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Academic Literacies as Documenting Becoming Through Mixed Genre Texts

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Doctor of Philosophy

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ACADEMIC LITERACIES AS DOCUMENTING BECOMING THROUGH MIXED
GENRE TEXTS

(Thesis format: Monograph)

by

Ani Amirmooradian Malhami

Graduate Program in Education

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Education

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Abstract and Keywords

The research for this study began with certain poststructural and postmodern readings and philosophical inflections that suggested, in various ways, that subjectivities are fluid, multiple, and complex. I arrived at the idea that one way of capturing the complexities of subjectivities is *documenting becoming*; this insight, in turn, led me to investigate the literature on academics who experience problems with representing, and on models of writing in higher education. However, the literature does not locate either the problem of representing or its resolution in the practices of academics struggling to write about the world in and through their subjectivities. In addition, the academic literacies model of writing in higher education does not take into consideration the crisis of representation, in the sense of how one writes.

To investigate how to compose becoming and capture this type of subjectivities, I employed a case study methodology. I also undertook document analysis of several disruptive poststructural autoethnographic (DPA) texts. When analyzing my resulting data, I used primarily Charmaz's grounded theory and Clarke's situational analysis. The analysis indicated that writings that detail becoming capture the space of mind in the Deleuzian sense of *affect*, which is aligned with the body's answer to particular received data beyond one's control. These received data are separate from the state of the person who experiences them, existing even in the absence of humans, and they lead to the formation of mental assemblages in the Deleuzian sense of *percept*. The result is ongoing, unpredictable transformation within the person in the Deleuzian sense of *concept*. Using DPA texts with these Deleuzian concepts helped me open up new ways of seeing.

Academics who write these texts go through a type of catastrophe and confront chaos to become artists in the Deleuzian sense, leaving traces in their writing by using different genres, layers, truths, and points of view.

Keywords: Poststructural, subjectification, documenting becoming, Deleuze, academic literacies/writing, crisis of representation, situational analysis, higher education.

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Chapter 1 : Introduction

1.1 Background

It is the summer of 2012, and after almost six years in my PhD program, I have yet to write my proposal. I have changed and revised my topic. Now, time is tight. I must submit a proposal as soon as possible, and I have simultaneously no idea and yet many ideas about which to write. In addition, I have been away from writing for more than a year, and I have to refresh my mind; I am coming back to my notes and written thoughts and drafts to figure out what I want to write. Then these questions occur to me: “Why can I not write? What is the problem that prevents me from writing?” I had diligently completed the course requirements of the PhD program. I had written almost all of my term papers to the full satisfaction of my professors. Certainly I had had problems with writing in my courses, but the nature of those problems was different. I had been more concerned with how to arrange and rearrange different parts of my papers; how to organize and outline my papers; how to understand the content of my course readings to help me write better. But now, I am having difficulty writing my proposal, which paradoxically is on the topic of writing and academic literacies. “What has happened? What is keeping me from writing this time around?” I ask myself. To answer my questions, I review my notes and the literature, trying to categorize them and make meaning for myself...

The literature on writing in higher education tells me that the problem of writing in academia is not solely a linguistic one (Boughey, 2000; Briane, 2002; Cummins 1989a, b; Curry, 2004; Hawkins, 2004; Hirst, Henderson, Allan, Bode, & Kocatepe, 2004; Lea & Street, 2006) but is also affected by factors such as students’ unfamiliarity with academic discourses (Boughey, 2000; Lea & Street, 2000).¹ To learn to write in higher education, the literature suggests, students should become acculturated to academic discourses.

¹ These studies rejected the “study skills” view. Lea and Street (2000) critiqued the “study skills” view, noting that in this view of writing in higher education, students’ writing is considered a technical and instrumental skill, with the emphasis on surface grammar and spelling.

According to Lea and Street (1998), these discourses are concerned with inducting students into a “new ‘culture’; focus[ing] on orientation to learning and interpretation of [the] learning task, e.g. ‘deep’, ‘surface’, ‘strategic’ learning” (p. 171). This way of viewing academic writing is called ‘academic socialization’ (Lea & Street, 2000). In an academic socialization view, the academy—and, arguably, students—is considered a homogenous culture (Lea & Street, 1998, 2000). The role and exercise of power is not sufficiently theorized, and students’ writing is considered simply a tool for representation.

Another factor affecting the writing of students in academia is their background (Braine, 2002; Curry, 2004; Dobson & Sharma, 1993; Farnill & Hayes, 1996; Thompson, 1990). The knowledge and experiences students bring to their studies may hinder their writing in higher education (Dobson and Sharma, 1993; Farnill and Hayes, 1996; Thompson, 1990) or facilitate it (Braine, 2002; Curry, 2004), depending upon the students’ previous experiences and acquired cultural capital (Curry, 2004). To learn to write in higher education, some learners more than others need to negotiate their individual cultural and linguistic-related histories with discourses and processes in academia. That is, learning to write involves understanding epistemologies (what counts as knowledge and who has authority over it),² identities (relations between forms of writing and formations of the self), and power (how partial and ideological positions and claims are presented as neutral and as given through the writing requirements and processes of feedback). To understand “power” is to understand that such claims are never neutral; they are always partial, situated, and contextualized in power and knowledge relations. Lea and Street (2000) call this way of looking at academic writing “academic literacies”; the academic literacies perspective is also concerned with dialogue at the centre of writing in academia, particularly dialogue between different genres (Lillis, 2003).

² Hirst, Henderson, Allan, Bode, and Kocatepe (2004) indicate that when we engage students in the practice of academic literacy, we are asking them to participate and “develop new ways of thinking and new ways of being” (p. 25).

I began to wonder whether my inability to write was tied to deficits in certain skills or strategies. I continued going through my notes and came across a paper that I had written, with passion, for a methods course that I had audited in September of 2009. It then became clear why writing had become difficult for me, and I was able to identify a problem that may have contributed (subconsciously) to my subsequent inability to write. Paradoxically, the problem that prevented me from writing also became what drove me to write again—specifically, my proposal and subsequent dissertation.

1.2 The Problem

The problem, as I had come to articulate in a paper submitted a couple of years earlier, was: “How can we write in a complex, multiple, and fluid world in which social reality, including the subjectivity of the researcher, is not fixed?” How can I *represent* when representation is unable to adequately capture what is there? The inspiration for raising such a question and seeking an answer to it has come from my PhD studies and reading poststructural and postmodern texts. In the literature, this situation is sometimes referred to as a *crisis of representation*.

A crisis of representation, according to Lincoln and Denzin (2000), speaks to the Other and the representation of the Other in researchers’ texts.³ It asks, “Who is the Other? Can we ever hope to speak authentically of the experience of the Other, or an Other? And if not, how do we create a social science that includes the Other?” (Lincoln & Denzin, 2000, p. 1050). Further, Guba and Lincoln (2005) claim that a crisis of representation “serves to silence those whose lives we appropriate for our social sciences and which

³ In this research, the Other usually refers to the research participants and seldom to the indigenous Other (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). While referring to the crisis of representation and representation of the Other, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) state that “there is no clear window into the inner life of an individual [the Other] . . . [On the other hand, we, as researchers, are situated] . . . There are no objective observations, only observations socially situated in the worlds of —and between—the observer and the observed. Subjects, or individuals [that is, the Others; the research participants], are seldom able to give full explanations of their actions or intentions; all they can offer are accounts, or stories, about what they have done and why” (p. 21).

may also serve subtly to re-create *this* world, rather than some other, perhaps, more complex, but just one” (p. 211). Finley (2005) states that a crisis of representation prompts questions from researchers, such as,

How should research be reported? Are the traditional approaches to dissemination adequate for an expanding audience that includes a local community? How do researchers “write up” their understandings without “othering” their research partners, exploiting them, or leaving them voiceless in the telling of their own stories? What forms should research take? How can researchers make their work available and useful to participants rather than produce reports in the tradition of academics writing for other academics or policymakers? (pp. 682–683)

Moreover, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) argue that “qualitative researchers can no longer directly capture lived experience. Such experience . . . is created in the social text written by the researcher” (p. 19). Scholars thus refer to this inability to capture experience as a representational crisis; the crisis of representation aligns with “uncertainty about adequate means of describing social reality” (Marcus & Fisher, 1986, p. 8). This crisis refers to “the impossibility of careful, faithful, and authoritative cataloguing of an exotic other” (Jones, 2005, p. 766). According to Richardson (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005), the impossibility of reporting and writing about the Other is based on the premise that there is no fixed object or single truth about the Other that can be triangulated. This perspective centers the crisis of representation in relation to “triangulation”. Hence, the crisis of representation is instantiated in writing up that which is not fixed but, rather, fluid, complex, and multiple.

Following Richardson’s (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005) conceptualization of crisis of representation in relation to triangulation, my dissertation examines the problem of *how to document becoming*. How to document becoming is concerned with capturing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities through writing. Detailing becoming as a problem of writing extends current models of writing in higher education,

forwarded by Lea and Street (1998) and related critical scholars of literacy in higher education. The expression “documenting becoming”, by which I mean capturing the unstable nature of life, has been taken from Richardson (2000).

1.3 The Study

In this qualitative case study, I explore the ways in which selected academics capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of mind through their writing when representation, in its traditional sense, is inadequate for capturing this space. To do so, I analyse five published disruptive poststructural autoethnographic/mixed genre texts written by academics who attempt to capture their own becoming. I selected “mixed genre” texts because truth in such texts is viewed as interobjective. That is, in writing this type of text, the author can present different takes on the same subject matter and can draw on a variety of genres, including literary, artistic, and scientific. To show how these academics capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity, this study focuses on a specific type of creative analytic practices (CAP) text: disruptive poststructural autoethnography (DPA).⁴ DPA texts have the characteristics of mixed genre texts in that they both possess layered accounts; but most importantly, DPA texts *deconstruct* the self and/or the Other in the process of representing the self and/or the Other. In essence, I chose my data texts based on my situatedness. That is, my disciplinary/interdisciplinary journey guided me in why and how to choose these particular texts, which depict a type of writing that showcases how transformation of a person happens. The data texts are as follows:

Akundes, F. Y. (2001). Pahala’s last (Bon) dance: The dead are not dead. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7(1), 21–34.

⁴ Creative analytic practices (CAP) texts are a class of ethnographies in which genres have “been blurred, enlarged, altered to include poetry, drama, conversations, readers’ theater, and so on” (Richardson, 2000, p. 929).

- Gannon, S. (2001). (Re)presenting the collective girl: A poetic approach to a methodological dilemma. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7(6), 787–800.
- Gannon, S. (2002). “Picking at the scabs”: A poststructural/feminist writing project. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 8(5), 670–682.
- Lau, K. J. (2002). This text which is not one: Dialectics of self and culture in experimental autoethnography. *Journal of Folklore Research*, 39(2/3), 243–259.
- Ronai, R. C. (1998). Sketching with Derrida: An ethnography of a researcher/dancer. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 4(3), 405–420.

To analyze the selected DPA texts, I employed a theoretical perspective and a loose frame that together conceptualize documenting becoming; these I extracted from philosophical concepts and the characteristics of CAP texts—specifically, the characteristics of DPA—while keeping in mind my main questions and four sub-questions (these question and sub-questions will be introduced in the upcoming pages).

Models of writing in higher education (Hounsell, 1988; Jones, Turner, & Street, 1999; Lea & Street, 1998; Taylor, Ballard, Beasley, Hanne, Clancky, & Nightingale, 1988) do not currently consider documenting becoming as a part of academic literacies and writing in academia. Through this study, I intended to extend the definition of academic literacies put forth by Lea and Street (1998) to include a process that records becoming as a part of academic literacies/writing. Therefore, the term *academic literacies* in this study is used in an extended way. Further, this study contends that the truth of writing the instabilities of subjectivities in the form of mixed genre texts is interobjective in Deleuze’s and Guattari’s sense of *percept* and *affect*.⁵

⁵ According to Deleuze and Guattari (1994), *affects* are what happen to us and *percepts* are what we receive.

Interobjectivity was first put forth by Maturana (1987) and Latour, (1996).⁶ It refers to the idea that to tell the reader what has happened to us entails producing a dialogue/dance among facts about how we experience situations and about social agreements.

Interobjectivity, then, “is understood to inhere in interaction. Here knowledge is embodied or enacted in the ever-unfolding choreography of action within the universe. That is, *the truth is not out there*” (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 71). However, in this study, knowledge, which corresponds with Deleuzian *affect*, is enacted in the ever-unfolding choreography of action within received data that are not located in a subject. These data, which Deleuze calls *percept*, are independent of the state of those who experience them; in turn, they lead to a bodily response that is not under one’s control and consequently will result in an unpredictable transformation in a/the person. That is, knowledge is not “out there”, but importantly, it aligns with the body’s answer, or what Deleuze calls *percept* and *affect*.

1.4 Research Questions

Given the background and literature mentioned earlier, the following main research question emerged:

How might we document becoming; that is, how do we capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of thought through writing?

⁶ Davis and Sumara (2006) contend that interobjective truth “is about emergent possibility as a learner/knower engages with some aspect of its world in an always-evolving, ever-elaborative structural dance” (pp. 15–16). Further, they state: “The notion of objectivity—of god’s-eye truths or observerless observation—is deemed an impossible fiction” (p. 15). They also claim: “The suggestion that individual experience [subjectivity] is sufficient for claims of facticity is rejected since it ignores . . . aspects of interpretations” (p. 15) and situatedness. According to Davis (2004), humanists (intersubjectivists) believe “that we are sufficient unto ourselves to make sense of our situations” (p. 96); in the view of humanists, knowledge is not descended “from on high [i.e., religion], it is not divined by mystical means, and it doesn’t inhere in nature . . . [It is] a matter of collective agreement—and must thus be explained in terms of human relations” (p. 97). According to Davis and Sumara (2006), the “notion of intersubjectivity . . . the belief that truths . . . [are] manufactured . . . through social accord—is also . . . inadequate” (p. 15). Indeed, they contend that intersubjectivity is culturally bounded, and truth is about social agreement (p. 15).

To explore this question, I consider the following sub-questions as I approach the reading of my selected texts.

1. How do writings that document becoming attend to multiple layers of meaning/different ways of knowing while writing subjective, objective, and intersubjective truth(s)?
2. How do writings that document becoming communicate, through multiple layers of meaning, the movement and becoming of humans (human currents)?
3. How do writings that document becoming convey, through multiple layers of meaning, elements of truth, resonance, feeling, and connection?
4. How do writings that document becoming write the same tale from different points of view through using fiction, field notes, and scientific materials, talking with different people, or drawing on literary, artistic, and scientific genres?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study is significant because it extends the literature on writing in academia and academic literacies. The *academic literacies* model put forth by Lea and Street (1998) encompasses a *study skills* and an *academic socialization* model. *Academic literacies* model, however, does not consider *documenting becoming*, that is, how to capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of thought through writing mixed genre texts, in the sense of how to write at the time of a crisis of representation, where this crisis refers to a writer's shifting subjectivity. Therefore, this study is significant because it communicates to readers that literacy is more complicated than the models put forth to date.

This study is an investigation of how writings that document becoming are being written and how they are of value to academics (both professors and students) who struggle with representation in their writing. It can offer clarification to those who are interested in the

struggle individuals experience with representational forms that limit their ability to document and share their knowledges.

This study can also be a guide for others who want to capture their past learning that was emergent and formed unconsciously, in much the same way as the authors of the data texts found their learning to have unfolded.

1.6 Overview of the Study

This thesis contains five chapters.

Chapter One has introduced the problem, provided a brief summary of my own writing history, presented the background to the study, outlined the major research questions, and addressed the study's significance.

Chapter Two presents my theoretical perspective and loose frame, drawing on some concepts of Deleuzian philosophy as well as the ideas of other philosophers and authors, such as Guattari, Richardson, Maturana, Latour, Bakhtin, and Ronai. In addition, this chapter reviews the literature on academics' struggles with representing, their answers to these challenges, models of writing in higher education, the academic literacies model in particular, and a critique of this model.

In Chapter Three, I elaborate on the research design, outlining the methodology and methods; my sampling and the sources of my data; my data analysis; and the trustworthiness and credibility of my analysis, findings, and interpretations. In this chapter, I also discuss ethics with respect to the biases that I bring to this work and the interpretations that I bring to the texts.

In Chapter Four, I discuss how I analyzed my data texts and arrived at the findings using grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006) and situational analysis (Clarke, 2005).

In Chapter Five, I summarize the findings, draw conclusions, and discuss the educational implications of the study; I also describe its limitations, along with possible future

research directions. Finally, I propose and further theorize on an expanded conceptualization of the academic literacies model and a theory of writings that document becoming.

Chapter 2 : Conceptual Framework and Review of the Literature

2.1 Theoretical Perspective (Loose Frame)

2.1.1 Introduction

In this study, Lea and Street's (1998) *academic literacies* model of writing in higher education is extended to include the process of *documenting becoming* as a way of writing in academia and therefore as fundamental to academic literacies.⁷ The original model is in agreement with acquiring particular ways of constructing the world through learning about epistemologies, identities, and power (Lea, 1999; Lea & Street, 1998, 2000; Lillis, 1999; Scott, 1999; Street, 1999; Turner, 1999). Since I decided (i) to extend the model to include recording the instabilities of subjectivities and (ii) to tell readers what such an extended form would look like, I investigated what epistemologies, identities, and power mean in writing that captures the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of thought. A Deleuzian perspective has been helpful for learning and conceptualizing this way of writing, since it speaks to the space of thought and its fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity. I suggest that to document becoming, confront a crisis of representation, and capture the space of mind, one becomes an artist in the Deleuzian sense. This chapter will explain the conceptual framework for my perspective/loose frame and the resulting study, including providing a review of the relevant literature.

⁷ In this study, "academia" and "academics" include university professors, college instructors, and graduate students.

2.1.1.1 Artist and Subjectification

For the purposes of this research, academics who write their becoming can be considered artists as conceptualized through the Deleuzian view of what makes an artist and what/who is an artist. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) contend that “[p]ainters [and, by extension, other artists] go through a catastrophe, or through a conflagration, and leave the trace of this passage on the canvas, as of the leap that leads them from chaos to composition” (p. 203). Deleuze states that artists are aggregates of percept and affect and nothing else (Stivale, 1996). They are not subjects, only an assemblage of rhizomes. Artists in the Deleuzian sense align with what Foucault called subjectification (Deleuze, 1995, p. 93). Deleuze elaborates upon Foucault’s original sense of the term (1995), stating that subjectification is aligned with “individuated fields, not persons or identities” (p. 93). Subjectification is not a theoretical return to subject. According to Deleuze, without subjectification, “we cannot go beyond knowledge or resist power” (1995, p. 99). Knowledge, power, and subjectification together “constitute[s] a way of living” (p. 93), and subjectification is thus a “search for another way of life, a new style” (p. 106); Foucault calls it “passion” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 3). It is concerned with “creating ways of existing, what Nietzsche called inventing new possibilities” (p. 118). To generate this new way of life and this unknown and “to free life from where it’s trapped” (St. Pierre, 2004, p. 141), one should be able to express oneself passionately and freely. *Subjectification* does not refer to imitation but, rather, pertains to “actualization of the virtual” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 212). This process is described as *becoming-other*, which is always a genuine creation (Deleuze, 1994).

Artists, according to Deleuze, “are presenters of affects, the inventors and creators of affects,” and to achieve this creation, they describe social realities in “minute detail” (1995, p. 175). Deleuze and Guattari (1994) contend that artists do not represent a world we already have but, rather, create new worlds. The artist

brings back from the chaos varieties that no longer constitute a reproduction of the sensory in the organ but set up a being of the sensory, a being of sensation, on an organic plane of composition that is able to restore the infinite. (pp. 202–203)

They add that artists or art “can live only by creating new percepts and affects . . . [and] no art and no sensation have ever been representational” (p. 193).⁸ Lotz (2009) implicitly criticizes what Deleuze calls subjectification, stating that Deleuze draws a strict line between non-intentional life and the representational world, but the “non-intentional relations that painting opens up is itself *part of* and emerges out of the representational force of painting” (p. 59). That is, she claims that no subjectification—in the sense of the body’s answer to assemblages that are made and being made in response to received data—is constructed in the artist. I agree that non-intentional relations emerge out of representational force. However, in this study I consider non-intentional relations in the sense of the answer that the body prompts, or what Deleuze calls *affect*, and I consider representational force in the sense of assemblages that are made and being made in response to received data, what Deleuze calls *percept*. I also take the view that representation, in the sense of *percept*, is part of *affect*, which corresponds with becoming/becoming other, or subjectification. Deleuzian *affect* is aligned with unintentional responses that *percept* prompts in one’s body; these responses are not under the person’s control and make her/him become in an unexpected manner.

Deleuzian concepts, particularly *affect* that is produced by artists and writers through their paintings and writings, inspired this study. Using a Deleuzian *affect* lens, I sought to learn about the workings of the mind and the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of thought through investigating published articles by academics that detail their or others’

⁸ When I state that “artists do not represent a world we already have”, I am using “represent” in the sense of writing/communicating/recognizing identities that are ideological, and by ideological I mean identities fixed by certain beliefs. When Deleuze and Guatarri claim that “no art and no sensation have ever been representational”, the word “representational” is aligned with *being*, which is about recognizing identities that are ideological.

becoming.⁹ My work initially sought to explore the problem of writing during a crisis of representation, when representation (that is, writing in its traditional sense) is unable to adequately capture social reality. The *affect* lens allowed me access to the workings of others' minds by investigating texts that capture becoming. One of my data texts, by Akindes (2001), offers a good example of this point. Akindes writes about her memories of visiting Pahala (her father's hometown) as a four-year-old for the first time to attend her great-grandmother's funeral ceremony. She mentions that revisiting these memories in the sense of *percepts* prompted an unexpected response in her, in the form of feeling "life as a 4-year-old" (p. 22); "becoming" her daughter, who is presently four, was a new experience, and Akindes had not anticipated that revisiting these childhood memories would lead to this type of change in her.

Artists, who are the presenters of affects, "write loosely" through following the brush (Akindes, 2001), and by doing this represent the working of their minds. In this type of writing, informed by a Deleuzian lens and specifically by his concept of *affect*, experiences correspond with events—a time of day, a season (Deleuze, 1995)—and are only a pretext for the author to remember and write, or, more exactly, to form collective assemblages: what will emerge in the process of writing is unpredictable. I have found looking through a Deleuzian lens and utilizing his concept of art and the artist helpful for investigating how to seize subjectivities, as this lens allows me to see how the process of thinking unfolds and is unfolding through the process of writing. Writings that record becoming describe the world through collective assemblages. Deleuze calls such writing rhizomatic, and according to Cole (2012), it is done through "activating forms of nomadism, that burrow through sedentary overlays of capitalist code and subjectification immanently" (p. 13). The rhizomatic nature of this type of writing "is not just about uncovering progressively more secret or hidden aspects of the research context, but also about making connections between these irradiating and interconnected themes and questions related to global concerns" (p. 14). In other words, artists—including

⁹ Cole (2012) refers to the example of notebooks left by Leonardo da Vinci that can help readers access the functionings of da Vinci's mind.

academics who write their becoming—are not subjects but, instead, assemblages of rhizomes.

2.1.1.2 Interobjectivity¹⁰

Following Tierney (2002), this study contends that texts written during a crisis of representation should include subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths; my understanding is that these different truths are associated through the complexivist concept of interobjectivity. Tierney believes that academics should connect the personal to the public by linking individual experience with theory, and should think about the different ways in which the author's voice might be inserted into a text.¹¹ This focusing on the author's voice (i.e., thinking about different ways to insert that voice into a text) through exercises such as writing about the same event from different perspectives (from their perspective [subjective truth] and the perspective of the other [objective truth]) enables individuals to see how they think of their connections to the other.¹²

Interobjectivity in the complexivist sense was first introduced by Maturana (1987) and Latour (1996) and is a “conceptual hybrid of intersubjectivity and objectivity” (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 69). According to Davis and Sumara (2006), truth “is not just about the object [facts], not just about the subject [fictions], and not just about social agreement. It is related to holding all of these in dynamic, co-specifying, conversational relationships while locating them in a grander, more-than-human context” (p. 15). In line with this, Tierney (2002) contends that writing about the same event from one's own and others' perspectives, and connecting the personal with the public, the experience with the theory,

¹⁰ Subjective, objective and intersubjective truths are called interobjectivity by Maturana and Varela (Davis & Sumara, 2006). However, interobjectivity is used in its ideological sense as it is stipulated by Tierney (2002). That is, it is not used in the Deleuzian sense of *percept* as an assemblage of experiences in the form of received data that is not located in the subject as discussed earlier.

¹¹ According to Frank (2000), they should understand “differences through a hermeneutic circle of experience, introspection and clarification” (cited in Tierney, 2002, p. 396).

¹² The other is used here in terms of Denzin and Lincoln (2005), as explained in Chapter 1, footnote 3.

enables individuals to understand how they think in connection to others. This understanding is itself fluid and in accord with them seeing the issue under study within the bigger picture/context, which will not otherwise be actualized. That is, the bigger picture/“more-than-human context” that individuals see is not something “out there” that is fixed—instead, the truth complies with emergent possibility as a learner/knower engages with some aspect of the world in an always-evolving, ever-elaborative structural dance (Davis & Sumara, 2006, pp. 15–16). In other words, the bigger picture is not there to be discovered by a lone individual but instead is the by-product of interactions between people.

Davis and Sumara (2006) contend that interobjective truth attempts to bring “humanities-based and physical sciences-based discussions of truth into greater dialogue”; indeed, “the notion of interobjectivity is oriented by the assertion that there is no objective . . . free-standing, eternal, knower-independent . . . knowledge”, “no observerless observations or measureless measurements” (p. 69). Hence, according to interobjectivity, we (re)produce knowledge and truth through imposing our interpretation. However, interobjective truth in the present study refers to the Deleuzian sense of truth. Deleuze contends that there is no interpretation; what we have are only assemblages/rhizomes—what he elsewhere calls *affects*—that are being made and re-made in our minds because of percepts, which correspond with the “reception of data that is not located in a subject” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 29) and are independent of the state of those who experience them. According to Deleuze, truth is emergent, as the assemblages that form and are in the process of forming are unpredictable. This is a different emergence from complexivist interobjective truth—the emergence of truth due to social interactions among different truths. In the Deleuzian sense, emergence not only continually aligns with making known the unknown of the research setting (causing “the heart of the matter to emerge” (Akindes, 2001; p. 24), but also corresponds with connecting these unseen and interrelated aspects to international matters and a bigger picture of reality (Cole, 2012). Our socialization makes us form assemblages and definitely has an impact on truth and the experiences that we receive in the form of percepts, but what is learned and what will be the end product/body response is unpredictable. For instance, Akindes (2001) never could have predicted that she would feel “life as a 4-year-old” (p. 22) and “become” her

daughter, before embarking on the journey of remembering her own visit to Pahala as a child of the same age.

This study contends that the process of writing texts that compose becoming, in the sense of capturing the space of mind, uses interobjectivity in the Deleuzian sense of *percept* and *affect*. Gannon (2006) contends that the most important point about DPA texts, which record becoming, is that they not only represent the self but also deconstruct it—processes that correspond with capturing Deleuzian *percept* and *affect*. Hence, in the following two subsections, I discuss *percept* and *affect* in greater detail, then I explain the notion of *concept*.

2.1.1.3 Percept

“[Percepts are] packets of sensations and relations that live on independently of whoever experiences them” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 137)—they go “beyond perception” (p. 173). Percepts refer to “a reception of data that is not located in a subject” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 29) and “are independent of a state of those who experience them” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164). They correspond to the natural, pre-human landscape. The validity of percepts “[lies] in themselves and exceeds any lived [*sic*] . . . They exist in the absence of man” (p. 164). Deleuze and Guattari (1994) contend that we are not *in the world* but, rather, that we become *with the world*; we do this by contemplating, and everything is vision. According to Stivale (1996), “An artist creates percepts . . . He wants to be able to construct aggregates of perceptions and sensations that survive those who read the novel” (“I as in Idea,” para. 4). Percepts “make perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world, affect us, and make us become” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 182).

2.1.1.4 Affect

Affect, according to Deleuze, is aligned with “what happens to us” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 21) and corresponds with the space of thought. It is the “power to interrupt synthesis and order” (p. 35). For instance, a novelist “invents unknown and unrecognized affects and

brings them to light as the becoming of his characters” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 174). *Affect* corresponds with the body’s response to received data/experiences/life events, it is not under human control, and it makes the relevant person become and change unexpectedly.

Deleuze (1995) states that “affects are not feelings [or affections], they’re becomings that spill over beyond whoever lives through them” (p. 137); they “go beyond the strength of those who undergo them . . . [Their] validity lies in [themselves] and exceeds any lives”, existing “in the absence of man” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 164). Affects are the “nonhuman becoming of man”, and becoming is “contemplating” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 169); becoming, in turn, is neither resemblance nor imitation, although “there is resemblance. But it is only a produced resemblance” (p. 173). For example, becoming a wasp of the orchard and becoming the orchard of a wasp is not concerned with “transformation of one into the other . . . but something passing from one to the other.” This passing is called the “zone of indetermination, of indispensability as if . . . persons . . . endlessly reach that point that immediately precedes their natural differentiation” (p. 173). Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call this endless reaching *affect*.

2.1.1.5 Concept

According to Lea and Street (1998), to learn about a particular way of constructing the world, students should develop their academic writing skills through examining epistemologies, identities, and power. From the Deleuzian perspective (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), epistemologies involve *affect*, identities involve *percepts*, and power corresponds with *concept*. Therefore, to learn to express in writing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of mind, academics should learn about *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*. According to Deleuze, as explained by May (2005), we can engage in ontology

when we cease to see it . . . as a project of identity. Deleuze contends that we begin ontology when we abandon the search for conceptual stability and begin to see what there is in terms of difference rather than identity. (p. 19).

May further contends that “[a] concept is a way of addressing the difference that lies beneath the identities we experience” (p. 19). According to Deleuze, “concepts palpate differences and by doing so they give voice to [difference] . . . [and disrupt] all projects of identification” (p. 21). Based on Deleuze, Semetsky states that “every newly created concept ‘speaks the event, not the essence’” (2003, p. 22, quoting Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 21) and concerns the “capacity to think differently” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 25). Power is aligned with the “permanent challenge to think differently by creating [new] problems” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 12) and concepts. As Bogue explains, Deleuze asserts that “if there is stuttering . . . it is a conceptual stuttering, a stuttering of thought itself” (Bogue, 2004, p. 21). To conceptualize writings that document becoming, I also relied on the construct of dialogue/ism, which will be discussed in the next subsection.

