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When Security Dominates the Agenda: The Influence of Interstate Rivalry on Women's Status

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WHEN SECURITY DOMINATES THE AGENDA: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERSTATE RIVALRY ON WOMEN'S STATUS

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

WHEN SECURITY DOMINATES THE AGENDA: THE INFLUENCE OF INTERSTATE RIVALRY ON WOMEN'S STATUS

The overarching theme of my dissertation is the effect of interstate rivalries on women's status. Specifically, I investigate the influence of rivalries on the election of women, the adoption of a gender quota, and the overall level of gender equality. National security is a prime concern in states involved in an interstate rivalry, which can influence women's lives in a number of key ways. Through the actions of individual voters and rational parties, I find that being in an interstate rivalry leads to lower levels of female representation. In addition, I theorize that rivalries lessen societal pressure to increase female representation. Empirically, I find that rivalries decrease the probability of adopting a strong gender quota. I also investigate sexism and gender equality more broadly, theorizing and finding that men will be given more rights and political power due to their service and sacrifice for the state.

KEYWORDS: Rivalry, National Security, Gender Inequality, Gender Quotas, Female Representation

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DEDICATION

To Agatha Zierolf and Anne Schroeder, who instilled in me the value of education.

To Margaret Jackman and Mary Zierolf, whose lives showed me that being a woman should never hold you back from accomplishing great things.

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Background

International behavior and domestic politics are not simply products of internal factors. Realists argue states must respond to the presence of anarchy in the international system by acquiring more power (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001) while neoliberalists believe states should come together and build international institution to coordinate the international system (Oye 1985; Gruber 2000).

Gourevitch (1978) argued that states transform their internal structures in a way that allows them to meet any external threat. Tilly (1985) later emphasized the importance of war on the creation of the state. In order to effectively fight wars, states must create domestic institutions that can extract resources from their citizens. The state must be able to raise funds to support the military through the collection of taxes and have the power to compel citizens to serve in the military. In order to accomplish these tasks, the state must strengthen and centralize (Tilly 1985). The threat of war stems from the international system, ergo, the international system helps shape domestic structures.

My research adds to this body of research by investigating how the international security environment of a state influences individuals within the state. Specifically, my research displays the influence of involvement in an interstate rivalry on the overall status of women's, including the election of women, the adoption of strong gender quotas, and gender inequality.

Previous research argues that the primary concern of states is to maintain their national security, because of this a patriarchy emerges where men hold the political power within the state (Tickner 1992). In addition, it has been asserted that when states

focus on war-fighting, sexism and gender inequality become an ingrained part of the societal structure (Reardon 1996; Enloe 1983, 2000). My research builds off this line of theorizing by focusing on the impact of interstate rivalries on women's ability to gain political power and societal gender inequality.

Rivalry and Domestic Politics

However, it is not the war fighting, per se, that prompts the state to reorganize; the threat of war alone can alter domestic structures so the state can thwart the external threat (Centeno 2002; Thies 2005). The national security threat from an interstate rival is well documented. While most country-pairs will not turn into rivalries, the 5% that do form into rivalries account for approximately 50% of militarized disputes (Thompson and Dreyer 2011; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Colaresi and Thompson 2002). Within a rivalry, based on past experiences, there is the anticipation of future hostility between the two states. Rivals often perceive benign actions as aggressive due to the high levels of mistrust. Subsequently, the threat of conflict is high, leading a state in a rivalry to allocate more of its resources to the military (Hensel 1999; Gibler 2010). The hostile environment created by the rivalry also makes national security a salient issue within domestic politics (Hensel 1999). The persistent threat of conflict compels the state to alter its institutions and internal structures so that it can deter or quickly meet any armed conflict that occur.

When a state is under threat, domestic issues are pushed aside and the maintenance of national security becomes the primary objective (Huth 1996; Hensel 1999). The state restructures internally in ways that allow for quick mobilization to counter any action from its rival (Coser 1956; Gourevitch 1978; Tilly 1985; Goldstein 2001). Subsequently, the state directs its resources towards funding and expanding its

military. The military's share of the budget increases and the government recruits citizens into the armed forces, sometimes forcefully (Hensel 1999; Gibler 2010; Nordhaus *et al.* 2011).

The hostile environment of a rivalry does more than just militarize the state; it also makes national security a salient domestic issue, subsequently influencing voting behavior (Huth 1996; Colaresi and Thompson 2002). Because of the importance of national security, voters support candidates they perceive as best suited to maintain security (Rosenwasser *et al.* 1987; Lawless 2004). Subsequently, voters punish political leaders they perceive as insufficiently aggressive towards a rival (Colaresi 2004). The saliency of national security and the desire for leaders capable of maintaining security influences the type of political leaders that come to power and subsequently influence domestic power structures. Specifically, it impedes women's ability to win elections and reinforces the creation of a gendered hierarchy.

Previous research argues a patriarchy emerges where men hold the political power because of the primary concern of states is to maintain national security (Tickner 1992). In addition, when states focus on war-fighting, sexism and gender inequality become an ingrained part of the societal structure (Reardon 1996; Enloe 1983, 2000). My research builds off this line of theorizing by focusing on the impact of interstate rivalries on women's ability to gain political power and societal gender inequality.

Cross-nationally, men predominantly hold the position of chief executive and hold the majority of the seats in national legislatures. However, if we look at states individually, the disparity in the level of power held by men and women varies. For example the percentage of seats in a state's legislature held by women ranges from zero

to over 63.8 percent. Thus, in some states women constitute a majority in office, while women in other states hold very little political power. Domestic factors such as ideology, level of development, institutional components, and religion help explain some of the cross-national variation in women's power and status (Matland and Studlar 1993; Inglehart *et al.* 2002; Paxton and Kunovich 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2009). However, I argue that international forces also influence the variation in the status of women. In the following chapters, I investigate the influence of interstate rivalry on the election of women, the adoption of strong gender quotas, and the level of gender inequality in a state.

In a rivalry state, security dominates the domestic agenda. Since women are consistently viewed as less capable than men in handling military affairs and maintaining national security, the focus on national security in rivalry states creates an impediment for women to win elections. This leads to lower levels of female representation due to stereotypical beliefs that women are unsuited to hold office and subsequent low voter support for female candidates. .

Voter preference for male leaders not only makes it difficult for women to win elections, but it also hinders the adoption of a strong gender quota. Discrimination against women, including women's underrepresentation in politics, became an international issue starting in 1975 with the United Nations Decade of the Woman. Subsequently, states experience pressure from the international community to improve women's representation, including the implementation of a gender quota. However, not all gender quotas are effective in increasing female representation (Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Jones 2009). Weak quotas allow a state to appear committed to improving women's

underrepresentation without actually altering the composition of the national legislature. In states involved in a rivalry, adopting a weak quota (a quota that will not substantially increase female representation) is more likely.

The effects of rivalry involvement extends beyond national politics to influence women's status in society broadly. Masculine traits such as aggression, strength, rationality, and decisiveness are viewed as the traits best suited to maintain national security. Consequently, these traits become the preferred characteristics for individuals to possess and feminine traits are seen as inferior by society. Since society commonly perceives women to possess feminine traits, the belief that feminine traits are inferior spills over in society attitudes about the beliefs about men's and women's worth in society. Thus, rivalry involvement leads to larger gender inequality.

Rivalry, Female Representation, and Gender Inequality

<Figure 1.1>

The impact rivalry has on the election of women, the adoption of strong gender quotas, and the level of gender inequality may seem independent of one another. The constant threat of conflict in rivalry states leads to lower levels of female representation. With masculine qualities viewed as best able to maintain national security and men perceived as innately possessing these qualities, society views men as superior. This belief promotes a larger gender inequality gap. However, as discussed in the following chapters, the level of female representation and gender inequality are not mutually exclusive; instead, they reinforce one another. Figure 1.1 graphically displays this cycle. With few women holding political power people may presume that women are ill-suited for leadership positions and less capable of taking on such roles. This forms a reinforcing

cycle where people start to believe women are actually inferior because there are so few examples of politically powerful women.

Having few women in the legislator influences societal attitudes about men's and women's worth, but it also influences women's status in a more tangible way. Female legislators are more likely to support legislation on prominent women's issues such as equal pay, access to paid childcare, and access to contraception (Swers 1998; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003; Kittilson 2008). Addressing these issues helps women obtain higher education and enter the paid labor force, both of which assist women in gaining economic independence as well as higher paying and more prestigious jobs. Consequently, women's issues legislation influences the level of gender inequality by lowering barriers for women and ultimately improve their societal standing. Since states involved in a rivalry have lower levels of female representation on average, women's issues bills are less likely to pass, reinforcing and solidifying the gender inequality gap within the state. The belief that women are inherently inferior to men, lower levels of educational obtainment among women, and a small percentage of women in the paid workforce all combine to impede the ability of women to win elections. This cycle reinforces a low level of female representation and perpetuates women's subordinate status in society

While most studies on female representation, quota adoption, and gender inequality focus on domestic factors (Matland and Studlar 1993; Kenworthy and Malami 1999), there is a small literature that highlights the importance of international forces. For instance, women's international non-governmental organizations play a key role in pressing governments to improve female representation (Paxton *et al.* 2006; Krook and

True 2010; Krook 2009) and emerging international norms make adopting a gender quota standard practice for democratizing states (Bush 2011). International treaties focusing on women's rights, such as the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, lead to the improvement of women's rights and gender inequality (Cole 2013). My work fits within this genre, by focusing on the influence of international forces on female representation. However, unlike previous work that investigates how international forces promote higher female representation, my work investigates how international forces can be a detriment to the election of women. Findings from my work indicate that involvement in a rivalry mitigate the influence of domestic characteristics that are conducive to the election of women, resulting in lower levels of female representation than expected.

<Figures 1.2 & 1.3>

Looking at Figures 1.2 and 1.3, it is apparent that female representation and gender inequality have improved overtime. This is in large part due to the growing international attention on the status of women. As I discuss in chapter 3, all states, regardless of if they are involved in a rivalry, face international pressure to take action to improve female representation and equality. Subsequently, states involved in a rivalry are no less likely to adopt a gender quota compared to states not in a rivalry. However, they are less likely to adopt a strong gender quota. In addition, female representation in rivalry states is lower on average than non-rivalry states. In addition, the gender inequality gap remains larger with states engaged in a rivalry. Thus, the international pressure to improve women's lives is tempered by the threat to national security.

The next three chapters describe the process of how rivalry involvement influences women's status broadly, beginning with the influence of rivalry on the election of women. The third chapter discusses the impact of rivalry on the adoption of strong gender quotas. Finally, the fourth chapter investigates the influence of rivalry on society, specifically the level of gender inequality. The findings and implications of the three chapters are further discussed in the conclusion of my dissertation, along with avenues for further research on the question of how security threats affects women's lives.

Figure 1.1 The Reinforcing Cycle of Low Levels of Female Representation, Gender Inequality, and Sexism.



Figure 1.2: Average Female Representation Cross-Nationally Overtime



Figure 1.3. Gender Inequality Overtime



Chapter Two: The Influence of Interstate Rivalry on Female Representation

Introduction

The assumption of men as warriors and women as pacifists is long standing and extends across states. States where women have greater access to political power have been found to spend less on their military (Koch and Fulton 2011), are less likely to use violence to handle international disputes (Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003), and have a more humanitarian and less militarized foreign policy (Brysk and Mehta 2014). In addition, the gender gap in support for the use of military force to handle international issues lends support to the idea that women are more pacific than men (see Nincic and Nincic 2002; Burris 2008). These findings indicate that increased female political power arguably leads to a more pacific foreign policy. These studies treat a state's foreign policy as largely a domestic decision, focusing on the gender composition of the state's political leaders as the primary determinants of its international actions. However, the amount a state spends on its military and how it interacts with other states are not exclusively driven by domestic politics, but is also a response to the international security environment. Specifically, being in an interstate rivalry influences a state's level of military spending and its level of conflict behavior.

The presence of an interstate rival creates a hostile and conflictual environment in which the state must operate within. Crises within a rivalry are likely to involve higher stakes and are more prone to conflict due to lack of trust between the two states. (Richardson 1939; Goertz and Diehl 1993; Thompson 2001). In response to the constant threat of conflict, the state allocates more of its resources to the military causing military spending to increase (Nordhaus *et al.* 2011; Hensel 1999). As a state places greater

emphasis on maintaining its security and diverting more resources towards its defense, it becomes increasingly militarized. Militarization of the state impacts the gendered roles men and women are expected to play, subsequently leading to women having less political power (Enloe 1983; Tickner 1992; Reardon 1996). Women's exclusion from political power is a repercussion of increasing militarization to maintain security. Thus, a state's level of military spending, level of conflict behavior, and level of female representation are all effects of the presence of an ongoing security threat from an interstate rival. Subsequently, these three state characteristics are all partially consequences of the international system.

This chapter argues that female representation is not simply a product of domestic characteristics, but a result of the international security environment a state operates within, specifically the influence of a rivalry on the election of women. By focusing on the influence of the rivalry on female representation, this chapter adds to previous work that contends that domestic politics are influenced by the international system (see Gourevitch 1976). The fear of war leads to the socialization of men and women to play different roles to combat the threat, perpetuating the stereotypical beliefs of men's and women's ability to maintain security. When security dominates the agenda voters are likely to prefer male candidates due to the perception that men are more capable of maintaining security (Tickner 1992; Reardon 1996). Political parties respond to voter preferences for male leaders by running fewer female candidates, subsequently leading to a lower level of female representation compared with states lacking an ongoing security threat from an interstate rival.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the steps by which a national security threat of an interstate rival leads to a lower level of female representation. From this discussion a hypothesis is derived concerning the relationship between involvement in an interstate rivalry and female representation in a state, which is then tested against alternative explanations among 98 states from 1981-2007. Important implications of the finding that security threats influence female representation are discussed in the conclusion.

Literature

National Security and Gender Roles

As discussed in chapter one, involvement in a rivalry impacts domestic structures and domestic politics. The threat of conflict increases group cohesion, pulling group members together in order to meet the threat from the out-group (Coser 1956; Simmel 1955). In addition to increasing group cohesion, a threat to national security also requires members of society to play their part and fulfill their civic duty to ensure security of the state (Simmel 1955; Hutchison 2011). The assigned roles for members of society during times of security threat traditionally fall down gendered lines. For men, this means being prepared to fight their countries' war (Tickner 1992; Elshtain 1995; Goldstein 2001). For women, fulfilling their civic duty means supporting the war effort as wives, mothers, and nurses (Enloe 1988, Tickner 1992; Elstain 1995, Klein 1998; Mathers 2013). Mothers are expected to raise sons and willingly send them off to war (Ruddick 1989; Elstain 1995; Kwon 2001). Wives are expected to take care of the domestic affairs so that their husbands can focus on war-fighting (Enloe 1983). Nurses are expected to not only care for the wounded, but to also look feminine and attractive while in the midst of war (Enloe

1983; Norman 1990). Women support the war fighting in various ways while men are expected to carry out the actual combat. This idea was articulated well by Judge Dudley of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in the debate on drafting women when he stated, "The teachings of history show that if the nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of defense while women keep the home fires burning" (Kerber 1993: 99). The gender roles of warfare have remained relatively consistent over time and have been found across states (Goldstein 2001).

Due to the different roles men and women are expected to fulfill, preparing for war solidifies the differences of the two genders (Tickner 1992; Goldstein 2001). The military is overwhelming a male domain and military training helps socialize recruits to view men and women as different. Drill sergeants call the new recruits "woman" and "pussies" to try and humiliate the man and draw a clear distinction between the two genders (Enloe 1983; Goldstein 2001; Rashid 2009; Tickner 1992). Once the possibility of war casts a shadow over everyday life, men and women are forced into their roles (Goldstein 2001). A state in an interstate rivalry is under constant threat of militarized conflict and must be prepared to respond quickly creating concrete expectations for the two genders. The distinct roles men and women are expected to fulfill in preparing and engaging in warfare subsequently impacts the perceived suitability of men and women to handle various issues within society.

Since the military and national defense is predominately a male domain, men are commonly perceived as more competent in running the military and attending to national security (Lawless 2004; Falk and Kenski 2006). Women are expected to play supporting roles, as mothers, wives, and nurses as the state prepares and engages in conflict.

Subsequently, women are viewed as better suited to handle compassion issues such as child and elder care, education, and ensuring the rights of minorities (Sapiro 1981-1982; Rosenwasser *et al.* 1987; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a). Thus, the gendered nature of national security not only impacts the roles men and women are expected to play, but also the issue areas the two genders are believed to be innately better at handling.

The gender roles of national security influences the belief that men are better at handling military and national security affairs, however, differences in support for the use of military force may help maintain this stereotype. Women tend to be less supportive of using military force when compared to men. The gender gap in support for military force has been routinely present in the U.S. (Smith 1984; Nincic and Nincic 2002; Burris 2008) and cross-nationally (Wilcox *et al.* 1996; Tessler and Warriner 1997). In addition, women are more likely to support cutting military spending (Togeby 1994; Clark and Clark 2008).[1] Due to the great importance of security, to both the state and the individual, when national security is a pressing concern voters are going to support candidates and leaders they view as most able to maintain their security. Women are seen as less capable than men to maintain security due to close association of men with the military and national defense and the belief that they will cut military spending and weaken the state's defenses. These beliefs about women can impede women winning elections in states with a salient national security threat, such as states involved in an interstate rivalry.

Rivalries, Voting, and Female Candidates

[1] However, the gender gap in support for military force and military spending is not

When running for political office, candidates must convince the voters that they can handle the most pressing issues facing the state. Consequently, candidates in states involved in an interstate rivalry must convince voters that they can maintain national security. Candidates unable to indicate this ability will have difficulty winning the election. For instance, incumbents viewed as overly cooperative with an interstate rival or that do not adequately respond with force to an increase in rival hostility are more likely to be voted out of office (Colaresi 2004). These office holders were viewed as putting the national security at risk and lost voter support.

Female candidates will have greater difficulty convincing voters they can maintain security because of the widely held stereotypes about women's innate abilities. The ability to handle security and military affairs has been found to influence voter support for candidates running for the national legislature. Survey research in the U.S. found that Congressional candidates seen as competent in handling military affairs were more likely to gain voter support (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Female candidates for the national legislature are aware that a portion of the public perceives them as deficient in military and security affairs and subsequently ill-suited to hold political office. Recently, a U.S. Senate staffer stated, "Women want to get on defense and foreign policy committees to establish their credibility on the issue" (Swers 2007:581). On the campaign trail when national security is a salient concern, female candidates will emphasis that they are supportive of the military in an attempt to overcome their perceived deficit. For example, Senator Mary Landrieu's campaign used camouflage "Military Mary" bumper stickers to signify Sen. Landrieu's continued support for the military (Swers 2007). However, the committees, bill sponsorship, and campaign strategies of female candidates

are unlikely to completely remove the perception that they are less capable than male candidates to handle military and security affairs. Even if female candidates act tough, talk in manly speech, and are described as possessing masculine qualities, they are still unlikely to be viewed as capable of handling military and national security affairs (Rosenwasser and Rogers 1987; Gedalya *et al.* 2011).

