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Terrain, Trains, and Terrorism: The Influence of Geography on Terrorism in India

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TERRAIN, TRAINS, AND TERRORISM: THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON
TERRORISM IN INDIA

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DISSERTATION

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

By
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

TERRAIN, TRAINS, AND TERRORISM: THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON
TERRORISM IN INDIA

What conditions give rise to and nurture ethno-nationalist terrorist movements in India?
Specifically, can geography create grievances and be beneficial in a terrorist campaign? I
investigate how geography prevented historical development in certain locations in India.
I theorize that rugged geographic features prevented economic, social, and political
development. Underdevelopment and isolation created grievances in the population.
Aggrieved groups then utilized the same geographic features that prevented development
to launch effective terrorist campaigns. I conduct a district level analysis of terrorism in
India using statistical and GIS analysis. I supplement the analysis with case studies from
the Indian states of Uttarkhand, Tamil Nadu, and Assam. I also include a case study from
Nigeria to demonstrate the applicability of my theory outside of Asia. I find that
geographic features, specifically forested terrain, and proximity to international borders
impeded development and increased the likelihood of terrorism.

KEYWORDS: India, Terrorism, Terrain, International Borders, Railway

Andrea Malji

June 16, 2015

TERRAIN, TRAINS, AND TERRORISM:
THE INFLUENCE OF GEOGRAPHY ON TERRORISM IN INDIA

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</div>

DEDICATION

For Xavier,

May you one day enjoy a Peanut Butter Milkshake

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From Kashmir to Kolkata

The Terrorism Experience throughout India

October 2, 2004 seemed like any other day in the city of Dimapur in the Indian state of Nagaland. Children were walking on their way to school, farmers were setting up their fruit and vegetable stands in the city market, businessman gathered around the busy chai stall drinking their hot beverages and reading the newspaper, shops were opening their doors and preparing for another day of business. As the citizens of Dimapur went about their morning routine, another group had plans to disrupt it.

While the children boarded their school busses and the businessmen hailed their rickshaws, a series of bombs simultaneously exploded throughout the city. The first bombs detonated at 9:30 a.m. throughout the local street market (Hussain, 2004). The once crowded stalls full of farmers and their latest crop were demolished. Farmers who had no other intent but to feed their family lay dead alongside their eviscerated crops. The blast was no accident. The blasts occurred during the market's busiest time in an attempt to kill and injure as many civilians as possible.

Just as the initial shock of the blasts was setting in, a second series of bombs detonated at the nearby bus station. Hours passed after the initial two explosions and it seemed the carnage was over for the day. Police began to collect evidence, sanitation

workers began to clean the area, and families began to mourn their lost. It was a tragic day in Dimapur but unfortunately, the misfortune was not over. Later that evening, at the height of the evening rush hour, militants opened gunfire at a local government meeting. Government officials were inside in an emergency meeting to discuss the blasts.   Across the street, other militants hurled grenades into the busy street traffic. The day's attacks coincided with the rush hours in order to target as many people as possible, including women and children.   By the end of the attacks, 48 people died and over 100 were injured (BBC, 2004). Militants from the banned National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) ultimately claimed responsibility for the attacks (Swami, 2008). Although the farmers, schoolchildren, and businessman had little interest in the political grievances of the NDFB, they died as a result of them.

Despite the lives lost that day and the severity of the attacks, the terrorist attack received little media attention, even within India. Ultimately, no one was arrested or charged for the October 2nd attacks, although the police sought high-ranking members of the NDFB (Swami 2008).   The limited media coverage of the attacks is most likely a reflection of the frequency of such attacks in the region. Explosions and grenade attacks with numerous fatalities are commonplace in Dimapur and Northeast India. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, 115 terrorist groups operate or have operated in the Northeast region in the last few decades. From 2000 to 2010, the state of Assam alone experienced nearly 1000 attacks. Most of the active terrorist groups in the region are separatists who seek independence or autonomy.

The NDFB militants have been active since 1986, and are responsible for dozens of similar attacks in the region. Bodo militants have several political goals, including the

liberation of Bodoland in Southern Assam from Indian occupation, exploitation and domination. The Bodo militants also want the script of the Bodo language to change from Devangari to Roman to reflect their Christian heritage. At the height of its operation in the mid-2000s, the NDFB had approximately 3500 armed members. Although membership has decreased, the NDFB remains active despite a 2005 ceasefire agreement (Janes 2008). Most of the NDFB's cadre is located in training camps across the border in the rugged areas of southern Bhutan, northern Myanmar, and north Bangladesh.

Sixteen ethno-nationalist groups similar to the NDFB currently operate in the state of Assam. Although the goals of each group vary significantly, their *modus operandi* is very similar. The groups target large gatherings of people, often in busy street markets or transportation centers. After the attacks, they retreat into nearby rugged and isolated areas, oftentimes crossing the international border. Most of these groups operate in districts that share an international border with Bhutan, Bangladesh, or Myanmar. Of the 34 currently active separatist groups in Northeast India, 29 have confirmed training camps across the international borders (SATP, 2013). The camps are located in isolated, underdeveloped, heavily forested regions. Within India, NDFB operates in the wilderness of Manas National Park and the Karbi Anglong district. The characteristics and techniques of the NDFB are not unique. There are dozens of similar groups within Assam, India, Asia, and the world. From Colombia and Nigeria, to the Philippines and India, groups use the rugged land to their advantage to wage brutal campaigns. Terrain is one of the most utilized weapons in terrorism campaigns, but is also one of the least discussed factors in the terrorism literature.

Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism throughout Asia and the World

Ethno-nationalist or separatist terrorism is very common throughout Asia. In fact, ethno-nationalist terrorism is the most commonly implemented form of domestic terrorism, and domestic terrorism is the most commonly implemented type of terrorism (Hoffman, 2006). In the year 2012, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base reports 2,536 events of domestic terrorism, but only 240 events of international terrorism.

Ethno-nationalist terrorism is generally classified as domestic terrorism because the attacks are planned and executed by indigenous groups. This seems somewhat complicated since ethnic groups are known to span borders. If a Bodo living in Myanmar crosses into India to carry out an attack, is this not considered an international attack? It may not always be known if some members of the same ethnic group are crossing porous borders to carry out attacks in a state that is not their own. What is known, is that the majority of the attacks being carried out are by groups that have formed and operated within the country they are targeting (Hoffman, 1997; South Asian Terrorism Portal, 2013). Although there may be some international elements, it is generally in the minority, and does not change the domestic nature of the group.

India has experienced over 8,000 terror attacks since 1970 (Global Terrorism Database, 2013). The majority of these attacks originate from groups with similar grievances and geographic locations as the NDFB (SATP, 2008). When analyzing these separatist groups, one commonality seems to emerge: all the groups operate in the rugged regions of their country.

In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) have operated in the southern region of the country since the

1960s. The MILF and MNLF claim to represent the Moro ethnic group, which is an ethnic, religious, and linguistic minority in the region. The groups seek independence from greater Philippines. Like most of the separatist groups in India, the Moro rebels operate in rugged territory. The island of Mindanao is one of the most physiographical diverse locations in the world. It has high rugged mountains, swamps, volcanoes, and dense forests. MILF and MNLF were ultimately successful in their campaign. In January 2014, the government of the Philippines signed a peace agreement that allows the Muslim community of the southern Philippines to have autonomy (Bangkok Post 2014).

In Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tamil Tigers Elam (LTTE) waged a 30-year long insurgency against the state. The LTTE sought to create an independent state for the Tamil people in northern Sri Lanka. The LTTE was world renowned for its implementation of suicide terrorism as a tactic. The group was responsible for nearly 2000 terrorist attacks in their 30-year span. Like many other separatist groups, the LTTE operated in the jungles of the island, particularly the Mullaitivu forests. The forest habitat was an essential refuge for the LTTE. The LTTE was so cognizant of the crucial importance of the trees that they had an administrative branch, the Tamil Eelam Forest Protection Division, which continuously planted new trees. Over 30 years, the LTTE was responsible for planting hundreds of thousands of teak, mahogany, and neem seedlings (Ilankai Tamil Sangam, 2003).

In Banda Aceh Indonesia, the vast jungles provided a haven for several terrorist groups, including the Free Aceh movement. Free Aceh sought independence for the Acehnese people and the Aceh Island from Indonesia. The Ulu Masen rainforest on Aceh, with its vast expanse of 1,852,500 acres, provided ample refuge for the movement.

The Free Aceh movement eventually signed a peace agreement with the government of Indonesia following the devastating tsunami of 2005. Since the peace agreement, hundreds of former rebels have returned to the forests to participate in illegal logging. Hundreds of other former rebels are actually employed by the government to protect the forest. The government has hired former rebels for two reasons: to overcome rampant unemployment in the region, and because they know the region better than anyone else since it once served as their sanctuary (Gelling 2010).

Throughout the world, numerous rebel groups have taken advantage of the terrain to mount insurgencies, civil wars, and terrorist movements. Despite the vast amount of rugged terrain throughout the world, most of these areas do not experience violent movements. The Himalayas in Nepal, Pakistan, and India have been host to numerous violent campaigns, yet neither the Himalayas in Bhutan nor the mountainous Indian states of Uttaranchal Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh have seen violence. However, some of the longest lasting separatist movements throughout the world seem to use geography to their advantage. In Aceh, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines, the rebels all were eventually defeated. These rebels also all lived on islands. The Indian separatist movements have even more advantageous geography on their side. Instead of oceans as borders, they have weak states with rugged borders. Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Nepal have difficulty maintaining security within their own state and choose not to use their minimal resources fighting Indian rebels that pose no threat to them. These states also do not wish to diminish their sovereignty by allowing their powerful neighbor into their land. As a result, ethno-nationalist terrorism throughout India continues without a clear end in sight.

Goals

This project seeks to understand what conditions give rise to and nurture ethno-nationalist terrorist movements. Specifically, this project seeks to understand if and how geography can create grievances and be beneficial in a terrorist campaign. Why is geography the weapon of choice for so many rebels?   I do not argue that geography is destiny. However, geography can affect other important factors, such as economic, political, and social development in addition to institutions. When the state is in conflict with non-state groups such as terrorists, strong institutions are essential in winning battles. A lack of strong institutions can create grievances and also make it difficult to ameliorate grievances. This can create a perpetual cycle of terrorism and ineffective counterterrorism.

The implications of this research can also extend to the general conflict literature. Much of the civil war literature finds geographic features to be important, but the causal process is not entirely clear. If geography truly plays an important role in creating grievances and continuing violent campaigns, then the causal mechanisms for terrorism may be similar to civil war. The literature already finds that civil wars last longer in states with rugged terrain (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, 2009). Although the tactics and membership may vary, many of the grievances espoused by terrorist groups are similar to groups operating in a civil war. An in-depth analysis of groups that persist for decades can provide insight into the drivers of success for non-state actors, and can provide an important bridge between the two literatures.

Understanding why terrorism is prevalent in certain locations can also provide an understanding of why groups select this tactic over other options. For example, why is

terrorism selected instead of more peaceful options, such as political party formation? Those who commit terrorism pay with a hefty price, often their lives, with a very low likelihood of achieving their goals. Despite these high costs, terrorism persists. Understanding why terrorism is selected as a tactic in certain locations provides insight into why other democratic methods are not selected.

Finally, understanding the relationship between geographic characteristics, history, development, and terrorism can help shape policy formation. Although history and geography cannot change, the methods states and actors use to interact in the environment can change. For example, if underdevelopment and poor infrastructure result from historical and geographic isolation, then policymakers must understand the best methods to address those limitations.

Why it Matters?

Understanding the origins of ethno-nationalist terrorist movements in India is important for several reasons. For one, the literature continues to find geography and rugged terrain affect civil conflict (Buhaug 2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Buhaug and Rod 2006; Starr 2005; Buhaug & Lujala 2006) and international conflict (Salehyan 2009; Gleditsch & Salehyan, 2006). However, the causal mechanisms by which geography influences conflict are not entirely clear. Understanding how geography influences non-state actors in India can provide important insight into the broader relationship between conflict and geography. It can also provide insight into other relationships, like the one between poverty and terrorism.

Second, in an increasingly globalized world, ideas, politics, and conflicts transcend borders. The globalized world is actively changing how, why, and where

conflict occurs. Several scholars suggest that we are now entering one of the most peaceful eras in modern history (Human Security Centre, 2009; Clark, 2008; Gat 2006; Pinker, 2011). Wars between states are increasingly rare. This does not mean war no longer exists. Instead, the nature of warfare has changed. War is no longer fought among the top commanders of top states. War is fought asymmetrically and within states. Understanding the nature of non-state actors is more important than ever.

Third, like war, terrorism is political in nature and seeks to change the *status quo*. Unlike war, terrorism is not rare. Terrorism has been implemented over 113,000 times since 1970 (Global Terrorism Database, 2013). Despite its frequency, terrorism remains less studied than war. Terrorism is a tactic employed by aggrieved groups attempting to reach some political goal. If we believe that an ethno-nationalist group in northeast India is unimportant to international affairs, we are doing ourselves a great disservice. Although some terrorist groups eventually disband, many evolve. Groups observe what works for another group, and then adopt the strategy for themselves. For example, Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah saw the advanced techniques used by the LTTE in Sri Lanka and adopted their tactics (Bloom, 2003).

Fourth, terrorist groups learn from each others experience throughout time and space. The strategies of the LTTE evolved from simplistic bombs to sophisticated IED's and suicide vests (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003). Although the grievances of the LTTE were entirely domestic, terrorist movements outside of Sri Lanka looked at the LTTE with envy of their deadly efficiency and ingenuity (Bloom, 2009; Pape 2003). The LTTE demonstrated to other aggrieved groups around the world that terrorism is not only a strategy of liberation, but one that can be successful. The LTTE

were among the first groups to implement Improvised Explosive Devices (IED's) and suicide bombings (FBI, 2009; International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003; United Nations Office at Geneva, 2013). Less than a year after LTTE introduced their new tactics, unrelated terrorist groups in the Middle East adopted similar tactics. Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda specifically adopted their preferred strategies by analyzing the LTTE (Hoffman 2006). LTTE commanders even traveled to the Middle East to teach other terrorist groups their strategies. Al-Qaeda, the world's most renowned terrorist organization, and organization responsible for the largest terrorist attack in history, learned its tactics from an ethno-nationalist group in Sri Lanka. Globalization not only connects the world, it also connects terrorist groups and victims of terrorism.

The connectedness of diverse groups is perhaps most evident in the post 9/11 era. Prior to 2001, most Americans probably assumed they had little in common with the subsistence traders of the Panjshir Valley in Afghanistan. Despite minimal similarities between the two groups, they were bound together. They were not bound because the US would eventually go to war in Afghanistan or because they shared similar political ideologies, but because they shared the same enemies. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban had made Afghanistan their 'base' despite the wishes of the Panjshir Valley inhabitants (Coll, 2005). Under Operation Cyclone, the US and Pakistan ISI provided weapons and training to the Mujahedeen, a group that eventually transformed into the Taliban (Gibbs, 2000; Meher, 2004). The ISI is notorious for its covert aid to terrorist groups. The ISI not only provided training for the Mujahedeen fighters that would later become the Taliban, but they also provide training to several ethno-nationalist groups in Northeast India.

The ISI maintains a tangled web of covert and overt supporters and trainees. Small ethno-nationalist groups of the Northeast seem mostly irrelevant outside their operating area. However, if these groups were as small and irrelevant as one might assume, why would an organization as powerful as the ISI take interest?   The modus operandi of the ISI reveals that their intended method of weakening India is through 'a thousand tiny cuts' or numerous small terrorist attacks throughout the country (CFR, 2009; New York Times, 2009; SATP, 2006). The ISI noted that one tiny cut may do minimal damage, but 1000 tiny cuts will bleed India to death (SATP, 2006: 12), demonstrating their interest in weakening the power of the Indian state. The ISI has decided to wage a proxy war through the usage of Indian separatist groups

Complex internal processes like terrorism and proxy wars affect how states interact with one another. When two rivals both have nuclear weaponry, it is in the world's interest that they avoid conflict, whether direct or indirect. This is why understanding ethno-nationalist separatism in India matters. In times of increased tension between India and Pakistan, ISI sponsored training of Indian ethno-nationalist terrorist groups may prove to be the tipping point in an already tense conflict.

What is Terrorism?

I define terrorism according to the Department of State as, "Incidents in which subnational or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or recklessly attack civilians or non-combatants including military personnel and assets outside war zones and war-like settings for political goals" (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85). Terrorism remains one of the most difficult terms to define. It has countless definitions that vary by region, government, and agency. First, terrorism is a tactic, it is not a type of war or conflict.

Consequently, terrorism can be used in a variety of settings, including guerrilla warfare and civil wars. However, several characteristics make terrorism unique compared to other types of conflict and tactics. This makes it necessary to explore the specific characteristics that explicitly define terrorism.

Despite what seems like a relatively straightforward concept, there is no consensus on what acts explicitly constitute terrorism. This leads to the broader question of how to differentiate terrorism from other types of conflicts. Young and Findley (2011) note that the majority of terrorism literature is qualitative case study work. Because of the relatively small number of observations that scholars use in case study work, they are able to define terrorism so that it fits the cases they are examining. However, when examining terrorism more broadly, the way terrorism manifests itself in one country may not be the same in another. In Sri Lanka, for example, the LTTE was considered a terrorist group. However, their most frequent target was the military. Moreover, in Iraq and Afghanistan, which are active war zones, attacks against the military are generally coded as terrorism. Coding attacks against the military in a war zone is generally problematic because it violates the definitional criteria of terrorism.

Bruce Hoffman (2006) has created perhaps the best definitional criteria for terrorism. He notes that there are six essential elements of terrorism. If an act of violence fails to meet these six criteria, then it is not terrorism. First, the motive must be *political*. A political motive is what makes terrorism different from crime. Someone who robs a gas station does not do so for political reasons. An individual with mental health issues who randomly shoots people in a public setting does not have a political motive. Daniel Byman (2011), a senior fellow at the Brookings institution, notes that John Hinckley Jr.

assassination attempt of Ronald Reagan was not terrorism. While assassination attempts often have political motives, Hinckley made the assassination attempt in order to impress actress Jodie Foster. Thus, he did not have a political motive. Conversely, the attacks of 9/11 had clearly political motives. In interviews before and after the 9/11 attacks with masterminds Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri, they note that they planned the attack for several reasons. These reasons include US support of Israel, U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia (the Holy Land), and sanctions of Iraq (Hoffman, 2006). These motivations are all clearly political. Table 1.1 lays out the six critical criteria Hoffman considers to be essential in defining terrorism.

Table 1.1

Terrorism Criteria

1. *Political Motive*
2. *Intent to Influence Broader Audience*
3. *Organized Group*
4. *Target Civilians*
5. *Non-State Actor*
6. *Premeditated*

The second criteria Hoffman says must be present for an act to be considered terrorism is the *intention of influencing a broader audience*. The November 2008 Mumbai attacks by LET targeted historical landmarks popular with Westerners. The Department of State frequently warns Americans traveling abroad that they are considered high value targets by terrorists. In Spain in 2004, attacks on Madrid trains were strategically planned to influence the Spanish public and their vote choice in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Two weeks after the attack, the population ousted the

incumbent government, who was previously expected to win the upcoming elections. The

Spaniards felt that their government's presence in Iraq led to the attacks. By voting for

the challenger, who ran on the platform of immediate withdrawal from Iraq, voters felt it

would prevent future attacks. The Madrid attackers therefore sought to influence, and

ultimately influenced, the Spanish electorate (Lago, and Montero, 2006).

The third criterion Hoffman says must exist is the *involvement of an organized

group*. An act by a lone wolf is not terrorism. A solitary suicide bomber may target a

public place, but just because he is acting alone does not mean he is not involved with a

broader organized group. Most suicide bombers are recruited and trained by a broader

organized group, such as Al-Qaeda or Laskar e Toiba. Therefore, even if someone

perpetrates the act alone, the act was still planned by a larger organization.

The fourth criterion is the *targeting of civilians*. This criterion is often the most

difficult aspect of defining terrorism. For one, who is considered a civilian? The

individuals inside the Pentagon on 9/11 were primarily employed by the government and

many were military officials. Does this mean that the attack on the Pentagon was not an

act of terrorism? No. The majority of scholars agree that the attack on the Pentagon was

an act of terrorism. Although the people inside the Pentagon may not fit the strictest

criteria of a civilian, generally a civilian is any individual, even government and military

officials, outside a war setting. The United States was not at war on 9/11, and therefore,

all of the targets were civilians. However, as previously mentioned, attacks on the

military in Iraq and Afghanistan should not be considered acts of terrorism because these

are war zones. However, if an attack targets military officials outside the battlefield, such

as a bombing of their sleeping quarters, this would be an act of terrorism. Moreover, if

the target of an attack is a contractor, journalist or other civilian, the act is terrorism even if it is in war-zone.

Fifth, a *non-state actor* must implement the attack. A non-state actor is a person or group outside the government. Al-Qaeda does not represent any government, and is therefore a non-state actor. If a facet of the government, such as the military or intelligence services, bombs neighborhoods or targets civilians, this is not an act of terrorism because it is government-sponsored. There is some contention in the literature over whether states can carry out terrorism (Bjorgo, 2007; Hoffman, 2007). Some scholars, particularly in the Philosophy field, contend that the tactics of modern terrorism by non-state actors is actually a reflection of the tactics used by states. Prior to WWII, terrorism generally targeted the aristocracy. This was particularly true in Czarist Russia, the centrifuge of late 20th century terrorism (Hoffman, 2006). It wasn't until after WWII that the targets and motivations of terrorism changed significantly, with the so-called 'new terrorism' (Walzer, 1977). Currently, members of the military or government can still carry out acts of terrorism if they are acting as a rogue agent or by sponsoring a terrorist group (such as Iran with Hezbollah). States have been known to carry out acts of terrorism against their people. An example of this would be Saddam Hussein's gassing of Kurds, but this is generally considered state-sponsored terrorism, which is something that is beyond the scope of this study (Crawford, 2003; Bjorgo, 2007).

Finally, the attack must be *premeditated* to be considered terrorism. Premeditation distinguishes terrorism from other types of violence, including riots and crime. Terrorism must be the consequence of planning and intent to do harm. This separates terrorism from other types of violence like riots, which can occur because of anger or passion following

an event, such as a racial or ethnic slur. Without premeditation, terrorism cannot be distinguished from a crime of passion.

The Difficulty with Defining Terrorism

The word "terrorism" has become much politicized in the post 9/11 era. Many argue that politicians and states define violent acts as terrorism in order to achieve some form of political expediency. This is a fair critique. Many states, such as Indonesia with Lashkar Jihad, classified long-active groups within their borders as terrorist groups at the urging of the United States and its global War on Terrorism (Stern, 2003). It is also true that the nature of terrorism has changed. Terrorism in the 1920's for example, was generally characterized by assassinations of political elites. It was not until the 1980s, primarily at the hands of the LTTE and Hezbollah, that religious and ethno-nationalist inspired terrorism became central. These groups changed what terrorism was and how it operated. The groups were characterized by frequent bombings and targeting of civilians. Shortly thereafter, many groups followed in the path and the tactics of terrorism changed from what was known and utilized in earlier decades. Not only has our understanding of terrorism changed, but the nature of it has also changed.

There are also different types of terrorist attacks that occur. First, there are large grand attacks, the kind that receive international media coverage. Large attacks are quite rare. In India, they occur every few years. Examples include the 2006 and 2008 Mumbai attacks and the 2001 and 2011 New Delhi attacks. Many of the grand attacks target symbolic locations with the intent on capturing international attention. Although these large attacks receive substantial coverage, they may not claim any more victims than smaller attacks that are part of the ongoing campaign. The 2001 attack on Parliament in

New Delhi killed nine people, but because of the esteemed location of the attack, the event received round-the-clock coverage. Most of these attacks are sophisticated and have ties to international terrorist groups based in Pakistan.

Second, there are smaller attacks that frequently occur as part of a larger ongoing campaign. Attacks such as these can occur on a weekly or even daily basis. The vast majority of these attacks are planned and executed domestically by indigenous groups. Because of their frequency and less symbolic locations, the shock value or unexpectedness of these attacks is reduced in comparison to large internationally planned attacks. The 2004 Dimapur attacks, mentioned in the opening paragraph of this chapter, is an example. Despite dozens of deaths and hundreds of injuries, the attack was not entirely a shock and did not receive the similar coverage compared to the Mumbai or New Delhi attacks.

The six criteria explained in the subsection above distinguish terrorism from other types of conflict. However, what complicates the study of terrorism is that it can occur in many different settings, including other types of conflict, such as civil war and insurgencies. For example, a civil war occurred in Sri Lanka between the government and LTTE from 1983 to 2009. However, within the civil war, the LTTE, a non-state actor with political goals, frequently targeted non-combatants. These acts are considered terrorism. However, when the LTTE targeted the Sri Lankan military in a war-zone, such as their 1991 massive attack on the military base in Elephant Pass, this was not terrorism. Terrorism, therefore, can occur in a variety of settings and can be used by different groups. Moreover, while terrorism is not the same as insurgency, insurgent groups often use terrorism as a tactic. Terrorism is often a tactic that is used within a broader

insurgency campaign by large organized groups. However, insurgencies should not be conflated with terrorism.

Terrorism can also be either domestic or international. In an increasingly globalized world where many groups are non-state organizations, it is often difficult to classify whether an act was domestic or international. In a domestic act of terrorism, the act originates and ends in the same state. In the United States a frequently referenced act of domestic terrorism are abortion clinic bombers or attacks carried out by the Animal Liberation Front (Hoffman, 2006). In the case of international terrorism, the planning of the attack and members who carry it out originate from outside the state they target. In the case of 9/11, members of the stateless organization Al-Qaeda, comprised mostly of Saudi nationals, trained in Afghanistan but implemented the attack in the United States. This is considered an act of international terrorism. Most terrorist acts within India are considered domestic attacks.

Given all these critiques, how can one ensure that what is being studied is actually terrorism and comes from an unbiased source? The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is maintained by the world's leading academic terrorism scholars. These scholars are well aware of the contentious debates and politicization of terrorism and provide the upmost objectivity possible when creating their database. The database is funded and maintained by the University of Maryland, not the US government. Because the GTD is a scholarly driven database, there should be fewer concerns about the politicization of the term terrorism.   The Global Terrorism Database[1] also flags all attacks considered uncertain. This allows a scholar to choose whether to include or exclude a case based on their

[1] Global Terrorism Database: http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/

judgment and definition they choose to implement.   In this project, attacks are excluded if there is any uncertainty.

Why Terrorism?

The primary focus of this project is terrorism for several reasons. For one, it is an increasingly common tactic used throughout the world. Terrorism is a relatively easier to conduct compared to other types of warfare. All that is required for a terrorist act are a few committed individuals. Whereas groups in larger conflicts, such as civil wars or insurgencies, are strong enough to challenge the state, groups that use terrorism are generally too weak to pose a legitimate threat to the existing government.   Nonetheless, guerillas or insurgents can also use terrorism as a tactic. In fact, many of the ongoing conflicts in India are considered insurgencies implementing a campaign of terrorism (Lama, 2010).

Second, terrorism is a popular tactic that has been implemented throughout history. Although it has occurred since the beginning of time, Figure 1.1 shows that terrorism peaked in 2014, the highest levels since systematic data recording began in 1970. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the pervasity of terrorism. Although terror attacks plummeted during the 1990s, following a rise in the 1980s, the decrease was only temporary. After the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001 and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, acts of terrorism increased to an all time high. Attacks reached their peak in 2013, with 11,952 attacks, which is higher than the entire decade of the 1970s (9601 attacks). Terrorism is becoming the tactic of choice, and it is essential that we understand why and how it occurs, and how to counter it.

Figure 1.1
Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2014

Global Distribution of Terror Attacks 1970-2013

Figure 1.2
Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2014

■	5000+ Attacks
■	2500-4999 Attacks
■	1000-2499 Attacks
■	100-999 Attacks
□	0-99 Attacks

Third, a look at figure 1.2 reveals that terrorism is not limited to a specific region.

Since 1970, nearly every continent has at least one state with a substantial terrorism

problem. South Asia is disproportionately affected. The region has experienced the

highest number of attacks in the world. India has experienced 8,682 attacks, Pakistan

9,627, and Sri Lanka 3,007. The Middle East, which generally receives the most media

attention regarding terrorism, experiences the second largest amount of attacks. The

number of attacks in the region is weighted substantially from the attacks in Iraq (12,340) and Afghanistan (6133) (Global Terrorism Database, 2013). However, several states in the Middle East, including the Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman, have experienced fewer than ten attacks, while the United Arab Emirates has experienced none.

Fourth, in addition to regional variation, what makes terrorism even more interesting is that it is a long-standing problem in some states, but only an occasional nuisance in others. Although there are numerous theories, there is no conclusive evidence to explain why some states become plagued with terrorism while others states do not. Figure 1.3 demonstrates that nearly seventy-five percent of all groups disband in less than one year, while less than 10% of all groups survive longer than five years. If most groups disband after one year, then why do countries like India, Colombia, and Sri Lanka have terrorist groups that are over 30 years old?

Avg. Years of Operation for Terrorist Organizations, 1970-2013

76%
14%
4%
4%
1%

Less than 1 year | 1 to 5 years
6 to 10 years | 11 to 20 years
Over 20

Figure 1.3
Source: Global Terrorism Database, 2014

The short lifespan of most terrorist groups is positive news because it suggests

that terrorism is generally not successful and, thus, not a long term problem for most

countries. Figure 1.3 demonstrates that 25% of groups are not able to exist beyond one

year. Even more interesting are the 1.26% of groups that persist for over 20 years. Long-

lasting groups such as ETA, IRA, and Al-Qaeda receive substantial attention, but are far

from the norm. Historically, most countries are able to defeat terrorist movements

because they are weak, do not have sufficient popular support, or have poor organization.

However, in many other cases, terrorist groups are able to survive because they operate in

ideal conditions.

Why India?

