2013

Peacekeeping and Peace Kept: Third Party Interventions and Recurrences of Civil War

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PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE KEPT: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS AND RECURRENCES OF CIVIL WAR

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Kentucky

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2013

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE KEPT: THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS AND RECURRENCES OF CIVIL WAR

Civil wars have become more prevalent in modern times and present unique challenges to conflict resolution. Third parties often intervene in civil wars attempting to insure that peace is imposed and will persist. However, the impact of third parties on intrastate conflicts remains incomplete. The civil conflict literature does not sufficiently distinguish how third parties promote peaceful outcomes during a peacekeeping operation and why a state remains stable after the peacekeepers leave. By examining data on third party interventions from 1946-2006 and individually examining the case of Sierra Leone, this research concludes that peacekeeping missions promoting transparency, credible information sharing, and strong signals of commitment present the best possibilities for peace during and after the mission. Analysis from empirical tests and case study support that peacekeeping missions are most effective when they allow for credible and reliable communication between domestic adversaries. Ultimately, third parties must promote a political solution between rebel and government factions in civil wars so that peaceful methods of dispute resolution are promoted in the absence of a third party preventing the recurrence of war.

KEYWORDS: International Conflict, Civil Wars, Peacekeeping, Interventions, Sierra Leone

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The following dissertation, while an individual work, benefited from the insights, direction and determination of multiple individuals. First, my Dissertation Chair, Karen Mingst, exemplifies the high quality of scholarship to which I aspire. She never gave up on me. The work ethic and standard of quality she sets will continue to inspire me. I wish to further thank the complete Dissertation Committee, and outside reader, respectively: Robert Farley, Donald Gross, Daniel Morey and Stan Brunn. Each individual provided valuable insight that substantially improved the final product.

Additionally, I received valuable assistance from my family and friends. My family provided incredible support without which I could not have completed this project. I further credit my family for instilling within me a commitment to scholarship. My father, Jeffrey Osborn, in particular, provided assistance and guidance throughout graduate school that helped me through some of the most challenging moments. Furthermore, my friends have always provided me a valuable outlet for my frustration, but also a metric for success. They never cease to believe in my abilities and their faith continues to motivate me to strive for more. To all those who helped me complete this project, I am eternally grateful.

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Resolving Civil Conflict

Though the international community remains united in its desire to permanently end civil conflicts, there exists uncertainty about what outsiders can do to solve the internal problems that make nations prone to civil war. While some have noted the need and effectiveness of outside intervention (Fortna 2004; Walter 2002), others are more skeptical that producing a negotiated settlement from outside intervention improves the political discourse among the internal actors at war (Werner and Yuen 2005; Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010; Toft 2010). Foreign interventions into civil wars have the well publicized goals of ending violence and resolving underlying conflict, but how does the composition of these interventions contribute to the efficacy of third party intervention?

This question must be addressed by first examining the fundamental processes that make third party intervention effective. Foreign interventions produce structural, informational, and normative incentives toward conflict resolution. By establishing how the composition of third party interventions affect conflict resolution, the structure and function of third party intervention can be better connected. By analyzing data on intervention into civil conflicts based on the rate of successes, it can be established *why* a third party intervention is effective in resolving civil conflicts. Determining what third parties do to promote peaceful outcomes in civil conflicts could benefit future interventions and peacekeeping missions.

Civil War Hurts Everyone

The international community has a decisive interest in ending civil conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War, a central focus of the international community has been to stabilize civil (intrastate) conflicts and prevent the humanitarian disasters that often come as a result (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005). Civil conflicts produce extraordinary economic and social costs for the conflict country as well as the greater international community. There are obvious costs such as the loss of life and damaged infrastructure. However, countries emerging from civil war are dominated with a vitriolic and violent political discourse, so at war's end, they have a unique set of challenges to overcome.

Civil wars typically last 7 years and reduce a country's economic growth by 2.3% each year. That makes the average country undergoing civil conflict approximately 15% poorer at the war's end (Collier 2007: 27). War-ravaged countries must deal with a population displaced and psychologically scarred from war atrocities ranging from child soldiering to rape. They must manage an economy structured around coercion and extortion, unaccustomed to negotiation and bargaining. Given the extent of these problems, it is not surprising that countries enduring civil war find themselves in a downward spiral of development with repeated iterations of violence.

Civil war produces more problems beyond a country's borders and the costs can be felt globally. Displaced refugees present economic and logistical challenges in countries where refuge is sought. Mass migrations of peoples not only deplete countries undergoing conflict of human capital, but place additional burdens on those that must administer makeshift areas of habitation and supply resources to those in need. Mass

displacements of peoples increase instances of disease and global health epidemics among the populations in countries that they go to (Collier 2007: 28). Countries undergoing civil conflict contribute to illicit activities that have global ramifications. Failed states find themselves to be hubs for international terrorist groups and it is estimated that ninety-five percent of global production of hard drugs comes from countries undergoing conflict. Collier (2007: 32) approximates that civil wars annually cost the international community twice the global aid budget. Breaking the cycle of conflict is both a collective interest as well as a moral imperative of the international community.

What Can Be Done?

Once civil wars have stopped, how can the international community insure that they end for good? Civil wars are particularly difficult to permanently end. Active hostilities might come to a close for multiple reasons, but civil wars have a tendency of making successive recurrences within the same country. A country having endured civil war makes war recurrence about twice as likely and about only half of the countries managing to end their conflicts can only maintain peace for the duration of the next decade (Collier 2007: 27; Collier et al 2008; Paris 2010). This means that the end of war is not necessarily the end of the conflict and that maintaining a peace is as difficult as implementing a peace (Collier 2007: 27; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2008; Paris 2010).

One increasingly popular remedy to prevent recurrences of war involves external military intervention through peacekeeping. This type of third party involvement includes the participation of a state or states prepared to use violence for political ends (Cochrane

2008: 41). External military intervention has shown tangible progress in alleviating the worst consequences of civil conflicts. The amount and intensity of civil conflicts have markedly declined since 1992 by almost 25%, while the number of peacekeeping operations has dramatically risen (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 17-20; Cockayne, Mikulaschek, and Perry 2010). Determining precisely how peacekeeping contributes to this trend is worth further investigation.

Peacekeeping serves three important roles in securing and pacifying a country enduring civil conflict; restoring order, maintaining post conflict peace, and preventing politically destabilizing acts, like coups (Collier 2007: 124). Restoring order serves the important task of providing security to an otherwise lawless area. Civil wars severely impair a government's capacity to enforce the rule of law. A country devoid of legal constructs opens itself up for mass atrocity crimes (crimes against humanity), illicit trade, and even genocide. To effectively restore order to a dysfunctional state, a peacekeeping operation must have the strength to deter violence. Maintaining post conflict peace is facilitated by negotiating political grievances and preventing accidents. When civil wars stop, those at war have tremendous deficits of trust which can inhibit cooperation and implementation of a resolution. Accidents can be misinterpreted as deliberately hostile actions leading to a resumption of war. In order to maintain peace, peacekeeping forces must be capable of effectively relaying credible information among the belligerents to demobilize combatants, implement negotiated agreements, and reestablish trust. Finally, a peacekeeping contingent can protect against the illegitimate seizure of political power. Deployment of a peacekeeping operation signifies the international community's approval

of a current government by recognizing and protecting it. By legitimizing the government of a post conflict country, peacekeepers can protect it from domestic threats when it is in a state of vulnerability. Ultimately, interventions by third parties in civil conflicts help countries overcome obstacles toward implementing and maintaining peace.

The Future of Peacekeeping

Despite a strong desire to maintain the public good of peace, external military intervention remains a contentious topic among both domestic and international actors. Countries are reluctant to accept foreign troops on their soil, undermining sovereignty. Intervening states supplying troops and materiel do not wish to sacrifice blood and treasure for situations that do not directly affect their immediate security. Peacekeeping requires a balance of action among the parties involved. Intervening forces must display strength and resolve when enforcing a peace, but must also be cautious not to infringe upon local state sovereignty.

Peacekeeping should also have staying power. The goal of a peacekeeping operation should not only be to impose a peace, but also to set up an adequate system of self governance. Peacekeeping serves as a crutch for a local government. However, that crutch cannot remain in place indefinitely and an effective peacekeeping operation should perform the dual tasks of maintaining security and restoring a new political regime that is self sufficient. If a military intervention only provides security based on its presence, it has not resolved a country's long-term problem with self governance. Effective peacekeeping missions should improve the short term and the long term security prospects within a conflict state.

Since peacekeeping provides a cost effective method to divert states from continued civil war, it is worth examining how best to provide it (Collier 2007: 128). Distinguishing how peacekeepers are effective at permanently ending civil wars would provide a blueprint to design future peacekeeping missions, insuring that the peacekeepers are not sent on missions unlikely to succeed, and that post conflict countries are provided the best opportunities to avert future civil war. The purpose of this research is to provide supportive analysis evaluating how peacekeeping operations are most effective while peacekeepers are present and after the peacekeepers leave.

Who Are the Best Peacekeepers?

Installation of a foreign military presence provides the means to forcefully oppose insurgency, a neutral intermediary for negotiation, and a legitimate entity to recognize the new framework of the state. However, not all peacekeeping operations are equal to the task. The qualities that make them effective intermediaries are embodied in different capacities. A peacekeeping operation may claim the moral high ground in protecting a population from impending genocide, but lack the military capability in preventing rogue elements from carrying it out. Would such a peacekeeping operation be as effective at preventing violence? Examining which peacekeeping operations best keep the peace helps identify which of these causal mechanisms make peacekeeping operations effective in curtailing post conflict violence.

Because peacekeeping missions vary in their composition, one can determine why peacekeeping is effective by distinguishing who is effective. Evaluating the makeup of peacekeeping missions and identifying which missions can be characterized by strength,

cooperation, and legitimacy, helps determine which qualities fare best in preventing recurrences of violence. A peacekeeping mission sponsored by a more universal international organization like the UN may command greater legitimacy, but not carry the strong operational command strength that a single state mission could provide. Establishing which intermediaries make the best peacekeepers can serve as an instructional guide for composing future missions in civil conflicts.

There are two primary methods of analysis used in the research. First, empirical analysis using large-n data permits us to draw general conclusions from a broader universe of observations involving third party peacekeepers. Second, process tracing in the specific case of Sierra Leone's civil war is employed to analyze how different peacekeeping missions in that country contributed to an immediate and ongoing peace in that country. Each of these methods carries specific advantages and disadvantages in the research.

The quantitative analysis is based on numerous observations of particular phenomena attempting to objectively distinguish instances, seeking more general description, and containing measurements and analyses that are replicable by other researchers (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This method attempts to provide more universal findings by including a larger selection of data. However, the shortcoming behind this kind of analysis derives from its generality. In order to generate broad observations, the analysis assumes that all of the observations in the analysis are fundamentally similar in their context and orientation. This is not always the case. This research uses the TPI Intrastate Dispute Dataset because it not only expands the universe

of peacekeeping observations to permit large-n analysis, but it also provides data necessary to compare interventions.

The qualitative case study focuses on a limited set of observations, intensive analysis of historical accounts and data, with a comprehensive account of the particular event (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Contrasted with the quantitative approach, a more thorough analysis of a particular event attempts to unearth the causal mechanisms at work. Though it produces specific explanations of the case at hand, it may lack broader explanatory power outside of that case in question. Case study analysis must, also, make greater inferential assumptions to determine counterfactual analysis. Careful case selection is important to isolate the causal factors one would like to identify. The civil war in Sierra Leone provides a strong case for study because it contains sufficient variation in the independent and dependent variables under review.

Chapter Overview

The plan of the dissertation follows. Chapter 2 details the theoretical underpinnings of the research. Bargaining theory provides the approach for examining the effects that third party intervention on producing durable conflict resolution. Based on the theoretical understandings of the effects of third parties in civil conflict, Chapter 2 will demonstrate that multinational peacekeeping missions led by nations that are strong in their commitments, transparent in their orientation, and legitimate in their purpose should have more promising effects on lasting peace.

Chapter 3 provides a close description of the data employed for the empirical research. Determining what constitutes a peacekeeping mission and what does not is an

important distinction to make in this research. Analyzing the observations of peacekeeping missions and the composition of the data will clarify what information can be extracted from using data taken from the Mullenbach and Dixon's Third Party Intervention data on Intrastate Disputes.

Chapters 4-6 present the findings from the empirical analysis of the data. The results of the logistical regressions are presented in table format and described in the subsequent chapters. The findings separate into three chapters, each section elaborates upon the major theoretical components and their corresponding explanatory variables. Chapter 4 examines the findings related to the strength of the intervening states. Chapter 5 analyzes the effect that information clarity has on peacekeeping outcomes. Chapter 6 discusses how legitimacy affects peacekeeping outcomes. The statistical analyses use logistical regression to estimate which aspects associated with a peacekeeping mission make peace most likely. The analyses of the data are presented from the statistical tests identifying which variables contribute to and the findings are described. Furthermore, analyses of control variables examine additional factors important to peacekeeping success. Finally, an explanation of quality control statistics scrutinizes the cogency of the empirical model. Imperfections and model misspecifications will address any lack of precision in the findings.

Chapter 7 presents a case study on the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone provides an excellent case since the 10 year civil war included multiple peacekeeping interventions from various international actors. Some of the interventions successfully stopped violence and other interventions failed to resolve the civil war. By

examining the impact that each of these interventions had on recurrences of civil war, inferences can be made about that critical characteristics of peacekeeping necessary to end civil conflict and maintain the peace.

Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the findings and explores some of the policy implications based on the results of the statistical tests and the case study. The main conclusions drawn from both the statistical tests and the case study analysis demonstrate that the real value of a peacekeeping mission is its ability to provide credible signals and relay information to hostile factions in civil war. A strong military presence may be capable of stopping violence, however post conflict states can only successfully reorganize into functioning states when intermediaries cultivate and maintain transparent and credible bargaining processes. Third party peacekeeping missions that are most capable of relaying credible information among belligerents best produce sustained peace after civil wars.

Chapter 2: Theory of Peacekeeping

Solving Commitment Problems in Civil Conflict

When violence ceases in civil war, third parties are often introduced to assist in consolidating the peace and demobilization process. While some current scholarship analyzes the success rates for third party interventions, little research analyzes the characteristics of those third parties that make them successful arbiters of conflict resolution. During any cessation of civil conflict, tensions are high and trust is low, so the likelihood for resolving these conflicts peacefully is difficult and complicated. I contend that for a third party peacekeeping mission to insure that peace will endure in a post conflict environment, it must be able to provide effective means for communicating and relaying credible signals among various parties to convey resolve and foster trust among the belligerents.

This chapter introduces the argument that peacekeeping missions with organizational strength, institutional clarity, and international legitimacy stand a better chance for reducing the recurrence of future conflicts. The chapter begins with a review of prior work in areas of peacekeeping and civil wars, primarily enumerating what methods have been effective in reducing recurrences of violence. The chapter then summarizes the theory suggesting why peacekeeping is an effective means for conflict management. This argument will be extended by applying the theoretical arguments for peacekeeping operations. To clarify the material related to peacekeeping, key terms will be defined and specified.

Mediation and peacekeeping are two of the major approaches that third parties take in post conflict. The primary difference between approaches lies within their commitment to the intervention. Mediation is more generally defined as assistance by a third party to numerous interacting parties in order to help facilitate a mutually acceptable settlement to a conflict (Greig 2005: 250). That assistance can manifest itself in numerous ways, including consultation, acting as an intermediary, or hosting negotiations between the belligerents. While these are not costless gestures, they do not alleviate the commitment problem that remains between belligerents to actually implement a negotiated solution.

Peacekeeping is a costlier form of intervention by the third party intermediary; a commitment of human resources to oversee the implementation, enforcement or construction of the peace process. Although two opposing sides may agree on a negotiated settlement, they still lack trust over actually implementing those agreements (Walter 2002). Consequently, a third party can help alleviate that distrust by monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement and clarifying the intentions of each party involved in the peace effort. Research on third party efforts at peacekeeping using empirical data have examined questions related to whether or not peacekeeping works (Fortna 2008), but other research has been limited to examination of case studies determining how peacekeeping works and how it works effectively (Coleman 2007; Howard 2008). By using the theoretical concepts enumerated in the mediation and peacekeeping literature, the universe of peacekeeping cases in civil conflict can be

reexamined to provide an empirical assessment of third parties that promote successful peace settlements.

It is unrealistic to think that all third parties will be equally effective in convincing belligerents in a civil conflict to permanently stop fighting and implement an agreement that satisfies both parties. Some third parties may have greater military capabilities or a more resolute ambition to end the violence, seeking to "strong arm" the disputants into ending the fighting. Some third parties may share cultural or linguistic similarities to the disputants making them more effective or trusted ombudsmen. Some third parties may be distrusted because of a prior colonial legacy in the region. Analyzing whether or not third party intervention into civil disputes is effective is important, but it is also important to analyze how third parties best promote a peaceful resolution. This research argues that the strength of the intervener, the credibility of signaling from the intervener, and the authority of the intervener all have positive effects in promoting peaceful outcomes in civil disputes.

Scholarly Research on Resolving Conflict through an Intermediary

Numerous studies in resolving interstate and civil conflicts examine the roles that third party intermediaries play when bringing about lasting and peaceful settlements to disputes (For example, Walter 2002; Fortna 2003, 2008). While actors engaged in conflict may be capable of resolving these disputes by themselves, they are motivated to pursue a more favorable outcome in the bargaining process and are often unable to credibly

commit to a tenable resolution outside of war.[1] Information asymmetries, mistrust between parties, and issue indivisibility all present formidable obstacles when negotiating a peaceful settlement to a dispute, but they are not insurmountable (Fearon 1995). Such bargaining difficulties and commitment problems among hostile actors have prompted research into the roles that third party intermediaries can play to alleviate these complexities through negotiation and implementation of peaceful settlements.

The research associated with third party intervention offers several explanations for the effectiveness of outsiders on establishing an enduring peace. Smith and Stam (2003) contend that third parties can be effective in insuring a cessation of conflict by providing an artificial boundary between the belligerents. Employing peacekeeping forces increases the associated costs of attacking, though informational asymmetries still exists among the warring parties. Consequently, Smith and Stam (2003) consider the value in third parties to be in separating the belligerents as opposed to solving informational problems between the hostile parties.

Such an analysis is useful when belligerents can be separated, but among warring factions in civil disputes, a third party may be unable to separate the belligerents since they are usually scattered throughout the country undergoing civil strife and must ultimately cooperate to establish a stable government. The inability of a third party to simply separate the actors involved in the conflict presents an even greater challenge on the third party to relay information to the parties involved. Fortna (2003), distinguishing

[1] In civil wars, war may be sought as an end in itself, particularly as a profitable enterprise (see Collier and Hoeffler 2004). However, I assume that war is a political tool used to accomplish political goals. Given that war is a costly form of political expression and ultimately ex post inefficient (Fearon 1995), belligerents should prefer peace to war when all things are considered equal.

between peacekeeping deployments in both interstate and intrastate conflict, finds that peacekeeping is, indeed, effective in both types of conflict, once a peace agreement has been forged. Such a finding suggests that an intervention by a third party promotes peaceful outcomes in wars beyond merely separating the belligerents.

The most notable studies on the effectiveness of third party intervention through peacekeeping do not distinguish missions based on the composition of the forces. However, prior studies contribute to the understanding of the overall impact of peacekeeping operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2003, 2008). While determining that outside intervention has a positive effect on peaceful resolution to conflicts, these studies treat all missions as if they were equal in terms of which countries intervened and how these missions are viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the local populations. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) include all UN peacekeeping missions, whether few or many countries participate. Fortna (2003) differentiates peacekeeping missions based on the UN mandate and era that the mission took place. But she limits her study to UN interventions. Interventions by regional organizations or individual states are not included. These studies provide evidence that peacekeeping missions help promote peaceful outcomes between hostile actors compared with leaving the belligerents to work out a deal on their own, but these studies do not tell the complete story why peacekeeping missions are successful.

Despite a significant research program aimed at distinguishing the role third parties play and empirically analyzing the effects that they have upon bringing about a peaceful resolution, few researchers have tested the characteristics of the intermediary to

ascertain which kinds of third parties most effectively resolve these disputes. Mediation techniques, cease-fire terms, preferences of the third party, and an intermediary's ability to increase the costs associated with resuming violence have all been scrutinized as tangible means to insure that the parties will not resume hostilities (Dixon 1996; Kydd 2003; Fortna 2004; Gent and Shannon 2008). An intermediary must tangibly establish trust and confidence among the belligerent, who must accept that they are neutral and honest brokers of conflict resolution. How might a third party enhance trust among domestic parties that have every reason to mistrust one another?

Using a third party intermediary is additionally important among civil war combatants, since these disputants are less easily separated among preexisting boundaries and must reincorporate themselves within the governing framework of the state. While the power for third parties to coerce belligerents into an acceptable settlement is significant, the "soft" power to effectively persuade the parties to permanently end hostilities through a bargaining outcome may also be important (Nye 2004). Even so, if a bargain is struck or disputants have revealed extraordinary amounts of information regarding both capability and resolve, what guarantees can they effectively give about their commitment to enduring peace? How warring parties interpret information once war has reduced its utility to transmit credible information is worth further investigation (Slantchev 2004).

Several studies speculate the impact that third parties have on reducing hostility and invoking a peace, albeit, with varying theoretical expectations and empirical results. Cunningham (2007) suggests that the involvement of more parties in negotiating a peace

reduces the range of acceptable outcomes for the belligerents, thereby lengthening the duration of conflict. Werner and Yuen (2005) contend that a third party alters the cost structure associated with war, artificially imposing a peace, but does not resolve the informational asymmetries that only war can reveal. Kydd (2003; 2006) concludes that biased mediators solve informational problems among belligerents, but neutral mediators are better at alleviating commitment problems. Svensson (2007) furthers the argument by demonstrating that an intermediary's bias in civil conflict toward the government has a greater impact on peace than does bias toward rebel forces. Despite these exploratory efforts, the effect that third parties have on conflict resolution remains unclear.

How an intermediary is perceived by local populations may also affect the intermediary's ability to end a civil war. For instance, a third party intervention into a civil conflict by an outside state that was a former colonial ruler may delegitimize the third party among warring factions because local nationals may consider the intermediary to have self-interested intentions, compromising the perceived neutrality of the intervening state. Yet, former colonial rulers could have greater interests in the unstable region and therefore be viewed as a more credible security guarantor in a fragile peace. However, if the former colonial power acts in collaboration with numerous other countries to broker a peace, the hostile parties may have greater confidence that states are not acting out of self interested motivations and, rather, are enforcing established and accepted global norms of conduct. Who intervenes in a conflict as a third party and how they distinguish their resolve as an intermediary is likely to determine the kind of reception they will receive by the belligerents. Neutral third parties with effective means for relaying

information, and greater resolve in promoting peace, all while projecting a high degree of strength should pose the least risk to the sovereignty of conflicting nations when arbitrating and implementing a settlement.

Though research on the effects of third party intervention in conflict resolution contends that intervention is effective at resolving disputes, there is less research about the reasons why these states are effective in promoting peace. Ultimately, it is unclear what characteristics of third parties intervening into a conflict might prevent future occurrences of violence and promote a lasting peace. Dixon (1996) examines the techniques that third parties use to initiate peaceful settlement of disputes, but does not involve the implementation methods for securing such agreements. This is not meant to suggest that implementation methods are "either unimportant or irrelevant for evaluating conflict management; in fact, some management techniques (eg. peacekeeping) may be most applicable at the implementation stage" (Dixon 1996: 657). Once warring parties in civil conflicts come to an acceptable solution after years of conflict, they may find it difficult implementing agreements and are equally apprehensive about a resumption of violence. The implementation stage of conflict resolution involves the same kinds of commitment and information problems that make bargaining and negotiation problematic.

Fortna (2008) provides the most complete analysis of peacekeeping and its effects on forging a lasting peace agreement in civil conflict. Her analysis concludes that third party interventions through peacekeeping are an effective means for overcoming commitment problems among belligerents at the cessation of civil conflict and reduce the

likelihood for recurrences of conflict while peacekeepers are present and after they have left. The causal mechanisms that she identifies include changing the cost structure among the belligerents, reducing fear and uncertainty among the belligerents, reducing the impact and perception of accidental outbreaks of violence, and insuring political representation of all actors in the post war government. Consequently, an effective peacekeeping mission should be undertaken by a trustworthy and transparent peacekeeping force. Additional research should further examine the causal mechanisms she specifies by distinguishing which types of third parties are best at reducing recurrences of violence. Fortna's (2008) analysis only establishes that peacekeeping is more effective than if the belligerents are left to their own devices.

Theoretical Foundations of Cooperation and War

This dissertation rests on several assumptions regarding dispute resolution. First, that states and non-state actors are rationally led; second, that war is a costly endeavor and not sought as an end in itself; and third, that while disputants have incentives to cooperate, fear and mistrust lead them to believe the other might deceive them in any agreement. By indicating that states and non-state actors are rationally led, it is assumed that leaders base their decisions on what information they have at hand and cognitively measure the expected costs and benefits of their actions. While they may not understand all of the implications of their actions, they are not likely to make decisions that are inherently detrimental to their self interests. Bargaining theory helps explain the incentive structures that lead to both cooperation and war.

Bargaining theory presents war as a costly method of bargaining. When belligerents in a dispute have competing interests and divergent preferences, they must make costly signals of their willingness to achieve their preferred outcomes. Those signals must illustrate their motivation and capability of securing their ideal preferences by force, although they would prefer to achieve their goals through capitulation. Each signal of capability and resolve changes the dynamic of negotiation. If a belligerent is less convinced that they can achieve their preferred outcome by force, they will be willing to deviate further from their preferred goal. Conversely, if a belligerent is convinced that they can achieve more through force than by negotiation, they will pursue their goals by force. Bargaining theory identifies war as a costly extension of the bargaining process, rather than a breakdown of the bargaining process (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2004).

Bargaining strategies are altered throughout a civil war. The course of the conflict alters the costs and benefits of continuing conflict or engaging in negotiation strategies. Adding a third party to the conflict changes the bargaining calculations of the belligerents. If the belligerents believe they can gain more through conflict, they will resume conflict. If they believe they can achieve more through peace and negotiation, they will engage in diplomacy. A brief description of bargaining theory clarifies how changes in a conflict's combatants and international interventions alter the willingness for the government and rebels to negotiate and commit to peace.

Bargaining theory explains conditions that motivate participants in war to pursue strategies of negotiation and strategies of war (Filson and Werner 2002; Powell 2002).

Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate simple models clarifying when a settlement is likely and unlikely. Consider that each participant in a conflict carries a single-peaked preference ideal point (IP). In the case of civil war, the IP most likely constitutes total control of the government and resources of the country for both the government and the rebels. However, because war is costly, each actor is willing to deviate from that ideal point to forgo the expenses associated with war. As Figure 2.1 illustrates, when neither actor is willing to deviate far enough from their preferred outcome, negotiation is not possible and war will ensue. Over the course of war, information regarding capability and resolve becomes public and clarifies the overall strength and motivation of each group. War constitutes a costly method of information sharing.

Figure 2.1: Unsuccessful Bargaining between Government and Rebels: Result War



Eventually, the costs associated with war will lead one or both parties to deviate further from their ideal preference point making an acceptable bargain between the groups undergoing conflict possible. Civil wars present unique challenges associated with the bargaining model of war. First, governments are often reluctant to officially recognize rebels because their existence poses a threat to its authority. Second, rebels often have more to gain in profit through war than through peace (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This is especially true in Sierra Leone, where RUF rebels engaged in some of the worst war atrocities ever witnessed and funded their rebellion through the illicit trade of

conflict diamonds. Furthermore, rebels are often reluctant to implement an agreement out of fear that once demobilization occurs and their strength is sapped, the government will renege on its agreements (Walter 2009: 246). These challenges in civil wars make brokering a peace extraordinarily difficult and often require a third party to alter the cost and benefit structure associated with the belligerents.

Figure 2.2: Bargaining Possible between Government and Rebels



The bargaining model of war is important when examining how the entrance of a third party alters the civil war outcome. When a third party enters a civil war, it makes renewal of hostilities costlier for the belligerents. A third party adds conflict costs since there is another foe to worry about. A third party is able to facilitate negotiation, clarifying information asymmetries when coordinating a settlement. Involvement of a third party also increases reputational costs, should the belligerents renege on the agreement.

That war is costly and not sought as an end in itself assumes that leaders will forgo the expenses of money and lives should they be able to achieve their goals without suffering the costs (Fearon 1995). Leaders will go to war only if their expected benefits through war outweigh their expected benefits through cooperation. Despite the

existence of low cost alternatives to war, bargaining problems among disputants make negotiation and cooperation difficult (Walter 2009). Assuming that enemies have deficits of trust when they have competing interests does not seem an extraordinary assumption, but it is important in resolving conflict. In order to enact an acceptable peace agreement among belligerents, each side must be faithful that the other is willing to commit to the agreement and cease fighting. Mistrust prevents either side from honoring their agreements.

Once belligerents reach a cessation of violence in a civil conflict, peace is not a foregone conclusion (Werner 1999). In the bargaining model of war, war is a costly method of displaying information and commitment to pursue preferred interests. Because war is costly, over time belligerents should be willing to deviate from their most preferred outcomes and agree to a settlement (Wagner 2000). Though a settlement may be reached, bargaining problems remain. Bargaining theory stipulates that wars persist as a result of informational asymmetries, difficulties among disputants to make credible commitments, and the indivisibility of stakes in the conflict (Fearon 1995; Walter 2009). Belligerents seek to withhold information and misrepresent their commitment, presenting the possibility of reigniting war in a post conflict area. These incentives for shirking rather than cooperating during the peace process in civil wars are explained in greater detail.

First, each of the belligerents has an incentive to cheat on any negotiated settlement. Even though both sides prefer cooperation to war, each of the belligerents prefers victory to cooperation. Bargaining theory suggests that belligerents will attempt to alter the terms of a settlement in their favor by strategically releasing private

information. Belligerents will misrepresent their commitment to fighting and capability to win a war in order to signal future costs to their opponent. Fighting provides an informational window about the capability, resolve, and bargaining willingness of each of the sides involved. Rather than war being outside the realm of cooperation, bargaining theory contends that it is merely an extension of the negotiation process. War commences when a negotiating impasse occurs and ends when a deal is struck (Reiter 2003).

A crucial component to the bargaining model of war is the role that both public and private information play in the onset and cessation of conflict. If war is viewed as a bargaining process, each side must consider what their ideal outcome of the bargaining process is, as well as the ideal outcome of the opposing side. Parties have incentives to hide or misrepresent this information to give themselves an advantage in either bargaining or war. Because of the incentive to misrepresent, actors have difficulty assuring each other of the merits of their intentions. These features of bargaining theory highlight the informational and commitment problems that ultimately lead to conflict (Filson and Werner 2002: 819-820). As conflicts cease, it is natural to assume that sufficient information has been communicated among the belligerents to alter their preferences to seek negotiation because war has become too costly. However, it is logical for one or both sides of the dispute to attempt to cheat or shirk on their present agreements in order to improve their future negotiation capability.

Second, each of the belligerents involved in a cessation of conflict has an inherent incentive, not only to strategically initiate and win a conflict, but also to fear that the

opposition is likely to do the same. These fears over the intentions of the adversary motivate both sides to engage in activity that destabilizes peace. Uncertainty over intentions can have two detrimental effects on peaceful resolution to conflict: it provides incentives for attack and it leads each actor to take defensive security measures that are construed as offensive in nature. These are aspects associated with the security dilemma. When temporary cessations in conflict occur, uncertainty over intentions leads to fearful behavior by the parties involved. This may lead each of the belligerents to engage in defensive measures, like rearmament or conscription, aimed at protecting themselves. While these actions may be defensive in nature, the opposition may view them as signs of renewing aggression (Jervis 1978). While each of the belligerents can benefit from mutual cooperation, they also know that forcing the hand of the opposition can lead them to an outcome that is more consistent with their most preferred outcome (total victory). Having incentive to be the first to take offensive action further complicates the security dilemma. If either of the belligerents believes that by being the first to break the peace, they can cripple the adversary in order to dictate the terms of the new agreement, they will attack. When this advantage exists for both parties involved in the conflict, neither side can trust the other as faithful in their intentions to honor a peace.

Third, when conflicts cease, the belligerents are essentially frozen at their current points of hostility. This presents a very unstable situation for the parties involved and, consequently, accidents occur and can be misconstrued as conscious acts of war. Highly mobilized and armed factions inside a country with little effective means for self policing yield a scenario where accidents are not only likely, but have severe repercussions.

Generally, civil wars employ individuals from various factions that do not necessarily follow a specific chain of command. They may not follow orders that command a cessation in conflict. Events in Northern Ireland illustrate this point. Though the Good Friday Agreement settled much of the underlying dispute between the warring factions, prevented violence, and prompted political reconciliation in Northern Ireland, it could not stop rogue Irish Republican dissidents from murdering military and police personnel in early 2009. Even such random small scale acts can rapidly escalate when tensions and anxieties are high in conflict areas. Effective means for communicating between belligerents can mean the difference between recurring war and lasting peace.

Finally, distribution problems can inhibit prospects for peace in conflict areas. Relative distributions from gains by cooperating are often unequal in nature, particularly in civil wars where even small factions can cause big problems. Belligerents that seek secession, greater minority representation, or more equitable distribution of wealth inherently provide gains for some at the expense of others. When a minority group gains political autonomy over a region, another group loses it. Zero-sum situations make bargaining difficult, particularly when leaders need to answer to constituencies. Making distributional concessions might make a leader appear weak or unpopular, jeopardizing their political survival. More democratic constituencies might use their domestic audiences to press for greater concessions in negotiations (Martin 2000). Less democratic regimes may worry about distributional losses and their ability to redistribute private goods to their domestic audiences (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). Indivisibility of political and economic resources that provide relative gains may make cessation of

conflict unlikely in the first place, but they also make cooperation and trust more unlikely once the fighting has stopped by exacerbating attack incentives, fear of cheating, and the risks of accidents (Fortna 2004: 19).

The preceding factors illustrate that while cessations in civil conflict provide an opportunity for peaceful resolution to conflict, they are fragile. While a stalemate or cessation in conflict reveals enough information to temporarily make war an unsuitable option, mistrust and fear may lead belligerents to continue to protect themselves from one another. These protective measures intensify the inherent mistrust and make renewed violence a more likely scenario. In order for peace to fully take hold and endure, third party intervention must address these commitment problems associated with conflict resolution.

How a Third Party Can Help

Intervention into conflicts by third parties is an old practice. Early examples of peacekeeping involve individual states combining their efforts or acting autonomously to insure the enforcement of agreements. Sweden/Norway (a single country at the time) sent a peacekeeping force of approximately 4,000 soldiers to the disputed region of Schleswig from 1849-1850, while Prussia and Denmark negotiated the details of a peace treaty (Gafvert 1995). France administered a police force in the German Saar region in the years following World War I, which was later transferred to a force of 3,300 from the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden, and Italy, while a referendum on the status of the region was held in 1935 (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005). Despite the popularity of using an intermediary to help resolve a dispute, proving the causal mechanisms that define an

intervention's success or failure remain elusive to scholars (Smith and Stam 2003: 116). Third parties should help alleviate bargaining obstacles by relaying reliable information to both actors, promoting credible commitments, and assisting in the implementation of settlements. These actions help belligerents reduce fear and hostility, while insuring that belligerents are serious about committing to the peace process. However, the impact that a third party has on this informational and commitment dynamic is difficult to extrapolate. Third parties may not only assist in settlement negotiation, but also aid in implementing that settlement once a deal has been struck.

There are three primary explanations that account for the effectiveness of a third party when enforcing a lasting peace in a post-civil conflict zone. First, a third party can escalate the costs among the parties for reigniting violence. When a stalemate is reached among the belligerents, the incorporation of a third party security guarantor increases the prospect of greater cost to a belligerent that initiates a breach of the cease fire. Second, a third party can facilitate the transfer of information among the combatants. Bargaining theory suggests that war is a result of misconceptions and an inability to effectively transmit credible information outside of war. Third, a third party can "shame" combatants into ceasing hostilities and accept a tenable compromise. The belligerents should be concerned over reputational costs they may suffer by resuming violence against the wishes of the greater international community. This idea is highlighted by the notion that when the international community speaks with a more unified voice that they are able to convince, rather than coerce, combatants into accepting a more universal international norm of conduct. Combined, these three components represent the

theoretical basis for the following research agenda aimed at distinguishing the effects of third parties on the cessation of civil conflict.

Increasing Costs for Reneging on an Agreement

A third party intermediary, first, changes the cost structure for the combatants involved in civil conflict when determining whether or not to resume violence. Not only must they consider the possibility of overcoming their domestic foe, but they must also consider the resources and assets introduced by the third party. Depending on the strength and resolve in the third party seeking to implement a peace agreement, resumption of war becomes a more costly endeavor for the belligerents. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) use various theoretical and empirical metrics for peacebuilding success in post conflict zones to show that the probability of peacebuilding success increases as the commitment of the international community increases. This finding remains consistent with the theoretical model that identifies war as a bargaining process. When added costs are incorporated into a state's calculation for attaining its political objectives, it will alter its bargaining behavior to forego such costs. Rather than aggressively pursuing a strategy to achieve gains through war, increasing the prospective costs by a third party will alter the negotiation spectrum making peaceful settlement a more risk adverse option. When each of the belligerents increases the spectrum of acceptable bargaining outcomes, the likelihood that they will be able to come up with an acceptable agreement also increases. Walter (2002) classifies the credibility of these third party security commitments based a third party's willingness to use military force and the interests that the third party has within the region undergoing conflict. These factors enhance the

probability that the third party will commit to the implementation phase of securing a lasting peace.

Fortna (2008) adds to the importance of this causal mechanism in her study of the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. Under the initial Abidjan cease fire agreement, no third party was present, the cost structures did not change, and violence resumed. When the next cease fire agreement under Lomé was signed, UN peacekeepers were sent to the region but their mandate and resolve were perceived as weak by the rebel forces and they still did not adhere to the agreement.[2] Only after the UN mandate was strengthened and additional contingents of British peacekeepers were sent to the region was a peaceful resolution implemented under the Abuja Agreement. Fortna's primary objective is to identify the overall impact of peacekeeping, comparing steps taken in Sierra Leone with studies on Mozambique and Bangladesh and the comparison shows that strength in commitment of an intermediary is a crucial factor for deterring violence (Fortna 2008: 125).

What Makes an Intermediary Strong?

