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A PEDAGOGY FOR JUSTICE: KANT, HEGEL, MARCUSE AND FREIRE ON EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

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A PEDAGOGY FOR JUSTICE: KANT, HEGEL, MARCUSE AND FREIRE ON
EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

DISSERTATION

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky

by
Shelly J. Johnson

Director: Dr. Arnold Farr, Professor of Philosophy

Lexington, KY

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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

A PEDAGOGY FOR JUSTICE: KANT, HEGEL, MARCUSE AND FREIRE ON EDUCATION AND THE GOOD SOCIETY

Rousseau's educational treatise *Emile* is a well-known pedagogical work often noted for its progressive educational insights. Although Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy* is much less well known, Kant suggests a solution to an educational problem Rousseau is unable to solve: the problem of whether or not education can work for the good of humanity. Rousseau is concerned that society, and the schools in society, inflames people's passions and leads to inequality and enslavement. Rousseau sketches an educational program that ideally develops students' autonomous moral reasoning untainted by inflamed passion, an education which enables students to be moral and just citizens, working for the good of humanity. I argue that Rousseau's educational philosophy ultimately fails because Rousseau maintains a deep skepticism that society, and therefore schools, can ever be a good place for humans. Rousseau suggests education must go to extreme measures such as isolating students in a rural environment and manipulating all aspects of their lives to prevent passions from becoming inflamed. Implementing this kind of education is not only improbable for individual students; it is especially improbable that it could be implemented on a large scale.

I further argue that Kant's educational philosophy provides a solution to the problems which beset Rousseau's educational philosophy. Kant embraces negative passions as necessarily educative, and so his educational philosophy does not require extreme measures to combat negative passion. In addition, Kant argues that it is only in society and through these negative passions that humanity develops. Kant's educational philosophy is achievable for both the individual student and also on a large scale because

it focuses on developing three key aspects of students that draw on capacities within the student and that are developed in community with others: a robust will bent towards the good; good and skilled moral judgment; and a commitment to the ethical commonwealth. Lastly, I argue that Hegel, Marcuse and Freire, three philosophers who follow after Kant, develop important aspects of Kant's solution to Rousseau's problem. Taken together, these four philosophers present a compelling educational philosophy which suggests that education not only *can* but indeed *must* work for the good of humanity.

KEYWORDS: Justice, Education, Freedom, Ethics, Liberation, Virtue

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May 6, 2016

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May 6, 2016

I DEDICATE THIS DISSERTATION TO MY HUSBAND, JOHN, WHOSE
COMMITMENT TO JUSTICE AND SUPPORT OF ME CONTINUALLY INSPIRES
ME

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements	iii
Chapter One: The Problem and the Potential of Education	
Education: The Greatest and Most Difficult Problem.....	1
Rousseau and the Problem of Education.....	4
The Trajectory of this Project.....	18
A Biographical Note: My Specific Interest in Education and Justice.....	22
Concluding Introductory Remarks.....	26
Chapter Two: Kant and an Education for the Ethical Commonwealth	
Kant and Education: An Introduction.....	28
Kant: The Student of Rousseau.....	28
Nature and Society: The Scylla and Charybdis of Heteronomy.....	31
The Perplexity of Education: Autonomy and Restraint.....	39
Educating the Young Child: The Robust Will Bent Towards Freedom.....	40
Sensuousness and Autonomy.....	48
The Older Student: Learning to Judge Well.....	53
Moral Feeling and the Educative Use of Shame.....	59
The Highest Good: Uniting Under a Common Purpose.....	63
Education as the Duty of All: Becoming a Friend to Humanity.....	65

The Ethical Commonwealth: Spaces of Ambiguity and Kant’s Unrealized Potential.....	68
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Chapter Three: Hegel’s Extension of Kant

Introduction: Hegel, Education and Justice.....	70
The Educational Fervor of Hegel’s Day.....	72
Hegel in Connection with Rousseau and Kant.....	76
Hegel and Education.....	80
The Dialectic.....	89
The Practices of Recognition, Responsibility and Right.....	93
Reconciliation.....	103
Problems of Alienation.....	106
Education and the Dialectic.....	109
John Dewey: An Example of Hegelian Educational Philosophy.....	110
Conclusion.....	120

Chapter Four: Marcuse and Education—Cultivating a New Sensibility

After Hegel: Justice, Education and Contemporary Society.....	122
Marcuse’s Notion of Education.....	124
Positivistic Thinking and One-Dimensionality.....	126
Repression and the Obscene Society: The Repression of Eros.....	134
Dialectical Thinking: Freeing Thought, Freeing Society.....	137
Cultivating New Sensibility—New Person.....	140
Marcusean Education: A Dialectical Education.....	145
Imagination and the Dialectical Education.....	146
Art and the Dialectical Education.....	151

Aesthetics (Beauty) and in Dialectical Education.....	154
Marcuse, Kant and Hegel.....	160
Chapter Five: Freire and Liberatory Virtues	
An Introduction to Paulo Freire.....	163
Freire’s Biography.....	164
Our Vocation of Humanization and Education’s Relationship to this Goal.....	166
The Political and Ethical Human.....	168
The Authentic Word and Praxis: The Necessity for Dialogical Relationships.....	172
Teaching Must Be a Dialogical Practice Rooted in Our Shared Ethical and Political Capacities.....	175
The Spectre of Dehumanization.....	179
Dehumanization in the Classroom.....	184
The Classroom as a Dialogical Space of Conscientization and Problem-Solving.....	185
Humanizing Teaching Cultivates a Liberatory Ethic.....	190
Freire and Ethics.....	191
The Virtues of Love, Humanizing Rebellion and Hope.....	198
Freirean Pedagogy in Action.....	202
Freire’s Pedagogy: A Complement and Extension of Marcuse.....	209
Chapter Six: Epilogue.....	213
CV.....	229

Chapter 1: The Problem and the Potential of Education

§1—Education: The Greatest and Most Difficult Problem

In *Lectures on Pedagogy*, Kant refers to education as “the greatest and most difficult problem.”¹ Kant specifically ties the problem of education to the fact that “Man must develop his tendency toward the good” but that this is something that is very difficult to do.² The potentially problematic nature of education becomes apparent when we realize as Kant states that “Man can only become man by education. He is merely what education makes of him.”³ If the full development of humanity rests on its education, then it seems imperative that educators fully understand the nature of humans and how to move their students towards the full development of their abilities for goodness. However, as Kant points out, “It is noticeable that man is only educated by man—that is, by men who have themselves been educated.”⁴ The potential danger in the fact that we are educated by those who have been educated is that all of us are educated by people with an imperfect understanding of what it means to be a human being and an imperfect understanding of the nature of a society that supports the flourishing of the good in human beings. As Kant writes, “There are many germs lying undeveloped in man. It is for us to make these germs grow by developing his natural gifts in their due proportion and to see that he fulfills his destiny.”⁵ The danger with trying to develop these abilities through the process of education is that often we are educated by people who hold an incomplete and often flawed understanding of human nature and how to

¹ Kant. *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 11

² Ibid

³ Ibid, pg. 6

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid, pg. 9

support its full flourishing. If it is true that all that we are comes from our education, then we begin to see why Kant calls education the greatest problem: Education holds the power to help humans realize their full potential or to prevent them from ever realizing it.

It seems then that educators must have a clear idea of the good of humanity in order to go about providing an appropriate education. Having a clear idea of the good of humanity as a whole is admittedly a lofty ideal, and given that there is so much disagreement over what the good of humanity is, it seems initially that it would be better to focus education on other goals that are more clearly defined and attainable. For example, two such goals that seem more easily defined are the goals of preparing students to become members of the larger society and the goal of helping students to pursue individual fulfillment. However, in exploring these possible goals of education, it soon becomes apparent that even these goals lead us back to the problem of the good of humanity as a whole.

For example, an education that prepares students to become members of society as a whole will focus on cultivating work skills, cultural values, a sense of patriotism, and other skills and attitudes that are necessary for a person to become a full-fledged member of a particular society. Cultivating such skills certainly seems laudable, but upon closer examination, it is unclear that cultivating these skills is necessarily good either for the individual or for society as a whole. For example, if the society at large is oppressive to human beings, then by preparing students for society, education actually apprentices them to their own dehumanization. Thus, while it may seem that preparing students to become members of society is a good goal for education to have, this goal only serves individuals and society well if society as a whole is good. Therefore, in order to prevent

education from promoting dehumanizing practices, it behooves educators to understand what a good society is. And understanding the nature of a good society entails understanding what is good for humanity as a whole.

Given the potential problems inherent in equating the goal of education with preparing students to become members of society, some educators might instead decide that the purpose of education is to help individuals fulfill their unique human potential. Education that focuses on helping students develop their potential helps them to actualize their emotional, physical, intellectual and social abilities. It might also prepare them to pursue their goals and dreams effectively. Once again, just as with the goal of preparing students to become members of society, the goal of helping students to reach their full potential seems like a laudable goal for education to pursue.

Interestingly, however, upon closer examination, it is not immediately clear that this goal is necessarily good for individuals or society either. For example, if educators aim at helping students develop their unique human potential without discussing what exactly human potential is, then it is possible for students to develop their potential in a distorted manner or in a manner that conflicts with other people's ability to develop their full potential. For example, on a basic level, a person cannot achieve her full potential if her neighbors or co-workers oppress her or endanger her life. Reciprocally, her neighbors and co-workers cannot achieve their full potential if she acts in a similar manner. Therefore, it seems that in order for people to reach their full potential, they must understand what human potential is, and they must learn to fulfill their potential in a way that doesn't oppress others. Otherwise, everyone's human potential is jeopardized because one person's ability to reach it can be hindered for the sake of others reaching

their own potential. Therefore, it seems that the fulfillment of individual potential is linked at least partially with society as a whole.

In addition, there is another way that individual fulfillment is inevitably linked with other people. Human potential includes at least some skills that cannot be actualized in isolation—human language and relationship abilities are at least two such abilities. In fact, it is hard to imagine many human skills that can be fully actualized in complete isolation. If it is the case that people can only achieve their potential in community, then an education that enables students to reach their full potential must teach students to be concerned with the fulfillment of other people’s potential as well as their own. This implies, among other things, that education must help students understand out how to organize a society so that people can live peaceably with one another and to reach their full potential together. In other words, this education must be concerned about the good of humanity and the type of society that best supports this good. Therefore, it is important to note that whether education aims at helping students to become members of society or whether it aims at helping students to fulfill their potential, education must inevitably be concerned with what the good of humanity is and the type of the society that supports the actualization of this good.⁶ In other words, it seems that education must be concerned with the very issues Kant raises in his *Lectures on Pedagogy*.

⁶ It seems that any other educational goal leads back to the concern about the good of humanity. For example, if education aims at job training, this education will only be good for humans and society if we determine what jobs are good or bad for human beings, which leads us back to the question of the good of humanity. If education aims at passing on a country’s tradition, this education is only good for students and society if they can determine which aspects of that tradition are good to perpetuate and which aspects of that tradition are good to discard. These issues can only be determined in the context of the larger question of the good of humanity.

It is one thing to say that education must be concerned with the good of humanity. It is another thing to understand exactly how education approaches this concern practically. The difficulty of doing this is exacerbated by the fact that there is no blueprint for what the perfect society or human being looks like. Therefore, even educators who are concerned with the good of humanity and who wish to educate for this good are similar to someone who starts on a journey, the map for which is poorly drawn, missing many major landmarks and lacking any clearly delineated final destination point. Such educators may have a vague idea of where they are going and how they might get there, but their journey is not clearly defined. Therefore, many false starts and wrong turns are possible and even quite likely.

§2—Rousseau and the Problem of Education

The problem of education which we have been discussing is one that has been long-recognized by philosophers. Plato's allegory of the cave in book seven of the *Republic* speaks to this problem. In this allegory, we see people who have lived all of their lives, viewing shadows on the wall, deceived as to the true nature of reality by their captors. One plausible reading of the cave allegory is that the cave is the *polis*. The *polis* is a place where people are educated, and in this educational process, they receive erroneous and distorted teachings—the equivalent of shadows on the walls⁷. The cave allegory further frames the problem of education because it highlights the fact that everyone, including educators, is living in a cave to some degree. That is humans are born into, nurtured, and educated in cultures which have not yet fully realized the good of humanity. To be educated in such environment means to absorb at least some wrong ways of viewing life

⁷ I do not intend to imply that the cave allegory only refers to the education that we receive in the *polis* but rather that the *polis* contributes at least partially to the shadowy understanding we have in the cave.

and other people—the equivalent of Socrates’ shadows—before we are old enough to be able to critique these ideas.

If it is true that people absorb wrong teachings before they are old enough to be able to critique them, it is uncertain how they ever come to see the error in the things they have been taught. That education in the *polis* can distort from birth the understanding of its citizens is an idea that is of great importance to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and it is an idea that plays a central role in his educational and political philosophy. It is important to understand Rousseau’s concern about the problem of education because he was one of the first modern educators to bring the problem of education into focus and to suggest that education must inevitably be concerned with the good of humanity.

In his various writings, Rousseau was concerned about the way in which education and society often destroy rather than support people’s ability to pursue the good of humanity. Rousseau devotes most of his writings to suggesting how both society and education can be organized to support this good. In order to understand why Rousseau believes that education and society can be so corrosive, it is important to understand Rousseau’s view of how this corruption of humanity takes place. It is in understanding this corruption that one can gain a clearer view of Rousseau’s solution to the problem.

In his *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Rousseau follows in the line of social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke. Unlike Hobbes and Locke who view the formation of society as a generally positive development for human in contrast to their existence in the violent state of nature or state of war, Rousseau argues that humans in the state of nature are peaceful and happy. It is only when humans enter into society and

competition ensues that they become corrupt, engaging in practices that lead to inequality, misery and injustice. Therefore, Rousseau does not assume that society is a place in which freedom and a better state of living are naturally present. Rather Rousseau argues that society is a place where corruption and dehumanization are *more likely* present than not and that society must work to realize and overcome the corruption and inequality that commonly arises in society.

Rousseau argues that in the state of nature, humans have very few needs and that they are easily able to satisfy these needs: “His modest needs are easily found at hand.”⁸ Because of this, the state of nature lacks those painful elements of existence such as violent competition, the pain of unfulfilled desire and the pain of jealousy and rejection. Rousseau writes that in this peaceful state, humans face few difficulties besides occasional hunger or physical pain. Rousseau writes, “His soul, agitated by nothing, is given over to the single feeling of his own present existence, without any idea of the future.”⁹ His existence is largely untroubled¹⁰: “His imagination depicts nothing to him; his heart asks nothing of him.”¹¹

It is only when people start to form attachments to other people and when they begin to gather into communities that humanity’s troubles begin. Rousseau argues that people gather into communities because they begin to recognize each other and prefer

⁸ Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, pg. 46.

⁹ Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, pg. 46

¹⁰ In this discussion of the peaceful and holistic quality of Rousseau’s state of nature, I am indebted to Richard Velkley’s book *Being After Rousseau*. In this Velkley argues that Rousseau was one of the first modern philosophers to rebel against enlightenment rationalism which argued that we could gain mastery over nature and society through reason. Rousseau rather sought, Velkley argues, to recapture a pre-rational wholeness that was lost through the artificiality of enlightenment society, and he argued that many of our ills stemmed from our reason, rather than reason ameliorating our lives., pg. 16.

¹¹ Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, pg. 46

certain people over others.¹² However, people also gather into communities because they are, unique to all living creatures, aware of the possibility of their own death, and they begin to realize that they can have a safer more secure and pleasant existence if they band together in communities.¹³ Rousseau certainly thinks that some excellent benefits come for humans when they form communities. He writes, “The habit of living together gave rise to the sweetest sentiments known to men: conjugal love and paternal love”¹⁴, but it is also true that the formation of communities is also the cause of all the misery and corruption in individuals. Society, Rousseau argues, is generally oppressive to human beings. Rousseau laments this condition eloquently: “Man is born free but everywhere he is in chains”.¹⁵

In order to understand why Rousseau thinks that society corrupts humans, it is important to understand the difference between two types of love Rousseau discusses at length: self-love (*amour de soi*) and *amour-propre*. In *Emile*, Rousseau says of *amour de soi*, the first kind of self-love, that it is a natural kind of love which motivates humans to look out for their own preservation.¹⁶ *Amour de soi* is a moderate, benign type of love because it is a love in which people’s primary concern is themselves, and so they don’t bother much with other humans. In addition, it is a love that is easily “contented when our true needs are satisfied.”¹⁷ This is the type of love and the type of outlook on life that Rousseau’s pre-rational and pre-societal human displays when he lives by his maxim “Do

¹² Ibid, pg. 61

¹³ Ibid, pg. 65

¹⁴ Ibid, pg. 63

¹⁵ Rousseau, *On the Social Contract*, pg. 141

¹⁶ Rousseau, *Emile*, pg. 213

¹⁷ Ibid

what is good for you with as little harm to others.”¹⁸ Self-love is a simple desire to live and let live, more or less.

The second type of love, *amour-propre*, is the type of love or passion from which all of the woes of society issue. Rousseau argues that *amour-propre* has many causes but the key characteristic of it is that rather than being focused on the self and survival, *amour-propre* is a passion that is inflamed when we start looking at other people, comparing ourselves to them, and desiring their esteem, even desiring them to esteem us more than themselves. Rousseau writes

Amour-propre, which makes comparisons, is never content and never could be, because this sentiment, preferring ourselves to others, also demands other to prefer us to themselves, which is impossible.¹⁹

When people become consumed with *amour-propre*, they want everyone to love them and to love them best of all.²⁰ *Amour-propre* can never be satisfied, and it is quickly disappointed because of course people will not be loved best all of the time by everyone. Thus, *amour-propre* soon gives way to “dissensions, enmity, and hate.”²¹ Rousseau describes the dire course *amour-propre* follows when he writes, “Self-love, ceasing to be an absolute sentiment becomes pride in great souls, vanity in small ones, and feeds itself constantly in all at the expense of their neighbors.”²²

It is important to recognize that Rousseau believes that *amour-propre* is a malleable passion, and if it is developed in the right way, it can be the catalyst for all of the best things in human nature. It is *amour-propre* that enables primitive

¹⁸ Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, pg. 55

¹⁹ Rousseau, *Emile*, pgs. 213-214

²⁰ Rousseau, *Emile*, pg. 235

²¹ *Ibid*, pg. 215

²² *Ibid*

man to be able to look outside himself for the first times and see things from another's perspective—to consider what might please or pain another person. Rousseau writes of the birth of *amour-propre*, “This is the second birth of which I have spoken. It is now that man is truly born to life and now that nothing human is foreign to him.”²³ This potentially civilizing effect of *amour-propre* is indeed a positive quality. *Amour-propre*, it appears, is a door that leads to civilization and the development of human potential. Nevertheless, when society is corrupt, it inflames *amour-propre*, and this leads to the degradation and enslavement of humans.²⁴ Rousseau writes, “This species of passion, not having its germ in children's hearts, cannot be born in them of itself; it is we alone who put it there, and it never takes root except by our fault...It is time to change our method.”²⁵ Education is the method that Rousseau suggests for properly nurturing people so that their *amour-propre* is not inflamed.

For Rousseau, education is the primary means by which potentially corrupting influences of society can and must be remedied and the means by which *amour-propre* becomes the proper catalyst for humanity. In *Emile*, Rousseau illustrates how he takes a young child, his fictional charge Emile, and raises him from birth to young adulthood to be a completely autonomous individual and a loving friend, husband and citizen. Rousseau nurtures Emile so

²³ Rousseau, *Emile*, pg. 212.

²⁴ In his book *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love*, Frederick Neuhouser provides a thorough and insightful account of *amour-propre* in Rousseau's works. Specifically pertinent to this discussion is Neuhouser's exploration of the causes of inflamed *amour-propre*. Neuhouser notes that while signs of inflamed *amour-propre* are often present in young children in their desire to dominate others, inflamed *amour-propre* is generally caused by societies failing to establish wholesome means of people gaining social recognition. Therefore, the desire for recognition from others devolves into jealousy, competition, and enmity which leads to all sorts of inequality and conflict in society.

²⁵ Rousseau, *Emile*, pg. 215

that his *amour-propre* is not inflamed and only brings about the healthy flourishing of his personhood. Rousseau further trains Emile so that his strength is great and his needs are few. Therefore, he relies very little on other people and is not overly concerned about their opinion. When he becomes desirous of attachments to other people, with the awakening of his sexuality, Rousseau carefully nurtures him so that Emile comes to value people in their own right, rather than as instruments to be manipulated. Emile develops *amour-propre* but under the careful guidance of Rousseau, it doesn't become inflamed. Rather, his *amour-propre* is used to develop good attachments to others such as Emile's companions in society and his future wife Sophie.

Rousseau intends the ideal society to mirror the processes of the ideal education. The ideal ruler is much like the tutor in *Emile*. In *Discourse on Political Economy*, Rousseau urges that rulers need to rule by love and example rather than fear and manipulation.²⁶ One of the most important concepts of Rousseau's ideal government is that the ideal governor should follow "the general will in all things"²⁷ and that he encourages virtue to reign in the city, which means that he encourages private wills to be in conference with the general will.²⁸ The general will, for Rousseau, is always that which is in the favor of the public good.²⁹ It is a pure, good human will untainted by inflamed *amour-propre*.

The general will represents actions, states of mind, and institutions that allow people to be fully free, self-sufficient and whole and yet relate with others in a

²⁶ Rousseau, *Discourse on Political Economy*, pg. 120

²⁷ Rousseau, *Ibid*, pg. 116

²⁸ *Ibid*, 120

²⁹ *Ibid*, 117

meaningful and productive manner. In *Discourse on Political Economy*, Rousseau writes, “The body politic, therefore, is also a moral being which possesses a will; and this general will, which always tends towards the conservation and well-being of the whole and of each part.”³⁰ What Rousseau wants is a society that will arrest the forces that inflame people’s *amour-propre* and that will allow them to develop self-sufficiency and autonomy, the precursors to any peaceful and happy society. So for Rousseau, the primary goal of education is help the student become completely autonomous and to form a will that is the general, just will. In doing so, education works for the good of humanity as a whole because it allows students to develop a good, non-corrupted, will that properly reflects the general will.

Rousseau’s ideas are significant to any study of education because they confirm the concerns regarding the problem of education raised at the beginning of this chapter. If education is not concerned with the good of humanity, there is the very real possibility that education further inflames inequality, injustice, and oppression rather than acting as a positive force in the lives of individuals and communities. Rousseau suggests that the primary role of education is to educate students in such a manner that they are able to critique society, resist dehumanizing influences in it, and to be citizens who can contribute to strengthening the morality and justice of the society to which they belong.

Rousseau offers invaluable insights regarding various problems in society that can negative affect education, but his philosophy raises several worries. If people are peaceful, good and compassionate before they enter society, and if society is more often than not a site of degradation, there is the worry that perhaps society is bad for people

³⁰ Rousseau, *Discourse on Political Economy*, pg. 114.

after all. Perhaps Rousseau's philosophy suggests that people should live in isolation from each other as much as possible and keep interactions to a minimum, given that our interpersonal interaction seems to be so potentially destructive to the good of humanity. Furthermore, if it is the case that people are better off living isolated from each other as much as possible, perhaps the goal of education should teach people to build a completely independent existence so that people do not risk developing an inflamed *amour-propre*. Indeed, it seems that the advances we have made in technology would allow us to achieve such an existence, so perhaps education should prepare us for this type of life. This is one possible response we might have to the notion that society is often destructive to the good of humanity.

Indeed, it is not clear that Rousseau ever entirely overcame his worry that society is ultimately a hostile and oppressive place for human beings. In *Emile* Rousseau argues that the truly happy being is the solitary being. He writes

It is man's weakness which makes him sociable; it is our common miseries which turn our hearts to humanity; we would owe humanity nothing if we were not men. Every attachment is a sign of insufficiency. If each of us had no need of others, he would hardly think of uniting himself with them. Thus from our very infirmity is born our frail happiness. A truly happy being is a solitary being.³¹

In this quote, Rousseau laments our "frail happiness", a frailty that proceeds directly from our need to live in community with one another. In his writing it certainly seems that Rousseau wants to show that the destructive tendencies of society can be overcome and that humanity can at last find a peaceful and happy home in society. In the final chapter of *Emile* Rousseau paints the happy and idyllic life Emile experiences when he marries his wife, Sophie, a young woman

³¹ Rousseau, *Emile*, pg. 221

who has been educated in a careful manner similar to Emile. In the final pages of *Emile*, there seems to be no question that the idyllic life of a gentle and nurturing family is the best place for Emile and the end for which he was intended all along.

On the final pages of *Emile*, Rousseau writes

Happy lovers! Worthy couple! To honor their virtues and to pain their felicity, one would have to tell the history of their lives...If there is happiness on earth, it must be sought in the abode where we live.³²

Despite Rousseau's joy in Emile's condition, Rousseau's writing also suggests, whether Rousseau consciously means to suggest this or not, that it is unlikely that humans can ever actually be at home in society in the manner Emile achieves.

It is important to note that Emile's education which allows him to avoid inflamed *amour-propre* is an extremely ideal education. Rousseau is chosen as Emile's tutor before Emile is even born, and once Emile is born, Rousseau oversees virtually every aspect of Emile's existence from his infancy until his adulthood and marriage to Sophie. Rousseau's sole focus is monitoring Emile and making sure that his passions develop carefully and that his *amour-propre* is not inflamed. One wonders how likely it is that the type of education which Rousseau envisions could be conducted on a large scale and provided for the majority of the citizens of a country. It seems unlikely that such a wide-scale education like that of *Emile* could occur in society. That an education like Emile's would be impossible on a large-scale does not diminish the value of Rousseau's insights. It does, however, raise the worry that one of the primary means by which Rousseau envisioned the proper cultivation of *amour-propre*—a careful

³² Ibid, pg. 480

education— may not seem possible on a large scale. Given how easily Rousseau seems to believe our *amour-propre* becomes enflamed, and given the seeming inability to achieve on a large scale the type of education which might militate against the inflammation of *amour-propre*, one might worry then about whether or not society and education itself can become place hospitable to human beings or if humans will forever remain in chains.³³

Indeed, Rousseau himself seems to be worried about the possibility of achieving the kind of education and society he explored so carefully in his writings. At the end of his life, embittered by the rejection of some of his friends and countrymen of his work, Rousseau retired to the country and wrote *Reveries of a Solitary Walker* in which we contemplated the benefits of the solitary and natural life. After retiring to an island, Rousseau writes of his hope of being able to remain indefinitely on this island:

I could have desired that this place of refuge be made my lifelong prison, that I be shut up here for the rest of my days, deprived of any chance of hope of escaping and forbidden all communication with the mainland, so that now knowing what went on in the world, I should forget its existence and be forgotten by those who lived in it.³⁴

He writes on the next page about wishing to spend the rest of his life in idleness on this island

³³ In his preface to Rousseau's *Emile*, Allan Bloom argues that Rousseau no more meant his *Emile* to be an educational manual than Plato meant the *Republic* to be a political manual. Rather, Bloom argues, Rousseau meant *Emile* to be a vehicle for exploring the problems and the cure to society's ills (Bloom 28). I think Bloom is correct to point out that Rousseau recognizes that Emile's education cannot be replicated on a large scale and does not intend to imply that it can be. However, Rousseau certainly recognizes the essential role education plays in aiding or discouraging the flourishing of individuals and society. I think it is likely that Rousseau's writing of *Emile* enforced in his mind the extreme difficulty involved in people learning to withstand the corrosive forces of society. This, I believe, is one of the factors that increased his pessimism later in life, as is discussed above.

³⁴ Rousseau, *Reveries of the Solitary Walker*, pg. 82

which I could not leave unaided and unobserved, and where I could have not communication or correspondence with the outside world...that I might end my days more peacefully than I had lived till then...³⁵

In these reveries, it seems that Rousseau returns to his notion that perhaps the natural, primitive life is the best one and that, ultimately, the pain that people bring are unbearable. This is a sentiment he echoes in book twelve of his

Confessions when he writes

A tortured creature, battered by every kind of storm, and wearied by many years of travelling and persecutions, I strongly felt the need of that repose which my savage enemies denied me for their own amusement. More than ever did I sigh for that delightful idleness, for that sweet repose of body and spirit, which I had coveted so dearly and in which, cured now of my desire for love and friendship, I knew my sole and supreme felicity to be.³⁶

Rousseau's deep distrust of society leaves a lingering worry that perhaps people in society are inevitably doomed to suffer only oppression and corruption there. Indeed, Rousseau often seems as though he reached this very conclusion at the end of his life. This creates a troubling problem in Rousseau's project. Frederick Neuhausser recognizes this problem well when he writes

If the tendency towards inflamed *amour-propre* is a nearly unavoidable consequence of certain fundamental, nearly universal features of human existence; if so much wisdom and artful intervention—requiring a godlike legislator and superhumanly wise tutor—are necessary to avoid the evils of *amour-propre*; if the number and variety of those ills are so great, then is a genuinely comprehensive solution to *amour-propre*'s dangers possible?³⁷

In Rousseau's *Theodicy of Self-Love*, Neuhausser argues that Rousseau wants to show that the ill-effects of inflamed *amour-propre* are not irreversible and that *amour-propre* is

³⁵ Ibid, pg. 83

³⁶ Rousseau, *Confessions*, pg. 600

³⁷ Neuhausser, *Rousseau's Theodicy of Self-Love*, pg. 266.

actually the means by which the salvation of humanity and society is achieved.

Neuhouser argues that Rousseau's account of the proper education of *amour-propre* is similar to a Christian theodicy in its attempt to provide an account of humanity's fall and salvation. Neuhouser argues, however, that Rousseau does not entirely succeed in showing that this salvation is possible.³⁸ Rousseau's unsatisfactory solution to the problem of education brings me to this current project.

In this dissertation, I wish to focus on the way that several philosophers after Rousseau take up his educational endeavor. Specifically, I want to focus on the way that Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Paulo Freire suggest solutions to the problem of education. Kant and Hegel are, by their own admission, influenced deeply by Rousseau. In addition, Marcuse and Freire are largely responding to various concerns related to Hegel's project and in this way carry on the legacy of Rousseau. It is interesting to note that these four philosophers, like Rousseau, are concerned with the potentially corrupting influences of society. Unlike Rousseau, however, all four of these philosophers remain optimistic that society is indeed the place in which we fully realize our humanity and our freedom, despite society's tendencies towards corruption. In addition, like Rousseau, all four thinkers are also concerned with the role education plays in shaping the just society.

³⁸ While Neuhouser reads ambivalence and melancholy in Rousseau's projects, some consider Rousseau's project as a commentary of despair. Phillip Scuderi writes, "*Emile* is not a prescriptive work—not even one that prescribes only to an idealized, purely theoretical pupil brought up under extraordinary circumstances. It is rather a statement of the extraordinary conditions that would be required to produce a healthy, autonomous man. By an act of dramatic reduction, Rousseau emphasizes that no such circumstances can come about. That our nature and our society should require such fundamental reworking in order to achieve what seems admirable in *Emile* only drives home the point that we are all hopelessly debased and monstrous in Rousseau's view (from which status he does not exclude himself). *Emile* is a fictive tale, an allegory of how things out to be; but the peculiarities of its fictive structure prevent it from being actualized even in principle. If *Emile* shows us how things out to be, but denies us the possibility of reaching that state—indeed, denies that state's very coherence outside Rousseau's own mind—then the proper response to the work is not one of hope but rather of despair." ("Rousseau, Kant and the Deception of Pedagogy.", pg. 36.)

Therefore, these four thinkers trace out an important legacy connected with the educational ideas raised by Rousseau.

In the remaining space of this chapter, I will highlight the unique insights that Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Freire bring to the problem of education and the way in which they suggest a solution to the problem of education that Rousseau highlights so well. In discussing their views, I will highlight the general trajectory their philosophy takes, as well as some of the potential questions and worries raised by their views. In addition, I will also add a brief, biographical note that explains much of the impetus behind this dissertation.

§3—The Trajectory of this Project

The first chapter of this dissertation details the way in which Kant solves the problem of education that Rousseau is unable to solve: namely how it is that education can work for the good of humanity. Kant believes the goal of education is to awaken students' latent rational abilities and to apprentice students to the rational community. Educators must do this so that students may become members of the ethical commonwealth which furthers the development of humanity towards the highest good. Kant argues that educators do this by cultivating a robust will bent towards the good and skilled moral judgment. Furthermore, Kant argues that social conflict and inflamed passions, which he refers to as unsocial sociability, are necessarily educative and are the means by which human beings cultivate their moral capacities. Therefore, Kant suggests that not only is it possible for teachers to cultivate moral capacities in their students through education, it is actually through education in society that this education ideally takes place.

Kant's notion that educators must cultivate in students a commitment to the ethical commonwealth so that they pursue the highest good shows how education is directly tied in Kant's mind to justice and the good of humanity. Nevertheless, the ethical commonwealth is something that Kant mentions rather briefly in his religious writings, and he seems to envision the ethical commonwealth as an entity similar to a church. It is not entirely clear how the ethical commonwealth functions and the way in which individuals and societies work together for the common good in the ethical commonwealth. One likely reason for the vagueness in Kant's conception of the ethical commonwealth is that Kant is concerned that the sphere of morality and the sphere of justice be kept separate. This is because Kant argues that the external realm of justice can never coerce internal morality. Nevertheless, Kant certainly believes that external conditions, such as our sensuous conditions, can and must act as a support to morality. This idea plays an important role in Kant's educational ideas. If external conditions must act as a support to morality, this holds interesting implications for education and the ethical commonwealth, implications which Kant is not able to explore fully in his writings. I believe Hegel does this. Hegel develops important potential in Kant's political and education philosophy through Hegel's notion of *recht* or justice. For Hegel, justice is the idea of human freedom fully worked out in all of its moments of external material relations, the inner moment of morality, and the unity of these two moments in the third moment of ethical life.

In chapter two, I examine the way in which Hegel develops the potential in Kant's political and educational philosophy. Hegel's *Philosophy of Right* argues that human

spirit is distinguished by the will, which is free.³⁹ So, the destiny of the human spirit is freedom, and justice is actually “the realm of actualized freedom.”⁴⁰ The goal of education is to help humanity actualize justice or ethical substance. When education does this, it allows humans to be reborn. In this chapter, I argue that Hegel believes that education is the means by which teachers cultivate a political disposition in students which entails the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation. This educational process is grounded in an understanding of the dialectical development of knowledge. The dialectic specifically honors the finitude and tragedy of the human existence. I will also argue that Hegel’s notion of justice and the political disposition develops the potential in Kant’s educational ideas and his idea of the ethical commonwealth.

In the chapter on Hegel, I also argue that John Dewey’s educational ideas, although Dewey did not always agree with Hegel, are a good expression of the types of education Hegel’s philosophy implies. Dewey’s philosophy illustrates that educational practices must always develop a clear and meaningful connection between what is being learned internally and its expression in the external world. Dewey’s philosophy, as an expression of Hegel’s educational ideals, illustrate to us how students can be educated to be an active agent, working for the good of everyone in society.

Although Hegel’s philosophy develops the potential in Kant’s educational philosophy, Hegel is primarily an optimistic philosopher whose main goal is to describe how freedom develops in the world. Because this is the primary goal of Hegel’s project,

³⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 35

⁴⁰ Ibid, pg. 35

he does not detail at length the various forces which can arrest the development of freedom. However, in *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel does note in a short paragraph that freedom can be alienated or blocked by certain forces in society. In chapter four of my dissertation, I argue that the philosophy of critical theorist Herbert Marcuse develops Hegel's notion of alienation and illuminates the forces that arrest the progress of freedom in our society. Specifically, Marcuse details the way that the problems of surplus repression and one-dimensional thinking block the progress of freedom.

Marcuse is also very interested in education. He argues that the goal of education is to cultivate a New Sensibility which allows the development of dialectical thinking and an aesthetic disposition towards the world, both of which disrupt surplus repression and one-dimensional thinking. The New Sensibility is an aesthetic sensibility which draws on the liberating capacities of imagination, art and beauty. This sensibility creates an erotic society in which people no longer relate to each other in a violent and purely instrumentalizing manner. Rather, the New Sensibility enables people to enjoy each other and their world receptively, as ends in themselves. In this way, Marcuse's erotic society resembles Kant's kingdom of ends, the type of society Kant describes in his notion of the ethical commonwealth. Therefore, Marcuse is also concerned, like Kant and Hegel, with the full development of justice and the good of humanity in the world. His philosophy explores how education can be a tool which disrupts the forces hindering the progression of freedom.

In my final substantive chapter, I argue that the educational philosophy of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire is an important complement to Marcuse's philosophy. I argue specifically that Freire makes a valuable contribution to this discussion that both

ties together the concerns of the previous philosophers and also adds an important dimension: Freire argues that classrooms must become dialogical spaces of conscientization which cultivates specific liberatory virtues such as love, humanizing rebellion and hope. I believe that Freire's notion of classrooms as dialogical spaces of conscientization develops important aspects of Marcuse's educational philosophy by detailing a broad heuristic that allows us to discover the forces which block freedom. I also believe that Freire's notion of liberatory virtues is a unique contribution and that this idea needs to be developed in more depth.

In the epilogue to my dissertation, I suggest how Freire's notion of liberating virtues might be developed further. I do not have the space in this epilogue to discuss these liberating virtues in depth. Rather I suggest some of the liberating virtues that I believe are either explicitly or implicitly stated in Freire's work, and I suggest how they may be developed. These virtues are virtues such as love and recognition, critical problem-posing, play, an aesthetic sensibility, hope and compassion. In this final chapter, I also argue for a renewed and invigorated dialogue between education and philosophy, a dialogue which I believe has grown attenuated over the years, despite its great importance historically to both philosophers and educators.

§4—A Biographical Note: My Specific Interest in Education and Justice

It would be remiss of me not to mention a few biographical details which explain the impetus of this project. Before I came to graduate school, I was a middle and high school teacher for over a decade. I also serve as a middle school principal for three of these years. Many of my experiences during that time, as well as my own experiences as

a student, fostered various ideas that specifically led to this dissertation. Three experiences stand out to me as particularly formative.

The first experience was my own education. As a young, curious girl, I was particularly enthusiastic about school. I was particularly fortunate to attend a public school in Oregon in which I experienced a lot of creative, child-centered curriculum—one that especially emphasized play, art, history and reading. At an early age, I remember thinking about school, “Every day is an adventure!” In seventh grade, I had the privilege of attending a small private school in Chehalem Valley Oregon that also had a rich humanities curriculum. It was there that I fell in love with the classics and Greek and Roman culture, something that significantly influenced my philosophical and educational interests. This school also provided a lot of time for free play and imaginative, student-directed activities. All of these experiences encouraged a love for learning when I was younger.

As I grew older, however, I increasingly found school to be an alienating and oppressive place. Teachers seemed less concerned about providing rich and meaningful activities for students and more concerned about teaching content, the importance of which was not always very clear. It also seemed like there was less time for students to imagine, to create and to play. Furthermore, it seemed to me that teachers were not really concerned about how education made students’ lives richer or fuller. There seemed to be a significant disconnect between education and the world. I remember my classmates generally being bored and frustrated with school, and even though I loved reading and writing copiously in my spare time at home, I often found that school interfered with my learning rather than encouraging it. I remember thinking in high school, “Surely school

can be better than this. Surely it doesn't have to be this way." At this point in my life, I was more concerned about how school could be a humane place for students, rather than thinking much about how education could bring about positive change in the world.

It was some of these concerns which eventually led me to major in secondary English education in college. In my last semester of college, I had the privilege of doing my student teaching at a bilingual school in Guatemala City, Guatemala. The school I taught at was one of the better, more wealthy schools in Guatemala, but as a student teacher I was often struck by how uncohesive and scattershot the curriculum was. In addition, there were many teachers from the United States in that school, and I was often shocked by how uninterested they seemed to be in their own teaching. As a young, idealistic teacher, I was looking for a guiding philosophy to help me understand what exactly I was trying to accomplish with my students, as well as how I could go about accomplishing it. It seemed like the teachers around me often lacked a clear philosophy of education. While I was in Guatemala, I also had the opportunity to visit a much different school.

This school was at a local garbage dump. The woman who ran this school explained to us that the people living around the dump suffered such poverty that the only way they could survive was by scavenging through the garbage dumps not only for clothing and basic necessities, but even for food. I remember vividly her telling us of a family that scavenged every day for leftover bread, some of which was moldy, that they would take and grind into flour in order to make new bread that they could sell to buy food. This life, the woman explained, was of so difficult and dehumanizing that many of the people living around the garbage dump became addicted to paint huffing in an

attempt to escape their pain. The woman explained to us further that she had started the school at the garbage dump because education was one of the few ways that people could escape from the cycle of poverty and degradation. It was experiences like the ones that I had in Guatemala which caused me to realize the transformative power of education. I realized that education could transform not only individual's lives but the trajectory of society as a whole. It also caused me to wonder why so many teachers I met seemed to fail to recognize and capitalize upon this transformative power. Furthermore, I questioned why, if education was so potentially powerful, it had become such drudgery for so many students.

