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# American Authoritarianism in Black and White

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AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANISM IN BLACK AND WHITE

A Dissertation Presented

by

MATTHEW C. MACWILLIAMS

Submitted to the Graduate School of the  
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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Political Science

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## **DEDICATION**

Dedicated to Leah K. Glasheen: My partner and wife for three decades and counting!

## ABSTRACT

### AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANISM IN BLACK AND WHITE

SEPTEMBER 2016

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How can African Americans be described simultaneously by political scientists as one of the most liberal and the most authoritarian groups in the United States? This conundrum frames the puzzle at the core of this dissertation.

I argue that the political behavior of many African Americans is caught in a tug of war between their racial identity and their predisposition to authoritarianism. When the issue at hand engages African Americans' authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism can trump racial identity, produce attitudes that defy conventional wisdom, and dash the common theoretical assumption that African American political behavior is homogeneous. Counter to some of the accepted theories of political science, I demonstrate that African American authoritarians are less likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their racial identity, African American political behavior is not always more liberal than Whites, and African American worldviews and political behaviors, when viewed through the lens of authoritarianism, are quite often heterogeneous and differentiated.

Based on these findings, I contend that any theory of authoritarianism must include African Americans in its analysis or at least present very persuasive arguments for their exclusion. The fact is that 65 years after Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford's *Authoritarian Personality* was published, the study of authoritarianism finds itself once again at a crossroads. Authoritarianism was originally conceived as a *universal* personality trait whose scope recognized no cultural, racial, geographic, or political boundaries. But the central theories

of authoritarian activation and polarization today are predicated on data that exclude the most authoritarian racial group in America – African Americans – from analysis.

It is time for political science to revise the contemporary research on authoritarianism to include African Americans. This is not an abstract exercise. It is a theoretical necessity. The result will not only improve the study of authoritarianism; it will also advance the broader inquiry that is political science as some of the discipline's theoretical certainties become shibboleths, the collateral damage of an empirical inquiry into American Authoritarianism in Black and White.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT .....	vi
LIST OF TABLES .....	x
LIST OF FIGURES .....	xiii
 CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION: AFRICAN AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANS .....	1
African Americans: Liberal Authoritarians? .....	2
Sixty-Five Years of Authoritarian Study .....	12
Defining Authoritarianism, Identifying its Origins .....	19
Data and Models .....	28
The Chapters that Follow .....	30
2 MEASURING AUTHORITARIANISM.....	36
Measurement Approaches and Problems .....	41
Hypothesis: The Authoritarian Scale Produced by Child-rearing Questions is “Cross-Racially Invalid” .....	45
A Broader Inquiry of the Hypothesis that the Authoritarian Scale is Cross-Racially Invalid .....	49
Theoretical Underpinnings.....	49
Observable Consequences: Question Variance and Attitudinally Discrepant Behavior .....	55
A Competing Hypothesis Concerning the Racial Validity of the Child-rearing Scale.....	67
Differential Principles and Overt and Covert Racial Issues .....	68
Authoritarian Activation .....	70
Nonauthoritarian Activation and Asymmetric Threats.....	70
Authoritarian Activation and Asymmetric Threat .....	71
Chapter Summary .....	72
3 AFRICAN AMERICANS: LIBERAL AUTHORITARIANS? .....	75
Prevalence of African American Authoritarians.....	79
Demographics of African American Authoritarians.....	83
Authoritarianism and African Americans’ Perception of Racial Identity .....	90



	Authoritarianism and Racial Identity: Racial Resentment.....	91
	Authoritarianism and Racial Identity: Linked Fate .....	95
	Chapter Summary .....	99
4	AUTHORITARIANISM AND THREAT .....	101
	The Effect of Threat on Authoritarianism .....	103
	Stigma and Authoritarianism .....	111
	Asymmetric Material, Psychological, and Physical Threats and African American Authoritarianism.....	114
	Symmetric Threats and Authoritarianism.....	121
	Chapter Summary: The Prevalence of Black Authoritarians and Protective Authoritarian Shield.....	125
5	AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AUTHORITARIAN WORLDVIEW .....	128
	Authoritarians and Moral Traditionalism .....	134
	Authoritarians and Moral Choices .....	139
	Authoritarians' Trust of Governmental and Institutional Authority.....	144
	Authoritarians' Contingent Support for Democratic Principles .....	146
	Empower a Strong Leader .....	148
	Support Majority Tyranny .....	152
	Support Dissent.....	157
	Authoritarianism and The Other .....	161
	Authoritarians' Patriotic Pride and American Dreaming.....	165
	Chapter Summary .....	169
6	THE POLITICAL AND POLICY PREFERENCES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANS.....	172
	Authoritarians and Gays and Lesbians .....	177
	Authoritarians and Civil Liberties .....	184
	Authoritarians and Immigration.....	187
	Authoritarians and Emerging Threats: Muslims and Marijuana Legalization .....	194
	Authoritarians and Political Leaders and Leadership .....	197
	Chapter Summary .....	201

7	AUTHORITARIANISM AND PARTISAN POLARIZATION.....	205
	Partisan Polarization .....	211
	Voter Turnout and Authoritarianism .....	216
	Voter Choices and Authoritarianism .....	219
	Paritsan Polarization: Revisited .....	232
	Chapter Summary .....	235
8	AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANISM IN BLACK AND WHITE.....	237
	APPENDICES .....	245
	A. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THREAT AND AUTHORITARIANISM.....	245
	B. NATIONAL SURVEYS USED IN THIS DISSERTATION .....	254
	C. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND TABLES FOR FIGURES .....	255
	D. HISTORIC AND EPIGENETIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO AUTHORITARIANISM.....	292
	REFERENCES .....	296

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: Authoritarian scale variant .....	58
2. Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: Authoritarian scale invariant .....	59
3. Statistical significance of difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on selected variables .....	86
4. Demographic indicators of African American authoritarianism .....	87
5. Additional demographic indicators of African American authoritarianism .....	89
6. African Americans' mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale .....	93
7. Fear of losing a job .....	116
8. Safety of neighborhood.....	117
9. Distrust of police.....	118
10. Bivariate analysis: Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism .....	122
11. Multivariate analysis: Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism .....	125
12. Authoritarians and moral traditionalism .....	135
13. African Americans—Feeling Thermometer scores: Gays and lesbians .....	178
14. White Americans—Feeling Thermometer scores: Gays and lesbians.....	178
15. Feelings toward immigrants.....	188
16. Feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas .....	199
17. OLS analysis of feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas .....	200
18. Partisanship as a function of authoritarianism 1992-2012.....	234
19. National surveys used in this dissertation.....	254
20. Incidence of authoritarianism in African and White Americans over time as measured by the four-question, child-rearing scale .....	255

21. Mean authoritarian scores for African Americans and White Americans .....	255
22. African Americans’ mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale .....	256
23. White Americans’ mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale.....	256
24. Racial resentment.....	257
25. Linked fate .....	258
26. Linked fate 2012 .....	260
27. Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism by racial group .....	261
28. Authoritarians and moral traditionalism (2008 ANES and 2012 ANES data) ....	262
29. Authoritarians and moral traditionalism when authoritarianism and church attendance are both estimated across a five-point scale.....	263
30. Authoritarians and moral traditionalism with party identification omitted from the model.....	264
31. Struggle between good and evil in the world and people must choose .....	265
32. Use science to solve important problems.....	266
33. African Americans – trust of government and institutions.....	267
34. White Americans – trust of government and institutions .....	268
35. African Americans – trust of government and institutions with ideology added to the model .....	269
36. White Americans – trust of government and institutions with ideology added to the model.....	270
37. African Americans – Presidential power or democratic principles .....	271
38. White Americans – Presidential power or democratic principles.....	272
39. African Americans – majoritarian rule or democratic principles .....	273
40. White Americans – majoritarian rule or democratic principles.....	274
41. African Americans – support for democratic principles.....	275

42. White Americans – support for democratic principles .....	275
43. African Americans – views of “The Other” .....	276
44. White Americans – view of “The Other” .....	277
45. American pride and American mythos .....	278
46. Gays and lesbians running for office .....	279
47. African Americans – gay and lesbian issues.....	280
48. White Americans – gay and lesbian issues .....	281
49. African Americans – civil liberties .....	282
50. White Americans—civil liberties .....	283
51. CIA and torture .....	284
52. Feelings toward immigrants (2004 data) .....	285
53. Feelings toward illegal immigrants.....	286
54. African American attitudes on immigrants and immigration .....	287
55. White American attitudes on immigrants and immigration.....	288
56. State laws that require state and local police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion that person is an undocumented immigrant .....	289
57. Bivariate analysis: Feelings toward Muslims .....	290
58. Multivariate analysis: Feelings toward Muslims .....	290
59. Legalization of marijuana .....	291

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure	Page
1. Mean authoritarian scores .....	44
2. Linked fate .....	51
3. African Americans' linked fate.....	52
4. Racial resentment among African Americans of African Americans .....	53
5. Strongly agree: Horatio Alger—if you work hard, you can succeed.....	54
6. Statistical similarities between African American and White authoritarian attitudes on worldview principles.....	62
7. Difference between African American and White nonauthoritarians and authoritarians predicted attitudes on two worldview principles.....	63
8. Difference between African American and White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians predicted attitudes on moral traditionalism. ....	64
9. Statistical similarity between African American and White authoritarians' attitudes of worldview evolution issues .....	65
10. Statistical differences between nonauthoritarian and authoritarian African Americans and Whites on worldview evolution issues.....	66
11. Distribution of Blacks and Whites on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012 .....	80
12. Distribution of Blacks on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.....	81
13. Distribution of Whites on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012 .....	82
14. Mean authoritarian scores .....	83
15. Racial resentment.....	94
16. Linked fate among African Americans.....	97
17. Linked fate .....	98
18. Fear of personal physical threat from terrorism.....	124
19. The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (ANES 2008).....	137

20. The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (ANES 2012).....	138
21. People must choose between good and evil.....	141
22. Use science to solve important problems.....	143
23. Strongly oppose President limiting speech and vote of opposition parties to ensure progress.....	150
24. Strongly oppose President governing without Congress when it hinders work of government .....	151
25. Strongly oppose President ignoring the Supreme Court when it hinders the work of government.....	152
26. Must prevent minority opposition when people decide what is right.....	153
27. Those who disagree with the majority are a threat to the country .....	154
28. Strongly disagree that the opinions of minorities are a threat to the country .....	155
29. Strongly disagree that we must prevent minority opposition when people decide what is right .....	156
30. Protect right to vote of people who criticize the American form of government .....	159
31. Protect right of people who criticize American form of government to run for office .....	160
32. Protect right of people who criticize American form of government to make speeches on television.....	161
33. If certain groups stay in their place, we would have fewer problems.....	163
34. Inferior groups should stay in their place .....	164
35. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place .....	165
36. Proud to be an American.....	167
37. Horatio Alger: If you work hard, you can succeed.....	168
38. Gays and lesbians should be allowed to run for office .....	180
39. Gay marriage.....	181

40. Gay adoption.....	182
41. Laws that protect gays from job discrimination .....	183
42. Require national identification card to prevent terrorism .....	185
43. Media (should/should not) report information on secret methods used to fight terrorism.....	186
44. CIA should be allowed to torture suspected terrorists .....	187
45. Feelings toward immigrants.....	189
46. New immigrants are a burden on the country.....	190
47. More jobs for immigrants means fewer jobs for people like me .....	191
48. State laws that allow police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion the person is undocumented.....	192
49. State laws that require police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion the person is undocumented.....	193
50. Feelings toward Muslims.....	196
51. Legalization of marijuana .....	197
52. Predicted values of feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas .....	201
53. Difference between the mean authoritarian scores of self-identified Republican and Democratic partisans.....	213
54. Difference between mean scores of self-identified Republican and Democratic partisans with African Americans included .....	215
55. Republican voter turnout.....	217
56. Democratic voter turnout .....	219
57. Difference in mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic voters for President .....	221
58. Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Democrats – including African American voters .....	223



59. Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Republicans – including African American voters .....	224
60. Difference in mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic voters for Senate.....	226
61. Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Democrats –including African American voters.....	227
62. Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Democrats—including African American voters.....	229
63. Authoritarian mean score differential between loyal and defecting Republican and Democratic voters in the House contests with 1992 as the base year .....	231
64. African Americans’ support for National Identity Card.....	252
65. White Americans’ support for National Identity Card .....	253
66. Linked fate among African Americans.....	259

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION: AFRICAN AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANS

In an interview on *Meet the Press* (NBC News, 2015) he supported limiting the constitutionally guaranteed civil rights of a minority group saying, “I would not advocate that we put a Muslim in charge of this nation. I absolutely would not agree with that.” He is “extremely pro-2<sup>nd</sup> Amendment” and against a woman’s right to choose. He believes we must “end the war on God,” end Obamacare, use torture to fight terrorism, “covertly spy on government workers to make them work harder,” and stop gay marriage (Carson, 2016, para 6).

His name is Ben Carson. He is a Republican candidate for President of the United States. He is an African American and to many in the media he “is not a candidate but an affront. A personal insult. After all, an educated Black man is supposed to think like, well, Barack Obama.” (Lord, 2015, para. 24)

Ben Carson’s views are not an anomaly. Many African Americans share them. For example, according to exit polls, 70% of African Americans voted to ban gay marriage in 2008 in California (Cilliza & Sullivan, 2013). The so-called defection of African American support for gay civil rights and liberties surprised political commentators and scholars and angered liberal organizers and activists around the country who assumed African Americans were monolithically and reflexively liberal voters (Williams, 2011). It contributed to the electoral defeat of gay marriage in one of the most liberal states in America. And it occurred on the same ballot in which 90% of California African Americans voted for Barack Obama for President.

The policies espoused by Ben Carson and the vote of African Americans against civil rights in California reveal something quite important and all too often overlooked by political science about Black Americans: The political behavior of many African Americans is caught in a tug of war between their racial identity and the predisposition of many Blacks to authoritarianism. When the issue at hand engages African Americans' authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism can trump racial identity, produce attitudes that defy conventional wisdom, and dash the common theoretical assumption that African American political behavior is homogeneous.

### **African Americans: Liberal Authoritarians?**

Race is one of the three symbolic predispositions identified by Sears and others (McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1993; Sears & Kinder, 1971) and is a fundamental organizing principle of American politics (Kinder & Winter, 2001). As such, race is thought to structure and define the political behavior of African Americans. The fates of African Americans are said to be linked. Their individual identity is subsumed by their group racial identity (Dawson, 1995; Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Tate, 1994), producing behavior that is in large part undifferentiated and a voting block that is attitudinally homogeneous (Dawson, 1995; Haynie, 2001; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004; Tate, 1994) and divided from Whites by their color (Kinder, 1996).<sup>1</sup> African Americans are a captive of the Democratic Party (Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) and

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<sup>1</sup> Scholars and writers including Nteta (2012), Robinson (2011), Tate (2010), Waters (2009), and West (1993) disagree with the conventional assumption that African American attitudes and political behavior are monolithic, liberal, and governed primarily by the Black utility heuristic commonly referred to as linked fate (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994). While recognizing the “strong identification of Black as a race” and the liberal policy positions that can engender, Tate also acknowledged in *From Protest to Politics* that “on certain issues, such as homosexuality and gender equality, Blacks are somewhat more conservative than Whites” (Tate, 1994, p. 38).

“are always more liberal than Whites, and the differences are substantial” (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 441).<sup>2</sup>

Yet, African Americans are also purported to be “the most authoritarian racial group in the United States, by far” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 141).

Authoritarianism is a “core political predisposition, on a par with party identification and political ideology” (Lavine, Lodge, & Freitas, 2005). It is an important predictor of political behavior (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005), structuring preferences on a wide range of issues, driving presidential and congressional voting behavior, and underlying the growing polarization in contemporary American politics (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

By definition and behavior authoritarians are not liberals. Much of the extensive scholarly literature concludes that authoritarianism and political conservatism are inextricably linked (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1988; Altemeyer, 2006; Christie, 1954; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Kinder & Kam, 2009; Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). Some social scientists consider authoritarianism the psychological basis of conservatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003) or even a virulent variety of political conservatism (Lavine et al., 2005). But contemporary scholar Karen Stenner (2005) makes a critical distinction between authoritarianism and conservatism. She argues that while authoritarianism is “an aversion” to different

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<sup>2</sup> To be accurate, Kinder and Winter (2001) appear to be saying that African Americans are “always more liberal than Whites” on issues with an overt or covert (but commonly assumed) racial dimension – for example affirmative action or social welfare spending (p. 441). In a footnote, Kinder also explains that the racial divide between Blacks and Whites predominates in racial and social welfare issues domains, but is “less impressive” in other areas including social issues, immigration, and foreign policy (see #3, p. 441). Theoretically, on issues where the racial divide is smaller or nonexistent (see Kinder, 1996; Schuman, 1997), African Americans have a lower probability of holding more liberal attitudes than Whites. Not coincidentally, culture war social issues, immigration, and foreign policy are also the issue domains in which the authoritarian predisposition is more likely to shape attitudes.

“people and beliefs,” status quo conservatism “is an aversion to...change,” and laissez-faire conservatism is simply a commitment to free market principles (pp. 150-154).

Authoritarian scholars also have fundamental disagreements concerning the provenance of authoritarianism. Most conclude that it is either a socially learned attitude, a powerful, inherited personality trait, or a predisposition whose development is abetted or constrained by social learning (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006; Duckitt, 1989; Duckitt, 1992; Feldman, 2003a; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et al., 2005; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Oesterreich, 2005; Rickert, 1998; Stenner, 2005). Other scholars sidestep the debate over the origins of authoritarianism entirely to focus on the study of its effects. These scholars stipulate in their work that authoritarianism precedes the formation of party identification and ideology, the inculcation of religious beliefs, and the learning and socialization provided by formal education (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

While scholars differ on the specific origin of authoritarianism, threat has always been thought to play an important role in the development of authoritarian behavior and the expression of authoritarian attitudes. Today, some argue that authoritarianism is activated by normative threat (Feldman, 2003a; Stenner, 2005). Others argue that physical threats are also important triggers of authoritarian attitudes and behavior (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). In either case, the linkage between threat and authoritarianism has remained a central tenet of authoritarian studies for more than seven decades (Altemeyer, 1996).

Whether authoritarianism is conceptualized as an individual personality trait forged in the crucible of childhood (Adorno et al., 1950), a socially-learned attitude

(Altemeyer, 1981; 1988, 1996, 2006), or a predisposition (Stenner, 2005), authoritarians are described as rigid thinkers who perceive the world in us-versus-them, Black-and-White terms (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; Duckitt, 1989; Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Jost et al., 2003; Lavine et al., 2005; Stenner, 2005). Uniformity and order are authoritarian watch words. Authoritarians obey. They seek order. They follow authoritarian leaders. They eschew diversity.

While contemporary scholarship has revived the study of authoritarianism, expanding our understanding of its origins, activation, and effect on political behavior, it has yet to reconcile the puzzle of African American authoritarians. How can African Americans be described simultaneously as one of the most liberal and most authoritarian groups in the United States?

This conundrum frames the question at the heart of this dissertation: Do African Americans hold authoritarian beliefs and exhibit authoritarian behaviors? And it provokes a cascade of other queries: How do African Americans compare to other racial groups when it comes to authoritarianism? Are African American authoritarians' worldviews and attitudes similar to White authoritarians? Are African American authoritarians' worldviews and attitudes dissimilar from their nonauthoritarian racial brethren? Does the exclusion of African Americans from leading contemporary research on authoritarianism raise questions about the universality of this research and its findings?

The exploration of these questions and their progeny lead to concerns not yet considered by contemporary students of authoritarianism. It brings African Americans back into the important study of authoritarianism. It adds to our understanding of

authoritarianism in America. And like Kinder's exploration of "both sides of the color line" in public opinion (Kinder, 1996, p. 7), which illuminated not only the racial divide between Blacks and Whites on overt and covert racial issues, but also the causal factors behind observed attitudinal gaps (Kinder & Winter, 2001),<sup>3</sup> this investigation is a corrective that acknowledges the important scholarly work already completed on authoritarianism and the importance of including African Americans in analyses to deepen and refine our understanding.

Of course, bringing African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism inevitably raises several concerns that go to the heart of authoritarian theory and the study of political behavior. As I will show, the conventional wisdom ascribed to by many scholars<sup>4</sup> that African Americans are so constrained by racial group identification that their political attitudes and behavior is monolithic (Dawson, 1995; Frymer, 1999; Haynie, 2001; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; McClain, Carew, Walton & Watts, 2009; Platt, 2008; Tate, 1994; Whitby, 2000) fractures when the opinions of Blacks are arrayed across the authoritarian scale. The theory that authoritarianism is the causal agent behind American political polarization (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) loses some of its empirical support when African Americans are included in the analysis. The universality of Stenner's (2005) theory of the *Authoritarian Dynamic*, in which intolerance is the outcome of an authoritarian predisposition activated by normative threat, comes into question when we learn that the data on which the theory rests only includes White

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<sup>3</sup> Kinder and Winter's (2001) finding of the important role differences between Blacks and Whites on the principles of equality of opportunity and limited government play in creating the racial divide (and the weaker or indifferent effects of social identity, meaning in-group identification and out-group resentment, social class, and material interests) form a starting point for considering the importance of values and worldview shared by Black and White authoritarians.

<sup>4</sup> Especially, as Nteta, Rhodes, and Tarsi (2015) note, those scholars who fall into the trap of limiting their definition of Black interests to issues of race, social welfare, and Black autonomy.

Americans.<sup>5</sup> And Hetherington and Weiler’s contention that it is nonauthoritarians – not authoritarians – who become more authoritarian when confronting physical threats forfeits claims to universality when it becomes apparent that the evidence offered in support of their argument is estimated only for “males who are not Black or Hispanic” (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). Quite unfortunately, Blacks, Latinos, Asians, other Americans who are not Caucasian, and women are all too often excluded when the important topic of authoritarianism is under scholarly examination.

If authoritarianism was originally conceptualized as a personality that only affects Whites (or to be more specific, White males), then the exclusion of African American, Latinos, and other minorities from contemporary analyses of authoritarianism would be completely defensible and not require explanation. But authoritarianism was originally conceived as a universal personality trait whose scope recognized no cultural, racial, geographic, or political boundaries. The authors of the first study to advance the concept of authoritarianism – authoritarian patient zero – clearly stipulated that their research was universally applicable (Adorno et al., 1950).<sup>6</sup>

At a minimum, contemporary scholars, whose works appear to make universal claims about authoritarianism but whose methods focus on just one racial group, need to either explicitly qualify their findings or provide compelling reasons for excluding what, according to census projections, will soon represent a majority of the American public from their analysis. Glossing over the exclusion of African Americans and Latinos from what is ostensibly an inquiry into a universally extant trait is not sufficient. If a

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<sup>5</sup> In his review of *The Authoritarian Dynamic*, Kinder (2007) writes: “Stenner’s analysis is confined to Whites. This is strange, since her aspirations are so general. She claims to be making an argument about a universal predisposition, one that works the same way across time and culture” (p. 265).

<sup>6</sup> They wrote: “when sections of the population not sampled in the present study are made the subjects of the research,” the findings “will still hold” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 26)



methodological choice is made to focus on one subgroup, that choice must be thoroughly explained as the universality of the findings resulting from it are also disclaimed.

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) assert that “African Americans are the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far” (p. 141),<sup>7</sup> a claim I verify empirically in Chapter 2. Given the prevalence of authoritarianism among Blacks, I contend that any theory of authoritarianism must include African Americans in its analysis or, at least, present very persuasive arguments for their exclusion. That is why I made the methodological choice in this dissertation to bring African Americans back into the contemporary scholarly discussion of authoritarianism. But following this methodological approach raises another fundamental question that begs an answer: Why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America?<sup>8</sup>

I suspect the answer to this question is rooted deeply in what we know about authoritarians and threat; what we are learning today about the genetic transfer of stress and anxiety from generation to generation; and what we bear witness to as Americans – the African American experience in the United States that began with slavery and remains battered today by social stigmatization and the institution of the New Jim Crow (Alexander, 2012; West, 1993). Physical, social, psychological, and personal threat courses through the history and everyday life of Black Americans.

Normative threat is said by Stenner (2005) to activate the authoritarian predisposition. This is the *Authoritarian Dynamic*. Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue, as did Lipset (1959) and countless other students of authoritarianism, that threat

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<sup>7</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) cite mean authoritarianism scores for Blacks and nonblacks from the 2004 ANES to support this claim (2009, p. 141). Nonblacks are defined as everyone in the sample who is not an African American.

<sup>8</sup> An ironic corollary to this question is: *How can the target of so much authoritarian ire in America also be the most authoritarian group in the country?*

and stress are drivers of authoritarian attitudes and behavior. To Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011), though, authoritarians are in a state of constant hypervigilance and hold authoritarian attitudes even when physical or normative threats are not extant. Thus, it is nonauthoritarians who become more authoritarian when a physical threat appears because authoritarians are always activated and “have little place to travel in terms of their opinions” (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 547).

Some scholars argue that authoritarianism is heritable with over 50 percent of the variance in the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale<sup>9</sup> attributable to genes (McCourt, Bouchard, Lykken, Tellegen, & Keyes, 1999). And recent epigenetic studies find that changes to genes – caused by stress and threat – can be passed down from generation to generation (Altemeyer, 2006; Fromm, 1941; Powell et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2010).

Thus, authoritarianism is activated and accentuated by threat. A predisposition to authoritarianism is genetically heritable. And the transmission of a predisposition to authoritarianism may be cumulative with threat and stress experienced over time building an authoritarian body burden that is passed down and grows from generation to generation.

Every day in America, African Americans confront more personal and physical threats than Whites (West, 1993). Many African Americans live in a constant state of hypervigilance to normative and physical threats because the society, culture, and environment surrounding them are constantly and consistently threatening. The

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<sup>9</sup> A set of questions developed and refined by Altemeyer over several decades (1981, 1988, 1996, 2006) whose objective is to measure authoritarianism. Critics contend that the RWA scale is tautological, measuring authoritarian behavior instead of an individual’s predisposition to authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). The four child-rearing questions used by Hetherington, Weiler, Suhay, Stenner, Feldman, and others to estimate authoritarianism are designed to avoid this tautology.

heightened levels of authoritarianism found among African Americans may simply be a protective response to the withering series of threats many Blacks face each day (Oesterreich, 2005; Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009).

Empirically, these threats are different than the dangers described by Stenner (2005), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). The regular threats faced by African Americans are both physical and normative. And they are not episodic. Threat is simply a constant, palpable fixture in the lives of many African Americans.

If threat plays an important role in activating authoritarianism, then African Americans' daily, asymmetric exposure to threat – from economic and educational inequalities to police brutality, symbolic and not-so-symbolic racism, and stigmatization – should differentially activate their authoritarian predisposition. The result, when survey questions probe for authoritarianism, should be a higher percentage of African Americans classified as authoritarians than Whites.

The differential exposure to threat that African Americans confront every day, however, is just part of the theoretical back story behind Black authoritarianism. Here is the rest of the tale.

Of all the racial and ethnic groups who have called America home over the last 400 years (with the exception of Native Americans), African Americans have confronted the most pervasive and consistent threats personally and as a group. From slavery to Emancipation, Plessy's Separate But Equal pronouncement and Jim Crow to the War on Drugs and the New Jim Crow (Alexander, 2012), generation after generation of African Americans have experienced systematic, unrelenting stress and threat to their well-being

and survival (West, 1993) – stress and threat that may be passed down epigenetically and reverberate from generation to generation (Altemeyer, 2006; Fromm, 1941; Powell et al., 2013; Wong et al., 2010). Thus, the constant exposure of African Americans to threat over four centuries may have made some African Americans more predisposed to authoritarianism than Whites. The result: because of their ancestors’ history of exposure to threat, some African Americans, who regularly confront immediate and systemic threats in America today, may also be more prone to an authoritarian reaction than other Americans – especially White Americans.

Setting aside the possible epigenetic mechanism behind African American authoritarianism for now,<sup>10</sup> many African Americans current, daily asymmetric exposure to threat and the stigma associated with their unequal and all-too-often separate social status provides a compelling explanation by itself for the high percentage of Blacks who are authoritarians. At face value, this simple explanation of the high percentage of African American authoritarians makes the exclusion of Blacks from contemporary studies of authoritarianism seem as unwise as it is unjustified.

Before treading too far onto this new scholarly shore, however, much evidence must be assembled, analyzed, and presented. I start this process in the next few pages with a brief review of 65 years of authoritarian study. This is a massive undertaking that could fill hundreds of pages. Since other scholars have already thoroughly covered this ground, I direct you to them (Martin, 2001; Meehan, 1993; M. B. Smith, 1997; R. M. Smith, 1993) and present in what follows a brief sketch of the literature on

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<sup>10</sup> A full analysis and discussion of this concept is far beyond the boundaries of this dissertation. A short review of recently published literature on the generational transmission of threat, however, is presented in Appendix D.

authoritarianism that is pertinent to my questions.<sup>11</sup> It is this literature that led me to the conclusion that bringing African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism was a methodologically necessary and important task.

This brief review is followed by a discussion of authoritarianism and its origins. I define what I mean by authoritarianism and expand on conventional accounts of authoritarianism's roots in individuals. My account of authoritarianism's origin goes beyond the ongoing genetic inheritance and social learning debate to explore the possibility that individuals' daily, personal experiences with inequality – and the social stigma that inevitably follows – may also activate and exacerbate authoritarianism. Including these threats, along with the stigmatization born of systemic inequality, creates the theoretical space in which the different rates of authoritarianism found between Whites and African Americans may be parsimoniously explained.

With the authoritarian literature reviewed fleetingly and my meaning of authoritarianism and description of its origin defined explicitly, I turn to a preview of the seven chapters that follow: the research questions tackled in each chapter, a summary of my findings, and the implications of these findings for the study of authoritarianism and political behavior.

### **Sixty-Five Years of Authoritarian Study**

*The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950) marks the beginning of the scholarly exploration of authoritarianism. Its investigation into the individual, psychological roots of the Fascist nightmare that descended on Europe from Nazi

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<sup>11</sup> An important part of this account, a review of the different scales used to measure authoritarianism, can be found at the beginning of Chapter 2. This chapter also analyzes the recent claim that the child-rearing scale used in surveys to measure authoritarianism is “cross- racially invalid” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014), meaning it is an unreliable measure of authoritarianism among African Americans and, as we find tucked away in a footnote in this paper (#23), Latinos as well. In Chapter 2, I find the claim invalid, not the scale.

Germany launched two thousand studies and hundreds of academic careers.<sup>12</sup> While its methodology was quickly questioned (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Lipset, 1960; Meloen, 1993; Stenner, 2005), its core observation that prejudice is a generalized attitude in those individuals who are intolerant – an “entire way of thinking about those who are ‘different’” (Myers, 2010, p. 320) – is the foundation on which the studies of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism that followed are based.<sup>13</sup>

From the observation that anti-Semites were also predisposed toward intolerance to others, Adorno et al. (1950) hypothesized that the systemic prejudice observed in some individuals could be measured by a series of questions probing nine distinct, covarying traits. Answers to these questions could be summed and then arrayed across a scale. This measurement was called the F-scale<sup>14</sup> (F for Fascism) and the psychological dimension it estimated – *The Authoritarian Personality*.

The unfalsifiable, Freudian basis of *The Authoritarian Personality*, which argued that the locus of authoritarian behavior is “child training as carried forward in a setting of family life” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 6), the faulty design of F-scale questions that created answer bias through acquiescent responses, and the multidimensional reality of the F-scale’s intended unidimensional output, led to withering criticism of Adorno’s methodology (Christie, 1954; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Meloen, 1993). It also led to new attempts at measuring authoritarianism, including the Dogmatism scale (Lipset, 1959), different Balanced F-scales (Rokeach, 1960), and the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale (Ray, 1972).

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<sup>12</sup> Forty years after the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950) more than 2,000 papers and studies on authoritarianism had been written (Meloen, 1993).

<sup>13</sup> Intolerant individuals’ propensity to prejudice across different outgroups has been found by numerous scholars, including, for example, Allport (1935), Adorno et al. (1950), and Altemeyer (2006).

<sup>14</sup> It is also called the California F-scale.

Altemeyer (1981) introduced the Right-Wing Authoritarian scale (RWA) as a solution to the measurement problems intrinsic to the F-scale. The RWA scale was constructed on the tenets of Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1969; Wilson & Patterson, 1968). It added the influence of the environment in which children and young adults develop to parental child-rearing practices as a factor in the development of an authoritarian individual. It was a welcome step forward from the Freudian theoretical basis of the F-scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006). To correct for the multidimensionality of the F-scale, Altemeyer streamlined and focused the original, nine dimensional description of the authoritarian personality type to three central, covarying attitude clusters that theoretically produced a unidimensional measure. Altemeyer (1981) posited that authoritarians submit to authority, prefer the conventional, and are aggressive toward out groups (those who question authority as well as those who are deemed unconventional) and designed a 34-item questionnaire to assess each individual's propensity to authoritarian attitudes. Empirically driven, rigorously tested, and assiduously refined, RWA is an exceptional tool for measuring authoritarian attitudes. But its inherent strength is also its fundamental weakness. Questions from which the RWA scale is built are tautological with the authoritarianism in individuals the scale seeks to estimate (Stenner, 2005).<sup>15</sup> Following Stenner's (2005) and Feldman's (2003a) critique of the scale, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) write that the reason the RWA scale "is so predictive of prejudice and intolerance is that it is, itself, largely a measure of

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<sup>15</sup> Stenner (2005) and Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that the RWA scale is tautological because many of the questions on which the scale is based are specific political or issue questions that measure authoritarian behavior, not an individual's predisposition to authoritarianism. The child-rearing scale measures an individual's predisposition to authoritarianism. Other criticisms of the RWA scale include that it fails to make adequate distinctions between conservatism and authoritarianism (Stenner, 2005) and only measures authoritarianism on the right side of the ideological spectrum (Ray, 1983; Shils, 1954). Altemeyer addressed the obvious ideological bias in the RWA by attempting to develop a scale to estimate the authoritarianism of individuals on the left side of the political spectrum.

prejudice and intolerance” (p. 47). As such, the scale is hopeless as an estimator of the underlying predisposition toward authoritarianism – the provenance of authoritarianism – but an excellent measurement of authoritarian preferences (Stenner, 2005).<sup>16</sup>

A theoretically better device for measuring an individual’s predisposition to authoritarianism was added by the National Election Study to its 1992 survey (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).<sup>17</sup> This tool is a four-item set of child-rearing questions that divorce the measurement of authoritarianism from the dependent variables authoritarianism is supposed to explain. Starting with the introduction “Which one do you think is more important for a child to have?” survey respondents are asked to choose from a series of four pairs, including:

- Independence or Respect for Elders?
- Curiosity or Good Manners?
- Obedience or Self-Reliance?
- Considerate or Well Behaved?