Increasing the costs to the belligerents by means of a peacekeeping force manifests itself in multiple ways. To determine the strength of an intermediary, one must consider both capability and motivation of the intermediary. Strength in peacekeeping missions can be approximated based on the numerical size of the peacekeeping mission, the military capability of the country leading the peacekeeping campaign, and the

[2] The inability for the RUF to adhere to the cease fire was not only related to the strength of the peacekeeping mission, but also the benefits and profits associated with their lucrative diamond mining operations.

incentive associated with the country leading the campaign. Testing these metrics of strength in a mission may shed light on the deterrent capacity in a peacekeeping mission.

The most basic element that could conceivably contribute to the strength of the peacekeeping mission is the size of the force sent to the conflict. When there are more peacekeepers sent to a conflict, there are potentially greater numbers of adversaries should the belligerents choose to violate the cessation of conflict. Bargaining theory maintains that belligerents will have the incentive to attain their goals through conflict if they think it will be more beneficial than negotiation. Introduction of a strong third party provides a clear and tangible establishment of added costs to the belligerents to achieve those goals. Introduction of added costs should plausibly compel belligerents to increase their willingness to bargain for and commit to a settlement. If there is explanatory value to bargaining theory, the stronger the third party is, the more likely each of the belligerents will deviate from their ideal outcome (Werner 1999). Simply stated, added costs introduced by means of peacekeeping personnel make resumption of wars less attractive as a means for accomplishing objectives.

Less clear is whether or not the size of the force will impact peace beyond the tenure of the peacekeeping mission. A large mission can serve as an indication of the commitment of the international community to the promotion of a settlement pressuring the belligerents to adopt an agreement and seeing it through. However, a large mission can also create an "unnatural" settlement or a settlement driven entirely by an intermediary being present (Werner and Yuen 2005). Once peacekeepers are removed, the return to unbalanced bargaining structures may lead to a resumption of violence. A

large peacekeeping mission increases the bargaining space for the individuals during the mission, but might not persist once the mission is over.

> **H_{1a}:** Larger peacekeeping missions should reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict while the peacekeepers are present

> **H_{1b}:** Larger peacekeeping forces should not reduce the likelihood for violence after the peacekeepers have left the region.

Peacekeeping missions can also be defined by the country that is leading the international peacekeeping campaign. The lead country in the peacekeeping mission should be defined as the country that provides the most peacekeepers to the mission. The country leading a peacekeeping mission serves as the primary source for military personnel and presents itself as the political representative of the peacekeeping force. If a state is willing to make tangible commitments to a peacekeeping mission, it has a significant stake and interest in the outcome of the mission. Using the lead country as a proxy for the overall peacekeeping mission provides an adequate substitute for trying to approximate the general composition of the peacekeeping force which routinely changes throughout the course of a mission.

Peacekeeping missions led by countries with significant strength based on military capability possess the ability to enforce a peace agreement. Since most peacekeeping operations have been authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), much of the focus of peacekeeping missions has placated the interests of the Permanent 5 (P5) members. Previous studies suggest that these members must have an interest in the conflict to take action (Durch 1993; Diehl 1993; Oudraat 1996). But authorizing a mission

to take place is a fairly modest commitment to an internal conflict compared to intervention itself. Additional studies show that UN missions are less likely to take place if one of the "great powers" has intervened in the conflict directly (Oudraat 1993; Mullenbach 1995). Great powers have the excess military capacity to intervene, but do not necessarily want to have their authority obstructed by an international organization. When one of the P5 members is committed to a conflict, enough to contribute troops to the region, it is safe to say that it is making a costly commitment to pursue its foreign policy interests (Diehl 1993; Durch 1993; Oudraat 1996).

The impact that former colonial rulers have in pacifying a conflict ridden country can also shed light on the importance of state interests. Former colonial powers, like the great powers, have multiple interests in pacifying a state at war. Former colonial rulers often maintain trade and cultural ties to their former colonies as well as military ties. These ties provide the necessary capacity to intervene with a sense of purpose. However, sovereignty can be tricky. One must assume that these former colonies gained their independence for a reason and that any hint of neocolonialist ambitions would inflame nationalist sentiment among citizens of the former colony. Since the former colony is emerging from civil war, one may assume that former colonial peacekeepers would be equally willing to withdraw without permanently resolving the conflict.

> **H_{2a}:** Peacekeeping missions led by major powers or former colonial rulers should reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict because they bring more immediate resources to bear.

H_{2b}: Peacekeeping missions lead by major powers or former colonial rulers will not significantly impact recurrences of conflict after the peacekeepers leave.

Countries that border the conflict countries have both the immediate means and long term motives to prevent resumptions of violence because they are more directly affected by the harmful consequences of the civil war. A country's interests are critical when conflicts occur in their own backyard (Fortna 2008: 34). While the previous factors related to strength rest upon the capability of the intermediary, involvement of a bordering country adds another dimension of motivation. Indeed, location enhances the capability of an intermediary. Resources can be efficiently allocated to a peacekeeping mission because of proximity and the spillover elements of civil conflict can be better confined. Bordering countries will more likely desire a long term solution because their wellbeing is closely linked to conflict country. Bordering countries likely share significant trade and cultural ties, making neighborhood stability beneficial to the peacekeepers and the citizens within the conflict country (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005). Additionally, the adverse consequences of civil war can affect the populations of the conflict countries and their neighbors. Refugees seeking asylum present logistical and financial burdens to neighboring countries and mass population displacements multiply regional health epidemics and the spread of disease (Collier 2007: 28). When contiguous countries intervene as peacekeepers, they do so out of immediate and long term self interest (Barbieri and Reuveny 2005).

H_{3a}: Peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries will reduce the likelihood for recurrence of violence while peacekeepers are present.

H_{3b}: Peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries will reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the peacekeepers leave.

Peacekeeping constitutes a costly signal of intent by the intermediary, however, less costly or "cheap" signals may also change the bargaining dimensions of a civil war (Thyne 2006). Willingness to mediate a dispute presents a signal to the belligerents that outside groups seek resolution to conflict. Mediation serves as a method of conflict resolution by means of communication between the belligerents, providing a process and procedure for conflict management, and by issuing directives and ultimatums to the belligerents (Bercovitch and Gartner 2006). Compared with the previous indicators for strength, major power mediation is a rather weak signal of resolve, since it requires little direct action by the intermediary.

States constantly interact with one another and these interactions act as signals of intent. "Signaling involves actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor" (Gartzke 2003: 1). Mediation by an intermediary constitutes a "cheap" method for conveying a signal to the belligerents because it does not require the signaler to make any significant investment to reinforce its position (Thyne 2009: 27). By attempting to mediate an agreement between the warring factions, an intermediary is making a statement of intent. The stronger the intermediaries, the more salient that signal should be. If a major power was involved in the mediation process, the belligerents may be responding to strongly worded directives or ultimatums from a powerful nation. Consequently, it is

expected that when a major power becomes involved in the mediation process between the belligerents, it deters the belligerents from resuming the conflict out of fear that a much stronger nation might involve itself.

> **H_{4a}**: When a major power is involved in the mediation process between the belligerents, resumption of violence will be less likely both during the peacekeeping mission.
>
> **H_{4b}**: When a major power is involved in the mediation process, resumption of violence will be less likely after a peacekeeping mission.

The strength of a peacekeeping mission serves as an overt signal of the international commitment to ending the conflict. Establishing which peacekeeping missions are stronger than others can be determined by looking at who intervenes and how they intervene. Intermediaries that have capable and resolute military forces committed to ending a civil conflict should alter the costs of war for the disputants enough to dissuade future violence. However, there is question about the durability of those commitments. Do peacekeepers that exhibit strength dissuade violence while they are present, or can they alter expected future costs to disputants based on their previous actions? Testing how peacekeeping missions defined by strength of the intermediary during and after the intervention should clarify the power of strength.

Enhancing Credibility of Information

Introducing a third party into a dispute helps solve informational problems among the combatants since monitoring the implementation of an agreement demonstrates the combatants' commitment to a peace settlement. Access to information is important, but

also important is the source of that information. Because of the importance of credible information, an effective intermediary must be able to present transparent and credible signals to the actors involved. When opposing factions work toward implementing a permanent peace settlement, they strategically release information to the opposition so that they do not give the other side an advantage should conflict recur. The conflicting factions should be willing to release information to a neutral third party since releasing such information would not likely compromise the security of the belligerents. The belligerents will only release information when they do not feel threatened by the third party. Third parties may also be able to generate independent and objective assessments of the capabilities and resolve of the factions related to the dispute. This capability rests upon the neutrality and objectivity of the third party involved in the implementation of a peace settlement as well as its capacity to effectively transmit credible information.

Despite the mutually harmful consequences of conflict, rational actors may find themselves in the midst of conflict despite attempts to negotiate a settlement. Actors have a tendency to misrepresent private information about their capability and resolve to pursue a more beneficial outcome in the bargaining process. Even in the context of perfect transparency of information, disputing factions often lack trust when credibly committing to an agreement. Each actor has an incentive to renege, once an agreement has been reached (Fearon 1995). These obstacles in bargaining present challenges to resolving conflict and intermediaries may clarify information and promote credible commitments among the disputants. However, identifying how an intermediary improves

bargaining behavior among conflicting factions will explain the role that information and signaling have in peacekeeping in civil wars.

Civil wars present particular problems associated with information sharing because rebel groups are often regarded as illegitimate political factions. Svensson (2007) notes this asymmetry in credibility among factions and takes into account the bias of the mediator when brokering peace. Though he contends that government biased mediators should provide the most effective signals of trust, his results indicate that neutral arbiters of peace have the greatest effect in overcoming the commitment to peace. The reason behind this may be that the rebels require credible signals from a third party intermediary just as the government does, even though the rebels may have greater incentive to renege on bargains struck with the government.

Howard (2008) contrasts this image by identifying "organizational learning" as the tool that best suits an intermediary in civil conflicts. Further analysis suggests the primary components of organizational learning relate to the ability of an intermediary to relay credible information and signal intentions. According to Howard, an intermediary that effectively gathers information on the ground, coordinates peacekeeping components of the mission, communicates intentions to local populations, and manages engagement between the leadership offers the best prospect for success in a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping operations that master these components of operational learning yield better rates of success in preventing violence. Organizational learning is rooted in an intermediary's ability to coordinate and facilitate credible information among the disputants.

Peace may additionally be tenuous in a post conflict zone because of the disputants' inability to commit to terms of agreements already negotiated (Walter 2002). Uncertainty about the intentions of the opposition prevents either party from initiating the terms of an agreement out of fear that the other side might renege on the negotiated deal (Schelling 1960). This is a significant difficulty associated with the implementation of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) coordination. Once one side disarms, the other side might press for more stringent conditions due to their disproportionately strong bargaining capability. Coordinating simultaneous implementation of agreements upon both parties is another task that neutral third parties can help facilitate. If the third party associated with facilitating the implementation of an agreement is regarded as biased toward one of the factions, uncertainty over intentions exist and commitment problems remain. However, if the third party is trusted by both of the factions involved, it allows greater certainty that when it relays information that factions are adhering to or disobeying the terms of an agreement, its information is credible. Democratic states acting in concert with organizational norms are transparent in their institutions and intentions. Thus, they are viewed as credible coordinators of agreements (Fortna 2004).

Domestic institutions change the political calculus when establishing credible commitments in foreign policy (Putnam 1988; Simmons 1994). The structural and normative components of democratic states provide added insight into the prospective outcomes of post conflict zones when engaging in peacekeeping operations. Democracies tend to have transparent institutional structures intended to enhance their perceived

neutrality as a third party. Their institutional structure and transparent media outlets inhibit them from hiding imperialistic or illicit motives and the open discourse within their domestic political institutions enhances their ability to openly and credibly relay bargaining terms among the disputants in the civil conflict (Schultz 1999). Democratic states should not only promote the kinds of legitimized outcomes determined to be acceptable in the greater international community, but they also have institutional structures making them more credible and sincere arbiters of monitoring and sanctioning the implementation of a peace agreement. Institutional transparency that comes with a democratic intermediary enhances the likelihood that credible information and commitments will lead to long term agreements in otherwise fractious bargaining processes between disputing parties (Martin 2000: 37).

Additionally, democracies have the capacity to make credible security guarantees when implementing the terms of a peace resolution. A key aspect of a credible peacekeeping commitment is the third party's capability to sanction noncompliance by the combatants in the implementation of a peace accord (Walter 2002; Toft 2010). When the third party offering a security guarantee toward the implementation of a peace agreement has the capacity to bring extraordinary capability to the fore, it escalates the costs of defection from the agreement for the combatants. Democratic governments can bring significant resources to a conflict due to their capacity to raise rents from their constituencies and enhanced audience costs shown to deter aggressive behavior by adversaries (Lake 1992). Democratic governments implementing a peace accord have the

capacity to bring substantial resources to a post conflict zone and, therefore, can deter noncompliance to the terms of a peace agreement.

> **H_{5a}:** There will be a greater likelihood for peace during a peacekeeping mission when the lead country (country contributing the most peacekeepers) is a more democratic nation.
>
> **H_{5b}:** There will be a greater likelihood for enduring peace in a post conflict zone when the lead country is a more democratic nation after a peacekeeping mission.

A peacekeeping operation upholding a clear agreement for peace provides an informational tool for the peacekeepers. Ceasefire and peace agreements provide transparent and tangible indications of the requirements and intentions of the belligerents at the cessation of conflict. If belligerents sign a ceasefire or peace agreement prior to a peacekeeping mission, they not only signal to each other what bargains they are implementing, but they clarify to the peacekeepers what obligations each of the belligerents must uphold to sustain a lasting peace. Though a ceasefire or peace treaty does not force compliance among any of the parties involved, it clarifies the intentions and obligations of each.

Accidents and unauthorized incidents can be another significant source of conflict renewal. Written agreements can serve as blueprints for acceptable and unacceptable behavior among disputing factions (Fortna 2004). While the existence of a peace or ceasefire treaty does not preclude the belligerents from returning to violent conflict once

the peacekeeping mission arrives, it presents the peacekeepers with specific terms that stipulate compliance or noncompliance.

> **H_{6a}**: There will be a greater likelihood for peace during the peacekeeping mission when the belligerents enter into a ceasefire/peace agreement prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission.

> **H_{6b}**: There will be a greater likelihood for lasting peace when the belligerents enter into a ceasefire/peace agreement prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission.

Written agreements prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission signal the importance of transparency, but not necessarily based on actions by the peacekeeping mission, itself. A ceasefire agreement provides a framework for the peacekeepers to monitor. However, a peacekeeping mission that fosters transparency and cooperation should be evident in the actions that take place during the mission. If peacemaking is a process, then that process must continue throughout the peacekeeping operation. Consequently, peacekeepers that continue dialogue and negotiation throughout the mission will reduce uncertainty and fear among the factions, alleviate fear of political abuse, and provide a political basis for future communication and negotiation.

Active communication and credible signaling behavior among the belligerents help alleviate widespread fear and distrust generated from years of war. Misconceptions and the motivation to misrepresent lead to suspicious dialogue, but an effective intermediary can alleviate this distrust. First, an intermediary can allow dialogue that might not otherwise exist. Left to their own devices, belligerents would not accept many gestures

for constructive dialogue. Over time, warring factions that meet under a banner of dialogue, rather than hostility, can overcome their distrust. Second, the acceptance of peacekeepers serves as a signal itself. Violating a peace after communicating intent to negotiate not only presents reputational costs to your opposition, but also to the intermediary. Cooperation through an intermediary offers an initial signal by the opposing sides that they desire a peaceful resolution (Fortna 2008: 95).

Active communication through a peacekeeping mission also reduces the possibility of political abuse in a future governmental structure. Among the unique challenges presented by civil wars is the need for assurance of political rights in any new government. Government forces are reluctant to grant political rights to rebel groups and rebel groups are reluctant to disarm without them. Continuous and open dialogue by a trusted intermediaries help facilitate this process. Commitment problems persist in civil conflicts because neither side wishes to make the first gesture which could be construed as bargaining weakness. Peacekeepers can insure incremental compliance by both sides during the transitional phases of governance. They can monitor elections and legal proceedings to insure governmental compliance and oversee disarmament by the rebel factions. Active involvement of peacekeepers insures that credible information is being relayed in a post conflict environment.

When discourse among belligerents has been defined by violent conflict, it is hard to build a political system based on communication, negotiation, and compromise. Effective intermediaries must contribute to overcoming this obstacle by demonstrating peaceful political discourse. Similar to the argument for the protection of political

commitments, intermediaries that facilitate dialogue and negotiation among the disputants display a model of healthy political discourse in a functioning state. Political violence should be a tactic of last resort, but in a dysfunctional state where opposing factions do not trust one another and refuse to recognize the legitimacy of each other, it is more likely to be the primary method of political expression. An intermediary displaying the diplomatic skill to facilitate successful negotiation and compromise among the belligerents should serve as a model for appropriate governmental discourse.

Determining how active and constructive dialogue takes place during a peacekeeping operation can be elusive. However, if peacekeepers are able to get the belligerents to commit to a peace treaty during the peacekeeping mission, it may serve as an indication that they are actively facilitating credible information transfer among the disputants and are shaping a continuing political dialogue. Signing a ceasefire agreement prior to the arrival of the peacekeepers indicates a dialogue primarily among the belligerents, but peace agreements signed during a peacekeeping mission indicates a dialogue facilitated and improved by the intermediary.

> **H_{7a}**: There will be a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission when the belligerents sign a peace treaty while the peacekeepers are present.

> **H_{7b}**: There will be a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence after a peacekeeping mission when the belligerents sign a peace treaty during the peacekeeping mission.

The metrics estimating transparency and signaling credibility associated with the peacekeeping mission are rough approximations. Further elaboration about how these

metrics are specified in the data will be discussed in chapter 3. However, the theoretical focus remains the importance of information. If war is a bargaining process, the credibility and process of information transfer between the disputing parties holds significance in negotiating a plausible settlement.

Legitimizing a Peace Resolution

While realists measure power through tangible measures like economic strength and military power, Nye (2004) asserts that the power to persuade is often more effective than the power to coerce. When a third party intervenes into a conflict only achieving their goals through the threat of punishment, they are only coercing reluctant actors. However, when a third party intervenes and has the credibility necessary to convince each of the actors to implement a lasting peace rather than resume violence, this exercise in persuasion has greater resonance since the actors are cooperating out of their own free will rather than out of threat. Furthermore, the use of threat as a means for coercion increases hostility between the intervening country and the host state actors. Coercive intervention can be used to mobilize internal support against the third party intermediary. Consequently, the perceived legitimacy and respected authority of the third party must be recognized by the warring factions for lasting peace to be effective. "As has often been said, in international affairs, perceptions matter because, so often, perceptions are mistaken for reality" (McNamara and Blight 2001: 141).

The final advantage that third parties possess when constraining renewals of violence in countries steeped in civil conflict can be characterized as "shaming" the disputants into accepting a compromise. While international norms of conduct are not

always clearly spelled out, resolving disputes through war is generally not accepted as a legitimate method. Consequently, a third party will often intervene in a conflict appealing to humanitarian concerns exacerbated by the violence of war. Combatants that fail to comply with such appeals risk suffering reputational costs which may hurt them, even in spite of a military victory. The international community, as a whole, carries a greater capability to persuade rather than coerce, often referred to as "soft power" (Nye 2004). A third party peace broker must utilize this idea if it is able to successfully propose tenable solutions to the combatants. Individual states often provide significant resources for coercing parties to come to agreement, but multinational organizations overcome this resource deficit with enhanced legitimacy and perceived lack of prejudice (Dobbins et al. 2005).

Legitimacy can prove to be important simply by acknowledging disputants' grievances. Among civil war disputants, rebel factions suffer from a lack of political recognition within their country. International recognition by a third party intervening in the conflict provides status to the rebel faction(s) and leadership, granting a political platform not previously allowed under the government. An intermediary giving a rebel faction recognition that the government refuses opens political discourse as an alternative to fighting. Also, an intermediary can provide the government with a source of legitimacy as well. The government may be reluctant to negotiate with a rebel group on its own because doing so, itself, is an act of recognition and makes them appear weak within their own constituency. However, acting through a recognized arbiter opens dialogue and negotiation without the internal appearance of weakness. This fragile political platform

can only be traversed by a third party that is clearly recognized by both the government and the rebel factions as legitimate and neutral body (Regan 2000: 112).

A third party can, first, be credited as a legitimate and neutral military arbiter when it carries the backing of a greater proportion of the international community. When more states commit themselves to a cause, they are making a strong political signal of support. The universality of a third party cause can be represented by the membership of the peacekeeping force or the authority under which the peacekeepers are acting. Collective interventions may suffer greater risks of free riding and incongruent objectives, but international condemnation and domestic political opposition can be minimized when greater international consensus in peacekeeping is sought (Olson 1965; Coleman 2007).

Peacekeeping missions are most likely to get a strong backing by a wider population of nations when the costs of intervention are well distributed and the benefits of intervention serve the greater collective (Regan 2000: 107). When more states commit to intervene, they assert their collective will to uphold international peacekeeping objectives. Therefore, when more countries are represented in a peacekeeping mission, it is assumed that there is greater international consensus behind the action of the peacekeeping mission and the outcome the mission is supporting. Universal involvement in the mission also means that more states are providing valuable input and confidence in the operation. Global contributions of resources and personnel should be evident among the citizenry within the country and greater input from a wider variety of sources provide better historical, political, and societal context for the mission organizers. "Multinational organizations do not necessarily depend on consensus for action, but peace operations

are viewed as more legitimate when the coalition is larger as opposed to duties carried out primarily by a single state" (Diehl 2008: 80). Greater international consensus and contribution should help make a peacekeeping mission successful in the immediate and long term.

> **H_{8a}:** There will be a greater likelihood for peace during the mission, if more countries contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission because it will be viewed as internationally legitimate.

> **H_{8b}:** There will be a greater likelihood for peace after the peacekeepers depart, if more countries contribute troops to a peacekeeping mission because it will be viewed as internationally legitimate.

Another factor contributing to the legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission is the authorization of a mission by the UN. While the UN is the leader in global peacekeeping operations, it does not have a monopoly on such interventions. At times individual states, regional organizations, and integrated security structures engage in operations outside of their borders, also with varying degrees of success. These varying types of interventions by outside actors differ in their composition. Dobbins et al. (2005) document this juxtaposition by highlighting some of the regularities in such initiatives by both the US and the UN in post conflict zones. The UN has regularly contributed fewer numbers of peacekeepers since they depend on voluntary contributions for the missions and the US often relies on overwhelming force to dissuade recurrences of violence. One would expect bigger to be better in terms of effectiveness, but that is not always the case. Both the UN and the US interventions stabilizing conflict zones have been met with varying

successes. However, any intervening state must establish itself as an honest negotiator of a conflict and a mission led by an organization or state serving the interests of a regional power player will most definitely have less legitimacy than a UN mission (Diehl 2008).

Despite the differences between US and UN styles in nation-building, the UN generally has better success rates because of its ability to compensate for its hard power deficit with the soft power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality (Dobbins et al. 2005: 243-245). The UN's success rate is particularly notable since the UN is more likely to engage peacekeeping missions under the most difficult circumstances (Dobbins et al. 2005; Fortna 2008; Wallensteen and Heldt 2008). Furthermore, Coleman (2007) argues that in the contemporary international system international organizations serve as authorities for peace enforcement operations when international peace and humanitarian conventions are breached. Though they authorize peace enforcement measures on a case by case basis, these organizations and the UN under Chapter VII in particular "remain central to establishing the international legitimacy of an intervention" (Coleman 2007: 46).

International legitimacy can be captured, in part, by distinguishing whether or not the mission has been sanctioned or authorized by the UN. Since the UN's goals and objectives are generally perceived as neutral in their orientation, belligerents in a post conflict zone should feel less threatened by a force that has the backing and authorization of the UN and less compelled to resist these forces. In the absence of a UN resolution that can be vetoed by any one of five permanent members of the Security Council, other regional organizations or individual states may be able to implement a peacekeeping

mission with greater effectiveness. While smaller local organizations (usually regional IGOs) might earn greater support among the belligerents due to common economic, historical, ethnic or tribal roots, they might also be regarded as a threat to sovereignty and ignite nationalistic sentiment. UN backing carries strong legitimizing significance without appearing to subjugate the state to foreign rule. The universal membership of the UN and institutional structures make UN consensus difficult but not impossible to achieve. Because of the difficulty of authorizing forceful UN resolution deploying peacekeepers, it can be expected that those peacekeeping missions that are sanctioned by the UN carry a significant degree of international authority and consensus.

> **H_{9a}:** There will be a reduced likelihood for violence during the peacekeeping mission if the mission is authorized by the UN.

> **H_{9b}:** There will be a reduced likelihood for violence after the departure of the peacekeepers if the peacekeeping mission is authorized by the UN.

A peacekeeping mission that is a result of greater international consensus and has the perception of legitimacy is less likely to be viewed as a militaristic threat to the conflict state. Determining the legitimacy associated with a peacekeeping mission is calculated by establishing the degree of international support for the mission. More states participating in the peacekeeping operation is one way of determining international support. Peer pressure is more effective when there are more peers advocating a cause. Furthermore, a UN mandate for a peacekeeping operation signals international support. The UN has the strongest degree of moral authority in the world, makes its decisions based on international consensus, and is less likely to invoke nationalistic sentiment

among the peacekept. Military intervention is a serious imposition on states' sovereignty and a third party must establish good cause and appeal to recognized international norms of conduct to legitimate its imposition.

Summary of the Argument

The literature research on third party intervention through peacekeeping has been limited in its analysis due to the relatively small number of peacekeeping missions. Some notable exceptions include Walter (2002) and Fortna (2008). Walter's analysis, however, only measures whether or not a third party security guarantee was issued during the peace negotiation process. This does not take into account the degree of commitment of the third party or the nature of the third party making the security guarantee. Fortna's analysis expands upon this earlier research by specifically examining peacekeeping operations and their ensuing results, but does not sufficiently analyze the composition of the peacekeeping force outside of the mandate for the mission. Prior work on peacekeeping makes significant contributions to theory on peacekeeping as an effective means for conflict resolution, but additional research on the causal mechanisms behind successful peacekeeping can further determine how peacekeepers affect the stability of peace.

Though belligerents left to their own devices may be able to invoke a lasting peace, fear and mistrust lead to information and commitment problems when implementing a permanent cessation of hostilities in civil conflict. Since belligerents are less likely to trust commitments they make with one another, they are unable to effectively share credible information, have incentive to cheat on agreements or

concessions they make, have an incentive attack the opposition, suffer from possibilities of escalations in hostilities resulting from accidents, and may not be able to effective allocate distributional political and economic resources. These difficulties amount to a security dilemma that make bargaining and negotiation difficult among the belligerents in civil conflict.

I argue that introduction of a third party benefits the process of conflict resolution in a civil conflict through three primary methods. A third party increases the costs for defecting from a resolution. If a peacekeeping mission provides a robust force to the region, recurrences of violence should be less likely. Third party peacekeeping missions may provide informational advantages to the belligerents involved in the civil dispute. War is theorized to consist of a bargaining process that does not necessarily stop when the fighting ceases. Third party peacekeepers may provide more transparent means for monitoring and verification that each of the parties involved are maintaining their commitments to peace. A peacekeeping mission may also provide legitimacy to a resolution. States and non state actors may seek recognition from the international community as legitimate actors that are promoting the general welfare of the people inhabiting their country. As civil conflict has grown to be seen as an international and not just a domestic problem, belligerents may be more likely to comply with peacekeeping missions supported by the international community due to prospective reputational costs.

Figure 2.3 illustrates and summarizes the theoretical arguments made regarding the effectiveness of peacekeeping missions. The most successful peacekeeping missions should involve states that provide the strength and sanctioning capacity to increase the

costs of resuming conflict so that recurrences of war are not a well suited option for either of the belligerents. The peacekeeping mission should have the support of the greater international community in order to legitimize a violation of state sovereignty. Lastly, the peacekeepers should be composed of nations and/or institutions that provide clear and credible transfer of information among the belligerents. Democratic third parties best accomplish this task by transmitting information that supported by domestic institutional structures and audiences. Peacekeeping missions that fulfill these criteria help alleviate the information and commitment problems associated with implementing peace in civil wars and will, therefore, reduce the prospect of violence during and after peacekeepers' deployment.

Figure 2.3: Increasing the Likelihood for Successful Peacekeeping



Chapter 3: Methods and Data for Testing Peacekeeping Success

Key Distinctions in the Analysis

In order to narrow the scope of inquiry, it is important to define the parameters of components within the analysis. Three terms that can be used in a rather broad context include peacekeeping, civil conflict, and international governmental organizations. What constitutes a peacekeeping action? When does a dispute become a civil war? When do interstate interactions constitute an organization? How these terms are defined in the analysis determine the boundaries of the study. One must address how such terms are addressed in the literature and how the current study addresses them in the data.

Is it Peacekeeping or Mediation?

"Peacekeeping" can be defined both broadly and narrowly. Commonly, it is used to describe any international effort to "promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes" (Diehl 1993: 4). When referring to peacekeeping throughout this research project, the term shall be defined as an enforcement operation as well as a confidence-building measure in post conflict areas alleviating suspicion among belligerents in a civil conflict (Werner 1999: 914). Rather than only serving as a force to stop violence, peacekeepers serve the role of monitoring compliance by the belligerents to increase trust and confidence between them. This role in post conflict areas is particularly important since "fear is high and trust is low among antagonists, parties may fail to carry out their commitments in the belief that the adversary will take advantage of them (Stedman and Rotchild 1996: 20).

This definition emphasizes that peacekeepers play an important informational role as opposed to only a coercive role in conflict resolution. Diehl (1993: 5-14) stresses this point by noting that the defining attributes to a peacekeeping operation involve nonenforcement, limited military capability, and neutrality. These characteristics imply that peacekeepers are less important as a coercive tool, than they are as an intermediary for establishing trust and cooperation. Peacekeepers must act multilaterally because they cannot rely on overwhelming force to insure compliance among belligerents. Despite their best efforts at remaining neutral, peacekeepers are still outsiders and might be regarded as a threat to sovereignty.

To elaborate upon the prior assertions regarding the purpose and role of peacekeepers, an operational definition as the subject of this research is consistent with the conditions set by Heldt and Wallensteen (2005). Peacekeepers must fulfill several characteristics to fit within my analysis. First, a peacekeeping contingent must come from a third party. That third party could represent a single state, multiple states or an intergovernmental organization, but must be a legal international body. Second, a peacekeeping contingent must provide an operational component within the post conflict zone. This is a departure from the mediation literature because mediation may involve nothing more than negotiation from afar. Peacekeeping involves a heavier cost burden on the intermediary by committing personnel. This commitment does not have to be military in nature, but it must contain a human oversight component. Third, a peacekeeping mission is sent to a conflict that is currently, if temporarily, involved in a cessation of active hostilities. If a third party involves itself while hostilities are active, it may be

perceived as favoring one side rather than preserving a ceasefire. This condition provides that the third party is neutral, but not necessarily impartial. Simply stated, a peacekeeping contingent involves the active commitment of personnel from a third party once there has been a cessation in conflict to insure that the belligerents remain at peace and continue the process of conflict de-escalation. This operational definition is consistent with definitions in the literature and permits further examination of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Civil Conflict and Intervention

Data on wars in the last half century show that civil wars outnumber interstate wars (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 20). The numbers of civil conflicts peaked in the 1990's and the end of the Cold War prompted more international interventions to subdue violence. When considering peacekeeping operations, there are approximately three times as many peacekeeping operations deployed to intrastate conflicts as there are to interstate conflicts (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 16-20). Furthermore, the breakdown of state oversight and institutions make rampant human rights abuses more prevalent in civil wars. States have greater concern with their reputation and international norms than nonstate actors. This makes the international responses to civil wars important.

Civil conflict identifies a war that exists within the territorial boundaries of a state, rather than between two or many states. This is not meant to suggest that outside states are not affected by conflict within another country. Cultural and ancestral ties often affect domestic politics in foreign countries, refugees fleeing bloodshed often spill over borders into neighboring states, and trade and investment are disrupted. Despite the

localized nature of civil conflict, the international community may seek to reduce hostilities and curtail violence. In addition to the scope of civil conflict, the scale can also be deceptive. Traditionally, scholars define interstate wars using a threshold of one thousand battle-related deaths to signify a war (Singer and Small 1972). However, civil wars can be just as brutal, though often resulting in fewer hostilities. Consequently, identification for civil wars often contain lower death-related thresholds (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008). This lower number of fatalities does not necessarily make them less brutal. Several components of civil conflicts make them especially difficult to resolve.

Civil conflicts involve both national and sub-national actors. The national actor is usually indicated as the government and the sub-national actor is usually designated as one or more rebel groups. On the surface this difference may not seem any more significant that two interstate rivals, however, it makes a difference in conflict resolution. First, the government will be unlikely or unwilling to even recognize the rebel group out of fear for legitimizing their cause while weakening the authority of the government. This makes negotiation especially difficult. A second problem relates to de-escalation. In order for conflict to end, some kind of tenable solution must be accepted and a government must be formed. To do this, both sides must demobilize to some degree. However, neither side is likely to do so without formidable guarantees that they will not be taken advantage of once they have demobilized. Furthermore, rebel groups can often be very fractious and in the wake of a settlement might not be able to control fringe elements of their supporters.

Civil conflict is a result of a state's failure to regulate and govern itself appropriately. Consequently, there are significant costs resulting from this failure. Failed states leave an extraordinarily hostile situation for civilians who are often caught within the fray of civil conflict, leading to human rights abuses, war crimes, and even genocide. The void left by ineffective government, also, promotes a surge in the illicit economy. Illegal transport and manufacturing of commodities ranging from diamonds to drugs fuel rebel armies and flood foreign black markets. These illicit activities can prove to be very profitable for rebel groups, who may seek to extend conflict for the mere purpose of enriching themselves (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The inability for a state to effectively police itself produces economic disaster and prospective human rights abuses affecting others in the international community.

Civil conflicts may inherently affect other states, but international conventions have traditionally been framed to prevent outside intervention into civil wars in the name of sovereignty. Despite significant incentive to intervene and attempt to stop civil conflict, states are often reluctant to take action. Intervention into a conflict within the confines of a state violates one of the central norms of international relations. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia formalized the convention of the sovereignty of the territorially defined state and the principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of recognized states. This concept of state sovereignty over domestic affairs has been one of the longstanding and accepted conventions of international affairs, but the destructive nature of civil conflict required reexamination of this norm in recent decades (Evans 2008). The post World War II reality of genocide alerted the international community to the

catastrophes associated with nonintervention in cases of genocide and humanitarian disasters. Consequently, the United Nations has more closely associated intervention into domestic affairs of states undergoing civil discourse with its international mandate to uphold international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Coleman 2007: 41-46) International involvement in the domestic affairs of states, formerly taboo, has become more acceptable particularly since the 1990's to alleviate the devastating effects of civil wars.

International Governmental Organization vs. States

The conception of the "international community" can take many forms whether it is individual citizens, leaders, individual states, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations, or collections of states through international governmental organizations (IGOs). The units of analysis that are singled out in this research project consist of states and collections of states through organizational bodies. While there is room for argument about how international organizations are perceived, they will largely be identified by their state composition. Even though IGO's are identified primarily by their state membership in this project, they can take on a larger identity than any one particular state.

The primary distinction that this research examines is the organization and influential strength of international organizations and states. IGOs have a difficult organizational threshold to overcome when engaging in collective action. IGOs, as collections of states, may have competing interests among their membership, making agreement and cooperation difficult. When IGOs involve themselves in political decisions,

they must develop consensus among their members and rely on mutual contributions from the various states that make up the organization. The structural differences between these two entities amount to states being able to act quickly, decisively, and perhaps with greater success. However, international consensus carries with it advantages as well. Foreign policy actions that have international consensus carry with it greater legitimacy or judgments of acceptability based on understood rules of the game (Coleman 2007: 31). Despite a difficulty to generate consensus on foreign policy actions, an IGO may better influence states to accept norms of conduct.

Recognizing an IGO as a collection of states through a more formal organization provides a simpler conception of the term, but also excludes organizations that could also fit within the definition. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or extra-state actors could have a significant influence in post conflict zones, but are excluded from the definition. Organizations like the Red Cross or Doctors without Borders significantly improve the conditions in post conflict areas and alleviate the human costs of war torn countries, making peace a more tenable solution. Nongovernmental individuals, such as religious leaders, may be able to play an active role in peace settlements and negotiations, helping alleviate hostilities among belligerents. While these actors may influence peaceful outcomes, their role is more difficult to quantify for empirical analysis. Although I do not empirically measure their role, NGO contributions are investigated in case study on Sierra Leone.

Choosing a Dataset

The Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Dispute Project (TPI) dataset best suits the research needs to empirically measure effects that peacekeeping forces have in civil conflicts. The discussion of the data begins with a specification of the dataset and then provides reasoning why it suits the purposes of the research at hand. Other peacekeeping datasets have significant benefits, but do serve all of the intended purposes for this research.

The dataset used is the Third Party Interventions in Intrastate Disputes Project dataset developed by Mullenbach and Dixon (2007).[3] This dataset provides a variety of suitable variables and a significant quantity of observations allowing for research on the composition of peacekeeping missions. The overall empirical record for peacekeeping missions is rather small, making large-n studies problematic. However, the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data resolve many data problems by reformulating traditional methods of distinguishing observations, thus expanding the number of observations of peacekeeping missions. These data employ a broader definition of peacekeeping. An outside state or organization must commit personnel to the state undergoing conflict for multiple purposes ranging from enforcement to monitoring. The personnel must also be sent within 12 months to the country experiencing a cessation of conflict (Mullenbach 2005). Each peacekeeping data point is determined by blending various observational methods and standards for third party intervention in civil conflicts. The two primary methods used to increase the number of data points involve including all third party peacekeeping

[3] This dataset can be found at the following web URL http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_homepage.htm

operations (not just UN peacekeeping missions) and revising the traditional methods of observing civil conflict and conflict recurrence.

Alternative datasets do not provide sufficient information for this analysis. The Doyle and Sambanis (2006) dataset includes 124 civil wars, specified by the Correlates of War standards classifying civil conflicts, only 27 of which identify outside intervention by a UN peacekeeping force. The problems with these data are that it only deals with UN sanctioned peacekeeping missions. If different types of peacekeeping mandates and interventions are going to be compared, there have to be additional types of peacekeeping interventions. Extracting what aspects of the intervention made peace more likely is the central purpose of the current research. Using a dataset that includes intervention in civil wars by unitary state actors and regional intergovernmental organizations not only expands the number of data points in the analysis, but also provides greater information on the effect that different compositions of peacekeeping forces have on the likelihood for peace.