2.1.1.6 Dialogue/ism

According to Tierney (2002), texts that speak to a representational crisis encompass multiple truths that, based on my interpretation, are aligned with what Maturana (1987) and Latour (1996) have called interobjectivity. Interobjective truth refers to “holding all of these [truths] in dynamic, co-specifying, conversational relationships” (Davis & Sumara, 2006, p. 15). I contend that this conversational relationship can be seen through Bakhtin’s concept of dialogue/ism (1981, 1984). In line with this perspective, Lillis (2003) states that to develop the academic literacies model of writing into a design frame with the potential to contribute to the pedagogy of student writing in both theory and practice, one should write different genres in dialogue with each other, in the Bakhtinian sense of dialogism and internally persuasive discourses. I contend that texts that detail becoming and capture the space of thought write different truths and genres in dialogue with each other, but not in this Bakhtinian sense. In explaining what he means by dialogism and internally persuasive discourses, Bakhtin (1981, 1984) states that dialogue is something that we struggle for, not something given. It has many truths or a range of truths, many voices, many identities, and hybridity, as opposed to what he calls monologism or authoritative discourses, which have one truth, one voice, one identity, and follow binary logic. Lillis, referring to Bakhtin (2003, p. 198), contends that all

utterances involve a tension between monologism and dialogism. These two signal the different kinds of relationships the individual has with ideas and wordings. Authoritative discourses seek to impose particular meanings and are therefore monologic in nature. These stand in contrast to internally persuasive discourses, which are ways of meaning with which the individual has dialogically engaged through questioning, exploring, and connecting, in order to develop a newer way to mean (p. 198). Bakhtin's notion of dialogue is the process by which newer ways to mean and to be can come into existence and, as such, dialogue stands in contrast to monologue and monologism. Lillis contends that Bakhtin's concept of dialogue in the sense of something to struggle for "is often hidden or ignored in writings and discussions about approaches to student writing in academia" (pp. 199–200) but should be a focus of attention in work on academic literacies. She further states that student-writers have the desire to make meaning through relying on writing texts that consider both "logic and emotion, argument and poetry, and impersonal and personal constructions" (p. 205), and Bakhtin's notion of dialogue is a good construct for them to reply upon. The resulting space is concerned with hybrid texts and is "pregnant with potential for new world views" (p. 205).

In this study, texts that capture the space of thought are written in ways that put different truths and genres in conversation with each other in the way Bakhtin describes. However, different truths in texts that catalogue becoming are written based on and in conformity with received data and events that are separate from those who experience them. These truths are put in conversation with each other through unplanned, rhizomatic connections, or *percept* and *affect*. Cole (2012) also describes this as a "smooth space", one in which "virtual multiplicities may form and break free, move over and shape opinion through previously unforeseen connections" (pp. 13–14). Out of these unintended connections and conversations that are made with received data, a writing emerges that, according to Cole (2012), makes the unseen of the research context seen—what Akindes (2001) calls uncovering the heart of the matter—but also makes "connections between these irradiating and interconnected themes and questions related to global concerns" (p. 14). In the following subsection, I discuss the characteristics of such hybrid texts through describing Ronai's concept of a layered account (1992) and Richardson's concept of crystallization (1994, 1997, 2000).

2.1.1.7 Layered Account

Texts that may answer representational struggles are written in a mixed genre format (Tierney, 2002; Richardson, 1994, 1997, 2000). These texts are concerned with multiple layers of meaning and, therefore, with creating a layered account, a notion first put forth by Ronai (1992). According to Ronai, a layered account is a “postmodern ethnographic reporting technique that embodies a theory of consciousness and a method of reporting in one stroke” (p. 24). In writing multiple genre texts, authors bring “epistemological and strategic assumptions about the kind of text the readers need and those whom [they] interviewed and [observed] deserve” (Tierney, 2002, p. 391). This means the author concentrates on the narrator’s voice when doing so will fit in the text. Such an account brings to life “many ways of knowing” through “various conceptions of self as subject and object, fantasies, abstract theoretical thinking and statistics to create a layered account” (Ronai, 1996, p. 25). That is, “[s]tatistical analysis and other forms of scientific prose occupy a place beside abstract theoretical thinking, emotional understanding, and the remembered and constructed details of everyday life” (p. 26). In writing a layered account, Ronai shifts multiple layers of reflections “forward, backward, and sideways through time, space, and various attitudes in a narrative format” (Ronai, 1992, p. 103). In other words, when writing mixed genre texts, authors concentrate on how they deal with time, and to do so, they write about events (e.g., a time of a day, a season; Deleuze, 1995) in their own lives. They also consider the demands of their readers and interviewees by specifying what knowledge is in the specific context of the event, and what the underlying assumptions of that knowledge are.

I contend that texts that seize becoming capture the space of thought through writing layered accounts. However, these layered accounts are written as a result of the unintended answer of each academic’s body to events that have happened in his/her life. A layered account brings to life many ways of knowing in the sense of making known the unknown and connecting the unknown to universal matters. This study contends that connecting the unknown to the known by producing texts that write becoming is done through relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. The layered accounts in this study use

statistical analysis/other scientific prose as well as abstract theoretical thinking, emotional understanding, and remembered and constructed details of life, but they consider all these different truths in the sense of percepts. The accounts do not record conscious acts but instead the body's answer to percepts that have led to unforeseen changes in the person. For example, remembering being four years old and visiting Pahala for the first time made Akindes "become" her daughter and made her body unconsciously produce responses in the form of layered accounts:

Revisiting myself at 4, something unexpected happens. The years that separate me from my daughter, Adelana, suddenly collapse. I am reminded that Adelana, who is now 4, is actively yet unconsciously recording memories for the future. Thirty-seven years from now, when she reflects on her childhood, what events, feelings, and moments will spring to her mind? (p. 22)

2.1.1.8 Crystallization

Richardson (1994, 1997) introduced the idea of crystallization to the research on writing. According to Richardson (1997), "the central imaginary for 'validity' for postmodernist text is [the] . . . crystal . . . with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities and angles of approach" (p. 97). In the crystallization process, "the writer tells the same tale from different points of view" (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 6), using genres such as fiction, field notes, and scientific articles. Crystallization

deconstructs the traditional idea of "validity" (we feel how there is no single truth, we see how texts validate themselves); and crystallization provides us with a deepened, complex, thoroughly partial understanding of the topic. Paradoxically, we know more and doubt what we know. (Richardson, 1997, p. 92)

The crystal as text reflects and refracts “multiple layers of meaning, through which we can see both . . . human currents and . . . elements of truth, feeling, connection, processes of the research that ‘flow’ together. [The crystal] is an attractive metaphor for validity” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208).

I contend that texts that record becoming have all the characteristics of crystallization. However, these texts use crystallization to capture the space of thought. That is, the academics write their/Others’ becoming by telling the same tale from different points of view and by seeing elements of truth, feeling, and connection. However, what separates crystallization in this study from Richardson’s notion is that these acts of writing are not intended and planned beforehand; they are written as a result of the academic’s bodily responses or affects, which are produced as a result of assemblages that are formed or in the process of forming in response to received data. That is, crystallization is used to capture the space of thought, not the social space, from different points of view, such as fiction, field notes, and scientific materials.

2.1.2 Conclusion

My interdisciplinary PhD studies and reading of poststructural and postmodern texts informed me that writings that seize subjectivities that are fluid, multiple, and complex can be conceptualized using the concepts discussed in this section: the artist and subjectification, interobjectivity, percept, affect, concept, dialogue/ism, layered accounts, and crystallization. These concepts helped me to form a loose frame and an initial hypothesis about writings that document becoming, as I have laid out earlier. I tested my preconceptions against my data texts, the results of which I will present in detail in Chapter 4, “Data Analysis and Findings”.

2.2 Literature Review

2.2.1 Introduction

In this study, I investigated how one can *represent* when representation is unable to adequately capture social reality. Following Richardson (in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005), I altered my question from “How does one write during a crisis of representation?” to “How does one document becoming?” (2005, p. 966). As explained earlier, my study considers the disruptive poststructural autoethnographic text as a way to write becoming. To investigate my question(s), I reviewed several bodies of literature. First, I reviewed the literature on academics’ different struggles with representing (Frank, 2000; Lather, 1993; Ortner, 1995; Page, Samson & Crockett, 2000; Richardson, 1988, 1990, 1997, 2000; Stoller & Olkes, 1987; Tierney, 2002). Second, I included the literature on how academics so far have examined their struggles with representing (Richardson, 1997; Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005; Tierney, 2002). Third, I reviewed the literature on models of writing in higher education (Hounsell, 1988; Jones, Turner, & Street, 1999; Lea & Street, 1998; Taylor et al., 1988), and more specifically on the academic literacies model of writing, which is the most comprehensive one to date. Fourth, I examined Lillis’s critique of the current way of conceptualizing writing in academia (2003), which contends that Lee and Street’s academic literacies model needs to be developed as a design frame if it is to contribute to both theory and practice.

2.2.1.1 Academics and Representational Struggles

The literature on higher education tells me that academics (especially graduate students) struggle in their programs for many reasons, including the challenges of socializing themselves to the culture of their discipline (Austin, 2002), interdisciplinary socialization (Holley, 2010), and academic capitalism (Mendoza, 2010). Academics also face the challenges of adapting in psychosocial, identity, cognitive (Gardner, 2010), and epistemological arenas (Shinew & Moore, 2010). Indeed, graduate students’ doctoral experiences change them in personal ways. In support of this fact, Kasworm and Bowles

(2010) indicate that “the commitment to seeking doctoral work . . . impacts doctoral students’ sense of self and being” (p. 232). Kiley (2009) contends that through graduate work, doctoral students experience being “stuck” in their understanding, which manifests itself as “depression, a sense of hopelessness, ‘going round in circles’ and so on,” and therefore develop “new levels of thinking and researching, new ways of being a research student,” undergoing what she refers to as a “rite of passage” (p. 293) through the help of their communities of learners and their research culture. The literature also indicates that “cultural issues in teaching and learning are becoming increasingly significant in universities and colleges” (Palfreyman, 2007, p. 1). Numerous sources emphasize the relationships between culture and social identity, attitudes, and power relationships in learning and teaching (Collings, 2007; Doherty & Singh, 2007; Ituarte & Davies, 2007; Jones & Jenkins, 2007; Manathunga, 2007).

While the literature refers to the struggles of academics (particularly graduate students) and conveys the big-picture problems that can hinder the learning process, it does not address the experiences of academics who struggle specifically with writing during a crisis of representation.

The phrase “crisis of representation” was first used by Marcus and Fisher (1986). Several academics have subsequently written about this crisis, describing it as not knowing how to “speak authentically of the experiences of the other” (Lincoln & Denzin, 2000, p. 577). Guba and Lincoln (2005) contend that a crisis of representation refers to silencing “those whose lives we appropriate for our social sciences . . . [and] serves to re-create *this* world rather than some other, perhaps more complex, but just one” (p. 211); according to Marcus and Fisher (1986), it refers to “uncertainty about the adequate means of describing social reality” (p. 8). Richardson and St. Pierre (2005) conceptualize the crisis in relation to triangulation, contending that academics confront crisis in their writing because there is no fixed object or single truth that they can triangulate. The literature

therefore indicates that a crisis of representation corresponds with writing up something that is not fixed but is instead fluid, complex, and multiple.¹³

Based on the earlier definition, and following Tierney (2002), a “crisis of representation is ineluctably tied to epistemological shifts with regard to a researcher’s claims to understanding the Other”; that is, a crisis of representation derives “from shifting assumptions about how authors ought to present knowledge claims that they have created from their data” (p. 386).

Experiencing these epistemological shifts and not knowing how to present the Other leads academics to struggle with representing. They do not know how to present the knowledge claims that they have created from their data (Frank, 2000; Lather, 1993; Page, Samson, & Crockett, 2000; Richardson, 1997, 2000; Stoller & Olkes, 1987). This crisis leads some to see their field research as futile (Page, Samson, & Crockett, 2000). Some rethink their narrative strategies (Frank, 2000) and produce, for example, a memoir text instead of an anthropological one (Stoller & Olkes, 1987), and some create new, poetic texts from the body of the memory stories produced within the group of people who write such stories (Gannon, 2001, 2002). Still others are reluctant to interpret their data (Ortner, 1995).

Academics also struggle with representing partly because, as Tierney (2002) claims, as graduate students, they were not given guidance on how to write in a different voice. They instead were encouraged to buy a reference guide or a dissertation manual and a “preponderance of texts that either employ old-style narrative voices or flawed experimental voices [for their graduate seminars on qualitative research]. This leads individuals to not learn how to construct their own voice” (Tierney, 2002, p. 395).

[A]ssistant professors are often on a tenure track where published articles in refereed journals remain the coin of the academic realm . . . [and] reviewers look

¹³ Stoller and Olkes (1987), referring to their fieldwork among the Songhay of Niger, contend that academics confront a crisis of representation because informants constantly lie to their ethnographers. This study will not consider a crisis of representation in this sense.

for particular forms of data presentation . . . [this leads] assistant professors [to] solidify the craft they learned in graduate school, [and] by the time the assistant professors have achieved tenure they have become socialized to the ways of standardized writing practices. (p. 390)

2.2.1.2 Academics' Answers to Representational Struggles

The literature on academics' answers to representational struggles tells me that to confront a crisis of representation, academics should not necessarily use the first person in their writing or focus on their experiences (Tierney, 2002). Instead, they should connect their experiences with the subject under study (Behar, 1996) and link the "author's voice [with] those whom [the author writes about]" (Tierney, 2002, p. 396).

In writing an experimental text, an author does not recreate a "static social sciences narrative . . . with a slightly different voice, [but] creates an entirely different landscape that befits the genre rather than [assuming] that the insertion of the first person makes a text experimental" (p. 396). Here, the focus is on the "voice of the narrator" (p. 396); authors focus on this voice (the voice of the interviewees and those whom they observe) through defining knowledge and relevant assumptions based on this voice. In line with this, Richardson (1997) puts different genres in conversation with each other, while contending that there is no single truth or fixed object that can be triangulated. In addition to the voice of the narrator, the focus is also on "how the narrator deals with time" (Tierney, 2002, p. 396). Ronai (1992) also emphasizes dealing with time while writing layered accounts, suggesting that in a layered account, one should shift multiple layers of reflections "forward, backward, and sideways through time, space, and various attitudes in a narrative format" (p. 103).

The voice in these types of texts should break the texts' linearity (Tierney, 2002). Experimental texts bring into question the narrative voice and consider different ways whereby the author's voice might be inserted into a text (Tierney, 2002). Tierney

contends that one way to do so and “break” (p. 396) the linearity is through considering empathy in the sense put forth by Frank (2000), who states that “empathy must be tried and tried again to comprehend differences through a hermeneutic circle of experience, introspection and clarification” (cited in Tierney, 2002, p. 396).

The present study, following Tierney (2002) and Richardson (1997), is not concerned with the question of how to write during a crisis of representation but, rather, is intended to investigate how to open up a space for writing experimental social sciences texts that can portray the becoming of the self and/or the Other, in the sense of capturing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of thought. Like Richardson’s work, this study alters the question from how to write during a crisis of representation to how academics write experimental texts that capture becoming and record the changes in a person’s mind that are concerned with seizing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity. Following Tierney, this study attempts to “open up a space in social science texts for a more protean and engaged portrayal of those lives we observe and live” (p. 385). To open up such a space for writing, contends Richardson, academics should make use of different genres when writing these types of texts. Tierney goes beyond this suggestion and states that academics should not necessarily concentrate on personal experiences to open such a space but instead should also bring objective truths and intersubjective truths, in the sense of connecting the personal with the public and/or their experiences with theory. That is, academics should construct a truth that is an amalgamation of subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths, or what Maturana (1987) and Latour (1996) call interobjective truth, as I have described earlier.

The literature on academics’ answers to representational struggles does not consider writing becoming, in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is, in the literature, writings that document becoming are not concerned with writing the space of thought in addition to the space of the “organism . . . organization [and properties, which is] filled with formed and perceived things” (de Beistegui, 2012, p. 75) in the sense of *percept*; as explained earlier, *percept* is aligned with the assemblages that are made and are in the process of being made and is not located in the experiences of the subject. In writing informed by Deleuzian philosophy, academics write multi genre texts in the sense of

layered accounts that are by-products of the body's response to life's events. From this perspective, writing is not an intentional act in which authors think of what they assume knowledge is when they attempt to write, nor do they consider the reader's needs. In this way of writing, academics also learn to deal with time, in the sense of writing about events such as a season, a winter, a summer, an hour, or a date (Deleuze, 1995). In addition, academics writing texts that record becoming should not only represent the self/Other but also deconstruct the self/Other. In writing these types of texts, academics represent the self/Other in the sense of writing interobjective truth, but this truth is not ideologically based; rather, it is concerned with the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of forming. Further, in writing texts that catalogue the thought space, academics deconstruct the self/Other in the Deleuzian sense of *affect/concept*, which is attributed to bodily responses to life events. This way of writing texts is not considered in the literature on academics' responses to representational struggles, and this gap led me to look at the literature on writing in higher education to see whether this way of writing is theorized therein.

2.2.1.3 Models of Writing in Higher Education

I reviewed the literature on writing in higher education to see whether it has conceptualized writings that capture the response of the body in the Deleuzian sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. I turn now to review the models of writing in higher education put forth by Lea and Street (1998): the study skills model, the academic socialization model, and the academic literacies model.

2.2.1.3.1 The Study Skills Model

In this model, the problem of writing in higher education is considered a technical one with fixed solutions. Students have been educated to learn a set of "atomised skills" in order to write; that is, writing practices are treated in terms of skills and effectiveness (Jones et al., 1999; Lea, 1999; Lea & Street, 1998, 2000; Lillis, 1999; Scott, 1999; Street,

1999; Turner, 1999) that are assumed to be transferable to other contexts. The emphasis is on acquiring *technical and instrumental skills* and proficiency in surface grammar and spelling (Jones et al., 1999; Lea & Street, 1998). In this context, the academy is considered a “source of knowledge and regulations that are determined by a few in authority” (Jones et. al., 1999, p. xvii). Students are given the codes and conventions of academia and must tailor their practice accordingly in order to write (Gibbs, 1994). Within this model, learning is considered an individual act. This is a dominant, widely accepted approach to conceptualizing students’ writing (Jones et al., 1999).

2.2.1.3.2 The Academic Socialization Model

A significant number of studies argue that the problem of writing in academia is not solely one of linguistics (Boughey, 2000; Briane, 2002; Cummins 1989a, b; Curry, 2004; Hawkins, 2004; Hirst, Henderson, Allan, Bode, & Kocatepe, 2004; Jones et al., 1999; Lea & Street, 2006), but is also affected by factors such as students’ unfamiliarity with academic discourses (Boughey, 2000; Jones et. al., 1999; Lea & Street, 2000).¹⁴ Jones et. al. (1999) find this view to be more sensitive to students as learners and to the cultural context, and Hounsell (1988) as well as Taylor et. al. (1988) also assert that in this model, contextual factors are considered important in students’ writing. To learn to write in higher education, students should become able to acculturate themselves into academic discourses (Lea & Street, 2000; Jones et. al., 1999). According to Street (1984), to acquire school-based literacies, learners must acculturate and socialize themselves in these literacies; he calls these “ideological literacies”, distinguishing them from “autonomous” literacies. Lea and Street (1998, 2000) call this way of looking at academic writing “academic socialization”. The job of the teacher, in this view, is to inculcate students into the culture of the academy, which is considered to be homogenous; the exercise of power is not sufficiently theorized, and students’ writing is considered a medium of representation. This way of looking at academic writing does not

¹⁴ These studies reject the “study skills” view put forth by Lea and Street (2000).

address the issues of language, literacy, and discourse (Lea & Street, 1998). In line with Lea and Street's academic socialization model, Ivanic (1999) states that in order for students to write in academia, they need to be explicitly taught academic genres.

2.2.1.3.3 The Academic Literacies Model

To learn to write in higher education, students should negotiate their individual cultural and linguistic-related histories with the discourses and processes in academia (Ivanic, 1998). The academic literacies model reconsiders writing in academia. Following Lea (1999), Lea and Street (1998, 2000), Lillis (1999), Turner (1999), Scott (1999), and Street (1999), Jones et al. (1999) state that writing is in conformity with learning about

epistemologies—what counts as knowledge and who has authority over it; of identity—¹⁵what the relation is between forms of writing and the constitution of self and agency; and of power—how partial and ideological positions and claims are presented as neutral and as given through the writing requirements and processes of feedback and assessment that make up academic activity. (p. xvi)

Indeed, in this model, which is a critique of traditional views on writing in academia, students' writing is considered constituted and contested, an ideologically determined, socially situated practice. The model incorporates the study skills and academic socialization models—that is, all three are encapsulated in each other. From this perspective, one problem of writing, following Cohen (1993), Lea (1994), Lea and Street (1997), Stierer (1997), and Street (1995), might be due to the gap between “academic staff expectations and students' interpretations of what is involved in writing” (Lea & Street, 1998, p. 159). Another problem maybe that academics struggle with articulating

¹⁵ Hirst, Henderson, Allan, Bode, and Kocatepe (2004) indicate that when we engage students in the practice of academic literacy, we are asking them to participate and “develop new ways of thinking and new ways of being” (p. 25).

what constitutes a “well-developed argument”. Lea and Street further contend that the problem of writing in this model is attributed to students not being “[familiar] with the subject matter” on which they have to write and not paying “attention to some of the implicit ways of writing” (p. 164). To be considered successful in writing within this framework, one should learn “particular ways of constructing the world and not . . . [just] a set of generic study skills” (p. 62).

The literature in this area suggests that the problem of writing is not simply a linguistic one. For example, a study skills model does not take into consideration the academic discourse/genre. The academic socialization model does not take into consideration the students’ background knowledge and experiences. The academic literacies model addresses these gaps and incorporates relevant aspects of the other two models, but it does not consider the problem of how to document becoming, in the sense of using writing to capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of mind. Lea and Street’s academic literacies model of writing in higher education refers to learning a particular way of constructing the world, which in turn requires that one learn about epistemologies, identities, and power in that specific way of constructing the world. In the case of this study, academics documenting becoming in the Deleuzian sense therefore need to understand what epistemologies, identities, and power are in this particular way of constructing/writing the world.

2.2.1.4 A Critique of Writing in Higher Education

While agreeing with the academic literacies model, Lillis (2003) offers a good critique of the current way of conceptualizing writing in academia, stating that it has “yet to be developed as a design frame (Kress, 1998, 2000) which can actively contribute to student writing pedagogy as both theory and practice” (p. 192). She proposes design implications based on Bakhtin’s notion of dialogue, rather than on a monologic perspective: dialogue in the form of “talkback” instead of “feedback” between student and teacher in order to open spaces for students to say what they like or do not like about their writing; dialogue between disciplinary knowledge and students’ personal experiences in order to make the

subject matter relevant to students' lives; and dialogues between different genres in order to produce *hybrid texts* which, according to Bakhtin (1981), have the "potential . . . [to create] new world views" (cited in Lillis, 2003).

Building on Lillis's (2003) work, this study has the potential to help readers with writing mixed genre texts that convey becoming in the sense of capturing the space of mind. The literature on writing in higher education has not yet theorized writings that document becoming (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005) as a part of the academic literacies model.

2.2.2 Conclusion of the Literature Review

My review of the literature indicated to me that academics struggle with representing, and their answers to this challenge are not attributed to the problem of writing the space of thought and capturing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of that space. Hence, there is a gap in the literature on representational crisis when it comes to writing the space of thought. As well, the literature on writing in higher education in general and the academic literacies model in particular does not attribute the problem of writing to representational crisis; therefore, documenting becoming is not considered part of the academic literacies model, and this constitutes another gap. The literature review thus indicated to me that, through relying on analyzing my data texts, I could theorize on writings that capture the space of thought, and could thereby extend the academic literacies model.

2.3 Summary

This chapter has delineated the preliminary loose frame through which I looked at my data texts as writings that capture becoming and the space of thought. I developed this frame by drawing on certain concepts of Deleuze and several other philosophers, as well as the ideas of authors who have studied writing in higher education. This frame acted as a starting point for me to conceptualize writings that document becoming and, ultimately, to extend the academic literacies model of writing in higher education.

In addition, this chapter has reviewed the literature on academics' struggles with representing, their answers to these struggles, models of writing in higher education, academic literacies, and a critique of the academic literacies model. The literature review summarized what relevant scholarly conversations are currently taking place, how the present work enters these scholarly conversations, the contribution this study makes, and the significance of this work for the scholarly conversation.

Chapter 3 : Methodology

3.1 Introduction

The issue of how to write the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of mind—an essential part of the struggle and art of writing—has not been explored in the literature on models of writing in higher education, including the academic literacies model. To understand how academics capture their space of mind through writing mixed genre texts, I adopted an “instrumental case study” approach, first introduced by Stake (1995). In this methodology, “the case serves to help us understand phenomena or relationships within it” (p. 77). In this particular type of case study, the issues are important. Specifically:

We face a problematic situation, even a sense of fulmination . . . Issues are not simple and clean, but intricately wired to political, social, historical and especially personal contexts . . . Issues draw us toward observing, even teasing out, the problems of the case . . . Issues help us expand upon the moment, help us to see the instance in a more historical light, help us recognize the pervasive problem in human interaction. Issue questions or issue statements provide a powerful conceptual structure for organising the study of a case. (pp. 16–17)

In the instrumental case study, “we start and end with issues that are dominant” (p. 16). Bassey (1999) argues that in this sort of study, “an issue or hypothesis is given, [and] a bounded system (the case) is selected as an instance drawn from a class” (p. 30), as a way of studying the problem and the resulting question(s) that arise. The instrumental case study approach is thus “theory-seeking and theory-testing” (Bassey, 1999, p. 3).

According to Bassey, in theory-seeking and theory-testing case studies, “[t]he singularity is chosen because it is expected in some way to be typical of something more general” (p. 62). The focus here is on the issue rather than the case as such. Bassey contends that “[a] study of a singularity is research into particular events” (p. 47), and that the study of

singularities leads to “fuzzy generalization” (p. 46). *Fuzzy generalization* “is the kind of statement which makes no absolute claim to knowledge, but hedges its claim with uncertainties” (p. 12).

The present study investigates the issue of how academics detail subjectivities in the sense of using writing to capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of thought. The literature on writing in higher education does not explicitly attribute the problem of writing to a crisis of representation when the crisis is related to capturing the space of thought—or what this study calls “composing becoming”. Hence, I sought to address a problematic situation—how to write these subjectivities—and even a sense of fulmination, namely the fact that the literature on writing in higher education does not explicitly examine the issue of how to document becoming. This set of circumstances gave rise to an *issue*: how to record becoming.

This study begins with a “research question, or a puzzlement, a need for general understanding” (Stake, 1995, p. 29). To investigate this research question, unravel this puzzlement, and gain a general understanding about the process of documenting becoming, I selected as my cases five published articles that capture the space of thought through writing mixed genre texts. This research studied singularities—that is, particular events—and thereby charted the process of documenting becoming. The study of singularities then led to fuzzy generalizations about the processes of detailing becoming. The cases are used as texts to illustrate the idea of how the process of writing subjectivities using mixed genre texts happens, not to understand the individual authors’ lives, as is common in the *intrinsic case study* approach.

3.1.1 Method

Document analysis was the sole method employed (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, Olson, 2009; Stake, 1995). Document analysis (or document review) is a common approach in case study research. According to Olson, documents provide a valuable source of data in case study research, beyond the immediacy of interviews and observations, offering a

window into a variety of the case's dimensions. Likewise, Denzin and Lincoln (2005) contend that "the case study strategy relies on . . . document analysis" (p. 25) as a source of data. Rather than collecting case study data from multiple sources, whereby "the main idea is to triangulate or establish converging lines of evidence to make . . . findings as robust as possible" (Yin, 2006, p. 115), this study aimed to illustrate an idea and develop a theory; the trustworthiness and credibility of the findings and the developed theory were ensured by using the techniques of theoretical sampling and data saturation, as defined in grounded theory (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Morse, 1995). To establish trustworthiness and credibility, I started from the ideas and theoretical concepts described in Chapter 2, in the theoretical perspective section. These suggested where I should sample, as well as what documents I should select and for what theoretical purpose(s). Analysis of the texts validated and/or dismissed my original idea(s). Based on this, I took an iterative approach to sampling, continuing until I hit saturation. Saturated themes were those that had the most interpretive potential, so I incorporated these themes around my core theme. By doing this, I was able to demonstrate the theoretical aspects of writings that convey becoming.

3.1.1.1 Sampling and Sources of Data

As mentioned earlier, I selected five articles written in a mixed genre format. These five rich disruptive poststructural autoethnographic texts were selected based on my readings. What follows are thumbnail sketches of each:

1. Akindes, F. Y. (2001). Pahala's last (bon) dance: The dead are not dead. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7(1), 21–34.

In this article, Akindes writes about her visit to Pahala (her father's hometown) years after her father's death, for the town's last *bon dance*. This dance is "an annual Buddhist ritual to entertain ancestral spirits that return home during the summer months" (p. 21). This visit—which included conversations with friends and family—as well as family stories and her memories of her father, prompted Akindes to reflect on several matters:

her relationship with him, who her father had been, and ways of seeing the concepts of father, mother, home, and death in different and conflicting ways.

2. Ronai, C. R. (1998). Sketching with Derrida: An ethnography of a researcher/dancer. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 4(3), 405–420.

Ronai draws on her experience of working as a striptease dancer before becoming a researcher. In her research, on striptease dancers, she interviewed a dancer named “Kitty”. As she researched and wrote this article, she troubled the meaning of being a researcher and a dancer. In the process, Ronai was also transformed, becoming someone with a different understanding of her researcher identity in relation to her dancer identity, and of what it is to be a researcher.

3. Gannon, S. (2001). (Re)presenting the collective girl: A poetic approach to a methodological dilemma. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 7(6), 787–800.

In this text, Gannon communicates the particular resolution that she found to methodological dilemmas in the writing of collective memory work. She describes feeling like a fraud, surrounded by collective texts that may have been rewritten to reflect the collective sensibility of the group. Gannon recounts that to develop her argument, she had to use texts selectively to meet a word limit. However, this selectivity went against the collective nature of the data, which was the main goal of the whole exercise. The resolution that she proposed is to play with the texts and thereby create new poetic texts from the body of the memory stories produced within the group.

4. Gannon, S. (2002). “Picking at the scabs”: A poststructural/feminist writing project. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 8(5), 670–682.

In this second text, Gannon communicates how, through reviewing a number of her autobiographical texts written at different times and in different styles about the same incident (the end of her marriage), she learned about discourses of femininity and romance, and what it means to be a writer. The reviewing process taught Gannon that

even among a group of female writers, writing could be a predominantly “masculine” practice, governed by an economy of logic, reason, linearity, and restraint, and that this way of writing flattened the detail into narrative prose. Also, through reviewing the latest version of her marriage’s end, Gannon learns that academic writing can also be women’s writing that is transgressive and creative and that validates lived experience. She comes to the conclusion that academics can construct poems from interview transcripts, using Richardson’s crystallization method. Here, the author retains clichés and repetition and avoids authorial distancing, the latter being common in her earlier versions of the story. Gannon reaches the view that women’s writing, be it produced by a male or a female, emerges from a “feminine libidinal economy”; it thereby has “revolutionary potential” and can “circumvent and reformulate existing structures” of thinking and narrative, bringing into “existence alternative forms of relation, perception, and expression” beyond a masculine viewpoint that is “repressive and self-referential”.