Answers within each pair are rotated randomly. On some surveys, respondents are also allowed to answer “both.”<sup>18</sup>

For each question, an authoritarian answer is scored 1.<sup>19</sup> A nonauthoritarian answer is scored 0. And in surveys where “Both” is an answer option, the value of both is .5.

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<sup>16</sup> Duckitt disagrees on this point arguing that the scale should be reconceptualized as “a set of three related ideological dimensions” instead of “a unidimensional personality construct” (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010, p. 685).

<sup>17</sup> Child-rearing questions designed to measure authoritarianism first appeared on the General Social Survey (GSS) in 1973. From 1973 to 1985, 13 child-trait questions were asked. Starting in 1986, this list was paired down to five questions. The GSS questions do not perfectly match the questions used by NES and other surveys used by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Stenner (2005), and Feldman (1997, 2003a) and analyzed for this dissertation.

<sup>18</sup> These surveys include the 2008 and 2012 ANES polls.

<sup>19</sup> Authoritarian answers are Respect for Elders, Good Manners, Obedience, and Well Behaved.



Respondent scores for all questions are then summed and divided by the number of questions to arrive at an authoritarian scale that varies from 0 (representing the most nonauthoritarian) to 1 (indicating the most authoritarian predisposition).<sup>20</sup>

These questions, or slight variations of them, have been used for more than two decades by political scientists whose work has pushed authoritarianism back onto the academic agenda (Adorno et al., 1950; Feldman, 2003a, 2003b; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).<sup>21</sup> Stenner's succinct explanation of the theoretical basis of the four questions elegantly sums up their unique utility: "Child-rearing values... can effectively and unobtrusively reflect one's fundamental orientations toward authority/uniformity versus autonomy/difference," the key dimension on which authoritarianism is arrayed (Stenner, 2005, p. 24). The four-item child-rearing battery "enables us to distinguish authoritarian predisposition from authoritarian 'products' (attitudes)... which are sometimes manifested but sometimes not, and whose specific content may vary across time and space" (Stenner, 2005, p. 24).

Stenner's (2005) words have profound implications for the measurement and study of authoritarianism. First, if the specific content of authoritarian attitudes varies across time and space, measurements of authoritarian attitudes – like the RWA –confront not only temporal definitional hurdles, but also cultural ones. For a scale based primarily

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<sup>20</sup> Developing a 0-1 scale from the child-rearing questions is the approach used by Feldman and Stenner (1997), Stenner (2005), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), and Hetherington and Suhay (2011). I use this approach throughout this dissertation instead of a factor analysis in order to more accurately compare my findings to theirs.

<sup>21</sup> The four child-rearing questions used to estimate authoritarianism asks respondents: "Which one do you think is more important for a child to have?" Then, respondents are presented with four pairs of answers: "1. Independence or Respect for Elders? 2. Curiosity or Good Manners? 3. Obedience or Self-Reliance? and 4. Considerate or Well Behaved?" Answers in each pair are rotated randomly. In some surveys, respondents are also allowed to answer "Both." Authoritarian answers are Respect for Elders, Good Manners, Obedience, and Well Behaved. Answers are aggregated and an authoritarian scale is constructed that typically varies from 0 (not authoritarian at all) to 1 (most authoritarian).

on what children learn from the environment in which they develop, this is an exceptionally vexing problem. Second, if authoritarian attitudes are sometimes extant and sometimes not, scales that use attitudes to identify authoritarians may or may not do an accurate job, depending on whether one's authoritarianism is activated when the scale questions are asked. Third, the on again, off again nature of authoritarian activation theorized by Stenner presents a difficult hurdle for a recent claim, advanced by Pérez and Hetherington (2014).

Pérez and Hetherington (2014) argue that the four child-rearing questions used to estimate authoritarianism are an unreliable measure of authoritarianism among African Americans.<sup>22</sup> One of the two arguments on which their claim rests is the theoretical expectation that authoritarian attitudes are expressed consistently in survey research.<sup>23</sup> Since African Americans did not consistently demonstrate authoritarian attitudes on policy questions from the two surveys examined by Pérez and Hetherington, they conclude that the child-rearing scale is “cross-racially invalid.”<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> While the focus of the paper was the “cross-racial invalidity” of the child-rearing scale as a measure of authoritarianism among Blacks, Pérez and Hetherington also find the scale overstates the authoritarianism of Latinos (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, pp. 13, footnote 23).

<sup>23</sup> The second argument on which Pérez and Hetherington's claim is based states that the questions that comprise the scale are understood differently by members of different races. In other words, the understanding of one or more questions that are part of the scale is variant (varies) between or among races. If African Americans and Whites interpret the child-rearing questions differently (variantly), the latent, unobserved variable (authoritarianism) estimated by the questions will have a different meaning for members of each race.

<sup>24</sup> The nomenclature here is tortured and easily confused. Here is what it means: Question invariance means the latent variable is valid. Question variance indicates the latent variable is invalid. When the meaning of questions is interpreted differently by different groups, the questions are variant. Variant questions produce a latent variable that is invalid across groups. When the two groups interpreting the questions variantly are defined in terms of race, the resulting scale is said to be, by Pérez and Hetherington, cross-racially invariant. This means, quite simply, that the latent variable produced by the questions has a different meaning for the different racial groups tested. See Chapter 2 for a full discussion of Pérez and Hetherington's two arguments in support of their claim that the child-rearing scale is cross-racially variant and invalid.

The inconsistent demonstration of authoritarian attitudes by African Americans found by Pérez and Hetherington (2014), however, may be succinctly explained by Stenner's (2005) *Authoritarian Dynamic* theory. In other words, authoritarian attitudes were not consistently displayed by African Americans on the policy questions from the two surveys analyzed by Pérez and Hetherington because the authoritarianism of African Americans was inactive when the survey questions were asked.

The second argument on which Pérez and Hetherington (2014) rest their claim that the child-rearing scale is an inaccurate estimator of authoritarianism among African Americans is a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis of scale question invariance from the results of the 2008 ANES. While Pérez and Hetherington's findings of scale variance between Whites and African Americans on the 2008 ANES is absolutely accurate, meaning the child-rearing questions on this may have been interpreted differently by members of each race, a multi-group examinations of the child-rearing questions on four other polls finds the answers invariant and, therefore, valid between Whites and African Americans. As I will demonstrate later, the difference between valid and invalid scale questions is simply the answer categories offered. Polls that allow "both" as an answer to the four authoritarian question pairs produce scales that are invalid between Whites and African Americans. Polls that do not offer "both" as an answer option, forcing respondents to choose between answer pairs, produce estimations of authoritarianism that are valid across race.

Sixty-five years after Adorno et al.'s (1950) *Authoritarian Personality* was published, the study of authoritarianism is again at a cross roads. While authoritarianism is a predisposition that theoretically knows no cultural, social, racial, or political

boundaries,<sup>25</sup> the central, contemporary theories of authoritarian activation and polarization are predicated on data that excludes the most authoritarian racial group in America – African Americans – from analysis. While the scientific rationale for excluding African Americans from these studies of authoritarianism remains both unclear and contested, much of Hetherington, Weiler, and Suhay’s work on authoritarianism is based on data from which African Americans and, at times, Latinos are excluded (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Stenner’s work (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005) also focuses exclusively on White, non-Hispanics.

Political scientists have learned a great deal about how the authoritarian predisposition affects the behavior and attitudes of Whites. It is time to expand research on authoritarianism to African Americans who, in the future with other minorities, will soon comprise a majority of the population in the United States.

Exploring why African Americans are more authoritarian than Whites, and understanding how, when, and under what conditions authoritarianism shapes African American behavior is an important undertaking for anyone truly concerned about securing the future of American democracy. The first step toward discovering answers to these questions is clearly defining what authoritarianism is and identifying its theoretical provenance.

### **Defining Authoritarianism, Identifying its Origins**

There are many variations on the scholarly definition of authoritarianism. Given the multiple ways in which authoritarianism has been conceptualized and described since

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<sup>25</sup> Adorno et al. (1950) studied “non-Jewish, White, native-born, middle-class Americans,” but asserted their findings “will still hold” across “the population not sampled” (p. 26).

*The Authoritarian Personality* was first published (Adorno et al., 1950), defining what it is and specifying its origin is central to starting any inquiry on solid ground.

My definition of authoritarianism begins with Altemeyer's three-part description of what authoritarians do.<sup>26</sup> Authoritarians submit to authority, prefer the conventional, and may act aggressively to those out-groups who question authority, are deemed unconventional, or both (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006). To Altemeyer's foundation, I add four other aspects that are components of different contemporary definitions of authoritarians.

First, authoritarian submission to authority is deeply rooted and compelled. Authoritarians follow authority because they seek order (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Authoritarians' need for order impels their submission to authority.

Second, authoritarians' need for order compels them to act to defend it. When usurpers – through their actions or simply their existence – question, challenge, or seek to change accepted order and norms, authoritarians rise aggressively to defend them. On this point, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that authoritarians, perpetually in a state of hypervigilance, are always threatened and activated. Normative and physical threats do not further agitate their authoritarian predisposition; they are already on alert. Instead, it is nonauthoritarians, when confronting physical threats, who act more like authoritarians (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). By contrast, Stenner's (2005) theory of *The Authoritarian Dynamic* posits that the innate authoritarian predisposition in individuals is activated by

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<sup>26</sup> Altemeyer streamlined Adorno et al.'s (1950) original nine authoritarian personality traits to three to arrive at what he argued is a unidimensional measure of authoritarianism – the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 1981). As noted earlier, Duckitt (1989) contends the RWA scale should not be operationalized as a unidimensional scale (Altemeyer, 1981).

normative threat. This produces the intolerant attitudes and aggressive behavior that makes authoritarianism such a potential menace to democracy and democratic thinking.

The contours of what constitutes a normative threat to authoritarians, however, are not as simple as one might assume. In Stenner's (2005) account, the authoritarian predisposition seeks to balance "group authority and uniformity... and individual autonomy and diversity" (p. 14). As such, authoritarians "want to be part of some collective... some system" to which they and others conform to protect societal uniformity (p. 18). Authoritarians' search for uniformity, singularity, and unanimity of purpose takes primacy over specific group identification and particular norms. Thus, theories that put group identification and defense – driven by threats to groups, competition among groups, or inequality between groups (Duckitt, 1989, 1992) – at the center of authoritarianism and its activation do not fit well with Stenner's definition. Authoritarians will "abandon group authorities and norms when they no longer serve the primary goal of enhancing uniformity and minimizing difference" (Stenner, 2005, p. 54).

Third, authoritarians' sense of order is not necessarily or solely defined by worldly powers. To authoritarians, there are higher powers that delineate right from wrong and good from evil. There are transcendent ways of behaving and being that are enduring, everlasting, and the root of balance and order (Feldman, 2003a). These authorities are "morally and ontologically superior" to worldly authority (Wilson, 1973, p. 858). For order to exist in the world, worldly authorities must submit to this higher authority. That higher authority may be other worldly or a text (for example, the Constitution) imbued with enlightened, transcendent power when its meaning is interpreted originally.

Finally, I stipulate, as other students of authoritarianism have, that authoritarianism is universal and transcends society, culture, politics, and race. Authoritarianism is not limited to Europeans or Whites. It does not discriminate. It is found in every culture and among members of every race (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 2006; Christie, 1954; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Ray, 1983; Shils, 1954; Stenner, 2005). Studies of authoritarianism must treat it as a universal constant or explain explicitly why it is not.

Given the continuing scholarly debate over the provenance of authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 35), defining its origins is another important housekeeping task to complete before turning to the questions at the heart of this dissertation. Four primary causal explanations of authoritarianism have been offered. These include abusive, controlling parents – the Freudian explanation (Adorno et al., 1950); social learning – Altemeyer’s attitudinal approach (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006); social dominance orientation – the need of certain individuals to identify with powerful groups (Duckitt, 1989); and Stenner’s (2005) dispositionally rooted and environmentally influenced hybrid.<sup>27 28</sup>

The Freudian account of authoritarianism’s origin was thoroughly kicked to the curb within a decade of its introduction for two reasons.<sup>29</sup> First, the F-scale developed by Adorno et al. to measure authoritarianism suffered from acquiescent bias response and included questions tapping behaviors other than authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981;

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<sup>27</sup> By himself and in collaboration with Stenner, Feldman’s work contributed greatly to the development of Stenner’s thinking (Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

<sup>28</sup> Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) work skips over the origin debate to focus on the effects of authoritarianism, stipulating that authoritarianism “is causally prior to the variables it affects” (2009, p. 36)

<sup>29</sup> By the “1960s, *The Authoritarian Personality* was treated as the social-science version of the Edsel” (Wolfe, 2005, p. B12).

Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Stenner, 2005). Second, the Freudian linkage of authoritarianism to childhood trauma was not considered scientifically falsifiable (Altemeyer, 2006; Stenner, 2005). As such, the Freudian account of authoritarianism is a poor candidate for revivification.<sup>30</sup>

The pervasiveness of authoritarians across cultures, societies, and racial and ethnic groups, and the persistence of authoritarianism across time, makes the socially learned theory of authoritarian development favored by Altemeyer empirically untenable (Stenner, 2005). How can authoritarianism exist across so many different cultures and societies (and throughout so many different historical periods) if, following Bandura's (1968) Social Learning Theory, it is only learned by children and young adults from their parents and particular parts of the environment in which they develop? Certainly, a theoretically stable, pervasive, and similar set of covarying traits cannot be solely the outcome of a set of influences that varies so fundamentally across families, cultures, and societies.

Altemeyer's research also rules out Duckitt's Social Dominance Orientation (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, 1989) as a cause of authoritarianism. Altemeyer (1996) concludes that the "need for group identification" is not a source of authoritarianism (1996, p. 85).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Milburn's (2014) recent paper on authoritarianism and childhood experiences, however, offers an intriguing examination of the relationship between political attitudes in adults and harsh childhood punishments.

<sup>31</sup> Both Altemeyer's RWA scale, based on Social Learning Theory, and Duckitt's Social Dominance Orientation (SDO), an outgrowth of Social Dominance Theory, are excellent estimators of prejudicial attitudes. Research indicates, however, that RWA and SDO capture "different motivational bases for... prejudice that differentially interact with intergroup conditions to predict prejudice" (Altemeyer, 1981, p. 73).



My explanation of authoritarianism's roots starts with the individual (not with in-groups and out-groups<sup>32</sup>) and sprouts from three conceptual seeds. First, authoritarianism is in part an inherited predisposition. Second, it is in part a socially learned attitude. And third, adding to the current debate over the origin of authoritarianism, I submit that it is shaped by economic, educational, and societal inequality and the stigmatization of, and threat and stress experienced by, individuals and groups who are deemed unequal. As such, the environmental drivers of authoritarianism go well beyond the direct teaching and imitation mechanisms described by Altemeyer. I contend that perceived and individually experienced inequality – the stigmas that come with it, the constant threat it poses, and the ceaseless anxiety and uncertainty it creates – must be part of any explanation of the origins of authoritarianism. The genetic and socially learned theories of authoritarianism's provenance are well worn paths. The elevation of personal threat and inequality as a root cause of authoritarianism is new territory.

Stenner (2005) stipulated that authoritarianism is neither a product of nature nor socially learned nurture – seeds one and two in my account. Authoritarianism is an outcome of the interplay of both. In other words, while authoritarianism starts as a product of genetic inheritance (personality and innate cognitive ability), environmental factors (primarily social learning as articulated by Altemeyer) play an important role in its nurturing and expression.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Thus, I reject Duckitt's (1989) group identification theory as the root of authoritarianism. As Stenner (2005, p. 54) contends "in-group identification is most appropriately considered a consequence" of "some general desire...to transfer sovereignty to...some collective order rather than an identification with a particular group." Altemeyer (1996) concludes "authoritarianism does not appear to be *basically* caused by a need for group identification" (p. 85).

<sup>33</sup> Specifically, Stenner (2005) argues "a variety of factors may influence the development of authoritarian predisposition...one may be inclined by personality to find difference exciting, or frightening; may be cognitively able to deal with complexity, or unable to understand that different is not necessarily worse;

Stenner's (2005) account of authoritarianism's origin is well supported. While the genetic mechanism that transfers the authoritarian predisposition from one generation to the next has not yet been identified by biologists, studies of authoritarianism in twins, which used the RWA scale to estimate authoritarian attitudes, found that approximately 50% of phenotypic variance was genetic and 35% of the variance was environmental (McCourt et al., 1999).<sup>34 35</sup> The authoritarian genetic inheritance is expressed primarily through one of the Big Five personality traits – openness to experience (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, & Dowling, 2011; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; McAdams & Pals, 2006; McCrae, 1996; Stenner, 2005). Openness to experience and authoritarianism, again estimated using Altemeyer's RWA scale, are negatively correlated and the correlation is significant (Butler, 2000; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Trapnell, 1994). In short, the more authoritarian a person is, the less open he or she is to new experiences— a personality trait that is primarily determined by genes (Lau & Redlawsk, 2006).<sup>36</sup>

Stenner's (2005) articulation of authoritarianism as a genetically inherited predisposition that is also environmentally shaped was a marked departure from scholarly conventional wisdom. As Lavine et al. (2005) wrote in the same year that Stenner's *Authoritarian Dynamic* was published, most contemporary scholars at the time considered authoritarianism “a set of ‘ideological beliefs’ or ‘social attitudes of a broad

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may be socialized to believe that the individual is sovereign, or that individuals must submit to group authority” (pp. 15-16)

<sup>34</sup> The remaining fifteen percent was allocated to “common environment or assortative mating” (McCourt et al., 1999). Assortative mating occurs when people with similar outlooks and background mate.

<sup>35</sup> Altemeyer (1996) also extensively analyzed research on the possibility of the role of genes in shaping authoritarianism. He concluded that the research does “not support the notion of fascism genes and instead direct[s] our attention to environmental influences” (p. 75).

<sup>36</sup> While the individual predisposition to a closed mind is passed on from generation to generation (Lipset, 1959), it is exacerbated by another individually inherited and environmentally conditioned capacity – cognitive ability. Authoritarians are demonstrably less facile cognitively than nonauthoritarians (Stenner, 2005). Some aspects of an authoritarian's cognitive limitations are innate. Other components of an authoritarian's cognitive impairments are environmentally shaped (Altemeyer, 1996).

nature' rather than... a basic dimension of personality" (Lavine et al., 2005, p. 220). The primary mechanism for developing authoritarian attitudes was Bandura's (1968) Social Learning Model as interpreted by Altemeyer (1996). It represents the second seed in my account of the origins of authoritarianism.

Offering a much needed replacement to the discredited psychodynamic description of the origins of authoritarianism, Altemeyer applied Bandura's (1977) Social Learning Theory to the study of authoritarianism and hypothesized that authoritarian attitudes "are shaped by the reinforcements and punishments administered by parents and others as we grow up" (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 78). As with Adorno et al.'s (1950) work, Altemeyer contends that through "direct teachings" parents play an important role in shaping authoritarianism in their offspring. But he adds that others play an important role too, including "other determined socializers, such as day-care staff, older siblings, grandparents, and Sunday school teachers... [who] can serve as models... [a] child might imitate" (Altemeyer, 1996, p. 79). Thus, social learning, through "direct teachings" and "imitation," is the crucible that shapes individual attitudes and each person's proclivity toward authoritarian behavior. According to Altemeyer, "we will learn as much or more from observing others as we will from the personal blessings and batterings bestowed" on us throughout life (1996, p. 78).

The effects of the blessings and batterings of everyday life on individuals – overlooked and devalued as a factor in the development of authoritarianism in individuals in the contemporary authoritarian literature – is the third and final seed in my account of the roots of authoritarianism.<sup>37</sup> I hypothesize that the threat, uncertainty, anxiety, and

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<sup>37</sup> Except when life lessons are administered by parents or observed and imitated by children and adolescents.

feelings of vulnerability that inequality produces in individuals, and the social stigma that comes with it, activate and feed authoritarianism not only in the present generation, but also, possibly, across generations. As such, the everyday facts of life confronted by some individuals, what could be called their individual environmental circumstances when inequality and unequal opportunity are the principle reality, have as much of a role in shaping authoritarianism as the direct teachings and imitation mechanisms that Altemeyer (1981) extrapolated from Bandura's (1968) Social Learning Theory.

From the extensive literature on threat, which began with Fromm (1941) and continues today with Stenner's (2005) theory of *The Authoritarian Dynamic*, Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) recent article, and especially Henry's (2008) and Brandt and Henry's (2012) work on inequality and the threat of stigmatization among ethnic groups and women, we know that perceived and actual threats can trigger and deepen authoritarian attitudes and behavior. I argue that the threat and anxiety produced in individuals by their personal experiences with pervasive and persistent inequality – its real, every day consequences as well as the long-term personal malaise it can manifest – is another important factor at the root of authoritarianism.

When discussing the origins of authoritarianism, Stenner (2005) notes in passing that “difficult life conditions may dispose those less privileged individuals to authoritarian and intolerant stances via some basic ‘frustration aggression’ (Berkowitz, 1998) mechanism” (p. 148). I contend that the feelings of vulnerability, anxiety, danger, and threat caused by unrelenting economic, environmental, and educational inequality,<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> From insufficient prenatal care to poor nutrition during childhood, exposure to lead paint and arsenic, and attendance at chronically underperforming schools, educational, economic, and environmental inequality creates conditions that can lead to emotional and cognitive impairments and may also exacerbate an individual's predisposition to authoritarianism.

as well as the stigma that inequality is known to create, should not be a footnote in a review of the lynchpins of authoritarian behavior. It must be a central consideration. If threat plays a key role in shaping authoritarian behavior, then the personal, group, and institutional threat felt by those who are treated unequally in society cannot be ignored when accounting for the origins of authoritarianism.

When we account for these asymmetrically experienced threats, the high percentage of African American authoritarians no longer seems a statistical anomaly and the exclusion of African Americans from contemporary analyses of authoritarianism seems unwarranted. In what follows, I bring African Americans back into the discussion of authoritarianism while leaving it to others to examine the role of threat in the development of African American authoritarians.

### **Data and Models**

Before turning to an outline of the chapters that follow, a short word about the data used throughout this dissertation and the independent variables included in each model is in order. Twelve national surveys form the foundation for my hypotheses and observations. These surveys represent all of the publicly available or privately accessible national surveys (that I am aware of) in which authoritarianism is estimated using the child-rearing battery of questions. The child-rearing item approach for estimating authoritarianism is my tool of choice because of its methodological superiority. A brief description of the surveys that asked these questions and were used in this dissertation is included in Appendix B.

In addition to authoritarianism, six other independent variables were used in the models that form the empirical backbone of my work. These variables are gender, age,

education, church attendance, party identification, and race. My parsimonious use of independent variables is based in theory and geared to avoid the prevalent and “highly dysfunctional habit” of “kitchen sink models that ignore the effects of collinearity” (Schrodts, 2014, p. 2).

Following Hetherington, Weiler, Suhay, and Stenner (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005), I stipulate theoretically that authoritarianism is a predisposition that may be a partially inherited trait and arises causally prior to the political attitudes and behavior that it affects. As such, it occurs before ideology, partisanship, other “isms,” and independent variables like income that clog the linear models of so much political science.

Authoritarian theory also specifies that it predicts a broad range of behaviors and attitudes that cut across ideological, income, education, race, and partisan lines. From attitudes about good and evil, presidential power, the place of “inferior groups” in society, linked fate, the central tenets of Madisonian democracy, fear of “the other,” aggressive behavior, and racial resentment to perceptions about immigrants and immigration, support for strong leaders, and the importance of obedience, authoritarianism, as I will demonstrate in later chapters, predicts behavior while other “usual suspects” independent variables just tag along. Thus, authoritarianism is the causal prior from which, for example, ideology and income are highly correlated outgrowths.

I include gender and age in each model because they are basic demographics. Race is added because the difference between White and African Americans’ authoritarianism is fundamental to my thesis. Even though I am already one step beyond Achen’s (2002) rule of three independent variables, Stenner’s (2005) finding that

education, primarily, and church attendance, secondarily, are major learned sources of authoritarianism led me to include both in all models.

Finally, I reluctantly added partisan identification because all of the behaviors I am studying are linked to politics. All other possible independent variables, including ideology and income, are excluded from my analysis because the garbage in, garbage out logic of garbage can models detracts from rather than adds to understanding.

### **The Chapters that Follow**

The chapters that follow this introduction seek to shed light on the questions at the core of this dissertation and the conundrum at its heart: How can African Americans be authoritarian, liberal, and attitudinally homogeneous simultaneously?

The exploration begins in Chapter 2 with a brief discussion of the different scales that have been used to measure authoritarianism since the 1950s. After reviewing the methodological problems presented by successive attempts to measure authoritarianism, I focus on the recent criticism levied against the four-question child-rearing scale.

The child-rearing scale is used exclusively in this dissertation to estimate authoritarianism. It is the measurement of choice for many contemporary authoritarian scholars. One of those scholars now argues that African Americans and Whites understand the questions that comprise the scale differently (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). As such, the scale is said to be cross-racially invalid, meaning the high incidence of authoritarianism found by the scale among African Americans is inaccurate.<sup>39</sup>

Using a multi-group confirmatory factor analysis of data from six surveys, I demonstrate that the variance problem identified by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) in one

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<sup>39</sup> Later in the article (see #23) it is also argued that the scale is invariant between Latinos and Whites, leaving a scale that appears to only measure authoritarianism among Whites.

survey is a result of the wording of question answers and not different understandings of the questions. I conclude that the child-rearing questions are indeed a good estimator of an individual's latent predisposition to authoritarianism, and predictor of authoritarian behavior irrespective of race, when question answers are limited to paired responses that omit "both" as a response.

With the issue of scale validity settled, I turn in Chapter 3 to describing African American authoritarians demographically. Using data from the University of Massachusetts's module on the 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, I make an intriguing discovery. African American authoritarians are less likely to believe their individual fate is linked to their racial group and more likely to be racially resentful of other African Americans than nonauthoritarians who are Black. Additionally, I find that standard demographics, including income, ideology, educational attainment, gender, and partisan identification are not associated with authoritarianism among African Americans. Regular church attendance, however, is associated with authoritarianism in African Americans as it is in Whites.

African American authoritarians' rejection of linked fate and the negative racial stereotype of Blacks in America lead to the observation that African American authoritarians may choose a different or additional group with which to identify. This group celebrates the mainstream norms of American individualism and self-determination, is traditionally moral, obeys authority, and eschews diversity. This is the group known as American authoritarians.

The push and pull of authoritarianism and race on African Americans' perceptions and attitudes, identified in this chapter, underlies and underscores the



discussion in every chapter that follows. It also debunks the widely held assumptions that African American opinion is homogeneous and African Americans have no choice but to embrace their identity as a member of a racially-stereotyped underclass. Some African Americans, in this case Black authoritarians, choose identities that do not fit the stereotype assigned to them by society.

Chapter 4 takes a quick detour from the discussion of authoritarianism and race to examine in more detail a threshold question that must be answered before exploring when, where, and how authoritarianism will affect the behavior of African Americans. I ask: Why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America? I contend that heightened authoritarian attitudes and behavior found in African Americans are the logical outcomes of the unrelenting stresses many African Americans experience daily.

Chapter 5 details the striking similarities between African American and White authoritarians' fundamental beliefs and values (or worldview) and the stark differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans on this same dimension. Worldview, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) define it, is "a distinct way of understanding political reality" that "shap[es] political behavior and identity" (2009, p. 64). A person's worldview is not produced out of the ether, nor does it exist in a vacuum. It is "tethered to an underlying predisposition" (2009, p. 64). In this case, that predisposition is authoritarianism.

The four components of the authoritarian worldview examined in this chapter flow from my definition of authoritarianism. They include authoritarians':

- demand for established and accepted norms and desire for order that maintains them,

- rigid, black-and-white view of the world and willing submissiveness to authority that works to insure the order they desire,
- belief in higher powers that supersede worldly authority – especially when that authority does not support enduring and ageless conventions, and
- aggression toward those who flaunt norms and conventions or question the worldly or transcendent authority that defends them.

I demonstrate that authoritarianism not only replaces some African Americans' allegiance to their racial identity, but also shapes their worldview. Thus, while African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differ in both group identification and worldview, the core beliefs and values of White and African American authoritarians are, at times, remarkably similar.

The effects of African American and White authoritarians' similar worldviews on issues and policies that theoretically engage the authoritarian predisposition (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005) are examined in Chapter 6. I demonstrate that authoritarianism is a powerful force that structures not only many African Americans' values and beliefs, but also their political and policy preferences.

A review of two decades of opinion research reveals that African American and White authoritarians hold similar attitudes on many of the wedge issues that Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue are at the core of the worldview evolution that is restructuring politics and driving political polarization among White Americans today. From gay rights to the effects of terrorism on civil rights, immigration, feelings toward political figures and out-groups, the role of the CIA, and even the legalization of marijuana, African American and White authoritarians are often on the same attitudinal page while

nonauthoritarian and authoritarian African Americans appear to be reading from quite different books.

Chapters 3, 5, and 6 demonstrate unequivocally that racial identity does not insulate some African Americans from the siren demands of their authoritarian predisposition. The worldviews, issue preferences, and racial identification of African Americans authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differ in ways that are measurable and meaningful. Contemporary scholarship that contends African Americans are politically monolithic and move en masse must be reassessed to account for this reality.

Next, Chapter 7 examines Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) important theory that political polarization in America is an outcome of the worldview evolution caused by authoritarianism. Their theory is based on an analysis of data from which African Americans are deleted. Thus, the most authoritarian segment of the American electorate, which is attitudinally similar to other authoritarians on issues that are part of the hypothesized worldview evolution, is excluded from the analysis of authoritarianism's effect on partisanship. I find that when African Americans are included in this analysis and the time period studied is extended to 2012, some of the polarizing effects found by Hetherington and Weiler are muted. The core thesis that authoritarianism plays a role in partisan polarization remains intact, but the magnitude of the effect is less than what Hetherington and Weiler initially found.

Given the intransigence of partisan identification, it may simply take longer for authoritarians to change identification than Hetherington and Weiler expected or, quite possibly, the right event may not yet have come along to catalyze the sorting more completely. The candidacy of Donald Trump may be the precipitating event or inflection

point that spurs a partisan realignment driven by authoritarianism. In either case, the 2016 election year provides an important laboratory and impetus for further study of authoritarianism in American politics.

My final chapter returns briefly to the core questions raised at the beginning of this dissertation. I ask: What has been learned from this investigation of authoritarianism and, most importantly, what may this learning mean to the study of political science? Authoritarianism has been described as the taproot of intolerance and a predisposition or attitude that is antithetical to democracy. If it is, then clearly defining it, understanding its origins, and measuring its prevalence as well as identifying what may provoke or assuage it is an important task on the political science agenda.

The threats and danger found in the unequal enclaves of urban and rural America and the deep-seated feelings of insecurity that inevitably accompany them harken back hauntingly to the “increasing isolation and powerlessness of the individual” identified by Fromm (1941, p. 241) as the breeding ground of authoritarianism. As the threats confronting the world – from climate change and terrorism to economic inequality – go global, understanding the authoritarian reaction and its causes may be an important step to securing a civil future in America and around the globe.

## CHAPTER 2

### MEASURING AUTHORITARIANISM

The child-rearing questions used since 1992<sup>40</sup> and throughout this dissertation to estimate authoritarianism have recently been called “cross-racially invalid” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, p. 1). The cross-racial validity of the child-rearing questions was examined by Pérez and Hetherington using Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA). MGCFA allows for the testing of variance between different groups’ understanding of questions that comprise a latent variable. In the case of authoritarianism, the child-rearing questions are the observed items tested for variance and authoritarianism is the latent, unobserved variable produced from the factoring or scaling of questions. If different groups of people have markedly different understandings of the child-rearing questions, their answers to the questions are “variant” and invalid between groups. On the other hand, invariance in question understanding between groups equals valid questions and a valid scale.

Put simply, cross-racially invalid means that African Americans and Whites interpret the child-rearing questions differently. This alleged difference in question interpretation means that while African Americans and Whites appear to be answering the same questions, their answers are based on different understandings of what the questions ask. The result, according to Pérez and Hetherington (2014), is that the

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<sup>40</sup> The four-question child-rearing battery used throughout this dissertation to estimate authoritarianism first appeared on the 1992 American National Election Study. Different batteries of child-rearing questions have been employed to measure authoritarianism since 1973. From 1973 to 1985, 13 child-trait questions were asked on the General Social Survey (GSS). In 1986, this list was paired down to five questions. The GSS questions do not perfectly match the four questions used by ANES, CCES, and other surveys analyzed by leading, contemporary political scientists studying authoritarianism.

authoritarian scale generated by the child-rearing questions is measuring different attitudes for Whites than it is measuring for African Americans.<sup>41</sup>

Of course, if the child-rearing scale is not cross-racially valid, then studies that include White and African American authoritarians in their analysis may underestimate (Kam & Kinder, 2007) or, depending on the attitudes under analysis, overrate the effect of authoritarianism on behavior. Moreover, studies that have included African Americans in their authoritarian analysis may be in error (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009) while those that have excluded African Americans and others, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), and Stenner (2005) have done, may confront valid questions about the universality of their claims concerning the effect of authoritarianism on behavior (Kinder, 2007).

The cross-racial validity of the child-rearing scale is a very important question for authoritarian scholars. In this chapter, I confront it by asking this simple, pointed question: Is the child-rearing scale on which most of the contemporary research on authoritarianism is based a variant and inaccurate means of estimating authoritarianism among African Americans?

The argument for scale variance is based on theory and supported by evidence. The suggested steadfast, monolithic allegiance of African Americans to their racial group identity, as measured by linked fate questions (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) is the alleged, root cause of variant Black interpretations of the child-rearing questions (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). The different attitudes expressed by African American and White

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<sup>41</sup> If the theoretical argument behind the cross-racial invalidity of the authoritarian scale, which I will explain later, is followed to its logical conclusion, it is possible to contend that the scale is valid only for White males. In fact, a footnote in Pérez and Hetherington's article (2014, p. 13, footnote 23) reports that the child-rearing questions are also an invalid estimator of authoritarianism among Latinos.

authoritarians on issues from two polls (the 2008 ANES and the 2010 YGP) that should theoretically engage their authoritarian predisposition adds evidentiary weight to the hypothesis. The actual finding of variance between African and White Americans' understanding of child-rearing questions on the 2008 ANES further bolsters the theory. And the persistent and unsettling prevalence of authoritarianism among African Americans is elegantly explained if the child-rearing scale is, in fact, rife with measurement error. Thus, if African American and White authoritarians express different attitudes on issues that should engage their authoritarianism similarly and their understandings of the child-rearing questions are statistically variant, *quod erat demonstrandum*, the child-rearing scale must be cross-racially invalid.