India is the primary focus of this project. Although it is only one country, it provides important variation on variables considered important in the terrorism literature. Many scholars seek to understand the relationship between democracy, Islam, poverty, inequality, ethnicity, federalism, population size, and terrorism. India is an ideal case to study because it provides variation of all of these variables. It is the world's largest democracy, has a federalist system, and is the second largest country in terms of population. It is incredibly diverse with over 2,000 ethnic groups, every major world religion represented, and 1652 languages and dialects, including 122 languages that have over 10,000 speakers (2010 Indian Census). Some of the world's richest billionaires and poorest people live within blocks of one another throughout major cities. India has a history of Islamic, Sikh, Hindu, and Christian violence and terrorism in addition to numerous ethnic conflicts throughout the country. Thus, understanding how terrorism operates in India gives insight into how and why terrorism may occur in other settings. However, even if understanding the complexities of terrorism in India does not provide great generalizability, it still generates an understanding of the world's largest democracy and second largest country, or 17.5% of the world.

India also has a substantial ethno-nationalist terrorism problem. There is nothing unique about the goals or tactics of ethno-nationalist terrorism in India compared to other countries. There are several similar groups throughout Asia and the world with remarkably similar goals and tactics. What is unique about India, and warrants examination, is why these groups have persisted for so long and carried out so many attacks. Outside of India, dozens of groups operate in similar circumstances. Analyzing

these Indian groups can provide an excellent means of comparison to other groups and understanding why they may fail or succeed.

Terrorism in India

India has a long history of terrorism. The Thugi, or Thugs, are recognized as some of the earliest terrorists. The Thugi roamed India killing travelers in dedication to the goddess Kali. In 450 years, they were responsible for thousands of deaths (Hoffman, 2006). In modern times, there are dozens of active terrorists groups throughout India that fight in the name of many causes, from Marxism and radical Islam to ethnic separatism and environmental rights. India's long relationship with terrorism has led some scholars to conclude that many romanticize terrorism as a tool the oppressed can use against the powerful oppressor (Kohli, 1990).

Since the end of the Thugi, India has experienced more acts of deadly terrorism than any other country.[2] Most of the acts of terrorism that occur within India are at the hands of minorities, or those claiming to represent them.[3] If these groups are inherently prone to committing terrorist attacks, then why do only some ethnic groups in some locations commit them? Most districts in India have never experienced a single attack. If ethnic diversity holds explanatory power, then India provides an excellent laboratory. Examining only one country also controls for many other outside potential explanatory factors like colonial history, freedom of the press, or regime type. Finally, the findings

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[2] Although the GTD lists Colombia and Peru as having the most terrorist attacks, over 50% of these attacks had 0 fatalities. Most of the terrorist attacks in India had at least 1-10 fatalities, while many attacks had hundreds.

[3] An ethnic minority includes Muslims, scheduled tribes or castes, and Naxalites, who may not always be members of a minority group but claim to represent their interests.

and theoretical reasoning that emerge from this case can be applied to other similar countries. The results likely extend to other terrorism-prone countries, including the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, Nigeria, and Indonesia.

The majority of terrorism in India is concentrated in three regions. The first region is Northeast India, or the Seven Sisters, shown below in figure 1.4. Northeast India is home to many separatist movements, including the United Liberation Front of Assam, the Bodo Liberation Tigers, the United National Liberation Front in Manipur, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, the National Liberation Front of Tripura, the Hmar People's Convention in Mizoram, and the Arunachal Dragon Force in Arunachal Pradesh. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal (2014), 115 groups native to India operate or have operated in the Northeast region in the last few decades. Most of the active terrorist groups are separatists who wish to either form a new country or become a new province or autonomous area. Geographically, the Northeast connects to India via the tiny Siliguri corridor. The region also shares borders with many of India's neighbors, including China, Bhutan, Myanmar, and Bangladesh. Despite the substantial number of terrorist groups in the region, the Northeast is the most sparsely populated area of the country.

Seven Sister States

Figure 1.4
Source Survey of India, 2014

The second region experiencing a large portion of terrorism in India is known as the Naxal belt. The Naxal belt, show in Figure 1.5 comprises a large portion of Central and Eastern India and segments of Southern India, such as Andhra Pradesh. The region is known as the Naxal belt because it is primarily where the Naxalite terrorist group operates. The Naxalites are a Maoist group that split from the Communist Party of India in 1967 (Ramakrishnan, 2005). The Naxalites are active in 180 districts in ten states and have a cadre strength between 20,000 and 50,000. The Naxalites operate in rural areas populated by scheduled castes and tribes. The Naxal areas are also among the most poor

and least literate regions of India (Thapaliya, 2007). Geographically, the region is less

populated than the remainder of India, and is characterized by flat, densely-forested,

terrain.

Figure 1.5
Source Survey of India, 2014

  The third region that experiences a substantial amount of terrorism in India is the

state of Jammu and Kashmir. Jammu and Kashmir, shown in figure 1.6, is located in

northern India and shares a border with Pakistan. The region has a long history of heated

disputes between India and Pakistan. Several wars have been fought over the territory,

and several domestic and international terrorist groups continue to operate in the area

including Lashkar e Toiba and Jaish e Mohammad. Nearly one-third of India's terrorist

attacks have occurred in Jammu and Kashmir, and it is considered one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world. Geographically, the state is located in the rugged areas of the Himalayas and borders Pakistan and China.

Figure 1.6
Source Survey of India, 2014

These three terrorism-afflicted areas in India seem to share few similarities, making it difficult to come to one conclusion of why terrorism exists where it does in India. This may leave some to assume that the causes of terrorism in one region are different from another. Despite what appears to be disparate regions in the country, it is still likely that similar explanations can determine why these regions are plagued with terrorism, while the rest of the country is not.

The Plan of the Dissertation

In the following chapters, I discuss the multifaceted relationship between terrain and terrorism. Chapter two reviews the literature that discusses terrorism in general, India-specific theories, and the overlap that exists between the two. The chapter also includes insights from the broader conflict literature. The overview of the literature will demonstrate the existing knowledge on the topic material and gaps in knowledge that exist.

Chapter three is the foundation of the project. In this chapter, I present a theory to explain the cause of terrorism in three disparate regions of India: Kashmir, the Northeast, and the Naxal Belt. I emphasize the compounding effects of geography on historical and modern economic, political, and social development. Poor development and weak institutions in the region not only nurture grievances in the population, but also make counterterrorism difficult. In addition to the low levels of development that make counterterrorism difficult, aggrieved groups exploit the geography of the region to launch their campaign. Rugged terrain, particularly forested terrain, affects state strength by inhibiting the ability of the state to utilize effective counterterrorism measures like helicopter surveillance, ground forces, and tanks. Responding to these types of groups would be difficult in developed locations; however, the underdevelopment and rugged terrain in the regions make it nearly impossible to defeat terrorist groups. Third, I discuss how rugged terrain creates financing opportunities for terrorist groups by offering ample resources to exploit and profit from on the illegal market, including marijuana, opium, timber, and coal. Finally, terrain, specifically access to an international border, provides access to international sanctuaries. International sanctuaries serve two important

purposes: First, they limit the ability of the state to pursue terrorists across borders. Second, they allow international agents to access terrorists groups and provide training and financing.

In the fourth chapter, I present my analyses of data collected from the Indian census, the global terrorism database, and the South Asian Terrorism Portal. I implement descriptive statistics and regression analysis to measure the relationship between terror attacks and my variables of interest. To supplement my descriptive and statistical analyses, I use GIS technology to visualize the data. The GIS data allows me to demonstrate the spatial dynamics of terror attacks in the country over time, and to see if attacks appear to cluster in certain geographic locations.

The fifth chapter provides an in-depth analysis of groups in India that have selected terrorism and peace as tactics to pursue their goals. I look at the peaceful Chipko movement in the rugged state of Uttarkhand to understand the dynamics that led this group to choose peaceful reconciliation of grievances. The Uttarkhand case demonstrates that rugged terrain, international borders, and grievances alone are not sufficient to lead to terrorism. Instead, the historical integration and development of the state was critical in preventing terrorism. I also analyze the peaceful movement of the Tamils in Southern India. The Tamils faced exclusionary policies and lived in a geographically similar region to the Naxals. However, the Tamils did not resort to violence. In the case of Tamil Nadu, I emphasize the importance of historical infrastructure and development in the state in preventing violence. Next, to analyze the path that leads to terrorism in Northeast India, I examine the ULFA terrorist movement in the state of Assam. Assam is a rugged, underdeveloped state with international borders. Assam also lacks critical infrastructure

and institutions due to historical exclusion. All of these factors helped make Assam a prime location for terrorism. Analyzing Assam and its history provides insight into how all the critical factors I discuss, interacted to eventually lead to terrorism in the state. Finally, to demonstrate the applicability of my theory outside of India, I include a brief analysis of Nigeria. In the final chapter, I discuss the implications of my findings and provide relevant policy recommendations.

2

Terrorism, Terrain, and Conflict around the World

If the literature has demonstrated one certainty, it is that there is no consensus on the root causes of terrorism. Any conclusions on 'root causes' are temporary at best. Instead, root causes of terrorism are dynamic and complex (Sinai, 2007). A variety of academic disciplines, ranging from anthropology, psychology, sociology, political science, philosophy, and criminology, have put forth sound theories that attempt to explain extremism and terrorism. These broad theories are often reflective of the existing theoretical approaches in the discipline, and much overlap exists.

Theoretical Frameworks

There are three prominent theoretical frameworks in the terrorism literature: rational choice theory, relative deprivation theory, and collective action theory. These frameworks attempt to explain how groups arrive at the decision to use terrorism. Beyond the broad theoretical frameworks, there are several additional theories that attempt to explain how domestic-level factors like poverty, exclusion, and underdevelopment explain terrorism. First, I provide a brief overview of the three theoretical frameworks. It is necessary to understand these broad approaches because they provide a theoretical background from which most detailed terrorism theories extend.

Relative Deprivation

Relative deprivation theory is a classical psychological approach to understanding violence. Gurr (1970) claims that men rebel when there is a 'perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities' (37). The stronger the perceived relative deprivation, the higher the likelihood of rebelling. This perceived deprivation occurs when economic, political, and cultural circumstances create discrimination, repression, and inequality. Relative deprivation can help create social movements, violent or nonviolent, because a group wants to acquire something that others have and which they believe they should possess as well.

Individuals with a poor socioeconomic background are also at a higher risk for radicalization (Al-Lami 2009; Pargeter 2006). Poverty, unemployment, underemployment, and low education can create a sense of frustration that makes one 'ripe for exploitation' (Pargeter, 2006). Higher levels of inequality in a society leave those at the bottom with increased levels of frustration and a propensity to rebel. Ultimately, deprivation can cause discontent, which in turn can lead to dissent. Whether this dissent is violent or not, though, depends on certain circumstances. Although the exact psychological process may not be clear, the general line of reasoning is that deprivation generates grievances, which channels frustration toward both the government and non-governmental entities as well. These grievances generate sympathies with similarly deprived actors who use these deprivations, grievances, and sympathies to generate anger and camaraderie in an attempt to change the status quo (Lichbach 1995).

Rational Choice Theory

According to rational choice theory, the behavior of individuals, groups, and states is purposive. Each one of these groups have goals they want to achieve, and will act rationally based on the information and resources available to them. To come to a tactical decision, the actor assigns a probability of success to each option and chooses the most practical and inexpensive option. The cost-benefit analysis is complex and difficult to understand to those who do not make the decision. From the outside, terrorism may seem like a costly and irrational option due to the high costs, which often include death and/or imprisonment. However, to the individual or a group, the costs of *not* pursuing a violent action may seem more costly.

Terrorists are goal-oriented and should be understood in the same decision-making calculus as other groups. Terrorism is generally a planned, calculated, and systematic act that displays the results of collective rationality (Crenshaw, 2011). Organizations arrive at a decision based on their assumptions about the efficacy of achieving their goal. These assumptions are informed by observation, experience, and ideology (Muller and Opp, 1986). Terrorism may seem more likely to achieve a goal when compared to its nearest alternative.

Terrorism may also be rational for a number of other reasons. For one, terrorists may learn from the experiences of others that it can be successful, which increases their own predicted probability of success. When the predicted probability of success is high, that option is more likely to be selected. Given India's history of negotiating with separatist groups, the probability for success is higher for groups in India than in many other locations. Groups may also resort to violence to compensate for their lack of ideological supporters (Zakaria, 2003). Most terror groups have relatively extreme

positions and goals, which limits the amount of potential supporters. This does not make terrorists bypass their goals. Instead, terrorism is a weapon of the weak used by those who lack conventional military power (Nasser-Eddine, et al 2011).

Collective Action Approach

Through collective action, the third common theory in the broad literature, groups can attempt to alter the status quo. Collective action refers to the actions taken by a group in an attempt to improve their social status and achieve a common goal (Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam, 1990). According to collective action theory, when a group sees a disadvantage that results in feelings of relative deprivation, it can help foster collective action (Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears, 2008). The collective action can result in some broad social movement that seeks change. The civil rights movement is a prime example of core political behaviors that can occur include civil disobedience, protests, demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, and organized violence.

There are four dimensions of collective action (1) discontent (2) ideology-feeding grievances (3) capacity to organize and (4) political opportunity (Oberschall, 1995; 2004). First, terrorist groups clearly have a political discontent with the state, which is what differentiates them from opportunistic criminals. Second, terrorist groups also have a substantial ability to organize, not only the fighters, but also a support system. To commit organized acts of violence, there must be high levels of trust among the members (Oberschall, 2004). Many terrorist members have known each other for years and share a dissident political subculture that strongly unites them (Wieviorka, 1993; Kurlansky, 1999; Obershchall, 2004). Moreover, members or supporters who defect from the organization may face violent retribution, including death. Third, participation in a

terrorist group often provides personal or selective incentives that maintain group cohesion (Olson, 1965). These types of selective incentives include potential leadership positions, elevated social status, physical protection of self and family, financial rewards, access to education or services otherwise unavailable, and wealth (Zakaria, 2003). When weighing the different potential outcomes of their choice, an individual may weigh the importance of elevated social status or physical protection as more important than likelihood of injury. In many locations, particularly in terrorism prone areas of India, the terror network provides safety, wealth, and status. Therefore, selective incentives may be weighted heavily when making the decision to join a terrorist organization.

Finally, terrorists generally act upon political opportunities. Terrorist groups often emerge following some shock in the political system, such as wars, coups, democratization, or repression. Organizations are able to capitalize on public discontent with the state in order to increase their support levels among the population. In many cases, terrorist groups may also rely upon other factors, such as state support and or a favorable international climate (Oberschall, 2004).

Although many may benefit from certain actions like a terrorist campaigns, there are associated costs that make it undesirable at the individual level, making it difficult to organize collectively. This difficulty is known as the collective action problem. Terrorism is not the first resort for most individuals, but the collective logic extends to them (Eager, 2008). When humans are frustrated, they often use aggressive means to negotiate the frustration (Rinehart, 2009). Using the rational model, groups may decide that violence is the most likely method to achieve their goals. However, the aggrieved group may still have difficulty getting enough members to act together. This is why

selective incentives are especially important in terror networks; they help overcome the collective action problem (Lichbach, 1995). Ethnicity or identity can also provide the social cohesion necessary to overcome the collective action problem (Arat, 2003).

These three dominant paradigms in the literature provide the appropriate background to understand the literature explicitly discussing the underlying causes of terrorism. The next section provides an overview of the dominant themes in the terrorism literature.

Explaining Terrorism

A brief look at the demographic profiles of terrorists shows that they can be uneducated and deprived or affluent and well-educated, and anywhere upon the continuum between both of these extremes. Although young men represent the largest demographic of terrorists, both men and women and individuals of all ages have participated in terrorism (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism also occurs in rich and poor states, democracies and autocracies, independent states and colonies, and in states with a majority Muslim, Christian, Hindu, Atheist, or Buddhist population. This high level of diversity makes it difficult to generalize about terrorism. Moreover, different types of terrorism may have different causes. Left-wing groups generally have different grievances than right-wing groups. Some scholars look at the individual and group level of analysis (Burton, 1978; Crenshaw, 1985; Horgan, 2003; Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Krueger, 2008; Bjorgo, 2011), while others focus on the domestic (Laquer, 1996; Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2006; Piazza, 2011) or international level (Hibbs, 1973; Kegley, 1990; Sandler and Enders; 2004; Piazza, 2007; Piazza, 2008) or a combination of all of these (Jongman, 1992; Hoffman, 1997; Combs and Hall, 2003; Bjorgo, 2005; Dugan,

Lafree, and Fogg, 2006; Enders, Sandler, Gaibulloev, 2011). Understanding terrorism is complex and difficult, but it is not impossible. Focusing on one specific case also gives additional insight into the causal mechanisms.

In the following pages, I will examine the key domestic factors that have been used to explain terrorism that are relevant to this project. These factors include poverty, inequality, underdevelopment, geography, and ethnicity and social exclusion. I give specific interest to the literature focusing on ethno-nationalist terrorism.

Poverty

One of the most divisive debates in the terrorism literature centers on the relationship between poverty and terrorism. Policymakers continually reference poverty as a root cause of terrorism. George W. Bush famously said, "We fight against poverty because hope is an answer to terror." The former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, claimed that social inequality, illiteracy and *poverty are the root causes of terrorism (Gorlick, 2009). The archbishop of Canterbury suggested that* terrorism is a result of the disease of poverty. According to the Archbishop, eliminating poverty will eliminate crime and terrorism (BBC, 2010).

The discussion of poverty and terrorism by prominent policymakers is reflective of the voluminous literature on the topic. Some of the first academic articles discussing terrorism appeared in the early 20th century. These articles often referred to personal bankruptcy, what we now refer to as poverty, as a cause of terrorism (Bedact, 1922). The widespread view that personal poverty creates terrorism has dominated much of the terrorism literature (Crenshaw 1981; Hoffman, 1996; Chen, 2003; Paxson, 2002; Li and Schaub, 2004; Stern, 2003). The presumed linkage between material want and terrorist

activity has been cited by countless political figures, and has shaped the debate of many issues from the invasion of Iraq to counter-terrorism policies.

However, it should be noted that there are different underlying conditions between individual poverty, state-level poverty, and propensity to commit acts of terrorism. A comprehensive empirical study of domestic and international terrorism conducted by Abadie (2006) finds no connection between state-level poverty and terrorism. According to Abadie, neither the richest nor the poorest states experience many attacks. Instead, the countries in the middle experience more attacks because the political circumstances in these countries are evolving and often unstable. Studies by Maleckova (2005) and Krueger (2003) on terrorism and poverty find no statistical relationship between either individual-level or state-level poverty. According to the authors, poverty on a national- or individual-level cannot explain the number of attacks a country experiences. Instead, the authors suggest that there is a more probable relationship between inequality and terrorism.

The World Bank (2008) estimates that around 80% of the world's population live on less than $10 per day, and 50% live on less than $2.50 a day. Although poverty is decreasing rapidly in the past several years, it is still a widespread issue (Brookings, 2011). An initial glance at the relationship between terrorism and state-level poverty reveals that of the 50 poorest countries in the world, only Afghanistan has experienced numerous attacks (GTD, 2014). The remaining 49 countries may experience other types of violence, but terrorism is not one of them. The missing relationship between state-level poverty and terrorism may be due to comparisons across different levels of analysis. For example, a poor state with widespread poverty will create different grievances than a

wealthy state with many poor people. When everyone in a country is poor, their main

concerns likely center around survival, whereas a poor individual in a rich country facing

inequality is frustrated with their status and seeks change.

Most of the literature analyzing poverty at the individual level finds no connection

between poverty and the tendency to commit acts of terrorism. In one of the first

empirical studies of terrorism and individual poverty, Russell and Miller (1977) find that

most terrorists surveyed came from middle-class backgrounds. More recently, Krueger

and Maleckova (2003) find that those who lived above the poverty line in Palestine were

more likely to be associated with the terrorist group Hezbollah. The authors also found

that higher-status respondents were more likely to support terrorism targeting Israel

compared to those of lower status. Berrebi (2004) finds similar results in Palestine.

Changes in economic conditions in Palestine had no effect on the number of attacks in

Israel. Other studies of individual terrorist backgrounds have found similar results. In the

largest study of individual terrorists to date, Marc Sageman (2004) found that 75% of all

respondents with ties to Al-Qaeda came from middle- or upper-class backgrounds.

Similarly, Brynjar and Skjølberg (2004) find socio-economic explanations to hold no

explanatory power in their study of terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Fieldwork analyzing individuals who join terrorist groups in Asia have provided

some different insights on individual-level poverty and terrorism. Jessica Stern (2003)

conducted substantial fieldwork in the Middle East and South Asia, interviewing

members of terrorist organizations. Her findings suggest that poverty plays a more

complex role than previously believed. Her findings in Pakistan are among the most

interesting. She studied the radicalization process in the madrassas of Pakistan. Stern

found that it was the poorest segments of society that were targeted for recruitment to radical madrassas. The radical madrassas Stern observed have greatly expanded in the last decade since her research (2003).

Sharmeen Obaid Chinoy's (2009) undercover documentary, *Pakistan's Taliban Generation*, support Stern's findings. Pakistan is a highly impoverished country with high illiteracy rates and high rates of terrorism. Chinoy found that terrorist recruiters continually exploit the poor in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Recruiters prey on the poor in rural areas, often targeting large families that cannot afford to send their children to school and offer free room, board, and education. Families of sons who commit suicide terrorism then receive substantial sums of money.

Limitations of the Poverty Literature

Although the case studies supplied by Chinoy and Stern offer support for the poverty theory, the majority of empirical analyses find a lack of evidence between poverty and terrorism. However, there are some flaws in these studies. For one, they often center on international terrorism, even though most terror attacks are domestic. Second, much of the individual profiling focuses on those with leadership roles in organizations, whereas most members of a terrorist organization are not leaders. Third, most of the empirical studies look at poverty at a national level instead of the poverty rate of individuals or groups compared to the rest of the country. Finally, most of the studies overwhelmingly concentrate in Israel and Palestine, Spain, or Ireland. While these cases can provide insight into terrorism since they experienced a lot of it, the findings not necessarily apply to other cases.

The findings from Stern and Chinoy's fieldwork are able to capture more personal level calculations. The glories of martyrdom and the opportunity to provide money to their family, albeit through their death, is often enough to lead young men to carry out suicide missions (Stern, 2000, Obaid, 2009; Thayer and Hudson, 2010; Kapoor, 2011). This type of personal motivation cannot be captured by most empirical studies. Lashkar e Toiba and Hizbul Mujahadeen use the *hawala* channel, or underground money network, to pay money to compensate terrorists' families (Kapoor, 2011). Following the 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, captured terrorist Ajmal Kasab admitted in an interview that his father had sold him to Lashkar e Toiba because the family needed the money for his sister's wedding (Sharma, 2008). A similar network is in place in Palestine and throughout many locations in the Middle East (Stern, 2000; Der Spiegel, 2007; Gurule, 2010). According to Arutz Sheva, the Palestinian authority allots $74 million of its budget for the families of Palestinian 'martyrs' (Arutz Sheva, 2014). Saddam Hussein also rewarded the families of suicide bombers with $25,000 (Grace, 2004).

The stories of compensation and rewards for terrorists and their families seem to challenge the generally accepted notion that individual poverty and terrorism are not related. However, most of these cases are anecdotal. Although investigations and firsthand accounts of the manipulation of poor people exist, there is no comprehensive academic study demonstrating a relationship. The anecdotal cases in Pakistan by Chinoy and Stern show that unequal economic and social relationships exist in Pakistan and are exploited in order to recruit terrorists. While these findings do not overturn the existing understanding of terrorism and poverty, they do demonstrate that the relationship between poverty and terrorism is more complex than previously understood. This

complexity seems to demonstrate the need to look beyond whether a country or individual is rich or not. A more fruitful approach may be one that investigates the relationship between inequality and terrorism. Being poor or rich seems too simplistic to understand something as complex as terrorism. Instead, the relationships between individuals and a group compared to the rest of the country may provide more insight. The next section investigates the relationship between inequality and terrorism.

Inequality

Scholars as early as Aristotle and Tocqueville theorized that human frustration is often the spark that ignites conflict. Frustration almost always has its root in some type of social, economic, or political inequality, whether perceived or real. Inequality can create feelings of powerlessness among communities and a desire to change their living situations. A sense of powerlessness at either the individual- or group-level can increase the likelihood of conflict (Shaw and McKay, 1942; Braithwaite, 1979; Blau, & Blau, 1982; Sampton & Grove, 1989; Messner and Golden, 1992; Quillian, 1998; Akers, 2000; Sambanis, 2004).

According to the World Bank (2013), 0.13% of the world's population control 25% of the world's wealth and the wealthiest 20% consume 80% of the world's goods. This form of vertical inequality, or inequality among individuals, is a major issue throughout the world, in both developing and developed states. The consequences of inequality extend far beyond money in the bank. Countries with high levels of inequality experience numerous social and economic hardships, including lower rates of civilian trust and access to healthcare and higher rates of imprisonment, health problems, homicide, infant and maternal mortality, and conflict (Wilkinsin and Pickett, 2009).

A more problematic form of inequality is horizontal inequality. Horizontal inequality occurs when resources and power are distributed unequally among groups of different ethnicities, religions and races (Ostby, 2008). There is ample evidence demonstrating that levels of crime are highest in communities with high horizontal inequality (Ehrlich, 1973; Bourguignon, 2001; Wilson & Daly, 1997; Chiu and Madden, 1998; Lederman et al., 2001; Demombaynes & Ozler, 2002). Galtung (1964) finds that aggressive behavior is most likely when disequilibrium exists along various social, ethnic, and economic classes. The consequences of horizontal inequality extend well beyond crime rates. States with high levels of horizontal inequality can nurture instability and violent political conflict (Muller, 1997; Nafziger and Auvinen, 2002). The probability of conflict rises with increased inequality among groups and increases instances of separatist violence (Østby, 2008; Murshed and Gates, 2005).

Horizontal inequality generally results in unequal opportunities and living conditions. Locations where different social and ethnic groups interact with one another have lower levels of ethnic violence (Varshney, 2001). According to Varshney, when diverse groups interact with one another, especially through civil society, it helps to develop trust among the groups and ultimately decrease feelings of frustration. In contrast, terrorism is most likely to occur in states with high levels of 'social distance' or 'social polarization' (De La Roche, 1996). According to Black (2004), terrorism is most destructive when the perpetrators are as socially removed from their victims as possible.

> 'An excellent social location for highly destructive terrorism would be a grievance against a powerful nation-state by a group ethnically and otherwise extremely far away in social space, such as the indigenous people of a colonial society or members of another society' (19).

Horizontal inequality along ethnic lines and can be particularly problematic for several reasons. For one, increased political inequality of minority groups may lead to increased amounts of violence in a state. Stewart (2000) finds that a combination of horizontal inequalities increases the likelihood of civil war. McCoy (2008) finds that one of the main root causes of conflict in Africa is horizontal inequality. Østby (2008) finds the horizontal inequality in developing states enhances grievances and group cohesion among deprived groups and can facilitate conflict mobilization by those groups.

Case studies of Sri Lanka (Gunatilaka & Chotikapanich, 2005) and Nepal (Murshed and Gates, 2003) confirm the horizontal inequality hypothesis. In Sri Lanka, strict economic, social, and political inequalities isolated the Tamil population from the majority Sinhalese population. The LTTE terrorist campaign followed harsh anti-Tamil legislation. The anti-Tamil laws made Sinhalese the official language of the state and Buddhism the official religion. The laws alienated much of the Hindu Tamil population and prevented them from obtaining government jobs and attending state schools. Within several years of the legislation, the Tamil population went from an affluent community to one that was highly impoverished with high unemployment levels (Gunatilaka & Chotikapanich, 2005; Oberst et al 2013).

In Nepal, horizontal inequality was a key factor in the recruitment of soldiers to the Maoist cause (Murshed and Gates 2003). Individuals most likely to join the revolutionary cause were those from landless families. The Nepalese monarchy and main political parties represented the interests of landed elite, specifically the Hindu Rajput. The dominant political parties consisted of high-caste Brahmins who promoted 'khasi hills nationalism' as a way of life (Oberst et al 2013). The monarchy considered those

from the Khasi Hills to be the most advanced Nepali people. According to the monarchy, Nepal could not advance until everyone looks and acts like those from the Khasi Hills. This ideology did not go over well with those outside the Khasi Hills. The Communist Party of Nepal and the Maoists began their ten-year insurgency on what they felt was unfair exploitation of the landless population (SATP Nepal Assessment 2013).

Limitations of the Inequality Literature

Although many studies confirm the importance of inequality, many other studies, particularly in the civil war literature, find no significance. This is of key importance because many of the grievances that lead to civil war overlap with grievances that lead to terrorism. Several studies have found that vertical inequality does not increase the risk for civil war (e.g. Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003). However, most of the studies that find no relationship between inequality and conflict fail to distinguish between vertical and horizontal inequality. Many studies rely on measures that only capture vertical inequality, such as the GINI index. However, such measures cannot capture the complexities that accompany broader horizontal inequality (Charles-Coll, 2011; Ostby, 2008).

Recent civil war literature has attempted to address the importance of horizontal inequality by differentiating it from vertical inequality. Østby (2008) introduced a measure of polarization that helped capture horizontal inequality and alienation. His study finds that social polarization and horizontal inequality can positively predict conflict whereas vertical inequality has no relationship. Distinguishing between vertical and horizontal inequality in the conflict literature is essential. For one, a group or individual may consider themselves socially or politically unequal, although their income

may not be vastly different from others. Many studies of terrorists in Europe and the Middle East find that the majority of terrorists are actually from middle- or upper-level economic classes (Russell and Miller, 1978; Krueger and Maleckova, 2002; 2003; De Mesquita, 2005; Bjorgo, 2005; Benmelech and Berebbi, 2007). However, looking only at income fails to account how many of these individuals may feel their group suffers from broader horizontal inequality.

Horizontal inequalities perceived as extensive and systematic can also aid in the recruitment for stateless Islamic movements. Many of the Islamist groups claim to act on behalf of what they consider exploitations of Muslims throughout the world. Exploited Muslims in Kashmir and Palestine are used as a rallying cry throughout the Muslim world, even though the less exploited may fight on their behalf. Some estimates show that nearly 62% of Al-Qaeda members have a university degree, a much higher percentage than the population they claim to be fighting for (Sageman, 2003). Similarly, Marxist insurgencies around the world often rally around exploited groups, even if they are not part of it. Groups from higher economic classes often join Marxist movements to fight on behalf of the exploited landless peasants, or in the case of India, the exploited landless untouchables (Chandra, 2013). Studies that only use income inequality to refer to inequality overlook other aspects of inequality that play critical roles in conflict.