As I began my own teaching career, I was very fortunate after several years of teaching to get a job teaching in a school which took educational philosophy seriously. While some of my earliest teaching experiences were in schools which lacked a unified philosophy, the school I taught in now was sincerely dedicated to building critical thinking and communication skills in students, as well as helping them to develop strong habits of responsibility. The school was centered around Latin, logic and rhetoric and an integrated humanities curriculum. As a regular part of the pedagogy in my school, I conducted classroom debates and critical discussions around classic humanities texts. In addition, the students regularly engaged in research projects which they presented as experts to other classes or even adults. I watched the students in this school become strong, confident thinkers and communicators who were eager to engage with the world around them. Empowered by their education, they were becoming thoughtful people who could critique problems in society in order to work for change.

The school I worked in certainly had its flaws, like most schools, but it was undeniable to me the powerful affect that its pedagogy and curriculum had on its students. During the end of my tenure at that school (before returning to graduate school), I actually had the privilege and burden of serving as the middle school principal for a few years. Through this experience, I had the opportunity to refine and implement my educational philosophy in the school. I had both great successes and significant failures as a middle school principal. One of the greatest difficulties I had as a principal was working to make sure that everyone understood our school philosophy and was implementing it in a consistent way in their classrooms. Some of my greatest successes and my greatest failures were tied to this struggle. My failures caused me to contemplate why exactly it was so difficult to implement our educational philosophy school-wide. It was experiences like this that made me want to understand the role that both individuals and institutions play in creating a more just how society, as well as the specific role education plays in this. All of these experiences are certainly the major impetus behind the work in this dissertation.

§5—Concluding Introductory Remarks

The question concerning the role that education plays in society is more important than ever. The institution of education is currently experiencing a time of great upheaval. Educators and educational institutions are experiencing drastic funding cuts, unprecedented job instability, and a breakdown in consensus of what the purpose of education is. In conjunction with this crisis, there have also been efforts by some communities to increase censorship in the classroom. These moves are often accompanied by further measures that encourage social conformity and which cut the

types of programs in school that foster critical self-reflection. Added to this problem is that, in my opinion, there is a current breakdown in the dialogue between philosophy and education, although education has always been of primary concern to philosophers historically (an issue I will address in the final chapter). If it is true that humans become human through education, and if it is true that too often education becomes an unwitting instrument of oppression, then now more than ever, philosophers, educators, and people in general, must attend to the problem of education.

Chapter Two: Kant and an Education for the Ethical Commonwealth

§1—Kant and Education: An Introduction

In this chapter I discuss the way in which Kant takes up Rousseau's educational project, and I discuss the unique insights Kant adds to the discussion of the problem of education. I argue that Kant believes the goal of education is to awaken students' latent rational abilities and to apprentice them to the rational community. In this way they may become members of the ethical commonwealth which furthers the progress of humanity towards the highest good. I also argue that Kant believes that everyone must be committed to the project of education, as a practical expression of working towards the highest good. Lastly, I argue that while Kant's pedagogical insights contribute significantly to the problem of education, he is unable to develop important potential in his political and educational philosophy. As the end of the chapter, I gesture towards this undeveloped potential. In order to examine these educational ideas of Kant's, it is helpful first to understand the educational climate of Kant's day.

§2—Kant: The Student of Rousseau

Kant's era was an era marked by educational fervor. The French Revolution occurred later in Kant's life, and people were filled with a vibrant enthusiasm about the possibility of social equality and the improvement of the human race. People became increasingly interested in education because they viewed it as the means by which equality and progress would come about. Many of the educational ideas of Kant's day were directly inspired by Rousseau's educational vision, and Kant's state, Prussia, was in the forefront of educational reform. Therefore, Kant's pedagogical ideas are interesting in themselves because of the pedagogical fervor of his day.

However, there are further reasons why Kant's pedagogical ideas are especially interesting, and they pertain to Kant's own personal education and his interest in Rousseau. Kant's formal education was varied. Kant's childhood was distinguished by a close relationship with his bright and nurturing mother, Anna Kant, who provided a lot of spontaneous education for Kant, encouraging his curiosity. Kant writes about his mother

I will never forget my mother, for she implanted and nurtured in me the first germ of goodness; she opened my heart to the impressions of nature; she awakened and furthered my concepts, and her doctrines have had a continual and beneficial influence in my life.⁴¹

When Kant was eight, he attended a local grammar school which was run by a Pietist headmaster, and the school was extremely strict and took a hostile view to science, denying the heliocentric theory of the universe. Proselytizing appeared to be the primary goal of the school. Kant later viewed this period as one of the most difficult times of his life.⁴²

Given Kant's fond memories of his early education with his mother and the educational disappointments he experienced at the local grammar school, it is not surprising that Kant was an enthusiastic supporter of Rousseau's. Indeed, Kant is a logical philosopher to examine after Rousseau regarding the problem of education. History has it that Rousseau's portrait was the only picture hanging in Kant's sparse house and that the only time Kant missed his habitual afternoon walk was when he was reading Rousseau's *Emile*.⁴³ Kant once wrote that "'Rousseau brought [him] around,' taught him 'to honor human beings', and inspired him to work, toward 'establishing the

⁴¹ Martin Schofeld and Michael Thompson. "Kant's Philosophical Development". Online.

⁴² Martin Schofeld and Michael Thompson. "Kant's Philosophical Development". Online.

⁴³ Christopher Bertram, "Jean Jacques Rousseau". Online.

rights of humanity’.”⁴⁴ Rousseau makes frequent appearances in various works of Kant, and Kant’s writings evince a deep concern with the very project that motivated Rousseau:⁴⁵ the manner in which good of humanity can be achieved.⁴⁶

A Rousseauian influence is clear in Kant’s pedagogical ideas. This can clearly be seen in Kant’s support of Johann Bernhard Basedow, a German educator who founded a special kind of school called a Philanthropinum in an attempt to implement Rousseau’s pedagogical spirit. Basedow was one of the most prominent educators in Prussia. Kant wrote several essays in support of Basedow’s Philanthropinum. In these essays Kant writes about Basedow’s educational endeavors,

Perhaps never before has a more just demand been made on the human species, and never before has such a great and more self-extending benefit been unselfishly offered, than is not the case with Herr Basedow, a man who, together with his praiseworthy assistants, has solemnly devoted himself to the welfare and betterment of human beings.⁴⁷

Kant continues with his excitement over the educational vision of the Philanthropinum:

In the civilized countries of Europe there is no lack of educational institutes and of well-intentioned diligence of teachers to be of service for everyone in this matter. And yet it has not been clearly proven that they were not all spoiled at the outset; that, because everything in them works against nature, the good to which nature has given the predisposition is far from being drawn out of the human being, and that, because we animal

⁴⁴ Joseph R. Reiser, “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education”, pg. 12

⁴⁵ As an example of this, Kant writes in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, “Rousseau wrote three works on the damage done to our species by 1) leaving nature for culture, which weakened our strength, 2) civilization which caused inequality and mutual oppression, 3) presumed moralization, which brought about unnatural education and the deformation of our way of thinking., 7:326

⁴⁶ Richard Velkley in his book *Being After Rousseau* argues that Rousseau contributed this key thought: “Kant finds in Rousseau the suggestion that humanity itself, through the development of reason, inflicts on itself all forms of ‘alienation’ tending to destroy both freedom and virtue. And that it is also the reason, in a certain self-legislative form (as the source of autonomy), that can restore humanity to wholeness and soundness, uniting freedom and virtue.”, pg. 37 Recent works such as Chris Suprenant’s *Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue* and Joseph R. Reiser’s essay “Kant and Rousseau on Moral Education” and Phillip Scudieri’s “Rousseau, Kant and the Pedagogy of Deception” all comment at length on the way in which Kant’s political and educational writings build off of key ideas found in Rousseau’s educational and political works.

⁴⁷ Immanuel Kant, “Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum”, pg. 100

creatures are made into human beings only by education, in a short time we would see very different human beings around us if that educational method were to come into common use which is wisely derived from nature itself and not slavishly copied from old habit and unexperienced ages.⁴⁸

In both of these quotes Kant echoes Rousseau's concerns that education be an instrument by which human beings learn to develop capacities given them by nature. We also see Kant echo Rousseau's concern that the human race be furthered through education.⁴⁹ In Kant's *Lectures on Pedagogy*, Kant clearly takes himself to be in conversation with Rousseau, as I will discuss in this chapter, and he also clearly takes himself to be carrying forward Rousseau's work, providing some correctives to aspects of Rousseau's educational project while building on Rousseau's insights.

§3—Nature and Society: The Scylla and Charybdis of Heteronomy

Kant's educational project is tied directly to his view of the state of nature, and therefore it is important to understand how Kant views the state of nature and why he believes that learning to live well together in society is imperative for the good of humanity. Kant certainly agrees with Rousseau that society can be a hostile environment for humans. He suggests that society works too often to the detriment of human moral flourishing, even when the society appears to be benevolently arranged. Kant suggests, "Rousseau was not so wrong when he preferred to it the condition of savages."⁵⁰ Kant,

⁴⁸ Immanuel Kant, "Essays Regarding the Philanthropinum", pg. 100

⁴⁹ Rousseau rejoices in the good and successful education of a child, "We did not make him lose anything that nature had given him." Rousseau also notes that while a good education protects what nature gives us, it is also the case that education, as one of the good institutions of society, "know[s] how to denature man, to take his absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the common unity, with the result that each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no longer feels except within the whole." (*Emile*, pg. 163 and 40). The notions of education preserving what nature has given humanity as well as transforming this raw material into a common unity are notions also strongly present throughout Kant's writing.

⁵⁰ Kant, "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim", pg. 116

however, dismisses the possibility that a pre-rational existence could be a state in which humanity can flourish.⁵¹ In distinction to Rousseau, Kant suggests that the existence of primitive man is not primarily marked by peaceful pre-rational reverie but by a type of barbarism. Kant writes

With [man in his primitive state] it is not a noble love of freedom which Rousseau and others imagine, but a kind of barbarism—the animal, so to speak, not having yet developed its human nature.⁵²

The barbarism Kant speaks of here is directly related to our lack of an educated rational principle.⁵³ If our human nature is uneducated, this means that people have not developed their reason which is the capacity that allows them to rule and prioritize the very incentives that motivate them. Therefore, the pre-rational state is a state of inner state of inner civil war. In this state, people cannot even strive towards the ideal of humanity. This ideal is for a human being to determine who he is by reason through choosing and pursuing universal ends accessed by reason.⁵⁴ Because a person living in the pre-rational state of humanity is unable to “determine his ends through reason”, he struggles to

⁵¹ Once again, I believe Rousseau wants to believe that society is the best place for humans as well but in the end struggles to convince himself of this matter entirely.

⁵² Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 4

⁵³ I would like to stress here that in discussing our lack of educated rational principle, Kant is specifically describing a situation similar to what Rousseau describes in a situation in which humans’ rationality has not developed in any significant way. In his *Discourse on the Origins of Inequality*, Rousseau appears to view this period in which reason is undeveloped in human beings as a primarily peaceful and benign. In this state, human beings have very simple needs and can basically meet them on their own (46). Because they are basically self-sufficient, they are primarily peaceful and untroubled with very few fears (46). Their reason is also mostly undeveloped in this state because Rousseau argues that it is when the passions are greatly stirred that reason begins to develop as human beings begin to use reason to figure out how to satisfy their passions (46). In the peaceful, pre-rational state of humanity, people are also naturally motivated by pity for one another (53). It is when reason begins to develop, Rousseau argues, that human beings become ego-centric and self-focused (54). Reason also, according to Rousseau, separates primitive man from his ability to pity others and “moves him to say in secret, at the sight of a suffering man ‘Perish if you will; I am safe and sound’” (54). Therefore, Rousseau sees the pre-rational state of humans as peaceful and benign, and for Rousseau, it is the introduction of reason that causes many of the problems now present in society. I argue in the section above that Kant disagrees with Rousseau’s view of reason.

⁵⁴Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, pg. 117

constitute any stable personality in this state. Our personality is the capacity we have “for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will.”⁵⁵ Therefore, Kant suggests that in the pre-rational state of nature, human beings cannot even constitute themselves as a person in any meaningful sense of the term.⁵⁶

The pre-rational state is a state in which we behave more like non-human animals, but there is a way in which we are uniquely set apart from animals, even in this state. Kant notes that because humans have the capability of being ruled by reason, they are not completely ruled by instinct. Indeed, they cannot fall back on some biological blueprint to tell them exactly what they can and should become. Kant writes

Animals use their powers, as soon as they are possessed of them, according to a regular plan—that is, in a way not harmful to themselves...Animals are by their instinct all that they ever can be...But man needs a reason of his own. Having no instinct, he has to work out a plan of conduct for himself. Since, however he is not able to this all at once, but comes into the world undeveloped, others have to do it for him.⁵⁷

Kant points out here that even though biology and instinct cannot fully explain how people should develop, our reasoning capacities are also wholly underdeveloped when we are born. They cannot show us initially how to behave morally or how to set good ends for ourselves. We are all initially helpless in matters of being human. Therefore,

⁵⁵ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, pg. 23

⁵⁶ Chris Surprenant makes a similar point in his book *Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue*. He notes, “There appear to be circumstances under which it is impossible to act from maxims consistent with autonomy, circumstances that an individual can find himself in when he is living outside of civil society...If an individual constantly fears that he is going to suffer a sudden and violent death, then this fear will affect all of the decisions he makes. Under these circumstances it is impossible for this person to act autonomously, because all of his actions are motivated by this particular fear and not by other maxims chosen by reason.”, pg. 26. Surprenant is right to note that the violent and precarious condition of the state of nature militates against people’s ability to be autonomous. However, I think the point Kant is making about the perils of the pre-rational state of nature is an even stronger point. In a pre-rational state of nature, humans can’t become autonomous even in the absence of fear and other external threatening factors because they have not sufficiently developed their rational principle to allow them to do this. Therefore, it is not just an external chaos that threatens them but an internal chaos as well.

⁵⁷Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 2

education is essential for human beings while it is not essential for animals. An education by those who ostensibly have developed their reasoning and set good ends is the only means by which humans become autonomous—i.e. education is the only way in which human beings become human beings. Of course, in one way Kant believes that human beings are always autonomous in the sense that they have the capacity to be autonomous. However, it is only through education that human beings fully develop their capacity to act consistently in an autonomous manner. It is our destiny, Kant suggests, to rise out of our animal state to achieve morality, and this is the purpose of education.⁵⁸

Although it is clear enough that humans must be educated in order to reach their full potential, Rousseau's worries about the corrosive aspects of society still linger. There is the worry that society and its ability to inflame passions may actually plunge people into a worse state of inner chaos than any state they suffered in the state of nature. Kant's answer to Rousseau's worries about this is to embrace the potentially corrosive aspects we face in society as necessary, educative elements of our existence. Kant argues that our human tendency towards "unsocial sociability"⁵⁹, as he refers to the conflicts we have in society, prompts humans to develop their full human capacities and potential.

Kant argues that our unsocial sociability arises from the fact that we have a tendency to socialize because we are able to develop our predispositions more fully in society; nevertheless, we have a strong desire to individualize, too, because other people inevitably obstruct us in the pursuit of our goals.⁶⁰ Kant notes that this perpetual tension between our desires to socialize and individualize "constantly threatens to break up this

⁵⁸ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 108

⁵⁹ Kant, *Idea of a Universal History*, 8:21

⁶⁰ Ibid

society.”⁶¹ It is this attempt to gain a desired standing⁶² and a peace with others in society that drives humans to develop their potential. Kant writes

Now it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the human being, brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence, and, driven by ambition, tyranny and greed, to obtain for himself a rank among his fellows, whom he cannot stand, but also cannot leave alone.⁶³

It takes our reason and ingenuity to figure out how we can live in such a way that we can achieve our goals for socialization without destroying our need for individuation (or vice-versa). Thus, our unsocial sociability awakens our reason, so to speak, as we seek a way to balance these tensions. Rather than inevitably corrupting us then, as Rousseau worries, it is our unsocial sociability that causes human beings as a whole to break away from their more animalistic and egocentric behavior and start to think as a whole about what behaviors are best and most desirable in a human⁶⁴ (i.e. the types of behaviors that balance our needs for socialization and individuation).⁶⁵

Interestingly, it seems that while Kant does not believe our unsocial sociability is a sufficient cause of moral development, it is a necessary cause. In fact, almost in direct response to Rousseau’s worries about society and our unsociable dispositions that arise in

⁶¹ Ibid

⁶² I take this desired standing to be the desire to gain recognition from others that we are human beings with particular projects and capable of freedom and therefore deserving of respect as such an individual.

⁶³ Kant, *Idea of a Universal History*, 8:21

⁶⁴ Rousseau seems to worry that corruption occurs in two ways in society. First, as we have seen in the last chapter, when an individual’s *amour-propre* becomes inflamed, he is not able to be a good citizen, friend or partner and instead contributes to the enmity, aggression and inequality in society. In addition, Rousseau suggests that when society as a whole is comprised of citizens with inflamed *amour-propre*, this society continually perpetuates a cycle of enmity, aggression and inequality through its daily practices and institutions such as education. While sympathetic to Rousseau’s account of the dangers of society, Kant suggests that people always have a capacity for autonomy and can, at every moment, choose anew to do the right thing. Furthermore, Kant argues that it is in society, through the tension of individuality and sociality that we learn to organize society in a way that encourages the cultivation of our capacity for autonomy.

⁶⁵ Ibid

it (such as inflamed *amour-propre*), Kant actually praises inflamed passions such “heartless competitive vanity” and “the insatiable desire to possess and to rule” because it is through these potentially educative passions that man is driven to develop his capacities. He writes

Nature wills that he should be plunged from sloth and passive contentment into labor and trouble, in order that he may find means of extricating himself from them. The natural urges to this, the sources of unsociableness and mutual opposition from which so many evils arise, drive men to new exertions of their forces and thus to the manifold development of their capacities. They thereby perhaps show the ordering of a wise Creator and not the hand of an evil spirit, who bungled in his great work or spoiled it out of envy.⁶⁶

Kant argues that these feelings of antagonism—even feelings of “ambition, tyranny and greed—are the catalyst for a “mode of thought which can with time transform the rude natural predisposition to make more distinctions into determinate practical principles and hence transform a pathologically compelled agreement to form a society finally into a moral whole.”⁶⁷

While Kant believes that our unsocial sociability is ultimately a positive quality that allows us to internalize our nature and respond consistently in a rational way to our external projects, it is important to note for the trajectory of this chapter that the antagonism inherent in our unsocial sociability, while necessary and educative, does make it difficult for us to bring the moral law to bear on our tendencies towards goodness and, thus, is not a sufficient cause for moral development. We must constantly make *good use* of our unsocial sociability to prod us towards an ever-improving society, and we don’t always do this or know how to do it. Kant argues that the end goal of our

⁶⁶ Ibid, 8:21-8:23

⁶⁷ Kant, *Idea of a Universal History*, 8:21

unsocial sociability is “the achievement of a civil society universally administering right.”⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the development of this civil society is a difficult goal to achieve and indeed, Kant argues, takes many generations to achieve. Formal education is the primary means by which this continued development occurs because, as we shall examine later in this chapter, ideally it teaches us to bend our rational will towards moral ends and to unite ourselves under the common goal of pursuing the highest good together.

Because formal education is the primary means the development of humanity occurs, it is especially important for educators to be enlightened. Educators must understand this important role of education and to fully committed to this endeavor. Furthermore, Kant argues, these educators must work so that that the entire human race can eventually take up the important task of educating for the good of humanity. Kant notes that developing all of the human dispositions cannot happen in one individual. Rather this development happens over time in the entire species, specifically as they endeavor educationally in a community together to bring about this end.⁶⁹ Hannah Arendt summarizes well Kant’s idea of our reliance on this rational community when she writes that it is the fact that “no man can live alone, that men are interdependent not merely in their needs and cares but in their highest faculty, the human mind, which will not function outside human society.”⁷⁰

Developing our predispositions through overcoming our unsocial sociability takes practice and exposure to the reasoning process of other rational beings. This is why Kant

⁶⁸ Ibid, 8:22

⁶⁹ Kant, *Idea of a Universal History*, 8:19-8:30

⁷⁰ Arendt, *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, pg. 10.

argues that in regards to understanding morality and law, people must become a part of a rational community and that education is an indispensable part of becoming part of this rational community. Kant writes, “For the individual, it is absolutely impossible to attain this object.”⁷¹ It is even impossible for parents or a single teacher to communicate the totality of what is moral and lawful to students because the teachings of the parents and educators are based on a limited number of experiences. What is needed is the whole entire human race educating the child. Kant writes, “No individual man, no matter what degree of culture may be reached by his pupils, can ensure their attaining destiny. To succeed in this, not the work of a few individuals only is necessary, but that of the whole human race.”⁷² To be fully committed to the project of morality and humanity, then, is to become fully committed to the endeavor of education. I will discuss this issue later on the chapter, as it is important for understanding Kant’s vision of education thoroughly.

It is important to note at this point that if we are to develop fully all of the possibilities of the human race, investing in the enterprise of education in society is our only option. Kant argues that our choice is not between the peaceful existence of man in his pre-rational primitive state, as Rousseau suggests, and the potentially perilous existence of man in society. Kant does not really leave us with the option of the peaceful, pre-rational state of nature. Rather, our predicament for Kant is one of Odysseus steering between Scylla and Charybdis. On the one side we have the Scylla of heteronomy that comes from our undeveloped capacity for autonomy in our pre-rational primitive state. On the other side, we have the Charybdis of potential heteronomy in society if our capacity for autonomy is not properly developed in through education. The only way we

⁷¹Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 19

⁷²Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 10

find our safe way to Ithaca, where our happiness and safety lies, is charting our way firmly between these heteronomies and becoming autonomous and free through our proper use of reason. This entails us becoming moral agents in community together. Education is the process by which we chart that course. The question now is how Kant envisions education allowing student to chart this path to freedom.

§4—The Perplexity of Education: Autonomy and Restraint

Kant addresses several different aspects of education in his educational theory, but the one I wish to focus on is the moral aspect of education. If students are to be moral in the Kantian sense, they must learn how to do their duty. To do this they must learn to act from the primary incentive of rational motives of duty rather than heteronomous impulses, passions and emotions.⁷³ Learning to be moral also entails that students learn to be just which means they learn to act in such a way that their freedom can “coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with universal law.”⁷⁴ Given that morality entails autonomous rationality and non-coerced freedom, one of the problems Kant realizes he must address in his educational theory is how it is that education restrains students in order to discipline them but also promotes freedom: “One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child’s capability of exercising his freewill—for restraint is necessary.”⁷⁵ It is not possible, according to Kantian moral philosophy, for teachers (or anyone for that matter) to force students to be moral.⁷⁶ To force morality on students is to make students act

⁷³Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 161

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Ibid, pg. 27

⁷⁶ It is important to note here that Kant doesn’t think anyone, parents or educators or juridical representatives, can force a person to be moral—that, in fact, the very act of forcing destroys morality.

morally because of an external incentive. If students act this way, then they are not autonomous and therefore not truly moral because they do not act from duty alone.⁷⁷

Autonomy only occurs when students self-legislate the moral law. The question is how an external force like a teacher can influence the internal conditions of students without destroying autonomy.

The strength of Kant's educational vision is that it suggests how parents and teachers cultivate an environment which allows student to develop an autonomous and moral disposition. This educational process differs depending upon the age of the student; however, at all stages of education, Kant emphasizes the cultivation of reason and the apprenticeship of students to the rational community.⁷⁸ Because of this, Kant's educational philosophy is deeply respectful of student autonomy and views education as a process that cultivates this autonomy rather than viewing education as a tool to perpetuate the current society which may or may not be just. In this way, Kant's educational philosophy follows in the tradition of progressive educators of his day such as Heinrich Pestalozzi and John Bernard Basedow, and it also foreshadows the ideas of progressive educators such as John Dewey, Herbert Marcuse, and Paulo Freire, educators which I will discuss later on in this project.

§5— Educating the Young Child: The Robust Will Bent Towards Freedom

Given that rational autonomy is central to our ability to be moral, Kant is concerned with developing rational autonomy even in very young students. Developing rational and moral autonomy in students is a difficult matter. It requires that teachers

Kant most clearly articulates this idea when he argues that the juridical realm of society can only regulate external matters of freedom, not internal matters of the heart.

⁷⁷ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 5:33

⁷⁸ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 89-91

somehow encourage students to be governed by skill that is not yet developed and to get them to do this on their own accord without too much external influence from authority figures. On the face of it, this seems like a dubious enterprise. Kant, however, suggests a process for achieving this goal. It is a process which (i) awakens children's awareness of the law that is already present in them; (ii) encourages a robust will bent towards duty; (iii) encourages truthfulness in all matters as the foundation of moral character; (iv) appeals to the child's sensuous nature not as a ground for morality but as an aid to morality.

Kant is concerned that students understand from an early age that human dignity—both one's own and that of others—is of the utmost importance and must be safeguarded at all costs. Lessons in the dignity of humanity may seem like lessons far too sophisticated to teach young children. However, Kant suggests that this awareness of the dignity of humanity is an awareness that children already have within them. Therefore, appealing to this law is to bring to the fore a latent knowledge. One of the ways Kant suggests making children aware of the dignity of humanity is to appeal to their conscience of which they are already aware. Kant says of this conscience that it is the “Consciousness of an internal court in the human being” in which they find themselves “observed, threatened, and, in general, kept in awe (respect coupled with fear) by an internal judge”.⁷⁹ Therefore, it seems that Kant likely thinks that making young children aware of this “judge” they already have inside of them is one way to awaken them to the dignity of humanity. By drawing their attention to their own conscience, educators make

⁷⁹ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 6:438

young children aware that humanity has a most important project: the project of attending the moral law, which is what their conscience points them towards.⁸⁰

Kant ties this awareness of the dignity of humanity directly to students learning obedience to duties to himself and to others.⁸¹ His duties to himself entail the student acting in such a way that he protects this special reasoning capacity he has that sets him above other creatures.⁸² He also has a duty to protect this same capacity in other people by treating them with respect. In order to make students aware of these duties, Kant certainly emphasizes obedience in the training of young children. However, this obedience is not a blind, unthinking obedience. It is a focused obedience that attends to duties and cultivates a strong, robust will bent towards rationality and morality.⁸³ Kant notes that children must learn to obey the restraints of duty because if they do not, children will develop the habit of being ruled by impulses. If they are ruled by these impulses, they cannot be ruled by reason, which is the beginning of freedom, morality, and human dignity. Therefore, Kant believes that the ability to resist these impulses protects our humanity. Kant writes, “It is discipline, which prevents man from being

⁸⁰ To further awaken children to human dignity, Kant also implies that appealing to children’s natural affinity with animals can be helpful. Kant argues that a child should become aware that his duties “Consist in his being conscious that man possesses a certain dignity, which ennobles him above all other creatures, and that it is his duty to act so as not to violate in his own person this dignity of mankind (*Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 101). Kant makes the connection between morality and young children’s relationship with animals when he notes that too often children’s natural curiosity with animals leads them towards cruelty, but when they become acquainted with their duty, they learn “the better to respect...creatures, and will thus be kept from an inclination towards destruction and cruelty, which we so often see in the torture of small animals. (*Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 114). The dignity of humanity rests in our ability to make moral decisions and to consider what would be the best for everyone. It seems likely that Kant believes that as we draw children’s attention to the fact of their conscience that they, but not animals, have, this conscience enables them to figure out how to act in an autonomous and moral manner.

⁸¹ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 90

⁸² *Ibid*, pg. 101

⁸³ *Ibid*, pg. 26

turned aside by his animal impulses from humanity, his appointed end.”⁸⁴ Nevertheless, the ability to resist these impulses can only occur in the presence of a strong will that is also a good will. Therefore, the strong, good will is foundational to virtue, for virtue is the ability to resist all heteronomous impulses.

Even though Kant emphasizes obedience to duty in younger children, he argues that if the child’s will is crushed, she cannot give herself the moral laws and is always susceptible to external and heteronomous forces. This is a problem, even if these external forces come from seemingly benign influences like authority figures. The ultimate goal of education is that students will consistently self-legislate moral maxims. Since a robust, good will is the key to moral decision-making for Kant, its healthy flourishing must be protected at all cost. Kant reiterates his concern that the child’s will not be broken countless times throughout his *Lectures on Pedagogy*. He cautions against adults who would be too overbearing in their authority to children: “We must let the child see his weakness all the more, but at the same time we must not overpower him with a sense of our own superiority and power; so that, though the child may develop his own individuality, he should do so only as a member of society.”⁸⁵ Kant is also concerned about authority figures that encourage a type of mindless, unreasoning obedience: “Nothing does more harm than to exercise a vexatious and slavish discipline over them with a view to breaking their self-will.”⁸⁶

But how can parents cultivate a robust flourishing will that is, at the same time, obedient to duties? Kant suggests here that students must learn to recognize the important

⁸⁴ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 3

⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pg. 65

⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 48

of acting only in such a way that protects their own freedom, freedom defined here as moral autonomy, and he has several principles for encouraging such autonomy. Kant suggests that students should be allowed to act freely in a way that they choose as long as their actions do not hurt themselves or other people or infringe on the liberty of other people.⁸⁷ For instance, Kant argues that a child must learn that “as soon as he screams or is too boisterously happy, he annoys others.”⁸⁸ In addition, Kant says the child is to learn early on that “he can only attain his own ends by allowing others to attain theirs”⁸⁹ and that “restraint is only laid upon him that he may learn in time to use his liberty aright, and that his mind is being cultivated so that one day he may be free.”⁹⁰

In these injunctions, Kant is suggesting that the most important lesson we can teach young children is that human dignity and liberty—both that of one’s own and of others—is of the utmost importance and must be safeguarded at all costs. Therefore, obedience for the sake of obedience is not what Kant has in mind. Obedience is always for the sake of a higher good—namely the cultivation of a good will and human dignity. In teaching children to act according to these principles and their duties Kant teaches students the difference between a slavish obedience, such as an obedience encouraged by despots and dogmatists, and obedience that is rational and purposive. Learning this lesson early on is excellent training for the child to learn to resist heteronomous influences all of her life, whether these are internal or external heteronomies.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 28

⁸⁸ Ibid

⁸⁹ Ibid

⁹⁰ Ibid

⁹¹ In my opinion, Kant’s discussion of cultivating a robust, autonomous will in students is insightful advice for educators. In addition, Kant’s opinions that this is the best way to discipline students reflects my own experience as a middle and high school teacher. Long before I ever read any of Kant’s philosophy, I discovered that the best thing I could do to create a disciplined classroom was to teach students to discipline themselves. To this end, I developed three guiding classroom principles: 1) Respect whoever is

One of the primary ways Kant urges teachers to help students to develop a robust moral will is to teach them to act consciously from carefully formed maxims, rather than acting from impulse or mere emotion. Kant writes on the importance of acting from maxims

Moral culture must be based upon ‘maxims,’ not upon discipline; the one prevents evil habits, the other trains the mind to think. We must see, then, that the child accustom himself to act in accordance with ‘maxims,’ and not from certain ever-changing springs of action.⁹²

When students act consciously from carefully formed maxims rather than from the other mentioned motivations, this encourages students to give reasons for why they are acting as they plan on acting. It is interesting to note that Kant believes that children, even from an early age, should become accustomed to engage in honest and opening reasoning about their ends. For example, Kant says that children should be taught to ask openly what they wish for instead of crying to get it.⁹³ Asking teaches them to reason with other about their ends; crying teaches them to manipulate and “extort”⁹⁴ others—that is, it teaches them to use others as means to their ends.

When students give reasons for their actions, they are practicing acting on maxims, and acting on maxims prepares students to be able to measure their actions

speaking during our class session; 2) Protect each other’s physical and emotional well-being; and 3) Take responsibility for your own education. I introduced these principles to my students on the firsts day of class and told them that these principles applied to myself as well as to them. For the first couple months of school, I helped my students understand how these principles applied in a variety of classroom situations. When discipline problems arose during class, the misbehaving student and I would discuss how his or her conduct violated these rules. I found that if I consistently implemented the principles in my classrooms, most classes became almost entirely self-policing by the end of the year. I believe these principles were especially effectiveness because they taught students, as Kant has suggested above, to protect their own dignity as well as the dignity of others. It also taught them that discipline was not arbitrary but rather focused on respecting their dignity as a human being.

⁹² Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 83

⁹³ Ibid, pg. 47

⁹⁴ Ibid

against the categorical imperative to understand whether or not their maxim is morally prohibited. In addition, by considering and then articulating the maxims one takes to be good, the child becomes accustomed to publicly announcing her reasoning. In this way she examines her reasoning from the perspective of the community of rational beings so that she can see if what she takes to be reasonable is actually reasonable to her community. As the child practices this publicity regularly, she is apprenticed into the rational community. This better prepares her to formulate maxims that could become universal law and therefore prepares her to be an autonomous moral thinker. For example, a child may believe that it is appropriate to strike another child with whom she is angry. It is through discussion of this matter with her wider rational community (likely her teachers and parents in this case) that the child recognizes that striking others with whom one is angry is not, after all, a universalizable maxim. Therefore, by teaching students to verbalize reasons for acting, children are inducted into the wider rational community, and they become rational and social beings.

That Kant places such an emphasis on reasoning in one's rational community helps to explain why he places such a premium on honesty. While it is true that lying violates the categorical imperative, lying also prevents one from participating in one's rational community. Whether someone lies to herself or to her community, she is not really holding her true reasons up for examination. If she is hiding her true reasons for acting, she can't really determine if her actions could be legislated by all rational agents. Therefore, there is no way to determine if her maxims are actually moral or not. When someone is unable to determine this, she is unable consciously to choose moral decisions. The ability to choose to make moral decisions or not is the basis for us forming our

personality and character. Therefore, Kant argues that lying destroys our capacity for character. If we don't have character, we lack a coherent unified will, and therefore we lack the ability to exert our will to resist immoral impulses. Thus, Kant suggests that lying, by destroying our ability to develop our character, destroys our capacity to be moral. Kant writes about the dangers of lying

But it is really through lying that a child degrades himself below the dignity of man, since lying presupposes the power of thinking and of communicating one's thoughts to others. Lying makes a man the object of common contempt, and is a means of robbing him of the respect for and trust in himself that every man should have.⁹⁵

That habituating one's self to lying is such a perilous enterprise underscores why Kant argues that training in truth telling must be one of the foundational aspects of moral education. A lie, even if it is not known by others, "makes himself contemptible in his own eyes and violates the dignity of humanity in his own person."⁹⁶ Kant's emphasis on honesty in conjunction to acting in ways that protect human dignity not only teaches students to reason well, it teaches them early on that one of their primary goals is socialness and participation in community.⁹⁷ We have been examining thus far the way educators cultivate a robust will bent towards the good. Educators do this by training students consciously to form moral maxims and to tell the truth about these maxims to others in their community. Now we must examine how the every-day, sensuous conditions of the student are connected to moral decision-making. Kant argues that

⁹⁵ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 102

⁹⁶ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 552

⁹⁷ Of course, it is important to note here that a lie can only be judged as a lie by understanding what a particular speaker takes herself to mean by a particular speech act, as well as what that speech act means in her particular context. That this is so suggests another reason why Kant likely thinks it is so important that children learn to act from consciously formed moral maxims which they discuss with others. In discussing one's maxims with others, it forces students to articulate what they take their reasons for a particular act to be, reasons that can then be challenged by their community that is aware of their particular context.

formal education, as much as possible, must create sensuous conditions which support students' ability to be rational, autonomous and moral.

§6—Sensuousness and Autonomy

With Kant's emphasis on reasoning and morality, it might be tempting to think that he is not that concerned with the sensuous conditions of students' lives. The tendency to think this about Kant's pedagogy might also be strengthened by the many times that Kant states, especially in the *Groundwork*, *Critique of Pure Reason* and *Metaphysics of Morals*, that happiness and material incentives cannot ground morality. However, the notion that Kant is not concerned with the material condition of students' lives overlooks the many ways in which Kant implies a direct connection between students' physical and sensuous lives and moral autonomy. In his *Lectures on Pedagogy*, as well as elsewhere, Kant suggests that careful attention to the sensuous conditions of the student not only aids her in her moral development but also helps her to become more sensitive to the way in which external sensuous conditions help or hinder other people's moral development.

In *Lectures on Pedagogy*, Kant states that "The best way of cultivating the mental faculties is to do ourselves all that we wish to accomplish...the best way to understand is to do."⁹⁸ We see this belief echoed in Kant's concern that children of all ages develop bodily strength and physical autonomy. He encourages that they engage in all manner of games such as blindman's bluff, swinging, spinning tops, and kite flying⁹⁹ and physical gymnastics. Students who become skilled physically have both the strength and the ability to carry out their ends, an ability that is essential if children are to articulate their

⁹⁸ Ibid, pg. 80

⁹⁹ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 63

moral impulses in the world. Kant emphasizes the benefit of physical cultivation in *Metaphysics of Morals* when he writes

Cultivating the powers of the body (gymnastics in the strict sense) is looking after the basic stuff (the matter) in a human being, without which he could not realize his ends. Hence the continuing and purposive invigoration of the animal in him is an end of a human being that is a duty to himself.¹⁰⁰

Therefore, it seems that Kant believes that bodily autonomy is directly related to moral autonomy.

Kant's notions about joy and cheerfulness also reflect his concern about the sensuous nature of the student. Kant is concerned that children not have too much pressure on them and that they are allowed to be children. On the one hand, Kant believes children must learn to work because they are naturally inclined to inaction, and working gets them used to restraining this natural inclination.¹⁰¹ Kant suggests that physical restraint is a type of practice for moral restraint. On the other hand, Kant is very concerned that children's natural vigor not be squashed. He writes "A lively boy will sooner become a good man than a conceited and priggish lad."¹⁰² Kant's idea here seems to be that a priggish lad is far more concerned about pleasing others than following his own urge for freedom. Kant also notes that children should be released from school pressure sometimes, lest they lose their natural joy and vigor:¹⁰³

Children should sometimes be released from the narrow constraint of school, otherwise their natural joyousness will soon be quenched. When the

¹⁰⁰ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6:445

¹⁰¹ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 68

¹⁰² Ibid, pg. 64

¹⁰³ In the quote below, Kant seems to be highlighting the way education must honor and cultivate the inherent spontaneity of children. Perhaps Kant's concern is that education is too often focused on receptivity to the detriment of spontaneity.

child is set free he soon recovers his natural elasticity. Those games in which children, enjoying perfect freedom, are ever trying to outdo one another, will serve this purpose best, and they will soon make their minds bright and cheerful again.¹⁰⁴

That Kant is so concerned that children maintain a joy which functions as a natural aid to morality should not surprise us when we consider that Kant says we have a duty to work for other people's happiness because

Adversity, pain, and want are great temptations to violate one's duty. It might therefore seem that prosperity, strength, health, and well-being in general, which check the influence of these, could also be considered ends that are duties, so that one has a duty to promote one's own happiness and not just the happiness of others.—But then the end is not the subject's happiness but his morality, and happiness is merely a means for removing obstacles to his morality—a permitted means...¹⁰⁵

So while our sensuous natures, which are directly related to our happiness, cannot rule us, and while they are not pursued as an end in themselves, they can be arranged as an aid to support our moral flourishing.

We see the idea that our sensuous natures can be an aid to morality reflected as well in Kant's notions of the potentially moral benefit of beauty. While there is not space in this essay to explore Kant's notions of beauty in depth, Kant argues that beauty is the symbol of morality.¹⁰⁶ He notes that "The beautiful is that which, without concepts, is represented as the object of a universal satisfaction."¹⁰⁷ Kant suggests that when we appreciate the beautiful, our appreciation is something that commands universally. We appreciate the beautiful for its own sake and not for what it brings us. In this way, it is like morality because morality commands us universally and categorically.

¹⁰⁴ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 92-93

¹⁰⁵ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6:388

¹⁰⁶ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 5:352

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 5:211

While Kant does not mention beauty specifically in his educational treatise, Kant's argument that beauty is a symbol of morality, and cultivates an inner space in which students are responsive to morality, suggests that teachers must cultivate an appreciation for beauty in their students. It also suggests that beauty in the child's environment can be a propaedeutic to morality as well. This cultivation of an appreciation of beauty allows students to develop a non-instrumental appreciation for something, which allows them to respond to the moral law, simply for its own sake.¹⁰⁸ Kant's emphasis on the moral importance of beautify suggests that Kant would approve of educational time spent in artistic endeavors and quiet reflection on beautiful artwork. Furthermore, Kant's notions about the importance of bodily autonomy suggests, among other things, that he would consider activities such as recess and gym class essential, or at the very least, a wise time investment and an aid moral training.

The emphasis that Kant places on the sensuousness nature of the student and its connection to autonomy is not a tangential feature of Kant's educational philosophy. Rather, this emphasis accords well with Kant's notions that our physical conditions—especially as they pertain to our happiness—are directly related to our ability to be moral. It is important to note, however, that if an important part of education is related to our sensuous nature, and if everyone is to be involved in the process of education, this entails that everyone must be concerned about the way the sensuous conditions of society either support or discourage moral flourishing. Furthermore, given that a person's ability to be just is directly tied to her ability to be moral, Kant's educational philosophy (as well as his philosophy in general) suggests that anyone concerned with promoting justice must be

¹⁰⁸ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6:485

concerned with the physical and material conditions of people in society. Kant suggests that if these physical and material conditions are wretched, they make it extremely difficult for people to be just. In line with this discussion, it would seem that wretched material conditions have a deleterious educational effect. This is an idea we will return to at a later point in this chapter.