But is it? A broader exploration of authoritarianism among African Americans (offered in the chapters that follow) and testing of child-rearing questions for variance from polls beyond the one examined by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) lead to a quite different conclusion. This exploration begins with the finding that African Americans' identification with their racial group is not monolithic. In fact, according to the data presented in Chapter 3, there are statistically significant and substantive differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians' perceptions of linked fate. African American authoritarians even express racial resentment toward other Blacks, essentially saying I am not like them. I am not one of them. The mainstream stereotype of African Americans is not my identity.

Data presented from over 20 years of polling in Chapters 5 and 6 also demonstrate that African and White American authoritarians' overall worldview and attitudes on numerous issues are often quite similar. And, as discussed in Chapter 4, the prevalence of

authoritarianism among African Americans is the predictable and observed outcome of their persistent, asymmetric exposure to threat.

These three observations, which are analyzed in detail in subsequent chapters, lead to the following hypotheses concerning the reliability of child-rearing questions as estimators of latent authoritarianism among African Americans as well as Whites. I expect (H1) most variations in observations of authoritarian behavior and attitudes between African American and White authoritarians are not a product of scale variance and can be explained more simply by whether:

1. The issue in question is based on principles that include an overt or covert racial dimension.
2. The question activates latent authoritarianism.
3. The threat posed by the issue in question causes nonauthoritarians to behave more like authoritarians.
4. The question poses an asymmetric or symmetric threat to African Americans and Whites.

While this hypothesis may explain the observed differences in behavior and attitudes documented by Pérez and Hetherington (2014), it does not address the variance found by their Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the child-rearing questions on the ANES 2008 survey.

To explore the issue of scale invariance in more detail, I tested the child-rearing questions from five national polls in addition to the ANES 2008. I found authoritarian question variance between Whites and African Americans in one additional survey and invariance on the other four. The two surveys in which authoritarian questions were variant included “both” as an answer in addition to the paired child-rearing responses. The four surveys in which the authoritarian questions were invariant and, therefore, valid



did not offer “both” as a response. Stated theoretically, I hypothesize (H2) that the authoritarian scale will be invariant and valid for Whites and African Americans when responses to the child-rearing questions are limited to paired attributes and survey respondents are not offered the option of choosing “both” as an answer.

Complications with the measures used to estimate authoritarianism is not a new problem. Measurement problems have bedeviled the study of authoritarianism since its inception. I begin this chapter with a brief review of those different measuring problems. This is followed by a summary of the claim (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014) that the present tool used to estimate authoritarianism – the child-rearing battery of questions – is valid for White Americans and errant when applied to African Americans. Next, I present a Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis of child-rearing questions from six recent polls and data from more than 20 years of surveys that questions the accuracy and universality of the claim that the authoritarian scale is variant between Whites and African Americans. I close with a brief discussion of how existing theories can be employed to explain the variations in authoritarian behaviors accurately noted by Pérez and Hetherington. These theories include Kinder’s observations in his works on the racial issue divide (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001), Stenner’s theory of the *Authoritarian Dynamic* (Stenner, 2005), and Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction theory, which argues that nonauthoritarians behave more like authoritarians when confronting threats that are personalized.<sup>42</sup>

Counter to Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) conclusion, I find that while the authoritarian scale derived from child-rearing questions is not a flawless predictor of

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<sup>42</sup> The limits of this theory are examined in Appendix D.

authoritarian behavior in every instance, it is still a very good estimator of the predisposition to authoritarianism.

Scale variance is a product of question wording. Scales based on child-rearing questions that do not include “both” as a response will produce invariant estimates of authoritarianism among African Americans and Whites. Certainly, there will be instances when the expected authoritarian behavior by authoritarians is not observed among both Whites and Blacks. In these cases, authoritarianism may be dormant and inactivated, blunted by race, not primed and therefore not expressed, asymmetrically activated, or simply obscured by nonauthoritarians reacting in an authoritarian manner. More often than not, however, the child-rearing questions do an excellent job of estimating latent authoritarianism in African Americans and Whites as well as predicting their political behavior.

### **Measurement Approaches and Problems**

Measurement problems have plagued the study of authoritarianism since its inception (Stone, Lederer, & Christie, 1993). The design and statistical validity of the first attempt to estimate individuals’ innate predisposition to authoritarianism, the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950) was questioned just four years after its introduction (Christie, 1954; Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954). By the 1960s, many scholars considered the F-scale an “Edsel, a case study in how to do everything wrong” (Wolfe, 2005).<sup>43</sup>

New measurement schemes, including the so-called balanced F-scales – designed to correct the acquiescent response bias intrinsic in the item wording of the original Fascism scale (Lee & Warr, 1969; Rokeach, 1960), the Dogmatism scale (Rokeach,

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<sup>43</sup> An excellent review of the genesis of the study of authoritarianism, the development of the F-scale, and the status of authoritarian theory and measurement is *Strengths and Weakness: The Authoritarian Personality Today* (Stone et al., 1993).

1960) and the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale (Ray, 1972) – fell short of the measurement mark for a bevy of different reasons. The Conservatism scale conflates authoritarianism with conservatism (Stenner, 2005). The foundation of balanced F-scales remains Freudian psychodynamic theory, which is inherently unfalsifiable (Altemeyer, 2006; Duckitt, 1992; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). And while the Dogmatism scale avoids the conservative bias of both the F and Conservatism scales (Rokeach, 1960), the questions which comprise it are worded (like the F-Scale) in one direction and subject to acquiescent response bias (Ray, 1970).

In an effort to resolve the ongoing authoritarian measurement problem, Altemeyer introduced the Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale in 1981 (Altemeyer, 1981) and has regularly updated it to reflect societal changes (Altemeyer, 1988, 1996, 2006). The RWA scale is recognized as an excellent tool for estimating authoritarian attitudes (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). Its fundamental strength is, however, its Achilles Heel. Many of the questions on which the scale is based measure political attitudes. As such, the scale is an excellent tool for measuring the expression of authoritarianism, but not for identifying individuals' underlying predisposition to it (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).<sup>44</sup> This presents a particular theoretical problem for Stenner, who argues that authoritarianism is latent until activated by a normative threat. Since the RWA scale only measures an individual's expression of authoritarianism, it is liable to miss those authoritarians who are not activated at a particular point in time. To Stenner, Hetherington, and Weiler the RWA scale is simply tautological – an excellent measurement of authoritarian prejudicial

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<sup>44</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that the RWA scale “is so predictive of prejudice and intolerance... [because it is] largely a measure of prejudice and intolerance” and not authoritarianism (p. 47).

preferences but an inaccurate estimator of a predisposition to authoritarianism (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005).

The thicket of measurement problems presented by the different scales designed to estimate authoritarianism consigned authoritarian studies to the “scholarly hinterlands” of political science (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 36) until the introduction of a new measure, based on four child-rearing questions, appeared on the ANES 1992 survey. Questions about child-rearing values had been used on the General Social Survey (GSS) since 1973 as a tool for estimating authoritarianism (Wronski, 2015). The inclusion of four similar questions on the ANES 1992 survey led to a revival of the study of authoritarianism by political scientists that was initiated by Feldman and Stenner (Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

The child-rearing questions appeared to resolve the vexing measurement problems that had bedeviled authoritarian scholarship for decades. As Stenner (2005) succinctly explains, the four child-rearing questions “enable us to distinguish authoritarian predisposition for authoritarian ‘products’ (attitudes)...which are sometimes manifested but sometimes not, and whose specific content may vary across time and space” (Stenner, 2005, p. 24). Armed with a new tool for identifying authoritarians, political scientists pushed the study of authoritarianism back onto the scholarly agenda (Feldman, 2003a; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005), starting with an analysis of data from the 1992 ANES studying the interaction of perceived threat and authoritarianism (Feldman & Stenner, 1997).

Since the inclusion of the child-rearing battery on the 1992 ANES, estimates of authoritarianism using these questions have consistently found that the percentage of

African Americans who are authoritarians in the United States is much greater than the percentage of Whites. The difference between African American and White authoritarianism is summarized in the boxplot below (Figure 1).




Figure 1: Mean authoritarian scores. (with 95% confidence intervals)

The significant difference between African American and White authoritarianism displayed in this figure, and found in every poll when authoritarianism is estimated using child-rearing questions, was overlooked for almost two decades by scholars leading the renaissance in the study of authoritarianism. Hetherington and Weiler’s original work on authoritarianism and partisan polarization toggled African Americans in and out of the analysis (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Their work on authoritarianism and threat focused predicted probability analyses exclusively on Whites (Hetherington & Suhay,

2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Stenner's research analyzed only non-Hispanic Whites (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Stenner, 2005).

As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, concerns about the cross-racial validity of the four child-rearing items used to estimate authoritarianism were recently raised by Pérez and Hetherington (2014). They contend that the gap in the prevalence of authoritarianism between African Americans and Whites, produced by these questions and summarized in Figure 1, is “largely a measurement artifact” (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, p. 2).

If their concerns are correct and the child-rearing questions form an accurate predictor of authoritarianism among Whites but not among African Americans, then decades of studies and theoretical claims based on the scale confront new and important challenges to their accuracy, validity, and universality. Understanding Pérez and Hetherington's concerns about the scales' validity and evaluating the efficacy of their argument goes to the very heart of contemporary and future studies of authoritarianism.

**Hypothesis: The Authoritarian Scale Produced by Child-rearing Questions is “Cross-Racially Invalid”**

Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) argument that the authoritarian scale derived from child-rearing questions is an inaccurate estimator of authoritarianism among African Americans begins with theory. They argue the four child-rearing questions that comprise the authoritarian scale are rooted in a metaphor that equates “hierarchical thinking at home (as parents) with hierarchical thinking in society” (2014, p. 1). This metaphor, according to Pérez and Hetherington, is apt with Whites who are racially dominant in America, but falls apart with African Americans who are not. Thus “for White respondents, individual dominance within a family hierarchy meshes with group

dominance within America's racial order" (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, p. 2).<sup>45</sup> The practical implication is that Whites and African Americans' understand and interpret the child-rearing questions differently with the result that the authoritarian scale generated by child-rearing questions is valid for Whites and invalid for Blacks because the metaphor on which it is based does not apply to African Americans. African Americans are simply not a dominant group in America's racial order.

Pérez and Hetherington (2014) assert that "two observable implications" follow if their theoretical "reasoning is correct" (2014, p. 4) that the family hierarchy metaphor is apt with Whites and inapt with African Americans and the authoritarian scale derived from child-rearing questions based on the metaphor is racially invalid. The first observable consequence will be variance between African Americans' and Whites' understandings of the questions used to approximate authoritarianism as estimated through Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis. If African Americans' and Whites' understanding of the four child-rearing questions, which when factored together produce the unobserved latent variable called authoritarianism, vary in a way that is statistically significant, then it is possible the two racial groups interpret and answer scale questions differently.

The second discernible result will be statistically and substantively discrepant responses between African American and White authoritarians to survey questions on issues that are theorized to activate authoritarian responses. In other words, African American and White authoritarians will express statistically different attitudes on worldview and issue questions that go to heart of the authoritarian predisposition to obey, seek order, defend norms, act aggressively toward "the other," and eschew diversity.

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<sup>45</sup> See also Kim (2003), Omi and Winant (1994), Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pkatto (1997).

Pérez and Hetherington (2014) present data from one survey (the ANES 2008) to test for the first observable implication of their theory – variance in understanding between African Americans and Whites of the child-rearing questions. They chose the 2008 ANES because its oversampling of Blacks yielded a robust N for analysis. Using Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis to test for invariance, Pérez and Hetherington find that African Americans and Whites may indeed have variant interpretations of the child-rearing questions used to build the authoritarian scale, concluding that their statistical analysis “indicates” the child-rearing questions “are not invariant across race” (p. 6).<sup>46</sup> In other words, there are indications that meanings of the child-rearing questions may be different for African and White Americans.

Presenting a bivariate analysis of selected questions from two polls (2008 ANES and 2010 YGP)<sup>47</sup> to test for evidence of what they describe as the second observable consequence of variance,<sup>48</sup> Pérez and Hetherington (2014) find what they characterize as discrepant correlations between White and African American authoritarian responses on some issues<sup>49</sup> that for African Americans and Whites “ought to be robustly correlated with authoritarianism” (p. 9). Yet, “the correlations between authoritarianism and these variables” among African Americans observed “are often zero” while they are “almost

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<sup>46</sup> The two other data sets analyzed by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) – the 2008 and 2010

YouGovPolimetrix (YGP) surveys that were administered online – yielded similar results (2014, p. 6).

<sup>47</sup> The 2010 YouGovPolimetrix poll is an online survey. It uses “opt-in design with matching methodology” (p.4) to produce a sample of 1,000 Whites and 1,000 Blacks.

<sup>48</sup> The ANES 2008 survey and the 2010 YouGovPolimetrix survey.

<sup>49</sup> The issues, opinions, and predispositions tested included: moral traditionalism, racial resentment, egalitarianism, feminism, partisanship, ideology, gay marriage, gay adoption, and immigration as well as feelings toward Muslims, atheists, Hindus, African Americans, and Whites, and identification with America, and concerns about threats to cultural norms.



always robust and reliable” among Whites (p. 9).<sup>50</sup> This leads Pérez and Hetherington to conclude that “this general pattern” of correlational differences between Whites and African Americans on issues that should engage authoritarianism “underscores the child-rearing scale’s lack of measurement invariance across race” (p. 9).

Finally, in a coda to their paper, Pérez and Hetherington (2014) append results from an immigration experiment on the 2008 YGP to provide additional support for their hypothesis that the child-rearing scale is variant. These results assess “the effects of authoritarianism on opposition to illegal immigration” by illegal Mexicans and illegal Canadians among Whites and African Americans (p. 11). The results find that both illegal Mexicans and illegal Canadian immigrants concern White authoritarians while only illegal Canadians concern African American authoritarians. From this data Pérez and Hetherington conclude that “the expected theoretical pattern is discernibly weaker among Blacks” (p. 10). While they note that differences in Whites’ and African Americans’ perception of threat may be behind the different authoritarian perceptions of illegal Mexicans, no explanation is given why anyone – authoritarian or not – would be concerned about illegal Canadian immigrants posing a threat to America.<sup>51</sup>

Based on their theory, the findings of discrepant correlations, the indications of variance produced by the Multi-Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis, and the experimental results examining reactions to illegal Mexican and illegal Canadian immigrants, Pérez and Hetherington (2014) conclude the child-rearing scale is “cross-racially invalid” (p. 1).

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<sup>50</sup> Pérez and Hetherington (2014) present correlation differences in their paper “because they are intuitive and simple to present...a more rigorous comparison of regression coefficients...affirm the results” presented (p. 7).

<sup>51</sup> As designed, the experiment seems a bit too unreal and other worldly, and the results too speculative, to be offered or accepted as evidence of variance among child-rearing questions.

**A Broader Inquiry of the Hypothesis that the Authoritarian Scale is  
Cross-Racially Invalid**

While Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) theory is bold, their conclusion that the authoritarian scale produced by the child-rearing questions is "cross-racially invalid" seems intemperate. The evidence in support of their hypothesis comes from just two surveys. The theory on which their hypothesis rests is, in light of the data presented in Chapters 3 and 4, demonstrably inapplicable to African American authoritarians. And the way in which African Americans were oversampled in the 2008 ANES, the only survey on which Pérez and Hetherington's statistical claims of variance between Whites and African Americans rest, may have affected their findings.

A reexamination of Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) claim begins, as it should, with the theory on which it is based and a broader analysis of two decades of authoritarian survey data to determine if the two observable consequences their theory predicts stand the test of a broader inquiry.

**Theoretical Underpinnings**

Pérez and Hetherington (2014) contend that the metaphor which makes the child-rearing questions accurate estimators of authoritarianism works for Whites but not for African Americans. They argue the metaphor is based on hierarchy. Whites are at the top of the racial group hierarchy in America. Blacks are decidedly not. Thus, the metaphor is applicable to Whites, but not African Americans.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Of course, Whites' racial hegemony over African Americans is not the only dominant group relationship extant in American society. Whites have also dominated Latinos, Native Americans, and Asians in America. Male dominance over women also has a long, checkered history that all too often persists. A logical extension of Pérez and Hetherington's metaphor theory leads to the possibility that the authoritarian scale produced by child-rearing value questions may be valid only among White males. In fact, Pérez and Hetherington open the door to this possibility in a footnote in their article stating "measurement invariance also emerges if we analyze Latino responses on the child-rearing scale" (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014, p. 13, footnote 23). Thus, if Pérez and Hetherington's theory is right, while authoritarianism is a universal

This theory assumes, of course, that African Americans are a monolithic racial group whose members perceive their fates are linked and all readily identify themselves, or have no choice but to identify themselves, as members of a Black underclass. This presumption that African Americans monolithically identify with the mainstream stereotype of Black inferiority is empirically flawed.<sup>53</sup>

As Robinson (2011) has argued, there are at least four attitudinal subsets of Blacks in America today – Mainstream, Abandoned, Emergent (divided into two subcategories), and Transcendents. “These four Black Americas are increasingly distinct, separated by demography, geography, and psychology. [And] they have different profiles, different mind-sets, different hopes, fears, and dreams” (Robinson, 2011, p. 5). One subset of Emergent African Americans has recently immigrated to this country. They now total almost 10 percent of all African Americans. Many of them are highly educated. And “half or more of the Black students entering elite universities” today “are the sons and daughters” of these Emergents (Robinson, 2011, p. 9). The threats posed by slavery and Jim Crow have little historic resonance with these Emergents. They immigrated to this country because of the opportunity it offers and, for some, the safe haven it represents.

Certainly, the historic dominance of Whites in America means little to Emergents. It follows then that the theoretical unsuitability of the parental metaphor on which the cross-racial variance theory rests is also inapplicable to them. Members of the Transcendent, Emergent, and middle-class Mainstream subsets of African Americans are

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predisposition the scale contemporary scholar’s use to measure it, and on which they base all of their hypotheses and work, may only be valid among White males.

<sup>53</sup> Robinson (2011) argues that the scholarly assumption of a monolithic Black community was never accurate. “Black America was never monolithic, but at certain rare moments it ha[s] recognized a single leader” ( p. 58).

also less likely to accept the proposition of White dominance within America's racial order. As such, the parental metaphor captured by the child-rearing questions may also be a reliable barometer of their authoritarian predisposition.

The evidence that Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) theoretical assumption is inaccurate, however, goes well beyond Robinson's descriptive analysis. African American authoritarians are statistically much less likely than their nonauthoritarian brethren to agree their individual fate is linked (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) to their racial group identity, and much more likely to say their fate is not linked at all (Figures 2 and 3).




Figure 2: Linked fate.




Figure 3: African Americans' linked fate.

African American authoritarians are also statistically more likely to agree with the symbolically racist (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1993; Sears, 1988; Sears & Kinder, 1971) negative stereotypes of members of their own race still broadcast by much of mainstream America and measured by racial resentment questions (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Racial resentment among African Americans of African Americans. (0 is not resentful at all and 1 is the most resentful with 95% confidence intervals)

And they react to questions about “the other” just as White authoritarians do, agreeing that there are inferior groups in society who must be kept in their place (see Chapter 5). And most importantly, while African American authoritarians are hostile to what they deem to be other inferior groups, they identify closely with the particular group with which they identify and aspire to belong – conventional, norm-espousing and -defending Americans who, for now, are at the top of the mainstream hierarchical social order.

African American authoritarians are prouder to be American than nonauthoritarians (see Chapter 5, Figure 36). They are much more likely than nonauthoritarians of either race to revere the Horatio Alger mythos, which sits at the core of the American Dream and whose veneration defines those who espouse and defend it as true or aspirational Americans (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Strongly agree: Horatio Alger—if you work hard, you can succeed.

In short, African American authoritarians differentiate and distance themselves from the mainstream stereotypes of Black Americans that define and reinforce the racial group hierarchy at the core of Pérez and Hetherington’s theory. African American authoritarians’ answers to linked fate, racial resentment, fear of “the other,” American pride, and Horatio Alger questions demonstrate unequivocally their self-identification as American and not, or not only, Black. They choose not to identify themselves as the mainstream stereotype of Black Americans. They are not them. They do not hold those values. They work hard. They refuse to be burdened by the downward mobility of being perceived as only Black in America (Waters, 2009, p. 65). American is one of their reference groups and a chosen identity. They are Americans who are also Black. And as

authoritarians, they will defend their chosen group identity against all others because the very act of defending defines who they are, and who they are not.

Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) theory of the cross-racial invalidity of the authoritarian scale rests fully on the assumption that African Americans have no choice when it comes to their identity. African Americans are consigned – without recourse – to inferior, under-class status in the hierarchical racial order of America.

Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) assumption, however, is incorrect. For African Americans who are also authoritarians, race is simply not the only factor that shapes their choice of identity, worldview, or political behavior. As I have demonstrated, African American attitudes are neither monolithic, predictably liberal, driven by a jointly held conception of linked racial fate, nor constrained, solely, by racial group identity. African American authoritarians choose and, in many cases, strive to identify with the Americans at the top of the hierarchy. As such, the metaphor at the core of the child-rearing questions resonates with them just as well as it does with White authoritarians.

#### **Observable Consequences: Question Variance and Attitudinally Discrepant Behavior**

Pérez and Hetherington (2014) contend that two observable consequences follow from their theory and marshal data from two surveys to find evidence of these consequences. The first consequence predicted by their theory is variant understanding of child-rearing questions among African and White Americans. Taking responses to the child-rearing questions from the 2008 ANES, Pérez and Hetherington estimate a model using “robust weighted least squares with polychoric correlations as inputs” (2014, p. 6). First, they approximate an unrestricted model in which “factor loadings and item thresholds are freely estimated within each racial group.” If a strong model fit, as



measured by through the comparative fit index (CFI) and root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) is found,<sup>54</sup> Pérez and Hetherington then estimate “a restricted model that fixes the item loadings and thresholds to equality” between Whites and African Americans, which “implies that race does not affect individual responses to the child-rearing items” (p. 6). To test for invariance “the difference in chi-square ( $X^2$ ) between the unrestricted and restricted models” is estimated (p. 6). A statistically significant difference between the models’ chi square ( $X^2$ ) means Whites and Blacks have a variant understanding of the child-rearing questions and the latent variable produced by scaling or factoring the questions – authoritarianism – is likely to be invalid between races. This racial invalidity is likely because the statistically significant difference in the models’ chi square ( $X^2$ ) indicates that “restricting the item loadings and thresholds to equality across groups deteriorates the model’s fit” (p. 6).

I use the exact same approach employed by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) to test for variant understandings of the child-rearing questions between Whites and African Americans on six different polls, including the 2008, 2011, and 2012 ANES surveys, the 2008 LAPOP poll, the 2014 UMASS CCES module, and a 2015 national poll I fielded in December. However, the inclusion of binary, categorical variables in my analysis necessitates the use of a different model estimator than the one used by Pérez and Hetherington. The estimator of choice for binary as well as categorical variables, and the one I employed, is weighted least squares with mean and variance adjustment (Muthén &

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<sup>54</sup> The recommended values for each measure of fit are: .950 or greater for CFI and .08 or less for RMSEA (Acock, 2013) or .900 or greater for CFI and .05 or less for RMSEA (Brown, 2006). CFI approximates how much better the estimated model fits the data than a null model. For example, a CFI of .950 means the estimated model performs 95% better than a null model “in which we assume the items are all unrelated to each other” (Acock, 2013, p. 23). RMSEA evaluates “how much error there is for each degree of freedom” penalizing a model “for unnecessary added complexity” (p. 24).

Muthén, 2005). As Brown (2006) notes, “WLSMV is a robust estimator...and provides the best option for modeling categorical and ordered data” (p. 24). Given the demonstrated difference between the authoritarian means between Whites and African Americans and following Pérez and Hetherington’s approach as well as Muthén and Muthén’s recommendation, I fixed group means in the unrestricted model to zero so that the invariance test was “unaffected by possible differences in group means” (p. 6).

Following Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) lead, I first estimate unrestricted and restricted models for the child-rearing questions of the 2008 ANES using the WLSMV estimator. My results mirror their findings, producing a significant chi square change between the models ( $X^2= 39.815$ ) that is also statistically significant ( $p < .0001$ ). This indicates the “observed scores on the child-rearing items are not strictly a function of people’s underlying level of authoritarianism. Race also affects the reporting of authoritarianism” (p. 6). When the same statistical approach is applied to child-rearing items from the 2012 ANES, which like the 2008 ANES includes “both” as an question response, variance between Whites and African Americans understandings of the questions ( $X^2=35.83$  with a  $p<.0001$ ) is found once again (Table 1).

Table 1

Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: Authoritarian scale variant

<i>Latent Variable</i> -- Authoritarianism				
<i>Observed Variables</i> -- Four Child Rearing Questions (Paired Child Attribute Responses plus "Both")				
<i>Compared Groups</i> -- Whites and African Americans				
<u>Survey</u>	<u>Chi Square</u>	<u>Chi Square</u>	<u>CFI</u>	<u>RMSEA</u>
		Difference Test		
<b>ANES 2008</b> (N=1621, 1093 White, 528 Black)				
Unrestricted Model	32.681 (p<.0001)		0.974	0.094
Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model		39.815 p<.001	0.945	0.087
<b>ANES 2012</b> (N=4214, 3260 White, 954 Black)				
Unrestricted Model	69.787 (p<.0001)		0.975	0.088
Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model		35.823 (p<.0001)	0.963	0.068
<i>Note: All estimates using Weighted Least Squares with Mean and Variance adjustments</i>				

Statistical testing of the cross-racial validity of child-rearing questions on the 2008 LAPOP, 2011 ANES, 2014 UMASS CCES module, and the 2015 national survey I conducted in December, however, all find the questions to be invariant (Table 2). In other words, the authoritarian scale produced from these questions in these four polls is cross-racially valid. Whites and African Americans have the same understanding of the questions and the authoritarian scale estimates their unobserved but essential predisposition to authoritarianism accurately.

Table 2

## Multi-group confirmatory factor analysis: Authoritarian scale invariant

<i>Latent Variable</i> -- Authoritarianism				
<i>Observed Variables</i> -- Four Child Rearing Questions (Paired Child Attribute Responses Only)				
<i>Compared Groups</i> -- Whites and African Americans				
<u>Survey</u>	<u>Chi Square</u>	<u>Chi Square</u>	<u>CFI</u>	<u>RMSEA</u>
		Difference Test		
<b>LAPOP 2008</b> (N=1248, 1095 White, 153 Black)				
Unrestricted Model	7.800 (p=.0992)		0.994	0.039
Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model		1.478 (p=.4776)	0.992	0.028
<b>ANES 2011</b> (N=1075, 956 White, 119 Black)				
Unrestricted Model	16.370 (p=.0026)		0.975	0.076
Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model		2.534 (p=.2817)	0.977	0.060
<b>UMASS-CCES 2014</b> (N=1865, 1620 White, 245 Black)				
Unrestricted Model	16.370 (p=.0026)		0.988	0.069
Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model		2.534 (p=.2817)	0.99	0.050
<b>UMASS 2015</b> (N=1470, 1219 White, 251 Black)				
Unrestricted Model	21.768 (p=.0002)		0.978	0.078
Restricted Model Nested in Unrestricted Model		2.162 (p=.3393)	0.98	0.061
<i>Note:</i> All estimates using Weighted Least Squares with Mean and Variance adjustments				

There is a difference, however, between the two polls in which the child-rearing questions are variant and the four surveys where the questions are invariant. The four surveys where invariance is found include child-rearing questions on which respondents' answers are limited to paired choices of desirable attributes. The two surveys where variance is found between African Americans and Whites ask questions in which "both" is added as a response option. This finding leads me to the hypothesis stated earlier: that the authoritarian scale will be invariant and valid for Whites and African Americans when responses to the child-rearing questions are limited to paired attributes and variant

when “both” is offered as a third choice. While I have not yet tested this hypothesis in a survey experiment, Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) claim of variance between African American and Whites’ understanding of child-rearing question can no longer be considered a universally applicable finding. Counter to Pérez and Hetherington’s conclusion, the scales derived from the questions on four of the six surveys analyzed here are cross-racially valid. In these surveys, African American and Whites have similar understandings of the child-rearing questions and the authoritarian scale built from these questions is not affected in a statistically or substantively meaningful way by racial differences.

The second consequence predicted by Pérez and Hetherington’s (2014) theory is that on issues that are theoretically of import to authoritarians White and African American authoritarian attitudes will be discrepant. Relying on questions from two surveys,<sup>55</sup> Pérez and Hetherington do find discrepant correlations between White and African American authoritarian responses on some issues that are theoretically of import to authoritarians.

Several of the questions tested by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) in support of their cross-racial thesis, however, are puzzling. For example, the differing correlations between African American and White authoritarians on racial resentment questions, feelings toward Atheists and Hindus, and partisan identification found on the ANES 2008 survey seem to prove little. First, nowhere in the current scholarly literature on authoritarianism are Atheists and Hindus identified as groups that present a threat to American authoritarians. Second, the racial resentment battery of questions is designed to measure the resentment of Whites and others toward African Americans. Thus, African

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<sup>55</sup> The 2008 ANES survey and the 2010 YouGovPolimetrix survey.

American authoritarians are unlikely to exhibit as much racial resentment toward members of their own race as authoritarian Whites express toward Blacks. Finally, on the other seven issues or issue areas cited as examples of correlational differences between White and African American authoritarians, the correlation between White authoritarians and the issue cited is low, never surpassing .28 or falling to less than -.29. Within this small range, the correlational differences between Whites and African Americans on these issues are at most an insignificant .15 points.

The bivariate results from these two surveys, which were also subjected to a multivariate analysis by Pérez and Hetherington (2014) that appears in the appendix of their article, must also be weighed against the data from 12 national surveys taken over the last two decades and presented in Chapters 3, 5, and 6. This data demonstrates time and again the similarity between the attitudes of African American and White authoritarians on a broad array of values and issues.

The attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians on fundamental principles that comprise the authoritarian worldview and a wide range of salient issues that are theorized to engage the authoritarian predisposition present another significant problem for Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) thesis. Certainly, African American and White authoritarians do not always exhibit the same attitudes. But more often than not, their worldview, attitudes on issues that should engage their authoritarianism, and even their perception of what should pose a symmetrical threat are strikingly similar.

For example, a sampling of the worldview principles presented in Chapter 5, ranging from the necessity of choosing between good and evil, suppressing the rights of

dissenters, the threat posed by “the other,” the belief that inferior groups should stay in their place, and the Horatio Alger mythos, reveals the statistical similarity of the opinions of African American and White authoritarians (Figure 6).



Figure 6: Statistical similarities between African American and White authoritarian attitudes on worldview principles.

Just as importantly, the opinions of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, no matter their race, are also statistically different. For example, African American and White nonauthoritarians are statistically less likely to strongly agree that we must choose between good and evil than authoritarians (worldview #1). They are also statistically more likely to strongly disagree that inferior groups should stay in their place (worldview #2) than authoritarians (Figure 7).



Figure 7: Difference between African American and White nonauthoritarians and authoritarians predicted attitudes on two worldview principles.

The empirical evidence of statistical similarity between African American and White authoritarians and dissimilarity between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on principles that are intrinsic to the authoritarian worldview abounds in the 12 surveys analyzed for this dissertation.

When the views of African American and White authoritarians are statistically different, the perceptions of authoritarians are still, often, statistically dissimilar from all nonauthoritarians. For example, on the 2012 ANES survey, White and African American authoritarians hold statistically different views on moral traditionalism, but both White and African American authoritarians are more morally traditional than nonauthoritarians (Figure 8).





Figure 8: Difference between African American and White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians predicted attitudes on moral traditionalism.

The documented statistical similarities between the worldviews of African American and White authoritarians on principles are repeated when it comes to their preferences on issues that theoretically should engage authoritarianism and are part of the worldview evolution (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). For example, from gay marriage and adoption to suppressing the free press, views of new immigrants, Muslims, and Clarence Thomas, the legalization of marijuana, and CIA torture, African American and White authoritarians again hold statistically identical views (Figure 9).




Figure 9: Statistical similarity between African American and White authoritarians' attitudes of worldview evolution issues.

Once again, the attitudes of nonauthoritarians and authoritarians, whether they are African American or White, are often statistically different on these issues. For example, nonauthoritarians are statistically less likely to oppose gay marriage and legalizing marijuana than authoritarians. They are also less likely to strongly agree that new immigrants are a burden on the country (Figure 10).




Figure 10: Statistical differences between nonauthoritarian and authoritarian African Americans and Whites on worldview evolution issues.

Finally, according to the theories explored in Chapter 4, a symmetrically perceived threat, like the physical threat posed by terrorism, should find authoritarianism a statistically and substantively significant independent variable for both African Americans and Whites. In other words, authoritarianism should be predictive of perceptions of threat irrespective of race; and the more authoritarian one's predisposition, the more likely they will be to fear physical harm from terrorism. As I will demonstrate in Chapter 4, this is exactly the behavior found. The authoritarianism of African Americans and Whites is predictive of their perceptions of symmetric threat.

From fundamental principles to authoritarian issues and perceptions of symmetric threats, African American and White authoritarians express statistically similar attitudes on questions from surveys spanning more than two decades. As such, the second

consequence predicted by Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) theory – statistically discrepant attitudes between White and African American authoritarians on issues that are theoretically of import to authoritarians – does not withstand a broader analysis of available polling data. African American and White authoritarians will not always hold statistically similar attitudes, but quite often they do.

### **A Competing Hypothesis Concerning the Racial Validity of the Child-rearing Scale**

Undoubtedly, there will be differences between the attitudes of African American and White authoritarians. However, as I have shown in the previous discussion of theory and consequences, these differences simply do not warrant the wholesale dismissal of child-rearing questions as estimators of authoritarianism in African Americans (or Latinos, Asian Americans, women, Muslims, and any other group that does not sit at the top of the hierarchical order in America). Variations that do exist between African and White American authoritarian attitudes, when they are statistically significant, can be explained by existing theories concerning race, authoritarianism, and threat without limiting the scope of the child-rearing scale's universality and utility so categorically that the scale and the theories based on it are virtually useless. Thus, my competing hypothesis (H1) asserts that child-rearing questions are a good estimator of the latent authoritarian predisposition among African Americans and Whites. Any variations in observations of authoritarian behavior and attitudes can be explained more parsimoniously by existing theories concerning race, authoritarianism, and threat.

