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Chinese National Identity and Media Framing

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Chinese National Identity and Media Framing

by

Yufeng Tian

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Zimmerman School of Advertising and Mass Communications
College of Arts & Sciences
University of South Florida

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DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Dr. Scott Liu, who inspired and encouraged my ponderation on questions of “who we are”, “where do we come from and where to go”.

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I have to admit that this thesis did not arise from a single original idea, but from the way ideas have been put together. I extend my thanks to my major Professor, Dr. Scott Liu. Without his excellent suggestion for the combination of the two paradigms, the literature of group identity and the discourses of media cognitive effect, the thesis could not be conceived. Also, the current study came to fruition under the expert guidance provided by Dr. Liu, both theoretically and methodologically, almost all of which were followed. These instructions included the study design and the improvement of statistical models, which kept me focused on both the needed details and the whole picture simultaneously. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Roxanne Watson for her outstanding detailed reviews, as well as many relevant ideas for theoretical rationale. Special thanks to Dr. Art Ramirez for his valuable feedbacks and efficient supports during the process of data collection. And finally, I am grateful to my data collectors and all of the volunteers for their participation in my survey. Without them, none of this would have been possible.

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ABSTRACT

This study explored the relationship between Chinese national identity and media framing and priming effect by combining the two paradigms, the literature of group identity and the discourses of media cognitive effect. Extending social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981), self-categorization theory (Turner, et al., 1987) and subjective group dynamics theory (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998), the current study drew the distinction between descriptive (cognitive/perceptual) and prescriptive (affective/subjective) fit of the social norms that contributed to social identity. After deliberating the macro concept (the ascribed vs. acquired) of a national identity (Westle, 2014), as well as the social, political, economic and cultural conditions in China, the structure of Chinese national identity (CNI) were delineated by three content-based categories: the meta-structure of the ethnic-cultural (MEC), the flexible ethnic-cultural (FEC), and the civic-institutional (CI) component, with each of which possessed the dichotomy of psychological dimension. The 3×2 matrix of Chinese national identity was hypothesized to have an impact, with structural variation, on evaluative judgments of alternative media frames of stories involving international disputes in China. To maximize internal and external validity, the empirical data had been collected through an online survey experiment with a sample size of 738. The theoretically argued relationship between the CNI, media framing, and the evaluative judgment was in accordance with the results derived from a series structural equation modeling analyses.

INTRODUCTION

The current study assumes that the attitude toward a specific social issue involved in international disputes is a kind of reflection of national identity, during which process media framing and priming effect play significant roles by activating certain components in the chronological knowledge pool of specific group members' national identity. In particular, the study tackles the following two batches of research questions: First, what is the specific structure of China's national identity in terms of its qualitative content and the psychological process? This batch of questions is focused on the three subjects: the theoretically reasoned structure of the Chinese national identity (CNI) and its empirical evidence (Q₁), possible ambiguities or confusions of the qualitative contents in the CNI (Q₂), the discordances or conflicts of the psychological standards in the CNI (Q₃). Second, how are the diverse elements of national identity stimulated via the media applicability & accessibility functions and ultimately manifested as the evaluative judgment toward the salient social issue? This batch of research focuses include the difference of the evaluative judgements derived from alternative media exposures (Q₄), the function of the descriptive normative fit of the social norms or the national self-categorization (Hogg, 1992; Turner et al, 1987) in the situation of intergroup comparison (Q₅), and the influence of the prescriptive normative fit of the social norms (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001) or national identification (Bland, Schmidt, & Westle, 2001) focused on the dynamic groups (Q₆).

The study report mainly includes three parts. The first part is the theoretical section including Chapter I and Chapter II, while, Chapter III is the empirical section. Additionally, statistical results, discussions, and research conclusions are presented in Chapter IV and V.

In Chapter I, the author defines and explores the psychological dimensions—the descriptive and the prescriptive (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001)—and the qualitative contents—the Ethnic-Cultural (EC) and the Civic-Institutional (CI) (Smith, 1991; Westle, 2014)—of China’s national identity based on the corresponding literature in social psychological and sociological discourses. The theoretical frameworks employed in the research include the Social Identity Theory (SIT), Self-Categorization Theory (SCT), the Subject Group Dynamic Theory (SGDT), and the Macro-Concept or the Eastern-Ethnic and the Western-Civic Model of national identity. In addition, a historical review involved in the Chinese national identity’s evolvement and transformation is also presented as the specific research focus of the current study.

Chapter II is mainly focused on the explanatory models of media framing and priming effects, so as to theoretically illustrate the mechanisms and process of media influences, as well as the relationship between national identity and media influence. As a result, based on the work of Price and Tewksbury (1997) — the model of Process of Construct Activation and Use (PCAU), a specific model that combines the PCAU and the dualistic psychological dimension of the national identity is formed.

In the empirical section, Chapter III, based on Westle’s (2014) work, the author talks about the problems, trends, and methodologies in the survey-based studies involved in national identity in the past three decades. In turn, the research design, data collection, and the demographic information of the participants are presented.

Research conclusions. The empirical evidence supported the theoretical arguments by forming the two confirmatory-factor-analysis-models (CFA-1 and CFA-2). The fit measures and statistical estimates indicated that the structure of CNI included the qualitative contents of the meta-structure of EC, the flexible EC, and the introduced CI elements, which were associated with the descriptive and the prescriptive psychological dimensions. Additionally, for the prescriptive dimension, these three qualitative contents could also be integrated as a general prescriptive standard of the normative fit (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001) in the Chinese national identification (Bland, Schmidt, & Westle, 2014). These conclusions were aimed at answering the first batch of research questions.

Subsequently, according to the PCAU model, three structure equation models, SEM-1, SEM-2, and SEM-3, linking the CNI and evaluative judgment were built and were statistically supported by the current data with psychological variations of specific qualitative content. Based on SEM-3 (figure-13), the current study suggested that the general prescriptive standard of the social norms in the process of national identification was the active accessibility in media information processing for salient social issues in both domestic and international levels, while, the descriptive meta-structure in the ethnic-cultural component, which contributed to the intergroup difference, was an additional accessibility being activated for media audiences to process the framed media information. The final conclusion was illustrated in figure-14.

CHAPTER I: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

I-1. The Psychological Dimension of Group Identity

Among the well-established theoretical discourses, the Social Identity Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT) propose that people tend to achieve cognitive clarity by enhancing intergroup differences and intragroup similarities in the social life. (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Because of the tendency, a process of self-stereotyping occurs. That is, a cognitive self-representation portrayed by the attributes shared within the ingroup members is established upon a depersonalized self-perception. These shared attributes, in specific contexts, simultaneously contribute to the highest similarity among the ingroup and the maximum differentiation from the outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al, 1987). A social (or collective) identity is the outcome of the self-stereotyping process defined as “the part of the individual’s self-consciousness which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, pp. 255). Individuals thus assimilate themselves to an ingroup prototype by cognitively maximizing the intergroup differences (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner et al, 1987). It is the attraction to the ingroup prototype, rather than the actual interdependence among group members, that mediate individuals' anticipations, attitudes, judgments, and behaviors about ingroup beliefs (Abrams, et al., 1990; Hogg & Hains, 1996). According to SCT, the fundamental motivation underlying social categorization is achieving “cognitive clarity” in

collective stimulus settings (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994), for which individuals expect normative fit between the members' and the corresponding groups' prototypical features (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). In other words, the SIT and SCT doctrines are focused mainly on the comparison and perceptual accentuation between the ingroup and outgroup, through which process group members could achieve cognitive clarity of specific self-categorization.

The normative fit refers to the degree that the perceived attributes or behaviors of an individual conform to the perceiver's knowledge-based expectations of certain collectiveness (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994), where norm (group thinking) refers to the customary standard of behavior or unwritten rules shared by members of a specific cultural group (Schacter, 2012). However, the intergroup distinction-oriented studies in the SIT or SCT traditions neglected, to some extent, the ingroup differentiations mainly caused by the various affective assessments toward the ingroup norms (Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). While, another tradition on group function and process in social psychology, the Small Group paradigm (SGT), has centered its studies mainly on the dynamic groups (Wilder & Simon, 1998; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). In contrast to SIT and SCT which cast light mainly on the comparison and discrimination between the ingroup and outgroups, studies in SGT root their doctrine in ingroup mechanisms such as the affective involvement, goal involvement, and ego-involvement (Druckman, 1994). In the 2000s, an emerging model of the Subjective Group Dynamics Theory (SGDT) (Abrams et al., 2000; Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998) integrated the two aforementioned doctrines. The theoretical statements and predictions of SGDT were not only rooted in the cognitive clarity toward the shared ingroup collectiveness (or prototype) from the intergroup comparisons but also established upon the ingroup deviations via the subjective ingroup prescriptive normative fit. Further, the interpretation of intergroup discrimination, according to SGDT, is derived more

from the will to retain a warm ego-involved (or self-esteem) feeling than the tendency to maintain a cold cognitive differentiation (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998).

According to SGDT (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998), the notion of the norm in SIT can be considered as a “descriptive norm,” a cognitive and logic-based concomitant that contributes to the distinctive ingroup position on a social comparison dimension. However, another structural component, named the “prescriptive norm”, is added to this framework. In contrast to the descriptive norm, the prescriptive norm refers to a collective expression of the affective, value-laden, and ego-involvement attitudes. In other words, the notion of normative fit embraces not merely a “descriptive” definition (the cognitive component) aimed at the uniqueness of the group prototype at the intergroup level, but also a customary “prescriptive” demand (the affective component), associated with affiliative and self-enhancement motives, for achieving the role self-esteem (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998; Druckman, 1994). Moreover, the SGDT emphasizes that the prescriptive norms are considered as the latitudes of the acceptable ingroup attributes and the reference standard of evaluative reaction to deviation from the group (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). All in all, the term of self-consciousness in social psychological paradigm is not considered as the invariant structures but the relative, inherently changeable, and context dependent constructs (Turner, et al., 1994) at both the intragroup and intergroup level.

Similarly, certain notions of group identity in the SGDT have been expressed in another way by Blank, Schmidt, and Westle (2001). That is, the term of national identity will be used to cover not only “the normative or cognitive based” qualitative content but the intensity of feelings toward one’s nation regardless of the qualitative content of these feelings. This kind of intensity of feelings toward one’s nation is termed as national identification (Blank, Schmidt, & Westle,

2001). That is to say, in their terminology, the term “normative” is in accordance with its connotation in the SIT, and refers only to the DESCRIPTIVE FIT in the SGDT; while the term of NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION which is analogous to the PRESCRIPTIVE FIT in the SGDT. In this paper, the author uses the term “prescriptive dimension” to represent the subjective feelings toward one’s nation, while the “descriptive dimension,” is the more cognitive national similarity and international discrimination. The following table (table 1) illustrates the diverse terminologies used by scholars. It is useful to clarify the various terms used in the area of national identity, in particular, for the current paper, although it is not an accurate presentation.

Table-1. The various terms used in the area of national identity

	Cognition/classification	Affection/feeling/evaluation
SIT	Normative fit	
SGDT	Descriptive normative fit	Prescriptive normative fit
Blank, Schmidt, & Westle (2001)	National identity	National identification

Therefore, it is reasonable that the term of group identity implies at least two levels of meanings in psychological dimension. One is the descriptive dimension, the knowledge of one’s membership in certain social groups (cognitive clarity of ingroup similarity and outgroup discrimination), while the alternative is the prescriptive dimension, the value and affective significance (ego-involvement) attached to that membership. Furthermore, the latter will contribute to the dynamic groups (Wilder & Simon, 1998; Marques, Abrams, & Serôdio, 2001). As to the national identity, an increasing consensus is that the former dimension should be distinguished from the latter dimension in terms of the meanings of nationality (e.g. Blank, Schmidt, & Westle, 2001; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; retrieved from Westle, 2014).

So far, the aforementioned theories provide a fundamental framework in psychological dimension for researchers to conduct their studies involved in national identity. National identity, as a kind of social identity, entails the common attributes, principles, and functions of diverse role identities as presented by SIT, SCT, SGT, and SGGT. Nevertheless, compared with other social identities, national identity has its unique characteristics in the conceptual dimension (the qualitative content). Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the corresponding concepts, components, or aspects of the national identity both in the psychological and sociological paradigms.

I-2. The Qualitative Content of National Identity

National identity is one of the collective identities. These collective identities include gender identity, religious identity, social class identity, ethnic identity, cultural identity, and national identity, etc. (Smith, 1991, pp. 3). In the current study, in order to explore the attributes and components of a specific national identity like China's, it could make sense to begin with the general concept of national identity, as well as its components, and then apply them as references to China's specificity.

National identity is a multi-dimensional concept (Schlesinger, 1987; Smith, 1991, pp. 14; Sasaki, 2004) which encompasses the structural elements including ethnicity, culture, territorial space, institutions of economic, legal, and political systems (Sasaki, 2004), and moreover, the specific language, sentiments and symbolisms (Smith, 1991, pp. vii). Due to the chameleon-like nature of national identity, it is hence necessary to introduce the current widely spread definition—the dichotomy of the macro-concepts: the ethnic, ascribed, traditional dimension versus the civic, achievable, post-national dimension of national identity (Westle, 2014). Such

macro-concept of national identity have been generally accepted, although with less firm consensus (Corkalo & Kamenov, 2003). In short, the Civic-Institutional (CI) concept is portrayed by attributes that are achievable, subjectivist, acquired, and voluntaristic (Westle, 2014), and assumes the definition of a nation as “within a state territory on the basis of citizenship” (Corkalo & Kamenov, 2003). However, the Ethnic-Cultural (EC) concept is featured by properties that are ascribed, objectivist, nativist, primordial, or mixed, and regards a nation as being established on the members of an ethnic-cultural integration (Corkalo & Kamenov, 2003). Furthermore, a common consensus of the concept of national identity by nature is it is a process rather than an essence (Schlesinger, 1987; Edensor, 2002, pp.24), and thus should be considered “through an internal-external dialectic involving a simultaneous synthesis of internal self-definition and one’s ascription by others” (Edensor, 2002, pp.24). Such arguments not only echo the macro-concept of national identity but implies each component in the concept could wax and wane in its range of permutations and combinations temporarily and spatially.

A trenchant connotation of the macro-concept of national identity, according to Smith (2001), is defined as “the maintenance and continuous reproduction of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identifications of individuals with that particular heritage and those values, symbols, memories, myths and traditions” (Smith, 2001, p. 30). The denotation, or the elements in the macro-concept of national identity includes “a predominantly spatial or territorial conception”, “the idea of a patria”, and “a sense of legal equality among the members of that community” in the “western civic model”, and the descent (or a presumed descent) as well as “the presumed family ties”, “popular mobilization”, and a set of vernacular culture-based law in the “eastern ethnic model” (Smith, 1991, pp.13). In turn, a nation is defined as “a named human population sharing a

historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (Smith, 1991, pp.14). Actually, some scholars believe that rare cases bare pure civic- or ethnic-model, and there have been a large amount of intersecting situations in which national identity was processed and functioned (Kuzio 2002; retrieved from Westle, 2014). Alike, some scholars have considered the dichotomy of the conceptual construct as a continuum (Westle 1999). Hence, the Western Civic- and Eastern Ethnic-model from which the definition of national identity is derived serve as the dualistic structural elements combined with other kinds of collective identities (i.e. ethnic and religious identity) and ideologies shared by most nations in varying degrees and different forms (Smith, 1991, pp.14). According to Smith (1991), the territorial, economic, and political elements of external functions and “the socialization of the members as nationals and citizens” of internal functions, are accompanied by a social bond achieved through maintaining certain shared values, symbols, common heritage, and culture kinship and sentiments among individuals (Smith, 1991, pp.19). In other words, “a sense of national identity provides a powerful means of defining and locating individual selves in the world, through the prism of the collective personality and its distinctive culture” (Smith, 1991, pp.19).

Sociologists have cast light on another remarkable concept—nationalism—as well as its relationship to national identity. Nationalism is defined as “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity, and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation” (Smith, 1991, pp.73). Therefore, other than the self-conscious awakening of nations, nationalism, based on some pre-existing elements such as ethnicities and sentiments, serves as the trigger and the “most compelling identity myth” that “invents” nations (Gellner, 1964, pp.168; Smith, 1991, pp.73). Also, by

emphasizing national symbols, customs, and ceremonies, etc., nationalism acts as the original and directive force to nation formation and national identity generation (Smith, 1991, pp.73). Other empirical evidence presented the similar signification of nationalism. For instance, according to Feshbach (1990), Kosterman and Feshbach (1989), nationalism, as a factor, emerged from a factor analysis of responses to items about attitudes toward one's own and other countries, in which nationalism involves feelings of national superiority and appeals for national dominance. In other words, nationalism places nations at the center of individuals' common sentiments, allowing national members to construct their perceptual selves via the description of the world and the prescriptions within the specific nation.

Therefore, the term nationalism signifies “a process of forming and maintaining nations”, “a consciousness of belonging to the nation”, “an aspirations for the nation’s security and prosperity”, “a language and symbolism of the nation”, “an ideology, including a culture doctrine of nations and the national will”, “prescriptions for the actualization of national aspirations and national will”, and “a social and political movement to achieve the goals of the nation and actualize its national will” (Smith,1991, pp.72). All these respects, on the one hand, form the perceptual consensus of certain nations in which they differ from members of other nations; on the other hand, these respects imply a prescriptive standard of the affectivity that sentimentally attached to one’s homeland (Terhune, 1964), and ego-involved attitudes through one’s national identification (Terhune, 1964).

Based on such statements, studies around national identity in the last two decades varied in terms of the target groups of studies, theoretical scope and paradigms, and structures of the key concepts. For example, the longstanding European tradition of national identity studies focuses more on the relationship between diverse nations and Europe as a whole. These studies

included the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1995 and 2003, European Values Study (EVS) 2008, the Integrated and United Survey (InTune) 2007 and 2009, and the Eurobarometer (EB) in 2010 (Westle, 2014). Since the current study is aimed at investigating China's national identity, it is necessary first to clarify the definition of national identity from the various conceptual models, which is more suitable to interpreting China's national identity, and tracing it back along the route of the formation, development, and the presentations of status quo of China's national identity via both the social psychological, sociological, and historical approaches.

I.3 The Formation, Development, and Status Quo of China's National Identity

Based on the fundamental statements of Smith (1991), Gellner (1964), as well as Shulman (2002) and Westle (2014), the current study follows, but is not limited to, the dualistic structure—the ethnic-cultural versus the civic-institutional—of national identity. Also, the author deals with the concept of national identity as a continuously constructed-reconstructed process adjusted by different situations (Schlesinger, 1987, pp.254). The author assumes that the formation, development, and function of China's national identity are processes rooted in the ethnic-cultural identity based on which the civic-institutional elements are added and accommodated. This is not only because of the distinguishing signification of the concept of “ethnie” (ethnic community, 民族) and “nation” (民族国家) in Chinese terminology, but also because of the significant social-psychological changes among the ethnic Chinese after the mid-nineteenth century during which period the Chinese national identity as well as an independent nation — the People's Republic of China (PRC) — emerged from a “semi-colonized empire”. Thus, the author will discuss the Chinese self-consciousness in two steps: the formation and

features of the ethnic-cultural identity of the Han Chinese (汉族) before the mid-nineteenth century; and the process of modern Chinese searching for a national identity after the mid-nineteenth century. Such steps could be appropriate to the basic assumption in terms of China's national identity mentioned above.

First and foremost, the precondition to interpreting China's national identity must be established on the sedimentary-rock-like Chinese civilization. Such civilization should be seen as a vertical and accumulative continuum which is different from the Western civilization—the horizontal and parallel one (Fairbank, 1987, pp.2). Fairbank's (1987) metaphorical portrait of Chinese civilization manifested the mixed and accumulative feature which will contribute to the interpretation of the concepts such as “ethnie” and “nation” in the Chinese context:

“All the historic sites of four thousand years of Chinese history lie close together. For us it would be as though Moses had received the tablets on Mt. Washington, the Parthenon stood on Bunker Hill, Hannibal had crossed the Alleghenies, Caesar had conquered Ohio, Charlemagne's crowning in the year 800 was in Chicago, and the Vatican overlooked Central park. (Fairbank, 1987, pp.2)”.

An ethnically- or a culture- based national identity emphasizes the first a community of birth and native culture (Smith, 1991, pp.71). A presumed common ancestry manifested mainly from a sense of family ties is the fundamental legitimacy contributing to the homogeneity among the ingroup members and the heterogeneity from the outgroup ones. This statement can be well applied to China. However, the presumed common ancestry or the “fictive superfamily” should more be considered as a cultural process, rather than an ethnic or blood-based racial essence. In China, the idiom of “the descendants of Huang-ti (the Yellow emperor, 黄帝) and Yen-ti (The Flaming Emperor, 炎帝) (炎黄子孙)”, for instance, illustrates such argument. According to Ssu-

ma Ch'ien (司马迁) (145 B.C.-86 B.C.) and his remarkable work-The Grand Scribe's Records (史记), the grand five Emperors (五帝)¹ who were the direct descendants of the clan of Shao-tien (少典)², were the common ancestors of the Chinese population (Ssu-ma Ch'ien, 145 B.C.-86 B.C.). In other words, Ssu-ma Ch'ien treated all the clans, tribes, and states as the branches of the Huang-Yen union (炎黄部落同盟), regardless of whether they were majorities or minorities. Such ethnic-cultural myth³ of the origin of an ethnic community reflected the perceived uniqueness shared by the group members and the expectation of the ingroup superiority over outgroups. Such a historical standpoint hence manifested the core value of the traditional thoughts of China—the unification of ethnicities (民族大一统), that is, the groups that built their states on the land of China (the perceived homeland) shared a common blood root and, in turn, were united into one superfamily (Wang & Yu, 2005. pp.287). The term of “国家” (a nation or a state) in Chinese terminology implies that a nation is the extension of families. Since the 2nd century, ethnic Chinese have begun to call themselves the “Han” people referencing the name of the corresponding dynasty-Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) (Edwards, 2004). Thus, the “Han race” (汉

¹ “The five emperors and their corresponding elements were The Huang-ti (黄帝, earth), Chuan-hsü (顓頊, wood), K'u (帝喾, metal). Yao (尧, fire) and Shun (舜, water). There are several sequences of these five rulers.” See Ssu-ma Ch'ien, (145 B.C.-86 B.C.). Nienhauser, et al., (Translators) (1994). *The Grand Scribe's Records*. The Five Emperors,' Basic Annals 1. Footnote 1. pp.1.