Due to the high saliency of national security, the perception that women are unsuitable to handle military and security affairs will make it difficult for female candidates to win voter support in states involved in a rivalry. If political parties are concerned that female candidates will be unable to garner much voter support they will be hesitant to run female candidates in the first place. Combined with a state's domestic institutions and voter support, the number of female candidates political parties run dictates a state's level of female representation.

Parties, Voters, Institutions, and Female Representation

Political parties typically want more power, which means they want to maximize their seat share in the national legislature. Political parties must run candidates that the voters will support in order to win more seats and maximize their power. To win voters, the candidate must be seen as qualified to hold political office. Typically, this means the candidate must have a certain level of education and professional experience. Possessing the education and work experience to be been seen as qualified to hold office is one factor that influences the differences in female representation seen cross-nationally. This is particularly problematic for women in less developed states since they often do not receive the same level of education as men and are commonly excluded from the paid workforce (Inglehart and Norris 2003). Therefore, women in these states typically lack

the necessary qualifications to hold political office creating a smaller pool of qualified female candidates for parties to select from. This leads to lower level of female representation in less developed states compared to developed states. (Michael 1985; Ross 2008). However, even if women and men are educated and in the paid workforce at equal rates, a state's level of female representation can be lower due to its institutional design.

Politics has traditionally been a male domain with male party leaders largely determining who becomes a candidate. Running more women means that the party has to run fewer men, which they are often reluctant to do. Maria Antonieta Saa, a Chilean legislator, articulated this well when she stated, "Parties have no interest in having more women: to have more women would mean losing men" (Hinojosa 2012:1). This mindset is particularly problematic in single member districts since it is a winner-take all system. However, proportional representation systems allow for multiple winners which means running a woman does not exclude male candidates from also running and parties are less hesitant to run female candidates. Consequently, female representation has been found to be higher in states the use PR systems compared to SMD (Rule 1987; Matland and Brown 1992; Kittilson 2006). Thus, a state's level of development and electoral system influence political parties' decision to run female candidates, however pressure from voters for greater female representation also impacts the candidate selection.

Typically, party leaders do not run more female candidates on their own volition since running more women means unseating men. Therefore, parties run more female candidates when there is an incentive, such as capturing a larger voting block, to do so. Traditionally, women are the ones pushing for greater female representation and are more

likely to vote for female candidates (Dolan 2008). However, being in a rivalry alters the willingness of female voters to support female candidates. Due to the heightened fear of conflict in states in a rivalry, voters want leaders that can maintain security and handle military affairs, which means male candidates will be preferred over female candidates. While this is true for both male and female voters, women appear to be most affected by security threats. Women have been found to be more fearful of the possibility of future conflict (Carroll 2008; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009). Therefore, when security dominates the agenda female voters are likely to prefer male candidates and shy away from voting for female candidates.

This shift can have a large impact on the ability of women to win election since traditionally female voters are more supportive of female candidates than male voters (Brians 2005; Dolan 2008; Hinojosa 2012). Part of the explanation for why women are typically more supportive of female candidates is due to women, both voters and candidate, being more concerned with issues such as welfare, childcare, and women's health. However, these issue areas are all domestic, issues that are lower priority in the presence of a national security threat from a rival. Security trumps all other concerns including the level of female representation. For this reason, male candidates are likely to receive a large share of voter support, from both male and female voters. The shift in support of female candidates influences the willingness of political parties to run female candidates.

<Figure 2.1 >

The process in which being in a rivalry influences female representation is summarized in Figure 2.1 Each state has a pool of qualified candidates from which

political parties select whom to run for office. Once candidates are chosen, a state's electoral system translates vote share into seat share and candidates into representatives. This in turn, determines the level of female representation. Being in a rivalry influences female representation in two interrelated ways. First, voters are less supportive of female candidates. Second, the decreased support for female candidates leads political parties to select male candidates. These two factors combine to lead to a lower level of female representation in states with an ongoing security threat. Because of the female candidate reduction, even if a voter wanted to vote for a female candidate they often will not have the opportunity. Therefore, it is hypothesized that states involved in an interstate rivalry will have a lower level of female representation compared to states not involved in an interstate rivalry.

Data and Methods

Sample

The theory put forth argues that female representation will be lower in states involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry through two interrelated mechanism: less demand for female political leaders and the subsequent running of fewer female candidates. It is not uncommon for less democratic states to have women in the legislature; however, representatives are unlikely to gain office through free and fair elections. Legislators in less democratic states may obtain their seats through elections, but the candidates may have to be approved by a central government body or the political parties may have to join a regime-supportive front in order submit a list (Gandhi 2008). In these systems, the parties are not able to operate freely and select any individual as a candidate. This implies that the state is democratic, has free and fair elections, and

women have the right to fully participate in the democratic process. Therefore, the hypothesis is tested using 21 consolidated democracies. A list of these states is included in the Online Appendix. These states all have a long history of free and fair elections and the influence of involvement in a rivalry on female representation is expected to manifest in these states. In addition, these are the same states used in Koch and Fulton (2011)'s study allowing the results in this chapter to more fully engage with their findings. However, Koch and Fulton (2011) include Israel in their sample, which is excluded in this study. In terms of rivalries, Israel is an outlier having as many as five rivals in the sample while the most any other state in the sample has is two. It is excluded in this study to help ensure that the findings are driven purely from the influence of Israel.[2]

Arguably, however, the influence of rivalry on the election of women is likely to appear in democratic states more broadly defined. As a robustness check, the hypothesis is tested on a broader sample of democratic states. In order to be included in the broader sample, a state must score six or greater on the polity scale and score two or greater on Cingranelli and Richards (2008) women's political rights scale. A score of two indicates that women are guaranteed by law the right to vote, run for office, hold government positions, join political parties, and petition government officials, but they may be moderately prohibited from exercising those rights in practice. Using these criteria creates a sample of 105 democratic states.

Dependent Variable

[2] The results remain consistent across all models when Israel is also included in the sample.

To test the influence of being in a rivalry on the election of women the percent of seats of the national parliament held by women is used as the dependent variable.[3] The rational for using this measure as opposed to directly testing the number of female candidates in each state in the sample is twofold. First, reliable data on candidates for the states in the sample across the time frame are largely unavailable. Second, the percent of female held seats in the national legislature is the outcome of the two mechanisms previously discussed. Without a high number of female candidates there cannot be a high level of female representations. In addition, less voter support for the female candidates that parties do run will result in the female candidates largely being unsuccessful in the election, creating a low level of female representation. These two mechanisms combined result in lower levels of female representation in states involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry.

Independent Variables

The primary explanatory variable is whether a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. Unlike interstate wars or militarized interstate disputes, rivalries produce long-standing national security threats. A militarized interstate dispute, no matter how hostile the action, can be subside within a matter of days. Fifty percent of MIDs end in a week and ninety percent terminate within a year (Ghosn *et al.* 2004). Interstate wars, while typically longer than militarized interstate disputes, often conclude within a few years after the start of hostilities. Seventy five percent end within two years and only five percent lasting past five years (Bennett and Stam 1996). The duration and conflict prone

[3]Data on this measure for the years 1945-2003 comes from Paxton *et al.* 2008. Data from 2004-2010 comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. www.ipu.org. If the state has both an upper and lower house, female representation is only measured for the lower house.

environment created by an intestate rivalry alters domestic structures and influences domestic politics having a larger impact on the state. While involvement in an interstate war can influence elections (Grose and Oppenheimer 2007; Kriner and Shen 2007) the war is unlikely to be ongoing through multiple elections. Once the war has ended, national security is no longer a salient domestic issue and thus will not influence the selection and support for female candidates. A national security threat that is present for a long period of time is expected to decrease female representation due to the mechanical effect of stereotypical attitudes of men's and women's ability on voter preferences. An interstate rivalry brings national security to the forefront of the public mind for an extended period and has been found to influence voting behavior (Colaresi 2004, 2014). Subsequently, interstate rivalry is utilized to capture an ongoing national security threat.

Koch and Fulton (2011) include a measure of conflict behavior in their article on the link between women's political power, military spending, and conflict. They use Goldstein (1992)'s measure of opposing conflict behavior, which is the average weighted conflict score directed at the state. Their findings indicate that a state's opposing conflict behavior does not influence female representation. However, a state's conflict behavior fluctuates greatly over a matter of years and consequently is unlikely to have a continuing influence on elections, particularly the election of women. In addition, the measure of conflict behavior ends in 1992. Koch and Fulton (2011) recognize this limitation and run a separate model without the conflict behavior measure and include a dichotomous variable indicating the Post-Cold War period. They find that female representation increases in the Post-Cold War period, indicating that women are more likely to gain access to the legislature as the security threat from the Cold War declines. This finding

lends support to the proposed theory in this chapter that women have difficulty winning elections when security dominates the agenda as well as the influence of interstate rivalry on female representation.

I employ the conceptualization of rivalry as presented by Thompson (2001). In order to be in a rivalry the actors must regard the other state as a competitor, as an enemy, and as an explicit threat with each side having the expectation that future interactions may become militarized (Thompson 2001; Colaresi *et al.* 2007; Colaresi 2004, 2014). The actions of the rival are looked upon with suspicion, inferring that all actions taken by the other are inherently hostile and directed towards them. Within the rivalry, some level of distrust or conflict between the two states becomes a norm. This often leads to relatively benign events, such as military maneuvers by a rival, to escalate to interstate violence (Colaresi and Thompson 2002).

The measure of rivalry created by Thompson (2001) was chosen over Klein *et al.* (2006) due to the lower severity threshold to be considered a rivalry in Klein *et al.* (2006)'s measure. For instance, multiple skirmishes over fishing rights can be considered a rivalry in Klein *et al.* (2006)'s dataset. The theory put forth argues that an ongoing security threat from a rival influences voter preferences for male candidates and political leaders. It is unlikely that the lower severity issues, such as fishing rights, will elicit a severe enough security threat to shift vote choice away from female candidates. For this reason, the rivalry measure in Thompson and Dreyer (2011) is utilized.

To first test the influence of rivalries on female representation, a dichotomous *Rivalry* variable is used. This variable signifies if the state is involved in a rivalry for each year. *Rivalry* does not account for the number of rivalries a state is involved in. All

states in rivalry, regardless of the amount of rivalries, in coded as a 1. However, the number of rivalries can also influence female representation. For instance, the election of women in the U.S. with tow rivals may be altered more than in South Korea, which only has one rival. For this reason, a second measure of rivalry is used, *Total Rivalry.* The *Total Rivalry* measure is the number of rivalries a state is involved in each year. In the sample, the max number of rivals a state has in a given year is two. In the sample of 21 consolidated states there are 64 observations of 2 rivals, 104 observations with a single rival, and 888 without any rivals.

Control Variables

Past research has found multiple factors that help explain the variation seen in female representation cross-nationally and will be included in the model. The use of gender quotas has been shown to increase the level of female representation, specifically when national level quotas such as reserved seats or a legislated quota, as opposed to voluntary party quotas, are used (Jones 1998, 2009; Schwindt-Bayer 2009).[4] Reserved seats and legislated quotas are commonly referred to as constitutional or legal quotas since they are created when a new constitution is established or with the passage of a national law (Krook 2014). Data for the *Constitutional/Legal Quota* measure is from the Global Database of Quotas for women.[5] The variable corresponds to the percentage of seats reserved for women if reserved seats are in place. If legislated candidate quotas are

[4] Reserved seats mandate that a certain number of seats be reserved for women whereas legislated quotas stipulate that all party lists must contain a certain percentage of women.
[5] Data available at http://www.quotaproject.org/. Since voluntary party quotas are adopted by a party's own free will and not mandatory for all parties, party quotas are not included in the *Constitutional/Legal Quota* measure. The decision to combine reserved seats and legislated quotas into one variable was made since states do not either have both reserved seats and legislated quotas. If a legislated quota variable and reserved seat variable are both included in the model, one is dropped due to high levels of collinearity.

used, the variable corresponds to the percentage of candidates that must be women. For example, the *Constitutional/Legal Quota* measure for Argentina beginning in 1991 when the legislated candidate quota was adopted equals 30, the percentage of all party lists that must be comprised of women. Beginning in 1997, 3 percent of Kenya's legislative seats are reserved for women, thus from 1997 the *Constitutional/Legal Quota* variable for Kenya is 3.

Different electoral systems have been found to influence female representation. Proportional representational systems allow for multiple candidates to run for office, making running a woman less of a risk. Thus, states using a PR system have been found to have higher levels of female representation compared to Single Member Districts (Rule 1987; Kittilson 2006). In addition, proportional representational systems with closed-lists candidate selection are largely controlled by the party and have been found be conducive to higher levels of female representation (Rule 1987; Matland and Brown 1992). For this reason, a dichotomous variable, *PR,* is coded as 1 for a state that uses a proportional representations system, and a dichotomous variable, *Closed List*, is coded as 1 for states that use close-list proportional systems are included in the model.[6] Political ideology of parties has been found to influence the selection of female candidates and the subsequent level of female representation. Parties with a leftist ideology typically have a higher number of female candidates and female representation (Caul 1999; Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Therefore, a measure of *Leftist Government* is also included in the model.[7]

[6] Data on PR systems from Norris (2008). Data on Closed List systems from the Database of Political Institutions.
[7] Data from the Database of Political Institutions.

Along with institutional factors, the supply of potential female candidates with the education and professional experience to be seen as qualified to hold political office also influences female representation. A measure of women of the percent of the labor force comprised of women, *Female Labor Force,* is included in the model along with the percent of higher education students, *Female Education,* to control for the supply of qualified female candidates.[8] Women's involvement in the paid workforce and their ability to obtain higher education not only gauges the supply of qualified female candidates, but also captures gender equality within the state. Women are unlikely to engage in the paid work force or be able to obtain high levels of education in states where women are not viewed as equal to men. Consequently, women in the workforce and in higher education have been utilized as measures of state gender equality (see Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005). Thus, the inclusion of these variables helps measure the overall gender equality of the state. However, data for these variables for the broader democratic of 105 states contain many missing values. Therefore, level of development as measured by *logged GDP per capita* is used in the place of female education and female labor force participation in the broader democratic sample of 105 states. Level of development is highly correlated with women's access to higher education and the paid workforce and has been utilized in previous work as a proxy for the women in higher education and the paid workforce (e.g. Bush 2011).

An additional domestic factor that influences female representation is the predominant religion of the state's population. The paternalistic nature of Islam and Catholicism have been shown to have a negative impact on female representation

[8] Data on female labor force participation and higher education enrollment from Cole (2013).

(Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Variables indicating the percentage of the population that is *Catholic* or *Muslim* are included as control variables.[9] The creation of the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has placed increased female representation on the international agenda and created an international goal of equality of genders including equal representation. Women's status in states that have ratified CEDAW has been found to improve (Cole 2013). Since the improvement of women's rights does occur immediately, but gradually increases in these states, a measure of years since a state has ratified CEDAW, *Years Since CEDAW Ratification,* is included in the model.

The ratification of CEDAW can influence women's status and female representation domestically, but the creation of CEDAW has had a broader impact on women's status globally. CEDAW helped bring women's rights and female underrepresentation into the spotlight, placing it on the international agenda. Consequently, we might expect female representation to increase following the creation of CEDAW in 1980 even if a state did not ratify CEDAW due to changes in international norms. To help control for the influence of the creation of CEDAW on female representation globally, a variable *Years Since CEDAW Creation,* is included that measures the years since CEDAW was created. The level of female power and societal standing may influence women's ability to win elections, therefore, as a robustness check additional measures of women's status are included. The variables include political characteristics such as if the state has a *Female Chief Executive* and the number of *Years Since the First Women MP* was elected and measures of women's societal standing,

[9] Data from Maoz and Anderson. 2013. "The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends"

including *Women's Economic Rights, Women's Political Rights,* and *Women's Societal Rights.*[10] The results for the models with additional measures of women's status are included in the Online Appendix

Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of the non-dichotomous variables. In addition, Table 2.1 also compares female representation between states involved in rivalry and states not in a rivalry. On average, female representation is lower in states in a rivalry. More specifically, the average female representation in states in a rivalry is statistically different than the average female representation in states not in a rivalry.[11]

<Table 2.1 >

Method

This chapter argues that the ongoing security threat from a rival influences the selection and voter support of female candidates resulting in lower levels of female representation. However, previous research has found that as female representation increases in a state, its foreign policy preferences change (Brysk and Mehta 2014) and its interactions with other states become less hostile and conflictual (Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Koch and Fulton 2011). While the previous studies do not measure the influence of female representation on involvement in an interstate rivalry, it can easily be argued that the level of women's political power in a state also influences the likelihood that the state will be involved in an interstate rivalry. Therefore, involvement in an interstate rivalry and the level of female representation is likely endogenous and it is necessary to purge the endogenous components to more accurately access the influence of rivalry on female

[10] Data on Female Chief Executive are from Goemans *et al.* (2009) and data on Years Since the First Female MP was elected are from Paxton *et al.* (2008). Data on Women's Rights are from Cingranelli and Richards (2008).
[11] The t score for the t test is 9.58.

representation. I address the issue of endogeneity by adopting an IV approach, utilizing a two-stage least squares estimation with instrumental variables (IV-2SLS). The IV-2SLS model statistically addresses the issue of reverse causality by purging the endogenous components. This leads to unbiased estimators and a more assessment of the relationship between variables (Baum *et al.* 2007). While the adoption of the IV-2SLS is rather straightforward, the difficulty is finding valid instrumental variables. A valid instrumental variable is one that is correlated with the endogenous variable of interstate rivalry, but is uncorrelated with female representation in general.

To identify valid instruments, I draw on the literature on the influence of rivalry on militarization of the state. Wallace first identified a link between rivalry and the collection of arms, arguing that arms races "result from the competitive pressure of the military rivalry itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry." (1979:5) Others have argued that the interactive competition between rivals leads to higher levels of military spending and enlarging of military forces (Diehl and Crescenzi 1998; Hensel 1999; Gibler *et al.* 2005). In their work on what influences military spending Nordhaus *et al* (2010) found that the spending of an adversary greatly influences a state's level of military spending. From these studies it is apparent that military spending, size of the military, and a state's national capability to fight wars is strongly linked to the involvement in an interstate rivalry. Therefore, I use measures of a state's *Military Spending*, *Military Personnel*, and national capacity (*CINC),* as instrumental variables.[12] *Military Spending* is the percentage of a state's GDP that goes towards its military and

[12] Data on military spending, military personnel, and national capacity from the National Material Components Dataset Version 4 of the Correlates of War Project (Singer *et al.* 1972).

Military Personnel is the percent of the total population in the military. The *CINC* variable is a state's Composite Index of National Capability score. The validity of these instruments is assessed through multiple diagnostic tests, which are further discussed in the results section.