This theoretical approach separates the authoritarian predisposition from its expression, recognizing, as we should, that predisposition and expression are different (Stenner, 2005). It acknowledges that while the authoritarian scale measures

predisposition, the expression of the predisposition can be attenuated by four different conditions. These conditions are not newly discovered or the progeny of radical theories. Three of them represent important scholarly contributions already made to the understanding of race, political behavior, and authoritarianism, including Kinder's work on the racial divide (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001), Stenner's (2005) theory of authoritarian activation (Stenner, 2005), and Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) negative interaction thesis. The fourth theory, concerning the symmetrical or asymmetrical nature of threat, is new and is advanced next in this dissertation. The ways in which these conditions can mediate the expression of the authoritarian predisposition are discussed next.

### **Differential Principles and Overt and Covert Racial Issues**

Kinder's exploration of the racial divide between Black and White Americans on race and social welfare issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001) produced an unexpected finding with important theoretical ramifications. Kinder finds that race – both in terms of in-group identification (linked fate) and out-group resentment (racial resentment) – is not at the core of the identified divide between African American and White opinions. In other words, race had “no effect” or is a “weak predictor of opinion” in the two issue areas where Kinder and Winter (2001) finds a wide gap in the attitudes of African Americans and Whites (2001, p. 447).<sup>56</sup> While this finding obviously presents another challenge to the theoretical underpinnings of Pérez and Hetherington's hypothesis concerning the validity of the authoritarian scale, it also forms the basis of the first explanation for variance and similarity among the attitudes of African Americans and White authoritarians.

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<sup>56</sup> Kinder and Winter (2001) note, “This is true except on the issue of affirmative action” ( p. 447).

The key to the divide in opinion between African and White Americans on race (overt racial issues like affirmative action) and social welfare issues (what Kinder and Winter [2001] consider covert racial issues) is the divergent views of African Americans and Whites on two principles – equal opportunity and limited government. As Kinder and Winter note “principles turn out to account for a sizable share of the racial divide in opinion (p. 447).<sup>57</sup> Kinder and Winter’s finding about the role principles play in attitude formation echoes Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) contention that worldview “serve[s] as a determinant of public opinion and political behavior” (p. 36).

As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, many of the principles on which the authoritarian worldview rests are shared by both African American and White authoritarians. Since there is congruence between African Americans and White authoritarians on a broad range of principles, and, according to Kinder and Winter’s (2001) work, principles drive attitudes more than race and class interest, the opinions of African American and White authoritarians should be similar across a wide range of contested issue in American politics that theoretically engage or provoke the authoritarian predisposition, including many of the salient concerns at the core of the worldview evolution posited by Hetherington and Weiler (2009).<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, when African and White Americans views on principles diverge, as Kinder and Winter found they do on equal opportunity and limited government, African Americans’ racial identity will compete

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<sup>57</sup> Differences in “social class” (also labeled as “material interests”) had no effect on the racial gap on race issues but were “part of the story” on social welfare issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, pp. 446-449).

<sup>58</sup> The racial divide is “much less impressive on other social issues, immigration, and foreign policy” (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 441). Not coincidentally, culture war social issues, immigration, and foreign policy are the issue domains in which the authoritarian predisposition and resulting worldview is more likely to shape attitudes (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

with their authoritarianism and American identity, producing variations between the attitudes of African and White American authoritarians.

### **Authoritarian Activation**

Stenner (2005) theorizes that normative threat activates authoritarianism in those Americans who are already predisposed to authoritarianism. To Stenner authoritarianism is not always on. Authoritarian behavior is activated “when needed” (p. 14) in reaction to a particular threat. As such, “authoritarianism does not consistently predict behavior across different situations” (p. 13).

Thus, when White and African American authoritarians both perceive a threat they will both react to it. When they perceive a threat differentially, they will react to it differently. (For example, the personal threat posed by local and state police which I document in Chapter 4.) And when neither White or African American authoritarians perceive a threat, their authoritarian predisposition –according to Stenner’s theory – will remain dormant and, in large part, unexpressed.

Following Stenner’s (2005) logic, observed variance between attitudes expressed by African American and White authoritarians is not necessarily an outcome of differences in their authoritarian predisposition. It may simply be a product of differential activation in the presence of threat or the lack of activation entirely.

### **Nonauthoritarian Activation and Asymmetric Threats**

Unlike Stenner (2005), according to Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011), authoritarians live in a perpetual state of hypervigilance. Perceiving threats whether they exist or not, their authoritarianism is always on (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011). As such, these scholars contend that increases in

perceived threats (threats to personal safety) cause nonauthoritarians to behave more like authoritarians. In their work, they demonstrate how the personal threat from terrorism can powerfully reshape attitudes of nonauthoritarians transforming them – under certain conditions – into authoritarian look-a-likes (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).<sup>59</sup>

This time, following Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) logic, two conditions could produce observable variances in attitudes expressed by African American and White authoritarians. First, if a personal threat is implied and increasing, but the threat is covertly or overtly racial as defined by Kinder and Winter (2011), White nonauthoritarians may react like authoritarians while the response of African American nonauthoritarians would be muted by their race. Conversely, if an asymmetric personal threat is extant, meaning in this case that it is perceived by African American nonauthoritarians but not Whites, African American nonauthoritarians may act more like authoritarians, employing authoritarianism as a shield to protect themselves from the perceived threat while White nonauthoritarians may not be activated at all. Again, variance between African American and White behaviors and attitudes in both of these circumstances are not an outcome of changes in latent authoritarian predisposition, they are reactions to varying perceptions of threat.

### **Authoritarian Activation and Asymmetric Threat**

The threat posed by police and discussed in Chapter 4 is an excellent example of how an asymmetrically perceived threat can trigger African American nonauthoritarians to act more authoritarian and also engage African American authoritarians while having

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<sup>59</sup> This is Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) negative interaction thesis, which is discussed in detail in Appendix A. Please note, the predicted probabilities used to illustrate the thesis in the article that appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science* are only estimated for “males who are not Black or Hispanic” (p. 553).



little effect on the attitudes of White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. Observed differences in responses to threat by African American and White authoritarians, therefore, can be the result of racial differences in the perception of threats by authoritarians and not racial differences in their authoritarian predisposition. In other words, different perceptions of threat among authoritarians may restructure their opinions on certain issues along racial lines and produce statistically differing attitudes among authoritarians without changing their underlying predisposition toward authoritarianism. This is not an outcome of variance within the authoritarian predisposition measured by scale questions. Instead, it is a result of the variant authoritarian activation of members of different races because of their differential reactions to particular threats.

### **Chapter Summary**

Until the four child-rearing items were included on the ANES survey in 1992, an accurate measurement of individuals' predisposition to authoritarianism had eluded political scientists for more than 40 years. The scale derived from the child-rearing questions led to a renaissance in the important study of authoritarianism, the risks it may pose to democracy (Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009), the role of threat in the activation of authoritarian behaviors among authoritarians as well as nonauthoritarians (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Stenner, 2005), and the role authoritarianism may have played in recent political polarization (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

If the scale is variant and African Americans and Whites interpret the questions on which it is based differentially, then the numerous universal theoretical claims that

have been made by contemporary authoritarian scholarship based on it must be carefully reconsider and qualified.

Evidence of the scale's variance, however, is at best ephemeral and inconclusive. In no less than four recent surveys examined in this chapter, the scale was invariant. These findings should put an end to any blanket scholarly claims that the authoritarian scale derived for child-rearing questions is cross-racially invalid. Moreover, the preponderance of data presented in Chapters 5 and 6 indicate that African American and White authoritarians are attitudinally quite similar on a wide range of values that structure worldview and issue preferences.<sup>60</sup> When threat is perceived differentially by African and White Americans, however, dissimilarities in the behavior of authoritarians may be observed. This is a result of variations in authoritarian and nonauthoritarian activation, not variance in predisposition.

The puzzle that led Pérez and Hetherington (2014) to test child-rearing questions for invariance, the marked prevalence of authoritarianism among African Americans, is more parsimoniously explained by the recognition that the asymmetric threats African Americans confront every day (and their forebears confronted throughout American history) predispose them to authoritarianism. Authoritarianism is a response to their environment, a protective shield from the dangers confronting them daily.

Pérez and Hetherington's (2014) finding of variant attitudes between African and White American authoritarians, when they do indeed exist, is more simply explained by the four conditions that I hypothesize mediate the expression of authoritarianism as well

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<sup>60</sup> Perceptions of the personal threat posed by terrorism, the threat variable used by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) to investigate their negative interaction thesis, also varies by authoritarianism without statistically significant or substantive differences between African and White Americans.

as the actual variation in the wording of answers to child-rearing questions. Moreover, the theory on which Pérez and Hetherington (2014) base their claims is founded on a caricature of African Americans that is inaccurate. African Americans are not the monolithic, homogeneous group of political science theory.<sup>61</sup> They never have been. A more nuanced approach to understanding African American attitudes is required not just in studies of American authoritarianism, but across the discipline of political science.

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<sup>61</sup> Robinson (2011) argues that the scholarly assumption of a monolithic Black community was never accurate. “Black America was never monolithic, but at certain rare moments it ha[s] recognized a single leader” (p. 58).

## CHAPTER 3

### AFRICAN AMERICANS: LIBERAL AUTHORITARIANS?

The exploration of African American authoritarians begins, as it should, with two threshold questions. The first question requires an empirical analysis of the claim made by Hetherington and Weiler that “African Americans are the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 141). This statement instigated the chain of questions that led to this dissertation and the puzzle at its core: How can African Americans be the most authoritarian and the most liberal group in America if their attitudes are homogeneous?

The simple answer is that African Americans cannot be authoritarian, liberal, and homogeneous simultaneously. Authoritarians are not liberal by any stretch of the imagination. If some African Americans are authoritarians and others are liberals, then African American attitudes are not monolithic. If African American attitudes are not monolithic, then the Black utility heuristic and theory of linked racial fate (Davis, 1995; Tate, 1994) is not a universal predictor of African American behavior. If linked fate only predicts how some African Americans behave, what, if anything, structures the opinions of other African Americans? Is it authoritarianism?

This question leads inevitably back to the initial empirical query: How prevalent is authoritarianism among African Americans? And its corollary: Are African Americans more authoritarian than Whites?

My hypothesis is simple. Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) statement, which they substantiated with data from one survey (the 2004 ANES), that African Americans are the most authoritarian racial group in America and always more authoritarian than Whites

is accurate. Stated simply, when authoritarianism is measured using the child-rearing battery of questions, a higher percentage of African Americans will be classified authoritarian than Whites (H1).

The second question wrestled with in this chapter is an obvious, yet important, follow-up to this hypothesis: Who are African American authoritarians, and how do they differ from African American nonauthoritarians? The latter part of this question, as well as the attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians, is the subject of Chapters 5, 6, and 7. The first part of this question, which assumes there will be demographic differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, is the focus of this chapter. Stated hypothetically, I contend there will be distinct, observable demographic differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians (H2).

Examining data from seven national surveys taken from 1992 through 2014, this chapter explores both hypotheses. First, I find that authoritarianism is always more prevalent among African Americans than Whites. Then, using data from the University of Massachusetts module on the CCES 2014 election surveys to explore whether demographic differences exist between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, I find that differences between African Americans perceptions of linked fate and reported church attendance are associated with authoritarianism. African Americans, who are less likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their group racial identity and more likely to attend church each week, are more likely to be authoritarian.

The finding that African Americans authoritarians are less likely to perceive their individual fate is linked to their racial identity leads to an interesting possibility and the

final hypothesis examined in this chapter that authoritarianism may be a more important force structuring the worldview and attitudes of some African Americans than their race (H3).

The implications of this hypothesis for the theorized homogeneity and liberal leanings of African Americans' opinions are significant. Contrary to the scholarly conventional wisdom, African American attitudes are neither necessarily homogeneous nor pathologically liberal. They may vary based on an African American's predisposition to authoritarianism, personal perception of linked fate and, as we will see later, whether the issue or behavior in question engages authoritarianism, demands racial solidarity, or both.

The possibility that authoritarianism structures the behavior of some African Americans more than their identification with their racial group leads to the final section of this chapter – a coda that starts with an analysis of several linked fate questions asked on recent surveys that include robust samples of African Americans. The goal of this exploration is to determine if African American authoritarians are consistently less likely to agree that their individual fate is linked to the fate of their racial group.

The question of the relative roles of authoritarianism and group identification in the structuring of African American behavior leads farther afield to the investigation of possible differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians answers to racial resentment questions.

Racial resentment questions and the scale derived from them were developed to measure the continuing antipathy of Whites toward Blacks as “biological racism”

declined (Kinder, 1996, p. 97).<sup>62</sup> Racial resentment “powerfully predicts derogatory racial stereotypes” (Kinder, 1996, p. 109) by measuring “animosity toward Blacks ... in the language of American individualism” (p. 124). Stated simply, the racial resentment scale estimates the symbolic racism of White Americans toward Blacks.<sup>63</sup>

In most surveys, African Americans have been asked the same questions probing racial resentment toward Blacks. This data has been mostly ignored by scholars. In the last part of this chapter, I analyze African Americans’ answers to these questions to see if African American authoritarians are more likely to agree with the negative, mainstream stereotypes of their race than nonauthoritarians who are African Americans. If they do, African American authoritarians’ rejection of linked fate may be part of a pattern in which African Americans authoritarians not only reject the proposition that their individual fate is tied to their racial group identity, but also differentiate themselves from other African Americans, rejecting the negative stereotype of Blacks in America, asserting that stereotypes does not define them, and choosing a different or additional identity and group to which to belong. A group that celebrates the mainstream norms of American individualism and self-determination, is traditionally moral, obeys authority, and eschews diversity to the exclusion of all else – in other words, American authoritarians.

Admittedly, the coda to this chapter is a departure that takes me far ahead to hypotheses and concepts that will be explored in detail in later chapters. I include it here because the push and pull of authoritarianism and race on African Americans underlies

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<sup>62</sup> As Kinder (1996) points out “the decline of biological racism must not be equated with the decline of racism generally” (p. 97).

<sup>63</sup> Kinder (1996) notes that the term “symbolic racism” was an “unfortunate choice,” and “we intend racial resentment to take on the characteristics normally attributed to symbolic racism” (p. 293).

and underscores everything that follows. Outlining the existence and contours of the tension between authoritarianism and race helps set the scene for what is yet to come in later chapters.

In this chapter, I find that African Americans authoritarians do indeed think their fate is not as linked to their racial group as nonauthoritarian African Americans. And, intriguingly, they are also more likely to express racial resentment toward members of their own race.

With the overview complete, let's turn to the first hypothesis offered and the evidence that authoritarianism is more prevalent among African Americans than Whites.

### **Prevalence of African American Authoritarians**

A simple frequency distribution of the authoritarian scales derived from answers to the child-rearing questions asked on seven polls conducted between 1992 and 2014 was estimated to determine the incidence of those with the most authoritarian predisposition (those who score 1 on the scale) among African Americans and Whites. The results of this analysis consistently find that the percentage of African Americans who are the most authoritarian in the United States is greater than the percentage of Whites (Appendix C – Table 20).

Next, authoritarian scale data was pooled from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys to assess the distribution of authoritarians for Americans who identify as White or African Americans. The skew among the racially combined population towards authoritarianism is obvious (Figure 11).

In this figure, following the approach used by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) as well as others, I also classified those who score .75 or above on the scale as high



authoritarians (labeled “authoritarians”), and those who score .25 on the scale as low authoritarians (labeled “nonauthoritarians”). Except where explicitly noted, this classification scheme is used throughout this dissertation to divide respondents into authoritarian and nonauthoritarian groups.




Figure 11: Distribution of Blacks and Whites on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.

A look at this same data divided by race reveals, once again, that African Americans (Figure 12) are more disposed to authoritarianism than Whites (Figure 13).




Figure 12: Distribution of Blacks on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.




Figure 13: Distribution of Whites on the Authoritarian Scale 1992-2012.

Finally, a difference of means test was used to determine if the mean authoritarian scores of African Americans are not only greater than, but also statistically different from Whites. The results of these bivariate tests reveal that the mean authoritarian scores of Whites are less than and statistically different from African Americans at a p-value of less than .05 on each of the seven polls (Figure 14 and Appendix C – Table 21).




Figure 14: Mean authoritarian scores.  
(with 95% confidence intervals)

Added to Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) finding from the 2004 ANES survey, the results from these seven polls conducted over the last two decades confirm the hypothesis that the prevalence of authoritarianism, as estimated by the four-item child-rearing questions, is indeed greater among African Americans than Whites. As such, any theory of authoritarianism based on the child-rearing scale should include African Americans in its analysis or, at least, present very persuasive arguments for excluding them.

### **Demographics of African American Authoritarians**

Data from the University of Massachusetts’s module on the 2014 CCES election survey was used to explore the second hypothesis offered in this chapter that there are

observable demographic differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.

First, a Wilcoxon-Mann bivariate test of independent samples was employed to determine if African American authoritarians are statistically different than nonauthoritarians across a series of common demographic variables including age, ideology, income, education, and party identification as well as three other variables. These three variables are linked fate, church attendance, and citizenship status. Theory is behind the inclusion of these three variables in my analysis. First, I hypothesized that African American authoritarians are less likely to think their fate is linked to their race than Black nonauthoritarians because they are more likely to identify themselves with other American authoritarians. Second, church attendance was included because of the correlation between religiosity and authoritarianism found among Whites and Stenner's (2005) contention that "religious upbringing does add a very small additional increment" to one's authoritarianism (p. 156). Finally, because of the hypothetical link between generational exposure to threat and anxiety and authoritarianism, I added citizenship status to ascertain if African Americans whose families had a longer history in the United States were more likely to be authoritarians than those who were new to this country.

Linked fate is an ordinal variable with four possible answers that range from "a lot" to "not at all." Church attendance is also an ordinal variable with five possible answers ranging from "once a week" to "never."<sup>64</sup> Finally, citizenship status included five possible answers. The first two answers are "citizen immigrant" and "non-citizen immigrant." These were combined to form an immigrant answer which is followed

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<sup>64</sup> Originally, there were seven answer options for the church attendance question. In this analysis, answers "more than once a week" and weekly were combined. The answers "never" and "don't know" were also combined.

ordinally by “first generation,” “second generation,” and “third generation and more” answers.

The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann test find a statistically significant difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians only on linked fate (p-value < .001) and church attendance (p-value = .0001). Thus, this bivariate test indicates that African American authoritarians are more likely to attend church at least weekly and less likely to think their individual fate is linked to their racial group than nonauthoritarian Blacks. None of the other variables examined reach a statistically significant threshold (Table 3).

Table 3

Statistical significance of difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on selected variables  
(0 = nonauthoritarian and 1 = authoritarian)

Where 0 is Nonauthoritarian and 1 is Authoritarian			
	<i>p-value</i>	<i>z score</i>	<i>N</i>
Linked Fate	0.0009	-3.332	190
Church Attendance	0.0001	3.809	191
Education	0.0651	1.845	191
Ideology	0.0815	-1.742	177
Age	0.2941	1.049	191
Citizenship Status	0.3587	0.918	191
Income	0.4851	0.698	174
Party Identification	0.9670	-0.041	187
<i>Source:</i> UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.			
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a Wilcoxon-Mann test.			

All these variables, except party identification,<sup>65</sup> were then placed in an ordinal logit regression model to which gender and a binary variable for Catholicism was added.<sup>66</sup> With Black authoritarianism as the dependent variable and nine independent variables included in the model only weekly church attendance and linked fate achieved statistical significance.<sup>67</sup>

I find that differences between African Americans perceptions of linked fate and reported church attendance are predictive of their authoritarianism. African Americans who are less likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their group racial identity and

<sup>65</sup> Ideology, which registered a *p-value* of .0815 on the Wilcoxon-Mann test, was included instead of party identification which had the least statistically significant *p-value* of .967.

<sup>66</sup> Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) inclusion of Catholicism as a binary independent variable in several of his regression analyses led to its testing here.

<sup>67</sup> Following Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) lead, I employ a one-tailed test of statistical significance on this question for linked fate because of the "clear directional claim" (p. 554) I made about linked fate and African American authoritarians. The two-tailed *p-value* of linked fate among African Americans in Table 4 is .069. The two-tailed *p-value* of linked fate among African Americans in Table 5 is .065.

more likely to attend church each week are more likely to be authoritarian. While Catholicism skirts the edge of statistical significance (p-value =.056), other standard demographics, including income, education, gender, ideology, and age have no statistically significant bearing on African Americans' authoritarianism.

Table 4

Demographic indicators of African American authoritarianism

	African Americans	
Linked Fate	0.275	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.152	
Church Attendance	0.743	***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.286	
Education	-0.035	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.107	
Ideology	0.627	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.496	
Age	-0.174	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.117	
Length of Citizenship	-0.122	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.156	
Income	-0.524	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.420	
Religion: Catholic	-1.158	*
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.607	
Gender	-0.352	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.287	
<i>Cut 1</i>	-3.967	
<i>Cut 2</i>	-2.440	
<i>Cut 3</i>	-1.300	
<i>Cut 4</i>	0.470	
Count R2	0.410	
Adjusted Count R2	0.042	
N	195	
<i>Source:</i> UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.		
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis. Following Hetherington's methodology (2011, p.554), a one-tailed test of statistical significance is used for linked fate because of the clearly stated priors of the relationship between authoritarianism and linked fate.		
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001		



Are there other variables beyond linked fate and church attendance that have statistical and substantive bearing on the observed authoritarianism of African Americans? Once again using data from the University of Massachusetts's module on the 2014 CCES election survey, I looked at whether employment status, region of the country, mobility over time, or type of community made a difference to African Americans' disposition to authoritarianism. I tested these variables in addition to other variables – such as income and citizenship status and family history in the United States – that were tested in the model reported in Table 4. I found that southerners and those who still lived in the community or state where they spent most of their childhood were also more likely to be authoritarians (Table 5). Thus, linked fate, church attendance, living in the South, and lack of mobility throughout life (operationalized as staying close to where you grew up) were all predictive of authoritarianism among African Americans.

Table 5

## Additional demographic indicators of African American authoritarianism

	African Americans	
Linked Fate	0.280	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.152	
Church Attendance	0.601	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.292	
Education	-0.052	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.108	
Ideology	0.681	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.496	
Age	-0.147	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.119	
Length of Citizenship	-0.158	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.158	
Income	-0.287	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.442	
Religion: Catholic	-1.156	*
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.605	
Gender	-0.269	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.295	
Region: South	0.542	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.278	
Mobility	-0.610	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.292	
<i>Cut 1</i>	-3.988	
<i>Cut 2</i>	-2.444	
<i>Cut 3</i>	-1.307	
<i>Cut 4</i>	0.521	
Count R2	0.397	
Adjusted Count R2	0.017	
N	194	
<i>Source:</i> UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.		
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis. Following Hetherington's methodology (2011, p.554), a one-tailed test of statistical significance is used for linked fate because of the clearly stated priors of the relationship between authoritarianism and linked fate.		
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001		

Linked fate is described as an observable expression of African Americans' racial solidarity. It is identified as the mechanism and "utility heuristic" (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) behind the theorized homogeneity of African American behavior as well as the

allegedly liberal bent of African American attitudes. The inverse relationship between African Americans agreement that their fate is linked to their race and authoritarianism, demonstrated in both a bivariate and multivariate analysis of data from the UMASS module of the 2014 CCES, calls for a deeper examination of the interrelationship between racial identity and authoritarianism and the intriguing possibility that authoritarianism may be a more important factor structuring the worldview and attitudes of African Americans than race.

### **Authoritarianism and African Americans' Perception of Racial Identity**

African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians' attitudes toward their shared racial identity can be found in two baseline questions that have been used extensively by scholars over the last two decades to explore how race affects political behavior. These standard questions include a battery used to measure racial resentment towards African Americans and linked fate – a question that explores whether African American respondents believe what happens in their life is tied to the fate of their race.

These baseline questions provide the grist for an examination of whether African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians perceive their shared racial identity differently and an exploration of the third hypothesis considered in this chapter that the difference between African American authoritarians' and nonauthoritarians' worldviews and attitudes are neither erased nor bridged by their shared racial identity. If this is the case, authoritarianism may vie with race to structure the behavior of African Americans who are also authoritarians.

### **Authoritarianism and Racial Identity: Racial Resentment**

The racial resentment battery of questions was designed (Kinder, 1996) as a measure symbolic racism. The questions first appeared on the survey fielded by ANES in 1988 and have been used extensively since. The genesis of the questions can be traced back to McConahay and Hough's (1976) and Kinder and Sear's (1981) argument that symbolic racism was replacing a more overt form of racism in America – racism based on the supposed biological inferiority of African Americans. In short, some Whites' overt, racist assertions of African American biological inferiority were being replaced by coded accusations that Blacks are lazy and do not work as hard as other Americans and ethnic groups who had immigrated to America.

Four racial resentment questions were designed to measure the level of symbolic racism Whites and others hold toward African Americans. On these questions, respondents are asked to answer, using a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree, whether “over the past few years Blacks have gotten less than they deserve,” if “Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites,” whether since “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up, Blacks should do the same without any special favors,” and if “generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class.” Typically, answers to these questions are aggregated and used to produce a racial resentment scale that varies from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the most racially resentful point on the scale.

In survey after survey, African Americans have also been asked to answer these questions. And as expected, African Americans score quite low on the racial resentment

scale. Looked at monolithically, African Americans strongly disagree that members of their race do not work as hard as Whites and other immigrant groups. However, the moral traditionalism of African American authoritarians and their belief in the Horatio Alger mythos, which are both documented in Chapter 5, lead to an obvious question: Do African American authoritarians' view their race's commitment to the American norm of hard work differently than nonauthoritarians as measured by the racial resentment scale? The short answer to this question is as simple as it is interesting: Yes, they do.

A bivariate, difference of means test of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians<sup>68</sup> placement on the racial resentment scale, conducted using data from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys<sup>69</sup> as well as the 2011 WISER poll, reveals statistically significant differences in racial resentment (p-value .05 or less)<sup>70</sup> in five of the six years studied (Table 6). In these five surveys, African American authoritarians are statistically more likely to score higher on the racial resentment scale than nonauthoritarian African Americans. In other words, African American authoritarians demonstrate a higher level of racial resentment toward members of their own race than nonauthoritarian African Americans. (Racial resentment values for White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are also statistically significant with both groups posting, as expected, higher racial resentment scores than African Americans – Appendix C – Tables 22 & 23)

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<sup>68</sup> In four of the six polls, African Americans scoring .75 and above on the authoritarian scale were categorized as authoritarians, and those scoring .25 and below were categorized as nonauthoritarians. Because of the small sample of African Americans surveyed by the 2000 ANES poll and the small number of African Americans giving nonauthoritarian answers on the 2008 ANES poll, African Americans scoring .875 or above in these two polls were categorized as authoritarians and the nonauthoritarian category included those African Americans scoring .5 or less.

<sup>69</sup> The four child-rearing questions were not asked on the 1996 ANES.

<sup>70</sup> The *p-value* on the 2004 ANES is 0.0538.

Table 6

African Americans' mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale  
(0 = least racially resentful. 1 = most racially resentful)

	1992 ANES	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2008 ANES	2011 WISER	2012 ANES
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	0.2453	0.3689	0.3077	0.4614	0.2726	0.3506
Authoritarians	0.3842	0.4615	0.4312	0.4940	0.3832	0.4151
Difference of Means	0.1389	0.0926	0.1235	0.0326	0.1106	0.0644
<i>P-value, one tailed</i>	<i>0.0008</i>	<i>0.0079</i>	<i>0.0269</i>	<i>0.0883</i>	<i>0.0115</i>	<i>0.0157</i>
<i>P-value, two tailed</i>	<i>0.0016</i>	<i>0.0157</i>	<i>0.0538</i>	<i>0.1766</i>	<i>0.0230</i>	<i>0.0314</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>209</i>	<i>106</i>	<i>122</i>	<i>346</i>	<i>717</i>	<i>719</i>
Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality, 2011.						
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.						

A multivariate analysis of the same polls and questions, with racial resentment as the dependent variable and authoritarianism, party identification, gender, age, church attendance, and education the independent variables, finds authoritarianism achieving statistical significance in three of the six surveys studied, including the 2011 WISER and 2012 ANES surveys, which included larger samples of African Americans (Appendix C – Table 24).

In the 2011 WISER survey, the predicted value of an African American authoritarian score on the racial resentment scale was .397, compared to a nonauthoritarian score of .241. In other words, African American authoritarians were 15 percentage points more resentful of members of their own race than nonauthoritarian African Americans.

In the 2012 ANES survey, the predicted value of an African American authoritarian score on the racial resentment scale was .439, compared to a nonauthoritarian score of .349. Thus, African American authoritarians were 9 percentage

points more resentful of members of their own race than nonauthoritarian African Americans.

Graphs of the predicted racial resentment values of African and White Americans across the authoritarian scale demonstrate the substantive differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians as well as White Americans (Figure 15).

Thus, there is bivariate and multivariate statistical evidence that African American authoritarians do indeed view their race's commitment to the American norm of hard work, as measured by the racial resentment scale, differently than nonauthoritarian African Americans.




Figure 15: Racial resentment.  
(1 = most racial resentment)

### **Authoritarianism and Racial Identity: Linked Fate**

Linked fate is the “acute sense of awareness (or recognition) that what happens to the group will also affect the individual member” (Simien, 2005). In terms of African Americans, it is the theorized recognition by individual African Americans that their futures are tethered inexorably to their racial identity (Dawson, 1995; Jaynes & Williams, 1989; Tate, 1994).

In survey research, linked fate, among African Americans and other groups, is measured by a standard question that asks: “Do you think that what happens generally to (racial group of respondents) will have something to do with what happens in your life.” Answers to this question include: “A lot,” “Some,” “Not Much,” or “Not at All.”

Results of African American answers to linked fate questions have been used to support the scholarly contention that African Americans sublimate their individual identity to their racial identity. These results have also been cited, along with historical explanations (Dawson, 1995; Gurin, Hatchett, & Jackson, 1989; Herring, Jankowski, & Brown, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Tate, 1991, 1994), as the primary factors behind African Americans’ monolithic political behavior. However, as was found when analyzing African American responses to racial resentment questions, important differences exist between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans’ attitudes toward their racial identity.

The 2011 WISER poll asks African Americans a one-step linked fate question.<sup>71</sup>

A multivariate analysis of the question -- with linked fate as the dependent variable and

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<sup>71</sup> The standard linked fate question on contemporary ANES surveys is a two-step question. In this format, respondents are first asked to respond – yes or no – if they believe their fate is linked to the group to which they belong. The follow-up question sorts “yes” respondents into “a lot,” “some,” and “not much.” This



authoritarianism, party identification, age, gender, church attendance, and education serving as independent variables – clearly demonstrates the statistically significant and substantive differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians’ perceptions of linkage to their racial group (Appendix C – Table 25 for Figure 16).

African American authoritarians are much less likely to agree “a lot” that their fate is linked to their racial identity than nonauthoritarian African Americans. In the 2011 WISER survey, the predicted value of African American nonauthoritarians saying their fate is linked “a lot” to their racial group is .627 compared to African American authoritarians predicted score of .275. Moving across the authoritarian scale from nonauthoritarian to authoritarian, therefore, generates a 35 percentage point drop in those African Americans who agree “a lot” that their fate is linked to their racial identity. Thus, African American authoritarians are more likely to express resentment towards other African Americans and less likely to agree that their individual fate is linked to their racial group.

The significant differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on whether their fate is linked to their racial identity are displayed visually in Figure 16. By comparison and as expected, White Americans show little difference of opinion on linked fate across the authoritarian scale (Figure 17).

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question format produces somewhat different results than the one-step approach used in the WISER study in which respondents are presented with all four-answer options at once.




Figure 16: Linked fate among African Americans.




Figure 17: Linked fate.  
 (“My fate is linked “A lot” to the fate of my racial group”)

As I noted in Chapter 3, a multivariate analysis of another linked fate question (on the 2012 ANES), which uses a different answer format than the 2011 WISER survey to measure African Americans’ perception of whether their fate is linked to their racial identity, finds again that the views of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans on linked fate are markedly different (Appendix C – Figure 66 and Table 26). With linked fate the dependent variable, and authoritarianism, party identification, gender, age, education, and church attendance the independent variables, the predicted values of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans attitudes on linked fate are mirror images.

On the key question of linked fate, which has been used to bolster the scholarly argument that African Americans are politically monolithic and reliably liberal because their individual concerns are subsumed by the racial identity, the opinions of African American authoritarians, according to the 2011 WISER and the 2012 ANES survey results, are statistically different than the opinions of nonauthoritarian Blacks. African American authoritarians are much less likely to see their individual fate linked to their racial group than nonauthoritarians.

### **Chapter Summary**

African Americans are more authoritarian than Whites. African American authoritarians are more likely to attend church regularly and much less likely than their nonauthoritarian brethren to believe their individual fate is linked (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) to their racial group identity. As measured by questions geared to estimate racial resentment (Kinder, 1996), they are also statistically more likely to agree with the symbolically racist (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1993; Sears, 1988; Sears & Kinder, 1971) negative stereotypes of members of their own race still broadcast by much of mainstream America.

The contest between African American's authoritarianism and their racial identity affects not only how these authoritarians view other African Americans, but also the ties that bind them to their race. They see themselves as different than the mainstream stereotypes of Black Americans. They are not them. They do not hold those values. They do not want to be burdened by the downward mobility of being perceived as only Black (Waters, 2009, p. 65). American is one of their reference groups. They are Americans

who are also Black and, as authoritarians, they will defend their chosen groups against all others.

For African Americans, who are also authoritarians, race is simply not the only factor that shapes their choices of identity (Waters, 2009), view of the world, or attitudes on salient issues. As I will show in the chapters that follow, when issues or circumstances activate their authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism will trump their racial identity within many value and issue domains. The result is African American political behaviors that are neither monolithic, predictably liberal, nor driven by a jointly held conception of linked racial fate. Instead, the political behavior of African American authoritarians is, at times, structured by their authoritarian predisposition and quite different than the behavior of their nonauthoritarian brethren.

Theory argues that authoritarianism is a powerful predisposition and predictor of behavior. Its incidence and effect knows no boundaries. It is a universal condition that reaches indiscriminately across race, ethnic, and national boundaries. There is no theoretical reason to assume that the siren call of the authoritarian predisposition affects African Americans less than Whites in America. That is why I made the methodological choice in this dissertation to bring African Americans back into the contemporary scholarly discussion of authoritarianism. But following this methodological approach leads to another fundamental question that begs an answer: Why do more African Americans answer authoritarianism call than Whites? Why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America?

That question, of course, is the subject of the next chapter.