5. Lau, K. J. (2002). This text which is not one: Dialectics of self and culture in experimental autoethnography. *Journal of Folklore Research*, 39(2/3), 243.

This text is written in a different, non-standard layout. The author separately composed three different narratives (personal, analytical, and theoretical). All three proceed simultaneously next to each other from beginning to end. Briefly, the narratives are as follows:

Analytical text: Lau tells the reader how playing with textual layout and producing a non-standard text have enabled her to enact “some of the linguistic play and feminine desire that Irigaray inspires” (p. 246).

Theoretical text: Lau puts different pieces of information together to communicate how one learns (or academics learn) about the nature of postmodern ethnic identities and the academic fascination with these identities, through writing autoethnographies. Writing these provides opportunities for the authors to theorize what happens when they are in between their intellectual commitment to poststructuralism and their personal desire for some sort of cultural authenticity.

Personal text: Lau recognizes and reveals the many hybridities of her own experiences—East/West and academic/everyday—and creates a dialogue with herself that teaches her about the nature of postmodern (ethnic) identities as ethnically and nationally hybrid. Hence, her everyday experiences are also hybrid.

I went through these texts one by one, ultimately seeking data saturation. The cohesiveness in my chosen sample brought me to data saturation sooner. Following Morse (1995), I also kept in mind that “there are no specific guidelines for the *a priori* estimation of the amount of data required in each category or theme” (p. 147). I considered the domain amply sampled and the data saturated when data replication occurred (Morse, 1995, p. 148), the data did not generate new categories (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), and the generated categories were sufficiently dense (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and described in detail. According to Morse (1995), to obtain saturation, all of the forms and varieties (here, of certain ways of communicating becoming) should be considered, including infrequent ones, negative cases, and gems. One also should have detailed descriptions of the data (Curtin & Fossey, 2007).

Following the idea of theoretical sampling (Walker & Myrick, 2006), I chose the above-mentioned texts based on the ideas (loose frame) that I formed according to my theoretical concepts, the characteristics of CAP texts (specifically, DPA texts), and my questions and sub-questions (as I have described in Chapter 1). In DPA texts, “genres and speaking positions proliferate” (Gannon, 2006, p. 477)—that is, they are written in a mix of genres and are interobjective. DPA texts fit my criteria for texts that document becoming since, according to Richardson, CAP texts “draw from literary, artistic, and scientific genres, often breaking the boundaries of those genres as well” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 963). These texts frequently are written “in first person, using a multi genre approach that can incorporate short stories, poetry, novels, photographs, journals, fragmented and layered writing” (Hamilton et al., 2008, p. 22). In addition, they are appropriate for my study because mixed genre texts are like a crystal (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005), and texts that work like a crystal have “multiple layers of meaning . . . through which we can see both . . . human currents . . . and . . . elements of truth, feeling, connection, processes of the research that ‘flow’ together” (Guba and Lincoln 2005, p.

208). Most importantly, these texts not only represent the self and/or the Other but also deconstruct the self and/or the Other.

3.1.1.2 Data Analysis

The selected data texts are all disruptive poststructural autoethnographies (DPAs). They are written as multi genre, layered accounts, their truth is interobjective, and they not only represent but also deconstruct the self/Other in the Deleuzian sense of *percept* and *affect*. I started my data sampling and selected my data sources based on the ideas that I formed during my theorizing process and/or from pre-existing knowledge (specifically, my loose frame). Morse (1995), Breckenridge and Jones (2009), Charmaz (2006), and Clarke (2005) call this theoretical sampling. Pre-existing knowledge (i.e., my theoretical perspective and the characteristics of DPA) gave me idea(s) of where to sample (Glaser, 1978) but not what part of a text to sample or where the text would lead me (Coyne, 1997). When reading the texts, I considered my theoretical perspective (loose frame), the characteristics of DPA and CAP texts, and my main question and sub-questions, to assess (i) how these texts *qualify* documenting becoming, (ii) whether they validate my theoretical perspective (and, if so, what part[s]), and (iii) what parts I should add to my theoretical perspective and therefore consider pieces in my emerging theory. I awarded no relevance to this pre-existing knowledge until the formation of the emerging theory validated or dismissed it.

In the initial stages of data collection, during the analytical coding process, I gave all of my data consideration. Especially in the preliminary analytical stages, I did not choose a certain part of the article to analyze, but instead read all parts of the data text meticulously and tried to pinpoint particular events that captured the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of thought through writing. Bassey (1999) contends that in instrumental case study, “the singularity is chosen because it is expected in some way to be typical of something more general” (p. 62); so, “[a] study of a singularity is research into particular events” (p. 47). Following Peräkylä (2005), I used the informal approach of “reading and rereading” to “pin down . . . key themes” (p. 870) while considering (i)

the theoretical concepts in my loose frame, (ii) my questions, (iii) the characteristics of CAP texts (Clandinin, Pusher & Orr, 2007; Clarke & Erickson, 2004; Dinkelman, 2003; Hamilton, Loughran, Marcondes, 2008; Hamilton & Pinnegar, 1998; La Boskey, 2004; Mitchell, Weber & O'Reilly-Scarlon, 2005; Moore, 2006; Renner, 2001), and (iv) the characteristics of DPA (Gannon, 2006) in particular.

In line with Stake (1995), I contend that document review calls for examining documents; to do so, I organized my mind by reading as much as possible about the characteristics of this particular type of CAP text and the relevant theoretical concepts. As Stake states, "One needs to have one's mind organized, yet be open for unexpected clues. Research questions [are] carefully developed in advance and a system set up to keep things on track" (p. 68). I also used a list of (sub-)questions (presented in Chapter 1), which helped me analyze the texts because the questions consider the tensions surrounding a crisis of representation. I focused on the parts of texts that could answer my sub-questions and kept in mind that the latter should be open and flexible to change as I read through the texts. I agree with Stake's view that the "researcher makes a flexible list of questions, progressively redefines issues, and seizes opportunities to learn the unexpected" (pp. 28–29). Of course, my a priori ideas extracted from theory, the characteristics of CAP texts, and my researcher's questions were validated/dismissed as I formulated an emergent theory (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009) via an iterative process. Above all of these, I put in place a protocol to analyze my data by relying on the grounded theory proposed by Charmaz (2006) and the situational analysis of Clarke (2005). Following Charmaz and Clarke, I relied on open, focused, axial, and selective coding to develop my theory.

To strengthen my emerging theory, in analyzing my data texts I looked at "all forms or types of occurrences, valuing variation over quantity" (Morse, 1995, p. 147), until each "negative case" . . . was saturated" (p. 149) in the sense of there being replication of the specific (negative) case. A "negative case" is one in which respondents' experiences or viewpoints differ from the main body of evidence. Negative cases, according to Ryan and Bernard (2000), are "cases that don't fit the model" (p. 782). When a negative case can be explained, the general explanation for the typical text is strengthened. As Charmaz explains (2006), negative cases put data into perspective. I looked at all forms and types

of composing subjectivities, starting from the different understandings that I had formulated about the process of creating this type of writing, and also using my readings of the data texts and the understandings that I formulated via an iterative process. To do so, I went back and forth between the data texts and my emerging theory, starting from my loose frame. First, I did open coding through relying on line-by-line analysis, which led to me creating abstract situational maps. Second, I did relational analysis using focused coding, which led to me producing ordered situational maps. Third, I did axial coding through employing a paradigm model, in order to determine whether more complex relationships existed than the ones depicted through relational analysis. This led me to produce a social worlds/arenas map. Finally, I did selective coding, again through a paradigm model, and this led to a positional map, which expresses my theory.

I stopped my data analysis when it ceased to generate new leads and categories, and properties were sufficiently dense. Here my aim (following a tenet of theoretical sampling) was not to achieve full descriptive coverage whereby I would know everything; rather, it was to systematically focus and narrow my data collection in the service of developing my theory, so as to understand how one captures the space of mind through writing.

As I described the process, I attempted to make transparent my thinking about the buildup of an emergent theory. To do so, I used the techniques of theoretical sampling and data saturation and wrote about the process of building my theory. These two techniques catered well to the study's purpose, which from the point of view of instrumental case study, is to illustrate an idea and develop a theory.

3.1.1.3 Trustworthiness, Credibility, and Significance

I contend that the process of interpretation that I have elaborated earlier in the data analysis description is evidence of the study's trustworthiness and credibility. My aim was to illustrate an idea and develop a theory. The trustworthiness and credibility of the findings and the developed theory were achieved using the grounded theory techniques of

theoretical sampling and data saturation (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Morse, 1995). To establish trustworthiness, I started from the ideas and theoretical concepts described in detail in my theoretical perspective (loose frame) section. This gave me ideas of where to sample, what documents to select, and for what theoretical purpose(s). Analysis of the texts either validated or dismissed the original ideas (here, my theoretical perspective), and this continued until I reached data saturation. Hence, the trustworthiness and credibility of this study and of the “ultimate” theory that it generated derive from this iterative process, this back and forth between the emerging theory and the data texts. I proceeded by saturating “categories that . . . [had] the most explanatory power and integrating [those] into and around a core variable”, and in this way I presented “the theoretical essence of a substantive area” (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009, p. 121), which, in this study, is how to record the space of thought.

This study is significant because it contributes to the body of literature on writing in academia and on academic literacies. Through this work, I investigated how to communicate the thought space of academics who have written about events that occurred in their lives or the lives of others. That is, I investigated how such academics respond to a representational crisis when they are writing, by capturing their space of thought. In addition, I extended Lea and Street’s (1998) academic literacies model of writing in higher education to include writing the space of thought through creating mixed genre texts. This study also supports the practice of writing that intends to capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity.

3.1.2 Ethics

This study dealt solely with published texts; therefore, it was not necessary to obtain ethical approval. In my work, I represented the public “partial representations” of others—and so brought my own bias/interpretation to bear on what I read and how I viewed it. In the various approaches I adopted, I took sole responsibility for what I selected, what I ignored, and what my interpretation of a “representation” would be (Gallagher, 1995; Smith & Deemer, 2000; Sparkes, 1993; Wolcott, 1995). I also

understood that no method can be neutral (Cherryholmes, 1988; Giddens, 1976; MacKenzie, 1981; Smith, 1985).

3.2 Summary

In this chapter, I discussed how I adopted “instrumental case study” as a methodology and document analysis as a specific method for this study. As well, I outlined how I selected particular disruptive poststructural autoethnographic texts as my data sources and sampled them. I then elaborated on how I analyzed the data, described in what ways the trustworthiness and credibility of my findings can be validated, and presented the study’s significance. Finally, I addressed the question of the study’s ethics.

Chapter 4 : Data Analysis and Findings

4.1 Introduction

The research for this dissertation began with my PhD studies and the reading of texts by poststructural and postmodern writers as part of my program. At the time, I had difficulty grasping the texts that I was reading, but then I found myself attempting to write a poststructural and postmodern text when I was planning to put together my proposal.

This problem made me curious about how these texts, which are about capturing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities, were being written. To answer my main question, which is how one writes about fluid, multiple, and complex subjectivities, I studied the literature on academics who have problems with representing, and how they respond to this crisis. The literature informed me that academics' struggles with representing were not concerned with how to write these types of subjectivities. Also, models of writing in higher education do not attribute the problem to a crisis of representation, in the sense of how one can write about these types of subjectivities.

To investigate my question, I selected and analyzed five disruptive poststructural autoethnographic (DPA) texts which, based on my experience of reading them during my PhD studies or my preliminary perspective and literature review, represent this type of writing.

To analyze my data, I used the constructivist grounded theory developed by Charmaz (2006) and the situational analysis developed by Clarke (2005). Grounded theory analysis is concerned with the interplay and iterative process between researchers and data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Situational analysis, a particular type of grounded theory, suggests a systematic way to conduct grounded theory analysis. It uses four types of coding: open coding, relational analysis (focused coding), axial coding, and selective coding. Following Strauss and Corbin (1998), I demonstrate through coding how I broke down the data, then conceptualized and reassembled it to formulate my theory.

At the beginning of this chapter, I present an overview of my steps and stages and the processes and protocols that I put in place, according to constructivist grounded theory and situational analysis. The overview provides an outline to help the reader understand the process that led to my findings. I consider my situatedness as a researcher (Charmaz, 2006; Clarke, 2005). I also share details of how I collected and coded the data, made comparison between data, developed categories, and identified relationships between categories. Mapping—an exercise for developing a theory using the situational analysis approach—is used for meaning-making in ways similar to memo-writing and coding. I developed (abstract) situational, relational (ordered situational), social worlds/arenas, and positional maps by performing open, focused, axial, and selective coding, respectively (Charmaz, 2000, 2006; Clarke, 2003, 2005). The maps indicate the processes whereby I analyzed and re-analyzed my data, especially when I struggled to represent the data through language. I used the maps to open up the data and explore novel pathways and opportunities, and ultimately to develop my theory (Clarke, 2005). These representations—graphics, maps, and tables—visually communicate how I built the theory.

4.1.1 My Embodiment and Situatedness as a Researcher

Clarke's (2005) situational analysis contends that we usually bring “a lot of baggage” to our analysis of data; these background “tacit assumptions ... [operate] ... behind our backs in the research process” (p. 85). I have therefore attempted to make explicit, as much as possible, my assumptions, ideas, and preconceptions. I present my embodiment and situatedness using tables and maps (Clarke, 2005).

In addition to using extracts from my data to strengthen my case, I also acknowledge the potentially powerful role that my own preconceptions may have played in constructing my theory of *documenting becoming*, a type of writing that captures the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities. Several concepts influenced how I received and analyzed the texts that constitute my data, which I refer to as my *data texts*.

To investigate how to capture these subjectivities, I searched for events in my data texts that demonstrate these phenomena. As a result of this approach, I encountered challenges in finding language with which I could theorize about writings that captured these subjectivities. I began my analysis by developing preliminary pictures of the components of texts that document becoming (as shown in Figures 1 and 2). I developed these figures from the ideas that I formed through my interdisciplinary PhD studies in general and by reading about certain specific philosophical concepts (which I describe in detail in the section on my theoretical perspective and in the Figure 1., below), as well as through a review of the relevant literature (especially the literature on CAP and DPA texts) and an initial analysis of two of my data texts. These preliminary ideas therefore influenced what I looked for in the data texts and how I analyzed them.




Figure 1. What is a CAP text? My initial loose frame.




Figure 2. Documenting becoming: my initial loose frame.

During the analysis of my data texts, I also developed sensitizing concepts that suggested further directions for looking at how academics capture these subjectivities. Sensitizing concepts, according to Blumer (1969), give the researcher initial ideas to pursue. They are tentative tools for developing ideas about processes that are implicit in data and that the researcher wants to discover (Charmaz, 2000, 2006). For instance, the analysis of my second data text informed my theory, and this in turn informed my analysis of my subsequent data texts by Gannon (2001, 2002) and Lau, (2002) and the preceding data text by Akindes (2001). An example will help illustrate this.

While analyzing an extract from my second data text, by Ronai (1998), I wrote in my memo that Ronai relied on layered accounts and different truths to detail her space of mind. Ronai, who was a striptease dancer before becoming a researcher, writes about her first encounter with Kitty (the striptease dancer whom she interviewed for her research), and how this event made her trouble the meaning of being a researcher and a dancer. However, the layered accounts in her writing were not the by-product of a conscious act, as she contended in an earlier publication (1992). I was similarly informed by the analysis of an extract from my first data text, by Akindes (2001) (the preceding data text). This extract refers to her visit to *Pahala*—her father's hometown—along with her father to attend her great-grandmother's funeral. Different truths were not produced as a result of social interaction, as stated by Davis and Sumara (2006) and as the analysis of the Akindes' extract showed me, but they were the by-products of conscious actions. In interpreting this extract, I wrote that Ronai (1998) shifted layers of reflection backward through time as she recalled first meeting Kitty. This recollection made her construct assemblages unconsciously and unintentionally, which were reflected in her writing and led her ultimately to trouble the meaning of being a researcher. These assemblages were in the form of remembered and constructed details of life, such as her description of Kitty's appearance. These assemblages were also in conformity with emotional understanding, as when Ronai described feeling scared, amused, and flattered when a man named Ted included her in a conversation about Kitty. Further, the assemblages that Ronai made were in compliance with abstract theoretical thinking and were in the form of

scientific prose. In writing these assemblages, Ronai used objective, subjective, and intersubjective truths. For instance, she wrote objective truth when she described Kitty's physical appearance, whereas she wrote subjective truth when she described the appearance of John (the manager). A detailed interpretation of this extract and examples from the data text can be found in the Appendix (p. 174).

The analysis of this extract from Ronai's article made me develop sensitizing concepts that, in this case, were about finding out that layered accounts in this way of writing were aligned with unintended and unconscious acts, and different truths were by-products of the assemblages that the author formed and was forming. Seeing layered accounts as unconscious acts and different truths, produced as a result of the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed in Ronai's (1998) text, is due to the background assumptions and disciplinary perspective that I brought with me to this study, although these were absent from my initial loose frame (theoretical perspective) when I started the study. That is, these ways of seeing layered accounts and truths emerged from the analysis of Ronai's text, but I believe I noted them during my data analysis because of my situatedness in my background knowledge and assumptions and my disciplinary perspective. My background knowledge and disciplinary perspective derive from reading about Deleuzian philosophy in general and the Deleuzian concepts of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* in particular.¹⁶ Therefore, my situatedness as a researcher works implicitly throughout my analysis of the data texts. I believe that viewing the data in different ways to discern their implicit dynamic underpinnings necessitated a disciplinary perspective informed by Deleuzian philosophy—that is, the (inter)disciplinary perspective that I acquired during my doctoral studies. Hence, sensitizing concepts emerged from my analysis of the data texts and from my initial loose frame.

The findings from analyzing Ronai's (1998) text made me probe the events in my first data text, by Akindes (2001), which I had analyzed earlier, to see whether reanalysis would bring me to the same understanding. Taking into consideration the sensitizing

¹⁶ Hereafter, when *percept*, *affect* and *concept* appear in italics, I am using them in their Deleuzian sense.

concepts that I had developed through analyzing Ronai's text, reanalysis informed me that in Akindes' writing as well, multiple layers of meaning are produced as a result of unintended acts, and different truths arise from the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed. In re-analyzing the extract about Akindes' trip to Pahala, I mentioned that Akindes catalogued her becoming through capturing the assemblages made in the form of subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths, by writing her memories of being four years old and attending her great-grandmother's funeral. This remembering made her construct assemblages unconsciously and unintentionally, which is reflected in her writing. She brought objective truths when writing, "In my family, 1963 is remembered not as the year that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated but the year that *makule bachan* (great-grandmother) died," and, "It was a year of firsts for me: first airplane ride, first visit to Pahala, first funeral" (p. 21). Akindes' assemblages also put multiple layers of meaning and different truths in dialogue with each other: "The walls are dancing with shadows from the constant flicker of candles, the curling smoke of incense" (p. 21); "She [*makule bachan*] is arresting in her oldness, eerie in her peacefulness, but I am not afraid. There is love in the room" (p.22). A detailed interpretation of this extract and examples from the data text can be found in the Appendix (p. 174).

At this stage, it became clear to me that the use of multiple layers of meaning and different truths in cataloguing becoming and in capturing fluid, multiple, and complex subjectivities is not an intentional, conscious act. As well, I understood that the different truths are the by-products of the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed. These new findings and understandings became more prominent and repeated themselves throughout my subsequent analysis of additional data texts. At the same time, I demoted and eventually deleted earlier ideas that layers of meaning are the by-products of intentional, conscious acts and that different truths are the by-products of social interactions. I continued to look for both conceptions of layered accounts—i.e., as by-products of unintentional acts and as interobjective truths produced as a result of formed assemblages—when analyzing the subsequent data texts, until I was content that my new understanding about layered accounts and different truths repeated itself.

Repetition indicated to me that these findings were valid (Charmaz, 2006; Morse, 1995; Ryan & Bernard, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

My intent was to develop sensitizing concepts throughout my data analysis, following the principles of grounded theory. These sensitizing concepts were usually informed not only by my background assumptions and disciplinary perspective but also by the process of analyzing the data. These concepts gave me ideas, especially in the preliminary stages, to pursue during data analysis; if the ideas were confirmed, I fed them into my theory and then attempted to verify them in terms of the remaining data texts and, potentially, previously analyzed data texts, until I was satisfied that they were “saturated” in the sense of repeating themselves.

4.1.2 Collection and Coding of the Data

Data analysis in grounded theory is a process of give-and-take between the researcher and the data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). That is, data collection and analysis are done simultaneously (Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987). Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest general procedures for analyzing data in the context of grounded theory. I discuss data collection and data analysis under separate headings, but I show their interconnectedness throughout my writing, as my theory informs me. Table 1 presents a snapshot of how I used the tenets of situational analysis within Clarke’s grounded theory (2005) and Charmaz’s grounded theory (2006) to analyze my five data texts, and what types of coding I applied in each stage of the analysis. This table also conveys the bigger picture of how I focused and organized my findings and built my theory using different codings according to grounded theory (Charmaz, 2003; Clarke, 2005). The components of each part and the findings for each coding stage are discussed in detail in subsections of the present chapter.

Table 1. A Snapshot of the Stages of My Analysis Using Grounded Theory

	Data Texts
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Tenets of Situational Analysis in Grounded Theory	<p style="text-align: center;">Akides (2001); Gannon (2001, 2002); Lau (2002); Ronai (1998)</p>
Open Coding	<p>Analysis: At this stage, analysis is done through line-by-line coding to generate initial categories.</p> <p>Resulted in: Abstract situational maps (see Figures 4 and 5)</p> <p>Discussion: I discuss this stage of analysis and its relevant findings in subsection of Data Coding</p>
Relational Analysis (Focused Coding)	<p>Analysis: At this stage of analysis, I decided which initial (open) codes would make “the most analytic sense to categorize [my] data incisively and completely” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 57). I then reassembled the data into cohesive, ordered groupings.</p> <p>Resulted in: Ordered situational map and relational analysis (see Figures 6 and 7).</p> <p>Discussion: I discuss this stage of analysis and its relevant findings in subsection 4.1.3 Comparisons Between Data and Between Codes</p>
Axial Coding	<p>Analysis: At this stage, I used the paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) to scrutinize further the categories and sub-categories that I obtained from the open coding stage, with the goal of systematically developing and relating categories to develop more precise and complete explanations about the phenomena.</p> <p>Resulted in: Social world/arenas map (see Figure 8).</p> <p>Discussion: I discuss this stage of analysis and its relevant findings in</p>

	subsection 4.1.4 How the Relationships Between/Within Categories and Sub-Categories Were Developed
Selective Coding	<p>Analysis: At this stage, I developed the relationships between my major categories using selective coding steps (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), selecting a core theme/category, relating subsidiary categories around the core category by means of the paradigm model, and validating these relationships against the data.</p> <p>Resulted in: Positional map (see Figure 9).</p> <p>Discussion: I discuss this stage of analysis and its relevant findings in subsection 4.1.5 How the Relationships Between Major Categories are Developed</p>

Data Collection

I believed my data collection and data analysis started before I began the research for this dissertation. This journey goes back to years of reading poststructural and postmodern texts and philosophers as part of my program of studies. I came to this study with a loose frame or what Blumer (1969) calls sensitizing concepts. Seeking to answer my questions about how to write at a time of representational crisis and how to represent what I think—and, probably more importantly, how to write when social reality, including the subjectivity of the researcher, is fluid, multiple, and complex—I reviewed and studied some philosophical concepts, a couple of CAP texts, and the characteristics of disruptive poststructural autoethnographic (DPA) texts (a type of CAP text) as part of my scholarly training. These concepts gave me a place to start collecting data (a loose frame). I had preliminary perspectives and hunches about how writings that seize becoming capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity, and what characteristics these texts might hold, as a starting point for data selection. Indeed, based on my initial ideas and studies, I had a hunch that texts that convey the thought space have all the characteristics of CAP texts, and this helped me with selecting my data texts. Hence, my disciplinary/inter-disciplinary

journey brought me to this so-called “starting point” for collecting data. These preconceived theoretical concepts and characteristics also provided starting points for looking at my data, although did not offer immediate codes for analyzing the data. These concepts and characteristics also helped me formulate my research questions and determine where to start my initial sampling. To avoid imposing my pre-existing frame on my data, I put in place a protocol and a systematic procedure for analyzing the data. I did open, focused, axial, and selective coding, following mainly Clarke’s (2005) situational analysis and Charmaz’s (2006) and Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) grounded theory. I discuss open, focused, axial, and selective coding below, under the sub-headings of data coding, comparisons between data and between codes, how the relationships between/within categories and sub-categories were developed, and how the relationships between major categories were developed.

Data Coding

Coding helped me to “define what is happening in the data and . . . grapple with what it means” (Charmaz, 2006; p. 46). I started this study with a loose frame (see Figures 1 and 2) and I approached my data with an “open mind” but not “an empty head” (Charmaz, 2006). To prevent my sensitizing concepts from dictating to me (Charmaz, 2000, 2006), I put my codes next to the data and attempted to develop a set of codes that depict slight differences (see an example in Table 2).

Table 2. An Example of Codes Corresponding to Data

Codes	Data text extracted from Ronai (1998)
Constructing assemblages; shifting layers of reflections backward through time; capturing	“When she walked into the lobby of the apartment complex, all activity ceased. Kitty, a 6’-1”, blonde, Jessica Rabbit caricature of femininity, sported a huge bosom that strained the red-and-white horizontal stripes of her midriff tank top. Her shorts, cut from a white, shimmery nylon, disappeared between the cheeks of her derriere. Kitty balanced on white, wedge sandals as she held her head high and looked straight forward, feigning a casual attitude, as if the

remembered and constructed details of life	office were always this quiet, as if unaware of the disruption her presence was causing. She asked to see John, the manager. His awkward, 6'-4" frame propelled the 380-pound 24-year-old stumbling to the counter.
Using different truths	‘Hey, Hey, Hey, it’s Kitty! What can I do for you?’ John asked, throatily, begging us to make the Fat Albert connection. At other times, I have known John to drape his weight across a sofa and laugh like Jabba the Hut from Star Wars, do Jackie Gleason impressions, or pull his chair up to the salad bar with his silverware in hand and napkin tucked under his chin.
Attending to emotional understanding	Kitty said, calculatingly, ‘I need my plumbing fixed.’” (p. 405) “Ted leaned over to me and said, ‘Actually I think she’s a fucking pig, a fat slut, but this’s too goddamn funny.’ He stood up to his full 5’-3’ and howled, in earnest, with the rest. I was scared, amused, and bizarrely flattered by being included.”
Using abstract theoretical thinking; writing scientific prose	The mystic writing pad, a children’s toy popular when Freud was writing, served for both Freud and Derrida as an analogy for consciousness. The pad itself consists of a sheet of wax paper layered between a wax slab and a protective sheet of celluloid. By pressing a sharp stylus against the celluloid, one could ‘write’ on the tablet.” (p 406)

I kept my initial coding open ended, which permitted new ideas and information to surface. To do this, I coded each word, line, and segment, an approach that “spark[ed] new ideas” for me to pursue (Charmaz, 2006, p. 70) (see Table 2). This type of coding helped me avoid analyzing the texts from the standpoints of the academics who wrote

them and instead to see and analyze my data in a new light. I acknowledge that my codes and the words that I choose to constitute my codes capture *my* view (Charmaz, 2000, 2006). For example, line-by-line initial coding of my second data text, by Ronai (1998), gave me the idea that writings that document fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity capture the codes of space of thought in general and answer two questions: how learning happens, in the sense of *percept* and *affect*; and what is learned, in the sense of *concept* in particular. This point is well illustrated by Ronai. While referring to 1982, when she was 16 and an art student sitting at her easel as an undergraduate in a Drawing 1 class, Ronai captured the code of space of thought in the sense of the code of how her learning happened and what was learned. Ronai's unintentional, rhizomatic connections, which is a code itself, led her to put the code of different truths in conversation with each other, write the code of multiple layers of meaning, and depict the code of space of thought, in the sense of the codes of how her learning happened and what she learned. Ronai wrote the code of layers of meaning in the form of the code of abstract theoretical thinking when she referred to "the mystic writing pad as a metaphor for consciousness" (p. 407). She also brought the code of other layers of meaning in the form of the code of emotional understanding when she referred to her art instructor: "I am painfully envious of his drawings, which record and interpret so lyrically the sweep of a hand, the juxtaposing of hips to shoulders in a figure's contrapposto stance, or the bone structure and venation around a wrist" (pp. 408–409). She also wrote the code of other layers of meaning in the form of the code of remembered and constructed details of her experience as an art student painting a nude figure, when she mentioned that her instructor shouted at the class to draw, whereupon she drew rapidly without looking at the figure until the instructor shouted at them to erase. In writing the code of layers of meaning, Ronai relied on the code of subjective truth when she said, "My figures are awkward combinations of drawing what I see and resorting to formulas I have learned as a kid" (p. 409). She also relied on the code of objective truth when she quoted what her instructor told her when he saw her drawing: "'Draw. Rambo [Ronai's first name], have you ever seen cartoon lips on a living human being?'" (p. 408). She introduced the code of intersubjective truth when she wrote about a conversation with her instructor: "he [the instructor] says aggressively . . . 'Rambo, where are your eyes?' 'On the model sir,' I lie, anxious at

being singled out” (p. 408). All these assemblages that are made in the form of codes of layered accounts and different truths answer the question of how Ronai’s learning happened, which is a code itself. Her learning occurred through assemblages made in the sense of *percept*, which is itself a code, and which is manifested in her writings in the form of the codes of multiple layers of meaning and different truths. Because of the code of these assemblages, her body prompted a response, which is also itself a code; this body response was not something she could control, which again is itself a code in the sense of the code of *affect*. Because of this response, she became someone who realized that to learn to draw what she saw, she should unlearn the formulas that she had learned as a kid. The experiences mentioned here led Ronai to give voice to difference rather than identity (May, 2005), in the sense of the code of *concept*. That is, through these experiences she learned that the concept of drawing was not just related to learning formulas and stereotypes—it was concerned with unlearning previous formulas so she could be free to record a figure and therefore “draw what she . . . sees” (p. 409). Indeed, through answering the two questions of how learning happens and what is learned, Ronai captures her space of thought.