Results

In the first-stage models, estimation of the endogenous variables is conducted using the previously discussed instruments. I report the first-stage diagnostics tests that assess the validity of the instruments in Table 2.2. The first diagnostic test of the instruments I use is the Stock-Yogo weak identification test (Stock and Yogo 2005). Since I specify clustering in my models, a Wald *F* statistic is derived from the Kleibergen-Paap *rk* statistic is used to test for weak instruments.[13] The Kleibergen-Paap *F* statistic must exceed the Stock-Yogo critical value of 6.46, which is used for cases of three instrumental variables and one endogenous regressor (Stock and Yogo 2005). As the first-stage diagnostics show in Table 2.2, the Kleibergen-Paap *F* statistic exceeds the critical value for each endogenous regressor, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. The second diagnostic test uses the Hansen's *J* statistic. This statistic indicates whether the instruments independently predict the second-stage models' error (see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman 2007). In Table 2.2, I report the *p*-values of the Hansen's *J* statistic for each model. None of these statistics near statistical significance giving further confirmation that the instruments are valid.

<Table 2.2 >

[13] The use of the rk Wald statistic is based on Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman (2007: 490)'s statement that is a sensible choice when clustering.

Table 2.2 also displays the second stage results of the IV estimation. Female representation is expected to be lower in states involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry. Models 1 and 3 report the influence of involvement in a rivalry, regardless of the number of rivalries, on female representation. As expected, the *Rivalry* variable is negative and statistically significant (.05 level). This result indicates that female representation is lower, on average, in states involved in an interstate rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry, supporting the hypothesis. This result holds for both samples. Models 2 and 4 further test the influence of rivalry on female representation using the total number of rivalries a state is involved in. Across both samples, *Total Rivalry* has a negative and statistically significant (.05) influence on female representation. This means that as the number of rivalries a state is involved in increases female representation decreases on average. This finding further supports the hypothesis that female representation will be lower in states involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry.[14]

In terms of the control variables, the models are relatively consistent with previous research. Institutional characteristics of the state behave somewhat as expected. For instance, *PR* is positive and statistically significant (.05) across all 4 models, indicating that female representation is higher in states using a proportional representational system. Likewise, *Leftist Government* is positive and statistically significant in Models 3 and 4, supporting the claim that leftist governments are more

[14] The results displayed in Table 2.2 are from non-lagged independent variables, however, the results using independent variables lagged one, five, and ten years, respectively, remain consistent across lag structures. The results remain consistent when Israel is included in the sample.

conducive to women in politics.[15] The influence of the creation of CEDAW is expected to have a positive influence on female representation due to changing international norms regarding women in politics. The variable *Years Since CEDAW Creation* is positive and statistically significant indicating that female representation has increased over the years since CEDAW was created. While the creation of CEDAW has a positive influence on female representation, the actual ratification of the convention does not appear to have an independent influence on female representation as expected.

As expected, the supply of qualified female candidates, as indicated by *Level of Development,* influences female representation. On average, as development increases female representation also increases. This finding is consistent with previous findings. Looking at more specific indicators of the pool of qualified candidates, *Women in the Paid Labor Force* and *Women in Higher Education,* we see mixed results. *Women in Higher Education* is positive and statistically significant whereas *Women in the Paid Labor Force* fails to reach significance. Workforce experience is often a prerequisite to holding political office, but it likely depends on the type of experience. What type of professional experience is relevant for holding office is likely to vary across states, which may explain the lack of relationship between women in the labor force and female representation. As expected, the percentage of Catholics in the population is negative and statistically significant. However, there is no relationship between Muslims in the population and female representation. This result is likely due to the sample. As Fish (2002) notes, Islam and authoritarian states are closely associated with one another and this is evident within the sample of democracies used in this study. For the 105 states

[15] Lack of statistical significance of *Leftist Government* in Models 1 and 2 is likely a product of the smaller sample size.

included in the sample, the average percentage of the population that is Muslim is 8 percent compared to 40 percent in the less democratic states excluded in the sample and 25 percent cross-nationally. Thus, the lack of a relationship between the percentage of Muslims in the population is likely a result that the democratic states in the sample have low level of Muslims in their population.

<Table 2.3 >

<Figure 2.2 >

Returning to the result that involvement in a rivalry leads to lower levels of female representation, to further illustrate the influence of rivalry involvement on the election of women I generate and compare the marginal effects of *Total Rivalries* on female representation in consolidated democracies.[16] The predicted margins are displayed in Table 2.3 and are plotted in Figure 2.2. With all variables held at their mean, the average expected female representation in a state not involved in a rivalry is 19 percent. However, the expected percent of the legislature comprised of women drops by 9 percent for a state involved in a single rivalry and female representation is expected to decline even more to 6 percent for a state involved in two rivalries. While more rivals arguably makes national security an even greater priority than one rival, involvement even in a single rivalry has notable consequents for female representation. Studies have found that as women hold 20 to 40 percent of legislative seats, legislative behavior is altered and policy outcomes change with more women's issues legislation being passed (see Kanter 1977; Dahlerup 1988; O'Regan 2000). Female representation, on average, is predicted to be 10 percent for states involved in a rivalry, much lower than the level many have found

[16] A Tobit model was used to create the predictive margins. The statistical results of the Tobit are consistent with the IV-2SLS.

to make substantive changes to policy outcomes. Subsequently, when security dominates the agenda not only is female representation lower, but this can also influence women's lives more broadly.

Discussion

The findings help us better understand the variation of female representation seen cross-nationally as well as further demonstrates the influence of international system on domestic politics. The findings from this chapter indicate that the level of female representation in a state is not purely a product of domestic characteristics. In states involved in a rivalry, women remain disadvantaged in winning elections even when the domestic environment would suggest otherwise. The rational for the ability of men to rise to the top of the political hierarchy hinges on the perception of innate abilities of both men and women. Men are perceived as being better able to handle military affairs due to the close association of military experience, particularly combat experience, with men. The association of men with combat experience makes it difficult for women to win elections in states involved in a rivalry.

In these states the threat to security is unlikely to diminish quickly, if at all, and women's representation is expected to remain low. However, the impact of the national security threat from the rival does not end at impeding women to win seats in the national legislature. Women running for chief executive are likely to be affected as well. As the number of female chief executives increases cross-nationally, women living in states involved in a rivalry may have difficulty breaking the glass ceiling. Women have led a state involved in a rivalry, such as Indira Gandhi (India), Benazir Bhutto (Pakistan),

Golda Meir (Israel), and Geun-hye Park (South Korea), but of the 22 current female executives, Park is the only one to be head a state involved in a rivalry.[17]

Women running for the position of chief executive in states involved in a rivalry may face an even larger challenge than women running for the legislature due to the nature of the office. As chief executive, you are also typically commander-in-chief, a position many may feel a woman is unqualified to hold. Tzipi Livini, the leader of the Kadima party, experienced this in the 2009 Israeli elections, often having her ability to handle Israel's security questioned. Her opponent stated she did not have the experience to handle the national security issues Israel faced (Gedalya *et al.* 2009). The Israeli media stated, "This is war lady, not a time for learning" (Gedalya *et al.* 2011: 170), implying that Livni lacked the experience needed to maintain Israeli security. Thus, national security threats emanating from a rival are likely to influence women in politics at all levels.

Conclusion

The finding that involvement in a rivalry negatively impacts the election of women means that female representation is not simply a product of domestic characteristics such as religion, level of development, or electoral system, but is influenced by the international system. In addition, the implications of an ongoing security threat for women are likely to reach further than the degree to which they have descriptive representation. As previously noted, women are more likely to initiate and support legislation such as paid maternity leave, access to contraceptives, and equal pay

[17] Information on female executives from the Worldwide Guide to Women Leaders, http://www.guide2womenleaders.com/Current-Women-Leaders.htm (accessed August 15, 2014).

that can give women the same prospects as men for obtaining higher education and meaningful employment (Swers 1998; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). These policies or lack of these policies influence the level of gender equality of the state. With a smaller portion of the legislature comprised of women in states involved in a rivalry, legislation that can improve women's lives and decrease gender inequality are less likely to be passed.

Rivalry involvement can impact gender inequality through the election of fewer female political leaders, but a rivalry can also have a less discernable influence of the level of gender inequality in society. In states where the chance of interstate conflict is high, the citizens are called upon to do their part to ensure security. For men, this means serving in the military. With military service comes rewards, including greater societal standing, respect, as well as access to better jobs and high political office, subsequently leading to greater gender inequality (Moon 1998). Gender inequality, to varying degrees, is seen in all states. Traditionally, the level of gender inequality has been attributed to a state's domestic characteristics such as its religiosity and level of development (Inglehart and Norris 2003). However, it can be argued an inherent state characteristic, gender inequality, has its roots in the international system. Gender inequality is a by-product of the threat of conflict.

In order to more fully test this claim more research on the relationship between national security threats and female representation as well as gender equality is needed. For instance, looking in-depth at states involved in a rivalry can allow for a more thorough examination of the mechanisms of how an ongoing security threat leads to lower levels of female representation. Do women have lower rates of electoral success

when security dominates the agenda and do we see fewer female candidates in these states? Sub-national research can help test these questions and further refine our theoretical understanding of this process

The research in this article is, but one way to investigate the relationship between security threats and female representation. Further research is needed in order understand how security threats impact women including conditional effects of different types of security threats. For instance, should we expect an external security threat, such as a rivalry, to have the same effect on female representation and gender equality more broadly as an internal security threat? Within internal security threats there is a great deal of variation, which could have different effects on women. For instance, does a civil war effect female representation and gender equality in the same way that high levels of violent crime? These questions all relate back to the initial question asked in this chapter: when security dominates the agenda, do women have difficulty winning elections? There is a great deal more to be learned in order to fully answer this question.

Figure 2.1: The Influence of Rivalry Involvement on the Political Process



Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics				
Variable	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall Female Representation	14.27	11.90	0	47.3
Female Representation in States in a Rivalry	7.57	5.26	0	22
Female Representation in States Not in a Rivalry	15.70	12.43	0	47.3
Difference	*8.13**			
Women in Higher Education	48.89	10.97	13.02	72.44
Women in the Paid Workforce	40.10	6.63	19.06	53.87
Years since CEDAW Ratification	9.32	3.35	0	27
Size of Constitutional/ Legal Quota[1]	3.46	10.28	0	50
% of Population Muslim	.08	.28	0	.99
% of Population Catholic	.35	.34	0	.97
Military Spending as % of GDP	2.26	3.14	0	33.70
Military Personnel as % of Total Population	.004	.005	0	.05
CINC Score	.007	.02	.0001	.17

*Note: Performing a t-test of the average female representation in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry is statistically significant.

Table 2.2: Influence of Rivalry on Female Representation				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rivalry	-17.56 **		-13.32 **	
	(4.15)		(4.49)	
Total Rivalries		-11.75 **		-7.13 **
		(3.16)		(2.71)
Closed List	2.14	2.17	-.01	-.01
	(2.67)	(2.56)	(.01)	(.01)
Leftist Government	.61	.24	2.58 *	2.27 *
	(1.06)	(1.05)	(1.12)	(1.13)
PR System	8.44 **	8.62 **	5.27 **	5.11 **
	(3.09)	(2.79)	(1.63)	(1.57)
Constitutional/Legal Quota	-.14	-.12	.12	.11
	(.088)	(.08)	(.07)	(.06)
Muslim	113.74	92.15	-1.56	-.16
	(101.40)	(97.87)	(3.02)	(3.59)
Catholic	-14.21 **	-13.58 **	-5.51 *	-6.34 *
	(4.39)	(4.19)	(2.66)	(2.63)
% Women in the Paid Labor Force	.11	.18		
	(.46)	(.43)		
% Women in Higher Education	.67 *	.71 *		
	(.29)	(.30)		
(logged) GDP per capita			1.84 **	1.92 **
			(.61)	(.62)
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.67 **	.74 **	.29 *	.29 *
	(.25)	(.24)	(.13)	(.13)
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.45	-.56	.00	.04
	(.23)	(.27)	(.14)	(.15)
Constant	-23.70	-28.40	-4.91	-5.96
	(2.52)	(19.12)	(5.04)	(5.24)
First Stage Diagnostics				
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic of excluded elements	7.01	89.87	17.43	14.36
Hansen's J statistic (p value)	.36	.40	.42	.31
Countries	21	21	105	105
Observations	527	527	1,502	1,502
R-squared	.72	.72	.22	.25

Notes: Dependent variable proportion of female-held seats;
Results using 2SLS with clustering by country;
Excluded Instruments: Military spending as % of GDP, military personnel as % of total population, CINC score;
Robust standard errors in parentheses;
** p<.01, * p<.05;

Table 2.3: Marginal Effects of Total Rivalries on Female Representation

Number of Rivalries	Margins	
0	19.97	**
1	10.06	*
2	6.07	*

Note: Predictions were generated using margins command in Stata 13 with variables held at their means; ** p<.01, * p<.05

Figure 2.2: Influence of Total Rivalries on Female Representation



Chapter Three: Influence of Rivalry on the Adoption of Strong Gender Quotas

Introduction

The proliferation of the adoption of constitutional or legal gender quotas to improve female representation is well documented.[18] Credit for the expansion of quota adoption cross-nationally has been given to female political leaders (Kittilson 2006), women's transnational advocacy networks (Krook 2009), and emerging norms of gender equality (Bush 2010). While the use of gender quotas is becoming increasingly more common, the quotas are not uniform across states and the differences impact how effectively the quota increases female representation. For instance, Bolivia and Brazil both adopted a national level gender quota in 1997, female representation increased by 14% in Bolivia, while female representation only increased by 2% in Brazil. Thus some quotas are weak and others are strong. This chapter argues that whether a state adopts a strong or a weak quota is greatly impacted by elements of the international system. Specifically, states involved in an interstate rivalry are more likely to adopt a weak quota.

Involvement in a rivalry makes national security a prime concern and subsequently influences voter behavior (Hensel 1999; Colaresi 2004; Schroeder Forthcoming). Due to the great importance of security, voters want political leaders they believe are most able to maintain security. Repeatedly, men are viewed as more capable of handling issues of national security and consequently receive greater voter support in the presence of a security threat (Lawless 2004; Falk and Kenski 2006), subsequently diminishing societal demand for increased female

[18] Constitutional and legal quotas are adopted at the national level and creates a new the law. The law requires all political parties run a certain percentage of female candidates if it is a party list system or mandates a certain proportion of legislative seats be reserved for women. This is different from party quotas where individual political parties voluntarily adopt gender quotas. When quota is used in this chapter it refers to the adoption of a constitutional or legal quota.

representation. Fewer women in the legislature along with less societal demand to improve female representation will decrease the probability a strong quota will be adopted.

It is well understood that the international system influences domestic politics and that the preparation for war shapes domestic structures (e.g. Gourevitch 1978;Tilly 1985). This chapter adds to the previous work on how rivalry involvement influences domestic politics (Colaresi 2004; Thies 2005) by examining how rivalry impacts the strength of a quota adopted. While domestic actors such as women's organizations, female legislators, and political parties, impact the type of quota adopted, the international environment overshadows the domestic setting in which these actors make their decisions. The national security threat emanating from a rival influences the decision to adopt a strong or weak gender quota. While previous scholars have investigated the influence of international forces on the adoption of gender quotas (e.g. Krook 2006; Bush 2011; Anderson and Swiss 2014), they are primarily interested in whether a quota was adopted and do not consider the different types of quotas adopted. This chapter analyzes not only the impact of the international system on the adoption of a gender quota, but also investigates the influence of the international system on the strength of the quota adopted.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the factors that promote the adoption of a gender quota. This is followed by an examination of what elements impact the strength of a strong or weak quota, and how involvement in a rivalry influences these elements. Hypotheses are derived and tested. Finally, the results of how involvement influences the adoption of a strong gender quota are discussed.

Literature

International Promotion of Quota Adoption

<Figure 3.1>

The decision to adopt a national level gender quota is influenced by multitude of factors. These factors are visually displayed in Figure 3.1. The first factor is the international norm to increase female underrepresentation, which emerged in the 1970s during the United Nations decade of the women. The use of gender quotas to address female underrepresentation gained momentum when numerous international and regional organizations recommended the adoption of gender quotas following The United Nations Fourth World Conference in Beijing in 1995 (Krook 2006; Krook and True 2010; Bush 2011). Increasingly, the use of a national level gender quota became part of what it meant to be a "modern" state and members of the international community became strong advocates for their adoption. For instance, the implementation of gender quotas became standard practice for newly democratizing states or states receiving international post-conflict assistance (Krook *et al.* 2010; Bush 2011).

The growing international norm to adopt gender quotas not only facilitated the spread of quotas by mandating their adoption in developing and democratizing states, but it also served as a tipping point in states where the debate to adopt gender quotas was already underway (Krook 2009; Baldez 2004). In states that ratified the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), women's organizations pressured the state to adopt a gender quota in order to be in compliance with the treaty (Lubertino 1992; Htun and Jones 2002; Baldez 2004). For example, when Ecuador established a gender quota in its 1998 Constitution, it specifically stated that the gender quota was included in accordance with international treaties. The fact that Ecuador referenced its international treaty commitments in its quota law lends support to the claim that international forces influence the adoption of a gender quota.

Are All Quotas Created Equal?: Factors of a Strong Quota

While the international norm to adopt a gender quota can motivate a state to implement a quota, how strong the quota is determined by the domestic actors within the state. Before discussing the three domestic factors displayed in Figure 3.1 that influence the adoption of a strong gender quota, an explanation of what makes a gender quota weak or strong is needed. As evidence by the example previously given of Bolivia and Brazil, some quotas increase female representation more then others. Part of the variation in the increase of female representation is due to the presence or absence of three components in a gender quota: the size of the quota, placement mandates, and enforcement mechanisms. These components have repeatedly been found to have a meaningful impact on women's representation (Htun and Jones 2002; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Guldvik 2011).

The size of the quota refers to the percentage of candidates that must be women in Legislated Quotas and the percentage of the seats in the legislature reserved for women in a Reserved Seat Quota. The size of the quota is particularly important for reserved seats. Reserved seats mandate the portion of seats in the legislature that must be filled by women. If the mandate is 30% then the legislature will have at least 30% of its seats filled by women. Likewise, if only 5 % of the seats are reserved for women, then women will hold 5% of the seats, possibly more. However, for legislated quotas, placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms are of key importance.

Placement mandates are important in determining the strength of the quota since parties often try to adhere to the quota law without risking unseating the men. For example, after the adoption of the legislated candidate quota in Bolivia, parties complied with the quota by appointing female candidates as alternatives. This allowed parties to be in compliance with the

new law without affecting the male candidates (Costa Benavides 2003). Placement mandates ensure that women are in electable positions on the list. For instance, Costa Rica's quota mandates that the list must alternate male and female candidates (Global Database of Quotas for Women 2014). Mandating that male and female candidates be alternated on the list ensures that female candidates are not all placed at the bottom of the list, but are in winnable positions.