Despite progress in the measurement of inequality and polarization in the civil war literature, the trend has not made much impact in the terrorism literature (Burgoon, 2006). Much of the terrorism literature remains qualitative or dependent upon the GINI index. Measuring horizontal inequality and terrorism is also complicated by the increasingly stateless nature of terrorism. Groups that fight against inequality and

exploitation may not be fighting for an exploitation they feel has occurred against them, it may be for someone else in another state. Fortunately, when studying separatist or ethno-nationalist terrorism, much of this problem is resolved since those fighting for independence often are the ones who feel exploited by the state.

One component that may contribute to horizontal inequality and social isolation is geographical isolation. Minorities often live in the periphery of the state and experience higher levels of poverty and isolation (Sachs, 2000; Bloom, Canning, Sevilla, 2003). Existing social isolation can be exacerbated by geographical isolation. Socially and geographically isolated minorities are at a much higher risk of horizontal inequality, which in turn can breed resentment and sympathy toward rebel movements. Moreover, although terrain is measurable, the method of measurement in most academic work on terrain is questionable (Pickering, 2014). Additionally, because terrain is constant and conflict is not, many may dismiss its importance. I suspect that terrain may play a more interactive and essential role than previously discussed. In the next section, I examine the literature on terrain and conflict. Specifically, how terrain can lead to underdevelopment and encourage conflict.

Geography

Nations are born, grow, fight, conquer, are conquered, become empires, and rise and fall on the great stage of physical geography and human passions and knowledge, and not on the homogeneous white planes on which we draw our diagrams.- Kenneth Boulding

Geography and Development

Despite somewhat limited research on the geography of conflict within borders, the literature suggests that violent conflict occurs most frequently in areas that have the following characteristics: remote and inaccessible, valuable natural resources, dispute

over property rights, high level of poverty, poor integration into democratic institutions, poor public services, and ethnic diversity (FAO, 2005). Generally, the rugged, particularly forested regions, of the world contain all of these factors. This same secluded land not only provides a hiding place, but the resources also provide financing for militant activities. However, research on forests and conflict or terrorism is limited.

A brief and anecdotal look around the world reveals the association between ruggedness, underdevelopment, and conflict. Nepal is situated in the most rugged mountains in the world, remains very economically, politically, and socially underdeveloped (UNDP, 2013), and dealt with a Maoist insurgency for over a decade. Colombia and Chechnya are also located in harsh mountainous environments with decade's long insurgencies. Although Colombia and Chechnya are not as underdeveloped as Nepal or Afghanistan, the conflict regions are underdeveloped in contrast to the rest of the state.

Perhaps no other country's geography receives more attention than Afghanistan. Afghanistan is often called the graveyard of empires. Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, the British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States have all invaded Afghanistan, but none have emerged victorious. Babur, the founder of the Mughal dynasty, claimed, 'Afghanistan has not been and never will be conquered, and will never surrender to anyone' (Hassan, 2010). The landscape of Afghanistan is bleak. The country of rugged mountains and vast deserts has the lowest literacy rate in the world and has been embroiled in conflict for centuries (Haidari, 2011). In addition to the terrain, the harsh weather makes Afghanistan difficult to fight and operate in logistically.

Although the relationship is not simplistic, terrain and geography can affect economic development (Kamarck, 1976; Mellinger, Sachs, & Gallup, 2000; Sachs, 2001; Gallup & Sachs, 2001; Sachs & Malaney, 2002; Rappaport & Sachs, 2003). Jeffrey Sachs (1997) found several interesting correlations between geography and poverty. For one, landlocked countries experience higher levels of poverty (Faye, 2004). He explains this is most likely reflective of the lost economic potential that is standard with access to coastlines and international markets. Although Sachs study is cross-national, he mentions that hinterlands within states (such as Uttar Pradesh in India) are often less developed than provinces with a water boundary.

Geography can affect development in several ways. For one, the profitability of an economic activity, such as agriculture, mining, and industry, are often determined by geographic features. No one will invest in an unforgiving or harsh environment if more ideal locations exists (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger, 1998). Other social factors, such as the health of the population and the desirability of living and investing in a particular place, often relate to geography (Sachs, 1998). Even within the United States, much of the poorest population centers on the Appalachian Mountain Range (Fessler, 2014). In the United States and most countries, people cluster near coasts. Drylands, highlands, and mountains are generally poorer and offer fewer opportunities because of their climatic and geographic environment (Sachs, 2012).

Geography can also affect the economic and political destiny for some states. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) find that Sub-Saharan Africa's geography is largely responsible for its weak government and underdevelopment. Even Adam Smith noted that much of central Africa's geography would inhibit its economic growth (1776).

Geography can also help explain the uneven spatial distribution of literacy and educational levels (Scott, 2009).

The uneven distribution of literacy is an important component to analyze when discussing terrorism since education can have a mediating effect on conflict. Scholars as early as Aristotle note that education creates a culture of peace (Sargent, 1996). Lipset (1959) emphasized the importance of education in society. According to Lipset, education broadens men's outlook and allows them to develop norms of tolerance. Higher levels of education increase the opportunity cost for young people and makes them less likely to join a rebellion (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Not surprisingly, an increase in educational spending can reduce grievances because it promotes economic and social development (Thyne, 2006). Education can also nurture notions of citizenship, including healthy skepticism, tolerance for diverse groups, an empowered middle class, and stable societies (Sanborn & Thyne, 2014).

Not only do rugged areas often have lower literacy rates, but they often have poor political development as well. Governments generally see forested and rugged areas as peripheral locations with limited economic or political importance (Goodhand, 2003). Any attention to the region is frequently centered on extracting resources. Consequently, most rugged regions receive minimal public services (Gallup, Gaviria, and Lora, 2003). The lack of proper institutions further marginalizes already isolated groups and leaves them to compete over limited resources (Le Billon, 2001; Starr, 2002). The scant economic and employment opportunities in the region make taking up arms appear to be the most profitable means of employment (FAO, 2005).

The state and corporate focus on the extraction of resources generally limits investment in rugged regions, further exacerbating the problem. Infrastructure development, particularly the installation of roads, communication networks, and electricity, is limited in remote regions (Boulding, 1962; le Billon, 2000; Global Witness, 2003). Locations with unfavorable or rugged geography can also prevent states and companies from investing in regions where production is expensive. Unfavorable topography can limit proximity to global markets, and makes investors consider conditions expensive or unfavorable for investment. Not only does this intensify underdevelopment, but it also limits job opportunities for locals.

The rail system was a prime example of the importance of geography. The railroad system was the most important technological advancement in the world during the Industrial Revolution. European colonizers generally developed some level of infrastructure in their colonies. However, the infrastructure, particularly the railways, were constructed to serve the export economy. In Angola and Namibia, the Portuguese and the Germans built expansive railways, but they led directly from mining plantations to the seaports (Goldstein and Pevehouse, 2013). In India, the railways were central in integrating markets and increasing trade (Bogart and Chaudhary, 2012). During the era of rapid development, the British initiated a mass expansion of the infrastructure, including railways, roads, canals, bridges, and a telegraph system. In India, an advanced infrastructure was necessary to transport Indian goods back to England. However, remote areas were considered too expensive to invest in the development of rail. Consequently, much of India was left behind (Bogart and Chaudhary, 2012). Just as geography affected the developmental path of many countries, geography may also affect whether or not

locations experience conflict. The next section explores how geography can aid in the creation and continuance of conflict.

Geography and Conflict

Boulding (1962) was among the first academics to measure the impact of geography on conflict. The loss of strength gradient he introduced claims that as distance from the capital increases, the ability of the state to project power decreases. The loss of strength becomes especially pronounced when the terrain becomes increasingly rugged. Several scholars have since implemented Boulding's loss of strength gradient to measure the likelihood of civil war onset (Herbst, 2000, Buhaug and Gates, 2002, Herbst, 2004, Cederman, 2008, Buhaug et al., 2008, Salehyan, 2010, Buhaug, 2010). The empirical evidence lends support to these longstanding claims. Rebels seek out, or exploit, remote areas in order to wage violent campaigns. In Cuba, for example, the 26th of July movement began in the remote and mountainous regions of the east before moving toward Havana (Macauley, 1978). In general, twentieth century insurgencies have depended on rural based guerillas to succeed (Millen, 2004).

Although the terrorism literature has limited discussions of geography, the civil war literature can provide more insight. Numerous studies find that rebels prefer to operate from peripheral bases, particularly in mountainous or densely forested regions. These regions provide safe havens from government forces (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, Collier et al., 2004, DeRouen and Sobek, 2004, Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Rugged terrain also inhibits the ability of the state to maneuver freely. Areas with rugged terrain generally have a decreased presence of military and police personnel since the area is

difficult to inhabit, and there is generally a smaller population (Scott, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Le Billon, 2001; McNeeley, 2003; Starr, 2002).

Limitations of the Geography Literature

Despite the findings that seem to indicate the importance of geography, there are still some additional factors to consider. For one, due to technological and infrastructural advancements such as drones, missiles, and satellite technology, the importance of terrain may be decreasing. Scott (2009) claims that geography is irrelevant in the post-WWII era. Even in 1962, Boulding remarked that "Everywhere now is accessible to everybody; there are no nooks, corners, or retreats left, and no snugly protected centers of national power" (272). Certainly, advanced technology has decreased the importance of geography since the time of Sun Tzu. However, it does not change the fact that rebels win more battles now than at any point in the last two centuries (Arreguin-Toft, 2001, Lyall and Wilson, 2009). Even the most powerful states in the world, such as the Soviet Union and the United States, failed to defeat guerilla forces in Afghanistan and Vietnam.

The literature provides two conclusions concerning the role of terrain and conflict. First, rugged terrain can lead to underdevelopment by preventing economic, social, and political progress. Underdevelopment of certain regions in a state creates horizontal inequality, and horizontal inequality is a factor that can lead to conflict (Østby, 2003). Second, ruggedness can decrease the ability of the state to sanction behavior. Despite technological advancements by the state, rebels are still capable of utilizing the land to their advantage. Rugged terrain provides distance and refuge away from the state. The influence of distance on conflict is amplified even further when ethnic and religious

minorities inhabit these rugged underdeveloped locations. In the next section, I explore

how ethnicity and social exclusion can affect the likelihood of uprisings.

Geography, Ethnicity and Social Exclusion

Since geography and underdevelopment appear to be related, it should come as no

surprise that some of the longest conflicts in the world occur in the most remote and

rugged areas of the world. FARC has waged a forty-year long conflict in Colombia in the

remote and mountainous areas. The thirty-year uprising by the Shining Path took place in

the rugged Andes. The centuries-long conflict between the Karen and Shan has been

fought in the remote rugged outposts of Myanmar. The dense tropical forests and marshes

led the U.S. to have substantial difficulty fighting the Viet Cong during the decade long

Vietnam War. Currently, the terrain of Afghanistan has prevented the U.S. from

consolidating control of the country after a decade of occupation. Much of Sri Lanka's

civil war was fought in the remote forests in the north of the island. Similarly, the MILF

of the Philippines operated in the island of Mindanao, often referred to as the most

geographically diverse location in the world (World Wildlife Fund). In southern

Thailand, the Muslim minority group waging war against Thailand operated in the

Southern provinces, an area they calculated as beyond the sovereign control of Bangkok

(Chalk 2008). Indigenous forest-dwelling groups have also participated in violent

conflict in the Chittagong Hills of Bangladesh, southeast Para in Brazil, the Amazon in

Peru and Colombia, the Quiché and Alta Verapaz in Guatemala, West Papua in

Indonesia, the Chiapas in Mexico, and the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua (McNeeley, 2003;

FAO 2005; Alvarez 2003).

Many of the conflicts described above happened at the behest of indigenous or ethnic minorities located in the rugged regions of their state. The rugged regions of the world are more likely to host conflict for a number of reasons. Not only are the areas often remote and inaccessible, but the land and its resources are often disputed among several groups (FAO 2005). Ethnic minorities and indigenous groups generally reside in the more rugged areas of a state (Kaimowitz, 2003). In addition to the lack of public services, these regions are often excluded from democratic and political institutions, and there is a widespread resentment of outsiders since they often try to reap the benefits from the forest's resources without providing any development (Nag, 2002; Vadlamannati, 2011; Kamrang, 2013).

All of the factors explained above seem to hold explanatory power in India. India is rife with poverty and inequality, geographic ruggedness, and social exclusion. Despite widespread acts of terrorism in the region, minimal scholarly research has been devoted to it. In fact, the amount of rigorous scholarly work discussing terrorism in the country is either very outdated or almost non-existent. In the next section, I review the literature on conflict in India. Although my research focuses explicitly on terrorism, it is necessary to draw from the broader conflict literature on India, because there is such limited research.

<div align="center">**Terrorism and Separatism in India**</div>

Background

India was the crown jewel of the British Empire for over a century. European powers had influence in the region as early as the 16th century when the Dutch entered western India. After nearly half a millennia of European influence, the Indian population became weary of their presence. Most of the Western world associates the Indian

independence movement with peaceful resistance and its figurehead Mahatma Gandhi. Although Gandhi had undeniable influence in the eventual independence of India, there was also a long history of violent revolt and separatism.

The British consolidated their rule in India following the Sepoy mutiny in 1857. The Sepoy mutiny was a violent revolt throughout India, led by Indian soldiers (sepoys) against British rule. Mangal Pandey, a sepoy, likely triggered the revolt when he killed a British officer. The increasing power of the British was upsetting the sepoys, but the breaking point came when the sepoys discovered their rifles contained grease from cows and pigs, animals considered unclean to Muslims and Hindus. The Sepoys felt the British intentionally disrespected their religious beliefs while simultaneously exploiting them. Widespread violence spread throughout the country following the murder of the officer. Sepoys began killing their commanding officers throughout the country, and the use of guerilla warfare was widely utilized. The Indians ultimately lost their battle against the British, and the revolt led to the official establishment of British authority in India (James, 1997).

Other violent revolutionaries like Bhagat Singh played a significant role in the independence movement. Bhagat Singh is one of the most well known independence leaders in India, and is arguably more admired than Gandhi in his homeland (Lal, 2007). Bhagat Singh was a Marxist revolutionary and independence leader. Singh was upset about British-led violence against peaceful protestors, particularly the death of a leading activist. Singh took revenge by killing a British police officer and bombing the central legislative assembly. Singh was jailed for murder and undertook a 116 day fast that received the attention and support of the nation. Despite the wide scale support, Singh

was convicted and ultimately hanged at the age of 23. Singh inspired dozens of other youth to partake in violent actions against the British occupiers, although none ever achieved the status of Singh (Lal, 2013).

Ultimately, India achieved independence not because of revolutionary violence like Singhs, but through peaceful resistance led by Gandhi and the weakness of the British following WWII (James, 1997). Gandhi envisioned a secular inclusive country for both Hindus and Muslims, but ultimately the two-state solution prevailed and India was partitioned (Oberst et al, 2013). Hindus were to live in India and Muslims in Pakistan. The partition established the notion in the Indian psyche that separation is the solution (Guha, 2007). After independence, a partition in thought also prevailed among minorities. The first line of thought followed Singh's tactic of violent resistance. The second followed Gandhi's peaceful resistance. Throughout India, both tactics have been used by minorities who are unhappy with the status quo, and both tactics have experienced some level of success. Once India became independent, several states, including Tamil Nadu and Assam, sought independence immediately. Although they did not succeed, the legacy of separatism remains (Kumar, 2006).

Terrorism continues to be a tactic used throughout India, but not by everyone. As previously discussed, it is particularly common in three regions: the Northeast, the Naxal Belt, and Kashmir. Is there something different about these three regions that can explain why inhabitants in these areas resort to terrorisms frequently? Many scholars have attempted to address this exact question and all came to very different conclusions. There seems to be a few prominent explanations in the existing literature, including colonial and Indian legacies of exclusion, ethnicity, and poverty and inequality.

Colonial Legacy and Early Days of Independence

Many Indian scholars point to the legacy of British colonial rule that further politicized existing ethnic and class cleavages (Bajpai, 2002; Chadha, 2005). Scholars consider the damage the British did to the subcontinent to be extensive and irreversible. Yet there is minimal research that asserts a causal arrow between colonialism and modern day terrorism in India. Nonetheless, to many the legacy of the British is a negative one that created ethnic tensions, inequality, and underdevelopment, all factors that can nurture terrorist movements.

Other scholars do not consider the British legacy to be entirely negative. Association with Britain, as opposed to other colonial powers, is considered more conducive to democracy (Blondel, 1972:169; Huntington, 1984:206; Lipset, Seong, and Torres, 1993:169).   British colonies are also known for their higher levels of infrastructure development. Several scholars discuss how the British developed strong education systems, transportation, communication, well-trained bureaucracies using local personnel, and rule of law (Von der Mehden, 1964; Moore, 1966; Dahl, 1971; Weiner, 1987; Hadenius, 1992; Diamond, 1998; Brown, 1999; Abernethy, 2000).

While some benefits of British colonization cannot be overlooked, the British motive was not to aid the Indian population. As the British gained control of the subcontinent, one of their first priorities was the monetization of the economy, allowing the colonial government to collect revenue (Nath, 2005). The resulting enclave economy generated minimal benefit to the local population. Any development that did occur was guided by the objective of maximizing profit for the colonial government. Some commercial activities took place in the state of Assam because of its massive amount of

tea gardens, but even the laborers for the tea gardens were generally drawn from outside the region (Khamrang 2013). Thus, all British activity in the region resulted in minimal development for the locals, particularly the tribal populations (Mukherjee 2014).

The tensions between tribal and non-tribal communities did not exist since the beginning of the Indus valley civilization. Instead, many Indian scholars suggest the conflict is an artifact of the British occupation (Khamrang, 2013). As the British tried to expand into the tribal regions of India, they received great push-back from the local communities. The Hill tribes, specifically the Nagas and Mizos, responded violently by kidnapping and killing several British officials and carrying their heads as trophies (Nag, 2002). Not surprisingly, the British were outraged by the deaths and the Nagas and Mizo communities faced punishment (Khamrang, 2013). Following the attacks, the British sought to integrate all of the tribal regions of the Northeast into the Raj, but later abandoned their attempts following immense difficulties involved in the exercise (Bhaumik, 2009). By 1873, the British instituted a line of control, which left the tribal people to manage their own affairs and governance without any British intervention (Kar, 2009). The line of control also blocked any migratory movement to or from the region (Nag, 2002).

Historically, the states of the Northeast did not identify with mainland India. The region was quite different and diverse from the mainland, including different customs, language, and traditions. This made integration during the colonial and post-colonial period very difficult (Bhawmik, 1998). Not surprisingly, just as the various ethnic groups had rejected British advances during colonialism, they also rejected independent India's suggestions to integrate. Following independence, countless groups demanded secession

(Inoue, 2005). Anti-Indian sentiment was actually a uniting force throughout much of Northeast India.

The entire blame for unrest in the Northeast cannot rest on the British alone. As India became independent and started forming the new states and their boundaries, the newly formed government grossly ignored the region and its complexities (Vadlamannati, 2011). States continued to be carved out of the intricate region until 1987. Although the constantly changing boundaries satisfied some, it generally resulted in massive discontent and the assertion of a northeast, non-conformist separatist identity (Das, 2007).

Instead of addressing the discontent of the inhabitants of these states, the Indian response was more aggression. The 1958 Armed Forces Special Power Act (AFSPA) gave the military permission to act beyond their usual rules of order in Northeast India and Kashmir. The AFSPA allowed the military to shoot to kill, detain individuals without court orders, search and seize any location without a warrant, stop and search any person or vehicle, and gave army officers legal immunity for their actions (Joshi 2013). The law was called 'draconian,' 'hateful,' and a 'violation of basic human rights' by the UNHCR (NDTV 2012). The NGO Human Rights Watch labeled the act a tool of state abuse, oppression and discrimination (HRW 2012).

The extra-judicial killings, torture, rape, abuse, and disappearance under the law increased the widespread discontent in already unstable areas (Nambath 2011). In an assessment of the state of Manipur under the AFSPA, The American Consul General found that

'Manipuris did not have the same rights of other Indian citizens and restrictions on travel to the state added to a sense of isolation and separation from the rest of India proper. Several Manipuris, argued that they had greater rights under the British Raj than under the present federation (Nambath 2011).'

Ultimately, it seems that the states with a legacy of resistance during the British colonial era continue their resistance to this day. The lawmakers of independent India have chosen to follow the example of their British predecessor and promote a policy of isolation and punishment. Unfortunately, it seems that the policy preferred by the British and the Indians has resulted in an increase in discontent and resistance. To complicate factors, the sensitive topic of ethnicity plays an important and underlying role. The next sections explore the complex and dynamic role of ethnicity and conflict in India.

Ethnicity

India is one of the most diverse countries in the world. There are over two thousand ethnic groups, every major religion, and 1,652 languages (2010 Indian Census). Only the continent of Africa exceeds the linguistic and ethnic diversity of India, yet India is only a quarter the geographic size of Africa. With this many diverse groups compressed into a relatively small geographic location, there is bound to be some disagreement.

India is a parliamentary, federal, state with a first past the post multi-party system. In addition to the two major parties, the Indian National Congress and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, there are numerous regional- and ethnically-aligned parties. Ethnicity is of central importance in Indian politics (Devotta, 2002). In fact, there are more parties formed around ethnic identity in India than ideology (Huber and

Suryanarayan, 2013). Elites use ethnicity to identify themselves and target voters of a similar background (Chandra 2004 and Posner 2005). Winning parties then use their power to distribute resources to the groups that provided support (Huber and Suryanarayan 2013). The BJP Hindu nationalist party, elected in May 2014, uses identification with conservative Hinduism to appeal to the majority Hindu population, for example. Hindu nationalist parties argue that Muslim migrants will cause a demographic shift in India and slowly erode India's Hindu identity (DiSilvio, 2007). This rhetoric is especially prevalent in locations with high numbers of Bangladeshi migrants, such as East and Northeast India (Gillan 2002).

Some scholars claim that cultural differences and primordialist loyalties to tribe make India a likely conflict zone (Huntington, 1996). State targeting of ethnic minorities has made groups identify more excessively with their group as they feel their identity is under attack (Vadlamannati, 2011). Homer Dixon (1999) claims that India may be particularly prone to conflict because of its diversity coupled with high population growth and resource scarcity. As resources become limited, groups identify more intensely with their ethnicity in an attempt to gain access. Toft (2003) suggests that the higher concentration of ethnic minorities in a region, the more likely they are to secede. What factor is ultimately the driving force between agitation and action? Many scholars suggest that ethnicity can help overcome the collective action problem and facilitate mobilization because it is such a powerful organizing force. Although only a few committed individuals are needed for terrorism, shared identity plus group-level discrimination can be sufficient to mobilize a larger group with a common grievance (Murshed & Gates,

2005; Østby, 2008; Østby, Nordås & Rød, 2009). A larger, more organized group will also make it more difficult for the state to defeat the terrorist movement.

Ethnicity plus exclusion can be a powerful combination with disastrous results. Wimmer and Min (2010) find that impoverished ethnic groups that are also excluded from political decision-making are the groups most likely to violently challenge the state. Vadlamannati (2011) finds considerable support for his social exclusion thesis. His analysis of nine northeast Indian states finds that absolute poverty in addition to economic and political discrimination of minority groups is positively related to incidences of conflict. The next section explores how poverty and inequality manifest themselves in India and help promote an environment conducive to conflict.

Poverty and Inequality

At the 2004 social summit in Mumbai, numerous business executives and politicians gathered to discuss the prevailing political and social woes in India. One theme emerged from the conference is that poverty and terrorism are exclusively linked (Ayar, 2004). Just as George Bush proclaimed poverty as the root of terrorism, so too have Indian politicians. Indian businessman and politician S P Hinduja claims that poverty is the root cause of terrorism and social unrest in India: "Unless the issue of poverty is solved, terrorism, which is a result of economic disparities between the rich and the poor will continue to thrive" (Deccan Herald 2013).

Hinduja echoes the sentiment of many throughout India. Several scholars throughout India feel that poverty and uneven development can explain much of the conflict in the country. Das Gupta et al. (2014) claim that uneven development is at the root of the social and communal conflicts throughout Northeast India. Uneven

development, according to the authors, creates social and communal conflict in addition

to the displacement of large portions of the population. Other scholars feel that poverty

in conjunction with other factors, particularly corruption, poor administration, and human

rights abuses, can explain the conflict in the Northeast (Mukherjee 2014; Kumar, 2006).

Rajagopalan (2008) and Arambam (2007) claim that institutional breakdown in Northeast

India has resulted in gross underdevelopment in the region. Underdevelopment coupled

with powerful and corrupt tribal elite lead many in the region to have little to no faith in

the national or local political leadership (Grossman, 2002; Mentschel, 2007).

As India's market liberalized in the mid-1990s, economists and politicians looked

to integrate northeast India into the broader economy through the 'Look East' policy.

The Look East policy still failed to develop the region. According to the World Bank

(2006), Northeast India is caught in a poverty trap. The Ministry of Development of

North Eastern Region claims that approximately 426 billion Indian Rupees (approx. US

$9.3 billion) was spent on the region between 1998 and 2006. Although ten percent of

the total annual budget was allocated to the region, the economic development of the

region has not been very successful (Bhatia, 2009). If anything, the policy has backfired

(Vadlamannati, 2011). An analysis of the development of the region after 1990 finds that

the development policy actually disintegrated the region even further and increased

regional disparity, consequently intensifying conflict in the region (Khamrang, 2013).

Extractive industries were the primary means at an attempt to develop the region.

As multi-national companies located in the region, jobs were created, but not for the

locals. The profits of companies located in the region increased, but unemployment and

poverty levels remained unchanged or even increased (Peet, 2006). Locals living in the

area reported rampant exploitation of resources by the government and affiliated MNC's without generating benefit to the people (Roy, 2011). In many cases, locals gave up their lands to corporations for the promise of wealth, yet received minimal compensation (Khamrang, 2013). A World Bank report studying development in Northeast India had similar conclusions. The 2006 report finds that much of the civil strife in Northeast India has origins in the economic inequality of the region (World Bank, 2006). Development programs attempting to remedy the rampant inequality are formulated so narrowly that they rarely address the needs of the people living in the region (McDui-Ra, 2008). There has been hardly any decrease in inequality throughout India in the last four decades, particularly in the states of the Northeast where conflict is most rampant (Das Gupta et al. 2014). One Indian scholar suggested that this is not because the region is neglected, but because the people in the region are neglected and victimized in the pursuit of transforming the region (Khamrang 2013).

In an attempt to remedy the inequality of the region and promote infrastructure development, the state turned to neo-liberal economic policies centered development programs in the region. Prominent examples of the reforms are special economic zones. These economic zones converted already locally active areas into newer ones that ultimately led to farmers, fisherman, and agricultural laborers being displaced (Nag, 2002). The construction of dams was seen as an important element of promoting development, yet they resulted in massive displacement of already poor tribal populations who were dependent on the agriculture of the region (World Bank, 2006). Negligence by the government has resulted in a growing sense of alienation among the people. Locals begin to feel frustrated at their dire living conditions and inability of the state to address

their needs. The locals' frustration with the government creates sympathy with non-state actors who promise deliverance from the chains of government corruption, apathy, and inefficiency (Baruah, 2005; Biswas, 2007). The sympathy toward separatist groups is intensified among many locals since they already have high levels of distrust toward outsiders due to a history of exploitation and isolation.

This chapter has given an overview of the existing literature and some of the underlying causes among poverty, inequality, exclusion, history, geography and terrorism. Chapter 3 explores the history of isolation and social exclusion at the hands of the British during the colonial era. The independent government tried to remedy some of the isolationist policies of the British, but later reinforced and even intensified exclusionary policies. These isolationist and exclusionary policies resulted in economic, social, and political underdevelopment. Underdevelopment and exclusion led to widespread grievances among the excluded population. Ultimately, the aggrieved and excluded population was able to utilize the geography that had once historically excluded them to launch successful terrorism campaigns. The existing terrorism literature has devoted very little attention to the intricate relationship among historical context, development, and geography. Although some attention has been given to geography, underdevelopment, and historical legacies separately, there has been a failure to discuss the probable connection between all three. My research attempts to fill this gap, and by doing so, advance the understanding of terrorism.

3

The Argument: Trains, Terrain, and Terrorism

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In this chapter, I attempt to incorporate many of the existing theories in the terrorism literature and some new explanations into an overarching theory. Ethnicity, inequality, poverty, colonial legacy, social exclusion, and geography all play important roles in terrorism. However, there is a less discussed path among history, underdevelopment, geography and terrorism. This chapter puts forth the theory that colonial history, geography, and development are all closely related, but they are not endogenous. Historical exclusion at the hands of the British occurred because of rugged geography and led to underdevelopment and exclusion. Underdevelopment and exclusion exacerbated grievances among the population, but these grievances alone were not sufficient to lead to terrorism. Instead, aggrieved groups were able to utilize the same geographic features and underdevelopment that once isolated them to lead a successful terror campaign. If it were not for these geographic features, the groups would have not been successful. In the following pages, I explore how the relationship between geography and colonial development affected political, economic, and social development, and ultimately gave rise to terrorism. The overview of my theory is expressed in figure 3.1.

Theoretical Expectations

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                        ┌─────────────────────┐
                        │  Colonial Exclusion  │
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        │   Rugged Geography   │      │ International Borders │
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
Figure 3.1

In Figure 3.1, causal arrow 1 demonstrates how rugged geography prevented the British from developing many locations throughout India. Lack of development resulted in weak institutions, poor infrastructure, and a weak government apparatus. Locations that were excluded by the British suffered poor economic, political, and social development in addition to rampant marginalization. The exclusion resulted in underdevelopment that created grievances in the native population (causal arrow 2). The native population that was originally marginalized due to geography then used the geography to their advantage in order to maintain a prolonged terrorist campaign (causal arrow 3). Each of these components and their importance to the development of the terrorist campaign are explained in detail in the following pages.