These findings recurred throughout the analysis and coding of Ronai’s data text. The new ideas and findings about texts that compose becoming gave me insight into how to analyze and code my subsequent data text, by Gannon (2002), and reanalyze and re-code my previous data text, by Akindes (2001); in doing so, I kept in mind the two questions of how learning happened and what was learned, to see whether the texts’ authors answered these questions when detailing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of their subjectivities. A clear example of this occurs in Gannon’s article when she is reviewing a number of her autobiographical texts about the same incident—the end of her marriage—which she wrote at different times and in different styles, capturing the code of space of thought in the sense of the codes of how learning happened and what was learned. Through her writing, Gannon relied on the code of making imperceptible forces (the connections that are made) discernable through relying on the codes of field notes and scientific articles while drawing on the codes of artistic and scientific genres. While referring to (i) her field notes written in artistic genres, (ii) a poststructural review of her autobiographical journal about her marriage split and ex-husband, and (iii) scientific

articles and genres—in this case, to Hélène Cixous’ idea that “writing that emerges from a feminine libidinal economy has revolutionary potential” (Gannon, 2002, p. 675)—Gannon captured the code of what she learned. The assemblages that Gannon made, which are made visible through her writing, enable her to learn that although at the beginning she, as the narrator of the story of the end of her marriage, thinks that she is in charge, later she

reconstructs a place for herself within the story, a subject position where she appears more powerful but where, ironically, she has no power at all. She is a Frankenstein, whose creation, in this case a stylish, good-looking man, turns away from her. This is not a passive victim subject position, but it is a disempowered, acted on, subject position. (Gannon, 2002, p. 675)

As well, my initial analysis and coding of Akindes’ text did not indicate that texts that catalogue a person’s transformation capture the codes of the space of thought and the answers to these two questions. However, reanalysis and re-coding of Akindes’ text communicated to me that Akindes also conveys these codes. For example, while first analyzing and coding a part of Akindes’ text about her August 1999 trip to Honolulu (where Pahala, her father’s hometown, is located) to attend her sister’s wedding, I wrote:

To capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity, Akindes relied on the codes of attending to multiple layers of meaning and different ways of knowing while writing about subjective, objective and intersubjective truths in the sense of Deleuzian concepts of *percept*, *affect* and *concept*. To produce the code of layered account, Akindes relied on the code of shifting multiple layers of reflections “backward . . . through time [and] space” (Ronai, 1992, p. 103) when she flashes back to August of 1999 and talks about the event of planning to visit Pahala for her sister’s wedding ceremony while writing about different truths. She conveys the code of objective truths about *Pahala* while relying on the code of “remembered and constructed details of life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) when she states that

We are in Honolulu after a 3-year absence to attend my younger sister's wedding . . . A few days before our trip, the *Honolulu Advertiser* features an article with the headline, "Bon dance to be Pahala's last" . . . Pahala is the sugar plantation town. (Akindes, 2001, p. 22)

While referring to fact that the "*Honolulu Advertiser* features an article with the headline, 'Bon dance to be Pahala's last'" (p. 22), Akindes communicates the code of subjective truth when she says "My heart races" (p. 22). She also adds the code of intersubjective truth when she puts different conceptions of "home" in conversation with each other when she writes "In Simon's [her husband] Yoruba culture (from the Republic of Benin in West Africa), one's home is not necessarily where one grew up but where one's parents and grandparents were raised" (p. 22). Reception of all these data, as mentioned earlier, in the form of the code of different truths, which are "independent of the state of those [here, Akindes] who experience them" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164), in the sense of the code of *percept* produced a response in Akindes, in the sense of the code of *affect* (here, of *becoming other*). These experiences prompted a response that was not controllable by Akindes, in the sense of the code of becoming other; that is, as Deleuze puts it, these responses "spill over beyond whoever lives through them" (Deleuze, 1995, p. 137). This code of *affect* or *becoming other* led her, following the code of *concept*, to "give voice to [difference] [here, different conceptions of home—home as a place where "one's parents and grandparents were raised" (Akindes, 2001, p. 22)] . . . and disrupts all projects of identification [here, home as a place "where one grew up" (p. 22)]" (May, 2005, p. 21).

As can be seen, my initial analysis and (open) coding of Akindes' text did not indicate that texts that document becoming capture the space of thought. My reanalysis and re-coding of Akindes' text after analyzing and coding Ronai's indicated to me that Akindes through her writing also depicted the codes of the space of thought and answered the questions of how learning happened and what is learned in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. In reanalyzing and re-coding the same section of Akindes' text, I wrote:

Akindes (2001), in her article, communicated her becoming and communicated the codes of the space of thought in the sense of how her learning happened and what she learned. She made perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate her world, which is itself a code, through relying on the codes of multiple layers of meaning and different ways of knowing while writing about the codes of subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths. To produce the code of layered account, Akindes made perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate her world (which is a code itself) and relied on the code of shifting multiple layers of reflections “backward . . . through time [and] space” (Ronai, 1992, p. 103) when she flashes back to the August of 1999 and talks about the event of planning to visit Pahala for her sister’s wedding ceremony while writing about the code of different truths. She conveys the code of objective truth about Pahala while relying on the code of “remembered and constructed details of life” (p. 26) when she states that

We are in Honolulu after a 3-year absence to attend my younger sister’s wedding . . . A few days before our trip, the *Honolulu Advertiser* features an article with the headline, “Bon dance to be Pahala’s last” . . . Pahala is the sugar plantation town. (Akindes, 2001, p. 22)

While referring to fact that the “*Honolulu Advertiser* features an article with the headline, ‘Bon dance to be Pahala’s last’” (p. 22), Akindes communicates the code of subjective truth when she says “My heart races” (p. 22). She also adds the code of intersubjective truth when she puts different conceptions of “home” in conversation with each other, which is itself a code, when she writes “In Simon’s [her husband] Yoruba culture (from the Republic of Benin in West Africa), one’s home is not necessarily where one grew up but where one’s parents and grandparents were raised” (p. 22). Reception of all these data, as mentioned earlier, in the form of the code of different truths that are “independent of the state of those [here, Akindes] who experience them” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164), in the sense of the code of *percept*, produced a response in Akindes in the sense of the code of *affect* (here, of *becoming other*). These experiences prompted an uncontrollable response in Akindes, which is itself a code, in the sense of the code of becoming other; that is, as Deleuze puts it, the code of responses that “spill

over beyond whoever lives through them” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 137). This *affect* of *becoming other*, which is itself a code led her, following the code of *concept*, to “give voice to [difference] [here, different conception of home—home as a place where “one’s parents and grandparents were raised” (Akindes, 2001, p. 22)] . . . and disrupts all projects of identification [here, home as a place “where one grew up” (p. 22)]” (May, 2005, p. 21).

In other words, Akindes, through writing this paragraph depicts the code of space of thought—in the sense of how her learning happened—through relying on the codes of multiple layers of meaning and different truths in the sense of the code of *percept*. She also depicted the code of what she learned when she mentioned that one’s home is where one’s parents and grandparents were raised and not necessarily where one grew up, in the sense of the codes of *affect* and *concept*.

To summarize, during the initial stages of coding the data, I built my analysis “step-by-step from the ground up” by “breaking the data into its component parts and properties” (Charmaz, 2006, pp. 50–51); I coded my data primarily using gerunds, “starting from words and actions” (p. 49), stipulated in my data texts (see Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5). This helped me to detect the processes of documenting becoming and the “tacit assumptions, explicating implicit actions and meanings, crystallizing the significance of the points, comparing data with data, identifying gaps in the data” (p. 50). Indeed, in this step of the data analysis, following Clarke’s (2005) situational analysis, I developed abstract situational maps. During this process, I examined my data texts closely for perspective. At this stage to some extent, and in the next stage—which was about performing relational analysis by doing focused coding to develop ordered situational maps—I identified and coded significant events within my data texts that I thought captured cases of writings that detail becoming with respect to the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the authors’ subjectivities. To create my situational maps, I began with abstract ones (Clarke, 2005). Open coding of my first data text, by Akindes (2001), done through line-by-line analysis while considering my sub-questions, generated abstract situational map #1 (see Figure 4). Here, I documented all “the most important human and non-human elements in the situation of concern of the research broadly conceived”

(Clarke, 2005, pp. 86–87). The analysis and coding of my remaining four texts and reanalysis of Akindes' led me to delete some of the themes that had emerged from the analysis of my first data text. Those that I deleted from my abstract situational map #1 are pink. I also added other elements, which are green in my abstract situational map #2 (see Figure 5). Indeed, in my abstract situational maps, which are the by-products of open coding, I descriptively laid out all of the most important properties involved in producing situations for writing about events that capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities in general. To develop a situational map, I went through the forthcoming stages and continually revised the maps (Clarke, 2005). These abstract situational maps are followed by an ordered situational map, which is the by-product of relational analysis. Then these ordered situational maps are followed by a social worlds/arenas map, which is the by-product of axial coding. In turn, this social worlds/arenas map is followed by a positional map, which is the by-product of selective coding. The following flowchart (Figure 3) presents the stages of developing my situational map. In the following parts, I discuss each of these stages and maps.




Figure 3. Stages of developing the situational map.



Figure 4. Abstract situational map #1.

Pink color indicates deleted themes




Figure 5. Abstract situational map # 2.

Green color indicates added themes

4.1.3 Comparisons Between Data and Between Codes

In this section, I compare data with data and code with code to give focus to my codes, following the idea of focused coding (Charmaz, 2006). This comparison is a “selective phase that uses the most significant or frequent initial codes to sort, synthesize, integrate, and organize large amounts of data” (p. 46) and determine the adequacy of the initial codes. Through comparing data with data and code with code, which is concerned with “pinpoint[ing] and develop[ing] the most salient categories in large batches of data” (p. 46), I developed focused codes. This stage of analysis helped me to locate “which initial codes make the most analytic sense to categorize my data incisively and completely” (p. 57). Focused coding (Charmaz, 2000, 2006) in this study is used in the sense of Clarke’s situational analysis. It is equivalent to a simplified version of axial coding, in which the researcher uses relational analysis to produce ordered situational maps. This is a plain version of axial coding and uses the process of relational analysis proposed by Clarke (2005). Therefore, I illustrate focused coding through relational analysis and an ordered situational map (see Figures 6 and 7). To do focused coding, I used the technique of theoretical sampling (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009; Charmaz, 2000, 2006; Morse, 1995; Walker & Myrick, 2006). This technique directed my sampling and helped me construct my theory, as well as “develop and refine [my] categories [codes] . . . [and] narrow . . . [my] focus on emerging categories [codes]” (p. 107). It also assisted me in making comparisons between data and between codes, in the sense of directing me where to go and what data to collect to explain my codes. Indeed, I kept my initial open coding ongoing while at the same time doing focused data collection.

As mentioned earlier, I initially organized my data through open coding. This approach gave me ideas and leads to pursue (see Figures 4 and 5). During this early stage, I started comparing data with data in the way I have illustrated in the previous sections “Data Coding” and “My Embodiment and Situatedness as a Researcher”.

I discovered that writings that capture subjectivities have the following characteristics and codes, each of which has its own sub-characteristics and sub-codes, which are depicted in Figures 6 and 7:

- Attend to multiple layers of meaning.
- Put different truths in conversation with each other.
- Produce meaning as a result of assemblages and rhizomes that are made or in the process of being made, or what Deleuze calls *affect*. Here, rhizomatic connections are made within and among subjectless subjects, who are amalgamations of *percept* and *affect*.
- Write the same tale from different point of view and through doing this capture the space of thought, or academics' body answer in the Deleuzian sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*.
- Capture feeling, truth, and connection, which relates to *percept* and *affect*.
- Write one's becoming, which is not a conscious act and corresponds with the concepts of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*.

The comparison led me to consider the above-mentioned initial codes as focused codes because, following focused coding, these codes “make the most analytic sense to categorize [my] data incisively and completely” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 57). I illustrate my comparison of data with data and code with code in the section on “My Embodiment and Situatedness as a Researcher”. For a complete interpretation of this example, see Appendix. In the following part, I will explicitly present an instance of how comparison between data and between codes helped me develop the initial code of “attending to multiple layers of meaning” and its characteristics (themselves codes) into focused codes (see Figures 6 and 7). For example, the category of “attending to multiple layers of meaning” and its characteristics are repeated throughout my data texts. It occupies a significant place in writings that capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities (space of thought). This code has its own characteristics, written in the form of emotional understanding and remembered and constructed details of life, in the Deleuzian sense of *percept*. For instance, Gannon's article (2002), one of my data texts, traces the discourses of what it means to be “a writer”. To do so, she reviewed a number of her autobiographical texts—written at different times and in different styles—about

the end of her marriage and her experience of learning to become a writer. She relied on multiple layers of meaning in the form of emotional understanding and remembered and constructed details of life in the sense of *percept*. For example, in a part of her article, Gannon made perceptible—through relying on multiple layers of meaning in the form of remembered and constructed details of life—that even among an intimate women’s (writing) group, writing is a masculine practice, by making perceptible the non-human landscape of the nature of writing: she says that she should write for an hour a day, have discipline and organization, write in a nice and inspirational atmosphere, and make sure she is up to it. Also, as a “real” writer, she should be more versatile. She should write the story of “an arrival, a conversation, and a departure, as all [stories] . . . are [, and write] as she had learned structurally, by leaping straight into the scenario of the arrival” (Gannon, 2002, p. 675). She should, as well, dutifully jot down “all the contradictory comments that were made about her writing” (p. 675), even if she is writing in a different way and different language, with “a feminine libidinal economy” (p. 675). Gannon made perceptible other layers of meaning, too, this time in the form of emotional understanding, when she referred to the fact that it was hard for her to be a versatile writer when it came to writing the story of her marriage split. “[I] knew as a “real” writer that [I] should have been more versatile. But this ordinary event was still an irritant [when I wanted to write]” (p. 675).

The code of “attending to multiple layers of meaning” and its characteristics (codes themselves) are repeated throughout my initial open coding stage with Gannon’s text. I learned that I identified important codes and/or processes during my initial analysis, so I made note of them. Then I returned to my earlier data text by Ronai (1998), which I had analyzed and coded earlier, and made comparison to see whether these codes and/or processes (in this case, attending to multiple layers of meaning and its characteristics) could explain my earlier data texts and make explicit what was implicit in my earlier data. These codes and/or processes did explain my earlier data texts—by Ronai (1998) and, later on, by Akindes (2001); further incidents and codes emerged from re-coding of the data texts by Ronai and Akindes, enabling me to see subsequent ones, by Gannon (2002 & 2001) and Lau (2002), “with incisiveness” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 59). For example, analyzing and coding Ronai’s (1998) text and comparing it with the Gannon text and my

coding of the latter not only confirmed that writings that catalogue becoming capture layers of meaning and its characteristics but also illuminated that layers of meaning led to the production of *affect*.

These findings are in agreement with the following:

1. Making “perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world [of the authors and make them become]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 182). For example, Ronai, while referring to being an undergraduate in drawing class 1, documented her becoming (who she became) in the sense of *affect*, which refers to making seen the invisible forces that inhabited her and made her become (Cole, 2012). Ronai became someone who learned that traces of her drawing class instructor, whom she loathed, will stay with her forever. To communicate how she realized this and who she became, Ronai relied on layered accounts. She wrote layers of meaning when she made her feeling visible through her writing and gained the “emotional understanding” (Ronai, 1996; p. 26) that it was difficult and made her angry to draw what she saw and to let go of the stereotypes and unlearn the formulas that she had learned as a child. Ronai also wrote other layers of meaning when she made visible, through relying on her “remembered and constructed details of . . . life” (p. 26), her connection to her instructor. She wrote about questioning her instructor’s way of teaching by complaining that he would not show her how to draw or tell her where a particular task was going so that she could draw “correctly”. She also wrote other layers of meaning when she made visible, through relying on her “abstract theoretical thinking” (p. 26), how she saw the “mystic writing pad” (p. 405) as a metaphor for consciousness. All Ronai’s different layers of meaning made her become, in the same vein as *affect*. She learned that her instructor became part of her—how he taught and treated students became part of who she is and will be.

2. Constantly unveiling the covert aspects of the research setting and linking them to the overall concern (Cole, 2012) through relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. For example, Ronai (1998), through relying on layers of meaning, showed how these layers continually make visible the invisible sides of the research setting (Cole, 2012), and to do so she relied on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. While referring to writing about her selves

as researcher and dancer, she brought different layers of meaning, in the sense of *percept*, to make sense of these two identities, which she juxtaposed in her writing. For example, while referring to a layer of meaning of “remembered and constructed details” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) about this event, she mentioned:

In one vignette I might attempt to enhance the researcher self, in another the dancer self, all the while knowing I am writing this for submission to an academic journal. Thus, I privilege the researcher self as the central identity, and the dancer self as the marginal one. (p.418)

She also wrote other layers of meaning, in the sense of *percept*, in the form of “abstract theoretical thinking” (p. 26) to make sense of her identities:

The identity of dancer or researcher is a formula, a cartoon caricature that must be unlearned. If I explore the “play of differences” (Derrida, 1982) between the two, I deconstruct my experience by decentering the researcher identity. This does not replacing the researcher with the dancer; that would only serve to centralize the dancer as a primary identity while marginalizing the researcher. The idea is to put them into play with one another. Because meaning is always subject to reinterpretation, there is no final dividing line for a binary construct like dancer/researcher. (p. 418)

All these layers of meaning in the sense of *percept* that were unseen and that Ronai, through her writing, made constantly visible about the research context (Cole, 2012) made her become other along the same line as *affect*. This led her to see the concepts of what research is and who a researcher is “in terms of difference” (May, 2005, p. 19), in the sense of *concept*, through linking this concept to a global concern (Cole, 2012); hence, she speaks generally about the role of researcher and says, “The researcher role

becomes a wild card, a joker, a destabilizer, a dancer, with any identity I might reflect on” (Ronai, 1998, p. 419).

3. Leading to unpredictable transformation in a person in the form of *concept*. For example, Ronai, while referring to her experience in the drawing class, depicts how this experience led her to become someone who saw the concept of instructor “in terms of difference rather than identity” (May, 2005, p. 19) in the sense of *concept*. Because of this experience, Ronai saw instructor as someone who taught students to let go and learn by seeing anew, instead of someone who told students what to do and how to do it, holding their hands every step of the way. This transformation in Ronai—in the sense of seeing the concept of instructor in terms of difference—was not something that Ronai could have predicted before having this experience.

Therefore, coding Ronai’s text indicated to me that layers of meaning led to the production of *affect*, which is in agreement with the three characteristics or codes mentioned earlier. Comparison of data with data and code with code in Ronai’s text indicated to me that these three codes are repeated throughout her text and prompted me to compare these codes to those in Akindes’ by reanalysing and re-coding the latter. Reanalyzing and re-coding Akindes’ text and comparing it with the data text and coding of Gannon (2002) confirmed that writings that write becoming capture the code of layers of meaning and its characteristics. Reanalyzing and re-coding Akindes’ data text and comparing it with Ronai’s confirmed that layered accounts led to the production of *affect*, which is in agreement with the three characteristics of *affect* discussed earlier in my analysis of Ronai. That is, my reanalysis and re-coding of Akindes’ text and my subsequent comparison showed that layered accounts are in agreement with continually showing the hidden sides of the research setting and linking them to worldly issues (Cole, 2012), through relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. For example, while referring to an extract in which Akindes discussed her relationship with her father and how he used to treat her, in my reanalysis I wrote that Akindes captured the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of her subjectivities through attending to multiple layers of meaning. Akindes made visible her becoming along the same line as *affect* through relying on a layered account in the form of “remembered and constructed details of . . . life” (Ronai, 1996, p.

26), and her “emotional understanding” (p. 26) in the sense of *percept* when she stated, “The closer I approached my high school graduation, the more I grew to hate him. I hated how he barked orders to me, how he demanded that I respond immediately to his call, and how he disrupted my reading” (Akindes, 2001, p. 28). She similarly relied on other layers of meaning when she referred to her father having a drinking problem and said it was her “afternoon assignment to hand him a drink as he entered the house” (Akindes, 2001, p. 28). She also showed the unseen sides of the research setting (Cole, 2012) when she referred to her later understanding of her father’s treatment: “It wasn’t until years later that I realized Daddy’s behavior to me was a response to the helplessness he felt at work. He was replicating the way he was treated by those who had power over him” (Akindes, 2001, p. 28). Akindes also brought other layers of meaning that showed other unseen sides of the way her father behaved toward her and that connected his behaviour to worldly issues (Cole, 2012): “It is the common curse of the working class, as is being exposed to work hazards (asbestos in the power plant) and dying young” (p. 28).

Through writing all these layers of meaning, making visible the connections, and connecting them to global concerns, Akindes specified how she saw her father’s behaviour “in terms of difference” (May, 2005, p. 19), in the sense of *concept* and not identity. She saw his bossy behaviour towards her not as something personal, but as a reaction to the “helplessness Daddy felt at work”, a reflection of “the way he was treated by those who had power over him”. In my initial analysis of the same extract I did not write about writings that document becoming as capturing layered accounts, or how these layers of meaning are in agreement with showing the hidden aspects of the research setting and linking them to global issues.

Instead, these codes emerged from my reanalysis and re-coding of Ronai and, later, Akindes. Comparing these emerged data and codes alerted me to the need to conduct similar comparisons for the subsequent data texts by Gannon (2001, 2002) and Lau (2002); doing so helped me see the category of the layered account more incisively. The analysis and coding of these subsequent texts informed me that texts that capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities are written in layered accounts that have the above-mentioned three characteristics. Coding these subsequent texts also

informed me that layered accounts lead to the production of *affect*, which is in agreement with leading to *constant* unpredictable transformation in a person, in the form of *concept* (see Figure 6).

For example, my coding of a part of Lau's personal narrative text about her ethnic identity communicated to me that Lau's writing conveyed her becoming in the sense of seeing her ethnic identity in terms of difference. To do so, she relied on multiple layers of meaning. In one instance, she referred to her ethnically hybrid identity by stating "I was born to . . . a fourth-generation Japanese-American woman from Kaua'i, Hawai'i, who married a second-generation Chinese-American man from New Jersey" (p. 243). She brought other layers of meaning to show how she felt ethnically Japanese, when she mentioned that her mother's aunts "surrounded me with a sense of being Japanese" while she and her mother were living with Lau's grandmother (p. 245). Elsewhere, she brought additional layers of meaning about her ethnic identity through relying on her "remembered and constructed details of . . . life" (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) when she referred to feeling Chinese because "my mother married a second-generation Chinese-American man from New Jersey (and my dad made us delicious Chinese food in his big wok)" (p. 245). Yet, in another part of her personal narrative, she referred to an Asian-American Studies Conference that she attended, and wrote, "I felt so comparatively non-Asian" (p. 248). Toward the end of her personal narrative, Lau also made visible other information about how she thought of her ethnic identity, when she referred to the 1991 Okumura family reunion, at which nearly all of the almost 125 people present were Japanese-American. Lau made perceptible that although she had expected to feel comfortable with her family, she felt "a certain unease and 'out of place' ness" (p. 256). Toward the end of her personal narrative and after commenting that she is uncomfortable among her Japanese relatives, Lau refers to the multiculturalism of Hawai'i, where "Japanese and Chinese and Portuguese and Native Hawaiians and whites intermarry in much the same way that their languages, their foods, and their customs blend" (p. 256), and states: "It is in Hawai'i that I feel most flattered to be considered a local" (Lau, 2002, p. 256).

Through writing layers of meaning, Lau communicated how she became someone with a different understanding of her own ethnic identity, along the same line as *affect*, and how

seeing her own ethnic identity in terms of difference was something ongoing and unpredictable in the sense of *concept*. In one place, she thought of her ethnic identity as Japanese, Chinese, and American, in another place as Chinese, in yet another place as not connected with Asian-ness and Japanese-ness, and, towards the end, as Hawai'ian. Seeing her ethnic identity in terms of difference was a transformation that happened to Lau because of experiences that she underwent—and she could not have predicted how her conceptions of her ethnic identity would be changed by those experiences.



Figure 6. Relational analysis.

Note for Figure 6: Following Clarke's (2005) situational mapping, I developed abstract situational maps (see Figures 4 and 5) into relational analysis (map) to illustrate focused coding and pinpoint significant and frequent initial codes. To do so, I drew circles around key words and common/frequent themes/elements/codes while linking them to other codes in the map.

Figure 7. Ordered situational map

- Documenting becoming pertains to attending to multiple layers of meaning and different ways of knowing, in the form of
 - statistical analysis/other scientific prose
 - abstract theoretical thinking
 - emotional understanding
 - “remembered and constructed details of . . . life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26)
- While one is writing objective, subjective, and intersubjective truths are in dialogue/conversation with each other.
 - Interobjective truth is the by-product of the assemblages and rhizomes that are made or what Deleuze calls *affect*. *Affects* are being made and remade in us because of *percepts*.
 - Interobjective truth emerges through interaction/dialogue/conversation in the sense of
 - unintentional rhizomatic connections;
 - these connections are made within and among subjectless subjects, who are nothing but rhizomes and assemblages, or amalgamations of what Deleuze calls *percepts* and *affects*. That is, the emergence of interobjective truth is here due to the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed, which are unpredictable.
 - The emergence of interobjective truth leads to one “uncovering . . . secret or hidden aspects of the research context [the heart of the matter . . . [and] making connections between . . . themes and questions related to global concerns” (Cole, 2012, p. 14).
- Writing layers of meaning is related to recording human becoming.
 - Human becoming corresponds with *percept*, *affect* and *concept*.
 - In producing these layers, authors rely on *percept* and *affect*; these layers
 - corresponds with writing about the “reception of data that is not located in a subject” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 29),
 - are independent of the state of those who experience them,
 - exist in the absence of a person (i.e., they are impersonal) (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), and
 - are in agreement with making “perceptible the imperceptible forces that populate the world . . . [of the authors]” (p. 182).

- All these different layers are produced as a result of the authors’ body’s response (in the sense of making visible) to *percept*, “the imperceptible forces (the assemblages that populated the world of the author)” (p. 182), which lead to unpredictable transformations in person in the form of *affect*.
- Analysis conveyed to me that a layered account is the by-product of our answer to events (a time of a day, a season, a winter) (Deleuze, 1995) that happen in one’s life.
- The answer that the body produces is not an intended or conscious act.
- Writing these many ways of knowing and layered accounts uncovers progressively more secret and hidden aspects of the research context and makes “connections between . . . themes . . . related to global concerns” (Cole, 2012, p. 14), through relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*.
- Attending to layers of meaning while writing about different truths made academics see what there is in terms of “difference rather than identity” (May, 2005, p. 19) or made them continuously see/think beyond what was already known or assumed, in the sense of *concept*.
 - This corresponds with power that is not in one’s control.
 - That is, writings that capture becoming engage in ontology in the Deleuzian sense, which corresponds with “abandon[ing] the search for conceptual stability . . . [seeing what there] is in terms of difference rather than identity” (May, 2005, p. 19). This is aligned with *concept*.
- “[E]lements of truth, feeling and connection” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208) are produced as a result of assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed.
- Analysis conveyed to me that in writings that seize becoming, dialogue refers to putting different truths and genres in conversation with each other through unintentional rhizomatic connections. According to Cole (2012), these connections are related to Deleuzian smooth space. In this space “virtual multiplicities may form and break free, move over and shape opinion through previously unforeseen connections” (pp. 13–14), through relying on *percept* and *affect*.
- Writings that capture the fluidity of subjectivities have a range of possible truths, as Bakhtin contends when referring to internally persuasive discourses of dialogue/ism (cited in Lillis, 2003).
- Analysis conveyed to me that writings that document becoming encompass different forms, such as questioning, exploring, and connecting, to develop a new way to mean, through Bakhtin’s internally persuasive discourses of dialogism.
 - These different forms:
 - Are the result of the unintentional rhizomatic connections made through *percept* and *affect*.
 - write the “same tale from different points of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 6) through using
 - fiction,
 - field notes, and

- a scientific article (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005)
- Analysis tells me that writings that convey the space of thought through relying on the same tale from different points of view are written as a result of
 - Academics' body's answer to
 - the received data
 - are not in one's control,
 - are not located in a subject,
 - are independent of the state of those who experience them,
 - exist in the absence of humans,
 - lead to ongoing,
 - unpredictable transformation in a person, or what Deleuze calls *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*.
- Writings that convey the same tale from different points of view capture the space of thought.
- Data analysis communicated to me that writings that capture becoming draw on
 - literary,
 - artistic, and
 - scientific genres (according to Richardson in Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005).

These different genres are produced as a result of the academic's body's answer to the received data that is not in one's control which are not in one's control, are not located in a subject, are independent of the state of those who experience them, exist in the absence of a person, and lead to ongoing, unpredictable transformation in a person, or what Deleuze calls *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*.

- Those who record becoming are artists in the Deleuzian sense.
 - Artists are not persons or identities but instead are aggregates of *percept* and *affect* (Deleuze, 1996). They are subjectless subjects, assemblages and rhizomes and nothing else, or what Deleuze (1995), following Foucault, calls (the process of) subjectification, which is a genuine creation or what Deleuze (1994) calls becoming other—which is in line with my concept of artist and subjectification in my initial theory of writings that document becoming.
 - Artists are seeking a new way of life, a new style (Deleuze, 1995), and they free life from where it is trapped; to do so, they express themselves freely and passionately and thereby bring to life this unknown (St. Pierre, 2004).
 - Artists “go through a catastrophe . . . , leave the trace of their passage on canvas” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 203), and create a new world (Deleuze, 1995).
 - Artists are “presenters of affects, . . . and creators of affects” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 175), and they describe social realities in “minute detail” (p. 175).
 - Artists not only represent a world we already know—they create a new world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) in the sense of *percept* and *affect*.
 - Artists represent the world of their thought and write/make perceptible the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed, while

writing about how they create a new world in the sense of becoming other and becoming someone with different conceptions of the world, or what Deleuze calls *percept* and *affect*, respectively.

- Artists and art “can live only by creating new percepts and affects . . . [and] no art and no sensation have ever been representational” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 193).

Note for Figure 7: I demonstrated the relationships between codes depicted in my relational analysis map (Figure 6) in the form of an ordered situational map. To do so, I relied on focused coding, which concerned with making comparisons between data and between codes. Through the ordered situational map, I reorganized my data and codes into cohesive groups. This stage prepared me for the next step of situational analysis—axial coding—which I discuss under the sub-heading “How the relationships between/within categories (codes) and sub-categories (sub-codes) were developed”. The ordered situational map drawn here was essential for drawing the social worlds/arenas map because, as Clarke (2005) states, there is “considerable fluidity through negotiations, repositioning, and so on in the relations portrayed in [ordered situational] maps” (p. 90). Indeed, ordered situational maps produced through relational analysis prepared the data for axial coding.

I argue that this focused process of comparing data with data and code with code enabled me “to move across substantive fields with greater ease” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 70). Focused coding helped me narrow down my data collection to specific codes. For example, I learned that writings that catalogue becoming capture truth, feeling, and connection. I also learned that they attend to multiple layers of meaning, in the sense of seeing what there is in terms of difference rather than identity and thinking beyond what is already known, in the sense of *concept*. Plus, I learned that in this type of writing, attending to multiple layers of meaning is in harmony with using “abstract theoretical thinking, [attending to] emotional understanding,” and writing “statistical analysis and . . . scientific prose” (Ronai, 1996; p. 26) (see Figure 6). In the remainder of this part, I will expand on the latter two points through two examples.