Fortna (2008) expands upon Doyle and Sambanis' data to analyze the success of peacekeeping operations. However, Fortna also examines only UN intervention versus nonintervention. Her updated data provide 36 total instances of peacekeeping in these civil wars, making a large-n study problematic. Fortna's study also examines intervention versus nonintervention in civil wars. This accommodates her research for a large-n study, but makes these data insufficient to study the observations associated with intervention.

Another popular dataset for analyzing civil war dispute resolution is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset.[4] These data apply a lower threshold for violent occurrences of civil war using a threshold of 25 battle-related deaths as an indication for civil conflict, specify government and opposition disputants, and document civil wars from 1945 through 2005. Such temporal and definitional variations on civil war outbreaks provide a much larger number of instances of civil war (approximately 1900). This expansion of the data makes it very useful for empirical analyses. However, for the purposes of the current study on third party interventions, some of the omissions in the data are problematic.

The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset identifies whether or not there was a third party associated with the conflict, which side the intervening party preferred (third party bias), how many states supported each of the disputants, and country codes for the supporter. However, the dataset does not specify the nature of this relationship or the mandate under which intervening countries provided their support. While these data provide a great amount of information about which parties enjoyed greater support from outside actors, it does not specify how that support manifested itself or much about the third party actor itself. Further research could clarify the nature of these relationships between disputants and third parties helping alleviate this ambiguity. These data include many more observations, but for the purposes of the current research project, more detailed data with a richer description of the peacekeeping mission are preferred and importantly identify the primary nations involved in the intervention. The 25 battle-death

[4] The dataset and corresponding codebooks can be found at the web URL http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO

threshold for civil conflict, additionally, may not necessarily capture civil wars, but rather short outbursts of violence in unstable countries.

As mentioned, the dataset that accommodates the purposes of the present research in civil wars is the TPI Intrastate Disputes Project. The TPI data provides empirical data on various third party interventions into intrastate disputes from 1946 to 2006 totaling approximately 149 observations of third party interventions into civil conflicts. The data not only provide information detailing the kinds of third party interventions, but also specifies additional variables relevant to the states contributing most of the peacekeeping forces to the region. Detailing where the peacekeepers come from and the kinds of international mandates supporting the mission provides insight into the strength, neutrality, and international impetus behind the peacekeeping mission providing suitable information for study. Peacekeeping observations used in the TPI Dataset are listed in Appendix A.

The TPI dataset has two primary advantages over the other datasets analyzing peacekeeping missions. First, the TPI data expands the number of observations by both including all peacekeeping interventions in civil conflicts rather than just UN sanctioned missions. Including individual state interventions and regional organization interventions into civil conflicts increases the number of observations in the data and permits us to see success based on who initiates the intervention. Second, the TPI dataset redefines when civil conflicts recur. Instead of using a fatality metric to determine recurrences of war, the TPI dataset use a time metric that records each civil conflict as an observation if violence recurs for 10 consecutive days after the civil conflict reaches a stalemate (Mullenbach

2005). These two data alterations expand the number of observable peacekeeping operations and provide a suitable dataset for empirical study.

Although the dataset has been used less frequently than Doyle and Sambanis/Fortna or UCDP/PRIO, the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project dataset includes a significant amount of testable variables, particularly specifics on the composition of the peacekeeping forces involved in the conflict. For instance, among the most relevant variables for the present study is the specification of the "lead nation" in a third party intervention. Because troop contributions and compositions change so frequently, it is difficult to quantify where all of the peacekeepers are coming from, so the data specify which country contributes the most troops to any particular mission which is subject to less frequent change. This variable can be valuable to determine how the third party will be perceived and received by the combatants and local populations. Further specification of this "lead state" could clarify how a peacekeeping mission may be effective through commitment, transparency, and legitimacy. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin (2004: 35-36) assert that peacekeeping operations routinely involve "pivotal states" motivated by roles that they may play as great powers, regional hegemons, concerned neighbors, or former colonial rulers. Identification of the lead state helps specify the historical, political, or geographical relationship that the peacekeepers may serve.

Additionally, the TPI dataset provides information about the organizational origins of the peacekeeping mission. The data delineate whether the peacekeeping mission is sent under the auspices of the UN, a regional IGO, or an individual state. International organizations have the capacity to operate with greater legitimacy than individual states,

have permanent bureaucratic structures that can manage and audit field operations, and provide greater accountability and operate within procedural norms (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004: 41). These characteristics provide credibility of the peacekeeping mission to local leaders and civilians, prospectively alleviating commitment problems among the belligerents. Including such specifications about the peacekeeping contingent can provide insight into how the peacekeepers will operate and be perceived by the belligerents involved in the cessation of conflict.

Describing the Data

To fully understand the dataset as it relates to peacekeeping, some detailed descriptions of the data are necessary. As is common with most data on third party intervention in intrastate disputes, there is variation in the temporal distribution of the peacekeeping missions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the distribution of peacekeeping operations by all actors in the TPI dataset from 1946-2006. The distribution of peacekeeping data clearly indicates that a majority of the peacekeeping missions are concentrated in the 1990's. These data are consistent with prior research findings on peacekeeping operations in both interstate and civil conflicts (Fortna 2003; Heldt and Wallensteen 2005). The data reflect increases in peacekeeping missions during the post Cold War era. Though the number of missions dramatically increased, only a few embarked on a wider scope of complex peacekeeping. Most remained smaller missions aimed at conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004: 76).

Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Peacekeeping Missions-TPI Data



Several explanations account for the increase in peacekeeping missions during the post Cold War era. These explanations center on the UN Security Council becoming a more proactive institution, the P5 members agreeing on foreign policy actions, and more states becoming willing and able participants in peacekeeping operations (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004: 78). The decline of the Soviet Union and rejection of communism in Eastern Europe, enabled the Security Council to pursue more liberal objectives promoting international cooperation and peace, permitting "a world where the United Nations, freed from the Cold War stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders" (Bush 1991). Additionally, increases in globalization and advances in information technology encouraged more western nations to address issues of human rights and suffering across the globe. Greater public awareness of human suffering, fewer

UN constraints due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and an ambitious plan for a liberal UN agenda promoted an upsurge in peacekeeping operations by the UN, other IGOs, and individual states alike (see Walter 2002; Heldt and Wallensteen 2005; Mullenbach 2005; Svensson 2007; Fortna 2008).

The disparity in distribution of peacekeeping operations over time should not cause major problems within the analysis, but rather it will strengthen the argument that effective information sharing and third party neutrality increase the viability of a peacekeeping mission. First, during the Cold War, the UN faced limitations because of the need for P5 unanimity. During the Cold War unanimity was difficult to obtain so UN peacekeeping missions were limited in numbers and scope. Fewer independent states and Regional Organizations intervened as peacekeepers during the Cold War for similar reasons (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005: 24-27). Many civil conflicts during this time may have had Cold War implications that could have provoked wider wars. While there were fewer peacekeeping missions, outside involvement in civil wars may have manifested through covert operations by the US and Soviet Union. The heavy concentration of cases during the post Cold War era are understood to be a result of a more proactive international agenda focused on a liberal peace through political reconciliation (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004: 76-81), rather than an increase in greater international disorder from a lack of superpower management (Waltz 1993). When peacekeepers serve as facilitators of political reconciliation, the credibility and neutrality of the third party in the eyes of the belligerents promote greater understanding and trust among those expected to maintain peaceful relations.

Figure 3.2 illustrates the proportion of dispute types within the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data. When examining the types of disputes that compose the data, 70% account for civil or political strife among various factions within the observed country. The remaining 30% involve independence and secessionist movements within the country. It is within civil conflicts affected by political strife that reconciliation is most important and credible signaling and information transfer is most important. The factions have little trust for one another and must form a single, unified government. Consequently, a third party acting as a trusted intermediary and guarantor of security will be important. Furthermore, secessionist movements seeking recognition from international bodies should be more receptive to outside influence since their acceptance is based on adhering to accepted international practices of state conduct and are susceptible to reputational costs. Secessionist movements may involve separation of belligerents by geographical boundaries and peacekeeping missions involving strong intermediaries could make a difference in getting the belligerents to commit to peace.

Independence movements most likely to favor "all or nothing" outcomes constitute the smallest number of observations within the data (4.3%). Peacekeeping missions are likely to be difficult in such instances, no matter how effective the intermediary might be at relaying information since each of the belligerents will be less likely to negotiate anything less than total victory. Rebel groups may care little about reputational costs associated with recurrences of civil war because rebel groups will more likely seek war as an end (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004).

Figure 3.2: Reasons for Civil War-TPI Data



One final concern about the data is that there may be a geographic bias in the peacekeeping missions deployed from 1946-2006. If any particular region of the world is represented disproportionately in the data, the analysis may be systematically biased in its conclusions. Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of peacekeeping missions in the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data by geographic region. While there are a greater number of missions deployed to sub-Saharan Africa (approximately one third of the total), each of the other regions of the globe are represented in the data and no one particular region is substantially overrepresented. The fewest number of observations are in the Western Hemisphere (10%) and the Middle East/North Africa Regions (11%). This may be reflective of fewer civil conflicts in the regions, as well as indicative of the fewer states within these regions. The regions including Europe and the Former Soviet Union and the

Asia/Pacific Region each constitute approximately 23% of the peacekeeping mission observations. Though there are more peacekeeping missions in sub Saharan-Africa, there is not necessarily a geographic bias in the data.

Figure 3.3: Where Peacekeepers Go-TPI Data



The TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data serve the intended purposes for the research, providing the best dataset using variables that are practical for the current analysis. It expands the number of peacekeeping observations and specifies necessary components about the peacekeeping mission that should prove valuable in the present research. While some time periods and geographic regions appear more often in the data, they do not significantly bias the results of the analysis which remains consistent with other examinations of peacekeeping.

Unit of Analysis: Identifying a Peacekeeping Mission

Each of the observations within the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data represent an identified peacekeeping mission by an outside organization or state in a civil conflict. Each observation consists of a state experiencing a cessation in conflict. Even though conflict has ceased, each of the belligerents distrusts one another, undermining their commitment to peace. This distrust makes recurrences of conflict likely since each of the belligerents should defect from the stalemate as soon as it thinks it can gain a strategic advantage (Filson and Werner 2002).

The TPI Intrastate Dispute Data consider a civil conflict to consist of government security personnel involved in active hostilities with one or more armed opposition groups challenging the sovereignty of the government. These conflicts must occur within the recognizable boundaries of a single state and the civil conflict must have been an active military engagement for no fewer than 10 consecutive days. Consistent with the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset, this unit of analysis uses a low threshold of violence to capture lower scale civil conflicts and uprisings. However, these data omit singular acts of violence which might be included in the UCDP/PRIO data.

If a civil conflict has taken place, it is not necessarily included in the data. Observations in the data only include instances when peacekeepers have been deployed to the observed civil conflict. While other studies have examined if third parties make a difference in the peace process (see Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Fortna 2003, 2008; Regan 2002; Walter 2002), this analysis examines the effectiveness of different intermediaries. There are several conditions that characterize the peacekeeping mission

so that it is not confused with military occupation or third party mediation. To be included in the data, the belligerents must have reached a relatively stable cessation of conflict. This insures that the peacekeepers are less likely to be viewed as a military occupation force seeking to alter the status quo within the conflict. The third parties introduced to the country must involve peacekeepers in the form of security and monitoring personnel so that these forces are not confused with diplomatic envoys meant to negotiate peace in an ongoing conflict. Ultimately, the observed peacekeeping missions in the data serve one or more of the following purposes: maintaining law and order, monitoring or verifying a ceasefire agreement, monitoring or verifying disarmament or demobilization, protecting/delivering humanitarian assistance, providing security to government or civilian facilities, and/or maintaining buffer zones between combatants.

Dependent Variables: Determining When Conflict Recurs

One of the more difficult tasks associated with the peacekeeping literature is determining when civil wars recur and when peace has been successfully implemented. The simplest definition for an existence of peace is a lack of war, but there must also be some capacity for political authority imposed by the state (Vasquez 1993: 264-265). Political authority is particularly important in civil conflicts because factions of rebellious belligerents must in some way be appeased to the point to seek political means to meet their objectives, rather than militaristic means. Once peacekeepers have been sent to an area of relative calm, new outbreaks of violence mark a failed peace.

The TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data define recurrences of violence in internal state disputes as "periods of military hostilities between government security personnel and members of one or more armed opposition groups within a state lasting 10 or more days, regardless of the number of fatalities" (Mullenbach 2005: 539-540). The data include 149 observations of outside interventions in civil conflicts. These observations account for recurrences of conflict both while the peacekeepers were present in the conflict and whether there was a recurrence of conflict one year after the peacekeepers left.[5] The variation in these two dependent variables allow for us to distinguish between mission resulting an artificial cessation of conflict and missions which actually help foster a working political structure that endures even after the peacekeepers are gone.

There are two primary dependent variables. The first dependent variable "Violence during PKO" measures whether or not military hostilities resumed while the peacekeepers were present. This variable measures the effectiveness of the immediate enforcement capability of the peacekeepers. Though peacekeepers are often numerically small and operate under strict rules of engagement, they make resumption of violence costlier for the belligerents. If consistent fighting between the belligerents resumes for at least 10 continuous days, the observation is coded as 1 and the peacekeeping mission is considered a failure according to the data. If there was no observed resumption of violence while the peacekeeping mission was present, the observation is coded 0 and the mission is considered successful because violence did not resume in the civil war.

[5] Variables in the data also distinguish observations in which peacekeepers have not yet left the post conflict area or have not yet been gone for a year. I use this data by incorporating and omitting these observations in separate analyses.

The second dependent variable "Violence after PKO: original data" provides an indication of peacekeeping effectiveness over time. This variable captures the lasting effects of a peacekeeping mission, rather than the immediate modification of the status quo by a third party intermediary. While the first dependent variable indicates a resumption of military hostilities while the peacekeepers were present, the "Violence after PKO: original data" variable indicates a resumption of military hostilities within one year after the peacekeeping mission leaves the post conflict zone. The same standard for resumptions of military hostility is applied to determine the success and failure of the peacekeeping mission in this variable. When there is 10 days of continuous fighting between the belligerents in the year after the peacekeepers leave, the civil war is considered to have resumed. Resumptions of military hostilities are coded 1. When peacekeeping missions aid a government's ability to commit to agreements with aggrieved domestic parties, their impact should not merely focus on ceasing conflict, but also alleviating conditions that promote future conflict.

There must be adequate variation in the dependent variable outcomes within the dataset.[6] The first dependent variable "Violence during PKO" includes 59% of the observations with no resumptions of violence and 41% of the observations with resumptions of violence. The "Violence during PKO" variable shows substantive variation in of successes and failures of peacekeeping operations while they are in progress.

The second dependent variable "Violence after PKO: original data," assessing the viability of peace after the peacekeepers have left, shows less variation. When the data

[6] Variation within the dependent variable is also captured in the Reduction of Error (ROE) statistic used as one of the quality control measures for the empirical model.

are summarized, 58% of the observations show no recurrences of violence, 23% of the observations show recurrences of violence and 19% of the observations do not fall into either category because the peacekeeping mission is listed as "ongoing" in the data.

There are two ways the ongoing data will be addressed in the analysis. First, the analysis omits the 31 observations that are considered ongoing. This results in 71% of the peacekeeping missions with no resumption of violence and 29% resulting in recurrences of violence. A second solution to improve long term analysis of peacekeeping missions involves recoding the outcomes listed as ongoing. This is done by identifying ongoing peacekeeping missions that illustrate a measure of success.

Updating the ongoing peacekeeping missions results in a third dependent variable "Violence after PKO: updated data." If the mission in question results in a 2 year period without a recurrence of violence in spite of the ongoing presence of a peacekeeping mission, it is coded as 0 indicating a successful peacekeeping effort. If the observation with an ongoing peacekeeping mission experienced a recurrence of violence, despite the presence of a peacekeeping contingent from December 2006 to December 2008, it is coded with a 1.[7] The revised data results in 69% of the total observed missions ending peacefully and 31% of the observed missions resulting in a resumption of violence. All of the dependent variables will be tested in the empirical model.

The three dependent variables are listed below for reference and a brief description is provided for each:

[7] The countries/regions that experienced recurrences of conflict in the 2 year period in question include Ossetia/Abkazia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, Cote d'Ivoire, Central African Republic, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. The same definition for recurrences of violence in the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data is used to make these estimations. The determinations derived from researching online databases of international media outlets and are specified in Appendix B.

Violence during PKO: Was there a resumption of military hostilities while the peacekeeping mission was present? (1=yes)

Violence after PKO: original data: Was there a resumption of military hostilities within 1 year after the peacekeeping mission left? (1=yes)

Violence after PKO: updated data: Was there a resumption of military hostilities within 1 year after the peacekeeping mission left and within the last 2 years if the peacekeeping mission is ongoing? (1=yes)

Explanatory Variables: Characteristics of Peacekeeping Missions

Peacekeeping theory suggests that a lasting peace relates to the strength of the peacekeeping mission, the transparency and effective signaling capability of the peacekeeping mission, and the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping strength is measured by the number of peacekeepers sent to the region, the nature of the intervening state, and the location of the intervening state. Transparency in a peacekeeping mission is measured by the existence of treaties signed prior and during the operation and the domestic political institutions of the inventing state. Legitimacy behind a peacekeeping mission is measured by the number of states involved in the mission and the sanctioning of the mission by the UN. While the explanatory variables do not completely capture the theoretical concepts, they provide specific and testable approximations. Finally, some control variables will enumerate possible alternative factors influencing peace in a post conflict area.

Measuring the Strength of the Peacekeeping Mission

The first component of the peacekeeping mission that affects the viability of peace is the collective strength associated with the peacekeeping mission. As a means for coercion, strength can be measured in various ways. Peacekeeping is often militarily weak, military forces usually vary in numerical size, and adhere to strict rules of engagement. Measurements of strength in the empirical model estimate the military capability of the peacekeepers by accounting for the size of the intervening force and the power of the states intervening in the conflict. Measurements also account for the resolve of intervening states, which can help overcome a deficit in capability. The explanatory variables that serve as indicators of strength include the numerical size of the peacekeeping force, the great power or colonial power status of the intermediary, the proximity of the intervening states, and the signaling strength of the intermediary.

Numerically larger peacekeeping forces can strengthen the coercive capability posed by peacekeepers. While the size of most peacekeeping missions varies from month to month, the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project data provide numerical approximations of the total peacekeeping personnel (including support staff) sent to the region. The data account for the wide variation in sizes from smaller observer missions to larger peace enforcement missions. The numerical size (boots on the ground) of peacekeeping missions within the data ranges from 2 to 65,000 peacekeepers.[8]

Additional variables related to strength are based on the estimation of power associated with the primary intervening state. The TPI Intrastate Dispute Project dataset include variables indicating the state contributing the most troops to the peacekeeping

[8] Numerical estimates of the size of the peacekeeping force is included within the TPI Intrastate Dispute Dataset and indicate the number of third party peacekeepers deployed to the civil conflict.

mission. However, it does not account for any individual characteristics of this lead state. Since troop contribution is voluntary, the state contributing the most troops to a peacekeeping mission has a distinct desire to see a permanent end to the fighting. The lead state is making a costly commitment to implement a peaceful resolution and is presumed to be highly motivated to that end.

The lead state data were individually coded to account for the strength in capability of the lead nation. The variables indicating the strength of the lead nation include major power status, colonial relationships, and contiguity. For the dichotomous variable accounting for the military strength of the intervener, a state is considered independently strong if it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Those five countries are among the strongest in terms of military capability during the post World War II era. Additionally, a dichotomous variable for a colonial relationship is provided. The lead country in a peacekeeping mission is coded for a prior colonial presence in the country undergoing civil conflict. Former colonial rulers should have greater historical, cultural, and economic ties to the conflict country, motivating it to permanently end violence. Variables are coded for lead nation contiguity in a peacekeeping mission to the country undergoing civil conflict. A country located near a conflict ridden country will be more willing and able to commit more resources to an unstable neighbor. These observations are coded for contiguity based on land borders or water contiguity consistent with the Correlates of War direct contiguity standard (Stinnett et al. 2002).[9]

[9] See www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2 Data/DirectContiguity/DCV3desc.htm, I use the 400 mile water standard with two notable exceptions of Australia's involvement in the Solomon Islands and East Timor. I code these as contiguous because few, if any, other fall within 400 miles of these island nations. The coding exception affects 3 observations in the data.

Each of these variables provides a nominal indication of the capacity for the lead country to engage in the mission and the potential strength in their resolve for the mission.

The final variable indicating the strength of the intervener relates to mediation. Involvement of a major power in the mediation process amounts to a cheap, but clear signal of intent by a militarily strong state. A major power is, again, defined as a permanent member of the Security Council. These data are included in the original TPI and do not require that a state actually contribute troops to the peacekeeping mission. It only requires that a major power become directly involved in the mediation process.[10] Though this is a weak signal of strength, it still may present an indication of future involvement by a militarily strong country.

The independent variables indicating strength of involvement by third parties are listed below, simplified in their explanation, and reflecting the abbreviations presented in the data tables.

Number of PKs: The approximate number of peacekeepers involved in the mission.

Colonial Power: Was the country contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers to the mission a former colonial occupant in the post conflict region? (1=yes)

Major Power: Was the country contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers to the mission one of the permanent 5 members of the UN Security Council? (1=yes)

Contiguity: Was the country contributing the largest contingent of peacekeepers to the region a contiguous state? (1=yes)

[10] The variable does not account for states that may become diplomatically involved in a dispute through a surrogate country or organization.

Major Power Mediation: Was a major power nation (P5 security council member) involved in the mediation process prior to the cessation of conflict? (1=yes)

Measuring Informational Components of the Peacekeeping Mission

Clarity in signaling and information transfer among the belligerents is trickier to estimate, but the written agreements and the domestic political institutions of the intermediary can help approximate such measurements. I use two specific methods of measurement. First, is the lead state involved in the peacekeeping mission a democracy? Democratic governments are often cited as better arbiters due to their ability to effectively convey information because of the transparent nature of their political institutions (Schultz 1999). Secondly, what treaties have the belligerents entered into either at the cessation of the conflict or while the peacekeeping mission is taking place? Written agreements constitute a transparent signal of the stated intentions of the belligerents to conform to a peace or ceasefire agreement (Fortna 2004). Data within the TPI Intrastate Dispute Project Dataset provide explanatory variables approximating the impact of these informational components on cessations of conflict. Quality of signaling and information transfer by third party intermediaries is measured by the democracy score of the peacekeeping mission and the existences of written agreements prior and during the peacekeeping mission.

Identifying democratic nations within a peacekeeping operation is important. Again, democracy associated with a peacekeeping mission is approximated by the state leading the mission. The most common measurements for democratic institutions involve Polity IV and Freedom House distinguishing existence of both political and civil democratic

principles. Freedom House scores do not cover the necessary pre-1975 time frame, so Polity IV scores ranging from 0-10 (10 being the most democratic and 0 being the least) are sufficient for capturing democracy of the lead nation of the peacekeeping mission. Rather than identifying a threshold for democracy, the Polity IV measurement provides an ordinal distinction for degree of democracy. Peacekeeping missions lead by nations that have a more democratic orientation should be transparent in their institutional composition and foster greater clarity among the parties seeking discourse.

Two additional explanatory variables identify informational clarity by identifying ceasefire agreements among the belligerents. Having a written ceasefire agreement clarifies the desire for peace by the warring factions and specifically enumerates the terms of upholding a resolution. Clarity in written peace agreements promote more peaceful outcomes after war (Fortna 2004). Written agreements are identified in the data in two variables. First, the TPI dataset identify if a written ceasefire agreement was signed prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission. This clarifies the scope of the mission by identifying agreements for the peacekeepers to uphold. Second, the data identify a variable determining if a peace agreement was signed in the presence of the peacekeeping mission. The analysis assumes that a peacekeeping mission had some role in facilitating and providing security guarantees if the treaty was signed during the mission. This provides the most robust measurement of peacekeeping involvement in a peace negotiation.

The explanatory variables measuring the transparency associated with a peacekeeping mission are listed below and reflect the abbreviations presented in the data tables.

Lead State Democracy: What was the democracy score (polity IV) of the country contributing the most troops to the peacekeeping mission? (0-10; 0 least democratic-10 most democratic)

Cease: Was a formal cease fire agreement signed between the belligerents at the cessation of conflict? (1=yes)

Treaty: Was a formal peace treaty signed between the belligerents while the peacekeeping mission took place? (1=yes)

Measuring the Legitimacy Associated with the Peacekeeping Mission

A particularly difficult variable to approximate deals with the legitimacy afforded to a peacekeeping mission. A measurement of legitimacy should take into account the international consensus behind a peacekeeping initiative. International consensus takes the form of granting authorization into to a peacekeeping action. This is accomplished by accounting for UN authorization for a peacekeeping mission and identifying the number of countries contributing peacekeepers to the mission.

UN authorization is not a perfect measurement for international legitimacy, but it is perhaps the best metric for international support for mission. A UN resolution for a peacekeeping operation requires a majority vote among the Security Council and no objection among the P5. Achieving such consensus requires significant collaboration and political will. Consequently, action taken by the Security Council requires significant

international resolve. The TPI dataset provides descriptive explanation for UN sanctioned peacekeeping operations, but the actual coding was done specifically for the purposes of this research and results in a dichotomous explanatory variable for UN authority behind the peacekeeping mission. All missions sanctioned by the UN fall into this category, including missions with personnel contributed from regional organizations. A peacekeeping mission supported by the UN is assumed to have greater backing from the international community than missions without UN backing.

In addition to the UN sanctioning a peacekeeping mission, political will behind a peacekeeping mission can be measured by the number of states willing to make costly signals of resolve. This is measured in the analysis by the number of states committing troops to the mission. While states can have multiple motivations for committing troops to a peacekeeping operation, this measurement estimates that it is a costly signal of international resolve for a peaceful outcome. One or few countries involved in a peacekeeping mission are likely to be viewed as an occupation, stoking nationalistic sentiment among local nationals. Alternatively, breaking a peace when more countries have troops in the area would not endear the belligerents to a larger number of states in the international community. The TPI Intrastate Dispute Data provide the approximate number of nations involved in the peacekeeping mission and though many nations choose to send small contingents of monitors and troops, their actions signal support for the mission, thereby, legitimizing the peacekeeping mission.

The explanatory variables approximating a measurement of legitimacy provided to a peacekeeping mission are listed below and reflect the abbreviations presented in the data tables.

UN Mandate: Was the peacekeeping mission sponsored or authorized by the UN? (1=yes)

Number of States: What was the approximate number of states involved in the peacekeeping mission?

Control Variables

Additional control variables help account for alternative factors influencing peaceful or violent outcomes in the data. First, population may alter the likelihood for peace in post conflict zones. Larger populations are difficult to control and belligerents may be able to shirk in their commitments to peace by hiding in a larger crowd. Second, one side achieving total victory in the conflict may account for a lack of recurrence in violence. Peace has been shown to persist when the victorious side has the capacity to dictate the terms of the post conflict peace (Toft 2010). Third, the duration of the peacekeeping mission may account for a peaceful or violent outcome in the conflict. Successful peacekeeping may simply be a reflection of how long the mission lasts. Without incorporating control variables, the statistical model may omit possibly relevant variables.

The population of the country is coded as a continuous variable based on the size of the country within which the peacekeeping mission is taken place. The population variable is recorded by the country's population size in millions at the beginning date of the peacekeeping mission. The largest country in the dataset was Indonesia (220.6 mil.)

and the smallest country in the dataset consisting of Tonga (.1 mil.). Population data are not included in the original TPI Intrastate Dispute dataset and was added using data acquired from the World Bank Data and Statistics website.[11] It is reasonable to predict that larger populations will be more difficult to control by relatively small contingents of peacekeepers, who usually operate under strict rules of engagement. Also, larger populations are usually reflective of geographically larger states, which may account for an inefficiency of peacekeepers covering all of the parts of the territory undergoing conflict. Bigger populations within a country could lead to more instances of peacekeepers being ineffective to quell popular uprisings.

Achieving military victory by one of the belligerents can also influence the likelihood for peace, once conflict has subsided. It can be expected that if one side achieved a military victory at the conclusion of the civil conflict, they have been able to successfully implement their preferred policies by force. While this may be the case, it is far from a certainty in civil conflicts. In spite of a military defeat, combatants in civil conflict could effectively wage a guerilla campaign or wait until more favorable conditions emerge. Consequently, while the winning side in a civil conflict can impose their will to a greater degree, they cannot ignore the political grievances that initiated the conflict in the first place. As a control variable, military victory is coded as a dichotomous measurement in the data. If the peacekeeping force was introduced in the wake of a military victory by one of the belligerents, the variable is coded 1 and if the peacekeeping mission is deployed in the midst of a stalemate, the variable is coded 0. However, peacekeeping

[11]http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/0,,menuPK:476823~pagePK:64165236~piPK:64165141~theSitePK:469372,00.html

missions are rarely deployed in cases of military victory. Only 5% of the observations involve a military victory.

The duration of the peacekeeping mission is coded as a continuous variable estimating the total number of months that the peacekeeping mission took place. The success of a peacekeeping mission may not be a result of *who* intervenes but rather, how long they are willing to remain there to insure that peace persists. Controlling for the duration of the peacekeeping mission provides that the success of a peacekeeping mission is not a function of how long the peacekeepers are willing to stay in a post conflict zone. The duration of the peacekeeping missions are accounted for in the TPI Intrastate Dispute dataset with the average peacekeeping mission lasting 35 months.

Population: What is the population (in millions) of the country in which the peacekeeping mission is taking place?

Victory: Did either of the belligerents achieve a military victory in the civil conflict, prior to the peacekeeping mission? (1=yes)

Duration: What was the approximate duration of the peacekeeping mission? (Months)

Methodology

STATA statistical software is used to analyze the data and the nature of the dependent variables make logistical regression models the appropriate method for analysis. Since the dichotomous dependent variables record the outcomes in the data, the output of a linear regression line is not accurate. Consequently, Clarify is used in conjunction with STATA to estimate the predicted probabilities of the logistical regression and further specify the impact of the explanatory variables on the outcome variables

(King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Simply put, the initial estimation of the regression line is a straight line represented by the coefficient as an indicator of the slope. However, the regression line, in actuality, is curvilinear and Clarify uses Monte Carlo estimations to simulate the change of the regression line at varying points on the curve. The result of this process is represented by a probability estimate indicated in supplemental tables accompanying each regression table.

The data are presented in multiple combinations of logistical regression models to fully address the statistical relationships among the variables. Each logistical regression table presents the results of a different dependent variable (exception: Table combination 3.1-3.2 & 3.3-3.4 use the same dependent variable but alter the explanatory variable listed below in parenthesis).

The results of the empirical tests are briefly summarized in the next section. Each regression analysis will include a description of the dependent variable being tested, a complete logistical regression table and a table displaying the predicted probabilities for significant variables. A more detailed description of the findings will further explain the empirical results in the following chapters 4-6.

Summary of the Analysis

The logistical regressions models are described below and followed by the corresponding regression tables:

Tables 3.1-3.2: Recurrence of Violence during Peacekeeping Operation (Major Power)

Table 3.1 displays the likelihood for recurrences of conflict while peacekeepers are present. Model 1 tests the variables related to the strength of the intermediary and

includes the variable for major power leadership. Model 2 tests the variables related to the transparency associated with the intermediary. Model 3 tests the variables related to the legitimacy of the intermediary. The Full Model tests all of the variables of interest together to determine the collective impacts of each of the variables and includes the variable for major power leadership. Table 3.2 displays the predicted probabilities for significant variables in Table 3.1. The predicted probabilities in Table 3.2 show the probabilistic effects of the variables on peacekeeping success during a peacekeeping operation.

Table 3.1: Resumptions of Violence during a Peacekeeping Mission (Major Power)

Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities during a Peacekeeping Deployment

	Model 1 Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 2* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 3* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Full Model* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)
Intercept	-.168(.291)	1.21(.554)**	-.199(.280)	1.70(.644)***
Number of PKs	.00001(.00002)			.00004(.00003)
Major Power	-1.17(.525)**			-.954(.628)
Major Power Mediation	2.62(.808)***			2.742(.886)***
Contiguity	-1.08(.466)**			-1.20(.585)**
Lead State Democracy		-.144(.056)**		-.146(.071)**
Cease		-.341(.433)		-1.03(.528)**
Treaty		-1.32(.448)***		-1.11(.529)**
UN Mandate			.784(.462)*	1.13(.640)*
Number of States			-.04(.016)**	-.042(.020)**
Duration	-.002(.004)	.005(.004)	.004(.004)	.00002(.006)
Population	.002(.005)	.001(.006)	.003(.006)	.041(.007)**
Victory	-1.27(1.13)	-1.96(1.13)*	-1.16(1.12)	-1.66(1.271)
Pseudo-r^2	.14	.15	.06	.29
χ^2	25.76	29.73	12.18	51.82
N	141	146	149	133
ROE	.18	.27	.002	.41
Log-Likelihood	-81.849	-83.228	-95.082	-63.916

Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Table 3.2: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables: During a Peacekeeping Mission

Significant Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Full Model
Major Power	-.24			
Major Power Mediation	.44			.39
Contiguity	-.23			-.26
Democratic Lead State		-.31		-.30
Ceasefire				-.23
Treaty		-.28		-.24
UN Mandate			.18	.23
Number of States			-.35	-.48
Victory		-.35		
Population				.42

Tables 3.3-3.4: Recurrence of Violence during Peacekeeping Operation (Colonial Power)

Table 3.3 also displays the likelihood for recurrences of conflict during a peacekeeping mission, but substitutes the major power leadership variable for a colonial power leadership variable. Since there is significant overlap between major powers and former colonial rulers, these variables are tested in separate models. Model 1 tests variables related to the strength of the intermediary substituting the colonial leadership variable. Since the colonial leadership variable is not used in Model 2 and Model 3, these models are identical to Model 2 and Model 3 in Table 3.1. The Full Model tests all of the variables of interest and includes the colonial leadership variable. Table 3.4 displays the predicted probabilities for significant variables in Table 3.3. Table 3.4 shows the predicted change in recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission when the colonial leadership variable is substituted.

Table 3.3: Resumptions of Violence during a Peacekeeping Mission (Colonial)

Substituting Colonial Power for Major Power

Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities during a Peacekeeping Deployment

	Model 1 Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 2* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 3* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Full Model* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)
Intercept	-.278(.288)	1.21(.554)**	-.199(.280)	1.63(.641)**
Number of PKs	.000001(.00002)			.00003(.00002)
Colonial Power	-1.93(.877)**			-1.441(.918)
Major Power Mediation	3.28(1.04)***			3.088(.976)***
Contiguity	-1.01(.463)**			-1.07(.565)*
Lead State Democracy		-.144(.056)**		-.170(.066)**
Cease		-.341(.433)		-.982(.524)*
Treaty		-1.32(.448)***		-.959(.528)*
UN Mandate			.784(.462)*	1.30(.635)**
Number of States			-.04(.016)**	-.044(.021)**
Duration	-.002(.004)	.005(.004)	.004(.004)	.00095(.0057)
Population	.006(.006)	.001(.006)	.003(.006)	.015(.008)**
Victory	-1.44(1.12)	-1.96(1.13)*	-1.16(1.12)	-1.69(1.257)
Pseudo-r^2	.14	.15	.06	.29
χ^2	26.84	29.73	12.18	52.36
N	141	146	149	133
ROE	.18	.28	.002	.46
Log-Likelihood	-81.312	-83.228	-95.082	-63.644

Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Table 3.4: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables:

During a Peacekeeping Mission (Included Colonial)

Significant Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Full Model
Colonial Power	-.30			
Major Power Mediation	.50			.45
Contiguity	-.21			-.23
Democratic Lead State		-.31		-.36
Ceasefire				-.21
Treaty		-.28		-.20
UN Mandate			.18	.28
Number of States			-.35	-.47
Victory		-.35		
Population				.48

Tables 3.5-3.6: Recurrence of Violence after Peacekeeper Departure (Original TPI Data)

Table 3.5 displays the results of the logistical regression models testing recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data. Testing the variables using the original dataset presents a baseline for peacekeeping success with the original TPI data. However, these data contain numerous observations in which the peacekeeping missions are ongoing. Similar to the previous tables, Model 1 tests the independent variables related to the strength of the intermediary, Model 2 tests the independent variables related to the transparency of the intermediary, and Model 3 tests the independent variables related to the legitimacy of the intermediary. The Full Model cumulatively tests all of the independent variables for peacekeeping success. Table 3.6 displays the predicted probabilities for significant variables in Table 3.5. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 test the likelihood for recurrences of violence based on the intermediary using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data.

Table 3.5: Recurrences of Violence after a Peacekeeping Mission (Using Original TPI Data)

Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities within 1 Year after the Withdrawal of a Peacekeeping Mission (D&M Dependent Variable)

	Model 1 Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 2* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 3* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Full Model* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)
Intercept	-.636(.282)**	.610(.552)	-.624(.283)**	.881(.635)
Number of PKs	.00001(.00002)			.00002(.00002)
Colonial Power	-.635(.618)			-.045(.810)
Major Power Mediation	.803(.642)			.242(.750)
Contiguity	-.480(.413)			-.643(.524)
Lead State Democracy		-.096(.055)*		-.101(.064)
Cease		-.068(.441)		-.406(.517)
Treaty		-1.87(.480)***		-2.41(.590)***
UN Mandate			-.783(.457)*	-1.13(.630)*
Number of States			.014(.014)	-.033(.021)
Duration	.006(.005)	.010(.005)**	.004(.004)	.012(.006)*
Population	.009(.006)	.009(.006)	.012(.008)*	.020(.011)*
Victory	.758(.791)	-.360(.820)	-.194(.349)	-.828(1.00)
Pseudo-r^2	.06	.18	.05	.26
χ^2	12.12	35.31	10.39	48.31
N	141	146	149	133
ROE	.13	.28	.13	.42
Log-Likelihood	-90.647	-82.432	-96.303	-67.188

Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Table 3.6: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables
Likelihood for a Resumption of Violence after Peacekeepers have Left (1 year)

Using Original TPI Data

Significant Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Full Model
Colonial Power				
Major Power Mediation				
Contiguity				
Democratic Lead State		-.21		
Ceasefire				
Treaty		-.38		-.48
UN Mandate			-.15	-.22
Number of States				
Victory				
Duration		.48		.22
Population			.42	.21

Tables 3.7-3.8: Recurrence of Violence after Peacekeeper Departure (Revised TPI Data)

To fully account for ongoing peacekeeping missions, Table 3.7 displays the results of the logistical regression models testing the updated dependent variable on long term peacekeeping success. The updated dependent variable uses an alternate definition of peacekeeping success to account for peacekeeping missions that remain ongoing. The new dependent variable classifies ongoing peacekeeping missions that remain ongoing and have not experienced violence for 2 years from 2006 as successful peacekeeping missions. Models 1-3 independently test the strength, transparency, and legitimacy of an intermediary on long term peacekeeping success. The Full Model in Table 3.7 tests all of the variables of interest using the updated dependent variable. Table 3.8 displays the predicted probabilities of statistically significant variables from the models in Table 3.7. Tables 3.7 and 3.8 display the likelihood for recurrences of violence after a peacekeeping mission using the updated dependent variable.