Legacies of Exclusion

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
Figure 3.2

The purpose of this section is to establish how rugged geography shaped the British colonial experience, which in turn resulted in underdevelopment. Causal arrow 1 emphasizes the importance of geography during British colonialism of India. Geography was central under the Raj and determined many administrative decisions, particularly exclusion. India has 4,600 miles of coastline and it is not coincidental that the most developed cities are also on or near the coast. Because the British were extracting Indian resources to send back to England, quick and cheap access to the coast was essential. The waterways continue to be a strategic aspect of India's development with India's most developed city, Mumbai, sitting on the Indian Ocean. Development of the interior was avoided because it was generally considered too costly. Although resources existed, they were not considered abundant enough to develop an entire infrastructure (Oberst, 2013). Not only did the terrain and lack of waterways make transport of goods difficult, but the substantial distance to the coast could not justify wide-scale development of infrastructure.

As the British began their resource extraction, they also began to develop institutions and infrastructure. As a result, British colonizers left an education system, a well-trained bureaucracy, and a transportation system throughout much of India, but they did not do so equally across the entire country. Some locations, such as modern Gujarat, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Kerala, and Chennai, became well-established economic powerhouses with advanced institutions. These locations have globally-ranked universities, diversified economies, and excellent transportation infrastructures. In contrast, many locations in India, such as Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Kashmir, and the majority of the seven sister states of the Northeast, were excluded. To this day, they are underdeveloped and have difficulty integrating into the mainstream political process due to their economic and political underdevelopment (Vadlamannati, 2011).

The colonial legacies of development are discussed richly throughout the literature (Robinson and Gallagher, 1961; Gann and Duignan, 1962; Denoon, 1983; Cain and Hopkins, 1993; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001). Many scholars emphasize the method that a state was colonized holds predictive power for its future success. For example, French and Belgian extractive colonization in Africa prevented the development of institutions whereas British colonization with a foundation in British common law helped promoted strong institutions (Hayek, 1960; Lipset, 1994). However, the discussion of how geography shaped colonial development is discussed less frequently. In the case of India, agricultural production, trade, and powerful states were geographically concentrated in the deltas of western and southern India. These locations had either international coastal access or easy access to the Ganges. The coasts and deltas were resource rich and had higher crop yields due to the fertile soil and water resources in

the area. The costs of transportation and trade were low in these locations because the geography was flat and access to the waterways made transport easy (Das Gupta et al., 2014). Long distance transportation in the forested and upland regions was expensive and inefficient, making trade and investment in those regions rare. Not surprisingly, the directly ruled territories the British invested in were primarily coastal areas, delta, and floodplains. The uplands and forests were either princely states or excluded territories (Oberst et al., 2013). Over time, the increased revenue and British concentration in the directly ruled areas led to greater investment on public goods such as education and healthcare (Roy, 2013).

Like much of Northeast India, Kashmir, and the central plains, the provinces of modern Pakistan were primarily ruled indirectly. The British invested very little in the land that would become Pakistan. At independence, Pakistan inherited 23% of British India's land and 17.5% of the former government's financial assets (Talbot, 2000; Oberst et al. 2013). Ninety percent of industry and income were located in the new country of India (Oberst et al, 2013).

The British invested very little in modern day Pakistan for several reasons. For one, the Gurdaspur-Kathiawar salient, a watershed that aligns almost perfectly with the Pakistan-India border, had all the water going east toward India. Modern day Pakistan was the unstable frontier of the subcontinent. The territory was characterized by fiefdoms and tribalism. The British did not incorporate the region into the vast bureaucracy of the Raj or invest in civil institutions (Kaplan, 2012). They felt the area was worth very little economically. The main use of Pakistan was for land routes into Central Asia (Oberst, et al, 2013). The sea routes were much more economical for the

British. Consequently, the British avoided most of Pakistan and made deals with tribal leaders if contact was necessary. The modern day tribal regions of Pakistan make it abundantly evident that little development has ever occurred in the region.

The indirectly ruled and excluded areas of India share multiple commonalities with Pakistan. Like Pakistan, most of northeast India, the Naxal belt, and Kashmir were considered the unstable frontier and never incorporated into the British Raj (Maitra and Maitra, 1995). Tribal leaders reigned supreme and infrastructure projects were minimal or nonexistent. Fortunately, these problematic regions did not achieve independence or else they may have faced the same difficulties as Pakistan. Unfortunately, the legacy of tribalism and underdevelopment remains.

The economic development of British-centric regions ultimately aided the population living in those areas. Compared to other colonizers, the British legacy left some positive influences in their host countries, even if it was not intentional. Fareed Zakaria (2008) emphasizes some of the positive impacts of British colonialism in India:

> India's democracy is truly extraordinary. ... India's political system owes much to the institutions put in place by the British over two hundred years ago. In many other parts of Asia and in Africa, the British were a relatively temporary presence. They were in India for centuries. They saw it as the jewel in their imperial crown and built lasting institutions of government throughout the country--courts, universities, administrative agencies. But perhaps even more importantly, India got very lucky with the vehicle of its independence, the Congress Party, and its first generations of post-independence leaders, who nurtured the best traditions of the British and drew on older Indian customs to reinforce them (3).

Yet a brief comparison of Mumbai and modern-day Chhattisgarh provide substantial insight. Both of these locations were ruled under the British crown, but their geographies varied substantially. Mumbai was on the west coast with easy seaport access.

Chhattisgarh was in the forested uplands of interior India. The isolated location with minimal valuable land resources made Chhattisgarh worth little investment. Even as the massive railway network developed, British colonizers did not consider investment in the rail network outside the coastal area to be worthwhile. Chhattisgarh remained without any rail access until the mid-20th century, and access remains minimal today. Mumbai, on the other hand, is the economic and cultural center of India. It ranks in the top ten cities worldwide in terms of global financial flows, and accounts for 6% of India's total economic power . Mumbai is also host to the burgeoning Bollywood industry, a well-connected rail and subway system, international airport, and several of the world's richest billionaires (Oberst et al, 2013). Mumbai and Chhattisgarh are characteristic of the divide that exists between the developed- and less-developed India. Mumbai has amenities on par with the Western world, including 5-star hotels, highly regarded English-language universities, and luxury shopping malls. Meanwhile, the less developed India lacks basic infrastructure, including proper sewage and sanitation facilities. Public transportation is minimal.

Direct rule by the British was in many cases an investment in future development and stability. The unified state or idea of India did not exist until the late 1800s (Roy, 2013). Provinces in India were not ruled uniformly. Some provinces were ruled directly by the British throne, while others were governed by tribal councils or as princely states under supervision of the British. In addition to the establishment of English universities and complex bureaucracies and institutions, the British also helped establish property rights in the directly-ruled areas. Initial analyses of economic and agricultural productivity show that directly-ruled areas were more successful economically than

indirectly-ruled locations (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). Directly-ruled districts also had higher levels of cooperation between economic classes (Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2010)

Directly ruled locations received the highest amount of investment and attention from the British that aided in development. However, there was another subset of governed areas in colonial India known as the 'excluded areas'. Excluded areas were underdeveloped and ignored, but unlike other underdeveloped locations that the British passively ignored, the underdevelopment of excluded areas was intentional. Excluded areas were locations the British considered so backward that no advanced form of administration was possible. British officials advocated isolationism of these regions and felt their contact with the outside world should be minimized despite the requests of tribals in the area to be included (Tiwari, 1995; Kumar, 2007). No one was allowed to travel to or from these areas without a special permit. Excluded areas were deemed backward since minimal indigenous formal institutions existed. This led the British to consider these areas unable to adapt to modern British-style institutions (Ahmad, 1937; Inoue, 2013). As a result, these areas were left 'untouched.' Figure 3.3 demonstrates the locations of excluded areas in India under British rule in accordance with the 1937 constitution.

Excluded Areas of India Under British Rule

Figure 3.3
Source: Ahmad, 1937

■ Excluded Areas

Figure 3.3 demonstrates that there is a clear overlap between the least developed districts of India and formerly excluded areas. However, not all underdeveloped areas of India today were once excluded areas. This is especially true for Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan. Some of India's poorest districts are in these two states, which were not excluded areas under the British. This is because two types of underdevelopment stem from colonialism: passive exclusion and active exclusion. The British passively excluded much of Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan because there was little worth investing in the region; however, they still received political representation and federal funding. However, the excluded districts of the Chittagong tracts (now Bangladesh), Spiti in

Punjab, all of the 'backward tracts' in Burma and Assam (now the majority of Northeast India), Angul in Bihar and Orissa, Chota Nagpur, Santal Parganas, and Sambalpur in Bihar were actively excluded by the British. Excluded areas were not given any direct representation in the legislature, no federal funds were allotted to their development, and the legislature had no authority over the region. Any constitutional changes or advancements were not applicable to excluded areas (Ahmad, 1937). Given this exclusion, it is not surprising that underdevelopment, corruption, political inefficiency, and minimal trust of outsiders is rampant in formerly excluded areas (Das Gupta et al., 2014). No formal democratic institutions, modern transportation, healthcare, education, or infrastructure existed before the arrival of the British, nor did they exist afterward. The early independent Indian government struck down the policy of excluded districts, and allowed the districts to gain representation, but many of the exclusionary policies remained (Maitra and Maitra, 1995).

One of the most obvious and enduring legacies that occurred during the era of rapid development in the late 1800s was the mass expansion of the travel infrastructure. In just a few short years, India's transportation network transformed from reliance on ox-carts to advanced railways, roads, canals, and bridges. A telegraph system was also put into place. This infrastructure was essential to aid in the transport of raw materials, such as cotton and tea, back to England, but it also led to economic and technological advancement in the locations where it existed. One of the most important components of industrialization and development in colonial India was the railroad system. The legacy of exclusion continues today. The excluded areas that did not have rail historically do not

have rail today. The next section highlights the central importance of rail infrastructure and how it is a strong reflection of the level of development and investment in India.

<center>**The Railway**</center>

The British initiated the Indian rail system in 1853 and it rapidly expanded over the next few decades. The development of the rail system was initiated for several reasons. Most importantly, the rail system would help decrease the operating costs in the country and allow for swift troop movement throughout the country if uprisings occurred. The railroad system was historically and remains the lifeline of India's economy. A 19th century Indian statesman Madhav Rao explained the railroad system in the following way

> *What a glorious change the railway has made in old and neglected India! Tamil, Telegu, Canarese, Marathi, Gujarati, Hindustani, Bengali, - populations which had been isolated for unmeasured ages, now easily mingle in civilized confusion. In my various long journeys it has repeatedly struck me that if India is to become a homogenized nation, and is ever to achieve solidarity, it must be by means of the railway as a means of transport (47).*

Rao was largely correct. Cities and states in India with access to the rail system provided locals with employment, access to opportunity, and government services (Kerr 2007). The rail infrastructure helped decrease trade costs and increase regional and international trade, minimize the effect of local productivity shocks, increase income, and decrease income volatility (Donaldson, 2010). All of these factors promoted development, which in theory, should decrease grievances toward the state.

The rail system also helped diverse ethnic groups interact with one another. Cities like Bombay, New Delhi, Calcutta, and Hyderabad transformed into 'global' cities. Not only were there numerous Europeans in the area, but countless numbers of Indians throughout the subcontinent migrated to Bombay. For thousands of years these diverse

groups of Indians had not interacted with one another. It was through the development of the major cities and the rail system that they were able to come together in search of employment and economic opportunities (Donaldson, 2010). The literature shows that social polarization can be a major contributing factor to conflict (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Østby, 2008). The urbanization spurred by the rail system not only promoted development, but it also increased interaction of diverse groups. Interaction can help normalize and limit distance between ethnic groups and promote a vibrant civil society, which can help increase levels of trust among diverse ethnic groups (Varshney, 2001)

The railway's central importance in Indian economic development ultimately affected the economic path of most Indian states. Indian locations with railways increased market integration and raised income (Donaldson, 2010). The ease of transportation enabled fast economic growth, and in markets previously served by roads alone, railways lowered the trade costs by 87 percent (Donaldson, 2010). The development and expansion of the railway system also provided substantial employment for the population. In 1869, Indians constituted 92 percent of total rail-related employment. By 1939, this number had increased to 98 percent (Kerr, 2007). In addition to employment, the railway services were valuable to the overall Indian economy. Over an 80-year period, the revenue from the rail system grew at an average rate of 6.2%. By 1939, the railways represented 4.9 percent of the total national income (Donaldson, 2010). By 1910, there were 42,000 miles of railway lines covering a large portion of India.

Despite the massive coverage, many areas still had no rail. Many of the lines that went through rural areas, or those outside of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, were used only for transit. No train stations served these areas. Currently, the Indian rail system is one of the largest rail systems in the world. With over 7,500 stations, India has the third largest rail network in the world and is continuously expanding. However, rail development still centers around major cities and states, and is notably absent in other locations such as Northeast India, East-Central India, and Kashmir.

My theory emphasizes that development is key in preventing terrorism. The rail was ultimately a major reflection of investment by the state and development. The rail can help subdue terrorism in several ways. First, and most importantly, the rail system was essential for economic development in India, and development is essential in quelling grievances in the population (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). For example, by helping farmers integrate their crops into the national economy, connecting and developing distant cities, and simplifying travel, much of the Indian citizenry was able to reap the rewards of development. All of these factors helped remedy underlying grievances that can emerge from underdevelopment and lack of opportunity. The rail represents opportunity. No access to rail means limited access to opportunity which often translates into dependency on sustenance agriculture or menial labor jobs. When opportunity and development are missing, not only do grievances increase, but sympathies for violent non-state actors and groups begin to increase. Non-state actors often offer to remedy underdevelopment with the promise of independence. Separatists convince locals that the underdevelopment in their area is the result of an ineffective and exploitative state.

Second, limited rail infrastructure limits tourism and investment to the regions since rail is the preferred method of travel and investment, especially in South Asia. Lack of connectedness leads to two major ramifications. One, it impedes outside investment in the region. If a location is not easy to travel to, investment costs are high, as are associated risks. Two, it limits movement and interaction of diverse ethnic groups. Lack of civic engagement and interaction among diverse ethnic groups can increase tension and promote inter-ethnic conflict (Varshney, 2001).

Third, the rail is central to the development of infrastructure, including bridges, roads, postal services, communication systems, food, safe drinking water, and power supply. Out of the seven terrorism-prone northeast states, only four have any railway stations. Kashmir does not have any rail stations outside of the extreme southern zone near Jammu.   Even the four states with some railway system have substantially less railway infrastructure compared to the remainder of the states. Tripura and Manipur have two stations, Mizoram has one, and Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, and Meghalaya have zero. These northeast states cover an area of 255,512 km, 7 percent of India, and have a population of 45 million yet do not have the amount of railway most other states have. By comparison, the state of Gujarat in West India has an area of 196,025 km and a population of 50 million. Gujarat has over 150 railway stations. While the Indian government is working on advancement of the road and rail infrastructure in Northeast India and Kashmir, these areas have the lowest levels of infrastructure development in the country, many locations have limited or no rail or road connectivity (Das, 2010; Bhattacharjee and Nayak, 2010; Indian Chamber of Commerce, 2013; Nandy, 2014).

Fourth, counter-terrorism activities are substantially more difficult in the absence of a rail system. Rail is the fastest and most economical way to transport military equipment. Although smaller military equipment can be transported via air, larger equipment must be transported via road or rail. When the rail is not available, it leaves the military to resort to local roads, many which are in very poor condition and not able to safely host large military equipment. Using poor local roads also leaves the military convoy more vulnerable to attack since IEDs may be set along the road or poor road construction may leave vehicles unable to easily pass along the road, putting them in danger of an attack.

Kashmir has only one rail station and it is limited to the far southern zone away from most of the population. Likewise, the road infrastructure is also poorly underdeveloped. There are 2060 locations without any road, air, or rail connectivity (Mahapatra and Shekhawat, 2008). The lack of infrastructure is evident in many other ways as well. For example, the number of telephones per 100 people in Kashmir is 7.76, compared to national level of 13.57. Mobile phones with pre-paid services, which many Indians rely upon, do not have any connectivity in Kashmir or much of the Northeast. Moreover, 25 per cent of rural households have no electricity, 58 per cent have no toilet facility, and only 55 per cent of people in rural areas have safe drinking water (Mahapatra and Shekhawat, 2008). Locations without rail infrastructure are almost guaranteed to have other inadequate forms of infrastructure. However, I believe the absence of the rail system is at the core of overall weak development. The rail network not only brings commerce to a region, but it helps commerce leave a region. Moreover, the majority of Indians cannot afford a car or an airplane ticket, but they can afford a rail ticket. When

the rail is not available to the citizens it limits their economic options and prevents diversification of the economy.

Causal Arrow 2 in figure 3.1 demonstrates a direct relationship between colonial exclusion and underdevelopment. I suspect that railways are tantamount to development and central artifacts of historical infrastructure and economic development. A district or state without access to the railway will likely have an economy centered around sustenance agriculture, which will result in lower rates of economic, political and social development and limited or no infrastructure (Banerjee, Duflo, and Qian, 2008). Underdevelopment will breed resentment toward the state and increase the sympathy toward violent non-state actors and, consequently, increase the likelihood of terrorist attacks in the district.

<u>Underdevelopment</u>

This section highlights how underdevelopment can ultimately create grievances that in the right condition can lead to terrorism. The legacy of exclusion in India resulted in economic, political, and social underdevelopment. As discussed in the previous section, the rail provides substantial insight into which locations are the most economically advanced in India. However, economic development alone does not create an effective state with strong institutions. Fortunately, the British left a relatively strong institutional legacy, at least in the parts of India that they chose to develop. Institutional legacy has played an important role in promoting democratic governance and decreasing conflict (Brown et al., 1997; Horowitz, 1985; Gurr and Harff, 1994; Diamond and Plattner, 1994; Dahl, 2005; Beteille, 2012). Strong institutions not only aid development,

but in the case of very diverse countries like India, they can decrease the likelihood of conflict along ethnic lines (Easterly, 2001).

Some may argue that exclusion may have resulted in lower grievances, but the evidence seems to point in the other direction. Indian terrorism analyst and Bodo tribe member Ramtanu Maitra claims the "root cause" of the terrorism problem in Northeast India was set in place by the British since 1826. The problem further escalated following independence when New Delhi was unable to integrate the region and converted the area into what Maitra calls a "human zoo", where each tribe roamed free in its own territory, but could not cross boundaries and establish contact with the rest of India (Maitra and Maitra, 1995: 3-5). This exclusion resulted in massive underdevelopment. Lack of development and exclusionary policies by the British and Indians are referenced explicitly in the official grievances of many groups including ULFA, NDFB, NSCN, CPI, and UNLF (SATP, 2014). One needs to look no further than the tribal regions of Uttarkhand, Tamil Nadu, and Gujarat, which were well-integrated during British and Indian rule, to see how well-developed these locations and communities are.

Underdevelopment is at the core of many ethno-nationalist grievances in India. Most underdevelopment stems from the history of exclusion. Underdevelopment can manifest itself in many different forms, including economically, politically, and socially. In the case of the excluded districts, underdevelopment occurred in all these manners. One of the most damning forms of underdevelopment in excluded areas is political underdevelopment.

Political Underdevelopment

Districts living under direct rule developed bureaucracies and democratic political institutions. Even though democratic institutions may not have been very strong at the time of independence, a political order existed that helped the nascent democracy eventually consolidate (Huntington,1968). The British instituted an early form of the democratic legislature by 1773 in Mumbai and formalized it in 1858 with the Government of India Act. By 1919, Indians were allowed to participate in government departments like education, agriculture, infrastructure development, and local self-government, although this was not the case in the excluded areas (James, 1998). The institutions India inherited ultimately helped its democracy succeed. Indian scholar Sumit Ganguly (2007) notes that the British legacy of a centralized state, a well-functioning civil service, introduction of early elections, and political socialization of the local elite were essential in the success of India's democracy.

The British also integrated the local population into the institutions in directly ruled areas. The civil servant 'Babus' working in the British bureaucracy were highly educated and generally came from prominent Indian families. These same civil servants not only formed the foundation of the independence movement, but they also helped continue government operations following independence. The bureaucracy was extensive in directly ruled areas and a substantial venue for employment. Daily access to these institutions was important for the future independent India since it exposed locals to democratic norms and standard operating procedures of government. Exposure, particularly the inclusion of Indians, helped ensure the system's survival following independence. These factors were all critical in a newly independent democracy, not

only because it made the state function, but because it was also key in preventing conflict (Oberst et al., 2013). Since those factors were essential in promoting development and democracy and limiting conflict, it is not surprising that they help exacerbate underdevelopment and associated grievances when they are absent.

Excluded areas did not have any form of institutions. They were characterized by tribalism and lawlessness. Indirectly ruled colonies utilized local chiefs and had no evidence of bureaucracies, democracy, or infrastructure. This exclusion reinforced tribalist tendencies, corruption, and inter-tribal conflict. The empowerment of local chiefs created ineffective institutions and underdevelopment. Instead of focusing on the development of their territory, local chiefs sought increased personal power and wealth (Maitra and Maitra, 1995). This is strikingly similar to the colonization patterns throughout much of sub-Saharan Africa that were extractive in nature and resulted in poor or non-existent institutions. The consequences of colonial extractive legacies throughout Africa remain abundantly clear. European patterns of colonialism, specifically in Africa resulted in poverty and weak institutions (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997). European colonizers also constructed divergent ethnic identities throughout the colonies and favored specific groups for civil service positions (Mamdani, 2001). In Rwanda for example, the Belgians primarily constructed the Hutu and Tutsi identities and used the Tutsi aristocracy to rule over and collect taxes from the Hutus. This ethnic divide created tensions between the two groups that ultimately culminated in a genocide in 1993. It is no surprise that a history of colonization is associated with an increased likelihood in conflict   (Blanton, Mason, and Athow, 2001).

The minimal investment in colonial Africa is very similar to the excluded districts in India. No member of the Indian Civil Service was even posted to any excluded tribal district in northeast or central India (Maitra and Maitra, 1995). Exposure to democratic institutions and bureaucracy was minimal or non-existent. Most tribal and isolated locations did not have official departments for agriculture or education (Inoue, 2001). This was troublesome for many states because it permitted local elites with little experience to run operations of important government departments like education, agriculture, and infrastructure development. This would ultimately nurture the rampant corruption still seen in these departments to this day. Consequently, when grievances arose in the excluded areas, most groups did not consider local political institutions to be the most useful methods for reconciliation. Instead, corrupt agencies helped further grievances (Kumar, 2006). For example, much of the rural isolated areas had no established court system. Instead, the Zamindars (landlords) had the right to administer justice and did so with no supervision, except in cases of capital punishment (Ray and Ray, 1975). The areas labeled 'backward' by the British were excluded from the provincial legislature and the High Court. By 1935, the 'backward' areas were fully excluded of any jurisdiction from the federal and provincial legislature and court system (Ahmad, 1937).

Backward areas had limited or no political or judicial structure, and the lack of educational facilities helped these backward institutions persist (Brown, 1994). Throughout most of developed India, Indian bureaucrats gained access to the bureaucracy directly through their education at English language institutions. Many of the higher-ranking officials even traveled to Britain to be trained in principles like liberal democracy

and governance (Oberst et al, 2013) When development and institutions are minimal, personal ties and ethnic groups are the primary source of social cohesion; there is little loyalty to the state (Aiyede, 2009).

In addition to the lack of infrastructure development, the failure of strong institutions to develop in the excluded areas also helped to promote conflict. Underdevelopment in locations with already excluded minorities will intensify feelings of discontent toward the state. As Gurr and Harff (1994) suggest, 'finding like-minded individuals with similar grievances intensifies discontent and increases willingness to take action' (Gurr and Harff, 1994: 84). Rampant exclusionary policies and poor development in excluded districts have led residents to develop deeply held hostility toward the state. High levels of hostility toward the state and outsiders increases the trust in rebels and separatists who are of the same ethnicity. This hostility gives terrorist groups more support, increases their operating size, and ultimately increases the likelihood of terrorism.

Social Underdevelopment

India has the largest concentration of poor people in the world (World Bank, 2014). Approximately 30% of India's population lives below the poverty line, defined by India as living on approximately 50 cents or less per day (Singh, 2014). Poverty exists throughout India, but it is not equally distributed. Figure 3.4 demonstrates the distribution of poverty at the state level throughout India. Two states, Uttar Pradesh and Madya Pradesh, do not have ongoing problems with terrorism, but have high poverty rates between 25-45%. Similarly, the state of Andhra Pradesh, which faces a Naxalite problem in its north, has a lower poverty rate, between 15-25%. The results of the remaining

states reveal a pattern that is not surprising. The states that were excluded under the British have high levels of poverty. The highest rates of poverty occur in Assam, Manipur, Chhattisgarh, and Bihar. Although the modern boundaries of Bihar were not excluded as fully as Assam, Manipur, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh, upon independence it had very little infrastructure or investment.

Poverty Rate by State

Figure 3.4
Poverty Rate
Source: Census of India, 2010

☐ Less than 15%
▢ 15-25%
▦ 25-45%
■ 45% and above

One of the most revealing indicators of social development is education. Since locals in the excluded areas did not have access to such educational institutions, bureaucratic institutions were minimal or inefficient. Education is critical because it provides opportunities for advancement in the Indian bureaucracy, but it is also key component of upward mobility and the amelioration of grievances (Thyne, 2006). To train competent bureaucrats, the British knew that education was essential. As the empire expanded, so did the need for well-educated bureaucrats. This led the British to invest in one of the most important components of social development, education. The British felt the existing Indian education system was inferior since 'a single shelf of a European library was worth the whole native literature of India and Arabia' (Yajnika and Sheth 2005, 70). British politician Thomas Macaulay justified the expansion of the English medium education in the following way:

> *It is impossible for us, with our limited means, to attempt to educate the body of the people. We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population (Macaulay 1835)*

Clearly, the motives of the British were not altruistic. However, Indians benefitted from the proliferation of English educational institutions. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated, 'Of all the legacies of the Raj, none is more important than the English language and the modern school system' (2010). Education equated to opportunity. Following the introduction of English medium schools, those with an English education

became eligible for government employment. For non-Brahmins, this was an essential step in upward mobility for themselves and their family.

The benefits of education failed to affect the excluded areas, exacerbating underdevelopment and continuing the cycle of poverty and grievances. Forty-five percent of public school teachers and 55% of private school teachers lack proper teaching qualifications (Varma, 2007). The untrained teachers are overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural, poor, and formerly excluded areas. The unequal educational legacy continues today. Those without an English education bypass many opportunities. Attending English language schools in India substantially increases the likelihood of obtaining a better career and admission to a top university. Fluency in English increases hourly wages approximately 34% for men and 22% for women (Prakash, Chin, and Azam 2010). India's best universities are also centered in the areas where the British invested in infrastructure and education. This is unfortunate since entrance into a top university is the key that opens employment opportunities in business and politics.

All of India's top 'deemed' universities[4] are centered in Tamil Nadu, Bombay, and Gujarat. There are no deemed universities in Assam, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Sikkim (NDTV, 2010). With the exception of Goa, which was a Portuguese colony, none of these states were very developed under the British, and most remain underdeveloped today. Children born and raised in these states would have to leave their home state to attend a top university.

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[4] Deemed universities are high-performing universities within India that are given autonomy to set their own course work, admissions, and fees (University Grants Commission,1956) .

Unfortunately, most of them will be unable to do so since they probably received a sub-standard primary and secondary education.

In addition to the obvious benefits of social development, several other benefits emerge from a quality education. For one, an increase in education decreases the likelihood of political violence. Aggrieved individuals with an education are more likely to choose institutional pathways to address their grievances instead of violence (Huntington, 1968 Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Hibbs, 1973; Hegre, 2003; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Thyne, 2006;). Consequently, educational underdevelopment leaves many youth without employment opportunities, which increases their frustration and propensity to rebel. Exclusion ultimately resulted in the creation of deep hostility toward the state due to rampant underdevelopment, lack of opportunity, and limited state resources. Without education and employment opportunities, many locals consider their future to be bleak. In fact, in locations like Kashmir, the Naxal Belt, and Northeast India one of the most promising opportunities for employment and influence is through the terrorist movement (Upadhyay, 2009).

The absence of institutions and political order left extensive poverty and corruption throughout India. Assam, Nagaland, Bihar, Jammu and Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Andhra Pradesh consistently rank as the most corrupt states within India (Times of India 2013), and all have a substantial terrorism problem. Wide-scale corruption, high levels of poverty, and low levels of literacy leave most individuals with little faith in the ability of the political system to reconcile their grievances. This is especially true as local citizens see their officials and MNCs in the region continually getting rich from minerals as the district and people remain poor (Roy, 2011). Despite

the potential wealth of their land, locals feel they are gaining none of the benefits. Historical development has failed and the movement of extractive MNCs into the area has resulted in the displacement of many tribal groups, leaving groups to be even wearier of outsiders and development plans, making true infrastructure and economic development even more challenging for the government.

If the government and local politicians are unable to change the dire conditions in the area, the local population will have little trust in the institutions. Failure of the local government leaves groups to consider alternative options to reconcile their grievances. In this instance, it has led groups to extremism. Conditions are so dire they believe separation, through violent means, is the only way to achieve development and cultural autonomy.

The isolation of tribal groups in the Northeast and Central plains instilled and exacerbated suspicion and hostility of any outsiders (Fox, 1985). Since 1977, due to the high level of violence in Northeast India, Kashmir, and the Naxal Belt, the government reserves the right for certain exceptional powers such as shoot to kill, warrantless search, seizure and arrest, and immunity from prosecution for the actions (Hayes, 2012). Not surprisingly, this has exacerbated resentment in the already-hostile area. Historical and current feelings of hostility led groups to reject the civic nationalism so crucial to democratic survival and unity (Ignatieff, 1994). Not only do these groups lack any sense of unity with their neighbors, they also lack basic infrastructure and institutions, helping create a population sympathetic to a violent campaign.

Economic Underdevelopment

In addition to the suspicion and hostility toward outsiders, the people living in isolated areas have low levels of economic development. Wages in Northeast India are 40% below the national average (Gupta, Das, and Haldar, 2014). Northeast India provides substantial amounts of petroleum to the rest of the country, but has the highest prices. Rice and milk are also the most expensive in these locations (Gupta, Das, and Haldar, 2014). Such high prices leave locals feeling exploited. Similarly, Kashmir has lower per capita income, economic growth, and GDP than the national average; only the northeast states have similar rates (Khan, 2013).

