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**Discursive Strategies Used by Political Parties
in the Bahraini Council of Representatives:**

**A critical discourse analysis of
religious ideologies in politic language**

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PhD in Linguistics

The University of Edinburgh

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Signed declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has been composed by me and that the work is my own. This work has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signed

Lamya Alkooheji

12 February 2013

All our words are but crumbs that fall down from the feast of the mind.

Kahlil Gibran, *Sand and Foam*

Dedication

To those to whom this accomplishment mattered most

and made so proud,

my parents,

Abdalmajeed Alkooheji and Fatima Alawadhi

and my husband, Eyad Rafei.

And

To those whom this journey puzzled most,

who yet made it worthwhile,

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Prophet Mohammed

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Abstract

This study attempts to present the relations between discourse and ideology in debates taking place in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. It uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) and the Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) to ground the theoretical claims in the idea that Shiite members of parliament (MPs) in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ discursive strategies differently from Sunni MPs. To test this hypothesis, the research aims first to observe whether, and if so how, the Sunni parties and the Shiite party employ discursive devices and strategies differently to achieve three ideological goals: attempting to gain political advantage discursively in parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control and political freedom; manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in the contexts of dissent control and political rights; and manipulating the law to support one's party's and/or sectarian affiliation's ideological stances about dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom and political rights. The second aim of the research is to explore whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain.

The research critically analyses excerpts on dissent control and personal freedom from the Hansard of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. The research first marks discursive devices used by MPs. It then identifies discursive strategies.

The research detects three major discursive strategies that are fulfilled by using the devices and called them 'corroborating by information'; 'intensifying grievance'; and 'centralising pride and dignity'. The analysis shows that some discursive devices are used more intensively, though not exclusively, under certain strategies. The research also notes that the Shiite party, Al Wefaq, employs the strategy of intensifying grievance more often than other strategies. The Al Wefaq members demonstrate more tendency toward objecting than do the other parties to the dissent control in Bahrain. The research relates this tendency to the ideologies of Shi'ism as a religious and political institution that heavily relies on the ideology of protest and the feeling of injustice and discrimination. Finally, the research provides a preview of the use of identified strategies during the unrest that started in Bahrain in February 2011.

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Transliteration System

In this research, the transliteration (or Romanisation) system I follow is that of the American Library Associations-Library of Congress (ALA-LC). Below are the letters used in the Romanization of Arabic (Barry 1997:10–11):¹

a. Consonants

Initial	Medial	Final	Alone	Romanization
ا	ل	ل	ا	omit (see Note 1)
ب	ب	ب	ب	b
ت	ت	ت	ت	t
ث	ث	ث	ث	th
ج	ج	ج	ج	j
ح	ح	ح	ح	h
خ	خ	خ	خ	kh
د	د	د	د	d
ذ	ذ	ذ	ذ	dh
ر	ر	ر	ر	r
ز	ز	ز	ز	z
س	س	س	س	s
ش	ش	ش	ش	sh
ص	ص	ص	ص	ṣ
ض	ض	ض	ض	ḍ
ط	ط	ط	ط	ṭ
ظ	ظ	ظ	ظ	ẓ
ع	ع	ع	ع	‘ (ayn)
غ	غ	غ	غ	gh
ف	ف	ف	ف	f
ق	ق	ق	ق	q
ك	ك	ك	ك	k
ل	ل	ل	ل	l
م	م	م	م	m
ن	ن	ن	ن	n
ه	ه	ه ، ة	ه ، ة	h (see Note 2)
و	و	و	و	w
ي	ي	ي	ي	y

b. Vowels and diphthongs

اَ	a	اَ	ā	اِي	ī
اُ	u	اِي	á	اَوْ	aw
اِ	i	اُو	ū	اَي	ay

One change I make in my transliteration is that I use the same symbol ā for both ā and á since they are pronounced exactly in the same way.

c. Letters representing non-Arabic consonants

گ	g	چ	ch	ق	v
ک	g	ج	zh	ڤ	v
پ	p	ژ	zh	ڤ	v

Notes

1. For the use of *alif* to support *hamzah*, it is simply omitted.
2. *ṣ tā' marbūṭah* in the construct state is Romanised.
3. To avoid complexity, I do not transliterate proper names of people or places as I will be using them a lot in my research and will simply spell them as they are usually spelled in English by local users.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Statement of the Problem

The Parliamentary members of the Bahraini Council of Representatives, which was established in 2002, are either affiliated to political parties or independent members. In the second legislative period in 2006, the three political parties that secured seats in the Council were Al Wefaq, Al Minbar and Al Asalah, the former being a Shiite party and the latter two Sunnis, something that strongly characterises the Bahraini Council of Representatives as a field of sectarian ideological struggle. This ideological struggle over power is represented most perceptibly in language through debates, newspaper reports and releases, interviews, public lectures and so on. This research is interested in exploring the discursive strategies employed by the different political parties in the Bahraini Council of Representatives in their ideological struggle over power specifically in political debates held in the parliament.

There are several reasons why the Bahraini Council of Representatives makes a particularly interesting topic of study. The elections for the first parliamentary legislative session in Bahrain in 2002 faced a call for a boycott by four parties: the Al Wefaq, Amal, Wa'ad, and the National Democratic Action Society. Both the Al Wefaq Party and the 'Amal (Islamic Action Society) Party are Shiite parties;² Wa'ad is the National Democratic Action Society with socialist and Arab nationalist orientations; and the

Nationalist Democratic Rally Society is attached to the Iraqi Ba'ath party. This boycott allowed Al Minbar and Al Asalah, both Sunni political parties, to dominate the parliament, leaving few seats for other independent candidates. However, with the Shiite political parties joining the elections in 2006, the second legislative session witnessed a furious competition for seats. Out of a total of forty seats, the Al Wefaq party, the Shiite party, won 17 seats, whereas the Al Minbar Party and the Al Asalah Party, the Sunni parties, won seven and eight seats respectively, leaving only five seats for two other blocs and three for independent candidates (see Table 1).

Table 1: Seats in the Bahraini Council in the 2nd Legislative

	Political Party	Distribution of Seats	
		Number	Percentage
a.	Sunni Parties	15	37
	Al Minbar	7	
	Al Asalah	8	
b.	Shiite Parties	17	43³
	Al Wefaq		
c.	Other secular parties	5	12
	Wa'ad	1	
	Future Block	4	
d.	Independents	3	8
	Total	40	100

The domination of Islamic parties in all legislative sessions was expected in Bahrain. The second legislative period (2006-2010) in particular has been very much characterised by sectarian division. Bahrain is the only Arab

country with such a strongly explicit diverse presence of sectarian blocs in the parliament, to the extent that their presence exceeds the presence of any other type of assemblage (i.e. 32 seats for three Islamic parties to 8 for all others), something that gives the sectarian division a prominent and explicit political existence that cannot be overlooked. Securing a place in the parliament has given the winning Islamic political parties more 'perceptibility', more capacity and more credence, or, in other words, they have gained more 'ideological power'.

One major point that is taken in this research is that discourse is important. That is because in order to convey their aims to the public and to listen to the public's demands, opinions and complaints, the MPs make contact with the public through various means: their individual surgeries, mail correspondence, emails and blogs, the radio and the television, local public speeches, informal gatherings, participating in programmes and activities, etc. All these involve discourse as the 'conveyer' of the message, or, in other words, the ideology. Each of these has different social, political and ritual settings and consequently, has different ideological settings and different reciprocal power relations and representations. For example, when speaking in parliament, the MPs are supposed to address the Speaker of the Council in discussion and debate and not other MPs. However, these sittings are reported to the public in various ways: almost all are broadcast live on the local radio station, a summary of the sessions is broadcast on national television, and a large part is reported to the public in local newspapers by

journalists who attend the general debates. Bayley and Vicente maintain that although ‘parliaments constitute closed and elite discourse communities ... politics does not take place in a void and it can thus be presumed that Members of Parliaments (MPs) are aware of speaking to a wider audience than that of their peers’ (2004: 237). Since their membership in the parliament is dependent on ‘public consensus’, the MPs are likely to pay particular attention to what they say (ibid.). This gives the sittings an important role as a way of delivering the group ideology to the public and as an opportunity for the public to make judgments about MPs and groups.

A second point the research takes is that Bahrain is a special case for studying discourse. In other Arab countries where sectarian divisions are reflected in the political parties, there is a greater division into smaller groups, each of which is better defined by its political vision rather than by sectarianism. In Lebanon, for example, the religious divide is very strong, but the party that won the largest number of seats in the 2009 elections, the Future Party, won a total of only 26 out of 128 seats. This is only just above 20% of the seats, something that so far has made it impossible for a single party to be dominant. Additionally, many of the political parties in Lebanon have members from different religious affiliations, although some affiliations are more prominent in certain parties. In the current Bahraini political parties, on the other hand, the three dominating parties have a distinct and exclusive sectarian affiliation. A third important difference is that the Lebanese Parliament has an assigned quota for the number of members from

each religious affiliations. Table 2 shows how representation is distributed in the current Lebanese Parliament according to the Taif Agreement signed in 1989.

Table 2: Lebanese Parliament Seat Allocation

Confession	No. seats
Maronite	34
Greek Orthodox	14
Greek Catholic	8
Armenian Orthodox	5
Armenian Catholic	1
Protestant	1
Other Christians	1
Total Christians	64
Sunni	27
Shiite	27
Druze	8
Alawite	2
Total Muslims	64
Total	128

(from Parliament of Lebanon 2002).

In contrast, there is no such arrangement in the Bahraini Council of Representatives and the candidate for each electoral district depends on winning votes. This makes competition fiercer and gives elections a stronger ideological significance, as there are no guaranteed seats for any sect or affiliation.

In this research, as the data demonstrate, the Council faces a difficulty in reaching an agreement about defining and specifying when an act or law

is constraining political freedom and when it is actually controlling dissent. This makes the problem the research is addressing an activity of a social nature as it is further elaborated under the third stage of the analytical framework explained in Section 3.10.2.

1.2 Research Hypothesis

The overt and strong sectarian construct of the Bahraini Council of Representatives makes it a scene of a strong sectarian divide, and, accordingly, of ideological divide and struggle. Motivated by my interest in the ideological struggle over power that is conveyed through language in the debates of the Bahraini Council of Representatives, I employ textual analysis to explore if there are discursive strategies in which different discursive devices (such as rhetoric, emotive speech, framing and reframing, avoiding answering questions, etc.) are used in debates in the Bahraini Council of Representatives.

Thus, this research hypothesises *that the Shiite MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs*. If the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates, then this indicates that a speaker's political and religious affiliation will affect his or her discursive choice strategies. The research hypothesis is based on the assumption that the structure of the Bahraini Council of Representatives reflects the social, ethnic and religious groupings existing in the country.

The hypothesis is also based on the fact that social, ethnic and religious construction in the Bahraini community is noticeably diverse (see Section 2.3). This is because previous research shows how such social and ethnic groupings have a strong tendency to be reflected or performed in linguistic and discursive differences (see Section 2.2.1).

1.3 Research Objectives

Noticing that debates and arguments over dissent control and political freedom repeatedly created a point of sharp division between the stances of the Sunni parties on the one hand and the Shiite party on the other hand in the parliamentary sittings, I chose to test the hypothesis above using excerpts on this topic from the official transcriptions, i.e. Hansard, of sittings at the Council of Representatives as the source of my main data to reach the following aims:

a. observing whether, and if so how, the Sunni parties and the Shiite party employ discursive devices and strategies to achieve the following ideological goals:

- attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control law and political freedom.
- manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in the contexts of dissent control law and political rights.

- manipulating the law to support one's party's ideological stances about dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom and political rights.

I then used the findings of the goal above to take a further step and perform a critical reading of ideologies by:

b. exploring whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain.

1.4 *Scope of the Study*

To set boundaries for the processes of collecting and analysing data, among different political discourses, I focused on one genre only: the political debates held in the Council of Representatives. I also limit my research to excerpts from the second legislative period in the Council of Representatives from the beginning of December 2007 until the end of April 2010. The excerpts taken from Hansard are on the topic of dissent control in relation to political freedom and human rights. This was, interestingly, the legislative period when the strongest sectarian divide was present, as the first legislative period was boycotted by the Shiite parties and thus was dominated by Sunni parties.⁴

Another boundary I set is whose intervention to analyse, as I only present a critical discourse analysis of the interventions of MPs in these

excerpts. I thus leave out any other interventions, i.e. those by ministers and other government representatives, after briefly mentioning the content.

1.5 Significance of the Study

There has been no thorough academic research on either the language of the Bahraini Council of Representatives or political language in Bahrain. Work on linguistics in Bahrain has often refrained from discussing politics and has mostly been directed towards in-class English language teaching and learning issues, language acquisition, and language usage in social contexts or in the newspapers or printed materials. It is hoped that this research, by providing an in-depth analysis, will provide information that could be the basis for further academic research on political language in Bahrain.

Providing such an analysis will be of great significance because the parliament is a relatively new experience in the democratic practice in Bahrain. In addition, the explicit sectarian-based division of dominant political parties and the absence of an allocated number of seats for each (as explained above in 1.1) are features that make the Bahraini Council of Representatives a very interesting subject of ideology studies and religious identities in general, something of which the sociolinguistic perspective in particular forms an important aspect.

Another further significance of this study can be understood from Sacks's *order at all points*' view; Emanuel Schegloff (1992: xlvi) explains that order is not 'present only at aggregate levels,' but 'in detail on a case by

case, environment by environment basis', which subsequently means that a culture does not only have an overall presence but is found at detailed levels of a culture (ibid.). Accordingly, a study of the parliamentary sittings, as a level of the Bahraini political culture, should reflect and manifest the political and religious tendencies in Bahrain while maintaining its individuality as a study of a certain topic in a certain context.

1.6 Definitions of Key Terms

1. Text and discourse: the two terms 'text' and 'discourse' are used distinctively. I use the term 'text' to refer to written excerpts, whether they are complete linguistic units or smaller but comprehensive parts of linguistic units. 'Discourse' is, thus, 'the whole process of social interaction of which text is just a part' (Fairclough 1989: 24).
Understood in this way, a discourse covers excerpts (i.e. texts), the process of producing and interpreting them, relevant information about events and interlocutors and their relations, and any relevant background information about incentives, events or other texts that can be linked to the text being analysed.
2. Ideology: in this thesis, the term 'ideology' is used to mean 'a set of political beliefs about how society ought to be and how to improve it, irrespective of whether those ideas are true or false or good or bad' (Adams 2001: 2).

3. Context: I follow van Dijk's definition of context in limiting it to 'those properties of the *communicative* situation that are *relevant*' for the production or the understanding of discourse (2009b: 4, emphasis in original).
4. Islamic and Islamist: I use the adjective 'Islamic' to describe any person, movement or matter related to Islam and Muslims. Unless quoting directly, I do not use the adjective 'Islamist' because of its negative connotations, often being associated with fundamentalism.⁵
5. The terms 'Council of Representatives', 'Parliament', 'House of Commons', 'Lower House', 'House', and 'Council' are used interchangeably. In the same way, the term 'representative' is used interchangeably with 'a member of parliament' and its abbreviation 'MP'.
6. I use the term 'Bahrain dialects' as the general term to cover all local Arabic dialects in Bahrain, which are divided into two major groups: the Bahrani dialect and the Bahraini dialect. I realise that having the two terms, 'Bahraini' and 'Bahrani', distinguished by one letter, is potentially confusing, but these are the local terms used in Bahrain. Some research refers to the first as the Shiite (or Shi'a) Bahrani and to the second as the Sunni Arabic, but unless I am quoting others, I do not use the latter terms because of their inaccuracy, as the dialects are

originally related more to ethnicity than to sectarian affiliation, as is explained in Section 2.2.4.

7. Excerpt and Extract: I use the two terms ‘excerpt’ and ‘extract’ differently to facilitate realising what I am referring to. I use ‘excerpt’ to refer to the full portion I cite from Hansard as a complete intervention and ‘extract’ to refer parts of the excerpts. I provide the complete excerpts in the appendix and use extracts from them to refer to precise discussed instances within an excerpt.

1.7 Acronyms used in the research

Some of the major abbreviations that are used in this research are the following:

1. BHD: Bahrain dialect, a term to cover both Bahrani and Bahraini dialects used by Bahraini people.⁶
2. MP: Member of Parliament.
3. CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis.
4. SCA: Sociocognitive Approach.

1.8 *Layout of Research*

This research is based in the field of sociolinguistics and employs analysis of discourse as a tool and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a perspective to achieve its goals through a sociocognitive approach (SCA).

In the next chapter, I provide a background that aims at contextualising the complex topic of the political language of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. In order to do so, Chapter 2 first highlights the role of politics in Islam and sketches the sectarian division between Sunnis and Shiites in the field of politics. It then examines the social, sectarian and ethnic composition of Bahraini society. After that, it sheds light on the topics of identity and power, and shows how they are entwined and how they interact with language and religion. The chapter briefly discusses the subject of emotions and their role in discourse, and then presents the discursive strategies that are observed and considered in the analysis of the research data. Finally, the chapter presents the discursive devices and explains the difference and relationship between devices and strategies.

In Chapter 3, on the methodology of the research, I illustrate the features and objectives of CDA and SCA to show how they are appropriate to address the objectives of the research in order to test the hypothesis. I also explain the procedure of collecting data from Hansard of the second legislative period of the Bahraini Council of Representatives and why I chose political rights and freedom and dissent-controlling laws, topics which were raised extensively in that legislative period, as the theme I traced in Hansard

to analyse in this research. I also explain my selection and use of newspaper articles which are directly related to the analysed excerpts to provide a context for the excerpts.

Chapter 4 is the heart of this research. The collected data are analysed in the light of the background information and according to the procedure explained in the methodology chapter. The analysis is based on illustrating the discursive devices employed to demonstrate how these devices work together to fulfil discursive strategies. I also use synchronous newspaper reports and press releases on the topics of relevant Hansard excerpts to create a more contextualised and intertextual analysis. In the analysis, I take note of the language usage and the strategies employed in each excerpt and I look for any significant evidence of struggle over power and of religious identity and ideology. Collected data are then analysed against theories of power and identity in the light of CDA and SCA. In the process of analysing the ideological struggle over power, I found three major discursive strategies: corroborating by information, intensifying grievance, and centralising pride and dignity.

Chapter 5, entitled Readings into Ideology, is a second level of analysis. At this level, I aim to show any correlations that can be found to relate the different elements of my hypothesis – sectarian affiliation and choice of strategies – so that I can test the research hypothesis. In order to achieve this, I discuss how the findings presented in Chapter 4 relate to the concept of group versus individual identity, ideology and struggle over

power, particularly that of Al Wefaq, whose MPs' interventions in the chosen extracts happen to be more numerous than those of Sunni MPs. I discuss how this supports or refutes the research hypothesis. At the end of this chapter, I briefly illustrate how the findings of the research correlate with the recent upheavals in Bahrain, which started in February 2011.

The last chapter summarises the research and its major findings and draws conclusions from the analysis. It makes some suggestions for further work in this field and in relation to the topic of this research.

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND OF STUDY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter sheds light on five aspects that together to form the basis for understanding and analysing the data in hand in order to test the research hypothesis. Since the politics in Bahrain has taken a clear sectarian turn and divide, the chapter begins with description of politics in Islam, followed by a section presenting Bahrain as a scene of political struggle over power, introducing the ethnic, linguistic, social and political structures in Bahrain. The third section discusses the notions of power and explains how identity interplays with it. Then, attention is given to emotions and their role in discourse. Finally, this chapter presents the discursive devices that are identified in the analysis in order to establish and detect the major discursive strategies followed by participating MPs in the examined data.

2.2 Political Islam and Politics in Islam

2.2.1 Language and religion, sects and ideologies

Carrasco and Riegelhaupt maintain that in many cultures, language and religion are inseparable, something which makes religion an essential element in discussing the sociology of language (2006: 259). Explaining how linguistics and religion meet, Wolf (2006: 42) maintains that ‘religion as a cult ... , i.e. the social practices built upon religious beliefs, involve language to a considerable degree. To that extent, these beliefs and practices are open

to (linguistic) analysis.’ He also points out that ‘lexical frequency is indicative of socio-cultural patterns’ (ibid.: 43). Joseph explains that:

[f]or any given language, there is not just a single cultural tradition it represents, but several, in some cases many, including perhaps religious ones, legal ones, ones formed for purposes of teaching and learning, logical or philosophical ones, and ones formed by modern linguists of various theoretical leanings (2004: 35).

In Bahrain, as in many other Muslim communities in general and Arab ones in particular, religiously-loaded phrases and expressions are very common, even more so in spoken than in written language, and most of them have become phatic expressions. As Rosowsky notes, the Qur’an’s language ‘has entered common parlance’ in the Arabic-speaking world (2006: 313).

2.2.2 Key issues in the construction of politics in Islam

There are four key issues in the theoretical foundation of Islamic ideology that directly affect its relation with politics. These key issues can be summarised in the following points: First, to most Muslims, Islam presents a total ideology, as ‘a belief and law (*‘aqida wa shari’a*), religion and state (*din wa dawla*)’ and a system of values for spiritual and temporal affairs (*din wa dunya*)’ (Merad 1981: 38). This belief makes consulting and referring to Islamic principles and legislations an expected move among politicians and parties with religious and sectarian affiliations.

The second key issue forming ideology in Islam is that the Qur'an, which is believed by Muslims to be the revelation of God/Allah to His Prophet Mohammed, and the *Hadith*, the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed (or *Sunnah*, to cover the sayings *and* actions of the Prophet Mohammed), who is believed to be the last prophet sent by God to mankind, are the two major sources agreed upon by Muslim movements and ideologies including contemporary ones. The Qur'an has a single version used and read throughout the world and is cover-to-cover accepted in Islam to be the Word of God. As for the *Hadith*, the available collections are categorised, following strict criteria, in authenticity-level groups ranging from the strongest and most fully accepted to the weakest and even the rejected ones.

The third and fourth points are very crucial to this research. It can be noted how they manifest in discursive choices made in political language of sectarian affiliations. The third key point is that there is a major political division between Sunni and Shiite,⁷ the two major sects in Islam, on the matter of authority and leadership, something which is at the core of the Sunni-Shiite conflict. Sunnis believe that the Prophet Mohammed died without naming a successor, leaving it to be decided amongst Muslims themselves. Under the Sunni doctrine, leadership (*imāmah*) is possible for any Muslim with religious and leadership qualities. Shiites, on the other hand, believe that the Prophet Mohammed *did* name a successor, his cousin Ali bin Abi Talib, and that the other companions of the prophet betrayed his will after his death and assigned Abu Bakr Al Siddiq as leader. Sunnis

believe that Ali bin Abi Talib did not seek to become the first Caliph after the death of Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) and that Ali himself was among the companions of the prophet who agreed on Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr was the first man who converted to Islam, he was the oldest among the companions, he was the prophet's companion in his *hijrah* (immigration from Mecca to Medina), and he was the one that the Prophet Mohammed asked to lead Muslims in prayers in the Prophet Mosque during the prophet's illness shortly before his death. Shiites, on the other hand, believe that the descendants of Ali and his wife Fatima Al Zahra', the daughter of the Prophet Mohammed, are the only ones eligible for *imāmah*, something which makes all other forms of leadership or government illegitimate.

The fourth point is how controversy is dealt with, something which controls the perception of proposed or available options. Issues regarding legitimacy and the legitimisation of controversial issues are first referred to the major sources, the Qur'an and the *Hadith* (or *Sunnah*), and when no clear-cut answer is found, the major and prominent imams use *ijtihad*⁸ i.e. 'the application of rational efforts to the methods of interpreting the sources', to come up with an agreed legitimacy on the subject matter being questioned (ibid.: 38–39). Under Sunni doctrine, no one apart from the prophets is protected from erring or sinning and all human beings including *imāms* are fallible; therefore, their decisions, acts and interpretations are revisable, refutable and not final. Different interpretations are expected to result from different human readings, which can result in various, but

usually parallel, *fatwas* (legal and religious rulings and responses of scholars to inquiries); the laypeople are expected to choose the *fatwa* most intelligible to their understanding and circumstances. On the other hand, Sachedina (1988: 90) explains that the sources of spiritual authority in Shiite Islam, who are considered to be the proof (*hujjah*) of God, are infallible and are capable of interpreting the Qur'an by special personal knowledge given to them, making them similar to prophets in this respect. Shiite Muslims are more likely to have more individual decisions made by individual *imāms* based on their personal endowments or interpretations. The concept of *ijtihād* is a centre point of many *fatwas* in Shiite doctrine. However, unlike Sunnis, Shiites have the concept of *taqlīd*, by which every Shiite Muslim is obliged to choose a single *marji'* (referee) whom he or she follows in any *fatwā* that is needed. This means that a layperson may not choose to accept a *fatwā* from one *marji'* and another *fatwā* from another *marji'*. Shiites go to the extent of ruling that if one does not follow a specific *marji'*, then all one's deeds are deemed unacceptable by Allah (God).

From the four key points above, it becomes clear that Islamic perspectives and sectarian variations are strongly present in ideological stances and consequently in the choices made and perspectives presented by Islamic affiliation. Therefore, this presence should inform discourse choices, and the research attempts to identify these variations (see Objectives of Research in Section 1.3).

2.2.3 Ideological evolution in the Muslim world

More than a quarter of a century ago, Ismael and Ismael were already maintaining that ‘popular Islamic political activism has become a dynamic force in Middle East politics,’ demonstrating a salient and discernible capacity for motivating the masses (1985: 134–135). A chief characteristic of political ideology in Islam is ‘the inherent pluralism and diversity of Muslim politics—that is, [...] the *impossibility* of a single theory to account for political Islam’ (Mandaville 2007: 1, emphasis in original). If we take the major key issues in Islam mentioned in the section above into account and see how they can apply to politics, we can see that Islamic politics, as Asad (1993: 1) explains, has features that make it impossible to apply the European secular division between religion and politics to Islam. Mandaville gives three reasons why this is so. He first mentions that the ‘Muslim world witnessed its own version of debate regarding the status of reason versus pure revelation as sources of knowledge some five centuries before this took place in the West’ (2007: 10). He explains that these debates ‘gave way to a sharp distinction between knowledge concerning morality and law, as seen not amenable to reason or rational thought, and the realms of science and technology’ (ibid). The second reason, according to Mandaville (ibid.: 11), is that there is no religious hierarchy in Islam, at least not in the *Sunni* mainstream, who make up 90% of all Muslims, and this absence of institutional authority leaves the call for reforming Islam without a target at which to aim. The third point Mandaville (ibid.: 12) draws attention to when

contrasting Islam and Christianity in this aspect is that in Islam, the concept of *tawhid* (oneness) puts emphasis on ‘the totalizing sovereignty of God.’ This spiritual-temporal unity has always been essential in Islam. ‘[T]he failure of the political institutions to realize this unity’ (Ismael & Ismael 1985: 127) beside the growing economic, political and cultural conflicts in the Islamic world (ibid.: 139) initiated the contemporary Islamic political movements or activism. This political activism moved Islamic legitimisation from being viewed as a cultural imperative that is used as an apolitical tool to a political imperative in itself (ibid.: 128).

Merad (1981: 39–40) believes that one of the most dominant themes in contemporary Islamic ideology is the theme of *asala*⁹ (authenticity), which is a form of nostalgia for the past when the Muslim world was under Islamic and Qur’anic legitimacy. This theme, however, can create a feeling of being threatened by ‘external aggressions, essentially those of the Western cultural models’ (ibid.: 40). He adds that the ideological implications of *asala* may also ‘help construct a political and social order’ that inspires ‘critical tendencies towards the established order’ (ibid). Merad highlights that the apologists and religious debaters often ‘intermingle political and religious debates’ in the Muslim world, and in some cases, the principal purpose behind this can be ‘the affirmation of the dominant ideology and the strengthening of the ruling elite’ (ibid. 1981: 34). He adds that:

ideological debates use different theses according to the subject of the debate, and whether they are of the progressive, traditional or fundamentalist type. The progressive (or revolutionary) ideologisation of Islam emphasises the values of liberation, community and distribution, whose adherents attempt to find its corresponding concepts in the ethics of original Islam. In the ideologisation of the traditional type, its advocates insist on the values of piety and obedience, which are most compatible with the authoritarian and conservative regimes (ibid. 43–44).

He explains that ‘government-inspired’ publications and essays illustrate this tendency to reflect compatibility with authority (ibid. 47n.).

Across the Islamic world, there have been what can be described as ‘revivalist or renewalist (*tajdidi*) trends ... from the mid-eighteenth century’ (Mandaville 2007: 43). Revivalism calls for going back to the roots of Islam, while renewalism (or reformism) focuses on ‘external challenges’ (ibid. 43). Two important landmarks in the contemporary Sunni political evolution are the emergence of the Salafī movement in Saudi Arabia and the emergence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Salafī is a major revivalist movement; it acquired its name from the Arabic word, *salaf*, meaning predecessors, and refers to the companions of the Prophet Mohammed. This trend or movement was established by Mohammed Abdul Wahhab (1703–92) and is seen as ‘the standard orientation of much of the religious establishment in present day Saudi Arabia’¹⁰ (Mandaville 2007: 43). What provoked Abdul Wahhab most was finding ‘the laxity of the society in which he grew up – its neglect of the prescribed rites and prayers, its promiscuity, its tolerance of

superstition' (Mortimer 1982: 60). He was greatly influenced by Ibn Taymiya, a follower of Ibn Hanbal. The latter established one of the four major schools of the Sunni sect; however, 'Abdul-Wahhab was opposed to any of the schools being taken as an absolute and unquestionable authority' (ibid.: 61). On the other hand, a major figure in the reformalist trend is Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who called for employing philosophy and science in reviving Muslim nations. Al-Afghani believed that how Islam strengthened Muslims and helped them rise as a nation and state in the first place was by awakening philosophical awareness in them and only then awakening other fields of knowledge (Mandaville 2007: 44–45).

Although Sunni Islamic movements in Bahrain have no actual organisational links with similar movements elsewhere, they sympathise with many of them as can be perceived from occasional mentioning of other movements in some sermons and talks. The *Salafī* and Muslim Brotherhood movements have had their effects on Bahraini religious revivalism, but again, as with most adapted ideologies and trends, the principles and objectives have been 'acclimatised' to Bahraini social and political backgrounds. This is reflected in the tendency of Bahraini Sunni 'religiousness' to be more lenient and tolerant than in many parts of the Middle East. The two founders of the movements above are barely known to the new generations and hardly mentioned by the older generations among religious people in Bahrain, something that signals the birth of a divergent, independent trend.

Within every single Muslim community, there is rarely agreement about what how Islam is activated in politics. This is due to diversity a difference among Muslims with respect to politics. Mandaville (2007: 105–106) believes that within the Islamic political stances, the ‘Islamists’ differ from Muslim democrats in that the former refer more to Shari’a in their choices and decisions. The Muslim democrats, on the other hand, ‘do not seek to enshrine Islam in politics’ (Nasr S.V.R. 2005: xx). As for differentiating Muslim democrats from the other conservative parties, Mandaville (op. cit.: 106) suggests looking ‘to the social bases of membership, recruitment, and mobilization.’

As for Shi’ism, it has three main branches: Twelvers (or Ja’faris), Ismailis and Zaidis. Two major revivals of Shi’ism that have had a direct and prominent effect on the Shi’a recent history are the establishment of the Safavid dynasty and the Iranian revolution. The Safavids, often but inaccurately viewed as an equivalent of Twelvers, are a dynasty that in the early 1500s took power over what is now Iran. The Safavid dynasty is named after its establisher, Ismail Al-Safawi,¹¹ a Twelver Shi’a who was the key figure in the conversion of Iran from Sunnism to Shi’isim (Ward 2009: 43). Twelvers, also known as Ja’fari Shiites or Imam Shiites, mainly follow twelve Imams (religious leaders) who are descendants of Imam Ali and his wife Fatima Al Zahra, the daughter of the Prophet Mohammed. The Twelvers consider that believing in *Imamah*, i.e. that Allah appointed these twelve Imams to be followed, as a pillar of Faith. The first Imam is Ali

himself, followed by his son Al Hussain, and the twelfth is Mohammed ibn Al Hassan, known as Al Mahdi (i.e. the Guided One) who, according to Shiite doctrine, was born in Iraq in 868 and was hidden by Allah in a cave. It is believed that he will come back with Christ. The Sunnis, on the hand, believe that Al Mahdi has not been born yet and will be an average person (i.e. with a normal life span) among Muslims, who will fight alongside Christ when he returns.

When it comes to contemporary Shiite political evolution, the revolution and the resulting establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 was a prominent divergence in the revival of Shi'ism as a political power. S. V. R. Nasr (2007: 138) states that the Iranian Shiite revolution was received with great pride among Shiites worldwide, and energised Shiite politics in many countries including Bahrain. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, led by the USA, is considered a major triumph for Shiites, as they succeeded in what the Iranian newspapers called the Nasrallah-Sistani-Khamenei axis, the Shia crescent (ibid.: 184). Nasr explains that the 'gains made in Iraq' have led to a Shiite revival that has created consensus among Shiite governments and movements. Nasr mentions three implications of this revival: first, the strengthening of religious and cultural ties among Shiites in the region are stronger; secondly, the gains in Iraq have encouraged further Shiite demonstrations in the region to gain more political power; and thirdly, the inter-Shiite religious and cultural ties have become stronger and thus 'sustain[ed] gains in power' (ibid.: 179). He explains that

Iraq has set a chain reaction that will play differently in Lebanon, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but the overall result will almost certainly be greater Shiite power and more manifest cultural and religious ties across the crescent from Lebanon to Pakistan (ibid.).

The need to maintain the gains and to expand them to include other areas meant that the Shiite needed to work with the USA on its plans in the Middle East (ibid.)

2.3 Bahrain as a scene of Political Struggle over Language

2.3.1 Population composition of the Bahraini community

The Bahraini community is complex and consists of several ethnic groups. This is not surprising if one considers two major factors. The first is the central and strategic location of the archipelago of Bahrain in the Arabian Gulf, very close to Saudi Arabia on the west and Iran on its east, and its being a transit centre for trade and travel throughout the history of mankind. The second factor is that Bahrain, as defined by its current boundaries, is a very new country, dating back only to the ending of the British protectorate in 1971. Before that, this archipelago had always been part of much larger territories and kingdoms. Controversy over nationalism is a recurring feature of many debates in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. In fact, it is a major area of disagreement between several political parties and the government, and it has repeatedly initiated riots and conflicts in the country. The topic is also repeatedly brought up in debates

dealing with other issues, especially by the Al Wefaq Party. There is always a tendency to frame Bahraini citizens in particular ways so as to exclude certain people. There are also repetitive attempts to involve the issue of naturalisation in discussions of disorder in the country, and examples of this will be seen in some of the chosen excerpts. Anderson (1983: 13–14) maintains that nationality (or nation-ness and nationalism) are artefacts and that they were founded towards the end of the eighteenth century. He cites Kemiläinen (1964: 10, 33 and 48–49), who noted that the word ‘nationalism’ only started being widely used towards the end of the nineteenth century. Anderson (*ibid.*: 14) also explains that theorists of nationalism have often been confused by three contradicting facts of the concept of ‘nation’: (a) its being historically modern vs. being ancient in the eyes of nationalists, (b) its formal universal acceptance as a socio-cultural concept vs. its *sui generis* characteristics when assigned to a people, and (c) the political power of nationalism vs. ‘its philosophical poverty and even incoherence’. Anderson defines the concept of ‘nation’ as ‘an imagined political community – and imaged as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (*ibid.*: 15).

The cosmopolitan nature and historical construct of Bahrain make it very difficult for any current residents to claim rightfully to be the ‘original’ habitants of the country, although there have been many attempts to prove one group or another as the more rightful ‘owners’ of the land. The vast majority of Bahraini people can trace back their origins to Central Arabia,

the Eastern coast of Arabia, Southern Iraq, Western Persia, or other parts of current Iran, and some to Pakistan or India. Additionally, many families have a history of taking foreign wives, especially Indian and Iranian wives. There are also more recent international marriages with European and Asian wives, but marrying and bringing in Indian and Iranian wives is the most common form of marriage with non-Arabs in the history of Bahraini families.

The four major ethnic and religious groups in the Bahraini community, who have been living on this archipelago since before its independence from Britain in 1971 are known as the Arabs, the *Huwala*, the *Baharna*, and the *‘Ajam*. The former two are Sunnis and the latter two are Shiites.¹² It is easy to see the ethnic and linguistic resemblance of each group to other ethnic and linguistic communities around Bahrain. When it comes to ethnicity, the Arab Bahrainis have more in common with either central Arabia or the southern half of the western coast of the Arabic Gulf and Oman.¹³ The *Huwala* or *Hewala* (singular: *Holi*) are still linked to Arab-Iranian (in certain families Arab-Persian) mixed families who resided on and moved between the western and eastern coasts of the Arabian Gulf until modern frontiers restricted their movements. Their existence on the western coast of the Arabian Gulf is mentioned in Dutch documents dating back to the late 1600s.¹⁴ They are originally Arabs who emigrated from Arabia to the Persian coast of the Arabian Gulf at different periods of Islamic conquests. They mingled within Persian society and intermarried with the Persians. In

the late 19th and early 20th century, many Huwala moved to the eastern coast of the Arabian Gulf and the western coast, mostly the southern part, and most intensively to the Emirates,¹⁵ Bahrain,¹⁶ Qatar and Kuwait before national borders restricted their movements.¹⁷ While Bahrain converted to Islam in year 629 until Qarmitians¹⁸ conquered Bahrain in the early decades of the tenth century (Lapidus 2002:107). This is when Shiism began spreading in Bahrain and the surrounding region. However, the oldest Shiite Cleric in Bahrain was Shaikh Maytham Bin Ali Al-Bahrani, a leading Twelver Shiite theologian, who passed away in 1280. The vast majority of Baharna are ethnically and linguistically linked to families residing in Southern Iraq who have moved to Bahrain and Al-Hasa, the northern half of the western coast of the Arabian Gulf. The 'Ajam, on the other hand, are of Iranian origins, though not necessarily Persian.

Due to space limitations, I do not intend to give further details about the origins of the various groups in Bahraini society in this part of the research. However, I must point out that the debate over which of the four groups are the original habitants is very fierce, especially between the Arabs and Buharna. I also need to point out that there are other smaller Bahraini groups, including those who long ago came from India, Yemen, and even longer-settled Arab Jewish residents, all of whom have no conflicts or problems of integration. However, there are many newly naturalised families who have arrived in the last twenty years from Syria to serve in the Armed Forces. Such immigration is not particularly unusual, since the same is

happening in many countries, including the UK. However, in the case of naturalised Syrians, there has been a lot of resistance and rejection from most Bahrainis, especially the Shiite movements, who repeatedly bring up the issue of naturalisation as a fault and as a part of a political strategy carried by the government to marginalise the Shiites of the country. A new term came up to label those people as *mujannasīn*, plural of *mujannas*, i.e. ‘the naturalised’.¹⁹

This ethnic diversity in Bahrain is also reflected in a dialectical and accentual divergence and variety, something that I explore further below.

2.3.2 Bahrain Language

Although the dialectal and accentual varieties do not interfere with the discursive analysis carried out in my research, I provide the following brief introduction to Bahrain language and dialects to familiarise readers with an important aspect of the Bahraini culture, as language is the interface of interaction and the conveyer of ideology. Accordingly, it is useful for the reader to have a glimpse of the linguistic variety to understand how the ethnic and, often, sectarian affiliation can be present in (or concealed by) linguistic choices made by the Bahraini interlocutor.

2.3.2.1 Standard Arabic, dialects and accents

Many linguists differentiate between the terms ‘accent’ and ‘dialect’ by assigning the former to pronunciation, and the second to the lexis (grammar and vocabulary) (Thomas *et al.* 2004: 134). Gregory and Carroll (1978: 12) explain that ‘[a]ccent normally refers to articulator and acoustic features of language while dialect [refers] to the totality of lexical, grammatical and phonological features. Dialect therefore incorporates accent but remains distinct from it.’ This distinction is adopted in this thesis. Gregory and Carroll (*ibid.*), add that dialect ‘can be thought of as the user’s macro-linguistic identity defining him in terms of birthplace, class, education and age’. However, there are some reservations about dialect defining class and education, although this might have been acceptable in the West and in the Arabian Gulf countries until two decades ago (noting that Gregory and Carroll’s book was published in 1978). The economic boost in Bahrain of the eighties resulted in fundamental changes in both access to education and income but at variant and diverse levels. This, in turn, has led to a fundamental restructuring of the class order. This is not to say that dialects have no social-assigning or positioning role, as within every community there is an approximate upper, middle and lower class based on stereotypical or prejudged criteria.

Oakes (2001: 91) states that the term ‘dialect’ is problematic for two reasons: for being ‘very socio-politically loaded ... reinforcing the inferior status of minority groups’ and because the term suggests that there is a

standard form of language, and this gives way to ‘the suppression of linguistic variation in favour of linguistic uniformity.’ This, nevertheless, is not the case in Bahrain for two major reasons: first, because dialects are part of regional and sectarian identities, while Standard Arabic (SA) does not belong to any particular regional or sectarian group. One reading of the role of dialects in Bahrain can be that of Joseph (2006b: 166):

Sectarian splits in Islam came to be associated with dialectal differences in Arabic, just as splits with Christianity would do. It is extremely unlikely that any of these alignments in belief and language were accidental. Members of the various sects needed and wanted to be able to recognise one another, and to identify members of other sects, and they adopted various ways of doing this, from circumcision, to distinctive clothing and ornaments, to rituals such as the sign of the cross or bowing to the east for prayers. In such a semiotically charged context, language could hardly fail to play its part.

On the other hand, SA, at least in Bahrain, has never been associated with a sect or group and has been the most unmarked form of language. SA has been associated mainly with written language, education,²⁰ the news and other formal uses of language. Generally speaking, people in Bahrain, even the illiterate, do understand spoken SA at least at the receptive level (listening and reading), such as watching the news on the TV or listening to the radio. Of course, those who are more educated have access to more vocabulary, yet SA is not considered problematic in Bahrain.

Secondly, in some Arabic-speaking countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon (see Suleiman 1996), the battle between SA and local dialects has been fierce. This, however, has never been an issue in Bahrain, and ‘replacing’ SA with a dialect has never occurred to anyone. Nevertheless, Bahraini dialects (BHDs²¹) are occasionally used in written texts as a source of humour, e.g. in local caricatures, and as an attempt to present less formality on some local TV shows. This is not to say that the SA used nowadays is identical to ancient classical Arabic, but the changes have occurred more gradually and as a result of being affected by the spread of successful Arabic publications that do not significantly diverge from the usual SA. Instead of fighting SA, the desire to ‘modernise’ and ‘elevate’ one’s language competency in Bahrain has always been associated with either learning another language, mainly English, or shifting to another language, again very often English. This is evident in the common perception among laypeople who perhaps too often measure the success or the distinction of a school by how fluent and native-like a student becomes in English rather than any other academic achievements. The local dialects have never occurred to most Bahraini communities as possible alternatives, as they have not been perceived as languages by themselves nor have been felt to be separated from SA. It is very likely that Bahrain’s multicultural nature and its having been a trade transit centre for centuries have helped found a general acceptance and expectance and expectation of multilingualism, which has always diminished the urge to have one particular language

chosen to cover all aspects of life. The linguistic community in Bahrain is familiar with people mastering a language and having a second language with a lower level of competence, whether the pair of languages is Arabic and Persian, Holi and Arabic, Arabic and a pidgin variation of Urdu or Hindi, amongst others.

This is not to say that Bahraini society still looks up to SA, as more and more Bahrainis are abandoning it and replacing it with English, believing that English will serve them better at the level of modernisation and education, and this view is facilitated by the spread of foreign and local private schools, where Arabic language classes are kept to a minimum, resulting in Arabic, i.e. both SA and BHDs, shifting to the level of a second — sometimes a third — language for younger generations, who simultaneously choose to communicate amongst themselves in English, and some of whom even communicate with their parents in English. As for daily life, English does serve them well as, in most fields of work, English is expected to be known, while Arabic is often more of a bonus than a requirement.

Although standardisation has not been a source of differentiation or discrimination in Bahrain, the dialects themselves have been perceived by the Bahraini community to have a kind of ranking; those dialects indicating different religious sectarian divisions have become major marked features, and the ones referring to the regional origins have a less hierarchical role. The role of the dialect as markers has more to do with categorising the

interlocutors according to origin rather than ranking them. As in mundane life, it is possible to detect sectarian and regional orientations from the accents and dialects of MPs in the Council of Representatives, often with the sectarian accent being the most perceptible. While the Council is per se a speech community with shared norms, it can be subdivided into smaller speech communities on the basis of dialectal varieties.

2.3.2.2 Bahrain dialect variations

Although this research is not interested in examining the differences in dialects in collected data, it should be useful to familiarise the reader with BHDs as part of the historical and political structure in the country. Dialects are an important component of one's group identity; it defines and categorises an interlocutor with a speech community. Corder (1973: 53) explains that '[a] speech community is made up of people who regard themselves as speaking the same language; it needs have no other defining attributes.' Wolf's definition of speech community concurs with this definition: he describes a speech community as 'a group of people that feels connected through the use of the same language or language variety' (2006: 43). These views make the perception and the self-image of the interlocutors the most fundamental criterion for defining a speech community.

Applying these definitions of speech communities, the members of the Bahraini Council of Representatives can be perceived as forming a major

speech community unified under SA first of all, and then subdivided by BHDs. BHDs can initially, depending on their linguistic uniformity levels, be divided into the BHDs of Sunnis and the BHDs of Shiites, as they are notably distinct for the historical and cultural reasons that were demonstrated in more detail in the previous section. Still, within each Sunni and Shiite subdivision, there are further divisions, but these are accents rather than separate dialects.

To understand dialectical variations in the Gulf region, it is useful to first understand the habitants of the area and how they moved around to construct what is now the Gulf region. Ingham (1982: 7) divides North Arabia into three central zones: Najd;²² Southern Iraq and Khuzistan;²³ and the Gulf coast of Arabia. He suggests three factors affecting the dialect geography of this area: (a) the continuous immigration from the central areas to the outer ones, (b) 'the existence of permanent centres of civilisations in these areas' throughout historical changes, and (c) the waves of immigration from Southern Mesopotamia to the coastal area (ibid.). Although nomads' grazing areas changed with 'the change of power in the area,' they have tended to stay relatively stable over the last two hundred years (ibid.: 9).

The immigration of nomadic groups from central Arabia to the settled lands seems to have had an obvious effect on dialect geography (ibid.: 11). Ingham (ibid.: 22) explains that the immigration of groups of nomads to the settled areas had an effect on the spread of the 'linguistic features' of the

immigrants and on the 'subsequent adaptation' by the population. The nomads of Najd found the coastal region and southern Iraq more attractive when they needed to visit settlements to buy supplies since these areas were well connected with the outside world; this was one of the factors that encouraged them to travel repeatedly to these zones, creating more connections with the sedentary populations there (ibid.: 23). Ingham states that the Al-Hasa region,²⁴ alongside Shatt Al Arab,²⁵ has long been a destination of immigration from central Arabia, the Syrian region and Iran (ibid.: 34). He also states that there has been one-way marriage between Arab tribesmen in Khuzistan and Persian women (ibid.). This one-way marriage has also occurred between the Holis and Bahranis and Iranian women being brought into the Bahraini culture.

When it comes to dialects of the Gulf region, most of the articles and books referring to them seem to distinguish two in particular: the Bahraini dialect and the Najdi dialect. However, this fails to encompass the reality. First of all, I would like to stress that the Najdi dialect has never been a dialect of Bahraini peoples. It recently received some attention when Nabti poetry became popular among the youth, but this has been more of a 'trend' or a wave that was imported from neighbouring countries with large Najdi populations, such as parts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and parts of the UAE. In fact, there are large numbers of urban people who have long lived on the western coast of the Arabian Gulf and who are neither Nomads nor Baharna; these have dialects that are different from both the Najdi and

Bahrani. If we take the more general features, the rest of the urban dialects of the western coast of Arabia can be divided into two distinct groups: the one spoken in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, and the one spoken in the UAE. I would prefer to use the popular term *Khaleeji* (the Arabic adjective from the word *Khaleej*, meaning Gulf) for the dialect used in Bahrain by the non-Bahrani, which is also used in Kuwait and in Qatar. However, in Kuwait and Qatar, Shiites also speak in the same dialect as Sunnis. As with any dialect, the *Khaleeji* dialect varies among these countries and even within each country. Still, the dialects spoken in these three countries are more similar to each other than different.

The *Khaleeji* dialect in Bahrain is known as Bahrani. It would not be accurate to call it ‘the Sunni dialect’ or the ‘Sunni Bahrani’; neither would it be accurate to call the Bahrani dialect ‘the Shiite dialect’ or ‘Shiite Bahrani’. First of all, the labels ‘Sunni’ and ‘Shiite’ are not locally used to identify dialects or accents in Bahrain or in the Gulf and the two labels are used only to refer to religious affiliations. Instead, ‘Bahrani’ and ‘Bahraini’ are the commonly used descriptions for the dialects and for ethnic differentiation; that is because the dialects are more ethnologically rooted than religiously. However, to distinguish the Bahraini dialects as opposed to Bahrani dialect from the more general term ‘Bahraini dialect’ that covers all the Arabic local dialects in Bahrain, I call the latter the ‘Bahrain dialect’, and call the two main branches the ‘Bahraini dialect’, or BHD, and ‘Bahrani dialects’ to make it easier to understand to which I am referring. There is, for example, a

considerable number of Shiite Bahraini people, more particularly in Muharraq city, who are known as Banānī and Ḥiyāyīch²⁶ (or Ḥiyyāch) and who speak Bahraini with a Muharraqi accent exactly as the Sunni Bahrainis in that city do. So they are Bahraini and Shiite but do not speak Bahraini. Apart from this, there are many individuals whose dialects do not refer to their religious sect affiliations, such as some Bahrainis who converted to Sunnism, and other Bahrainis who chose to speak in Bahraini dialect without changing their religious affiliation. Additionally, Shiite people of Iranian origins, known as *ʿAjam*, pl. of *ʿTjmī*, speak the dialect of Arabic that is spoken in their neighbourhood, whether it is Bahraini or Bahraini. On the other hand, the *Huwala* of Bahrain who speak Arabic do so only in Bahraini and never Bahraini.²⁷ Each of the Bahraini and the BHDs has a varying spectrum of dialects, especially the Bahraini dialects. In this section, however, and for the purpose of providing a general insight, I discuss only the most common dialects which, as Bahraini society gets more and more intertwined, tend to move towards dropping words that are very specific to one particular dialect and adapting the more popular ones.

Al-Qouz (2009) carried out a trend study of Arabic in Bahrain. In trend studies, ‘comparable but different samples of individuals are questioned at two or more points in time’ (Weston & Ruggiero 1978: 133). Holes (1995: 275) mentions that an ‘inter-communal’ dialect has emerged as a result of constant contact between the Shiite and the Sunni speakers in Bahrain in the capital city, Manama. He explains that this dialect ‘seems to

have acquired the role of a neutral standard for both Sunni and Shia speakers, both in out-group contexts and contexts of public speech' (ibid.). Al-Qouz (2009) builds on this finding and discusses whether this inter-communal dialect has had any permanent effects on the dialects of the Shiite and Sunni youth of Manama. She detects five linguistic variables: sect, age, socio-economic class, type of schooling and gender (ibid.: 83). When the researcher asked her Shiite informants why they spoke 'Sunni' very well, they replied that it was only 'ordinary Bahraini (Arabic)' (ibid.: 286). This view of what is classified by many researchers as Sunni dialect as 'ordinary' is interesting and worth considering, but it is beyond the scope of my research to examine this matter in detail. However, it can instantly provide a glimpse into a standardisation tendency of Bahraini dialect, at least by the youth of Manama.

2.3.2.3 Borrowed vocabulary in Bahrain dialects

The Gulf region in general and Bahrain in particular have been very open to and interactive with other cultures. Bahrain's central location has made it very cosmopolitan. This interaction has affected some local words, and many borrowed words have become part of the Bahrain dialect. The words have been adapted and become so familiar in Bahrain dialect that most speakers do not even realise their origins, despite their being very different from the equivalent SA word. Some examples of such borrowed words are: *jūti*

(meaning shoe, borrowed from Hindi), *bānka* (meaning fan, borrowed from *pānka*, which is Persian), *badqīr* (which is a construction in traditional Gulf coastal houses that allow cold breezes into the house, borrowed from Persian; the original word is *badqīr*), *dirisha* (from Hindi, meaning window), *kashma* (meaning glasses from the Hindi word *chushma*). There are also many words in the local dialects that have been borrowed from English, especially ones related to driving, mechanics and equipment. Some examples of very popular words related to driving are *signair* (meaning indicator lights of the car from the word *signal*), *rāmsaid*, (meaning ‘wrong side’ if a road is one-way), and *raiwas* (from *reverse*). Some examples of tools and equipment are *ispāna* (from *spanner*) and *skidraiwal* (from *screw driver*).

Besides, there are some words that are not only pronounced with a distinct dialect, but are also very different from their equivalents in SA. Such words may be also borrowed from other languages and adapted into everyday language like the ones above. However, so far, there does not seem to be a known source for those in Table 3 and I would categorise them separately as local dialect words.

Table 3: Bahraini words that differ from their classical equivalents

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
<i>mādhā</i>	<i>waish</i>	<i>shinow</i>	what
<i>ḥalaq</i>	<i>ḥalag</i>	<i>tirchiyyah</i>	earrings
<i>qitt</i>	<i>sannūr</i>	<i>qatow</i>	cat
<i>sijjadah</i>	<i>zūliyyah</i>	<i>zūliyyah</i>	carpet
<i>yatadhammar</i>	<i>yithaltam</i>	<i>yithaltam</i>	(he is) whining

2.3.2.4 Bahrain dialects and standard Arabic

Apart from distinct words, there are also phonological differences. The strongest distinction between the two Bahraini and Bahrani dialects lies in intonation patterns. Additionally, many vowels are pronounced noticeably differently in the two major dialects in Bahrain. I shall not present details here, first, for reasons of space, and secondly because my data is written texts without any intonation or vowel variations marked. For a recent detailed account of the differences between dialects and the changes at both lexical and phonological levels in Manama, see Al-Qouz (2009).

In this section, nevertheless, I provide only an illustration of the other differences between the two major dialects, the different pronunciations of consonants between Bahraini and Bahrani dialects. There are consonants that are pronounced differently from how they are pronounced in SA, either in one of the two BHDs or in both. Although a consonant can come at the beginning, middle or end of a word, I give examples only of consonants at the beginning of words in order to make it easier to identify the consonant and compare the pronunciations.

A main shift in all BHDs is altering the *ḍ* ض sound with a *ẓ* ظ. This alteration is common in several Arabic dialects. The former is the most complex phoneme in Arabic, being pronounced with one side of the tongue, either left or right, placed against the edges of the upper teeth. This is why in many Arabic dialects it is either replaced with the phoneme *ẓ*, which is

pronounced from the tip of the tongue touching the edge of the upper front teeth. Some examples are given in Table 4.

Table 4: Pronunciation of *ḍ* in Bahrain dialects

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
<i>ḍuhā</i>	<i>ṣaḥah</i>	<i>ṣaḥah</i>	late morning
<i>ḍabāb</i>	<i>ṣabāb</i>	<i>ṣabāb</i>	fog
<i>ḍayf</i>	<i>ṣeif</i>	<i>ṣeif</i>	guest

In addition, in many cases, but not all, *k* is pronounced as *ch* in BHDs. There are times when this is done in Bahrani but not as frequently as in Bahraini dialect, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5: Pronunciation of *k* in Bahrain dialects with alteration

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
<i>kam</i>	<i>cham</i>	<i>cham</i>	how much/many
<i>kabid</i>	<i>chibid</i>	<i>chabid</i>	liver
<i>kilāb</i>	<i>klāb</i>	<i>chlāb</i>	dogs

However, this is not done in all words. Some examples of *k* pronounced without alteration are presented in Table 6. I cannot find any particular semantic or phonological pattern that can explain the difference.

Table 6: Pronunciation of k without alteration in Bahrain dialects

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
<i>kitāb</i>	<i>ktāb</i>	<i>ktāb</i>	book
<i>kalām</i>	<i>kalām</i>	<i>kalām</i>	speech
<i>kursiy</i>	<i>kursiy</i>	<i>kirsaeiy</i>	chair

Also, the Bahrani dialect makes changes to certain phonemes: *d* and *dh* are both pronounced as *d*, while the *th* and *f* are pronounced as *f*. In Bahraini, these consonants are pronounced as they are in standard Arabic (SA). Some examples of this alteration are listed in Table 7.

Table 7: Pronunciation of th and dh in Bahrain dialects

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
th into f		th without alteration	
<i>thalātah</i>	<i>falāfeh</i>	<i>thalāteh</i>	three
<i>thūm</i>	<i>fūm</i>	<i>thūm</i>	garlic
dh into d		dh without alteration	
<i>dhubābah</i>	<i>dubbaneh</i>	<i>dhubbāneh</i>	a fly
<i>bathinjān</i>	<i>badinjān</i>	<i>bathinjān</i>	aubergine

It is worth mentioning that merging the *th* and *f* is becoming less frequent among the Bahrani people, especially the younger generations. There is a tendency now to distinguish the two phonemes as *th* and *f*. In the study of dialect change among the Bahraini youth of Manama, Al-Qouz (2009: 183) confirms that the *th* → *f* merger has almost been levelled out.

Additionally, Bahraini dialect changes the *j* into a *y* in most words but not all, but when it comes to Bahrani speakers, they are divided between

those who alter the *j* to a *y* and those who do not (e.g. Bahraini people from Duraz, Daih and Ras Rumman areas in Bahrain make the alteration). Some examples are provided in Table 8.

Table 8: Pronunciation of *j* in Bahrain dialects

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
<i>rajul</i>	<i>rajjāl</i>	<i>rayyāl</i>	man
<i>jamal</i>	<i>jamal</i>	<i>yimal</i>	camel
<i>jāb</i>	<i>jāb</i>	<i>yāb</i>	(he) brought

Another difference in the pronunciation of consonants is that of the sound *q* ق. in Bahraini dialect, this sound is changed into a *j* in some words and into a *q* in others. In Bahrani dialect, however, it is changed only to *q* and never to *j* (see Table 9). In SA, the *g* sound does not exist; hence the alteration of *q* to a *g* does not create any confusion for listeners who are familiar only with other Arabic dialects.

Table 9: Pronunciation of *q* in Bahrain dialects

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
	q into g	q into g	
<i>qamar</i>	<i>gamar</i>	<i>gumar</i>	moon
<i>qumm</i>	<i>gūm</i>	<i>gūm</i>	get up
<i>qaraṣ</i>	<i>garaṣ</i>	<i>giraṣ</i>	(it) stung
	q into g	q into j	
<i>qal'ah</i>	<i>gal'ah</i>	<i>jal'eh</i>	castle
<i>qalīl</i>	<i>galīl</i>	<i>jilīl</i> ²⁸	little/ few
<i>qāsī</i>	<i>gāsī</i>	<i>jāsī</i>	harsh/ rough

Besides, it is very common in Bahraini dialect to change the *gh* sound to *g* (see Table 10). However, in SA, *g* and *gh* sounds are two distinct phonemes and replacing one with another is very likely to change the meaning of the word. For example, *qarīb* means a relative or nearby, while *gharīb* means a stranger. The verb *qafala* means (he) locked, while the verb *ghafala* means (he) became unwary. The local interlocutors depend on the context to distinguish the minimal pairs in such situations.

Table 10: Pronunciation *gh* as *q*

Standard Arabic	Bahrani Arabic	Bahraini Arabic	English
	<u>gh without alteration</u>	<u>gh into q</u>	
<i>ghubār</i>	<i>ghbār</i>	<i>qbār</i>	dust
<i>ghuyūm</i>	<i>ghyūm</i>	<i>qyūm</i>	clouds
<i>ghīrah</i>	<i>ghīrah</i>	<i>qīrah</i>	jealousy

The distinct pronunciations presented above show that Bahraini interlocutors convey their ethnic and – often though not always – their sectarian affiliation through dialectal differences, which are more distinct than mere vowel pronunciation variations. The research is interested in finding out if there are more discursive differences that can be related to sectarian ideological differences (see research hypothesis and goals in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 respectively).

2.3.3 Sectarian political conflicts in Bahrain

Bahrain is an ancient settlement. It has been open to trade and functioned as a connection point between the east and the rest of the old world. The family of Al Kahlifa, the current ruling family and a branch of Bani Utbah tribe, entered Bahrain in 1783 and the first ruler was Ahmed bin Mohammed Al Khalifa. Before Al Khalifa, Bahrain was ruled by different reigns and states, many of whom were Arabs and some Holis; sometimes Bahrain was under Persian rule and at other times under Portuguese forces.

The vast majority of the citizens in Bahrain are Muslims, divided between Sunnis and Shiites. Almost all of Shiites in Bahrain are Twelvers (more on Twelvers and Shiaism ideology in 2.2.3), and this includes the Arab Bahraini Shiite (Bahrani) and the Iranian Bahraini Shiites ('Ajam). There are controversial publications and articles about which sect, that is, Shiite or Sunni, is more ancient in Bahrain and this conflict in history has a role in the present sectarian political conflicts; the sectarian division is seen not only as a split in belief but also as an indicator of intrusion (the Shiites seeing Sunnis as intruders and themselves as indigenous residents and vice versa, the Sunnis seeing the Shiites as intruders.) Of course, the need to claim to be more ancient is often urged by competition over jobs, land, and, most importantly, authority. Bahrain is a small country, with an area not exceeding 665 square kilometres and a rapidly growing population that currently exceeds one million (51% nationals, 49% non-nationals). This means that the population density has exceeded 1,500 people per square

kilometre. The actual density is higher since the southern part has no residential areas. Although this is not the generator of the sectarian conflict, it is worth bearing in mind as a crucial part of the context of this conflict.

The ancient and complex demographic composition of Bahrain helped different ethnic and religious groups live together with minimum conflicts for a long time. The political movements in Bahrain varied in their nature, some were linked to Arab nationalism, others defined themselves as leftists, Bahrain also witnessed a wave of communism, and some Islamic movements. The Sunni Islamic movement known as, or at least resembling, the Muslim Brotherhood, was probably the first organised modern Islamic movement in Bahrain. It started in the 1950s, and at that time, the movement was not much welcomed by the government, and some restrictions were placed on them. Islamic political participation, like any political participation, was seized and limited for long periods, and consequently, the Sunni Islamic organisations were forced to limit their activity to charitable work. Any interest in politics rapidly diminished among most of Sunnis, while it grew gradually stronger among Shiites.

The Shiite Iranian Revolution in 1979 was received with great pride among Shiites worldwide (S. V. R. Nasr 2007: 138) and this was true in Bahrain as well. Nasr (*ibid.*) describes it as follows:

The revolution ... awakened the Shia. They became bolder in their demands for rights and representation, secure in the belief that

Khomeini would support them and that they had a model for political activism which would succeed in challenging authority.

Following the Iranian Revolution, Shiite politics ‘began to stir’ in many countries in the Middle East, among which was Bahrain (ibid.: 139). Nasr explains that

Shias started to abandon Arab nationalism or leftist ideologies to join the ranks of avowedly Shia political movements — many of which received financial and political support from Tehran — in order to push for specifically Shia agendas (ibid.).

Nasr mentions the Al Wefaq Party of Bahrain among the movements that are supported by Tehran (ibid.); but the Al Wefaq Party itself denies being connected with Tehran. Nasr notes that ‘Shia demonstrations, riots, and violent clashes with ruling regimes occurred in various parts of the Middle East’ among which was ‘a failed coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981’ (ibid.) by an Iranian organisation known as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, which tried to overthrow the government and assassinate the then ruler, Shaikh Essa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the father of the current King. The attempt was detected and stopped. However, the Islamic Front carried out a series of bomb attacks in Bahrain. Several riots, sit-ins, demonstrations and strikes were carried out by Shiites, almost exclusively Bahrainis (Arab Shiite), not ‘Ajam Shiite. In the same decade (i.e. the 1980s), a petition was signed by a group of Shiites, Sunnis and other nationalists demanding

reforms and more democracy in Bahrain. This, however, led to the arrest of several Shiite and Sunni clerics.

The country witnessed a quiet and peaceful period after that, but still with limited freedom of speech, until the events of the 1990s raised some tensions between Sunnis and Shiites in Bahrain, creating a feeling of distrust. In 1995 in particular, wide disturbances and demonstrations, and the vandalism of both private and government properties took place. The participants in the upheavals were then only Shiite revolutionists; they carried the flag and symbol of Hezbollah in their demonstrations and sit-ins. However, Nasr considers their actions as a call for political reform that the government of Bahrain labelled as 'Shi'a plots' (ibid.: 156). The movement demanded the overthrow of the government, and the ruling family and was strongly associated with Tehran through slogans, banners and expressions related to Hezbollah's and Iran's religious leaders. Many were arrested and some leading Shiite and liberal figures were deported. The arrests did not last long, as the Emir pardoned the detainees after petitions and requests were addressed to him by the detainees and their families.

Up to then, many Shiites had felt that the government, being a Sunni government itself, favoured Sunnis. At the same time, many Sunnis had felt that the government took them for granted and thus ignored them and their problems and concentrated on satisfying Shiites on the one hand and the international media and powers on the other. Several Sunnis who spoke up were arrested and prosecuted as traitors. Citizens showed extreme caution

regarding what they said in relation to government and people in power, even in social gatherings and in the media. However, a dramatic shift toward democracy came when Shaikh Hamad bin Essa Al Khalifa became the ruler after his father's death in 1999. Rapid reform has taken place since, starting with the release and pardon of all political prisoners, allowing deported ones to return, and giving more freedom of speech to the media, politicians and the public. Another major step has been establishing the Bahraini Parliament and running free elections that were monitored by local and international NGOs. However, some did not see the latest reforms as sufficient and considered them as failing to address their demands. While most Sunnis, even the previously anti-government ones, perceived the changes positively as a right step in the right direction, many Shiite political parties did not.

The establishment of the Bahraini Parliament has created a new level of tension, more of a competition, between the Shiites and the Sunnis at the political level. While the conflict in the 1990s was more between the Shiite movements and the government, with the Sunni citizens caught in the middle with no political representatives, the Parliament created a new interface between political powers. The Sunnis have gained a political voice and position, but they have started to be viewed by the Shiite movements as a 'pro-government' movement, creating a new battle front for the Shiite movements. This has been the case despite the fact that the Sunni parties do not classify themselves as such, but on the contrary, find themselves

independent from and at certain levels and in certain issues in opposition to the government. Since the parliamentary experience started, both sides have put much effort into proving how the other side is ‘wrong’ and not to be trusted with political governance.

2.3.4 The Bahraini Parliament

2.3.4.1 Establishment of the current parliament in Bahrain

On 6 December 1973, the late Amir Shaikh Essa bin Salman Al Khalifa, the ruler of Bahrain, ratified the Constitution of the State of Bahrain, which stipulated the setting up of the National Council (Council of Representatives 2007: 9). The following day witnessed the first elections in the country, and the number of voters was 27,000 (ibid.: 10). However, the National Council was dissolved on 26 August 1975 by the Amiri Decree No. (14) of 1975 (ibid.: 11). This was due to conflicts and tension growing between the government and a number of the members of the National Council (Isma‘il 2005: 70).

On 20 December 1992, the late Amir Shaikh Essa bin Salman Al Khalifa issued Amiri Decree No. 9 of 1992, under which the Shura Council (i.e. Consultative Council) was established. This council ‘serves as an advisory body to assist the Government in achieving the National goals’ (Council of Representatives 2007: 12). In November 2000, King Hamad bin Essa Al Khalifa, who succeeded his father the late Amir Shaikh Essa bin

Salman Al Khalifa, issued a plan to establish the National Action Charter. A referendum, which was included in the charter, took place on 14 and 15 February 2001 and 98.4% of voters voted in favour of this charter (ibid.: 14). On 14 February the following year, the King approved amendments to the constitution, by which the name of the country was changed from the State of Bahrain to the Kingdom of Bahrain, and his title was changed from the Amir to the King of Bahrain (ibid.: 15).

Then, on 14 February 2002, a constitutional amendment was made, as a result of which the Shura Council became one of two constitutional authorities in Bahrain alongside the House of Parliament (or the Council of Representatives) (ibid.: 12) and these two councils came to represent the legislative power in the kingdom²⁹ (ibid.: 22). These two councils are respectively parallel to the Upper House or House of Lords and the Lower House or the House of Commons that together form the UK Parliament.

The Shura Council and the Council of Representatives are each formed of 40 members. While the members of the former are appointed by the King himself, the members of the latter are elected by citizens in general elections (ibid.: 22) by which the public choose their representatives. The Bahraini Council of Representatives consists of five permanent committees: (a) Legal Affairs and Legislation Committee, (b) Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee, (c) Legal and Legislative Affairs Committee, (d) Services Committee and (d) Public Utilities and Services Committee. In

addition, occasional temporary committees are set up to handle specific issues and investigations.

2.3.4.2 Islamic identity of the Bahraini Council of Representatives

As in many other Muslim-majority countries, Islamic identity is an affirmed feature of Bahrain's national character. The National Action Charter (see above in 2.3.4.1) states in Chapter 2, under the Government System, Article 3: 'Islamic Shari'a and legalisation: Islam is the religion of the state. Islamic Shari'a is the principal source of legislation' (National Action Charter of Bahrain 2001: 20). Islamic identity is openly declared as the religious identity of the country, although in many ways, the legal system shares more aspects with secularism than with Islamic systems. The democratic movement in Bahrain witnessed a major transformation when the Bahraini Parliament was established in 2002. Among the four political parties that successfully secured places in the second legislative session in 2006 were three that declare themselves to be Islamic parties: Al Minbar and Al Asalah (both Sunni parties), and Al Wefaq (a Shiite party). The Sunni parties won 15 seats and the Shiite 14, something that meant that 80 per cent of the seats were won by Islamic parties.

The Council holds weekly sittings every Tuesday, and occasionally, when required, additional sittings are held and these are called extensional sittings. An agenda of each sitting is set to the MPs in advance and the

Council is expected to follow the agenda and any other topics should be proposed for following meetings. The debates held in the sittings of the Council are recorded and documented. The printed document that records the speeches and conversations at each meeting of the Council of Representatives is called 'Hansard'.

2.3.4.3 Procedure for producing Hansard

The procedure followed in transcribing and documenting the parliamentary sittings uses the system employed in the Shura Council, which was established in 1992. I interviewed Mr Hamad Mohammed Al-Hadhrami, the Director of Committees Affairs,³⁰ Bahraini Council of Representatives, in order to understand the procedure. Al-Hadhrami (2009) explained the ten steps carried out in documenting the parliamentary sittings.