While placement mandates are important to assure female candidates will obtain a seat, arguably strong enforcement mechanisms are vital. Without heavy sanctions for non-compliance, parties have no incentive to abide by the law. For instance, after the national level gender quota was adopted in France, many political parties preferred to pay the small fine given for non-compliance with the gender quota rather than run more female candidates. The parties believed the cost of the fine would be off-set by the money they earned through a larger seat share if they ran male candidates (Murray *et al.* 2011). Subsequently, the size of the quota, the presence of placement mandates, and enforcement mechanism determine the strength of the quota. With these components the quota will substantially increase female representation. Without these components, the quota can be considered to be weak, or "lacking teeth" (Hinojosa 2012:141). The international system can stimulate the adoption of the gender quota, but the components of the quota and its subsequent strength is a domestic decision and domestic actors are the ones that drive this process.

Elements That Influence the Adoption of a Strong Quota

The first domestic element that impacts the strength of the gender quota is the domestic women's movement. Domestic women's movements capitalize on the international norm to improve female representation to push for the adoption of a gender quota. Women's groups use their state's ratification of CEDAW as a tool to push the state to adopt a gender (Htun and Jones

2002). In addition to lobbying the government to adopt a gender quota, the women's movement can call public attention to women's underrepresentation, stimulating societal demand for increasing female representation. In Mexico, the National Women's Institute took out advertisements to educate the public about the debate surrounding the adoption of the gender quota. This media campaign helped build public support for a gender quota and ultimately contributed to the adoption of the gender quota in Mexico (Baldez 2004: 247).

Mounting societal pressure to increase female representation is the second domestic element that influences the likelihood a strong gender quota will be adopted. Adopting a strong gender quota becomes more attractive to political parties when it can expand their voter base (Kittilson 2006). Specifically, adopting a gender quota can attract more votes from women, which creates an incentive for the adoption of a strong gender quota (Murray and Krook 2011). Thus, when parties know there is societal demand for female representation, their cost to adopt a strong gender quota decreases, making adoption more likely (Htun and Jones 2002; Baldez 2004; Murray and Krook 2011). If the voters want more women in the legislature, there are greater incentives to political parties to create a strong quota that will improve female representation.

Rivalry and the Adoption of a Strong Quota

The first manner in which involvement in a rivalry influences the strength of the quota adopted is by diminishing societal demand for more female representation. As discussed in Chapter one, rivalry involvement creates a hostile and conflict prone environment, making national security a salient domestic issue. The importance of maintaining national security overwhelms other domestic policy or constituent concerns (Huth 1996; Hensel 1999), including having better female representation. Since men are viewed as better at handling national security, there is decreased support for female candidates (Dolan 2004). This leads to less societal

pressure to increase female representation. Without demand to increase female representation, the likelihood a strong quota will be adopted is low. Thus, a weak quota is more likely to be adopted in states involved in a rivalry.

Returning to Figure 3.1, the final domestic element that influences the strength of the quota adopted is the number of female legislators. Women in political leadership can use their status to advocate for the adoption of a gender quota (Kittilson 2006). Women can also use their leadership position to put the adoption of gender quotas on the legislative agenda subsequently forcing the legislature to vote on the issue. For instance in 1996, as President of the Legislative Commission of Labor and Social Law in Ecuador, Aracelly Moreno Silva, proposed the creation of a legislated gender quota in Ecuador to promote women's political participation as part of the new labor laws under discussion (Ecuador 1996).

Female legislators, more generally, can also positively influence the adoption of gender quotas, using their political power to push for the creation of a gender quota. The cross-party pressure exerted by women in Argentina and Mexico played an integral role in the successful adoption of a legislated quota in the two states (Lubertino 1992; Baldez 2004). Thus, the women that have acquired political power as legislators can alter the rules to ensure women have access political power in the future. A strong quota will unseat men, which would decrease male power and political influence. In the debate on adopting a gender quota, a Uruguayan legislator stated, "We're talking about giving up positions of power here, and nobody likes to give up power" (Baldez 2004: 232). Consequently, the female legislators are likely to advocate more forcefully to adopt a strong quota compared to men thus more women in legislature will increase the likelihood of adopting a strong quota. In addition, having more women in the legislature makes it

more likely that there will be women leadership roles that can put the adoption of strong quota on the legislative agenda, thus making the adoption of strong gender quota more likely.

Involvement in a rivalry influences society demand for increased female representation. It also influences voter support for female candidates and consequently impacts the level of female representation in the state. States involved in rivalry have lower levels of female representation compared to states not in a rivalry (Schroeder 2014). Having fewer women in the legislature is the second way involvement in a rivalry influences the strength of the quota adopted. With fewer female legislators to advocate for and use their political power to adopt a strong gender quota, states in a rivalry are more likely to adopt a weak gender quota.

All states undergo pressure from the international community to adopt a gender quota, but how strong the gender quota is a product of domestic actors. Pressure from the domestic women's movement, along with increased societal demand to improve female representation, are both utilized by female legislators to coerce political parties to adopt a strong gender quota. In states involved in a rivalry, national security is a prime concern and given the importance of security, ideals of gender equality in representation are pushed aside. Voters want leaders that can maintain security, which means they will prefer male political leaders. Thus, there are fewer women in the legislature and little societal pressure to increase female representation.

H1: The likelihood of the adoption of a strong gender quota decreases in states in a rivalry.

While multiple domestic actors influence the likelihood of adopting a strong quota, ultimately it is the legislators that must vote for and adopt a strong gender quota. Male legislators are typically less willing to alter the rules that can expedite their removal from office. Thus, female legislators are integral to the adoption of a strong gender quota. The female legislators

will take measures to solidify their gains. As female representation increases, their ability to adopt a strong gender quota grows.

H2: As female representation increases, the likelihood of adopting a strong quota increases.

Data and Methods

This chapter argues that the strength of the quota a state adopts is influenced by whether or not a state is involved in an interstate rivalry. Thus, to be included in the sample a state must have adopted a Constitutional or Legal quota, such as a legislated quota or reserved seats. Some states revised and strengthened their quota after one was initially adopted; therefore, some states are coded as having adopted different strength of quotas. There are 42 states in the sample with 67 Constitutional/Legal quota adoption observations in the sample. The temporal domain for the sample includes the years 1980 to 2010. This time period includes the adoption of all national level quotas since the first Constitutional/Legal gender quota was adopted in 1990 by Nepal.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the strength of the quota that was adopted. Quotas can be constructed in different ways and subsequently vary in their ability to actually increase female representation. The components of a quota that have been found to impact how well the quota increases the female representation are the size of the quota, the use of placement mandates, and enforcement mechanisms (Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Guldvik 2011). Consequently, the presence or absence of these components will be used to construct the measure of the strength of a legislative quota. Due to the nature of the quota, reserved seats do not have placement mandates or enforcement mechanism, thus, to the size of the percentage of seats reserved for women will be the sole determinate in how strong the quota is.

<Table 3.1>

A dichotomous variable was created signifying strength of a quota, with one indicating a strong quota and zero indicating a weak quota. The coding of *Quota Strength* is shown in Table 3.1. Beginning with legislative quotas, there are three elements of a quota that determine its strength: size of the mandate, placement mandates, and enforcement mechanisms. A strong quota is one that has all three elements. Specifically, a strong quota is one that has a placement mandate, and enforcement mechanisms.

A weak quota lacks the placement mandates, enforcement mechanisms, or less than 30% of the list must be comprised of women. Without placement mandates, parties are likely to place women in unelectable positions or the bottom of the list which means the female candidates will be less likely to obtain a seat in the legislature (Jones 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2009). Subsequently, female representation will not increase. In addition, without strong enforcement mechanisms parties are unlikely to comply with the quota since there is little penalty for noncompliance (Costa Benavides 2003; Baldez 2004; Schwindt-Bayer 2009; Krook and Murray 2011). With a lack of placement mandates and enforcement mechanisms, the percentage of a party list that must be female is irrelevant. Thus, regardless of the size of the mandate, if the quota does not have enforcement mechanisms and/or placement mandates, the quota is regarded as weak.

Coding rules for determining strength of reserved seats are also in Table 3.1. Since the size of the quota has been found to be the most important factor, the proportion of seats that must be reserved for women is the primary determinant of whether the quota is effective. Reserved seats of greater or equal to 30% is coded as a strong quota 30% is chosen due to the fact that 30% women in the legislature is often referred to as the amount necessary to make a difference

in policy outcomes, or the critical mass (Dahlerup 1988). Consequently, reserved seats are coded as weak if less than 30% of the legislative seats are reserved for women.

<Figures 3.2 >

Figure 3.2 visually displays the number of weak and strong quotas adopted cross-nationally, segregated by if the state is involved in a rivalry or not. It is apparent that adopting a weak quota is more common than adopting a strong quota. 44 states have adopted a weak quota compared to 23 that have adopted a strong one. The difference may be partly due to the fact that states sometimes adopt a weak quota only to later adopt a strong quota. For example, Ecuador initially adopted a quota that lacked placement mandate, but revised the quota three years later to include placement mandates. Not only is it evident that strong quotas are less common, but more states not in a rivalry have adopted strong quotas compared to states in a rivalry. This advances the argument that states in a rivalry will be less likely to adopt a strong quota compared to states not in a rivalry.

Primary Independent Variables[19]

Rivalry is expected to impact the adoption of a strong gender quota. The conceptualization and measurement of rivalry utilized in this chapter as first defined by Thompson (2001). [20] This measure indicates if a state is involved in a rivalry and does not take into account whether the state has multiple rivalries. Arguably, more rivals will make the preference for male political leaders stronger, diminishing the pressure to increase female representation by adopting a strong gender quota more than one rival. For this reason, the

[19] All independent variables are lagged by one year.
[20] Data for this measure comes from Thompson and Dreyer (2011). More information on the coding of this variable can be found on page 28.

variable, *Total Rivalries,* is included to separately measure the influence of involvement in rivalries on the adoption of a strong gender quota.[21]

In all rivalries, the two states must consider the other as an enemy, a competitor, and a national security threat. However, what the states are competing over is not the same in all rivalries. While the exact issue is different in each rivalry, three common themes of competition have emerged with states commonly competing over territory (spatial), power status (positional), or ideology (ideological) (Colaresi *et al* 2007). Figure 3.3 shows the number of spatial, positional, and ideological rivalries across time indicating that spatial rivalries are the most prevalent. However, the three common themes of a rivalry are not mutually exclusive with a single rivalry being classified as multiple types. The rivalry between Argentina and Chile, for example, was over territory in the Beagle Channel making the rivalry spatial, but it was also over power in the region making the rivalry also positional (Thompson and Dreyer 2011).

<Figure 3.3>

The different issue areas that rivalries may develop around can have varying influences on the adoption of strong gender quotas. Previous scholars have argued that territorial disputes are particularly salient to the public influencing domestic politics (Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Gibler 2010). The desire to control pieces of land is a fundamental human characteristic, leading to the majority of conflicts being fought over territory (Vasquez 1993). It can be expected that spatial rivalries see greater levels of active hostility and may pose a more serious threat to national security. This may lead to an even greater societal preference for male leaders making the adoption of a strong gender quota less likely. Subsequently, spatial rivalries may have a greater influence on the adoption of gender quotas compared to ideological or positional

[21] Information on how this variable is coded can be found on page 29.

rivalries. To test the influence of different types of rivalry on the adoption of a strong gender quota, three separate dichotomous variables were created coded as one if the state was involved in a positional, ideological, or spatial rivalry[22]. Thompson and Dreyer (2011)'s rivalry classification was used to determine if the rivalry was positional, spatial, and ideological.

It is hypothesized that a higher number of women in the legislature can lead to a higher probability of a strong quota being adopted. *Women in Legislature* is measured as the proportion of seats in the national legislature held by women. If the state has both an upper and lower house, female representation is only measured for the lower house.[23]

Additional Independent Variables

Along with interstate rivalry and women in the legislatures, additional variables that can influence the adoption of a strong quota are included in the model. Domestic groups have used signing of CEDAW by their state as leverage to adopt a gender. In addition, time since ratification has had a positive influence on women's rights (Cole 2013), thus variable indicating the number of years since CEDAW was signed by a state is included in the model. Women working domestically utilize transnational networks created by Women's International Nongovernmental Organizations (WINGOs) to learn and disseminate information (Htun and Jones 2002; Krook 2006). The shared information helps the domestic women's groups successfully push for the adoption of quotas that will effectively increase female representation. More WINGOs in a state may influence the adoption of a strong quota. For this reason, the *Number of WINGOs* is included in the model.[24]

[22] Some states are coded as one in multiple categories since the rivalry can encompass multiple issues.
[23] Data on this measure for the years 1945-2003 comes from Paxton *et al.* 2008. Data from 2004-2010 comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. www.ipu.org
[24] Data on WINGOs from Cole (2013).

It is argued that the adoption of a strong gender quota is impacted by societal demand for increased female representation. This implies that the adoption of a strong quota is more likely when citizens have larger control over their representatives and is more likely in more democratic states. State *Polity* scores are included in the model.[25] A common argument for not adopting a gender quota is because there are few women qualified to hold office. For instance, in the first quota adoption debate, an Ecuadorian legislator said that the quota would make creating overly time consuming since finding qualified women would be difficult (Ecuador 1996). If a state lacks women with the education and work experience often viewed as a prerequisite to holding political office, it may be less likely to adopt a strong gender quota. Ideally, the percentage of women in higher education and the percentage of women in the paid workforce would be utilized to capture the pool of qualified women. However due to a high level of missing data on these measures cross-nationally, when these measures are included the number of states decreases from 44 to 35. For this reason, a different measure is used to capture the pool of qualified female candidates. Since less developed states have routinely been found to have higher disparity in women in the paid work and in higher education, a measure of level of development, *logged GDP per capita,* is used to capture the pool of qualified candidates. [26]

Similarly to the election of women, different religious backgrounds in a state can influence societal attitudes about women generally (Inglehart *et al.* 2002; Bush 2011) and women's suitability to hold office specifically. Thus a measure of the Catholic and Muslim population is included in the model.[27] Since quotas have been found to vary regionally, a

[25] Data from Marshall *et al.* (2011)
[26] Data from the World Bank.
[27] For information about this measure refer to page 32.

regional dummy variable is also included in the model. The United Nations regional classifications were used to determine what region a state is in.

The Method

To test the hypotheses an event history model is used. This method is common in studies of policy diffusion (e.g. Bush 2011). Once a state adopts a strong quota, it is rarely weakened, thus adopting a strong gender quota can be viewed as a one-time occurrence. For ease of interpretation, a logit model is used with time and time squared dummy variables included to help control for the influence of time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

Results

<Table 3.2>

Table 3.2 displays the results of the influence of involvement in a rivalry on the adoption of a strong quota. As expected, in Model 1 *Rivalry* is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that states involved in a rivalry are less likely to adopt a strong gender quota compared to a state not in a rivalry. Figure 3.4 visually displays the predicted probabilities of adopting a strong quota for states in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry.[28] On average in states that have adopted a quota, a state not in a rivalry has a 39% likelihood of adopting a strong gender quota, while states involved in a rivalry has only an 11% likelihood of adopting a strong gender quota, a 28% difference. This supports the hypothesis that states in a rivalry will be less likely to adopt a strong gender quota.

<Figures 4 & 5>

The rivalry variable in Model 1 indicates whether a state is involved in a rivalry or not and does not take into consideration the number of a rivalries a state is in. Arguably, more

[28] Predicted probabilities computed using Stata 13 with all non-rivalry variables held at their means.

rivalries will create a more hostile security environment and subsequently have a stronger influence on the adoption of strong or weak quota. Model 2 in Table 3.2 displays the results of the number of rivalries a state is involved in on the adoption of a strong gender quota. As expected, the *Total Rivalries* coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This means that as the number of rivalries increases, the likelihood of adopting a strong gender quota decreases. Figure 3.5 graphically presents how the probability of adopting a strong gender quota changes as the number of rivalries a state is involved in increases.[29] Again, a state not in a rivalry has a 39% probability of adopting a strong gender quota. The probability of adopting a strong gender quota decreases to 20% when a state is involved in a single rivalry. This is a 19% decline in probability of adopting a strong gender quota from involvement in even one rivalry. The probability of adopting a strong gender quota decreases further as the number of rivalries increases. A state involved in two rivalries has a 9 % probability of adopting a strong quota, a state in three rivalries has a 4% probability of adopting a strong gender quota, and a state in four rivalries has a 2% probability. This finding supports the hypothesis that a state in a rivalry is less likely to adopt a strong gender quota.

<Table 3.3>

As previously discussed, rivalries are created over a variety of issues and these different issues may have varying impacts on the adoption of a strong quota. Table 3.3 displays the results the influence of the positional, spatial, and ideology rivalries on the adoption of strong gender quotas. The variables *Spatial,* and *Ideological* fail to reach statistical significance. This finding indicate that spatial and ideologically driven rivalries do not have an influence on the probability a state will adopt a strong or weak gender quota. This may be a result of the small number of

[29] Predicted probabilities computed using Stata 13 with all non-rivalry variables held at their means.

states that have adopted a strong gender quota and the small number of states in each type of rivalry. *Positional* rivalries, on the other hand, perfectly predict the adoption of a weak gender quota. Of the 8 states in a positional rivalry that have adopted a quota, no state has adopted a strong gender quota. Based on previous research on the importance of territory and the salience of territorial disputes, it is surprising that *Positional* and not *Spatial* rivalries are so highly correlated with the adoption of a weak quota. This finding implies that involvement in a positional rivalry has a larger impact on domestic politics, specifically the adoption of a strong quota.

<Figure 3.6>

While involvement in a rivalry has a negative influence on the adoption of a strong quota, as expected, women in the legislature can promote the adoption of a strong quota. Returning to Table 3.2, we see that *Women in the Legislature* is positive and statistically significant in both models. This indicates that as the number of women in the legislature increases the probability of adopting a strong gender quota also increases. Figure 3.6 graphically displays the influence of women in the legislature on the adoption of a strong gender quota. [30] The probability of adopting a strong gender quota gradually increases as the proportion of female-held seats enlarges. What is particularly interesting is that the probability of adopting a strong gender quota surpasses 50% when the proportion of female-held seats reaches 30%. A critical mass is argued to have been reached when 30% of the legislature is comprised of women meaning that we should expect a difference in policy outcomes(Dahlerup 1988). As the graph illustrates, once women comprise 30% of the legislature the probability of adopting a strong quota is greater than adopting a weak

[30] Predicted probabilities computed using Stata 13 with all non-rivalry variables held at their means.

quota. This supports the argument that when women comprise a large enough faction of the legislature, they are able to have a real impact on policy outcomes.

<Figures 3.7 & 3.8>

Figure 3.6 represents how women in the legislature influence the adoption of a strong gender quota regardless of if the state is involved in a rivalry. On average female representation is lower in states involved in a rivalry, however there is variation. Due to the heightened threat to national security in states involved in a rivalry, a larger proportion of women in the legislature are needed to adopt a strong gender quota in these states. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 visually displays the influence of women in the legislature in states involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry. [31] Fewer women in the legislature are needed to adopt a strong gender quota in states not involved in a rivalry compared to states involved in a rivalry. The probability of adopting a strong gender quota surpasses 50% when women reach 25% of the legislature in states not in a rivalry. However, women must comprise 40% of the legislature in states involved in a rivalry for the probability of adopting a strong gender quota to reach 50%. Women in the legislature are an important factor in explaining which states will adopt a strong or weak quota, however, the international security environment mitigates gains in female representation. With less societal demand for increased female representation, the women in the legislature have less ability to push for the adoption of a strong gender quota.