² “Hsü Hsü-sheng (徐旭生) (1882-1976) [argued] that Shao-tien was a clan and that the Shen-nung (Yan-ti, 神农) and the Huang-ti were branches of it (see *The Myth Era of the Ancient History of China*, 中国古史的传说时代, (Peking: Wen-wu ch'u-pan she 文物出版社. 1985. pp. 40)”. Also See Ssu-ma Ch'ien, (145 B.C.-86 B.C.). Nienhauser, et al., (Translators.) (1994). *The Grand Scribe's Records*. The Five Emperors,' Basic Annals 1. Footnote 3. pp.1.

³ “Our translation adheres to Ssu-ma Ch'ien's concept of these figures as historical, rather than mythical. In the historical interpretation, Huang-ti can refer both to a clan and to the head of that clan at any particular time... Huang-ti was originally the head of the Yu-Hsiung (有熊) Clan who lived in the region near Hsin Cheng (新郑) in modern Honan (河南). After he united a number of clans in the region he became The Huang-ti.” See Ssu-ma Ch'ien, (145 B.C.-86 B.C.). Nienhauser, et al., (Translators) (1994). *The Grand Scribe's Records*. The Five Emperors,' Basic Annals 1. Footnote 3. pp.1.

Also See Meissner, W. (2006). “the identity of the Han people as the descendants of the legendary Yellow Emperor [Huang-ti];”

族), the major ethnic group in China, was not so much an ethnic or racial one, but a systemized, ethnicity-involved, cultural awareness—the Han Culture circle or a Chinese culturalism. That is, the early self-awareness of ethnic Chinese signifies a unified spatial-temporal system and process based on the perceived homeland of ancient China. In this sense, it is reasonable to say that the classical work of the Grand Scribe's Records (史记) is a historical content involved in the process of the formation of the China's ethnic-cultural identity.

Such self-awareness of ethnic Chinese before the nineteenth century has three features. First, it was established, theoretically and practically, on the comparison among the Han people and the non-Han people (intergroup comparison). For instance, two theories- Tsou Yen's Theory (邹衍“九洲论”)⁴ and the Five-Zone Theory (五服论)⁵ were the fundamental theoretical frameworks of the world order of Han China and had a far-reaching impact on the following generations until the nineteenth century. The two theories roughly presumed several hierarchical zones by placing the reigning dynasty of Han people in the central zone and other groups outside the center based on the blood or cultural distance between the corresponding group and the Han people. Tsou Yen's theory illustrated that the Han Chinese knew that Han China was not the

⁴ “According to Tsou Yen's theory, there are nine large continents (大九州) in the world, and each is further divided into nine regions. The nine continents are separated from one another by vast oceans, and the nine regions of each continent are also separated from one another by a circling sea. China, known as the Spiritual Continent of the Red Region (赤县神州), constitutes but one of the nine regions of a large continent.” See Twitchett & Loewe (Eds.) (1986), *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. I. pp.377.

⁵ “According to this theory, China since the Hsia dynasty (the 21st B.C. - the 16th B.C. 夏朝) had been divided into five concentric and hierarchical zones or areas. The central zone (tien-fu 甸服) was the royal domain, under the direct rule of the king. The royal domain was immediately surrounded by the Chinese states established by the king, known collectively as the lords' zone (hou-fu 侯服). Beyond the hou-fu were Chinese states conquered by the reigning dynasty, which constituted the so-called pacified zone (sui-fu 绥服 or pin-fu 宾服, guest zone). The last two zones were reserved for the barbarians. The Man and I (蛮夷) barbarians lived outside the sui-fu or pin-fu in the controlled zone (yao-fu 要服), which was so called because the Man and I (蛮夷) were supposedly subject to Chinese control, albeit control of a rather loose kind. Finally, beyond the controlled zone lay the Jung and Ti (戎狄) barbarians, who were basically their own masters in the wild zone (huang-fu 荒服) where the sinocentric world order reached its natural end.” See Twitchett & Loewe (Eds.) (1986), *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. I. pp.379-380.

whole world but 1/81 of the whole world 2,200 years before, whereas, the Five-zone theory indicated the relationship among the Han Chinese (ingroup) and the “barbarians” (outgroups). These two theories illustrated that the Han Chinese were Sinocentric in the political-cultural sense, although they were not Sinocentric in the geographical sense (Twitchett & Fairbank, 1986, pp.379). Furthermore, there was a set of practical systems to exert such theories. One of these systems was the Tributary System (贡纳制度). The Tributary System should not only be considered as a normative model by which Chinese foreign relations were regulated, but an embodiment of the relative dichotomy in terms of the Five-zone theory as well as the discriminations among Chinese versus non-Chinese (Twitchett & Loewe, 1986, pp.382) or inner versus outer groups.

The second feature of the self-awareness of ethnic Chinese before the nineteenth century was that the identification was not a static essence but a constructed-reconstructed process. For example, emperor Wu (157 B.C.-87 B.C., 汉武帝) had spoken of Yangzhou (扬州, modern Kiangsu and Chekiang, 江苏和浙江) as “the controlled zone” (the 4th zone for the non-Han barbarians) in the Hsia-Shang-Chou (夏, 商, 周) period (before the second century B.C.) (Twitchett & Loewe, 1986, pp.380), while it was seen as “the pacified zone” (the 3rd zone belonged to another Han group conquered by the reigning Han group) during the Han dynasty. Further, this area became the area where the imperial capital was located during the South-Sung dynasty (南宋) (1127-1279). Other examples involved in sinicization or alienization almost ran throughout China’s history. For instance, at the end of the third century, “barbarians” unrests were rampant along the frontier. In 304 A.D., joined by a large number of frontier Han Chinese, the descendants of the southern Hsiung-nu (南匈奴), a non-Han ethnic group, rose in arms under the Sinicized leader, Liu Yuan (刘渊). The family name of the leader — “Liu” — was the royal

surname of Han which had been vouchsafed to his family in order for the non-Han ethnic clan to possess the legitimacy of Han cultural identity. After the fall of the Western Chin dynasty (西晋) (265-316), the minority tribe established the first alien dynasty in Chinese history (Twitchett & Loewe, 1986, pp.403).

The third feature was that cultural identity was dominant in the ethnic Chinese self-awareness before the nineteenth century. Twitchett & Franke's (1994) comments on Mongols' militarily conquering the South-Sung (1127-1279) in the late 13th century illustrated this argument, that is, for Han Chinese, the ethnic identity was subject to the dominant cultural identity when there was an irreconcilable conflict between ethnic and cultural concerns when the non-Han ethnic group succeeded in conquering the reigning dynasty of the Han people. Actually, this interpretation was also applied for the Ch'ing dynasty (清) (1644-1911), the dynasty established by a non-Han ethnic group named Manchus (满族) after conquering the Ming dynasty (明) (the last Han Chinese dynasty) (1368-1644):

“The Mandate of Heaven theory⁶ did not demand that China's rulers be Chinese, only that they accept the conceptual framework on which the Chinese imperial institution rested (正) and

⁶ The Mandate of Heaven theory was formed during the prosperous period of the Han dynasty (武帝时代, 157 B.C.-87 B.C.), mainly contributed by Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒 179 B.C.-104 B.C.). However, it was disintegrated along with the collapse of the Han Empire roughly at the end of the 2nd century. The reconstruct of the Mandate of Heaven model was roughly started at the mid Tang dynasty (中唐, 766-835). Till the South Sung dynasty, it was reinterpreted and reestablished by Cheng-Zhu school (程朱理学) of Confucianism represented by Zhuxi (朱熹, 1130-1200). Thus, during the 3rd century to the 8th century, lots of doctrines such as Taoist metaphysics (玄学) and Buddhism became the competing discourses which fulfilled the “left vacuum” derived from the lack of Confucianism. However, the logic structure of thinking of each discourse was the similar no matter what doctrines it belonged to. For instances, Wu Zetian (武则天, 624-705), the only female emperor in the early Tang dynasty (初唐, 618-712), searched for her legitimacy of rule from Buddhism. Instead of the mandate of heaven, she claimed that she was the reincarnation of Maitreya (弥勒佛), an ideological legitimacy from sinicized version of Buddhism. Therefore, in terms of the Mongols and Manchus, the Mandate of Heaven theory was a

that they bring all the Chinese under one unified rule (统). The mandate theory implied a common ground of humane ethical and social values, the adherence to venerable ritual norms, and a well-worked-out pattern of civilian rule through a bureaucracy of merit as measured by the standards of Confucian cultivation” (Twitchett & Franke, 1994, PP.623-624).

The longstanding history of China manifests the general argument about the ethnic group which is described as a cultural collectivity. According to Smith, such collectivities are, to a great extent, a historical process. On the one hand, certain historical memories are essential to these ethnic groups’ continuance, on the other hand, each of them is the function of specific historical forces (Smith, 1991, pp.21). This kind of historical-cultural categorization leads to the attachment of individuals to their community's membership, adjusted by the subjective significance of that community’s prototype (Smith, 1991, pp.23). Therefore, it is reasonable to say that there have been many ethnic communities with their own regimes subject to the predominant Chinese cultural identity in varying degrees. These ethnic communities, for example, include Han (汉族, 220 B.C.-), South Hsiung-nu (南匈奴, represented by the Ch’an Zhao dynasty 前赵, 304-329)⁷, Khitan (契丹, represented by the Liao dynasty 辽, 916-1125)⁸, Tangut (党项, represented by the Hsi Hsia dynasty 西夏, 1038-1227)⁹, Mongols (蒙古,

reinterpreted and a developed version of Confucianism (Neo-Confucianism). See Ge (2000). *An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief before the Seventh Century* [Chinese Eds.]. PP. 197-229; 258-355; 408-438;

⁷ See Twitchett, D., & Loewe, M. (Eds.) (1986). The Ch'in and Han Empires, 221 BC–AD 220. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.1. Cambridge University Press., pp.403.

⁸ See Twitchett & Franke (Eds.) (1994). Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.6. pp.43-149.

⁹ See Twitchett & Franke (Eds.) (1994). Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.6. pp.154-205.

represented by Yuan dynasty 元, 1271-1368)¹⁰, Manchus (满, represented by Ch'ing dynasty 清, 1644-1911)¹¹, etc.

The statement mentioned above presents the basic pattern of China's ethnic-cultural identity before the nineteenth century, as well as the fundamental social norms — the Five-zone theory and the Tributary System, etc.— which were flexibly fitted into the intergroup relationship for ethnic Chinese achieving cognitive clarity of intergroup discrimination.

However, in terms of SGDT, the cognitive clarity of intergroup discrimination obtained from the Five-zone theory and the Tributary System should be a concomitant of the prescriptive norm and its normative fit. Also, it is the value-laden and ego-involved ingroup prescriptive norms that contribute to the ingroup harmony or the latent instability caused by the deviances of the ethnic-cultural collectivity. Thus, for a historically longstanding nation, there has been huge social norms, thoughts, and knowledge each of which functioned in certain social facets in various periods. For example, there are lots of classical works which are usually regarded as the representations of Chinese culture, such as the moral-philosophical doctrines of Confucianism, legal school¹², Moism¹³, and Taoism¹⁴, or religious discourses like Buddhism and Zen¹⁵.

¹⁰ See Twitchett & Franke (Eds.) (1994). Alien Regimes and Border States, 907–1368. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.6. pp. 414-557.

¹¹ See Peterson, W. J. (Eds.) (2002). The Ch'ing Empire to 1800, Part 1. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 9. Cambridge University Press., pp.561-562.

¹² Scholars of legal school in pre-Ch'in & Han (先秦) period, compared with Confucian and Taoist scholars, are not philosophers but practicing statesmen. The legalist doctrines were formed mainly for enhancing the economic and military forces of a state and weakening or limiting the force of aristocrats, merchants, and intellectuals. See Stavrianos, L. S. (1995). *The World to 1500: a Global History*. pp. 131.

¹³ See Ge, (1998). Continuation and the Renewal of the intellectual Tradition, II. Mo or the Moists. Duck, M. S. & Chiu-Duke, J. (Translators) (2014). *An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief before the Seventh Century CE*. pp. 141-146.

¹⁴ See Ge, (1998). Warring States Hundred Schools Content, III. Life of the Individual. Duck, M. S. & Chiu-Duke, J. (Translators) (2014). *An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief before the Seventh Century CE*. pp. 193-198.

¹⁵ See Ge, (1998). Buddhist conquest of China? Duck, M. S. & Chiu-Duke, J. (Translators) (2014). *An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief before the Seventh Century CE*. Chapter 6-03. pp. 350.

However, none of these intellectual discourses could be the dominant political ideology throughout the whole history of China¹⁶. Even though certain discourse became the state orthodoxy, it had rarely actually functioned in the general ethnic Chinese everyday life¹⁷. Further, aside from these different intellectual scholars' discourses, various heritages involved in the Han ethnic-cultural system, including values, memories, regulations, norms, symbols, myths, customs, and traditions, are diverse, even conflict sometimes, not only in essence but also in practice. It, therefore, seems not feasible for the researcher to analyze all of these items. Therefore, it is necessary to find and explore a perceived general social framework in a high degree of invariance in which every group member was embedded involuntarily. Such a perceived general social framework serves as a "meta-Structure" of the pre-modern China and a skeleton or a vehicle of the social process, based on which diverse state's administrative systems, political ideologies, intellectual scholars' doctrines, folk beliefs, patterns of general knowledge and thinking, as well as the values, memories, regulations, symbols, myths, customs, and traditions, are formed, developed, presented, and withered away. The meta-structure hence function in a society just like "a chorus backs up a solo performance" (Ge, 1998). Thus far, the proposed meta-structure in ethnic Chinese collectivity before the nineteenth century were the dichotomy of the administrative meritocracy in the vertical dimension and the kinship-based semi-autonomy in the lateral dimension.

¹⁶ See note 6.

¹⁷ For instances, from the 3rd to 12th century, there were various public beliefs accompanied with oceans of folk sacrificial activities that actually participated and functioned in the general social life. These folk sacrificial activities included Nature worship, spirit and ghost worship, and memorial worship, etc., which were totally different from the official and intellectual scholars' discourses represented by the competing of Buddhism and Taoism before the 10th century, the legalist school and the Confucianism in the 11th century, and the arouse of Neo-Confucianism from the 11th to 12th century. Historical records shows that the central government dismantled more than 1700 folk temples (淫祠) in the mid seventh century and 1038 temples in the capital of the North Sung dynasty in the early 12th century. See Ge, (2000). *An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief from the Seventh Century to the Nineteenth Century* (Chinese Eds.). pp. 359-385.

The administrative meritocracy refers roughly to the position that a collectivity (a state) should be led by the person with the greatest capability (才) and best moral character (德), and be chosen in accordance with the merits (Bell, 2015, pp.64). The ways in which such people are chosen are usually the imperial examination system (科举)¹⁸, local recommendation system (举孝廉)¹⁹, and the master-protégé succession (师承关系)²⁰, etc.. Such norms or customs, including both of the cognitions and operational mechanisms, implied and reflected the perceived hierarchical social structure and the fundamental social relationships among different social strata. The theoretical foundation of the meta-structure in vertical dimension was the general knowledge in the Han dynasty, say, the “unity of heaven, earth, and human” (天人合一), or the theory of the “resonance between heaven and the human” (天人感应)²¹, in which the emperor was regarded as the person with the greatest “capability” and the best “virtue” chosen by Heaven (the son of heaven), in turn, the imperial officials should be the people with merits, abilities, and virtues selected by the emperor—the deputy of heaven. From this rationale, an emperor could also be overthrown if he lost his “capability” and “virtue”, and the insurrectionists could obtain their legitimacy from the meta-structure by proclaiming that they were enforcing justice on

¹⁸ The imperial examination system was actually implemented after the Tang dynasty (the 7th century-1904), while various self-recommendations via intellectual visits and persuasions (游说) or academic debates in the pre-Ch'in-Han (先秦, before the 2nd century) and local recommendations based on the moral behaviors of the recommended judged by his neighbors or local officials (举孝廉) mainly in Han dynasty were two alternative mechanisms ensured the implementation of the administrative meritocracy. Actually, the local recommendation as a way of recruiting local officials functioned in the local administrative system till the 20th century. See Bell, (2015), *Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy. The China Model*. pp.81.

¹⁹ See note 18.

²⁰ The master-protégé succession (师承关系) was widespread in administrative, academic, handicraft, drama, kung fu, and art area etc. The relationship between the master (the teacher or superior) and the protégés (the students, apprentices, or subordinate staffs) was analog to a family. In these system, a master shielded the protégés, while the protégés stuck up for the value of the master as well as the school he represented. See Li, Y., 2015. *A Comparative Study of the Relationships between the Ancient Master-Protégé Succession and the Present Tutors-Graduate Students*. *Education and Examination* 2015 (2).

²¹ See Ge, (1998). Duck, M. S. & Chiu-Duke, J. (Translators) (2014). *An Intellectual History of China: Knowledge, Thought, and Belief before the Seventh Century CE*. pp.246.

behalf of the heaven (替天行道). It is reasonable to say that the meritocracy model could be traced back to the mythical age.²² At least it has lasted for two thousand years, given the imperial examination system was the fundamental mechanism for the model (Bell, 2015, pp.65). Because people could shift their social statuses from the lower to the higher (get closer to the central power) through this vehicle, each male was educated and motivated to pursue a higher social status, and females to assist their husbands to gain fame and prosperity. Through vicarious learning, the administrative meritocracy was not merely an administrative system, but also gradually became the common accepted social norm functioning in ethnic Chinese daily life and was carried forward generation by generation. Also, various thoughts of the elites such as Confucianism and diverse patterns of intellectual narratives competed with one another, yet these competitions adhered to the meritocracy tradition as well as its mechanisms such as the imperial examination system, local recommendations, and the master-protégé system. Through these systems, people in lower classes could shift to the higher class, helping to create a dynamic stability in China's social hierarchy. Therefore, due to the salient function and longstanding history of exerting, this social management model became not merely an administrative system but also a meta-structure in vertical dimension which guided ethnic Chinese individuals' ideals, expectations, behaviors, and even destinies.

In lateral dimension, aside from the will of heaven and theories such as the “resonance between heaven and the human” being the foundation of the ethnic Chinese values in the Han dynasty, the human feelings and the characteristic of agricultural civilization also served as one of the foundations of the general knowledge, thought, and belief system. Family ties, thus,

²² Based on a relaxed conception of meritocracy, such tradition could be exemplified through the stories of the three legendary emperors (尧, 舜, 禹) four thousand years ago, who were regarded as the kings with most capabilities and virtues of ancient Chinese. See note 2.

became the basic perception of the social structure on the lateral level. In turn, the closeness or distance of the blood relationship functioned as the root of social order. Like the examination system being the mechanism of the political meritocracy, series symbolic rules named rites (礼) were highlighted as the mechanism of the blood relationship-based social order (Ge, 1998). Such blood relationship-based social order was extended and developed, after the Sung dynasty in the eleventh century, into a significant basal social structure—the kinship clan (宗族组织), a semi-autonomous kinship organization associated with the Baojia system (保甲制度), an applied system of the administrative meritocracy in rural regions (Chu, 2004; Yu, 2002). Like the administrative meritocracy, the kinship organization ultimately developed into a general knowledge and the fundamental prescriptive social norm fitted into the daily life of the ethnic Chinese. In turn, a lot of moral-based community compacts²³ (族规, 乡约) derived from the kinship organization model, by which individuals of a certain clan attached themselves and were subject to a kinship clan (Ge, 2000, PP.377-384). In this sense, the social unit on the “rock-bottom” of China’s social structure was to some degree semi-autonomous with variations in various degrees in different dynasties (Tang, et. al., 2011). The semi-autonomy signified that the kinship communities possessed their own community compact associated with various prescriptive local rules, usually morally-oriented, served as the crucial social norms to which each individual in the clan (ingroup member) should conform. The interceders (or administrators) were usually the patriarch and local scholar-officials (乡绅) (Ge, 2000, PP.356-386; Tang, et. al., 2011). Sometimes the patriarch himself was a local scholar-official. The social

²³ The first community compacts was founded by Lv Brothers in Lantian, Shanxi, in Sung dynasty in 1079. See Chu Hung-lam. (2004). Twentieth Century Studies of Ming-Qing Community Compacts. Liu, Z. (Eds.) Journal of History and Anthropology. II.1. 2004 (4) PP.175-196. Also see Tang, M., Zhao, K., & Liu, Z. (2011). The Basic Pattern and Historical Change of Rural Governance in Ancient China. Jiangnan Luntan 2011(3).

strata of the local scholar-officials, therefore, became, metaphorically speaking, the “middle class” bridging between the central government and the basic kinship units associated with the Baojia system (保甲制度) in pre-modern China (Yu, 2002). By conforming to this Meta-structure cognitively and affectively, ethnic Chinese identified themselves into a concrete cultural collectivity and obtained their ethnic-cultural superiority through a series of policies of inter-status relationships, for example, the Five-zone theory and the Tributary system. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that the Five-zone theory and the Tributary system could be regarded as the extensions of the meta-structure —the administrative meritocracy (and its mechanisms) and the kinship-based social connections.