## CHAPTER 4

### AUTHORITARIANISM AND THREAT

In all of its different manifestations and guises, threat is at the root of authoritarianism. It determines where an individual is likely to be located “on the continuum between authoritarian and democratic belief” (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 189) and it is “one of the strongest predictors of intolerance” (p. 332). In this chapter, I argue that threat is the logical and overlooked explanation for the high levels of authoritarianism found in African Americans today. Authoritarianism is not an anomaly among African Americans. It is the predictable outcome of the unrelenting and asymmetric threat, stress, and stigmatization African Americans experience personally each day and have experienced historically.

The link between African Americans’ high rate of authoritarianism and their asymmetric exposure to personal threat was not explored by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), or Stenner (2005) – some of the leading, contemporary theorists on authoritarianism and threat. It cannot be plumbed in depth in this chapter. But its exploration can begin by first reviewing the extensive literature linking authoritarianism and threat. This scholarship on the relationship between the perception of personal threat and the incidence of authoritarianism is clear. If African Americans perceive personal threats more intensely and pervasively than Whites, they are more likely to exhibit authoritarian attitudes and behaviors.

Next, I add stigma and inequality to the list of threats that can engender authoritarianism. The relationship between stigma and authoritarianism is the subject of recent studies. These studies find that authoritarianism is partially a response to

stigmatization (Brandt & Henry, 2012; Cohen et al., 2008). As such, authoritarianism shields minorities from the psychological threat of stigma. This new theory, what I call the Authoritarian Shield, may prove as useful a concept as Stenner's (2005) *Authoritarian Dynamic* when African American and other minorities are added back into analyses of authoritarianism.

Then, I examine the first hypothesis offered in this chapter. I argue (H1) that some personal threats are experienced much more by African Americans than Whites in America. The racial basis and structuring of these threats and the pervasive, asymmetric exposure to them by African Americans makes Blacks more fearful of these personal threats than Whites and transcends authoritarian differences among African Americans. For the sake of clarity, I call this the asymmetric threat proposition.

I present empirical evidence that demonstrates African Americans experience or fear certain racially-based material, psychological, and physical personal threats more than Whites in America. These threats are asymmetrically experienced by African Americans, meaning they are a common part of the daily experience of African Americans but a less common or uncommon experience for Whites. And the asymmetry of the threats is racially-based or structured.<sup>72</sup>

I follow the presentation of the empirical evidence of asymmetrically experienced threat with a discussion of a simple but important corollary to the theory that increasing threat increases authoritarianism. I hypothesize (H2) that threats, which are not race-based but pose a danger that is theorized to engage authoritarianism and endangers

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<sup>72</sup> The empirical evidence of asymmetrically experienced material, psychological, and physical threats is summarized in three questions asked on the LAPOP 2008 survey. This survey includes the child-rearing battery used to estimate authoritarianism.

African and White Americans equally, will be perceived by African Americans authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differentially and African American and White authoritarians similarly. I call this the symmetric threat proposition.

If every day, personal threat, experienced asymmetrically by Blacks leads to higher levels of authoritarianism in African Americans than Whites, then the African Americans who are authoritarians should also be more reactive to, and evince more fear of, generalized threats that are theorized to engage all authoritarians. Thus, African American and White authoritarians will fear a generalized threat (a threat that is not race specific) similarly while authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, no matter what their race, will fear it differentially.

I conclude by discussing how the twin notions of the Authoritarian Shield and asymmetrically experienced threats connect with the two leading, contemporary accounts of authoritarianism and threat, add to them, and provide a robust and theoretically consistent explanation of the prevalence of authoritarianism among African Americans.

### **The Effect of Threat on Authoritarianism**

Fromm (1941) attributed Fascism's rise to threat. Isolated, powerless, and insecure people escaped from freedom by submitting to Nazi authoritarianism. Adorno et al.'s (1950) Freudian explanation of authoritarianism proposed that a threatening childhood environment created authoritarian adults. Rokeach (1960) argued that "adverse experiences, temporary or enduring" threaten individuals, create anxiety, and cause dogmatism and intolerance (p. 69). As such, over time, threat, uncertainty, and fear breed authoritarianism ( Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006; Fillenbaum & Jackman, 1961; Lipset, 1959, 1960; Sanford, 1966; Wilson, 1973).



A variety of threats have been theoretically implicated in authoritarianism and “point to threat as a primary, or perhaps as the primary, determinant of heightened authoritarianism” (Sales & Friend, 1973, p. 163). Among them are personal threat (Fillenbaum & Jackman, 1961; Lipset, 1960; Sanford, 1966), the threat of personal failure (Sales & Friend, 1973), threat aggregated and estimated across society (Sales, 1973), socially learned and experienced threats (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 2006), external and internal fear and anxiety (Ray, 1972; Wilson, 1973), intensely identified and conforming in-groups threatened by unconventional out-groups (Duckitt, 1989), individual and collective threats (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991), threats perceived to be more personal (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011), personal insecurity caused by the threat of terrorism (Hofstadter, 1964), and differentially perceived economic threats (Lipset, 1959; McFarland, Ageyev, & Hinton, 1995).

Nearly a half century after *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950) was first published, however, the statistical evidence linking threat to authoritarianism remained sparse (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) work bridged this empirical gap. Using child-rearing questions included on the ANES 1992 survey for the first time to estimate authoritarianism, they found that “authoritarianism and perceptions of environmental stress (threat) interact in creating intolerance” (Dalton & Klingemann, 2007, p. 332). Threat did not make individuals more authoritarian. Instead, according to Feldman and Stenner’s hypothesis, it activated intolerant authoritarian behaviors in individuals already predisposed to authoritarianism.

Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) findings did not contradict the widely held assumption that long-term exposure to threat breeds authoritarianism. They did challenge,

however, the notion that personal threats play an important role in authoritarianism. Feldman and Stenner contended that “authoritarianism is activated when there is a perception that the political or social order is threatened” (pp. 765-766). Based on their analysis of 1992 ANES data, threats to social norms and order from ideologically distant political parties or candidates, negatively perceived presidential candidates, or a deteriorating national economy interact with authoritarianism, while personal threats to individuals (for example, unemployment) did not (p. 765).<sup>73</sup>

“In the absence of threat” the lack of a connection “between authoritarian predispositions and the dependent variables” (p. 765) studied by Feldman and Stenner also raised serious questions about both Adorno et al.’s (1950) and Altemeyer’s (1981) theoretical accounts of the origins of authoritarianism. To answer these questions, Feldman proposed a new explanation for authoritarianism that allows for the empirically observed interactive effects of threat and authoritarianism. He posited that “authoritarian predispositions originate in the conflict between the values of social conformity and personal autonomy” (Feldman, 2003a, p. 41). When social conformity is threatened, authoritarian predispositions are activated and intolerant behavior is produced (Feldman, 2003a, p. 51). Building on this work, Stenner (2005) proposed the *Authoritarian Dynamic*, a “process in which an enduring individual predisposition interacts with changing environmental conditions – specifically, conditions of ‘normative threat’ – to produce manifest expressions of intolerance” (p. 13).

There are three vitally important components of Stenner’s (2005) theory. First, authoritarianism is conceptualized as an enduring predisposition that is partially

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<sup>73</sup>This is the first example of analysis of authoritarianism using child-rearing questions that exclude all but Whites from the data.

inherited. Second, authoritarianism is not always on. Authoritarian behavior is activated “when needed” (p. 14). As such, “authoritarianism does not consistently predict behavior across different situations” (p. 13). Finally, not all threats are created equal. Only threats to norms and order, when they are perceived by an individual with an authoritarian predisposition, have the capacity to elicit an intolerant reaction.

There is also one glaring omission in the data on which Stenner rests her theory of authoritarian activation. Beginning with Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) first account of authoritarian activation and continuing with her book, *The Authoritarian Dynamic* (Stenner, 2005), only the behaviors of White, non-Hispanic Americans are evaluated.<sup>74</sup>

While Feldman and Stenner’s (1997) account of the interaction between threats to moral order and authoritarianism is compelling and well documented, it was certainly not the last word. Other scholars found that threats to morality and mortality can activate authoritarian behavior in individuals with a predisposition to authoritarianism. Using a balanced F-scale to measure authoritarianism, Rickert (1998) discovered that authoritarians who were economically threatened were six times more likely “to favor restricting benefits to powerless groups” than authoritarians and nonauthoritarians who were not threatened (1998, p. 707). Experimenting with situationally induced threats, Lavine et al. (2002) concluded that threats to cultural values as well as personal threats activate authoritarian behaviors in those predisposed to authoritarianism. Moreover, the experimental results implied “that authoritarians think and act as they do in order to

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<sup>74</sup> In his review of *The Authoritarian Dynamic*, Kinder (2007) underscores this as a shortcoming of Stenner’s work (2005).

reduce an apparently acute sensitivity to threat” (p. 359)<sup>75</sup> – an observation that is a half-step away from conceptualizing authoritarianism as a shield from threat.

“Threats to social order and cohesion, social identity, economic security, and mortality” have all been associated with authoritarian activation (Lavine, Milton Lodge, & Kate Freitas, 2005, p. 227). And while some scholars have found sociotropic threat is a more important trigger of intolerant, antidemocratic behavior than personal threat (Gibson, 1998; Marcus, 1995; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1993), Davis and Silver (2004) contend that “when threat is personalized the response may become overwhelmingly intolerant toward perceived outgroups or threatening groups” (1957, p. 30).<sup>76</sup> Thus, the list of scholars who find threats beyond normative challenges to order important to authoritarianism is indeed lengthy and includes Adorno, Altemeyer, Davis, Duckitt, Hetherington, Weiler, Suhay, Lavine, Lodge, Merolla, Oesterrich, Rickert, and Zechmeister.

Who is activated by threat is as contested a question as what type of threat activates them. As already discussed, some scholars contend that authoritarians are activated and respond aggressively when confronted by threat (Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Lavine et al., 2005; Lavine et al., 2002; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Rickert, 1998; Stenner, 2005). Others argue that authoritarian behavior is not turned on and off by the presence or absence of threat. Instead, the aggression that forms the bedrock of authoritarian behavior is chronically salient and not only influences how authoritarians act, but also how they perceive the world around them (Adorno et al.,

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<sup>75</sup> Greenberg et al. (1990) also contend authoritarians are more sensitive to threats to mortality than nonauthoritarians.

<sup>76</sup> This quote summarizes some of the findings of Davis’s (1995) paper on Black political intolerance.

1950; Altemeyer, 1981,1988, 1996, 2006; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Muelken, Van der Linden, & De Witte, 1996).

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011), leading authoritarian scholars who argue that the authoritarian predisposition is constantly engaged irrespective of threat, add that nonauthoritarians will be more affected than authoritarians by rising threats to morality and mortality. They contend that “as people in the middle and lower tiers of authoritarianism come to perceive threat, they adopt policy orientations that are more like an authoritarian’s” (p. 113). Thus, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) contend that a negative interaction exists between threat and authoritarianism. Nonauthoritarians become more aggressive in the presence of physical and normative threat, while authoritarians, already chronically near the apex of aggressive behavior, have much less room for their aggression to grow.<sup>77</sup> In other words, in the presence of mortal, physical threat or moral, normative danger nonauthoritarians become more aggressive and behave more like authoritarians.<sup>78</sup> Or, as the cartoon character Pogo remarked, and Hetherington and Suhay (p. 558) conclude: We have met the enemy, and he is us.

Implicit in Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s theory of threat and authoritarian behavior or, at least, their approach to testing it, is the

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<sup>77</sup> In Appendix A I explore if Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) theory that a negative interaction exists between threat and authoritarianism is universal or threat specific. This theory is a very important concern for all who care about preserving democracy in what seems like an increasingly threatening world. It raises numerous concerns about the ability of states and societies to maintain democratic institutions and protect liberties when confronted by external and internal threats. Examining this theory through the lens of asymmetric and symmetric threats discussed in Chapter 4, I find that certain threats do not cause a more authoritarian reaction in nonauthoritarians than authoritarians. Thus, the negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism is threat specific and not universal.

<sup>78</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) make an important distinction between sociotropic physical threat and personal physical threat. They argue that personal physical threat makes nonauthoritarians behave more like authoritarians. Sociotropic physical threat or, as Hetherington and Suhay (2011) operationalized it in their study, perceiving “that the country is in danger” from terrorism (p. 556) does not.

assumption that authoritarianism alone structures perceptions of mortal and moral threat. Racially-based differences in perceptions of threat between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are not considered. Irrespective of race, authoritarians and nonauthoritarians will not only be moved by threat differentially, they will also always perceive threat differently. Stuck in a perpetual state of hypervigilance, authoritarians will always be more likely to perceive the world as a dangerous place and feel threatened, anxious, and insecure (Adorno et al., 1950; Alexander, 2010; Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt, 2001; Greenberg et al., 1990; Lavine et al., 2005; Lavine et al., 2002; Oesterreich, 2005). On the other hand, nonauthoritarians will be less likely than authoritarians to perceive threats. But when nonauthoritarians do perceive a clear and present personal danger, they will be more likely to react with authoritarian aggression (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011).

In testing this theory, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) operationalize threat in two ways. Normative threat is estimated through questions from the standard, ANES moral traditionalist battery that they argue get to the root of threats to norms (Davison, 1991; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Layman, 2001). The two questions used to scale perceptions of what they call the moral threat posed by “Newer Lifestyles”<sup>79</sup> are:

- “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.”
- and “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.”

Next, physical danger is estimated using a question that personalizes threat and links it to a prevalent and pervasive concern. The question asks: “How worried are you that you

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<sup>79</sup> The other two questions that comprise the ANES moral traditionalist battery, which focus on the rights of gays and lesbians, were not included in Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) “Newer Lifestyles” scale.

personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?”<sup>80</sup> This is labeled in Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) data tables as “Perceived Threat from Terrorism.” Both normative and physical threats are combined with authoritarianism to produce independent variables that account statistically for the interaction between authoritarianism and normative threat or authoritarianism and physical threat.

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) use gay rights questions as dependent variables to test their threat theory in the moral domain. Along with Suhay, they employ questions on civil liberties and use of American force to test his hypothesis in the mortal domain (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). In regression analyses, they employ a binary independent variable (with 0 representing nonblacks and 1 equal to African Americans) to estimate the effect of race on gay rights, civil liberties, and use of American force. In each predicted probability graph used to display the effect of authoritarianism, perceived threat, and the interaction of these variables on gay rights, civil liberties, and use of force, African Americans, however, are excluded from the analysis.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Wording from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study.

<sup>81</sup> Do African Americans perceive the two threats operationalized by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay (2011) in their work the same as Whites? Hetherington and Weiler found, authoritarians are statistically more likely to agree that “Newer Lifestyles” are an anathema to our society. Thus, White and African American authoritarians are more likely to perceive “Newer Lifestyles” as a threat to normative order while White and African American nonauthoritarians are not. Importantly, there are no statistically significant differences between White and African Americans, White and African Americans authoritarians, and White and African Americans nonauthoritarians’ opinions on this question. Hetherington, Weiler, and Suhay also find that authoritarians are statistically more likely to be worried about the personal threat posed by terrorism than nonauthoritarians. In this analysis, authoritarians are defined as those who score .75 on the 0-1 scale and higher. Nonauthoritarians score .25 and lower on the scale. Comparing attitudinal differences between “high” and “low” authoritarians is a standard approach used by many scholars.

The two leading, contemporary accounts of threat and authoritarianism, advanced by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2009), and Stenner (2005) are constrained by similar analytical shortcomings – the list of threats considered is limited and the role threat plays in authoritarian behavior is examined after the most authoritarian racial group in America has been excluded. Their approaches, which the discussion of stigma that follows underscores, suffer from these constraints.

### **Stigma and Authoritarianism**

Threat can take many forms. One such form, neglected so far in this discussion of the role of threat in authoritarianism, is the psychological threat posed by stigmatization. Stigmatized individuals are those who are marginalized in a society. They are threatened by prejudice and discrimination that stems from the social devaluation of them as individuals and of the group to which society says they belong. They are rejected in whole or part by society.

Two recent studies on the relationship between stigma and authoritarianism have found “higher mean levels of authoritarianism compared to Whites” among stigmatized ethnic minorities in the United States (Cohen et al., 2008, p. 19) and higher levels of authoritarianism in women in the 54 societies studied across the globe where gender inequalities were high (Brandt & Henry, 2012).

The root cause of the elevated levels of authoritarianism in both groups studied – women and ethnic minorities – was stigma. As such “authoritarianism is, in part, a response to [societal] rejection, a psychological threat associated with stigma” (Brandt & Henry, 2012, p. 1301).



The notion that some expressions of authoritarianism are a response to the intolerance that is a product of Stenner's (2005) *Authoritarian Dynamic* is a revelation. It is also a concept unlikely to be articulated or explored by contemporary studies of authoritarianism that exclude African Americans and other minorities from the analysis.

The theory, however, is not new. In 1957, using the contested but not yet discredited F-scale to measure authoritarianism, two researchers analyzed "Ethnic Differences in the Authoritarian Personality" (C. U. Smith & Prothro) among a sample of 196 students from a Southern state's separate White and Black universities. In this study, African American authoritarian scores were substantively higher than the scores of Whites, and African Americans "scored considerably higher than most of [the groups measured by] Adorno" (1957, p. 336). The statistical difference between the scores of White and African American authoritarians was significant at a p-value of  $<.05$ .

Child-rearing practices, the Freudian explanation offered by Adorno et al., (1950) for authoritarianism, was rejected by C. U. Smith and Prothro (1957) as the mechanism driving the difference they observed. Instead,

The writers are inclined to believe that the pattern of race relations, typified by segregation and discrimination, in the South is of primary importance in contributing to the relatively high degree of susceptibility to authoritarian values demonstrated by the Negro subgroup... Negroes possess a higher authoritarian potential than Whites [because of] the biracial social system prevalent in the South. (p. 338).

The separate and unequal Jim Crow system stigmatized Blacks. That stigmatization produced higher levels of authoritarianism among Blacks than Whites "since Whites in the South are not faced with similar experiences (as Blacks), they are far less likely to develop such (authoritarian) personality characteristics" (C. U. Smith & Prothro, 1957, p. 338).

The irony of intolerance, which is an outcome of the interaction of a predisposition to authoritarianism interacting with threat, producing increased levels of authoritarianism in the individuals and groups subjected to the prejudicial stigmatization is a puzzle in need of an explanation. Why might stigmatized groups become more authoritarian when confronted by intolerance and discrimination?

One possible answer is deeply rooted in the study of authoritarianism. From the beginning, authoritarianism and intolerance have been explained as a reaction to, or a way to escape from, psychological and physical threats (Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1935; Altemeyer, 1996). Recently, authoritarianism has been conceptualized as an “emancipatory strategy to protect Blacks from groups who directly threaten their physical and psychological security” (Davis, 1995, p. 1), a means for finding “safety and security” (Oesterreich, 2005, p. 275) or collective security (Jugert & Duckitt, 2009), and an effective buffer for mentally distressing threats (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) that is “good for you” (Van Hiel & De Clercq, 2009, p. 33).

No matter whether you are a member of a majority or minority racial, ethnic, or social group, when threat is afoot, authoritarianism is a protective solution – an Authoritarian Shield from exigent physical or psychological peril. And the more threat you or the group you belong to has experienced, including the threats emanating from stigma, the more likely you will exhibit authoritarian attitudes and behaviors that shield you from danger.

There is no better example of individual and group stigmatization in America than African Americans.

## **Asymmetric Material, Psychological, and Physical Threats and African American Authoritarianism**

Today, “Black people in the United States differ from all other modern people owing to the unprecedented levels of unregulated and unrestrained violence directed at them” (West, 2001, p. XIII). This violence and threat of violence is asymmetrically experienced by African Americans. And while it is a common part of African Americans’ daily experience, White Americans are largely untouched by it.

Empirical evidence of the difference between African and White Americans’ experience with material, psychological, and physical threats is present in numerous national surveys conducted over the last several decades. Surveys in which these threats were studied and authoritarian child-rearing questions were asked, however, are not common.

In this chapter, three questions asked on the LAPOP 2008 survey are analyzed to begin to examine whether African Americans report higher levels of material, personal, and psychological threat than Whites. Since this survey also includes the standard battery of authoritarian child-rearing question, the similarities and differences of perceptions of threat among African American and White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, which are central to the argument made in this chapter, can also be measured. This measurement is necessary to test the asymmetric threat hypothesis (H1) that some personal threats are experienced much more by African Americans than Whites in America.

The empirical ramifications of this proposition are clear. African Americans should express greater fear than Whites of racially-based or structured threats they experience asymmetrically and, importantly, their fears will transcend their authoritarian

differences. In other words, authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans will react similarly to these threats.

The first threat analyzed to test this theory is job loss. When it comes to job loss, a fear of material loss and a threat to personal security, a bivariate analysis of LAPOP 2008 questions shows that African Americans fear the threat of job loss statistically more than Whites. Moreover, as predicted, there is no statistical difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians fear of losing a job (Table 7). Given the continuing socio-economic disparities between African and White Americans and the historical and contemporary differences in job opportunities available to them, African Americans asymmetric fear of job loss, which transcends their authoritarianism, comports with theoretical expectations.

Table 7

Fear of losing a job  
(0 = Not at all worried. 1 = Very worried) (Whites and African Americans only)

	All	All	Authoritarians	Nonauthoritarians	African Americans
	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score
Non Authoritarians	0.5215				0.6204
Authoritarians	0.5071				0.6333
Whites		0.5049	0.4795	0.5160	
African Americans		0.6057	0.6333	0.6204	
Difference of Means	0.0144	-0.1008	-0.1539	-0.1044	-0.0130
<i>P-value</i>	0.5646	0.0013	0.0001	0.2376	0.8845
<i>N</i>	925	1246	584	341	123
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.					
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.					

Next, African Americans are also more likely than Whites to say the neighborhood where they live is unsafe at a p-value of < .001. Once again, the physical threat to personal safety felt by African Americans because of where they live transcends their authoritarianism (Table 8). Thus, when it comes to asymmetrically experienced material and physical personal threats, race matters to African Americans while differences in their level of authoritarianism do not.

Table 8

Safety of neighborhood  
(0 = Safe 1 = Unsafe) (Whites and African Americans only)

	All	All	Authoritarians	Nonauthoritarians	African Americans
	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score
Non Authoritarians	0.2057				0.3333
Authoritarians	0.2503				0.3079
Whites		0.2208	0.2377	0.1986	
African Americans		0.2963	0.3079	0.3333	
Difference of Means	-0.0446	-0.0755	-0.0702	-0.1348	0.0254
<i>P-value</i>	0.0078	0.0003	0.0088	0.0202	0.6981
<i>N</i>	928	1249	586	342	123
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.					
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.					

Finally, on the question of trusting police, which is reconceptualized as both a physical and psychological measure of fear of police,<sup>82</sup> African American and White perceptions differ dramatically. Not surprisingly, African Americans are statistically more likely to fear and distrust the police than Whites. Once again there is no statistical difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians fear of the police. The wide gap between African American and White perceptions of the police is underscored by the finding that, when race is factored out of the equation, authoritarians are more statistically more likely to trust the police, than nonauthoritarians at a p-value of .0287 (Table 9).

<sup>82</sup> Those who answer that they do not trust police are assumed to be saying, in effect, that they fear police.

Table 9

Distrust of police  
(0 = Trust 1 = Distrust) (Whites and African Americans only)

	All	All	Authoritarians	Nonauthoritarians	African Americans
	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score
Non Authoritarians	0.4371				0.5648
Authoritarians	0.3942				0.5429
Whites		0.3843	0.3617	0.4300	
African Americans		0.5381	0.5429	0.5648	
Difference of Means	0.0429	-0.1539	-0.1811	-0.1348	0.0220
<i>P-value</i>	0.0213	<0.0001	<0.0001	0.0347	0.7530
<i>N</i>	928	1249	586	342	123

Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.  
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Evidence of the asymmetric nature of material, physical, and psychological personal threats African Americans experience every day also abound in survey research that does not include authoritarian question batteries. For example, 70% of African Americans say that police treat them less fairly than Whites (Anderson, 2014). Ninety-one percent agree that police forces across the United States do a poor or only a fair job of treating racial and ethnic groups fairly, and 87% of Blacks think the police do a poor or only a fair job of using the right amount of force in each situation (Pew Research Center, 2014).

African Americans also question the fairness of the court system. Sixty-eight percent say Blacks are treated less fairly by the courts than Whites (Anderson, 2014). Anderson also reported that close to one out of every two African Americans agrees they are treated less fairly on the job (54%), in local public schools (51%), when voting (48%), in getting health care (47%) and in stores and restaurants (44%) than Whites.

Eighty-eight percent of African Americans say there is a lot or some discrimination against them today in America and 35% think they have been discriminated against or been treated unfairly because of their race in the past twelve months (Doherty, 2013). Even news coverage of African Americans is perceived by Blacks as being too negative. Fifty-eight percent of African Americans say news coverage of them is too negative, compared to just one percent who say it is too positive.

African Americans perceptions of discrimination, measured through surveys, square with the reality of the asymmetric sleights, challenges, unequal treatment and opportunity, and real threats and dangers they confront regularly. “African Americans are incarcerated at grossly disproportionate rates” in the United States (Alexander, 2012, p. 97) with African Americans and Latinos representing “ninety percent of those admitted to prison for drug offenses in many states” (p. 57). The mass incarceration of African Americans since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the beginning of the War on Drugs has created a “new racial caste system” in the United States that has replaced the old Jim Crow with “The New Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2012).

Poverty among African Americans is “the highest of any racial or ethnic group” in the United States with 27.2% of Blacks, according to census data, living at or below the poverty line (Krogstad, 2015). While a Black middle class has emerged in America during the last five decades, “roughly one-quarter of Black Americans... remain in poverty” forming a group of racially and economically segregated Americans who live in urban cores and rural backwaters and have been labelled “the Abandoned” (Robinson, 2011, p. 7). These African Americans in particular, as well as other African Americans who are doing better economically, experience threats – individually and as a group –



from stigmatization, inequality, and discrimination that know no equal among Whites. As journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates (2015) commented, while discussing his new book *Between the World and Me* to an audience in West Baltimore just months after the Freddie Gray riots: “Fear is one of the dominant emotions in the African American community” (Coates, 2015).

There are biological consequences to African Americans chronic exposure to threat, stress, and anxiety. These costs include the “increased risk of disease, and... increases in the expression of proinflammatory genes” (Powell et al., 2013, p. 16574).<sup>83</sup> While all men and women are created equally, the threats, anxieties, and stress they experience in life are not. Survey research, social statistics, census data, and scholarly and journalistic accounts document the very different threat environments in which Whites and African Americans live every day.

The material, physical, and psychological threats African Americans experience personally and asymmetrically every day contribute to the elevated levels of authoritarianism, estimated using the child-rearing questions, found among Black Americans in survey after survey conducted since 1992. African Americans are “the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 141) because they are members of the most socially stigmatized and personally threatened racial group in America. The scholarship could not be clearer: Increased threat and social stigmatization increases authoritarianism.

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<sup>83</sup> A brief review of the epigenetic literature on the biologic consequences of prolonged exposure to threat is included in Appendix D.

## Symmetric Threats and Authoritarianism

A simple but important corollary to the proposition that increasing threat increases authoritarianism is the second hypothesis considered in this chapter. The symmetric threat proposition (H2) argues that threats, which are not race-based but pose a danger that is theorized to engage authoritarianism and endangers African and White Americans equally, will be perceived by African Americans authoritarians and nonauthoritarians differentially and African American and White authoritarians similarly. Stated simply, African American and White authoritarians will fear a symmetric threat similarly and react to it equally. African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians will fear the same symmetric threat differentially and react to it unequally.

Another question on the LAPOP 2008 survey provides a test of this hypothesis and an excellent point of comparison with the three asymmetric threats – job loss, neighborhood safety, and fear of police – discussed earlier. The question asks “How worried are you or someone in your family will become a victim of a terrorist attack?” This question was used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011) in their article on authoritarianism, threat, and the war on terror to estimate a physical threat variable that theoretically activates an authoritarian response.<sup>84</sup> There is no racial component to the threat in the question and the question was selected specifically to estimate the interactive effect of threat and authoritarianism on selected dependent variables that were postulated as likely authoritarian responses to personalized, physical threats from terrorism.

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<sup>84</sup> In their article, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) used terrorism questions from two surveys to estimate this threat for eight dependent variables (p. 554). The wording of the terrorism questions on the two surveys and the answer scales is somewhat different. This difference is not noted by Hetherington and Suhay. The LAPOP 2008 terrorism question used by Hetherington and Suhay has a seven-point answer that ranges from “a lot” to “not at all.” The question wording is quoted above. The CCES 2006 terrorism question is “How worried are you that you personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack.” It has a four-point answer scale that ranges from “not at all worried” to “very worried.”

A bivariate analysis of the fear of threat from terrorism question, which replicates the approach used to examine responses to asymmetric threats, demonstrates that, when confronted by a symmetric threat, African American and White authoritarians react similarly while authoritarians and nonauthoritarians react differentially. As predicted, the reaction to symmetric threat is the opposite of what was found when the three asymmetric threats were examined earlier.

Table 10

Bivariate analysis: Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism  
(0 = Not at all 1 = A lot) (White and African Americans only)

	All	All	Authoritarians	Nonauthoritarians	African Americans
	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score
Non Authoritarians	0.2022				0.2222
Authoritarians	0.3245				0.3429
Whites		0.2785	0.3205	0.2011	
African Americans		0.3083	0.3429	0.2222	
Difference of Means	-0.1223	-0.0297	-0.0224	-0.0211	-0.1206
<i>P-value</i>	<.0001	0.2175	0.4662	0.7243	.0619*
<i>N</i>	927	1248	585	342	123

*Source:* The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), 2008.

*Note:* Estimates produced using a difference of means test. The p-value reported for African Americans is one-tailed based on the clearly stated theoretical expectation that African American authoritarians will be more threatened by this question than nonauthoritarians

African American and White authoritarians are more worried about the threat posed by terrorism than nonauthoritarians, and the difference between the scores of authoritarians is small and not statistically significant (p-value = .4662). The difference between the mean scores of African American and White nonauthoritarians on terrorism is also small and statistically insignificant (p-value = .7243). On the other hand, the difference of means score between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on terrorism concern is statistically significant at a p-value of <.0001, while the one-tailed difference

of means between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is just slightly above statistical significance (p-value = .0619) with the small sample size, in all likelihood, leading to this finding.

Thus, as predicted, African American and White authoritarians perceive this symmetric threat similarly and authoritarians and nonauthoritarians perceive it differentially. The expected difference in perception of the threat by African Americans authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, however, is just outside the boundary of statistical significance.

Theoretically, according to the hypothesis, a multivariate analysis of a symmetrically perceived threat, like the physical threat posed by terrorism, should find authoritarianism a statistically and substantively significant independent variable for both African Americans and Whites. In other words, authoritarianism should be predictive of perceptions of threat irrespective of race. Thus, the more authoritarian one's predisposition, the more likely they will be to fear physical harm from terrorism. An OLS model with physical threat from terrorism as the dependent variable and authoritarianism, gender, age, party identification, education, and church attendance specified as the independent variables was estimated for African Americans and Whites. The results clearly demonstrate that the authoritarianism of African Americans and Whites is predictive of perceptions of this type of symmetric threat (Figure 18). Authoritarianism is statistically significant at a p-value  $<.05$  for African Americans and Whites and is substantively the largest coefficient in both regression analyses (Appendix C – Table 27).




Figure 18: Fear of personal physical threat from terrorism.

As predicted, since they perceive the threat from terrorism symmetrically, the more authoritarian an African or White American is, the more fearful they are of the physical threat posed to them or their family by terrorism. On the other hand, nonauthoritarians, no matter what their race, will simply not be as concerned about terrorist threats.

The acid test of this hypothesis is to interact authoritarianism with race in a regression model. If the resulting interaction term is statistically insignificant and the coefficient is small, the hypothesis that threats which are not race based, in other words threats that are symmetric, will be reacted to similarly by authoritarians no matter what their race and differentially by authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is supported. The results reported in Table 11 support the hypothesis.

Table 11

Multivariate analysis: Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism  
(0 = Not worried at all 1 = Worried a lot)

	Whites & African Americans	
Authoritarianism	0.850	****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.189	
Race (Whites and African Americans)	-0.242	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.439	
Authoritarianism*Race	0.496	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.598	
Gender	0.358	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.107	
Age	0.133	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.059	
Party Identification	0.068	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.026	
Education	-0.054	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.036	
Church Attendance	0.243	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.122	
<i>Cut 1</i>	0.063	
<i>Cut 2</i>	1.128	
<i>Cut 3</i>	1.820	
<i>Cut 4</i>	2.703	
<i>Cut 5</i>	3.519	
<i>Cut 6</i>	4.234	
Count R2	0.312	
Adjusted Count R2	-0.009	
N	1191	
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.		
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using Ordinal Logistic regression.		
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001		

**Chapter Summary:**

**The Prevalence of Black Authoritarians and the Protective Authoritarian Shield**

The regular asymmetric exposure of African Americans to material, physical, and psychological personal threats work in two ways to make Blacks, when measured in surveys using the child-rearing scale, more authoritarian than Whites. These two

pathways are not new inventions. Instead, they represent the two competing, contemporary accounts of the interaction of threat and authoritarianism posited by leading scholars of authoritarianism.

First, as Stenner (2005) predicts, threat activates authoritarianism in those African Americans who are already predisposed to it. Second, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) predict, threat causes nonauthoritarian African Americans to behave more like authoritarians. The fusion of these two different authoritarian pathways leads to heightened levels of authoritarianism among African Americans that are an observable, and regularly observed, statistical fact.

There are important differences, however, between Stenner's (2005) and Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) conceptualization of threat and the threats confronting African Americans detailed in this chapter. Stenner's threat is normative, and it is not constant. When it appears, the authoritarianism latent in people is activated. On the other hand, Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) authoritarians live in a hypervigilant state. Perceiving threats whether they exist or not, their authoritarianism is always on.

The asymmetric threats analyzed in this chapter and experienced by African Americans – those who are predisposed to authoritarianism and those who are not – are neither episodic, normative, nor imagined. They are a constant, palpable fact of life every day for African Americans. The clear and present dangers asymmetrically confronting most African Americans make them more authoritarian. African Americans construct a protective shield to shelter them and their families from these pervasive, corrosive

threats. That shield is authoritarianism, and more African Americans build an Authoritarian Shield than Whites simply because they confront more threats than Whites do.

Why are African Americans the most authoritarian racial group in America and statistically so much more likely to be authoritarian than Whites? The disproportionately high rate of authoritarianism consistently found among African Americans – detected when using tools as disparate as the F-scale and the contemporary battery of childrearing questions – can be explained by the predictable reaction of African Americans to their greater, asymmetric exposure to threat. This includes the personal material, physical, and psychological threats and stresses experienced daily by African Americans, along with threats to their racial group that are an outcome of stigma and inequality, and shape the cultural and social environment in which they live and grow up today.