It is important to note that Kant's pedagogical strategies are indeed possible to implement in a classroom setting. They do not require, such as Rousseau's pedagogy seems to require, that students be educated in a controlled rural environment under the tutelage of an educator dedicated solely to their education.¹⁰⁹ Kant's educational theory for young children is also insightful for it suggests a way in which students can be cultivated so they understand their flourishing is inevitably connected with others. By understanding this, it becomes evident to students that right conduct is a communal endeavor of rational beings. It is an education that works with the grain of the student (both with her inner awareness of conscience and her outer sensuous nature) that teaches the child to honor her own dignity as a human being. As she does this, she recognizes this same dignity in every other human being.

This early education is an important education, but it is not sufficient for students to become morally autonomous people working for the good of humanity. This early education is a propaedeutic to the education of young adults, an education which focuses

¹⁰⁹ To say that Kant's educational strategies can be implemented in the classroom is not to say that they are easy to implement or that they can be implemented in any classroom environment whatsoever. It seems likely that Kant's pedagogical ideas would require careful planning on the part of the teacher and would require certain kinds of classroom arrangements and activities while precluding others. I do not think, however, that this signals a weakness in Kant's philosophy, as it seems that any worthwhile educational practice requires careful planning and specific arrangements of the classroom environment and resources.

specifically on cultivating autonomous thinking and judgment. The education of young children is primarily negative in that it focuses on how one should not act—namely, one should not act in a manner that destroys the dignity of human beings either in one’s self or in other people. On the other hand, the education of the young adult is primarily positive education that it focuses a great deal on how to act. Crucial to understanding how to act is the art of judgment, the cultivation of moral feeling, and the cultivation of a desire to enter into the ethical commonwealth.

§7—The Older Student: Learning to Judge Well

Although Kant emphasizes the importance of reason all throughout a student’s education, the type of reasoning emphasized with younger children is focused on obedience to the rules of duty given by adults. The education of young adults, on the other hand, focuses on doing what is right for the sake of duty, which means obeying one’s own reason.”¹¹⁰ If students are to obey their own reason, this means they develop the ability to judge. Kant’s heuristics such as the categorical imperative and his description of our duties to ourselves and to others do not specifically tell us how to act in each scenario. Rather, they outline general guiding rules for acting or not acting. Kant’s heuristics tell us that we must act only on maxims that are universalizable, and he tells us that we have duties to protect the dignity of ourselves and of others. He does not tell us which specific actions in specific situations meet these criteria. In order to determine this, students must learn to connect their particular situations with these rules. In other words, they need to learn to judge properly.

¹¹⁰ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 90

Kant writes in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that “the power of judgment is the ability to subsume under rules, i.e., to distinguish whether something does not does not fall under a given rule (is or is not a *casus datae legis*).”¹¹¹ Therefore, as students get older, they have to figure out how to judge properly. Kant does not allow students the option of letting people judge for them for the rest of their lives. Kant notes the temptation to be a minor, to let others think for one’s self, perpetually:

It is because of laziness and cowardice that so great a part of humankind, after nature has long since emancipated them from other people’s direction...nevertheless gladly remains minors for life, and that it becomes so easy for other to set themselves up as their guardians. It is so comfortable to be a minor! If I have a book that understands for me, a spiritual advisor who has a conscience for me, a doctor who decides upon a regimen for me, and so forth, I need not trouble myself at all. I need not think, if only I can pay; others will readily undertake the irksome business for me.¹¹²

To become properly morally educated, one must learn how to judge. However, the process by which older students learn to judge this way, once again, presents another obstacle for education, for just like autonomy, the art of judgment cannot be taught.¹¹³

In fact, Kant writes that in order to figure out whether or not a sensible intuition does or does not fall under a rule, we must once again have a rule to teach us how to do this.¹¹⁴ However, to select the right rule to help us judge universals and particulars correctly is also a matter of judgment (and an infinite regress ensues). Therefore, it would seem that it is up to us to develop correct rules for practicing judgment, and this is a skill “that cannot be taught at all but can only be practiced.”¹¹⁵ Kant calls the power of

¹¹¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B:172

¹¹² Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” 8:35

¹¹³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B: 172

¹¹⁴ Ibid

¹¹⁵ Ibid

judgment “the so-called mother wit, for whose lack no school can compensate.”¹¹⁶ While judgment cannot be taught, the right kinds of skills and attitudes can be cultivated which allow for good judgment to take root. This is where Kant’s discussion of catechism is helpful.

Kant argues that “For the beginning pupil the first and most essential instrument for teaching the doctrine of virtue is a moral catechism.”¹¹⁷ Kant does not envision his catechism to be a mere tool of rote memorization. If it functioned this way, it seems that it would perpetuate the regency of the teacher, rather than allowing the student to become fully autonomous. Kant envisions the moral catechism as tool that helps students to judge. Through catechizing the student, Kant suggests that the teacher presents her pupil with certain moral casuistical cases. These cases allow the student to practice her ability to use moral reasoning in concrete situations. Kant writes

For logic has not yet taken sufficiently to heart the challenge issued to it, that it should also provide rules to direct one in searching for things, i.e., it should not limit itself to giving rules for conclusive judgments but should also provide rules for preliminary judgments (*iudicia praevia*), by which one is led to thoughts.¹¹⁸

One of the things that Kant seems to be suggesting here is that careful moral catechizing of students allows them to develop a set of internal preliminary rules which helps them to come to conclusive moral judgments in different situations. That developing one’s own internal set of rules is important should not surprise us when we recall Kant’s statements in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that good judgment cannot be taught; it can only be practiced. However, examples can prove a helpful tool for developing this type of

¹¹⁶ Ibid

¹¹⁷ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 6:478

¹¹⁸ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 6:478

judgment, and the casuistical examples presented in the catechism are just this type of example.

It seems, too, that through the practice of catechism, which allows for conversation between the student and the teacher, that students, once again, practice publicizing their reasons behind their particular maxims. Through their process, they hold their reasoning up for scrutiny to the rational community, and they discover whether or not their maxims are indeed the maxims by which everyone could act and which could indeed be declared universal law. In this way, the catechism for the older student serves a similar purpose to the practice students have in making maxims when they are younger. Younger children learn to act according to maxims, maxims which are strongly guided by authority figures. Older children practice judging the most appropriate maxim for a given situation. Both methods allow students to practice publicizing their reasons to members of the rational community.

The process of students learning to obey their own reasoning and to think on their own is so essential that Kant strongly criticizes some educational techniques that might be considered fairly standard. For example, Kant criticizes the use, especially long-term, of punishment, rewards and comparisons to encourage morality. Kant writes, “If we wish to establish morality, we must abolish punishment.”¹¹⁹ The meaning behind this somewhat startling claim becomes clearer when we realize that in trying to dissuade students from acting badly by wielding the threat of punishment, we engender fear and therefore heteronomous reasoning. Kant certainly understands that using punishment as a propaedeutic to facilitate autonomous behavior is necessary sometimes. However, fear

¹¹⁹ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 84

can never be a long-term motivator if the end goal is morality. Kant echoes this concern that fear not be a long-term motivator for morality in his urging that morality be taught first instead of theology. When morality is taught first, Kant argues, students learn to heed the law that is already within them, which leads them to be moral for autonomous reasons. If they learn theology first, they learn to be moral out of fear of God or eternal punishment, and these are not suitable motivations for morality.

This is the same reason why Kant argues that students must not learn to act morally for the sake of egoistic benefit, such as acting morally for the sake of achieving a reward.¹²⁰ When we act in order to obtain a reward, we are motivated by pleasure instead of our dignity as a human being. Kant echoes this concern in *Metaphysics of Morals* when he writes

For unless the dignity of virtue is exalted above everything else in actions, the concept of duty itself vanishes and dissolves into mere pragmatic precepts, since a human being's consciousness of his nobility then disappears and he is for sale and can be bought for a price that the seductive inclinations offer him.¹²¹

Rewards are problematic because they teach students to sell his nobility for the sake of the rewards it earns him. In addition, Kant cautions against educators using comparisons to others to try to form moral reasoning, as comparison focus students' attention on other people's behavior and distracts them from heeding the law and making it the primary incentive:

As for the power of examples (good or bad) that can be held up to the propensity for imitation or warning, what others give us can establish no

¹²⁰ With his concern over the use of rewards to incentivize good behavior, Kant foreshadows contemporary progressive educators like Alfie Kohn who in his book *Punished by Rewards* suggests that incentivizing students with gold stars and other incentives to behave well trains students to work for rewards, but it does not teach them to behave morally and well for its own sake.

¹²¹ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6:483

maxim of virtue. For a maxim of virtue consists precisely in the subjective autonomy of each human being's practical reason and so implies that the law itself, not the conduct of others human beings, must serve as our incentive.¹²²

It seems that using fear, egotistical thinking and envy to incentivize students to act morally not only encourages heteronomy but also prevents students from thinking, which prevents them from developing rules for good moral judgments. Kant further contrasts these types of heteronomous incentives with thinking when he writes, "Moral culture must be based upon 'maxims', not upon discipline."¹²³ While possible rewards and the example of other people's conduct—both good and evil—can be helpful initially for illumination, Kant argues that it is the *method* of moral decision-making, which comes through forming maxims and acting on them, that allows students to think and develop moral character. It is important to note that maxim-making is a method and not a habit: "To form a habit is to establish a lasting inclination apart from any maxim, through frequently repeated gratifications of that inclination."¹²⁴ This is why using fear, reward and comparisons as a long-term strategy for making students moral is not wise: it forms the unthinking habit of looking outside one's own reasoning for moral motivation. A moral method, on the other hand, is a plan someone has to be autonomous. Kant's strong criticism of heteronomous incentives such as fear and rewards seems to be an extension of his idea that our sensuous condition do, indeed, have a strong connection to our ability to be moral and so educators and anyone else concerned with the cultivation of morality

¹²² Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 593

¹²³ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 83

¹²⁴ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 6:479

must be aware of the material conditions which both encourage and discourage autonomy and morality.

§8—Moral Feeling and the Educative Use of Shame

While punishments, rewards and comparisons are generally unacceptable discipline techniques because they encourage heteronomy, interestingly Kant does believe that shame plays an important pedagogical role in the education of the older child. Kant writes “It is the shamefulness of vice, not its harmfulness (to the agent himself), that must be emphasize above all.”¹²⁵ It seems perplexing that the use of shame as a moral incentive could escape the charge of heteronomy. After all, it seems that shame is often considered to be an emotion which involves fear or embarrassment about what other people think of us. It would seem initially then that Kant should be opposed to using shame to motivate students because fear about the opinions of others is a heteronomous motivation. Therefore, if Kant believes that shame is an appropriate moral motivator, Kant’s definition of shame cannot entail a concern about others’ opinions. Rather, Kant must have in mind a type of shame that refers to one’s own reasoning processes alone.

Perhaps what Kant has in mind with shame is the feeling people have when they realize they have acted in a completely counter-productive manner to their own most cherished projects or goals. For instance, this kind of shame might be the feeling someone has when he realizes that his actions are destroying the friendships that he most cherishes or when someone realizes that she is completely undermining her goal for financial dependency through profligate spending habits. While this type of feeling can

¹²⁵ Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 6:483

refer to other people's opinions or to consequences, it doesn't necessarily reference these things. Often this type of shame is a disgust with one's own rational incoherence.

Perhaps this kind of shame is expressed in our moments when we say, "How could I have been so stupid?" or "Dear God, what have I done?" These phrases suggest an awareness of the incongruity of our current actions with our cherished ends. This seems to be the kind of shame Kant has in mind. This feeling then is a type of moral feeling, which Kant approves and says is "The susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty."¹²⁶

It seems like he is suggesting that when older children misbehave, we can point out to them the incongruity of their actions with their worth as a human being. Kant suggests that using this kind of shame with older students helps them to understand that their actions are not worthy of their humanity and that they may be in fact undermining their humanity, as well as their dignity. That Kant argues that shame cannot be used with younger seems to reinforce this interpretation of his notion of shame as a moral incentive. Young children often act in badly because they do not understand the full import of their actions. Therefore, to try to point out to them how their actions undermine their dignity as human beings (shaming them in this sense) is not effective. This is why young children must be taught to obey rules of duty rather than figuring them all out themselves. It is only when children are older and have a fuller sense of what their actions entail that shame becomes an effective tool.

¹²⁶ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6:399

Kant's use of shame with older children also fits well with his idea that education is a process of enlightenment from one's own self-incurred minority, as Kant discusses in his essay "What is Enlightenment". Kant writes

Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. *Sapere aude!* Have courage to make use of your own understanding! Is thus the motto of enlightenment.¹²⁷

It is interesting here that Kant notes that "self-incurred minority" occurs when someone lacks resolution and courage to use their own understanding. Young children often fail to act virtuously because their understanding is underdeveloped. Older children have a more developed understanding, but often lack the resolution and courage to use it properly. Through shame, Kant suggests that we help students understand that they are failing to be the boss of themselves—they are failing to be autonomous. In this way, Kant's use of shame can provide a strong emotional incentive that is still autonomous.

As older students obey their own reason and escape their minority, self-incurred or otherwise, they increasingly make public use of their reason, which as we have noted previously is the goal of education for Kant.¹²⁸ Being able to make public use of one's reason is essential for developing "maxims of the common understanding" which are "1. To think for oneself 2. To think in the position of everyone else 3. Always to think in accord with oneself."¹²⁹ That Kant believes that these are maxims that we must develop to use our understanding correctly makes sense when we recognize that to use our understanding correctly implies that we use it morally. Using our understanding morally

¹²⁷ Kant "What is Enlightenment?", pg. 17

¹²⁸ Ibid

¹²⁹ Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, 5:294

requires that we are autonomous (this pertains to the first maxim) and that we always act on maxims we can universalize (this pertains to the second and third maxim). In other words, using our understanding morally means that we form the consistent habit of autonomously choosing actions that everyone could choose.

Through developing these maxims of thinking, we develop a *sensus communis*, which Kant describes as “a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought.”¹³⁰ In developing this *sensus communis*, we achieve enlightenment because we free ourselves from prejudice, narrow-minded and inconsistent thinking by learning to hold our judgment “up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on judgment.”¹³¹ Kant’s rules for thinking and his discussion about the *sensus communis* directly pertain to developing good judgment. Developing *sensus communis* allows students to judge better what everyone would judge as rational, rather than judging in a way that is chained more to specific, localized, facts in the students’ life. Kant actually calls this type of problematic thinking superstition. Good judgment and the ability to follow through on it seem to be the end goal of a good education. Kant affirms this when he writes

The inferior faculties have no value in themselves; for instance, a man who has a good memory, but no judgment. Such a man is merely a walking dictionary. These beasts of burden of Parnassus are of some use, however, for if they cannot do anything useful themselves, they at least furnish material out of which others may produce something good. Intelligence divorced from judgment produces nothing but foolishness. Understanding is the knowledge of the general. Judgment is the application of the general to the particular.¹³²

¹³⁰ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 5:293

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 5:294

¹³² Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 71

Kant's pedagogical practices seem aimed at this very goal: cultivating the kinds of attitudes and habits that make good judgment possible. And in exercising good judgment, we consciously choose to join the rational human community.

§9—The Highest Good: Uniting Under a Common Purpose

It is important to draw our attention back to the fact that Kant believes that the purpose of education is to further the development of all of humanity. Kant notes that humanity is only partially developed and that its destiny is “to develop all of the germs of goodness within [it].”¹³³ He notes further that “it is through education by people who are further down the road of autonomy that human nature is continually improved” and “this opens out to us the prospect of a happier human race in the future.”¹³⁴ In this way, the primary goal of education is to prepare students to strive towards the highest good, the unity of morality and happiness, and Kant clearly believes that stirring students' passion for the progress of humanity is an essential part of education. Kant underscores our responsibility to work for the common good when he writes that we have existing in us an idea and concern for “the progress of the world”¹³⁵ and that “Children should be made acquainted with this interest, so that it may give warmth to their hearts. They should learn to rejoice at the world's progress although it may not be to their own advantage or to that of their country.”¹³⁶ It seems likely that one of the reasons Kant suggests that students must be encouraged to care for the progress of the world is because it helps them escape the narrow interests of getting by in society or merely serving the states' interests, which Kant says are too often the goals of educators. However, there are other reasons it seems

¹³³ Ibid, pg. 9

¹³⁴ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 8

¹³⁵ Ibid, pg. 120

¹³⁶ Ibid, pg. 121

that Kant encourages this interest as well.

Kant's injunction that students be encouraged to care about the progress of the human race shows that while Kant is very concerned educationally about helping students to become moral, his goal is not a solipsistic morality that leads to students living isolated, moral lives. Rather, Kant envisions morality in the service of humanity. It may seem initially that it is obvious that the moral person helps to bring about a moral and just society. However, Kant does not believe this is necessarily true. Kant suggests that people can be moral and just but can have such different purposes that they work at cross purposes with each other. Kant writes

Under the present system man does not fully attain to the object of his being; for in what various ways men live! Uniformity can only result when all men act according to the same principles, which principles would have to become with them a second nature.¹³⁷

So for Kant, the realization of the good of humanity comes about through more than people merely being moral or just people. What is needed is for moral and just people to unite themselves voluntarily under a common goal, namely the highest good. Kant's comments about the ethical commonwealth are helpful in understanding his concern in this matter more clearly.

In the ethical commonwealth, Kant envisions people voluntarily uniting themselves under the laws of virtue in order to work for the highest good.¹³⁸ Kant argues that people can have the best and even the most moral and just motives but still do harm to each other and create problems in society because they are not united under a common goal. Kant writes

¹³⁷ Kant, *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone*, 6:97

¹³⁸ *Ibid*, 6:99

Human beings...mutually corrupt one another's moral predisposition and, even with the good will of each individual, because of the lack of a principle which unites them, they deviate through their dissensions from the common goal of goodness, as though they were instruments of evil, and expose one another to the danger of falling once again under its dominion.¹³⁹

The story of Antigone and Creon seems to illustrate perfectly the type of problems Kant has in mind in this quote. Antigone and Creon clash with one another, not because they are immoral or unjust, but because they have not yet been able to unite themselves under a common goal that allows for the joining of human morality and happiness. The story of Antigone and Creon is an example we will return to later in the chapter on Hegel's educational philosophy. For now it is sufficient to note that Kant believes that while we must be just and moral, we must also leave our ethical state of nature and join under the common goal of the highest good. It is only when do this that the good of humanity, which is the goal of education, can be pursued in earnest. Therefore, if education is to be concerned about bringing about the progress of the human race, education must prepare and motivate students to enter into the ethical commonwealth and seek the highest good.

§10—Education as the Duty of All: Becoming a Friend to Humanity

Given that the ethical commonwealth is devoted to pursuing the highest good of humanity, everyone involved in the ethical commonwealth must be dedicated to education. One of the ways that the ethical commonwealth promotes education is to make the practice of education a study in itself. Kant argues that the work of education is to mold a society that creates good educators.¹⁴⁰ The goal is hopefully that an education focused on improving the good of humanity and preparing students to be members of the

¹³⁹ Ibid, 6:97

¹⁴⁰ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 13

ethical commonwealth prepares students to go beyond their parents and teachers, and they do this by education becoming a study.¹⁴¹ Kant notes that the only way education becomes a study is for the most enlightened people with the broadest interests in mind to take an active role in education.¹⁴² It is especially important for education itself to become a study because education involves judgment. This entails that what we judge to be good educational methods are not actually in the end always good methods. Just as skilled judgement in moral situations takes practice to develop, so does good judgement in educational matters.

It requires thoughtful people reflecting on our educational methods, discussing them, and experimenting with different techniques in experimental schools to allow the institution of education to improve. For Kant, the study of education is not just an interesting intellectual exercise. It is directly tied to our ability to progress as a human race. This fact becomes more evident when we consider, as Kant points out, that education depends on insight, but insight depends on education.¹⁴³ In other words, as Kant has already mentioned previously, we are what we are because of our education. If our educators have poor reasoning and are bad practitioners of judgment, it is very likely that we will carry forward the same flaws. Therefore, the study of education must be a concern of the entire ethical commonwealth.

While Kant thinks that school is one of the primary places of education, it seems that he also believes that everyone in the ethical commonwealth must be involved with educational endeavors in one way or another, whether this means students becoming

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, pg. 14

¹⁴² *Ibid*, pg. 17

¹⁴³ Kant, *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 11

teachers themselves, being wise educators as parents, or supporting various educational institutions in society. If education is the means by which we become human, and everyone must be concerned with the dignity of humanity, it seems that Kant implies, rather than directly states, that everyone has a duty to education. The implication that education is everyone's duty flows out of Kant's claim that we have a duty to love others. This love is a "(practical love) which results in beneficence."¹⁴⁴ Kant argues that our duty to love others requires us "to make others' ends my own (provided only that these are not immoral)."¹⁴⁵

If we are truly to make others' ends our own, this means that we must act practically in the world to promote these ends. Willing certain ends always requires that we adopt the means to promote these ends. Therefore, if we are to make other's ends our own, this requires that we take an active stance of philanthropy towards others and that we become a "friend to humanity".¹⁴⁶ Given the connection between education and the development of human ends and potential in this chapter, it is clear that while a friend of humanity might support many endeavors and institutions in society, schools are one of the institutions he absolutely must support. Kant's implication is clear: if you are to love humanity, which is your duty, you must support education for everyone. Therefore, commitment to education is a duty. That education is a duty implies many things. One of the implications, however, is that a moral person cannot forsake the responsibility of public education for society. This does not imply that a person cannot also be an advocate

¹⁴⁴ Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6:449

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 6:499

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 6:450.

of private education. However, to fail to support the means for everyone to become educated, it seems, is to fail in our duty to love humanity practically.

§11—The Ethical Commonwealth: Kant’s Unrealized Potential

In this chapter, I have argued that Kant believes the goal of education is to awaken students’ latent rational abilities and to apprentice students to the rational community. In this way students may become members of the ethical commonwealth which furthers the development of humanity towards the highest good. I have also argued Kant implies that everyone has a duty to education, a duty which is implied by our duties to love others and become a friend to humanity. In arguing for these points, Kant has done an excellent job of building on Rousseau’s educational project and addressing some of Rousseau’s lingering concerns. Kant agrees with Rousseau that society is a potentially enslaving place for individuals, and he agrees with Rousseau that education must focus on creating the type of environment which allows students to form a robust and free will. Kant solves Rousseau’s educational worries because Kant embraces the conflict we face in society as potentially educative and tied to our ability to develop our rationality and capacities of morality and justice. Kant also shows that it is possible to educate students in a way that respects the student and encourages moral autonomy. He further argues that education can and must become the duty of everyone.

This is why the ethical commonwealth is crucial for Kant. It is only by uniting ourselves under a common goal that we ensure that our actions are not only moral and just but that they work for the good and happiness of everyone. It seems that Kant believes that it is only through uniting in this ethical commonwealth that we are actually able to bring about the final goal of humanity, as described in Kant’s *Universal History*

essay. Given the importance of the ethical commonwealth, one might wonder how Kant envisions us operating in ethical commonwealth and what specific attitudes or virtues or dispositions are necessary to enable us to work for the highest good. I think Kant is aware that these ideas are very important, and he begins to address some of them in his third critique, but he is unable in his lifetime to fully develop the potential in his own educational and political philosophy. One of the great contributions of Hegel's philosophy is that he develops some aspects of Kant's philosophy that Kant was unable to develop.

Chapter Three: Hegel's Extension of Kant

§1—Introduction: Hegel, Education and Justice

It may at first seem strange to include a chapter about Hegel in a study of education or even to speak about such a thing as “Hegel’s educational philosophy”. Unlike Rousseau, Kant, and the later educators I will address in this dissertation, Hegel never wrote a book or an essay specifically devoted to the topic of education. However, there are several key reasons I believe that Hegel’s educational philosophy is important to consider when exploring the connection between education and justice. First, even though Hegel did not write a specific book or essay about education, we will see shortly that education is central to Hegel’s project and directly related to Hegel’s central concerns. Education is also of key importance in Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, his work which details the working out of justice in society. Paragraph 187 in the *Philosophy of Right* is an especially rich, although brief, discussion of education. I believe that this paragraph expresses the core of Hegel’s educational philosophy. Hegel states explicitly in this paragraph that “Education, in its absolute determination, is...liberation and work towards a higher liberation.”¹⁴⁷

This liberation Hegel speaks of, as we shall see, is certainly the liberation of the individual from what Hegel describes as a natural state of immediacy. This immediacy is a state in which the person is sunk into a type of barbarism that makes the full expression of freedom impossible.¹⁴⁸ However, as we shall also see, in liberating the individual, education also helps to create a fully just society. Justice for Hegel is the full flourishing of both individual freedom and the idea of freedom, and for the rest of my dissertation, I

¹⁴⁷ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 225

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 52

will also be using the term *justice* in this way. Hegel believes that education is directly tied both to the ability of a person to achieve freedom and also for a society to achieve justice. He argues that those two things are actually identical. Hegel's era was an era filled with a great passion for education and education's connection to human flourishing and justice. Given that he wrote about education and justice in such an era, his ideas about education are significant in their own right.

However, there are other two other reasons why I believe it is important to study Hegel's ideas and the way in which they pertain to justice. First, Hegel's philosophy is important for this study because Hegel takes himself to be in conversation with both Rousseau and Kant, whom he references throughout his philosophy. Therefore, if we are to understand how the trajectory of Rousseau and Kant's thought developed, specifically in regards to education and justice, Hegel is an important heir to these ideas. Second, I think Hegel is especially significant to the trajectory of thought in this dissertation because of the way Hegel's work was taken up by later educators, especially practitioners of critical theory like Herbert Marcuse and Paulo Freire, on whom my later chapters will focus. Hegel not only developed Rousseau's and Kant's ideas on education and justice, but through these developments, introduced important philosophical ideas which significantly influenced the educational projects of these thinkers. Therefore, in order to understand the educational contributions of thinkers like Marcuse and Freire adequately, it is important to grasp the unique philosophical contributions Hegel makes.

In this chapter, I argue that Hegel believes that education is a dialectical process through which teachers cultivate a political disposition in students. This political disposition entails the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation. I

will also argue that Hegel's notion of justice and education develops the potential in Kant's notion of education, specifically the potential in his notion of the ethical commonwealth. In order to argue these things, I first explore the educational milieu of Hegel's day and the way in which Hegel took himself to be connected to Rousseau and Kant's project. Second, I examine important educational remarks Hegel makes in *Philosophy of Right*. Specifically, I will point out the way in which the political disposition is the end goal of education for Hegel. Third, I examine the way in which the dialectic undergirds Hegel's notion of education. I will also discuss the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation that I believe are entailed in Hegel's political philosophy and therefore his educational philosophy. Lastly, I examine what I believe are specific, concrete examples of Hegel's educational philosophy. I suggest that these educational insights are especially illuminated by the educational philosophy and practices of John Dewey.

§2—The Educational Fervor of Hegel's Day

The educational fervor present in Kant's lifetime continued and even strengthened during Hegel's life. The cultural milieu of Hegel's time was marked by a great hope that education could bring about universal freedom and enlightenment. As we are about to examine Hegel's contribution to the discussion of education and justice, it is helpful to take a moment to examine some of the educational ideas that were most influential during his lifetime.

One of the most influential educators of Hegel's era was Heinrich Pestalozzi, a Swiss educator and admirer of Rousseau's work whose educational method was especially concerned with loving pupils and treating them with dignity. Pestalozzi's

schools were known for abolishing spanking and rote drill in the classroom and for cultivating a loving and nurturing relationship between the student and the teacher. His educational ideas were popular all over Europe, but they were especially popular in Prussia, where Pestalozzi had several devoted disciples, such as the philosopher Fichte who was a student of Kant's philosophy and later influenced Hegel's philosophy. Fichte, a committed educator and philosopher, also contributed greatly to the educational ideas of Hegel's time. Fichte wrote in his *Address to the German Nation* on the importance of education for achieving the freedom of the individual and the human species as a whole. In this address, Fichte stresses the importance of educating the human will for freedom. Fichte argues that the goal of education is to fashion the will of the students so that they so intimately identify the good with their own will, that they can will nothing but the good, and their character becomes stable and fixed. Fichte critiques past educational projects because he says they have

never succeeded in making its picture of a moral world order so vivid that the pupil is seized by ardent love and longing for it, and by the glowing emotion that impels him to represent it in life and before which selfishness falls away like a withered leaf; that consequently this education has been a long way from reaching down to the root of the real stirrings and motions of life and cultivating it.¹⁴⁹

Fichte argues further that the old kind of education has not at all been the "art of cultivating humanity."¹⁵⁰ Fichte wants to create an educational system that shapes the very will of students and creates a new kind of human being. Fichte writes, "All education strives to bring forth a fixed, definite and permanent being [*Sein*], one that no longer becomes but is and can be nothing else but what it is."¹⁵¹ In order to accomplish

¹⁴⁹ Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, pg. 18

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, pg. 18

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, pg. 23

such an education, Fichte argues that education must appeal to students' rationality and love and show them how the good is but their own rationality and good.¹⁵² By introducing this love of the good and the rational early in students, Fichte argues that it destroyed the possibility of immorality because students' wills have become so bent towards the good, that there is no room for the immoral.¹⁵³

Fichte's goal is certainly that this cultivated love for reason in the student will eventually result in a changed society. Fichte further argues that previously, education has failed because it has only focused on stirring students' loves for their sensuous conditions, and it has aimed at convincing students that by educating themselves, their sensuous conditions would be improved.¹⁵⁴ Fichte notes, however, that this kind of education is fundamentally flawed because "with this method of education he who has become outwardly a harmless or useful citizen remains inwardly a wicked person, for wickedness consists precisely in loving only one's sensuous well-being and being motivated solely by hope and fear for that sensuous well-being".¹⁵⁵ In other words, this type of education cultivates students who are whited sepulchers: they look good on the outside but are decaying on the inside. Fichte argues that this previous type of education must be replaced by an education that "aims directly at the good, simply and as such for its own sake, and plants it in the minds of all those whom we wish to reckon among our nation".¹⁵⁶ In this address, Fichte writes of the new education that it is conducted in such a way that students see that educational principles are their very own principles—the

¹⁵² Ibid

¹⁵³ Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, pg. 24

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, pg. 24-25

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, pg. 24

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, pg. 25

laws of freedom and their own good.¹⁵⁷ This rational good is the good of every rational being. Therefore, as educators cultivate students in this manner, they cultivate the entire human race.

In his work *On the Vocation of the Scholar*, Fichte echoes these ideas when he emphasizes that the role of the scholar is to advance the whole human race. He writes to these scholars

When I teach something to you, I am most probably teaching unborn millions. Some among you may be well enough disposed toward me to imagine that I sense the dignity of my own special vocation, that the highest aim of my reflections and my teaching will be to contribute towards advancing culture and elevating humanity in you and in all those with whom you come into contact, and that I consider all philosophy and science which do not aim at this goal to be worthless.¹⁵⁸

In Fichte's concern that education be primarily concerned with the furthering of the good of humanity, we see both the influence Rousseau and Kant, both of whose writings Fichte was very familiar with.¹⁵⁹

Influenced by the ideas of educators and philosophers such as Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Kant and Fichte, people increasingly believed that education was not just for the elite but that it must be for everyone. They further believed that it was through education that a nation was unified and the spirit of a nation was solidified. It was

¹⁵⁷ Fichte, *Addresses to the German Nation*, pgs. 25-27

¹⁵⁸ Fichte, "Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar's Vocation", pg. 152.

¹⁵⁹ If time and space permitted, it would certainly be right to detail Fichte's educational views in this dissertation. Fichte is directly and intimately influenced by Kant's philosophy, and therefore, I think more work should be done in the future to examine the way in which Kant's and Fichte's educational philosophies complement each other. Nevertheless, I decided to focus on Hegel in this chapter. I have done this specifically for two reasons. First, as I mention later in this chapter, Hegel's entire corpus could be considered to be an examination of the education of human reason and freedom. Therefore, I think Hegel's philosophy holds some very interesting insight about how notions of justice develop dialectically and educationally in general in humanity. Secondly, Hegel's philosophy was a very important influence on later critical theorists like Marcuse and Freire, whose educational philosophies play an important role in this project. Therefore, although Fichte's educational philosophy is certainly valuable in its own right, I am especially interested in the connection between the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Freire.

through education, the promise of equality and progress was realized. Furthermore, people became increasingly concerned that teachers and schools honor the dignity and rationality of the student, cultivating a the free will bent towards the good. Thus, Hegel lived in a time in which it was not only the case that educational revolution was underfoot, but the Prussia of Hegel's day was actually one of the foremost nations involved in the pursuit of educational revolution. When we understand this educational climate, it helps to illuminate some of the primary concerns of Hegel's educational philosophy. We shall see shortly that Hegel believes that education has, simultaneously, the interests of the individual and the State in mind and that for Hegel there is no dichotomy between these two. We will also see that for Hegel, the good of the individual, society, morality and justice are all intimately intertwined, and education is immediately concerned with this good.

§3—Hegel in Connection with Rousseau and Kant

Before examining Hegel's educational ideas more thoroughly, it is helpful to gain an idea of the way in which Hegel takes himself to be in conversation with Rousseau and Kant about matters of education and justice. Hegel agrees with Kant's view of the state of nature (and his critique of Rousseau), but Hegel also critiques Kant's notion of morality and justice. Gaining an understanding of this critique will help to clarify the goal Hegel is trying to accomplish in the *Philosophy of Right* and the way in which education specifically pertains to that goal.

Hegel, like Kant, believes that human beings can only become free in society and, therefore, believes that education must prepare students to be good citizens and strive for a fully just state. Like Kant, Hegel believes that the state of nature is not one of freedom

because human beings are not free by nature, nor are they born free.¹⁶⁰ Rather, Hegel argues, freedom is something that must be won, and this winning of freedom is accomplished “through an endless process involving the discipline of knowledge and will.”¹⁶¹ Hegel argues that the state of nature is a “condition of injustice, of indolence, of untamed natural drives, in human acts, and emotions.”¹⁶² It is a state in which the person also has no volitional control over her life but is immersed in a kind of immediacy of drives and passions, and so she can’t take up any particular orientation or responsibility towards the world.

Hegel also agrees with Kant that it is in society with other people who present challenges and opportunities to us that we have the chance to develop our natural predispositions and to become fully ethical and free. For both Kant and Hegel, there is ultimately no conflict between the fully realized ends of the individual and society. It is not the case for Kant and Hegel that education must choose between the flourishing of one or the other because they believe that when conducted rightly, education supports the flourishing of both. In direct critique of Rousseau, Hegel writes

Those pedagogical experiments in removing people from the ordinary life of the present and bringing them up in the country (cf. Rousseau’s *Emile*) have been futile, because one cannot successfully isolate people from the laws of the world...the individual attains his right only by becoming the citizen of a good state.¹⁶³

While Hegel agrees with Kant’s critique of Rousseau, Hegel also critiques Kant on several points. I do not fully agree with Hegel’s critique of Kant, but I believe it is

¹⁶⁰Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, pg. 43

¹⁶¹ Ibid

¹⁶² Ibid

¹⁶³Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 196

important to understand Hegel's critique in order to understand why he develops his political and educational project the way he does.

The first thing Hegel critiques Kant for is a supposed dichotomy between morality and the material, sensuous world. As we have seen, Kant believes that our emotions and sensuous conditions cannot be the grounding of morality or else this make morality heteronomous and unstable. Hegel is concerned that this view unnecessarily dichotomizes reason and sensuousness in a way that is ultimately undermining. Hegel notes that Spirit cannot ultimately separate reason and sensuousness because the sensuous world is where morality is actualized.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore, Hegel argues that formal freedom only has content in the subjects' "Natural subjective existence—its needs, passions, opinions, fancies, etc." and that "the satisfaction of this content is welfare or happiness".¹⁶⁵ Therefore, to try to separate the formal moral decision from its connection with the sensuous world is to undermine the possibility of moral decision-making. Hegel emphasizes the manner in which our humanity is necessarily connected to our moral decision-making when he writes

The fact that [the person] is a living being is not contingent, however, but in accordance with reason, and to that extent he has a right to make his needs his end. There is nothing degrading about being alive, and we do not have the alternative of existing in a higher spirituality. It is only by raising what is present and given to a self-creating process that the higher sphere of the good is attained (although this distinction does not imply that the two aspects are incompatible).¹⁶⁶

This quote indicates Hegel's notion that morality and justice are not principles we obtain *a priori* and then next apply to our sensuous conditions. Rather, they grow out of the very

¹⁶⁴Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*: §603

¹⁶⁵ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 150

¹⁶⁶ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 151

material of our day-to-day lives when we “[raise] what is present” and give it “to a self-creating process.” We will soon see that education is the process by which people learn to do this very thing.

Hegel’s second critique, a critique of the Kantian conception of justice, is related to his critique of Kantian morality. We must recall that Kant clearly demarcates morality—the inner realm of freedom—and justice—the external realm of freedom. Hegel believes that this view of freedom focuses exclusively on the arbitrary will of the individual rather than recognizing there is also a universal idea of freedom which is “being in and for itself.”¹⁶⁷ Hegel argues that freedom is an Idea that works itself out in objective existence and has necessary structures and relations in the world. A focus on the individual and arbitrary freedom, however, completely overlooks freedom’s actual existence as Idea. Hegel argues further that this view of the freedom is deficient and can never lead to a fully just society that allows for complete human flourishing. Furthermore, Hegel would certainly argue that an education based solely on a notion of freedom as individual and arbitrary cannot hope to bring about a fully just society either.

I believe that Hegel’s critique of Kant fails to recognize two important ideas in Kant’s philosophy which we have already discussed. First, as I noted in the last chapter on Kant, Kant certainly believes that our sensuousness conditions must support morality. As we have seen, Kant clearly notes that wretched material conditions can make it very hard for us to be moral. This is why he is so concerned in *Lectures on Pedagogy* that teachers not make their students miserable. Second, although Kant does indeed carefully demarcate the sphere of internal and external freedom, he certainly realizes as we have

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, pg. 58

seen that in order for the highest good to be achieved, society must work together under a common purpose in the ethical commonwealth to achieve this highest good. Kant is aware of the types of concerns Hegel raises regarding our material conditions and the expression of freedom in the world, but he does not work out fully in his own writings a satisfactory resolution to these concerns.

Nevertheless, while I believe Hegel fails to recognize Kant's awareness of these concerns, I believe that Hegel's perception of Kant's failure, whether it is an accurate perception or not, inspires him to craft a political philosophy that develops the potential in Kant's moral and political philosophy, especially Kant's notion of the ethical commonwealth. Furthermore, since Hegel's educational philosophy is inspired by his political philosophy, I believe Hegel's educational philosophy is an important extension of Kant's educational philosophy. Specifically, I believe Hegel's philosophy shows how skilled moral judgment develops in the ethical commonwealth and the kind of practices that allow it to develop. We will now examine key remarks Hegel makes about education in *Philosophy of Right*.

§4—Hegel and Education

Paragraph 187 of *Philosophy of Right* contains a detailed look at Hegel's educational philosophy, so it is helpful to look at it to gain a clear understanding of Hegel's view of education. First it is helpful to understand why Hegel believes that children need to be educated. Hegel views the young child much like someone in the state of nature. The state of the young, uneducated child is a state of immediacy and arbitrariness. Hegel notes that for the young child, reason (which is the essence of the child as a human being) is only an inward and undeveloped potential. Because the child's

freedom is only this internal possibility, it is also external in that freedom must be imposed upon the child through “the will of its parents, the learning of its teachers, and in general the rational world that surrounds it.”¹⁶⁸

In this state in which the child’s freedom is imposed upon him by external forces, he is not living as a fully flourishing human being because the defining characteristic of human beings is that they are self-determining and responsible, and young children are not yet able to be self-determining and responsible. When humans determine themselves, they (as free human beings) are present in everything they do. Hegel writes, contrasting the educated and uneducated person, that

[The distinctive interest of a human] consists precisely in the fact that the human being knows himself as absolute and determines himself. The uncivilized human being lets everything be dictated to him by brute force and by natural conditions; children have no moral will and allow themselves to be determined by their parents...¹⁶⁹

And he concludes with noting the type of consciousness that is the goal of every person and all education: “but the cultivated and inwardly developing human being wills that he should be present in everything he does.”¹⁷⁰ Since the child as a rational being does have freedom as its concept but this freedom is merely an inward possibility, the child must be educated. Hegel writes

The human being, in his immediate existence in himself, is a natural entity, external to his concept; it is only through the development of his own body and spirit, essentially by means of his self-consciousness comprehending itself as free, that he takes possession of himself and becomes his own property as distinct from that of others.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 136-137

¹⁶⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, pg. 136-137

¹⁷⁰ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 136-137

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, pg. 86

When the student is educated so that her freedom is developed, she becomes what she really is, and she is self-determining. Hegel says that she takes on an existence which is “purely its own and free.”¹⁷²

The means by which this pure and free existence is achieved is the process of a person representing her drives and working with and through her sensuous conditions so that her drives obtain a universal quality. This universal quality is a cultivated - understanding about the proper way in which to order the drives as a system. In this way, the drives aim for the sum total of happiness, rather than aiming for merely capricious fancies. Hegel writes

When reflection applies itself to the drives, representing them, estimating them, and comparing them with one another and then with the means they employ, their consequences, etc., and with a sum total of satisfaction—i.e. with happiness—it confers formal universality upon the material and purifies it, in this external manner of its crudity and barbarity. This cultivation of the universality of thought is the absolute value of education.¹⁷³

At the beginning paragraph 187 in *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel explains the contrast between the particular and universal will more thoroughly, as well as the way in which this educative process of the drives occurs. He notes that individuals have their own end which they work out in a universal way. This universal way is the means they adopt.¹⁷⁴ However, individual ends are not isolated and arbitrary. Hegel notes that “They can attain their end only in so far as they themselves determine their knowledge, volition, and action in a universal way and make themselves links in the chain of this continuum.”¹⁷⁵

¹⁷² Ibid, pg. 87

¹⁷³ Ibid, pg. 52

¹⁷⁴ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 224

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, pg. 224

Hegel suggests in this quote that there are ways of working out individual ends that are recognized by general humanity as legitimate and purposeful. It is only by figuring out and adopting these means of working out ends that people actually create a harmonious and stable society that achieves the good for everyone.