SA is the official language. Hansard aims to maintain accurate records of the points raised and of debates in the sittings held in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. The debates and speeches are mostly written in SA. As some of the speeches in the Council of Representatives are spontaneous, the order of the words in Hansard may sometimes have to be changed without changing the meaning and content in order to make the phrase more understandable. This is because those who attend the meeting may understand the original wording but people who read Hansard later on may find some of the language incomprehensible. Sometimes, there are

colloquial words or expressions that have no suitable equivalent in SA, and at other times, there are colloquial or vernacular expressions or phrases for which the standard equivalent does not carry the corresponding social meaning; such cases are noted down between parentheses as they were uttered. At the beginning, the Directorate of Committee Affairs strived to avoid colloquialisms in Hansard, but in order to maintain an accurate record of the actual speeches and debates, they began recording many words just as they were uttered, including English words, and Hansard has been moving closer to the wording used by the speakers.

A sitting is documented in the format of Hansard in ten steps, as follows:

1. An audio and video record of each sitting is made, and each of these recorded sittings is divided into 15-minute clips.
2. A technician receives the 15-minute clips, follows the audio and video clips on a computer and transcribes the dialogue in SA.
3. The technician hands the text to the ‘editor of Hansard’, who holds at least a bachelor’s degree. The editor verifies that the typed text matches the audio version, checks that each section or dialogue is tagged with the name of the correct person, and revises language mistakes (diction, grammar and style).

4. A third member of staff, known as the 'corrector', revises the text once more without referring to the audio recording. This person has a high degree of proficiency in Arabic.

The four steps above are accomplished on the day of the sitting, and these steps often continue until nightfall; if a sitting takes longer than usual, the above work is carried out on the following day.

5. Assembly: clips are then collected and integrated into a single text, and an index of speakers is added. Any reports that were mentioned or referred to in the sitting are saved on a CD that is attached to the printed text. These attachments are also made available in the Office of the General Secretary of the Parliament and on the website of the Parliament.
6. Five or six copies of Hansard are printed out, and they are distributed to the President of the Parliament, the General Secretary, the Assistant to the General Secretary for Committees and Sittings, and the Director of the Sittings, and one or two copies are shared by the Head of Hansard, Hansard Supervisor and some editors (the senior and most qualified ones).
7. Twenty-four to forty-eight hours after the distribution of copies, they are collected from the parties mentioned above, and checked

for any amendments or alterations that might need to be made.

Then a copy of the amended Hansard is given to each MP.

8. In the following sitting, the second item on the agenda is ‘the ratification of Hansard’. MPs can request further amendments or corrections and vote on them.
9. The final revised version of an amendment is then passed to the General Secretary and the President of the Parliament for signature and formal adoption.
10. A certified copy of Hansard is sent to the Official Gazette.

Hansard is saved electronically and a final version is printed and kept in the Parliamentary Library, and at the end of each legislative period of Parliament (four years), volumes and CDs are issued for the whole period. The full volume is saved on encrypted sites to prevent it from being penetrated or changed.

According to Mr Khalid Abdullah Ebrahim (Ebrahim 2009), Head of Hansard and Meetings, when an MP is speaking, his or her speech is given priority, and any marginal comments made by other MPs that do not affect the meaning or the direction of the speech, such as laughter and interjections, are normally not recorded. He explained that the same is true for extraneous expressions or comments by the MP delivering a speech in his or her turn, such as humorous comments or those of an extremely rude

nature, and Bahraini expressions and idioms that do not affect the purpose or the meaning of the speech. He also explained that grammatical mistakes by the speakers are corrected. Ebrahim does not approve of this editing and explains that this rephrasing system delivers the message in detail but reduces the individual aspects of the speeches or conversation, especially personality and language competence that should be reflected in the records. Apparently, however, the transcription procedure is moving toward less editing and Hansard is becoming more reflective of the actual speech.

2.4 *Power and Identity*

2.4.1 The Concept of Power

Joseph explains that although in everyday life the term ‘politics’ is used in association with ‘what politicians do [and with] affairs of the *state*’ (2006a: 2, emphasis in original), there is a still broader usage of the word in vernacular phrases. He explains that the word ‘politics’ is used in both its ‘narrow and broad sense,’ whereas the broader sense includes any situation in which unequal powers interact (ibid.: 3). Kramarae, Schulz and O’Barr (1984: 10–11) choose to distinguish between the two terms ‘politics’ and ‘power’, considering the former to be etymologically associated with state or government and using power as a more inclusive term. Wrong (1979: 21) presents the definition of power as being ‘the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others’. However, I query whether

the effects can be limited to those intended, and I suggest that the scope be widened to include ‘unintended’ effects under the definition of power, particularly in language issues.

Fairclough (1989: 1–2) explains that ‘sociolinguistic conventions have a dual relation to power: on the one hand they incorporate differences of power, on the other hand they arise out of – and give rise to – particular relations of power.’ He defines the relationship between power and language by linking the two to ideology: ‘the exercise of power, in modern society, is increasingly achieved through ideology, and more particularly through the ideological workings of language’ (ibid.: 2). Fairclough (ibid.: 33) explains that the people who have power exercise it and maintain it by either physical coercion or by winning others’ consent, the latter being exercised through language, which is the power form that concerns this research. Fairclough emphasises that ‘[p]ower relations are always relations of *struggle*’ (ibid.: 34, emphasis in original).

2.4.2 Power, Ideology and Language

Along the lines of the theories of discourse and power articulated by Foucault’s *The Order of Things* In this thesis (1970), ‘power’ is perceived as ‘a systematic and constitutive element/characteristic of society’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 9), which is the stand taken by CDA (see Section 3.4.1 for more on CDA in). The common-sense usage of the notion of ideology ‘is generally

pejorative' (van Dijk 1998: 1). This is because the traditional approaches to ideologies viewed them as false beliefs that others have and that are used to deceive. Ideology in these approaches was associated with dominance and power (ibid.: 2). Van Dijk explains that 'contemporary versions of the Marxist idea of the combined socio-economic and symbolic power of elite groups' continue to be applied by many approaches (ibid.: 3). He asserts that the concept of ideology started to become less pejorative in the second part of the twentieth century; it began to be defined as 'political or social systems of ideas, values or prescriptions of groups or other collectivities, [that] have the function of organizing or legitimating the actions of the group' (ibid.: 3). Van Dijk sees ideology as best understood in the 'conceptual and disciplinary triangle that relates *cognition*, society and *discourse*' (ibid.: 5, emphasis in original). He (ibid: 6) asserts that 'although discourses are not the only ideologically based social practices, they certainly are the most crucial ones in the formation of ideologies in their social reproduction.' He adds that participants in discourses are not only listeners and speakers or writers and readers, but also 'social actors who are members of groups and cultures' and that '[d]iscourse rules and norms are socially shared' (ibid.). Accordingly, Van Dijk views ideology as 'the basis of the group shared social and mental representations (ibid.: 8 & 10). He emphasises that ideologies are not only an instrument of dominance, as 'there are also ideologies of opposition or resistance, or ideologies of competition between equally powerful groups, or

ideologies that only promote the internal cohesion of a group, or ideologies about the survival of humankind' (ibid.: 11).

Fairclough (1989) explains how power, ideology and language are linked. What he terms a 'social group' is what in this research is viewed as a political group, since I have chosen to expand the sphere of the term 'politics' to include all forms of interaction among unequal powers. The explanation summarised below can also be applied precisely to politics in the narrow sense, which is meant to be used in this research for the interactions in sittings of the Bahraini Council of Representatives being observed. Stressing the role of discourse in politics, Chadwick maintains that (a) 'politics is a linguistic practice,' and that (b) including related discourses is essential to understand any political practice (2000: 288–9). As for the role of language in politics, Bayley explains that 'the activities of a politician... are all fundamentally linguistic activities' (2004: 8). Politics, thus, is a linguistic art, and political struggles are discursive struggles, a struggle among ideologies. Fairclough (1989: 84) explains that common sense is, to a large extent, ideological. He asserts that:

Ideology is most effective when its workings are least visible. If one becomes aware that a particular aspect of common sense is sustaining power inequalities at one's own expense, it ceases to *be* common sense, and may cease to have the capacity to sustain power inequalities, i.e. to function ideologically (ibid.: 85, emphasis in original).

Fairclough explains that the diversity in ideologies results from ‘the differences in position, experience and interests,’ something which in turn creates ‘ideological conflicts ... in terms of power’ (ibid.: 88). He stresses that ‘ideological struggle pre-eminently takes place in language’ and explains the relationship between ideological struggle and language as follows:

The struggle over language can manifest itself as a struggle between ideological diverse *discourse types*, ... [i.e. diverse] conventions, norms, codes of practice underlying actual discourse. ...What is at stake is the establishment or maintenance of one type as the dominant one in a given social domain, and therefore the establishment or maintenance of certain ideological assumptions as commonsensical (ibid.: 90, emphasis in original).

Ideology, thus, is embodied through language, and in this process, conflicts and struggle between ideologies arise. Ideologies, however, are activated by people who feel related to them, or in other words, by people who ‘identify’ with them.

2.4.3 Identity

Castells asserts that identity involves a ‘process of self-definition from the point of view of actor’ and he argues that identities can sometimes be defined by dominant institutions, but they are not considered identities unless the defined group ‘internalise’ them and accept them to define their social meanings (1997: 7). Castells defines his use of the term ‘meaning’ in

the context of identity as ‘the symbolic identification by a social actor of the purpose of her/his action’ and proposes that ‘in the network society, ... for most social actors, meaning is organized around a primary identity (that is an identity that frames the others), that is self-sustaining across time and space’ (ibid). However, I do not entirely agree with the last phrase — ‘that is self-sustaining across time and space’ — as it pushes into the background the way an actor’s primary identity is prone to change across time and space, though often arduously and minimally. Also, which identity is pushed forward as the primary one in a certain context is neither consistent in different circumstances nor throughout one’s life. I do agree that a primary identity essentially retains most of its main and distinguishing characteristics, some of which are more strongly projected than others at certain times and stages of life, and that primary identity is in interaction with the other dominant characteristics of the other identities, but this does not prevent change. Greatbatch and Dingwall (1998: 131) maintain that identities produced in a talk are not maintained throughout a talk, and participants in ‘talk-in-interaction’ change the identities ‘even within a single turn at talk.’

Many sociolinguists and sociologists agree that identities are constructed (cf. Joseph 2004: 6, Castells 1997: 6–7). Bruter (2005: 15) maintains that ‘the emergence of a new identity’ does not conflict with ‘pre-existing components’ of an individual identity. According to Bruter (ibid.: 10–11), sociolinguists distinguish two types of identities: personal (some also

call this individual, e.g. Joseph 2004 and Castells 1997) and social (also called group identity, e.g. Joseph 2004). Bruter (ibid.) describes the personal identity as 'inductive', 'affective', 'centred on the individual and extending towards the rest of the world', an identity that is made up of networks within families and people who share one's cultural upbringing. As for social identity, he (ibid.: 10) describes it as deductive, based on 'a set of references to pre-existing social groups, feelings of belonging to characteristics that "make a difference" in the society in which the individual lives.' However, terming the two groups as 'personal' versus 'social' may be misleading, as one's personal identity is a social construction, and accordingly, the term 'group' identity instead of social identity may be more appropriate. Joseph (2004: 37) mentions two opposite but interlinked ways in which identity can be recognised: 'identity-as-sameness is principally recognised through contact with what is different, while identity-as-uniqueness is established largely through the intersection of identity-as-sameness categories.' To a certain extent these two ways match the definitions of group identity and individual identity respectively.

For many sociologists, political identities come under group identities as an 'extension' of these; however, Bruter does not agree with this and argues that political identities are distinct identities by themselves, despite having characteristics of both personal and social identities at the same time. Political identities are affective like personal identities, while, at the same time, they have feelings of belonging to a pre-existing group like social

identities (2005.: 10). Bruter (ibid.: 11) accordingly distinguishes between two hypothesised components of political identities: he labels the personal aspects of them as ‘civic’, and the social (or group) ones as ‘cultural’. He explains that a cultural perspective would measure ‘the sense of belonging a citizen feels towards a particular political group,’ while the civic perspective would measure ‘the identification of citizens with a political structure, such as a State, which can be defined as the set of institutions, rights, and rules that preside over the political life of a community’ (ibid.: 12). Bruter, nevertheless, asserts that, usually, the cultural and civic components of political identities are ‘almost impossible ... to distinguish, because in many cases, the dominant “State” and “Nation” of reference are super-imposed’ (ibid.: 12–13). As an explanatory example of this, he points out that most Scots consider themselves to have a dual identity: Scottish/British, while for most English people, Englishness and Britishness are considered to be similar (ibid.).

In his study of European mass identity as a national and political identity, Bruter (2005: 4–5) recommends that a researcher in the field of identity take on one of two ‘perspectives’: he defines the first as a ‘top-down’ model, which basically asks who *should* be considered in the identity in question ‘in terms of geography, politics, culture, and what the natural limits of “European” [or the identity in question] are.’ The second model is ‘bottom up’, which appears to conform more to the folkloristic study of language, taking into account who *feels* they belong to that identity. The first model is

of a more cultural nature while the second is of a more civic nature, and the choice between them is recommended to be made according to the nature, questions and purpose of the research (Bruter 2003 cited in *ibid.*). The ‘bottom-up’ approach, as in Anderson’s imagined communities (1983), conforms to the theories of identification, where there is no identity unless an individual thinks of himself or herself as part of that identity; while the ‘top-down’ approach, which in turn conforms to ‘identity-recognition’ theory, assumes that there are pre-existing identities with certain characteristics and in which an individual ‘recognises’ his or her relevance (Bruter 2003: 13–14).

Identities seem to have ‘elastic’ boundaries, which are significantly affected when new mass identities emerge. Considering the role of the emergence of American identity in establishing the American States as an example, Bruter (2005: 4) asserts that, historically, such a success is due to the emergence of ‘common ideals, common interests, and a set of favourable political circumstances.’ These may also describe the mutual grounds of many other mass identities, such as religious and sectarian mass identity.

Van Dijk (1998: 118) explains that when a group ideology is formed, this ideology in turn forms the group identity. He explains that self-representation ‘is a gradually constructed abstraction from personal experiences (models) of events’ and that part of this self-representation is ‘inferred’ from how others treat us or what they say about us (*ibid.*).

Widdicombe (1998: 52–53) asserts that:

a reference to a person's social identity is also a reference to their membership of a specific category. ... [C]ategory terms may be used to invoke activities or other attributes which may be expected or considered appropriate for people to whom the category term is applied (by themselves or others). Conversely, a description of someone's activities may be used to invoke their category membership.

Widdicombe and Wooffitt (1995: 53) state that ascription can be a form of social control in that once one's affiliation is assigned; then one's 'actions, beliefs, opinions,' etc. are very likely to be expected to conform to what is ascribed and believed about that category of that individual, something that in turn will 'provoke a sense of social injustices' (ibid.). It also is important to note that different groups may still not share the same group identities even if they have the same social activities, symbols, settings or organisations. This is because each group attaches them to totally different meanings, and this makes group identity intersubjective in the same way personal identity is (van Dijk 1998: 125).

Muhawi (1996: 56) summarises three different ways of looking at identities from three different perspectives: (a) in the fields of anthropology and sociology, the terms 'ethnic group' and 'nation states' are often used; (b) core linguistics and sociolinguistics use 'speech community', and this term is similar but not identical to the term 'performance' presented by Barth (1969 cited in Muhawi, ibid.); and (c) the third field is that of folkloristics, who use

‘folk groups’. Muhawi (1996: 56) points out that these ways of defining identity are not identical but ‘interdependent’. By checking Muhawi’s definition against Bruter’s dichotomies, it is clear that Muhawi’s categorisation is based on a group (or cultural) perspective rather than on a personal (or civic) one. It is worth noting that the boundaries of these different definitions given by Muhawi are not rigid. For instance, one may be associated with a certain ethnic group from a certain perspective and then reassigned to another, depending on which characteristics (often stereotypical ones) are intended to be projected. As with speech communities, bilinguals or multilinguals can, for example, choose not to speak one of the languages or can shift from one language to another in the social network. An example of this can be the many Holī families resident in Bahrain whose inter-group language used among family and close friends was Holī; they then shifted to Arabic and limited the use of Holī to conversations with older generations who rejected the shift. As for the third way of looking at identity, i.e. folk identity, it is very dependent on how people as groups evaluate and define themselves and others as groups or individuals with certain references. This folkloristic definition of identity is affected most by various external factors, whether social, political, regional, religious, etc.

In this thesis, the major perspective of identity that will be built on is that of speech community, as a sectarian division is also projected in a linguistic division. The Arabic language first unites the whole Bahraini

community as one language community, and then dialects subdivide it, and accents subdivide it even further. It is difficult, however, to talk about one way of defining identity (i.e. as a speech community) without taking the other two (as an ethnic group and as a folk identity) into consideration and, thus, these other two perspectives are continuously and deliberately mentioned and discussed whenever appropriate in this research.

To demonstrate how these three perspectives are entangled, it is interesting to consider these two definitions: Corder's definition of a speech community as being 'made up of people who *regard themselves* as speaking the same language' (1973: 54, emphasis in original), and Bruter's definition of a citizen's political identity as 'his sense of belonging to politically relevant human groups and political structures' (2005: 1). These two definitions are heavily based on what people think, i.e. on a more folkloric perspective, but again, it is difficult to define a speech community objectively. Oakes (2001: 20) considers Corder's definition to be based on socio-psychological factors, which in turn are moulded by socio-political factors, such as ethnic identity and nationalism. This relates the matter to issues of ethnic identity and nationalism, and it takes us back to the ethnological view of identity.

A given community can be divided into speech communities either on the basis of social or geographical variation. If social factors are taken into consideration, then subdivisions are known as linguistic varieties. Sociolinguistic variation can include, for example, 'a speaker's socio-

economic class, sex, age, ethnic group, etc.’ and these variations, despite ‘challeng[ing] the homogeneity of a given language ... rarely lead to the emergence what can be considered as separate languages’ (Oakes 2001: 18). As for geographical variation, speech communities are divided by what is known as ‘dialects and regional accents.’ However, as Oakes (ibid.: 18–19) explains, the term ‘dialect’ is ‘socio-politically loaded’ as it suggests the inferiority of certain groups on a linguistic basis. Regional accents are another way to divide a speech community geographically, but on a smaller scale.

Regarding the fluidity of social identities, van Dijk (1998: 121) explains that:

Just like personal identity, social identities may change. Whereas some basic (ideological) principles may remain more or less identical over a relatively long period of time, the more specific social representations, such as attitudes, may adapt strategically to social and political change.

This means that identity is dynamic, making it more of a ‘process’ of ‘identification’ than a state, while what is relatively stable is the ‘collectivity of people’ (ibid.). Van Dijk (ibid.: 123) states that, while ideologies are ‘limited to the cognitive realm,’ group identities can be characterised by collective action, institution rituals, and *group-identifying symbols*, such as uniforms, flags, buildings, and prominent historical events that serve as ‘a

collective memory.’ These are rather an ‘*expression or enactment*’ of the ideologies (ibid. 26, my emphasis). He explains that by extending the notion of group identity to elements, it becomes ‘as comprehensive and vague as that of culture.’ All this makes group identity ‘a very fuzzy notion’ that has both strict and broad perspectives (ibid.: 124). As for discourse, it plays a role in forming and reproducing group identity at two levels: intergroup discourse, such as in meetings and teaching, and intragroup discourse, such as when group members present, legitimise or defend themselves (ibid.: 125).

In Marxism, ideologies and groups are related to the notion of ‘class’, but in present-day academic discourse, the notion of groups tends no longer to be based on socio-economics (ibid.: 140). ‘Ideologies are acquired, confirmed and changed by social actors as members of groups, and as a function of the goals and interests of such groups’ (ibid.: 141). Van Dijk mentions five criteria of ‘groupness’ or for defining a social group, and distinguishes them from social categories. The criteria can be summarised as follows:

- A group must have some continuity beyond one event (ibid.).
- A group has one or more shared problems, concerns or interests, which can be (a) objective ones, whether social, political or economic, and (b) cognitive or affective ones (ibid. 143).

- The members of a group ‘have affective *feelings* of belonging to the group’, or, in other words, ‘they share *social representations*’. The continuity and reproduction of a group is often dependent on individual or group acts that are based on the shared social representations of the members. This confirms ‘that groups are not merely a societal construct, but also constituted mentally through shared representations’ (ibid., emphasis in original).
- A group has ‘a social *conflict, struggle* or any other kind of interest-based opposition’ with one or more other groups (ibid.: 145, emphasis in original). The shared problems, concerns or interests may make the group members become ‘mutually dependent’ and may motivate them ‘to act collectively to overcome their plight’. With conflicts among groups, the dominant one(s) will try to develop an ideology that serves to keep it dominant, and it may ‘develop an ideology as a basis for its attitudes, opinions, practices and discourses of resistance or opposition’ (ibid.: 145).
- A group has a degree of *institutionalisation*, and this excludes ephemeral social categories, such as socio-biological ones (ethnic groups, sex groups, age groups, etc.) or socio-economic ones (the rich and the poor, etc.) (ibid.: 156).

In any group, there can always be members who deviate from their ideology, which means that the notion of group can ‘sometimes be distinct from its

individual members' (ibid.: 147). This means that 'groups may have attributes that are not necessarily those of (all) their members' (ibid.). However, 'a group "has" an ideology if most of its members share most of the propositions that define such an ideology' or what can be called 'the set of "essential" or "core" ideological propositions, namely those that are the specific, defining or prototypical fundamental beliefs of a group' (ibid.: 148). If, nevertheless, only a small number of members share the core ideological propositions, then this results in ideological decline or change (ibid.: 149). Still, group members do not necessarily have to be explicitly or consciously aware of these ideological properties (ibid.: 150). Additionally, it is not enough that the members consider themselves part of a group, but how others perceive them also counts (ibid.: 151).

At the level of the role of institutions in constructing and affecting identities, Bruter (2005: 167) construes the following from the results of empirical tests he conducted:

When it comes to the formation and evolution of political identities, institutions and people both undoubtedly matter. Thanks to the combination of experimental and time-serial evidence, it has been shown that symbolic campaigns are efficient in stimulating the emergence and consolidation of a new political identity. It has been underlined that the way we are informed about the outcomes of a political project has an influence on our propensity to identify with it. It has even been demonstrated clearly that, the very existence, survival, and consolidation of a set of political institutions participates in the generation of its own identity, that is, to the

reaction of civic identification of the citizen under its rule with the political community. This, however, should not make us lose sight of the subtle interaction that results from institutions trying to influence increasingly cynical citizens.

This relation and constant interaction between an institution's identity and the public makes political power a two-way interaction between political institutions and the public, with each having a significant effect on the other.

An important term in relation to ingrouping and outgrouping is Othering. Lévinas (2003: quoted in Zuckemann 2006: 244) explains that othering is the status of being the awareness of the *Other* initiates, by which the identity of self is realised, and this consequently leads to empowering oneself with a sense of unity with similar religious or national groups. This realisation, thus, as many other ideologically group shared model (or semantic representation) can be reflected in discursive choices a speaker makes.

2.5 *Emotions in Discourse*

2.5.1 Generalities

Identity (both personal and group), discourse and ideology all include feelings and emotions as an essential feature. Political language as other language genres can get emotive. Emotions can be revealed in, and even suppressed by, language. Religions and cultures also vary in how they

perceive and deal with emotions. This makes emotions a mutual theme running through identity, discourse, ideology and culture. Emotive speech can be a discursive device that either fortifies or weakens an interlocutor's stance. Weigand (2004: 9) maintains that human beings are 'inevitably influenced by emotions.' Plantin maintains that unlike mood, which is 'a stable, long-lasting disposition ... unrelated to an external, definite stimulus,' emotions are 'passive, secondary to an arbitrary emotion-inducing event, provoking an emotional state that fades away more or less quickly' (2004: 266). Stamenov explains that the function of emotion is 'to signal to the organism in an unmediated way where it finds itself on the road which leads from a desire for some object stimulus to its gratification' (2004: 180).

There was an attempt in the 1970s among linguists to deconstruct language into 'simple atomic predicates which were supposed to make up the whole meaning', an attempt that disregarded emotions and individuals. This has drastically changed, and terms like 'individuality, probability, principles, and performance have replaced the terms of generality, fixed codes, rules, and system' (Weigand 2004: 3). The study of emotions has gone through various stages in different cultures and different scientific fields, ranging from total neglect as a non-scientific subject, to it being seen as a by-product of human physical activities, and to it being considered as the actual motivation of all other cognitive and physical human activities (for a succinct account of historical shifts, see Lindholm 2005: 30–38 and White 2005: 241–247).

2.5.2 Variables affecting emotions

White (2005: 242) points out that ‘the history of emotion theory is largely one of oscillation between binaries of mind–body and nature–culture.’

Weigand emphasises that ‘[t]he framework for investigating human communicative behaviour ... has to include all possible variables, social, cultural, personal, which have the power to influence human actions’ (2004: 7). Different cultures perceive the expression or suppression of feelings differently, and this does not exclude what can be considered to be the commercially initiated perspective of controlling emotions, which expect, for example, the air hostess always to smile and be cheerful regardless of how she actually feels. Controlling emotions can involve suppressing the way one feels and projecting indifference on the one hand, or forcing an exterior expression of another feeling that contradicts one’s actual feeling, on the other hand (Lindholm 2005: 38–39). Lindholm (*ibid.*: 40) stresses that:

physiological and evolutionary evidence ... indicates emotions are not infinitely malleable, not totally cognitive, nor completely rational; nor is the quest for power the only motivation of human beings. ... [T]he drives that impel them do have some autonomy, force, and structure and do press toward expression no matter how thoroughly they are denied.

Lindholm (ibid.: 42) maintains that ‘the psychological substance out of which mixtures [of emotions] come is universal’ but there are still both individual and cultural variations affecting ‘the specific colorations and intensities’ of these emotions. He asserts that these differences are culturally, historically and structurally motivated while ‘resting upon common psychic ground’ (ibid.: 43). Damasio (2000: 57) also maintains that emotions are both biologically and culturally shaped. He explains that the role of culture in shaping emotions comes in three parts: shaping ‘an adequate inducer’ of each emotion, shaping how such emotions are expressed, and shaping ‘the cognition and behaviour which follows the development of an emotion’ (ibid.). White (2005: 242) affirms that many approaches to emotions have taken an individual-centred methodology; however, he sets out to identify the limitations of this methodology, and instead proposes the concept of emotion institution, which stresses ‘the mutual influences’ of psychology, culture, and what people say or do on emotions (ibid.). He explains that ‘emotions are also located within wider spheres of ideology and political structure’ (ibid.: 243), something which gives emotions a social dimension. White stresses ‘the significant role played by socially organized activities in facilitating (and creating) culturally meaningful forms of emotion’ while, simultaneously, putting emotions “‘at risk” of being redefined or transformed as they are manifest in communicative routines and practices’ (ibid.: 243). Bazzanella (2004: 60–61) lays equal stress on both cultural and individual

variations of emotions by explaining that there are cross-cultural variations and intracultural ones.

Weigand (2004: 10) asserts that emotions are internal states that are motivated by one's 'expectations and needs' from other human beings or from the world. She also states that '[e]motions are *always present* and cannot be switched off. They are integrated with other abilities' (ibid., emphasis in original). Accordingly, politics and the struggle over power are emotionally loaded no matter how much one tries to present them objectively. Weigand also adds that reason has 'modest' controlling power over emotion.

Emotions are triggered and motivated by context. To understand how this works, it is important first to understand the status of context, whether it is something that is already there or is created differently in every individual setting. Bazzanella explains that while sociolinguists consider context *a priori*, in psychology and artificial intelligence it is considered to be *activated* (2004: 58). Bazzanella (ibid.: 58) 'integrates' the two approaches as two levels of context. She calls the first the global level in reference to 'the external components of the context' and says that it corresponds to *a priori* features, i.e. sociolinguistic parameters such as age, status ... social roles of participants ... [and] the general experience resulting from the interplay of culture and social community (ibid.). She calls the second level the *local level*, which 'corresponds to the parameters that are selected because of their relevance to the space/time/person localisation and to the

linguistic interaction itself ...; it is activated and constructed in the ongoing interaction as it becomes relevant' (ibid.). She explains that local context can result in the same person reacting differently at different times to the same or similar 'external inputs' (i.e. what she calls the global context) (ibid.: 59). Being dynamic in that sense, the local context affects the production of an emotion, its intensity and its duration (ibid.). The two levels of context actually work simultaneously and together, but it would be useful to distinguish between them for analytic purposes (ibid.: 62). Bazzanella explains that sincerity communicates a given emotion to the audience in different ways depending on the purpose of needing to communicate this emotion:

[I]n situations such as talk shows, emotions are *displayed* rather than expressed. A scalar continuum could be drawn from *expressed* emotions (i.e. actually felt in a given, everyday situation) to *displayed* (i.e. shown more than felt, ...), to *reproduced* (such as in theatre, where the actor behaves as if he really feels the emotions), to *fictitious* (i.e. pretended emotion), up to various degrees of *lying/deceiving*. The 'sincerity condition' varies according to the different kinds of emotion, and the interaction involved is of course affected by it (Bazzanella 2004: 67, emphasis in original).

Stamenov argues that emotions are a stimulus of behaviour (2004: 180); however, experiencing ambivalent emotions makes it difficult to choose between two contradictory behaviours and, accordingly, '[b]eing ambivalent means first and foremost being behaviourally in trouble' (ibid.: 181).

However, when one expresses a feeling towards something that actually opposes one's real feelings (e.g. saying that a lecture was fantastic while deep inside feeling it was boring), then this is related to ambivalence but is essentially called euphemism, face-saving etiquette or hypocrisy (ibid.: 186–187).

2.5.3 Emotions affecting language

In explaining when and how emotions affect utterances, Weigand (2000: 13–14) asserts that 'it is not the word which has a meaning by definition but the speakers predicate with words how they perceive and construct an image of the world. ... Isolated words are often considered polysemous. Polysemy however is a problem of theory not of language use.'

Čmejrková maintains that '[a] political debate as any kind of exchange may be dominated either by a referential function or by emotional and expressive functions' (2004: 51). She emphasises that

in ritual communication of political debates we should be aware of ritual masks determined by institutional roles of their participants. ... An adequate account of *emotive communication needs to consider that at the discourse level of interaction, emotional as well as unemotional choices can be interpreted as masks* (Čmejrková 2004: 52, emphasis in original).

Thus, the absence of expressing emotion is as vital and significant as not expressing emotion, and consequently, emotions are involved in political discourse even in the most impassive and bleak discourses. However, while some discursive structures and wordings of parts of excerpts being analysed may present some instances of emotive speech, it was not possible to illustrate when emotions were suppressed or hidden. It is important to note that in order to stress the fact that failing to recognise an emotive aspect or expression does not deny their presence. Still, an analyst, nevertheless, will always have a number of examples in which emotions are expressed or reflected in discursive choices that he or she can build upon. To be able to examine emotions and how they are expressed or *not* expressed in parliamentary debates, carrying out an analysis of audio and video records would be required. This is in order to include voice pitch, intonation, overlap, speech speed, facial expressions and gestures alongside textual analysis.

Emotional reactions can result from breaking norms (Walrod 2004: 210). That is because the 'foundational' nature of norms makes them subconscious, which results in their being adhered to 'scrupulously'. If any norms are violated, this leads to a 'strong emotional reaction', resulting sometimes in physical violence, but more often in normative discourse, such as 'a scolding, a grievance, or an argument' (ibid.). This makes normative discourse an instance of 'the interconnectedness of language and emotion' (ibid.: 207).

Normative discourse is used to ‘influence behavior, opinions, or beliefs of others’ (ibid.: 210). Walrod explains that normative discourse is based on concepts of ‘should’, ‘ought’ or ‘must’, and this varies among cultures and languages, depending on ‘the system of values’ and ‘norms’ governing these cultures or languages (ibid.: 211). He contends that when we utter an evaluation, we are expressing opinions that ‘imply a prescription, i.e. an implicit “ought”’, as ‘[e]ach prescription necessarily implies an evaluation’, but that when we utter this prescription then that is an imperative (ibid.).

2.6 Discursive Devices and Discursive Strategies

2.6.1 Generalities

In this research, I differentiate between discursive devices and discursive strategies. I use the term ‘devices’ to describe the smaller and more phrase- or expression-specific units which serve to fulfil a strategy. Devices can be detected in isolation, but strategies require comprehension of the larger picture, the context and the purpose of the bigger linguistic unit being studied. Kettell (2010: 769–790) defines discursive strategies as ‘the way in which agents frame and present particular themes, issues and arguments with a view to shaping the context of political debate, whether in the media, political institutions or elsewhere.’ In the context of political debate,

discursive strategies have ‘multifarious’ aims, which can be one or more of the following:

to provide a common interpretation of the main problems and challenges faced, to set out a coherent explanation of goals and objectives, to seek to justify and legitimise political action for the pursuit of these ends, and to persuade and mobilise support, as well as undermine, challenge and otherwise call into question opposing arguments (ibid.).

A discursive device, in contrast, is a discursive or linguistic tool with a specific goal or intention that is fulfilled in the specific utterance, i.e. a phrase or sentence, in which the device is used. A discursive device, often but not necessarily always, alongside other discursive devices, can be used to serve a larger discursive strategy. Accordingly, a discursive strategy is a scheme or a plan that employs various discursive devices to execute an ideological goal. A device, hence, can be identified more instantly at the analysis stage, while a strategy is identified when the ‘full picture’ is synthesised. Different combinations of discursive devices can be used to create different discursive strategies. Thus, the same device can be used in different, even contrasting, strategies.

Since the data used in the analysis are in the form of text (for more discussion about how the data were chosen, see Section 3.9), the focus will automatically be on the linguistic features of the examined discourses (also see definition 1 in Section 1.6 for the difference between discourse and text,

and the first paragraph in Section 1.4 for the position of extra-linguistic content in this research). In this thesis, I cover a range of linguistic acts, moves and styles to make my list of devices. I mainly focus on the following discursive devices:

- shift between local accents and classical Arabic
- emotive speech
- framing and reframing
- quoting other sources
- humour
- discourse markers

in addition to six of the broader list of devices observed by Socio cognitive Approach (SCA)³¹ (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 28–29):

- lexical style
- local semantic moves (such as disclaimers)
- speech acts
- rhetorical features
- propositional structure
- turn-takings.

The first two discursive devices, shifting between local dialects and standard Arabic and emotive speech, have already been introduced in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.5 respectively. Rhetoric, style and speech acts are briefly introduced below, and the analysis section provides ample space for them to be elaborated. When it comes to the propositional structure, I mean the conceptual structure, or, to put it simply, the meaning of the utterances regardless of its syntactic structure. Propositional structures are explicit and may convey mental representations, though not necessarily. However, they are useful ‘may ... be ideologically controlled’ (van Dijk 1995b: 258). In this research, propositional structures are taken into account and used to understand how a speaker constructs his or her utterances on the basis of mental schemata reflecting ideological beliefs; however, the term itself is not mentioned in the analysis. As for the other ones, they are identified in the analysis chapter itself when instances of such devices occur. The reason why these devices are only briefly introduced in the present chapter is that more details are given when instances of these devices are illustrated in Chapter 4, where further and more specific explanations are provided as the excerpts and the instances require. What is required first of all is a brief introduction to Arabic language rhetoric and style.

2.6.2 Arabic Language Rhetoric

The major rhetorical devices in the Arabic language are the following:

- the use of repetition
- the use of synonyms
- the employment of examples and illustrations
- the choice of suitable vocabulary
- the variation of styles between statement-making, questioning, exclamation, and denunciation
- the choice of strong and appropriate locations for pausing (Aljarim & Ameen 1999: 16. My translation).

Of course, none of these features is unique to Arabic, but their frequency in distributing varies amongst and defines different rhetorical cultures.

Determining the location of short pauses within a speech by an individual was not possible in this research, since it deals with written text that does not mark pauses. Still, the point at which a speaker chooses to end his or her speech or intervention is considered. Other devices which I observed are added to my own more comprehensive list of discursive devices in 4.1, at the beginning of the Analysis Chapter.

The use of figures of speech, or description and imagery, is a powerful device that has branched and detailed subdivisions in Arabic. This branch of language rhetoric is called *‘ilm albayān* علم البيان (for more details, see *ibid.*: 18–141), while the study of sound patterns is another field known as *‘ilm albadī* علم البديع (*ibid.*: 236–270).

In this research, I focus on the former, *‘ilm albayān*, and since the data were translated from the original texts, this automatically excluded sound patterns from being examined. Hence I do not provide any discussion on *‘ilm albadī*.

2.6.3 Style

Style, being *how* the content is said or communicated, is an important discursive device that can reflect information beyond what the content communicates. Social styles are important resources for making ‘different sorts of personal and interpersonal meaning’, and what is most significant for linguistic style is the process (i.e. ‘how people *use* or *enact* or *perform* social styles for a range of symbolic purposes’) rather than the product (Coupland 2007: 3). In interviews, there are moments when a speaker is more relaxed and thus speaks less carefully; in such moments, the speaker will use more features of his or her local style than he or she would in other parts of the interview. This is what Labov calls ‘stylistic variation’, referring to ‘the differentiation of speakers by their social status’ (1972: 110).

The discussion of styles or social styles covers a broad spectrum of language features. Coupland (2007: 2), for example, believes that dialects are social styles. A brief presentation of dialects in Bahrain is provided in Section 2.3.2 above. Style is a broad term and can cover a number of linguistic features, including grammar, tone, imagery, etc. In this research, I

choose to focus on lexical style, which is concerned with vocabulary use. I present rhetoric devices as separate discursive devices.

2.6.4 Speech acts

Speech acts are the functions of utterances. Some examples of speech acts are request, permission, complaint, command, statement, exclamation, etc. They differ from the structure. For example: ‘You haven’t told me what happened’ has the structure of an affirmative statement, but it has a function of a request, requesting the addressee to tell the speaker what happened. Weigand believes that there are three speech acts related to emotions: constructive speech acts can be used to state one’s feeling, declarative ones can be used to ‘create social relationships by declaring emotions’, and expressive speech acts can be used to ‘emphasize an overwhelming emotion’. Expressive speech acts are often signified though the grammatical structure and the intonation of the utterance. In addition to these speech acts that convey emotion, a statement can be accompanied by emotion without actually referring to any emotion. Sometimes, however, intonations are not clear enough. In such situations, rules and generalisations do not work any longer, and ‘[p]rinciples of probability, inferences and suppositions’ of the motivation behind the utterances can be useful³² (2004: 16–17).

Although I include speech acts as an importance discursive device, there is almost no direct mention of them as such. This is because all the

sentences in the excerpts being analysed have speech acts assigned to them. I occasionally mention comparing and contrasting as a speech act particularly when it is relevant to constructing an image of oneself and others, of identities. The other devices I detect also have speech acts of their own, as it will be clear in the analysis chapter. Thus, I only mention functions within my analysis where and when appropriate without mentioning the term ‘speech acts’.

Above, I have provided some insight into what I have called discursive devices. Regarding the discursive strategies, they are presented and explained in Chapter 4, the Analysis Chapter, since this allows me to use my actual data to motivate and illustrate them, rather than setting them out *a priori*. This way, the devices are the starting point of the analysis and the strategies evolve with analysis.

2.7 Conclusions

In this chapter I have presented an overview of the research topic to present both a theoretical background and a context for my analysis. Since politics is a linguistic practice, when religious or sectarian perspective is adopted, then the ideology of that religion or sect is expected to be manifested in the political discursive practices. The Bahraini Council of Representatives should not be an exception; however, there is no academic evidence of such

manifestation of sectarian ideology in political language and the discursive strategies. In order to test if there is a difference between the discursive strategies used by Sunni parties and those used by Shiite parties in the Council, I provided a theoretical and historical background to the topic. I have first of all shown how according to the Islamic perspective, politics is an inseparable aspect of Islam and thus politics gets evaluated by and measured against Islamic principles and values when a party has an Islamic basis. This has been the theological argument for the existence of a difference. However, it had to be tested impartially by critically analysing actual excerpts from the debates held in the Council. I thus moved to presenting the sectarian and ethnic structure of Bahrain to set the scene of the analysis. I have presented a preview of the sectarian structure and the varieties of spoken Arabic in Bahrain and how it is considered a marker of ethnic and, often, sectarian affiliation of interlocutors. Understanding that the Council represents members of the same speech communities as in mundane life, I have then explained the historical background of the current parliament and how Sunni and Shiite movements interacted with and reacted to it.

I have then presented a theoretical background of major concepts that are essential to grasp the ideological struggle for power in the excerpts I analyse in this research. These major concepts are power, identity, ideology, emotive speech and discursive devices. Such information should help trace a pattern in the examined excerpts and accordingly test the hypothesis by

comparing and contrasting discursive strategies employed by the political parties at the Council and how sectarian ideological constructs prevail in them. With all this information in mind, the methodology of this research was developed to fulfil the research objectives.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 *Introduction*

Having established a background of the key areas and concepts that are related to the research problem in the previous chapter, in this chapter, I elucidate the methodology followed in selecting, collecting and analysing the data in this research.

The chapter begins with an overview of the theoretical framework adapted in the methodology of the research, explaining the features of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as a perspective and Sociocognitive Approach (SCA) as an approach and how they serve to meet the objectives of this work. The chapter then explains how the research hypothesis was developed and how the choice was made to focus on the theme of dissent control and political freedom in the course of data analysis. After that, the chapter shows how different sources of data, i.e. excerpts from Hansard and reference to sittings or relevant events from local newspapers, are linked to provide a better understanding of the context and the topic. The chapter also explains the importance of continuous feedback between the data collection and the data analysis and how this contributed to developing the research.

3.2 *Theoretical Framework*

The topic of the Bahraini Council of Representatives and the role of its religious or sectarian identities is so complex that a single perspective

isolated from other fields of study cannot properly inform research. This is because political ideologies and power relations can be studied from different academic perspectives, such as politics, sociology and history. My thesis mainly, but not exclusively, approaches the topic from a sociolinguistic angle, and this perspective allows for related interpretations and explanations from other fields – particularly politics, psychology and theology – and while grounding the analysis in language data.

This research has Hansard of the Bahraini Council of Representatives as its main source of data. It analyses linguistic units in order to present a reading of the prominent political identities in the Bahraini Council of Representatives by analysing how language is employed in the struggle over for power. The basic perspective this research adopts is that of CDA. A major aspect of CDA is that it is ‘problem-oriented’ and ‘interdisciplinary’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 2). In the study of the Bahraini Council of Representatives, CDA is most suitable since its three focal concepts are ideology, power and critique (ibid.:1). From CDA many approaches have evolved, each constructed from a different viewpoint of how ideology and power can be critically observed and analysed. Among these approaches is SCA, which was proposed by Teun van Dijk. SCA combines social representation theory and mental representations (i.e. context models). In this research, I adopt SCA, which proposes, and strongly supports, that cognition mediates between discourse and society, whereas many other CDA approaches focus on society and discourse alone (van Dijk: 2009a: 64).

‘Discourse’ and ‘text’ are key-terms that are repeatedly mentioned in the research. Since the definitions of discourse and text vary from one discipline to another – and even from one approach to another – I would like to present the definitions that my research adopted in accordance with SCA and my methodology. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 2) use the term ‘text’ to cover both written and spoken text and stress the unity of meaning: ‘[a] text is best regarded as a SEMANTIC unit: a unit not of form but of meaning’ (emphasis in original). They use the term ‘discourse’, on the other hand, to refer to ‘the whole process of social interaction of which a text is just a part’ and which also includes the interaction (a) between the process of production and the process of interpretation and (b) between the context of production and the context of interpretation’ (Fairclough 1989: 24–25). This way, discourses are ‘unique occurrences involving particular social actors in a particular setting and context’ (ibid.: 24). For example: ‘I object’ can be difference discourses, each occurring in a different setting (e.g. in the Bahraini Parliament, in the British Parliament, in a company) and different context (e.g. a regular meeting, during one’s turn, as an interruption of someone else’s turn) by and among (or addressed to) different social actors (e.g. by a certain MP addressing the Speaker of the Council, by another MP to the same Speaker, among a certain group of MPs and journalists or at the attendance of a minister or a delegation). The utterance can be shouted or murmured, can be a reaction to a proposal, to a law draft or to an intervention, for example. Each change in the sitting, context or social actors

creates a unique occurrence and thus a new discourse. The definitions of text and discourse provided by Fairclough above are suitable for this research except for one point: I find it controversial to use the word 'text' to also cover spoken forms of language, as this contradicts the common use of the word 'text'. Hence, I use it to refer to written units of language alone, whether it was something that was originally produced as written or if it was a transliteration of spoken experts. This way, the data I am dealing with in this research are all texts, whether originally produced as texts, i.e. originally written, transliterated spoken excerpts, or translated ones.

When it comes to the term 'discourse analysis', '[d]iscourse analysis focuses on the systematic account of the complex structures and strategies of the text and talk as they are actually accomplished (produced, interpreted, used) in their social contexts' (van Dijk 1998: 198). Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter (2007: 147) maintain that 'the notion of "discourse" is more informative and relevant than the term "text".' Within these lines, the term 'discourse' in my research covers a wider scope than the term text; it covers the following:

- the language unit in question, whether spoken or written,
- the context it appears in and with, and
- any institutional conducts, whether social, cultural, political, religious, language specific or organisational, that constrain or shape the production and interpretation processes of the linguistic unit.

With these points in mind, I next shed light on how CDA can be useful in analysing political discourse. In the following sections, I present an overview of CDA to show how it is related to the objectives and hypothesis of this thesis in relation to a struggle over power. I provide details about SCA, which is one of the approaches that adapt the perspective of CDA, to show why it is a suitable approach for the research data and for fulfilling the research objectives.

3.3 CDA as a perspective

Critical discourse analysis (CDA), or Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), is a vast field with multiple approaches and uses. Some scholars prefer one term to the other while others distinguish between the two. Van Dijk (2009a: 62ff), for example, prefers CDS to CDA, as he finds CDS more general, including both critical theory and critical application, and it does not limit itself to critical analysis. He adds that '[t]he designation of CDS may also avoid the widespread misconception that a critical approach is a method of discourse analysis' (ibid.: 62). He explains that:

CDS is not a method, but rather a critical *perspective, position or attitude* within a discipline of multidisciplinary Discourse Studies. Critical research makes use of a large number of methods, both from Discourse Studies itself, as well as from humanities, psychology and the social sciences (ibid.: 62–63).

This wider description fits my research purpose and objectives well as an analysis of a political text requires bringing together the social, linguistic, historical and psychological aspects related to the text in hand; that said, I use CDA as the general and more comprehensive perspective to stay in accordance with most publications and research work in the field. I use the term CDS only when quoting directly. This is to keep the terminology in this research in line with the most common use in the literature reviewed on this topic.

However, many authors tend to classify CDA as a method of text analysis (cf. Titscher, Meyer, Wodak and Vetter 2007), so it is hard not to view it as such. I thus suggest an intermediate way of looking at the matter by considering CDA as a group of overlapping methods that have a mutual stance and share common features (for more details, see Section 3.4), something that makes CDA more of a movement that generates theories and applications.

The term ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’ itself ‘is far from implying a homogenous method within discourse analysis’ (Titscher *et al.* 2007: 144). However, in essence, the CDA perspective, first of all, has a desire to serve the community with the analysis or studies carried out. Secondly, methods under CDA follow theoretical sampling in collecting and analysing data (for more details see the upcoming sections). A third major difference between CDA and Discourse Analysis (DA) is that, unlike DA, the major interest of CDA is not the linguistic units *per se* but the social phenomenon of which the

discourse is part (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 2). With three central concepts in CDA: power, ideology and critique, CDA is interested in ‘de-mystifying’ ideology and power (ibid.: 1).

This breadth of the topic makes it unfeasible to include a comprehensive account of CDA in the literature review carried out for this research. Therefore, in this chapter, I limit myself to information related to my research objectives and suitable for the data I am analysing.

3.3.1 CDA and politics

My research is interested in exploring ideological power relations in parliamentary debates (see research objectives in Section 1.3), and CDA’s perspective proves to be very relevant to politics, as will be evident from this section. CDA is based on the concept that some discourses and texts ‘may be *unjust*’ and that the task of CDA is to expose this ‘discursive injustice’ (van Dijk 2009a: 63, emphasis in original text). Fairclough emphasises that ‘in human matters, interconnectedness and chains of cause and effect may be distorted out of vision. Hence “critique” is essentially making visible the interconnectedness of things’ (1985: 747). Van Leeuwen (2006: 293) maintains that being critical implies making one’s own position explicit and not apologising for being critical. Wodak and Meyer (2002: 9) explain that ‘[b]asically, being “critical” is to be understood as having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly,

and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research.’ This explains the importance of ideology for CDA as a mediator between language and different institutions (ibid.: 10). Van Dijk (1998: 191) objects to reducing ideologies to discourse and discourse analysis. This is because ideologies are not only processed and reproduced by language use and communication, but also by ‘social and semiotic practices other than text and talk.’ However, text and talk have properties that ‘allow social members to actually express or *formulate* abstract ideological beliefs,’ while semiotic codes do not convey opinion and meanings as explicitly and accurately as naturally occurring language (ibid.: 192, emphasis in original).

Politics have always been a battlefield for ideologies, battlefields in which discourse is a very crucial instrument. Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000: 2–3) state that:

[d]iscourse theory assumes that all objects and actions are meaningful, and that their meaning is conferred by historically specific systems of rules. ... [M]eaning depends on the orders of discourse that constitute its identity and significance. ... Each [discourse] is a social and political construction that establishes a system of relations between different objects and practices, while providing (subject) positions with which social agents can identify. ... [A] political project will try to weave together different strands of discourse in an effort to dominate or organise a field of meaning so as to fix the identities of objects and practices... .

Howarth and Stavrakakis (ibid.: 5–6) also mention that discourse theory does not limit struggle in societies to class order, and considers ‘all ideological elements in a discursive field contingent’ (ibid.: 6).³³ Thus, discourse analysis is seen to be interested in key political concepts such as hegemony, antagonism, and dislocation (ibid.). Howarth and Stavrakakis also maintain that discourse theory does not fully separate ‘socially constructed meanings and interpretations’ from ‘objective political behaviour and action,’ emphasising that ‘meanings, interpretations and practices are always inextricably linked’ (ibid.: 6). Accordingly, the task of discourse analysis is to record and explain historical and social changes ‘using political factors and logics’ (ibid.). Howarth and Stavrakakis add that discourse cannot completely detach itself from the world it is trying to interpret because it focuses on ‘the creation, disruption and transformation of the structures that organise social life,’ and this in turn means that the division between objectivity and subjectivity in social sciences is more blurred than used to be thought (ibid.), making it difficult to completely distinguish facts from values (ibid.: 7).

Wodak and Meyer mention that CDA is used to refer to an analysis that looks at ‘the larger discursive unit of text’ as ‘the basic unit of communication’ (2002: 2). They explain that CDA is ‘fundamentally concerned with analysing opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language’ (ibid.). CDA should pay attention to discourse as both ‘the

instrument of power and control’ and as ‘the instrument of the social construction of reality’ (van Leeuwen 2006: 193). In order to better understand and extensively analyse these relationships and better see the bigger picture, CDA recommends interdisciplinarity.

3.3.2 Interdisciplinarity in CDA

The concept of interdisciplinarity is very important to CDA because ‘it aims at investigating complex social phenomena which are inherently inter- or trans-disciplinary and certainly not to be studied by linguistics alone’ (Wodak 2007: 5). Van Leeuwen (2006: 3) explains that there are three models of interdisciplinarity: centralist, pluralist and integrationist.

Briefly, the centralist model is ‘the relation between different autonomous disciplines’ in which each discipline considers on the one hand itself, its theories and its method central, and on the other hand, its relation to the other disciplines as a space to overlap and to obtain support for their positions (ibid.: 3–4). Under this model, many disciplines have developed well planned methodologies which, on the one hand, encourage ‘disciplined’ thinking, but on the other hand, discourage consulting other disciplines’ methods when their central methodologies fail (ibid.: 5).

In the second interdisciplinary model, the pluralist, the problem becomes the axis of research. The model aims to make use of different disciplines simultaneously ‘as equal partners’ while each discipline maintains

its autonomy in the way it operates (ibid.). Triangulation, in which more than one method is used to verify results, is often used in the pluralist model (ibid.: 6). However, the way each discipline contributes to the 'holistic approach' is not always explained (ibid.: 7). This approach can be used in edited volumes, conferences or research projects.

Like the pluralist model, the integrationist model focuses on the problem instead of on the method and brings various disciplines together (ibid.: 7). However, this model, unlike the pluralist, requires 'team work' in which the disciplines brought together are seen as 'interdependent'. This can lead to change the way these disciplines work and this can be felt as a threat, leading to 'a lack of depth and methodological rigour, a risk of amateurism and eclecticism' (ibid.: 8). When it comes to discourse analysis, however, integration is very important because there are many expressions or elements that the methods of discourse analysis alone cannot explain (ibid.: 13). Discourse analysis requires integration with other disciplines, mainly social theory, ethnography and history (ibid.: 10). More details on how discourse analysis relies on these disciplines can be found in van Leeuwen (ibid.: 10–14). Van Leeuwen asserts that we should not limit ourselves to one discipline at the beginning of the research, because this can make the outcome of the research biased; he explains that we should ensure that the team consists of people who have both a good theoretical background and experience so that unprincipled eclecticism would not result (ibid.: 11).

In the light of van Leeuwen's categorisation of interdisciplinary, the model of this research is best described as a centralist. The main disciplines approached are sociolinguistics and linguistics while remaining open and receptive to any relevant data, readings and analyses from other disciplines as long as they serve the research without destruction or confusion. I achieved this by keeping my analysis open to political, social, psychological and theological input (i.e. from journals and other references) where they help to better understand the discourses in hand.

3.3.3 Common dimensions of CDA approaches

According to Wodak and Meyer (2009: 2), there are at least seven 'common dimensions' among the various approaches to CDA, which are as follows:

- an interest in naturally occurring language use
- a focus on large language units instead of isolated words or sentences
- going beyond language grammar to include actions and interactions
- paying attention to non-verbal aspects of discourse
- taking into consideration the socio-cognitive and interactional aspects of language
- studying the functions of contexts of language in use
- including a wide variety of language use and grammar in analysis (such as coherence, speech acts, turn-taking, mental models, etc.).

My research takes these dimensions into account in that its data are instances of naturally occurring language use. By ‘natural’ language, I refer to ‘human’ language – in contrast to artificial or constructed languages (i.e. programming languages or auxiliary languages) –that occurs without the intervention of researchers. Being natural does not necessarily mean being spontaneous (see more about spontaneity of language analysed in this research in the last paragraph of Section 3.9). The second feature, focusing on large language units, also applies to my data, since I take full language units that cover a discussion or exchange over a topic or issue and make sure to start and end my excerpts where the topic starts and ends respectively. Additionally, actions and interactions, whether described in Hansard or in relevant newspaper articles, are major focal points in my research as is apparent in the analysis chapter and as my set of strategies reflects.

When it comes to non-verbal aspects of discourse, although these are a common dimension, not all CDA analyses include them, as this depends on what type of data is being analysed. In my research, I am dealing with written transcriptions that have a very limited amount of non-verbal actions mentioned in them. I am thus limited to what is mentioned in Hansard excerpts alone (e.g. any mentioning of someone leaving his or her seat or pointing at someone or something) whenever available.

Context is a crucial element of my analysis, and each excerpt is analysed in relation to any associated social, political, historical and/or

religious contexts. My interest in the context consequently is reflected in the wide variety of language use, and this is again reflected in my chosen definition of context and my list of discursive devices (listed in Section 2.6).

3.4 *Features of CDA*

3.4.1 A critical perspective

Wodak and Meyer clarify that ‘critical’ does not necessarily mean negative and that ‘[a]ny social phenomenon lends itself to critical investigation, to be challenged and not taken for granted’ (2009: 2). CDA is critical in two senses: first, critical as established by the Frankfurt School; and secondly, in the ‘tradition’ of critical linguistics (Titscher et al. 2007: 144).

Geuss (1981: 55–56) explains that the Frankfurt School distinguishes between scientific theories and critical theories on three levels: first, while the goal of scientific theories is the ‘successful manipulation of external world,’ critical theories aim at ‘emancipation and enlightenment’ and freeing people from hidden coercion in order to enable them to realise their true interests. Secondly, scientific theories have ‘objectifying’ as their logical and cognitive structure (i.e. a distinction is made between the theory and the object to which the theory refers). On the other hand, critical theories are ‘self-reflective’ or ‘self-referential’ in the sense that the theory is always part of the object being examined. Thirdly, each of the two types of theory requires a different kind of confirmation; whereas the scientific theories

‘require empirical confirmation through observation and experiment,’ critical ones are cognitively acceptable if they survive deep and complex evaluation.

When it comes to the second sense of ‘critical,’ i.e. the sense shared with critical linguistics, then the critical perspective of linguistics has emerged ‘as a reaction to contemporary pragmatics’ and the ‘quantitative correlative sociolinguistics of William Labov’ (Titscher et al. 2007: 145). I do not elaborate on this here as it not the sense of critical that I adopt in my analysis.

3.4.2 Intertextuality

One distinct feature of CDA is ‘intertextuality and interdiscursivity,’ which is achieved by analysing the relation of an examined text to other texts (Titscher et al. 2007: 166). Intertextuality means that a text can be analysed in the light of an analysis of other texts, and observations and analyses can be linked, compared and contrasted in order to better understand and better describe the findings of a piece of research or an analysis. This concept is deemed crucial in CDA because the concept of context makes language a social interaction by relating it to and explaining it by ‘other communicative events that are happening at the same time or that have happened before’ (Wodak 1999: 178).

3.4.3 The triangle of society, cognition and discourse

Hodge and Kress (1993: 1) maintain that, besides being concerned with the relation between language and mind, linguists must give equal attention to the relation between society and language ‘since language is so distinctly a social phenomenon.’ To present the theoretical framework that CDA employs to study ‘the discursive reproduction of power abuse,’ van Dijk explains how CDA plays a role in what he describes as ‘knowledge management’ (2005a: 87). He explains that ‘the maintenance and legitimation of domination’ is not achieved through ideology alone but also through knowledge management (ibid.: 87-88). He explains that knowledge, which he views as a cognitive device (ibid.: 76), is ‘a necessary interface between society and discourse’ (ibid.: 87) and, accordingly, knowledge cannot be defined ‘as personal beliefs, but as social beliefs certified, shared and hence discursively presupposed by the members of epistemic communities’ (ibid.).

However, while knowledge is not personal but shared, the context model has both a social dimension to it, being affected by ‘communicative representations,’ and a personal dimension, being affected by ‘individual personal experiences, aims and interests of language users’ (ibid.). Thus, language is both ‘inherently social’ and has personal variations; this duality can explain the ‘interface’ between the macro aspects of discourse (social, political, cultural) and its micro aspects (individual variation) (ibid.). Van Dijk explains that if knowledge is defined as shared beliefs, then people who

have access to public discourse, such as politicians, professors and priests, are capable of influencing ‘people’s knowledge formation’ (ibid.: 88).

Van Dijk assumes that knowledge has ‘a specific status as a cognitive device’ (ibid.: 76), and explains three forms of abuse of the contextualised knowledge by the elite (ibid.: 89). The first form is *presumptions* held by the elite about people knowing certain matters in which the elite believe (ibid.: 88). Each of these assumptions has ‘social conditions, consequences and biases.’ This is because, normally, these assumptions are made by the elite about the knowledge of ‘average’ people, and by average people they mean well-educated ones exclusively. Often, presumptions made by the elite or the authority are taken for granted and are not verified or tested (ibid.: 88).

These presumptions reflect ‘opinions or prejudices’ rather than knowledge, but are used by the elite to ‘manipulate’ people ‘into accepting such biased, ideologically based beliefs’ as knowledge. The second type of abuse of contextual knowledge of the cognitive device is to assume the opposite. In this case, there are presumptions about the audience *not* sharing the knowledge of the elite and accordingly being treated as ignorant. This presumption is based on polarising one self’s ‘positive image’ from the others’ ‘negative image’ (ibid.: 89). The third kind of abuse that van Dijk introduces is the assumption that only elite discourse can ‘convey’ knowledge. Although this is not entirely wrong, ‘[i]n this case presuming ignorance of the audience is not just a question of infravaloration, but rather an example of the corresponding process of supervaloration of the self as the

only instance of “truth” (ibid.: 89). These three types of abuse can inevitably be found in political speeches and debates, but their repetition, density and explicitness may vary depending on various factors affecting the interlocutor’s presumptions as the analysis of the excerpts is expected to reflect.

3.5 Approach: SCA

3.5.1 Social Cognition

SCA looks at discourse as having two inseparable facets: social and mental (or cognitive). Since my research takes the term ‘discourse’ to cover a whole social interaction, it is important to understand the social facet as perceived by SCA. The social facet draws on social representation theory, which was originally developed by Serge Moscovici in 1961. Since then, this theory has become central to many psychological activities (Marková 1998: 371). Social representation refers to ‘a bulk of concepts, opinions, attitudes, evaluations, images and explanations which result from daily life and are sustained by communications’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009: 25–26). They are specific to social groups and are dynamic and constantly changing (ibid.: 26). Van Dijk values ‘the fundamental importance of the study of cognition (and not only that of society) in the critical analysis of discourse, communication and interaction’ (ibid.: 64). Van Dijk elsewhere calls the duality using one term: social cognition, which he defines as ‘the system of mental representations and

processes of group members' (1995a: 18). He explains that only through the 'integration' of these two aspects may the analysis reach 'descriptive,' 'explanatory' and 'critical adequacy' (2009a.: 66). By this, van Dijk creates a discourse-cognition-society triangle in the analysis of communication and interaction (ibid.: 64). However, he stresses that this approach does not suggest that 'discourse and cognition are *outside* society,' but are, instead, 'an inherent part of society' (ibid. 66, emphasis in original). SCA is interested in observing which 'shared social representations are being expressed or presupposed by discourse' (ibid.: 78).

The members of a group 'have affective feelings of belonging to the group' or, in other words, '*they share social representations.*' The continuity and reproduction of a group is often dependent on individual or group acts that are based on these shared social representations of the members (van Dijk 1998: 143, emphasis in original). This means utterances, actions, reactions, etc. and all other forms of social representation is how a group is maintained, and when these forms of expressing social representations stops, the group will have lost that group or mass identity. Van Dijk suggests that groups, besides being 'a societal construct,' are 'constituted mentally through shared representations' (ibid.: 143). Social representations are collective elaborations 'for the purpose of behaving and communicating'³⁴ (Moscovici 1963: 251), and this is something that makes them similar to encoded conditionals or assumptions (or presumptions) that treat particular inputs in a certain planned way. However, social representations are dynamic and can

and do change as the influences that form them change, such as historical and social conditions. This may result in new, modified formulas. Taking into account these two definitions of discourse and social representations, then, social representations are embedded in discourse, which in turn is a comprehensive and inclusive process. Social representations surface in linguistic and behavioural actions within the process of discourse. In a single discourse unit,³⁵ there can be several social representations relating to different ideas, opinions, attitudes, etc. The social representations occurring in the discourse can belong to one or more social groups and subgroups. In this way, the same discourse in which a number of interlocutors are participating can consist of various social representations that can be perceived differently. When this research, for example, attempts to explore to what degree the social representations of ‘political freedom’ and ‘dissent control’ concord or contradict on the basis of sectarian political affiliation of the interlocutor. Some linguistic instances, which are among the discursive devices my research examines, that can be used to observe social representations are ingroup and outgroup definitions, self-portrait, and framing and reframing techniques. Each of these discursive devices reflects an opinion, attitude, an evaluation, an explanation or an image of a member of a group or of a group.

Each social representation consists of a combination of mental representations, which in turn are smaller units, more like the input of the formulae (i.e. of the social representations). They are units that are coded

with semantic properties. The attention that SCA gives to mental representations also makes individual cognition important in analysing collective thoughts and ideologies. Van Dijk (2009a: 64) assumes that cognition mediates between discourse and society. Cognition can be defined ‘as a set of functions of the mind, such as thought, perception and representation.’ Although SCA focuses on social and cognitive interaction, it does not assume that CDA should be ‘limited’ to them, but only shows more interest in these two interfaces³⁶ (ibid.: 65). Cognition is relevant in my research, as my hypothesis (see Section 1.2) aims at testing whether and how ideological differences, which are differences in axiomatic beliefs, have major effects on the production and perception of discourses. These differences in cognition are assessed by assessing differences of perception and representations that are expressed discursively. This is again why linguistic instances need to be analysed by accumulating information on the topic in hand by employing intertextuality and context to understand interlocutor’s perception and perspective in relation to the topic being analysed.

Of course, at the cognitive level, there is no measurable, definite way to see how words, concepts and experiences are stored in the brain. There are a few theories, such as the theories that assume the existence of networks between lexical entries and the theories that assume that lexical entries are arranged in sets according to semantic features. However, not being able to measure mental representations directly and the fact that there

is no ready access to them does not make them less important and does not prevent them from playing a major role in forming interlocutors' ideology and stances. Sometimes, the effects of mental representations, or at least what are assumed to be their effects, are reflected in language, attitude, actions and reactions. Since my research data are linguistic, the excerpts can be used to indicate manifestations of these representations and will depend on the analysis of rhetorical devices, speech acts, emotional speech, etc. to give a retrospective look at what mentally encoded ideas and opinions 'could' have generated in this specific language usage. The inferences made are tentative and not absolute. This is because the process of speaking consists of transferring concepts and ideas between the interlocutors. Those ideas and concepts are assumed to be affected in one way or another by certain mental representations. The listener or the reader re-codes then these into other concepts and interpretations of the mental representations behind them. This interpretation can carry considerable insight, which can be reinforced by other indicators or signs in the same excerpt or other excerpts that lead to the same readings.

Having briefly presented the theoretical aspects of SCA, I assert that SCA is an appropriate approach for analysing my data and suitable for achieving my research objectives for several reasons:

- The topic of struggle for ideological power in a political setting, i.e. the Bahraini Council of Representatives, is very

dependent on context, which is a major concept in SCA (more details on context in SCA is below).

- My comparison and contrast aims to find if there are significantly different discursive strategies used by different political parties in their struggle over power rather than comparing and contrasting individual strategies. This means it is concerned with ideologies, which have both a social and a cognitive dimensions, a duality that SCA asserts.
- To link the use of discursive devices to ideology means that in this research I assume that there is a considerable number linguistic instances that can be used as a window into understanding ideological stances. SCA believes that there are ‘forms of interaction which are in principle susceptible to speaker control, but are in practice mostly not consciously controlled’ (Wodak & Meyer 2009a: 29). This means that ideological stances eventually surface in discourses.

3.5.2 Context in SCA

In the period from the 1960s to the 1980s, many researchers in the fields of social sciences and humanities started showing more interest in social or contextual approaches than in focusing on the ‘formal study of sentences, discourse, speech acts, interaction, communicative events or mental

processing' (van Dijk 2008: 13). Context represents 'the interface between language and discourse, on the one hand, and social institutions, society, politics and culture on the other hand' (van Dijk 2009b: x). As clarified in the definition section above, the concept of context covers the communicative situations that affect the production and the understanding of discourse (ibid.: 4).

The same content will have 'very different functions while uttered in different situations' (van Dijk 2008: 5) and this makes each context a unique experience formulated for a certain communicative situation (ibid.: 16). The participants in a particular discourse are engaged in defining it in a way that is relevant to them, something which makes context subjective (van Dijk 2009b: 5). This subjectivity suggests the mediation of mental representations of contexts, which can be called mental models (ibid.: 5). A model can be defined as 'a subjective representation of an episode' that gets stored in the long-term memory with one's personal experiences, which are affected by one's own interests, emotions, perspectives and other personal elements (ibid.: 6). This means that, like mental models, contexts are dynamic and undergo constant updating and adaptation (van Dijk 2008: 18). However, despite being subjective, these models are not entirely personal, as they have 'social inter-subjective dimensions' to them, based on shared knowledge and shared beliefs, i.e. on social representations. The 'intersubjective' property of these models helps create mutual grounds of understanding among participants in a discourse (van Dijk 2009b: 6). This means that '*contexts are*

not some (part of a) social situation, but a subjective mental model of such a situation' (ibid.: 7, emphasis in original).

Another concept that becomes important in the discussion of context in SCA is that of 'contextualising'. Contextuality can be defined as 'making inferences about [one's] definition of the communicative situation,' with which others involved in the context may or may not agree (van Dijk 2008: 2): '[T]he notion of the context is the broadest in CDA, since this explicitly includes social-psychological, political and ideological components and thereby postulates an interdisciplinary procedure' (Titscher et al. 2007: 166).

3.6 Criticisms of CDA and SCA

As with any theory or approach, CDA has not avoided criticism. A major recurring criticism of CDA is that it focuses on certain texts and fails to present a comprehensive picture of the situation being handled. However, as long as excluded text units are not left out deliberately in order to mislead the audience or readers or knowingly to conceal some facts or perspectives, the relatively narrower focus is justifiable. That is because it is meant to allow higher precision and concentration. Hence, the urge to focus on controversial or intriguing discourse or on text units is a meaningful strategy to reach or try to reach CDA's objective: enlightening and empowering the people affected by the issue discussed.

Additionally, although the concept of social representations is central to SCA and has been theoretically elaborated repeatedly by van Dijk, it is

first of all difficult, if not impossible, to pin down precise social representations at the practical analytical level in texts and discourses, but only manifestations and reflections of their workings. The concept has also been extensively criticised by many academics for being vague and overlapping with other concepts. Potter and Litton (1985) present a detailed discussion of what they consider are the problems or difficulties underlying the theory of social representations. The four problems as they put them are:

- the relationship between groups and social representations;
- problems of consensus and the level at which social representations are shared;
- the operation of social representations within particular contexts of use;
- the role of language in social representations.

(ibid.: 81)

To take a step toward to constructing an applicable method instead of getting caught in debates, I next present the research approach and use my findings and observations in the pilot study to construct a research method.

3.7 Pilot Study

At the beginning of this research, I set a broad research question: how is language used by different religious parties in the Bahraini Council of Representatives to convey and enforce their ideological power? I then attended a couple of parliamentary sittings. Below are some of my

observations of language use on the sittings held on 5 October 2008 from 9:30 to 12:20, which then resumed at 1:00 p.m. I left the session at 2.20 before it had finished.

The purpose of randomly attending some sessions was to acquaint myself with the setting of the Bahraini Council of Representatives debates and to take notes on language use in order to be able to specify an area of interest or a theme, or note anything that would help focus my research objectives. In the sittings I attended, I noted the following:

- Standard Arabic (SA) is the official language in the Parliament and the prepared speeches and comments are all in SA.
- In speeches that have not been written in advance, SA is still mainly used, especially for the core discussion, conversations and for less emotional comments.
- During parliamentary debates, SA is dominant but with minimal, if any, use of word-end *ḥarakāt*.³⁷ Competence in using word-end *ḥarakāt* is positively associated with other elements of the SA competence of the speaker, as the more language-competent the speaker is, the more *ḥarakāt* are used.

The SA language competence of some MPs is much higher than others, and this is notably used as (a) ‘an instrument of situation management’ (Suleiman 2004: 11), and (b) a chance for a quick, mild mock of other’s mistakes, but this nevertheless seems to demonstrate

power and appears to indirectly assert who has the upper hand in the parliament.