Returning to Table 3.2, we see that the *Number of WINGOs* in a state can impact the adoption of a strong gender quota. As the number of WINGOs increases the probability of adopting a strong gender quota also increases. This finding is unsurprising given the previous research on the influence of transnational action networks and women working domestically on

[31] Predicted probabilities computed using Stata 13 with all non-rivalry variables held at their means. Rivalry held at 0 in Figure 3.7 and held at 1 in Figure 3.8.

the adoption of gender quotas (e.g. Htun and Jones 2002; Krook 2009 Bush 2011). The proportion of the population that is Muslim has no impact on the adoption of a strong gender quota. However, having a larger Catholic population makes it more likely the state will adopt a strong gender quota. This finding may be due to regional variation and the high correlation between Catholicism and Latin America. Specifically, 8 Latin American states have adopted strong gender quotas and these states all have 85% or greater proportion of its population that are Catholic. Regional diffusion of quotas similar components within Latin America may explain why a high Catholic population increases the probability of a state will adopt a strong gender quota.

One interesting finding is that the *Level of Democracy* variable is negative and statistically significant. Thus, less democratic states are more likely to adopt a strong gender quota than more democratic states. In less democratic states, the legislature often lacks governing power. The political leaders can yield to societal and international pressure to improve female representation by adopting a strong gender quota without fear that it will not alter the political leaders' share of power. However, in more democratic states, adopting a strong gender quota will unseat male legislators ultimately diminishing the power share of the political leaders. This might explain why less democratic states are more likely to adopt a strong gender quota.

The variable, *Years Since CEDAW Ratification* is also negative and statistically significant. A state is less likely to adopt a strong gender quota as the number of years since it ratified the CEDAW treaty increases. Based on previous findings that years since CEDAW was ratified have been found to have a positive influence on women's rights broadly (Cole 2013), this finding is in the opposite direction from what is expected. One explanation is the difference in the time it takes to improve women's rights versus the time it takes to adopt a strong gender

quota. The improvement of rights is often gradual, whereas the adoption of a strong gender quota can be immediate action. Thus, a state may take actions to improve women's rights, such adopting a strong gender quota, shortly after ratifying CEDAW, but it takes time for the policy changes to have a noticeable impact on women's rights.

Robustness Checks

<Table 3.4>

States where parties have adopted voluntary party quotas prior to the adoption of a Constitutional/Legal may be more likely to adopt a weak quota since a national level quota is unnecessary. As a robustness check, a variable indicating if there are party quotas in the state is included. Table 3.4 displays the results with *Party Quota* included. Both *Rivalry* and *Total Number of Rivalries* remain negative and statistically significant. The finding that female representation influences the adoption of a strong gender quota is also consistent in both models. As female representation increases, the probability of adopting a strong gender quota increases. As an additional robustness check different measures for the pool of qualified female candidates is used. The percent of women in higher education and the percent of women in the paid workforce are exchanged for the level of development measure[32], logged GDP per capita. This decreases the number of states in the sample to 34, but as Table 3.4 shows, the findings remain consistent even with a smaller sample. Once again *Rivalry* and *Total Number of Rivalries* remain negative and statistically significant and *Women in the Legislature* remains positive and statistically significant.

[32] Data are from Cole (2013).

Discussion and Conclusion

Previous research discovers the importance of the international system on encouraging the adoption of gender quotas. However, similar to the signing of a human rights treaty, the adoption of a gender quota does not guarantee a substantial improvement of women's underrepresentation. Women's transnational advocacy networks can promote the adoption of a strong quota; other elements of the international system can be an impediment. Specifically, the international security environment created by a rival can hinder the adoption of a strong gender quota. As findings from this chapter indicate, as security environment becomes increasingly more hostile through the addition of multiple rivals, the likelihood adopting a strong gender quota diminishes. This finding highlights the powerful influence of the international system. It also reveals the importance placed on national security by society.

Individuals want security even if it comes at the cost of female representation. Security trumps equality. This is evident in the percentage of women in the legislature needed to make the adoption of a strong quota more likely than a weak quota in states involved in a rivalry compared states that are not. Female legislators not in a rivalry state are able to successfully adopt a strong quota with a smaller number of women since they can capitalize on societal demand for increased female representation. The societal demand creates an incentive for political parties, making the adoption of a strong quota more appealing. However, in states involved in a rivalry, the percent of women in the legislature must be near parity to men in order to make the likelihood of adopting a strong quota greater than adopting a weak quota in states. As the number of women in the legislature grows, the probability of having female legislative leaders also increases. Without societal demand, the women in the legislature lack a way to pressure the political parties to adopt a strong quota and must rely on their own political influence as leaders

to bring about the adoption of a strong quota. Thus, getting a strong quota adopted when a state is involved in a rivalry is not impossible, but it takes women in political leadership for it to occur.

The findings from this chapter highlight the importance of women's actions in the successful adoption of a strong gender quota. Even in cases where a strong gender quota may be unexpected, through actions of women in society, the legislature, and the international actors strong gender quotas have been adopted. This is an encouraging sign that the adoption of strong gender quotas can come to fruition, leading to gains in female representation even in "worst case" states.

Figure 3.1: Factors in the Adoption of a Strong Gender Quota



Table 3.1: Strength of Quota Coding Rules		
	Legislated Quotas	Reserved Seats
1:Strong	Placement mandates for women in electable positions; and Enforcement mechanisms for non-compliance	Reserved seats for women >30%
0: Weak	Females comprise at <30% of the candidates; and/or No Placement mandates for women in electable positions; and/or No enforcement mechanism in place	Reserved seats for women <30%

Figure 3.2: Adoption of Weak and Strong Quotas in Rivalry and Non-Rivalry States



Figure 3.3: Interstate Rivalries by Type



Table 3.2: Adoption of Strong Gender Quota				
Rivalry	-1.91	*		
	(.89)			
Total Rivalries			-1.05	*
			(.47)	
Women in the Legislature	.12	**	.12	**
	(.03)		(.04)	
# of WINGOS	.04		.05	*
	(.02)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.15		-.22	*
	(.08)		(.09)	
(logged) GDP per Capita	-.32		-.22	
	(.56)		(.64)	
Polity	-.23	*	-.27	*
	(.09)		(.13)	
Islam	2.89		1.96	
	(2.31)		(2.52)	
Catholic	7.83	**	7.86	**
	(2.71)		(2.73)	
Region	-.22		-.49	
	(.53)		(.59)	
Time	-.15		.01	
	(.34)		(.34)	
Time Squared	.01		.01	
	(.01)		(.01)	
Constant	-1.63		-2.70	
	(3.92)		(4.19)	
Observations	407		407	
Number of Countries	47		47	
DV: Adoption of Strong Gender Quota;				
Results using Logit model;				
Years 1980-2010;				
Robust standard errors in parenthesis;				
** p<.01; * p<.05;				

Figure 3.4: Probability of Adopting Strong Gender Quota



Figure 3.5: Rivalry Involvement and Probability of Adopting Strong Gender Quota



Table 3.3: Influence of Different Types of Rivalries on Adopting a Strong Quota

Spatial Rivalry	-.98			
	(.98)			
Ideological Rivalry			-1.16	
			(1.49)	
Women in the Legislature	.10	**	.10	*
	(.03)		(.03)	
# of WINGOS	.03		.03	
	(.02)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.15		-.14	
	(.09)		(.08)	
(logged) GDP per Capita	-.20		.01	
	(.59)		(.60)	
Polity	-.15		-.15	
	(.08)		(.09)	
Islam	3.06		1.92	
	(2.42)		(2.40)	
Catholic	7.56	**	6.22	*
	(2.84)		(2.48)	
Region	-.24		-.40	
	(.57)		(.57)	
Time	.01		.13	
	(.34)		(.31)	
Time Squared	.01		-.01	
	.01		.13	
Constant	-3.96		-5.15	
	(4.60)		(4.43)	
Observations	407		407	
Number of Countries	47		47	

DV: Adoption of Strong Gender Quota;
Results using Logit model;
Years 1980-2010;
Robust standard errors in parenthesis;
** p<.01; * p<.05;

Figure 3.6: Influence of Women in Legislature on Adoption of Strong Gender Quota



Figure 3.7: Adopting a Strong Quota in States Not in a Rivalry



Figure 3.8: Adopting a Strong Quota in States Involved in a Rivalry



Table 3.4: Influence of Rivalry on the Adoption of Strong Gender Quotas with Additional Variables

Rivalry	-2.11	*			-2.80	*		
	(1.02)				(1.25)			
Total Rivalries			-1.05	*	.21	**	-1.48	**
			(.50)		(.06)		(.55)	
Women in the Legislature	.17	**	.18	**	3.20	**	.24	**
	(.04)		(.05)		(1.20)		(.07)	
Party Quota	2.33	**	2.35	*	.02		3.46	**
	(.89)		(.93)		(.02)		(1.25)	
# of WINGOS	.03		.04	*	.21	**	.03	
	(.02)		(.02)		(.06)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.19	*	-.26	*	-.24	*	-.33	*
	(.08)		(.11)		(.11)		(.15)	
(logged) GDP Per Capita	-.47		-.39					
	(.53)		(.60)					
% Women in Higher Education					-.03		-.04	
					(.04)		(.04)	
% Women in the Paid Workforce					.06		.02	
					(.08)		(.08)	
Polity	-.29	*	-.34		-.51	**	-.56	**
	(.11)		(.14)		(.15)		(.14)	
Islam	1.90		1.03		2.13		.03	
	(1.94)		(2.26)		(2.15)		(2.16)	
Catholic	7.70	**	7.97	**	1.67	**	1.48	**
	(2.34)		(2.46)		(3.19)		(2.87)	
Region	-.18		-.41		-.35		-.53	
	(.51)		(.54)		(.73)		(.65)	
Time	-.08		.09		-.08		.31	
	(.37)		(.36)		(.60)		(.63)	
Time Squared	.01		.00		.01		-.01	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.02)		(.02)	
Constant	-2.10		-3.58		-7.32		-7.64	
	(4.37)		(4.63)		(6.45)		(7.67)	
Observations	392		392		223		223	
Number of Countries	47		47		34		34	

DV: Adoption of Strong Gender Quota;
Results using Logit model;
Years 1980-2010;
Robust standard errors in parenthesis;
** p<.01; * p<.05;

Chapter Four: The Influence of Interstate Rivalry on Gender Inequality

Introduction

Gender discrimination is deeply ingrained within societies with some level of gender inequality present in all states. The differences in the size of the gender gap has largely been attributed to domestic characteristics, such as level of development, dominant religion, ethnic heritage, or regime type (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Beer 2009) excluding the influence of the international system from the equation. Domestic characteristics impact the size of the gender inequality gap, however, this chapter argues that gender inequality has its roots in the international system. Specifically, states faced with a persistent national security threat from an interstate state rival will have a greater level of gender inequality.

In response to the constant national security threat, a state in a rivalry becomes militarized. As this process occurs, society gives greater value to those with the characteristics best suited to maintain national security. Repeatedly, masculine traits and consequently men are perceived as better at handling national security affairs. Thus, society gives greater worth to men and subsequently more power leading to more gender inequality in the state. This chapter adds to the growing literature that asserts that in order to fully explain the formation of domestic structures, the influence of the international system must be considered (e.g. Gourevitch 1978; Krook and True 2000). Specifically, the international security environment a state operates under impacts gender inequality, leading to a larger gender inequality gap, in attitudes and societal elements, in states involved in a rivalry compared to those not in a rivalry.

This chapter begins with a discussion of the process in which rivalry leads to militarization of the state. This is followed by an examination of how militarization influences societal preference for masculine traits, which is followed with a discussion of how this preference leads to greater gender inequality. A hypothesis is derived from this discussion and the research design is explained. The findings are presented and discussed followed by the implications of this study.

Literature

Rivalry and Militarization of the State

As previously discussed, there is a constant threat of military conflict within a rivalry, which makes national security a primary concern. The state directs its resources toward the military and enlarges the number of military personnel to ensure it is able to maintain national security. (Hensel 1999; Gibler 2010). Thus, involvement in a rivalry leads the state to become militarized. A militarized society is one in where the military has a large influence on the culture of the larger society. In these states, a large portion of a state's resources goes to supporting its military. Citizens are responsible for maintaining the military apparatus through active participation as soldiers and by sacrificing their wealth in taxation to pay for military expenditures.

Militarization of the state can be seen in the size of military and its budget (Reardon 1996), but the militarization process is also evident within society as a whole. A state is said to be militarized when "military goals, values, and apparatus increasingly dominate a state's culture, politics, and economy" (Merryfinch 1981:9). In a militarized state, military ways are used to handle any crises and solve any problem the state faces (Enloe 1983; Reardon 1996). This helps create a "warrior culture", one where traits

commonly associated with a warrior and military ways are revered and become the ideal traits to possess. These traits include: strength, decisiveness, aggressiveness, stoicism, and rationality (Goldstein 2001; Belkin 2012). Not only are these the character traits of a good warrior, but they are commonly viewed as masculine traits and routinely ascribed to men (Williams and Best 1982). Thus, men are perceived to inherently possess the desired traits of a good warrior and the traits that a militarized state holds in high esteem. The preference given to masculine traits, and consequently the bias in favor of men, is one way that militarization of the state leads to larger gender inequality.

Rivalry, Militarization, and Military Service

To ensure a quick response to any aggressive move from its rival, the state must organize internally in a way that promotes rapid action (Simmel 1955; Coser 1956).All citizens are called to fulfill their civic duty to ensure national security. For men, this means serving in the state's military while women are expected to support the military as mothers, wives, and nurses to the soldiers. The gendered division of warfare is near universal, having been found throughout time and across states (Goldstein 2001). Military trainers strive to rid the recruits of undesirable feminine qualities such as, weakness, emotionality, and meekness and replace them the traits of an ideal warrior (Belkin 2012). To aid in this process, the male recruits are called "pussy," "woman," and other words commonly associated with women when they are not meeting the standard of a good solider (Enloe 1983; Goldstein 2001; Rashid 2009). This aids in creating the ideal warrior, but it also reinforces the belief that masculine traits are superior to feminine ones. Consequently, military training contributes to the view that women are inferior to men.

While the military is predominately comprised of men, in many states women may also join the military. Similarly to the men, female recruits are pressured to rid themselves of feminine qualities and take on more masculine traits and modes of behavior (Enloe 1984). Essentially, the women are attempting to be more like men. Discarding feminine traits for the sake of acquiring masculine ones, in both female and male recruits, reveals the preference for "maleness" within the military and is indicative of the underlying assumption that women are inferior to men. Arguably, this belief is not confined to the military and does not disappear once the soldier has left the military. States involved in a rivalry create large militaries to ensure national security, consequently, a large proportion of its population have served in the military. Thus, the belief that feminine characteristics and women are inferior becomes widespread throughout the society.

Rivalry, Militarization, and Patriarchy

Rivalry involvement and the subsequent militarization of the state influence societal attitudes about ideal characteristics a person should exhibit. War is a time when quick, aggressive actions are necessary. For this reason, the masculine traits of strength, decisiveness, stoicism, and rationality, are viewed as the qualities best suited to make the necessary decisions to maintain national security (Tickner 1992; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993b; Goldstein 2001). Since national security is a prime concern in these states, society attaches greater worth to masculine traits and to those who possess them. Due to the close association of masculinity and being male, men benefit from the societal preference for masculine traits in states involved in a rivalry.

A primary way in which men benefit is due to the fact that national security is commonly seen as a male domain (Sapiro 1981-1982; Lawless 2004; Gedalya *et al.* 2011). Traditionally, the military and the civilian components that create national security and defense policy, such as the department of defense, national legislature, and chief executive, are overwhelmingly comprised of men (Tickner 1992). In addition, men are commonly viewed as better suited than women to handle military affairs and maintain national security (Rosenwasser *et al.* 1987; Lawless 2004; Falk and Kenski 2006). Since national security is a primary concern to the state and citizens, the perception that men are better suited to maintain national security than women enables men to gain a larger share of political power.

In fact, research has repeatedly found that candidates viewed as able to maintain national security gain greater voter support, regardless of political party (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993b; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Teigen 2013). In addition, states with a persistent threat to national security from an interstate rival have lower levels of female representation (Schroeder 2014), indicating that men have a larger share of political power. This supports the claim made by international relations feminist theorists that a focus on national security will lead to the emergence of a patriarchical system (Tickner 1992; Reardon 1996; Peterson and Runyan 1999), a system where men hold the overwhelming majority of state power.

Female candidates are aware of their perceived deficit in ability to maintain national security. In order to overcome this deficiency, they take actions to more closely ally with the military and bolster their national security capabilities. For instance, a

female legislator may push to be on committees dealing with defense, foreign policy, or veterans affairs to build their credentials. A U.S. House Staffer stated,

> Women want to get on defense and foreign policy committees to establish their credibility on the issue. Voters don't question a man's ability on defense issues. Senior male senators with no defense experience---no one will say they are not tough. Women need these committees to how they are tough and fit to lead in that area since women are not likely to have served in the military." (Swers 2007: 581).

Other female politicians support military spending bills and campaign on their voting record in support of defense spending to bolster their ties to the military (Swers 2007). In addition to trying to strengthen their credentials through being assigned to defense committees and supporting military spending, women can also adopt masculine styles of behavior to attract greater voter support. However, female candidates rejecting feminine traits only help to reaffirm that masculine traits are preferential to feminine traits. In addition, the desire to build up ties to the military and increase defense spending further strengthens the idea that militarized solutions are the preferred means to handle foreign affairs, sustaining the militarization of the state. Thus, women help perpetuate the belief that masculine and military ways are superior to feminine and non-military methods.

Reinforcing the Patriarchy

Involvement in a rivalry and the subsequent militarization of the state help men acquire greater political power since they are viewed as best able to maintain national security. Thus, within society men overwhelmingly hold high-level political seats, creating a patriarchy. Preference for masculine traits helps create the belief that women are inferior and a lack of women in political leadership positions helps perpetuate this opinion. Citizens may surmise that the fact that men dominate leadership positions is a product of men's inherent superior ability. Consequently, citizens believe men are

entitled to more rights and access to more opportunities, such education and high prestige professions. More rights and more opportunities only helps to further enhance men's ability to obtain political power, which, maintains the gendered hierarchy in the state.

In the hopes of ensuring national security, political leaders that possess the traits viewed as most capable of maintaining national security come to power. Thus, masculine ways and the men assumed to embody these traits acquire political leadership positions, leaving women largely out of power in the state. Female underrepresentation in politics helps reinforce the belief that women are inferior, but it can also codify women's subordinate position in society. This is due to the fact that male and female legislators have been found to have different policy preferences. Specifically, female legislators are more likely to initiate support women's issues bills such as paid maternity leave, equal pay legislation, and access to birth control (Swers 1998; Taylor-Robinson and Heath 2003; Schwindt-Bayer 2006).