The prevalence of authoritarianism found consistently in surveys over the last two years among African Americans is not a statistical anomaly. It is an outcome of the daily, asymmetric exposure of African Americans to personal threat. In America, the Black experience with threat is pervasive and, at times, life threatening. More than 50 years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, threat, stress, and stigmatization continue to permeate the social and economic reality confronting most African Americans. A higher percentage of African Americans are authoritarians than Whites because more African Americans experience more threats, stress, and stigmatization as part of their lives every day than Whites do.



## CHAPTER 5

### AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AUTHORITARIAN WORLDVIEW

If authoritarianism is as powerful a predisposition with African Americans as it is reputed to be among White Americans – and there is no reason postulated by Stenner (2005), Hetherington and Weiler (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2009), or other authoritarian scholars to expect otherwise – then authoritarianism should fundamentally structure and shape the political behavior of African American authoritarians. Thus, African American authoritarians may identify as Democrats. They may also claim to be ideologically liberal or moderate. But if authoritarian theory is universal, the worldview of African American authoritarians (examined in this chapter) and attitudes on issues shaped by their worldview (examined in the next chapter) must be demonstrably different than African Americans who are not authoritarian. Even more, the worldview and attitudes of African American authoritarians will be similar to authoritarians who are also White.

The implications of worldview and attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians and dissimilarities with other Black Americans for orthodox political science are clear. African Americans' political behavior may not be as monolithic or as reflexively liberal as scholarly conventional wisdom asserts because, for many African Americans, their political behavior is structured by authoritarianism as well as race.

When I write that authoritarianism shapes some African Americans' worldview, I am employing Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) definition of authoritarianism and mean "a distinct way of understanding political reality" that "shap[es] political behavior and

identity” (2009, p. 64). A person’s worldview is not produced out of the ether, nor does it exist in a vacuum. It is “tethered to an underlying predisposition” (2009, p. 64). In this chapter, I argue that predisposition is authoritarianism, and it shapes some African Americans’ worldview more than their racial identity does.

With African Americans excluded from much of the contemporary analyses of the effect of authoritarianism on political behavior, cleavages between the political behavior of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, the effects of African American authoritarian political behavior on theories of authoritarianism, and similarities between African and White American authoritarians’ preferences and opinions are often overlooked and unexamined.<sup>85</sup>

In this chapter, I continue to bring African Americans back into the analysis of authoritarianism in America by exploring whether the worldview of some African Americans is in fact shaped by authoritarianism. To that end, I examine three questions: Do African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians have different worldviews? Is the worldview of African American authoritarians similar to or different than the worldview of White authoritarians? And are particular aspects of African American authoritarians’ worldview more conservative than the attitudes held by White Americans who are not authoritarians?

Core authoritarian demands and desires, identified by scholars over the last 65 years (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Feldman, 2003a; Feldman & Stenner, 1997;

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<sup>85</sup> Hetherington and Weiler’s thesis concerning authoritarianism and party polarization is founded on an analysis of data (2009) from which African Americans are excluded. Stenner (2005) excludes African Americans from all of her data analysis. She only studies Whites who are non-Hispanic. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) include African Americans in the initial regression analyses of their negative interaction theory, but drop Blacks from the predicted probability analyses that follow and focuses on White Americans only. Thus, their thesis that those who are less authoritarian become more authoritarian when confronted with threats is empirically supported by predicted probability analyses from which African Americans are excluded.

Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Lavine et al., 2005; Lipset, 1959; Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009; Stenner, 2005), comprise the working definition of authoritarianism and form the foundation from which an authoritarian worldview emerges and authoritarian attitudes on issues emanates.

By definition, authoritarians demand and defend established and accepted mainstream norms. They desire order to maintain valued conventions. They possess a rigid, black-and-white view of the world. And they submit to authority that works for the order they demand.

Authoritarians also believe in higher powers that supersede worldly authority – especially when that authority does not support enduring and ageless conventions. And authoritarians act aggressively toward those, whose flaunting of norms and conventions and questioning of the worldly or transcendent authority that defends them, present a threat. In short, authoritarians view the world through a much different lens than nonauthoritarians.

This working definition of how and when authoritarians act and react or, in other words, how and when the authoritarian predisposition affects authoritarians' political behavior, forms the sieve through which survey items from the last two decades of research are sifted to identify and examine survey respondents' worldviews.<sup>86</sup> The expression of authoritarianism is estimated and differences among the worldviews of

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<sup>86</sup> Throughout this dissertation, the predisposition to authoritarianism is measured using four child-rearing questions that first appeared on the ANES 1992 survey. Child-rearing questions designed to measure authoritarianism were included on the General Social Survey (GSS) since 1973. From 1973 to 1985 thirteen child trait questions were asked. Starting in 1986, this list was paired down to five. The four question child-rearing battery developed to measure authoritarianism was first included in the 1992 ANES. The GSS questions do not perfectly match the questions used by ANES or other surveys analyzed by Hetherington and Weiler, (2009), Hetherington and Suhay (2011), Stenner (2005), Feldman and Stenner (1997), and Feldman (2003a). The four-question child-rearing battery is used throughout this dissertation to estimate authoritarianism.

African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are examined in six different areas.

First, a standard battery of questions designed to assess moral traditionalism is analyzed. These questions have been included on the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys and other polls since 1986. They are designed to gauge whether respondents think morals are fixed or malleable and changing. African and White American authoritarians' preference for norms should make them more traditionally moral than nonauthoritarians.

Second, questions probing the rigidity of respondents' worldview and belief in the existence of higher, transcendent moral authority are assessed through two questions exploring the necessity of choosing between good and evil and whether government should use science to try and solve important problems. As rigid, dichotomous thinkers, who believe in the existence of higher authority, African American and White authoritarians should be more likely to agree that people must choose between good and evil and government should not use science to solve important problems because, ostensibly, moral teachings and norms are a better guide.

Third, African American and White authoritarians' demand for order should make them more supportive of government institutions and authority. Several questions gauging public trust in established institutions are analyzed to determine whether authoritarian support for them is different than nonauthoritarians.

Fourth, support of fundamental democratic principles by African and White Americans should be contingent on their estimated predisposition to authoritarianism. As such, African American and White authoritarians should be more supportive of

concentrating power in a singular leader to protect and reassert order. They should also be less likely than nonauthoritarians to support democratic principles in general and the constitutional rights of minorities and dissenters.

Questions asking whether the President should take action when Congress and the Supreme Court stands in the way or opposition threatens the progress of the country are examined to test the willingness of authoritarians to grant the President unconstitutional powers to protect order. Questions asking if dissenters' basic constitutional rights, including the right to vote, should be protected are analyzed to determine the commitment of authoritarians to democracy.

Fifth, authoritarians should be willing to act aggressively toward out-groups or groups that they perceive to be inferior or outside of the mainstream norm of society. Three questions that ask respondents about "certain," "inferior," and "other groups" lay bare the authoritarian predisposition toward the other, providing a stark and unequivocal example of the effect of authoritarianism on attitudes toward out-groups by White and African Americans.

Finally, as supporters of the existing order and societal norms, African American and White authoritarians should be more patriotic and nationalistic than nonauthoritarians. They should also report greater support for fundamental American beliefs, including the uniquely American assertion that through hard work individuals can overcome adversity, seize opportunity, and succeed.

Written formally as premises that can be empirically tested, these statements form six hypotheses that assert African American and White authoritarians, when compared to nonauthoritarians from either race, will be more:

- traditionally moral (H1),
- likely to agree that people must choose between good and evil and government should not use science to solve important problems (H2),
- supportive of government authority(H3),
- supportive of concentrating power in a single leader to protect and reassert order, and less likely to support the democratic principle of protecting minority rights, especially when minorities are labeled as dissenters (H4),
- aggressive toward outgroups (H5), and
- patriotic and nationalistic (H6).

Conceptualizing these six hypotheses as a group of principles that comprise and define in part the authoritarian worldview is a unique approach. Comparing the attitudes African American and White authoritarians on these six dimensions also tills new ground. But if, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue, worldview is “a set of beliefs and ideals that a person uses as a guide to interpret the world” that shapes not only identity but also political behavior (2009, p. 36), then identifying areas of congruence between African American and White authoritarians’ worldviews is important step toward explaining the political attitudes they share.

As I demonstrate next, the findings of this examination of the worldview of authoritarians produces new and valuable insights into the behavior of African Americans and African American authoritarians. On the six dimensions that I argue comprise an important part of the authoritarian worldview, the opinions of African American and White authoritarians are strikingly similar. By comparison, the attitudes of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on these same six dimensions are quite different.

With that said, let us turn to the data, starting with moral traditionalism and the hypothesis that African and White American authoritarians' preference for norms will make them more traditionally moral than nonauthoritarians (H1).

### **Authoritarians and Moral Traditionalism**

Since 1986, the American National Election Survey (ANES) has asked four questions designed to assess whether survey respondents think morals should be fixed and unyielding in the face of changing social norms or malleable and changing. These four questions, identified in surveys as the moral traditional battery, include:

- “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.”
- “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society.”
- “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.”
- “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.”

Answers to these questions are logged on a five-point scale where 1 is strongly agree and 5 represents strongly disagree.<sup>87</sup> Theoretically, African and White American authoritarians' preference for established norms should predispose them to favor a moral code that does not change. As such, for example, they should disagree with the moral

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<sup>87</sup> As noted in a previous chapter, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) use answers to two of these questions (1 and 3) to build an independent variable he calls “Newer Lifestyles” to account for moral conservative orthodoxy in their analysis of the effect of authoritarianism on attitudes about gay rights. They also employ the second question as an independent variable to capture the threat “people report feeling from gays and lesbians” (2009, pp. 94-96). Altemeyer has not used these particular questions to construct the different versions of his RWA scale (1981, 1988, 1996, 2006). But several questions on the different versions of the RWA scale plumb opinions on morally traditional concerns. For example, questions 6, 9, 15, 16, and 31 on the 1996 version of the RWA scale assess different dimensions of moral traditionalism (Altemeyer, 1996, pp. 12-15). Pérez and Hetherington (2014) cite a moral traditionalism variable from the 2008 ANES survey in their paper on authoritarian scale variance, but do not define how the variable is constructed. No scholars appear to have used all four moral traditional scale questions to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview.

traditional question that states “the world is always changing, and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes.”<sup>88</sup>

Bivariate and multivariate tests of the aggregated and scaled results from the four moral traditional questions from the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys demonstrate that African American authoritarians hold more morally traditional views than nonauthoritarians.<sup>89</sup> In both surveys, a bivariate test of the difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians mean scores on the moral traditionalism scale are statistically significant at a p-value of 0.0001 and less (Table 12).<sup>90</sup>

Table 12

Authoritarians and moral traditionalism

On 0 to 1 Scale where 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional				
	African Americans	White Americans	African Americans	White Americans
	ANES 2008	ANES 2008	ANES 2012	ANES 2012
	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score	Mean Score
Non Authoritarians	0.4089	0.4467	0.4375	0.4473
Authoritarians	0.5443	0.6275	0.5417	0.6668
Difference of Means	0.1354	0.1808	0.1042	0.2195
<i>P-value</i>	0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	391	703	740	2378
<i>Sources:</i> 2008 and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.				
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.				

<sup>88</sup> To avoid acquiescent response bias, researchers design survey questions so that morally traditional responses to the four questions are divided equally into negative and positive answers. Post survey, the morally traditional positive or “agree” answers are converted so that the more morally traditional answers for each of the four questions are assigned higher scores. Scholars then sum the answers to the four questions and array them onto a 0 to 1 scale where 1 represents the most morally traditional posture.

<sup>89</sup> These surveys included child-rearing questions enabling an analysis of moral traditionalism in terms of the authoritarian predisposition of African Americans.

<sup>90</sup> For this test, African American and White authoritarians were defined as those respondents who scored .75 and above on the authoritarian scale derived from the four child-rearing questions. Nonauthoritarians were defined as those who scored .25 and below on the authoritarian scale.



African American authoritarians are also statistically more morally traditional than White nonauthoritarians while White authoritarians are the most morally traditional of all.

A multivariate analysis of the data from both the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys supports the finding that African Americans authoritarians hold more morally traditional views than nonauthoritarian African Americans. With the moral traditional scale as the dependent variable, an ordinal logit model was estimated with independent variables for authoritarianism, church attendance, gender, age, educational attainment, and party identification. The results of the multivariate analysis show that authoritarianism is statistically significant at a p-value of less than .001, and has a greater effect on moral traditionalism than even church attendance (Appendix C – Table 28).<sup>91</sup> A similar, statistically significant and substantive authoritarian effect was found when the model is run for White Americans.

Finally, predicted probabilities were calculated for each model to isolate the effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism. This was accomplished by holding party identification, gender, age, education, and church attendance variables at their means while varying authoritarianism along a scale ranging between 0 (for most nonauthoritarian) and 1 (for most authoritarian). The results of this analysis graphically demonstrate the effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (Figures 19 and 20) and, importantly, the similarity of its effect across race.

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<sup>91</sup> The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism is much greater than church attendance when both variables are estimated across a five-point scale – as they are in the Table 29 in Appendix C.




Figure 19: The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (ANES 2008).




Figure 20: The effect of authoritarianism on moral traditionalism (ANES 2012).

In the 2008 ANES survey, African American nonauthoritarians (0) were predicted to score a .453 on the moral traditional scale while the predicted score of African American authoritarians (1) was .561 – a .108 point difference. By comparison, White nonauthoritarians (0) in the 2008 ANES survey were predicted to score a .501 on the moral traditional scale while the predicted score of White authoritarians (1) was .629 – a .128 point difference.

In the 2012 ANES survey, African American nonauthoritarians (0) were predicted to score a .432 on the moral traditional scale while the predicted score of African American authoritarians (1) was .550 – a .118 point difference. In the same survey, White

nonauthoritarians (0) were predicted to score a .472 on the moral traditional scale while the predicted score of White authoritarians (1) was .671 – a .199 point difference.

Thus, while Whites are more morally traditional than Blacks, authoritarianism has the same effect on members of both races. Authoritarians are more morally traditional than nonauthoritarians.<sup>92</sup>

The effect of authoritarianism on both African Americans and Whites on the principles that comprise and define, in part, the authoritarian worldview will be evident in almost every figure presented in this chapter. African American authoritarians are indeed attitudinally different than nonauthoritarian African Americans and more conservative than nonauthoritarian White Americans on principles that are fundamental components of the authoritarian worldview.

### **Authoritarians and Moral Choices**

Two survey questions asked between 2008 and 2012 provide a more detailed glimpse into authoritarians' moral thinking and underscore the fundamental differences between how authoritarians and nonauthoritarians view the world. These moral choice questions ask respondents whether it is necessary to choose between good and evil and how often government should use science to try and solve important problems.<sup>93</sup> As rigid

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<sup>92</sup> Since moral traditionalism is likely to play an important causal role in party identification, and party identification varies among White but not as much among African Americans, including partisanship in models analyzing moral traditionalism could be misleading. Table 30 in Appendix C reports the results of a moral traditional model in which partisanship was omitted. The results do not change the findings as presented.

<sup>93</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) write that there is “an extraordinary difference between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on the question of whether there is a right way and a wrong way to do things” (, but does not provide data to support this claim. They also note “that authoritarianism is highly correlated with belief in biblical inerrancy” (p. 35). Both of these observations led to the inclusion of these questions as means for measuring a dimension of the authoritarian worldview. Altemeyer’s 1996 version of the RWA scale (pp. 12-15) includes questions asking about “one right way to live life (question 14), church attendance (question 8), and biblical inerrancy (question 22). None of the questions on the RWA scale, however, are replicas of the three included here. Moreover, other scholars have not used the specific questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview.

thinkers who believe in the existence of a higher moral authority, I expect that African American and White authoritarians will be more likely to agree that people must choose between good and evil, and that moral teachings and norms are a better guide to solving problems than science (H2).

The first moral choice question appeared on the AmericasBarometer poll in 2008<sup>94</sup> and asked whether there is a “struggle between good and evil” in today’s world “and people must choose between them.” As rigid, black-and-white thinkers, who believe in the existence of higher authority, African American and White authoritarians should be more likely to agree that people must make a conscious choice between good and evil. To authoritarians the world is divided into these two spheres. The difference between good and evil is clearly delineated by a higher authority. It is incumbent upon people to choose a side. Moral relativism is not a choice. Tradition and morality is. There are no grey areas when it comes to the struggle between good and evil.

The results for authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans on the AmericasBarometer “good versus evil” question are displayed in Figure 21. Using predicted probabilities generated by an ordinal logit analysis of answers to this question (Appendix C – Table 31), the figure clearly demonstrates that the more authoritarian African and White Americans are, the more likely they are to agree strongly that there is a struggle in the world between good and evil and people must choose a side.

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<sup>94</sup> The Latin American Public Opinion Project 2008 AmericasBarometer Poll was conducted by Vanderbilt University. The complete poll question reads: “In today’s world there is a struggle between good and evil, and people must choose between one of the two. How much do you agree that a struggle between good and evil exists?” This poll includes a child-rearing authoritarian battery, probes several topics and questions not normally asked on scholarly polls, and includes a sample of 153 African Americans. Because of this, it plays an important role in my examination of African American authoritarians




Figure 21: People must choose between good and evil.

Once again, African American authoritarians are statistically more likely to strongly agree with the morally traditional position that people must choose sides in the war between good and evil than either African or White American nonauthoritarians.

By comparison, African and White Americans who are not authoritarian think just the opposite. They either are more likely to strongly disagree people must choose between good and evil, or do not think there is a struggle between good and evil in the world. Importantly, in terms of strongly agreeing or disagreeing with the statement, the 95% confidence intervals for nonauthoritarian (0) and authoritarian (1) African and White Americans do not overlap, indicating a statistically significant and substantive difference in their worldviews.

The second glimpse of the morally traditional lens through which African American authoritarians view the world comes from a moral choice question asked on the 2012 ANES poll. On this survey respondents were asked whether or not government should use science to solve important problems. The answers ranged from always to never and were arrayed across a 5-point scale. Using an ordinal logit model where government use of science is the dependent variable and authoritarianism, party identification, gender, age, church attendance, and education are the independent variables, African American and White authoritarians are much more likely to assert that government should not use science to solve important problems because, inferring from our theoretical expectations, they believe moral teachings and guidance from a higher power are better decision making tools (Appendix C - Table 32).<sup>95</sup>

Analyzing responses using predicted probabilities and graphing “always and most of the time” responses on one set of lines and “never and some of the time” on a second set (Figure 22) visually displays African American and White authoritarians greater probability of agreeing that science should not be used to solve important problems. Once again, African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians hold statistically significant and substantively different opinions on this question. However, authoritarianism has a greater effect on the opinions of Whites on this question than Blacks, and nonauthoritarian Whites are more supportive of using science to solve problems than African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.

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<sup>95</sup> Following Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) lead, I employ a one-tailed test of statistical significance on this question for African Americans because the hypothesis includes a “clear directional claim” for authoritarianism (p. 554). The two-tailed *p-value* of authoritarianism among African Americans when using science to solve important problems is the dependent variable is .063.




Figure 22: Use science to solve important problems.

As measured by moral traditionalism, the differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians as well as White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are significant. The analysis of two moral choice questions (on good and evil and the use of science to solve problems) adds breadth and nuance to the attitudinal differences identified by the earlier analysis of the moral traditionalism scale. The sum of both demonstrates that the basic worldviews of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans on morally traditional values and the existence and importance of a higher, non-temporal authority in the world are significantly different. But do the differences found on matters of morality and other worldly authority between African American and White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians repeat themselves when more secular forms of authority are considered?



### **Authoritarians' Trust of Governmental and Institutional Authority**

Theoretically, because of their need and demand for order, authoritarians should support governmental and institutional authority more than nonauthoritarians when these entities are perceived as either defenders of established societal norms and morality, or guardians of the group to which authoritarians belong or aspire (H3). One simple measure of support for governmental and institutional authority is trust. Logically, the more someone trusts the government and institutions, the more likely he or she supports the authority of these institutions.<sup>96</sup>

The 2008 AmericasBarometer poll contains four questions measuring respondents' trust of government and institutions. Respondents are asked whether or not they trust Congress, the government in Washington, political parties, and the President. All four questions use the same answer template (a seven-point scale ranging from 1 "do not trust at all" to 7 "trust a lot") to measure respondents' level of trust. An ordinal logit regression is estimated to evaluate answers to each of these four questions. In each estimate, the object of trust is the dependent variable and authoritarianism, party identification, gender, age, church attendance, and education are the independent variables.

Contextually, it is important to consider two points before assessing this data. First, Republican George W. Bush was at the end of his presidency when these questions were asked. At this time, he was a polarizing political figure with very low job performance and personal approval ratings. As the so-called "captives" of the Democratic Party (Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), African Americans were arguably

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<sup>96</sup> Altemeyer's 1996 RWA scale includes one question (3) that touches on trust of "established authorities in our country" (p. 13). Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview.

one of the least likely groups in the United States to trust the government in Washington and the President as the Bush presidency came to its conclusion. At this moment in time, and under the circumstances of heightened partisanship and strong prevailing partisan headwinds, any statistically significant variation among African Americans in trust of the President and the government in Washington that is correlated with authoritarianism reveals the underlying potential of the authoritarian predisposition to structure political behavior.

Second, trust in American institutions was approaching or at a nadir when these questions were asked.<sup>97</sup> Americans were simply much more distrustful of government than trustful. Thus, the effect of authoritarianism on trust must be viewed through this prism, and the right question to ask is not how much more trusting authoritarians are of government and institutions than nonauthoritarians. Instead, it is how less distrustful they are.

With this context in mind, and considering just African Americans, authoritarianism is a statistically and substantively significant variable for each of the four dependent variables tested. In all instances, the authoritarian coefficient is positive and larger than every other coefficient reported (Appendix C – Table 33). The more authoritarian an African American is, the less likely he or she is to distrust the government in Washington, the President himself (even though George W. Bush was in office when the question was asked), political parties, and Congress. For White

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<sup>97</sup> According to Gallup, Americans trust and confidence in the federal government in Washington to handle domestic problems measured 47% in September 2007 and 48% in September 2008 (great deal or fair amount of trust) – the lowest measurement since Gallup began asking the question more than thirty years earlier in 1972. On another question asked by Gallup, Americans’ trust of the “government in Washington to do what is right” just about always or most of the time fell from a high of 60% immediately after 9/11 to a low of 19% in 2009 – the lowest rating in 15 years. Gallup, “Trust in Government,” <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx>

Americans, authoritarianism is statistically significant for three of these four dependent variables, including government in Washington, political parties,<sup>98</sup> and the President. In these three cases, the more authoritarian a White American is, the less likely he or she is to distrust these institutions (Appendix C – Table 34).<sup>99</sup>

These four trust questions represent the first evidence, cited so far in this chapter, that the authoritarian predisposition structures not only authoritarians' worldview on fundamental moral values and choices, but also their probability of supporting existing institutions – especially the government in Washington and the President.<sup>100</sup>

### **Authoritarians' Contingent Support for Democratic Principles**

Driven by their demand for order and need for norms, authoritarians are predisposed to support unitary leaders with concentrated powers who stand up for what authoritarians, with their binary sense of right and wrong, deem to be right.<sup>101</sup>

Theoretically, authoritarian demands for a unitary leader who takes action should be at their apex when authoritarians perceive that order is threatened. It follows, then, that African and White American authoritarians should be less likely to support democratic principles when those principles empower political minorities and groups who are perceived either to be outside of the mainstream or a threat to order. Authoritarians should oppose constraining the power of the plebiscitary President (Canes-Wrone, 2001a, 2001b, 2006; Kernell, 1997) to work the will of the majority when that will is threatened.

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<sup>98</sup> The *p-value* of authoritarianism when the dependent variable is political parties is .093.

<sup>99</sup> Trust of Congress was the one dependent variable where African American authoritarians were statistically less distrustful of government and White authoritarians were not.

<sup>100</sup> Even when ideology is added to party identification as a control in the government trust models, authoritarianism structures institutional support (Appendix C – Tables 35 and 36).

<sup>101</sup> Authoritarian desire for and support of a strong leader who maintains order has been a fundamental component of scholarly theories of authoritarianism beginning with *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno et al., 1950). Altemeyer's 1996 RWA scale asks several questions (5, 21, 23, and 32) that explore this aspect of authoritarianism. Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview.

They should also be more likely to support unilateral action by Presidents (Moe & Howell, 1999), with little concern for the constitutionally established balance of power among the three branches of government, when the Supreme Court or Congress stands in the way of the President maintaining or establishing order. In short, African and White American authoritarians will favor strong, Presidential leadership when it is perceived to be defending majoritarian order or asserting majoritarian will. Stated as a hypothesis, I contend that when order is challenged, African American and White authoritarians will be more supportive of concentrating power in a singular leader to protect and reassert order (H4).

Authoritarian theory also predicts that authoritarians will support majority rule over minority rights when the majority defends what authoritarians believe is the societal norm. Authoritarians will doggedly support interpretations of the Constitution and institutional power that enshrine and enforce conventional rules, norms, and order. And no matter how unconstitutional the outcome, they will be more likely to favor circumscribing the rights of minorities who criticize the order and conventions their authoritarian predisposition demands. Again, stated as a hypothesis, African American and White authoritarians will be less likely to support the democratic principle of protecting minority rights, especially when minorities are labeled as dissenters (H4A).

Do authoritarians actually value order above democratic principles and constitutional protections as theory predicts? On nine different questions that test the commitment of Americans to fundamental, constitutional principles, African and White American authoritarians consistently support the less democratic and more autocratic position than nonauthoritarian Americans. These questions range from the scope of

presidential power to the basic rights of minorities and dissenters under the Constitution. African and White American authoritarians support for the less democratic and unconstitutional position, as measured through ordinal logit models, is statistically significant (at a p-value of .05 or less) and substantive on each of the nine questions.

### **Empower a Strong Leader**

The first three of these questions (Appendix C – Tables 37 and 38) examine opinions on the rightful scope of presidential power. These questions ask if the chief executive should be able to limit the voice and vote of opposition parties to insure progress, and whether the President should govern without Congress or ignore the Supreme Court when either of these two branches of America’s constitutional democracy hinders the work of government.<sup>102</sup>

The positive coefficients found in the tables for authoritarianism indicate that the more authoritarian an African or White American is, the more likely he or she is to agree that the President should ignore the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the minority and the constitutionally vested powers of the legislative and judicial branches of government when either becomes bothersome to the progress of the country. Importantly, when these questions were asked the sitting President was Republican George W. Bush and his approval ratings were at a nadir.

Graphs of the predicted probabilities for these three question demonstrate the depth and marked similarity of African and White American authoritarians’ support for

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<sup>102</sup> The poll questions read: “Taking into account the current situation of this country, I would like you to tell me how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. 1. It is necessary for the progress of this country that our Presidents limit the voice and vote of opposition parties, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? 2. When the Congress hinders the work of our government, our Presidents should govern without the Congress, how much do you agree or disagree with that view? 3. When the Supreme Court hinders the work of our government, it should not be paid attention to by our Presidents, how much do you agree or disagree with that view?”

the unitary exercise of presidential power to “limit the voice and vote of opposition parties” when they stand in the way of progress or “govern without Congress” and “not pay attention to the Supreme Court” when either hinders the work of government.

African American and White authoritarians are statistically and substantively less likely to oppose (disagree with) the President limiting the voice and vote of opposition parties than nonauthoritarian African and White Americans (Figure 23). For example, the predicted value of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly disagreeing with the President limiting the speech and vote of opposition parties to insure progress was .668 while the predicted score African Americans authoritarians strongly disagreeing was just .294. Thus, moving across the authoritarian scale from nonauthoritarian (0) to authoritarian (1) yields a 37 percentage point decrease in the probability that African Americans strongly disagree with the President limiting the voice and vote of opposition parties.




Figure 23: Strongly oppose President limiting speech and vote of opposition parties to ensure progress.

By comparison, White nonauthoritarians predicted value of strongly disagreeing with this statement was .634.<sup>103</sup> Once again, African American authoritarians are statistically and substantively different than nonauthoritarian African Americans and hold a less democratic and liberal view than nonauthoritarian White Americans. As demonstrated in each of the previous figures in this chapter, the effect of the authoritarian predisposition is also cross racial, structuring the preferences and behaviors of African and White Americans.

The statistically significant and substantive differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian Whites and African Americans on the use of presidential power when

<sup>103</sup> The predicted probability of White authoritarians strongly disagreeing with this was .330 with a 95% confidence interval of .280 to .380.

the Executive confronts a recalcitrant Congress or Supreme Court further underscores the willingness of authoritarians to set aside constitutional protections and procedures when either becomes a threat to what they consider progress – ostensibly progress that protects the institutional order that exists and conventional norms (Figures 24 and 25).




Figure 24: Strongly oppose President governing without Congress when it hinders work of government.






Figure 25: Strongly oppose President ignoring the Supreme Court when it hinders the work of government.

### Support Majority Tyranny

The next two questions examining respondents' commitment to basic democratic principles (Appendix C – Tables 39 and 40) remove presidential power from the equation to focus on whether minorities should be protected from the tyranny of the majority. Specifically, these questions ask if minority opposition must be prevented when the majority has decided the right way to proceed, and whether those who disagree with the majority are a threat to the nation. These questions are excellent tests of authoritarian aggression toward out groups;<sup>104</sup> and African American and White authoritarians perform

<sup>104</sup>Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview. Altemeyer's 1996 RWA scale, however, asks two questions (24 and 29) that touch on the role of free thinkers and those who challenge majority norms in society. These questions are not framed in terms of minority and majority rights in a democracy.

just as theory predicts. The more authoritarian an African or White American is, the more likely he or she is to agree with abridging the rights of political minorities (Figures 26 and 27).<sup>105</sup>




Figure 26: Must prevent minority opposition when people decide what is right.

<sup>105</sup> Answers to these questions are arrayed on a seven-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree. In Figures 26 and 27, answers have been collapsed into agree and disagree with neither, the midpoint answer on the scale, omitted.




Figure 27: Those who disagree with the majority are a threat to the country.

The differences on these questions between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans and White Americans are statistically significant at a p-value of less than .05 and substantively different.

Examining these two questions from the same perspective as the three presidential power questions discussed above, African and White American authoritarians are also less likely to strongly disagree that minority opposition must be prevented “when people (the majority) decides what is right” and minority opinion is a “threat to the country” (Figures 28 and 29). For example, the predicted value of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly disagreeing that “those who disagree with the majority are a threat to the interests of the country” was .652 while the predicted score African Americans authoritarians strongly disagreeing was .220. Thus, moving across the authoritarian scale

from nonauthoritarian (0) to authoritarian (1) yields a 43 percentage point decrease in the probability that African Americans strongly disagree that the opinions of minorities are a threat to the country.

By comparison, White nonauthoritarians predicted value of strongly disagreeing with this statement was .582.<sup>106</sup> Once again, African American authoritarians are statistically and substantively different than nonauthoritarian African Americans, hold a less democratic view than nonauthoritarian White Americans, and are statistically similar to White authoritarians.




Figure 28: Strongly disagree that the opinions of minorities are a threat to the country.

<sup>106</sup> The predicted probability of White authoritarians strongly disagreeing with this was .208 with a 95% confidence interval of .170 to .246.




Figure 29: Strongly disagree that we must prevent minority opposition when people decide what is right.

As members of a racial minority whose civil and human rights were oppressed for centuries in the United States, why would some African Americans be so quick to call opposition to the majority a threat and so ready to suppress constitutionally guaranteed minority rights? The framing of the first question speaks to authoritarians. It says: a decision has been made by the “people” about “what is right” and minority opposition must be prevented. As defenders of an order that stands for right against wrong, African American authoritarians identify themselves with the people (or majority) invoked in the question and are more than willing to quash minority opposition to what is right.

The second question also engages authoritarianism by framing dissent as a threat to the order that is supported by the majority. African American authoritarians perceive

themselves as part of the majority seeking order. A minority who opposes that order is a threat. Thus, when the question at hand engages their authoritarian predisposition, the racial gap between African and White Americans is bridged. Authoritarians from both races appear attitudinally quite similar to each other and very dissimilar from their racial brethren.

Authoritarians think those who question the opinion of the majority are a threat to the country. And if it is necessary for the progress of the country, authoritarians – irrespective of their race– also believe the President should have unconstitutional power to limit the voice and vote of the opposition.

### **Suppress Dissent**

Dissenters contest the conventional, challenge the existing order, and by definition do not obey. Dissenters questioning of authority is an anathema to authoritarians. Their existence is a threat to the order authoritarians’ demand. When confronted by dissenters, authoritarians should demonstrate a predilection to abridge democratic principles and suppress dissenters’ democratic rights.<sup>107</sup>

Four questions on the AmericasBarometer Poll in 2008 focused on whether dissenters described as “people who only say bad things about the American form of government, not just the incumbent government, but the system of government” should have the same rights as others in the United States. Specifically, these questions<sup>108</sup> asked

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<sup>107</sup> Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview. Altemeyer’s 1996 RWA scale, however, asks questions about “getting rid of the ‘rotten apples’” (question 7), using the “strongest methods to get rid of ‘troublemakers’” (question 17), silencing “troublemakers spreading bad ideas” (question 23), and inversely “treating protestors and radicals with open arms and open minds” (question 33).

<sup>108</sup> The poll questions read: “There are people who only say bad things about the American form of government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. 1. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote? 2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views. 3. How strongly

if dissenters should be allowed to vote, demonstrate peacefully, run for office, or make speeches on television. The results provide empirical proof that African and White American authoritarians are statistically less likely than nonauthoritarians to support democratic principles when those principles are tested by the actions of dissenters (Appendix C – Tables 41 and 42). As indicated by the negative signs next to each authoritarian coefficient in these tables, the more authoritarian African and White Americans are, the more likely they are to oppose protecting dissenters’ right to vote, demonstrate peacefully, run for office, and make speeches on television.

Graphed using predicted probabilities, the effect of authoritarianism on each question is substantive and similar. African and White authoritarian are more likely than nonauthoritarians to oppose protecting dissenters’ right to vote (Figure 30), ability to run for office (Figure 31), free speech rights (Figure 32), and right to demonstrate peacefully.

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do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted to run for public office? 4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television to make speeches?”




Figure 30: Protect right to vote of people who criticize the American form of government.






Figure 31: Protect right of people who criticize American form of government to run for office.




Figure 32: Protect right of people who criticize American form of government to make speeches on television.