According to Marques, Paez, and Abrams (1998) who confirmed empirically that an individual identifies him or herself through the fits of both descriptive norms, “a concomitant of social categorization”, and the prescriptive norm, a value-laden attitude or evaluation toward such categorization (Marques, Paez, & Abrams, 1998), The meta-structure in ethnic Chinese collectivity before the nineteenth century fundamentally contributed to China’s ethnic-cultural identity, through which members within the ethnic-cultural collectivity obtained, both cognitively and affectively, their group similarity and superiority toward the outgroup. Further, the author suggests that the ancient intellectual schools such as Confucianism, Neo-Confucianism, Taoism, Zen (or Buddhism), and Moism, etc. were the results or sublimation, rather than the reason, of the Meta-structure and self-identification. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between meta-structure and some remarkable Chinese intellectual thoughts. Nevertheless, the perceived self-identification could be considered as both the passive and active facets in the formation of a modernized nation in the Western sense after the mid-nineteenth century. During this process, drastic and profound changes, both social-political and cultural-

psychological, emerged from the vernacular mobilization in accordance with various introduced political ideologies and social movements.




Figure-1. The location of several traditional intellectual schools based on the meta-structure

In order to achieve the transformation from traditional ethnic-cultural collectivity to the modernized nation, as well as the ethnic-cultural identity to the national identity, the imperative of a political and idealistic revolution aimed at a “political community of equal citizens” by purifying the people from the spatial-temporal accretions of history was put on the agenda (Smith, 1991, pp.65). Such revolution includes “a movement from passive subordination of the community to its active political assertion”, “a movement to place the community in its homeland, a secure and recognized compact territory”, “a movement to turn ethnic members into legal citizens by conferring civil, social, and political rights on them” etc. (Smith, 1991, pp.65). In China, the corresponding efforts, mainly promoted by intellectuals and political elites, functioned in terms of the emergence of a modern China in the last two centuries, yet

accompanied by various conflicts and confusions of self-consciousness among civic Chinese until today. All in all, in the national identity sense, the history before the mid-nineteenth century could be considered as a time during which Chinese established, modified, and consolidated their ethnic-cultural identity by constantly adjusting the corresponding symbols, values, memories, myths, norms, and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of the collectivity, while the time period after the mid-nineteenth century should be regarded as the one focused on the search for a national identity, another kind of social identity triggered by various nationalisms and transformed from the previous ethnic-cultural identity.

The transformation started with the ethnic crisis derived from China's defeat in the Opium War²⁴ in 1840. Such an ethnic crisis drove up a strong nationalism (the trigger of a nation) and, hence, a process of redefinition and adaptation of a national identity as well as a corresponding set of symbols, values, memories, myths, and norms, in which a new equilibrium was expected to be set between internal elements and external challenges (Meissner, 2006). The perennial ethnic crisis and the nationalist movement was actually stimulated by the extremely urgent threats stemming from the expansion of the Western powers which was totally different from the previous "barbarian" conquests of Han Chinese Empires, because the essence of the Han Chinese culture as well as the ethnic-cultural identity has not been challenged by other ethnic communities such as the Mongols and Manchus, but adopted by the conquerors through various methods of sinicization and acculturation of the "barbarians". However, the Western powers actually undermined the essence of the Han Chinese culture and the perennial superiority of Chinese self-perception (Meissner, 2006). Thus, in order to obtain the collective self-

²⁴ See Fairbank J. K. (eds.) (1978). Late Ch'ing 1800–1911, Part 1. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 10. pp.163-208.

enhancement, modern China started the process of searching for national identities and, in turn, achieving national self-categorization and ego-involvement.

According to Meissner (2006), Chinese elites' efforts as responses to the Western threats could be divided into five phases (Meissner, 2006). Such phases are roughly summarized here in order to investigate whether they have fulfilled the transformation, the transformation from the ethnic Chinese to the civic Chinese, from the long-lasting ethnic-cultural identity to China's national identity. The purpose of this exploration is to verify whether, or how, the alleged civic-institutional (or civic-territorial) element of national identity actually functioned in the process of self-consciousness of modern China. The first phase in searching for a national identity was the Self-Strengthening Movement beginning in 1861 marked by emphasizing western technology (Fairbank, 1978, pp.491). The core proposals included that "Chinese learning should be followed as the essence; western learning as the practical application." (Zhang Zhidong, 张之洞, 1837-1909, 中学为体, 西学为用)²⁵. "Subdue the barbarians [the Western power] by learning from their strong points [technology]" (Wei Yuan, 魏源, 1794-1857, 师夷长技以制夷)²⁶. The movements, as well as the corresponding policy, resulted inevitably in a departure from traditional statecraft; the search for state's prosperities gradually obtained precedence over the Confucian concerns of government by virtue (Fairbank, 1978, pp.491). The second phase was between 1895 and 1911, represented by the reformists and constitutionalists (维新派, 立宪派) and their corresponding works and movements (Meissner, 2006). These reformists recognized that, aside from the mere adoption of the Western technology, political reform was necessary for the state's prosperity. However, these reformers tried to solve these problems by means of re-

²⁵ See Zhang Zhidong 张之洞, (1837-1909), *Quan Xue Pian* (劝学篇).

²⁶ See Wei Yuan 魏源, (1794-1857). *Illustrated treatise on the maritime kingdoms* (海国图志), chapter 5.

interpreting the Confucian classics to respond to the Western challenge. For example, in order to obtain the ideological legitimacy for political change by means of returning to the Neo-Confucianism,²⁷ Kang Youwei (康有为, 1858-1927) presented the idea that Confucius had been an adherent of institutional change²⁸ (Meissner, 2006). Constitutionalism was the basic theme in this phase, yet the famous constitutionalism-oriented reform in 1898 (百日维新) lasted a mere one hundred and three days and failed. However, the year of 1898 is usually thought of as one of the two watersheds (the year 1898 and 1919) in China's intellectual break with Confucian civilization. The traditional Sinocentric worldview was gradually replaced by the “new learning” of the West (Fairbank & Twitchett, 1983, pp.322).

The third phase of seeking responses to the Western threats, according to Meissner (2006), was between 1911 and 1945. During this period, unprecedented discussions about Western ideas and Chinese culture were exerted by Chinese intellectuals. Represented by four main groups, these thorough and comprehensive discussions had a profound influence on the construct of China's national identity. The first group was Confucians such as Gu Hongming (辜鸿铭, 1827-1928) and the adherents of Neo-Confucianism represented by Carsun Chang (张君勱, 1887-1969). Both Gu and Chang emphasized the superiority of Chinese spiritual culture (精神文化) over the Western materialism, but Chang wanted to selectively adopt science and the Western idealist philosophy, in particular, German Idealism (Roger, 1997). The second group

²⁷ A re-interpreted version of Confucianism represented by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Wang Yangming (1472-1528). See Meissner, (2006). *China's Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present*.

²⁸ Kang Youwei, 康有为, 1897. *Confucius as Reformer (孔子改制考)*. See Meissner, (2006). *China's Search for Cultural and National Identity from the Nineteenth Century to the Present*. Also see Fairbank J. K. & Twitchett, D. (Eds.) (1983). *Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.12. pp.327.

was nationalists represented by Sun Yat-sen (孙逸仙, 1866-1925). In his work, Three People's Principles (Sunology, 三民主义) —the Principle of Nationalism (民族主义), the Principle of Democracy (民权主义), and the Principle of People's Livelihood (民生主义) —, Sun tried to synthesize the Confucian doctrine with the Western political liberalism by introducing the democratic institutions to China (Meissner, 2006) on the one hand, and leading a revolution against the Ch'ing Empire to form a national government on the other hand. The third group was the liberal thinkers such as Hu Shi (胡适)²⁹. These scholars proposed the “total Westernization” (全盘西化) of Chinese civilization by adopting political liberalism and a controlled capitalism in order to re-establish China's greatness. The fourth group was represented by the Marxists, such as Ch'en Tu-hsiu (陈独秀) and Li Dazhao (李大钊). They aimed to substitute a new socialist identity based on Marxism for the traditional Chinese culture³⁰ (Meissner, 2006). Not only restricted to the ideological and political area, the efforts to reconstruct China's cultural system and re-identify the modern Chinese was broadened into various social processes including language, literature, science, and life custom during the period between the 1910s and 1940s. For instance, the Vernacular Movement (白话文运动)³¹ and the traditional drama and music reforms

²⁹ Also see Fairbank J. K. & Twitchett, D. (Eds.) (1983). *Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 12. pp.424.

³⁰ Also see Fairbank J. K. & Twitchett, D. (Eds.) (1983). *Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol. 12. pp.427-433.

³¹ This institutional development [e.g. Beijing University] soon brought forth a major linguistic reform, namely *pai-kua* (the everyday language, 白话), the written vernacular. Ch'en Tu-hsiu (1879-1942, 陈独秀), who became dean of letters, had studied in Japan and France, participated in the Revolutions of 1911 and 1913, and founded several magazines including *Hsin ck'ing-men* (New Youth, 新青年) in 1915, which he continued to edit after becoming dean. Another classically-trained young scholar, Hu Shih (1891-1962, 胡适) returned to Peita from study between 1910 and 1917 at Cornell and Columbia. Hu Shih soon had Ch'en Tu-hsiu's support in the promotion of *pai-hua*, as an essential tool both for modern thinking and for bringing education to the common people. The esoteric classical writing intelligible only to scholars was abandoned in favor of the expressions and vocabulary of everyday speech - the change made when Latin gave way to the national languages in the European Renaissance. By 1920 the Ministry of Education prescribed the use of *pai-hua* in the schools. See Fairbank J. K. & Twitchett, D. (Eds.) (1983).

resulted in the emergence of the Westernized dramas, novels, music, and artworks. These social waves culminated in the 1920s aimed at establishing a scientific and democratic “new culture”³² accompanied with most intellectuals moving from “the questioning of the traditional values to their total repudiation” (Fairbank & Twitchett, 1983, pp.322).

The fourth period, between 1949 and 1978, was portrayed by the efforts to establish a national identity based on Marxism-Leninism (Meissner, 2006). The Maoism (毛泽东思想), a developed version of the Leninism, became the dominant ideology that penetrated through every facet of China’s social life. In order to confirm the legitimacy of the new regime, the newly established central government tended to impose exclusively the official communist ideology as the state orthodoxy upon Chinese individuals, instead of both of the traditional Chinese culture and the European culture with the exception of the natural sciences and Marxism (Meissner, 2006). After the third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) (十一届三中全会) in 1978 came the fifth period marked by the national reform and opening-up policy (改革开放) and the Deng Xiaoping Theory (Dengism 邓小平理论) (Meissner, 2006). In contrast to Maoism, Dengism emphasizes building “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (有中国特色的社会主义) and “emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts and shifting the focus of the Party's work to economic development”³³. During this period,

Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.12. pp.406.

³² The intellectual campaign for a totally 'new culture', which was symbolized by the May Fourth demonstrations of 1919 (五四运动), was seen as an attack upon the traditional moral and social orders as well. The leadership of the later movement came from China's newly modernized universities and schools. In addition to anti-imperialism, its goal was the establishment of a scientific and democratic 'new culture' purged of all relics of China's feudal past. In a generation China's intellectuals had apparently moved from the questioning of core traditional values to their total repudiation.” See Fairbank J. K. & Twitchett, D. (Eds.) (1983). Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.12. pp.322.

³³ See excerpt from remarks made on hearing a work report by members of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China. Hold High the Banner of Mao Zedong Thought and Adhere

the urban industry system, changed from the bureaucratic command system to the Socialist Market Economy,³⁴ by allowing the competition among enterprises in different regions in China, where before each of them possessed a monopoly of its own region's market (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1991, pp.509)³⁵. During the 1990s, the CPC called for some reviving movements. Two of them worth mentioning were, according to Meissner (2006), the renaissance of Confucianism and the re-introduction of the Western thoughts (Meissner, 2006). Today, it seems that the alleged bureaucratic ideology is the trinity of the developed Marxism-Leninism, modified Confucianism, and part of the Western thoughts. The trinity is depicted by the term "the China Dream" (中国梦) which has been popularized since 2013. The slogan emphasizes a set of individual and national expectations and ideals in current China.³⁶

Thus far, depending on the introduction and modification of new thoughts, concepts, slogans, and symbols, Chinese intellectual scholars and political elites after the mid-nineteenth century proposed various ideal plans involved in the reconstruction of China's national identity with some of them being put into practice in varying degrees and social aspects. These ideal designs mainly roughly came from two sources: the traditional cultural memory and the Western civic-institutional culture. No matter what kind of design it is, a common problem which is significant for every thinker or political elite is dealing with the relationship between China's

to the Principle of Seeking Truth from Facts. Published in September 16, 1978. Retrieved from:
<http://en.people.cn/dengxp/vol2/text/b1220.html>

³⁴ See MacFarquhar, R. & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.) (1991). *The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982. "Reforming the industrial system"*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.15. pp.509-511.

³⁵ See MacFarquhar, R. & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.) (1991). *The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982. "Reforming the industrial system"*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.15. Note 30: "William Byrd et al., Recent Chinese economic reforms: studies of two industrial enterprise" pp.509

³⁶ Central Party School, Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. "The Chinese Dream infuses Socialism with Chinese characteristics with New Energy". Qiushi. chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com. Retrieved June 9 2013. <https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/05/06/the-chinese-dream-infuses-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics-with-new-energy/>

tradition and the newly introduced ideas. However, to what extent have these efforts injected the external elements into modern China's national identity? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to recall the Western civic model of a national identity. According to Smith (1991), the elements of a nation in the Western civic model include the "historic territory", "the legal-political community", "the legal-political equality of members", and "the common civic culture and ideology". In turn, the elements of national identity in the Western civic sense involve "a compact, well-defined territories", "a community of laws and institutions with a single political will", "a sense of legal equality among the members of that community" (Smith, 1991, pp.10-11). All of these elements, at first sight, seems included in contemporary China's national identity, since the People's Republic of China (PRC) has its own constitution based on which each individual who has PRC citizenship possesses equal legal-political rights and duties and the same reciprocal rights and obligations. Nevertheless, these narratives are ideal versions of national identity, they are to some degree the intellectual scholars' and political elites' expectations presented through either formal official expressions, academic discourse, or contents of compulsory education, and then propagated via the mainstream media. These identity-involved scenarios, in turn, lead to the illusion that it seems the general Chinese actually think and behave within such framework. In other words, whether these complex political philosophies or propaganda could play determinant roles in Chinese national identity depend on to what extent these scenarios could become the social norms—the customary standards of behavior or unwritten rules shared by members of the nation (Schacter, 2012), and to what extent these social norms are fitted into the general Chinese everyday lives both cognitively and affectively. In this sense, Meissner's (2006) argument was restricted in the field of elites' thoughts or bureaucratic discourses, namely, an ideal scenario or an imperative up-to-down

announcement, although such narratives have functioned as the driving force (nationalism-oriented) for the formation of PRC. Therefore, the author has to reconsider the meta-structure functions in the daily life in current China's society. In other words, an unwritten, general, and relatively constant normative skeleton to which the current Chinese values, thinking, and behaviors attach. Based on the common cultural memory, sentiments, and symbols, the proposed meta-structure in current China is the modified version of the dichotomy of social norms—the political meritocracy (or the superior-inferior affiliation) in the vertical dimension and the web of social connections (or the circle of contact) in the lateral dimension.

The Chinese model, the political meritocracy, has been of concern in recent years. According to Bell (2015), the characteristics of this model is a kind of collective leadership which is described as “an evolving three-pronged approach” which signifies “democracy at the bottom”, “experimentation in the middle”, and “meritocracy at the top” (Bell, 2015, PP.180). Usually such principles are conducted by the CPC's Organization Department (组织部) which is responsible for the selection, appointment, and removal of the Party's cadres (Bell, 2015, pp.72). Like the mechanisms —the imperial examination, the master-protégé system, and local recommendation systems— guaranteeing the administrative meritocracy in the pre-modern China's society, the remarkable operational mechanisms to achieve the political meritocracy model include the Civil Service Examination, the College Entrance Examination, and the Superior-Inferior Affiliation. It was reported that the number of candidates taking China's civil service examination increased from 4,400 in 1994 to 1,520,000 in 2014³⁷. Such data illustrates that the vertical meritocracy tradition in pre-modern China is still influencing the current social management mode and individuals' thinking pattern involved in the social strata shifting in

³⁷ The data is retrieved from guoqing.china.cn (http://guoqing.china.com.cn/2013-11/07/content_30521186.htm)

modern China. Furthermore, such influence, say, selecting people based on his or her capability and virtue, is not merely restricted to the administrative area, but is broadened into most aspects of social life. For instance, the number of people attending the national college entrance examination, another important exam for individual development, reached to 10,500,000 in 2008, the highest the years from 1977 to 2012³⁸. A winner in these examinations could be regarded as a person with more capability and therefore would have more opportunities to succeed in career competition or getting closer to the central power. This implies that the winner has risen into a perceived relatively higher social hierarchy which brings him or her a feeling of self-enhancement. More important, a winner in these examinations will be favored and eulogized because he or she bring honor to his or her family ancestors (光宗耀祖). Therefore, such an assessment is not merely within the consideration of success in personal career but also implies the social value system, a value system stemming from the kinship-based norms in pre-modern China. Based on the hierarchical implication and kinship prosperity oriented “motivation”, individuals (or families) have to attach themselves to the invisible social vertebra to think, behave, and perceive their self-consciousness. In terms of the superior-inferior affiliations, it is not precisely denominationalism, because it is not belief based, but based on capability, merit, and interest. In other words, different “cliques” probably do not differ in their beliefs, religious or political appeals, but are just different temporary interest groups based on the superior-inferior affection and loyalty. In this sense, the superior-inferior affiliations could be considered a relatively looser version of pre-modern China’s master-protégé system. It is reasonable that the superior-inferior affiliations are the most important concomitant of the political meritocracy

³⁸ The data is retrieved from People’s Daily Online (<http://edu.people.com.cn/n/2013/0503/c116076-21359059.html>)

model: a superior has to cultivate his or her own “janissary” in order to compete with his or her rivals, while a subordinate staff has to choose a superior to whom he or she is loyal. In this sense, the superior-inferior affiliations could be seen as vertical social connections cooperating with the lateral social connections which the author will discuss in the next paragraph. Every unit of the social life (an individual, a family, etc.) is not only a point in such a web but also runs its own social web, from which each unit provides or obtains the reciprocal sense of security and the expectation of prosperity. This implies that the perceived legal system, regulations, credits, or other Western-civic elements, or the homogeneity of social class and political ideology in Marxism-Leninism discourse could not provide such feelings at least compared with the web of social connections inherited from pre-modern China’s meta-structure. Therefore, the rule of the superior-inferior affiliations is not limited in the national management system, it penetrates into almost every facet of Chinese social life.

Further, there is another potential motivation of the fervency of political meritocracy and the superior-inferior affiliations. It is the expectations of the candidate’s kinship and the lateral social connections, that is, others who have a close relationship with the competent candidate will benefit from his or her success. Also, it is easier for a winner in such a system to attain and maintain his social connections through which one could bring honor to his or her family ancestors. In this sense, the social connections could be seen as the extension of the lateral blood-relationship in pre-modern China. The more social connections one possesses the more feasible that the individual could satisfy the expectations from one’s family or clan. Compared with the relative static and mutually separated kinship clans in pre-modern China, the social connections are more broad, complex, and dynamic. Chinese people will develop their social connections not merely limited to their kinships but extend to a broad and complex “interest (i.e. political or

economic) web”. It also implies that the potential desires of specific interests and senses of security of the unit of social life are not mainly ensured through the contracts, legal provisions, institutional guarantees, or the homogeneity of social class and political ideology, but via the affective affiliations and interest reciprocities within certain interest webs. If, metaphorically speaking, the United States is a huge company, China is a super family. A competent individual signifies to a great extent that he or she can manipulate vast social connections, rather than possessing specific knowledge or skill to handle a concrete job in a well-defined citizenship or a legal frame or a homogeneous social class.

