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# THINGS FALL APART: THE DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY MUTINIES

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THINGS FALL APART:  
THE DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY MUTINIES

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DISSERTATION

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A dissertation submitted in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the  
College of Arts and Sciences at the  
University of Kentucky

By

Jaclyn M. Johnson

Lexington KY

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Lexington, Kentucky

2018

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## ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

### THINGS FALL APART: THE DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY MUTINIES

Military mutinies are occurring more frequently in the last two decades than ever before. Mutinies impact every region of the world. Given that they are occurring more frequently, impact every region, and often have disastrous implications, scholars must answer the foundational question: why do mutinies occur? What are the proximate domestic conditions that give rise to military mutinies? This project makes three contributions. First, I set out to formally define mutinies and collect a new dataset that will allow scholars to examine mutinies empirically. Second, I present a theoretical framework that explains when and why mutinies will occur. Finally, I present three novel empirical tests of the theory.

The first portion of this dissertation defines mutinies and describes the data collection process. I present the Military Mutinies and Defections Databases (MMDD). Using news articles from various sources, I code 460 mutiny events from 1945 – present day. I code a number of other variables that give users details about the event, such as: whether or not violence was used, whether or not civilians were killed, and whether or not soldiers defected from the military apparatus.

Next, I utilize a nested principal agent model to describe when mutinies are likely to occur. Agent models describe hierarchical relationships of delegation. A nested structure allows for multiple agents and multiple principals in a given model. I apply this nested structure to the military to generate three various nests. The first examines foot soldiers as an agent of the military leadership. In this nest, policy failures (e.g., bad strategy) secured by the military leadership will drive foot soldier mutinies. The second nest explores foot soldiers as agents of the executive, a civilian principal. In this nest, I expect that situations that place soldiers in conflict with the executive will generate shirking. The final nest considers foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the executive. I theorize that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking, or mutinies, in this nested structure. The final nest presents an interesting trade-off for a coup-worried leader. I argue that while executives can utilize regime securing strategies, such strategies might actually agitate the military and drive low level military rebellions. Coup proofing, a common practice among executives that are worried they will be ousted

by the military, effectively wards off coups but can generate unintended consequences. Specifically, I expect that counterbalancing measures and other coup proofing tactics should spur mutinies because the intended purpose of these measures is to create coordination challenges which likely spur military splintering.

The first empirical chapter sets out to explore the relationship between civil conflict and the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that when civil wars are extremely bloody or long lasting, mutinies will be more likely as war-weary soldiers no longer want to invest in the war effort. I find evidence that indeed civil war intensity and duration contribute to the probability of a state experiencing a mutiny. The second empirical chapter explores scenarios that pit foot soldiers' preferences against the executive's. I expect that scenarios that impose steep costs on foot soldiers, yet provide some benefit to the executive are likely to spur mutinies. I find evidence that protest events and divisionary conflict spur mutinies. The final empirical chapter explores the military apparatus as a whole. I find that coup proofing measures increase the likelihood of mutinies. Additionally, I find that scenarios that are likely to spur widespread dissent among military actors will increase the likelihood of a mutiny in the context of steep coordination challenges that stifle coup activity.

The final chapter concludes by providing policy recommendations. I offer recommendations for leader states (e.g., major powers and democratic leaders in the international system) and for states experiencing mutinies. I conclude by discussing the many possible extensions for this project. This section seeks to emphasize the fact that this is a young, novel research program with many promising avenues for future research.

KEYWORDS: Mutiny, Military, Civil-Military Relations, Coups,  
Coup Proofing

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April 2018

THINGS FALL APART:  
THE DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY MUTINIES

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For my parents (Kurt and Jodie) and grandparents (Noah and Rosemary; Patricia and George). May this project be one small payment towards the huge debt of gratitude I owe all of you.

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## **Chapter 1**

### **An Introduction: Why Do Mutinies Matter?**

#### **Introduction and Background**

Military mutinies do not occur in isolation. Often they are the first stage in a cascade of events that impact the lives' of civilians. Mutinies are frequently followed by gross violations of human rights, the onset of civil war, and military coups that result in repression. There are a myriad of examples that one could use to highlight the grave impacts that mutinies have on the lives' of individuals. Below I will outline a recent case that occurred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The mutinies that have impacted this state have had severe consequences, but this anecdote does not stand out when reading through the case descriptions of mutinies (see Appendix). Indeed, there are many anecdotes that could have been selected to portray the impact of mutinies.

In late March of 2012, Bosco Ntaganda, a former rebel leader, and his troops mutinied against the DRC national army (FARDC). Ntaganda and his soldiers had previously signed a peace agreement with the central government in 2009 that incorporated rebels back into the state's military apparatus. However, after feeling that the central government had not held up the terms of the agreement, Ntaganda and his troops defected from the FARDC in an effort to protest the central government's actions and to display discontent over unpaid salaries. The renegade troops carved out an area of control in Masisi with several hundred renegade soldiers serving under him (Human Rights Watch 2013). Within several weeks, he declared that the mutiny had given way to a full scale rebellion. This rebellion gave birth to one of the most infamous, notorious rebel groups in recent history, the M23 rebels. A simple mutiny had created a scenario that was quickly spiraling towards disaster and protracted civil war.

The impact that M23 has had on the lives of individuals cannot be understated. Approximately 80% of the total recruitment of child soldiers in 2013 occurred in the North and South Kivu provinces where M23 consolidated power after the mutiny (The International Peace Support Training Centre Report 2013). Within the first three months of M23's formation, Human Rights Watch estimated that M23 raped at least 61 civilians and summarily executed at least 44, although these are likely underestimates (Human Rights Watch 2013). The formation of M23, as a direct result of a military mutiny, produced horrific conditions for civilians and spurred years of ongoing conflict in the DRC.

Mutinies occur in every region of the world and are dramatically increasing in frequency. While I outlined recent events in DRC, there are many other states that have repeatedly experienced mutinies. For example, Nigeria has experienced several protracted mutinies in recent years that have resulted in soldier defections to Boko Haram. Afghanistan's military has seen soldiers regularly defect to the Taliban. Mutinies in Yemen have contributed to the rise of the Houthi rebellion. In many of these instances, mutinies involve state trained and equipped soldiers defecting to violent non-state actors. This type of defection does not bode well for the security of the state. Mutinies have the ability to embolden violent non-state actors by creating parity between these traditionally weak and ill-resourced groups and the traditionally stronger state. Given the potentially disastrous effects that mutinies can have on the state and its civilians, further exploration is needed.

This dissertation starts from the basic premise that while mutinies can have disastrous effects, scholars and policy makers have virtually no systematic information



about mutinies. There is no empirical, quantitative work that explores why mutinies occur. The recent civil military relations literature has focused almost exclusively on military coups d'état. Our aggregate state of knowledge regarding coups has expanded greatly in the last decade. While this knowledge on coups has expanded, a systematic understanding of mutinies is practically nonexistent. To illustrate this point, I surveyed two top International Relations, sub-field journals. Examining *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* and *The Journal of Peace Research*, there have been 463 articles that contain the word “coup”.<sup>1</sup> In contrast, there are 49 articles in these two journals that mention the word “mutiny”. This incongruity in knowledge is surprising given that mutinies are occurring more often than coups at present. This dissertation sets out to enhance our scholarly understanding of why mutinies happen and explore policy-relevant implications of systematic research findings.

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is the empirical task of building a new dataset that codes global instances of military mutinies from 1945-presentday. Beyond facilitating the empirical tests of this dissertation that were previously impossible to carry out due to a lack of data, these data will provide scholars the ability to answer a number of policy-relevant questions about the determinants and effects of military mutinies. These data will also allow scholars to ask questions about variation in the nature of mutinies, such as, why are some mutinies violent and others are not? It is my hope that these data will make lasting and meaningful contribution to scholars' and policymakers' understanding of civil-military relations.

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<sup>1</sup> This count covers the life of these journals. JCR was created in 1957. JPR was created in 1964.

## **Outline of Dissertation**

Given that there are no cross-sectional datasets that code mutinies across regions, data collection was the first step in this project. The following chapter presents a new dataset: the Military Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD). This chapter presents basic descriptive statistics of MMDD as well as exploratory analyses. Here, I unearth a number of patterns in this new catalog of military mutinies. The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter are novel in that scholars and policy makers alike have virtually no systematic knowledge about the nature of mutinies.

Chapter 3 seeks to answer the primary research question of this dissertation, “what are the proximate causes of military mutinies?” I utilize a nested principal agent framework to outline scenarios that are likely to spur military mutinies. There are three primary actors in this nested framework: the foot soldiers, the military leadership, and the executive. These three actors form various hierarchical nests, making a nested principal agent model a suitable theoretical framework. I describe how agents may shirk, or mutiny, due to risk aversion or divergent preferences that do not align with the principal. After outlining the main theoretical mechanisms, I present a number of testable implications regarding scenarios that are expected to create divergent preferences or test risk averse agents and thus are likely to result in shirking.

The subsequent chapters present empirical tests of these theoretical expectations. The first empirical chapter explores the relationship between foot soldiers as agents and military leadership as principals. Here, I argue that foot soldiers are largely risk averse due to their position of individual vulnerability. The risk of conflict for soldiers is grave, imposing steep costs and even death on individuals. Military leaders are tasked with

securing good strategy, or strategies that mitigate individual risk for foot soldiers. When military leaders fail to secure good strategy, the risk posed to foot soldiers is steep. Due to risk aversion, foot soldiers are likely to shirk when bad strategy is selected by military leadership. As an indicator of bad strategy, I examine the impact of long lasting and intense civil war on the likelihood of shirking. I find evidence that risk aversion does drive shirking in this nest where foot soldiers are serving as agents of military leadership. Bloody and enduring civil wars raise the risk of mutiny.

The second empirical chapter examines the relationship between foot soldiers and the executive. In this nest, foot soldiers serve as agents of the civilian principal, the executive. I argue again that risk aversion and divergent preferences will drive shirking in this nest. I expect that military regimes, or regimes where the executive branch and military leaders are essentially one cohesive unit, will be more mutiny prone. I do not find strong empirical support for this expectation. I then examine the impact that protests have on mutinies. Protests can impose steep costs on foot soldiers. I find that indeed, protests spur mutinies. Diversionary war creates scenarios of great danger for foot soldiers and also great benefit for executives. Thus, I expect this relative risk and reward should incentivize shirking by way of mutiny. I find support for this expectation that diversionary conflict increases the chances of a mutiny.

The final empirical chapter examines all the actors in the interaction. In this nest, the foot soldiers and military leadership are serving as agents of the executive. Adding all of the actors back into the model generates complex dynamics and tradeoffs for the executive to consider. Executives are fearful of coup activity as such extraconstitutional shifts in power threaten their tenure. As such, they are likely to impose coup proofing

measures, or strategies that are effective at minimizing the risk of coup activity.

However, such tactics increase coordination challenges and exaggerate existing cleavages in a military, such as those along ethnicity, or generate artificial rifts in order to minimize conspiratorial tendencies. In doing so, executives can unintentionally increase the propensity for mutinies by imposing coup proofing measures on their military.

Additionally, I examine scenarios that are likely to generate wide spread grievances among the military and would traditionally be associated with coup activity. However, in the context of high coup proofing, where coup activity may not be able to be fully realized, I argue that mutinies will be used as a substitution for coups. I examine the impact of democratization and human rights violations on the likelihood of mutinies given a highly counterbalanced military. I find evidence that of all the various types of human rights violations, political imprisonment in the context of high coup proofing spurs mutinies.

The final chapter explores a number of policy implications that arise from the research findings presented in this dissertation. I demonstrate that policy makers in the West have often encouraged and incentivized mutinies in the developing world as a solution to civil conflict. However, I offer a strong caution here. There is actually no evidence that mutinies shorten wars or produce favorable outcomes. Next, I discuss whether or not mutinies may serve as a harbinger for other domestic processes. I show preliminary evidence that mutinies can serve as an early indication of possible coup activity. This evidence is useful to both policy and scholarly communities seeking to predict when and where the next coup may occur. Finally, I offer recommendations to leaders trying to secure their tenure. While coup proofing can ward off coups, there are

potential risks with maximizing counter balancing measures. Specifically, in placing the steepest coup proofing measures on a military, mutinies are more likely. While mutinies do not directly oust the executive, they can give way to escalating processes that pose serious threats to a leader's security, such as: rebellion or full scale revolution. In the last portion of Chapter 7, I put forward many avenues for future research. One of the strengths of this research program is the potential for expansion. I offer several ideas research projects that will serve both scholarly objectives and produce meaningful policy implications.

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## **Chapter 2**

### **Military Mutinies and Defections (MMDD) 1945-2017: A New Dataset**

#### **Special Data Feature**

While research on civil-military relations has burgeoned recently, the focus has remained largely on coups d'état, or events that specifically seek to oust the executive. There is no doubt that coups are critically important; however, they likely only represent the apex of military dissatisfaction. Evidence suggests that militaries have many modalities they utilize to express grievances before launching a fully-realized coup. Specifically, militaries can signal grievances with smaller-scale military rebellion, or mutinies. Focusing solely on coups limits scholars' understanding of the micro-processes of military rebellion. To this point, scholarship has lacked a complete catalog of smaller-scale indiscipline, which prevented the systematic study of such events. The Military Mutinies and Defections Database (MMDD) introduced here provides scholars with the necessary tools to explore indiscipline beyond coups. MMDD provides scholars with the opportunity to examine lower level rebellion that operates through distinct theoretical channels from coups.

Mutinies are central to the understanding of civil military relations. To illustrate the importance of lower-level military rebellion, consider Nigeria's military. Nigeria has not experienced a coup in the last two decades. The last fully realized-coup occurred in 1993 after the military annulled the outcome of a presidential election and stepped into power. As such, observers might conclude that civil-military relations in Nigeria have been relatively placid over the course of the last two decades, especially if they relied on extant data to capture civil military relations (e.g., Powell and Thyne 2011). This conclusion is far from the truth.

Nigeria's military is frequently entangled in civilian politics. Soldiers displeased with the state's policies often use unauthorized tactics or refuse to participate in combat. As recently as July 2008, nearly 30 Nigerian soldiers serving in a United Nations mission in Liberia protested low pay during deployment (BBC Monitoring Africa 2009). Similarly, Nigerian soldiers mutinied on several occasions in 2014, refusing to fight Boko Haram because they felt under-resourced (Daily Nation 2014). While such acts are clearly not coup activities, they are still a threat to the state. As Parsons (2003: 3) writes, "Mutiny is usually a capital offense because it represents a direct challenge to lawful civil authority over the armed forces. Without civil control, soldiers can easily devolve into a predatory threat to the very societies they are charged to protect." The predatory threat posed by military mutinies is critically important to enhancing scholars' understanding of civil military relations.

### **Contributions**

The contributions of this project are threefold. First, there are no longitudinal datasets that systematically code military mutinies across all regions. This dataset represents the first attempt to capture events that do not directly seek to oust the executive but still represent serious forms of military indiscipline. The existing work on military mutinies typically explores case studies that select cases non-randomly upon the dependent variable, making it increasingly difficult to draw inferences about the causes and effects of military mutinies (e.g., Osbourne 2014). This dataset will move scholarship forward by introducing a systematic, cross-sectional catalog of military mutinies, which will allow scholars to test expectations about why militaries rebel and how such rebellions influence other conflict processes.

A second contribution MMDD makes is allowing scholars to consider the impact of military disloyalty through domestic perspectives. The military is a critically important actor in transitioning societies, such as those that are democratizing, concluding a civil war, or experiencing domestic dissent. Successful democratization processes must incorporate the military, as we know that the military is an important veto player in fledgling democracies (Mansfield and Snyder 2002). Military cohesion is also essential for quick and decisive civil war termination (Cunningham 2006). If the military is fractured, civil conflict may drag on as a result of disunity that creates parity between rebel groups and state forces. Likewise, scholars have demonstrated that military loyalty also impacts the success of protest movements. As Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) show, military defections enhance the success of protest movements. While their study only considers the impact of very large-scale defections, MMDD gives scholars the opportunity to examine military rebellion on a smaller scale. Clearly there are many domestic phenomena that are likely impacted by dimensions of military loyalty. MMDD will allow scholars to examine these links across space and time for the first time.

Third, dimensions of military loyalty also impact international phenomena. Military mutinies undoubtedly have an impact on battlefield effectiveness. However, it remains unclear if mutinies should enhance fighting capabilities or weaken them. On the one hand, mutinies might result in a policy change or strategy shift. This divergence from previous policies might enhance a state's fighting capabilities. On the other hand, mutinies represent a splintering within the military and may result in a slapdash, disjointed war effort. MMDD will enable scholars to pursue such questions and test theoretical mechanisms that enhance or diminish fighting effectiveness. Alliance



formation might also be impacted by mutinies. States may hesitate to form alliances with mutiny-prone states, recognizing that their military is prone to fracture. This fracture could make the ally a weak or unreliable partner, thus impacting decisions made at the formation stage. While these are primary suggestions for future work that would consider dimensions of military loyalty, there are many other areas of the intra- and interstate conflict literatures in which MMDD will prove useful.

### **What are Mutinies? A Conceptual Definition**

I define military mutinies as *observable acts committed by military actors with intent to display indiscipline towards leadership in an effort to revise the status quo.*<sup>2</sup> I require that mutiny events surpass a minimum threshold of 12 soldiers for an event to be considered a mutiny.<sup>3</sup> This threshold is in line with the existing understanding that mutinies are defined in large part by their collective nature (Dwyer 2015). In other words, a single rouge soldier or a few renegade combatants does not represent the conceptual equivalent of a mutiny.

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<sup>2</sup> The definition put forward here departs existing narrow definition of mutinies. The most commonly used definition is “an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt against lawfully constituted authority” (Dwyer 2015). One exceedingly important caveat is that this thin conceptualization of mutinies excludes events such as desertion, evading orders purposefully, or military defection. Theoretically, there are a number of ways for soldiers to display grievances, and one particularly effective way might be to remove themselves from the military apparatus altogether or join the other side in a conflict. Therefore, I include desertions and defections in MMDD, but code them accordingly so that users may drop such cases if they do not find them theoretically useful for their project.

<sup>3</sup> While this threshold might seem arbitrary, 12-15 individuals the average size of a squad in the U.S. context. Clearly, the size of squads may vary between countries, but this is at least a full unit of soldiers in most contexts and provides a theoretical justification for this threshold.

The key components of the MMDD definition of mutiny require elaboration. First, mutiny events must be purposeful, not accidental. Simply misunderstanding orders does not constitute a military mutiny. Mutineers must clearly share a grievance, and as a result, attempt to change the status quo by defying the chain of command in some observable, collective way. Mutinies may occur domestically or abroad when troops are deployed.<sup>4</sup> Below I will outline who perpetrates mutinies, who mutineers target, and the goals of mutinies.

Military actors must perpetrate military mutinies. MMDD does not code events of rebellion carried out by those in civilian positions, rebel groups, or military reserves.<sup>5</sup> Early work on civil military relations largely argued “soldiers mutiny, while officers stage coups” (Nordlinger 1977). While this statement contains an attractive element of simplicity, the rough dichotomy does not hold up in reality. There are many cases of mutiny that are initiated and orchestrated by junior officers, officers, or generals. For example, junior officers perpetrated the 2011 Libyan mutiny by rebelling inside the home of Al-Qadhafi (BBC Monitoring Middle East 2011). These junior officers were quickly opposed by Al-Qadhafi’s paramilitary. They were clearly not seeking to harm or oust Al-Qadhafi himself, but instead were using intimidation tactics to promote their interests. This case highlights that while mutinies are generally carried out by the rank-and-file, higher ranking military officials can also perpetrate them. For this reason, MMDD

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<sup>4</sup> When troops are deployed, mutinies are coded in respect to which state’s forces mutinied. For example, the German mutiny in February 1945 occurred in Copenhagen. Because German troops mutinied, this is coded as a German mutiny, rather than a Danish mutiny.

<sup>5</sup> Espionage events are not coded in MMDD, although they are often labeled “defections.”

includes a variable that codes whether or not mutinies are perpetrated by foot-soldiers or are spearheaded by military leaders. I define military leaders as commissioned ranks as opposed to non-commissioned ranks. However, MMDD does not set out to distinguish mutinies from coups based upon the perpetrators. I allow for military leadership to mutiny, just like foot soldiers. Instead, what separates coups and mutinies is the goal. Events that have the explicit goal to oust the executive are coups, while event that have a goal short of regime change are mutinies.

Mutinies can have two potential targets: military leadership (e.g., various commissioned officers, such as Lieutenant Colonels) or the executive. Similar to perpetrators, I do not categorize mutinies based upon the target. In my extensive reading of cases, I learned that mutinies often target the executive, just like coups. As the unusual 2011 Libyan mutiny illustrates, sometimes mutinies can, in fact, target the executive. Because mutinies may target the executive, they can be difficult to distinguish from coups. Fortunately, coup scholars have spent a great deal of time considering the ultimate goal of coup-plotters. As Powell and Thyne (2011: 249) state, coups are “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive.” Thus MMDD only codes events that begin with no clear intent to oust the executive. However, there are times that this intent to oust the executive develops as events progress. Below I will describe the process for handling such escalating events.

Mutinies may be one early step in a larger, escalating process of contentious in politics. As Rose (1982: 572) suggests, mutinies can be “the first step in a much larger upheaval and the catalyst through which discontents in other sectors of society are activated.” In reality, a series of mutinies will often proceed coup activity. Therefore, it is

critical to establish when the dissent moves from mutiny territory and into coup activity. In an order to capture this escalation effect, I have coded two variables that capture escalation. These variables are coded 1 if a coup occurs within two temporal thresholds of a mutiny (1 month and 6 months). These variables will allow users to carefully consider the relationship between these distinct forms of military rebellion. In addition, Powell and Thyne's (2011) coup dataset was cross-referenced to ensure that no coup attempts were coded as mutinies unless the event clearly began as a mutiny that escalated to a coup. Each mutiny's source document was assessed to confirm that the perpetrators were seeking to change military policy or to signal grievances to observers, rather than explicitly seeking to oust the executive.

Failed coups present a unique challenge. Because failed coups do not result in the ousting of the executive, they can be hard to distinguish from mutinies. Singh (2014: 37) calls coup attempts led by foot soldiers "coups from the bottom." He writes that a "coup from the bottom" is "...a mutiny intent to overthrow the government." While I recognize that there are a handful of coup attempts that are led by the foot soldiers, they are vastly outnumbered by coup attempts organized by military leaders. Coups from the bottom and mutinies should not be conceptually conflated, as these are two distinct processes that can be differentiated from one another. As outlined previously, a coup, even those led by foot soldiers, will be observable because they are *overt* attempts to unseat the executive.

**Mutineers have a goal short of unseating the executive. Thus, MMDD is not coding "coups from the bottom," as they are conceptually distinct from mutinies.**

## Data Collection

MMDD was coded using *Lexis-Nexis Uni* (formerly known as *Lexis-Nexis Academic*) and the *Historical New York Times*. *Lexis-Nexis Uni* searches beyond major English news wire sources, making it extremely useful for this project. *The New York Times* was also used due to its widespread accessibility and enhanced temporal coverage. The search was performed with the following terms: “mutiny,” “military mutiny,” “military sedition,” “military defection,” “military desertion,” “military rebellion,” “soldier mutiny,” “soldier defection,” “soldier desertion,” “soldier rebellion,” “troop mutiny,” “troop rebellion,” “troop desertion,” “troop defection.” In some instances, news sources did not report specifics about the mutiny event, such as the number of soldiers involved or the duration. In these instances, consulting books and region-specific academic journals clarified these specifics.<sup>6</sup> If reliable information could not be located, those variables were marked as missing in the dataset for that case.

Other datasets were consulted to identify candidate cases. Powell and Thyne’s (2011) full coup candidate dataset includes events that were initially considered for inclusion in their coup dataset but were excluded because there was no overt attempt made to oust the executive. I reviewed each of these cases, and many of them were mutinies rather than coups.<sup>7,8</sup> The Social Political and Economic Events Dataset (SPEED), Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD), and the Armed Conflict Location, and Event Data Project (ACLED) code events of mutiny (Nardulli et al. 2014; Salehyan

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<sup>6</sup> Outside sources are reported in the dataset files.

<sup>7</sup> 22 cases were identified from Powell and Thyne (2011) using the “no\_exec” variable in their full candidate case dataset.

<sup>8</sup> Counter coups are not included in MMDD.

et al. 2012; Raleigh et al. 2010). I also used these datasets to help identify candidate cases; however, it is important to note that the primary objective of these projects is not to produce a comprehensive catalog of mutinies. As such, I find that many mutinies are not coded in these datasets and some of the events that are coded do not fit the formal definition of mutinies. Indeed, many of the events coded as mutinies in these datasets do not even roughly resemble mutinies.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, I consult Dwyer (2015) to explore her sample of mutinies in Western Africa. Likewise, I find that many of the events coded here do not meet MMDD's formal definition of mutinies. Some events in this research could not be verified by primary or secondary sources, and thus are not included in MMDD. It is likely that these existing data sources have been miscoding mutinies, thus inhibiting scholars' ability to draw accurate inferences about the effects and determinants of mutinies. MMDD addresses this issue by coding only events that meet a formal conceptual and empirical definition of mutiny.

Beyond coding the occurrence of mutiny, MMDD also codes several pieces of specific information about each event. Each mutiny event is geocoded. For the majority of events, the specific sub-national latitude and longitude of the location of the mutiny is reported.<sup>10</sup> This geocoding will provide users with the unique ability to examine

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<sup>9</sup> For example, there are events in SPEED that are coded as mutinies (or they take on the value of 18 on the "stat-act" variable). However, many of these events are clearly not mutinies. There are several events from the integration era in America that are coded as mutinies. News articles for some of these events are titled, "New Flare up in Nashville" (1968), "Columbus, Ga., Mayor Asks People to Keep off Streets" (1971), and "Louisville Bussing Resumes as More Students Enroll" (1975). Given the high level of certainty in the American context that these are not mutinies, users should also seriously question the accuracy of this coding scheme in lower information environments.

<sup>10</sup> For most events, these coordinates are coded for the specific location of the mutiny within a city. However, some news reports are less specific than others. For less specific articles, the coordinates of the city in which the mutiny occurred are reported.

dynamics of spatial contagion and subnational considerations of military rebellion. Characteristics of each mutiny event are also coded, such as: estimated number of mutineers, estimated duration of mutiny in days, the occurrence of civilian deaths, and the occurrence of violence. I have also coded particular characteristics on which users can eliminate particular types of events. For example, I have coded whether or not junior officers led the mutiny. If users are only concerned about foot soldier mutinies, this variable will allow them to drop all events that military leadership influenced. Likewise, I have coded two escalation variables that code if a mutiny escalated to a coup within 1 month or 6 months. Thus, if users want to only examine cases of escalation or exclude cases of escalation, this variable facilitates such adjustments.

A dichotomous variable is coded to capture whether or not an event involved defection. Defection can be conceptually tricky. In order for an event to involve defection, the state must be actively countering either an internal threat (e.g., rebel group, terrorist organization, secessionist movement, etc.) or an external threat. Defection only occurs if there is evidence or suggestion in the source document that the soldiers not only left the military apparatus, but then joined forces with this internal or external threat. Defections are theoretically important because they are events that shift the balance of power between state militaries and their opponents.

MMDD users might be concerned with the reliability of the data. As with any measure in social science, there are likely errors associated with the measurement of indicators (Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). However, it is unlikely that these errors are systematic, thus introducing noise into the data but not systematically biasing them in one direction. While most errors are likely random, there may be some systematic biases in

MMDD. There are fewer events occurring in Asia and in closed regimes, likely due to a gap in reporting and media restraints. Non-democracies are able to suppress the media in ways that constrain the reporting of any form of state weakness. For example, the managing editor of *L'Observateur*, a weekly newspaper in Chad, was detained and held in police custody after reporting on a 2013 mutiny in the Bardai region of Chad (BBC Monitoring Africa 2013). Events like this might result in a systematic underreporting in non-democracies.

In order to partially address this issue, users should always include a control variable for regime type and consider using regional fixed effects. Additionally, MMDD users might consider estimating models on a limited sample to see if findings hold (e.g., limiting the sample to only Western democracies where there is little reporting gap). As a final robustness check, users might consider including a control variable in the estimation that holds constant the total number of news articles from each country in a specific year. While it would be nice to be able to overcome such systematic biases in more satisfying ways, many events datasets suffer from similar biases (e.g., human rights data). However, these potential biases should not deter scholars from attempting to examine critically important topics that can have dire consequences for civilians. As we know, similar reporting biases exist across many commonly used data sources. Regime type and media openness is likely the only systematic bias in these data. All other bias will be random, thus not threatening our ability to draw inferences with these new data.

Validity of the measure is another concern. While a measure might be reliable, it could still lack conceptual validity, meaning that it does not adequately capture the concept being operationalized. As mentioned previously, the literature has conceived of



mutinies in various ways. Some conceive of mutinies only occurring within the military apparatus while others equate mutinies with defection events. In order to address this conceptual confusion, there is a variable that indicates defections, allowing users to decide whether or not they want to include these events in their study of mutinies.

MMDD has reassuring face validity. I find 460 mutiny events over this time series, which is about what we should expect to see given that there are roughly the same number of coups attempts in this time period (Powell and Thyne 2011).<sup>11</sup> Perhaps face validity would be challenged if MMDD found a drastically different number, but indeed, MMDD yields roughly the same number of events. In compiling MMDD, I have made every attempt to make a user-friendly dataset that can be manipulated depending on the user's research question and goals.

### **Exploring MMDD**

Presented below are a number of descriptive and exploratory figures that seek to find general patterns and identify possible determinants of mutinies. Figure 2.1 presents military mutinies across space. Unsurprisingly, the Global South experiences more mutinies than the North. This pattern is likely driven by regime type, given that the majority of anocracies and autocracies are located in the Global South. Another important observation to make from this figure is that mutinies are occurring in every region. There are no regions that are “mutiny-proofed”.

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<sup>11</sup> They code 475 events.

**Figure 2.1: Military Mutinies across Space, 1945-2018**




Table 2.1 summarizes the frequencies of mutinies across regions. Africa stands out as not only the most mutiny prone region. Given that mutinies occur, they are more likely to be violent if they occur in Asia. Not surprisingly, the fewest violent mutinies occur in Europe where democracies tend to be more consolidated and other levels of political violence are lower.

**Table 2.1:** Frequency of Mutinies across Regions, 1945-2017

Region	Name	Count of Mutinies	Count of Violent Mutinies (% of mutinies associated with violence)
1	Europe	51	12 (23.5%)
2	Middle East	61	19 (31.1%)
3	Asia	102	50 (49%)
4	Africa	199	82 (41.2%)
5	Americas	47	15 (31.9%)

**Figure 2.2:** Mutinies by Region





Figure 2.2 displays the number of mutinies across region graphically. This figure also displays the portion of mutinies that involved defection. Remember, defections are coded when the source document indicates that soldiers left the state’s military apparatus and joined cohorts with an internal or external threat. We see that defections follow the same general pattern as the total count of mutinies. Defections occur most often in Africa, likely due to the strong presence of both internal and external threats and the weakness of state institutions. This state weakness creates opportunity structures that incentivize defection. Furthermore, threats (most specifically internal threats) are often designed to be competitors of the state and offer an alternative to disgruntled soldiers. In contrast, defections occur least often in Europe. Figure 2.3 displays defections across space. In this


figure, X's are events that involved defection. Black circles are mutinies that were not associated with defection.

Figure 2.3: Mutinies with Defections 1945-2018



Next, Figure 2.4 presents military mutinies and coups d'état across time. An interesting pattern emerges from this exercise. This figure demonstrates that in the post-Cold War era, militaries have shown an increased propensity for mutinous activity. At the same time, the number of military coups is dwindling. This pattern firmly justifies the continued exploration of mutinies. Mutinies often disastrous implications for human security, and they are happening more often than military coups at present. These two observations motivate the remainder of this dissertation. Given that mutinies happen more now than in previous decades, they have outpaced coups, and they can impact civilians, we must understand why they happen.

**Figure 2.4:** Mutinies and Coups d'état over Time



Next, I explore the relationship between regime type and mutinies. Figure 2.5 shows military mutinies across different regime types using Polity IV measures of regime type (Marshall and Gurr 2009).<sup>12</sup> Interestingly, the figure suggests that there is a non-monotonic relationship between regime type and the mutiny proneness of a country. Semi-democracies appear to be the most susceptible polities to military disloyalty.<sup>13</sup> This pattern in the data makes sense when considering that militaries in democracies are likely to have institutional avenues to secure their organizational preferences, making the option of mutiny less appealing and necessary in the first place. In contrast, militaries in completely autocratic states are unlikely to rebel because the heavy-handed, repressive nature of the regime is likely to enhance loyalty even if it is not sincere. Militaries in semi-open regimes are likely to face circumstances that make them unsatisfied with the status quo. Furthermore, militaries in semi-open regimes are more likely than their democratic and autocratic counterparts to carry out violent mutinies. This figure also demonstrates that semi-democracies are more likely to experience violent mutinies than other regime types. Figure 2.6 displays violent mutinies across space. In this figure, triangles represent mutinies that were associated with violence. Circles represent peaceful mutinies. About half of all mutinies are associated with violence.


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<sup>12</sup> Autocracies are indicated by regimes that score a -6 or lower, while democracies must score a 6 or higher. Semi-democracies are regimes that fall somewhere between these cut points.

<sup>13</sup> Returning to the idea of reporting bias, this pattern offers an interesting insight. If reporting bias was pervasive in these data we would expect to see that democracies have the most events, semi-democracies the second most, and dictatorships the least. Instead, we see that semi-democracies have the most events and dictatorships the least. While this pattern does not go a long way to assuage concerns about the autocracy category, this pattern should alleviate fears that MMDD is only picking up events in transparent democracies.



**Figure 2.5:** Mutinies by Regime Type 1945-2016




ANOVA [F(2, 7465) = 20.44, p=0.000]

Figure 2.6: Violent Mutinies 1945-2018




Figure 2.7 explores the relationship between regime type and the duration of mutinies. Duration is captured by the estimated number of days a mutiny lasted. The round symbols in the figure are proportional representation symbols. Larger circles represent longer lasting mutinies whereas smaller circles represent shorter mutinies. This figure demonstrates that while autocracies and democracies experience mutinies less often than anocracies, the nature of the mutinies they do experience is qualitatively different. Autocracies experience protracted mutinies that endure longer. Democracies tend to have short-lived mutinies. There is no coherent pattern for semi-democracies. Some mutinies in these regimes are very long while others are short. Figure 2.8 displays the relative duration of mutinies spatially.

**Figure 2.7:** Proportional Duration of Mutinies by Regime Time



**Figure 2.8:** Proportional Duration of Mutinies 1945-2018



Mutinies vary dramatically by size. Figure 2.9 displays the relative size of mutinies spatially. The size variable is coded as the estimated number of individuals involved in a mutiny event. This variable is only coded if the source document provides an estimate. This variable ranges from 1-25,000 individuals.<sup>14</sup> The largest mutiny in the dataset took place in Egypt in 1986 after conscripts of the CSF (paramilitary organization) staged a protest in Cairo in response to a rumor that conscription terms were going to be lengthened from 3 years to 4 years of service. The second largest event in MMDD occurred in Iraq in 2004. The Iraqi army was ordered to deploy to Fallujah in an effort to assist U.S. Marines who were actively fighting in this region. The troops refused these orders and an estimated 15,000 soldiers and military police officers deserted their posts. This forced the U.S. to reevaluate military recruiting and retention strategies in Iraq. Despite these dramatic outliers, the average size of a mutiny event in MMDD is 88 soldiers.

