Theses and Dissertations

Summer 2014

"Baby, you're a rich man" (the Beatles 1967): at the intersection of social class and gender

Donna A. Lancianese
University of Iowa

"BABY, YOU'RE A RICH MAN" (THE BEATLES 1967):
AT THE INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL CLASS AND GENDER

by

Donna Ann Lancianese

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy
degree in Sociology in the Graduate College of The University of Iowa

August 2014

Thesis Supervisor: Associate Professor Alison Bianchi

Graduate College
The University Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

_____

PH.D. THESIS

_____

This is to certify that the Ph. D. thesis of

Donna Ann Lancianese

has been approved by the Examining Committee for the thesis requirement for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Sociology at the August 2014 graduation.

Thesis Committee: _____
                       Alison J. Bianchi, Thesis Supervisor

                       _____
                       Karen Heimer

                       _____
                       Joseph B. Lang

                       _____
                       Kevin T. Leicht

                       _____
                       Freda B. Lynn

                       _____
                       Paul T. Munroe

To Tom Lancianese and Josephine DeCastro, you left this world too soon to see this

would not be here without you. To my siblings, Niki, Anna, and Tommy, you three are my next historical supporters. My brother-in-laws, nieces and nephews, friends (my non-blood family), cousins, aunts, uncles, and grandparents, you have supported me and provided a space away from academia. Moreover, you all in some way are responsible for the theme of this dissertation: social class during interaction. Thank you for being there for me.

To my daughter, Josie, you have kept me grounded during this journey – a constant reminder that life exists outside of academia. You are truly amazing and being a part of your life makes all this work worth it!

If I could write about the last three people to acknowledge simultaneously, I would. However, since I cannot, I will start with Lezley May. Buddy, the support you have provided me since the beginning of our friendship is impossible to enumerate. So, I'll just mention what seems to be the most important – I can always count on you to listen with empathetic ear, whether it be personal or professional topics. Furthermore, you provide alternative views and courses of action that have made me a better person. Thank you!

Dave Frisina, firstly, parts of this dissertation would not be as unique and interesting without your artistic talents. But, that is not the most important thing I want to acknowledge. As my partner, you have kept me sane during this process. You have made me laugh. You have supported me. I would have been hard pressed to do this without you in my life. Thank you for sticking with me!

My mentor, Alison Bianchi, where do I start? I guess at the beginning. You provided me an amazing opportunity eleven years ago, to be your research assistant. You trusted me with your "baby," and having run my own study, I know just how big that was. From there, you encouraged me to become a sociologist. Without you, this thesis would not be. You trained me in a theoretical orientation that has forever shaped my academic interests. You have supported me as both a mentor and friend. You have

provided feedback on work beyond my expectations! Without you, I know I would not be here today. A simple thank you will never express the gratitude I have in my heart for you! All the same, Thank You!

ABSTRACT

Many social scientists consider race, class, and gender to be the three main axes of inequality and a plethora of research covers these topics. As such, a wealth of knowledge has accumulated about how they affect individuals' life chances and trajectories. Much is also known about how race and gender affect interaction, but what about social class? Little is known about the role of social class during interaction compared to gender and race. Thus, the focus of this thesis is to better understand the effect of social class during interaction. Moreover, I examine social class in combination with gender.

I first present meta-theoretical orientations to interaction, social class, and gender. I orient my empirical studies with the theoretical research program of Expectation States Theory (EST). In Chapter 2, I explicate Status Characteristics Theory (SCT), a robust theory from EST. Here I provide two innovations. First, I link implicit social cognition to SCT, and second, I provide illustrations of the mechanisms of SCT. In Chapter 3, I present descriptions of a "rich guy" and "poor guy" from focus groups of University Iowa undergraduates. Two very distinct profiles emerged. In Chapter 4, I present a 12-condition experiment to test explicit and implicit cues of social class on status processes in isolation and in combination with gender. Using the standardized experimental setting of EST, I present social class as a series of interactional cues, which to my knowledge is a first in the EST tradition. The data partially support the theory. In Chapter 5, I discuss the empirical chapters, limitations of the studies, and future directions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND META-THEORETICAL ORIENTATIONS

Social class is a central concept in the social sciences (Fiske and Markus 2012). The sheer number of studies on social class is staggering, especially in terms of stratification and social mobility research (see Hout and DiPrete 2006 for recent review). Most of this vast research program explains how people maintain and accumulate advantage and disadvantage (DiPrete and Eirich 2006) or how people do or do not move from one social class category to another (Breen and Jonsson 2005). Despite this deep well of knowledge, there is limited empirical research and theoretical development about individuals producing social class as a personal attribute during interaction (DiMaggio 2012).

Like social class, gender is another core concept in social scientific research. Additionally, social class and gender proliferate stratification research (Leicht 2008). However, the knowledge base for understanding how gender operates during interaction is vast, both empirically and theoretically (Eagly 1987; Hollander, Renfrow, and Howard 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Thorne 1993; West and Zimmerman 1987).

From this knowledge, we know that there is a clear belief system about gender and this belief system structures many interactions (Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway 2011). The belief system surrounding gender is theorized as hegemonic, beliefs that seem to be universal depictions of women and men defined by a narrow set of features.[1] A set of beliefs that people experience as "natural" or "unchangeable" that serve to keep the social order as it is. For many, the gender belief system informs their production of gender, that is how they display their gender during interaction.

---

[1] I take seriously the notion that gender categories are polytomous and not dichotomous (i.e., trans-identified individuals typically do not self-identify as a "man" or "woman"), however, I am studying the hegemonic gender system, and so I will use the cisgendered model of women and men who agree with their birth gender assignment.

Does social class structure interaction in the same ways gender? Is there a "social class belief system" that informs an individual's production of social class? More generally, how does an individual's production of social class affect interaction? Moreover, how does the combination of gender with social class affect interaction in general, and status processes, in particular?[2] These questions guide the rest of this dissertation.

I limit the type of interaction to status processes as a starting point for understanding the role of social class during interaction. Additionally, there is a comprehensive and robust research program for understanding status processes, Expectation States Theory (EST). I use EST throughout this thesis (see Berger and Webster 2006 for a recent review).

EST is a theoretical research program, a collection of theories (Wagner and Berger 1985), about status processes.[3] Specifically, EST examines how the expectations that individuals have for self and other come to organize behavior during interaction. Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) is one theory in the EST tradition. SCT examines how individuals' observable social attributes (i.e. status characteristics) inform expectations that affect behavior. The observable characteristics of interest in this thesis are gender and social class.

My basic research questions are: How does social class affect interaction? And, how does social class combine with gender to affect group structure? Before I begin to answer these questions, I offer condensed reviews of the meta-theoretical concepts within this dissertation: interaction, culture, social structure, social class, gender, and

---

[2] By status process, I mean being voluntarily deferential to and influenced by fellow interactants (Ridgeway and Walker 1995)

[3] By theory, I mean a theory from the middle range (Merton 1949), characterized by relational statements of abstract concepts from which empirical assessments can occur (Markvosky 1994; Wagner and Berger 1985).

intersectionality. These concepts are the foundation for the coming chapters, which I briefly introduce at the end of this chapter.

Interaction: Where Culture and Social Structure Collide

Interaction is an activity, whereby, (at least) two people are aware of each other and communicating with each other (Blumer 1969; Goffman 1966). Individuals use culture (e.g. language) and enact social structure to facilitate interaction (Sewell 1992). But what does that mean?

Culture is "what we know" about the world (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Geertz 1973). Members of a society learn their culture from different agents of socialization. People draw on cultural knowledge to define situations, categorize people, and act (Blumer 1969; Correll and Ridgeway 2003; Goffman 1967; Thomas 1923). Social constructionists would argue that the repeated use of the same cultural knowledge creates and reproduces social structures (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

Some social scientists define social structures as enduring patterns of behavior (Goffman 1977; House 1981). This definition is too simplistic and static to describe adequately the enduring and complex phenomena that are social structures. Sewell (1992) provides a more comprehensive perspective on social structure that combines culture, resources, and action. He argues that social structures have a dual nature – they exist as virtual constructs and behaviorally.

Sewell (1992) posits that social structure consists of *cultural schema* and *resources*. Cultural schema are the rules for how one uses knowledge (i.e. they are mental constructs) to enact social structures. More specifically, they are "conventions, recipes, scenarios, principles of action, habits of speech and gestures" (Sewell 1992:8). Resources are anything that can be used during the enactment of social structures, which could be things a person can do (internal resources such as being able to run up a flight stairs carrying a 50 pound fire hose) or things a person has (external resources, such as money). Because access to resources is not distributed equally in society, but people's cultural

schema tend to be similar within an society, social structures maintain inequality. Consequently, resources and schema reinforce each other to confine or expand action. It is this social action that reproduces social structures, or alternatively, changes them. We *do* social structure!

This dissertation is an attempt to understand how the cultural schema for social class and gender enact social structures to shape influence processes during one type of interaction. Conceptualization of gender and class begins with this dual notion developed by Sewell (1992); thus, we "do gender" and "do social class."

Social Class

Theorizing about social class as a performance, as opposed to social class as an attribute that places individuals into a stratification system, is relatively new (West and Fenstermaker 1995). Historically, social theorists examine social class as position in society typically in relation to material resources. For my purposes, I focus on Max Weber's notions on stratification as a starting point.

Weberian Tradition

Weber ([1922]1978) argued that social position is a multidimensional construct. Social position is determined by economic conditions (class), status (honor or prestige), and party (political and bureaucratic power). The dimension of status is key. Weber's use of status refers to honor or prestige centered on lifestyles, and is linked to expectations during interaction. Weber argued that class captures economic opportunities and status denotes communal groups that share subjective cultural meanings (Archer and Orr 2011). While individuals with high social status may have economic resources, not everyone with economic resources will have a high social status. Consider a successful drug dealer. Conversely, not everyone with high social status will have economic resources, such as the typical college professor.

Contemporary Stratification vis-à-vis Social Class

Much of the stratification research concerning social class can be conceptualized using a ladder (Ewen 1998). The ladder is the social class hierarchy. Different rungs represent different social class positions. If individuals are at the top of the ladder, they are in the upper class. If they are at the bottom, they are in the lower class.

To study social class and associated social outcomes, some stratification researchers use occupational prestige to sort people into social class categories (see Blau and Duncan 1967 for original statement on occupational prestige), while some researchers use objective social class indicators, such as education and/or income (Lareau 2008). However, the correlation between subjective and objective social class is far from perfect. The correlation seems to work well at the tails of the distribution. Those that are at the top of the social class hierarchy, also have high incomes and advanced education. Those who are in bottom of the hierarchy, also have low incomes and meager education attainment. It is the middle (i.e. various middle class and working class distinctions) where the association between subject and objective social class is muddled. For instance, Hout (2008) found some people with an advanced degree placed themselves in the working class.

Additionally, some researchers use a multidimensional construct that is a combination of income, educational attainment, and occupational prestige (objective indicators) to capture a socioeconomic status (SES) (e.g. Barrett and White 2002; Bjarnason 2000; Kohn 1969; Parsons 1957; Wright 1997).[4] While SES might be useful, it is also limiting as an instantiation of social class because it omits the lifestyle aspects of social class with a focus instead on economics (Lareau 2008). Moreover, the differential lifestyle patterns associated with different SES categories are assumed or implied.

---

[4] There are probably thousands of citations that use this formulation of social class. For brevity, I cite a few examples.

Added to this complex problem of capturing social class in order to study it are the obstacles associated with Americans self-reporting their social class. For example, subjective social class is individuals' perception of their class positions (Hout 2008). A majority of Americans think quite consistently that they are either middle or working class. Essentially, most Americans perceive their social class position to be somewhere in the middle of the stratification system, which may or may not be correct. Another issue is the fact that Americans do not like to talk about social class (Jenson 2012), and often misreport their income (Yans, Curtin, and Jans 2010). These problems create both validity and reliability errors in measures of social class.

What is truly interesting is that very few scholars have ever attempted to capture social class as it is enacted during interaction (Saperstein 2013). Moreover, crafting social class as an experimental manipulation to explore its effects on group outcomes is even more rare. In fact, scholars have used objective indicators of social class, such as education, income, and occupational prestige as experimental manipulations (Cashen 1996; Cohen and Zhou 1991; Markovsky, Smith, and Berger 1984; Moore 1969; Webster and Driskell 1983; Zellner and Warnecke 1973). To the best of my knowledge, none have tried to model "doing social class" with all of its concomitant visual cues.[5] I will attempt to do so in the current study.

The exploration of social class as performative versus objective indicators begins with examining theories and research that theorize about social class with behavioral components. I begin with Bourdieu.

---

[5] Cashen (1996) manipulates objective indicators of social class (education and occupation) and verbal (speech rates) and nonverbal (gestures) cues that denote status. However, the author does not make direct claims of testing social class affecting status processes, but rather just status cues (see Chapter 4 of this thesis for an exposition of status cues). Moreover, the author does not discuss social class as an abstract concept connected to status. In fact, there is no discussion of social class, other than a reference to a controlled observational study examining social class differences of conversation components (Robbins, Devoe, and Wiener 1978). I would argue Cashen (1996) is not testing "doing social class" as she holds constant important visible cues associated with social class such as dress and hairstyle.

Bourdieu

Inequality in society is not just a consequence to economic conditions (Schwalbe, Godwin, Holden, Schrock, Thompson, and Wolkomir 2000). Bourdieu's work allows for a conceptualization and operationalization of social class that goes beyond income, level of education, and/or occupational prestige, and fits nicely with Sewell's (1992) perspective on the duality of social structures. Habitus and capital are concepts that together create social class distinctions (Wenninger 2005). Habitus is similar to cultural schema because habitus contains mental structures for how to make sense of the social world (Bourdieu 1977a; 1990).

Individuals acquire their habitus throughout their life. It is dependent upon one's experiences and social location. Habitus operates at a non-conscious level and is observable through what we wear, how and what we eat, speak, etc.; accordingly, it structures one's life. Habitus contain elements from one's environment that shape self and life outcomes. Social class, socialization, and experiences are all interrelated and all affect habitus.

Bourdieu's (1986) forms of capital are other concepts that are crucial for understanding social class. They are similar to Sewell's (1992) discussion of resources. Bourdieu (1986) explicates four different types of capital – economic, cultural, social, and symbolic – that together create social class stratification. Economic capital is both money and property. Cultural capital is cultural knowledge or behaviors that are socially designed as valuable and that give advantages to groups possessing such capital. Social capital refers to positions in networks and the relations derived from those networks. Symbolic capital is any legitimate form other than the three aforementioned forms capital.

Within sociology, especially in the areas of stratification and the sociology of education, cultural capital has been a well utilized concept (Sallaz and Zavisca 2007; Lareau and Wenninger 2005). Bourdieu (1977b) argues that educational institutions

reward the cultural capital from the upper and middle classes and devalue the cultural capital from the working and lower classes. Therefore, parents who have "passed" on socially valuable capital to their children can expect that their children will transform the cultural capital into superior academic performances. In turn, students can transform their high academic achievement into economic capital separate from their parents. Thus, this cyclical socialization process reproduces the class system of stratification in America.

By introducing the concepts of habitus and forms of capital, we can achieve a more nuanced approach to examining social class than by just taking into account income, education, and occupational prestige. These concepts can show how social class acts as social structure that organizes, reproduces, or allows for mobility. Moreover, the expression of habitus and forms of capital during interaction begin to aid our understanding of "doing social class."

Gender

Gender as Display

Goffman (1976) introduced the term "gender display." In his analysis of advertisements, he asserts that individuals display their gender through customary acts that convey their gender. Goffman posits that fellow interactants will negatively sanction (on continuum from minor, a dirty look, to extreme, assault) those individuals who display non-customary acts. His writing is the first step in theorizing about gender as action and not just a social category.

West and Zimmerman (1987) continue from Goffman and theorize further on gender display. They argue that gender is an accomplishment. It is something people "do" during interaction, not a property (trait or role) of an individual. Gender is an emergent process of social interaction.

Individuals have a behavioral repertoire and costumes used to display their gender. The audience to the performance will hold the person accountable for their gender display. Consequently, the individual giving the display may be called to account

for it. This is not say that people will give a gender normative display, or a display that aligns with the audience members' conceptions of femininity and masculinity. To do gender is to engage in behavior at the risk of gender assessment. However, by doing gender appropriately, individuals help to sustain, reproduce, and legitimate social structure. If an individual fails to do gender appropriately, then one will be called on for an account (e.g. for character, motives, predispositions); the actual gender norms will not be questioned.

Since the publication of West and Zimmerman (1987), theorizing on gender display did not. Researchers within the field of gender studies have crafted definitions for the term "gender display", but there is no standard definition. Lorber's definition of the term is:

> *"…Gender display,* presentation of self as a certain kind of gendered person through dress, cosmetics, adornments, and permanent and reversible body markers…" (1994:31).

Another expert, Connell (1987; 2002; 2005), defines gender displays as gender practices, specifically behavioral qualities of masculinities and femininities.

Taking these definitions and others discussed above, I define *gender display* as the communication of one's gender through the body, bodily movements, speech (e.g. vocabulary, intonation, volume, etc.), and/or by sartorial presentation. Gender display involves cues for the senses and by the senses that require some level of cognition to process their meaning (Ridgeway 2011; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). My innovation adds to the gender studies literature because it encompasses the extant scholarship about gender display, and applies to different kinds of interaction domains (i.e., it works for face-to-face, texting, etc.). It also implicitly claims that gender display is a social psychological phenomenon, which requires cues, cognition, and processing.

"Doing Gender" is a useful orienting perspective for understanding gender in micro-level interactions, but has not undergone formal nomothetic theorizing, for

example, hypotheses that could be tested (Ridgeway 2009). However, Ridgeway and Correll (2004) incorporate the foundations from the "Doing Gender" perspective to connect group encounters with macro-level trends of gender inequality.

Framed by Gender – Ridgeway's Extensions

Ridgeway and Correll (2004; Ridgeway 2011) discuss gender in terms of the connection between beliefs and interaction, and also specify the processes by which gender inequality is recreated through everyday social relations (i.e. interactions). Gender is an institutionalized system of social practices for designating people as two significantly different categories (women and men), which organizes social relations of inequality. These widely understood beliefs of the binary nature of the gender system, which Ridgeway and Correll (2004) refer to as hegemonic gender beliefs, are maintained through enactment of shared cultural beliefs about gender during *social relational contexts*. These contexts are comprised of any situation in which individuals define themselves in relation to others in order to act. Hegemonic gender beliefs seem to be universal depictions of women and men defined by a narrow set of features, but also incorporate gender stereotypes that are the cultural rules for enacting the social structure of difference and inequality.

Social relational contexts are the circumstances during which cultural beliefs are used to motivate behavior and to evaluate others. The process of linking cultural beliefs to behavior is called automatic sex categorization, which allows individuals to non-consciously typify others as fitting into the binary category system of gender. Because the process happens automatically, gender becomes a ghost in the background while other identities and activities are performed in the foreground. Gender is therefore always a background, implicit identity within social relational contexts. Gender rarely is the focus of what is going on in the situation.

Thus, gender becomes a primary frame for negotiating interactions. In most situations, it is difficult for people to effectively resist the constraints on them created by

gender beliefs. Since hegemonic gender beliefs are institutionalized in many settings, there are often real social costs to challenging them behaviorally; thus, the specter of negative social sanctions helps maintain the status quo.

In the next section, I review some of the literature on hegemonic gender focusing on masculinities and femininities.

Femininities and Masculinities

Masculinities and femininities are gender practices in which people engage to display their gender (Connell 2005). Borrowing the term hegemony from Gramsci (1971), Connell (1987; 2002; 2005) describes the processes which keep dominant groups in power by ensuring that subordinate groups support or at least accept "the way things are." Connell defines *hegemonic masculinity* as the socially dominant form of masculinity in a particular culture within a given historical period. The practices of hegemonic masculinity legitimate patriarchy. Hegemonic masculinity is not the statistical norm – the "average" man – but the idealized conception of manhood. In the United States, this would be a man who is economically successful, heterosexual, autonomous, competitive, "cool," and handsome. Hegemonic masculinity is constructed in relation to other masculinities – subordinate and oppositional – and femininities.

Subordinate masculinities are defined by marginalized men (e.g. on the basis of race or class), such as the Chicano Machismo (Davidson 1974). Within masculinities, men who are not class-privileged, race-privileged and/or heterosexual are marginalized. Men who are not class or race privileged tend to construct a masculinity similar to hegemonic masculinity (i.e. independent, competitive, and dominant), but because of their social class position they are "barred" from other aspects of hegemonic masculinity (Anderson 1999; Mullins 2006). These men focus more on the dominance and aggression aspects of masculinity.

In terms of sexuality, heterosexuality is privileged and young men who do not express an intense desire for women are often marginalized and labeled as "fags" (Pascoe

2007). For example, men using an online forum for computer programmer and gamers expressed their masculinity by using explicit heterosexual comments (Kendall 2000). It was as if the men, lacking other behavioral repertoires because of the virtual interaction, used their "talk" to express their heterosexuality, and ultimately their masculinity. Masculinity of the academically intelligent, and especially the "nerds," may be called in to question by virtue of their intelligence and lack of other masculine cues.

Oppositional masculinities explicitly resist and possibly challenge hegemonic masculinity. For example, "emo" (or emotional punk) music has engendered an oppositional masculinity of middle-class adolescent boys and young men that reveres emotional expression and emo style – tight jeans (e.g. skinny jeans), asymmetrical haircut and eye make-up, known in pop-culture as "guy-liner" (Aslaken 2006). Emo masculinity eschews some aspects of hegemonic masculinity, particularly machismo and suppression of emotions.

Connell (1987; 2002; 2005) argues there is no hegemonic femininity that corresponds to hegemonic masculinity. Women can either attract a masculine man by emphasizing their femininity, or they can try to be masculine themselves. Femininities, emphasized and other, are defined through the subordination of women. *Emphasized femininity* is constructed around compliance to male domination, with emphasis on nurturance, empathy, and other stereotypical feminine characteristics. The main emphasis is on the desires and interests of men. The woman through her femininity is a prop for her man. *Other femininities* are defined with non-compliance and resistance. There is no pressure to set up/negate forms of femininity in the ways that there are with masculinities. Actual femininities might be more diverse than masculinities because women might be more free to transgress normative gender displays. Emphasized femininity is often used to marginalize or delegitimize alternative forms of femininity.

In 2005, Connell and Messerschmidt reviewed the concept of hegemonic masculinity and its criticisms. Critics view the concept of "hegemonic masculinity" as

unclear and blurred, and that it also deemphasizes power and domination. They argue that construction of hegemonic masculinity is done within a heteronormative conception of gender that essentializes the female-male difference.[6] Moreover, masculinity research needs to integrate local conceptions of masculinity to capture better the role of masculinity.

Masculinity as the Focus of the Thesis

A research project investigating the intersection of gender and social class is quite daunting because the potential permutations of these intersections based on the many types of aforementioned gender displays could be quite large. I choose to focus on male-embodied masculinity for the empirical portions of this thesis. I exclude female-embodied femininities because they might be even more diverse than masculinities, as women might be more free to transgress gender displays (Bianchi, Morse, and Munroe 2010).

I also limit empirical work to cisgendered men. *Cisgendered* are individuals who have congruency among the gender they were assigned at birth, their bodies, and their gender identity (Schilt and Westerbrook 2009). Automatic gender categorization of cisgendered men "works" during interaction because their congruency of gender birth assignment, bodies, and identity are what members of mainstream culture would define as masculine. In other words, automatic gender categorization is accurate in this case. In other cases for which there is not alignment of these entities, automatic sex categorization fails –this is a different class of social psychological processes. I take seriously the notion that these latter processes do exist, but recognize that one project cannot cover all processes involving gender.

In sum, to reinforce Sewell's (1992) concepts vis-à-vis the gender system, the hegemonic gender binary system is pervasive in U.S. culture. Hegemonic gender beliefs

---

[6] Heteronormativity is a system of practices that assumes that there are two genders based on two sex categories, and sexuality is based on opposite sex attraction (Schilt and Westbook 2009)

are enacted during interactions with both automatic sex categorization and expected gender display. Men and women are expected to portray hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity, respectively. In so doing, they create emergent social structure based on gender inequality.

Intersectionality

I now turn to the literature on "intersectionality" to explore how social class and gender might be combined to construct relations during interaction. Feminist scholars of color challenged the notion that the experience of "woman" as monolithic and posit that it is modified by other personal characteristics, especially race (Collins 1990; Crenshaw 1989; King 1988). They argue that identities (or axes of inequality) combine non-linearly. This contention brought about *intersectionality* as a way to approach research to include multiple forms of oppression to understand social reality better.

There are many definitions of intersectionality. For the purposes of this study, I define intersectionality as "conceptualizing a person's constellation of social traits and characteristics that demarcates an individual's social position" (Lancianese 2014:557).

Doing Difference

Some critics assert that constructionist arguments of gender ignore larger power differences, such as patriarchy and racism (*and maybe social class)*, which indirectly influence gender construction (Collins 1990). Accounting for limitations of the "doing gender" paradigm, West and Fenstermaker (1995; 2002) extend doing gender by incorporating race and class into the "doing difference" paradigm. Embedded in their argument, the authors posit that interactional accomplishments are not solely based on gender. Individuals are accountable based on many social structures. By extending the "Doing Gender" perspective, the authors are better able to explain the mechanism for producing and reproducing inequality vis-à-vis the interplay of the big three axes of inequality – race, class, and gender.

Combining Bourdieu's conception of social class – habitus and forms of capital – and ideas from the doing gender paradigm, I argue that we "do social class." This means that like gender we perform our social class vocally, sartorially, bodily, etc. Furthermore, gender displays are "classed" and/or class displays are "gendered." At this point, I do not know which is the more theoretically or empirically accurate description, or if it matters. However, research does illustrate that gender displays vary by social class (Bettie 2003; Mullins 2006; Proweller 1998; Shows and Gerstel 2009).

Intersectionality, Cultural Beliefs, and Interaction

Race, class, and gender are, on the one hand, distinct social structures of inequality for individuals (i.e. placement in the structure based on both cultural beliefs and resource allocation), especially in the U.S. (Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz 2013). On the other hand, people do not hold these characteristics in isolation; they occur simultaneously. Consequently, social structures intersect and the effects of these intersections on social outcomes are not straightforward, additive, or even linear.

Following from Ridgeway's (Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Ridgeway 2011) earlier work, Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) argue that visible aspects of gender and race "frame" people.[7] That is, people use cultural knowledge about gender and race to inform and coordinate behavior. Cultural knowledge tends towards hegemonic cultural beliefs. As discussed above, hegemonic beliefs are those that keep the dominant groups in power (Gramsci 1971). In terms of race, class, and gender, hegemonic beliefs are about being White, middle-class, and heteronormative. Because an individual's social class is not always identifiable, or can be achieved (e.g. Eliza Doolittle's transformation in *Pygmalion*), it is not always a primary stratifying characteristic. Said another way, people may not readily perceive a person's social class during the interaction as one would with race or gender; hence, they will not immediately draw on hegemonic class beliefs.

---

[7] Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz (2013) focus on the White-Black distinction of race given the plethora of research in this domain.

Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's (2013) main argument is that race, class, and gender as social structures are distinct, but related systems of inequality. Individual outcomes vary because of specific combinations of race, class, and gender (e.g. White, rich, and male).

Part of the distinctness of "intersected" social structures is the quantity and quality of interaction between group members. Out of the three primary structures, we tend to interact more frequently and more intimately (sexually and familial) with people of differing genders. Women, in general, are seen as less competent than men are, but more positive on socio-emotive characteristics, such as warmth. Interactions of people from different races or classes are less frequent and less intimate. In both situations, many mix-gendered interactions and few mix-race/mixed-class interactions, people draw on cultural knowledge that tends to reproduce inequality. However, with race and class, because the frequency and intimacy are low, people depend on institutional knowledge (e.g. from the media) to categorize self and other during interactions.

Moreover, they argue that the salience of social structures may affect the social relation context (i.e. interaction). For example, in neighborhoods, race may play a larger role in the interaction than gender would because in the U.S. there is a preponderance of racially segregated neighborhoods. Additionally, the cultural beliefs surrounding the intersection of race and gender may constrain or advantage an individual. One example the authors use is a Black women. Because Black women are seen as less feminine, they can act agentic, or instrumental, without their gender display being called into question. Consequently, they may be afforded more competence than White women.

As for social class and gender, the intersectionality in which I am interested, it may be true that individuals from different social classes interact less than those from the same social class. Nonetheless, this cross-class interaction occurs in important domains for American individuals: during college, at work, in arenas of commerce, and for those experiencing upward or downward social mobility. Understanding these interactions may

shed light on why social mobility is difficult, and will certainly add to an understudied phenomenon in intersectionality research.

Central to the authors' thesis is integrating cultural beliefs into theories that study status and influence hierarchies.[8] Much of their discussion is about the intersection race and gender, and not race, class, and gender. What is missing from their argument and potentially problematic is a thorough discussion of the confounding of race and social class in the U.S especially among African Americans (Wright 1997). Cultural beliefs about poor Black women and men conjure up very different images than just Black women and men.[9]

In the present study, I purposefully omit race as an observable characteristic because of the complexity of this category system and its effect on status processes, and also because of race confounded with social class and gender displays. In the future, I would like to bring race into the research program, but for this dissertation, I limit my focus to social class and gender. In this way, I attempt to expand on Ridgeway and Kricheli-Katz's (2013) argument by first elucidating the mechanisms of one form of intersection, social class, and gender, which these researchers assume, but do not explicate.

To summarize, Sewell provides us with the general concepts and propositions for how culture is enacted during the emergence of social structure; however, he does not provide a specific theoretical mechanism for this process. The "Doing Gender" perspective reminds us that gender is ubiquitous as an organizer of social interaction, but does not provide us with propositions for how this process works. Ridgeway and Correll discuss how hegemonic gender beliefs are an aspect of the culture that shapes social encounters, and Connell asserts that there is a hegemonic masculinity component to these

---

[8] See Chapter 2 for an overview of status and influence theories.

[9] See Monahan, Sctrulis, and Givens (2005) for example of the impact of a welfare queen stereotype. See Welch (2007) for the impact of the male counterpart, poor Black man equals criminal.

beliefs. Bordieu remarks that our habitus fashions our social world, especially through transference of forms of capital. All of these researchers provide the theoretical background for specifying how social class and gender intersect to manifest social structures, but none expound on a particular mechanism that describes the process. Accordingly, I explore the particulars of the culture, social structure, and intersections of social class and gender.

Organization of Thesis

I organized this chapter by introducing the meta-theoretical concepts of interaction, social structure, culture, social class, gender, and intersectionality. I discussed historical orientations (briefly) and contemporary understandings that I use in the empirical chapters later in the dissertation.

In the second chapter, I explicate Status Characteristics Theory (SCT). To aid the initiation into SCT, I divide the chapter into three parts. First, I link implicit processing research from cognitive psychology to SCT. Second, I conceptually describe SCT and provide pictures to aid in the understanding of the theory. Third, I explain the mathematics of the theory.

In Chapter 3, I investigate local conceptions of masculinity and social class. I present findings from survey and focus group data. The focus group data are the main empirical analyses. I present two profiles of men – a "rich guy" and "poor guy." The emergent pattern of the profiles aligns with another theory from EST, Status Cues Theory.

Chapter 4 contains results from a 12-condition experiment where I manipulate social class using interactional cues. The experiment utilizes a confederate who gives varying classed gender displays that I derived from the focus group data.

To conclude the thesis, Chapter 5 recounts the major findings from the focus groups and experiment. I discuss limitations of the empirical work, additions to literatures of social class, gender, and status processes, and future directions.

CHAPTER 2: PERCEPTION TO ACTION

Understanding how people use social information during interaction is the underlying theme of this dissertation. Within sociological social psychology, the theoretical research program, Expectation States Theory (EST) explains how expectations for competence (i.e. social information) come to structure interaction in the group. EST focuses on status processes during interaction. A status process is being voluntarily deferential and influential during interaction (Ridgeway and Walker 1995). As mentioned in Chapter 1, Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) is one theory from EST that explains how observable characteristics and their evaluative meanings affect expectations for competence. Group members use these expectations to discern who is more competent to accomplish the task at hand.

This chapter explicates the mechanism of SCT called status generalization. I explain the process conceptually and then go through the mathematics of the theory. Moreover, I offer several innovations to previous expositions on status generalization. First, I link cognitive psychology work on implicit social cognition as lower level mechanism (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010) embedded in status generalization. Second, I use pictorial representations of the mental processing posited by SCT to aid in explaining the complexities of status generalization.

This chapter serves as the theoretical framework for the experiment presentation in Chapter 4. Additionally, it provides a rationale for Chapter 3, which is to understand how undergraduates perceive social class and gender (i.e. what is the picture in their head).

In the next section, I briefly review a robust area of research cognitive psychology, implicit social cognition. I discuss the theoretical foundations and focus on Implicit Attitude research for empirical examples.

Implicit Social Cognition

The central social psychological process described by status characteristics theory is *status generalization*. Before explicating what that process is, we need to understand the difference between implicit and explicit mental processing, as status generalization is of the former type.

According to the dual-process model of cognition (Brewer 1988; Evans 2008; Fiske and Taylor 2013; Gawronski, Sherman, and 2014), our brains process social information in one of two ways, explicitly and implicitly. Explicit processing is conscious mental action that is non-automatic and under our control – we are aware that our brains are doing it. It requires effort and is deliberate (Payne and Gawronski 2010). For example, when you think about tomorrow, and start mentally planning your day, this is explicit social processing. On the other hand, implicit processing is mental action that is outside of our conscious awareness; it is automatic.[1] Implicit social cognition requires little mental attention and it is difficult to suppress.

Implicit social cognition is non-conscious mental action guided by memories (i.e. past experiences), which influences judgments and behavior (Greenwald and Banaji 1995). Think of your first day of college. You walked into the classroom, what did you do? You found a seat. How did you know to do that? You knew what to do because you have experienced many other similar situations through your formal education; that is, you learned what to do and it became a habit. You did not have to think consciously about what to do when you walked into that classroom.[2] The psychological process of implicit social cognition is: a person is presented with a stimulus (e.g. walking into classroom), and a seemingly automatic behavior occurs (e.g. taking one's seat).

---

[1] I will use the terms "implicit processing" and "implicit social cognition" interchangeably.

[2] In regards to this example, I am not implying that there are no explicit thoughts, such as where to sit, do I see any familiar faces, etc.

Research about implicit processing has exploded over the past two decades (Payne and Gawronski 2010). The research program has centered on the measurement of implicit attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes (see Fazio and Olson 2003 and Payne and Gawronski 2010 for reviews).

Historically, researchers used self-report measures on surveys to assess attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Ironically, survey methodology actually requires explicit processing. With surveys, individuals may adjust their responses to "look better"; that is, social desirability biases compel respondents not to appear to be racist, sexist, a loser, etc.[3] Measures for implicit processes circumvent these phenomena (see Payne and Gawronski 2010 for a thorough exposition). One such instrument is the Implicit Association Test (IAT), which is actually a family of implicit social cognition measures of attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes (Evans 2008; Fazio and Olson 2003; Fiske and Taylor 2013; Greenwald et al. 1998; Payne and Gawronski 2010).[4]

The IAT test is a sequential series of tasks during which subjects eventually associate a social category (e.g. white or black for racial types) with "pleasant" or "unpleasant."[5] If the pairing aligns with cultural evaluations of the category, that is "White" is more highly evaluated (or valued) in society and therefore is pleasant, then the respondents do very well at the task with fast and accurate responses. When the pairing is not congruent (e.g. paring Black with pleasant), subjects perform poorly (i.e. more slowly and inaccurately). Researchers theorize that when presenting participants with the social category, the participants' brains are calling up all the social information about the category implicitly. Thus, for congruent associations, such as "man" and "pleasant,"

---

[3] Adjusting responses to "look better," or social desirability, is one issue with self-reporting. Another issue is respondents also may not know the answer to a question.

[4] See https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/ for a demonstration of the IAT.

[5] For instances of measuring implicit self-esteem, the social categories are "me" and "not me" instead of "man" or "woman" in the example given above.

subjects perform well at the task because their stored social information (or cultural schema) is congruent.[6] Conversely, participants perform poorly when their cultural schema is incongruent with the task (i.e. "man" associated with "unpleasant"). These patterns have been found when assessing gender (Rudman, Greenwald, and McGhee 2001) and racial stereotypes (Greenwald et al. 1995).

In the preceding paragraphs, I briefly discussed two ways individuals process social information – explicitly and implicitly (Evans 2008; Gawroski, Sherman, Trope 2014). Explicit social cognition is purposeful, conscious, and deliberate, while implicit social cognition is automatic, out of our awareness, and out of our control. Both forms of cognition rely on memories. However, because implicit processing is out of our control, this mental action could use any stored information. We may not personally endorse the information, but it is still part of our cultural schema (Fazio and Olson 2003). Results from IAT tests correlate highly with general cultural evaluations of the categories, such as race and gender, but weakly with the individuals' explicit attitude of the categories.

While psychology's measures and results help us understand the difference between explicit and implicit processing, this research agenda lacks work that shows how implicit processing is related to social order. For example, if we indeed process information based on cultural stereotypes, how does this affect interaction with others? What does it mean for larger social organizations? Status characteristics theory provides one answer to these questions, as the process of status generalization describes how implicit processes can activate cultural stereotypes in situ. More importantly, status generalization also describes how broader societal stratification is enacted and maintained during group interaction, even outside of our awareness.

---

[6] Cultural schema are the rules for enacting social structure (Sewell 1992). One can think of cultural schema as knowledge about the social world that guides behavior during interaction. On the next page, I go into more detail about cultural schema and social structure.

From Psychology to Sociology

Findings from implicit attitudinal research begin to explain how individuals process social information and evaluate categories using cultural schema. One problem with this research is that implicit social cognition does not happen solely within individuals, which is how psychologists examine the phenomenon, but also when individuals interact with others. While psychologists' tests show how cultural beliefs affect evaluations of others, they lack the actual "others" to show how implicit processes not only have effects on actors' internal evaluations, but also affect how people behave toward others within a group. Once others are involved in examining implicit processes, we can witness how our cultural schema, even those that we do not endorse, affect how group members organize their behaviors to reflect said schema. In other words, we can observe how cultural schema create behavioral inequalities that mirror our "pleasant" and "unpleasant" preferences for individuals who are members of the social categories that we evaluate. When we detect these behavioral inequalities, we are seeing social structure in action – "structuration," as Giddens (1979) refers to it. Examining social structure in this way is often the difference between how psychological and sociological psychologists approach their studies (Thoits 1983), and is the difference between the implicit processes explored by psychologists and sociologists' exploration of status generalization.

Social structure is the enactment of virtual constructs; it is something we do (Sewell 1992). Specifically, social structures are comprised of cultural schema (the rules for how one uses what one knows to enact social structures) and resources (anything that can be used during the enactment of social structures, which could be things a person can do or things a person has). For example, men are perceived as more competent than women are, in general. Other resources maybe tangible, like money, or intangible like a good conversationalist can do better to dictate the terms of a group. Because access to resources is not distributed equally in society, and people's cultural schemas are similar,

social structures create inequality. Consequently, resources and schema reinforce each other to confine or expand action. It is this social action that reproduces social structures, or alternatively, changes them. During implicit processing, people draw on cultural schema, and thus, implicit social cognition is part of doing social structure.