Thus far, the meta-structure of contemporary Chinese society is the dichotomy of the meritocracy tradition (and the implied mechanisms) and the social connections, both of which belong to the continuum of the China’s traditional culture. However, the Chinese population is not unfamiliar to western political discourses and the Marxism-Leninism doctrines due to the longstanding efforts of China’s intellectual scholars and political elites and, more importantly, compulsory education in China. Article 1 of the Regulations for Primary and Middle School Students suggests that a student should ardently love the motherland, the people, and the Communist Party of China.³⁹ The Regulation was first issued in 1981 and revised in 2004, 2012, and 2015, while the basic content of Article 1 roughly remained constant. This implies that the government tends to inject certain political ideology into the young people and expects it to become the fundamental general social norm based on which this discourse becomes one of the elements in China’s national identity. Such political discourse is the essential trinity of the nation (ardent love for the motherland), the ethnic collectivity (ardent love for the people), and the CPC

³⁹ See Regulations for Primary and Middle School Students (Revised edition 2015). Issued by Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China on Aug 20, 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A06/s3325/201508/t20150827_203482.html

(ardent love for the CPC). In accordance with this trinity, there is a corresponding ideological trinity, as mentioned previously, which includes the developed Marxism-Leninism (the Deng Xiaoping Theory), revised Confucianism, and the selected Western culture (the civic-institutional norms). The bureaucratic scholars and the political elites expect that the double-trinitarian structure could imply a legitimate social rule encompassing, guiding, and shaping China's national identity, an ideal national identity, both at the national (intragroup) and international (intergroup) levels.

Nevertheless, there is a lot of discordance between the actual and the ideal social norms contributing to the confusion of modern China's national identities. First, the actual meta-structure—the political meritocracy (or superior-inferior affiliation) and the social connections—roots in the natural evolvement of the perceived traditional social rules and their implications; while the ideal (or expected) rule—the essential trinity (the nation-ethnicity-CPC) and the ideological trinity (the developed Marxism-Leninism -revised Confucianism-selected Western culture)— is, to some extent, an artificial transplantation or a basketwork through deliberate logic and linguistic skills. Second, in terms of the longstanding significant reference of China's cultural characteristics—the collectivism, there are differences about the essence of the collectivism between the actual and ideal versions of the social norms. The collectivism is blood-based or interest-based in the sense of the actual norm, which means individuals could be subject to their kinships, or sometimes, the interest-web based on affective affiliations and interest reciprocities. However, there is a weak collectivism in the sense of the ideal norm which is social-class-based, or moral idealism, or Western-culture based. This fact has been manifested in the discordance between the actual and the ideal social norm. An example that can illustrate such

discordance was the Agricultural Cooperatives and Communes (人民公社) from 1958 to 1978⁴⁰ versus the Household Contract Responsibility System (家庭联产承包责任制) after 1978⁴¹. The former was portrayed by eradicating private property and encouraging peasants to work altruistically in the Agricultural Cooperatives and Communes for the peasants' collective interest since all of the peasants belonged to the same social class.⁴² The latter was a kind of rural development strategy aimed at restoring the private household plots as well as the legitimacy of the family-based private incomes.⁴³ Empirical evidence of the growth rates of agricultural output between 1953 and 1986 exhibits that the corresponding growth rate of minus sideline output was 0.9% (1958-1965), 3.1% (1966-1978), 6.4% (1979-1982), and 5.8% (1983-1986)⁴⁴. Such data illustrate that the policy based on blood-relationship is more effective (6.4% and 5.8%) than that rooted in the social class (0.9% and 3.1%). Also, it signifies that the actual meta-structure, rather than the political idealism, corresponds to and guides people's attributes, behaviors, and self-identification, although at first glance the official doctrine was great in strength and impetus. The social connections are neither social class nor legal based, but kinship and interest based.

Last and most important, the discordance between the actual and the ideal social norms implies the crucial transformation of China's political-economic structure from the traditional agricultural to the industrial-informational society, as well as the varying challenges derived

⁴⁰ See MacFarquhar, R. & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.) (1991). *The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982. "Rural Development Policy"*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.15. pp. 515.

⁴¹ See MacFarquhar, R. & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.) (1991). *The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982. "Rural Policy Changes after 1979"*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.15. pp. 524.

⁴² See note 41.

⁴³ See note 42.

⁴⁴ Sources: State Statistical Bureau, *Statistical yearbook of China, 1986*, 130 (中国国家统计局, 中国统计年表); and State Statistical Bureau, *中国统计摘要, 1987*, 28-31. Retrieved from MacFarquhar, R. & Fairbank, J. K. (Eds.) (1991). *The People's Republic, Part 2: Revolutions within the Chinese Revolution, 1966–1982*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.15. Table 23. pp.517.

from such transformation. In terms of the challenge-reaction framework⁴⁵, The pre-modern (before the mid-nineteenth century) China's meta-structure, the administrative meritocracy and the semi-autonomous kinship custom in the ingroup level and the Five-zone theory and the Tribute System at the intergroup level, were the reactions to the challenges of the natural environment⁴⁶ (the agricultural prerequisite) and the nomad "barbarians" (the outgroup members). While, the actual modern China's basic social norms —the political meritocracy (or the superior-inferior affiliations) and the kinship-based social connections—are the "descendants" of the pre-modern ones, and have lost their agricultural foundation. They could not fit the industrial and informational society very well, and therefore, result in a lack of prescriptive fit—the value-laden, ego-involved oriented assessments and attitudes toward the meta-structure as well as the customs, values, and symbols belonging to it. However, as aforementioned, the meta-structure still function as the macro social norms to which each national member ought to conform, although he or she probably has a negative attitude (low prescriptive fit) toward it. This results in the national identity conflict. The national identity conflict refers to the discordance between the prescriptive and the descriptive dimensions of national identity. In other words, it is possible for an individual who does not favor certain ingroup identity (low ego-involvement) but has to conform to it (self-categorization) due to the assimilation of the ingroup prototype and discrimination of the outgroup. Further, in order to respond to the challenges from the outgroups such as the trends of industrialization, urbanization,⁴⁷ modernization and international competition, China's political elites have put

⁴⁵ Different parts (units) in a historical process tended to react differently to an identical general cause. They reacted, and each contributed, in various ways to "the forces which that same cause sets in motion." See Toynbee, A. J. (1946). Somervell D. C. (1958) (Eds.) *A Study of History. Abridgement of volumes I-VI*. pp.3.

⁴⁶ See Huang, R. (1997). *China a Macro History*. Chapter 3. Soil, Wind, and Water. pp. 23-29.

⁴⁷ 56 percent of the total population has lived in urban areas by the end of 2015, a dramatic increase from 26% in 1990. See CCTV.COM.ENGLISH. <http://english.cntv.cn/2016/01/30/VIDEf3nCcpAilTmx5J17brHD160130.shtml>.

forward the ideal norm—the double trinities—, whereas, such structure as well as its regulations and values are just a type of political idealism or “romantism”, and cannot function fundamentally in Chinese citizen’s daily life. Therefore, the complicated ideal social norms should be considered as a nominal or a “pseudo” social categorization.

Thus far, the author summarized the history of the Chinese search for a national identity after the mid-nineteenth century, the ideal CNI of the double-trinitarian structure, and the actual CNI. From the perspective of the qualitative component of the CNI, this situation ultimately results in the confusion or ambiguity of China’s current national identity, in particular, in the prescriptive dimension. The confusion of national identity refers to the fact that individuals could be perplexed when engaging in the self-identification process due to the complex and contradictory options of categorizing elements. It is reasonable that Chinese’ affections and evaluations toward some introduced western-civic norms should entail the common sentiment of ethnic-cultural unity and family-nation homogeneity. This type of ambiguity reflects the function of Sinicization of the introduced civic norms rather than the Westernization of the EC elements. In other words, although Chinese could probably differentiate the objective existence of the civic norms from the ethnic-cultural norms merely by their everyday cognition or observation, the connotation of or evaluation toward these civic norms to some degree shift from the original pure-western-civic meaning to an ethnic-cultural sense. At least, they could be interpreted in a mixed way. The ambiguity or confusion is what has changed in Chinese collective identity in the past one hundred and fifty years. The aforementioned is echoed by MacFarquhar & Fairbank’s (1987) “hybrid modernization” which insists that Chinese society has been “modernized” in the sense of material technology, while such “modernized” society is based to a large extent on the

core perceptions of traditional structures of social order and values (MacFarquhar & Fairbank, 1987, pp.26).

So far, China's national identity is rooted in the Ethnic-Cultural (EC) identity to which the Civic-Institutional (CI) components are added and accommodated. Such structure of national identity is different from the notion that national identity has the components both of the ethnic-cultural and the civic-institutional element, because such a notion parallels the two components, while China's proposed national identity places the ethnic-cultural element on the essential site on which the civic-institutional element is based. Also, such structure is different from the opinion that the ethnic-cultural and the civic-institutional elements are a continuum in the process of national identification (Westle, 1999) because the formation and development of China's national identity does not mean a successive process from ethnic-cultural identity to a civic-institutional one, but the evolvement of the ethnic-cultural identity adjusted by the civic-institutional element in order to gratify national superiority toward aliens by reacting to challenges from outgroup including industrialization, urbanization, and the international environment.

Thus far, the arguments mentioned above mainly refer to the attributions and the components (the qualitative content) of China's national identity both in the conceptual and psychological dimensions (figure-2 and figure-3 illustrate such argument). The author makes this argument by constructing a model of meta-structure and assumes this structure is a perceived normative skeleton or background functioning in both ethnic and civic Chinese daily lives.

Because the foregoing argument is based on a theoretical analysis, it is necessary to explore this question in an empirical way. Hence, comes the first batch of research questions:

Q₁: Can the theoretically reasoned structure of the Chinese National Identity (CNI) be supported by the empirical results? In other words, do meta-structure (inflexible EC), the flexible EC, and the CI components fit the CNI structure?

Q₂: Whether there exists the relative blurred boundary between the EC and the CI elements, which can be understood as the identity ambiguity or confusion?

Q₃: Are there significant discordances between the descriptive and the prescriptive dimensions of each of these qualitative contents of the CNI, which can be interpreted as identity conflicts?

These research concerns tackle the latent structure of the CNI, followed by the questions: how is the CNI presented in the Chinese social lives? In other words, how does the CNI function in specific social issues involved in the subjects of “nations”, “sovereignty”, “nationalism”, or “national identity”? In order to address these questions, the current study employs the notion that exposure to media coverage is one of the key social situations that influences the presentation of the national identity because people in their daily lives are surrounded by oceans of media information which has been well framed in order for the disseminators to achieve various specific media influences. As the two significant cognitive effects of media, media priming and framing effects have been studied jointly since the 1990s, during which the academic concerns were focused on the ability of media to alter the kinds of considerations that media audience members use in information-processing (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Therefore, the current study tends to link the media framing & priming effect with the presentations of national identity. That is, how are the diverse elements of CNI stimulated via the media applicability & accessibility function and ultimately manifested as the attitudes toward the salient social issue.




Figure-2: The Meta-structure, Normative fit, and Identity from pre-modern to modern China




Figure-3. The actual and ideal construction of modern China's national identity

CHAPTER II: EXPLANATORY MODELS OF MEDIA FRAMING & PRIMING EFFECT

II-1. Theoretical Foundation and the Cognitive Processes of Media Framing & Priming Effect

As far as the explanatory models are concerned, the applicability versus the accessibility model are the two widespread paths for media influence in the psychological, sociological, and mass communication research domains (Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003; Scheufele, & Tewksbury, 2007, 2009; Higgins, 1996). What these models share is the cognitive proposition that the specific information package functions in the audience opinions via intermediate effects on knowledge activation (Higgins, 1996; Price & Tewksbury, 1997), because, rather than processing all information available in one's knowledge store, people tend to use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics relevant to the task at hand (Taylor, 1981; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). That is, by activating some knowledge rather than others in a presumed knowledge store of the audience, certain information could encourage particular lines of thought toward certain social issues and, therefore, invite the audience to approach, to some extent, the predictable conclusions (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

The difference between these two models is that the applicability effects emphasize how links between concepts and interpretations function in the formation of audiences' opinions. In other words, how a framed information package builds the strengths of the connection of descriptors and considerations (Scheufele, & Tewksbury, 2009). Media framing effect is generally classified into the applicability effects. That is, a frame is an important tool that helps

the audience to make sense of issues in the news. In contrast, the accessibility model, generally represented by agenda setting and priming effect, highlights that information selection increases the likelihood that some issues rather than others will come to mind via the intermediate impact on knowledge (nodes) activation in memory. By controlling the frequency (Higgins et al., 1985) and recency (Herr et al., 1983) of node activation, the press can affect the formation of subsequent judgments of the audience.

In terms of the relationship between the two media influences, there are “conceptual obliqueness” and “operational inconsistency” between framing and priming effect in the field of communication (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). On the one hand, some studies suggested that framing effects could be regarded as a second-step of agenda setting. That is, media framing functions after effects on perceived issue importance (McCombs, 2004); while others, such as Price & Tewksbury (1997) and Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997), suggested that accessibility effects were distinct from framing effects in which the meaning, implication or cause of an issue was “relevant framed” (Nelson, et al., 1997). For instance, according to Price & Tewksbury (1997), the applicability and accessibility effects are depicted as “at the point of message processing the salience of attributes of a message evoke and activates certain constructs, which then have an increased likelihood of use in evaluations made in response to the message [the applicability effect]...once activated, constructs retain some residual activation potential, making them likely to be activated and used in subsequent evaluations [the accessibility effects]” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). That means the accessibility effects, including agenda setting and priming, are the second-order effects of framing.

Moreover, rather than emphasizing the cognitive order of these effects, Brewer and his colleagues (2003), based on the associative network model (e.g. Collins and Loftus, 1975),

interpreted the two routes of media influence by emphasizing whether or not a direct association is drawn between an issue and a specific target of judgment. The accessibility effect implies that, once a specific node is activated, “activation spreads along the associative pathways [automatically] to other nodes in the mental network” (Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003). This implies that media priming (or agenda setting) elevates the probability that news stories may influence certain judgments indirectly via the function of spreading activation (Collins and Loftus, 1975). Nonetheless, the applicability effect holds that, by directly telling people which associations in memory should receive greater weight (Nelson et al. 1997), frames increase the likelihood that those framed associations could be followed during issue processing (Miller & Krosnick, 2000), because a not well-framed message may activate contradictory associations in mind between the issue and the possible judgments and, therefore, fail to direct audiences’ judgments, although it does make the issue more accessible or increase the perceived issue’s importance. This argument implies that spreading activation does not result in media priming effects, and therefore the accessibility of a concept is determined, at least to some degree, by its applicability to the current stimulus (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). In their empirical work of priming or framing: Media influences on attitudes toward foreign countries, Brewer, et al. (2003) tested the two types of media effects. That is, whether the media message influences the audience’s judgment toward foreign nations by highlighting issues on the domestic agenda without a direct link to the specific foreign nations (priming effect). Second, whether or not the media exposure functions in the audience’s judgment process by providing news frames that directly link issues to the target countries (framing effect). After pre- and post-test, the experiment showed little evidence of a priming effect via the indirect route and mixed evidence

of a news framing effect with a direct link between issues and the nations at hand (Brewer, Graf, & Willnat, 2003).

Based on the associative network body of theories shared by both types of routes of media influence, Price and Tewksbury (1997) introduced a psychological model named Process of Construct Activation and Use (PCAU) (figure 4) which helps to interpret the mechanism of the spreading of knowledge activation from one construct to a related concept without being triggered by the external stimulus (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).




Figure-4. Process of construct activation and use (Price & Tewksbury, 1997)

According to Price and Tewksbury (1997), a Knowledge Store is analogous to the long-term memory which includes “social objects and their attributes (OA); goals, values, and motivations (GVM); and affective and emotional states (AS).” Three primary variables

determined the activation of a construct in this knowledge store: “the Chronic (or Baseline) Accessibility”, “the Temporary Accessibility”, and “the Applicability to Current Stimuli” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). The first two accessibilities, as the activation potential of available knowledge, are in accordance with the concept defined by Higgins (1996). That is, when constructs are activated, they are imbued with a certain level of residual energy (or the construct's excitation level) which is thought to make constructs more accessible only on a temporary basis (Higgins, 1996).

Also, the intersection between the Knowledge Store and the Current Stimuli, according to Price and Tewksbury (1997), is the required stimulation with some kind of matching or applicability created when the construct’s key features correspond to the salient features of the stimulus. Thus, the current stimuli refer to the key elements of those objects, attributes, and events that are most salient to perceivers and, therefore, used in their social evaluation (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

The third part of the model, the Active Thought, corresponds to the working memory. That is, “the real-time processing actors undergo as they interpret and interact with their environment” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Such active thoughts are in accordance with the prevailing opinions in the social psychological literature that people tend to accept adequate constructs that are most accessible via the recency and frequency of prior activation due to their cognitive misers in nature (Taylor, 1981). There are three elements within such Active Thought: “the Real-Time Processes of Construct Activation”, “the Evaluation of Construct Relevance”, and “the Use of Constructs in the Evaluation of the Stimuli” which also intersects with the set of Current Stimuli (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). In particular, the process of the Evaluation of

Construct Relevance plays in part determines whether and how constructs are used in social evaluation in terms of their suitability for responding to the circumstances.

Also, the model implies that applicability effects should be regarded as primary or first-order effects of media messages. In other words, “for either type of accessibility effect to occur, there must have been prior activation through applicability to some prior stimulus” (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Further, accessibility effects are the concomitant of “temporary residual excitation” (Higgins, 1996) or high chronic accessibility and thus serve as the secondary effect of media messages (Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Therefore, this model explains in detail what Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) suggest as “perhaps the best way to conceive of the difference between the two [media framing versus priming effect] is to recognize that accessibility and applicability go hand-in-hand in everyday information processing” (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007) Therefore, the current study will employ this model as a fundamental framework to investigate how and to what extent the media influence function in the manifestation of China’s national identity, since media framing and priming effect play a joint important role in everyday information processing.

II-2. The Function of Media Framing & Priming Effect and the National Identity

In chapter I, it seems there are two sets of national identity constructions competing with each other in the current Chinese society. That is, the actual versus the ideal national identity. In terms of the actual version, modern China’s national identity has roots in pre-modern China’s Ethnic-Cultural identity (EC) which is mediated by being injected into the introduced external elements, the Western Civic-Institutional element (CI). Chinese citizens have not merely to cognitively conform to various social norms so as to achieve national categorization

qualitatively, but also to subjectively use the evaluation of such norms in the process for ego-involvement quantitatively.

According to the PCAU model, these elements or components could be seen as, in Price and Tewksbury's (1997) terminology, the "social objects and their attributes (OA), goals, values, and motivations (GVM), and affective and emotional states (AS)" in the Knowledge Store associated with long-term memory—the Chronic Descriptive & Prescriptive normative fit. Therefore, if an appropriate current stimulus, a well-framed message-package based on a carefully selected social issue, makes some OA, GVM, or AS in the Knowledge Store more salient than others, the applicability or relevance of the construct between the current stimuli and the target concentration—the specific OA, GVM, or AS of national identity—should elevate the accessibility of the target concern. In turn, the audience will use these salient accessibilities (the framing effect) and the temporal residual excitations generated from the salient accessibilities (the priming effect) (Higgins, 1996) to make certain attitudinal assessment towards the target concentration. That is, media audiences have a high probability of using these activated thoughts to react to the target theme. Figure 5 illustrates the combination of the PCAU model and the SIT- & SGDT-based construction of national identity. As to the current study, the social issue selected as the temporary accessibility is the recent Chinese street protests, demonstrations, and boycotts toward specific alien brands due to a series of territorial disputes among China and some of the East & Southeast Asian states. The rationale for selecting this issue will be discussed in the following sections.




Figure-5. Process of construct activation and use in terms of national identity

It is reasonable that, based on this model, the issue selection and the relevant frames by which the issue is presented are the two key elements raising the possibility of the occurrence of the media effects. Thus, here comes to the next concern: what is the initial requirement involved in the key predicting variables (the issue selection) in the current study? Since the national identity is a kind of role identity involved in the feelings and concepts about a nation, the predicting social issue selected should possess the possibility to activate such feelings and concepts, say, the chronic accessibility, in the knowledge store. In other words, there should be a pre-existing link between the selected issue (the node) and the target feelings and concepts within national identity (the nodes expected to be activated). However, in terms of Price and Tewksbury's (1997), the expected accessibility effect could not necessarily occur until the selected issue is relevantly framed as the current stimuli. Therefore, the next question being

solved is the relevance or applicability of the issue framing, in statistic terminology, the levels of the predictor or the treatments, which satisfy the functions of the key predicting variables. The reasonable levels of such variable are the ingroup and outgroup situations, or simply, whether there exists a condition involved in intergroup (or international) comparison, because a national identity is a kind of social identity which implies that ingroup similarity & ego-involvement or outgroup difference & discrimination are the fundamental psychological process leading to the occurrence of group identification.

The question, thus, is clear as long as the issue selection and the way the issue is framed are concerned. That is, there are at least two well-framed news stories involved in a common social issue in ingroup and intergroup levels respectively (the independent variable in two levels) to predict the dependent variable—the attitude toward the selected issue.

II-3. Issue Selection and Frame Building

Issues of the territorial dispute could be closer to the theme involved in the concept of “nations”, “sovereignty”, “nationalism”, or “national identity”. Because, a historic territory or homeland is one of the fundamental features of national identity (Smith, 1991, pp.14). Several large-scale street protests occurred in China in 2012 followed by the dispute between China and Japan over the territorial sovereignty of the Diaoyu (or the Senkaku) islands in the East China Sea. These demonstrations were usually accompanied by boycotts of the commodities of the related countries. For instance, sales in Japanese autos plunged in 2012 in China after the acuteness of this dispute.⁴⁸ In July 2016, after the Chinese government accused Washington of

⁴⁸ See The Associated Press July 21, 2016. KFC, Apple in China hit by South China Sea spat. Contributed by AP researchers Yu Bing and Dong Tongjian. Retrieved from http://wowway.net/news/read/category/world/article/the_associated_press-kfc_apple_in_china_hit_by_south_china_sea_spa-ap

encouraging Manila to oppose Beijing's claims to vast tracts of the South China Sea, the nationalists were calling for boycotts of KFC outlets. Likewise, photos of young Chinese wearing scarves with patriotic slogans smashing Apple iPhones in the protest were circulated online⁴⁹.