Six percent of mutinies are associated with civilian deaths. Figure 2.9 displays these events spatially. Squares represent mutinies that are associated with civilian deaths. Circles represent mutinies that did not kill civilians. It is possible that this variable is an underestimate of reality. This dichotomous variable was only coded if the source document explicitly mentioned the death of a civilian. Therefore, it is likely that there are events in which civilians were killed but the source document did not explicitly state this, resulting in a false negative. Even with this possible bias, we still see that 1 out of every

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<sup>14</sup> Size is only coded for 260 mutiny events (56.5% of MMDD). Many source documents do not mention size estimates. Thus, this information is only available for some events.

20 mutinies results in the death of a civilian, proving that these events have a direct and immediate impact on human security.

**Figure 2.9:** Mutinies Associated with Civilian Deaths 1945-2018



Some mutinies are led by commissioned ranks while others are conducted entirely by foot soldiers. This reality may be of interest to scholars seeking to understand the impacts of mutinies. It is theoretically plausible that foot soldier mutinies have distinct outcomes when compared to those that involve military leaders. For example, foot soldier mutinies may likely be more violent in nature than mutinies in which commissioned ranks are involved. When foot soldiers lead mutinies, they are likely less concerned with legitimacy and more concerned with securing their preferences as quickly as possible by any means necessary. Generally, these foot soldier mutinies are staged over resources. One particularly effective way to secure resources is to exploit the civilian population through the use of violence to facilitate looting. In contrast, commissioned ranks understand that the use of violence may spoil their movement (similar to Stephan and Chenoweth's argument mentioned earlier). Commissioned officers will be more hesitant to use violence, understanding that it may in fact detract from the effectiveness of their campaign.

Using a simple contingency analysis, Table 2.2 demonstrates preliminary evidence that foot soldier mutinies may be more dangerous than mutinies led by low-ranking military officers. 45.2% of all foot soldier mutinies are associated with violence while only 27.1% of mutinies led by commissioned ranks are associated with violence (chi-squared = 14.7,  $p < 0.001$ ). Figure 10 displays whether a mutiny was led by commissioned officers or foot soldiers. Stars represent events that were initiated by commissioned ranks while circles represent foot soldier mutinies.




**Table 2.2:** Mutinies and Civil Conflict, 1945-2008

	Foot Soldier	Low Rank	Total
Not Violent	161 (54.7%)	121 (72.9%)	282
Violent	133 (45.2%)	45 (27.1%)	178
Total	294	166	460

Pearson  $\chi^2(2) = 14.7002, p < 0.001$

**Figure 2.10:** Mutinies lead by Commissioned Officers 1945-2018



## **Avenues for Future Research**

Beyond the enticing empirical relationships explored above, there are several theoretical and policy-oriented areas for further research on mutinies. First, there is an emerging reality that the international community is beginning to punish coup activity more harshly and consistently than in previous decades. Specifically, in the post-Cold War era, coups are generally condemned by democratic leaders in the international system as well as in international organizations. Consider the recent July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. Despite Erdogan's tenuous leadership, President Obama was swift in his condemning response. President Obama urged all parties to "support the democratically elected government of Turkey," seeking to discourage such upheaval (Politico 2016). Furthermore, international organizations are also likely to respond negatively to coup activity. The 2009 Honduran coup resulted in immediate expulsion of the state from the Organization of American States (OAS), revoking all membership contingent benefits (OAS Press Release 2009). As the cost of coup plotting continues to rise, it is likely that the incidence of mutinies will continue to increase as military actors recognize that this is a less costly alternative to coup plotting.

Beyond the rising cost of coups, there is strong evidence that the incidence of coups is waning (Lindberg and Clark 2008). Thyne and his colleagues (2016) demonstrate that negative international reactions to coups decrease the time that a coup plotter will remain in power after they stage a successful coup. These findings suggest that the post-coup state is often treacherous for the putschist. Given the rising costs associated with launching a coup, it seems likely that militaries will pivot to new modalities of rebellion that are less costly but are still likely to change the status quo. It

seems reasonable to expect coups to continue to decline and lower levels of indiscipline to become the new normal, especially given the large difference in costs.

Third, not only do mutinies seem to be an increasingly popular form of dissent, but they also continue to shape the face of civil conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Consider the current Syrian civil war. As Arab Spring protests reached Syria in late March of 2011, tens of thousands of protesters joined the movement across several of the state's largest cities. The Assad regime was clear in its intention to repress, ordering the military to squelch contention as effectively as possible, even ordering soldiers to fire and kill peaceful dissidents where necessary. However, portions of the military refused to comply with the regime's orders. Sunni portions of the military mutinied at remarkable rates. Some of these disloyal combatants sought political asylum, some were executed, and many joined the rebel forces (Nepstad 2013). It is still unclear the degree to which some of these defecting soldiers supported, sympathized with, and ultimately joined non-state actors operating in Syria. While spurred by generations of sectarian divides, the defection of Sunni combatants has undoubtedly contributed to Syria's bloody civil war by leveling the playing field between the state forces and rebel forces. The lack of state forces and fighting capacity in particular regions facilitated ISIS's growth and its ability to consolidate grip on swaths of territory, including Raqqa and Deir al-Zour.

Syria is not alone in demonstrating how military mutinies contribute to prolonged civil conflict. For nearly two decades, conflict has plagued the Central African Republic (CAR). It is clear that this conflict is at least partially rooted in the state's inability to ward off protracted military mutinies. In 1996, portions of the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) mutinied over low wages and concerns of equity. President Patasse was

unable to appease the mutineers, which resulted in a lack of fighting capacity for the state. Local militias and rebel groups were able to successfully recruit, generate revenue, and engage in guerilla tactics because of this vacuum of state military power. In an act of improvisation, President Patasse formed a new security force that would later commit wide-scale human rights violation in the name of the state (U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, February 23, 2000). Much like the current Syrian case, mutinies provided the kindling needed to spark civil conflict and sustain the fire for nearly two decades in CAR. These two examples of the impact of military mutinies on the stability of states and on the severity of intrastate war call attention to the need for systematic understanding of this unique phenomenon.

Fourth, military mutinies also have direct implications for the study of interstate conflict and traditional measures of power. Scholars who examine military power generally use measures such as Composite Index of National Capabilities, or CINC scores (Small and Singer 1982). However, such measures do not consider military loyalty, a dimension of power that has a direct and measurable impact on the state's ability to wage war. There is an implicit assumption behind the use of CINC scores that every state will be able to leverage proportional resources in the CINC index in the event of a conflict. However, simply because a state has a large military does not mean that it will translate directly into fighting power. A large military may be plagued with ideological divides, ethnic cleavages, grievances due to under resourcing, etc. Any one of these factors may result in a large military being ineffective at fighting if rifts generate mutinies — meaning the total number of military personnel never make it to the battlefield because they decide to walk off their post. States are only as strong as their

military is cohesive. MMDD will allow scholars to critically examine how much dimensions of military disloyalty influence traditional conceptions of power.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter introduces MMDD, a unique dataset that codes events of military rebellion. This new tool will allow scholars to test theoretical expectations about the determinants and effects of mutinies. The chapter also explored a handful of empirical relationships and discussed implications of MMDD for a variety of research areas. Regarding mutinies as a future research agenda, there are a number of directions for investigation. The next obvious step would be to predict mutinies. As seen in the exploratory portion of the paper, I have presented preliminary ideas about what other social processes are likely driving soldiers' decisions to defect. A second goal would be to explore multinomial outcomes of military unrest. For example, why does the military decide to launch a coup in some cases, while in other scenarios they simply mutiny? Beyond exploring why mutinies occur, MMDD will now allow scholars to consider questions about the effects of mutinies. Scholars might explore how mutinies affect the outcome and duration of civil wars by introducing more spoilers or veto payers. Or perhaps there are theoretical reasons to suspect that mutinies weaken battlefield effectiveness. MMDD provides scholars with numerous avenues of inquiry that will likely provide timely policy recommendations.

In sum, military mutinies are a topic worthy of further investigation. Mutinies have the ability to affect a number of larger conflict processes both in the inter- and intrastate context. This dataset represents a strong contribution to the literature by allowing conflict scholars to consider elements of military loyalty longitudinally to

enhance our broader understanding of conflict processes. While this chapter offered a broad exploratory overview of MMDD, the next chapter will dive into the central research question of this dissertation, seeking to provide scholars an explanation for why mutinies occur. In the next chapter I outline the theoretical framework that will guide subsequent empirical chapters.


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## Chapter 3

### Why Mutinies Occur: A Theoretical Framework

Military mutinies have occurred more frequently in the last 30 years than ever before. Figure 1 presents a moving average of military mutinies from 1945-present day using the new MMDD dataset presented in the previous chapter.

**Figure 3.1:** Temporal Trends of Military Mutinies



Not only are mutinies occurring more often at the systemic level, but mutinies have also become a persistent and pervasive problems over the last two decades for particular states. For example, the Ivory Coast experienced its first mutiny in 1990. Since then, the state has experienced nearly a dozen mutinies, many of which have been violent and disrupting to state stability. Most of these mutinies occurred along the lines of former rebel groups that were integrated back into the state's military after the conclusion of the Cote d'Ivoire's civil war. Likewise, since 2011 Syria has experienced 12 mutinies during



a civil conflict that proved to have disastrous implications for the stability of the entire region. Beyond these two examples there are many states, especially in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, that have seen a recent and dramatic upticks in the incidences of mutinies.

Given this notable observation, the goal of this chapter is to provide a theoretical framework that explains when states are likely to experience mutinies. I argue that mutinies are likely to arise due to divergent preferences and risk aversion on behalf of military agents. Using a nested principal agent framework, I describe why agents might have strong incentives to shirk, resulting in military rebellion. I begin by reviewing extant explanations of mutinies. Next, I describe the actors involved in this complex interaction and what we know about their preferences. Finally, I describe how principal-agent problems are likely to arise in the civil-military context, allowing for various types of mutinies in a nested structure.

### **Extant Explanations of Mutinies**

Much of the work considering why soldiers choose to rebel has been conducted through qualitative case studies. This work is rich in anecdotal evidence and theoretical nuance, focusing largely on the impact of having an ethnically-divided military. For example, Osborne (2014) examines how ethnicity in East Africa affected military loyalty during colonial periods. Colonizers recognized the Kamba ethnic group in Kenya as a “martial race,” or superior fighters, when compared to other ethnic groups. Colonizers believed that this particular group had a genetic makeup that made them more advanced military men with enhanced senses of loyalty and duty. However, this reputation was largely used

instrumentally by the Kamba to get favorable treatment from the colonial powers, while other ethnic groups tended to display disloyalty towards the colonizers.

This work emphasizes the reality that the decision to remain loyal or step away from the military apparatus is largely an instrumental choice. In events of mutiny, unlike most coup activity, soldiers step away from the state and very clearly articulate demands like higher pay or better resources. In contrast to coup activity, the demands often come prior to the putsch or rebellion, making mutinies distinct because observers know precisely what soldiers want and why they have chosen to rebel. While this work gets at the interesting idea that rebellion and the inverse, loyalty, are largely instrumental and can be driven by ethnic divisions, it offers few explanations for the proximate causes of military mutinies.

Scholars have also considered the effect of grievances due to having a colonial power control the military apparatus, a condition that usually goes hand in hand with having an ethnically fragmented army. This camp of scholars largely agrees that militaries that are run by a colonial powers are prone to waning loyalty. Some of the most explored cases of this phenomenon include East Africa 1964, Kenya 1945, India 1857, and Singapore 1915. The Singaporean case is particularly interesting. As World War I was devastating mainland Europe, trouble was brewing away from home in Singapore. Indian troops, under the colonial rule of the British, were plotting a mutiny spurred by a number of grievances. First, the brigade deployed in Singapore (Malay at the time), the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Infantry, was largely made up of Muslim Indians who were influenced by the Ghadar Party. The Ghadar Party actively encouraged Indian nationalism and resistance of Western forces. After predicting a small mutiny in Mumbai in January of 1915 and

reassigning soldiers to new outposts to prevent sedition, the British military overlooked the swelling discontent in the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade. Second, there were rumors that this brigade would be commanded to fight in Turkey against a largely Muslim military.

The rank-and-file soldiers of the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade pointed out that they had only been ordered and contracted for service in the Federated Malay States originally, not in Turkey against religious kin. The officers of the brigade largely sided with the rank-and-file soldiers on this issue, not wanting to deploy to the Middle East or Africa (Kuwejima 2009). For these reasons (*inter alia*), several companies in the 5<sup>th</sup> Light Brigade staged a massive mutiny in February of 1915 with estimates suggesting that up to 800 men were involved in the violent sedition. This case demonstrates that rank-and-file soldiers are apt to rebel when they experience widespread grievances. However, one can look anecdotally and find many cases where militaries were under colonial rule, yet maintained loyalty. Also, colonization is a condition that persists and endures over decades. Therefore, while colonization can certainly spur grievances, colonization remains an unsatisfying answer to why we see military mutinies at particular moments and not at others. Furthermore, these explanations do not offer any power to help explain why the incidence of mutinies is increasing rather dramatically in recent periods. They also do not explain why particular states, like the Ivory Coast or Syria, have experienced many more mutinies lately than ever before.

### **Actors and Interests**

Though previous research has suggested that ethnic fragmentation and colonial control might spur disloyalty, we continue to lack an explanation of the proximate causes of mutinies. Thus, in this section, I will lay out the actors and their specific interests to

explore strategic interactions that might spur mutinies. To begin, I will review the preferences and strategies beginning with the executive then moving to the military leadership.

As depicted below in Figure 2, the executive serves as the principal of the military leadership. The chief concern of the executive is to remain in power (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2004). Leaders will secure their tenure through many strategies that I label “regime-securing strategies.” Scholars have focused on many regime securing strategies including institutions (Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007), the generation of audience costs (Weeks 2008), and even the presence of particular resources, like oil (Wright, Frantz, and Geddes 2015). For this analysis, I will focus squarely on repression, diversionary tactics, and coup proofing, as these particular regime securing strategies place a burden of responsibility on the military apparatus and apply to both democracies and non-democracies.

Executives may utilize repressive tactics when they feel their tenure is being threatened. Repression has the explicit goal of limiting the dissidents’ ability to overturn institutions of the state or the current leadership (Davenport 1995). Repressive techniques can range in severity from limiting civil liberties to direct physical integrity violations. Repression can be costly because at times it is sanctioned by the international community, or it can backfire and spur increased mobility among existing dissidents (Davenport 1995). For this reason, executives may consider other tactics, such as diversionary conflict or coup proofing.

**Figure 3.2:** Military Leadership as an Agent of the Executive



Diversionsary tactics may also be used as regime-securing strategies. To maintain adequate levels of approval and legitimacy, the leader may initiate conflict abroad to enjoy a boost in public opinion and enhance loyalty within the military by enhancing a sense of nationalism (Levy 1989; Andreski 1968). While diversionsary theory has been largely applied to democracies, Miller (1995), Mitchell and Prins (2004), and Powell (2012) demonstrate that autocrats may also engage in diversionsary tactics to secure their tenure. In the face of elevated coup risk, there is strong evidence that the likelihood of militarized interstate dispute (MID) initiation increases dramatically (Miller and Elgun 2010). Leaders who are fearful of losing their grip on power, even in autocratic contexts, may initiate conflict to secure tenure and divert the attention of the public and military.

Coup proofing is a regime-securing strategy used by executives to ward off putsches. Of all the strategies outlined<sup>15</sup> (repression, diversionary tactics, and coup proofing), coup proofing at initial glance appears to be the least costly because coup proofing is a completely domestic process, and leaders do not risk angering the international community as they might by using heavy repression or diversionary tactics. Most non-democracies will experience irregular regime change through a coup (Decalo 1990). In response to this threat, leaders may choose to counterbalance the military by disaggregating horizontally to make mutually suspicious factions, thus making coordination challenges steeper and decreasing the probability of a coup attempt. Beyond counterbalancing, leaders can utilize paramilitaries, militias, and secret police to protect their tenure (Feaver 1999). Purges may also be used when leaders suspect that the military has become too intertwined in political processes (Young and Turner 1985). Scholars have already demonstrated that coup proofing directly diminishes the ability of militaries to coordinate, weakening fighting capacity (Durell-Young 1997) and the quality of individual soldiers (e.g., Pilester and Bohmelt 2011; Roessler 2011). As we will see, coup proofing likely has an additional unintended consequence that executives rarely consider. By introducing coordination challenges, coup proofing diminishes coup risk but may simultaneously enhance mutiny risk.

Moving from the executive, the next actor I analyze is the military leadership. As an agent of the executive, the military leadership has a number of divergent preferences

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<sup>15</sup> It is unlikely that leaders will use coup proofing and diversionary tactics simultaneously. As Powell (2012) demonstrates, coup proofing measures and diversionary incentives are inversely related. In other words, as a leader imposes steeper coup proofing measures, they are less likely to undertake diversionary tactics. However, repression may be used jointly with other regime-securing tactics.

and strategies to secure these preferences. Scholars possess a significant amount of information regarding the preferences of the military leadership because of the vast coup literature. A fruitful practice is to consider the disposition and ability of the military leadership to intervene in politics (Powell 2012). At this point in the theoretical framework, I will focus largely on aspects of disposition, leaving dimensions of ability to be explored later. According to dispositional arguments, military leadership will intervene, specifically by staging a coup when they are dissatisfied with the status quo. Scholars in this area emphasize the importance of legitimacy, arguing that military leadership will be dissatisfied when the government is experiencing a decline in public support due to a perception of poor performance (Finer 1962; Welch 1970; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Casper and Tyson 2014; Johnson and Thyne 2016). Moving forward in time, the corporate grievance model argues that military leaders' dispositions respond to the amount of institutional "goodies" the military receives (Thompson 1973). When militaries are well armed and well paid, dispositional factors for intervention are likely to fade. However, when militaries are under-resourced, military leaders might recalibrate their disposition and coordinate efforts to launch a coup. I will return to this argument later by adding complexity to this notion of disposition.

Scholars have also spent time exploring the individual characteristics of military personnel. Huntington (1957) explores what he calls the "military mind." He argues that the military mind sees war as a political instrument. As such, total war and absolute war are to be avoided at all costs as they "...produce the mutual devastation of combatants" (Huntington 1957: 65). By extension, I assume that military leadership would prefer to fight short and decisive conflicts as opposed to enduring wars of attrition. Huntington

also argues that because of the way the military mind views the world and the competition among sovereign states, they will continue to urge bureaucrats to enlarge and strengthen the military. This idea falls in line with the corporate grievance model of military preferences that argues that militaries essentially want institutional rewards. The military mind also sees that expertise is a prerequisite for competency. In other words, “professional training and experience is necessary for decision and action.” (Huntington 71). Based on this notion that the military mind realizes that competency is based on professional training, I expect that military leadership would prefer a meritocracy, where promotions are based on ability rather than loyalty to the executive.

To this point, scholars know a lot about how executive tactics and the preferences of military leadership interact to influence many forms of unrest. Coup proofing has been shown to decrease the likelihood of a coup (Powell 2012). Likewise, well-funded militaries have been demonstrated to have lower coup risk (Powell 2012). We know that repression can cause backlash, specifically in the form of protest movements (Davenport 1995, 2007; Moore 1998), but can also help secure the executive’s tenure. Scholars have also shown that protests, which may be a response to repression, are likely to spur coups (Casper and Tyson 2014; Johnson and Thyne 2016). However, the existing literature has not examined how mutinies might play a role, which is an important gap to fill for many reasons.

First, mutinies are important outcomes in themselves. We have seen that mutinies can quickly change the dynamics of a conflict, as seen in the recent example of Syria. What is more, mutinies are happening at an increasing rate. Finally, it is hard to understand executive decisions about things like resource allocation, military purges,



diversionary war, and coup proofing without bringing the possibility of military mutinies into the picture. In order to develop a theory about mutinies, I will introduce a new actor into the principal agent structure to demonstrate how foot soldier preferences can add new avenues of disagreement between the executive and military leadership.


### **A Nested Principal Agent Model of Military Mutinies**

Canonical Principal Agent theory (hereinafter referred to as P-A theory) has been used to explain various political processes, from IO behavior to domestic governance. In a traditional setting, principals give instructions and demands and can sanction agents if those orders are not followed. Agents are supposed to do the bidding of the principal, but as we will explore below, in some circumstances agents have stronger incentives to defect and not comply with the principals' orders. These suboptimal outcomes are called shirking. Militaries can shirk in a number of ways, but here I will focus exclusively on shirking as a result of military mutinies. A nested principal agent problem is simply an expansion of canonical P-A theory, allowing for more than one principal and more than one agent in an interaction.<sup>16</sup> Figure 3 presents the nested structure of the various principals and agents in a military organization.

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<sup>16</sup> See Mitnick (1992) and Waterman and Meier (1998) for discussion of the need to move beyond dyads when exploring principal agent theory. These works argue that very few interactions are simply dyadic in nature. It is more realistic to think of various principals and many agents.

**Figure 3.3:** Nested Principal Agent Structure of Military



There is strong precedent in the civil-military relations literature to apply a principal-agent framework to interactions within the military. Feaver (2009) lays out what he calls the “civil-military problematique.” The inherent tension in civil-military relations is that “... the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat to the polity.” (2009 : 4). Thus, he presents a principal-agent framework in which civilian principals must contract military agents to protect society. However, these civilian principals must then worry about how the agents behave. Agents may behave inappropriately by either inadequately protecting society or becoming a predatory institution. Because this context provides a strategic interaction and a clear hierarchical order, Feaver argues that a principal-agent model is appropriate when considering the civil-military relations. As an extension of Feaver (2009), I argue that

there is not only one principal and one agent, but rather there are many principals and many agents. In his model, military agents shirk against civilian principals. While this type of shirking may occur in my model, I also allow for military agents to shirk against military principals.

Next, I borrow simple assumptions from P-A theory about the behavior of each actor in this nested structure. I assume that principals can monitor the behavior of agents (Pollack 1997). This ex-post monitoring is an attempt to overcome the steep information advantages that favor agents (Waterman and Meier 1998). In this context, foot soldiers know more about the everyday realities of being a soldier than military leadership. Likewise, military leadership knows more about the reality of conflict and details about the fighting capacity of the opponent than the executive. In general P-A models, this information asymmetry is what drives shirking. Here, I will not focus exclusively on information asymmetries, but add a parameter of risk aversion, which will drive shirking by introducing goal conflict between the principal and the agent. Relaxing a few assumptions of the canonical setting will introduce friction into the model, creating strong incentives for agents to shirk. Shirking in the context of this nested structure would mean staging a coup attempt or a mutiny, based on which actor shirks.

Inefficient outcomes in this nested principal agent situation can arise due to fear. Sappington (1991) demonstrates that by considering risk aversion displayed by agents, we can expect shirking to be more likely. That is, when agents are asked to carry out tasks that impose steep risks onto them, they are less likely to follow through with the demands of the principal. Risk aversion is particularly salient when applied to the military context. Mutinies and coups are likely to occur because agents will shirk when

they are asked to undertake risky activities like facing an opponent without appropriate resources or repressing peaceful protestors. Such risk aversion creates a conflict of goals between the principal and the agents.


One might note that in this framework shirking is highly observable. Indeed, the purpose of a mutiny is to notify observers of grievances in an effort to change the status quo. This sets shirking in this framework apart from the canonical principal agent scenarios where shirking involves hidden action and is therefore not observable. This inability to observe shirking is what classifies these models as “moral hazard models.” However, there are many recent applications of P-A theory in which shirking is not outright observable. In other words, these recent iterations are not moral hazard models. For example, one seminal P-A application by Brehm and Gates (1999) examines strikes by police officers. Similar to my application, shirking in this context is highly observable. Thus, while it is a step away from tradition in the P-A literature, it is appropriate to apply principal agent theory in scenarios of observable shirking. Below I will outline various scenarios that are likely to create risky situations for agents in the various nests presented above. This exercise will allow me to introduce and test many novel hypotheses.

### **Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership (Type 1 Mutinies)**

The first nested structure in Figure 3.4 considers the foot soldiers serving as agents of the military leadership. For a moment, I will exclude the executive from the interaction. This nest represents one of the most conventional pathways to a military mutiny. In most cases, the executive determines broad military policy, such as total military expenditure and opponents, while the military leadership oversees specific military policy, such as how resources are distributed among battalions and specific

fighting strategies. Thus, there is a distinct possibility that soldiers may be pleased with the executive, but feel that the military leadership is not promoting the interests of the individual soldiers or is asking soldiers to carry out particularly risky activities.

**Figure 3.4** Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership



In this nest, we are unlikely to see a coup because the grievance is spurred by military leadership rather than the executive, and by definition, coups must be pointed at the executive. Furthermore, the vast majority of coups are perpetrated by military leadership or at least require military leadership coordination (Thyne and Powell 2011). There are several situations that might create strong incentives for foot soldiers to shirk their duties as an agent of military leadership.

First, high military spending and low soldier pay presents a situation that might lead to a disagreement between military leadership and foot soldiers. In this scenario, the

executive funnels significant resources to the military, but this does not improve the soldiers' individual pay, which suggests that military leadership is squandering or stealing the money. High military spending with low individual pay presents a situation where soldiers are not adequately rewarded for undertaking the risks associated with serving in the forces. The 2012 Yemeni mutiny illustrates this type of grievance where nearly 600 rank-and-file soldiers rebelled against former President Saleh's half-brother, General Mohamed Saleh al-Ahmar. Soldiers organized a sit-in at the al-Dalaimi air force base and reported that military leadership was largely dishonest and stealing portions of soldiers' salaries. One soldier was quoted saying, "We are tired of being ruled by an unjust and corrupt man who steals portions of our salaries and confiscates our food and clothes allowances for his own benefit" (Bikya News 2012). Even though this is a clear scenario that would result in shirking in this nest, because of a lack of micro-level data regarding soldiers' individual pay, it is nearly impossible to examine soldiers' pay as a portion of total military expenditure. Thus, we turn to a second situation where soldiers are satisfied with the executive and simultaneously unhappy with the officers to derive the first testable hypothesis.

Particularly bloody conflict is also likely to spur mutinies in this particular nest. The executive is responsible for picking opponents and the decision to enter war, but the military leadership is responsible for fighting strategies. As such, war specifics, such as strategy, that go wrong are likely to be blamed on the military leadership rather than the executive. Battle deaths are likely to be a result of poor strategy. As Biddle (2010) argues, gross numerical figures of military power are not adequate in explaining war outcomes. It is necessary to look at strategy and tactics, which are decisions made by

military leadership, not the executive.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, bloody battle is likely to generate incentives for foot soldiers to shirk as they recognize that doing their job has become increasingly risky.

Nigeria provides an illustrative example of soldiers blaming military leadership for battle losses. Nigerian troops have continued to face the insurgent threat in the North-eastern province of their state against Boko Haram. Recently, the insurgent threat has swelled and soldiers have taken notice of how well-equipped and -resourced Boko Haram combatants are compared to state forces. This has created a sense among soldiers that they are sent into a completely hostile battlefield simply to be sacrificed in the name of the state. As such, there have been a series of mutinies where soldiers refuse to go into the field to face Boko Haram. An unnamed soldier told BBC that, “Soldiers are dying like fowl. The Nigerian army is not ready to fight Boko Haram. Boko Haram are inside the bush, everywhere. They [senior commanders] are sacrificing soldiers” (BBC News 2014). As illustrated by this quotation, soldiers in Nigeria blamed commanders for their losses against Boko Haram rather than the executive. This discussion generates my first hypothesis:

H1: As battle deaths increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.

Another factor that is likely to spur mutinies in this nest is the duration of conflict. Soldiers prefer to fight short and decisive wars over long and bloody wars. While the decisions to enter the war rests in the hands of the executive, the decisiveness of the war

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<sup>17</sup> This may not be the case for military regimes. I will control for military regimes, or regimes in which the executive is synonymous with military leadership, in the empirical model.

is directly related to strategy, which is determined by the military leadership. If the military leadership is adequately resourced, soldiers expect them to levy these resources from the executive in order to fight short wars leading to victory. If wars drag on, soldiers are likely to blame the military leadership for not using better strategy or allocating resources better. As such, long wars are likely to generate rifts between soldiers and military leadership.

Syria provides an alarming example of this relationship between conflict duration and mutinies. Prior to the onset of Syria's civil war in 2011, the state had only experienced a total of three mutinies. In 2011, at the onset of civil war, there were three mutinies. In 2012, the number of mutinies more than doubled, resulting in seven mutinies. While this rough count of mutinies might not entirely capture the relationship between conflict and mutinies, anecdotal evidence suggests mutinies often occur because soldiers are demanding demobilization. For example, during the Angolan civil war, two mutinies occurred in 1992, after decades of fighting. In both of these instances, soldiers were demanding immediate demobilization and a return to civilian life. The primary source documents indicate that soldiers were experiencing fatigue and simply wanted a conclusion to the conflict (BBC 1992). While conflict duration and intensity work through similar theoretical mechanisms, I intend to explore their independent and joint effects on the likelihood of mutinies. This discussion yields the second hypothesis regarding the relationship between long lasting conflict and mutinies:


H2: As the duration of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.



### **Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive (Type 2 Mutinies)**

A second nested structure in Figure 3.5 shows foot soldiers serving as agents of the executive. Shirking is likely to happen because soldiers are unhappy with the mandates of the executive. It is important to note that military leadership are not included in this nest, and therefore it is assumed that they are generally pleased with the policies of the executive and remain loyal. Because the military leadership is still aligned with the executive, a coup attempt is not an option because this would require defection of the military leadership, as nearly all coup attempts require high ranking military leadership involvement (Thyne and Powell 2014).

**Figure 3.5** Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive



The most common route to a mutiny in this particular nest is the presence of a military regime. A military regime provides a context where the executive and military leadership are essentially the same actor. As such, anything the executive does that spurs

discontent among the soldiers can only be met with a mutiny because the military leadership is not likely to side with the soldiers, as their interests are directly represented in the regime. Early work on military regimes emphasized their inability to negotiate outcomes between societal actors that may have conflicting aims (Finer 1976: 12-14). Geddes (1999) points out that military regimes are surprisingly fragile and rarely survive longer than democracies or other types of autocracies. What is more, Frantz and Ezrow (2011) demonstrate that leaders of military regimes are the most likely to get ousted despite the extensive training and expected discipline within these regimes. I expect this logic to extend to dimensions of military loyalty. I anticipate military regimes to be more mutiny prone than other regime types due to their relative inflexibility and the superimposition of military leadership on the executive position.

After a coup in December of 2000 in the Cote D'Ivoire, foot soldiers took the streets of Abidjan in protest. Soldiers were demanding compensation from the ruling junta for the critical part they played in the December coup that resulted in the junta's new found power. The soldiers were displeased with both the military leadership and the executive, as these two actors are superimposed in a military regime. The Ivory Coast is not alone in experiencing mutinies during the reign of a military regime. Indeed, Argentina experienced many mutinies at the end of the military junta and immediately after the junta fell. Many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have experienced mutinies in the context of a military regime, such as: Niger, Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, among many others. This anecdotal evidence paired with theoretical expectations yields the following hypothesis about the effect of military regimes on military mutinies:

H3: Military regimes are more likely to experience mutinies than other types of regimes.

Other pathways to mutinies in this nest occur when events place steeper costs on foot soldiers than the military leadership or the executive. In these situations, the soldiers are likely to blame the executive as he or she is at the helm of the ship and can mitigate the costs paid by the soldiers, but fail to do so. Military leadership is unlikely to side with the soldiers because they experience smaller costs than the soldiers. For military leadership, siding with foot soldiers may result in the loss of their elite status, a severely high cost.

Protests facilitate mutinies in this particular nest. Protests create situations where foot soldiers pay steeper costs than the military leadership and executive. When dissent arises, the executive can choose to use repressive tactics or simply try to monitor and contain the situation without the use of repression. In either scenario, foot soldiers pay steep costs. These high costs paid by foot soldiers are a result of their closeness to the civilian population. In contrast, military leadership and the executive are more removed from civilian populations. In the absence of repression, soldiers are often used to monitor dissent. This means being in the street, exposing themselves to the potential dangers associated with unrest. When protests are met with repression, I expect that the difference in cost paid by these actors will be even more intense.

While executives order repression, they are the most insulated and thus pay the lowest cost for repressing, and yet stand the most to gain by maintaining their elite status. Even if protests are particularly successful and spur coup activity (Casper and Tyson 2014, Johnson and Thyne 2016), coups are rarely bloody and generally end in exile. Clearly this is not a preferred outcome for the executive, but it is not rarely a deadly outcome. The benefits associated with repression for the executive are ample. He or she

can secure their own tenure through the use of heavily repressive tactics that discourage dissent. A similar pattern emerges when examining costs and benefits of using repressive strategies for military leadership. There is a strong benefit associated with repression for military elite, as it will in most scenarios help secure their tenure. The costs are minimal because the military leadership supervises repression, but they will not carry it out with their own hands.

When examining the costs and benefits associated with repression for foot soldiers, a different pattern emerges. Soldiers are generally not life-long military professionals. Most soldiers, particularly conscripts, want to return to the civilian population after their service. The IDF of Israel provides an illustrative example of conscripts wanting to return to civilian life after duty. After conscription in the IDF, foot soldiers are given the choice of remaining in the active reserves. In 2013, only 1/3 of past conscripts chose to maintain an “active” reservationist status. This number fell in 2015 to 26% of all conscripts (The Times of Israel 2016). Recognizing that the clear majority of foot soldiers want to return to civilian life, they do not want to commit atrocities that would distance them from the civilian population. Repression is almost always committed by the hands of foot soldiers. Therefore, the costs of repression is dramatically steeper than the cost for the executive or military leadership. Because of this difference in the costs incurred, protests are likely to spur mutinies.

Yugoslavia saw protests lead directly to mutiny activity in 1999. Women’s protests sparked in Krusevac and Aleksandrovac after the bodies of seven slain soldiers were returned home. Mothers, sisters, and wives of soldiers began protesting demanding the return of their sons, brothers, and husbands (New York Times 1999). The women

blew whistles (a common tactic in many pro-democracy campaigns that these anti-war protestors borrowed) and threw eggs at the Town Hall building. Even though this dissent was technically under the emergency military rule put in place during the NATO air campaign, the protestors remained committed to their decision. In response to the women's protests, nearly 2,000 soldiers deployed to Istok deserted their posts and returned to their home cities of Krusevac and Aleksandrovac. But this anecdote is among many others help illustrate how protests can spur mutinies. Romanian soldiers mutinied in response to General Chirac's orders to shoot protestors in February of 1990. In response to these orders, 48 officers joined nearly 3,000 soldiers and student protestors in the streets and demanded that Defense Minister and the Internal Security Minister be ousted. This example highlights the cost argument made earlier. Protests that are met with extreme repression are likely to encourage mutinies by imposing steep costs on soldiers.

H4: As a state experiences more protests, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.

The nature of the protest will also influence the likelihood of mutinies. Returning to the cost argument, the cost of repression for individual soldiers will also change depending upon whether the protest is peaceful or violent. Repression is easily justified when protests are violent. One of the primary objectives of the military is to maintain law and order, which is directly challenged by violent protests. However, peaceful protests do not pose a similar threat. Firing on peaceful protestors is likely to engender negative feelings towards soldiers among the civilian population (Johnson and Thyne 2016).

The recent Syria example provides an illustration of repressive orders challenging troop loyalty. As Assad ordered decisive repression, including firing on and even killing

protesters, in largely Sunni populated regions of the state, Sunni factions of the military had a decision to make. They could either demonstrate complete loyalty to the regime or follow orders – an endeavor that was costly on many levels (e.g., firing on their own ethnic-religious kin) or they could resist the orders of the Assad regime and mutiny. Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) find that nonviolent campaigns are particularly likely to test troop loyalty when compared to their violent counterparts.<sup>18</sup> Returning to the cost argument, it is much easier to follow repressive orders when protesters are using violent means, whereas firing on peaceful protesters is associated with a much higher set of costs (Johnson and Thyne 2016).