Low levels of development alone can fuel violence (Huntington, 1968; Gurr, 1970; Muller & Seligson, 1990; London & Robinson, 1989; Sen, 1999; Fearon & Laitin, 2003), but the conflict-ridden regions have rampant underdevelopment in addition to several other factors that can promote conflict. Gurr (1970) claims men rebel when there is a 'perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities' (37). Perceived deprivation occurs when economic, political, and cultural, circumstances create discrimination, repression, and inequality. Low levels of development, isolation and hostility seem to be a perfect recipe for an aggrieved population, and the terror-prone regions in India have all of the above.

Underdevelopment increases the difficulty of combating terrorist groups. However, because India is a federalist country, the responsibility for law and order within the state is the responsibility of the state police forces, making counterterrorism even more difficult. Although the central government provides financial support and training to local police forces, the responsibility to quell internal violence generally rests with the

local police. Because corruption and underdevelopment are pervasive in the most

terrorism prone states, the response to terror attacks by local police is generally poor.

Ultimately, poor coordination and training of the locals results in substandard responses

to attacks, such as failure to apprehend suspects and tainting evidence (Roy, 2011). Much

of the poor coordination stems from the culture of corruption and underdevelopment.

Terrorists are aware of the faulty police forces in the region and are able to manipulate or

exploit their weaknesses. Failure of the local government and representatives to provide

change leaves aggrieved groups to consider alternative forms of protest, particularly

violence. This is especially true when the district is underdeveloped as alternative options

are limited and frustrations are heightened. This leads to my first hypothesis

H1: As a district's distance to a rail station increases, the number of terrorist attacks in that district should increase.

Because lack of rail infrastructure is reflective of neglect and exclusion, I expect

there to be fewer attacks in districts that have easy access to rail. Locations without easy

access to rail will suffer from rampant underdevelopment, which will create rampant

grievances in the population.

In the least developed districts in India, choosing terrorism may be the most likely

way to achieve change. This leads to the second set of hypotheses.

H2: As a district's level of development increases, the number of terrorist attacks in that district should decrease.

Lack of development plays an important historical and modern role in

understanding why certain regions of India are so prone to terrorism. However,

underdevelopment alone cannot fully explain why only the three regions, northeast

India, the Naxal belt, and Kashmir, experience terrorism. After all, there are other

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locations such as Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Haryana that are underdeveloped and do

not have a terrorism problem. This means underdevelopment plus some other factor

provide the perfect formula for a long-running terror campaign.

Geography

As my theoretical figure demonstrates, I believe that all of the aforementioned

factors create the grievances that lead to the propensity to use terrorism. However, once

this grievance is situated in the ideal environment, terrorism not only becomes likely but

it becomes much easier to conduct. In the case of India, I suspect that

underdevelopment plus rugged geography and close proximity to international borders

leads to the ideal scenario for terrorism and prolonged terrorist campaigns. My theory

suggests that following exclusion, there is underdevelopment. When underdevelopment

occurs in locations with rugged geography and close proximity to international borders,

terrorism becomes most likely.

Geography: Theoretical Expectations

Underdevelopment:

+   +

Rugged Geography   International Borders

3   3

Terrorism

Figure 3.5

This section explains the mechanisms at work with causal arrows 3. As figure 3.5 demonstrates, exclusion and underdevelopment alone are not enough to lead to terrorism. It is once exclusion and underdevelopment are combined with an ideal geographic setting that terrorism occurs.

My theoretical figure shows exclusion and underdevelopment do not lead to terrorism directly. Instead, two other features, rugged geography and international borders, translate grievances from exclusion and underdevelopment into terrorism. In India, rugged geography is primarily characterized by dense forests, but many locations near the Himalayas also have towering mountains. Access to international borders is also crucial in the majority of the conflict zones in India, particularly Kashmir and Northeast India.

Forests and Jungles

> *To our men the jungle was a strange, fearsome place; moving and fighting*
> *in it were a nightmare. We were too ready to classify jungle as*
> *impenetratable*-Field Marshall Slim, Victor in Burma, World War II
> (Concerning the early days of the Burma Campaign)

Geographic features affect the ability of the state to sanction violent behavior. An increased number of certain geographic features, such as forests and mountains, make sanctioning more difficult. For one, rugged terrain inhibits the ability of the state to maneuver freely. Areas with rugged terrain generally have a decreased presence of military and police personnel since the area is difficult to inhabit, and there is generally a smaller population (Scott, 2009; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Additionally, the lack of government penetration in the rugged areas leads to the governments decreased level of knowledge about the terrain, in addition to a substantial difficulty of navigating the

terrain due to its ruggedness (Boulding, 1962; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Scott, 2009; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom, 2004). For terrorism to continue, extensive planning, secrecy, and sophistication are needed. When under the constant eyes of surveillance, a terrorist act becomes more difficult to complete. However, in geographically isolated areas, government and military presence is minimal compared to the rest of the country.

Forests act as safe havens for groups or individuals planning attacks because they have minimal military or police personnel and substantial canopy cover. Once it is known that a group suspected of committing terrorism is hiding out in forests, effective counterterrorism mechanisms prove difficult or impossible (Department of State, 2013). The Indian government is well aware of the counterterrorism difficulties and attempted to overcome the challenges by establishing the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in the Northeast State of Mizoram in 1970 and the High Altitude Warfare School in the state of Kashmir in 1948. The motto of the Jungle Warfare school is '*Fight the guerrilla like a guerrilla,*' and soldiers undergo extensive training in jungle survival, counter-terrorism, and counter-insurgency (Upadhyay, 2009). The school trains 7,000 Indian soldiers a year and coordinates training exercises with foreign troops, including the United States, as well (Rajagopalan, 2000; 2004; 2008; Gates and Roy, 2014).

India is one of the only countries in the world with such well-established jungle warfare and high altitude training facilities, but despite its experience, India continues to have a terrorism problem in its jungles, forests, and mountains. Indian military official Durga Mitra considers the role of inaccessibility to be central to counterterrorism difficulties. Mitra claims less developed countries have areas that are physically, functionally, and technologically remote, which leaves the state and its agents removed

from the "life-world" of the inhabitants and, thus lacking confidence in any operations in the area (Mitra 2007, 15). According to Mitra, hundreds of years of historical underdevelopment have excluded these locations and prevented government penetration. In contrast, the local population is tight knit, with close connections to the terrorist movements. Not only does this inaccessibility prevent the government from building schools, hospitals, and police stations, it also prevents the state from be adequately aware and prepared to fight against the terrorists in these areas. Any external threat to the population, particularly a counterterrorism operation, acts as a unifying force since an attack on an ethno-nationalist group is considered an attack on the entire ethnicity (Mitra, 2007).

In the Army field manual from 1963, the US government recognized the difficulty in fighting an insurgency in rugged forested areas. The Army counterinsurgency manual states that within heavily forested areas it is 'difficult to obtain reliable, secure, and rapid communication' (72). The field manual states that ground and air observation and 'trafficability' in forested areas including rain forests, deciduous forests, swamps, and mangroves is poor and concealment is excellent. Counter-insurgent forces must rely on foot movement, which is classified as extremely slow and difficult in such terrain (8). Vehicular traffic is also extremely limited if not impossible without extensive construction by engineers. The terrain of forests, and especially dense forests, also makes it difficult for air surveillance from helicopters and drones. In non-forested terrain, hideouts and training facilities can be seen from above ground. The density of forests, however, can prove difficult in leading an effective ground counterterrorism operation since crucial visuals are not available (De Jong, Donovan and Abe 2009). An eco-tourist

guide in Colombia sums up the relationship between forests and terrorism quite well, "if you can be seen by a helicopter you are probably in a safe area. If not......well, don't stick around very long" (Colombia Travel Warnings, 2011). This quote demonstrates two important factors. One, the rugged terrain has prevented the government from exerting control over the area and providing effective rule of law. Two, the dense forest provides cover and protection from the government forces.

Groups that use terrorism also have the advantage of familiarity with the terrain due to their time spent planning, living and operating in the area. The US army field manual claims that 'jungle enemies' are skilled in the art of camouflage. They are able to move easily among concealed and covered routes and depend heavily on streams for transport and drinking water. Insurgents operating in forests are generally experts on removing all intelligence indicators from their path, making it incredibly difficult for the counter-insurgency forces to find their command post (USMC, 1985). Insurgents operating in the forest use the dense terrain for their distinct advantage. They use the foliage to 'infiltrate positions and eliminate command posts, key weapons, and vital facilities' (31). Such operations result in creating a more even footing between the state and non-state actor. By taking away the advantages of the state forces, the non-state actors diminish the traditional advantages of the state forces including their 'command and control, fire support, and logistical means' (32). Extensive familiarity with the land is critical if the local or national government wishes to implement a counterterrorism campaign in the area. The terrorist group will likely be able to move quickly in the area and even regroup in a nearby forest whereas the counterterrorism agents will have more difficulty navigating the terrain. The counterterrorism agents generally do not have the

same level of local knowledge and experience with the terrain as the groups they are fighting (Mitra, 2007; See Tzu; Guevara especially). Non-state actors even use the weather to their advantage, choosing to use fog, rain, and nightfall as key times to attack (USMC, 1982).

The Indian Army describes the most impactful limitations when fighting in rugged terrain, specifically dense forests or jungles. First, and most importantly, there is a lack of available visuals on and above ground. Second, tree limbs block mortars, flame weapons, and grenades, all common weapons employed by military forces. Third, machineguns cannot operate properly because they cannot attain grazing fire. Fourth, limited visibility makes it difficult to navigate the location of enemy versus friendly fire. Fifth, the noise conditions due to the wildlife can often conceal noise from enemies. Sixth, foliage limits how sounds are carried making noises appear closer than they really are. Seventh, and perhaps most importantly, movement is often difficult or impossible. The heat, thick vegetation, and ruggedness tires forces quickly, especially those carrying equipment. The lack of roads also hinders supply and evacuation routes (IA 2003).

A dense forest will also make it difficult for the military to use modern equipment and must therefore resort to a foot battle. If a foot battle does ensue, the terrorists knowledge of the terrain will allow them to escape attack prior to being located. The non-state actor generally creates complex bunkers, spider holes, and underground tunnels that are all difficult to see and navigate. Numerous obstacles, snipers, and boobytraps are also strategically placed throughout the terrain to demoralize and further slow the opposition (USMC 1982). The Indian Naxalites knowledge of the land has proven

extremely advantageous. For every Naxalite killed, two Indian police force or military are killed (Shahshikumar, VK, 2010).

The land is clearly advantageous to the rebel. Most terrorist groups in the world survive less than two years, but many terrorist groups in India have defied the odds and thrived for thirty plus years. The terrain of the land and the cover of the forest have undoubtedly increased the longevity of terrorist groups. In addition to the inaccessibility and cover it provides, in many cases the terrain also provides natural resources, which can increase group survivability. Much of the forests in India are also resource rich (Kumar, 2006; Roy, 2011).

The literature has long focused on how abundant natural resource can actually be a 'curse' because it impedes development and can promote conflict (Auty, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995). However, terrain can also serve an important role by providing resources that continue the conflict (Stedman, 2001; Renner, 2002; USAID, 2005). Conflict in India is not caused by resources, but the resources of the land help nourish and provide money to the campaign. Rugged terrain has the ability to provide physical nourishment for the groups living in the areas, but it can also provide resources to fund groups that use terrorism. In the Naxal belt, Naxalites cultivate massive amounts of marijuana and opium to help finance their operations (Manoharan, 2012). Northeast India is part of the 'Golden Triangle,' which in conjunction with Myanmar supplied half of the world's heroin in the last decade (Doherty, 2010). However, the region has transitioned from heroin to amphetamine and methamphetamine production since it can be produced cheaply in small, hidden laboratories without the need for acres of exposed land (Goswami, 2014). Kashmir is abundant in timber. Illegal timber smuggling is one of the

main livelihoods in the region and hundreds of acres have been deforested (KEWA). In

addition to timber, the forest provides fuel wood, fruits like mangoes, jackfruit, and

medicinal plants and flowers like marijuana, eucalyptus, and sandalwood. Sandalwood

sells for $70 an ounce or more and is highly sought after throughout the world (Mehta,

2011). In the Naxal Belt, terrorist groups rely on extortion or 'protection taxes' from

company executives (The Hindu, 2014). Many of the groups in Northeast India, whose

terrain is dense in coal reserves, rely on extortion from coal executives (Kumar 2006).

The abundance of natural resources in the Indian forests that help fund a terrorist

campaign and the difficulties of fighting non-state actors in rugged areas leads me to the

central hypotheses of this project:

H3: As a district's percentage of forested terrain increases, the number of terror attacks in that district should also increase.

H4: As a district's elevation increases, the number of terror attacks in that district should also increase.

At the intersection of the rugged terrain often lies a common denominator:

international borders. India shares many borders with weak states, and many of these

borders have no fortification or surveillance. The role of borders in conflict has been

discussed extensively in the literature (Starr and Most, 1978; Diehl, 1985; 1991; Lemke,

1995; Vasquez, 1993; Salehyan, 2009). In the next section, I discuss the role between

international borders and terrorism.

International Borders

As my theoretical figure demonstrates, international borders are not necessary for

terrorism. The Naxals do not utilize an international border for their campaign. However,

international borders are helpful to aid campaigns. International borders provide the fuel

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to the flames that promote a terrorist campaign. India borders five weak states, all of which provide sanctuary to active terrorist groups. In the east, India borders Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan. The borders are massive and porous (Mitra, 2007). The border with Bangladesh is 2,429 miles and 1900 with Myanmar. In the west, India and Pakistan share an 1800-mile border. India also shares a 1200-mile border with China in its northeast, and a 1600-mile border in the northern state of Kashmir.

International borders play an important role in the continuation of terrorist groups in the subcontinent. Borders without natural frontiers like rivers are more likely to provoke wars between states (Vasquez, 1993). The same logic can extend to internal conflicts. If borders are easily accessible, groups can infiltrate them. Only the Tibetan border with Himachal Pradesh has impassable mountains, and there has never been any active conflict in the region. Moreover, many border locations are not actively monitored (Mitra, 2007). Although, lack of monitoring is less of an issue in Kashmir, entire states in the northeast like Arunachal Pradesh are without clear demarked borders.[5] The uncertainty of the border makes it difficult for local law enforcement and military to determine whether the use of force is permissible or a violation of international law (Jamwal, 2002). The borders are also very culturally porous, not only because of terrain, but because similar ethnic groups occupy both sides of the border. Illegal migration, smuggling, and the crossing of militant groups are common place (SATP, 2012). The majority of India's terrorist groups have international camps where they receive training,

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[5] In the state of Meghalaya there is no clear demarcation with the Bangladesh border. Unclear jurisdiction can extend between 5-15 km for the entire state.

shelter, and external support (SATP 2012). The countries of Myanmar, Bangladesh, and

Bhutan all act as external sanctuaries for Indian-based terrorist groups. These states do

not actively support the terrorist groups that are within their borders. Instead, the states

are relatively weak and unable to patrol and eliminate groups operating in the rugged

periphery of their country (Mitra, 2007).

The case of Pakistan is clearly the most worrisome for India. Not only does

Pakistan offer external sanctuary for many Kashmiri based groups, but they also provide

support. Numerous groups have received training, weapons, and funding from Pakistani

sources, including the government's intelligence agency the ISI. In addition to supporting

Kashmir based groups, Pakistan also supported Sikh separatists in Punjab in the 1980s

such as Babbar Khalsa and Khalistan Command Force (SATP, 2012). Pakistan sought to

create an independent state to help create a buffer zone between itself and India. Pakistan

also funds Islamist groups that are not tied to a specific region, such as Lashkar e Taiba

and Jamat e Islami (SATP, 2012).

Outside of Pakistan, the ISI has reached out to separatist groups in the Northeast.

Former ISI chief Assad Durani recently admitted to the Pakistan Supreme Court that the

agency has meddled in Northeast Indian affairs for several decades. The ISI supplied

weapons to ethno-nationalist separatist groups and transported them to Pakistan for

training. According to Durani, Pakistan also transported nearly 9,000 foreign fighters

into Bangladesh to aid in the northeast insurgencies (Rediff news, 2012). The ISI has

played an integral role in assisting separatist movements since independence. According

to numerous internal reports from Indian intelligence, Pakistan helped plant the seeds of

separatism early. Prior to Bangladesh's independence, Pakistani forces provided

resources to aggrieved ethnic groups in the region. After independence, the ISI

maintained contact in the border regions with forces reportedly aiding separatists in

Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan (SATP, 2012). An ISI internal document

revealed that the modus operandi of the ISI is to carry out 1000 small attacks to make

India bleed to death (Dey, 2010). This provides insight about Pakistan's motives in

supporting separatism. Although each individual attack in India's northeast may be

relatively small, the amount of resources India devotes to address the problem is

substantial, and in essence slowly bleeding India's resources away.

Porous international borders are of central importance for the continuation of

terrorism in the region. Poorly fortified and controlled borders allow groups to have

international refuge and continue their training. They also allow them to escape from

Indian security forces. Secondly, poorly controlled borders allow international agents

from both Pakistan and China to contact and support separatists in the region. In 2014,

the BJP government announced plans to double troop presence along the borders and

fortify more border locations (Bhalla, 2014). However, full fortification and staffing of

all borders in their entirety would be nearly impossible and impractical due to the

expansiveness of the regions.

This leads to the final hypothesis:

*H5: As a district's distance to international borders decreases, the number of terror
attacks in that district should increase.*

The essence of this chapter suggests that underdevelopment and exclusion create

grievances in the population. A legacy of isolationism has bred resentment, poor

education, poor infrastructure, and rampant corruption in three key regions of India. In

many cases, geography helped to exacerbate the existence of these grievances. Most importantly though, the geography of a region can help determine whether a campaign will exist, and whether it will be successful and continue. Counterterrorism efforts are substantially diminished by rugged terrain. Rugged terrain limits the effectiveness of counterterrorism methods such as surveillance, troop penetration, and ease of movement making it difficult to defeat what may otherwise be weak terrorists. Weak international borders also give aid to terrorist groups since they are able to provide sanctuary to groups and allow them to access external funders. In essence, rugged terrain, international borders, and terrorism are all inter-related.

Now that the central hypotheses have been established, it is necessary to explore whether the empirical evidence supports my claims. In the next section, I utilize an original district level database of terrorism. If a causal relationship exists between underdevelopment, geography, and terrorism, a statistical analysis should provide some insight. In addition to a statistical analysis, I will also utilize GIS technology to visually explore the locations of terrorist attacks in relation to their geographic qualities.

Investigating the Relationship among Trains, Terrain, and Terrorism

India has experienced 6029 terror attacks in the last decade, which is more than it experienced in the past three decades combined. Terrorism has become increasingly common and groups have become increasingly lethal. Groups like the United Liberation Front of Assam have existed for over three decades, but their tactics have become increasingly deadly. Chapter 3 emphasized the importance of variables such as terrain, international borders, and railways. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of terrorism in India from 2000-2014.

Terrorism does not generally occur evenly throughout a state (Lafree, 2010). When it does occur, there is often disagreement on whether the attack qualifies as terrorism (Young, 2011; Findlay and Young, 2010). The regional concentration of terrorism often means that the characteristics of some locations are not similar to the rest of the state. As a result, analysts may make conclusions about statewide or global terrorism based on simplistic generalizations. Most of these problems can be overcome when using proper analysis. However, most terrorism literature utilizes a cross-national examination of multiple states to see if a correlation exists between total number of attacks and another variable, such as regime type, poverty, or religion (Poe, Tate, and Keith, 2002; Li, 2004; Neumayer, 2004; Piazza, 2008; Krueger and Laitin, 2008; Lafree, Morris, and Dugan, 2010).

Cross-national examinations of domestic terrorism can have several potential

flaws. For one, some states, particularly democracies and states with open media, are

more likely to report attacks that occur (Li, 2005), which makes cross-national data

examinations of terrorism prone to bias. Second, cross-national analyses do not consider

the wide level of in-state variation that exists. A region within a state, such as Northeast

India, may have quite different experiences than the rest of the country. Yet, the

substantial amount of attacks occurring in a specified region may make one conclusions

about the country itself, rather than the regions where attacks actually occur. This can

lead to scholars to make broad conclusions about the world based on ill-informed

correlations. Much of these problems can be addressed by conducting a within-country

analysis of terrorism in addition to in-depth case studies. To rectify the analytical issues

surrounding cross-national analyses, this chapter conducts a district-level analysis of

terrorism in India. While reporting errors can still occur, a district level analysis reduces

many of the errors associated with terrorism research. Most importantly, it controls

several state-level factors, such as regime type and general history, religion, and culture.

While within-state variation exists, it is at a much lower level compared to cross-national

data.

    There are also limitations when only analyzing a single country. For one,

increased attention to only one case decreases generalizability (Geddes, 1990). Although

I believe my theory can explain how geography and terrorism operates in other countries,

my analysis is limited to India. Ultimately, my case provides in-depth understanding of

terrorism in India only. Nonetheless, I believe my detailed analysis of India can help

explain phenomena outside of the region. Choosing only one case can also reflect

selection bias (King, Keohane, Verba, 1994). Critics may suggest that by choosing India, I selected a case that demonstrates my theory, while other cases may not have demonstrated a relationship. One way to remedy problems of selection bias is to avoid selecting cases on the dependent variable. I include all districts in India, not just those that have experienced terrorism, in an attempt to overcome any problems my country case selection may have caused. Including the world of cases in an analysis specific to the district is not feasible. Ideally, future work can extend upon my single country analysis to include other states and regions. However, even if the findings are limited to India alone, understanding terrorism in the world's largest democracy and 2nd largest country is still immensely helpful. In the next section explains each variable selected, how it will be measured, and why it was included.

Variables

Unit of Analysis

This project analyzes terrorism in India from 2000-2014. There are two different units of analysis in this project, the state and the district. Most quantitative analyses of India use the state as the unit of analysis (Piazza, 2009; 2010; Vadlamannati, 2011). However, I suspect that substantial detail is lost by not using the district as the unit of analysis. Because it is generally the preferred method of analyzing Indian data, I also conduct an initial descriptive analysis at the state level in order to compare the results to the district level. As of 2014, India has 29 states, seven territories and 1 capital region. Because of the low number of states, there are not enough observations to conduct a regression analysis.

Census data is not available for several districts, such as those in the Andaman Islands since the groups living in the area are incredibly hostile to any outsiders, making census data and information about the territory incredibly difficult to obtain. However, attack data for every district is included. Although the 0 attacks given to the Andaman islands is not with certainty, there have been no known reports of terrorism on the islands.

Data for each variable is collapsed into a single observation. Each state and district will have only one observation for total number of attacks, literacy rate, percent forested, etc. Collapsing the data is ideal in this analysis for several reasons. First, most of the data, specifically data on terrain and borders, is relatively constant. Second, terror attacks are not evenly distributed over time so collapsing the data into a single observation gives a stronger idea of overall trends, which is my primary interest. Third, two Indian censuses have taken place during the timeframe of the study, to account for any changes that may have taken place from 2000-2010, I average the data from the census in 2000 and 2010 for each relevant variable (literacy rate, percent scheduled caste, percent scheduled tribe, population density, and percent Muslim). Fourth, since the data for the independent variables is only updated every decade, then it should follow that the dependent variable should be constructed in a similar manner. Collapsing data does result in the loss of some information, mainly the yearly distribution of terrorist attacks, however, this should not affect my results, if anything it would only serve to make my results less significant, rather than more significant.

To test the relationship between the independent and dependent variables I use a Negative Binomial Regression (NBREG). A NBREG is appropriate in this model due to

the over-dispersion of 0s since nearly 50% of Indian districts have not experienced a single terror attack. The distribution is therefore not normal and thus not estimated well using OLS regression. I also run two models, one with Kashmir and one without. Many may argue that Jammu and Kashmir will drive any positive relationship found since the district has experienced 2041 attacks from 2000-2010 and because it is a rugged region with an international border.

Dependent Variable

The primary dependent variable is number of terrorist attacks. To measure terrorist attack data, I utilize the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to create a state and district level terrorism database of India's 6029 attacks. The attacks that are included are those by domestic groups between 2000 and 2014. The two terrorism databases include information on the village or city name where the attack happened, but they do not classify in what district the attacked occurred. Using detailed maps from the government of India, I determined the district of each terrorist attack and coded accordingly. The mean number of attacks at the district level is 18.59, with a standard deviation of 4.18 while the mean number of attacks at the state level is 217.40, with a standard deviation of 80.35.

Independent Variables

The independent variables in this study are distance to train station, development, rugged terrain, and distance to international borders. The mean distance to rail for each district is 21.6 km, with a standard deviation of 2.25. At the state level, all states except Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland have at least one rail station. My first hypothesis predicts that terrorist attacks should increase as distance to

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railways increases. My theory discusses the importance of economic and social development, and the railroad system was an integral part of that integration. I suspect that districts that have no easy access to rail and are farther away from train stations is evidence of historical underdevelopment. If a district has a train station, they are classified as a 0 km distance to the nearest train station. If a district does not have a train station, I used GIS to calculate the distance to the nearest district train station. Several states have no train stations, including Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Manipur. Assam does have several train stations, but the colonially excluded districts of Assam do not. Most of Kashmir outside of the Jammu district does not have a train station. In Chhattisgarh, access to the rail network is sparse. The mean distance to a rail station is 45 km with some districts nearly 195 km away from the nearest station.

My second hypothesis predicts that acts of terrorism should decrease as levels of development increase. Measuring development is slightly more complicated. For one, access to rail should demonstrate historical integration and development. However, there is a possibility that external factors, not related to historical underdevelopment, may have prevented or encouraged the development of the rail system. Therefore, although distance to train station can provide insight into underdevelopment, poverty is more likely a reliable measure. India does not measure poverty levels for each district, however. The literature suggests that literacy should serve as a strong predictor of economic and social development (UNESCO, 2006). Areas with lower levels of historical development will have a lower number of schools and access to education. Increased education and literacy rates are associated with more successful crops, lower unemployment, lower fertility

rates, and increased human capital (Mitra and Singh, 2005). All of these factors should decrease feelings of resentment and make individuals less likely to support terrorist movements.

The mean literacy rate for the period of analysis is 77%, with a standard deviation of 2.9. The district with the lowest literacy rate in India is Bijapur (a terrorism prone district in Chhatisgarh), with only 40.86% literacy. The state with the lowest literacy rate is Bihar, with a 63.17% literacy rate. In contrast, the district of Alaphuza in Kerala, has the highest literacy rate in India with 97% literacy. Likewise, the state of Kerala has the highest literacy rate in India with a mean of 94% literacy.

My third and fourth hypotheses predict that terror attacks should increase as rugged terrain increases. To capture rugged terrain, I use two different measures: percent forested and percent mountainous terrain of a district. Much of the literature generally measures ruggedness based on mountains (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Pickering, 2012), while less attention is paid to forested terrain (Buhaug and Gates, 2002). Forested terrain, however, is often equally or more rugged than mountains, as established in chapter three. To measure forested terrain, I use data from the Indian Forest Service to get the percent of the district covered by forest. The mean forest cover for each district is 34%, with a standard deviation of 4.4. The most forested state in India is Mizoram, with 90% forest cover while the most forested district in India is East Garo in Meghalaya, with a forest cover of 97%. The least forested district in India is Kolkata, which has 0% forest cover, while the least forested state in India is Punjab, with a forest cover of only 4%.

India was among the first countries in the world to maintain data on their forests and their data is updated every five years (Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2010).

The percent forest cover does change, but generally, it is a negligible amount. In five years, there was only a small change in the percent forest cover in India. Between 2010 and 2015, there was a net increase in forested area of 422 sq km (less than 1%) in the entire country. Most of this change took place outside traditional forested lands in urban centers in an attempt to enhance green cover. (Forest Survey of India, 2015)   This limited amount of change gives me confidence that minimal information is lost by collapsing the data for percent forested terrain in a district. Although most of the literature uses mountains to capture rugged terrain, my theory considers forests to be more important in perpetuating attacks than mountains, although this may not hold true for the universe of cases throughout the world. Nonetheless, data on mountainous terrain will still be included because of the importance the variable has played within the conflict literature. Following the lead of other scholars, I use elevation as a proxy for mountainous terrain. Although there may be errors with this categorization, such as misclassification of plateaus and rugged uplands, (Collier, 2001; Fearon, 2001; Pickering, 2012), I believe the data is primarily reflective of India's mountainous terrain.

The fifth hypothesis predicts that attacks will be more likely the closer a district is to the international border. Measurement for this variable is relatively straightforward. I use GIS to measure the distance to the closest international border. The distance is calculated by determining proximity from the center of the district to the closest international border. If a district shares an international border it is considered to have a distance of 0 km. The mean distance to international border for a district is 674 km, while 62 districts share an international border.

Control Variables

The literature on terrorism is expansive. Numerous explanations exist that attempt to explain why terrorism does or does not occur in specific locations. At times, many variables such as poverty, literacy rate, and percent ethnic minority overlap. Variable overlap makes it difficult to understand which variables actually have a causal connection and which ones are only correlational. In order to consider alternative explanations, it is necessary to include several control variables in the analysis.

The first control variable is population density. Population density is included for several reasons. For one, the higher number the population, the increased likelihood of the presence of a radicalized individual or group. Simply put, more people equal higher likelihood of attacks. Moreover, the desire for mass casualty terrorism has led to a correlation between population density and risk of terrorist attacks (Morral AR, Kelly TK, 2009). Second, some may suggest that an increase in the number of people increases the likelihood that someone will carry out an attack because it becomes a high value target (Berebbi and Lakdawalla, 2006). Conversely, population density may also affect ease of entry and ability to camouflage (Chatterjee and Abkowitz, 2011).