Therefore, Hegel implies that as people work out their ends, this is not merely an individualistic, isolated affair. While human ends are particular, they are also universal in that there are only certain types of ends that can be recognized as legitimate human ends: namely ends that allow the further expression of human will, rationality and freedom as a universal experience. Once rationality is externalized in the world, it has an objectivity that can be evaluated and recognized as valid or not. Therefore, the particular individual is also universal in that it possesses human rationality and freedom. In addition, it has an objective existence and is characterized by participating in necessary relationships with others in order to express its freedom. These necessary relationships are the relationships that naturally come about when human beings externalize their rationality and freedom in ways that can be recognized by everyone. Therefore, human rationality to be free must be worked out in certain ways. Kant has already suggested this, as I noted in the last chapter, in his discussion of the connection of our sensuous conditions to our moral capacities. Hegel extends Kant's ideas by giving us a few more details about how freedom is articulated fully in our sensuous conditions and the way our judgement develops to guide this articulation.

Hegel notes that through individual actions, the Idea is worked out, and this Idea "is the process whereby their individuality and naturalness are raised, both by natural necessity and by their arbitrary needs to formal freedom and formal universality of

knowledge and volition.” In this process, subjectivity is educated in its particularity.¹⁷⁶ When people only focus on actualizing their own individual will, however, and forget that there is a universal aspect to will, Hegel argues that they miss the “nature of spirit” and the “end of reason.”¹⁷⁷ In this they fail to understand the way in which rationality and freedom is working itself out in the world.

It is the working out of this universal will and its objective existence in the world with its necessary relationships that Hegel believes is the goal of education. He argues further that this process is a liberating process. Hegel notes that education liberates Spirit so that it can both impose finitude upon itself through its work in the world and by working on this finitude, raise it to universality. In this way, Spirit finds itself in its world and is at home there. This is a world where both the individual and the universal person is free. He writes that

Spirit attains its actuality only through internal division, by imposing this limitation and finitude upon itself in [the shape of] natural needs and the continuum of this external necessity, and, in the very process of adapting itself to these limitations, by overcoming them and gaining its objective existence within them.¹⁷⁸

The goal of education is neither to return to the state of nature nor to promote merely individual pleasure. Rather the goal is to move from immediacy to universality and understanding. Hegel writes about the goal that it is

to work to eliminate natural simplicity, whether as passive selflessness or as barbarism of knowledge and volition—i.e. to eliminate the immediacy and the individuality in which spirit is immersed, so that this externality may take on the rationality of which it is capable, namely the form of universality or of the understanding.”¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁶ *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 224

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 224

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 224

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pg. 225

Hegel argues that when Spirit does this, it is at home in its world because it is “at home and with itself in externality as such”¹⁸⁰ and “Spirit becomes for itself and has to do only with what it has impressed its seal upon and produced itself.” Therefore, for Hegel, education is a liberation from immediacy, individual arbitrariness, and caprice to genuine being for self, a being that has necessary structure.¹⁸¹ He writes that “Education, in its absolute determination is therefore liberation and work towards a higher liberation.”¹⁸²

Hegel notes that the opposite of an educated will is a will that is driven by capricious and arbitrary drives that pull a person this way and that and make its existence contingent. This is irrational. Our drives need to be ordered so that they reflect a rational and coherent system which is in line with our concept— that is the concept of a free and rationally willing being. When the drives become “a rational system of the will’s determinations”, then we grasp abstract property, morality and ethical substance, which is what the science of right is.¹⁸³

When the drives are purified in this way, human beings develop a second nature in which their natural subjective will is purified and raised into a rational, ethical nature. Education teaches students how a rationally ordered will can become their second nature, a spiritual nature, so that pursuing their happiness and freedom in the world through relationships with others is natural, easy and habitual for them.¹⁸⁴ He writes that education is

¹⁸⁰ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 225

¹⁸¹ Ibid

¹⁸² Ibid

¹⁸³ Ibid, pg. 51

¹⁸⁴ We should notice here how Hegel’s notion of an ethical nature is similar to Fichte’s notion explored at the beginning of the chapter: namely that the purpose of education is to create a new will in students that is wholly bent towards the good and towards rationality.

the art of making human beings ethical; it considers them as natural beings and shows them how they can be reborn, and how their original nature can be transformed into a second, spiritual nature so that this spirituality becomes habitual to them. In habit, the opposition between the natural and the subjective will disappears, and the resistance of the subject is broken; to this extent, habit is part of ethics, just as it is part of philosophical thought, since the latter requires that the mind should be trained to resist arbitrary fancies and that these should be destroyed and overcome to clear the way for rational thought.¹⁸⁵

When humans develop this second ethical and rational nature, they fulfill the vocation of man because they understand what good and evil is, and they are able to take responsibility for their actions. Hegel writes

This is the seal of the absolutely high vocation of Man, that he or she knows what is good and what is evil, and that is for him or her to will either the good or the evil. It is the mark of the human, in other words, to be capable of bearing such responsibility, not only for the evil but also for the good; and responsibility not only for this, that, or another thing, but responsibility for the good and evil stemming from his or her individual freedom.¹⁸⁶

As people are educated and learn to take responsibility for their own action and act in a rational way, the universal will is worked out in the world in such a way that human beings recognize themselves in the world and are at home both in it and their relationships with other people. Ultimately, this process develops in people a political disposition which allows them to forge a community of trust (and love as we shall later see) in which they find individual fulfillment. Hegel says about this political disposition that it is

patriotism in general...This disposition is in general one of trust or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest and end of an other (in this case, the state), and in the latter's relations to me as an individual. As a result, this other

¹⁸⁵ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 19

¹⁸⁶ Hegel, *Phenomenology of History*, pg. 37

immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free.¹⁸⁷

I would like to suggest here that Hegel's description of the political disposition, which is his end goal of education, is almost identical to Kant's notion of the goal of the ethical commonwealth. We have seen in Kant's ethical commonwealth that human beings unite under the same goal of pursuing the highest good, and in doing so, they work out a society in which happiness and morality are united. Everyone is treated as an end in themselves, and people's material world is arranged in such a way that it supports their moral flourishing. Thus, if Kant's goal for education is a commitment to the ethical commonwealth and Hegel's end goal of education is the political disposition, it appears that Kant and Hegel's end goal for education is one and the same. What is especially helpful about Hegel's philosophy in relation to Kant's is that he describes how this political disposition develops, and his description carries some important implications for education. Hegel's description of how the political disposition develops is related to the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation.

Before I move on to Hegel's description of the way that the political disposition develops, the four practices mentioned above and the implications it carries for Hegel's educational philosophy, I would like to focus on several claims Hegel makes about education in paragraph 187. These are claims that will help us better understand Hegel's further description of how the political disposition develops. Hegel claims that there are several goals of education:

- (i) Education cultivates students' internal and external awareness of their freedom.

¹⁸⁷ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 288

- (ii) Education cultivates this awareness by providing opportunities for students to purify their drives in a way that their external expression of these drives is recognized by others.
- (iii) As education cultivates students' awareness in this way, it helps them to develop a "a rational system of the will's determinations" which allows them to recognize themselves as free beings in their relationships with other people who have gone through a similar process.
- (iv) When students recognize themselves and others in this manner, they have cultivated a political disposition

I do not mean to suggest that these four implications of Hegel's educational philosophy are the only important implications. I do believe, however, that these four implications are at the heart of Hegel's educational philosophy. I believe further that these four implications are directly tied to four other practices central to Hegel's writing: the practices¹⁸⁸ of recognition, responsibility, right, and reconciliation. If it is true that these key implications are tied to the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation, then any education that wishes to develop a just society must encourage these practices. I will soon examine these practices and how they are tied to Hegel's

¹⁸⁸ I am exercising some license in referring to recognition, right, responsibility and reconciliation as practices and in referring to them specifically as practices of Hegel's political and educational philosophy. Hegel neither refers to these ideas as practices nor does he refer to them specifically as practices of education. I believe, however, that the word *practice* is the correct word to use here. All of the practices that I am discussing certainly have an internal aspect to them, but they also entail an external expression and without this external expression, they are incomplete. Therefore, I will show that the practices of recognition, right, responsibility, and reconciliation all begin with an internal moment of reflection but are completed in external practice. Furthermore, these practices are integral to Hegel's political philosophy, as I will show in this chapter. Since Hegel's educational and political philosophy share the same end goal—the political disposition—then, I believe it is right to say that the practices that are integral to Hegel's political philosophy are also integral to his educational philosophy.

educational philosophy. But first it is important to examine Hegel's notion of the dialectic because the guiding notion of Hegel's entire educational method is that it is a dialectical process.

§5—The Dialectic

Hegel's conception of the dialectic governs his understanding of the whole process of education, and for Hegel the dialectical process is present in the reflection and action of each individual. In all of Hegel's works, Hegel notes that the process of the Idea coming to its full fruition in the world is a process of development. It is not a state or end goal that can be achieved all at once. Freedom does not spring forth fully formed from the head of Zeus, or from the head of anyone for that matter. Rather, Hegel portrays freedom as something that is won through a process that inevitably involves failed shapes of consciousness and the difficult and sometimes tortuous movement towards more fully concrete understanding. While the *Phenomenology* and the *Philosophy of Right* suggests that the Idea is now fully embodied in the world in the State and Absolute Knowing, this does not entail that Hegel believes that each person possesses a fully articulated understanding of freedom themselves. Indeed, as we have already seen, Hegel believes that people must be educated for the very reason that they lack this full understanding.

Hegel writes that

Freedom as an ideal dimension of original nature, does not exist as an original and natural state. On the contrary, it must be achieved and won, and indeed won through an endless process involving the discipline of knowledge and will.¹⁸⁹

That freedom is won through “an endless process involving discipline of knowledge and will” suggests an educative process that continues throughout a person's entire life. That

¹⁸⁹Hegel, *Introduction to the Philosophy of History*, pg. 43

this wining of freedom is a process of discipline suggests that it is dialectical, just as the process of the Idea articulating itself in the world is dialectical. Indeed, Hegel himself seems to conceptualize the education of the individual as a dialectical process. He writes about the student that

He begins with Childhood—mind wrapt up in itself. His next step is the full-developed antithesis, the strain and struggle of a universality which is still subjective (as seen in ideals, fancies, hopes, ambitions) against his immediate individuality. And that individuality marks both the world which, as it exists, fails to meet his ideal requirements, and the position of the individual himself who is still short of independence and not fully equipped for the part he has to play (youth). Thirdly, we see man in his true relation to this environment, recognizing the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world as the work which it collectively achieves to afford the individual a place and a security of this performance. By this share in this collective work he first is really somebody, gaining an effective existence and an objective value.¹⁹⁰

This quote conveys a dialectical process of the student striving to understand his world originally as an abstract self; failing at first to reconcile himself to and to find himself in his world; and then moving to more concrete levels of understanding and liberation. This eventual liberation is a concrete liberation that reconciles the student with his world and helps him, as we see in the quote above, “recognize the objective necessity and reasonableness of the world.” The process, then, is a movement from abstract to concrete understanding.

In order to understand how this process of concrete understanding develops for Hegel, it is helpful to examine how the Idea comes to know itself in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.¹⁹¹ The *Phenomenology* can be viewed as the education of World Spirit and

¹⁹⁰Hegel, *Philosophy of Mind*, pg. 173

¹⁹¹ It is important to note that at the end of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel believes that Absolute Spirit is realized, and reason is now at home in the world. Therefore, I am using interpretive license to suggest that reason’s dialectical development in the *Phenomenology* is similar to the dialectical development of the individual. I believe this interpretive move is legitimate as long as it is stipulated that individual

therefore, it sheds light on the process by which individuals become educated, although it is not necessarily the case that individual people must pass through all of the shapes of consciousness that Spirit experiences in the *Phenomenology*. When we examine the tortuous process World Spirit goes through and the lessons it learns about its knowing in the *Phenomenology*, this sheds light on educative experience of the individual's dialectical journey.

In the *Phenomenology*, Hegel describes the dialectical process as one of constant trial and error in which spirit recognizes that our cognition of knowledge always changes knowledge is some way and that we are not getting the whole truth.¹⁹² Given that our grasping hold of knowledge always changes or distorts the truth, Hegel suggests that we must revise our concept of error. If we refuse to act for fear of error, this fear actually perpetuates error because it already presupposes that we are distinct from our knowledge.¹⁹³ Hegel writes

It presupposes that cognition which, since it is excluded from the Absolute, is surely outside of the truth as well, is nevertheless true, an assumption whereby what calls itself fear of error reveals itself rather as *fear of truth*. [italics mine]¹⁹⁴

Hegel argues that we become fixated on “getting it right” and in doing so, we cling dogmatically to particular concepts that we believe fully capture the truth but that actually fail to do so. Hegel suggests that the proper attitude to take in this dialectical endeavor is skepticism towards our knowledge in that any knowledge we possess cannot

consciousness does not move through every shape of consciousness in the *Phenomenology* but shares a similar process of grasping and error and learning, as is characterized by the dialectic in the *Phenomenology*.

¹⁹² Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pgs. 46-47

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, pg. 47

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid*

be considered complete knowledge but only knowledge as it appears to us at the time.¹⁹⁵ If we take this stance, then, we must in a way always be reaching beyond ourselves. We must grasp knowledge and realize that in this grasping we are grasping a knowledge that will soon lead to new ways of knowing.

Once again, it is important to note that in at the *Phenomenology*, it appears that Hegel believes Absolute Knowing has overcome the separation between itself and the world and that it is now at home in the world. Nevertheless, even if Absolute Knowing has reached this stage, this does not entail that people are born into a world with a perfect, dialectically complete knowledge of their world. If we consider this way of viewing knowledge in relation to the individual's educative process, it seems likely that Hegel does not envision students coming to a final and complete stage of knowing such as the end achieved by Absolute Knowing. Rather, the knowing of an individual is a knowing that has rid itself of abstractions and that understands the world in its concreteness and connection. It has therefore reconciled itself to the world by overcoming its seeming irrationality.

What is important to note about this dialectic process, as has been mentioned, is that it is an understanding that must be won through attempts and failures. This failure is an inherently necessary part of the nature of finite human beings who must win their knowledge and freedom by proceeding from an abstract understanding to an increasingly concrete understanding of knowledge and freedom. Because every person's educational process is necessarily dialectical, and because people's educational processes also entail a development of the practices of recognition, responsibility, and right, it is now important

¹⁹⁵ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pg. 50

to investigate the role these practices play in Hegel's philosophy in general. In doing this, we will then be in a good position to see how they play a role in Hegel's educational philosophy and how they are developed dialectically in education.

§6—The Practices of Recognition, Responsibility and Right

While Hegel does not explore pedagogical techniques in depth, I believe he gives us quite a few clues about the type of pedagogy that cultivates the political disposition in students. He discusses at great length the process by which the will develops into its full expression of freedom. Therefore, by examining Hegel's description of the full development of the political disposition, we will gain some important insights into possible pedagogical practices that would bring about the full development of freedom.

Two of the most integral concepts to the Hegelian notion of the political disposition are the notions of recognition and the notion of responsibility which is intimately connected to recognition. In his description of the political disposition which we examined earlier in the chapter, Hegel notes that it is a disposition in which I find my interests preserved in another's interests, and at this moment, the other person ceases to be an other for me. Rather, we recognize that in our actions together in the world, we are creating a world which reflects our humanity and freedom. Recognition for Hegel is tied to our ability to honor and respect each other's freedom both in a moment of internal understanding and also through our everyday actions in the world.

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel describes how recognition first develops. Self-consciousness emerges as people become aware of how their subjectivity is inextricably bound up in this process of cognizing the world. In this awareness of subjectivity, self-consciousness is troubled over how to close the gap between what it perceives and what actually is. Self-consciousness then is a desire to close the gap

between appearance and reality.¹⁹⁶ It is through this desire that self-consciousness becomes sensitive to norms and reasons that would confirm what it takes to be true. It is our relationships with other people, Hegel suggests, and their recognition of us, that actually allows us to take up commitments and responsibility. We cannot make commitments to objects because objects cannot provide a challenge to us which allows us to know our commitments as commitments. Challenges from other people allow us to realize that our commitments are not just biological imperatives. In the moment of realizing that we have commitments, we become aware of ourselves as achieving self-consciousness.¹⁹⁷

In both the *Phenomenology* and the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel suggests that a consistent and stable consciousness of ourselves and our freedom only occurs through the recognition of others.¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, Hegel argues that recognition is present at each moment of the state because each moment requires that people take responsibility

¹⁹⁶ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pg. 104

¹⁹⁷ Pippin, pg. 88

¹⁹⁸ Hegel's notion of recognition is a development of Fichte's notion of the Summons, and understanding the Summons can be helpful in understanding Hegel's notion of recognition. Fichte introduces his notion of the Summons in *Foundation for Natural Right*, and he does so in the context of explaining how it humans come to have consciousness of themselves, a condition that is necessary for freedom and rationality. Fichte argues that for a finite being to have consciousness of itself, it must know that it has efficacy (18). However, the only way a finite being can understand itself as efficacious is if it can posit an object upon which it exercises its efficacy, a positing which already seems to presuppose freedom and consciousness. (30). Fichte suggests that we experience our own self-efficacy in the moment of the Summons, which is "a summons to the subject, calling upon it to resolve to exercise its efficacy" (13). This summons comes from my positing of "other finite rational beings outside of itself" (29). In order for the summons to invite me to freedom, it must be a specific kind of summons, namely a summons from something that understands the "freedom of the being to whom it is addressed" (35). So this summons must be from a being capable of having concepts, setting ends and achieving them—in other words, this must be another free and rational being (35). Thus, I must posit the summoner as a rational, free being, and the summoner must posit me as a rational free being (35). If it is the case, then, that our self-consciousness and freedom is immediately bound up with the summons of the other, a moment in which I both recognize myself and my summoner as a free and rational being, then my personhood is inextricably interwoven with other people. For Fichte, then, our ability to be self-conscious is bound up in community. Hegel takes up Fichte's notion of recognition and the importance of community, but he extends Fichte's notion in such a way that recognition actually undergirds and is present at each moment of society.

through their commitments, and this is only something people can do within recognitive relationships with other people. We must note here, however, that the practice of recognition alone does not yet lead to a political disposition. For the political disposition to form fully, we need the practices of responsibility and right and reconciliation. So I will now examine these.

The practice of responsibility, the second practice of the political disposition is directly tied to recognition. I have already discussed the importance of responsibility in my discussion of recognition, but it is important to discuss it a little further at this point. Hegel locates the Idea of freedom in self-consciousness' ability to reflect upon itself and to be responsible in the attempt to forge a home in the world. Recall that we have already seen that Hegel says that "It is the mark of the human, in other words, to be capable of bearing such responsibility...responsibility for the good and evil stemming from his or her individual freedom."¹⁹⁹ We must note here that until a person actually articulates her will in the external world, her will is abstract and not a fully-expressed or developed will. The will that is not externalized is not actually taking up commitments or responsibility, as both entail action. In order for will to become fully expressed in the world, it must externalize itself, but the only way it can do this is to have a network of social relationships to give it a stable framework. Will must be able to take responsibility in a way that is stable and able to be recognized by others. The need for this network of social relationships leads to the third integral practice associated with the political disposition: right.

¹⁹⁹ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, pg. 37

Hegel argues that the system of property and social arrangements that allows the full expression of the will, both particular and individual, is the system of right (or *recht*), which for Hegel is the system that allows for the full expression of freedom.²⁰⁰ Hegel argues, then, that the notion of right and freedom finds its full articulation in the State in which the individual subjective will, with its unique and individual passions, harmonizes with the universal will in the structure of the State. Hegel writes, “The State is the externally existing, genuinely ethical life. It is the union of the universal essential will with the subjective will—and this is ethics.”²⁰¹ Hegel says that the state is the reality wherein the individual has and enjoys his freedom—but only insofar as he knows, believes and wills the universal.²⁰² This universal is the rational quality of a will that is educated so that it loses its completely particular character. In fact, Hegel writes that educated people are people who

...do everything as others do it and who do not flaunt their particular characteristics, whereas it is precisely these characteristics which the uneducated display, since their behavior is not guided by the universal aspects of its object.²⁰³

Since the universal will is the will that does “everything as others do it” and is a will that does not “flaunt [its] particular characteristics”, the universality of will has a necessarily social and communal quality to it. Therefore, Hegel believes that it is only in a fully articulated society, the State, that people become fully human. In fact, the State and the full actualization of human beings for Hegel is inseparable. He writes

We must understand, further, that all the value that human beings possess, all of their spiritual reality, they have through the State alone. Their spiritual reality consists in the fact that their essence—rationality—is

²⁰⁰ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 26

²⁰¹ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, pg. 41

²⁰² *Ibid*

²⁰³ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 226

objectively there for them as knowers, and that rationality has an immediate objective existence for them. Only in that way is man a consciousness, with an ethical way of life, the legal and ethical life of the State.²⁰⁴

Hegel's notion that freedom develops fully in the State is a continuation of Kant's notion that freedom must be worked out fully in society. Hegel develops this ideas, however, because he argues that the development of freedom in the state happens through the full development of the idea of right or freedom and that a fully developed concept of right contains the moments of abstract right, morality and ethics: "The content of this science of right can be expounded with reference to all its individual moments such as right, property, morality...the state, etc."²⁰⁵ I would like to examine each of these moments briefly because they will soon play an important role in my explanation of Hegel's educational philosophy as it is applied in a concrete educational setting.²⁰⁶

The science of right, as Hegel has described it above entails both external and internal expression. For example, the first moment of right is the moment of abstract property in which people externalize their freedom in property and other people's recognition of my freedom as expressed in my property.²⁰⁷ This ownership of property is an externalization of my will, but my will is not yet an internal reality. Hegel argues that

²⁰⁴ Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, pg. 42

²⁰⁵ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 51

²⁰⁶ It is important to note that while I am claiming that all of Hegel's philosophical project is in some sense educative, I am also arguing that Hegel has a unique educational philosophy that is a separate project. One way of understand the difference between Kant's overall philosophical project and his individual educational project is this: Hegel suggests that both Spirit and freedom have reached their full capacity for articulation in the modern world and that individuals must full develop their own capacities in this area. Spirit has completed its education; the individual has not. Furthermore, the individual in her education may not go through every shape of consciousness that Spirit has gone through, but she will certainly follow a path that has some similarities to the education of Spirit. Therefore, Hegel's educational philosophy is informed by the education of Spirit while not replicating it. In addition, the education of Spirit is a macroscopic look at educational processes, while in this individual educational philosophy, Hegel suggests some more detailed and microscopic concerns of which we should be aware.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 103

it is only as I realize I can refuse to recognize other's people's property that I develop this inner sense of my freedom and the concept of morality as the inner expression of freedom develops. In the moment of morality, I develop an inner sense of my will and realize that my particular will is different from the universal will. At the same time, I gain an awareness that my particular will ought to be in line with the universal will, for this is the only way that I can tell that it has a type of legitimacy and is truly free.

If I am to harmonize my particular will with the universal will, however, this desire must be expressed externally into actions in the world, and (as we have seen) these actions must be recognized by other people. In other words, if my moral actions do not count in other people's eyes as moral actions it is difficult for me to be free. Hegel writes,

The concrete person who, as a particular person, as a totality of needs and a mixture of natural necessity and arbitrariness, is his own end, is one principle of civil society. But this particular person stands essentially in relation to other similar particulars, and their relation is such that each asserts itself and gains satisfaction through the others, and thus at the same time through the exclusive mediation of the form of universality.²⁰⁸

Therefore, the external moment of abstract property, and the internal moment of morality call for a third moment—the moment of ethical substance—in which I take responsibility to externalize my will in a way in which my personal, particular will aligns with the universal will. My will is articulated in such a way that society can interpret my actions as moral and rational actions.

The actions that articulate both the internal and external moment of freedom become necessary actions or duties. My duty is that which works for the welfare of both myself and humanity universal. Hegel writes, “What is duty? For this definition, all that

²⁰⁸ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 220

is available so far is this: to do right, and to promote welfare, one's own welfare and the welfare in its universal determination, the welfare of others."²⁰⁹ Hegel continues that my duty is to work for the good, which is the whole aim and end of ethical substance. Hegel writes, "Ethical life is the Idea of freedom as the living good which has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action."²¹⁰ Hegel notes that "Ethical life is accordingly the concept of freedom which has become the existing world²¹¹ and the nature of self-consciousness."²¹²

We must note here that the emphasis that Hegel's system of right places on responsibility that proceeds from responsible reflection and action in recognitive relationships with other people. Freedom is only developed by people actively engaging with their world and purposefully taking up commitments that align with the universal will, a will which is reflected in society's recognition of these actions as legitimate. It is when people take responsibility in a system of right through recognitive relationships with others that the political disposition to develop. This is because they truly see their own interests reflected in the interests of others, and other people are no longer alien to them.

Thus far I have discussed three practices of the political disposition: recognition, responsibility and right. I would now like to discuss the fourth practice: reconciliation. At first it seems as though Hegel does not discuss the practice of reconciliation as in depth as he does the practices of recognition, responsibility and right. However, I believe that the

²⁰⁹ Ibid, pg. 161

²¹⁰ Ibid, pg. 189

²¹¹ We should note here once again the similarities between Hegel's notion of ethical substance and Kant's well-ordered society brought about by a commitment to the ethical commonwealth.

²¹² Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 189

practice of reconciliation undergirds Hegel's entire educational project because reconciliation is connected to the dialectic which undergirds Hegel's entire educational project.

§7—Reconciliation

We have already examined the way in which the individual's process of development is necessary dialectical. We have also seen that because this process is dialectical, it marked by necessary error and failure. It is important to note here that if error and failure is a necessary part of human being's development, then error and failure will also necessarily mark people's relationships with one another as they work to develop a free society and the political disposition. That these necessary errors in our relationships with one another often lead to tragedy seems inevitable. By tragedy, I mean an inevitable collision of wills that occur when people have two different and competing conceptions of the good which they are unable to relinquish. These conflicts often lead to tragedy.

We see such moments of failure, transgression and tragedy in the *Phenomenology* in the master and slave dialectic, the story of Antigone and Creon and the moment of the Beautiful Soul and forgiveness. In each of these moments of consciousness' journey in the *Phenomenology*, conflict erupts between individuals, and it is a type of conflict that results necessarily from the particular defective shape of consciousness that Spirit experiences. In the master and slave dialectic, consciousness only knows how to maintain a sense of itself by initiating a fight to the death with another consciousness, a fight that ends with a master and slave relationship which institutionalizes alienated will and labor.

It is through this defective shape of consciousness that the slave comes to a full awareness of its own freedom, and Spirit moves into another shape of consciousness.

In the story of Antigone and Creon, we see two individuals locked in a deadly struggle that ensues because Antigone and Creon hold two equally legitimate and diametrically-opposed conceptions of the good. The particular shape of consciousness in which Antigone and Creon operate, ancient ethical life, cannot accommodate both of these conceptions of the good and, therefore, Antigone is destroyed. Nevertheless, the tragedy and pain of this moment propels Spirit into a higher stage of understanding and liberation. After experiencing several more troubling and even disastrous shapes of consciousness, Spirit adopts the stance of the Beautiful Soul. In this moment, self-consciousness, wearied by the continual failed attempts of Spirit to articulate itself retreats into itself and refuses to act.²¹³ Spirit relishes communing with beautiful ideas. The Beautiful Soul makes judgments on other people's actions but refuses to act herself.

Eventually, other people realize their fallibility and ask for forgiveness of the Beautiful Soul. At first the Beautiful Soul refuses; however, as other people ask the Beautiful Soul for forgiveness, the Beautiful Soul realizes that they achieve a moral purity equivalent to herself and eventually her hard heart melts. The Beautiful Soul forgives and asks for forgiveness as well.²¹⁴ She is reconciled with the other in her world. In the *Phenomenology*, it is this moment of forgiveness and reconciliation that paves the way for ethical substance to become a reality.

The moment of forgiveness and reconciliation is essential because it shows that Hegel believes that we only become at home in the world when we are reconciled with

²¹³ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pg. 400

²¹⁴ Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, pg. 400

one another and recognize ourselves in the other. This reconciliation seems inherent in the political disposition which Hegel describes in *Philosophy of Right* which, once again, is

in general one of trust or the consciousness that my substantial and particular interest is preserved and contained in the interest an end of an other (in this case, the state), and in the latter's relations to me as an individual. As a result, this other immediately ceases to be an other for me, and in my consciousness of this, I am free.

In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel gives us a further clue to this political disposition when he characterizes it as love. Hegel writes

The first moment in love is that I do not wish to be an independent person in my own right and that, if I were, I would feel deficient and incomplete. The second moment is that I find myself in another person, that I gain recognition in this person, who in turn gains recognition in me. Love is therefore the most immense contradiction; the understanding cannot resolve it, because there is nothing more intractable than this punctiliousness of the self-consciousness which is negated and which I ought nevertheless to possess as affirmative. Love is both the production and the resolution of this contradiction. As its resolution, it is ethical unity.”²¹⁵

In love, I find myself incomplete in my independent state and both gain and give recognition in relationship with another. I find myself in another and am therefore both present with myself and present in the world as well. This loving relationship with others that marks the political disposition then is what allows me to be at home in my world. If our goal is the political disposition that is an ethical unity marked by love and recognition, and if the process of achieving this unity is a dialectical process marked by necessary errors and transgressions, this suggests that educators must cultivate in their students the practice of reconciliation, a practice that allows the political disposition to be maintained despite the inevitable error and transgression that occurs through the

²¹⁵ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 199

dialectical development of our understanding. Reconciliation is the practice which allows the maintaining of this disposition.

The practice of reconciliation is not just a nice and generous gesture for Hegel; it is a necessary practice that allows us to be free. We can only achieve freedom in our cognitive relationships with other people. Therefore, to remain forever estranged from each other because of the tragedies and transgressions we experience together is to refuse to recognize the will and freedom of whole groups of people in society and to remain estranged from ourselves. Reconciliation is the only possibility we have of cultivating our political disposition and preventing ourselves from perpetuating further forms of alienation.

It is important to note that the moment of reconciliation in the *Phenomenology* cannot be a moment in which we merely excuse and dismiss wrongdoing. Hegel believes, as we will soon see, that we must militate against all forms of alienation in society. Hegel also certainly believes that people can do evil and that one of the purposes of education is to help them adopt good rather than evil practices. To do evil, for Hegel, is to promote one's particular, arbitrary will as the universal²¹⁶, a practice which inevitably leads people to destroy others' freedom and lives. That Hegel believes we should militate against all forms of alienation and evil suggests to us that his concept of reconciliation cannot entail the dismissal of injustice.

Rather Hegel's emphasis on reconciliation suggests that sometimes tragedy occurs because there is always an inevitably a gap between our abstract understanding of a matter and its concrete realization in the world. Hegel suggests this when he writes

²¹⁶ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 167

The autonomously acting will, in the ends which it pursues in relation to the existence...it has before it, has an idea of the circumstances which that existence involves. But since, on account of this presupposition, the will is finite, the objective phenomenon is contingent for it, and may contain something other than what was present in the will's idea of it.

In Hegel's description of the acting will, we can imagine examples of government policies that on paper sounded efficient and beneficial but when applied in real life, become inefficient and harmful to the people involved. Hegel writes about the way intentions can go awry when articulated in the world:

But the action, as the end translated into the external world, is at the same time exposed to external forces which attach to it things quite different from what it is for itself, and impel it onto remote and alien consequences.²¹⁷

We readily acknowledge the way in which our own particular actions often pick up "remote and alien consequences" as we articulate them in the world. We often pardon ourselves for the pain these remote and alien consequences cause *others*. We less readily excuse the remote and alien consequences that attach to others' intentions, especially when they cause *us* pain. Hegel's practice of reconciliation is a practice of freedom because it offers us a way to forgive by understanding the moments of tragedy that stem from the dialectical way our understanding develops. Reconciliation also acknowledges the finite stance from which we attempt to articulate our will in the world.

The practice of reconciliation allows freedom to continue flourishing. It reminds us that we must figure out how to live together because we can only be free together. The practice of reconciliation, then, is an awareness of the finitude of human understanding. It is an awareness of the tragedy and pain that sometimes inevitably ensues from such finitude. It is a determination to figure how to make space in universality for particular

²¹⁷ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 145

freedom, even if this requires tragedy and forgiveness. I think Hannah Arendt illuminates Hegel's notion of forgiveness beautifully in *The Human Condition* when she writes (and I think is valuable to quote at length)

The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility—of being unable to undo what one has done though one did not, and could not, have known what he was doing—is the faculty of forgiving. The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises. The two faculties belong together in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, whose “sins” hang like Damocles’ sword over every new generation; and the other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, island so security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men.²¹⁸

In this quote, I think Arendt beautifully illuminates the idea captured in Hegel's notion of reconciliation. Through reconciliation, we are able to recognize that tragedy is often a necessary aspect of our finite condition. Through reconciliation we find a way to recognize our humanity in each other and take responsibility. It allows us to work anew for the preservation of our political disposition.

Having examined Hegel's notion of the dialectic as well as the practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation, the question now is how education can reflect these practices. I will now attempt to answer this question. In doing so, I will first discuss a problem that Hegel believes education must guard against. Then I will suggest concrete ways Hegel's education can be developed in the classroom. To do this, I will draw on the work of educator and philosopher John Dewey.

²¹⁸ Arendt, *The Human Condition*, pg. 237

§8—Problems of Alienation

Given our discussion of Hegel's notion of will and freedom, one of the first things we must realize is that educational practices which alienate and dominate the will must be militated against in any educational system that aspires for Hegelian educational ideals. Hegel certainly implies that militating against alienation is an important part of education. In the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel describes the process by which the essence of humans—their rationality and reason—become alienated. It is important to note that for Hegel, alienation is the process by which either the external or the internal moment of right is blocked or seized from us in some way. We will see in a moment that the blocking of the external and internal moment of right can happen in a wide variety of different ways. What is essential to understand about alienation, however, is that when alienation occurs in any form, it prevents people from being able to fully articulate their freedom in the world. When people cannot do this, they cannot be fully at home in the world with themselves or with others. Hegel suggests, rather than implies directly, that alienation like this can lead to further problems with each other and society such as domination and violence. Hegel writes about alienation

The alienation of intelligent rationality, of morality, ethical life, and religion is encountered in superstition, when power and authority are granted to others to determine and prescribe what actions I should perform...or how I should interpret the dictates of conscience, religious truth, etc.²¹⁹

While Hegel does not specifically mention educators in this quote, the implication is clear that educators who attempt to dictate all of students' actions and beliefs alienate their students' will. They fail to recognize their students' essence which is to be free and

²¹⁹ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 96

responsible. Therefore, it seems that a pedagogy in line with Hegel's educational philosophy would suggest that while a teacher must act as a strong external force in a child's early years, the teacher must increasingly become less of an external controller and more of a facilitator who helps students take responsibility for their freedom in relationships with other students in the classroom, in the school community, and in society at large.

Hegel's philosophy suggests that a teacher who constantly exercises pervasive external control, dictating every aspect of students' beliefs and opinions alienates the students' freedom. Hegel's educational philosophy also suggests that alienation occurs when students are forced constantly to be passive in the classroom, since will can only be properly exercised through making choices. Alienation also occurs when education is conducted in such a way that it does not allow students opportunities to externalize their freedom into property (such as tangible projects on which they are working) or to reflect on this externalization and discuss it with others. Recognition, responsibility and right entail both internal and external expression, so both of these types of expression must also be present in education.

Hegel's educational theory suggests that educators must always be on guard against perpetrating practices of alienation against their students, but his theory also suggests that educators must educate students to recognize patterns of alienation in their relationships with others and in the larger society as a whole. Hegel says that "Examples of the alienation of personality included slavery, serfdom, disqualification from owning property, restrictions on freedom of ownership, etc."²²⁰ Since alienation can still occur in

²²⁰ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 96

society, it is likely that Hegel would consider it important to help students identify alienation in the larger society. This would entail very likely that studies of history would focus on themes of human freedom, will and alienation. These studies would help students critique the way in which the Idea has been alienated or cultivated in the past and the way it is still alienated in society today. In this way, students understand how alienation can be overcome in society as a whole.

One of the best ways that educators militate against alienation in the classroom is by honoring the dialectical nature of students' educational development. Therefore, I will now examine the types of educational practices that honor the dialectic.

§9—Education and the Dialectic

One of the foremost educational implications of the dialectical nature of human understanding is that it suggests that educators must rethink how they present knowledge to the student. One traditional view of the classroom is it is a place in which teachers impart knowledge to their students through concepts which the students then reproduces on tests or in papers. Hegel would not completely eschew this type of educational practice. After all, in order for people to come to know, they must have some kind of starting point, even if that starting point is abstract and ultimately insufficient, as we have already seen in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Spirit must move through a series of abstract and inadequate shapes of consciousness. The failure of each shape propels it towards a more increasingly concrete and adequate shape of knowing.

While Hegel believes that education does entail moments of abstraction, he would criticize education that remains forever locked in the moment of abstraction. Hegel suggests that education must enable students to move beyond the moment of passive

abstract understanding to an active, concrete understanding of their world. In his essay “Who Thinks Abstractly”, Hegel gives an example of such concrete understanding. He gives the example of a murderer who is led to the gallows. The uneducated person, Hegel says, only thinks of the criminal abstractly—purely as a murderer. The educated person, however, is

One who knows men and traces the development of the criminal's mind: he finds in his history, in his education, a bad family relationship between his father and mother, some tremendous harshness after this human being had done some minor wrong, so he became embittered against the social order — a first reaction to this that in effect expelled him and henceforth did not make it possible for him to preserve himself except through crime.²²¹

If the uneducated think in an abstract manner, then an education that wishes to cultivate the student, even if it starts with abstraction must move beyond this and allow students to work out these abstract concepts into concretion. This implies among other things that students must have a thorough understanding of at least some concepts so that they can have a thorough knowledge of the concrete connection of their knowledge. It also implies that for at least some of the things learned in school, students must be able to experience how these concepts play out in the actual world.

While learning abstract concepts from a book or from lectures can be extremely helpful, especially initially, an awareness of the concrete connections of things in the world cannot come about except by actually working on this knowledge in the world. For example, it is one thing to learn about mathematics abstractly through a textbook. It is quite another thing to use mathematical knowledge to try to do work such as growing a garden or developing a budget for a class project. It is one thing to learn about the

²²¹ Hegel. “Who Thinks Abstractly”, pgs. 113-118.

mechanisms and procedures of the government. It is quite another thing to hold a mock congress in the class, have the students take on the roles of senators and congressmen, and have them deliberate on laws that could actually affect the class or school. The latter scenario in both of these cases allows students to gain a concrete understanding of abstract concepts by understanding their connections in concrete existence.

It is important to note at this point that an education that takes the concrete seriously must make room for trial and error and periods of inefficiency. We have already seen that the dialectic, which is the necessary movement of our understanding, is a process by which consciousness moves from an abstract to a concrete understanding, and it is a process that takes many trials and failures. It also often entails that people make serious errors in their attempt to grasp a hold of truth. Thus, knowing is a messy process that involves trial, error, and sometimes serious error. This entails that education must allow for mistakes, error and reconciliation.

Having discussed general Hegelian educational ideas pertaining to alienation and the dialectic, I would now like to explore some particular pedagogical insights implied by Hegel's emphasis on recognition, responsibility, right, and reconciliation. To do this, I would like to draw on John Dewey's educational insights.