- There is a level of *ḥarakāt* that cannot be avoided, and these are the types of *ḥarakāt* that appear with the word's letters other than the last letter, not only as an addition to the last letter of the words. One example of this that was used in this session is: the words مستفيدين *mustafīdīn* and مستفيدون *mustafīdūn*, both of which are the same Arabic word. The choice between them depends on which part of speech they appear as (i.e. grammatically). Another example from this session is *kalimatā* كلمتا and *kalimatay* كلمتي ; again these are the same Arabic word and, again, the choice is based on the grammatical function of the word. With these words, there is more chance of making mistakes, and the more spontaneous the speech, the more prone to error their usage becomes. In this parliamentary session, the first word was used in a spontaneous comment by an MP who made a 'grammatical' error in his choice (he chose the former form, مستفيدين *mustafīdīn*, when the grammatically correct form was the second, مستفيدون *mustafīdūn*), but this mistake in spontaneous speech either passed unnoticed or was considered at least 'permissible'. With the second word, another MP commented on its being misused in the item under discussion. He said that the form that should be used was *kalimay* كلمتي instead of *kalimatā* كلمتا and tried to justify this with an incorrect grammatical explanation. Several other MPs immediately

saw that his explanation had nothing to do with that word form and laughed.

It is worth mentioning that Bahrain dialects (BHDs) have words whose equivalents in SA are very different, as وايد *wāyid* or واجد *wadjid* in BHDs for كثير *kathīr* and جداً *jiddan* in SA ('a lot', and 'very' respectively), and شلون *shlown* for كيف *kayfa* (how). Still, although these are noticeably avoided in official and major communications, a considerable number of the MPs still pronounced some SA words in a different way that belonged neither to SA nor to BHDs, but was more like the word spelled as an SA word and pronounced with a Bahraini accent. This sometimes resulted in a new pronunciation of the word, but one that would be fully understandable to all SA speakers; at other times, the resultant pronunciation was identical to pronunciations of those words in Arabic dialects other than Bahraini, such as pronouncing *kayfa* as *kaif*, a pronunciation used in many other Gulf dialects, including Saudi and Omani dialects.

- Interjections are almost always in BHDs, such as يعني *ya'ni* (i.e. 'which means'), and شسمه *shismah* (i.e. 'whatsitsname' or 'whatshisname').
- Brief humorous comments and socialising comments almost always follow a clear pattern:

- Mostly in BHDs when an MP is making the comment, usually accompanied with a smile, a change in tone and a change in the head direction. Examples:
 - After MP Abdulhalim Murad discussed the requirements for a broker's job in the item being examined, he added as a final sentence: أهم شيء يعرف يعد الفلوس *aham shay y'arf yaḥsib il flūs*, i.e. *the most important thing is that he can count money*.
 - In discussing a proposal for a student fund, the phrase طويل المدى *ṭawīlul madā*, i.e. long-distance, was used to describe instalments to be paid by students taking out loans. A side comment in BHD was: طويل المدى؟ ليش، *ṭawīlul madā? leish, ṣowārīkh?* i.e. 'Long-distance? Why? [Are they] missiles?'
- Mostly in SA when the Speaker is trying to impose order but in a friendly and humorous way, he accompanies his SA comments with a smile, often dropping his head and looking up toward the MPs over his reading glasses; after a short pause, the comment is made at a pace slower than his usual speech. He is well received and the MPs always take such comments positively. Examples:
 - التصويت تُستخدم فيه الأصابع وليس اللسان *attaṣwīt tustakhdam fīhil aṣābi' wa lyysal lisān*, i.e. 'in

voting, fingers are used and not the tongue' (asking the MPs to stop side discussions and to press the buttons in front of them to register their votes). This is a rather interesting reversed use of SA, in which the Speaker lowers his authoritative supremacy by using it in a humorous way.

- Scorn and disapproval are almost always expressed in BHDs, and Bahraini idioms and expressions are intensively used for this. Here, the meaning behind the BHD expression is often, but not always, unfamiliar to the other SA speakers. Examples:
 - PM Ebrahim Al Hadi, objecting to reducing some penalties, ends his talk with the comments: (بنكون بصّرنا عليهم البراءة *binkūn baṣṣarnā 'alaihumil barā'ah*, i.e. 'we will have shown them [the way to claim] innocence.'

As can be seen from the examples above, although SA is the official language of the Parliament and is the one that is consciously and deliberately given priority over BHDs in presenting and discussing the agenda, BHDs still have great value in the MPs' communication. The language spoken in the Bahraini Council of Representatives, then, can be said to be 'domesticated' on three levels:

- a. implicit agreement on omitting the end *ḥarakāt* when using SA and overlooking mistakes with inter-word grammatical *ḥarakāt* in spoken discussions (although the latter is taken seriously in the written forms of paper work both produced or discussed by the Parliament)
- b. the presence of a strong Bahraini accent, or the *Bahranisation* of the pronunciation of SA (as explained above) by the vast majority of the MPs, each of whom applies his or her own dialect (notice that in Bahrain itself there are several dialects, which fall mainly into a division between speakers of Bahraini dialects and speakers of Bahrani dialects. Further details are in Section 2.3.2)
- c. BHD expressions and phrases are frequently and repeatedly used without any objection or hesitation, but they are increasingly associated with subjectivity as they are almost always used with personal and emotional articulations (whether positive or negative), and with more sociable and more affable expressions.

However, because I was taking notes manually, I could not make comments about discursive devices or comments on any other language use that would be helpful in writing a critical discourse analysis. I therefore realised that it would be much more useful to get either a video or audio recording or to get detailed transcriptions of the sittings. I structured my method accordingly (see Section 3.83.8).

I also noted that the reaction and level of interaction differed from one party to another in some political themes, as sometimes members of Al Wefaq would be more interactive and, at other times, Al Minbar and Asalah would be more interactive. This observation supported the theoretical background I had been collecting on political power, language and religion. Together with the theoretical background, these observations motivated the research hypothesis (see Section 1.2). The pilot study also necessitated setting a list of discursive devices, at least a provisional one, to start with when analysing the data (the discursive devices are listed in Section 2.6). The pilot study also drew my attention to the importance of humour and emotions in the political discourse in Bahrain, features that I had not considered as discursive devices before.

3.8 Method

This research method drew on the literature on CDA and context theories discussed above. SCA does not provide a set of guidelines for doing analysis; different methods of analysis of discourse or text can be applied within the model's parameters. The method followed to collect and analyse data was based primarily on critically analysing excerpts from Hansard of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. There have been many attempts to systemise CDA, all of which, according to Luke (2002: 100), follow one common strategy:

CDA involves a principled and transparent shunting back and forth between the microanalysis of texts using varied tools of linguistics, semiotic, and literary analysis and the macroanalysis of social formations, institutions, and power relations that these texts index and construct.

Theoretical sampling is possible because my research, despite it being principally deductive, involves both deductive and inductive reasoning. It is deductive in that I adopted the theories on power, language and religion and set a hypothesis on the basis of the related theoretical background and information to the Bahraini society. The research is inductive in that I allowed my analysis to reconstruct the methodology on one hand and allowed the list of devices to initiate a list of discursive strategies without any presumptions on the other hand.

The method I followed consisted of six steps, each of which considered the tools of microanalysis and macroanalysis that were relevant to the research objectives. The first stage was setting criteria and procedures for choosing data and excerpts suitable for testing the research hypothesis and meeting the research objectives. The second step was deciding on the main discursive devices, an initial list of devices open to addition and amendment. The list then was used to observe and comment on in the analysis while finding more devices, something which served to test the hypothesis and meet the objectives. After analysing the excerpts in hand, finalising the list of discursive devices and illustrating how they were employed in

constructing an argument, the next step was looking back to see if there a systematic use of devices in a way that it would serve the struggle over power in among the different sects. In this research, I call such systematic uses ‘discursive strategies’. After the observed discursive strategies were identified, the way they were employed by the Sunni parties was compared to the way they were employed by the Shiite party in the Council. I further explain these steps in more detail the next two sections.

3.9 Data and criteria for choosing data

As presented in the introduction (Sections 1.2 and 1.3), my research hypothesizes *that the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates*. Among many topics discussed in the Council, I noticed that the topic of dissent control and political freedom are raised extensively in the second legislative period, 2006–2010. I thus set the research aims to observe whether, and if so how, the three political parties discursive strategies to achieve the following ideological goals:

- attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the parliamentary discussions on political freedom and dissent-controlling laws

- manoeuvring the definition(s) of self and others in the contexts of dissent-controlling law and political rights
- manipulating the law to support a party's ideological stances about dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom and political rights.

The second goal was exploring whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain.

To test the hypothesis and achieve the set goals, the research used two sources of data: the parliamentary Hansard and local newspapers, and below I will explain how these data were used.

3.9.1 Hansard

I first of all needed to obtain records of parliamentary sittings. When I started fieldwork in October 2008, the Bahraini Council of Representatives was running its second legislative term, which had started in September 2006. Each legislative term at the Bahraini Council of Representatives is four years long. As taking notes manually had proven inadequate, I decided to record the subsequent sessions I attended, but the recording quality was inferior due to a malfunction in the audio recorder. To avoid such unexpected but possible disappointment, I decided to try to obtain access to

video or audio recordings made by the Bahraini Council of Representatives itself. The last sitting of the second legislative period was held on 26 May 2009, something which meant that all the agendas, recordings of sessions and minutes of this legislative period (October 2006 to May 2009) were available and complete. This meant that there was a full 'unit' of data to examine.

To build up the background on which the analysis would be based, I first browsed the Parliament's web pages and went through the hand-outs and manuals published by the Bahraini Council of Representatives. I chose CDA as a perspective and CSA as an approach (more details in Section 3.5).

When I started collecting data, there were two lists on the web page of the Bahraini Council of Representatives (the webpage is fully in Arabic until the time this research was written): one was summaries of the ten most recent regular sittings and one of the ten most recent exceptional sittings. At the time, the former was for sittings from 24 March up to 26 May 2009 within the second legislative period. I went through the available summaries, paying particular attention to recurring themes. One theme that caught my attention and stirred my curiosity was the conflict in defining and reacting to incidents or acts that could be seen as a source of 'dissent' to some and as a 'political right' to others. The definition of these two is controversial and largely ideologically determined, as will become clear from the excerpts and the subsequent analysis. I looked for discussions related to riots, to political freedom, to arrests related to political stances or

riots, to government boundaries when it comes to the public's privacy, to penal laws and punishments, to weapons, and to other relevant topics. I wrote a list of the dates on which these themes were put forward in the agendas of the twenty sittings available online. I was aware that there would be indirect references to or indications of the themes elsewhere under other items and in other discussions, but since there were no subject indices in Hansard, it was not very easy to find these instances. I first tried only to use the instances referred to in the agenda. This was not very reliable, as the agendas did not match consistently with the content of Hansard (see Appendix A to see how the agenda did not match the content).

I contacted Bahrain Television (BTV) and asked for a list of available video recordings of the parliamentary sittings. Each of the recordings I received was no longer than 45 minutes, while on average, the actual parliamentary sittings were four hours long. When I requested full recordings from the Parliament itself, my request was declined on the basis of confidentiality. I was, however, allowed access to Hansard in the form of soft copies on CDs. The CDs also contained attachments to Hansard organised in two files per sitting: one Word document file for the debate itself and one attached PDF file relating to that particular sitting. Most of the attachments were around 300 pages long with no table of contents or index. Despite realising that Hansard is censored in the sense that some sentences or expressions are 'toned down' or rephrased to sound less vulgar, I decided to use the written Hansard instead for the following reasons.

3.9.1.1 Suitability of Hansard

Hansard is an extensive record and, as the transcriptions are denaturalised (i.e. they do not have any notations signalling speed, intonation, pauses, overlaps or volume of speech), they are, as such, sufficient for CDA. Hansard is suitable source of data for this research. Tracy (1991: 184) explains that ‘the more deductive [...] one’s research approach, the more license a researcher has to transcribe broadly; the more inductive [...], the more important it is to record a larger number of particulars.’ For this research, using a denaturalised transcription style was sufficient, as the focus is on the meaning rather than on the phonological aspects that naturalised transcription adds to an excerpt. It is true that Hansard of the Bahraini Council of Representatives is subject to minor amendments during transcription, such as the reordering of words in spontaneous utterances to make them clearer, and the addition of some formalities, such as starting by thanking the Speaker even if the MP speaking did not do so (Ebrahim 2009). Another reason why Hansard is suitable source of data is that the sittings were too long to attend fully, which means I would have collected with fewer recordings of fewer sittings. Had I chosen to attend sittings, I would have inspected a smaller number of sittings in total than I if I had chosen to go through Hansard of a complete legislative session. Additionally, depending on attending sittings would have been very likely to impede the

process of deciding on criteria for choosing excerpts and it would also have meant less chance of tracking down a theme through different parliamentary sittings.

There were no subject indices in Hansard itself, and I could not anticipate when the themes were mentioned or referred to under other topics or debates. Reading the full Hansard was not an option because of its length (most records are around 300 pages per sitting), and the agendas were neither sufficiently detailed nor fully reflective of what was covered in the actual sittings. I therefore decided to go through the archive of the *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* Newspaper reports of the sittings held in that legislative period. More on how the newspaper was used to find suitable data is in the Section 3.9.2.

Another reason why Hansard is suitable source of data is that the transcripts are becoming more and more accurate, as stated by the Director of Committee Affairs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives (Al-Hadhrami 2009), and they include even colloquial words, expressions and foreign words as uttered by the speaker (ibid.). The excerpts I use appear to have had minimal, if any, interference. This can be seen from the fact that conflicts, repetitions, interruptions, unfinished sentences, non-constructive and irrelevant utterances, and even discourteous ones, are transcribed in Hansard. I provide some translated instances showing how close the transcription is likely to be to the original; these examples would have been rephrased into better sentences if significant editing had been done:

Example 1: An interrupted speech

JLF: ... There was an agreement -where has Brother MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu'awdah gone? – that the Chairman of the Committee withdraw the proposal for at least one week,
(Hansard of Sitting 14, 29 Jan. 2008)

Example 2: Bad collocations and wrong choice of vocabulary

KM: We believe that there are many ways to address political situations without getting into security mazes*. Security mazes* complicate the situation, they do not offer solutions but increase charge*...³⁸
(Hansard of Sitting 13, 27 Jan. 2009)

Example 3: Irrelevant jokes using common knowledge

DS: Thank you. With bill proposals, there is no discussion and no argument, no obscenity or depravity. So we vote for either approval or rejection.
(Hansard of Sitting 14, 29 Jan. 2008)

Example 4: Conflicts and harsh exchanges

S: Mohammed Al-Miz'al I will get you out myself–
MM: You have no right to. As a council you have no right to. You have no right.
MK: Is it up to you?
MM: Shut up–
MK: Get out
(Hansard of Sitting 10, 30 Dec. 2008)

Example 5: Incomplete utterances

MM: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course we are with—I mean when we talk about banning manufacturing, selling, storing, producing, or developing chemical weapons... .

(Hansard Sitting 16, 12 Feb. 2008)

The data are transcribed and published, but hardly edited at all, and this edition has no, or only minimal and occasional, changes. It is also worth noting that each MP receives a copy of Hansard of each sitting for revision before the following session. In this way, each MP has sufficient time to check that his or her speeches have not been twisted in a way that their meanings or purposes are affected. This again minimises the possibility of biased editing. The minimal editing would, in any case, not fundamentally affect the overall content and analysis, since my approach, SCA, is more interested in the broader perspective: the practical applications of discourse, which facilitate understanding the social representations in the examined discourses.

In this way, Hansard is suitable for my research goals and for testing its hypothesis. The analysis of this data contributes to testing the hypothesis of the research to find out if the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs when participating in parliamentary debates.

It is true that, as in most parliamentary debates and any political language, these data are not spontaneous and are rather planned or semi-

planned. Nevertheless, even in semi-planned situations, political speeches follow or attempt to follow previously set ideological restrictions and expectations. This is very characteristic of political speeches, whether read out from papers, recited, or given in reply to questions or in interviews. This, however, does not make planned or semi-planned discourses less valuable; on the contrary, the planning ensures that the speeches reflect or attempt to fulfil the ideological conventions and perspectives of the political affiliation of the speaker.

3.9.1.2 Translation and transliteration

The original Arabic excerpts of Hansard are provided in the appendix to this thesis, followed by their English translations. Since all the discourses being examined were conducted exclusively and entirely in Arabic while this thesis is written in English, the excerpts referred to obviously required translation, resulting in an inevitable loss of nuance, association, register, ambiguity and other significant and crucial aspects of the discourses. However, I aimed to limit this as much as possible. In the translated versions, I have tried to maintain the style and structure of the original text as much as possible by reproducing the same style, the interruptions, the incomplete utterances, etc. In the analysis section, I have quoted only the English translation, not the Arabic, for convenience as it would be very distracting and difficult to follow

if each example were presented in both Arabic and English, especially given that I have quoted speeches repeatedly and closely.

In the English translations of the excerpts, whether in the appendix or whenever quoted in the analysis chapter, there are some phrases or collocations that were constructed in an improper linguistic structure. I have deliberately translated them into a parallel improper structure in English to preserve the style, but I have indicated any instance of deliberate 'bad language' by underlining it and following it with an asterisk. In addition, it will be noticed that I use italics in the speeches. If used only for single words, then the use indicates stress;³⁹ when with a long, full linguistic unit (i.e. a passage) within a speech, preceded by '(reading)', then it is an act or proposal that is being read. There are a few speeches by non-MPs that are fully italic included in the full excerpts in the appendix, and this is to indicate that these speeches, unlike the speeches of the MPs, have had the content translated without conveying any other hesitations or mistakes since I did not intend to analyse any non-MP speeches in this research.

3.9.2 Using newspapers

I started with *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* newspaper because it is the oldest and most widely circulated local newspaper published in the Arabic language in Bahrain. Again, as there were so many articles relating to the Parliament, I decided to go only through the articles that reported the sittings of the

chosen excerpts and MPs' press releases directly related to those chosen excerpts, but not articles with views, analysis, criticism or comments on the sittings or the MPs. I therefore excluded columns, editorials, extras, features, fillers and reviews. In my search for related reports and press releases, I started a few months before the second legislative session began in order to obtain a fuller picture of the argument expanding over time and see when it intensified, regardless of the legislative period's start and finish.

I referred to the archive of *Akhbar Al-Khaleej*, and there was a series of files assigned for news and articles about the Bahraini Parliament cut out from the newspaper and filed in chronological order. It consisted of news reporting the sittings, MPs' press releases, reportages and columns which mentioned the parliament. Among these, I chose to make a record of the articles reporting the parliamentary sittings held from June 2007 until December 2009. Since regular sittings are held on Tuesdays, the weekly report of the sittings is often published on the following day, i.e. on Wednesdays, and sometimes two days later, i.e. on Thursdays. The dates of all the sittings in which topics related to limiting political freedom or dissent control were noted. I found that these topics were discussed more intensively in the period from December 2007 to December 2009 (a period of two years). I kept a record of what was reported to refer to in the analysis. I examined further Hansard records of dates beyond May 2009 until the end of the Second Legislative Period.

I noticed that this intensity was associated with political incidents involving riots, clashes with the government and the vandalism of public property, something that I have taken into account and presented at the analysis stage; it is an important part of the political context of the excerpts being analysed. Since the period above started before the beginning of the second legislative period, I requested the CD of Hansard for the previous legislative period. I then used the noted dates to trace back the exact Hansard record of the sittings in which the theme was brought up or discussed (most of the time one day before the report was published, but sometimes up to three days before).

When referring to newspaper articles, the reference (issue number, page and date) of the articles are given in the analysis. It is important to note that, when referred to, the newspaper reports are not to be considered in this research as representations of what was stated in the sittings, but rather as an illustration of how the issues are covered by the newspapers. On the other hand, the press releases made by MPs are a chance for them to further express themselves on past and upcoming issues within the parliament. The press releases, on the other hand, provide a chance to add reactions to and stances on topics, speeches and actions, and to add views on either upcoming or past debates. This adds more instances to support or challenge the findings and analysis made of the ideological struggle and identities in Hansard excerpts. These press releases are an opportunity for the MPs to reinforce, reframe, rectify or deny the contents of parliamentary

debate. This makes these newspaper excerpts a strong ideological tool that the MPs and their parties can use to address the public. In this way, reinforcing the analysis of excerpts from parliamentary debate with newspaper articles and press releases helped, first, to provide a contextual background for the events, and secondly, to cross-examine my readings of the ideological goals and motivations.

3.10 Analysing Data

3.10.1 Major discursive categories analysed

The hypothesis of the research is that the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates. As mentioned previously, to test this hypothesis, the research set its objectives to, first, observing whether, and if so how, the three political parties use language to achieve the following ideological goals:

- attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the parliamentary discussions of political freedom and dissent-controlling laws
- manoeuvring the definition(s) of self and others in the contexts of dissent-controlling law and political rights

- manipulating the law to support a party's ideological stance on dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom and political rights.

The second objective was to explore whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies can reflect the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. The topic of identity and ideology in the Bahraini Council of Representatives language is a major multifaceted issue in Bahrain. As I explained in Section 2.2.1, differences in sectarian identities in language choices and variations. Therefore, to achieve the objectives of this research I searched for and analysed the following discursive devices in the chosen data:

- shift between local accents and classical Arabic
- emotive speech
- framing and reframing
- quoting other sources
- humour
- discourse markers
- lexical style
- local semantic moves such as disclaimers
- speech acts
- rhetorical features

- propositional structure
- turn-takings.

This list is based on (a) the analysis made in the pilot study (see Section 3.7) and (b) the continuous feedback between the analysis and the data. Initially I developed a provisional list of discursive devices to detect before analysing the excerpts, but the list was adjusted during the analysis process and only finalised when the analysis was completed. I also checked my analysis while in progress against the list of devices mentioned in Wodak and Meyer (ibid.), and chose from their list what could be detected in my excerpts. Among the fourteen they listed, I chose six (the latter six in the list above). There was a reason for eliminating each of excluded devices. For example, they mentioned stress, intonation and hesitation, all of which cannot be detected in my excerpts, as the excerpts are in the form of denaturalised transcriptions. The authors also mentioned word order and syntactic structures, both of which cannot be analysed properly as I am not analysing the excerpts *per se* but a translated version of them, something that means the syntactic structure and word order are no longer those uttered by the interlocutors. Another mentioned device in Wodak and Meyer's list is repairs, but many of these are not possible to detect because the transcription process is unlikely to include self-repairs, which matter most here. There were examples of interrupted sentences and repairs marked with an editing term such as 'I mean' but not instant repairs such as 'acreo-

archaeology' or hesitation presented in silences or by exclamations such as 'er' or 'um'. The detected discursive devices, in short, are basically built on what the data offer. This two-way move between the list and the analysis is part of the process of theoretical sampling, which is followed in CDA (see Section 3.8 for more on theoretical sampling).

Based on CDA's dictum that that language is a way in which the people in power exercise and maintain power, and that '[p]ower relations are always relations of *struggle*' (Fairclough 1989: 33-34, emphasis in original), in the Analysis Chapter, I searched for a linguistic pattern of exercising this struggle over power in the excerpt and found three major discursive strategies. Each of the three discursive strategies is a discursive tactic at a macro level that employs a number of discursive devices at its micro level. My analysis led me to categorise these under the following three titles:

- corroborating by information
- intensifying grievance
- centralising pride and dignity.

I present further details on discursive devices in Chapter 4 as I analyse the excerpts. However, in short, the above three discursive strategies appear to encompass the ideological struggle over power in the chosen excerpts, and very likely in most of the parliamentary debates in the Bahraini Council of

Representatives. The presentation and analysis of the strategies take into account the concept that SCA emphasises about the duality of social and cognitive facets of discourse. By ‘corroborating by information’, I mean the use of facts, statistics, news and any kind of information to empower the speaker as someone who knows better or knows more. By ‘intensifying grievance’, I mean displaying weakness and possible injustice or misunderstanding as a strategy of defence, something that, in return, empowers the speaker and the case. ‘Centralising pride and dignity’ is about proposing an objection, rejection or demand that is justified by the belief that this proposition fulfils either the speaker’s or a referent’s pride and dignity. Identifying these strategies and devices was achieved under the analytical framework below.

3.10.2 Five-stage analytical framework

An important point that van Dijk (2009a: 63) stresses is that CDA research ‘should be accessible, and avoid esoteric style.’ In order to achieve this, I have attempted to follow van Dijk in avoiding unnecessary jargon. I also followed a research framework that I adopted from Fairclough (2001: 235–239) in order to make my analysis systematic, and thus accessible. Fairclough modelled this framework upon the concept of ‘explanatory critique’ presented by Roy Bhaskar (1986). This analytical framework consists of five stages:

Stage 1: Focusing upon a social problem that has a semiotic aspect

A social problem can be in a social practice: (a) in activities of the social practice or (b) in the representation of this social practice (Fairclough 2001: 236). In my research, the problem is in an activity of a social problem: the difficulty facing the Council in reaching an agreement about defining and specifying when an act or law is constraining political freedom and when it is actually controlling dissent. This is due to the divergence in the perception and definition of dissent and, consequently, in its association with political freedom by the different political parties. The first research objective aims at finding out how various strategies used by different political parties in debates over this topic are required to achieve the ideological goals mentioned under the first objective of the research. This is because different strategies highlight some or all of the following:

- various language competence levels that can be related to individual differences or political affiliation differences
- various priorities and agendas
- various degrees of attention given to the audience apart from the MPs themselves, starting with reporters attending the sittings, to authorities and government officials, and, finally, to the public.

Stage 2: Identifying obstacles to the social problem being tackled

Fairclough (ibid.) explains that the objective of this stage is ‘to understand how the problem arises and how it is rooted in the way social life is organised.’ He adds that this stage should identify how much context is relevant for the analysis (ibid.: 337). In this research, the obstacle to reaching an agreement about drawing a line between political freedom and dissent that needs to be controlled by law is rooted in the social and religious affiliation of the parliament parties. Al Wefaq is a Shiite party representing a large proportion of the Bahraini society, having not only a distinct sectarian background but also a distinct ethnic, historical and cultural background from that of the Sunnis. These differences are succinctly presented in Section 2.3. The confrontations of Sunni and Shiite activists and oppositions with the law and the government have been different too, and the confrontations that are concurrent with the debates also create a divergence that widens the gap between the two groups’ perception and definition of dissent and, accordingly, its association with political freedom.

The political conflict between Sunni and Shiite politicians in Bahrain, and the desire of each to gain more power and credence, generates the need to be more convincing. The sectarian conflict is historically rooted, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore this when analysing parliamentary debates in general and linguistic strategies in particular. In the period before the parliament was established, there was major conflict between the Shiites and the Sunni government, and a number of confrontations between

individual Sunni activists and the government. The political structure in the Bahraini Council of Representatives could reflect the social, ethnic and religious differences among the three political parties dominating the parliament. It has become a new 'battlefield', with language being its strongest weapon. However, the competition over parliamentary seats has accentuated the struggle for authority and political power between the two sects, in addition to the struggle between each of the parties and the government. This is not to say that there was no tension or competition between the sects before the parliament was established, but the nature of the competition has changed dramatically. Further details of the sectarian and ethnical composition are provided in Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1.

Stage 3: Deciding if the social order 'needs' this problem

This stage questions whether there is a social order that benefits if the problem persists (ibid.: 236). Fairclough (ibid.: 238) explains that the point of this stage is 'to assess the degree to which problems in their semiotic aspect are an insuperable part of the social order as presently constituted.' This stage relates to my second research objective, which aims at finding if and how the use of discursive devices and strategies can reflect the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. This objective, hence, can contribute to deciding if the social order 'needs' this problem.

With two major religious groupings in Bahrain, the Shiites and the Sunnis, the domination of Islamic parties in both legislative sessions was

expected. Bahrain is the only Arab country with such strong, explicitly diverse sectarian parties in the parliament, to the extent that they exceed the presence of any other type of grouping (32 members for three Islamic parties to 8 for all others). This diverse presence gives the sectarian division a prominent and explicit political existence that cannot be overridden. As with any political party winning seats in a parliament, each of the three Islamic parties needs to convey their perception and definition of dissent and accordingly its association with political freedom in order to maintain the party's seats in the upcoming elections since the issue is one on which parties are actively campaigning.⁴⁰ Each party is required to demonstrate that its choices and perspectives are the most appropriate and most credible for the good of the country and its people.

Who benefits from the persistence of this problem might seem unclear at the beginning, but apparently, during the second legislative period, from which the excerpts are taken and in which the Sunni and Shiite parties have almost equal presence in the parliament,⁴¹ each group may hold on to its stances and keep the conflict unresolved, hoping that the next, or any following, legislative elections will end up with more seats for its party, thus allowing that party to impose its perception and definition of dissent and, accordingly, its association with political freedom. This topic never fails to attract the attention of the laypeople in Bahrain and clearly their stances in a very similar way to that division in the stances of the political parties in the Council. Therefore, the political parties are eager about the topic and

very persistent and even emotive about exhibiting their ability to force their stance in the legislations of the country in order to fulfil an instance public, or rather voters', expectation.

Stage 4: Identifying possible ways past the obstacles

According to Fairclough, this stage 'shifts to dialectical logic.' It examines various network practices in order to point out any 'potentials for change' in the social problem being examined by focusing on gaps, contradictions, paradoxes and contradictions in the text (ibid.: 239). In my research, I have assumed that there are a number of contradictions between the national, human and legal incentives that are used to tackle issues discussed in the parliamentary debates on the one hand, and the actual predetermined and ideologically rooted motivations of the political parties on the other hand. In the analysis, the instances are analysed to show whether a demand, an objection or a complaint has more than a legal incentive behind it, such as a political or sectarian incentive. Realising such incentives makes it easier to accept or reject any demand, objection or complaint more objectively.

Stage 5: Reflecting on the analysis of stages 1 to 4

Fairclough (ibid.: 236) first points out that this stage is not part of Bhaskar's explanatory critique, but rather an addition that he himself finds vital. He explains that a researcher carrying out a discourse analysis is part of the network of the social practices he or she is analysing (ibid.: 239). Therefore,

the researcher should question if they are ‘an obstacle to their work having any significance or value for people located in other social practices,’ and examine how the analysis can ‘contribute to emancipatory change’ (ibid.).

To ensure that I do not abstain the significance of my own research, first, when it comes to the three discursive strategies in the ideological struggle over power in the Bahraini Council of Representative that I observed, I made sure that the description and specifications of the strategies make it possible to track the strategies in other political settings, whether in political discourses in Bahrain or elsewhere. Secondly, understanding that I am part of the social network and that my personal stances and views may limit and direct my analysis, I made sure to include certain steps in my analysis to make it more representative and more inclusive of the topic in hand. I first analysed all the excerpts that fit the criteria for choosing excerpts: being from Hansard and being a transcription of what MPs said during the parliamentary sittings. I also used intertextuality to support my analysis and show if and how the Sunni parties and the Shiite party tend to use certain discursive devices and discursive strategies differently. Intertextuality made my analysis less judgemental and less subjective.

The five stages are presented in the data analysis, which is in two separate chapters: the first analytical chapter, which is significantly longer than the following one, is called ‘the Analysis of Discursive Strategies’. This chapter is stage 1 of the above mentioned analytical framework. It focuses

upon the social (political) problem. This is carried out by identifying discursive devices and how they serve to construct discursive strategies as stated earlier. The first stage built a background upon which stages 2, 3 and 4 could be built. Stages 2 and 3, defining an obstacle, deciding which social order 'needs' this obstacle and identifying possible ways past the obstacle, are presented in the following chapter, entitled 'Exploring the Ideologies'. As for stage 5, it is carried out throughout the analysis. Adhering to the above mentioned five stages helped present an explanatory critique, in which CDA is interested, and which consequently leads to the fulfilment of the research objectives and, thus, the testing of the research hypothesis.

3.10.3 Presenting findings before the discussion

I have chosen to first present the three discursive strategies and explain what I mean by each. I then present the excerpt analyses in chronological order and illustrate which strategy is used at which stage as I go on analysing. The reason I need to do so is to (a) show how an argument is built up and developed as it moves between strategies and devices, (b) show the sequence of devices and strategies used, something that is also important and worth noting, and (c) use newspaper articles and reports to provide further depth to each setting and to mention any relevant reactions or elaborations that should help improve understanding of the ideological struggle in the Hansard excerpts.

The analysis is then taken one step further in a separate chapter, Chapter 5, in an attempt to identify and examine the ideological incentives of any noted differences in relationship to the sectarian affiliations of the speakers. This reading is used to shed some light on the recent unrest that started in Bahrain in February 2011 in order to reinforce the analytical chapter and the ideological reading. There is some use of extra-discursive knowledge mentioned or referred to in the analysis, as I believe that there are always links or details that provide the necessary context of the discourse and that are influential and relevant to the analysis. This is necessary to conform to CDA's perspective. This way, following two analytical chapters take the linguistic findings further to apply a critical reading.

In the conclusion of this research, Chapter 6, I present a synthesis that summarizes how and under which circumstances each strategy has been used by the political parties in the examined excerpts.

3.11 Truthworthiness of Analysis

This is qualitative research and the truthworthiness of the analysis is based on presenting a logical argument and analysis. In this research, the transcribed texts in Hansard and the relevant reports *Akhbar Al-Khaleej*, a major newspapers is analysed. This is not to underestimate the importance of non-verbal communication, but delimiting the type of data that is

analysed ensures a more extensive and comprehensive analysis within the time and word limits available.

Although I have attempted to be as objective as possible, the idea of total isolation of a researcher's experience and knowledge is not realistic. De Beaugrande explains that:

[t]here is no zero degree of uninvolvement for us to leap in prior to any understanding of the data, and no zero ideology as our starting point where we can build a domain for what is 'established as scientifically correct'. Even the 'hard sciences' are discursive constructs, modes of communication about what is 'currently' said to be 'probably' correct (2006: 44).

Nevertheless, in order to promote the trustworthiness of this research, I used the following two strategies:

- Researcher as detective: I did not merely make hypotheses or rival comments and instead looked for evidence to make the final case examined beyond any doubt.
- Extended fieldwork: the observations were conducted over a period of two and a half years, i.e. the second legislative period and a few months on either side, until the theme of dissent control in the parliament was ignored for a significant period.

CHAPTER FOUR: AN ANALYSIS OF DISCURSIVE STRATEGIES

4.1 Introduction

This is the first of two analytical chapters that attempt to test the research hypothesis, that the Shiite MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from Sunni MPs in parliamentary debates. This chapter is the longest and most detailed one, and attempts to fulfil the first objective of the research, specifically, observing whether, and if so how, the Sunni parties and the Shiite party employ discursive devices and strategies to achieve the following ideological goals:

- attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control law and political freedom.
- manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in the contexts of dissent control and political rights.
- manipulating the law to support one's party's ideological stances about dissent control and the definition of political freedom and political rights.

The same data of this chapter alongside its findings are synthesised in the next chapter to present a reading of the ideologies of the political parties and the sectarian political conflict in Bahrain.

Adhering to the methodology outlined in the previous chapter, I present the data analysis in this chapter, which is divided into three sections. I start with a short section presenting the three strategies that my analysis led me to. Although I observed these strategies while doing the analysis, I introduce them before the analysis in order to make it possible for the reader to identify them while reading analyses and the excerpts. The three discursive strategies are as follows:

- corroborating by information
- intensifying grievance
- centralising pride and dignity

These discursive strategies are constructed using a number of the following discursive devices:

- shift between local accents and classical Arabic
- emotive speech
- framing and reframing
- quoting other sources
- humour
- discourse markers
- lexical style
- local semantic moves

- speech acts
- rhetorical features
- propositional structure
- turn-takings.

In the next section, I present the analysis of the excerpts in chronological order and, as I move through the excerpts, I point out which strategies are used at different stages of the debates. The third section draws conclusions from the analysis. The conclusions summarise the use of the three discursive strategies by different parties in order to test my research hypothesis and meet the research objectives.

For convenience, I define the excerpts of the parliamentary sittings by headings that use keywords to refer to the major topic in that excerpt (e.g. condemning a terrorist plot, the arrest of Abdali, eavesdropping, etc.). I number them in chronological order and then refer to the source by three numbers separated by colons. The three numbers respectively refer to the legislative term, followed by the legislative period, and then the session number. For example, if an excerpt were from the second legislative period, third term, sitting 9, the session would be numbered as 2:3:9. I also give the date of the sitting in the headings of the analytical sections and also in Appendix B. The line numbers of the exact phrase or word being discussed are given in the analysis. The line numbers I use correspond only to my own English translations of the excerpts as presented in Appendix B, not to the

full Hansard of the sitting or to the Arabic excerpt. The date and page number(s) of the original Hansard records from which each excerpt is taken are also mentioned and so are the full excerpts in both Arabic, the original as in Hansard, and English, my translation.

4.2 *Three Discursive Strategies*

Having examined and analysed the Hansard excerpts that I had collected on dissent control and political freedom, I traced three major discursive strategies used by the MPs in their struggle over ideological power when giving speeches in examined parliamentary sittings. I present these three strategies under the following titles:

a. Corroborating by information

In parliamentary arguments, an MP sometimes utilises some information that he or she has about the topic not to inform but instead to demonstrate that he or she is aware and up to date. A new piece of information or a good understanding of a law or certain regulations can, and is expected to, make a difference to how a topic is addressed and/or perceived. Additionally, being the one who has this piece of information instantly gives more power to this person, while simultaneously putting the other person in what I would call a 'lower argumentative cachet' for having ignored, or perhaps missed, that piece of information. The same information can be used differently, and

corroborating one's stance with information can range between being gentle – even indirect – and being hostile and confrontational.

The data analysis in the following section illustrates how, in the examined excerpts, 'new' information that supports an MP's argument is very often used to create a position from which to 'strike'. The strategy of corroborating by information can be frequently used in order to defend one's stand, but is often manifested in the form of an attack.

Normally, in many political debates, a person employing the strategy of corroborating by information is likely perceived to be 'knowledgeable' and hence in a position of power and control. This is because he or she has more space to manoeuvre by employing more logic and rationale to support his or her point of view, more opportunity to choose the direction of his or her 'punches', pushing others into the position of needing to react rather than act. An awareness of the advantage that attack has over defence makes the use of information to attack others' stands preferable to its being used to defend one's own stand. MPs who employ the strategy of corroborating by information, whether it is done gently or in a hostile way, therefore, automatically place their opponents in a defensive position, something that consequently reduces the chances of the former being attacked, or that at least works as a method of creating a 'temporary' distraction.

The strategy of corroborating by information can sometimes take a 'deceptive' form, in which the speaker sounds as if he or she has too much information for the listeners to follow up or understand, making the listeners

less likely to argue back, comment or ask for elaboration. Later on, when the same utterances are re-examined, especially in their written forms, the topic or the argument appears less loaded with meaningful or constructive 'information' than it seemed to be when first heard. This intensity, or wordiness, can create a shield to protect the speaker from having his or her statement easily argued against or even elaborated on. In the chosen excerpts, I noticed that at certain points there were intense uses of jargon, compound words, expressions, normalisations and/or complex phrases when unnecessary and often in an ineloquent way. Sometimes this wordiness took the form of what is known in U.S. politics as filibustering, i.e. the use of obstructive long speeches that aims at preventing or delaying approving a decision. In the case of filibustering, the wordiness does not necessarily lack eloquence or relevance, but it simply hampers decision making or aim at preventing or delaying next speakers. I had first categorised this way of using information as a separate strategy and called it 'shielding oneself with wordiness.' After proceeding with the analysis and covering all the excerpts in hand, I realised that it is only a form of the strategy of corroborating by information and that 'wordiness' is employed to fulfil this strategy and decided to consider it a form of the discursive device known as lexical style.

Shielding oneself with wordiness can be viewed as a group of devices in the same way that rhetoric is a group of devices. In the excerpts analysed in this research, wordiness has been used from time to time by some MPs who have elsewhere proven to be eloquent and thus seem to be using this

device deliberately at certain points. Sometimes wordiness can sound 'serious' and in other cases it is combined with a sarcastic or humorous sense.

b. Intensifying grievance

Generally speaking, emotions have an important place in Bahraini society, in which the ability to express compassion and sympathy is highly appreciated and respected. This makes the strategy of intensifying grievance an important and intensively used strategy in the Bahraini Council of Representatives in order to win sympathy, not only of the Council, but also that of the laypeople, the voters. This is why intensifying grievance is a recurring strategy in the Bahraini Council of Representatives in a way that might not be expected in parliaments in other countries. Of course, there is a limit to how much grievance is acceptable, and 'overdoing' it is likely to reverse its effect.

Showing affection and empathy towards citizens' suffering and difficulties is very important. The Bahraini community expects MPs to express the community's disturbance and grief. MPs do not just talk about citizens' anguish or difficulties as if they are reporting them, but also interact with them. Interaction with people's agony or grief is expressed by facial expressions, voice tone (two things that this research cannot capture because of the nature of the data), by the discursive devices that MPs

employ, i.e. repetitive rhetoric questions, and in the lexical choices they make. These choices help communicate MPs' messages while simultaneously stressing their involvement.

c. Centralising pride and dignity

In the Bahraini community, much thought is given to one's pride and dignity, and these are repeatedly mentioned in discussing problems, evaluating proposed solutions and pressing for demands and decisions. Preserving one's pride and dignity is highly regarded as a factor upon which decisions are based. Many compromises may be made in order to preserve pride and dignity, and numerous problems can occur if one's pride is wounded. I classify this as a strategy *per se* because, first, it does not fall under either of the two previous ones or overlap with them. Secondly, it is a strategy that frequently recurs in the MPs' speeches and strongly affects the discursive choices a speaker makes.

The strategy of centralising pride and dignity is similar to that of intensifying grievance in that both are very emotive and are asking for something that is considered a right. Throughout the analysis process, I carefully observed how the two are constructed, ensuring that they are not the same strategy. They proved to be two separate, though associated, strategies. They both demand or reject an action, a law, a treatment or such like. However, each looks at the matter from a different perspective: when

using the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, the speaker is evaluating and considering the matter by positioning himself or herself at a level that is, to him or her, higher than the target altitude, the standard or the benchmark that the discussed matter is required to reach. On the other hand, by using the strategy of intensifying grievance the speaker is positioning himself or herself at a humble or low position, looking up at a target or benchmark.

4.3 Data Analysis

Having presented the three major strategies that I detected in the excerpts, I now present the analyses of excerpts individually, identify which discursive strategies are employed in each, and illustrate how various discursive devices are used to construct the discursive strategies that aim, in turn, to secure or win ideological power in the parliamentary debates. I analyse the following eleven excerpts listed in Table 11.

Table 11: *List of excerpts with details*

<i>Excerpt No.</i>	<i>Topic of Excerpt</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Sitting No.</i>	<i>Pages in Hansard</i>
1	<i>Teargas</i>	12 Feb. 2008	2:2:16	62–73
2	<i>Bahraini Detainees Abroad</i>	22 Apr. 2008	2:2:25 a	19–20
3	<i>Insulting the Government</i>	22 Apr. 2008	2:2:25 b	43–44
4	<i>Condemning a ‘Terrorist’ Plot</i>	30 Dec. 2008	2:3:10	95–99
5	<i>The Arrest of Political Activists</i>	27 Jan. 2009	2:3:13	4–6
6	<i>Big and Small Thieves</i>	7 Apr. 2009	2:3:23	103–104
7	<i>Eavesdropping</i>	20 Oct. 2009	2:4:3	15
8	<i>The Arrest of A. Hassan (a)</i>	22 Dec. 2009	2:4:10	6–7
9	<i>The Arrest of A. Hassan (b)</i>	29 Dec. 2009	2:4:11	6
10	<i>Censoring a Speech</i>	30 Mar. 2010	2:4:24	78–79
11	<i>Activating a Punishment Decision</i>	27 Apr. 2010	2:4:28	43

The upcoming analysis is presented in the same order as the list above, which is in chronological order, and under the same headings. The full excerpts are available under the same headings in Appendix B.

I now analyse the excerpts one by one, identifying the discursive devices used by each speaker and showing how these devices fulfil discursive strategies. Every time I first mention an MP in the analysis of an excerpt, I mention his or her political affiliation. I also present small tables, mentioning the interlocutor(s), to list the devices under the discursive strategy or strategies each interlocutor employs, and the political affiliation.

4.3.1 Excerpt 1 on Teargas

From sitting 2:2:16, 12 Feb. 2008

This is the longest excerpt among the ones I collected for this research. In this excerpt, the dialogue concentrates on one particular detail in the law that was under discussion: permission to use teargas locally as a riot control agent. The discussion was raised in reaction to the report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee on the bill on the prohibition of developing, producing, stocking and using chemical weapons and on destroying them.

In the excerpt, the discussion starts with a rebuke about delaying the report by a Sunni MP. Then a number of MPs, all except one are Shiite MPs, express their objection to the use of teargas in local riots. Generally speaking, the Sunni MPs and parties seemed to have no problem with the riot control law and thus found no reason for it to be reviewed. This is why there are no interventions by the Sunni MPs and the only comment was that of a rebuke of its being delayed, an indirect way to hint that the law was right and correct in the first place and hence no revision was necessary. The fact that the law is consistent with international standards and measures⁴² makes argumentation rather tough and challenging. The objecting MPs use all three of the discursive strategies presented in this research to argue against this particular detail. The discussion ends in disappointment for the Al Wafaq Party when the report is withdrawn and not rejected, something that evokes an emotive reaction. Since the analysis of this excerpt is very

long, I subdivide it into what is more like ‘scenes’ to make it easier to follow the development of the debate.

4.3.1.1 A reproach: a backgrounded disagreement

The report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee on the bill proposal on chemical weapons had first been presented to the Council two months earlier, but it had then been withdrawn for further revision. In this sitting, it is presented again but without any changes being made to its original form. In the excerpt, in lines 17–26, MP Sami Ali Qamber (Al Minbar) expresses his dissatisfaction over the delay, employing the strategy of corroborating by information. Below is MP Qamber’s intervention. Table 12 lists the devices and strategies used in this intervention.

Table 12: *Strategy of MP Sami Qamber in Excerpt 1*

MP	Strategies	Devices
Sami Qamber (Al Minbar)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> lexical style: backgrounded disagreement through a ‘rebuke’ rhetoric: aporia (raising doubt)

S is the Speaker.

SQ is MP Sami Qamber from Al Minbar.

15 **S:** Are there any comments on the principles and foundations of the
 16 bill? Brother MP Dr Sami Ali Qamber, please.
 17 **SQ:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have words of reproach on this
 18 topic. This topic was withdrawn from the sitting last December
 19 although the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
 20 and National Security was ready. And to satisfy the wishes of some
 21 MPs, the issue was withdrawn at the time. I really do not know
 22 what amendments were made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
 23 Defence and National Security that have required almost two months;
 24 there have been no amendments. I demand an explanation from the Chairman
 25 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
 26 National Security about this matter.

MP Qamber begins his comment with: ‘In fact, I have words of reproach on this topic.’ By calling what he has to say a ‘reproach’, something which is supposed to be milder than a rebuke or criticism, MP Qamber is avoiding having his comment perceived as being too critical. A reproach can be considered a backgrounded disagreement, the least hostile and least confrontational form of disagreement (more on conflict and disagreement in Section 4.3.4.1, point e). This establishes a less tense and a less confrontational contact with the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee. MP Qamber uses aporia by doubting any progress in the previous two months: ‘I really do not know what amendments were made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security that have required almost two months’ (lines 21–23). Aporia in such case functions as a modest way to understate what the worthwhileness of the two months and hinting that the Committee of Foreign Affairs has wasted time.

4.3.1.2 A combination of grievance and information

When MPs from Al Wefaq share their opinion about the law draft in this excerpt, their most intensively used discursive strategy is that of corroborating by information. This is the most commonsensical strategy when arguing against a law, as it is most likely to invalidate an internationally accepted law by a verdict that is based on logical and ‘scientific’ validity in the same way such a law is supposedly issued. However, the strategy of intensifying grievance also comes into play as the objecting MPs find their argument and rationalisation insufficient to stand on a par with an international convention and, hence, they bring in the second strategy.

The first speaker from the Al Wefaq Party who raises the issue is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq, who has three interventions in this excerpt alone. The strategy and devices used in the extract above can be summarised in Table 13. This is his first intervention.

Table 13: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq (a) in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategies	Devices
Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• quoting other sources: the conviction• discourse marker ‘but’ to indicate contrast• framing the law as ‘suspicious’

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

75 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.

76 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Emphasis on this observation has
77 been based on the fact that it exists in the International Convention
78 and it is not included. But article or Item d "some non-prohibited
79 purposes", d says: "those related to implementing the provisions of
80 the law, including purposes of local riot control." I believe it is
81 inappropriate to say that this agreement is to be used for controlling
82 local riots. This agreement – the Chemical Weapons Convention – to
83 make an exception is as if to condone domestic riot control to, to
84 permit the use of ground pepper, I mean teargas, about which the
85 brothers have talked. I believe that "including purposes of local riot
86 control" should be deleted. My suggestion is to delete "including
87 purposes of local riot control" because it is suspicious. This is because
88 it makes it possible to use riot control agents whether included or not
89 in the banned substances, such as pepper spray. Thank you.

90 **S:** Thank you, Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please.

MP Al-Marzooq starts by trying to present his view with a legal frame, something which can be classified under the strategy of corroborating by information: he first affirms that the connection between the International Convention and permitting the use of tear gas. He immediately indicates a contrast by the discourse marker 'but'; he suggests the inappropriateness of the discussed agreement on the basis of the fact that it leaves leeway for exceptions in using banned substances such as riot control agents. He indicates this He states his conclusion, 'I believe it is inappropriate to say

that this agreement is to be used for controlling local riots’ (lines 80–82), and the justification he gives is that ‘[t]his is because it makes it possible to use riot control agents whether included or not in the banned substances, such as pepper spray’ (lines 87–89). By doing so, he is framing the law as ‘suspicious’ (line 87). This is an attempt to nullify the legality of the law article, and humanitarian aspects of the matter, up to this point, have still not been raised.

The next speaker is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim. His strategies are summarised in Table 14 followed with his intervention.

Table 14: *Strategies of MP Ebrahim in Excerpt 1*

MP	Strategies	Devices
Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> quoting other sources (other people’s experiences)
	intensifying grievance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> emotive speech using second person singular rhetoric: use of synonyms shift to local dialect rhetoric: exaggeration reframing rioters (or terrorists) as residents and as families reframing the affected people as women and children

S is the Speaker.

AKE is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim from Al Wefaq.

- 90 **S:** Thank you, Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please.
- 91 **AKE:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have reservations about the same item, d.
- 92 Of course Article 1 excludes non-prohibited purposes. I request
- 93 amending the article by deleting section d. If you notice, on page
- 94 106 there is a summary of the views of the Ministry of Health. There
- 95 are also some reservations from the Ministry of Health about the use
- 96 of chemical weapons in fighting riots. That means that there is
- 97 an observation and fear*. I mean, from practical experience – of course
- 98 not that I participate in riots – Mr Speaker, using teargas is
- 99 semi-fatal. It causes suffocation, dizziness and you may *trūḥ fihā*.⁴³
- 100 You may be killed and could die, especially if teargas is directed
- 101 at dense residential areas. This is happening in some areas. There
- 102 are other legal instruments. I demand the deletion Article d because
- 103 I perceive it as a prohibited use of chemical weapons in riots as it
- 104 may lead to death, lead to dizziness. We have children and women.
- 105 Sometimes teargas is even used in wrong places in the first place.
- 106 There is a law that must be codified so that it is used within the
- 107 framework of the law. I have a reservation about this article and ask
- 108 for the deletion of section d. Thank you.
- 109 **S:** Thank you. ...

MP Ebrahim uses two strategies in this intervention: the strategy of corroborating by information and that of intensifying grievance. He first follows MP Al-Marzooq's employment of the strategy of corroborating by information when he first employs the device of quoting to fulfil the strategy of corroborating by information. He quotes two other sources: first, the Ministry of Health and secondly some people who had been exposed to

teargas. He mentions the fact that the Ministry of Health has reservations about the use of teargas: 'If you notice, on page 106 there is a summary of the views of the Ministry of Health. There are also some reservations from the Ministry of Health about the use of chemical weapons in fighting riots. That means that there is an observation and fear*' (lines 93–97).

Then MP Ebrahim presents evidence to support his case by referring to what he calls the 'practical experience' (line 97) of people who have suffered or know others who have suffered from suffocation or dizziness as a result of being exposed to teargas. The indication of 'practical' experience is where MP Ebrahim starts shifting from the strategy of corroborating by information to that of intensifying grievance, a shift that becomes emotive: 'using teargas is semi-fatal. It causes suffocation, dizziness and you may *trūh fihā*. You may be killed and could die' (lines 98–99). The use of the reports or narrations of the experiences move from being 'evidence' to being a way to emphasise the speaker's distress and sense of injustice. He employs second person singular, 'you', in listing possibilities to involve the listener, i.e. the Speaker of the Council, in the imagined experience, to initiate a sense of solidarity. In this sentence, MP Ebrahim uses a strange description of the effect of pepper spray when he considers it 'semi-fatal' (line 99). As fatal is a non-graded adjective, then nothing can be described as 'semi-fatal'; however, he seems to be careful not to call it fatal as there is no confirmed evidence of its being so, yet he employs this exaggeration simply to stress his opinion about teargas being harmful. MP Ebrahim also employs a third device under

the strategy of intensifying grievance when he shifts to BHD to provide a short expression: *trūḥ fihā*, i.e. be doomed or be ‘a goner’, an expression that can also mean to die (in a horrible way, such as because of a severe illness or an accident). This shift suggests that the speaker might be becoming emotive. MP Ebrahim repeats the same idea two more times when he follows the colloquial expression with its synonymous expressions: ‘You may be killed and could die’ (line 100). This use of synonyms, which is another discursive device employed to fulfil the strategy of intensifying grievance, aims to amplify the speaker’s concerns and emotions about the risk of death associated with teargas. It can be considered unnecessary repetition, but he seems to want to affect the attitude of the listeners and convince them.

MP Ebrahim then adds a setting for a scene of when teargas might be used in which the rioters are reframed as residents and families when he follows the previous phrases with ‘especially if pepper spray is directed at dense residential areas’ in lines 100–101 and then again with ‘We have children and women’ (line 104). He explains that ‘[s]ometimes teargas is even used in wrong places in the first place’ (line 105). Here, MP Ebrahim is reframing the scene from a conflict between chaotic people and Riot Control Forces to a scene of Riot Control Forces petrifying and threatening social communities, with a stress on the image of vulnerable women and children. This reframing is a fifth device, and the specification adds a humanitarian dimension to MP Ebrahim’s concerns. He is portraying the conflict between the Riot Control Forces and the people in a residential area and focuses on

the idea of women and children being involved in order to provoke emotions and concern.

I explained in point c in Section 4.2 how the strategy of collaborating with information may be used to delude listeners into thinking that he is presenting information. In this excerpt, MP Hassan Ali Sultan, the third speaker from Al Wefaq on the issue of using teargas, picks up where MP Ebrahim has left off and applies this strategy and loads the utterance with wordiness (see Table 15).

Table 15: Strategy of MP Sultan (a) in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategy	Devices
Hassan Ali Sultan (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • filibustering • lexical style: wordiness • avoidance and hesitations • quoting others (people affected by teargas) • emotive speech • reframing people affected by teargas as victims • rhetoric: apophasis

S is the Speaker.

HS is MP Hassan Ali Sultan from Al Wefaq.

- 120 **S:** Brother MP Sheikh Hassan Ali Sultan, please.
- 121 **HS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I regret to say that, from experience, and
- 122 I do not assert this, but there is a huge possibility that there are
- 123 deaths – to be precise – that happened in the light of* using teargas.
- 124 Not directly, but after some time. Maybe on different grounds we
- 125 did not mention, for specific interests and for public accounts*, but
- 126 there are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of
- 127 using teargas in riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*.
- 128 All the relatives – I say that I do not assert this and I am trying to
- 129 be objective – the relatives point out that the cause of death was
- 130 the use of teargas. I therefore request the deletion of this passage from
- 131 this article. Thank you.
- 132 **S:** Thank you.

MP Sultan starts with several extraneous phrases with self-interruptions (incomplete sentences being interrupted by other phrases) before he expresses his opinion about teargas causing deaths: ‘I regret to say that, from experience, and I do not assert this, but there is a huge possibility that there are deaths – to be precise – that happened in the light of* using teargas’ (lines 121–123). This complex yet ungrammatical structure seems to attempt to add ‘volume’ to the simple and repetitive point MP Sultan is making: that teargas can kill. This makes MP Sultan’s intervention another example of filibustering.

When he says ‘from experience’, it sounds as if he is referring to his personal experience, but then there is no further elaboration of a personal experience and he moves to referring to narrations of relatives of people who were affected by teargas while participating in riots. MP Sultan attempts to present this ‘experience’ as evidence and elaborates, ‘there is a huge possibility that there are deaths’ (line 122–123), but possibilities are not the same as factual information. He uses ‘I do not assert this’ twice: once in line 122 and another later on in line 128. By doing so, he is showing a degree of reluctance about affirming the fact of gas tear being fatal. This act of reluctance sounds contradictory with his attempt to present his objection as being supported by facts. Then, when MP Sultan wants to mention that tear gas caused deaths (line 122–123), he mentions that there were incidents that occurred ‘not directly but after some time’ (line 124). Because no deaths were proven to be resulting from exposure to teargas, the MP is trying to convince the listeners that it can cause death, at least eventually. As MP Ebrahim did before him, MP Sultan builds empathy when he reframes the setting of using teargas and highlights a vulnerable side of the confrontations: children and elderly people ‘there are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of using teargas in riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*’ (lines 126–127).

MP Sultan reframes the people affected by teargas one more time, but this time ambiguously, as innocent victims of others’ interests being protected: ‘Maybe for different grounds we did not mention, for specific

interests and for public accounts*' (lines 124–125). This utterance is not syntactically well constructed and is incomplete, but it hints that 'some people' and their interests are being protected by not revealing the side effects of teargas, 'some people' whom he does not want to identify. This is the rhetorical device known as apophasis, that is, mentioning something by saying that one does not want to mention it. This hint, however, is a short and interruptive attempt to carry out a short shift to the strategy of corroborating by information, although ambiguous information, but the Speaker of Council stops him.

MP Al-Marzooq takes another turn. This time he uses more devices under the same strategy he used earlier: corroborating by information. This is his second intervention in this excerpt. He speaks after the Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who explains how Item d is consistent with international conventions. In this intervention, MP Al-Marzooq starts to sound disturbed and unconvinced by the intervention of the Director of the Legal Department, in which he asserted that the use of teargas for riot control is in accordance with International Convention on Chemical Weapons. MP Al-Marzooq sounds irritated and is becoming more emotive. Below is Table 16 on his usage of discursive devices followed by his intervention.

Table 16: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq (b) in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategies	Devices
Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> indirectly framing the justifications of the Director of the Legal Department as illogical rhetoric: using a conditional sentence style: employing a tutoring role: framing himself as more knowledgeable style: a tutoring role using inclusive ‘we’ rhetoric: exaggeration reframing rioters as citizens

KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

S is the Speaker.

- 155 **S:** ... Are there any other comments? Brother MP Khalil
156 Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
- 157 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, let us take things logically.
158 When we say that law enforcement-related purposes and riot
159 control agents are completely free of banned chemical weapons,
160 something which means that we do not need to list them in the
161 law that prohibits the use of chemical weapons, if -and this is a
162 confirmation*– if the tools of implementing the law are totally free
163 of chemical weapons, then we do not need to mention them in this
164 law, [they do not need to] be excluded. If there is any suspicion that
165 there may be any articles in the law, or in what is required by any
166 article in relation to law enforcement, even a suspicion that is equal
167 to a single atom out of a million that there are chemicals, then this
168 article must be nullified. That is because the process should be
169 accurate. But not prohibiting agents that contain chemicals or
170 chemicals that are banned*, then we do not need to add it. If there
171 is any suspicion, then removing it is a must. Thank you, Mr Speaker.
- 172 **S:** Thank you. ...

MP Al-Marzooq begins his second intervention in line 157 with: 'let us take things logically.' By this move, he is employing the device of framing as he presents what he is going to say as taking matters logically. First, he is indirectly 'framing' and implying that the preceding statements, i.e. the justification of the Director of the Legal Department, have been not constructed logically, an indirect understating of the response.

Simultaneously, this move is an attempt to reframe or reshape MP Al-Marzooq's discourse into what he presents as the crux of the matter. He can be said to be assuming the role of a tutor who has a better understanding of the situation, as if he is saying: 'Fine, you have said enough. Now let us listen to what I have to say.' By this rhetorical move, MP Al-Marzooq is trying to take control and refocus the discourse.

MP Al-Marzooq then employs the use of a conditional sentence to support the strategy of corroborating by information. He explains that the discussed law, which excludes the prohibition on chemical substances use for riot control, should be unnecessary if the substances that the Riot Control Forces use are, as claimed by the Ministry of the Interior, harmless and not chemical. This time, he employs the tutoring role when he uses the inclusive 'we' to explain how the law can be interpreted: 'when we say that ..., which means that we do not need to list them ...' (line 158 and line 160 respectively) and again in line 163 'then we do not need to add it.' This use of the inclusive first person plural, 'we', serves to establish a rapport with the listeners, including the Speaker of the Council, the MPs and the guest

speakers participating in this discussion⁴⁴. He can be perceived as suggesting that this is a group-task, a group-decision, and that ‘we’ all should work on finalising it together. It can alternatively be perceived as an emphasis on the fact that MP Al-Marzooq and his political party, or he and the Council, have a say and a role that are no less valuable or salient than the say and the role of the Ministry of the Interior. In either case, he is conveying a message of involvement and presence.

MP Al-Marzooq then employs exaggeration as a rhetorical device: ‘If there is any suspicion that there may be any articles in the law, or in what is required by any article in relation to law enforcement, even a suspicion that is equal to a single atom out of a million that there are chemicals, then this article must be nullified’ (lines 164–168). This exaggeration, ‘a single atom out of a million,’ is used to evoke a strong feeling of him or his party being deeply concerned about details and about the safety and well-being of the people. The exaggeration is presented within a conditional sentence; this conditional claim is used here as an inference. What the statement is actually saying is: ‘There is suspicion of chemicals being involved, in spite of it being a small suspicion. Therefore, this article must be nullified.’

After MP Al-Marzooq, MP Al-Miz’al from Al Wefaq shares his view. He builds his argument upon the strategy of corroborating by information, this time to construct an image of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, an image of an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group’. This attempt is a strong argument based on

corroborating by information in this excerpt. To achieve this, he employs several discursive devices (illustrated in Table 17.)

S is the Speaker.

MM is MP Mohammed Al-Miz'al from Al Wefaq.

- 172 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yusif Al-Miz'al, please.
- 173 **MM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course we are with – I mean when we
- 174 talk about banning manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing
- 175 and developing chemical weapons – we are aware of the consequences
- 176 of such an act on a small country such as Bahrain, where there are
- 177 dense gatherings in both the capital and other areas. May God
- 178 protect all, by His will, from the wickedness of Al Qaeda and
- 179 anyone similar or any of their followers should they get access to
- 180 a chemical formula and use it in one of these gatherings, God forbid.
- 181 But when it comes to discussing the legality of this point, d, if we
- 182 go back to, I just want to, Mr Speaker, to link this point so we
- 183 understand it. Can we, Mr Speaker, go to Article 3 Item e, which
- 184 speaks about the use of – Mr Speaker, can everyone pay heed to me
- 185 because this is a very important point...
- 186 **S:** We are now in Article 1. Do not go to Article 3.
- 187 **MM:** No, no. In order to understand this I need to import a text from
- 188 there, because Article 3 e states that "the use of riot control agents
- 189 as a means of war: It is prohibited to use riot control agents as a
- 190 means of war". If this was not possible, then the law would not have
- 191 issued something about it. This means that the means of fighting
- 192 riots can be a means of war. When an enemy wants to attack the
- 193 sovereignty of the country, the law guarantees that no means of riot
- 194 control is used against them. However, the same law allows the use
- 195 of means of riot control domestically. We protect external enemies
- 196 who attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be
- 197 used against a citizen, whatever was the mistake made by the citizen.
- 198 This big paradox, Mr Speaker, will place the people who are in

199 charge of law enforcement in a very critical position. The country,
 200 the government and we will all be indicted all the time. I request
 201 scrutinising, comparing and contrasting Item d in Article 1 and
 202 Item e in Article 3. Mr Speaker, the risk here is when we issue that*
 203 a substance that is a used in riot control can be an instrument of war,
 204 while we prohibit using it against an external enemy attacking or
 205 invading us. Thank you, Mr Speaker.
 206 S: Thank you. ...

Table 17: Strategy of MP Al-Miz'al in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategies	Devices
Mohammed Yusif Al- Miz'al (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> lexical style: exclusive and inclusive 'we' rhetoric: procatalepsis shifting the frame of terrorists to another group speech act: comparing using mitigation and intensification rhetoric: sarcasm local semantic move: disclaimer framing others as Al Qaeda outgrouping through othering discourse marker: 'but' indicating contrast and adding accent on the following rhetoric: figure of reasoning (logos): using legal facts speech acts: contrasting articles in the same law rhetorical explanation to affect attitude rhetoric: intensifying and mitigating warning: distortion of the image of Bahrain

First of all, it is interesting to follow how MP Al-Miz'al employs 'we' in his speech and how it moves between the inclusive 'we' and the exclusive 'we'.

The first time he uses it inclusively: ‘when we talk about banning manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing and developing chemical weapons’ (lines 173–175); here he is speaking on behalf of either Al Wefaq or the Council. However, he is most probably excluding the guest speakers⁴⁵ when he says: ‘we are aware of the consequences of such an act on a small country such as Bahrain’ (lines 175–176). The rest of the first person plurals that MP Al-Miz’al uses are inclusive and are probably used to show involvement in decision making: ‘I just want to, Mr Speaker, to link this point so we understand it’ (line 182–183), ‘We protect external enemies who attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be used against a citizen’ (lines 195–197), ‘we will all be indicted all the time’ (line 200), and ‘when we issue that* a substance that is a used in riot control can be an instrument of war, while we prohibit using it against an external enemy attacking or invading us’ (lines 202–205).

Going back to the intervention, MP Al-Miz’al’s first ‘we’, the inclusive one, employs the rhetorical device known as procatalepsis, or what can be also described as a disclaimer (a local semantic move). MP Al-Miz’al acknowledges the importance of the law against chemical weapons in lines 173–176: ‘Of course we are with – I mean when we talk about banning manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing and developing chemical weapons – we are aware of the consequences of such an act on a small country such as Bahrain.’ He uses this procatalepsis to shift the frame of ‘terrorist’ from the Shiite opposition, who are normally associated with riots

and clashes and who are the implicit subject of most of the discussions revolving around riot control, to another group of indictees, a smaller group of Sunnis under arrest for planning a terrorist explosion. This is a disclaimer: the good position of *Us* against terrorism and the bad position of *Them* being Al Qaeda. Although this is not openly stated, it is a hint that is well understood in Bahrain by both MPs and a large sector of the laypeople, as it made headlines in local newspapers at the time. This had been the only incident in which the indictees of a local riot or terrorist act were Sunnis, and they had been accused of being ‘inspired’ by Al Qaeda. MP Al-Miz’al conducts this shift by saying: ‘May God protect all, by His will, from the wickedness of Al Qaeda and anyone similar or any of their followers should they get access to a chemical formula and use it in one of these gatherings, God forbid’ (line 177–180). This is a new perspective, a different reading of who might be threatening the security of Bahrain, a use of ‘othering’. The use of othering has a further function: it aims at bringing the speaker and his in-group together against the ‘others’, who are often perceived as enemies, as intruders or as a threat, even if this other entity did not really oppose or threaten the group. In such a case of creating or constructing an enemy, the device of othering is a strong device of manipulation.

MP Al-Miz’al follows this statement with: ‘But when it comes to discussing the legality of this point, d, ...’ (line 181). The use of ‘but’ here is a discourse marker that acts as a contrast and adds an accent on what follows. Now, after having established whom he is framing as terrorists, he

shifts to discussing the 'legality' of using teargas in local riots. Al-Miz'al starts here to read the article critically and, to do so, he brings in another item from another article, Item e from Article 3, and compares it with Item d. This, apparently, seems to inspire some objections from the other MPs. No objection or interruption is mentioned in Hansard, but it can be understood from MP Al-Miz'al's asking for attention in lines 183–185: 'Can we, Mr Speaker, go to Article 3 Item e, which speaks about the use of– Mr Speaker, can everyone pay heed to me because this is a very important point....' It sounds as if there were side talks or disturbance among the other MPs, something which made MP Al-Miz'al interrupt his intervention and ask for attention. The Speaker, in line 186, explains that the Council is currently dealing with Article 1 Item d and asks MP Al-Miz'al to keep to it. From the Speaker's reaction, it sounds that the side talks or disturbance that rose was a result of the MPs objecting to MP Al-Miz'al moving to another article. However, MP Al-Miz'al insists that he needs to bring that item in to explain his point (lines 187–188). His insistence reflects his confidence in the strength of this argument.

Al-Miz'al then builds a strong argument by comparing and linking two items in two different articles under the same law. He denounces how the same law is more considerate towards and protective of enemies than it is of Bahrainis: 'We protect external enemies who attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be used against a citizen' (lines 195–197). He uses sarcasm to present the notion of protecting the enemies, and then he

mitigates the action of the citizen that would expose him to the same substance from which the enemy is protected: ‘...whatever was the mistake made by the citizen’ (line 197). The verb ‘guarantees’ in the rhetorical explanation itself is denouncing how this law provides the enemy with security assurances. He adds a further rhetorical explanation based on the comparison between this ‘guarantee’ and the permission for using the same weapons in local riots: ‘However, the same law allows the use of means of riot control domestically. We protect external enemies who attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be used against a citizen, whatever was the mistake made by the citizen’ (lines 194–197). When he adds: ‘...whatever was the mistake made by the citizen,’ he is using mitigation to depict a huge gap between the two offences: an external enemy invading the country versus a citizen making some fuss in a riot. MP Al-Miz’al is illustrating two continuums: a significant contrast between the two offences, and another contrast between the two approaches to the use of chemical weapons against each offence. This is an illustrative presentation that strengthens MP Al-Miz’al’s argument. MP Al-Miz’al then brings in the issue of the image of Bahrain being affected, which I will elaborate upon in the following section.

The next speaker is the Director of the Military Courts, the Ministry of Interior. In his intervention, he explains that the teargases are made of

natural substances and consist of no chemical toxics. He mentions that dropping the item that allows using teargas with local riots would mean that the police would use other means, which would be more harmful (see Appendix, Excerpt 1 lines 208-221).

MP Haider Hassan Al-Sitri speaks after the Director of Military Courts. MP Al-Sitri repeats what was said by the MPs before him (MP Al-Marzooq, MP Ebrahim, MP Sultan and MP Al-Miz'al). He does not add any new input or arguments but serves as reinforcement. The repetition of an idea in a parliamentary setting is called filibustering. Within the repeated content, MP Al-Sitri employs a number of discursive devices as presented in Table 18.

Table 18: *Strategy of MP Al-Sitri in Excerpt 1*

MP	Strategies	Devices
Haider Hassan Al-Sitri (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rhetoric: filibustering • framing affected people as citizens • rhetorical question • rhetoric: conditional statements • procatalepsis • lexical style: complex, stylishly awkward word compounds • framing the law as deceptive

S is the Speaker.