Table 3.7: Recurrences of Violence after a Peacekeeping Mission
Updated TPI Data (Accounting for Ongoing Missions)

Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities within 1 Year after the Withdrawal of a Peacekeeping Mission

	Model 1 Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 2* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 3* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Full Model* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)
Intercept	-.509(.307)*	.813(.552)	-.448(.287)	1.25(.629)**
Number of PKs	.00002(.00002)			.00003(.00002)
Colonial Power	-.222(.460)			.095(.610)
Major Power Mediation	.917(.626)			.327(.732)
Contiguity	-1.02(.478)**			-1.37(.603)**
Lead State Democracy		-.147(.056)***		-.145(.071)**
Cease		.305(.459)		.051(.525)
Treaty		-1.95(.551)***		-2.17(.635)***
UN Mandate			-.553(.471)	-.646(.674)
Number of States			-.0008(.015)	.0013(.0205)
Duration	-.009(.006)	-.006(.005)	-.005(.005)	-.005(.005)
Population	.005(.005)	.004(.006)	.007(.006)	.013(.008)*
Victory	.110(.815)	.251(.823)	-.223(.375)	-.621(.990)
Pseudo-r^2	.06	.18	.03	.26
χ^2	10.84	33.69	5.65	43.99
N	141	146	149	133
ROE	.02	.17	.00	.31
Log-Likelihood	-83.622	-75.617	-91.549	-63.117

Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Table 3.8: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables
Likelihood for a Resumption of Violence after Peacekeepers have Left (1 year)
Updated TPI Data

Significant Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Full Model
Major Power				
Major Power Mediation				
Contiguity	-.19			-.31
Democratic Lead State		-.34		-.29
Ceasefire				
Treaty		-.31		-.42
UN Mandate				
Number of States				
Victory				
Population				.37

Tables 3.9-3.10: Recurrence of Violence after Peacekeeping Mission (Omitting Ongoing)

To be sure that the ongoing peacekeeping missions are consistent with the rest of the data, Table 3.9 tests long term peacekeeping success omitting ongoing missions from the analysis. If the results of Table 3.10 show substantially different results from the previous models on long term peacekeeping success, it indicates that the statistical results are being driven by ongoing peacekeeping missions in the data. In Table 3.9, Models 1-3 display the independent effects of strength, transparency, and legitimacy in the intermediary and the Full Model displays the cumulative effects of the independent variables of interest on recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers. Table 3.10 displays the predicted probabilities for statistically significant variables in Table 3.9. To insure that ongoing peacekeeping missions are not altering the results of the logistical regression models, Tables 3.9 and 3.10 show the likelihood for recurrences of violence while omitting ongoing peacekeeping operations.

Table 3.9: Recurrences of Violence after a Peacekeeping Mission (Omitting Ongoing Missions)

Likelihood for the Resumption of Military Hostilities within 1 Year after the Withdrawal of a Peacekeeping Mission

	Model 1 Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 2* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Model 3* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)	*Full Model* Estimated Coefficient (Robust SE)
Intercept	-.509(.307)*	.850(.663)	-.342(.333)	1.41(.744)*
Number of PKs	.00002(.00002)			.00005(.00003)*
Colonial Power	-1.37(.885)			-.334(1.02)
Major Power Mediation	1.17(.765)			.650(.868)
Contiguity	-1.44(.615)**			-1.81(.803)**
Lead State Democracy		-.119(.062)*		-.123(.078)
Cease		.019(.511)		-.488(.609)
Treaty		-2.56(.801)***		-2.58(.751)***
UN Mandate			-.257(.524)	-.121(.751)
Number of States			-.017(.021)	-.015(.029)
Duration	-.022(.011)**	-.011(.012)	-.011(.009)	-.018(.016)
Population	.006(.006)	-.004(.007)	.005(.008)	.016(.011)
Victory	.450(1.04)	.033(.997)	-.265(.441)	-.507(1.15)
Pseudo-r^2	.11	.22	.04	.32
χ^2	15.08	32.39	5.89	42.42
N	113	118	123	107
ROE	.03	.14	.03	.36
Log-Likelihood	-61.573	-56.391	-72.276	-44.895

Notes: * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Table 3.10: Predicted Probabilities for Significant Variables
Likelihood for a Resumption of Violence after Peacekeepers have Left (1 year)
Using TPI Data (Omitting Ongoing Missions)

Significant Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Full Model
Number of Peacekeepers				.18
Major Power Mediation				
Contiguity	-.20			-.35
Democratic Lead State		-.27		
Ceasefire				
Treaty		-.39		-.49
UN Mandate				
Number of States				
Duration	-.36			
Population				
Victory				

Findings

The findings are reported through three descriptive mediums. First, the results of the empirical tests for each of the variables of interest are described based on their statistical relationships to the dependent variables. The logistical regression models determine if the independent variables have a statistically significant impact on the dependent variables and predicted probabilities measure that impact. Predicted probabilities are generated using CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). Second, the statistical results are interpreted in the context of theory on peacekeeping. If the statistical results are consistent with theory on peacekeeping, that relationship will be explained. If the statistical results are inconsistent with theory on peacekeeping, possible explanations for the inconsistency will be examined.

The results of the empirical tests show mixed findings regarding the success of peacekeeping operations both during and after a peacekeeping mission. Variables associated with the strength and legitimacy associated with the intervener show mixed evidence that the explanatory variables promote a lasting peace in civil wars. However,

the variables associated with transparency and signaling credibility in an intermediary provide the best evidence of permanently reconciling the warring factions in civil conflict. Though the explanatory variables are approximations of the larger theoretical arguments, they present a clearer picture of how peacekeeping promotes resolutions in civil conflicts.

Chapter 4: Evaluating the Strength of the Intervening Third Party

Stronger intermediaries should reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence in civil conflicts. Theory suggests that a third party peacekeeping force with strong "will and skill" to subdue violence in a civil conflict will be more successful. Strong intermediaries in a civil conflict escalate the costs among the belligerents for defecting from a cessation in conflict. However, once the intermediary is removed, if a bargaining imbalance remains, conflict will recur. Consequently, peacekeepers relying on strength to subdue the belligerents should be successful while peacekeepers are present, but not after they leave.

Five explanatory variables test the strength of the intervening peacekeeping mission. The measurements accounting for the strength of the intermediary include the number of peacekeepers involved in the mission, the leadership of the peacekeeping mission by major powers, former colonial rulers, or contiguous nations. Furthermore, if a major power is involved in the mediation process, it may present a signal to the belligerents that escalation of involvement is a possibility. Troop commitment presents a visible signal of engagement. Large numbers of peacekeepers makes conflict escalation for the belligerents a potentially costly decision. Major powers, former colonial states, and contiguous states have greater military capabilities at their disposal, making recurrences of violence a costlier pursuit for the belligerents. These states have a significant motive in maintaining peace. In addition, the involvement of a major power in the mediation process presents a tangible but "cheap" signal to the belligerents that more coercive involvement of a strong third party is a possibility. These explanatory variables

describe characteristics of a strong intervening peacekeeping force and illustrate the influence of strength on peaceful outcomes while the force is on the ground and after the force exits the region.

Number of Peacekeepers: More Boots on the Ground

Table: 4.1: Impact of the Number of Peacekeepers on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Number of Peacekeepers (Model 1)	.00001	.00001	.00002	.00002
Number of Peacekeepers (Full Model)	.00003	.00002	.00003	.00005* (Pr=.18)

The first explanatory variable related to the strength of the intervening peacekeeping force examines the impact that the size of the peacekeeping force has on recurrences of violence. Peacekeeping forces are composed of troops contributed by individual states. While the size of the force is often related to the tasks the force intends to accomplish, states determine the overall size of the mission since troop contributions are based on what states are willing to contribute. The voluntary nature of the forces usually makes the overall numbers suboptimal for the duties of the force (Diehl 2008: 87).

It is expected that when more peacekeepers deploy to a post conflict zone, the international community is presenting a tangible signal of resolve toward ending the civil conflict. In addition to stronger capabilities for coercive force, having more troops on the ground provides a substantial monitoring capability. Since the size of the peacekeeping force deployed to the region represents both a tangible commitment of capability and an

intangible commitment of resolve by the international community to ending the civil conflict, larger peacekeeping operations should make recurrences of conflict less likely.

What the Models Indicate

The empirical tests show more peacekeepers do *not* necessarily reduce recurrences of violence in civil wars. The statistical tests cannot conclusively determine that larger peacekeeping missions generate a reduced probability of recurrences of violence in civil conflict states. This finding remains true both before and after the peacekeepers leave the host country. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 (H_{1a} and H_{1b}) cannot be accepted. The data do not suggest that a larger peacekeeping force will insure a reduction of military hostilities while present, nor do the data suggest that larger peacekeeping contingents reduce conflict over the long term after the peacekeepers leave.

The lack of statistical evidence linking numerically larger peacekeeping missions to reductions in recurrences of violence during the mission can be found in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3. Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 analyze the likelihood for recurrences of conflict while a peacekeeping mission is present within a country, the only difference being that Table 3.1 includes a major power as the primary contributor to the peacekeeping mission and Table 3.3 includes a former colonial ruler as the primary contributor of personnel to a peacekeeping mission.[12] Model 1, the reduced model for strength, in Table 3.1 and Table

[12] Initially, the variables accounting for "Major Powers" and "Colonial Powers" were included in the same logistical regression analyses, but were highly correlated with one another (Thank you to Dan Morey for this observation). Consequently, the analyses are done separately and displayed in Table 1 and Table 3 to show that there are no significant differences in the outcomes of the tests, but when both variables are the model there are issues of collinearity. In the following logistical regression analyses only the "Colonial Power" variable is used in order to simplify the models and eliminate redundancy.

3.3 each show a coefficient of .00001 that is not statistically significant (p>.10). The Full Models in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3, further, do not indicate that the troops numbers deployed to the area significantly impact recurrences of violence. Table 3.1 shows a positive coefficient of .00004 and Table 3.3 shows a positive coefficient of .00003. Neither variable is statistically significant (p>.10). The models do not indicate that larger peacekeeping missions in the context of troop strength make violence more or less likely with any statistical certainty during a peacekeeping mission.

Furthermore, the size of the peacekeeping force does not have a statistically significant impact on recurrence of violence after the peacekeepers depart. Tables 3.5-3.10 illustrate the results of the logistical regression showing no statistically significant impact between the size of the peacekeeping force and recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers. The logistical regression models displayed in Table 3.5 use the original dependent variable in the Dixon and Mullenbach dataset and indicate that there is no statistical relationship between the size of the peacekeeping force and the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of the peacekeepers. In Model 1 of Table 3.5, there is a positive relationship (.00001) between peacekeeping numbers and recurrences of violence, but it is not statistically significant (p>.10). Furthermore, the Full Model in Table 3.5 also shows a positive coefficient (.00002) that is not statistically significant (p>.10). The Dixon and Mullenbach data do not indicate that there is a statistically significant relationship between troop strength and recurrences of violence in civil conflict within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers.

However, analysis of the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions may show different results.

Table 3.7 displays the logistical regression results when the explanatory variables are tested against the updated dependent variable that incorporates ongoing peacekeeping missions. The results in Table 3.7 indicate that the size of the peacekeeping force still does not significantly affect the likelihood recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers using the updated data. Both Model 1 and the Full Model show positive coefficients of .00002 and .00003, respectively, and are not statistically significant ($p>.10$). The logistical regression model using the updated dependent variable remains consistent with the previous models, showing that troop number does not significantly alter the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of the peacekeepers.

To insure that ongoing missions are not distorting the data related to long term peacekeeping success, Table 3.9 displays the results of the logistical regression model when observations with ongoing missions are removed from the data. When ongoing peacekeeping missions are omitted from the data, the size of the peacekeeping mission does have a statistically significant impact on recurrences of violence within one year of the departure of the peacekeeping mission, but only in the Full Model. Consistent with previous models, Table 3.9 Model 1 indicates a positive coefficient of .00002 but is not statistically significant ($p>.10$). However, the Full Model displays a positive coefficient of .00005 and is statistically significant. In this logistical regression model, larger numbers peacekeepers produce an increased likelihood for recurrences of violence within one year

of the departure of the peacekeepers. The corresponding predicted probability in Table 10 estimates that larger peacekeeping forces increase the likelihood for recurrences of violence by 18%. The Full Model in the logistical regression omitting the observations with ongoing peacekeeping missions displays the only indication that the size of the peacekeeping force is statistically significant in recurrences of violence within one year after the peacekeepers leave.

Interpretation

The results of the logistical regression analysis on troop commitment and peacekeeping success suggest that bigger does not necessarily mean better when it comes to peacekeeping. The number of peacekeepers committed to a peace operation is, perhaps, the most basic metric imaginable for estimating the strength of a military operation. Yet, the data do not suggest that sending more troops lead to reductions in recurrences of violence. In each of the regression models, there is no connection to reductions in violence during a peacekeeping mission. For the most part, the results were not statistically significant. However, one model indicated that larger troop commitments lead to higher probabilities of recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of peacekeepers.

Why might increased troop levels lead to *increases* in violence after the peacekeepers leave? Peacekeepers and belligerents may be engaging in a waiting game. Greater numbers of peacekeepers may be sent to the most hostile disputes and belligerents may be waiting for the peacekeepers to leave before they reassert themselves violently. This idea is weakly supported in the data because there is only a

recurrence of conflict when ongoing missions are omitted from the analysis. Only in the Full Model omitting ongoing missions do large peacekeeping numbers lead to increases in recurrences of violence. Peacekeepers may be reluctant to leave situations they deem hostile. This finding may provide evidence supporting Werner and Yuen (2005), who argue that significant outside commitment to civil conflict disrupts the structural balance of a dispute. Consequently, disputants are more likely to become hostile when the impediment to the civil war is removed.

Overall, it was expected that more troops would yield a reduced likelihood for violence while they are present yet the logistical regression models do not show that troop numbers produce statistically significant results. As a result, Hypothesis 1 (H_{1a} and H_{1b}) cannot be accepted based on the statistical findings. More peacekeepers may alleviate humanitarian disasters in civil conflicts, but more peacekeepers do not reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence in civil conflicts.

Major Powers & Colonial Powers: Strength in Capability and Connection

Table: 4.2: Impact of Colonial and Major Powers on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Colonial/Major Powers (Model 1)	-1.93**/-1.17** (Pr=-.30/-.24)	-.635	-.222	-1.37
Colonial/Major Powers (Full Model)	-1.441/-.954	-.045	.095	-.334

States may involve themselves in a civil conflict because of historical colonial ties. States may also believe that a strong international stature makes them responsible for the

promotion of peaceful outcomes in civil war. By examining the effects of a major global power or a former colonial ruler on post conflict peace, the analysis adds another dimension of intervention strength. If the strength of an intermediary is an important factor when imposing peace, states with a preponderance of power and states with a prior colonial history should be better equipped to persevere in their mission to secure peace. The analysis of the data shows that the involvement of a former colonial state or major power does not consistently reduce the likelihood for the recurrences of violence in a civil conflict.

Involvement of a major power or former colonial ruler is determined by the majority of the peacekeeping contingent. If most of the peacekeepers come from either a former colonial ruler or a P5 member of the UN Security Council, the mission is considered to be led by a nation with a considerable motive and capacity to restore order. A permanent member of the Security Council likely carries a strong military capability and a former colonial ruler should be resolute in its mission to secure peace. Since colonial powers might also be permanent members of the Security Council, these variables are tested separately, illustrating their similar effects in the model.[13] The effects of the involvement of a major power and a colonial power similarly demonstrate their effects on peaceful outcomes in post civil conflict peacekeeping missions. However, neither variable consistently correlates to reductions in recurrences of violence.

What the Models Indicate

[13] When these variables are included in the same model, colinearity obscures the overall effects of the statistical analysis. Consequently, Tables 1 and 3 illustrate the effects of these variables separately and subsequent analyses show only the colonial power variable in the analyses. Logistical regression results showed identical effects with the major power variable.

The effect of major power and colonial involvement during a peacekeeping mission is illustrated in Table 3.1, 3.3 and summarized in Table 4.2. Table 3.1, Model 1 shows that when a major power leads a peacekeeping operation, there is a statistically significant reduction in violence ($p<.05$) as indicated by the negative coefficient (-1.17). The predicted probabilities estimated using Clarify and shown in Table 3.2, Model 1, determine the predicted reduction in violence to be about 24%. However, when this variable appears in the Full Model in Table 3.1, the major power variable is no longer statistically significant ($p>.10$). Including all of the explanatory variables of interest reduce the statistical effect of major powers reducing recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission.

Intervention into civil wars by former colonial rulers exhibit similar results. Table 3.3 substitutes a colonial power for the major power variable. Table 3.3, Model 1 shows that the involvement of a former colonial ruler in a peacekeeping mission reduces recurrences of violence, indicated by a negative coefficient (-1.93) and is statistically significant ($p<.05$). Table 3.4, Model 1 illustrates the predicted change in reducing recurrences of violence at 30%. However, this relationship ($p>.10$) also disappears in the Full Model of Table 3.3 on peacekeeping success. Like the involvement of major powers in a peacekeeping operation, former colonial powers leading a peacekeeping mission only statistically reduces recurrences of violence if the other variables of interest are not included in the logistical regression model.

Former colonial rulers and major powers who intervene in a civil war likely have the capability and desire to intervene again, should violence break out after their

departure. This possibility should keep belligerents from returning to war. Table 3.5, Table 3.7, and Table 3.9 display the results of the logistical regression models distinguishing the impact of peacekeeping led by a former colonial ruler on recurrences of conflict within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers.[14] However, the logistical regression models show that colonial powers leading a peacekeeping mission do not have a statistically significant impact on recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave. Tables 3.5, 3.7 and 3.9 all show that involvement of colonial powers does not impact recurrences of violence.

Interpretation

When strength in a peacekeeping mission is approximated by the lead state contributing troops to the mission, there is limited evidence that peace will persist while the peacekeepers are present. However, after the peacekeepers leave the region, it is less likely that violence will recur. Peacekeeping missions led by major powers or former colonial rulers only support Hypothesis 2 (H_{2a} and H_{2b}) in some cases. Major power and former colonial ruler involvement shows some impact on peace during the mission, as indicated in Table 3.1 (Model 1) and Table 3.3 (Model 1), but results are less conclusive when all of the explanatory variables are included in the Full Models and in the logistical regression models determining recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave. Recurrences of conflict cannot be considered more or less likely after a third party has exited a post conflict zone. These findings similarly support Fortna's (2008: 118) statistical

[14] To avoid redundancy, the remaining logistical regression models examining recurrences of violence after the departure of the peacekeepers only use the colonial power variable. Separately, logistical regression models using the "major power" variable produced similar results to those displayed in Tables 3.5, 3.7, and 3.9 using the colonial variable.

evidence using alternate data showing "no consistent relationship between wars in former colonies of the P5 and the stability of peace." Consequently, the increased role that smaller states have shown toward peacekeeping in recent years (Neack 2005) may not necessarily lead to more intractable civil wars.

Contiguity: The Importance of Proximity

Table: 4.3: Impact of Peacekeeping Missions Led by Contiguous Countries on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Contiguity (Model 1)	-1.01** (Pr=-.21)	-.480	-1.02** (Pr=-.19)	-1.44** (Pr=-.20)
Contiguity (Full Model)	-1.07* (Pr=-.23)	-.643	-1.37** (Pr=-.31)	-1.81** (Pr=-.35)

The final explanatory variable related to the strength of the intervening third party involves the peacekeeper's geographical proximity to the conflict area. When the state leading the peacekeeping mission is contiguous to the state undergoing conflict, greater resources can be employed and contiguous states have stronger motives to quell violence. Neighboring states carry the burdens of refugees and illicit cross border activities when contiguous states undergo civil conflict. Not only does proximity give contiguous states the capacity for involvement, but also the motivation for preserving a peaceful resolution. The data show that involvement of contiguous countries has distinct advantages in pacifying a state undergoing internal conflict.

What the Models Indicate

When a contiguous state leads a peacekeeping mission, the data suggests that the recurrences of conflict are less likely during a peacekeeping mission and after the peacekeepers leave. Multiple models show that when a majority of peacekeepers come from a state that is contiguous to the conflict state, there is a significant likelihood that violence will not recur during and after the peacekeeping mission. The cumulative findings are summarized in Table 4.3.

Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 display the results of logistical regression models testing recurrences of violence during the peacekeeping mission. Table 1 Model 1 shows that leadership of a peacekeeping mission by a contiguous state has a negative and significant effect on recurrences of violence (-1.08; $p<.05$). The Full Model illustrates a similarly negative effect on recurrences of violence that is also significant (-1.20; $p<.05$). When the colonial power variable is substituted for the major power variable in the logistical regression, the effect of contiguous peacekeepers is consistent with the results in Table 3.3. These results provide support that peacekeepers from neighboring countries reduce the recurrence of violence during a peacekeeping mission. The predicted probabilities listed Table 3.2 and Table 3.4 show the estimated reduction in war recurrence when contiguous states lead a peacekeeping mission. The estimated reduction in recurrence of violence is between 23% and 30% in the models.

When missions are led by peacekeepers from countries that are contiguous to the conflict state, there is additional evidence that violence will be less likely to recur after the peacekeepers leave. Table 3.5 illustrates the results of the logistical regression models testing the effects of contiguous peacekeepers on the recurrence of violence within 1 year

after the peacekeepers leave using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data. Table 3.7 and Table 3.9 display results of the models indicating that contiguity reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of the peacekeepers. Table 3.7 shows that when peacekeepers come from contiguous countries there is a negative and significant impact ($p<.05$) on recurrences of violence using the updated dependent variable. Both Model 1 and the Full Model produce negative coefficients (-1.02 and -1.37, respectively) that are statistically significant ($p<.10$). Table 3.8 indicates that peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries reduce the likelihood of the recurrence of violence by 19% (Model 1) and 31% (Full Model). When the updated dependent variable is incorporated into the data, intervention by contiguous countries shows a reduction of the recurrence of violence after peacekeepers leave.

In the logistical regression models using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data omitting observations with ongoing missions, Table 3.9, peacekeepers from contiguous countries have a statistically significant and negative impact on recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure. Table 3.9, Model 1 shows a negative coefficient (-1.44) and the Full Model also displays a negative coefficient (-1.81), with both results statistically significant ($p<.05$). The predicted probabilities in Table 10 show that peacekeeping missions led by contiguous countries reduce the likelihood for violence within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers by 20% (Model 1) and 35% (Full Model). The results show that peacekeepers from contiguous countries promote long term peace.

Interpretation

The results of the logistical regression analyses suggest that when peacekeeping missions are led by states that neighbor the conflict state, violence is less likely to recur in the civil war. In the models examining recurrences of conflict while peacekeepers are present, the contiguity variable is statistically significant with the expected negative relationship. The models accounting for recurrences of violence within 1 year after the peacekeepers depart also show that peacekeepers from contiguous countries reduce violence, but only in the models using the updated data. The results of the regressions using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data do not produce statistically significant results. However, when accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, the models show a reduction in the likelihood for recurrences of violence.

Theory predicts that the involvement of a contiguous state in a peacekeeping mission represented a proxy for strength and resolve in an intermediary, dissuading belligerents from resuming violence in post civil conflict environments. These findings support Hypothesis 3 (H_{3a} and H_{3b}), postulating that peacekeepers from contiguous countries decrease the likelihood for resumptions of violence in civil conflicts. The results across the models using the updated dependent variables suggest that there is a negative impact on recurrences of violence among belligerents when contiguous states take leadership roles in peacekeeping missions during (H_{3a}) and after (H_{3b}) the presence of peacekeepers.

Despite the assumption that peacekeepers from contiguous countries bring more resources to bear and can limit the sanctuary for combatants in a civil war, there may be other factors at play. Neighboring countries may have a deeper history in the conflict

prior to their involvement as peacekeepers or contiguous states may provide cultural appeals to belligerents and citizenry in a conflict state. Cultural explanations suggest that the strength in contiguous peacekeepers comes from their ability to persuade rather than coerce. Identifying the specific cultural role that makes neighboring countries better peacekeepers may be better suited for a qualitative research design and could be further examined in future research by looking at the effectiveness of peacekeeping and ethnic ties.

Major Power Mediation: Talk is Cheap and Potentially Harmful

Table: 4.4: Impact of Mediation by a Major Power on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Maj Power Mediation (Model 1)	3.28*** (Pr=.50)	.803	.917	1.17
Maj Power Mediation (Full Model)	3.088*** (Pr=.45)	.242	.327	.650

Theory suggests that when a major power involves itself in the mediation of a civil dispute, the third party presents a signal toward the belligerents that it seeks a resolution to the conflict and could consider a costlier escalation by intervening with more peacekeepers. Hypothesis 4 postulates that major power mediation should reduce violence both during (H_{4a}) and after (H_{4b}) a peacekeeping mission. Major powers possess the capability for intervention and the involvement of a major power in the mediation process signals their desire for resolving the conflict. Despite this contention, the data

show that when a major power attempts to mediate a civil conflict, that conflict is *more* likely to recur during the peacekeeping mission.

What the Models Indicate

When major powers get involved in the mediation of a civil war, the data show that the recurrence of violence is more likely while peacekeepers are present. The data presented in Table 3.1, 3.3 and summarized in Table 4.4 show the impact of major power mediation on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping operation. While a peacekeeping mission is on the ground, major power mediation makes the resumption of military hostilities *more* likely in both logistical regression models found in Table 3.1 and Table 3.3.

In Table 3.1 Model 1, major power mediation has a positive coefficient (2.62) and is statistically significant ($p<.01$). The Full Model in Table 1 also shows a positive coefficient (2.742) and is statistically significant ($p<.01$). Statistical significance in both models supports the finding that major power mediation increases the likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission. The predicted effects of major power mediation on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission are shown in Table 3.2: 44% in Model 1 and 39% in the Full Model. This indicates that major power involvement in mediation while a peacekeeping mission is present makes the resumption of violence in civil conflict more likely.

The logistical regression models in Table 3.3 replacing major power leadership for the leadership of a former colonial state show similar results. The results for major power mediation during a peacekeeping operation are similar to the previous model. Table 3.3

Model 1 shows a positive coefficient for major power mediation (3.28) that is statistically significant ($p<.01$). The Full Model in Table 3.3 confirms the positive relationship between major power mediation and recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission indicated by a positive coefficient (3.088) that is statistically significant ($p<.01$). Table 3.4 illustrates the predicted probabilities from this logistical regression models showing that major power mediation increases the likelihood for violence by 50% in Model 1 and 45% in the Full Model.

Despite the strong statistical relationship between recurrences of violence and mediation by a major power during a peacekeeping operation, this relationship disappears in the models examining recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of peacekeepers. The models illustrated by Table 3.5, Table 3.7, and Table 3.9 show that there is no statistically significant relationship between major power mediation and the likelihood for peace after peacekeepers leave the region. The results of the logistical regression models using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data are shown in Table 3.5. Model 1 indicates a positive coefficient (.803), but it is not statistically significant ($p>.10$). The Full Model in Table 3.5 also displays a positive coefficient (.242) and is not statistically significant ($p>.10$). The logistical regression results using the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing missions is displayed in Table 3.7. Model 1 and the Full Model both show a positive coefficients (.917 & .327, respectively) for the effects of major power mediation, but neither value is statistically significant. Similar results are shown in Table 3.9, displaying the logistical regression results of recurrences of violence when ongoing peacekeeping missions are omitted from the data.

Model 1 shows a positive coefficient (1.17), as does the Full Model (.650), but neither coefficient is statistically significant ($p<.10$). Because these values were not statistically significant, no further analysis is relevant for their predicted probabilities.

Interpretation

Hypothesis 4 (H_{4a} and H_{4b}), which predicts that major power mediation would curtail violence, is not validated. This hypothesis is unsupported by the data and contradicted by the results. The conclusion that can be drawn from the data is that involvement of a major power in mediating a civil war increases the likelihood for violence while peacekeepers are present. However, the logistical regression models do not show that major power mediation affects recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers. This is a peculiar finding, but may suggest that the "cheap signals" associated with signaling intent through mediation, even in the presence of a major international power, may not convince the belligerents that an intermediary is serious about physically intervening in the conflict.

However, an alternative story may relate to major power mediation and omitted variable bias. The involvement of a major power mediator during a peacekeeping mission may increase recurrences of violence if the major power is favoring either the government or the rebel groups during the negotiations. The Mullenbach and Dixon data do not specify whether or not the mediator represents a government or rebel bias by the major power mediator, but Svensson (2007) suggests that biased mediators affect prospects for peaceful resolutions in civil conflicts because the favored combatant makes more demands when negotiating a settlement. Consequently, the positive coefficients,

indicating a resumption of violence, may result from the security guarantees by peacekeepers and an expectation that outside support favors the rebel or government factions, which Svensson shows to exacerbate commitment problems in civil conflicts. Additional research examining this question may clear up the possibility of biased mediation as an omitted variable.

Chapter 5: Evaluating an Intermediary's Signaling Capability

Successful peacekeeping in civil wars requires that a third party be effective at serving as a conduit for credible information between the conflicting factions. Variables measuring an intervening third party's capacity for credible transmission of information between the belligerents include the involvement of democracies in the peacekeeping mission, the existence of a ceasefire agreement between the belligerents prior to the peacekeeping operation, and the development of a permanent peace treaty during the peacekeeping mission. Theory suggests that these explanatory variables should reduce recurrences of violence during and after a peacekeeping mission. The data suggest that variables related signaling credibility and information transparency have a substantial impact on reductions in recurrences of violence in civil conflicts. Promoting credible and transparent information by an intermediary promotes peaceful outcomes in civil conflicts.

Democratic Lead State: Transparency and Trust in Domestic Institutions

Table: 5.1: Impact of Peacekeeping Missions Led by Democratic Countries on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Democracy of Lead Country (Model 2)	-.144** (Pr=-.31)	-.096* (Pr=-.21)	-.147*** (Pr=-.34)	-.119* (Pr=-.27)
Democracy of Lead Country (Full Model)	-.170** (Pr=-.36)	-.101	-.145** (Pr=-.29)	-.123

Democratic states should be more effective at relaying credible signals due to open and transparent institutional government structures, more definitive signaling methods, and stronger commitments of resources in their foreign policies. These factors

clarify foreign policy decision making and reduce commitment problems between belligerents (Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2008). The data, summarized in Table 5.1, support this theoretical contention by demonstrating that states with democratic institutions lead to better peacekeeping outcomes in civil conflicts.

Since democracies are measured through Polity IV scores, the Democracy measurement takes into account the *degree* of democracy, rather than a nominal distinction that the lead state exceeds a threshold to be considered a democracy.[15] States with higher Polity IV values contain transparent political institutions with separations of political powers and greater civil liberties allowing for open public discourse. Since Polity IV values are determined by the openness of the political structures, the Polity IV metric provides a more direct measurement of the institutions associated with democracy. Greater institutional transparency should present effective signaling capabilities and promote credible commitments in foreign policy. Previous research further shows that democratic institutions decrease dispute durations in interstate wars (Bennett and Stam 1996; Russett and Oneal 2001). However, when applied to civil conflicts, intervention by democratic states have a less successful track record when implementing democratic institutions in post conflict states (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006).

The data support the theory that democratic institutions promote successful peacekeeping outcomes. The data show that there is a significant and negative relationship between democracy score of the lead nation and recurrences of violence in

[15] Most of the explanatory variables are dichotomous variables with predicted probabilities determining likelihood estimates of the explanatory variables changing from their minimum values to maximum values (0-1). However, the use of Polity IV scores containing a 0-10 scale determine predicted probability changes in value of the explanatory variable holding values constant at their mean.

the conflict state. The more transparent the state and societal institutions of the leadership in the peacekeeping mission, the less likely that violence will recur during and after the peacekeeping mission.

What the Models Indicate

The logistical regression models suggest that states with democratic institutions leading peacekeeping missions reduce recurrences of violence in civil conflicts. Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 show that higher democracy scores significantly reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence during the mission. Tables 3.1 and 3.3 indicate that the impact of democracy score is a consistent indication of reductions in violence during a peacekeeping mission. The impact of democracy is determined by the predicted probabilities found in Table 3.2 and Table 3.4. The predicted impact of democratic peacekeepers is a 31% reduction in the likelihood for recurrences in violence in Model 2 and a 30% reduction in the Full Model. The reduction in likelihood for violence is based on predicted change in the y coordinate as the x coordinate moves from its minimum to maximum value.[16] There is a 36% reduction in violence in the Full Model of Table 4 identifying the impact of democracy during a peacekeeping mission when colonial lead state is substituted for a major power lead state. The statistical results provide sound evidence that democratic peacekeepers reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission.

In the statistical models examining the impact of democracy after the peacekeepers depart, there is additional evidence suggesting that democratic

[16] Since the variable is ordinal, values are held at their mean when estimating this predicted probability using CLARIFY.

peacekeepers reduce recurrences of violence in civil conflicts. Table 3.5 shows the results of the logistical regression model using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data. In Model 2, increased democracy score reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence and the coefficient (-.096) is statistically significant ($p<.10$). The predicted probability for this impact on recurrences of violence, listed in Table 3.6 Model 2, shows a decline of 21% when democratic states intervene. Despite a statistically significant result in Model 2, the Full Model of the logistical regression does not show statistically significant results for democracy. In the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, there is more limited statistical evidence showing that democratic peacekeepers promote peace after the departure of the peacekeepers.

The results are robust across models using the updated dependent variable. The results of the logistical regression using the updated dependent variable are listed in Table 3.7 and show that democratic peacekeepers reduce the likelihood for violence after the departure of peacekeepers. Table 3.7 (Model 2) shows a negative coefficient (-.147) for democratic peacekeepers and is statistically significant ($p<.01$). The negative relationship is further supported by the Full Model in Table 3.7, showing a negative coefficient (-.145) that is statistically significant ($p<.05$). The predicted probabilities, found in Table 3.6, display the expected impact of democracy on recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers using the updated dependent variable. The predicted probabilities show a 29% (Full Model) and a 34% (Model 2) decline in the likelihood for a resumption of violence. The logistical regression model updating the dependent variable, accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, shows that peacekeepers with higher

democracy scores reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of a peacekeeping force.

The regression models in Table 3.9, omitting ongoing peacekeeping missions, display results comparable to the original Dixon and Mullenbach data. In Model 2 of Table 3.9, democracy is shown to have a negative effect (-.119) on recurrences of violence and is statistically significant ($p<.10$). The predicted probability, listed in Table 3.10 (Model 2), estimates the impact of democracy to be a 27% reduction in the likelihood for recurrences of violence. The significance of this relationship disappears in the Full Model using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data and in the models omitting observations with ongoing peacekeeping operations. While there is evidence that peacekeeping missions led by more democratic nations influence peace after the departure of the peacekeepers, this result is only statistically consistent in the models when ongoing missions are taken account in the logistical regression models.

Interpretation

The analyses support the theory that democratic peacekeepers are more effective at maintaining peace. Most of the models indicate that higher democracy scores of the lead peacekeeping nation reduces the likelihood for recurrence of violence in civil conflicts. Democratic peacekeepers significantly reduce the likelihood for a recurrence of violence during the peacekeeping mission with the results in each of the models displaying statistically significant coefficients in the expected negative direction. The statistical results also show that democratic peacekeepers reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave, although these statistical results have

the strongest impact using the updated dependent variable. Using the updated dependent variable, accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, the results show that peacekeeping missions led by democratic nations produce the best results for peacekeeping, even after the departure of the peacekeepers.

The results support Hypothesis 5 (H_{5a} and H_{5b}). When peacekeepers come from democratic countries, civil wars are more likely to end peacefully and remain peaceful. While the original Dixon and Mullenbach data sporadically show the impact of democratic peacekeepers, the updated dependent variable consistently shows reductions in the likelihood for recurrences of violence. The negative impact that democratic peacekeepers have on resumptions of violence is illustrated by Figure 5.1. The x-axis indicates the democracy score of the nation leading the peacekeeping mission (0=least democratic, 10=most democratic) and the y-axis indicates the predicted probability for a recurrence of violence in the civil conflict. Figure 5.1 shows that when peacekeeping missions are led by democratic countries, there is a reduced likelihood for violence during and after the peacekeeping mission.[17] Given these findings, one can conclude that greater democratic institutions help peacekeepers implement a lasting settlement in civil wars. Institutional transparency is the theoretical explanation supporting the results of the logistical regression models.

The empirical models suggest that democratic institutions produce the expected outcomes in peacekeeping missions; however, the results prompt further questions.

[17] Figure 5.1 shows the predicted decline in likelihood for recurrences of violence in the Full Models of the logistical regression models. The predicted change in violence during the peacekeeping operation uses the model with the "colonial" variable (Table 3.3) and the predicted change in violence after peacekeepers depart uses the updated dependent variable, accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions.

Further investigation can clarify the value of democracy in peacekeeping. Perhaps, democracies have institutional advantages that allow for better collaboration with other nations or democracies are recognized as better enforcers of international law. Some clues might come from the results in the models updating the ongoing missions. When ongoing missions are recoded using the updated dependent variable, peacekeeping missions lead by democracies promote significant reductions in violence. However, using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, these results do not meet the threshold for significance in the Full Models on recurrences of violence. Democracies may contain institutional advantages that promote continuing a peacekeeping mission until it is appropriately ready to conclude. Discussion in democratic institutions and open public debate about the merits of withdrawal may force leaders to insure that withdrawal of a peacekeeping operation is done at a time when long term success is most likely. Since the duration of the peacekeeping operation is a control variable, democracies do not appear to be waiting out a resolution, but rather withdrawing from the mission at a time when recurrences of violence are unlikely or forcing domestic political actors to assume responsibility for security in the post conflict state. [18]

[18] From my personal experiences in Afghanistan, I can say that political transparency in NATO countries sent strong signals to Afghan political officials about withdrawal of NATO forces in 2011-2012. This forced Afghan political officials to prepare for withdrawal of forces by organizing their domestic coalitions and placating the local Afghan public who legitimized their authority.

