance, based on the findings supporting the Three Dimensionality Model and stressing both commonalities and differences, it might be useful to analyze the Syrian civil conflict. The Arab Spring is an ongoing event and the results of uprising vary considerably. Diversity in the course of conflict and the outcomes in each country allows me to examine the usefulness of the model developed here and which dimension of state security is more influential. In this way, I can make stronger analytic generalization for the theory behind the Three Dimensionality Model of state security and armed conflict.

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