HHS is MP Haider Hassan Al-Sitri from Al Wefaq.

222 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Mr Haider Hassan Al-Sitri, please.
 223 **HHS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think we should seriously consider such
 224 critical topics. What my colleague MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz'al
 225 has said is very clear, that this is forbidden to be used with an enemy
 226 in war, a war with military weapons, killing and fighting. It is allowed
 227 to be used in encountering citizens. Therefore no need for a large
 228 explanation* or a long argumentation. Let us be serious. The concerned
 229 party says that what is being used are natural substances and that thus
 230 there is no need to mention it* in this article of this law. We do not
 231 need to use chemicals in riots, so why do we mention it* here? We
 232 do not need it. What we are using is a natural substance, which is
 233 ground pepper; this is what the concerned authorities said. If this
 234 interpretation is wrong and not true, if we will place it*– then the
 235 explanation is incorrect. If we place it in this law*, then the remarks
 236 of the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the
 237 real substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.
 238 Thank you, Mr Speaker.
 239 **S:** Thank you. ...

MP Al-Sitri starts with the discursive device of framing as did MP Al-Marzooq in his second intervention. MP Al-Sitri frames his justification as being serious when he says: 'I think we should seriously consider such critical topics' (lines 223–224), something which can imply that other perspectives are not serious enough. He makes the same rhetorical move in line 228: 'Let us be serious.' He also frames the people affected or targeted by the teargas as citizens in lines 226–227: 'It is allowed to be used in encountering citizens.' A last framing MP Al-Sitri makes is that of the law at the end of his intervention. The framing is made within his conditional statement in lines 235–237 If we place it in this law*, then the remarks of

the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the real substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.’ A law that conceals a truth would be a deceptive one, and hence, he is suggesting the invalidity of the law.

MP Al-Sitri also uses a rhetorical question in line 230–233: ‘We do not need to use chemicals in riots, so why do we mention it* here? We do not need it. What we are using is a natural substance, which is ground pepper; this is what the concerned authorities said..’ He proposes a question, then immediately follows it with an answer. He then uses procatalepsis: he anticipates the response to this objection, based on what the Director of Military Courts has said earlier: that the substance being used is ground pepper, which is a natural substance. MP Al-Sitri immediately answers this objection with conditional sentences, which, nevertheless, are not very well constructed. The immediate answers in the form of conditional sentences are presented next when I present the discursive device of lexical style.

When it comes to the content of MP Al-Sitri’s intervention, it appears that his intervention is a duplicate of what the preceding speakers have already presented. This device, filibustering, aims to delay or obstruct making a decision that the speaker is not satisfied with. MP Al-Sitri centres his reservation on the elderly people and children and individual experiences of teargas causing eventual deaths, as in lines 125–127: ‘there are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of using teargas in riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*.’ This is an example of

complex structure and compound words, which I called ‘wordiness’; another example of this wordiness found in lines 233–237: ‘If this interpretation is wrong and not true, if we will place it* – then the explanation is incorrect. If we place it in this law*, then the remarks of the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the real substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.’ The same latter example (lines 233–237) consists of conditional statements which aim at negating the justifications given by the Director of Military Courts.

4.3.1.3 Bahrain’s international image as a perspective

The strategy of centralising pride and dignity is another strategy that is employed in this excerpt to object to the use of teargas for local riots. This is achieved through centralising concern about the image of Bahrain. Two MPs follow this strategy: the first one is the independent MP Abdul Aziz Abul, and second one is MP Al-Miz’al.

MP Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent MP, is the only MP other than those of the Al Wefaq Party who expresses his reservations about the law permitting the use of teargas for local riot control. The strategies and the devices in MP Abul’s intervention are summarised in Table 19.

Table 19: Strategies of MP Abul in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategies	Devices
Abdul Aziz Abul (independent)	centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • shift to local dialect • discourse marker: a filler • emotive speech • rhetoric allusion: disturbing historical event • rhetorical question • metaphor
	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • warning: possible international indictment

S is the Speaker.

AA is MP Abdul Aziz Abul, an independent Sunni MP.

- 239 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Dr Abdul Aziz Hassan Abul, please.
- 240 **AA:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, in fact, I join everyone
- 241 objecting to adding this item under the non-prohibited purposes.
- 242 That is because, *sallamkallah*,⁴⁶ Mr Speaker, as soon as we talk
- 243 about chemical weapons, chemical weapons by nature mean
- 244 weapons used for military purposes or for the purpose of
- 245 exterminating an opponent. I think that chemical weapons are
- 246 always characterised with anti-humanitarian qualities, associated
- 247 with genocide. When we insert this in our law, and then we mention
- 248 them in fighting riots and consider that fighting riots with chemical
- 249 weapons is unprohibited, this will tarnish the image of Bahrain! We
- 250 send a message to the whole world tomorrow that whenever we
- 251 have a riot, we will use chemical weapons, regardless of their
- 252 components. This is enough to offend Bahrain. I believe that first:
- 253 it sends a negative message indicating that there are bad intentions,
- 254 that for any disturbance we may use weapons to which we apply the
- 255 title 'chemical'. So why do we put ourselves in this situation that
- 256 essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the
- 257 status of the government, about the status of the state, and about

258 citizens being dealt with using weapons? As it happened in Halabcha⁴⁷.
 259 and then the ruler of the country was indicted and executed for that
 260 reason. I believe it is necessary to shut this door and delete this
 261 article because it opens an illegitimate door for no good reason.
 262 First of all, we do not need at all to talk about chemical weapons in
 263 Bahrain. I believe that the issue is not our concern. We neither
 264 produce chemical weapons, nor, hopefully, will we need them. They
 265 should, *a fortiori*, be prohibited for fearing that some outrageous
 266 people may use them. However, to get into the issue of riots means
 267 to allow security forces to be accused in future of using chemical
 268 weapons against the people of Bahrain. Why put this topic forward
 269 and open a door? I suggest, like the brothers said, that we write it
 270 off and delete Item e from Article 3, so as not to allow the distortion
 271 of the image of Bahrain or [allow] accusations. Then it will emerge
 272 on the Internet that the government of Bahrain is preparing for the
 273 use of chemical weapons against the citizens whatever disturbance
 274 they are causing. Thank you, Mr Speaker.
 275 S: Thank you. ...

MP Abul focuses on two perspectives: the humanitarian perspective, and the potential international response to the law allowing the use of teargas in local riot control. The first perspective builds upon the strategy of centralising pride and dignity while the second upon the strategy of corroborating with information. The first perspective, starting on line 242, contains at its opening a shift to local dialect: ‘That is because, *sallamkallah*, Mr Speaker, as soon as we talk about chemical weapons, ...’ (line 242). The phrase *sallamkallah* consists of two words, *sallamka* and *Allah*, meaning [may] God protect you. However, the phrase is a common interjection in Bahraini dialect used before or instead of mentioning the name or title of the addressee as an indication of respect and not meant as a prayer *per se*. It

serves here as a filler and carry no meaning. The first perspective proposes a 'general' humanitarian assumption that suggests, though not overtly, an urge to ban chemical weapons: 'I think that chemical weapons are always characterised with anti-humanitarian qualities, associated with genocide' (lines 245–247). The second perspective is concern about the criticism and suspicion of the country and its system that the existence of such a law is likely to provoke. MP Abul elaborates this point in lines 247–258, using the inclusive 'we' to generate a feeling of the involvement of the Council in distorting the image of Bahrain, and thus evoking a sense of responsibility towards distorting the image of Bahrain at the international level: 'When we insert this in our law, and then we mention them in fighting riots.... We send a message to the whole world tomorrow that whenever we have a riot, we will use chemical weapons.... So why do we put ourselves in this situation that essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the status of the government, about the status of the state, and about citizens being dealt with using weapons?'

After suggesting the Council's responsibility, MP Abul follows this with a rhetorical question: 'So why do we put ourselves in this situation that essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the status of the government, about the status of the state, and about citizens being dealt with using weapons?' (lines 255–258). This question suggests that approving such a law, without even implementing it, will have negative consequences. MP Abul is thus refuting the feasibility of having such an item in the

Bahraini law. To enforce the image, he makes a historical allusion: ‘As it happened in Halabcha then the ruler of the country was indicted and executed for that reason’ (lines 258–260). The allusion to Saddam Hussain, the former Iraqi President who was executed, is a very strong and disturbing one.

Additionally, MP Abul employs the metaphor of ‘opening a door’ to signify allowing something to happen and affect the course of events. This metaphor is used three times, twice in one sentence: ‘I believe it is necessary to shut this door and delete this article because it opens an illegitimate door for no good reason’ (lines 260–261), and a third time in lines 268–269: ‘Why put this topic forward and open a door?’ The metaphor may be inspired by the colloquial Arabic idiom الباب اللي بيك منه ريح سيده واستريح *il bāb illi yik minnah riḥ siddah wistirih*, i.e. the door from which wind flows, close and relax. The image of a closed door that is about to be opened has a further implication: that there are some people, organisations or countries who are waiting for an opportunity to distort the image of Bahrain, and thus the country should not give them the chance to do so. This metaphor is politically loaded. Bahrain has been closely observed by many other government and organisations for different reasons. On one hand, there has been Iran that has repeatedly claimed it as ‘fourteenth province’, and this an old conflict. On the other hand, are the oppositions, whether based inside or outside Bahrain, who would benefit from flaws. This is an important point and will be better understood in the next chapter.

The other MP applying the strategy of centralising pride and dignity in this excerpt is MP Al-Miz'al (Table 20).

Table 20: *Strategy of MP Al-Miz'al (b) in Excerpt 1*

MP	Strategy	Devices
Mohammed Al-Miz'al (Al Wefaq)	centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • framing the law of teargas as paradoxical • speech act: warning that the government will be affected negatively too

At the end of his speech, presented earlier, after employing the strategy of corroborating by information (in his second intervention above), MP Al-Miz'al makes a third intervention and adds a further dimension to this issue: 'This big paradox, Mr Speaker, will place the people who are in charge of law enforcement in a very critical position. The country, the government and we will all be indicted all the time' (lines 198–200). This conveys the message that not only will this 'paradox' be unfair for the people exposed to teargas, but will also affect the international image of the country. He is demonstrating how this law will also negatively affect the country and the government, and suggesting that therefore the government has to consider its own interests, too – a second perspective to bear in mind. However, the responses of authorities and specialists keep confirming that using teargas is considered internationally legal and that there have been no definite allegations against it. Even when the Director of Environmental Control in

the General Authority for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife asks for an amendment to the article to make it clearer and more definite, she still does not suggest eliminating it. This leaves the Al Wefaq Party's demand unsupported by any concrete facts from officials inside or outside the country. Consequently, the Al Wefaq Party now needs to intensify its use of other strategies.

4.3.1.4 Disappointment

In response to MPs' objections, the Director of Military Courts of the Ministry of the Interior again confirms the fact that all the substances used in manufacturing riot control tools are permitted according to international conventions (lines 303–306), and that if this item of the law were to be cancelled, it would mean that the Riot Control Forces would be obliged to use more powerful and more dangerous weapons. Here, MP Al-Marzooq makes his third intervention, which becomes particularly emotive and charged, but again employs the strategy of corroborating by information (see Table 21).

Table 21: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq (c) in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategy	Devices
Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rhetoric: using conditional statements repeatedly, denouncing justifications • rhetoric questions • rhetoric: using the intensifier ‘honestly’ to express disapproval • emotive speech

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

- 275 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please, a point
276 of order.
- 277 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. A point of order, only a clarification. That
278 is because what the Representative of the Home Office, Brother
279 Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud, has said needs to be considered. First,
280 this article does not regulate— or this whole law does not regulate
281 dealing with riots, so as to say that if you omit this article then
282 more deadly weapons will be used. The process is then not clear.
283 Constitutionally or legally, this law is new. First: if this new law now
284 included practising*, is not this practice codified or something?
285 This needs to be clarified. Secondly. The second point in this topic
286 is the use of the word* that if we removed this article while stressing
287 that, according to what the brother has mentioned at the beginning
288 of his speech, that all riot control agents being free of prohibited
289 chemicals, something that we have mentioned and referred to in
290 the first intervention, if they were free [from prohibited agents]
291 then we would not need to involve [the topic of] anti-riot here. This
292 assertion requires the anxiety* that it has caused now, so that its
293 cancellation would necessitate the use of more lethal materials.
294 Honestly, this topic requires consideration. To say that if we drop
295 this article that states that the use of riot control agents and that are

296 completely free of dangerous and prohibited chemicals*, if we drop it
 297 then we will have to use lethal weapons, this is threatening us with
 298 a cluster bomb or something similar. I stop here honestly. Thank you,
 299 Mr Speaker.
 300 **S:** Thank you. Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi, Legal Counsel,
 301 the Ministry of State for Defence, please.

MP Al-Marzooq protests against what the Director of Military Courts has said. He makes the accusation that the procedure is ‘not clear’ (line 282). He expresses his disparagement by mainly repeating the points made by the Director of the Military Courts in two forms: conditional statements and rhetorical questions, all of which are denouncing and reproving the justifications provided. MP Al-Marzooq’s intervention here is to use the strategy of corroborating by information. MP Al Marzooq protests using a number of conditional sentences, the first of which contains a rhetoric question: ‘First: if this new law now included practising*, is not this practice codified or something?’ (lines 283–284), ‘if they were free [from prohibited agents] then we do not need to involve [the topic of] anti-riot here’ (290–291) and ‘To say that if we drop this article..., if we drop it then we will have to use lethal weapons’ (lines 294–297). The last conditional statement that concludes his speech is followed by an angry comment: ‘this is threatening us with a cluster bomb or something similar’ (lines 297–298). After this, he immediately signifies the end of his speech with: ‘I stop here honestly’ (line 298). The intensifier ‘honestly’ is used to express disapproval and dismay. MP Al–Marzooq is applying a strategy of corroborating by

information here, putting himself in a stronger, more knowing position, and thus his dismay, as can be inferred from his reaction, results from his reasoning about the illegality of the law not affecting the legal stance of the guest speakers or the report committee. Still, Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi, Legal Counsel, the Ministry of State for Defence comments and again confirms the legality of the procedure.

At the end of the debate, MP Adel Al-Mu'awdah (Al Asalah), the Chairman of Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Law Committee, comments on the debate and the interventions. He also employs the strategy of corroborating by information (see Table 22).

Table 22: Strategy of MP Al-Mu'awdah in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategy	Devices
Adel Al-Mu'awdah (Al Asalah)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> discourse marker 'but' to indicate a tone shift rhetoric: periphrasis: promising to consider but not promising to delete the article local semantic move, a disclaimer: employing periphrasis (rhetoric): expressing the endorsement of the safety of the public but again not expressing being convinced by arguments against teargas

S is the Speaker.

AM is MP Adel Al-Mu'awdah from Al Asalah.

- 316 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course, it is the right of MPs to share
317 the comments they have and this is an inherent right for them. But
318 I regret that we reviewed this bill three weeks ago. It was [supposed
319 to be] two weeks and we postponed till three, and yet we have not
320 received any comments except on the issue of punishment. I think
321 now I believe that we will be locked in a vicious circle, and we will
322 eventually be obliged to withdraw the bill, but now I am asking for
323 the withdrawal of the bill, but I ask the brothers who have all the
324 comments to come with all the comments, and to read the law— not
325 during the sitting but before the sitting. I will arrange a meeting with
326 the Ministry of the Interior and discuss this, article by article, with those
327 involved. We are also concerned about the good of everyone and if
328 there is anything that harms people then we do not want it. If there
329 is something that benefits the country then we want it. I withdraw
330 the bill and I ask all the brothers to come with all their observations,
331 and to authorise some people...
- 332 **S:** Thank you. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
333 Defence and National Security has requested the withdrawal of the
334 project, to carry out further study, and he requests that everyone who
335 has a proposal or an opinion on the subject to offer it in writing.
336 Who agrees to return it to the committee?

MP Al-Mu'awdah employs periphrasis. He starts by acknowledging the 'legality' of the discussion when he says: 'Of course, it is the right of MPs to share the comments they have and this is an inherent right for them' (lines 316–317). The use of the intensifier 'of course' functions as a device that treats something as 'taken for granted' or obvious in order to emphasise that he agrees with and approves of the MPs expressing their points of view. He

then immediately shifts tone, a cancellation of what he has said with the discourse marker 'but' in lines 317–320: 'But I regret that we reviewed this bill three weeks ago ... and yet we have not received any comments except on the issue of punishment.' He explains that comments are inadequate unless they are submitted in writing: 'I think now I believe that we will be locked in a vicious circle, and we will eventually be obliged to withdraw the bill' (lines 320–322). The two parts of his statements compose a local semantic move, a disclaimer: a positive part about *Us* accepting others' points of views, with a negative part about *Them* not submitting any objecting in writing. MP Al-Mu'awdah is thus signalling a desire to stop the discussion when he adds: 'I ask the brothers who have all the comments to come with all the comments, and to read the law— not during the sitting but before the sitting' (lines 323–325). He requests that the proposal be withdrawn and he immediately follows this with an assurance that he will follow up the matter: 'I will arrange a meeting with the Ministry of the Interior and discuss this, article by article, with those involved' (lines 325–327); by doing this he is actually showing his desire to follow a procedure. MP Al-Mu'awdah concludes by demonstrating an endorsement of and a concern about the safety of the public: 'We are also concerned about the good of everyone and if there is anything that harms people then we do not want it. If there is something that benefits the country then we want it' (lines 327–329). This statement reflects an approval of the motivation, i.e. the safety and legality of substances used in riot control, but not necessarily

the way this is interpreted or applied. In other words, this is a promise to consider the matter further but not a promise to demand the elimination of teargas as a riot control agent. In this way, MP Al-Mu'awdah states his decision (i.e. the withdrawal), which is not what the Al Wefaq MPs hoped and argued long for.

When the Speaker of the Council decides to end the discussion here, MP Sultan disagrees and reacts emotively. MP Sultan's reaction is to the conditional promise that MP Al-Mu'awdah has given. The Al Wefaq MPs hoped for the proposal to be voted down, in order to eliminate teargas as a permitted riot control agent (Table 23).

Table 23: Strategy of MP Sultan (b) in Excerpt 1

MP	Strategy	Devices
Hassan Sultan (Al Wefaq)	intensifying grievance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> emotive speech Shift to Bahrain dialect: using <i>kinyah</i> to address Speaker a sequence of rhetorical questions

S is the Speaker.

HS is MP Hassan Sultan from Al Wefaq.

332 **S:** Thank you. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
 333 Defence and National Security has requested the withdrawal of the
 334 project in order to carry out further study and he requests that everyone who
 335 has a proposal or an opinion on the subject offer it in writing.

336 Who agrees to return it to the committee?
 337 **HS:** Abu Muhammad (Mr Speaker), this is a critical thing to say. You
 338 are the first person in the Council to be responsible for it. How can
 339 the people be threatened with deadly weapons? What is this? What
 340 does this mean?
 341 **S:** Şalli ‘annebi⁴⁸ [i.e. Stay calm], and jazaka Allah khair⁴⁹ [i.e. thank you].
 342 Who agrees with returning it to the committee?
 343 **(Majority agree.)**

MP Sultan begins his protest in lines 337 by addressing the Speaker of the Council with his *kinyah*, Abu Mohammed. A *kinyah* indicates a form of closeness and respect, a sort of nickname that is constructed by calling one the father or mother of someone, e.g. if one’s oldest son is called Ali, then the *kinyah* of the father and mother respectively is *Abu Ali* and *Um Ali* (in some dialects, including BHD, Abu is reduced to *Bu*, so *Bu Ali*). This type of nickname is very popular in Arabic, falling somewhere between the formal use of titles with last names and the informal use of first names does. The *kinyah* conveys a lot more respect than the use of one’s first name or nickname. At the same time, however, it implies a degree of closeness, of intimacy. It is used among friends, family members, and even co-workers. MP Sultan is thus placing himself closer to the Speaker than an average citizen would. This closeness indicates that the Speaker is approachable. What follows is a rebuke, and MP Sultan is trying to keep the rebuke less confrontational: ‘Abu Muhammad (Mr Speaker), this is a critical thing to say’ (lines 337). This is more likely to initiate a degree of empathy rather than a defence. MP Sultan then immediately holds the Speaker responsible for

putting himself in his current position: ‘You are the first person in the Council to be responsible for it’ (lines 337–338). This is an act aimed at involving the Speaker in a decision that may affect the people being exposed to teargas. MP Sultan becomes emotive and follows his statement with a sequence of three rhetorical questions: ‘How can the people be threatened with deadly weapons? What is this? What does this mean?’ (lines 338–340). These moves form a strong and intense objection to the fact that no decision against using teargas has been made. Instead, the proposal has been withdrawn, which keeps the issue open. The response of the Speaker starts with the Arabic formulaic expressions *ṣalli ‘annebi* and *jazakallah khair* (line 341) commonly used to mean ‘stay calm’ and ‘thank you’ respectively. The latter formulaic expression, however, is sometimes said after an imperative or a request to soften it and implicates a polite request. In such a case, like in this intervention, it is an equivalent of saying ‘please’. The style of the Speaker’s reply may have been affected by the *Kinyah* use when MP Sultan addressed him, resulting in the Speaker’s accommodating himself to MP Sultan’s style.

In this long excerpt, using teargas in local riot control, there has been an intense contribution from Al Wafaq and only one other MP, namely MP Abul, an independent MP. The strategies of corroborating with information and that of intensifying grievance have been dominant and the discursive

devices employed varied, with reframing and rhetoric playing major roles, but failed to compete with the law that conforms to international standards.

4.3.2 Excerpt 2 on Bahraini Detainees Abroad

From sitting 2:2:25 a, 22 April 2008

In this speech, MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, a member of Al Wefaq, complains about the status of Bahraini prisoners held captive abroad. When discussing this issue, MP Al-Mitghawi mentions that the persistence of the problem can stir up demonstrations and chaos. He is therefore indirectly relating this issue to possible disturbances.

In the excerpt, MP Al-Mitghawi's approach to the topic mainly employs the strategy of centralising the pride and dignity of Bahrainis (see Table 24). MP Al-Mitghawi does use the strategy of intensifying grievance, but grievance over imprisonment and harm is not as strongly present as that of the feeling of wounded pride. This is because his protest does not revolve around the arrests themselves but around the lack of proper communication and information about the internees, something which is perceived as a lack of respect and interest in them.

Table 24: Strategy of MP Al-Mitghawi in Excerpt 2

MP	Strategies	Devices
Abdul Hussain Al-Mitghawi (Al Wefaq)	centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rhetoric: mockery and denunciation • rhetoric: comparison: criticizing the disgracing of Bahrainis in their homeland and considering it a reason for them being disgraced abroad • rhetoric: sarcasm: criticizing the low level and lack of professionalism of communication between the Council and the government • rhetoric: irony (adverb ‘surprisingly’ to mean ‘expectedly’) • rhetoric: sarcasm about response of the embassy • rhetorical question about possible reaction of the American Embassy with similar cases • style: short shifts to narrative mode • rhetoric: aporia (raising doubt) • rhetoric: rhetorical question (erotesis), presupposing strong negation • rhetorical questions • rhetoric: suggestive metaphor • rhetoric: hypothetical assumption using an inductive conditional

DS is the Deputy Speaker.

AHM is MP Abdul Hussain Al-Mitghawi from Al Wefaq.

- 1 **DS:** ... Brother MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, please.
- 2 **AHM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. The wondrous response to the proposal for
- 3 returning prisoners— and the purpose is well-known and this proposal
- 4 was long time ago. There was a second proposal, which has also
- 5 become outdated*. But the response is a descriptive essay, ...

MP Al-Mitghawi repeatedly uses mockery as a device to express dissatisfaction and frustration. In line 2, he begins his intervention by describing the response that the Council has received from the government on the issue as ‘wondrous’, and in line 5 as ‘a descriptive essay’. Both descriptions scorn the level and professionalism of communication about this issue between the Council and the government. Mockery as a discursive device is a very strong and confrontational form of criticism and it will be used again in this intervention as seen below.

5 AHM:... and
6 surprisingly, the Bahraini citizen – I feel – if he gets disgraced in his
7 own country, then, *a fortiori*, he gets disgraced abroad. Brother
8 Al-Mirbati has been under arrest for five years, and the proposal
9 was intended for him. He is now in a country with which we have
10 security links. Up to now, his relatives have not got or barely get to
11 visit him, perhaps once a year. Additionally, there are eight
12 detainees from Bahrain who are now either under arrest in the country
13 or in one of the neighbouring countries and the reasons for their arrest
14 are still unknown. They are totally neglected and their families have
15 not met them. One person met them; he went and got the chance to
16 meet them but not the rest. ...

MP Al-Mitghawi links what he perceives as disrespect for those Bahraini prisoners to the lack of respect for Bahrainis in general in their own country. In lines 6–7 he says: ‘Surprisingly, the Bahraini citizen — I feel — if he gets disgraced in his own country, then, *a fortiori*, he gets disgraced abroad’. This idea will be repeated later. The use of the adverb ‘surprisingly’ is an irony,

as he obviously means to show no surprise in one being less respected abroad than in his home country. The sarcastic opening is followed by a list of facts in lines 7–16 about the detainees, their families, the contacts the Council has made with the Bahraini Embassy, the role of the Council in mediating between the relatives and the internees, the families' inclination to protest and the Council's role in preventing this. Knowing these details serves to assert the Council's full involvement and solicitude, a way of confirming being on the side of the public and their representatives. This serves to condemn the government further for not being sufficiently involved. Within the body of 'updates' given in these lines, MP Al-Mitghawi comments on the role of the Bahraini Embassy:

16 **AHM:** ... And our embassy says: we are in contact.
 17 The meaning of the word 'contact' is unknown! Is it possible today
 18 that a foreign citizen or an American gets arrested in Bahrain and
 19 the U.S. Embassy waits for a moment without releasing him?! We
 20 have eight people, university graduates and secondary school
 21 teachers beside Al-Mirbati. It has been five years now. They are
 22 staying in the midst of other countries' prisons, no one contacts them
 23 and no one knows anything about them. ...

In lines 16–17, MP Al-Mitghawi mocks the Bahraini Embassy, which confirms that it is in contact with the authorities regarding the arrest cases. Al-Mitghawi comments: 'The meaning of the word "contact" is not known!' By doing so, he is using aporia to actually hint that the ones who claim to be in contact do not know how to establish contact or communicate. He is thus

that the MPs calm them down or reassure them. This is a strongly suggestive metaphor. It conveys a powerful message: first of all, the silence and calmness of the relatives is temporary; and secondly, as drug brings an elusive feeling of calmness while being health wise destructive, the attempt to keep the relatives of the detainees quiet without them getting a response is, from MP Al-Mitghawi's point of view, not an appropriate measure to take.

After that, MP Al-Mitghawi presents a hypothetical assumption of the situation getting out of control with the relatives not being attended to:

'Then if chaos starts, ...' (line 26). This is an inductive conditional to suggest, and hence to warn against, a very probable outburst. He illustrates how MPs' positions are critical as there will be a twofold pressure on them: from the government to prevent or stop chaos on the one hand, and, on the other hand, from the families of the detainees demanding a response and some answers: 'Then if chaos starts, the government will say to us: What are you, MPs, doing? Do you ask us what we are doing? And the people are asking us what we are doing' (lines 26–29). MP Al-Mitghawi follows the consequent part of the inductive conditional with a rhetorical question: 'Do you ask us what we are doing?' (line 28) as a reproof, holding the Council responsible; something which, according to MP Al-Mitghawi, will have resulted from the government failing to respond properly to the people's demands. The stress on '*you*' in the Arabic original text is achieved by sentence structure. He follows this in line 29 by rhetorically asking how he or the Council should proceed in such a situation. By this rhetorical device,

which is known as *aporia*, MP Al-Mitghawi is asking the listeners how to proceed only for rhetorical purposes, not expecting or waiting for an answer: ‘So how to cope?’ After that, MP Al-Mitghawi puts forward his demand in lines 29–31: ‘I request the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, who are involved in this matter, to make a fast move.’ Although this is the crux of the matter, MP Al-Mitghawi did not present it at the beginning, as it is something the Council has pushed for many times, and this time he needed to present the issue more convincingly.

MP Al-Mitghawi reinforces the key point of his debate again in line 31, using the disgracing of Bahrainis as an affirmative fact: ‘Bahraini citizens are disgraced.’ He then adds another narrative, of an Al Wefaq member being denied access to a country (lines 32–33) and then concludes his speech by posing another rhetorical question in the form of dubitation (lines 27–28): ‘Do Bahrainis stay disgraced in every region while foreigners are honoured?!’ This rhetorical question aims at triggering a negation from the listeners and, hopefully, the government. By provoking ‘no’ as a response, MP Al-Mitghawi is simultaneously attempting to provoke the government into taking an action that confirms the response.

With his speech starting with mockery, ending up with a rhetorical question, and being filled with objection to the lack of communication and respect, rather than with pleas for help, MP Al-Mitghawi is demonstrating the stance of a proud citizen rather than a grieving one.

MP Al-Mitghawi has linked the topic of Bahraini detainees abroad to the topic of dissent. He has, in fact, made the concern over (or perhaps the warning of) possible chaos and disturbance crucial, and has consequently held the government responsible for any possible riots or unrests resulting from the lack of clear and possible response. This has been achieved by employing the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, in which he almost exclusively depended on rhetorical devices. The same strategy is also dominant in the next excerpt in responding to a government letter addressing MPs, but with a different employment of devices.

4.3.3 Excerpt 3 on Insulting the Government

From sitting 2:2:25 b, 22 April 2008

In this excerpt, two MPs, the first from Al Wefaq and the second from Al Asalah, object to a letter that was received from the government. According to an article in Akhbar Al-Khaleej reporting this sitting (Nasr and Jaber: 23 Apr. 2008, pp. 12–13), MP Al-Miz'al from Al Wefaq described the government as 'stupid.'⁵⁰ This description is not recorded in Hansard as MP Al-Miz'al asked before the end of the first half of the same sitting for the word to be withdrawn (ibid.) In response to this, the government addressed a letter to MPs, condemning some of them for what the government considers an insult to its prestige. The same newspaper article (ibid.) also mentions that the MPs were angered by the withdrawal of the Minister of Finance from the sitting, something that the MPs thought should not occur

without the minister following the usual procedure expected from a minister when desiring to withdraw, as he did not ask for the permission of the Speaker or the Head of the Financial Committee as was supposed to (ibid.).

In claiming their political freedom, both MPs employ the same strategy in objecting to this letter: that of centralising pride and dignity. Neither of them is apologetic and neither tries to rationalise his or the accused MPs' stance. Instead, they reverse their position from indictees to indictors to whom the condemnation gives more power to criticise, as will be explored below.

The first intervening MP is an Al Wefaq member, MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim. His use of strategies and devices are summarised in Table 25.

Table 25: *Strategies of MP Ebrahim in Excerpt 3*

MP	Strategies	Devices
Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim (Al Wefaq)	centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rhetoric: mockery • reframing the position of the MPs from indictees to indictors • reframing 'insult' as 'criticism' • rhetoric: exclamation in a conditional statement • inclusion: adding the pride of the Bahraini people beside that of the MPs • rhetorical question • rhetoric: aporia (raising doubt) used as a pun
	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • speech act: comparing and contrasting • lexical style: wordiness, a blurring comparison between insult and criticism

DS is the Deputy Speaker.

AKE is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim from Al Wefaq.

- 1 **DS:** Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please. A point of order.
- 2 **AKE:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I need a clarification from Mr Abdul Aziz
- 3 bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel, the Minister of Shura and the House of
- 4 Representatives. He is saying that there are MPs who insult their
- 5 government. If an MP puts forward a criticism then this is an insult
- 6 to the government?!
- 7 **DS:** No, no. Excuse me, excuse me. He really means the words we are
- 8 hearing today and days other than today and which are out of range*,
- 9 and that actually impinge on the prestige of the government. I have
- 10 alerted the...
- 11 **AKE:** No, I— a comment, Mr Speaker, that there is a difference between
- 12 something said during a conversation and something that an MP
- 13 says to deliberately insult his government...
- 14 **DS:** Actually, intentions are not known except by God.
- In lines 2–4, MP Ebrahim asks the Minister of Shura and the Council of Representatives for what MP Ebrahim calls ‘a clarification’: ‘I need clarification from Mr Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel, the Minister of Shura and the House of Representatives.’ By doing this, the MP is actually orienting his speech to reframe the condemned MPs’ statements, changing the condemnation from ‘insults’ to ‘criticism’. In lines 5–6, he expresses his objection to this condemnation with an exclamation that reproves the government for the way in which it perceives a criticism: ‘If an MP puts forward a criticism then this is an insult to the government?!’
- The Deputy Speaker interrupts and explains that these were utterances that ‘impinge on the prestige of the government’ (line 9). MP Ebrahim responds

to this by contrasting two different circumstances or contexts when he says, in lines 11–13: ‘there is a difference between something said during a conversation and something that an MP says to deliberately insult his government.’ This is an attempt to distinguish a criticism, which is supposed to be an act of judging, from a disrespectful insult, which is an act of scorn and disrespect. However, if the comparison is carefully read, it is not clear how the first concept is meant to be presented differently from the second. This is the weaker version of corroborating by information, saying in what sounds a knowing voice that there is a difference between what is done and the accusation; this is when a temporary shift is made to wordiness to protect one’s stance. The statement fails to make an appropriate comparison and the difference between the two contexts is actually blurred. In the statement, there is ‘there is a difference between ...,’ which sets up a distinction structurally. However, the substance or content of that statement does not sound to present any contrast. Thus, there is a structural contrast but there is no substance contrast. MP Ebrahim’s argument about intention is cut short by the Speaker commenting that intentions are not measurable (line 14), but this response itself makes it clear that shielding oneself with wordiness has worked, as the Speaker fails to see that the comparison was not valid in the first place. Lakoff mentions that George Bush won over Gore by ‘framing issues to his advantage.’ When Gore attacked with figures and facts, Bush ‘retaliated’ with his own figures and facts, and to the public, the difference was blurred; it was all ‘fuzzy math’ (2002: 398). Thus, framing

can be considered to have an influence even when not properly grasped by the listener. Having shifted his position from being a defendant to being a protester and, hence, an attacker, MP Ebrahim begins striking in the following lines:

- 15 **AKE:** The messages that were sent to us today, were not they an insult
16 to the MPs? Poor proposals, Abdul Rahim Al-Mirbati, they do not
17 know where he is, in which prison, is not this an insult? I mean,
18 does the Council deal— actually I am afraid that if I talk the Brother
19 Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will withdraw ...
20 **DS:** No, no, he will not withdraw.
21 **AKE:** We do not know how to manage a dialogue between us and the
22 government, Mr Speaker.
23 **DS:** Brother MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad, please.

MP Ebrahim returns to the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, with which he started his intervention, in lines 15–17, where he lists three issues that he perceives as a source of insult to the Council: first, the messages the MPs have received;⁵¹ secondly, the Council’s receiving what he describes as ‘poor proposals’ from the government, and here he suggests that the government understates the Council’s intelligence; and thirdly, the government’s failure even to locate a particular Bahraini prisoner. The first two points impinge on the pride of the Council, the third on the pride and value of a Bahraini citizen. The three points of objection are followed by a rhetorical question in line 17: ‘Is not this an insult?’ This question affirms the negative: that this is perceived as an insult.

Then, in lines 17–19, MP Ebrahim begins another point, but he interrupts himself before finishing it: ‘I mean, does the Council deal— actually I am afraid that if I talk the Brother Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will withdraw.’ This comment functions at two levels: first, what he is doing is very close to ‘teasing’, telling the minister that he would not tolerate what he is about to say. At a second level, it is indirectly conveying the message that what he, the MP, has to say is powerful, and perhaps shocking. By these two embedded messages, the MP is manifesting his ideological power, how he is on a par with, if not even more powerful than, a minister – this minister – and that he can and would say something very disturbing to a minister. It is either that MP Ebrahim did not say much more after the Speaker has assured him that the minister will not leave, or, if he did say anything, then it has been deleted from Hansard. The MP ends his speech saying: ‘We do not know how to manage a dialogue between us and the government’ (lines 21–22). This statement is an aporia, an unreal dubitation that is used as a pun saying the government does not converse, and thus he is actually making a further complaint.

Hansard then presents the intervention of MP Halim Murad (Al Asalah), whose use of devices are summarised in Table 26.

Table 26: Strategy of MP Murad in Excerpt 3

MP	Strategies	Devices
Halim Murad (Al Asalah)	centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • a sequence of rhetorical questions • lexical style to express ingroupness: including the people of Bahrain to the MPs in being insulted • foreground confrontation: demanding interrogating the minister immediately • emotive speech

DS is Deputy Speaker.

HM is MP Halim Murad from Al Asalah.

- 23 **DS:** Brother MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad, please.
- 24 **HM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. The minister says that the MPs insult the
- 25 government. The minister leaving the Council this way, is not this
- 26 an insult to this Council? And therefore an insult to all the people
- 27 of Bahrain? This is first. Then the wrong responses that come signed
- 28 by the Prime Minister, responses with millions of serious errors, is
- 29 not this an insult to the Council? I commend the speech of Brother
- 30 MP Hamad Khalil Al-Mohannadi. This minister should be
- 31 interrogated, starting at this sitting, because there is no time. Thank
- 32 you, Mr Speaker.
- 33 **DS:** Thank you...

Hansard does not mention what has happened or what has been said

between the intervention of MP Ebrahim and that of MP Halim Murad.

However, it is evident that some information is missing: MP Murad mentions in line 25 that the minister has left the Council, and then, in lines 29–30, he

refers to MP Al-Mohannadi (Al Asalah), whose intervention is not mentioned in Hansard either. It must have been what MP Al-Mitghawi said that made the minister leave, and it seems that MP Al-Mohannadi commented in disapproval on the minister's departure.

In his speech, MP Murad (lines 24–29) conforms to MP Ebrahim's approach, indicting the government for insulting the Council. MP Murad's comments are motivated by the belief that the Council's pride has been wounded, and like MP Ebrahim before him, he is employing the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. MP Murad puts forward two instances of what he perceives as an insult: the departure of the Minister of Shura and the Council of Representatives during this sitting, and the Council's receiving responses from the Office of the Prime Minister that contain many errors. He presents both examples in the form of a sequence of rhetorical questions: 'The Minister says that the MPs insult the government. The Minister leaving the Council this way, is not this an insult to this Council? And therefore an insult to all the people of Bahrain?' (lines 24–27).

The sequence of rhetorical questions adds a prominent and confrontational aspect to the disagreement. To MP Murad, the first insult is also an insult to the people of Bahrain. This way he backs up the Council's pride with that of the people of Bahrain, an act of inclusion, which includes the Bahraini nation on their side. While MP Ebrahim's approach had a sense of mockery to it, MP Murad's response sounds more furious and emotive, and most probably is affected by the minister's reaction and departure. He

comments: ‘This minister should be interrogated, starting at this sitting’ (line 30–31), which is too much to expect.

The situation in this excerpt, hence, has developed into a challenge, and the MPs turned the accusations against them to accusations against the government and the Minister of Shura, and none of the interlocutors attempted to present an apology or a justification of what the government has considered a form of insult. The MPs regardless to their sectarian affiliation seem to agree on a position and agree on that the letter from the government criticising their language has violated their political freedom.

4.3.4 Excerpt 4 on Condemning a ‘Terrorist’ Plot

From sitting 2:3:10, 30 Dec. 2008

One of the tensest encounters on the topic of dissent control in the Bahraini Council of Representatives in the second legislative term is found in Excerpt 4. This is the second longest excerpt in this research. The MPs here use the strategy of corroborating by information, which becomes very emotionally loaded as they proceed.

In this sitting, a proposal was made by a group of MPs, all Sunnis, requesting the issue of a statement in the name of the Bahraini Council of Representatives to condemn an incident of rioting that took place on 17 December, in which a group of people were arrested for planning an attack

with IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in a public place. This coincided with the annual holiday for the National Day of Bahrain, on 16 and 17 of December. There is strong disapproval of the proposal by Al Wefaq; two members of this party, MP Ali Salman and MP Mohammed Al-Miz'al, give their feedback and express their reservations.

In the analysis below, for convenience, the group of MPs who signed the proposal will be called 'the statement group'. The statement group consists only of Sunni MPs, although not all of the Sunni MPs. The two MPs who declared their objection are Shiites from Al Wefaq. The detainees in the incident being discussed are all Shiites.

Al Wefaq's argument against the statement follows the strategy of corroborating by information. The information is centred around two points: (a) the legality of the accusations, articles in the constitution that condemn accusing a detainee unless the charges are proven, and (b) a comparison between the detainees under question with a parallel group of detainees. This extract is one of the most confrontational that the Bahraini Council of Representatives experienced in the second legislative period. The mode of disagreement in this excerpt reached the most confrontational level of disagreement, which can be called 'foregrounded disagreement', and stayed at that level for a large part of the debate.

Below, I first briefly present the definition of dispute and types of disagreement, and then show how the excerpt is a site of foregrounded disagreement. Since it is relatively long, I have divided the analysis into

subsections, each bringing together instances of a discursive device used to support one's argument.

4.3.4.1 Analysis of the excerpt

To implement the strategy of corroborating by information, the two speakers from Al Wefaq rely on a number of discursive devices that I group below under separate headings. As I am bringing together examples which are mostly scattered throughout this long excerpt, I found it difficult here to provide the extracts being analysed as I have done in the analysis of the other excerpts.

The three sides who shared their views on the statement in this excerpt are the statement group (via a submitting a written proposal), MP Ali Salman and MP Al-Miz'al by commenting on the proposal. In this excerpt, there are devices employed in the written statement, which relies on the strategy of corroborating by information to convey its request. On the other hand, both MP Salman's approach and that of MP Al-Miz'al depend on the strategy of corroborating by information too, but have a different view and different points to consider as information. Both MPs agree on their objecting the statement, but each employs discursive devices differently to implement this strategy as will be seen below. The major difference is that MP Salman's strategy relies more on building upon logic and then gradually centralising his role and his opinion, while MP Al-Miz'al starts with relying

on verifying the legality of the procedure, and then gradually becomes more reliant on emotive speech and foregrounded disagreement.

Beside the discursive device of emotive speech that raised at different parts of the interventions of MP Al-Miz'al, a device that becomes more prominent as Al-Miz'al proceeds in this excerpt, the other discursive devices employed in the strategy of corroborating by information can be grouped under the following major headings: (a) in-groupness and out-groupness, (b) cheater-detection module as a rhetorical move, (c) framing and reframing, (d) metaphor, and (e) lexical style to express foregrounded disagreement, under which I also list a group of discursive devices. How the speech becomes emotive is illustrated in MP Al-Miz'al's comments as he proceeds and becomes more confrontational. Table 27 summarises the analyses of the proposal by the statement group, the interventions of MP Salman and that of MP Al-Miz'al. The table is followed by an elaborated discussion of these discursive devices.

Table 27: *Strategies in Excerpt 4*

MP	Strategies	Devices
The statement group (All Sunnis)		a. ingroupness and outgroupness expressed through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> lexical style to compete over patriotism framing the plot as terrorist framing targeted people by the attack as innocents framing Bahrain as ‘our kingdom’ metaphor: homeland for the people of Bahrain
	corroborating by information	b. framing and reframing the detainees indicating that the defendants are terrorists by describing their plot as a terrorist plot
MP Salman (Al Wefaq)		a. ingroupness and outgroupness expressed through <ul style="list-style-type: none"> lexical style: self-definition and othering starting with inclusive ‘we’, moving to the exclusive ‘we’, and then to the singular first person, ‘I’
		b. speech act: comparing the current case with a previous one to express suspecting reliability of allegations relying on the duality of doubt and certainty

MP Al-Miz'al
(Al Wefaq)

a. ingroupness and outgroupness

- lexical style to compete over patriotism
- shifting the frame of 'terrorist' to another group
- lexical choices: using the word *waṭan*, i.e. homeland

self-definition and othering: using exclusive 'we' when talking about wanting justice

b. rhetoric: aporia and rhetoric questions to express suspecting the reliability of the allegations

- relying on the duality of doubt and certainty
- cheater-detection module

c. framing and reframing the detainees

- reframing them with the neutral term 'defendants' and then reframing them as 'victims'
- mistakenly reinforcing negative frames given to the defendants by his opponents

d. rhetoric: metaphors

e. foregrounded argumentation

- | | |
|-------------|----------------------------------|
| • absolutes | • discourse markers |
| • emphatics | • floor bids |
| • flow | • repetitions |
| • negations | • lexical second person pronouns |

f. emotive speech

lexical second person pronouns

- challenging questions²²⁴
 - short-turns
-

a. Ingroupness and outgroupness

Ingrouness and outgrouness in this excerpt were realised by two major axes: first lexical style to express patriotism and secondly self-definition and othering.

- **Patriotism through Lexical style**

This is the first axis. In this excerpt, the overt issue is that of the safety of the country. The two groups, the statement group and the Al Wefaq members, compete over demonstrating their devotion to the country to prove that what they ask for is the right thing to do. The lexical style, i.e. vocabulary choice, plays a major role in the competition over patriotism. The proposal made was as follows:

2 ... A proposal to urgently issue a
3 statement condemning and disapproving of the terrorist plot. Your highness
4 Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dhahrani, may Allah guard and protect, we
5 are pleased to put forward our proposal to urgently issue a statement
6 condemning and disapproving the terrorist plot that targeted our
7 Kingdom, and that aimed at upsetting security and stability, and
8 startling secured and innocent people. We would like to simultaneously
9 praise the efforts of security services and procedures that prevented
10 the terrorist incident and the plots of the terrorists.
11 Suggestion proposed by:
12 MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa'eedi
13 MP Hassan Salim Al-Dossari
14 MP Khamis Hamad Al-Rumaihi
15 MP Sheikh Nasir Abdillah Al-Fudhalah
16 MP Dr Abdul Latif Ahmed Al-Sheikh
17 MP Sami Muhsin Al-Buhairi

18	<i>MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad</i>
19	<i>MP Latifa Muhammed Al-Qu'ood</i>
20	<i>MP Abduallah Khalaf Al-Dossari</i>
21	<i>MP Sheikh Hamad Khalil Al-Muhannadi</i>
22	<i>MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Bu-Sandal</i>
23	<i>MP Essa Ahmed Abu-Alfat'h</i>
24	<i>MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Hadi</i>
25	<i>MP Sheikh Muahmmed Khalid Ebrahim</i>

In the proposal, the statement group demonstrate their loyalty on two levels: (a) by supporting 'the efforts of security services' in line 9 and (b) by the act of othering, when distancing themselves from the detainees whose act they label or frame as that of 'terrorists': 'condemning and disapproving of the terrorist plot' in line 3, 'disapproving of the terrorist plot' in line 6 and the 'terrorist incident' in line 10. 'Innocence' for the statement group is a label given to the people who could possibly have been harmed by the plot: 'startling secure and innocent people' (line 8). Now the Al Wefaq speakers have an onerous task ahead of them. They need to portray themselves as patriots despite opposing the proposal. This cannot be achieved as long as the defendants are perceived as being terrorists, so it is necessary for Al Wefaq to reframe the defendants convincingly. This attempt is more challenging for them than for the statement group, whose stance, after all, does not require a detour from the present governmental procedure. Al Wefaq, on the other hand, needs to go against the current and construct its argument legally.

At the level of patriotism, there is the underlying struggle over whose country it is and how the country is framed. When it comes to the statement group, the use of 'our Kingdom' (lines 6–7): 'disapproving the terrorist plot that targeted our Kingdom' instead of the more neutral 'the Kingdom' is an instance of this competition over the label of patriotism and ownership. It is an emotional attachment and an indirect demonstration of loyalty to the present ruling system. It also denotes caring and, consequently, being able to make appropriate and constructive choices. Al Wefaq's members participating in the discussion, on the other hand, do not use the word 'Kingdom'. Al Wefaq has always presented itself as an opposition party, and has always had reservations about the system of monarchy. The phrase 'our Kingdom' used by the statement group can, therefore, be potentially provocative to Al Wefaq. Now the Al Wefaq MPs are faced with the challenge of having to invalidate the connotation of an unpatriotic stance that will be associated with their rejection of a proposal that claims to care for the safety of the country.

To the first MP to comment on the statement, MP Ali Salman (Al Wefaq), the topic of patriotism does not rivet his attention. On the other hand, MP Al-Miz'al builds up upon the topic and expresses his patriotism several times in his interventions. Below, I underline the words and expressions MP Al-Miz'al uses to convey the message of patriotism, the first being when mentioning the arrested cell on 2 February 2003:

S is the Speaker.

MM is MP Mohammed Al-Miz'al from Al Wefaq.

- 52 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yusif Miz'al.
53 **MM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Previously on 2 February, 2003
54 a terrorist cell was discovered in this country (*balad*). It was
55 trained in Afghanistan, trained in Lebanon. The investigations
56 revealed a range of weapons: Kalashnikovs, explosives, bullets,
57 weapons stores, all this and the Council did not use a word to condemn
58 it prior to the trial. Moreover, the issue has been concealed and
59 dissolved. I do not know where, in which sea, this topic has been
60 dissolved and terminated without a trial and without the escalation
61 that we see in the press, the media, in the street, everywhere.

He again indicates caring for the country when he speaks of the
Constitutional law in relation to the detainees:

- 67 On what basis are they described as such? Does not
68 Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (*bilād*), which you
69 vowed to respect, state that "The accused is innocent until proven
70 guilty in a court of law"? Has there been a conviction that allows
71 you to state that they are not innocent?

The facts about the cell and their activity, and about the Constitution and what it states about detainees, are associated with the words *balad* and *bilād*, respectively: 'a terrorist cell was discovered in this country (*balad*)' in line 54 and 'the Constitution of this country (*bilād*)' in line 68. *Balad* is the singular form and *bilād* is plural,⁵² meaning a piece of owned land. Here, the

Although there are other synonyms, such as *balad* and *dawlah*, which could have been used, in the instances above, MP Al-Miz'al chooses to use *homeland*. He uses *balad* in the first stage of his speech but as he becomes more emotive, he shifts to the word 'homeland'. Whether this shift is made consciously or unconsciously, the word 'homeland' (*waṭan*) is an appropriate choice because, unlike the other two synonyms, it has the connotations of belonging, attachment and settlement. In addition, the word 'homeland' is used with the metonymic presentation of the people who may make judgements about the defendants: 'The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged behind charges that have not been proven by judiciary' (lines 101–104).

- **Self-definition and othering**

Regarding the second axis of ingroupness and outgroupness, by Al Wefaq in this excerpt, that is illustrated in their forms of self-definition and othering, both of which are used repeatedly. The construction of the ingroup and outgroup in the speeches of both MP Salman and MP Al-Miz'al is interesting.

Starting with MP Salman's self-definition and othering, he moves from the inclusive 'we' representing the Council as a united entity dealing with the claims (lines 35–38), to the exclusive 'we' when talking about Al Wefaq's stance on the current incident (lines 40–43), and then he even

excludes Al Wefaq and focuses on his own stance and authority using ‘I’ (lines 43–50). I have underlined the instances in the extract below:

S is the Speaker.

AS is Ali Salman from Al Wefaq.

- 31 **S:** ... Brother MP Sheikh Ali Salman Ahmed, please.
- 32 **AS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. With respect to the brothers who submitted
33 the proposal, this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior
34 announces the discovery of a cell – according to the claims of the Ministry
35 of the Interior – intending to carry out some terrorist acts. We have
36 already gone through a number of events and our council did not
37 address those events and we did not issue any statements in the
38 Council. I suggest that my brothers who made this suggestion express
39 their point of view outside the framework of the Council through
40 individual or joint statements because if we raise this issue now,
41 we will then have a stance. We will have a reservation on the subject
42 and we will express our point of view. We will also ask to highlight
43 our point of view. I would not like this council to get now into a
44 state of disagreement. I would like to keep the position of the work
45 done and keep the position of Gaza,⁵³ so I ask my brothers to take
46 this proposal and declare it through the parties, through individuals
47 with independent statements; otherwise I will be obliged to
48 intervene to illustrate my point and I will come up with another
49 statement representing my party and I will try to publish it. I think
50 this is an argument the Council should keep itself away from. Thank
51 you very much. This is the first intervention.
- 52 **S:** Thank you. ...

In his statements with the exclusive ‘we’s, he is placing himself and his party in an opposing position to the statement group, or even the whole council,

e.g. ‘if we raise the issue now, we will then have a stance’ (line 40–41) and ‘we will express our point of view’ (line 42). By the exclusive ‘we’, MP Salman narrows down his identity circle or role from that of a council member dealing with an interior issue to that of Al Wefaq, positioning himself and his party against the rest of the Council. Then, MP Salman stops using ‘we’ and shifts to ‘I’ instead (lines 43–50), e.g. ‘I will be obliged to intervene’ (lines 47–48), and ‘my point’ (line 48). By showing what steps he is individually ready to take in support of the party’s ‘stance’, he reinforces his party’s view with his own voice as the head and the leader. The role of leader is activated in his demonstration of his ability to issue a statement illustrating his point of view: ‘I will be obliged to intervene to illustrate my point of view and I will come up with another statement representing my party’ (lines 47–49). Overall, there is a demonstration of power in MP Salman’s speech: power at the individual level and at the group level.

As for self-definition and othering, there are some interesting instances in the following extract from MP Al-Miz’al’s intervention:

- 98 **MM:** –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be
 99 fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair,
 100 and for this council to enhance fair judiciary, to enhance justice.
 101 The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the
 102 homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind
 103 charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven
 104 by the judiciary. There are allegations made by lawyers of torture –
 105 **AA:** Allow us to take over from here, Brother MP Mohammed Yusif
 106 Al-Miz’al.
 107 **MM:** This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued

108 by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement.
109 **S:** All right, we stop here.
110 **MM:** If you want to issue a statement, do it yourselves. ...

MP Al-Miz'al uses the exclusive 'we' when he represents the stance of Al Wefaq in lines 98–99: 'We want this judiciary to be fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair.' The exclusion of the other council members can be understood from his previous reference to the Council in lines 91–93: 'The Council has no right to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the Constitution unless a fair trial in which all –.' In these and following mentions of the Council, MP Al-Miz'al is criticising the stance of the Council and considering it wrong. When he uses 'we', however, he mentions what he considers righteous stances of him and his party, and is thus excluding other members, as in lines 98-99. The exclusion gets clearer in line 110: 'If you want to issue a statement do it yourselves.' The use of the second person plural, 'you ... yourselves,' versus the exclusive 'we' constructs an image of two groups and two stances, *Us* and *Them*, othering the statement group and anyone who may vote for their proposal as 'them', and the ones who want to vote against it as 'us'. The othering is clear from the following uses of the second person plural pronoun, you, in the rest of MP Al-Miz'al's intervention:

120 **MM:** ... We do
121 not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council having

122 a say against an innocent person. You may not do this, I say.
 123 Withdraw the statement, withdraw the statement.
 124 **S:** It does not get withdrawn.
 125 **MM:** You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.
 126 Be intent on the security of the homeland.
 127 **S:** This is a start; this is a statement –
 128 **(MP Al-Miz'al moves to the middle of the chamber.)**
 129 **MM:** Withdraw the statement. Have the statement withdrawn. ...

Examples of second person plurals are in line 122: 'You may not do this;' line 125: 'You (second person plural) cannot do that. Be (second person plural) intent on the security of the homeland;' and the other imperative in line 129: 'Withdraw (second person plural) the statement. Have (second person plural) the statement withdrawn.' The imperatives in the original text, the Arabic one, have a plural reflective suffix, which shows that these verbs are addressed to a plural.

b. Rhetoric in suspecting the reliability of allegations

Under the same strategy, i.e. corroborating by information, comes logical argumentation. The Al Wefaq MPs employ two discursive devices to argue the legality and objectivity of their stance logically: First of all, both speakers from Al Wefaq, MP Salman and MP Al-Miz'al, begin their speeches by contrasting the current incident with a previous one, as can be noted in the two extracts below. First is MP Salman's intervention:

32 AS: Thank you, Mr Speaker. With respect to the brothers who submitted
33 the proposal, this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior
34 announces the discovery of a cell – according to the claims of the Ministry
35 of the Interior – intending to carry out some terrorist acts. We have
36 already gone through a number of events and our council did not
37 address those events and we did not issue any statements in the
38 Council. ...

MP Al-Miz'al also makes a comparison in lines 53–61. This move of contrasting the current incident with a previous one is a move that charges the proposed conviction statement suggesting, though not directly stating, a discrimination between the two groups of detainees. In other words, the Al Wefaq MPs are relying on what I would call 'a duality of doubt and certainty' pulled together to demand the withdrawal of this proposal. By employing doubt, the Al Wefaq MPs are diminishing the reliability of the outcome of the current investigations and, consequently, presenting their party's perspective, if not for being convincing *per se* then for being relatively more trustworthy. By stating certainties, such as giving dates and mentioning facts and stating laws, the Al Wefaq MPs are emphasising they are well-informed and committed. The certainties presented by the Al Wefaq MPs are of two types: simple facts and deduced certainties. The simple facts are dates, constitutional law, and other past incidents. Deduced certainties are the illegality of the accusations and dismissing charges against others. Simon-Vandenberg notes that the deduction technique in asserting an

opinion is often used in interviews carried out with politicians and he calls it 'the expression of cognitive certainty' (1996: 392).

The doubt that the Al-Wefaq MPs raise as opposed to the certainty they have mentioned is achieved by questioning, even impeaching, the integrity of the Ministry of the Interior and of the investigations. MP Salman does this in lines 33–38: '... this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior announces the discovery of a cell ... intending to carry out some terrorist acts. ... and our council did not address those events and we did not issue any statements in the Council.' Calling the accusations made by the Ministry of the Interior 'claims' has the effect of casting doubt on the accusations, and to compare the reaction of the Council to the earlier accusations also questions the rightfulness of the Council in issuing a statement now and not then.

MP Al-Miz'al also makes the move of suspecting the legality of the procedures in two parts of his interventions: first, by spotlighting a probable breach of constitutional law. He uses aporia to raise this point (lines 67–73):

- | | | |
|----|---|----------|
| 67 | MM: ... | Does not |
| 68 | Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (<i>bilād</i>), which you | |
| 69 | vowed to respect, states that "The accused is innocent until proven | |
| 70 | guilty in a court of law"? Has there been a conviction that allows | |
| 71 | you to state that they are not innocent? | |
| 72 | They are innocent according to the Constitution until fair | |
| 73 | administration of justice proves otherwise. It is not right to do this. | |

and again in lines 89–93 when he associates the Speaker of the Council’s duty to not condemn the detainees by referring to the ‘vow’ he took when appointed in his position and then mentions the constitutional law again against condemning the detainees:

89 **MM:** ... Respect
90 your vow, Mr Speaker, the vow you took. Do not condemn someone
91 whom the Constitution considers innocent. The Council has no right
92 to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the
93 Constitution unless a fair trial in which all ... —

The second way in which MP Al-Miz'al employs logical-augmentation can be found in lines 74–85:

74 **MM:** There must be a legal trial in which the accused one is guaranteed
75 what the Constitution states. He has to be given necessary
76 guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence. The necessary
77 guarantees. I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, I ask the
78 MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask lawyers to provide them with the
79 necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence at all
80 stages of the investigation, and I draw ten lines under all stages of
81 investigation. Before you stands an advisor who was formerly in the
82 Military Judiciary. Let him tell us what the entire stages of the
83 investigation are. Has there been a lawyer assigned for these
84 defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been
85 interrogated without a lawyer? Lawyers have objected to that, Mr
86 Speaker. ...

In the extract above, MP Al-Miz'al makes a rhetorical move by indicating that there is a suspicion that the routine procedure is not being followed

when he insists on the detainees being given ‘necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence’ (lines 75–76). He again stresses the procedures, which again reflects his doubts, in lines 80–81: ‘I draw ten lines under all stages of investigation.’ The two rhetorical questions and the sentence that follow confirm his distrust: ‘Has there been a lawyer assigned for these defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been interrogated without a lawyer? Lawyers have objected to that’ (lines 83–85). This rhetorical move is what Cosmides and Tooby (2000: 196) call the ‘cheater-detection’ module. As cheating is a violation of some social rules, cheater detection module is a possible response to this violation (ibid).

c. Framing and reframing of the defendants

As mentioned earlier, the statement group framed the plot and the incident as ‘terrorist’, which implies that the defendants are terrorists, even without having to say so. While MP Salman does not frame the defendants or mention them at all in his intervention, the defendants are a focal point in MP Al-Miz’al’s intervention. Framing and reframing are important discursive devices that reveal a lot about a speaker’s stance, attitude and perspective. First, there is the shift in framing that MP Al-Miz’al uses when talking about the people who were arrested, the people whose act was described by the statement group described as ‘terrorist’ (lines 3, 6 and 10), something which consequently framed the indictees as terrorists. This way, the first framing was already done in the statement. MP Al-Miz’al objects to this framing and

reframes the indictees at two levels as he moves from a more reason-based approach to a confrontational stage as the following examples illustrate.

When MP Al-Miz'al at first relies on the Speaker's abiding by the Constitution and his vow as evidence of his objectivity, MP Al-Miz'al demands that the trial should take place before any convictions are made. At this stage, he does not confirm the innocence or the guilt of the defendants, who, he explains, are innocent by law: 'The accused is innocent until proven guilty in a court of law' (lines 69–70). This conditional innocence is the first frame that MP Al-Miz'al repeats: 'Do not condemn someone whom the Constitution considers innocent,' (lines 90–91) and 'who are innocent under the Constitution' (lines 92–93). The reference to the Constitution stresses the legitimacy of his reframing. The repetition that reinforces the frame.

MP Al-Miz'al reframes the defendants one more time when he reframes them as victims, although he does not use that exact word, when he says: 'There are allegations made by lawyers of torture' (line 104). Then the framing of the defendants shifts to the unrestricted description of them as innocents, starting from line 120: 'We do not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council to have a say against an innocent person' (lines 120–122), 'Do not condemn the innocent' (line 132). Such reframing in a political discourse is a use of what Bayley and Vicente call 'semantic nuances' (2004: 238). They explain that 'cultures tend to develop a wide range of vocabulary to denote various semantic nuances where certain values may be in conflict, thus constructing different ways of looking at the

same thing' (ibid.). Nevertheless, the argument of MP Al-Miz'al here is cut short, as it comes late and is amongst a considerable number of repetitions about following the constitution and innocence. This shift in framing is a shift in the purpose of MP Al-Miz'al's speech from calling for the proposal to be withdrawn as being not a proper issue for the Council to discuss or interfere in to actually wanting to represent the defendants as innocent.

d. Protesting through metaphors

Looking at MP Al-Miz'al's use of metaphors in this excerpt as a rhetorical device, there are several occurrences that reflect strong disapproval and denunciation. For example, he comments on a previous terrorist plan that he claims was contained differently and without as much fuss: 'the issue has been concealed and dissolved. I do not know where, in which sea, the topic has been dissolved' (lines 58–60). The metaphoric image that begins with an aporia. 'I do not know', which expresses a stimulated perplexity, reflects strong disapproval and despair simultaneously: a disapproval of what he considers to be the concealment of an issue, and despair in finding a thread to the issue to compare charges. Then, in lines 101–102, there is the metonymy in which 'homeland' is substituted for the nation, the people, as observers of the argument and representatives of public opinion: 'The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the home land and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges that have not been proven by law' (lines 101-103). In the same sentences, a metaphor is

used of the people being ‘dragged’, something which adds a strong image of being forced to think differently from what they would normally do if they were not influenced by the charges: ‘The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven by the judiciary.’ First, there is the use of an absolute: ‘the whole’, which is one of the features of foregrounded disagreement, as will be explained further below. Secondly, the metaphor of ‘dragging’ indicates a state of force and abuse while misleading public opinion. This is what evolutionary psychologists consider as one of the modular programmes that are ‘functionally responsible for solving a different adaptive problem’ (Cosmides and Tooby 2000: 91). By using the ‘dragging’ metaphor, MP Al-Miz’al is attempting to activate ‘inferential procedures’ to catch or detect a cheater in a social environment (Cosmides 1989: 196). MP Al-Miz’al is applying what can be called cheater-detecting language, which Hart describes as ‘manipulative’ (Hart 2005: 191). It is, therefore, not an end in itself, but is an attempt to accuse MP Al-Miz’al of using ‘fictitious emotions’ (Bazzanella 2004: 67), MP Al-Miz’al is encouraging the audience to realise that they are being cheated or deluded into thinking something that is not true, to accept the conviction of the detainees. MP Khalid, in line 150, also activates a cheater-detecting module when he says: ‘Record the play.’ In both cases with the interventions of both MPs, the audience is not only the MPs but also the journalists attending the sitting, through whom the public

will get a picture of what happened. This alert is supposed to influence, even recruit, the audience, or public opinion in this case, against the cheater so that they become moral support for the speaker, if not by proving him to be right, then by proving the other person to be wrong.

e. Foregrounded argumentation: from dispute to conflict

Starting from line 98, the strategy of centralising pride and dignity comes into play. At this stage, MP Al-Miz'al stops adding input to his argument and moves from the reason-based and rhetorical repetition stage to the more emotional confrontational stage, with repetition failing to strengthen the argument. The lexical style he shifts to presents a foregrounded argumentation, which becomes empty of new input from line 98 onwards. At this stage, the speech has moved into a conflict.

First I explain how a status of dispute is being constructed and what devices are used in creating it. Distinction should be made between the concepts of dispute, conflict and argument. The 'key action' in all three is disagreement (Argaman 2009: 516).

Disputes are often about 'controlling' the 'ownership of physical material and spaces'⁵⁴ (Cobb-Moore et al. 2008: 597) and can be over legislative matters (see various legal uses of the term, e.g. custody dispute, dispute settlement, dispute resolution, etc.). According to this definition, the debate until this point has been based on a dispute, which is normal and expected in parliamentary debates. However, at this stage, it develops into a

conflict, which 'lacks all interpersonal niceties and relies instead on the performance of hostile argumentation' (Lorenzo-Dus 2008: 81).

Lorenzo-Dus (ibid.: 89) explains that '[f]oregrounded disagreements are at the most explicit and hostile end pole of a disagreement style continuum, the opposite end pole of which is occupied by backgrounded disagreements.' She lists a number of 'linguistic strategies, grammatical categories and lexical items' that identify a foregrounded disagreement:

- absolutes (e.g. all, every)
- negation
- discourse markers (but, now and well)
- emphatics (e.g. a lot)
- floor bids (i.e. phrases that indicate an attempt to stop others from talking)
- flow (i.e. confrontational latching and interrupting)
- indexical second person pronouns (e.g. accusatory use of pronouns)
- modals (necessity, prediction and semi-modals)
- repetition
- questions (challenging)
- turn length (i.e. short turns as potential indexes of disagreement), and
- uptake avoidances (e.g. non-answers to challenging questions)

(ibid.).⁵⁵

I am adding them under my list of discursive devices. Besides the absence or presence of these items, their strength (i.e. frequency) affects the strength of the foregrounded disagreement (ibid.). Interestingly, this stage of the argument proves to be a very strong foregrounded disagreement, as the employment of the following discursive devices reveals.

- **Absolutes**

MP Al-Miz'al employs a number of absolutes. One clear use is in the beginning of his interventions, far in advance, signalling a tendency to express strong disagreement, when he claims that another terrorist group was not brought to justice: 'this topic has been dissolved and terminated without a trial and without the escalation that we see in the press, the media, in the street, everywhere' (lines 59–61); 'I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, ... the right of defence at all stages of the investigation, and I draw ten lines under all stages of investigation' (lines 77–81); 'Let him tell us what the entire stages of the investigation are. Has there been a lawyer assigned for these defendants at all stages of the investigation?' (line 82–84); 'unless a fair trial in which all—... , in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guaranteed for a fair trial' (lines 93–96) and 'the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges that have not been proven by law' (lines 101-103).

While one would normally avoid absolutes in a preplanned debate or argument, they become more common as the disagreement becomes more

hostile and more confrontational as seems to happen in the interventions of MP Al-Miz'al in this excerpt.

- **Negations and indexical second person pronouns**

Negation, which is another prominent discursive device that signals foregrounded argumentation, becomes the most prominent item of foregrounded disagreement in MP Al-Miz'al's speech, with it being used repeatedly. Many examples of negation can found in this stage of the excerpt, too, as the argumentation builds up towards a conflict: 'It is not right to do this' (line 73); 'Do not condemn someone whom the Constitution considers innocent. The Council has no right to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent' (lines 90–92). It is, however, intensified in the following section, in which the instances of negation are underlined:

- 94 **S:** MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu'awdah, please.
95 **MM:** –No, in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guarantees
96 for a fair trial–
97 **JDF:** Mr Speaker
98 **MM:** –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be
99 fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair,
100 and for this council to enhance fair judiciary, to enhance justice.
101 The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the
102 homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind
103 charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven
104 by the judiciary. There are allegations made by lawyers of torture–
105 **AA:** Allow us to take over from here, Brother MP Mohammed Yusif
106 Al-Miz'al.

107 **MM:** This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued
108 by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement.
109 **S:** All right, we stop here.
110 **MM:** If you want to issue a statement do it yourselves. Condemn the
111 innocents before a trial. I will not allow this. I will not allow this
112 council, and there is no good in this council if it condemns an
113 innocent person before his trial. This council must not, this council
114 must not interfere in what is not its business. You are not a judicial
115 council, you are a parliamentary council, the Council of
116 Representatives, you are a council of legislation. You are an
117 observation board. Watch the ministries in their work, watch the
118 judiciary in its work, watch the Interior in its work. Yes, we have
119 cooperated and we cooperate, and we are extremely intent on the
120 security of this homeland, and the safety of this homeland. We do
121 not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council having
122 a say against an innocent person. You may not do this, I say.
123 Withdraw the statement, withdraw the statement.
124 **S:** It does not get withdrawn.
125 **MM:** You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.
126 Be intent on the security of the homeland.
127 **S:** This is a start; this is a statement—
128 (MP Al-Miz'al moves to the middle of the chamber.)
129 **MM:** Withdraw the statement. Have the statement withdrawn. I will not
130 sit. This council has no right to intervene, it is not right to do so, Mr
131 Speaker. The Council has no right to intervene, the Council has no
132 right to intervene. Do not condemn the innocent. I will not move
133 from this place until you withdraw the statement. There is no
134 good in the Council. There must be a fair trial. You^ may not, you^56
135 may not, Mr Speaker. I will not move. Arrest me. Evict me.
136 You have no right—
137 **S:** Mohammed Al-Miz'al, I will get you out myself—
138 **MM:** You have not the right to. As a council you have no right.
139 You have no right.
140 **MK:** *‘ala kaifuk?*⁵⁷ [i.e. Is it up to you?]
141 **MM:** Shut up—
142 **MK:** *Itla*⁵⁸ [i.e. Get out.]
143 **S:** Sitting adjourned for ten minutes.

There is an instance of interrupting negation which seems to be in response to either unrecorded opposition or interruptions in line 99: 'No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair.' Here, the Speaker responds with a negation, a response that displays a shift made by the Speaker to become more foregrounded after a few attempts to stop MP Al-Miz'al less confrontationally (as explained under the section above on floor bids): 'It does not get withdrawn' (line 124). Still, MP Al-Miz'al keeps loading his intervention with negations, and the use of negation becomes particularly intense from line 129 onwards.