Implicit processing is especially prevalent in groups during which people have to evaluate competency. Evaluations of competency are important in groups with goal-oriented tasks, and the group members want to succeed at the task. These kinds of groups are very different from other types of groups, such as primary groups, collectives, and categories (Forsythe 2010), which lack the social pressures compelling group members to evaluate competence.[7] It is also notable that cultural schema are often composed of cultural stereotypes concerning competence judgments about those from certain social categories. For example, in general, men are viewed as having more competence than women (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). With social pressure to evaluate which group member has the know-how to get the task done, and the presence of cultural schema with "information" about social categories and competence, implicit processing in these situations is a driving force.

The groups of interest to this thesis are task groups, which Forsythe refers to as "social groups." They tend to be small, the behavior in the group tends to revolve around a goal, and unlike other groups, admittance into them could involve certain qualifications, such as job title. Examples of social groups are coworkers, study groups, and task forces. When social groups complete tasks successfully, there are collective rewards that are given jointly, but may be distributed unevenly to group members (e.g. an overall salary increase for the entire group, but the leader gets more of an increase than others).

---

[7] Primary groups are long-term, include face-to-face interaction, and tight-knit. These groups are our families and close friends, for examples. A collective is a set of people, who spontaneously gather for short amount of time, and it is very easy to join or leave. Examples of collectives could be a mob, an audience, or a queue at a deli. Categories are a set of people who share a common similarity or characteristic, such as their gender, ethnicity, or region of the country.

Therefore, there is pressure to get the job done, accomplish it successfully, or face the consequences, which might be no reward for the entire group.

Individuals in social groups need to deduce who in the group is competent to get the task accomplished successfully. There are several obstacles to this assessment. First, people do not have their competencies printed on their forehead; rather, what people do have are observable characteristics that have cultural notions of competency connected to them (e.g. race, gender, and maybe social class). Second, group members need to ascertain quickly who is competent. Thus, individuals instantaneously process social cues, evaluate competency, and act on those evaluations. Implicit social cognition is the first step in explaining the psychology of attaching cultural notions of competency to individuals based on their perceived characteristics. However, implicit processing does not explain the mechanism for how groups then stratify into a hierarchy based on said characteristics, and then behave according to that hierarchy.

Status Characteristics Theory (SCT) is one theory that describes how groups stratify using observable characteristics of the group members (Berger et al. 1977; Webster and Foschi 1988; Berger and Webster 2006). SCT is ultimately a theory about social inequality. Status generalization (SG), a mechanism that can create social inequality, begins with implicit processing of group members' competency.

SG occurs in specific kinds of social groups – task- and collectively oriented groups, which represent the scope conditions for the theory (Berger et al. 1977; Webster and Foschi 1988; Berger and Webster 2006). The scope conditions are the domain of phenomena to which a theory applies (Cohen 1989; Tootell, Bianchi, and Munroe 1998). In general, scope conditions are the set of circumstances that need to be met or satisfied. They limit the range of applicability and generality of a theory. Moreover, scope conditions provide the settings for theory testing. For SG, groups must be both task- and collectively oriented (Berger et al 1977). See Figure 2.1 below for the Venn diagram representing the scope conditions.

Members who are primarily motivated to achieve or solve a valued goal or problem are participating in task-oriented groups. The members perceive this goal as having a successful or unsuccessful outcome. Task groups need to accomplish something and competence for successful task completion matters to these group members. In addition to task-orientation, these groups must also be collectively oriented. Collective orientation refers to group members believing it is legitimate (i.e. right and proper) and necessary to take others' behaviors and opinions into consideration to accomplish the task. Examples of such groups are juries, occupational and student work groups, and athletic teams (see Berger et al. 1977 for a complete rendering of SCT's scope conditions).

Figure 2.1 Scope Conditions for Status Generalization

In sum, psychological social psychologists study the presence of implicit processing within the individual. Sociological social psychologists take this process up a unit of analysis, and investigate its effects on group dynamics. Moreover, they are careful to delimit the kinds of groups in which this process would be found. In so doing, they capture how social structure operates through cultural schema.

In the next section, I expound on these ideas, and discuss status generalization (SG), a process through which people in task- and collectively oriented groups tap into cultural schema to develop expectations of self and other.

Status Generalization – The Core Process of SCT

When people are in groups that meet the scope conditions, they are under pressure to complete a task successfully. Successful task completion typically occurs through competent behavior. Therefore, the group members have to establish who is the most competent for the group to avoid failure. The problem is, of course, that objective competence is hard to gauge, and so individuals use perceptions of competence, based on implicit knowledge of cultural schema, to determine who has the goods to get the job done. These perceptions often do not reflect objective reality, which is why we study social psychology – individuals filter their objective world through cultural lenses, and then behave accordingly. Status generalization (SG) is one of the ways in which individuals use their filters to inform their actions.

SG involves evaluating self and others (Berger et al. 1977; Berger and Webster 2006; Webster and Foschi 1988). As described above, we humans evaluate social information both explicitly and implicitly. Explicit evaluations can be time consuming, whereas implicit evaluations tend not to be. We know from IAT research that humans will use cultural information (that may not be accurate in terms of competency) to evaluate members from social categories. Thus, beliefs about the characteristics of the group members and self are activated. Included in the cultural schema are stereotypes, and these too become the social information used by group members to discern who is competent. Therefore, group members may arrive at inaccurate perceptions of competency through this evaluation process. Nonetheless, as W. I. Thomas notes, "If men

define situations as real, they are real in their consequences" (Thomas and Thomas 1929:572).[8]

SG is a complicated process. In an attempt to demystify SG, I use pictorial diagrams to facilitate the explanation, a first for the Expectation States theorist research program in which SG is a main process. I believe that by using these visual devices, SG will resonate more with those who are unfamiliar with its inner workings. As I discuss and show images depicting SG, I will also integrate formal definitions and the five formal principles that delineate the process.[9]

Figure 2.2 Student Work Group

Figure 2.2 presents a picture of a typical work group. These students have been randomly assigned to work together by their professor. They have just met, but need to create a working relationship to complete a group project; actually, their group grade

---

[8] By the way, this quote was from a book that both he AND his wife published, but she never gets credit for it.

[9] The formal statements of the principles of SG have several iterations in the literature. In this section, I focus on the conceptual formal statements. In the next section, which involves the mathematics of the theory, I may restate principles in terms of the mathematics.

depends on it. They have very little information about each other to judge who is most competent for successful task completion, such as knowing who received a good grade on another assignment. However, what they do have are observable characteristics and other status cues presented during the interaction.[10]

Note some inherent properties of this group. One is that these students do not have forever to complete the task – there is a time constraint. Also, until we know more, we can assume that they do not vary on any other social classification except gender (for example, we can surmise that they are from the same racial category). They are approximately the same age, and are students from within the same organization. At first meeting, these students would be unaware of any clear ability differences (for example, if one student is an engineering major and the other a sociology major, they would not have this information at the beginning of the interaction).

These students will use social information (those observable characteristics) to make their evaluations about each other in terms of competence. The observable social distinctions that confer competence and then advantage and disadvantage are called *status characteristics;* these are personal attributes that are socially distinct and differentially ranked within a society. Group members perceive these distinctions through visual cues, and understand their attached meanings through a shared culture.

> "…a *status characteristic,* a characteristic around which differences in cognitions and evaluations of individuals or social types of them come to be organized" (Berger et al. 1977:5).

There are two types of status characteristics, *specific* and *diffuse* (denoted as C and D respectively).[11] *Specific status characteristics* (C) are social attributes that have a

---

[10] "Status cues are indicators, markers or identifiers of the different social status people possess" (Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, and Rosenholtz 1986:155). They are observables used to classify people, such as a uniform, a diploma on a wall, an accent, etc. See Chapter 3 in this thesis for a full discussion.

[11] These symbols (C and D) will be important for the mathematics of SCT discussed later in the chapter.

limited scope of expectations, such as math ability (Berger et al. 1977); some people have

high ability and some people have low ability (and levels of ability in between).

> "A characteristic is a *specific status characteristic* if it involves two or
> more states that are differentially evaluated; and associated with each state
> is a distinct expectation state" (Berger and Webster 2006:272).

Consider, for example, the majors of the students in Figure 2.2 – they are

Statistics and English (respectively) and they have a math task. It does not take much

cognitive work for the group members to discern who will be more competent for

successful task completion. One of the group members has an ability related to the task

and thus would be expected to be more competent at the task.

However, our group members do not know each other's major. What they do

know is each other's gender. Gender is an example of a *diffuse characteristic* (D). These

are social attributes of an individual that contain general notions of competency or value

(other examples of diffuse status characters include race and beauty). It is not just that

there are different states (or categories) of diffuse characteristics, or that one state is

evaluated differentially compared to another state of the characteristic, but there are

generalized expectations about the state. For example, in general, men are viewed as

more competent than women (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). As such, men will be

perceived as more competent on a whole host of tasks, not just the task at hand. Below is

the formal definition and updated version of a diffuse status characteristic, the elements

of that definition are encapsulated in the above paragraph.

> "A characteristic is a *diffuse status characteristic* if the following three
> things are true: (1) it involves two or more states that are differentially
> values; (2) associated with each state are distinct sets of specific
> expectations, each itself evaluated; and (3) also associated with each is a
> similarly evaluated general expectation state" (Berger and Webster
> 2006:272"

These notions of competency and value are contained within cultural schema.

These cultural beliefs matter even if one does not buy into them. I could think, for

example, that I am the smartest person in the room, smarter than all the men, too. *But*, I know that in general men make more money than women, are more likely to be CEOs, more valued than women, and most importantly, I know that others in the group know that, and so we are expected to behave accordingly. If I do not, other group members may sanction me because they do not expect me to be the smartest one in the room because I am a woman (controlling for other factors).

Figure 2.3 Automatic Sex Categorization and the Recognition of Difference

Getting back to the example group, the students in Figure 2.2 have just met. Thus, they have very little social information about each other. What they do know is each other's gender. Figure 2.3 is a pictorial representation of automatic sex categorization.[12] It seems as if the thoughts of the individuals are conscious, when in fact this mental processing is most likely implicit. The individuals have categorized each other into a gender, which are states of a diffuse status characteristic. Cultural assumptions have not

---

[12] Automatic sex categorization allows individuals to typify others non-consciously as fitting into the binary hegemonic category system of gender (Ridgeway and Correll 2004).

come into the picture just yet; the students have just recognized the difference between themselves. This is the first principle in the status generalization process, *salience*.

> Principle 1 (P_1): Status characteristics are *salient*, if they differentiate group members or if group members think it is relevant to the task.

The students in our work group have classified each other into a gender. As they note the difference between self and other (Figure 2.3 Salience), the meaning of that difference is processed (Figure 2.4). It is after recognition of difference that the group members begin to imbue the difference with cultural understandings about competency associated with gender. Before we get to Figure 2.4, the next step in the process is about maintaining status characteristics as salient, which is the *burden of proof* principle.

Going back to our student work group, gender differentiates the two students. Additionally, the instructor did not explicitly say, "It does not matter what your gender is, there are certain abilities to do this task and gender is not associated with them." In terms of status generalization, gender will stay a salient diffuse status characteristic and be used to discern competency of group members because it has not been disassociated from the task at hand. It is at this point in the status generalization process that cultural schema about salient diffuse status characteristics are activated, which are depicted in Figure 4.

> P_2: If a characteristic becomes salient, then group members will think it to be relevant to the task unless it is shown to be irrelevant or becomes disassociated from the task. This is called *burden of proof.*

In Figures 2.4 through 2.6, there are some meanings we associate with gender in American culture. A cultural stereotype that girls are bad at math (Hyde, Lindberg, Linn, Ellis, and Williams 2008). Teachers are more likely to call on boys than they are to call on girls (Renold 2006). Men make more money than women do, all else equal (Mandel and Semyonov 2005). The group members are connecting the gender differences with notions about gender inequality. Individuals contain these notions of gender inequality in their cultural schema. Recall that cultural schema are knowledge that informs action. In

Figure 2.4 through 2.6 (below), the group members are tapping into cultural schema of gender inequality.

Figure 2.4 Stereotype of Girls Not Doing Well at Math

Figure 2.5 Teachers Calling on Male Students More than Female Students

The group members are trying to distinguish who has the "stuff" to get the task done successfully. To do this, the group members are associating cultural meanings of

competency associated with gender. At this point, they then associate notions of competency to each other. Recall back to the implicit cognition at the beginning of the chapter that states, in general, people associate "pleasant" and "not pleasant" with man and women, respectively (Payne and Garowski 2010). The students have sex characterized each other, they implicitly call up cultural schema about gender, and now they are associating those general notions of competency to each other based on the individual's gender category in a pair-wise fashion. This is the principle of *organized subsets*.

Figure 2.6 Men Earning More than Women (all else equal)

> P₃: Stratification within the group begins with combining, or *aggregating organized subsets* of status information.

Student A is a woman and Student B is a man. According to the theory, Student B possesses the valued state of gender and thus receives notions of competency. Student A has the devalued attribute of gender and consequently receives notions of less competency. They arrive at the same conclusion through a pair-wise comparison process that utilizes shared cultural schema. Using Figures 2.4 through 2.6 as examples, both

Student A and B are tapping into cultural schema about gender. Student A compares herself to Student B and Student B compares himself to Student A; they arrive at the conclusion that they differ on gender. They both tap into the shared cultural schema that contain information that men are more competent than women.

With one diffuse status characteristic, it is easy to predict who will be more likely to be associated with successful task outcome, the person with the valued state of the characteristic. What if there is another diffuse status characteristic?

In Figures 2.7 and Figure 2.8, we have the same group structure and task, but now the students differ on gender and race. Both race and gender are salient status characteristics, and the instructor did not mention anything about race in connection to the task: Now who's most likely to be associated with successful task completion? Principle three "organizes" the status information for each individual into two sides – positively valued attributes and negatively valued attributes.

Figure 2.7 Group 2

For the student group in Figure 2.7 (we will refer to them as Group 2), the man has a positively valued state, "man," and a negatively valued state, "African American."

The woman has one positively valued attribute, "European American," and one negatively valued attribute, "woman." While in Figure 2.8 (Group 3), the woman has two devalued attributes, woman and black, and the man has two valued attributes. Below in Figure 2.9, we can see the status information organized into subsets based on the positive or negative valuation from cultural schema.

Figure 2.8 Group 3

I referred earlier to the next step in the process, estimating who is most likely to be associated with task completion. Another way to think about this is how the group could be arranged in a hierarchy based on perceived competence. This is the next step in SG, taking the information from Principle 3 and resolving who is at the top and who is at the bottom of the hierarchy based on their number of positively and negatively valued attributes. This mental calculus involves combining all the positive states and all the negative states of salient status characteristics that group members possess into a profile. The hierarchy of the group comes from rank ordering the profiles of the group members, which is called the *power and prestige order* and is the fourth assumption.

Using the information from Figure 2.9, we can unravel the order of each group's hierarchy. In Figure 2.10, I rearrange the information from Figure 2.9 to allow for easier conceptualization of Principle 4. Let us begin with our simple case of one diffuse status characteristic, which we will call Group 1. The man in the group has one positively valued attribute, or advantaging attribute, which we could assign the value of "+1." The woman has one negatively valued attribute, or disadvantaging attribute, for which we could assign "-1" to it. Thus, the man would be at the top of the power and prestige order for Group 1, and we could refer to him as having higher status (and the woman as having lower status) in this instance.

Groups	Group Member	Number of positively valued attributes	Number of negatively valued attributes
Group 1 (from Figure 2)	Woman	0	1
	Man	1	0
Group 2 (from Figure 5a)	White Woman	1	1
	Black Man	1	1
Group 3 (from Figure 5b)	Black Woman	0	2
	White Man	2	0

Figure 2.9 Organizing Subsets of Status Information for the Student Groups

P$_4$: Group members are ordered in terms of their aggregated subsets of valued and devalued states. This ranking is the expectation order.

Group 2 has two salient status characteristics, race and gender. The white woman has one advantaging attribute, white (=1), and one disadvantaging characteristic, woman (=-1). The black man has one advantaging attribute, man (=1), and one disadvantaging characteristic, black (=-1). If we "add" up their respective attributes, the result would be

zero for both. This is represented in the "Status Difference" column of Figure 2.10. The attributes in essence cancel each other out for the members of Group 2. The woman and the man are status equals in terms of SG.

Groups	Group Members	Gender		Race		Status Difference
		Women	Man	Black	White	
Group 1	Woman	—		0	0	-1
	Man		+	0	0	+1
Group 2	White Woman	—			+	0
	Black Man		+	—		0
Group 3	Black Woman	—		—		-2
	White Man		+		+	+2

Figure 2.10 Status Differences from the Organized Subsets

Group 3 has two salient characteristics like Group 2, but because of the configuration of the members attributes, the resulting order of the hierarchy is different. The black woman has two disadvantaging characteristics and the white man has two advantaging characteristics. Thus, the resulting ordering of the hierarchy is man (high status) and then the woman (low status).

Principle 4 tells us who in the group is more likely to be associated with the successful task outcome because of perceived competence from their positively valued attribute(s), but we cannot observe this directly. Because these first four principles occur in the group members heads, they are mental processes. However, what we can observe are the behavioral inequalities that indicate the status hierarchy. Principle 5 is *translation of the power and prestige order into behavior* (see Figure 2.11 below).

P₅: Observable power and prestige behaviors are direct functions of group members' position in the expectation order (adapted from Berger and Webster 2006:273).

Group members at the top of the hierarchy tend to display such behaviors as *performance outputs*; that is, doing something to accomplish the task, (e.g. "Let's do this…"). Lower status group members tend to engage more in *action opportunities*; that is, they ask questions to facilitate the task, such as "What should we do next?" Within the group, differing levels of influence will also indicate placement in the power and prestige order. For Group 1, SCT would predict that the guy in the group is more likely to influence. The gal would be more likely to defer.

Figure 2.11 Principle 5

We started with a simple dyad, two students working on group project (Figure 2.2, Group 1). They did not know who is more competent to get the task accomplished successfully. They just knew each other's gender. However, SG describes how group members' attribute difference and the cultural schema associated with the attribute are used to form expectations for competency. These expectations become "true" through

behavior, where, in general, the one with the higher social status performs, and the one with lower status defers.

SG outlines how group members use cultural schema to determine competency of each other based on the characteristics they possess (Berger et al. 1977; Berger and Webster 2006; Webster and Foschi 1988). SG occurs by actors taking into account status characteristics of individuals in collectively and task-oriented groups. Individuals use salient status characteristics of group members to create *performance expectations* for each other. Performance expectations are anticipations of abilities of self and others in the group. They are "out-of-awareness" hunches or anticipations of one (or more) others' likelihood of useful contribution to the group's task as compared to self (Walker and Ridgeway 1995).

> "*Performance expectations* are anticipations on the part of an individual of the abilities and task capacities of self and others" (Berger and Webster 2006:269).

Forming performance expectations first involves attributions of perceived ability (e.g. "Will my partner perform better in comparison to me?") with "perceived" being the key word. In terms of SG principles, this would be Principle 3, aggregating organized subsets achieved through a pair-wise comparison between "self" and "other."

The second component in performance expectation formation is the self-fulfilling expectations based on the attribution. This is the way it is expected to be, so people behave according to the expectations, and thus reinforce expectations. Based on the **perceived** ability of self and other group members, the group members then behave as if those perceptions are real. The power and prestige order follows the self-fulfilling expectations, the power and prestige order is the status hierarchy (Principle 4). Group members behave according to those expectations, which is Principle 5 – translation of the expectations into behavior. Group members' behavior indicates the power and prestige

and order. Thus, performance expectations are the result of the status generalization process and the main component for the mathematical calculations of SG.

A more sophisticated way to derive performance expectations exists than the simplistic way presented in this section illustrated in Figure 2.9 and 2.10. In the next section, I explicate the mathematics of the theory, and introduce the "graph theoretic formulation" – these are path diagrams that represent the mathematical calculations of the theory. I will refer back to this conceptual section to aid in the coming discussion.

Mathematics of SCT and the Graph Theoretic Formulation

The purpose of the mathematical calculations is to assign a numerical value, referred to as a "point prediction," to the performance expectations of each group member, which ultimately allows for hypothesis testing. Driving these calculations is a heuristic, a pictorial representation of the ability attribution, called the graph theoretic model or a path diagram, depicted below in Figure 2.12.[13] This heuristic is meant to represent what is going on in people's heads. It is a model. If mental processing is described as a black box (i.e. from Skinnerian or other behavioral psychology), the path diagram fills in the black of the box without explaining the black box (i.e. the path diagram does not explain fully the mental processing involved with status generalization such as implicit social cognition as undergirding the process). The path diagram illustrates how status characteristics lead to enactment of the status hierarchy.

Additionally, the graph theoretical model shows us how we sort out which group member is most likely to be "seen" as competent, that is, perceived as the one who could accomplish the task most successfully, and which group member is associated with less competence, that is, cannot get the task done as successfully. The path diagram helps us calculate point predictions, which are ordered according to magnitude; the resulting order is our prediction for the status ordering.

---

[13] While path diagrams are called the graph theoretic formulation, they do not follow formal graph theory from mathematics. They are just models, or pictures.

$$p - C^+ ———— C^{*+} — T^+$$

$$|_-$$

$$o - C^- ———— C^{*-} — T^-$$

Figure 2.12 One Specific Status Characteristic Path Diagram

Figure 2.12 is a path diagram with one specific relevant status characteristic. Let us examine this most simple path model to get acquainted with the symbols of a path diagram. The basic structure of the path diagram represents status generalization for a dyad. The dyad is "p" and "o." "P" is the focal actor and "o" is the other. This also portrays for the pair-wise comparison between "self" (=p) and "other" (=o) that occurs during Principle 3.

Using our example Group 1 from Figure 2, p and o could be Student A and Student B, except in this instance their gender is not salient because they have the same gender (i.e. both women or men). Connected to each group member is a state of a specific status characteristic (C, an ability related to the task at hand, T). In this instance, p possesses the positive state of the characteristic (C^+), meaning she or he is perceived to have high ability compared to o. Through C^+, p is associated to the positive state (C^{*+}), which is the ability necessary to complete the task successfully (T^+). O possesses the

negative state (C⁻), or perceived low ability in relation to p. Through C⁻, o is associated to the negative state of the ability necessary (C⁻*) to complete the task (T⁻).[14]

       The *path links*, or the lines, both horizontal and vertical (— or |) that connect components of the path diagram are central for the mathematical calculations. When theorists in this tradition talk about a "path," they are referring to the segment of the diagram from actor to task outcome (e.g. $p - C^+ - C^{*+} - T^+$). A *path length* is the number of path links in a path.

Figure 2.13 One Diffuse Status Characteristic Path Diagram

       SG explains how group members will use observable characteristics of other group members and themselves to assess who is perceived as competent to complete the task successfully (T⁺). Figure 2.13 is a path diagram with one diffuse status characteristic.

---

[14] In reality, very few tasks have a single needed ability to complete the task successfully. Most tasks need many abilities to complete the task successfully. We are cognitive misers, meaning we will do as little cognitive processing as we can. Thus, we lump all the abilities needed to get the task completed into one ability (C*). Cohen (1994) demonstrates that when group members are made aware of all the different abilities needed to complete the task successfully, status generalization breaks down. The process stops because there are many C*s in the path diagram and the attribution process with many C*s would be cognitively difficult.

Since the focus of the conceptual section used diffuse status characteristics, I will

continue with that focus through the mathematics section. Note that Figures 2.12 and 2.13

are not that different, except for the additional path link and a gamma (Γ). Recall that

diffuse status characteristics contain general expectations for competency associated with

each state of the characteristic. The general expectations are depicted in the path diagram

as the gamma (Γ – see yellow box in Figure 2.14 below).[15]

Figure 2.14 Clarification of One Diffuse Status Characteristic Path Diagram

Using our original student group from the previous section (depicted in Figure 2.2

and reprinted below), let us go through status generalization. Given the path diagram in

Figure 2.13 (or 2.14), "p" is Student B, a man, and "o" is Student A, a woman, which is

notated below in the red box in Figure 2.14. They are in a task- and collectively oriented

group. We know that in Figure 2.13 (or 2.14), p is the man, Student B, because he

possesses the positive state of the diffuse characteristic gender (D^+), and that o is the

woman, Student A, because she possesses the negative state (D^-). The *dimensionality* path

---

[15] Figure 2.14 is a replication of Figure 2.13 with additional colored boxes for explanatory purposes, but the colored boxes are not part of the actual path diagram.

(in the green box in Figure 2.14) represents an evaluative continuum of the status characteristic with one end of the continuum specifying a more valued state of the characteristic and the other end specifying a less valued state.

Figure 2.15 Student Work Group 1 (reprinted from earlier in this chapter)

In this situation, gender is a salient diffuse status characteristic because it differentiates p and o, Principle 1. The activation of the salient status characteristic is depicted through the negative sign on the dimensionality path (in the blue box). Principle 2, burden of proof, holds because the characteristic has not been shown to be irrelevant to the task.

At this point in SG, Principle 3, aggregating subsets, involves calculations, but inputs from the path diagrams are needed. As mentioned earlier, performance expectations are a result of SG. Both p and o have a performance expectation (e_p and e_o, respectively). To calculate a performance expectation, we need to count the path links (—— or |) between actor (p or o) and task outcome (T). Thus, each actor will have two sets of paths, a set associated with T^+, and a set associated with T^- for each status characteristic.

As Principle 3 outlines, status information will be organized into positive (e_{p+}) and negative information (e_{p-}).

Going back to our student group (in Figure 2.15), Student B is the man and thus represented as "p" in the path diagram because in Figure 2.13, p possesses the valued state of the diffuse status characteristic (D^+) of gender. Accordingly, Student A is represented as "o" because she possesses the devalued state of the diffuse status characteristic (D^-) of gender. The path diagram is p-centric, meaning p is the focal actor, and using the path diagram we can conclude p's placement, relative to o's, in the status hierarchy. Alternatively, we can say that using performance expectations, we predict p's status advantage or disadvantage relative to o's. As mentioned before, to do this, we need to count the path lengths associated with p and o.

Counting path lengths starts with the actor, p, and ends at the perception of expected task outcome (T). Using Figure 2.16 below and following the blue arrows, we will count p's path links, which give us the path length. The path link between p and D^+ is one. The second link is between D^+ and Γ^+. The third is the path link between Γ^+ and C^{*+}. The fourth link is between C^{*+} and T^+. Thus, p possesses a path length of four. They are considered positive information (i.e. e_{p+}) because the T is positive and they have no negative signs associated with them.

P also has another path ending at T^-. The process is the same as above, but following the green arrows. The first path link is the same from p to D^+, but the second path link is from D^+ to D^- through the dimensionality path link. The third link is between D^- and Γ^-. The fourth is between Γ^- and C^{*-}. The fifth is between C^{*-} and T^-. P possesses an additional path of length five. These are also considered positive because of the negative sign on the dimensionality path cancels out the negative sign on T^-. Taken together, p has two sets of paths with lengths four and five – that will be used in the performance expectation equation (see Formula 2 below). Additionally, p has no negative path lengths. Figure 2.19, below, organizes this information.

Figure 2.16 Counting p's Path Lengths

To calculate o's performance expectation (e_o), we need to count up o's paths. Below is Figure 2.17, which illustrates o's paths. Following the green arrows, we can count the links of one path. The first path link is between o and D^-. The second link is between D^- and Γ^-. The third is the path link between Γ^- and C^{*-}. The fourth link is between C^{*-} and T^-. Thus, o possesses a path of length four. They are considered negative information (i.e. e_{o-}) because the T is negative and all other paths are positive[16] (i.e. -1*1=-1).

As with p, o also has another path ending at T^+ through the dimensionality path link. The process is the same as above, but following the blue arrows. The first path link is the same from p to D^-, but the second path link is from D^- to D^+ through the dimensionality path. The third link is between D^+ and Γ^+. The fourth is between Γ^+ and C^{*+}. The fifth is between C^{*+} and T^+. O possesses an additional path of length five. These are also considered negative because of the negative sign on the dimensionality path link changes the positive sign on T^+. Taken together, o has two negative paths – lengths four and five – that will be used in the performance expectation equation (see Formula 5

---

[16] The dimensionality line is the only negative line. Thus, if the path does not go through the dimensionality line, then the valence of the path is the valence of the task outcome (T).

below). Additionally, o has no positive path lengths (see Formula 4 below). Again this information is organized below in Figure 2.19.

Figure 2.17 Counting o's Path Lengths

Figure 2.18 Student Work Group and Status Generalization

The path diagram represents a picture of the implicit cognitive processes underlying status generalization. Above, Figure 2.18 illustrates the heuristic in situ. Each

person in the group makes pair-wise comparisons based on constellations of salient status characteristics, which form their performance expectations. Both group members tacitly agree upon the profiles generated because they share cultural schema when it comes to gender and competence. Additionally, we can put a point estimate on the profile and rank them. This ranking creates the status hierarchy. Group members behave to confirm the ranking, thus creating the self-fulfilling expectation discussed earlier.

In the next section, we will derive the performance expectation profiles for p and o using the path lengths from the above counting exercises. Below, Figure 2.19 organizes the information about the path lengths from the above counting exercises. We will take these numbers and plug them into formulae in the next section to arrive at point predictions that enumerate the status hierarchy.

Path Lengths to Performance Expectation Profiles

Path	Positive Path of Length:	Negative Path of Length:
$p - ... - T^+$	4	0
$p - ... - T^-$	5	0
$o - ... - T^-$	0	4
$o - ... - T^+$	0	5

Figure 2.19 Path Lengths with One Diffuse Status Characteristic

Formula 1 below calculates the performance expectation for the focal actor, p, which is comprised of the positive and negative information. Formula 2 calculates the positive performance expectation, where $f(i_p)$ is the value for the strength for a given

number of links in a path connecting p and T, where "i" is the number of path links through each of "n" paths (Fişek, Norman and Nelson-Kilger 1992).[17, 18] This process is repeated for the negative performance expectation in Formula 3. Formula 4 is the function used to derive the strength of each set of paths. For each salient status characteristic, there are two paths; one through T^+ and one through T^-.

$$e_p = e_{p+} + e_{p-} \tag{1}$$

$$e_{p+} = [1 - ((1 - f(i_{p+})) \ldots (1 - f(n_{p+})))] \tag{2}$$

$$e_{p-} = - [1 - ((1 - f(i_{p-})) \ldots (1 - f(n_{p-})))] \tag{3}$$

$$f(i) = 1 - e^{-2.618^{(2-i)}} \tag{4}$$

Using the formulae from above with the path lengths for p from Figure 4.13 it is easy to calculate the expectation profile for p. P has two positive path lengths, one of 4 and one of 5. These values are put into Formula 2 (i.e. f(4) and f(5)). It is plug and chug at this point!

$$e_{p+} = [1 - ((1 - f(i)) \ldots (1 - f(n)))] \tag{2}$$
$$= [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5)))]$$
$$= [1 - ((1 - .1358)(1 - .0542))]$$
$$= [1 - (.8642)(.9458)]$$
$$= [1 - .81736]$$
$$= .18264$$
$$e_{p-} = - [1 - ((1 - f(i)) \ldots (1 - f(n)))] \tag{3}$$
$$= 0$$
$$e_p = e_{p+} + e_{p-} \tag{1}$$

---

[17] Fisek et al. (1992) derived the strength of a path a priori and using meta-analytic techniques fit their estimations to 24 SCT experiments. I will take up this topic in Chapter 4 when discussing model estimations for the experimental data.

[18] When calculating the performance expectation (either positive or negative), $(1 - f(i_{p+}))$, the quantity that derives the complementary number to the strength of the path length $(f(i_{p+}))$, is repeated for each length. This repeated calculation is represented by the ellipses in the Formula 2.

$$= .18264 + 0$$

$$= .18264$$

Note in Formula 2, f(4) equals .1358 and f(5) equals .0542 (and for three path links, f(3) equals .3175). As path links increase, their impact in the performance expectation decreases or less powerful. A path of length three is derived from a relevant specific status characteristic path diagram, such as in Figure 2.12.[19] A specific status characteristic has more impact in the performance expectation than a diffuse characteristic. Why might the diffuse characteristic pack less of a punch to figure out competence? A relevant specific characteristic is an ability related to the task, whereas a diffuse status characteristic is a social attribute of person. Connecting a related ability to task outcome is easy for the brain, that is, it takes less cognition to arrive at the perception that some with an ability related to the task (i.e. C^+) is more likely to be perceived as competent to complete the task (T^+). However, connecting a social attribute to a task outcome is not so easy, and requires more mental processing (i.e. Γ in the path diagram).[20] It takes time for the brain to make connections between perceived attribute and ability. Thus, the diffuse status characteristic is weaker in terms of stratifying a group compared to an ability.

Using our calculations from above, p's performance expectation is roughly .18. What does this number mean? It only has meaning in relation to o's performance expectation. Thus, we need to derive the expectation profile for o. Using the information from Figure 4.13 allows for simple calculation of the performance expectation (Formula

---

[19] Relevant specific status characteristics refer to abilities associated with the task (Berger et al. 1977). Specific status characteristics have a limited range (or domain) of expectations and they become relevant when the domain overlaps with the task. In the discussion above, when I reference a specific status characteristic, I assume it is relevant.

[20] See Webster and Driskell (1985) for nuanced exposition on connecting a specific status characteristic to a task, when the domain of specific status characteristic does not apply to the task (i.e. it is like status generalization for a diffuse status characteristic).

6). O has no positive paths (Formula 4) and two negative paths – one of length four and one of length five (Formula 5).

$$e_{o+} = [1 - ((1 - f(i_o)) \ldots (1 - f(n_o)))] \tag{4}$$

$$= 0$$

$$e_{o-} = - [1 - ((1 - f(i_o)) \ldots (1 - f(n_o)))] \tag{5}$$

$$= - [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5)))]$$

$$= - [1 - ((1 -.1358)(1 -.0542))]$$

$$= - [1-(.8642)(.9458)]$$

$$= - [1-.81736]$$

$$= -.18264$$

$$e_o = e_{o+} + e_{o-} \tag{6}$$

$$= 0 + (-.18264)$$

$$= -.18264$$

O's performance expectation is -.18264 and only has meaning when compared to p. P's performance expectation is .18267. Thus, p is expected to have a status advantage over o because e_p is greater than e_o. Comparing the performance expectations is Principle 4, determining the expectation hierarchy.

Using our student group (Group 1), Student B (the man) is expected to have an performance advantage over Student A (the woman) because he has the advantaging state of gender, while the woman has the disadvantaging state. Recall from the last section, this is exactly the result attained going through the status generalization process.

Now at this point, you might be asking yourself, "Why go through the math if we can conceptually derive the status hierarchy?" First, in reality, we are rarely in a group (or studying a group) with only one salient status characteristic. For example, what is the status hierarchy for a group with four salient status characteristics – one specific, three diffuse, and p does not have all the advantaging states of the characteristics? Using the mathematical calculations allows for examining groups that are more complex. Second,

using the mathematical calculations for performance expectations ultimately leads to point predictions in empirical work to derive rigorous hypotheses.

Let us examine one of the other groups from the previous section, Group 3, which is more complex than Group 1 in terms of status information. Recall that Group 3 contains two students, Student A is an African American woman, and Student B is a European American man (depicted in Figure 2.20). There are two more important concepts embedded in Principle 3 (organized subsets), *inconsistency* and *attenuation effects*, and Group 3 will serve as an illustrative example for these concepts.[21]

Figure 2.20 Group 3 (reprinted from earlier in this chapter)

The process is the same as earlier, we will calculate performance expectations for Group 3, and with the inconsistency effect, we add another salient status characteristic. The groups depicted in these examples have symmetry, which allows us to calculate one actor's performance expectation and the other's will be opposite in direction, but with the same magnitude.

---

[21] Fişek (1998) provides mathematical proofs of these effects.

When adding additional consistent status information, such as more positive information (or more negative information), the effect of that additional information is less (i.e. diminishing returns).

> "… the *'attenuation effect'*: each additional bit of consistent status information has less weight than it would be itself" (Webster and Foschi 1988:12; emphasis added).

Going from Group 1 to Group 3 adds race as a salient diffuse status characteristic. For both Group 3 members, they receive additional consistent status information. The path diagram for Group 3 is below in Figure 2.21, and we need to count p's lengths to calculate her performance expectation. P is the African American woman. In this instance, she has two disadvantaging diffuse status characteristics. For gender, she possesses a four-path length and five-path length; and the same is true for race. Moreover, all the status information is negative.

Figure 2.21 Path Diagram for Group 3 and the Attenuation Effect

The formula for combining the status information shows the diminishing returns of adding the same valence status information. It adds less to the performance

expectation, than if the information was considered by itself. Below are the calculations for p's performance expectation.

$$e_{o+} = [1 - ((1 - f(i_o)) \ldots (1 - f(n_o)))] \qquad (4)$$

$$= 0$$

$$e_{o-} = - [1 - ((1 - f(i_o)) \ldots (1 - f(n_o)))] \qquad (5)$$

$$= - [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5))((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5))))]$$

$$= - [1 - ((1 - .1358)(1 - .0542))((1 - .1358)(1 - .0542))]$$

$$= - [1 - (.8642)(.9458)(.8642)(.9458)]$$

$$= - [1 - .6681]$$

$$= -.3319$$

$$e_o = e_{o+} + e_{o-} \qquad (6)$$

$$= 0 + (-.3319)$$

$$= -.3319$$

Recall from earlier that Student A, the woman, had a -.1826 performance expectation. With the addition of another disadvantaging status characteristic, p's (or Student A) performance expectation is lower -.3319. However, the magnitude of increase is not linear. The addition of consistent status information increases the performance expectation, but with the each additional piece of consistent status information, the impact is less and less. If we added a third piece of negative status information, Student A's performance expectation is -.4539. Adding an additional piece of status information increased the performance expectation by -.1493 (= -.3319 – (-.1826) or $e_{oGroup3} - e_{oGroup1}$), and adding a third piece increased the performance expectation by -.1221 (= -.4539 – (-.3319). Adding additional consistent status information increases the performance expectation (either positively or negatively), but at a decreasing rate.

The inconsistency effect, on the other hand, explains what happens when adding differently valenced status information. In general, adding a piece of positive status

information has more impact when combined with a bunch of negative status information than it would have alone. Said more formally:

> "…the *'inconsistency effect'*: a single piece of status information in a field of negatively evaluated characteristics has a greater effect than it would by itself" (Webster and Foschi 1988:12; emphasis added).

To illustrate the inconsistency effect with Group 3, we need to make salient another status characteristic. This time it is beauty. Student A, or p, now has two disadvantaging states of status characteristics (woman and African American) and one advantaging state of a characteristic (hegemonic beauty), depicted below in Figure 2.22.