Another recent example highlights this causal process. Burmese troops in September of 2007 declared that they supported Buddhist monks that were leading mass protests against the regime. A group of dissatisfied soldiers formed a group called the Public Patriotic Army Association and drafted a formal letter declaring their support for the dissenters. They wrote, “On behalf of the armed forces, we declare our support for the non-violent action of the Buddhist Monks and members of the public and their peaceful expression” (The Guardian 2007). The soldiers carefully point out that their support for this movement was largely conditioned on the nature of the protests. Had these protests been violent, it seems much less likely that the soldiers would have signaled their strong support. This discussion yields a secondary hypothesis about the effect of protests on Nest C mutinies.

H5: Peaceful protests are more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests.

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<sup>18</sup> They examine very large-scale military defections that are indicative of a massive systemic break down with a dichotomous variable. The dependent variable used in my analysis will be capturing smaller breakdowns in troop loyalty.

Diversionsary war also creates an avenue for disagreement between the three actors. Diversionsary war is likely to generate grievances among individual soldiers that must do the bidding of the executive even if they realize that the conflict was not started on legitimate grounds, but rather only an effort to help the executive maintain his or her elite status. Foot soldiers are those that must serve on the front lines and are therefore most likely to be killed or injured by conflict. The military leadership is likely to side with the executive in such a situation because their elite status is directly tied to the fate of the leader. If the leader suffers from a rapid decline in public opinion, the military leadership is also likely to suffer similarly. Even more dramatically, if the leader is facing the possibility of full scale revolution, military leadership recognizes that such an event would completely jeopardize their position. Foot soldiers will pay the steepest costs for diversionsary conflict as they are the ones in the field. This discussion leads to the following hypothesis:

H6: Divisionsary war should increase the likelihood of mutinies.

Purges are a final avenue of disagreement between soldiers and the executive. Purging is a scenario where the executive rids their military apparatus of elites that are likely to oppose their policy preferences or are seen as potential coup plotters (Sudduth 2015).<sup>19</sup> Purges are likely to create a situation where leaders are promoted based upon loyalty rather than competency (Quinlivan 1999). As such, the newly promoted leaders are likely to be aligned with the executive because they recognize that they have been

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<sup>19</sup> Clearly purges are likely to generate grievances among the military leadership that is purged. However, because they are no longer part of the military apparatus, they cannot stage a mutiny or a coup. They have simply returned to civilian status. If they were to act against the government, it would be a form of civilian dissent (e.g., protests, rebellion).

promoted not necessarily because of skill, but because of allegiance to the executive. However, soldiers are likely to be angry because they now have relatively ineffective leaders, as soldiers would prefer a meritocracy than a system of promotion based on ideology and allegiance. It is hard to know whether promotions are based upon merit or not, but purges offer a strong indications that the military apparatus is no longer a meritocracy. As such, I expect that there is a positive relationship between purges and mutinies.

Cambodia provides an illustrative example of how purges encourage mutinies. During the later years of the Pol Pot regime, several purges were initiated from 1976-1978. These purges specifically targeted Hanoi-trained communists and the Sihanouk supporters within the Royal Government of National Unit of Kampuchea (GRUNK) (Jackson 1979: 77). Phnom Penh consistently purged the military of higher ranking officials that presented a threat to the Pol Pot regime. In October of 1978, Cambodian troops joined various anti-government organizations in different parts of the country to revolt against the central government in Phnom Penh. Soldiers largely cited that purges against military officials as a primary grievance (The Globe and Mail 1978). A more recent example can be seen in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland Somalia. Mutineers staged a revolt in a garrison near the Galgala Mountains. Soldiers were protesting months of unpaid salaries, but the mutiny did not pick up until immediately after Puntland president Abdiweli Muhammad Ali fired a top military commander, paramilitary members, and other security forces (BBC Monitoring Africa 2015).

A similar dynamic played out in South Sudan in 2014. Air force and military officers defected from the military and joined the rebels. They stated that their defection




was a result of lack of diversity and promotion in the military. The officers accused President Salva Kiir Mayardiit of tribalism and promotion based only loyalty rather than competency. In a press conference, the defected soldiers said that the state had "... poor promotion policies. Officers who joined the Air Force in 2007 have never been promoted and in some situations promotions are based on ethnicity..." and "... training opportunities for South Sudanese joining the Air Force does not reflect diversity; for instance, the first batch comprised of 32 pilots, 21 of which were from the Dinka Tribe, the remaining 63 tribes were represented by just 11 pilots" (Southern Sudan News Agency 2014). While there were no purges in this scenario, purges create situations of perceived inequality like the complaints of these soldiers highlight. This logic leads to the final expectation in this nested structure, which is that purges will spur mutinies.

H7: As an executive orders more purges, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.

### **Foot Soldiers and Military Leadership as Agents of the Executive (Type 3 Mutinies)**

The final nest that will be examined organizes the foot soldiers and military leadership as collective agents of the executive. This relationship is presented in Figure 3.6 below. This is the most complex nested structure considered. In this nest, I incorporate all the military actors and a civilian principal. The civilian principal, or the executive, has an interesting tight rope to walk. The executive needs to maintain power, but one of the most effective regime securing strategies might encourage mutinies.

**Figure 3.6** Foot Soldiers and Leadership as Agents of Executive



In order to develop expectations about this final nested structure, I return to the coup literature that examines disposition and ability of military leaders (Powell 2012). Remember, disposition is essentially asking, “Are military leaders satisfied with the status quo?” Here, I will focus more squarely on dimensions of ability. Ability asks, “Even if military leaders are unsatisfied, are they able to coordinate in order to launch a putsch?” This question is exceedingly relevant in this nested structure. In this nested structure, shirking can come by way of mutiny or coup, unlike the previous structures where the only possible outcome was mutiny. The first theoretical expectation put forward here is that attempts to increase coordination challenges, specifically through the use of coup proofing, will have a direct unintended consequence. While a leader may effectively ward off coup attempts by limiting the military’s ability to work across

branches horizontally, they may accidentally spur mutinies. Through the process of disaggregation and instilling a general sense of suspension between branches, the leader increases the odds that soldiers will shirk due to perceptions of unfairness or relative deprivation. Often times, executives create “multiple, overlapping security forces, which report to the executive through different chains of command” (De Bruin 2017). Such divisions will spur dissent. Coup proofing measures increase the likelihood that battalions feel that the executive is showing favoritism to other groups or basing promotion off of loyalty, rather than competency. Thus, the first expectation I will test in this final nest is the direct impact that coup proofing measures have on the likelihood of mutinies.

H8: As coup proofing measures increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.

Coup proofing will not only have a direct linear effect on mutinies. I expect that under conditions in which scholars have demonstrated coups are more likely, we will see mutinies given that coordination challenges are too steep to realize a coup. As executives are likely to take measures to limit the ability of military leaders to launch a coup, the likelihood of a mutiny will be conditional on the level of coup proofing an executive has in place. When the entire military apparatus is dissatisfied, we should expect a coup. However, there may be situations in which the entire military is unsatisfied, but because the leader has anticipated a coup and implemented preventative measures to safeguard her tenure, the unsatisfied actors are unable to coordinate. In this scenario, a mutiny is likely to occur as a result of the coup’s coordination failure. The grievance is still present and agents are still shirking, but due to coup proofing measures, they cannot successfully target the executive. There are a number of conditions that are likely to cause wide spread

grievances in the military apparatus. These conditions are only likely to result in a mutiny in the face of steep coordination challenges that are a result of coup proofing measures.

Democratization can spur mutinies in this final nested structure. Democratization presents a unique commitment problem for the executive. Recent democratization makes it nearly impossible for the executive to credibly commit policies that are favorable for the military. Because of the introduction of elections, while an executive may be supportive of the military, there is no way of ensuring that the next executive will be equally committed to policies that favor the military as an institution. Furthermore, when the military organization is unsatisfied, it understands that the costs for perpetrating a coup have been updated in the wake of recent democratization. The military is not apt to stage a coup recognizing that the international community will respond negatively and immediately, imposing steep costs for reversing democratization. As Feaver (1999: 215) writes, "...in a democracy, the hierarchy of *de jure* authority favors civilians over the military, even in cases where the underlying distribution of *de facto* power favors the military." As such, the military recognizes that democratization generally means relinquishing *de jure* authority, and thus is counter to their institutional interests.

Niger's path to democratization provides a descriptive example of the dynamics I outline above. Prior to democratization, the military of Niger was intimately involved in politics and officers found this relationship to benefit their personal financial status greatly (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). However, after democratization, the military budget was constricted to under 1% of the GDP, which left the military replete of the necessary resources and the individual luxury of side payments (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Not only did this diminished budget effect the individual benefits of

military officers, it also left them uncertain about the future and concerned about the potential of an even less supportive executive and legislature. In January 1996, immediately following this budgetary reduction, the military ousted President Ousmane. While this event resulted in a coup d'état, I argue that not all patterns of democratization will result in the apex of military disloyalty due to counterbalancing efforts made by a forward thinking executive. When levels of coup proofing are high, instead of a coup we will see a mutiny but for similar dynamics as presented in Niger's path to democratization.

Dwyer (2015) argues that democratization in Africa will likely decrease the probability of military mutinies because of a democracies pluralistic nature that allows military actors to express their preferences. I counter her claims by arguing that democratization actually makes the military more uneasy as a result of this commitment problem. Military leadership does not benefit from the pluralistic nature of democracy in the same way that other actors in a society might because military leadership already holds elite status prior to democratization. This discussions yields my next hypothesis:

H9: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences democratization, the likelihood of a mutiny should also increase.

Human rights violations may also generate rifts between the executive and the military leadership and foot soldiers. Militaries are challenged by the changing norms of the international human rights regime. While executives often order repression and human rights violations, soldiers carry out the bidding of the executive on this matter (Carey 2006). It is relatively easy for the executive to blame repression on the military, eliminating their own personal responsibility in the matter. When rights violations come

to light, it is often military actors that are used as “scapegoats” when in reality they were simply following orders that were handed down from the executive through military leadership. As such, when executives order soldiers to commit human rights violations, the soldiers are uncertain whether the executive will defend their actions should the violations come to light. This presents a challenging commitment problem that poses a steep threat to troop loyalty. Although the actors can agree to cooperate today, there is no guarantee that the executive will not be quick to blame the atrocities on soldiers should they become public.

Argentina provides an illustrative case of how human rights violations might spur military disloyalty. In 1987, there were a series of military mutinies under the leadership of President Raul Alfonsin. General Hector Rios stepped down from his position of leadership after not being able to put down a series of military rebellions. These rebellions were motivated by the accused officers who violated human rights under the previous regime. The soldiers desired blanket amnesty for these officers that were simply following the bidding of the regime. This tug-of-war between the executive’s desire of appearing to comply with international norms of human rights standards and the temptation to betray soldiers that were following orders presents a challenge to military loyalty, specifically through increasing the likelihood of mutinies.

H10: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences more human rights violations, the likelihood of a mutiny should also increase.

Overall, this chapter presents a novel theoretical framework that allows scholars to anticipate mutinies. Unlike past scholarship that uses rather constant conditions (e.g., ethnic fragmentation and colonial control) to explain mutinies, this chapter focuses on


making proximate arguments using highly variable conditions (e.g., democratization, protests, and purges). By presenting a nested principal agent structure, I create a typology of different interactions that lead to different kinds of mutinies. The main contribution of this chapter is to provide new, parsimonious explanations for why mutinies happen. The next chapters will examine the expectations presented here empirically. The following chapter will begin by testing the first set of theoretical expectations. These expectations are the ones associated with type 1 mutinies, which involve foot soldiers rebelling against the military leadership.

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## Chapter 4: Type 1 Mutinies

This chapter sets out to test the first set of theoretical expectations put forward in the previous chapter. I will examine the proximate causes of military mutinies that occur when foot soldiers are serving as agents of the military leadership (see Figure 4.1). However, because this chapter represents the first effort to systematically predict military mutinies, I must first spend time exploring contextual factors that likely explain the onset of mutinies. Thus, I will begin this chapter by exploring a number of covariates that will be used as control variables for the remaining empirical tests included in this dissertation. In this chapter, I will first develop a general, baseline model of mutinies. Then I will conduct the first set of empirical tests of theoretical expectations presented in the previous chapter.

**Figure 4.1:** Nest 1, Foot Soldiers as Agents of Military Leadership





## **Dependent Variable**

To capture the dependent variable, *mutiny*, I utilize the data collected and described in Chapter 2. MMDD defines mutiny as *observable acts committed by military actors with the intent to display indiscipline towards leadership in an effort to revise the status quo*. MMDD codes 460 number of mutinies from 1945 – present day, with the majority of these events occurring in the latter half of this time series.

## **Covariates of Mutinies**

As emphasized previously, there exist no attempts to predict mutinies across space and time. As a result, I must begin by outlining potential covariates that likely help explain a state's propensity for experiencing a mutiny. These covariates will be state level and military-level factors that influence the general levels of satisfaction among military personnel.

The first covariate I will hold constant a state's legacy of military coups. This variable is called *Coups* and is a dichotomous indicator of whether a state experienced a coup attempt in the previous year or not (Powell 2012).<sup>20</sup> If a state has experienced military coups in its past, this signifies that the military has grievances and is willing to act on them. Such activity indicates a propensity towards disobedience and rebellion. Coups are generally conducted by commissioned officers of high rank. Similar indiscipline is likely to be observed and learned by lower-ranking enlisted soldiers.

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<sup>20</sup> As a robustness check, I will also run the baseline model examining the impact of having had a coup in the last 5 years or not.

Because lower ranking soldiers are often unable to launch coups, this learned indiscipline is likely to only manifest itself in mutiny activity. There is also a strong argument to be made that coups and mutinies are part of one single, interrelated process. As such, by controlling for coup activity, we are presenting a confusing illustration of reality. Because both the arguments for and against controlling for coups are compelling, I will estimate all models with and without this control variable. I generally find that results are robust to both specifications, as well as alternate temporal specifications of the coup variable.

The second covariate I will control for is a country's level of development. In more traditional civil-military relations work, wealth is known to have a "coup-inhibiting" influence (Londregan and Poole 1990; Belkin and Schofer 2003; Powell 2012). The causal mechanism put forth by these authors is that a strong economy can strengthen the legitimacy of leadership and thus secure the tenure of the executive. I expect that a similar logic applies when the outcome of interest is mutinies rather than coups. As Mantle (2006:32) writes, one way to enhance obedience within the military is for leadership to develop a strong sense of legitimacy specifically through enhancing formal authority. One way to enhance formal authority is to offer rewards for good behavior. Clearly, the ability to offer rewards depends almost entirely on the strength of the state's economy and its ability to invest in such measures. Therefore, I anticipate that a strong economy will have a neutralizing effect on the military either through a direct or indirect legitimizing mechanism. Thus, *GDP* (Gleditsch 2002) per capita, logged is included as a control variable to hold constant the pacifying impact of a strong economy on the likelihood of mutinies.

Regime type is another state-level factor that is likely to predict the general likelihood of mutiny activity. I expect an inverted-U shaped relationship between regime type and mutinies. Democracies will have few mutinies as will autocracies, while hybrid regimes will have the most. Militaries in strong democracies are less likely to have grievances that will lead to indiscipline because there are strong, consolidated institutional channels for these militaries to secure their corporate interests. Instead of mutinying, these militaries will turn to legislative bodies with strong legislative processes to secure their preferences (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002).

On the other side of the spectrum, I anticipate that staunchly authoritarian regimes also less likely to experience mutinies. Such rigid regimes are often associated with strong repressive apparatuses that can respond quickly and decisively to such rebellion (e.g., Escriba-Folch 2013, Frantz and Kindall-Taylor 2014, Bove and Rivera 2015). As militaries are often complicit in the repressive actions of an executive, these actors know from firsthand experience that the regime can and will repress (Risee and Skkink 1999). Thus, military actors in this environment are less likely to test the resolve and ability of the regime to repress.

Hybrid regimes are likely to experience the most mutinies. As Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) argue, in less-staunchly authoritarian regimes, or hybrid-regimes, one way the executive can ward off rebellion is to rely on partisan legislatures to solicit cooperation from outsiders. While these nominally democratic institutions shore up opposition cooperation, they are likely to be ineffectual legislative bodies that exist as a regime survival mechanism rather than a policy making chamber. Thus, I expect that militaries in this category have the most to gain by mutinying as institutions do not

actually exist to serve their intended purpose. For these reasons, I include two variables *Democracy* and *Autocracy*. *Democracy* takes on the value of 1 if the state has a Polity IV score of +5 or higher. In contrast, *Autocracy* takes on the value of 1 if the state has a Polity IV score of -5 or lower. The excluded category for the analysis is Anocracy which ranges from Polity IV score of -4 to +4.

In an effort to control for temporal trends, I hold constant *Cold War*. This variable is simply a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 during Cold War years and 0 otherwise. As depicted in Chapter 3, mutinies seem to occur more in the post-Cold War period. While there are many plausible explanations for this rise in mutiny activity, it is essential to account for empirically. One such explanation is that during the Cold War period, the rivalry between the U.S. and the USSR held many militaries in the developing world together as a result of the involvement of these major powers in the developing world. Additionally, in the post-Cold War era, there are increasingly punitive measures taken against coup plotters, which might incentivize mutinies versus alternative forms of military resistance.

Finally, I control for military size which is a military-level factor which likely helps predict mutinies. Large militaries will have more opportunities for splintering and divergent preferences. In contrast, small forces will have enhanced cohesion and strongly aligned preferences among actors. *Military Size* logged is captured by the total number of military personnel from the Correlates of War project.<sup>21</sup> In order to address temporal dependence, I control for *years since last mutiny*, *years*<sup>2</sup>, and *years*<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Military size and military spending are highly correlated (0.68). I include military size in the baseline model and remaining models as opposed to spending because military size

## **Theoretical Expectations to Test**

As laid out in Chapter 2, I anticipate that mutinies are likely to arise due to a principal agent problem between military leadership and foot soldiers. Foot soldiers are likely to shirk in this particular nest when they feel that military leaders are not securing strategies that mitigate risk for foot soldiers. Military leadership is largely in charge of battlefield specific; thus, failures on the battlefield that create dangerous situations for foot soldiers and increase risk are likely to result in observable shirking. In this chapter, I focus largely on the failure to secure successful strategy in the context of civil wars. However, these expectations hold for interstate conflicts as well.

H1: As the intensity of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.

H2: As the duration of war increases, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.

## **Research Design**

The unit of analysis for this chapter is the country-year. In order to test the hypotheses above, I again draw my dependent variable from MMDD. This is a dichotomous measure indicating whether or not a mutiny occurred in a given year. There are 460 mutiny events in the dataset, but only 392 that fall within the time series of this analysis, 1946-2015.


The first independent variable I examine is *Civil War Intensity*. This variable is drawn from the UCDP/PRIO civil war onset and duration dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002;

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has a larger substantive effect than spending. Both variables are significant in the baseline model. Military spending ( $p \leq .086$ ) has a miniscule effect size. While military size ( $P \leq .002$ ) has a larger, yet still very small effect size.

Strand 2006). This is an ordinal variable that is coded 0 if no significant conflict is occurring in a country-year. *Civil War Intensity* is coded 1 if there are 25-999 battle deaths. I label this category “moderate conflict.” *Civil War Intensity* takes on the value of 2 if there are more than 999 battle deaths in a given country year. I label this category “intense conflict.” This variable is zero inflated with most country-year observations not experiencing any significant level of conflict (85%). 10.6% of country-year observations experience moderately intense conflict. Only 4.4% of country-year observations experience intense civil conflict.


**Figure 4.2:** Distribution of Civil War Intensity



The next explanatory variable considered in the analysis is *Civil War Duration*. This variable is again drawn from the UCDP/PRIO civil war onset and duration dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Strand 2006). I have created this variable by coding how many years a particular conflict lasts. This variable can range from 0-67. The maximum value

of 67 represents the longest lasting conflict in these data which occurred in Myanmar. This conflict started in 1949 and persisted through 2015. Again, this variable is largely zero inflated, with 83% of the observations taking on this value.<sup>22</sup>

**Figure 4.3**



### **Baseline Model Results**

I begin by evaluating the impact of a number of covariates on the likelihood of mutinies. All coefficients can be interpreted in the same way, with a positive coefficient indicating that the likelihood of a mutiny increases as the independent variables increases

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<sup>22</sup> As a robustness check, I will transform this variable many ways due to the heavy skew. I will examine the log of this variable and also ordinalize the variable so that one or two cases are not making it hard to find results. These results will be reported in a separate robustness table.

in value. The baseline model largely behaves as anticipated. Figure 4.4 illustrates the results of the baseline model substantively. This figure displays the change in predicted probability when considering a change in a given independent variable. The diamonds represent the point estimate of the predicted probability surrounded by a 95% confidence interval. To begin, focus on the baseline model (enclosed in box). This represents the predicted probability of a mutiny given that all continuous independent variables are held at their means and all dichotomous variables are held at their minimum.



<b>Results Table 4.1</b>	Baseline Model	Intensity Model	Duration Model	Full Model
<b>Main Results</b>				
<b>Primary Independent Variables</b>				
CW Intensity		0.488***(0.105)		0.445***(0.115)
CW Duration			0.020***(0.007)	0.005(0.010)
<b>State-Level Controls</b>				
Coups	0.529**(0.210)	0.443**(0.210)	0.525**(0.215)	0.450**(0.211)
GDPPC	-0.196***(0.071)	-0.158**(0.071)	-0.184***(0.068)	-0.158**(0.070)
Military Size	0.000**(.000)	0.000**(.000)	0.000**(.000)	0.000**(.000)
Democracy	-0.598***(0.200)	-0.519**(0.217)	-0.599***(0.204)	-0.526**(0.212)
Autocracy	-0.377*(0.220)	-0.318(0.218)	-0.380*(0.225)	-0.323(0.220)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>				
Cold War	-0.624***(0.198)	-0.581***(0.196)	-0.534***(0.201)	-0.564***(0.2)
Years	-0.417***(0.044)	-0.403***(0.044)	-0.411***(0.044)	-0.403***(0.044)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.017***(0.003)	0.016***(0.002)	0.017***(0.002)	0.016***(0.002)
Years <sup>3</sup>	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)

**Table 4.1 continued**


Constant	0.496 (0.483)	-0.0868 (0.531)	0.249 (0.492)	-0.0923 (0.531)
Observations	8,156	8,156	8,156	8,156

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Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.

Figure 4.4

Predicting Military Mutinies



Moving to the left of the baseline prediction, there are three factors that are seen to increase the likelihood of a mutiny. The variable that increases the likelihood of a mutiny most dramatically is a history of military coups. If a state moves from experiencing no coups in a given year to experiencing one additional coup, this increases the likelihood of a military mutiny by 65% over the baseline predicted probability. This is likely because coups are capturing a state's military's underling predisposition to get involved in politics and act in indiscipline. The next most important factor that increases a state's propensity for mutinies is its overall wealth. Falling in the 5<sup>th</sup> percentile of GDPPC increases the states likelihood of experiencing a mutiny by 54% over the baseline predicted probability. This finding makes sense because often militaries mutiny when they are concerned with corporate interests or resources. Richer states are better able to alleviate these types of grievances than poor states. The next factor that increases the probability of a mutiny is the state's military size. However, this effect is smaller than the other two previously discussed. Falling in the 95<sup>th</sup> percentile of military size increases the likelihood of a state experiencing a mutiny by 16% over the baseline predicted probability.

All point estimates to the right of the baseline predicted probability (highlighted by box) are factors that are associated with a diminished likelihood of a state experiencing a mutiny. Having a small military decreases the predicted probability of a mutiny. Dictatorships are less likely to experience mutinies than semi-democratic regions which is the baseline scenario presented here. Rich countries are less likely to experience mutinies. By falling in the 95<sup>th</sup> of GDPPC, a state can reduce its likelihood of experiencing a mutiny by 39% compared to the baseline predicted probability.

Democracies are less likely to experience mutinies than semi-democracies. As mentioned previously, this result is driven by the fact that democracies have consolidated institutional avenues for militaries to secure their interests. Finally, the Cold War era saw fewer mutinies than the post-Cold War era.


### **Intensity and Duration Results**

In the subsequent models, I test the independent and additive effects of civil war intensity and duration on the likelihood of mutinies. First, the Intensity model seeks to uncover the relationship between intense conflict and the likelihood of foot soldiers shirking by way of a mutiny. The positive and significant coefficient in Results Table 4.1 indicates strong support for this expectation that particularly bloody conflict will incentivize shirking.

Figure 4.5 displays the substantive results from the Intensity model. This figure plots the change in predicted probability as the value of the Intensity variable changes. The first point estimate displayed is the baseline scenario of no conflict. As the Intensity variable changes from a value of 0 (no conflict) to a value of 1 (moderate conflict), the likelihood of a mutiny increases by 58%. As the Intensity variable increases in value, moving from the baseline scenario of no conflict to the most intense conflict with greater than 999 battle deaths, the probability of a mutiny increases by 156%. These substantive impacts demonstrate that a state experiencing particularly intense civil war is most predisposed to mutinies. States experiencing some conflict, but not extremely bloody conflict, are more likely to experiencing mutinies than states that are experiencing no conflict at all.

**Figure 4.5**

**The Influence of Civil War Intensity on Mutinies**



\*Predicted probabilities are calculated using Intensity model in Results Table 4.1.


The Duration model explores the relationship between long lasting civil conflicts and the likelihood of foot soldier shirking in the form of mutinies. The expectation here was that long lasting conflict will incentivize shirking as foot soldiers blame military leadership for poor strategy. Due to risk aversion, foot soldiers will protest continued fighting. Again, in Results table 4.1, I find support for the independent effect of duration as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient.

Figure 4.6 shows the change in simulated predicted probability as civil war durations changes value. The figure displays the change in the dependent variable as we

move from the minimum value of duration through the maximum value (with 25<sup>th</sup>-75<sup>th</sup> percentiles displayed). There seems to be only a mild increase in the likelihood of mutinies as we move from the minimum value of duration to the 25<sup>th</sup> and 50<sup>th</sup> percentile. However, as duration moves to the other end of the distribution, there is a larger effect. Moving from the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile of duration to the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of duration, there is a 9% increase in the likelihood of a mutiny. As we move from the 50<sup>th</sup> percentile to the maximum duration of civil conflict, there is an 88% increase in the propensity for a state to experience a mutiny. Thus, a state like Myanmar in 2015 (which holds the maximum value for civil war duration) is 8 times more likely to experience a mutiny than a state that only experiences a year of civil war.

**Figure 4.6**

The Influence of Civil War Duration on Mutinies



\*Predicted probabilities calculated from Duration model in Results Table 4.1.

In the full model (see Results Table 4.1) that considers the impact of civil war intensity and duration simultaneously, I find that the effect for duration disappears. When considering both of the dimensions at the same time, only intensity appears to have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of mutinies. I explored the interactive effect of these two variables, but found that it is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.843). Due to fears of multicollinearity, I examined the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)



between duration and intensity. However, upon investigation it appears that they are not as multicollinear as expected.<sup>23</sup>

### **Robustness**

I included coups as a control variable to hold constant the general state of civil military relations in a country. However, it is possible that coups and mutinies are closely interrelated processes, and as such the inclusion of this control variable is problematic. I re-estimated the model excluding this variable from the analysis to ensure that my results are robust to this specification. I find that the primary independent variables behave exactly the same with or without the coup variable in the model. Likewise, the controls in the baseline model do not seem to be responsive to the inclusion or exclusion of this variable. Thus, I conclude that this variable does not seem to be driving my results. Because there are solid theoretical reasons to suspect that a state's history of coups matters for predicting mutinies, I will keep this variable in the baseline model.

---

<sup>23</sup> The VIF is reported to be 1.80. The Square Root VIF is 1.34. The correlation between the two variables is 0.668.

<b>Results Table 4.2</b>	Baseline Model	Intensity Model	Duration Model	Full Model
<b>No Coup Variable Specification</b>				
<b>Primary Independent Variables</b>				
CW Intensity		0.499***(0.105)		0.462***(0.116)
CW Duration			0.020***(0.007)	0.004(0.010)
<b>State-Level Controls</b>				
GDPPC	-0.201***(0.071)	-0.162**(0.07)	-0.189***(0.067)	-0.162**(0.069)
Military Size	0.000*(.000)	0.000**(.000)	0.000*(.000)	0.000**(.000)
Democracy	-0.626***(0.195)	-0.539**(0.214)	-0.626***(0.199)	-0.546***(0.209)
Autocracy	-0.382*(0.219)	-0.319(0.216)	-0.384*(0.224)	-0.324(0.218)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>				
Cold War	-0.597***(0.198)	-0.557***(0.194)	-0.506**(0.2)	-0.542***(0.198)
Years	-0.419***(0.044)	-0.404***(0.044)	-0.413***(0.044)	-0.404***(0.044)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.017***(0.003)	0.016***(0.002)	0.017***(0.003)	0.016***(0.002)
Years <sup>3</sup>	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)
Constant	0.579 (0.477)	-0.0273 (0.523)	0.331 (0.485)	-0.0313 (0.522)

**Table 4.2 continued**

Observations	8,156	8,156	8,156	8,156
Robust standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				

In an effort to explore the coup variable more thoroughly, I also reestimate the models using an alternative specification in Results Table 4.3. Instead of looking at the effect of a coup in the previous year, I explore the impact of having a coup attempt in the previous two years. When using this specification, all the same findings appear in the results table. However, the coup variable falls out of significance. The conclusion here is that coups have a very immediate effect on the likelihood of mutinies. When we consider a longer timeline, coups no longer help predict mutinies. Thus, for the remainder of this dissertation, I will include the original coup variable which codes whether or not a coup occurred in the previous year.

<b>Results Table 4.3</b> <b>Alternative Coup Speciation</b>	Baseline Model	Intensity Model	Duration Model	Full Model
<b>Primary Independent Variables</b>				
Intensity		0.497***(.105)		0.460***(.116)
Duration			0.02(.007)***	0.004(.01)
<b>State Level Controls</b>				
Coup (within 2 years)	0.127(.17)	0.033(.179)	0.112(.174)	0.038(.179)
GDPPC	-0.197***(.07)	-0.161**(.07)	-0.186***(.067)	-0.161***(.069)
Military Size	0.000*(.000)	0.000**(.000)	0.000**(.000)	0.000**(.000)
Democracy	-0.617***(.2)	-0.538**(.217)	-0.618***(.204)	-0.544**(.212)
Autocracy	-0.382*(.219)	-0.319(.217)	-0.385*(.224)	-0.324(.218)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>				
Cold War	-0.606***(.198)	-0.559***(.195)	-0.515**(.2)	-0.545***(.199)
Years	-0.419***(.044)	-0.404***(.044)	-0.413***(.044)	-0.404***(.044)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.017***(.003)	0.016***(.002)	0.017***(.003)	0.016***(.002)
Years <sup>3</sup>	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)
Constant	0.534 (0.475)	-0.0376 (0.520)	0.292 (0.482)	-0.0433 (0.521)
Observations	8,156	8,156	8,156	8,156

**Table 4.3 Continued**

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<

As an additional robustness check, I estimate the same models including various dummy variables for regions. It is possible that particular regions are having a strong influence over these findings. The excluded category for this analysis is Europe. The results demonstrate that the Middle East is the only statistically significant region when compared to Europe in the baseline model. In the full model, the Americas are significant and negative, suggesting that compared to European countries, these states are less likely to experience mutinies during intense or long lasting civil war. What is particularly important about this robustness table is that the results of the baseline model do not change when including regional dummies. Furthermore, I find stronger support for my primary independent variables of interest when I include the regional dummies. This suggests that my main findings are not driven by a certain region. My findings are robust to a specification that considers that regions may have heterogeneous impacts on the likelihood of mutinies.

<b>Results Table 4.4</b>				
<b>Regional Dummies</b>	Baseline Model	Intensity Model	Duration Model	Full Model
<b>Primary Independent Variables</b>				
CW Intensity		0.458***(.114)		0.449***(.124)
CW Duration			0.494**(.218)	0.418**(.211)
<b>State-Level Controls</b>				
Coup	0.502**(.215)	0.416**(.21)	-0.244***(.08)	-0.202***(.079)
GDPPC	0.253***(.084)	-0.202**(.079)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)
Military Size	0.000**(.000)	0.000***(.000)	-0.496***(.19)	-0.428**(.203)
Democracy	-0.47**(.195)	-0.426**(.208)	-0.486**(.215)	-0.431**(.211)
Autocracy	-0.505**(.21)	-0.431**(.211)	0.497***(.189)	-0.532***(.188)
<b>Regional Controls</b>				
Africa	0.209(.298)	0.288(.278)	-0.108(.295)	-0.03(.285)
Asia	0.026(.296)	-0.024(.284)	0.698**(.297)	0.742**(.308)
Middle East	0.876***(.301)	0.75**(.305)	0.125(.286)	0.204(.281)
Americas	0.173(.281)	0.207(.279)	0.405***(.045)	-0.397***(.045)



**Table 4.4 Continued****Temporal Controls**

Cold War	0.577***(.185)	0.536***(.185)	0.17(.281)	0.284(.275)
Years	0.411***(.044)	0.397***(.045)	0.016***(.003)	0.016***(.003)
Years2	0.017***(.003)	0.016***(.003)	0.000***(.000)	-0.000***(.000)
Years3	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.017**(.007)	0.001(.01)
Constant	0.587 (0.738)	-0.0668 (0.734)	0.462 (0.703)	-0.0615 (0.721)
	8,156	8,156	8,156	8,156

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

As a final robustness measure, I take a deeper dive into exploring the duration variable. As presented in Figure 4.3, this variable is zero inflated with a dramatic skew. In order to ensure that one or two cases is not driving the results, I create an ordinal variable from the quartiles of the duration variable. The results are presented below in Results Table 4.5. As presented, the main findings are largely the same. Intensity still has a positive and significant effect across all models. This new duration variable has a positive and significant independent effect. However, it falls out of significance when included in the full model. In this specification the sign flips, but due to the lack of statistical significance, this is not too alarming. All in all, the main results to hold up to a number of alternate specifications.

**Results Table 4.5****Quartiles of Duration**

Baseline Model

Intensity Model

Duration Model

Full Model

**Primary Independent Variables**

Intensity

0.488\*\*\*(.105)

0.728\*\*\*(.148)

Quartiles of Duration

0.159\*\*(.065)

-0.146(.105)

**State Level Controls**

Coup

0.529\*\*(.21)

0.443\*\*(.21)

0.479\*\*(.209)

0.450\*\*(.209)

GDPPC

-0.196\*\*\*(.071)

-0.158\*\*(.07)

-0.172\*\*(.072)

-0.161\*\*(.072)

Military Size

0.000\*\*(.000)

0.000\*\*(.000)

0.000\*\*(.000)

0.000\*\*(.000)

Democracy

-0.598\*\*\*(.2)

-0.519\*\*(.217)

-0.570\*\*\*(.211)

-0.509\*\*(.214)

Autocracy

-0.377\*(.22)

-0.318(.218)

-0.343(.223)

-0.321(.219)

**Temporal Controls**

Cold War

-0.624\*\*\*(.198)

-0.581\*\*\*(.196)

-0.612\*\*\*(.198)

-0.577\*\*\*(.196)

Years

-0.417\*\*\*(.044)

-0.403\*\*\*(.044)

-0.398\*\*\*(.044)

-0.411\*\*\*(.046)

Years<sup>2</sup>

0.017\*\*\*(.003)

0.016\*\*\*(.002)

0.016\*\*\*(.002)

0.017\*\*\*(.003)

Years<sup>3</sup>

0.000\*\*\*(.000)

0.000\*\*\*(.000)

0.000\*\*\*(.000)

0.000\*\*\*(.000)

Constant

0.496  
(0.483)-0.0868  
(0.531)-0.0721  
(0.584)0.148  
(0.605)

**Table 4.5 Continued**

Observations	8,156	8,156	8,156	8,156
	Robust standard errors in parentheses			
	*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

## **Directions for Future Research**

This chapter presents evidence that militaries are particularly prone to splintering in the face of long lasting or particularly blood civil war. In conducting the analysis for this chapter, I developed a number of ideas for future research projects. Recently there has been a dramatic influx in the number of projects that examine the sub-national characteristics of civil conflict. There are several datasets that code the sub-national geographic dispersion of civil conflict intensity (e.g., ACLED and UCDP GED). MMDD is also geocoded, giving the user the ability to locate precisely where mutiny events are occurring. In the future, I would like to examine the relationship between intense fighting in particular sub-national units and the likelihood of a mutiny occurring in a proximate location. This would lend further evidence to the notion that intense conflict is indeed a proximate cause of mutinies, rather than just a correlate. By zooming in and examining the geographic proximity of these two processes, it might even be possible to test specific causal mechanisms that lead soldiers to mutiny in the face of intense conflict.