Figure 5.1



Ceasefire Agreement: Getting it in Writing before the Mission Starts

Table: 5.2: Impact of Ceasefire Agreements before a Peacekeeping Mission on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Ceasefire (Model 2)	-.341 (Pr=-.21)	-.068	.305	.019
Ceasefire (Full Model)	-.982* (Pr=-.21)	-.406	.051	-.488

The ceasefire variable approximates cooperation and negotiation prior to the arrival of the peacekeeping mission. The existence of a ceasefire provides better clarity in the negotiated terms of conduct between the belligerents. This variable says less about the impact of the peacekeepers and more about the importance of information, communication, and the intent among the disputants. On one hand, a written ceasefire lays out the terms associated with an agreement and clarifies the expectations within a

cessation of conflict. On the other hand, it also may be a tactic to buy time to allow for one or more of the belligerents to rearm and remobilize forces. Despite these alternative conditions, a ceasefire agreement can be a valuable tool for peacekeepers. Having a ceasefire agreement provides the peacekeeping force with a directive to uphold as well as an expectation of behavior between those involved in the conflict. Consequently, having a ceasefire agreement prior to the imposition of the peacekeeping force should make achieving peace more a more realistic prospect.

What the Models Indicate

Theory suggests that a ceasefire agreement should reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence; however, the data do not support the theory. The results are summarized in Table 5.2. When considering the impact of a ceasefire agreement on resumptions of violence while the peacekeeping mission is present, the results of the logistical regressions are mixed. A ceasefire agreement among the belligerents reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence during the peacekeeping mission, but the statistical evidence does not link a ceasefire agreement to recurrences of violence after the peacekeepers leave.

Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 display the results of the logistical regression models on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission. In Table 3.1 Model 2, the logistical regression model shows the existence of a ceasefire agreement produces a negative coefficient (-.341) toward recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission, but this relationship is not statistically significant. However, this relationship is statistically significant ($p<.05$) in the Full Model of Table 3.1, with the existence of a

ceasefire agreement showing a negative coefficient (-1.03). The predicted probability for this value, shown in the Full Model in Table 3.2, estimates that a ceasefire agreement reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission by 23%. This result is consistent in the Full Model substituting the colonial variable for the major power variable in Table 3.3. The Full Model in Table 3.3 shows that a ceasefire agreement is negatively related to recurrences of violence (-.982) and is statistically significant ($p<.10$). The predicted probability for this effect is shown in the Full Model of Table 3.4 and indicates that a ceasefire agreement reduces recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission at a similar rate of 21%. Ceasefires between the belligerents before the arrival of the peacekeepers improve the conditions for peacekeepers by reducing the likelihood for recurrences of violence.

Despite a negative and statistically significant relationship on reductions in violence during a peacekeeping mission, ceasefire agreements do not appear to have the same effect after the peacekeepers leave the conflict country. Remaining models in Tables 3.5-3.10 show that the existence of a ceasefire agreement does not statistically impact recurrences of violence. Ceasefire agreements negotiated between the belligerents appear to provide a framework for a peacekeeping mission to maintain peace, but do not improve the capacity for the belligerents to cooperate after a peacekeeping mission departs.

Interpretation

Ceasefire agreements appear to statistically reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict, but only during a peacekeeping mission. When the belligerents enter into a

ceasefire agreement and peacekeepers arrive, the data show that there is a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence. However, this statistical relationship dissolves upon the departure of the peacekeeping force in each of the models testing recurrences of violence after the departure of the peacekeepers. Why the discrepancy?

Several contentions can be made about the value of a ceasefire agreement. There is a possibility that a ceasefire agreement can be used as bait for a peacekeeping contingent by the belligerents. Belligerents may sign a ceasefire hoping that it might coax a peacekeeping mission to the area, allowing for time and protection while they remobilize and improve their bargaining position. This would imply that belligerents enter into a ceasefire without any intention of honoring it. However, the results do not show that violence is *more* likely after the departure of the peacekeeping force; only that prolonged peace is no longer statistically significant. This finding adds credibility to Werner and Yuen (2005), who argue that third party interventions only promote a pause in civil conflicts.

Hypothesis 6 cannot be accepted in its entirety. Hypothesis 6 contends that ceasefire agreements will reduce the likelihood for violence while peacekeepers are present and within a 1 year of their departure. During a peacekeeping operation, the data show that ceasefires statistically reduce the likelihood for violence, supporting H_{6a}. However, the data show no statistical impact of ceasefires after the peacekeepers leave the region which does not support H_{6b}.

The results prompt additional questions about how ceasefires work to alleviate violence. They may operate as an informational component to enumerate the intentions

of the warring factions or ceasefires may exacerbate future conflict by giving time for the factions to remobilize. However, peacekeeping missions must do more than prevent violence. Effective peacekeeping missions must actively engage the disputants in dialogue and implement a program of Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR). The variable on treaty negotiation attempts to capture some of this relationship among peacekeepers and the belligerents. Rather than examining a variable that identifies a negotiation that took place prior to the arrival of the intermediary, the treaty negotiation variable captures successful negotiations that occur during the peacekeeping mission.

Treaty Negotiation: Actively Working out a Resolution

Table 5.3: Impact of Negotiating a Treaty during a Peacekeeping Mission on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Treaty (Model 2)	-1.32*** (Pr=-.28)	-1.87*** (Pr=-.38)	-1.95*** (Pr=-.31)	-2.56*** (Pr=-.39)
Treaty (Full Model)	-.959* (Pr=-.20)	-2.41*** (Pr=-.48)	-2.17*** (Pr=-.42)	-2.58*** (Pr=-.49)

Ceasefire agreements prior to the arrival of peacekeepers can be instruments promoting clarity of intention among the belligerents and reduce violence. However, the effectiveness of the peacekeeping mission itself is an important component of evaluating an intermediary as an arbiter of conflict resolution. A peacekeeping mission must actively engage the belligerents in a peaceful discourse and negotiate a more permanent peace treaty as well as implement it. Consequently, a proxy for a mission's capacity for negotiation, communication, and information relay can be shown by a successful treaty

negotiation during the peacekeeping mission. The Dixon and Mullenbach data include this variable as a dichotomous variable identifying the successful negotiation of a treaty *during* the peacekeeping operation. The results of the logistical regression show that a treaty negotiation is strong predictor for reductions of violence in post conflict areas. Since the existence of a ceasefire agreement prior to the arrival of a peacekeeping mission has little impact on peacekeeping success, this variable tests peacekeeping outcomes of a treaty when it is negotiated in the presence of a peacekeeping force.

What the Models Indicate

The logistical regression models show that when a peace treaty is signed during a peacekeeping mission, there is a reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence during the peacekeeping mission. Table 3.1 shows that a treaty signed during a peacekeeping operation has a negative impact on recurrences of violence (-1.32; -1.11) and is statistically significant ($p<.05$) and Table 3.2 shows a 24-28% reduction in the likelihood for a recurrences of violence. The negative and significant impact remains in the model with the colonial power variable substituted in the model ($p<.10$). Together, the models offer support that when peacekeepers actively promote the negotiation of a treaty among the belligerents, there is a significant reduction in the likelihood for recurrences of conflict.

The results of the logistical regressions further show that treaty negotiation has an impact on reducing the likelihood for violence after peacekeepers depart. The results of the regression models are displayed in Tables 3.5-3.10. Table 3.5 shows the effect of treaty negotiation on recurrences of violence after the departure of peacekeepers using

the original Dixon and Mullenbach data. Table 3.5 shows a negative relationship (-1.87; -2.41; p<.01) with treaty negotiation reducing the likelihood for violence after the peacekeeping mission by 38%-48%. The data suggest that when a peace treaty is negotiated while peacekeepers are present, there is a significant likelihood for peace after the peacekeepers leave.

Using the updated dependent variable, Table 3.7 shows that treaties signed during the peacekeeping mission have a negative (-1.95; -2.17; p<.01) impact on recurrences of violence after peacekeepers depart and Table 3.8 shows this impact to be a 31%-42% reduction in the likelihood for a recurrence of violence. Using the updated dependent variable, treaties negotiated in the presence of a peacekeeping force display a negative impact on recurrences of violence after the departure of a peacekeeping mission.

The results in the models that omit observations with ongoing peacekeeping missions further support the contention that signing a treaty during a peacekeeping mission reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence after the departure of peacekeepers. Table 3.9 displays the regression results when ongoing peacekeeping missions are omitted from the analysis. Signing a treaty during a peacekeeping mission has a negative (-2.56; -2.58; p<.01) and significant (p<.01) impact on recurrences of conflict after the departure of peacekeepers, reducing the likelihood for recurrences of violence by 39%-49%. This finding further supports the previous models showing that when peacekeepers are instrumental in negotiating a peace treaty, civil wars are less likely to recur.

Interpretation

The results of the logistical regression clearly indicate that when treaties are signed during a peacekeeping operation, there is a reduced likelihood that violence will recur while peacekeepers are present and after they are gone. The assertion behind this finding is that a peacekeeping force facilitates credible information among the belligerents during the mission which persists afterward. While the findings do not necessarily specify that the peacekeeping mission serves as the integral cog, the negotiation of a treaty during a peacekeeping mission has a greater impact on the prospects for peace than if the belligerents construct a ceasefire on their own.[19] Further research could specifically examine how treaty negotiations differ in the presence of a third party versus when they occur independently.

What does this mean for peacekeeping? Treaties are more successful in securing a peace when they are signed in the presence of peacekeepers. Having a neutral intermediary makes for a better channel when transferring information than when the belligerents independently negotiate an agreement. The findings of the regression models support Hypothesis 7 (H_{7a} and H_{7b}). When a ceasefire exists prior to the arrival of a peacekeeping force, there is little evidence that violence will cease permanently, but when treaties are negotiated in the presence of peacekeepers, there is a reduced likelihood that violence will recur. These findings support the conclusion that

[19] The Third Party Intervention data by Dixon and Mullenbach also include a variable indicating the existence of a permanent peace treaty before the imposition of a peacekeeping mission. Separately, an analysis was done examining the impact of the existence of a permanent peace treaty prior to the imposition of a peacekeeping mission, yielding similar results when using the "ceasefire" variable. For the sake of parsimony, only the "ceasefire" variable was used since it accounts for peace treaties in addition to ceasefire agreements.

peacekeepers who maintain a dialogue and bargaining process in the context of treaty negotiation reduce recurrences of violence during and after a peacekeeping mission.

Chapter 6: Evaluating the Importance of Legitimacy

The two explanatory variables used to determine international legitimacy include a UN sanctioned operation and the number of states contributing personnel to the mission. The existence of a UN mandate and a large number of states involved in the mission approximate a more committed international community to a peacekeeping mission. The empirical models indicate that peacekeeping missions estimated to be more legitimate based on their support by international bodies do not lead to reductions in the likelihood for recurrences of violence. While theory suggests that collective international pressure legitimizing a peacekeeping mission should deter belligerents from resuming violence, the findings demonstrate some mixed results and do not show legitimacy of a peacekeeping mission to be a significant factor for peacekeeping success.

UN Mandate: Providing an International Blessing

Table 6.1: Impact of a UN Mandate on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
UN Mandate (Model 3)	.784* (Pr=.18)	-.783* (Pr=-.15)	-.553	-.257
UN Mandate (Full Model)	1.30** (Pr=.28)	-1.13* (Pr=-.22)	-.646	-.121

A UN mandated peacekeeping mission should provide legitimacy to the mission and improve the prospects of peace both during and after the deployment of peacekeeping troops. As a large intergovernmental organization with few nationalistic goals and the global leader in peacekeeping operations, the UN can enter the fray of a

tenuous peace and alleviate local concerns of territorial occupation and colonial rule. The near universality of membership in the UN makes it an appropriate representative of the international community. Additionally, the humanitarian goals behind UN missions promote international goodwill toward the institution. The regression models display some statistically significant results, but are mixed in their outcomes both before and after the peacekeepers leave the area. Overall, the results show that a UN led mission leads to a *greater* likelihood for recurrences of violence while peacekeepers are present. This unexpected finding requires further investigation. However, the results also show that UN authorization for peacekeeping missions lead to a reduced likelihood of violence 1 year after peacekeepers depart, although there is some discrepancy across models. The results are summarized in Table 6.1.

What the Models Indicate

The logistical regression models analyzing recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission show that UN mandated missions are more likely to result in resumptions of violence. Table 3.1 shows that a UN mandate is positively related (.784/1.13/1.30; $p<.10$, $p<.05$) to recurrences of violence while peacekeepers are present by 18%-28% (Tables 3.2 and 3.4). These findings are peculiar since UN mandated missions were expected to reduce recurrences of violence as stated in Hypothesis 8 (H_{8a}).

Though the models show that UN missions are more likely to see violence during a peacekeeping mission, there is non-robust evidence that UN missions reduce the likelihood for violence after the departure of the peacekeeping mission (H_{8b}). The models in Table 3.5, using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, shows peacekeeping missions

with a UN mandate are less likely to experience a recurrence of violence within 1 year after the departure of the peacekeepers by 15% to 22% (-.783/-.033; p<.10). Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, peacekeeping missions with UN mandates are less likely to experience violence in the year after the departure of the peacekeepers, but the updated dependent variable is the preferred measurement.

The findings using the updated dependent variable, accounting for ongoing missions does not match original Dixon and Mullenbach data on UN mandated missions. The updated variable indicates that UN missions do not reduce recurrences of violence after the departure of peacekeepers. Furthermore, the regression models omitting ongoing missions report similar results. When ongoing peacekeeping missions are removed from the data, the regression models displayed in Table 3.9 show negative coefficients that are not significant. When accounting for ongoing missions, the results of the logistical regression analysis are unsupportive of the effect of a UN mandate after the departure of peacekeepers. Consequently, the data cannot conclusively state that UN mandated missions reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict within 1 year of the departure of the peacekeepers.

Interpretation

Most of the logistical regression models produce results that are not statistically significant, although the models using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data show that UN mandated missions reduce violence after a peacekeeping mission. These findings using a UN mandate to account for a greater degree of legitimacy associated with a peacekeeping mission offers some insight into the effect of a UN sanctioned mission on

the prospects for lasting peace. While UN mandated missions more often result in violence while the peacekeepers are present, this relationship may be a result of the UN taking part in more hostile peacekeeping missions with a lower probability of success.

In the longer term perspective, UN mandated missions show little evidence to support the theory. Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, UN mandated missions appear to be more effective in promoting peace after the peacekeepers leave the area. However, when the ongoing missions are taken into account by either excluding them from the analysis or altering the coding rules examining ongoing missions, UN mandated missions do not lead to reductions in violence over the long term. Consequently, H_{8b} cannot be accepted.

International Involvement: Bandwagon Legitimacy

Table 6.2: Impact of More States Participating in Peacekeeping Mission on Recurrences of War

Variable	During PKO	After a PKO (Original Data)	After a PKO (Updated Data)	After a PKO (Omitting Ongoing)
Number of States (Model 3)	-.04** (Pr=-.35)	.014	-.0008	-.017
Number of States (Full Model)	-.044** (Pr=-.47)	-.033	.0013	-.015

Another indication that a peacekeeping mission has legitimacy involves the number of states willing to commit personnel to the mission. States can have varying rationale to commit peacekeepers to a post conflict area. Some states may be seeking a cost effective method to train their soldiers by minimizing the amount of harm to which they are subjected. Other states may have self interested motives related to securing

borders or vital trade relationships. However, considering motives in the aggregate, it would be unlikely that a leader would be willing to pay a political price for an unpopular commitment of peacekeeping personnel. Generally, one would expect that when more countries send troops to a conflict area, they do so out of a sense of obligation and political desire toward resolving the conflict. The regression results show that more countries contributing to an operation only lead to reductions of violence while peacekeepers are present. The likelihood for recurrences of violence after peacekeepers leave is less clear because none of the models show coefficients that are statistically significant. The results are summarized in Table 6.2.

What the Models Indicate

The empirical models show that increased state involvement reduces the likelihood that violence will recur during a peacekeeping mission. Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 present the results of the logistical regression models examining the impact of increased state involvement in a peacekeeping mission on recurrences of violence during peacekeeping operations. Table 3.1 shows negative coefficients (-.04/-.042; $p<.05$) that are statistically significant and Table 3.2 estimates a 35% to 48% reduced likelihood for recurrences of violence while peacekeepers are present.[20] The Full Model in Table 3.3, replacing the major power variable with the colonial lead state variable, further, supports the argument on added state involvement. Table 3.3 shows that state involvement in a peacekeeping mission has a negative (-.044) and significant ($p<.05$) impact on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission by 47% (Table 3.4).

[20] This estimation in predicted probabilities is used keeping the variable "Number of States" held constant at its mean value. Consequently, the reduction in likelihood for violence (35-48%) describes movement from the mean value to the maximum value of the variable.

The regression models examining long term effects of peacekeeping do *not* show that increased state involvement has an effect on recurrences of violence in any of the empirical analyses. Table 3.5 using the original dependent variable shows that state involvement does not have an effect on recurrences of conflict in any of the models. Additionally, the regression models using the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions display similar results and show no significant relationships in the data (Table 3.7). Furthermore, when omitting ongoing missions from data, the results of the logistical regression models still do not indicate significant results (Table 3.9).

Interpretation

The results of the regression models show that state involvement reduces the likelihood of recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission, but does not have an impact on recurrences of violence after the departure of peacekeepers. The finding that more states sending troops to a peacekeeping mission reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence indicates that greater international attention and recognition dissuades warring factions from accepting the reputational costs of breaking a ceasefire. While this finding supports the notion that greater international legitimacy toward a peacekeeping mission adds influences the mission's capacity to deter violence, this argument is only valid while peacekeepers are present. The impact of greater legitimacy, as approximated through state participation, is only evident while the peacekeeping mission is taking place and Hypothesis 9 can only partially be accepted. Therefore, H_{9a} is validated while H_{9b} cannot be accepted.

This mixed finding may be a result may lend greater support to the notion that the international legitimacy surrounding a peacekeeping operation motivates peace among the warring factions. Since the international community is more likely to be focused on a peacekeeping mission while troops are on the ground, the belligerents are most likely to face international pressure to maintain a ceasefire. A breach of the peace is probably most likely when the international community is not paying sufficient attention to the post conflict state and least likely when more countries around the world have a stake in the fight. One would expect the international community to focus more attention on a conflict during the deployment of international personnel.

Figure 6.1



The case that a more legitimate international peacekeeping effort plays a significant role in post conflict peace cannot completely be accepted and requires further exploration. Peacekeeping missions sanctioned by the UN are more likely to see violence during their missions. Greater international involvement in a peacekeeping mission (indicated by state participation) promotes less violence during the mission, but not after

peacekeepers leave. Why there is such disparity between these variables while peacekeepers are present and after they leave attests to a more complicated relationship between UN and state involvement? Further investigation could clarify the nature of these relationships.

Control Variables: What Else Might Influence Peace?

Control variables added to the model insure that possible alternative explanations for recurrences of violence are taken into account within the regression models. If any alternative explanations prove to weigh heavily on the results of the models, the explanatory capacity of the variables of theoretical interest will be reduced. The primary control variables that provide alternative explanations for durable peace in peacekeeping missions deal with the duration of the peacekeeping mission, the population size of the country undergoing conflict, and the existence of a conclusive military victory by one side in the civil conflict. None of the control variables consistently show a significant impact on the dependent variables related to recurrences of violence in post civil conflict areas. Inclusion of the control variables adds credibility to the significance of the explanatory variables that show impacts on recurrences of violence.

Duration: Waiting Out a Resolution

The duration control variable measures the length of time (in months) that the peacekeeping mission was present in the conflict. It is reasonable to expect that peacekeeping missions with longer duration may simply be waiting out the peace process in spite of any active engagement with the local populations. Over time, a peaceful status quo may emerge and the animosity of the militant factions within the country will

dissipate. Alternatively, lengthy peacekeeping missions might also put peacekeepers in harm's way for added opportunities for acts of violence against them. The duration of the peacekeeping mission is intended to mute a possible selection effect of the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping missions may just be sticking around until they think that peace is likely to persist. Despite an expectation that longer peacekeeping missions should reduce the onset of renewed violence, the regression models suggest that there is little evidence of any relationship between the duration of a peacekeeping mission and the likelihood for recurrences of violence.

What the Models Indicate

The regression models do not indicate that the duration of a peacekeeping mission has significant effects on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping operation. In Tables 3.1 and 3.3, each of the logistical regression models display coefficients that are not statistically significant. The logistical regression models examining the effect of duration of a peacekeeping mission on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission do not indicate any relationships that are statistically significant.

In the models focusing on recurrences of violence within one year after the peacekeeping mission leaves the post conflict country, evidence indicating that the duration of the peacekeeping mission impacts the prospects for peace is more mixed. Taken in its entirety, the analysis indicates that little statistical relationship exists between duration of a peacekeeping mission and the likelihood for recurrences of violence. However, Table 3.5 displays positive coefficients (.010, .012; $p<.05$, $p<.10$) indicating that longer missions increase the likelihood for recurrences of violence within 1 year after the

peacekeepers leave by 48% in Model 2 and 22% in the Full Model. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.2.

In the regression models accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions, the statistical relationship between the duration of a peacekeeping mission and the likelihood for recurrences of violence within 1 year of the departure of peacekeepers is no longer evident. Table 3.7, which includes the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing missions, does not display coefficients in any of the models that are significant. Table 3.9 shows a negative coefficient (-.022) that is statistically significant ($p<.05$); however, when additional variables are introduced into the model, this relationship disappears. Collectively analyzed, the logistical regression models accounting for ongoing missions show that the duration of a mission is not statistically related to recurrences of violence within 1 year after peacekeepers depart.

Interpretation

The results in the logistical regression models indicate that the duration of the mission is not substantially influencing the recurrences of violence in the data. Interestingly, there is little relationship between the duration of a peacekeeping mission and the resumption of military hostilities while the peacekeeping mission is present within the country. One would expect that the longer a peacekeeping mission maintains its presence within a tenuous cessation of conflict, the more opportunities there would be to experience resumptions in violence. Positive coefficients in the logistical regression models indicating increased likelihood for recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping

operation show that duration may offer these opportunities; however, these coefficients are not consistent in the models to draw extensive conclusions.

Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, the regression models show that longer peacekeeping operations lead to increases in violence within the year after the departure of peacekeepers. There are several explanations that may account for this finding. If a peacekeeping mission is staying in a country for a longer period of time, it might be an indication that there is a major problem in the negotiation processes between the belligerents. The lengthy duration of peacekeeping missions may be an indication in the data that little progress is being made in conflict resolution. Furthermore, the data may indicate that peacekeeping missions with an extended duration produce a dependency on an intermediary for order. Once the intermediary is removed, resumptions of conflict are more likely.

The regression models using the modified data, displayed in Table 3.7 and Table 3.9, show that increases in the likelihood for resumptions of violence based on the duration of the mission are no longer significant. These subsequent findings indicate that when ongoing missions are taken into account, the duration of the peacekeeping missions do not impact recurrences of conflict.

Figure 6.2



Population: More People, More Problems?

Peacekeeping success may also be influenced by the population size of the country.[21] Post conflict states with larger populations will likely be more difficult to control, given the relatively small contingents of peacekeepers that are sent to states undergoing conflict. Larger populations can also serve as an approximation for greater ethnic fractionalization with the country undergoing conflict. Both of these factors related to the population size of the country lead one to believe that more populous countries will be more likely to endure protracted civil conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). The data show that the size of the country makes recurrences of violence more likely.

What the Models Indicate

[21] The original Dixon and Mullenbach data set does not include a population size variable, which was added using the World Bank population estimates for the year in which the peacekeeping mission *began* in the conflict state.

Larger populations in the conflict state appear to make recurrences of conflict more likely, but only in the Full Models of the regressions. Table 3.1 and 3.3 mostly display results that are not significant. However, the Full Model in Table 3.1 shows that population increases (.041; p<.05) recurrences of conflict during a peacekeeping mission by 42%.[22] This finding is further supported by the Full Model in Table 3.3 which also shows that population has a positive (.015; p<.05) impact on recurrences of conflict during a peacekeeping mission (48% increase). The finding that population size influences recurrences of conflict is further supported in the models examining violence after the departure of peacekeepers. Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, Table 3.5 shows a positive relationship between population size and recurrences of violence within 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers, but only in select models. Using the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing peacekeeping missions only shows that population size has a positive relationship (.013) on recurrences of conflict in the Full Model (Table 3.7). When ongoing peacekeeping missions are omitted from the data, the results of the logistical regression models are no longer significant.

Interpretation

In each of the logistical regression models on recurrences of violence during a peacekeeping mission, the Full Models show that large populations are more likely to endure recurrences of violence. These findings suggest that during a peacekeeping operation larger populations are more difficult to monitor and prevent from returning to civil conflict. Upon the departure of peacekeepers, population size also accounts for

[22] Population data is kept constant at its mean when calculating predicted probabilities.

recurrences of violence according to 2 of the 3 Full Models. Figure 6.3 summarizes the statistical effect of population size on recurrences of conflict.

The statistical relationship between population size and recurrences of civil conflict suggests that peacekeeping missions should recognize that populous states are more difficult to monitor. The population size of the country undergoing civil conflict is not one of the explanatory variables of interest, but the regression models show that population size influences recurrences of conflict. The importance of population size indicates that further research should take the size of a country's population into account when analyzing the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.

Figure 6.3



Victory: To the Victor Go the Spoils?

It is reasonable to predict that the prospects for peace are directly related to the outcome of the civil war. If one side achieves an overwhelming victory, the bargaining capability of the defeated side is essentially nonexistent. As a result, the victorious side

has the capacity to dictate and impose the terms of the settlement toward the defeated side. Despite military victory, there remains a possibility of violence. Military victory does not necessarily erase the social and political discontent of the defeated side, nor does it insure carte blanche dictation of the post conflict settlement for the victorious side. Though a military victory does not guarantee post conflict peace, it should make the bargaining terms of the settlement easier to negotiate since the defeated side loses significant capacities to negotiate its preferences. In theory, military victory should make peace a more likely outcome; however, the findings do not support this argument.

What the Models Indicate

The regression models do not show much support that victory by one side reduces the likelihood that violence will recur. During a peacekeeping mission, the control variable for military victory is only significant in Model 2 of Tables 3.1 and 3.3. Table 3.1 and Table 3.3 show that victory by one side reduces recurrences of conflict during a peacekeeping mission (-1.96; $p<.10$) by 35% but not when all of the explanatory variables are taken into account. The regression models testing peacekeeping success within 1 year after the departures of peacekeepers show that military victory by one side does not have any significant effect on recurrences of violence. Using the original Dixon and Mullenbach data, Table 3.5 shows that military victory is not statistically significant. Using the updated dependent variable accounting for ongoing missions, the models show mixed results; however, none of the coefficients related to military victory in Table 3.7 or Table 3.9 are significant.

Interpretation

The results of the regression models show little evidence that military victory has an impact on resumptions of violence in civil conflicts. In the regression models examining recurrences of conflict during peacekeeping missions, military victory is a significant factor in only one model.[23] This is hardly a strong endorsement for the contention that military victory has a consistent relationship in effecting outcomes in civil conflicts. During a peacekeeping mission, there is evidence that military victory is negatively related to recurrences of conflict, but rarely is this effect statistically significant. Furthermore, none of the empirical analyses examining outcomes after the peacekeepers leave the country show any statistical relationship between military victory and recurrences of violence. Consequently, the analysis shows limited, support that military victory has a lasting peaceful impact in civil conflict.

While the finding that military victory has little impact on recurrences of violence does not present any considerable problems to the theoretical contentions, it serves as an important control in the analysis insuring model accounts for alternative explanations in reductions of conflict. Toft (2010) contends that decisive military victory by one side produces the best possibility for ending a civil conflict. However, Collier and Hoeffler (2004: 257) note that military victories in civil wars are rare occurrences and military victories in civil wars with the imposition of an intermediary are rarer still. If one side achieves military victory over the other, they have little need for an intermediary, since they have crippled the opposition beyond its capacity to retaliate. Military victory may be an important factor in reducing violence, but rarely will a peacekeeping force be

[23] Model 2 in Table 3.1 and Model 2 in Table 3.3 display coefficients from the same logistical regression model.

requested when one side is victorious in civil war. The data in this analysis showing that military victory is rarely significant could be driven by the rarity of intervention after a military victory in a civil war.

Quality Control Statistics

It is worth examining some of the quality control measurements used to quantify the veracity of the results in the logistical regressions. Multiple models, variables, and statistical tests insured that the reported results of the analyses were valid in their findings. Additionally, quality control statistics point to potential problems that exist in the models. Using a dataset with relatively few observations leads to less than ideal statistical verifications, however, considering the size of the dataset, the abundance of models, and the robustness of the results, the quality control statistics show that the regression results are relatively valid.

Because the relatively small number of observations in the dataset, some accommodations and leniency in the quality control statistics must be reconciled. General rules pertaining to logistical regression and sizes of datasets stipulate that logistical regression models break down when the number of observations reduces below 100 (Long 1997: 54). Consequently, significant efforts were made to maintain a threshold of at least 100 observations in each of the models. The model with the fewest observations had an N of 107. Since the number of observations was still relatively low, some concessions had to be made on the alpha levels for statistical significance. The alpha level for statistical significance was reduced to .10, which is not uncommon and still most variables of interest were able to maintain more robust thresholds of confidence

intervals. Although, many of the models have p-values below .10, a priory research requires that the initial metric for significance be maintained despite more robust findings after the analysis was conducted.

Because of the smaller numbers of observations in the dataset, several summary statistics are not as robust as one would desire. Log-likelihood statistics throughout the varying models are not as low as they typically would be in most logistical regression models and the Pseudo-r^2 statistics are particularly low in several of the models. This is not entirely unexpected in empirical models related to international relations and models that include relatively few observations. The Full Models in each of the tables improve upon many of these robustness indicators and the models with variables related to legitimacy produce less robust statistical indicators. Among the most important statistical indicators in a logistical regression analysis is the reduction of error statistics (ROE), indicating the statistical improvement upon chance. The Full Models produce results that have the largest improvement upon random chance and the models analyzing variables related to legitimacy produce the weakest improvements.

Taken together, the summary statistics show that the empirical results produced by the logistical regression analyses support the models. Less robust quality control statistics can be seen in the models emphasizing explanatory variables related to legitimacy, but these variables show limited statistical significance when compared to other explanatory variables in the analysis. The quality control statistics are most robust in the models with significant explanatory variables.

Conclusions on Successful Peacekeeping from the Empirical Data

The findings in the logistical regression models support many of the predictions in the theoretical model. The explanatory variables measured in the analysis focus on a third party's strength, the third party's capacity to effectively transfer information, and legitimacy associated with the peacekeeping mission. Additionally, the effectiveness of the third party is analyzed both during and after the deployment of peacekeepers. Consequently, the analysis of third party intervention in civil conflicts provides a clearer picture of how third party intervention in civil wars are most likely to produce peaceful outcomes in the short term and long term. The conclusions provide insight into developing third party peacekeeping missions that can more effectively prevent recurrences of violence which have been shown to plague failed states undergoing civil conflict (Collier 2007: 27).

According to the empirical analyses, the explanatory variables estimating the strength of the intervener matter most while the peacekeeping mission is on that ground. The numbers of peacekeepers sent to the post conflict area do not have a strong effect on recurrences of violence and major powers mediating a conflict, actually, make violence more likely to recur. Despite these findings, involvement of major powers and former colonial states leading the peacekeeping mission reduces recurrences of violence when other explanatory variables are not taken into account in the scaled down models. Contiguity of an intervening third party showed the strongest results in reducing the likelihood for recurrences violence. Though contiguous state involvement could be considered a greater imposition of sovereignty by the local populations, the analysis

shows that contiguous states contributing troops have a better record in maintaining peace in post civil conflict states. This finding adds credibility to future peacekeeping operations involving cooperation among the neighboring countries of the conflict state.

The models show that peacekeeping success both during and after a peacekeeping mission is strongly influenced by the capacity for the intervening third party to effectively and credibly transmit information among the belligerents. Among all of the components included in the empirical models, one can conclude that third parties that are best able to relay credible information among the belligerents make the best peacekeeping contingents. The variables that produce significant results involve the third parties deemed to be the most credible and transparent intermediaries. Peacekeepers from democratic countries and peacekeepers that successfully negotiate permanent treaties during the mission best prevent recurrences of violence over the short and long term. The argument of this dissertation contends that peacekeeping missions with transparent and credible signaling mechanisms are capable of establishing long term solutions to states undergoing civil conflict.

The influence of legitimacy on the success of the peacekeeping mission is mixed in the empirical results. While the existence of a UN Mandate for the peacekeeping mission might contribute to reduced violence over the long term, UN sanctioned missions are more likely to result in resumptions of violence while the peacekeepers are present. This result may be influenced by previous research findings that UN Missions often deploy to the most difficult conflicts (Fortna 2008). Resulting violence may be a product of the difficulties surrounding the UN missions, rather than the impact of the peacekeepers.

Mixed results can also be seen in the effect that more states have on successful peacekeeping outcomes. When more states contribute personnel to the mission, violence is less likely to result while the peacekeepers are present, but no relationship can be seen in the longer term after peacekeepers leave. Though legitimacy in a peacekeeping operation cannot conclusively be determined to promote peaceful outcomes in post civil conflict situations, further research might identify how a peacekeeping mission with greater international support might affect the attitudes of local populations and promote international awareness of humanitarian crises that are often related to civil wars. Such aspects of a peacekeeping operation may peripherally affect the short term and long term success of a mission.

The empirical study sought to answer one larger question in particular: does it matter who intervenes in a post civil conflict scenario? These findings, taken together, expand upon previous work to show that whether or not a third party intervenes is not the only thing that is important, but in addition, who intervenes? Research on third party interventions in civil conflict has focused on three theoretical explanations when aiding belligerents to overcome commitment problems. By analyzing different types of intervening third party peacekeeping operations, the empirical findings stress that credible signaling capabilities make the most effective intervention force, while stronger intervention forces promote peace in the short term, such intervention forces do not show tangible results over the long term, and the impact of legitimacy is inconclusive in its assessment and could be subject of further research. Because international peacekeeping is a relatively new phenomenon in international relations and civil conflict is becoming

more abundant across the globe, more data will be available for expanding upon the results described in this research.

Chapter 7: Sierra Leone

Researchers use case study analysis to identify processes through specific and detailed analysis, otherwise eluding larger scale empirical research. Traditionally, this method of analysis focuses on a single or limited set of subjects with an aim to describe and explain an observed phenomenon (Berg 2009: 317). Key aspects of case study research include using a limited set of observations and a detailed examination of the subject (Berg 2009; Bogdan and Biklen 2003: 54). Geertz (1973) most notably described the nature of case study analysis as "thick description." The use of highly detailed descriptions of limited data assists a researcher in studying the processes behind the phenomenon being studied (Weick 1995). For the purpose of tracing the causal processes behind the efficacy of peacekeeping, case study analysis can be a useful tool. The objective of case study is to advance the propositions that are not examined in large-n empirical studies. Though the previous chapters presented multiple observations of peacekeeping in civil conflicts across different states, it is assumed that these observations are comparable. Chapter 7 examines the case of Sierra Leone to trace the processes leading to successes and failures of different peacekeeping missions.

Though case study analysis is a useful tool in social science research, two obstacles must be overcome when selecting a case: bias and counterfactual analysis. First, it is imperative that there is no evidence of bias when third parties intervened in Sierra Leone. It is possible that third parties intervened in a situation they saw as an easy fix, thereby reducing the impact of their intervention on the outcome of the conflict. Second, the case of Sierra Leone must show that alternative outcomes were possible in the conflict. A case

study may illustrate all of the variables under examination, but there must also be evidence that the explanatory variable(s) exacted the observed change on the outcome variable. These obstacles associated with case study can be overcome with careful case selection that does not intentionally favor our prior hypothesis and is consistent with the objectives of the research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 139-140).

The civil war in Sierra Leone presents a suitable case for analysis for three particular reasons. First, the involvement of the international community was not limited to one type of third party intervention. Rather, international envoys, regional organizations, the UN, private security firms, and individual countries played significant roles as intermediaries in the civil war. These interventions were met with varying degrees of success in the peace process. Second, the conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990's illuminates the worst aspects of civil conflict with particular characteristics that make it especially difficult for the belligerents to reconcile. Multiple factions, child soldiering, human rights abuses, war profiteering, and refugee problems all presented extraordinary challenges at the conclusion of civil war (See, for example, Walter 2004). If an intervention force can overcome such challenges, it highlights the effectiveness of various international efforts and does not indicate a biased selection of intervention by the intermediaries. Third, Sierra Leone has been at peace long enough so that substantive conclusions can be drawn concerning the effectiveness of the international efforts to reconcile the country. While peace is often defined as an absence of violence,

reconciliation efforts in Sierra Leone included constitutional reform, economic development, democratic elections, and truth and reconciliation panels. [24]

The civil war in Sierra Leone presents a unique instance in which multiple actors in the international community became involved in a hostile situation with varying degrees of success. Since the research examines the effectiveness third party interventions, it is imperative that a case study on civil war show how third party interventions changed the course of the war. Third party interventions will be examined in Sierra Leone, including UN special envoys, the private South African security firm Executive Outcomes, the regional organization Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and the British military intervention in Operation Palliser. The different strategies, operations and resources brought by the outside interventions help distinguish how effectively the interventions maintained peace.

Furthermore, the conflict in Sierra Leone proved to be an extraordinarily devastating. The international community did not send peacekeeping missions with the expectation that the country would easily be pacified. Civil wars that have more casualties and cause more economic damage to a country are more difficult to end. High mortality rates and economic devastation diminish a country's capacity for self governance (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Sierra Leone's economic dependence on diamond exports also complicated a resolution in the civil war. Dependence upon primary

[24] Though democratic elections do not necessarily mark the endpoint of a civil war, it signaled a peaceful transition of government in which former rebels were successfully integrated into the political process. Additional indications for sustained peace in Sierra Leone include: the demobilization of 75,000 ex fighters, the return of approximately half a million refugees and internally displaced persons, and the organization In other words, in addition to an absence of violence, active steps were being taken insure a functioning state.

commodity exports, like diamonds, increases rent seeking behavior in countries, making them susceptible to coups and prolonged civil wars (Collier 2007: 32-36; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). Since Sierra Leone is associated with many of these difficulties that make peace less likely, this case is a "hard case." In other words, if international intervention can influence peace in a country suffering from as many structural difficulties as Sierra Leone, one can reasonably infer intervention forces did not selectively pursue an easy target in conflict management and that peacekeeping made a difference in the outcome.