Women's issue legislation helps diminish barriers women face in obtaining an education and entering the paid workforce. Education and professional experience are viewed as prerequisites to holding positions of power in the state. When women have difficulty attaining these skills and experiences, it reinforces the gendered stratification and helps solidify women's inferior status. There is less support in the legislature for women's issues legislation that can address gender inequality in states involved in a rivalry due to a smaller number of female political leaders in states, subsequently perpetuating the patriarchy that has emerged.

Rivalry, Militarization, and Women's Status

The security environment that a state in a rivalry operates within influences attitudes about women's worth and impacts women's societal standing. Figure 4.1 visually displays this process. States in a rivalry face the constant threat of conflict and becomes militarized in order ensure national security. The state increases the size of its military and diverts more of its resources to ensuring the military is highly trained and technologically advanced. Not only does the state enlarge its military to protect national security, but it also recruits and builds soldiers with the traits of an "ideal warrior." Military training further promotes the adoption of these traits while simultaneously encouraging the rejection of feminine traits. Thus, militarization of the state fosters the belief that masculine traits and ways are superior to feminine ones.

<Figure 4.1>

Masculinity and being male are intrinsically linked. Men are perceived as possessing masculine qualities and therefore are viewed as more suitable than women to maintain national security. Consequently, men hold the majority of political power in these states. Lack of women in the higher echelons of society perpetuates the belief that men are more capable, advancing the perception that men are superior to women. In addition, with fewer women in the legislature, policies that can help women improve their societal standing are less likely to come to fruition, further entrenching women's subordinate position within society. Therefore, through the process of militarization, rivalry involvement leads to the view that masculine traits are preferable over feminine traits. The preferences for masculine traits help men gain more power in the state, which

solidifies attitudes about men's and women's abilities and their subsequent place in society.

Hypothesis: The gender inequality gap will be larger in state's involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry.

Research Design

The theory put forth argues that rivalry involvement and the subsequent militarization of the state leads to higher levels of gender inequality. Gender inequality can be an ingrained element of the society, visible in the disparity between men and women in the political office, as students of higher education, and members of the paid workforce. However, gender inequality can also be found in society's opinions of men's and women's worth. Involvement in a rivalry leads to masculine traits and men being given more value. Consequently, men are viewed as superior to women and entitled to more rights and privileges, creating gender inequality in opinions. Society is more sexist in its attitudes. Due to the various forms gender inequality can take, the hypothesis will be tested using attitudinal data as well as cross-national measures of state level gender inequality.

Dependent Variables

In order the test the influence of rivalry on attitudes about men's and women's worth, individual level data from the World Values Survey is used. The World Values Survey is a multi-country survey that uses a common survey instrument in order to obtain information about people's attitudes cross-nationally. [33] The survey has been conducted in multiple waves and for this study Wave 2 (1990-1994), Wave 3 (1995-1998), and

[33] More detailed information about the World Survey and how it conducts its surveys can be found at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.

Wave 4 (1999-2004) are utilized. Not all states have been surveyed, and the different waves do not include an identical sample of states. Thus, using multiple waves creates a larger sample of states than using a single wave, creating a sample of 79 states. A list of states surveyed in each wave can be found in Table A4.1 included in the appendix.

From the World Values Survey, three questions are used to test the influence of rivalry on individual's attitudes about men's and women's worth in society. These questions ask the respondent to state how much they agree or disagree with the following statements: men make better political leaders than women do, university education is more important for boys than girls, and men have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce.[34] It can be concluded that the stronger a respondent agrees with the statement, the more worth he/she attributes to men and that the respondent holds a higher degree of sexist attitudes.

Rivalry involvement is expected to not only influence attitudes about men's and women's worth in society, but also influences the status of men and women in society, leading to higher levels of societal gender inequality. For this reason, the influence of rivalry on societal gender inequality is also tested in this chapter. To measure state level of societal gender inequality, cross-national time series data is used, creating a sample of 154 states and data from the years 1981 to 2006.

Gender inequality is multi-dimensional, which means that using only one measure will not suffice. Therefore, three different measures are used: *Percentage of Women in the Paid Labor Force, Percentage of Women in Higher Education,* and *State Fertility Rate.* There are multiple reasons why these three measures are used. First, the three

[34] The exact wording of each question and the list of response choices for each question are included in the appendix.

measures capture three different aspects of gender inequality. The ability to join the paid labor market allows women to be independent and not rely on a husband, father, or other male relative to survive. Without access to paid work, women will remain subservient to the men that provide them with financial resources. Subsequently, women's share of the paid labor force, *Percentage of Women in the Paid Labor Force,* measures women's ability to be self-sufficient and is illustrative of gender inequality within society.[35]

Having more education helps the individual acquire skills needed for high paid work and is viewed as a requirement to hold leadership positions. The level of women in higher education is indicative of women's ability to access the resource that enable them to take on higher status roles in society. As a higher number of women obtain higher education, the disparity between men and women in leadership positions will diminish, subsequently and creating a more gender equal society. Thus, the proportion of women in higher education, *Percentage of Women in Higher Education,* is used as a measure of societal gender inequality.[36] Finally, a state's *Fertility Rate* represents women's ability to control when they have children and how many children they have. Fertility rates represent women's decision-making power and empowerment within society. In addition, having many children impedes women's ability to access higher education as well as enter the paid work force. Fewer women in higher education and in the paid workforce reinforce gender inequality in society. Therefore, *State Fertility Rate,* the average number of children women of childbearing have in each state is used as a measure of societal gender inequality.[37]

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[35] Data are from the World Bank for years 1990-2010.
[36] ibid
[37] ibid

Using three variables that address different aspects of gender inequality in society enables a more fully measured concept. In addition, these variables are routinely used as cross-national measures of gender inequality (Regan and Paskeviciute 2003; Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005; Cole 2013). These variables also correspond with the measures of attitudinal gender equality used in this chapter. For instance, women in the paid labor force dovetails with the question of whether men have more right to a job than women. The measure of women in higher education fits with the question of whether a university education is more important for a boy. The question of whether men make better political leaders taps into the belief that men and women have specific roles to play and should operate within particular spheres of society, public and private. Politics is considered part of the public sphere where men are expected to operate while women are expected to stay within the private sphere, caring for children. Thus, the attitude that men make better political leaders corresponds with a high fertility rate.

Independent Variables

The primary independent variable of interest is *Rivalry*. The conceptualization and measurement of rivalry utilized is that of Thompson (2001).[38] *Total Rivalries* is included in a separate model to further test the influence of rivalry on gender inequality.[39] As a robustness check, an additional measure of rivalry intensity is included in the appendix. The empirical results using this measure are displayed in Table A 4.2 located in the appendix. In addition, the influence of spatial, positional, and ideological rivalries on gender inequality is also tested.[40]

[38] Refer to page 27 for more information on this variable.
[39] Refer to page 28 for more information on this variable.
[40] Refer to page 74 for more information on this variable.

Controls

Factors that can contribute to state's level of sexism and gender inequality are also included in the models. Level of development is a central factor in determining gender equality (Inglehart and Norris 2003), therefore *logged GDP Per Capita*.[41] The state's *Polity* scores are also included in the model since gender equality is expected to be greater in democratic states (Beer 2009).[42] Predominately Muslim and Catholic societies have been found to have more gender inequality (Fish 2002; Inglehart and Norris 2003; Donno and Russett 2004). For this reason, measures of the percentage of the population that are *Muslim* and the percentage of the population that are *Catholic* are both included in the model.[43]

The creation of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has placed increased female representation on the international agenda and created an international goal of equality of genders including equal representation. Women's rights in states that have ratified CEDAW has been found to improve (Cole 2013). Since the improvement of women's rights only gradually increases in these states, a measure of years since a state has ratified CEDAW, *Years Since CEDAW Ratification,* is included in the model. The ratification of CEDAW can influence women's status and female representation domestically, but the creation of CEDAW has had a broader impact on women's status globally. CEDAW helped bring women's rights and female underrepresentation into the spotlight, placing it on the international agenda.

[41] Refer to page 76 for more information on this variable.
[42] Refer to page 76 for more information on this variable.
[43] Refer to page 76 for more information on this variable.

Consequently, we might expect female representation to increase following the creation of CEDAW in 1980 even if a state did not ratify CEDAW due to changes in international norms. To help control for the influence of the creation of CEDAW on female representation globally, a variable *Years Since CEDAW Creation,* is included that measures the years since CEDAW was created. Women's International Non-governmental Organizations (WINGOs) have been found to improve women's rights and gender inequality domestically (Paxton *et al.* 2006). For this reason, a measure of the number of WINGOs is also included in the model.[44]

States can be influenced by the domestic actions of their neighbors, with norms of behavior diffusing from one state to another. It is possible that we may see regional patterns of sexism and gender equality levels with states in the same region having similar gender inequality and female empowerment levels. For this reason a regional variable, *Region,* is included in the model.[45]

Also included in the models are measures of women's rights in the state. Attitudes about women's political leadership is likely to be lower in states where women lack the right to run for office. Likewise, women's share of the paid workforce will be low if women are unable to enter the workforce. To help control for this, Cingranelli and Richard's Women's Rights Scale is used in the models. Different women's rights scales are used in the models, depending on the dependent variable. For instance, the *Women's Economic Rights* scale is used in the models pertaining to attitudes about women's right to a job and women's share of the workforce. *Women's Social Rights Scale* is included in the models pertaining to women's need for an education and rivalry's influence on

[44] Refer to page 75 for more information on this variable.
[45] Refer to page 77 for more information on this variable.

fertility rates. And finally, the *Women's Political Rights Scale* is used in the model measuring rivalry's influence about women's ability as political leaders.

Method

Due to the nature of the data, different statistical models will be used to test the influence of rivalry on attitudinal and societal gender inequality. A multi-level model is appropriate to test the influence of rivalry on attitudinal gender inequality due to the "nested" quality of data. As Kertzer (2013) states, "a multilevel approach allows for both slopes and intercepts to vary, avoiding heterogeneity bias while letting macro-level phenomena explain why the effect of micro-level variables vary across time" (231). Therefore, a hierarchical linear model is utilized in this study to test the influence of rivalry on attitudinal gender inequality. The societal gender inequality data has a time-series cross-sectional structure of the data. For this reason, a panel regression with Prais-Winsten corrections for auto-correlation is used to test the influence of rivalry on societal gender inequality. Prais-Winsten transformations assume that there is a first-order autocorrelation process and that the coefficient of the autocorrelation process is common to every panel (Greene 1993).

Empirical Models and Results

Rivalries and Sexism

Table 4.1 displays the results of the influence of rivalry on sexist attitudes within society. Model 1 tests the influence of being in an interstate rivalry on attitudes about women as political leaders. *Rivalry* is negative and statistically significant indicating that respondents living in states that are involved in an interstate rivalry are more likely to agree with the statement that men make better political leaders. This finding

demonstrates, that in terms of politics, women are viewed as less suitable to hold political office in rivalry, which supports previous work on the influence of interstate rivalry on female representation (Schroeder 2014). The finding that more respondents believe men make better political leaders also supports the hypothesis that higher levels of gender inequality will be found in states involved in an interstate rivalry.

<Table 4.1 >

Model 2 displays the results of the influence of rivalry on respondent's attitudes about men and women's right to job. *Rivalry* is once again negative and statistically significant. This means that respondents are more likely to agree that men have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce, signifying higher levels of gender inequality in states involved in a rivalry, supporting the hypothesis. Model 3 tests the influence of rivalry on attitudes about women's need for higher education. Interestingly, *Rivalry* is positive and statistically significant, which is in the opposite direction than predicted. Thus, respondents from states involved in a rivalry disagree that a university education is more important for a boy than a girl. It was expected that higher levels of sexism in states involved in an interstate rivalry would mean that respondents would believe higher education was necessary for boys, but not for girls. However, the findings reveal this is not the case. This finding will be further examined following the discussion of the influence of rivalry on gender equality.

Looking now at Table 4.2, a similar pattern emerges using the total number of rivalries a state is involved in. The *Total Rivalries* variable is negative and statistically significant in Model 4, indicating that as the number of rivalries as state is involved in increases, respondents are more likely to believe men make better political leaders. *Total*

Rivalries is also negative and statistically significant in Model 5, which measures people's attitudes about men's and women's right to a job, finding that respondents are more likely to agree that men have more right to a job as the number of rivalries increases. Similar to Model 3, *Total Rivalries* is positive and statistically significant in Model 6. Increasing the number of rivals leads to greater disagreement by respondents' that university education is more important for boys than girls. This result is in the opposite direction of what was expected and will be more thoroughly discussed subsequently.

<Table 4.2> <Figure 4.2 >

In order to more fully understand the relationship between rivalry involvement and attitudes about women, the influence of the number of rivalries a state is involved on responses from the World Values Survey are graphically displayed. Figure 4.2 portrays how the influence of the number of rivalries on the belief that men make better political leaders. The co-efficient in Table 4.2 shows that as the number of rivalries increases, respondents are more likely to agree that men make better political leaders, however, as Figure 4.2 shows, this is not a simple linear relationship. The average response from individuals in states not in a rivalry is 2.52, essentially in the middle of the scale between agree and disagree that men make better political leaders. Involvement in one rivalry moves the prediction slightly, to 2.42 indicating that respondents in states involved in a rivalry are slightly more likely to believe that men make better political leaders. However, respondents in states involved in 2 rivalries are slightly more likely to disagree that men make better political leaders as evidenced by the average response being 2.59, but moving to states with 3 rivals, we once again see respondents agreeing slightly more

with the statement that men make better political leaders, with the average response being 2.44. The largest change in agreement that men make better political leaders is when there are 4 rivals. Average response in these states is 2.02, indicating stronger agreement that men make better political leaders from respondents. Thus, while the relationship between the number of rivals and attitudes about women's ability as political leaders is not perfectly linear, we do find that that when a state has more rivals, respondents are more likely to believe men make better political leaders.

<Figure 4.3 >

Next we move to the influence of rivalry involvement on attitudes that men have more right a job when jobs are scarce. Figure 4.3 graphically displays how attitudes change as the number of rivalries a state is involved with increases. When a state is not involved in a rivalry, the average response is 1. 57. As a state becomes involved in additional rivalries this declines. The average response in states involved in 1 rivalry is 1.51 and 1.52 for states involved in 2 rivalries. Based on the findings in Figure 4.2, we might expect the belief that men should have more right to a job should be lower in states involved in 3 rivalries since we saw less support in these states that men make better political leaders. However, this is not the case. Respondents in states involved in 3 rivalries had an average response of 1. 46, which is lower than states not in a rivalry as well as lower than states involved in one or two rivalries. We see the sharpest decline from respondents involved in 4 rivalries, who have an average response of 1.23. Thus, as the number of rivalries a state is involved in, a greater number of respondents agree that men have more right to a job indicating a higher level of sexism.

Rivalries and Gender Inequality

Table 4.3 displays the results of the influence of being in an interstate rivalry on three measures of gender inequality, percent of women in the paid workforce, average fertility rate, and the percent women in higher education. Model 1 displays the results of the influence of being in a rivalry on women's equal access to the paid workforce. As expected, *Rivalry* is negative and statistically significant indicating that women comprise the paid workforce at lower levels in states involved in a rivalry compared to states not in a rivalry. This supports the hypothesis that the gender inequality gap will be larger in states involved in an interstate rivalry. As Model 2 in Table 4.3 shows, *Rivalry* is positive and statistically significant. Women living in states involved in a rivalry have more children, on average, compared to women living in states not in a rivalry. This result occurs even when level of development and religion is controlled for. The finding that the fertility rate is higher in states involved in a rivalry is indicative that women have less ability to make family planning choices and have less control over their bodies. This supports the hypothesis that gender inequality will be larger in states involved in a rivalry.

<Table 4.3>

The final measure of gender inequality is the percent of women in secondary education. Model 3 in Table 4.3 indicates that involvement in a rivalry does not have a negative influence on women's access to higher education as evident by the lack of statistical significance for the *Rivalry* variable in Model 3. Thus, while it is theorized that being in a rivalry will negatively influence women's involvement in secondary education,

the empirical results do not support this claim. Rivalry involvement has no influence on women's ability to enter higher education.

Arguably, the presence of more rivals will have a stronger influence on domestic structures leading to greater gender inequality. Table 4 presents the results of the influence of the total number of rivalries on gender inequality within a state. An increasing number of rivalries leads to lower levels of women in the paid workforce. In addition, the fertility rate increases as the number of interstate rivalries increases. However, *Total Rivalries* does not reach statistical significance in Model 3. This adds to the previous finding that involvement in an interstate rivalry does not have an influence of women in higher education.

<Table 4.4>

Using the different measures of sexism and gender inequality, the results support the hypothesis that involvement in a rivalry leads to higher levels of sexism and gender inequality. However, involvement in a rivalry does not have the expected affect on attitudes on women's need for a university education and women's participation in higher education. What is particularly interesting is that, while women in a rivalry state are no less likely to be in higher education they are less likely to a member of the paid workforce. This indicates that obtaining an education does not translate into entering the paid workforce. This finding may be due to women's role as mothers and their child's first teacher. Maternal education has been linked to better child health (Frost *et al.* 2005; Boyle *et al.* 2006), as well as better academic outcomes for children (Christian *et al.* 1998; Davis-Kean 2005). Thus, education may be viewed as just as important for women so they can educate their young children and help their children succeed.

The results displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that involvement in a rivalry impacts sexist attitudes and gender inequality within a state. Respondents in a state in a rivalry are more likely to agree that men make better political leaders and that men have more right to a job when jobs are scarce. In addition, women are in the paid workforce at lower levels in states involved in a rivalry and have more children on average. There are certain characteristics common across rivalries such as mutual competition and hostility however; the issue at stake between different sets of rivals varies. These different issues may influence the level of sexism and gender inequality to varying degrees. For instance, the high salience of territorial disputes spatial rivalries may have a larger impact on the domestic structures including the level of sexism compared to ideological and positional rivalries.

<Table 4.5 >

Tables 5-7 display the results of the influence the three different types of interstate rivalry on sexism. Beginning with the influence of different types of rivalries on attitudes about women as political leaders, Table 4.5 indicates that the different types of rivalries do have different impacts on attitudes about women as political leaders. While the co-efficient for each of the three types of rivalries are negative, only spatial and ideological rivalries are statistically significant. Respondents in states involved in a spatial or ideological rivalry are more likely to strongly agree that men make better political leaders. A threat from a rival has a strong impact on domestic politics, making national security a salient issue in elections. Arguably, rivalries over territory and state ideology incite greater fear within the public mind. The desire for control of territory is deep-seated (Vasquez 1995). The public wants political leaders that are able to either

retain territory in question or win it back. In an ideological rivalry the states are fighting over divergent views of how to govern, religion, or economic policy (Thompson and Dreyer 2011). Thus, survival of the state is often at stake. When your way of life is threatened, once again the public will want strong leaders that can defend the state. Rivalries over territory or ideology are great issues to use against incumbents during elections, making national security a salient issue (Colaresi 2004). Thus, the fact that respondents from states involved in a spatial or ideological rivalries are more likely to see men as better political leaders but those from states involved in a positional rivalry do not is less surprising.