Figure 2.22 Group 3 and the Inconsistency Effect

Below are the calculations for Student A's performance expectation for two negatively valued states of diffuse status characteristics and one positively valued state of a characteristic.[22]

$$e_{o+} = [1 - ((1 - f(i_o)) \ldots (1 - f(n_o)))] \tag{4}$$

---

[22] Path lengths such as $p — D_2^+ — D_3^+ — \ldots — T^+$ are not included because one would have to trace the path length through the general expectation and go backwards (i.e. $p — D_2^+ — \Gamma^+ — D_3^+ — \Gamma^+ — C^{*+} — T^+$). Tracing of path lengths only moves forward from actor to task outcome and the only turn is through the dimensionality path.

$$= [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5)))]$$

$$= [1 - ((1 -.1358)(1 -.0542))]$$

$$= [1 - (.8642)(.9458)]$$

$$= [1 -.81736]$$

$$= .1826$$

$$e_{o\text{-}} = \text{-} [1 - ((1 - f(i_o)) \ldots (1 - f(n_o)))] \tag{5}$$

$$= \text{-} [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5))((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5))))]$$

$$= \text{-} [1 - ((1 -.1358)(1 -.0542))((1 -.1358)(1 -.0542))]$$

$$= \text{-} [1 - (.8642)(.9458)(.8642)(.9458)]$$

$$= \text{-} [1 -.6681]$$

$$= \text{-}.3319$$

$$e_o = e_{o+} + e_{o\text{-}} \tag{6}$$

$$= .1826 + (\text{-}.3319)$$

$$= \text{-}.1493$$

The inconsistency effect demonstrated above works in conjunction with the attenuation effect. If we keep adding same valenced status characteristics to an actor, the effect of each additional characteristic decreases. However, if we add a differently valenced state of the status characteristic, then the effect can wipe out, or neutralize the combined effect of some of the differently valance states of status characteristics. In the above example, by adding beauty to p's performance expectation, her status disadvantage decreases by more than half, which compensated for the effect of one of her negative states of a status characteristic and some of another.

In this section, I presented the process of calculating performance expectation profiles (i.e. e_p and e_o) using path diagrams and several formulae. Because of cultural schema, the group members share the performance expectation profiles for self and other. Then they act on it. The mathematics of the theory allow for precise and rigorous predictions of Principle 4, the ranking of the status hierarchy.

Conclusions

I first presented implicit social cognition from cognitive psychology. Researchers demonstrate that this type of mental processing, out of our awareness, affects our judgments and behaviors. I link this mental processing to status generalization. Additionally, I explain status generalization – the mechanism of Status Characteristics Theory, which explains how groups stratify based on expectations for self and other derived from observable characteristics of group members. Innovating on previous theoretical accounts, I used pictorial representations to illustrate status generalization. Finally, I presented path diagrams – a heuristic for status generalization, and the mathematics of the theory.

In the next chapter, I present data from focus groups that illustrate cultural schema that undergraduates at The University of Iowa have about gender and social class. This information becomes the manipulation for the experiment I present in Chapter 4, which instantiates STC using diffuse status characteristics of social class and gender.

CHAPTER 3: CULTURAL SCHEMA AND STATUS CUES

In the previous chapter, I explicated the status generalization process, which details how group members form and act on perceptions from social information. Group members use perceptions to create expectations about who is competent to get the task accomplished successfully and who is not. Part of this process occurs in the group members' minds, and is out of the awareness of the individual. This implicit social cognition relies on cultural schema, those mental structures that house cultural information typically created from learning and experience.

This chapter focuses on cultural schema for gender and social class. What are the meanings individuals associate for these diffuse status characteristics? Or, said another way, what do people know about the social information associated with masculinity and social class? By using focus groups, I ascertained the local cultural meanings for a "rich guy" and "poor guy" from undergraduate students at The University of Iowa (UI). In so doing, I hope to capture the cultural schema of a local population. Most importantly, this local population will be my subject pool, so understanding how these individuals perceive "rich guys" and "poor guys" will be crucial for my experimental test.

Next, I review the methods for data collection and sample selection for my focus groups. In the Analysis section, I discuss sample characteristics of the focus group participants, as well as any consensus of the focus group profiles for a "rich guy" and a "poor guy." From the focus group data, important themes emerged, so in the last section, I will discuss the data using the concept "status cues."

Methods

Focus Groups

How do we know what social actors know about gender and social class? A method for extracting the information about these aspects of culture from knowledgeable actors is warranted. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) critique masculinity scholarship for neglecting local constructions of masculinity, the ideas that individuals develop out of

interactions within groups and organizations. To answer their critique, I facilitated focus groups to tap into local gender and social class meanings.

Focus groups are one method to discover beliefs and attitudes. The goal of the method is for the groups to reach consensus of ideas through discussion (Stewart, Shamdansani, and Rook 2007). The validity of focus group data hinges on the comfort level of the participants. The group composition and environment of the focus group must inspire feelings in the participants, so they can be open and honest in a group setting. Stewart and colleagues (2007) suggest that a degree of homogeneity within the group can facilitate the "safe zone" atmosphere for participants. However, they suggest careful construction of groups because too much homogeneity can impede group synergy. The researcher needs to be mindful of the interaction of personal characteristics (personality, demographic, and physical characteristics) when constructing the groups to ensure a cohesive entity. In sum, the researcher must craft the group mindfully, by creating cohesion from the start, and then guide the group to ensure each member's participation.

To accomplish this, I constructed a pre-screen survey to collect information about participants to create homogenous focus groups based on certain characteristics. This survey also contained items to assess demographic characteristics, self-relevant gendered meanings, and cultural meanings of social class categories and masculinity. In the next section, I outline the specifics of the survey.

Sample Selection

As mentioned before, careful construction of the focus groups began with a pre-screen survey (see Appendix A for pre-screening questions). A mass email was sent to undergraduates at The UI inviting them take the survey and possibly participate in the focus groups. Ultimately, this recruitment technique created a convenience sample (Neuman 2000).

The screening questions first assessed country of birth. Non-native born undergraduates most likely have a gender meaning system created from their formative

years in a different culture, which may not correlate with the gender and class meanings of native-born undergraduates (Scott, Alwin, and Bravn 1996). Therefore, I excluded those undergraduates who are not native born. Additionally, I omitted those individuals who were not raised in the United States for the same reason as those non-native-born.

Race/ethnicity could be another potential characteristic that can affect group dynamics (Kane 2000). Moreover, racial/ethnic identity can affect meanings for gender and class because of subcultural meanings that may differ from dominant cultural beliefs. Thus, I constrained the potential focus group participants to people who self-identified as European American. This exclusion is also advantageous because the university undergraduate population is overwheming white.[1]

To control for cohort effects, I limited the potential focus group participants to those aged 18 to 25. Additionally, I excluded all respondents who did not identify as being an undergraduate. Differing age and level of education can also affect the cultural meanings people hold (Davis and Greenstein 2009).

Lastly, I excluded participants who self-identified as transgender.[2] They may hold subcultural meanings of gender and social class that differ from cisgender respondents. The argument is similar to racial and ethnic subcultures. [3]

After the pre-screening questions, participants who are native born, European American, undergraduate, aged 18 to 25, and woman or man responded to items about self-relevant gender beliefs. Specifically, they answered the short form Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem 1981). See Appendix B for inventory questions. This inventory was developed originally to conceptualize and measure femininity and masculinity on two

---

[1] According The UI Office the Register, about 12% of the 30,000+ students at the university of identify as a minority. The University does not differentiate between race and ethnicity, nor do they give separate statistics for undergrads and graduate students (University of Iowa 2012).

[2] People who self-identify as transgender do not agree with the gender they were assigned at birth (Schilt and Westerbrook 2009).

[3] Cisgendered individuals have congruency among their assigned gender at birth, their bodies, and their gender identity (Schilt and Westerbrook 2009).

continua; instead of a single dimension (Bem 1974). These items contain stereotypical notions of masculinity and femininity. The respondents' answers to the inventory could give me a sense of how they view themselves in gendered terms. Additionally, I compared responses from the focus group participants to the non-focus group participants to examine if there were any group differences. (I discuss these in analysis section.)

In addition to the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), the participants also rated words associated with social class categories and masculinity, such as rich, poor, and rich guy. I derived these items from Affect Control Theory and will refer to them as EPA ratings (Heise 2007; see Appendix C for these items).[4] These items provide a baseline for how the focus group participants view masculinity and social class in general. As with the BSRI, I analyzed these items to see if the focus group participants hold beliefs different from the larger sample of survey respondents.

Lastly, the respondents answered demographic questions (see Appendix D for these questions). Some of these items are objective indicators of social class, that is, their parents' highest level of education (assessed separately) and if they ever received a Pell grant while attending The UI (Ver Ploeg 2002). They also reported the urbanicity of their hometown. These demographic questions along with the BSRI and EPA ratings contributed nuanced information about the focus group participants that the method of focus groups could not provide. Moreover, I was able to compare the focus group participants to the non-focus group participants to account for any differences between the two groups, which I discuss below in the analysis section.

---

[4] Affect control theory (ACT) is social psychological theory that quantifies cultural meanings of interaction components (e.g. actors, behaviors, identities, objects, etc.). The measurement of these components is on three continua: Evaluation (good versus bad), Potency (powerful versus powerless), and Activity (lively versus quiet).This measurement technique is from the work of Osgood and colleagues (1957; 1975). They sampled many distinct cultures and found these three continua to be a near universal for human language.

Participants that met the pre-screening characteristics were ultimately given a code to sign up for a focus group. They were sorted into two groups, women and men.[5] Separating the groups into same genders will allow the group dynamics not to be hindered by other gendered individuals (Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). Women may feel less inhibited to talk about masculinity and the same may be true for the men. Keeping the groups same-gendered should help ameliorate problematic group dynamics that can arise with mixed-gender groups (Stewart et al. 2007). Additionally, I moderated the all-women groups and a fellow male graduate student conducted the all-men focus groups for this same reason.[6]

Focus Group Procedures

Participants came to a large waiting room for their scheduled group. The moderator went through the consent process with the group of participants. This allowed the students to decline participation and make a gracious exit; none did. After consenting to participate, the moderator showed the participants to a large group study room.[7]

The participants sat in a circle around a large table with assigned seating. To begin the process of group cohesion, the moderator led them through an icebreaker. They introduced themselves (first names only) and shared their favorite kind of ice cream. Then they ate dinner. The participants were encouraged to talk during dinner. Eating together helped to foster a sense of community between the group members and further the process of group cohesion.

---

[5] I take seriously the notion that gender categories are polytomous and not dichotomous (i.e., trans-identified individuals would not self-identify as male or female), however, I am studying the hegemonic gender system at this point, and so I will use the cisgendered model of men and women.

[6] I will refer to myself or the other research assistant as the "moderator."

[7] Compensation for focus group participation was monetary.

After eating, the moderator walked the participants through the first thought exercise (see Figure 3.1 below).[8] The thought exercises are an opportunity for the participants to write down a description of a "rich guy" and a "poor guy" without the influence of other group members' thoughts. The participants were given five to seven minutes to write down the image in their head of a rich guy. After the participants recorded their responses for the rich guy, they then went through the same exercise for a poor guy (see Appendix E for both thought exercises). There was no group discussion in between the thought exercises.

Figure 3.1 "Rich Guy" Thought Exercise

After the participants finished their thought exercises, the moderator guided them through the group discussion, which was video and audio recorded (both done separately). First, they discussed the "rich guy" and then the "poor guy." The moderator recorded the lists of attributes from the group on the board. The participants discussed the

---

[8] I created the thought exercises from various sources (Aslaken 2006; Bourdieu 1986; Connell 2005; Martin 2011; Morris 2005; Mullins 2006; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999; Schilt and Westbrook 2009; and West and Fenstermaker 2002).

adjectives. There were some lively discussions about each guy, which I will discuss in the analysis section.

The moderator encouraged dissent because I wanted the participants to come to consensus through discussion and not because one person did the talking. During each focus group, everyone in the group spoke, so this was not a problem. Once the group reached the point of not generating new ideas, or saturation, the participants returned to their folder to fill out agreement surveys of the different characteristics (see Appendix E for the instrument).

These procedures yielded four types of data: the pre-screen survey, notes taken by the moderator during the focus groups, the participants thought exercises, and the participants' agreement surveys.[9] In the next section, I present analyses from said data. Because of the different kinds of data collected, both quantitative and qualitative, I used several different analytic strategies. I explain the analytic technique before I discuss the results.

Analysis

In this section, I first present the background information about the focus group (FG) participants and comparisons to the respondents who did not participate in the focus group. I then present analyses of the focus group discussions and the profiles that emerged from the groups. I conducted a content analysis of the moderators' notes to compare the generated profiles across the focus groups. The participants thought exercise data provided emergent patterns, serendipitous data, and examples. The agreement surveys demonstrate the level of consensus participants had with the groups' generated profile. From these analyses, a theme emerged. The participants talked about the "guys"

---

[9] While the focus groups were recorded, these data will not be analyzed in this thesis. The recordings were used to verify the moderators' notes generated from the focus group discussions. However, future analyses of the recorded groups are possible, such as conversation analysis and group interaction. These possible analyses are not central to the research questions of this thesis and therefore were not conducted.

in terms of status cues.[10] Thus, in a separate section, I present a content analysis of the focus groups' data that I analyzed specifically for examples of status cues before the discussion and conclusion of the chapter.

Sample Characteristics

To recruit focus group participants, undergraduates responded to a survey that served two functions. The first was to create homogenous groups based on the characteristics described above (born and raised in the United States, European American, undergraduates aged 18 to 25 who self-identify as either a man or woman). Second, the survey provides background information – demographic characteristics, stereotypical gendered self-beliefs, and EPA ratings about words associated with gender and social class – about the respondents (and ultimately the focus group participants).

A mass email was sent to undergraduates and 139 respondents made it through the pre-screening questions and finished the survey. From there, 34 students participated in the focus groups (eighteen women and sixteen men). It is important to note that I could not match two of the focus group participants' data to their survey responses (I could identify their gender as women though). Thus, the sample size for the focus group survey respondents is 32, sixteen women and sixteen men.

Table 3.1 below displays the percentages for demographic questions for the full sample of pre-screened respondents (referred to as the "Full Sample"), the non-focus group sample (NFG in the table), the focus group participants, and each sample divided by gender. These questions came at the end of the survey; so as not to prime respondents (Steele 1995; see Appendix D for exact wording). The first three questions assessed objective indicators of social class – mothers' and fathers' highest level of education and whether or not the respondent ever received a Pell grant while attending The UI. The last question assessed urbanicity of the respondent's hometown.

---

[10] I discuss status cues in detail later in this chapter. For now, "status cues are indicators, markers or identifiers of the different social status people possess" (Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, and Rosenholtz 1986:155).

Table 3.1 Percentages for Demographic Characteristics of Full Sample, Non-Focus Group Sample, Focus Group Sample, and by Gender

Characteristics	Full Sample			Non-Focus Group Sample			Focus Group Sample[a]		
	Combined (N = 137)	Women (N = 97)	Men (N = 42)	Combined (N = 107)	Women (N = 81)	Men (N = 26)	Combined (N = 32)	Women (N = 16)	Men (N = 16)
Gender	—	69.78%	30.22%	—	75.7%	24.3%	—	50.00%	50.00%
Mom's highest level of education:									
Less than a high school diploma	2.16%	1.44	.72	2.81%	1.87	.93	0%	0	0
High school diploma	5.04	4.32	.72	5.61	4.67	.93	3.13	3.13	0
High school diploma equivalent	1.44	0	1.44	.93	0	.93	3.13	0	3.13
Some college	13.67	10.79	2.88	15.89	12.15	3.74	6.25	6.25	0
Associate Degree	15.11	10.07	5.04	13.08	10.28	2.80	21.88	9.38	12.50
Bachelor Degree	38.85	25.90	12.95	38.32	27.10	11.21	40.63	21.88	18.75
Masters/Doctorate	23.74	17.27	6.47	23.36	19.63	3.74	25.00	15.63	9.38
Not Applicable	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dad's highest level of education:									
Less than a high school diploma	.72	0	.72	.93	0	.93	0	0	0
High school diploma	14.39	12.23	2.16	14.02	12.15	1.87	15.63	12.50	3.13
High school diploma equivalent	6.47	5.76	0.72	5.61	4.67	.93	9.38	9.38	0
Some college	13.67	10.07	3.60	13.08	10.28	2.80	15.63	9.38	6.25
Associate Degree	9.35	6.47	2.88	10.28	7.48	2.80	6.25	3.13	3.13
Bachelor Degree	26.62	19.42	7.19	29.91	23.36	6.54	15.63	6.25	9.38
Masters/Doctorate	28.06	15.83	12.23	26.17	17.76	8.41	34.38	9.38	25.00
Not Applicable	.72	0	.72	0	0	0	3.13	0	3.13
Pell Grant (yes)	17.99	13.67	4.32	18.69	14.95	3.74	15.63	9.38	6.25
Urbanicity:									
Rural	28.78	22.30	6.47	30.84	25.23	5.61	21.88	12.50	9.38
Suburban	56.12	39.57	16.55	53.27	41.12	12.15	65.63	34.38	31.25
Urban	15.11	7.91	7.19	15.89	9.35	6.54	12.50	3.13	9.38

[a] Focus Group Sample, N = 32, is for just survey respondents that also participated in the focus groups. Two focus group participants' pre-screening survey data could not be matched to focus group data. They identified as women.

I conducted a series of tests of the differences between the Full Sample and NFG. These tests are reported in Table 3.2. There is no significant difference between the full sample and non-focus group for the demographic characteristics. Thus, I only discuss the differences between the focus group and non-focus group participants for ease of reporting. In Appendix F, I report tests of the difference between the focus group and Full samples.

Highest level of education is an ordinal level variable assessing degree attainment with a not applicable category. Given the small sample sizes, I collapsed the categories into a dichotomous variable of a bachelor's degree or higher and coded "Not Applicable" to missing. I used this dichotomous variable for testing the differences between various samples.

Table 3.2 Tests of Difference between Full Sample (N = 139) and Non-Focus Group Sample (N = 107) on Demographic Characteristics

				Women			Men		
Characteristics	**Full Sample**	**NFG Sample**	**Z-score**	**Full Sample (N = 97)**	**NFG Sample (N = 81)**	**Z-score**	**Full Sample (N = 42)**	**NFG Sample (N = 26)**	**Z-score**
Mom's education is bachelor's or higher	.626	.617	.146	.619	.617	.017	.643	.615	.228
Dad's education is bachelor's or higher	.551[a]	.561	-.157	.505	.543	-.506	.659[b]	.615	.359
Pell Grant (yes)	.180	.187	-.142	.196	.198	-.028	.143	.154	-.124
Urbanicity:									
Rural	.288	.308	-.351	.320	.333	-.195	.214	.230	-.159
Suburban	.561	.533	.444	.567	.543	.375	.548	.500	.382
Urban	.151	.159	-.168	.113	.123	-.207	.238	.269	-.288

[a] N = 136 for this item

[b] N = 41 for this item

Table 3.3 below contains the tests of difference of proportions between the non-focus group and focus group samples. There is no difference between the non-focus group and focus group samples on mother's education is a bachelors or higher (p_{NFG} =

.617; p_{FG} = .656; z = -.404; p-value = .343 for a one-tailed test) or for father's level of

education (p_{NFG} = .561; p_{FG} = .516; z = .439; p-value = .330 for a one-tailed test). The

only difference between focus group and non-focus group on level of education is fathers

for the women from the focus group sample. They have significantly lower education

compared to the women from the non-focus group sample ($p_{NFG♀}$ = .543; $p_{FG♀}$ = .313; z =

1.687; p-value = .0458 for a one-tailed test). In fact, it is the only statistically significant

difference for any of the demographic variables. The majority of the focus group

participants parents have bachelor's degree or higher and a minority of them have ever

had a Pell grant (p_{FG} = .156). Taking parents' level of education and Pell grant

receivership together, the focus group participants are middle class, on average.

Additionally, the majority of them grew up in the suburbs (p_{FG} = .656). In general, the

focus group participants "look like" the other respondents from the survey – except for

the women focus group participants' father's level of education.

Table 3.3 Proportion Differences of Pre-screening Characteristics Between Non-Focus Group Sample (N = 107), Focus Group Sample (N = 32), and by Gender

				Women			Men		
Characteristics	NFG Sample	FG Sample	Z-score	NFG Sample (N = 81)	FG Sample (N = 16)	Z-score	NFG Sample (N = 26)	FG Sample (N = 16)	Z-score
Mom's education is bachelor's or higher	.617	.656	-.404	.617	.625	-.058	.615	.688	-.474
Dad's education is bachelor's or higher	.561	.516	.439	.543	.313	1.687*	.615	.733	-.767
Pell Grant (yes)	.187	.156	.396	.198	.188	.092	.154	.125	.259
Urbanicity:									
Rural	.308	.219	.983	.333	.25	.653	.231	.188	.332
Suburban	.533	.656	-1.236	.543	.688	-1.064	.500	.625	-.790
Urban	.159	.125	.470	.123	.063	.703	.269	.188	.604

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 – one-tailed test

In addition to the demographic questions, respondents also answered the Bem Sex Role Inventory – Short Form (BSRI). They responded to 30 statements for how true the item was for them (please Appendix B for complete list). There are ten items for femininity, ten for masculinity, and ten "filler" items.[11] For example, a feminine item is: "I am affectionate." The response categories are never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7). Following Bem (1981), I averaged the femininity items and the masculinity items separately to create the femininity and masculinity scales.

My rationale for asking the respondents this inventory was to see how stereotypically gendered the respondents are, given that some of them would be participating in a focus group discussing masculinity and social class. Additionally, I wanted other measures to compare the focus group participants to the non-focus group participants that were self-assessments. As with the demographics, I wanted to evaluate differences between focus group and non-focus group participants. Because of these reasons, I limit the scope of my discussion to just differences between the focus group and non-focus group samples. In Appendix F, there are descriptive statistics for the Full, NFG, and focus group samples with each sample subdivided by gender.

As with the demographics, I also tested if the samples were statistically different from each other on the BSRI items. Appendix F contains tables of tests that yielded significant differences.[12] There were no differences when comparing samples that

---

[11] I will not directly discuss the filler items. While they are interesting, they are not substantively important. I do report descriptive statistics and include them in means tests of the different sample combinations though.

[12] In Appendix F, I only report analyses that yielded at least one significant difference. I ran means tests of all pertinent comparisons: (1) Full Sample v. Focus Group; (2) Full by Gender; (3) Focus Group by Gender; (4) Full v. Focus Group just Women; (5) Full v. Focus Group just Men; (6) Non-Focus Group v. Focus Group; (7) Non-Focus Group by Gender; (8) Non-Focus Group v. Focus Group just Women; and (9) Non-Focus Group v. Focus Group just Men. The only group comparisons that yielded significant differences were (2), (3), (7), and (9).

included both men and women together, regardless of which samples I was comparing (e.g. Full versus focus group, or non-focus group versus focus group). The differences tended to be between men and women (for all combinations of sample comparisons), and when comparing the non-focus group men to the focus group men.

The focus group participants, on average, reported an "often true" for the feminine scale ($\bar{X}$ = 5.262; s.d. = .825 – see Table F8 in Appendix F). Whereas, their score on the masculinity scale was in between "occasionally true" and often true ($\bar{X}$ = 4.681; s.d. = .856). I would posit that the masculinity scale is lower than the feminine because of three items that have a mean lower than the other items in the masculinity scale. They are: (1) I am forceful ($\bar{X}$ = 2.875; s.d. = 1.338); (2) I am dominant ($\bar{X}$ = 3.813; s.d. = 1.401); and (3) I am aggressive ($\bar{X}$ = 3.065; s.d. = .1.340). These items seem to have a negative connotation. Following the pattern from the filler questions, the respondents also tended to rate negative filler items as not so true for them also. For example, the focus group participants responded to the item "I am conceited" with "sometimes but infrequently true" ($\bar{X}$ = 2.969; s.d. = 1.402).

There are a few differences between the women and the men of the focus group on the femininity and masculinity items of the BSRI (see Table F12 in Appendix F). The women tended to report that being tender and loving children as more true for them than the men did ($\bar{X}_{\male\text{tender}}$ = 3.688; $\bar{X}_{\female\text{tender}}$ = 4.938; t_{tender} = -2.308; p-value$_{\text{tender}}$ = .028; $\bar{X}_{\male\text{children}}$ = 4.563; $\bar{X}_{\female\text{children}}$ = 5.938; t_{children} = -3.180; p-value$_{\text{tender}}$ = .004).[13] Men, on average, reported that taking risks was more true for them compared to the women ($\bar{X}_{\male}$ = 5.438; $\bar{X}_{\female}$ = 4.250; t = 2.319; p-value = .027). Even with these differences, the women and the men of the focus group are similar on BSRI.

When comparing the focus group to the non-focus group on BSRI, the differences were only between men (see Table F14). The focus group men responded to the item "I

---

[13] I conducted all means tests with unequal variances assumed and report two-tailed tests unless otherwise noted.

am understanding." as more true for them compared to the non-focus group men ($\bar{X}_{\male\text{NFG}}$ = 5.000; $\bar{X}_{\male\text{FG}}$ = 5.938; t = -2.352; p-value = .024).

The last undiscussed portion of pre-screen survey is the EPA ratings of words about gender and social class categories. As with the analyses presented above, there are descriptive statistics for each word/word phrase in Appendix F.[14] I also performed the same group comparisons as for the demographics and BSRI (see footnote 12 for the full list of sample comparisons). Typically, ACT researchers use a horizontal 9-point ordinal scale as the response category resulting in a scale from -4 to +4 with zero being neutral.[15] Unfortunately, the online survey package that I used to create the pre-screen survey could not adequately display nine horizontal radio buttons. To remedy this, I used a slider from zero to 100 for the EPA ratings. I then rescaled the values to the -4 to +4 scale.

The respondents were asked to rate words: guy, man, rich, poor, and intersections of gender and social class categories (see Appendix C for the list of words and Appendix F for descriptive statistics). Reviewing the average ratings for focus group participants, they tended to rate any word/word phrase with rich as slightly to quite powerful, and any word/word phrase with poor as slightly to quite powerless (e.g. $\bar{X}_{\text{rich guy power}}$ = 1.773; s.d. = 1.087; $\bar{X}_{\text{poor guy power}}$ = -1.497; s.d. = 1.042), but the valence for evaluation is in the exact opposite direction. They evaluated words with poor as slightly good and words with rich as slightly bad. For example, they tended to evaluate a rich guy/man as slightly bad ($\bar{X}_{\text{rich guy evaluation}}$ = -.426; s.d. = 1.530; $\bar{X}_{\text{rich man evaluation}}$ = -.224; s.d. = 1.570), but the poor

---

[14] There are some missing cases for the EPA ratings compared to the other portions of the survey. I do note the different sample sizes for each item in the descriptive and mean difference tables.

[15] As mentioned above, ACT researchers use a 9-point ordinal scale to assess EPA ratings. The response categories are infinitely = -4/4; extremely = -3/3; quite = -2/2; slightly = -1/1; and neutral = 0. These adjectives are used to describe the aggregated ratings as well.

guy/man as slightly good ($\bar{X}_{\text{poor guy evaluation}}$ = .673; s.d. = 1.462; $\bar{X}_{\text{poor man evaluation}}$ = .920; s.d. = 1.446).[16]

When testing the mean difference between different sample comparisons (refer to footnote 12), there were not many statistically significant differences. Table 3.4 contains all the significant differences found. The majority of the differences were on the power dimension. I am going to limit the discussion to just differences between the focus group and non-focus group samples.

On average, the non-focus group sample rated a rich man as quite powerful compared to the focus group sample, which tended to rate a rich man as slightly powerful ($\bar{X}_{\text{NFG}}$ = 2.342; $\bar{X}_{\text{FG}}$ = 1.680; t = 2.230; p-value = .016 for a one-tailed test). Women from the focus group and the non-focus group also differed on several of their ratings with the non-focus group having more extreme scores. Non-focus group women appraised poor as quite powerless, whereas the focus group women rated poor as slightly powerless ($\bar{X}_{\female\text{NFG}}$ = -1.850; $\bar{X}_{\female\text{FG}}$ = -1.050; t = -2.851; p-value = .009). Women from the non-focus group sample rated rich guy as quite powerful, but the focus group women rated rich guy as slightly powerful ($\bar{X}_{\female\text{NFG}}$ = 2.033; $\bar{X}_{\female\text{FG}}$ = 1.550; t = 2.276; p-value = .030). The last significant difference between the non-focus group and focus group women is on the power dimension for rich man with same pattern as with the rich guy ($\bar{X}_{\female\text{NFG}}$ = 2.441; $\bar{X}_{\female\text{FG}}$ = 1.535; t = 2.110 p-value = .050).

Taking the survey as a whole, the focus group participants are not that different from the other respondents. However, there were some significant differences between the focus group and non-focus group on the demographic characteristics (the focus group women's father's having less education than the NFG) and on the BSRI (the focus group men had higher scores on "I am understanding.", and "I am adaptable."). Because of these group differences, I ran a probit model to examine if these differences would impact

---

[16] I asked respondents to rate both man and guy as categories for masculine gender categories because given their age, they might see "guys" as peers and "men" as older. There are differences in the ratings, but they are not statistically significant differences.

the predicted probability of participating in the focus group. They did not. These variables (father has a bachelor's degree or higher, understanding, and being adaptable) were not statistically significant in the model. Taking all of these analyses together, the focus group participants are similar (enough) to the rest of the survey respondents. Thus, I am confident that any differences between non-focus group and focus group samples is due to chance alone.

Table 3.4 T-tests (with unequal variances assumed) of Mean Difference for EPA Ratings Across Samples of Pre-Screening Focus Group Survey

Item	Sample Comparisons	Mean	t-value
Man - Evaluation	Full Sample Men (N = 37) Full Sample Women (N = 89)	.789 1.143	-2.287*
Poor – Power	Full Sample Women (N = 94) Focus Group Women (N = 16)	-1.714 -1.050	-2.397*
Poor - Power	Full Sample Men (N = 41) Focus Group Men (N = 16)	-.170 -1.815	3.939***
Rich Man – Power	Non-Focus Group (N = 103) Focus Group (N = 31)	2.342 1.680	2.230*
Man - Evaluation	Non-Focus Group Men (N = 23) Non-Focus Group Women (N = 73)	.661 1.432	-2.087*
Poor – Power	Non-Focus Group Women (N = 78) Focus Group Women (N = 16)	-1.850 -1.050	-2.851**
Rich Guy – Power	Non-Focus Group Women (N = 81) Focus Group Women (N = 16)	2.033 1.550	2.276*
Rich Man – Power	Non-Focus Group Women (N = 79) Focus Group Women (N = 16)	2.441 1.535	2.110*

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 – two-tailed test

In the next section, I discuss the focus groups' profiles of a "rich guy" and a "poor guy." I facilitated four groups of UI undergraduates – two consisting of women and two consisting of men. I constrained the groups to have between twelve and eight

participants. The final sample sizes of the women's groups were nine and nine, and for the men's groups were nine and seven.

Profiles of Two Kinds of Guys

From the focus group discussions, two distinct profiles emerged across the four groups with high consensus amongst the participants. These profiles are grounded in a particular situation. The focus group participants are imagining working with a "guy" from another school on a project; therefore, their responses are guided by this definition of the situation.

As I discuss the profiles, I only mention characteristics or themes that are consistent across all the focus groups. To aid the written description, Figures 3.2 and 3.3 (below) are artist renderings of the emergent profiles.

Moreover, I include the percentage of agreement the participants had with the characteristics from the agreement survey (see Table 3.5 below) Recall from earlier, the participants rated their agreement on each characteristic generated by the group (refer to Appendix D for instrument). The original instrument used a 6-point agreement scale (1 coded as strongly disagree, 2 coded as disagree, 3 coded as somewhat disagree, 4 coded as somewhat agree, 5 coded as agree, and 6 coded as strongly agree). Because of the small sample size, I collapsed the response categories into agree (strongly agree through somewhat agree coded as 1) or disagree (strongly disagree through somewhat disagree coded as zero).

Beginning with the profile of the "rich guy" (pictured above in Figure 3.2) and what he looked like, 97% of the participants agreed that the rich guy would have styled hair. More specifically, it would be "gelled." There were differences across and within the groups in terms of a hair color. However, they said explicitly it would not be red, or they did not mention red as a possibility. In the second male focus group, one participant said, "No gingers."

Ninety-four percent of the participants supported a physically fit, somewhat athletic body type. They qualified athletic because they thought he would be fit and svelte, but not hulking (i.e. big muscles). The groups also said he would have nice teeth (white and straight). He would also be about six feet tall. In terms of facial hair, 97% said he would be clean-shaven. For his clothes, there were several consistencies with an agreement of 97%. They would be form fitting or tailored and name brand. The groups even endorsed on a specific kind of shoes, boat shoes called Sperry® – each group mentioned it during the discussion.[17] They also said he would wear a polo or button-down shirt with khakis.

Figure 3.2 The Rich Guy

In addition to how he looked, the participants were also asked to report on his hometown, where he would go to school, and his extracurricular activities. Ninety-four percent concurred he would go to an Ivy-League institution. His hometown would be on the East Coast in a gated community, which 97% of the participants confirmed. In terms

---

[17] These name brand boat shoes retail for about $100. I did not know what a "Sperry" was and had to ask the focus group participants for clarification.

of extracurricular activities, the participants gave a variety responses like lacrosse, golf, boating – activities that require money. They also said he would not work while in school and 94% agreed with the group consensus.

The participants also discussed how this rich guy would introduce himself, mannerisms, tone of voice, word choice, and body position. The rich guy's mannerisms would be polite, yet arrogant, which 91% affirmed. Ninety-one percent supported that his tone of voice would be assertive and a little condescending. His word choice would be proper and 91% conferred. One woman from the first focus group said, "He would use elevated diction." The focus groups described the rich guy introducing himself as formal and 94% agreed. When working together in a group with this guy, 91% acceded that he would take up space, but have good posture.

Table 3.5 Percentage of Agreements of Characteristics from Focus Group Discussion (N = 34)

Characteristics	Rich Guy	Poor Guy
Looks:		
Hair	97.06%	85.29%
Body Type	94.12	85.29
Facial Hair	97.06	76.47
Clothes	97.06	97.06
School	94.12	91.18
Hometown	97.06	82.35
Extracurricular Activities	94.12	100.00
Interaction Style:		
Mannerisms	91.18	79.41
Tone of Voice	91.18	76.47
Word Choice	91.18	85.29
Introduction	94.12	94.12
Body Position	91.18	85.29

The picture the focus groups painted is clear with high group consensus. The rich guy's doing of gender is moderated by his social class. This is clear when juxtaposed to the picture that emerged of the poor guy (see Figure 3.3 below).

The focus group participants generated a very different picture of the poor guy. Before going through the different characteristics of the poor guy, it is important to note that rate of agreement, while still high, is not as high as it was with the rich guy characteristics. I will take this up in the discussion section in the last chapter of this thesis.

Figure 3.3 The Poor Guy

As depicted in Figure 3.3, this guy looks very different. Eighty-five percent of the participants confirmed that the poor guy's hair would need a cut and would not have a style. He would not be fit, even if he was skinny, and 85% of the participants affirmed this. They also thought he would need a shave, which 76% of the participants agreed. One woman from the first focus group said, "He'd have 15 o'clock shadow." The poor guy would wear ill-fitting jeans, t-shirt, and sneakers, which 97% endorsed.

Ninety-one percent concurred he would go to a community college. When discussing his hometown, the participants had a hard time agreeing on specific place or kind of hometown. However, 82% did agree that regardless of location or size of town, this guy would live on the "bad" side of town. One student wrote, "Cedar Rapids is not poor enough, no Iowa town is poor enough, Detroit was a good representation." Unanimously, all the focus group members thought the poor guy would work and his activities in general would be limited by money.

The participants discussed the interaction style of the poor guy very differently from the rich guy. Seventy-nine percent accepted that his mannerisms would be polite, introverted, and a little passive. His tone of voice would be timid or insecure with 76% agreement. For his word choice, 85% confirmed that he would use slang or misuse words/grammar. When introducing himself, 94% concurred it would be informal and timid. When working in a group with this guy, 85% of the participants agreed that he would have bad posture and be more compact.

The focus group participants created two very distinct profiles of the men with consensus within and across the groups. The rich guy is confident, attractive in accordance with hegemonic masculinity, and a little arrogant without much dissent from the participants. In fact, the participants did a thorough job describing the rich guy in terms of hegemonic masculinity (Connell 1987). The description of the poor guy aligns with the marginalized masculinities presented in Chapter 1. However, the discussion of marginalization due to class usually depicts a masculinity imbued with "toughness" or one that inspires fear, typically within a criminal context (e.g. Cheng 1999; Mullins 2006). Obviously, the focus group members did not describe someone to be feared when they discussed the poor guy. I believe this difference highlights the importance of context when discussing classed based masculinity. I will take up the topic of contextualization of displays in the discussion of this chapter.

In the next section, I highlight some emergent patterns from the data and discuss some of the disagreements surrounding the characteristics of the "guys." These serendipitous patterns differed by gender of the focus group participants and the "guy" being discussed.

Disagreements and Serendipity

As one can note from above, there was not uniform consensus within the group discussions. Moreover, there are gender differences across the focus groups in terms of differential patterning. In this section, I discuss the disagreements the focus group participants had with the characteristics generated during the discussion. In addition, I explore the differences that emerged in the focus groups by the gender of the focus group. Lastly, I detail other emergent patterns from the thought exercise data.

Beginning with dissent regarding characteristics about how the rich guy would look, those disagreeing with the group discussion did not offer radically different alternatives to what the group decided.[18] In fact, the disagreements still followed the theme of "styled and put together" that the emerged in the focus groups. However, the specific style was where the disagreement lay. As evidenced by this example, "I thought of groomed facial hair such as a goatee or soul patch." The dissenters also thought the rich guy would be more slender or skinny rather than an athletic build.

The comments about interaction style (e.g. mannerisms, word choice, introduction, etc.) that diverged from the group discussion were rather unflattering. One in disagreement wrote, "I pictured him much more fragile and not condescending at least when to talking to females." Another reported about the rich guy's word choice, "He has good grammar, can hold a conversation, but he does not have interests in intellectual matters, but does come off as intelligent." One person who differed from the group consensus about mannerisms expressed the following, "depends on what he's trying to

---

[18] In the disagreement survey, participants had the opportunity to write why they disagreed. Many who disagreed offered examples, and I use these in this section. Two of the men, regardless of agreeing or disagreeing, editorialized every characteristic.

get out of the situation." Not all the dissent was negative, as one participant wrote about mannerisms, "Not everyone who is rich is a dick;" a backhanded compliment to be sure, but not as negative.

The participants who dissented about the rich guy's hometown, school and extracurricular activities were somewhat random. The person who did depart from the group said, "I think he's from everywhere, like, it varies." One of the two participants disagreeing with the extracurricular activities wrote, "He plays whatever he needs/wants to and that his parents approve of."

The disagreements about the poor guy's looks centered around him trying to do what he could to look better. As noted by this participant, "I saw him as clean shaven. It is an easy way to make himself look good without expensive clothing." Another reported, "I thought the poor man would attempt to look nice with a faded, non-brand name short-sleeved shirt and scratched up khakis…" However, those disagreeing on body type were not as generous, as most thought he would be pudgy. In fact, one reported, "more overweight, short, bad acne."