§10—John Dewey: An Example of Hegelian Educational Philosophy in Action

Hegel's philosophy is often considered one of the most difficult and opaque philosophical systems of the western tradition. Because of this, it is tempting to wonder if his ideas could be implemented in any consistent and meaningful way in the classroom. Interestingly, Hegel had a strong influence on John Dewey, one of the most famous and influential educators in the United States in the first half of the twentieth century. John

Dewey was born (1859) about twenty years after Hegel's death (1831). Hegel's ideas were very influential in the United States for many years during Dewey's life, and Dewey was especially influenced by a group of group of philosophers called the St. Louis Hegelians who were committed to working out Hegel's philosophical insights, specifically as they pertained to society and education.²²² The St. Louis Hegelians organized and published the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, a journal in which John Dewey published several articles.²²³

Dewey was a student of Hegel's work and mentions Hegel frequently throughout his various educational works such as *Democracy and Education*. In his work on ethics, Dewey explicitly acknowledged that Hegel had an indelible influence on his thinking.²²⁴ While Dewey is sometimes critical of Hegel's thought, Hegel's influence on Dewey is clear in Dewey's works, especially in *Democracy in Education* and *Experience in Education*, two works which I will explore briefly here. I will first explore why Dewey is critical of Hegel, as well as Dewey's basic philosophy of education. I actually take Dewey's educational ideas to be an expression of Hegel's educational philosophy, whether Dewey realized they were or not. I will then discuss the way Dewey practically applies his educational philosophy and note the similarities with Hegel's philosophy.

In *Democracy in Education*, Dewey is critical of Hegel because Dewey argues that Hegel's educational philosophy is too focused on the unfolding of Absolute Spirit, a philosophy which minimizes the individual at the expense of the absolute and community. Dewey further argues that Hegel's educational philosophy leads to a

²²² Good, Good, James A. "John Dewey's 'Permanent Hegelian Deposit' and the Exigencies of War" pg. 293

²²³ Ibid, pg. 295

²²⁴ Ibid

situation in which the individual is swallowed up in the state, the state reflecting the true expression of freedom and absolute expression. This leads to a static and fixed state affairs in which the state's mandates are the truest expression of freedom, and the individual's job is to conform to the state. Education's job, then, is to facilitate the realization of absolute spirit. But once again, Dewey believes that this conception of education undermines the importance of the individual.

As opposing this idea of education, Dewey advocates the notion of philosophy as a process of social formation. Dewey writes in *Democracy and Education* that human life is a constant process of renewal.²²⁵ "It is the very nature of life to strive to continue in being. Since this continuance can be secured only by constant renewals, life is a self-renewing process."²²⁶ Individuals are in a constant state of renewal, and because humans are inevitably surrounded with other people in society, Dewey argues, social groups are also in a state of constant renewal together. Dewey writes "A being connected with other beings cannot perform his own activities without taking the activities of others into account."²²⁷ Dewey writes further, "We have seen that a community or social group sustains itself through continuous self-renewal, and that this renewal takes place by means of the educational growth of the immature members of the group."²²⁸

Dewey argues that living together in society is generally a beneficial thing for humans because "It enlarges and enlightens experience; it stimulates and enriches imagination; it creates responsibility for accuracy and vividness of statement and

²²⁵ Dewey, *Democracy in Education*, pg. 1

²²⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 9

²²⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 12

²²⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 10

thought.”²²⁹ However, community can only be beneficial for folks if the people in it are engaged in a constant process of renewal, and if they are united under a purpose. Dewey writes that if people “were cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a community.”²³⁰ This renewal and shared purpose comes through communication. Dewey writes, “Society not only continues to exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said to exist in transmission, in communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words *common*, *community*, and *communication*. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common.”²³¹ Dewey continues, “The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions—like ways of responding to expectations and requirements.”²³² He writes further of communication that “Communication is a process of sharing experience till it becomes a common possession. It modifies the disposition of both the parties who partake in it.”²³³

What we have noted here thus far then is that Dewey believes that to live, human beings must continually renew themselves as they interact with life, and since humans live with others, communities must continually renew themselves to stay free and vibrant. But it is only in communicating about what they share in common that communities become true communities. This communication is a process of education. Dewey writes,

²²⁹ Ibid, pg. 6

²³⁰ Dewey, *Democracy in Education*, pg. 5

²³¹ Ibid, pg. 4

²³² Ibid

²³³ Ibid, pg. 9

“By various agencies, unintentional and designed, a society transforms uninitiated and seemingly alien beings into robust trustees of its own resources and ideals.”²³⁴ Dewey describes this process of formation when he writes

The particular medium in which an individual exists leads him to see and feel one thing rather than another; it leads him to have certain plans in order that he may act successfully with others; it strengthens some beliefs and weakens other as a condition of winning the approval of others. Thus it gradually produces in him a certain system of behavior, a certain disposition of action.²³⁵

School strives to “reenforce [sic] the power of the best” and “weeding out what is undesirable” in a society.²³⁶ Therefore, for Dewey, education is a process by which people grow and are prepared for greater growth, and it is also a process of a social formation, whereby people are empowered to continually grow in their community.

While Dewey takes his notion of social formation to be different from Hegel’s notion of unfolding, I think Dewey is missing how close his notion of education actually is to Hegel’s. As we have seen already, Hegel’s is concerned with the actualization of both individual freedom and the actualization of freedom the Idea. The two are tied together for Hegel because as people actualize their freedom, they create the network of relationships and ideas that become the state. And it is the state that provides the structure for individual freedom to be realized fully. Therefore, there is really no conflict between individual freedom and the idea of freedom, and both are realized together. Furthermore, if we consider Dewey’s notion of education as growth and social formation, we will see that it harmonizes very well with the elements of Hegel’s educational philosophy that I have been emphasizing in this chapter—recognition, right, responsibility and

²³⁴ Ibid, pg. 10

²³⁵ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, pg. 11

²³⁶ Ibid, pg. 20

reconciliation. Dewey's emphasis on our necessary communal nature and his emphasis on education as social formation entails that students recognize each other as autonomous, continually growing human beings; that students take an active role in reflection and externalization of these commitments; and that students take responsibility for them in their own process of growth.

Lastly, while Dewey does not mention the word reconciliation in his works that I am exploring here, the notion of reconciliation is implicit in his works. As we have seen, Dewey thinks that (i) The defining characteristic of human life is constant growth and renewal; (ii) For human beings that this constant growth and renewal happens necessarily with others and happens best in a community; and (iii) That communities form when people share common purposes. These three points from Dewey's pedagogy suggest that humans grow best when they continually work to forge a common purpose with other people and to order their individual and social growth together. Forging a common purpose entails that people are able to move past differences to reconcile with one another. Therefore, I think that while Dewey believes that a different aim underlies his and Dewey's philosophy, they are actually quite similar in their aim. This similarity becomes even more apparent when we examine the practical implication of Dewey's educational philosophy.

It is important to note how Dewey's entire philosophy is centered around helping students to take active responsibility by cultivating internal understanding and external expression, goals that are completely in line with Hegel's educational goals. In *Experience and Education*, Dewey criticizes the "non-social character of the traditional

school”²³⁷ He says that traditional school “erected silence into one of its prime virtues”²³⁸ and that it was an artificial education that emphasized “seeming before being”²³⁹ Dewey emphasizes the importance of thoughtful education that cultivates an intelligence that is free and adopting worthwhile purposes. He writes, “The only freedom that is of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence, that is to say, freedom of observation and of judgment exercised in behalf of purposes that are intrinsically worthwhile.”²⁴⁰ Here we see Dewey’s reflection of Hegel’s notion that the goal of education is to allow students to take responsibility in the world and exercise their freedom in it in order to cultivate a world that is meaningful and a suitable home.

We also see reflections of Hegel’s universal will and the political disposition in Dewey’s notion of the way in which school must cultivate a society so that people are united together for the common good. Dewey writes

If we took instances of co-operative activities in which all members of a group take part, as for example in well-ordered family life in which there is mutual confidence, the point would be even clearer. In all such cases it is not the will or desire of any one person which establishes order but the moving spirit of the whole group. The control is social, but individuals are parts of a community, not outside it.²⁴¹

For Dewey, just as for Hegel, in a just society there is no conflict between the individual and the state because the spirit of the society, while instills a type of control, is a spirit of the entire group. Dewey emphasizes this point when he writes

The authority in question when exercised in a well-regulated household or other community group is not a manifestation of merely personal will; the

²³⁷ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, pg. 63

²³⁸ Ibid

²³⁹ Ibid, pg. 62

²⁴⁰ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, pg. 61

²⁴¹ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, pg. 54

parent or teacher exercises it as the representative and agent of the interests of the groups as a whole.²⁴²

The purpose of education for Dewey is to help students cultivate the kind of rationality and dispositions that allow them to construct a society organized by the interests of the group as a whole.

We see Dewey's purpose expressed in his notion of how teachers should act. Teachers in a well-ordered school do not engage in acts of power merely for the sake of exercising power. Dewey writes, "When it is necessary...to speak and act firmly, it is done in behalf of the interest of the group, not as an exhibition of personal power."²⁴³ He contrasts the kind of exercise of power in the old and new model of school. With the old model of schooling he writes, "The school was not a group or a community held together by participation in common activities" so the teacher just had to enforce arbitrary control.²⁴⁴ In new schools, on the other hand, "the primary source of social control resides in the very nature of the work done as a social enterprise in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute and to which all feel a responsibility."²⁴⁵ Therefore, this school is a genuine community, and "A genuine community life has its ground in this natural sociability."²⁴⁶

That school should be a genuine community influences the kinds of activities done in the school. Dewey writes

Community life does not organize itself in an enduring way purely spontaneously. It requires knowledge of subject-matter that will enable activities to be selected which lend themselves to social organization, an organization in which all individuals have an opportunity to contribute

²⁴² Ibid

²⁴³ Ibid

²⁴⁴ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, pg. 55

²⁴⁵ Ibid, pg. 56

²⁴⁶ Ibid

something, and in which the activities in which all participate are the chief carrier of control.²⁴⁷

Dewey suggests here that a school that is truly a community takes careful planning that allows particular students to express themselves together in a universal manner with others in a community. This kind of community, it seems, facilitates and maintains the responsibility and recognition of its individual participants.

Dewey argues that the pedagogical activities in this school must also pay close attention to the particular needs of the student, rather than imposing a completely external and arbitrarily homogenous curriculum on students. This way students are able to cultivate their individual will and reason. Dewey emphasizes that teachers must tailor their lesson plans to the individual “capacities and needs”²⁴⁸ of her particular class. These capacities and needs are to provide the subject-matter of the classroom, and he writes that

The planning must be flexible enough to permit free play for individuality of experience and yet firm enough to give direction towards continuous development of power.²⁴⁹

These particular and universal activities must also allow for both external action and reflection, as these are the practices that allow students to take responsibility for their actions. Dewey writes.

There should be brief intervals of time for quiet reflection provided for even the young. But they are periods of genuine reflection only when they follow after times of more overt action and are used to organize what has been gained in periods of activity in which the hands and other parts of the body beside the brain are used.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷ Ibid

²⁴⁸ Dewey, *Experience and Education*, pg. 58

²⁴⁹ Ibid

²⁵⁰ Ibid, pg. 63

It is in this combination of both action and reflection that students become aware of their own freedom externally in the world but cultivate an internal awareness of it as well. This reflects Hegel's notion that freedom must have both external and internal expression. Dewey seems to further emphasize the importance of cultivating both an internal and external awareness of freedom when he writes that a merely abstract understanding of freedom

turns freedom which should be positive into something negative. For freedom from restriction, the negative side, is to be prized only as a means to a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evaluate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them power to select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation.²⁵¹

We hear echoed almost perfectly in this quote Hegel's notion that the purpose of education is to raise students from immediacy so that they can weigh and consider their different drives and impulses and organize them responsibly into a system that allows for the fulfillment of societal happiness.

While the purpose of this dissertation is not to trace out in detail Dewey's full connection to Hegel, it is important to note that Dewey was self-consciously influenced by Hegel and that his educational philosophy at least in part fleshed out the worthwhile ideas he found in Hegel's philosophy. His educational philosophy emphasizes building a school that was a community of individuals specifically attuned both to the particularity of the school environment and the students in it but also the pursuit of a universal goal: the working out of a free and flourishing society together. An environment like this becomes not only liberating to students but to teachers as well. Educators and philosophers alike who are concerned with cultivating liberating educational practices

²⁵¹ Ibid, pg. 64

such as those suggested by Hegel can take inspiration from Dewey as well as educators like Marcuse and Freire whom I will discuss in later chapters.

§11—Conclusion

Hegel's notion of dialectical education marked by practices of recognition, responsibility, right and reconciliation develop the potential in Kant's educational philosophy. Hegel's notion of the political disposition reflects the same goal present in Kant's ethical commonwealth, and Hegel's educational philosophy suggest to us the way this ethical commonwealth develops. Hegel's educational philosophy also suggests practices that facilitate the end-goal of the ethical commonwealth, which for Hegel is the political disposition. John Dewey's educational philosophy suggests how Hegel's educational philosophy can be implemented in a classroom setting.

In closing, one obvious matter that must be acknowledged in examining Hegel's philosophy of education is that it seems that the goal Hegel wrote so enthusiastically about has not yet been accomplished. Here we are, hundreds of years after Hegel first wrote his ideas, and we still do not seem to have a fully just society in which the majority of people in society display a consistently political disposition. People are certainly not yet fully at home with themselves in their relationships with one another and in the state. The seeming failure of right to realize itself fully in the world causes us to wonder if Hegel's political, and therefore his educational, philosophy is flawed in some major way. In the next two chapters, I will examine Herbert Marcuse and Paulo Freire's political and educational philosophy and the way in which their philosophy extends Hegel's philosophy.

These philosophers are significant for the project of education and justice for two specific reasons. First, both Marcuse and Freire consciously take up Hegel's project and extend his ideas in their views of education and society. Therefore, they can be viewed as modern practitioners of the Hegelian political and educational project. Secondly, both Marcuse and Freire write within the tradition of critical theory and, therefore, are very concerned about the way in which modern society has failed to achieve a fully free and flourishing society. In the following chapters, both Marcuse and Freire suggest that the fact that we have not yet achieved a fully free and flourishing world is due to specific practices that alienate the freedom and will of people. These philosophers argue that these alienating practices are present both in society as a whole and schools.

For both of these philosophers, education is a powerful tool that disrupts the practices of alienation and allows the working out of freedom to continue. If it is the case that modern society is marked by significant practices of alienation, then our failure to achieve freedom does not signal a failure of Hegel's philosophy. Rather, it shows the strength of his concepts of freedom, will and recognition. I suggest in the following chapters that it is through studying the way Marcuse and Freire extend Hegel's project that we will gain a clearer picture of how Hegel's political and educational goals can be accomplished.

Chapter Four—Marcuse and Education: Cultivating a New Sensibility

§1—After Hegel: Now What? Justice and Education in Contemporary Society

Hegel's political philosophy seems to have a decidedly optimistic view of the actualization of human freedom in the state. As we have seen, in the *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel details the way in which human rationality and freedom become increasingly more complete and concrete in the world and the way it is fully realized in the State. The question is how we are to interpret Hegel's philosophy given that human reason and freedom has yet to actualize itself fully in the world. After all, despite the almost ubiquitous nature of the State in contemporary society, and despite the ways in which it is an efficient and productive State, it seems that the problem of unfreedom is still with us.

In fact, it can be argued that rather than people recognizing themselves in their relationships with one another and cultivating a political disposition marked by patriotism and love for their fellow citizens, people increasingly figure out new and ingenious ways to destroy, dominate and oppress each other. Most shockingly of all, it seems that when we examine many modern instances in which people were systematically oppressed and even destroyed by each other or the State²⁵², large portions of that society or the state justified the oppression rationally, at least at the time it was perpetrated, as necessary for freedom and flourishing. Given that modern society has failed to become fully free, and given that we have instances of such profound oppression in modern society, we might wonder if Hegel was entirely wrong in his belief that society is the site of human freedom and flourishing and that the Idea of freedom is realizing itself in the world. In fact, the failure of freedom to realize itself in the world, coupled with the frequent rationalization

²⁵² The holocaust and recent genocides are examples of this.

of oppression in the state, once again raises Rousseau's worries that society is inevitably a site of dehumanization. Furthermore, we wonder whether education in such a society inevitably corrupts its students.

Marcuse is an ideal philosopher to examine after Hegel in regards to matters of justice and education, specifically in regards to some of the lingering concerns we have about Hegel's philosophy. Marcuse was a dedicated and thorough student of Hegel's writings, exploring Hegel's philosophy thoroughly in his books *Hegel's Ontology and Theory of Historicity* and *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory*. In addition, as a member of the Frankfurt School, Marcuse is concerned that society be a place hospitable to human flourishing, and his main concern is to analyze the type of societal influences that impede the ability of humanity fully to express their freedom in society. What is especially important about Marcuse's philosophy in relation to Hegel is that Marcuse describes specific external forces that prevent freedom from becoming fully actualized in the world.

Marcuse's philosophy develops Hegel's notions of alienation in modern society and suggests the forces that arrest the progress of freedom in our world. Marcuse is also very interested in education and, like the other philosophers covered in previous chapters, argues that education has a very specific and important role to play in promoting a free society. He argues that the goal of education is to cultivate a New Sensibility which allows the development dialectical thinking and an aesthetic disposition towards the world, both of which disrupt diseased forces in society and prevent the progress of freedom. The purpose of education then is to cultivate the sensibilities that allow for freedom to flourish in society. The New Sensibility, as we shall see, is an aesthetic

sensibility which draws on the liberating capacities of imagination, art and beauty to create an erotic society in which people no longer relate to each other and their world in a violent and purely instrumentalizing manner. Rather, the New Sensibility enables people to enjoy each other and their world receptively, as ends in themselves. It is important to note that Marcuse suggests that this New, erotic Sensibility is a new kind of ethic, the practice of which allows freedom to fully flourish in society. In this way, Marcuse's erotic society resembles Kant's kingdom of ends. For Marcuse, the goal of education is to enable students to think dialectically and to cultivate the New Sensibility which will enable people to build the erotic society together. Marcuse then is an important synthesis and complement to both Kant and Hegel's pedagogical ideas. He both suggests the way in which the dialectical development of freedom is blocked and also suggests the way both the sensuous and transcendent elements of our existence can become tools of liberation.

§2—Marcuse's Notion of Education

In order to understand Marcuse's notion of education and the New Sensibility, it is helpful to examine two educational addresses he made. It is also important to understand the problems that Marcuse believes are present in society and how education can be a solution to these problems. Marcuse is clear in his essay "Lecture on Higher Education and Politics" that education cannot be a neutral enterprise but must strive for the liberation of people in society so that a new society and a qualitatively different kind of person can be molded and shaped through this educational process. Marcuse believes that education must actively strive to liberate students because he believes that the current society is not a place hospitable to human flourishing. Modern society, Marcuse argues,

is sick and diseased and, therefore, that human instincts are being deformed by this diseased society. The danger of such a society is that any education that occurs in it²⁵³ actually ends up inculcating and perpetuating this sickness. In his *Essay on Liberation*, Herbert Marcuse raises such a worry when he writes

The danger is that the educational establishment will be absorbed by the larger Establishment, and a whole generation will be educated in the knowledge and goals of a sick society, permeated with aggression, violence, hypocrisy and indifference.”²⁵⁴

In “Lectures on Higher Education and Politics”, Marcuse notes that on the one hand it is true that “we cannot change the goals of education without changing the society which sets the goals.”²⁵⁵ On the other hand, he argues that “we cannot wait for the revolution to become human beings”²⁵⁶ Therefore, Marcuse calls for a change to come from within the system. This change will create an entirely new person that can resist the sickness present in the society. This New Sensibility is not just a sensibility of resistance, however. It is a sensibility which cultivates an erotic²⁵⁷ and aesthetic relationship to the world that allows human beings to understand how society must be arranged in order for freedom to become fully present in it. In order to understand this New Sensibility better we must first examine exactly why Marcuse views society as being sick and deforming to people’s instincts. In the next section, I will examine the problems of one-dimensional thinking and surplus repression. After I examine these problems, I will then return to Marcuse’s

²⁵³ The education occurring in society here is an education that is not self-consciously critical of the prevailing society but rather unreflectively accepting of it.

²⁵⁴ Marcuse, “Letters on Education”, pg. 35-36

²⁵⁵ Marcuse, “Lectures on Higher Education and Politics”, pg. 39

²⁵⁶ Marcuse, *Ibid*

²⁵⁷ The erotic sensibility that Marcuse speaks of is not primarily focused on genitalia. Rather, when society becomes non-repressive, as we will explore shortly, this allows the erotic and life instinct to intensify and spread to the entire body and psyche of the individual so that every aspect of the individual becomes a site for receptive enjoyment of the world, rather than the human being—his body and mind—being an instrument in service of irrational productivity.

educational philosophy in order to explore how he thinks education can and must address these issues.

§3--Positivistic Thinking and One-Dimensionality

We will better be able to understand Marcuse's diagnosis of our societal sickness if we recall Hegel's account of alienation in *Philosophy of Right*. In the last chapter, we explored Hegel's notion that freedom must have both an external moment of expression and an internal moment of realization. Therefore, if either of these moments are blocked, humans become alienated from their freedom, and it cannot be fully actualized. As we noted in the last chapter, a person's external freedom is blocked through scenarios such as "the alienation of personality included slavery, serfdom, disqualification from owning property, restrictions on freedom of ownership, etc."²⁵⁸ Hegel also noted instances of when someone's internal moment of freedom is blocked. Hegel writes that

alienation of intelligent rationality, of morality, ethical life, and religion is encountered in superstition, when power and authority are granted to others to determine and prescribe what actions I should perform...or how I should interpret the dictates of conscience, religious truth, etc.²⁵⁹

I take it that it is this second type of alienation—alienation of one's "intelligent rationality"—that Marcuse's project is most concerned with.²⁶⁰ One of the most significant problems of modern society, Marcuse argues, is the problem of one-dimensional thinking. In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse suggests that one dimensional

²⁵⁸Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 96

²⁵⁹ Ibid, pg. 96

²⁶⁰ It is important here to distinguish between Hegel's and Marcuse's account of alienation. In works like "Alienated Labor", alienation for Marx focuses on the negative effects that occur when our material world in the form of our work is alienated from us and becomes a thing by which our freedom, and therefore human essence, is taken from us. While Marcuse is certainly concerned with the way in which our material world is alienated from us. However, Marcuse also examines the subjective side of human experience more in depth. That is, he is very concerned with the way our emotions and thought can become alienated from us as well. I take Marcuse's examination of subjective alienation to be an improvement over Marx's account in that Marx primarily focuses on the alienation of our material world.

thought is thinking in which inner freedom and the “private space in which man may become and remain ‘himself’” is lost.²⁶¹ As this inner space disappears, a person’s thinking is increasingly marked by “immediate, automatic identification” with society and all of its structures, institutions and practices.²⁶² The immediacy which one-dimensional thinking cultivates is a deformed type of thinking because “in the process, the ‘inner’ dimension of the mind in which opposition to the status quo can take root is whittled down.”²⁶³ In other words, when people lose the ability to oppose the status quo, they lose their ability to imagine a free or better society. In this way, they lose their rationality. This is a type of thinking that enforces the notion that the only possible society is the current society, no matter how unfree or dehumanizing it is. Marcuse writes that this type of thinking “turns Reason into submission to the facts of life, and to the dynamic capability of producing more and bigger facts of the same sort of life.”²⁶⁴ With its complete submission to facts, one-dimensional thinking blocks any development of freedom in the world. Marcuse’s account of one-dimensional thinking, then, suggests to us one possible reasons why Hegel’s account of the Idea of freedom being actualized in the world has not yet come to fruition.

If we want to understand clearly how one-dimensional thinking developed in our society, a good place to start is Marcuse’s account of positivism. Marcuse’s account of positivism, which occurs in his book *Reason and Revolution*, is especially helpful to examine after our discussion about Hegel’s views of justice and education. Positivism arose in response to Hegel’s philosophy, and its goal was to correct perceived

²⁶¹ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 10

²⁶² Ibid

²⁶³ Ibid

²⁶⁴ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 11

deficiencies in Hegel's philosophy. As we will see, Marcuse believes that the way in which positivism contradicted Hegel's project led to modern problems of alienation and dehumanization.²⁶⁵

Marcuse notes the reaction to Hegel that developed after the French Revolution and describes the way in which positivists such as Auguste Comte reacted against the critical and negative philosophy of Hegel.²⁶⁶ They viewed Hegel's system as purely negative because the system led Hegel 'to a critique of everything that was hitherto held to be the objective truth.'²⁶⁷ Positivists suggested that Hegel tried "for the potentialities of things, but [was] incapable of knowing their reality."²⁶⁸ Therefore, positivism argues that negative philosophy "denies to the given the dignity of the real."²⁶⁹ As positive philosophy developed as response to negative philosophy, Marcuse notes that its goal was "to overcome negative philosophy in its entirety, that is, to abolish any subordinating of reality to transcendental reason, and its goal further was to teach men to view and study the phenomena of their world as neutral objects governed by universally valid laws."²⁷⁰ In order to study the world as neutral objects, the goal of positive philosophy is to study "the social realities after the pattern of nature and under the aspect of objective necessity."²⁷¹ By studying nature with an objective stance, this restored "to facts the dignity of the positive."²⁷² Thus, with rise of positive philosophy, we saw a demotion of

²⁶⁵ It is important to note again that positivism is a reaction to Hegelian philosophy. Marcuse argue that it permeates every aspect of society, and in doing so, it becomes a tool of capitalism to bring everything under it hegemony.

²⁶⁶ Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pg. 325

²⁶⁷ Ibid

²⁶⁸ Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pg. 325

²⁶⁹ Ibid

²⁷⁰ Ibid, pg. 326

²⁷¹ Ibid

²⁷² Ibid, pg. 327

critical (and negating) reason and a decline in the tendency to measure reality against the standards of reason.

As reason was dethroned, neutral observation and the acceptance of the given took its place. With the rise of positivism, Marcuse notes that we see the rising tendency to make philosophical observation of society adopt the procedures of the sciences. For example, Hegel notes that the purpose of Comte's positive sociology was "to concern itself with the investigation of facts instead of transcendental illusions, with useful knowledge instead of leisured contemplation, certainty instead of doubt and indecision, organization instead of negation and destruction."²⁷³ Marcuse argues that because positivist theory like Comte's advocates the neutral observation of society according to fixed, scientific laws, it "bears the seeds of a philosophic justification of authoritarianism."²⁷⁴ This authoritarianism blocks the inner moment of freedom, or the ability to recognize that we can defy the system or status quo. Therefore, it is a type of alienation such as the kind Hegel discusses in *Philosophy of Right*.

Marcuse believes that this justification of authoritarianism was a result of "defamation of reason in positive philosophy."²⁷⁵ This is because positive philosophy is not concerned with human reason but more concerned with "predominantly receptive functions."²⁷⁶ In emphasizing receptive functions, Comte and other positivists directly or indirectly advocate a resignation to the status quo. Quoting Comte, Marcuse notes that "True resignation, that is, a disposition to endure necessary evils steadfastly and without any hope of compensation therefore, can result only from a profound feeling for the

²⁷³ Ibid, pg. 341

²⁷⁴ Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pg. 342

²⁷⁵ Ibid, pg. 343

²⁷⁶ Ibid

invariable laws that govern the variety of natural phenomena.”²⁷⁷ With Comte’s positivism, there is no longer any room for critiquing the evils enduring in society as an example of the irrational and unreasonable organization of society. There is only room for accepting society as it is, directed as it is by immutable laws.

In *One-Dimensional Man*, Marcuse argues that the particularly insidious nature of the positivistic mindset which leads to one-dimensional thinking is that people learn to accept cheerfully and “freely” their society as the best and the only possible society, even if it is a very unfree society. Marcuse notes that modern society delivers the goods well and has allowed the progress of people to a certain extent extremely efficiently. However, the effective management of the modern society becomes the end of society and its citizens, enamored as they are with the goods the society delivers and managed so thoroughly that there is no longer an inner space for resistance, forget that life could be qualitatively different and better. Worse yet, people in society are so thoroughly managed that they can no longer imagine a qualitatively different way of life. In fact, it does not even occur to them that there could be a legitimate qualitatively different way of life. Marcuse explains how this society functions efficiently and comfortably to such a degree that people are lulled into a tranquil acceptance of unfreedom which alienates their individuality:

A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress. Indeed, what could be more rational than the suppression of individuality in the mechanization of socially necessary but painful performances; the concentration of individual enterprises in more effective, more productive corporations; the regulation of free competition among unequally equipped economic subjects; the curtailment of prerogatives and national sovereignties which impede the international organization of resources.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, pg. 345

That this technological order also involves a political and intellectual coordination may be a regrettable and yet promising development.²⁷⁸

Marcuse notes that this system is so efficient in delivering satisfaction and comforts to individuals that “non-conformity with the system itself appears to be socially useless.”²⁷⁹ In fact, non-conformity or resistance to the status quo can actually appear dangerous or hostile if “it entails tangible economic and political disadvantages and threatens the smooth operation of the whole.”²⁸⁰ Ironically, in such a system, when people strive for their own full actualization and fulfillment, they seemingly become a threat to freedom and prosperity because the smooth-running system, which appears to deliver freedom and prosperity, only functions well through the total suppression and alienation of the individual.

However, as Marcuse notes, as efficient and productive as this society seems to be, it is far from free. It is a society that in “satisfying [people’s needs], perpetuates [their servitude].”²⁸¹ It is a society that demands a “debilitating competition for social survival and advancement.”²⁸² In this society, Marcuse argues, a person must continually “prove himself on the market”²⁸³ in order to survive. It is a society in which “commodity production and productive exploitation—join and permeate all dimensions of private and public existence.”²⁸⁴ This society creates false needs in people, “needs which perpetuate

²⁷⁸ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 1

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, pg. 2

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, pg. 2

²⁸¹ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 9

²⁸² *Ibid*, pg. 10

²⁸³ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 2

²⁸⁴ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 12

toil, aggressiveness, misery and injustice.”²⁸⁵ Marcuse notes that these false needs²⁸⁶ are needs that when met, bring great delight and satisfaction to the individual but in so doing “arrest the development of the ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and grasp the chances of curing the disease.”²⁸⁷ These needs would be, among other things, needs that cause people to consume resources at an increasingly alarming rate without concern about the sustainability of such consumption. They would also be needs that encourage us to instrumentalize one another so that we are only able to relate to one another in terms of ranking ourselves or using each other for our own ends.

One of the most insidious things about false²⁸⁸ needs, Marcuse suggests, is that they are almost entirely heteronomous. They are not the actual needs of people but rather needs created by society. Marcuse writes of these false, heteronomous needs

Such needs have a societal content and function which are determined by external powers over which the individual has no control; the development and satisfaction of these needs is heteronomous. No matter how much such needs may have become the individual’s own, reproduced and fortified by the conditions of his existence; no matter how much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning—products of society whose dominant interest demands repression.

This repression Marcuse speaks of is a repression of the real and actual needs of free human beings—needs of the life impulse, or the erotic impulse, and of autonomy which

²⁸⁵ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 5

²⁸⁶ In presenting examples of the kinds of false needs he has in mind, Marcuse writes, “Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to this category of false needs” (*One-Dimensional* 5).

²⁸⁷ Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 5

²⁸⁸ When Marcuse discusses false needs, I take him to be describing needs that society cultivates in us that lead to degradation rather than the increase of freedom. For example, surplus repression may create a false need in us to be occupied all the time. It might create a distorted sense of work ethic in which people feel the need to work far beyond the time that is actually necessary for their survival. The need to work this much lead to a decrease in time to reflect and contemplate. A lack of reflection and contemplation can lead to dehumanization because it is in the space of reflection and contemplation that we have the ability to contemplate how we may be more free.

enables people to pursue their flourishing in society with others. Marcuse refers to this type of society which represses the actual needs of its citizens in order to perpetuate false needs as an “obscene”²⁸⁹ society. He writes

This society is obscene in producing and indecently exposing a stifling abundance of wares while depriving its victims abroad of the necessities of life, obscene in stuffing itself and its garbage cans while poisoning and burning the scarce foodstuffs in the fields of its aggression.²⁹⁰

Marcuse notes that in this society only “The systematic increase in waste, destruction, and management keeps the system going.”²⁹¹ It is a society that promotes aggression, brutality and ugliness, as people and environments are exploited to feed the increasingly insatiable demands of the machine (the machine in this case being the efficient and smooth running state). Marcuse notes that if people were to be freed from having to prove themselves on the marketplace and, therefore, freed from having to try to survive in an aggressive and brutal society, then this would “release individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom beyond necessity.”²⁹² With energy released in this way, he argues

the very structure of human existence would be altered; the individual would be liberated from the work world’s imposing upon him alien needs and possibilities. The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a life that would be his own.²⁹³

This liberation of human beings would allow for human freedom to develop fully in the world and to presence itself in the development of a fully free society: in other words, the goal of Hegel’s project, as we discussed in the last chapter,

²⁸⁹ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 12

²⁹⁰ Ibid

²⁹¹ Ibid

²⁹² Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, pg. 2

²⁹³ Ibid

would be realized. We will see shortly that Marcuse believes education plays a pivotal role in this liberation. Before we explore the way education aids in this liberation, we must better understand the way in which true and autonomous needs of human beings are repressed in a one-dimensional society.

§4--Repression and the Obscene Society: The Repression of Eros

The inability to critique the status quo and to imagine a qualitatively different way of life which occurs in one-dimensional thinking is always problematic in itself because it distorts thinking and alienates us from our human essence, which is the ability to think freely. It becomes an especially acute problem, however, when the society is a sick, diseased society. This is the very problem, indeed, that afflicts us, Marcuse argues. We have already seen the way in which a society which encourages the pursuit and satisfaction of false needs fosters brutalization and aggressiveness. However, Marcuse believes that modern society is marked by another significant pathology: surplus repression. In *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse, explains how repression which was originally necessary for the formation of society and the survival of the species²⁹⁴ became excessive and the interest of dominating powers while destructive to the average members of society. Marcuse argues that in the early stages of society, repression of our basic instincts—I will specifically focus on *eros*, or our pleasure and life instinct, here—is necessary for our survival and for our ability to overcome scarcity. Because *eros* is primarily a pleasure instinct, when it is left unstructured, it does not allow us to build a society that allows for full human flourishing. Therefore, we must repress our basic

²⁹⁴ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 88

instincts like *eros* so that we bring ourselves to do the necessary alienating work that initially allows us to build society.

Marcuse argues that as our erotic instinct became repressed and subordinated in service of civilization, it underwent a deformation whereby it become primarily genitalia focused and in the service of reproduction.²⁹⁵ That is, as our whole person became subordinated to productivity, every part of our person, including our erotic instinct, became subordinated to productivity—in this case, reproduction. In this deformation, our bodies are transformed into instruments of labor, rather than of pleasure.²⁹⁶ Marcuse paints a clear picture of what life is like in this repression of *eros*:

Life is experienced as a struggle with one's self and the environment; it is suffered and won by conquests. Its substance is unpleasure, not pleasure. Happiness is a reward, relaxation, coincidence, a moment—in any case, not the goal of existence.²⁹⁷

In a condition of repression, labor, rather than happiness, becomes our goal, and our labor is essentially alienated labor.²⁹⁸ As civilization progresses, however, the initial necessary deformation of *eros* becomes unnecessary and irrational. While *eros* originally had to be placed under stricture for us to make civilization and ensure our survival, Marcuse argues that we have now achieved such a production of wealth and have achieved such advances in science and technology that we no longer need to fear scarcity. We have produced enough for everyone to have their basic survival needs met, and we can now invest our energy in creating a qualitatively different way of life—a life in which we no longer need

²⁹⁵ Marcuse, "Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts", pg. 35

²⁹⁶ "Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts", pg. 34

²⁹⁷ Ibid

²⁹⁸ Marcuse, "Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts", pg. 167

to repress *eros* so severely;²⁹⁹ we no longer need to engage in constant alienating labor, and we can regain a free enjoyment of our lives. Marcuse notes, however, that we are not creating a new and liberating society. Rather, our culture is increasingly marked by surplus repression.³⁰⁰

As I have suggested already, in societies of surplus repression, work is measured solely in quantitative terms—productivity and efficiency—rather in terms of how the work qualitatively benefits humans and makes them more free.³⁰¹ But as the value of our work has become increasingly measured in terms of productivity, we have lost the ability to ask the question “Productivity for the sake of what?” In other words, we have lost the ability to question why, in the midst of so much abundance and technological capabilities, we must keep increasing our productivity, especially when it requires so much repression and alienation. We have lost the ability to recognize an inherent irony in our lives--that the very repression which allowed us to achieve the goods that we have also prohibits us from fully enjoying them or even enjoying them at all.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Marcuse is not describing some type of vague utopia here. Rather, he is pointing to a real, material aspect of our existence. Human beings spend a great deal of time in physical and mental toil that makes it very difficult for them to actualize their full personality and freedom. We now have the material wealth to alleviate this kind of excessive toil for everyone. If we eliminated this toil, people could invest their time in solving problems and building a society that better facilitate human flourishing. In other words, ending world hunger isn't just a utopian dream. It is a real, material possibility that we have.

³⁰⁰ It is difficult to determine where exactly surplus repression ends and begins. I think what is important to note in Marcuse's discussion of surplus repression that much of work today is still driven by a scarcity mentality and survival-fear instincts, and this is not necessary because we have generated enough wealth for everyone to survive and have their basic needs met. Therefore, surplus repression may be characterized more by a scarcity and fear mentality than it is by the quantity of hours we work a week, although that certainly plays a role in Marcuse's idea, too.

³⁰¹ Ibid, pg. 28-30

³⁰² Marcuse, “Progress and Freud's Theory of Instincts”, pg. 36

If education in this society, then, is to be truly liberating, it is clear, according to Marcuse that one of the primary goals of education should be to liberate students from one-dimensional thinking and surplus repression. It will also have to create a New Sensibility and new person with markedly different instincts and drives. We will now examine what this kind of person might look like, according to Marcuse and what an education that creates this kind of person looks like.

§5—Dialectical Thinking: Freeing Thought, Freeing Society

If society is to become free again then it is clear, given Marcuse's account of diseased society, that one-dimensional thought must be disrupted, and people must be able to develop a healthy kind of thought that enables them to imagine a qualitatively different type of society. In his essay "A Note on the Dialectic", Marcuse describes what this healthy kind of thinking looks like. It is dialectic and negative thinking. The 'negative' in this context refers to the ability of human beings to negate the status quo and to envision all of the potentialities of human beings and their society that are not yet fully realized in a given society. Marcuse characterizes this type of thinking as negative because it contradicts the given organization of society and is in fact excluded by the 'positive', i.e. that which has been achieved so far. Negative thinking, in this sense, would be the opposite of positivism because rather than merely observing and accepting the status quo, it would focus on the possibilities presently excluded by the status quo and critiquing the given state of affairs. Negative thinking is essential for progress, Marcuse argues, because progress requires "recognition of the negative as a force and as a

reality.”³⁰³ In other words, progress requires that we recognize that other possible ways of living (the negative) can actually come about.

Marcuse also notes that dialectical thought is thought that corresponds to reality because it recognizes contradiction.³⁰⁴ Reality, which is a constant state of becoming (entailing moments of being and nothingness) is marked by constant contradiction.³⁰⁵ Therefore, dialectical or negative thinking is the truest type of thinking. To illuminate further this contradictory nature of reality, Marcuse argues that the given reality that we posit—the world of common sense and science—denies this contradiction in order to pose concepts and systems for attempting to organize and penetrate this society: “Common sense and science purge themselves from this contradiction.”³⁰⁶ Philosophical thought, on the other hand, does just the opposite, according to Marcuse. It recognizes and traces these contradictions as they develop. Marcuse writes

Philosophical thought begins with the recognition that the facts do not correspond to the concepts imposed by common sense and scientific reason—in short, with the refusal to accept them. To the extent that these concepts disregard the fatal contradictions of which make up reality, they abstract from the very process of reality.³⁰⁷

Because posited reality focuses on what is posited and denies its opposite, Marcuse notes that “negative thinking is always examining this world...in order to notice ‘terms of its internal inadequacy’.”³⁰⁸ The dialectic recognizes that “all facts are stages of a single process—a process in which subject and object are so joined that truth can be determined

³⁰³ Marcuse, “A Note on Dialectic”, pg. 63

³⁰⁴ It is important to note that we can probably never know for certain if we are thinking dialectically. Rather, the notion of dialectical thinking is more of a guiding ideal.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, pg. 64

³⁰⁶ *Ibid*

³⁰⁷ *Ibid*

³⁰⁸ Marcuse, “A Note on Dialectic”, pg. 65

only within the subject-object totality.”³⁰⁹ Because the dialectic recognizes that all facts are “stages of a single process”, the dialectic recognizes that any given facts are in themselves insufficient in terms of how they represent total reality and that they necessarily exclude some aspects of it. Therefore, the given facts only ever represent things as they are at that present moment, rather than representing things as they always must be or as they are in totality.