<Table 4.6 >

Table 4.6 displays the results of the influence of different types of rivalry on attitudes about men's and women's right to a job. Unlike attitudes about women as political leaders, all three types of rivalry have the same impact on attitudes about women's right to a job. The *Spatial, Ideological, and Positional* variables are all negative and statistically significant. Across rivalry types, being in an interstate rivalry leads to more respondents indicating that men should have more right to job than a woman when jobs are scarce.

<Table 4.7 >

Finally, Table 4.7 displays the results of different types of rivalries on attitudes about the importance of a university of education for boys compared to girls. The findings indicate that the type of rivalry a state is involved with can influence attitudes about the importance attitudes about women's need for university education differently. Respondents in states involved in a spatial or positional rivalry involvement are more

likely to disagree that university education is more important for a boy than a girl. This is indicated by the positive and statistically significant co-efficient. However, involvement in an ideological rivalry has the opposite influence on attitudes. Involvement in an ideological rivalry is negative and statistically significant. This finding means that respondents in these states are more likely to agree with the statement that university education is more important for a boy than a girl, indicating more sexist attitudes in these states.

Ideological rivalries are formed over differing beliefs over how to govern, disparate dominant religions, or contrasting economic systems. The two states have fundamental differences, with one state commonly being liberal or left leaning while their rival is conservative or right leaning (Thompson and Dreyer 2011). This means that the population in one state in the ideological rivalry is likely to fold more traditional or sexist views about women. The fact that the society is more conservative may explain why ideological rivalries have the opposite influence on attitudes about boy's and girls' need for higher education.

<Tables 4.8, 4.9, 4.10 >

Next we move to investigate the influence of the three types of rivalry on overall gender inequality of a state. Tables 4.8-4.10 display the results of different types of rivalry on gender inequality. Beginning with Table 4.8 we see, that when separated, Spatial, Positional, and Ideological rivalries have no impact of the overall fertility rate in a state. While all the co-efficient are positive they fail to reach statistical significance. Table 4.9 presents the results of the different types of rivalry on the next measure of gender inequality, women in the paid workforce. All rivalry types are negative, however,

involvement in a *Spatial* rivalry is the only one to have a statistically significant result.

Spatial rivalries may produce greater fear of conflict in the population and the subsequent creation of a patriarchical system. However, based on the previous findings in this chapter, we should expect ideological rivalries to have a similar effect yet this is not evident in the findings in Table 4.6. In addition, as shown in Table 4.6, respondents in states across rivalry types were more likely to strongly agree that men had more right to a job than women but only in states in a spatial rivalries do we see a lower level of women in the workforce. Finally, Table 4.10 reports the results of the influence of different types of rivalry on women in higher education. Previous results reported in this chapter found rivalry to have no influence on women in higher education. When broken apart, the different types of rivalry have no influence of women in higher education. The findings indicate that involvement in a rivalry can lead to higher levels of sexism and gender inequality in a state. However, different types of rivalries can influence sexism and gender inequality to varying degrees.

Now we turn to a discussion of the other variables in the model and their influence on sexism as displayed in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, beginning with the influence of religion. The findings in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicate that as the percentage of the population that is Muslim increases, sexist attitudes also increases. Looking at Tables 4.3 and 4.4 we find that states with larger Muslim populations have lower levels of women in the workforce, which aligns with attitudes about women's right to a job. However, the percentage of women in higher education, while negative, does not reach statistical significance.

Predominately Catholic countries are also expected to have higher levels of sexism since Catholic religious leaders are all men. However, this premise is not upheld in the results. Respondents in highly Catholic countries are more likely to strongly disagree that men make better political leaders. Many of the states that have large populations of Catholics are found in Latin America, a region that has a high level of women in the legislature and has experience with female presidents. Respondents in these states are accustomed to female political leaders and may be less likely to view politicians as a male domain, helping to explain the result.

Respondents in predominately Catholic countries are also more likely to strongly disagree that men have more right to a job while also strongly agreeing that university education is more important for a boy. In these states, respondents believe that women have equal right to a job, yet do not need a university education. This result may be indicative of the fact that different types of jobs are viewed as appropriate for men and women, with women being funneled into work such as cooks and maids that do not require advanced education. Comparing these findings to those in Tables 3 and 4, we find that Catholic states have higher proportion of women in higher education, even though respondents in Catholic states believe a university education is more important for boys. Thus, attitudes about women's need for higher education may be a result of the types of jobs women are expected to fill, as well as backlash from their advancement in obtaining higher education.

Unsurprisingly, more democratic states and more developed states have less sexism. For all three measures in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 level of democracy is positive and statistically significant as is logged GDP per capita. Years since the Convention to

Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) was ratified by a state has mixed results in terms of sexist attitudes. As the number of years since CEDAW was ratified increases, respondents are more likely to strongly disagree that a university education is more important for a boy yet more likely to strongly agree that men have more right to a job. Coupling the findings in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 with Tables 4.3 and 4.4 we find that years since CEDAW ratification increases the percentage of women in the workforce. The attitude that men have more right to a job may be a result of women having greater access to jobs after a state ratifies CEDAW due to anti-discrimination laws which subsequently makes it more difficult for men to obtain work, creating a backlash effect.

The creation of CEDAW has had a positive influence on attitudes about women as evident by the positive coefficients in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. As years since CEDAW was created increases, respondents are more likely to strongly disagree that men make better political leaders and that university education is more important for a boy. Looking at Tables 4.3 and 4.4, we see that the fertility rate is negative and statistically significant indicating as years since CEDAW was created increases. The proportion of women in higher education is positive and statistically significant as time since CEDAW was created increases. These findings indicate that CEDAW, broadly, has had a positive influence on attitudes about women as well as gender inequality.

Discussion

This chapter argues that involvement in an interstate rivalry would lead to higher levels of sexism in the state. Not only would the state be more sexist, but there would also be a higher level of gender inequality. Involvement in a rivalry does influence sexist

attitudes and the degree of gender inequality. Attitudes about men's superiority in politics and men's right to a job have been found to be more prevalent in states involved in a rivalry. However, respondents in a rivalry state are more likely to strongly disagree that university education is more important for a boy. In addition, there was is no statistically significant difference between the proportion of higher education comprised of by women in states involved in a rivalry and states that are not. Thus, rivalry involvement is not an obstacle for women to obtain higher education. What is particularly interesting is that while women are able to obtain higher education, this advanced training does not also lead to higher levels of women in the paid workforce in states involved in a rivalry.

The influence of rivalry involvement on attitudes about women varies based on the number of rivalries a state is involved in. National security is a much larger concern as the number of rivals increases which have a larger impact on sexist attitudes. However, there is not a simple linear relationship between the number of rivalries and level of sexism. This finding warrants further investigation in subsequent research.

Typically, levels of women in higher education and in the paid workforce rise and fall together. States with many women in the universities also have many women in the paid workforce. One explanation for this finding is due to woman's role as mother and wife. A mother is a child's first teacher thus a highly educated mother is likely to be better equipped to educate her child. Also, a woman may obtain higher education and join the paid workforce, but once married she leaves the workforce. This more likely in societies that have firm beliefs about the proper roles of men and women, like those involved in a rivalry.

Conclusion

Over the past few decades, women's rights and gender inequality have become an international topic of discussion. The United Nations created the "Decade of the Woman" beginning in 1976 to focus international attention on the needs of women. This led to the creation of the Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, created additional pressure for states to address gender inequality domestically. Subsequently, previous studies (Cole 2013) along with findings in this study indicate that women's rights have improved after the creation of CEDAW. While all states have experienced international pressure to address women's underrepresentation, gender inequality, and discrimination, the findings from this study indicate that states involved in an interstate rivalry are not responding as strongly to these international pressures. Gender inequality is higher and sexist attitudes more prevalent in states involved in an interstate rivalry. Even with the emerging international norms and pressure to take actions to improve women's status, when security dominates the agenda, women's issues are pushed aside, perpetually entrenching the patriarchy.

Figure 4.1: Rivalry's Influence on Gender Inequality



Table 4.1: Influence of Rivalry on Attitudes About Women			
	(1) Men make better political leaders.	(2) Men have more right to a job.	(3) A university education is more important for boys.
Rivalry	-.04 **	-.05 **	.08 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Islam	-.06 **	-.17 **	-.04 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Catholic	.26 **	.04 **	-.08 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Level of Democracy	.01 **	.01 **	.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.01	-.01 **	.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.01 **	.01 *	.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
# of WINGOs	.01 **	.01 **	-.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
(logged) GDP per capita	.11 **	.04 **	.06 **
	(.02)	(.01)	(.03)
Region	-.01	-.02 **	-.10 **
	(.03)	(.01)	(.04)
Women's Political Rights	.23 **		
	(.01)		
Women's Economic Rights		.09 **	
		(.01)	
Women's Social Rights			.22 **
			(.01)
Constant	.86 **	1.14 **	2.32 **
	(.02)	(.01)	(.03)
Countries	79	79	79
Observations	157,787	149,465	118,775
Dependent Variable Data from World Values Survey, Waves 2, 3, 4.			
Question ranges from 0 (Strongly agree)- 4 (Strongly disagree)			
Years 1990-2004			
Results using a Hierarchical linear model.			

Table 4.2: Influence of the Number of Total Rivalries on Attitudes About Women			
	(1) Men make better political leaders.	(2) Men have more right to a job.	(3) A university education is more important for boys.
Total Rivalries	-.01 **	-.04 **	.02 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Islam	-.06 **	-.15 **	-.03 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Catholic	.25 **	.03 **	-.07 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Level of Democracy	.01 **	.01 **	.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.01	-.01 **	.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.01 **	.01	.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
# of WINGOs	.01 **	.01 **	-.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
(logged) GDP per capita	.11 **	.04 **	.06 **
	(.02)	(.01)	(.03)
Region	-.01	-.01 **	-.11 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.04)
Women's Political Rights	.23 **		
	(.01)		
Women's Economic Rights		.08 **	
		(.02)	
Women's Social Rights			.21 **
			(.01)
Constant	.84 **	1.15 **	2.40 **
	(.02)	(.01)	(.03)
Countries	79	79	79
Observations	157,787	149,465	118,775
Dependent Variable Data from World Values Survey, Waves 2, 3, 4.			
Question ranges from 0 (Strongly agree)- 4 (Strongly disagree)			
Years 1990-2004			
Results using a Hierarchical linear model.			

Figure 4.2: Total Rivalries And Attitudes About Women's Political Leadership Ability



Figure 4.3: Total Rivalries and Attitudes About Women's Right to a Job



Table 4.3: Influence of Rivalry Involvement on Gender Inequality

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Fertility Rate		Women in the Workforce		Women in Higher Education	
Rivalry	.03	*	-.24	*	-.54	
	(.01)		(.10)		(.60)	
Islam	.13		-4.55	*	-.06	
	(.16)		(1.86)		(1.69)	
Catholic	-.07		-1.31		2.69	*
	(.11)		(.79)		(1.31)	
Level of Democracy	-.01	**	.00		.03	
	(.01)		(.06)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	.02		.12	*	-.03	
	(.01)		(.05)		(.09)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	-.07	**	.06		.50	**
	(.01)		(.04)		(.07)	
# of WINGOs	-.01	**	.01		-.01	
	(.01)		(.02)		(.01)	
(logged) GDP per capita	-.08	**	-.45	**	.45	
	(.02)		(.12)		(.59)	
Region	-.91	**	-.25		5.46	**
	(.09)		(.56)		(.90)	
Women's Social Rights	-.01				.06	
	(.01)				(.10)	
Women's Economic Rights			.06	*		
			(.02)			
Constant	7.58	**	42.60	**	17.72	**
	(.24)		(1.86)		(3.93)	
Countries	154		154		154	
Observations	2,141		2,359		2,987	
R-squared	.83		.84		.36	
SEE	.09		.60		2.38	

Dependent Variables Model 1: overall fertility rate, Model 2: percent of paid labor force comprised of by women, Model 3: percent of higher education students comprised that are women.
Years 1981-2006;
Results using panel regression with Prais-Winston corrections;
Robust Standard errors in parentheses;
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table 4.4: The Influence of Total Number of Rivalries on Gender Inequality

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Fertility Rate		Women in the Workforce		Women in Higher Education	
# of Total Rivalries	.03	**	-.34	**	-.05	
	(.01)		(.12)		(.27)	
Islam	.13		-4.53	*	-.11	
	(.15)		(1.84)		(1.69)	
Catholic	-.07		-1.32		2.69	*
	(.11)		(.79)		(1.31)	
Level of Democracy	-.01	**	-.01		.04	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	.02		.12	*	-.03	
	(.01)		(.05)		(.09)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	-.07	**	.07		.51	**
	(.01)		(.04)		(.07)	
# of WINGOs	-.01	**	.01		-.01	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
(logged) GDP per capita	-.08	**	-.46	**	.43	
	(.02)		(.12)		(.62)	
Region	-.91	**	-.24		5.50	**
	(.09)		(.56)		(.93)	
Women's Political Rights	-.01				.06	
	(.03)				(.10)	
Women's Economic Rights			.06	*		
			(.02)			
Constant	7.57	**	42.81	**	17.55	**
	(.243)		(1.85)		(3.81)	
Observations	2,141		2,359		2,98	
R-squared	.83		.85		.366	
SEE	.095		.60		2.38	

Dependent variables Model 1: overall fertility rate, Model 2: percent of paid labor force comprised of by women, Model 3: percent of higher education students comprised by women.
Results using
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4.5: Influence of Different Types of Rivalry on Attitudes on Women's Political Leadership Ability

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Spatial Rivalry	-.02	**				
	(.01)					
Positional Rivalry			-.01			
			(.01)			
Ideological Rivalry					-.07	**
					(.01)	
Islam	-.06	**	-.07	**	-.06	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Catholic	.26	**	.25	**	.24	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Level of Democracy	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	.0		.01		-.01	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
# of WINGOs	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
(logged) GDP Per Capita	.11	**	.11	**	.12	**
	(.02)		(.02)		(.02)	
Region	-.01		-.01		-.01	**
	(.03)		(.03)		(.01)	
Women's Political Rights	.24	**	.24	**	.22	**
	(.06)		(.06)		(.01)	
Constant	.84	**	.82	**	.83	**
	(.02)		(.02)		(.02)	
Countries	71		71		71	
Observations	157,787		157,787		157,787	

Dependent Variable World Values Survey Question "Men make better political leaders";
Question ranges from 0 (Strongly agree)- 4 (Strongly disagree)
WVS Waves 2, 3, 4.
Years 1990-2004
Results using a Hierarchical linear model.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4.6: Influence of Different Types of Rivalry on Attitudes about Women's Right to a Job

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Spatial Rivalry	-.02	**				
	(.01)					
Positional Rivalry			-.10	**		
			(.01)			
Ideological Rivalry					-.07	**
					(.04)	
Islam	-.18	**	-.14	**	-.18	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.04)	
Catholic	.04	**	.02	**	.02	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.04)	
Level of Democracy	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.10)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.01		-.01	**	-.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
# of WINGOs	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
(logged) GDP per capita	.04	**	.05	**	.05	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Region	-.01	**	-.02	**	-.02	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Women's Economic Rights	.09	**	.08	**	.09	**
	(.01)		(.02)		(.02)	
Constant	1.11	**	1.12	**	1.08	**
	(.01)		(.09)		(.01)	
Observations	149,465		149,465		149,465	

Dependent Variable: World Values Survey Question "Men have more right to a job over a woman."
Question ranges from 1 (strongly agree)- 4 (strongly disagree).
WVS Waves 2, 3, 4.
Years 1990-2004
Results using a Hierarchical linear model.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4.7: Influence of Different Types of Rivalry on Attitudes on Women's Need for a University Education

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Spatial Rivalry	.09	**				
	(.01)					
Positional Rivalry			.03	**		
			(.01)			
Ideological Rivalry					-.05	**
					(.01)	
Islam	-.02	*	-.01		-.04	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Catholic	-.07	**	-.07	**	-.08	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Level of Democracy	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.01	**	.01	**	.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
# of WINGOs	-.01	**	-.01	**	-.01	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
(logged) GDP per capita	.05	**	.06	**	.06	**
	(.01)		(.03)		(.01)	
Region	-.10	**	-.11	**	-.11	**
	(.04)		(.04)		(.04)	
Women's Social Rights	.21	**	.20	**	.22	**
	(.01)		(.01)		(.006)	
Constant	2.40	**	2.35	**	2.30	**
	(.03)		(.03)		(.03)	
Countries	71		71		71	
Observations	118,775		118,775		118,775	

Dependent Variable World Values Survey Question "University education is more important for a boy";
Question ranges from 0 (Strongly agree)- 4 (Strongly disagree)
WVS Waves 2, 3, 4.
Years 1990-2004
Results using a Hierarchical linear model.
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
** $p<0.01$, * $p<0.05$

Table 4.8: Influence of Different Types of Rivalry on Overall Fertility Rate			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Spatial Rivalry	.02		
	(.01)		
Positional Rivalry		.02	
		(.04)	
Ideological Rivalry			.02
			(.02)
Islam	.13	.13	.13
	(.16)	(.16)	(.16)
Catholic	-.07	-.07	-.07
	(.11)	(.11)	(.11)
Level of Democracy	-.01 **	-.01 **	-.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.92 **	-.92 **	-.91 **
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.02	.02	.02
	(.01)	(.02)	(.01)
# of WINGOs	-.07 **	-.07	-.07 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
(logged) GDP per capita	-.08 **	-.08 **	-.08 **
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Region	-.01 **	-.01 **	-.01 **
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Women's Social Rights	-.92 **	-.92 **	-.91 **
	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Constant	7.58 **	7.59 **	7.59 **
	(.24)	(.24)	(.24)
Countries	154	154	154
Observations	2,141	2,141	2,141
R-squared	.83	.83	.83
Dependent Variable: fertility rate			
Years 1981-2006			
Results using panel regression with Prais-Winston corrections			
Robust Standard errors in parentheses			
** p<0.01, * p<0.05			

Table 4.9: Influence of Different Types of Rivalry on Women in the Workforce			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Spatial Rivalry	-.38 **		
	(.12)		
Positional Rivalry		-.86	
		(.44)	
Ideological Rivalry			-.44
			(.23)
Islam	-4.48 *	-4.59 *	-4.60 *
	(1.83)	(1.86)	(1.87)
Catholic	-1.29	-1.35	-1.33
	(.78)	(.80)	(.80)
Level of Democracy	.01	.01	.01
	(.06)	(.06)	(.01)
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	.12 *	.12 *	.12 *
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.07	.06	.06
	(.04)	(.05)	(.04)
# of WINGOs	.01	.01	.01
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
(logged) GDP per capita	-.45 **	-.45 **	-.45 **
	(.11)	(.12)	(.12)
Region	-.24	-.23	-.25
	(.56)	(.55)	(.56)
Women's Economic Rights	.06 *	.06 *	.06 *
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
Constant	42.61 **	42.61 **	42.58 **
	(1.85)	(1.86)	(1.86)
Countries	154	154	154
Observations	2,359	2,359	2,359
R-squared	.84	.85	.85

Dependent Variable: Proportion of the Workforce that are women;
Years 1981-2006
Results using panel regression with Prais-Winston corrections
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Table 4.10: Influence of Different Types of Rivalry on Women in Higher Education

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Spatial Rivalry	.09					
	(.22)					
Positional Rivalry			-1.47			
			(1.61)			
Ideological Rivalry					-1.16	
					(1.36)	
Islam	-.14		.05		-.05	
	(1.69)		(1.68)		(1.67)	
Catholic	2.69	*	2.68	*	2.67	*
	(1.31)		(1.30)		(1.30)	
Level of Democracy	.04		.04		.03	
	(.02)		(.02)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.03		-.03		-.03	
	(.09)		(.09)		(.09)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.51	**	.50	**	.50	**
	(.07)		(.07)		(.07)	
# of WINGOs	-.01		-.01		-.01	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.01)	
(logged) GDP per capita	.43		.46		.44	
	(.62)		(.57)		(.58)	
Region	5.51	**	5.49	**	5.45	**
	(.93)		(.91)		(.89)	
Women's Social Rights	.06		.06		.06	
	(.10)		(.10)		(.10)	
Constant	17.47	**	17.66	**	17.83	**
	(3.81)		(3.82)		(3.92)	
Countries	154		154		154	
Observations	2,987		2,987		2,987	
R-squared	.36		.36		.36	

Dependent Variable: percent of higher education students that are women;
Years 1981-2006
Results using panel regression with Prais-Winston corrections
Robust Standard errors in parentheses
** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Chapter Five: Conclusion

Future Research

Stemming from previous research on the impact of the international system on domestic politics, this project focuses on the influence of interstate rivalry on the status of women. National security becomes a salient concern for states involved in a rivalry due to the hostile and conflict prone environment created by the rivalry. Based on arguments made by international relations feminist scholars (e.g.; Enloe 1983; Tickner 1992) that the focus on national security will lead to a global patriarchy, I argue in this project that involvement in a rivalry will negatively influence the status of women. Specifically, involvement in a rivalry influences the election of women, the adoption of a strong gender quota, and levels of gender inequality. The findings from this project indicate that states involved in a rivalry have lower levels of female representation, are less likely to adopt a strong gender quota, and have a larger gender inequality gap, on average, compared to states not in a rivalry. Subsequently, the findings from this project support international relations feminist scholars' claims that when the maintenance of national security is the primary focus of state policies and actions, a patriarchal system will emerge within the state. While national security is not the main focus of all states, as realists have argued, it is the dominant concern for states involved in a rivalry. The focus on national security within rivalry states has detrimental consequences for women's status. Specifically, women face impediments to obtaining high political office and societal equality, which further reinforces their subordinate position in society.