While coding Lau's text, I compared a part of her text (data) with other parts of her text (data). Through doing this comparison, I developed a focused code. In my memo, I mentioned that by writing using a non-standard layout and textual fragmentation in the form of personal, analytical, and theoretical narratives—instead of standard writing with a linear layout—Lau attended to layers of meaning. She did this in the sense of seeing in terms of difference rather than identity, and by thinking beyond what was already known. I learned about this characteristic (code) of layers of meaning through comparing different parts of Lau's data text with each other. To do this comparison, in my memo I wrote that to communicate to the readers where her idea of writing using a non-linear layout originated, Lau referred to Luce Irigaray's concept of women's sex; a text that enacts

some of the linguistic play and feminine desire . . . places different voices and different narratives near to each other . . . resists the "linearity of a project", . . . cohesion and a sense of closure . . . [and] exists in the infinite approach, . . . the same way . . . meaning might exist . . . in the spaces between the dominant narratives . . . [and] beyond [what is taken from those of women's sex, as conceptualized by Luce Irigaray]. (p. 246)

I compared this data with another part of her text, where she mentioned that her conception of this type of writing was taken from Irigaray's metaphor of lips. In her article, Lau suggested that this metaphor had been important in shaping her thinking because lips, following Irigaray, suggest a contact/nearness/caress that never ends, similar to the layout of writing that she proposes; she states:

Through the metaphor of the lips, Irigaray problematizes language (spoken through one set of lips) and desire (established, though only in part, through the other set) and the ways in which they write the body through their complex relation to patriarchal constructs, controls, and limitations. (p. 243)

I further compared the earlier data with another part of Lau's text, where she refers to her experience of teaching a graduate seminar titled "Writing Culture and Identity". In presenting this course, she used Gloria Anzaldúa's *Borderland*, which is a narrative in both prose and poetry, English and Spanish. Lau mentioned that in some cases, Anzaldúa translates "cases, words, phrases, and whole passages . . . [while] in other cases, they are left untranslated" (p. 247). She added that the book's theory postulated that cultural forces, such as language, often act on those who are not members of dominant groups, engendering a sense of disempowerment. She then mentioned that this book enacted its own theory, describing the reaction of two of her white, middle-class students, who read the text and stated that they disliked it because they "felt excluded from the Spanish parts of the text and were frustrated [and felt disempowered] by that exclusion" (p. 248). Lau mentioned that the experience she gained through teaching enabled her to learn about the concept of writing in a non-standard, textually fragmented layout. Through writing layers of meaning, Lau learned to write differently and think about writing beyond what she already knew—she learned to create "a text that enacts its own theory" (p. 248). Her learning was then manifested in the layout of her own writing. Comparing data and pinpointing significant and frequent initial codes led me to think that writings that document becoming rely on multiple layers of meaning in the sense of seeing in terms of difference rather than identity and thinking beyond what is already known (May, 2005), in the sense of *concept*.

While coding Akindes's (2001) text, I also made comparisons between different parts, and through these comparisons, I pinpointed significant and frequent initial codes and thereby developed focused codes. The process of comparison informed me that attending to multiple layers of meaning is in harmony with using "abstract theoretical thinking, [attending to] emotional understanding" and with writing "statistical analysis and . . . scientific prose" (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) (see Figure 6.). Coding Akindes' text communicated to me that in writing about the present condition of Pahala, her father's family (presently living back in Pahala), her father's smoking problem, and her relationship with her father, she relied on attending to multiple layers of meaning. These layers are in the form of "scientific prose [and] abstract theoretical thinking" (p. 26). For example, while talking about her father's bossy behaviour towards her, Akindes referred

to the Marxist concept of alienation in order to convey how her father felt at work and how that influenced the way he behaved with her. My comparisons also informed me that that these layers of meaning are in the form of “statistical analysis” (p. 26). For example, to communicate how the younger generations were migrating from Pahala, Akindes says, “Pahala has a dwindling population of some 1,500 residents and a high rate of unemployment since the sugar plantation’s closure in April 1996 (Clarke, 1999a, 1999b). Many of the residents we encountered during our visit were retired folks” (Akindes, 2001, p. 25). My comparisons also conveyed to me that these layers of meaning are in the form of “emotional understanding” (Ronai, 1996; p. 26). A good illustration of this form occurs when Akindes refers to the type of relationship that she had with her father: “Our prescribed relationship was father-daughter, yet to some degree Daddy died a stranger to me” (p. 25).

Clarke’s (2005) situational mapping starts with open coding and abstract situational maps (as I have discussed in a previous section about data collection and coding), followed by relational analysis, ordered situational maps, axial coding, and social worlds/arenas maps, and ends with selective coding and positional maps. Through the initial (open) coding and focused coding done so far, I learned about the categories (codes), the relationships between the categories (codes), and the characteristics (properties) of the categories (codes). Through axial coding, the researcher reanalyzes the relationships developed in the relational analysis phase in order to investigate whether more complex relationships exist among categories and/or sub-categories.

Next, I explain (i) what I mean by axial coding and (ii) how I learned about these (complex) relationships between/within categories (codes) and sub-categories (sub-codes) through axial coding, while bringing evidence from my analyzed data to communicate how the relationships between and/or among categories (codes) and sub-categories (sub-codes) were developed.

4.1.4 How the Relationships Between/Within Categories (Codes) and Sub-Categories (Sub-Codes) Were Developed

Following Charmaz's grounded theory (2006) and Clarke's situational analysis (2005), I used axial coding to develop categories, relationships among categories, and—more so—between sub-categories. Guided by Clarke, I analyzed the relationships that I found between and within categories and sub-categories established through relational analysis, in order to find out whether more complex relationships existed among my categories and/or sub-categories. Clarke states that to reanalyze these relationships, the researcher should use a paradigm model and develop a social worlds/arenas map based on the model. Indeed, axial coding uses the paradigm model proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990) to examine more carefully the initial relationships developed through relational analysis and open coding between themes (categories/sub-categories). My careful examination at this stage of analysis was aimed at developing more complex and precise explanations about the phenomena of writings that detail becoming. That is, I employed a paradigm model approach to scrutinize my categories and sub-categories so as to specify the properties and dimensions of a category. I utilized Strauss and Corbin's paradigm model to specify a category and/or phenomenon "in terms of the conditions that give rise to it; [the] *context* . . . in which it is embedded; the action/interactional *strategies* by which it is handled, managed, and carried out; and the *consequences* of those strategies" (p. 97). The paradigm model is also used to specify a category in terms of intervening conditions, which are related to the "*broader structural context* pertaining to a phenomenon . . . [Intervening] conditions act to either facilitate or constrain the action/interactional strategies taken within a specific context" (p. 103). In the case of this study, my categories and/or phenomena developed from open coding indicated to me that writings that document becoming capture Deleuzian concepts of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. I further scrutinized these concepts/categories through reanalyzing the relationships depicted in the relational analysis by specifying them in terms of the following sub-categories, based on Strauss and Corbin's paradigm model, as follows.

The categories/phenomena of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* laid out through open coding and further developed through relational analysis were additionally specified through axial coding in terms of several factors:

- *The causal conditions and/or sub-categories that gave rise to them* (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 100).

In the case of this study, the production of the categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* is further specified in terms of the causal conditions of “a catastrophe . . . [and] a conflagration” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 203) that authors of texts that record the fluidity of thought space go through. For example, to document the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities through relying on the concepts of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*, Gannon (2002) goes “through a catastrophe”—divorce—and reviews a number of autobiographical texts, written in different styles, about the same incident: the end of her marriage. She makes visible, in different parts of her article and “in minute detail” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 175), the “imperceptible forces” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 182) in the sense of *percept*, involved in her learning about the fact that writing about women’s bodies is not just about clichés but is also about flesh. At one point, she quotes from a journal text that she had written for a workshop, in which she was supposed to write about “leaving”; she tells readers how her story was “about being ‘left’ rather than leaving,” that “it was in third person . . . chronological and still a narrative of an arrival, a conversation, and a departure” and that it began with “the usual banality, the consciousness of cliché” (p. 680):

When he [her husband] said he was leaving she couldn’t believe it. She felt as cold as a stone. She felt like she’d spun away into some other reality—a bad soap opera with the script full of clichés and everything said a thousand times before by other people. (p. 680)

Elsewhere, Gannon states that “the story of leaving is framed by . . . a cultural story rather than a writerly story”. She brings in material, from her autobiographical journal,

about her fertility, mentioning that a radiologist told her that instead of being “plump and juicy”, her ovaries were “shriveled up” and useless because she had taken birth-control pills (p. 681).

This “go[ing] through a catastrophe” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 203) resulted in her becoming someone with a different conception of the female body and then writing about that body: not in terms of clichés (in this case, “the conventional patriarchal script of daughter-wife-mother”) but rather in terms of difference—of flesh, whereby a “woman’s body enters into a medical discourse in which both technology and medical professionals have the power to define the state of the body, and a health discourse wherein the chemicals that control the out-of-control bodies of woman damage—temporarily or permanently—those bodies”. That is, the concept of woman’s body and writing about it “is a much more complex and embodied story about identity as a woman” (p. 681).

- *The context/sub-category of context in which my categories and phenomena are embedded, or the “specific set of properties that pertain to [these categories]” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 101).*

In this study, the production of the categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* is further specified in terms of the context that pertains to this production, which in this case firstly is concerned with a “catastrophe [and] . . . conflagration” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 203) that authors of texts that document becoming go through. This is illustrated in the above-mentioned example, where Gannon notes that writing about women’s bodies means writing about flesh, not clichés.

The context also aligns with a “specific set of properties” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 101) that are used in producing such texts. That is, the production of categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* is made in the context of writings that use different genres and truths and that capture “elements of truth, feeling [and] connection” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005; p. 208). For example, Lau (2002), in writing a text that captures the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of her subjectivities, specified the categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* in the context of putting different genres and truths in conversation with each other. That is, the relationships between the categories of *percept*,

affect, and *concept* and the sub-categories of putting different genres and truths in conversation with each other are additionally specified through axial coding in terms of the sub-category of a “specific set of properties that [give rise to these categories]” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 10), or the sub-category of context. In other words, the relationship between the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* and the sub-categories of putting different genres and truths in conversation with each other is further developed through the sub-category of context from the paradigm model, in the sense that the sub-categories of putting different genres and truths in conversation with each other give rise to the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Hence, a more complex relationship is detected, through the sub-category of context from the paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) between categories and sub-categories, in which the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* in writings that convey becoming are embedded in a text that utilizes the technique of putting different genres and truths in conversation with each other.

While referring to the analytical narrative of Lau’s text, I mentioned in my memo, that Lau wrote a text that detailed her becoming in the sense of becoming someone else, along the same line as *affect*: someone who learns that playing with textual layout and producing a non-standard text have enabled her to enact “some of the linguistic play and feminine desire that Irigaray inspires” (p. 246), in the sense of *concept*, through specifying the context in which this type of writing comes to life. In this context different genres and truths are put into conversation with each other. That is, Lau’s depiction of becoming other, someone who learns that playing with textual layout brings certain results, is embedded in a writing that puts different truths and genres in conversation. In other words, a writing that puts different truths and genres in conversation with each other gives rise to the production of a text that depicts Lau’s becoming other, along the same line as *affect*. Lau’s depiction of how she came to this different conception of layout is embedded in her introduction of different genres. In a couple of places, Lau relied on “artistic and scientific genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 963) in order to make visible to readers how she learned what she learned while relying on objective truth. She referred to Irigaray’s conceptions of women’s sex and her metaphor of lips as women’s genitals, which suggests a contact/nearness/caress that never ends, and she put into question a sort of logic that continually gestures back to one that could be a belief in

language or a belief in the primacy of the penis; she then explains how she applied this idea to that of non-standard writing layout, which enacts some of the linguistic play and feminine desire that Irigaray inspires. As well, Lau's depiction of how she came to a different understanding about layout is embedded in her use of different truths in her writing. To show how she learned, Lau relied on subjective truths when she introduced some of her field notes while referring to her experience of teaching a graduate seminar titled "Writing Culture and Identity"; she described how the students' reading of Gloria Anzaldúa's *Borderlands* (a writing that enacts its own theory) and the negative responses of two of her white, middle-class students (as elaborated earlier) sparked her to think of writing differently in the sense *concept*: writing a text that enacts its own theory. That is, the relationships between Lau's category of becoming other—someone who learns that playing with textual layout brings certain results, in the same vein as *affect*—and the sub-categories of using different genres and truths is further developed through the sub-category of the context of the paradigm model while doing axial coding.

Further, Akindes' depiction of becoming other in the sense of *affect*, someone who sees the concept of "death . . . as a continuation of life" (p. 32), is embedded in a writing that captures "elements of truth, feeling, [and] connection" (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208). In other words, a writing that captures elements of truth, feeling, and connection gives rise to a text that depicts Akindes' becoming other, along the same line as *affect* and *concept*. Her depiction of how she came to a different understanding of the concept of death and dying is embedded in her bringing elements of truth, feeling, and connection. Akindes relied on elements of truth in the followings extracts:

My dad has been dead since 1980, but his old friends at the bon dance teach me that the dead are not dead. They live in living. (p. 27)

Years after Daddy died, he continued to receive the first scoop of steaming rice at dinnertime, just as he had in his living days . . . Visits home to Molokai from Honolulu always began at the altar with the ritualistic lighting of the white candle, burning a few sticks of incense, placing the incense upright in the ceramic bowl,

rolling the ojuzu (prayer beads), holding hands up in prayer, and bowing in reverence. Daddy remained in the house for some 8 years before he was buried at the Valley of the Temples on the Windward side of O’ahu . . . Mom does admit, however, that days lapsed when she failed to serve him fresh rice. Perhaps on these days, the threshold between the living and the dead was widened, with the dead pushed into the shadows. (p. 30)

June 18, 1996. I return home to Hawai’i with Simon and our 8-month-old daughter, Adelana. On Father’s Day, we drive to Valley of the Temples to visit Daddy . . . The cemetery has a festive air, with families sharing picnic lunches with dead fathers and grandfathers. I rummage through my bag and find an orange as an offering. Sitting on the manicured grass, I introduce my family to Daddy, to ‘grandpa.’ (p. 31)

‘The dead are not dead’ is a common African expression reflecting a wide belief that an interplay between the living and the dead continues even after one’s body ceases to breathe. Senegalese writer Birago Diop (1961) composed a poem, ‘Souffles’ (‘Breaths’), that suggests where the beloved dead can be found. The dead are not departed . . . They are in the trembling trees . . . sobbing woods . . . flowing [and sleeping] waters . . . They are in the hut, they are in the crowd . . . There is no distinction between either realms but, instead, a continuing movement. Buddhists share a similar view . . . The Buddha believed in “no self” and impermanence: If there is no self, how can it pass from life to death? Instead, death is viewed as a continuation of life in a different form and shape. (pp. 31–32)

She also made visible elements of feeling in the sense of *percept* to depict how she learned what she learned, when she referred to the event of her dying father visiting her, and the conversation that she had with her sisters:

During one of his visits to Honolulu, we leave him, my sisters and I, after breakfast. I am sitting in the backseat of the car while my two older sisters sit in front. Suddenly I start to cry, and my sisters ask what's wrong. "Daddy's dying," I say. No one says anything. (p. 30)

Akindes also made visible some elements of connection in the sense of *percept* to depict how she learned that the dead are not dead, when she referred to her visit to Molokai, where her mom lived, after her father's death. She stated:

Daddy[']s urn] remained in the house for some 8 years before he was buried at the Valley of the Temples on the Windward side of O'ahu. When I asked my mom why she kept the urn home so long after he died, she said, "I thought I would be closer to him." The presence of Daddy's urn signified his physical presence as reflected in the continued practice of serving him food and drink and the added practice of spiritual prayer, of ancestral worship. (p. 30)

Akindes brought other elements of connection when she referred to visiting her father's graveyard on Father's Day:

The cemetery has a festive air, with families sharing picnic lunches with dead fathers and grandfathers. I rummage through my bag and find an orange as an offering. Sitting on the manicured grass, I introduce my family to Daddy, to "grandpa." Symbolically we are joined in life and in death. The dead are not dead. (p. 31)

That is, the relationships between Akindes' category of becoming other, someone who sees the concept of death in a different light, along the same line as *affect*, and the sub-categories of using elements of truth, feeling, and connection are further developed through the sub-category of the context of the paradigm model while doing axial coding.

- *The action/interactional strategy used to “carry out, and respond to a . . . phenomenon”* (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 101).

In the case of this study, the production of the categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* is further specified in terms of the action/interactional strategy carried out by academics, such as attending to multiple layers of meaning while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths. For example, for Akindes (2001) to write the phenomenon of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* and communicate to readers how she came to see the concept of death and dying in terms of difference (dead are not dead) than identity (dead are dead), she utilized the action/interactional strategy. She did this through attending to multiple layers of meaning while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths when referring to her experiences. Akindes in several places made visible the “imperceptible forces that populate the world [i.e., our internal world]” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 182) in the sense of *percept* when she attended to multiple layers of meaning in the sense of bringing in some of the remembered and constructed details of her life while writing objective truths:

June 18, 1996. I return home to Hawai'i with Simon and our 8-month-old daughter, Adelana. On Father's Day, we drive to Valley of the Temples to visit Daddy . . . The cemetery has a festive air, with families sharing picnic lunches with dead fathers and grandfathers. (p. 31)

Also she mentioned

The bon dance represents a cultural practice that stitches my Buddhist culture with Yoruba culture. Ancestral worship is central to both. In Benin, . . . dancers

masquerading as dead spirits perform, attesting to their immortality. Similarly, in Hawai'i among the Japanese, dead spirits . . . are believed to return home between July and August. (p. 23)

She as well brought other *percepts*, in the sense of emotional understanding, while writing subjective truths when she referred to June 18, 1996, and her visit along with her family to the Valley of the Temples to visit Daddy: "Sitting on the manicured grass, I introduce my family to Daddy, to 'grandpa.' Symbolically we are joined in life and in death. The dead are not dead" (p. 31).

Furthermore, Akindes wrote other *percepts*, in the form of abstract theoretical thinking while writing subjective truth: "The Buddha believed in 'no self' and impermanence: If there is no self, how can it pass from life to death? Instead, death is viewed as a continuation of life in a different form and shape" (p. 31).

Additionally, Akindes brought other *percepts* in the form of remembered and constructed details of life while capturing intersubjective truths when referring to the event of visiting her mother years after her father's death. She noticed that her father continued to receive the first scoop of steaming rice at dinnertime, just as he had in his living days, and she stated:

Daddy remained in the house for some 8 years before he was buried at the Valley of the Temples on the Windward side of O'ahu. When I asked my mom why she kept the urn home so long after he died, she said, "I thought I would be closer to him." The presence of Daddy's urn signified his physical presence as reflected in the continued practice of serving him food and drink and the added practice of spiritual prayer, of ancestral worship. (p. 30)

Through writing these multiple layers of meaning and different truths, Akindes captured how she became other in the sense of *affect* and saw the notion of death and dying in the

sense of “difference rather than identity” (May, 2005, p. 19) in the sense of *concept*. Therefore, the action/interactional strategies of attending to multiple layers of meaning and writing different truths helped Ronai to write *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*.

- *The intervening conditions, which are concerned with the structural conditions “bearing upon action/interactional strategies” that pertain to a phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 103).*

These intervening conditions “facilitate or constrain the . . . strategies taken within a specific context” and include “time, space, culture, economic status, technological status, career, history and individual biography” (p. 103). For example, Akindes’ production of categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* is further specified in terms of the action/interactional strategies (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) of shifting multiple layers of reflections backward through time (Ronai, 1996) while writing different truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987). This shifting of the sub-category of multiple layers of meaning through time using the intervening conditions of the paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) facilitates a writing that captures the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is, the relationships between categories and sub-categories are further specified and developed through the intervening condition of the paradigm model. For example, Akindes’ learning about the concept of death and dying in the sense of the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*, is embedded in the structural conditions of shifting time to the June 18, 1996. This use of the intervening condition of shifting time to the year 1996 facilitated Akindes’ writing about *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* and therefore her depiction of how she learned to see the concept of death in different terms.

- *The outcomes, consequences, and results of action or interaction (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 106).*

The production of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*—which, in brief, is related to a body’s answer to received data—is further specified in terms of the sub-category of the consequence of action/interactional strategies (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which in this case refers to the consequence of writing using multiple layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996)

and different truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987) to communicate constant and unpredictable transformation in a person.

For example, Lau (2002), while referring to her hybrid ethnic identity, made visible the unseen forces that populated her world (Cole, 2012), in the sense of *percept*, and making her become someone who sees herself as multicultural rather than American, Japanese, or Chinese. To do so, Lau relied on bringing multiple layers of meaning in the form of “details of [her] . . . life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) while using objective truth to communicate how she is ethnically hybrid: “I was born to one woman, a fourth-generation Japanese-American woman from Kaua’i, Hawai’i, who married a second-generation Chinese-American man from New Jersey” (Lau, 2002, p. 243). In another part of her article, Lau made visible other unseen forces, in the sense of *percept*, when she referred to other layers of meaning in the form of emotional understanding while bringing subjective truth, when she referred to her feeling of being Japanese: “They (my mother’s aunts) surrounded me with a sense of being Japanese” (Lau, 2002, p. 245). Yet, elsewhere, when relying on multiple layers of meaning in the form of emotional understanding while at the same time introducing subjective truth, she made perceptible how she was not identified with Asian-ness, when referring to attending the Asian American Studies Conference: “I felt so comparatively non-Asian” (p. 248). She also made visible the unseen forces that populated her world in the sense of *percept* through bringing subjective and objective truths, and layers of meaning in the form of emotional understanding (Ronai, 1996). To do so, while referring to the Okumura family reunion, she stated that although she expected to feel comfortable with her family, she felt “a certain unease and ‘out of place’ ness” (Lau, 2002, p. 256). By writing these layers of meaning and different truths about her hybrid ethnic identity, Lau was able to communicate to readers, through these action/interactional strategies, how she transformed in an unpredictable manner—that is, how she become other in the same vein as *affect*. This resulted in Lau seeing herself as ethnically multicultural, leading her to refer to Hawai’i—which is a symbol of multiculturalism, where “Japanese, Chinese, Portuguese, Native Hawaiians and Whites intermarry the same way that their languages, foods and customs blend” (p. 256)—as her home. She stated, “It is in Hawai’i that I feel most flattered to be considered a local” (p.

256). Hence, she saw her ethnic identity not in terms of being American, Japanese, and/or Chinese but in terms of difference (May, 2005), that is, more in the sense of *concept*.

I used the above-described paradigm model to relate sub-categories to categories and thereby give “density and precision” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990; p. 99) to my emerging theory. This linking, according to Charmaz (2006), “occurs on a conceptual level rather than a descriptive” one; here, “analyzing data means converting text into concepts” (p. 61).

The actual process of doing axial coding and relating sub-categories to categories through a paradigm model is quite complex (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The next section will detail my procedures for connecting sub-categories to categories.

4.1.4.1 The Iterative Process for Connecting Categories to Sub-Categories Using a Paradigm Model

In the previous section, I detailed how I further specified the relationships between categories and sub-categories using axial coding. The actual process of axial coding and relating sub-categories to categories through a paradigm model is quite complex and is done through an iterative process. To do axial coding and find out whether there were more complex relationships between categories and sub-categories, I went through the following steps, proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990).

First, I generated a hypothesis about the “*nature of the relationships*” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 107) between categories (phenomena) and sub-categories by posing “questions denoting a type of relationship” (p. 107), based on my analysis of the data texts. For instance, I posed the question: Is the consequence of writings that document becoming the depiction of a person’s transformation in the sense of *affect*?

Second, I verified my hypothesis about the relationship between categories and sub-categories—here, the category of *affect* and the sub-category of the person’s transformation—against my subsequent or previous data. If my question regarding relationship was supported by data, I “change[d] the question to a statement of

relationship” (p. 108). In the case of this study, for instance, my hypothesis was verified against my data text. So, I changed it to a statement of relationship. Therefore, my statement of relationship is: The consequence of writings that document becoming is the depiction of a person’s transformation in the sense of *affect*.

For example, in analyzing Gannon’s (2001) text, I wrote that Gannon, while referring to the paralysis that she felt when she intended to analyze the memory work and collective biographies for her project that focused on women’s transgressive writing practices, wrote her becoming along the same line as *affect*. Because of the experiences that she gained in the sense of *percept* when she was intending to write memory work, she became other, along the same line as *affect* (Deleuze, 1995). Because of these experiences, she transformed into a person with a “particular resolution” (Gannon, 2001, p. 790) with respect to the problem of writing memory work in the sense of *concept*. She learned that to confront the dilemma of writing collective memory, academics should write “collective poetry” (p. 799) and use their “*creativity and imagination*” (p. 787). That is, she transformed into a person who saw writing memory work in terms of difference—contending that the solution to the dilemma of writing memory work is writing poetry as an academic manuscript—rather than identity (May, 2005), which contends that academic manuscript writing should be within “linear . . . and . . . patriarchal discourses” (Gannon, 2001, p. 790).

My hypothesis was also verified by analyzing another Gannon text (2002). In doing so, I wrote that Gannon, while referring to reviewing “a number of [her] autobiographical texts written at different times and in different styles about the same incident, the end of her marriage” (p. 670), recorded her becoming along the same line as *affect*. Because of the experiences that she obtained in the sense of *percept* when she was reviewing these texts, she became other in the sense of *affect*. She also transformed into a person with a different understanding of academic writing, in the sense of *concept*, one who saw academic writing not as a task that “flattened the detail into narrative prose”, in which “the writer had selected embodied details from her memories and her journal entries and layered over them with well-formed sentences, with considerations of tone and style and voice” (p. 676)—that is, she did not see academic writing in terms of identity; instead,

she saw it in terms of difference (May, 2005) in the sense of *concept*, in which “academic writing can be transgressive and creative and can validate lived experience” (Gannon, 2002, p. 676).

Third, I “*continued . . . [searching] for the properties of categories and subcategories, and the dimensional locations of data*” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 107) indicative of these categories and sub-categories. For instance, I continued to seek for properties of *affect* while doing my data analysis. This search indicated to me that *affect* aligns with the body’s answer to assemblages that are formed. For example, in analyzing Lau’s (2002) text, I wrote that the assemblages Lau made prompted a body response along the same line as *affect*, which pertains to creating a text (her present article) with a “non-standard layout” and “textual fragmentation” (p. 251) that “enacts [its] own [theory]” (p. 255): a writing that communicates the “linguistic play and feminine desire” (p. 246) that Irigaray inspires. As well, this search conveyed to me that one of the properties of the sub-category of consequence (“transformation of person”) is that it is “unpredictable”.

For instance, in analyzing Gannon’s (2001) text, I noted that through relying on layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996) and different truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987), Gannon conveyed the *affect* that her body produced/her body’s answer. This led her to transform and to learn that to confront the “dilemmas [of writing] collective memory” (p. 799), academics should write “collective poetry” (p. 787) and use their “*imagination and creativity*” (p. 787) in the sense of *concept*, and that this transformation is unpredictable.

Fourth, I explored “*variation in my . . . [phenomenon/category], by comparing each category and its subcategories for different patterns discovered by comparing dimensional locations of instances of data*” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 107). That is, I looked “for instances of when . . . [my initial hypothesis did] not hold up” (p.108). These instances I elsewhere refer to as negative cases. Negative cases “tell us that something about this instance is different, and so we must . . . take a close look at what this might be” (p. 109). These cases do not “**negate . . . or disprove [necessarily but] . . . add variation and depth of understanding**” (p. 109; bold type in the original). For instance, I continued exploring variation and different patterns in the phenomenon of *affect* by

comparing the category of *affect* and its sub-category of consequence, which in this case is concerned with human transformation. This exploration led me to notice the phenomenon of *affect*—which pertains to the body’s answer—in terms of not only the consequence of unpredictability (which I used to know based on my previous data analysis), but also the consequence of transformation, which is ongoing and continuous. In analyzing Lau’s (2002) text, for example, while referring to her discussion of her hybrid ethnic identity, I learned that Lau’s transformation (her sense of what her ethnic identity is) has been ongoing and continuous. In one place, Lau felt Japanese, in another place Chinese, in yet another place she did not identify with Asian-ness, and elsewhere she identified as Hawaiian. That is, through my analysis, I added variation to my understanding of *affect* as the body’s answer. I learned that Lau’s sense of ethnic identity and her body answer to it has constantly been on the move.

To verify a proposed relationship between categories and sub-categories, “relationships [developed between categories and sub-categories through an iterative process] have to be supported over and over again in the data, though the particulars may differ” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 112). In this study, for example, the relationship between the category of the body’s answer and the sub-category of consequence, which is concerned with transformation, is supported repeatedly through the data texts, although the particulars differ.

Axial coding, implemented through the paradigm model described in this section, led me to develop my main categories/core phenomena and produce a social worlds/arenas map (see Figure 8). This map does not show all of the (inter)relationships, just the important ones.




Figure 8. Social worlds/arenas map.

When interpreting this map, readers should note the following.

1. The three concepts or categories that are used to write texts that record becoming in the sense of capturing the space of thought have been projected on the map in the form of triangle. Representing these three concepts or categories in a triangle helped me connect characteristics and (sub)-categories extracted from the analysis and coding of texts to writings that capture the space of thought. Each corner of the triangle touches the circle, and the circle showcases the arena of writings that document becoming. This helps me communicate that writings that seize becoming correspond with capturing the space of thought in the sense of categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*, as well as other sub-categories, some of which are depicted in this map.
2. Most of the sub-categories that I encountered during my analysis of the data texts are included in this map. However, not every code or category of writings that document becoming is covered in this research; other texts that document becoming may contain different characteristics.
3. Ellipses in the map do not represent broadness or narrowness in the sense of how prevalent the sub-categories are.
4. The three main sub-categories of the body's answer, assemblages that are made, and transformation—shown as ellipses—are not fixed; their meanings are in a state of active change and flux.

To read the social worlds/arenas map, readers should consider the following points.

- The sub-categories' fluidity, in the sense of being in a state of change, is represented by dotted lines. Clarke (2005) contends that this capacity to depict fluidity gives a social worlds/arenas map its flexibility, "its plastic capacity to take change and heterogeneous perspectives into account" (p. 111).
- The triangle representing the three concepts and categories that capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities is intersected by

ellipses/Venn diagrams. These ellipses themselves overlap with one another due to the complex nature of this study.

- Although this map does not include every characteristic and sub-category of texts that write becoming, it encompasses the most important categories—namely *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*.