Simultaneously, MP Al-Miz'al is intensifying the use of the second person pronouns (the singular 'you' and the plural 'you') in an accusatory way, starting with the second person plural pronouns. As can be noted from the extract above, the second person becomes more intense in MP Salman's speech, shifting from plural to singular ones as he proceeds. MP Al-Miz'al's final line of defence is placing himself, both audibly and physically, as an obstacle to the progress of the proposal, when he gets up from his seat and walks to the middle of the hall, shouting (lines 128 onwards). As he is interrupted again by the Speaker, he shifts to a sit-in position with an intense use of negation: 'I will not sit' (lines 129–130), 'I will not move from this place until you withdraw the statement' (lines 132–133). Now all the speakers seem to have grown impatient, and there are some harsh exchanges that get most hostile in lines 136–142. In lines 140 and 142, MP Khalid shifts to Bahraini dialect, a shift suggesting losing composure as a reaction to the

foregrounded disagreement: ‘*‘ala kaifuk?* [i.e. Is it up to you?]' and ‘*İtla*‘ [i.e. Get out.]’

- **Discourse markers**

Discourse markers, such as *oh*, *actually*, *well*, *now*, *I mean*, *but* and other linking words, are normally used to link ideas and add coherency to a discourse. Stenstrom believes that a conversation becomes ‘much less lively and less “personal” without [discourse markers] signalling receipt of information, agreement and involvement’ (1994:17). However, when they become intensively used, they signify that an argument has become more foregrounded. Nonetheless, there is no notable intensity of the use of discourse markers in the part in which MP Al-Miz’al becomes more confrontational. This could be mainly because the pace of his objections and protests is accelerating and because, as noted above, he is not putting forward new ideas, something that makes his speech less coherent and, therefore, less dependent on discourse markers. There is also a chance that many discourse markers, especially ones like *oh*, *well*, and *I mean* were not transcribed in Hansard due to their being perceived as interjections.

- **Emphatics**

Showing emphasis in a conversation can be achieved through intonation and stress, both of which are beyond the scope of this research (see Scope of Research in Section 1.4). However, there are expressions that can convey

emphasis, such as intensifiers and other wordings that can convey stress and forcefulness.

As MP Al-Miz'al gets more confrontational in this stage of the sitting, he does use some verbal emphatics: 'On what basis are the defendants described –and I emphasize and draw ten lines under the word defendants – as guilty, as criminals, as *khārijites*, *takfūrriyyūn* as stated by some MPs?' (lines 61–64); 'There must be a legal trial' (line 74); and also when he says 'and I ask lawyers to provide them with the necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence at all stages of the investigation, and I draw ten lines under all stages of investigation' (lines 78–81).

- **Floor bids and flow**

I present these two devices together, as floor bids and flow are simultaneous in the examples I provide from this argumentation. While the Speaker of the Council is supposedly the one who has the power to stop an intervention in the parliamentary sittings, this excerpt presents an example of when this power is lost, or at least challenged, when an argument becomes foregrounded. There are several examples of floor bids in this excerpt and they get closer as we advance. The first attempt was after MP Al-Miz'al made a long intervention (starting 53 on line and being stopped by the Speaker in line 94):

MM is MP Mohammed Al Miz'al from Al Wefaq.

S is the Speaker.

JDF MP Jawad Fayrooz from Al Wefaq.

MK is MP Mohammed Khalid from Al Asalah.

AA is MP Adel Al-Mu'awdah from Al Asalah.

- 91 **MM:** ... The Council has no right
92 to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the
93 Constitution unless a fair trial in which all –
94 **S:** MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu'awdah, please.
95 **MM:** –No, in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guarantees
96 for a fair trial–
97 **JDF:** Mr Speaker
98 **MM:** –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be
99 fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair ...

The Speaker in line 94 gives the floor to MP Al-Mu'awdah from Al-Asalah but before the latter can speak, MP Al-Miz'al continues and then Jawad Fayrooz, who is also from Al Wefaq, tries to take the floor. Nevertheless, he is also interrupted by MP Al-Miz'al, who continues his speech ignoring the three other interlocutors. MP Al-Miz'al succeeds in winning more time until MP Adel Al-Mu'awdah unsuccessfully attempts to get his turn but in a very lenient way:

- 104 **MM:** ... There are allegations made by lawyers of torture–
105 **AA:** Allow us to take over from here, Brother MP Mohammed Yusif
106 Al-Miz'al.

- 107 **MM:** This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued
 108 by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement.
 109 **S:** All right, we stop here.
 110 **MM:** If you want to issue a statement, do it yourselves. ...

With 'allow us' (line 105), MP Al-Mu'awdah sounds as if he is asking for permission to get his turn although MP Al-Miz'al has taken more than his rightful space and time and no longer speaking during his turn. The Speaker then signals the end of MP Al-Miz'al's turn again, but this time more directly: 'All right, we stop here' (line 109). The use of inclusive 'we' serves as a soother to sound less hostile, but MP Al-Miz'al still does not respond and goes on and again wins more space and time (lines 110-123). The speaker tries to stop him for a third time but this time by negating the possibility of MP Al-Miz'al's demand being approved:

- 123 **MM:** ... withdraw the statement.
 124 **S:** It does not get withdrawn.
 125 **MM:** You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.
 126 Be intent on the security of the homeland.
 127 **S:** This is a start; this is a statement–
 128 **(MP Al-Miz'al moves to the middle of the chamber.)**
 129 **MM:** Withdraw the statement....

As can be noted above, the overt and direct rejection by the Speaker of MP Al-Miz'al's demand in line 124 does not stop the latter. The Speaker tries a fourth time to take over the floor in line 127, but MP Al-Miz'al interrupts and takes over very briefly. The floor bids have now become very tense and

the other interlocutors are not as tolerant of MP Al-Miz'al any longer; the floor bids and interruptions are made in the form of short turns as will be shown below under the device of 'short turns'.

- **Modals of necessity and prediction**

Some modals and semi-modals can indicate necessity, such as 'should', 'must', 'have to' and 'be supposed to'; other indicate prediction, such as 'will', 'assume' and 'should be' etc. There are some examples of these modals and semi-modal in MP Salam's intervention and they are instances all of the modal of prediction 'will', a group of which are part of conditional statements predicting what will happen if the statement was not withdrawn: 'if we raise this issue now, we will then have a stance. We will have a reservation on the subject and we will express our point of view. We will also ask to highlight our point of view' (lines 40-43), 'I will be obliged to intervene to illustrate my point and I will come up with another statement representing my party and I will try to publish it.' (lines 47-49). MP Al-Miz'al's foregrounded argument also contains several modals. One example is in lines 101-103: 'The homeland, the whole homeland should not be dragged, the homeland, the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges that have not been proven by law,' another in line 107: 'We will not allow this statement to be issued' and more in lines 111-114: 'I will not allow this. I will not allow this Council,... This Council must not, this Council must not interfere in what is not its business.' In the interventions of

both MPs, Salman and Al-Miz'al, the modal of prediction 'will' functions as a form of warning, a threat to a certain extent, which makes it a device of foregrounded argumentation. The modal of necessity 'must' indicates that the interlocutor, i.e. MP Al-Miz'al, is not willing to negotiate that certain point and thus is attempting to impose it as an obligatory requirement for the success of the conversation, something which also adds more hostility to the conversation.

- **Repetition**

Repetition is a strong rhetorical device. Young explains that repetition of one's stance or opinion is a technique used by politicians for 'staying on message' (Young S. 2010: 629). In her analysis, Young refers to repetition of the same idea on separate occasions, but here repetition appears to be happening within the same debate. The effect may, therefore, be different, if not reversed. While the more scattered repetition of the message can have 'important effects in fending off scrutiny and analysis' (ibid.: 629), repetition in the same discourse or speech may reinforce an idea at a certain point, but may then cause it to have a reverse effect, that is, losing the listener's trust. It seems that MP Al-Miz'al crosses this boundary in line 98 onwards.

There are many instances of repetition in MP Al-Miz'al's speech, repetition of words, phrases and ideas, as 'I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, I ask all the MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask the lawyers' (lines 77–78); the repetition in 'We want this judiciary to be fair. We want this

trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair' in lines 98–99; 'The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind charges' (lines 101–102); 'I will not allow this. I will not allow this council' (lines 111–112); 'You are not a judicial council, you are a parliamentary council, ... you are a council of legislation, you are an observation board. Watch the ministries..., watch the judiciary..., watch the Interior...' (lines 114–118).

Going back to lines 77–78, when MP Al-Miz'al says: 'I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, I ask all the MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask the lawyers,' there is an awareness of an audience that is not the major or direct addressee: the journalists, the public, the judges and the lawyers are not part of the exchanges in parliamentary debates, and yet MP Al-Miz'al is conscious of their having an opportunity to convey his message to a wider audience. Therefore, if he fails to convince the Council, he will still have reached other people whose opinion can influence and put pressure on parliamentary attitude.

The repetition of 'I ask' in lines 77–78 and the repetition of 'watch' in lines 117–118 are much more effective than if the addressees in the former and the objects in the latter had been listed immediately and without such a repetition, for example: 'I ask all the journalists, all the people, all the MPs, the judges and the lawyers' and 'Watch the ministries, the judiciary and the Interior.' The repetition adds individual emphasis and, consequently, is putting each group in a spotlight by itself.

The other challenging rhetorical question is posed by MP Mohammed Khalid (MK) much later during the most hostile exchanges in the excerpt and it is posed in a Bahraini dialect, making it more of a personal challenge and showing intolerance of MP Al-Miz'al's (MM) long and seemingly unstoppable dispute:

- 138 **MM:** You have no right to. As a council you have no right.
139 You have no right.
140 **MK:** *‘ala kaifuk?*⁶³ [i.e. Is it up to you?]
141 **MM:** Shut up—

MP Khalid's question, *Is it up to you?*, receives a more hostile response, *Shut up*, bringing the argument to a climax.

• Short Turns

As MP Al-Miz'al gets more and more confrontational, and other MPs, including the Speaker, are less prepared to tolerate his behaviour, turn taking becomes shorter and shorter. It particularly gets shorter in lines 124–143 (see above).

The Speaker of the Council becomes impatient and converses with him at a personal level: 'Mohammed Al-Miz'al, I will get you out myself' (line 137), but MP Al-Miz'al continues his protest: 'You have not the right to. As a council you have no right to. You have no right' (lines 138–139). This is when a short but hostile and personal exchange between MP Mohammed

Khalid, and MP Al-Miz'al takes place: MP Khalid asks in condemnation: "*ala kaifuk?* [i.e. Is it up to you?]" (line 140), only to infuriate MP Al-Miz'al even more, and he responds with: 'Shut up' (line 141). The sit-in atmosphere continues when the Speaker demands that the microphones be turned off to force the adjournment of the sitting (lines 143–144), but Al-Miz'al does not want to stop and instead confronts the Speaker, now using the singular second person pronoun: 'Turn off the microphone. As you like. Turn off what you want' (lines 145–146). At this stage the Speaker also has a quick personal exchange with MP Al-Miz'al: 'Stop acting. Enough, stop talking' (line 147), which MP Khalid picks up and scorns: 'Record the play. Is this proper behaviour?' (line 150). The hostile short turn exchanges urge the Speaker of the Council to put an end for the debate.

The sitting was then supposed to be adjourned for ten minutes but did not resume for 50 minutes. Apparently, more than ten minutes was required to calm down the heated debate outside the parliament hall. According to Hansard, after the adjournment, the Speaker decided to complete the remaining topics on the agenda and to leave the controversial proposal to the end of the sitting. However, Hansard does not report the topic as having been brought up again. *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* newspaper (Nasr and Jaber, 31 Dec. 2008: 10), on the other hand, mentions that the Council agreed that each party could issue its own statement in this case.

This excerpt in particular, beside other parts of other excerpt, has shown how the strategy of corroborating by information can get very emotive and

confrontational, and how using facts and information is not necessarily objective. To understand the incentive of the tension and emotions, it is useful to examine the topic beyond what this excerpt provides.

4.3.4.2 Beyond the text

- ***On the background to the conflict***

In the previous year, 2007, riots and vandalism took place during the same period in December to coincide with the National Day holiday and celebrations. Among the casualties of that year was a policeman on duty, who was burnt to death in his police car. At the time, the Council had proposed issuing a statement condemning the vandalism and violence that had taken place. The Al Wefaq Party and one other MP, Abdul Aziz Abul, refused to issue this statement and voted against it. The riots resulted in twelve MPs for and exactly the same number against the proposal, but as the voice of the Speaker equals two voices, the proposal was approved and the Council issued the statement (Jaber 2007).

After the 2008 riots, which the statement group is referring to, however, Al Wefaq did not allow the same scenario of voting to signal a similar condemnation. After the ‘terrorist plot’ of December 2008, none of Al Wefaq MPs made any statements through Akhbar Al-Khaleej about the plot, either for or against, until the parliamentary sittings on 23 and 30 December 2008. In the parliamentary sitting held on 23 December, only MP Adel Al-

Mu'awdah, a Sunni MP from the Al Asalah Party, mentioned the incident at various points, suggesting a relevant addition in the response to the Royal Address of the King (Hansard Sitting 9, 23 Dec. 2008: MP Al-Mu'awdah: 66). MP Al-Mu'awdah started by suggesting an addition to an item on the legislative system. In his addition, he stressed that riots and vandalism should not be dealt with as 'childish niggling' and should be taken seriously as acts of terrorism (ibid.). He called for 'drying up the sources of terrorism by monitoring them and draining them to prevent sedition in the country' (ibid.). He then moved on to other items in the response to the Royal Address, mainly economic criticism, but he was interrupted by the Speaker for having used up his assigned time (ibid. 67). MP Al-Mu'awdah briefly returned to the riot incident in the single statement with which he closed his speech: 'We should not forget under the topic of Rights: the rights of the ones whom the incidents harmed; we have duties towards them too. Thank you' (ibid.).

- ***Paving the way for expressing points of view***

According to Hansard, no further direct discussion of the riots came up during the sitting held on the 23 December. However, when MP Jalal Fayrooz, from the Al Wefaq Party, suggested his additions to the letter in reply to the Royal Address, he first demanded three amendments to the response to the Royal Address (Attachment to Sitting 9, pp. 334–345). MP

Fayrooz required an addition under the section entitled ‘Sixth: the Level of Rights,’ as follows (Fayrooz, Sitting 9, 23 Dec 2008):

- There should be adherence to the International Covenant Against Torture and preventing any form of torture and coercion against detainees in detention centres.
- The government should cooperate to amend laws restricting freedom, which must be amended to comply with the covenants and conventions signed by the Kingdom.
- The government should cooperate to form a body of justice and equity to resolve the outstanding issues from the pre-reform era.

(Hansard, 25 Dec. 2008: 56).

In this sitting, several MPs from Al Wefaq brought in the topic of naturalisation and the demand to employ Shiites in the Armed Forces. These two topics which were off the agenda and not relevant to the discussion are major conflicts between Al Wefaq and the government and had been the main causes of the riots in the country in the few days previously.⁶⁴ MP Fayrooz mentions both topics as he resumes with his recommendations. He asks for amendments on the Armed Forces item in the response to the Royal Address as follows: ‘I have two proposals: first, [to add] at the end of the paragraph “to comply with Article 16 of the Constitution by not employing foreigners in public offices except on a temporary basis, and that is to be

achieved by Bahrainising the Defence Force jobs in Bahrain” – and I do not mean naturalisation when I say Bahrainisation, but [I mean] employing Bahrainis – Secondly: “and allowing all Bahrainis including those belonging to the doctrine of Ahl al-Bayt to serve in the Bahrain Defence Force” (ibid.).

MP Fayrooz’s first additions are about detainees’ rights, and they seem to be timed well after the arrest of the instigators of the riots and the defendants accused of killing the policeman. His additions to the item on the Armed Forces are directly linked to his first amendments; this is because the riots and vandalism that had happened in the previous days were motivated by conflicts with the government, mainly over the issues of naturalisation. Many Shiite parties, and mainly Al Wefaq, have in the last twenty years strongly objected to the process of naturalisation. However, historically speaking, the vast majority of Bahraini citizens are of other origins, such as Central and East Arabia, Southern Iraq and Iran. This is very much reflected in the variety of cosmopolitan ethnicity, customs and dialects that this small country encompasses. Only a few families, most of whom are Sunni, can be said to have lived for generation in Bahrain at least since Islam came in year 629. This means that the negative attitude towards naturalisation is directed only at certain groups, while the naturalisation of other groups is overlooked by the same protesters. If Van Dijk’s definition of prejudice is taken as ‘mental representations in social memory consisting of structured schemata of general opinions shared by a group’ (1993b:39), then the attempt to argue logically that a certain group is less Bahraini than others does not stand up

to scrutiny, as the attempt to differentiate between the ones who were naturalised more recently than those who have been naturalised earlier is actually based on prejudice rather than logic.

In his additions to the item regarding the Armed Forces, MP Fayrooz demands two contradictory requirements: on the one hand, he is objecting to what he sees as a type of discrimination against Shiites when the Armed Forces are being selective about whom to accept. The fact is that the current system of enrolment in the Armed Forces has been preventing the employment not only of Shiites, but also of any Bahrainis from non-Arab origins, like Holis (mixed Arab Persian Sunnis). However, MP Fayrooz is not concerned about who does not join but more about whom he wants to join, and therefore he focuses on Shiites' right to join. Thus, his statement 'and allowing all walks of life⁶⁵... to serve in Bahrain Defence Force' is only a legal and constitutional covering for a specific demand: to allow Shiite in particular in. It also contrasts with his immediately previous demand that a certain group of Bahrainis not be allowed to serve in the Armed Forces if gained citizenship relatively recently.

The label that MP Fayrooz gives the Shiites here generates a quarrel. He calls them, according to Hansard, *Ahl Al-Bait*, and according to Akhbar Al-Khaleej 'Āl Al-Bayt'. Both names refer to the descendants and the family of the Prophet Mohammed, and within the Shiite doctrine, this is more restricted to the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed's cousin Imam Ali bin Abi Talib from his wife Fatima Al-Zahra', the daughter of the Prophet

Mohammed. This is an incorrect label for two reasons: first, although a number of Shiites trace their roots back to Imam Ali and Fatima Al-Zahra', the vast majority of Shiites do not. MP Fayrooz probably wanted to give the Bahraini Shiites a prestigious religious halo, but he failed to include most of the Shiites in his call. This attempt at self-definition, therefore, was not successful even in the Shiite context. Secondly, there are many Sunnis who are descended from the Prophet Mohammed, and even from Imam Ali and Fatima Al-Zahra'. After all, the division between Shiite and Sunni did not exist in the Prophet's day, not even during the era of Imam Ali's reign. This sectarian division is the result of a complicated historical and political transformation.

- ***Individual comments and total 'silences'***

While there are no newspaper statements in *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* by Al Wefaq MPs about the riots and the murder of the policeman, other MPs issued statements to *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* condemning the incident. For example, on the 19th of the same month, MP Jassim Al Sa'eedi, an independent Sunni MP proclaimed that he had 'repeatedly warned against terrorist cells with political, economic, religious and military divisions. They are fully fledged organisations supported by foreigners' (A-Sa'eedi quoted in Nasr and Jaber 19 Dec. 2008a: 8). MP Hassan Al-Dosseri, a Sunni MP and the Head of the Al-Mustaqbal Party, not a religious party, demanded the law of terrorism be employed against those condemned (ibid.). On the 22nd, MP Mohammed

Khalid called for the prohibition of a demonstration against naturalisation that was organised in Madinat Hamad, a city that falls within his parliamentary area. This demonstration was scheduled for Friday 26th of the same month and was organised by six political blocs⁶⁶ (Nasr and Jaber 22 Dec. 2008: 10). MP Khalid requested that people stay away from violence and ‘not ... politicise more issues for sectarian and group related interests’ (ibid.).

These events that were concurrent with the debate over condemning a terrorist act should clarify some of the incentives behind the riots and should shed light on the stances of the sectarian political parties and their relationship to riots on the one hand and the process of naturalisation on the other.

4.3.5 Excerpt 5 on the Arrest of Political Activists

From sitting 2:3:13, 27 Jan. 2009

In this excerpt the discussion is about the process of arresting political activists. MP Al-Marzooq, from Al Wefaq, employs the strategy of corroborating by information (see Table 28). On behalf of his party, MP Al-Marzooq in lines 10–12 makes an intervention while Hansard of the previous sitting is being reviewed – a routine step on the agenda that does not contain anything relevant to the topic of the arrest – and he demands the release of two detainees. The two detainees are Bahraini political activists from the

Haq Movement, an unauthorised political movement in Bahrain whose main demand is that the ruling system be replaced with a republican system. Haq leaders were originally members of the Al Wefaq Party and split off from the main party later. The detainees whom MP Al-Marzooq is talking about are Shiites.

Table 28: Strategy of MP Al-Miz'al in Excerpt 5

MP	Strategy	Devices
Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)	Corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rhetoric: periphrasis: negotiation through embedded messages • rhetoric: discourse markers 'of course', 'then' • lexical style: word order • rhetorical move: starting with a mutual convention • speech act: predicting reactions • rhetoric: metaphors • rhetoric: understatement • repetition • periphrasis • speech act: exhortation

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

- 8 **S:** Thank you. Are there any other comments on Hansard of the
9 regular twelfth sitting? Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
10 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker, *Assalāmu alaykum wa rahmatu Allah*.⁶⁷

- 11 Of course, I will comment for a couple of minutes on the
12 current situation in the country ...
13 **S:** Let us finish the ratification first!
14 **KM:** A few minutes, Mr Speaker, out of interest to our security.
15 **S:** Let us first finish the ratification.
16 **KM:** So allow me to speak after the ratification.
17 **S:** Are there any comments on Hansard of the twelfth sitting?
18 **(No comments)**

MP Al-Marzooq starts his sentence with ‘of course’, which does not linguistically fit in since the associated phrase whose validity ‘of course’ should acknowledge does not relate to what has just been said. The discourse marker ‘of course’ may seem not to serve as more than an expression as, besides this inappropriate use of the expression, there are other linguistic problems in MP Al-Marzooq’s speech. There are a number of incomplete sentences as will be noticed in the extract below: a clause that does not fit into a sentence in lines 23–24: ‘As a result of our concern over safety and security in Bahrain’; wrong collocations: ‘security mazes’ twice in line 27 and ‘increase charge’ in line 28; and some wrongly structured sentences,⁶⁸ However, many ideological encodings are present in his speech, and these are demonstrated in the analysis below.

MP Al-Marzooq is stopped by the Speaker of the Council in line 13: ‘Let us finish the ratification first.’ Al-Marzooq tries to negotiate presenting his intervention, but the Speaker restates what he has just said with the words reordered: ‘Let us first finish the ratification’ (line 15). Moving ‘first’ forward is used by the Speaker to insist on his position. At the same time, his

40 have complied with the orders of the prosecution. But there are
41 procedures that if one does not comply, one gets sent for once and
42 twice and thrice, and they quietly go to him at his house. But to arrest
43 the brothers at night at 3 a.m. in this unjustifiable manner! ...

When MP Al-Marzooq gets the chance to present his intervention, he starts by providing a setting for the demand in lines 23–24: ‘As a result of our concern over safety and security in Bahrain,’ There are two observations about this opening. First, the demand is opened by a convention, a point about which it is difficult to disagree: that the security of the country matters. This opening, ‘our concern over safety and security in Bahrain’ (lines 23–24), sets up what can be considered ‘the more specific mental model based on these general social representations’ (Van Dijk 2009a: 71). An argument is more likely to be accepted if points of agreement are presented first as the basis of, or the motivations behind, what may be less agreeable. Secondly, MP Al-Marzooq expresses concern over ‘the safety and security in Bahrain.’ Although choosing safety and security concerns over justice concerns could have been simply random and unplanned, it can also be read as an indirect warning. This is because, if the choice made was ‘our concern over justice,’ then the intervention would only be looking back and evaluating the legality and acceptability of the procedures the Attorney General has followed in executing the warrant of the arrest. However, ‘our concern over safety and security in Bahrain’ is a statement that looks

forward and predicts the outcome of this arrest. The indirect warning is that the arrest is expected to cause chaos and instability.

MP Al-Marzooq comments on the arrests in line 25 saying: ‘Matters are not addressed in this manner.’ I would have expected him to say ‘matters should not (or could not) be addressed in this manner’ to express the view that the arrest did not follow police procedure. However, MP Al-Marzooq’s sentence is an informative statement, as if he is telling the Attorney General something he does not know. This has a covert sense of ridicule. The use of ‘should not’ or ‘could not’ would have sounded more implicative and more of an exhortation. The informative statement emphasises the ‘wrongness’ of what is proposed here.

Then, MP Al-Marzooq uses the metaphor ‘security mazes’ in line 27, which is not a common collocation in Arabic. This subtly points to the lack of directness and predictability in the security procedures followed by the Attorney General, something which, in turn, signals a lack of integrity in these procedures. This is again a covert accusation presented in such a way as not to be confrontational.

MP Al-Marzooq explains that these security mazes ‘increase charge’. Here there is a vocabulary-use problem. He should have used the better word شحنة *shahnā*, i.e. hostility; instead, the word he actually uses is شحن *shahn*, which means the action of charging, filling, or loading (or it can mean ‘cargo’). This is a poor linguistic choice of vocabulary, but it seems to be understood as it was intended. The word was even reported uncorrected

in *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* the following day (28 Jan. 2009: 10). This time, the warning MP Al-Marzooq is making is more explicit, but it is a warning against a disturbance in feelings and attitude, not actions, at least not directly. This makes it safer to warn openly against any possible disturbance. After that, MP Al-Marzooq makes another embedded attack when he explains that this would ‘increase the complexity of the accumulated files’ (line 29). The reference to the accumulated file is an assertion of the belief that there is a huge number of other cases and detentions to which Al Wefaq objects and which the party considers illegal.

In lines 30–32, MP Al-Marzooq sums up Al Wefaq’s objection: ‘The arrest that took place was unjustifiable. The way the arrest was made is unjustifiable.’ This is the third time he uses indirectness. This time he uses understatement as a rhetorical device to tone down his stance. What Al Wefaq wants to convey is the illegality of both the arrest and the procedure of the arrest. However, MP Al-Marzooq uses the less legal adjective غير مبرر *ghayr mubarrar* i.e. unjustifiable or inexcusable. This adjective has a more logical perspective than a legal one.. MP Al-Marzooq repeats the word ‘unjustifiable’ to add more stress to the idea of the arrests being wrong, and this repetition partially compensates the understatement. The same word, ‘unjustifiable’, is used again in line 43 to describe the arrest of the detainees at 3:00 a.m. Specifying the time is likely to be more provocative to the families and supporters of the detainees than if it were merely described as unjustifiable, although the timing could not be described as illegal.

have three rhetorical readings. First, the conditional may have been used to ‘cloak’ or ‘soften a rebuke and make it more respectful’ (Young, 1989: 39). This use tallies with the other less confrontational objections above. A second reading of the function of these conditionals can interpret them as laments. Softened rebukes and laments share two conditions: that the event referred to happened in the past and that the interlocutor believes that it was not in his or her favour or in favour of the hearer (ibid.: 40–41). However, in the case of a softened rebuke, the speaker feels and expresses anger at the event, while in the case of a lament he or she feels and expresses grief (ibid.: 40–41). Whether the function of this illocutionary act is, to soften a rebuke or to express lament, the purpose of the conditional sentences is equivalent to saying: ‘We are *not* a state of institutions or law because we are not moving gradually in the proceedings. Citizens will *not* respect the law because the government and security forces are not respecting the law and are bypassing it.’ While a rebuke is accompanied by a feeling of dissatisfaction and a lament is accompanied by a feeling of regret, the two feelings can coincide without causing any ambivalence. This means that the conditionals can simultaneously embed rebuke and express lament. A third possible function of the illocutionary act is exhortation. Young defines exhortation as ‘an attempt to urge a hearer to do something he recognizes is proper’ (ibid.: 45). This can be the sole function or can concur with either or both of the other rhetorical functions. All these rhetorical readings of the conditionals are possible since, after all, and according to

CDA, the process of interpreting the text is as important as the process of producing it. Thus, how the other MPs interpret the function of the conditionals matters too. In any case, whether interpreted as a softening rebuke, a lament or an exhortation, an important part of MP Al-Marzooq's and Al Wefaq's message is conveyed via these conditionals.

After building up his argument, MP Al-Marzooq shifts to another topic in lines 47–49: 'There is someone who blasphemes the sect, and every week he intervenes in these matters and no one questions him.' This is an attempt to bring another controversial topic into the discussion. Although no names are mentioned, and normally it is expected to mean that this person is someone from the other sect, i.e. a Sunni, and then the mention of 'every week' is an understood reference among Bahrainis to the weekly sermon of صلاة الجمعة *Ṣalāt Al Jum'a* (Friday Prayers). This narrows down the accusation to someone among the Sunni clerics. Perhaps MP Al-Marzooq is willing to give further description, but at this point he is stopped by the Speaker (line 50).

The analysis of the next excerpt will help understand whom and what MP Al-Marzooq is referring to here (see Section 4.3.6.2). This interruption brings MP Al-Marzooq back to his topic and he concludes it in lines 51 and 52 by stressing the 'calm' stance of the Al Wefaq Party, their desire to address the matter without acceleration. What is unsaid here by emphasising the idea of calming down is the request to the Attorney General in turn to respond to Al Wefaq's 'calmness' by responding to their request. This is one

more covert confrontation, which MP Al-Marzooq uses to end his speech. While the last sentence 'We calmly say that we demand the release of the detainees immediately' means to encourage the authorities to cooperate with Al Wefaq, the statement also implies that there are other ways in which Al Wefaq can react to the arrest. There is a sense of anger, opposition and dissatisfaction towards the Attorney General, but it is expressed in a 'calm' way.

According to the report about the sitting that appeared the following day in Akhbar Al-Khaleej (Nasr and Jaber, 28 Jan. 2009: 10), the detainees mentioned in the excerpt are Hasan Mushaime' and Muhammad Al-Miqdad. These are the two whose release the Al Wefaq Party is demanding, However, the day before the sitting the same newspaper reported that there were three detainees: the two mentioned above, and in addition, Dr Abdul Jalil Al-Singace. The police had brought three charges against the three of them, while an additional fourth charge was brought against Al-Miqdaq (Abdul Qadir, 27 Jan. 2009: 11). The major charge was of conspiring to overthrow the regime (ibid.) However, for health reasons, Al-Singace was only interrogated and then put under house arrest,⁶⁹ which is why he is not mentioned in Al Wefaq's demands.

Hasan Mushaime' has been the leader of the Haq Movement, an unauthorised political opposition in Bahrain. Muhammad Al-Miqdad was its General Secretary and Al-Singace, a university lecturer, was a spokesperson for this movement. A large number of the leading figures of Haq were

previously leaders in Al Wefaq. Back in 2002, Al Wefaq boycotted the parliamentary elections because it considered the Constitution of the country illegal. However, Al Wefaq decided not to boycott the second legislative period starting in 2006, instead participating and winning seats in the parliament. Nevertheless, a number of Al Wefaq leaders insisted on the illegality of the parliament and broke away from the party to form a movement of their own, Haqq. The three detainees, who were all released soon, became leading figures in the unrest Bahrain has been witnessing since February 2010.

Another point to make about this sitting is how Al Wefaq managed to make headlines silently, using writing as a more powerful way to highlight a political demand. In the sitting from which the above excerpt is taken, all of Al Wefaq's MPs attended with large badges on their chests that said: بحرينيون ضد التجنيس السياسي, *baḥrayniyyūn ʿidd al tajnīs al siyāsī*, i.e. Bahrainis against political naturalisation. These badges had a red background and the text was in white, the two colours of the Bahraini flag. The text on the badges created polarised stances: 'Bahrainis' and 'political naturalisation.' In turn, this created many polarised pairs: legal and illegal, righteous citizenship holders and unrighteous citizenship holders, true and fake, and *Us* and *Them*. This is what Van Dijk calls 'polarising the mental model' (2009a: 70), and here it is a mental modal of the Bahraini citizen. Such polarisation is 'the familiar form of the negative other-presentation, and the positive self-presentation' (ibid.). The polarisation these badges made has two parallel constructs: the

first is the polarisation between Bahrainis who, according to Al Wefaq, deserve their citizenship, including the badge carriers, and the unwelcome naturalised immigrants; the second is the polarisation between ‘righteous’ MPs and the government.

The topic of naturalisation was not brought up in the sitting, but the large badges were reported in the newspaper headlines. The badges could not be dismissed, especially as their size was considerably larger than that of average badges, something that made the text clearly legible even in the average sized photographs published in the newspapers. As the issue of naturalisation had been a common major issue for Al Wefaq and Haq, the badges were a form of support shown to the detainees while, at the same time, they were meant to touch upon a sensitive issue of concern to Al Wefaq. A message conveyed through a published photo is likely to reach more people than if it is reported in a long article among many other points. Readers flipping through the pages will grasp the message even if they do not wish to read the article. In this way, Al Wefaq managed to bring up this controversial topic and express its stance without uttering a word about it.

Besides making the headlines, this action by Al Wefaq irritated many other MPs. MP Al Sa’eedi, for example, made a statement to the press in reaction to this move on the day of the sitting. He stated: ‘While some MPs hung on their chest a sign against naturalisation in the last sitting, I had completed collecting information about some of the parliamentary members and their families who obtained Bahraini citizenship in illegal ways, through

forging official documents and certificates. This [allegation] is supported by evidence and proof that I have and I will present them to the Attorney General to look into it. ... Once [they have been] found guilty, the law provides for imprisonment, the withdrawal of their citizenship and their deportation from the country' (MP Al-Sa'eedi quoted in Nasr and Jaber, 28 January 2009, my translation). Here, MP Al-Sa'eedi is using the topic of naturalisation itself as his counter-attack, or what can be described as 'fighting fire with fire.'

This tension and mutual disrespect between Al Wefaq party and MP Al-Sa'eedi will still elaborate every now and then, either as direct or indirect comments, and the next excerpt shows one of these instances of the swift hint.

4.3.6 Excerpt 6 on Big and Small Thieves

From sitting 2:3:23, 7 April 2009

In this short excerpt, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee is reading its decision about a proposal made by MP Jassim Al-Sa'eedi, a Sunni MP. The proposal suggested increasing security measures against thefts, as the extract below illustrates. I present a discursive analysis followed by a reading into the relationship between Al Wefaq and MP Al-Sa'eedi.

4.3.6.1 Political wit

In this excerpt, MP Abdulhussain Al-Mitghawi, the Rapporteur of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security Committee is given the floor to read the committee's decision. The committee itself consists of members from both Sunni and Shiite backgrounds; the Rapporteur is a member of Al Wefaq, which has always maintained a tense relationship with MP Al-Sa'eedi in particular, more than with any other MP.

SDS is the Second Deputy Speaker.

GS is the General Secretary.

AM is MP Abdulhussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, the Rapporteur, member of Al Wefaq.

- 1 **SDS:** ... Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of the
- 2 Council, please.
- 3 **GS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) *Item 9: Proposals, Sixth:*
- 4 *The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and*
- 5 *National Security on the proposal for increasing security*
- 6 *measures to reduce incidences of theft in the Kingdom of Bahrain,*
- 7 *presented by MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa'eedi. Thank you,*
- 8 Mr Speaker.
- 9 **SDS:** Thank you. Brother Rapporteur. Please.
- 10 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I request having the committee's report
- 11 inserted in Hansard.
- 12 **SDS:** Who agrees on inserting the report in Hansard?
- 13 **(Majority agree.)**
- 14 **SDS:** Then the report is inserted in Hansard.
- 15 **(See Attachment No. 15.)**

In his very short intervention, MP Abdulhussain Al-Mitghawi wittingly makes use of him being given the floor to express a point. MP-Al Mitghawi is asked to read the recommendation of the committee, employing mockery in the form of political wit to serve the strategy of centralising pride and dignity (see Table 29). The pride and dignity that is served here is slightly different than it in other excerpts. This difference is better understood by understanding the relationship between MP Al-Sa’eedi and Al Wefaq was explained, something which I explain in the next subsection.

Table 29: Strategy of MP Al-Miyghawi in Excerpt 6

MP	Strategy	Devices
Abdulhussian Al-Mighawi (Al Wefaq)	Centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • humour (political wit) • discourse marker: ‘but’ to preface a reaction, shifting to another focus • rhetoric: irony • sarcasm: rhetoric

SDS is the Second Deputy Speaker.

AM is MP Abdulhussain Al-Mitghawi from Al Wefaq.

- 16 **SDS:** Thank you. Brother Rapporteur, please.
- 17 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. The committee is confused. The Brother MP
- 18 Sheikh Jassim Al Sa’eedi mentioned that this is to reduce theft and
- 19 asked for strict security measures, but did not specify if he meant
- 20 theft by the big or small–
- 21 **SDS:** Read the recommendation.
- 22 **AM:** (Reading) *Committee’s recommendation: After reviewing the Constitution*

23 *and the Bylaws of the Parliament, and after discussions and deliberations,*
 24 *the committee recommends approving the proposal, due to the validity*
 25 *of its justifications. Thank you, Mr Speaker.*
 26 **SDS:** Thank you.
 27 Who agrees on the recommendation about the proposal
 28 submitted to your council?
 29 **(Majority agree.)**

When it is time to read the recommendation as expected from the committee's Rapporteur, MP Al-Mitghawi takes advantage of his ability to be heard and makes a cunning joke about corruption. He starts with 'The committee is confused' in line 17. Of course, the committee had not reached a decision without actually discussing the recommendation made by MP Al-Sa'eedi, so they are not really confused. The intervention of MP Al-Mitghawi starts with a phrase that sounds serious, and this automatically attracts attention and requires him to clear up the so-called confusion before moving on. Had he started more openly with something like: 'I/we have a comment/an intervention' he would not have got the chance to express this idea and he would have been interrupted and asked to read only the recommendation. MP Al-Mitghawi prefaces his own and his committee's reaction using 'but', which indicates a shift to presenting something else, in this case, their reaction. He comments: 'but [MP Al-Sa'eedi] did not specify if he meant theft by the big or small' (lines 19–20). This political wit uses mock-seriousness as a rhetorical device; MP Al-Mitghawi starts by pretending to be serious and then makes an unexpected joke that twists the

meaning of the previous part that sounded serious at the beginning. The choice of the two words صغار *ṣighār*, i.e. ‘small’ or ‘young’ and the antonym كبار *kibār*, i.e. ‘big’ or ‘old’ is clever, too. For a moment, it possibly sounds as if he is comparing theft by adults and juveniles, a not very perceptive question, but then the question is reinterpreted and the pun becomes clear. Speier (1998: 1353) mentions two sources of political wit: jokes “‘from above,” from those of higher status’ and “‘from below,” that is, jokes born from triumph rather than resistance.’ He explains that a joke from below does not necessarily target certain people but can instead target a group or ‘strata’ in society (ibid.), which is what MP Al-Mitghawi is doing here. Speier (ibid.: 1354) maintains that one of the purposes of political wit is making the ‘arrangements or the precautions of an opponent seem ridiculous.’ This serves as an act of derision: direct derision of the ‘big’ thieves, the people in power who get away with big thefts and with corruption, and then there is less direct derision of MP Al-Sa’eedi, which will be made more explicit in the upcoming section on the relationship between Al Wefaq and MP Al-Sa’eedi.

When MP Al-Mitghawi derides the people ‘above’, he is positioning himself ‘below’. Parliamentary members are actually at the top of the social and authoritative hierarchy, but MP Al-Mitghawi is now stressing the role of ‘the representative of the people’, the role of voicing their dissatisfaction and anger. Accordingly, he is placing himself and his party closer to the public, further from the ‘corrupted’ people in the upper strata. Speier (ibid.: 1357) explains that ‘[l]aughter forges ties between people, bringing those who

laugh together to one another.’ Humour, as seen in this example, helps minimise barriers between politicians and the public, and politicians can consequently win more trust from the public. With his opening, MP Al-Mitghawi is applying the devices of shielding oneself with wordiness in a way that the irrelevance of the additional utterances, ‘but the committee is confused’ (line 17), works as a ‘soother’ that serves to bring the interlocutors closer to each other. Speier (ibid.: 1356) maintains that ‘[h]umour weakens an audience’s defences and makes it more amenable to persuasion.’ He explains:

Certain political jokes also reconcile antagonists with each other. Politics not only revolve around the battle of power; it also serves the public spirit, the social order, the sense of legitimacy in a society, harmony and indeed peace (ibid. 1357–1358).

Speier explains that while political jokes can be used as a weapon to hurt, they can also be used in a reflective way to soothe (ibid.: 1358).

Additionally, by deriding financial corruption in some senior authorities, the Al Wefaq Party gets a chance to make an attack for which it cannot be held accountable. This attack cannot be taken seriously at the legal level, but is understood to be serious by all listeners and readers. Hinting and joking about corruption has a further intended suggestion: to create an image of oneself that opposes the ridiculed person or group. Therefore, MP Al-Mitghawi is suggesting that he or his party are not corrupt, implying

polarisation of the 'good ones' and the 'bad ones'. Using the terms Zuckermann (2006: 244) presented, they are 'othering' the corrupt authorities and, consequently, uniting themselves with the public to win their sympathy and thus their support.

4.3.6.2 Background to excerpt

I classified this political wit under the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. To justify this choice, it is useful to understand the relationship between MP Al-Sa'eedi and Al Wefaq, as the relationship between them had reached a confrontational level before this sitting. The month preceding this sitting, i.e. March 2009, witnessed a harsh confrontation between Al Wefaq and MP Al-Sa'eedi in the most open and legal way, after a long period of hints and indirect personal recriminations. The March event, presented below, was not the first time conflicts between MP Al-Sa'eedi and the Al Wefaq Party had risen to the surface; in that month, there were two incidents that revealed this relationship more than ever: the first incident was the demand for the withdrawal of the immunity of MP Jassim Al-Sa'eedi, and the second was the demand for the withdrawal of that of MP Dr Jassim Hussain from Al Wefaq.

The demand for the withdrawal of the immunity of MP Jassim Al-Sa'eedi, came, in brief, after thirteen people had accused him of insulting the Shiite sect in his sermons and of calling them Zionists and other names, such

as ‘the descendants of monkeys and pigs.’ They also claimed that MP Al-Sa’eedi had accused the Shiites of causing riots and chaos in the country and that he had advocated killing them. The prosecution was passed to the Committee of Legislative and Legal Affairs at the parliament, which decided at the end of the meeting, held on 8 March 2009, to withdraw parliamentary immunity from MP Al-Sa’eedi in order to present him to the court. A total of four committee members, all Shiites from Al Wefaq, agreed to the demand; the two other members, Sunnis, both from the Al Minbar Party, disagreed. The decision was then passed on to the agenda of the next parliamentary meeting to be voted on. On the same day, MP Al-Sa’eedi held a press conference in which he explained that the accusations were fabricated and that the case was malicious. He mentioned that there was no recorded evidence of the accusations and said that the criticisms of chaos he made were not addressed to the Shiites. He also maintained that none of the prosecutors had attended any of the religious sermons mentioned; the evidence they presented was based either on anonymous witnesses whose names were not revealed to the prosecutors or on discussion forums on the Internet (my summary and translation, Nasr and Jaber 9 Mar. 2009: 8).

In his comment on the decision of the committee, the Chairman of the Committee of Legislative and Legal Affairs, MP Khalil Al-Marzooq, said: ‘What happened yesterday regarding withdrawing immunity from MP Al-Sa’eedi was conducted according to the law. I speak on behalf of the Al Wefaq Party and say that there were trespasses committed by the MP and

the people are not deaf or blind to what Al-Sa'eedi is saying' (ibid.). This statement from MP Al-Marzooq suggests that Al Wefaq had adopted a decision in advance of the committee meeting on the basis of input they had received prior to the meeting.

Around the same time, MP Dr Hussain was deplored by a number of citizens for accusing the Bahraini political system of discrimination and sectarianism at a conference held by the Congress in the USA on 16 October 2008. In his turn, MP Hussain made a statement to the newspapers saying that the Attorney General did not carry out investigations in a professional way and did not do his job when investigating the claims made by the prosecutors (Nasr and Jaber 23 Mar. 2009: 8). He also maintained that the case made against him was malicious and that the prosecutors' accusations were not credible. MP Hussain added that some of the prosecutors were friends of MP Al-Sa'eedi and that one of them had delivered a religious sermon in which he praised MP Al-Sa'eedi. MP Hussain also pointed out that the Bahraini Ambassador in Washington was among the audience and she did not comment on the statistics presented by the participants at the conference. He also linked the request for the withdrawal of his immunity with that of the withdrawal of MP Al-Sa'eedi's, saying that the former was a response to the latter. He described MP Al-Sa'eedi as 'a danger to society and national unity' who should get life imprisonment because he wished for death for a sect (ibid.).

In the sitting held on 24 March 2009, the parliament voted on the recommendation of the Committee for Legislative and Legal Affairs about withdrawing MP Al-Sa'eedi's immunity. The recommendation was rejected, as 19 voted against it (all Sunnis) while 14 voted for it (all Shiites); three were absent from the sitting (all independent Sunni MPs). However, three Al Wefaq MPs, among whom was MP Al-Marzooq himself, were absent at the time of the vote despite attending the sitting of that particular day (Nasr and Jaber 25 Mar. 2009: 13). This was described in the newspapers as a 'parliamentary deal' and it was said that Al Wefaq was expecting the Sunni members to 'reciprocate' in the following sitting when it came to voting on the demand to withdraw the immunity of the Wefaq MP Hussain (ibid.). In the sitting held on 31 March 2009, the parliament voted in favour of the decision made by the Committee for Legislative and Legal Affairs against withdrawing the immunity of MP Hussain (Nasr and Jaber 1 April 2009: 10) and thus the 'parliamentary deal' was kept by both sides and the exchange of harsh accusations then ceased.

The two immunity withdrawal conflicts alongside Excerpt 5 above dated 27 January 2009 can reveal the identity of the person indicated by MP Al-Marzooq, who is accused of blaspheming the Shiite section every week. MP Al-Marzooq was referring to a Sunni cleric, and MP Al-Sa'eedi is the only one who fits the description. This brings us back to the second level of derision meant by the mock-serious statement made by MP Al-Mitghawi in this excerpt. By this sitting, the tension between Al Wefaq and MP Al-Sa'eedi

has not eased at all; it has only lessened the probability of the legal confrontational alternative. The withdrawal of the immunity failed, or was probably deliberately foiled to save the two MPs. Preceding this sitting, a number of riots and acts of vandalism had taken place at a number of locations in Bahrain, and while other Sunni parties expressed their disapproval, Al Wefaq kept quiet and did not condemn these acts, as they did in sitting 2:3:10 in response to the attack plot (Excerpt 4).

The Al Wefaq Party considers MP Al-Sa'eedi a pro-government MP and the party describes itself as the opposition. In this sitting, MP Al-Mitghawi is taking advantage of the opportunity of him being the Rapporteur and making fun of the recommendation made by MP Al-Sa'eedi. Accordingly, this act of mockery, unlike many short and quick jokes, is not meant to 'soften the blow' in the parliamentary atmosphere. Instead, MP Al-Mitghawi is indirectly ridiculing MP Al Sa'eedi's recommendation, suggesting that the proposal is turning a blind eye to 'big thefts', to corruption and to abuse of public money, and is instead focusing on smaller problems. The action of ridiculing creates a gap, a kind of a 'scale' of how much respect one deserves. Here comes the idea of reflecting the pride of Al Wefaq in the actual action of ridiculing the proposal of Al-Sa'eedi. In this way, this method of using the strategy of centralising pride and dignity differs from the more direct and overt use of the same strategy seen in other excerpts in this research.

4.3.7 Excerpt 7 on Eavesdropping

From sitting 2:4:3, 20 Oct. 2009

In this excerpt, MP Nasser Al-Fudhalah, a member of the Al Minbar Party, objects to the government's eavesdropping on phone calls in Bahrain, which he considers an issue of political (and personal) freedom. MP Al-Fudhalah employs the strategy of corroborating by information in his short intervention. The strategy and the devices used are summarised in Table 30.

Table 30: *Strategy of MP Al-Fudhalah in Excerpt 7*

MP	Strategy	Devices
Nasser Al-Fudhalah (Al Minbar)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • speech act: backgrounded disagreement • framing recording calls as eavesdropping • use of inclusive 'we' to establish rapport with the listeners • speech act: comparing the situation to that of the U.S. and Europe • rhetorical question • lexical style to evoke sense of responsibility • rhetoric: procatalepsis

NF is MP Nasser Al-Fudhalah from Al Minbar.

- 1 NF: Thank you, Mr Speaker. *Bismillāh arrahmān arrahīm*.⁷⁰ Letter No.
- 2 18 on eavesdropping on phone calls, is in fact not clear to me.
- 3 I inferred from the answer that, and we have heard so often that,
- 4 problem the records are taken out and used. This is a kind of
- 5 eavesdropping. ...

MP Al-Fudhalah first indirectly reproves the response and indirectly depicts it as unclear in line 2: ‘is in fact not clear to me’; and in line 3 when he says: ‘I inferred from the answer,’ something that criticises the style of the response. By referring to indirectness, the MP is making a hint: he makes the point clear enough to be taken note of but not stressed or straightforward enough to be confrontational. This is an instance of backgrounded disagreement. This style of disagreement recurs a few times in several Sunni MPs’ participations in the excerpts of debates in the analyses in this research (see Section 4.3.1.1 for more on dispute and disagreement). After the indirect expression of dissatisfaction with the vagueness of the response, MP Al-Fudhalah, in lines 5–6, frames the procedure of recording all calls as eavesdropping: ‘This is a kind of eavesdropping.’ By framing the procedure as such, he is framing it as it eligible to criticise it and disapprove it; he is classifying it as immoral and unethical, which is again an indirect criticism that is embedded in this framing:

- 6 **NF:** ... We must speak clearly about this issue, guided
- 7 by some European countries and by the U.S. There are many
- 8 objections in those countries to the issue of eavesdropping. There
- 9 are very big problems that have occurred because of this intervention
- 10 in the privacy of people and recording them, even if declared.

When MP Al-Fudhalah says in line 6: ‘We must speak clearly about this issue,’ he is actually demanding that the institution be clear. The use of the inclusive ‘we’ here aims at establishing a rapport with the addressee and the listeners. The addressee here is the institution and the listeners are the other MPs. This device is similar to that used also by MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 5, but the instance in MP Al-Fudhalah’s speech does not seem to have a tutoring role like that of MP Al-Marzooq. The latter repeated the inclusive ‘we’ a few times in a row and this repetition helped build this tutoring role. MP Al-Fudhalah’s approach to demanding clarity is less direct, and ‘we’ supports the devices above in building this indirectness.

To justify his request and support it with information, he compares what he is demanding to what is being applied in some European countries and the U.S. (lines 6–7), whom he offers as role examples for security procedures. He would probably mean Western Europe in particular when saying ‘some European countries,’ as they are the ones whom Bahrain tends to see as models for security measures that do not contradict human and civil rights. The mention of some European countries and the U.S. serves to set a realistic and respected benchmark, and to stress that criticising eavesdropping is a logical and civilised procedure.

Another indirect criticism can be read in his illustration of objections in the aforementioned countries in lines 7–10: ‘There are many objections in those countries to the issue of eavesdropping. There are very big problems that occurred because of this intervention in the privacy of people and

recording them.’ In these lines, while he is illustrating objections in those countries, he is simultaneously suggesting and concurring with a similar reaction from telephone users in Bahrain. He is thus suggesting something like: ‘Do not expect the people to accept, and if they object and cause problems, then it is a normal consequence.’ He then immediately follows it with ‘even if declared’ (line 10), an employment of procatalepsis, anticipating a reply and responding to it. He is here removing the possibility of any response attempting to legalise the procedure of recording telephone calls by stating it beforehand. Again, this move is linked in a single sentence to the objections and problems that have occurred in the ‘model’ countries.

- 11 **NF:** Who gives authority to who records my calls? And the calls of the
 12 Council and the rest of the figures in the country, and the average
 13 citizen as well? We want an explanation from this institution, to tell
 14 us if there is an ongoing recording of all phone calls. This matter
 15 needs to be considered and approved by this council, because we
 16 consider it a kind of eavesdropping and an interference in people’s
 17 privacy. Sometimes people talk with their wives and have their own
 18 secrets, so why does this institution keep recordings of all calls in the
 19 country? We want to know a very clear response* about this issue
 20 because it is demanded that this council stop this matter if it exists.
 21 Thank you, Mr Speaker.

In the extract above, MP Al-Fudhalah moves to demanding the Council to be given the authority to permit the procedure of recording telephone calls or not, and involving it in the decision making in relation to this matter. He does so using three discursive devices: first, a rhetorical question in lines 11–

13: ‘Who gives authority to who records my calls? And the calls of the Council and the rest of the figures in the country, and the average citizen as well?’ He later gives the answer he wants to this question (lines 14–15): ‘This matter needs to be considered and approved by this Council.’ Secondly, not directly after the demand, he justifies the involvement of the Council by showing that it is its responsibility: ‘it is demanded that this Council stop this matter if it exists’ (line 20). Saying ‘it is demanded’ signals this responsibility, and is most likely to mean that the people of Bahrain, whom the MPs represent, demand it. The final addition of ‘if it exists’ works as a shield just in case the listening-in was denied or unproven, so that MP Al-Fadhel would not be blamed for fabricating an accusation, a cautionary action and a step away from being confrontational.

4.3.8 Excerpt 8 on the Arrest of A. Hassan (a)

From sitting 2:4:10, 22 Dec. 2009

This Hansard excerpt and the following one are taken from two consecutive parliamentary sittings, one week apart. In both cases, the topic of MP Abdali Hassan (Al Wefaq), who had been detained by the police, is not on the agenda, but MP Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq successfully brings it up and argues his point of view. In this excerpt, as in the one that follows, he employs the strategy of centralising pride and dignity (see Table 31).

Table 31: Strategy of Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 8

MP	Strategy	Devices
Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)	centralising pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • reframing the Speaker as the guardian of the MPs • ingroupness: involving the Speaker in the issue. • framing MP Hassan as a citizen • emotive speech • rhetoric: sarcasm • rhetoric: procatalepsis

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

- 1 **KM:** Mr Speaker, if I may, I will speak on another topic.
- 2 **S:** Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
- 3 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, you are the chief figure in this
- 4 Council and you care about the safety of the Council and the safety
- 5 of its members. ...

From the beginning of his speech, MP Al-Marzooq involves the Speaker of the Council in the issue, presenting him as one who is, as the head of the Council, responsible for its members: ‘Mr Speaker, you are the chief figure in this council and you are interested in the safety of the Council and the safety of its members’ (lines 3–5). By doing so, MP Al-Marzooq is shifting the frame of the Speaker from that of the listener and organiser of speeches to that of the ‘guardian’ of the MPs when he describes him as ‘the chief figure,’ a term

of praise, but one which consequently establishes responsibility. MP Al-Marzooq then moves to describing the arrested MP.

- 5 ... The vicious attack on the citizen Dr Abdali
6 Mohammed Hassan is unjustified. I say “the citizen” because he was
7 beaten as a citizen, not as an MP. It is not reasonable that as soon as
8 the so-called Riot Control Forces, as soon as they see a citizen, and
9 this citizen is not young and whose traits do not suggest
10 burning a tyre or doing something similar, this is a citizen. Does he
11 look as if he burnt a tyre in the street? Assaulting citizens in such a
12 manner. We want you— and since he presents the people, and since
13 you are responsible for this council...
- 14 **S:** Thank you.
- 15 **KM:** I will finish Mr Speaker. ... to ask the Ministry of the Interior when
16 MP Dr Abdali Mohammad Hassan was beaten, was he beaten because
17 he was an MP? This is a disaster ...
- 18 **S:** A letter should be submitted.
- 19 **KM:** And if he was beaten because he was a citizen? Are there any orders
20 to beat citizens? Because he went out?! If Riot Control Forces, and
21 regardless of the current security crisis, can address—but they cannot
22 address the security crisis by attacking any citizen leaving his house
23 and getting him beaten. Or does the Ministry of the Interior want the
24 citizens to raise white flags as soon as they come out of their houses
25 or from their cars?! Mr Speaker, tell them: no. And I say: do not
26 say no in a calm voice. Tell them: no, because the people of Bahrain
27 are not accustomed to kneeling except before God. These attacks and
28 assaults cannot continue. There are security incidents dealt with at
29 their level*. And we reject any sabotage or the like, but not this way.
30 Thank you, Mr Speaker.
- 31 **S:** Thank you, ...
- 1

In this excerpt, MP Hassan is simultaneously framed as a citizen and as an MP, a representative of the people. However, there is more emphasis on his

role as a citizen: ‘The vicious attack on the citizen Dr Abdali Mohammed Hassan is unjustified. I say “the citizen” because he was beaten as a citizen, not as an MP’ (lines 5–7); ‘as soon as the so-called Riot Control Forces, as soon as they see a citizen, and this citizen is not young and whose traits do not do not suggest burning a tyre or doing something similar, this is a citizen’ (lines 7–10); ‘Assaulting citizens in such a manner,’ (lines 11–12); and for a fifth time in lines 19–20: ‘And if he was beaten because he was a citizen? Are there any orders to beat citizens?’ The two roles that are stressed in framing MP Hassan as *both* a citizen and an MP aims to provide him with all possible sympathy and support: for his being one of the citizens on the one hand, and for his being a person of prestigious status in the government and a representative of the people on the other hand. MP Al-Marzooq is stressing the fact that the way MP Hassan was treated was wrong either way, and thus he demands *all* his possible rights. In this way, MP Al-Marzooq appears to be trying to secure sympathy and support for at least one role, if not both: the dignity of a citizen or the dignity of an MP. This framing of MP Hassan is to be later on compared with his framing in the following excerpt, which is from a sitting week later.

Another rhetorical device which MP Al-Marzooq employs in this excerpt to fulfil his strategy of centralising pride and dignity is the use of emotive speech. Examples are when he describes the attack as ‘vicious’ (line 5) and the situation as ‘a disaster’ (line 17). He employs sarcasm when he asks: ‘Or does the Ministry of the Interior want the citizens to raise white

flags as soon as they come out of their houses or from their cars?!’ (lines 23–25). He even asks the Speaker to respond emotively to the insult when he says: ‘Mr Speaker, tell them: no. And I say: do not say no in a calm voice’ (lines 25–26). In doing so, he is again presenting it as a case that concerns and involves the Speaker too, an insult on the Council and the Speaker as well as on MP Hassan. MP Al-Marzooq reaches the climax of his emotive speech as he involves the pride of the whole Bahraini nation in the matter when, in lines 26–27 he says: ‘Tell them: no, because the people of Bahrain are not accustomed to kneeling except before God.’ Instead of worrying about the verdict, in his speech, MP Al-Marzooq has initiated a state of resistance without grovelling for forgiveness.

MP Al-Marzooq closes his speech saying: ‘And we reject any sabotage or the like, but not this way’ (line 29). This rhetorical device is known as *procatalepsis*. MP Al-Marzooq is expecting an objection that condemns sabotage, so he mentions it before the Minister of Shura does, and MP Al-Marzooq immediately responds to it, showing that the Council, or Al Wefaq, rejects sabotage as well. However, Al Wefaq refuses to accept the way riot is being handled and does not accept leaving the topic unresolved, so they mention it again the following week.

4.3.9 Excerpt 9 on the Arrest of A. Hassan (b)

From sitting 2:4:11, 29 Dec. 2009

This is the second time MP Al-Marzooq attempts to defend MP Abdali Hassan, his fellow member of Al Wefaq. The first attempt was in the previous sitting, a week earlier. In the previous week, in Excerpt 8: the Arrest of Abali Hassan (a), the focus of MP Al-Marzooq's speech was the illegality of the detention, while in this excerpt he shifts to the accusations against MP Hassan after his detention. MP Hassan had been accused of using abusive words. Here, the major difference is speaking of the arrested MP as an MP with rights and a reputation to protect, while in the previous week, the stress was on his being a citizen.

In this excerpt, MP Al-Marzooq employs the strategy of centralising pride and dignity as the rationale behind his complaint (see Table 32).

Table 32: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 9

MP	Strategy	Devices
<i>Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)</i>	centralising	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • emotive speech • change of tone: using <i>kinyah</i> • rhetorical questions: erotesis • lexical style to put MPs on a par with ministers
	pride and dignity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • speech act: contrasting arrested MP's behaviour with that of Riot Control Forces • rhetoric: apophasis • othering, attempt to blame others whose interests are being protected

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Al-Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

- 1 **S:** ... Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
2 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. *Assalāmu alaykum*. Mr Speaker, on page
3 7 in Hansard, I spoke on the topic of the criminal attack against
4 an MP. I hope *Bu Nayif* (Mr Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel,
5 the Minister of Shura and Representatives Council) allows me. On
6 Thursday, the Interior Ministry declared: “The MP is lying” and they
7 say that the MP uttered abusive words. Do you, *Bu Nayif*, allow an
8 MP to be said to be using abusive words and lying? You do not allow
9 this with the Ministry of the Interior or any of the ministries. Is it
10 allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of
11 uttering abusive words? ...

The first discursive device used here to build this strategy is emotive speech.

After introducing the topic, i.e. the assault against an MP, which was carried out by the Riot Control Forces, MP Al-Marzooq briefly implores the Minister of the Interior, who was present at this sitting employing *Bu Nayif* in line 4 and again in line 7; this is known in Arabic as *kinyah*, defining oneself as the father of so and so, and with an intonation characteristic of caretaker speech (explained in the analysis of MP Sultan’s second intervention in Excerpt 1).

The use of *kinyah* suggests that MP Al-Marzooq presents himself as of a high and prestigious rank parallel to that of the Minister, something which in turn gives space for the criticism and complaint which follows.

In his speech, however, MP Al-Marzooq does not deny that the arrested MP used abusive words, but he denounces the fact that such an accusation

could be addressed to an MP. Although this excerpt and the previous one are both on the same issue and both employ the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, the major difference between the two excerpts, 8 and 9, is in the way the MP Hassan is framed. Here, the frame emphasised is that of an MP, something which provokes a feeling of pride and hence requires the strategy of centralising pride and dignity to defend it.

MP Al-Marzooq uses the *kinyah* once again within a rhetoric device: a rhetorical question: ‘Do you, *Bu Nayif*, allow an MP to be said to be using abusive words and lying?’ (lines 7–8). This use of erotesis implies a strong affirmation of the contrary, that the Minister of the Shura Council and the Representatives Council does *not* allow such an accusation to be addressed to an MP. The question used here functions as a negative assertion. Although the original argument is weak, since MP Al-Marzooq cannot deny the accusation that the arrested MP used abusive words, something that is a critical ethical issue, MP Al-Marzooq is strengthening his position by accentuating pride and dignity. He continues this strategy when he puts the Council and MPs on a par with ministries and ministers respectively by saying: ‘You do not allow this with the Ministry of the Interior or any of the ministries’ (lines 8–9). Now the MPs are on a par with the ministers and, accordingly, they need their immunity as authoritative people. The debate continues:

9 **KM:** ... Is it
10 allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of
11 uttering abusive words? Only to protect certain individuals...
12 **S:** Enough ...
13 **KM:** I, Mr Speaker, I see the cars of Riot Control Forces go out and skid
14 [their cars] like adolescents. We do not want to talk more here.
15 There are excesses. These excesses must be addressed.

MP Al-Marzooq follows this with a second rhetorical question functioning as a negative assertion in lines 9–11: ‘Is it allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of uttering abusive words?’. He begins to use othering; he tries to explain that there are others whose interests and reputations are being protected by the attack on the arrested MP. MP Al-Marzooq starts this in lines 11–12 by saying: ‘Only to protect certain individuals...’ but he is immediately interrupted by the Speaker in line 12: ‘Enough’.

Since whole argument fails, and apparently does not even attempt, to deny the fact that the arrested MP used abusive words, something that in the world of politics in particular is disreputable and shakes trust, MP Al-Marzooq therefore, in order to stress the arrested MP's dignity and pride as an issue, tries to create a behavioural gap between the arrested MP and the Riot Control Forces who arrested him. He says: 'I see Riot Control Forces go out and skid [their cars] like adolescents' (lines 13–14). MP Al-Marzooq is trying here to illustrate that Riot Control Forces are not mature enough to be given authority or to be trusted to deal with the people. MP Al-Marzooq

ends his intervention with an apophasis, a rhetorical device in which one mentions something by claiming that he or she does not want to talk about it: 'We do not want to talk more here. There are excesses. These excesses must be addressed' (lines 14–15). By doing so, he is suggesting that there is more that he can say.

4.3.10 Excerpt 10 on Censoring a Speech

From sitting 2:4:24, 30 March 2010

In this excerpt, MP Mohammed Khalid from Al Minbar argues with the Speaker about his speech being censored, and objects to limiting his political freedom. MP Khalid has talked about corruption and abuse of authority in the government and local 'big' institutions. The argument he uses in his speech being censored using the strategy of intensifying grievance. He presents censorship as an unjust act, unfair to him, and implores the Speaker to insert his speech uncensored in Hansard. Table 33 summarises his strategy and the devices used and then follows the analysis of the excerpt.

Table 33: Strategy of MP Khalid in Excerpt 10

MP	Strategy	Devices
<i>Mohammed Khalid (Al Asalah)</i>	intensifying grievance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • rhetoric: repetition • rhetorical questions • rhetoric: mitigation • shifting to local dialect in order to implore • turn-taking: short exchanges • irony • speech act: from imploring to protesting • speech at: threatening or warning

SDS is Second Deputy Speaker.

MK is MP Mohammed Khalid from Al Minbar.

- 1 **SDS:** Thank you. *Jazāk Allah khair*. I do not know how long it took you
- 2 to prepare this speech, but no doubt some of the utterances
- 3 will be removed from your intervention, honestly.
- 4 **MK:** Mr Speaker, no, no, excuse me, excuse me, why will you remove
- 5 them? They will not be broadcast on the radio and His Excellency
- 6 the minister was laughing all the time. Why remove them?
- 7 **SDS:** We will remove them, and you can demand them in the next sitting.

Although the topic of corruption is a recurring topic in the parliamentary sittings and is always addressed viciously, the Speaker is upset about some of the expressions and descriptions used by MP Khalid. The Speaker starts with an ironic, rather sarcastic, statement (line 1–2): ‘I don’t know how long it took you to prepare this speech.’ By doing so, showing that he finds this speech unnecessarily elaborate, and he immediately follows his comment

with: 'but no doubt some of the utterances will be removed from your intervention, honestly' (lines 2–3), which denotes that there are rude or unacceptable utterances. The use of the discourse marker 'but' indicates a tone shift, a cancellation of the positive response the Second Deputy Speaker has put forward; after thanking MP Khalid as a routine procedure, the Speaker shifts to emphasise his disapproval. He stresses his point of censoring the speech by the intensifier 'honestly'. At this point, MP Khalid protests, demanding that his speech be reported in its entirety in Hansard. While the Speaker sees the expressions as improper, MP Khalid sees them as a right to express himself freely.

MP Khalid moves to a defensive position, confronting the decision to censor the speech. He uses repetition: 'Mr Speaker, no, no, excuse me, excuse me' (line 4). Repetition is one of the devices that are used in foregrounded disagreement, but here the disagreement comes in the form of imploring. MP Khalid defends himself by underestimating, or mitigating, the severity of the expressions to which the Speaker is objecting. MP Khalid says: 'why will you remove them? They will not be broadcast on the radio and His Excellency the minister was laughing all the time. Why remove them?' (lines 4–6). The first and the last sentences are rhetorical questions expressing MP Khalid's opposition. The two points he makes between these two questions, i.e. 'They will not be broadcast on the radio and His Excellency the minister was laughing all the time' (lines 5–6), are meant to reframe rejected expressions he has used as harmless and not offensive: the

first one was that the attending minister, the Minister of Finance, had been laughing, which is a sign of him taking MP Khalid's speech light-heartedly. The second point was that MP Khalid's speech will not be broadcast (i.e. there are no worries about publicity). MP Khalid wants his speech to be recorded fully in Hansard. He is thus using these two facts as a way of illustrating that censoring of his speech is unjustified. This, however, does not appear to convince the Speaker, who replies: 'We will remove them, and you can demand them in the next sitting' (line 7). MP Khalid still does not want to risk his demand being rejected in the next sitting and wants to make sure his full speech will be inserted in Hansard. The argument continues:

- 8 **MK:** Why will you remove them, Mr Speaker? Why? We have had
9 enough of removing.
- 10 **SDS:** *Bu Ammar* (MP Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Ebrahim).
- 11 **MK:** They are all right, leave them – *Allah yisalmuk* – Do not remove
12 anything.
- 13 **SDS:** We will remove–
- 14 **MK:** They are all right.

MP Khalid poses more rhetorical questions expressing disapproval in line 8: ‘Why will you remove them, Mr Speaker? Why?,’ and then complains about previous removals: ‘We have had enough of removing’ (lines 8–9). MP Khalid is now accumulating previous removals to strengthen his stand, to initiate a sense of guilt and uneasiness about censoring any further speeches. This, however, does not seem to work either. The Speaker insists on his position, and he addresses MP Khalid with his *kinyah*, ‘*Bu Ammar*’ (line 10). MP Khalid keeps pleading: ‘They are all right, leave them – *Allah yisalmuk* – Do not remove anything’ (lines 11–12). The expression *Allah yisalmuk* means ‘May God protect you’ and is normally used either as an interjection or a way to implore the addressee to agree or accept a request or a demand. In this context, it is the latter use. The short exchanges between the Speaker and MP Khalid (lines 8–14) signify a development of a foregrounded disagreement between the two.

The Speaker then continues:

- 15 **SDS:** No, we will delete— I do not think— when you say that Bahrain is the
 16 land of the raven and the ravens. You should choose your words
 17 properly. When you say that the thieves and the thief—why do you
 18 say these words? You say that Bahrain was ‘given away like a freebie’
 19 (*biblāsh*). You say that Bahrain was sold cheaply.
 20 **MK:** No problem. Delete what you want to delete and I will post it on
 21 the Internet and announce it. I will pass it to the brothers in Al Wefaq.
 22 No problem.

The Speaker insists on his stance. In lines 15–19, he condemns the words MP Khalid has used. The Speaker quotes some of the censored expressions: ‘you say that Bahrain is the land of the raven and the ravens. ... the thieves and the thief... that Bahrain was ‘given away like a freebie’ (*biblāsh*). You say that Bahrain was sold cheaply’ (lines 15–19). He instructs MP Khalid to ‘choose [his] words properly’ (line 16–17). The Speaker apparently makes MP Khalid angry, as he shifts from the imploring to the defiant tone: ‘No problem. Delete what you want to delete and I will post it on the Internet and announce it. I will pass it to the brothers in Al Wefaq. No problem’ (lines 20–22). The use of the conventional reply ‘no problem’ is ironic. MP Khalid does have a problem with this decision, but he is now angry and disappointed, and with this move, he is trying to show that he is unaffected or untouched by the Speaker’s stance. This defiant tone is more confrontational, as if he is saying: ‘I don’t care what you do or think and I will get my point across.’ He mentions two ways in which he intends to publicise his speech in full: by publishing it online on his homepage and by passing it to Al Wefaq. It is interesting that MP Khalid threatens with using Al Wefaq, the Shiite party, while he is a member of Al Minbar, a Sunni party that is strongly disliked by Al Wefaq for their being closer to the Muslim Brotherhood trend (for more on Islamic political movements, see Section 2.2.3); this is beside MP Khalid’s being in a particularly tense relationship with Al-Wefaq. This interesting reaction may indicate MP Khalid’s expectations or understanding of his party’s opinion about his speech.