Additionally, Sierra Leone is a good case for study because the civil war ceased for an extended period of time. This is important for two reasons. First, one must be sure that the current break from active hostilities is not a temporary phenomenon. This is a particular concern with cases of recent third party intervention. Belligerents may use a third party intervention and subsequent ceasefires to rearm and resupply. Sierra Leone has not engaged in sustained violence since late 2001, so the years of peace imply that there is not a temporary break in the civil war and that the peace process was consolidated (UN 2004: 10). Second, part of the quantitative analysis examines the long term implications of third party interventions in civil wars and whether or not peacekeepers provide merely a stopgap in civil wars as suggested by Werner and Yuen (2005) or offer a more permanent solution to conflict by reorganizing how a country can properly function on its own. Since the withdrawal of UNAMSIL in December 2005 (Fortna 2008: 167; UN 2005), there has been a sufficient time frame to determine Sierra Leone's capacity to govern itself without the security guarantees of a strong intervention

force. An effective third party intervention must not merely escalate costs to such a point that continued conflict is irrational, but must also take active steps to reconcile the country and provide it with sufficient resources for self governance.

History of the Conflict

Abbreviated Timeline of Historical Events and Third Party Interventions in Sierra Leone

1961: British grant independence to Sierra Leone. London Constitutional Conference

1961-1967: Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) controlled government with Milton Margai as Prime Minister. Upon his death in 1964, his brother Albert Margai controlled the SLPP. Siaka Steven's All People's Party (APC) formed as opposition.

1967: The APC narrowly wins parliamentary elections and Brigadier Lansana orchestrates a coup to reinstate the SLPP. There is quickly a counter-coup led by Major Charles Blake.

1968: A third coup led by the APC reinstates Stevens as head of government.

1971: Siaka Stevens consolidates one-party rule and becomes Executive President.

1985: Joseph Saidu Momoh appointed as APC successor upon Stevens' retirement

1987: Momoh declares state of economic emergency.

1991 (Civil war begins): RUF begins military campaign against Momoh in Eastern Sierra Leone under the leadership of Foday Sankoh.

1992: Momoh deposed in military coup led by Valentine Strasser. A military junta controls the government of Sierra Leone.[25]

1995: Executive Outcomes hired by Strasser's military junta to repel the RUF.

1996: Strasser overthrown by a military coup led by Brigadier General Julius Maada Bio. First free elections held since 1967 in Sierra Leone (February). Ahmad Tejan Kabbah elected and the RUF does not participate. Kabbah agrees to the Abidjan Peace Accord but the RUF and military thwart peace efforts (November).

[25] This military government was also called the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Members of the NPRC later overthrew Strasser in 1996. I will refer to the period from 1992 to 1996 as the Strasser junta.

1997: Military coup overthrows Kabbah (May). Military government led by Major-General Koroma collaborates with the RUF and suspends the constitution. UN imposes economic sanctions (October)

1998: ECOMOG sends peacekeepers into Freetown to remove the RUF.

1999: UN initiates negotiations between Kabbah and the RUF (May). The Lomé Peace Agreement is signed, reinstating Kabbah, but granting significant political concessions to the RUF (July). The UN Resolution 1270 authorizes UN intervention (October).

2000: UNAMSIL peacekeepers deployed in support of the Lomé Agreement (January). ECOMOG withdraws forces from Sierra Leone (March-April). Many Nigerian troops remain to support UNAMSIL. The RUF breaks the peace by capturing 500 UN peacekeepers and the British subsequently deploy military forces to Sierra Leone (May). British engage in two significant military campaigns (Palliser and Barras). UN increases its troop presence throughout the summer and fall.

2002: Abuja Peace Agreement signed. Elections held. Peace persists.

The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a military offensive from the Liberian border attacking government forces. However, the historical genesis of the political strife began much earlier. This summary of the events surrounding the civil war demonstrate the inability for the government to properly function and the instability of the factions fighting for control of the country.

Prior to 1962: British Colonial Rule

As a British protectorate for freed slaves, Sierra Leone functioned as a stable state despite diverse religious and ethnic populations (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; Woods and Reese 2008: 10). The British created a colonial territory considered to be the education and commercial hub of West Africa. Mineral wealth permitted the construction of schools, roads, and a modest health care system (Pratt 1999; Lord 2000: 2). The

political stability of the country promoted Muslim, Christian, and animist religious sects to peacefully coexist during British rule. The primary ethnic groups of Mende and Temne accounted for about two thirds of the population and cohabited with about 20 additional ethnic groups within the country (Roberson 2007: 2-3).[26] Although there were ethnic divisions, ethnic tensions did not directly apply to Sierra Leone's civil war in the 1990's (Posner 2005: 257-259). Rather, political competition and the prospective spoils from corrupted government institutions promoted a politically elite class and alienated much of the population (Woods and Reese 2008: 13-14).

1962-1985: Post-Colonial Rule and The Presidency of Siaka Stevens

After the British left the country, political power shifted to the Sierra Leoneans through political parties and governmental institutions. Elections took place soon after independence in 1962 and Milton Margai of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) was elected Prime Minister. However, Margai soon died in 1964, leaving a small ruling elite class which began to consolidate its economic and political power (Roberson 2007; Keen 2005; Malan et al. 2002: 13; Williams et al. 2002). Though ethnic ties strengthened Margai's Mende relatives, Posner (2005) contends that hostility between ethnic factions played a minimal role in the onset of the civil war.[27]

As patronage networks and graft exacerbated the disparities between elites and the rest of the public, citizens became increasingly dissatisfied with their political

[26] Religious and ethnic population data were researched and confirmed at CIA World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html), the US Dept. of State (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5475.htm), and the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/country/sierra-leone)

[27] Rather, Posner attributes ethnic political factionalization in the nascent state to the multiparty structure of the political system.

leadership. Public dissatisfaction over corruption within SLPP, led to the election of Siaka Stevens and his All People's Congress (APC) Party in 1967 (Woods and Reese 2008: 11). Despite winning an election, several military coups from 1967 to 1968 were required to establish Stevens as president. Stevens consolidated his political power by creating a single party republic under the APC and purging government of those not loyal to Stevens.

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, widening economic divisions among the elite class and general public led to widespread public dissatisfaction with the state. Stevens and the APC's political power resulted from their ability to generate revenues from the diamond trade and use the profits to invest in the military to repress dissent. The APC became political faction personally loyal to Stevens, intimidated opposition groups, and promoted corruption through patronage networks (Williams 2002: 13; Fortna 2008: 55). By diverting resource wealth from public state services and toward private benefactors, the APC bankrupted the government of Sierra Leone leading to general economic decline and an entrenched system of neopatrimonialism (Williams 2001: 143; Brummel and Molgaard 2007).

1985-1991: The Presidency of Saidu Momoh and Precursor to Civil War

Stevens retired in 1985 and Major General Joseph Saidu Momoh succeeded him as President of Sierra Leone. Subsequent graft and corruption depleted state revenues and Sierra Leone suffered significant economic decline, prompting Momoh to declare a state of economic emergency in 1987. The state could no longer pay most civil servants and the professional class fled the country (Adebajo 2002). Fuel scarcity, currency devaluations, and electricity shortages fed popular unrest and led to the development of

numerous opposition movements, most notably the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and its leader Foday Sankoh. The combination of weak governmental leadership, ineffective state institutions, and the development of an unstable economic class structure based on natural resource rents led to the breakdown of the state by 1991. Citizens turned to rebel groups for monetary and political support (Collier 2007: 32-35).

The strengthening of the RUF and the outbreak of civil war became unavoidable for two reasons. First, as corruption became entrenched within the government, citizens turned toward illicit methods to earn income and promote their wellbeing. Williams (2001: 143) argues that, "corrupt patrimonial manipulation of educational and employment opportunities … increased the likelihood that those excluded from its benefits would use violence as a means of redress." Second, the RUF was supported by neighboring Liberia and its notorious warlord Charles Taylor.[28] Charles Taylor had two motivations for supporting the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone. First, Taylor sought to finance his own war in Liberia and destabilize Sierra Leone by using the RUF to illegally smuggle diamonds from the resource rich area of Kono in Eastern Sierra Leone. Along the smuggling routes, diamonds were exchanged for weaponry, providing war materiel for the RUF and valuable mineral resources for Taylor to finance civil war. Second, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mohmoh's government supported Taylor's rival political party, the United Liberian Movement for Democracy.[29] By

[28] RUF leader Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor first met in Libya by Muommar Gaddafi who promoted revolutions throughout West Africa. Sankoh joined forces with Taylor in Liberia and took part in the early stages of Liberia's civil war in 1989 (Woods and Reese 2008:14).

[29] ECOWAS used Sierra Leone as a supply route for its mission in Liberia and had an interest in maintaining use of the airport in Freetown. Additionally, a contingent of 200 Guinean ECWAS troops can be credited with stopping the RUF advance across the Liberian border in 1991. Because their mission focused on the Liberian war, it should not be considered an intervention in the Sierra Leonean civil war.

supporting a revolutionary movement in Sierra Leone, Taylor could disrupt material support from ECOWAS along the Sierra Leonean border and consolidate his control within Liberia (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; Woods and Reese 2008).

1991-2002: The Civil War and International Interventions



Sources: CIA World Factbook; Woods and Reese 2008

The civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when approximately 2000 RUF affiliated rebels[30] captured Kailahun and Pujahun, towns near the eastern border with Liberia. The stated intent of the RUF was to overthrow Momoh's government. The government's inability to maintain order outside of Freetown prompted a military coup in 1992 led by Captain Valentine Strasser.

[30] 1600 of the rebels were members of Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). However, soon after the invasion, Taylor pulled his NPFL troops out of Sierra Leone, leaving the remaining RUF soldiers poorly manned and equipped (Woods and Reese 2008).

The Strasser government took over a state in disarray. The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA)[31] army was poorly equipped, underpaid, numerically small, and highly undisciplined. Although the RUF offered a ceasefire, Strasser instead chose to channel state resources toward strengthening the army and defeat the RUF. Beginning in 1992, the Strasser government promoted a rapid recruitment strategy to increase the size of the SLA from 3,700 to 17,000 (Woods and Reese 2008; 27-28). The war consumed all of the state's resources. Furthermore, the RUF deprived the government of its primary source of revenue in diamonds by occupying the eastern areas near Kono and bribed SLA officers to ignore RUF activity. Strasser needed outside support but the UN considered the conflict an internal problem and did not intervene (Keen 2005: 91-92).

In late 1994, the Strasser government hired the South African mercenary company Executive Outcomes to push the RUF out of the diamond rich east of Sierra Leone. Executive Outcomes proclaimed their global mission was to stabilize the legitimate governments against rebels, but Executive Outcomes tended to focus their interventions on countries rich in mineral wealth demonstrating that their interests remained monetary. The government of Sierra Leone paid Executive Outcomes for their military services and awarded diamond mining rights to firms linked to the company. Executive Outcomes cleared the RUF out of the Kono region and river regions south of Bo and Kenema after approximately 1 month with only a few hundred mercenary soldiers. Executive Outcomes brought sophisticated military equipment and highly trained personnel to support the SLA, restored order in Freetown, and reestablished government

[31] Under Stevens and Momoh the army was called the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF). Strasser changed the name to the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) to reflect his strategy of reforming the military.

control over the diamond mines of Kono (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; Woods and Reese 2008).

After Executive Outcomes helped establish order, the international community pressured Strasser to hold democratic elections. Strasser's need for international support compelled him to oblige and the relative peace provided by Executive Outcomes permitted elections to take place. However, elections were difficult to organize since the RUF still occupied pockets of the countryside and factions within the SLA often collaborated with the RUF. Though Strasser announced multiparty elections, he was removed from power by another military coup led by his defense minister Brigadier Julius Maada Bio prior to the elections in February 1996. Though elections probably should have been suspended, the UN threatened sanctions and Executive Outcomes threatened to withdraw if elections did not proceed as planned.

After the 1996 Presidential election, the military ceded power to the winner, former United Nations Development Program official, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Kabbah's primary objective was to negotiate a peace between the government and the RUF and diplomatic negotiations had been taking place with the assistance of UN appointed Special Envoy Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) working in conjunction with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS. Those negotiation efforts continued for 8 months after Kabbah's election. The RUF and the government agreed to all of the conditions except for two points: the RUF wanted all foreign troops (Executive Outcomes) out of the country immediately and a vice presidency for Sankoh. When negotiations broke down, Kabbah

ordered the SLA and Executive Outcomes to attack the RUF headquarters near Bo in October 1996.

The aggressive military campaign forced Sankoh back to the bargaining table. He admitted defeat and signed the Abidjan Peace Accord in November 1996, but extracted an important concession that the contract with Executive Outcomes be allowed to expire. While the government and the RUF both made promises to disarm and demobilize, they would be monitored by a joint government and RUF commission. Executive Outcomes left the country.

Sankoh had no intention of maintaining the peace agreement. Rather, he used the agreement to remove Executive Outcomes and remobilize his guerilla campaign. The security vacuum left by Executive Outcomes allowed the RUF to reassert its control over the eastern parts of the country and again trade diamonds for weapons. A RUF radio message intercepted by the SLA in January 1997 confirmed that Sankoh did not intend to keep adhere to the agreement and two months later he was detained for purchasing weapons in Nigeria (Woods and Reese 2008: 34).

The Abidjan Agreement did not last and by mid 1997 another military coup lead by Major General Paul Koroma and supported by members of the RUF deposed Kabbah's government. The coup forced Kabbah into exile in Guinea and returned the country to civil war (UN 2005). The Koroma military junta[32] returned Sierra Leone to a closed, one party political system by suspending the constitution, banning public demonstrations, and outlawing competing political parties. When the elected government of Sierra Leone

[32] This government was also called the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

remained in exile and military rule repressed civil and political freedoms, the international community began to focus more attention on Sierra Leone. Koroma's government also collaborated with the RUF, offering Sankoh a vice chairmanship within the junta. Sankoh accepted and brought RUF soldiers into Freetown to support the junta. The joint Koroma/RUF government in June 1997 represented the height of lawlessness in Sierra Leone. All government services ceased, infrastructure within the country was destroyed, and the citizens of Sierra Leone were terrorized.

Attempts at stabilizing the country and implementing a workable peace came when UN and ECOWAS envoys attempted to broker an agreement restoring democratic governance and a ceasefire. In October 1997, ECOWAS representatives and the chairman of the military junta met in Conakry, Guinea to negotiate and, eventually, agreed upon a peace accord calling for a ceasefire between the military and Kabbah. The agreement would be monitored by ECOWAS and UN military observers. Though the Conakry peace plan was accepted by Kabbah and publicly embraced by the junta, the military privately objected to the interpretation of the "combatants" who were to be disarmed (Fyle 2000: 111-112). After the Kabbah government refused to sign the peace deal, the UN Security Council and ECOWAS increased their pressure by imposing targeted diplomatic and economic sanctions on the Koroma government. ECOWAS[33] troops enforced the sanctions from a base north of Freetown (Lungi) where the Kabbah government still maintained a presence.

[33] The monitoring group in Sierra Leone hereafter referred to as "ECOMOG," the acronym representing the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group.

A combination of public discontent, international pressure, and collusion between the military and rebels destabilized the military junta by February 1998. Public protests against the government and general disorder spread by RUF soldiers required ECOMOG troops impose order to Freetown. "Operation Tigerhead," spearheaded by ECOMOG infantry troops gained control of Freetown. Koroma's and RUF resistance to international forces was costly. In an effort to minimize casualties, ECOMOG forces allowed Koroma/RUF forces safe passage out of the Freetown to the eastern city of Kailahun (Woods and Reese 2008: 44).

By March 1998, Kabbah was reinstated as President, however, poor logistics and stretched supply lines forced ECOMOG to take defensive positions around Freetown. This defensive posture allowed the RUF to reorganize their forces in the east. Additionally, ECOMOG's lack of policing capability led to "vigilante justice" in the capital. Many civilians sought retribution against Koroma collaborators (Report 2004: 295).

The UN Security Council lifted the oil and arms embargo and strengthened UN security personnel in Sierra Leone, establishing in June 1998 the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) (UN 2005). UNOMSIL appointed UN Special Envoy Francis Okelo to head the mission. The mission was designed to monitor and disarm combatants and restructure security forces within the country (commonly referred to as Disarmament/Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR)). UNOMSIL teams promoted internal security sector reform within the government of Sierra Leone and sought to verify any human rights abuses taking place. However, these teams

remained unarmed, numerically small, and movement was restricted to locations secured by ECOMOG. The need for a stronger peacekeeping force soon became evident.

In December 1998, fighting within Sierra Leone intensified. The RUF remobilized their army and planned an attack on Freetown, seeking revenge. Though ECOMOG had been instrumental in removing the rebels from Freetown, they did not have control outside of the capital. In January 1999 ten-thousand RUF combatants disguised as civilians infiltrated Freetown in a revenge campaign they called "Operation No Living Thing." This period marked the most widespread and intense violence of the civil war with ECOMOG troops resorting to undisciplined tactics and indiscriminate killing in an attempt to subdue the violence. The following months produced heavy fighting, a RUF takeover of Freetown and forced the evacuation of UNOMSIL (Roberson 2007; Woods and Reese 2008).

ECOMOG troops eventually succeeded in restoring order to Freetown and reinstated the civilian government by April 1999. However, ECOMOG troops were under considerable strain as Nigeria, the primary contributor of military personnel, began to withdraw forces. To prevent a resumption of violence, peace negotiations resumed for a new ceasefire. UN Special Representative Okelo and representatives of ECOWAS organized negotiations in May 1999 in Lomé, Togo. After weeks of negotiations, the Lomé Agreement was signed, pledging an end of hostilities and a government of national unity incorporating both Kabbah's civilian government and the RUF. The Lomé Agreement made major concessions to the RUF, including immunity for its leadership, political

representation, and multiple cabinet appointments in the new government (Keen 2005: 250-252).

Under the Lomé Agreement, the factions pledged an end to violence and the international community committed to help rebuild the country. In October 1999, UNOMSIL was disbanded by the Security Council and a new UNAMSIL mission replaced it under UN Resolution 1270. While UNOMSIL was designated as an "observation" mission, UNAMSIL changed the UN presence to an "assistance mission." UNAMSIL intended to assist the government in DDR efforts by providing a more robust peacekeeping presence in the country. Unlike UNOMSIL, UNAMSIL included military personnel and was tasked with enforcing the Lomé Peace Agreement. UNAMSIL was also designed to replace the ECOMOG forces leaving the country. ECOMOG peacekeepers withdrew from Sierra Leone in March-April 2000 and by May 2000 turned over peacekeeping responsibilities to UNAMSIL, although some ECOMOG forces remained under the auspices of UNAMSIL (Woods and Reese 2008: 48). In the next year, the size and scope of UNAMSIL expanded considerably by sending 11,000 peacekeepers to Sierra Leone. The peacekeepers deployed to areas outside Freetown to disarm an estimated 40,000-50,000 rebel combatants (Woods and Reese 2008: 58).

The volatility of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the composition of UNAMSIL made DDR a difficult task. Struggles between RUF combatants and UNAMSIL peacekeepers took place throughout the spring of 2000. RUF combatants prevented movement of peacekeepers in the countryside and refused to comply with disarmament. Despite UNSC Resolution 1289 authorizing UNAMSIL to use military force to uphold the treaty, military

commanders did not change their rules of engagement (Woods and Reese 2008: 59-60). The ceasefire under the Lomé Agreement ended in May 2000 when the RUF renounced the treaty (the same day that ECOWAS transferred operations to UNAMSIL), took approximately 500 UN peacekeepers hostage along with their equipment and began to move RUF forces toward Freetown.

This renewal of violence sparked international media outrage and prompted Great Britain to send a military force for a civilian/non-combatant evacuation operation known as "Operation Palliser." In May 2000, the British secured the main airport in Lungi, then moved to secure Freetown, facing heavy resistance from the RUF (Leatherwood 2001). Contingents of the RUF attacked British forces, but were repelled with overwhelming force. As the British intervention force established a better foothold within the country, British soldiers engaged in low intensity operations throughout the country and helped reorganize the SLA into the more professionalized Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA) (Roberson 2007: 7). UNAMSIL reached a deployment of approximately 11,000 peacekeepers authorized in February 2000. By March, 2001 17,500 UN peacekeepers would be authorized to deploy to Sierra Leone. By comparison, the British sent approximately 1,000 troops to subdue violence, but 5,000 troops for all operations (Leatherwood 2001; Collier 2007: 129). With British and UNAMSIL security assistance, the RSLA resumed policing responsibilities in the capital.

Throughout the summer of 2000, British-led peacekeeping forces secured larger areas of Sierra Leone and displaced RUF forces. The British immediately cleared insurgent areas surrounding the capital and left UNAMSIL and RSLA soldiers in defensive positions

to hold territory. Most of the British soldiers left Sierra Leone by June 15, 2000, but left behind 200 British peacekeepers to train and support the RSLA. At the end of May 2000, UNAMSIL increased their numbers to 13,000 under UN Security Council Resolution 1299. UNAMSIL and the RSLA displayed more aggressive tactics to resist the RUF and exerted control over larger parts of the country. When a local militia captured and turned over Foday Sankoh to the British, leaving Issa Sesay to take command of the RUF, the RUF was significantly weakened and was willing to negotiate with UNAMSIL and the Kabbah government (Woods and Reese 2008: 64).

By October 2000, RUF efforts to reorganize and mount attacks failed because international forces took coordinated and multilateral action to isolate the rebels. Effective intelligence-sharing with the Guinean government helped the Guineans secure the northern border, thus denying the RUF safe havens. The British navy engaged in military exercises, demonstrating the British commitment to support UNAMSIL (Woods and Reese 2008: 72-73). By 2001, UNAMSIL increased its numbers to 17,500 and moved further outside of Freetown to secure a majority of the country. Furthermore, diplomatic pressure mounted against Charles Taylor which forced him to cut off monetary support for the RUF. UNSC Resolution 1343 targeted RUF funding by outlawing trade in rough diamonds.

Finally, the RUF signed a final ceasefire with the government of Sierra Leone in November 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria. By 2002 the UN had successfully disarmed 70,000 combatants and returned rebel fighters to civil society. By isolating the RUF, removing its sources of funding, and aggressively moving disarm the combatants, international

peacekeepers tipped the balance of the civil conflict in Sierra Leone and promoted a peace agreement that was accepted by the belligerents.

Third Party Interventions: Increasing Costs of War & Validating Commitments

Figure 7.1



The conflict in Sierra Leone included multiple interventions and failed peace agreements before a sustainable negotiated treaty was reached in Abuja, Nigeria (2001). The intervention forces altered the cost structures for the belligerents and represented differing degrees of international consensus. While interventions controlled by fewer international actors may carry a stronger organizational and operational structure, they are likely to be considered by local populations as less legitimate and a greater threat to local sovereignty, motivating resistance and a renewal of violence (Pape 2005: 83-85). Conversely, less invasive interventions that are more benevolent in nature carrying greater degrees of international consensus do not operate under robust rules of

engagement to curtail violence, but are less threatening to sovereignty. Figure 7.2 places Sierra Leone's third party actions according to its strength to use force and its ability to threaten and provoke nationalist zeal. Executive Outcomes represents a less legitimate, but more unconstrained force, whereas the diplomatic envoys are a constrained, but unthreatening force. The belligerents and interventions will be described based on their contribution in stabilizing Sierra Leone's civil war. Each intervention will be analyzed based on the overall strength of the mission, the mission's capacity to credibly relay information and the overall legitimacy of the mission.

Figure 7.2



Conflict and Negotiation among the Belligerents (Govt. vs. Rebels)

During the ten years of civil war in Sierra Leone, the government and the rebels moved from unfavorable to favorable conditions for negotiation. War served as a mechanism for sharing information between these two actors, but despite bargains being struck, implementation of the terms of the agreements proved problematic. Relative

capabilities shifted between the combatants due to changes in internal cohesion and outside support. Furthermore, the goals and resolve of the primary actors were clarified over time. These changes in the power dynamics of the conflict complicated the bargaining behavior throughout the course of the war leading to recurrences of conflict after fragile periods of peace.

The two primary adversaries in Sierra Leone will be described in the context of their motivations, capabilities, and tactics which altered their bargaining strength in pursuing a stable outcome in the war. For most of the 1990's, the RUF's capacity to destabilize Sierra Leone outweighed the government's capability to maintain order, thus, making a negotiated settlement to the war unlikely. The ability of the RUF to operate with impunity in the most resource-rich areas of Sierra Leone escalated their capability and reduced their desire for compromise. Similarly, the government was inherently weak due to frequent coups, the weak geographic base it controlled, and its limited financial means to pay soldiers. Since international actors sought to deal with the legitimately elected government of Sierra Leone, they would have to improve the government's capacity to force the RUF to negotiating table.

The government forces of Sierra Leone did not display an ability to enforce the terms of their agreements with the rebels. Although provisions in the peace agreements included favorable terms for the RUF, the RUF chose to break the peace agreements to assert more control. The Lomé Agreement provided amnesty for all rebels and key government posts for its leadership.[34] The fractiousness of government forces led the

[34] The specific concessions included reserved cabinet posts which included the Chairman of the Board of the Commission for the Management of Resources. Lomé Agreement Part 2: Article IV, Part III: Article IX

RUF to believe that they could exert power through war rather than a negotiated peace. The SLA was "notoriously ill-trained and ill-equipped (Fortna 2008: 56)." After three months without pay in 1992, soldiers in the SLA toppled the Mohmoh government in a coup. Even after the fall of the Momoh government, Sankoh indicated through radio a willingness to negotiate with the Strasser government.

However, the successful coup emboldened Strasser. He believed that by increasing the size of the force by about 12,000 over four years, the government would be in a better position to suppress the rebels. The RUF soon occupied the diamond rich region of Kono and used the illegal diamond trade to fund their army. The Strasser government expected to be in a better bargaining position, but rapid conscription produced undisciplined and poorly paid soldiers. Consequently, government soldiers engaged in acts of banditry and often colluded with the rebels for personal profit. These early events reduced the government's legitimacy and ability to promote their interests, while bolstering the strength of the rebels. As a result, both factions reduced their willingness to accept a negotiated settlement and continued fighting.

Similarly, as the civil war progressed, the bargaining strength of the RUF reinforced their tactics and objectives. Several factors permitted the RUF to advance their goals and increase their demands from the government. Outside support, profits from illicit trade, and fear and intimidation strengthened the position of the RUF and emboldened the RUF to take aggressive actions to widen their scope of influence. Prior to 1991, the RUF was only a small group of rebels numbering approximately one to four hundred Sierra Leoneans (Fortna 2008: 56; Woods and Reese 2008: 15). However, support from rebel

leader and later President of Liberia, Charles Taylor, permitted the RUF to engage in more hostile and aggressive actions.[35] Early in the civil war, the collaboration with Taylor provided the RUF with a base of operation, training, and personnel. After the initial RUF assault in Sierra Leone, Taylor withdrew his personnel from the RUF, forcing Sankoh to conscript soldiers and seek alternative sources of funding. However, Liberia continued to provide a market for the illicit trade of conflict diamonds, funding both the RUF and Taylor's war. Though Liberia had no significant diamond fields, Liberia's diamond exports exploded in the 1990's from the cross border trade of diamonds and weapons. Spoils from war provided the RUF funding and motivation to expand their demands, ultimately making bargaining difficult and war likely.

In addition to outside support and financing, the RUF used fear and intimidation of local populations to inhibit public opposition and enhance their political aims in the process. They amputated limbs to frighten the local population who had supported Kabbah and democratic elections. Ibrahim Fofana, a miner in the Kono region, described his encounter with the RUF in April 1998: "They told us that we voted for Tejan Kabbah and it was because of our vote, it was why he won the election. They said that by cutting off our hands, we would lose the capacity to actively participate in politics to elect anyone into government." Brutal war crimes and mutilation of civilians during the war paralyzed civilian resistance to the RUF and forced the population from strategically important regions of Sierra Leone (Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 42).

[35] Charles Taylor has been found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in Sierra Leone's civil war. He denies all 11 charges against him mostly relating to the illegal trafficking of conflict diamonds. His son was also convicted and sentenced for torture and conspiracy crimes that occurred under his father's rule in Liberia and Charles Taylor pleaded for the release of RUF leader Foday Sankoh upon Sankoh's initial arrest in 1998 (BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/50931.stm)

War is a method of revealing information among the combatants. The civil war in Sierra Leone exposed the weakness of the government and the growing strength of the RUF. At the outset of the war, the government refused to negotiate because it believed its military strength would be bolstered by conscription and that the RUF was relatively weak. However, poor military training and inadequate pay proved to weaken the government. At the outset of the conflict, it seemed a negotiated settlement would be possible, but the dynamics of the conflict pushed the government and the RUF further from acceptable compromise since continuing the conflict was profitable for the RUF. The Strasser government refused to make concessions by the time intermediaries became involved.

As the war progressed in the early 1990's, the bargaining strength of the RUF was strengthened and the government weakened. Government forces collaborated with the rebels and lawlessness in the eastern regions provided freedom of movement for rebel forces. Only significant enforcement capability, international pressure, and reconciliation with the rebels would reestablish governmental authority within the country. The intervention forces in Sierra Leone discovered this by trial and error. Several intervention forces had international participation, but lacked the military strength. Others had the military strength, but lacked the capacity to demobilize and repatriate fighters. Peace could only endure when the outside intermediaries employed the combined strategies of military enforcement, negotiation, and DDR.

The Role of Spoilers

Rebel groups often profit from the spoils of war and seek to continue a conflict to maximize their profit and power. Rebels in Sierra Leone certainly had reason to continue the civil war despite the favorable terms offered in negotiated settlements. Controlling the diamond mining areas of Sierra Leone served two purposes for the rebel groups. First, controlling the diamond fields enriched the RUF, allowing them to purchase weapons to extend the reach of their power. Global Witness estimates that the RUF made between 50-125 million dollars annually in the years that they controlled the diamond fields (Alexander Yeardsley [Senior Researcher, Global Witness] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007). Additionally, controlling the diamond fields deprived the government of vital resources it needed to fund its own military and public services. Depleting government revenues led to its inability to pay soldiers in the military. This caused many of the soldiers in the army of Sierra Leone to collaborate with the rebel forces, further destabilizing the country (Brummel and Molgaard 2007). The weakened government of Sierra Leone compromised its strength. Distraught soldiers overthrew the Kabbah government in the 1997 coup, allowing unchecked power for the RUF in both the countryside and within Freetown.

While the RUF initially claimed to promote political freedoms for the people of Sierra Leone, the rebel's true motive was wealth. "The RUF said that it was fighting against military rule and they were for democracy and they wanted peace and development, but when… there was an elected government, they kept fighting (Ian Smillie [Research Coordinator, Partnership Africa-Canada] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 56)." The most obvious military campaign designed around enriching the RUF was called

"Operation Pay Yourself" by the RUF. While Freetown was largely free of violence until 1997, the military junta invited the RUF into the city to confiscate civilian property. "We went house to house; looting. We took belongings, demanded money, and sometimes killed two or three of their family members…" "It was a war of stealing, grabbing, and taking illegally what you never worked for (Former child soldier and Dr. Edward Nahim [Director of Mental Health Services, Sierra Leone] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 45)." The RUF would eventually be driven away from Freetown by ECOWAS forces, but quickly returned to the diamond fields in the east. When total control of the country became too costly for the rebels, they returned to the diamond-rich countryside pay for rearmament. The RUF eventually returned to Freetown in January 1999.

While the RUF military campaign was publicly justified by political grievance and by a concerted attempt to improve their bargaining position, their underlying motives remained greed. "When you're dealing with a group as anarchic and as murderous as the RUF, it was unlikely that they were ever going to settle for half the cake. They wanted full power (Ian Smillie [Partnership Africa-Canada] in Brummel and Molgaard 2007: min 55)." Given the ulterior motives of the RUF, not only was there little that could be offered through negotiation that would placate them, but it was unlikely that they would follow through with a peace settlement. This became evident with the collapse of the Lomé Peace Agreement. For peace to persist in Sierra Leone, the RUF had to be crippled militarily and cut off from their sources of funding. Eventually, the British/UNAMSIL peace enforcement mission accomplished that and greater global cooperation regulating the illicit trade of diamonds made it more difficult for conflict diamonds to further fund rebels

in Sierra Leone. Until that end, peacekeeping missions were unsuccessful in permanently stabilizing the country.

Executive Outcomes

The 1994 introduction of Executive Outcomes was a product of the Strasser government's efforts to defeat the RUF. Executive Outcomes, the South African private security firm directly attacked the RUF, supported the SLA in military operations, and trained soldiers within the SLA. Executive Outcomes received a total of $1.8 million per month from the government of Sierra Leone for their services (Wood and Reese 2008).[36] Their pay was also contingent on securing Sierra Leone's Kono diamond fields, thereby removing the RUF's capacity to finance their war. Their deal with Strasser's government included collaboration with Diamond Works, a private diamond mining company. Executive Outcomes secured the diamond mining areas and Diamond Works used local labor to mine and export the diamonds, returning 37.5% of the profit to the government of Sierra Leone. While Executive Outcomes removed the RUF's revenue source, it also took public revenue that the government needed to operate the country. Essentially, the insertion of Executive Outcomes to remove the RUF replaced rent seeking RUF insurgents with stronger rent seeking military entrepreneurs.

With the promise of diamonds as pay, Executive Outcomes cleared the RUF out of the Kono region within one month and maintained order in the region (Brummel and Molgaard 2007). Furthermore, Executive Outcomes located rebels in hiding, trained soldiers in the SLA, and funded a public information campaign supporting the government

[36] The average Executive Outcomes soldier was paid $3500/month.

of Sierra Leone (Woods and Reese 2008). When Executive Outcomes became involved in the conflict, the SLA had a sizeable army of approximately 17,000, but these soldiers were poorly trained, uneducated, undisciplined, and in many cases criminals (Gberie 2005: 76). Executive Outcomes brought 3,500 highly trained soldiers, air support, a radio interception system, night vision technology, and light weaponry. Within two weeks, Executive Outcomes pushed the RUF 60 miles outside of Freetown and by January 1996, the RUF presence was limited to Kailahun (Gberie 2005; Woods and Reese 2008). By November 1996, the SLA and Executive Outcomes crippled the RUF to a point that left the RUF with few choices outside of negotiating what became the Abidjan Peace Agreement.

However, two provisions of the Abidjan Peace Agreement appeared problematic. The RUF demanded the removal of all foreign troops and the country's vice presidency. After the terms offered were deemed unacceptable to the government, Executive Outcomes attacked and captured the RUF headquarters outside Bo. The RUF dropped their demand for political representation, but maintained their demand that Executive Outcomes' contract not be renewed. Although Executive Outcomes forced the RUF to the bargaining table, the peace settlement did not last because the former rebel soldiers were not sufficiently demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. Upon the departure of Executive Outcomes, rebel fighters continued fighting against the government.

After the elections in 1996, the UN urged the termination of the contract. Kabbah's government only accepted the withdrawal of Executive Outcomes with the expectation that 750 UN troops would replace them. The RUF was reluctant to accept UN peacekeepers and once Executive Outcomes withdrew, the RUF refused to allow UN

monitors to deploy (Fortna 2008: 67).[37] The reluctance of the international community to enforce peace allowed the RUF to regain control of the outlying areas of Sierra Leone.

Failings of Executive Outcomes

Executive Outcomes effectively secured the Kono region and tilted the balance of power in favor of the government by maintaining a strong military presence. However, it only served as a temporary measure to alter the incentives of the rebels. With 500 military advisers, 3,000 highly trained combat soldiers, and superior weaponry, Executive Outcomes restored order to Freetown, secured the RUF stronghold near Kono, and forced the RUF to negotiate for peace (Woods and Reese 2008: 30). Executive Outcomes specialized in overwhelming their adversary with military force, rather than promoting political participation and governmental reform. Unsurprisingly, the 1996 elections were marred by a military coup and voter intimidation efforts by the RUF. Through negotiations, the RUF extracted concessions for the removal of foreign troops and once this impediment was removed, the RUF no longer had incentive to live with their negotiated concessions.

Executive Outcomes took some measures to promote a secure transition in preparation for their departure. They provided training, intelligence, and equipment to the SLA. They also significantly weakened the RUF, forcing them to make concessions to the government. However, Executive Outcomes did not demobilize the RUF and did little to promote a functioning, legitimate government in Sierra Leone. The RUF maintained its

[37] Sankoh had strong rejections of the entire UN system, evident in his refusal to negotiate with the UN special envoy, and mistrusted international agencies in their ability to offer adequate protection to rebel leaders (Bright in Lord 2000: 4). However, it is equally plausible to contend that Sankoh sought to remove all foreign forces from Sierra Leone to improve his strategic military advantage.

base of operations, continued to receive outside support from Taylor's regime, and had formal representation in the government's peace commission to challenge any allegation of impropriety made against them. Furthermore, critics allege that the only incentive for Executive Outcomes was monetary (Woods and Reese 2008). There was no expectation of internal government reform. Despite overwhelming military success, Executive Outcomes could did not promote a functioning state capable of maintaining peace (Howe 1998).

Once Executive Outcomes left the country, the unbalanced status quo led to renewed violence and a resurgence of the RUF in 1996. The involvement of Executive Outcomes summarizes the contention by Werner and Yuen (2005), who argue that outside interventions in civil wars only temporarily alter the incentive structures of belligerents. Once the third party is removed, the dispute will again become violent if the opposing sides remain mobilized and do not share a common desire to adhere to the negotiated agreement.

Diplomatic Envoys

The UN Special Envoys that intervened in Sierra Leone had different problems. The envoys had diplomatic authority, were able to communicate with both sides effectively, and came from respected international organizations, but lacked an enforcement capability. Their interests rested entirely upon reconciling the belligerents without committing the tools to make noncompliance costly for the belligerents. Despite successfully negotiating a peace agreement, the envoys were unable to get both parties to commit to its implementation and recurrence of civil war resulted.

The first UN envoy led by Berhanu Dinka (Ethiopia) attempted to mediate the conflict in Sierra Leone in 1996. The civil war reached a stalemate and elections confirmed Kabbah as President (Gberie in Lord 2000). Kabbah, as a former UN official, had a good relationship with the international community, but had an inherent mistrust of Sankoh and the RUF. Sankoh had little credibility, but held advantages in organization and funding over the fledgling government. It was also evident that contingents of the SLA were collaborating with the RUF, undermining the authority of the government.