Therefore, news reports, editorials, comments, and essays involved in the current protests and boycotts toward certain alien brands due to territorial disputes can serve as the current stimuli which could trigger the chronic and temporary accessibilities in the Chinese citizens' knowledge stores. As aforementioned, the set of symbols, values, memories, and norms—the baseline accessibility—related to the perennial ethnic crisis and the process of Chinese searching for a “new” national identity during the nineteenth century was stimulated by the extremely urgent threats stemming from the global expansion of the Western powers. However, historically speaking, the Chinese have complex or even conflicting feelings toward street protests, demonstrations, or boycotts. Some demonstrations were regarded as the positive force promoting the development of contemporary society such as the May Fourth Movement (五四运动)⁵⁰ in 1919, while others, carried out by the benighted mobs or the “nationalist” hooligans, were marked by a ruinous turbulence with negative influences in the social process

⁴⁹ See Note.49; also see The Associated Press, July 20, 2016. China criticizes street protests over arbitration ruling. Retrieved from <http://www.ctvnews.ca/world/china-criticizes-street-protests-over-arbitration-ruling-1.2994035>.

⁵⁰ “In 1919 Chinese nationalism was at a new height of concern over the Shantung issue (山东问题). At the Paris Peace Conference it was finally decided to honor the secret wartime agreements made by Japan with Great Britain, France and Italy by which Japan would retain the entitlements of Germany in Shantung province, from which the Japanese had expelled the Germans in 1914. This flagrant denial of the new Wilsonian principles of open diplomacy and self-determination touched off the May Fourth incident (五四运动). On that afternoon [May 4th, 1919] over 3,000 students from a dozen Peking institutions rallied at the Gate of Heavenly Peace (天安门) at the entrance to the palace to protest at the Paris decision and the complicity of the Anfu-government (安福系军阀政府) that had itself in 1918 secretly agreed to let Japan remain in Shantung (山东)” See Fairbank J. K. & Twitchett, D. (Eds.) (1983). *Republican China, 1912–1949, Part 1*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.12. pp.407.

such as the Boxer Movement (义和团运动)⁵¹ in the 1890s. Therefore, street demonstrations triggered by territorial or other international dispute as both of the chronic and temporal accessibility will be in accordance with what Miller and Krosnick (2000) argued that a message of an issue without frames may activate contradictory associations in mind between the issue and the possible judgments and therefore fail to direct audiences' judgments, although it does make the issue more accessible or increase the perceived issue's importance. Frames, therefore, increase the likelihood that those framed associations could be followed on issue processing (Miller & Krosnick, 2000).

According to the key levels of the predictor (ingroup or intergroup situations), two frames are built upon the issues of the street demonstrations that occurred in 2016 in China in order to facilitate the PCAU model to be achieved in the current study. One frame tends to on the domestic level link the street protests to the Chinese ingroup similarity (including both of the EC and CI elements, see frame I). The alternative is aimed at establishing the intergroup discrimination via international comparison (including both of the EC and CI elements, see frame II). The research interest is to explore what components in the structure of CNI (the latent variables of activated descriptive or prescriptive fits of EC and CI elements) function in the corresponding process of each of the evaluative judgments (the presentations or reflections of

⁵¹ "Boxers was the English name for a Chinese secret society called the *I-ho ch'lian*, or the *Righteous and Harmonious Fists* (义和拳) after the old-style calisthenics practised by its members... In the 1890s this traditionally anti-dynastic organization also took on an anti-foreign cast, vowing to kill foreigners and their Chinese collaborators." in particular, after 1899 "the Boxers raised the banner of 'support for the Ch'ing and extermination of the foreigners' (扶清灭洋). The governor subsidized the Boxers, invited them to train his own soldiers and renamed them the *I-ho t'uan* (义和团) as a form of officially sanctioned militia... The Boxers became more daring, destroying railways and telegraph lines as symbols of the foreign enslavement of China." See Fairbank J. K. & Liu, Kwang-Ching (Eds.) (1980). *Late Ch'ing 1800–1911, Part 2*. In Twitchett, D. & Fairbank J. K. (Eds.) *The Cambridge History of China*. Vol.11. pp.117-119.

CNI) toward the boycott. Table-2 illustrates the frame building and the target concentration. Table-3 presents the two media information packages in the current study.

Table-2. Frame building and the target concentration

Frame	Target concentration
Frame I	the Chinese ingroup similarity
Frame II	the intergroup discrimination

Hence, the second batch of research questions are listed as:

Q₄: Is there a significant difference in the evaluative judgments between the two groups of participants?

Q₅: Does the activated descriptive (or cognitive) dimension of CNI functions in the evaluative judgment of the participants who receive the treatment focused on intergroup discrimination since the participants will emphasize their difference from others?

Q₆: Does the activated prescriptive (or affective) dimension of CNI functions in the evaluative judgment of the participants who receive the treatment focused on ingroup similarity since the participants have dynamic affections or evaluations toward certain ingroup norms?

According to Kenny and Lavoie (1985) Attitude toward an event refers to the personal judgments; while, norms refer to the mean attitude of a group toward an event. In other words, attitudes are the internalities of the social influence; while norms are the social influence at the group level (Kenny & Lavoie, 1985). Hence, the diverse norms of Chinese society and their different kinds of fit stimulated via the media applicability & accessibility functions could be manifested ultimately as the attitudes towards the street demonstrations. By tackling these research questions, the current study tends to grasp the map of the relationship among the CNI, the media effect, and the evaluative judgment toward the street demonstrations.

Table-3. Two media information packages in the current study⁵²

Frame I.	Frame II.
<p>Street protests and boycotts have appeared in many cities since 2012. These events were triggered by a series of sovereignty disputes in the East and the South China Sea. The following are opinions selected from academic reports, online forums, and social media. Please answer the questions after reading the opinions attached.</p>	
<p>Media comments: The ostensible legalization and civilization on the surface, and the actual web of social connections aimed at private purposes in the reality. They were free to boycott strangers' Japanese cars but to take care of their own Japanese Cars. Actually, this is our 5000-year's historical-cultural gene.</p> <p>A blog essay: it is easy to interpret these protests: being enslaved with the boss in the office, slavishly dependent on clients in social occasions, and caring much about the facial expression of the mother-in-law on weekends, I have already contributed myself to be a "Merit Student". I just kick a Japanese car, so, leave me alone, okay? O(∩_∩)O ...</p> <p>A blog essay: I do not understand that facing these valorous, patriotic, and manful Chinese protestors, some persons are criticizing them and crying "law-abiding" and "selfless dedication" of the patriotic. I'll ask those who are crying: Are you are really law-abiding patriotic?</p> <p>A scholar's article: There is no public politics in China, and people, therefore, cannot obtain from the public politics a sense of self-importance. Some of them plunge into the mass movement so as to quickly enhance individuals' self-esteem.</p> <p>Media comments: what we care is actually not fair but benefit; we are free to criticize others, but rarely reflect on ourselves; Things that can be done through social relationships are never solved by proper means.</p> <p>A scholar's article: we must admit that we Chinese have insufficient Economic knowledge such as international trade and the opportunity cost, etc. Grassroots cannot assess the consequences of trade boycott. We are more accustomed to making judgment intuitively and morally.</p>	<p>US Media: the Chinese "patriotic" protests is the residual of exclusionism derived from a banal peasant society.</p> <p>British Media: The low education level and the distorted xenophobia of Chinese mass worry the international community. They have inadequate knowledge of bilateral economic and international trade.</p> <p>Singaporean Media: For European and American thinking, trade resistance was an economic problem. But in the Chinese perspective, boycotts were actually the collective sentiment derived from the family-country homogeneity.</p> <p>A comment on Canadian student's forum: China has her own cultural context. You can love this country because of calligraphy, architecture, or even mahjong. As living in a country built up by immigrants, American are not able to understand this. For them, a nation is a big company or a piece of contract.</p> <p>An academic report from a US university: based on the economic data, the 1919 May Fourth Movement caused a significant loss in Japan (exports fell by \$86 million 960 thousand, accounting for 9% of the following year). Furthermore, the Chinese National consciousness manifested via the protest provided the Chinese delegation a major public opinion support at the Washington Conference and ultimately contributed to the return of Shandong (山东).</p> <p>French media: in fact, there is not much tradition of public protest in Chinese civilization, the Chinese protest is only a demand of national self-esteem. However, the strikes and protests in Europe are more worthy of our attention. Some countries have been in debt and even bankruptcy.</p>

⁵² The two framed stories are constructed artificially by the author in order to create the appropriate trigger for the current study.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

III-1. Theoretical and empirical problems in testing the attributions of the macro-concept of national identity and the hypothetical assignment of the attributions of China's national identity in the current study

Research validity about the qualitative component. One obstacle confronted by the empirical studies of national identity, according to Corkalo & Kamenov (2003), was the ambiguity of the very concept of national identity due to the various historical processes of diverse national states, because of which scholars in different nations constructed different definitions and theoretical approaches to the term of national identity (Corkalo & Kamenov, 2003). Therefore, the attempts at trying to measure the attributions, extent, and implications of national identities in mass populations were rare (Corkalo & Kamenov, 2003; Sinnott, R., 2004). Nonetheless, some scholars had tried to tackle the problems by deliberately reifying the qualitative contents and psychological dimensions of national identity. Also, studies had resulted in a lot of methodological suggestions which contributed to the knowledge in this field such as the research conducted by Westle (2014).

Westle (2014) presented a brief summary of the current trends of studies involved in the well-known macro concept of national identity (Westle, 2014). As to the ethnic versus civic model of national identity (Smith, 1991), some suggested discarding the differentiation due to the lack of pure ethnic or civic nations in the actual world (e.g. Kuzio 2002; retrieved from Westle, 2014), while some wanted to add a cultural dimension into the more parsimonious

dichotomy structure (e.g. Shulman, 2002; Kuzio, 2002; retrieved from Westle, 2014). As far as the investigative scope (or the psychological dimension) was concerned, an increasing consensus was that the vertical dimension should be distinguished from the more cognitive dimension in terms of the content or meaning of nationality (e.g. Blank, Schmidt, & Westle, 2001; Huddy & Khatib, 2007; retrieved from Westle, 2014), because the degrees of different individuals' attachments to certain nationalities could be different, although the national categorization was roughly the same.

More important, after reviewing the quantitative approaches involved in studies of national or European identities during the last two decades, Westle (2014) pointed out the existing problems and possible directions of the solution. These studies included the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1995 and 2003, European Values Study (EVS) 2008, the Integrated and United Survey (InTune) 2007 and 2009, and the Eurobarometer (EB) in 2010 (Westle, 2014). Westle (2014) reduced the survey indicators and research validity on national identity into three dimensions. That is, the cultural dimension was separated from the ethnic-cultural combination, thus the ethnic dimension was treated as the "ascribed, nativist, objectivist, primordial" being, and the civic dimension the "achievable, acquired, subjectivist, voluntaristic", and the cultural dimension, the mixed one (Westle, 2014).

In contrast to the three dimensions summarized by Westle (2014), it is reasonable to combine the ethnic and cultural dimensions in the concept of China's national identity, because, as argued in the first Chapter, the cultural element should not and cannot be separated from the ethnic component. Moreover, there is not a pure race concept that is not being mixed with the cultural element, and there is not a Chinese culture separate from the ethnic sentiment. Likewise, the term of territory in Chinese does not merely mean the sovereignty or constitutional essence,

but rather a historical-cultural and ethnic-sentimental being. Such richness in the meaning of the concept of territory derived essentially from the loess and the yellow river, as well as the agricultural civilization based on them.⁵³ The perception of the territory is always combined with concepts of “mother”, “homeland”, “family-ties”, “local kinship”, and “growth”. That’s why, as far as the territorial issues are concerned, the direct response of a general Chinese (sometimes an official announcement) is not something like “from××Pact, or ××Treaty, the sovereignty of this area...”, but usually something like “from the history, Chinese people lived here...” Therefore, the term of the civic-institutional model is substituted for the civic-territorial model (Smith, 1991) in the current study.

Likewise, there were some common categorical questions about the specific items (the indicators) in the hypothetical construct of the national identity, for instance, the indicator of the national economy. According to Westle (2014), the economy was classified into the ethnic-cultural dimension in some survey (i.e. Allbus 1988-1996), while sometimes it was classified into the civic dimension (i.e. ISSP 1995 and 2003) (Westle, 2014). Similar problems probably occur in situations involved in the ambiguity toward the prescriptive norms as mentioned in the first section of the current study. That is, although the participants could distinguish the indicators which belong to the civic-institutional component by their everyday perceptions and observations, they probably could not tell the affective or evaluative criteria of such indicators from the norms of ethnic-cultural components, because the civic-institutional indicators should entail the common sentiment of ethnic-cultural unity and family-nation homogeneity due to the

⁵³ China is one of the cradles of agriculture in the world. See Stavrianos, L. S. (1995). *The World to 1500: a Global History*. pp. 28;

Also, the uniqueness of the loess, season wind, and rivers in the central China not only triggered the agricultural-political management system and philosophical thoughts, but also shaped ethnic Chinese characters. See Huang, R. (1997). *China a Macro History*. Chapter 3. pp.23-30.

function of Sinicization of the political items introduced. However, in order to accurately conform to the existing theoretical framework and the enforceability of a study, the author categorized the following norms (indicators) into the common accepted two conceptual dimensions. Table-4 illustrates the basic hypothetical categorization of the survey indicators.

Table-4. The hypothetical categorization of the elements of China’s national identity

Ethnic-cultural (EC) (ascribed, nativist, objectivist, primordial)	Civic-institutional (CI) (achievable, acquired, subjectivist, or mixed)
history, born, family ties, language and writing characters, moral feeling, ancestry, destiny, customs, habits, cultural symbols, meritocracy, social connections, the superior-inferior affiliations	Constitution, laws, political-legal system, rights, and duties, social welfare, citizenship, political participation, contractual spirit, public interests, collectivism, nationality, economy, national symbols

Research validity about psychological dimension. Westle (2014) reduced the survey indicators and research validity on national identity into a five-question stimuli. Such stimuli included “objects on national pride”, “importance of certain traits for being truly national or European”, “shared national (or European) commonalities”, “criteria for accepting immigrants as new co-nationals”, and “traits for accepting groups as certain nationality” (Westle 2014). Because some stimuli such as “criteria for accepting immigrants as new co-nationals” and “traits for accepting groups as certain nationality” were not salient in China’s national identity, they were excluded from the current study.

As to the remaining three stimuli, the “objects of national pride” (e.g. How proud are you in each of the followings?) seems more affection-oriented, because national pride or sense of superiority involves human emotion and affection. Also, in accordance with the SGT, the prescriptive fit involves the affective involvement, goal involvement, and ego-involvement (Druckman, 1994). Therefore, question stimuli involved in national pride, affection, and superiority were classified into the measure of the prescriptive dimension in the current study.

In contrast, the other two question stimuli in Westle's (2014) categorization are more perception- or cognition-oriented. Because these stimuli are based on the participants' everyday observations or cognitions, the perception of certain items that are important in national identity and the cognition of shared commonalities imply a type of descriptive normative fit to some degree regardless of whether they are favored or affected by the participants. These stimuli, hence, were jointly classified into the descriptive dimension.

Based on the foregoing empirical studies, the first part of the questionnaire of the Chinese national identity (QCNI) focused on the structure of CNI in the current study used a 28-indicator bipolar scale with seven steps so that higher scores represented "completely agree", while the lower scores represented "completely disagree". The twenty-eight survey indicators (the manifest variables) were formed by fourteen selected qualitative items of national identity (seven for the latent EC and seven for the latent CI variables), with was asked two times (in two different ways) so as to satisfy the descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. Thus, the twenty-eight indicators actually constructed a 14×2 matrix. In terms of the second part of the QCNI, six items involved in affection, evaluation, and behavior tendency were formed as the manifest variables to represent the latent attitudes toward the issue of street demonstrations. Table-5 represents the construct of QCNI. (Also see Appendix: Questionnaires of the Chinese national identity)

III-2. Method

The current research was a survey-based study focused on the relationship between China's National Identity (CNI) and the attitude toward the street demonstrations (the reflection of the CNI) via media influences. The survey included two steps. First, two groups of

participants were required to complete the same section of the questionnaire aimed at measuring the attributes and components of the CNI. No interferences occurred during this section. This step was aimed at answering the first batch of research questions—the qualitative content and the psychological dimensions of the structure of the CNI. Second, the two groups of participants were asked to read one of the two framed stories and then complete the second part of the questionnaire aimed at measuring the attitude toward the street demonstrations. The two framed stories in the second section were the interferences each of which was focused on the association between the street demonstrations and certain target attributes in the structure of the CNI. Therefore, the second step involved answering the second batch of research questions which was aimed at exploring the relationship between the CNI and the evaluative judgments. During this process, the activated content in CNI which were stimulated by the corresponding framed media story were regarded as the independent variable, while the attitude toward the street demonstrations was the dependent variable. In terms of the statistical analysis technique, the data would be treated as the multivariate data based on which a series of confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) and structural equation models (SEM) were formed so as to draw the structure of the CNI and the map of media applicability-accessibility effect. In order to increase the precision of the study, some covariates were recorded. Such covariates include: the region where the participant grew up until he or she went to the college (two levels: the coastal China and the inland China),⁵⁴ the occupation status (two levels: the college students and ones who have already

⁵⁴ The author assumes the respondents' opinions could be shaped-resaped by different regional contexts for the following two reasons: (1) the difference of the urbanization degree between the coastal areas (the east) and the inland area (the west). "China encompasses a highly urbanized, highly industrialized, highly prosperous East, and a much more rural, agrarian, and poor West." See Abebe, D. & Masur, J. (2008). A Nation Divided: Eastern China, Western China, and the Problem of Global Warming. University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 232, 2008. Also, (2) the China's income inequality could be roughly manifested by the disparities between the Coastal China and the Inland China. See Keidel, (2007). China Regional Disparities: The Causes and Impact of Regional Inequalities in Income and Well-Being. Retrieved from Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: <http://carnegieendowment.org/files/keidel1.pdf>. Also see Wong, (2013). Survey in China

worked), age (two levels: younger than or equal to 30 years old and older than or equal to 31 years old), and gender status (male or female).

Table-5. The qualitative items of QCNI

Section 1			
	EC items		CI items
descriptive	How do you think our Chinese are described as the following: (META-EC) 1-Social Connection or Circle of Contact 2-Superior-Inferior Affiliations (Flexible-EC) 3-Chinese Language 4-Ancestors, Histories, and Traditions 5-Confucianism 6-Family Ethics 7-Being Born in China		How do you think our Chinese are described as the following: (CI) 8- Laws and Legal Concepts 9- Civic Rights and Duties 10-Political Participation 11- Public Interests 12- Chinese Citizenship 13- National Economy 14-National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem
prescriptive	How do you like, or how are you proud of, each of the attributes: (META-EC) 1-Social Connection or Circle of Contact 2-Superior-Inferior Affiliations (Flexible-EC) 3-Chinese Language 4-Ancestors, Histories, and Traditions 5-Confucianism 6-Family Ethics 7-Being Born in China		How do you like, or how are you proud of, each of the attributes: (CI) 8- Laws and Legal Concepts 9- Civic Rights and Duties 10-Political Participation 11- Public Interests 12- Chinese Citizenship 13- National Economy 14-National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem
Section 2			
Evaluative	Affection	Evaluation	Tendency of participation
judgement	Do you Like it? Do you think it is good?	Is it valuable? Is it effective?	Should it be supported? Do you want to participate?

The questionnaire was constructed via one of the most popular online survey websites named AskForm in China, which was similar to Survey Monkey. The researcher invited the participants through several large-sized social media in China such as Wechat, QQ-online


Shows a Wide Gap in Income. Retrieved from the New York Times, 07-20-2013:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/20/world/asia/survey-in-china-shows-wide-income-gap.html?_r=0.

groups, Sina Weibo. The questionnaire was also disseminated through some well-known online communities, such as bbs.tianya.cn, qzone.qq.com, www.renren.com, facebook, etc. Apart from these regular approaches, the researcher hired several data collectors including staff in IT, real estate, landscape-planning INC., and college teachers, sports and fitness coaches, hairdressers, cab drivers, bookstore keepers, pet- and online-shopkeepers, etc. The total sample size was 738, with group I, 319 and group II, 419. Table-6 and Figure-6 summarized the demographic structure of the sample.


Table-6. The demographic frequency of each treatment group

	Demographic Items	Group I (Frame I)	Group 2 (Frame II)	Total
Occupational status	Government-affiliated institutions	26.56%	18.38%	21.95%
	Private enterprise	43.75%	45.11%	44.75%
	Students	29.69%	36.52%	33.6%
Education level	High school or vocational education	8.13%	11.93%	10.30%
	Undergraduate	70.63%	73.27%	72.22%
	Graduate	21.25%	14.80%	17.62%
Age range	18-30	57.81%	57.04%	57.45%
	31-45	33.44%	34.37%	33.88%
	≥ 46	8.75%	8.59%	8.67%
Location	Inland China	63.13%	67.54%	66%
	Coastal China	36.88%	32.46%	34%
Gender	Male	51.72%	58.17%	55%
	Female	48.28%	41.83%	45%


Occupational Status



Locations



Age range



Gender




Figure-6. The summary of the demographic structure of the sample.