I limited this analysis to civil conflict. However, there are no reasons to suspect these theoretical expectations would not hold for interstate conflict. In the future, I intend to expand this analysis to interstate conflict. I have considered that MID escalation captures this idea of “bad strategy” well. If military leaders are utilizing effective strategy, MIDs should not escalate. However, due to miscalculations or errors, MIDs may escalate, drawing foot soldiers into conflict. In coding MMDD, I observed that most of the cases of mutiny in consolidated democracies came during war times. Very rarely do consolidated democracies experience mutinies without being actively involved in an

interstate war. Thus, I think this avenue of future research is likely to yield powerful explanations for when and why consolidated democracies experience military rebellions.

## **Conclusion**


In this chapter I presented a baseline model for predicting mutinies. I found that there are a number of state-level factors and temporal dynamics that help predict the occurrence of mutinies. I then set out to test the theoretical expectations that predict Type 1 mutinies, or mutinies that occur when foot soldiers are displeased with the actions and decisions of military leadership. I found strong support for my two primary theoretical expectations. First, I found that particularly bloody civil conflict increases the likelihood of a state experiencing a mutiny. Second, there is evidence that long lasting civil conflict also spur type 1 mutinies, although the intensity finding has more support. This chapter confirms anecdotal evidence that civil war countries, like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, are indeed more mutiny prone than their peaceful counterparts.

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## Chapter 5: Type 2 Mutinies

Scholars still lack a complete understanding of the determinants of military mutinies. The goal of this chapter is to explore a particular type of mutinies, specifically those that arise when foot soldiers and the executive have a divergence of goals. While the previous chapter focused on mutinies that arise between the military leadership and foot soldiers, this chapter will examine rifts in preferences between civilian principals and foot soldier agents, as depicted in figure 5.1. As laid out in Chapter 2, I argue that mutinies are likely to arise in a nested principal agent model when actors have divergent preferences or agents are asked to carry out extremely costly and risky endeavors. Below I will summarize the expectations I derived in Chapter 2 that I will test in this chapter.

**Figure 5.1:** Nest 2, Foot Soldiers as Agents of the Executive



## **Theoretical Expectations to Test**

Shirking in this particular nest of the nested principal agent model will come by way of mutiny, since foot soldiers alone rarely launch a coup (Thyne and Powell 2014). In chapter 2, I outlined the logic of several testable expectations that flow from this theoretical framework. Specifically, I am looking for scenarios that will generate a rift between the goals of the foot soldiers and those of the executive. Below are the hypotheses I outlined in chapter 2:

H1: Military Regimes are more likely to experience mutinies than other types of regimes.

H2: As expenditures per soldier decrease, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.

H3: As a state experiences more protests, the likelihood of mutinies should increase.

H4: Peaceful Protests are more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests.

H5: Diversionary war should increase the likelihood of mutinies.

H6: Executive ordered purging should increase the likelihood of mutinies.

## **Research Design**

In this analysis, the unit of analysis will be the country-year. The dependent variable is again drawn from MMDD, and is a dichotomous indicator of annual mutinies. This variable takes on the value of 1 if a mutiny occurred in a given year and 0 otherwise. Chapter 2 outlines many details about the nature and distribution of this variable.

The independent variables of interest for this chapter are drawn from various sources. To begin, the military regime variable is drawn from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2012). The *Military Regime* variable is dichotomous with a zero indicating some regime



type besides a military regime and a value of 1 indicating the presence of a military regime. Only 7.49% (881 cases of 11,763) of all regime-years are military regimes, making military regimes a rarity. Table 5.1 displays the distribution of military regimes across region. The Americas have had more military regimes than other regions, followed by Asia and Africa.

Table 5.1

Distribution of Military Regime Variable across Regions

	Americas	Asia	Africa	Middle East	Europe
% of all regimes in region that are military regimes	14.4%	11.4%	8.26%	4.2%	.002%


The protest measure comes from The Social, Political, and Economic Events Database (SPEED) (Nardulli et al. 2014). This dataset codes “destabilizing human-initiated” events, which include many acts beyond protests. For this reason, I limit the analysis only to protests events carried out by non-state entities targeted at the state. The *Protest Count* variable is a count of the total number of protest events in a given country-year. This variable can range from 0-214. The maximum value of this variable occurred in the U.S. in 1971 at the height of anti-Vietnam protests.

The next hypothesis I will evaluate considers the nature of a protest event. I anticipate that peaceful and violent protests have different effects on the likelihood of mutinies. I expect that peaceful protests will be more likely to encourage mutinies because the cost of repressing peaceful protestors is much higher than the cost of repressing violent protestors. Fortunately, the SPEED data include a variable that codes

whether or not a protest was violent based upon the use of weapons. This categorical variable actually codes what specific instrument was used (e.g., gun, improvised explosive, fire, blunt instruments, etc.). However, because my theory does not suggest that different weapons should have different effects, I collapse this categorical variable to capture whether or not a weapons was used in any of the protest events in a given country-year. I create three categories for the analysis: *No Protests*, *Violent Protests*, and *Peaceful Protests*.

Next, I examine the effect of executive ordered *Purges* on military mutinies. I draw from Sudduth (2015). These data make a large contribution to the field by allowing scholars to examine purges empirically. However, the dataset has somewhat limited temporal coverage (1969-2003) when compared to the full time series in my analysis (1946-2015). Despite the limited temporal coverage, I leverage these data as they are the best opportunity to examine executive ordered purges. Sudduth imposes a rule that states that in order for an event to be a purge it must meet one of the following criteria: the executive eliminates rival elites (1) who have support from other elites (2) who have different policy preferences than the executive (3) who been suspected to plot the overthrow of the executive (Sudduth 2015:18). Figure 5.2 displays the distribution of purges across regions. African executives appear to be utilizing this regime securing mechanism more than executives in other regions, followed by those in the Middle East and Asia.

**Figure 5.2:** Purges by Region



My final expectation is that diversionary conflict will spur military mutinies because they present scenarios where the executive benefits from conflict by experiencing a boost in public opinion, but the foot soldiers do not experience a benefit. In contrast, the foot soldiers experience steep costs as conflict imposes risk on them. In order to proxy for diversionary conflict, I follow Mitchell and Thyne (2010).<sup>24</sup> I create an interaction term using dispute initiation and an indicator for poor domestic, economic conditions. The basic intuition here is that an executive initiating conflict during economic downturns is likely trying to distract domestic constituencies from the present economic failures through the use of diversionary tactics.

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<sup>24</sup> Their unit of analysis is directed dyads. Here I simplify and maintain the country-year unit of analysis. This means that a MID will only be coded for the initiator state.

The *MID* variable is coded 1 if a state initiates a dispute in a given year (Jones et al. 1996). In order to measure domestic turmoil, the *CPI* variable captures the percentage change in a state's World Bank's Consumer Price Index (CPI) (Mitchell and Prins 2004; Mitchell and Powell 2010). This measure is a common proxy for domestic economic conditions and offers better data availability than more direct measures, like unemployment or investment (e.g., Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and O'Neal 1991). I then interact these two terms together to get a proxy for diversionary conflict. This measure has limited temporal coverage compared to the other primary independent variables of interests.

I estimate a logistic regression with standard errors clustered by country. All independent variables are lagged. I include time since last mutiny, time since last mutiny<sup>2</sup>, and time since last mutiny<sup>3</sup> to account for temporal dependency (Carter and Signorino 2010). I use all same control variables that are outlined in Chapter 4. These are: *Coups*, *GDPPC*, *Military Size*, *Cold War*.

## **Results**

Results Table 5.1 shows the effect of the primary independent variables of interest. This table excludes the final hypotheses regarding divisionary conflict due to the fact that this variable is temporally limited. The results for the final hypothesis can be found in Results table 5.2. The first hypothesis I set out to test was whether or not military regimes are more mutiny prone. The results suggest that military regimes are not more mutiny prone than other regime types. In the final full model, military regimes

become marginally significant but work in the opposite direction as expected. Thus, I do not find support for the expectation that military regimes will be most predisposed to mutinies.

<b>Results Table 5.2</b>	Military Regime	Protest Count	Protest Nature	Purges	Full Model with Protest Count	Full Model with Protest Nature
<b>Primary Independent Variables</b>						
Military Regime	-0.473(0.324)				-0.804**(.382)	-0.908**(.387)
Protest Count		0.016***(.005)			0.019***(.005)	
Violent Protests			0.831***(.233) Prob > chi2 = 0.362			0.739***(.248) Prob > chi2 = 0.299
Peaceful Protests			0.552**(.258)			0.391(.274)
Military Purges				0.411(.398)	0.604(.429)	0.279(.381)
<b>State Level Controls</b>						
Coups	0.414(.260)	0.482**(.24)	0.418(.258)	0.355(.232)	0.264(.326)	0.258(.325)
GDPPC	0.197***(.073)	0.232***(.073)	-0.256***(.073)	0.249***(.082)	0.273***(.084)	0.265***(.083)
Military Size	0.000***(.000)	0.000(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.001***(.000)	0.000(.000)	0.000**(.000)
Democracy	-0.698**(.278)	-0.738**(.297)	-0.655**(.329)	-0.519(.322)	-0.639*(0.35)	-0.593**(.359)
Autocracy	-0.55**(.225)	-0.408*(.225)	-0.486**(.233)	-0.409(.254)	-0.216(.25)	-0.216(.255)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>						
Cold War	-0.518**(.205)	0.763***(.218)	-0.623***(.215)	-0.425**(.244)	-0.471(.292)	-0.472*(.265)

**Table 5.2 Continued**

Years	0.438***(.047)	0.418***(.049)	0.433***(.053)	0.412***(.053)	0.421***(.054)	0.427***(.061)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.02***(.003)	0.018***(.003)	0.020***(.003)	0.018***(.003)	0.018***(.003)	0.020***(.003)
Years <sup>3</sup>	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)
Constant	0.463 (0.464)	0.699 (0.467)	0.334 (0.516)	0.487 (0.547)	0.824 (0.539)	0.461 (0.578)
Observations	11,872	12,878	11,619	9,778	9,090	8,646


Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Protests do increase the likelihood of a state experiencing mutinies, as hypothesized. The positive and significant coefficient indicates support for my second hypothesis. Figure 5.3 displays the substantive effects. Here, using simulated predicted probabilities obtained through clarify, I plot the change in predicted probabilities given a change in the number of protests a state experiences in a given year. There is a 7.8% change in the predicted probability of a mutiny given that a state moves from experiencing no protests to experiencing 5 protest a year. Moving from the baseline of no protests to 10 additional protests, there is an 18.4% change in the predicted probability of a mutiny. If a state moves from experiencing no protests to experiencing 25 additional protests, the likelihood of a mutiny jumps by 48.3%. Finally, moving from the baseline of no protests to 50 protests, the predicted probability of a mutiny changes by a dramatic 126.8%.



Figure 5.3



\*Predicted probabilities calculated from protest count model in Results Table 5.1.

I theorized that different types of protests would encourage mutinies more than others. Specifically, I expected that peaceful protests would encourage mutinies due to the high costs associated with repressing peaceful dissenters. However, the results suggest that both peaceful and violent protests predict mutinies and one is not a better predictor than the other (Probability  $\chi^2 = 0.362$ ).<sup>25</sup> I do not include *Protest Count*, *Peaceful Protests*, and *Violent Protests* in the same model due to issues of collinearity. I present full models, one which includes the protest count variable and one which includes

<sup>25</sup> This reports the  $\chi^2$  of  $\beta$  for each variable.

the two protest nature variables. In the full model considering protest nature, we see that the difference between violent protests and peaceful protests is indistinguishable from zero. Thus, there is no evidence that peaceful protests encourage mutinies over violent protests. Both types predict mutinies, but one no more than the other.

Military purges fail to achieve statistical significance. The coefficient is positive as expected, but the effect is indistinguishable from zero. There are a few possible explanations for this null finding. First, it is possible that the effect of purging is immediate. In other words, there is not temporal lag and the mutiny occurs immediately after the purge. However, upon investigating this, I do not find support even when estimating the model with no lag of the independent variable, although the p-value does get closer to reaching statistical significance. Second, it is important to note that these data are temporally restricted. The dataset only covers 1969-2003. This limited coverage may be making it challenging to find results. I estimated this model for each region to see if there are heterogeneous effects across different that are washing out results (reported in Results Table 5.3). Interestingly, the coefficient is only positive and significant in the Americas. For every other region there is no statistical significance, although Africa and the Middle East are close to achieving significance.

<b>Results Table 5.3</b>	(1) Europe	(2) Africa	(3) Middle East	(4) Asia	(5) Americas
<b>Military Purges</b>	0.158(.794)	-1.00(.622)	-0.755(.462)	0.368(1.082)	<b>1.774**(.804)</b>
Coup	0.687(1.735)	0.063(.388)	-0.390(.962)	0.535(.596)	1.026(.684)
GDPPC	-0.508(.369)	-0.248(.224)	-0.5(.31)	-0.538**(.24)	-0.455(.306)
Military Size	0.002***(.001)	0.005(.004)	-0.001(.002)	0.000*(.000)	0.001*(.000)
Democracy	-0.872(.693)	-0.346(.334)	1.919(1.477)	-1.293(.833)	0.592(.986)
Autocracy	-0.276(.850)	0.439(.386)	0.531(.82)	-0.634(.407)	-1.298*(.709)
Cold War	-1.668**(.676)	-1.724***(.477)	-1.349*(.744)	1.182***(.337)	0.689(.461)
Years	-0.361*(.209)	-0.463***(.01)	-0.456***(.095)	-0.324***(.099)	-0.390**(.18)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.016**(.008)	0.023***(.006)	0.025***(.007)	0.011**(.005)	0.020**(.01)
Years <sup>3</sup>	-0.000**(.000)	-0.000***(.000)	-0.000***(.000)	-0.000*(.000)	-0.000*(.000)
Constant	1.782 (2.364)	0.576 (1.349)	2.501 (2.056)	1.199 (1.616)	-0.117 (2.553)
Observations	2,153	1,898	1,092	1,155	3,480

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.

In Results Table 5.4, I display the results for the diversionary theory hypothesis. I find support for the expectation that divisionary conflict will incentivize mutinies by creating scenarios where executives benefit from conflict while soldiers suffer. Figure 5.4 presents the substantive results from this model. I have split the results by two dimensions. Each point estimate represents a maximum or minimum value of a constitutive term (e.g., maximum or minimum value on MID variable and maximum or minimum value on CPI variable). The figure is split so point estimates on the left side of the figure represent the minimum values on the CPI variable, or situations of economic downturn. Point estimates on the right of the figure represent scenarios of a strong domestic economy or the maximum value on the CPI variable. The X-axis alters the value on the MID variable, creating scenarios of conflict and no conflict. As the figure displays, scenarios of conflict during economic downturns are associated with the highest predicted probabilities of military mutinies. Good economic conditions seem to ward off mutinies. However, in the context of a strong domestic economy, states that experience conflict are more likely to experience mutinies than those that do not. What is most important in figure 5.4 is that the interaction of conflict and an economic downturn spurs mutinies.

<b>Results Table 5.4</b>	MIDs	% Δ CPI	Interaction	Full Model w/ Protest Count	Full Model w/ Protest Nature
<b>Primary Independent Variables</b>					
Diversionsary Conflict			-0.402*(.227)	-0.427*(.221)	-0.457*(.234)
MID Initiated	-0.112(.378)		0.655(.517)	0.970**(.472)	0.811(.513)
% Δ CPI		-0.083(.056)	-0.075(.055)	-0.095(.058)	-0.01(.07)
Military Regime				-2.050**(.874)	-1.943**(.887)
Protest Count				0.024***(.007)	
Peaceful Protests					0.456(.710)
Violent Protests					0.989*(.588)
Military Purges				1.660**(.74)	1.247*(.691)
<b>State Level Controls</b>					
Coups	0.812(.543)	0.724(.521)	0.698(.532)	0.764(.544)	0.841(.527)
GDPPC	-0.404(.279)	-0.442(.276)	-0.433(.274)	-0.388(.276)	-0.530*(.295)
Military Size	0.001***(.000)	0.001***(.000)	0.001***(.000)	-0.000(.001)	0.001**(.000)
Democracy	-0.447(.678)	-0.426(.709)	-0.433(.719)	-0.264(.77)	-0.058(.762)

**Table 5.4 Continued**


Autocracy	-1.333***(.458)	-1.42***(.482)	-1.435***(.496)	-1.470***(.448)	-1.302***(.471)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>					
Cold War	-0.751*(.39)	-1.139***(.404)	-1.170***(.406)	-1.144***(.385)	-0.993***(.381)
Years	-0.537***(.116)	-0.552***(.12)	-0.555***(.121)	-0.544***(.128)	-0.480***(.135)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.027***(.007)	0.027***(.008)	0.027***(.008)	0.026***(.007)	0.0239***(.008)
Years <sup>3</sup>	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000**(.000)
Constant	1.782 (2.144)	2.679 (2.353)	2.611 (2.357)	2.434 (2.270)	2.495 (2.510)
Observations	5,587	5,587	5,587	5,424	5,424

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Figure 5.4

The Influence of Divisary Conflict on the Mutinies



\*Predicted probabilities calculated from Interaction model in Results table 5.3.

## **Ideas for Future Research**

In this chapter I consider the impact of protests on mutinies. I theorized that peaceful protests will be more likely to spur mutinies than violent protests because the cost of repression will be steeper. There are other ways to measure the varying cost of repression for soldiers and the executive. I would like to carry out an analysis that examines the impact of having ethnic kin of soldiers protesting. For example, in Syria in 2011, Sunni soldiers refused orders to repress dissenters because they identified ethnically and culturally with these protesters. Anecdotally, there are many cases of mutiny that are spurred by ethnic considerations (e.g., Nigeria 1967, Uganda 1977, CAR 1996, Niger 1997). I hope to explore this relationship between shared ethnic identity between soldiers and civilians and the likelihood of mutinies when repressive strategies are deployed.

I found support for my expectation about diversionary conflicts spurring mutinies. However, there are many proxies for diversionary conflict. I would like to expand this analysis to include several more types of diversion. For example, diversion might happen during economic downturns, but it may also happen during scandals – which are easily observed by soldiers – making the diversion perhaps more obvious. With diversion being more obvious, the costs imposed on soldiers should be more obvious, thus making military rebellion more likely.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter examined the determinants of type 2 mutinies, or those that occur when foot soldiers experience high costs and point their discontent at the executive. I theorized that




scenarios that benefit the executive and impose steep costs on the soldiers are likely to spur this type of mutiny. I found evidence that protests (both violent and peaceful) increase the likelihood of mutinies. I also found evidence that military purges in the Americas drives mutinies, but do not seem to matter in other regions. Finally, I found evidence that diversionary tactics used by the executive encourage foot soldiers to mutiny.

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## Chapter 6: Type 3 Mutinies

This chapter will present the final empirical tests of the last set of theoretical expectations, which considers an interesting strategic calculation for the executive. As Feaver (2003) established, the central issue with civil military relations is that executives need strong militaries to ward off both domestic and international threats. However, in strengthening their military, they increase the chances that a strong, capable military will turn against the executive and use its new-found power to usurp the civilian power. This final nest (Figure 6.1) includes all the actors in the military apparatus. Because military leadership are included in the interaction, coup plotting is a realistic option for disgruntled military actors who may seek to oust civilian principals. However, executives are forward thinking and will act in an effort to limit this type of conspiratorial behavior. In seeking to introduce new coordination challenges, the executive may be spurring a new type of dissent: mutinies.

**Figure 6.1:** Foot Soldiers and Leadership as Agents of Executive



It is well established that executives are concerned with the military's ability to coordinate against them, and thus take measures to limit the military's ability to coordinate (Pilster and Bohmelt 2011, Powell 2012). It is also well established that coup proofing can limit military effectiveness (e.g., Biddle and Zirkle 1996; Brooks 2006; Pilster and Bohmelt 2011). I expect that there is yet another unintended consequence of coup proofing. Given that the inherent purpose of coup proofing is to factionalize the military to raise coordination obstacles, I expect that these measures will increase the military's likelihood of experiencing a mutiny. I also expect that in the context of high coup proofing, situations that are known to spur widespread military dissatisfaction, should instead predispose a state to suffering from mutinies rather than coups. While this type of pervasive and general dissatisfaction should traditionally result in coup activity, the regime-securing strategy of coup proofing will prevent such coordination. Instead of large scale conspiracy, we will observe lower level military rebellions in the context of high coup proofing.

### **Theoretical Expectations to Test**

The expectations I set out to test in this chapter are:

H8: As coup proofing measures increase, the likelihood of a mutiny should increase.

H9: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences democratization, the likelihood of a mutiny will also increase.

H10: In the context of high coup proofing, as a country experiences more human rights violations, the likelihood of a mutiny will also increase.

## Research Design

The dependent variable in this analysis is a dichotomous indicator of mutinies. As with previous chapters, the unit of analysis is country-year. The first expectation I set out to test is the impact of coup proofing on military rebellions. The coup proofing literature presents various measures for coup proofing. Most of them are temporally limited and difficult to interpret. The shortcomings of these measures are recognized by other scholars (e.g., De Bruin 2017, Reiter *working paper*). The authors point out that while coup proofing is conceptually clear, it can be a very challenging concept to capture empirically and quantitatively. However, despite these shortcomings, I will utilize extant coup proofing measures. Below I will describe each measure that I include in Results Table 6.1.

The first coup proofing measure I include in the analysis is *CB Count*. This variable is a count of the counterweight forces in a given year within a single country that fulfill these criteria: “(1) it is independent from military command. (2) the force is deployed within 60 miles of the capital which ensures it has at least to possibility to intercept a coup.” *Balancing* is simply the natural log transformation of the *CB Count* variable. *New CB* is a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a new counterweight was created in a given year. De Bruin (2017) uses 1,200 primary and secondary sources in the coding of these data. One major drawback of these measures is that they are only available for 65 randomly selected states between 1960-2010. While the sample is random and representative, users may still be worried that there is something systematically different about this sample from the population. However, the advantages of these data far outweigh the drawbacks.

The most established and commonly used coup proofing measures were developed by Pilster and Bohmelt (2011). By expanding Belkin and Schofer's (2003) coup proofing measure, Pilster and Bohmelt develop a measure called *counterbalancing*, which is the ratio of military to paramilitary organizations. The second measure developed by Pilster and Bohmelt includes a count of ground capable organizations, or those that could theoretically be expected to combat a coup or deter a coup attempt. This variable is called *Effective Organization*. Finally, they develop a ratio that measures the total number of military personnel relative to the total number of paramilitary organizations. A relatively high number of paramilitaries indicates an army that has more structural coup proofing in place. All of these measures cover 1970-1999, which is improved temporal coverage from Belkin and Schofer's original measures which only covered 1966-1986. However, the dependent variable drawn from MMDD ranges from 1945-present day; thus, there are many years of the dependent variable that are not covered by these datasets.

The conditional hypotheses involve a number of domestic conditions. These various measures are drawn from different datasets. The first, *democratization*, is calculated using Polity VI scores. This dichotomous variable takes on the value of 1 if a country has experienced a three point positive shift in polity over the previous 5 years.<sup>26</sup> I draw various measures of human rights violations from the CIRI data project (Cingraneli and Richards 1999). All of these variables cover 1981-2011. Unfortunately for this project, there is limited temporal overlap between the CIRI project and the coup proofing

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
<sup>26</sup> I tried a number of thresholds here, and the results are robust to various other specifications. (e.g., 2 point shift in two years, 5 point shift in five years, etc.)

measures. As reported in the results section, this means that the total number of observations for this portion of the analysis drops quite significantly. The first variable I examine is *Political Imprisonment*. This is an ordinal variable that is coded 0 if there were “many individuals imprisoned for political reasons.” 1 if there were “few individuals imprisoned for political reasons.” and 2 if there were no individuals imprisoned unjustly. Most of these data are distributed in the “no individuals” category (47%). The next type of violation considered is *Torture*. This variable is coded 0 if torture, or “the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain by government officials,” was practiced frequently. The variable takes on the value of 1 if torture was deployed occasionally, and 2 if it did not occur in a given year. The distribution of this variable is different than *political imprisonment*. 40% of the observations fall in the “some torture” category, while 40% fall in the “frequent torture” category, and 20% fall in the “no torture” group.

The next human rights violation examined is *Disappearances*. These events are cases where individuals are disappeared due to political reasons and the victims have not yet been found. Like the previous variables, this is coded as 0 if disappearances are frequent, 1 if there are occasional, and 2 if they do not occur. Most countries do not experience disappearances in a given year (72%). *Extrajudicial Killings* are the next category of rights violations. These events are killings carried out by government officials without due process of law. They are categorized in the same way, 0 if killings are common, 1 if they are occasional, and 2 if they do not occur. 29% of countries experience occasional extrajudicial killings in a given year, and 19% experience frequent killings in a year. Finally, I examine the impact of *Physical Integrity* violations, which

are simply an additive index of the aforementioned measures of rights violations. This variable ranges from 0 which represents no government respect for rights to 8 which represents full respect for rights. Figure 6.2 presents a histogram of the distribution of *Physical Integrity*. Most country-years have moderate to good respect for rights (values 4-8).

**Figure 6.2**



## Results

The results for the first hypothesis, examining the effect of coup proofing on mutinies, are presented in Results Table 6.1. Of the six measures of coup proofing, four of them are positively associated with mutinies. In other words, most conventional measures of counterbalancing increase the propensity of state experiencing mutinies. This finding

should be included in the dictator's handbook. Dictators can ward off coups by counterbalancing, but they should use this regime-securing strategy with extreme caution. Mutinies may likely be direct result of imposing artificial coordination challenges on a military. Anecdotally, we know that mutinies can have disastrous impacts, perhaps just as consequential to the tenure of a dictator as a coup (e.g., the formation of rebel groups as seen in the DRC with the formation of the M23 rebel group). Leaders should use extreme caution when implementing such coup proofing strategies as they may likely be a double edged-sword.



<b>Results Table 6.1</b>	Measure 1	Measure 2	Measure 3	Measure 4	Measure 5	Measure 6
<b>Coup Proofing and Mutinies</b>						
<b>Independent Variables of Interest</b>						
CB Count (De Bruin)	0.224***(.062)					
Balancing (De Bruin)		0.504**(.249)				
New CB (De Bruin)			0.162(.718)			
Counter Bal (P&B)				0.292**(.143)		
Effective Number (P&B)					0.291**(.148)	
Paramilitary (P&B)						0.044(.104)
<b>State Level Controls</b>						
Coup	0.51(.323)	0.459(.323)	0.384(.314)	0.143(.64)	0.094(.435)	0.271(.459)
GDPPC	-0.199(.146)	-0.139(.131)	-0.092(.132)	0.078(.19)	-0.166*(.099)	-0.181(.114)
Democracy	-0.355(.415)	-0.488(.398)	-0.705*(.428)	-0.804(.811)	-0.437(.395)	-0.361(.579)
Autocracy	-0.452*(.273)	-0.523*(.272)	-0.508*(.277)	-0.931*(.487)	-0.212(.275)	-0.359(.333)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>						
Cold War	-0.083(.308)	-0.148(.282)	-0.347(.291)		-0.452(.287)	-0.625**(.315)

**Table 6.1 Continued**

Years	0.489***(.069)	0.508***(.065)	-0.52***(.06)	0.524**(.233)	0.502***(.069)	0.462***(.112)
Years2	0.023***(.004)	0.024***(.004)	0.024***(.004)	0.034*(.018)	0.023***(.004)	0.023***(.007)
Years3	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)	-0.000(.000)	0.000***(.000)	0.000***(.000)
Constant	0.0637 (0.977)	-0.220 (0.946)	0.0322 (0.889)	-2.659 (1.746)	-0.150 (0.797)	0.445 (0.798)
Observations	4,531	4,531	4,531	3,704	7,090	5,065

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

The next expectation I examine is the impact of democratization in the context of high coup proofing. I expected that when democratization occurs during periods of heavy counterbalancing, the military might have the dispositional factors required to stage a coup. However, the coup proofing measures will limit the ability of the military to intervene. Thus, instead of experiencing a coup, the military will experience a mutiny. The results in Results Table 6.2 do not support my initial expectation. Instead, the negative coefficient on the interaction term indicates the opposite. In the context of high coup proofing, democratization decreases the likelihood of a mutiny. I present the marginal impact of the interaction on the likelihood of mutinies in Figure 6.3.


**Results Table 6.2****Interaction 1**

	Democratization	Coup Proof	Interactive
<b>Independent Variables of Interests</b>			
INTERACTION			-0.940***(.309)
<b>Constitutive Terms</b>			
Democratization	0.027(.201)		-0.924(.738)
Counter Balance (P&B)		0.292**(.143)	0.325**(.145)
<b>State Level Controls</b>			
Coup	0.189(.243)	0.143(.640)	0.123(.604)
GDPPC	-0.212***(.665)	0.078(.19)	0.075(.196)
Democracy	-0.619**(.259)	-0.804(.811)	-0.843(.823)
Autocracy	-0.604***(.216)	-0.931*(.487)	-1.066**(.502)
<b>Temporal Controls</b>			
Years	-0.427***(.047)	-0.524**(.233)	-0.514**(.235)
Years <sup>2</sup>	0.017***(.003)	0.034*(.018)	0.033*(.018)
Years <sup>3</sup>	-0.000***(.000)	-0.001(.000)	-0.001(.000)
Constant	0.687(.463)	-2.659(1.746)	-2.527(1.8)

**Table 6.2 Continued**

Observations	12,957	3,704	3,697
Robust standard errors in parentheses			
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1			

Figure 6.3



Due to this null finding, I returned to my theoretical expectations in order to see if perhaps there was a misstep here. Theoretically speaking, any institutional shift, either towards democratization or away from it, should present similar circumstances that threaten the military's ability to secure its corporate interests. When moving from a positive high value on the polity scale to a lower or perhaps even negative value, we should expect that the military feels its institutional avenues for securing preferences are shrinking. In other words, the way resources are secured today may not be the way that resources are secured tomorrow. This type of commitment problem should spur the military to mutiny against the executive.

Given this observation, both democratization and “autocratization” should cause mutinies in the context of high coup proofing. Thus, I created a new independent variable, *regime shifts*, which captures any three-point shift in absolute value on the Polity scale within five years. I re-estimate this model and with the *regime shift* variable instead of the *democratization* variable. However, my results do not change significantly. I still find that the interaction term is negative and significant, which is the opposite of what was expected (see Results Table 6.3 and Figure 6.4). These results are a bit disappointing but not all together surprising given the state of measures for coup proofing. I am not convinced that these results are actually representative of reality. Instead, I believe that the results might be a driven by poor measures with limited temporal coverage. I am not ready to recant my theoretical expectations but will continue to seek out better coup proofing measures in the future.

---

**Results Table 6.3****Interaction 2**

---

Regime Shift

Coup Proof

Interactive

---

**Independent Variables of Interest**

INTERACTION

-0.535\*\*(.251)

**Constitutive Terms**

Regime Shift

-0.097(.202)

0.195(.561)

Counter Balance (P&amp;B)

0.292\*\*(.143)

0.354\*\*(.144)

**State Level Controls**

Coup

0.325(.244)

0.143(.64)

0.038(.63)

GDPPC

-0.191\*\*\*(.067)

0.078(.19)

0.082(.187)

Democracy

-0.631\*\*(.25)

-0.804(.811)

-0.684(.801)

Autocracy

-0.506\*\*(.221)

-0.931\*(.487)

-0.928\*\*(.462)

**Temporal Controls**

Cold War

-0.497\*\*(.208)

Years

-0.41\*\*\*(.049)

-0.524\*\*(.233)

-0.515\*\*(.236)

Years<sup>2</sup>

0.017\*\*\*(.003)

0.034\*(.018)

0.033\*(.018)

Years<sup>3</sup>

0.000\*\*\*(.000)

-0.001(.000)

-0.001(.000)




**Table 6.3 Continued**

Constant	0.694 (0.496)	-2.659 (1.746)	-2.770 (1.746)
Observations	12,957	3,704	3,697

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figure 6.4



The next expectation I examine is the conditional impact of human rights violations and coup proofing on the likelihood of mutinies. To revisit the basic intuition, I expected that human rights violations that are ordered by the executive but carried out by the military will cause widespread grievances in the military apparatus. Often times, even though the executive orders the repression, he or she will blame the act on military leadership and foot soldiers. Thus, in this instance, we should expect to see a widely dissatisfied military. However, the use of coup proofing tactics will limit the dissatisfied military's ability to coordinate. Thus we will only observe a mutiny instead of a coup.

<b>Results Table 6.4</b>	Interaction 1 (Political Prison)	Interaction 2 (Torture)	Interaction 3 (Disappearances)	Interaction 4 (Killings)	Interaction 5 (Phys Integ)
Political Prison * Counterbal	0.436**(.21)				
Political Prison	-0.340(.603)				
Torture * Counterbal		0.01(.022)			
Torture		0.009(.016)			
Disappear * Counterbal			0.022(.026)		
Disappearances			-0.002(.004)		
Killings * Counterbal				0.042(.089)	
Killings				0.006(.009)	
Phys Integ * Counterbal					0.087(.069)
Phys Integ					-0.201(.207)
Counterbalance	0.038(.191)	0.234(.207)	0.304(.21)	0.201(.198)	0.043(.2)
GDPPC	0.075(.313)	0.026(.335)	-0.092(.341)	0.009(.344)	-0.082(.325)
Democracy	-2.733(1.721)	-3.119*(1.694)	-2.847*(1.651)	-3.073*(1.715)	-2.35(1.521)
Autocracy	-0.625(.693)	-0.559(.73)	-0.827(.777)	-0.57(.724)	-0.578(.661)
Years	-0.560*(.294)	-0.504*(.278)	-0.417(.295)	-0.511*(.279)	-0.376(.331)

**Table 6.4 Continued**


Years2	0.029(.018)	0.027(.017)	0.023(.018)	0.027(.017)	0.02(.02)
Years3	0.000(.000)	0.000(.000)	0.000(.000)	0.000(.000)	0.000(.000)
Constant	-2.359 (1.984)	-2.377 (2.000)	-1.987 (2.014)	-2.220 (2.090)	-1.569 (2.041)
Observations	1,236	1,252	1,252	1,252	1,226

---

Robust standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

Figure 6.5

Predictive Margins:  
The Conditional Effect of Political Imprisonments and Coup Proofing on Mutinies



Results table 6.4 presents the interactive effects of various rights violations and counterbalancing. The number of observations in these models plummets due to limited temporal overlap between these two data sources. However, I find evidence that *Political Imprisonment* has the expected interactive effect when considered in tandem with coup proofing. In other words, as a state experiences more political imprisonments and has extremely high coordination obstacles in place, it is much more likely to experience a mutiny. Figure 6.5 shows the marginal impact of this interaction on the likelihood of mutinies. I have split the sample by democracies and non-democracies, expecting that this effect could be more pronounced in non-democracies. Moving across the x-axis, the counterbalancing variable moves from its minimum to its maximum. The dark black line represents country-years that experience a high number of political imprisonments. It is indeed these non-democratic, imprisonment-prone states with high levels of coup proofing that are most likely to experience mutinies.