The opposition revolving around the poor guy's interaction style was that he would be more rude, louder, and assertive. One wrote, "No sirs and mams." They also thought he would have good posture.

The characteristics about where the poor guy would grow up, go to school, and his extracurricular activities had the highest rates of consensus. However, there were some disagreements. A dissenting participant reported, "I thought he would still go to a university but a cheap in-state one and have a ton of loans, living away from his family so he could try to get out of being poor."

The disagreements discussed above were not the only differences that emerged from the focus groups. Interestingly, how the women talked about the rich guy was different from how the men did. The women sexualized the rich guy, but not the poor guy. "I want to date him," one woman replied after discussing the rich guy. Additionally,

the women mentioned that the rich guy would have a girlfriend or date in reference to his extracurricular activities. One woman summed up the rich guy thusly, "All the girls want to date him and all the guys want to be him."

In contrast, the men talked about the rich guy with hostility and more negatively than the women did. In the second men's focus group, one man mentioned that the rich guy would miss class. Another said, "He'd be a cokehead." Additionally, when the men talked about the rich guy, their description usually involved the rich guy lying about himself to look better. This is evidenced by one male focus group participant saying, "He's 5'11", but says he's six foot." When discussing the rich guy's interaction style, the men did not have nice things to say about this either, such as the rich guy is a "one-upper," "say's five things before you can say one," "talks when it makes him look good," "condescending and fake," and "eager to please people who can help his social position."

The men were not alone in their disparagement of the rich guy's character, they were just more public about it. The women tended to write not so nice things about the rich guy. While coding the individual level data, 37% of the focus group participants made derogatory comments about the rich guy. Moreover, they made more than one nasty comment in their thought exercises. One woman wrote, "He does volunteer work because it's a résumé stuffer." A man reported in the thought exercise, "He likes getting things done, but he's lazy."

There were some derogatory comments leveled at the poor guy, too, but only 15% of the focus group participants wrote something nasty about the poor guy's character. Writing comments like "ignorant and foolish," or "occasionally works, mostly mooches off welfare." However, 15% of the participants also made comments to explain why this guy might not behave "better." For example, a participant wrote in defense of the poor guy not shaving, "He might not have much time to shave his face."

In this section, I discussed some of the patterned disagreements, the differences across the focus groups by gender, negative comments about the rich guy and poor guy,

and some rationalizations about the poor guy. Even though there was dissent, the focus group participants coalesced around similar disagreements.

Next, I offer an organizing theme for the profiles of the guys, that is, status cues from the Expectation States Theory (EST) research program that houses Status Characteristics Theory (see Chapter 2 of this thesis for more information of SCT). Status cues are things we do and say that signify our social position, or our social statuses (Berger et al. 1986; Fişek et al. 2005). This concept and integration into the status generalization process is one way I analyzed the profiles generated from the focus groups. In the next section, I review status cues and how they give information about status and task abilities.

Status Cues

Status cues "are indicators, markers, or identifiers of the different social status people possess" (Berger et al. [1986] 1998:155) Status cues are immediate in the interaction because we observe them directly. Some require no thought to what the cue means, like a uniform indicating police officer or nun. However, these indicators are more than the clothes that we wear, but also how we speak (e.g. accent, speed, word choice, etc.), what we speak (e.g. "I am professor" or "I rebuild automobile engines"), how we move our bodies, phenotypical characteristics (e.g. skin tone), and others. Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 on "Doing Gender," the act of performing our gender is a collection of status cues that allow audience members to categorize us into a gender.

Status cues are part of the interaction and something we typically do or present to the other interactants (e.g. hanging one's diploma on an office wall). Berger and colleagues ([1986] 1998; Fisek et al. 2005) theorize that status cues exist on two separate dimensions. One dimension, indicative versus expressive cues, conveys "how" the status information will be transmitted. The other dimension, task versus categorical cues, relay the "what" of the cue (i.e. exactly what is one trying to communicate with the display).

Figure 3.4 below arranges the dimensions to create a 2X2 design with examples of each type of cue.

Indicative cues are one way for transmitting status information. They explicitly label someone as having "X" social status, such as the diploma on the wall or saying "I am a professor." They appear deliberate and purposeful. Another way to display status is through expressive cues. These are cues we "give off" during interaction, such as an accent.[19] They seem to be beyond the actor's control, such as phenotypical traits of race or gender. We can infer abilities through expressive cues as well, such as speed and fluency of speech.

	Task	Categorical
Indicative	"I just happened to know how to do this." "I am confident of my abilities here." "I have a great deal of previous experience with this type of problem." I have the ability in general to solve problems"	Diploma, licenses, and certificates Obvious symbols of wealth, poverty, educational attainment, status position "I have a Harvard Ph.D." "I am a mathematician." "I am a Chicano."
Expressive	Eye contact and duration Speech speed Speech loudness Speech fluency or hesitancy Rapid, sure movements (in sports) Graceful posture (in sports) Choice of head of the table Maintaining minority position	Ethnic or regional dialect Grammar, word usage, phonology Speech styles which are race, gender, or ethnic specific Skin color or facial features which are race, gender, or ethnic specific

Figure 3.4 Examples of Status Cues (recreated from Berger et al. [1986] 1998:160)

Task and categorical cues reference the "what" – what is his race, what can she do, etc. Task cues tell us how well a fellow interactant will perform on a task during an interaction. Do they have "X" ability? For example, if one were in a group, and this person mentions, "I know how to do 'X'," then the other group members are likely to believe that she is competent.

---

[19] Berger and colleagues borrow the phrase "give off" from Goffman (1958).

A categorical cue articulates who a person is. It could answer the question "Is he from Illinois?" Skin tone, physical form, and one's diploma are all categorical cues giving fellow interactants information about who one is. As Figure 3.4 shows, specific status cues are a combination of the two dimensions.

Status cues tend to work together in a cluster to convey to others our social status and category. To communicate a social status through cues we often need more than one (Fişek et al. 2005). Expectation states theorists refer to a set of cues as a *cue gestalt*. My cue gestalt to indicate my gender is to have a feminine hairstyle, wear clothing cut specifically for a feminine form, and grow fingernails past my fingertip, for example. Each marker, in and of itself, may not communicate "woman" all on its own. However, the set of cues together indicate my social category of woman. The gestalt is the whole, the sum of the parts and possibly a little more than the sum.

There are strong and weak cue gestalts. A *strong gestalt cue* leaves nothing to the imagination. When we see, hear, witness, etc. the cues, there is no ambiguity to the social status displayed. If one were to experience the gender display described above, the individual would have no problem identifying me as a woman. On the other hand, *a weak cue gestalt*, leaves some room for ambiguity, or uncertainty, which the individual belongs in the social status or category some of the cues are reflecting. This may occur when there are inconsistencies within the set of cues, such as a light-skinned Latina (Biagas and Bianchi 2012).

The difference between strong and weak cue gestalts is important for the status generalization process. What is important here is the idea that status cues come together to affect status generalization. As outlined in the previous chapter, group members use social information to infer abilities of self and other group members. If these cues are strong enough, they become the indicator of the salient status characteristic to differentiate the group.

Focus Group Profiles as Status Cue Gestalts

Recall the profiles discussed in this chapter. The focus group participants wrote and discussed the look of the guys in status terms. For the most part, their descriptions were "obvious signs of wealth" and signs of lack of wealth for the guys. These are examples of categorical indicative cues. Their discussion of the interaction styles also seemed to differentiate the guys in terms of status. To be sure of this assessment, I re-analyzed the individual level data.

I conducted a separate content analysis of just the interaction style (mannerisms, tone of voice, word choice, introduction, and body positioning) comments from the thought exercises. I focused on these because social psychologists have shown that research subjects associate aspects of interactional style (e.g. direct eye contact, speech (speed, word choice, tone, etc.), and body position) with the status level of the actor (Berger et al. [1986] 1998; Fişek et al. 2005; Ridgeway et al.1985; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 1999). For example, when a person maintains eye contact, or has fluid, fast speech, fellow interactants would rate this individual as competent (i.e. high status).

Not all participants wrote about interactional style or all aspects of it in their thought exercises. Thus, I report the number of instances participants used status terms to describe the guy. First, I go through the rich guy, and then I will go through comments made about the poor guy. The overall pattern was the rich guy was described in high status terms (i.e. more competent), and the poor guy was described in low status terms (i.e. less competent).

Nine out of the 36 participants did not write about any interactional style indicators for the rich guy. Out of the 27 other participants, not every participant wrote about each aspect of interactional style. In fact, none of the participants commented on how the rich guy would introduce himself or how he would position his body. However, there were seven instances where they described his mannerisms as confident, two cases of smart, and one occurrence of educated and superior. For tone of voice, there were

seven examples of authoritative and two of trustworthy. In terms of the rich guy's word choice, there were sixteen instances of the rich guy using "elevated diction" and only one wrote that he would use perfect grammar.

For the poor guy, thirteen out of the 36 participants did not report any interactional style examples. In regards to the poor guy's mannerisms, there were eight instances of not confident, one wrote that he would seem untrustworthy, and another reported that he be would ignorant. There were seven occurrences of the poor guy being soft spoken. Ten participants wrote that his word choice would simple. There were six cases of the poor guy using slang and two examples of poor grammar. To describe how he would introduce himself, there was one instance each of being disregarded/ignored while introducing himself, that he would stutter through it, or he would be nervous. There were no examples of body positioning in the individual level data.

This analysis supports my original summation that the profiles of the guys are cue gestalts. The descriptions in the individual level data and from the group discussions indicate that the rich guy would probably be seen as more competent than the poor guy in a task situation. Now, whether these are strong or weak gestalts is an empirical question that I will address in Chapter 4.

Discussion and Conclusions

Ascertaining local meanings, or the cultural schema undergraduates at The UI hold for a rich guy and a poor guy, revealed two distinct profiles with high consensus. The rich guy's profile demonstrates hegemonic masculinity. Recall from Chapter 1, hegemonic masculinity is the socially dominant form of masculinity in a particular culture within a given historical period centered on power (Connell 2005). The hegemonic male in the United States is powerful because he is independent, competitive, attractive, economically and sexually successful. Not only did the focus group participants give us a concrete description of a hegemonic male college student, but also an element of the prescreening survey corroborates that power is a part of this schema.

From the EPA ratings, the focus group participants rated a "rich guy" on the power dimension as quite powerful ($\bar{X}$ = 1.773; s.d. = 1.087, N = 32), but evaluated him as slightly bad ($\bar{X}$ = -.426; s.d. = 1.087, N = 32). Moreover, the respondents who did not participate in the focus group rated the rich guy similarly.

Notice the valence of the participants' evaluation of the rich guy from the prescreening survey. It is negative. This too emerged in the focus group through derogatory comments made by focus group members. Not all focus group participants discussed or wrote about the rich guy this way. However, there were enough instances that it is reasonable to posit that for the focus group participants while the rich guy is powerful, he is not that good.

As mentioned above, the masculinity of the poor guy does not conform to previous research on marginalized masculinities. Here the focus group participants generated a profile that did not include toughness, but rather a mellow shy kind of guy. I speculate that given the context of the thought exercise (i.e. describe a guy from another school) is very different from the contexts of some masculinity scholarship, that is street life (Anderson 1999; Cheng 1999; Mullins 2006). I further speculate that the context of a university (or higher education in general) may moderate cultural schema. That is, the cultural schema of a poor guy is different across contexts. These different contexts could be the regional, racial, or urbanicity differences of the people sharing their schema or the definition of the situation for the poor guy. Regardless, this finding does support the importance of discerning local conceptions of masculinity (Connell and Messerschmidt 2005; Messerschmidt 2012).

I also argue in this chapter that the emergent profiles are status cue gestalts. When involved in a goal orientated task, one could assess the individual giving one of the classed gender displays as competent or incompetent. To know if this knowledge claim is true, one would need to test it.

In the next chapter, I offer a test of different classed gender displays within the Status Characteristics Theory framework. Using the profiles from the focus groups, I craft the confederates used in the experiment. [20, 21] The confederate profiles are the stimulus for the experimental conditions. The conditions test whether social class, gender, and their intersections act as status characteristics and ultimately stratify the groups.

---

[20] An experimental confederate is an actor is who trained to behave in a specific way and the subject in the experiment is not aware that the confederate is a deception rather than a simple participant (Neuman 2000).

[21] While the focus group sample is not representative of all UI undergraduates, they are very similar to the subject pool I use. The subject pool is White, self-identifies as male or female, undergraduate, and appear to be traditional college age. Thus, the classed gender displays should resonate with the subject pool.

CHAPTER 4: FROM PERCEPTIONS TO ACTION

In Chapter 2, I discussed status generalization, the process whereby group members perceive observables about self and other(s) (Berger et al. 1977; Berger and Webster 2006; Webster and Foschi 1988). They use these perceptions to form expectations about who in the group is more competent to complete the task. Status generalization occurs in specific kinds of groups - task- and collectively oriented groups.[1] The observables that people perceive are status characteristics – specific and diffuse – those socially distinct attributes that are linked to expectations for performance. [2,3] The status characteristics important for SG are those that differentiate group members or if group members perceive the characteristic as relevant to the task. Through the status generalization process, group members perceive self and others with salient status characteristics as more or less competent to complete the task.

In this chapter, I provide results from a 12-condition experiment. In it, I directly manipulate explicit and interactional cues, or status cues, of social class, which is a first for the Expectation States research tradition. Previously, researchers have used objective indicators of social class, such as level of education and occupation (Cashen 1996, Cohen and Zhou 1991; Markovsky, et al. 1984, Moore 1969; Webster and Driskell 1983; Zellner and Warnecke 1973).[4] The objective indicators of social class stratify the group. One

---

[1] Task-oriented group members perceive the task's outcome in one of two ways, success or failure, and are motivated primarily by the need to complete the task successfully (Berger et al. 1977). Collectively oriented group members believe that it is right and proper to consider other others' contributions when working on the group task.

[2] Specific status characteristics are social attributes that have a limited scope of expectation for performance, such as math ability (Berger et al. 1977). Diffuse status characteristics refer to social attributes of group members that are socially distinct and differentially evaluated. Diffuse characteristics are associated with general expectations for competence.

[3] The experiment presented here only utilizes diffuse status characteristics.

[4] I have omitted literature that does not involve a self-other comparison process during interaction, such as the evaluations literature (see Foschi, Lai, and Sigerson 1994 for an example) or experimental work on the motherhood penalty (Correll, Bernard, and Paik 2007). These studies communicate information about cultural schema of gender/motherhood and general performance expectations for gender/motherhood. They do not show how status characteristics are enacted during interaction.

issue with this research is that level of education is confounded with age (i.e. Zellner and Warnecke 1973 use high school and university as levels of education). Another issue is that not all of the work was experimental, but used survey data (Cohen and Zhou 1991). One main issue is the lack of enactment of education because there is no interaction in surveys; the method is static.

I derive the status cues from the focus groups discussed in the previous chapter. The focus group participants and the experimental subjects are all from the same pool of research participants – White, traditional-aged, undergraduates at The University of Iowa (UI). Thus, the focus group participants' knowledge of social class and masculinity is probably similar to other students (who have similar personal characteristics).

Using said profiles, does social class operate as status characteristic? Or said another way, do differing levels of social class create differing levels of performance expectations for group members? How does a mixed-gender dynamic affect this process? Given the limited research on social class during interaction in general (DiMaggio 2012), does the presentation of social class matter for status generalization? Are interactional cues enough, or do the stimuli need to be more explicit?

To test these questions, I conducted a 12-condition experiment using the standardized experimental situation of Status Characteristics Theory (Berger 2007). Below, I explain the experimental conditions, performance expectation profiles, and consequent hypotheses. I then describe the procedures and sample characteristics. Following that, I discuss the results of the experiment.

Methods

Experimental Conditions

There are six main experimental conditions design that are blocked by gender creating the twelve conditions (refer to Figure 4.1 Experimental Conditions below).[5, 6] The main stimulus is social class. It technically has four levels – lower, middle, and higher social classes, and a controlled level, where the partner's social class is the same as the subject's.[7] The second experimental stimulus is the presentation of the social class and there are two types. All subjects view the "partner introduction." [8] This is a prerecorded confederate, which the subject believes is occurring in real time. This video contains the interactional cues of social class – dress, mannerisms, and extracurricular activities. In half of the conditions, the subject in addition to the video exchanges background information through a survey (discussed in detail later). There are six conditions resulting from the social class and stimuli experimental manipulations. These six conditions are repeated by gender, women and men, and thus, there is a grand total of twelve conditions.

Performance Expectations and Path Diagrams

To derive hypotheses, I need several pieces of information – path diagrams, path lengths, and performance expectations. I first created path diagrams that represent the conditions (see Appendix G for diagrams). The presentation of stimuli does not change the path diagram; therefore, I only created five diagrams - three for the conditions with

---

[5] A blocked experiment is where a feature of the subject (i.e. gender) is a potential source of variation and the feature is not manipulated by the experimenter (Stockburger 1998). As such, I do not assign a person's gender, it is established outside of experimental control; thus, it is not an experimental factor.

[6] An experimental factor, or treatment factor, defines the conditions. Factors ultimately create the experimental stimuli (Lenth 1994; Oehlert 2000). Because of the levels of social class are not consistent across stimuli type the experiment is not a true factorial design. In this instance, the computer program and confederates deliver the stimuli to the subjects. I will discuss this in detail in later sections of this chapter.

[7] The language used here may be awkward at times (e.g.) middle social class. I use this phrasing because the "partner's" social class is always in reference to the subject.

[8] The "Controlled" conditions occur in place of the middle social class in the "Video + Survey" conditions.

female subjects and two for the male subjects. In all of the conditions, o is male. There is

no path diagram for the baseline condition, called "Middle" or "Controlled" in Figure 4.1,

because the subject and partner are status equals (both men and both middle class – no

differentiation on social class or gender). I assume that the subject pool is middle class,

on average.[9]

Social Class of the "partner"	Presentation of the Stimulus
Lower	Views the confederate introduction video only
Middle	
Higher	
Lower	Exchanges background info with a "partner" and views the confederate video introduction
Controlled	
Higher	

Figure 4.1 Experimental Conditions[10]

Recall from Chapter 2, "p" is focal actor (i.e. the research participant or subject)

and "o" is the other (i.e. the "partner" or confederate) in the path diagrams. The path

diagrams for the men contain only one salient status characteristic – social class. Figure

G1 (located in Appendix G) is the condition where p and o are male, p is middle class –

---

[9] Given the demographics of the focus group survey respondents and the University of Iowa student body in general, I assume that, on average, UI students are middle class. Additionally, subjects in the background survey conditions reported their subjective social class. The overwhelming majority of subjects reported categories in the middle class range. The subjects that did not report a middle class subjective social class category did select a social class category consistent with the condition they were in. Moreover, there are no statistically significant differences between conditions on subjects' social class. Thus, I think this was a reasonable assumption.

[10] This figure, and ones pictured later, have the same color block theme. Conditions where the stimulus is the partner introduction only, called "Video Only," are in blue. Conditions where the stimulus is both the video and background survey, called "Video + Survey," are in purple.

the valued state of social class, and o is lower class – the devalued state of social class. Therefore, according to status generalization and Principle 3, p has two positive path lengths – 4 and 5, and no negative path lengths. Figure 4.2 below, details the number and valence of path lengths for the conditions.[11] Figure G2 represents the condition where p and o are male, p's social class is still middle class, but now o displays a higher social class. Thus, p has two negative lengths – 4 and 5, and no positive path lengths.

Gender of Subject (p)	Social Class of "Partner" (o)	Positive Path Lengths for p	Negative Path Lengths for p
Men	Lower	4,5	—
	Middle	—	—
	Higher	—	4,5
Women	Lower	4,5	4,5
	Middle	—	4,5
	Higher	—	4,5 4,5

Figure 4.2 Path Lengths for Subject (p) by Condition

In the conditions where the subjects are women, there are three path diagrams because there is always at least one salient status characteristic – gender. Figure G3, in Appendix G, contains the path diagram for the condition in which p is middle social class and o has a lower social class. Here p has two positive path lengths for social class – 4 and 5 – because her social class is higher than o. Additionally, she has two negative path lengths – 4 and 5 because of her gender. In Figure G4, gender is the only salient status characteristic because both p and o are middle class. Thus, p has two negative path lengths, 4 and 5, for her gender because "woman" is the devalued state of gender. Lastly,

---

[11] Refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed description of path diagrams and counting path lengths.

Figure G5 represents the double jeopardy condition for p. She has two disadvantaging status characteristics – gender and social class. Consequently, she has four negative path lengths – two of length 4 and two of length 5.

Knowing the path lengths, I can now derive the performance expectations for each condition. Recall from Chapter 2 (p.49), the mathematics of performance expectations (i.e. calculating e_p and e_o) involve calculating the relevant strength of both positive and negative path lengths (i.e. the f(i)). Figure 4.3, below, presents the performance expectation for the experimental subject (e_p) by condition. These numbers should seem familiar, as they are the same performance expectations derived in Chapter 2 from the example Groups 1, 2, and 3.

To refresh, Formula 1 below computes the performance expectation for p (Berger et al. 1977). Formula 2 calculates the positive status information and Formula 3 determines the negative status information. Formula 4 calculates the strength of a path length (Fişek et al. 1992). Using the path length information from Figure 4.3, I calculated the performance expectation for p (the subjects) for each condition.[12] I do not need to calculate the performance expectation for o (e_o – the confederate) directly because the path diagrams are symmetrical. Therefore, e_o is the same magnitude as e_p but in the opposite direction. These values, e_p and e_o, are necessary for deriving hypotheses.

$$e_p \quad = \quad e_{p+} + e_{p-} \tag{1}$$

$$e_{p+} \quad = \quad [1 - ((1 - f(i_{p+})) \dots (1 - f(n_{p+})))] \tag{2}$$

$$e_{p-} \quad = \quad - [1 - ((1 - f(i_{p+})) \dots (1 - f(n_{p+})))] \tag{3}$$

$$f(i) \quad = \quad 1 - e^{-2.618^{(2-i)}} \tag{4}$$

To derive the hypotheses, I need to introduce a new concept, the expectation advantage of p over o (or the difference of e_p and e_o). Additionally, I need to describe the dependent variable and stimulus for each condition. In the next section, I discuss

---

[12] For the specific calculations, please see p.50 in Chapter 2.

expectation advantage, the experiment dependent variable and manipulations, and the resulting hypotheses.

Stimulus Method(s)	Social Class of Confederate	Subjects' Gender	
		Women	Men
Video Only	Lower	0	.183
	Middle	-.183	0
	Higher	-.332	-.183
Video + Survey	Lower	0	.183
	Controlled	-.183	0
	Higher	-.332	-.183

Figure 4.3 Performance Expectations for Subject (p) by Condition

Expectation Advantage

The path diagrams are a heuristic, a picture, which details the status generalization process. In a simple path diagram (i.e. only one salient status characteristic), we can trace the paths and quite easily determine who is more likely to be advantaged in the group. Take our example Group 1 from Chapter 2, the young woman and man, working on a class project. As we worked through the principles of status generalization, we predicted that the man is more likely to be associated with successful task completion than the woman. In a dyad, the more advantaged person is at the top of the power and prestige hierarchy, or the status hierarchy (Principle 4). As mentioned in Chapter 2, we are rarely in situations like this and we need to be able to model complex groups in the laboratory. To do this, we can use more mathematics of status generalization – the *expectation advantage* of p over o.

"The actor's *expectation advantage (or disadvantage)* relative to another is equal to the aggregated expectation for self less that formed for the other" (Berger and Webster 2006:273).

The expectation advantage is p centric because p is the focal actor, the research participants. It is their behavior I am trying to predict. As a result, we need to know whether p is advantaged or disadvantaged relative to o. A formal definition of expectation advantage appears above, but it also has an algebraic definition, which uses the performance expectations generated above and listed in Figure 4.3. These calculations from Formula 5 are central in the hypothesis testing for the standardized experimental situation. An expectation advantage ranges from one to negative one, where zero indicates an actor is (theoretically) not advantaged nor disadvantaged by salient status characteristics.

$$\text{expectation advantage} \quad = \quad e_p - e_o \tag{5}$$

To derive hypotheses, we need to know who is advantaged in each condition. Beginning with the block of conditions with men who view the partner introduction and exchange background information with their partner, their expectation advantages are located below in Figure 4.4. Let us consider each condition individually. First, the condition where p is middle class and o is lower class, called "Lower" in Figure 4.4.[13] When reviewing path lengths and performance expectations (Figures 4.2 and 4.3, respectively) for this condition, p had positive path lengths and no negative path lengths. This situation is similar to Group 1 Chapter 2 (i.e. the path diagrams are the same). Thus, our conclusion based on status generalization is the same, p is advantaged because his social class is the valued state of the status characteristic and o's is not.

The numbers confirm this conceptual claim. The performance expectation for p is positive ($e_p = .183$), and o's performance expectation is negative ($e_o = -.183$). We know substantively p is advantaged. Putting the performance expectation for p and o into Formula 5, we can know the numerical advantage.

---

[13] Refer to Appendix G, Figure G1 for this condition's path diagram.

$$\text{expectation advantage} \quad = \quad e_p - e_o \tag{5}$$

$$= \quad .183 - (-.183)$$

$$= \quad 183 + .183$$

$$= \quad .365$$

This number, .365, tells us that p is advantaged over o because it is positive, which is what one would expect given p only has positive status information. This information will help when it comes to hypothesis creation, but it has more information in comparison to other expectation advantages of the conditions in the set (referenced in Figure 4.4).

Social Class of Confederate	e_p (Performance Expectation for p)	e_o (Performance Expectation for p)	e_p - e_o (Expectation Advantage)	Advantaged Actor
Lower	.183	-. 183	.365	p
Controlled	0	0	0	neither
Higher	-.183	.183	-.365	o

Figure 4.4 Expectation (Dis)Advantage for Male "Video + Survey" Conditions

Moving to the next block in Figure 4.4, labelled "Controlled," we will go through the same process as we did for the "Lower" condition. In the Controlled condition, p and o are both men, and they have the same social class.[14] Theoretically, there are no salient

---

[14] There is no path diagram for this condition because there are no salient status characteristics. Additionally, I call this condition "Controlled" because whatever social class category the subject selects in the background survey, the program returns the same value as the partner's social class. I discuss this in detail in the section on the experimental stimulus.

status characteristics between p and o for this condition and consequently, p and o are status equals. For this condition, the performance expectation for both p and o is zero, which makes the expectation advantage zero. SCT advantages neither actor and this condition serves as a baseline for the experiment.

Before I compare expectation advantages across conditions; there is one more condition in this set, the "Higher" block. In this condition, o has a higher social class than p.[15] Now, o has the valued state of social class and p has the devalued state. From the path diagram, p has two sets of negative path lengths (lengths 4 and 5) and no positive status information. According to SCT, by knowing that p only has negative status information, we can predict (conceptually) that p will be disadvantaged in this condition. However, let us go through the calculations of p's expectation advantage over o for this condition.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{expectation advantage} \quad &= \quad e_p - e_o \quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad (5)\\
&= \quad -.183 - (.183)\\
&= \quad -183 - .183\\
&= \quad -.365
\end{aligned}
$$

For the "Higher" condition, p's expectation advantage is -.365. Because it is negative, p is disadvantaged in this condition. Comparing expectation advantages across the conditions, gives us information about how the conditions can be ordered based on the social class of o. As the social class of o increases, relative to p, p's advantage decreases across the conditions. I will use this information in the hypothesis section below, but for now, I turn to the conditions where p is a woman.

Figure 4.5 below, contains the performance expectations for p and o, the expectation advantage, and which actor is advantaged for the conditions where p is a woman viewing the video and survey stimuli. Beginning with the "Lower" condition,

---

[15] Refer to Appendix G, Figure G2 for this condition's path diagram.

here p is woman and has a higher social class than o (and o is always a man).[16] P has a valued state of a status characteristic, social class, and devalued state of a status characteristic, gender.[17] This results in two sets of positive path lengths and two sets of negative path lengths (both are length 4 and 5). Having one valued state and one devalued state results in a performance expectation of zero because the positive information cancels out the negative (theoretically). Below, I demonstrate the calculations for the women in the "Lower" condition beginning with the performance expectation for p.

Social Class of Confederate	e_p (Performance Expectation for p)	e_o (Performance Expectation for p)	$e_p - e_o$ (Expectation Advantage)	Advantaged Actor
Lower	0	0	0	neither
Controlled	-.183	.183	-.365	o
Higher	-.332	.332	-.664	o

Figure 4.5 Expectation (Dis)Advantage for Female "Video + Survey" Conditions

$$e_p = e_{p+} + e_{p-} \tag{1}$$

$$e_{p+} = [1 - ((1 - f(i_{p+})) \dots (1 - f(n_{p+})))] \tag{2}$$

$$= [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5)))]$$

$$= [1 - ((1 - .1358)(1 - .0542))]$$

---

[16] Refer to Appendix G, Figure G3 for this condition's path diagram.

[17] This condition is just like Group 2 from Chapter 2 – the student work group with a man who is African American and woman who is European American. Also, see Appendix G, Figure G3 for this condition's path diagram.

$$= \quad [1-.81736]$$

$$= \quad .1826$$

$$e_{p-} \quad = \quad - [1 - ((1 - f(i_{p+})) \ldots (1 - f(n_{p+})))] \qquad (3)$$

$$= \quad - [1 - ((1 - f(4))(1 - f(5)))]$$

$$= \quad - [1 - ((1 - .1358)(1 - .0542))]$$

$$= \quad - [1-.81736]$$

$$= \quad -.1826$$

$$e_p \quad = \quad e_{p+} + e_{p-} \qquad (1)$$

$$= \quad .1826 + (-.1826)$$

$$= \quad .1826 - .1826$$

$$= \quad 0$$

In theory, p and o are status equals because they both have one advantaging and one disadvantaging status characteristic.[18] SCT predicts that neither actor is advantaged in the "Lower" condition with the women subjects. However, for the conditions with women, as the conditions move from p and o having the same social class, to o having a higher social class, p is predicted to be even more disadvantaged.

In the "Controlled" condition, there is only one salient status characteristic, gender.[19] This condition is the student work group (Group 1) from Chapter 2 – a woman and a man working on a task. The woman has the devalued state of gender and the man has the valued state. The simple status situation and SCT predicts the woman to be disadvantaged during the interaction ($e_p - e_o = -.365$).[20]

---

[18] This does assume that all status characteristic are created equal and thus have the same effect during interaction. I will revisit this topic in the discussion section of this chapter and in Chapter 5.

[19] Refer to Appendix G, Figure G2 for this condition's path diagram.

[20] The mathematics for the "Controlled" condition for the women subjects are the same as the "Higher" condition for the men subjects, see above for those calculations.

The last condition, "Higher," is the double jeopardy situation.[21] Recall from Chapter 1, double jeopardy refers to situations where an individual has two disadvantaging characteristics. Here, p, a woman, has a lower social class than o, a man, has. Because of the attenuation principle (see p.53 in Chapter 2 for a complete discussion), she is not doubly disadvantaged in the mathematical sense, just more disadvantaged compared to the p in the "Controlled" condition and a lot more than p in the "Lower" condition.

Stimulus Method(s)	Social Class of Confederate	Subjects' Gender	
		Women	Men
Video Only	Lower	0	. 365
Video Only	Middle	-.365	0
Video Only	Higher	-.664	-. 365
Video + Survey	Lower	0	. 365
Video + Survey	Controlled	-.365	0
Video + Survey	Higher	-.664	-. 365

Figure 4.6 P's Expected (Dis)Advantage over O by Condition

The discussion thus far has been about the expectation advantage for the conditions where the subject views both the video and the background survey. The expectation advantage for the conditions where the subject just views just the video I assume to be the same. Refer to Figure 4.6 for the complete list of p's expectation advantage over o by condition.

---

[21] Refer to Appendix G, Figure G2 for this condition's path diagram.

The general pattern of p's expectation advantage over o is as o's social class increases, p's advantage decreases. In terms of SCT, as o's status increases, p's predicted ability to influence decreases. Influence is a traditional resultant concept in SCT.[22]In terms of the experiment presented here, I (and many other researchers using SCT) operationalize influence as the proportion of stay responses during the task. Thus, the proportion of stay responses (colloquially referred to as "the P of s score" and written as P(s)) is the dependent variable of the experiment.

In the next section, I discuss operationalization of influence and the instantiation of the dependent variable.

Dependent Variable

An advantaged actor within the SCT framework is more likely to reject influence than a disadvantaged actor. In the standardized experimental situation of SCT, influence is operationalized as the proportion of stay responses, the P(s) score (Berger 2007). During the task, p, the subject, has the option of staying with her initial choice (typically coded as a 1), or changing to agree with her partner's choice (typically coded as zero). Changing one's response is an indicator of being influenced; whereas staying with one's initial choice is an indicator of rejecting influence. The proportion of stay responses is the number of stay responses divided by the total number of responses. An individual P(s) is a discrete bounded variable between zero and one. As the P(s) score increases, we interpret it as rejecting influence, and indicating increasing status.

In this experiment, the instantiation of the dependent variable, the P(s), is a task called "Contrast Sensitivity." It is an ambiguous task, meaning there is no right or wrong answer, but the subject is lea to believe there is. I will discuss this more in the procedures section later.

---

[22] A resultant concept in nomothetic theoretical terms is the abstract outcome (Kaplan 1964). Researchers operationalize the resultant concept into the dependent variable.

The subject views a contrast sensitivity image (like the one in Figure 4.7 below) for 5 seconds to discern if the picture on top or bottom has more White (see Appendix H Figure H1 for a screen shot of the computer program). She then makes an initial choice (see Appendix H, Figure H2 for a screen shot). After making her initial choice, she views her partner's choice (see Appendix H, Figure H3 for a screen shot). She views the image one more time and then makes her final choice (see Appendix H, Figure H4 for a screen shot). In each condition, the subject goes through 23 trials of Contrast Sensitivity. Twenty out of the 23 trials are disagreements.[23] The computer program returns the opposite of the subject's initial choice for those disagreement trials. These are used to calculate the P(s) for each subject.

Figure 4.7 Example of a Contrast Sensitivity Image

The dependent variable is just one part of the portion of the hypotheses. In the next section, I discuss the experimental manipulation or the stimuli (the independent variables).

---

[23] The three agreement trials are trial 3, 7, and 13 for every condition.

Creating Levels of Social Class in the Laboratory

        The experimental stimuli presented in all of the conditions are a confederate video where the "partner" introduces himself to his partner. The confederate "gives off" social class cues specific to the condition either "Lower," "Middle," or "Higher" social class. I developed these cues from the Focus Group data presented in Chapter 3. I focused specifically on dress, mannerisms, and extracurricular activities.

Dr. Gordon: "Participant #2, what is your name?"

Person #2: *"Oh… Hi, I'm Mark."*

Dr. Gordon: "What school are you attending?"

Person #2: *"Um, I go here at Iowa."*

Dr. Gordon: "What do you like to do in your free time?"

Person #2: *"Well… when I'm not working, I like to play video games."*

Figure 4.8 Picture and Script for "Partner" used in Lower Social Class Conditions

        The "Lower" class conditions refer to the partner's social class and it is lower than the subject's social class, since I assume the subject to be middle class (see footnote 9 for rationale). Figure 4.8 above contains a picture of the confederate (at the beginning of the introduction) and the script for the introduction.[24] In the "Lower" conditions, Mark displays a hunched, shy, and passive demeanor. He fumbles when he first introduces himself. He also misspeaks when he reports where he goes to school. Finally, he gives

---

[24] In the script presented in Figures 4.8-4.10, Dr. Gordon is another confederate of the experiment, who runs the task. I will explain more in the procedures section.

limited activities, does not mention friends, and indicates that he works. The shirt is from the thrift store and is at least a size too big.[25]

The next condition is "Middle" class. I used the standard male baseline we implement at The Center for Study of Group Processes. Mark's demeanor is not passive; it is the typically Iowa student, friendly and open. He does not misspeak and likes to hang out with his friends. He is clean-shaven and is wearing an Iowa tee shirt, but it is nicer than the one in the Lower class condition.[26] Below Figure 4.9 depicts "Middle" class Mark and the accompanying script.

Dr. Gordon: "Participant #2, what is your name?"
Person #2: "Oh, hi, I'm Mark."
Dr. Gordon: "What school are you attending?"
Person #2: "I'm a student here at Iowa."
Dr. Gordon: "What do you like to do in your free time?"
Person #2: "I like to hang out with my friends…"

Figure 4.9 Picture and Script for "Partner" used in Middle and Controlled Social Class Conditions

Lastly, the "Higher" condition portrays high social class Mark, which is depicted below in Figure 4.10. He is confident, sure of himself, and assertive.[27] His responses are

---

[25] Unfortunately, the actor portraying "Mark" did not have a lot of facial hair, but he did grow what he could for this condition.

[26] Anecdotally, I believe wearing an Iowa tee shirt is typical for undergraduates. One might even say, "It is their uniform."

[27] During the first take of the "Higher" condition (which was not used for the experiment), I directed the actor to be confident and self-assured. I called "Action," and his demeanor completely changed. His display

direct and he has good posture. He is also clean-shaven (see Footnote 24). He participates in numerous activities that require money. He is also dressed according to the Focus Group data, blue button down dress shirt and khakis (not pictured here).

Dr. Gordon: "Participant #2, what is your name?"
Person #2: "*Hi, my name's Mark.*"
Dr. Gordon: "What school are you attending?"
Person #2: "*I'm a student here at Iowa.*"
Dr. Gordon: "What do you like to do in your free time?"
Person #2: "*I like to go out with my friends, go boating, play golf…*"

Figure 4.10 Picture and Script for "Partner" used in Higher Social Class Conditions

The confederate introductions are just one-half of the experimental manipulations. To ensure exposure to the partner's social class, the subject exchanged background information with the partner. I replicate the "Lower," "Middle," and "Higher" conditions with a survey pictured in Figure 4.11. The "Middle" condition here is actually a control condition, because I assign the partner's subjective social class as the exact social class the subject chose.

When the subject views the results from the background survey, she receives explicit status information about self and other. Figure 4.12 is an example of the "Background Survey" results for the "Higher" condition where the subject is a woman. In the "Higher" condition, the partner is always from the upper class. As mentioned earlier,

became more masculine compared to our interactions off camera and during the filming of the other conditions. His voice got deeper, serious, less friendly, and no smiles. Take 2 was friendlier and he smiled.

the "Controlled" condition, the partner has the same social class as the partner. For the "Lower" condition, the partner is always from the lower class.

Figure 4.11 Screen Shot of Background Survey

Figure 4.12 Screen Shot of Fictitious Background Survey Results

In previous two sections, I described the dependent variable (the P(s) score) and the experimental stimuli (video introduction and background survey). Together with the

expectation advantage, I am able to discuss the hypotheses for the experiment. In the next section, I detail a number of hypotheses.

Hypotheses

The expectation advantage by condition determines the theoretical ordering of the conditions (Balkwell 1991a; Fişek et al. 2002). I expect that the P(s) will decrease as the social class of o increases. Refer back to Figure 4.6, as we move from "Lower" to "Middle" to "Higher," p's expected advantage over o decreases. I anticipate that same pattern in the dependent variable. However, I will test individual sections of the conditions. I am separating the hypotheses by gender and stimulus type.