The second control variable is percent Muslim population. Given the recent increase in global Islamic inspired terrorism, particularly during the 2000-2010 period of this study, it is necessary to see if Islamic groups are disproportionately causing attacks (Hoffman, 2006). Some scholars have hypothesized that terrorism in the 21st century is primarily a Muslim phenomenon, and that Islam is a precondition that increases the propensity to commit terrorism (Israeli, 2002; Kushner, 1996). The media also gives an exorbitant amount of attention about the relationship between Islam and terrorism (Saeed, 2007; Said, 2008; Jackson, 2010; Powell, 2011). I do not expect Islam to play a role in

terrorism in India. However, even if the percent Muslim population variable holds some significance, it can still be argued that indigenous Islamic groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and similar groups operating in Kashmir align more closely with ethno-nationalist grievances rather than Al-Qaedaesque international terrorist groups (Rao et al, 2007)

The third control variable is scheduled caste and scheduled tribe. This is perhaps the most important control variable since most of the ongoing conflicts in the northeast and Naxal Belt are related to tribal identity and the quest for autonomy or secession. Scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are two very different groups, although both are highly impoverished. Scheduled tribes make up 8.2% of the total population of India, or 85 million people. About 93% of all scheduled tribe members live in rural areas (Census of India, 2010). There are more than 400 tribal groups throughout India all with distinct cultures, languages, practices, and beliefs. Tribal populations live throughout India, with the exception of New Delhi, Chandigarh, Punjab, and Haryana. Tribal communities continue to lag behind the general population in their educational attainment. However, the tribal communities of Northeast India have much higher education rates than tribal communities in Rajasthan, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh (Mitra and Singh, 2006). Scheduled Castes vary quite significantly from scheduled tribes. Scheduled castes are at the bottom of the Hindu social hierarchy. They are traditionally undereducated and considered unclean by Hindu society. Like scheduled tribes, their literacy rate is very low. Unlike scheduled tribes, scheduled caste members are more geographically dispersed and do not necessarily live in rural only areas. Scheduled caste members face extensive discrimination, although the Indian government has attempted to rectify this through wide scale social provisions such as quotas in the University system and in

government jobs (Oberst et al, 2013). Discrimination and low social standing could potentially lead to grievances that result in acts of terrorism. However, there is very little evidence to suggest low-castes and untouchables association with terrorist movements in India.

Control variables for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe are essential because it can provide insight into whether a minority of the population is responsible for the majority of terror attacks. After all, most of the secessionist movements in India are tied to minority indigenous groups. The Naxalite movement is particularly attractive to the scheduled tribe community in Chhattisgarh (Roy, 2010) since the Naxalites claim to be fighting for land rights for the landless and exploited tribals. Data on scheduled castes and tribes also provides insight on horizontal inequality since widescale discrimination occurs against these groups based on their ethnicity and caste If scheduled castes and scheduled tribes are responsible for a majority of the attacks it may render the geography explanation untrue and instead provide evidence for cultural or social proclivity to commit terrorism. If horizontal inequality is related to terrorism in India, there should be a positive relationship between this variable and terrorism.

In the next section, I carry out the state level analysis of my research. To begin with, I map the distribution of terror attacks throughout the country from 2000-2010.

<u>**State Level Analysis**</u>

Terrorist Attacks per Indian State 2000-2010

Figure 4.1
Source: Global Terrorism Database
Number of attacks

☐ 0-10
▨ 11-50
▨ 51-100
■ 101-499 attacks
■ 500+

     The geographic clustering of the attacks in figure 4.1 is immediately evident. The

Naxal Belt, Kashmir, and Northeast India are the epicenters of terrorist activity. Kashmir

and Assam have the most activity. Assam experienced 909 attacks, while Kashmir

experienced 1,974 attacks. One of India's smallest states, Manipur, in Northeast India

experienced 587 attacks. The Naxal belt states of Andhra Pradesh (324), Bihar (305),

Chhattisgarh (426), and West Bengal (352) experienced 1407 attacks collectively.

Several states had zero or fewer than 10 attacks. Four states, Goa, Uttarkhand, Himachal

Pradesh, and Sikkim experienced zero attacks. Nine states, including Tamil Nadu,

Rajasthan, Punjab, Mizoram, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Haryana, and Gujarat

all experienced fewer than 10 attacks. Table 4.1 provides detailed characteristics of each

state listed and is ordered by the state with the fewest number of attacks (Goa) to the

state with the most (Jammu & Kashmir).

Table 4.1

State Level Characteristics of India

State	Attacks	% Forested	International Border	Lit. Rate	% SC	% ST	% Muslim
Goa	0	57	No	88.7	1.7	0	6.84
Himachal Pradesh	0	31	China	83.78	25.2	4.22	1.97
Sikkim	0	60	China	81.42	5.02	20.6	1.42
Uttarkhand	0	60	China; Nepal	71.6	17.9	2.9	11.92
Haryana	1	5	No	75.55	20.2	0	5.78
Rajasthan	2	7	Pakistan	66.11	17.16	12.6	8.47
Gujarat	3	12	Pakistan	78	7.09	14.8	9.06
Madya Pradesh	4	24	No	65.38	15.17	23.3	6.37
Kerala	5	45	No	93.91	9.81	1.5	24.7
Tamil Nadu	5	16	No	83	19	1.1	5.56
Mizoram	6	90	Myanmar; Bangladesh	93.91	0.1	94.9	1.14
Punjab	6	4	Pakistan	75	31.9	0	1.57
Karnataka	11	21	No	75.6	16.2	4.26	12.23

Uttar Pradesh	23	5	Nepal	67.68	20.7	0.6	18.5
Meghalaya	27	79	Bangladesh	74.43	0.6	85.9	4.28
Nagaland	73	79	Myanmar	76.88	0	86.5	1.76
Maharashtra	89	16	No	66.59	10.2	8.85	10.6
Tripura	95	77	Bangladesh; Myanmar	94.65	17.37	31.1	7.95
Orissa	261	28	No	63.61	16.53	22.1	2.07
Bihar	305	7	Nepal	63.82	4.3	1.3	18.1
Andhra Pradesh	324	15	No	61	16	8	18
West Bengal	352	13	Bangladesh	76.26	23.5	5.5	25.25
Jharkhand	382	26	No	66.4	16.35	1.3	13.85
Chhattisgarh	426	40	No	67.5	22.3	37.1	2.5
Manipur	587	66	Myanmar	79.21	2.62	32.3	8.81
Assam	909	30	Bhutan; Bangladesh	73.18	6.9	12.4	28.8
Jammu & Kashmir	1974	35	Pakistan; China	65.57	7.59	10.9	66.97
India	5870	~13	Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China	74	16.6	8.6	14.4

There is no immediately evident pattern between certain characteristics and terrorist attacks at the state level. International borders and attacks have a small negative correlation (-.19). This is not surprising since several states like Punjab and Rajasthan have international borders yet have experienced six and two attacks respectively. Uttarkhand, which is heavily forested and shares a border with China and Nepal, has

never experienced an attack. Some states are densely forested, but do not have a terrorism problem. The correlation between forested terrain and attacks is negative and low (-.02). Goa for example is 57% forested and never experienced an attack. Mizoram and Sikkim are over 50% forested, yet Mizoram has only experienced six attacks and Sikkim has not experienced any. As for scheduled caste and tribe and attacks, there is no evident relationship at the state level (correlation of -.16 and -.07 respectively). The states of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Rajasthan account for over 50% of the total tribal population but have all experienced fewer than five attacks each.

The one possible relationship that deserves some additional investigation is the relationship between the percentage of Muslims and number of attacks (correlation of .83). The clash of the civilizations literature has prompted many to assume a relationship between Islam and terrorism, particularly where Muslims are minorities (see Huntington, 1996). The two states with the highest number of attacks, Assam and Kashmir, also have the largest percentage of Muslim population, 28.8% and 67% respectively. West Bengal has the third highest number of Muslims (25%) and a high number of attacks (352). Muslim identity plays a clear role in the Kashmir campaign, but Muslim identity has generally played a nominal role in Assam.[6]

The state level data provides initial insight into the relationship between terrain, population, and terror attacks; however, I still suspect crucial details are lost by not evaluating the data more closely. As I have detailed in the previous pages, I believe a district level analysis is most appropriate for this research because ample variation exists

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[6] ULFA has one small off shoot called MULFA or Muslim United Liberation Front of Assam. Although the organization's members are Muslim, the group shares the same goal as the broader ULFA organization, which is independence from India (SATP, 2014).

even within states. Within Assam, for example, there are some districts with nearly 97% forested terrain and over 75% of the population belonging to a scheduled tribe. However, a few districts away have fewer than 5% forested terrain and no tribal population. There is too much variation within states to consider the state an appropriate means of analysis for something as district-specific as terrorism. The next section explores the data at the district level.

District Level Analysis

Terrorism in India is geographically clustered. To demonstrate this clustering I implement the mapping tool in Stata to show the location of terror attacks throughout the country. My main interest is the attack data. For simplification, I categorized attacks into three categories: 0-10 attacks, 11-50, and 50+. Since all but 17 districts had between 0-50 attacks, distinguishing among categories at the lower end of the spectrum provides more detail.

Figure 4.2 demonstrates the geographic clustering of attacks in India. As discussed throughout the project, attacks are primarily centered in three regions, Jammu and Kashmir in Northern India, the Northeast India corridor, and the Naxal Belt of Central and eastern India.

Attacks by District 2000-2014

Figure 4.2

Legend:

☐   0-10 attacks

▦   11-99 attacks

■   100+ attacks

     To provide some additional insight into the terrorism-prone districts in India, table

4.3 lists the characteristics of the 30 districts with the highest number of attacks.

Table 4.2

Characteristics of the 30 Districts with Highest Number of Attacks

India average in parentheses

Mean # of attacks	% with more than 30% forest cover	% with less than 25 km to intl. border	Mean literacy rate	Mean distance to railroad (km)
140	96	82	69	207
India (10)	(27)	(11)	(74)	(26)

Kashmir dominates the list in table 4.2 with eight of its fourteen districts in the top 30. Five of Manipur's eight districts also made the list. The large majority of these districts have very easy access to an international border, which is substantial since only 11% of all Indian districts share an international border. Only seven districts in the top 30 do not have an international border. The districts that do not have an international border are located in the Naxal Belt and still have easy access to densely forested areas. The data also shows that districts experiencing attacks are generally heavily forested. Every single terrorism-prone district is not only above the national average for percent forest cover (13%), but all but two districts are more than double that number. Seventeen of the thirty districts have more than 50% of their land covered by forest, while twelve districts have more than 75% forest cover. Forested terrain clearly seems to be an important component of terrorist activity in India. The mean distance to railroad in the top 30 terrorism-prone districts is 207 km, which is ten times more than the average for India. This stark difference strongly reiterates the geographical and developmental isolation of the districts.   Ninety-six percent of all districts have more than 30% forest cover. The

only terrorism-prone districts that do not have major forest cover are primarily in

Kashmir. However, these districts still have two other favorable conditions for a terrorist

campaign. For one, the land is much more mountainous in these locations. Although

militants in Kashmir frequently use the forests, they also take advantage of the

Himalayan Mountains. Second, all but Srinagar (the capital) and Udhampur districts have

easy access to international borders.

To move beyond state level results and summary statistics, table 4.3 displays the

results of the district level analysis. In addition to displaying the results of the NBREG

with and without Kashmir, I also include the min, max, and percent change category to

display the results of the substantive effects. The minimum category represents the

predicted number of attacks at the lowest data point for each variable, while the max

category represents the predicted number of attacks at the highest point. The percent

change represents the difference between the min and max category. For the forested

variable for example, at the lowest level of percent forested (0.5%) there are 1.54

predicted attacks, compared to 18.79 predicted attacks at the highest level of percent

forested (99%), accounting for an increased change of 1120%.

Table 4.3

Results: District Level Analysis

	With Kashmir	Min	Max	%Δ	Without Kashmir	Min	Max	%Δ
Forested	0.047**	1.54	18.79	1120	0.024**	21.81	206.995	849
	(0.007)				(0.01)			
Elevation	-0.001**	5.79	0.0002	-99.99	-0.001	276.22	4.737	-98.28
	(0.0005)				(0.0005)			
Elevation^2	2.48*	70.26	23.16	-67.03	0.002			
	(1.52)				(0.0006)			
Distance to Border	-0.009**	70.26	23.16	-67.03	-0.00**	21.28	1.1	-94.8
	(0.0002)				(0.00)			
Scheduled Caste	-0.00**	54	44	-18.51	-0.005			
	(0.0157)				(0.021)			
Scheduled Tribe	-0.006**	44.52	100.18	125	0.011			
	(0.008)				(0.01)			
Population Density	0				-0.00			
	(0.0004)				(0.0004)			
Percent Muslim	0.01**	39.33	139.31	125	0.0006			
	(0.0087)				(0.0123)			
Literacy Rate	-0.06**	1.07	10.26	-89.57	-0.03**	181.97	22.77	-87.48
	(0.0001)				(0.012)			
Train Station	0.001**	2.99	14.75	393	0.02**	2.91	13.6	367.35
	(7.98)				(0.005)			
Observations	516				501			
Pseudo R2	0.0783				0.050			
Prob > chi2	0				0.000			
LR chi2	154.02				115.660			
AIC	1836.199				1982.000			
BIC	1886.894				2020.209			
Df	12				9			

Note: Standard Error in Parentheses. ** significant at .1%, * significant at 1%. Only significant variables are shown for the marginal effects.

Hypothesis one predicts that an increase in the distance to a train station increases

the likelihood for terrorism. The distance to train station variable not only represents

geographic and economic isolation, but also provides insight into historical

underdevelopment. The distance to train station variable is positive and significant in both models, meaning that as distance to a train station increases, so too do attacks. This result is not surprising. The districts inundated with attacks are located in the periphery of the state and are isolated from much of the region. The train station variable also serves as a proxy for development and is representative of districts that were not historically integrated during colonialism. Given that both literacy rate and distance to train station are significant in the model, this provides significant support for H1 and initial support for H2.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that as a districts level of development increases, the number of terror attacks will decrease. The train station variable provides ample insight into levels of development since the rail is a central component of historical and modern development in India. However, the train station variable alone is not enough. The literacy rate variable also serves as a proxy that can capture economic and social underdevelopment. The results in table 4.3 demonstrate that as a district's literacy rate increases, it is less likely to experience terrorist attacks. This result holds significance in both models. Because the train station and literacy rate variable are significant, I can confidently accept hypothesis two. There clearly seems to be a relationship between underdevelopment, grievances, and the propensity to experience terrorist attacks in India.

Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive relationship between forested terrain and terror attacks in a district. The results in table 4.3 demonstrate a strongly significant positive relationship between terrorist attacks and forested terrain in both models. As percent forested terrain increases, so does the number of attacks. The positive relationship was evident from the descriptive statistics and the state-level analysis, but the continued

significance at the more detailed district analysis demonstrates the power of the relationship. This finding allows me to accept my third hypothesis and lends support to the central component of my theory emphasizing the importance of terrain in Indian terrorism.

Hypothesis 4 predicts that there is a positive relationship between mountainous terrain and attacks. Using elevation as a proxy for mountainous terrain, the initial analysis found no significance. However, only expecting a simple positive relationship between elevation and attacks is unrealistic. Beyond a certain elevation, India's mountains no longer have hospitable living conditions. Attacks are not at the greatest likelihood at the highest elevation since living, much less fighting, in such a location is not probable. Instead, a curvilinear relationship is much more likely. To remedy this problem I introduce elevation squared into the model, which should capture a curvilinear relationship if one exists. Once elevation and elevation squared are entered into the model, both variables hold significance in both models, demonstrating the curvilinear relationship. This finding goes against the initial prediction in hypothesis four, which predicts a simple positive linear relationship, however it still lends support to my theory that suggests ruggedness is important for terror campaigns.

My fifth and final hypothesis predicts that attacks will increase as distance to an international border decreases. The results in table 4.3 lend support for this hypothesis. The distance to international border variable is significant in both models. This positive relationship comes as no surprise since nearly all of the ethno-nationalist groups operating in India have international bases. Moreover, all of the ethno-nationalist groups in states with international borders have international bases. In fact, 70% of ULFA's

bases are actually located in Bangladesh. Most Kashmiri militants are headquartered in Pakistan controlled Kashmir.

After seeing the strong positive relationship between forested districts and terrorist attacks, many may still assume another factor is driving the relationship. One immediate assumption is that ethnic minorities are likely located near international borders and in isolated areas such as forests. Although it is true that scheduled tribes generally inhabit these remote regions, most scheduled tribes live outside of them. The results demonstrate that ethnic minorities are not driving the relationship, in fact, quite the opposite. The scheduled tribe variable actually has negative significance in the all districts model and no statistical significance in the Kashmir model. The scheduled caste variable is negatively significant in both models. These results indicate that as the percentage of the scheduled caste population increases, attacks actually decrease. While members of lower and other backwards castes and scheduled tribes do participate in terror attacks, most do not. Himachal Pradesh, Gujarat, Punjab, and Haryana all have some of the highest percentages of scheduled castes, but these states have experienced practically no attacks in the last decade. Scheduled tribe is negatively significant in the all districts model and insignificant in the model excluding Kashmir. The negative significance of this variable may seem surprising to some since terrorism in India is often associated with ethnic separatists. This means that districts with higher levels of scheduled tribes have lower numbers of attacks. This finding is interesting since most of the ongoing conflicts in the northeast are related to tribal identity and the quest for autonomy or secession. This means that although many tribal groups are participating in terrorism, most of them are not.

The results indicating that attacks decrease as percent scheduled tribe (ST) is somewhat surprising, but has a likely explanation. I suspect that districts with high levels of ST's do not experience more attacks for three reasons. First, most of these locations have been historically integrated into the state rather that excluded. Most of the scheduled tribes in Gujarat and Rajasthan hold special status, but they have not been isolated in the way that tribes in Northeast India or the Naxal belt have. The exclusion of tribal groups in Northeast India is the exception, rather than the rule. Secondly, because tribal groups are located in areas where the state can easily sanction behavior or groups, terrorism would not be a rational tactic. Third, in most cases, the state has attempted to accommodate ST's and SC's by offering generous affirmative action policies, including quotas in public jobs and universities (Zwart, 2000). This accommodation has been instrumental, in my opinion, in creating grievances toward the state. Instead, the state is held in rather high regard by most scheduled castes and tribes.

The final variable that holds significance is percent Muslim. The variable is significant in the model including Kashmir, but loses its significance in the model without Kashmir. The districts in Kashmir are overwhelmingly Muslim, and have had many attacks. Most of the districts in Kashmir, outside Ladakh, have a Muslim population of over 90%. This is a very high percentage of Muslims compared to the rest of India. Outside of Kashmir, the average percent of Muslims in any given district is around 15%. Given the high number of attacks in the substantially Muslim district, it is no surprise this variable had some significance. However, once Kashmir is excluded, the relationship disappears.

The insignificance of the Muslim variable outside of Kashmir demonstrates that Islam associated terrorism is only a substantial problem in Kashmir. However, even in Kashmir, the battle is not really centered around Islam and Islamic extremism. Instead, ethnic identity as a Muslim holds much more salience. Just as groups in the Northeast rally around their tribal status, groups in Kashmir strongly identify with their Islamic identity and the fear that their group is exploited. The attacks in Kashmir do not occur as a quest for a global caliphate as seen in many other Islamist type groups such as Al-Qaeda. Terrorism associated with the Muslim identity does not seem to have a stronghold anywhere outside of Kashmir. This means that Islam and terrorism does not have as strong of a relationship in India as many believe.

Population density is the only variable that does not hold any significance. It is not surprising that population density is not significant since most attacks are taking place in rugged and isolated districts of India. Some may suggest that an increase in the number of people increases the likelihood that someone will carry out an attack or that groups target densely populated areas. However, the results in both models in table 4.3 demonstrate there is no relationship. In fact, the states in the northeast are among the least populated in India. This does not mean that urban areas such as Mumbai and Delhi have not faced and continue to face a very real threat. Instead, on a daily basis, the rugged districts on the border are much more likely to experience attacks.

Since the primary variables of interest hold significance in the statistical models, the next step is to discern the magnitude of the significance. Figure 4.3-4.7 implement substantive effects using the margins command in Stata for the variables significant in

both models (with and without Kashmir): forested, distance to international border,

elevation, literacy rate, and distance to rail.[7]

Percent Forested and Terrorist Attacks

Figure 4.3

The results in figure 4.3 and table 4.3 demonstrate that the predicted number of

attacks increase as forested terrain increases, providing additional evidence of a

relationship between forested attacks and terrorist attacks in India. At the minimum level

of percent forested terrain the predicted number of attacks is 1.54 whereas at 96%

forested, the max number, the predicted number of attacks increases to 18.79 an increase

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[7] Figures 4.3-4.7 have large confidence intervals, this is a result of how the data is distributed. Attempts at transforming the variable through normalizing, logging, or dropping outliers had only nominal or no effect on the confidence intervals.

of 1120%. The results in figure 4.3 provide additional support for my third hypothesis that predicts a positive relationship between forested terrain and number of attacks.

Figure 4.4

Figure 4.4 demonstrates that as distance to international border increases the likelihood of attack decreases. When at the minimum distance to a border, 0 km, the predicted number of attacks is 70.26 when at the maximum distance from a border (2500 km) the predicted number of attacks is 23.16, a total change of 67.03%. This provides

additional evidence for my fifth hypothesis predicting a negative relationship between

distance to international border and number of attacks.

Figure 4.5

Figure 4.5 demonstrates that more attacks are predicted to take place in elevations

below 2500 feet. The higher the elevation the less likely attacks are to take place. At an

elevation of 0 the predicted number of attacks is 5.79 but when the elevation is at the max

of 6000 km 0 attacks are predicted, a decrease of 99.99%. This decrease occurs because

the high elevations are mostly uninhabitable and fighting is unlikely to occur in such

locations.

Figure 4.6

Figure 4.6 demonstrates that attacks decrease as literacy rate increases. When literacy rates are at their lowest point of 30.6%, 10.26 attacks are predicted. When literacy rates reach the highest point of 98.76, 1.07 attacks are predicted, a decrease of 89.57%. Figure 4.6 provides additional support for my 2nd hypothesis, which predicts that terror attacks will decrease as literacy rates increase.

Figure 4.7

The final figure demonstrates that attacks become increasingly likely as distance from rail increases. Because of the skewed distribution, I log the distance to rail variable. At the minimum distance to a rail station (0 km), the predicted number of attacks is 2.99, at the max distance to a rail station (100 km) the predicted number of attacks is 14.75. This further demonstrates that districts far from the rail are expected to experience a high level of attacks. Of the 10 districts with the highest number of attacks, 80% are more than 75 km away from a rail station.

Given the significance of the forested and international border variables, some may wonder whether there is an endogeneity problem. Perhaps groups move to these locations because of its favorable terrain. While this is a legitimate concern, in the case of

India it is not true. Although some Pakistani militants have been known to move into Kashmir to fight for their cause, all of the groups analyzed in this project are indigenous to the regions they fight. This is generally true for most ethno-nationalist movements around the world. The MILF in the Philippines are indigenous to Mindanao. The Muslims in Southern Thailand are indigenous to the region, as are the LTTE to Northern Sri Lanka, the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, and the members of Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The descriptive and statistical analyses of the variables give substantial support to the theory and five hypotheses. Already, the analyses demonstrate that a relationship exists between the physical environment and terror attacks. However, there are still additional tools that can help understand and visualize how the data is functioning in India. In the next section, GIS (Geographic Information Systems) is utilized to map the terror data. GIS is an extraordinary mapping system that can help unveil spatial patterns of data. If mountains, forests, or proximity to railroads influences terrorist activity, then GIS can help unveil and visualize these relationships.

<u>Mapping the Data</u>

Tables 4.1 and 4.4 and figures 4.3-4.7 provide support for my hypotheses. To expand the evaluation of the data, this next section implements GIS to map the data. The anecdotal, descriptive, and statistical analyses so far seem to suggest a relationship exists. Figure 4.8 uses the ArcGIS program to visualize the relationship between forested terrain and number of attacks. The volume of the red circle increases as the number of attacks increase. Accordingly, the shade of green darkens as the percent forested terrain increases. The rail network lines are also included in black.

Forested Terrain and Terrorist Attacks using GIS

Figure 4.8

Three things are evident once the data is visualized in figure 4.8. First, attacks are

most frequent in the most forested regions of India. The most heavily forested regions,

which occur in Northeast India in the states of Manipur and Assam, have the highest

concentration of attacks. Nearly every district in the densely forested Northeast has

Three things are evident once the data is visualized in figure 4.8. First, attacks are most frequent in the most forested regions of India. The most heavily forested regions, which occur in Northeast India in the states of Manipur and Assam, have the highest concentration of attacks. Nearly every district in the densely forested Northeast has experienced numerous attacks. The most heavily forested district, Imphal East, which is over 90% forested, experienced 315 attacks. This is also the district with the highest number of attacks in the Northeast and second highest in India. The most heavily forested locations of the Naxal Belt also have the highest number of attacks outside of the northeast and Kashmir. The district of Dantewada, which is 65% forested, experienced the highest number of attacks (179) outside of Kashmir and Northeast India. Similarly, the district of Bijapur, which is also 65% forested, experienced 100 attacks. The less forested districts in Chhattisgarh have markedly lower number of attacks. The least forested districts of Durg (9% forested) and Janjgir (4% forested) have one and zero attacks, respectively. Although not as much attention is generally given to the forested terrain of Kashmir, Kashmir is also quite heavily forested. The more heavily forested locations also seem to be home to more attacks. The percent forested terrain in Kashmir is not as high as the Naxal Belt or Northeast India, but the forests of Kashmir continue to be an important base for militants. What is more important for the Kashmiri militants though, is the international border.

Second, figure 4.8 clearly shows the importance of borders. This is especially true in Kashmir. Baramulla, Doda, and Pulwama, the districts with the highest number of attacks in Kashmir, all have an immediate border with Pakistan. Districts further away from the border, such as Leh, Kathua, Jammu, and Kargil, all have fewer than ten attacks.

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The district of Leh, which is 300 km away from the Pakistan border, had only one attack. Compare that to Baramulla, on the Pakistan border, which experienced 386 attacks. Attacks are also concentrated near the border in Northeast India. Tinsukia in Assam experienced 256 attacks, the highest in Assam, and shares a border with Myanmar. Imphal East in Manipur, which shares a border with Myanmar, experienced 315 attacks. Being near a border does not guarantee that attacks occur, as the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarkhand demonstrate. However, if grievances exist and groups want to carry out attacks, the international borders ease the ability to attack and flee.

Third, the significance of the rail lines is immediately evident. The rail infrastructure is notably absent in the most terrorism-prone regions of Northeast India, Kashmir, and the Naxal Belt. The next subsection explores the location of the rail and terrorism.

Rail Networks

The rail line in figure 4.8 is demonstrative of historical legacies of exclusion. There are three very clear gaps in the rail network: Northeast India, Kashmir, and most of the Naxal Belt. IThe expansive rail network is evident throughout most of the country, but it clearly stops at the state of Kashmir. Figure 4.9 demonstrates how the rail network is non-existent in Kashmir, with the exception of the station that extends to lower Jammu in the extreme southern portion of the state. There is no rail network within 100 km of the terrorism-prone districts of Kashmir, with most districts more than 250 km away from access to any rail network. Figure 4.9 shows the characteristics of Jammu and Kashmir. Most Kashmiri districts are clearly more forested than neighboring states and attacks are concentrated near the border, away from rail, and in quite dense forests. In addition to

covert support from the Pakistan ISI, all of these factors help continue terrorism in
Kashmir.

Terrain, Rail Network, and Terror Attacks in Kashmir

Figure 4.9

Figure 4.10 shows the veritable exclusion of the rail network in Northeast India
and the heavily forested environment of the region. Leading up to the seven sisters states
the rail network is quite extensive, but outside of the one rail line leading through
portions of Assam, it is absent in the rest of the region. There is also a clear concentration
of attacks in the densely forested districts near the border with Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Terrain, Rail Network, and Terror Attacks in Northeast India

Figure 4.10

Finally, figure 4.11 demonstrates the clear gap in the rail network in a large

portion of the Naxal Belt and the extensive forested terrain in the area. The Naxal Belt is

not as deprived of neighboring rail infrastructure as Northeast India or Kashmir, but there

is a clear gap of the rail network in the area where attacks are most concentrated,

particularly in the state of Chhattisgarh. It is no coincidence that this area was also

historically excluded.

Terrain, Rail Network, and Terror Attacks in the Naxal Belt

Figure 4.11

The statistical and GIS analysis both demonstrate that indeed a veritable relationship exists between forested terrain, international borders, and terrorist attacks. This allows me to add additional support for my third and fifth central hypotheses, which posit a relationship between forested terrain, international borders, and terrorist attacks. Underdevelopment alone can results in grievances, but underdevelopment coupled with political inefficacy and marginalized minorities gives rise to grievances the state apparatus is unable to address. Most importantly, when groups with these grievances are located in a rugged location with access to international borders, the state will find them nearly impossible to defeat. This explains why most of India's terrorist groups continue to persist, even when their cadre strength is limited.

Conclusions

The findings in this analysis provide credible evidence that forested terrain, international borders, and historical exclusion are central to the Indian terrorism experience. Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 provide statistical support for my variables of interest at both the state and district level. Statistical and substantive significance of these variables of interest allow me to accept all of my hypotheses. The state level analyses of table 4.2 demonstrate that relationships are evident even at the broader unit of analysis. However, when using the district as the unit of analysis, the relationship becomes even more evident.

The maps in figures 4.8-4.11 add additional support to my findings and help visualize the distribution of terror attacks throughout India. There is a clear clustering of attacks in three locations: highly forested areas, locations near international borders, and locations distant from rail infrastructure. As suspected, terrorist groups are able to utilize

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the dense forest cover, international borders, and limited infrastructure to their advantage. Despite advanced counterterrorism training in jungle warfare and high altitude locations, India is still unable to defeat groups operating in these locations.

I also suspect the findings in India are not exclusive to India alone or just the tactic of terrorism. The results should also apply to the broader conflict literature. Most analyses of geography in the broader conflict literature focus explicitly on mountainous terrain. However, this analysis suggests that forested terrain has a more significant impact on conflict and terrorism than previously recognized. This relationship may not have been unveiled if it were not for a district level analysis of terrorism. I suspect that district level analyses of countries with similarly long-standing conflict problems will find a similar relationship.

This chapter established the statistical significance among forested terrain and international borders and terrorism. Chapter five contains several case studies to provide further insight into the phenomena of terrorism in India in addition to a brief look at how the theory in this project may apply outside of India. I focus my attention on several locations within India that have diverse geography and varied experiences with terrorism and peaceful resistance. I conclude chapter five by examining terrorism, underdevelopment, and geography in Nigeria. I select Nigeria to analyze how my variables of interest operate outside of India.