I do not find support for the other various rights violations. This is not all together surprising, especially considering the theoretical expectations put forward. I made an implicit assumption that these rights violations would only lead to mutinies if they were ordered by the executive, yet carried out by military actors. For these other types of rights violations, such as torture or killings, it is not evident that they are necessarily executive ordered. Instead, these events could be carried out by rouge soldiers or police without the directive of the executive all together. However, political imprisonment is the most likely rights violation to be ordered by higher-up civilian leaders, like the executive or his or her cronies. Given this observation, it is not surprising that I have only found support for imprisonment and not the various other types of violations.

## **Avenues for Future Research**

This chapter presented a number of conditional expectations regarding the effect of coup proofing and scenarios that are likely to create general military dissatisfaction. I have several other ideas for scenarios that are likely to generate wide-spread grievances among foot soldiers and military leaders. In coding cases for MMDD, I came across a number of cases in which military actors were upset because the legitimacy of the executive branch, and thus their own institutional legitimacy was called into question. Fraudulent elections are one avenue by which executive and thus military legitimacy can be questioned. The 1986 snap presidential election in the Philippines demonstrates the tension that a perceived fraudulent election can introduce to the interaction between military leadership, rank and file soldiers, and civilian leadership. President Ferdinand Marcos won a snap election against the opposition candidate Aquino, a wife of an assassinated opposition senator. Philippine Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile stated that his and his troop's defection from the Marcos regime was justified because "the mandate of the people does not belong to the regime..." (Oberdorfer 1986). Clearly, military actors are sensitive to the notion of legitimacy. Especially in younger democracies, military leaders only want to operate under an executive with adequate levels of legitimacy and a clear mandate from the people.

As the example from the Philippines demonstrates, fraudulent elections may encourage mutinies because the military organization does not want to be associated with an executive who has a questionable or shaky mandate from the people. Specifically in the post-Cold War era, the international community has taken a strong stance on electioneering. International norms have shifted in such a way that fraud, if caught and

reported, is likely to be associated with punitive measures. One such measure is the withdrawal of military aid. As such, even if an executive seems to look favorably upon the military institution, if they are fraudulent, they cannot credibly commit to promoting the best interests of the military. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the fraudulent leader will receive so much domestic and international backlash that their tenure is short lived. Should the military expect the possibility of regime change or popular uprising, they will likely find strategic benefits in detaching the institution from the executive.

### **Conclusion**

In this chapter I demonstrated that coup proofing tactics have a direct yet unintended consequence on military loyalty. While leaders can effectively ward off coups through the use of such tactics, they are simultaneously spurring lower level military rebellions which can have severe impacts. I also demonstrated that human rights violations, specifically in the form of political imprisonment, will spur mutinies when executives have rolled out steep coup proofing measures. I did not find support for regime changes spurring mutinies in the context of high coup proofing. This chapter's theoretical expectations and findings situate my work in the context of the broader civil military relations literature by considering how the executive's decisions may spur different types of dissent.

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## **Chapter 7: Conclusion**

This dissertation sets out to develop a foundational framework for understanding (1) what mutinies are and (2) why mutinies occur. MMDD represents the first cross-sectional dataset on mutinies. This dataset will be useful for civil-military scholars moving forwards as there are still many questions to answer about mutinies. This dissertation focused on the most foundational question, but many others remain, making this research program promising. Below I will explore some of the policy implications that come out of this project. Then I will describe where I intend to take the project in the future.

### **Policy Implications for External Actors, Major Powers, and IOs**

In part, I chose to study mutinies due to the policy relevance that this project promised. A casual reading of current events in major news outlets will clue the reader into the fact that mutinies are occurring more and more often. Not only are they occurring more often, but they are becoming a policy tool for major powers. Near the beginning of the Syrian civil conflict, then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton pushed strongly for an army mutiny among the Syrian forces. In an address at a news conference in Morocco, Secretary Clinton spoke directly to Assad's forces saying, "The longer you support the regime campaign of violence against your brothers and sisters, the more it will stain your honor. If you refuse, however, to prop up the regime or take part in attacks on your fellow citizens, your countrymen and women will hail you as heroes" (Daily News 2012).

The notion that military rebellions can demoralize and drain an incumbent's ability to continue to wage war is not isolated to the Syrian case. NATO encouraged mutinies in Yugoslavia in 1999. By dropping leaflets of encouragement, NATO sought to

increase the number of desertions and mutinies against Milosevic (The Guardian 1999). The leaflets said, “Stay in Kosovo and meet certain death, or abandon your units and your military equipment and run away as fast as you can. If you decide to stay, NATO will attack you unfailingly from all sides. The choice is yours. –NATO.” What is most striking about this use of mutinies as a policy tool is that scholars and policy makers alike actually have no systematic evidence that such defections and desertions facilitate peace. The simple calculation being made here is that mutinies will decrease the fighting capacity of the state. This observation is certainly true, but I am fearful is an oversimplification of reality.

Mutinies drain the fighting capacity of the state, but can simultaneously increase the fighting capacity of non-state actors. This enhanced fighting capability of non-state actors is particularly pronounced when mutinies involve defections. In either scenario, if mutinies involve defections or do not, state forces and non-state forces move closer to parity. We know from classic international relations work (e.g., Organski and Kugler 1980) and more recent civil war literature (e.g, Butler, Cunningham, and Gates 2017) that the distribution of power and resources matter for conflict onset, duration, and intensity. Specifically, parity or an even distribution of resources (as described in the civil war literature) is a dangerous condition, increasing the likelihood of conflict onset and increased intensity. Given this strong empirical evidence that parity is dangerous, Western powers should use extreme caution in encouraging mutinies in ongoing conflicts or states that are likely to experience conflict. This policy recommendation is ineffective at best and inherently dangerous at worst.

Mutinies that occur organically without outside influence may serve as an indicator or “warning sign” for other processes. For example, if mutinies could serve as an effective foreshock for coup activity, they would be an extremely useful clue for policy makers trying to predict regime change. Coups likely follow mutinies because mutinies are a signal to military leadership about whether or not strong dispositional factors are present to launch a successful coup. These smaller rebellions reveal information about the military’s ability to coordinate on the same signal to oust the executive. In an effort to explore this notion a bit, I ran a preliminary model to see if mutinies might be a predictor of coups. In Results table 7.1, I have run a basic model predicting coups with the standard controls established in the literature. Mutinies do indeed appear to be a significant predictor of coup activity.

**Results Table 7.1: Mutinies as Predictors of Coups D'état**

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	Coups d'état
Mutiny	0.854***(.203)
GDPPC	-0.1**(.046)
Military Expend	0.000***(.000)
Military Size	0.000(.000)
Democracy	-0.753***(.142)
Autocracy	-0.127(.108)
Cold War	0.283**(.119)
Years	-0.441***(.033)
Years2	0.022***(.003)
Years3	0.000***(.000)
Constant	-0.480 (0.318)
Observations	12,449

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Standard errors in parentheses  
\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

While preliminary, this finding should be useful to policy makers trying to ascertain the likelihood of regime change in a given country. In the future, I would like to spend more time theorizing about this relationship and exploring it further. It is possible that perhaps there is a non-monotonic relationship between mutinies. In other words, having a few mutinies might predict coup activity. However, when mutinies happen extremely frequently, the forces that are left are likely to be incredibly loyal, thus diminishing the likelihood of a coup after a certain point. This expectation is driven by

anecdotal evidence from cases like Syria in its recent conflict. While many scholars and policy makers expected Assad's tenure to get cut short by a coup, it appears that all the forces left at this point are loyal, co-ethnics because all battalions that were in question have defected or deserted at this point. I do not explore this possibility empirically here, but will in future projects.

### **Policy Implications for Mutiny-Prone States**

The three empirical chapters of this project offer direct policy recommendations for states that are prone to experiencing mutinies. The first chapter finds strong evidence that civil war intensity is likely to contribute to military rebellions. Clearly, a leader cannot directly and unilaterally control the intensity of conflict in his or her state. However, they can strategically deploy units to particularly locations. As mentioned at the conclusion of Chapter 4, there is significant sub-national variation in the intensity of civil wars. Thus, if a leader is worried about the loyalty of a specific sub-population in the military, they may be well advised to deploy these soldiers to lower-intensity conflict zones. For example, Assad should be weary of deploying Sunni soldiers to the highest intensity conflict zones like Raqqa. Instead, he would be wise to deploy these soldiers of questionable loyalty to low intensity zones where their loyalty will be challenged less.

I find evidence that protest events increase the chances of a mutiny. While leaders cannot do much to prevent protest events, and indeed there is evidence that in trying to prevent dissent leaders may actually spur it on (e.g., Davenport 1995), leaders should be weary of ordering repression in the face of protests. Repression means that soldiers have to go out and face protestors in the street. This often means harming ethnic-kin which is where the incentive to mutiny is generated. Leaders can mitigate this risk by keeping

soldiers quartered during unrest. This is a tricky dynamic though because idle hands and quartered soldiers might increase the likelihood of coup activity, and unchecked protests might lead to full scale revolution. For smaller, less threatening protest events, though, leaders might be well advised to not order repression if they are concerned with mutinies.

One clear policy recommendation offered in Chapter 5 is about the intention of conflict. Leaders might participate in conflict in order to generate a rally effect and a boost in public approval through the use of diversionary tactics. My findings suggest that while leaders might be able to divert the attention of civilians, the military is not as easily duped. In engaging in diversionary conflict, leaders are gambling on the loyalty of the military. The military appears to have the ability to gauge a leader's intention. If the military perceives that conflict is divisionary in nature, and thus only benefiting the leader, they are apt to rebel. Thus, leaders should be very cautious when engaging in insincere conflict.

Finally, the last empirical model offers a strong word of caution to leaders who are concerned with extra-constitutional regime change. Coup proofing is indeed a double edged sword. While we know that it can ward off coups effective, it has a lot of unintended consequences, of which mutinies are just one (e.g., Powell 2012, De Bruin 2017). Leaders who are worried about mutinies should coup proof with extreme caution. Specifically, the formation of counterbalancing organizations seems to spur mutinies. This implication returns to Feaver's (2003) conceptualization of the military problematique, which is that leaders want a strong military to counter sincere threats but not so strong that it can usurp civilian leaders. Civilian leaders then, should understand that coup proofing severely limits the military's ability to counter threats both directly

through limiting coordination and indirectly through spurring mutinies. Given this observation, leaders must weigh the value of introducing coordination challenges to enhance the chances of regime survival and the drawbacks that such coordination challenges present.

### **Avenues for Future Research**

This dissertation represents the leading edge in mutiny research, but there is still much work to be done. I have presented the first quantitative dataset on mutinies across regions and time, and I have offered evidence that allows scholars and policy makers to make predictions about when mutinies are likely to occur given certain domestic situations. The research presented here, however, is just the first step in a much larger research program. Below I will describe a number of extensions to this project.

Table 7.2 lays out a number of avenues for future research. The first column presents many of the relationships tested in this dissertation, which are the domestic causes of mutinies. There is a potential domestic cause that I hope to explore in the future that I have not included in this project. In my reading of cases during the data collection process, I found many instances of mutinies that occurred along former rebel lines. As a peacekeeping measure, many states incorporate former rebel forces into the military apparatus. The logic behind this policy is that by giving former rebel troops a vocation, they will not be tempted to revisit rebellion. However, this inclusion of former rebels seems to make a military more apt to fracture. For example, most of the Cote D'Ivoire's mutinies have broken out along the lines of former rebel battalions. Guatemala also experienced a similar mutiny in 1997 when actors were fearful that a peacekeeping

measure would strip them of their jobs. While peacekeeping is a common post-conflict measure, it might actually pose a threat to human security and state security.



**Table 7.2:** Future Directions

<b>Mutinies as Dependent Variable</b>		<b>Mutinies as Independent Variable</b>	
<b>Domestic Causes</b>	<b>International Causes</b>	<b>Domestic Effects</b>	<b>International Effects</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intense Civil War</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rivalries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil war outcomes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Traditional measures of power</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long civil war</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• MID escalation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rebel group formation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military aid withdrawal</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Protests</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intense conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Violence against civilians</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Alliance formation</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Divisionary Conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Long conflict</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regime change (preliminary evidence presented)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International organizations</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Peace Agreements in Post-conflict societies</li> </ul>			

While this dissertation largely considers domestic causes of mutinies, there are a whole host of potential explanations for mutinies that occur from beyond a state's borders. For example, Chapter 4 tested the effect of intense and long lasting civil wars on the likelihood of a mutiny. The theoretical expectations tested in this chapter should extend to scenarios of interstate war. A natural extension of this project would be to examine the impact of interstate conflict on mutinies. Returning to the theoretical argument presented in Chapter 3, bad strategy selected by military leadership should spur grievances among foot soldiers. Risk aversion will also increase the chances that foot soldiers will shirk in the form of mutiny. I would like to examine intense interstate conflict, long-lasting interstate conflict and MID escalation as proxies for bad strategy selected by military leadership. This analysis can be facilitated quite easily by the Correlates of War data project (e.g. Ghosn et. al 2004).

Rivalries also present a potential avenue for military mutinies. Rivalries are similar to divisionary war in that they generate benefits for the executive but impose steep costs on foot soldiers. As Colaresi (2004) finds, dovish leaders in a rivalry context are more likely to suffer electorally than hawkish leaders. This finding suggests that in a rivalry context leaders have strong incentives to engage in unnecessary conflict in order to generate public support for their tenure. Such engagement in unnecessary conflict will help the leader maintain his domestic constituency, but will impose greater personal danger on foot soldiers. This logic leads to the expectation that international rivalries should spur mutinies.

Beyond examining the causes of mutinies, there is a promising future in evaluating the effects of military mutinies. In regards to the implications that mutinies

have for human security, this line of research has the most potential to inform scholars and policy makers about the dangers of mutinies. Mutinies likely have measurable impacts on a number of domestic conditions. First, while Chapter 4 considered the impact of civil wars on the likelihood of mutinies, scholars would be well served to consider how mutinies during civil conflict effect the outcomes of such conflicts. For example, do mutinies make rebel victories more likely? Do they make negotiated settlements less likely? Do mutinies make civil wars last longer? Clearly, there will be issues of reverse causality that must be addressed here, since I have already demonstrated that long lasting civil wars spur mutinies. However, this line of research will be critically important to scholars, policy makers, and international actors alike when considering the best plan of action in states with protracted civil wars, like Syria and Yemen.

In reading cases of mutinies, I have found strong anecdotal evidence that mutinies are often followed by rebel group formation. I hope to demonstrate that this relationship holds up empirically, showing that mutinies indeed have dire downstream effects for the state. This exact dynamic played out in the DRC and Yemen. I have presented preliminary evidence in this chapter that mutinies spur extraconstitutional regime change by way of coups d'état. I would like to expand this preliminary finding into a full analysis and situate the preliminary findings in a well-grounded theoretical framework. At this point, I have not put forward adequate theoretical expectations for why this relationship exists, but I hope to develop this portion of the project in the future. MMDD codes a number of important variations in mutiny events, such as: were they violent? Did they kill civilians? All of these variations in mutinies can be predicted. In the future, I hope to

ask a number of research questions about these interesting variations in the nature and quality of mutinies.

Finally, there are a host of international processes that military mutinies might impact. First, conventional measures of power (e.g., CINC) do not consider dimensions of loyalty. I hope to undertake a project that modifies extant measures of power by considering observable dimensions of military loyalty. Next, my reading of cases during the data collection process highlighted that often times when international actors perceive militaries as rebellious in nature, they will withdrawal military aid from the mutiny prone state. However, this policy further limits that receiving state's ability to appease mutineers through resources. I intend to estimate the effect that mutinies have on the likelihood of military aid withdrawal. Then, given that aid is revoked, does this further increase the likelihood of more military unrest?

Potential alliance partners are likely to consider dimensions of military loyalty when considering what states to partner with as allies. As we know from the alliance formation literature, allies want to select strong and resolute allies. Mutinies are an indication of state weakness. As such, mutiny-prone states are perhaps less likely to be selected as allies unless they possess some geo-political, strategic advantage. I would also like to spend more time exploring international organizations' reactions to mutinies. In recent decades, IOs have become increasingly punitive in the aftermath of coups. I would like to examine if responses to mutinies have followed a similar pattern. Due to the preliminary evidence offered in this chapters that mutinies are an early indicator of coups, perhaps IOs actually offer support to states experiencing mutinies.

In sum, this dissertation represents the first deep dive into the empirical, quantitative study of mutinies. We have learned that mutinies are occurring more often than ever before, and they mark every region in the world. Indeed, no region is immune from military rebellions. In fact, most countries have experienced at least one of these events. From my reading of individual cases, it is clear that mutinies can have long lasting, downstream effects that inhibit peace. Human security is undoubtedly threatened by such events. Policy makers often seek to encourage military defections in the developing world, but this work provides many reasons why this might be a perilous policy recommendation. I am excited to continue this research program and provide these data to scholars and policy makers alike so that the broader community can answer important questions about mutinies.

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**Appendix: Case Descriptions**

<b>Country</b>	<b>ccode</b>	<b>Event date</b>	<b>violent</b>	<b>civilian</b>	<b>Description of Events</b> (paraphrased from primary source to maintain meaning)
<b>United States</b>	2	1/12/1946	0	0	Troops dissented in Frankfort and Berlin in an effort to protest their continued deployment. The article indicates that morale was extremely low among these battalions.
<b>United States</b>	2	3/1/1972	0	0	The aircraft carrier USS midway received orders to leave the San Francisco Bay for Vietnam. Anti-war protests swept the ship. The crewmen deliberately destroyed property, spilling three thousand gallons of oil into the bay in an attempt to sabotage the war efforts.
<b>United States</b>	2	6/1/1972	0	0	The attack carrier USS Ranger experienced a mutiny when the ship was ordered to sail from San Diego to Vietnam. The mutineers sabotaged the ship by destroying gears in the engine and other parts of the ship. These damages delayed the departure of the ship by 4 months.
<b>United States</b>	2	10/12/1972	1	0	A mutiny occurred on the USS Kitty Hawk in the Subic Bay in the Tonkin Gulf. The mutiny broke out along racial lines, black soldiers were allegedly holding a meeting to discuss blatant discrimination. This meeting was made up of over 100 black sailors. As Captain Maryland Townsend tried to disband the meeting, confusion broke out and there was a

					<p>brawl. The fighting left nearly 50 soldiers injured. more info here: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Kitty_Hawk_riot">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Kitty_Hawk_riot</a></p>
<b>United States</b>	2	11/3/1972	0	0	<p>Another racial flare up took place on the carrier Constellation. 60 black soldiers refused to leave the mess deck and threatened to "tear up the ship". In order to avoid a situation like Kitty Hawk, the captains decided to return to San Diego and return the mutineers to land. 130 men de-boarded the ship at this time. The Constellation returned to pick up the rebellious soldiers a few days later but the men refused to get on the ship. On Nov. 9 they staged a defiant strike. More info here: <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1976-01/uss-constellation-flare-was-it-mutiny">https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/1976-01/uss-constellation-flare-was-it-mutiny</a></p>
<b>United States</b>	2	10/16/2004	0	0	<p>17 US American soldiers mutinied in Basra Iraq, where they were stationed to "plug a gap" south of Baghdad to limit the flow of supplies to Islamic insurgents. They refused to run a fuel convey which they had labeled a "suicide mission". All but two of the men in the 343rd quartermaster company refused the orders.</p>
<b>Canada</b>	20	2/26/1949	0	0	<p>Sailors mutinied and locked themselves in their mess decks. They refused to follow orders or come out of</p>

					the mess decks until the captain would agree to hear their grievances. The primary mutiny accrued on the Athabaskan during a fueling stop at Manzanillo Mexico. However, other ships also experienced mutinies, such as the Crescent while in port in Nanjing China. More info here: <a href="http://www.christopherwilson.ca/papers/The_Great_Canadian_Naval_Mutiny.pdf">http://www.christopherwilson.ca/papers/The_Great_Canadian_Naval_Mutiny.pdf</a>
<b>Cuba</b>	40	1/15/1985	0	0	A senior military officer, Lt. Col. Joaquin Mourino Perez defected from Cuba in Spain after serving extensively in Africa. He gave the CIA inside information about Cuban operations in Africa. This counts as a mutiny because he was a commissioned officer.
<b>Haiti</b>	41	4/27/1987	0	0	
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	42	1/6/1966	0	0	Rebel soldiers under Col. Francisco Caamano Deno were issued a warning by the OAS not to attempt a coup. The OAS suggested that this would be a direct threat to security and democracy in the country. The rebel soldiers seized a government radio station and declared there was no coup attempt. The mutiny appeared to be in response to the provisional government that was put in place after Trujillo.
<b>Mexico</b>	70	9/11/1961	0	0	General Gasca was arrested in raid because he was



					leading rebellion and sedition against the state. Dissent was also occurring in many parts of the state that was attributed to General Gasca's planning.
<b>Mexico</b>	70	11/21/1997	1	0	Military personnel mutinied in a 14 hour standoff because of their alleged involvement in the torture-murder of 6 young people. The mutiny was led by Gen. Jose Lamberto Ponce, head of the Zorros.
<b>Mexico</b>	70	12/18/1998	0	0	Lt. Col. Hildegardo Bacilio Gomez led 50 soldiers in a march down Mexico City's central street to protest heavy handed and unfair treatment of the armed forces by the justice system. Mutiny appears to have been peaceful.
<b>Guatemala</b>	90	11/1/1949	0	0	Officers mutiny in response to Col. Francisco Arana's assassination. Not many details in article.
<b>Guatemala</b>	90	11/1/1950	0	0	Not many details in article. Lt. Col. Alfredo Pedroza sentenced to death for assaulting the local military base in November, 1951.
<b>Guatemala</b>	90	2/2/1997	0	0	1000 military police defied commanders and seized their compound in the first army rebellion since the peace treaty ended the 36 year civil war (signed Dec. 29, 1997). The army police were concerned about their severance terms and the dissolution of their units.
<b>Guatemala</b>	90	2/1/1997	0	0	400 armed military police locked two generals inside their fortified compound. The military police were

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					demanding the government pay them severance when they lost their jobs under the terms of the recent peace accord. About 1,000 military police defied their commanders and seized their compound a few evenings before.
<b>Nicaragua</b>	93	11/2/1987	0	0	A senior military officer defected to the U.S. This was a high ranking officer, Maj. Roger Miranda Bengoechea. The officer took \$15,000 of government funds with him when he left.
<b>El Salvador</b>	92	1/6/1983	0	0	6 day long mutiny led by a military commander in a northern province that was not associated with violence. The colonel began the mutiny after being ordered to a diplomatic post in Uruguay. It also seems that the colonel wanted to see the defense minister ousted.
<b>Costa Rica</b>	94	3/20/1948	0	0	The military seems to be split into two factions: one group trained by the U.S. that supported the president and a second set of communist troops that followed Rafael Calderon Guardia in the Bella Vista Barracks. The president moved to the artillery barracks when dissent started. The president did not have control over Guardia's forces.
<b>Panama</b>	95	12/4/1990	0	0	Rebel soldiers who separated from government forces in December elude capture for over a month.

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					<p>The rebel forces were strong and well-armed, better armed than state forces. The rebels were members of the army under the former Panamanian leader gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega. The rebels do not seem to have a coherent ideology aside from restoring the military as Panama's dominant institution.</p>
<b>Venezuela</b>	101	7/22/1958	0	0	<p>Soldiers went on strike in an effort to postpone the Nov. 30 elections. They also sought rule for three years by a de facto government and press censorship. The mutiny was led by Gen. Jesus Maria Castro Leon. He left for the U.S. on "official mission" the day after the strike ended. This event clearly began as a mutiny and escalated to a coup. It is coded by Powell and Thyne.</p>
<b>Venezuela</b>	101	12/20/1960	1	0	<p>A former officer, Lt. Gonzalo Abreu Molina recruited a few active members of the national guard to join him in a protest against the state. The mutineers were on their way to Caracas to set free a group of political prisoners when they were met with loyal state forces. They exchanged gun fire and the mutiny ended. While the Lt. was no longer part of the state forces, he was able to recruit from those that were still active in state forces, making this a mutiny. This is not a coup attempt as no</p>

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					direct move was made on the executive.
<b>Venezuela</b>	101	4/1/2017	1	0	The article indicates that at least 123 members of Venezuela's armed forces have been detained and arrested since April of 2017. The charges against these individuals range from treason to rebellion to desertion.
<b>Venezuela</b>	101	8/5/2017	1	0	Captain Juan Caguaripano led a group of rebel soldiers (the 41st Armored Brigade) in a rebellion against Maduro. The soldiers said that the event was a "legitimate rebellion" against a government that was destroying the country. The mutineers took over an army base in the city of Valencia.
<b>Ecuador</b>	130	5/30/1959	1	0	Draftees are joined by civilians in mutiny. Conscripts were protesting against the harsh discipline of Galo Quevedo an army captain. Mutineers handed out weapons to civilians. The officer in question was killed, and his body was dragged through the streets.
<b>Ecuador</b>	130	3/31/1971	0	0	Soldiers mutinied led by an ousted general (fired the day prior). They mutinied because they wanted the president to fire the defense minister and the army commander. 50 officers supported the ousted general Jacome Chavez by signing a statement demanding the resignations of these leaders.

<b>Ecuador</b>	130	10/1/2010	1	1	Pres. Rafael Correra claims this is a coup attempt, but Powell and Thyne do not have it coded. Soldiers mutinied and loyal soldiers patrolled a number of cities. This mutiny is associated with a lot of violence and many deaths. Mutineers were protesting a new law that would strip their benefits. While this was largely a police mutiny, some articles indicate that soldiers were involved also.
<b>Peru</b>	135	6/9/1976	1	0	Rightist general barricaded himself in Peru's military school with armed officers and students. He felt strongly that Peru should adopt more capitalist policies and as a result was asked to resign. He staged the mutiny in defiance. Shots were exchanged.
<b>Brazil</b>	140	3/26/1964	0	0	Rebels of the marine force (3,000 in total) took over a building of metallurgical workers union in Rio de Janeiro. The enlisted men yelled that they wanted reforms and were dying of hunger. The men were part of the leftist sailors and marines association, which Admiral Mora ordered to have the leadership of this group arrested.
<b>Brazil</b>	140	2/4/2017	0	0	703 military police went on strike demanding that the state invest more in public security and a salary raise. The state of Epirito Santo experienced an upsurge in violence during this strike. According to the article, 121

					were murdered, 300 shops looted, and over 170 cars stolen during the strike.
<b>Bolivia</b>	145	6/15/1946	0	0	Article does not give specifics.
<b>Bolivia</b>	145	2/1/2003	1	0	A revolt over wages occurred at barracks. Story does not give many details at all. This is the same facility that will experience a mutiny in 2012.
<b>Bolivia</b>	145	6/22/2012	1	0	Commandos protest over pay. Wives join in their barracks to protest. Mutiny breaks out after their wives are thrown out of the barracks by the men's superiors.
<b>Bolivia</b>	145	4/22/2014	0	0	Bolivian sergeants from all services protest through La Paz against the firing of four non-commissioned officers and discrimination by the military's high command. Meanwhile, a group of military wives went on a hunger strike. Head of the national association of non-commissioned officers said, "we are not against the government... we are against this system, this capitalistic, neo-liberal, colonial model within the military."
<b>Paraguay</b>	150	3/14/1947	0	0	Army troops in Concepcion were in rebellion. Report alleges that troops in the Chaco region also rebelled. Not many details given about the event.
<b>Paraguay</b>	150	4/22/1996	0	0	225 soldiers were dismissed in Dec. for their participation in a barracks uprising. The men backed Lino Oviedo, a rebel

					general. Oviedo finally backed down when the President offered him a position of Defense minister. Once he stepped down, however, his rank was stripped and he was placed on trial. This was not a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Chile</b>	155	10/22/1969	1	0	Soldiers mutinied for higher pay. This appears to be a military strike. Some said it was a coup attempt, but clearly it is just a lower-level of military rebellion. It did turn violent (14 people injured by gunfire). The President very clearly called this a coup attempt, but there was no attempt to seize executive power.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	8/8/1962	0	0	Major General Federico Toranzo Montero set up rebel headquarters in Northern Argentina. He sent communication to all army establishments saying that he was taking over as commander in chief "in accordance with the opinion of a majority of generals". This forced Gen. Juan Bautista Loza to resign as Argentina's Secretary of War and Commander in chief.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	4/13/1987	0	0	Soldiers mutiny because they are demanding amnesty for accused officers in human rights allegations. Mutiny was peaceful and only lasted one day. Rebel officers occupied the infantry school at Campo die Mayo and criticized

					General Rios Erenu for not protecting the army from "injustices and humiliations".
<b>Argentina</b>	160	4/21/1987	0	0	150 officers mutiny demanding that Gen. Rios Erenu be replaced. He made many officers angry when he ordered them to testify in court because of human rights abuses during military rule from 1976-83.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	1/17/1988	0	0	Not much information is given by article but there is evidence that there was a second mutiny occurring on this same date in Las Lajas, a southwestern Neuquen Province. Commander Gen. Antonio Balsa, commented on the second event of unrest on 1/17/1988 and said that order had been restored.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	1/17/1988	1	0	A violent mutiny takes place at Monte Caseros camp in Northeastern Argentina. Troops loyal to the civilian government encircled a northern army compound after a rebel officer and about 100 sympathizers had seized control of the building. Seems that rebels were led by Colonel Rico. Officers were demanding an end to the prosecution of officials in previous military dictatorships, according to NYT article.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	12/5/1988	1	1	Mutiny occurs at Villa Martelli arsenal and is led by Col. Mohammad Ali Seineldin. There was a street battle between rebel



					soldiers and protesters that resulted in 3 deaths and many injuries. Rebels demanded an end to the prosecution of officers for human rights abuses in the 1976-83 dictatorship. They also sought a new military hierarchy and better pay and equipment. This event escalated to a coup attempt that is coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	1/23/1989	1	0	There is a lot of uncertainty surrounding this event. It seems that the mutineers were probably in support of previous mutineers that resented punishment for human rights violations. However, it remains unclear. Some proposed that these mutineers had been in hiding since the previous December mutiny.
<b>Argentina</b>	160	12/3/1990	1	0	Right wing rebels take hold of a number of military buildings and depots. They stated that were not trying to stage a coup or disrupt democratic institutions but that they wanted to see changes in the army hierarch and pledged their loyalty to Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin who was cashiered after launching a similar mutiny against ex-president Raul Alfonsin 2 years prior. There were at least 6 deaths associated with this mutiny but it's unclear if they were civilian deaths.
<b>Uruguay</b>	165	2/9/1973	0	0	The army rebels against the defense minister. This looks

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					<p>a lot like a coup and in fact is coded by Powell and Thyne, but the attempt to oust president Bordaberry did not come till 2/12. He had to negotiate with the armed forces to continue his presidency. However, the unrest was not initially pointed at the president. Instead the unrest is pointed to the Minister of National Defense, Antonio Francese. Therefore, until this escalated to a coup attempt, it was simply a mutiny. More information can be found here:  <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Uruguayan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1973_Uruguayan_coup_d%27%C3%A9tat</a>.</p>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	200	5/13/1946	0	0	<p>Soldiers mutinied upon arriving in Malay because of "shocking conditions". They refused to obey orders to parade. Charges were ultimately dropped against most, although this was undoubtedly a mutiny. More info here:  <a href="http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1946/12/01/page/86/article/englands-heroic-malaya-mutineers">http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1946/12/01/page/86/article/englands-heroic-malaya-mutineers</a></p>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	200	2/12/2012	0	0	<p>This is the largest military mutiny since WW11 for the UK. 16 soldiers sat down during a military training operation in Kenya. They were protesting poor leadership- they said they were being led by "Muppets" and complained that officers were hung over. More info here:  <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/">http://www.telegraph.co.uk/</a></p>

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					news/uknews/defence/10505987/Group-of-soldiers-mutinied-over-hungover-bosses-court-martial-hears.html
<b>Netherlands</b>	210	2/1/1949	0	0	Article doesn't give many details but suggests that there was a mutiny of at least 200 soldiers in Sumatra. It is unclear whether the rebel soldiers were Dutch nationals or Indonesians that were rebelling against the colonial power.
<b>Netherlands</b>	210	1/23/1950	1	0	Renegade Dutch officer Capt. R. R. P. Westerling defected from the Royal army while deployed in Indonesia. He formed a guerrilla operation called "Forces of the Queen of Justice". This group was not only made up of Dutch soldiers but they also recruited and trained Indonesian airborne units and commandos. The guerrilla forces captured the town of Chamahi in the mountains of West Java. They were approximately 600 individuals strong.
<b>France</b>	220	3/10/1947	0	0	400 soldiers mutinied in order to hide the individuals that were guilty of torturing, mutilating, and killing individuals that were pro-France. Occurred in "Indochina", no specific location given. The mutineers were chased out of the barracks by gas.
<b>France</b>	220	4/4/1947	0	0	400 Indo-Chinese soldiers mutinied due to anti-French

					feelings. Similar to previous mutiny.
<b>France</b>	220	6/14/1951	0	0	Army chief of staff of the Caodai sect of South Vietnam, Trinh Minh Tay, defected. He and 2500 troops fled to Cambodia from the Tayninh area. There was not a specific reason cited for the mutiny.
<b>France</b>	220	4/30/1961	0	0	The story is confusing, but French soldiers (conscripts) in Algeria rebel against officers because they disagree with the officers that aided in staging a mutiny among Algerian soldiers to help keep Algeria under French control. The French soldiers refused to march with the Algerian mutineers.
<b>Spain</b>	230	1/22/1994	0	0	18 conscripts mutinied and protested the rough treatment from instructors on the Island of Majorca. The conscripts accused leadership of physical and psychological abuse.
<b>Spain</b>	230	6/10/1996	0	0	Soldiers refused to partake in a parade celebrating Armed Forces Day because of the conscription policy. The article indicated that at this point, the government was hoping to end conscription within 6 years and transform Spain's military to a purely professional force.
<b>Portugal</b>	235	10/7/1975	0	0	Mutiny occurred in a leftist artillery garrison. This mutiny lasted for 8 days after general Carlos Fabiano acted on his own to offer concessions to the rebellious

					artillery regiment in Oporto. Many sources indicated that General Fabiano did not clear the terms of the agreement with the President. Many felt that his offer would not help restore military discipline.
<b>Germany</b>	255	2/3/1945	1	0	German troops in Norway mutinied when ordered to go to the Eastern Front. They fired on their officers and refused orders. The mutiny was suppressed quickly.
<b>Germany</b>	255	2/5/1945	1	0	German soldiers mutinied in barracks in Copenhagen. This led to a battle that lasted two hours at night between German soldiers from Norway in route to the Eastern front and Nazi elite guard troops. This battle caused 300 casualties. All of the mutineers were executed by firing squad.
<b>Germany</b>	255	3/25/1945	1	0	Article is brief but indicates that Austrian troops in the German military mutinied in Copenhagen and fought in the streets with military police.
<b>Germany</b>	255	4/15/1945	1	0	German troops comprised of Russian and Polish soldiers mutinied and "batches" of soldiers defected to a Quebec Armored Regiment. This led to fighting between German Loyal troops and Russian/Polish troops.
<b>Germany</b>	255	4/28/1945	1	0	Article is extremely brief. A mutiny occurred in the German navy and it included events of desertion. Hitler was

					informed of the event by a group of Nazi generals. There was no information about size or duration of mutiny.
<b>Poland</b>	290	2/15/1982	0	0	Several hundred soldiers defected and regrouped in the forests of Silesia. They went on to form an active resistance unit.
<b>Czechoslovakia</b>	315	7/18/1948	0	0	General Antonin Bohumil Hasal defected to the U.S. zone in Germany and signaled an important rift in the "iron curtain". This defection was particularly notable because Hasal was a high ranking military commander and a top military aid to the president. The article indicates that he likely knew a number of details about strategy and military structure in Czechoslovakia, which would be of great interests to military intelligence officers.
<b>Czechoslovakia</b>	315	2/1/1967	0	0	Maj. General Jan Sejna defected to the United States because he was more right leaning than the executive and the military leadership. He kept warning of the Soviet threat.
<b>Albania</b>	339	3/5/1997	0	0	Article does not give many details, but indicates that Western diplomats reported widespread military mutinies among conscripts of the Albanian military. This was likely a result of their dissatisfaction with President Berisha. More info can be found here:

					<a href="http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-07.htm">http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1998/9802-07.htm</a>
<b>Macedonia</b>	343	5/27/2001	0	0	Macedonian commanding officer and his troops refused to follow orders and fight against a four month old Albanian insurgency. The leader of the troops complained that they did not have enough resources and that the conscripts were poorly trained. There seemed to be no end in sight to the insurgency.
<b>Yugoslavia</b>	345	9/19/1991	1	0	Army soldiers disobeyed their orders and moved an armored column from Belgrade towards Croat territory. More columns were reported to be on the move to Bosnia-Herzegovina. These were not orders handed down from the President, but rouge troops taking matters into their own hands.
<b>Yugoslavia</b>	345	6/25/1991	0	0	Army appears to be losing command structure and hierarchy. Article says that at least 250 rank and file deserted in Slovenia. The article mentions that officers are also being rebellious.
<b>Yugoslavia</b>	345	5/19/1999	1	0	Mutiny occurred among Serb forces when 3 battalions (2,000 soldiers mentioned in second article) mutinied at Istok, in Western Kosovo. They stole vehicles and left with their weapons still in their possession. They fired weapons in the air. The mutiny was in response to protests in the troops' home towns of Krusevac and

					Aleksandrovac lead by soldiers' mothers who took to the streets to call their sons home.
<b>Yugoslavia</b>	345	10/8/2000	0	0	The military elite troops mutinied in order to display their disdain for Milosevic. The mutineers were at least 100 strong and staged the mutiny inside and outside of the parliament building.
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	346	9/10/1993	1	0	Soldiers mutinied in response to perceived corruption. Specifically, the article notes that the state has used its influence to take from minorities that are already economically disadvantaged. The mutineers were led by Captain Dragovan Babic. They fired weapons into empty stalls at a market where black market goods were often sold.
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	346	10/5/1993	1	0	2,500 soldiers defected to the rebel forces in the Bihac district. At least five people died in this incident.
<b>Greece</b>	350	5/25/1973	0	0	Navy men mutinied on a destroyer that was off the coast of Fiumicino Italy. They were said to be protesting the military government. The mutineers were said to be fewer than 15, but included Capt. Nicholas Pappos and several other officers. They were arrested before they had time to return to Athens and carry out further plans.
<b>Cyprus</b>	352	8/1/2011	0	0	Soldiers mutinied after a blast in July killed 13 soldiers and injured 60 more. The conscripts



					demanded that they were let off the national guard. They were asked to sign a statement saying where they wanted to be posted but they refused to do so. They blocked the base with their cars and proceeded to leave the camp, against orders.
<b>Bulgaria</b>	355	1/28/1997	0	0	A mutiny occurred at Georgi S. Rakovski military academy in protest of pay. Officers were disgruntled because their pay did not correspond with new legislation and contracts they had signed with the defense minister. The officers refused monthly pay as a sign of protest against deception.
<b>Romania</b>	360	2/12/1990	0	0	This mutiny was largely a result of soldiers resisting repressive orders from General Chirac, who ordered soldiers to shoot at protesters. In response, 48 officers joined by nearly 3,000 soldiers and students protested and demanded the ousting of Defense minister Gen. Nicolae Military and the Minister of Internal Security General Mihai Chitac. This represented a large threat to the provisional, interim government that came to power after the Ceausecu Government. This interim government was considered to be one of the most repressive regimes in the Eastern Bloc.
<b>Russia</b>	365	1/9/1980	0	0	14 Russian soldiers defected to the side of Muslim rebels

					in Afghanistan. They declared that they were also Muslims from the Tajik republic and could not follow the heartless Kremlin policies in Afghanistan. They did not want to kill religious kin.
<b>Russia</b>	365	2/19/1991	0	0	121 soldiers defected and sought asylum in Germany. The defectors were placed mostly in former East Germany with the right to temporary residence.
<b>Russia</b>	365	12/15/1994	0	0	Four top generals were fired because they refused orders in Chechnya. A leading general, advancing on Grozny halted his forces and said that they would not shoot at local people. The Kremlin responded by saying that this general was fired for "Indecisiveness and inaction."
<b>Russia</b>	365	2/4/1995	0	0	An elite unit mutinied in Chechnya in response to "inhumane and chaotic conditions". The mutiny was carried out by a 100 strong unit that disagreed with Yeltsin's crackdown in Chechnya. They were not punished for their sedition.
<b>Russia</b>	365	7/21/1997	0	0	Article states that 230 conscripts have defected in the last week. It points to a larger military crises, where an estimated 4,000 soldiers have defected from 1992-1997. This crises was a result of the country's larger economic crises. Soldiers were not receiving adequate pay or resources.

<b>Russia</b>	365	9/11/2002	0	0	54 soldiers mutinied by deserting in masse from the motorized infantry division. They were protesting brutality by one of their commanders.
<b>Estonia</b>	366	7/30/1993	0	0	Soldiers mutinied in response to a lack of food and poor working and living conditions. The article indicates that the mutiny may have also been in response to the controversial Mr. Rabas, a controversial choice for defense minister because he was actually a Swedish citizen.
<b>Lithuania</b>	368	9/22/1993	0	0	60 mutineers fled the barracks to hide in a forest, taking 130 automatic weapons along. The mutineers wanted higher wages and better living conditions. Eventually they returned from the forest near Kaunas.
<b>Ukraine</b>	369	7/24/1992	0	0	The Black Sea Fleet was ordered by both President Boris Yeltsin (Russia) and Leonid Kravchuk (Ukraine) to not declare allegiance to either country as they were patiently working out a deal. However, despite these orders, a ship with a crew of about 60 soldiers mutinied and declared allegiance to Ukraine and set off from a naval base in the Crimea to a Ukrainian port of Odessa. Other warships chased the mutineers.
<b>Ukraine</b>	369	3/1/2014	0	0	This event is distinct from the 2014 Feb. Ukrainian coup. Ukrainian troops were defecting in large numbers

					in Crimea. While the Ukrainian defense minister denied and denounced the assertion of defections, the information seems to be true. The soldiers continued to face pro-Russian soldiers. Over the next several weeks there are various, specific reports of defections that have all been coded as this single event.
<b>Ukraine</b>	369	6/8/2014	1	0	300 Ukrainian soldiers defected over the course of a few days due to shelling at the Donetsk airport. This event is similar in nature to other mutinies that occurred in Ukraine in 2014.
<b>Ukraine</b>	369	12/13/2016	0	0	27 Ukrainian soldiers defected to the pro-Russian group in Eastern Ukraine after being held captive in Donbass.
<b>Georgia</b>	372	10/19/1998	1	0	Mutinous soldiers took hostages and clashed with government forces. There were soldier deaths associated with this mutiny. The mutiny was led by military commander who supported the late president Gamsakhurdia who died because of mysterious circumstances after being ousted in 1994.
<b>Georgia</b>	372	3/14/2000	0	0	65 conscripts of the Kodjor Training Facility deserted their post due to bad living conditions and inadequate food supplies. After 24 hours, 30 of them returned but the rest remained at large.
<b>Georgia</b>	372	5/26/2001	0	0	Troops took over an interior ministry base in a mutiny

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					over pay. They were demanding overdue wages. Article does not give details about the size and nature of the military protest. More info here: <a href="http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/05/26/georgia.army.02/">http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/05/26/georgia.army.02/</a>
<b>Georgia</b>	372	2/26/2004	0	0	A mutiny occurred as a wave of protest surged through the Georgian army. The Adjara government (a semi-autonomous region) was accused of trying to carry out a coup. However, this does not appear to be a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Georgia</b>	372	5/5/2009	0	0	Russia backed a mutiny in Tbilisi in order to disrupt major NATO exercises in Georgia that were due to start on this day. Originally Georgian officials were saying that Russia was sponsoring a coup against the President. However, they later dropped these allegations. This was clearly not a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne. This mutiny was peaceful.
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	373	9/4/2002	0	0	3,000 cadets at the most prestigious military academy in Azerbaijan mutinied and deserted without leave. Many returned the next day but some did not. The mutiny was a response to senior officers demanding bribes from cadets and cancelling their leave.

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<b>Denmark</b>	390	2/16/1953	0	0	Danish soldiers mutinied at Bornholm by straining. They were protesting against the extension of the draft period from 12 to 18 months. The soldiers reportedly beat other soldiers that were not joining the protest. The idea of the protest started a day prior in Copenhagen. However, this planned protest was anticipated and squelched by military leaders.
<b>Denmark</b>	390	7/15/1957	0	0	Article does not give many specifics. Danish Navy men staged a mutiny in July of 1957 in Groennedal Greenland. The Danish Chief Naval Prosecutor flew to investigate the ordeal. Officials would not give specific details of the event.
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	404	3/17/1993	1	0	Article doesn't give many details, but Major Robalo, was shot and killed at the FIR barracks in Alto de Bandim. Soldiers were disgruntled about not receiving back pay.
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>	404	10/7/2004	0	0	600 soldiers mutinied citing poor living conditions in barracks, rampant corruption in the high command, and a pay dispute. The mutineers were very explicit that this was not a coup attempt and indeed, it is not coded by Powell and Thyne as there was no attempt to oust the executive.
<b>Gambia</b>	420	7/22/1994	0	0	This event is clearly a mutiny that escalates to a coup attempt. Rank and file

					soldiers began a mutiny after returning from a tour in Liberia serving with ECOMOG. The mutineers were protesting back pay of allowances. While this event started as a pay mutiny, it escalated when military leadership became involved.
<b>Gambia</b>	420	12/30/2014	1	0	6 mutineers (including commissioned officers) attacked the State House. They were Led by Lt. Col. Sarjo Jarju and various other Lts. And Capts. This is not a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne
<b>Mali</b>	432	5/23/2006	0	0	Lt. Col. Hassan Sagaga led the mutineers which were made up of former Tuareg rebels. The mutineers took control of two main military camps of Kidal town. Civilians seemed very fearful of the mutineers, although there were no civilian deaths.
<b>Mali</b>	432	3/21/2012	1	0	This event very clearly begins as a mutiny and later escalates to a coup attempt. The mutiny began at a military camp in Bamako during a visit by the Defense Minister Gen. Sadio Gassama. The Defense minister did not assuage mutineers' grievances over the governments mishandling of the rebellion by Tuareg separatists in the Northern part of the country. Many soldiers were killed fighting the rebels and were sent to

					battle without sufficient supplies. The mutineers fired weapons into the air. Later, it seems that officers get involved and this event escalates to a coup event (coded by Powell and Thyne).
<b>Mali</b>	432	2/8/2013	1	1	Paratroopers mutiny in Bamako in response to disciplinary measure taken against some of the unit's members. This mutiny was violent.
<b>Mali</b>	432	3/10/2013	0	0	"Several dozen" soldiers deserted their posts in Diably. The deserters fired shots into the air and demanded that they receive their deployment bonuses because it was "a right" guaranteed by the state.
<b>Mali</b>	432	9/29/2013	1	0	Mutineers lead by Col. Youssou Traore, stormed an office at the Kati camp and shot an army colonel and held him hostage for hours. This occurred at the same camp where a coup began the year prior (2012).
<b>Benin</b>	434	8/4/1992	0	0	Capt. Tawes led mutineers in taking control of the town and the military camp in Natitingou. 45 mutineers were captured when the govt. forces regained control. The motivation is unclear from the story.
<b>Niger</b>	436	3/1/1992	1	0	Mutiny is led by unpaid soldiers. The mutiny caused local business and traffic to a dramatic halt. Mutineers briefly seized the state broadcasting center. Other soldiers called this a coup attempt although no plot



					was directed at the executive and this event is not coded by Powell and Thyne. Soldiers fired weapons into the air while driving around the city. Civilians marched in protest against the military.
<b>Niger</b>	436	7/10/1993	0	0	"Dozens" of soldiers mutinied in Zinder barracks demanding three months of back pay.
<b>Niger</b>	436	6/3/1997	1	0	A mutiny occurred after an attack on an army supply truck. The attack was blamed on an ethnic Tuaregs. The mutiny then occurred, demanding the departure of leadership because they were ethnic Tuaregs.
<b>Niger</b>	436	2/25/1998	1	0	Troops revolted and were driving around firing in the air. It appears they were upset over late payment of salaries. Story does not give many details.
<b>Niger</b>	436	10/5/1999	1	0	Mutiny occurred in Maradi as soldiers were protesting unpaid salaries. Mutineers took several local administrators hostages and drove through the streets firing shots into the air.
<b>Niger</b>	436	11/4/1999	1	0	100 soldier mutinied due to not receiving their salary for 8-12 months. Mutineers fired on officers. This mutiny may also have been an effort to protest rape allegations against two soldiers.
<b>Niger</b>	436	8/4/2002	1	0	5 day long mutiny sparked because of unpaid salaries. A simultaneous mutiny occurred in Diffa. Mutineers

					join each other as those in Diffa were fleeing east to join comrades.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	5/13/1990	1	0	Troops took over airport and protested pay in the capital city. They were largely upset that they were not allowed to stay on after their terms of conscription in the military and receive pay. They fired weapons into the air, but this act seemed largely symbolic. They were easily convinced to end their mutiny by higher military officials. More info on all Ivory Coast mutinies here: <a href="https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/1051/1058">https://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/afsp/article/view/1051/1058</a>
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	4/29/1993	0	0	A two-day occupation of the Ivory Coast's presidential palace occurred because of low pay and living conditions. Story doesn't give many details. President Felix Houphouet-Boigny was guarded by loyalists at his private residence. Does not appear to be coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	12/23/1999	0	0	Troops protest in Abidjan over pay. This event clearly begins as a mutiny. During the process of mutiny, Robert Guei used this moment of opportunity to launch a coup.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	3/1/2000	1	0	Article doesn't give many specifics but there was a mutiny in Daloa that appeared to be over issues of pay. More info (although not much) can be found

					here: <a href="http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/ivory-coast-1960-present/">http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/ivory-coast-1960-present/</a>
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	7/5/2000	1	0	Mutineers were protesting in the capital city, Abidjan, demanding money from the ruling junta for their role in the Dec. coup that brought the current leaders to power. Soldiers fired weapons into the air. Soldiers tore through Abidjan and terrorized civilians by commandeering hundreds of private cars.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	9/17/2002	1	0	Soldiers mutinied in order to protest demobilization. This event clearly started as a mutiny with foot soldiers expressing a grievance then escalated to a coup.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	6/28/2008	1	0	Soldiers loyal to the former rebel chief Zacharia Kone attacked military headquarters in Vavoua and Seguela. This mutiny was in response to Kone being sacked after not responding to and taking part in a demobilizing event.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	1/6/2017	1	0	Mutiny is spurred by concerns of pay. Mutineers fired Kalashnikovs into air outside local government offices. The mutiny spread to other major cities. The mutiny was spearheaded by ex-rebels that were incorporated into the military as part of peacekeeping measures after the civil war.
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	5/13/2017	1	1	Mutiny is spurred because soldiers claim they never received bonuses that were

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					promised to them after the Jan. mutiny. This mutiny follows a very similar pattern to the Jan. mutiny. At least three civilians were killed when they were being denied access to Bouake. The article indicates that the bonuses likely weren't paid as a result of a down turn in to cocoa market (the IC's main export).
<b>Ivory Coast</b>	437	7/15/2017	1	0	Three soldiers were killed during a mutiny that involved infighting in a barrack at Korhogo. It seems that the mutiny also spread to the capital city Abidjan with similar violence.
<b>Guinea</b>	438	5/26/2008	1	0	Mutiny begins May 26 over unpaid back wages. Soldiers fire into air in Kouyate. The mutiny occurred at one of the country's largest military bases. Mutiny appears to be led by foot soldiers, who targeted Defense Minister General Mamdou Baillo Diallo, looting his house.
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	439	5/30/2011	1	0	The President (Blaise Compaore's) personal guard mutinied and soldiers ran riot for two days. The mutiny began in the barracks, including one in the compound of Compaore's residence in Ouagadougou. This does not appear to be a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne. Soldiers are upset about housing conditions and food allowances. They said they

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					do not want "to work for them (leaders) to get rich."
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	439	4/14/2011	1	0	Soldiers from the second largest military base took to the streets of the country's economic capital and fired shots into the air. About 80-100 soldiers mutinied. The state said there was no looting associated with the event, but it might be the case the state wants to appear strong. Despite the fact that the military has been offered a range of benefits over the previous months, there remains a high level of discontent with working conditions and pay.
<b>Liberia</b>	450	4/3/1963	0	0	A mutiny at a military base near Monrovia ended after the president threatened to send troops to crush the rebellion. The article doesn't give many details about why the mutiny occurred in the first place. A battalion of artillery troops had mutinied on the ground and 3/4 of supplies for common mess had been stolen by the officers.
<b>Liberia</b>	450	6/30/2009	0	0	300 soldiers defected at the Tubman military barracks in Gbarnga, Bong County. The defections were a result of low morale among soldiers who had entered the service "with high expectations, amongst them [expectations] were foreign training and scholarship with accompanying benefits."
<b>Liberia</b>	450	1/9/2018	0	0	Soldiers and their wives protested by marching from

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					the Edward Binyan Kessely Military Barracks to the Robertsfield highway and erected a roadblock on the highway leading from the airport to the capital city of Monrovia. The soldiers were dressed in civilian clothing. They were demanding money that was deducted from their salary but the Ministry of Defense. They claimed that each month the military leadership was deducting \$20 (USD) from their salaries, amounting to thousands of dollars in their pockets.
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	451	4/29/1992	1	0	This event began as a pay mutiny and escalated to a coup within 24 hours. Truckloads of soldiers drove into Freetown firing machine guns into the air and demanding back pay and better working conditions. Later, the mutineers surrounded the State House but were opposed by soldiers sent from the military headquarters.
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	451	2/5/1998	0	0	70 soldiers from Sierra Leone defected and joined the Nigerian-led West African Peacekeeping force (ECOMOG). The leader of ECOMOG stated that the defectors would be integrated into the peacekeeping forces and will form their own Sierra Leonean contingent.

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<b>Sierra Leone</b>	451	1/2/1999	0	0	Army soldiers defected to rebels operating in the north and east of the state.
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	451	8/15/2013	0	0	The news stories were only published once the case was pending trial. There aren't many details about the actual event. It is clear that the soldiers were violating the chain of command. Junior officers were leading the charge.
<b>Ghana</b>	452	1/15/1961	0	0	Article does not give many details but says that three Ghanaian soldiers are being sentenced for their involvement in a mutiny involving 100 mutineers. This mutiny occurred in Congo during a UN peacekeeping mission.
<b>Ghana</b>	452	1/12/2001	0	0	Soldiers refused to take part in a parade that celebrated President Jerry John Rawlings successful coup that occurred on December 31, 1981. The mutineers indicated that they got the idea to mutiny from soldier in the Ivory Coast.
<b>Cameroon</b>	471	6/12/2017	0	0	50 soldiers from the air force mutinied in the Northern most region of Cameroon. The mutineers were demanding back pay from up to two years prior. They said that officials owed them this back pay as well as various other expenses. They set up a road block and stopped traffic. Mutiny does not appear violent.
<b>Nigeria</b>	475	8/10/1967	1	0	A mutiny occurred amongst Ibo (ethnic minority) soldiers in the Eastern

					region of Nigeria. This mutiny was largely over a federalism-regionalism issue. Specifically, the soldiers did not want to repress their ethnic kin.
<b>Nigeria</b>	475	7/4/2009	1	0	28 Nigerian soldiers mutinied and demonstrated in the streets of Akure, the Ondo State Capital over allowances and pay. The state officials said that soldiers that have a "monopoly of all kinds of weapons provided by the state" should not enjoy the same right to go on strike as civilian counterparts. The news article comes t the point of trial, where soldiers' convictions are downgraded from life in prison to only 7 years in jail. News report says that the mutiny was violent.
<b>Nigeria</b>	475	2/15/2014	1	0	Soldiers deserted their posts in N. Nigeria due to being heavily outnumbered by Boko Haram. Because of their desertion, Boko Haram was able to launch extremely aggressive attacks that killed 33 civilians.
<b>Nigeria</b>	475	5/14/2014	1	0	Soldiers mutinied and shot at the vehicle of the General Officer Commander in Borno State. Soldiers in the Barracks initially thought the attack was from insurgents, rather than from soldiers within the barracks. The attack followed the killing of 12 soldiers who were reportedly ambushed by members of Boko Haram



					while on their way to Maiduguri from Kala-Balge area.
<b>Nigeria</b>	475	8/1/2014	0	0	News story comes at the point of sentencing for 54 soldiers that refused to deploy for an operation against Boko Haram Islamists. After Boko Haram captured a series of town in the North East earlier in the year, the military vowed to retake all lost territory back from the insurgent group. However, soldiers report that they are unhappy with pay, resources, and strategy.
<b>Central African Republic</b>	482	11/15/1996	1	1	400 soldiers demanded their paychecks and mutinied. This mutiny was exceptionally violent and involved the mistreatment of civilians. Soldiers looted and released hundreds of criminals after breaking into Bangui's largest prison. Mutineers also broke into homes of business leaders and demanded money, beating those that did not cooperate. Soldiers that remained loyal clashed with mutineers right outside the presidential palace. 9 people, 5 civilians and 4 presidential guards were killed and at least 50 civilians were wounded.
<b>Central African Republic</b>	482	5/18/1996	1	0	The mutiny began May 18. There were an estimated 200 soldiers that rebelled. They did not agree to end their dissent until French military forces essentially offered them protection and

					helped them return to the barracks. The mutiny included looting. Four hostages were taken by the mutineers, including a government minister and parliamentary speaker.
<b>Central African Republic</b>	482	4/19/1996	1	1	Mutineers were protesting low pay and the army's diminished role under President Ange-Felix Patasse, whose election in 1993 ended 12 years of military rule. The rebellious soldiers fired mortars at a French-owned hotel in the capital and a 2 hour firefight with presidential guards and French troops. Rebel soldiers abducted a former government minister and his son and shot them dead. Some stories suggest that the mutiny broke out along ethnic fragmentation. The Yakoma ethnic group is the group that most mutineers belonged to. The mutineers also beheaded a regional prefect and his daughter who were related to president Patasse and served a districted that has a Yakoma majority constituency.
<b>Central African Republic</b>	482	1/5/1997	1	0	Troops mutinied against president Patasse. Specific reason not outlined in article. The mutiny was violent, killing two French soldiers.
<b>Central African Republic</b>	482	6/25/1997	1	1	Mutinous soldiers were met by opposing peacekeeping troops, as reported on by the Red Cross. Thousands of civilians had to flee the

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					capital of CAR, Bangui. Camp Kasai military base represented the mutineers' headquarters since November of the prior year. Peacekeepers from neighboring African states and French troops were able to re-gain control over the city's southwest region after the mutineers had captured it over the weekend. However, they were unsuccessful in breaking up the mutineers' control of Camp Kasai.
<b>Chad</b>	483	6/26/1991	0	0	This case is interesting. Frankly, it is hard to determine if this is a mutiny or not. However, since Dwyer (2015) includes this case in her dataset, I also do on account of precedent. 20 military officers write and publish a letter to the president stating their grievances. They ignore the typical hierarchy and chain of command and make these grievances known publicly.
<b>Chad</b>	483	5/19/2004	0	0	Officers and soldiers mutinied in Ndjamena but the mutiny was quickly put down. The mutineers were responding to an executive order that froze military pay and bonuses for two months and arrested several officers. This came after an investigation that suggested that officers were pocketing salaries that were being paid to military battalions that did not actually exist. The President seems to think this was a coup attempt, but

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					there is no clear attempt to oust or assassinate the executive. This event is not included in Powell and Thyne's coup dataset.
<b>Chad</b>	483	10/15/2005	0	0	"Tens of soldiers" defected in the Adre region. The mutineers were upset with internal dynamics of the military, such as appointments and promotions. The article indicates that these mutineers likely have ties to the 2004 mutineers.
<b>Chad</b>	483	2/28/2006	0	0	56 soldiers and two colonels defected to join the rebels in the East.
<b>Chad</b>	483	7/9/2007	0	0	35 armed soldiers and Major Abakar Al Bechir defected from the Chadian army and joined a group of resistance fighters led by Ahmat Hassballah.
<b>Congo</b>	484	1/21/1992	1	1	Soldiers, acting under the orders of the army high command, demand the resignation of Milongo (PM) and his interim government. Mutineers took over radio and TV buildings. At least 3 civilians were killed in street fighting with rebel soldiers. Milongo went into hiding, although the state officials continued to state that his government was still in charge. This does not appear to be a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne. The soldiers report to have been seeking back pay and higher wages.

<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	7/12/1960	0	0	Congolese soldiers rebelled against Belgian officers. 3 Congolese soldiers were killed by rockets from a Belgian military plane. This caused Congolese troops to mutiny at Camp Hardy in Thysville. The troops took control of the military camp and jailed all white officers. They held hostages 48 whites but later released them. Lots of threats, but it does not appear that the mutineers used direct violence.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	9/22/1960	1	0	This almost appears to be a counter coup but the mutineers to not overtly try to oust Mobutu who had just come to power through a coup. Instead, they surround his house and protest pay. There is clearly no attempt to take his life or kick him out of power. After soldiers were reassured that there was no truth in reports about pay increases to officers, they stopped their rebellion.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	11/15/1961	0	0	Mutiny started in Thysvill garrison over pay. Several officers and men were arrested by military police. Mr. Lumumba, the deposed president and opposition leader, was said to have been released from prison by mutineers, thus threatening the leadership of President Kasavubu and Col. Mobutu. However, the reports seem to be overstated, according to the article.

<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	1/13/1961	0	0	Rebellious soldiers took 13 Italian airmen prisoner in the town of Kindu. The action was likely led by Antoine Gizenga in an effort to defy central government. Major. Gen. Victor Lundula attempted to free the airmen but attempt failed. The troops moved to Albertville and went on a rampage stealing civilian property and looting houses. They set road blocks and demanded money.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	6/4/1963	1	0	Congolese troops left post at Camp Shinka and began "plundering property and molesting everyone on their way". 4 civilians died in this incident. This appears to be a particularly violent mutiny. The catalyst appears to be a civilian beating a soldier until he was "half dead" and then he later died. Story is a bit confusing and doesn't give many important details. This does appear to be a mutiny as these events were not ordered directly by a commander or the President.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	3/29/1963	1	1	Congolese troops terrorized a copper mining town in Kolwezi. This event killed at least one Belgian and one "African". Article does not indicate whether or not they were civilians. Story does not give many details, but it seems like soldiers plundered and looted through this resource rich city.

<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	9/23/1964	0	0	Mutiny occurred when troops led by Christophe Gbenye began fighting in military barracks and in residential parts of the city of Stanleyville. Gbenye requested that an aircraft be placed at his disposal in a Burundian airport. Fighting was reported on the Northern bank of the Congo river.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	7/15/1966	1	1	Rebellious troops in Kisangani were former members of the Katangese gendarmerie, which fought for Tshombe against the central government. However, they were technically incorporated into the Congolese National Army, which is why this event is considered a mutiny. The troops mutinied in July of 1966. The central government was not able to crush the mutiny decisively and had to reach a compromised settlement.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	7/8/1967	1	1	This story is very confusing, but it seems that mutinous soldiers went to Bukavu and started killing any Europeans they suspected of support anti-regime mercenaries. This was not an ordered attack, but rather soldiers just taking their own initiative.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	10/25/1991	0	0	3,000 paratroopers mutinied in Zaire. The mutineers pillaged stores in Kinshasa. The country's main airport was forced to close There were unconfirmed reports of shootings and civilian

					deaths. Soldiers mutinied over back pay that they had not received for several months. Firing was heard in two neighborhoods that house wealthier residents.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	9/24/1991	1	0	Mutineers rebelled because of back pay they never received. The mutiny spread to at least four southern towns. Soldiers began looting and committing acts of "vandalism", specifically targeted at foreigners. The unrest appears to be spurred by the firing of Etienne Tshisekedi, a popular opposition leader that Mobutu named prime minister. The appointment of Tshisekedi was made under the pressure of western governments after a similar mutiny occurred the month prior.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	12/20/1992	0	0	News story does not give many details. Mutiny appears to occur over pay. Soldiers began looting and arrested a regional governor. The state radio said that mutinous soldiers were blaming their commander for bad pay.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	1/25/1993	1	1	Mr. Tshisekedi (PM appointed under pressure of Western powers) urged soldiers to not accept a newly printed 5 million Zaire bank note as pay. This mutiny appears to be particularly violent and bloody. As least 1,000 people were killed over the weekend. Most of them appear to be soldiers, but



					there are also civilian deaths. Civilians had to flee areas of conflict.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	6/8/1997	1	0	Mutineers formed a militia and fought troops loyal to President Pascal Lissouba. Mutineers vowed their loyalty to ex-president Denis Sassou Nguesso. The mutiny appears to be extremely bloody and violent.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	1/22/1998	1	0	Mutiny was sparked over back pay. The senior military source interviewed in story seemed to downplay the sedition and imply that it was localized. However, other reports suggested the unrest was much more serious and two soldiers had died. Mutineers engaged in looting and firing weapons into the air.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	8/2/1998	1	0	This mutiny was spurred largely by ethnic division. The military revolt was sparked by officers and troops of Tutsi and other minority ethnic groups, and fighting in the capital, Kinshasa. Officers reportedly pitted Tutsi army units against those of other groups. This mutiny spread to a number of other cities.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	1/15/2007	1	0	The news story for this event comes at the point that soldiers were fired for sedition (about 5 mo. After the actual event). The mutineers rebelled in January and looted a number of civilian properties. There was an accusation of rape of a

					young girl but the charge was not upheld by the court for lack of evidence. The story does not detail the cause of the mutiny.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	6/16/2009	1	0	Soldiers opposed to their redeployment and back pay of 5 months' worth of salary caused mutiny. The mutineers fired shots into the air and caused civilians to flee certain areas. The soldiers were redeployed with a joint operation with the UN Mission in DR Congo to root out the Democratic forces of the liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	2/14/2012	1	0	Mutineers were protesting tough living conditions and corruption that they observed in the national army. On Feb. 15 and 16 they protested in the streets and fired shots in the air. Negotiated outcome was achieved and the fourth brigade of DRC armed forces was broken into 4 regiments controlled directly by a high ranking general in order to increase surveillance.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	4/30/2012	1	0	The Congolese army suspended military operations in order to bring a mutiny under control. The army had been fighting defectors and hunting order rebel leaders and mutinous soldiers.
<b>Democratic Republic of Congo</b>	490	6/11/2012	1	1	A general leads soldiers in a mutiny in DRC. The story is told through the perspective of Rwandans that were

					recruited to join the mutiny. The rebellious soldiers and general eventually came to be known as M23, an actual rebel movement. But at this moment, they are simply mutinous factions form within the state.
<b>Uganda</b>	500	1/23/1964	0	0	Mutineers rebel because of complaints of pay. 250 soldiers if the Ugandan Rifles mutinied at Camp Jinja on Lake Victoria and held their British Officers hostage. The state denied reports of the mutiny. However, the Minister of the Interior responded to the event and agreed to grant soldiers a pay increase.
<b>Uganda</b>	500	2/19/1977	1	0	The news story calls this event a coup attempt, but it does not appear to be and is not coded by Powell and Thyne. There seems to be a divide between ethnic groups in the military. The mutineers are largely comprised of Langi and Acholi tribes which are Christian tribes. 6 soldiers died during the dissent.
<b>Uganda</b>	500	10/30/1978	0	0	Mutiny started in barracks at Mbarara a town 25 miles from the Tanzanian border. The town appeared to be in control of the mutineers. The mutiny might have been in response to allegations that Cuban-backed Tanzanian forces launched an invasion into Uganda. However, some argued that this was actually diversionary tactics used by President Amin and the

					invasion was actually made up or overstated. The news story isn't exactly clear about why the mutiny occurred.
<b>Uganda</b>	500	11/1/2004	0	0	UPDF soldiers deserted their official work stations and stayed with civilian women around town. This mutiny occur in the Gulu municipality.
<b>Kenya</b>	501	1/2/1947	1	0	150 Askari troops mutinied because they wanted to be demobilized. They refused to perform their duties. The mutiny was violent as mutineers took over an ammunition depot in Gilgil.
<b>Kenya</b>	501	1/25/1964	0	0	Mutineers were calling for the dismissal of senior army officials that were British. The mutiny represents a push back against colonial powers controlling military operations.
<b>Tanzania</b>	510	1/24/1964	0	0	This mutiny appears to be spurred by a push back against colonial powers leading the military. The mutineers were seeking the "Africanisation" of the military.
<b>Tanzania</b>	510	1/21/1983	0	0	Haya tribe led a mutiny that involved officers but was quashed rather quickly by loyalists. The mutiny seems to be in response to economic decline that caused grievances among the Haya.
<b>Burundi</b>	516	3/5/1995	1	0	There was a mutiny in barracks in Bujumbura that involved a shootout. No one was injured or killed.
<b>Burundi</b>	516	12/12/2015	1	0	Rebels attacked a military base, but then soldiers

					joined the rebels and attacked various other bases. The location that was primarily targeted trains Burundi officers. The mutiny was violent.
<b>Rwanda</b>	517	5/30/1992	1	0	Article does not give many details but a mutiny occurred in Gisenye and Ruhengeri in the norths of the country. The mutiny was violent and killed at least 27. The article does not say if these deaths were military actors or civilians.
<b>Rwanda</b>	517	8/1/2014	0	0	Former Presidential Guard Chief and Serving Col. Tom Byabagamba, and Brig-Gen. Frank Rusagara were arrested for inciting military rebellion against strong man President Kaul Kagame. While there were only 2 implicated in this mutiny, it is included because they were military leaders and commissioned officers.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	4/1/1989	0	0	Article does not give many details, but indicates that there was a mutiny in Kismayu, the capital of Lower Juba. Somali Defense minister Husayn Abd al-Rahman Husayn Mattan and Commander of the armed forces Brig-Gen Masleh Muhammad Siyad visited the barracks in order to talk about "the consolidation of defense" and "the strengthening of national unity".
<b>Somalia</b>	520	4/2/2008	0	0	Somalian soldiers defect from the Puntland state government on the frontlines of the battle with

					secessionist Somaliland. The leader, Col. Jama Muse Umar told local radio station that the soldiers came to speak with traditional elders in the Puntland capital because they had not been paid in months. There were reports that soldiers and military leaders had driven into Somaliland, in act of defection. Apparently they were welcomed warmly by Somaliland leaders.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	3/21/2009	0	0	Somalian soldiers defect to the Bay and Bakool regions of southwestern Somalia. About 100 men with armored vehicles crossed into Bay and Bakool regions, moving away from the government of Mogadishu.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	9/6/2010	0	0	General Muhammad Gelle Kahiye was accused by TFG President Sharif of being responsible for tons of weapons missing from the government's military facilities in Mogadishu. The President fired the military chief and several subordinates. Meanwhile, hundreds of TFG troops in the few areas under government control have mutinied due to nonpayment of salaries.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	10/2/2010	0	0	Ahmed Amin Ma'alin (military officer) defected from Billa Baydhabo military camp in Mogadishu. He deserted the apostate administration and asked for amnesty from Al-