The first group of hypotheses is the order of conditions based on p's expectation advantage over o by gender and stimuli type.[28] Hypothesis 1_a is for men viewing both the "Video + Survey." The next is for men viewing just the video. Hypothesis 1_c is for women viewing both the video and the survey. The last hypothesis presented is for women viewing just the video.

H_{1a}: $P(s)_{\male Lower} > P(s)_{\male Controlled} > P(s)_{\male Higher}$

H_{1b}: $P(s)_{\male Lower} > P(s)_{\male Middle} > P(s)_{\male Higher}$

H_{1c}: $P(s)_{\female Lower} > P(s)_{\female Controlled} > P(s)_{\female Higher}$

H_{1d}: $P(s)_{\female Lower} > P(s)_{\female Middle} > P(s)_{\female Higher}$

Given that there is little research on social class during interaction and none on social class status cues, I am testing the null for stimuli type across all conditions. I hypothesize that there is no difference between the P(s) of the "Video Only" condition and the P(s) of the "Video + Survey" condition within the same level of social class and gender. Written symbolically:

H_{2a}: Male subjects/partner lower social class: $P(s)_{Video\ Only} = P(s)_{Video\ +\ Survey}$

H_{2b}: Male subjects/partner middle social class: $P(s)_{Video\ Only} = P(s)_{Video\ +\ Survey}$

---

[28] I will refer to this set of hypotheses as Model Fit in the Results sections.

H_{2c}: Male subjects/partner higher social class: $P(s)_{\text{Video Only}} = P(s)_{\text{Video + Survey}}$

H_{2d}: Female subjects/partner lower social class: $P(s)_{\text{Video Only}} = P(s)_{\text{Video + Survey}}$

H_{2e}: Female subjects/partner middle social class: $P(s)_{\text{Video Only}} = P(s)_{\text{Video + Survey}}$

H_{2f}: Female subjects/partner higher social class: $P(s)_{\text{Video Only}} = P(s)_{\text{Video + Survey}}$

Expectation states theorists have tested gender as a status characteristic in many studies (see Berger and Webster 2006 for a recent review). The overarching pattern is that women tend to defer to men, as long as the task is not a "feminine task" (Bianchi 2001; Dovidio, Brown, Heltman, Ellyson, and Keating 1988). Thus, I expect that, in the "Middle" or "Controlled" conditions, the P(s) for the women will be lower than the P(s) for the men. Written symbolically as:

H_{3a}: $P(s)_{\text{♀Controlled}} < P(s)_{\text{♂Controlled}}$

H_{3b}: $P(s)_{\text{♀Middle}} < P(s)_{\text{♂Middle}}$

There are several reasons for why I do not hypothesize about the other conditions with women subjects. First, is an empirical limitation, I have not fully crossed gender in this study. The experiment presented here is a first step in understanding status generalization under conditions of intersectionality. The next step is to run these conditions, but with a female confederate. With this second set of results, I would have a better understanding of intersectionality and status generalization.[29] Second, because of the lack of EST studies examining social class (and then only with objective indicators, such as education), I need to demonstrate that social class is a status characteristic before I can make arguments about how social class and gender may or may not combine.[30]

---

[29] There is one experimental study of SCT that examines gender at different age levels and is "sort of" intersectional. Hopcroft (2006) examined age and gender on status generalization and found that women at higher age levels reject influence at a greater rate than women at lower age levels. She did not intend for the study to examine intersectionality of gender and age, but it is a start. It is not intersectional because the older women do not work with the younger men, and the younger women do not work with the older man. However, she does demonstrate that the gender is not always a status characteristic.

[30] I do not know how the P(s) will vary for the conditions with women compared to the conditions with the men. In the Model Fit hypotheses, H_{1a} through H_{1d}, I use SCT to predict the ordering, which includes those conditions. SCT predicts the same advantage for women working with a man (social class held constant) as for the condition where a man is working with higher social class man. Because of attenuation of status

Thus, I will limit my hypotheses and discussion of intersectionality to the model fit hypotheses.

Experimental Procedures

Most SCT research uses a standardized experimental situation (Berger et al. 1977; Berger 2007). Standardization minimizes extraneous sources of variation by systemizing the experimental protocol and potential tasks. The goal is to limit information that could affect status generalization. Moreover, standardization allows for population norms within laboratories, and comparisons across studies.[31,32]

The standardized experimental situation utilizes a two-person task group who are collectively oriented, and usually the "partner" is computer-simulated. The experimenter and the experimental protocol lead the participant to believe she or he is working with an actual person. Computer-assisted protocols facilitate the majority of the experiment. They provide specific instructions, information that satisfies the scope conditions, present experimental stimuli, the task, and post-session surveys to the subject.

For this experiment, the subjects came to The Center for the Study of Group Processes ostensibly to work on a group task about decision-making. The experimenter shows the subject to the study room (see Appendix I for session script). The experimenter begins to cement the deception of a "partner" by leaving the subject to see if the "partner" has arrived. After a few minutes, the experimenter returns to the subject and goes through the informed consent process (see Appendix J for the Letter of Consent).

---

characteristics, a positive state cancels out a negative, the women in the controlled condition have the same advantage as the men in the higher condition based on SCT. However, research from gender studies could argue that the simple cancelling is not how intersectional status characteristics work. It might be that gender has a bigger impact during interaction than social class. Therefore, social class cues are eclipsed by gender cues.

[31] I will discuss population norms for the Center for the Study of Group Processes in the Results section.

[32] See Kalkhoff and Thye (2006; 2009) for meta-analyses about SCT and the standardized experimental situation.

Upon receiving consent, the experimenter proceeds with study instructions: (1) the subject works with a partner on a perceptual task; (2) all the instructions necessary to complete the task will be given by a laboratory associate, Dr. Gordon (see Appendix K for Dr. Gordon's Script); and (3) and all of these portions are accomplished over the computer network. The experimenter lays the foundation for the scope conditions during the introduction, which Dr. Gordon will later reinforce. After answering any questions, the experimenter has the subject "join the session" (i.e. start the computer program).

The computer program is the engine of the session.[33] First, Dr. Gordon introduces the task and establishes the scope conditions. Next, Dr. Gordon has the subject and partner introduce themselves to each other using a web-cam. As discussed at length above, the partner introduction is one of experimental stimuli in all of the conditions (see Figures 4.8-10 above). In half of the conditions, the subject and partner will exchange background information using a survey (see Figures 4.11a and 4.11b above).

After the introductions, Dr. Gordon recaps the task, and then "sends" them the task. The subject completes the Contrast Sensitivity task described above in the dependent variable section (see Appendix H for screen shots of the task). Remember there are 23 trials for the task, 20 of them are disagreements, and three are agreements.

Upon completion of the task, Dr. Gordon "sends" the post-session survey to the subject (see Appendix L for instrument). These questions assess scope conditions, manipulation checks, and beliefs about self and the partner (some specific to the task and some about the partner). When the subject finishes the survey, she or he alerts the experimenter.

The experimenter sits with the subject for the post-session (or exit) interview and the debriefing (see Appendix N for Post-Session Interview and Appendix N for the Debriefing Script). During the exit interview, the experimenter assesses suspicion and the

---

[33] I programmed the experimental protocol using Python open source language (http://www.python.org).

scope conditions. The exit interview is the first step in determining if the data are usable. If the scope conditions are not met, the subject differs on visible status characteristics (i.e. is Non-White or not traditionally aged), or they are suspicious of the deception, then the experimenter flags the session for further investigation.

After the exit interview, the experimenter debriefs to subject about the true nature of the study and deception used. The experimenter answers all the subject's questions, and goes over compensation information.[34] The experimenter shows the subject out and then documents the session in the logbook (see Appendix O Session Log for an example).

In the next section, I present the results of the experiment. I present the results for Hypotheses 1_a through 1_d, model hypotheses. To do this, I need to present information about how to analyze these hypotheses, which I do first.

Results

The sample consists of White, traditionally aged, undergraduate men and women from The UI.[35,36] I recruited the women from Sociology courses, and they received extra credit for their Sociology course as compensation.[37] I recruited men from Sociology

---

[34] The main form of compensation was extra credit for a Sociology course, where I conducted recruitment in-person for each course. However, I needed to enlarge the subject pool (beyond Sociology courses) because not enough male undergraduates signed up for sessions. At The Center, we have found that men do not sign up at the same rate as women. According to Center statistics, the men sign up at (roughly) 25% of the rate at which women do. Thus, I needed more men. I applied for and received an internal research grant to offer monetary compensation to undergraduate males. I recruited these men with a mass email. The majority of the men in sample received extra credit as their form of compensation.
A footnote to the footnote, I have been informally asking other experimentalists if they are experiencing the same gendered sign-up rate, and they are.

[35] The experimenter identified the subjects as White or Non-White. Any subjects identified as Non-White were excluded from analyses, as these subjects added an additional status characteristic into the interaction, race/ethnicity.

[36] Subjects who were not task- or collectively oriented were also excluded from these analyses. The exclusion rate based on scope conditions is 12.5% for women and 11.85% for men.

[37] The Center for the Study of Group Processes moved from monetary only compensation to extra credit and money (Spring semester 2013). To ensure compensation type does not affect status generalization, we had a conversation with Dr. Joseph Berger (one of the founding fathers of status generalization). He concluded that the nature of compensation should not have any bearing on status generalization because the compensation is not tied into the task like with exchange studies (i.e. the better one does on an exchange task the more money they earn). He was confident that this would not be a problem.

courses and a mass email. The majority of men received extra credit as their form of compensation. The total size for the analyses is 289 subjects (150 women and 139 men).[38]

Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variable – Proportion of Stay Responses (P(s)) by Condition

Gender of the Subjects	Stimulus Method(s)	Social Class of Confederate	Average P(s)	Standard Deviation	N	Minimum	Maximum
Men	Video + Survey	Lower	.684	.127	25	.45	.90
		Controlled	.650	.129	14	.45	.85
		Higher	.604	.150	25	.35	.90
	Video Only	Lower	.652	.119	25	.45	.95
		Middle	.720	.138	25	.45	1.00
		Higher	.594	.141	25	.30	.90
Women	Video + Survey	Lower	.642	.150	25	.35	1.00
		Controlled	.588	.160	25	.30	.90
		Higher	.616	.134	25	.35	.80
	Video Only	Lower	.642	.159	25	.40	.95
		Middle	.640	.151	25	.30	.95
		Higher	.538	.133	25	.30	.85

I randomized the order of conditions with Excel following Dr. Lenth's protocol.[39] Additionally, there is another level of randomization embedded in the study. At The Center, we use an online scheduling platform, Sona Systems. When more than one study is available to potential students, Sona randomizes the order that studies are presented to the student.

---

[38] The sample size for men in the "Controlled" condition is smaller than the other conditions because of the sign-up rate for men. I will finish data collection before publication. Interestingly, the patterns for the conditions were set after about 10-15 subjects. I doubt there will be much change in the results. Currently, there may be a power issue with the statistical tests.

[39] Dr. Lenth teaches Experimental Methodology at The UI. Following his method to randomize in Excel, one column lists the number of observations needed for each condition (e.g. for "Condition 1" I listed 25 ones, then 25 twos for Condition 2, and so forth). In the next column, I inserted a random number, and then I sorted the condition number column based on random number column. The random ordering of the conditions becomes the basis for the session log, which communicates to the experimenter what condition to run for her or his session (see Appendix P for an example). Furthermore, I randomized the conditions for women and men separately.

I organize the Results section according the ordering of hypotheses discussed earlier. Additionally, I explain the statistical technique for assessing Hypotheses 1_a through 1_f, created specifically to analyze data from the standardized experimental situation (Balkwell 1991a; Balkwell 1991b; Fişek, Berger and Moore Jr 2002; Fox and Moore 1979).

Model Fit

The first set of hypotheses test whether the ordering of conditions based on the expected advantage of p over o because of social class fits the data or not. In essence, does the theoretical model (e.g. H_{1a}) fit the data? Expectation theorists use two statistics to address model fit, a Pearson χ^2 Goodness of Fit and G^2 model fit (Balkwell 1991a; Fişek, Berger and Moore 2002).

Expectation theorists test model fit with a Pearson χ^2 (Balkwell 1991a). The χ^2 tests how far the observed scores deviate from the expected scores. A significant χ^2 indicates poor model fit. Figure 4.13 above contains the χ^2 test statistic and term definitions.

In the equation, pi represents the predicted P(s) score. To obtain predicted P(s) scores, Expectation States theorists use a linear estimation of P(s), formalized in Formula 8 below (Berger et al. 1977; Fox and Moore 1979).[40] The average P(s) for the baseline of a given subject population is represented by "m." It represents the average propensity to

---

[40] Fox and Moore (1979) developed the linear estimation of predicting P(s). They chose OLS regression because (at the time) there were too many parameters to estimate if they tried using a different estimation method (i.e. they would not have been able to specify the model). Those extra parameters were the f(i), the functions that derive the strength of the path length, which are central to the calculating expectation advantage. This is not a problem now that we have the f(i) (see Formula 4 discussed in Chapter 2 from Fişek et al 1992).

The majority of research in EST uses the P(s) as a dependent variable. A concern of the linear estimation of P(s) it that it violates some of the assumptions for a least square estimation (i.e. P(s) is a limited dependent variable – bounded between zero and one). Limited dependent variables can create heteroscadasctic errors, which violates the assumption that the errors are normally distributed, or the regression can estimate nonsensical predictions, for example (Fox 2008).

Balkwell (1991a) tested a logistic function to estimate m and q. However, his purpose was theoretical and not statistical purity per se. He does note that his estimates of m, q, and subsequent χ^2 tests do not differ from the previous work using linear estimation of the same data. Other EST scholars noted this linear versus non-linear estimation, and many opt for the linear estimation (Fişek and Barlas 2013).

reject influence. At The UI, m is about .61. For conditions where the subject and partner are status equals, the predicted P(s) would be m. "Q" is the slope and "captures special features of the experimental manipulation" (Berger et al. 1977:131). It captures situational parameters, such as experimenter effects. The independent variable is the expectation advantage of p over o (see Figure 4.6 specific values).

$$P(s) \quad = \quad m + q(e_p - e_o) \tag{8}$$

$$\chi^2 = t \sum_{i=1}^{c} n_i \left\{ \frac{(p_i - \pi_i)^2}{\pi_i(1 - \pi_i)} \right\}$$

- t = number of critical trials (20)
- i = experimental condition
- c = summation over experimental conditions
- n_i = number of subjects in condition
- p_i = observed P(s) value
- π_i = predicted P(s) value

Figure 4.13 Formula for χ2 Goodness of Fit (Balkwell 1991a & 1991b)

To test the model fit with the χ^2, researchers estimate predicted P(s) scores using Formula 8. The dependent variable is the average P(s) of each condition in model and the independent variable is the associated expectation advantage of p over o. The predicted P(s), or expected P(s) are in Tables 4.2, 4.4, 4.6, and 4.8 for each hypothesis. The theoretical model fits when the expected P(s) and the observed P(s) do not deviate far from each other (i.e. a non-statistically significant χ^2-value)

EST researchers use an additional statistic to test model fit called G^2 – Figure 4.14 below depicts the formula (Fişek et al. 2002). G^2 is a proportion of the dispersion in the data. It ranges from zero to one and a value of .9 or higher indicates a "good model fit."

The "χ^2 of average" utilizes the grand mean of the P(s) (from the conditions in the model) as the expected score, which shows how much the conditions are deviating from the grand mean. The "χ^2 of data" is the χ^2 generated from Figure 4.13.

$$G^2 = \frac{\chi^2 \text{ of average } - \chi^2 \text{ of data}}{\chi^2 \text{ of average}}$$

Figure 4.14 Formula for G^2 (Fişek, Berger, and Moore 2002)

I test the ordering of conditions based on the social class of the partner with Hypothesis 1_a through 1_d. Table 4.2 contains information for Hypothesis 1_a: the predicted and observed P(s) for the conditions where the subject is a man and he views the video and survey, the resulting χ^2, and G^2.[41] The tests confirm the model fitting the data, χ^2 is not statistically significant ($\chi^2 = .037$; $df = 1$; p-value $= .982$) and the G^2 is close to one ($G^2 = .994$). Taken together, for the men viewing both the video and survey, the resulting P(s) is ordered in the same pattern as the expectation advantage. As the expectation advantage of p over o decreases, so does the observed P(s). Said another way, as the social class of o increases relative to p, p is more likely to defer. Thus, for men viewing both the video and survey, social class is a status characteristic.

---

[41] I list Table 4.3 and subsequent means tests of conditions after the model fit statistics.

Table 4.2 Model and Goodness of Fit for Hypothesis 1$_a$ for Conditions with Male Subjects Presented with Video and Survey Stimuli (N = 25 per Condition[a])

Social Class of the "Partner"	Predicted P(s)	Observed P(s)
Lower	.686	.684
Controlled	.646	.650
Upper	.606	.604
Goodness of Fit Test	χ^2	.037
Model Fit	G^2	.994

[a] Men working with a middle class partner viewing both the Video + Survey have a N = 14.

Table 4.3 Means Tests for P(s) for Conditions with Male Subjects and Presented with Video and Survey Stimuli (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	P(s)	Lower (P(s) = .684)		Middle (P(s) = .650)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	.684	—			
Controlled[a]	.650	.795		—	
Higher	.604	-2.034	*	-1.009	

Notes: [†]p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; **** p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Men working with a middle class partner viewing both the Video + Survey have a N = 14.

Hypothesis 1$_b$ tests the same model as Hypothesis 1$_a$, except the stimulus is just male subjects viewing the video. Table 4.4 below has the results. The χ^2 and G^2 indicate poor model fit, very poor model fit (χ^2 = 13.910; df = 1; p-value = .0001). When looking at the observed P(s) in Table 4.3, it should not be surprising that the model does not fit the data; they do not follow the ordering based on the expectation advantage. The condition that is really out of the theoretical order is the "Middle" condition (subject views video of a middle class confederate). Thus, Hypothesis 1$_b$ is not supported.

Hypothesis 1$_c$ assesses the ordering of conditions for female subjects viewing both the video and survey. The results are in Table 4.6 below and they do not support the theoretical ordering of the conditions. The χ^2 is not statistically significant (χ^2 = 2.209; df = 1; p-value = .489), but the G^2 is .283, which indicates a poor fitting model. The

condition with the "Higher" social class partner seems to be the condition not following

pattern. I will return to this later in the Results section.

Table 4.4 Model and Goodness of Fit for Hypothesis 1$_b$ for Conditions with Male Subjects Presented with Video Stimulus (N = 25 per Condition)

Social Class of the "Partner"	Predicted P(s)	Observed P(s)	
Lower	.684	.652	
Middle	.655	.720	
Upper	.626	.594	
Goodness of Fit Test	χ^2	13.910	***
Model Fit	G^2	.210	

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Table 4.5 Means Tests for P(s) for Conditions with Male Subjects and Presented with Video Only Stimulus (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	P(s)	Lower (P(s) = .652)		Middle (P(s) = .720)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	.652	—			
Middle	.720	1.865		—	
Higher	.594	-1.575	†	-3.189	***

Notes: †p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; **** p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

Hypothesis 1$_d$ is the last one in this set. It contains conditions with women

viewing just the video of the confederate. Table 4.5 below has the results and the

hypothesis is not supported. The χ^2 and G^2 both indicate poor model fit (χ^2 = 4.245; df = 1;

p-value = .0009; G^2 = .714). The women are rejecting influence at the same rate in the

conditions with a "Lower" and "Middle" classed partner, but the women working with

the "Higher" social class reject influence at much lower rate.

Table 4.6 Model and Goodness of Fit for Hypothesis 1$_c$ for Conditions with Female Subjects Presented with Video and Survey Stimuli (N = 25 per Condition)

Social Class of the "Partner"	Predicted P(s)	Observed P(s)
Lower	.630	.642
Controlled	.614	.588
Upper	.601	.616
Goodness of Fit Test	χ^2	2.209
Model Fit	G^2	.283

Table 4.7 Means Tests for P(s) for Conditions with Female Subjects and Presented with Video and Survey Stimuli (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	P(s)	Lower (P(s) = .642) Test Statistic	Significance Level	Middle (P(s) = .588) Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	.642	—			
Controlled	.588	1.234		—	
Higher	.616	-.648		.673	

Notes: †p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; **** p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

Table 4.8 Model and Goodness of Fit for Hypothesis 1$_d$ for Conditions with Female Subjects Presented with Video Stimuli (N = 25 per Condition)

Social Class of the "Partner"	Predicted P(s)	Observed P(s)
Lower	.659	.642
Middle	.603	.640
Upper	.558	.538
Goodness of Fit Test	χ^2	4.245 *
Model Fit	G^2	.714

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Stimuli Type and Gender Differences

Taking these results together, the experiment partially supports SCT. However, the patterns in the observed P(s) are interesting and require further exploration. I continue testing Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the next section. After that, I will use the Post-Session Survey to examine those disconfirming of the hypotheses.

Table 4.9 Means Tests for P(s) for Conditions with Female Subjects and Presented with Video Only Stimuli (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	P(s)	Lower (P(s) = .642)		Middle (P(s) = .640)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	.642	—			
Middle	.640	-.046		—	
Higher	.538	-2.510	**	2.542	**

Notes: [†]p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; **** p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

Hypotheses 2_a through 2_f test the null for the no difference between stimuli type across the conditions. Refer below to Table 4.10 for means tests information. I conducted two-tailed means tests between conditions with unequal variances assumed. The data support Hypotheses 2_a through 2_e. The only statistically significant difference between stimuli type is between women working with higher social class partner, Hypothesis 2_f ($P(s)_{♀Video}$ = .538; $P(s)_{♀Video+Survey}$ = .616; t = -2.072; p-value = .044).[42] Just examining this set of hypotheses, it seems like the difference in stimuli type is negligible. However, when thinking about the totality of results, there may be something to the difference in stimuli type. One way to address this is by assessing the Post-Session Survey data.

Before turning to the Post-Session Survey data, there is one set of hypotheses to review, gender difference by stimuli type for the controlled and middle class partner (see Table 4.7 below). Hypothesis 3_a and 3_b test whether men are rejecting influence at a higher rate than the women are. Hypothesis 3_b is supported ($P(s)_{♀Video}$ = .640; $P(s)_{♂Video}$ = .720; t = -1.955; p-value = .028 for one-tailed test). The significance level for

---

[42] T-tests are sensitive to sample size and the P(s) difference between conditions needs to be (about) .08 for an N of 25 to be statistically significantly different. In Hypothesis 2_b, the sample size for the "Video plus Survey" condition is only 14 and the difference is .07, but not statistically significant (t = 1.560; p-value = .124). This could change once the sample size reaches 25. I do not think the P(s) will change much in that condition, but even an .01 difference, which is possible, could create a statistically significant difference between stimuli type for these two conditions (men working with a middle class partner).

Hypothesis 3_a is not at .05 threshold for confirmation (P(s) $_{♀Video+Survey}$ = .588; P(s) $_{♂Video}$ = .650; t = -1.322; p-value = .098 for one-tailed test).[43]

Table 4.10 Means Tests for Hypotheses 2_a through 2_f – Tests of No Difference by Stimuli Type (N = 25 per Condition[a])

Gender of Subject	Hypothesis	Social Class of Partner	Observed P(s)		Test statistic	
			Video Only	Video + Survey		
	2a	Lower	.652	.684	-.920	
Men	2b	Middle[a]	.720	.650	1.560	†
	2c	Higher	.594	.604	-.243	
	2d	Lower	.642	.642	.000	
Women	2e	Middle	.640	.588	1.185	
	2f	Higher	.538	.616	-2.072	*

Notes: †p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 (two-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Men working with a middle class partner viewing both the Video + Survey have a N = 14.

Table 4.11 Means Tests for Hypotheses 3_a through 3_b – Gender Differences by Stimuli Type (N = 25 per Condition[a])

Social Class of Partner	Stimuli Type	Observed P(s)		Test Statistic	
		Female Subjects	Male Subjects		
Controlled[a]	Video + Survey	.588	.650	-1.322	†
Middle	Video Only	.640	.720	-1.955	*

Notes: †p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Men working with a middle class partner viewing both the Video + Survey have a N = 14.

Post-Session Survey

Hypotheses 1_a through 1_d provide partial support of social class as a status characteristic. However, the theoretical model only fit the set of conditions with men

---

[43] Because of the small sample size of the men in the "Video + Survey" condition, I thought this non-significance could be a power issue. I conducted a t-test with all information the same, except I increased the sample size to 25 (P(s)$_{♀Controlled}$ = .588; P(s)$_{♂Controlled}$ = .650; t = -1.512; p-value = .069 for an one-tailed test). The results are not statistically significant, but the pattern is there. As with Footnote 41, a slight change in the P(s) for the men working with a social class equal in the "Video + Survey" condition could change these results.

viewing both the video and the survey. Why did the data disconfirm Hypotheses 1_b through 1_d?

The Post-Session Survey (see Appendix L for a list of questions) is one potentially useful tool to answer this question. The post-session survey asks the subject myriad questions. They evaluate their partners on series of adjective pairs (i.e. semantic differentials), themselves and partner about the task, manipulation checks, and EPA ratings (the exact same ratings as discussed in Chapter 3).[44] If differences in responses across certain conditions exist, the results might help explain why the subjects behaved as they did.

Within Hypotheses 1_b through 1_d, I isolated the conditions that were not following the pattern (i.e. as the social class of the partner increases, the P(s) decreases). I feature the problematic conditions in Figure 4.15 outlined in red. I then compared those conditions' Post-Session Survey results to their complementary condition (i.e. the other stimuli type for the same level of social class), see Figure 4.16 for those conditions outlined in yellow. For example, in the "Higher" condition with men viewing "Video Only" is problematic, and its companion condition is male subject viewing video and survey in the "Higher" condition.

---

[44] I will not analyze the EPA ratings across the chapters. The scope of that analysis is beyond this thesis, but I will in a later publication.

Stimuli Type	Social Class of Partner	Subjects Gender	
		Men	Women
Video + Survey	Lower	.684	.642
	Controlled	.650	.588
	Higher	.604	.616
Video Only	Lower	.652	.642
	Middle	.720	.640
	Higher	.594	.538

Figure 4.15 Observed P(s) by Condition – Problematic Conditions Outlined in Red

Hypothesis 1_b tests the ordering of conditions with male subjects viewing the "Video Only." There are two issues with this set of conditions: (1) the "Middle" condition's P(s) is quite large (P(s) = .720); (2) the "Lower" condition's P(s) is a little too small (P(s) = .652) (see Table 4.5). Why are these conditions not following the pattern? [45]

Using the Post-Session Survey and subsequent means tests, I compared the "Middle" condition with men viewing the video to the "Controlled" condition (male subject view both stimuli), and ostensibly there should be no difference between these conditions. There are statistically significant differences and I report them in Table 4.12 (see Appendix Q Tables Q1 and Q2 for descriptive statistics). From these significant differences, the subjects in the "Video Only" condition are evaluating their partner differently from the "Video + Survey" condition.

The subjects in the "Video Only" condition are rating their partner less positively – he is less persuasive, fair, reasonable, intelligent, and convincing – than the subjects do in the "Video Only" condition. Taken with the two other items – the subjects in the "Video Only" condition evaluate their performance on contrast sensitivity as more

---

[45] The P(s) for this condition is significantly different from the other two in this set ($t_{Middle-Lower}$ = 1.865; p-value = .034; $t_{Middle-Higher}$ = 3.189; p-value = .001). Please see Table 4.5 for avearge P(s) scores.

helpful, and think they have more Contrast Sensitivity than their partners – the subjects in "Video Only" condition think they are better at the task. This could explain why they would reject influence at a higher rate than in the "Video + Survey" condition. If the subject "thinks" he is more competent than his partner, then through the self-fulfilling expectation portion of status generalization, he will behave according to his original expectation. In the "Middle" condition with male subjects viewing "Video Only," the subjects may be constructing status differently. That is, they are probably not seeing their partner as an equal.

Stimuli Type	Social Class of Partner	Subjects Gender	
		Men	Women
Video + Survey	Lower	.684	.642
	Controlled	.650	.588
	Higher	.604	.616
Video Only	Lower	.652	.642
	Middle	.720	.640
	Higher	.594	.538

Figure 4.16 Observed P(s) by Condition – Comparison Conditions for Problematic Conditions Outlined in Yellow

The other problematic condition involving male subjects is in the same set of conditions. It is the "Lower" condition with the subjects viewing the "Video Only." The P(s) for this condition is .652 and in comparison to the "Lower" condition with the subjects viewing "Video + Survey" (P(s) = .684), it is a little low. Comparing these two conditions' Post-Session Survey results did not yield a clear explanation (see Table 4.13, and Appendix Q Tables Q3 and Q4 for descriptive statistics). The subjects in the "Video

Only" condition were not worried about their decisions, but they were not confident about them either compared to the subjects viewing the "Video + Survey." The men in the "Video Only" condition thought their partner was more "sure of himself" and working with him made them not anxious compared to the subjects in the "Video + Survey" condition. These patterns suggest that the subjects in the "Video Only" Condition the subject are not noticing lower status cues as compared to the men in the "Video + Survey" condition. Alternatively, the men in either condition do not perceive the subtle lower social class cues and they need the explicit status information. I will revisit this in the discussion section.

Table 4.12 Means Test of Post-Session Survey for "Middle" Condition with Male Subjects Viewing Video Only (Problematic Condition) Compared to Male Subjects Viewing Both

Item[a]	Video Only (N = 25)	Both (N = 14)	Test Statistic	
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
persuasive—unpersuasive	4.560	3.786	1.915	*
fair—unfair	3.000	1.929	2.439	**
reasonable—unreasonable	3.080	2.286	1.776	*
unintelligent—intelligent	4.360	5.214	-1.998	*
unconvincing—convincing	3.520	4.357	-1.789	*
Question Stem: I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
helpful — not helpful at all	2.920	3.857	-1.844	*
Question Stem: Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?				
contrast sensitivity[b]	1.458	2.429	-4.435	****

Notes: *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$; ****$p \leq .0001$ (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] This question has three responses: "I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity" (coded as 1); "I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity " (coded as 2); and "I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I" (coded as 3).

The women also had two problematic conditions. The women in the "Higher" condition viewing both the video and the survey rejected influence at a high rate (P(s) = .616). Why would the P(s) go from .538 (in the "Video Only" condition) to .616 (in the "Video + Survey"? Why would seeing the explicit social class of the partner create this behavior difference? The comparison of the Post-Session Survey for these two conditions did not yield much of an explanation (see Table 4.14 for means tests, and Appendix Q Tables Q5 and Q6 for descriptive statistics).

The women in the "Video + Survey" condition do not think their partner was as fair or agreeable as the women in the "Video Only" condition did. Additionally, the women in the "Video Only" condition were neutral on the majority of significant items about the task (neutral for worried and confident). The women were not resentful when making final choices, but to a lesser degree than the women in the "Video + Survey." Finally, the women in the "Video + Survey" condition were not as comfortable working with their partner as the women in the "Video Only" condition were.

The women in the "Higher" condition viewing the "Video + Survey" did evaluate their partner differently from the women in the "Lower" and "Controlled" conditions viewing the same stimuli when comparing differences on the Post-Session Survey.[46] The general pattern here is the women in the "Higher" condition see their partner more positively and are not angry at all working on the task (to a greater extent) than the women in the "Lower" and "Controlled" conditions did. These findings suggest that the women in the "Higher" condition are rating their partner as if he had higher status than the women in the other conditions did (Berger et al. 1977). Because if the women in the "Higher" condition see their partner has higher status, they should be deferring to their partner. Thus, this does not explain why they would reject influence. I speculate that the

---

[46] See Appendix Q Tables Q7 through Q13 for means and descriptive statistics of Post-Session Survey comparisons of "Video plus Survey" conditions.

women's behavior, rejecting influence, is a reaction to the partner's claim of "Upper Class."

Table 4.13 Means Test of Post-Session Survey for "Lower" Condition with Male Subjects Viewing Video Only (Problematic Condition) Compared to Male Subjects Viewing Both (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Video Only	Both	Test Statistic	
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	6.000	5.000	2.402	*
confident — not confident at all	5.400	4.480	2.166	*
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	5.960	5.080	1.893	*
confident — not confident at all	5.540	4.600	1.893	*
Question Stem: I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
sure of self — unsure of self	3.400	4.080	-2.516	**
Question Stem: Overall, working with my partner made me feel:				
anxious — not anxious at all	5.200	4.400	1.719	*

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; ****p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)
[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

The last problematic condition is the "Middle" condition with women viewing the video only. Again, the women are rejecting influence at a higher rate (P(s) = .640) than the women in the "Video + Survey" (P(s) = .588) condition did. The Post-Session Survey comparisons between the "Middle" conditions with women viewing the "Video Only" and the "Controlled" condition with women viewing the "Video + Survey" generated conflicting results (see Table 4.15 for means tests, and Appendix Q Tables Q14 and Q15 for descriptive statistics).

Table 4.14 Means Test of Post-Session Survey for "Higher" with Female Subjects Viewing Both Stimuli (Problematic Condition) Compared to Female Subjects Viewing Video Only Working (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Video Only	Both	Test Statistic	
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
fair—unfair	2.080	2.720	-1.889	*
combative—agreeable	5.440	4.680	1.795	*
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	5.520	4.600	1.960	*
confident — not confident at all	5.200	4.208	2.373	*
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
resentful—not resentful	6.240	5.080	2.989	**
confident — not confident at all	5.280	4.375	1.894	*
Question Stem: Overall, working with my partner made me feel:				
comfortable—uncomfortable	2.520	3.440	-2.453	**

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; ****p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

Table 4.15 Means Test of Post-Session Survey for "Middle" with Female Subjects Viewing Video Only Stimuli (Problematic Condition) Compared to Female Subjects Viewing Both Stimuli Working (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Video Only	Both	Test Statistic	
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
advantage—disadvantage	3.920	3.480	1.965	*
Question Stem: I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
competent—incompetent	3.480	2.680	1.806	*
helpful — not helpful at all	3.560	2.880	1.711	*
influential — not influential at all	3.680	3.040	1.794	*
Question Stem: Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?				
contrast sensitivity[b]	1.920	2.429	-2.084	*

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; ****p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] This question has three responses: "I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity" (coded as 1); "I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity " (coded as 2); and "I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I" (coded as 3).

The women in the "Middle" and "Video Only" condition evaluated their partner as less advantaged, their own performance on Contrast Sensitivity as not as competent, helpful, or influential compared to the women in the "Video + Survey" condition did. The women in the "Video Only" condition reported that they have more Contrast Sensitivity ability than their partner has. In the "Video + Survey" condition, the women responded that they had equal Contrast Sensitivity with their partner. The items of interest that help explain the higher rate of rejecting influence are evaluating their partner as less advantaged and thinking they have more Contrast Sensitivity. These two results in combination with the high P(s) suggest that social class and gender are not combining as theorized. In fact, it seems as if they are constructing status very differently compared to the companion condition (i.e. women in the "Controlled" social class and viewing both stimuli condition). These results are similar to the "Middle" condition with men viewing the viewing just the video. I will return to this in the discussion section.

The problematic conditions aside, the attractiveness evaluation of the partner from the Post-Session Survey warrants investigation and discussion. Examining the descriptive statistics first (see Table 4.16), two distinct patterns emerge. The first is the gender difference in attractiveness evaluation. It appears that the women are rating their partner as more attractive. In Table 4.17, I aggregate the attractiveness item by gender, and report descriptive statistics and a means test. On average, the women do rate their partner as more attractive ($\bar{X}_\female = 5.061$; $\bar{X}_\male = 3.790$; t = 9.111; p-value = .0000). Not only do the women evaluate their partner as more attractive, but also the men rate him as unattractive.

The second pattern is the ordering of attractive in each set of conditions. Regardless of gender and stimuli type, the subjects rated the partner in the "Higher" condition as more attractive than partner in the "Lower" or "Middle/Controlled" conditions (see Tables 4.18 through 4.21 for means tests organized by gender and stimuli type). The attractiveness evaluation is important because it too is a status characteristic (Webster and Driskell 1983). The "rich guy" is considered more attractive.

Table 4.16 Descriptive Statistics for Subject's Rating of Partner on Unattractive—Attractive[a] from the Post-Session Survey by Condition

Gender of the Subjects	Stimulus Method(s)	Social Class of Confederate	Mean	Standard Deviation	N	Minimum	Maximum
Men	Video + Survey	Lower	3.600	1.225	25	1	6
		Controlled	3.714	1.590	14	1	7
		Higher	4.400	0.957	25	3	7
	Video Only	Lower	3.458	1.021	24	1	4
		Middle	3.520	1.194	25	1	5
		Higher	4.000	1.190	25	1	6
Women	Video + Survey	Lower	4.667	1.274	25	1	7
		Controlled	4.720	1.137	25	2	7
		Higher	5.840	0.987	25	4	7
	Video Only	Lower	4.640	0.757	25	4	6
		Middle	4.667	0.917	24	3	6
		Higher	5.800	1.040	25	4	7

[a] Unattractive—Attractive is a semantic differential (i.e. an adjective pair) with seven points in between the adjectives. Unattractive would be a 1, neither unattractive nor attractive would be a 4, and attractive would be 7.

Table 4.17 Descriptive Statistics and Means Test for Subject's Rating of Partner on Unattractive—Attractive[a] from the Post-Session Survey by Gender

Gender of the Subjects	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Women	148	5.061	1.150	1	7
Men	138	3.790	1.205	1	7

Item[a]	Women	Men	Test Statistic	
unattractive—attractive	5.061	3.790	9.111	****

Notes: [†]$p \leq .1$; *$p \leq .05$; **$p \leq .01$; ***$p \leq .001$; ****$p \leq .0001$ (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Unattractive—Attractive is a semantic differential (i.e. an adjective pair) with seven points in between the adjectives. Unattractive would be a 1, neither unattractive nor attractive would be a 4, and attractive would be 7.

Discussion

I presented results from a 12-condition experiment examining whether interactional cues of social class – separately and in combination with explicit social class – create a status hierarchy. Additionally, I tested how gender affects this process. With Hypotheses 1_a through 1_d, I tested if the ordering of conditions (based on the social class

of the partner) followed the pattern of the expectation advantage of the p (subject) over o (partner). In Hypothesis 2_a through 2_f, I assessed differences between the stimuli type. Finally with Hypotheses 3_a through 3_b, I evaluated gender differences by stimuli type (the "Middle" and "Controlled" conditions only).

Table 4.18 Means for Subject's Rating of Partner on for Unattractive—Attractive[a] from the Post-Session Survey for Conditions with Male Subjects and Presented with Video and Survey Stimuli (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	Mean	Lower ($\bar{X} = 3.600$)		Controlled ($\bar{X} = 3.714$)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	3.600	—			
Controlled[a]	3.714	-.233		—	
Higher	4.400	2.573	**	1.471	†

Notes: †p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Men working with a middle class partner viewing both the Video + Survey have a N = 14.