Clearly, African and White American authoritarians believe dissenters forfeit their constitutional rights when they question conventions and the existing order. Dissenters are out-groups. When they take action, they become targets of authoritarian suppression. African and White American authoritarian aggression towards them comports with the description of the authoritarian predisposition defined earlier in this chapter. It is a primal component of the authoritarianism that transcends race and shapes the worldview of African American and White authoritarians.

### **Authoritarianism and The Other**

Three questions from the 2011 Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality (WISER) poll lay bare the authoritarian predisposition toward the

other.<sup>109</sup> These questions ask respondents opinion about “certain,” “inferior,” and “other groups” outside of a particular political, institutional, or governmental frame.<sup>110</sup> The questions provide a stark and unequivocal test of authoritarianism. On each question, African and White American authoritarians perform quite differently than nonauthoritarians (Appendix C – Tables 43 and 44) with the authoritarian independent variable statistically significant and substantive in each instance.

In particular, African American authoritarians are more likely to agree there would be fewer problems “if certain groups of people stayed in their place.” They are more likely than nonauthoritarians to agree that “inferior groups should stay in their place” and “sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.” For each one of the questions, the scaled authoritarian variable is statistically significant at a p-value less than, or equal to .001.

Put in terms of predicted probabilities, while only 2% of African American nonauthoritarians<sup>111</sup> (those scoring 0 on the authoritarian scale) strongly agree that “if certain groups stayed in their place there would be fewer problems,” 17% of African American authoritarians strongly agree with this statement.<sup>112</sup>

Graphs derived from predicted values of these questions reveal the statistically significant and substantive pattern of authoritarian antipathy toward out groups (Figures 33, 34, and 35). Authoritarianism structures the attitudes of not only Whites, but also African Americans toward out-groups on these questions with the result that both White

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<sup>109</sup> Scholars have not used the questions analyzed here to assess this dimension of the authoritarian worldview.

<sup>110</sup> The poll questions read: “1. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. 2. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 3. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. The responses are in an agree/disagree format on a seven point scale.”

<sup>111</sup> The 95% confidence interval is .0034 to .0420.

<sup>112</sup> The 95% confidence interval is .1137 to .2327.

and African American authoritarians are statistically more likely to agree there are certain, inferior groups who should know their place in society and stay in it. This is a central component of the authoritarian worldview.




Figure 33: If certain groups stay in their place, we would have fewer problems.




Figure 34: Inferior groups should stay in their place.




Figure 35: Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place.

Theoretical arguments that African Americans cannot display authoritarian attitudes because they have no “other group” below them in society (Blumer, 1958) simply do not square with the results reported here. African American authoritarians react to questions about “the other” just as White authoritarians do. They believe that there are other groups in society that must be kept in their place and, if these groups attempt to change their position in society, they must be forced back to where they belong.

### **Authoritarians’ Patriotic Pride and American Dreaming**

While African American authoritarians are hostile to what they deem to be other inferior groups, they identify closely, as authoritarian theory predicts, with the particular group to which they see themselves belonging – mainstream, conventional Americans. Thus, I expect that as supporters of the existing order and societal norms, African

American and White authoritarians will be more patriotic and nationalistic, and more likely to agree with fundamental American beliefs, than nonauthoritarians (H6). And that is exactly what I find.

Both African and White American authoritarians are prouder to be Americans than nonauthoritarians (Appendix C – Table 45). Authoritarian pride in being an American is statistically significant at p-values of less than .05 for African and White Americans. The predicted value of an African American authoritarian strongly agreeing that he or she is proud to be an American is .931 or 19 percentage points greater than the predicted probability of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly agreeing they are proud to be an American.<sup>113</sup> A boxplot of predicted values of pride in being an American with 95% confidence intervals demonstrates the substantive difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on this important question of patriotic and aspirational belonging (Figure 36).

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<sup>113</sup> The predicted value of nonauthoritarian African Americans strongly agreeing that they are proud to be an American is .745. The 95% confidence intervals between authoritarians (.893 and .968) and nonauthoritarians (.587 and .904) strongly agreeing that they are proud to be an American overlap slightly. The overlap of 95% confidence intervals is .011.




Figure 36: Proud to be an American.

African American and White authoritarians are also more likely than their nonauthoritarian counterparts to buy into the Horatio Alger mythos – sitting at the core of the American Dream – that hard work leads to success (Appendix C—Table 45). On this question, African American authoritarians are statistically and substantively different than African American and White nonauthoritarians with African American authoritarians strongly agreeing that hard work leads to success at a predicted value of .812 compared to a predicted value of .430 for nonauthoritarian African Americans and .573 for nonauthoritarian White Americans. Importantly, White and African American authoritarians are statistical look-alikes when it comes to hard work leading to success with the predicted value of White authoritarians agreeing with concept of .880. Arrayed across the authoritarian scale, the belief of African and White American authoritarians in



the Horatio Alger myth at the core of the American Dream, and the contrasting attitude of all nonauthoritarians, is eminently apparent (Figure 37).




Figure 37: Horatio Alger: If you work hard, you can succeed.

As supporters of the existing order and societal norms, African American and White authoritarians evince greater pride in being American and support for fundamental American myths than nonauthoritarians. American is their reference group. The group they identify with or aspire to belong. And as authoritarians, they will defend their chosen group from all others.

African American authoritarians' pride in and connection to their American identity, as well as their belief in the majoritarian mythos of the American Dream, is not an unimportant statistical oddity. It is the final piece of evidence offered in this chapter

that significant differences exist between the fundamental worldviews of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians.

### **Chapter Summary**

The existing literatures on African American and authoritarian political behaviors lead to one contradictory and quite unlikely conclusion at the heart of this dissertation: African Americans are at once the most liberal and most authoritarian group in America. From this conclusion came the question explored in this chapter: Are the worldviews of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans different? To explore this question data from twelve different national surveys, conducted from 1992 through 2014, were analyzed. The findings of this analysis are clear.

Authoritarianism vies with race to structure the worldview of African Americans. On the six dimensions that were theorized at the beginning of this chapter to form a group of principles comprising and defining in part the authoritarian worldview, African Americans' authoritarianism surpasses racial identity in shaping their view of the world. The result: African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians observe the world from quite different perspectives. African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians worldviews are so demonstrably different that contemporary scholarship contending African Americans are politically monolithic and move en masse (Dawson, 1995; Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hutchings & Valentino, 2004; Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Tate, 1994) must be carefully reassessed and, at a minimum, carefully qualified.

On the other hand, when traditional morality, good and evil, trust in institutional order, support of unitary leadership, allegiance to democratic principles, denigration of

the other, nationalistic pride, and belief in majoritarian myths are considered, the attitudes and resulting worldviews of African and White American authoritarians are quite similar. This similarity in worldview between African and White American authoritarians may also necessitate a reconsideration of the scholarly conventional wisdom that African Americans are “always more liberal than Whites” (Kinder & Winter, 2001)

Two questions follow from these findings. First, Do the differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans’ worldviews and racial identification lead to different political behaviors when actual policies, political figures and groups of people are considered? And second, How does the political behavior of African American authoritarians on these issues compare to the behavior of authoritarian and nonauthoritarian White Americans?

I focus these questions in the next chapter on the wedge issues that Hetherington and Weiler argue are at the core of the worldview evolution restructuring politics and driving political polarization among White Americans today (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). These issues include gay rights, the effects of terrorism on civil rights, the use of force around the world by the United States, immigration, and the legalization of marijuana. For good measure, I round out this list of issues by comparing the attitudes of African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians toward different politicians, governmental leaders, and out-groups in American society whose presence should theoretically engage the authoritarian predisposition.

The answers unearthed are possibly quite consequential. I have shown that significant differences exist between the racial identities and worldviews of African

American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. If these differences affect the attitudes of African Americans on the wedge issues that are considered to be behind the evolution driving political polarization differentially, then the precursors for African American party sorting may be extant and opportunities for dog whistle political messaging may abound (Hillygus & Shields, 2008). While the barriers to sorting are said to be two fold – history and racial identity (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), authoritarianism has already been shown to neutralize and breach racial identity, leaving history as the only bulwark between African Americans authoritarians evolving worldview and present party identification. With the advent of political microtargeting and the addressable, cookie-matched delivery of advertising messages over the web, the communications options for dog whistle campaigning are increasing. African American authoritarians may present a ripe target for this messaging. And in 2016, some whistles and bullhorns may already have been blown by Ben Carson and Donald Trump.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Carson's first radio ad aimed at African American voters repeated the Horatio Alger myth that resonates so well with authoritarians White and Black. My 2015 national primary poll found statistically and substantively significant authoritarian support for Donald Trump.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE POLITICAL AND POLICY PREFERENCES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANS

The last chapter focused on an examination of some of the principles shaping the worldviews of African and White American authoritarians. Authoritarianism's structuring of behavior is unlikely to stop, however, at some imaginary boundary between principles and policy. The worldview of authoritarians inevitably shapes their political attitudes on questions of policy, creating differences between their behavior and the behavior of nonauthoritarians (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

In this chapter, I examine a hypothesis that builds on Hetherington and Weiler's worldview theory.<sup>115</sup> I submit that African American authoritarians will hold opinions about policies and political figures that are different than nonauthoritarian African Americans and, in many instances, similar to authoritarians who are White (H1). The investigation of this hypothesis that follows focuses on policy areas that form much of the contested issue turf in contemporary American politics, including the salient issues which Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue are structured by authoritarianism and behind partisan polarization. It also includes an examination of authoritarian attitudes on some important political figures and identifiable out-groups.

Both components of this hypothesis (the contentions that the opinions of African Americans are not homogeneous and that African American and White authoritarians hold similar attitudes on many policy issues) question directly two, well-established tenets of conventional scholarly wisdom. First, linked by what is described as a common

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<sup>115</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) "characterize American politics as undergoing a worldview evolution in which politics is increasingly contested over issues for which preferences are structured by authoritarianism" (p. 9).

racial fate (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994), African Americans are assumed to sublimate their diverse individual interests to the unidimensional group interest of their race and, in so doing, reduce African American opinions to a monolithic block (Dawson, 1995; Frymer, 1999; Haynie, 2001; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Tate, 1994).<sup>116</sup> The linked fate theory, also known as the Black utility heuristic, is said to explain the continued “homogeneity seen in African American public opinion” as “class-based differences in the African American community” grow (Nteta, 2012, p. 151).<sup>117</sup>

The issues domains in which homogeneity of African American preferences are observed, and on which the notion of the monolithic nature of African American attitudes rests, however, have been limited primarily to “social welfare, economic redistribution, and civil rights issues” like affirmative action (Whitby, 2000, pp. 2-3) or what are called “Black interests” (Nteta et al., 2015, p. 6). This myopic definition of Black interests has had “pivotal consequences for our theories and interpretations and understandings of African Americans” (Nteta et al., 2015, p. 6).

The scholarly assumption that African American preferences are universally homogeneous, demonstrated through the use of a narrow and limiting definition of Black interest, is demonstrably incorrect when issues beyond affirmative action and social welfare policy are analyzed. African American preferences are only likely to be homogeneous when race and social welfare questions are front and center. In most other situations, African American attitudes will be heterogeneous reflecting fundamental differences among Blacks including authoritarianism.

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<sup>116</sup> This notion was debunked in Chapter 3.

<sup>117</sup> Nteta (2015) argues that when the scope of inquiry is expanded to matters and concerns beyond Black interests, African American attitudes are not homogeneous.

The second part of the hypothesis examined in this chapter asserts that the attitudes of African American and White authoritarians will be similar on a wide range of issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition and are the driving forces behind Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) theorized worldview evolution. The assertion that African Americans and Whites will hold similar attitudes on contested issues at the forefront of the political debate runs counter to another established and widely accepted convention in political science that "Black and White Americans disagree consistently and often substantially in their views on national policy" and "racial difference in public opinion are well documented" (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 439; Schuman, 1997; Tate, 1994).

As with linked fate, the racial divide between African and White American opinion is most pronounced when issues involve race directly (for example, affirmative action) or social welfare policy. It is "much less impressive on other social issues, immigration, and foreign policy" (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 441). Not coincidentally, culture war social issues, immigration, and foreign policy are the issue domains in which the authoritarian predisposition and resulting worldview is more likely to shape attitudes (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

Kinder and Winter's (2001) exploration of the racial divide between Black and White Americans on race and social welfare issues produced an important, and seemingly overlooked or, at least, underappreciated finding with important ramifications for this chapter and dissertation. Kinder and Winter found that race – both in-group identification (linked fate) and out-group resentment (racial resentment) – is not at the core of the identified divide between African American and White opinions. In other words, race had

“no effect” or is a “weak predictor of opinion” in the two issue areas where there is a wide gap in the attitudes of African Americans and Whites (p. 447).<sup>118</sup> The key to the divided opinion between African and White Americans on race and social welfare issues was their divergent views of two principles – equal opportunity and limited government. As Kinder and Winter note “principles turn out to account for a sizable share of the racial divide in opinion” (p. 447).<sup>119</sup>

Kinder and Winter’s (2001) finding about the role of principles in opinion formation led to this question: If divergence on fundamental principles drives differences of opinions between Blacks and Whites on issues of race and social welfare, could convergence on principles, the congruency between African American and White authoritarians detailed in the last chapter on a wide range of principles that comprise an important part of the authoritarian worldview, lead to similarities in opinions across races on issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition? This question frames the second part of the hypothesis examined in this chapter.

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) contend worldview “should translate into certain political preferences.” Since worldview “is situated near the beginning of the causal chain of political reasoning... it will serve as a determinant of public opinion and political behavior (2009, p. 36). I add that many of the principles on which the authoritarian worldview rests are shared by both African American and White authoritarians. Since there is congruence between African Americans and White authoritarians on these principles, and, according to Kinder and Winter’s (2001) work, principles drive attitudes more than race and class interest, the opinions of African American and White

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<sup>118</sup> Kinder (2001) notes, “This is true except on the issue of affirmative action” ( p. 447).

<sup>119</sup> Differences in “social class” (also labelled as “material interests”) had no effect on the racial gap on race issues but were “part of the story” on social welfare issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, pp. 446-449).



authoritarians should be similar on a wide range of contested issue in American politics that theoretically engage or provoke the authoritarian predisposition.

The data examined in this chapter finds both the hypothesized similarities between the opinions of African American and White authoritarians and the differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on gay and lesbian issues, civil liberties, foreign policy, immigration, emerging societal threats, out-groups, and political leaders. African American and White authoritarians' moral traditionalism, need for authority and order, willingness to sacrifice democratic principles for security, aggressiveness toward outsiders, and allegiance to the American in-group and its norms fundamentally structures their political and policy preferences. In short, on the key wedge issues that are thought to be the causal force behind polarization in America (Hetherington & Weiler (2009), the political behavior and policy preferences of African American authoritarians are measurably different than nonauthoritarians and quite often similar to Whites who are authoritarians.

Obviously, race is an important factor that structures the behavior of African Americans, but it does not structure that behavior equally nor it is not the only factor that shapes the behavior of African Americans authoritarians. The fact is that authoritarianism is a powerful force which structures not only the way some White Americans behave, but also the way many African Americans think and act politically. African Americans' racial identity simply does not insulate them from the siren demands of their predisposition to authoritarianism and the authoritarian worldview that follows. That is why, as was demonstrated unequivocally earlier, African American authoritarians are statistically less likely to agree that their individual fate is linked to their racial identity

The evidence of the differences between the political behavior and policy preferences of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians resides in the same places (contemporary issues of growing salience) where Hetherington and Weiler found evidence of authoritarianism structuring the preferences of Whites. Additional evidence can be found by examining policy concerns that have grown in salience in the years since Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) book on polarization and authoritarianism was written. For example, African American views on immigration and the legalization of marijuana.

This is a sprawling and unwieldy body of evidence. It is examined piece-by-piece and, when viewed as a whole, establishes clearly that authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans hold significantly different political and policy preferences on issues that are increasingly salient to politics and polarization. An excellent place to begin this examination is authoritarian perceptions of policies affecting gay and lesbian Americans.

### **Authoritarians and Gays and Lesbians**

Authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans hold significantly different opinions about gays and lesbians as well as gay and lesbian issues. Over two decades, from the first election study survey that measured authoritarianism using child-rearing questions (the 1992 ANES survey) through the 2012 ANES poll, African American and White authoritarians have consistently reported lower mean feeling thermometer scores for gays and lesbians than nonauthoritarians.<sup>120</sup> The difference between the mean feeling thermometer scores authoritarians and nonauthoritarians reported for gays and lesbians is statistically significant among African

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<sup>120</sup> Feeling Thermometer scores are typically reported on a 0-to-100 scale. In the surveys reported here a score of 0 represents the coldest feeling toward the object item in question, and a score of 100 represents the warmest feeling toward the object.

Americans in four of the five polls analyzed and in all five of the same surveys for White Americans (Tables 13 and 14).<sup>121</sup>

Table 13

African Americans—Feeling Thermometer scores: Gays and lesbians

On 0 to 100 Scales where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling					
	1992 ANES	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2008 ANES	2012 ANES
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	57.20	61.94	54.17	65.65	61.35
Authoritarians	37.86	32.08	41.68	43.76	51.13
Difference of Means	19.34	29.87	12.48	21.91	10.22
<i>P-value</i>	0.0012	<.0001	0.1391	0.0004	0.0009
<i>N</i>	205	99	122	381	729
<i>Sources:</i> 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.					
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.					

Table 14

White Americans—Feeling Thermometer scores: Gays and lesbians

On 0 to 100 Scales where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling					
	1992 ANES	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2008 ANES	2012 ANES
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	50.32	54.04	60.07	61.71	62.31
Authoritarians	28.81	34.82	37.98	42.01	42.85
Difference of Means	21.52	19.58	22.09	19.70	19.46
<i>P-value</i>	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001	<.0001
<i>N</i>	1173	810	502	695	2369
<i>Sources:</i> 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.					
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.					

<sup>121</sup> Once again, please note 1996 ANES is omitted from this analysis because child-rearing questions were not asked on the survey.

The lower feeling thermometer scores for gay and lesbians reported by African and White American authoritarians are not surprising. By definition, authoritarianism includes aggression and hostility toward the unconventional and those who are perceived outside of the mainstream of society. While acceptance of gays and lesbians has increased over the last two decades, they are still perceived more negatively by authoritarians.

Differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian opinions about gays and lesbians are not limited to feeling thermometer scores. Authoritarian fears of gays and lesbians, coupled with their willingness to abridge or limit the constitutional rights of minority out groups (discussed in the last chapter), also make African and White American authoritarians statistically much less likely to support “homosexuals running for office” (Appendix C – Table 46). Once again, African American authoritarians are more conservative on this question, meaning they are less likely to support gays and lesbians running for office than nonauthoritarian White Americans (Figure 38).




Figure 38: Gays and lesbians should be allowed to run for office.

To authoritarians, gays and lesbians are the quintessential “other.” When they seek political power, the will of the majority and the social norms, conventions, and order authoritarians’ demand are threatened. Authoritarians reason that order must be maintained. The Constitution is a means of maintaining order. Abridging the constitutionally guaranteed rights of gay and lesbian minorities to run for office is simply a constitutional exercise of the rights of the majority to impose its will and thwart a minority, who is outside the mainstream of society, from gaining undue power and threatening the established order. Thus, the theoretically predictable response from authoritarians is to stop gays and lesbians from obtaining political power even if this is accomplished by limiting the constitutional right of gays and lesbians to run for office.

The opinions of African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on other salient policy issues involving gays and lesbians are also anything but monolithic. Statistically significant and substantive differences in the opinions of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on gay marriage, the ability of gay and lesbian couples to adopt children, and discrimination against gays in the workplace exist across numerous polls fielded during the last twenty years -- including ANES surveys conducted in 1992, 1996, 2004, 2008, and 2012; the 2006 CCES survey; and the 2011 WISER poll (Appendix C – Tables 47 and 48). For example, African and White American authoritarians are more likely to believe that gay marriage should not be allowed than are nonauthoritarians of either race (Figure 39). They are also more likely to oppose gay adoption (Figure 40).




Figure 39: Gay marriage.




Figure 40: Gay adoption.

While the differences between African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are less pronounced when it comes to laws that protect gays from employment discrimination, they are still statistically and substantively significant (Figure 41). For example, almost one quarter of African American authoritarians strongly oppose laws that protect gays from job discrimination. The predicted value of African American authoritarians opposing laws that protect gays from job discrimination is .222 while the predicted score of African Americans nonauthoritarians strongly opposing the same law was just .095. Thus, moving across the authoritarian scale from nonauthoritarian (0) to authoritarian (1) yields a 13 percentage point increase in the probability that African Americans strongly oppose laws protecting gays from discrimination in the workplace.




Figure 41: Laws that protect gays from job discrimination.

Statistically significant differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans are not found on gay and lesbian rights questions every time they are asked. This is not surprising. Following the logic of Stenner's (2005) *Authoritarian Dynamic*, differences between the attitudes of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians do not always need to be observed because the dynamics of authoritarianism are not always engaged. But the results from the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys, which included large samples of African Americans, indicate that authoritarian African and White Americans are more likely than nonauthoritarians to oppose gay marriage, gay adoption, and approve of job discrimination against gays and lesbians in the workplace.



## Authoritarians and Civil Liberties

As discussed in Chapter 5, African and White American authoritarians consistently support the less democratic and more autocratic position than nonauthoritarians on a wide range of questions concerning basic constitutional principles. Three questions from two polls conducted post-9/11 demonstrate that the penchant of African and White American authoritarians to favor abridging constitutional and human rights does not stop when abstract questions about constitutional principles are transformed into specific policy proposals to limit civil liberties domestically and human rights globally.

When it comes to fighting terrorism, African and White American authoritarians favor requiring every American to carry a nationally-issued identification card and agree that the media should not report “secret methods the government uses to fight terrorism.” The effect of authoritarianism is statistically and substantively significant in both of these questions. African American and White authoritarians are also more likely to agree that warrantless electronic surveillance, a constitutionally questionable practice, is acceptable (Appendix C– Tables 49 and 50).<sup>122</sup>

A graph of predicted probabilities arrayed across the authoritarian scale displaying whether African and White Americans agree or disagree that citizens should be required to carry a national identification card to prevent terrorism (Figure 42) and the media should be gagged when it comes to reporting on secret methods employed by the government to fight terrorism (Figure 43) reveals the same attitudinal pattern found on

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<sup>122</sup> Following Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) lead, I employ a one-tailed test of statistical significance on the question of warrantless electronic surveillance because I make a “clear directional claim” for the effect of authoritarianism (p. 554). The two-tailed *p-value* of authoritarianism among African Americans when warrantless electronic surveillance is the dependent variable is .084.

questions as diverse as gay adoption, gay marriage, linked fate, protecting the rights of dissenters in American, using science to solve problems, and choosing between good and evil. When the question is the establishment of a national identification card or gagging the press in order to prevent terrorism, authoritarians, no matter what their race, once again stand ready to support measures that circumscribe or abrogate civil liberties and the First Amendment. To authoritarians, Ben Franklin’s admonition that “those who sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither” falls on deaf ears.<sup>123</sup>




Figure 42: Require national identification card to prevent terrorism.

<sup>123</sup> What Franklin intended by this comment is a matter of discussion with some scholars saying it is the opposite of what is connoted here (New England Public Radio, 2015).




Figure 43: Media (should/should not) report information on secret methods used to fight terrorism.

When the policy question turns to the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) torturing of suspected terrorists, African and White American authoritarians once again behave on this question exactly as theory predicts (Appendix C – Table 51). With torture as the dependent variable (where 1 means the “CIA should torture” and 0 stands for “torture should not be allowed”) and authoritarianism, party identification, gender, education, church attendance, and age the independent variables, African and White American authoritarians are both statistically and substantively more likely to agree the CIA should be allowed to torture suspected terrorists than nonauthoritarians (Figure 44).




Figure 44: CIA should be allowed to torture suspected terrorists.

The predicted value of an African American authoritarian agreeing that torture should be allowed is .507 compared to a predicted value of just .129 for nonauthoritarian African Americans – a 38 percentage point difference. The predicted values for White authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on torture by the CIA are also statistically and substantively different. And the predicted value of White authoritarians supporting CIA torture at .646 overlaps the predicted confidence interval of African American authoritarians on this question.

### **Authoritarians and Immigration**

Authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African and White Americans hold significantly different opinions concerning immigrants and immigration. First, in bivariate tests of survey data spanning two decades, African and White American

authoritarians report lower mean feeling thermometer scores for immigrants (1992 ANES) and illegal immigrants (2011 WISER) than nonauthoritarians.<sup>124</sup> The difference between the mean feeling thermometer scores for authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is statistically significant in both surveys (Table 15).

Table 15  
Feelings toward immigrants

On 0 to 100 Scale where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling				
	1992 ANES African Americans Mean Score	1992 ANES White Americans Mean Score	2011 WISER African Americans Mean Score	2011 WISER White Americans Mean Score
Non Authoritarians	66.30	61.80	53.61	47.22
Authoritarians	53.85	55.37	41.85	30.87
Difference of Means	12.45	6.45	11.76	16.34
<i>P-value</i>	<0.0058	<0.0001	0.0253	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	201	1177	220	477
<i>Sources:</i> 1992 American National Election Studies survey and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.				
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.				

A multivariate analysis of feeling thermometer scores toward illegal immigrants from the 2011 WISER poll, which controls, as we do throughout this study, for authoritarianism, age, gender, education, party identification, and church attendance, reveals that authoritarianism is a statistically and substantively significant variable for both African and White Americans (Appendix C – Table 53) with White and African American authoritarians holding statistically significant colder predicted feelings toward immigrants than their nonauthoritarian brethren (Figure 45).

<sup>124</sup> Except for the 2004 ANES, feeling thermometer questions about immigrants were not included on other surveys analyzed for this dissertation. The results of the 2004 ANES are not included in Table 15 because of the small number (N=12) of nonauthoritarian African American respondents. The feeling thermometer results on illegal immigrants for this survey are included in Appendix C – Table 52.




Figure 45: Feelings toward immigrants.

The lower feeling thermometer scores for immigrants (1992 ANES wording) and illegal immigrants (2011 WISER wording) found among African and White American authoritarians using bivariate and multivariate analyses are not surprising. By definition, immigrants are outsiders. To authoritarians outsiders can pose threats to the established order that must be minimized or aggressively addressed.

Differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarian opinions on immigrants and immigration are not limited, however, to feeling thermometer scores. African and White American authoritarians are also more likely to agree that new immigrants are a burden on the country (Appendix C – Tables 54 and 55).

The graph of predicted values on whether “new immigrants are a burden” on America demonstrate that African and White American authoritarians hold the same

opinions about new immigrants, and those opinions are the opposite of those held by their nonauthoritarian brethren (Figure 46).




Figure 46: New immigrants are a burden on the country.

The threat perceived by African and White American authoritarians from immigrants is palpable. Authoritarians agree that immigrants are an economic threat taking jobs and opportunities away from those who are already a part of America (Figure 47) and, possibly as a result, support policies that will decrease legal immigration (Appendix C – Tables 54 and 55).




Figure 47: More jobs for immigrants means fewer jobs for people like me.

The threat posed by new immigrants to America – the America to which African and White authoritarians see themselves belonging – elicits an aggressive response from authoritarians. But that response is not limited to dislike of immigrants and support for limiting immigration. African and White American authoritarians are also more supportive of giving the police additional power to stop and check the immigration status of those who look as though they may be illegal immigrants (Appendix C – Table 56).

In the name of promoting law and order, stop and frisk policing has abridged the civil rights of African Americans in cities across the country (Alexander, 2012). African American authoritarians, many of whom have (in all likelihood) experienced this constitutionally questionable policing technique firsthand, along with their White



authoritarian counterparts who have not, are more than willing to have similar tactics used against what they view as a threat to order – “the other.”

The difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians on making it legal to stop people who the police suspect are undocumented is clearly shown in Figure 48 (see solid lines).<sup>125</sup>




Figure 48: State laws that allow police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion the person is undocumented.

African American authoritarians are statistically and substantively more likely to favor granting the police the authority to stop people who they suspect are undocumented than

<sup>125</sup> The difference between Whites and African Americans on this question is also obvious. That difference was explained in the discussion of symmetric and asymmetric threat in Chapter 4. Theoretically, the empowerment of police at the core of this proposed policy represents an asymmetric threat to African Americans and Whites, depressing African American authoritarian support for it when compared to their White brethren.

nonauthoritarian African Americans. The predicted probability of an African American authoritarian granting police this power is .403. By comparison, the predicted probability of nonauthoritarian African Americans supporting police stops of suspected undocumented immigrants is just .189.

Omitting the oppose answer from Figure 48 clarifies another important finding, White authoritarians are more likely to favor empowering the police to stop those they suspect are undocumented than African American authoritarians (Figure 49). This




Figure 49: State laws that require police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion the person is undocumented.

difference of opinion among authoritarians is explained by the discussion of symmetric and asymmetric threat presented in Chapter 4. The empowerment of police at the core of the policy tested in this survey question represents an asymmetric threat to African

Americans and Whites. Conceptually, for African American authoritarians both undocumented immigrants and the state and local police present a threat. On the other hand, for White authoritarians, undocumented immigrants are a threat but the police are not. Thus, the difference between White and Black assessment of the threat represented by police is, quite possibly, behind the racial differences found among authoritarians on this question. Expanding police powers is a common sense approach to control “the other” and protect the order with no downside for White authoritarians. Granting the police more power is a threat to Black authoritarians.

**Authoritarians and Emerging Threats:  
Muslims and Marijuana Legalization**

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue that authoritarianism “has reshaped American political competition and changed the nature of the political debate itself” ( p. 54). The authoritarian predisposition is at the foundation of this profound transformation. Tied to it are an ever changing group of issues that have one element in common – they engage people’s authoritarianism. Over time the salience of these issues transforms the extant political debate and produces a transformed worldview that reshapes political reality and behavior. Thus, the “issue evolution” based on race (Carmines & Stimson, 1990) that reshaped the New Deal Coalition is supplanted by a “worldview evolution” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 9) that has hastened party sorting<sup>126</sup> and increased political polarization.

According to Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the cluster of salient issues causing this polarization is not static. Since the inception of the process of worldview evolution in the 1960s, the list of issues has grown and changed in response to changing threats to the

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<sup>126</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) limit this party sorting to nonblack Americans.

conventions, norms, and order that authoritarians are so ready to defend. Thus, gay rights and gay marriage have supplanted feminism and the Equal Rights Amendment; and the War on Terror has replaced the Vietnam War in salience (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

Two new threats to Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) changing rotisserie of challenges to the established order may be the legalization of marijuana and the rise of a new "other" – Muslims. The legalization of marijuana is the emerging and salient wedge issue while, in the wake of 9/11, Muslims are the new, threatening out-group.

Polling of African and White Americans on both of these new potential threats to order reveals a strong divide between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians. First, as we have seen with gays and immigrants, authoritarians express much lower feeling thermometer ratings of Muslims than nonauthoritarians. The mean difference between African and White American authoritarian and nonauthoritarian feelings toward Muslims is statistically significant at p-values of  $<.05$  (Appendix C – Table 57).

A multivariate analysis of feeling thermometer scores toward Muslims from the 2011 WISER poll, which controls for authoritarianism, age, gender, education, party identification, and church attendance, also finds that authoritarianism is a statistically and substantively significant variable in accounting for both African and White Americans feelings toward Muslims (Appendix C – Table 58). Stated simply, the more authoritarian one is, the more likely he or she is to feel less favorable toward Muslims (Figure 50).




Figure 50: Feelings toward Muslims.

African American authoritarians feel colder toward Muslims than nonauthoritarians who are Black. White authoritarians feel colder to Muslims than nonauthoritarian Whites. And in both cases, the differences are statistically significant.

African and White American authoritarians are also statistically and substantively more likely to oppose the legalization of marijuana than nonauthoritarians (Figure 51 and Appendix C – Table 59). The predicted probability of an African American authoritarian opposing the legalization of marijuana is .379 while White authoritarians probability of opposing the legalization of marijuana is .431. By contrast African American and White nonauthoritarians probability of opposing marijuana legalization is .197 and .229 respectively.




Figure 51: Legalization of marijuana.

### **Authoritarians and Political Leaders and Leadership**

Authoritarians’ moral traditionalism, their search for order, and their support of institutions and leaders who advocate for both create attitudinal differences between African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians that transcend partisan identification and ideological lines. These significant attitudinal differences demonstrate the power of authoritarianism in structuring political perceptions and preferences. As with the rest of the evidence presented in this and the previous chapter, they also raise a clear and present challenge to the scholarly notion that African American opinion is homogeneous.

For example, as a result of his heated, televised Senate confirmation hearing in 1992, Justice Clarence Thomas became a political lightning rod. His Originalist judicial

philosophy made him a darling of the political right and a bogeyman of the left. To say the least, Justice Thomas was a polarizing, political figure. His support for the existing order embodied in and supported by his view of the Constitution as an unchanging, secularly sacred text, also spoke to the basic authoritarian worldview.

To date, scholarship explaining African American's strong support for the conservative Justice Thomas has focused on race arguing that "Thomas's support in the Black community was based on his ability to put the accusations [advanced to oppose him] in a powerful racial frame, by referring to the [confirmation] process as a 'high-tech lynching'" (Tate, 2010, p. 6).

This race-based argument, however, overlooks a crucial fact about the variation in African American support for Thomas. African American support for Justice Thomas was not at all monolithic. Support for Justice Thomas, as measured through the feeling thermometer scores scholars used to estimate his backing in the African American community and assert the primacy of race in attitude formation, varies by authoritarianism – and the variation is both statistically and substantively significant.

African American nonauthoritarians were not statistically different than White nonauthoritarians in their dislike of Justice Thomas. By comparison, no matter what their race, authoritarians were more likely to like Justice Thomas. Evidence of authoritarianism's structuring of feelings toward Justice Thomas and the heterogeneity of African American support of him is found in both bivariate and multivariate analyses of the 1992 feeling thermometer scores.

First a bivariate, difference of means test of feeling thermometer scores for Justice Thomas from the 1992 ANES survey reveals a difference between African American

authoritarians and nonauthoritarian feelings toward Justice Thomas of 17.76 percentage points.<sup>127</sup> African Americans authoritarians were more favorable toward Justice Thomas (54.38 thermometer score); African American nonauthoritarians were much less favorable (36.62 score); and the difference between them was statistically significant at a p-value of .0005. Moreover, White and African American nonauthoritarians feelings toward Justice Thomas (at a 95% confidence interval) were statistically the same and the feelings of White and African American authoritarians toward Justice Thomas were also statistically indistinguishable (Table 16).