Despite being a member of Al Minbar, he does not say that his party would publish his speech as he seems to expect his approach is not acceptable to his party while he expects that content and style would be more appealing to Al Wefaq's MPs, who present themselves as being in opposition to the government.

4.3.11 Excerpt 11 on Activating a Punishment Decision

From sitting 2:4:28, 27 April 2010

In this excerpt, the Council is supposed to vote on a proposal made by MP Naser Al-Fudhalah from Al Minbar. The proposal is to activate a decision of the Civil Service Bureau to punish government sector employees in the Bureau who are convicted of participating in unauthorised rallies and sit-ins or in riots and vandalism. MP Hassan Al-Dosseri, an independent MP, indicates an objection in his intervention:

HD is MP Hassan Al-Dosseri, independent MP.

DS is Deputy Speaker.

33 **HD:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have a technical comment. The
34 proposal was for activating the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau,
35 but the committee's report is on a proposal for punishing
36 employees. The proposal did not come to punish. "Activation of
37 the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau". I think that the
38 committee has erred in this matter, and the members have voted
39 on something other than the proposal that was made by MP

- 40 Abdullah Khalaf Al-Dosseri.
 41 Thank you, Mr Speaker.
 42 **DS:** Thank you. ...

MP Hassan Al-Dosseri objects to the fact that the committee studying the proposal has returned with a refusal, which has not been regarding activating the decision but regarding the decision itself. Employing the strategy of corroborating by information (Table 34), the Chairman of the Committee, MP Khalil Al-Marzooq intervenes.

Table 34: Strategy of MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 11

MP	Strategy	Devices
Khalil Al-Marzooq (Al Wefaq)	corroborating by information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • filibustering • lexical style: shielding oneself with wordiness • illusion: referring to wrong page numbers • wordiness: quoting (wrong sources)

KM is MP Khalil Marzooq from Al Wefaq.

DS is Deputy Speaker.

MHM is MP Makki Hilal Makki, the Rapporteur from Al Wefaq.

- 54 **KM (Chairman of Committee):** Thank you, Mr Speaker. What came to us
 55 is like this, that the committees have reached, and even the reports*:
 56 on page 696 in regard to the proposal for punishing government
 57 sector employees under the Civil Service Bureau. Do you want to
 58 return it to the committee so that we present it in the next term?
 59 We request correcting the procedures ...
 60 **DS:** Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, the proposal— brothers,

61 let us talk a minute – is available with the attachments actually,
62 on pages 709 and 710 ...
63 **MHM (Rapporteur):** 696, this proposal ...
64 **DS:** This is the signature of MP Abdullah Al-Dosseri on pages 709 and
65 710. The proposal for the activation of the decisions of the Civil
66 Service Bureau. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.

Although MP Al-Dosseri has clearly pointed out the mistake made, the committee attempts to employ a number of devices for shielding oneself with wordiness to pass the committee's decision. MP Al-Marzooq first tries to justify their reading and response by referring to the proposal and mentioning page numbers: 'What came to us is like this, the committees have reached, and even the reports*: on page 696 in regard to the proposal for punishing government sector employees under the Civil Service Bureau' (lines 54–57). Besides the quoting of page numbers, the statement is interrupted by an unclear and badly structured phrase – the part that is underlined and followed by an asterisk – as another attempt to add lexical richness to his speech by adding terms that can make the listener think they are hearing something professional. MP Al-Marzooq stops and asks if the Council would return the proposal to the committee (lines 57–59). It sounds as if he has realised the mistake. The Speaker corrects him in lines 60–62: 'the proposal ... is available with the attachments actually, on pages 709 and 710.'

The Rapporteur of the committee, MP Makki Hilal Makki, interrupts and refers to the page MP Al-Marzooq mentioned (line 63), on which the

decision of the Civil Service Bureau is mentioned, rather than the proposal to activate it, trying to show that they based their decision on the document provided, but the Speaker interrupts MP Makki too, and corrects him: 'This is the signature of MP Abdullah Al-Dosseri on pages 709 and 710. The proposal for the activation of the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau' (lines 64–66). Here, the pointing to the signature puts an end to the discussion, and there can be no further argument about the purpose of the proposal. Thus, the weaker version of the strategy of corroborating by information, which relies on filibustering and shielding oneself with wordiness, fails to justify the decision of the committee, and, on the contrary, demonstrates a mistreatment of information.

4.4 Discursive Devices and Strategies: a Synthesis

Having analysed each excerpt separately, I now describe the general use of the strategies and devices and present a synthesis of their employment in the excerpts. The deductions below were made possible by linking, comparing and contrasting the findings of the analysis of all the excerpts. The purpose of this step is constructing an understanding of how sectarian political parties employ the identified discursive devices and strategies in parliamentary debates over the topic related to dissent control and to political freedom. This understanding will meet the first objective of this research (restated in the Introduction to this chapter). The findings

presented in this section also form the foundation of the following chapter, Chapter Five, which will meet the second objective of the research.

4.4.1 Employment of discursive strategies

It is clear that whenever there are facts and information to present, MPs attempt to employ the strategy of corroborating by information, or at least to begin with this strategy before shifting to another. While there are several instances of using this strategy in most of the excerpts, Excerpt 1 in particular provides a number of examples of speakers beginning with this strategy and then, after exhausting the available information, moving to other strategies. In Excerpt 1 the interventions of MP Al-Marzooq (Tables 13, 16 and 21), MP Ebrahim (Table 14), MP Al-Miz'al (Table 17), MP Al-Sitri (Table 18), and MP Sultan (Table 15) represent corroborating by information. The other strategies surface later on, either as a shorter intervention (see Table 15 of MP Sultan), or as in the later interventions when no more information or details can be presented (see Tables 19 and 20 of MP Abul and MP Al-Miz'al respectively). The strategy of corroborating by information appears to be the most 'confident' strategy; hence, it is most expected from MPs, whose electorates presume them to be knowledgeable and aware of the local and international laws and events and of the people's needs and prospects. The strategy of corroborating by information comes in the form of 'evidence' to prove the viability of the MPs' objections and

demands. This is frequently the case in the interventions of Al Wefaq, as they tend to object more than do the other parties to the dissent control in Bahrain.

There are several instances in the analysed excerpts in which, once the law is clear-cut and there is no chance of discussing the legality of something with which the MPs disagree, the MPs move to the strategy of intensifying grievance as their second option. Some examples are found in Excerpt 1; see Table 14 of MP Ebrahim; Table 20 of MP Al-Miz'al's third intervention in the same excerpt after two interventions employing the strategy of corroborating by information; and Table 15 of MP Sultan's intervention. There is, however, one example in which another strategy comes first then a shift is made to that of corroborating by information as stated above. This is found in Excerpt 1 in an intervention by MP Abul (see Table 19) in his reservations on using teargas against local riots. The strategy of centralising pride and dignity is used first then a shift is made to the strategy of corroborating by information. This reverse use does not seem to be random; on the contrary, MP Abul seems to make the issue of the image of Bahrain a priority, and hence starts with the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. The use of the strategy is therefore rather different in MP Abul's intervention, which is talking about the pride of the country, presumably a common interest of all MPs and Bahrainis. This can explain why the combination of the strategy of centralising pride and dignity and

the strategy of corroborating by information came in the opposite order from all the other combinations of these two strategies.

In addition to its combination with the strategy of corroborating by information, there are also instances of the strategy of intensifying grievance being used independently by some MPs, such as in Excerpt 1: in MP Sultan's first and third interventions (Tables 15 and 23), and in Excerpt 10 in MP Khalid's intervention (Table 33). This indicates that the strategy of intensifying grievance is strong, and has viability in the Bahraini parliamentary setting and in Bahraini political discourse.

When it comes to centralising pride and dignity, it is interesting that in these excerpts this strategy is specifically used in the contexts of arrest and detention. It can be found in Excerpt 2 on Bahraini Detainees Abroad (Table 24 of MP Al-Mitghawi's intervention). Other examples are the intervention of MP Al-Mitghawi in Excerpt 6 (Table 29) the interventions of MP Al-Marzooq in Excerpt 8 (Table 31) and in Excerpt 9 (Table 32). The latter two are on the arrest of MP Hassan. However, although Excerpt 5 is also on the arrest of political activists, the strategy employed is that of corroborating by information. This seems to be the case because, unlike the case in Excerpts 8 and 9, in this excerpt MP Al-Marzooq has an argument against the legality and the appropriateness of the arrest while there are no legal 'flaws' to address in the arrest of MP Hassan to condemn in Excerpts 8 and 9. Another use of the strategy of centralising pride and dignity is found in Excerpt 3 on Insulting the Government (Table 25 on MP Ebrahim's intervention and Table

26 on MP Murad's intervention.) Here, this strategy becomes the only appropriate one that can circumvent a need to defend oneself against the government accusation of the MPs insulting the government, something that also eliminates the need to apologise to the government. The only other use of the strategy of centralising pride and dignity is that of MP Abul in Excerpt 1 (Table 19), which is combined with the strategy of corroborating by information. He gives priority to the international image of Bahrain, and hence the pride and dignity of Bahrain is what is being centralised in this intervention, not that of individuals as in the other interventions in Excerpts 8 and 9 on the arrest of MP Hassan. The strategy of centralising pride and dignity in Excerpt 6, which is based on the relative appropriateness of the proposal if compared to major corruption issues in the country, is suspecting the value of the proposal, and hence indirectly suggesting that the MPs not who are taking the proposal seriously have a better political perspective of the issues needed to be addressed in the country.

4.4.2 Employment of discursive devices

When it comes to the employment of discursive devices, the first observation is that there are no strict uses of particular devices per strategy; nevertheless, some devices are used more frequently for certain strategies than are others.

First of all, conditional statements are used more frequently in the strategy of corroborating by information: in Excerpt 1, there is seven by MP Al-Marzooq (Tables 16 and 21) and three by MP Al-Sitri (Table 18). There were also examples, but less frequent, of conditional statements used in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity: both in Excerpt 2, one by Al Mitghawi (Table 24) and another by MP Ebrahim (Table 25). This is because confirming the correctness or legitimacy of a discussed point or a stance can be achieved more easily if compared to a condition opposed to or different from the one being discussed.

The device of rhetorical questions, a second discursive device, is used in seven of the excerpts: Excerpts 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9 and 10. This device is used most intensively in the strategy of intensifying grievance and that of centralising pride and dignity. Rhetorical questions have a property similar to that of conditional statements, as both make assumptions and try to convince the listeners of the interlocutor's correctness and legitimacy. This is because rhetorical questions do not require an answer but actually propose and direct the listener to a certain answer the interlocutor is provoking. As for emotive speech, a third intensively used device, it was found that it is used most in the strategy of intensifying grievance, but it is also notable in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. This is demonstrated in many excerpts. Examples of emotive speech being employed in the strategy of intensifying grievance are found in Excerpt 1 (MP Ebrahim in Table 14, MP Sultan in Tables 15 and 23, and MP Abul in Table 19); in Excerpt 4 (MP Al-

Miz'al in Table 27); and also in Excerpt 10 (MP Khalid in Table 33). There are emotive speeches in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity in Excerpt 3 (MP Murad in Table 26) and Excerpt 8 (MP Al-Marzooq in Table 31). As for emotive speech in the strategy of corroborating by information, there is only one example, which is in Excerpt 1 (MP Al-Marzooq in Table 21). Of course, it is possible to employ the device of emotive speech in the strategy of corroborating by information, especially when the intervention becomes confrontational (see MP Al-Miz'al's later interventions in Excerpt 4). While being more emotive in their nature, the two strategies of centralising pride and dignity and that of intensifying grievance remain independent of each other; on the one hand, with the strategy of centralising pride and dignity there is an assertion of righteous and fulfilled dignity that requires certain standards and procedures. On the other hand, the strategy of intensifying grievance involves a call for a claimed but unfulfilled dignity or need.

The discursive device of framing and reframing is a strong and recurrent device in all strategies; it serves in constructing a stance or a perspective, and herein lies its strength. Bayley and Vicente (2004: 238) explain that the semantic nuances of a word 'may reflect political orientations ... towards a phenomenon that has become socially problematic.' Framing and reframing provide a definition of concepts and perspectives, but a definition that the speaker wants to adopt. Abstract concepts and controversial labels in particular are open to framing and reframing most of the time, if not all the

time. Labels and terms such as ‘terrorist’, ‘innocent’, ‘victim’, ‘rioters’, ‘citizens’ are recurrent in Excerpt 1; ‘insult’ and ‘criticism’ in Excerpt 3; ‘terrorist’ again in Excerpt 4; ‘thieves’ in Excerpt 6; ‘eavesdropping’ in Excerpt 7; and ‘citizen’ again in Excerpt 8. This openness to framing and reframing provides a leeway for proposing, and perhaps indirectly imposing, a specific ideological stance and a political and sectarian perspective on a matter, making framing and reframing a strong device in the ideological struggle over power if employed successfully. As for the difference between framing and reframing, framing is the less ‘daunting’ and challenging of the two. It is expected that each listener, as an individual and as a member of a group, has a mental ‘frame’ of a concept. However, when being the first person to propose the concept or label in a discourse, the interlocutor does not have to challenge a frame that has already been proposed. Reframing, on the other hand, involves a frame that has already been proposed by others, whether individuals, parties, organisations, or the government. The person reframing will then have to compete with the existing frame. Reframing aims to change or shift the listeners’ stance from the previously proposed frame to that of the interlocutor. In either case of framing and reframing, failing to frame or reframe one’s stance reduces the chances of finding common ground for discussion.

Another interesting observation is that ridiculing devices, such as mockery and puns, are used more often in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity than in the other two strategies (see for example Excerpts 3 and

6). Perhaps this is because expressing pride can be stressed by expressing the inferiority of the 'other' person or idea. This is not to suggest that this is the only or the most proper way pride and dignity can be expressed, but it seems to be a way that is easy to use for stressing one's pride – by degrading the others.

It is noted that the device of shielding oneself with wordiness, which in the excerpts only occurs under the strategy of corroborating by information, is hardly used and seems to be a last resort. Shielding oneself with wordiness, a lexical style, is thus used when no good argument is available or when an MP needs to give an impression of being knowledgeable, if not an expert, in a certain matter, especially a legal one, to avoid counter-arguments. However, shielding oneself with wordiness is risky and may position the MP using it in the circle of ignorance, ineloquence or, what would be worse, of cheating and deception; perhaps this is why it tends to be used less frequently than other devices and, if used, why it tends to continue only for a short period of time. The reason for the brevity of this strategy could be either that it is easy to detect, and hence 'quick hits' may be safer and easier to get away with; or that it is not easy to continue to construct difficult-to-detect 'void' phrases for a long period.

The observations above indicate that the employment of the discursive devices is not completely random. Instead, most of the choices follow a pattern, of which an MP may or may not be conscious. However, the findings and observations can be either of individual or group strategies. If

the choices have any group traits, then they reflect the ideology of that specific group or party. To be able to decide if there are group features, it is useful to verify if there are findings specific to political groups.

4.4.3 Strategies and devices among political parties

Having presented my observations about the general ‘patterns’ and usage of the three discursive strategies and the discursive devices employed to implement them, I now examine how the strategies and devices are used by the political parties in the excerpts analysed above.

In the examined legislative period, three parties managed to dominate the Council, the three of which are religious with a sectarian affiliation: Al Wefaq, Al Minbar and Al Asalah. The first is Shiite and the last two are Sunni. Unfortunately, there are only a few interventions from Al Minbar and Al Asalah, and one from an independent MP. The intensity of participation and involvement in the discussion of the topic of dissent control, however, appears to relate to the differences in the ideological and political goals and prospects of the parties, something that is elaborated in Chapter 5.

The strategies I propose in this research are deduced from the analysis of the excerpts, which are on the topic of dissent control and political freedom. The major comments and objections to dissent-controlling laws and measures come from Al Wefaq. Al Wefaq employs all three strategies in the examined excerpts. The tone of the strategy of corroborating by information

can range between being confrontational to being 'soft'. The discussion of dissent control and, in particular, the 'softer' tone tends to be used more often by Al Asalah and Al Minbar than by Al Wefaq. I must stress, nevertheless, this is an observation made on the excerpts from specific settings and a specific topic and it is not necessarily, or likely, the case with all topics and in all settings. I assume that the same strategies can be found in excerpts on other topics. I do not propose that these three strategies are inclusive or comprehensive, hence there might be other strategies in other excerpts. However, the frequency, length and usage of the devices may differ among different topics, settings and users.

There are three discursive devices that Al Wefaq MPs use frequently: conditional statements, mockery and reframing. Interestingly, the conditional statements found in the research data are used only by Al Wefaq, and mockery, a device which appeared only in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity, is also used only by Al Wefaq. Framing and reframing are crucial devices in political language. The data analysis shows that framing is used to indicate stance and to orient listeners with the interlocutor's stance, and reframing to enforce a new or different stance or perception. Al Wefaq uses more reframing than framing in order to diverge from the stance and perspective of the 'others', i.e. the government and the Sunni parties. The Sunni parties, on the other hand, tend more toward framing than reframing. This can indicate that Al Wefaq's ideological stance on the topic of dissent

contrasts more with what the Bahraini law and the norms in Bahrain propose.

On the other hand, the ideological stances of Al Asalah and Al Minbar are more in accordance with the laws and norms in Bahrain, in relation to dissent control in particular. In Excerpt 4, for example, the statement group MPs are implying in their statement that they approve of punishing the detainees. On the whole, agreeing with what is already implemented under the law does not require becoming confrontational. However, on the few occasions when any of the Sunni MPs, particularly MP Mohammed Khalid in Excerpt 10 and MP Hamid Murad in Excerpt 3, expressed strong and confrontational disagreement, it was on the specific topic of the freedom of expression when they sensed that their criticism of corruption in the government is being censured. When the Sunni parties choose a confrontational tone, they seem to usually avoid mockery, sarcasm and offence (see MP Murad in Excerpt 3 and MP Al-Fudalah in Excerpt 7). MP Khalid in particular brings in his own confrontational style. His individual style has always been unacceptable to his party and his unwillingness to maintain the style and the delimitations of the party eventually resulted in a breakup at the end of the Second Legislative Period. MP Khalid's confrontational style was the crux of the disagreement and the local newspaper reported the conflict between MP Khalid and his party in November and December 2010.

This confirms that there are strategic differences among the political parties, something which consequently confirms that ideological differences are reflected in discourse. This conclusion, in turn, allows us to use the findings to move to the second objective of the research, reported in Chapter 5. Based on the analysis I present in this research, although there are personal 'styles' and hence a tendency toward differences when it comes to choosing among strategies and devices, the ideological affiliation of the interlocutor enforces a group style. This group style, in turn, generates tendencies toward and preferences for certain strategies over others, and of particular devices over others; these mutual preferences reflect each group's identity and ideology. To better understand how the findings in this chapter relate to identity and ideology, Chapter 5 critically examines them in the light of the specific political backgrounds and sectarian orientations of Bahraini society.

4.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, I have identified a number of discursive devices that appear to serve three of the discursive strategies used by MPs in the analysed excerpts on dissent control and political freedom from debates held in the second legislative period of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. I have called these three discursive strategies corroborating by information, intensifying grievance, and centralising pride and dignity.

The eleven excerpts in which the topics of dissent control and political freedom are discussed have been critically analysed. The analysis reflects which discursive strategies and devices each MP employs in his interventions in that excerpt.

In a separate section, I have indicated how the strategies have been used and how they were associated with topics and devices; I have also demonstrated how most dominant discursive devices were implemented to achieve these strategies in the excerpts. I then showed that there were usage differences among political parties, which confirms that political affiliation of the interlocutors affected their choice of discursive choices. This in turn has confirmed that ideological struggle over power among political parties is reflected in discourse.

CHAPTER FIVE: EXPLORING THE IDEOLOGIES

5.1 *Introduction*

In this research, I have hypothesised that the Shiite party MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from the Sunni MPs. The previous chapter was essential in constructing a linguistic basis for the topic of the research, especially as there are no extensive academic studies on the political language of the Bahraini Council of Representatives upon which I could have built (as discussed in Section 1.5, in the Significance of my Research). Building upon the findings reported in the previous chapter, this chapter aims to fulfil the second objective of this research: exploring whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. Adopting SCA's proposition about cognitive mediating between society and discourse, I consider the discourses I analyse in this research as a space to manifest or practice, i.e. express and reproduce, the cognitively stored but group-shared ideologies. This chapter combines the background information collected in Chapter 2 and the findings of the linguistic analyses made in Chapter 4, bringing in theories, contexts and linguistic analysis of the excerpts to maintain intertextuality and a degree of interdisciplinarity in order to present a macro level analysis, which is concerned with 'overall intergroup relations and institutional control' (van Dijk 1993: 110). While the critical analysis in the previous chapter revolved around the textual data, the critical

analysis in this chapter will focus on the theological axis. This level of analysis fulfils the second objective of the research.

Van Dijk maintains that ‘[a]lthough general properties of language and discourse are not, as such, ideologically marked, systematic discourse analysis offers powerful methods to study the structures and functions of “underlying” ideologies’ (2006: 115). Nevertheless, van Dijk mentions that ‘discourse is not always ideologically transparent, and discourse analysis does not always allow us to infer what people’s ideological beliefs are’, as speaker may choose not to express these beliefs depending on the context (ibid.: 124).

I here attempt to demonstrate if, and how, a political party’s ideology can be reflected in the linguistic choices the members make, how group identities are related to the ideologies, and how ideology is used as a form of struggle over power. I have illustrated in Chapter 4 that there are group-based preferences of strategies and devices (see Section 4.4). The analysis is also based on the postulate that text and talk have properties that ‘allow social members to actually *express* or *formulate* abstract ideological beliefs’ (van Dijk 1998: 192, emphasis in original). Thus, communication ‘function[s] simultaneously as both as an expression and creation of organizational structure’ (Mumby & Clair 2004: 181). As a criterion of CDA, the same text and discourse are always open to new contexts and information, causing the results to change and, consequently, confirming that ‘the validity of CDA results is not absolute and immutable’ (Titscher,

Meyer, Wodak and Vetter 2007: 164). This, however, does not undermine the value and validity of any discourse analysis, including the one made in this research. Instead, this view is a positive one, allowing analyses and readings to congregate in order to construct a better and more profound understanding of a discourse. My reading is thus based on the available data and details and perhaps different data or details open the text to a different, though not necessarily contradictory, reading.

5.2 *Manifesting Power*

While two of the three identified discursive strategies, namely, corroborating by information and centralising pride and dignity, can be used to *display* and *emphasise* power, the third strategy, i.e. intensifying grievance, can be said to *claim* power (see Section 4.4.2). Thus, the strategies seem to complement each other. However, the ideological struggle over power, as evidenced from the excerpts, can be represented differently according to *whom* the struggle is with or against. On this basis, in the excerpts analysed in this research, the instances of MPs' struggle for power can be categorised into three types of 'battlefield': first is the battlefield against government bodies, institutions and individuals, to confirm MPs' status as high, if not the highest, and most independent government figures. The second is the battlefield in which MPs, often as parties, congregate against each other. The third is that of MPs attempting to force a law or a decision against a category of people or an

action, or to change an existing law that would normally affect a specific group of people or action. Each of these battlefields contributes by being a setting for the discursive strategies used for the struggle over power.

Examples of the first type of battlefield in the struggle for power, i.e. *against the government*, can be found in Excerpt 3 on Insulting the Government, when both MPs Ebrahim and Murad challenge a minister in a tone stressing being on a par with him. MP Ebrahim says: ‘I am afraid that if I talk the Brother Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will withdraw ...’ (lines 18–19) and MP Murad comments on the departure of the minister by saying: ‘The minister says that the MPs insult the government. The minister leaving the Council this way, is not this an insult to this Council?’ (lines 24–26); another example is found in Excerpt 7 when MP Al-Fudhalah tries to demonstrate power over a government institution by demanding to have the Council consulted over eavesdropping: ‘We want an explanation from this institution, to tell us if there is an ongoing recording of all phone calls. This matter needs to be considered and approved by this council’ (lines 13–15).

The second battlefield, in which *MPs congregate in two groups*, witnesses the most direct and most interactive struggle over power with the two opposing groups physically present. It is like a volley ball match: the two groups take ‘normal’ steady turns, with each group maintaining its ground, but it becomes more like a football match when it gets confrontational, with the MPs having shorter exchanges and more interruptions. Some examples of

the second type of battlefield occur in Excerpt 4 between MP Al-Miz'al and the statement group. It is true that there are no interventions from the statement group, but the statement itself, which is read out loud, defines their stance, which condemns the events of what the MPs signing the proposal defined as a 'terrorist plot'. The proposal requests the Council to issue a statement conforming to their stance. However, MP Al-Miz'al takes an opposing stance and objects to the Council issuing the proposed statement. Another example of this type of battlefield is in the same excerpt between MP Al-Miz'al on the one hand and both the Speaker of the Council and MP Khalid on the other. A further example is in Excerpt 6 between MP Al-Mitghawi and Al-Sa'eedi, the latter's stance represented in his proposal. Again, one stance is that of MP Al-Sa'eedi wanting to fight robbery, but MP Al-Mitghawi hits at corruption in the government. By doing so, he is simultaneously signalling not taking MP Al-Sa'eedi's opinion or relevant parliamentary views very seriously seeing it addressing a minor problem and overlooking a major one. A third example can be found in Excerpt 5 with MP Al-Marzooq taking the role of the tutor as he objects to how an arrest was made; and a fourth example is in Excerpt 10 when MP Khalid protests against the decision of the Speaker of the Council to censor his speech and when he, MP Khalid in lines 20–22, sounds as if he is 'threatening' to congregate with Al Wefaq, a party with which MP Khalid normally strongly disagrees. An interesting example of manifestation of power against a group is the intervention of MP Ali Salman in Excerpt 4. This is because in lines

43–51 he shifts from the inclusive ‘we’ to the exclusive ‘I’. He shifts from his party being against issuing a statement condemning ‘terrorist’ attacks to standing alone as an individual against the statement being issued. In the same excerpt, when MP Al-Miz’al uses ‘I’, it is simply an expression of an immediate individual reaction. However, MP Salman’s ‘I’ manifests a high degree of authority and power at the individual level. This demonstration of personal or individual power is uncommon among MPs; it reflects the level of authority the party leader of Al Wefaq has within his own party.

As for the third type of battlefield, that of MPs attempting to force or change a law *against a particular category of people or an action*, one example is that of the statement proposing condemnation of what the party considered a ‘terrorist’ act in Excerpt 4; others are the bill for activating punishment in the civil sector in Excerpt 12, and a third is the debate against allowing the use of tear gas in local riot control in Excerpt 1.

In efforts to win or maintain power, the three battlefields may allow diplomatic options when the struggle takes a calmer and less confrontational form. Examples of this diplomatic struggle are that of independent MP Abul and that of MP Al-Mu’awdah’s reproach in in Excerpt 1. These two examples fall into the first and second types of battlefield respectively but share a calm diplomatic tone. The third battlefield, i.e. that of MPs attempting to force or change a law against a specific category of people or action, can develop into either of the other two battlefields, i.e. against the government or congregate in two groups when there is a resistance of the idea being

proposed. Thus, the battlefields can concur and can also change from one type to another as the discourse develops.

5.3 *Marking Identities*

People represent themselves as being ‘members of several categories and groups’ (van Dijk 1998: 118). As noted in the analysis of the data for this research in Chapter 4, the two identities most explicitly and deliberately emphasised by MPs were their identity as Bahrainis, i.e. as citizens, and their identity as MPs, i.e. as representatives of the people. These two identities were emphasised most in the strategy of centralising pride and dignity. Al Wefaq MPs, however, have an additional identity that keeps coming to the surface under the theme of the dissent control, in particular when relevant laws are discussed, and that is the identity of Bahrani, the Arab Shiite Bahrainis. The terms ‘Bahrani’ and ‘Shiite’, or related words, were not uttered or hinted at. Zubaida (1997: 103) states that, according to many Western writers, there is more ‘immediate solidarity of primary communities based on tribe, religion or sect’ than there is solidarity based on nationalism or socialism.⁷¹ The sectarian solidarity of Shiites in Bahrain has become stronger since the Iranian Revolution, as mentioned earlier. In the analysed excerpts, the word ‘sect’ was mentioned only once in Excerpt 5 in line 48 by MP Al-Marzooq: ‘There is someone who blasphemes the sect, and every week he intervenes in these matters and no one questions him ...’ (line 47–48). However, by repeatedly employing the discursive devices of exclusion

and inclusion, othering, framing and reframing, and defining out-groups and in-groups (see examples in Chapter 4, excerpts 4, 5, 8 and 9), this unmentioned group has been represented as a distinct one with its own distinct ideology and political stance. The use of these devices is most prominent under the strategy of intensifying grievance, despite occasionally emerging in the other two strategies, those of centralising pride and of corroborating by information. In Excerpt 4, for example, the mentioning of the terrorist cell discovered in February (starting from line 54), is an example of expressing ideological affiliation by what van Dijk identifies as selecting a negative topic about *Them* (2006: 125). The same applies to all othering and ingrouping and outgrouping devices: they all either emphasise or de-emphasise positive or negative things about *Us* or *Them*, all of which help construct an understanding of ideology in discourse. Comparing and contrasting two groups or two events have also contributed to constructing an image of self, as in Excerpt 4 when MP Al-Miz'al mentions the 'other' terrorist cell comparing it to the one the statement group intends to condemn.

Obviously, the topic of dissent-controlling laws is more provocative to a certain group, the Bahranis, the leading figures of whom share the idea of *wilāyat al faqīh* (i.e. the sovereignty of the Imām). This concept is political rather than religious and accepting it consequently means rejecting a non-Shiite and non-religious government, and from this belief comes the need for combating the government and rising against it. Interestingly, in spite of

being prominent and fundamental in contemporary Shi'ism doctrine, the concept of *wilāyat al faqih* was first applied to government by Khomai. Zubaida (ibid.: 105) asserts that applying this doctrine to government 'is a major departure from Islamic historical political thought and practice, including Shi 'ism.' A large number of Bahrain's Shiites, both Bahraini and 'Ajams, firmly believe in it even if they themselves are not religious or practising Shiites. Thus, Al Wefaq's Bahraini identity becomes more 'present' during such debates, resulting in a repeated shift to this sectarian and ethnic identity, something which result from the ideological rejection of the government.

As we move from the excerpts discussing political freedom *beyond* riots and demonstrations (i.e. in Excerpt 7 on eavesdropping and 3 on detainees abroad) to excerpts from debates on dissent control within riots, protests and sit-ins, two accompanying shifts can be observed: first, Sunni MPs become less opposing and, hence, less involved in the debates; and secondly, the boundaries of Al Wefaq's group identity tighten to reflect a sector of Bahraini society rather than the whole society. When it comes to the first observation, the Sunni parties, Al Minbar and Al Asalah, do not show much desire to identify themselves and their sect distinctly in these discussions, although they clearly present rioters and protesters as an out-group (see Section 4.4.2). Thus, the identity they repeatedly frame is that of the others rather than themselves, something which results in an indirect self-definition being provided. For example, if one person accuses another of

being irrational, it implies that the accuser believes that he or she is rational. This is what van Dijk considered to be a form of expressing ideology by negative presentation of *Them* when a speaker emphasises *Their* bad things (van Dijk 2006: 125). In the same way, at least in the examined excerpt, Al Asalah and Al Minbar do not show objection to the laws and rules opposing riots and punishing disobedience or vandalism and, when doing so, they define themselves as disciplined and nonviolent. In Excerpt 4, for example, the statement group frame the plot as a 'terrorist' one, and the people who could be hurt in the attack as 'innocent', by which they emphasise *Their* bad things and *Our* good things.

The Al Wefaq MP's use of the exclusive 'we' that excludes MPs other than those from Al Wefaq becomes more frequent in discussions related to riots, protests and sit-ins. Al Wefaq becomes a separate body, with a sense of detachment from the Council as a whole. The line between individual identity and the group identity of Al Wefaq becomes blurred, and the more emotive the interventions, the more blurred the line (as in the interventions of MP Salman and MP Al-Miz'al in Excerpt 4 on condemning terrorism). On the whole, Al-Wefaq group identity tends to persist most of the time despite its members' using different personal 'styles', with occasional surfacing of individual identity.

5.4 *The Ideology of Protest*

As seen from the analyses made in this chapter and the previous one, it is difficult to compare and contrast in depth the strategies used by the Sunni and the Shiite MPs simply because the interventions made by the former in the chosen extracts are considerably fewer than those made by the latter. This automatically increases the focus of the analysis to the discursive strategies and devices employed by Al Wefaq, the Shiite party. Nevertheless, some comparison is essential, although I am obliged to base it on the limited existing data.

It is worth noting that the reason why there are fewer interventions by the Sunni MPs in the research data is not that the Sunni parties or MPs make fewer interventions in parliamentary debates on the whole, but that the theme I chose for the excerpts proved to be more controversial and more troubling to the Al Wefaq party than to the others. This is due to the political attitude of a number of Shiite political movements in Bahrain, one of which is Al Wefaq, towards the government. The divergence in attitude between Sunnis and Shiites can be better comprehended if we consider the relationship between the government and the Shiites, particularly since the 1980s. On the other hand, Sunni MPs, including independent ones who do not have Islamic or religious tendencies, have been less disturbed by strict law and order measures against riots and vandalism, and they are thus less likely to protest against related laws or verdicts.

SCA confirms that ideologies are cognitively stored while being socially shared. Discourse is, thus, a place to express, display and reproduce ideology. The analysis made in the previous chapter has shown that the strategy of intensifying grievance has been dominant and most intensely used by the Al Wefaq Party in the excerpts on laws controlling dissent. This strategy can reflect a type of what van Dijk called 'ideologies of opposition or resistance' (1998: 11). Taking into account the historical and cultural roots of Shi'ism, the ideology can be better called the ideology of protest and it seems central to the Shiite construction. This ideology can be traced back to a series of historical disappointments to the history of Shi'im, starting when Ali bin Abi Talib, the cousin of the Prophet Mohammed and Shiite's first Imam, was not appointed as successor to the Prophet Mohammed, and running through the injustice felt at the killing and decapitation of Al Hussain, the son of Imam Ali, in the Battle of Karbala. It is important to stress here that members of an ideological group 'are able to speak or act on the basis of the acquired ideology, but are not always able to formulate its beliefs explicitly' despite that every ideological group has its experts who can explain and reproduce its ideology (van Dijk 2006: 119). This applies to the ideology of protest in Shi'ism too. The notion of injustice and the urge to avenge is historically rooted and called upon repeatedly in Shi'ism and manifested in different fields and areas of creed and daily life alike. From the point of view of the Shiite leaders and key figures both inside and outside Bahrain, the current Sunni Royal Family, Al Khalifa, should not be in

power for political and theological reasons. At the political level, the Bahrainis claim to be ‘the original residents’ of the western coast of Arabia, and say that Al Khalifas arrived later; according to the Shiite version of the story, Al Khalifas ‘took over’ the country, and hence should not be the rulers.⁷² At the theological level, Shiite doctrine underwent a major shift with the Iranian Revolution, maintaining that Shiite communities cannot be ruled by someone who is not Shiite (see Section 2.3.3). In the Shiite political state structure, as seen in both Iran and Iraq, there are two parallel leaderships, with power shifting between them: the religious leadership and the political one; both have to be Shiite. The president is publically elected for a four-year term while the supreme religious leader is appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts, which is an assembly of high-ranking Shiite clerics. For example, the current political leader in Iran is President Ahmadi Najad, while the religious leader is Ali Khamenei. The relationship between these leaderships is direct and strict in the Shiite doctrine. The parallel political-religious duality in Bahrain is represented by Shaikh Ali Salman, the leader of Al Wefaq Party, and Shaikh Issa Qassim respectively. However, since this leadership is not part of the formal structure of government in Bahrain, the political structure is considered invalid according to Shiite doctrine. Thus, both the historic and theological beliefs make and maintain the tense relationship between the religious and political Shiite leaders on the one hand and the current Bahraini government on the other. It also makes it difficult, if not impossible, to reach a state of political and

economic reform that can be considered acceptable and satisfactory to the Shiite dogma as long as the Al Khalifas, or even any non-Shiites, are ruling the country.

The theological foundation affects the perception of the acts, the people involved and, consequently, the perception of relevant laws. The feeling of injustice feeds into and fortifies the ideology of protest in Shi'ism, making strikes, riots and sit-ins essential in the praxis of Shi'ism. Of course, this belief is not put forward in public discussions or arguments, as it cannot be defended, justified or accepted by international and national standards and laws. Nevertheless, even when it is not the direct source of objection or disagreement, this ideology can create a constant feeling of suffering from oppression and injustice, a feeling that always persists at least at unconscious levels. This in turn makes the strategy of intensifying grievance a central strategy in Shiite arguments and debates, a strategy that has become prominent in parliamentary settings too, as the excerpts analysed in this research have revealed.

Both inside and outside the parliament, while the essence stays the same, the style of protest among Shiite politicians in Bahrain has changed. It used to tend more towards being linked with weakness and complaining of humiliation before the democratic shift that took place in Bahrain in 2000, but after that a number of these politicians have become MPs and have gained officially acknowledged power in the government. Since then, their strategy of intensifying grievance has become more confrontational and

loaded with anger, something which can again be related to the theological construction of Shi'ism.⁷³ The change in the democratic nature of Bahrain in 2000 (for more details, see Section 2.3.4) provided a change to more openness in expressing oneself, something that was previously unfamiliar to both Sunnis and Shiites in Bahrain. However, reform would not solve the fundamental protest of Shiite political figures against the government: *who* they are, rather than *how* they run the country. Thus, the vast majority of protests, riots and sit-ins in Bahrain over the last twenty years have been carried out by Shiites, while being supported by an extremely small number of liberals; most of the liberals and other non-Islamic movements and activists welcomed the democratic shift despite most having their reservations about one thing or another in relation to the government. This explains why Shiite MPs, who happen to have been represented only in Al Wefaq in the Second Legislative Period,⁷⁴ took the topics relating to control of dissent and political freedom very critically, as if the rules referred only to their sect and movement. There are a considerable number of laws and punishments that conform to international conventions in relation to local riot control and standards which are often rejected by Al Wefaq, such as Al Wefaq's strong objection to the use of tear gas, discussed in Excerpt 1.

I came across other examples of Al Wefaq's reservations about laws and regulations that may criminalise what they view as freedom of expression. These examples are not in the analysis section because there were no parliamentary debates about them in the sittings; they were draft

laws by MPs other than Al Wefaq demanding stricter measures, to which Al Wefaq objected. In contrast, there were draft laws by Al Wefaq demanding a loosening of restrictions, such as their request to allow carrying sticks and white weapons in rallies and demonstrations and their request to cancel a part of an article that demands getting the approval of the Head of Public Security about the time and venue of gatherings and limiting his role to being notified without having the authority to refuse or change the venue or time (mentioned in Attachment 5 of Exceptional Session 7, 14 May 2009: 481-584). The draft laws were not discussed during the sittings and were only voted on; since my research scope limited my data to debates (i.e. spoken and then transliterated in the Hansard) taking place in the Council, I could not use the attachments to Hansard as data for analysis. However, it is worth referring to them here to demonstrate the point I am making. Another interesting stance of Al Wefaq against laws controlling dissent is the Al Wefaq MPs' initial refusal of a bill proposal for issuing a cybercrime law. The bill proposal was voted on in the sitting of 29 January 2009, but the Al Wefaq MPs abstained from voting (Akhbar Al-Khaleej Newspaper, 2009 Jan. 28: 6). However, Al Wefaq justified its abstention by viewing the law as imposing a challenge to religious legitimacy (Bu Eeda, 2008 Feb. 6: 6).

The examples demonstrate that, on the one hand, the Sunni MPs see such laws and decisions as being against 'others', whom they frame as 'terrorists' rather than 'activists' or 'freedom fighters'. For the Sunni MPs, people breaking the law, causing chaos and rioting should be punished as

‘wrong-doers’ and as ‘outlaws’ whose actions need to be first of all controlled, and when out of control, to be rectified and punished. To the Shiite MPs, on the other hand, dissent-controlling laws appear to restrict their in-groups, freedom fighters and political activists and whom they view as human rights activists. This is what their reactions to such laws and proposals in the analysed excerpts suggest (most evidently in Excerpts 1, 4, 8, 9 and 11).

The strategy of corroborating by information, on the other hand, has less of an ideological quality about it, and is more of a ‘default’ that most MPs would ideally aim at using in order to display knowledge and to justify stances and demands. However, since the strategy of corroborating by information can appear in a more deceptive style when it employs wordiness, jargon or vague structures, it can be more manipulative than transparent. By whom and when this lack of transparency are used is worth tracking and analysing. Nevertheless, in my excerpts, there were insufficient occurrences to make generalisations or to note a pattern, and the three examples I found of this use are by Al Wefaq (MP Al-Mitghawi in Table 24; MP Ebrahim in Table 25; and MP Al-Mitghawi again in Table 29.)

Another interesting observation in relation to the ideology of protest is that of employing the discursive device known as reframing. In the excerpts examined here, reframing is used only by Al Wefaq. This again can be explained by the ideological conflict between the government and some Shiite Bahrainis, something which is again related to the construction of

injustice and grievance in the doctrine of Shi'ism (in Excerpt 1 reframing rioters affected by tear gas as residents and citizens, then as families, a third time as women and children, and a fourth time as victims; in Excerpt 3 reframing the government letters to MPs as an 'insult' and what the government called insult as 'criticism'; in Excerpt 4 shifting the frame 'terrorist' to another group; in Excerpt 6 shifting the frame 'theft' from robberies to corruptions in the government; and in Excerpt 8 reframing an arrested MP as a 'citizen'). In the examined excerpts, the Sunni MPs did not need to reframe concepts or people. They did use framing (in Excerpt 1, framing the planned attack as 'terrorist' and the country as 'our Kingdom', and framing recording phone calls as 'eavesdropping' in Excerpt 7), but hardly any reframing (MP Murad reframing the government letter of complaint as an 'insult' in Excerpt 3). This again can be because the Sunni MPs are not challenging the norms or the perceptions of the rioters and protesters or the stance that the government and international law had adopted in relationship to this issue, while the objections and proposals of Al Wefaq suggest that to validate their opposition or objection, they need to evaluate people, laws and incidents from a different perspective.

Additionally, it is also noted that all the conditional statements with rhetorical purposes that occur in the excerpts are used by Al Wefaq (see excerpts 1 through 5), and this elucidates an important role of conditional statements as a device to help justify opposing and confronting norms, laws and decisions.

Accordingly, Al Wefaq would like the Bahraini laws and practices to be amended, so that (a) they give more leeway to the protesters and demonstrators, (b) it becomes more difficult to indict arrested people regarding riots and protests, and (c) there would be less severe punishment for those prosecuted and found guilty. The ideological incentive behind the need for this change is not as simple as it may seem. To understand this ideology, we must bear in mind the other participants in this discourse. As explained in Section 2.4.2 on Power, Ideology and Language, participants in a discourse are not only the speakers and listeners but also the other ‘social actors’ who share discourse norms and rules with the speaker and/or the listener (van Dijk: 1998: 6). The discourse of Shi’ism in Bahrain links us to the system of the Iranian Republic and its ideology. Since Shi’ism was revived by the Iranian Revolution in 1979, it has moved from being a religious practice and has become a key political ideology and praxis with expansionist goals. Iran has become a point of reference and a centre for what Khomeini called ‘exporting’ the Islamic revolution. Joyer explains that the revolution was not perceived by Khomeini and other religious leaders as ‘an Iranian event but the beginning of a world revolution’ (1990: 31). Joyer also explains that Khomeini believed that the oppression of Muslims and in the developing world needed to be fought and that *fiqh*, ‘the supreme jurispudent’, should pave the way for the return of the Mahdi (ibid.). Sunni Islamic doctrines and governments, however, have never been perceived by the Iranian regime as part of this revolution, as the tense and confrontational

relationship between the two groups reflects. The Sunni doctrine, on the other hand, despite a belief in the Mahdi,⁷⁵ does not believe that anyone has to pave the way for the Mahdi or take any actions to increase the likelihood of his appearance and that he will arrive when it is time. Joyer (ibid.: 11) mentions that Bahrain, of all the Gulf countries, is the most vulnerable to what he called 'Shi'ite radicalism'.⁷⁶ However, this means that the change required to the laws should be 'temporary' and should serve the process of exporting the revolution. Meanwhile, there seems to be no fear of the Sunnis using the leniency of the law to their advantage. The Sunni parties and independent MPs thus benefit from keeping the dissent-controlling laws strict, while loosening them would be beneficial for Al Wefaq, but only until the Islamic Revolution has been successfully exported to Bahrain. After that, Bahrain would be another state with another system, which would be unlikely to demand similar lack of restrictions.

5.5 A Step toward Overt Criticism

Until recently, until March 2011 to be more precise, the Sunni public was known as 'the silent sector' of the Bahraini community.⁷⁷ The few instances we have in the excerpts reflect how the Sunni politicians in Bahrain, generally speaking and as a norm, tend to be less confrontational. MP Mohammed Khalid's style, which was the most confrontational among Sunni MPs, was *not* received well by his own Sunni party, Al Minbar. Other Sunni

MPs could get emphatic and emotional but kept a ‘ceiling’ for the level of ‘toughness’ (e.g. MP Al-Mu’awdah in Excerpt 1 and MP Al-Fudhalah in Excerpt 7). The strategy of corroborating by information can get confrontational (e.g. All Al Wefaq MPs in Excerpt 1, and MP Al-Miz’al in Excerpt 4) and this version of this strategy seems to be better applauded by many of the advocates of Al Wefaq. This perspective can be confirmed by how different local newspaper with different policies and political stances report such encounters. The way newspapers report them is a research study in itself, but I provide only one example here to explain. In relationship to the Al Wefaq’s objection to the use of tear gas, Al Wasat newspaper, which is an Al Wefaq advocate, reports that Al Wefaq MPs and MP Abul ‘attacked’ the bill on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, ‘something which *obliged* the Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and National Security to request it being withdrawn in order to receive suggestions in this regard’ (Al Wadi and Abdulla: 13 Feb. 2008, p. 14, my translation and my emphasis). The lexical choices made here suggest that Al Wefaq succeeded in forcing the bill to be withdrawn, something which in return suggests that the ‘attack’ was productive. The same encounter was reported in Akhbar Al-Khaleej, another newspaper. However, no ‘attack’ or ‘obligation’ was reported. Instead, the report mentioned that ‘the MPs *called for* the deletion of articles on the use of what can be detrimental to the lives of individuals’ and the reaction was reported as

follows: 'The Council *decided* to return the report to the Committee *upon the request* of Chairman of the Committee for further study and to allow the deputies to make observations and amendments' (Akbar Al-Khaleej: 13 Feb. 2008, my translation and my emphasis). Al Wasat, thus, is attributing the success of stopping the bill from being approved to the 'attack' of Al Wefaq MPs and MP Abul, something that is indirectly applauding the embraced confrontational style while Akhbar Al-Khaleej is making it sound like a consented decision of the Council.

After the strategy of corroborating by information, the strategy of centralising pride and dignity was the second most frequently used among the Sunni parties, more frequently than the strategy of intensifying grievance. This can be better understood if we realize that sermons and teachings under the Sunni doctrine, at least in Bahrain, put more emphasis on strength, pride and gratefulness. Historical instances of failure or conflicts are less emphasized than are successes. Although this might sound optimistic and positive, I believe that this can and does have a negative effect when overdone and in the long run. This is because this attitude can lead to a habit of ignoring obstacles and problems, creating an exaggerated, even elusive, sense of confidence and reassurance, something that can defer, and even obstruct, the ability to prepare for and react to potential threats, dangers and drawbacks in the same way that concentrating on protest and grievance can obstruct the ability to perceive or accept positive inputs or changes. Additionally, this attitude gradually creates a gap between the

laypeople and their representative MPs who might from time to time tone down the laypeople's agony as they present them in the parliament. Even if this periphrasis happens occasionally, the laypeople affected by the problem being presented in the Council may lose confidence in their representative and hence, the party may lose popularity.⁷⁸ I, however, would hesitate to call this attitude 'ideology', as it seems, at least according to the data I examined, less consented to among the ideological group of Sunnis and less structured, with a significant and growing number of Sunni activists and politicians adopting harsher and more direct criticism.

5.6 *Ideological Manifestations in the Unrest of 2011*

In this section, I show how the analysis of the parliamentary debates, which is the initial focus of this research, can help better understand the most recent unrest, which began in Bahrain in February 2011. I briefly demonstrate how linguistic analysis made in Chapter 4 and the ideological analysis made in this chapter correlate with the recent unrest. This topic could be extensively elaborated, but this short section is a 'coda' to the thesis, which was nearing completion at that time; it simply describes what happened and how it relates to the strategies and ideological readings reached in my analysis. This section also shows how the tensions in the analysed excerpts have played themselves out in the coup attempt in Bahrain.

I have mentioned in my analysis (see Section 5.4) that Al Wefaq's notable interest in loosening the rules and restrictions on protests and sit-ins seemed to be paving the way for its advocates to carry out further protests and sit-ins, seeing themselves among those most likely to be affected and obstructed by stricter measures. The attempt at a wholesale coup had not occurred to me as a possibility at that time, and I had assumed that only occasional riots and protests would benefit from more space being given for freedom and self-expression. Apparently, the success of the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia had provided the some political movements in Bahrain with an opportunity to present the unrest in Bahrain as yet another national revolution, especially at the international level, as the Arab world is viewed as a corrupt region with corrupt regimes, a view that has little understanding of the variations and differences among the regimes. A large section of the population opposed the idea of overthrowing the King and instead chose to demand reform under the current government. The opponents of the coup attempt joined forces in what became known later as the Al Fateh Assembly or the National Unity Assembly (NUA),⁷⁹ consisting mostly but not exclusively of Sunni Bahrainis. Interestingly, though, the optimistic approach of the Sunni politicians, which I criticised in Section 5.6, appears to have played a part in the failure of many, but not all, Sunni politicians to anticipate an upheaval, and in their slowness to address the potential incentives that had generated or fuelled this upheaval. It also showed that the stand of the Sunni parties was not very quick, and they

faced difficulty in finding proper local and international channels to convey their position as representing the stance of a large sector of the community.

The implementation of the ideology of protest can be found even before the unrest itself occurred, in the video clips and posters calling for the unrest. The conveying of an exaggerated idea of 'excessive' political abuse and humiliation can be seen in the calls for rebellion. The 'agony' presented in these calls suggested widespread poverty on the one hand and excessive physical torture and oppression. They presented an image of severe malfunction and deprivation across the country, with photos and video clips of screaming, weeping and collapsing women, people being beaten, blood, and angry youths yelling and protesting. The unrest relied extensively on emotionally triggering a long-standing conviction of injustice activating the ideology of protest.

The people who responded to the call for a coup were almost all Shiites, with a very small number of Sunnis; the latter were mainly members of the Wa'ad Party, a party that is better defined as secular than Sunni although its members come from Sunni families. During the events, several splits occurred within the demonstrators, resulting in a reduction in the number of supporters of the movement calling for the coup. This happened because of several disagreements and clashes on the ideology and/or the manner of the protestors or the politicians leading the protests. However, I do not explore these issues here.

It is worth mentioning a few brief facts about the economic and democratic status in Bahrain here. The levels of poverty in Bahrain are very low, even in comparison to the UK. Freedom of expression has improved notably over the last ten years of reform presented by King Hamad Al Khalifa. There are, of course, issues with bureaucracies, abuse of connections, and slow pace of progress, but there have also been constant developments and amendments that were made possible to the community by the freedom of expression given by the National Charter (see Section 2.3.4.2). UNICEF statistics, for example, show that in 2009, the life expectancy was 76 years and that literacy among adults reached 91% in the period 2005–2008. The same statistics for Egypt are a 70-year life expectancy and 66% literacy rate, and for Syria, 74 years and 84%. Additionally, according to a report by the United Nations Development Programme, UNDP, there is no absolute poverty in Bahrain. The same report confirms that 91.5% of Bahraini families reside in a home of three rooms or more and that 77% of Bahrainis own their own homes (United Nations Development Programme: Kingdom of Bahrain [n.d.]: 3). According to the same report, the human development index (HDI) is very high in Bahrain: 0.831 in 2000 (ibid.: 5). In fact, the report criticises the Ministry of Labour for the cash support it gives to needy families as this approach not only can create a climate of dependency, but also depletes resources which could otherwise be devoted to training, reorientation, and self-employment schemes, all of which would help to alleviate the unemployment that is a

major cause of economic hardship (ibid.: 5). This raises the question of whether the climate of dependency was actually created and oriented to the people so extensively in the society that welfare and financial assistance stopped being seen as additional help but instead were viewed as a right and a norm. If so, perhaps an ideological build-up of a feeling of suppression could take away the feeling of gratitude and replace it with a feeling of deprivation and dissatisfaction.

The ideological basis of reform as claimed by the Shiite demonstrators was the claim of 'mass' injustice being done to them as a sect and as an ethnic group, and a feeling of distance and detachment from the nation as a whole and from the government as their representative. The fact is that social classes and economic power are an issue for all citizens from both sects alike. The widespread claims that 'half' of the Bahrainis are poor are invalid and unproven, despite the fact that employed Bahrainis have the lowest income of all GCC people. Interestingly, the Shiite Bahrainis have grown rapidly and in economic weight and make up a large sector of the country's businesses. The government also appoints many Shiite constructors and importers to perform high-budget businesses for the government.

The upheavals started with sit-ins at the GCC Roundabout, a large roundabout in a central location in Manama, the capital, and a critical passing point that is heavily used during weekdays and the weekend alike. This severely paralysed businesses, work and medical and educational services. The calls were made anonymously, with posters and video clips

being circulated via the Internet, especially via Facebook and Twitter, as in the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. The anonymous group, presenting themselves as the Youth of Bahrain, designated the 14 February 2011 as the day of revolution. That date coincided with the tenth anniversary of the National Charter issued by the King and voted for by the public. As the calls went public and the promised date got closer and closer, in the beginning, there was no government reaction to or interaction with the movement at any level: it was not mentioned by any government figures or spokespersons, and no local newspapers or TV news reports mentioned them. The public panicked, as they had neither any sources to rely on nor any authority with which to seek refuge; simultaneously, the announcement of a 'revolution' intensified over the Internet and was supported by a number of foreign Hizbullah television channels, mainly Al Alam, Al Anwar and Press TV among many. The international media also, at least at the beginning, expressed almost full sympathy toward the coup attempt.

Al Wefaq was the largest of seven political societies leading and supporting the upheaval and calling for the overthrow of King Hamad; it was the strongest and most influential party in the seven-society alliance and with the vast majority of advocates, having won 18 out of 40 seats in the Council of Representatives with 26% of the votes. The other six societies were very small ones with very small number of members and advocates, one, for example, consisted of five members only. Al Wefaq presented itself as a follower and supporter of the youth-led movement. No one up to that

moment, however, had heard or recognised the leadership of this youth movement or heard from it directly; it was almost always Al Wefaq who spoke on behalf of the rioters. There were also figures and speakers from the unauthorised Haq bloc, which came second in the number of followers, and from another movement, based in London, called the Bahrain Freedom Movement; the latter has very few followers, although they used their presence in the UK to make themselves publicly known through the media. Within the country, however, the religious leader was that of Al Wefaq, its *marji'* Shaikh Isa Qassim⁸⁰ (see Section 2.2.3 on the concept of *marji'* in Shi'ism). Another noteworthy bloc, although with a very small number of followers and without any decisive role, was the Wa'ad Party, a secular liberal party, whose president, Ebrahim Sharif, was also one of the representatives of the revolution but rarely a spokesperson for it. His party and his image were often used to stress that the revolution was national and not only Shiite, but his party was given no authority to declare a stance or make any decisions, neither before nor during the unrest.

Nonetheless, accumulated data from parliamentary sittings and other undiscussed proposals and draft laws make one speculate that Al Wefaq was expecting the attempted coup and hence had been planning to protect rioters legislatively against any possible governmental dissent control measures, something that raises a question about the actual role and position of Al Wefaq in the unrest. Leaving aside the development of events, I would like to focus on how the discourse analysis I have presented in this research is

sustained throughout the positions taken and the declarations made by Al Wefaq in the recent unrest. At the beginning of the upheavals, Al Wefaq was quick to join the rioters. On Arabic and other international television and radio channels, MPs from Al Wefaq repeatedly declared that they had lost confidence in the government and that the government was obstructing progress in the country. This self-grievance reinforced the ideology of protest. While the other two revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia had a national character, the one in Bahrain in no time got politicised and ‘sectarianised’, and the protestors repeatedly stressed the claim that the Bahraini government had been discriminating against Shiites and that the Shiites were a majority and were the poorest of the people in Bahrain, none of which was based on evidence.⁸¹

These claims were strengthened and circulated in the international media by a number of well-organised procedures, ranging from the distribution of claims and reports about injustice and corruption among NGOs in a well-organised manner, and from the choices made of leadership and spokespersons, to the revolution’s slogans and ‘rituals’. Professionally taken photo shots were carefully chosen and displayed to convey a message of agony and helplessness in front of government-armed forces; even when there had been no clashes at all and the protesters had been faced by these armed forces for days only on one side of the roundabout, but never surrounded, a lot of selective work was done to convey a different idea, e.g. the photo shot of a young man facing tanks with a naked chest and open

arms, as if he is standing in the way of the attacking tanks whereas, in reality, the tanks had not been moving at all and were not planning to move, having had orders not to engage with or even respond to the rioters stoning them. A still photo could not convey the fact that the trunks were not driving towards the bare-chested rioter.

Such photo shots and many others reinforced the image of injustice, humiliation and physical abuse, something which was made to appear the central point at issue; in fact, the issue of how things should be and how corruption and the misuse of power should be treated were never seriously addressed or agreed upon by the protestors. A list of demands was put forward but there was a constant refusal from the leaders of the coup of discussing it with the government. It appears that the ideology of protest had been central to leading politicians to win the world's sympathy. A message of agony and abuse would normally raise immediate sympathy and would prevent listeners and viewers from questioning how valid the allegations are.

Until the unrest, Al Wefaq had been speaking proudly, locally and internationally, about its achievements since enrolling in parliament in the Second Legislative Period. Nonetheless, to validate the revolution, it denied having achieved any reform and any constructive results. It insisted that the parliament had failed to serve the country and that the efforts and time that the MPs had spent during their appointment were futile. All the statements of Al Wefaq, whether printed or broadcast, denied any progress in the

country and insisted that there had been a continuous regression. This is another example of an ideological need for total impedance and injustice.

It is beyond the scope of this research to collect or present instances about how the devices or strategies were employed in the unrest, but I here provide a general sketch of this employment based on my observations. During the unrest, the strategy of intensifying grievance was widely employed by Al Wefaq when addressing foreign channels and media. There are many examples, but I provide only one example of report by an anonymous doctor calling the BBC from Bahrain and reporting ‘hundreds of casualties’ and that ‘soldiers and police had seized ambulances and appeared to be firing on anyone in their path’ on the day of clearing the roundabout (BBC News, 15 Mar. 2011), numbers and claims which proved to be exaggerated. On the other hand, the strategy of centralising pride and dignity was vital to Al Wefaq when addressing the government, the other MPs and those Bahrainis who were against the upheavals. One example is a statement made by MP Hassan Sultan on 15th February 2011. His statement was published on the official webpage of Al Wefaq, and the opening paragraph of it states that ‘this era is the era of nations, and nothing will stand in the way of their rumbling ride’ and that ‘there are those who did not learn the lesson and still insist on facing the national will with intransigence of violence and bullying, without wisdom or intuition’ (Al Wefaq Islamic Society: 15 Feb. 2011). The strategy of corroborating by information occurred in both contexts, when addressing the government and

when addressing the foreign media. However, it became more detailed when Al Wefaq advocates were speaking to foreign media. A significant number of instances from Al Wefaq's discourses in the two contexts can be found in video-, audio- and printed- news and press releases and these instances can elaborate how the strategies differed in these two contexts.

Moving the focus to examine the Sunni parties' discourses and ideological stances in the recent unrest, it can be noticed that the majority of Sunni MPs left behind the backgrounded argumentation style. Several Sunni MPs became more assertive in addressing the government. One Sunni MP, however, namely, Al-Mu'awdah from Al Asalah, remained supportive of both the government and Al Wefaq in a very unusual way that stirred many people against him, without his being accepted or praised by Al Wefaq. MP Al-Mu'awdah's stance and discourses are also worthy of individual critical analysis, as they diverge greatly from all other discourses: although he tends to participate in debates and discussion, he uses backgrounded confrontations when objecting to a point and an apologetic tone when justifying a stance. On the whole, the upheavals have created and still are creating a shift in the Sunni political discursive style and linguistic approaches to both the government and the anti-government blocs.

5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has used the findings of the discursive analysis of the excerpts and related them to the sectarian nature and the components of the political construct in Bahrain. By doing so, the chapter aimed to fulfil the second objective of this research: exploring whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. The critical analysis in this chapter has confirmed that ideologies are expressed in parliamentary debates and has shown how the same strategies can be found in other political settings and events. This means that the usage of discursive strategies and devices can demonstrate the ideological struggle over power among political parties and MPs.

The excerpts have also shown that there are a range of identities from among which the MPs choose, depending on the ideological perspective from which they present their stance. Interestingly, the discursive analysis I made prior to the unrest Bahrain has been experiencing since February 2011 has shown that the proposed discursive strategies are relevant to and evident in the political happenings and shifts that started in February. Accordingly, the findings of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 converge to provide a view of the sectarian nature of the political parties at the Bahraini Council of Representatives.

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

6.1 *Introduction*

This research has critically analysed political discourses from the Bahraini Council of Representatives to explore the sectarian ideological struggle over power in this institution. This chapter provides a summary of the ground covered by the research, followed by the conclusions reached about the objectives and hypothesis of the research. It then explains how the research contributes to knowledge in this field and outlines the study's limitations. The chapter concludes with directions for further research within the field of parliamentary language and sectarian conflicts.

6.2 *Summary*

With the current bi-cameral parliamentary system having been established in 2000, the Bahraini democratic system is still young. While members of the Consultative Council are appointed by the King himself, the Council of Representatives is elected by the people and is open to political parties' candidates and to independent ones. One aspect that makes the Bahraini Council unique is the dominant and explicit presence of a sectarian division between the Sunni and Shiite political movements.

In this thesis, I first presented the problem that the research addresses, which is the ideological struggle over power, something which can be conveyed through language in the debates of the Bahraini Council of

Representatives. I presented the Council as the scene of sectarian and political struggle in Bahrain and maintained that the sectarian identity is notably present in this Council. I then presented the research hypothesis and objectives (revisited in the following section).

I offered a concise and yet comprehensive background to the research, exploring the variables affecting and related to the research problem, i.e. the ideological struggle over power that is conveyed through language in the debates of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. The chapter has shown that politics in Muslim World are entwined with Islamic theology, and that the sectarian division between Sunnis and Shiites has political essence to it. The research has also presented Bahrain social and sectarian structure and suggested that the struggle over power in Bahrain has a sectarian nature and that this is reflected in the composition of the Council and power relationships among the parties in the Council. I concisely explained that ethnic differences are very easily recognizable in an interlocutor's dialect, and that these differences divide the Arabic-speaking Bahraini community into two major speech communities: the *Bahraini* and the *Bahrani*, often, although not always, Sunni and Shiite respectively. I also discussed the notions of individual identity and group identity and explained that the group identity conveys ideology through language. After that, I presented twelve linguistic indicators or moves that I tracked in the analysis of the excerpts. I called these indicators 'discursive devices'.

The methodology was designed around the concept of power according to CDA, which presumes that in any discourse, the power relationships are unequal, something which makes discourse a scene of ideological struggle. I adopted SCA, which tries to relate discourse structures with cognitive structures (such as mental models) and social structures, in the case of this thesis, sectarian political structure. SCA advocates using many kinds of methods – among which I focus on textual analysis, ideological analysis, political analysis and context analysis. All these aspects are touched upon in the analyses whenever sounded relevant.

The continuous feedback between the data collection and data analysis processes contributed to developing both the analysis and the research method simultaneously. Presenting the analysis was a challenge when it came to how to present the analysis in a coherent and approachable way without missing out contexts or intertextuality; I eventually succeeded in presenting the data, indicating discursive devices in the analysed extracts and showing how these devices were employed in the interventions.

Interestingly, the vast majority of interventions were by MPs from the Al Wefaq Party, and the discussions were mainly against strict measurements against riots, demonstrations and sit-ins. The MPs from other parties were more likely to have intervention with the topic when it was more associated with freedom of expression and privacy, such as recording phone calls. Based on the overall analysis, I proposed that discursive devices were employed by interlocutors to fulfil three linguistic tactics that were

employed in the struggle over power among the political parties in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. I called these tactics ‘discursive strategies’ and identified three in the analysed excerpts: the strategy of corroborating by information, the strategy of intensifying grievance, and that of centralising pride and dignity. I showed which discursive devices were used in each excerpts and what functions these devices served, and I showed which discursive strategy or strategies each intervention employs. After the individual analysis of each excerpt, I presented a synthesis, in which I described the overall usage of discursive devices and strategies, and followed it with an overview of differences among political groups. The discursive devices I considered were the following: shift between local accents and classical Arabic, emotive speech, framing and reframing, quoting other sources, humour, discourse markers, lexical style, local semantic moves such as disclaimers, speech acts, rhetorical features, propositional structure and turn-takings. For example, among many devices, there was a significant number of conditional statements and rhetorical questions. I also detected that certain devices were used more often with certain strategies, though not exclusively. Additionally, a noticeable difference is that the instances of mockery and sarcasm were more likely to be used by the Al Wefaq Shiite party than by Sunni MPs. Also, the use of rhetorical conditional statements and rhetorical questions was significant in the interventions of Al Wefaq members. One further interesting finding was that the use of figurative speech was more prominent with the strategy of

centralising pride and dignity. I also found that very often, if a speaker used both the strategy of corroborating by information and that of intensifying grievance, the former almost always came first and then a shift to the second was made.

As I identified the discursive devices by each speaker, I observed that they were being employed by the MPs participating in these excerpts to serve the three discursive strategies. I identified the three discursive strategies as being corroborating by information, intensifying grievance, and centralising pride and dignity. The strategy of intensifying grievance was very prominent and recurred often in interventions made by Al Wefaq MPs in their objections to security measures and arrests of rioters.

Then, in order to test the research hypothesis, I took the findings one step further to interpret the ideological struggle for power to see if the strategies relate to any sectarian traits in Bahrain. I suggested three types of 'battlefields' for debates, depending on against whom the debate is constructed. The critical analysis from the research to the most recent unrest in Bahrain reinforced the suggested ideological readings of the critically analysed the excerpts and their association with ideology. The recurrent use of the strategy of intensifying grievance by Al Wefaq in discussions related to dissent control appeared to be associated with the sectarian ideology of protest, an ideology that is deeply rooted in the Shiite praxis. I finally linked the sectarian split that was apparent in the discourses I analysed with the

recent unrest in Bahrain and suggested how the ideological difference between the Sunni and Shiite MPs was reflected in this unrest.

6.3 Conclusions about Research Objectives and Hypothesis

As stated in Chapter 1, I hypothesised that *the Shiite MPs in the Bahraini Council of Representatives employ strategies differently from the Sunni MPs*. To test this hypothesis, I set the following objectives: first, to observe whether, and if so how, the Sunni parties, Al Minbar and Al Asalah, and the Shiite party, Al Wefaq, employ discursive devices and strategies to achieve the following ideological goals: (a) attempting to gain political advantage discursively in the parliamentary debates on topics related to dissent control and political freedom; (b) manoeuvring the definitions of self and others in the contexts of dissent control and political rights; and (c) manipulating the law to support one's party's ideological stances about dissent-controlling laws and the definition of political freedom and political rights. The second objective was to explore whether and how the use of discursive devices and strategies reflects the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain.

6.2.1 First Objective: Discursive Differences

The analysis presented in Chapter 4 has identified a large number of discursive devices employed by both Shiite and Sunni MPs under three discursive strategies. The analysis of these devices and strategies helped

accomplish the three goals under the first objective. First, the analysis asserted that discourse was a scene of struggle for these parties, and that the discursive devices strengthened each speaker's argument and stance. The analysis also has demonstrated that the topic of dissent control divided the MPs very often, though not always, between Sunnis and Shiites, making a considerate amount of the struggle over power in this setting between the two congregations rather than between the Council and the government.

When it comes to the second goal, manoeuvring the definition of self and others, the analysis has shown that the devices of othering and framing were used by Sunnis and Shiite MPs to define the boundaries of the ingroups and outgroups. The MPs have repeatedly tightened these boundaries to limit the ingroup to those who share the same stances on dissent control. A tendency to define ingroups and outgroups appeared to have a sectarian structure even without the mentioning of sects in the excerpts. The devices of framing and reframing were also used very constructively by both the Sunni and the Shiite to achieve polarising: good *Us* and bad *Them*. A third device that was notably used in the excerpts for the purpose of self-definition by Shiite MPs, but not Sunni MPs, was contrasting the point being discussed with a parallel example from the 'other' sect. This was done to claim discrimination.

The third goal under the first objective was manipulating the law to support one's group. The analysis has shown that Al Wefaq MPs were eager to loosen the laws about dissent control, as they considered them to be

against freedom of expression. Also, Al Wefaq MPs objected in general to arrests and how they were made in cases related to riot and dissent control. Moreover, the Shiite MPs were keener on loosening the security measures and releasing detainees in dissent control related indictments; in return, the Sunni MPs either showed (a) no reaction to these measures, (b) a sign of approval, or (c) insisted on law enforcement. Framing and reframing were used in portraying stances and perspectives, and thus reflected ideological perspectives of the speakers. Mainly, the Sunni MPs were more likely to frame, while Al Wefaq repeatedly needed to reframe. This is because Al Wefaq MPs often needed to present a perspective that differed from the one taken for granted or the one that conformed to the government's points of view and the legal definitions. Contrasting verdicts and stances of the ingroups with those of the outgroups were employed too.

6.2.2 Second Objective: Sectarian Conflict in Discourse

When comparing and contrasting how discursive strategies and devices were employed on the basis of sectarian affiliation, I found that the strategies of corroborating by information and of centralising pride and dignity were used in similar ways by both Sunni and Shiite MPs. However, I noticed that the strategy of intensifying grievance was more frequently used by Al Wefaq MPs, a finding that was then used to fulfil the second objective of the research. This intensity and frequency were assessed to explore whether and

how the use of discursive devices and strategies can reflect the sectarian ideological conflict in Bahrain. The tendency to use the strategy of intensifying grievance more frequently and more elaborately seemed to be associated with the ideology of grievance and protest that has theological roots in the Shiite doctrine, a doctrine that is based on mourning the death of Imams Ali and Hussain and the extortion of the Imams' right of sovereignty. This feeling of injustice has been carried down over the ages and casts its shadow over contemporary political perceptions. The analysis has, thus, shown that *the Shiite MPs and party employ discursive devices and strategies differently from the Sunni MPs and parties*, a finding that confirms the hypothesis of the research.