Therefore, given that dialectical thought recognizes that given facts are but a moment in the process of the joining of subject and object, dialectical thought contradicts any type of mindset that merely accepts the given as the given and as the totality of reality because this type of thinking denies the process-oriented nature of thinking. Thinking that only recognizes the given state of affairs is, Marcuse argues, is unfree because it is an incomplete and frozen way of thinking. Therefore, Marcuse argues, dialectical thought starts with the assumption that “the world is unfree; that is, to say, man and nature exist in conditions of alienation, exist as ‘other than they are’.”³¹⁰ For Marcuse, thought can only become free when it “transforms reality by comprehending its contradictory structure.”³¹¹ Therefore, dialectical thought demands that the given state of affairs change because thought becomes “negative in itself,”³¹² pointing out the contradiction and inadequacies of the given state of affairs. The purpose of the dialectic, Marcuse notes, is to undermine our over-confidence in our facile ability to comprehend reality. Its purpose

is to break down the self-assurance and self-contentment of common sense, to undermine the sinister confidence in the power and language of

³⁰⁹ Ibid

³¹⁰ Ibid, pg. 66

³¹¹ Ibid

³¹² Ibid

facts, to demonstrate that unfreedom is so much at the core things that the development of their internal contradiction leads necessarily to qualitative change: the explosion and catastrophe of the established state of affairs.³¹³

Marcuse notes that the dialectic is especially concerned with what is excluded from the current status quo.”³¹⁴ In this way, dialectical and negative function as the Great Refusal, which is the refusal to “accept the rules of a game in which the dice are loaded”³¹⁵ and thinking in which “The absent must be made present”³¹⁶ because the greater part of the truth is in that which is absent.”³¹⁷

Negative thinking is a healthy and free type of thinking, and it is only through the ability to engage in this type of thinking that individuals are able to envision a different kind of society together. Therefore, it is clear that Marcuse would argue that any education which hopes to liberate its students must encourage dialectical thinking, an educational idea to which we will return later. Not only, however, is dialectical thinking required for this change; Marcuse also argues that a New Sensibility rooted in a new biology is requisite as well. It seems from Marcuse’s writing that dialectical thinking and this new sensibility are intertwined. That is, it seems that dialectical thinking creates the space for the New Sensibility to develop, and as it develops, it fosters greater dialectical thinking. We will now examine what this new sensibility looks like.

§6—Cultivating the New Sensibility—The New Person

For Marcuse, cultivating a new type of sensibility is essential because, as we have seen, people in the current repressive conditions of contemporary society, motivated by

³¹³ Marcuse, “A Note on Dialectic”, pg. 66

³¹⁴ Ibid, pg. 67

³¹⁵ Ibid

³¹⁶ Once again, it is important to note here, that we cannot know for sure that we are thinking dialectically and making the absent present. This is, rather, an ideal for which we strive.

³¹⁷ Marcuse, “A Note on Dialectic”, pg. 67

their current repressed and distorted drives and needs, not only harm one another but they also harm themselves. Marcuse writes

What is now at stake are the needs themselves. At this stage, the question is no longer: how can the individual satisfy his own needs without hurting others, but rather: how can he satisfy his needs without hurting himself without reproducing through his aspirations and satisfaction, his dependence on an exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his needs, perpetuate his servitude?³¹⁸

In order for people to stop hurting themselves or others, the new type of person has to be liberated from repressive and distorted instincts and needs. It is important to explore what this new person with a new biology would look like for Marcuse.

The new type of person would be freed, Marcuse argues, but it would be a wholly new type of freedom—one that breaks with the previous status quo. Marcuse writes of this new type of freedom that it would

become the environment of an organism which is no longer capable of adapting to the competitive performances required for well-being under domination, no longer capable of tolerating the aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness of the established way of life.³¹⁹

Marcuse believes that in order for this new person to be educated, their rebellion “would then have taken root in the very nature, the ‘biology’ of the individual”³²⁰, and once this rebellion and revolution in biology had taken place, it would then become the driving force in the creation of a new society.³²¹

³¹⁸ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 9

³¹⁹ *Ibid*, pg. 10

³²⁰ When Marcuse speaks about this rebellion rooted in our very biology, he is noting that the structure of our biological drive is a structure towards more and fuller life. Alienation, because it is destructive and deforming, conceals the life instinct we have. However, as we overcome alienating forces in society again such as surplus repression and one-dimensional thinking, we free the life instinct and can begin pursuing fuller life again. In other words, the rebellion against all forms of alienation is a rebellion rooted in the very structure of our biology.

³²¹ *Ibid*

If people's biology is to change, this will entail, Marcuse argues, that they will no longer tolerate "aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness" of an excessively repressive society, a society that aggressively distorts and brutalizes the human psyche in order to make it fit for alienated and excessively productive labor.³²² Therefore, the needs of the new man and the New Sensibility would be very different. Marcuse notes that these people would be "men who would speak a different language, have different gestures, follow different impulses; men who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality, ugliness."³²³ He states further that these new people would be "men and women who have the good conscience of being human, tender, sensuous, who are no longer ashamed to be themselves."³²⁴ They would be people with a "new sensibility" that "expresses life instincts over aggressiveness and guilt..."³²⁵ and "who are physiologically and psychologically able to experience things, and each other, outside the context of violence and exploitation."³²⁶

In this society people are able, in Kant's terms, to appreciate and treat each other as ends in themselves and not merely as means to their own ends.³²⁷ They would be bringing about Kant's kingdom of ends or Hegel's political disposition—a disposition in which people recognize themselves and their freedom in one another. Marcuse notes that once this shift at the biological level appears, there would also occur a radical, societally-transformative revolution, a revolution

³²² Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 19

³²³ *Ibid*, pg. 20

³²⁴ *Ibid*

³²⁵ *Ibid*, pg. 22

³²⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 23

³²⁷ It would seem that in Marcuse's repressive society people are not allowed to be ends in themselves. Primarily, they exist for the purpose of productivity, whether this is work or procreative productivity.

which would be driven by the vital need to be free from the administered comforts and the destructive revolution which, by virtue of this ‘biological’ foundation, would have the change of turning quantitative technical progress into qualitatively different ways of life—precisely because it would be a revolution occurring at a high level of material and intellectual development, one which would enable man to conquer scarcity and poverty.³²⁸

The New Sensibility necessarily transforms society because it is a “negation of the entire Establishment, its morality, culture.”³²⁹ The new sensibility finally lets go of false needs by negating the society that perpetuates them, and in negating this culture, it expresses an “affirmation of the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty and toil terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms of existence and thereby the Form of the society itself.”³³⁰ Marcuse is right to characterize the New Sensibility in this way. If the status quo is focused on performance, productivity, aggressiveness, and competition, then the New Sensibility must negate this status quo. That is why it must reintroduce and be marked by “the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful”, elements which are almost entirely missing from the current status quo, including its educational institutions.

This New Sensibility, Marcuse argues, will transform every facet of society. For example, science and technology would change radically and would “have to be reconstructed in accord with a New Sensibility—the demands of the life instincts.”³³¹ Technology would focus on “global elimination of poverty and toil.”³³² Furthermore a change in focus in technology could lead to a significant “transformation of the working

³²⁸ Ibid, pg. 19

³²⁹ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 23

³³⁰ Ibid

³³¹ Ibid, pg. 19

³³² Ibid, pg. 22

day.”³³³ This would be a change, Marcuse argues, in which “the stupefying, enervating, pseudo-automatic jobs of capitalist progress would be abolished.”³³⁴ And because workers would be free from stupefying and enervating labor, their new sensibility and liberated consciousness “would foster on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and misery and would shape the further evolution of the ‘standard of living’.”³³⁵

Furthermore, the new liberated consciousness “would promote the development of a science and technology free to realize the protection and gratification of life.”³³⁶ With this new aim of life, there would be no dichotomy between technique and art or imagination and reason. Marcuse writes, “the opposition between imagination and reason, higher and lower faculties, poetic and scientific thought, would be invalidated.”³³⁷ Art, imagination and reason would all become vehicles through which individuals would pursue an increasingly free society, one in which human beings are valued for their own sake. They would become the foundation for the New Sensibility rather than being subjugated to the reality principle and in the service of constant, quantitatively measured production. Marcuse believes that education must have a clear role in cultivating the New Sensibility. The question is how it is that education can play this emancipatory role. Cultivating the New Sensibility is no easy matter given that, as we have seen, it requires a marked break from a repressive society and yet all of the educators and students involved in the endeavor of education are a part of the very culture from which they are trying to make a break.

³³³ Ibid, pg. 20

³³⁴ Ibid

³³⁵ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 22

³³⁶ Ibid

³³⁷ Ibid

§7—Marcusean Education: A Dialectical Education

In his two essays on education, Marcuse does not write a great deal about the specific pedagogical techniques he believes that teachers should use to create the New Sensibility, but throughout his works, three important ideas emerge that suggest the types of educational endeavors that would need to occur in order for the New Sensibility to be cultivated in students and in society at large. These educational endeavors would be marked by imagination, beauty and art.³³⁸

Before discussing the way that imagination, beauty and art play an important role in Marcuse's educational theory, it is important to note that any education that claims to draw inspiration from Marcuse must be a dialectical education. As we have already seen in this chapter, Marcuse believes that a society cannot become free unless it is able to engage in dialectical or negative thinking which allows people to imagine or to think about elements of existence that are not currently represented in the status quo, a thinking that enables them to contradict the current state of affairs. If it is true that society cannot be free without this kind of thinking, this certainly entails that education must cultivate dialectical thinking in its students.

Therefore, as we examine how Marcuse believes that imagination, beauty and art play an important role in education, we should keep in mind that Marcuse likely believes these educational aids are important because there is some way in which they foster dialectical thinking. However, it seems important to note that there are pedagogical

³³⁸ It is important to note here that Marcuse's educational philosophy is implicitly critiquing any education that focuses solely on communicating skills rather than on building culture. Education for Marcuse must focus on building culture because, as we have seen, our biological drive is towards life and the kind of culture that supports life. Therefore, if education is to honor who we are as human beings, it must focus on culture building. Marcuse believes that education, historically, has been primarily focused on imparting skills rather than building culture.

activities that either encourage or discourage dialectical. For instance, it is important to note that an education that wishes to cultivate dialectical thinking must certainly permit extended times for analysis, reflection and discussion. The only way that students can learn to imagine realities that contradict the status quo is if they are given opportunities to reflect on and analyze the status quo and discuss different possibilities.

This entails, among other things, that any education which preempts reflection or discussion or which attempts to present the status quo as the only possibility, curtails dialectical thinking and likely contributes to one-dimensional thinking. For example, an education that is so rushed and packed full of activities that it does not allow students to cultivate any inner space of reflection would be an example of the type of education that hinders dialectical thinking. We will return to the importance of cultivating dialectical thinking in the next chapter on Paulo Freire, especially in Freire's critique of something he calls the banking model of education. At this point, however, it is important to examine the pedagogical role that imagination, art and beauty plays in education. Marcuse argues that there is an "Inner connection between pleasure, sensuousness, beauty, truth, art, and freedom." All of these aspects of life are connected through an "aesthetic" sensibility.³³⁹ Therefore, Marcuse implies in his writings that any education that wishes to liberate its students will tend carefully to the cultivation of imagination, art and beauty.

§8—Imagination and the Dialectical Education

In *Eros and Civilization*, Marcuse discusses the importance of imagination for cultivating the New Sensibility. He especially focuses on the importance of phantasy and

³³⁹ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 172

imagination for cultivating a mindset amenable to a new order. Marcuse writes that in a repressive society, especially one marked by a positivist mentality, imagination is repressed, and there is a strong emphasis in passive receptivity that is only “free to become practical, i.e., to transform reality only within the general framework of repression.”³⁴⁰ Imagination in a repressive society is not free and spontaneous. It operates, much like one-dimensional thought, within already carefully established social parameters.

On the other hand, Marcuse notes that in this repressive society, imagination that breaks from the status quo and portrays a radically different reality is a “violation of taboos of social morality, [is] perversion and subversion”.³⁴¹ Marcuse notes that imagination must be unleashed to disrupt the previously repressive society before a new society can be created. This is where phantasy becomes important. Marcuse notes that phantasy calls forth “the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom.”³⁴² Rather than being overwhelmed by the reality principle, phantasy “continues to speak the language of the pleasure principle, of freedom from repression, of uninhibited desire and gratification...”³⁴³ and ³⁴⁴ phantasy is the form of the Great Refusal: “it refuses to accept as final the limitations imposed upon

³⁴⁰ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 25

³⁴¹ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 25

³⁴² Marcuse, *Eros & Civilization*, pg. 140-141

³⁴³ *Ibid*, pg. 142

³⁴⁴ In his “Lecture on Higher Education and Politics, Berkeley, 1975”, Marcuse reminds us that “Class-consciousness is mediated by individual consciousness” (41). The mediation of individual consciousness allows people to take up their individual existence in a manner than is different from one another or the manner in which society dictates is the aspect of human existence that allows imagination to occur. Drawing on Schiller’s *Aesthetic Education of Man*, Marcuse notes that it is in our play drive—the drive that mediates our sensuous and transcendent conditions and that expresses itself in beauty and is the path to autonomous freedom.

freedom and happiness by the reality principle, in its refusal to forget what can be...”³⁴⁵

Therefore the imagination exercised through phantasy

“envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization, of happiness with reason.”³⁴⁶ In other words, imagination is in itself dialectical in that it calls to attention what is taboo and exiled from a certain society and seeks to understand how these missing elements can be integrated into a harmonious whole.

The erotic element in phantasy goes beyond the perverted expressions we might normally associate with liberated *eros*. Marcuse reminds us that it is only in the repressive society that *eros* has a primary association with genitalia. Therefore, liberated *eros* in this kind of society does indeed lead to all sorts of perversion and even sexual barbarisms. However, *eros* in the liberated society aims at an ‘erotic reality’ where the life instincts would come to rest in fulfillment without repression.”³⁴⁷ In this type of society, the erotic instinct is no longer merely associated with genitalia but is spread over the entire body and psyche so that the entire person becomes a site for pleasure. In other words, every aspect of a person—all parts of her body and all of her senses and her intellect are able to experience intense pleasure and wholeness. Marcuse notes that “The biological drive becomes a cultural drive,”³⁴⁸ and so *eros* in the non-repressive society in this way aims towards building greater unities and lending itself more towards developing the receptivity and flourishing of all human capacities. Recalling the discussion of *eros* in Plato’s *Symposium*, Marcuse notes that “Spiritual ‘procreation’ is just as much the work of *eros* as is corporeal procreation, and the right and true order of

³⁴⁵ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 149

³⁴⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 143

³⁴⁷ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 146

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 212

the polis is just as much erotic as is the right and true order of love.”³⁴⁹ Therefore in a non-repressive society, “sexuality is neither deflected from nor blocked in its objective; rather, in attaining its objective, it transcends it to others, searching for fuller gratification.”³⁵⁰

In this society all aspects of humans are fully actualized and experiencing all of the pleasure of which they are capable, and they achieve this in a unified, holistic manner. Marcuse, referring back to Freud, describes this type of feeling as an “oceanic feeling”, or “a limitless extension and oneness with the universe.”³⁵¹ This suggests that in our imagination, we are able to imagine a reality that would cultivate a fully actualized society. Marcuse notes that the “The images of phantasy could refer to the unconquered future of mankind rather than to its (badly) conquered past”³⁵² and thus can pave the way for the imagination. Imagination can then lead us to the eventual creation of a new reality in which humanity is fully flourishing, happy, harmonious with others and at home in its world—the very goal that Kant and Hegel believed should drive society and education.³⁵³

It seems clear that if phantasy and imagination are to be a regular part of educational experience, then students of all ages must have access to activities in which they become autonomously creative and acting agents, rather than having every moment of their educational experience managed, programmed and dictated. This would certainly

³⁴⁹ Ibid, pg. 211

³⁵⁰ Ibid

³⁵¹ Ibid, pg. 168

³⁵² Ibid, pg. 147

³⁵³ In his essay “Biopower, Play and Experience in Education”, Tyson Lewis, drawing on Schiller’ ideas in *Aesthetic Education of Man* and Marcuse’s ideas of play and freedom in *Eros and Civilization*, characterizes the flourishing of imagination and phantasy as play and notes that play emancipates all of the senses. He writes, “Play is for Marcuse absolutely serious in that it emancipates the senses, consciousness, and in turn the totality of the human through an educative moment” (pg. 54).

mean that school would include activities like recess and art with a lot of time given for students' free creation.³⁵⁴ These types of experiences seem to foster directly the kinds of imagination and phantasy that Marcuse believes can be revolutionary. However, it also seems that any subject can become a medium for imagination and phantasy when it allows students to manipulate or explore the subject in ways in which their free imagination dictates. In this way, every class—whether it be mathematics, physics, computer science or American government—can become a space in which educators cultivate students' imagination and their ability to build realities different from the status quo. Marcuse notes that the goal is not to abolish the various disciplines within elementary and secondary school and the academy; rather, the goal is to infuse these subjects with a dialectical and imaginative spirit. Marcuse writes

We need history because we need to know how it came about that civilization is what it is today: where it went wrong. And we need history not only of the victors, but also of the victims. We need a sociology which can show us where the real power is that shapes the social structure. We need economics which are not “sublimated” to mathematics. We need science in order to reduce toil, pain, disease, and to restore nature.³⁵⁵

Although every subject matter can become a vehicle for phantasy and imagination, Marcuse implies that the arts and humanities indeed have a special and perhaps primary place in the cultivation of the New Sensibility. This is because, as Marcuse writes, “The truths of imagination are first realized when phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a

³⁵⁴ Tyson Lewis suggests that when children play with toys, an activity infused with imagination, they generate “new signifiers out of decayed signifieds” (pg. 47). In other words, they infuse with new and often entirely different meaning and life items that culture has used in a significantly different way. This type of imaginative play, then, naturally creates new worlds of possibility out of its current world. This would be an example of “radical change” emerging “within the existing society and its institutions”, which is what Marcuse says must happen for revolution to occur in society (Marcuse, “Lecture on Higher Education and Politics”, pg. 39).

³⁵⁵ Marcuse, *Lecture on Higher Education and Politics*, pg. 43

universe of perception and comprehension...this occurs in art.”³⁵⁶ Thus, art is one of the primary expressions for imagination, and it is also one of the primary places in which imagination is kindled. Therefore, we will now take some time to explore the importance of the arts and humanities in a dialectical education.

§9—Art and the Dialectical Education

Marcuse’s notions of phantasy and imagination naturally lead into his ideas of art which he takes to have an inherently revolutionary potential. While Marcuse doesn’t specifically state it, he indirectly implies that art, in its various expressions, must be a part of any type of education that intends to create a New Sensibility. Art is able to cultivate this New Sensibility because of its inherently revolutionary capacity which is directly tied to the way in which art invokes imagination. Marcuse defines revolutionary art as art that “represents, in the exemplary fate of individuals, the prevailing unfreedom and the rebelling forces, thus breaking through the mystified (and petrified) social reality, and opening the horizon of change (liberation).”³⁵⁷ We have seen that a one-dimensional society presents the current state affairs as the only possible state of affairs. The power of art, Marcuse argues, lies in its ability to disrupt the idea this reality is the only reality. Its power, like the power of phantasy and play, lies in “the effort to break the power of facts over the word, and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish, enforce, and benefit from the facts.”³⁵⁸ Therefore, when art is a central focus of education, art cultivates the ability in students to see past the given facts of the current state of reality and to imagine different realities.

³⁵⁶ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 144

³⁵⁷ Marcuse, “The Aesthetic Dimension”, pg. 6

³⁵⁸ Marcuse, “A Note on Dialectic”, pg. 67

This ability of art to see past the given facts is especially crucial for students in a one-dimensional society, as in these societies, Marcuse writes “the power of the given facts tends to become totalitarian, to absorb all opposition and to define the entire universe of discourse.”³⁵⁹ Art has radical potential, Marcuse argues, because “art transcends its social determination and emancipates itself from the given universe of discourse and behavior while preserving its over-whelming presence.”³⁶⁰ In emancipating itself from the given universe of discourse, art creates a space in which dialectical and negative thinking can emerge because the world of art is “is given a reality which is suppressed and distorted in the given reality.”³⁶¹ This new reality opened up by the work of art is an extreme picture of the given situation “which explodes the given reality in the name of a truth normally denied or unheard.”³⁶²

In exploding the given reality, Marcuse notes that art makes a space for “the emergence of another reason, another sensibility, which defies the rationality and sensibility incorporated in the dominate social institutions.”³⁶³ Marcuse notes that this emergence of a different kind of reason “shatters the reified objectivity of established social relations.”³⁶⁴ In doing this people and society can experience a “rebirth of the rebellious subjectivity.”³⁶⁵ In other words, when art is a large part of education, education liberates students’ subjectivity, a liberation which enables them to create a society governed by a new and free sensibility.

³⁵⁹ Ibid

³⁶⁰ Marcuse, “The Aesthetic Dimension”, pg. 6

³⁶¹ Ibid

³⁶² Ibid, pg. 7

³⁶³ Ibid, pg. 7

³⁶⁴ Marcuse, “The Aesthetic Dimension”, pg. 7

³⁶⁵ Ibid

It seems clear, then, given the revolutionary capacity of art, an education which desires to help students and societies become free must build a strong humanities curriculum. Therefore, not only should students be encouraged and given time to do art (such as drawing and painting and other hand crafts) in school; they should also be given plenty of time to appreciate art through other mediums such as literature, music, drama, manual art (such as woodworking, cooking, gardening) and dance. Marcuse certainly argues that any school that drastically curtails the arts is very likely engaged, whether purposefully or not, in constricting the space for free thought and imagination and, as a result, perpetuating one-dimensional thinking and an oppressive society.

It turns out that art helps to create this very New Sensibility Marcuse says must come about. Marcuse writes that “Art liberates sensibility from performance and instrumentality”³⁶⁶ and that art specifically helps to cultivate this new sensibility because the beauty of art “has the power to check aggression.”³⁶⁷ Aggression in this case is the aggression that tries to repress any type of negative or erotic thinking. Because of these aspects of beauty and art, Marcuse writes that “The beautiful has the ‘biological value’ of that which is ‘useful, beneficial, enhancing life’.”³⁶⁸ Beauty, because it is an end in itself, cultivates the ability in student to appreciate non-instrumental thinking, a kind of thinking that is essential for a free society. It turns out for Marcuse that the New Sensibility he wishes to cultivate in students is actually an aesthetic sensibility that is nourished and developed by an immersion in and sensitivity to beauty.

³⁶⁶ Ibid, pg. 9

³⁶⁷ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 24

³⁶⁸ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 24

§10—Aesthetics (Beauty) and Receptive Reason in the Dialectical Education

While Marcuse focuses primarily on the revolutionary power art, he also mentions the importance of beauty in general. One of the most important things about a cultivated aesthetic sensibility for Marcuse is that it is a sensibility capable of receptivity, and it is averse to domination. Marcuse notes that a one-dimensional society is a society that seeks to dominate both the people in it and also nature as well, for it is only in this domination that the one-dimensional society can function smoothly and efficiently and continue to increase its delivery of new and exciting comforts. Marcuse writes that “Productivity thus designates the degree of the mastery and transformation of nature: the progressive replacement of an uncontrolled natural environment by a controlled technological environment.”³⁶⁹ And “In a repressive society, “man is evaluated according to his ability to make, augment, and improve socially useful things.”³⁷⁰

In a society that values productivity above everything, both nature and people must be dominated so that they can become manageable and serviceable to the overall machine of society. Non-managed nature and people become a threat to the smooth running of society. The aesthetic sensibility, then, cultivates an attitude in us that works against our societally-fostered tendencies to dominate and exploit both nature and each other, and in doing so this sensibility creates a space in which we can enjoy both nature and each other in a receptive, peaceful and non-instrumental manner. The aesthetic sensibility allows us to appreciate both nature and other people as ends in themselves.³⁷¹

³⁶⁹ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 155

³⁷⁰ *Ibid*, pg. 155

³⁷¹ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 176

Marcuse refers back to something we have already explored in the Kant chapter—namely that Kant believes that beauty can be a symbol for morality and that our sensuous conditions, if they are attended to properly, can ameliorate our ability to be moral. Marcuse refers to this idea of Kant’s philosophy when he writes, “We found that, in Kant’s philosophy, the aesthetic dimension occupies the central position between sensuousness and morality—the two poles of the human existence. If this is the case, then the aesthetic dimension must contain principles valid for both realms.”³⁷² In other words, our aesthetic sensibilities need to inform how we structure and govern our material conditions because they are the mediating sensibility between the sensual and transcendent aspects of our existence.

When the aesthetic sensibility is cultivated, Marcuse argues, people no longer must dominate nature and one another in order to gain enjoyment through forced productivity and efficiency. Rather, people are able to engage in receptive enjoyment of others and the world. Marcuse writes, “Nature, the objective world, would then be experienced primarily neither as dominating man (as in primitive society) nor as being dominated by man (as in the established civilization), but rather as an object of ‘contemplation’.”³⁷³ We would cultivate an entirely different attitude towards nature and begin to view it “not as an object of domination and exploitation, but as a ‘garden’ which can grow while making human beings

³⁷² Van Heertum notes that Marcuse advocates a “relationship with nature where we overcome a rationality that subordinates nature to human domination. This can be instrumental in overcoming the logic of human-to-human domination, by challenging its roots in the social and scientific domination of nature” (pg. 110).

³⁷³ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 189

grow.”³⁷⁴ In addition, we would be able to cultivate relationships with each other in which we experience each other purely as free human beings pursuing a free and aesthetic society together, rather than experiencing each other in relationships aimed at domination, competition, or forced productivity. These are relationships that are “no longer mediated by the market, no longer based on competitive exploitation or unfree societies.”³⁷⁵ Marcuse notes that in a non-repressive society, the way we relate to each other in work and society qualitatively changes: “The emergence of a non-repressive reality principle would alter rather than destroy the social organization of labor: the liberation of Eros could create new and durable work relations.”³⁷⁶

In a repressive society, “man is evaluated according to his ability to make, augment, and improve socially useful things,”³⁷⁷ but in a non-repressive order, “lasting erotic relations among mature individuals”³⁷⁸ that build society and build institutions that allow for human flourishing can occur. This aesthetic sensibility in addition cultivates “a sensitivity free from the repressive satisfactions of the unfree societies; a sensitivity receptive to forms and modes of reality which thus far have been projected only by the aesthetic imagination.”³⁷⁹

Since the aesthetic sensibility frees us from heteronomous needs and dominating dispositions and allows us to experience the world in each other in open and receptive ways, Marcuse notes that an awareness of the aesthetic dimension can help us measure

³⁷⁴ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 216

³⁷⁵ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 24

³⁷⁶ Marcuse, *Eros and Civilization*, pg. 155

³⁷⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 155

³⁷⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 199

³⁷⁹ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 24

how free our society actually is.³⁸⁰ When a society becomes infused with the aesthetic sensibility, there will be external changes in this society as well. Marcuse writes

For the aesthetic needs have their own social content: they are the claims of the human organism, mind and body, for a dimension of fulfillment which can be created only in the struggle against the institutions which, by their very functioning, deny and violate these claims.³⁸¹

If these aesthetic needs were to become the predominant needs of people, it would radically change society. Marcuse writes, “they would critically weaken the economic, political, and cultural pressure and power groups which have a vested interest in preserving the environment and ecology of profitable merchandizing.”³⁸² Furthermore, the awakening of the aesthetic dimension of people, namely through education, would invoke “the sensuous power of the imagination.”³⁸³

When students and people in general become infused with an aesthetic sensibility and the sensuous power of imagination, Marcuse notes that at some point, repressive reality becomes “utterly regressive.”³⁸⁴ When this happens, people demand change in their external lives: “The political action which insists on a new morality and a new sensibility as preconditions and results of social change”³⁸⁵ erupts. When this new morality and new sensibility begin to emerge, a society governed by new relationships and a new-found harmony between previously dichotomous elements emerges. In this new society,

[there] now appears the prospect for a new relationship between sensibility and reason, namely, the harmony between sensibility and radical consciousness...rational faculties and capable of projecting and defining

³⁸⁰ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 24

³⁸¹ *Ibid*

³⁸² *Ibid*, pg. 25

³⁸³ *Ibid*, pg. 26

³⁸⁴ *Ibid*

³⁸⁵ *Ibid*

the objective (material) conditions of freedom, its rationality of domination, the sensibility would be guided by the imagination, mediating between the rational faculties and the sensuous needs.”³⁸⁶

This new morality and New Sensibility is the morality and sensibility that allow for the full development and liberation of “faculties of freedom.”³⁸⁷ Marcuse calls the world this new morality and New Sensibility creates the “aesthetic universe” and points out that it is essential for the liberation of the faculties of freedom. There are specific and necessary elements that must be present for freedom to develop, and certain societal factors most certain destroy the ability for freedom to develop. Marcuse notes that the faculties of freedom

cannot develop in an environment shaped by and for aggressive impulses, nor can they be envisaged as the mere effect of a new set of social institutions. They can emerge only in the collective practice of creating an environment: level by level, step by step---in the material and intellectual production, an environment in which the non-aggressive, erotic, receptive faculties of man, in harmony with the consciousness of freedom, strive for the pacification of man and nature, in the reconstruction of society for the attainment of this goal, reality altogether would assume a Form expressive of the new goal.³⁸⁸

We notice in this quote that Marcuse emphasizes that the aesthetic sensibility demands change at each level of society—relationships, the external world and the environment. Therefore, a society that has had this new sensibility cultivated in them requires certain and specific changes in its concrete articulation in the external world. For instance the society requires thing like

the harmless drive for better zoning regulations and a modicum of protection from noise and dirt to the pressure for closing of whole city areas to automobiles, prohibition of transistor radios in all public places,

³⁸⁶ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 26

³⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 27

³⁸⁸ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 27

decommercialization of nature, total urban reconstruction, control of the birth rate.³⁸⁹

Marcuse suggest that the requirements of a society governed by the aesthetic principle end up being rational and necessary requirements for the full aesthetic flourishing of humanity. Marcuse emphasizes the necessary and rational development of the New Sensibility again when he writes in *Eros and Civilization* that a society that is governed by the aesthetic sensibility

generates its own projects of realization: the abolition of toil, the amelioration of the environment, the conquest of disease and decay, the creation of luxury. All these activities flow directly from the pleasure principle, and, at the same time, they constitute work which associates individuals to “greater unities.”³⁹⁰

This should remind us of Hegel’s State in which the State that develops is actually the totality of necessary relationships for freedom to presence itself in the world.

Marcuse’s ideas of the aesthetic sensibility illustrates that a cultivation of the aesthetic sensibility inevitably results in the demand for external change in our relationships both with the world and with each other. The New Sensibility demands that our relationships with each other become free, receptive, non-aggressive and marked by play and leisure rather than excessive performance, competition and productivity. If this is true, then as schools cultivate an aesthetic sensibility, this should certainly result in changes in relationships between faculty and students, and between students themselves. It should also result in changes in the school environment. For example, schools infused with an aesthetic sensibility would decrease or stop activities that focus primarily on competition, ranking and domination. This would certainly affect the way we handle

³⁸⁹ Ibid, pg. 24

³⁹⁰ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, Get pg. #

common school activities like grading, class rankings, athletic events and other events whose purpose is almost solely competition. It would also most certainly affect the way in which teachers discipline their classes and structure their class lessons. Furthermore, a school infused with an aesthetic sensibility would certainly pay attention to the beauty of the school, both inside the school itself and in the way its grounds are ornamented and maintained. It also seems reasonable that students who have had an aesthetic sensibility cultivated in them would both desire and be expected to participate in beautifying their school internally and externally.

§11—Marcuse, Kant and Hegel

Having examined Marcuse's view of education and the role it plays in society, we are now in an ideal position to examine the way that Marcuse extends and complements both Kant and Hegel's philosophy in significant ways. We saw in an earlier chapter that Kant was specifically concerned that education develop a student with a robust, autonomous will who joins the ethical commonwealth in order to strive for the continued advancement of humanity. Kant was especially concerned that teachers avoid using heteronomous incentives like fear and comparisons to discipline students, and he was especially concerned that students' sensuous conditions support and ameliorate their moral training. Hegel extends Kant's educational view by explaining how the ethical commonwealth develops through dialectical moments of abstract property, morality and the State rooted in recognitive relationships. Hegel also suggest that this working out of the Idea of freedom is a necessary unfolding of human subjectivity in the world throughout history, and can be realized in the world. However, he also suggests that this

process continues unless it is blocked by forms of alienation. Education is the process that allows the Idea of freedom to unfold in individuals and, therefore, society as a whole.

Marcuse's educational ideas build on both Kant and Hegel's notions of education. Marcuse extends Hegel's idea of the dialectic and shows how the dialectical move towards freedom becomes blocked in modern society through one-dimensional thinking and surplus repression, which are modern forms of alienation. Marcuse suggests how these modern forms of alienation can infect both society and the educational system in such a way that education becomes an apprenticeship into disease rather than liberation. Furthermore, Marcuse draws on Kant's ideas of autonomy and the way in which beauty and our sensuous conditions enhance our capacity to be free to suggest the way in which a new sensibility which is an aesthetic sensibility can cultivate imagination, art and beauty in schools to liberate students to create a new society.

In this new society, all human capacities are free to develop fully, and humans are able to enjoy both the world in each other as ends in themselves. This is Marcuse's erotic society, and it is the Kingdom of Ends that Kant envisions—a free, non-instrumental society in which people work for the realization of the highest good. In the next chapter, I examine Paulo Freire's pedagogy and the way in he further illuminates the way that one-dimensional thinking infects the classroom, which he explores this through his notion of banking education. I also examine the techniques that Freire advocates to encourage dialectical thinking in the classroom (Freire calls this dialogical education), and the way in which educators can help this dialectical thinking extend into the world beyond the classroom. In their commitment to dialectical education and social transformation, Freire and Marcuse make excellent pedagogical companions, and Freire provides a capstone to

the problem of education introduced by Rousseau and developed by Kant, Hegel and Marcuse.

Chapter Five—Freire

§1—An Introduction to Paulo Freire

Paulo Freire is the last major educator I will discuss in this project. Freire situates himself firmly in the German Idealist and critical theory traditions. Because of this, Freire is very concerned with the political and educational issues discussed by each of the philosophers I have covered thus far. I will argue in this chapter that Freire makes a valuable contribution to this discussion that both ties together the concerns of the previous philosophers and also makes an important contribution: Freire argues that classrooms must become dialogical spaces of conscientization which cultivate specific liberatory virtues such as love, humanizing rebellion and hope. I believe that Freire's notion of classrooms as dialogical spaces of conscientization develops important aspects of Marcuse's educational philosophy by detailing a broad heuristic that allows us to discover the forces which block freedom.

I also believe that Freire's notion of liberatory virtues is a unique contribution that he makes, and I believe it is also a contribution that needs to be developed in more depth. In my final chapter, I will suggest how I believe this might be done. In order to illuminate Freire's contributions to this project, it is important to get an overall grounding of Freire's philosophy as a whole. To do this, I will first give a little background information on Freire's life. Next I will explain Freire's concept of humanization and dehumanization in general. Then I will examine how Freire describes a humanizing and dehumanizing classroom. It is in this part of the chapter that I will explain Freire's notion of the classroom as a dialogical space of conscientization. I will also discuss Freire's

notion of liberatory virtues and why I believe this idea is a significant contribution to the discussion of education and justice.

§2—Freire’s Biography

Paulo Freire was a Brazilian educator and philosopher who had first-hand experience with dehumanizing politics, an experience which solidified his commitment to justice and education. Freire was born in 1921 in Recife Brazil, which during the Great Depression became “The center of one of the most extreme situations of poverty and underdevelopment in the Third World...”³⁹¹ Freire grew up in a middle class family in Recife Brazil, and his family was hit especially hard by the Great Depression—so much so that for a period of time, Freire was constantly hungry, and his school work began to suffer because of his hunger. Freire often found himself unable to complete his work or even concentrate in class, not because he lacked intelligence, but because he was chronically and acutely hungry. In the introduction to Freire’s most famous work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Richard Shaull writes “As the economic crisis in 1929 in the United States began to affect Brazil, the precarious stability of Freire’s middle-class family gave way and he found himself sharing the plight of the ‘wretched of the earth.’”³⁹²

Although circumstances later improved for his family, Freire’s experience of suffering and hunger never left him. Shaull writes about the experience that “This had a profound influence on his life as he came to know the gnawing pangs of hunger and feel behind in school because of the listlessness it produced; it also led him to make a vow; at age eleven, to dedicate his life to the struggle against hunger, so that other children would

³⁹¹ Richard Shaull, *Introduction to Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 30

³⁹² *Ibid*

not have to know the agony he was then experiencing.”³⁹³ Paulo Freire went on to earn his doctoral degree in education, and his focus in his research was specifically on educational philosophy.³⁹⁴ In his research, he was heavily influenced by philosophers like Hegel and Marx and critical theorists such as Marcuse and Erich Fromm.³⁹⁵ He also began programs working to educate illiterate people in Recife, especially the Brazilian farm workers.³⁹⁶

As Freire worked with the poor, he came to recognize what he termed a “culture of silence.” That is, “He came to realize that the ignorance and lethargy of the farmers was the direct product of the whole situation of economic, social, and political domination—and of paternalism—of which they were victims.”³⁹⁷ Because of his writings and teachings, Freire eventually came under suspicion by Brazilian authorities, and he was “jailed after a military coup in 1964.”³⁹⁸ He was in prison for seventy days, and afterwards he was strongly encouraged by those in power to leave Brazil.³⁹⁹ Freire lived and worked in Chile for a time, working with UNESCO and adult education in the Chilean Institute for Agrarian reform.⁴⁰⁰ Freire also visited the United States and taught classes at Harvard in the School of Education.⁴⁰¹ In 1980, he was able to return to Brazil.⁴⁰² Patrick Clark writes of Freire that “Paulo has been and remains a light in the darkness—the darkness of ideological determinism, fatalism; and organized

³⁹³ Richard Shaull, *Introduction to Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 30

³⁹⁴ *Ibid*, pg. 31

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*

³⁹⁶ *Ibid*

³⁹⁷ *Ibid*, pg. 30

³⁹⁸ *Ibid*, pg. 31

³⁹⁹ *Ibid*

⁴⁰⁰ Richard Shaull, *Introduction to Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 31

⁴⁰¹ *Ibid*

⁴⁰² Patrick Clarke, *Translator’s Notes, Pedagogy of Freedom*, ix

hopelessness. It is a light that neither persecution, exile, nor unjust criticism has been able to extinguish.”⁴⁰³

We will find in this chapter that Freire’s notions of pedagogy and liberation are especially rich, immersed as they are in philosophy and critical theory. We will also find that they provide a culmination to the trajectory of educational philosophy started by Rousseau and solved by Kant with help from Hegel and Marcuse. Freire continues a train of thought began by Marcuse. Like Marcuse, Freire is concerned about the types of social behaviors and structures which block the advance of human freedom. His work is especially helpful because he specifically provides a broader heuristic for determining societal forces that block freedom. Furthermore, he specifically examines how hindrances to human freedom arise in the classroom, and his pedagogy is specifically centered around disrupting these blocks.

§3—Our Vocation of Humanization and Education’s Relationship to this Goal

In order to understand Freire’s view of pedagogy, it is essential to understand his view of humanity and humanization. One of Freire arguments, in his seminal work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, is that the vocation of human beings is humanization, and we will see that Freire believes that education is intimately tied to this views. When Freire speaks of humanization, he means a state in which human beings are able to exercise all of their capacities and are fully free to reflect on their world and act on that reflection. This is the notion of praxis, which we will examine shortly. For Freire, humanization is a liberation from being solely immersed in and imprisoned by materiality. If humans remain in this condition of immersion and material imprisonment, they would be

⁴⁰³ Patrick Clarke, Translator’s Notes, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, ix

subservient to their materiality instead of having any option to transform their materiality in a way that could support their humanity and allow the full range of human capacities to emerge. Freire argues that humans have “the seat of their decisions located in themselves and in their relations with the world and with others.”⁴⁰⁴ Because of this, humans are able to infuse “the world with their creative presence by means of the transformation they effect upon it.”⁴⁰⁵ Humans do this specifically, Freire argues, because they are tri-dimensional beings who relate to themselves and the world in terms of their “past, present, and their future”.⁴⁰⁶ This tri-dimensional way of relating to the world specifically creates the human capacity to transform the world because it provides human beings with a historical sense of themselves and their environment. It allows them to understand the human ability to intervene and transform their world for better or worse. And because human beings realize they have the capacity to transform their world, human beings, both individuals and the human race are unfinished. What they will be is not set in stone. Freire writes, “In fact, this unfinishedness is essential to our human condition.”⁴⁰⁷ Because of their unfinishedness, the goal of human beings, both individually and as a species, is to pursue the full development of humans and all of their capacities; again, this what Freire means by humanization. This notion of humanization harmonizes with Kant’s ideas of the *summum bonum*, Hegel’s notion of *recht*, and Marcuse’s notion of the erotic, liberated society.