My research finds that rivalry involvement negatively influences women's status; however, it does not address the fluctuation in the intensity of a rivalry. Over the life of a

rivalry conflict often waxes and wanes. For example, the rivalry between Ecuador and Peru did not experience any Militarized Interstate Disputes from 1984 to 1991. However, in 1991, the level of contention increased, culminating in the Cenapa War (Ghosn *et al.* 2004).

Clearly, rivalry involvement should have a larger impact on the election of women and gender equality during times of high intensity. Current empirical measures of rivalry do not do an adequate job capturing the changes in intensity over time. To capture this dynamic we need detailed case studies. Case studies would allow me to measure the intensity of a rivalry over time and more accurately gauge the subsequent impact on the election of women and gender inequality. Thus, an extension of this research project will involve in-depth case studies of Ecuador, Israel, and South Korea over the years 1950-2010.

The rationale for selecting these three states derives from the varying levels of intensity and lengths of the rivalries. Israel has been involved in multiple rivalries since the 1950s.Currently Israel has five active rivalries and routinely reaches the level of active militarized conflict. Contrast this to South Korea's one rival that alternates between long periods of active hostility and relative peace (Thompson and Dreyer 2011). Based on the research presented here, I would expect the election of women and gender inequality to be affected differently in Israel compared to South Korea. Finally, an in-depth case study of Ecuador provides a unique opportunity to study the effects of rivalry termination. With Ecuador's rivalry ending in 1998 (Thompson and Dreyer 2011), female representation and gender inequality can be evaluated when the state was in a rivalry compared the period immediately following the rivalry. This case will allow me

to evaluate my theoretical arguments within the same state with variation in the rivalry condition. Further, this case allows for an evaluation of the speed at which the effects of rivalry diminish.

A second extension is to explore the impact of subnational threats. The impact of security threats on women's status is unlikely to be restricted to threats from other states. National security threats from terrorist organizations, drug cartels, and even a mass influx of immigrants could have a similar effect on women's status. Consequently, I plan to conduct studies on how drug violence in Mexico influences the selection of female candidates and voter support for female candidates. The violence in Mexico has high geographic variance, which will allow me to compare areas with high levels of drug-related violence to areas of low violence. This will provide further test of the influence of security threats on the election of women.

The Importance of Female Representation and Gender Equality

The impact of women's underrepresentation in politics and a large gender inequality gap reaches beyond women as individuals. Female representation and gender inequality have ramifications for the internal development of the state and its international standing. Having female political leaders influences citizens' trust in the government. In a survey conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2000), respondents reported that when women are underrepresented in politics, there is a democratic deficit. One respondent stated,

> A democracy which excludes women, or in which women are represented only marginally, is not a real democracy. Women's participation in policymaking is a question of justice and equality (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2000: 17).

Other respondents assert that the policies created by the legislature do not reflect the needs of society when women are not part of the decision-making process (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2000).

Along with altering the perceptions of the level of democracy within a state, the presence of large numbers of women in politics also influences the level of trust in government. In a cross-national sample, people in states with higher levels of female representation reported viewing their government as less corrupt (Dollar *et al.* 2001). Similarly, having female candidates reduces the perception of election fraud (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014). The view that the government is not meeting the needs of the people combined with low levels of trust can encourage citizens to take actions against the government, increasing the risk of internal conflict. In fact, high levels of gender inequality and low levels of female representation have been linked to higher risk of internal conflict (Caprioli 2005; Melander 2005). Thus, gender inequality and women's underrepresentation have palpable effects on state survival and ability to govern effectively.

Further, female representation and gender inequality also influence a state's relations with other states. For example, states with higher gender equality have more peaceful relations with their neighbors (Hudson *et al.* 2008) and are less likely to initiate conflict (Caprioli 2003). In addition, states where women have greater access to the political process and have a larger share of political power have more peaceful relations generally (Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Regan and Paskeviciute 2003). Additionally, as female representation increases, military spending has been found to decline (Koch and Fulton 2011). Also, states with higher levels of female representation are more likely to

actively promote human rights abroad (Brysk and Mehta 2014). Clearly, women's underrepresentation and gender inequality have implications beyond the individual and the state, reaching into the international system.

What Can Be Done To Address the Issue

The findings from this project indicate that even when a state has domestic characteristics conducive to high female representation and low gender inequality, involvement in a rivalry mitigates the impact of a favorable domestic environment. Since women's underrepresentation and gender inequality has far reaching effects, the question becomes what can be done? One solution would be to make a concerted effort to end rivalries. Once a rivalry terminates we should see a clear increase in female representation. For example, both the United States and Ecuador saw a marked increase in female representation at the end of long-standing rivalries. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union ended in 1989. At the rivalry's end, women comprised 6.7 % of the U.S. Congress. In the 1992, the U.S. saw an unprecedented number of female candidates running for office, and was dubbed "the Year of the Woman" (Carpini and Fuchs 1993; Dolan 2004). Subsequently, the level of female representation in the U.S. increased by 4.3%, subsequently, leading to women holding 11% of the seats in Congress.[46]

The turnaround in Ecuador was even more dramatic. Until 1998, the rivalry between Peru and Ecuador was the longest running dispute in the Western Hemisphere. The two states had been in a conflict over territory along their shared borders since independence in the late 1800s (Colaresi *et al* 2007). Since 1884 there had been 34

[46] Data on female representation are from Paxton *et al.* (2008).

episodes of hostile interaction between the two states, with full-scale war erupting on three separate occasions, the most recent being the Cenapa War in 1995 (Simmons 1999a). With the approval of the Treaty of Commerce and Trade in 1998 by both countries the rivalry between the two states officially ended (Palmer 2001). In 1997, female representation in Ecuador was a meager 3.7% . Immediately following the end of the rivalry female representation rose to 17.4%.[47] These examples indicate that terminating a rivalry can have a positive influence of female representation, with a fast and dramatic increase possible.

Unfortunately, rivalries are deeply engrained in the psyche of the states involved, even taking on institutional characteristics, thus making rivalries difficult to end. While rivalries are hard to terminate, it is not impossible, especially with assistance from a third-party. Ending the rivalry over disputed territory along the borders of Peru and Ecuador may have proved impossible without international assistance. Following the Cenapa War, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States stepped in to help negotiate a lasting peace (Simmons 1999). The four states created a military observation mission (MOMEP) to monitor and enforce the cease-fire (Palmer 2001). Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States also scheduled and mediated multiple peace negotiations over the subsequent years, until Ecuador and Peru were finally to reach an agreement in 1998 (Simmons 1999; Palmer 2000). Since the signing of the Treaty of Commerce and Trade, there has been no militarized interstate disputes reported between the two states (Palmer *et al.* 2015). The case of Ecuador and Peru shows the ability of external actors to alter the relationship between rivals, producing a peaceful relationship.

[47] ibid

The ability of third-party actors, especially Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), to facilitate peaceful relations is well documented. Joint IGO membership can decrease the probability of conflict as well as decrease the duration of conflict between two states (Boehmer *et al.* 2004; Shannon *et al.* 2010). In addition, third-party involvement in mediating peace and enforcing the agreement has been found to increase the duration of peace following civil war (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Joshi 2012). IGOs and other third-party actors have been found to promote peaceful relations between states. They have also been able to facilitate lasting peace after civil wars, disputes that are notoriously difficult to end. IGOs and third-party actors have been found to help produce peace in these instances, they have also been successful in terminating rivalries (Greig 2005). As the case of Ecuador and Peru indicate, third-party actors can help generate a lasting peace between rivals. Therefore, IGOs and third-party actors working with rival states to address the issues in dispute may be able to resolve the rival and consequently, transform women's underrepresentation and high gender inequality.

IGOs and third-party actors may be able to resolve some rivalries; however, it is unlikely they will able to bring to end all rivalries. For this reason, alternative actions are needed to address women's underrepresentation and gender inequality in states involved in a rivalry. While women face impediments in winning elections in states involved in a rivalry, some women have been successful in obtaining high political office, even acquiring the post of chief executive. Park Guen-hye of South Korea and Indira Gandhi of India both successfully reached the position of chief executive of states involved in heated rivalries. This leads to additional questions. How did these women win election despite a rivalry and are there particular characteristics that women may possess that can

off-set stereotypical beliefs that women are ill-suited to maintain national security? The profitable approach would be to return to case studies of successful female candidates, at all levels of political office, in states involved in a rivalry. Similarities among a number of cases may point to strategies that can be generalized to improve female representation.

One option would be to run female candidates that have military or national security experience. Proven experience with military and national security affairs may counterbalance stereotypical beliefs about women's ability to maintain national security. Survey research conducted in the U.S. indicates that this might hold true. In their survey experiment Holman *et al.* (2011) found respondents viewed Condoleezza Rice, a minority woman with experience handling national security, as capable of ensuring national security. This indicates that women are able overcome the stereotype that they are ill-suited to maintain national security. Thus, one way to alter women's underrepresentation in states involved in a rivalry would be to recruit women with particular characteristics, such as military or national security experience to run for political office. These women may have greater success in winning elections when security dominates the agenda, consequently reducing women's underrepresentation.

Recruiting and running women with certain characteristics may reduce women's underrepresentation; however, this may also reinforce the idea that women, generally, are inferior to men. The stereotypical views of women are likely to be reaffirmed if society only views certain women as capable of handling national security and suitable to hold political office. Thus, different actions to address women's underrepresentation may be necessary, specifically, the adoption of a strong gender quota.

As the findings from this research indicate, states involved in an interstate rivalry are less likely to adopt a strong quota, or a quota that will substantially increase female representation, which helps perpetuate women's underrepresentation in these states. Domestic pressure to increase female representation is decreased within rivalry states, reducing the incentives for political parties to adopt strong quotas. While domestic pressure is expected to remain low throughout the life of the rivalry, external pressure to adopt a strong quota can be applied from international actors. International pressure and emerging norms have been integral for the expansion of the use of gender quotas, particularly in democratizing and developing states (Bush 2011).

As the number and diversity of gender quotas has grown, so has knowledge regarding what makes a quota noticeable affect female representation. Using this information, IGOs and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) can push states to adopt strong quotas. This pressure can produce additional incentives for the state to adopt a strong quota, even when faced with the national security threat from a rival, thus altering women's underrepresentation. More women in the legislature, subsequently, can reduce gender inequality. While running women with characteristics that can offset gender stereotypes may improve female representation in the short-term, the adoption of a strong gender quota can help ensure long-term gains in female representation as well as promoting diversity with the female political leaders.

Conclusion

This project adds to the international relations literature that focuses on the influence of the international system on domestic politics while building off the work of international relations feminist scholars. This project helps bridge a diverse body of work.

In addition, findings from this study contribute to what is known about the systematic variance of female representation and gender inequality across states. Traditionally, studies of female representation and gender inequality focus on domestic characteristics. Findings from this study indicate that international factors must also be taken into consideration. Whether or not a state is involved in an interstate state rivalry contributes to women's status within society. Gender inequality has its roots in the international system and we can no longer ignore this influence if we are to improve the global status of women cross-nationally.

Appendices:

As an additional measure of *Rivalry Intensity*, I created a continuous variable that indicates the number of fatalities in a given year due to the rivalry. The variable ranges from 1-7 and was created using the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset. The results using this measure are displayed in Table A.1.

Table A.1: Influence of Rivalry Intensity on Adoption of Strong Gender Quota

Rivalry Intensity	-.99	
	(.97)	
Women in the Legislature	.09	*
	(.04)	
# of WINGOS	.03	
	(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.12	
	(.07)	
(logged) GDP per Capita	-.24	
	(.56)	
Polity	-.19	*
	(.09)	
Islam	3.05	
	(2.19)	
Catholic	7.27	*
	(2.90)	
Region	-.12	
	(.07)	
Time	-.14	
	(.51)	
Time Squared	.44	
	(.35)	
Constant	-.01	
	(.01)	
Observations	331	
Number of Countries	47	

DV: Adoption of Strong Gender Quota;
Results using Logit model;
Years 1980-2004;
Robust standard errors in parenthesis;
** p<.01; * p<.05;

Table A.2: List of States Included in World Values Survey

States	Wave 2 (1990-1994)	Wave 3 (1995-1998)	Wave 4 (1999-2004)	Wave 5 (2005-2009)
Albania		1998	2002	
Algeria			2002	
Andorra				2005
Argentina	1991	1995	1999	2005
Armenia		1997		
Australia		1995		2005
Azerbaijan		1997		
Bangladesh		1996	2002	
Belarus	1990	1996		
Bosnia-Herzegozina		1998	2001	
Brazil	1991			2006
Burkina Faso				2007
Bulgaria		1997		
Canada			2000	2005
Chile	1990	1996	2000	2006
China	1990	1995	2001	2007
Colombia		1998		2005
Croatia		1996		
Cyprus				2006
Czech Republic	1991			
Dominican Republic		1996		
Egypt			2001	
El Salvador		1999		
Ethiopia				2007
Estonia		1996		
France				2006
Finland		1996		2005
Georgia				2008
Germany		1997		2006
Great Britain		1998		2005
Hungary		1998		2009
India	1990	1995	2001	2006
Indonesia			2001	2006
Iran			2000	2005

Table A.2 (cont)				
Iraq			2004	2006
Israel			2001	
Italy				2005
Japan	1990			2007
Jordan			2001	2007
Kyrgyz Republic			2003	
Latvia		1996		5
Lithuania		1997		5
Macedonia		1998	2001	
Malaysia				2006
Mexico	1990	1995	2000	2005
Moldova		1996	2002	2006
Montenegro		1996	2001	
Netherlands				2005
Morocco			2001	
New Zealand		1998		2004
Nigeria	1990	1995	2000	
Norway		1996		2007
Pakistan		1997	2001	
Peru		1996	2001	2006
Philippines		1996	2001	
Poland	1989	1997		2005
Qatar				2005
Romania		1998		2005
Russia	1990			2006
Rwanda				2007
Saudi Arabia			2003	
Serbia			2001	2005
Singapore			2002	
Slovakia	1990	1998		
Slovenia		1995		2005
South Africa	1990	1996	2001	2005
South Korea	1990	1996	2001	2005
Spain	1990	1995	2000	2007
Sweden		1996	1999	2006
Switzerland	1989	1996		2007
Tanzania			2001	
Thailand				2007

Table A.2 (Cont)				
Turkey	1990	1996	2001	2007
Uganda			2001	2005
Ukraine		1996		2006
Uruguay		1996		2006
USA		1995	1999	2006
Venezuela		1996	2000	
Vietnam			2001	2006
Zambia				2007
Zimbabwe			2001	

As an additional measure of *Rivalry Intensity*, I created a continuous variable that indicates the number of fatalities in a given year due to the rivalry. The variable ranges from 1-7 and was created using the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset. The results using this measure are displayed in Table A.3.

Table A.3: Influence of Rivalry Intensity on Gender Inequality

	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Fertility Rate		Women in the Workforce		Women in Higher Education	
Rivalry Intensity	.01		-.06		-.19	
	(.01)		(.04)		(.10)	
Islam	.48		-11.97	**	-1.71	
	(.31)		(3.34)		(2.57)	
Catholic	-.07		-3.80	*	5.16	*
	(.11)		(1.53)		(2.01)	
Level of Democracy	-.01	**	.01		.04	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.02)	
Years Since CEDAW Ratification	-.88	**	-.77		5.36	**
	(.09)		(.60)		(.97)	
Years Since CEDAW Creation	.02		.11		-.12	
	(.01)		(.09)		(.11)	
# of WINGOs	-.07	**	.08		.52	**
	(.01)		(.08)		(.09)	
(logged) GDP per capita	-.12	**	-.62	**	1.30	
	(.03)		(.20)		(.72)	
Region	-.01	**	-.01		-.01	
	(.01)		(.01)		(.02)	
Women's Social Rights	-.01				.12	
	(.03)				(.11)	
Women's Economic Rights			.07			
			(.03)			
Constant	7.65	**	47.03	**	1.68	*
	(.26)		(2.13)		(4.69)	
Countries	154		154		154	
Observations	1,739		1,944		1,739	
R-squared	.85		.890		.85	
SEE	.10		.751		.10	

Dependent Variables Model 1: overall fertility rate, Model 2: percent of paid labor force comprised of by women, Model 3: percent of higher education students comprised that are women.
Years 1981-2004;
Results using panel regression with Prais-Winston corrections;
Robust Standard errors in parentheses;
** p<.01, * p<.05

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