					Shabab. All Shabab paraded the defected military officer in Baydhabo town.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	1/1/2011	1	0	Soldiers mutinied in Mogidishu over nonpayment of their salaries. The mutiny was violent.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	4/4/2011	0	0	Soldiers defected to Al-Shabab forces. A parliament member blamed this defection on some cabinet ministers (a delegation of government officials) that arrived in this region, spurring a mutiny and subsequent defection. The number of defected soldiers doesn't appear to be too large (although the article is not explicit). The rebel soldiers did take an armored vehicle with them in their defection. The parliamentary member said that he and his colleagues used to contribute parts of their salary to funding government forces in the region in an effort to promote loyalty.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	7/20/2013	0	0	500 soldiers and 13 improvised fighting vehicles defected from the Khaatumo regional administration to Somaliland. An agreement between local elders in the south of Sanaag Region (Northern Somalia) and the Somaliland administration led to the defection of the soldiers in an attempt to combine previously warring forces.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	3/15/2014	0	0	Article doesn't give many details but Puntland Defense

					Forces in 54th Somali Army base staged a mutiny. They set tires on fire and chanted their military rights.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	7/31/2014	0	0	20 Puntland soldiers defected to Somaliland's separatist administration after striking over salaries that were unpaid.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	1/27/2015	0	0	Presidential Security Unit (PSU) soldiers mutinied at Boosaaso palace over delayed pay. They had not been paid for seven months.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	6/14/2015	0	0	A senior Commander of the Interim Jubba Administration defected to Al-Shabab. Yusu Ma'alin Abdi Nur defected because of the atrocities carried out by Jubaland forces against civilians in the region. He reportedly said that he defected because he was "disillusioned" by the atrocities being carried out by the local forces against resides of the town Husingow.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	7/1/2015	0	0	Mutiny is spurred over the sacking of a military commander by the Puntland President. Soldiers were led by General Muhidin. The Puntland government responds quickly due to the geographical proximity of the mutiny to Al-Shabab activity.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	9/23/2015	0	0	Puntland paramilitary soldiers entered the administration's finance office in Northern Gaalkacyo and a local bank. The soldiers were mutinying over salaries that had not



					been paid in the last 7 months. The soldiers stated that they were "not out to cause trouble".
<b>Somalia</b>	520	10/14/2015	0	0	Troops formerly stationed in the town of Gaalkacyo mutinied. The exact reason was not identified in the article, but this seems like a pay mutiny, which Somalia is particularly prone to during this time period.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	1/13/2016	0	0	An officer that previously worked for the Galmudug region government in central Somalia handed himself over and defected to Al-Shabab. He was received in ceremony at Xarardheere town. He pledged his allegiance to Al-Shabab and vowed that he would never return to work for Glamudug and Puntland administration in the future.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	6/11/2016	0	0	Soldiers mutiny over unpaid salaries. Article doesn't give many details.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	3/9/2017	0	0	Puntland military officers took over the main customs office and complained of lack of salaries and allowances from the administration of President Abdiweli Mohamed Ali "Gas". Soldiers also seized the region's parliamentary compound several days prior.
<b>Somalia</b>	520	5/20/2017	0	0	Soldiers were being housed in Bali Doggle Airbase, after 1500 mutineers were drive out of Mogadishu. The soldiers were protesting unpaid salaries. The soldiers

					have been battling Al-Shabab for years.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	2/27/1974	0	0	Troops who were sent to quell riots and dissent were upset about pay. After suppressing dissident activity, soldiers requested higher pay. They were ultimately granted an increase but said that it was not good enough. The dissident activity was largely in response to an economic downturn caused by inflation and severe drought and famine. A second article discusses the mutiny within the air force which occurred simultaneously. This mutiny appears to be largely over pay concerns and working conditions.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	3/29/1974	0	0	Troops ended a three day occupation of Asmara. The rebel troops were making various demands to the central government and the article indicates that most times, the government complied. The dissident soldiers took hostages. The unrest appeared to be spreading to other parts of the country.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	6/28/1974	0	0	Troops revolted and began holding parts of Addis Ababa. They took over a radio station and forced employees to broadcast statements denouncing former cabinet ministers and army officers. The rebel soldiers were protesting their officers' inaction against 8 members of

					Parliament who called for the release of 25 officials that were held on corruption charges.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	7/7/1974	0	0	Similar to event described above. A rebellious faction of the military took over a radio station to appeal to the population to help them located individuals that were on wanted list for suspicion of corruption.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	5/28/1991	0	0	Military officers defected to neighboring countries including Kenya as the intensity of conflict in Ethiopia increased.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	8/9/2006	0	0	An army general (Gen. Kemal Gelchu) deserted the government and headed to Eritrea (enemy of Ethiopia) across the border with tens of senior army officers and hundreds of fully armed soldiers. The general allegedly defected because of what he called widespread violations of human rights throughout the country.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	3/27/2007	0	0	7 high ranking Ethiopian military officers defected to Ogaden National Liberation Front. The officers defect to ONLF and asked for a safe passage to Somalia where they believe they can get Somali smugglers to take them to Kenyan Refugee camps. The article suggests many more soldiers were expected to defect in the coming days, but there is no follow up article to suggest whether or not this actually happened. Defectors

					reported that corruption within the Ethiopian Military, delayed pay and bad strategy were the primary reasons for the defection.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	11/9/2009	0	0	6 high ranking military officers defected from the state after being scheduled to deploy to Ogaden in Southeastern Ethiopia where government forces are engaged in fighting against rebels of ONLF. It appears that this defection was a result of overwhelming losses and commando attacks from ONLF.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	4/22/2011	0	0	60 soldiers and two high ranking colonels defected from Ethiopia and fled to Kenya. The article states that the Weyane (Ethiopian) government was trying to return the defected soldiers back to Ethiopia illegally.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	10/1/2014	0	0	Eight pilots crossed the Eritrean boarder with an unspecified number of fighter jets to join the Ginbot 7 and the Ethiopian People's Patriotic front armed opposition forces.
<b>Ethiopia</b>	530	12/26/2014	0	0	Three high ranking pilots using sophisticated MI-35 helicopter gunship defected to Eritrea. The Ethiopian regime accused Eritrea of hijacking the military planes. However, this was a high level defection.
<b>Eritrea</b>	531	1/21/2013	1	0	100 soldiers lead by Saleh Uthman, an officer, surrounded the perimeter of Eritrea's ministry of

					Information. The mutineers had a long list of demands that included: implementation of the constitution, installation of a transitional government, accountability, elimination of officers' corruption, release of political prisoners, and others. This does not appear to be a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Angola</b>	540	7/17/1990	1	0	A mutiny broke out among MPLA units stationed in Huambo. Dozens of soldiers were injured in the fighting between rival factions of the MPLA army. The mutiny spread to the town of Longonjo, where there were more shootouts.
<b>Angola</b>	540	12/12/1990	0	0	Soldiers mutinied and abandoned their units fearing possible reprisals from civilians in the event of peace. During the 15 year long war, many civilians were subject to human rights violations at the hands of MPLA soldiers. The mutinies were occurring in several parts of the country.
<b>Angola</b>	540	3/7/1991	0	0	The 47th Tactical Group of the MPLA stationed in Uige mutinied because they were demanding regular food supplies. The mutineers stated that they had been without food from the Luanda government for months. They had been relying on food that they looted from local civilians.

<b>Angola</b>	540	9/4/1991	0	0	Article does not give many details but states that a mutiny occurred in Cahama. Mutineers rebelled against their commander. The soldiers stormed the house of the commander and took civilian property that the officer had stolen.
<b>Angola</b>	540	4/20/1992	1	0	Government troops mutinied in Lunda Province. The unhappy soldiers were demanding immediate demobilization and reintegration into civilian life. The article indicates that the mutiny was violent.
<b>Angola</b>	540	9/5/1992	1	1	A mutiny erupted in Cabinda because soldiers were demanding an immediate demobilization and payment of salary arrears. The army confirmed that three government soldiers were killed in the violence. 9 individuals in total were killed.
<b>Angola</b>	540	9/23/1992	0	0	Demobilized soldiers mutinied. More than 50 mutineers put up barricades blocking main routes into the city of Soyo.
<b>Mozambique</b>	541	8/1/1992	0	0	300 soldiers from Maputo garrison mutinied in Marracuene. The mutineers set up a barricade on the road to the north of the country. The government said that the mutinies may have been because soldiers were, "manipulated by agitators alien to the army."
<b>Mozambique</b>	541	9/23/1992	0	0	Soldiers mutinied for two days because they had not been paid for 18 months. They looted and robbed

					local shops. They seized a plane of the state-owned light aircraft company and took the pilot hostage for one night. They ended their mutiny but threatened to resume on 10/1 if their back pay was not paid.
<b>Mozambique e</b>	541	1/14/1993	1	1	Two civilians were killed after a mutiny in Chimoio. The mutineers were protesting, demanding social reintegration and food assistance.
<b>Mozambique e</b>	541	4/7/1993	0	0	100 demobilized soldiers mutinied near the Nampula provincial government building. They were demanding that they be paid funds that were made available by the central government to help soldiers reintegrate into society.
<b>Mozambique e</b>	541	7/1/1994	0	0	Soldiers mutinied because they were protesting delays in demobilization. Attempt to assuage them only made matters worse. The article indicates that this was likely several mutiny events (average of 1 per day in July).
<b>Mozambique e</b>	541	7/30/1994	1	0	Mutineers undertake rebellion in response to the peace process. The mutineers blocked a dozen roads and looted markets. Reports suggest that women were raped by rebellious soldiers. The troops were demanding immediate demobilization.
<b>Mozambique e</b>	541	12/15/1994	0	0	4 sergeants were found to incite mutiny of 43 soldiers. The mutineers were part of the Mozambique Defense

					Armed Forces (FADM) but were previously part of the rename ranks (National resistance army).
<b>Mozambique</b>	541	2/28/1995	1	0	A 16 hour long mutiny began because soldiers were protesting their working conditions and the fact that their salaries had not been paid (specifically the salaries of demobilized soldiers), due to peace agreement. The government in Maputo quickly agreed to pay the soldiers more in an effort to end the rebellion.
<b>Mozambique</b>	541	5/25/1996	0	0	100 demobilized soldiers mutinied in front of the Machava administrative building because they were promised to be paid subsidies by Culima, a Mozambican nongovernmental organization. A Culima official was held hostage.
<b>Malawi</b>	553	11/11/1980	0	0	Two air force officers defected from Malawi and fled to Tanzania, asking for political asylum. The prior month, 12 army officers fled to Zambia and asked for political asylum.
<b>Malawi</b>	553	8/2/1994	1	0	200 armed guards from nearby tea plantations marched into Milange and demanded demobilization money ahead of the October elections and the conclusion of 16 years of civil war.
<b>Malawi</b>	553	4/28/1995	0	0	Soldiers of the UDF were involved in a maize-smuggling scheme. The Minister of Information pointed out that this was a mutiny, not a coup attempt



					like media outlets had been reporting.
<b>Malawi</b>	553	7/1/1996	0	0	Article does not give many details but suggests that Lt. Col. James Joloma was inciting soldiers to mutiny using violence.
<b>Malawi</b>	553	12/10/1997	0	0	50 soldiers rebelled and threatened to shoot their military commander General Kelvin Simwaka due to a disagreement over training allowances. A paying officer told the soldiers that they were getting underpaid, which set the mutiny into motion. The army general did not move to rectify the situation which lead the soldiers to mutiny. Soldiers were rounded up by military police and locked up at a military barracks.
<b>Malawi</b>	553	6/5/2015	0	0	Officers within the Malawian army were dissatisfied with Army Chie Ignancio Maulana because their salaries were deducted when they were serving on a peace keeping mission in the DRC. They protested and stated that if he did not step down that they would take action to have him removed.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	2/1/1981	1	0	New story doesn't give many details. It indicates that there were mutinies and desertions that marked Mr. Mugabe's rule in 1980 and 1981. These mutinies and desertions seem to be a result of ethnic divisions (between the shonas and Ndebeles).

<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	11/14/1998	0	0	50 soldiers plus a few officers refused to deploy to Congo and have been arrested. Many were arguing that the war is not constitutional and therefore invalidates their contracts of service.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	3/15/2003	1	0	26 army deserters were recruited by the opposition Movement for Democratic change (MDC) and were deployed into high-density suburbs of Harare and Chitungwiza to terrorize and beat up civilians while wearing army uniform in an effort to prompt an uprising by civilians. The deserters were suspected to have strong links with the MDC's underground military wing which had allegedly planned to bomb all service stations in Harare and other major cities during this uprising. The MDC later denied that it had any connection to these renegade soldiers.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	10/2/2008	0	0	During the height of a Cholera epidemic, soldiers mutinied after they failed to access their paltry wages as a result of cash strapped banks. The mutiny is violent and full of riots, but the soldiers were unarmed. The news story suggest that this unrest is a reflection of Mugabe's waning popularity and legitimacy.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	12/2/2008	0	0	Mutineers take to the streets of Harare and attack and rob foreign currency dealers because they had not been paid. They had demanded

					money from the banks but the mint had not been able to print enough. The news story suggest that the "vast majority" of all troops are very unhappy with Mugabe. The unrest seems to be a symptom of the disintegration of Zimbabwe's economy.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	1/20/2009	0	0	15 armed soldiers looted a shop belonging to an opposition movement, Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The soldiers said that they were looting because their salaries were not sufficient.
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	552	8/11/2012	0	0	The military took over the census tracking and counting process because it paid \$90 a day. Thousands of soldiers stormed centers where enumerators (mostly teachers) were completing their final training session. The soldiers forced the teachers out and started counting.
<b>South Africa</b>	560	5/30/1983	0	0	Lt. Gerald Andreas Eckert defected to Mozambique in order to, "show that there are also whites inside the South African armed forces who do not agree with apartheid". While this mutiny was only carried out by one individual it is included because he was a commissioned officer.
<b>South Africa</b>	560	1/12/1984	0	0	Story doesn't give many details but the mutiny was largely in response to the troops' unhappiness with their involvement in the Angolan War. The state

					leadership was subsequently accused of brutality while breaking up the uprising. The state and loyal military officials seemed to be quite heavy-handed in their repressive response.
<b>South Africa</b>	560	10/23/1987	0	0	400 black soldiers mutinied and refused to fight on the side of the rebels of the National Union for the total indolence of Angola, or UNITA, which was trying to overthrow the soviet-backed Angolan government. South African troops were in southern Angola fighting on the side of guerilla forces against Angolan Troops. These battles seemed to be extremely bloody.
<b>South Africa</b>	560	9/1/1992	0	0	Transkei soldiers that were part of the state military took 23 senior officers hostage. They were protesting pay disparities between the south African defense force and their traskei military battalions. General Holomisa promised to reform the command structure in response to the demands of the mutineers.
<b>South Africa</b>	560	11/26/2008	0	0	Close to 200 men mutinied and complained about corrupt generals and poor working conditions. They were expected to travel via government vehicle 20 km from Lenasia to Doornkop every day. However, due to a shortage of space in vehicles, they decided to walk in a form of protest.

<b>South Africa</b>	560	8/26/2009	0	0	Soldiers marched in Pretoria to the Union Buildings and demanded a 30% increase in pay. At the time of the story, the soldiers and the state were still negotiating. The news story implies that there will likely be more mutinies, however there are no follow up articles. Military intelligence had exposed a plan to kidnap senior military officials at a function at a military base earlier in the month.
<b>South Africa</b>	560	9/6/2009	0	0	3,000 soldiers in Pretoria mutinied over pay grievances. The story doesn't give many details, but this appears to be a foot soldier mutiny.
<b>Namibia</b>	565	7/28/2009	0	0	2/3 of the Namibia Defense Force (NDF) did not show up at a military parade because they were in shock over the news that their Chief, Lt-Gen Martin Shalli had been suspended. The soldiers claimed to be sick but they were really defying orders because of Shalli's suspension.
<b>Lesotho</b>	570	1/23/1994	1	0	Mutiny was spurred by pay grievances. South African officials seemed extremely concerned about the potential for diffusion of this unrest to their state. The mutineers fired mortars and machine guns. The mutineers originally demanded a 100% pay increase.
<b>Lesotho</b>	570	4/14/1994	1	0	Mutineers killed one minister and kidnapped four others who were taken to

					army barracks and later freed. The soldiers were mutinying over pay rather than trying to stage a coup. A mutiny was put down just a few months ago over pay, and pay policies were never adjusted or updated.
<b>Lesotho</b>	570	9/22/1998	1	0	Protests over a disputed election led to a mutiny. A fresh election was to be held 15-18 months after the disputed election. More than 60 soldiers were killed during the mutiny (including troops sent from South Africa and Botswana to quell unrest).
<b>Lesotho</b>	570	5/15/2015	1	0	23 soldiers of the Lesotho Defense force (LDF) mutinied. They were lead by army commander, Lt-Gen Maaparankoe Mahao. Lt-Gen was shot by other military colleagues who suspected him of leading this mutiny. The mutineers sought to topple the LDF command.
<b>Madagascar</b>	580	11/18/2006	0	0	General Fidy went on the run after a mutiny. Presidential candidates said that his defection was legitimate. His rebellion was spurred by problems of low pay for foot soldiers.
<b>Madagascar</b>	580	3/8/2009	0	0	Soldiers mutinied at a major military camp just outside of Antananarivo in protest of the government's repression of opposition demonstration in months prior. The soldiers were calling on all the country's law and order forces (police) to join their

					rebellion. The article indicates that officers supported and backed the actions of the soldiers.
<b>Madagascar</b>	580	5/20/2010	1	0	Story does not give many details, but troops mutinied in Antananarivo. The rebel troops and security forces exchanged fire and two soldiers were killed. The mutiny only lasted a day.
<b>Madagascar</b>	580	7/22/2012	1	0	The story doesn't give details about why the mutiny happened. Mutinous soldiers took over a military camp and shot an army officer that was sent in to negotiate their surrender.
<b>Comoros</b>	581	8/30/2001	1	1	The story calls this a coup attempt, but it is not a direct action to oust the executive and is not coded by Powell and Thyne. A breakaway Comorian island of Anjouan experienced a mutiny. Troops seized Anjouan's radio station in an effort to reinstate their preferred leader, Col. Said Abeid. The mutiny was violent and included a civilian death.
<b>Seychelles</b>	591	8/19/1982	1	0	Soldiers mutinied and took nearly 200 hostages. The Seychelles government called for help from Tanzania, South Africa, and UK. The story seems to indicate that the mutineers, led by Sgt. George Nichole, were not happy with the Rene Government. However, this was not a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne. Rebellious soldiers reported

					that they had been treated like "pigs" by officers.
<b>Morocco</b>	600	2/4/1991	0	0	2,000 Moroccan soldiers left their camps and crossed over into Algeria.
<b>Algeria</b>	615	2/20/1956	0	0	50-100 soldiers deserted during a battle with rebel nationalists. The French leadership started a big round-up to catch the deserters. Not many details given.
<b>Algeria</b>	615	4/25/1961	0	0	The stories are confusing. To condense a lot of material, French troops spurred a mutiny in Algiers. They were staging the mutiny against President De Gaulle. It's not immediately clear what their intentions were.
<b>Algeria</b>	615	4/2/1995	1	0	This mutiny was a very large, barracks mutiny. Reports suggest that 2,500-5,000 soldiers rebelled. These were mostly young conscripts doing their compulsory military service. The government forces responded with extreme violence and bombed the barracks.
<b>Algeria</b>	615	11/23/2013	0	0	An officer in the Algerian army defected and fled to Morocco. His decision to do so was motivated by human rights abuses in Algeria and economic hardships. Although this is only one individual, it is included as a mutiny because he was a commissioned officer.
<b>Libya</b>	620	8/7/1980	0	0	600 soldiers rebelled and troops loyal to Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi crushed the rebellion. There



					were no known deaths associated with the mutiny. The article doesn't indicate why the original mutiny occurred. It is clear that the state was trying to cover-up the rebellion and down play its significance in an effort to look strong and resolute.
<b>Libya</b>	620	8/31/1985	0	0	Libyan Army and Air force mutinied after receiving orders to invade Tunisia. The article says that troops tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the Libyan Leader, Qaddafi, but this doesn't appear to be a coup attempt and is not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Libya</b>	620	3/3/1987	0	0	A lieutenant colonel, a senior officer, and his crew landed their plane in Abu Simbel airport in upper Egypt after defecting from the battlefield in Chad. The individuals disagreed with the campaign and strategy in Chad. Also, they may have been upset about the killing of three dissident soldiers several weeks before the event.
<b>Libya</b>	620	5/15/1986	1	0	A mutiny occurred in the Aziza camp after the U.S. amped up air raids. 8 mutineers were shot and killed. The mutiny was in response to Gadhafi's extreme policies that resulted in the ramping up of U.S. aggression.
<b>Libya</b>	620	10/7/1993	0	0	Troops mutinied over pay at the Zawiyah barracks. While this happened in very close proximity to a coup, it is clear that there is a low

					level mutiny occurring several days before the coup attempt.
<b>Libya</b>	620	3/6/2011	1	0	Mutiny broke out when units of the army refused to attack Misrata, Libya's third largest city and the only place in the west of the country that was still defying Gaddafi's rule. There was infighting between troops loyal to Gaddafi and those that weren't.
<b>Libya</b>	620	4/1/2011	0	0	A limited mutiny took place inside Gaddafi's residence. The mutiny was led by junior officers from the pro-Libyan regime armed forces. Gaddafi's security forces intervened and crushed the mutiny immediately. This does not appear to be a coup attempt, but rather intimidation tactics. This event is not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Libya</b>	620	6/1/2011	0	0	A Colonel, four lieutenant colonels, and four rank and file soldiers left their post and fled to Tunisia. This seems to be one event of many like this in the same month.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	8/24/1955	1	0	360 soldiers of the Equatorial corps of the defense force mutinied and forced senior officers to flee. This mutiny was violent. Powell and Thyne have this coded as a coup but I think this is incorrect. At least from the sources I located, this event was targeted at military

					leadership, not the executive.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	12/11/1965	0	0	60 army officers mutinied because they were dissatisfied with the government's attempts to repress the rebellion among southern Sudanese. During the mutiny, officers refused to receive orders from superiors. Later they demanded that the army commander listen to their demands and grievances while he was detained.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	2/1/1983	0	0	Article was written in 2014, but recounts a mutiny that occurred in 1983. Sudanese army units took place at Bor and the Khartoum army leadership dispatched Colonel Garang to suppress the mutiny. However, Col. Garang joined the mutiny and became its leader rather than suppressing it. Many trace back to this event to explain the rise of SPLA, the guerrilla movement.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	3/15/1983	0	0	Article doesn't give many details, but states that a detachment of Division 105 of the First Battalion of the Southern Region mutinied. The command had shown signs of indiscipline over the proceeding months. The mutineers stole large quantities of arms, ammunition, and explosives from a store in Bor.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	9/25/1985	1	1	Mutiny occurs in North Khartoum and in Omdurman. Mutiny appeared to have ben in response to northern troops

					refusing to obey orders to enter the war zone in the south. Civilians died during this mutiny. Roadblocks were set up to apprehend deserters and mutineers.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	3/19/1986	1	0	State troops mutinied in Juba as they were ordered to transfer to the north. They took control of the Juba airport and ordered an airline to take them to Khartoum. 65 men including the commander and his deputy were captured and killed by loyal forces.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	8/21/1996	0	0	A military battalion stationed at the Kutum Garrison in Darfur refused orders from the Armed Forces General Command's operations department in Khartoum. The battalion had been ordered to move to the Eastern border for military preparations. Local populations expressed sympathy for the rebel battalion and supplied them with food and water. The battalion warned that they would fire on anyone who went near them.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	6/12/1998	0	0	Students in military training program defected and fled the camp in response to a controversial program that may have involved deploying students to war zone in southern and eastern Sudan.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	6/3/1999	0	0	Two army convoys in Sudan mutinied after trying to recapture the town of Togan from the opposition

					(National Democratic Alliance - NDA). The troops rebelled after suffering a major defeat against the NDA.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	1/1/2004	0	0	The date given in the article is rather unclear. It says the mutiny occurred sometime in 2003 or 2004. As such, the mutiny has been coded to have occurred in Jan. of 2004, but the article isn't precisely clear. The mutiny occurred when 18 soldier refused to deploy from Al-Ubayyid city to the town of Umbro in northern Darfur and instead went to al-Fashir capital city with 26 vehicles.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	12/16/2006	1	0	Mutiny occurred over unpaid salaries. Heavy gun fire was reported in Juba, the administrative capital of South Sudan. The mutiny began in the barracks.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	2/4/2011	1	1	50 people died in this mutiny. The mutiny occurred in Makalal during the separation of Sudan's northern and southern armies right before secession. The members of an army unit refused to redeploy with their weapons to the north and trend on other members of their unit.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	4/21/2013	1	0	A paramilitary (central reserve police) mutinied in Darfur. They mutineers fired weapons into the air in the state capital El Geneina near the Chadian border. Members of this paramilitary group used to belong to the Janjaweed,

					before being folded back into the state's military.
<b>Sudan</b>	625	12/2/2015	0	0	"Dozens" of soldiers from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and other paramilitaries deserted their posts in Makja, Disa, and Dondero. There are two possible reasons for this rebellion. First, the officer indicated that soldiers defected because they did not want to take up arms against possible relatives in the state in which rebels were operating. Second, they were protesting against the non-payment of their salaries after the battles of Malkin and Kalgo.
<b>South Sudan</b>	626	12/16/2013	1	0	A mutiny occurred between troops loyal to Salva Kiir, the president, and troops backing Riek Machar, the former deputy and leading cleric. Hundreds of civilians had to flee to UN bases. The fighting largely took place around a barracks. The article calls this a coup attempt but it is not coded by Powell and Thyne and there is no attempt to oust the executive.
<b>South Sudan</b>	626	9/12/2014	0	0	Air force officers joined SPLM/A in opposition to a lack of diversity in the army. The officers accused South Sudan's government of tribalism and a poor promotion policy.
<b>South Sudan</b>	626	1/30/2015	0	0	Major Losuba Lodoru, a SPLA officer, defected and formed a new rebel movement. This officer had been really well respected

					by military leadership prior to his rebellion. This event is included since a commissioned officer defected.
<b>South Sudan</b>	626	5/17/2015	0	0	Renegade Deputy Commander Johnson Olony defected to the rebels. The state accused him of aiding the rebels and helping them cross a river from the western side of Malakal city. This helped the rebels claim part of Malakal city and recapture it from the control of President Salva Kiir's forces.
<b>South Sudan</b>	626	11/9/2017	0	0	General Chan Garang defected to the rebels. While this mutiny does not meet the threshold for size, it is included because he was a high ranking officer.
<b>Iran</b>	630	10/30/2015	0	0	Because of a rising death toll within Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, senior commanders and junior officers refused to obey orders to fight in Syria. The mutineers were referred to a court-marshal on charges of mutiny and treason. This mutiny followed many pounding losses in Syria and several deaths of Iranian soldiers, even though Iran denied the presence of Iranian soldiers on the ground in Syria.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	9/25/1990	0	0	500 men from the elite Iraqi republican guard defected and fled with their arms together to Anarab state. The soldiers did so in response to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

<b>Iraq</b>	645	8/10/1995	0	0	Two of Saddam Hussein's sons defected to Jordan. They were Lieut. Gen. Hussein Kamel, the husband of Hussein's oldest daughter. Kamel oversaw the biological and chemical weapons and nuclear research program in Iraq. The other defector was Col. Saddam Kamel who was married to Hussein's other daughter, Rana. Kamel was in charge of Iraq's special forces.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	4/1/2004	0	0	Article mentions a mutiny that occurred when a battalion of the Iraqi army was ordered to deploy to Fallujah in order to assist U.S. marines who were actively fighting there. The troops refused the orders to deploy and during the weeks that followed more than 15,000 soldiers and police officers deserted. This forced the U.S. to reevaluate recruiting and retention strategies.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	4/25/2004	0	0	A second mutiny occurred in Fallujah. After being involved in heavy fighting with insurgents, a second unit of Iraqi forces mutinied. Part of the 36th battalion rebelled after 11 days of brutal conflict. U.S. marines had to parse through and separate soldiers that wanted to fight from those that refused. The article suggests that the battalion may have split along ethnic lines. About half of the soldiers were not



					Iraqi, but Kurdish Peshmerga. The Kurds were ready to fight but the Iraqi Arab soldiers had vowed that they had enough fighting.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	5/1/2006	0	0	After completing a 5 week training program at Camp Habbaniyah, a base 45 miles west of the capital, dozens of soldiers began to protest the fact that they would have to serve outside their home areas. The soldiers began ripping their clothes off in rage. The mutiny was rather short lived and was brought under control quickly.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	8/23/2006	0	0	100 soldiers defied orders to move into Baghdad as part of a large security crackdown in the capital city. The mutiny was spurred by sectarian divides. The soldiers believed they would be operating in their own region or "homeland" and did not want to patrol other areas.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	3/15/2008	0	0	1,300 soldiers and policemen refused to fight against Shiite militias in Basra during an attack.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	4/6/2009	1	0	The awakening guard, which was heavily funded by the U.S. experienced a mutiny in which members feared they might be receiving unfair treatment from the Shia-led government for sectarian reasons. The rebellious troops clashed with Iraqi forces. Some were suspected of planting a road

					side bomb. This led to a U.S. air strike targeting the rebellious soldiers.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	6/11/2013	0	0	1,000 Kurdish troops from the Iraqi army (16th Brigade) deserted. They desired to be integrated into forces loyal to the Kurdish region. The troops disobeyed orders to take part in an operation against a mainly Sunni Arab town.
<b>Iraq</b>	645	6/12/2014	0	0	Iraqi army deserted Kirkuk and have been replaced by Peshmerga fighters. The soldiers even abandoned their uniforms and fled in civilian clothing. These desertions were largely in response to the growing threat of ISIS.
<b>Egypt</b>	651	10/20/1952	0	0	Major General Hussein Sirry Amer and Col. El Sayed Farah were charged with desertion and attempting to spread alarm among their troops. The article doesn't give many details. While this event only includes 2 individuals (although it may have included their troops too, it's unclear) it is considered a mutiny because these were commissioned officers.
<b>Egypt</b>	651	2/25/1986	1	1	25,000 conscripts of the CSF (paramilitary force) staged protest in Cairo in response to a rumor that conscription was going to mandate 4 years of service instead of three. The mutiny was very violent. More info here: <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wik">https://en.wikipedia.org/wik</a>

					i/1986_Egyptian_conscripts_riot
<b>Egypt</b>	651	1/21/1991	0	0	There was a mutiny among Egyptian forces in Saudi Arabia due to a disagreement between lower ranking Egyptian Officers and the Egyptian forces' commander. Mubarak sent a military delegation to Saudi Arabia to resolve the issue.
<b>Egypt</b>	651	5/9/2012	0	0	In Obour City, hundreds of Central Security Forces conscripts mutinied over torture that they endured committed by their officers. They blocked the road and started chanting anti-police songs. The mutiny was put down quickly. The conscripts were poorly paid, fed and had to endure torture.
<b>Syria</b>	652	1/16/1963	0	0	Col. Kerim Nahlawi staged a mutiny and recruited active soldiers. The Syrian government was locked in negotiations with the mutineers that threatened to occupy Damascus if their demands were not met. The article does not clearly outline what the demands of the mutineers were. This event escalated into a coup, although it very clearly started as a mutiny.
<b>Syria</b>	652	3/4/1963	0	0	The article doesn't give many details but says that Syrian troop mutinied on the Israeli frontier because they demanded that Syria reunite with Egypt.
<b>Syria</b>	652	1/21/1991	0	0	Syrian troops mutiny in Saudi Arabia after seeing that some of the Western

					military personnel were wearing a star of David.
<b>Syria</b>	652	3/15/2011	0	0	Desertions were occurring in Deir al-Zour in the northwestern province of Idlib, and in towns around Homs and Damascus. Size of desertions not mentioned.
<b>Syria</b>	652	6/8/2011	1	1	Soldiers mutinied in Jisr al-Shughor in response to heavy repression committed by pro-government gunman known as "shabiha". Soldiers ultimately defected. It seems that the soldiers were most likely Sunni, resenting the Alawite minority that rules. Mutiny was certainly spurred by sectarian divisions.
<b>Syria</b>	652	10/20/2011	1	0	Similar as above. Defectors were reported to launch deadly guerrilla raids on state loyal convoys and fortifications. Article points out that Syrian defectors lack international support, which is likely why Assad is able to weather such large defections.
<b>Syria</b>	652	3/8/2012	0	0	4 high ranking Syrian officers defected to camp in Turkey. Many of them seem to have ties to the FSA. Lt. Khaled al-Hamoud joined the ranks of the FSA as an advisor.
<b>Syria</b>	652	4/28/2012	1	0	Report suggests that there were "major defections" from units in the Syrian Army that were headquartered close to the Republican Palace in Latakia. The mutiny involved 30 soldiers.