Table 4.19 Means for Subject's Rating of Partner on Unattractive—Attractive[a] from the Post-Session Survey for Conditions with Male Subjects and Presented with Video Stimulus (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	Mean	Lower ($\bar{X} = 3.458$)		Middle ($\bar{X} = 3.520$)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	3.458	—			
Middle	3.520	.195		—	
Higher	4.000	1.712	*	-1.423	†

Notes: †p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

I begin the discussion with the last set of hypotheses presented, 3_a through 3_b. These tested gender differences. There is ample research within EST and gender studies that concludes that women are viewed as less competent than men (Ridgeway 2011; Ridgeway and Smith-Lovin 2006). These general expectations about men and women infiltrate interaction, which would explain why the women in the study reject influence at

a lower rate than the male subjects do (see Table 4.11). From these data, when women are working with a man, all else equal, gender is a status characteristic. This confirmation supports SCT.

Table 4.20 Means for Subject's Rating of Partner on Unattractive—Attractive[a] from the Post-Session Survey for Conditions with Female Subjects and Presented with Video and Survey Stimuli (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	Mean	Lower ($\bar{X} = 4.667$)		Middle ($\bar{X} = 4.720$)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	4.667	—			
Middle	4.720	-.154		—	
Higher	5.840	3.594	***	3.720	***

Notes: [†]p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

Table 4.21 Means for Subject's Rating of Partner on Unattractive—Attractive[a] from the Post-Session Survey for Conditions with Female Subjects and Presented with Video Stimulus (N = 25)

Social Class of Confederate	Mean	Lower ($\bar{X} = 4.640$)		Middle ($\bar{X} = 4.667$)	
		Test Statistic	Significance Level	Test Statistic	Significance Level
Lower	4.640	—			
Middle	4.667	.111		—	
Higher	5.800	4.506	****	-4.049	****

Notes: [†]p≤.1; *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; **** p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

As mentioned early, replicating this experiment, but with a female confederate would give information whether gender in general is a status characteristic at The UI. Without knowing how men working with women and women working with women differ (or not), I cannot say definitively that gender is a status characteristic. I would speculate that all else equal, a man working with a woman (here at The UI) would reject influence at a higher than a woman working with a woman would.

Hypotheses 2_a through 2_f assessed variation by stimuli type. Except for the "Higher" condition with women, the differences were not large enough to be statistically different. The difference between "Middle" and "Controlled" conditions with men is trending toward the stimuli type affecting the status generalization. Interestingly, the "Higher" condition with women viewing both stimuli and the "Middle" condition with men viewing the video are both problematic, which I detailed earlier. They are problematic because the P(s) score is higher than expected, but the reasons for the increased P(s) are different. Before I discuss these problematic conditions in any more detail, I will discuss the first set of hypotheses.

As mentioned the first set of hypotheses are the core of testing social class and gender within a SCT framework. Do the status characteristics combine to affect rejection of influence? The data supported hypothesis 1_a as captured by the model fit. On average, when the men were presented with both the video and the survey, the ordering of the P(s) score followed the ordering of the expectation advantage of p over o. As the social class of the partner increased, the P(s) score decreased. Here social class is a status characteristic.

However, the data do not support the other hypotheses in the model fit set. I identified four problematic conditions in non-supported hypotheses. The men in the "Middle" condition viewing the video only are not "seeing" their partner the same way as the men in the "Controlled" condition, and consequently are rejecting influence at high rate. Additionally, the women in the "Middle" condition viewing the video only behave the same way as the men in the "Middle" condition, rejecting influence at high rate. There may be an issue with the manipulation. The subjects may be interpreting the interactional cues from the confederate as something other than a middle class peer. It could be that the subjects are constructing status differently from what I intended.

When I think about the "Middle" condition's interactional cues compared to the "Lower" and "Higher" conditions, I analyze how the conditions are different and how

those differences could affect behavior. In the "Middle" condition, the confederate is relaxed and gives a limited range of activities, "hanging out with his friends." Whereas in the "Lower" condition, the confederate gives two activities and one of them is working. In the "Higher" condition, the confederate gives a laundry list of activities. For the "Middle" condition, the deficit of activities and just saying he hangs with his friends, the subjects in the "Middle" condition could be interpret their partner as a "Bro."

The term "Bro" has morphed from a simple reference of male friend, shortened from "brother", to mean a specific kind of masculinity (Martin 2013). The "Bro" culture is associated with fraternities and heavy drinking, and some view it as a disparaging term (Zeilinger 2014). The transformation of the term "Bro" to mean a type of masculinity is so new that the majority of the writing is in popular media (e.g. NPR) and the blogosphere (e.g. *The Fbomb blog*). As type of masculinity, "Bro" masculinity would fit with some aspects of Kimmel's (2005) 'Guy Code." However, a "Bro" is more narrowly defined, whereas Kimmel's treatise encompasses masculinity during adolescence and early adulthood.

My data does not support or disconfirm the subjects (both women and men) in the "Middle" condition viewing the partner as a "Bro." The most I can do is speculate. The men in the "Middle" condition compared to the men in the "Controlled" condition, do rate their partner less positively than the men in the "Controlled" condition. However, their evaluations are neutral or close to neutral on the semantic differential scale.[47] The Post-Session Survey results for the women in the "Middle" condition compared to the women in the "Controlled" condition do not yield any support to the "Bro" hypothesis. The only indicator is their behavior. They are rejecting influence at a similar rate to the women in the "Lower" condition (regardless of stimuli). Seeing the "Middle" condition

---

[47] This is a facet of our subject population, extreme social desirability. The subjects at The UI are very polite during exit interviews (i.e. when describing their partner, regardless of gender).

partner as a "Bro" could be an indicator of how social class and gender combine non-linearly.

There are other two problematic conditions. The "Lower" condition with men viewing the video has "low-ish" P(s) when compared to the "Lower" condition with men viewing both the video and survey. It seems as if the men are not picking up on the lower social class cues because there are not many differences on partner evaluation from the Post-Session Survey. However, the results are trending towards the P(s) in the "Lower" condition with men viewing the video only as getting close to the P(s) in the "Lower" with men viewing the video and survey. It could be that the manipulation was not strong enough.

The last problematic condition is the "Higher" condition with women viewing both video and survey. The women here do not evaluate their partner differently from the women in the "Higher" condition viewing just video. The only difference is their behavior. I speculate that the women in this condition did not like that their partner blatantly stated that he is from the upper class. As such, the women push back with only thing they had, the ability to disagree and stay with their decision.

In some of the conditions, subjects are behaving and evaluating their partner as if social class is salient during the interaction. The issue might be with social class as a diffuse status characteristic being so context specific. Given the context of the UI, I used the focus group data to create the confederates. However, to make the confederates believable and control for potential confounds, I could not have extreme differences between the conditions. Thus, the differences in the social class cues are rather subtle, and social class as a status characteristics is still working, albeit imperfectly.

In the next and final chapter, I review the empirical chapters, highlighting the results, discuss limitations, and place the thesis in the broader sociological knowledge.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Social class is a well-studied concept in Sociology (Fiske and Markus 2012). How social class operates during interaction is less studied (DiMaggio 2012). In Chapters 3 and 4, I offer empirical evidence of cultural schema about social class and gender, and how these characteristics combine to affect interaction. I focus on status processes during interaction as a specific interactional context (Lawler, Ridgeway and Markovsky 1993). As such, in Chapter 4, I test whether social class is a status characteristic in all-male dyads, and then how the addition of gender affects status generalization, which is the mechanism of Status Characteristic Theory (SCT). In Chapter 2, I explicated Status Characteristics Theory, a theory from the theoretical research program of Expectation States Theory.

Social Class as a Status Characteristic

The 12-condition experiment in Chapter 4 provided partial support for social class as a status characteristic. Male subjects working with another man, who viewed both the video and background survey manipulation indicating their partner's social class, behaved according to SCT. SCT predicted that as the social class of the partner increased, the rate of rejecting influence would decrease. This pattern was supported in the conditions with men working with men viewing both the video and the background survey. And, I can safely say, in all-male groups of equal status (i.e no other status process is activated), then social class can be the predominant stratifier within task groups.

However, there were specific conditions that did not follow the predicted pattern. The men who watch the video only of the "Middle" class partner rejected influence at very high rate compared to other conditions. As mentioned in Chapter 4, these subjects might be constructing status differently from subjects in the other conditions. Specifically, they are not seeing their partner as a social class equal, but as certain kind of masculinity that is devalued in task-oriented situations. This is just speculation, and

consequently should be studied in depth. A way to understand this specific condition/confederate is to investigate how people outside the experimental setting view this person. I could accomplish with an online survey, focus groups, or interviews.

Another condition that did not follow the predicted pattern is the condition in which men viewing the video only of the "Lower" class partner. They had a slightly lower rate of rejecting influence than the subjects who viewed both the video and background survey. Again, the manipulation might not have been strong enough, or because I am trying to portray a lower social class person in the university context, subjects may interpret this person as socially mobile. Cultural schema for social mobility might contain expectations for competence associated with task success. I could assess that as I discussed above with the problematic "Middle" condition.

Women viewing the "Higher" social class partner video and the survey had a higher rate of rejecting influence. What is interesting with this problematic condition is that the explicit cue of social class created such an impact on the behavioral outcome. In an attempt to understand why the women behaved this way, I used the post-session questionnaire as I did with other problematic conditions. These analyses did not yield any insight into their behavior. However, the women are reacting to the explicit cue (given the difference between P(s) of that condition and the women who viewed both the video and the background survey, and the lack of difference between the Post-Session Surveys).

Studying social class with these methodologies has its share of problems with the concept. There is social desirability in general with research subjects (Neuman 2000) and specifically with social class. People do not want to admit their privilege or lack of privilege (Lott 2002). People do not want to report their income on surveys (Yans et al. 2010). Social class makes people uncomfortable (Jenson 2012). In an experiment, the subject may react to the explicit social class cues and it only shows up behaviorally because of these other processes such as social desirability or the other problems with social class. Accordingly, while I have behavioral differences among certain conditions,

it is difficult to tease out why these differences exist, as they do not confirm theory nor do the concomitant survey responses reveal statistical differences.

Intersecting Social Class and Gender

Gender as status characteristic has a well understood belief system backing up experimental findings (Ridgeway 2011). Specifically, it has the binary "nature" of the hegemonic gender system as understood by most people in American society. Individuals notice gender and readily put individuals into one of two binary categories, and understand, in general, the ranking of those gender categories. However, by combining social class and gender, the clear and well-understood belief system of binary genders broke down in this experiment. The subjects seem to bring in subjective notions of social class combined with gender. As I discussed above, it seemed as if the women and men were constructing status differently from what SCT would have predicted. As I describe in Chapter 2, SCT has a mathematical heuristic that demonstrates how two status characteristics combine to impact influence processes. Gender and social class did not follow this heuristic, thus the status elements of social class are combining in different ways with gender. We can surmise that our mental processes do not perceive "male" and then "social class" and amalgamate; rather, perhaps "rich man" and "poor man" are culturally-constructed categories unto themselves that the mind perceives as a singular characteristic. To examine this possibility, more tests must be done.

Intersecting social class and gender within the standard experimental setting added a layer of complexity to status generalization. Additionally, testing SCT under intersectionality conditions has not been done before. Given the partial theoretical support and compelling disconfirmation, there is more to do to understand status processes and intersectionality.

Limitations

Every research study has its limitations because no method is perfect (Neuman 2000). They each have their strengths and weakness. In Chapter 3, I used focus groups to

ascertain local conceptions of gender and social class. These findings are not generalizable to even the student body of The UI. However, they are illustrative of the local cultural schema and offer rich descriptions of different "guys." In Chapter 4, I presented experimental data, which are not externally generalizable. Alternatively, the theoretical understanding is generalizable.

Another limitation is the population in general – undergraduates at The UI. On average, these students are middle class and there is little variation in social class. This limited range of social class constrained how I could present a believable confederate. For example, in the focus groups, students said that they thought "rich men" were from the East Coast. I could not use the standardized experimental setting in one university's domain to use this information. Similarly, the focus group participants told me that "poor boys" did not go to college. Given the limited range of using only "the university student" as a confederate, I am really splitting hairs when it came to different class displays. This limited variation may explain some of the disconfirmation in the experiment.

Future Directions

Given the limitation of the population, two important future projects would involve university settings with different class backgrounds from UI, and more importantly using community samples. Ridgeway (2012) remarks that many of cross-class interactions take place in a work environment; thus, moving outside of an undergraduate subject pool might be more helpful in understanding the role of social class as a status characteristic.

The next major step in this research program is running a similar experiment but with a female confederate by focusing on femininities and social class. Even with the limitations of The UI subject pool, I would like to examine the same hypotheses with the same population. Using the same population, but with a female confederate, will allow me to cross gender with social class fully. I can test whether gender is operating as status

characteristic. Additionally, the results of a study with a female confederate might allow me to begin to disentangle gender and social class effects.

The next step with the current project is to improve the confederate for the middle and lower social class categories. This may mean more focus groups and most importantly changing the context. As mentioned above, the context of The UI presents certain limitations that only changing contexts will overcome, that is, community samples and more diverse university settings.

Social Class, Gender, and Intersectionality

Is there a cultural schema for social class like gender or even race? Yes, but it is complicated, unlike gender, and more complicated than race. Race is more complicated than gender, but a researcher can still create a meaningful binary category system (e.g. Black versus White or Asian versus White) (Cohen and Zhou 1991). Both gender and race are primary frames for interaction; we quickly categorize people based on those characteristics to figure out how to interact (Ridgeway and Krichel-Katx 2013). However, with social class it is not as straightforward.

The category distinctions of social class may invoke other social psychological processes other than status processes. Interactionally, there seems to be some reaction, maybe affective (at least for the women dealing with the high social class partner), when social class is made explicit. It might not be legitimate, that is, right and proper to be explicit about one's social class in American culture during interaction.

On the other hand, it may be that social class is a partial status characteristic, which under certain conditions (e.g. intersectionality) only high social class can create a status distinction. Alternatively, SCT may not be able to handle social class because it does not act like a typical diffuse status characteristics and new theory needs to be developed (or elaborated). During status generalization, other characteristics might mediate the relationship between social class and rejecting influence, such as attractiveness. In the high social class conditions, it might be that the partner's social

class buys him social status (like attractiveness). This would be similar to the halo effect in psychology.[1]

The bottom line is more studies need to be done within the standardized experimental situation and outside of it. Implicit attitude tests may be a fruitful starting place (Project Implicit 2011). It is clear, even with partial support, that social class structures interaction in some way. At this point, it is not clear how, but this thesis is a starting point to understand better the role of social class during interaction.

 "Nowadays it is fashionable to talk about race or gender; the uncool subject is class" (hooks 2000:vii), so I guess I'll be uncool.

---

[1] The halo effect is "extrapolation from a general impression to unknown attributes" (Nisbett and Wilson 1977:250). For instance, if an individual likes someone then she is more likely to evaluate that someone more positively because the initial liking casts that someone in positive light.

APPENDIX A. PRE-SCREEN QUESTIONS

Introduction to section: In this set of background questions, please answer as accurately as possibly.

1.   Select the country you were born in.
□ United States of American
□ Other
□ Prefer to not answer

2.   Select the country that you were raised in.
□ United States of American
□ Other
□ Prefer to not answer

3.   Select your race/ethnicity from the list below.
□ African American
□ Asian American
□ European American
□ Latino/a
□ Other
□ Prefer to not answer

4.   Select your age range.
□ 17 years or younger
□ 18 – 25 years
□ 26 or older
□ Prefer to not answer

5.   Select which is your status within the University.
□ Graduate/Professional Student
□ Undergraduate Student
□ Prefer to not answer

6.   What is your gender?
□ Man
□ Transgender, trans, trans*
□ Woman
□ Prefer to not answer

APPENDIX B. BEM SHORT FORM

Introduction to inventory: For the following statements, please select the response that you think is most true for you.

Response Category for all items:
□ never or almost never true
□ usually not true
□ sometimes but infrequently true
□ occasionally true
□ often true
□ usually true
□ always or almost always true

1. I defend my own beliefs.
2. I am affectionate.
3. I am conscientious.
4. I am independent.
5. I am sympathetic.
6. I am moody.
7. I am assertive.
8. I am sensitive to the needs of others.
9. I am reliable.
10. I have a strong personality.
11. I am understanding.
12. I am jealous.
13. I am forceful.
14. I am compassionate.
15. I am truthful.
16. I have leadership abilities.
17. I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.
18. I am secretive.
19. I am willing to take risks.
20. I am warm.
21. I am adaptable.
22. I am dominant.
23. I am tender.
24. I am conceited.
25. I am willing to take a stand.
26. I love children.
27. I am tactful.
28. I am aggressive.
29. I am gentle.
30. I am conventional.

APPENDIX C. EPA RATINGS[1]

Introduction to inventory: This section focuses on how you feel about different kinds of people and characteristics.

Each line with circles is like a ruler for measuring how you feel. Mark off how close something is to the description at one end of the ruler or other. If something is not close to either description, put a mark in the middle.

It is very important to put a mark on every row of circles.

a guy

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Bad, awful	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Fast, noisy, young

rich

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Powerless, little	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Good, Nice

poor

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Powerless, little	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Good, Nice

a man

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Slow, quiet, old	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Fast, noisy, young

rich guy

Bad, awful	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	o	Fast, noisy, young

---

[1] As mentioned in Chapter 3, I ended up using a slider that went from zero to 100 because of the way the radio buttons looked like on a web browser, which was bad. The web-surveyor could not handle 9 horizontal buttons, so the slider was the best option. What is depicted here is the traditional way of presenting EPA ratings.

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	

poor guy

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	

rich man

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	

rich man

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	

APPENDIX D. BACKGROUND DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS

Introduction to section: In this set of background questions, please answer as accurately as possibly.

1.   What is/was your mother/mother figure highest level of education?
□ Less than a high school diploma
□ High school diploma
□ High school diploma equivalent (e.g. GED)
□ Some College
□ Associate's Degree
□ Bachelor's Degree
□ Master's/Doctorate Degree
□ Not Applicable

2.   What is/was your father/father figure highest level of education?
□ Less than a high school diploma
□ High school diploma
□ High school diploma equivalent (e.g. GED)
□ Some College
□ Associate's Degree
□ Bachelor's Degree
□ Master's/Doctorate Degree
□ Not Applicable

3.   While attending the University, have you received a Pell grant.
□ Yes □ No

4.   How would you describe your hometown? If you have lived in one than one location in your formative years, pick the response that best describes the area you spent the most amount of time.
□ Rural
□ Suburban
□ Urban

APPENDIX E. FOCUS GROUP SESSION MATERIALS

Imagine you are in work group, and you are working with a guy from another school. This guy is rich. How would you describe the picture of him in your head? What are the characteristics you would attribute to this person?

- What would he look like (facial hair, hairstyle, body type, etc.)?
- How would he dress (type and brand of clothing)?
- How would he act (mannerisms, tone of voice, word choice)?
- What kinds of things would he do when he's not in school?
- Would he work?
- Where would he go to school?
- Where would he have grown up?

Imagine you are in work group, and you are working with a guy from another school. This guy is poor. How would you describe the picture of him in your head? What are the characteristics you would attribute to this person?

- What would he look like (facial hair, hairstyle, body type, etc.)?
- How would he dress (type and brand of clothing)?
- How would he act (mannerisms, tone of voice, word choice)?
- What kinds of things would he do when he's not in school?
- Would he work?
- Where would he go to school?
- Where would he have grown up?

Thank you for sharing your opinions with the group. These next questions give you an opportunity to rate your level of agreement with each characteristic the group came up with tonight. If you disagree, please a give a brief explanation.

<u>Rich Guy</u>

Hair Style: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Body Type: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Facial Hair: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Rich Guy
Clothes: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

School: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Hometown: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

<u>Rich Guy</u>
Mannerisms: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Tone of voice: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Word Choice: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

<u>Rich Guy</u>
Introduction: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Extracurricular Activities: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Body Position: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Thank you for rating the rich guy characteristics. Please do the same with the poor guy characteristics. Again, if you disagree, please a give a brief explanation.

<u>Poor Guy</u>

Hair Style: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Body Type: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Facial Hair: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

<u>Poor Guy</u>
Clothes: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

School: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Hometown: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

<u>Poor Guy</u>
Mannerisms: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Tone of voice: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Word Choice: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

<u>Poor Guy</u>
Introduction: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Extracurricular Activities: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

Body Position: _____

○	○	○	○	○	○
Strongly disagreed	Disagree	Somewhat disagreed	Somewhat agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

APPENDIX F. ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER 3

Table F1 Proportion Differences of Pre-screening Characteristics Between Full Sample and Focus Group, and Gender Differences within the Focus Group Sample

Characteristics	Full Sample[a]	Focus Group Sample[b,c]	Significant Difference	Focus Group Sample[b,c]		Significant Difference
				Men	Women	
Gender				.471[c]	.529[c]	
Men	.302	.471[c]	*			
Women	.698	.529[c]	*			
Mom's education is bachelor's or higher	.623	.656		.688	.625	
Dad's education is bachelor's or higher	.551	.516		.733	.312	**
Pell Grant (yes)	.180	.156		.125	.188	
Urbanicity:						
Rural	.288	.219		.188	.250	
Suburban	.561	.656		.625	.688	
Urban	.151	.125		.188	.063	

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
[a] Full Sample N = 139.

[b] Focus Group Sample N = 32 for just survey respondents that also participated in the focus groups. Two focus group participants' pre-screening survey data could not be matched to focus group data. They identified as women.

[c] Focus Group Sample from Focus Group Participation N = 34 (16 men and 18 women).

Table F2 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Full Sample (N = 139)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	5.314	.912	2	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.230	1.315	1	7
I am sympathetic.	5.518	1.276	1	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.489	1.106	1	7
I am understanding.	5.662	1.039	1	7
I am compassionate.	5.583	1.160	1	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.388	1.487	1	7
I am warm.	5.194	1.301	2	7
I am tender.	4.647	1.508	1	7
I love children.	5.338	1.640	1	7
I am gentle.	5.094	1.245	1	7
Masculine Scale[b]	4.602	.692	2.6	6.7
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.640	1.083	2	7
I am independent.	5.662	1.129	2	7
I am assertive.	4.460	1.292	1	7
I have a strong personality.	5.259	1.253	2	7
I am forceful.	2.741	1.206	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.381	1.181	2	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.755	1.301	1	7
I am dominant.	3.892	1.300	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.194	1.141	2	7
I am aggressive.[b]	2.934	1.254	1	7
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.	5.532	1.014	2	7
I am moody.	3.281	1.240	1	6
I am reliable.	6.167	.956	3	7
I am jealous.	3.460	1.395	1	7
I am truthful.	5.835	1.047	2	7
I am secretive.	3.669	1.529	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.338	1.126	2	7
I am conceited.	2.727	1.334	1	7
I am tactful.	5.237	.967	2	7
I am conventional.	4.275	1.328	1	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 136 for this scale/item

Table F3 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Women from the Full Sample (N = 97)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	5.514	.773	3.3	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.423	1.223	2	7
I am sympathetic.	5.784	1.063	2	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.639	.915	3	7
I am understanding.	5.794	.816	4	7
I am compassionate.	5.814	.982	3	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.536	1.347	1	7
I am warm.	5.412	1.134	3	7
I am tender.	4.948	1.365	2	7
I love children.	5.577	1.664	1	7
I am gentle.	5.216	1.235	1	7
Masculine Scale[b]	4.591	.656	2.6	6.3
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.784	.938	2	7
I am independent.	5.660	1.145	2	7
I am assertive.	4.505	1.234	1	7
I have a strong personality.	5.227	1.246	2	7
I am forceful.	2.701	1.156	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.381	1.168	2	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.649	1.208	1	7
I am dominant.	3.876	1.235	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.175	1.041	2	7
I am aggressive.[b]	2.801	1.212	1	6
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.[c]	5.611	.982	2	7
I am moody.	3.392	1.229	1	6
I am reliable.[d]	6.198	.991	3	7
I am jealous.	3.474	1.385	1	6
I am truthful.	5.876	1.043	2	7
I am secretive.	3.526	1.466	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.278	1.161	2	7
I am conceited.	2.557	1.266	1	6
I am tactful.	5.299	.915	2	7
I am conventional.[d]	4.281	1.311	2	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 94 for this scale/item

[c] N = 95 for this item

[d] N = 96 for this item

Table F4 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Men from the Full Sample (N = 42)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	4.852	1.043	2	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	4.786	1.423	1	7
I am sympathetic.	4.905	1.511	1	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.142	1.407	1	7
I am understanding.	5.357	1.394	1	7
I am compassionate.	5.048	1.361	1	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.048	1.738	1	7
I am warm.	4.690	1.522	2	7
I am tender.	3.952	1.607	1	7
I love children.	4.786	1.457	2	7
I am gentle.	4.809	1.234	2	7
Masculine Scale	4.626	.775	3	6.7
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.309	1.316	2	7
I am independent.	5.667	1.141	3	7
I am assertive.	4.357	1.428	2	7
I have a strong personality.	5.333	1.282	2	7
I am forceful.	2.833	1.324	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.381	1.229	3	7
I am willing to take risks.	5.000	1.482	2	7
I am dominant.	3.929	1.455	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.238	1.358	2	7
I am aggressive.[b]	3.214	1.317	1	7
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.	5.357	1.078	3	7
I am moody.	3.024	1.239	1	6
I am reliable.	6.095	.878	4	7
I am jealous.	3.429	1.434	1	7
I am truthful.	5.738	1.061	3	7
I am secretive.	4.000	1.638	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.476	1.042	2	7
I am conceited.	3.119	1.418	1	7
I am tactful.	5.095	1.078	2	7
I am conventional.	4.262	1.380	1	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

Table F5 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Non-Focus Group Sample (N = 107)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	5.330	.940	2	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.215	1.346	1	7
I am sympathetic.	5.514	1.299	1	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.467	1.135	1	7
I am understanding.	5.607	1.044	2	7
I am compassionate.	5.570	1.183	1	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.439	1.461	1	7
I am warm.	5.271	1.225	2	7
I am tender.	4.748	1.461	1	7
I love children.	3.364	1.721	1	7
I am gentle.	5.103	1.157	2	7
Masculine Scale[b]	4.579	.639	2.6	6.3
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.673	1.053	2	7
I am independent.	5.673	1.080	3	7
I am assertive.	4.439	1.215	1	7
I have a strong personality.	5.168	1.240	2	7
I am forceful.	2.701	1.167	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.299	1.167	2	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.729	1.225	2	7
I am dominant.	3.916	1.275	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.206	1.035	2	7
I am aggressive.[b]	2.895	1.232	1	7
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.[b]	5.505	1.011	2	7
I am moody.	3.355	1.283	1	6
I am reliable.[c]	6.179	.954	3	7
I am jealous.	3.449	1.340	1	6
I am truthful.	5.822	.979	2	7
I am secretive.	3.636	1.538	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.280	1.172	2	7
I am conceited.	2.654	1.311	1	7
I am tactful.	5.243	.930	2	7
I am conventional.[c]	4.217	1.287	1	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 105 for this scale/item

[c] N = 106 for this item

Table F6 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Women from the Non-Focus Group Sample (N = 81)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	5.511	.782	3.3	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.407	1.243	2	7
I am sympathetic.	5.765	1.076	2	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.642	.913	3	7
I am understanding.	5.802	.797	4	7
I am compassionate.	5.815	.976	3	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.605	1.221	2	7
I am warm.	5.444	1.095	3	7
I am tender.	4.951	1.368	2	7
I love children.	5.06	1.747	1	7
I am gentle.	5.173	1.488	2	7
Masculine Scale[b]	4.595	.639	2.6	6.3
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.840	.843	4	7
I am independent.	5.654	1.097	3	7
I am assertive.	4.519	1.246	1	7
I have a strong personality.	5.185	1.246	2	7
I am forceful.	2.642	1.176	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.358	1.514	2	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.728	1.162	2	7
I am dominant.	3.914	1.227	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.148	1.014	2	7
I am aggressive.[b]	2.835	1.224	1	6
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.[b]	5.582	.956	2	7
I am moody.	3.407	1.253	1	6
I am reliable.[c]	6.163	1.012	3	7
I am jealous.	3.494	1.380	1	6
I am truthful.	5.802	1.042	2	7
I am secretive.	3.593	1.515	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.296	1.188	2	7
I am conceited.	2.568	1.224	1	6
I am tactful.	5.296	.872	3	7
I am conventional.[c]	4.213	1.270	2	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 79 for this scale/item

[c] N = 80 for this item

Table F7 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Men from the Non-Focus Group Sample (N = 26)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	4.765	1.160	2	6.4
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	4.615	1.499	1	7
I am sympathetic.	4.731	1.614	1	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	4.923	1.547	1	7
I am understanding.	5.000	1.442	1	7
I am compassionate.	4.808	1.443	1	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	4.923	1.978	1	7
I am warm.	4.731	1.458	2	7
I am tender.	4.115	1.583	1	7
I love children.	4.923	1.547	2	7
I am gentle.	4.885	1.177	2	7
Masculine Scale	4.531	.650	3.3	6.1
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.154	1.434	2	7
I am independent.	5.731	1.041	3	7
I am assertive.	4.192	1.096	2	6
I have a strong personality.	5.115	1.243	2	7
I am forceful.	2.885	1.143	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.115	1.211	3	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.731	1.430	2	7
I am dominant.	3.923	1.440	2	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.385	1.098	3	7
I am aggressive.	3.077	1.262	2	7
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.	5.269	1.151	3	7
I am moody.	3.192	1.386	1	6
I am reliable.	6.231	.765	5	7
I am jealous.	3.308	1.463	1	6
I am truthful.	5.885	.766	4	7
I am secretive.	3.769	1.632	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.231	1.142	2	7
I am conceited.	2.923	1.547	1	7
I am tactful.	5.077	1.093	2	7
I am conventional.	4.231	1.366	1	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

Table F8 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Focus Group Sample (N = 32)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	5.262	.825	3.8	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.281	1.224	3	7
I am sympathetic.	5.531	1.218	3	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.562	1.014	3	7
I am understanding.	5.844	1.019	4	7
I am compassionate.	5.625	1.100	3	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.219	1.581	1	7
I am warm.	4.938	1.523	2	7
I am tender.	4.313	1.635	1	7
I love children.	5.250	1.391	2	7
I am gentle.	5.063	1.522	1	7
Masculine Scale[b]	4.681	.856	3	6.7
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.531	1.191	2	7
I am independent.	5.625	1.338	2	7
I am assertive.	4.531	1.545	2	7
I have a strong personality.	5.563	1.268	3	7
I am forceful.	2.875	1.338	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.656	1.208	4	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.844	1.547	1	7
I am dominant.	3.813	1.401	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.156	1.462	2	7
I am aggressive.[b]	3.065	1.340	1	7
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.	5.625	1.040	4	7
I am moody.	3.031	1.062	1	5
I am reliable.	6.125	.976	4	7
I am jealous.	3.500	1.414	1	7
I am truthful.	5.875	1.264	3	7
I am secretive.	3.781	1.518	1	7
I am adaptable.	5.531	.950	3	7
I am conceited.	2.969	1.402	1	6
I am tactful.	5.219	1.099	2	7
I am conventional.	4.469	1.459	1	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 31 for this scale/item

Table F9 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Women from the Focus Group Sample (N = 16)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	5.531	.746	4.2	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.500	1.155	4	7
I am sympathetic.	5.875	1.025	4	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.625	.957	4	7
I am understanding.	5.750	.931	4	7
I am compassionate.	5.813	1.047	4	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.188	1.870	1	7
I am warm.	5.250	1.342	3	7
I am tender.	4.938	1.389	2	7
I love children.	5.938	1.124	4	7
I am gentle.	5.438	1.632	1	7
Masculine Scale[b]	4.573	.763	3.3	5.8
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.500	1.317	2	7
I am independent.	5.688	1.401	2	7
I am assertive.	4.438	1.209	2	6
I have a strong personality.	5.438	1.263	3	7
I am forceful.	3.000	1.033	1	5
I have leadership abilities.	5.500	1.265	4	7
I am willing to take risks.	4.250	1.360	1	7
I am dominant.	3.688	1.302	2	6
I am willing to take a stand.	5.313	1.195	3	7
I am aggressive.[b]	2.667	1.175	1	5
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.	5.750	1.125	4	7
I am moody.	3.313	1.138	1	5
I am reliable.	6.375	.885	4	7
I am jealous.	3.375	1.455	1	6
I am truthful.	6.250	1.000	4	7
I am secretive.	3.188	1.167	1	5
I am adaptable.	5.188	1.047	3	7
I am conceited.	2.500	1.506	1	6
I am tactful.	5.313	1.138	2	7
I am conventional.	4.625	1.500	2	6

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 15 for this scale/item

Table F10 Descriptive Statistics of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Men from the Non-Focus Group Sample (N = 16)

BSRI[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Feminine Scale	4.994	.835	3.8	7
Feminine Items:				
I am affectionate.	5.063	1.289	3	7
I am sympathetic.	5.188	1.328	3	7
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.500	1.095	3	7
I am understanding.	5.938	1.124	4	7
I am compassionate.	5.438	1.153	3	7
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.250	1.291	3	7
I am warm.	4.625	1.668	2	7
I am tender.	3.688	1.662	1	7
I love children.	4.563	1.315	2	7
I am gentle.	4.688	1.352	3	7
Masculine Scale	4.782	.947	3	6.7
Masculine Items:				
I defend my own beliefs.	5.563	1.094	3	7
I am independent.	5.563	1.315	3	7
I am assertive.	4.625	1.857	2	7
I have a strong personality.	5.688	1.302	3	7
I am forceful.	2.750	1.612	1	6
I have leadership abilities.	5.813	1.167	4	7
I am willing to take risks.	5.438	1.504	2	7
I am dominant.	3.938	1.526	1	7
I am willing to take a stand.	5.000	1.713	2	7
I am aggressive.	3.438	1.413	1	6
Filler Items:				
I am conscientious.	5.500	.966	4	7
I am moody.	2.750	.931	1	4
I am reliable.	5.875	1.025	4	7
I am jealous.	3.625	1.408	2	7
I am truthful.	5.500	1.414	3	7
I am secretive.	4.375	1.628	2	7
I am adaptable.	5.875	.719	5	7
I am conceited.	3.438	1.153	1	5
I am tactful.	5.125	1.088	3	7
I am conventional.	4.313	1.448	1	7

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

Table F11 T-tests of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Gender Differences of Full Sample

BSRI[a]	Men (N = 42)	Women (N = 97)	Significant Difference
Feminine Scale	4.852	5.514	***
Feminine Items:			
I am affectionate.	4.786	5.423	**
I am sympathetic.	4.905	5.784	**
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.143	5.639	*
I am understanding.	5.357	5.794	*
I am compassionate.	5.048	5.814	***
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.048	5.536	
I am warm.	4.690	5.412	**
I am tender.	3.952	4.948	***
I love children.	4.786	5.577	**
I am gentle.	4.810	5.216	*
Masculine Scale	4.626	4.59[b]	
Masculine Items:			
I defend my own beliefs.	5.310	5.784	*
I am independent.	5.667	5.660	
I am assertive.	4.357	4.505	
I have a strong personality.	5.333	5.227	
I am forceful.	2.833	2.701	
I have leadership abilities.	5.381	5.381	
I am willing to take risks.	5.000	4.649	
I am dominant.	3.929	3.876	
I am willing to take a stand.	5.238	5.175	
I am aggressive.	3.214	2.809[b]	*
Filler Items:			
I am conscientious.	5.357	5.61[c]	
I am moody.	3.024	3.392	
I am reliable.	6.095	6.198	
I am jealous.	3.429	3.474	
I am truthful.	5.738	5.876	
I am secretive.	4.000	3.526	
I am adaptable.	5.476	5.278	
I am conceited.	3.119	2.557	*
I am tactful.	5.095	5.299	
I am conventional.	4.262	4.281	

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 94 for these items

[c] N = 95 for this item

Table F12 T-tests of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Gender Differences of Focus Group Sample

BSRI[a]	Men (N = 16)	Women (N = 16)	Significant Difference
Feminine Scale	4.994	5.531	
Feminine Items:			
I am affectionate.	5.063	5.500	
I am sympathetic.	5.188	5.875	
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	5.500	5.625	
I am understanding.	5.938	5.750	
I am compassionate.	5.438	5.813	
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	5.250	5.188	
I am warm.	4.625	5.250	
I am tender.	3.688	4.938	*
I love children.	4.563	5.938	**
I am gentle.	4.688	5.438	
Masculine Scale	4.781	4.573[b]	
Masculine Items:			
I defend my own beliefs.	5.563	5.500	
I am independent.	5.563	5.688	
I am assertive.	4.625	4.438	
I have a strong personality.	5.688	5.438	
I am forceful.	2.750	3.000	
I have leadership abilities.	5.813	5.000	
I am willing to take risks.	5.438	4.250	*
I am dominant.	3.938	3.688	
I am willing to take a stand.	5.000	5.313	
I am aggressive.	3.438	2.667[b]	
Filler Items:			
I am conscientious.	5.500	5.750	
I am moody.	2.750	3.313	
I am reliable.	5.875	6.375	
I am jealous.	3.625	3.375	
I am truthful.	5.500	6.250	*
I am secretive.	4.375	3.188	*
I am adaptable.	5.875	5.188	*
I am conceited.	3.438	2.500	*
I am tactful.	5.125	5.313	
I am conventional.	4.313	4.625	

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 15 for these items

Table F13 T-tests of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) Gender Differences of Non-Focus Group Sample

BSRI[a]	Men (N = 26)	Women (N = 81)	Significant Difference
Feminine Scale	4.765	5.511	**
Feminine Items:			
I am affectionate.	4.615	5.407	**
I am sympathetic.	4.731	5.765	**
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	4.923	5.642	*
I am understanding.	5.000	5.802	**
I am compassionate.	4.808	5.815	**
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	4.923	5.605	
I am warm.	4.731	5.444	*
I am tender.	4.115	4.951	*
I love children.	4.923	5.506	
I am gentle.	4.885	5.173	
Masculine Scale	4.531	4.595[b]	
Masculine Items:			
I defend my own beliefs.	5.154	5.840	*
I am independent.	5.731	5.654	
I am assertive.	4.192	4.519	
I have a strong personality.	5.115	5.185	
I am forceful.	2.885	2.642	
I have leadership abilities.	5.115	5.358	
I am willing to take risks.	4.731	4.728	
I am dominant.	3.923	3.914	
I am willing to take a stand.	5.385	5.148	
I am aggressive.	3.077	2.835[b]	
Filler Items:			
I am conscientious.	5.269	5.582[b]	
I am moody.	3.192	3.407	
I am reliable.	6.231	6.163[c]	
I am jealous.	3.308	3.494	
I am truthful.	5.885	5.802	
I am secretive.	3.769	3.593	
I am adaptable.	5.231	5.296	
I am conceited.	2.923	2.568	
I am tactful.	5.077	5.296	
I am conventional.	4.231	4.213[c]	

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

[b] N = 79 for these items

[c] N = 80 for these items

Table F14 T-tests of Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) of the Non-Focus Group Sample Men Compared to Focus Group Men

BSRI[a]	Non-Focus Group Men (N = 26)	Focus Group Men (N = 16)	Significant Difference
Feminine Scale	4.765	4.994	
Feminine Items:			
I am affectionate.	4.615	5.063	
I am sympathetic.	4.731	5.188	
I am sensitive to the needs of others.	4.923	5.500	
I am understanding.	5.000	5.938	*
I am compassionate.	4.808	5.438	
I am eager to soothe hurt feelings.	4.923	5.250	
I am warm.	4.731	4.625	
I am tender.	4.115	3.688	
I love children.	4.923	4.563	
I am gentle.	4.885	4.688	
Masculine Scale	4.531	4.781	
Masculine Items:			
I defend my own beliefs.	5.154	5.563	
I am independent.	5.731	5.563	
I am assertive.	4.192	4.625	
I have a strong personality.	5.115	5.688	
I am forceful.	2.885	2.705	
I have leadership abilities.	5.115	5.813	
I am willing to take risks.	4.731	5.438	
I am dominant.	3.923	3.938	
I am willing to take a stand.	5.385	5.000	
I am aggressive.	3.077	3.438	
Filler Items:			
I am conscientious.	5.269	5.500	
I am moody.	3.192	2.750	
I am reliable.	6.231	5.875	
I am jealous.	3.308	3.625	
I am truthful.	5.885	5.500	
I am secretive.	3.769	4.375	
I am adaptable.	5.231	5.875	*
I am conceited.	2.923	3.438	
I am tactful.	5.077	5.125	
I am conventional.	4.231	4.313	

Notes: *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

[a] The response categories are: never or almost never true (coded as 1), usually not true (coded as 2), sometimes but infrequently true (coded as 3), occasionally true (coded as 4), often true (coded as 5), usually true (coded as 6), and always or almost always true (coded as 7).