6.2.3 Research Hypothesis

The analysis has asserted that there is a struggle over power between the Sunni and Shiite parties in the Council of Representatives in Bahrain. It has illustrated some differences in the way the discursive devices and discursive strategies are employed by the two groups. From time to time, polarising is employed by Al Wefaq to distinguish oneself from the other group, something that has shown that the Shiite MPs and party employ discursive devices and strategies differently from the Sunni MPs and parties. This finding, accordingly, confirms the hypothesis of the research.

6.4 Contribution to the Field of Study

This thesis has succeeded in providing academic data to identify discursive strategies in the language used in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. It also indicates the discursive devices used to fulfil these strategies. The findings were then used to interpret the ideological struggle for power between the Sunni and Shiite parties in the Bahraini Council of Representatives. This information can be a useful reference for studies in the fields of linguistics, theology, ideology, sociolinguistics, and even politics, since the topic and the analysis have taken these aspects into account.

The research methodology was developed to fit a relatively new theoretical perspective (CDA) and a theoretical approach that is still under development (SCA); this qualifies it to give those theoretical models a practical and reproducible methodology for use and further development in other studies using CDA and SCA.

The thesis is also relevant to the current political and sectarian disturbances in the Kingdom of Bahrain, specifically, the stage of unrest which began in February 2011, and can serve in providing political readings of these events, especially if combined and strengthened with historical and diplomatic studies of the Middle East in general, and the Shiite-Sunni history of the area in particular. Similar readings of political language and their ideological and sectarian indications can be useful to understand bases and incentives of political disturbances and instabilities so that they get addressed at early stages.

One further contribution this research has made is to the field of political studies on Bahrain, as it has shown how the ideology of protest can affect and reflect the political struggle in the country, and how discursive discourse analysis can be used to predict the ideological directions of parties in a way that can affect the course of political events in the future. This can be noted in the readings this research made of ideology and identity, both of which were manifested clearly in the recent unrest in Bahrain, which started on 14 February 2011. However, as my research pre-dated these events, having started in October 2008, and because I was in the final stage of writing my analysis when the unrest took place, including them would have required more time and space than I had at the time to finish my research and more data than I had available. Interestingly, however, the analysis of the discursive strategies proved an existing ideological basis for the unrest of 2011, and although my interest was in parliamentary debates, it has been proven that the proposed strategies are not specific to the analysed data and can apply to other political discourses.

6.5 Study Limitations

I faced several difficulties while conducting this research. First, despite the fact that CDA is interdisciplinary, this research was carried out by a single researcher and was centred on, but not restricted to, sociolinguistic and linguistic analysis. In an ideal situation, interdisciplinary research would be

done by a group of researchers who have different disciplinary backgrounds to maximise the profundity of the work and the results. For this reason, but also because of space and time limitations, it was beyond the capacity of this thesis to provide a comprehensive account of the ideology of politics in Islam, a historical account of political developments in Islamic countries, or a record of critical analyses of political religious movements. There is abundant literature regarding these issues and only information that is directly related to the analysis of the discourse examined has been included. The thesis focused on a number of excerpts from sittings that were held in the Bahraini Council of Representatives and used these excerpts as linguistic units or small interrelated case studies. One further difficulty of which I was aware was that Hansard excluded extra-linguistic content, something which can have some effect on the analysis of the linguistic content.

Another difficulty at the theoretical level was applying an approach, something which proved challenging and intimidating. SCA was appropriate for the research hypothesis and objectives for it being directly concerned with power connections in society and for it urging to take into account relevant context, something which is important to understand a complex issue involving politics, language and sectarian praxis. However, the fact that SCA is willing to remain open all possible analyses made it difficult to set a scope or delimitations. Additionally, SCA is still in the process of development, and the notion of mental representations, which is an element of SCA, could not empirically be applied in the process of text analysis.

However, no theory, approach or methodology is ever complete or can entirely escape criticism, and thus I could adopt SCA despite the accompanying challenges.

At the level of collecting data, I faced a difficulty with finding excerpts for my research. The ones to which I had access were difficult to search, and, unlike those in Hansard of the British Parliament, there were no precise agendas or indices to rely on in Hansard of the Bahraini Council of Representatives. I therefore had to skim through the records of full sittings to find suitable data, something which consumed more time than if the agendas and indices had been accurate. To make it more difficult, Hansard was not available online, although I was able to obtain some records from the beginning of the legislative period still in progress, on a number of separate CDs. However, toward the end of the third year of my research, I received a CD with full records, which made it easier to follow the sittings. Bahraini politics, after all, is a rich field that has not been studied deeply enough. This applies to publications on anthropological, cultural and political studies about Bahrain, and the scarcity of such references and statistics was a major obstacle as I constructed the background of my thesis.

Additionally, I was aware that the topic of religious ideologies represented in the parliamentary sessions is too broad and complex to be covered comprehensively in one thesis, and that any aspects, categories, criteria, causes, or features I presented or discuss were only a small segment of the whole picture and, therefore, unlikely to be inclusive or decisive.

What made comprehensiveness more difficult is the fact that the political and religious language of the Bahraini Council of Representatives had not been studied in depth academically, leaving me with little to build upon. Although some similarity may be found between the examined data and other data or instances – indeed, it is even possible to find similarities with political debates in other parliaments – not all the analysis results would spontaneously be generalised to all political instances or parliamentary discussions. This is simply because I analysed one theme in a specific setting and a specific period of time, and thus there might be other matters and issues which I am not aware of that could affect other discourses.

Additionally, I could not provide statistics or even simple percentages of the findings and observations simply because the data collected and the method of choosing extracts did not allow this for many reasons. One reason was that my research reported more interventions from Al Wefaq than from other parties, not necessarily because they normally intervened more often, but because the topic of dissent control and freedom seemed to have provoked or interested them more.

6.6 *Directions for Further Research*

In this section, I present some suggestions and recommendations for further research within the field of political language and the ideological struggle over power. As I skimmed through the Bahraini Council of Representatives' Hansard, I found that the level of engagement in the topic, style, and other aspects varied as the themes varied. A study of other individual themes is an interesting option; comparing a number of discursive devices and how using them may differ from one theme to another is another option. A third possibility is the study of the power relationship between certain political parties or political figures and the government through studying their language. In particular, the relationship between Al Wefaq, and particularly MPs Ali Salman and Mohammed Al-Miz'al, and the King and/or the Crown Prince, and how it developed over the four-year long second legislative period (which includes the period of local unrest that started in February 2011) is intriguing, and may reveal more about the ideology of Al Wefaq as a religious political group. The same can be done with the interventions of Sunni MPs, especially leading figures.

I also suggest that a multi-disciplinary study of the political language in Bahrain by a network or a group of theologians, anthropologists, politicians and linguists would offer a better analysis of topics of interest after setting objectives of the research to be performed. This will guarantee that all the input in the research is verified by experts. There are many

political topics and issues in Bahrain awaiting academic research and analysis, especially as the recent disturbances have raised many questions and have drawn attention to the complex and multi-layered nature of the problem, which is deeply historically rooted. Applying CDA, each topic could focus on one or more sources of data: political debates in the Council of Representatives, political debates in the Shura Council, press releases from politicians, public speeches by politicians and interviews on local television, or other channels that address the political conflicts.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Agenda Topics Matched to Items in Hansard

Date	Session Number	Page numbers in Hansard	Item in Hansard	Related attachments to Hansard (and page numbers of PDF file)
Regular Sessions				
1. 26/05/2009	30	117	Withdrawn by the Chairman of the Committee; not discussed in the session.	Appendix 2, Attachment 16, pages 1–26.
2. 05/05/2009	27		Mentioned in agenda but not found in Hansard.	
	26		Mentioned in agenda but not found in Hansard.	Attachment 6, pages 147–330
3. 21/04/2009	25			Attachment 6, pages 331–444.
Exceptional Sessions				
4. 14/05/2009	7	198–201	A proposal for changes to the rules and regulations for demonstrations and sit-ins. A proposal to punish those who	Appendix 1: Attachments 5, (pages 481–584),

	accuse the Ministry of Interior or the Attorney General's Office of lying by arrest for no longer than two years and a fine that does not exceed BD1,000 (withdrawn before being voted on). A proposal to amend some rules of Law Article No. 58 for the year 2006 on protecting society from terrorist acts: a proposal to increase punishment (withdrawn before being voted on.)	Attachment 6 (pages 585–633) and Attachment 7 (pages 634–721).
6. 14/11/2007	Mentioned in agenda but not found in Hansard.	Attachment 4 pages 296–330.

Appendix B: The Excerpts

- **Underlined and followed with asterisk:** the parts that are underlined and followed with an asterisk are the parts that are ungrammatical or unintelligible or are bad word compounds. This is because I, as explained in the methodology section, have tried to convey the same style and structure of the original excerpts in Arabic besides the conveying the content. There are still other incomplete sentences or phrases that I translate as such without marking them because they can be understood as incomplete when read. I only marked the parts that may mistakenly be considered as typing mistakes or translation errors.

- **Use of Italic:** I use italic in the following cases:
 - For the transliterations of Arabic words or phrases.
 - For single English words to it indicates stress.
 - When within a speech, preceded by (reading), then it is an act or proposal that is being read.

- **For full speeches or interventions if not of MPs or members of the Council:** there are a few speeches of non-MPs that are fully italic, and this is to indicate that these speeches have the content translated without conveying any other hesitations or linguistic mistakes as I did with the speeches of the MP since I do not intend to analyse any non-MP speeches in this research.

There are references to supplements or attachments in the original Arabic excerpts and I translate the texts or lines referring to them as they are but I am not including any of the mentioned attachments.

The eleven excerpts are as follows:

1. Teargas: from Sitting 2:2:16, 12th Feb. 2008, pp. 62–73
2. Bahraini Detainees Abroad: from Sitting 2:2:25 a, 22nd April 2008, pp. 19–20.
3. Insulting the Government: from Sitting 2:2:25 b, 22nd April 2008, pp. 43–44.
4. Condemning a ‘terrorist’ plot: from Sitting 2:3:10, 30th Dec. 2008, pp. 95–99.
5. The Arrest of Political Activists: from Sitting 2:3:13, 27th Jan. 2009, pp. 4–6.
6. Big and Small Thieves: from Sitting 2:3:23, 7th April 2009, pp. 103–104.
7. Evesdropping: from Sitting 2:4:3, 20th Oct. 2009, p. 15.
8. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (a): from Sitting 2:4:10, 22nd Dec. 2009, pp. 6–7.
9. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (b): from Sitting 2:4:11, 29th Dec. 2009, p. 6.
10. Censoring a Speech: from sitting 2:4:24, 30th March 2010, pp. 78–79.
11. Activating a Punishment Decision: from Sitting 2:4:28, 27th April 2010, p. 43.

1. Teargas

From Sitting 2:2:16, 12th Feb. 2008, pp. 62–73

الرئيس :

شكرا الأخ المقرر، سعادة الأخ نوار علي المحمود الأمين العام للمجلس تفضل بقراءة البند الذي يليه.

الأمين العام للمجلس :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، تقرير لجنة الشؤون الخارجية والدفاع والأمن الوطني بخصوص مشروع قانون بشأن حظر استحداث وإنتاج وتخزين واستعمال الأسلحة الكيميائية وتدمير تلك الأسلحة، المرافق للمرسوم الملكي رقم 79 لسنة 2007م، وشكرا.

الرئيس:

تفضل الأخ المقرر.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم (المقرر) :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم أطلب تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة.

الرئيس :

من هم الموافقون على تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة؟

(أغلبية موافقة)

الرئيس :

إذن يتم تثبيت التقرير في مضبطة الجلسة.

(انظر الملحق رقم 8)

الرئيس :

هل توجد أي ملاحظات على المبادئ والأسس للمشروع؟ الأخ النائب الدكتور سامي علي قمبر تفضل.

النائب الدكتور سامي علي قمبر :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، في الحقيقة أنا لي عتب بشأن هذا الموضوع، هذا الموضوع قد سحب من الجلسة في شهر ديسمبر الماضي، وكان تقرير لجنة الشؤون الخارجية والدفاع والأمن الوطني جاهزا، وبسبب رغبة بعض النواب سحب هذا الموضوع في ذلك الوقت، وأنا في الحقيقة لا أدري ما هو التعديل الذي أجرته لجنة الشؤون الخارجية والدفاع والأمن الوطني حتى تطلب الأمر بأن يبقى في حدود شهرين ولم يطرأ أي تعديل، وأريد توضيحا من رئيس لجنة الشؤون الخارجية والدفاع والأمن الوطني على هذا الموضوع.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم (المقرر) :

عندي توضيح، المقرر عنده توضيح يا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس :

شكرا، الأخ النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة رئيس اللجنة هل لديك تعليق؟

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم (المقرر) :

عندي تعليق يا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

تفضل الأخ المقرر.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم (المقرر) :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، طبعاً المشروع سحب - معالي الرئيس - بناء على رغبة الإخوة في كتلة الوفاق، في صفحة 103 لو تلاحظون هناك رقم 13 رأي الإخوة وناقشته اللجنة مع الإخوة، وارتأت اللجنة بعد التصويت ألا تأخذ ببعض الآراء التي وردت من خلال ملاحظات الإخوة، لذلك أرجع المشروع كما هو حسبما اتفق مع اللجنة، وشكراً.

الرئيس:

شكراً، الأخ النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة رئيس اللجنة تفضل.

النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة (رئيس اللجنة) :

شكراً معالي الرئيس، في الحقيقة التغيير أو الملاحظة لم تكن ملاحظة في صلب القانون أو مواده، إلا أن القضية في تقديرات العقوبة، فكان الإخوة يرون كما هو في قانون عمان، وأيضاً هناك قوانين أخرى مشابهة لقانون البحرين، لكن هناك نقطة أريد أن أذكرها، وسأذكرها لاحقاً إن شاء الله، وشكراً.

الرئيس :

شكراً، من هم الموافقون على المبادئ والأسس للمشروع؟

(أغلبية موافقة)

الرئيس :

تفضل الأخ المقرر بقراءة ديباجة المشروع.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم (المقرر) :

شكراً معالي الرئيس، الديباجة: توصي اللجنة بالموافقة على الديباجة كما وردت في المشروع بقانون.

الرئيس :

هل توجد أي ملاحظات على ديباجة المشروع؟

(لا توجد ملاحظات)

الرئيس :

من هم الموافقون على الديباجة كما أقرتها اللجنة؟

(أغلبية موافقة)

الرئيس :

تفضل الأخ المقرر بقراءة المادة 1.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم (المقرر) :

شكراً معالي الرئيس، المادة 1، أيضاً توصي اللجنة بالموافقة على المادة كما وردت في المشروع بقانون.

النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم :

معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

الأخ النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي تفضل.

النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي :

شكراً معالي الرئيس، في المادة رقم 1 صفحة 111، سقطت كلمة في الصفحة 111 السطر 3، أي مادة كيميائية غير مدرجة في أحد الجداول، فأعتقد أن هذه سقطت من الكاتب، فأرجو الانتباه، عامل مكافحة الشغب.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة رئيس اللجنة تفضل.

النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة (رئيس اللجنة) :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، نعم، لأن القانون، وهذه سقطت وعندنا رسالة رسمية من وزارة الخارجية ومن المفترض أن تكون "أي مادة كيميائية هي غير مدرجة".

الرئيس :

هذا الذي تفضل به الأخ النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي؟ الكلمة سقطت؟

النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة (رئيس اللجنة) :

نعم، الكلمة سقطت، وهناك رسالة رسمية من وزارة الخارجية تبين ذلك، وشكرا.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، التأكيد على هذه الملاحظة كانت على أساس أنها موجودة في الاتفاقية الدولية وغير مدرجة، لكن المادة أو البند (د) "من الأغراض غير المحظورة"، (د) تقول: "الأغراض المتصلة بتنفيذ أحكام القانون بما في ذلك أغراض مكافحة الشغب المحلي" أعتقد أنه غير مناسب بأن نقول إذا كان لأغراض مكافحة الشغب المحلي أن نستخدم "أن هذه الاتفاقية - اتفاقية الأسلحة الكيميائية - أن يستثنى منها كأنما نجز لمكافحة الشغب المحلي، أن نجز استخدام الفلفل المطحون أقصد مسيل الدموع الذي قال عنه الإخوة، فأعتقد أنها تحذف "بما في ذلك أغراض مكافحة الشغب المحلي"، اقتراحي هو بحذف "بما في ذلك أغراض مكافحة الشغب المحلي" لأن وجودها يشكل شبهة، لأنه بالإمكان أن نستخدم مواد سواء أدرجت أو لم تدرج في المحظورة في مكافحة الشغب منها الفلفل المطحون، وشكرا.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم تفضل.

النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، أنا تحفظي على نفس البند (د)، طبعاً المادة 1 تستثنى الأغراض غير المحظورة، وأنا أطلب تعديل المادة بحذف الفرع (د)، لو تلاحظون في صفحة 106 خلاصة رأي وزارة الصحة هناك تحفظ أيضا من وزارة الصحة على أن استخدام الأسلحة الكيميائية في مكافحة الشغب، يعني أن هناك ملاحظة وتخوفاً، يعني من خلال خبرة عملية، ليس أنا الذي أشاغب طبعاً لكن فقط - معالي الرئيس - استخدام مسيلات الدموع شبه قاتل، يعطيك حالة من الاختناق والدوار قد (تروح فيها) قد تقتل وقد تموت، خصوصاً إذا تم توجيه مسيلات الدموع إلى الأماكن السكنية المكثفة وهذا موجود في بعض الأماكن، هناك أدوات قانونية أخرى، أنا أطلب بحذف مادة (د) لأنني أرى فيها استخدام أسلحة كيميائية في مكافحة الشغب هذا محظور، لأنه قد يؤدي إلى الوفاة، يؤدي إلى الدوار، وعندنا أطفال وعندنا نساء بعض الأوقات توجه مسيلات الدموع حتى في غير أماكنها أصلاً، هناك قانون يجب أن يقنن بحيث يتم استخدامه ضمن إطار القانون، فأنا أتحفظ على هذه المادة وأطلب حذف الفرع (د)، وشكرا.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الدكتورة عفاف الشعلة مدير إدارة الرقابة البيئية في الهيئة العامة لحماية الثروة البحرية والبيئة والحياة الفطرية تفضلي.

مدير إدارة الرقابة البيئية في الهيئة العامة لحماية الثروة البحرية والبيئة والحياة الفطرية :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، السلام عليكم، نشكركم على دعوتكم، عندنا ملاحظة بشأن المادة 1، هذه المادة جاءت لتعرف بعض المصطلحات المستخدمة في هذا القانون، ما ذكر هنا يعرف ما جاء في المادة 4، كل ما حظر في الأغراض غير المحظورة المادة 4 تغطيها ولكنها محدودة للبحث العلمي والأغراض الوقائية وبعض الأغراض غير المذكورة في هذا التعريف، فلذلك إما أن تعدل المادة 4 أو يعدل التعريف، وشكرا.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب الشيخ حسن علي سلطان تفضل.

النائب الشيخ حسن علي سلطان :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، أنا يوسفني أن أقول إنه من تجربة، ولا أسوق هذا على سبيل الجزم، ولكن الاحتمال الكبير جدا أن هناك حالات وفاة - حتى أكون دقيقا - حدثت على ضوء استخدام الغاز المسيل للدموع ليس مباشرة، ولكن بعد مدة، ربما نحن لحيثيات مختلفة لم نتطرق إليها لمصالح معينة، لحسابات عامة، ولكن هناك كبار السن وهناك صغار، بعد فترة من استخدام الغاز المسيل للدموع الذي يستخدم في مكافحة الشغب، بعد فترة تمت حالات وفاة وكل الأهالي - أنا أقول هنا لا أسوق هذا على سبيل الجزم أتمنى أن أكون موضوعيا - الأهالي يشيرون إلى أن سبب الوفاة هو استخدام الغاز المسيل للدموع، لذا أطلب حذف هذه الفقرة من هذه المادة، وشكرا.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الدكتور يوسف عبدالكريم محمد مدير الإدارة القانونية بوزارة الخارجية تفضل.

مدير الإدارة القانونية بوزارة الخارجية :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، في الحقيقة فقط أود التعليق على المادة 1 من مشروع القانون، في الحقيقة يجب أن نذكر تماما أنه حدث تشاور وثيق في الاتصال مع الأمانة الفنية لمنظمة حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية بخصوص هذا المشروع استغرق 3 سنوات في الحقيقة باتصال مباشر مع المستشار القانوني في المنظمة، صيغ تماما بالمراعاة مع اتفاقية حظر وإنتاج وتخزين وتدمير الأسلحة الكيميائية مادة مادة، عكسنا قلب وأهداف الاتفاقية في مشروع القانون الوطني، أعتقد أنه ربما حصل لبس في تفسير وقراءة ما يتعلق بعامل مكافحة الشغب، وكذلك ما يتعلق بالأغراض غير المحظورة، أنا أريد أن أنبه السادة النواب إلى أن المادة 2 من اتفاقية حظر الأسلحة الكيميائية قد عرفت تماما التعريف الذي وضعناه في مشروع القانون، فنذكر المادة 2 الفقرة 9 يقصد بمصطلح أغراض غير محظورة بموجب الاتفاقية، ثم تأتي تماما (د) كما وضعناها في مشروع القانون الوطني (د) "إنفاذ القانون بما في ذلك لأغراض مكافحة الشغب المحلي"، نحن عكسنا تماما روح اتفاقية، هناك استحقاق في الحقيقة لاتفاقية دولية يجب أن نراعي قدر المستطاع التقارب والتشابه مع الاتفاقية الدولية، إلا أنه كذلك الاتفاقية تلزم فيما تلزم إليه أن تقدم الدولة إعلانات فيما يتعلق بعامل مكافحة الشغب الوارد في التعريف المذكور، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس :

شكرا، هل توجد أي ملاحظات أخرى؟ الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، دعنا معالي الرئيس نأخذ الأمور بمنطقية، عندما نقول إن الأغراض المتصلة بتنفيذ القانون ومكافحة الشغب خالية تماما من الأسلحة الكيميائية المحظورة، أي أننا لا نحتاج إلى أن ندرجها في قانون ينص على حظر استخدام الأسلحة الكيميائية، إذا كانت - وهذا للتأكيد - أدوات تنفيذ القانون خالية تماما من الأسلحة الكيميائية

فنحن لا نحتاج إلى أن ننص عليها في هذا القانون، أن تستثنى، وإذا كانت هناك شبهة أنه ربما تكون بعض أحكام تنفيذ القانون أو ما يتطلبه بنص المادة الأغراض المتصلة بتنفيذ القانون فيها ولو شبهة ذرة واحدة من المليون يمكن أن تكون فيها مواد كيميائية فيجب أن تسقط هذه المادة، لأن العملية تكون دقيقة، أما ألا تكون هذه المواد التي ستستخدم فيها كيميائي أو مواد كيميائية محظورة، فبذلك لا نحتاج إلى أن نضيفها، وإذا كانت فيها شبهة فإنها أوجب، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب محمد يوسف مزعل تفضل.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، طبعاً نحن مع، يعني عندما نتكلم عن حظر تصنيع وبيع وتخزين وإنتاج واستحداث الأسلحة الكيميائية ندرك ما يمكن أن يجره عمل مثل هذا على بلد صغير مثل البحرين تكثر فيها التجمعات في العاصمة وفي غير العاصمة، وأجار الله الجميع إن شاء الله من شر القاعدة وأمثالها وأذئابها، فيما لو توصلت إلى معادلة كيميائية واستخدمتها في أحد هذه التجمعات والعياذ بالله، لكن كمناقشة قانونية لهذه النقطة (د)، إذا رجعنا إلى، فقط أريد - معالي الرئيس - أن أربط بين هذه النقطة حتى نفهمها، ممكن أن نذهب للمادة الثالثة البند هـ - معالي الرئيس - الذي يتكلم عن استعمال، معالي الرئيس ممكن أن أحصل أذانا صاغية لأن النقطة مهمة جداً...

الرئيس :

نحن الآن في المادة 1 لا نذهب للمادة الثالثة.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

لا، لا فقط حتى أفهم تفسيرها أنا بحاجة أن أستورد نصاً من هناك، لأن المادة 3 هـ تقول "استعمال عوامل مكافحة الشغب كوسيلة للحرب، يحظر استعمال عوامل مكافحة الشغب كوسيلة للحرب"، معناه أن - لو لم يكن ذلك ممكناً لما نص عليه - عوامل مكافحة الشغب يمكن أن تكون وسيلة للحرب، العدو حينما يريد أن يهاجم سيادة البلد القانون يضمن لذلك العدو ألا تستخدم ضده عوامل مكافحة الشغب، ولكن نفس القانون يسمح باستخدام عوامل مكافحة الشغب المحلي، حمي العدو الخارجي الذي يهاجم سيادتنا من استخدام مادة ونسمح باستخدامها ضد المواطن، أيا كان خطأ المواطن، هذه المفارقة الكبيرة - معالي الرئيس - ستضع منفذي القانون موضعاً خطراً جداً، يشار لنا ويشار للبلد ويشار للحكومة بالاتهام في كل حين، أرجو التدقيق في النظر والمقارنة والمفارقة بين البند د في المادة 1 والبند هـ في المادة 3، معالي الرئيس الأمر هنا حينما ننص على أن المادة التي هي عامل من عوامل مكافحة الشغب يمكن أن تكون أداة للحرب ونمنع استخدامها ضد العدو الخارجي فيما لو هاجمنا أو غزانا، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ الرائد حمود سعد حمود مدير إدارة المحاكم العسكرية بوزارة الداخلية تفضل.

مدير إدارة المحاكم العسكرية بوزارة الداخلية :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، بالنسبة لتعقينا على الفقرة د المتعلقة بالأغراض المتصلة بتنفيذ أحكام القانون بما في ذلك أغراض مكافحة الشغب - معالي الرئيس - أحب أن أوضح بأن جميع عوامل الشغب التي تستخدمها وزارة الداخلية هي مصرحة دولياً وليس فيها أي مانع من الموانع أو تأثيرها على الصحة، وكلها مصنعة من مواد طبيعية لا تأثير لها إطلاقاً، العوامل الكيميائية السامة معرفة في ذات المادة والأسلحة الكيميائية معرفة في ذات المادة، وعوامل مكافحة الشغب لم يتطرق لها بأسلحة أو مواد كيميائية سامة، فالتعريف - معالي الرئيس - واضح، في حالة حذف هذه الفقرة سوف يضطر أفراد مكافحة الشغب لاستخدام أسلحة قوية وقتالاً قد تؤدي بحياة الإنسان فنحن - معالي الرئيس - نفضل الإبقاء على هذه الفقرة تحاشياً لاستخدام أسلحة أشد قسوة على بعض المتظاهرين، وللعلم - معالي الرئيس - وأحب أن

أكد لمجلسكم الموقر بأن معالي وزير الداخلية أصدر توجيهاته لقوات مكافحة الشغب باستخدام هذه الأسلحة على أضيق نطاق، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب السيد حيدر حسن الستري تفضل.

النائب السيد حيدر حسن الستري :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، أنا أتصور يجب علينا أن نقف وقفة جادة في مثل هذه الموضوعات الخطيرة جدا، الكلام الذي قاله الزميل النائب محمد يوسف مزعل واضح جدا، أن هذا يحظر استخدامه مع العدو وفي الحرب، حرب عسكرية وفيها سلاح وفيها قتل وقتال، هذا يسمح باستخدامه في مواجهة المواطن، فلا تحتاج إلى تفسير كبير، ولا تحتاج إلى جدال طويل، لنكن جادين والجهة المعنية تقول بأن ما تستخدمه هي مواد طبيعية، إذن لا يوجد لزوم إلى أن نضعه في هذه المادة في هذا القانون، نحن لا نحتاج إلى استخدام المواد الكيميائية في مكافحة الشغب، لماذا نضعه هنا؟ نحن لا نحتاج له، نحن الذي نستخدمه هي مواد طبيعية وهو فلفل مطحون، هذا الذي قالته الجهات المعنية، وإذا هذا التفسير خطأ وليس صحيحا، إذا سنجعله، فالتفسير غير صحيح، وإذا جعلناه في هذا القانون فالكلام - كلام الجهات المعنية - غير صحيح وهو تغطية على المواد الحقيقية وهي مواد كيميائية وليست مواد طبيعية، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب الدكتور عبدالعزيز حسن أبل تفضل.

النائب الدكتور عبدالعزيز حسن أبل :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، معالي الرئيس في الحقيقة أنا أضم صوتي إلى صوت كل من يعترض على وضع هذا البند تحت الأغراض غير المحظورة لأن - سلمك الله - معالي الرئيس نحن بمجرد أن نتحدث عن الأسلحة الكيميائية، الأسلحة الكيميائية في طبيعة الحال تعني الأسلحة لأغراض عسكرية أو لأغراض إبادة الخصم، وأعتقد أن الحديث اليوم عن الأسلحة الكيميائية هي دائما تتصف بصفات غير إنسانية، تتصف بإبادة، عندما نضعه في قانون لنا ثم نشير إلى مكافحة الشغب ونعتبر أن مكافحة الشغب بالأسلحة الكيميائية غير محظور، هذا يشوه صورة البحرين! نحن نرسل إشارة للعالم كله أننا غدا لو خرج عندنا شغب سنستخدم أسلحة كيميائية بغض النظر عن مكوناتها، يكفي هذا ليسيء للبحرين، أنا أعتقد أن أولا: هو يشير إشارة سلبية إلى أن هناك نوايا غير حسنة بمعنى أن أي شغب قد نستخدم معه أسلحة ينطبق عليها أو مسمى كيميائية، فلماذا نضع أنفسنا بهذا الوضع الذي أساسا يثير اللغط هنا ويثير تساؤلات حول وضع الحكومة، حول وضع الدولة أن المواطنين نستخدم معهم أسلحة؟ مثلما صار في حلبجة وبعدها يحاكم رئيس دولة ويعدم بهذا السبب، وأنا أعتقد أنه من الضروري أن نغلق هذا الباب ونشطب هذه المادة، لأنها تفتح بابا غير مبرر، لسنا بحاجة مطلقا عندما نتحدث أولا عن الأسلحة الكيميائية في البحرين أعتقد أنه باب ليس لنا، لا ننتج أسلحة كيميائية ولا - إن شاء الله - سنحتاج لها، فمنعها من باب أولى، خوفا من أن يكون هناك بعض المجانين يستخدمونها، ولكن أن ندخل فيها قضية الشغب معناها أن نتيح لقوى الأمن أن تتهم غدا بأنها تستخدم أسلحة كيميائية ضد شعب البحرين، فلماذا نضع هذا الموضوع ونفتح علينا بابا؟ أنا أقترح كما يقول الأخوة شطبها وشطب الفقرة هـ من المادة 3، حتى لا نسمح بالإساءة لصورة البحرين والالتهامات، ثم تخرج في الإنترنت بأن حكومة البحرين تحضر لاستخدام أسلحة كيميائية ضد المواطنين مهما كان الشغب الذي يقوم به، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل لنقطة النظام.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، نقطة نظام فقط استيضاح، لأن الذي قاله ممثل الداخلية الأخ الرائد حمود سعد حمود يحتاج إلى وقفة، إن هذه المادة أولا لا تنظم أو القانون كله لا ينظم التعاطي مع الشغب، على أساس أن نقول أنه إذا حذفت هذه المادة سوف نستخدم أسلحة فتاكة بزيادة، فالمعملية ليست واضحة، دستوريا أو قانونيا هذا قانون جديد، أولا: إذا هذا قانون جديد فيه ممارسة الآن هل هذه الممارسة ليست مقننة أو ما شابه؟ هذا يحتاج إلى توضيح ثانيا: النقطة

الثانية في هذا الموضوع هي: استخدام لفظة أننا إذا حذفنا هذه المادة مع التأكيد - بداية كلام الأخ - أن جميع مواد مكافحة الشغب خالية من المواد الكيميائية المحظورة والذي قلناه واستندنا إليه في المداخلة الأولى بما أنها خالية فلا نحتاج أن نزج بمكافحة الشغب هنا، هذا التأكيد يستوجب القلق الذي أحدثه الآن أنه في حالة رفعها سوف نضطر أن نستخدم مواد أشد فتكا، صراحة هذا الموضوع يجب أن يتوقف الشخص عنده، بأننا إذا حذفنا هذه المادة التي تقول أن استخدام مواد مكافحة الشغب والخالية تماما من المواد الكيميائية الخطرة الممنوعة، إذا حذفناها سنضطر لأن نستخدم أسلحة فتاكة يهددنا بالعنقودي أو شيء آخر، وأنا أتوقف هنا صراحة، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، العميد عبدالرحمن عبدالله النجدي المستشار القانوني بوزارة الدولة لشؤون الدفاع تفضل.

المستشار القانوني بوزارة الدولة لشؤون الدفاع :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، معالي الرئيس الاتفاقية أو مشروع القانون بحظر إنتاج الأسلحة الكيميائية بني على اتفاقية دولية، والاتفاقية الدولية نصت على هذا البند، في المادة الأولى من الاتفاقية البند الخامس " تتعهد كل دولة طرف بعدم استعمال عوامل مكافحة الشغب كوسيلة للحرب" إذن هي ماذا؟ 145 دولة أو أكثر من 145 دولة قد وقعت على هذه الاتفاقية، وهي لا تقرأها ولكن تستخدمها كمادة، ونحن دائما نقول بخصوص وزارة الداخلية أنها تستخدم أسلحة، هي لا تستخدم أسلحة، ولا تستخدم حتى المواد الكيميائية، ولكن القانون نص على استخدام كمية محددة ومعينة من المواد الكيميائية رغم أن البحرين خالية ولم تستخدم، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة رئيس اللجنة تفضل.

النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة (رئيس اللجنة) :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، طبعاً من حق النواب أن يبدوا كل ما عندهم من ملاحظات وهذا حق أصيل لهم، ولكن الذي يؤسفني أننا راجعنا القانون منذ ثلاثة أسابيع كان أسبوعين ونحن أخرناه ثلاثة، ولم تصلنا الملاحظة إلا على قضية العقوبة، وأعتقد الآن أنا أتوقع أننا سندور في حلقة مفرغة، وسنضطر في النهاية لسحب المشروع، ولكن الآن أنا أطلب سحب المشروع، ولكن أطلب من الأخوة الذين عندهم كل الملاحظات أن يأتوا بكل الملاحظات، وأن يقرؤوا القانون - ليس في الجلسة بل قبل الجلسة - وأنا أرتب لقاء مع وزارة الداخلية ومع المعنيين ونناقشه مادة مادة، ونحن أيضاً حريصون على الكل وإذا يوجد شيء يضر بالناس لا نريده وإذا يوجد شيء ينفع البلد نريده، فأنا أسحبه وأطلب من الإخوة أن يأتوا بالملاحظات كلها ويوكل بعض الأشخاص...

الرئيس :

شكرا، رئيس لجنة الشؤون الخارجية والدفاع والأمن الوطني يطلب سحب المشروع للجنة لمزيد من الدراسة ويشترط بأن الذي لديه مقترح أو رأي حول الموضوع أن يقدمه كتابة، من هم الموافون على إعادته للجنة؟

النائب الشيخ حسن علي سلطان :

يا أبا محمد (معالي الرئيس خليفة بن أحمد الظهراي) هذا الكلام خطير أنت الشخص الأول في المجلس المسؤول عنه، كيف يهدد الشعب بأسلحة فتاكة؟ ما هذا؟ ما معنى هذا الكلام؟

الرئيس :

صل على النبي، وجزاك الله خيراً، من هم الموافون على إعادته للجنة؟

(أغلبية موافقة)

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ الرائد حمود سعد حمود مدير إدارة المحاكم العسكرية بوزارة الداخلية هل عندك توضيح؟ تفضل.

مدير إدارة المحاكم العسكرية بوزارة الداخلية :
شكرا معالي الرئيس، معالي الرئيس لو سمحت الذي أحب أن أقوله إنني لم أتطرق لأسلحة فتاكة، قلت أسلحة
قد تكون أشد قسوة، والمقصود في حالة حذف هذه الفقرة لن نستخدم الأسلحة المسيلة للدموع - العبوات المسيلة للدموع
- فهذا قد يؤدي بنا للتطرق لأسلحة أخرى كاستخدام الطلقات المطاطية، وهذا منع تماما معالي الرئيس، ونحن لا نود أن
نتطرق لهذا الجانب أو استخدامه.

Participants in conversation

- S** is the Speaker.
- GS** is General Secretary, Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud.
- SQ** is MP Dr Sami Ali Qumber, a member of Al Minbar.
- MK** is MP Mohammed Ebrahim Khalid, a member of Al Minbar.
- AM** is MP Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Muawdah, a member of Al Asalah.
- AHM** is MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, a member of Al Minbar.
- AKE** is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, a member of Al Minbar.
- DEC** *is the Director of Environmental Control in the General Authority for Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife, Dr Afaf Al Shu'la.*
- HS** is MP Sheikh Hassan Ali Sultan, a member of Al Wefaq.
- DLD** *is Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs*
- MM** is MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz'al, a member of Al Wefaq.
- DMC** *Director of Military Courts, the Ministry of the Interior, Major Hmoud Sa'ad Hmoud.*
- HHS** is MP Mr Haider Hassan Al-Sutri, a member of Al Wefaq.
- AA** is MP Dr Abdul Aziz Hassan Abul, an independent MP.
- KM** is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq.
- LC** *is the Legal Counsel, the Ministry of State for Defence, Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi.*
- HM** is MP Halim Murad, a member of Al Asalah.

The Excerpt

- 1 **S:** ... Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of the
2 Council, please read the next item on the agenda.
- 3 **GS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) The report of the Committee
4 on Foreign Affairs, Defence and National Security on the bill on the
5 of developing, producing, stocking and using chemical
6 weapons and on destroying them, attached to the Royal Decree No.
7 79 of 2007. Thank you.
- 8 **S:** Brother Rapporteur, please.
- 9 **MK:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. *Bismillāh Arraḥmān arraḥīm*⁸². I request to
10 insert the committee's report in Hansard.
- 11 **S:** Who agrees on inserting the committee's report in Hansard?
12 **(Majority agree.)**
- 13 **S:** So the report gets inserted in Hansard.
14 **(See Attachment No. 8.)**
- 15 **S:** Are there any comments on the principles and foundations of the
16 bill? Brother MP Dr Sami Ali Qumber, please.
- 17 **SQ:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have words of reproach on this
18 topic. This topic was withdrawn from the sitting last December
19 although the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
20 and National Security was ready. And to satisfy the wishes of some
21 MPs, the issue was withdrawn at the time. I really do not know
22 what amendments were made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
23 Defence and National Security that have required almost two months;
24 there have been no amendments. I demand an explanation from the
25 Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and
26 National Security about this matter.
- 27 **MK:** I have a clarification, the Rapporteur has a clarification, Mr Speaker.
- 28 **S:** Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu'awdah,
29 the Chairman of the Committee. Do you have a comment?
- 30 **MK:** I have a comment, Mr Speaker.
- 31 **S:** Brother Rapporteur, go on please.
- 32 **MK:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course, the withdrawal of the bill, Mr
33 Speaker, was made at the request of the brothers in Al Wefaq. On

34 page 103 if you notice, there is, number 13, the perspectives of the
 35 brothers. After discussing the matter and voting on it, the committee
 36 have decided not to take some of the views received through the
 37 feedback of the brothers. Therefore, the bill was returned in its
 38 original form as agreed upon with the committee. Thank you.

39 **S:** Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu'awdah, the
 40 Chairman of the Committee, please.

41 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, the change or comment was not
 42 at the heart of the law or its articles. The issue was in the estimates
 43 of the punishment. The brothers wanted it as it is in the law of Oman.
 44 There are other laws similar to the law of Bahrain, but there is a
 45 point I would like to mention, and I will mention it later,
 46 *inshā'a Allah*⁸³. Thank you.

47 **S:** Thank you. Who agrees on the principles and foundations of the
 48 project?

49 **(Majority approve.)**

50 **S:** Brother Rapporteur, please read the preamble to the bill.

51 **MK:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) *The preamble: The committee*
 52 *recommends approving the preamble as contained in the bill.*

53 **S:** Are there any comments on the preamble to the project?

54 **(No comments.)**

55 **S:** Who agrees to the preamble as approved by the committee?

56 **(Majority agree.)**

57 **S:** Brother Rapporteur, please read Article 1.

58 **MK:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (reading) *Article 1, the committee*
 59 *recommends the approval of the article as contained in the bill.*

60 **AKE:** Mr Speaker.

61 **S:** Brother MP Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, please.

62 **AHM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. In Article 1, page 111, a word is missing
 63 on page 111, line 3. 'Any chemical substance not listed in one of
 64 the tables'. I believe that this was dropped by the writer. So I request
 65 more attention. Riot Control Agent.

66 **S:** Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu'awdah,
 67 The Chairman of the Committee, please.

68 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Yes. Because the law – and this was dropped
69 and we have an official letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
70 It is supposed to be "any chemical substance that is not mentioned."
71 **S:** This is what brother MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi has
72 mentioned? The missing word?
73 **AM:** Yes, it is missing, and there is an official letter from the Foreign
74 Ministry clarifying that. Thank you.
75 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
76 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Emphasis on this observation has
77 been based on the fact that it exists in the International Convention
78 and it is not included. But article or Item d "some non-prohibited
79 purposes", d says: "those related to implementing the provisions of
80 the law, including purposes of local riot control." I believe it is
81 inappropriate to say that this agreement is to be used for controlling
82 local riots. This agreement – the Chemical Weapons Convention – to
83 make an exception is as if to condone domestic riot control to, to
84 permit the use of ground pepper, I mean teargas, about which the
85 brothers have talked. I believe that "including purposes of local riot
86 control" should be deleted. My suggestion is to delete "including
87 purposes of local riot control" because it is suspicious. This is because
88 it makes it possible to use riot control agents whether included or not
89 in the banned substances, such as pepper spray. Thank you.
90 **S:** Thank you, Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please.
91 **AKE:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I have reservations about the same item, d.
92 Of course Article 1 excludes non-prohibited purposes. I request
93 amending the article by deleting section d. If you notice, on page
94 106 there is a summary of the views of the Ministry of Health. There
95 are also some reservations from the Ministry of Health about the use
96 of chemical weapons in fighting riots. That means that there is
97 an observation and fear*. I mean, from practical experience – of course
98 not that I participate in riots – Mr Speaker, using teargas is
99 semi-fatal. It causes suffocation, dizziness and you may *trūḥ fīhā*⁸⁴.
100 You may be killed and could die, especially if teargas is directed
101 at dense residential areas. This is happening in some areas. There

102 are other legal instruments. I demand the deletion Article d because
 103 I perceive it as a prohibited use of chemical weapons in riots as it
 104 may lead to death, lead to dizziness. We have children and women.
 105 Sometimes teargas is even used in wrong places in the first place.
 106 There is a law that must be codified so that it is used within the
 107 framework of the law. I have a reservation about this article and ask
 108 for the deletion of section d. Thank you.

109 **S:** Thank you. Dr Afaf Al Shu'lah, the Director of Environmental
 110 Control in the General Authority for the Protection of Marine
 111 Resources, Environment and Wildlife, please.

112 **DEC:** *Thank you, Mr Speaker. Assālmū 'alaikum⁸⁵. Thank you for the*
 113 *invitation. We have a note on Article 1. This article aims at defining*
 114 *some of the terms used in this law. What is stated herein defines what*
 115 *comes in Article 4. All that are prohibited in the non-prohibited purposes*
 116 *are covered by Article 4. However, they are limited to scientific research,*
 117 *preventive purposes and other purposes that are not listed in this definition.*
 118 *Hence, Article 4 should be amended or the definition should be modified.*
 119 *Thank you.*

120 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Sheikh Hassan Ali Sultan, please.

121 **HS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I regret to say that, from experience, and
 122 I do not assert this, but there is a huge possibility that there are
 123 deaths – to be precise – that happened in the light of* using teargas.
 124 Not directly, but after some time. Maybe on different grounds we
 125 did not mention, for specific interests and for public accounts*, but
 126 there are elderly people and there are youngsters, after a period of
 127 using teargas in riot control, after some time fatalities occurred*.
 128 All the relatives – I say that I do not assert this and I am trying to
 129 be objective – the relatives point out that the cause of death was
 130 the use of teargas. I therefore request the deletion of this passage from
 131 this article. Thank you.

132 **S:** Thank you. Dr Yousuf Abdul Karim Mohammed, the Director of the
 133 Legal Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, please.

134 **DLD:** *Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact I would just like to comment on Article*
 135 *1 of the bill. In fact, we must mention that there has been an in*

136 *depth discussion with the Technical Secretariat of the Convention*
137 *on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, regarding this national bill.*
138 *The discussion took three years and was based on direct contact with*
139 *the counsel in the convention. The law was constructed in accordance*
140 *with each single article in the Convention of the Prohibition,*
141 *Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their*
142 *Destruction. The national bill, however, has reversed the core and*
143 *the objectives of the convention. I assume that the section on riot*
144 *control substance has been misunderstood. The same applies to the*
145 *non-prohibited purposes. I would like to draw the attention of the*
146 *MPs to the fact that Article 2 of the Chemical Weapon Convention*
147 *defines the term that we use in the bill. Article 2, paragraph 9,*
148 *defines the non-prohibited substances in accordance with the*
149 *convention. Then comes Article d as mentioned in the bill and*
150 *includes local riot control purposes. The core of the convention*
151 *has been totally reversed. We are trying to follow an international*
152 *agreement as closely as possible, but the same convention demands*
153 *the country to support riot control as mentioned in the given definition.*
154 *Thank you, Mr Speaker.*

155 **S:** Thank you. Are there any other comments? Brother MP Khalil
156 Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.

157 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, let us take things logically.
158 When we say that law enforcement-related purposes and riot
159 control agents are completely free of banned chemical weapons,
160 something which means that we do not need to list them in the
161 law that prohibits the use of chemical weapons, if –and this is a
162 confirmation*– if the tools of implementing the law are totally free
163 of chemical weapons, then we do not need to mention them in this
164 law, [they do not need to] be excluded. If there is any suspicion that
165 there may be any articles in the law, or in what is required by any
166 article in relation to law enforcement, even a suspicion that is equal
167 to a single atom out of a million that there are chemicals, then this
168 article must be nullified. That is because the process should be
169 accurate. But not prohibiting agents that contain chemicals or

170 chemicals that are banned*, then we do not need to add it. If there
 171 is any suspicion, then removing it is a must. Thank you, Mr Speaker.

172 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz'al, please.

173 **MM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course we are with— I mean when we
 174 talk about banning manufacturing, selling, stockpiling, producing
 175 and developing chemical weapons – we are aware of the consequences
 176 of such an act on a small country such as Bahrain, where there are
 177 dense gatherings in both the capital and other areas. May God
 178 protect all, by His will, from the wickedness of Al Qaeda and
 179 anyone similar or any of their followers should they get access to
 180 a chemical formula and use it in one of these gatherings, God forbid.
 181 But when it comes to discussing the legality of this point, d, if we
 182 go back to, I just want to, Mr Speaker, to link this point so we
 183 understand it. Can we, Mr Speaker, go to Article 3 Item e, which
 184 speaks about the use of— Mr Speaker, can everyone pay heed to me
 185 because this is a very important point...

186 **S:** We are now in Article 1. Do not go to Article 3.

187 **MM:** No, no. In order to understand this I need to import a text from
 188 there, because Article 3 e states that “the use of riot control agents
 189 as a means of war: It is prohibited to use riot control agents as a
 190 of war”. If this was not possible, then the law would not have
 191 issued something about it. This means that the means of fighting
 192 riots can be a means of war. When an enemy wants to attack the
 193 sovereignty of the country, the law guarantees that no means of riot
 194 control is used against them. However, the same law allows the use
 195 of means of riot controldomestically. We protect external enemies
 196 attack our sovereignty from a substance that we allow to be
 197 used against a citizen, whatever was the mistake made by the citizen.
 198 This big paradox, Mr Speaker, will place the people who are in
 199 charge of law enforcement in a very critical position. The country,
 200 the government and we will all be indicted all the time. I request
 201 scrutinising, comparing and contrasting Item d in Article 1 and
 202 Item e in Article 3. Mr Speaker, the risk here is when we issue that*
 203 a substance that is a used in riot control can be an instrument of war,

204 while we prohibit using it against an external enemy attacking or
 205 invading us. Thank you, Mr Speaker.

206 **S:** Thank you. Brother Major Hmoud Sa'ad Hmoud, the Director of
 207 the Military Courts, the Ministry of Interior, please.

208 **DMC:** *Thank you, Mr Speaker. When it comes to our comments regarding*
 209 *the implementation of the provisions of the law, I would like to clarify*
 210 *that all the riot control substances used by the Ministry of Interior are*
 211 *permitted internationally and there is no objection to them or to their*
 212 *impact on health. They are all made from natural substances and have*
 213 *no effect at all. Toxic chemical agents and chemical weapons are defined*
 214 *in the same article. The definition is hence clear. Riot control agents do*
 215 *not include chemical weapons or toxic chemicals. If you delete this item*
 216 *it will mean that Riot Control Police would be forced to use powerful*
 217 *and lethal weapons and that may be fatal. We, Mr Speaker, we prefer*
 218 *to retain this item in the article in order to avoid the use of weapons that*
 219 *are more cruel to gatherings. It must be stressed that the Minister of*
 220 *Interior issued directives to the Riot Control Police to only use these*
 221 *weapons on a very narrow range. Thank you, Mr Speaker.*

222 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Mr Haider Hassan Al-Sitri, please.

223 **HHS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think we should seriously consider such
 224 critical topics. What my colleague MP Mohammed Yousuf Al-Miz'al
 225 has said is very clear, that this is forbidden to be used with an enemy
 226 in war, a war with military weapons, killing and fighting. It is allowed
 227 to be used in encountering citizens. Therefore no need for a large
 228 explanation* or a long argumentation. Let us be serious. The concerned
 229 party says that what is being used are natural substances and that thus
 230 there is no need to mention it* in this article of this law. We do not
 231 need to use chemicals in riots, so why do we mention it* here? We
 232 do not need it. What we are using is a natural substance, which is
 233 ground pepper; this is what the concerned authorities said. If this
 234 interpretation is wrong and not true, if we will place it*– then the
 235 explanation is incorrect. If we place it in this law*, then the remarks
 236 of the concerned party are incorrect and are a concealment of the
 237 real substances, which are chemicals and not natural substances.

238 Thank you, Mr Speaker.

239 S: Thank you. Brother MP Dr Abdul Aziz Hassan Abul, please.

240 AA: Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, in fact, I join everyone

241 objecting to adding this item under the non-prohibited purposes.

242 That is because, *sallamkallah*⁸⁶, Mr Speaker, as soon as we talk

243 about chemical weapons, chemical weapons by nature mean

244 weapons used for military purposes or for the purpose of

245 exterminating an opponent. I think that chemical weapons are

246 always characterised with anti-humanitarian qualities, associated

247 with genocide. When we insert this in our law, and then we mention

248 them in fighting riots and consider that fighting riots with chemical

249 weapons is unprohibited, this will tarnish the image of Bahrain! We

250 send a message to the whole world tomorrow that whenever we

251 have a riot, we will use chemical weapons, regardless of their

252 components. This is enough to offend Bahrain. I believe that first:

253 it sends a negative message indicating that there are bad intentions,

254 that for any disturbance we may use weapons to which we apply the

255 title 'chemical'. So why do we put ourselves in this situation that

256 essentially raises the argument here and raises questions about the

257 status of the government, about the status of the state, and about

258 citizens being dealt with using weapons? As it happened in Halabcha⁸⁷

259 and then the ruler of the country was indicted and executed for that

260 reason. I believe it is necessary to shut this door and delete this

261 article because it opens an illegitimate door for no good reason.

262 First of all, we do not need at all to talk about chemical weapons in

263 Bahrain. I believe that the issue is not our concern. We neither

264 produce chemical weapons, nor, hopefully, will we need them. They

265 should, *a fortiori*, be prohibited for fearing that some outrageous

266 people may use them. However, to get into the issue of riots means

267 to allow security forces to be accused in future of using chemical

268 weapons against the people of Bahrain. Why put this topic forward

269 and open a door? I suggest, like the brothers said, that we write it

270 off and delete Item e from Article 3, so as not to allow the distortion

271 of the image of Bahrain or [allow] accusations. Then it will emerge

272 on the Internet that the government of Bahrain is preparing for the
 273 use of chemical weapons against the citizens whatever disturbance
 274 they are causing. Thank you, Mr Speaker.

275 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please, a point
 276 of order.

277 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. A point of order, only a clarification. That
 278 is because what the Representative of the Home Office, Brother
 279 Major Hmoud Sa'ad Hmoud, has said needs to be considered. First,
 280 this article does not regulate— or this whole law does not regulate
 281 dealing with riots, so as to say that if you omit this article then
 282 more deadly weapons will be used. The process is then not clear.
 283 Constitutionally or legally, this law is new. First: if this new law now
 284 included practising*, is not this practice codified or something?
 285 This needs to be clarified. Secondly. The second point in this topic
 286 is the use of the word* that if we removed this article while stressing
 287 that, according to what the brother has mentioned at the beginning
 288 of his speech, that all riot control agents being free of prohibited
 289 chemicals, something that we have mentioned and referred to in
 290 the first intervention, if they were free [from prohibited agents]
 291 then we would not need to involve [the topic of] anti-riot here. This
 292 assertion requires the anxiety* that it has caused now, so that its
 293 would necessitate the use of more lethal materials.
 294 Honestly, this topic requires consideration. To say that if we drop
 295 this article that states that the use of riot control agents and that are
 296 completely free of dangerous and prohibited chemicals*, if we drop it
 297 then we will have to use lethal weapons, this is threatening us with
 298 a cluster bomb or something similar. I stop here honestly. Thank you,
 299 Mr Speaker.

300 **S:** Thank you. Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi, Legal Counsel,
 301 the Ministry of State for Defence, please.

302 **LC:** *Thank you, Mr Speaker. Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm⁸⁸. Mr Speaker,*
 303 *the convention banning the production of chemical weapons was based*
 304 *on an international convention, which provided for this item in the first*
 305 *article of the convention, Item 5: "Each country undertakes not to use*

306 *riot control agents as a means of war." So what is it? One hundred*
 307 *and forty five countries or more have signed this convention, and they*
 308 *do not approve it, but use it as an article. It has always been said*
 309 *that the Ministry of Interior uses weapons, but the ministry does*
 310 *not use weapons, not even chemical substances. Still, the law*
 311 *provided for the use of specific amount of chemicals despite the fact*
 312 *that Bahrain does not own and have not ever used any. Thank you,*
 313 *Mr Speaker.*

314 **S:** Thank you. Brother Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu'awda, the
 315 Chairman of the Committee, please.

316 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Of course, it is the right of MPs to share
 317 the comments they have and this is an inherent right for them. But
 318 I regret that we reviewed this bill three weeks ago. It was [supposed
 319 to be] two weeks and we postponed till three, and yet we had not
 320 received any comments except on the issue of punishment. I think
 321 now I believe that we will be locked in a vicious circle, and we will
 322 eventually be obliged to withdraw the bill, but now I am asking for
 323 the withdrawal of the bill, but I ask the brothers who have all the
 324 comments to come with all the comments, and to read the law – not
 325 during the sitting but before the sitting. I will arrange a meeting with
 326 the Ministry of the Interior and discuss this, article by article, with those
 327 involved. We are also concerned about the good of everyone and if
 328 there is anything that harms people then we do not want it. If there
 329 is something that benefits the country then we want it. I withdraw
 330 the bill and I ask all the brothers to come with all their observations,
 331 and to authorise some people...

332 **S:** Thank you. The Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
 333 Defence and National Security has requested the withdrawal of the
 334 project in order to carry out further study, and he requests that everyon
 335 who has a proposal or an opinion on the subject offer it in writing.
 336 Who agrees to returning it to the committee?

337 **HS:** Abu Muhammad (Mr Speaker), this is a critical thing to say. You
 338 are the first person in the Council to be responsible for it. How can
 339 the people be threatened with deadly weapons? What is this? What

340 does this mean?
341 S: *Şalli ‘annebi* [i.e. Stay calm], and *jazaka Allah khair* [i.e. thank you]⁸⁹.
342 Who agrees with returning it to the committee?
343 (Majority agree.)
344 S: Thank you. Brother, Major Hmoud Sa’ad Hmoud, the Director of the
345 Military Courts, the Ministry of Interior. Do you have any
346 clarifications? Please.
347 **DMC:** *Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, if I may, what I would like to say*
348 *is that I did not touch upon lethal weapons. I said weapons that may be*
349 *more cruel. What I intend to say is that in the case of deleting this*
350 *section, we will not use teargas weapons – teargas canisters – and this*
351 *may lead us to use other weapons, such as the use rubber shots, and this*
352 *is completely banned, Mr Speaker, and we do not wish to dwell on this*
353 *aspect or use such weapons.*

2. Bahraini Detainees Abroad From Sitting 2:2:25 a, 22nd April 2008, pp. 19–20

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

... الأخ النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي تفضل .

النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، الرد العجيب الذي ورد على المقترح برغبة في مسألة إرجاع المعتقلين، والمقصود معروف وكان هذا المقترح قديما، وكان هناك مقترح ثان الآن أيضا قدم، ولكن الرد رد إنشائي، والعجيب أن المواطن البحريني - أنا أشعر - إذا كان يهان داخل بلده فمن الأولى أن يهان في الخارج، الأخ المرباطي خمس سنوات معتقل وكان المقصود بالمقترح من أجله، وهو موجود في دولة شقيقة تربطنا معها روابط أمنية، وإلى الآن أهله لا يحصلون أو بالكاد يحصلون على زيارته ولعلها في السنة مرة، والجانب الآخر ثمانية معتقلين من البحرين الآن أو موقوفين في إحدى الدول الشقيقة ولا يعرف السبب وغيبوا تماما ولم يلتق أهلهم بهم، التقى شخص واحد فقط، ذهب للزيارة وحصل على لقاء والباقي لم يحصلوا على زيارة، وسفارتنا تقول: نحن على اتصال، كلمة (اتصال) لا تعرف ما هي! هل من المعقول مواطن أجنبي اليوم أو أمريكي يعتقل في البحرين وتبقى السفارة الأمريكية للحظة من دون أن تخرجه؟! نحن ثمانية أشخاص جامعيين ومدرسين ثانوي بجانب المرباطي خمس سنوات الآن يبقون في غياهب سجون دولة أخرى، لا أحد يتصل بهم ولا أحد يعرف عنهم شيئا، والضغط على النواب، يا نواب ماذا عملتم؟ يا نواب ماذا تصنعون؟ يا نواب أولادنا معتقلون؟ وكل ما أرادوا أن يخرجوا في الشارع أعطيناهم الأبر لتخديرهم ونقول لهم: لا تخرجوا ولا تسبوا الفوضى في الشارع، بعد ذلك إذا خرجت الفوضى تتجه لنا الحكومة وتقول لنا: أنتم يا نواب ماذا تصنعون؟ أنتم تقولون ماذا نصنع؟ والناس تقول لنا ماذا نصنع؟ إذن كيف التكيف؟ أرجو من وزارة الخارجية ووزارة الداخلية المعنيين بهذا الأمر التحرك السريع، المواطن البحريني يهان، رئيس كتلة الوفاق يوما ما وفي دولة ما يريد أن يدخل ويمنعونه من الدخول وهو يحمل الجواز الخاص الذي يسمح له بالدخول، هل لهذه الدرجة يبقى البحريني مهانا في كل منطقة والأجنبي يكرم؟! وشكرا سعادة الرئيس.

Participants in conversation

DS is the Deputy Speaker.

AHM is MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, a member of Al Wefaq.

The Excerpt

- 1 DS: ... Brother MP Abdul Hussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, please.
- 2 AHM: Thank you, Mr Speaker. The wondrous response to the proposal for
- 3 returning prisoners – and the purpose is well-known and this proposal
- 4 was long time ago. There was a second proposal, which has also
- 5 become outdated*. But the response is a descriptive essay, and

6 surprisingly, the Bahraini citizen – I feel – if he gets disgraced in his
7 own country, then, *a fortiori*, he gets disgraced abroad. Brother
8 Al-Mirbati has been under arrest for five years, and the proposal
9 was intended for him. He is now in a country with which we have
10 security links. Up to now, his relatives have not got or barely get to
11 visit him, perhaps once a year. Additionally, there are eight
12 detainees from Bahrain who are now either under arrest in the country
13 or in one of the neighbouring countries and the reasons for their arrest
14 are still unknown. They are totally neglected and their families have
15 not met them. One person met them; he went and got the chance to
16 meet them but not the rest. And our embassy says: we are in contact.
17 The meaning of the word ‘contact’ is unknown! Is it possible today
18 that a foreign citizen or an American gets arrested in Bahrain and
19 the U.S. Embassy waits for a moment without releasing him?! We
20 have eight people, university graduates and secondary school
21 teachers beside Al-Mirbati. It has been five years now. They are
22 staying in the midst of other countries’ prisons, no one contacts them
23 and no one knows anything about them. The pressure is on the
24 MPs. MPs, what have you done? MPs, our children are arrested.
25 Every time they want to go out in the streets we opiate them and say:
26 Do not go out and cause chaos in the streets. Then if chaos starts,
27 the government will say to us: What are you, MPs, doing?
28 Do you ask us what we are doing? And the people are asking
29 us what we are doing? So how to cope? I request the Ministry of
30 Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, who are involved in
31 this matter, to make a fast move. Bahraini citizens are disgraced.
32 One day in a specific country the Head of the Al Wefaq Party wants
33 to enter, but gets stopped while he is carrying his authorised passport.
34 Do Bahrainis stay disgraced in every region while foreigners are
35 honoured?! Thank you, Mr Speaker.

3. Insulting the Government **From Sitting 2:2:25 b, 22nd April 2008, pp. 43–44**

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

... الأخ النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم تفضل لنقطة النظام.

النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، أنا أريد إيضاح من سعادة السيد عبدالعزيز بن محمد الفاضل وزير شؤون مجلسي الشورى والنواب، العبارة التي قالها الآن هناك نواب يسيئون لحكومتهم، إذا تقدم النائب بانتقاد يكون هذا إساءة للحكومة؟!!

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

لا، لا، اسمح لي، اسمح لي، هو يقصد كلمات فعلا نسمعها اليوم وغير اليوم تكون خارج النطاق، وتمس فعلا هيبة الحكومة، وأنا نبهت...

النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم :

لا، أنا تعليق - سعادة الرئيس - أن هناك فرقا من عبارة تصدر في أثناء الحديث، وبين عبارة يعتمد النائب الإساءة لحكومته...

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

والله النوايا لا يعلم بها إلا الله.

النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم :

اليوم الرسائل التي أرسلت إلينا أليست إساءة للنواب؟ اقتراحات هزيلة، عبدالرحيم المرباطي لا يعلمون عنه أين هو موجود، في أي سجن، أليست هذه إساءة، يعني هل يتعامل المجلس، والله أنا أخاف أتكلم وسعادة الأخ وزير شؤون مجلسي الشورى والنواب ينسحب...

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

لا، لا، لا ينسحب.

النائب عبدالجليل خليل إبراهيم :

فنحن لا نعرف كيف ندير الحوار بيننا وبين الحكومة يا سعادة الرئيس.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس):

الأخ النائب عبدالحليم عبدالله مراد تفضل.

النائب عبدالحليم عبدالله مراد :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، يقول الوزير بأن النواب يسيئون إلى الحكومة، خروج الوزير بهذا الشكل من هذا المجلس أليست إهانة لهذا المجلس؟ وبالتالي إهانة لشعب البحرين كله، هذا أولا. ثم الردود الخاطئة التي تأتي بتوقيع من رئيس الوزراء، فيها أخطاء فادحة بالملايين، أليست هذه إساءة لهذا المجلس؟ أنا أثني على كلام الأخ النائب حمد خليل المهندي، هذا الوزير يجب أن يستجوب ومن هذه الجلسة لأنه لا يوجد وقت، وشكرا سعادة الرئيس.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

...شكرا،

The Participants in this conversation

DS is the Deputy Speaker.

AKE is MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, a member of Al Wefaq.

HM is MP Halim Murad, a member of Al Asalah.

The Excerpt

- 1 DS: Brother MP Abdul Jalil Khalil Ebrahim, please. A point of order.
- 2 AKE: Thank you, Mr Speaker. I need a clarification from Mr Abdul Aziz
- 3 bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel, the Minister of Shura and the House of
- 4 Representatives. He is saying that there are MPs who insult their
- 5 government. If an MP puts forward a criticism then this is an insult
- 6 to the government?!
- 7 DS: No, no. Excuse me, excuse me. He really means the words we are
- 8 hearing today and days other than today and which are out of range*,
- 9 and that actually impinge on the prestige of the government. I have
- 10 alerted the...
- 11 AKE: No, I— a comment, Mr Speaker, that there is a difference between
- 12 something said during a conversation and something that an MP
- 13 says to deliberately insult his government...
- 14 DS: Actually, intentions are not known except by God.
- 15 AKE: The messages that were sent to us today, were not they an insult
- 16 to the MPs? Poor proposals, Abdul Rahim Al-Mirbati they do not
- 17 know where he is, in which prison, is not this an insult? I mean,
- 18 does the Council deal— actually I am afraid that if I talk the Brother
- 19 Minister for Shura and Representatives Councils will withdraw ...

20 **DS:** No, no, he will not withdraw.
21 **AKE:** We do not know how to manage a dialogue between us and the
22 government, Mr Speaker.
23 **DS:** Brother MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad, please.
24 **HM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. The minister says that the MPs insult the
25 government. The Minister leaving the Council this way, is not this
26 an insult to this council? And therefore an insult to all the people
27 of Bahrain? This is first. Then the wrong responses that come signed
28 by the Prime Minister, responses with millions of serious errors, is
29 not this an insult to the Council? I commend the speech of Brother
30 MP Hamad Khalil Al-Mohannadi. This minister should be
31 interrogated, starting at this sitting, because there is no time. Thank
32 you, Mr Speaker.
33 **DS:** Thank you...

4. Condemning a 'terrorist' plot From Sitting 2:3:10, 30th Dec. 2008, pp. 95–99

الرئيس :

الأخ النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة أؤكد لك أننا إن لم نزد على الإخوة في الشورى في المشاركات لا نقل، هذا سجله علي وتأكد، بارك الله فيك، سعادة الأخ نوار علي المحمود الأمين العام للمجلس تفضل.

الأمين العام للمجلس :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، اقتراح بصفة مستعجلة بإصدار بيان شجب واستنكار للمخطط الإرهابي، صاحب المعالي خليفة بن أحمد الظهراني حفظه الله ورعاه رئيس مجلس النواب الموقر، يسعدنا أن نتقدم بطلب اقتراح بصفة مستعجلة بشأن إصدار بيان شجب واستنكار للمخطط الإرهابي الذي كان يستهدف مملكتنا ويهدف إلى زعزعة الأمن والاستقرار فيها وترويع الأمنين والأبرياء فيها، مع إشاداتنا في الوقت ذاته بجهود الأجهزة الأمنية وإجراءاتها التي حالت دون وقوع الحادث الإرهابي وإفشال مخططات الإرهابيين، وتفضلوا بقبول فائق التحية والتقدير. مقدمو

الاقتراح: النائب الشيخ جاسم أحمد السعيد، النائب حسن سالم الدوسري، النائب خميس حمد الرميحي، النائب الشيخ ناصر عبدالله الفضالة، النائب الدكتور عبداللطيف أحمد الشيخ، النائب سامي محسن البحيري، النائب عبدالحليم عبدالله مراد، النائب لطيفة محمد القعود، النائب عبدالله خلف الدوسري، النائب الشيخ حمد خليل المهندي، النائب الشيخ إبراهيم محمد بوصندل، النائب عيسى أحمد أبو الفتح، النائب الشيخ إبراهيم محمد الحادي، النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم، وشكرا.

الرئيس :

شكرا، هل يوافق المجلس على إدراج هذا المقترح على جدول أعمال الجلسة؟ من هم الموافقون على إدراج هذا المقترح على جدول أعمال الجلسة؟

(أغلبية موافقة)

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب الشيخ علي سلمان أحمد تفضل.

النائب الشيخ علي سلمان أحمد :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، مع التقدير إلى الإخوة الذين تقدموا بهذا الاقتراح، ليست هذه المرة الأولى التي تعلن فيها وزارة الداخلية عن اكتشاف خلية – بحسب ادعاءات وزارة الداخلية – تنوي القيام ببعض الأعمال الإرهابية، وسبق أن مررنا بعدد من الأحداث ولم يتصد مجلسنا إلى تلك الأحداث ولم تصدر بيانات من المجلس، أنا أقترح على إخواني مقامي المقترح هذا الأمر بأن يعبروا عن وجهة نظرهم خارج إطار المجلس من خلال بيانات فردية أو مشتركة، لأننا إذا طرحنا هذا الأمر الآن نحن عندنا وجهة نظر، سنتحفظ على الموضوع وسنبدي وجهة نظرنا وسنطالب بإبراز وجهة نظرنا، وأنا لا أحب لهذا المجلس أن يدخل الآن في حالة اختلاف في وجهات نظر، أحب أن أبقى موقف العمل الذي تم ونبقى موقف غرة، لذا أرجو من إخواني بأن يأخذوا هذا المقترح ويعلنوه من خلال الكتل، من خلال المستقلين ببيانات مستقلة، وإلا سأضطر للتدخل لتبيان وجهة نظري وسأخرج ببيان آخر يعبر عن كتلتي وأحاول أن أنشره، وأعتقد أن هذا جدل أرجو أن يتجنبه المجلس على نفسه، وشكرا جزيلا، هذه هي المداخلة الأولى.