<b>Syria</b>	652	6/21/2012	0	0	Syrian air force colonel defects to Jordan. This event does not meet the threshold for mutiny, but because commissioned officer defected, it is included in dataset. The article indicates that this was an anti-Assad act on behalf of the colonel.
<b>Syria</b>	652	6/24/2012	0	0	A general, a major, 2 colonels, and 33 soldiers defected from Syria in an act against Assad. They fled to Turkey.
<b>Syria</b>	652	10/11/2012	0	0	A female military officer announced her defection from Assad on video. Colonel Zubaida al-miki - an Alawite Muslim, calls on other officers to join her in defection against Assad. She stated that he was fomenting a "sectarian conflict in order to destroy the revolution." While this event does not meet the minimum threshold for a mutiny, it is included because Al-Miki is a commissioned officer.
<b>Syria</b>	652	12/7/2012	0	0	15 military officers and their families crossed the Syrian border to the Turkish Reyhanli area in the Antakya-Hatay province. The motivation of this mutiny was not stated.
<b>Syria</b>	652	12/27/2012	0	0	Major General Abdul Aziz Jassem al-Shallal, the chief of the military police, appointed by Bashar al Assad to prevent defections, defected himself. He said that the Syrian military had "deviated from its mission to protect the country and

					had transformed in a gang for killing and destruction." He fled to Turkey. This event does not meet the threshold for mutiny, but because commissioned officer defected, it is included in dataset.
<b>Syria</b>	652	3/16/2013	0	0	A Syrian general (high ranking) who once led the military intelligence office defected from the army and presumably joined the rebels. This defection occurred immediately after the rebels' top military commander called for members of the armed services to join the uprising against Assad. Although this doesn't meet minimum threshold for size, it is included because this was a commissioned rank that defected.
<b>Syria</b>	652	8/6/2013	0	0	Soldiers turn in their weapons to state loyal leaders. This events occurred because regime forces wanted to instant a rocket launcher to shell the Eastern Ghouta District of Jaramana, which residents felt to be a breach of a previous agreement to keep this area out of the Syrian war.
<b>Jordan</b>	663	2/7/1974	0	0	Mutineers were led by Junior officers in a mutiny. The mutineers demanded a salary increase and also the dismissal of the Premier; the army chief of staff, and Lt. Gen Zaid Ben-shaker.
<b>Lebanon</b>	660	2/11/1990	1	0	A Christian officer, Col. Paul Faris, led a rebellion

					against General Aoun. He set up a "neutral Command" in Amsheet and encouraged soldiers to join him in resisting General Aoun because of the way he led the army. Faris argued that Aoun deserved to be executed. Aoun condemned Faris's actions and called him a renegade.
<b>Lebanon</b>	666	5/21/2012	1	0	Article doesn't give many specifics. Sheikh Ahmad Abd-al-Wahid was killed at a military check point. It was not clear exactly who killed him, but it clearly was not ordered by military leadership. More information can be found here: <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/23/syria-uprising-lebanon-assad">https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/23/syria-uprising-lebanon-assad</a>
<b>Israel</b>	666	10/1/1952	0	0	Article is brief but says that 15 mutineers were imprisoned for their recent protest against extending the draft period from 2 years to 30 months. The article indicates that the mutiny did not last very long.
<b>Israel</b>	666	3/31/1971	0	0	The article does not give many details but states that Abraham Isaac Polack, a 32 year old officer in the Israeli army, defected to S. Lebanon. He is one of four soldiers to do so within the month. While this event does not meet the minimum size threshold it is included because a commissioned officer was involved.
<b>Israel</b>	666	2/27/1998	0	0	60 soldiers mutinied because their commanding

					officer would not allow them to sleep and forced them to train in a state of sleep deprivation. They announced that they refused to eat, drink or change until the officer was replaced. Finally, the brigade commander was brought in and was able to end the strike.
<b>Israel</b>	666	11/30/1999	0	0	Israel soldiers mutinied because of what they felt was mismanagement by some of their officers. The officers had failed to anticipate and ambush because they literally fell asleep on the job. The situation was complicated by illicit drug trade conducted by Israeli officers.
<b>Israel</b>	666	9/25/2003	0	0	28 air force pilots were fired and set to be tried for their mutiny which resulted in them refusing to attack Palestinian towns. The pilots wrote a letter that outraged the military establishment and must of the public who had previously held the pilots with high esteem. The pilots were unsatisfied with the grand strategy of the military establishment.
<b>Israel</b>	666	4/17/2006	0	0	20 soldiers mutinied and forced commanding officers to chase them through the streets in public in the northern border town of Kiryat Shmona. The mutiny was staged in support and in solidarity with 6 soldiers



					after infantrymen had their privileges suspended.
<b>Israel</b>	666	8/5/2007	1	0	10 soldiers and 2 officers refused to take part in a raid that was intended to remove thousands of Jewish settlers from the Gaza strip. More than 40 soldiers considered not following orders after consulting with rabbis and family members, according to the article.
<b>Israel</b>	666	10/15/2009	0	0	A mutiny followed a protest by conscripts that disrupted a swearing in ceremony. These mutineers were pro-settler soldiers. There was another small mutiny in November but it was not large enough to meet formal coding rules.
<b>Israel</b>	666	12/15/2009	0	0	Article doesn't give specific date, but mutineers were protesting what they saw as incompetence on the part of their platoon commander. They had reported concerns that went unanswered. As such, they refused orders during training in the Jordan Valley.
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	670	5/30/2017	0	0	Article says that Saudi troops mutinied in Awamiyah after an accidental explosion killed many soldiers. The article suggests that the mutineers rebelled because they did not want to carry out field operations against civilians and follow the regime's orders to "crackdown" on protestors.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	1/27/1969	1	0	Republican security forces in the Yemeni capital shot and killed Maj. Abdel

					Raqeeb Abdel-Wahab. The major shot at the forces that had surrounded his house. The general was considered to be a hero among leftists and those that belonged to the Shafei sect of Sunni Islam.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	3/21/2011	0	0	Article doesn't give many details but a mutiny occurred within the divided army apparatus. The rebel soldiers defected while a large portion of the military remained loyal to president Saleh.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	6/29/2011	1	1	300 Yemeni soldiers defected to rebels. The state responded with heavy repression and fighting. One strike hit a bus carrying civilians, resulting in casualties.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	11/19/2011	0	0	400 Yemeni troops mutinied as they refused orders to fire on peaceful protestors. They were welcomed by troops that had mutinied in the previous March. The protestors celebrated the defections.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	1/22/2012	1	0	Soldiers rebelled against the authority of General Mohamed Saleh al-Ahmar, former president Saleh's half brother. The rebel soldiers staged a sit-in at a military base and encouraged other soldiers to join them and support their demands. The soldiers cited corruption in the form of military leadership stealing portions of their salaries to line their own pockets. The

					state responded by heavily repressing soldiers.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	2/21/2012	0	0	Article discusses a mutiny against a rebellious general. This does not count as a mutiny as these troops had already split from the state, but the article discusses two other mutinies that occurred in military camps. On in the southern Shabwah Governorate. Hundreds of soldiers mutinied demanding payment of overdue salaries.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	2/22/2012	1	0	Same as above but occurred in Aden. Shots were fired into the air to disperse soldiers.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	3/17/2012	0	0	"Thousands" of airmen mutinied in order to encourage the new president to dismiss the commander of the air force who held his post for more than 20 years. The commander had had familial ties to the ousted president. Airmen camped out for weeks near the president's home. Many low ranking airmen went on strike for more than two weeks to press their demands.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	5/10/2012	0	0	A new leader of the 3rd Republican Guard Brigade, Al-Halili, was unable to assume control of his new position. He was appointed to replace former president Salih's nephew, by new President Hadi. Maqwala, brigadier chief of staff and on of the former president's aides, deployed tanks in and outside of the brigade's

					headquarters. He instructed soldiers to reject the new appointment and resist the commander's orders.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	8/14/2012	1	0	93 soldiers and officers mutinied and assaulted a military defense complex in Sanaa. They deserted their posts, refused orders, fired on military leaders.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	1/13/2013	0	0	According to available information, Brigadier Al-Qushaybi was besieged in the Al-Amaliqah Brigade's headquarters, which he visited the day before yesterday to contain the incidents. Other protesters, who demanded that their former commander return to his post, prevented General Al-Qushaybi from leaving the headquarters to perform the Friday prayers. According to information leaked from the brigade's headquarters, this triggered severe tension as loyal and protesting officers drew their guns against one another, prompting Brigadier Al-Qushaybi to remain at the headquarters and perform the prayers there.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	3/13/2013	1	0	Mutineers demanded the ousting of commander Brigadier Mohammad al-Bukhaiti. They besieged his office and a clash broke out between guards of the commander and the soldiers who were wanting him to be dismissed because of accusations that he was making illegal deductions

					from their payroll. Weapons were used.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	4/8/2013	1	1	In Rada, soldiers mutinied form the RG 1st Mountain Infantry division. They blocked roads and forced locals to close businesses. Many believe that this event was carried out in collusion with or under the directive of al-Qaidah. The mutinous soldiers were very aggressive and conducted violent confrontations with civilians that resulted in civilian casualties.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	5/27/2013	1	0	Mutineers opened fire in the air to prevent security chief from entering the administrative building in the capital. They blocked Chief of capital secretariat security, brigadier Dr. Umar Abd-al-Karim Abdu from entering his office until demands are met. The goals of the mutineers were not directly stated.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	8/3/2013	1	0	About 500 soldiers mutinied against president Abd-Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. The soldiers were from the former presidential Guard used weapons to confront units of the presidential protection force. Mutineers demanded the dismissal of the defense minister Muhammad Nasir Ahmand, and Finance minister Sakhr al-Wajih stating that they had abused human rights. The mutiny was suppressed within hours. This does not appear to be a coup attempt

					and was not coded by Powell and Thyne.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	11/12/2014	0	0	Parts of the Special Security forces mutinied in response to the former president, Hadi, being fired from his post as secretary general. The new appointee, Maroni, had close ties to the Houthi movement. The appointment was thought be part of the government's plan to integrate Houthi militants into the country's military.
<b>Yemen</b>	679	7/8/2015	1	0	A portion of Yemeni troops tried to defect to Houthi rebel forces. They were met with air strikes. More information here: <a href="http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33443092">http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33443092</a>
<b>Yemen People's Republic</b>	680	6/16/1959	1	1	Soldiers rebelled and took control of the Kingdom's primary port, Hodeida. A soldier was killed by a judge, which did not stop his car when the soldier was trying to get him to stop. This resulted in troops killing the judge and his brother. They then paraded the body through the streets and destroyed the judge's house.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	10/16/1979	1	0	Afghan troops mutiny against Soviet-backed government. Mutiny puts pressure on soviets to repress heavily or pull out completely.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	8/4/1979	1	0	Mutiny occurs in Kabul. Government loyal forces were able to put it down. There were civilian deaths,

					but these deaths appear to be unrelated to the mutiny itself. Article doesn't indicate why mutiny occurred in the first place.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	5/4/1981	1	0	Troops of the 8th division in the Afghan army deployed in South Kabul mutinied against their Soviet commanders. The troops used their weapons against the Soviet troops. The Soviet troops responded by moving against the rebellious troops and dropping bombs.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	1/1/1983	1	0	Demoralized Afghan soldiers mutinied, killing 30 officers and blowing up an ammunition dump. Not immediately clear who led mutiny.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	7/23/1983	1	0	100 Karmal troops of the 8th division mutinied. About half of the mutineers defected to join insurgent groups.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	3/7/1984	0	0	Afghan soldiers deserted their posts after news came that tours were to be extended from three to four years. Many soldiers on guard near Kabul airport and the main army bases in SW Kabul fled their posts after hearing the news. The size of the mutiny is not reported.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	10/5/1985	1	0	Afghani troops mutiny after Soviet officers execute one of their comrades. Said comrade was executed because he reportedly bought hashish frequently from Muslim rebels. Violent mutiny with lots of

					destruction of military property.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	11/25/1988	0	0	184 Afghani soldiers defected to a leading guerilla group. The article indicates that the defection was likely a result of low morale because of a lack of supplies.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	5/20/1997	0	0	Assassination of Abdul Rahman Haqqani, a member of the Afghan Mujahedeen, sparked mutiny. General Abdul Malik led the mutiny because he felt that a general was protecting Haqqani's killers.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	10/20/2013	0	0	Afghanistan Special Forces Commander defects to insurgents. While this event does not meet the minimum threshold, it is considered a mutiny since a commander was involved. The commander took with him his teams guns and high tech equipment.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	2/16/2014	0	0	25 soldiers defected to the Taliban in Qaysar.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	10/20/2014	0	0	300 Arbakis joined the Taliban and vowed to support its interests
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	10/25/2014	0	0	Very similar event to 10/20/2014 defections, but smaller and in a different location. 25 soldiers defected in Kohestanat and joined the Taliban. They took with them over 15 Kalashnikovs.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	5/26/2015	0	0	71 active soldiers defected to the Taliban. They took with them tanks, vehicles, and weapons. They vowed to support the goals of the Taliban.



<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	9/17/2015	0	0	30 Afghan soldiers defected to the Taliban in Kohestanat district. They pledged to support the goals of the Taliban for the rest of their lives. They took their weapons and ammunition with them when they defected.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	11/16/2015	0	0	70 Afghan soldiers and 5 commanders defected to the Taliban in the district of Sangin. The deserters took their weapons with them when they defected. A local tribal elder indicated that the soldiers defected due to a lack of weapons, ammunition and rations. The Taliban had distributed leaflets stating that if the soldiers stayed and fought they would be killed but if they defected they would be spared.
<b>Afghanistan</b>	700	10/29/2016	0	0	41 Afghan National army soldiers surrendered their base to the Taliban in Chora district. This follows several other small events of base surrender in the same week.
<b>Tajikistan</b>	702	1/15/1996	0	0	Two army commanders partnered to lead mutiny. The mutiny was "short lived" and the mutineers were appeased by changes in the cabinet. Opposition fighters took advantage of the confusion and launched a new assault in the mountains of central Tajikistan.
<b>Tajikistan</b>	702	11/1/1998	1	0	Colonel Mahmud Khudoiberdyev led 1,200 troops in the North and seized several towns. For

					more information see: <a href="http://www.rferl.org/a/1089948.html">http://www.rferl.org/a/1089948.html</a>
<b>Tajikistan</b>	702	9/1/2015	1	0	Mutiny commanded by former deputy defense minister Abukhalim Nazarzoda. Attack on police station and weapons depot in Dushanbe. Participants were recently tried.
<b>China</b>	710	4/23/1949	1	0	Communist troops attacked Nanking and the state troops fled the area. This gave way to looting and the destruction of civilian property. The article suggests that the troops deserted the city because they believed that their commanders had lost control of the situation.
<b>China</b>	710	12/22/1952	1	0	The article is very brief but says that a battalion of Chinese communist (6th security regiment( mutinied on Dec. 22 on Taishan Island off the south China coast. The mutiny was led by a battalion commander. 200 (possibly more) of his troops turned machine guns on other loyal soldiers. It appears that the mutineers left their post and joined Chinese guerrillas.
<b>China</b>	710	3/21/1985	1	0	China military vessel experiences mutiny. Several soldiers die. Floats into South Korean waters when runs out of fuel. Is returned eventually to China.
<b>China</b>	710	6/4/1989	1	1	Troops fought among themselves at the Nanyuan military air base south of Beijing. The fighting was very violent and shelling

					could be heard from far away. The People's Liberation Army was deeply split over the massacre that occurred earlier in the week. Sections of the army wore white arm bands to signify support for the student protestors.
<b>China</b>	710	12/1/2000	0	0	Xu Junping, a senior colonel in the People's liberation army defected to the U.S.. He also held the position of director at the Defense ministry's Bureau of North American and Oceanic Affairs. This event does not meet the minimum size threshold for a mutiny but because it was a colonel (or a commissioned officer) it counts as a mutiny.
<b>Taiwan</b>	713	8/11/1981	0	0	Maj. Huang Che Cheng flew his plane into Chinese territory and defected. This event does not meet the minimum size threshold for a mutiny but because it was a major (or a commissioned officer) it counts as a mutiny.
<b>Taiwan</b>	713	4/23/1983	0	0	Maj. Li Dawei flew his plane into Chinese territory and defected to communist China. This event does not meet the minimum size threshold for a mutiny but because it was a major (or a commissioned officer) it counts as a mutiny.
<b>North Korea</b>	731	5/23/1996	0	0	A North Korean fighter pilot flew his plan into South Korean air space and dipped his wings to signal that he was not hostile. He landed the plane and was

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					monitored closely. He indicated that he could no longer live under the North Korean regime. The article indicates that this pilot was someone who the regime trusted and clearly a higher ranked military actor. Thus, while this event does not surpass the threshold of minimum size for a mutiny, it counts because a high ranked military actor was involved.
<b>South Korea</b>	732	8/23/1971	1	0	31 men mutinied against their commanders in 1971 in a secret mission that was never fully realized and carried out. Unit 684 was kept on an island because relations had improved with north Korea so the mission was postponed. Several died in bad conditions and the rest mutinied in order to escape the conditions.
<b>South Korea</b>	732	12/12/1979	1	0	5 generals led a mutiny of Dec. 12 1979 that killed three men and seriously injured many others. The leading general (General Chung) was charged with sedition. There were allegations that he was taking side payments for his actions. There article does not indicate why the original mutiny occurred.
<b>India</b>	750	2/18/1946	1	0	Indian troops revolt against British leadership. 8 causalities and 33 wounded. Revolt was against imperial rule and contributed to independence of India.
<b>India</b>	750	2/26/1946	1	0	Similar as above

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<b>India</b>	750	6/11/1984	1	0	Article only briefly mentions information on 1984 mutiny. Sikh soldiers mutiny as Indian military desecrates holy sites. More info found at <a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0612/061237.html">http://www.csmonitor.com/1984/0612/061237.html</a>
<b>India</b>	750	5/15/2016	0	0	A young soldier died after the infantry units leadership ordered a 10 km march. After the soldier's death, several other soldiers mutinied and began fighting senior officers. There aren't many details about the event.
<b>India</b>	750	1/3/2017	1	0	Soldiers took to social media complaining about poor food and facilities. While this alone does not constitute an obvious mutiny, one paramilitary soldier in India's elite security units shot for of his senior officers dead in an act of protest. Taken together, this month's events represent an observable violation of the chain of command.
<b>Pakistan</b>	770	6/1/2011	0	0	Brig Ali is charged and convicted of encouraging mutiny among 4 other officers. He himself is a Brigadier.
<b>Bangladesh</b>	771	2/25/2009	1	0	Large mutiny, up to 70 killed in Dhaka. Elements of the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles mutinied for 33 hours.
<b>Myanmar</b>	775	8/10/1948	1	0	There was a four day long mutiny that occurred in the town of Thayetmyo. It appears that the mutineers began attacking loyal

					troops. The article does not give many details about this event, but it appears to be a violent mutiny that lasted four days. Other articles indicate that this was a mutiny among the Burma Rifles battalions.
<b>Myanmar</b>	775	8/8/1988	1	1	Troops joined prodemocracy protests because regime was targeting peaceful protesters.
<b>Myanmar</b>	775	9/9/1988	0	0	200 air force pilots defected to the anti-government protestors side. This event was in close proximity to a coup. This is clearly mutiny activity because the pilots make no attempt to depose the executive.
<b>Myanmar</b>	775	10/3/2007	0	0	Officer defects to Thailand after being ordered to beat protesting monks. This event comes among many other reports of mutiny in East Myanmar. Soldiers all over country seem to be resisting orders to repress protesters.
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	780	8/13/1984	1	1	Troops mutiny after fighting Tamil rebels in northern Sri Lanka. Military leadership tried to blame destruction and chaos on rebels, but civilians report that it was the state's troops perpetrating the violence. Civilians were killed and businesses were burned
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	780	11/5/1999	1	0	Tamil rebels establish edge over state forces. After driving state forces out of several towns, state troops refuse to fight and kill two military policemen in

					resistance. There are a number of additional articles that detail desertions that occur between 1999-2005. However, these articles do not discuss specific events. It seems that there is a slow stream of desertions that occur during this period.
<b>Sri Lanka</b>	780	5/1/2009	0	0	3,000 soldiers and 7 officers were arrest for desertions that took place during the military campaign against the Tamil Tigers in the lead up to victory in 2009.
<b>Nepal</b>	790	6/11/2007	0	0	An officer from the APF defected with weapons and joined rebel forces. While the article calls the APF a police force, this groups is actually a paramilitary organization that carries out military objectives as well as law enforcement. Because this was an officer, while this event does not meet the minimum threshold for a mutiny, it is included.
<b>Nepal</b>	790	6/26/2008	0	0	Poor living conditions and discrimination lead 200 soldiers to mutiny.
<b>Nepal</b>	790	3/28/2011	0	0	The Indrabaksha Battalion mutinied after Army Major Arun Bahadur Singh forced soldier Ram Bahadur Chaudhary to continue exercise after complaining of chest pain. The soldier died as a result, and the troops were furious with major.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	8/10/1946	1	0	Rebel soldiers (members of the Burma Rifles battalions) mutinied and seized the

					Rangoon. They advanced southward in an attempt to overrun Rangoon and establish military rule, according to the article. However, this event is not coded by Powell and Thyne. There seems to be no direct action made at the executive. The rebel troops captured Thayetmo, petroleum center. The mutiny appeared to last around 20 days.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	8/11/1948	0	0	Rebel soldiers mutinied in Thayetmyo. The government forces indicated that they had the situation under control after four days. The article does not give a clear reason for the mutiny other than rebel soldiers may align with communist factions. The government assured civilians that everything would be okay and there would be no food shortages despite food and commodity price shocks.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	10/24/1978	1	0	Troops kill senior officers and take over airport control tower. This mutiny was in response to a purge of the military earlier in the year.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	7/1/1979	1	0	Article doesn't give many specific details about the event. It says "hundreds of soldiers of the puppet Heng Samrin army of Kampuchea stationed in a barrack near Kompong Cham recently staged an uprising against the control of the Vietnamese aggressor troops..." The mutineers



					killed many Vietnamese troops and crossed over to Pol Pot's army.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	10/4/1981	1	0	A two day mutiny occurred in Kompong Thom when Cambodian soldiers were forced by Vietnamese enemies to carry out orders in Kampuchea. The mutineers used tanks and cannons against the Vietnamese, causing deaths on both sides. The soldiers were upset due to the Vietnamese use of chemical weapons and genocidal acts in Kampuchea.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	12/16/1985	0	0	Cambodian troops mutinied against the allied Vietnamese occupation troops. The mutineers were upset over the forcible recruitment of local people to work at security posts near the border. The Cambodian mutineers (850 soldiers strong) seized two tanks and five trucks. This mutiny set back the Vietnamese strategy in Cambodia.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	1/10/1986	1	0	5 truckloads of Cambodian soldiers mutinied when they arrived in Thmar Puok. They killed 6 Vietnamese soldiers then fled back to their hometowns. There were several small mutinies this month. They were in protest to orders given by the Vietnamese to conduct operation in the jungle.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	8/17/1986	1	0	Cambodian soldiers mutinied in Chakrei Ting against a company of Vietnamese soldiers. They

					were upset because Vietnamese soldiers were forcibly recruiting Cambodians to fight. The mutiny was violent, 13 Vietnamese were killed, and 24 injured.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	5/23/1987	1	0	100 Cambodian soldiers deserted their post at a Vietnamese (ACO) military training center. They killed a number of Vietnamese soldiers and fled to their homes. They took their weapons with them, in order to defend their villages and families from the DK national army.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	7/22/1988	1	0	200 Cambodian soldiers deserted after being ordered to the Pailin battlefield by Vietnamese officers. They revolted and killed some of these officers. It appears that most mutineers returned home after the event.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	9/6/1989	0	0	This mutiny appears to be a classic example of desertion. 500 forcibly recruited soldiers deserted their posts upon being sent to the Pailin battlefield, which they felt meant certain death.
<b>Cambodia</b>	811	2/4/1990	1	1	Troops mutiny and rampage through Koh Kong. Soldiers reportedly destroyed houses and property. Troops were disgruntled about longer deployment than they were promised.
<b>Laos</b>	812	11/12/1960	0	0	The article does not give many details about the mutiny event but states that troops defected in Luang

					Prabang to right wing rebels.
<b>Laos</b>	812	3/25/1965	0	0	Article doesn't give many details about this event. 500-1,000 soldiers rebelled and seized the town of Thakhek. They were given a 48 hour ultimatum to surrender but ultimately fled north. Although this event occurs in close proximity to a coup, there is not attempt made to depose the executive.
<b>Laos</b>	812	4/19/1965	0	0	300 soldiers mutinied in support of an exiled rightist general, Phoumi Nosavan. The mutineers deserted their positions in the Mekong River town of Paksane. While this event occurs in close temporal proximity to a coup, the act of desertion clearly makes this event a mutiny. These 300 soldiers make no attempt to oust the executive.
<b>Laos</b>	812	10/21/1966	1	0	Powell and Thyne have this event coded as a coup. However, its clear that the mutineers are targeting military leadership at the beginning of the event. Since they target military headquarters, this is a mutiny event that picks up steam and also becomes coup activity.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	7/9/1980	1	0	40 Vietnamese soldiers at Phum Anlung Toek rebelled against their commanders. They killed these two commanders and fled home to Vietnam. These commanders were notorious for being cruel and

					threatened to kill any Vietnamese soldiers who refused to go on operations.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	7/10/1980	1	0	22 soldiers mutinied and lobbed grenades at company commanders then fled home. They were constantly ordered to go on operation. Additionally, Vietnamese soldiers from the North and South were in daily conflict with each other. The Khmer soldiers and the Vietnamese often fired at each other. This constant conflict made conditions very dangerous for soldiers.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	3/4/1981	1	0	The article doesn't give many details, but a fight broke out within a Vietnamese unit in the village of Thnol Tah. The fight ended with 15 casualties.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	3/30/1981	1	0	Mutineers killed three of their own officers and 19 of them fled. It appears that the soldiers were deserting their posts to go home.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	9/30/1981	0	0	10 Vietnamese soldiers flew across the border into China's Guangzi Zhuang region. They explained that they were unhappy with their conditions in Vietnam. They flew the helicopter into Chinese airspace and hung a white flag. They were led by Luit. Khieu Than Luc. While 10 individuals falls below the threshold of a mutiny, because they were led by a higher ranking official, this meets the formal definition of a mutiny.

<b>Vietnam</b>	816	8/4/1982	1	0	Vietnamese soldiers posted in Trapeang Svay mutinied against their commander and killed him. They fled back home to Vietnam. They deserted their posts due to low morale among soldiers fighting in Kampuchea.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	9/30/1984	1	0	Vietnamese soldiers mutinied in Prey Veng province. They began firing on commanders when the commanders threatened to kill them with pistols after refusing orders to fight in Kampuchea.
<b>Vietnam</b>	816	6/25/1992	1	0	13 Vietnamese soldiers from a platoon in Treng were angry with aggressive and abusive commanders. The mutineers lobbed grenades and the commanders and killed two of them. They then fled back to Vietnam.
<b>The Republic of Vietnam</b>	817	4/2/1966	0	0	Three thousand South Vietnamese troops marched through the streets of Hue in protest of the military government. These soldiers were encouraged to protest by their officers. The article discusses a number of other dissident activities, but this appears to be the only mutiny event with military actors involved.
<b>The Republic of Vietnam</b>	817	4/27/1969	0	0	The article indicates that the Vietcong were defecting in gradual waves all spring. However, it specifically mentions that 556 soldiers defected from Sedac. The article points out that most of these defectors are very

					young men that failed to adopt the ideology of the Vietcong.
<b>Philippines</b>	840	3/21/1968	1	0	Soldiers at a military camp mutinied and deserted their post due to harsh conditions. The camp was on Corregidor island. The mutineers killed the camp commander.
<b>Philippines</b>	840	4/18/1987	1	0	50 soldiers mutiny and try to free comrades that were in jail after the unsuccessful coup of the previous January. This is not a coup attempt, as the target was not the executive, although it comes at a time when the Philippines were particularly apt for coup activity.
<b>Philippines</b>	840	11/30/1989	1	1	A rebellion from within the Philippine Military came despite the government's claim that the attempted coup against president Corazon C. Aquino had been crushed. This is clearly a mutiny as rebel soldiers were fighting within the army headquarters at Camp Aguinaldo. Rebel soldiers were using cannons and various other weapons against state loyal forces. This was not a counter coup or an attempt at ousting the executive, although it happens within close temporal proximity to the Dec. 3 coup. One article points out that the main objective of the mutineers was to kill the country's military leadership (Ramon Montanto, the chief of the

					constabulary forces and Renato de Villa the army chief of staff).
<b>Philippines</b>	840	10/4/1990	0	0	Major Cerdena led about 200 soldiers and took control of a military camp in Butuan. This event was followed by a clear coup attempt, however, this act of taking over a military camp does not explicitly target the executive. Thus, this event is a mutiny.
<b>Philippines</b>	840	7/27/2003	0	0	300 soldiers mutiny against Mrs. Arroyo, who enjoyed large amounts of support from Bush Administration. The mutiny was clearly organized by officers, not just haphazardly thrown together by idealistic foot soldiers. The Philippines has one of the most corrupt military organizations. The Bush Administration had actually supported 70 of the officers that turned out to be rebellious, prior to their sedition. Referred to as the "Oakwood mutiny"
<b>Philippines</b>	840	11/29/2007	1	0	30 officers and soldiers on trial for coup plotting in 2003 and 2006 walked out of the courtroom during their trial and commandeered the nearby Peninsula Manila Hotel. They demanded the ouster of President Arroyo and were calling for a dissident movement against the government.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	4/13/1950	1	0	Capt. Andi Abdul Aziz, 26 year old, led a mutiny against the central government. The forces

					under Captain Aziz were Indonesian soldiers that had recently transferred to the Indonesian Army from the Royal Netherlands Indonesian army after independence in December of 1950. The revolt was largely in response to the disbanding of the Royal Netherlands Indonesian Army and its subsequent absorption into the Indonesian army.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	12/22/1956	0	0	Colonel Simbolon and 5,000 rebel soldiers declared that they had seceded from Indonesia's central government because the president had failed to clean up corruption as the army had been putting pressure on him to do so. The mutiny appeared to be non-violent.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	3/9/1957	0	0	Colonel Barlian, commander of the Second Territorial District, announced that Jakarta had failed to lead the country toward attainment of its ideals and for this reason stated that he was going to take over administrative processes.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	3/15/1958	1	0	Rebel soldiers turned on the government and seized the military center of Medan, a strategic location. The mutiny only lasted 1 day, before U.S. trained military officials took back control of Medan. The original cause of the mutiny is unclear.



<b>Indonesia</b>	850	11/3/1996	0	0	Timorese soldiers in the Indonesian army serving in East Timor mutiny after the death of a sergeant. Sergeant was killed by Indonesian soldiers, not east Timor rebels, as the Indonesian army claimed. 300 soldiers refused to return to barracks and insisted on answers surrounding their leader's death.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	9/7/1999	0	0	Troops mutiny in East Timor, threatening Indonesian democracy. Article does not give much information about the motivation of the mutineers, other than resisting Indonesia's power over the military apparatus.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	5/20/2001	0	0	Military signals its defiance by protesting in very clear opposition to the presidents tactics to stave off impeachment proceedings. They parade through the streets in opposition.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	6/2/2001	0	0	Police and military troops mutiny because Wahid dismissed the chief, gen. Suroyo Bimantoro. Mutineers accused the president of trying to politicize the police and military in order to secure his own tenure.
<b>Indonesia</b>	850	4/29/2009	1	0	Indonesian soldiers mutinied against a commander in Indonesia's Papua Province. 100 soldiers participated in the mutiny. The mutiny was specifically targeted at the battalion commander. Shots

					0	were fired in the air, but no one was injured. The soldiers were upset because of the commander's decision over returning a body of a dead soldier as a function of the cost of this action.
<b>East Timor</b>	860	2/8/2006	0	0	0	Troops mutiny because of poor living conditions and selective promotions. Troops are largely made up of what used to be rebel fighters (fighting for independence from Indonesia).
<b>East Timor</b>	860	4/28/2006	1	0	0	Half of the East Timor military mutinied. This mutiny was largely led by officers that felt they had been passed over for promotion. A number of soldiers were killed during the unrest. Situation eventually brought under control by Australian troops.
<b>Australia</b>	900	12/6/2012	0	0	0	Pilots refuse to fly new Tiger attack helicopters because of safety concerns surrounding fumes in the cockpit. Pilots were upset that there was not a decision to suspend flying until technical issues were resolved.
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	910	1/3/1961	0	0	0	80 soldiers protested over pay. They clashed with local, civilian police forces. 60 soldiers were arrested.
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	910	3/17/1997	0	0	0	PNG government hired mercenaries to control and respond to a 9 year rebellion on the island of Bougainville. This infuriated the army that mutinied and rioted for 9

					days. They were joined by civilian protesters that blockaded the parliament building and refused to let lawmakers leave. This spurred the PM to step down voluntarily.
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	910	5/5/1997	0	0	Soldiers took up arms in support of brig-gen Jeery singirok who led the 3/17/1997 mutiny. Soldiers loyal to Gen. Singirok armed themselves in expectation of a policy attempt to aren't the former commander. Mutiny appears to be peaceful.
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	910	3/14/2001	0	0	Troops mutiny because the government planned to cut the military in half (to 1,900 men). 100 soldiers seized weapons at Murray Barracks in Port Moresby. The government quickly scrapped these plans. The mutiny was peaceful even though weapons were seized.
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	910	3/9/2002	0	0	PNG defense force troops mutiny for 10 days in response to a retrenchment scheme (reduction of forces). The renegade soldiers took control of Moem Barracks in Wewak. Mutiny seems peaceful.
<b>Papua New Guinea</b>	910	1/26/2012	1	0	This mutiny event happens in very close temporal proximity to a coup attempt. However, there is a mutiny event because soldiers were targeting military leadership and seeking to depose military leaders, not the executive. The mutineers placed Brigadier Agwi

					under house arrest. The mutineers were led by Colonel Yaura Sasa.
<b>New Zealand</b>	920	9/16/1945	0	0	150 airmen of the New Zealand air force mutinied at a hangar in Whenuapai. They were upset because they were demanding an earlier release to civilian life and were protesting mustering out delays.
<b>New Zealand</b>	920	10/10/1945	0	0	This event is similar to the 9/1945 New Zealand Mutiny. Airmen of the New Zealand air force mutinied at the Rapa Island Station. The men quit their duties for two hours in protest of demobilization delays and the conditions in which they were serving. The men eventually resumed their duties when they were told that their chief demand (a 5 day work week) would be granted.
<b>Vanuatu</b>	935	9/27/1996	0	0	Vanuatu paramilitary officers mutiny over low and delayed pay. A spokesman of the paramilitary said over radio broadcast that the paramilitaries were "in command" but that it was not a military takeover.
<b>Fiji</b>	950	11/2/2000	1	0	This event is confusing, because there are many stories only written at the point of the trial of the soldiers. This specific story indicates that 63 soldiers were tried for a mutiny that occurred in November of 2000. There was a coup in May of 2000. This mutiny is largely in response to the

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					coup. A high ranking military official appears to have encouraged this event.
<b>Fiji</b>	950	5/17/2011	0	0	A high level military official, Lieutenant- Colonel Ratu Tevita Mara, defected to Tonga after being falsely accused of trying to depose the president. The defector said that the military regime has been responsible for heavy amounts of repression and military style torture of civilians at the Queen Elizabeth barracks in Suva. Although this is only one actor, it counts as a mutiny because this is a high ranking official.

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Spring 2018

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M.A. Political Science, University of Kentucky, 2016

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**PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS**

Johnson, Jaclyn M. & Clayton L. Thyne. 2016. "Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty: How Domestic Protests Influence Coups d'état, 1952-2005." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, forthcoming.

Johnson, Jaclyn M. & Clayton L. Thyne. "The Aftermath of Civil Conflicts." *Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory*, forthcoming.

"Military Mutinies and Defections (MMDD) 1945-2017: A New Dataset" Revise and Resubmit at *The Journal of Peace Research*

**AWARDS**

Malcolm E. Jewel Award, University of Kentucky Political Science Dept., 2018

Description: Awarded to the Outstanding Political Science Graduate Student.

Women in Political Science Graduate Student Award, University of Kentucky Political Science Dept., 2018

Best Graduate Student Paper Award, University of Kentucky Political Science Dept., 2018

International Studies Association South, Jim Winkates Graduate Student Paper Award 2017

Description: Second runner up recipient. The Criteria for judging the papers include mastery of the field, originality, logic, organization, good writing, and proper documentation.

Kentucky Political Science Association Graduate Student Paper Award 2018

Description: Award recognizes the outstanding graduate student paper presented at last year's conference.

David Hughes Paper Award, Kentucky Political Science Association 2017

With Clayton Thyne

Description: Award recognizes the most outstanding paper presented at the previous year's conference by a faculty member or graduate student from a Kentucky college or university.

Coleman Political Science Award, University of Kentucky 2017

(\$2,000)

Description: Award granted to graduate students selected by the graduate committee to conduct summer research.

Emerging Global Scholars Award, University of Kentucky 2016

Description: Awarded to the graduate student who shows the most long-term promise for having an impact on the fields of either IR or CP. The winner is determined by a vote of the CP and IR faculty in the Political Science Department of the University of Kentucky.

3 Minute Thesis Finalist – University of Kentucky Graduate School Competition. 2016.  
“Squeaky Wheels and Troop Loyalty.”

Description: 3 minute presentation of dissertation or thesis project to lay audience. Judged by a panel of non-academics.

## **RESEARCH POSITIONS**

Quantitative Initiative for Policy and Social Research, Research Assistant, *Fall 2017*

## **PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE**

Research Assistant at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in Nuclear Non-proliferation and Safeguards group. 2010-2012.