In the following part, I will discuss the main concepts and categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* that emerged at this stage of analysis, mainly through relying on the social worlds/arenas map. I will show how these three main categories—which emerged as a result of the situational analysis/coding done in general so far and axial coding in particular—correspond with epistemologies, identities, and power, respectively. I will further discuss how these three main categories helped me extend the academic literacies model of writing and include documenting becoming within it, thereby bridging a gap. According to the academic literacies model, to learn about a particular way of constructing the world, one should learn about epistemologies, identities, and power (Lea, 1999; Lea & Street, 1998, 2000; Lillis, 1999; Scott, 1999; Street, 1999; Turner, 1999). That is, to learn about writings that capture the space of thought, one should learn about what epistemologies, identities, and power are in this way of constructing the world. In the following part, I will discuss how epistemologies are related to *affect*, identities are connected to *percept*, and power pertains to *concept*.

4.1.4.1.1 Epistemologies, Identities, and Power in the Extended Academic Literacies Model of Writing

The academic literacies model of writing in higher education does not discuss how to write the space of thought—the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities at a time of crisis of representation—which is a particular way of constructing the world through learning about and relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. My work attempts to fill this gap.

4.1.4.1.1.1 Theme #1: Epistemology as Affect.

My analysis of the data up to this point informed me that epistemologies—or what knowledge is—in writings that capture becoming are mainly the outcome of the main category of *affect* in the earlier stages of production. (Note that *affect* contains traces of *percept* and *concept*, and all three main categories overlap to some extent). The following paragraphs will showcase the findings of this study that pertain to what knowledge is in an extended academic literacies model of writing that includes seizing becoming.

First, knowledge in writings that communicate becoming is in conformity with academics writing interobjective truth (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987), in the sense of rhizomes that are made and are in the process of being made, or what Deleuze calls *affect* in the sense of the body's answer to the assemblages that are being made and re-made. That is, knowledge is about rhizomatic connections that are made within and among subjectless subjects that lead to inadvertent answer, along the same line as *affect* and *percept* (although mainly *affect*). These subjectless subjects themselves are nothing but rhizomes, or amalgamations of *percept* and *affect* (see areas b and c in Figure 9). The nature of these truths is emergent (Davis & Sumara, 2006), and interobjective truths emerge not as a result of social interaction, as argued by Davis and Sumara (2006), but due to assemblages that connect and collide. Knowledge produced in this process is unpredictable. For example, while referring to Ronai's (1998) experience of collecting data through Kitty (the strip dancer whom she came to know), in my memo I wrote that knowledge in Ronai's writing is aligned with her capturing the concept of *affect*. This is in compliance with her writing her body's answer, which in this case is aligned with her becoming other, with a different understanding of researcher as someone who could have access to Kitty's (her participant's) data in exchange for going through a hardship in order to do her a favor. In addition, her knowledge is emergent, unintentional, and unpredictable—that is, Ronai's seeing the concept of researcher in terms of difference is unintended in the sense that she did not expect to learn what she did from her encounter with Kitty (to whose data and dancers she wished to gain access). Her learning came about because of the assemblages that were made, the subjectless subjects, in response to the experiences that she received, which manifested in her writing in the form of

subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987). For instance, she presented intersubjective truth when she wrote about Kitty (to whom she had given her phone number three months earlier but without hearing back from her), calling to ask her to dance/wrestle with her team in an upcoming event for two hours. She also wrote objective truths when she described the circumstance in which she would have to dance:

Men are at their worst in situations like these—nasty, creepy, slimy. It’s in a bar. They’ll be drunk and hard to handle, with vomit beer breath or gin stench that triggers a headache everytime I smell it. I’ll get stage fright and they’ll take advantage of it, reach out to grab me, hurt me. (p. 413)

Ronai captured subjective truth when she detailed her feeling of putting herself in such a situation:

I am frightened and scared, internally trembling with the adrenaline rush of it—nauseated. What am I doing to myself? . . . I feel their big hands around my wrists, their fingers digging in to the ridges of my bones, crushing them. I curl up small in my chair. I can’t do this. I am deflated. I am disappointed in myself because I can’t live up to my image of myself. I want to be daring, to put it all on the line, yet I don’t want to be that scared again, that vulnerable. [This fear is real. This fear feels fake. Which is true? Both and neither—ambivalence—something in between, something I must defer defining for now.]. I’m doing this to get the data. I only have to dance one night for 2 hours. Somehow it will happen and be behind me. Kitty will be grateful for the help, and I will have access to her dancers. Basic, simple, no bullshit equation. [That’s what a real researcher would do. Right?]. (pp. 413–414)

Second, in writings that detail becoming, knowledge—which is in the form of different truths—is not produced due to the interpretations that authors and academics put on the texts, as agreed by Davis and Sumara (2006) while referring to interobjectivity (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987). Instead, in this way of writing, knowledge is produced in response to unintentional rhizomatic connections (Deleuze, 1995), which is in compliance with the concepts of *percept* and *affect* (mainly *affect*) (see areas b, c, and d in Figure 9). With respect to the same text by Ronai discussed earlier about Kitty calling her to ask her to dance/wrestle in a bar, I wrote in my memo that Ronai’s new knowledge about what a “real researcher would do” to collect data is in conformity with her capturing assemblages that are made in the sense of *percept* and *affect*, and does not arise as a result of the interpretation that she puts on the experiences that she received.

Third, although knowledge in writings that document becoming corresponds with Bakhtin’s internally persuasive discourses, which are ways of meaning with which the individual has dialogically engaged (such as questioning, exploring, connecting, etc., as discussed by Lillis [2003]), knowledge in this way of writing is not the by-product of individuals, as Bakhtin contends. Different forms are produced due to unintentional rhizomatic connections that are formed in the sense of *percept* and *affect* (mainly *affect*), not due to individuals (see areas b, c, and d in Figure 9). For example, Lau (2002), in her analytical narrative, sees the layout of writing in terms of difference—in this case, “textual fragmentation and non-standard layout” (p. 251) in the form of “personal, analytical and theoretical” (p. 250) narrative in the sense of *concept*—instead of in terms of identity (May, 2005), in this case linear, standard writing (Lau, 2002). While referring to Lau’s extract in my memo, I noted that knowledge in Lau’s writing is in agreement with ways of meaning that Lau dialogically engaged, in Bakhtin’s sense of internally persuasive discourses (Lillis, 2003). To achieve this, Lau connected Irigaray’s metaphor of lips to the writing layout that she proposed, with the intention of putting “different voices and different narratives near to each other” (Lau, 2002, p. 246). This connection is not due to Lau’s individual volition but instead is a result of unintentional rhizomatic connections that she made in the sense of *percept* and *affect*. That is, through her writings, Lau showed the unseen links and connections (Cole, 2012) that she made

between Irigaray's metaphor of lips and her writing layout, and how this approach made her become someone with a different conception (May, 2005) of layout.

Fourth, knowledge in this way of writing is produced due to unintended acts in the sense of *percept* and *affect* in the form of layered accounts (Ronai, 1996) (see areas b, c, and d in Figure 9). That is, layered accounts are not produced as a result of intentional acts by individuals. For example, in my memo I wrote that knowledge in Gannon's (2002) writing is in accord with her becoming someone else. By using a poststructural lens to review her journal writings on the topic of the end of her marriage, Gannon became someone who learned that she cannot separate herself from the character in her story, someone who is "less in control" (p. 673) of her writing because of clichés that are empty of meaning and "'just flow'" (p. 674), and someone who learns that in writing she either has to "[remain] mute with grief or . . . [babble] with clichés" (p. 674). Gannon's becoming someone other was not something she could decide on but emerged due to her reviewing of her journal, and the connections that were made because of this reviewing, in the sense of *percept* and *affect*. Gannon captures these connections in the form of different layers of meaning, as discussed earlier when I referred to this part of her writing.

Fifth, knowledge in this way of writing is aligned with capturing "elements of truth, feeling, [and] connection" (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208) through relying on layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996) in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (see areas a, b, c, d, and e in Figure 9). For example, Akindes' (2001) knowledge about her father is learned through her relying on capturing her body's answer to assemblages made along the same line as *affect* (mainly), as well as *percept* and *concept* (partly). Akindes' body answer to her father's behaviour was for her to become other and empathize with him instead of hating him, through capturing connections that led her to this understanding. To capture these connections, Akindes relied on layered accounts through bringing elements of truth, feeling, and connection. Akindes empathized with her father in a number of ways. In some instances, she employed elements of truth and connections by relying on emotional understanding: "I realized Daddy's behavior to me was a response to the helplessness he felt at work. He was replicating the way he was treated by those who had power over

him” (p. 28). In other instances, she used “abstract theoretical thinking . . . and constructed details of . . . life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26): “[Daddy’s behaviour towards me was a replication of] the way he was treated by those who had power over him . . . Marxist theory explains the alienation and servitude that Daddy experienced in his job” (p. 28). Akindes also employed “elements of truth” by relying on “remembered and constructed details of . . . life”; for instance, she wrote that “work was not a source of fulfillment for him” (p. 28). And she brought “elements of . . . feeling” by relying on “abstract theoretical thinking”; to this end, she referred to the feeling of freedom that fishing and playing guitar gave to her daddy. She noted that “Marxist theory explains the alienation and servitude that Daddy experienced in his job and the freedom and affectivity that fishing in the ocean or playing slack-key guitar gave him” (p. 28).

Sixth, knowledge is produced not due to conscious acts (Ronai, 1992), but as a result of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*, through drawing on “literary, artistic, and scientific genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). For example, Gannon’s (2002) knowledge of the subject position in feminine writings “not [as] a passive victim position, but . . . [as] a disempowered, acted on, subject position” (p. 675) in the sense of her body answer—or *affect* and *concept*—is written through her relying on making perceptible the unseen, unconsciously made assemblages and connections (Cole, 2012), or what Deleuze called *percept* (Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), while referring to her field notes written in “artistic. . . genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005), through a poststructural review of her autobiographical journal about her marriage split and “scientific [articles and scientific] genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). In this case, she refers to the work and ideas of Hélène Cixous, which assert that “writing that emerges from a feminine libidinal economy has revolutionary potential” (Gannon, 2002, p. 675).

Seventh, knowledge is concerned with the body’s answer to the received data that is not located in a subject and is not controllable by the subject. It “exist[s] in the absence of man” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164) and leads to constant, unpredictable transformation in a person in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Such knowledge is produced through writings that capture “the same tale from different points of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; p. 6). For example, Akindes’ (2001) knowledge that leaving

Pahala is a sign of success was produced due to her body answer, which was not in her control— what Deleuze calls *affect*. Such a way of thinking is not located in Akindes and would have been there even if Akindes had not written about it. Akindes’ body answer led her to transform and become someone other, someone who sees leaving Pahala as “a sign of success” (p. 27). Akindes did not anticipate having this different perspective before receiving this piece of information. Akindes’ transformation can be continuous; that is, newer pieces of information might even have led her to see the meaning of leaving Pahala differently. Akindes’ knowledge/body answer about leaving Pahala is captured through her writing “the same tale from different points of view”. That is, she used different points of view to write the assemblages that are made in the sense of *percept*. In this case, she referred to her field notes when she mentioned her conversation with Mr. Kitasato (one of her father’s friends):

he deepens my understanding of what Pahala’s last bon dance means for retired plantation workers such as him whose grown children now live far away. He says that Pahala’s last bon dance is a sign of success. There are only a handful of younger people to carry on this 99-year-old tradition in Pahala because they have moved on to better lives. (p. 27)

As well, she referred to her other field notes when describing her personal interpretation of what the younger generation leaving Pahala means: “[these] children have escaped the plantation discursive system that perpetuated the master-slave dialectic. To remain in Pahala would have been entrapment, a visible sign of failure” (p. 27).

She also brought in a scientific perspective (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005); in the next paragraph, Akindes told the same tale (“plantation [as a] discursive system” [p. 27]) using the “scientific genre” (Ronai, 1996) when she quoted Hunter (1971) and said, “[the Buddhist church] helped to reproduce the plantation workforce, was supported by the haole plantation owners” (Akindes, 2001, p. 27).

Eight, knowledge produced in this way of writing not only represents a world we already have, but demonstrates a new world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (see areas a, b, c, d, and e in Figure 9). In other words, in this way of writing, knowledge is aligned not only with representing/writing self/Other in the sense of *percept* (received data and created assemblages), but also with deconstructing self/Other in the sense of *affect* and *concept*, which corresponds with the body's answer to received data and seeing social realities in terms of difference rather than identity (May, 2005). For example, Akindes documented her becoming other first through representing her mother's self in the sense of *percept*—writing about her mother as someone who looked after her father's urn, even years after his death, by offering it the first scoop of steamed rice and by keeping the urn in the house for some eight years before burying him, to maintain his physical presence. Next, Akindes demonstrated her body's answer in the sense of becoming other and seeing the meaning of the concept of mother not in terms of identity (as someone who looked after her family and her husband's urn for a long time), but in terms of difference (May, 2005)—in terms of *concept*, as a “desirable woman” (Akindes, 2001, p. 30), who wears an elegant dress and is in love, someone whom her second husband calls “Dear” and kisses in public.

Ninth, knowledge in this form of writing refers to academics representing the world of their thoughts and making visible invisible and hidden forces (Cole, 2012) and multiplicities that are made and are in the process of being made; they do this while writing about how they create a new world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) in the sense of becoming other, becoming someone with a different conception of the world, or what Deleuze calls *percept* and *affect*, respectively. For example, for Akindes to show how her knowledge of the concept of mother was expanded, she wrote about received data and the assemblages made through attending to multiple layers of meaning/different ways of knowing (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), by relying on “remembered and constructed details of everyday life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987) in conversation with each other. Akindes introduced objective truth about her mother's marriage:

June 6, 1992. On a Hawaiian summer morning . . . Mom and Steve marry under a banyan tree of Central Union Church. Mom is dressed in elegant pink, and Steve wears a black tuxedo . . . Steve calls her “dear” and kisses her in public, something I never witnessed of Daddy . . . Immediately following the service and before their dinner reception, they drive around the island to place fragrant *pikake* (jasmine) and *maile* leis on the burial sites of their spouses” (Akindes, 2001, pp. 30–31).

She mentioned intersubjective truth when saying, “Steve calls her ‘dear’.” In addition, she mentioned subjective truth about her mother getting married again when saying: “On a Hawaiian summer morning, the type of morning tourists expect of Hawaii . . . I have never seen Mom so radiant, so blissfully in love . . . Steve positions Mom as a desirable woman” (p. 30). All these truths—which are in the form of *percept*, in the sense of “a reception of data that is not located in a subject” (Colebrook, 2002, p. 29), and are “independent of a state of those who experience them” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 164)—prompted a response in Akindes in the form of becoming someone else, along the same line as *affect*, someone who sees mother/grandmother in new terms, different from the way(s) she used to see the meaning of being a mother in her family.

4.1.4.1.1.2. Theme #2: Identities as Percept.

My analysis of the data informed me that identities in this way of writing—which, according to the academic literacies model, is concerned with answering the question of what the relationship is between the type of writing and the constitution of self and agency—is mainly in agreement with *percept* (and to some extent *affect* and *concept*)

(Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). I elaborate upon this in the following paragraphs.¹⁷

Writings that capture the thought space are the by-product of selves and/or represent selves who are constituted because of the assemblages and rhizomes that are unintentionally made in the sense of *percept* within and among subjectless subjects, who are amalgamations of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (see area b in Figure 9). For example, Lau (2002), in the theoretical narrative section of her article, conveyed how her identity became other in the sense of her becoming someone with a different understanding about how one learns about “the nature of postmodern (ethnic) identity and academic fascination with it” (p. 256), someone who comes to realize that to learn about this type of identity, one should theorize what happens when one is “between [one’s] intellectual commitment to poststructuralism and . . . personal desire for some sort of cultural authenticity” (p. 252), through writing autoethnography. Lau’s self was constructed because of the assemblages that were made. She made visible the assemblages and imperceptible forces (Cole, 2012) that were made when she referred to the characteristics of autoethnography in connection with the “disjuncture between . . . personal [and academic]” (Lau, 2002, p. 252). In one instance, she said:

reading and writing autoethnography and experimenting with textual fragmentation and formatting might help illuminate some of the ways in which East/West and West/East delimit the contours of academic disciplines. [Autoethnography] may enable us to enrich the methods by which we translate cultural knowledge across groups, disciplines, countries and continents. (Lau, 2002; p. 256)

¹⁷ Just as *affect* contains traces of *percept* and *concept*, *percept* also has traces of *affect* and *concept*. All three overlap. I elaborated upon this earlier, when I described how I developed the theory of documenting becoming.

In another instance, stated, “I want to focus on the political dimensions of personal experience by investigating East/West and West/East cultural flows through autoethnography” (p. 243). Lau also indicated that

autoethnography [that grows out of the crisis of representation] seeks to make sense of the often contradictory relationships between self and culture that so acutely mark the postmodern predicament . . . [autoethnographic] “texts . . . identify zones of contact, conquest, and the contested meanings of self and culture that accompany the exercise of representational authority” (Neuman 1966: 191).
(Lau, 2002, pp. 224–225)

She explained: I choose autoethnography as a research method and written product in order to draw out the political implication that transcultural flows have not only on cultural communities but on individuals within communities as well . . .

I share some personal narratives because I have an emotional attachment to them, and because they help illustrate some of the cultural hybridities—the transcultural flows between East and West and West and East—that were entirely naturalized as I was growing up. (p. 245)

Lau also made perceptible other assemblages/imperceptible forces when citing the example of Herzfeld, who wrote his autoethnography to communicate the disjuncture between what he felt and what he thought. Herzfeld knew that “nationalism is not ‘natural,’ but cultural, constructed, and contrived; . . . yet . . . [he was] moved by the memory of . . . [the] Florentine night” (p. 252).

Lau’s self is constituted by the assemblages/rhizomes and imperceptible forces that are made in the sense of *percept*. Her learning about postmodern identities was not

predictable—that is, she did not know in advance what she would learn by going through these experiences. Also, Lau’s self became other and developed its understanding of postmodern ethnic identities through her making connections within and among the assemblages and imperceptible forces discussed earlier. These assemblages are aligned with subjectless subjects, are made unintentionally, and are themselves an amalgamation of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994).

Indeed, writings that record becoming and are produced by unconscious rhizomatic connections between and among subjectless subjects are written in the form of layered accounts (Ronai, 1996) and demonstrate many ways of knowing (see area e in Figure 9). For example, in order for Lau to communicate how she learned about the “nature of postmodern (ethnic) identity” (Lau, 2002, p. 256) she relied on different layers of meaning in the form of “scientific prose[,] . . . abstract theoretical thinking, emotional understanding, and the remembered and constructed details of . . . [her] life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26). These layered accounts constantly show the hidden sides of the research context (Cole, 2012). In communicating how she learned about the “nature of postmodern (ethnic) identity” (Lau, 2002, p. 256), for instance, Lau made perceptible how connections are made and assemblages are formed, and how these led her learn. These assemblages were hidden sides of the research context, and through writing, Lau made them visible.

As well, these layers of meaning form links between themes/phenomena related to international matters (Cole, 2012) (see area e in Figure 9). For example, in showing the hidden research context through making visible the assemblages that are formed, Lau made links between the phenomenon related to international matters through connecting learning about the “nature of postmodern (ethnic) identity” (Lau, 2002, p. 256) with the phenomenon of theorizing the “hybridity that exists between the academic scholar who deconstructs integrated identity and the individual who desires an authentic self” (p. 255).

As previously described, writings that detail becoming and are produced by unconscious rhizomatic connections between and among subjectless subjects are also written in the form of interobjective truths in the sense of putting different truths in conversation with

each other (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987) (see area e in Figure 9). In the personal narrative section of her article, Lau communicates that she learned about postmodern (ethnic) identities not through simply “adding [her] own . . . [personal] stories to the . . . public scripts” (p. 254), but through “revealing the many hybridities of [her] . . . own experiences . . . [and creating] a dialogue with [herself]” (pp. 255–256). To do so, she relied on putting different truth in conversation with each other when she wrote objective truth: “I was born to one women, a fourth-generation Japanese-American woman from Kaua’i, Hawai’i, who married a second-generation Chinese-American man from New Jersey” (p. 243). To show how she learned about these types of identities, she also brought subjective truth, mentioning that she does not identify with Asian-ness: she “felt so comparatively non-Asian” at the Asian American Studies Conference that she attended with the intention of “scouting for a position” (p. 248).

Equally important, these writings are written in the form of different (literary, artistic, and scientific) genres (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005) that are put into dialogue with each other (Lillis, 2003) (see area e in Figure 9). For example, to communicate her becoming in the sense of how she learned about postmodern (ethnic) identities, Lau put her field notes and some scientific articles in conversation with each other. Also, these texts are written in a way that captures “elements of truth, feeling, [and] connection” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208). For example, she relied on emotional understanding and remembered and constructed details of life (Ronai, 1996) to convey how she learned about postmodern ethnic identities.

Writings that document becoming also use different forms of writing in Bakhtin’s sense of internally persuasive discourses, such as questioning, exploring, and connecting, to develop new ways to mean (Lillis, 2003). However, these different forms are not the by-product of individuals, as Bakhtin contended (cited in Lillis, 2003), but result from unintentional rhizomatic connections in the sense of *percept* and *affect* (see area b in Figure 9). For example, Lau’s section on analytical narrative uses the technique of connecting in order to develop a new way to understand layout. She says that “playing with textual layout” (p. 252) and producing “non-standard . . . texts” (p. 254) have enabled her to enact “some of the linguistic play and feminine desire that Irigaray

inspires” (p. 246). To showcase this new understanding, she connected Irigaray’s metaphor of lips, which suggests a contact/nearness/caress that never ends, to the layout that she proposes, which puts

different voices and different narratives near to each other, . . . resists the “linearity of a project,” . . . cohesion and a sense of closure and . . . exists in the infinite approach [in which] . . . meaning might exist . . . in the spaces [among different narratives and beyond]. (p. 246)

This connecting of layout to Irigaray’s lips metaphor is not a by-product of a personal act; it is produced and becomes perceptible because of unintentional rhizomatic connections that Lau made.

Another point to note is that writings that record the fluidity of the space of thought are unintentionally produced by academics who capture their body’s answer to the assemblages that they are forming (see areas b and c in Figure 9). These assemblages are produced in response to received experiences, which are not located in the person and exist on their own (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) (see area a in Figure 9). These writings also capture ongoing, unanticipated changes in the academics and answer the two questions of how learning happens and what is learned in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (see areas a, b, c, d, and e in Figure 9). For example, Gannon (2002), through her writing and by reviewing her autobiographies, captured her body’s answer to the assemblages that were made; this answer was in compliance with becoming someone who learned about “discourses of femininity and romance . . . [and] what it means to be ‘a writer’” (p. 670). These assemblages were also in agreement with learning different things—for instance, that “even among a group of female writers, [writing could be a] . . . ‘masculine’ practice, governed by an economy of logic, reason, linearity, and restraint” (p. 675), and that this way of writing “flattened the detail into narrative prose” (p. 676). She also learned that “academic writing [could be women’s writing that is] . . . transgressive and creative and can validate lived experience” (p. 676), and that an

academic could construct a poem from interview transcripts, using the method of crystallization proposed by Richardson (1994, 1997).

The assemblages were also produced in response to the data that she received through reviewing her autobiographical writings about the end of her marriage. This data about the phenomenon of the “end-of-marriage” exists and is there and will be there (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), even if Gannon does not talk about it. In this way of writing, academics capture their continuous transformation and what they have learned, which is unanticipated and unpredicted. The fact that Gannon learned about the discourses of femininity was not something she has anticipated happening before she reviewed her autobiographical texts.

Another notable point is that writings that compose becoming are written in the form of different genres/different points of view, such as fiction, field notes, or scientific prose (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). They are put in conversation with each other in Richardson’s sense of crystallization and through this convey human becoming by capturing the space of thought in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (see area e in Figure 9). For example, Akindes (2001) documented becoming someone with a different understanding of her father through relying on Richardson’s concept of crystallization, in which texts validate themselves. The different genres that Akindes used to communicate how she became other with a different understanding of her father validated each other. She conveyed how she became someone who empathized with her father instead of hating him. To do this, she relied on different genres (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). She brought field notes (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) to convey how she used to hate her father: “he barked orders to me . . . he demanded that I respond immediately to his call, and . . . he disrupted my reading” (p. 28). And elsewhere, she stated: “It wasn’t until years later that I realized Daddy’s behavior to me was a response to the helplessness he felt at work. He was replicating the way he was treated by those who had power over him” (p. 28). She captured other piece of information in the form of scientific material:

It is the common curse of the working class, as is being exposed to work hazards (asbestos in the power plant) and dying young (Mantsios, 1992). Work was not a

source of fulfillment for him. Marxist theory explains the alienation and servitude that Daddy experienced in his job and the freedom and affectivity that fishing in the ocean or playing slack-key guitar gave him. (p. 28)

In other instances, she brought fiction: “The ocean was where he renewed his sense of being, where he enacted *aloha ‘aina*—love for the land/earth. The ocean carried him back home” (p. 29). Elsewhere, she used other field notes to show how her feelings changed, by flashing back to when her father was on the verge of dying:

I am sitting in the backseat of the car while my two older sisters sit in front. Suddenly I start to cry, and my sisters ask what’s wrong. “Daddy’s dying,” I say . . . The night before leaving for Honolulu, when Daddy is lying in bed, I kiss him on the cheek and say “I love you”. (p. 30)

Hence, Akindes put different genres in conversation with each other in the sense of *percept* and through this captured her space of thought and the connections that were made. Capturing her assemblages allowed her to communicate how she became someone with a different feeling towards her father, along the same line as *affect*, and gave voice to difference in the sense of *concept* (Colebrook, 2002; May, 2005): in this case, a relationship based on loving her father rather than hating him. All this captured Akindes’ space of thought, which corresponds with Akindes’ body answer, in the sense of *affect*, to the assemblages that her body made and was being made, which led her to give voice to difference in the sense of *concept*.

Academics who write texts that convey the thought space also write *percept*/the assemblages that are being made and *affect* in the sense of the body’s response to these assemblages, and to do so they write precise accounts (see areas b, c, and d in Figure 9). For example, to show how her feeling towards her father changed from hate to love, Akindes relied on presenting a precise account (Deleuze, 1995) of their relationship and how it evolved, through relying on field notes, fiction, and scientific articles.

In writings that communicate the space of mind, academics not only represent the world of their thought and make perceptible the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed (see area b in Figure 9)—they also write about becoming other, someone with a different understanding of the world in the sense of *percept* and *affect* (see area c in Figure 9). For instance, in the above-mentioned example from Akindes, to communicate how her relationship with her father has changed, Akindes not only relied on representing, by writing her space of mind and the connections that were formed and were in the process of being formed, through using different genres; she also wrote about her becoming someone other, with a different understanding of her relationship with her father (loving him instead of hating him) in the sense of *percept* and *affect*.

A final point in relation to this theme is that academics who write texts that document becoming in the sense of capturing the space of thought are artists in the sense of *percept* and *affect* (and to some extent *concept*). They are not persons or identities, but subjectless subjects who are assemblages and rhizomes and nothing else. They are the process of subjectification, which is a genuine production, according to Deleuze, or what is called becoming-other (Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) (see area c in Figure 9). In their writings, these academics are in “search of [a new] . . . way of life [and] . . . a new [and unknown] style” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 106) and in the process they express themselves freely and passionately (Deleuze, 1995) (see area e in Figure 9). For example, in reference to Akindes’ shifting understanding of her father one can see that it was not her self or identity that made her become a person with this different understanding—it was the subjectless subjects or (amalgamation of) connections that were made and being made that made her become who she was. That is, it was not Akindes’ conscious intention to become other; rather, this resulted from her unconscious search for a new way of life and an unknown style, in this case, a new relationship with her father. This unconscious search led her to express herself and write freely and passionately. All this led to genuine production, or what Deleuze calls becoming other or subjectification, which in this case is concerned with Akindes becoming someone else: someone who empathizes with her father rather than hates him.

4.1.4.1.1.3. Theme #3: Power as Concept.

The concept of power in the academic literacies model of writing in higher education was originally concerned with how, when it comes to the demands of writing in academia and the system of evaluation, one-sided, prejudiced, and ideologically determined statuses are deemed impartial and taken for granted (Jones et al., 1999; Lea & Street, 2000). My analysis of the data communicated to me that power in writings that capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of space of mind is mainly in agreement with *concept* (and to some extent *affect* and *percept*).

First, power in this way of writing corresponds with constantly seeing social realities in terms of becoming/difference rather than being/identity (May, 2005), in the sense of *concept* and to some extent *affect*. That is, this way of writing employs an ontology that disrupts conceptual fixity and views social realities in terms of multiplicities (May, 2005) (see area e in Figure 9). In Akindes' (2001) writing, power is concerned with seeing the concept of home in terms of difference and becoming: something that evolves rather than something fixed. That is, the ontology of the concept of home—or “What is home?”—is not one thing throughout Akindes' writing, but something that evolves and is fluid. Akindes presented the concept of home in a number of ways. In one instance, she referred to Pahala, where her father grew up, as home from her father's point of view: “Pahala is the sugar plantation town that Daddy referred to whenever he told stories about back home” (p. 22). In another instance, she emphasized that home is where one's parents and grandparents were raised—in her case, Pahala and Japan—while also referring to her husband's Yoruba culture: “In Simon's Yoruba culture (from the Republic of Benin in West Africa), one's home is not necessarily where one grew up but where one's parents and grandparents were raised. I was, then, taking him home for the first time” (p. 22). While referring to this belief in the footnote of her article, she stated, “if we [Simon and I] were to travel to Japan, it could again be said that ‘I was taking Simon home for the first time’” (p. 33). Akindes came to see Japan as home because her paternal grandparents came from Japan. “Daddy's family migrated to Hawai'i during the early part of the century from a fishing village in Fukuoka, Japan, as indentured sugar plantation laborers” (p. 25). Yet in another instance, she saw the concept of home in the

sense of their house (the home where her mother, three sisters, and herself physically lived). While referring to her father's view, she said, "Mom, my three sisters, and I constituted home for Daddy until Kevin's [Akindes' brother] arrival when I was 10 years old" (p. 23). As well, Akindes saw the concept of home as Molokai (where they moved as a family from Pahala) and Pahala; that is, she considered these two as possible places that she could call home. Referring to her father's view and her own doubt about where her home is, she noted:

Yet despite the seeming ease with which he embodied the social habitus of Molokai, Pahala continued to be the place my dad referred to whenever he spoke of people and things "back home." This "back home" talk was laced with a guarded sentimentalism. What did he miss about home? Would Molokai ever become home? Where was my home? (p. 25)

Furthermore, Akindes considered the concept of home and staying home (here, Pahala) a sign of both "failure" (p. 27) and rootedness when she referred to two different views—those of Hawai'i's Japanese and the Yoruba:

[while at Pahala's last bon dance, Mr. Kitasato, a Hawai'ian Japanese and a friend of Dad] deepens my understanding of what Pahala's last bon dance means for retired plantation workers such as him whose grown children now live far away. He says that Pahala's last bon dance is a sign of success. There are only a handful of younger people to carry on this 99-year-old tradition in Pahala because they have moved on to better lives. In other words, their children have escaped the plantation discursive system that perpetuated the master-slave dialectic. To remain in Pahala would have been entrapment, a visible sign of failure. This ephemeral concept of home, then, distances Hawai'i's Japanese from the Yoruba,

who are physically rooted in the Benin-Nigeria region over multiple generations.
(p. 27)

A short while later, she referred to Pahala as home:

The bon dance not only entertains the dead whose spirits have returned to earth, but it calls the living back home . . . The drumming is vigorous, the flute playing capricious. The music absorbs the night, entertaining the dead spirits who have returned home to Pahala. Was Daddy's spirit there, "back home"? (p. 28)

Next, she saw Pahala as home, or "back home", as her father referred to it. She pointed to her experience of cooking with her father: "We cooked mongo beans with eggplant and bittermelon, the way Daddy had learned from Filipino bachelors working at the sugar plantation 'back home'" (p. 28). She also referred to Pahala as home when first mentioning her visit to Hawai'i: "June 18, 1996. I return home to Hawai'i with Simon and our 8-month-old daughter, Adelana. On Father's Day, we drive to the Valley of the Temples to visit Daddy" (p. 31).