Table F15 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Full Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.468	1.403	-2.32	4	132
Guy – power	1.441	.988	-1.44	4	132
Guy – activity	1.372	1.169	-2.4	4	125
Man – evaluation	1.230	1.417	-4	4	126
Man – power	1.758	.971	-1.28	4	131
Man – activity	.198	1.301	-3.04	2.96	124
Rich – evaluation	-.141	1.326	-4	4	128
Rich – power	2.079	1.149	-2.4	4	138
Rich – activity	.207	1.533	-3.52	3.52	126
Poor – evaluation	.169	1.509	-3.76	3.36	120
Poor – power	-1.708	1.150	-4	1.36	135
Poor – activity	-.721	1.244	-3.52	3.12	122
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.282	1.437	-4	4	125
Rich Guy – power	1.907	1.065	-2.48	4	138
Rich Guy – activity	.913	1.403	-2.72	4	130
Rich Man – evaluation	-.131	1.505	-3.2	3.44	126
Rich Man – power	2.189	1.214	-3.36	4	134
Rich Man – activity	.149	1.410	-3.52	3.68	124
Poor Guy – evaluation	.526	1.364	3.12	3.52	116
Poor Guy – power	-1.505	1.129	-4	4	131
Poor Guy – activity	-.475	1.230	-4	2.16	132
Poor Man – evaluation	.831	1.339	-4	3.52	118
Poor Man – power	-1.418	1.190	-3.92	4	126
Poor Man – activity	-.964	1.171	-4	3.52	127

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F16 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Women from the Full Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.522	2.358	-2.32	4	94
Guy – power	1.515	.988	-1.44	4	93
Guy – activity	1.437	1.183	-1.68	4	87
Man – evaluation	1.413	1.393	-2.24	4	89
Man – power	1.780	1.002	-1.28	3.92	93
Man – activity	.111	1.330	-3.04	2.96	86
Rich – evaluation	-.164	1.356	-4	4	91
Rich – power	2.176	1.035	-2.24	4	97
Rich – activity	.316	1.574	-3.04	3.52	87
Poor – evaluation	.294	1.432	-3.76	3.36	81
Poor – power	-1.714	1.111	-4	1.36	94
Poor – activity	-.691	1.263	-3.52	2.72	83
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.305	1.370	-3.36	4	86
Rich Guy – power	1.953	1.014	-2.48	4	97
Rich Guy – activity	.983	1.449	-2.56	4	91
Rich Man – evaluation	-.275	1.458	-3.04	3.44	88
Rich Man – power	2.288	1.210	-3.36	4	95
Rich Man – activity	.097	1.446	-3.52	3.68	87
Poor Guy – evaluation	.555	1.355	-3.12	3.52	78
Poor Guy – power	-1.492	1.161	-4	4	91
Poor Guy – activity	-.470	1.259	-3.52	2.16	92
Poor Man – evaluation	.976	1.280	-1.92	3.52	79
Poor Man – power	-1.512	1.191	-3.92	4	86
Poor Man – activity	-1.031	1.244	-4	3.52	88

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F17 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Men from the Full Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.335	1.52	-1.6	3.6	38
Guy – power	1.266	.981	-.8	4	39
Guy – activity	1.221	1.139	-2.4	3.76	38
Man – evaluation	.789	1.395	-4	3.28	37
Man – power	1.657	.896	0	4	38
Man – activity	.392	1.228	-2.8	2.48	38
Rich – evaluation	-.086	1.265	-2.4	2.4	37
Rich – power	1.850	1.369	-2.4	4	41
Rich – activity	-.037	1.427	-3.52	2.72	39
Poor – evaluation	-.090	1.648	-3.68	3.2	39
Poor – power	-1.697	1.248	-4	1.28	41
Poor – activity	-.784	1.218	-3.2	3.12	39
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.230	1.592	-4	3.2	39
Rich Guy – power	1.799	1.182	-1.44	4	41
Rich Guy – activity	.749	1.294	-2.72	4	39
Rich Man – evaluation	.202	1.579	-3.2	3.2	38
Rich Man – power	1.947	1.203	-.8	4	39
Rich Man – activity	.270	1.334	-2.64	3.2	37
Poor Guy – evaluation	.465	1.399	-2.08	3.2	38
Poor Guy – power	-1.536	1.065	-4	0	40
Poor Guy – activity	-.486	1.174	-4	1.92	40
Poor Man – evaluation	.537	1.423	-4	3.2	39
Poor Man – power	-1.216	1.177	-3.6	2.08	40
Poor Man – activity	-.814	.984	-3.12	1.6	39

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F18 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Focus Group Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.573	1.343	-1.6	3.6	30
Guy – power	1.419	1.012	-1.44	3.2	31
Guy – activity	1.476	1.037	-1.36	3.2	29
Man – evaluation	1.173	1.019	-.08	4	30
Man – power	1.608	.851	-.08	3.6	31
Man – activity	.328	1.288	-2.8	2.48	30
Rich – evaluation	-.441	1.179	-2.4	2	31
Rich – power	1.820	1.267	-2.4	4	32
Rich – activity	-.011	1.529	-2.96	2.24	29
Poor – evaluation	.323	1.542	-3.68	3.2	29
Poor – power	-1.433	1.304	-4	1.36	32
Poor – activity	-.739	1.300	-3.2	1.44	30
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.426	1.530	-4	4	31
Rich Guy – power	1.773	1.087	0	4	32
Rich Guy – activity	1.117	1.326	-1.44	4	31
Rich Man – evaluation	-.224	1.570	-3.2	3.2	30
Rich Man – power	1.680	1.548	-3.36	3.6	31
Rich Man – activity	.195	1.165	-1.6	2.8	30
Poor Guy – evaluation	.673	1.462	-3.12	3.52	29
Poor Guy – power	-1.497	1.042	-4	0	31
Poor Guy – activity	-.55	1.324	-4	2.08	32
Poor Man – evaluation	.92	1.446	-4	3.28	28
Poor Man – power	-1.234	1.076	-3.6	.8	31
Poor Man – activity	-.795	1.112	-3.04	1.06	30

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F19 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Women from the Focus Group Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.707	.918	0	3.36	15
Guy – power	1.381	1.023	-1.44	2.48	15
Guy – activity	1.465	1.162	-1.36	2.8	13
Man – evaluation	1.325	.979	-.08	4	16
Man – power	1.61	.705	-.08	2.64	16
Man – activity	.181	1.117	-1.12	2.4	15
Rich – evaluation	-.435	1.128	-2.4	1.68	16
Rich – power	1.865	.619	1.2	3.04	16
Rich – activity	-.046	1.700	-2.96	2.16	14
Poor – evaluation	.480	1.143	-1.28	2.8	13
Poor – power	-1.050	1.009	-2.64	1.36	16
Poor – activity	-.507	1.319	-2.32	1.44	15
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.315	1.409	-1.92	4	16
Rich Guy – power	1.550	.708	.24	3.36	16
Rich Guy – activity	1.205	1.427	-1.44	4	15
Rich Man – evaluation	-.485	1.310	-2.88	1.84	16
Rich Man – power	1.535	1.650	-3.36	3.52	16
Rich Man – activity	.229	1.107	-1.2	2.32	15
Poor Guy – evaluation	.560	1.578	-3.12	3.52	14
Poor Guy – power	-1.259	.775	-3.12	0	15
Poor Guy – activity	-.255	1.039	1.76	2.08	16
Poor Man – evaluation	1.154	1.038	-.72	3.28	14
Poor Man – power	-1.275	1.253	-3.6	.8	15
Poor Man – activity	-.697	1.183	-2.96	1.68	16

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F20 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Men from the Focus Group Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.440	1.690	-1.6	3.6	15
Guy – power	1.455	1.034	0	3.2	16
Guy – activity	1.485	.963	0	3.2	16
Man – evaluation	1.000	1.072	0	3.28	14
Man – power	1.605	1.010	0	3.6	15
Man – activity	.475	1.464	-2.8	2.48	15
Rich – evaluation	-.448	1.272	-2.4	2	15
Rich – power	1.775	1.712	-2.4	4	16
Rich – activity	.021	1.444	-2.4	2.24	15
Poor – evaluation	.195	1.831	-3.68	3.2	16
Poor – power	-1.815	1.478	-4	1.28	16
Poor – activity	-.971	1.283	-3.2	.88	15
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.544	1.691	-4	3.2	15
Rich Guy – power	1.995	1.355	0	4	16
Rich Guy – activity	1.035	1.266	-1.2	4	16
Rich Man – evaluation	.074	1.827	-3.2	3.2	14
Rich Man – power	1.835	1.472	-.8	3.6	15
Rich Man – activity	.160	1.258	-1.6	2.8	15
Poor Guy – evaluation	.779	1.391	-1.2	3.2	15
Poor Guy – power	-1.72	1.225	-4	0	16
Poor Guy – activity	-.845	1.535	-4	1.92	16
Poor Man – evaluation	.686	1.774	-4	3.2	14
Poor Man – power	-1.275	1.253	-3.6	.8	15
Poor Man – activity	-.697	1.183	-2.96	1.6	14

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F21 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Non-Focus Group Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.437	1.426	-2.32	4	102
Guy – power	1.448	.986	-.8	4	101
Guy – activity	1.340	1.210	-2.4	4	96
Man – evaluation	1.248	1.524	-4	4	96
Man – power	1.805	1.005	-1.28	4	100
Man – activity	.155	1.309	-3.04	2.96	94
Rich – evaluation	-.045	1.361	-4	4	97
Rich – power	2.157	1.105	-2.24	4	106
Rich – activity	.272	1.536	-3.52	3.52	97
Poor – evaluation	.120	1.504	-3.76	3.36	91
Poor – power	-1.764	1.090	-4	1.28	103
Poor – activity	-.715	1.233	-3.52	3.12	92
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.234	1.410	-3.76	3.28	94
Rich Guy – power	1.948	1.059	-2.48	4	106
Rich Guy – activity	.848	1.427	-2.72	4	99
Rich Man – evaluation	-.103	1.491	-3.04	3.44	96
Rich Man – power	2.342	1.055	-2.32	4	103
Rich Man – activity	.134	1.486	-3.52	3.68	94
Poor Guy – evaluation	.476	1.335	-2.88	3.44	87
Poor Guy – power	-1.508	1.159	-4	4	100
Poor Guy – activity	-.451	1.204	-3.52	2.16	100
Poor Man – evaluation	.804	1.311	-1.92	3.52	90
Poor Man – power	-1.478	1.245	-3.92	4	95
Poor Man – activity	-1.017	1.189	-4	3.52	97

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F22 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Women from the Non-Focus Group Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.487	1.428	-2.32	4	79
Guy – power	1.541	.985	-.64	4	78
Guy – activity	1.432	1.194	-1.68	4	74
Man – evaluation	1.432	1.473	-2.24	4	73
Man – power	1.839	1.053	-1.28	3.92	77
Man – activity	.096	1.376	-3.04	2.96	71
Rich – evaluation	-.106	1.399	-4	4	75
Rich – power	2.237	1.091	-2.24	4	81
Rich – activity	.386	1.557	-3.04	3.52	73
Poor – evaluation	.259	1.485	-3.76	3.36	68
Poor – power	-1.850	1.087	-4	1.04	78
Poor – activity	-.732	1.256	-3.52	2.72	68
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.303	1.371	-3.36	3.28	70
Rich Guy – power	2.033	1.049	-2.48	4	81
Rich Guy – activity	.939	1.458	-2.56	4	76
Rich Man – evaluation	-.229	1.493	-3.04	3.44	72
Rich Man – power	2.441	1.050	-2.32	4	79
Rich Man – activity	.070	1.512	-3.52	3.68	72
Poor Guy – evaluation	.553	1.315	-2.88	3.44	64
Poor Guy – power	1.538	1.221	-4	4	76
Poor Guy – activity	-.516	1.303	-3.52	2.16	76
Poor Man – evaluation	.938	1.330	-1.92	3.52	65
Poor Man – power	-1.064	1.282	-4	3.52	70
Poor Man – activity	1.266	1.437	-1.6	3.44	72

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

Table F23 Descriptive Statistics of Affect Control Theory Ratings for the Men from the Focus Group Sample

EPA Ratings[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
Guy – evaluation	1.266	1.436	-1.6	3.44	23
Guy – power	1.134	.942	-.8	4	23
Guy – activity	1.029	1.238	-2.4	3.76	22
Man – evaluation	.661	1.568	-4	3.04	23
Man – power	1.690	.836	.16	4	23
Man – activity	.337	1.078	-2.24	2.4	23
Rich – evaluation	.16	1.228	-1.76	2.4	22
Rich – power	1.898	1.133	-.8	4	25
Rich – activity	-.073	1.447	-3.52	2.72	24
Poor – evaluation	-.289	1.518	-3.68	2.56	23
Poor – power	-1.619	1.103	-3.28	1.28	25
Poor – activity	-.667	1.188	-2.8	3.12	24
Rich Guy – evaluation	-.033	1.530	-3.76	2.64	24
Rich Guy – power	1.674	1.067	-1.44	4	25
Rich Guy – activity	.550	1.303	-2.72	3.36	23
Rich Man – evaluation	.277	1.452	-2.4	3.2	24
Rich Man – power	2.017	1.029	-.4	4	24
Rich Man – activity	.345	1.407	-2.64	3.2	22
Poor Guy – evaluation	.261	1.397	-2.08	2.88	23
Poor Guy – power	-1.413	.952	-4	0	24
Poor Guy – activity	-.247	.806	-1.52	1.44	24
Poor Man – evaluation	.454	1.217	-1.2	2.8	25
Poor Man – power	-1.181	1.155	-2.88	2.08	25
Poor Man – activity	-.880	.874	-3.12	1.36	25

[a] Items rescaled to a -4 to 4 continuum

APPENDIX G. PATH DIAGRAMS

Figure G1 Path Diagram for Lower Social Class of "O" and "P" is a man

Figure G2 Path Diagram for Higher Social Class of "O" and "P" is a man

Figure G3 Path Diagram for Lower Social Class of "O" and "P" is a woman

Figure G4 Path Diagram for Middle and Controlled Social Class of "O" and "P" is a woman

Figure G5 Path Diagram for Higher Social Class of "O" and "P" is a woman

APPENDIX H. SCREEN SHOTS OF THE CONTRAST SENSITIVITY TASK

Figure H1 Screen Shot of Contrast Sensitivity Slide with Image

Figure H2 Screen Shot of Contrast Sensitivity Slide for Subject's Initial Choice

Figure H3 Screen Shot of Contrast Sensitivity Slide Showing Partner's Initial Choice

Figure H4 Screen Shot of Contrast Sensitivity Slide for Subject's Final Choice

APPENDIX I. EXPERIMENTER SCRIPT[2]

---

(1) Greeting

[At the start time, go to alpha waiting room.]

- Hi, are you here for the experiment Performance in Decision Making?

  - If NO: Sorry to disturb you. I'll notify the proper research assistant you are here.

  - If YES: And your name is?

- Hi_____. My name is _____, and I will be the experimenter assisting you during today's study. Please come into our research center.

[Escort subject down the hall to the appropriate study room.]

---

(2) Greeting Continued...

- You can place your things here [under the desktop, or somewhere out of the way]. You can have seat at the computer.
- I'd like to welcome you to the Center for the Study of Group Processes here at the University of Iowa and thank you for volunteering to help us today.
- We do ask that you turn all electronic devices to a silent for the duration of the experiment.
- At this time, I need to step out of the room and see if your partner is here, I'll be back in a few minutes. Go ahead and make yourself comfortable, but please do not touch the computer or any of the study equipment. I will knock on the door before I enter.

[Leave study room, depending on time, spend as about two minutes getting the "partner" settled. Go to control room and get letter of consent.]

---

[2] These are a replica of the cards used during the sessions.

(3) <u>Introduction</u>

- Thanks for waiting.

- Throughout the study as you've probably already noticed I will be referring to these index cards. This is to make sure that every person participating in the study is given the same set of instructions and nothing important is left out. If you have any questions while I'm giving you these instructions, please don't hesitate to interrupt me.

(4) <u>Introduction Continued...</u>

- I'd like to tell you a little bit about what you will be doing today.

- Today's session will involve one task:

  o You will be working with a partner as a team to check your group level performance on a perceptual task. I will give you more details about the task in a moment.

- As you may have noticed, you are Participant #1 today [point to sign], and your partner will be referred to as Participant #2.

(5) <u>Introduction Continued...</u>

- You may have also noted that a webcam is set up on your computer. You will be asked to introduce yourself to your partner through this webcam. When asked to do so, please look into the camera. The microphone is connected to the camera.

- Please note, your name will not be recorded during this introduction, and your name will NOT be associated with any data. And your introduction over the webcam will be transmitted, but not recorded, and the computer will know you as Session # _____, Participant #1.

- During the study, you will work with your partner to choose correct answers. We ask that you try your best to work together as a team to determine the correct answers.

- Do you have any questions at this point?

(6) <u>Consent</u>

- This is a letter of consent. It briefly outlines what I've just explained to you. It also states that your participation in this study is completely voluntary: at any time, for any reason, if you no longer feel comfortable with what you are doing, please notify me and I'll terminate the session with no penalty to you.

- If there is a particular question that you do not wish to answer for any reason please do not answer it.

- I'll stop now and let you read over the letter. Please read it carefully, and if you wish to continue, I will ask for verbal agreement when I return. I'm going to go administer this same letter to your partner, and will return in a few minutes. [Hand letter to participant.]

[Leave the room. Go to control room about 2 minutes.]

(7) <u>Completing Consent</u>

- Did you have enough time to read the letter of consent?

- I do need verbal confirmation of consent; so, do you consent to participate?

    o If YES: good! I'll give you a copy of the letter when we finish.

    o If NO: Thank you for your time. I'll update the Sona Systems so you receive credit for showing.

(8) <u>Introduce Computer Protocol</u>

- We'll be using the computer to administer the study. The study is done in the Center with Dr. Gordon, one of our research associates. He is seated in the control room, and will be able to communicate with you and your partner through our closed-circuit television system. He will be giving you both instructions, which you will be able to hear and view over the computer.

- When you work on the task all you will use is your mouse – you will click through the task, but only when prompted.

- Okay, I need to step out of the room for a minute and obtain consent from your partner. Also, I need to inform Dr. Gordon that you're about to begin the study. When I come back, we will get started.

    - [Leave the room. Go to control room for the same amount of time spent with subject.]

(9) Computer Protocol Continued...

- Okay, both Dr. Gordon and your partner are ready to get started, so make yourself comfortable because we are about to begin the session.

- Before we have you start your session, we want you to know that there may be periods where the computer network is accessing the closed-circuit TV system and nothing is happening. **Don't be concerned the audio or visual will happen soon.**

(10) Computer Protocol Continued...

- Before I leave, I have two more instructions

  o Dr. Gordon will instruct you to press the alert assistant button to notify me that you are finished with the study.

  o **Also, only use the computer equipment, specifically the mouse, when instructed to do so by Dr. Gordon.**

- When you press the "join session button," it will connect you to Dr. Gordon, but there will be delay as your computer joins the closed-circuit television system. It's about 5 second delay, but it feels longer.

- Okay, just take your time, relax, and join the session by clicking the gray button.

(11) <u>Post Session Interview</u>

[After you are alerted, KNOCK on subject's door and enter the room with Post-Session Interview, DVR, and Debriefing script.]

- All finished? Good! =)

- Well, I have couple of questions I'd like to ask you. There are no right or wrong answers to any of these questions. I do need to audio record your responses for verification purposes. And then I will go through the debriefing.

[Use script on Post-Session interview…]

APPENDIX J. LETTER OF CONSENT

I invite you to participate in a research study. The purpose of the study is to explore how two persons perform teamwork over a computer network.

I am inviting you to participate in this research study because you are an undergraduate at The University of Iowa who expressed an interest in our study through your sign-up for the study on the Department of Sociology Web-based experiment scheduler. Approximately 400 people will take part in this study at the University of Iowa.

If you agree to participate, you will be instructed to work on a team task that will require you to make decisions with your partner. You will be introduced to your partner after you have been instructed how the team task will work. Then, you will work on the team task together with your partner. You will then fill out a questionnaire independent of your partner; the questionnaire will ask you to rate your impressions about the task. I will interview you at the end of the study to ask about your experience in completing the study procedures. The interview will be audio recorded. You must agree to audio recording to participate in this study. The study will take place in this room of the Center for the Study of Group Processes in the Department of Sociology and your involvement will last for 1 hour.

One aspect of this study involves talking over a Web camera, so that your partner can see you through a computer network. These images will not be recorded. Another aspect involves audio recording your reaction to the study. The recording will be made by the research assistant. No one but the research team members will have access to the recordings, which will be deleted from the computer after the entire study is completed. Your name will never be associated with the tape recording; rather, I will assign an experiment number to the recording. I download these recordings as a computer file. Only the researchers on this study will listen to the recordings. Once I have listened to the recordings, I will delete all of these computer files.

You have the right to refuse to answer any questions throughout this study.

I will keep the information you provide confidential, however federal regulatory agencies and the University of Iowa Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research studies) may inspect and copy records pertaining to this research. To help protect your confidentiality, I will collect data from you by computer. A code number is then assigned to the data, and so your name is never associated with your data. There is no way to link your name to the data. Furthermore, the data collected are grouped with other subjects' data, an action that further obscures the source of the data. The post session interview will be audio recorded and only identifiable by the experiment number, after which it will be downloaded onto a computer, listened to by the researchers, and then deleted. Data for the post-session interview are hand-written on a form that is placed in an envelope with only the experiment number identifier. These envelopes are collected daily by the research assistant running the study, and are placed

in a locked cabinet in the principal investigator's office. If I write a report about this study, I will do so in such a way that you cannot be identified.

There are no known risks from being in this study, and you will not benefit personally. However, I hope that others may benefit in the future from what I learn as a result of this study.

You will not have any costs for being in this research study.

As research participant you will compensated either with extra credit for your Sociology course or you will be paid for participating in this research study. You will need to provide your address for a check will be mailed to you. You will receive $15 for participating in the study. If you choose to withdrawal from the study early, you will receive $5 compensation.

If you are electing extra credit as a form of compensation, you will earn 1 research credit. As an alternative to participating in this research, you may earn extra credit by reading about and summarizing someone else's research. Please check your course syllabus for further details on the alternative assignment.

Taking part in this research study is completely voluntary. If you decide not to be in this study, or if you stop participating at any time, you won't be penalized or lose any benefits for which you otherwise qualify.

If you have any questions about the research study itself, please contact: Donna Lancianese, 319-335-2861, (donna-lancianese@uiowa.edu). If you experience a research-related injury, please contact Donna Lancianese, 319-335-2861, (donna-lancianese@uiowa.edu) or the faculty advisor for this project Alison Bianchi, W118 Seashore Hall, alison-bianchi@uiowa.edu. If you have questions about the rights of research subjects, please contact the Human Subjects Office, 105 Hardin Library for the Health Sciences, 600 Newton Rd, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1098, (319) 335-6564, or e-mail irb@uiowa.edu. To offer input about your experiences as a research subject or to speak to someone other than the research staff, call the Human Subjects Office at the number above.

Sincerely,
Donna Lancianese, M.A.
Principal Investigator

APPENDIX K. DR. GORDON'S SCRIPT

<u>Dr. Gordon's Script</u>

<u>For The Basic Contrast Sensitivity Test</u>:

Dr. Gordon: Welcome to the Center for the Study of Group Processes. Thank you for participating in the study today. We think you'll find this to be an interesting as well as a rewarding experience. Please make yourselves comfortable. In today's group there will be two participants. Both of you are students here at The University of Iowa. You will introduce yourselves to each other after I read the instructions for your team task. **[PAUSE]**

I am Dr. Phillip Gordon and I'm speaking to you by closed-circuit television from the control room in the Center. I will be your host for today's study.

I'm going to read the instructions for this study to be certain no details are omitted and that every participant has the same instructions. Please note that you have a personal pager to the left of your computer. When we have completed the closed-circuit television presentation, you will be asked to press the button to alert your research assistant that you have completed this part of the study.

We are members of a research team of social scientists studying differences in a certain kind of skill. The skill that we are studying is generally unlike any of the usual types of skills and aptitudes, such as personality traits or academic tasks. This makes it interesting because it is difficult to predict beforehand how people compare at them. Today we will be studying how people use this skill to solve problems.

Let us begin with detailed instructions about your team task. We are going to ask the two of you to work together to solve a set of problems. The problems are unlike any of the usual sorts of problems in school, such as mathematical problems or artistic projects. The problems you will be working on are from a newly discovered ability called Contrast Sensitivity. Let me explain what that is.

Within the past few years, social scientists have found in their studies that individuals differ in their ability to perceive contrasts between figures or objects. More simply, it has been found that when some individuals are presented with a set of figures or objects they are able to make accurate judgments about contrasts, such as black and white differences, in them. Other people do not seem to have this ability to the same extent. This ability to make accurate judgments about contrasts, social scientists call Contrast Sensitivity. At this time we do not know all the answers as to why some people have this ability more than others. We have found, however, that this ability is not related to a person's mathematical abilities or artistic talent.

Now let me explain how to work on Contrast Sensitivity problems.

Today we are studying how group members use Contrast Sensitivity to solve problems. Therefore, the two of you will be working together as a team on set of Contrast Sensitivity problems. For many types of problems, results have shown that individuals working as teams perform more effectively than do individuals working alone.

The task you will be asked to work on consists of a series of 23 Contrast Sensitivity slides like the one now being presented on the computer monitor.

[DR GORDON: Turn to your laptop and make a motion as if to cue the CST DEMO slide.]

[Computer Protocol Presents DEMO SLIDE #1]

Each slide will contain two patterns, one above the other, as in this sample. One of these two patterns, either the top one or the bottom one, contains more small white rectangles than the other pattern. That is, one of these patterns contains more white area than the other pattern. Your task is to determine, in each case, which of the two patterns, the top one or the bottom one, contains the greater amount of white area.

You may find that some of these slides will seem difficult to judge, as the differences between the patterns are sometimes small. However, there is a right answer to

each and every slide, and we have found that individuals with high Contrast Sensitivity consistently choose more correct answers than those with low Contrast Sensitivity.

We have also found that people with high Contrast Sensitivity may not be completely aware of how it is they choose the correct answer. They seem to be operating on the basis of very slight, almost intuitive cues and feelings. However, be careful. Guesses based on first impressions may often be incorrect.

[Computer Protocol Removes DEMO SLIDE #1]

As I mentioned, we are interested in how individuals and groups use their Contrast Sensitivity to solve problems. Exchanging information with others can often lead to more correct decisions than a single individual could make alone. We have observed that in many situations, such as when a doctor diagnoses an illness, individuals are called upon to make decisions that must be correct. In these situations, where the person is concerned only with the correctness of the decision, that person will often gather all of the advice and information from others that he or she can get.

In this phase we are interested in studying these kinds of situations. Therefore, we are going to allow you to make an initial choice between top and bottom, and to exchange information with each other. Then, after a short period, you will be asked to make a final decision between top and bottom. Since we are only interested in your making the correct final decision, you should not hesitate to change your initial choice to make a correct final decision.

This is how it will work. First, I will present a slide on the screen. After you have studied the slide for 8 seconds, I will ask each of you to make an initial choice as to which pattern contains the greater area of white, top or bottom. That is to say, each of you will first make a preliminary choice between top and bottom. This is for the purpose of letting the other person know what you think is the correct choice. You will indicate this choice by using the mouse to position the cursor over the pattern you think contains a

greater area of white, and clicking the left mouse button. After you make your initial choice, a <u>box</u> around your initial will appear on the screen.

When you make your initial choice, this choice will be communicated to your partner, and you will be able to see your partner's initial choice on your computer monitor. That is, a grey shaded box will appear around your partner's initial choice. However, you will not receive information on the other person's initial choice until after you have made your own initial choice.

[PAUSE]

Now please look at your computer monitors and let's try this out.

[DR GORDON: Turn to your laptop and make a motion as if to cue the CST DEMO slide.]

[Computer Protocol Presents DEMO SLIDE #2]

Person number two, will you select the top pattern by using the mouse to position the cursor over that answer and clicking the left mouse button?

[ALLOW TIME TO MAKE THE SELECTION]

Person number one, you will not see number two's choice until after you have made your own initial choice. Person number two, since you have already made your choice, you will see number one's choice as soon as it is made. So regardless of who makes an initial choice first, you can only find out the other person's choice after you have made your own initial choice.

Person number one, will you select the bottom pattern; that is, use the mouse to click on the bottom pattern.

[ALLOW TIME TO DO SO.]

Now you can see on your computer monitors, number one chose bottom and number two chose top. Do you see that, number one? Number two?

[WAIT WHILE SHE NODS.]

After both of you have made your initial choices and exchanged information, we will give you 8 seconds more before we ask you to make your final decision as to which pattern contains the greater area of white. At the end of that time, we will call for your final decision for the slide. During the actual task, after you make your final decision, the next image slide will appear. You will not see your partner's final decision on any of these slides.

Please note that if you do not make your final decision within a few seconds after we have called for you to do so, the computer will not record your choice for that slide. That means your final decision for that slide will not contribute to the team score. If you answer too late, you will see a message in red telling you that your decision was not recorded. Please be sure to make your final decision promptly after we ask you to.

Just for practice, I now want both of you to make a final decision by clicking on either the top pattern or the bottom pattern.

[ALLOW TIME FOR THEM TO DO SO.]

After both of you have made your final decisions, we will present the next slide. The procedure for all of them will be as we have just demonstrated.

[Computer Protocol Removes DEMO SLIDE #2]

This is important: The only answer that counts on your team's Contrast Sensitivity Score is your final decision. Initial choices are only for the purpose of exchanging opinions on the correct answer before you make your final decision. Try to make as many correct final decisions as you can, and do not worry whether your initial choice and final decisions are the same. Let me caution you, however, to make your initial choice with care, so as to provide your partner with the best information you can.

[PAUSE]

[FOR CONDITIONS 7-10 – BACK GROUND QUIZ BEFORE INTRODUCTION]

Before we begin the team contrast sensitivity task, I would like you to take a short background survey. This information will be shared between you and your partner. On your computer screen, you will see a series of questions, please choose the responses that describe you the best. Then submit your responses to your partner.

[PAUSE]

[FOR CONDITIONS 1-6 –INTRODUCTION ONLY]

Before we begin, I would like you two to introduce yourselves to each other. Let's begin with Participant number two. Participant number two, please look into the Web camera at the top of the computer, so that your partner can see you and hear your answers.

[ALLOW TIME FOR REPLY AFTER EACH QUESTION]

[SHOW OTHER TO PARTICIPANT]

Dr. Gordon: Participant number two, what is your name?

Person #2: *Depends on condition*

Dr. Gordon: What school are you attending?

Person #2: "Um … I'm a student here at Iowa."

Dr. Gordon: What do you like to do in your free time?

Person #2: *Depends on condition*

[SHOW SELF TO PARTICIPANT]

Now, Participant number one. Please look into the Web camera at the top of the computer,   so that your partner can see you and hear your answers.

Dr. Gordon: Participant number 1, what is your name?

Participant: [SUBJECT RESPONSE INTO CAMERA.]

Dr. Gordon: What school are you attending?

Participant: [SUBJECT RESPONSE INTO CAMERA.]

Dr. Gordon: What do you like to do in your free time?

Participant: [SUBJECT RESPONSE INTO CAMERA.]

Thank you.

Now we are ready to begin the team work on Contrast Sensitivity. Let me summarize several important points before we begin:

- You two are about to work on a set of 23 Team Contrast Sensitivity problems.
- Before you make your final decision, you will be able to see your partner's initial choice for that slide. You will not see your partner's final decision. At the end of this phase, we will report your team score to both of you.
- Each time a person makes the correct final decision, the team will receive one point. If an individual makes the incorrect final decision, then that final decision adds nothing to the team score for that trial. This means that both of you will have an equal opportunity to contribute to the team score, and both of you have equal responsibility for that score.

Is everything clear?

[DR GORDON: Turn to your laptop and make a motion as if to cue the first CST TEAM TASK slide.]

[SHOW THE 23 SLIDES]

This completes the series of slides. Now we would like you to fill out a questionnaire. In a minute, questions will appear on the computer monitor regarding your perceptions and experiences about the team Contrast Sensitivity task. When a question appears, read it carefully. There is no time limit for these questions. Please take your time and think about your answers before making your choices.

Your answers are completely confidential – your partner will not see your responses. The only persons who will see your responses are members of the research team, and even they will not know who made these responses, as your name will not be associated with them.

[DR GORDON: Turn to your laptop and make a motion as if to cue the questionnaire.]

[Computer Protocol Presents QUESTIONNAIRE]

Thank you for completing the questionnaire. We would now like to discuss your scores from the Team Contrast Sensitivity task with you, and to talk with each of you individually to get a further elaboration of your feelings and opinions about the study. In a minute your research assistant will come into the room and speak with each of you.

[Pause]

Please press the alert "Research Assistant" button on personal pager located to the left of your computer.

[STOP Computer Protocol]

END [Start Post-Session Questionnaire and Then Debriefing]

APPENDIX L. POST-SESSION SURVEY

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
POST-SESSION SURVEY
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
TEAMWORK IN DYADS
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF GROUP PROCESSES
THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

PART 1. This section of post-session questionnaire will review your personal impressions. Your first impressions are important to us. Please remember that your responses will be STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. Your partner WILL NOT be told your answers. Please answer the questions according to how you feel at the moment.

Please select and circle the most appropriate number on the following rating scales. For example,

How active was my interest during the experiment?

Active   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Inactive

    1 means you think your interest was very active.
    2 means you think your interest was moderately active.
    7 means you think your interest was not active at all.

(1) In reference to feelings about my partner, I feel my partner was:

Pleasant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unpleasant
Dominant	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Submissive
Likable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unlikable
Advantaged	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Disadvantaged
Persuasive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unpersuasive
Vigorous	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Laid-back
Fair	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unfair
Reasonable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unreasonable
Unintelligent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Intelligent
Tried to Please	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Did not try to Please at all
Intimidating	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Fearful
Unconvincing	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Convincing
Warm	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Cold
Weak	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Strong
Active	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Passive

Not Powerful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Powerful
Bold	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Cowardly
Feminine	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Masculine
Combative	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Agreeable
Delicate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Robust
Good	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Bad
Friendly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Reserved

(2) When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:

Assertive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unassertive
Burdened	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Burderened by The Decision at all
Anxious	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Anxious at all
Worried	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Worried at all
Aggressive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unaggressive
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Resentful at all
Sure of self	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unsure of self
Highly Responsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Responsible at all
Concerned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Concerned at all
Confident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unconfident
Angry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Angry at all
Certain of my Response	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Certain at all

(3) When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:

Assertive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unassertive
Burdened	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Burderened by The Decision at all
Anxious	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Anxious at all
Worried	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Worried at all
Aggressive	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unaggressive
Resentful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Resentful at all

Sure of self	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unsure of self
Highly Responsible	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Responsible at all
Concerned	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Concerned at all
Confident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unconfident
Angry	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Angry at all
Certain of my Response	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Certain at all

(4) I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:

Competent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Incompetent
Helpful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Helpful at all
Sure of Self	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unsure of Self
Influential	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Influential at all
Lacking Skill	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Skillful
Unconfident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Confident

(5) I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:

Competent	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Incompetent
Helpful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Helpful at all
Sure of Self	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unsure of Self
Influential	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Influential at all
Lacking Skill	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Skillful
Unconfident	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Confident

(7) Overall, working with my partner made me feel:

Anxious	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Not Anxious at all
Important	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Unimportant
Comfortable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Uncomfortable

 (8) Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?

___ I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity than my partner.

___ I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I.

___ I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity ability.

(9) How satisfied are you with how well you did on the Contrast Sensitivity panels?

- Extremely Satisfied
- Definitely Satisfied
- Somewhat Satisfied
- So-so
- Somewhat Dissatisfied
- Definitely Dissatisfied
- Extremely Dissatisfied

(10) How important to you were the following things in making your final choices on the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test Panels (be as accurate as you can):

Getting the correct answer:

- Extremely Important
- Definitely Important
- Somewhat Important
- Slightly Important
- Not at all Important

Sticking with your own decision when your partner disagreed with you:

- Extremely Important
- Definitely Important
- Somewhat Important
- Slightly Important
- Not at all Important

Changing your decision just to agree with your partner when your initial choices were different:

- Extremely Important
- Definitely Important
- Somewhat Important
- Slightly Important

- Not at all Important

(11) <u>Even when I disagreed with my partner's initial choice, I always took my partner's initial choices into consideration when making my final choice.</u>

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- I'm not sure
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

(12) <u>Even if I had trouble deciphering the right and wrong answer, there was a right answer and a wrong answer for each of the set of patterns we observed.</u>

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- I'm not sure
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

(13) <u>If I had more practice rounds judging sets of patterns, I would have gotten better at deciphering the right and wrong answers for each set of patterns.</u>

- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- I'm not sure
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

PART 1. This section of post-session questionnaire focuses on how you feel about different kinds of people and characteristics.

Each line with circles is like a ruler for measuring how you feel. Mark off how close something is to the description at one end of the ruler or other. If something is not close to either description, put a mark in the middle.

It is very important to put **a mark on every row of circles**.