<center>**5**</center>

<center>**Experiences of Terrain and Terrorism in Tamil Nadu, Uttarkhand, Assam, and**</center>

<center>**Nigeria**</center>

The following cases are illustrative examples of the theory put forth in chapter three. The quantitative analysis in the previous chapter provides support for the hypotheses put forth in chapter three. To provide additional insight into the conditions that may or may not promote terrorist campaigns, I select several cases throughout India and one case outside of India. First, I examine the history of the Tamil movement of Tamil Nadu in southern India. Tamil Nadu neighbors Naxal Belt states, and like them contains some densely forested locations. However, unlike the Naxal Belt areas, Tamil Nadu was well-integrated during the colonial era, and consequently was one of the most advanced provinces in British India. The similar rugged geography, culture, and geographical proximity of Tamil Nadu but different historical path from the Naxal Belt, makes it ideal for comparison. Tamil Nadu (Madras) was one of the most well-developed provinces in India throughout the colonial era. Tamil Nadu was home to top universities, key political leaders, and numerous political parties. Nonetheless, at independence, many Tamils held grievances against the government due to what they considered exclusion. The exclusion many Tamils felt has parallels the exclusion other tribal members in the Naxal Belt and Northeast India; however, the methods of addressing their grievances have been starkly different. In the early years of independence, many Tamils called for secession from India. However, violent actions

never occurred in the state, and the Tamils resolved their grievances with the state using non-violent participation through institutions.

In the second case, I examine Uttarkhand in Northern India. Uttarkhand has a similar geography to Kashmir and Northeast India and shares an international border with Nepal, but has not experienced any terrorism. Uttarkhand is home to several ethnic minority groups including the Chipkos, a group that had grievances with the state but selected peaceful methods of protest to reconcile them. Uttarkhand did not have the strong advanced educational institutions and political leaders present like Tamil Nadu, so the aggrieved population did not respond in the same way the Tamils did, but they did not use violence either. Uttarkhand did have relatively advanced economic and social development, which likely led to the Chipko using non-violent protest as their method of reconciliation. Uttarkhand demonstrates that even without strong educational institutions and amid rugged geography, non-violence can still be utilized to address grievances if there is economic and social development.

Analyzing the cases of Uttarkhand and Tamil Nadu are helpful in revealing additional information about terrorism, historical development, and terrain in India. My selection of Uttarkhand and Tamil Nadu reflect a most-similar case design. These two states have surprisingly similar variables of interest to terrorism-prone regions, but vary on one key component, their lack of terrorism and violence. My theory suggests that terrain is important in promoting terrorism. However, there are rugged locations like Uttarkhand with an international border, and forested areas like Tamil Nadu that did not experience terrorism. In chapter three I discussed that terrain alone is not sufficient to lead to terrorism. If a location is developed, even if they are densely forested or near an

international border, they should not experience terrorism. There are only a few examples of locations in India that are rugged but also developed. Examining these cases will provide insight into how development plays an important role in terrorism in India.

After exploring the cases of Tamil Nadu and Uttarkhand, I utilize an illustrative case to investigate the development of the ongoing terrorist campaign in Northeast India, paying specific attention to ULFA in the state of Assam. Analyzing Assam and the rise of ULFA gives insight into how colonial exclusion due to geography gave rise to underdevelopment. ULFA then used the rugged environment and international borders to their advantage to launch a long-lived campaign. In essence, this case serves as an illustrative example of the underlying causal mechanisms at work. Finally, I demonstrate the applicability of my theory by briefly examining cases outside of India. The case of Nigeria gives insight into how geography and historical development helped nurture the rise of Boko Haram. The examination of Nigeria gives insight into how my theory applies outside of India.

Tamil Nadu

Most Indians are broadly classified as either Aryan or Dravidian race. In the Indian sub-continent, Aryans are those whose language belongs to the Indo-Aryan branch. The Indo-Aryan language is the dominant language group in north India and has ties to ancient Iranian/European migration around 1500 BC. Dravidians are members of the Dravidian language family, an indigenous language group and people of southern India. More than 200 million people speak Dravidian languages, which is distinct from Indo-Aryan languages. Apart from a different language, Indo-Aryans have distinct physical features compared to Dravidians. Aryans are considered to have taller stature

and lighter skin compared to Dravidians. Although, the Aryan/Dravidian dichotomy and 'Aryan invasion theory' has fallen under increasing (Rajaram, 1993; Chellappan, 2011), the typology was accepted by the British colonizers in order to classify the population.

The British considered Indo-Aryans and their language closer to the Caucasoid race, and, thus, superior. Consequently, Dravidian languages of the south were viewed as inferior. This led to Sanskrit speaking Brahmins in the Dravidian south, only 2% of the population, to hold around 80% of political seats from the region (Wilkinson, 2006). Not surprisingly, this created widespread discontent in the population. Despite this exclusion, none of the Dravidian movements turned violent. Tamil Nadu was developed and integrated during the colonial era and had high levels of development. Today, Tamil Nadu is one of the most advanced states in India. The next section discusses how this development came into existence.

The Development of Madras and modern Tamil Nadu

Despite the exclusion of many Dravidians from the national legislature, much of South India was well-developed and included during the British occupation. The region developed early. By 1611, there was a British trading post in Southern India. A fully functioning factory was present in modern day Chennai (Madras) by 1625 and a postal service by 1712. In 1853, just 8 years after its invention, the telegraph was also in use throughout Madras (Wright, 1999). By 1858, the Madras presidency, the British state which included modern day Tamil Nadu and portions of Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Karnataka, came under full rule of the British empire. During this time, there was significant investment in the educational system and an increase in the number of Indian representatives in the local government (Sadasivan, 1974). By 1861, legislative powers

were given to Indians under the creation of the Governor's council. A Tamil, Vembaukum Sadagopacharlu, was the first Indian member of the council.

The Madras presidency developed quite rapidly in the 19th and 20th centuries. There was significant emphasis placed on infrastructural development. In addition to several hydroelectric dams, major road and canal construction took place as early as 1845. By 1946, the Madras presidency had over 26,000 miles of paved roads, a level comparable to the Western world. Railway construction began in south India by 1856 and developed rapidly over the next few decades. The Madras presidency rail system was well-connected with other major cities such as Bombay and Calcutta. By 1947, there were over 5,000 miles of railway in the Madras presidency (Muthiah, 2004).

There was a strong emphasis on education in the Madras presidency. Consequently, Madras had the highest literacy rate in British India. This legacy continues today, Tamil Nadu and southern India continue to have among the highest literacy rates in India with an 80% literacy rate in Tamil Nadu and 93% in Kerala (Indian Census, 2011). The Madras presidency was also the center of English education and the University system in the region expanded in the late 19th and 20th century. Today, Tamil Nadu has the highest number of deemed universities in India, with a total of 28. Tamil Nadu also had numerous political parties, originating as early as the 1890s.

In contrast, the Central Provinces and princely state of Chhattisgarh, which contains much of the modern day Naxal Belt, had much more limited development. Although the geography and people were strikingly similar, the development was not. In fact, many of the districts of the central provinces were excluded from British

administration as the tribes living there were considered too 'backward' to accommodate (Russell, 2007). Not surprisingly, modern day Chhattisgarh has no deemed universities, and Madya Pradesh has only two. The Central Provinces also suffered devastating famines and crop failures, in addition to major outbreaks of cholera and the bubonic plague. Neighboring Madras, despite its strikingly similar geography, did not (Russell, 2007).

The high rates of literacy and inclusion however, did not prevent discontent in Madras and Tamil Nadu. Following Indian independence, many early Dravidian politicians sought independence from India. Dravidian leaders felt that their unique identity and historical discrimination required a Dravidian homeland. Previous discrimination helped strengthen Tamil nationalism. However, the Tamils never turned violent. Compare the Tamil response to the methods of those in the Naxal belt, and the differences are striking. The aggrieved groups in the Naxal Belt used and continue to use violence and terrorism as their method.

Lessons from Tamil Nadu

Tamil Nadu is a case that emphasizes the importance of historical development. The grievances of the Tamils are not unique. Groups in northeast India had similar complaints, as did groups in the Naxal Belt, groups who lived in a location with a strikingly similar geography. Although the Tamils had grievances based on ethnic exclusion, they had not been excluded from social and political development through historical isolation like the tribals of the Northeast or the Central Provinces. The long-term investment by the British in the region provided development, which affected how the Tamils responded. For hundreds of years Madras was central to the British Raj.

Madras was well-developed socially, politically, and economically. It is no surprise that Madras is home to India's first indigenous political parties. None of these factors were present in the Naxal Belt despite its cultural and geographic similarity, which can explain why the two groups with similar grievances took very different paths. Development is a strong deterrent of violence.

The geography of Tamil Nadu could have easily allowed for violent movements. Although Tamil Nadu does not have an international border, neither does the Naxal Belt. Tamil Nadu exemplifies the positive consequences of development and institutions on ameliorating grievances. Because Tamil Nadu was not historically excluded, even when ethnical exclusion occurred, the Tamils used non-violent means to address their concerns.

The next case of Uttarkhand demonstrates that rugged geography and an international border also do not guarantee violence. Instead, in developed states aggrieved groups will utilize a d peaceful pathway to address their grievances. In the case of Uttarkhand, the Chipko used non-violent protest.

Uttarkhand and the Chipko Movement

Soil ours, water ours, ours are these forests. Our forefathers raised them, it's we who must protect them.
-- Traditional Chipko Song

One look at Uttarkhand, also referred to as Uttaranchal Pradesh, and many assume it is the ideal location for a resistance movement. The state is the perfect example of ruggedness. It is set in the middle of the Himalayas and has towering mountains, dense forest cover, and a border with Nepal. Yet, Uttarkhand has experienced zero terror attacks in its history and has given rise to no violent resistance group.

My theory emphasizes the importance of geography in localized conflict, but I do not theorize that geography creates the conflict. Instead, it is how geography has shaped

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historical development. Although ethnic minorities like the Chipko have had grievances, they chose peaceful methods to reconcile them. What makes Uttarkhand different from the other rugged states in India is the substantial attention it received during colonialism and after independence. This attention promoted economic and social development. The state also served as the central location for government officials to vacation in the summer and remains a tourist haven for locals and foreigners. This development was central in leading aggrieved groups away from violent methods. As my theory suggests, underdevelopment and exclusion is often at the heart of resistance in India. Uttarkhand demonstrates that rugged terrain, international borders, and a tribal population do not destine an area to underdevelopment and violence. Early intervention in the region promoted a strong infrastructure and industry all the while exposing locals to peaceful political methods and development. Looking back at figure 3.1, although Uttarkhand had rugged geography (causal arrow 1), colonial exclusion did not occur, thus preventing causal arrow 2. As a result, rugged geography and international borders are irrelevant.

Theoretical Expectations

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                    ┌──────────────────────┐
                    │   Rugged Geography   │
                    └──────────────────────┘
                            1 │
                              ▼
                    ┌──────────────────────┐
                    │  Colonial Exclusion  │
                    └──────────────────────┘
                            2 │
                              ▼
                    ┌──────────────────────┐
                    │   Underdevelopment   │
                    └──────────────────────┘
              +                                  +
    ┌──────────────────────┐        ┌──────────────────────┐
    │   Rugged Geography   │        │    Intl. Borders     │
    └──────────────────────┘        └──────────────────────┘
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                    │      Terrorism       │
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
Figure 5.1

The Chipko movement consisted of tribal men and women in the mountainous Garhwal Himalayas of Uttarkhand. The group literally hugged the trees to prevent deforestation by the state and multi-national companies entering the region. The Chipko did not avoid violence because they are inherently more peaceful than any other Indian tribal group; instead, their actions are a reflection of the historical development of Uttarkhand. If Northeast India, Kashmir, and the Naxal Belt had been integrated in the same way as Uttarkhand, in all likelihood, aggrieved groups would have reacted in a similar manner to the Chipko.

The Chipko, like many tribal groups throughout India, depended on the forest for their livelihood. In the 1960s, rapid deforestation started to become a problem in the state and threatened the Chipko people's home. Large contractors were buying land in the region and promptly destroying the forest cover. The contractors in the region refused to employ the Chipko people and instead chose to import semi-skilled workers from

neighboring states. The rampant deforestation in the region was starting to take a toll on the ecology of Uttarkhand, resulting in major landslides and other ecological disasters including floods and erosion. In response to what the Chipko felt was ecological devastation and a threat to their existence, the group decided to protest. By 1964, the Dasholi Society for Village Self-Rule was established by Gandhian social-activist Chandi Prasad Bhatt. Following the disasters, the Chipko felt that immediate action was needed. The Chipko embraced the non-violent method of 'Satyagraha', which emphasized protest and non-cooperation as a political weapon (V Shiva, J Bandyopadhyay, 1986).

What makes the Chipko people of Uttarkhand different from the aggrieved minorities in Northeast India? Like Northeast India, Uttarkhand is heavily forested with 67% of the region covered in heavy forest. Uttarkhand also shares a 1000 km border with two countries, the Tibetan Autonomous region of China and Nepal. Both bordering states have a history of uprising and violence. Given the geographical characteristics of the state, one would assume it is the ideal setting for a violent campaign for an aggrieved group like the Chipko. However, the historical development of Uttarkhand is starkly different from its neighbors. The state has a literacy rate of 80%, 6% higher than the national average. The state also has significant rail and road infrastructure and an advanced diversified economy. The Chipko are not inherently more peaceful than other tribal groups in India. Instead, the long-term vested interested in the development of Uttarkhand helped to promote peaceful political methods of resolving violence.

The Development of Uttarkhand

Uttarkhand and Himachal Pradesh (which were one state until the 1970s) were favorite locations of the British during the colonial period. The climate of the two states was in fact very similar to England. Consequently, numerous hill stations were established in the region. Hill stations are resorts located at higher elevations, generally in colonial states. The British established hill stations to escape the excruciating heat of the Indian summers. Due to their far northern location, the small states of Uttarkhand and Himachal Pradesh were home to the most famous hill stations, including Dharamsala, Khajjiar, Manali, Dalhousie, Rishikesh, Nainital, and Shimla. To this day, Indians and tourists around the world flock to the area to experience the mountainous scenery and the colonial towns. The Hill-stations of India are some of the top revenue producing locations in India due to the tourism related money. As a result, India continues to invest substantial resources into the infrastructure of the region (India Ministry of Tourism, 2012).

Because of the intense interest of the British in the locations, the area was developed quite well relative to other northern states. Himachal and Uttarkhand have great connectivity to the rest of the country, including first-class highways, 5 star hotels, well-connected rails, and domestic airports (Government of India Tourism Board, 2012). The capital of New Delhi is only 100 miles away and easy accessible. The tiny state is the 7th most visited state for tourists in all of India (India Ministry of Tourism, 2012).

The British entered Uttarkhand by the early 1800s and initiated development. Within two decades the annual crop yield increased substantially, large markets developed in the hills and plains region, massive road construction was implemented, and

by 1884, a railway existed connecting the major cities in the state to one another and to New Delhi. The expansion of the railway into the region strengthened the economy substantially. Industry also took hold in the region during the British rule (Ibid). Numerous tea plantations also originated as did several newspapers in English and native languages (Ibid). There were several English language schools and bureaucratic offices had a strong presence. Locals were integrated into the bureaucracy by and many of the Indian civil servants from Uttarkhand went on to participate in the independence movement (Ibid).

Compare Uttarkhand to Nagaland or Tripura and the similarities and differences are resounding. Both have remarkably similar geography, a large tribal population, and have an international border. Unlike Uttarkhand, Nagaland and Tripura had minimal development during colonialism or afterwards. No roads, railways, or airports were constructed since the British had no interest in the region. The British did not flock to the hill cities in the Northeast for summer vacation. Today, the tourism legacy of Uttarkhand remains. The European tourists so visibly present in Uttarkhand's hill stations are markedly absent in Northeast India. Just to visit Nagaland, Indian nationals are required to obtain inner line permits. All international tourists are required to purchase a restricted area permit from the Ministry of Home Affairs in Delhi (Nagaland Government, 2014). The tourism board of India describes tourism in the Northeast in the following way

> *It is unfortunate that due to socio-political and geographical reasons, the entire Northeast India has remained neglected and backward from the developmental point of view. The basic needs for tourism development of the region are efficient infrastructure, good connectivity between the states and peace in the region. The entry permit formality required for a few states for both domestic and international tourists is a major deterrent for the region's tourist attractiveness (37).*

The economy of Uttarkhand is one of the fastest growing in India. This is partially due to tourism. In 2010, 30 million Indian tourists and 127,258 international tourists visited the small state (Ministry of Tourism, 2012). The state has the 3rd fastest growing economy in India and had a 9.31% GDP growth in 2011. A 2003 industrial policy that provided generous tax benefits for investors produced a massive increase in capital investment and promoted strong industrial and technological growth (Zee News 2012). The economy is diversified and social development is strong. Uttarkhand represents what Northeast India and Kashmir could have been.

Lessons from Uttarkhand

Today, Uttarkhand is one of the most promising states in all of India. With its high levels of tourism, economic growth, infrastructure, and literacy, it signals that economic and social development are possible. If the Chipko had decided that violence was their method of choice, they had the appropriate environment for such a campaign. Fortunately, environment alone cannot determine strategy. The legacy of development in the region led the Chipko to choose non-violent protests, which ultimately helped them achieve their goal.

One may look at the case of the Chipko and ask why many of the tribal movements in the Northeast didn't choose the same path. First, the grievances between the groups are quite different. The Chipko's grievances stemmed from the consequences of rapid development. Given the increasing development in the region, the state clearly had a stake in the stability of the region. In order to advance economic development, the state would invest as much resources as possible to secure calm. In contrast, the

Northeast tribals' grievances came from a brutal cycle of underdevelopment, minimal infrastructure, and social exclusion, issues that are substantially more difficult to counter than a singular issue like deforestation by a MNC. Although the state always wants stability, stability in the periphery locations was not as critical as stability to more centralized locations.

Second, the lack of exposure to political, economic, and social development and the distrust of outsiders made violence seem to be the most viable option in Northeast India. In most of the formerly excluded areas, local officials were considered heavily corrupt and national officials were considered too removed from local issues. Violence also had a proven track record to many in the region. When the British first entered the Northeast tribal lands, the tribals attacked them, the British left and never returned. The line system was implemented and remains in place to this day. If violence has been so effective and is the most familiar method, why reconsider?

Finally, violence in the Northeast is easy given the geographical environment. The Chipko movement demonstrates, however, that geography is not destiny. Geography alone is not sufficient to lead groups to utilize violent campaigns. Instead, long-term underdevelopment and isolation leads to grievances the state cannot resolve using military force. The rugged geography in the region only serves as a vehicle to utilize once grievances are developed. Because the government had long been involved in the political, social, and economic development of the state of Uttarkhand, locals considered violence an unnecessary measure. This is clearly not the case in Northeast India, the Naxal Belt, and Kashmir.

Unfortunately, as already established, this type of development and exposure did not happen throughout all of India. As a result, several indigenous groups have selected terrorism as their tactic. The next section explores the development of terrorism in Assam and how the geographical features and historical development of Assam specifically and Northeast India in general have led aggrieved groups to utilize terrorism. The case study of Assam, focusing on the terrorist group ULFA, also highlights how borders are utilized to perpetuate conflict and avoid capture.

Assam and ULFA

The United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) was founded in 1979 by Bhimakanta Buragohain. ULFA seeks to create an independent socialist Assam through an armed struggle. The group officially began recruiting for its armed struggle in 1983 and began amassing weapons by 1984. Within a decade, ULFA became widely popular among lower class Assamese and tribal members. The cadre strength of the group skyrocketed to over 10,000 and received aid by other existing militant units in the region, including the Kachin Independence Army and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland. By 1990, the organization became one of the most violent organizations in all of Asia and was branded a terrorist organization by the Indian government. The Indian government has fought three major offensives against the group since its inception. Although over 2,500 militants have surrendered since the group's inception, it has not been defeated (START, 2013).

Like many other groups throughout India, ULFA has identity-based grievances. All of the factors that make a location ideal for terrorism are present in Assam. For the case of Assam, I will walk through each theoretical component to discuss how it

manifests in Assam. The first key component of my theory in causal arrow 1 is rugged

geography that leads to colonial exclusion. This exclusion ultimately results in

underdevelopment (causal arrow 2).

Causal Arrows 1 and 2

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        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │    Rugged Geography     │
        └─────────────────────────┘
                    1 │
                      ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │    Colonial Exclusion    │
        └─────────────────────────┘
                    2 │
                      ▼
        ┌─────────────────────────┐
        │     Underdevelopment     │
        │ Political, Economical, Social │
        └─────────────────────────┘
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Figure 5.2

Background of Grievances

ULFA claims that it is not secessionist because it never belonged to India in the

first place. According to ULFA members, the 1826 treaty of Yandaboo gives

independence to Assam, Manipur, and the district of Cachar (SATP, 2013). The

Yandaboo treaty ended the Anglo-Burmese war and forced the Burmese to accept their

terms. According to the treaty, the Burmese were required to cede Manipur, Rakhine, and

Taninthavie coast to British Assam and to cease all interference in the districts of Cachar

and Jaintia. All of these locations today have a considerable terrorism problem.

The treaty clearly transfers control of Assam and Manipur to the British from the

Burmese. However, many of the locals in the region feel that the treaty instead

established independence for the population of the region. Locals feel this claim of

independence is supported by the British line system implemented in the region (Maitra

and Maitra, 1995). The line system in Assam sought to isolate immigrants and workers from the local people (Dutta 2012). The British branded the line system as a means to prevent conflict between the indigenous and the migrant population. Many of the indigenous population went on to consider it apartheid (Maitra and Maitra, 1995).

The locals were exempt from British taxes and the British did not enter the area. The politics, education, commerce, and industry of the districts beyond the line system continued as they had for the previous centuries. According to the South Asian Terrorism Portal (2013), Indians had absolutely no part to play in the administration of the northeastern hill tribal areas. The limited Bengali clerks, junior engineers, and doctors whom the British found necessary in the beginning were gradually phased out. No Indian member of the Indian Civil Service was ever posted to a hill tribal district. The tribal regions were also exempted from the civil and criminal codes of the land.

The British avoided development in the region under the guise of 'protecting the tribal population' (Maitra and Maitra, 1995). Such isolation was relatively unique to the region. Although other locations, including Orissa and modern day Chhattisgarh in the Naxal Belt, and Kashmir had similar systems, no other region achieved such physical and legal separation during colonial rule, including other tribal communities in other parts of India.

Looking back, British statesmen Michael Scott described the isolation of the tribal regions in the following way:

'Britain's imperial policy kept Nagaland isolated from India and from contact with the people and political movements of India so that there was very little exchange of ideas or mutual understanding of the people and their society when India became independent' (67).

The exclusionary policies of the British instilled the notions of suspicion and hostility toward non-hill tribals. When India ultimately diminished some of the line system in the 1980's, it was met with resistance. This led the tribals of the region to revolt and India offered to once again redraw borders and also give the tribals of Cachar Hills (Assam) autonomy. It is no surprise that the redrawing of Assam's borders in the 1980s and 1990s coincided with a massive surge in the number of militant groups in the area (SATP, 2012).

Assam's economic development is substandard. In 1998-99, it was 41 per cent below the national average. Per capita income growth in Assam has only increased by 10% from 1998-2008, compared to 40% for all of India. Between 1980 and 1990, per capita income grew by 20 per cent in Assam compared with 40 per cent for all-India (Indian Planning Commission, 2012). The poor growth resulted in high levels of unemployment and frustration. Per capita electricity consumption in Assam, for example, is 75% lower than the Indian average, reflecting the poor quality of life and low-level of economic activity (Indian Planning Commission, 2012). The economy of Assam has yet to industrialize and it likely will not until substantial infrastructure changes take place.

Eighty-nine percent of Assam remains rural and dependent on agriculture; however, the agriculture industry is in poor condition. The lack of infrastructure and investment in the region has led to repeated crop failure, inability to industrialize, and failure to join the national economy. While much of India is following an urbanization trend, Assam is not. The Indian planning commission claims that Assam and the Northeast do not have the setting for industrial growth because of their poor infrastructure.

Lack of adequate infrastructure has prevented internal development and industrialization. The lack of rail and road system makes the transport cost exorbitantly high, and prevents farmers from entering their agricultural industry into the national economy (Indian Planning Commission, 2012). The Indian Planning Commission considers the inequality in Assam and the Northeast to be a result of transport and access disadvantage. The cost of moving a typical 9 ton delivery truck from Assam's capital to Calcutta (a distance of 1100 kms) costs approximately 20,000 rupees. In contrast, the same truck traveling a longer distance of 1600 km from the well-developed city of Chennai to Calcuta, costs only 16,000 rupees. The development committee believes this is a reflection of the poor road connectivity between the Northeast and the rest of the country. It takes approximately 25 days for goods from Assam's capital to reach Calcutta due to poor roads and additional customs formalities along the way, which means goods from the Northeast cost substantially more than goods from elsewhere in India, subsequently decreasing the demand for those goods. The planning commission believes this transport difficulty could be overcome if a more advanced infrastructure were in place in Northeast India and Assam. The partition of the Northeast, according to the planning commission, imposed a major transport and access disadvantage to the region that created a vicious cycle of underdevelopment.

The isolation, separation, and subsequent underdevelopment of Assam created a substantial amount of grievances throughout the population. Decades of isolation led Assam to have high unemployment, high levels of poverty, minimal industry, inadequate or absent infrastructure, and limited political development. Given all these factors, it is no surprise that Assam is rife with conflict. However, Assam is not alone in its

underdevelopment. Other states throughout India have also experienced high

unemployment and high poverty. Bihar and Rajasthan for example, have lower levels of

development. What made the separatist groups in the Northeast be so successful while

other poor areas did not have such a campaign? Of central importance is the

geographical environment. The same factors that prevented development and integration

now provide the ideal setting for a terrorist campaign

The Terrorism Climate of Assam

ULFA is the longest-standing and largest terror group in Assam. The group has

been incredibly lethal in its campaign. Eighteen-thousand people, mostly the people

ULFA claim to represent, have died in clashes and attacks carried out by the organization

(SATP, 2013). This section details how ULFA acted upon its grievances from

underdevelopment to lead a terrorist campaign by utilizing the rugged geography and

international borders in the state.

Terrorism Climate of Assam

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        ┌─────────────────────┐
        │  Colonial Exclusion │
        └─────────────────────┘
                   │
                   ▼
        ┌─────────────────────┐
        │   Underdevelopment  │
        └─────────────────────┘
      +                          +
┌──────────────────┐    ┌──────────────────┐
│ Rugged Geography │    │   Intl. Borders  │
└──────────────────┘    └──────────────────┘
           \                  /
            ▼                ▼
        ┌─────────────────────┐
        │      Terrorism      │
        └─────────────────────┘
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Figure 5.3

Much of ULFAs success can be traced to the geography of the region. Assam is one of the most heavily forested states in India. Of particular importance in Assam is the extensive access to international borders. Assam shares borders with Bangladesh, Tibet (China), Myanmar, and Bhutan. All of the borders are with weak states, rugged, isolated, and heavily forested. Because the borders are so isolated, they are not well fortified or patrolled. ULFA and every other active Assamese separatist group have bases beyond the international border (SATP, 2013). ULFA also established numerous bases in all of the neighboring countries.

ULFA's primary operating bases are the Mon district of Nagaland, the Garo hills of Meghalaya, and the Tirap and Changlang districts of Arunachal Pradesh (SATP, 2013). Outside of Assam, ULFA maintains bases in Sandrup Jongkhar, a district in southern Bhutan and numerous camps in Bangladesh and Myanmar. These locations are all characterized by their similar features. According to the Forest department of India (2013), the Garo Hills and Changlang district are approximately 90% dense forest, Mon district is 75% dense forest, and they all have an international border.

Resources in these rugged areas are also quite abundant and helped militants fund their operations. ULFA was reportedly involved heavily in drug trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana indigenous to the region as well as timber from the forests (Chaulia, 2007). The organization had millions of dollars worth of illegal drugs it sold through Myanmar and into China. In addition to using the land's resources for food, shelter, and survival, ULFA also extorted substantial amounts of funds from Assamese businesses and people. Tea factories, hospitals, politicians, banks, and coal mine companies were all popular targets of ULFA's extortion racket (SATP 2013). Assam's

water resource minister openly admitted to paying extortion money to ULFA in exchange

for his safety (Mazumdar 2012). Over time, ULFA made hundreds of millions of dollars

in extortion money (Upadhyay 2009).

Navigating this landscape is difficult and not surprisingly, the indigenous

population has the advantage. However, the most advantageous feature for ULFA and

similar groups is the international border. Even if Indian troops are close to capturing

militants, if they flee across international boundaries, the domain of the Indian military

ends. Although India tries to maintain good relations with its neighbors, the border

countries feel their sovereignty is being violated by the regional power. Militants take

advantage of the lax security on the borders and enter the areas and create bases and

training camps.

Once foreign bases were established, the militant groups underwent

comprehensive tactical training. Although the leaders had no previous military

background, they found no shortage in outside forces willing to help train them.

According to numerous intelligence sources, ULFA received training from the Royal

Bhutan Army, the Chinese military, the Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI)

of Bangladesh, and the Pakistan ISI (SATP, 2013). Although the aid from neighboring

states may have been from rogue agents, the support was immensely helpful in the

group's long-term survival. Bangladesh was also an important stronghold for ULFA

agents as well. Bangladesh and India share a 4,096-km border, which is regarded as one

of the world's most fluid borders where weapons flow freely (Habib, 2014). The

Intelligence Committee (DGFI) of Bangladesh reportedly facilitated ULFA's presence

and operations in the country in the early 1990s. The strongest relationship ULFA

maintained was with the ISI of Pakistan. India has long accused Pakistan of supporting terrorist groups throughout the country, although Pakistan denies the link. The ISI reportedly transported ULFA militants to Pakistan and provided training in small arms and battle rifles. In 1999, captured militant Saurav Kakoti claimed he and nine other militants were sent to Bhutan for specialized arms training to ultimately help fight in Kashmir (Anand 1999).

Lessons from Assam

ULFA's grievances are not unique, their response to it is. In fact, one could say the groups frustrations are based on ethnic exclusion akin to the Tamils of Tamil Nadu. ULFA's tactics in Assam compared to the Tamils of Tamil Nadu and the Chipko of Uttarkhand demonstrate that it was not geography that made the group violently rebel. Instead, it was the historical development of the region. The Assamese are not inherently violent. They arrived at their decision to commit a terrorist campaign based on rational calculation. If Assam been more historically developed, alternative options like protest and political participation would have most likely been utilized instead, just as it was in Uttarkhand and Tamil Nadu.