The RUF was able to obtain its primary objective when negotiating the Abidjan Peace Accord which stipulated the removal of Executive Outcomes from Sierra Leone. The military coup that removed the Kabbah government effectively ended the peace (UN 2005), but Sankoh's willingness to accept the agreement was questionable from the start. First, the RUF continued fighting during the negotiations, signaling little intent to carry out the terms of the peace agreement. Second, Sankoh refused to allow the 750-man UN peacekeeping unit from deploying to the region once Executive Outcomes had removed their forces from the country (Hirsch 2001). Third, the composition of the National Commission for the Consolidation for Peace (NCCP) did not provide effective oversight for compliance with the terms of the Abidjan Peace Accord. The government and the rebels were responsible for self policing within a Joint Monitoring Group. The Joint Monitoring Group had an equal number of members from the RUF and the government. The group was tasked with implementing DDR and required a majority consensus to report violations of the peace agreement. Consequently, any disagreement over compliance with demobilization amounted to a stalemate on the committee. Eventually, the rebels and

the military began collaborating and violence escalated, culminating in the May 1997 coup (Woods and Reese 2008).

The second UN envoy, a group lead by Francis Okelo (Uganda) in 1997, was less ambitious, but also unsuccessful to negotiate a long term peace. Okelo's diplomatic mission attempted to persuade Koroma's military junta to relinquish control of the government and reinstate Kabbah as President. At the time, Kabbah was in exile in neighboring Guinea after Koroma's coup. Koroma's government imposed heavy restrictions on civil rights, access to information, and curbed political parties. He also openly collaborated with the RUF, which promoted lawlessness in Sierra Leone. The international community reacted to Koroma's government with three successive responses: dialogue, sanctions, and military intervention. The Okelo envoy represented the first phase of an escalating strategy by the international community, but failed to persuade the junta to step down. Ultimately, military intervention from ECOWAS was necessary to restore order.

At this point, the belligerents did not appear willing or interested in negotiating a peace agreement. The Okelo Envoy was able to negotiate terms for agreement that protected the political status of the RUF and immunity for the leaders of the junta. In return, the Kabbah government would be restored to power and the implementation of the peace process previously agreed upon in the Abidjan Peace Accord would begin in October 1997 (UN 1997).[38] Despite negotiating an agreement, Koroma soon determined that he would be able to restore order on his own within 2-4 years (Woods and Reese

[38] This peace plan, known as the Conakry Peace Plan (Oct. 1997), was negotiated both by the UN envoy and ECOWAS. Koroma soon reneged on the plan and it was never implemented.

2008). He would not make the concessions necessary for a negotiated peace when he suspected his bargaining position would improve in the future and the treaty was never implemented.

The Security Council reacted to the failure in diplomacy by imposing an oil and arms embargo in October 1997. ECOWAS was authorized to monitor the implementation of the embargo. The UN recognized that the diplomatic envoys did not carry the monitoring or sanctioning capability to force compliance between the belligerents. The embargo appeared to have some effect, since it got the junta back to the bargaining table within a few weeks. Once the elected government was restored, the sanctions were removed (UN 2005).

Failings of the Envoys

Although the envoys fostered dialogue among the belligerents, they required an element of force to implement the agreements. Both of the diplomatic envoys were successful in securing agreements, but could not enforce compliance. Involving a third party peacekeeping force to implement these agreements would have fulfilled two purposes: applied additional costs to committing to the agreements and provided better oversight to insure compliance. Implementing the Abidjan Peace Accord contained goals for DDR, but was heavily reliant on self policing. The composition of the self policing mechanism of the NCCP highlights the need for outside intervention. The NCCP was equally composed of representatives from both primary factions without a tiebreaking mechanism or a standard for suitability to be a representative on the commission. The

commission was destined to be composed of unsavory figures unable to agree on implementing the peace agreement (Bangura 1997).

The peace agreements negotiated by the UN envoys had reasonable intentions, but lacked the force necessary to insure compliance with the agreement. The addition of a peacekeeping force along with the agreements would have changed the dynamic of compliance among the belligerents. First, the structural problems associated with the NCCP would not have been an issue. The NCCP was structured with each of the primary belligerents having equal representation on the commission with no tiebreaking procedure. Furthermore, the inclusion of possible war criminals on the commission prevented the commission from tackling possible humanitarian issues (Woods and Reese 2008:33-34). An intervention force would have provided an impartial and objective assessment of compliance with the terms of the Abidjan Peace Accord and consisted of members that both parties could trust. Second, inclusion of a peacekeeping mission would have constituted a costly signal to both the combatants and the international community. Such a signal is a method of "tying the hands" of the leadership and "sinking costs" toward its implementation (Fearon 1997). Rather than presenting these costly signals of intent, the envoys presented little tangible evidence that the international community was willing to pay the costs necessary for enforcing a peace. Since the combatants had so little at stake, they had little to lose when the agreements ultimately failed.

ECOWAS (ECOMOG): How Regional Peacekeepers Performed

ECOWAS was the regional organization with the earliest presence in Sierra Leone, but the numerically small size and limited mandate of its forces reduced its security impact to the immediate area surrounding Freetown. Furthermore, the unwillingness to provide troops by Nigeria signaled to the rebels that they could wait out the peacekeepers as they did Executive Outcomes. The involvement of a regional organization like ECOWAS increased the international involvement and legitimacy in the peacekeeping mission; however, ECOWAS brought limited peacekeeping resources into the conflict and did not support peace enforcement with demobilization efforts. The failings of ECOWAS stemmed from its inability to credibly enforce commitments from the combatants.

ECOWAS first deployed forces in Sierra Leone in 1992, but did not become engaged in Sierra Leone's civil war until 1997. ECOWAS arrived in Sierra Leone to support their mission to assist government forces in neighboring Liberia. ECOWAS used the Lungi airport (Freetown) as a supply base for troops stationed along the Liberian border. ECOMOG's presence in Sierra Leone during the early 1990's was limited to the airport, key supply route areas, and the Liberian border region. However, when the Abidjan Agreement fell apart and Sierra Leone descended into chaos under Koroma, the ECOMOG peacekeeping mission became costlier and exposed its limited capability to maintain peace (Woods and Reese 2008: 40-42).

While the presence of ECOWAS reduced the control of the rebel groups, it could not curtail their activities outside of Freetown. The peacekeeping contingent was forced on several occasions to stabilize parts of Freetown when the city was infiltrated by the rebels. Although ECOWAS peacekeepers had an enforcement capability in Freetown,

rebel groups rearmed and remobilized outside the city. Despite their ability to stabilize the government security forces and avert greater chaos from rebel attacks, ECOWAS was unable to substantially alter the costs of war for the rebel forces. Continuing the war had a favorable cost-benefit ratio for the rebels, making peace negotiation unlikely. Rather, ECOWAS was only able to prevent the RUF from achieving their most preferred goal of complete control of Sierra Leone, reducing human suffering, and possibly averting total state collapse in Sierra Leone.

The ECOWAS peacekeeping contingent (hereafter, ECOMOG) was largely supported by Nigerian troops until June 1998. 12,000 of the 13,000 ECOMOG troops were from Nigeria (Adebajo 2002: 91). The involvement of Nigeria had several motives. First, Sani Abacha's regime in Nigeria sought to reduce its international isolation by becoming an active participant in peacekeeping, second, peacekeeping provided both valuable military training for Nigerian troops and lucrative opportunities for corruption and theft, finally, Nigeria wished to contain such regional conflicts, hoping that they could prevent spillover into their own country and playing the role of regional hegemon (Adebajo 2002: 92; Fortna 2008: 71). These incentives provided ECOMOG enough motivation to curtail violence, but not enough to promote public trust, secure the country, and reestablish a functioning government.

ECOMOG pushed violence away from the capital rather than ending the conflict. After the 1997 military coup, the primary responsibilities of ECOMOG troops were to defend Freetown and ensure the implementation of the oil and arms embargo against the ruling military junta. ECOMOG helped negotiate Abidjan Peace Plan, requiring a ceasefire

(monitored by ECOMOG) and the return of the Kabbah government from exile. Although the junta privately agreed to the Abidjan Peace Plan, it publicly renounced it and it was never implemented. Instability within the military junta and RUF collaboration/bribery among government soldiers emboldened the rebels. Once again in 1998, rebel forces attacked Freetown, but ECOMOG troops successfully expelled them. When the fighting subsided, Kabbah was reinstated as President and the rebels continued to rearm in the countryside due to the lifting of the oil and arms embargo (Brummel and Molgaard 2007; UN 2005).

While the violence in 1998 prompted new diplomatic efforts between the Kabbah government and rebels, the peacekeeping force still lacked the enforcement mandate and capability to maintain order throughout Sierra Leone. Though ECOMOG could secure the elected government of Sierra Leone, it did not take measures to weaken the rebels or strengthen government forces to a point that the country could stabilize.

ECOMOG also had to deal with internal difficulties within the peacekeeping force. When Nigerian leader Abacha died, Nigeria returned to democratic rule and Nigerians were less willing to shoulder the high casualty and economic costs of the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone (Rashid 2000: 1; Fortna 2008: 58). The cost of operations was reported to be a million dollars per day and hundreds of Nigerian soldiers lost their lives as a result of hostile action (Fortna 2008: 58). Once Nigeria announced that it would soon withdraw its forces, the international community sought to fast track the peace process and find replacements for the departing Nigerian peacekeepers. This marked the beginning of the departure of ECOMOG and the increasing involvement of the UN.

UNOMSIL deployed 70 unarmed observers to Sierra Leone while ECOMOG was still present, but UNOMSIL also had a limited mandate to observe conditions for "voluntary" disarmament, rather than enforce a peace agreement. UNOMSIL was deployed to support the Conakry Agreement, which was never implemented because the Koroma government backed away from it and Sierra Leone returned to violence shortly afterward (Nuarmah and Zartman 2004).

Failings of ECOMOG

The failure to secure peace in Sierra Leone by ECOMOG was due to its inability to overcome commitment problems in the civil conflict. ECOMOG sought a negotiated resolution while the bargaining position of the government was weak and the international community did not sufficiently signal its willingness to escalate its peacekeeping presence in Sierra Leone. It did not possess the capability to sufficiently force the rebels to accept an agreement, nor did Nigeria want to accept the costs of a protracted peacebuilding mission. As a result, the rebels reneged on agreements and continued to engage in violence throughout the country.

The bargaining position of the RUF was strong relative to the government, so there was very little incentive for the RUF to make concessions when negotiating a peace. ECOMOG demonstrated the ability to secure Freetown, but little else beyond the western peninsulas of Freetown and Lungi. They conceded strategic geographic areas to the RUF in the east allowing rearmament, financed through illegal diamond mining. Normally, permitting a rebel force to operate in remote, landlocked areas of the country would limit its ability to operate, however, the collaboration with Charles Taylor and the smuggling

routes through Liberia gave the RUF the ability to collect weapons and revenues despite the international economic sanctions. The capacity to operate in this environment further illustrates the importance of peacekeeping operations to collaborate with neighboring countries during a mission.

The strength of ECOMOG forces could not compel the RUF to fully commit to an agreement. Despite successful enforcement missions near Freetown (Operation Sandstorm and Operation Tigerhead), the ECOMOG soldiers were not equipped to overwhelm the RUF outside of the city. Poor road conditions and a lack of air support inhibited troop movements in the east of the country and cut off supply lines. Consequently, ECOMOG soldiers found themselves ill equipped and short on supplies (Report 2004). The supply and logistical difficulties required ECOMOG to take up defensive positions around Freetown, rather than secure the rest of the country. Rebel groups used this advantage to remobilize their forces, capture women and children to use as human shields, and overwhelm the ECOMOG forces in their attempts to reoccupy Freetown. RUF tactics of disguising themselves as civilians and using civilians as human shields led ECOMOG forces to capture and kill anyone suspected of being linked with the RUF. Additionally, morale among ECOMOG soldiers remained low as a result of extended deployments and low pay. Many soldiers resorted to extortion and smuggling to supplement their incomes. There is also evidence that ECOMOG soldiers engaged in war atrocities. Poor discipline and morale hurt ECOMOG's credibility as an intermediary among the local population (Woods and Reese 2008: 46, 49).

The attempts at peace negotiations did not provide a credible signal of resolve from ECOMOG to the belligerents. Up to this point, negotiation led the RUF to believe that the international community was unwilling to assume the costs necessary for enforcing a peace. Consequently, the RUF concluded that that their future bargaining position would improve over time. Several explanations account for the RUF's confidence in their bargaining position. First, the timid escalation of commitment by ECOMOG signaled that there was very little desire to strengthen its mission in Sierra Leone. After all, ECOMOG had a presence in Sierra Leone since 1990, but did not assert a robust role Sierra Leone's conflict until 1997. Additionally, ECOMOG's mandate limited its mission to reinstalling Kabbah as President. Once that objective was achieved, ECOMOG did not extend the scope of its peacekeeping operations. Second, the involvement of ECOWAS was an example in which transparent democratic institutions failed to benefit peacekeeping. Nigeria, as the primary contributor of ECOMOG soldiers, conveyed their desire to withdraw troops from Sierra Leone. Intervention in Sierra Leone cost Nigeria a million dollars per day and upset many citizens in the newly democratic country (Adebajo 2002). Transparency, in this case, indicated to the RUF that the citizens of Nigeria were no longer willing to shoulder the costs of intervention in Sierra Leone.

The conclusion of ECOMOG's mission marked the commencement of the UN's peacekeeping mission mandated by the Lomé Peace Accords in July 1999. The government of Sierra Leone made numerous concessions to the RUF and the international community signaled its unwillingness to force the hand of the rebels with a robust military presence. Consequently, the RUF began the implementation phase of the Lomé

Agreement in a strong bargaining position and a belief that the international community was not willing to commit itself to the civil conflict. Despite the generous concessions to the RUF under the Lomé Agreement, the RUF still had incentives to renege on the agreement. A stronger intervention force and signal of resolve from the international community would be required to reduce the incentives for defection by the RUF.

UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL: Peacekeeping and Enforcement Capability

The UN played a substantial role in consolidating peace in Sierra Leone. However, its contribution to a lasting peace came less from its military presence and more from its role as a neutral and credible intermediary. The military resources and personnel that the UN committed did not amount to much more than that which ECOMOG had withdrawn from the country. Lacking a cohesive and robust peace enforcement contingent, Sierra Leone became violent once again despite the presence of UN peacekeepers. The UN provided the peacekeeping effort with a perception of legitimacy and neutrality which primarily helped implement DDR, but depended on British security guarantees. These qualities helped to impose a lasting settlement after security was established. The UN was ultimately successful in Sierra Leone, but it required British security guarantees in order for its demobilization efforts to succeed.

Though the UN authorized ECOMOG's mission in Sierra Leone, it took over peacekeeping responsibilities following the Nigerian withdrawal. UNOMSIL had been authorized as an observer mission in June 1998 with no enforcement capability. The maximum number of observers authorized by the Security Council under UNOMSIL was 210. Thus, fighting continued while UNOMSIL was present and all UN personnel were

evacuated during the December 1998 rebel offensive on Freetown. After ECOMOG recaptured Freetown and the Lomé Peace Agreement was negotiated in May 1999, the belligerents requested an expanded role for the UN peacekeeping mission. In October 1999, UN Security Council Resolution 1270 authorized a new peacekeeping mission creating UNAMSIL and increasing the number of military personnel to 6,000. By February 2000, that number was revised to 11,100 military personnel to oversee the Lomé Peace Agreement. UNAMSIL included a mandate for a larger peacekeeping force, as well as additional responsibilities in civil affairs and civilian police (UN 2005).

Despite the increase in size and scope of the UNAMSIL mission, it was not prepared to stop violence in Sierra Leone if the Lomé Agreement was breached. UNAMSIL was authorized as a peace enforcement mission; however, the force did not present a credible deterrent to the rebels. When UNAMSIL was authorized, it was expected that a majority of the ECOMOG forces would remain, but the ECOMOG forces (primarily Nigeria) intended for UNAMSIL to replace them as peacekeepers (Woods and Reese 2008: 59). From the beginning of the mission, RUF ceasefire violations were frequent and UN access was denied to strategically important rebel strongholds (Fortna 2008: 59). The 6000 UNAMSIL peacekeepers initially deployed in early 2000 avoided the rebel controlled diamond fields of Eastern Sierra Leone. This limited their ability to weaken the RUF and remove their primary motivation for continuing the war. The logistical and supply problems that plagued ECOMOG were exacerbated under UNAMSIL due to inconsistencies of command and control structures, language barriers, and even stolen military equipment (Woods and Reese 2008: 57).

UNAMSIL also had significant difficulty establishing itself as a credible intermediary. Because UNAMSIL had to contend with an estimated 40-50,000 armed combatants in Sierra Leone, the size of the force was increased to 11,100 (total), although half of that force came from remaining Nigerian ECOMOG troops. The Nigerian troops operated autonomously and caused unease among the RUF who did not trust them (Woods and Reese 2008: 58). As the UN force expanded its mission, Sankoh denounced the UN mission as "illegal and inconsistent with the Lomé Agreement" and obstructed UN deployment into the diamond fields of Eastern Sierra Leone (Bright 2000: 2). The UN mission in Sierra Leone effectively collapsed in May 2000 when the RUF violated the ceasefire agreement by killing numerous UN peacekeepers and taking 500 hostages.

The rebels took such actions assuming the determination of the international community was weak and that a resumption of violence would insure a withdrawal of peacekeepers as had happened in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994, respectively. The signals displayed by international community indicated that there was little interest in a costly and protracted mission and the UN mission did not establish itself as a robust presence from the outset. Soldiers arrived in sporadic intervals, military equipment was routinely lost in transit and the commanding General Jetley (India) did not wish to engage in an enforcement mission (Hirsch 2001: 157; Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2002: 14; Fortna 2008: 137). The transition from ECOMOG to UNAMSIL left a temporary security vacuum and credibility gap for the incoming peacekeeping force, since the UN mission had not been militarily tested and the Nigerian and Indian[39] contingents argued over areas of

[39] India was the second largest contributor of peacekeepers to Sierra Leone with approximately 3000 soldiers (four battalion-sized elements).

responsibility (Bright 2000: 1; Fortna 2008: 138). Despite the favorable terms granted to the RUF under the Lomé Agreement, it had reason to believe that it could improve its status in the country by breaking the peace agreement and attempting to assert control over the whole country.

The commitment of the international community proved to be stronger than the RUF expected. Since UNAMSIL's peacekeeping contingent essentially replaced the ECOWAS military forces in size, it could not forcefully deter RUF aggression. However, international reaction to the RUF's hostile actions, informed rebels that the international community would not sit idly in the midst of another failed state. UNAMSIL's mandate was almost immediately revised to "deter and where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile actions or threat of imminent and direct use of force (UN 2000)." The new mandate provided clear language that the UN forces would take preventative and reactive measures to enforce peace in Sierra Leone under Chapter VII. Later, the involvement of the British military in Sierra Leone further clarified the commitment of the international community and that they would not hesitate to provide a deterrent force in the future (Fortna 2008: 138).

Rather than deterring the international community, renewed violence demonstrated the need for a robust peacekeeping force with a stronger enforcement mandate. Televised Images of RUF war atrocities and reports that corporations profited from the trade in conflict diamonds reinforced public support to strengthen the peacekeeping mission rather than withdraw it. Fortna (2008) reveals in several interviews of British and UNAMSIL officials that the RUF breaking of the ceasefire turned out to be a

blessing, because it provoked an immediate response by the British who sought a larger role in the UNAMSIL peacekeeping operation.

UNAMSIL deterred hostile acts by the rebels, but it also restrained government forces from attempting acts of retribution when rebel forces were repelled. In an interview with Behrooz Sadry, the Acting Special Representative to the Secretary General of UNAMSIL, he made it clear that the UN actively prohibited the SLA from taking advantage of the weakened position of the rebel groups insuring that violence did not recur on the part of the government forces (Fortna 2008: 139). Although UNAMSIL was unable to prevent a recurrence of war, it reduced the destruction caused by the breach of the peace.

Failings and Successes of UNAMSIL

In February 2000, the initial UNAMSIL troop contingent of 6000 proved insufficient to curtail violence and the surprise removal of most Nigerian troops made conditions worse. The UN recognized that the situation was deteriorating and passed Resolution 1289 increasing the number of troops in Sierra Leone and allowed more forceful responses to enforce compliance with DDR (UN 2000: paragraph 10). Despite authorization to use more forceful tactics of disarmament, General Jetley refused to change UNAMSIL rules for engagement. After multiple instances of provocation, the RUF began to recognize that UNAMSIL would not respond with force and became bolder in noncompliance with demobilization. By April 2000, the ECOMOG forces had completely withdrawn and the RUF became openly hostile toward UNAMSIL, taking 500 peacekeepers hostage (approximately 300 Kenyans and 200 Zambians). On the surface,

UNAMSIL seemed to be a failed mission since it did not stop a recurrence of violence in Sierra Leone. However, once the commitment of the international community was established by enacting stronger peace enforcement mission, the UN presence in Sierra Leone proved to be crucial in restraining violence and reorganizing the country into a functioning state.

From November 2000 to March 2001, the existence of a strengthened peacekeeping contingent was, perhaps, the only thing that kept Sierra Leone from collapse. The strengthening of UNAMSIL and the backing of the British incapacitated the RUF, but the UN still favored bringing rebel groups into the political process. In order to do that, UNAMSIL coordinated DDR and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Sierra Leone with the British, ensuring that the vacuous security structure would be filled with a capable and legitimate domestic security force. Fortna (2008) describes the efforts of UNAMSIL and the British as a friend vs. foe effort, with UNAMSIL negotiating to bring the RUF into the political process and the British waiting in the wings advocating a more aggressive approach.

Trust among the belligerents was an important component of UNAMSIL's contribution to the peacekeeping effort in Sierra Leone. Early in the UNAMSIL's mission, DDR camps were underequipped, resembled POW camps, and were staffed by Nigerian troops (Woods and Reese 2008: 58). Unsurprisingly, combatants were reluctant to participate in the disarmament process (Chawla 2000). In order to promote successful DDR, UNAMSIL had to convince RUF leaders that they could accomplish more through participating in the political process, rather than undermining it. UNAMSIL General

Opande describes convincing RUF leader Issa Sesay that his security was dependent upon UNAMSIL's ability to provide it (Fortna 2008: 139). UNAMSIL focused on security measures including the disarmament of approximately 75,000 ex-combatants and SSR in the form of rebuilding Sierra Leones police and military. Each soldier that submitted to the DDR process underwent a 6 week program of job retraining and was provided food, clothing, shelter, and transport to anywhere in the country in exchange for his weapon (Woods and Reese 2008: 58). Furthermore, the UN was responsible for providing logistical support and public information campaigns on national elections, repatriation of a half a million refugees, establishing of truth and reconciliation commissions, and leading a coordinated effort to eliminate international trade in conflict diamonds. Multilateral action in post conflict management of Sierra Leone prepared the country for a sustainable future after the civil war.

While UNAMSIL was an integral part of the establishment of peace in Sierra Leone, it needed the backing of a force willing to relay the resolve of the international community. The British intervention force in Sierra Leone served this purpose. While some have contended that UNAMSIL illustrated the failures of international peacekeeping efforts, since it only succeeded after the British intervention, neither intervention force can claim full credit for the success of the mission (Roberson 2007). UNAMSIL depended upon the military strength provided by the British and the British depended upon the multilateral capabilities of UNAMSIL. The mantra of foreign policy has often been "speak softly and carry a big stick." The success of peacekeeping in Sierra Leone is often credited

to the “big stick” of British intervention, but likely would not have lasted without the trusted “voice” of UNAMSIL.

Great Britain

The enforcement capability of a peacekeeping operation is often the point of emphasis in peacekeeping effectiveness, however analysis of the conflict in Sierra Leone illustrates that it is not sufficient to permanently end a civil conflict. Executive Outcomes was as a highly capable military force. Yet, when Executive Outcomes occupied strategically important territory limiting the conflict, its one-dimensional coercive capacity for peace in Sierra Leone evaporated upon its departure. Alternatively, the UN envoys intended to facilitate a peace between the belligerents were also ineffective since they lacked the coercive capability to enforce the terms of the agreements and could do little to stop the belligerents from shirking. The inability of the UNAMSIL to solely police Sierra Leone became evident when 500 UN peacekeepers were taken hostage and many were killed in April-May 2000 attempting to patrol the diamond mining areas of Kono (Malan, Rakate, and McIntyre 2002). It was at this time that Britain deployed a rapid reaction force of 1300 troops called Operation Palliser. A majority of the British forces were withdrawn within 6 weeks, leaving UNAMSIL to remain as the primary peacekeeping force (Williams 2001). While the British involvement proved to be an integral component in pacifying Sierra Leone, it depended upon the UN as a neutral intermediary with the ability to persuade the belligerents to commit to the agreement and implement DDR.

The British sent troops to Sierra Leone to support the UN mission after the collapse of the Lomé Agreement in April 2000. Although the terms of Lomé were highly

favorable toward the RUF and its leadership, the RUF believed that they could gain more from fighting than from cooperation. The involvement of the British was the clearest indication that the RUF was mistaken in that assumption. The British operation in Sierra Leone represented a classic example of counter insurgency (COIN) strategy with signs of success evident with a few weeks of the commencement of the operation (Roberson 2007). First securing the airport and area surrounding Freetown, the British intervention forces allowed the UN and SLA forces to reestablish defensive positions. Britain's primary role in the mission was Security Sector Reform (SSR) by helping reconstitute the SLA as the Republic of Sierra Leone Army (RSLA). With a more disciplined and trained army, the British then played a supportive role in helping the RSLA assert control over the eastern parts of the country under rebel control. In Freetown, the British forces gained the confidence of the citizens of Sierra Leone from regularly patrolling, participating in military exercises, promoting public information campaigns, and the arresting of Foday Sankoh (Roberson 2007). Effectively displaying strength and empowering the local security forces were the primary components of the successful British COIN strategy.

The strength of the British response came from adding the boots on the ground outside of UNAMSIL's strict rules of engagement and the domestic push from the Labor government's focus on promoting peace and prosperity in Africa. As a democratic regime, Britain effectively conveyed their foreign policy intent in Sierra Leone to mount a robust and concerted enforcement mission in the civil war. While democracies are often credited with taking forceful military action at the outset of conflict and signaling the intent of their foreign policy, they are less likely to accept sustained costs of conflict over

time (Mueller 1974; Lake 1992; Martin 2000). Public acceptance of the British mission and the Labor government's desire for a strong foreign policy in the third world permitted the British military to endure sustained costs over time to pacify Sierra Leone. However, operating as a support force to the UN allowed the British to avoid protracted commitments to peacebuilding operations that would have most likely sapped public support over time.

While the British government was initially hesitant to commit forces to Sierra Leone after the collapse of the Lomé Agreement, several criteria motivated the British to become involved. First, the UK was a former colonial ruler in Sierra Leone gave Britain a greater sense of responsibility to a country that it had current and historical links. Second, the failure of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1998 to prevent British arms from being sent to Sierra Leone in breach of UN sanctions increased this sense of responsibility among the British. Finally, failure of the UN mission in Sierra Leone would have undermined British foreign policy as a permanent member of the Security Council. Britain had a moral obligation to assist UNAMSIL and prevent failure of the UN mission (Connaughton 2000; Williams 2001).

After the success of Operation Palliser, the British allowed the RSLA and UNAMSIL to operate autonomously and successfully to promote DDR. In June 2000, the main body of the British contingent left the country and only 200 British soldiers remained to train the RSLA. However, the resolve of the British military was tested when a splinter rebel faction known as the West Side Boys took eleven Royal Irish Regiment soldiers hostage. The British forces responded quickly and decisively with Operation Barras. That

constituted a significant offensive military operation for two reasons. First, the operation was the first offensive counterinsurgency operation of its kind in Sierra Leone and, second, it presented a clear signal of resolve that the international commitment to Sierra Leone could not be broken with hit and run acts of hostility (Roberson 2007: 8). Despite the relatively short and limited period of British involvement, the British peacekeeping contingent permitted UNAMSIL to increase their numbers and reinforced the international commitment to pacifying Sierra Leone from those seeking to spoil the efforts of bringing peace to Sierra Leone.

Most important to the collective peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone was the ability for the British to deter spoilers in the peace process. Despite an effective COIN strategy in Western Sierra Leone and British support for a humanitarian mission, the escalation of British forces posed risks for two reasons. First, the existence of an outside force, portrayed as occupiers, could bolster popular local opposition to the peacekeepers and swell the ranks of the rebels. Second, democratic governments are more responsive to audience costs and even small scale attacks against such forces could have a much larger affects on public opinion at home (Pape 2005). As a result, the British kept their intervention limited, but assertive. Had the British backed away from the mission in Sierra Leone, it would have conveyed weakness by the international community toward the mission in Sierra Leone, emboldening the rebels to take further steps to derail the peace process.

Contributions from the British

The British involvement in Sierra Leone provided the perception of strength to curtail violence, dissuade spoilers, and display commitment by the international community toward peacekeeping efforts. Although the British force only took offensive military action against the RUF in two instances (Operation Palliser and Barras), they provided a visible military threat and added an intelligence capability to the UN mission. The British forces, by patrolling, were able to visibly project strength toward the rebel populations. Their presence on the ground was able to expose rebel weaknesses. The British forces helped identify sources of rebel funding through the illegal diamond trade and the external connection to Charles Taylor's government in Liberia in this illicit trade. Subsequent international sanctions on the diamond trade in West Africa cut off the primary source of funding for the RUF rebels (Roberson 2007: 62-64).

The British presence in Sierra Leone was a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for peace. As a former colonial ruler in Sierra Leone, permanent member of the Security Council, and established global military power, Great Britain had both the capability and resolve to police country and authoritatively impose a cessation of violence. Some have characterized Britain's role in Sierra Leone as "part COIN, part war fighting, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding (Griffin 2005: 216)." However, Britain's real contribution to the peacekeeping mission was establishing credibility in the mission and reestablishing the UN's prominent role in post conflict reconstruction insuring that future commitments would be honored and a just order would return to the country. Collier (2007: 128) describes the British intervention in Sierra Leone as "a model for military intervention… cheap, confident, and sustained." Visible and decisive military engagement, although

brief, signaled their intention to support the UN. Britain had the strength to alter the status quo for the belligerents, but depended on the credibility of the UN to insure acceptance of a new government.

Democratic institutions and public information campaigns influenced the international commitment to the conflict. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) like Global Witness and Partnership Africa-Canada promoted awareness campaigns and brought attention to the role of conflict diamonds in funding the civil war in Sierra Leone. In many cases, diamonds were directly traded for weapons. In January 2000, Partnership Africa-Canada produced a report linking the illicit diamonds trade to the war in Sierra Leone and documented the brutal human rights abuses taking place in the country to acquire diamonds. It also exposed the smuggling routes in Liberia, use of fake invoices, and the role multinationals like DeBeers played in the purchasing of conflict diamonds. (Brummel and Molgaard 2007).

Publicizing the issue gained the attention of the diamond industry and audiences in countries dependent upon global consumer demand for diamonds. The diamond industry and diamond exporting countries were worried that bad publicity might inspire a consumer boycott in the western world. Consequently, DeBeers discontinued buying diamonds on the open market and more than 70 countries approved the UN-sponsored Kimberly Process Certification Schemes. Under the Kimberly process, diamonds are tracked and certified from their point of origin to the stores in which they are sold to insure that they are not illegally smuggled from conflict areas. It is estimated that less

than 1% of diamonds on the market today can be considered conflict diamonds (Brummel and Molgaard 2007).

Information was a weapon against the RUF because democratic audiences reacted to events in Sierra Leone. Linking conflict diamond sales to the mass atrocities in Sierra Leone influenced the international community to take more forceful action and motivated international cooperation to closely regulate the international sale of diamonds. The international community successfully cooperated to remove the primary source of funding for the RUF, crippling its capability and motivation to continue fighting. Information campaigns promoted by NGOs targeted democratic audiences who influenced their leadership to take action and prompted multinational corporations to adjust their business practices. These actions illustrate the impact that civil society has in promoting forceful and multilateral peace enforcement in civil wars.

Alternative Explanations for Post Conflict Peace in Sierra Leone

The Abuja Agreement and the reinstatement of the popularly elected government signified the end of hostilities in Sierra Leone. The British and UNAMSIL interventions successfully implemented security sector reform, oversaw elections, and facilitated government transition. However, alternative explanations for an end to the war should be considered. As an alternative to peacekeeping, the war in Sierra Leone could have plausibly ended as a result of exhaustion, the military victory by the government, or the death of the RUF's charismatic leader.

The first alternative explanation for the end of military hostilities in Sierra Leone may be exhaustion. There is no doubt that civil war in the 1990's had taken a tremendous

toll on the people of Sierra Leone; the will and resources for war may simply have run out. The UN and other international organizations estimate that more than 50,000 people died during the 10 year civil conflict and nearly half the population was at some point displaced. Despite the heavy toll of the war, the rebel forces showed signs that they would continue fighting. Rebels attempted to hide in the mountainous areas near Guinea and continue to attack peacekeepers until the Guinean government took measures to better police its border. Yet, war begets war. Collier (2007: 26-27) finds that "the experience of having been through a civil war roughly doubles the risk of another conflict."

Second, peace in Sierra Leone may have been a result of victory by the government. When one side is overwhelmingly defeated, it has few bargaining chips and, consequently, must take whatever deal is handed to them. The increasing presence of peacekeepers and the removal of funding may have demoralized the RUF so that it could no longer mount a serious military campaign. However, this was not entirely the case in Sierra Leone. While the RUF was dismantled as a rebel and criminal network, it was not completely eliminated. Most of the members of the RUF were not held accountable for war crimes and were allowed to form a political party after the war. If they lacked all ability to bargain after the war, they would not have been granted any political rights.

Another alternative explanation for permanent cessation for civil war in Sierra Leone could have been the cult of personality and wealth that accompanied Foday Sankoh. There is no doubt that Sankoh was the primary instigator of the rebel cause in Sierra Leone and the timing of his death coincided with the implementation of permanent

political concessions. It is possible that the imprisonment of Sankoh left the RUF without leadership and guidance to continue their war. However, splinter factions such as the "West Side Boys" who kidnapped British and RSLA soldiers demonstrated that they were capable of operating autonomously from the RUF leadership. Splinter factions operated less like organized rebel movements and more like local criminal gangs. While Sankoh inspired much of the RUF cause, government corruption and wealth inequality destabilized the country and promoted the conditions necessary for a rebel movement (see Collier 2004).

Accomplishing Peace: Confidence Building through Intermediaries

Theory suggests that third party interventions help clarify bargaining space among the belligerents and alleviate concerns about committing to peace. It is tempting to look at the case of Sierra Leone and conclude that the strong response by the British prompted the collapse of the RUF and rebel groups. This would give the impression that the strength of the intermediary is the most important component of a peacekeeping mission. However, that was only one element of the peacebuilding process for Sierra Leone. There are several inferences that can be drawn from the peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone.

The case study leads to several conclusions. First, peacekeepers need to be resolute in curtailing violence and convey that signal to the peacekept. International leaders must be willing to commit resources to prevent violence and reintegrate the state. The peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone that proved most successful were those that had a strong resolve, rather than a strong military capability. Neither the British, nor Executive Outcomes had overwhelmingly powerful forces committed to their

peacekeeping mission, but they were highly motivated to subdue the violence in Sierra Leone. The Nigerians were less resolute in their mission as a part of ECOMOG. Despite sending approximately 12,000 troops and spending large sums on the mission, the peacekeepers controlled little outside of Freetown and withdrew their forces at their earliest opportunity. Having strong capability when engaging in a peacekeeping mission is important, but equally important is having the right interests at stake. Executive Outcomes was motivated by profit, which motivated them to pacify the country, but did not motivate them to reform the security and government structures. The UN sought to stabilize the country with the intention of making it function properly. To achieve this, the UN negotiated peace treaties, assisted with reforming the military and police, set up a legal framework to manage war crimes, and oversaw elections. Due to these substantive changes, Sierra Leone has not experienced significant violence since the signing of the Abuja Accord.

A second lesson drawn from the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone is that signals matter. The perception of the British forces changed the willingness of the RUF to engage in hostile actions. It took only one significant military operation (Operation Barras) to effectively signal serious intent to halt violence and the RUF got the message. After that, the British allowed the UN and the RSLA to patrol the countryside and the RUF avoided hostile actions out of fear for retribution from the British. The RUF habitually reneged on their commitments to peace agreements and took advantage of their relative strength. The intermediaries continued to offer concessions to the RUF, hoping that they would eventually be placated. It was clear early on that the RUF were deceitful in their

negotiations for peace. Based on their financial incentives, history, and relative strength, the collapse of the Lomé Agreement should have been evident. Peacekeeping missions must be both effective at interpreting and relaying credible signals.

Finally, international cooperation and coordination is important. Once violence is defused, a peacekeeping mission must address the underlying grievances associated with the conflict and implement governmental components of a functioning state. This cannot be done without a concerted effort by the peacekeepers to relay information among the belligerents and coordinate a unified response by the international community. Despite the isolation of the RUF, the UN still had to convince them that they were better off under the new government and demobilize. Additionally, the UN had to convince the new government not to repress and punish former rebels. Furthermore, because it was evident that conflict diamonds were funding the rebels, the international community had to coordinate the Kimberly Process to regulate the international diamond trade. Isolating Sierra Leone's rebels required coordination and cooperation from neighboring countries. Liberia stopped trafficking conflict diamonds and the Guineans increased their border patrols to prevent rebels using cross border safe havens. A considerable amount of international cooperation is required within and without a country to demobilize after a civil war.

The analysis of Sierra Leone provides important lessons about the importance of both peacekeeping and peacekeepers. The civil war would have likely persisted without the introduction of peacekeepers and it could not have been permanently stopped without the right peacekeeping mission as well. Despite the involvement of special

envoys, a private security firm, and a regional organization, violence continued. It took a coordinated effort by the UN and Great Britain to employ clear signals of strength to deter spoilers, facilitate cooperation, demobilize the belligerents, reestablish a legitimate government, and implement a lasting peace agreement.

Comparing the Case Study and the Empirical Results

The findings from the case study on Sierra Leone can be compared to the results from the empirical analysis to determine a broader understanding of why peacekeeping works or does not work in civil conflicts. First, conclusions can be drawn about the strength and the legitimacy of the peacekeeping mission. Second, the importance of an intermediary acting as a facilitator of communication between the belligerents is evident. Third, the role that democracies can play as peacekeepers is clarified. Finally, the case study clarifies the importance of neighboring countries in a civil conflict. Comparing the empirical results and the findings in the case study clarifies the theory on peacekeeping success in civil wars.