<div align="center">a guy</div>

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young

<div align="center">rich</div>

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice

poor

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice

a man

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young

rich guy

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young

poor guy

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice

rich man

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Powerful, big
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young

rich man

	infinitely	extremely	quite	slightly	neutral	slightly	quite	extremely	infinitely	
Slow, quiet, old	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young
Bad, awful	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Good, Nice
Powerless, little	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	○	Fast, noisy, young

APPENDIX M. POST-SESSION INTERVIEW

DVR# _____   Room# _____

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

POST-SESSION INTERVIEW

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

PERFORMANCE IN DECISION MAKING

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF GROUP PROCESSES

THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Before we do through the debriefing, I have questions for you. Recall that I will be audio recording our conversation. This is just for accuracy purposes. *[Turn on DVR and press record]*

This is session # _____ on _____ session starting at _____.
                                              date   **session time**

(1) So, what did you think about the study? [if subject is suspicious, they typically mention it here]

(A)   Have you ever done anything like this before?

(B) Have any of your friends participated in these studies?

(1) Did they tell you anything about it?

(2) What did they tell you about it?

(C) Before you came here, did you wonder what the study would be like?

(a) Did you come to any conclusions about the study before you came here?

(b) Did you think it might be like anything you had done before?

(2) Do you have any idea who your partner was today? [is subject suspicious about partner]

(IF YES)

(A) How certain are you that it was someone that you knew?

(B) Why? What made you think that it might be he?

(C) Does he usually do well at tests (in coursework), or not?

(D) Did you think that his ability at other tests might affect how well he would do here?

(E) Did knowing who it was make any difference in how you answered the Contrast Sensitivity panels?

(3) How would you describe your partner? Did he seem likeable?

Next I would like to ask you some questions about the Contrast Sensitivity slides you worked on. These are the two-pattern slides where you exchanged initial choices and then made final decisions.

(4) Can you tell me, in as much detail as you remember, how you arrived at your initial choices to those panels? [If the subject is going through a detailed explanation, that's good; if not, and they say random, that's a problem for task orientation. If they say, "I guessed," then probe, "did you do anything to come up with your guess?"]

(A)   Did you change the method you used during the series of panels?

(B)   Did the panels seem to get easier or harder as you went through the series?

(5) After you made your initial choice, then what did you do? [task orientation; if they give you information for the next set of Qs A-D, you don't need to ask, but they have to address each Q]

        (A)   Did you look at your partner's choice? [collectively oriented groups, take the other's initial choice into consideration]

                (1) How did you make use of this feedback from your partner?

(B)   Did you restudy the slide?

        (C) Did you try to see how he arrived at his answer?

        (D) Did you find that it helped you to see your partner's choice?

(6) Did you do anything else to arrive at your final choice? [If the subjected responded to the initial choice, with random or they guessed, see if they became more tasked oriented. E.g. "Did you so anything different to arrive at your final choice compare to the initial?]

(7) How satisfied were you with your performance on the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test?

(A)   How satisfied were you with your partner's performance on the team test? [if dissatisfied, question on next page]

(B)   Overall, how satisfied were you with your and your partners' performance as a team on the two-patterned test?

Only ask 7C If dissatisfied with partner's performance

(C)   Why were you dissatisfied with your/your partner's/your team's performance? [If a subject is too dissatisfied with their partner, they may no longer be collectively oriented. if non-collective orientation is detected, try to determine consistence/severity.]

(8) Do you think you would have done better at the panels if you had worked at them alone? Why? [task and collective orientation]

(9) Did you develop a pattern or strategy other than carefully examining the slides to make your initial or final choices? [if they say, "I picked top, then bottom, and just went back and forth – not task oriented]

      (A) For what portion of the test did you use this strategy?

            (1) How did this help you make your decision on the slides?

(10) Was there ever a time when you made an initial choice, … and he disagreed with it, … and you thought your partner was probably right, … but you stayed with your initial choice anyways? [if subject is doing this more than 50% of the time, they collective orientation may be an issue]

      (A) About how many times do you think this happened?

      (B) Why do you think this happened?

(11) So, you two seemed to disagree quite a bit on your initial choices… do you have any idea why that happened? [if subject is suspicious of the task, this question probes for this]

(A)   Do you recall about how many times did you disagree on the 23 slides?

(B)   What did you do when you found your partner disagreeing with you so much?

(12) Did you come to think that one or the other of you was more likely to be right? [depending on condition, this is an indication that they bought the manipulation]

(A)   Which one? Why? When did you begin to feel that way?

(B)   Was that something that you thought of while you were actually working on the slides, or something you thought of after you finished?

(C)   Can you remember as precisely as possible just when you thought of this?

(D)   Did you come to any conclusions about it?

(E)   Do you think that affected the way you arrived at your final to the slides? How? Why?

(13) How many correct final decisions would you estimate you made?

    (A) Suppose you had to pick a number, what would it be?

(B) And suppose you had to estimate how many correct final choices the other person made? What would it be?

(C) So you think you probably did a bit (better or worse) than your partner?

[If the subject says "about the same" or "I don't know," follow up with **"If you had to pick one"**]

<u>Any additional probing questions:</u>

APPENDIX N. DEBRIEFING SCRIPT

Once again I'd like to thank you for participating in this study.

So, I've been asking you a lot of questions. Do you have any for me at this point?

[PAUSE. TO GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EXPERIMENT, REPLY THAT YOU THINK IT WILL BE COVERED IN WHAT FOLLOWS, BUT IF IT ISN'T, S/HE SHOULD FELL FREE TO ASK IT AGAIN.]

I'd like to explain our study more fully to you. As I go along, if there's anything that I don't make clear, I want you to interrupt and ask me about it. If you have any questions in the end, I want you to ask them, because I want you to be in full understanding of our study. First, our study is about how people get together to solve disagreements. We're interested in finding out, when people disagree, who's likely to be right, who's likely to be listened to, whether the right person is likely to be listened to, what factors affect that, and how they affect it. We are also interested in how social class and gender inform people's perceptions about others, and how these perceptions affect group interaction.

Second, why is it that we use a laboratory to do this research? The reason we need to study this type of problem in a sociological laboratory is because it is practically impossible to study a single social science problem in a natural setting due to the complexity of human interaction. In a natural setting, it is very difficult to isolate the phenomenon of interest. For example, it would be difficult to study the resolution of disagreements on a street corner. We might have to wait for hours to find two people in disagreement. And, it might be very hard for us to determine exactly how the disagreement was resolved and what factors influenced the way in which the final decision was made. Furthermore, each situation we observed might be completely different.

To solve these problems, we conduct our studies in a laboratory, where every group works under the same set of conditions. We can draw valid conclusions about our studies only if the groups we are studying are comparable. Using the laboratory helps us to make our groups comparable by putting each participant in a similar situation.

Third, since the resolution of disagreements is our primary focus, the measuring of Contrast Sensitivity is not very important to our study. In fact, there's no such thing as Contrast Sensitivity!! The panels of the test are there for a reason -- to provide people something to make judgments and resolve disagreements about. There is no right or wrong answer to any of these panels. All the patterns in every panel you viewed were exactly half white and half black. Since deciding which of the colors was dominant in each slide was impossible, we set up a situation where the outcome of the test was not important, but how you resolved the answers with you partner was. In other words, what we are interested in is solely the resolution of the disagreement, not the answer to the question "is this panel more black or more white?"

We use this test, for two reasons: (a) it's something that you've probably never seen before and (b) we set up a task that has nothing to do with your prior expectations of your ability. If we set up a test with math problems, for example, you would probably judge how you would fare on this test based on your past experiences with mathematics. However, if you have never heard of Contrast Sensitivity, you have never had to assess your ability at such a task, and come at it with fresh expectations.

Finally, your partner in today's study was actually a computer generated person!! In other words, you were making decisions based on the random outputs of a computer program that told you that you were interfacing with a person. It is obvious that if we told you this before the experiment, you would have answered the questions in a different manner -- perhaps like you were playing a video game and not interacting with a person!!

What is important for you to know about these deceptions is that anyone exposed to them would respond the same way -- including me! You are not gullible for thinking a partner existed in the study, for example. This study was designed to manipulate your perceptions in order to study group tasks -- please do not feel badly for participating so effectively as you have!

I think that you can see the reason we wouldn't tell you all of these things before you judged the panels. Obviously, if you had known that there were no correct answers to the panels you may not have paid much attention to these tests or tried to get the right answers. Then the disagreements would not have meant anything to you, and you wouldn't have bothered with resolving them. But as I've said before, that is what the whole study is about -- how people get together and resolve their disagreements based on the information given to them -- so it is important for the study that the people involved will take the task seriously, and really try to resolve the disagreements presented, just as you did today.

You have helped us a great deal in participating with this study, so we wanted to clear up any misconceptions about the study as soon as possible.

Now that you have seen the nature of the study, you can see how really important it is that people coming into the study NOT know anything about it. If the next subject knew about the ambiguity of the Contrast Sensitivity Test, they may not be that interested in trying as much as you did. This is why it is important that you keep the procedures and outcomes as CONFIDENTIAL as we plan to keep your results!! There is no big secret about the study -- as you know, when it is completed we fully reveal what it is that we do -- it's just that if others were told about the study, then our data would be spoiled and so would the other person's experience.
Therefore, we would be very grateful if you did not share the nature and details of this study with others.

Good! Thank you so much for helping us out! I want to once again emphasize the importance of not telling anyone about the experiment -- you never know who may be the next subject, so your confidentiality is very much appreciated.

Now, I'd like to ask you once more if you have any questions about this study?

[ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS HERE.]

I'd also like to offer you this last chance to withdraw your participation in the study if you feel in anyway uncomfortable in how it was conducted. You will receive your extra credit either way.

Thank you for your participation. For your extra credit, we will update Sona Systems that you have participated. Your professor will receive the list at the end of the semester from the Director of the Center for the Studies of Group Processes.

APPENDIX O. EXAMPLE SESSION LOG

Session Log

Experiment Session #:	**101**
Experimenter Name:	**Donna**
Date:	**2/14/2013**
Start Time of Session:	**11:00 am**
Attractiveness of Subject: (scale of 1 – 7)	**4**

Session Overview:

- Subject acted as if

- Everything went well

APPENDIX P. EXAMPLE OF THE SESSIONS LOG BOOK

Condition #	Session #	Date	Experimenter Name	Sona #	Session Time	No Show	PSI Flagged
7	2079						
9	2080						
10	2081						
10	2082						
8	2083						
7	2084						
8	2085						
8	2086						
6	2087						
6	2088						
10	2089						
7	2090						
7	2091						
10	2092						
9	2093						
9	2094						

APPENDIX Q. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF POST-SESSION SURVEY FOR PROBLEMATIC CONDITIONS

Table Q1 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Male Subjects Viewing Video Only (Problematic Condition) Working with "Middle" Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
persuasive—unpersuasive	4.560	1.356	2	7
fair—unfair	3.000	1.581	1	7
reasonable—unreasonable	3.080	1.552	1	7
unintelligent—intelligent	4.360	1.524	1	7
unconvincing—convincing	3.520	1.686	1	6
Question Stem: I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
helpful — not helpful at all	2.920	1.352	1	6
Question Stem: Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?				
contrast sensitivity[b, c]	1.458	.658	1	3

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] This question has three responses: "I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity" (coded as 1); "I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity " (coded as 2); and "I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I" (coded as 3).

[c] N = 24 for this item

Table Q2 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Male Subjects Viewing Both Stimuli with "Controlled" Social Class (N = 14)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
persuasive—unpersuasive	3.786	1.122	2	6
fair—unfair	1.929	1.141	1	4
reasonable—unreasonable	2.286	1.204	1	4
unintelligent—intelligent	5.214	1.212	3	7
unconvincing—convincing	4.357	1.216	2	6
Question Stem: I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
helpful — not helpful at all	3.857	1.610	1	7
Question Stem: Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?				
contrast sensitivity[b]	2.429	.646	1	3

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] This question has three responses: "I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity" (coded as 1); "I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity " (coded as 2); and "I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I" (coded as 3).

Table Q3 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Male Subjects Viewing Video Only Stimuli (Problematic Condition) Working with "Lower" Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	6.000	1.258	3	7
confident — not confident at all	5.400	1.291	3	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	5.960	1.513	3	7
confident — not confident at all	5.520	1.447	3	7
Question Stem: I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
sure of self — unsure of self	3.400	1.000	2	5
Question Stem: Overall, working with my partner made me feel:				
anxious — not anxious at all	5.200	1.780	2	7

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

Table Q4 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey Male Subjects Viewing Video Only Stimuli with "Lower" Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	5.000	1.658	1	7
confident — not confident at all	4.480	1.686	1	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	5.083	1.717	1	7
confident — not confident at all	4.600	1.555	1	7
Question Stem: I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
sure of self — unsure of self	4.080	0.909	2	6
Question Stem: Overall, working with my partner made me feel:				
anxious — not anxious at all	4.400	1.500	2	7

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

Table Q5 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Female Subjects Viewing Both Stimuli (Problematic Condition) with Higher Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
fair—unfair	2.720	1.208	1	4
combative—agreeable	4.680	1.651	2	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	4.600	1.708	1	7
confident — not confident at all	4.208	1.560	2	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
resentful—not resentful	5.080	1.656	2	7
confident — not confident at all	4.375	1.789	1	7
Question Stem: Overall, working with my partner made me feel:				
comfortable—uncomfortable	3.440	1.417	1	6

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

Table Q6 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Female Subjects Viewing Video Only with "Higher" Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
fair—unfair	2.080	1.187	1	5
combative—agreeable	5.440	1.325	2	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
worried — not worried at all	5.520	1.610	1	7
confident — not confident at all	5.200	1.354	3	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
resentful—not resentful	6.240	1.012	4	7
confident — not confident at all				
Question Stem: Overall, working with my partner made me feel:				
comfortable—uncomfortable	2.520	1.229	1	5

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

Table Q7 Means Test of Post-Session Survey for Both Stimuli from "Higher" (Problematic Condition) Compared to "Lower" Conditions (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Higher	Lower	Test Statistic	
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
dominant—submissive	3.120	3.920	-2.655	**
friendly—reserved [b]	2.160	3.042	-2.082	*
unattractive—attractive [b]	5.840	4.667	3.594	***
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
angry — not angry at all [c]	6.625	5.920	1.970	*
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
burdened — not burdened by the decision at all [b]	4.000	5.083	-2.161	*
Question Stem: I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
lacking of skill — skillful [b]	5.200	4.333	2.470	**
unconfident—confident [b]	5.360	4.583	2.409	**

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; ****p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] N = 24 for "Lower" Condition

[c] N = 24 for "Higher" Condition

Table Q8 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for "Higher" Condition with Women Viewing Both Stimuli (Problematic Condition) (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
dominant—submissive	3.120	1.013	1	5
friendly—reserved	2.160	1.313	1	6
unattractive—attractive	5.840	0.987	4	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
angry — not angry at all[b]	6.625	0.824	4	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
burdened — not burdened by the decision at all	4	1.915	1	7
Question Stem: I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
lacking of skill — skillful	5.200	1.323	3	7
unconfident—confident	5.360	1.075	4	7

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] N = 24

Table Q9 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for "Lower" Condition with Women Viewing Both Stimuli (Problematic Condition) (N = 24 per Condition)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
dominant—submissive[b]	3.920	1.115	1	6
friendly—reserved	3.042	1.628	1	6
unattractive—attractive	4.667	1.274	1	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
angry — not angry at all[b]	5.920	1.579	1	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **final** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
burdened — not burdened by the decision at all	5.083	1.587	2	7
Question Stem: I would evaluate my partner's performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
lacking of skill — skillful	4.333	1.129	2	7
unconfident—confident	4.583	1.176	3	7

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] N = 25

Table Q10 Means Test of Post-Session Survey for Both Stimuli from "Higher" (Problematic Condition) Compared to "Controlled" Conditions (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Higher	Controlled	Test Statistic	
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
feminine—masculine	6.480	5.880	2.147	*
unattractive—attractive	5.840	4.720	3.720	***
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
angry — not angry at all[b]	6.625	6.040	1.821	*

Notes: *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001; ****p≤.0001 (one-tailed test, unequal variances assumed)

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] N = 24

Table Q11 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for "Controlled" Condition with Women Viewing Both Stimuli (Problematic Condition) (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
feminine—masculine	6.480	0.918	4	7
unattractive—attractive	5.840	0.987	4	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
angry — not angry at all[b]	6.625	0.825	4	7

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] N = 24

Table Q12 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for "Controlled" Condition with Women Viewing Both Stimuli (Problematic Condition) (N = 25 per Condition)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
feminine—masculine	5.880	1.054	3	7
unattractive—attractive	4.720	1.137	2	7
*Question Stem: When making the decision for the **initial** set of patterns for the Team Contrast Sensitivity Test, I felt:*				
angry — not angry at all	6.040	1.369	3	7

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

Table Q13 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Female Subjects Viewing Video Only Stimuli (Problematic Condition) with "Middle" Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
advantage—disadvantage	3.920	.702	2	6
Question Stem: I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
competent—incompetent	3.480	1.661	1	7
helpful — not helpful at all	3.560	1.446	1	6
influential — not influential at all	3.680	1.215	2	6
Question Stem: Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?				
contrast sensitivity[b]	1.920	.862	1	3

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] This question has three responses: "I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity" (coded as 1); "I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity " (coded as 2); and "I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I" (coded as 3).

Table Q14 Descriptive Statistics of Post-Session Survey for Female Subjects Viewing Both Stimuli with "Controlled" Social Class Partner (N = 25)

Item[a]	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Question Stem: In reference to my partner, I feel my partner was:				
advantage—disadvantage	3.857	0.363	3	4
Question Stem: I would evaluate my performance on the Contrast Sensitivity Task as:				
competent—incompetent	3.286	1.773	1	7
helpful — not helpful at all	3.857	1.610	1	7
influential — not influential at all	3.643	1.216	1	5
Question Stem: Overall, who do you think has the most Contrast Sensitivity?				
contrast sensitivity[b]	2.429	0.646	1	3

[a] Items are a semantic differential (an adjective pair with the anchors as opposites). There are seven points between the adjective pair. The responses are coded from one (e.g. persuasive equals 1) to seven (e.g unpersuasive equals 7) and a 4 is interpreted as neutral (e.g. neither persuasive nor unpersuasive).

[b] This question has three responses: "I think I have more Contrast Sensitivity" (coded as 1); "I think my partner and I have the same Contrast Sensitivity " (coded as 2); and "I think my partner has more Contrast Sensitivity than I" (coded as 3).

REFERENCES

Archer, Patrick and Ryan Orr. 2011. "Class Identification in Review: Past Perspectives and Future Directions." *Sociological Compass* 5:104-115.

Aslaken, Matthew J. 2006. "Middle-Class Music in Suburban Nowhere Land: Emo and the Performance of Masculinity." MA Thesis, Department of Sociology, Bowling Green State University.

Anderson, Elijah. 1999. *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City.* New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Balkwell, James W. 1991a. "Status characteristics and social interaction: Assessment of theoretical variants." Pp. 135-76 in *Advances in Group Processes*, edited by E. J. Lawler, B. Markovsky, C. Ridgeway, and H. A. Walker. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc.

-----. 1991b. "From expectations to behavior: An improved postulate for expectation states theory." *American Sociological Review* 56(3):355-69.

-----. 1995. "Strong Tests of Expectation-States Hypotheses." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 58(1):44-51.

Barrett, Anne E. and Helene Raskin White. 2002. "Trajectories of Gender Role Orientations in Adolescence and Early Adulthood: A Prospective Study of the Mental Health Effects of Masculinity and Femininity." *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 43(4):451-468.

Bem, Sandra L. 1974. "The Measurement of Psychological Androgyny." *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 42:155-162.

Bem, Sandra L. 1981. *Bem Sex-Role Inventory: A Professional Manual*. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists Press, Inc.

Berger, Joseph. 2007, "The Standardized Experimental Situation in Expectation States Research: Notes on History, Uses and Special Features." Pp. 353-378 in *Laboratory Experiments in the Social Sciences* edited by M. Webster, Jr. and J. Sell. San Diego, CA: Elsevier.

Berger, Joseph, M. Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 1977. *Status Characteristics and Social Interaction: An Expectation-States Approach.* New York: Elsevier Scientific Pub. Co.

Berger, Joseph and Murray Webster, Jr. 2006. "Expectations, Status, and Behavior." Pp. 268-300 in P. J. Burke (ed), *Contemporary Social Psychological Theories.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Berger, P. L. and T. Luckmann (1966), *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books

Bettie, J. 2003 *Women without Class: Girls, Race, and Identity.* Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Bjarnason, Thoroddur. 2000. "Grooming for Success? The Impact of Adolescent Society on Early Intergenerational Social Mobility." *Journal of Family and Economic Issues* 21:319-342.

Biagas, David, Jr. and Alison J. Bianchi. August 2012. "Gueros and Morenos: A Social Psychological Investigation of the Latin Americanization Thesis Among Latino/as." Roundtable held at the American Sociological Association Conference's Group Processes Meeting, Denver, Colorado.

Bianchi, Alison J. 2001. *Fairness evaluations and high school grades: A status value approach*. PhD Dissertation Department of Sociology, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA.

Bianchi, Alison J., MiKayla Morse. Paul T. Munroe. 2010. "Masculinity and Femininity: Status Cues and Status Characteristics." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of Group Processes, Atlanta Georgia.

Blau, Peter M. and Otis D. Duncan. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Blumer, Herbert. 1969. Symbolic Interactionism. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977a. *Outline of a Theory and Practice.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

-----. 1977b. "Cultural Reproduction and Social Production." Pp. 487-511 in *Power and Ideology in Education* edited by J. Karabel and A.H. Haslsey. New York: Oxford University Press.

-----. 1986. "Forms of Capital." Pp. 241-258 in the *Handbook of Theory of Research for the Sociology of Education* edited by J. E. Richardson, translated by Richard Nice. New York, NY: Greenword Press.

-----. 1990. *The Logic of Practice.* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Breen, Richard, and Jan O. Jonsson. 2005. "Inequality of Opportunity in Comparative Perspective: Recent Research on Educational Attainment and Social Mobility." *Annual review of sociology* 31:223-43.

Brewer, Marilynn. 1988. "A Dual Process Model of Impression Formation." Pp. 1-36 in *Advances in Social Cognition*, *Volume 1* edited by T. K. Srull and R. W. Weyer Jr. Hillsdal, NJ: Erlbaum.

Cashen, Jacqueline Marie. 1996. "Status Cues and Behavior." PhD Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Stanford University. Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertation & Theses Database, 9360288.

Cheng, Cliff. 1999. "Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An Introduction." *Journal of Men's Studies* 7(3):295-313.

Cohen, Bernard P., and Xueguang Zhou. 1991. "Status Processes in Enduring Work Groups." *American Sociological Review* 56(2):179-88.

Collins, Patrica Hill. 1990. *Black Feminist Theory: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment*. Boston: Unwim Hyman.

Connell, R.W. 1987. *Gender and Power.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

-----. 2002. *Gender*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

-----. 2005. *Masculinities*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Connell, R. W. and James W. Messerschmidt. 2005. "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept." *Gender and Society* 19:829-859.

Correll, Shelley J., and Cecelia L. Ridgeway. 2003. "Expectation States Theory. Pp. 29-51 in the *Handbook of Social Psychology* edited by J. Delemater.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. "Demarginalizing the Intersectionality of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1989: 139-167.

DiMaggio, Paul. 2012. "Sociological Perspectives on the Face-to-Face Enactment of Class Distinction." Pp. 15-38 in *Facing Social Class*, edited by Hazel Rose Markus and Susan T Fiske. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Davidson R. Theodore. 1974. *Chicano Prisoners: The Key to San Quentin*. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland.

Davis, Shannon N, and Theodore N Greenstein. 2009. "Gender Ideology: Components, Predictors, and Consequences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 35:87-105.

DiPrete, Thomas A, and Gregory M Eirich. 2006. "Cumulative advantage as a mechanism for inequality: A review of theoretical and empirical developments." *Annual Review of Sociology* 32:271-97.

Dovidio, John F., Clifford E. Brown, Karen Heltman, Steve L. Ellyson, and Caroline F. Keating. 1988. "Power displays between women and men in discussions of gender-linked tasks: A multichannel study." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55(4):580-87.

Eagly, Alice H. 1987. *Sex Differences in Social Behavior: A Social Role Approach*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawerence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Evans, Johanthan St. B. T., 2008. Đaul-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgement, and Social Cognition." *Annual Review of Psychology* 59:255-278.

Ewen, Lynda Ann. 1998. *Social Stratification and Power in American: A View from Below*. Lanham, MD: General Hall.

Fazio, R. H. and M. A. Olson. 2003. "Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use." *Annual Review of Psychology* 54:297-327.

Fenstermaker, Sarah, and Candace West. 2002. *Doing Gender, Doing Difference: Inequality, Power, and Institutional Change*: Psychology Press.

Fişek, M. Hamit, and Zeynep Barlas. 2013. "Permutation Tests for Goodness-of-fit Testing of Mathematical Models to Experimental Data." *Social Science Research* 42(2):482-95.

Fişek, Hamit, Joseph Berger, and James C. Moore. 2002. "Evaluations, Enactment, and Expectations." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 65(4):329-45.

Fişek, Hamit, Joseph Berger, and Robert Z. Norman. 2005. "Status Cues and the Formation of Expectations." *Social Science Research* 34(1):80-102

Fişek, Hamit, Robert Z. Norman, and Max Nelson-Kilger. 1992. "Status Characteristics and Expectation Status Theory: A Priori Model Parameters and Test." *Journal of Mathematical Sociology* 16(4):285-303.

Fiske, Susan T, and Shelley E Taylor. 2013. *Social cognition: From brains to culture*: Los Angeles: Sage.

Foschi, Martha. 1996. "Double Standards in the Evaluation of Men and Women." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 59(3):237-54.

Foschi, Martha, Larissa Lai, and Kirsten Sigerson. 1994. "Gender and Double Standards in the Assessment of Job Applicants." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 57(4):326-39.

Fox, John. 2008. *Applied Regression Analysis and Generalized Linear Models*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Fox, John, and James C. Moore, Jr. 1979. "Status Characteristics and Expectation States: Fitting and Testing a Recent Model." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 42(2):126-34.

Gawronski, Bertram and B. Keith Payne. 2010. *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications*. New York: Guilford Press.

Gawronski, Bertram, Jeffrey W. Sherman, and Yaacov Trope. 2014. "Two of What? A Conceptual Analysis of Dual-Process Theories." Pp. 3-19 in *Dual-Process Theories of the Social Mind.* New York: Guilford Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The interpretation of cultures*. New York: Basic Books.

Giddens, Anthony . 1979. *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Goffman, Erving. 1958. *The Presentation of Self in Self in Everyday Life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

-----. 1966. *Behavior in Public Places.* New York: Free Press.

-----. 1967. *Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior.* Garden City, NY: Anchor Books.

-----. 1976. *Gender Advertisements.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

-----. 1977. "Arrangement between the Sexes." *Theory and Society* 4(3):301-331

Gorman, Thomas J. 2000. "Cross-Class Perceptions of Social Class." *Sociological Spectrum* 20(1):93-120.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections from the Prison Notebooks.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Greenwald, Anthony G. and Mahzarin R. Banaji. 1995. "Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes." *Psychological Review* 102:4-27.

Hedström, Peter and Petri Ylikoski. 2010. "Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences." *Annual Review of Sociology* 36:49-67.

Hollander, Jocelyn A, Daniel G Renfrow, and Judith A Howard. 2011. *Gendered situations, gendered selves: A gender lens on social psychology*. Plymouth, United Kingdom: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

hooks, bell. 2000. *Class Matters.* New York: Routledge

Hopcroft, Rosemary L. 2006. "Status Characteristics among Older Individuals: The Diminished Significance of Gender." *The Sociological Quarterly* 47(2):361-74.

House, James S. 1981. "Social structure and personality." Pp. 525-561, *Social Psychology: Sociological Perspectives* edited by M. Rosenberg & R. H. Turner. New York: Basic Books.

Hout, Michael. 2008. "How Class Works: Objective and Subjective Aspects of Class Since the 1970s." Pp. 25-64 in *Social Class: How Does it Work?* edited by A. Lareau and D. Conley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Hout, Michael and Thomas A. DiPrete. 2006. "What We Have Learned: RC28's Contributions to Knowledge about Social Stratification." *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 24:1-20.

Hyde, Janet S., Sara M. Lindberg, Marcia C. Linn, Amy B. Ellis, and Caroline C. Williams. 2008. "Gender Similarities Characterize Math Performance. *Science* 321:494-495.

Jenson Barbara. 2012. *Reading Classes: On Culture and Classism in American.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Kane, Emily W. 2000. "Racial and ethnic variations in gender-related attitudes." *Annual Review of Sociology 26*:419-439.

Kalkhoff, Will and Shane Thye. 2006. "Expectation States Theory and Research: New Observations from Meta-Analysis." *Sociological Methods and Research* 35:219-249.

Kendall, Lori. 2000. "Oh No! I'm A Nerd": Hegemonic Masculinity on an Online Forum." *Gender and Society* 14:256-274.

Kimmel, Michael. 2005. *Guyland: The Perilous World Where Boys Become Men*. New York: Harper Collins.

King, Deborah. 1988. "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of Black Feminist Ideology." *Signs* 14:42-72.

Kohn, Melvin. 1969. *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values.* Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press.

Lancianese, Donna. 2014. "Sociological Social Psychology and Intersectionality: A Synergistic Relationship." *Sociology Compass* 8:556-570.

Lareau, Annette. 2008. "Introduction: Taking Stock of Class." Pp. 3-24 in *Social Class: How Does it Work?* edited by A. Lareau and D. Conley. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Lareau, Annette and Elliot B. Wenninger. 2005. "Cultural Capital in Education Research: A Critical Assessment." *Theory and Society* 32:567-606.

Lawler Edward, Ridgeway, Cecilia, and Barry Markovsky. 1993. "Structural Social Psychology and the Micro-Macro Problem." *Sociological Theory* 11:268-290.

Leicht. Kevin. 2008. "Broken Down by Race and Gender: Sociological Explanations of new Sources of Earnings Inequality." *Annual Review of Sociology* 34:237-255.

Lenth, Russell V. 1994. Design, Data, and Deduction. Department of Statistics and Actuary Sciences, The University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA. Unpublished manuscript.

Lober, Judith. 1994. *Paradoxes of Gender.* New Haven, Conn: Yale University Press.

Lott, Bernice. 2002. "The Social Psychology of Class and Classism." *American Psychologist* 67:650-658.

Mandel, Hadas and Moshe Semyonsov. 2005. "Family Policies, Wage Structures, and Gender Gaps: Sources of Earnings Inequality in 20 Countries." *American Sociological Review* 70:949-967.

Markovsky, Barry. 1994. "The Structure of Theories." Pp. 3-24 in Group Processes: Sociological Analyses. Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers.

Markovsky, Barry, Le Roy F. Smith, and Joseph Berger. 1984. "Do Status Interventions Persist?" *American Sociological Review* 49(3):373-82.

Martin, Katherne Connor. 2013. "The rise of the portmanbro: How an abbreviation of brother became a word-forming dynamo." Oxford Dictionaries originally published online October 9, 2013 (http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2013/10/the-rise-of-the-portmanbro/).

McCall, Leslie. 2005. "The Complexity of Intersectionality." *Signs* 30:1771-1802.

Merton, Robert K. 1949. "On Sociological Theories of the Middle Range." Pp. 39-53 in *Social Theory and Social Structure* by R. K. Merton. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Moore, James C., Jr. 1969. "Social Status and Social Influence: Process Considerations." *Sociometry* 32(2):145-58.

Mullins, Christopher W. 2006. *Holding Your Square: Masculinities, Streetlife, and Violence.* Portland, OR: Willan Publishing.

Messerschmidt, James W. 2012. "Engendering Gendered Knowledge: Assessing the Academic Appropriation of Hegemonic Masculinity." *Men and Masculinities* 15(1)56-76.

Monahan, Jennifer, Iren Shtrulis, and Sonja Brown Givens. 2005. "Priming Welfare Queens and Other Stereotypes: The Transference of Media Images into Interpersonal Contexts." *Communication Research Reports* 22:199-205.

Neuman, W Lawrence. 2000. *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Fourth Edition*. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Nesbitt, Richard E. and Timothy DeCamp Wilson. 1977. "The Halo Effect: Evidence for Unconscious Alternative of Judgments." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 55(4):250-256.

Oelert, Gary W. 2000. A First Course in Design and Analysis of Experiments. New York: W. H. Freeman Company.

Parsons, Talcott. 1955. *Family Socialization and Interaction Process*. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press.

Pascoe, C.J. 2007. *Dude, You're a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Payne, B. Keith and Bertram Gawronski. 2010. "A History of Implicit Social Cognition: Where Is It Coming From? Where Is It Now? Where Is it Going?" Pp.1-14 in the *Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications* edited by B. Gawkroski and B. K. Bertram. New York: Guilford Press.

Project Implicit. 2011. "Project Implicit". Retrieved October 12, 2013 (https://www.projectimplicit.net/index.html) .

Proweller, Amira. 1998. *Constructing Female Identities: Meaning Making in an Upper Middle Class Youth Culture.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Proweller, Amira. 1998. *Constructing Female Identities: Meaning Making in an Upper Middle Class Youth Culture.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Renold, Emma. 2006. "Gendered Classroom Experiences." Pp. 439-452 in *The Sage Handbook of Gender and Education* edited by C. Skelton, B. Francis, and L. Smulyan. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Inc.

Ridgeway, Cecilia. 2011. *Framed By Gender: How Gender Inequality Persists in the Modern World.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Ridgeway, Cecilia and Susan Fisk. 2012. "Class Rules, Status Dynamics, and Gateway Interactions." Pp. 131-151 in *Facing Social Class*, edited by Hazel Rose Markus and Susan T Fiske. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Tamar Kricheli-Katz. 2013. "Intersecting Cultural Beliefs in Social Relations: Gender, Race, and Class Binds and Freedoms." *Gender & Society* 27(3):294-318.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L, and Shelley J Correll. 2004. "Unpacking the Gender System A Theoretical Perspective on Gender Beliefs and Social Relations." *Gender & Society* 18(4):510-31.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1999. "The Gender System and Interaction." *Annual review of sociology* 25:191-216.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 2006. "Gender and interaction." Pp. 247-74 in *Handbook of the Sociology of Gender*: Springer.

Ridgeway, Cecilia L. and Henry A. Walker. 1995. 'Status Structures.' Pp. 281-310 in *Sociological Perspectives on Social Psychology* edited by K. S. Cook, G. A. Fine. New York: Allyn & Bacon.

Ridgeway, Cecilia, Joseph Berger, and L. Smith. 1985. "Nonverbal Cues and Status: An Expectation States Approach. *American Journal of Sociology* 90:955-978.

Robbins, Owen, Shannon Devoe, and Morton Wiener. 1978. "Social Patterns of Turn-Taking: Nonverbal Regulators." *Journal of communication* 28(3):38-46.

Rudman, Laurie A., Anthony G. Greenwald, and Debbie E. McGhee. 2001. "Implicit Self-Concept and Evaluative Gender Stereotypes: Self and Ingroup Share Desirable Traits." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27:1164-1178.

Sallaz, Jeffrey J. and Jane Zavisca. 2007. "Bourdieu in American Sociology, 1980-2004." *Annual Review of Sociology* 33:21-41.

Schilt, Kristen and Larel Westbrook. 2009. "Doing Gender, Doing Heteronormativity." *Gender & Society* 23:440-464.

Schrock, Douglas, and Michael Schwalbe. 2009. "Men, masculinity, and manhood acts." *Annual review of sociology* 35:277-95.

Schwalbe, Michael, Sandra Godwin, Daphne Holden, Douglas Schrock, Shealy Thompson, and Michele Wolkomir. 2000. "Generic Processes in the Reproduction of Inequality: An Interactionist Analysis." *Social Forces* 79:419-452.

Scott, Jacqueline, Duane F Alwin, and Michael Braun. 1996. "Generational changes in gender-role attitudes: Britain in a cross-national perspective." *Sociology* 30(3):471-92.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1992. "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation." American Journal of Sociology 98:1-29.

Shows, Carla and Naomi Gerstel. 2009. "Fatherhood, Class, and Gender." *Gender & Society* 23:161-187.

Saperstein, Aliya. 2013."The Dynamics of Race and Inequality in the United States." Presented at The Theory Workshop at the University of Iowa.

Steele, Claude M., and Joshua Aronson. 1995. "Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 69(5):797-811.

Stewart, David W., Prem N. Shamdansani, and Dennis W. Rook. 2007. *Focus Groups: Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Stockburger, David W. 1998. Multivariate Statistics: Concepts, Models, and Applications. Retrieved May 1, 2014 (http://www.psychstat.missouristate.edu/multibook/mlt00.htm).

Thomas, W.I. 1923. "The Regulation of the Wishes." Pp. 41-69 *The Unadjusted Girl with cases and standpoint for behavior analysis*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

Thomas, W. I. and Dorthy Swaine Thomas. 1928. The child in America: Behavior problems and programs. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.

Thorne, Barrie. 1993. Gender Play: Girls and Boys in School. New Brunswick, NJ:Rutgers University Press.

Thye, Shane and Will Kalkhoff. 2008. "Seeing the Forest through the Trees: An Updated Meta-Analysis of Expectation States Research." *Current Research in Social Psychology* 15:1-14. Retrieved November 5, 2009.

University of Iowa. 2012. "University of Iowa Student Profile." Retrieved April 22, 2014 (http://admissions.uiowa.edu/future-students/university-iowa-student-profile).

Ver Ploeg, Michele. 2002. "Children from disrupted families as adults: family structure, college attendance and college completion." *Economics of Education Review* 21(2):171-84.

Wagner, David G., and Joseph Berger. 1985. "Do Sociological Theories Grow?" *American Journal of Sociology* 90(4):697-728.

Weber, Max.[1922]1978. *Economy and Society, Vol. 1 & Vol. 2*. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.

Webster, Murray, Jr., and James E. Driskell, Jr. 1978. "Status Generalization: A Review and Some New Data." *American Sociological Review* 43(2):220-36.

-----. 1983. "Beauty as Status." *American Journal of Sociology* 89(1):140-65.

-----. 1985. "Status Generalization." Pp. 108-141 in *Status, Rewards, and Influence* edited by J. Berger and Morris Zelditch, Jr. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers.

Webster, Murray Jr. and Lisa Slattery Rashotte. 2010. "Behavior, Expectations and Status." *Social Forces* 88: 1021-1049.

Welch, Kelly. 2007. "Black Criminal Stereotypes and Racial Profiling." *Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice* 23:276-288.

Wenninger, Elliot B. 2005. "Foundations of Pierre Bourdieu's Class Analysis." Pp. 119-149 in *Approaches to Class Analysis* edited by E. O. Wright. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

West, Candace, and Sarah Fenstermaker. 1995. "Doing difference." *Gender & Society* 9(1):8-37.

West, Candace, and Don H. Zimmerman. 1987. "Doing Gender." *Gender and Society* 1(2):125-51.

Wright, Erik Olin 2005. *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge, GBR: Cambridge University Press.

Yans, Ting, Richard Curtin, and Matthew Jans. 2010. "Trends in Income Nonresponse over Two Decades." *Journal of Official Statistics* 26(1):145-164.

Zeilinger, Julie. 2014. *College 101: A Girl's Guide to Freshman Year.* Waco, TX: Prufrock Press Inc.

Zeller, Richard A., and Richard B. Warnecke. 1973. "The Utility of Intervening Constructs in Experiments." *Sociological Methods & Research* 2(1):85-110.