ULFA and similar organizations in the northeast and Kashmir had and continue to have all the right conditions for a terrorist campaign. The lack of development in the region not only gave rise to grievances, but also made counterterrorism difficult. The dense forest and inadequate infrastructure helped the groups maneuver undetected by the Indian army and local police. The international borders provided safe refuge and contact with external state actors, and the resources of the land provided funding. International borders in locations where there are grievances caused by underdevelopment can fuel

prolonged terrorism. Given the connections and tactics of ULFA, it is not difficult to see how the organization has survived. The support of external state actors has definitely helped prolong the organization. However, even without external help, ULFA could have still been successful.

Bangladesh and Bhutan's cooperation with India also provides important insight into counterterrorism and inter-state cooperation. Weaker states are often hesitant to cooperate with regional powers, but by doing so they can overcome a mutual problem. Cooperation is essential to defeat terrorism. ULFA was dealt a heavy blow once Bangladesh and Bhutan agreed to help India with hunting and destroying militant bases (India Times, 2014). Within a few months of the agreement between the countries, the six top leaders of the organization were captured. States do not have to cooperate, but when they do, they often discover substantial benefits. In a world of powerful non-state actors and international anarchy, cooperation is key.

Beyond India

Although most of this book has focused on India to exemplify the consequences of historical underdevelopment and rugged geography, the same story likely plays out throughout the world in very similar ways. With very few exceptions, most of the world was colonized and experienced some level of uneven domestic development. Many of these former colonies went on to develop problems with domestic conflict. Many former colonies throughout the world have strikingly similar experiences.

For the final case, I choose to look outside of India to see if the circumstances that explain terrorism in India apply elsewhere. I select Nigeria because it shares many developmental and historical characteristics with India. At first glance, the two countries

do not appear very similar, but they do share some key similarities. For one, Nigeria and India have a similarly low gdp per capita and are ranked 133 and 135, respectively. Nigeria and India's overall literacy rate are also very similar, approximately 60% in both states. Both states are also federal republics with a history of British colonization and substantial ethnic, linguistic, and religious fractionalization. Nigeria and India were also developed in a similar manner with attention being focused on the coastal regions and not in the interior, more rugged regions.

The harsh response of the Nigerian and Indian military and police to the violent campaigns also have some overlap. In Nigeria, the government has hired local militias to be especially harsh toward suspected members or sympathizers of Boko Haram. The militias frequently kill and torture any young male who is even found in suspected Boko Haram areas (Frontline, 2014). In India, The government gives rewards to individuals who kill or capture any 'terrorist'. In India, the Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act (POTA), the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) are considered incredibly draconian and allow the government to restrict movement of individuals, shoot to kill any suspect, detain family members of suspects indefinitely, and gives nearly limitless powers to the government (Rao, 2015). This has lead to harsh punishments, retaliatory actions, and low levels of trust in the violence-prone areas of both countries.

Nigeria does have some notable differences from India, including a history of coups, civil war, and political instability. Although India has not had the same level of political instability as Nigeria, it has battled decade's long insurgencies and, like Nigeria, has high levels of corruption. Both countries have made significant economic

advancement since their economic restructuring in the 1990s, which led both countries to become regional powers. Based on the similarities between the two, it is appropriate to consider the comparison a most-similar case design. However, some notable differences stand out between the two. In addition to the different geographical location, Nigeria does have a different religious makeup. Approximately 50% of the population is Christian and 45% Muslim, compared to 80% Hindu and 13% Muslim in India. Nigeria also has a history of civil wars and political instability. Although India has had many internal violent campaigns and some political instability, its government is stronger in comparison to Nigeria and has been a democracy since independence.

Nigeria and Boko Haram

The Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram, or the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad, have carried out over 20 terrorist attacks in 2014 alone and killed approximately 481 individuals. The organization, founded in 2002, seeks to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria free from the influence of westernization. Frequent targets of the group include Christians, churches, police stations, tourists, foreigners, and liberal Muslims (BBC, 2012). Since its foundation in 2002, the organization is responsible for approximately 10,000 deaths. In November 2013, the United States Government declared Boko Haram a designated terrorist organization (BBC, 2014). Boko Haram fighters maintain their base in the 'bush' or forested regions of Nigeria and Niger.

In October 2014, the government of Nigeria signed a ceasefire with Boko Haram. However, the ceasefire has been less than successful. By February 2015, violence had actually escalated and Boko Haram carried out increasingly deadly attacks, including

obliterating 15 villages within one week. Boko Haram also expanded its campaign further into Chad, Niger, and Cameroon (The Guardian, 2015). Over 2000 people were killed in the first two months of 2015 at the hands of Boko Haram (Amnesty International, 2015).

Background

Nigeria gained its independence in 1960 and has been seated in conflict, coups, and corruption ever since. Nigeria became a protectorate of the British in 1901 and a full colony by 1914. Nigeria gained independence by 1960 alongside much of the African continent. From the beginning, independent Nigeria was split among various rival ethnic groups and two dominant religions, Islam and Christianity. There was intense infighting among the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa minorities as they each sought to gain power and control of the government. By 1966, members of the Igbo tribe carried out a coup and just six months later, members of the Yoruba tribe carried out a counter-coup and established a military junta. Following the second coup, intense rivalries developed among the three ethnic groups. Within the next year, a civil war erupted and carried on for three years, killing approximately 3 million people (BBC, 2015).

The British created the idea of Nigeria around 1900 and institutionalized an unequal society alongside it. Not only did they put three very distinct ethnic groups into arbitrary borders, but they also gave a preference to groups living in southern Nigeria. As a result, much of southern Nigeria, and the ethnic groups living there developed, while those living in the North did not. Not surprisingly, the North is where most of the terrorism in Nigeria is concentrated (BBC, 2015).

Nigeria has pronounced economic inequality clearly defined along ethnic and geographic lines. The economy of Nigeria is growing fast, and the number of millionaires

in has increased by 44% just in the last six years (Nevin, 2014). Most of this wealth is concentrated in Lagos, the southern city on the coast. Northern Nigeria, much like Northeast India, was never really incorporated into the British protectorate. The Northern Nigeria Protectorate was characterized by indirect rule. Chiefs and emirs were considered 'native authorities' (Mustapha, 2006). Whenever the British tried to collect tax, build infrastructure, or create other political institutions, the native chiefs usually vetoed it, preventing development and growth.

When Northern and Southern Nigeria were unified under the British in 1914, the administration of the North was separate and dependent on local chiefs. The British feared an educated population would be a discontented population (Graham, 1966). As a result, the British prevented the emergence of strong educational institutions (Barnes 1997). Frederick Lugard, the governor of Northern Nigeria implemented several policies to limit development and education in the protectorate. Under the guise of protecting Islam, Lugard banned missionary activities, including the founding of schools. In contrast, colonial subsidies in the south ran several English schools, providing a modern education, while nothing of the sort existed in Northern Nigeria (Mustapha, 1986).

Citizens of Northern Nigeria were termed 'sabon garior' or strangers by the colonial administration and treated as 'native foreigners,' making northern Nigeria 'systematically isolated from the rest of the country' (Mustapha, 2006: 14). When the British began the railway in 1898, it had no presence in northern Nigeria. By 1950, the rail network transported five million people per year and heightened the interaction of people from different regions and ethnic groups. Not surprisingly, the railway had minimal presence in northern Nigeria.

Although Nigeria is notorious for corruption, bureaucratic and political institutions are more ingrained in the Southern regions of Nigeria compared to the North. Upon independence, the constitution of Nigeria placed the entire administrative and fiscal structures of the government along ethnic and regional lines. This led to fierce competition among ethnic groups for power. It also led groups to maintain loyalty to ethnic group and tribe before the state. The extreme federalism of Nigeria made a precedent of tribal loyalty and bifurcated citizenship (Aiyede, 2009). Not surprisingly, Nigeria has been seated in a variety of conflict since independence.

The similarities between northern Nigeria and northeast India are striking. The British claimed to be helping indigenous groups in northeast India by isolating them and preventing the development of any bureaucratic, educational, or political institutions. A nearly identical strategy was implemented in northern Nigeria. This long-term isolation promoted underdevelopment and nurtured conflict. Boko Haram operates in the poorest part of Nigeria, where 71.5% of the population lives in absolutely poverty and half is malnourished (Al-Jazeera, 2014). The state of Borno, the base of Boko Haram, has the lowest economic indicators in the country, and investors shun development and industrialization in the region due to poor infrastructure and security (Abrak and Brock, 2014). The similarities are strikingly similar to the excluded districts of India. Using geospatial mapmaking and data tools available from the Gates foundation, I compose a map that displays the spatial distribution of poverty in Nigeria. Figure 5.3 displays the population living under $2 per day. The highest concentration of population living under $2 a day is in the North in general, and in northeast state of Borno specifically.

Nigerian Population Living on Less than $2 per Day

Figure 5.4
Source: World Bank, 2013

Percent population living on under $2 per day
0%   100%

Although the north is generally impoverished, the high concentration of

population living under $2 per day in the Northeast is evident. The high levels of poverty

in the north are not surprising given the historical isolation and underdevelopment of the

region. Northern Nigeria did not offer the same level of development opportunity as the

southern states and districts due to their proximity to the seaport. The entire southern

region of Nigeria has substantially lower levels of poverty in comparison with the North.

The physical environment of Northern and Northeast Nigeria has aided in the

continuation of violent campaigns. Although most of northern Nigeria is savannah, the

militants operate in the forested Sambisa forest, a former wildlife reserve on the Chad

and Cameroon border. The forest is referred to as 'wicked' due to the harsh environment, venomous insects, and snakes residing in the area (Kayode, 2014). Wicked has taken on a new meaning for the forest, though, as Boko Haram has established their camp in the area. Boko Haram is now considered the 'forest's new masters' and maintain 'super-bunkers' under the forest floor (Kayode, 2014). The forested area is said to be lush in vegetation with fertile soil. As a result, Boko Haram is capable of living off the land for extended periods. Most importantly, the thick vegetation makes it difficult to navigate and the Nigerian forces have difficulty maneuvering in the area. It took three years before the Nigerian government even discovered that the group used the forest as their stronghold (Kayode, 2014). The infrastructure of the region, as demonstrated by figure 5.2, is also very underdeveloped. The lack of navigable roads, reliable telephone or internet services, and general accommodations makes counter-terrorism operations incredibly difficult.

Northern Nigeria also shares border with other very weak states, including Chad, Niger, Benin, and Cameroon. The borders with these three countries are relatively open due to the weak nature of all four states and the sparse population. Teenage boys living near the Niger-Nigeria border report that Boko Haram militants frequently cross the border looking for recruits (Fessey, 2014). The porous borders and dense vegetation of the Sambisa forest have allowed Boko Haram militants to pass freely between the weak countries. Cameroon, Chad, and Niger do not have sufficient resources to militarize their borders since they are also dealing with substantial internal security problems.

Lessons Learned from Nigeria

The lack of development, porous borders, rugged environment of the Sambisa forest, and weak institutions has allowed Boko Haram to thrive in Northeast Nigeria. Boko Haram and other Islamist militants in the region are able to utilize the ruggedness of the Sambisa forest and the open borders with Cameroon, Niger, and Chad to freely move and establish training camps and bases. Although, much of the underdevelopment and poor integration can be traced to the colonial era, the lack of development and integration continued following Nigerian independence.

The British policy of isolating tribal communities in the name of protecting their culture was a common practice throughout the British Empire. The isolationist tendencies backfired in the long term once these countries were independent. The arbitrary borders also intensified inter-ethnic conflict by putting historically rivaling groups together in a new country. The use of federalism as a solution to address diversity and conflict may have caused more long-term harm than good. Newly independent states not only had arbitrary borders, but the intense federalism promoted long-term loyalty to tribe over state.

Nigeria has also established emergency rule in three northeast states just as India established similar rules in the Northeast and in Kashmir. Instead of stopping militancies in both of the locations, it has likely promoted it. Following Goodluck Jonathan's declaration of emergency rule in 2012, thousands of troops were sent to the region alongside local militias. However, substantial video evidence shows the militias and military carrying out torture and summary executions of civilians, including children and non-members of Boko Haram (Frontline, 2014). A member of the local government in

northern Nigeria claims that the emergency rule has 'radicalized Boko Haram more than anything else and generated other gangs and groups of bandits' (Fessey, 2014).

The case of Nigeria, like India, also demonstrates the importance of interstate cooperation. Although, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon are among the weakest states in the world, cooperation between the states' militaries are of key importance. Niger is facing a growing refugee crisis due to the influx of northern Nigerians affected from the Boko Haram related violence. Niger is not capable of providing protection or refugee camps to the Nigerians fleeing violence. It is in the interest of the already drought and poverty stricken county to limit any refugees. Joint border forces may help limit the recruitment and establishment of bases by militant groups, a problem all wish to avoid. It will also help combat the growing problem of human and drug trafficking in the region.

Lessons Learned from the Case Studies

Terrorism is not coincidental. It does not appear in random locations for random reasons. Each of the case studies above has attempted to demonstrate the complex causal mechanisms that led to the creation of terrorist campaigns in each state. Historical development certainly played an important role in creating grievances. In the case of India and Nigeria, the colonial government promoted isolation of certain minority communities. The long-term isolation impeded the development of infrastructure, political institutions, and broader economic development. Generally, the independent government continued the policy of isolation.

When groups in these locations became aggrieved due to the rampant underdevelopment in the region, the government often responded harshly. India and Nigeria implemented draconian style emergency laws that ultimately promoted the cause

of local militant groups rather than limit it. Once these groups decided to implement a terrorist campaign, the underdevelopment and geography of the region was advantageous. The state had difficulty responding to militants due to the limited infrastructure in the region, corruption of the local police and politicians, and the porous borders. The geography alone did not lead to grievances. If it did, one would have expected the Chipko people of Uttarkhand to respond in the same way groups in Northeast India did.

Once the campaigns begun, then the geography was of key importance. The militant campaigns in India and Nigeria, were able to thrive because of their isolation, densely forested areas, and borders with weak states. Defeating a terrorist campaign with legitimate grievances based on underdevelopment is difficult enough. Once that campaign operates in a rugged location near international borders, it can become nearly impossible. This is why the longest running terrorist campaigns in the world operate in similar environments. The next and final chapter provides insight into countering the type of violent extremism prevalent in India and Nigeria. Although history and geography cannot be changed, the way the state responds to historical inequality and geography can be.

6

Conclusions and Policy Implications

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This project has provided ample amounts of information for researchers and policy-makers. Terrorism continues to be at the forefront of the American and global psyche. On average, at least one terrorist attack occurs a day. Despite the frequency of terrorism, there continues to be a lack of understanding surrounding its causes. There is no singular root cause of terrorism, but there are frequently occurring themes that can help us have a more thorough understanding of the phenomena.

In chapter two, I discussed the broad array of literature on underdevelopment, conflict, geography, and terrorism. This broad literature has many conflicting and diverse findings and theories. My research demonstrated the connectivity of the broad literatures. The project also demonstrated the importance of history and geography, but also emphasized that neither of these are destiny. The historical development of India certainly effected its long-term development, but the most problematic finding from the research is that India continued the mistakes of the colonizer. Continued marginalization, minimal investment in infrastructure and economic development, and draconian security policies ultimately reinforced grievances, rather than addressing them.

Chapter 3 presented the theoretical foundation of the project. The theory emphasizes the importance of geography. Geography is not the causal mechanism in the story. Instead, geography affects how humans interact with their environment. In the case of India, the geographic isolation and ruggedness of Kashmir, Northeast India, and

the Central Plains prevented the British from investing in the region. Since the primary goal of the British was easy resource extraction, the colonizers only invested in locations with close proximity to seaports. Consequently, most cities and states with seaports experienced rapid development of their economy and infrastructure while isolated locations did not.

In Northeast India, the British instituted a line system that physically and socially isolated the population. Excluded areas continued to operate in the same manner they had for the last several centuries, while outside areas developed. These excluded locations did not have civil servants, bureaucracies, infrastructure, or a diversified economy. Social and economic development was minimal, leaving locals with few viable opportunities outside of sustenance agriculture. A viable transportation system prevented industrialization or expansion of the agricultural markets. Numerous Indian studies have confirmed that the absence of an advanced transportation system in Northeast India and Kashmir has prevented investment in the region and economic diversification. Chapter 2 emphasizes the importance of the rail system on Indian development. The rail network was essential to the historical and modern development of India. Lack of access to rail consequently serves as an excellent proxy of historical neglect. It is not surprising that the historical and geographical location of the excluded areas ultimately translated into grievances.

Once aggrieved, the population had an ideal location to conduct a terrorist campaign. The isolation that prevented long-term development and investment provided a key setting for terrorism. Dense forests, rugged mountains, and porous international borders with weak states define the geographic climate of Northeast India and Kashmir.

The lack of infrastructure increased the difficulty of counterterrorism operations in these locations, helping to increase the longevity of the groups. In addition to providing foreign safe haven, crossing into international territory also provides rebels with access to outside groups, such as Pakistan ISI, that provide weapons and training. This climate helps to perpetuate acts of terrorism and prolong the existence of terrorist groups.

Chapter 4 tested the propositions discussed in chapter 3. Using a combination of descriptive statistics, multiple regression, and mapping techniques, I conducted a district-level analysis of terrorism in India from 2000-2014 and found substantial evidence to support my claims. Terrorism occurs more frequently and for longer periods in the rugged areas of the country, close to international borders, and far from rail infrastructure. The findings provide what I believe to be important new ramifications for other terrorism and conflict researchers. For one, although the work in this project centered on terrorism in India, the findings are likely not India-specific. India served as the primary laboratory to demonstrate the consequences of underdevelopment and exclusion. Although underdevelopment and exclusion are not sufficient to cause terrorism, underdevelopment in a location with favorable geography can make terrorism more likely to occur and with increased longevity. However, these findings have applicability outside of India. The case study of Nigeria in chapter five helped establish the relevancy of my theory outside of India. I suspect that many other cases have similar circumstances, including the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Peru, Colombia, Thailand, and Indonesia.

Many scholars have included variables for terrain, specifically mountainous terrain, in their research. However, the existing research has failed overall to account for

the importance of terrain in conflict and terrorism. For one, scholars have generally focused on state level analyses. Such an analysis overlooks the spatial dynamics of conflict, which are generally concentrated in specific regions. By conducting a district level analysis of terrorism, I was able to amplify the importance of forested terrain, whereas a state level or cross-national comparison may not have found similar results. Conflicts do not occur evenly throughout the state, so they should not be measured as if they do. Second, scholars have not given ample attention to the role of forested terrain in conflict and terrorism. Although the importance of jungles and forests have been emphasized for hundreds of years by insurgents and counter-insurgents, the Political Science literature, specifically terrorism researchers, have mostly ignored the variable. The exclusion of the forested variable may be due to the relative lack of variation in the terrain overtime whereas acts of terrorism vary substantially. The lack of variation in forested terrain is not a valid reason for its exclusion, however. Instead, like my research emphasizes, we cannot discount the effect of terrain on factors like human behavior and development. Moreover, given the centrality of forests in many terrorists groups' modus operandi, it is important that they be included in future analyses. My research clearly demonstrates that forested terrain plays an important role for terrorism and counterterrorism. Finally, scholars emphasizing the role of geography and environment on political behavior should consider including GIS technology in their analyses. GIS is an excellent supplement to statistical analyses and allows visualization of spatial data.

My research also demonstrates that terrorism is a more extensive problem in the subcontinent than many realize. Many seem to be aware that terrorism occurs in India, but most are unaware of the full extent. Grand attacks like those that occurred in Mumbai

in November, 2008 deservedly received ample attention. However, the terrorism problem that plagues Northeast India, the Naxal Belt, and Kashmir rarely receives Western attention. Nonetheless, the plight of these regions is important for several reasons. For one, and perhaps most importantly, India is a nuclear power. Internal instability in a global nuclear power is never welcome. The danger of instability is amplified by the fact that India does not have good relations with its nuclear neighbor, Pakistan, who is meddling in Indian affairs by supporting terrorist groups in Kashmir and Northeast India. Second, thousands of lives have been lost and will continue to be lost as long as the conflict continues. Since India is a rising global power, it is in their best interest to have internal stability and limit secessionism. The internal conflicts in the country are embedded in three generations now. Such long-term volatility is difficult to end and creates an endless cycle of underdevelopment and conflict. Finally, conflict in these regions is fuelling drug, arms, and human trafficking. Not only does lack of opportunity breed conflict, but it also fuels the black market. Southeast Asia and the northeast India corridor serve as a major transit hub for heroin, methamphetamines, weapons, and slaves. In northeast India, girls and young women are taken from their homes and sold in faraway states for bonded labor or sexual exploitation. Parents sell their daughters to agents who lure them in with the promise of employment, education, money, and a better life (Kaur, 2013). Stability and secure borders in Northeast India will help to diminish the success of the black market in the region.

The findings of this research may seem bleak. At first glance, it may appear that there are few practical solutions to address the causes of terrorism in India. British colonial history cannot be changed and rugged terrain is permanent. However, several

important policy implications emerge from this research. First, and most importantly, the international community must take the conflict in India seriously. As discussed in the introductory chapter, the actions of what appear to be small ethno-nationalist groups in a geographically isolated area actually have imminent repercussions for international politics. Numerous reports indicate that Pakistan provides aid to numerous ethno-nationalist groups in the Northeast and Kashmir. If true, Pakistan is engaging in a proxy war with India. The two countries already have strained relations.

India and Pakistan have already been on the brink of war twice since they developed nuclear weaponry. Both times, Kashmir was at the center of the dispute. It is not unlikely that India would consider increasing tensions and threats with Pakistan based on Pakistan's involvement in ongoing conflict. This is even more important given the 2014 election of Hindu nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Narendra Modi and the BJP party have reportedly reconsidered the 'first strike' option with Pakistan (Miglani and Chalmers, 2014). Pakistan's covert activities previously accepted by the Congress party may no longer be tolerated by the BJP. Pakistan must immediately cease supporting and training any militant groups active in India. Many groups that may have otherwise failed were able to persist due to Pakistani support. Regional and global stability depend upon Pakistan's commitment to combat terrorism.

As for India, combating the militancy problem will be complex. Many of the 'root issues' creating or exacerbating grievances must be changed. These types of changes do not occur overnight, but they are essential to winning the support of the communities in the afflicted areas. Those living in the terrorism prone regions must see that the government will give them opportunity and wealth that the militants cannot. If the

militants are able to provide protection and opportunity, then loyalty will be to them instead of the state.

At least three things must occur if there is any hope of ending the conflict.

1. Development and regional integration is essential. The economic, political, and physical infrastructures of these regions are underdeveloped. Development, particularly of highway and railway systems that connect the regions to the rest of the country, are of crucial importance. Northeast India, Kashmir, and the Naxal Belt should also aim to have at least one deemed university.

2. Minorities should be further integrated into the political landscape. India already has extensive affirmative action policies that are helpful for scheduled castes and tribes. However, more emphasis should be placed on integrating members of the hill communities in Northeast India and the Naxal Belt into bureaucratic jobs and deemed universities.   This will show India's commitment to inclusiveness, rather than the current policy of alienation.

3. India must continue to collaborate with its neighbors, particularly Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, to secure borders and end foreign camps. Foreign bases are lifelines for most of these groups. Once India began some collaboration with Bangladesh, they saw a drastic reduction in terrorist activity near the Bangladeshi border.

It is essential that India embraces these recommendations for numerous reasons that I will detail below.

Terrorism is Bad for the Economy, but Development Alone is Not the Answer

India is a rising global economic powerhouse. Simply put, terrorism is harmful for a burgeoning economy. India's Home Minister P. Chidambaram has stated that terrorism damages India's rising prosperity (Dehejia, 2011). The continuous attacks affect the economy in both the short term and long term. Short term, there are usually hits to the stock market and the obvious destruction of life and property. Long term, the state has to divert resources and security to the terrorism-prone regions. These resources could have been used for much needed economic or social development instead.

Recommendation 1: Reward companies that invest in Northeast India, the Naxal Belt, and Kashmir, employ locals, and invest in the local community. Punish companies that pay extortion fees.

Capital accumulation is an important factor in economic growth. Northeast India and the Naxal Belt are particularly resource rich. However, investors are fearful of investing in a region that is prone to attacks. This can lead to a perpetual cycle of underdevelopment and related attacks. Grievances exist due to underdevelopment, attacks occur, and these attacks ultimately prevent investment. Some increased investment is occurring in Northeast India and the Naxal Belt in the form of raw material extraction of resources such as coal and bauxite (Roy 2011). However, this investment seems to create more problems than solutions.

Large mining companies come into the region, fail to employ locals, and locals feel further exploited. To make matters worse, the companies generally pay exorbitant extortion fees to the local terrorist outfits in order to secure protection (Roy, 2011). Paying these fees gives greater power to the militants and deters other investors from

locating to the region. This also leaves locals feeling weary of any development projects. Because so many tribal communities have been kicked out of their dwellings in the name of development, it often ends with the groups giving their physical or emotional support to local militant groups.

The government should provide generous benefits to companies that invest in these regions. However, companies working in the area should be required to have a majority of their workforce come from the local population. The company can only hire outside of the community if they require skilled labor that cannot met by the local community. A worthwhile investment would be for companies to train locals and receive government remuneration for doing so. There must also be stringent requirements that no tribal communities will be relocated due to any project. Any tribal communities that have previously been affected or continue to be affected from mining companies should receive an annual percentage of the revenue from the company for reparations. This investment should seriously help overcome many of the tribal grievances that lead to them joining the Naxalites.

The government should invest in the community by building schools and providing training. This research found that terrorism-prone districts also had very low literacy rates. Numerous other studies continue to find that education is a powerful deterrent of violence (Sargent, 1996; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Thyne, 2006; Sanborn & Thyne, 2014). Government grants should be allocated to ensure the development of primary, secondary, and vocational schools staffed by well-trained teachers (something in critical shortage in the terrorism-prone regions). Not only will this promote development, but it will create a future workforce for the companies as well.

Geographic isolation, to an extent, continues to promote distrust of outsiders. My second recommendation will help to counter some of the distrust of outsiders by promoting regional integration. One of the greatest investments that could occur in the terrorism-prone regions is the development of infrastructure. The rail and highway network in the three terrorism prone regions is underdeveloped and in many cases non-existent. Since infrastructure such as the railway is often a high value target for militants, the state hesitates to promote infrastructure investment projects in the conflict areas; however, lack of investment perpetuates the underlying cause.

Recommendation 2: Invest extensively in the development of the railway and highway network in the states of Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, and Arunachal Pradesh.

Development is multi-faceted, but in India the railway is the lifeline. A railway that connects Northeast India and Kashmir to mainland India is of crucial importance because it provides the opportunity for jobs and economic integration. The new BJP government and railway minister have unveiled 11 national projects that seek to expand India's rail infrastructure in Northeast India and Kashmir. The main goal is admittedly to counter Chinese infrastructure being built across the border. However, any development is good progress, even if done in the name of countering a regional opponent. Unfortunately, many of the railway projects have been on hold since the 1990s due to 'security concerns' (Sharma, 2014). The delayed projects do little to gain the confidence of locals. Unfulfilled promises of development and rail access for over 20 years will only increase the frustration toward the government. It is crucial that the new BJP government follows through with these rail infrastructure projects.

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Recommendation 3: Continue to cooperate with neighbors. A strong relationship with Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan are essential.

Given the international bases of most of the terrorist groups in the Northeast and Kashmir, international cooperation with neighbors is essential. Militants take advantage of India's massive, often unfortified borders, by crossing the boundaries and establishing camps. The neighboring states of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Bhutan, are quite poor and cannot devote resources to fighting an Indian problem. The military of the neighboring countries are third tier and unable to control the border and do not wish to risk their own security force's lives for an Indian problem. To incentivize cooperation, India could offer certain military training or economic aid in exchange for cooperation. India was able to deal a substantial blow to ULFA once it began cooperating with Bangladesh under the Zia regime (Chaudhury, 2015)

India's relationship with Myanmar is slightly more complicated. India has had a strained relationship with the military regime in Myanmar since 1962 due to its anti-Indian stance. However, relations starting warming in the mid 1990s when India and Myanmar signed a joint agreement to control drug trafficking along the border (Singh, 2007). Relations further warmed between the two countries with the gradual democratization of Myanmar since 2009. In 2010, India and Myanmar agreed to enhance cooperation in order to tackle terrorism. One suggestion was the Indian Myanmar Thailand trilateral highway project. Although Yangon assured New Delhi it would not allow its territory to be used for violent Indian separatists, the assurance was only verbal.

ULFA operatives continue to utilize Myanmar territory for sanctuary. Myanmar's commitment to combating terrorism is essential for future success.

Under the Modi regime, India has increased cooperation with Bhutan. In January 2015, Prime Minister Modi met with Bhutan Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay to discuss security cooperation along the Assamese border with Bhutan (NetIndian News, 2015). During the meeting, Bhutan agreed to increase its presence on the border and commit to fighting militants and sharing real-time information with India. To aid in cooperation, the two countries announced a shared hydro-electric project in the region. The leaders also discussed the need to build further infrastructure, specifically rail, in the region. It is ultimately in the interest of neighboring countries to not be the base for militant group. India must make cooperation with these states first priority, even if they have to provide incentives like the hydro-electric project with Bhutan.

Final Thoughts

The policy recommendations I have listed above are all essential in overcoming the longstanding conflict. None of the policy recommendations promoted deforestation, changing international borders, or leveling mountains. The geography is not the problem. Other states, like Uttarkhand, Himachal Pradesh, and Kerala have rugged terrain. Nonetheless, they were able to be economically and politically integrated. These states should serve as a reminder that geography is not destiny. In fact, the rugged geography of these states helps to bring in substantial tourism revenue. The lessons from India also do not end at India's borders. The findings and recommendations in this book are relevant to

other countries in conflict. Ideally, future scholars can extend this research to see if it is explicable to other states with terrorism problems.

The politics of India, South Asia, and the world are complex. There is no single cause or solution to terrorism. My hope for this project is that it provides insight, and most importantly, a solution to the longstanding terrorism problem in India and the world. As we continue to fight terrorists and wage wars against terrorism, we should remember the timely quote by India's founding father.

The only alternative to coexistence is codestruction. - Jawaharlal Nehru

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George C. Brown and Carol M. Wright Alumni Scholarship for Young Mid-East
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Professional publications

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