Akindes introduced yet other conception of home when she referred to where she, her mother, and her siblings physically lived as her/their home. While pointing to "the alienation [that her father] experienced in his [workplace]" (p. 28) and how he found ocean and fishing in the ocean to be an escape-hatch, she stated, "The ocean was where he renewed his sense of being, where he enacted *aloha 'aina*—love for the land/earth. The ocean carried him back home" (p. 29).

In addition, she probably saw Molokai as home; referring to the event of visiting her parents there she said

months later, sometimes around Thanksgiving, I am home [home here could be both Molokai and the physical home where her parents resided] for the weekend and am convinced that death waits in the shadows. Daddy retires to bed right after

dinner, sometimes without eating, his shirt draped over his shoulders that are more bones than flesh. (p. 30)

She certainly saw Molokai and her mother's house there as home. Visiting home years after her father's death, she notes her mother's care of her father's urn:

Visits home to Molokai from Honolulu always began at the altar with the ritualistic lighting of the white candle [by my father's urn] . . . Daddy remained in the house for some 8 years before he was buried at the Valley of the Temples on the windward side of O'ahu. When I asked my mom why she kept the urn home so long after he died, she said, "I thought I would be closer to him." (p. 30)

A second point with respect to this theme is that in writings that document becoming, power is in agreement with academics' unintentional desire to think in terms of difference (see area b in Figure 9). In this type of writing, power corresponds with constantly seeing beyond what is already known, through inventing novel problems in the sense of *concept* and to some extent *affect* (Colebrook, 2002; May, 2005) (see areas d and e in Figure 9). Deleuze refers to this as "conceptual stuttering" (Bogue, 2004, p. 21) (see area e in Figure 9). Power—in the sense of challenging what is already known and attempting to see in terms of difference—is performed through attending to different layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996) while writing about different truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987) (see area e in Figure 9). Power in writings that capture becoming corresponds with capturing the constantly unanticipated change and transformation that happen to academics (see areas d and e in Figure 9). With reference to the earlier example, about Akindes' concept of home, throughout her writing she showcases her desire (which is unintentional and ongoing) to think about home in different ways. I described her desire as ongoing because throughout her text, Akindes goes back and forth between different conceptions of home; it is unintentional because Akindes never intended to tell readers about these different conceptions of home, but her thought—and, more exactly, the connections that she formed—made her think and therefore write in

these terms about the concept of home. Akindes' mind did this maneuvering by "creating new problems" (Colebrook, 2002, p. 12). For example, in one place, Akindes created a new problem in the sense of *concept* by noting that her father had a hard time calling Molokai home, and that her father always referred to Pahala as "back home". Elsewhere, Akindes communicated that she is doubtful about what/where home is, and that she confronted "conceptual stuttering". In one place, she considered Pahala home, in another Molokai, while in other places she considered Japan or the house where her parents, her siblings, and herself physically resided as home. That is, power in Akindes' writing corresponds with capturing her transformation—which is constant and unanticipated—when it comes to how she conceptualizes home.

In Akindes' writing, power (which is, for example, about seeing the concept of home in terms of multiplicity) is captured through her not only relying on different layers of meaning but also writing about different truths. To communicate to readers different conceptions of home, Akindes brought different layers of meaning by capturing "remembered and constructed details of [her] . . . life" (Ronai, 1996, p. 26) and by referring to her father's view of Pahala as home. She also relied on "emotional understanding" (Ronai, 1996) when she said, "I return home to Hawai'i with Simon and our 8-month-old daughter, Adelana. On Father's Day, we drive to Valley of the Temples to visit Daddy" (p. 31).

Akindes also brought different truths. For example, she relied on her own subjective truth in the form of her conception of home when, while talking about Pahala's last bon dance, she referred to Pahala as home. She also brought objective truths when she referred to the meaning of home as it is accepted in the Yoruba culture. Plus, she brought intersubjective truth when she mentioned her conversation with Mr. Kitasato, who informed her that staying in Pahala (home) is a sign of failure.

A third point is that power, in this way of writing, is captured through writing layered accounts (see area e in Figure 9) that are the by-product of academics' unconscious (see area c in Figure 9). Following Cole (2012), this way of writing communicates the unseen sides of the research context and the links between themes related to global concerns,

mainly in the sense of *concept* and to some extent *affect* and *percept* (see areas b and e in Figure 9). For example, to communicate the concept of home in terms of difference, Akindes relied on layered accounts. Through doing this, she unconsciously communicated the unseen sides of the research context; she also captured different conceptions of home and linked them to something above her individual (subjective) level. When Akindes referred to Mr. Kitasato's view that staying in Pahala was a sign of failure, she connected his belief to a higher level/bigger picture. Indeed, she assimilated this belief with that of Japanese Hawai'ians, who see success (especially for the younger generations) in leaving Pahala behind and moving to a better life. She differentiated this belief from that of Yoruba culture, "physically rooted in the Benin-Nigeria region over multiple generations" (p. 27). Making the unseen of the context seen (i.e., that staying home is a sign of failure) and discussing this unseen side in the bigger picture (comparing it with the perspectives of Japanese Hawai'ians and the Yoruba) created possibilities for the readers and Akindes herself to think beyond what is already assumed. That is, doing so made Akindes think about the concept of home mainly in the sense of *concept*, which is related to seeing what there is in terms of difference.

Fourthly, power in this way of writing corresponds with academics jotting down what they learned in the sense of *concept* (see areas d and e in Figure 9). For instance, in Akindes' writing, power complies with capturing what she learned about the concept of home in the sense of *concept*, which is concerned with thinking beyond what is already known (Deleuze, 1995). A good example of this is when Akindes refers to the concept of home as Japan, Pahala, Molokai, and the familial house. These experiences made her see the concept of home as fluid. That is, what she learned from these experiences was that the concept of home is fluid in the sense of *concept*. Indeed, in a footnote, Akindes mentioned, "The concept of home is fluid" (p. 33).

A fifth point is that in this way of writing, academics communicate their power (or what they have learned) by relying on putting different genres (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) and different points of view—in the form of fiction, field notes, and scientific references (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005)—in conversation with each other in Richardson's (1994, 1997) sense of crystallization (see area e in Figure 9). Through this they capture human

becoming and their space of thought in terms of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (see areas c, d, and e in Figure 9). Akindes relied on crystallization in the sense of putting fiction, field notes, and scientific materials into dialogue with each other to speak to her power and what she had learned. For instance, to show how she gained this power and learned that the concept of home is fluid, she introduced fiction, in the sense of a subjective view, when she referred to a belief that stemmed from her husband's Yoruba culture: home is "where one's parents and grandparents were raised" (p. 22). She also brought in field notes when she referred to her conversation with Mr. Kitasato: "he deepens my understanding of what Pahala's last bon dance means for retired plantation workers such as him whose grown children now live far away . . . To remain in Pahala would have been entrapment, a visible sign of failure" (p. 27). She introduced the scientific genre when she referred to the Yoruba people being "physically rooted in the Benin-Nigeria region over multiple generations" (p. 27). Through this, Akindes captured her own becoming: specifically, becoming someone with a different understanding of Pahala and a notion of the concept of home as fluid. Through referring to her field notes, fiction and the scientific genre, Akindes captured becoming someone else, along the same line as *affect*, and someone with a different conception of home in the sense of *concept*. She also captured her space of thought through writing about received data and assemblages that are made in the sense of *percept*.

Sixthly, power, which corresponds with what is learned by academics (see areas b, c, d, and e in Figure 9), is unintentionally captured by them through writing layers of meaning and elements of truth, feeling, and connection (Guba & Lincoln, 2005) (see area e in Figure 9). This is in agreement with detailing the space of thought in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. For example, Akindes captured power—or what she learned, which corresponds with coming to see the concept of home and staying home as fluid and a sign of failure—through writing layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996). She brought remembered and constructed details of life when she referred to her conversation with Mr. Kitasato. She also brought emotional understanding when she referred to visiting her father's tomb. To show the fluidity of the concept of home, Akindes relied on writing elements of truth when she referred to the Yoruba belief or how her father thought of home. She also brought elements of feeling when she referred to her father escaping to the ocean from

the alienation that he felt at work, in order to come home whole again. She added elements of connection by referring to her feeling of connecting with her father when he was dying, when she cried and felt that she loved him now instead of hating him. Through writing layers of meaning and elements of truth, feeling and connection, Akindes captured the data she received, the connections she made, and what she learned in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is, she captured her space of thought.

A seventh point is that power is produced by artists who are nothing but subjectless subjects in Deleuze's sense of subjectification (Deleuze, 1994; 1995) (see area c or areas a, b, c, d, and e in Figure 9). Akindes, for example, produces power—which is aligned with learning about the concept of home as fluid—as a response to different conceptions of home that she made. She saw home in terms of a physical house, Pahala, Japan, Molokai, staying home as a sign of failure, and having roots in one place. Throughout her writing, Akindes made visible these different conceptions of home. The by-product of subjectless subjects, they in turn became *percepts* in the Deleuzian sense of received data (here, home as physical house, as Pahala, as Molokai, as Japan, etc.). These percepts made Akindes form connections and subjectless subjects and become other, in the same vein as *affect* or *subjectification*. She therefore saw the concept of home as fluid.

In the next chapter, I will use my analysis in this section to discuss my extended version of the academic literacies model, which includes writing becoming. I will also show how this extended version fills a gap in the literature. In the following section, I discuss how the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* are related to each other, using selective coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). This analysis helped me arrive at my theory of writings that write becoming.

4.1.5 How the Relationships Between Major Categories Were Developed

From here on, I attempt to relate the three themes of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* to each other to reach an overall theoretical formulation of documenting becoming. Axial coding

readies the ground for selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). In this section, I discuss how, following Strauss and Corbin's (1990, 1998) selective coding, I systematically developed what I have analyzed so far into "a picture of reality [in this case, the reality of the texts that document becoming] that is conceptual, comprehensible and above all grounded" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117). Indeed, I use selective coding to describe the analytic procedures that led to my theory of documenting becoming.

To develop the relationships between my three major categories, I employed the following steps of selective coding, as proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1990): selecting a core theme/category, relating subsidiary categories around the core category by means of a paradigm model, and validating these relationships against data.

4.1.5.1 Selecting a Core Theme/Category

According to Strauss and Corbin (1990), "**Integration** [in selective coding] **is not much different than axial coding. It is just done at a higher, more abstract level of analysis**" (p. 117; bold type in the original). To integrate my themes into a theory, I wrote a "*story line*" (p. 117). This story line described in a few sentences what writings that record becoming are based on what I have found so far. My story line is as follows.

The main story is how academics document becoming and capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of their space of mind. To capture their space of mind, academics unconsciously consider knowledge as the body's answer to the assemblages that they make and are making, along the same line as *affect*. The answer that the body produces is not controllable (Deleuze, 1995) by academics. Additionally, the assemblages are formed in response to the received data or events that have happened in the academics' lives. These assemblages are independent (Deleuze, 1995) of the academics' states, and are and will be there (i.e., they will continue forming) even if the academics are not there in the sense of *percept*. That is, knowledge is produced by academics, who are their assemblages. The *percept* (in the sense of the received data and assemblages that are made and are in the process of being made) led to the production of the body answer, which in turn led to constant (Colebrook, 2002) and unpredictable (Deleuze, 1994)

changes in the person in the sense of *concept*. *Concept* pertains to seeing what there is in terms of difference (May, 2005) and corresponds with power.

I chose *affect* as my “core category” because it is “abstract enough [and it encompasses] all that has been described in the story” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 120) and because this phenomenon is “reflected over and over again” in my data, as can be seen earlier. The category of *affect* encompasses both *percept* and *concept*, and I selected it for the following reasons:

- Knowledge, which is related to *affect*, is produced by assemblages that are formed by academics in the sense of *percept*. Therefore, the category of *affect* incorporates *percept*.
- *Percept* leads to the production of body answer, or what Deleuze calls *affect*, which in turn leads to constant and unpredictable transformation in a person in the sense of *concept*. Therefore, the category of *affect* is a middle term between *percept* and *concept* and encompasses both.

I developed my core category of *affect* in terms of its properties (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), which are “unconsciousness”, “not having control”, and “the body’s answer”.

In the next section, I will describe how I related *affect* to my other two sub-categories (themes) of *percept* and *concept* using a paradigm model.

4.1.5.2 Connecting *Percept* and *Concept* to *Affect* and Validating These Relationships Against the Data

I have discussed the categories of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* separately as much as possible, although as the discussion and my analysis in the axial coding stage indicates, there are connections between and within these three categories. In this section, I use the paradigm model discussed in the axial coding stage to point out the nature of the relationships between and among the core category of *affect* and the sub-categories of *percept* and *concept*, and the other relationships among these three categories.

In discussing “epistemologies as *affect*”, I indicated that the core category of *affect* is connected to the sub-categories of *percept* and *concept*. Also, in discussing “identities as *percept*” and “power as *concept*”, I described how the sub-categories of *percept* and *concept* are connected to the core category of *affect*. In this part, I refer to these connections and point to the nature of the relationship between and among these categories—mainly as these relate to the central phenomenon of *affect*—while considering the paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).

Considering the paradigm model while re-reading the sections on “epistemologies as *affect*”, “identities as *percept*”, and “power as *concept*” conveyed to me that the core category of *affect* is related to the other two sub-categories at a “**higher, more abstract level**” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117). I also learned that these three concepts are highly intertwined, and writings that compose becoming manifest this intertwining and convey the authors’ space of mind, or what Deleuze calls subjectification (Deleuze, 1995). Here, I will elaborate on these points.

Percept is a part of *affect*—that is, *percept* is connected to the concept of *affect* because of the assemblages and rhizomatic connections that are made. These assemblages lead to unpredictable transformation and change in a person’s assemblages, in the initial stage, which is not under the person’s control, and give rise to the formation of the body’s answer. These assemblages in the person are formed in response to received data that is independent of the person, and these data exist even if the person who received it is not there. Hence, the sub-category of *percept* is related to the core category of *affect* through the “causal condition” of the paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). For example, Ronai (1998), while referring to her experience of being in an undergraduate drawing class, documented the assemblages and rhizomatic connections that she made in the sense of *percept*. She noted how she became other; her thinking transformed what was initially happening in her and manifested itself in the form of the body’s answer, or *affect*, because of these connections. Ronai captured the assemblages by referring to the way her drawing instructor ordered the students to draw, without letting them look at the nude model or giving them enough direction. This made her and most of her classmates upset and confused. The assemblages that Ronai formed, “othered” her and led her to move in

the sense of seeing what drawing is in terms of difference (May, 1995): not something to be thought but a process of unlearning what was learned. This transformation—in the sense of seeing drawing in terms of difference—initially happened in Ronai as a response to the assemblages that she made in the sense of *affect*. (see area b in Figure 9. for a visual representation of the overlap and relationship between *percept* and *affect*.)

The subsidiary category of *concept* is part of the core category of *affect*; that is, *concept* is connected to *affect* because the move or change that happens in the person—or what Deleuze calls becoming other or *affect*, as a result of the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of forming—transforms how the person thinks, which initially happens in the person in the sense of *concept*. That is, the sub-category of *concept* is connected to the core category of *affect* through the “causal condition” of the paradigm model (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). For example, Ronai, while referring to the drawing class and the assemblages that were made, pointed to the transformation that occurred in her. She wrote how her ideas about drawing had been changed to a new way of thinking about this phenomenon, along the same line as *affect*. This transformation that initially happened in Ronai is related to *concept*, which is concerned with creating new possibilities (Deleuze, 1995) for thinking. This creation of new possibilities corresponded with new way of thinking (transforming) about learning to draw, which entailed unlearning what she had learned as a child. Ronai’s new way of thinking was beyond what she already knew (Deleuze, 1995), which was the belief that the instructor should tell the class how to draw. (see area d. in Figure 9. for a visual representation of the overlap and connections between *affect* and *concept*.)

The meeting of *percept* and *concept* with *affect* results in the creation of the space of mind. That is, *affect* is an area in between *percept* and *concept* and manifests as the space of mind, where movements happen in the person. Deleuze (1995) calls this area subjectification, where *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* meet in the person. Here we have subjectless subjects. The meeting of the two subsidiary concepts of *percept* and *concept* with the core category of *affect* results in the creation of the space of mind, or *subjectification*, through the “causal condition” of the paradigm model. According to Deleuze, without subjectification, “we cannot go beyond [fixed] knowledge or resist

power [the dominant thought]” (p. 99). For example, while referring to her experience of collecting data for her PhD work, Ronai wrote about the assemblages that she made in the sense of *percept* while pointing to the event of Kitty asking her to dance in a bar for two hours to help her out, in exchange for giving her access to her data/dancers. This led Ronai’s body to prompt a response as a result of a move in her, in the same vein as *affect*, and therefore to produce a new concept regarding the selection of a PhD dissertation subject, which initially happened in her in the sense of *concept*. She realized that when selecting your PhD dissertation subject, you should consider your image. Writing about these assemblages—the move that she made or how her learning happened and what she learned (the new concept)—manifests Ronai’s space of mind, or subjectification. By writing about this event and representing her space of mind, Ronai showed how her space of mind helped her to go beyond the fixed knowledge of what selecting a PhD dissertation work includes. Ronai’s subjectification helped her surpass the fixed knowledge that she should select her PhD dissertation work without considering her image. She resisted this dominant power and way of thinking through the subjectification of what had happened to her, and this process of subjectification is manifested in her writing about this event, through relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Her writing brought about a new way of life—a new way of looking at the concept of selecting a PhD topic. (See area c. in Figure 9. for a visual representation of space of mind, or subjectification, which is in compliance with the overlap and relationships that *percept* and *concept* have with *affect*.)

I checked the relationships described earlier against further data texts and found the relationships to be repeatedly supported by the data, so I changed my hypothesis to statements of relationship (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). I did not find “instances of when . . . [my initial hypothesis did] not hold up” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 108).

In the next chapter, I will describe my theory of documenting becoming based on the analysis done so far and will attempt to answer my four sub-questions. I will also discuss the extended version of the academic literacies model that encompasses documenting becoming.




Figure 9. Positional map: My theory of documenting becoming.

Note for Figure 9: This map is the visual representation of my theory of writing that documents becoming. Writing that documents becoming captures the space of thought in Deleuze's sense of subjectification (Deleuze, 1995). Subjectification, or space of mind, is where *percept* and *concept* overlap in the area of *affect*, as indicated in this figure. Writing space of mind is aligned with answering the two questions of how learning happens and what is learned. The dotted circles of *percept* and *concept* in this figure indicate that these two categories are in motion and not fixed. What is inside (for example, in areas b and d) becomes outside (for example, becomes areas a and e) and vice versa. Therefore, these meanings are in a state of flux and overlap with each other and the meaning of *affect*. Therefore, the meaning of *percept* and *concept* is not confined to their circles, but includes parts of the other two categories, where they overlap with each other and the circle of *affect*. This also resulted in the expansion of the meaning of *affect*, which is not confined to the middle circle but instead includes all three circles.

4.2 Summary

In this chapter, I discussed my embodiment and situatedness as a researcher in this study. As well, I outlined how I used different coding and maps to analyze my data from beginning to end and how I arrived at the findings using the tenets of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2006) and situational analysis (Clarke, 2005).

Chapter 5 : Discussion

5.1 Introduction

This study aimed to investigate how to write at a time of crisis of representation, when this crisis is related to how to capture the fluid, multiple, and complex of subjectivities. To document at such times, one should write texts that document becoming. Documenting becoming—in the sense of capturing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of space of thought, or what Deleuze calls subjectification (Deleuze, 1995)—has not been investigated in this way to date. In this chapter, I discuss my theory of writings that document becoming, based on my analysis implemented in chapter 4. In the process of discussing this theory, I will answer my four sub-questions.

As explained in earlier chapters, in my search to learn about how to write texts that compose becoming, I looked at the literature on writing in higher education. This literature informed me that the academic literacies model of writing proposed by Lea and Street (1998), which is the most complete, nonetheless does not include writings that record the space of thought. This led me to investigate how to extend this model to include documenting becoming. In this chapter, I discuss my proposed extended version of the academic literacies model, while considering findings that I have described in Chapter 4.

This chapter also describes the limitations of this study, recommendations for further studies, my conclusions, and potential implications of my finding.

5.1.1 The Academic Literacies Model Extended

In writings that capture the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of the space of mind, epistemologies correspond with *affect*. Knowledge in this way of writing is in conformity with academics writing interobjective truth (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987) in terms of connections that are made and are in the process of being made or *affect* (Deleuze, 1995), in the sense of the body's answer to a given situation: a catastrophe and conflagration that

happened in the academic's life. These interobjective truths are emergent (Davis & Sumara, 2006). Here, however, emergence is not a result of social interaction, but is due to unintentional assemblages that academics form and are forming (Deleuze, 1995) in response to events in their lives (e.g., a time of a day, a season). These rhizomatic connections are made within and among subjectless subjects, who are nothing but rhizomes, or amalgamations of *percept* and *affect*. Knowledge produced in this process is unpredictable (Deleuze, 1994). When knowledge is produced in the form of different truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987), it comes not from the interpretations that academics put on texts—as agreed by Davis and Sumara (2006) when referring to interobjectivity—but in response to unintentional rhizomatic connections (Deleuze, 1995), which is in compliance with *percept* and *affect* (mainly *affect*) (Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994).

Knowledge in writings that communicate becoming corresponds with Bakhtin's internally persuasive discourses, which are ways of meaning with which the individual has dialogically engaged, such as questioning, exploring, connecting, etc., as discussed by Lillis (2003). However, this knowledge is not the by-product of individuals, as Bakhtin contended; these different forms are produced due to unintentional rhizomatic connections that are formed in the sense of *percept* and *affect* (mainly *affect*). Knowledge in this way of writing is produced due to unintended acts in the sense of *percept* and *affect*, in the form of layered accounts (Ronai, 1996) that are not produced intentionally (Ronai, 1998). Knowledge in writings that convey becoming captures “elements of truth, feeling, [and] connection” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208) through relying on layers of meaning in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). Knowledge is produced not as a conscious act (Ronai, 1992), but as a result of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*, by the author drawing on “literary, artistic, and scientific genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005). Knowledge produced from the body's answer, which is not in one's control and is produced in response to received data. Received data is not located in a subject and “exist(s) in the absence of man” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 164).

All these factors lead to constant, unpredictable transformation in a person in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*, which is captured through writing “the same tale from different points of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 6). Knowledge produced in this way of writing not only represents a world we already have, but demonstrates a new world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. In other words, in this way of writing, knowledge is in conformity with not only representing and writing self and/or the Other in the sense of *percept* (i.e., in the sense of received data and assemblages that are made), but also deconstructing the self and/or the Other along the same lines as *affect* and *concept*, which correspond with the body’s answer to received data and seeing social realities in terms of difference rather than identity (May, 2005). Knowledge in this form of writing is concerned with academics representing the world of their thought and making visible the invisible and hidden forces (Cole, 2012) and multiplicities that are made and are in the process of being made while writing about how they create a new world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), in the sense of becoming other, someone with different conception of the world, or what Deleuze calls *percept* and *affect*, respectively.

In this way of writing, identities—or relation between forms of knowledge and the formation of the self—correspond with *percept*. Writings that convey the space of thought are the by-products of selves and/or represent selves who are constituted because of the assemblages and rhizomes that are unintentionally made in the sense of *percept* within and among subjectless subjects who are amalgamation of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Writings that catalogue these assemblages use different forms of writing in the sense of Bakhtin’s internally persuasive discourses, such as questioning, exploring, and connecting to develop a novel way to mean (Lillis, 2003). However, these different forms are not the by-products of individuals, as Bakhtin contended (cited in Lillis, 2003), but are the result of unintentional rhizomatic connections that are being made in the sense of *percept* and *affect*. Writings that compose becoming are unintentionally produced by academics who capture their body’s answer to the assemblages that are being made. These assemblages are produced in response to received experiences. These received experiences, in turn, are not located in the person but exist on their own (Deleuze &

Guattari, 1994). These writings also capture constant unanticipated changes in the academics.

Writings produced by these academics/these types of identities answer the two questions of how learning happens and what is learned, in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Writings that detail becoming are also written in the form of different genres, such as fiction, field notes, and scientific publications (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005), and from different points of view. They are put in conversation with each other in the sense of crystallization (Richardson, 1994, 1997) and through this dynamically represent human becoming by capturing the space of thought in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Academics who write texts that communicate becoming write *percept* in the sense of the assemblages that are being made and *affect* in the sense of the body's response to these assemblages, and to do so, they create precise accounts of whatever they are writing about. In these writings, academics not only represent (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) the world of their thought and make perceptible (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed—they also write about becoming other (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), someone else, who has a different understanding of the world in the sense of *percept* and *affect*. Academics who write texts that document becoming in the sense of capturing the space of thought are artists in the sense of *percept* and *affect* (and to some extent *concept*). They are not persons or identities, but subjectless subjects who are assemblages and rhizomes and nothing else. They correspond with the process of subjectification, which is a genuine production or what Deleuze calls becoming-other (Deleuze, 1995; Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). These writers are artists in “search of [new] . . . ways of life [and] . . . [a] new [and unknown] style” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 106), and in this search, they express themselves freely and passionately (Deleuze, 1995).

Power in this way of writing is mainly in agreement with *concept* (and, to some extent, *affect* and *percept*), which is concerned with seeing what there is in terms of difference. (As I have previously described these three concepts overlap.) Power here corresponds with constantly seeing social realities in terms of becoming and difference rather than being and identity (May, 2005) in the sense of *concept* and, to some extent, *affect*. That

is, this way of writing employs an ontology in the Deleuzian sense, which disrupts conceptual fixity and views social realities in terms of multiplicities (May, 2005). Power, here, is in agreement with academics' unintentional, ongoing desire to think in terms of difference and see beyond what is already known, through inventing novel problems in terms of *concept* and, to some extent, *affect* (Colebrook, 2002; May, 2005). Deleuze refers to this as “conceptual stuttering” (Bogue, 2004, p. 21). Power—in the sense of challenging what is already known and attempting to see in terms of difference—achieved through attending to different layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996) while writing about different truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987). It corresponds with constantly capturing the unanticipated change and transformation that happen to academics, and it is conveyed through the unconscious attempts of academics to write layered accounts (Ronai, 1996). This way of writing reveals the unseen sides of the research context and the links between themes related to global concerns (Cole, 2012), mainly in the sense of *concept* and, to some extent, *affect* and *percept*. Here, power, is in accord with academics writing what they learned in the sense of *concept*. In addition, these academics communicate their power (or what they have learned) through relying on putting different genres and different points of view—in the form of fiction, field notes, and scientific materials—in conversation with each other in Richardson's sense of crystallization. They thereby capture human becoming and their space of thought in terms of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Power in the sense of what academics learn is unintentionally captured by them through writing layers of meaning and elements of truth, feeling, and connection (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), in the sense of writing the space of thought in terms of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. Power is produced by artists who are nothing but subjectless subjects in Deleuze's sense of subjectification.

Hence, I have been able to expand Lea and Street's academic literacies model by (i) connecting epistemologies, identities, and power in writings that document becoming to *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*, respectively; and (ii) expanding the categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* in terms of their important “properties, dimensions, and associated paradigmatic relationships, giving the categories richness and density” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 117), by using axial coding in grounded theory.

In the next section, I will discuss how, through relying on selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), I developed possible relationships between the categories of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* by seeing links and overlaps between and among these categories. That is, in analyzing my data using axial coding, I started noticing “possible relationships between major categories along the lines of their properties and dimensions. Furthermore, . . . [I] began to formulate some conception of what . . . [my] research [was] all about . . . [and] some conclusions [were] formed in . . . [my] mind” (p. 117). For example, I noticed that epistemology conforms mainly with *affect* but also contains traces of *percept* and *concept*. In the next section, while relying on selective coding, I discuss how I developed my theory of writings that capture becoming (or my theory of documenting becoming) in a methodological manner through relying and building on the analysis I have done so far.

5.1.2 A Theory of Documenting Becoming¹⁸

My findings indicated to me that, in brief, writings that document becoming capture one’s space of mind, or what Deleuze calls subjectification in the sense of *affect*, *percept*, and *concept* (see area c in Figure 9). They answer bodily prompts that are not in one’s control, in lieu of the connections and assemblages that are made when data are received (see areas c, b, and a in Figure 9). These data are not located in the person who receives them, and they exist even if the recipient is not there (see area a in Figure 9). These received data, and the connections that are made, are *percept* (see areas a and b in Figure 9). The answers that the body produces (affects) lead to constant and unpredictable transformation in the person in the sense *concept* (see area e in Figure 9). In writings that write becoming, *percept* is connected to *affect* because the connections that are made lead to unanticipated moves in the person (see areas b and c in Figure 9); in the initial stages, these connections are not under the person’s control and manifest themselves in the form of the body’s answer (see areas b and c in Figure 9). In addition, *concept* is connected to

¹⁸ My theory of documenting becoming has been shaped, in part, by several different sources, in addition to my own work, including: Colebrook (2002), Deleuze (1994), Deleuze (1995), and Deleuze and Guattari (1994).

affect because the move or change that occurs in the person—what Deleuze calls becoming other, or *affect*—because of the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed transforms the way the person thinks (see areas b, c, and d in Figure 9); this initially happens in the person in the sense of *concept*, which is aligned with transformation (see area d in Figure 9). As well, that portion of *affect* where *percept* and *concept* overlap manifests as space of mind, or subjectification (see area c in Figure 9). In this space, movements happen, and all three concepts—*percept*, *affect*, and *concept*—meet in this area in the person. In this space, we have subjectless subjects, because here all that we have are connections and assemblages that are made and are in the process of being made.