It is important to note that for Freire, the process of humanization must be active, and it is one education must be directly involved in. Freire notes that if human beings are

⁴⁰⁴ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 99

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid

⁴⁰⁶ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 101

⁴⁰⁷ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 52

unfinished, then their lives as individuals and as a human race are continually open to greater and fuller life and more freedom. To resign one's self fatalistically to the way things are, then, is deadening and dehumanizing. Freire argues that the current status of the world, rather than being some fixed, external reality, is actually a product of human intervention and transformation in the world. When we transform the world for a fuller expression of freedom, humanization has occurred. Therefore, when humans are acting most like humans, they are continually intervening in and transforming their world. The primary role of education is to facilitate students' ability to become agents who continually do this work. Very shortly, we will examine how Freire envisions education facilitating students' ability to transform their world. At this point, it is important to note that not all human intervention in the world transforms the world towards greater humanization. Therefore, to understand how humans do this, it is important to understand Freire's concept of humans as ethical and political beings, an idea closely related to humans' transformative capacity.

§4—The Political and Ethical Human: Beings Who Spiritualize the World

Freire ties humanization directly to the human ability to be political and ethical, an ability rooted in the human capacity to spiritualize their world through their language. Freire's account of the relationship between human ethical capacities and language is not a brand new idea. Aristotle argues a similar point in the *Politics*.⁴⁰⁸ What is unique about

⁴⁰⁸ Aristotle writes in the *Politics*, "It is also clear why a human being is more of a political animal than a bee or any other gregarious animal. Nature makes nothing pointlessly, as we say, and no animal has speech, except a human being. A voice is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful, which is why it is also possessed by other animals...But speech is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful, and hence also what is just or unjust. For it is peculiar to human beings, in comparison to the other animals, that they alone have perception of what is good or bad, just or unjust, and the rest. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city state" (*Politics*, 1253a2-7).

Freire's description of this relationship is the way in which he relates it to liberating pedagogical practices in this classroom and the liberatory virtues educators must cultivate. Therefore, we must examine Freire's human being's political and ethical capacities in order to understand how they are related to each other and to the process of humanization and education.

Freire centers our ethical and political nature in our use of language. Language facilitates humans' awareness of existence. In the process of becoming aware of existence, human beings objectify their world through the use of language. Freire argues, "The invention of 'existence' necessarily involves the emergence of language, culture, and communication at levels of complexity much greater than that which obtains at the level of survival, self-defense and self-preservation."⁴⁰⁹ Freire refers to this ability to consider existence people's ability to "spiritualize" their world. As we have seen previously, Freire means that humans have the ability to create a multi-dimensional reality that includes not only the material dimension but an emotional dimension in which we relate to our present, our past, and our future. In this tri-dimensional space, people compare and consider, comprehending actions that are better or worse, less beautiful or more beautiful, more free or less free. It is this tri-dimensional relation to our world in which people are able to move beyond their materiality and basic survival needs,

⁴⁰⁹ *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 53

and they are able to consider their emotions, dreams, goals and hopes. Their subjectivity, which Freire refers to here as spirituality, emerges. This subjectivity, in all of its dimensions, then, is an essential part of human freedom for Freire.

This emergence of subjectivity enables humans to understand themselves as individuals who have the ability to opt, as opposed to animals who cannot really distinguish themselves as individuals distinct from the species.⁴¹⁰ Once human beings can name their world in terms of things that are bad and good and just and unjust, human beings realize that they can intervene personally in the current state of affairs. They realize that they make the world better or worse through their commitments. This realization is the moment when ethical capabilities emerge. Freire argues

What makes men and women ethical is their capacity to ‘spiritualize’ the world, to make it either beautiful or ugly. Their capacity to intervene, to compare, to judge, to decide, to choose, to desist, makes them capable of acts of greatness, of dignity, and, at the same time, of the unthinkable in terms of indignity.⁴¹¹

It is this ability to be ethical that leads people to be able to contemplate the difference between good and evil. Freire argues

...Human existence is, in fact, a radical and profound tension between good and evil, between dignity and indignity, between decency and indecency, between the beauty and ugliness of the world.

Because humans have the capacity to understand these tensions, they have the capacity to be political. They can contemplate the current state of affairs surrounding them and consider how they may be changed for the better. Freire argues

⁴¹⁰ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 52

⁴¹¹ *Ibid*, pg. 53

In other words, it was becoming simultaneously clear that human existence is, in fact, a radical and profound tension between good and evil, between dignity and indignity, between decency and indecency, between the beauty and the ugliness of the world. In other words, it was becoming clear that it is impossible to humanly exist without assuming the right and the duty to opt, to decide to struggle, to be political.⁴¹²

This human ability is not just some intellectual characteristic of human beings. Rather, Freire argues, it is a condition that touches on every aspect of existence. Freire argues

Consciousness about the world, which implies consciousness about myself in the world, with it and with others, which also implies our ability to realize the world, to understand it, is not limited to a rationalistic experience. This consciousness is a totality—reason feelings, emotions, desires; my body, conscious of the world and myself, seizes the world toward which it has an intention.⁴¹³

As we shall soon see, Freire argues that education that is humanizing facilitates the ethical and political characteristics of students that are the very foundation of their humanity. Furthermore, Freire argues that education which ignores these aspects is a dehumanizing education. It is an education, in fact, that treats students as objects to be manipulated, rather than subjective, free beings with ethical and political capacities. I have thus far emphasized the way in which human capacities for language enable human beings to develop capacities for ethical and political action. Freire writes of our language capacities specifically in his discussion of the authentic word, praxis, and dialogical relationships with others. These ideas are directly related to Freire's ethical and political ideas which are foundational to his educational philosophy. Therefore, I will now examine these ideas in greater detail.

⁴¹² Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 53

⁴¹³ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Heart*, pg. 94

§5—The Authentic Word and Praxis: The Necessity for Dialogical Relationships

In order to understand Freire's concepts of humanization and dehumanization more fully, we must first understand his idea of the word. When Freire speaks of the word, he is certainly referring to our language capacities which lead to our spiritual understanding of the world. But he also means something more than this. When Freire refers to the word, he is speaking of our ability to name the world we see around us and in doing so, our word contains both reflection and action.⁴¹⁴ In the process of reflection and action, our word become praxis. Therefore, Freire's notion of the word pertains directly to his notion of praxis. Praxis is our ethical and political capacity to reflect on the world and act on that reflection to transform the world for greater humanization. Freire writes "There is no true word that is not at the same time a praxis. Thus to speak a true word is to transform the world."⁴¹⁵

Freire is pointing out here that in order for humans to act on their political and ethical capacities, they must name their world authentically and act on their word. For example, if I name an environment as dangerous, this entails that I must act in a way to protect myself by erecting a protective shelter, or taking up weapons or fleeing from danger. When I speak the word that someone is a friend, this entails that I act with friendliness and warmth, not enmity and aloofness. And this acting with friendliness and warmth transforms certain aspects of my environment. Freire's point is that an authentic word always implies actions which transform one's environment. An inauthentic word, however, cannot transform. On the other hand, inauthentic words perpetuate dehumanization. Freire argues that with an inauthentic word, there is a dichotomy

⁴¹⁴ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 85

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid*, pg. 86

between reflection and acting. With this dichotomy, the word becomes an alienating and empty word. Because it is alienating and empty, this word can't denounce the dehumanizing elements of the world, and so it can't transform it.⁴¹⁶

Freire's emphasis on speaking the authentic word is not merely a description of the way in which our subjectivity emerges and operates. His emphasis on speaking the authentic word actually implies that political and educational dialogue is essential. The more one speaks the authentic word, the more one moves towards humanization. Therefore, speaking the authentic word is the responsibility and the right of everyone, as the humanization of the species cannot be accomplished by one individual. If everyone has the right and responsibility to speak the authentic word, this requires that we dialogue with one another in order to transform our world towards greater humanization. If human beings must engage in praxis, it entails that they must engage in dialogue as well. Human beings inevitably see the world differently, which means they name it differently, and this difference in naming inevitably leads to tension. Freire describes this tension and its results. He argues

Confronted by this 'universe of thees' in dialectical contradiction, persons take equally contradictory positions: some work to maintain the structures, others to change them. As antagonism deepens between themes which are the expression of reality, there is a tendency for the themes and for reality itself to be mythicized, establishing a climate of irrationality and sectarianism.⁴¹⁷

Freire's description of social tension recalls to us Kant's notion of un-social sociability and Hegel's master-slave dialectic. Freire suggests here that as we name the world, inevitably some people name certain aspects of the world as

⁴¹⁶ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 87

⁴¹⁷ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 102

humanizing, while others will name them as dehumanizing. The problem arises when people become entrenched in their particular way of naming the world and are unable to recognize others' rights to naming reality, too. In refusing to recognize this right, and in retreating solely into one's own praxis, Freire notes above that people establish a climate of "irrationality and sectarianism". This irrationality, I believe, is caused by a refusal and inability to listen to how other people name reality, which leads to the speaking of inauthentic words which can no longer transform reality.

It is only through sincere dialogue with other people that our words are authentic and life-giving. Freire explains further why dialogue is a necessity. "Human existence cannot be silent, nor can it be nourished by false words but only by true words, with which men and women transform the world together."⁴¹⁸ Freire goes on to explain what he means by dialogue: Dialogue is the encounter between men, mediated by the world, in order to name the world.⁴¹⁹ It is through sincere dialogue that humans are able to transform their world towards a greater expression of freedom. Because of this, Freire argues that dialogue is how "people achieve significance as human beings. Dialogue is thus an existential necessity."⁴²⁰ Freire believes that that dialogue is an imperative not only in politics but in education as well. He argues that an education that prohibits dialogue and crushes students' ability to name their world authentically and transform it is a dehumanizing education.

⁴¹⁸ Ibid, pg. 88

⁴¹⁹ Ibid

⁴²⁰ Ibid

It is important to note that much of Paulo Freire's life was dedicated to teaching illiterate farmers in Recife, Brazil (and other places) how to read. Freire believed that in giving the farmers the gift of reading and writing, he helped them develop their ability to name the world so they could transform it in order to make it more humane for them. It is no wonder that Freire was exiled by Brazilian authorities for this seemingly excellent endeavor. It was much better for those who profited from the farmer's cheap labor that these same farmers viewed their condition as static, immutable, and fixed. Now we must examine how Freire's ideas of dialogue and our ethical and political capacities pertain specifically to the classroom.

§6— Teaching Must Be a Dialogical Practice Rooted in Our Shared Ethical and Political Capacities

As mentioned before, Freire certainly believes that the goal of education is humanization. Freire shows us that to treat students humanely our teaching must be marked by specific characteristics: namely, our teaching must cultivate an environment in which the teacher and the students engage in dialogue together in which both are allowed to engage in authentic praxis. When teachers engage in dialogical practice with their students, they are actually acting as co-liberators for each other, and in doing so, they are better able to transform their environment together and to work for greater humanization in the world.

If dialogical practice must undergird humanizing teaching practices, this suggests several pedagogical implications. First, it implies, as Freire realized, that student literacy is of primary importance. But even when literacy is achieved for students, teachers must

continually work to cultivate students' ability to speak their own word and engage in praxis, for this is the only way students can become ethical and political. This implies several things. First it seems that writing and dialogue must be a consistent component of class. This also suggests that as students master basic literacy skills, education in the classroom should increasingly become a partnership between the students and the teachers.

Second, class writing and dialogue must allow students to speak authentic words, which means there must be space for them to name their world authentically in a way that reflects their current understanding of the world. This does not entail that students are allowed to say anything they want and that there is no content that must be taught. In teaching the Brazilian farmers literacy, Freire certainly had content to his teaching plans which included teaching the Brazilian farmers phonetic structures and knowledge. However, Freire's literacy method began with an exhaustive first-hand research into the lives of the farmers through observation and discussion. In doing this, Freire learned the key words that were important to the farmers. Freire built literacy lessons around these themes so that even when he was presenting a specific content to the farmers, the way the content was presented was centered around the words the farmers themselves had spoken about their existence. It is important to note that empowering students to name their world does not entail that students are allowed to say anything they wish. It would seem that certain words—words that demean groups of individuals, specifically—are words that hinder other people from speaking their words. Freire would certainly argue that these types of words cannot be permitted in the class because they are dehumanizing.

Towards the end of this chapter, I present several examples of classrooms and schools which use Freirean pedagogy to teach in a rich, nuanced and humanizing manner. I would like to mention briefly here that I recently attempted to employ Freirean pedagogy in a political philosophy class I teach. One of the dangers of writing about education and justice is that one becomes acutely aware of the ways in which one's pedagogy falls short of the mark. After studying Freire's work in depth, I became concerned that I was doing too much talking and directing in class, and that I was not allowing students to do enough of this. One of my goals as a teacher is to create a more collaborative classroom environment that is still content-rich. It will take me several years to fully accomplish the plans I have to make my classroom more collaborative. However, I took a small step in the right direction this semester when I allowed students to come up with a list of problems we would be discussing this semester.⁴²¹

On one of the first days of class, I had students write reflectively about why politics is such a contentious issues in society, and I also had the students discuss this question with one another. Then, after we had discussed this question, I had students reflect silently again and generate a list of questions concerning politics related to the issues we had just discussed in class together. After a few moments of reflective writing, we generated a list of questions together. For instance, students asked questions like "What is justice?" and "How do we balance the tension between individual and community rights?" I wrote down these questions, and after each several philosophers we discuss in class, I will revisit the students' questions with them to explore how the various philosophers we are studying answer these questions. While this step is one small

⁴²¹ I will discuss the role that problem-posing plays in Freire's pedagogy in greater depth later on in this chapter.

step I have taken to implement Freirean pedagogy in my classroom, it is a step that I believe allows students to engage in more consistent praxis which is aimed towards transforming the world.

It is important to note that for Freire, authentic praxis is always aimed at the transformation of the world towards greater humanization. This implies that whenever we teach, we must empower students to see how the information learned could be potentially transformative to the world around us. This means that it is essential that our teaching is connected with students' lives and with them as multi-dimensional individuals with intellect, emotions, a past and a future. With this description, Freire tells us that education must always be a dialogue between the teacher and student. He confirms this when he writes

Authentic education is not carried on by 'A' for 'B' or by 'A' about 'B', but rather by 'A' with 'B' mediated by the world—a world which impresses and challenges both parties, giving rise to view or opinions about it. These view, impregnated with anxieties, doubts, hopes, or hopelessness, imply significant themes on the basis of which the program content of education can be built.⁴²²

It may seem difficult to understand how Freire's ideas could translate into a classroom in the United States. I think that it is much more important that a teacher bring a dialogical humanizing attitude to a classroom than it is that a teacher adopt practices that look exactly like Freire's. Once again, at the end of this chapter, I will provide some specific examples of some practices that I believe exemplify Freire's humanizing pedagogical spirit. At this point, however, it is important to explore the types of educational practices that are dehumanizing, rather than humanizing: for this is one of

⁴²² Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 93

Freire's primary educational concerns which he addresses at length in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*.

§7—The Spectre of Dehumanization

In the previous account of the development of our capacity to spiritualize the world, Freire has presented a phenomenological account of how our ethical and political capacities are rooted in our ability to name the world in dialogue with one another. It is through this dialogue that we are able to accomplish our vocation of humanization. It is important to note, however, that while humanization is our vocation, dehumanization is always a possibility. Freire argues

While both humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is the people's vocation. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. It is thwarted by injustice, exploitation, oppression, and the violence of the oppressors; it is affirmed by the yearning of the oppressed for freedom and justice, and by their struggle to recover their lost humanity.⁴²³

We must now examine more in depth what Freire means by dehumanization, and in doing so, we will better understand what dehumanization looks like in the classroom.

If humanization occurs when people dialogue authentically together and engage in transformative praxis, then dehumanization occurs when people are deprived of their ability to dialogue and engage in praxis. Freire argues that a dehumanizing state of affairs is "Any situation in which "A" objectively exploits "B" or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation."⁴²⁴ If we recall that our ability to affirm ourselves as human in the world

⁴²³ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 44

⁴²⁴ *Ibid*, pg. 55

and take responsibility implies our ability to engage in praxis, then for Freire dehumanization occurs when people are denied their ability to engage in praxis. The question is how people are denied this right. Freire believes this process of dehumanization can happen both politically and educationally.

We have already noted earlier in this chapter that conflict inevitably arises in the human process of naming the world when “confronted by this ‘universe of thees’ in dialectical contradiction, persons take equally contradictory positions: some work to maintain the structures, others to change them.”⁴²⁵ If people can remain in dialogue through this tension, then they are able to gain a clear and more accurate view of their world, which allows them to transform it together. Unfortunately, as Freire notes, people often retreat into isolation and dogmatism when they encounter this tension. Again, Freire notes this when he writes, “As antagonism deepens between themes which are the expression of reality, there is a tendency for the themes and for reality itself to be mythicized, establishing a climate of irrationality and sectarianism.”⁴²⁶

To understand why dehumanization does occur in these confrontations, it is helpful to refer back to Hegel’s master and slave dialectic. In this dialectic, which Freire references in *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, two self-consciousnesses facing each other in the world stage a fight to the death. It seems like the only way they can figure out how to negotiate their freedom is through violence, rather than dialogue. In the ensuing fight, one consciousness capitulates, becoming the slave, and the other becomes the master. The master, for a while, becomes the dominant consciousness and requires the slave to conform to his consciousness. The slave is not allowed to have his own “Consciousness

⁴²⁵ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 102

⁴²⁶ Ibid

intent upon the world"⁴²⁷. He is not allowed to inquire into the world himself and develop his own praxis. He is dominated by the master and required to carry out the master's praxis.

Freire argues that this same violence perpetrated by the master against the slave is a violence that is repeated in everyday life. He argues, "Any situation in which some individual prevent others from engaging in the process of inquiry is one of violence."⁴²⁸ Destroying people's ability to engage in praxis or dialogue is an act of dehumanization. Freire notes that there are many ways this dehumanization can occurs. Dehumanization occurs when someone tries to force someone else to accept her naming of the world. In this process, the oppressor tries to deposit her praxis into someone else, rather than dialoguing with people and allowing them to exercise their own praxis. Freire argues "Dialogue can never be an act of deposit or consuming."⁴²⁹ This type of depositing in others is domination, and dialogue is an act of creation, not instrument of domination.⁴³⁰ Freire also argues that any kind of "Propaganda, management, manipulation—all arms of domination—cannot be the instruments of their rehumanization."⁴³¹

Freire argues that the oppressor consciousness wishes "to transform everything surrounding it into an object of domination." This suggests that the oppressor consciousness is motivated by a need to control and to make people manageable, predictable and immediately useful. However, in order to turn people into objects that can be easily managed, one must take away people's freedom, for it is their freedom that

⁴²⁷ Ibid, pg. 70

⁴²⁸ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 85

⁴²⁹ Ibid, pg. 89

⁴³⁰ Ibid

⁴³¹ Ibid, pg. 68

make them unmanageable, unpredictable and hard to control. Freire underscores the objectifying nature of dehumanization when he argues, “Violence is initiated by those who oppress, who exploit, who fail to recognize others as persons—not by those who are oppressed, exploited, and unrecognized. It is not the unloved who initiate disaffection, but those who cannot love because they love only themselves.”⁴³²

Freire argues, however, that in dehumanizing others, the oppressors dehumanize themselves as well. This is because in the very act of dehumanizing others, the oppressors now practice an inauthentic praxis. In the act of treating human beings as objects, they have inauthentically named the world: namely, they have named some human beings as objects rather than as people. Through this inauthentic praxis, they are no longer able to transform the world towards greater levels of humanization. This is why Freire argues that “Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is a distortion of the vocation of becoming more fully human.”⁴³³

Freire urges us to recognize that just as the authentic word transforms the world towards humanization, domination reshapes the world towards dehumanization. Freire argues, “Once a situation of violence and oppression has been established, it engenders an entire way of life and behavior of those caught up in it—oppressors and oppressed alike. Both are submerged in this situation, and both bear the marks of oppression.”⁴³⁴ This act of violence can engender an entire environment of violence. It does this because the act of violence deeply affects the consciousness of both the oppressed and the

⁴³² Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 55

⁴³³ *Ibid*, pg. 44

⁴³⁴ *Ibid*, pg. 58

oppressors. It creates a view of the world in which some people are ostensibly free, and some people are objects to be manipulated. Those objectified people are prohibited from speaking their words, and they absorb the words of the oppressors, an process in which the objectified are domesticated. They are domesticated into the *domus*, the house—the mindset—of the oppressor.⁴³⁵

Freire adds that once this dehumanizing situation is cultivated, the oppressors become entrenched in their position as possessors of the *world*, which, Freire implies, is also a position of being possessors of the *word*. Freire argues

Analysis of existential situation of oppression reveals that their inception lay in an act of violence—initiated by those with power. This violence, as a process, is perpetuated from generation to generation of oppressors, who become its heirs and are shaped in its climate. This climate creates in the oppressor a strongly possessive consciousness—possessive of the world and of men and women.⁴³⁶

It seems clear at this point that not only is dehumanization always possible historically, it very easy for it to occur. And in fact, given Freire's account of dehumanization as a process that occurs whenever someone's ability to engage in praxis is denied, it seems clear that both small and larger instances of dehumanization occur daily. Certainly we see instances of dehumanization through laws and actions in society that either overtly or covertly deny people the right to dialogue in political life or engage in praxis. However, Freire is especially concerned with how dehumanization occurs in the classroom in a method he refers to as the banking model of education.

⁴³⁵ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 51

⁴³⁶ *Ibid*, pg. 58

§8—Dehumanization in the Classroom

The banking model of education, a dehumanizing pedagogy, is one of Freire's primary concerns in the *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. This type of education is the opposite of education that cultivates praxis. Rather than cultivating ability to name and act on that naming, the banking model encourages the passive reception of other people's word concerning how one should act. In the banking method of education, Freire argues, "the educator's role is to regulate the way the world 'enters into' the students."⁴³⁷ Freire adds that "Implicit in the banking concept is the assumption of a dichotomy between human beings and the world: a person is merely in the world, not with the world or with others; the individual is spectator, not re-creator."⁴³⁸ Freire argues that in this model of education, the teachers acts solely as the expert⁴³⁹ who has pre-determined knowledge to deposit into the students' minds, students who are passive recipients. Freire writes, "Banking education inhibits creativity and domesticates (although it cannot completely destroy) the intentionality of consciousness by isolating consciousness from the world, thereby denying people their ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human."⁴⁴⁰

We should recall that Freire is not advocating a content-less education or an education in which the students decide every aspect of the curriculum and pedagogy.

⁴³⁷ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 76

⁴³⁸ Ibid, pg. 75

⁴³⁹ Freire certainly believes that teachers have a type of expertise they share with their students. A problem arises, however, when the teacher acts solely in the role of expert and fails to recognize the knowledge students bring to an experience. When teachers do this, they fail to recognize students as beings of praxis, and in doing so, they create a dehumanizing situation.

⁴⁴⁰ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 84

What is important to understand here is that the banking model of education is not marked fundamentally by a specific type of content or lack of content, although these could play a role in dehumanization. Rather, the banking model of education is dehumanizing because the teacher is completely directive and non-dialogical.

One of the primary ways that teachers perpetuate the banking model of education, Freire argues, is through myth-depositing. In myth-depositing, the teacher give herself the sole right to name the world and decide now things are. She communicates that her interpretation of the world is the right interpretation, and the myth is then deposited into the students. These myths could be particular interpretations of society or of history or a rigid interpretation of any subject that does not allow for inquiry or questioning. Because this myth is incontrovertible, it does not allow students to engage in transformative praxis. The question now is how Freire envisions a classroom that liberates students from dehumanization towards greater humanization. I will now discussion how Freire believes that humanizing classrooms become dialogical spaces of conscientization through the practice of problem-posing and the cultivation of liberatory virtues.

§9—Liberating Teaching Cultivates the Classroom as a Dialogical Spaces of Conscientization Through Problem-Posing

Freire gives us many clues about the type of pedagogy that disrupts dehumanization in the classroom and society at large. We have already seen that humanizing pedagogy must be dialogical. Dialogue not only allows students and teachers to pursue further humanization. Dialogue also disrupts forces of dehumanization. In order to be liberating, however, this dialogue must be a specific sort of dialogue: one which

focuses on problems and leads to conscientization, a word Freire uses to describe the process in which students become aware of dehumanizing practices in the world.

Freire notes that in order for the situation of dehumanization to end, that students must first become aware of the dehumanizing situation. This is the process of conscientization, and it is a process that occurs through dialogue. Freire argues about the process of conscientization and the dehumanizing situation, “To no longer be prey to its force, one must emerge from it and turn upon it. This can be done only by means of the praxis: reflection and action upon the world in order to transform it.”⁴⁴¹ Freire ties humanization and dialogue directly with conscientization which is a type of critical thinking marked by critical consciousness that arises through the attention to and resolution of problems. Freire writes, “Finally, true dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking—thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world and the people and admits of no dichotomy between them---thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in temporality without fear of the risks involved.”⁴⁴² We see here that Freire emphasizes that conscientization cannot separate humans from the world, as though the world is just something human beings find themselves in. Rather, critical consciousness continually emphasizes that the world is a product of human reflection and action in the world.

Freire goes on to emphasize the difference between critical thinking and its opposite: naïve thinking. He writes, “Critical thinking contrasts with naïve

⁴⁴¹ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 51

⁴⁴² *Ibid*, pg. 92

thinking, which sees historical time as a weight, a stratification of the acquisitions and experiences of the past, from which the present should emerge normalized and ‘well-behaved’. For the naïve thinker, the important thing is accommodation to the normalized ‘today’.”⁴⁴³ Freire argues further that “For naïve thinking, the goal is precisely to hold fast to this guaranteed space and *adjust to it*.”⁴⁴⁴ By thus denying temporality, it denies itself as well.”⁴⁴⁵ Freire’s contrast between critical and naïve thinking is illuminating because it suggests that critical thinking is not just an academic skill, removed from life, which is only practiced in a few classes such as logic or philosophy. Rather, since critical thinking is a way we view life, history and our place in both of these, critical thinking must be carried out in every subject and in all parts of life.

Furthermore, since critical thinking and conscientization are directly related to our attunement to and resolution of problems, it suggests that it is important for educators to organize disciplines around the resolution of problems. Since our goal is humanization, and we have not reached fully humanization yet, the reality we have created contains inherent contradictions that must be resolved. The implication that our reality is marked by problems that need to be resolved suggests that if the material and subjects students study in school are truly reflective of life, they should be focused on problems, the very nature of which can become a catalyst for conscientization, dialogue, and praxis. Therefore, by presenting reality as a fixed state of affairs but rather a problem that

⁴⁴³ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 92

⁴⁴⁴ Italics mine

⁴⁴⁵ Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 92

presents clues to how we transform it towards greater humanization, the teacher automatically invites her students to be co-participants in this transformative process.

I would like to present an example of problem-posing education from two episodes in my educational career. Before coming to graduate school, I was a middle and high school teacher, primarily in a school with a curriculum that emphasized debate and student-led discussions based on critical thinking questions co-generated by the teacher and class. Before I taught in this school, I taught in a school that had a more typical curriculum which communicated knowledge primarily through the banking model of education. I primarily communicated information through lecture, and the students primarily learned through taking notes, memorizing information, and producing it on a test. When I started teaching at my second school which emphasized debate and discussions co-led by teachers and students, I was amazed at how energized my students became during these discussions.

My favorite memories of this type of pedagogy include an eighth grade debate over whether the United States should have dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; a seventh grade teacher/student discussion over the emotional and psychological capabilities of the faerie Ariel in Shakespeare's *Tempest*; and an eleventh grade discussion over the parallel between Dr. Frankenstein's moral irresponsibility in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* with some contemporary scientific and environmental irresponsibility. In retrospect, I realize now that the energy the students invested into these debates and discussions specifically grew out of the way they were focused on problems that students were invited to solve, along with me (the teacher). Furthermore, these problems were problems that had specific implications for the students' lives.

Therefore, by actively engaging in solving these problems, students gained experience in praxis and felt more empowered to change their world.

It wasn't until I left middle and high school teaching and began teaching at the college level that I actually read Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, and in his account of problem-posing education, I recognized what I was doing when I invited students to participate in debates and critical discussions with me in my previous teaching experiences. Although, I already had a tendency to use problem-posing in the philosophy courses I was teaching at the university level, I began to center all of my classes around the solution of problems such as the problem of the good, the problem of moral action, the problem of free will and determinism, and the problem of justice.

At the beginning of each semester, I pose a set of problems to my students, and we discuss why exactly it is that these issues are problems for us individually and as a society. I suggest to them that our goal together as a class is to develop a set of plausible solutions to these problems. I further explain that we will do so by dialoguing with each other, as well as a variety of philosophers who hold very different views on these matters. One of my primary goals for each semester is to help students develop a personal solution to these problems, and the papers that we write are directly focused on these solutions. I really enjoy discussing these problems with students throughout the semester, as they are problems that are very important to me. I often find that our classroom discussions help me to solve certain aspects of the problem that have been perplexing. I am also very pleased that students often write on their evaluations that our class discussions have helped them understand how they can apply the things they are learning in class to their lives.

It is examples like the ones that I have shared above and will share at the end of the chapter that suggest that Freire is absolutely right to characterize dialogue as an existential necessity. But is conscientization and problem-solving alone enough to motivate students to work for humanization? I believe Freire suggests that something more is needed, and that is the cultivation of liberatory virtues. I will now discuss Freire's notion of liberatory virtues.

§10—Humanizing Teaching Cultivates a Liberatory Ethic: An Important Complement to Marcuse's Pedagogical Vision

I believe that Freire's unique contribution to the discussion of education and liberation is that he suggests that in order for humanization to occur, teachers and students must cultivate together liberatory ethics grounded in liberatory virtues. I want to note that while Freire certainly discusses the notion of ethics at length, he does not specifically call his ethics *liberatory ethics*. This is in interpretive movie I am making, but I believe it is an appropriate interpretive move, given that Freire repeatedly states, as we have seen previously, that the goal of our shared ethical and political life is to liberate humans from all forms of dehumanization. Freire argues that ethics contains a set of virtues, and some of the integral virtues he refers to directly or indirectly are love, humanizing rebellion, and hope.

It is also important to note while Freire discusses ethics specifically in *Pedagogy of Freedom*, he does so only briefly even though the subtitle of *Pedagogy of Freedom* is *Ethics, Democracy and Civic Courage*. I believe there is a very plausible reason why Freire speaks only briefly about ethics, even though it is an integral idea in his philosophy. Freire's primary concern was to challenge the dehumanizing elements,

specifically banking education, that he saw in the education and lives of the Brazilian farmers he was so passionately concerned with. At that particular time in history, the most serious threat to the farmers was this banking model of education that permeated both the education and politics of Brazil, and so Freire wrote most comprehensively about this problem. However, I believe that Freire's notion of liberatory ethics is integral to his idea of humanization and the disruption of the banking model of education. While Freire is very concerned about critiquing dehumanizing practices in education and society, he is obviously concerned about humanizing praxis, a notion which is positive, active and creative. Therefore, it only makes sense that in addition to his insightful critique on the banking model of education, Freire is also concerned with the type of ethical practices that allow for humanizing praxis. Furthermore, I believe that Freire's notion of liberatory ethics is an important complement to and development of Marcuse's notion of a liberated, erotic society. For these reasons, I believe it is important to explore and develop Freire's account of liberatory ethics. To do this, I will first explain what Freire says about ethics and virtue in general. Then I will explore three virtues that I believe Freire emphasizes, either directly or indirectly, that are an integral part of this kind of ethics. Lastly, I will explain how I believe Freire's notion of liberatory ethics complements and develops important ideas in Marcuse's philosophy.

§11—Freire and Ethics

We have already discussed in this chapter that Freire argues that humans naturally possess an ethical disposition. Early I noted Freire's argument that, "What makes men and women ethical is their capacity to 'spiritualize' the world, to make it either beautiful or ugly. Their capacity to intervene, to compare, to judge, to decide, to choose, to desist,

makes them capable of acts of greatness, of dignity, and, at the same time, of the unthinkable in terms of indignity.⁴⁴⁶ Freire has argued that this ethical capacity stems from the human ability for praxis which is a natural outgrowth of their language capacities. Because ethics is integrally related to the human capacity for praxis, and because praxis results in humanization and liberation, then ethics rightly understood should be a practice of liberation and humanization. Freire argues as much in *Pedagogy of Freedom* when he writes, “It is in our becoming that we constitute our being so.

Because the condition of becoming is the condition of being. In addition, it is not possible to imagine the human condition disconnected from the ethical condition.⁴⁴⁷ Because ethics and ethical practice is integral to our human nature, Freire argues that educators who wish to work for humanization and justice must be concerned with ethics. Freire argues, “If we have any serious regard for what it means to be human, the teaching of contents cannot be separated from the moral formation of the learners. To educate is essentially to form.”⁴⁴⁸ In fact, Freire suggests that any teaching is in itself an ethical activity because teaching is a form of praxis. As such, it is either a humanizing, authentic praxis, or it is a process of speaking false words about the world, about students and about one’s self. Freire gives examples of the speaking of false words in the classroom when he writes

To deify or demonize technology or science is an extremely negative way of thinking incorrectly. To act in front of students as if the truth belongs only to the teacher is not only preposterous but also false. To think correctly demands profundity and not superficiality in the comprehension and interpretation of the fact. It presupposes an openness that allows for

⁴⁴⁶ *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 53

⁴⁴⁷ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 39

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid*

the revision of conclusions; it recognizes not only the possibility of making a new choice or a new evaluation but also the right to do so.⁴⁴⁹

Freire's point here is not to make a list of the types of subjects a liberating and humanizing teacher must cover in her classroom. Rather, his point is that there can be no dichotomy between right thinking and right action. A commitment to humanization always requires certain actions.⁴⁵⁰ Freire writes, "To claim the right to change requires a coherence that makes a difference. There is no point in making such a claim and continuing as if nothing had changed."⁴⁵¹

The natural response to these ideas is to wonder what humanizing action looks like. Certainly it cannot be reduced to a prescribed set of behaviors. For example, humanizing action may look quite a bit different in the United States than it does in Brazil because the different environments, populations, and manifestations of dehumanization require different praxis. Nevertheless, although humanizing action may look different in different contexts, perhaps there are certain commitments or virtues or attitudes that mark the type of ethics that Freire is discussing. Freire suggests as much. For example, Freire argues "This critical evaluation of one's practice reveals the necessity for *a series of attitudes or virtues*⁴⁵² without which not true evaluation or true respect of the student can exist."⁴⁵³ Freire continues in this vein,

*These attitudes or virtues*⁴⁵⁴—absolutely indispensable for putting into practice the kind of knowledge that leads to respect of the autonomy, dignity, and identity of the students—are the result of a constructive effort

⁴⁴⁹ Ibid

⁴⁵⁰ Here we see a reflection of Adorno's adage, "Wrong life cannot be lived rightly."

⁴⁵¹ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 39

⁴⁵² Italics mine

⁴⁵³ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 63

⁴⁵⁴ Italics mine

that we impose on ourselves so as to diminish the distance between what we say and what we do.⁴⁵⁵

As a specific example of these attitudes or virtues, Freire continues the previous quote with a discussion of a virtue he calls coherence. Freire writes, “In fact, this diminution of the distance between discourse and practice constitutes an indispensable virtue, namely that of coherence. How, for example can I continue to speak of respect of the dignity of the student if I discriminate, inhibit, or speak ironically from the height of my own arrogance?”⁴⁵⁶ I believe that Freire’s suggestion that liberatory teaching requires a certain set of attitudes or virtues is promising.

The project of becoming a humanizing teacher can seem like a daunting and vague goal. Furthermore, the complicated nature of practicing a humanizing education becomes more pronounced if we imagine a scenario in which an educator inquires, “How exactly do I practice a humanizing education?” Someone might respond to this question by discussions dialogical education or conscientization—some of the aspects of Freirean education we have discussed already. However, the educator might inquire further, “Well, how do I know that I am truly practicing dialogical education or conscientization?” After all, it seems possible to conduct activities that look like dialogical education and conscientization but that are really just a perpetuation of a banking type of education. This seems to indicate that Freirean pedagogical techniques like dialogical education and conscientization must be practiced with a certain type of

⁴⁵⁵ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 63

⁴⁵⁶ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 63

virtuous disposition or commitment. If these virtues could be identified and a proper understanding of them could be developed, it would help educators understand specific steps they can take to cultivate a liberating classroom and pedagogy. As we shall soon see, the virtues which Freire discusses are not so much emotions. Rather, they are types of attitudes, habits and practices that a teacher commits to which, over time, may be accompanied by certain emotions. In addition, while Freire does not discuss this at length, these virtues are certainly virtues teachers must cultivate in herself, but they are also virtues which must be cultivated in students, and they are virtues which must eventually permeate society as a whole in order for humanization to occur on a wide scale.

By emphasizing the importance of virtues in the pursuit of liberation, Freire builds on important ideas present in both Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*, as well as Marcuse's writings such as his *Essay on Liberation*. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel argues that virtues are "the ethical in its particular application,"⁴⁵⁷ and he argues that Aristotle's notion of the mean is indeed necessary for understanding the nature of virtue.⁴⁵⁸ This is because since the virtues are the "ethical in its particular application", and since each particular application has a largely and an inevitably subjective element, we cannot speak of the virtues in terms of exactly what kinds of actions should occur in a certain situation or how much virtue exactly should be applied in a certain situation.

⁴⁵⁷ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 194

⁴⁵⁸ Ibid

Rather, Hegel argues “Discussion of them will therefore involve those defects or vices which are opposed to them, as in Aristotle...”⁴⁵⁹

Hegel also argues that “Virtue consists...in ethical virtuosity”⁴⁶⁰ and that a person is only ethical if the virtuous mode of conduct “is a constant feature of his character.”⁴⁶¹ Hegel’s notion of virtues as they relate to ethics harmonizes well with Freire’s idea that the human ethical capacities relate to the human ability to judge their environment and determine what makes it more beautiful or ugly or just or unjust or good or bad and to transform it for greater human liberation. Freire implies or directly states in all of his works that a person with a strong and proper ethical capacity consistently engages in praxis that transforms the environment in favor of beauty, justice and good. Therefore, it seems that Hegel and Freire share a consistent vision of what virtue is and its connection to ethics.

Not only is Hegel concerned about virtue and liberation in relation to ethics, Marcuse is as well. In his *Essay on Liberation*, Marcuse argues that a critique of the oppressive aspects of society must be accompanied by “new categories: moral, political and aesthetic.”⁴⁶² He further argues that “sociological and political vocabulary must be radically reshaped: it must be stripped of its false neutrality; it must be methodically and provocatively ‘moralized’ in terms of the Refusal.”⁴⁶³ Marcuse provides the example of obscenity which he refers to as a “moral concept”.⁴⁶⁴ He argues that this term can either be abused in the service of

⁴⁵⁹ Hegel, *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, pg. 194

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid

⁴⁶¹ Ibid

⁴⁶² Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 12

⁴⁶³ Ibid, pg. 12

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid

repressive ideologies, or it can be appropriated by liberating mindsets to authentically point to oppressive elements of society. To explain this, Marcuse argues, “Obscene is not the picture of a naked woman who exposes her pubic hair but that of a fully clad general who exposes his medals in rewarded in a war of aggression.”⁴⁶⁵

Marcuse further argues that discussions of morality in a repressive and oppressive society are distorted. They simultaneously provoke shame or moral outrage at the wrong things, while overlooking the proper shame or outrage that should accompany oppressive elements of society.⁴⁶⁶ Therefore, Marcuse argues that in order for a society to be liberated, the way morality is discussed must change. Marcuse writes, “Political radicalism thus implies moral radicalism: the emergence of a morality which might precondition man for freedom.”⁴⁶⁷ Marcuse notes that this new, radical morality activates tendencies and predispositions already present in human biology—namely, our biological drive to pursue life.

Marcuse argues, “Morality is a ‘disposition’ of the organism, perhaps rooted in the erotic drive to counter aggressiveness, to create and preserve ‘ever greater unities of life’”⁴⁶⁸ Marcuse adds to this that this predisposition we have towards pursuing greater unities of life may indicate an “instinctual foundation for solidarity among human beings.”⁴⁶⁹ We should note here that Marcuse’s notion of the human instinctual foundation for solidarity harmonizes very well with Freire’s

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid, pg. 13

⁴⁶⁷ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 13

⁴⁶⁸ Ibid

⁴⁶⁹ Ibid

notion of our vocation for humanization. While Marcuse focuses more on our biological instincts and Freire focuses more on our language capacities as the foundation for our ethics, they are both concerned with the types of attitudes, morals and virtues that people practice in their day to day life that allow the liberation of society to occur.

Marcuse develops this ideas of a new ethics and a new morality in terms of his New Sensibility which I detailed in the previous chapter. I believe that Freire complements and extends Marcuse's ideas about a liberating ethics and the virtues that are necessarily entailed in such an ethic. While I do not have the space in this chapter discuss all of the virtues that Freire mentions as a part of his ethics, I would like to focus specifically on three practices that I think are integral to Freire's pedagogy: love, humanizing rebellion and hope. I will then discuss how I believe Freire's notion of practices of a liberating ethic is a complement to Marcuse's pedagogy and a significant contribution to the discussion of pedagogy and justice in general.