الرئيس:

شكرا، الأخ النائب محمد يوسف مزعل تفضل.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، سبق في 2 فبراير 2003م أن أعلن في هذا البلد عن خلية إرهابية تدربت في أفغانستان، تدربت في لبنان، التحقيقات كشفت عن مجموعة من الأسلحة (كلاشينكوفات)، عبوات، رصاص، مخازن أسلحة، كلها لم يكن لهذا المجلس كلمة في إدانة قبل أن تتم المحاكمة، بل أكثر من ذلك أن الموضوع قد تمت تغطيته وإذابته، لا أعلم، في أي مكان في أي بحر تمت إذابة هذا الموضوع وإنهاؤه من دون محاكمات ومن دون أن يكون له هذا التصعيد الذي نراه في الصحافة، في الإعلام، في الشارع، في كل مكان، على أي أساس يتم وصف المتهمين وأركز وأضع 10 خطوط تحت كلمة المتهمين بأنهم مذنبون، بأنهم مجرمون، بأنهم خوارج، بأنهم تكفيريون كما جاء على لسان بعض النواب، على أي أساس يشارك عضو في هذا المجلس، في مجلس النواب في برنامج تلفزيوني ليصف المتهم بأنه مجرم وبأنه حاقق وبأنه قاتل؟ على أي أساس يتم وصفهم بذلك؟ أليس المتهم بريء حتى تثبت إدانته؟ أليس المادة 20 في دستور البلاد الذي أقسمتم على احترامه هذه المادة – المادة 20 – ألا تقول "المتهم بريء حتى تثبت إدانته في محاكمة قانونية"؟ هل تثبت الإدانة حتى تقول إنهم ليسوا أبرياء؟ إنهم أبرياء بحكم الدستور حتى يثبت القضاء النزيه أنهم غير ذلك، لا يجوز لكم ذلك، يجب أن تكون هناك محاكمة قانونية تؤمن للمتهم فيها كما هو نص الدستور الذي أقسمتم عليه، تؤمن له فيها الضمانات الضرورية لممارسة حق الدفاع، الضمانات الضرورية، أسأل جميع الصحفيين، أسأل جميع أبناء الشعب، أسأل النواب، أسأل القضاة، أسأل المحامين، أن تؤمن لهم فيها الضمانات الضرورية لممارسة حق الدفاع في جميع مراحل التحقيق، في جميع وأضع 10 خطوط تحت كلمة جميع مراحل التحقيق، أمامكم مستشار وكان سابقا في القضاء العسكري، فليقل لنا ما هي جميع مراحل التحقيق؟ هل تم تأمين محام لهؤلاء المتهمين في جميع مراحل التحقيق؟ أم أنه تم التحقيق معهم من دون أن يكون هنالك محام؟ المحامون اعترضوا على ذلك، معالي الرئيس إذا كنتم قد أدنتم هذه التي كان فيها أسلحة وليس أنهم ينوون تهريب أسلحة، لينوون، يقولون إنهم ذهبوا وكذا والنقوا وفعلوا، هذه أسلحة (كلاشينكوفات) صورتها الوزارة ووضعتها في الصحافة، احترمت القسم يا – معالي الرئيس – الذي أقسمت عليه، لا تدن برينا بحكم الدستور، وليس من حق هذا المجلس أن يصدر بيانا ليدين برينا بحكم الدستور ما لم تتم المحاكمة العادلة التي فيها جميع...

الرئيس:

النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة تفضل...

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

لا، التي توفر فيها جميع الضمانات، معالي الرئيس ما لم توفر جميع الضمانات للمحاكمة العادلة...

النائب جلال فيروز غلوم :

معالي الرئيس.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

النزيهة، نعم نحترم القضاء، نريد لهذا القضاء أن يكون قضاء نزيها، نريد لهذا القضاء... لا، لا، نريد لهذا القضاء أن يكون نزيها وأن يكون هذا المجلس هو المعزز للقضاء النزيه، المعزز للعدالة، لا يجب أن ينساق الوطن كل الوطن، لا يجب أن ينساق الوطن وكل الوطن وراء اتهامات لم تثبت بحكم القانون، لم تثبت بحكم القضاء، هناك ادعاءات من المحامين بالتعذيب...

النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة :

دعنا نكمل عنك الأخ النائب محمد يوسف مزعل.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

لا يمكن، لن نسمح بأن يصدر من هذا المجلس بيان، لا يجوز أن يصدر من هذا المجلس بيان...

الرئيس :

طيب نكتفي.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

إن أردتم أن تصدروا بياناً فأصدروه بأنفسكم، أدينوا الأبرياء قبل أن يحاكموا، لن أسمح، لن أسمح لهذا المجلس، ولا خير في هذا المجلس إذا أدان بريئاً قبل أن يحاكم، لا يجوز لهذا المجلس، لا يجوز لهذا المجلس، لا يجوز لهذا المجلس التدخل فيما لا يعنيه، أنتم لستم مجلس قضاء، أنتم مجلس شعب، أنتم مجلس نواب، أنتم مجلس تشريع، أنتم مجلس رقابة، راقبوا الوزارات في أعمالها، راقبوا القضاء في عمله، راقبوا الداخلية في عملها، نعم تعاوننا ونتعاون، ونحن أحرص الناس على أمن هذا الوطن، وعلى سلامة هذا الوطن، لا نريد ولا نقبل ولا نرضى أبداً لهذا المجلس أن تكون له كلمة على بريء، لا يجوز لكم ذلك، أنا أقول: اسحبوا البيان، اسحبوا البيان ...

الرئيس :

لا يسحب...

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

لا يجوز لكم ذلك، كونوا حريصين على أمن الوطن، كونوا حريصين على أمن الوطن.

الرئيس :

هذه بداية، هذا بيان ...

(وهنا انتقل النائب محمد يوسف مزعل واقفاً وسط القاعة)

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

اسحبوا البيان، فليسحب البيان، لن أجلس، ليس من حق هذا المجلس التدخل، ليس من حقه معالي الرئيس، ليس من حق المجلس أن يتدخل، ليس من حق المجلس أن يتدخل، لا تدينوا الأبرياء، لن أتحرك من هذا المكان حتى تسحبوا هذا البيان، لا خير في المجلس، يجب أن تكون هناك محاكمة عادلة، لا يجوز لك، لا يجوز لك يا معالي الرئيس، لن أتحرك، احبسوني اطرءوني، ليس لكم الحق ...

الرئيس :

محمد المزعل سأخرجك أنا...

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

ليس لكم الحق، كمجلس نواب ليس لكم الحق، لا يجوز لكم...

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

على كيفك.

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

اخرس...

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

اطلع.

الرئيس :

ترفع الجلسة لمدة عشر دقائق، أغلق (المايكروفون).

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

أغلق (المايكروفون) مثلما تريد، أغلق ما تريد.

الرئيس :

لا تمثل علينا، (بس اسكت).

النائب محمد يوسف مزعل :

افعل ما تريد أن تفعله، ليس من حق المجلس أن يدين بريئاً...

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

سجلوا المسرحية. هل هذا أسلوب؟!

الرئيس :

ترفع الجلسة لمدة عشر دقائق.

(رفعت الجلسة في تمام الساعة 12:25 ظهرا ثم استؤنفت في تمام الساعة 1:15 ظهرا)

الرئيس :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، بسم الله وبعون منه نواصل جلستنا، يوجد 4 مواضيع في الواقع إذا لم يكن عددها 5، لا يحضرني العدد، الموضوع الذي عليه الخلاف ورفعت الجلسة بسببه نتركه كآخر موضوع إذا وافق المجلس وأبدأ في بقية المواضيع، وسوف نتلوها واحدا تلو الآخر، وعن موضوعنا إن شاء الله لكل موضوع حل، ولا نختلف إن شاء

الله في مصلحة وحدتنا في هذا المجلس، لن نختلف إن شاء الله، والعقلاء مازال لهم الفرصة لاحتواء الموضوع، الأخ نوار علي المحمود الأمين العام للمجلس تفضل بقراءة الموضوع الثاني.

النائب الدكتور علي أحمد عبدالله :
التصويت على التأجيل.

الأمين العام للمجلس :
التصويت على تأجيل البند الأول.

الرئيس :
كلها دقائق وننتهي من هذه المواضيع لا نحتاج إلى التصويت، الأخ نوار علي المحمود الأمين العام للمجلس تفضل.

The Participants in the conversation

The three major Participants in this conversation

S is the Speaker, Khalifa Al-Dhahrani.

MM is MP Mohammed Al-Miz'al, member of Al Wefaq.

AS is MP Sheikh Ali Salman, Head of Al Wefaq.

Other participants

GS is the General Secretary, Nawwar Al-Mahmoud.

JDF is MP Jawad Fayrooz, a member of Al Wefaq.

AA is MP Adel Al-Mu'awdah, a member of Al Asalah.

MK is MP Mohammed Khalid, a member of Al Minbar.

DS is the Deputy Speaker, MP Dr Ali Ahmed, a member of Al Minbar.

The Excerpt

- 1 **S:** ...Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary, Please.
- 2 **GS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) *A proposal to urgently issue a*
- 3 *statement condemning and disapproving of the terrorist plot. Your highness*
- 4 *Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dhahrani, may Allah guard and protect, we*
- 5 *are pleased to put forward our proposal to urgently issue a statement*
- 6 *condemning and disapproving the terrorist plot that targeted our*

7 *Kingdom, and that aimed at upsetting security and stability, and*
8 *startling secured and innocent people. We would like to simultaneously*
9 *praise the efforts of security services and procedures that prevented*
10 *the terrorist incident and the plots of the terrorists.*
11 *Suggestion proposed by:*
12 *MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa'eedi*
13 *MP Hassan Salim Al-Dossari*
14 *MP Khamis Hamad Al-Rumaihi*
15 *MP Sheikh Nasir Abdillah Al-Fudhalah*
16 *MP Dr Abdul Latif Ahmed Al-Sheikh*
17 *MP Sami Muhsin Al-Buhairi*
18 *MP Abdul Halim Abdullah Murad*
19 *MP Latifa Muhammed Al-Qu'ood*
20 *MP Abduallah Khalaf Al-Dossari*
21 *MP Sheikh Hamad Khalil Al-Muhannadi*
22 *MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Bu-Sandal*
23 *MP Essa Ahmed Abu-Alfat'h*
24 *MP Sheikh Ebrahim Mohammed Al-Hadi*
25 *MP Sheikh Muahmmmed Khalid Ebrahim*
26 *Thank you.*
27 **S:** Thank you. Does the Council agree on inserting this suggestion in
28 the agenda of the sitting? Who are the ones who agree on including
29 this suggestion in the agenda?
30 **(Majority agree.)**
31 Thank you. Brother MP Sheikh Ali Salman Ahmed, please.
32 **AS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. With respect to the brothers who submitted
33 the proposal, this is not the first time that the Ministry of the Interior
34 announces the discovery of a cell – according to the claims of the Ministry
35 of the Interior – intending to carry out some terrorist acts. We have
36 already gone through a number of events and our council did not
37 address those events and we did not issue any statements in the
38 council. I suggest that my brothers who made this suggestion express
39 their point of view outside the framework of the Council through
40 individual or joint statements because if we raise this issue now,

41 we will then have a stance. We will have a reservation on the subject
42 and we will express our point of view. We will also ask to highlight
43 our point of view. I would not like this council to get now into a
44 state of disagreement. I would like to keep the position of the work
45 done and keep the position of Gaza,⁹⁰ so I ask my brothers to take
46 this proposal and declare it through the parties, through individuals
47 with independent statements; otherwise I will be obliged to
48 intervene to illustrate my point and I will come up with another
49 statement representing my party and I will try to publish it. I think
50 this is an argument the Council should keep itself away from. Thank
51 you very much. This is the first intervention.

52 **S:** Thank you. Brother MP Mohammed Yusif Miz'al.

53 **MM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Previously on 2 February, 2003
54 a terrorist cell was discovered in this country (*balad*). It was
55 trained in Afghanistan, trained in Lebanon. The investigations
56 revealed a range of weapons: Kalashnikovs, explosives, bullets,
57 weapons stores, all this and the Council did not use a word to condemn
58 it prior to the trial. Moreover, the issue has been concealed and
59 dissolved. I do not know where, in which sea, this topic has been
60 dissolved and terminated without a trial and without the escalation
61 that we see in the press, the media, in the street, everywhere. On
62 what basis are the defendants described –and I emphasize and draw
63 ten lines under the word ‘defendants’ – as guilty, as criminals, as
64 *khārijites*⁹¹, *takfūrriyyūn*⁹² as stated by some MPs? On what basis
65 does any member of this council, the Parliament, participate in a
66 TV program to describe the defendant as a criminal, as hateful
67 and a killer? On what basis are they described as such? Does not
68 Article 20 of the Constitution of the country (*bilād*), which you
69 vowed to respect, state that “The accused is innocent until proven
70 guilty in a court of law”? Has there been a conviction that allows
71 you to state that they are not innocent?
72 They are innocent according to the Constitution until fair
73 administration of justice proves otherwise. It is not right to do this.
74 There must be a legal trial in which the accused one is guaranteed

75 what the Constitution states. He has to be given necessary
 76 guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence. The necessary
 77 guarantees. I ask all the journalists, I ask all the people, I ask the
 78 MPs, I ask the judges, and I ask lawyers to provide them with the
 79 necessary guarantees for the exercise of the right of defence at all
 80 stages of the investigation, and I draw ten lines under all stages of
 81 investigation. Before you stands an advisor who was formerly in the
 82 Military Judiciary. Let him tell us what the entire stages of the
 83 investigation are. Has there been a lawyer assigned to these
 84 defendants at all stages of the investigation? Or have they been
 85 interrogated without a lawyer? Lawyers have objected to that, Mr
 86 Speaker. If you had condemned this one that had weapons, and not
 87 that they intend to smuggle weapons. They say they went and so,
 88 and met and did. These weapons (Kalashnikovs) of which the
 89 ministry took photos and published them in the press. Respect
 90 your vow, Mr Speaker, the vow you took. Do not condemn someone
 91 whom the Constitution considers innocent. The Council has no right
 92 to issue a statement condemning someone who is innocent under the
 93 Constitution unless a fair trial in which all –
 94 **S:** MP Sheikh Adel Abdulrahman Al-Mu'awdah, please.
 95 **MM:** –No, in which all guarantees, Mr Speaker, unless all guarantees
 96 for a fair trial –
 97 **JDF:** Mr Speaker
 98 **MM:** –fair. yes, we respect the judiciary. We want this judiciary to be
 99 fair. We want this trial... No, no, we want this judiciary to be fair,
 100 and for this council to enhance fair judiciary, to enhance justice.
 101 The homeland, the whole homeland, should not be dragged, the
 102 homeland and the whole homeland should not be dragged behind
 103 charges that have not been proven by law, have not been proven
 104 by the judiciary. There are allegations made by lawyers of torture –
 105 **AA:** Allow us to take over from here, Brother MP Mohammed Yusif
 106 Al-Miz'al.
 107 **MM:** This is not possible. We will not allow this statement to be issued
 108 by this council. It is not right for the Council to issue this statement.

109 S: All right, we stop here.

110 MM: If you want to issue a statement, do it yourselves. Condemn the
 111 innocents before a trial. I will not allow this. I will not allow this
 112 council, and there is no good in this council if it condemns an
 113 innocent person before his trial. This council must not, this council
 114 must not interfere in what is not its business. You are not a judicial
 115 council, you are a parliamentary council, the Council of
 116 Representatives, you are a council of legislation. You are an
 117 observation board. Watch the ministries in their work, watch the
 118 judiciary in its work, watch the Interior in its work. Yes, we have
 119 cooperated and we cooperate, and we are extremely intent on the
 120 security of this homeland, and the safety of this homeland. We do
 121 not want and do not accept and do not agree on this council having
 122 a say against an innocent person. You may not do this, I say.
 123 Withdraw the statement, withdraw the statement.

124 S: It does not get withdrawn.

125 MM: You cannot do that. Be intent on the security of the homeland.
 126 Be intent on the security of the homeland.

127 S: This is a start; this is a statement –

128 **(MP Al-Miz'al moves to the middle of the chamber.)**

129 MM: Withdraw the statement. Have the statement withdrawn. I will not
 130 sit. This council has no right to intervene, it is not right to do so, Mr
 131 Speaker. The Council has no right to intervene, the Council has no
 132 right to intervene. Do not condemn the innocent. I will not move
 133 from this place until you withdraw the statement. There is no
 134 good in the Council. There must be a fair trial. You⁹³ may not, you⁹³
 135 may not, Mr Speaker. I will not move. Arrest me. Evict me.
 136 You have no right –

137 S: Mohammed Al-Miz'al, I will get you out myself –

138 MM: You have not the right to. As a council you have no right.
 139 You have no right.

140 MK: *ʿala kaifuk?*⁹⁴ [i.e. Is it up to you?]

141 MM: Shut up —

142 MK: *Itla*⁹⁵ [i.e. Get out.]

143 S: Sitting adjourned for ten minutes.
 144 Turn off^ the microphone.
 145 MM: Turn off^ the microphone. As you^like.
 146 Turn off what you^ want.
 147 S: Stop acting. Enough, stop talking.
 148 MM: Do what you^ want to do. The Council has no right to condemn an
 149 innocent person.
 150 MK: Record the play. Is this proper behaviour?
 151 S: Sitting adjourned for ten minutes.
 152 **(Sitting adjourned at 12:25 p.m. and then resumed at 13:15 pm.)**
 153 S: *Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm*⁹⁶, in the name of Allah and with
 154 His support we continue our sitting. There are four issues in fact, if
 155 not five. I do not recall the number. The issue causing disagreement
 156 and because of which the sitting got adjourned, we leave it until the
 157 end if the Council agrees, and I will start with the rest of the issues,
 158 one after the other. As for our issue, inshā Allāh⁹⁷, there is a solution
 159 for every matter. We do not disagree about our interest in our unity
 160 as a council. We will not disagree by the will of God. Brother Nawwar
 161 Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary, please read the next topic.
 162 DS: Voting on postponement.
 163 GS: Voting on postponing the first item.
 164 DS: It is only a matter of minutes and we will finish these issues. We do
 165 not need voting. Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, General Secretary,
 166 please.
 167 **(The Council moves to the other items. The transcription does not**
 168 **mention the topic again. It is not clear if they actually discussed it**
 169 **or not.)**

5. The Arrest of Political Activists From Sitting 2:3:13, 27th Jan. 2009, pp. 4 –6

الرئيس :

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم، والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا ونبينا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين، أيها الإخوة الحضور جلستنا هذه سائلين الله سبحانه وتعالى العون والتوفيق. أحبيكم بتحية الإسلام فالسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته، نبدأ البند (1) وهو: تلاوة أسماء الإخوة المعتذرين عن عدم حضور الجلسة حيث اعتذر سعادة النائب الشيخ علي سلمان أحمد، كما تغيب عن هذه الجلسة سعادة النائب عبدالله خلف الدوسري. البند (2) وهو: التصديق على مضبطة الجلسة الاعتيادية الثانية عشرة، هل هناك أي ملاحظات على مضبطة الجلسة الاعتيادية الثانية عشرة ؟ الأخ النائب الدكتور عبدعلي محمد حسن تفضل.

النائب الدكتور عبدعلي محمد حسن :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، السلام عليكم. معالي الرئيس في الصفحة 19، السطر الرابع والخامس من الأسفل، استبدال كلمة (نظيف)، الكلمة الصحيحة (نضيف) وليست (نظيف)، وشكرا.

الرئيس :

شكرا، هل توجد أي ملاحظات أخرى على مضبطة الجلسة الاعتيادية الثانية عشرة؟ الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته. طبعاً أنا سوف أعلق دقيقتين على الوضع الحاصل في البلد..

الرئيس :

دعنا ننهي التصديق أولاً!

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

دقيقتان يا معالي الرئيس حرصاً منا على استتباب الأمن.

الرئيس :

دعنا أولاً ننهي التصديق.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

إذن أعطني الكلمة بعد التصديق.

الرئيس :

هل توجد أي ملاحظات على مضبطة الجلسة الثانية عشرة؟

(لا توجد ملاحظات)

الرئيس :

إذن يتم التصديق على مضبطة الجلسة الاعتيادية الثانية عشرة مع إجراء التعديل الذي أشار له الأخ النائب الدكتور عبدعلي محمد حسن. الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، حرصا منا على السلامة واستتباب الأمن في البحرين، الأمر الذي جرى في اليومين السابقين له تداعيات خطيرة، والأمور لا تعالج بهذه الكيفية، ونحن نعتقد أن هناك طرقا كثيرة لمعالجة الأوضاع السياسية من غير أن ندخل في مناهات أمنية. المناهات الأمنية تعقد الوضع، لا تقدم حولا وإنما تزيد من الشحن وتزيد من تعقيدات الملفات المتركمة التي يمكن أن تحل سياسيا بدل أن تحل أمنيا. الاعتقال الذي جرى اعتقال غير مبرر، طريقة الاعتقال غير مبررة، الوفاق تطالب بأن يكون إفراج فوري عن المعتقلين الأستاذ حسن المشيمع والشيخ محمد حبيب المقداد. هناك إجراءات نحترمها ولكن بهذه الآلية هناك تعقيدات، وتجرب هذه التعقيدات إلى تعقيدات. هناك قضايا الآن، وهناك ازدواجية في التعامل، أنا أدري الآن بعض الإخوة يتحفظون ولكن إذا تمت المعاملة بازدواجية، هناك أناس تحاكم في بيوتهم، وآخرين يقال أنهم لم يمتثلوا لأمر النيابة، لكن هناك إجراءات إن لم يمتثل تبعث له مرة ومرتين وثلاث، وتذهب له إلى البيت بهدوء. أما أن تعتقل الإخوة في الليل عند الساعة 3 فجرا بهذه الطريقة غير المبررة! إذا كنا دولة مؤسسات وقانون علينا أن نندرج في الإجراءات. إذا أردنا من كل المواطنين احترام القانون على الحكومة والأجهزة الأمنية أيضا أن تحترم القانون ولا تتجاوزوه. هذه الأمور تعقد، هناك من يشتم الطائفة، وفي كل أسبوع يتدخل في هذه الأمور ولا أحد يسائله...

الرئيس :

أعطيتك الدقيقتين المطلوبتين، وهذا خارج الموضوع.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

أعتقد أننا محتاجون لتهديئة، وكل هدوء نقول إننا نطالب بالإفراج عن المعتقلين فورا، وشكرا.

الرئيس :

شكرا، ننقل إلى البند الثالث

The Participants in this conversation

S is the Speaker, MP Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Dharani.

AAH is MP Abdali Mohammed Hassan, a member of Al Wefaq.

KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq.

The Excerpt

- 1 S: ... Item 2: approving Hansard of the regular twelfth sitting. Are
- 2 there any comments on Hansard of the twelfth regular sitting?

3 Brother MP Dr Abdali Mohammad Hassan, please.

4 **AAH:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. *Assalāmu alaikum wa rahmat Allah*⁹⁸.

5 Mr Speaker, on page 19, fourth and fifth lines from the bottom,

6 replacing the word *nadhīf*, [i.e. clean], the correct word *nudhīf*

7 [i.e. we add] and not *nadhīf*. Thank you.

8 **S:** Thank you. Are there any other comments on Hansard of the

9 regular twelfth sitting? Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.

10 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker, *Assalāmu alaykum wa rahmatu Allah*.⁹⁹

11 Of course, I will comment for a couple of minutes on the current

12 situation in the country ...

13 **S:** Let us finish the ratification first!

14 **KM:** A few minutes, Mr Speaker, out of interest to our security.

15 **S:** Let us first finish the ratification.

16 **KM:** So allow me to speak after the ratification.

17 **S:** Are there any comments on Hansard of the twelfth sitting?

18 **(No comments.)**

19 **S:** So Hansard of the twelfth regular sitting is approved with the amendment

20 that has been made by Brother MP Dr Abdali

21 Mohammad Hassan. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq,

22 please.

23 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. As a result of our concern over safety and

24 security in Bahrain, what has happened in the previous two days has

25 serious implications. Matters are not addressed in this manner. We

26 believe that there are many ways to address political situations

27 without getting into security mazes*. Security mazes* complicate

28 the situation, they do not offer solutions but increase charge* and

29 increase the complexity of the accumulated files that can be solved

30 politically rather than being solved through security measures. The

31 arrest that took place was unjustifiable. The way the arrest was made

32 is unjustifiable. Al Wefaq demands an immediate release of

33 detainees Mr Hassan Mushaime' and Sheikh Mohammed Habib

34 Miqdad. There are procedures that we respect, but with this

35 mechanism there are complications. And complications lead to

36 complications. There are issues now, and there are double

37 measures. I know now that some of the brothers have reservations,
38 but if treatment is based on double measures. There are people who
39 are prosecuted while they stay at home, and others are said not to
40 have complied with the orders of the prosecution. But there are
41 procedures that if one does not comply, one gets sent for once and
42 twice and thrice, and they quietly go to him at his house. But to arrest
43 the brothers at night at 3 a.m. in this unjustifiable manner! If we are
44 a state of institutions and law, then we should move gradually in the
45 proceedings. If we want all citizens to respect the law, then the
46 government and security forces should also respect the law and not
47 bypass it. These matters are being complicated. There is someone
48 who blasphemes the sect, and every week he intervenes in these
49 matters and no one questions him ...

50 **S:** I have given you the requested two minutes, and this is off-topic.

51 **KM:** I believe we need to calm down. We calmly say that we demand
52 the release of the detainees immediately, and thank you.

53 **S:** Thank you. ...

6. Big and Small Thieves

From Sitting 2:3:23, 7th April 2009, pp. 103 – 104

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس):

شكرا، سعادة الأخ نوار علي المحمود الأمين العام للمجلس تفضل.

الأمين العام للمجلس :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، البند التاسع: الاقتراحات برغبة: سادسا: تقرير لجنة الشؤون الخارجية والدفاع والأمن الوطني بخصوص الاقتراح برغبة حول تشديد الإجراءات الأمنية للحد من حوادث السرقات في مملكة البحرين، والمقدم من سعادة النائب الشيخ جاسم أحمد السعيد، وشكرا سعادة الرئيس.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس):

شكرا، تفضل الأخ المقرر.

النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي (المقرر) :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، أطلب تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

من هم الموافقون على تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة؟

(أغلبية موافقة)

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

إذن يتم تثبيت التقرير في مضبطة الجلسة.

(انظر الملحق رقم 15)

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس):

شكرا، تفضل الأخ المقرر.

النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي (المقرر) :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، اللجنة محتارة، الأخ النائب الشيخ جاسم أحمد السعيد ذكر أن هذا للحد من السرقات فيطلب إجراءات أمنية مشددة، لكن لم يحدد السرقات عند الكبار أو الصغار...

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

اقرأ التوصية.

النائب عبدالحسين أحمد المتغوي (المقرر) :

توصية اللجنة: بعد الاطلاع على الدستور وعلى اللائحة الداخلية لمجلس النواب وبعد المناقشة والتداول توصي اللجنة بالموافقة على الاقتراح برغبة وذلك لوجاهة مبرراته، وشكرا سعادة الرئيس.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

شكرا، من هم الموافقون على توصية اللجنة بشأن الاقتراح برغبة المعروض على مجلسكم؟
(أغلبية موافقة)

The Participants in this conversation

SDS is the Second Deputy Speaker.

GS is the General Secretary.

AM is MP Abdulhussain Ahmed Al-Mitghawi, the Rapporteur, member of Al Wefaq.

The Excerpt

1 **SDS:** ... Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of the
2 Council, please.

3 **GS:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) *Item 9: Proposals, Sixth:*
4 *The report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and*
5 *National Security on the proposal for increasing security*
6 *measures to reduce incidences of theft in the Kingdom of Bahrain,*
7 *presented by MP Sheikh Jassim Ahmed Al-Sa'eedi.* Thank you,
8 Mr Speaker.

9 **SDS:** Thank you. Brother Rapporteur. Please.

10 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I request having the committee's report
11 inserted in Hansard.

12 **SDS:** Who agrees on inserting the report in Hansard?
13 **(Majority agree.)**

14 **SDS:** Then the report is inserted in Hansard.

15 **(See Attachment No. 15.)**

16 **SDS:** Thank you. Brother Rapporteur, please.

17 **AM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. The committee is confused. The Brother MP
18 Sheikh Jassim Al Sa'eedi mentioned that this is to reduce theft and
19 asked for strict security measures, but did not specify if he meant

20 theft by the big or small –
21 **SDS:** Read the recommendation.
22 **AM:** (Reading) *Committee's recommendation: After reviewing the Constitution*
23 *and the Bylaws of the Parliament, and after discussions and deliberations,*
24 *the committee recommends approving the proposal, due to the validity*
25 *of its justifications.* Thank you, Mr Speaker.
26 **SDS:** Thank you. Who agrees on the recommendation about the proposal
27 submitted to your council?
28 **(Majority agree.)**

7. Evesdropping

From Sitting 2:4:3, 20th Oct. 2009, p. 15

النائب الشيخ ناصر عبدالله الفضالة :

. الرسالة رقم 18 بشأن التنصت على المكالمات، أنا فيشكرا معالي الرئيس، بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم الواقع ليس واضحا لدي، واستشفت من الرد أنه، وسمعنا كثيرا أنه يتم تسجيل كل المكالمات، ثم بعد ذلك إذا حصلت شبهة أو حصلت مشكلة يتم إخراج هذه المكالمات واستخدامها هذا نوع من التنصت، فيجب أن نتكلم بوضوح في هذه المسألة، الاسترشاد ببعض الدول الأوروبية وبأمريكا، هناك احتجاجات كثيرة في تلك الدول على قضية التنصت، وهناك من يعطي الصلاحية لمن يسجل قضايا كبيرة جدا حدثت لأن هذا تدخل في خصوصية الناس وتسجيلهم حتى ولو يعلن، مكالماتي أنا؟ ومكالمات النواب وبقية الشخصيات الموجودة في البلد، والمواطن العادي أيضا؟ نريد توضيحا من هذه الهيئة أن تقول لنا إذا كان هناك تسجيل مستمر لكل المكالمات هذا أمر يحتاج إلى نظر وإلى إقرار من هذا المجلس، لأننا نعتبره نوعا من التنصت والتدخل في خصوصيات الناس، أحيانا الناس يتكلمون مع زوجاتهم ويكون عندهم أسرارهم الخاصة، فلماذا تحتفظ هذه الهيئة بتسجيلات لجميع المكالمات في البلاد؟ ونريد أن نعرف ردا فعلا واضحا في هذه المسألة، لأن هذا المجلس مطالب بأن يوقف هذه المسألة إذا كانت موجودة، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

Participants in this conversation

NF is MP Al-Sheikh Nasser Abdullah Al-Fudhalah, a member of Al Minbar.

The Excerpt

- 1 NF: Thank you, Mr Speaker. *Bismillāh arraḥmān arraḥīm*¹⁰⁰. Letter No.
- 2 18 on eavesdropping on phone calls, is in fact not clear to me.
- 3 I inferred from the answer that, and we have heard so often that,
- 4 all phone calls are recorded. After that, if there is a suspicion or a
- 5 problem the records are taken out and used. This is a kind of
- 6 eavesdropping. We must speak clearly about this issue, guided
- 7 by some European countries and by the U.S. There are many
- 8 objections in those countries to the issue of eavesdropping. There
- 9 are very big problems that have occurred because of this intervention
- 10 in the privacy of people and recording them, even if declared.
- 11 Who gives authority to who records my calls? And the calls of the
- 12 council and the rest of the figures in the country, and the average
- 13 citizen as well? We want an explanation from this institution, to tell
- 14 us if there is an ongoing recording of all phone calls. This matter
- 15 needs to be considered and approved by this council, because we
- 16 consider it a kind of eavesdropping and an interference in people's
- 17 privacy. Sometimes people talk with their wives and have their own

18 secrets, so why does this institution keep recordings of all calls in the
19 country? We want to know a very clear response* about this issue
20 because it is demanded that this council stop this matter if it exists. Thank
21 you, Mr Speaker.

8. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (a)
From Sitting 2:4:10, 22nd Dec. 2009, pp. 6 – 7

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق:

معالي الرئيس، إذا سمحت لي سأتكلم في موضوع آخر.

الرئيس:

الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق:

شكرا معالي الرئيس، معالي الرئيس أنت الشخصية الأولى في هذا المجلس وتهمك سلامة المجلس وسلامة أعضائه، والاعتداء الآثم على المواطن الدكتور عبدعلي محمد حسن غير مبرر، وأنا أقول المواطن لأنه ضرب وهو ليس من المعقول أن قوات ما يسمى بمكافحة الشغب أن مجرد أن يرى مواطنا مواطناً ولم يضرب وهو نائب، والمواطن ليس شاباً وسماته لا توحى بحرق إطار سيارة أو ما شابه، هذا مواطن، هل هذا شكله حرق إطار سيارة في الشارع؟ الاعتداء على المواطنين يمثل هذا الأسلوب، نريد منك وبما أنه يمثل الشعب وبما أنك مسؤول عن هذا المجلس...

الرئيس:

شكرا.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

أكمل معالي الرئيس، أن تسأل وزارة الداخلية عندما ضرب النائب الدكتور عبدعلي محمد حسن ضرب لأنه نائب؟ هذه مصيبة...

الرئيس :

يقدم رسالة.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

وإذا ضرب لأنه مواطن؟ هل هناك أوامر بضرب أي مواطن؟ لأنه خرج؟! وإذا كانت قوات الشغب وبغض النظر عن الأزمات الأمنية الموجودة، يمكن أن تعالج ولكن لا تعالج الأزمات الأمنية بأن يعتدى على أي مواطن يخرج من بيته ويضرب، أم تريد وزارة الداخلية من المواطنين أن يرفعوا أعلام بيضاء بمجرد خروجهم من بيوتهم أو من سياراتهم؟! معالي الرئيس قل لهم: لا، وأنا أقول: لا تقل له لا، بصوت هادئ، قل لهم: لا، لأن شعب البحرين لم يتعود أن يركع إلا لله، فلا يمكن أن تتواصل هذه الهجمات والاعتداءات، هناك أحداث أمنية تعالج بمستواها، ونحن نرفض أي تخريب أو ما شابه ولكن ليس بهذا الأسلوب، وشكرا معالي الرئيس.

الرئيس:

... شكرا،

Participants in this conversation

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq.

The Excerpt

- 1 **KM:** Mr Speaker, if I may, I will speak on another topic.
- 2 **S:** Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
- 3 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Mr Speaker, you are the chief figure in this
4 council and you care about the safety of the Council and the safety
5 of its members. The vicious attack on the citizen Dr Abdali
6 Mohammed Hassan is unjustified. I say “the citizen” because he was
7 beaten as a citizen, not as an MP. It is not reasonable that as soon as
8 the so-called Riot Control Forces, as soon as they see a citizen, and
9 this citizen is not young and whose traits do not suggest
10 burning a tyre or doing something similar, this is a citizen. Does he
11 look as if he burnt a tyre in the street? Assaulting citizens in such a
12 manner. We want you— and since he presents the people, and since you are
13 responsible for this council...
- 14 **S:** Thank you.
- 15 **KM:** I will finish Mr Speaker. ... to ask the Ministry of the Interior when
16 MP Dr Abdali Mohammad Hassan was beaten, was he beaten because
17 he was an MP? This is a disaster ...
- 18 **S:** A letter should be submitted.
- 19 **KM:** And if he was beaten because he was a citizen? Are there any orders
20 to beat citizens? Because he went out?! If Riot Control Forces, and
21 regardless of the current security crisis, can address— but they cannot
22 address the security crisis by attacking any citizen leaving his house
23 and getting him beaten. Or does the Ministry of the Interior want the
24 citizens to raise white flags as soon as they come out of their houses
25 or from their cars?! Mr Speaker, tell them: no. And I say: do not
26 say no in a calm voice. Tell them: no, because the people of Bahrain
27 are not accustomed to kneeling except before God. These attacks and
28 assaults cannot continue. There are security incidents dealt with at
29 their level*. And we reject any sabotage or the like, but not this way.

30 Thank you, Mr Speaker.

31 **S:** Thank you, ...

9. The Arrest of Abdali Hassan (b)
From Sitting 2:4:11, 29th Dec. 2009, p. 6

الرئيس :

الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق تفضل....

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

شكرا معالي الرئيس، السلام عليكم، معالي الرئيس في صفحة 7 في المضبطة أنا تحدثت عن موضوع الاعتداء الآثم على النائب، وليس لي بونايف (سعادة السيد عبدالعزيز بن محمد الفاضل وزير شؤون مجلسي الشورى والنواب)، في يوم الخميس صرحت وزارة الداخلية وقالت: إن النائب يكذب، وتقول: إن النائب يتلفظ بألفاظ نابية، هل تسمح يا بونايف بأن يقال عن نائب وعضو في مجلس النواب بأنه يتلفظ بألفاظ نابية ويكذب؟ أنت لا تسمح على وزارة الداخلية أو أي وزارة من الوزارات، هل مسموح لهذا المجلس أن يكون النواب به يكذبون أو أنهم يتهمون بأنهم يتلفظون بألفاظ نابية؟ فقط لحماية بعض الأفراد...

الرئيس :

يكفي...

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق :

أنا يا معالي الرئيس أرى سيارات مكافحة الشغب يخرجون و(يفحطون) مثل الشباب المراهقين، لا نريد أن نتكلم هنا زيادة، هناك تجاوزات، تعالج هذه التجاوزات.

Participants in this conversation

S is the Speaker.

KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq.

The Excerpt

- 1 **S:** ... Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.
- 2 **KM:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. *Assalāmu alaykum*¹⁰¹. Mr Speaker, on page
- 3 7 in Hansard, I spoke on the topic of the criminal attack against
- 4 an MP. I hope *Bu Nayif* (Mr Abdul Aziz bin Mohammed Al-Fadhel,
- 5 the Minister of Shura and Representatives Council) allows me. On
- 6 Thursday, the Interior Ministry declared: "The MP is lying" and they
- 7 say that the MP uttered abusive words. Do you, *Bu Nayif*, allow an
- 8 MP to be said to be using abusive words and lying? You do not allow
- 9 this with the Ministry of the Interior or any of the ministries. Is it

10 allowed for the Council to have people who lie or are accused of
11 uttering abusive words? Only to protect certain individuals...

12 **S:** Enough ...

13 **KM:** I, Mr Speaker, I see the cars of Riot Control Forces go out and skid
14 [their cars] like adolescents. We do not want to talk more here.

15 There are excesses. These excesses must be addressed.

10. Censoring a Speech From Sitting 10, 30th March 2010, pp. 78 –79

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

شكرا – جزاك الله خيرا – أنا لا أدري كم من الوقت أخذت وأنت تعد هذه الكلمة؟ ولكن لا شك أن بعض المصطلحات سوف نزيلها من مداخلتك صراحة.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

سعادة الرئيس لا، لا، عفوا، عفوا لماذا تزيلها؟ لم تبث في الإذاعة والوزير حضرته دائما يضحك لماذا تزيلها؟

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

سنزيلها وطالب بها في الجلسة القادمة.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

لماذا تزيلها يا سعادة الرئيس؟ لماذا؟ يكفي إزالة.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

يا بوعمار (النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم).

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

خلاص، دعه - الله يسلمك - لا تزل شيئا.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

سنزيل.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :

خلاص.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الثاني للرئيس) :

لا، سنحذف، أنا لا أعتقد، حينما تقول البحرين ديرة الغراب والغراب ينبغي أن نختار الألفاظ جيدا، حينما تقول إن الحرامية والحرامي، لماذا تذكر هذه المصطلحات؟ تقول البحرين (بيعت ببلاش)، تقول البحرين بيعت ببخس.

النائب الشيخ محمد خالد إبراهيم :
لا توجد مشكلة، احذف الذي تود حذفه وسأضعه في الانترنت وسأذيعه وسأقلها للإخوان في الوفاق، لا توجد مشكلة.

Participants in this conversation

SDS is the Second Deputy Speaker.

MK is MP Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Ebrahim, a member of Al Asalah.

The Excerpt

- 1 **SDS:** Thank you. *Jazāk Allah khair*¹⁰². I do not know how long it took you
- 2 to prepare this speech, but no doubt some of the utterances
- 3 will be removed from your intervention, honestly.
- 4 **MK:** Mr Speaker, no, no, excuse me, excuse me, why will you remove
- 5 them? They will not be broadcast on the radio and His Excellency
- 6 the minister was laughing all the time. Why remove them?
- 7 **SDS:** We will remove them, and you can demand them in the next sitting.
- 8 **MK:** Why will you remove them, Mr Speaker? Why? We have had
- 9 enough of removing.
- 10 **SDS:** *Bu Ammar* (MP Sheikh Mohammed Khalid Ebrahim).
- 11 **MK:** They are all right, leave them – *Allah yisalmuk*¹⁰³ – Do not remove
- 12 anything.
- 13 **SDS:** We will remove –
- 14 **MK:** They are all right.
- 15 **SDS:** No, we will delete— I do not think— when you say that Bahrain is the
- 16 land of the raven and the ravens. You should choose your words
- 17 properly. When you say that the thieves and the thief— why do you
- 18 say these words? You say that Bahrain was ‘given away like a freebie’
- 19 (*biblāsh*). You say that Bahrain was sold cheaply.
- 20 **MK:** No problem. Delete what you want to delete and I will post it on
- 21 the Internet and announce it. I will pass it to the brothers in Al Wefaq.
- 22 No problem.

11. Ativating a Punishment Decision From Sitting 2:4:28, 27th April 2010, p. 43

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس):

سعادة الأخ نوار علي المحمود الأمين العام للمجلس تفضل.

الأمين العام للمجلس :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، البند السابع، الاقتراحات برغبة: أولاً: تقرير لجنة الشؤون التشريعية والقانونية بخصوص الاقتراح برغبة بشأن تفعيل قرارات ديوان الخدمة المدنية بشأن معاقبة الموظفين العاملين بالقطاع الحكومي الخاضعين لديوان الخدمة المدنية الذين يدانون بتهمة المشاركة في المسيرات والاعتصامات غير المرخصة أو في أعمال الشغب والتخريب من قبل القضاء، المقدم من سعادة النائب عبدالله خلف الدوسري (مرحل من الجلسة العادية السابعة والعشرين التي عقدت يوم الثلاثاء الموافق 20 أبريل 2010م). وشكرا.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

شكرا، صراحة نتمنى من الحكومة بالنسبة إلى مقترح النائب الشيخ عادل عبدالرحمن المعاودة أن المجلس لن يناقش، سيصوت، نتمنى من الإخوة في الحكومة ألا يطيلوا في المداخلات، إن كانت هناك مداخلات، أنت معترض بو هيثم على القرار (النائب حسن سالم الدوسري)، خيرا إن شاء الله، الأخ النائب مكي هلال مكي مقرر اللجنة تفضل.

النائب السيد مكي هلال مكي (المقرر) :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، أرجو تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة، وشكرا.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس):

شكرا، من هم الموافقون على تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة؟
(أغلبية موافقة)

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس):

إذن يتم تثبيت تقرير اللجنة في مضبطة الجلسة.

(انظر الملحق رقم 7)

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

شكرا، تفضل الأخ المقرر بقراءة التوصية، في صفحة 704، رفض.

النائب السيد مكي هلال مكي (المقرر) :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، توصي اللجنة برفض الاقتراح برغبة لعدم كفاية المبررات، وشكرا.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

المبررات واضحة في الجدول، نحن اتفقنا إذا رفض فواحد له حق الكلام، الأخ النائب حسن سالم الدوسري تفضل.

النائب حسن سالم الدوسري :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، الحقيقة لدي ملاحظة فنية، جاء المقترح بتفعيل قرارات ديوان الخدمة المدنية، ولكن تقرير اللجنة جاء بخصوص الاقتراح برغبة بشأن معاقبة الموظفين، المقترح لم يأت بأنه يعاقب، "تفعيل قرارات ديوان الخدمة المدنية"، فأعتقد أن اللجنة أخطأت في هذا الأمر، وصوت أعضاء اللجنة على غير المقترح الذي أتى من سعادة النائب عبدالله خلف الدوسري، وشكرا سعادة الرئيس.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

شكرا، الإجابة يا إخوان إما من رئيس اللجنة أو من المقرر، الأخ النائب حسن سالم الدوسري يقول: إن تقرير اللجنة أتى خلاف الرغبة الأصلية، الرغبة الأصلية هي تفعيل قرارات ديوان الخدمة المدنية، والتقرير جاء عن معاقبة الموظفين، هل تريدون أن يعاد إلى اللجنة؟

النائب حسن سالم الدوسري :

أي لجان الآن؟ لا توجد لجان.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

من يقول ذلك بل توجد لجان، نسمع رئيس اللجنة ربما لديه مبرر، ونصوت عليه، الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق رئيس اللجنة تفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق (رئيس اللجنة) :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، الذي جاءنا هكذا، الذي وصلت إليه اللجان، وحتى التقارير، في صفحة 696 بخصوص الاقتراح برغبة بشأن معاقبة الموظفين العاملين بالقطاع الحكومي الخاضعين لديوان الخدمة المدنية، هل تريدون إرجاعه إلى اللجنة حتى نأتي به في الفصل القادم؟ نطلب تصحيح الإجراءات...

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق المقترح - يا إخوان دعونا نتكلم دقيقة واحدة - موجود عندك من ضمن المرفقات، وبكل أمانة في صفحتي 709 و710...

النائب السيد مكي هلال مكي (المقرر) :

696، هذا المقترح...

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

هذا هو توقيع النائب عبدالله خلف الدوسري، في صفحتي 709 و710، اقتراح برغبة بشأن تفعيل قرار ديوان الخدمة المدنية، الأخ النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق بفضل.

النائب خليل إبراهيم المرزوق (رئيس اللجنة) :

شكرا سعادة الرئيس، أنا أسحب التقرير لأنه إجرائيا غير صحيح، وشكرا.

رئيس الجلسة (النائب الأول للرئيس) :

شكرا، من هم الموافقون على أن تسترد اللجنة تقريرها لعدم السلامة في الإجراءات؟
(أغلبية موافقة)

The participants in this conversation

DS is the Deputy Speaker.

GS is the General Secretary, Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud.

HD is MP Hassan Salem Al-Dosseri, an independent MP.

KM is MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, a member of Al Wefaq.

MHM is Makki Hilal Makki, a member of Al Wefaq, the Rapporteur of sitting.

The Excerpt

- 1 DS: Brother Nawwar Ali Al-Mahmoud, the General Secretary of
- 2 the Council, please.
- 3 GS: Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) *The seventh item, proposals:*
- 4 *First: The report of the Legislative and Legal Affairs on the proposal*
- 5 *made for the activation of the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau*
- 6 *about the punishment of government sector employees under the Civil*
- 7 *Service Bureau who are convicted by the judiciary of participating in*
- 8 *unlicensed marches and sit-ins or in riots and vandalism. Made by MP*
- 9 *Abdallah Khalaf Al-Dossari (carried over from the regular sitting of the*
- 10 *twenty-seventh sitting held on Tuesday, 20th April 2010). Thank you.*
- 11 DS: Thank you. Truly, we hope that the government, when it comes to
- 12 the proposal of MP Sheikh Adel Abdul Rahman Al-Mu'awdah, that
- 13 the Council will not discuss it, but will vote. We hope that the

14 brothers from the government do not prolong interventions, if there
 15 are any interventions. You are objecting to the decision, Bu Haitham
 16 (MP Hassan Salem Al-Dossari). *Khayran inshā' Allah*¹⁰⁴. Brother MP
 17 Makki Hilal Makki, the Rapporteur, please.

18 **MHM (Rapporteur):** Thank you, Mr Speaker. Please insert the report of
 19 the committee in Hansard of the sitting. Thank you.

20 **DS:** Thank you. Who agrees on inserting the report of the committee
 21 in Hansard of the sitting?

22 **(Majority agree.)**

23 **DS:** So the report gets inserted in Hansard of the meeting.

24 **(See Supplement No. 7.)**

25 **DS:** Thank you. Brother Rapporteur, please read the recommendation
 26 on page 704, a refusal.

27 **MHM (Rapporteur):** Thank you, Mr Speaker. (Reading) *The committee*
 28 *rejecting the proposal due to the inadequacy of justifications.* Thank
 29 you.

30 **DS:** The justifications are clear in the table. We had agreed that if it
 31 was refused then one will have the right to speak. Brother MP
 32 Hassan Salem Al-Dosseri, please.

33 **HD:** Thank you, Mr Speaker. In fact, I have a technical comment. The
 34 proposal was for activating the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau,
 35 but the committee's report is on a proposal for punishing
 36 employees. The proposal did not come to punish. "Activation of
 37 the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau". I think that the
 38 committee has erred in this matter, and the members have voted
 39 on something other than the proposal that was made by MP
 40 Abdullah Khalaf Al-Dosseri.

41 Thank you, Mr Speaker.

42 **DS:** Thank you. The response, my brothers, should come either from the
 43 Chairman of the Committee or from the Rapporteur. Brother MP
 44 Hassan Salem Al-Dosseri says the report of the committee came to*
 45 other than the original proposal. The original proposal is for
 46 activating the decisions of the Civil Service Bureau, while the report
 47 was on punishing employees. Do you want it to be returned to the

48 committee?

49 **HD:** Which committees now? There are no committees.

50 **DS:** Who says so? There are committees. Let us hear from the Chairman

51 of the Committee. He may have a justification on which we can

52 vote. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, the Chairman of the

53 Committee, please.

54 **KM (Chairman of Committee):** Thank you, Mr Speaker. What came to us

55 is like this, that the committees have reached, and even the reports*:

56 on page 696 in regard to the proposal for punishing government

57 sector employees under the Civil Service Bureau. Do you want to

58 return it to the committee so that we present it in the next term?

59 We request correcting the procedures ...

60 **DS:** Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, the proposal – brothers,

61 let us talk a minute – is available with the attachments actually,

62 on pages 709 and 710 ...

63 **MHM (Rapporteur):** 696, this proposal ...

64 **DS:** This is the signature of MP Abdullah Al-Dosseri on pages 709 and

65 710. The proposal for the activation of the decisions of the Civil

66 Service Bureau. Brother MP Khalil Ebrahim Al-Marzooq, please.

67 **KM (Chairman of Committee):** Thank you, Mr Speaker. I withdraw the

68 report because of the invalidity of the procedures. Thank you.

69 **DS:** Thank you. Who agrees on returning the proposal to the committee

70 because of the invalidity of the procedures?

71 **(Majority agree.)**

End Notes

¹ The pages covering Romanisation of Arabic are in pages 10–19 of the book. More details of the system are available in the document on Arabic Romanisation provided by the Library of Congress on <http://www.loc.gov/catdir/cpsd/romanization/arabic.pdf>.

² Al ‘Amal is more appealing to the followers of Iranian Shiite leaders in Najaf.

³ The Al Wefaq Party won 43% of the seats with 26% of the total number of votes.

⁴ The third legislative period started with the Al Wefaq Party dominating the Council with 18 seats and with the Sunni parties’ dramatic failure; they secured a total of only five seats between the two parties (two for Al Minbar and three for Al Asalah), leaving 17 in total for independent Sunni candidates. However, all of the MPs from Al Wefaq resigned in March 2011 in protest at the government’s handling of riots in that period. This means the third legislative period is of a very different nature, and its ideological features deserve an individual study per se.

⁵ Despite the fact that there are Islamic matters, stances and opinions with a strong extremist or fundamentalist link, I still avoid using ‘Islamist’ as a description for them, as it is a subjective and simplistic description that indicates a tendency to label people, thoughts or actions with little or no attention to contexts and inputs. Further, the term builds on the assumption that fundamentalism is motivated by Islamic ideology rather than resulting from complex political, social and economic factors. As for the common use of ‘Islamist’ to refer to the ideology or ideologies that hold that religion and political systems should both be represented in Islam, I still do not call them ‘Islamist’ because every ‘Islamic’ movement does, in essence, believe in Islam having a political role and aspects, regardless of the vast differences in views on how this should and can be implemented. This means that there is no need for the term ‘Islamist’ to define a group calling for Islam to be implanted in politics. The calls to separate religion from politics have been made only by ‘non-Islamic’ people,

with little or no interest in or understanding of Islamic teachings and legislation. This means that they themselves may not correctly be labelled as Islamic movements (see further explanation in 2.2.2 and 2.2.3).

⁶ In this research, BHD is used as an abbreviation for Bahraini dialect instead of the initials BD, because BD in Bahrain is the symbol used for Bahraini Dinars, the local currency.

⁷ Despite the conflict associated with ruling issues after the death of the Prophet Mohammed, Shi'aism actually emerged after the martyrdom of Hussain, the son of Ali, in the Battle of Karbala in 680 (Mandaville 2007: 39). The Sunni legal and religious background accepts the rulings and the teachings of the four caliphs succeeding the Prophet Mohammed (from 632 until 661). Sunnis as a distinct group emerged as the followers of the four Imams (Malik, Abu Hanifa, al-Shafi'i, and Ibn Hanbal) in the mid-ninth century (ibid.: 34–35) as a contrast to Shiites. Sunnis currently comprise 90% of Muslims while the remaining 10% are Shi'a (ibid.: 11).

⁸ One form of *ijtihad* is known as *qiyas*, 'the method of analogical deduction' (Mandaville 2007: 350). One example of an issue that required *ijtihad* is smoking. As there were no cigars or cigarettes in the era of the Prophet or his Caliphs, this issue was measured against the concept of 'self-harming' and 'harming of others' in the Hadith of the Prophet Mohammed: 'عن أبي سعيد سعد بن سنان الخدري رضي الله عنه أن رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم قال : (لا ضرر ولا)' (i.e., 'No harming [of others] and no harming [of self].') (my translation) and the Qur'anic verse: (chapter 2, verse 195). i.e. 'And do not make your hands contribute to your destruction' (my translation). According to these major sources, smoking was rejected, but there was a disagreement as to what extent. Many of the Sunni imams see smoking as a prohibited act, *ḥarām*, and some look on it unfavourably, *makrūh*. On the other hand, the overwhelming majority of Shiite scholars have opted to issue a dislike fatwa on smoking on

the basis mentioned above. However, recently, one marji⁹, namely, Sayed Mohammed Hussain Fadhlallah (in Lebanon), issued a prohibition fatwa on smoking, which is considered a first in Shiite Islam.

⁹ Pronounced asālah, but I quote it as mentioned in the source text.

¹⁰ The political and religious standards and status of Saudi Arabia have gone through various stages and it is probably now an over-simplification to identify the Salafi principles, trends and motivations in present-day Saudi Arabia with those established by Mohammed Ibn Abdul Wahab.

¹¹ Ismail Safavid conquered Iran, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the period from 1500 to 1508 and then the Khurasan region and the city Heart in 1510 (Ward 2009: 43).

¹² Although it is common in Bahrain to label Bahrainis with Persian backgrounds as Huwala, not all Sunnis with Persian roots are Huwala, as the term ‘Holi’ (singular of Huwala) is supposed to indicate the Arabs who immigrated to Persia and then returned to the West coast of the Arabian Gulf. Thus, ‘Ajams can be either Sunnis or Shiites. However, I will follow the looser definition that uses ethnic labels to identify religious affiliations: ‘Ajam for Shiites and Huwala for Sunnis.

¹³ Interestingly, the ‘black’ community in Bahrain, which is very small, has always been seen as part of the Arab community and are all Sunnis.

¹⁴ The Huwala are mentioned as residents of the Gulf western cost in several books. See for example Farmanfarmaian (2008: 128), who briefly mentions the Huwala and their origins. Three families of Huwala ruled Bahrain, and they were Al-Mansor, Al-Haram and Al-Mathkoor. Slot (1991:72) who identifies the Huwala as the ones who possessed Bahrain for a period of time before the Utub tribe conquered Bahrain in 1736.

¹⁵ Dubai and Sharja more specifically, and up to now a big percentage of the Emirati residents of these two cities are Holis.

¹⁶ Basically, but not exclusively, in Manama and Muharraq, and have been moving elsewhere within the country starting from the late 1960s and early 1970s.

¹⁷ Being a Holi myself, I know that my father's paternal grandfather had a house on the West coast of Iran, another in Bahrain and a third in Saudi Arabia, and these three areas were not seen as separate or independent at that time. The Holi community was spread throughout the area, so that many did not speak or need to speak Arabic.

¹⁸ Qarmitians were Ismaili Shiites. The conversion to Twelver Shiism happened much later on.

¹⁹ The issue of naturalisation and the discrimination against the so-called *mujannasin* is a major and detailed topic that cannot be encompassed in this research.

²⁰ Even in the field of education, in government schools the textbooks, assignments and exams are in SA, while lessons, apart from Arabic language lessons, are almost always delivered in the personal dialect of the teacher.

²¹ See note 6.

²² Najd is the central area of Arabia.

²³ Khuzistan is a province in the South West of current Iran, bordering on Basrah province.

²⁴ Al-Hasa is the Eastern region of Arabia that is adjacent to the Arabian Gulf.

²⁵ Literally, the Coast of Arabs, is a coastal district in southeast Iraq, named after a river running in that district. The River of Shatt Al Arab itself is formed when the two rivers Tigris and Euphrates.

²⁶ *Banānī* (pl. of *Bannāy*) means builders, and *Hiyāyīch* (pl. of *Hayyāch*) means tailors. The titles refer to their ancient trades. Using trades as last names is very common in the Gulf and many families still keep these old names.

²⁷ Some 'Ajam in Bahrain speak Iranian and dialects of Persian, known in Bahrain as 'Ijmi. The Huwala, on the other hand, have a distinct language which is a spoken variant or

dialect of Persian; however, it shares more syntactical and phonological resemblance than semantic ones with Persian. As with Within the Holi language there are several dialects. Originally, the dialects of ‘Ijmi and Holi used to be the first if not the only language of the ‘Ajam and Huwala in Bahrain and the Gulf region for long. It is not the case for all ‘Ajam and Huwala any longer. To many, these dialects have become either a second language or a total unknown foreign language. For information on Ethnic origins of ‘Ajam and Huwala see Section 2.3.1.

²⁸ *There is a tendency among younger people to pronounce this word in its classical form, qalil, and the older pronunciation with the q converted into a j in this word is quickly disappearing. Shway is another synonym of this word, in greater use.*

²⁹ Although the two together comprise the parliamentary system in Bahrain, it is common in Bahrain to use the term Parliament to mean the lower chamber.

³⁰ The same directorate is responsible for recording Hansard of the Al-Shura Council and the Bahraini House of Representatives.

³¹ In Wodak and Meyer (2009: 28-29) they are called language indicators, which are what I call discursive devices in this research. Wodak and Meyer (ibid.) list fourteen language indicators and I only detect the five mentioned. More on creating the final list of discursive devices is in Section 3.9.1.

³² Weigand (2004: 16–17) gives examples of speech acts: declarative speech act related to emotion: *I love you. I regret it* (in the court); statement/constructive: *I love him, I regret it* (in everyday talk), *I am surprised. – I can believe it*; expressive speech act: *What a surprise! – Indeed.*; accompanying emotion: *You are playing the piano again.*

³³ Ideological elements can be, for example, values of political affiliation, family, traditions, patriotism, prejudgments and prior knowledge of the topic.

³⁴ Moscovici was not consistent or singular in his definition of definitions of social representations in different works, but this thesis does not have sufficient space to present or discuss them.

³⁵ Although the definition of a discourse unit is controversial and not homogenous, for convenience, where a discourse unit starts and where it ends is not relevant to my analysis, so I simply accept the definition that ‘discourse units are chunks of conversation which are clearly marked as different from the surrounding turn-by-turn talk’ by discourse markers and structural unity (Graumann and Kallmeyer, 2002: 326).

³⁶ Some other approaches focus on historical accounts, others on pragmatic features, and others on corpus linguistics, etc.

³⁷ حركات *ḥarakāt*, plural of *ḥarkah* حركة , additional vowel determined by grammatical function, without which a word is lexically complete and understood.

³⁸ Here, شحن *shahṇ* i.e. charge, is used instead of شحنة *shahṇā*, i.e. dispute.

³⁹ There are a few instances of stress in Arabic that are based on word order and structure and can be ‘read,’ but cannot be conveyed in word order or structure in English. For those, I convey the idea by phonetic stress that is normally expressed in English writing by italics. The word order and structure of the original Arabic text have a similar effect to stress conveyed by word order and structure in English sentences like: ‘You do it yourself’ (addition of yourself) and ‘Security is what he is pursuing’ (instead of ‘He is pursuing security’). So whenever it is possible to convey emphasis in the Arabic text by word order or structure in English I do so, and I use italics only to indicate stress when this is not possible.

⁴⁰ The parties’ need to champagne their stance about dissent control and political freedom is better understood in the light of the political and sectarian conflicts in the country (see Sections 2.3.3 and 2.3.4).

⁴¹ See Table 1 in the Introduction.

⁴² According to the Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(same excerpt, lines 135 to 153), the law allowing the use of pepper spray itself conforms to what had been discussed for three years by the Interior Ministry with the Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The Ministry had also discussed the law with the Legal Counsels of the Organization in order to make sure that the law conformed to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The convention is available on line (See United Nations 2012).

⁴³ *trūḥ fihā* فيها تروح, literally: 'go in it', a Bahraini colloquial expression that is an equivalent of 'to be doomed' or 'to be a goner'.

⁴⁴ The three guest speakers in this sitting were the Director of Environmental Control in the General Authority for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife; the Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and the Director of the Military Courts, the Ministry of the Interior, The first and the last suggested amending Article 4 while the other defended it as it was.

⁴⁵ There were four guest speakers who spoke in this excerpt on teargas, and they were: the Director of Environmental Control in the General Authority for Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife, Dr Afaf Al Shu'la; the Director of the Legal Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Director of Military Courts, the Ministry of the Interior, Major Hmoud Sa'ad Hmoud; and the Legal Counsel, the Ministry of State for Defence, Brigadier-General Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi. Their interventions are provided in full in Excerpt 1 in the appendix (in italic).

⁴⁶ *sallāmkallah* الله سَلَّمَكَ, literally meaning 'May God protect you'.

⁴⁷ Halabcha is a city in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The city was hit with chemical weapons during the reign of Saddam Hussain, who was convicted for this after the fall of his government.

⁴⁸ An expression in Bahrain dialect.

⁴⁹ As above.

⁵⁰ The word used is غيبة, *ghabiyyah*.

⁵¹ Details are neither given in Hansard nor in the *Akhbar Al-Khaleej* Newspaper.

⁵² The singular and the plural can be used interchangeably to mean the same. The only difference is that the singular is grammatically treated as a masculine noun and the plural, as with all non-human nouns, is treated as feminine singular when adding adjectives or verbs.

⁵³ This is in reference to the other topics on the agenda of this sitting on which the Council wants to issue a statement.

⁵⁴ Cobb-Moore et al. (2008: 597) refer to ‘physical materials and spaces *to play*’ (my emphasis) and I here extend the same fundamental notion to other disputes over other matters.

⁵⁵ The list above is directly quoted from the article, but in the article, they are presented in a continuous paragraph and not presented in a bullet-point list as I present them here.

⁵⁶ Unlike the other ‘you’s in MP Al-Miz’al’s speech in this excerpt, the ‘you’s and verbs with a ^ symbol in this excerpt are singular second person pronouns and verbs (since in Arabic verbs addressing a singular are different from those addressing a plural) addressing the Speaker. The remaining ‘you’s in his speech are plural.

⁵⁷ كيفك على, *ala kaikuk*, i.e. ‘Is it up to you?’, is in Bahraini dialect.

⁵⁸ اطلع, *iṭlaʿ*, i.e. ‘Get out’, is in Bahraini dialect.

⁵⁹ خارجي *khārijī*, the singular of the most commonly used plural: خوارج *khawārij*. The root of the word is خرج *kh-r-j*, to go out, to leave. Al-Aql defines a *khārijī* as one who rejects obedience to a legal leader and declares disobedience and pits himself against the leader (1989: 28, my translation).

⁶⁰ تكفيريون *Takfirīyyūn*, the plural of *takfirī*, which refers to the person who labels or describes someone else, often some other groups or sects, as being *kifir*, i.e. an infidel.

⁶¹ See note 59.

⁶² See note 60.

⁶³ See note 57.

⁶⁴ In this research, I do not elaborate on the discussion over naturalisation and the demand to employ Shiites in the Armed Forces as, despite it being a major source of dispute and a stimulus for riots, I am focusing on the legislative response of the parliament to handling political freedom and dissent, i.e. the legislative approach to the condition and not the causes or motivations. A total ignorance of the stimuli is not realistic, but an analytical and discursive approach to them is not possible in order to stay within the research scope.

⁶⁵ MP Fayrooz sounds contradicting himself when he mentions allowing ‘all walks of life’ after objecting to employing the newly naturalised citizens.

⁶⁶ There is no mention of the names of the parties in the newspaper article.

⁶⁷ السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته *assalāmu alaikum wa raḥmat Allāh wa barakātuh*, i.e. ‘Peace from God be up on you, and His mercy and His blessings’, an expression of greeting. It can be cut short and to only the first two words, to mean ‘peace be upon you’.

⁶⁸ I have tried to translate the structure into something of a similar linguistic competence, but sometimes it was difficult to keep certain sentences as they were uttered. Take, for example, line 42, which I have translated into ‘Al Wifaq demands an immediate release of detainees’; but the actual Arabic sentence is المعتقلين عن فوري إفراج يكون بأن تطالب الوفاق, which has a problem of verb-noun matching. If I am to convey the structural error, it can be translated into ‘Al Wifaq demands to it be immediate release of the detainees’*.

⁶⁹ The sentence was subsequently reduced to a travel ban.

⁷⁰ بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم An Arabic phrase that means ‘in the name of God, the most merciful, the most gracious’, and it is often used as an opening of a treatise.

⁷¹ I, however, find such solidarity with theological and/or ethnic orientations stronger in most if not all communities, even when there is a tendency by the people themselves or the systems to deny its significance.

⁷² This is a detailed debate that I will not enter into in this research. In short, most of Shiite families in Bahrain arrived after Al Khalifa, and most are originally from either Southern Iraq or Iran. There were only a few Shiite families in Bahrain when Al Khalifa arrived and a larger number of Sunnis, most of whom were, and still are, the Holis. More details can be found in Section 2.3.1 of this thesis.

⁷³ Several books on this topic can be referred to for further detail, such as *The Theology of Discontent* and *Shi'ism, a Religion of Protest* both by Dabashi (2006, 2011).

⁷⁴ There were independent Shiite candidates and members of other Shiite parties, who also ran for the Council for the Second Legislative Period in areas with a high density of Shiite residents, but none of them won and they received a low percentage of the votes. It is claimed that Al Wefaq fought unfairly against them and issued a *fatwa* that voting for them was not allowed and was punishable. However, Al Wefaq, who won all the 18 seats the party contested, denies this, and maintains to have won by being more popular.

⁷⁵ For the differences between the description of the Mahdi and his appearance in the two sects, see Section 2.2.3.

⁷⁶ Joyer attributes this to the high percentage of Shiites in Bahrain. He provides a ratio of 70% to 30% for Shiites and Sunnis. However, the source of this statistic is not provided and it seems, like most of the sectarian ratios, to be based on circulated information rather than any reliable statistics. As I explained earlier in Section 2.3.1, the percentage of Shiites was very low when the Al Khalifa dynasty began, and then many families were brought in and others allowed in from Iran, Southern Iraq and Al-Hasa (the ones from Al-Hasa are also originally from Southern Iraq). Nevertheless, they have not outnumbered the Sunni population and it is most likely that the numbers are now equal.

What makes Bahrain more vulnerable to what Joyer calls 'Shiite radicalism' is that it is the smallest independent country in the Gulf region, open to access from the sea from all sides, with most of the coast uninhabited, and that it is the least militarily armed, all of which would make invading it and controlling it very easy in comparison to the other Gulf countries. The Shiite presence has its importance as well, especially as the percentage of Shiites is still the highest and most explicit in the western Gulf countries, with them being empowered and given much space to practise their faith.

⁷⁷ The recent political coup attempt that started on 14 February 2011 has shaken members of this sector and made them move, speak up and express their demands, which are mainly for reform under the current regime without having to overthrow the ruling system. The 'silent sector' has demonstrated a 'mass' political stance for the first time after a long period of reluctance during which only a few figures were outspoken and critical.

⁷⁸ I made this prediction during the Second Legislative Period, and after having finished writing this chapter the results of elections for the Third Legislative Period came out, and the Sunni parties made a great loss, with Al Minbar only securing one seat and Al Asalah only two.

⁷⁹ Also known as the Gathering of National Unity Assembly (TGONU). More information about its philosophy and goals were presented in two speeches by its head and are available on their webpage <http://tgonu.org/languages/8>

⁸⁰ Shaikh Isa Ahmed Qassim is a member of Ahl uhl Bayt World Assembly in Tehran. He is the appointed representative in Bahrain and the top religious reference, marji', for the Shiites of Bahrain. Bahraini (Shiite) people are directed by Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Kazim Al-Haeri, a major Shiite marji' in Qom, Iran.

⁸¹ No statistics are available to measure the level of income among the two sects in Bahrain, nor their number (as records of sectarian affiliations do not exist), and the only

unbiased income statistics available are those of the UN; these show that there is a very low percentage of poverty in Bahrain and no absolute poverty in the country.

⁸² See note 70.

⁸³ إن شاء الله *Inshā' Allāh*, an expression very meaning 'God willing'. The difference is that in Arabic it is used for not only a high certainty but also wishes and hopes. There is a third use, which is more culturally bond and used by some people, and that is for not giving a definite yes or no to a request or question. The difference is mainly individual and is also noted in the intonation used when uttering inshaAllah, to reflect a certainty, hope or avoidance.

⁸⁴ تروح فيها *trūḥ fihā*, literally: 'go in it', a Bahraini colloquial expression that is an equivalent of 'get doomed' or 'be a goner'.

⁸⁵ See endnote 71.

⁸⁶ سَلَّمَكَ اللهُ *sallāmkallah*, literally meaning: '[may] God protect you'..

⁸⁷ Halabcha is a city in the Kurdish region of Iraq. The city was hit with chemical weapons during the reign of Saddam Hussain, who was convicted for this after the fall of his government.

⁸⁸ See endnote 96.

⁸⁹ Although this phrase exists in classical Arabic, in the context of this conversation, following an imperative, it would be in Bahraini dialect to mean 'please'.

⁹⁰ This is in reference to the other topics on the agenda of this sitting, on which the Council wants to issue a statement.

⁹¹ خارجي *Khārijī*, the single of the most commonly used plural: خَوَارِج *khawārij*. The root of the word is خرج *kh-r-j*, to go out, to leave. Al-Aql (vv: 28) defines a *Khārijī* as the one who discards the obedience of a legal leader and declares disobedience and pits against the leader.

⁹² تكفيريون *Takfīriyyūn*, the plural of *takfīrī*, which refers to the person who label or describe someone else, often some other groups or sects, as being *kīfir*, i.e. an infidel.

⁹³ Unlike the other ‘you’s in MP Al-Miz’al’s speech in this excerpt, the ‘you’s and verbs with an ^ symbol in this excerpt are singular second person pronouns and verbs (since in Arabic verbs addressing a singular is different than that addressing a plural) addressing the Speaker. The rest ‘you’s in his speech are plural.

⁹⁴ على كيفك, *‘ala kaikuk*, i.e. ‘is it up to you?’, is in Bahraini dialect.

⁹⁵ اطلع, *iṭlaʿ*, i.e. ‘Get out’, is in Bahraini dialect.

⁹⁶ See endnote 71.

⁹⁷ As in endnote 83.

⁹⁸ As in endnote 68.

⁹⁹ As in endnote 98.

¹⁰⁰ As in endnote 96.

¹⁰¹ As in endnote 71.

¹⁰² Literally ‘[May] God reward you’, a common expression with religious origin that became a formaic expression used to say thank you.

¹⁰³ الله يسلّمك *Allah yisalmuk*, literally ‘God keep you safe’ or ‘God protect you’, is an interjection.

¹⁰⁴ خيرا إن شاء الله *Khayran inshāʾ Allah*, literally ‘[May it be] good by the willing of Allah’. It is an interjection meaning ‘fine’ or ‘all right as in this instant. It can also express approval or the speaker’s willingness to consider what was has said.