CHAPTER IV: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Seven hundred and thirty-eight participants provided complete responses to the QCNI. Responses were analyzed via the computer tool of lavaan_0.5-22 for R version 3.3.2 (R-3.3.2). Two batches of statistical results were generated, each of which was associated with the corresponding research questions. Table-7 was a summary of the research questions.

Table-7 A summary of the research questions

Batch 1. The structure of CNI
Q1: Can the theoretically reasoned structure of the CNI be supported by the empirical evidence? In other words, do meta-structure (inflexible EC), the flexible EC, and the CI components fit the CNI structure?
Q2: Whether there is a relative blurred boundary between the EC and the CI elements, which can be understood as the identity ambiguity or confusion?
Q3: Are there significant discordances between the descriptive and the prescriptive dimensions of each of the qualitative contents of the CNI, which can be interpreted as identity conflicts?
Batch 2. The relationship between the activated CNI and evaluated judgments
Q4: Is there a significant difference of the evaluative judgments between the two groups of participants?
Q5: Does the activated descriptive (or cognitive) dimension of CNI function in the evaluative judgment of the participants who receive the treatment focused on intergroup discrimination since the participants will emphasize their difference from others?
Q6: Does the activated prescriptive (or affective) dimension of CNI function in the evaluative judgment of the participants who receive the treatment focused on the various degrees of ingroup similarity since the participants have dynamic affections or evaluations toward certain ingroup norms?

IV-1. The Statistical results for the Structure of CNI

IV-1.1. Qualitative Content of CNI and Identity Ambiguity

Based on the theory of macro-concept of national identity (Westle, 2014; Corkalo & Kamenov, 2003; Smith, 1991), as well as the historical argument of the uniqueness of China's context in the first section, a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model (CFA-1) was formed by using the total six factors (the big-six-factor-model). The model was represented as:

Table-8. CFA-1 with the big-six factors and the Fit measures⁵⁵

Model of CFA-1:	
Latent variable	Manifest variable
D-MEC	Cir + Aff
D-FEC	Lag + His + Cfu + Fam + Brn
D-CI	Law + Rig + Pol + Cll + Nat + Eco + Flg
P-MEC	Cir0 + Aff0
P-FEC	lag0 + His0 + Cfu0 + Fam0 + Brn0
P-CI	Law0 + Rig0 + Pol0 + Cll0 + Nat0 + Eco0 + Flg0
Factors:	
D-MEC: Descriptive Meta-Ethnic Cultural Component	
D-FEC: Descriptive Flexible-Ethnic Cultural Component	
D-CI : Descriptive Civic Institutional Component	
P-MEC: Prescriptive Meta-Ethnic Cultural Component	
P-FEC: Prescriptive Flexible-Ethnic Cultural Component	
P-CI : Prescriptive Civic Institutional Component	
Indicators (indicator0: represents prescriptive fit):	
Cir: Social Connection or Circle of Contact	
Aff: Superior-Inferior Affiliations	
Lag: Chinese Language	
His: Ancestors, Histories, and Traditions	
Cfu: Confucianism	
Fam: Family Ethics	
Brn: Being Born in China	
Law: Laws and Legal Concepts	
Rig: Civic Rights and Duties	
Pol: Political Participation	
Cll: Public Interests	
Nat: Chinese Citizenship	
Eco: National Economy	
Flg: National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem	

⁵⁵ Values of CFI and TLI are 0.95 or higher indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999); Values of RMSEA \leq 0.05 indicate good model fit, while values between 0.05 and 0.08 imply adequate model fit (Kline, 2011); Values of SRMR \leq 0.08 suggest good model fit to the data (Hu & Bentler, 1999).

Table # (continued)

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
830.056	335.000	0.966	0.961	0.045	0.063

After a Mardia test of multivariate skew and kurtosis, the Normal Q-Q Plot (figure-7) suggested that it might not be tenable to assume that the data were multivariate normal. Therefore, the model was fitted with WLSMV estimation. The fit measures presented above indicated that CFA-1 fitted the current data fairly well. That is to say, the macro-concept of national identity was supported by the current data, in particular, the theoretically reasoned Meta-structure (inflexible EC), the flexible EC, and the CI components for the CNI. Table 9 indicates all of the standardized path coefficients and covariances of the latent variables.




Figure-7. Mardia tests of multivariate skew and kurtosis for the current data.

Table-9. Standardized Path Coefficients and latent covariance of CFA-1

Latent Variables:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-MEC =~						
Cir	1.000				1.046	0.776
Aff	0.762	0.214	3.565	0.000	0.797	0.557
D-FEC =~						
lag	1.000				0.346	0.263
His	2.767	0.533	5.191	0.000	0.958	0.628
Cfu	1.122	0.258	4.348	0.000	0.389	0.373
Fam	2.791	0.600	4.653	0.000	0.966	0.569
Brn	1.180	0.398	2.967	0.003	0.408	0.184
D-CI =~						
Law	1.000				1.179	0.656
Rig	1.286	0.074	17.327	0.000	1.515	0.788
Pol	1.069	0.069	15.444	0.000	1.261	0.681
Cll	1.013	0.073	13.946	0.000	1.195	0.620
Nat	0.587	0.080	7.343	0.000	0.692	0.338
Eco	0.797	0.059	13.448	0.000	0.940	0.552
Flg	1.083	0.083	13.106	0.000	1.277	0.631
P-MEC =~						
Cir0	1.000				1.303	0.667
Aff0	1.048	0.096	10.936	0.000	1.366	0.716
P-FEC =~						
lag0	1.000				0.960	0.623
His0	1.267	0.078	16.203	0.000	1.216	0.701
Cfu0	1.427	0.112	12.794	0.000	1.370	0.711
Fam0	1.284	0.110	11.670	0.000	1.232	0.626

Table # (continued)

Latent Variables:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
Brn0	1.677	0.110	15.312	0.000	1.610	0.797
P-CI =~						
Law0	1.000				0.230	0.182
Rig0	1.012	0.224	4.510	0.000	0.233	0.190
Pol0	2.252	0.545	4.135	0.000	0.519	0.277
Cl10	2.079	0.465	4.470	0.000	0.479	0.342
Nat0	7.092	1.598	4.437	0.000	1.633	0.825
Eco0	6.351	1.406	4.517	0.000	1.463	0.728
Flg0	7.311	1.656	4.416	0.000	1.684	0.817
Covariances:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-MEC ~~						
D-FEC	0.100	0.035	2.867	0.004	0.276	0.276
D-CI	-0.234	0.074	-3.153	0.002	-0.189	-0.189
P-MEC	-0.129	0.078	-1.645	0.100	-0.094	-0.094
P-FEC	-0.099	0.055	-1.810	0.070	-0.099	-0.099
P-CI	-0.024	0.014	-1.739	0.082	-0.099	-0.099
D-FEC ~~						
D-CI	0.276	0.058	4.796	0.000	0.676	0.676
P-MEC	0.149	0.040	3.702	0.000	0.331	0.331
P-FEC	0.211	0.048	4.412	0.000	0.635	0.635
P-CI	0.043	0.014	3.089	0.002	0.544	0.544
D-CI ~~						
P-MEC	0.937	0.113	8.270	0.000	0.610	0.610
P-FEC	0.730	0.080	9.075	0.000	0.645	0.645

Table # (continued)

Latent Variables:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
P-CI	0.196	0.045	4.391	0.000	0.721	0.721
P-MEC ~~						
P-FEC	0.746	0.089	8.362	0.000	0.597	0.597
P-CI	0.174	0.041	4.284	0.000	0.579	0.579
P-FEC ~~						
P-CI	0.205	0.047	4.323	0.000	0.927	0.927

Additionally, based on the argument in the first and the third sections, an alternative way to interpret the CNI structure was the tendency of the ambiguity of the prescriptive standard of both of the EC and CI components due to the globalization and the Sinicization. The statistical results also indicated such notions. For example, the correlation between P-FEC and P-CI was 0.927 (the last row of table 9). Therefore, the author tried to construct an alternative model (CFA-2) in which a latent variable of a general prescriptive standard (P-GNR) was substituted for the P-MEC, P-FEC, and P-CI. The factor P-GNR could be interpreted as, by using Bland, Schmidt, and Westle’s (2001) terminology, the national identification. The general-four-factor-model, the fit measures and part of the fit summary were listed as table-10:

Table-10. The Model, fit measures, standardized Path Coefficients and latent covariance of CFA-2

Model of CFA-2:	
Latent variable	Manifest variable
D-MEC	Cir + Aff
D-FEC	Lag + His + Cfu + Fam + Brn
D-CI	Law + Rig + Pol + Cll + Nat + Eco + Flg
P-GNR	Cir0 + Aff0 + lag0 + His0 + Cfu0 + Fam0 + Brn0 + Law0 + Rig0 + Pol0 + Cll0 + Nat0 + Eco0 + Flg0
Factors:	
D-MEC: Descriptive Meta-Ethnic Cultural Component	
D-FEC: Descriptive Flexible-Ethnic Cultural Component	

Table # (continued)

D-CI : Descriptive Civic Institutional Component
P-GNR: General Prescriptive standard of the current China's social norms

Indicators:

Cir: Social Connection or Circle of Contact
Aff: Superior-Inferior Affiliations
Lag: Chinese Language
His: Ancestors, Histories, and Traditions
Cfu: Confucianism
Fam: Family Ethics
Brn: Being Born in China
Law: Laws and Legal Concepts
Rig: Civic Rights and Duties
Pol: Political Participation
Cll: Public Interests
Nat: Chinese Citizenship
Eco: National Economy
Flg: National Flag, Emblem, and Anthem

(indicator0: represents prescriptive norms)

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
937.678	344.000	0.959	0.955	0.048	0.066

Latent Variables:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-MEC =~						
Cir	1.000				1.047	0.776
Aff	0.761	0.215	3.545	0.000	0.797	0.557
DCEC =~						
lag	1.000				0.344	0.261
His	2.784	0.539	5.163	0.000	0.957	0.627
Cfu	1.123	0.261	4.308	0.000	0.386	0.370
Fam	2.824	0.608	4.641	0.000	0.970	0.571
Brn	1.203	0.404	2.979	0.003	0.414	0.186
D-CI =~						

Table # (continued)

Law	1.000				1.175	0.654
Rig	1.292	0.075	17.289	0.000	1.519	0.789
Nat	0.585	0.080	7.276	0.000	0.688	0.336
Pol	1.068	0.070	15.327	0.000	1.255	0.678
C11	1.016	0.073	13.872	0.000	1.194	0.620
Flg	1.092	0.083	13.104	0.000	1.284	0.634
Eco	0.799	0.060	13.356	0.000	0.939	0.551
P-GNR =~						
Cir0	1.000				0.890	0.456
Aff0	1.045	0.093	11.245	0.000	0.931	0.488
lag0	1.026	0.111	9.207	0.000	0.914	0.594
His0	1.302	0.124	10.522	0.000	1.159	0.669
Cfu0	1.487	0.130	11.453	0.000	1.324	0.687
Fam0	1.329	0.131	10.107	0.000	1.184	0.601
Brn0	1.733	0.151	11.500	0.000	1.544	0.764
Law0	0.252	0.061	4.126	0.000	0.224	0.177
Rig0	0.253	0.063	4.027	0.000	0.225	0.184
C110	0.524	0.084	6.264	0.000	0.467	0.333
Pol0	0.572	0.101	5.688	0.000	0.510	0.272
Nat0	1.787	0.157	11.368	0.000	1.592	0.804
Flg0	1.839	0.163	11.286	0.000	1.637	0.794
Eco0	1.609	0.135	11.902	0.000	1.433	0.714
Covariances:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-MEC ~~						
D-CEC	0.099	0.035	2.860	0.004	0.275	0.275
D-CI	-0.233	0.074	-3.151	0.002	-0.189	-0.189

Table # (continued)

P-GNR	-0.099	0.048	-2.054	0.040	-0.106	-0.106
D-CEC ~~						
D-CI	0.274	0.057	4.773	0.000	0.678	0.678
P-GNR	0.183	0.040	4.552	0.000	0.597	0.597
D-CI ~~						
P-GNR	0.757	0.090	8.425	0.000	0.724	0.724

The statistical results indicated that CFA-2 also fitted the current data. The fact that both of the two models fitted the data fairly well suggested that there existed a relative blurred boundary between the P-FEC and the P-CI elements⁵⁶. One of the possible reasons was that the discordance between the actual and ideal CNI resulted in a type of ambiguity of the prescriptive norms or identification confusion. In other words, the Western-Civic elements which were introduced by the Chinese scholars and political elites after the mid-nineteenth century had functioned profoundly in the process of the transformation of CNI from the Chinese cultural identity to the national identity. The prescriptive standards in both the EC and CI tended to combine with each other due to globalization or sinicization.

IV-1.2. The Identity Discordance between the Descriptive and the Prescriptive norms.

In terms of the third research question which was focused on the discordances between the descriptive and the prescriptive dimensions of each of the meta-EC, Flexible-EC, and CI

⁵⁶ The author had tried to combine the D-MEC, D-FEC, and D-CI, but such model could not fit the original data. This indicated that the Meta-structure-EC, the flexible EC, and the CI components in descriptive dimension possessed their own meaning and could not be mixed.

latent components of the CNI, a series of Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank tests were conducted on the scores of these latent components based on CFA-1. The scores of the latent components were obtained by calculating the means of the indicators of each of the corresponding latent components. Because the difference of each of the three paired scores (D-MEC and P-MEC, D-FEC and P-FEC, D-CI and P-CI) was not normal distributed after a series of Shapiro-Wilk normality tests, the author thus employed the Wilcoxon-Signed-Rank test, since it was the substitute for a t-test in paired samples which did not necessarily require a normal distribution of the data being tested. The R results indicated that there were significant differences between descriptive and prescriptive dimensions for all of the three paired comparisons. The mean difference between D-MEC and P-MEC is 2.71 with p-value $< 2.2e-16$; the mean difference between D-FEC and P-FEC is -0.07 with p-value = 0.0002432; the mean difference between D-CI and P-CI is -1.60 with p-value $< 2.2e-16$. In order to visualize the whole structure of the CNI, as well as the discordances between the two psychological dimensions in terms of the three qualitative contents, the author plotted the scores of these latent components (figure 8). Note that they were not factor scores. Also, since the two psychological dimensions of each of the three qualitative contents significantly differed from one other, the author plotted the means and medians of these scores (figure 9). These plots were helpful for grasping the map of the contemporary CNI.

From figure-8, the red points (descriptive) and the cyan points (prescriptive) were comparatively discretely distributed, which indicated the discordantly psychological normative fits of the social norms (the latent components). The red points in the meta-EC panel gathered on the upper side, while the cyan points gathered on the lower side. This indicated, on the one side, Meta-structure (social contacts and superior-inferior affiliation) of the traditional ethnic-cultural

norms fitted, descriptively or cognitively, the contemporary Chinese everyday lives, and it was partly via these cognitions that the Chinese obtain the collective awareness of “who we are”.

However, the cyan points which represented





Figure-8. Plot of the scores of the three qualitative contents against participant ID

relatively lower scores indicate that the Chinese did not actually favor the Meta-EC. In other words, the Chinese did not like the norms but had to conform to them for some practical needs and hence the collective identity. It was reasonable to interpret this situation as an identity conflict. In terms of the civic-institutional norms in the CI-panel, in contrast, the cyan points (the prescriptive normative fit of CI) distributed on the upper side of the penal compared with the red

points (the descriptive normative fit of CI). This indicated that the civic norms, such as laws, legal principles, public interest, etc., were favored or valued by the contemporary Chinese, but these norms were not significantly perceived as the actual social norms and rarely functioned in the everyday behaviors and ways of thinking of Chinese population. This situation could be regarded as identity desire. The discordance between the perception and the affection of the CI norms provided current Chinese an additional understanding of the attributes of our Chinese and social self-awareness.



Points connected by the solid line: means
 Points connected by the dotted line: medians
 The left side of each of the plots: Descriptive dimension
 The right side of each of the plots: Prescriptive dimension

Figure-9. Means and medians plot of the scores of the three qualitative contents

In the flexible-EC panel, two kinds of points were almost mixed together (the difference is as small as -0.07), although the difference between them was statistically significant. We could also see the situation in the middle panel of figure 9, where the medians of the two psychological dimensions were roughly similar. Also, these points were distributed roughly near the middle area (the fifth step in the seven-step-bipolar scale). Could we interpret it as a moderate fit of the latent flexible-EC component merely in a mathematical way? The author suggested that the participants gave the indicators of the latent flexible-EC moderate scores probably because they did not have clear opinions toward these indicators. That is to say, perhaps the participants did not know whether or not they favored the flexible-EC norms, or they did not have a clear perception of these norms in Chinese everyday lives. This situation could be regarded as another kind of identity confusion. This was, of course, due to the impact of the introduced civic-institutional norms by the modern intelligentsia and political elites in China, while it was reasonable that, as mentioned in the first section, the flexible-EC norms, such as Confucianism, being born in China, etc., were dynamic ones in the Chinese society and possessed a large variance or dispersion degree in their distributions in the long-lasting history.

IV-1.3. The CNI-Structure and the Covariates.

Apart from tackling the CNI-structure for the whole sample, it was interesting to explore the dynamics of the CNI-structure by using the covariates available in the current data. After a series of calculations by employing the MIMIC MODLE, several multiple-group comparisons of means (latent intercepts) were conducted with an estimation of WLSMV. R outputs indicated some significant differences of part of the six latent components of CNI between different levels of the specific covariate.

In terms of the covariate of location which involves two levels of Inland and Coastal China (including Beijing), the statistical result suggested significant differences in the means of D-CI, P-FEC, and P-CI. The corresponding factor means differences between the two groups (Inland scores minus Coastal scores) were -0.203 (p-value = 0.046), -0.318 (p-value = 0.000), -0.067 (p-value = 0.007). These estimates indicated that, compared with the participants in Inland China, participants from Coastal areas had a higher perception or cognition of the civic-institutional norms (D-CI). This was reasonable because the Coastal regions of China had been regarded as the developed region in China⁵⁷. Furthermore, participants from Coastal regions also possessed a higher affection or evaluation of the flexible ethnic-cultural norms (P-FEC) and civic-institutional norms (P-CI). These results also implied the development degree of a region probably influenced the affection or evaluation toward both of the flexible-EC and CI norms at least in the data at hand. Because this notion had gone beyond the current study, the author would not expand on it. Table-11 presented the model fit measures and part of the summary of the model fit.

Table-11. Fit measures and structure estimates of MIMIC Model with “group = location”

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
853.969	357.000	0.966	0.961	0.043	0.062

Regressions:	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-CI ~ location	-0.203	0.102	-1.992	0.046	-0.173	-0.082
P-FEC ~ location	-0.318	0.086	-3.698	0.000	-0.331	-0.157
P-CI ~ location	-0.067	0.025	-2.701	0.007	-0.292	-0.139

⁵⁷ See Note 55.

For the covariates of occupational status, compared with college students, persons who had already worked possess a higher degree of cognition toward meta-structure of EC (diff = 0.29, p-value = 0.005) and a lower degree of affection toward meta-structure of EC (diff = -0.23, p-value = 0.016). This result indicated that the persons who had worked had a higher level of conflict toward the obstinate meta-ethnic-cultural norms than the college students. This result suggested that meta-structure as the stable EC norms functioned more effectively in the real China's social context, and persons who had greater contact with the real society would more easily conform to and, simultaneously, dispraise such social norms (table-12). This result was also found in the results of the model formed with the covariate of age-range, which showed a higher degree of conflict between D-MEC and P-MEC in the group of the elder participants (table-13). As far as civic-institutional norms were concerned, participants who had worked exhibited a lesser degree of either the perceptions or the affections toward the CI (table-12).

Table-12. Fit measures and structure estimates ($p < .05$) of MIMIC Model with “group = occupational status”

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
934.641	357.000	0.960	0.955	0.047	0.064

Regressions:	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-MEC ~ work	0.290	0.104	2.792	0.005	0.279	0.131
D-CI ~ work	-0.226	0.094	-2.410	0.016	-0.192	-0.090
P-MEC ~ work	-0.326	0.122	-2.666	0.008	-0.250	-0.118
P-CI ~ work	-0.044	0.019	-2.371	0.018	-0.197	-0.093

Table-13. Fit measures and structure estimates ($p < .05$) of MIMIC Model with “group = age range”

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
931.036	357.000	0.961	0.955	0.047	0.063

Regressions:	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-MEC ~ age	-0.220	0.096	-2.295	0.022	-0.210	-0.104
P-MEC ~ age	0.318	0.121	2.617	0.009	0.243	0.120

As far as gender was concerned, three differences in statistical significance were summarized in table-14. The regression estimates exhibited could be regarded as the latent intercepts of the females as the intercepts of males were fixed to zero. It was easy to reason that females could cast more affective value on the flexible-EC norms (diff = 0.286, p-value = 0.000) because, traditionally speaking, female were more concerned with family-level issues such as family ethics, traditional virtues, and customs, filial educations. The most interesting thing, however, was that females also possessed a higher perception of the civic-institutional norms. This was probably because females, compared to males, experienced social competitions to relative lesser degrees of intensities and social pressures, which in turn led to an ideal picture of the civic-institutional perception. In terms of the affection of the civic-institutional norms, the difference between females and males was actually similar, because the difference (the regression coefficient) was 0.069, although the estimate was statistically significant (p-value = 0.003). This implied that males in the current society possessed greater conflict toward both of the civic-institutional and flexible ethnic-cultural norms.