I will further discuss my theory of writings that document becoming by answering my four sub-questions, based on the findings discussed in Chapter 4. In the following subsections, I will also elaborate upon how the analysis of my five texts validated, dismissed, or added to my initial loose frame (Blumer, 1969; Charmaz, 2000, 2006) and my theory of documenting becoming. I discuss each sub-question separately.

5.1.2.1 Sub-Question #1

Sub-question #1: *How do writings that document becoming attend to multiple layers of meaning/different ways of knowing while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truth(s)?*

The analysis of my texts informed me that writings that compose becoming attend to multiple layers of meaning and different ways of knowing in the form of “statistical analysis . . . other . . . scientific prose, . . . abstract theoretical thinking, emotional understanding, and the remembered and constructed details of everyday life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26), while writing objective, subjective and intersubjective truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987) in dialogue and conversation with each other (Davis & Sumara, 2006; Tierney, 2002). This way of seizing becoming was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases (Charmaz, 2006; Morse, 1995; Ryan & Bernard, 2000; Strauss

& Corbin, 1990) were saturated. This category was present in my initial theory, or loose frame, and therefore is validated.

My analysis showed me that the layers of meaning (Ronai, 1996) to which authors attend in order to document their becoming are not conscious acts, as conceptualized in my initial theory based on Ronai's (1992) conception of layered accounts. This initial theory and loose frame informed me that academics who are able to capture and represent themselves in these rich and complex ways produce layered accounts as a conscious act. To do so, they evaluate who the readers of their texts will be, in the sense of what readers will want from them, and they consider the needs of those whom they have interviewed; based on these observations, they consider how to see knowledge and its underpinning assumptions in their writings (Tierney, 2002). However, I dismiss the idea that producing a layered account is a conscious act and remove it from my theory. In fact, my analysis tells me that in producing these layers (Ronai, 1996), authors rely on *percept*. That is, the layers of meaning that authors employ to record their subjectivities are written in response to received information that is not located in the author (Colebrook, 2002). In other words, the layers of meaning produced in the sense of *percept* are impersonal and are in agreement with making known the unknown that is located in the author (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). All these different layers are produced as a result of the author's body's response (in the sense of making known) to *percept* (the unknown forces and assemblages that populate the author's world), which leads to unanticipated change in the author in the form of *affect*.

My analysis also indicated that a layered account is the by-product of the author's answer to events (e.g., a time of a day, a season) (Deleuze, 1995) in the author's life, and the answer that the author's body produces is neither intended nor conscious (Deleuze, 1995). In addition, these many ways of knowing and these layered accounts constantly reveal the unknown sides of the research context and connect categories to international issues (Cole, 2012) through relying on *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. All these new categories were repeated throughout my data texts and therefore were considered saturated, while all the negative cases were also saturated. Therefore, these new categories were added to my theory of how to document becoming.

Analyzing the data texts also revealed that writings that document the fluidity of a person's mind attend to multiple layers of meaning while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths; however, these truths are not the by-products of the authors' interpretations (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987), as my theory and loose frame initially assumed. I therefore dismissed this category.

Based on the Deleuzian perspectives employed and the method of data analysis, I also realized that interobjective truth is, instead, the by-product of the assemblages and rhizomes that are made, or *affects*, which are being made and remade because of *percepts*. Here, interobjective truth does not emerge through social interactions between subjects, as I initially postulated (following the concept of interobjectivity put forth by Maturana [1987] and Latour [1996]). Hence, I dismissed this category.

The analysis of my data texts instead conveyed that interobjective truth emerges through interaction, dialogue, and conversation (Davis & Sumara, 2006; Tierney, 2002) in the sense of unintended rhizomatic connections (Deleuze, 1995) that the person makes within and among subjectless subjects who are nothing but rhizomes and assemblages, or amalgamations of *percepts*, *affects*, and *concepts*. That is, here, the emergence of interobjective truth is due to unpredictable assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed; this emergence leads to one "uncovering . . . secret and hidden aspects of research [i.e., heart of the matter] . . . [and] making connections between . . . themes and questions related to global concerns" (Cole, 2012, p. 14). All these new categories were repeated throughout my data texts and therefore were saturated; likewise, all the negative cases were saturated, so I added these new categories to my theory of writing that documents becoming.

Furthermore, my analysis showed me that the layers of meaning to which authors attended while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths, which complied with *percepts* and *affects* to document their subjectivities, made them see social realities in terms of difference rather than identity (May, 2005), or made them continuously (Colebrook, 2002) see and think beyond what they already knew or assumed (Deleuze, 1995) in the sense of *concept*. This continuously seeing social realities

in terms of difference rather than identity corresponds with *concept* (May, 2005). *Concept* accords with power (Colebrook, 2002), which is not in a person's control (Deleuze, 1995). That is, writings that document becoming engage in ontology in the Deleuzian sense, which is aligned with "abandon[ing] the search for conceptual stability and . . . [seeing what there] is in terms of difference rather than identity" (May, 2005, p. 19). This type of writing is concerned with a "permanent challenge to think differently by creating [new] problems" (Colebrook, 2002, p. 12), and this aligns with *concept*, which contends that power is related to this type of challenge. This new finding was repeated throughout my data and became saturated, so I added it to my theory.

The analysis of my data texts led me to add, dismiss and validate (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009) other categories, too, as follows. Writings that tell readers how writing becoming happens are written in layered accounts with multiple layers of meaning, and these layered accounts are, in turn, written in the form of different truths that are put in dialogue with each other. This category was repeated throughout my analysis and was therefore validated and incorporated into the theory. However, dialogue is used here in a different sense than in my initial theory, which was based on Bakhtin's notion of internally persuasive discourses of dialogue/ism (Lillis, 2003). My analysis indicated that in writings that document becoming, dialogue is not something that we attempt, nor is it something specified in the Bakhtinian sense of dialogue and internally persuasive discourses (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984), as I had originally conceptualized. I therefore dismissed this category. Instead, dialogue is concerned with putting different truths and genres into conversation with each other through unplanned, rhizomatic networks, or through *percept* and *affect*. These networks, according to Cole (2012), pertain to Deleuzian smooth space. In this space, "virtual multiplicities may form and break free, move over and shape opinion through previously unforeseen connections" (pp. 13–14), by relying on *percept* and *affect*. This category was repeated and all its negative cases were saturated, so I added it to my initial theory.

From my analysis I also learned that these kinds of writings that contain an array of possible truths, similar to what Bakhtin contends when referring to internally persuasive discourses of dialogue/ism (cited in Lillis, 2003). This category was repeated throughout the analysis of my data texts and all of its negative cases were saturated; hence, the

analysis validated my initial theory. However, the truths in these writings are not the by-products of our interpretations of knowledge (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987), so I dismissed this category. Instead, my analysis showed me that these truths are the by-products of unintended connections that are made and are in the process of being made, or *percept* and *affect*. This category was repeated throughout the analysis, and all of its negative cases were saturated, so I added it to my initial theory.

Finally, the analysis conveyed to me that writings that capture becoming encompass different forms—such as questioning, exploring, and connecting—to develop a novel way to mean, as Bakhtin contended with his notion of internally persuasive discourses of dialogue/ism. This category repeated throughout my text and therefore validated my initial theory. However, these different forms are not the by-products of the individual, as Bakhtin contended, so I dismissed this portion from my theory. Instead, these different forms are the result of the unanticipated networks that are formed and are in the process of being formed in the sense of *percept* and *affect*. This category was repeated throughout the analysis, and all of its negative cases were saturated, so I added it to the theory.

Through my systematic focusing and narrowing (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) to answer the first sub-question, I realized that capturing subjectivities is concerned with attending to multiple layers of meaning and different ways of knowing (Ronai, 1996) while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths (Latour, 1996; Maturana, 1987), where writing different layers of meaning and truths is a way to capture one's space of mind in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is, my analysis conveys to me that: (a) writing that documents becoming captures the body's answer or space of mind when it receives data (what Deleuze calls subjectification), and this reception is not under the person's control; (b) these received data are not located in a subject, exist in the absence of the person, and form and are forming assemblages in the mind; and (c) the foregoing lead to ongoing, unpredictable transformation in the person.

My analysis indicated that a, b, and c are aligned with *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*, respectively. All three (a, b, and c) together manifest the space of mind (subjectification). In other words, writings that documents becoming answer the questions: How does learning happens—that is, how are assemblages formed and how does becoming happen

(which corresponds with *percept* and *affect*, respectively)? What is learned? What do we learn as a result of our becoming, which is the by-product of the assemblages that are formed and forming (and which corresponds with *concept*)?

5.1.2.2 Sub-Question #2

Sub-question #2: *How do writings that document becoming communicate, through multiple layers of meaning, the movement and becoming of humans (human currents)?*

My analysis of the texts informed me that writings that documents becoming communicate the movement and becoming of humans (Deleuze, 1994) by using layers of meaning and different ways of knowing in the form of “statistical analysis . . . other scientific prose, . . . abstract theoretical thinking, emotional understanding and remembered and constructed details of life” (Ronai, 1996, p. 26). This was repeated throughout my data texts and therefore validated my initial theory. However, as discussed earlier, I realized that producing a layered account is not a conscious act, as I had assumed in my initial theory and when analyzing the first text, by Akindes (2001); I therefore dismissed this category.

Instead, my analysis showed that producing a layered account corresponds with producing *percept* and *affect* (see my previous detailed discussion regarding the first sub-question). These categories were repeated throughout my data texts, and all the negative cases were saturated, so they either validated or added to my initial theory (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). That is, my analysis showed that such writings use layered accounts to present human becoming; it also showed that human becoming is not a conscious act, as I had assumed in my initial theory by relying on Richardson’s concept of crystallization. I therefore dismissed this category. Instead, human becoming corresponds with *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. These categories were repeated throughout my data texts, and all their negative cases were saturated, so I added them to my initial theory.

The answers to the second sub-question indicated that writings that detail the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities correspond with communicating, through

multiple layers of meaning/different ways of knowing (Ronai, 1996), human movement (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), where writing different layers of meaning and human becoming is a way to capture one's space of mind in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is, (a) writings that catalogue becoming captures the body's answer or space of mind when it receives data (what Deleuze calls subjectification), and this reception is not under the person's control (b) these received data are not located in a subject, exist in the absence of the person, and form and are forming assemblages in the mind; and (c) the foregoing lead to ongoing, unpredictable transformation in the person.

My analysis indicates that a, b, and c are aligned with *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*, respectively. All three together manifest the space of mind (subjectification). In other words, writings that documents becoming answer the questions: How does learning happen—that is, how are assemblages formed and how does becoming happen (which correspond with *percept* and *affect*, respectively)? What is learned? What do we learn as a result of our becoming, which is the by-product of the assemblages that are formed and forming (and which corresponds with *concept*)?

5.1.2.3 Sub-Question #3

Sub-question #3: *How do writings that document becoming convey, through multiple layers of meaning, elements of truth, resonance, feeling, and connection?*

My analysis validated that writings that document becoming convey, through layers of meaning, elements of truth, resonance, feeling, and connection. However, the analysis also indicated that these layers of meaning are not produced intentionally or consciously, as I had originally postulated, so I dismissed this category. Instead, the layers of meaning are produced as a result of *percept* and *affect*. This finding was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases were saturated, so I added this category to my initial theory, as discussed earlier.

Also, when writers represent the process of becoming in their writing, elements of truth, feeling, and connections are not the intentional, conscious by-products, as I had assumed

based on Richardson's concept of crystallization, so I dismissed this category. Instead, elements of truth, feeling, and connection are produced as a result of connections that are formed and are in the process of being made. This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases were saturated, so I added these categories to my theory of documenting becoming.

My analysis also indicated that documenting becoming produces elements of truth, feeling, and connection through relying on layers of meaning in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases were saturated.

My answers to the third sub-question indicated that this kind of writing is communicating, through multiple layers of meaning/different ways of knowing (Ronai, 1996), human movement (Guba & Lincoln, 2005), where writing different layers of meaning and human becoming is a way to capture one's space of mind in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is: (a) writing that documents becoming captures the body's answer or space of mind when it receives data (what Deleuze calls subjectification), and this reception is not under the person's control; (b) these received data are not located in a subject, exist in the absence of the person, and form and are forming assemblages in the mind; and (c) the foregoing lead to ongoing, unpredictable transformation in the person.

My analysis indicates that a, b, and c are aligned with *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*, respectively. All three together manifest the space of mind (subjectification). In other words, writings that documents becoming answer the questions: How does learning happen—that is, how are assemblages formed and how does becoming happen (which correspond with *percept* and *affect*, respectively)? What is learned? What do we learn as a result of our becoming, which is the by-product of the assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed (and which corresponds with *concept*)?

5.1.2.4 Sub-Question #4

Sub-question #4: *How do writings that document becoming write the same tale from different points of view through using fiction, field notes, and scientific materials, talking with different people, or drawing on literary, artistic, and scientific genres?*

My analysis of the texts indicated that writings that documents becoming write the same tale from different points of view through using fiction, field notes, and scientific materials (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 5), talking with different people, or drawing on “literary, artistic and scientific genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 963). However, telling the same tale from different points of view is not a planned, intentional act, as I had originally conceptualized based on Richardson’s idea of crystallization, so I dismissed this category. Instead, these writings result from the academic’s body’s response to the information that they receive (Deleuze, 1994, 1995). The body’s answer is not under the academic’s control (Deleuze, 1995), the received data are not located in the self, and the data will be there even in the person’s absence (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). These data are separate from the state of the academics who experience them (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) in the form of events (Deleuze, 1995). The mind forms assemblages and connections in response to these received data, and these lead to ongoing, long-lasting (Colebrook, 2002) unforeseen changes in the recipient (Deleuze, 1994), or *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases were saturated, so I added it to my initial theory.

My analysis also showed that writings that document becoming through relying on telling the “same tale from different points of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 6) do not capture the social space (Richardson, 1994, 1997), as I had originally assumed, so I dismissed this category. Instead, such writings capture the space of thought (Deleuze, 1994, 1995). This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all of its negative cases were saturated, so I added it to my theory.

In addition, my data analysis indicated that writings that record becoming draw on literary, artistic, and scientific genres, but these different genres are not introduced as a result of conscious acts, as I had thought based on Richardson's crystallization idea and Ronai's (1992) concept of layered accounts with respect to multi genre texts, so I dismissed this category. Instead, different genres are introduced as a result of the academics' bodies' responses to the events that happen in their lives. These events come to them as received data that are not in their control, in the sense that the data are not situated within a self and are independent of the state of the academics who experience them. These events also exist in the absence of the academics who experience them, and lead to the formation of a network in the academics' mind resulting in ongoing, unpredictable transformation in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases were saturated, so I added it to my theory.

My answers to the fourth sub-question indicated that writing that communicates becoming is concerned with writing the same tale from different points of view through using fiction, field notes, and scientific materials, talking with different people, and drawing on literary, artistic, and scientific genres, to capture the space of mind in the sense of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. That is, (a) writing that documents becoming captures the body's answer or space of mind when it receives data (what Deleuze calls subjectification), and this reception is not under the person's control; (b) these received data are not located in a subject, exist in the absence of the person, and form and are forming assemblages in the mind; and (c) the foregoing lead to ongoing, unpredictable transformation in the person.

My analysis indicates that a, b, and c are aligned with *affect*, *percept*, and *concept*, respectively. All three together manifest the space of mind (subjectification). In other words, writings that documents becoming answer the questions: How does learning happen—that is, how are assemblages formed and how does becoming happen (which correspond with *percept* and *affect*, respectively)? What is learned? What do we learn as a result of our becoming, which is the by-product of the assemblages that are formed and forming (and which corresponds with *concept*)?

The analysis of the data texts indicated to me that writings that seize becoming capture the space of mind, or subjectification, through writing *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*. I also concluded that these writings should answer two questions: how learning happens, which corresponds with *percept* and *affect*, and what is learned, which corresponds with *concept*. Further to this, my analysis indicated that those who write the thought space are artists in the Deleuzian sense who “go through a catastrophe . . . [and] leave the trace of their passage on the canvas” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 203), thereby creating a new world (Deleuze, 1994, 1995). I also found that academics are creators of *percept* and “presenters of affect” (Deleuze, 1994, p. 175), and they describe social realities “in minute details” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 175), all of which align with my initial theory that those who convey becoming are artists in the Deleuzian sense of art and artist (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994). These categories were repeated throughout my data texts, and all the negative cases were saturated, so they validated my initial theory and became part of it.

My analysis also indicated that academics not only represent a world we already know, but also create a new world (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994), as I suggested in my initial theory. This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases became saturated, so this category was validated. However, I found that academics who compose their subjectivities represent the world of their thought and make perceptible the assemblages that are formed and forming while writing about how they create a new world in the sense of becoming other, becoming someone with a different conception of the world, or *percept* and *affect*, respectively. This category was repeated throughout my data texts, and all its negative cases became saturated, so I added it to my initial theory, which did not explicitly refer to this category; I had referred to this point but in a different sense, when I contended that artists and art “can live only by creating new percepts and affects and no art and no sensation have ever been representational” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, p. 193).

My analysis also indicated that artists are not persons or identities but instead aggregates of *percept* and *affect*, subjectless subjects, assemblages and rhizomes and nothing else, or what Deleuze (1994), following Foucault, calls subjectification. This is a genuine creation, or what Deleuze calls becoming other, which is in line with the concept of artist

and subjectification in my initial theory. This category repeated throughout my data texts and therefore was validated, so I considered it part of my evolving theory.

In addition, I found that artists in my study “search for . . . [a new] way of life, new style” (Deleuze, 1995, p. 106); they “free life from where it is trapped” (St. Pierre, 2004, p. 141), and to do so they express themselves freely and passionately, thereby bringing to life the unknown and unpredictable (St. Pierre, 2004, p. 141). This is in agreement with my initial theoretical conception of the artist and subjectification. These categories were repeated throughout my texts, and all their negative cases became saturated, so they were validated and became part of my theory.

The steps that I took to analyze my data texts, as elaborated earlier, brought me to my theory of writings that document becoming which, in essence, is as follows.

The writings selected for this study were written by academics who are also artists in the Deleuzian sense. They are subjectless subjects, amalgamations of *percept* and *affect* and nothing else. Writings that compose becoming capture the space of mind, or what Deleuze describe as the academics’ subjectification, through answering two questions: how learning happens, in the sense of *percept* and *affect*, and what is learned, in the sense of *concept*. To answer these two questions, writings that document becoming attend to multiple layers of meaning and different ways of knowing while writing about subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths. Through these layers of meaning and different ways of knowing, they communicate human movement and convey “elements of truth, feeling and connection” (Guba & Lincoln, 2005, p. 208), writing “the same tale from different points of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 6) by using fiction, field notes, and scientific materials, talking with different people, or drawing on “literary, artistic and scientific genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 963). In writings that document the fluidity of subjectivities, layers of meaning are not the by-products of conscious acts but instead are aligned with the body’s answer to *percepts* and *affects*. Also, the different truths—subjective, objective, and intersubjective—that emerge in these writings are not the by-products of the subject’s social interactions; instead they are the offshoots of the unintentional rhizomatic connections made within and among subjectless subjects, who

are nothing but rhizomes and assemblages. Further, in writings that document the space of thought, human movement is not a conscious act, but instead corresponds with *affect* (the body's response), *percept* (the assemblages that are formed), and *concept*. Nor are the elements of truth, feeling, and connection the by-products of conscious acts; rather, they are produced as a result of assemblages that are formed and are in the process of being formed. Moreover, while writings that document becoming present “the same tale from different points of view” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 6) through using fiction, field notes, and scientific materials, these different tales are not intentional acts that capture the social space—they are the results of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept* and they capture the space of thought. Writings that document transformation in a person also draw on “literary, artistic and scientific genres” (Richardson & St. Pierre, 2005, p. 963); but again, these different genres are not introduced consciously but rather as a result of *percept*, *affect*, and *concept*, or subjectification. *Percept*, *affect*, and *concept* correspond with the body's answer, or the space of mind, or subjectification; they are involuntary responses to received data, which are not located in a subject and exist in the absence of humans. These received data form assemblages in the mind and lead to ongoing, unpredictable transformation in a person.

5.2 Directions for Further Studies

Theory is an “ever-developing entity, not a perfected product” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 32). I have detailed how I developed my theory of documenting becoming, what protocols I put in place, and what stages of analysis I went through. These detailed descriptions could be further examined, whether by other researchers or by me.

As well, my theory of capturing the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities could be tested against further data (other disruptive poststructural autoethnographies) to see whether one could thereby expand upon the theory's nuances and add to the properties and relationships of its constituent components.

The detailed descriptive information discussed in Chapter 4 was arrived at by the triangulation of data (Patten, 1999), using an iterative process; specifically, the triangulation was done through comparing (i) literature pertaining to writings that intend to confront crises of representation, (ii) the data texts, and (iii) my experience, in the form of a theoretical frame (my initial and emerging preliminary loose frame). I suggest that other qualitative approaches, such as participatory action research, phenomenology, and ethnography, could add further depth to our present understanding of writers (and their writings) who document becoming and who thereby confront crises of representation, in the sense conceptualized in this study.

Further studies might be needed to determine whether there are other types of texts that capture becoming, in the sense of communicating the space of mind as elaborated in this study.

5.3 Implications

This study found that writing mixed genre texts that embody the characteristics discussed in this study was helpful for academics in order to capture their space of thought, in the sense of how their learning happened and what they had learned. So, I ask myself what this work has to say to institutions—processes like the one that I am in right now—about what needs to change.

In this study, I put Deleuzian concepts next to the analysis of certain texts and let my *affects* flow (although I tamed my *affects*). This led to the emergence of a newer understanding of what writing can be, one that had not, to date, been theorized. This work illuminated a way of writing that has been practiced among certain academics but has not been validated and appreciated within academic discourse and research arenas as such. One lesson that I gained from my study and that might have implications for education is that institutions and programs should, more than ever, open a space for academics' *affects* to flow in their work. This way, academics in particular could investigate unexplored spaces and shed light on practices that exist within academia, but that they might not be

aware of or appreciate because these spaces do not take the shape of academic discourses. A noteworthy caveat, which I acknowledge in my research, is that once these unexplored spaces took the shape of academic discourses, they lose some of their initial characteristics because originally, they were not meant to be written within such a framework. Academics and researchers who wish to embark on this journey should be aware of this challenge.

The findings of this study might have implications for those who confront the problem of how to write during a crisis of representation, when representing is related to capturing/writing one's own or another's subjectivities, which are fluid, multiple, and complex. It could also serve as a guide for academics seeking to capture their emergent and unconscious learning in ways similar to those of the academics whose texts I analyzed.

This study extends the academic literacies model of writing in higher education put forth by Lea and Street (1998), adding to it writings that document becoming. The framework of such writings could contribute to both the theory and the practice of writing pedagogy, following Lillis (2003), as this framework pertains to certain academics who are interested in knowing about how to write and capture spaces of thought through answering questions about how learning happens and what is learned.

The experience of going through this study was enlightening, and others who choose to go through similar processes, through incorporating other methods of data collection—such as interviewing and observing academics who write texts that record and capture the space of thought—may gain new insights.

5.4 Limitations and Concluding Thoughts

Similar to most other qualitative inquiries, this study yielded no absolute claims about writings that capture becoming, but it did result in partial understanding. The study focused on a few cohesive data texts, and its findings are not generalizable to all types of texts; it therefore yielded only fuzzy generalizations. Deleuzian concepts helped me

conceptualize writings that record the space of thought. These writings capture different truths and connections that academics' minds produce; for those who compose them and those who read them, they also result in new ways of living and thinking.

I brought my own biases and interpretations to the data texts, as I have discussed in an earlier chapter, where I described my situatedness as a researcher. I came to this study with a loose frame that reflected my situatedness and particular standpoints (Smith & Deemer, 2000, p. 889). I lessened the effect of my situatedness by employing the situational analysis of Clarke's grounded theory (2005) and the grounded theory of Charmaz (2006), thereby spelling out clear-cut analytical stages through which to arrive at a theory of documenting becoming and to extend the academic literacies model of writing in higher education. I interpreted my data texts based on (i) the data analysis stages of situational analysis in grounded theory and (ii) my loose frame or preconceptions. I used a specific set of values within a particular value system to interpret my data. As detailed in Chapter 4, my analysis of the data texts and my development of this theory of documenting becoming were done through iterative processes by making comparisons between and among categories and sub-categories and identifying relationships between all of these. Had I used other rules and methods for data analysis, I would have arrived at different results.

Doing this research allowed me to learn a number of different things, but I inevitably encountered its limitations as well. The topic that I chose for my dissertation was slippery and fluid, yet my job as a PhD student was to ensure that this dissertation fit within the structures of a certain, academia-defined, genre. In the process of trying to direct a fluid topic into a fixed academic channel, I confronted a number of challenges and limitations.

1. I learned that I am implicated in my work; as hard as I tried to reduce and suppress my own influence so as to comply with academic standards, I found that my background interdisciplinary training was informing my interpretations specifically and my research generally. At first, I was uneasy about this and wanted to challenge it; however, I then I realized that there was no way out, in the sense that I was implicated in the assemblages and *affects* informed by my

interdisciplinary studies, and this contradiction was part of complex nature of my work. So I decided to acknowledge my own presence in this study. In analyzing and interpreting my texts, even when I tried to theorize, speculation at times became part of the process. I listened to my own *affects* during analysis and interpretation and when producing this dissertation. I, therefore, wrote the “My Embodiment and Situatedness as a Researcher” to present this fact. I recognize that if this work had been written by another individual, it would have turned out differently. I also acknowledge that had I received different background training, I would have conducted my analysis differently and generated different findings.

2. For the purpose of this study, I had the challenge of bringing together two different areas: on the one hand, I had this complex, slippery topic that was hard to make sense of, and on the other hand, I had to put it into an acceptable academic format, in this case the tenets of grounded theory. To make this happen, I traveled back and forth between the fluidity of my topic and the fixity of standard academic analytical frameworks.

3. Generating new theory is challenging for a new scholar. Strauss and Corbin (1990) claim that “integrating one’s materials [in the sense of developing a theory] is a task that even seasoned researchers find difficult” (p. 116). Emphasizing the demanding nature of theory development, they quote Hammersley and Atkinson (1983): “making it all come together [i.e., in theory development]—is one of the most difficult things of all” (p. 16). For me, this process was complicated by circumstances that saw me begin this journey at one institution and finish it at another. As a culturally and linguistically diverse student, I also found the language, the institutional structures, the fixed timelines and the expectations quite demanding.

4. In an attempt to represent the fluidity of this topic within an academic format that is written in a linguistic context, I worked with the grounded theory protocols in a way that led me to map my thinking and represent the phases of my analysis as they happened in the research.

5. Deleuzian philosophy, while helpful in advancing my thinking, is counter-intuitive to vernacular discourses. Throughout my dissertation, I grappled with Deleuzian concepts. His take on social reality and ideology, for example, and his theories of perception and representation, are not embedded in everyday discourses and are therefore incomplete and difficult to concretize. Deleuzian ideas probably were not intended to be concretized but instead to inform readers' thinking and inspire them to think differently. Hence, this work challenged me to speculate even doing so was uncomfortable.

6. In order to capture the processes in which I engaged in order to build a new theory that reflected the fluidity, multiplicity, and complexity of subjectivities, I relied on Charmaz's (2006) and Clarke's (2005) grounded theory. However, the result left the process feeling a little formulaic for a topic with such a fluid nature. Hence, throughout writing this dissertation, I felt the tension of these conflicting forces.

These reasons may, in part, account for why little work has been done in this area to date.

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Appendix

The following materials relate to subsection 4.1.1 My Embodiment and Situatedness as a Researcher.

Item 1

In interpreting an extract from Ronai (1998) about Kitty (the strip dancer whom she interviewed for her research), I wrote in my memo that Ronai shifted her layers of reflection backward through time, recounting when she first met Kitty. The recollection made her construct assemblages unconsciously and unintentionally, which was reflected in her writing and ultimately led her to trouble the meaning of being a researcher.

These assemblages were in the form of remembered and constructed details of life, such as Kitty's appearance. "Kitty, a 6'-1", blonde, Jessica Rabbit caricature of femininity, sported a huge bosom that strained the red-and-white horizontal stripes of her midriff tank top. Her shorts, cut from a white, shimmery nylon, disappeared between the cheeks of her derriere" (p. 405).

The assemblages also conformed with emotional understanding, such as when Ronai described feeling scared, amused, and flattered to be included in a conversation with Ted (a man who was in the lobby of the apartment that Kitty entered and made fun of Kitty). "Ted leaned over to me and said, 'Actually I think she's a fucking pig, a fat slut, but this's too goddamn funny.' . . . I was scared, amused, and bizarrely flattered by being included" (p. 406).

Further the assemblages accord with abstract theoretical thinking. For example, Ronai talked about a wax slab/mystic writing pad, connecting it with the unconscious mind and the concept of layered accounts.

The assemblages also took the form of scientific prose. For example, when talking about this "mystic writing pad", she quoted Derrida (1978) on Freud.

In writing these assemblages, Ronai used subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths. For instance, she employed objective truth when describing Kitty's physical appearance: "Kitty, a 6'-1", blonde". In an instance of intersubjective truth, she described Kitty walking into the apartment lobby and asking for John, the manager, who stumbled to the counter and said, "Hey, Hey, Hey, it's Kitty! What can I do for you?" . . . Kitty said, "I need my plumbing fixed" (p. 405). She also wrote subjective truth when describing John: "a 380-pound 24-year-old . . . Begging us to make the Fat Albert connection" (p. 405).

Item 2

In re-analyzing the extract from Akindes (2001) about visiting Pahala with her father, I mentioned that Akindes documented her becoming through capturing the assemblages that arose in her mind, in the form of subjective, objective, and intersubjective truths; she did so by writing memories and "the remembered and constructed details of . . . [her] life" (Ronai, 1996, p. 26). She recalled being four years old and attending her great-grandmother's funeral. This act of remembering made her unconsciously and unintentionally construct assemblages that are reflected in her writing.

She brought in objective truths about the death of her great-grandmother when stating, "In my family, 1963 is remembered not as the year that President John F. Kennedy was assassinated but the year *makule bachan* (great grandmother) died" (Akindes, 2001, p. 21). She also introduced other objective truths (facts), such as that 1963 was a year of firsts for her: "first airplane ride, first visit to Pahala, first funeral" (p. 21). She included further facts (objective truths) through detailing her journey by airplane and car—"We reached Pahala after two plane flights, a stopover on Maui, and an hour-long car ride through rain forests and a volcanic desert" (p. 21)—and when recalling, with present-tense immediacy, "I am offered a bowl of rice and warm tea" (p. 22). These assemblages yielded multiple layers of meaning, different truths in the form of "remembered and constructed details of . . . life", as well as objective truth in dialogue with certain subjective truths, when she wrote "The walls are dancing with shadows from the constant flicker of candles, the curling smoke of incense" (p. 21), and "[s]he [her great-

grandmother] is arresting in her oldness, eerie in her peacefulness, but I am not afraid. There is love in the room” (p. 22).

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