§12—The Virtues of Love, Humanizing Rebellion and Hope

If there is a virtue that is central to Freire's ethics of liberation, it is most certainly the virtue of love. We have already seen that for Freire, dialogical relationships between people in the world are essential for the transformation of society towards humanization. Freire continually urges that a commitment to the dialogue that leads to humanization cannot be carried out without a lack of love. Freire argues

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of *a profound love for the world and for people*.⁴⁷⁰ The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused *with love*. *Love*

⁴⁷⁰ All italics mine

is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself. It is thus necessarily the task of responsible subjects and cannot exist in a relation of domination. Domination reveals the pathology of love: sadism in the dominator and masochism in the dominated. Because *love* is an act of courage, not of fear, *love* is commitment to others. No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of *love* is commitment to their cause—the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is *loving*, is dialogical.⁴⁷¹

Although Freire at times seems to be speaking here of love as an emotion, I believe it is more of a practice of recognition and of valuing the human capacity for ethics and humanization. This type of recognition requires a commitment to the world, to humans as a species, and to them as individuals. The love Freire writes about is a recognition of the fact that human beings cannot transform the world except for in dialogue with one another, and it is a willingness to take on this challenge, even though it is difficult and painful sometimes.

It cannot be emphasized enough how much love plays a role in Freire's philosophy for overcoming the situation of dehumanization. In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire writes that because "Women and men, among the uncompleted beings, are the only ones which develop"⁴⁷², they are always "Subjects in expectancy"—people becoming aware of their status in an oppressive situation⁴⁷³ and working to transform that situation. The fact that men and women are subjects in expectancy, which often makes them unpredictable, requires that if people are to move towards a society marked by greater levels of humanization, they must be committed to humanity more than they are to control. This commitment is the love I believe Freire is speaking of: dedication to the autonomy of other people as

⁴⁷¹ Marcuse, *Essay on Liberation*, pg. 89

⁴⁷² Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*—Must find footnote

⁴⁷³ *Ibid*, pg. 131

expressed in their shared political and ethical life. This practice of love leads to a type of loving rebellion against all forms of dehumanization. Therefore, I believe that another virtue central to Freire's liberatory ethics is humanizing rebellion.

For Freire, one of the primary functions of the classroom is to serve as a space in which students and teachers can practice humanizing rebellion. While Freire does not refer to the classroom directly as such, there is significant evidence that suggests that Freire views the classroom this way. In *Pedagogy of the Heart*, Freire writes at length about his religious commitment. Freire's commitment to his faith (specifically Catholic Christianity) spurred him to a rebelliousness against all forms of dehumanization. Freire writes

It is not easy to have faith. Above all, it is not easy due to the demands faith places on whoever experiences it. It demands a stand for freedom, which implies respect for the freedom of others, in an ethical sense, in the sense of humility, coherence, and toleration...For this reason, salvation implies liberation, engagement in a struggle for it. It is as if the fight against exploitation, its motivation, and the refusal of resignation were paths to salvation. The process of salvation cannot be realized without *rebelliousness*^{474 475}.

Here we note that salvation—and Freire mean this in both a spiritual and physical sense—always involves rebellion against all forms of dehumanization because of the respect that is due individuals. Freire continues

The issue around liberation and its practice is not fighting against the religiousness of popular classes, which is a right of theirs and an expression of their culture but rather overcoming, with it, the vision of God at the service of the strong for a God on the side of those with whom justice, love and truth should be. What marked popular religiousness--resignation and annihilation--would be substituted with forms of resistance to outrage, to perversity. This way, submission-faith toward a destiny that

⁴⁷⁴ Italics Mine

⁴⁷⁵ *Pedagogy of the Heart*, pg. 105

would reflect God's will makes way for a spurring faith of *loving rebelliousness*.⁴⁷⁶ In this process, the understanding of the body--for those who have evolved in their faith—as the dwelling of sin turns into an intelligence of the body as the temple of God.⁴⁷⁷

Freire notes here again that it is his faith in God as God on the side of “those with whom justice, love and truth should be” that motivate him to a loving rebelliousness that fights against all forms of dehumanization.

Freire’s point here is not to convince people that they should be religious. What Freire is suggesting here is that anyone who is committed to respecting every human being and working for justice—whether they are religious or not—must commit themselves to loving rebelliousness against all forms of dehumanization. This implies that any educator who wishes to work for the good of humanity, and wishes her students to work for his end as well, must cultivate the classroom space as a place of humanizing rebellion. I have specifically chosen the adjective *humanizing* to use with the word *rebellion* because it is certainly possible for people to rebel in ways that are purposeless or dehumanizing. Therefore, while rebellion is certainly important to Freire’s conception of liberating ethics, it is a rebellion that is always in the service of greater humanization for everyone.

Love and humanizing rebellion are integral virtues to Freire’s liberating ethics, but these virtues cannot be sustained without the virtue of hope. Therefore, I believe that hope is the third virtue that is integral to Freire’s liberatory ethics. As long as I am dialoguing with others about how dehumanizing aspects of the

⁴⁷⁶ Italics Mine

⁴⁷⁷ *Pedagogy of the Heart*, pg. 103

world could be transformed, I am practicing the virtue of hope, even if I do not feel particularly hopeful at the moment. Freire writes about hope

Nor yet can dialogue exist *without hope*.⁴⁷⁸ *Hope* is rooted in men's incompleteness from which they move out in constant search—a search which can be carried out only in communion with others. *Hopelessness* is a form of silence, of denying the world and fleeing from it. The dehumanization resulting from an unjust order is not a cause for despair but for *hope*, leading to the incessant pursuit of the humanity denied by injustice. *Hope*, however, does not exist in crossing one's arms and waiting. As long as I fight, I am moved by *hope*; and if I fight with *hope*, then I can wait. As the encounter of women and men seeking to be more fully human, dialogue cannot be carried on in a climate of *hopelessness*.⁴⁷⁹ If the dialoguers expect nothing to come of their efforts, their encounter will be empty and sterile, bureaucratic and tedious.⁴⁸⁰

We see in this quote, one again, that hope is not so much a feeling that people have as it is the constant commitment to dialogue. Indeed, all three of the virtues I have mentioned—love, humanizing rebellion, and hope—are virtues that are best practiced through dialogue with others, and I believe this is why dialogue is so essential to a Freirean and humanizing notion of pedagogy. However, as central as dialogue is to the type of liberating ethics and education we are discussing here, I believe that these virtues can be cultivated and expressed in a wide variety of classroom practices, activities and adventures. In the next section, I would like to share three examples of pedagogy that I believe illustrate the kind of virtues I have been discussing.

§13—Freirean Pedagogy in Action

One of the most delightful examples of an educator enacting Freire's pedagogy in her classroom is Mary Cowhey, the author of the award-winning book *black ants and buddhists: Thinking critically and Teaching Differently in the Primary Grades*. Cowhey

⁴⁷⁸ All italics mine

⁴⁷⁹ All italics mine

⁴⁸⁰ *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, pg. 92

is an elementary school teacher who acknowledges Freire's influence on her teaching.⁴⁸¹

In the introduction to her book, Cowhey relates a story about an event in her classroom surrounding black ants that illustrates both her approach to teaching and the kind of classroom practices and environment that cultivate the liberatory ethics that we have been discussing in this chapter.

Cowhey narrates an event in her primary classroom one day in which students found their corner of the room overrun by black ants, at which point they started stomping on the black ants in order to kill them. One of the other young students in Cowhey's class, a practicing Buddhist, was appalled by this and pled with the students to stop killing the black ants. While the Buddhist boy was certain that killing these ants was a terrible action, other students in the class believed that it was perfectly okay and that they had a right to kill the black ants. This collision of perceptions precipitated a class-wide discussion, moderated by Cowhey, about why different people in the class had such different perspectives about whether or not it was right to kill the ants. The class became curious about different religious perspectives on this issues as well as why many people in the United States viewed killing black ants so differently than people in other countries.

This curiosity prompted Cowhey to invite a number of guest speakers from different religious backgrounds to visit class to discuss their religious backgrounds and their view of killing creatures like ants. It prompted the class to read a variety of books that they found in their own library and other libraries pertaining to this issue. After a Japanese Buddhist man visited the class, one of Cowhey's students, a reluctant reader,

⁴⁸¹ Ibid, pg. 17-18

discovered a book about the Japanese internment camps in the United States during World War II. Because this boy made a connection between the speaker who visited the class and the Japanese families and individuals the book was discussing, he became extremely interested in reading the book during free-reading time in class, even though the book was quite a bit above his reading level. As he read it, he received occasional help from Cowhey and his classmates, and he was able to finish the book, strengthening his reading skills considerably.

In addition to students learning about the topic of black ants through class speakers and individual reading projects, the black ant discussion also prompted students to launch a scientific investigation into the life, habitats and nature of ants. Lastly, the discussion catalyzed classroom changes orchestrated by the students. In discussing the ant problem, the students decided both that it was not fun to have ants crawling around in the classroom but that it was also not right to upset their classmate by killing the ants. Therefore, they began to investigate what changes they could make in the classroom that would lead to a decrease in black ants without harming the ants in any way. This prompted the students to create new classroom cleaning plans and routines, practices which soon carried over into their home lives. The mother of one of Cowhey's students asked what Cowhey had done to her daughter because the daughter had suddenly become very concerned about cleaning and organizing her room and other spaces around the house.

While Freire passed away before Cowhey published her book, I believe he would have been delighted by Cowhey's classroom experience. In this story we see a teacher and students involved in problem-posing: "Is it right to kill ants in the classroom?"

Through the process of dialogical education, students not only experienced conscientization about problematic elements of their views of ants and violence and property, this conscientization inspired them to investigate their world further, a process during which they strengthened their understanding of religion, culture, literature, science, and psychology. Furthermore, this conscientization inspired authentic praxis in which their dialogue inspired significant change in their environment towards greater humanization.

I believe the story of black ants also exemplifies virtues like love, humanizing rebellion, and hope that I have been discussing in this chapter. Because Cowhey chose to turn the black ant crisis into a moment of dialogue, she empowered her students to rebel against adopting hegemonic solutions to the ant problem, which certainly would have happened if they had not engaged in dialogue about the situation. Furthermore, she empowered them to love each other as classmates by creating a hospitable space in which everyone's voice could be heard, and she infused them with hope that they could come up with a creative solution that would honor the particular situations and needs of their classroom. In other words, she practiced a liberatory ethics that transformed a potentially painful and dehumanizing situation into a humanizing situation for everyone in the classroom and even those beyond the classroom. In doing so, she cultivated virtues in her students that soon began to permeate all aspects of their lives.

It may be tempting to imagine that scenarios like the one I have just been describing are necessarily rare and unusual moments in the classroom. However, I believe these kinds of moments can become a new and exciting status quo when educators devote themselves to the types of practices and virtues described in this

chapter. One very interesting example of Freirean pedagogy at work is a detailed in an article published in the *Journal of International Pedagogy* titled “Critical Pedagogy and Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice”. This article describes a math educator who decided to teach a required statistics unit by centering it around the problem of racial profiling.⁴⁸²

During this unit, students not only read an article on racial profiling by the American Civil Liberties Union, they also discussed instances of racial profiling in their own lives.⁴⁸³ As the majority of the class was white with several African-American and Latino students, the class soon became aware through this discussion that their experiences and views of racial profiling were quite a bit different.⁴⁸⁴ After having establish a conceptual foundation for the unit through reading and discussing the issue of racial profiling, the class collected, analyzed and organized statistical information about profiling from “44 law enforcement agencies” in Tennessee which detailed “the racial composition of people pulled over for traffic violations.”⁴⁸⁵ The teacher witnessed increasing engagement in the students as the unit progressed, and she noted that one especially shy student who was normally withdrawn in class shared his personal experience of racial profiling.⁴⁸⁶ The teacher notes in the article “I could have taught the same mathematical skills traditionally with no difference in learning outcomes, but

⁴⁸² David W. Stinton, Carla Bidwell, and Ginny C. Powell. “Critical Pedagogy and Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice”, pgs. 76-94

⁴⁸³ Ibid, pg. 8

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid, pg. 9

⁴⁸⁵ Stinton, Bidwell and Powell, “Critical Pedagogy and Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice”, pg. 8

⁴⁸⁶ Ibid, pg. 10

instead, I gave them the opportunity to raise their own awareness and form their opinions on racial profiling.”⁴⁸⁷

This story is particularly striking to me. As a former secondary school instructor, I heard a lot of student complaints about a wide variety of school subjects (including occasionally my own). Unfortunately, many students would complain that they would never use the math they were learning in real life. I think it is safe to say that the students who experienced this unit on statistic and racial profiling understand how a strong grasp of statistics is intimately connected to their lives and their ability to work for a more humanized world.

It is tempting to write at length about the work of educators inspired by Freire. However, because of the limited space I have to do so in this project, I will share just one more story. Author and educator bell hooks is a student and personal friend of Freire, a relationship she details in her chapter “Paulo Freire” in her book *Teaching to Transgress*.⁴⁸⁸ In another chapter in this book, she details a continuing dialogue she had with a student of hers named Gary. Hooks, a literature professor, is especially concerned with feminist and, particularly, black feminist issues. Although Gary had been a student of bell hooks, and they had a strong working relationship, Gary had decided to join a fraternity, a decision bell hooks strongly disapproved of because, as Gary later commented, the particular fraternity he wished to join represented “a vision of black manhood that [hooks] abhorred, one where violence and abuse were primary ciphers of bonding and identity”.⁴⁸⁹ Although Gary joined the fraternity, much to bell hooks’

⁴⁸⁷ Stinton, Bidwell and Powell, “Critical Pedagogy and Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice”, pg. 10

⁴⁸⁸ bell hooks, *Teaching to Transgress*, pgs. 45-58

⁴⁸⁹ bell hooks, *Teaching to Transgress*, pg. 20

consternation, she and Gary continued to dialogue about the matter. Hooks writes that “Ultimately, Gary felt that the decision he had made to join a fraternity was not constructive, that I ‘had taught him openness’ where the fraternity had encouraged one-dimensional allegiance. Our interchange both during and after this experience was an example of engaged pedagogy.”⁴⁹⁰ I take hooks’ phrase “engaged pedagogy” to be identical to Freire’s notion of dialogical engagement with students.

While this story illuminates an educational moment hooks shared with one particular student, I think it illustrates the type of problems that emerge naturally out of the everyday life of students. For elementary students, the problem might be that of students figuring out what to do with ants in a classroom when some of the class thinks it is okay to kill them and some do not. At the middle and high school level, the problem might be the problem of how to organize, analyze and interpret statistical data surrounding racial profiling in a fairly racially homogenous class. At college the problem might be what to do when you value and are committed to the feminist ideals you have been reading about in class yet feel socially pressured to join a sorority or fraternity with values inimical to feminist ideals. The point is that because life presents itself as a problem, problems arise at all levels of education. As they arise, it is possible and important for educators to respond to these ideas in a way that establishes dialogical relationships with students which lead to conscientization, problem-posing, and the cultivation of liberatory virtues.

⁴⁹⁰Ibid, pg. 20

§14—Freire’s Pedagogy: A Complement and Extension of Marcuse

I believe that Freire’s work provides an important extension and completion of the educational views I have been discussing in this dissertation, and I would like to conclude this chapter by examining why this is so. Freire is entirely sympathetic with Rousseau’s notion that society is too often a place of dehumanization. Yet, in accordance with Kant, Freire argues that despite the very real possibility of dehumanization in society, society is most certainly the place where human beings achieve humanization and freedom. As we have seen, Freire argues that it is in dialogue that we are able to be fully ethical and political human beings. Therefore, Freire agrees with Kant and Hegel that it is only with others that we can fully actualize our ethical and political capacities which allow us to create a world amenable to human flourishing. Furthermore, Freire agrees with Kant and Hegel that our goal as human beings is to work out a society through education and politics that permits the full humanization of individuals and the human race.

It is important to note, too, how compatible Freire’s educational methods are with both Kant’s and Hegel’s. Freire’s notion of students engaging in transformative praxis is entirely in line with Kant’s notion that cultivating a robust will bent towards the good and a commitment to the ethical commonwealth is the purpose of education. It also accords with Hegel’s notion that education must cultivate students’ abilities to practice recognition, right, responsibility, and reconciliation. Freire’s notion of dialogical education is also harmonious with Kant’s development of moral reasoning through casuistical discussion and Hegel’s notion that education is developed dialectically.

Following in the tradition of critical theory, it is also important to note that Freire’s educational views resonate with Marcuse’s educational views that the classroom

must disrupt blocks in the movement of freedom. It also resonates with Marcuse's notion that a New Sensibility which focuses on non-instrumentalized relationships that allows for the full expression of human freedom. Because Freire is aware of both the philosophical ideas in German Idealism, along with the important insights of critical theory and the Frankfurt School, he is able to craft a pedagogy that critiques the dehumanization present in modern society while maintain the liberating aspects of Kant and Hegel's educational insights. There are two specific ways I believe Freire's unique insights extend the discussion of education and justice in a meaningful way.

First, Marcuse was right to suggest that the progress of freedom can be blocked by social forces such as surplus repression and one-dimensional thinking. It also seems likely that these are, indeed, common forces in the United States that hinder the progress of freedom. However, these are not necessarily the only forces that block the progress of freedom. It is likely that different subcultures within the United States or people in cultures markedly different from the United States experience different societal hindrances of freedom. This is why Freire is helpful. While certainly influenced by Marcuse's notions of one-dimensional thinking, Freire's account of myth-depositing and the banking model of education reveal to us the types of hindrances to freedom present in colonialized societies in which the differences between classes are much extreme and entrenched than those in the United States. Furthermore, his practice of dialogical education through conscientization and problem-posing suggests a broad heuristic that can be used to discover all forms of dehumanization.

Secondly, Freire's discussion of liberatory ethics is an especially important and a helpful complement to Marcuse. Marcuse is right that that much of the talk of the

discussion of morality, virtue, ethics and even religion in our culture and cultures around the world have been distorted or co-opted by oppressive and dehumanizing elements of society. Therefore, we need a revolution in our moral and ethical language. However, understanding how to bring about this revolution and the proper language that accompanies it is certainly a challenge, and it is a task that perhaps critical theory and critical pedagogy have just begun. In his article “Marcuse, Bloch and Freire: Reinvigorating a Pedagogy of Hope”, Richard Van Heertum suggests as much when he argues that critical theory and its related disciplines “tend to share too firm a commitment to the first half of their sobriquet, forgetting that critique alone has never led to revolution.”⁴⁹¹ Van Heertum argues that critical theory must work to engender a hope which empowers people to work for societal change, and he emphasizes the “Centrality of hope as a necessary complement to critique”.⁴⁹²

He also further argues, specifically related to education that, “Teachers need to do more than awaken students to the surrounding world; they need to simultaneously give them the faith and strength to work to transform the world.”⁴⁹³ I believe that Paulo Freire’s liberatory ethics and virtues complements important ideas in Marcuse work to do exactly the things that Van Heertum is suggesting here.⁴⁹⁴ Freire believes, just like Marcuse, that cultivating our aesthetic sensibilities is essential for creating a more humane society, but he still believes that these ideas cannot be divorced from the ethical

⁴⁹¹ Van Heertum, “Marcuse, Bloch and Freire: Reinvigorating a Pedagogy of Hope”, pg. 45

⁴⁹² Ibid, pg. 46

⁴⁹³ Ibid

⁴⁹⁴ It is important to note here that Ernst Bloch has written a three-volume titled *The Principle of Hope* which provides us with a rich panorama of the virtue of hope, examined from historical, literary, psychoanalytic, religious and philosophical perspectives (just to name a few). Such a detailed description suggests how we might explore different liberating virtues in order to understand how to develop a fully liberating ethic.

considerations we have been discussing in this chapter. Freire writes about a “rigorous ethical formation side by side with an aesthetic appreciation.”⁴⁹⁵ He further argues that “beauty and decency” must always go hand in hand and writes “I am more and more convinced that educational praxis, while avoiding the trap of puritanical moralism, cannot avoid the task of becoming a clear witness to decency and purity.”⁴⁹⁶ Freire, like Marcuse, is not concerned here with a type of moral legalism that focuses narrowly on issues such as sexual behavior and alcohol consumption, as sometimes certain ethical and religious systems have done historically.⁴⁹⁷ Nor is he concerned with an ethics that is grounded in anything other than the liberation of human beings.⁴⁹⁸ But it is right to say that Freire believes that education cannot be a force for humanization unless it takes seriously the ethical vocation of human beings which is the same thing as the vocation of humanization.

I believe that Freire’s notion of liberatory ethics and the virtues it entails is a concept that needs to be developed more in depth. In *Pedagogy of Freedom*, Freire mentions a dozen or more practices, attitudes or virtues that he believes are necessary for educators and students to possess in order to work for humanization. However, Freire’s discussion of these virtues is a bit scattered. While some virtues seem to be more central to Freire’s project, it isn’t clear which virtues are primary practices and which are secondary. Furthermore, because of reasons I have mentioned previously in this chapter,

⁴⁹⁵ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 38

⁴⁹⁶ Ibid

⁴⁹⁷ In his book *Letters to Cristina*, Freire actually decries the type of moralism that enforces strict taboos on matters of sexuality and notes how destructive these types of taboos can be to the development of children’s psychology. He also critiques the rampant homophobia and prejudice against homosexuals he saw as being widespread in Brazil. In this way, Freire agrees with Marcuse’s critique of repressive morality, while at the same time remaining adamant in his belief that we must develop a proper ethic in order to facilitate humanization.

⁴⁹⁸ Freire, *Pedagogy of Freedom*, pg. 38

Freire does not develop a systematic account of any of these virtues at length, nor does he discuss in detail how they are cultivated. The purpose of my last chapter is to suggest briefly how these ideas might be further explored and developed.

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Chapter Six: Epilogue

In this epilogue, I wish to accomplish three things. First, I wish to discuss the contemporary relationship between philosophy and education in general. And second, I would like to suggest how Freire's notion of liberatory ethics might be developed further. Lastly, wish to share some concluding remarks on this project.

One of the overall conclusions I have reached from working on this project is that there needs to be greater dialogue between education and philosophy in the academy and society today. It is interesting to note that while education has been a major concern for almost every great historical philosopher, there seems to be not quite as strong of a relationship between education and philosophy today. As someone who was trained in secondary English education and earned her master's degree in educational leadership, both at very strong liberal arts schools, I had no class in either my undergraduate or master's training which required me to read the educational philosophy of Socrates, Plato, or any of the philosophers I have written about in this dissertation.

To my knowledge, no such class was offered. My relationship with fellow educators suggests that my experience is a fairly standard experience in teacher education programs. In addition, it seems that few philosophy departments have professors who specialize in the philosophy of education and that in addition, few philosophy departments offer classes in this area, even though many graduate students of philosophy will go on to teach philosophy classes as either adjunct or tenured professors. It seems that if education is to work for justice in society at large, it would be extremely beneficial for there to be a greater dialogue between philosophy and education. One practical way I would like to build on this project is to research and write more about the necessity of the dialogue between education and philosophy. I would like to examine potential causes of

the lack of dialogue between these two disciplines and also examine ways this relationship can be cultivated.

A second way in which I would like to develop the ideas in this project is to develop in more detail Marcuse and Freire's notions of liberatory ethics and virtues. The notion of liberatory virtues holds great promise for helping us understand how to work for humanization in both education and society while also critiquing dehumanizing elements in that society. There are two key ways that I would like to explore the notion of liberatory ethics further.

First, since the publication of Elizabeth Anscombe's article "Modern Moral Philosophy", there has been greater contemporary philosophical discussion about virtue ethics, and virtue ethics has become one of the three major approaches to ethics, along with utilitarianism and deontological ethics.⁴⁹⁹ Nevertheless, it can be difficult, in my opinion, to figure out exactly what the virtues are in any virtue system of ethics. Furthermore, it can be difficult to give an account of the grounding of these virtues. This problem becomes especially apparent when one examines classical virtue ethics, such as those of Socrates and Aristotle. Virtues that we consider very important today, such as love and compassion, were not a part of the Greek conception of virtue. Furthermore, the Greek conception of virtue was grounded in a conception of human beings certainly marred by racism, sexism, and a host of other problems.

I believe critical theory and critical theorists like Marcuse and Freire can play an important role in the contemporary discussion of virtue ethics. Hegel, who is arguably an

⁴⁹⁹ Hursthouse, Rosalind, "Virtue Ethics", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/ethics-virtue/>>.

important influence on critical theory, was influenced by Aristotelian conceptions of human beings and their relationship with the polis. Hegel's goal in the *Philosophy of Right* is to develop our understanding of how human beings can find themselves at home in the state and their relationships with one another, a happy state of affairs that he believes was lost with the shattering of the classical world. Nevertheless, as Hegel details in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and the *Philosophy of Right*, the classical world did not have a fully developed conception of individual freedom and subjectivity.

This is a modern development, Hegel argues, and he attempts to show how the fully just state is a perfect harmony of both the individual and the universal. Hegel's notion of ethics and virtue is certainly grounded in this conception. Therefore, Hegel's work may be a fruitful place to begin for understanding the role critical theory can play in the contemporary virtue ethics discussion. Furthermore, since critical theorists such as Marcuse and Freire are certainly influenced by Hegel and are also greatly concerned with issues of ethics and virtue, it may be interesting to examine how their ideas can be connected with Hegel to flesh out a virtue ethics grounded in human dignity, flourishing and freedom.

It is interesting to note that some work is being done in this field already. While Hegel's ethics have not been explored in great detail, more scholars are starting to pay attention to this aspect of Hegel's philosophy. While not incredibly recent, Andrew Buchwalter published an article entitled "Hegel's Concept of Virtue" in 1992 in *Political Theory*. Joshua Goldstein's 2010 book *Hegel Idea of the Good Life: From Virtue to Freedom, Early Writing and Mature Political Philosophy* explores Hegel's attempt to forge a solution to the failure of Aristotelian virtue ethics. In this book, Goldstein

suggests the way in which ideas such as rectitude and ethical life are a completion to Aristotelian notions of virtue and *phronesis*. In addition, while I was previously unaware of this, the notion of liberatory ethics is not an entirely novel concept. Greek philosopher and economist Takis Fotopoulous has written about democratic liberatory ethics, and Lisa Tessman, a philosophy professor at Binghamton University, has written a book called *Burdened Virtues* in which she draws on Aristotelian virtue ethics to understand the causes and solutions to various forms of oppression. She specifically relates this to feminist issues.

In the future, I would like to develop a stronger understanding of Hegelian ethics and virtues, and I would like to use this study as a springboard for connecting it to similar issues in critical theory, especially to ideas in the work of Marcuse and Freire. I believe that forging a strong understanding of liberatory ethics and virtues is necessary for understanding how educators can teach in a humanizing manner. Therefore, while my interest in the role that critical theory plays in virtue ethics may seem tangential to the work done on education and justice in this dissertation, I believe it is foundational to it.

While I am very interested in the broad project of examining the way in which Hegel's ethics and critical theory can contribute to the discussion of virtue theory, I am also very interested in developing a clearer understanding of individual liberatory virtues, and I have already done some work in this area. In the space below, I have sketched out a list of some specific liberatory virtues that I believe are implied by Marcuse and Freire's notion of liberatory ethics and that I wish to study more in depth.⁵⁰⁰ Some of the virtues I have mentioned below, such as aesthetics, are virtues that Marcuse and Freire specifically

⁵⁰⁰ I also draw on Hegel a little bit for the first virtue of the hospitality of recognition.

mention. Other virtues, such as hospitality and play, are virtues I have included that I believe capture more fully some of the ideas that Marcuse and Freire's work contain. I do not think this list is necessarily *the* right list or *the only* list of liberatory virtues. Rather, I intend the list to gesture towards the kind of exploration of individual liberatory virtues I may wish to pursue in the future.

Hospitality, love and recognition: Our word *hospitality* comes from the Latin word *hospes* which means both guest and host. The practice of hospitality has been a practice throughout history that allows strangers and even enemies to share public or private spaces temporarily for purposes such as rest, education, nourishment, negotiation, or peacemaking. If true liberation comes through dialogue, as Freire has claimed, then it is essential that we learn better to cultivate spaces of hospitality in which strangers and even enemies can dialogue with one another. I think the practice of hospitality may capture more clearly what Freire mean when he discusses the virtue of love in his various works. I also think that the concept of hospitality may capture well Hegel's notion of recognition. Therefore, I am interested in researching more the type of virtuous dispositions that allow people to give recognition to the stranger and even the enemy in a way that facilitates liberating dialogue. Such a discussion may be very helpful in understanding issues like non-violent resistance and the resolution of internecine conflict we see in the Palestine-Israeli conflict or even racial conflict in the United States.

Critical Problem-Posing and Conscientization: This practice is at the heart of Freire's pedagogy. Critical problem-solving requires that people become aware of the problems in society, something which the banking model of education and one-dimensional thinking suppress. I see direct connections between Freire's discussion of

conscientization and problem-posing and the way in which Socrates uses *aporia* in his dialogues to promote the pursuit of truth. Therefore, an area of research that has long interested me is the philosophical account of the role *aporia* and perplexity play in moral understanding and the way in which it might relate to Freire's pedagogy.

Play: This is a virtue that I am especially interested in researching more. While it may seem odd to consider play as a virtue integral to liberation ethics, I believe it is indeed so. The notion of play as a virtue intimately tied to ethical liberation is already present in the German idealist tradition such as in some of Kant's pedagogical writings and writings in the third critique, as well as Schiller's *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Furthermore, the notion of play as a tool for human liberation appears in the work of critical theorists such as Marcuse in his notion of phantasy as a vehicle for liberation and Mikhail Bakhtin and his notion of the carnivalesque. It seems that revisiting the notion of play as a liberation virtue is especially important in an era when recess is being cut from school programs and time spent on homework and preparation for standardized tests is increasing. In addition, the fact that people in the United States are increasingly spending more hours working and are taking much less vacation is a sign that play may be a necessary virtue for cultivating liberatory ethics. I presented a paper on play and liberation at the 2014 Radical Philosophy Association conference. I am currently working on turning this paper into a full-length article.

Aesthetic Sensibility: The practice of aesthetics is closely tied to the practice of play mentioned previously. However, I think that it is fruitful to study play and aesthetics as different virtues. We have already examined the way in which Kant argues that beauty is the symbol of morality and Marcuse draws on these ideas to argue for the liberating

power of aesthetics. Certainly these ideas are important to explore more in depth in relation to education, especially as so many art and music programs are in jeopardy. Furthermore, it is important to explore how the aesthetic virtue can be practiced in all areas of life. As we saw in the chapter on Marcuse, Marcuse argues that the New Sensibility is an aesthetic sensibility that permeates the entire psyche of individuals, rather than a sensibility they only manifested during certain activities. I am especially interested how this aesthetic virtue might illuminate discussions of environmental ethics.

Hope: As I explained in the chapter on Freire, hope is a practice integral to his liberatory ethics. It is also central to critical theorists like Ernst Bloch who wrote a three-volume work on hope. Nevertheless, it can be extremely difficult at times to maintain hope in the midst of the significant amount of suffering and cruelty in the world. One potential area of study is to examine the way in which insights from Bloch and Freire can be used to flesh out the virtue of hope as a part of liberatory ethics and the practices that cultivate hope in the midst of such suffering and cruelty. I presented a paper on hope and liberation at the 2015 Biennial Herbert Marcuse conference, and I am working on turning this paper into a full-length article.

Compassion: It seems a liberating ethic must give us some way to cope with that fact that, once again, there is so much suffering and cruelty in the world and that more often than not, there is significant disagreement about how we should address this suffering and cruelty. It seems that the virtue of compassion is a virtue that allows us to understand, without excusing, why people act cruelly or respond in immoral ways to cruelty and suffering. When we are able to understand without excusing, this creates a space for us to hope and to work for change in the midst of conflict. Compassion is a

virtue frequently associated with Buddhism, and it is interesting to note that critical theorists such as Eric Fromm and bell hooks explore Buddhist ideas as a complement to their critical theory. One of the projects I am most interested in exploring is the way in which certain theologies such as Buddhism can inform the development of liberatory virtues.

While I do not think it is likely that I can pursue all of the projects I have mentioned above, I believe that these are some of the most worthwhile potential projects implied by my dissertation, and I hope that they are pursued fully in the future by philosophers who also find them worthwhile.

As I conclude this dissertation, I have become aware that this entire project has been a work of praxis, a realization which should not really be a surprise to anyone. I decided to write a dissertation on education and justice because of a very real problem I encountered in the world. I am deeply committed to the cause of education and the notion that education can and must work for the betterment of humanity as a whole.

Nevertheless, as I mentioned in my first chapter, throughout my past experience as a student, educator, and even a principal of a private, parochial middle school, I have too frequently observed education failing, sometimes radically, to live up to this goal. And this failure is not just a failure I have seen in the lives of other teachers and students and educators; it is a failure I have witnessed in my own life as well.

Nevertheless, my educational history is also marked by times as a student and teacher when my life was dramatically transformed by a lesson I was taught or that I had the privilege of teaching. Gratefully, I have also witnessed numerous teachers who have had a profound effect in not only their students' lives but even in their larger community

because of their committed, intentional pedagogy. The problem then is how the practice of education, which has so much potential, often fails to actualize that potential. Even more perplexing is how education which has so much potential can, in the wrong hands, actually become an instrument of oppression and dehumanization. That is the problem that I believe Rousseau proposed to us initially. It is a problem that Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Freire are all deeply concerned with. And it is a problem that I am deeply concerned with. In writing this dissertation, I have hopefully initiated a meaningful dialogue between philosophers who have very important things to say about this issue. In participating in this dialogue with the philosophers, I have attempted to name what I believe are the causes and solution to this problem. In doing so, I have continually refined my educational philosophy and pedagogy, and this has certainly transformed my praxis in the classroom. It is my hope that this dissertation is an invitation for other people to join in and continue working on the solution to this problem, which I believe is intimately tied to the good of humanity.

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- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*. In *Jean Jacques Rousseau: The Basic Political Writings*. Donald A. Cress, trans. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, Co., 1987. Print.
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- _____. *Reveries of a Solitary Walker*. Russell Goulborne, trans. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print.
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- Scuderi, Phillip. "Rousseau, Kant, and the Pedagogy of Deception." *Kant and Education: Interpretations and Commentary*. Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenat, ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012. Print.

- Stinton, David W. Carla Bidwell, and Ginny C. Powell. "Critical Pedagogy and Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice." *Journal of International Pedagogy*. Vol 4 (1) (2012). Online.
- Surprenat, Chris W. *Kant and the Cultivation of Virtue*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2014. Print.
- Van Heertum, Richard. "Moving from Critique to Hope: Critical Interventions from Marcuse to Freire." *Marcuse's Challenge to Education*. Douglas Kellner, Tyson Lewis, Clayton Pierce, and K. Daniel Cho, ed. United Kingdom: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. Print.
- Velkely, Richard L. *Being After Rousseau: Philosophy and Culture in Question*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 2002. Print.
- Wood, Allen. "Kant and the Problem of Human Nature." *Essays on Kant's Anthropology*. Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.

Curriculum Vita

Areas of Specialization

Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy

Areas of Competency

Ancient Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Asian Philosophy, Critical Thinking, Critical Theory

Language Experience

Advanced Greek
Advanced Latin
Intermediate Spanish
Basic French

Education

2016	University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY Ph.D. in Philosophy (pending Spring 2016) Advisor: Arnold Farr Dissertation: "A Pedagogy for Justice: Kant, Hegel, Marcuse and Freire on Education and the Good Society"
2003-2006 2006)	Covenant College, Lookout Mountain, GA M.Ed. in Educational Leadership (Spring
1994	Malone University, Canton, OH B.A. in Secondary English Education

Awards

April 2015, College of Arts and Sciences Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award

March 2015, Philosophy Department Outstanding Teaching Award

Publications

“Quo Vadis: Charting a Path in Turbulent Times: A Review of *Crisis and Commonwealth*.” *Radical Philosophy Journal*, Volume 18, Number 1 (2015): 165-168.

Publications on Pedagogy

**Secondary logic and critical thinking textbooks and articles written before graduate school*

2016, *Everyday Debate* (released April 2016), Classical Academic Press

2011, “A Socratic Invitation: Becoming an Artisan of Thought,” Classical Academic Press

2011, “Introducing Students to Socratic Dialogue and Learning,” Classical Academic Press

2010, *Discovery of Deduction* (Co-Author), Classical Academic Press

2008, *Argument Builder*, Classical Academic Press

Presentations at National and International Conferences

November 2015, “Marcuse and Freire on Pedagogy, Hope and Our Instinct for Solidarity.” Fall 2015 of Biennial Herbert Marcuse Society Conference, Salisbury University, Salisbury, MD.

November 2014, “Subversive Play in Totalitarian Spaces: Disrupting the One-Dimensional Classroom.” Fall 2014 Meeting of Radical Philosophy Conference, Stony Brook University, NY.

October 2013, “Review of Charles Reitz’s book *Crisis and Commonwealth*.” Fall 2013 Meeting of Biennial Herbert Marcuse Society Conference, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.

October 2013, “Marcuse and Freire on Liberating Praxis.” Fall 2013 Meeting of Biennial Herbert Marcuse Society Conference, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.

Presentations at Local Conferences/Workshops

June 2013, “My Happiness and Yours: The Crucial Role Happiness Plays in Kant’s Account of the Virtuous and Moral Life.” Summer 2013 Meeting of the Kentucky Philosophical Association Summer Writing Workshop, Centre College, Danville, KY.

December 2012, “Marxian Reflections on Ending the Apprenticeship to Alienation: Overcoming School Violence by Practicing Humane Pedagogy.” Fall 2012 Whither Marxism Conference, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.

May 2011, “Maieusis and Transgression: The Role of the Other in the Dialectic of Plato and Hegel.” Spring 2011 Meeting of Occasional Daniel Boone Conference, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.

Commentaries

March 2014, Commentator on Drew Van’t Land, “Interrupting the Instru-Mentality: How Hegel and Arendt Shift from the Economic to the Political.” 17th Annual Philosophy Graduate School Conference, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY.

Chaired Panels

November 2014, “Praxis, Strategy and Prefiguration.” Fall 2014 Radical Philosophy Association Conference, Stony Brook University, Long Island, NY.

Teaching Experience

Instructor, University of Kentucky

Problems of Knowledge and Reality (PHI 100)	Fall 2013, Spring 2015
Introductory Logic (PHI 120)	Spring 2012
Introduction to Ethics (PHI 130)	Spring 2014, Fall 2014,2015
Philosophy of Human Nature (PHI 310)	Spring 2015
Business Ethics, Online (PHI 334)	Summer 2016*
Asian Philosophy (PHI 343)	Summer 2014 and 2015
Individual and Society (Phi 335)	Spring 2016*

Teaching Assistant or Grader, University of Kentucky

Introductory Logic (PHI 120)	Fall 2010, Spring 2011
Individual and Society (PHI 335)	Fall 2011
Asian Philosophy (PHI 343)	Fall 2011, Fall 2012

Academic Service

- 2014-2015 Organizer of first departmental Comprehensive Exam Strategy and Mentoring Session
- Annual University of Kentucky Philosophy Graduate School Conference Coordinator
- Vice President of the Philosophy Graduate Students Association
- 2013-2014 Women in Philosophy Activity Coordinator

Seminars

Kantian Ethics	Stefan Bird-Pollan
Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist	Eric Sanday
The Phenomenology of Spirit	Dan Breazeale
Medieval Philosophy	David Bradshaw
Heidegger's <i>Being and Time</i>	Natalie Nenadic
Eastern and Western Marxism	Arnold Farr
Kantian Idealism	Stefan Bird-Pollan
Hegelian Ethics	Stefan Bird-Pollan
Ethics: Kant, Fichte and Hegel	Dan Breazeale
Fichte	Dan Breazeale

Graduate Course Work

Critical Social Theory	Arnold Farr
Phenomenology and Power of Place	Omer Aygun
The Republic and Aristotle's Politics	Eric Sanday
Nietzsche and the Greeks	David Bradshaw
Symbolic Logic: Metalogic	Meg Wallace

Independent Study

Social and Political Philosophy	David Bradshaw
Aristotelian Virtue Ethics	David Bradshaw
Hegel, Marcuse, Freire and Social Transformation	Arnold Farr

Greek and Latin Reading Groups

Herodotus (Greek translation)	Amy Clark
Aquinas' Summa Theologica (Latin translation)	David Bradshaw

Additional Professional Experience

2013-2015, *Schole* Academy, Online course designer and instructor for *Argument Builder: Persuasive Writing*.

2008-2009, Bluegrass United Academic Center (Lexington, KY), secondary logic, Latin and writing instructor.

2005-2008, Trinity Christian Academy (Lexington, KY), middle school principal.

1996-2005, Trinity Christian Academy (Lexington, KY), secondary humanities and logic teacher.

1997-2003, Trinity Christian Academy (Lexington, KY), curriculum design committee.

1994-1996, RLC Academy (Salem, Ohio), English teacher.

Spring 1994, Cross-cultural Student Teaching Experience, Collegio Americano, Guatemala City Guatemala.