Table-14. Fit measures and structure estimates ($p < .05$) of MIMIC Model with “group = gender”

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
864.473	357.000	0.965	0.960	0.044	0.062

Regressions:	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
D-CI ~ gender	0.316	0.094	3.360	0.001	0.268	0.133
P-FEC ~ gender	0.286	0.079	3.608	0.000	0.297	0.148
P-CI ~ gender	0.069	0.023	2.976	0.003	0.300	0.149

Thus far, through various descriptive and prescriptive fit of the social norms, both traditional and the introduced, contemporary Chinese identified themselves as social beings, hence their national identity. The identity conflict and ambiguity existed in the structure of CNI with various degrees in terms of diverse regions, occupational statuses, and the variation of genders. The identity conflict or the discordance among descriptive and prescriptive normative fits and the confusion or the ambiguity between the EC and the CI components implied the possibility of the media applicability and accessibility influences upon the audience, because an ambivalent feeling toward a message source would motivate the audience to try to make sense of the endorsed message to reduce their discomfort. Therefore, the initially disoriented feeling toward the evaluation of the endorsement might be subject to the influence of the advocated message for sense-making of the audience (Chang, 2014). This was the prerequisite for the analysis in the next step in the current study, which was featured by the relationship between the CNI and the evaluative judgment toward salient social issues involved in international disputes via alternatively framed stories.

IV-2. The Statistical Outcomes for the Relationship between CNI and Evaluative Judgment via Media Framing and Priming Effect

IV-2.1. The Difference in the Evaluative Judgment between the Two Treatment Groups.

For the second batch of research questions, the author started with the analysis of the evaluative difference toward street demonstrations between the two groups of participants who received alternatively framed media stories. In order to compare the latent means between the two groups, the author fitted the model with WLSMV estimation by constraining model loadings, intercepts, and indicator-specific variances to be equal between the groups (CFA 3). Fit measures and part of the fit summary of CFA 3 were presented as (table-15, 16, 17):

Table-15. CFA-3 with different treatment groups

Latent variable	Manifest variable
attitude	Like + goodness + value + effectiveness + support + participation

The covariate (group):
 -within: the group receiving the framed story only at the domestic level (frame I)
 -between: the group receiving the international information (frame II)

Group equal argument in the model:
 Group.equal = c("loadings", "intercepts", "residuals")

Estimation: WLSMV

Table-16. Fit measures of CFA-3

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
57.890	34.000	0.994	0.995	0.044	0.062

Table-17. Part of the fit summary of CFA-3

Group 1 [between]:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
Latent Variables:						
attitude =~						
like	1.000				1.665	0.850
goodnss (.p2.)	0.939	0.026	35.650	0.000	1.563	0.806
value (.p3.)	1.024	0.028	36.174	0.000	1.705	0.828
effctvn (.p4.)	0.843	0.034	25.115	0.000	1.403	0.717
support (.p5.)	1.016	0.029	34.639	0.000	1.692	0.861
prtcptn (.p6.)	0.890	0.032	27.735	0.000	1.482	0.727
Intercepts:						
attitud	0.000				0.000	0.000
Group 2 [within]:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
Latent Variables:						
attitude =~						
like	1.000				1.768	0.863
goodnss (.p2.)	0.939	0.026	35.650	0.000	1.660	0.823
value (.p3.)	1.024	0.028	36.174	0.000	1.811	0.844
effctvn (.p4.)	0.843	0.034	25.115	0.000	1.490	0.738
support (.p5.)	1.016	0.029	34.639	0.000	1.797	0.874
prtcptn (.p6.)	0.890	0.032	27.735	0.000	1.574	0.748
Intercepts:						
attitud	-1.496	0.136	-10.961	0.000	-0.846	-0.846

The fit measures indicated the model fitted the data fairly well, and the loadings of the latent variable of evaluative judgment (“attitudes” in the model) for the six manifest variables were also valid. Since the constraint of the model included the invariance of the scales and the locations, the intercepts of the latent variables of the two groups were allowed to be compared. As indicated in table-17, the latent intercept of group 2 (the within groups) was -1.496 with p-value equaled zero, given the latent intercept of group 1 (the between groups) was fixed as zero. That is, the mean evaluative judgments of the participants who received the framed story only at the domestic level (frame I) was approximately 1.50 units lower than the mean attitude of the subjects who received the international information (frame II). In other words, participants tended to downgrade the street demonstration if there was no international comparison and relatively upgraded the street demonstration in the condition of intergroup comparison. This result supported, statistically, the notion that group comparison could result in the polarization of attitude toward group identity in SIT and SCT. Also, it confirmed the media applicability and accessibility effect, in particular, the media framing effect on the course of information processing.

IV-2.2. The Relationship between Activated CNI and Evaluative Judgment

Analyzed Group by Group.

In terms of the relationship among national identity and the evaluative judgment involved in topics of national identity, the author first analyzed the data group by group based on the corresponding theories and forgoing empirical evidences, and then, combined the two group together so as to establish a whole picture of the relationship between CNI and evaluative judgment.

First, the ingroup level (the domestic group, frame I). According to SGDT, ingroup members tend to anchor their attitudes toward other ingroup members via “the group norms as a prescriptive standard” which is regarded as “the group expression of members’ subjective ego-involvement attitude” so as to ascertain the ingroup’s superiority, rather than the intergroup distinctiveness (Marques & Paez, 1998). Therefore, based on the explanatory model of media framing and priming effect – Process of Construct Activation and Use (PCAU) (Price & Tewksbury, 1997), group norms in prescriptive level, P-MEC, P-FEC, P-CI, could be regarded as the active thoughts triggered by the current stimuli – the framed media story I. Also, it was reasonable to hypothesize that the qualitative contents of CNI in prescriptive level, P-MEC, P-FEC, P-CI, should contribute, at least partly, to the evaluative judgment toward social issues involved in CNI. Based on this notion, a structure equation model (SEM-1) with WLSMV estimation was constructed by highlighting the regression relationship between the three predictors, P-MEC, P-FEC, and P-CI, and the response, the evaluative judgment. The path graph of SEM-1 was exhibited as figure-10. The fit measures and the regression section of the summary for SEM-1 were presented as table-18:




Figure-10. SEM-1 for domestic group

Table-18. Part of the fit summary of SEM-1

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
228.635	164.000	0.988	0.986	0.035	0.073

Regressions:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
atti ~						
P-MEC	0.497	0.145	3.422	0.001	0.357	0.357
P-FEC	-0.649	0.700	-0.927	0.354	-0.305	-0.305
P-CI	4.328	3.505	1.235	0.217	0.448	0.448

SEM-1 indicated the prescriptive normative fit of the Meta-structure in the ethnic-cultural component (P-MEC) significantly contributed to the evaluative judgment of the current research subject. The standardized regression coefficient was 0.357 with p-value = 0.001. P-FEC and P-CI had no relationship to the evaluative judgment at a .05 α -level. These results, in particular, the positive contributions of P-MEC partly supported Marques and Paez's (1998) notion that the group norms as a prescriptive standard contributed to the judgments of the ingroup members toward other ingroup members (Marques & Paez, 1998). Also, the statistical results were in accordance with the explanatory model of media framing and priming effect, the PCAU, since the activated elements from the chronic knowledge pool to some degree significantly related to the evaluative responses. One point worth mentioning was that the P-FEC element, the prescriptive standard of the flexible-EC component, such as family ethics and Confucianism, was not significantly linked to the formation of evaluative judgment. This was reasonable because the P-FEC component was highly correlated with the P-CI (the standardized covariance = 0.927, see

CFA-1, table 9). This result was in accordance with the notion about the ambiguity of the prescriptive standard between the EC and the CI components.

Second, the intergroup level (the international group, frame II). As to the group which had received the framed message involved in the “foreigner’s” opinions – the outgroup evaluation toward the ingroup prototypes, models analogous to the domestic group were formed based on the SIT and SCT. The SIT framework suggested that group members in social life tended to achieve cognitive clarity by exaggerating intergroup discriminations and ingroup similarities (Hogg, 1992; Tajfel, 1969, 1978; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). The perceptual accentuation would be anchored on group prototypes which were associated with the self-stereotyping process. That is, the depersonalized self-perception resulted in a cognitive self-representation encompassing only the shared ingroup-attributes (Hogg, 1992; Turner et al, 1987). Furthermore, Marques and Paez (1998) suggested that the notion of “group norm” in the SIT and SCT discourses, such as cognitive clarity, be regarded as a descriptive principle of intergroup differentiation (Marques & Paez, 1998). Additionally, based on the model of the PCAU (Price & Tewksbury, 1997), the group norms at the descriptive level, D-MEC, D-FEC, D-CI, could be regarded as the active thoughts triggered by the current stimuli – the framed media story II.

Based on the above theories, the author created a model (SEM-2) linking the descriptive principles of the social norms, the D-MEC, D-FEC, and D-CI, to the responses of the evaluative judgment toward the street demonstrations. The path graph was presented as figure-11 and the fit measures and the regression section of the summary for SEM-2 were presented as table-19.




Figure-11: Path graph for SEM-2

Table-19. Fit measures and Part of the fit summary of SEM-2

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
174.095	164.000	0.998	0.998	0.012	0.047

Regressions:

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
atti ~						
D-MEC	-0.722	0.360	-2.007	0.045	-0.322	-0.322
D-FEC	3.146	1.735	1.814	0.070	0.529	0.529
D-CI	0.048	0.282	0.170	0.865	0.036	0.036

The R-result indicated the latent variable of D-MEC was negatively linked to the response (the standardized regression coefficient is -0.322, p-value = 0.045). This relationship was exactly reverse to the relationship of P-MEC to the corresponding response in the domestic group. The result implied that participants who possessed a lower degree of cognition toward meta-structure in the ethnic-cultural norms would have a higher probability to assess the street

demonstration as the valuable behaviors given the conditions of international comparison. D-FEC had no relationship to the evaluative judgment at a .05 α -level, although the regression coefficient was considerable. Thus far, the models based on the current data were to some degree in accordance with the theoretical discourses of SIT and SCT and the explanatory model of media framing and priming effect – PCAU (Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

IV-2.3. The Overall Analyzed Relationship between Activated CNI and Evaluative Judgment.

Here came the overall model. As mentioned in the second section of the current study, the components in the construction of modern China's national identity, either actual or ideal, could be seen as, in Price and Tewksbury's (1997) terminology as well as the PCAU model, the "social objects and their attributes (OA), goals, values, and motivations (GVM), and affective and emotional states (AS)" in the Knowledge Store associated with long-term memory—the Chronic Descriptive (OA) and Prescriptive (GVM and AS) norms. The models built and analyzed in section IV-2.2 assumed that certain memories, either OA or GVM and AS, were activated based on the theoretical discourses of SGDT, SIT, and SCT. This means, concretely, in the domestic group, the model assumed that only the prescriptive norms (GVM and AS) were activated, while in the domestic group the author assumed that only the descriptive norms (OA) were activated. Although these assumptions are rooted in the SGDT, SIT, and SCT, there were no clear statements that the descriptive norms could not be activated in the domestic context or the prescriptive norms in international situations. Actually, the SGDT distinguishes descriptive norms "as a concomitant of social categorization, and prescriptive norms as a consequence of such categorization" (Marques & Paez, 1998). This statement indicated that the prescriptive

norms were correlated with the descriptive norms since the prescriptive norms were the consequence of the social categorization, although the SGDT focused more on the prescriptive norms aimed at ingroup dynamics. The considerable covariance among the latent variables of CFA-1 in table 9 also evidenced such notion. Also, doctrines in SIT and SCT emphasizing cognitive clarity of intergroup difference had not exactly excluded the value and emotional elements during the self-stereotyping process. For instance, a social (or collective) identity was the outcome of the self-stereotyping process defined as “the part of the individual’s self-consciousness which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, pp. 255). Therefore, it was reasonable that the difference between the two batches of the theory was just the difference in theoretical focus, rather than two series of independent discourses that were mutually exclusive by nature. Thus, it was necessary to build an integrated model by using the whole latent variables as well as their indicators. SEM-3 (figure 12) was the latent variable model with two groups which was fitted with WLSMV estimation by constraining model loadings and intercepts to be equal. Because the latent variable of P-FEC and P-CI were highly correlated as indicated in table-9 which would result in some statistical problems, the author constructed this model by using the latent variable of P-GNR, the general prescriptive standard of the social norms (or national identification) suggested by the general-four-factor-model (CFA-2) instead of P-MEC, P-FEC, and P-CI in CFA-1. The fit measures and part of the summary were listed as table- 20:




Figure-12: Path graph for SEM-3

Table-20. Fit measures and Part of the fit summary of SEM-3

CHISQ	DF	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR	
1583.978	1092.000	0.978	0.978	0.035	0.069	
Group 1 [international group]:						
Regressions:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
atti ~						
D-MEC	-0.387	0.191	-2.022	0.043	-0.227	-0.227
D-CEC	1.603	0.904	1.774	0.076	0.330	0.330
D-CI	-0.200	0.231	-0.867	0.386	-0.143	-0.143
P-GNR	0.767	0.199	3.860	0.000	0.432	0.432
Covariances:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
DMEC ~~						
DFEC	0.086	0.030	2.854	0.004	0.271	0.271
DCI	-0.120	0.075	-1.601	0.109	-0.109	-0.109
PGNR	-0.050	0.061	-0.810	0.418	-0.057	-0.057

Table # (continued)

	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
DFEC ~~						
DCI	0.283	0.067	4.252	0.000	0.726	0.726
PGNR	0.203	0.052	3.932	0.000	0.661	0.661
DCI ~~						
PGNR	0.819	0.105	7.773	0.000	0.767	0.767
Group 2 [domestic group]:						
Regressions:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
atti ~						
D-MEC	-0.093	0.151	-0.620	0.535	-0.066	-0.066
D-FEC	-0.884	0.791	-1.117	0.264	-0.164	-0.164
D-CI	0.380	0.210	1.807	0.071	0.254	0.254
P-GNR	0.561	0.162	3.472	0.001	0.270	0.270
Covariances:						
	Estimate	Std.Err	z-value	P(> z)	Std.lv	Std.all
DMEC ~~						
DFEC	0.096	0.056	1.716	0.086	0.234	0.234
DCI	-0.383	0.136	-2.816	0.005	-0.260	-0.260
PGNR	-0.168	0.074	-2.271	0.023	-0.158	-0.158
DFEC ~~						
DCI	0.242	0.064	3.792	0.000	0.627	0.627
PGNR	0.138	0.039	3.523	0.000	0.495	0.495
DCI ~~						
PGNR	0.669	0.100	6.664	0.000	0.667	0.667

According to the Lavaan results, the latent variable of P-GNR in the domestic group (group 2 in table-20), was the only predictor that was positively linked with the response at a .05 α -level (the standardized regression coefficient = 0.270, p-value = 0.001). The result was in accordance with the statistical results derived from SEM-1 which were focused on the relationship between prescriptive CNI and the evaluative judgment of the domestic group. Therefore, we could confirm statistically that, in contrast to the descriptive norms, the prescriptive standard of the social norms in the CNI structure could more likely be activated as the active GVM and AS by the domestically framed media information. In other words, it was the group affections, evaluations, and ego-involvement, rather than the group prototypes, group representations, and the awareness of ingroup memberships, that contributed to the evaluative judgment toward social issues involved in the CNI, given the framed media story successfully guiding the audience thinking on a domestic level.

As far as the international group (group 1 in table-20) was concerned, latent variable D-MEC was negatively linked with the response at a significant .05 α -level (the standardized regression coefficient = -0.227, p-value = 0.043), which was in accordance with the R-result in SEM-2. Additionally, latent P-GNR was also linked with the evaluative judgement significantly (the standardized regression coefficient = 0.432, p-value = 0.000). These results indicated that, when international comparison was involved, both of the descriptive norms (OA) and “the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel 1981, pp. 255) (GVM and AS) in the chronic memory store of ingroup members tended to be activated as normative positions by which the media audiences drew their evaluative judgements involved in the salient social issues. That is, on the one hand, the salient attributes of the national representations or prototypes (OA), such as meta-structure in CNI, could be activated as a cognitive clarity of the ingroup

similarity; on the other hand, the value and emotional significance of all of the attributes (GVM and AS) could be simultaneously activated in order to successfully completing national superiority.

Furthermore, although only the specific component(s) in CNI structure was (were) activated with statistical significance during this process, almost all of the components were correlated. The significant covariance among D-MEC, D-FEC, DCI, and P-GNR in both of the groups thus could be regarded as the priming (or accessibility) effect⁵⁸, because based on the associative network model (Collins & Loftus, 1975), one node which was activated tended to result in the spreading activation. That is, the activation spread automatically “along the associative pathways to other nodes” in audience’s mental network (Domke et al., 1998). Figure 13 indicated the relationship between the framed media stories and the evaluative judgment.




Figure-13: The relationship between the framed stories and evaluative judgments

⁵⁸ The notion of “be regarded as the priming (or accessibility) effect” does not mean it is an evidence of the priming effect. See note 59.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS

The current study has answered all of the six research questions involved in, roughly speaking, the relationship among China's national identity, the media framing and priming effect, and the evaluative judgment of the salient social issues. The research answered not only the different influences of alternatively framed media stories toward the evaluative judgments but also tackled what specific accessibility and applicability based on the psychological dichotomy of normative fit of the various social norms contributed to such influences via the vehicle of media framing and priming effects.

First, based on the social psychological frameworks including SIT, SCT, and SGDT, sociological theories such as Macro-Concept or the Eastern ethnic and the Western civic Model, as well as a historical review involved in Chinese ethnic-cultural and national identity's evolution, two models (CFA-1 and CFA-2) of Chinese national identity were generated, which were formed by either the big-six factors for CFA-1 or the general-four-factors for CFA-2. Both the theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence indicated that the structure of Chinese national identity included the qualitative contents of the Meta-structure of EC, the flexible EC, and the introduced CI elements, which were associated with the descriptive and the prescriptive psychological dimensions. Additionally, for the prescriptive dimension, these three qualitative contents could also be integrated as a general prescriptive standard of the normative fit in the Chinese national identification. These research conclusions were aimed at answering the first three research questions which were the theoretically reasoned structure of the CNI and its

empirical evidence (Q₁), possible ambiguities or confusions of the qualitative contents in the CNI (Q₂), the discordances or conflicts of the psychological standards in the CNI (Q₃).

Subsequently, according to the theoretical discourses of media framing and priming effect, in particular, the explanatory model of media accessibility and applicability—the PCAU model, three reasonable models, SEM-1, SEM-2, and SEM-3, linking the CNI and evaluative judgment were built and were statistically supported by the current data with psychological variations of specific qualitative contents. Based on SEM-3 (figure-13), the current study suggested that the general prescriptive standard of the social norms in the process of national identification be the active accessibility in media information processing toward salient social issues at both domestic and international levels, while, the descriptive meta-structure in the ethnic-cultural component, which contributed to the intergroup difference, was an additional accessibility being activated and functioning in media-message-processing by the audience. These conclusions were drawn so as to answer the last three research questions, the difference of the evaluative judgments derived from alternative media exposures (Q₄), the function of national self-categorization in the situation of intergroup comparison (Q₅), and the influence of national identification focused on the dynamic groups (Q₆).

Third, the three specific explanatory models, SEM-1, SEM-2, and SEM-3 assumed that the CNI were the baseline accessibility in the memory store of the Chinese, and the structural variations of the CNI were the active accessibilities by which media audiences process the framed media information. Therefore, the current research treated national identity as both a chronic (or baseline) variable and a conditional (or context-dependent) variable. On the one hand, CNI derived, both cognitively and affectively, from the evolvement of the long-lasting history as well as the inherited common memory of certain group of people; On the other hand,

the group-membership-awareness and the group ego-involvement possessed dynamics in terms of the conflict between different psychological dimensions and the ambiguities among diverse qualitative contents, and ultimately expressed through media framing processes. This point of view was in accordance with Turner and his colleagues' (1994) argument that self-categorization was a comparative and fluid variable with variant structures (Turner, et. al., 1994). Furthermore, the current research provided what parts in the CNI structure experienced what kind of variation, e.g. the Meta-structure-EC and the flexible EC component, and how these variations occurred and were presented through the specific evaluative judgment.

Apart from the above research conclusions, there are some enlightening significant implications of the current study that are worth mentioning. These implications include the meaning of the variation of the social identity, the practical application of the macro-concept of the national identity, and the deliberation toward the media applicability and accessibility effect.

First, the meaning of the variation of social identity encompasses at least two dimensions, the dimensions of time and structure. On the one hand, a social identity is both chronic (or a trait) and conditional (or specific, temporal) by nature. The former contributes to the baseline accessibility on which the specific or temporal identity is anchored, while, the latter is the activated one that contributes to the latent references based on which specific attitude is formed. In this sense, the author suggests that the chronic social identity be regarded as the mean normative fit of certain social norms, while the conditional social identity is the identity in an actual context which fluctuates around the chronic social identity. On the other hand, the variation of the social identity is also a structural one, in particular, the dichotomy of the descriptive versus prescriptive normative fit of social norms. A study including both of the psychological structures of social identity could grasp the whole picture of the variation of the

social identity for certain group members, while separate studies either focused on social identity or identification probably lose some interactive information because the covariance matrix of the whole data was different from that of the separate data. In other words, to tackle the variation of a specific or conditional social identity is to some degree to tackle the structural variation of such identity.