The case study on Sierra Leone reaffirms that a strong peacekeeping force can keep warring factions from resuming conflict, but the peacekeeping efforts must also be directed at DDR to prevent future recurrences of conflict. The results of the empirical analysis show that stronger peacekeeping missions deter violence better during the mission, rather than after the departure of the peacekeepers. In Sierra Leone, this finding is better illustrated by the intervention of Executive Outcomes. Executive Outcomes could deter rebel forces, but did not permanently alter the incentives to return to war after their departure. Consequently, the civil war resumed when Executive Outcomes

departed. The British intervention was equally strong in its enforcement capability and successfully deterred violence from the rebel fighters. However, war did not recur after the British departure because of the concurrent DDR and security sector reform of the RSLA forces by UNAMSIL. While the British forces helped deter violence, UNAMSIL altered the conflict environment by disarming rebels and training the RSLA security forces.

The case study also confirms that an outside peacekeeping force must work to continue dialogue as the bargaining structure in the conflict changes. The empirical results show that when a treaty is negotiated during a peacekeeping mission, the factions are more likely to settle their dispute and remain at peace. If war is a breakdown of the bargaining process, a third party peacekeeping mission must facilitate communication to continue the bargaining process. The case study on Sierra Leone reaffirms this contention, but identifies the necessity of bargaining in good faith. The intermediaries in Sierra Leone's civil war were able to negotiate multiple treaties (Conakry, Abidjan and Lomé) between the rebels and the government. However, in each instance, one of the belligerents reneged on the agreement. Despite the failed attempts at negotiation, each successive peace negotiation built upon the previous negotiation. For instance, the Abidjan Agreement required compliance with disarmament to be self reported by the belligerents. Without an independent monitoring institution, noncompliance went unreported. Future agreements required peacekeeping forces to monitor compliance. The success of the peacekeeping forces can be explained both through the intervention forces' abilities to curtail violence as well as the continual efforts to communicate and negotiate between the warring factions. Despite the large amount of enforcement

capability required from the peacekeepers in Sierra Leone, the final outcome of the war was eventually resolved through a negotiated peace agreement.

The empirical results show that when democracies lead peacekeeping missions, there is a greater likelihood for peace both before and after the peacekeeping mission. However, the case study shows that transparency of democratic institutions and a democratic leadership's sensitivity to audience costs can be beneficial and detrimental when displaying resolve. When Nigeria transitioned to a democratic state, the leadership was much more sensitive to the escalating costs of the peacekeeping mission under ECOMOG. As a result, there was significant pressure to withdraw from the peacekeeping mission, resulting in the transfer of peacekeeping authority to UNAMSIL and a remobilization effort by the RUF. However, the involvement of the British peacekeeping force showed that democracies can also use audience costs to their benefit. Two factors motivated the British government to act forcefully in Sierra Leone. First, publicity associated with war atrocities prompted a response on humanitarian grounds. Second, the new Labor government was elected on a foreign policy platform directed at reducing war and poverty in third world countries pressuring it to respond to the situation in Sierra Leone. The British leadership had incentive to become involved as an intermediary and their military responses in Sierra Leone presented credible signals to the rebels that they would not withdraw like Nigeria.

Finally, a comparison of the empirical results and the case study illustrate the importance of neighboring countries to promote long term peace. The empirical models show that when contiguous countries lead a peacekeeping mission, peace will likely

persist during and after the mission. The argument for using this variable was that neighboring countries could bring more resources to civil war and they had a greater incentive to end the conflict. However, the case study in Sierra Leone shows that neighboring countries do not have to be directly involved in the peacekeeping mission to affect the outcome. Illicit trafficking weapons through Liberia kept the RUF armed during the civil war and mountainous jungles near the Guinean border provided refuge and cover for the RUF. However, when Charles Taylor was deposed in Liberia and the UN coordinated with Guinea better monitoring along the border, the RUF was denied supply and safe haven. The denial of safe haven along the border regions of Sierra Leone prevented the RUF from hiding, waiting and rearming.

Chapter 8: How Peacekeeping Works

The primary goal of the dissertation was to identify factors that contributed to the success of peacekeeping operations in civil conflicts. With the increase in civil conflicts globally and their high rates of recurrence, identifying practices that produce the best outcomes is a worthwhile pursuit (Heldt and Wallensteen 2005; Collier et al. 2008). The most popular method for insuring that civil conflicts cease permanently involves outside intervention by way of peacekeeping. Prior research shows that third party interventions improve peaceful outcomes in civil conflicts (Walter 2002; Fortna 2008), but little research actually tests how intermediaries promote more stable post conflict environments. The central question of this research project is what makes intermediaries better peace brokers?

Scholars identify three causal mechanisms that promote effective peacekeeping missions. First, intervention by a third party increases the expected costs of resuming conflict. Should the belligerents resume fighting, they must contend with each other as well as the intervening forces, making resumptions of violence costlier actions. Second, outside intermediaries provide credible sources for signaling and relaying information. Civil conflict can be exacerbated by an inability to trust the intentions of adversaries and credibly commit to agreements. Intermediaries can bridge the gaps between foes, develop mutually acceptable agreements, and monitor/implement the terms of agreements once negotiated. Finally, third parties can represent the will of the international community. Civil conflicts often test the limits of human rights and the international community feels compelled to curtail mass atrocities. By bringing mass

atrocities to light and uniformly condemning them through action, the international community can discredit and isolate those that support the worst outcomes of civil conflict. It was expected that peacekeeping missions representing these theoretical qualities produced the best opportunities for post conflict peace.

The theoretical arguments on third party intervention were categorically tested against the outcomes peacekeepers produce in post civil conflict scenarios from 1945-2006. Peacekeeping missions were measured in their capacity to militarily subdue the warring factions, the informational transparency of peacekeepers' domestic institutions and written agreements, and the international legitimacy credited to the mission. The impact of these causal mechanisms is linked to recurrences of violence upon arrival of peacekeepers. Furthermore, the immediate and long term effects of a peacekeeping operation are contrasted by examining outbreaks of violence while the peacekeepers are present and within the year after their departure. By using these metrics one can identify which missions successfully reduce violence temporarily and permanently. Testing the success of these missions is accomplished through empirical modeling and case study.

The empirical model tests how peacekeeping best pacifies civil conflicts in the immediate and long term. The theoretical contentions all indicate some empirical support to theory, but not all of the hypotheses can be accepted. The hypotheses relating to the strength of the intervention force show minimal evidence strength of the third party intervention reduces the likelihood for recurrences of conflict in civil wars. Hypothesis 1 predicts that greater numbers of peacekeepers sent to the mission should deter resumptions of violence both during and after the peacekeeping mission. The empirical

results do not show that more peacekeepers deployed reduced the likelihood for recurrences of violence. Hypothesis 2 cannot be accepted, either. The empirical analysis does not consistently show that the involvement of a P5 member of the Security Council or a former colonial ruler reduce recurrences of violence in a peacekeeping mission. The empirical results for Hypothesis 3 display results counter to the expectation. The empirical results show that the involvement of a major power in mediation increases the likelihood for recurrences of violence in a civil war. Hypothesis 4 is supported by the empirical data. The regression analysis shows that the involvement of contiguous countries in a peacekeeping mission reduces the likelihood for recurrences of violence both during and after a peacekeeping mission.

The strongest finding in the empirical model is that peacekeeping missions that act as better facilitators of transparent and credible information are more likely to sustain peace. Two of the three variables related to signaling transparency in the peacekeeping mission reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence. The empirical data support Hypothesis 5, suggesting that peacekeeping missions led by democracies reduce the likelihood for recurrences of conflict. Furthermore, the empirical data support Hypothesis 7, suggesting that treaties negotiated during a peacekeeping mission reduce the likelihood for recurrences of violence. Hypothesis 6 is not supported by the empirical data. The data do not show that ceasefire agreements signed before the arrival of a peacekeeping mission reduce recurrences of conflict. However, the contrast in the data between treaties negotiated before the arrival of the peacekeepers and during the peacekeeping mission demonstrates the impact that peacekeeping missions have when facilitating

negotiation. Peacekeeping missions that effectively relay information and continue the bargaining process among the disputants after the fighting stops, promote the best outcomes in civil conflict. The greatest strength in a peacekeeping mission appears to be its ability to present credible and transparent signals between the belligerents.

The empirical data are less supportive of the proxies estimating the legitimacy associated with a peacekeeping mission. The data do not support Hypothesis 8, which contends that UN mandated missions should reduce recurrences of violence during and after a peacekeeping mission. During a peacekeeping mission, the data show that recurrences of violence are more likely when a mission is mandated by the UN. Another measurement for legitimacy associated with a peacekeeping mission included the number of states contributing peacekeepers to a mission. The empirical data show that more states contributing troops to a peacekeeping mission reduce the likelihood for violence during the mission, but not after the peacekeepers leave. Therefore, Hypothesis 9 can only be partially accepted. As a result, the empirical data do not substantially support the theory peacekeeping missions with more international support produce more peaceful outcomes.

Though the empirical model provides valuable insight into the success of peacekeeping missions, the measurements may not fully explain the theoretical contentions. The case study of intervention in Sierra Leone's civil war clarifies the causal mechanisms at work and analyzes effects unseen in the empirical model. Sierra Leone presents an excellent model for analysis because numerous peacekeeping missions were deployed in the civil war, exacting multiple outcomes. Peacekeeping contingents

composed of soldiers from Great Britain, ECOWAS, the UN, and a private security company intervened in the conflict. A peacekeeping force composed of UN peacekeepers and backed by the British were able to subdue the rebel factions and support a functioning government in Sierra Leone.

The case study in Sierra Leone reinforces the importance of strong signaling capability by peacekeeping contingents and highlights important components that are elusive in the empirical model. First, the importance of signaling strength is important in curtailing immediate violence. Though British troops engaged in few military operations, they presented a credible signal of strength to the rebel factions. Next, the importance of local cooperation is clarified. The empirical model showed that neighboring state involvement is important and the case study reinforced that finding since better patrolling of the border regions in Guinea and Liberia contributed to the prevention of rebel groups seeking refuge in neighboring states. Finally, successful peacekeeping is a multidimensional effort. Changes in capability prevented violence from reigniting while peacekeepers were present, but efforts in DDR by the UN and pressure by NGOs to reduce trafficking of conflict diamonds altered the cost-benefit structure for belligerents, insuring that peace would remain after the departure of peacekeepers.

The results of the study answer the research question by examining peacekeeping missions and their resulting outcomes. The study illustrates that a strong intervention is necessary to deter future conflict, but that a viable system for communication and signaling is required for sustained peace after the removal of the peacekeeping mission. “Intervening successfully isn’t so much a matter of how many troops and planes you use,

it's about mustering decisive power –military, diplomatic, legal, economic, moral – while avoiding the casualties and collateral damage that discredit the mission" (Clark 2011).

Directions for Future Research

Any research model contains imprecision and imperfections. One must acknowledge where the imperfections exist and how they might be rectified in future work. Some of the possibilities for imprecision include measurement error and dual causality. While these imperfections must be considered and identified, they do not invalidate the research model. Rather, the imperfections present opportunities for further research. Identifying imperfections in the research model help clarify the boundaries of the findings and consider directions for future research.

The first concern with the research model involves possible measurement imprecision. The measurement for long term peacekeeping success might require more time to fully evaluate peacekeeping effectiveness. The use of 1 year after the departure of peacekeepers was used for three reasons. First, the data were readily available. Second, if belligerents were waiting for the peacekeeping contingent to leave, 1 year is sufficient time to resume war. Third, the measurement of 1 year provides added insurance that if civil war does recur; it remains a product of unresolved issues related to the civil war. However, alternative measurements could be used to determine peacekeeping success. Further work could use the number of years of continuous peace after the departure of a peacekeeping mission. Rather than identifying a dichotomous dependent variable indicating recurrences of violence or not, using a continuous variable could show factors that promote continuous years/months of stable peace.

A second concern with the research model presenting an opportunity for further research involves multiple impacts of a peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping missions are multifaceted events and the impacts of a military campaign, a diplomatic campaign, and a humanitarian campaign cannot easily be analyzed separately and the empirical model treats all of the variables as independent entities. In reality, the variables impact each other. The case study on Sierra Leone attempted to resolve many of the issues related to the multiple affects an outside intervention can have in a civil conflict. However, additional empirical models using interaction variables could show if any of the explanatory variables in the model only promote peace when other variables are present. For instance, a democracy may only be a suitable peacekeeper in the presence of a peace treaty. The combination of transparent institutions and a transparent mandate could reinforce the success of a peacekeeping mission. Further research could identify variables in the model that influence each other.

Finally, peacekeeping is not the only form of intervention into a civil conflict. Additional research could analyze the effects of economic sanctions on isolating belligerents in a civil war. Identifying the impact of intervention through diplomacy could impact outcomes of civil wars. The international community can take numerous courses of action to alter the costs and benefits of belligerents or "shame" them into accepting a compromise. Media coverage may impact civil war recurrence by casting light on war crimes. Intervention into a civil conflict can take multiple forms and further research should reflect the multidimensional aspects of international intervention into civil conflicts.

Ultimately, this research intends to supplement the work of Doyle and Sambanis (2000; 2006), Walter (2002) and Fortna (2008). While these research studies identify the influence and impact of peacekeeping, further research should investigate how local populations view and understand peacekeeping operations. Future research would have to incorporate field studies in countries undergoing peacekeeping operations to document local attitudes.

Policy Implications: Isolate, Mitigate, and Integrate

Research on politics should have some practical importance to guide future policies. Policymakers often feel compelled to act in civil wars, but must understand the implications of taking action. The policy implications for the current research suggest that there are three actions by which peacekeepers should produce immediate and lasting peace in civil conflicts. Peacekeepers must *isolate* the belligerents in civil conflict, *mitigate* the dispute, and *integrate* the belligerents into a functional government and society. These steps also mirror the current US COIN strategy implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan (See: US Army Field Manual 3-24). By enacting these sequential steps in a peacekeeping mission, third party intermediaries can insure the best possibility for peacekeeping success.

Isolating the conflict freezes the disputants from engaging in acts of hostility and allowing for reliable negotiation to take place. The results of the empirical study show that during a peacekeeping operation, it is important to employ an intermediary that can credibly signal intent to apply force if necessary. However, the finding is better supported in the case study by demonstrating that limited military action by the British could signal

to defecting rebels that failure to comply with their agreements would escalate what costs they could expect to incur. Furthermore, some groups in civil conflicts do not prefer peace to war (spoilers) and military force must neutralize the threats such groups pose to the peace process. Combined these findings suggest that having the support of a strong state that exhibits its willingness to intervene can successfully freeze a conflict to allow for negotiation to take place in a civil conflict.

Obtaining the cooperation of neighboring states helps to further isolate the belligerents. Gaining support of neighboring countries may help provide cultural appeals during negotiation, but also cuts off supply routes so that belligerents cannot use a temporary ceasefire to rearm themselves. In the empirical models on peacekeeping success, the results show that involvement of a contiguous state significantly reduces the likelihood for recurrences of conflict. These findings are evident during and after a peacekeeping mission, indicating that the involvement of neighboring countries deters conflict during and after a peacekeeping mission. The case study supports this finding. Neighboring countries were important in providing locations for negotiating ceasefires, but after Liberia and Guinea successfully closed their borders and prevented smuggling and safe haven to the rebels could the conflict be effectively frozen. Furthermore, isolation from implementing the Kimberly Process prevented rebels from gaining ground from illegal sources of revenue. When intervening in a civil conflict, policymakers should gain the diplomatic and operational support of neighboring countries.

Once the belligerents in a civil conflict have been isolated, intervention force must address the grievances related to the civil dispute. It is not enough to apply credible

pressure to compel a ceasefire. A forum and dialogue to settle the political disputes in a conflict must be facilitated by an intermediary. The findings demonstrate that signaling transparency is important for an intermediary when addressing a civil conflict. Democratic peacekeepers produce better chances for successful peacekeeping theorized by the transparency of their institutions. Transparency can be established by putting ceasefire agreements in writing. The empirical analysis compares ceasefire agreements developed by the belligerents and treaties signed during a peacekeeping mission. Treaties negotiated in the presence of a peacekeeping force lead to better prospects for peace. The logistical regression results show that peacekeeping success is more likely when treaties are negotiated in the midst of peacekeepers than when they are negotiated among the belligerents on their own. The case of Sierra Leone illustrates that even in the midst of honest brokering through an intermediary; the intermediary must credibly signal its commitment to implementing the agreement. The RUF believed that the international community was not committed to enforcing the terms of the Lomé Agreement until the British intervened. Negotiating an agreement in the midst of credible security guarantees help belligerents mitigate a civil conflict.

The final stage in a peacekeeping mission must include an integration of the disputing factions into the new government. Once political reconciliation has been achieved, the factions must militarily demobilize. Demobilizing a civil war removes the capacity for war to resume. Because a leap of faith is required to effectively demobilize, belligerents are much more likely to trust a neutral intermediary. At this stage of the peace process, trust and neutrality are valuable assets and the UN has the credibility and

capability to successfully implement and monitor the DDR process. The UN is perceived as a neutral arbiter, beyond the scope of nationalistic causes. As the Libyan rebel opposition leader, Abdel-Hafidh Ghoga, states "if it is with the United Nations, it is not a foreign intervention (Fahim and Kirkpatrick 2011: A11)." Although UN intervention increases the likelihood for recurrences of war during a mission, the empirical analysis shows it has a better record after peacekeepers leave. This indicates that the legitimacy of a UN mission has staying power in peace agreements. The findings on Sierra Leone further support this notion. The UN had logistical problems early in the mission, but provided a much better arbiter for DDR. Executive Outcomes and the Nigerian-led ECOMOG forces could subdue violence, but did not command enough trust among the belligerents to successfully promote demobilization and reintegration of rebel factions.

The peacekeeping process in civil wars can be compared to a medic applying first aid. The first priority of peacekeeping as well as medicine is to stabilize the condition of the patient. Peacekeepers accomplish this task by isolating the belligerents' capacity to wage war. However, a medic's job does not end there. Recovery requires rehabilitation. Violence may cease in a civil conflict but hostility remains. An intermediary must negotiate political grievances and promote practices of good governance to insure public confidence. With commitment problems and informational asymmetries alleviated, belligerents will be more willing disarm and sink costs toward peace. A peacekeeping force must signal the willingness to subdue a civil conflict, but must also take the steps necessary to promote a functioning state if conflict is to permanently cease.

Appendix A

Year	Country	Peacekeeping Mission
1947	Dutch East Indies	UN Good Offices Committee (GOC) military observation mission (Indonesia)
1947	Greece	UN military observation mission - UNSCOB (Greece)
1948	Costa Rica	OAS peace observation mission (Costa Rica)
1949	Dutch East Indies	UN Commission on Indonesia (UNCI) military observation mission
1950	S. Korea	UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) military observation mission
1952	Greece	Balkan Subcommittee of the UN Peace Observation Commission (POC) military observation mission
1954	Vietnam (Fr)	International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - Vietnam)
1954	Laos (Fr)	International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - Cambodia)
1954	Cambodia (Fr)	International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - Laos I)
1955	Costa Rica	OAS peace observation mission (Costa Rica)
1958	Lebanon	UN Observer Group in Lebanon - UNOGIL
1960	Congo-Kinshasa	UN Operation in the Congo - ONUC
1962	Laos	International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC - Laos II)
1963	Cyprus	British peacekeeping mission (Cyprus)
1963	N. Yemen	UN Yemen Observation Mission - UNYOM
1964	Cyprus	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus - UNFICYP
1964	Tanzania	Nigerian peacekeeping mission (Tanzania)
1964	Congo-Kinshasa	Nigerian peacekeeping mission (Congo-Kinshasa)
1965	Dominican Rep.	UN Mission for the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)
1965	Dominican Rep.	OAS Inter-American Peace Force - IAPF (Dominican Republic)
1967	N. Yemen	LAS military observation mission (North Yemen)
1970	Jordan	LAS military observation mission (Jordan)
1973	S. Vietnam	International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS - South Vietnam)
1976	Lebanon	LAS Symbolic Arab Security Force - SASF (Lebanon)
1976	Lebanon	LAS Arab Deterrent Force - ADF (Lebanon)
1979	Chad	Nigerian peacekeeping mission (Chad)
1979	Britain/Rhodesia	Commonwealth Monitoring Force - CMF (Rhodesia)
1980	Chad	OAU peacekeeping mission (Chad)
1981	Chad	OAU peacekeeping mission (Chad)
1982	Lebanon	Multinational Force - MNF I (Lebanon)
1982	Lebanon	Multinational Force - MNF II (Lebanon)
1983	Grenada	OECS Caribbean Peacekeeping Force - CPF (Grenada)
1987	Sri Lanka	Indian Peace Keeping Force - IPKF (Sri Lanka)
1988	Afghanistan	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan - UNGOMAP
1988	Angola	UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM I
1989	S. Africa/Namibia	UN Transition Assistance Group - UNTAG (Namibia)
1989	Nicaragua	International Commission for Support and Verification - CIAV/UN (Nicaragua)
1989	Nicaragua	International Commission for Support and Verification - CIAV/OAS (Nicaragua)

1990	Mozambique	Joint Verification Commission - JVC (Mozambique)
1990	Liberia	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Liberia)
1990	Nicaragua	UN Observers Group in Central America - ONUCA (Nicaragua)
1991	Cambodia	UN Advanced Mission in Cambodia - UNAMIC
1991	Yugoslavia/Croatia	EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM-Croatia)
1991	Yugoslavia/Slovenia	EC Monitoring Mission (ECMM-Slovenia)
1991	Iraq (Kurdish)	US-led multinational force in Iraq/Operation Provide Comfort
1991	Morocco/W. Sahara	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara - MINURSO
1991	Angola	UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM II
1991	Djibouti	French military observation mission (Djibouti)
1991	Rwanda	OAU Military Observer Team - MOT (Rwanda)
1992	Cambodia	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia-UNTAC
1992	Georgia/Ossetia	Joint Peacekeeping Force - JPF (Georgia/Ossetia)
1992	Moldova	Russia, Ukraine, Moldova military observation mission (Moldova)
1992	Moldova	Moldovan Joint Force - MJF (Moldova)
1992	Bosnia-Herzegovina	UN Protection Force (UNPRFOR - Bosnia-Herzegovina)
1992	Croatia/Serbians	UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Croatia)
1992	Macedonia	OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (Macedonia)
1992	Macedonia	UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR - Macedonia)
1992	Mozambique	UN Operation in Mozambique - ONUMOZ
1992	Djibouti	French peacekeeping mission (Djibouti)
1992	Somalia	UN Operation in Somalia - UNOSOM I
1992	Somalia	US-led Unified Task Force - UNITAF/Operation Restore Hope (Somalia)
1992	Rwanda	OAU Neutral Military Observer Group - NMOG I (Rwanda)
1992	El Salvador	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador - ONUSAL (military division)
1993	Cambodia	UN military observation mission (Cambodia)
1993	Georgia/Abkhazia	UN Observer Mission in Georgia - UNOMIG
1993	Tajikistan	CIS peacekeeping mission (Tajikistan)
1993	Liberia	UN Observer Mission in Liberia - UNOMIL
1993	Somalia	UN Operation in Somalia - UNOSOM II
1993	Rwanda	OAU Neutral Military Observer Group - NMOG II (Rwanda)
1993	Rwanda	UN United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)
1993	Rwanda	UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda - UNAMIR
1993	Burundi	OAU Observation Mission in Burundi (OMIB)
1994	Papua New Guinea	South Pacific Peacekeeping Force - SPPF/Operation Lagoon (Papua New Guinea)
1994	Georgia/Abkhazia	CIS peacekeeping mission (Georgia/Abkhazia)
1994	Georgia/Ossetia	OSCE Monitoring Mission (Georgia/Ossetia)
1994	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Western European Union Police Force (WEUPF - Bosnia-Herzegovina)
1994	Tajikistan	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan - UNMOT
1994	Rwanda	French-led multinational force/Operation Turquoise (Rwanda)
1994	Rwanda	US humanitarian protection mission/Operation Support Hope (Rwanda)
1994	Haiti	US-led Multinational Force/Operation Uphold Democracy (Haiti)
1995	Sri Lanka	Canada, Netherlands, Norway observation mission (Sri Lanka)
1995	Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO Implementation Force-IFOR/Operation Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-

		Herzegovina)
1995	Bosnia-Herzegovina	UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina - UNMIBH
1995	Croatia/Serbians	UN Confidence Restoration Operation - UNCRO (Croatia)
1995	Macedonia	UN Preventive Deployment Force-UNPREDEP (Macedonia)
1995	Angola	UN Angola Verification Mission - UNAVEM III
1995	Haiti	UN Mission in Haiti - UNMIH
1996	Philippines	OIC Monitoring Team (MT-Philippines/MNLF)
1996	Bosnia-Herzegovina	NATO Stabilization Force-SFOR/Operation Joint Guard (Bosnia-Herzegovina)
1996	Croatia/Serbians	UN Transitional Authority in East Slavonia - UNTAES (Croatia)
1996	Croatia/Serbians	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka - UNMOP (Croatia)
1996	Haiti	UN Support Mission in Haiti - UNSMIH
1997	Papua New Guinea	Truce Monitoring Group - TMG (Papua New Guinea)
1997	Albania	Italian-led Multi-National Protection Force - MNPF (Albania)
1997	Iraq (Kurds)	Turkey-led Peace Monitoring Force-PMF (Northern Iraq)
1997	Sierra Leone	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Sierra Leone)
1997	Angola	UN Observer Mission in Angola - MONUA
1997	Central African Rep.	Inter-African Monitoring Mission - MISAB (Central African Republic)
1997	Comoros/Anjouan	OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC I
1997	Guatemala	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)
1998	Papua New Guinea	Peace Monitoring Group - PMG (Papua New Guinea)
1998	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission - KVM
1998	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	NATO Kosovo Verification Mission - KVM
1998	Macedonia	EC/EU Monitoring Mission (ECMM/EUMM-Macedonia)
1998	Sierra Leone	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone - UNOMSIL
1998	Guinea-Bissau	ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG - Guinea-Bissau)
1998	Lesotho	SADC peacekeeping mission/Operation Boleas (Lesotho)
1998	Central African Rep.	UN Mission on the Central African Republic-MINURCA
1999	Indonesia/East Timor	UN Assistance Mission in East Timor - UNAMET
1999	Indonesia/East Timor	International Force for East Timor - INTERFET
1999	Indonesia/East Timor	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor - UNTAET
1999	Solomon Islands	Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring Group - CMPPMG (Solomon Islands)
1999	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	UN Mission in Kosovo - UNMIK
1999	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	NATO Kosovo Force - KFOR
1999	Sierra Leone	UN Mission in Sierra Leone - UNAMSIL
1999	Dem. Rep. of Congo	UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo-MONUC
1999	Dem. Rep. of Congo	OAU military observation mission (Democratic Republic of Congo)
2000	Solomon Islands	Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group - CMPAG (Solomon Islands)
2000	Solomon Islands	International Peace Monitoring Team - IPMT (Solomon Islands)
2001	Afghanistan	International Security Assistance Force - ISAF (Afghanistan)
2001	Macedonia	NATO peacekeeping mission/Operation Essential Harvest (Macedonia)

2001	Macedonia	NATO peacekeeping mission/Operation Amber Fox (Macedonia)
2001	Burundi	South African Protection Support Detachment-SAPSD (Burundi)
2001	Central African Rep.	CEN-SAD peacekeeping mission (Central African Republic)
2001	Comoros/Anjouan	OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC II
2002	Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission - SLMM
2002	East Timor	UN Mission of Support in East Timor - UNMISET
2002	Indonesia/Aceh	Henry Dunant Centre - Aceh Monitoring Mission (HDC-AMM)
2002	Macedonia	NATO peacekeeping mission/Operation Allied Harmony (Macedonia)
2002	Sudan/Anya-Nya	Civilian Protection Monitoring Team - CPMT (Sudan)
2002	Ivory Coast	French peacekeeping mission (Cote d'Ivoire)
2002	Central African Rep.	CEMAC peacekeeping mission (Central African Republic)
2002	Comoros	OAU Observer Mission in Comoros-OMIC III
2003	Afghanistan	NATO - ISAF (Afghanistan)
2003	Solomon Islands	Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)
2003	Macedonia	EU Peacekeeping Force in Macedonia/Operation Concordia (EUFOR - Macedonia)
2003	Sudan/Anya-Nya	IGAD Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT-Sudan)
2003	Liberia	ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL)
2003	Liberia	UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
2003	Ivory Coast	ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI)
2003	Ivory Coast	UN Mission for Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI)
2003	Burundi	AU military observation mission (Burundi)
2003	Burundi	AU Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)
2003	Dem. Rep. of Congo	EU Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the DRC/Operation Artemis (IEMF-DRC)
2004	Papua New Guinea	UN Observer Mission in Bougainville (UNOMB)
2004	Papua New Guinea	Australian peacekeeping mission (Papua New Guinea)
2004	Philippines	OIC International Monitoring Team (IMT-Philippines/MILF)
2004	Bosnia-Herzegovina	EU Peacekeeping Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina/Operation Althea (EUFOR - Bosnia-Herzegovina)
2004	Sudan/Darfur	African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS I-Darfur)
2004	Sudan/Darfur	African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS II-Darfur)
2004	Ivory Coast	UN Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
2004	Burundi	UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
2004	Haiti	US-led Multinational Interim Force (MIF-Haiti)
2004	Haiti	UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
2004	Colombia	OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (MAPP-OEA)
2005	Indonesia/Aceh	EU Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP-Aceh)
2005	Indonesia/Aceh	EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)
2005	Sudan/Anya-Nya	UN Mission in Sudan - UNMIS
2006	East Timor	Australian-led Multinational Peacekeeping Force (East Timor)
2006	East Timor	UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT)
2006	Tonga	Australian-led peacekeeping mission (Tonga)
2006	Comoros	AU Mission of Support to the Elections in the Comoros-AMISEC
2006	Dem. Rep. of Congo	EU Force in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR-DRC)

Appendix B

Year	Country	UN Mandate	Lead State	PK Ongoing	Military Hostilities (Ongoing: 2006-2008)
1947	Dutch East Indies	Yes	US	No	
1947	Greece	Yes	US	No	
1948	Costa Rica	No	..	No	
1949	Dutch East Indies	Yes	US	No	
1950	S. Korea	Yes	Australia	No	
1952	Greece	Yes	UK	No	
1954	Vietnam (Fr)	No	India	No	
1954	Laos (Fr)	No	India	No	
1954	Cambodia (Fr)	No	India	No	
1955	Costa Rica	No	..	No	
1958	Lebanon	Yes	Norway	No	
1960	Congo-Kinshasa	Yes	Sweden	No	
1962	Laos	No	India	No	
1963	Cyprus	No	UK	No	
1963	N. Yemen	Yes	Sweden	No	
1964	Cyprus	Yes	India	Yes	No; Diehl et al. (1996), p.686
1964	Tanzania	No	Nigeria	No	
1964	Congo-Kinshasa	No	Nigeria	No	
1965	Dominican Rep.	Yes	India	No	
1965	Dominican Rep.	No	US	No	

1967	N. Yemen	No	..	No
1970	Jordan	No	Egypt	No
1973	S. Vietnam	No	Indonesia	No
1976	Lebanon	No	Egypt	No
1976	Lebanon	No	Egypt	No
1979	Chad	No	Nigeria	No
1979	Britain/Rhodesia	No	UK	No
1980	Chad	No	Congo-Brazzaville	
1981	Chad	No	Nigeria	No
1982	Lebanon	No	US	No
1982	Lebanon	No	France	No
1983	Grenada	No	Jamaica	No
1987	Sri Lanka	No	India	No
1988	Afghanistan	Yes	Finland	No
1988	Angola	Yes	Brazil	No
1989	S. Africa/Namibia	Yes	India	No
1989	Nicaragua	Yes	..	No
1989	Nicaragua	No	Argentina	No
1990	Mozambique	No	..	No
1990	Liberia	No	Nigeria	No
1990	Nicaragua	Yes	Spain	No
1991	Cambodia	Yes	France	No
1991	Yugoslavia/Croatia	No	..	No
1991	Yugoslavia/Slovenia	No	..	No

1991	Iraq (Kurdish)	No	US	No	
1991	Morocco/W. Sahara	Yes	Canada	Yes	No; No known violence in past 2 years.
1991	Angola	Yes	Brazil	No	
1991	Djibouti	No	France	No	
1991	Rwanda	No	..	No	
1992	Cambodia	Yes	Australia	No	
1992	Georgia/Ossetia	No	Russia	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 8/2008
1992	Moldova	No	Russia	No	
1992	Moldova	No	Russia	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
1992	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Yes	Canada	No	
1992	Croatia/Serbians	Yes	India	No	
1992	Macedonia	No	..	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
1992	Macedonia	Yes	Norway	No	
1992	Mozambique	Yes	Brazil	No	
1992	Djibouti	No	France	No	
1992	Somalia	Yes	Pakistan	No	
1992	Somalia	No	US	No	
1992	Rwanda	No	Nigeria	No	
1992	El Salvador	Yes	Spain	No	
1993	Cambodia	Yes	Bangladesh	No	
1993	Georgia/Abkhazia	Yes	Denmark	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 8/2008
1993	Tajikistan	No	Russia	No	

1993	Liberia	Yes	Kenya	No	
1993	Somalia	Yes	Turkey	No	
1993	Rwanda	No	Nigeria	No	
1993	Rwanda	Yes	Canada	No	
1993	Rwanda	Yes	Canada	No	
1993	Burundi	No	Tunisia	No	
1994	Papua New Guinea	No	Australia	No	
1994	Georgia/Abkhazia	No	Russia	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 8/2008
1994	Georgia/Ossetia	No	Russia	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 8/2008
1994	Bosnia-Herzegovina	No	..	No	
1994	Tajikistan	Yes	Jordan	No	
1994	Rwanda	No	France	No	
1994	Rwanda	No	US	No	
1994	Haiti	No	US	No	
1995	Sri Lanka	No	..	No	
1995	Bosnia-Herzegovina	No	US	No	
1995	Bosnia-Herzegovina	Yes	Denmark	No	
1995	Croatia/Serbians	Yes	Jordan	No	
1995	Macedonia	Yes	Finland	No	
1995	Angola	Yes	Brazil	No	
1995	Haiti	Yes	US	No	
1996	Philippines	No	Indonesia	No	
1996	Bosnia-Herzegovina	No	US	No	

1996	Croatia/Serbians	Yes	Belgium	No	
1996	Croatia/Serbians	Yes	Sweden	No	
1996	Haiti	Yes	Canada	No	
1997	Papua New Guinea	No	New Zealand	No	
1997	Albania	No	Italy	No	
1997	Iraq (Kurds)	No	Turkey	No	
1997	Sierra Leone	No	Nigeria	No	
1997	Angola	Yes	Zimbabwe	No	
1997	Central African Rep.	No	Gabon	No	
1997	Comoros/Anjouan	No	..	No	
1997	Guatemala	Yes	Spain	No	
1998	Papua New Guinea	No	Australia	No	
1998	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	No	US	No	
1998	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	No	US	No	
1998	Macedonia	No	..	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
1998	Sierra Leone	Yes	India	No	
1998	Guinea-Bissau	No	Togo	No	
1998	Lesotho	No	South Africa	No	
1998	Central African Rep.	Yes	Gabon	No	
1999	Indonesia/East Timor	Yes	Australia	No	
1999	Indonesia/East Timor	No	Australia	No	
1999	Indonesia/East Timor	Yes	Philippines	No	
1999	Solomon Islands	No	Fiji	No	
1999	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	Yes	Denmark	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years

1999	Yugoslavia/Kosovo	No	US	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
1999	Sierra Leone	Yes	India	No	
1999	Dem. Rep. of Congo	Yes	Senegal	Yes	Yes; Resumption of Violence 2007 PRIO data
1999	Dem. Rep. of Congo	No	Algeria	No	
2000	Solomon Islands	No	Fiji	No	
2000	Solomon Islands	No	Australia	No	
2001	Afghanistan	No	UK	No	
2001	Macedonia	No	Britain	No	
2001	Macedonia	No	Germany	No	
2001	Burundi	No	South Africa	No	
2001	Central African Rep.	No	Libya	No	
2001	Comoros/Anjouan	No	..	No	
2002	Sri Lanka	No	Norway	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 1/2008
2002	East Timor	Yes	Thailand	No	
2002	Indonesia/Aceh	No	Thailand	No	
2002	Macedonia	No	Italy	No	
2002	Sudan/Anya-Nya	No	US	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 PRIO data
2002	Ivory Coast	No	France	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 11/2004
2002	Central African Rep.	No	Gabon	Yes	Yes;
2002	Comoros	No	..	No	
2003	Afghanistan	No	Germany	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2006-2008 PRIO data

2003	Solomon Islands	No	Australia	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2003	Macedonia	No	France	No	
2003	Sudan/Anya-Nya	No	Kenya	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 PRIO data
2003	Liberia	No	Nigeria	No	
2003	Liberia	Yes	Nigeria	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2003	Ivory Coast	No	Senegal	No	
2003	Ivory Coast	Yes	Bangladesh	No	
2003	Burundi	No	Tunisia	No	
2003	Burundi	No	South Africa	No	
2003	Dem. Rep. of Congo	No	France	No	
2004	Papua New Guinea	Yes	Guyana	No	
2004	Papua New Guinea	No	Australia	No	
2004	Philippines	No	Malaysia	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2007-2008 PRIO data
2004	Bosnia-Herzegovina	No	Britain	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2004	Sudan/Darfur	No	Nigeria	No	
2004	Sudan/Darfur	No	Nigeria	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 PRIO data
2004	Ivory Coast	Yes	Benin	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2004
2004	Burundi	Yes	South Africa	No	
2004	Haiti	No	US	No	
2004	Haiti	Yes	Brazil	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2004	Colombia	No	Argentina	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2005	Indonesia/Aceh	No	Netherlands	No	

2005	Indonesia/Aceh	No	Netherlands	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2005	Sudan/Anya-Nya	Yes	India	Yes	Yes; Resumption of violence 2007 PRIO data
2006	East Timor	No	Australia	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2006	East Timor	Yes	Philippines	Yes	No known violence in past 2 years
2006	Tonga	No	Australia	No	
2006	Comoros	No	South Africa	No	
2006	Dem. Rep. of Congo	No	France	No	

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