Second, a practical application of the macro-concept of the national identity is that the author successfully distinguished the meta-structure from the whole ethnic-cultural component on which the remaining other ethnic-cultural norms were anchored. The distinction of meta-structure implied the uniqueness of a national group rooted in its specific history, while the remaining other ethnic-cultural elements implied, to some extent, the commonness of such group that had been transforming or flexible due to the function of globalization. Therefore, the author suggests that, for the macro-concept of national identity, the Eastern ethnic and the Western civic components (Smith, 1991), or the ascribed and the acquired components (Westle, 2014), it be important for researchers to distinguish the uniqueness of the attributes belonging to certain national groups, because such effort takes both of the historical and globalization functions into consideration. This practical application could probably be helpful to solve the disputes of the validity toward the macro-concept among scholars, for example, the incompatible contradiction of the macro-concept (e.g. Miller 2000) versus the continuum of the dichotomy of the conceptual construct (Westle, 1999), or the intersecting situations in which national identity were processed and functioned (Kuzio 2002; retrieved from Westle, 2014).

Third, the deliberation toward the media applicability and accessibility effect. Based on the associative network model (Collins & Loftus, 1975) which proposed an organized network of nodes linked through associative pathways in people's memories (Collins & Loftus,

1975), Brewer and his colleagues (2003), clearly tested the two routes for media influence—media framing and priming effects—by emphasizing whether or not a direct association between an issue and a specific target of judgment was drawn. That is, media priming raised the possibility of media influence indirectly (automatically), while media framing elevated accessibility by directly highlighting the associations between an issue and a target of judgment (Nelson et al., 1997). The experiments showed that issue frames affect judgments, whereas accessibility (priming) did not (Brewer et al., 2003). Also, rooted in the associative network model (Collins & Loftus, 1975), Price and Tewksbury (1997) formed the model of PCAU to process how memory activation could spread from a specific construct to other related ones. The model of PCAU treated the media framing and priming functioning in a hand-in-hand way. The result of the current study provided empirical evidence to interpret the above discourse, which could be clearly illustrated via figure-14.




Figure-14: media applicability and accessibility effects in terms of CNI

From figure-14, the horizontal black lines with arrowheads which linked the knowledge store, framed media stories, the active thoughts, and the evaluative judgments could be regarded as media applicability or framing effect. The black lines, other than the gray dashes, were suggested by the path effects with statistical significance at a .05 α -level in SEM-3. This result illustrated that media framing could elevate specific accessibilities by directly linking an issue to the target of judgments. However, we should not neglect the correlations (or covariance) among various components in the panel of active thought (the vertical double-arrowed black curves between D-MEC, D-FEC, D-CI, and P-GNR), because both of the correlation coefficients between the latent variables and the regression coefficients between the exogenous and the endogenous variables contributed to the model which otherwise could not be fitted to the original data. Therefore, it was reasonable that these correlations should be interpreted as the media priming or accessibility effects which were featured as the automatic association without a direct trigger in the associative network (Brewer et al., 2003). Therefore, the author suggests that it be helpful for researchers in their studies to combine the paradigm of media cognitive effect with other relevant paradigms, such as the theories of national identity because the latter could provide possible elements which could be regarded as the manifest agency used for quantitatively presenting media accessibility and applicability effects⁵⁹.

Fourth, research limitations and further studies. The current study assumed that CNI was an independent variable, while the evaluative judgment was the dependent variable. Also, the

⁵⁹ However, the author could not claim that these correlations were the evidence for the priming effect, although these correlations could be interpreted as the function of media priming based on both of the associative network model and mathematical rationale, because, in the current study, values of D-MEC, D-FEC, D-CI, and P-GNR were obtained before the media-interference. In other words, we could not confirm that these components were activated by the experimental interference. If the study had been redesigned by shifting the first section (CNI structure) in the survey to the last, we could confirm all of the components of CNI were triggered by the experimental interference. Therefore, the accurate evidence of media priming effect is remained to future study since the current study is focused on media framing.

context-dependent variable of the activated components of CNI could be interpreted as a structural variation in the situations featured by whether the intergroup comparison was involved. For instance, D-MEC and P-GNR were activated and contributed to the evaluative judgment in the international group, while only P-GNR was activated and influenced the response in the domestic group. However, the current study could not tackle whether there was a variation of the intensity or mean normative fit in different contexts. In other words, whether the scores assigned to survey indicators changed due to different research interferences because this was another possible interpretation of the notion of “context-dependent” CNI. To tackle this question, the variable of national identity should be treated as a dependent variable and be regressed on the framed media stories (research treatments). Obviously, this was beyond the current study and remained to be studied in the future.

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APPENDIX:


Appendix A: Questionnaire of the CNI (QCNI)⁶⁰

A. DESCRIPTIVE DIMENSION

The following are some depicts about being truly Chinese. To what extent do you agree with them?

Note: Your response is your actual perception and observation in your daily life, rather than any moral evaluation, affection, or value-based judgment toward what you observed.

The score range from 1 to 7 represent the strength of agreement with 1-totally disagree, 7-completely agree.



1-in general, we Chinese attach importance to the web of social connections or the circle of contacts. The notions of “the web of social connections” and “the circle of contacts” refer to the mutually beneficial interactions spontaneously formed by people in their social lives for the needs of interest, convenience, or efficiency. The Chinese, for instance, are accustomed to tackling their problems or troubles by seeking help from the relationships. (D-MEC)

2-overall, the superior-inferior affiliations is a distinguishing feature of being truly “Chinese”, and “the latent social hierarchy” is a consensus of our society. The notions of “the superior-inferior affiliations” and “the latent social hierarchy” refer to the prescriptive order and rules between the leadership and the subordinates, the superiors and the inferiors, or the managers and the employees, etc. the inferiors tend to cultivate and maintain good relations with their superiors, while the superiors tend to be nepotism-oriented. (D-MEC)

3-in general, the Chinese language, as well as its characters, is a distinguish symbol of being truly Chinese. Here, the concept of “the Chinese language” includes the languages of the ethnic minorities and the dialects of different regions (D-FEC)

4-generally speaking, it is our common ancestors, history, traditions, customs and habits that let us be aware of being truly “Chinese”. These terms refer to our common quality, character, morality, behavior, manners, customs, rituals, and norms obtained from the experiences of daily life or social learning. (D-FEC)

5-overall, we Chinese understand and attach importance to Confucianism; we regard Confucianism as a code of conduct for everyday life. (D-FEC)

⁶⁰ The two questionnaire are based on Westle, B. (2014). How to Measure or not to Measure National and European Identity – Problems in Quantitative Approaches and Possible Directions of Solution. Paper prepared for the ECPR General Conference, Glasgow, UK, 3.-6. Sept. 2014. In order to be appropriate the current study, question stimuli are adapted to the two psychological dimensions.

Table # (continued)

The score range from 1 to 7 represent the strength of agreement with 1-totally disagree, 7-completely agree.	
Totally disagree	completely agree
○	○
○	○
○	○
○	○
○	○
○	○
○	○
←	→
1	7
6-overall, we Chinese attach importance to the family ethics, pecking order, and kinship. The family ethics and family ties are distinguished features of being truly Chinese. (D-FEC)	
7-having been born in China is an important reference for being truly Chinese (D-FEC)	
8-in general, we Chinese understand and attach importance to the legal concept. The notion of the “legal concept” includes the understanding of laws or the habits of thinking and solving problems in legal ways. (D-CI)	
9-generally, we Chinese are well aware of the civic rights and obligations. We actively pursue legal rights and fulfill the obligations prescribed by the modern citizenship. (D-CI)	
10-Overall, we Chinese actively care about the relevant national policies and attach importance to their constructive comments. In a word, we Chinese are accustomed to political participation. (D-CI)	
11- Generally speaking, our Chinese attach importance to the public interest. The concept of “public interest” here refers to the collective interests, such as interests of a class, an enterprise, a community, or a city, etc., except the interests of individuals and families. (D-CI)	
12- Generally speaking, we Chinese regard national citizenship is an important reference to judge whether or not a person is a Chinese. If a white person (or a black) has a Chinese national citizenship, we would think that he is a Chinese. (D-CI)	
13-overall, we Chinese care about the national economic affairs. In a word, it is the national economy that let us be aware of being truly Chinese. (D-CI)	
14-we Chinese, in general, love the national flag, emblem and the national anthem. Therefore, it is such national symbols that let us be aware of being truly the Chinese. (D-CI)	
B. PRESCRIPTIVE DIMENSION	
The following items are some common traits, attributions, or behaviors. Based on your subjective emotion, how do you like them or how are you proud of them?	
(1-totally dislike; 7-completely like)	
1-generally, I like the web of social connections and the circle of contacts. I want to live in a society featured by the web of social connections and the circle of contacts. (P-MEC)	
2-overall, I like the culture of superior-inferior affiliations. I want to live in a group whose members attach importance to the relationship between the superiors and the subordinates. (P-MEC)	
3-generally speaking, Chinese language and characters provide me a sense of national superiority and pride. (P-FEC)	

Table # (continued)

<p>The following items are some common traits, attributions, or behaviors. Based on your subjective emotion, how do you like them or how are you proud of them?</p> <p>(1-totally dislike; 7-completely like)</p>
4-generally speaking, I like our common ancestors, history, traditions, customs, and habits. These commonness provide me a sense of national superiority and pride. (P-FEC)
5-generally, I like Confucianism. I am proud of Confucianism. (P-FEC)
6-overall, I like the family ethics, pecking order, and kinship. I am proud of family ethics. (P-FEC)
7-overall, I am proud of being born in China. I like being born in China. (P-FEC)
8-generally, I like the legal concept. I want to live in a society where people consciously conform to laws. (P-CI)
9-overall, I like the civic rights and obligations. I suggest that everyone consciously pursue the civic rights and fulfill the obligations prescribed by the modern citizenship. (P-CI)
10-overall, I like political participation. I wish everyone actively participate the political affairs. (P-CI)
11-generally, I believe it is a virtue to care about the public interest. (P-CI)
12-overall, I am proud of my national citizenship. (P-CI)
13-overall, our national economy provides me a sense of superiority. I could experience a feeling of exaltation and fulfillment when I talk about national economic affairs. (P-CI)
14-generally speaking, I am proud of the national flag, emblem, and national anthem. (P-CI)
<p>C. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DEMONSTRATIONS</p> <p>(after reading the corresponding framed information)</p>
What is your personal attitude towards these street demonstrations?
-overall, my attitude towards the demonstrates are: 1-bad_____good (affective closeness)
2-dislike_____like (affective closeness)
3-unworthwhile_____worthwhile (evaluation)
4-ineffective_____effective (evaluation)
5-should NOT be supported_____should be supported (behavior tendency)
6-I won't participate the demonstrates_____I will participate the demonstrates (behavior tendency)

Appendix B: Questionnaire of the CNI (Chinese)

您好：

我们诚挚邀请您参与“中国人集体性格和网络态度调查”课题的研究。当您同意参加本次调查，您将会通过网络平台完成下面这份调查问卷，您的个人信息将完全保密，此调查为不记名调查。您有权利选择不参加此次调查。您参加此次调查完全在您自愿的原则下，您随时有权利选择退出此次调查。如果您是18周岁以上的成年人，并且同意参与本次调查，请点击“开始”；如果您不同意参与，请选择直接退出。

A. DESCRIPTIVE DIMENSION

下面这些表述，表达的是我们中国人（作为一个群体）的某些属性、习惯、特征，请根据您在生活中观察到的客观现实，表达您在多大程度上同意这些表述。

注意：题目问的是你观察到的、我们这个群体的、客观的、实际情况，而不是你个人的主观判断或者情感好恶。

评分说明：

每题都有7个分数。你给的分数越高，就说明你越同意。（1分：完全不同意；7分：完全同意）

1-总的来说，我们是“人情社会”；中国人很看重“人情关系网”。（这里的“人情社会”和“人情关系网”指的是人们在生活中，出于利益、便利、效率等需要，而自发形成的、互惠的、熟人社会交往。生活中，遇到大事小情，中国人的惯性思维是“托人”、“找关系”）——您同意么？

2-我们中国人很在乎“层级关系”；“层级社会”是我们对社会的一个共识。（“层级关系”指的是“领导与手下”、“上司与下属”、“管理者与员工”……等上下级关系。下属要跟上级领导搞好关系，上级也倾向于培养、提拔与自己关系不错的人）——您同意么？

3-总体来说，中国语言和汉字是我们中国人的一个显著标志。（这里，“中国语言”包括各少数民族的语言，各地方言。）

4-总体而言，我们中国人都认同我们共同的历史、传统、风俗习惯。（这里的“历史、传统、风俗习惯”泛指一切人们基于日常生活经验或在学校、家庭、社会学习中获得的，我们共同的品质、特点、道德、行为、仪式、礼节、规范、惯例……等等）——您同意么？

5-我们中国人很关心、清楚、信奉儒家思想；我们把儒家思想作为日常生活的行为准则。——您同意么？

6-总体而言，我们中国人很看重家庭伦理、长幼尊卑、亲属关系。——您同意么？

Table # (continued)

评分说明：

每题都有 7 个分数。你给的分数越高，就说明你越同意。（1 分：完全不同意；7 分：完全同意）

7-总的来说，我们中国人认为：是否在中国出生，是判断一个人是不是中国人的重要标准之一。——您同意么？

8-总体而言，我们中国人的法制观念都很强。（这里的“法制观念很强”指的是人们熟悉法律法规、规章制度；如果生活中遇到麻烦，我们习惯按照法律、规章、制度的程序去思考问题、解决问题）——您同意么？

9-总的来说，我们中国人很清楚、也很看重“现代公民的权利和义务”。总体上，我们积极追求合法权力并履行法律规定的义务。——您同意么？

10-总体而言，我们中国人积极参与有关政策法规的讨论和制定，关心国家大政方针、并表达自己的建设性意见。一言以蔽之，我们中国人能够积极地参与政治生活——您同意么？

11-总的来说，中国老百姓很在意“公共利益”。（这里的“公共的利益”指的是在排除个人的、家庭的利益后，那些共有的利益，比如班级的、集体的、企事业单位的、社区的、城市的利益……等等；）

12-总的来说，我们中国人认为：“国籍”是判断一个人是不是“中国人”的重要依据之一。简言之，假如一个白人（或黑人）一旦拥有中国国籍，我们会认为他就是一个中国人。——您同意么？

13-总的来说，我们中国人很关心国民经济中各行各业的发展状况；对宏观经济话题很关注，一言以蔽之，我们中国人都很关心国民经济事务。——您同意么？

14-总体而言，国旗、国徽和国歌是中国人的象征和标志。——您同意么？

B. PRESCRIPTIVE DIMENSION

1-我喜欢“人情关系网”。我向往生活在一个“人情社会”里。——您同意么？

2-我喜欢“层级关系（上下级关系）”。我向往生活在一个重视上下级关系的群体里。——您同意么？

3-中国语言和汉字让我感到一种优越感和自豪感。——您同意么？

4-我喜欢我们的历史传统、风俗习惯。它让我感到很骄傲。——您同意么？

5-我喜欢儒家思想。儒家思想令我感到自豪。——您同意么？

Table # (continued)

评分说明： 每题都有 7 个分数。你给的分数越高，就说明你越同意。（1 分：完全不同意；7 分：完全同意）
6-我喜欢家庭伦理、亲属关系、长幼尊卑。重视家庭伦理、长幼尊卑、亲属关系叫我感到自豪。——您同意么？
7-“在中国出生”给我一种优越感和自豪感。我喜欢出生在中国。——您同意么？
8-我喜欢法律法规、规章制度。我向往生活在一个法治社会里。——您同意么？
9-我喜欢现代公民的权利和义务。我觉得每个人都应追求合法权力并履行法律规定的义务。——您同意么？
10-我喜欢参与政治生活。我也希望每个人都能积极参与。——您同意么？
11-我喜欢公共的或集体的利益。我希望人人都能重视公共利益。——您同意么？
12-我喜欢我的国籍，我的国籍给我有一种优越感和荣誉感。——您同意么？
13-我们的国民经济给我一种优越感，提起国民经济，我就感到扬眉吐气。——您同意么？
14-国旗、国徽、国歌让我感到一种优越感和自豪感。——您同意么？
C. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE DEMONSTRATIONS
对于这些抗议行为，您个人的态度是？
-总体而言，我对这些抗议行为的态度是：
1-不好的 _ _ _ _ _ 好的
2-不喜欢 _ _ _ _ _ 喜欢
3-没有意义 _ _ _ _ _ 有意义
4-无效 _ _ _ _ _ 有效
5-不应该支持 _ _ _ _ _ 应该支持
6-我不会参与 _ _ _ _ _ 我会参与

Appendix C: The Framed Stories (Chinese)

Framing 1:

近年来，钓鱼岛、南海仲裁在中国引发很多民间抗议，引发社会关注。下面搜集了一些媒体意见（包括媒体人、学者、论坛博主），请阅读后回答问题

1. 媒体人（评论）：“摆在台面上的法律和文明；台面下的圈子和人情。”陌生人的日本车随便抵制，但是对亲戚和熟人，他会提前通知：“这几天别开日本车啊……”。这是我们中国人的传统文化基因”。
2. 博主（杂文）：抵制洋货其实很容易解释。在单位里看上司的脸色，在酒桌上看客户的脸色，下班后还要看丈母娘的脸色……平日里我都做一个“三好学生”了，对日本人的车踹两脚，对美国人的肉夹馍说个“不”——总该可以了吧……0(∩_∩)0。
3. 博主（评论）：我就不明白，有血性的中国汉子，抵制些日货美货，你们就叫嚷着“遵纪守法”和“无私奉献”的爱国了。试问你们这些理客中们，哪个真正做到了遵纪守法的爱国？
4. 学者（评论）：中国传统文化中没有公共政治、契约精神等概念，民众因此无法从公共政治中获得自尊感，从而投身到群体性运动中去，这样就能迅速提升个体的自尊感。
5. 媒体人（杂文）：中国人的特点：计较的不是不公平，而是自己不是受益者；动辄批判外界，却很少反思自己；自己爽不爽没关系，反正不能让别人爽；能通过关系办成的事，绝不通过正当途径解决。
6. 媒体人（自媒体文章）：我们必须承认，我们中国人对国际贸易、机会成本这些经济学常识的认知是不足的，草根们想象不出，也不愿去想“贸易抵制的恶果”等高大上的问题，我们更习惯于用直觉的、道德等方式来简单思考……

Framing 2:

近年来，钓鱼岛、南海仲裁在中国引发很多民间抗议，引发国际关注。下面搜集了一些国际媒体（包括国外的主流媒体、学术机构、国外民间论坛）意见，请阅读后回答问题。

1. 美国媒体：中国民众的“爱国”抗议，是一种农业社会的排他心态的遗留。大部分中国人对贸易抵制的后果好无认知。
2. 英国媒体：中国民众极低的受教育水平和扭曲的排外心态令国际社会担忧。
3. 新加坡媒体：按欧美思维，贸易抵制仅仅是经济问题。但在中国人（甚至早期南洋华人）看来，这不是经济问题，这实际上是“家国同源”的民族情感问题。
4. 加拿大留学生博客：中国有自己的文化、历史、语言环境。你可以因为书法、建筑、甚至麻将爱上这个国家，这是值得中国人骄傲的。美国人无法理解这些，作为移民国家，美国差中国 100

个英国，对他们，国家就是一个大公司，是一份合同而已。

5. 美国学术机构：1919年“五四运动”成功造成日本的重大损失（出口额下降8696万美元，占次年9%）更重要的是，中国在抵制日货中所表现出来的国家意识，给予中国代表团在华盛顿会议中以重大的民意支持，促成了山东的回归。

6. 法国媒体：事实上，中华文明中并没有太多公共抗议的传统，中国民众的抗议只是一种民族自尊的诉求。而欧洲的罢工和抗议其实更值得我们关注，有些国家已经因此债台高筑，甚至国家破产。

Appendix D: IRB Approval Letter



RESEARCH INTEGRITY AND COMPLIANCE
Institutional Review Boards, FWA No. 00001669
12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd., MDC035 • Tampa, FL 33612-4799
(813) 974-5638 • FAX(813)974-7091

January 17, 2017

Yufeng Tian
School of Advertising and Mass Communications
Tampa, FL 33612

RE: Exempt Certification
IRB#: Pro00029191
Title: Chinese National Identity and Media Framing

Dear Mr. Tian:

On 1/17/2017, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) determined that your research meets criteria for exemption from the federal regulations as outlined by 45CFR46.101(b):

(2) Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, employability, or reputation.

As the principal investigator for this study, it is your responsibility to ensure that this research is conducted as outlined in your application and consistent with the ethical principles outlined in the Belmont Report and with USF HRPP policies and procedures.

Please note, as per USF HRPP Policy, once the Exempt determination is made, the application is closed in ARC. Any proposed or anticipated changes to the study design that was previously declared exempt from IRB review must be submitted to the IRB as a new study prior to initiation of the change. However, administrative changes, including changes in research personnel, do not warrant an amendment or new application.

Given the determination of exemption, this application is being closed in ARC. This does not limit your ability to conduct your research project.

We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John A. Schinka, Ph.D." The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial 'J'.

John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board