Table 16

Feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas

On 0 to 100 Scale where 0 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling		
	African Americans	White Americans
	<i>Mean Score (with 95% CI)</i>	<i>Mean Score (with 95% CI)</i>
Non Authoritarians	36.62 (26.64 to 46.59)	37.17 (34.96 to 39.38)
Authoritarians	54.38 (50.65 to 58.10)	49.50 (47.86 to 51.15)
Difference of Means	17.76	12.33
<i>P-value</i>	0.0005	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	178	1023
<i>Source:</i> American National Election Studies 1992.		
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.		

A multivariate analysis of feelings toward Justice Thomas with authoritarianism, gender, age, education, party identification, and church attendance confirms the findings of the bivariate analysis. The effect of authoritarianism on feelings toward Justice Thomas is statistically significant at a p-value of <.01 for both African and White Americans. The only other independent variable reaching statistical significance is

<sup>127</sup> Feeling thermometer scores range from 0-to-100 with 0 representing the coldest and 100 the warmest feelings toward a person or concept.



education at a p-value of <.05. But the substantive effect of authoritarianism on feelings toward Justice Thomas dwarfs educational differences (Table 17).

Table 17

OLS analysis of feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas

On 0 to 100 Scale where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling				
	African Americans		White Americans	
Authoritarianism	17.645	***	13.576	***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	6.237		2.013	
Gender	-1.907		-5.222	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	3.307		1.142	
Age	-8.847		-9.225	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	7.279		2.494	
Education	-2.780	**	-0.447	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	1.087		0.383	
Party Identification	1.387		17.271	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	6.789		1.700	
Church Attendance	2.47		4.556	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	3.814		1.321	
<i>Intercept</i>	52.600		35.074	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	8.325		2.680	
R-Squared	0.11		0.15	
N	211		1374	
<i>Source:</i> American National Election Studies 1992.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an OLS model.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Predicted probabilities of the feelings of African and White American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians complete the picture demonstrating that authoritarianism played an important role in structuring support for and opposition to Justice Thomas (Figure 52).




Figure 52: Predicted Values of Feelings toward Justice Clarence Thomas.

Once again, the theoretical assumption that African American attitudes are monolithic because race is the primary variable structuring the political behavior of Blacks preempted a deeper analysis of feelings toward Justice Thomas and obscured a fact observable to any analyst – the critical role played by each respondent’s predisposition to authoritarianism.

### **Chapter Summary**

Authoritarian theory has always conceptualized authoritarianism as a universal condition. It is not limited to Europeans or Whites. It does not discriminate. It is a predisposition that is found in every culture and among members of every race. Bringing African Americans back into the scholarly discussion of authoritarianism in America is not a luxury; it is a necessity.

Authoritarianism's structuring of African Americans' worldview does not stop at some imaginary boundary between principles and policy. It fundamentally structures their political and policy preferences on key wedge issues that are thought to be the causal force behind polarization in America (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).

Authoritarian and nonauthoritarian African Americans hold significantly different preferences on these issues. As such, African Americans are not a politically monolithic group. They do not necessarily move en masse because the difference between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians is neither erased nor bridged by their shared racial identity. Race is an important factor that structures the behavior of African Americans, but it is not the only factor that shapes the behavior of African American who are also authoritarians.

On the other hand, the attitudes of African American and White authoritarians on salient wedge concerns are often quite similar. Thus, authoritarianism is a powerful force that structures not only the way some White Americans behave, but also the way many African Americans think and act politically. African American and White authoritarians hold quite similar attitudes across a range of salient issues because African Americans' racial identity does not insulate them from the siren demands of their authoritarian predisposition.

These findings pose a significant challenge to scholars who contend African Americans' political behavior is monolithic. Empirically, it is not. The findings also contradict the conventional scholarly tenet that African Americans and Whites "disagree consistently and often substantially" on national policy issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 439). On concerns as disparate as feeling thermometer ratings of Clarence Thomas, CIA

torture, the need for national identity cards, views of immigrants and immigration, and the rights of gays and lesbian, African American and White authoritarians hold remarkably similar views.

The attitudinal similarities between African American and White authoritarians on fundamental principles that comprise the authoritarian worldview and a wide range of salient issues that are theorized to engage the authoritarian predisposition also present a significant problem for a recent theory that questions the racial validity of the authoritarian scale based on child-rearing questions (Pérez & Hetherington, 2014). As was discussed in Chapter 2, the study cites observed attitudinal differences between African American and White authoritarians (from the ANES 2008 and 2010 YGP surveys) to support its claim that the child-rearing scale used to estimate authoritarianism is valid for Whites, but not for African Americans. The data presented in this and the last chapter leave little doubt of the attitudinal kinship of authoritarians whether they are White or Black.

Finally, the observation that African Americans are and will continue to be a political captive of the Democratic Party (Frymer, 1999; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) may need to be reassessed based on findings on Chapters 6 and 7.<sup>128</sup> The values and opinions of African American authoritarians on numerous issues are out of synch with the core of the Democratic Party. African American Republican legislators and candidates, including Senator Tim Scott of South Carolina, presidential candidate Ben Carson, Congresswoman Mia Love, Congressman William Hurd, and former

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<sup>128</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) assert that African Americans “are a group that is clearly tethered to the Democratic Party for now” for “obvious historical reasons.” (p. 141). To Hetherington and Weiler, the racial identity of African Americans trumps their authoritarianism and creates political behavior that is monolithic.

Congressman Allen West are giving voice to the preferences and principles of African American authoritarians. As such, African American authoritarians past allegiance to the Democratic Party is, therefore, not necessarily a harbinger of the future. While the party identification of most African American authoritarians has not changed yet, the differences between authoritarian and nonauthoritarians political and policy preferences are significant, demonstrably affect their political behavior, and may be a precursor of a worldview-driven evolution (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) in the party identification of African Americans as it has been for White Americans. As such, it is possible that African American authoritarians may be primed and on the cusp of changing their partisan identification.

The role of authoritarianism in party sorting is the topic of the next chapter. Ironically, the exclusion of African Americans from the key figure from which Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) party sorting theory sprung, as well as from many subsequent parts of this analysis, demonstrates the need, once again, for political scientists to make authoritarian inquiries inclusive.

## CHAPTER 7

### AUTHORITARIANISM AND PARTISAN POLARIZATION

So far, I have demonstrated that the worldviews of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, whether they are African American or White, differ in significant ways. African American and White authoritarians think morality is not malleable. It is fixed. They believe there is an unambiguous difference between good and evil in the world that creates clear choices. They are more supportive of governmental authority, more ready to agree to the concentration of power in a single leader, and more patriotic and nationalistic than nonauthoritarians. African American and White authoritarians are also less likely to support democratic principles when those principles are tested by dissenters or outsiders.

Authoritarianism not only structures the worldview of many African Americans, it also structures how they view themselves and the identities they choose (Waters, 2009). African American authoritarians are much less likely than their nonauthoritarian brethren to believe their individual fate is linked (Dawson, 1995; Tate, 1994) to their racial group identity. As measured by the questions geared to estimate racial resentment (Kinder, 1996), they are statistically more likely to agree with the symbolically racist (Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay & Hough, 1976; Sears, 1993; Sears, 1988; Sears & Kinder, 1971) negative stereotypes of members of their own race still broadcast by much of mainstream America. African American authoritarians are believers in the America of Horatio Alger and take greater pride in being American than nonauthoritarian African Americans. Americans is one of their reference groups. It is an identity they have chosen (Waters, 2009) or to which they aspire to belong. Their claim of Americanism is

an assertion that they are different than the mainstream stereotypes of Black Americans. They are not them. They do not hold those values. They aspire like Horatio Alger to rise up; not to be burdened by the downward mobility of being perceived as only Black (Waters, 2009, p. 65). For African Americans, who are also authoritarians, race is not the only factor that shapes their worldview or identity choices. Authoritarianism and race compete to structure the lens through which they view the world, their attitudes on salient issues, and, at times, as I discuss next, their political behavior.

I have also shown that on the issues that form much of the contested policy turf of contemporary American politics over the last two decades, and which are allegedly at the root of political polarization (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009),<sup>129</sup> the attitudes of African American authoritarians are also demonstrably different than nonauthoritarians and remarkably similar to White authoritarians. Quite simply, African American authoritarians are neither “always more liberal than Whites” (Kinder & Winter, 2001) nor a political monolith.

In the chapter that follows, I turn to explore what the identity, worldview, and attitudinal differences between African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians, as well as the similarities between White and African American authoritarians, mean to the theory that is central to our current understanding of authoritarianism’s effect on political behavior – the political polarization theory articulated by Hetherington and Weiler (2009).

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<sup>129</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) write: “Issues such as gay rights, terrorism, and war are all now prominent on the issue agenda and all have the ability to provoke strong feelings. And, as we demonstrate in later chapters, all are structured by authoritarianism, which has, itself, come to divide Republicans from Democrats” (p. 32).

In this theory, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) contend that authoritarianism has become an important determinant of partisan identification. They argue that “consistent with the issues evolution framework (Carmines & Stimson, 1986, 1990), a coalitional reconfiguration of the parties is in the works, with authoritarians increasingly gravitating toward the Republican Party and nonauthoritarians increasingly gravitating toward the Democratic” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p.158).

To Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the mechanism behind partisan reconfiguration is an extension of the issues evolution process, in which dormant issues increase in salience and persist over time, creating new lines of cleavage between parties. The evolution of these issues as important markers of partisan differences slowly but surely cause some voters to shift allegiances to the party more aligned with their issue interests. Hetherington and Weiler assert that as more new issues arise and are organically added to the issues separating parties, an issues evolution can morph into a worldview evolution. The recent transformation from an issues to a worldview evolution began with the addition of gut-level issues to the political debate. These gut-level issues, Cultural War concerns that elites have added to the issue agenda since the 1960s, drove the existing wedge between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians deeper – expanding, sharpening, and calcifying a new cleavage line that first formed at the beginning of the issues evolution.

Changing feelings toward both parties, falling voter turnout, and shifting voter choice in presidential and Senate contests are cited by Hetherington and Weiler as quantifiable, political manifestations of the shift from an issues to worldview evolution structured along the predispositional and socially-learned division between authoritarians



and nonauthoritarians. These observable political outcomes are also the precursors of an authoritarian-catalyzed, partisan transformation that they theorize is extant.

Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) dissection of the data on which these claims are made, however, omits African Americans from the analysis. Even though African Americans are "the most authoritarian racial group in the United States by far," Hetherington and Weiler focus their analysis of changing party feeling thermometer scores, falling voter turnout, and shifting choices in Senate and presidential contest on nonblacks "for obvious historical reasons" (2009, p. 141).<sup>130</sup> In making this methodological choice, Hetherington and Weiler elect to exclude the most authoritarian segment of the American electorate from his analysis of authoritarianism's effect on American partisanship.

The data Hetherington and Weiler (2009) examine to investigate their theory that political polarization is structured by authoritarianism is also temporally constrained. Their analysis of changing attitudes toward parties is limited to two surveys.<sup>131</sup> Their scrutiny of voter turnout and presidential choice stands on cross sectional data from three surveys – the 1992, 2000, and 2004 ANES data sets. And the core of their partisan transformation argument is based on cross sectional data from four surveys – with the

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<sup>130</sup> In this dissertation, I focus on African Americans and Whites. In this chapter, following Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) methodology required changing the racial units of analysis to African Americans and nonblacks. Whites represent a significant majority of the nonblacks in each survey sample examined. That said nonblacks also include Latinos, Native Americans, Asian Americans, and any other group that does not identify as Black. Hetherington and Weiler chose to draw this analytical line between nonblacks and African Americans throughout their book on authoritarianism and polarization in American politics (2009). Hetherington and Suhay (2011) do not make this distinction in their article on authoritarianism and threat, though the predicted probabilities they use in their article to explore this hypothesis are limited to "males who are not Black or Hispanic" (p. 553).

<sup>131</sup> These are feeling thermometer scores from the 2000 and 2004 ANES surveys.

fourth and final survey, conducted by ANES in 2006, providing the critical evidence in support of the argument (p. 147).<sup>132</sup>

The data from this fourth survey (2006 ANES) is the most convincing piece of data supporting Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) partisan polarization theory. It shows an increase of almost twenty percentage points in authoritarianism's influence on partisanship (from 16.9 in 2004 to 36.6 in 2006) significantly extending the upward trend measured since 1992. Mapping partisanship and authoritarianism onto a 0-to-1 interval with the 2006 ANES results included, Hetherington and Weiler find that authoritarianism's effect on partisanship is the equivalent of one-third of the entire partisan scale's range – more than 2 points on the 7-point party identification scale (pp. 146-149).

But, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) dutifully warn twice in their discussion of this data, only half of survey respondents in the 2006 ANES were asked a partisanship question. The result: the twenty percentage point surge in authoritarianism's effect on partisanship observed by them from 2004 to 2006 is based on an exceedingly small sample (just 249 respondents) from which African Americans were excluded. The definitive piece of evidence offered by Hetherington and Weiler in support of their intriguing theory of authoritarian structured polarization ultimately rests on this slim reed.

In this chapter, I test that reed. Given the significant similarities between African American and White authoritarians in terms of worldview and policy preferences demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, and the existence of two additional years of ANES survey data (2008 and 2012) that include robust oversamples of African Americans,

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<sup>132</sup> This is the 2006 ANES Pilot Study. This study reinterviewed 675 people from the 2004 ANES. Only half of the 2006 sample was asked a partisan identification question.

authoritarian question batteries and tracking questions,<sup>133</sup> I ask: What effect, if any, does the addition of African Americans to the analysis and the expansion of the time period studied to 2012 have on Hetherington and Weiler's theory of authoritarian structured political polarization?

I begin the pursuit of this question with an examination of the data from which Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) authoritarian polarization theory sprung. This is followed by an analysis of authoritarianism's effect on voter turnout and voter choice, with the voter choice investigation expanded beyond presidential and Senate campaigns to include races for the House of Representatives. After examining voter choice, I use data pooled from five ANES surveys taken from 1992 through 2012 to reassess Hetherington and Weiler's finding that authoritarianism is restructuring party identification and driving polarization.

When all is said and done, I find that when African Americans are added back into the analysis and the time period studied is extended through 2012, the empirical support for Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) theory of authoritarian-driven partisan polarization is weakened but still intact. While, as Hetherington and Weiler argued, authoritarianism appears to be behind some of the shift in the party identification of Whites, it has affected the partisan loyalties of African American authoritarians less.

As I demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, African American and White authoritarians hold similar worldviews and attitudes on a wide range of issues that engage

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<sup>133</sup> Because both the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys include authoritarian child-rearing questions, it is possible to construct an authoritarian scale that is identical to the tool used by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). Party identification, moral traditionalism, racial resentment, and a raft of other key questions used in the 1992, 2000, and 2004 surveys (and at the core of Hetherington and Weiler's research) are also repeated in the 2008 and 2012 surveys, allowing apples-to-apples comparisons of the cross sectional data. Finally, the sample sizes of African Americans on both the 2008 and 2012 surveys are robust, providing ample samples for analysis.

their authoritarian predisposition. In this chapter, I demonstrate that while the siren call of authoritarianism may be changing some of the voting choices made by African American authoritarians – especially in down ballot races – it has not yet begun to shift their partisan identification significantly.

### **Partisan Polarization**

Ground zero for Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) theory that authoritarianism is the causal factor sorting partisans and propelling political polarization is a simple graph that summarizes their fundamental observation (p. 28, Figure 2.2). In this figure, the difference between the mean scores of self-identified Republicans and Democrats are mapped on four different dimensions using ANES surveys from 1988 through 2004.<sup>134</sup>

The first dimension plotted is moral traditionalism. A battery of four different questions is used to assess whether respondents think morals are malleable or fixed and unchanging.<sup>135</sup> These questions and this scale have been used by ANES since 1986. Answers to the four moral questions are added and mapped across a 0-to-1 scale. A 1 on the scale represents a completely orthodox view of morality. A 0 on the scale equals a completely relative or secular view. To arrive at the percentage difference between party partisans in each survey, Republicans’ and Democrats’ individual scores are grouped and added together. Then, they are divided to calculate a mean score for both parties. Finally, the Democratic mean is subtracted from the Republican mean to arrive at the percentage

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<sup>134</sup> The 1988 ANES survey did not include an authoritarian question battery and is not included in this analysis. Following Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) approach, mean scores are derived by adding the scores of strong and weak partisans from each party together and then dividing by the number of total scores summed by party. The scores of self-identified Independents, Independent Democrats, and Independent Republicans are excluded from this analysis.

<sup>135</sup> Moral traditionalism is different than “Newer Lifestyles” – the variable Hetherington and Weiler (2009) develops to estimate normative threat. Four questions are combined to measure moral traditionalism. Only two of these four questions are employed to calculate the threat from “Newer Lifestyles” (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 94).

difference between Republican and Democrat partisans on moral traditionalism. A positive score on the graph means that Republicans are more morally traditional than Democrats.

A battery of racial resentment questions designed to capture symbolic racism (Kinder, 1996; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Kinder & Winter, 2001; Sears & Kinder, 1971) form the second dimension arrayed on Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) seminal graph. The racial resentment scale is built from four questions. The difference between the mean Republican and Democratic partisan scores on racial resentment is calculated using the same procedure followed in the construction of the moral traditionalism scale. The number 1 represents the highest level of racial resentment and, when graphed, a positive score means that Republicans are more symbolically racist than Democrats.

The third dimension charted on the graph is support for defense spending. This is a measure of hawkishness. It is calculated from a standard 7-point scale and plotted on a 0-to-1 interval, making it comparable to moral traditional and racial resentment measures. A positive percentage difference on the graph means that Republicans are more hawkish than Democrats.

Finally, the four child-rearing questions are used to estimate mean authoritarian scores for Republican and Democratic partisans. The difference between these scores is then calculated. A negative score means Democratic partisans are more authoritarian than Republican partisans. A positive score indicates Republican partisans are more authoritarian than Democrats. And values around 0 means there is little difference between Republican and Democratic mean scores on authoritarianism.

Figure 53 charts the mean authoritarian score differences (expressed as percentages) between Republican and Democratic partisans using Hetherington and Weiler’s original findings that exclude African Americans and revised authoritarian scores that include African Americans. It also projects Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) calculations through 2012. The difference between the two lines represents the effect of including African Americans in the analysis of authoritarianism. Unlike Hetherington and Weiler’s findings, when African Americans are included (the red line in Figure 53), the percentage difference between the mean authoritarian scores of Republicans and Democrats vacillates around zero from 1992 to 2012.




Figure 53: Difference between the mean authoritarian scores of self-identified Republican and Democratic partisans.

Figure 54 adds the mean score differences between Republican and Democratic partisans on moral traditionalism, racial resentment, and defense spending to authoritarianism – the four dimensions originally studied and graphed by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) who found increasing partisan differences on all four dimensions between 1988 and 2004. Importantly, in Figure 54, African Americans are included in the analysis and the time period studied is extended to 2012.<sup>136</sup> In contrast to the authoritarian findings graphed in Figure 53, the trend between Republican and Democratic partisans' mean score differences on moral traditionalism, racial resentment, and defense spending is decidedly upward from 1992 to 2012 even when African Americans are included in the analysis (Figure 54).

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<sup>136</sup> Figure 53 includes data from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys. The authoritarian child-rearing battery was not asked in the 1996 ANES survey.




Figure 54: Difference between mean scores of self-identified Republican and Democratic partisans with African Americans included.

Relying on ANES surveys from 1988 to 2004 and excluding African Americans from their analysis, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) concluded that “the underlying orientation that structures all these things – race, morals, and hawkishness – is authoritarianism...[and] importantly...[the data] shows that partisans are also now sorted by authoritarianism” (p. 29). Figures 53 and 54 do not support this claim. When African Americans are included in the analysis and the time period is extended, the percentage differences between Republican and Democratic scores simply do not support the observation that authoritarianism underlies the growing difference between partisans on race, morality, and defense.



## Voter Turnout and Authoritarianism

Changes in voter turnout, shifting voter choices in presidential and Senate contests, and changing feelings toward both parties among authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are identified by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) as indicators that an authoritarian structured and catalyzed partisan transformation is now in motion. If observed, these precursors of a shift from an issues to a worldview evolution support the theory that authoritarianism, and the rise of public debate around issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition, are the causal mechanism behind recent partisan polarization.

Analyzing ANES surveys from 1992 to 2004 and excluding African Americans from his inquiry, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) observed that, as the Republican Party adopted more authoritarian positions on issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition, authoritarian Republican turnout increased.<sup>137</sup> Conversely, as the Democratic Party increasingly embraced a nonauthoritarian worldview, turnout among authoritarian Democrats decreased.<sup>138</sup>

Adding African Americans to the analysis and extending the time period examined to 2012 (Figure 55) produces a somewhat different snapshot of authoritarian turnout than described by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). Between the 1992 and 2000 ANES surveys,<sup>139</sup> there was a marked increase in Republican authoritarian turnout and a

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<sup>137</sup> It is important to note that all voter turnout data analyzed here is not validated. Since survey respondents have been shown to over report voting, it is likely all data in this section exaggerates actual voter turnout (Bernstein, Chadha, & Montjoy, 2001).

<sup>138</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) state, “As Republicans adopted a larger number of issue positions friendly to those with an authoritarian worldview and Democrats took the other side, self-identified nonblack Democrats who score high in authoritarianism began to turn out at lower rates while self-identified Republicans who score high in authoritarianism started to vote at high rates” ( p. 141). In this case, “high in authoritarianism” means those people who score a 1 on the authoritarian scale.

<sup>139</sup> Again, the 1996 ANES survey did not include an authoritarian battery of questions.

concomitant drop in nonauthoritarian<sup>140</sup> Republican voting. From 2000 through 2008, however, the trends in voter turnout among Republicans reversed, as nonauthoritarian turnout increased and authoritarian turnout decreased. By 2012, however, turnout among both nonauthoritarian and authoritarian Republicans reached the highest level over the 20-year period studied.




Figure 55: Republican voter turnout.

Thus, from 1992 to 2012, turnout of Republican authoritarians increased markedly but, after dipping precipitously between 1992 and 2000, so did the turnout of nonauthoritarian Republicans. Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) singular focus on the effect of the Republican elite’s embrace of authoritarianism on Republican authoritarians

<sup>140</sup> In this instance, nonauthoritarians are those who score 0 on the authoritarian scale.

overlooks a question that begs an explanation. If the embrace of the authoritarian worldview by the Republican Party elicits an increase in Republican authoritarian turnout as authoritarians “feel more enthusiasm about politics,” why isn’t there a concomitant decrease in turnout among Republican nonauthoritarians as they see their party abandoning values and positions they hold dear?

Of course, this is only half the story. Hetherington and Weiler also contend that a drop in Democratic authoritarian turnout occurred as Democratic Party elites adopted nonauthoritarian positions and Democratic authoritarians became less excited about politics.<sup>141</sup> Adding African Americans back into the analysis, however, erases most of the Democratic authoritarian turnout decrease found by Hetherington and Weiler between 1992 and 2004 (Figure 56). Extending the time period studied to include the 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys reverses the slight downward trend and replaces it with a surge in Democratic authoritarian turnout as, presumably, African American authoritarians turned out to vote for Barack Obama.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>141</sup> Democratic authoritarian turnout (with African Americans excluded) fell from 63% in 1992 to 56% in 2000 and remained at 56% in 2004 according to Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009), calculations.

<sup>142</sup> The behavior of Democratic nonauthoritarians does not demonstrate the theoretically expected increase in turnout expected as Democratic Party elites embraced more nonauthoritarian positions. Instead, Democratic nonauthoritarian turnout vacillates between the low-to-mid nineties over the five surveys studied. The already high turnout of nonauthoritarian Democrats, however, is probably the culprit behind this deviation from the theoretically expected outcome.




Figure 56: Democratic voter turnout.

### Voter Choices and Authoritarianism

A singular focus on turnout, however, may obscure other changes in voting patterns that are a precursor of a partisan shift in party identification driven by authoritarianism. For example, an increase in Democratic authoritarian turnout does not necessarily mean an increase in Democratic votes. Democratic authoritarians may be turning out to vote for Republican candidates. Conversely, the turnout of Republican nonauthoritarians may remain steady, but more of those nonauthoritarians may be defecting from their party and voting for Democratic candidates.

Hetherington and Weiler (2009) examined voter choices in campaigns for President and U.S. Senate to untangle voting patterns of loyal and defecting members of

both parties viewed through the lens of authoritarianism.<sup>143</sup> Excluding African Americans from their analysis, they observed that the difference between the mean authoritarian scores of all voters voting for the Republican or Democratic presidential candidate, irrespective of their party identification, grew from 8.5 percentage points to 14.5 percentage points between 1992 and 2004.<sup>144</sup> When African Americans are included in this analysis, however, the difference between Republican and Democratic presidential voters mean authoritarian scores between 1992 and 2004 are less than half of what Hetherington and Weiler found (Figure 57). Extending the time period studied to include 2008 and 2012 ANES surveys reveals no difference in the mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic presidential voters in 2008 and a less than 5 percentage point difference in 2012.

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<sup>143</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) say, they “suspect[ed that] authoritarianism will have started to guide decision about vote choice by the 1990s” (2009, p. 142).

<sup>144</sup> The authoritarian scores of third party candidates are not included in this calculation. Given the strong candidacy of Ross Perot in 1992, the exclusion of third party candidate voters from this analysis may have depressed Republican authoritarian scores in this base year resulting in an exaggerated trend line from 1992 to 2000 and 2004. As calculated by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), the difference in mean authoritarian scores between Republican and Democratic candidates in 2000 was 12.2 percentage points. In 2004, it was 14.5 percentage points – a small increase.




Figure 57: Difference in mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic voters for President.

Once again, the effect of including and excluding African Americans in the analysis is represented by the area between the two lines in the figure.

Defining Democratic partisans who voted for the Republican candidate for President as defectors and subtracting loyal Democrats' mean authoritarian score from the defecting Democrats' score, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) conclude that authoritarianism was "driving defections among Democrats" (p. 142) in presidential elections. They cite this observation as another precursive indicator of authoritarian-catalyzed, partisan sorting.<sup>145</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) say, "To the degree that differences between defectors and loyal partisans exist, it suggests partisan changes might soon be in the offing." (p. 142).

Including African Americans in the analysis of the mean authoritarian score difference between Democratic loyalists and defectors in presidential campaigns between 1992 and 2012 produces results that are quite similar to Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) (Figure 58). In four of the five presidential contests studied, the mean authoritarian score differential between loyal and defecting Democrats was significant at a one-tailed, p-value of less than .05.<sup>146</sup> Only during the 2008 presidential contest, as African American authoritarians surged to vote for Barack Obama, did the statistical difference between the authoritarian mean scores of loyal and defecting Democrats disappear at the presidential level. Thus, in the 1992, 2000, 2004, and 2012 presidential contests, Democratic defectors had a higher and statistically significant mean authoritarian score than Democratic loyalists.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> A one-tailed test of significance is an appropriate test of statistical significance because the assumption that defecting Democrats should score higher on the authoritarian scale than loyal Democrats has been clearly stated here and in Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) work.

<sup>147</sup> The 1996 presidential contest is not included in this analysis because authoritarian questions were not asked on the 1996 ANES survey.




Figure 58: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Democrats – including African American voters.

By comparison, the authoritarian mean score differential in presidential voting among Republican loyalists and defectors achieves statistical significance only once – in 2000. In this year, the mean authoritarian score of Republican defectors was more than 10 percentage points lower than the score of loyalists (Figure 59).






Figure 59: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Republicans – including African American voters.

In the presidential contests after 2000 and in 1992, there were no statistical differences between the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting Republicans. Even though African Americans are included in this analysis, the findings also track with Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) results for the three contests (1992, 2000, and 2004) they studied.<sup>148</sup>

Given these results it seems clear that, with or without the inclusion of African American voters, Hetherington and Weiler’s (2009) initial conclusion that authoritarianism affects the presidential vote choices of some Democrats, causing them to defect from their party and vote Republican, is supported. Hetherington and Weiler

<sup>148</sup> Only a few African American in each survey identify as Republicans. Thus, their addition to this analysis makes little difference statistically.

caution, however, about the folly of relying solely on presidential data to support claims that authoritarianism's structuring of vote choice is a precursor to partisan polarization.<sup>149</sup> And they turn to the results of Senate contests for further evidence that authoritarianism is driving partisan voting defections.

Examining Senate results for information to bolster their presidential findings, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) report that "Senate results follow a similar pattern (to the Presidential data), but they depart in ways that even more aptly fit our data" (p. 144). The results, mapped by the top line in Figure 60 reveal that the difference between the mean authoritarian scores of those who voted for Republican and Democratic Senate candidates rose steadily and markedly from 1992 through 2004, growing from 6.1 percentage points in 1992 to 14.2 percentage points in 2004.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Hetherington and Weiler (2009) note, "Presidential voting might not reflect general trends because the characteristics of specific candidate and themes of specific campaigns play a vital role. The pattern of results above might reflect a particular set of candidacies" (p. 143).

<sup>150</sup> They also find that the percentage point difference between the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting Democratic Senate voters in 2004 was 18.8 points (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).




Figure 60: Difference in mean authoritarian scores of Republican and Democratic voters for Senate.

When African Americans are added to the analysis and the time period is once again extended to include the 2008 and 2012 surveys, much of the evidence Hetherington and Weiler found in Senate vote data to support their vote choice theory evaporates (see the red line in Figure 60).<sup>151</sup> With African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians added to the analysis, the difference between the mean authoritarian scores of people voting for Republican or Democratic Senate candidates rises to just under 10 percentage points in 2004. In 2008, this difference is completely erased as the mean authoritarian

<sup>151</sup> A cautionary, red flag should also be raised concerning the methodological assumption implicitly made by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) that elections from different Senate classes can be conflated to produce a single trend line. For example, the 1992 and 2000 Senate elections were held in different states and, as a result, were contested among quite different voters. The same observation is true for the 2000 and 2004 Senate contests. Apples-to-apples comparisons can only be made between 1992 and 2004 elections as well as 2000 and 2006 elections. A direct comparison between 2004 and 2012 Senate results or 2008 and 2012 Senate statistics is inherently flawed because a completely different set of states and voters went to the ballot box in each year studied.

score of voters for Democratic Senate candidates was actually higher than the mean authoritarian score of Republican Senate voters. In 2012, the Republican Senate voters mean authoritarian score bounces back to just over 5 percentage points more than Democratic Senate voters.

When African Americans are included in the analysis, a more in-depth inspection of loyal and defecting Democrats’ authoritarian mean scores in Senate elections further erodes Hetherington and Weiler’s supporting evidence that authoritarianism is driving vote choice and is a precursive warning sign of partisan polarization. In only two (2000 and 2004) of the five elections studied did the difference between the mean authoritarian scores of defecting and loyal Democrats in Senate contests reach a one-tailed, p-value of less .05 (Figure 61).




Figure 61: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Democrats—including African American voters

Moreover, in 1992, 2008, and 2012 the mean authoritarian scores of defecting and loyal Democrats were statistically the same.<sup>152</sup>

While the Senate data with African Americans added into the analysis offers little support for Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) vote choice hypothesis, data from House elections, which were not included in their original analysis, provide an indication that authoritarianism may be beginning to affect the outcomes of races for the United State House of Representatives. Moreover, the analysis of election data in U.S. House contests does not confront the statistical problem presented by the six-year election cycle for U.S. Senate.

The mean authoritarian score of defecting and loyal Democrats in House elections was statistically significant at a one-tailed, p-value of less than .05 in 2000 and 2012. In both election years, Democrats with higher authoritarian scores were more likely to defect and vote for the Republican candidate for Congress (see Figure 62).

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<sup>152</sup> A statistical difference appeared between the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting Republicans in Senate contests only once in five years – the 2000 election. This was the same election in which a difference in the mean authoritarian scores of loyal and defecting Republican Presidential voters attained statistical significance.




Figure 62: Difference between the authoritarian mean scores of defecting and loyal Democrats—including African American voters.

The difference between defecting and loyal Democrats' authoritarian mean score in House elections also approached statistical significance in a third year (2008) – a year in which authoritarian, African American voter turnout surged for Barack Obama and should have completely obscured the authoritarian voting cleavage in down ballot races. Moreover, from 1992 to 2012, the mean authoritarian score of Democratic defectors in House contests rose more than 10 points (from 52.8 to 63.6), while the mean authoritarian score of loyal Democrats began (56.3) and ended (56.7) this two decade period at statistically the same point.

Thus, when the choices of all voters, including African Americans, are included in the analysis, the rise in the authoritarian score of Democratic defectors in House

contests represents the greatest change among defectors and loyalists from both parties across all contests examined between 1992 and 2012. Figure 63 displays the significant rise in the authoritarian mean score differential between Democratic defectors and loyalists in House contests (blue line). This rise is contrasted with the relatively stable and negative mean score authoritarian difference between Republican loyalists and defectors starting in 2000.<sup>153</sup> As such, it puts the magnitude of the authoritarian change in Democratic and Republican House voting over the last two decades in context. While authoritarian differences in Presidential and Senate contests have vacillated around zero, the authoritarian difference between defecting and loyal Democrats in House races rose to 10 percentage points in 2000 and has remained above 7 percentage points ever since. On the other hand, the authoritarian difference between defecting and loyal Republicans grew to approximately 4 percentage points in 2000 (expressed as a negative number in Figure 63 to better reveal the gap between party loyalists and defectors) and has remained there through 2012.

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<sup>153</sup> See Appendix C – Figure 67 for comparison of authoritarian mean score differential for loyal and defecting partisans in Presidential, Senate and House contests from 1992 through 2012.




Figure 63: Authoritarian mean score differential between loyal and defecting Republican and Democratic voters in the House contests with 1992 as the base year.

Ideological differences between members of the U.S. House and Senate continue to grow and are now at historic levels (Poole & Rosenthal, 2011). The increasing political polarization in Congress “rests on a firm electoral base” (Jacobson, 2013, p. 688) and discourages “ideological moderates from running for office” (Thomsen, 2014, p. 2). The authoritarian scores of Democratic defectors and Republican loyalists in House races may be the confirmation of authoritarianism’s effect on vote choice that Hetherington and Weiler (2009) were searching for in Senate data. It may also be evidence of the authoritarian-driven partisan polarization of the electorate theorized by them – though more years of election data is certainly needed to confirm it. While waiting for that data, however, it is important to note that the rising authoritarian scores of Democratic defectors in House elections were observed even though an African American was



leading the Democratic Party at the end of the time period studied, African Americans were included in the analysis, and turnout among African Americans was rising.

### **Partisan Polarization: Revisited**

Turnout, partisan vote choice, and changing feeling thermometer scores are identified by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) as early manifestations of authoritarianism's effect on political behavior. They hypothesize that this effect inexorably culminates in a slow partisan sorting by authoritarianism as "authoritarians increasingly gravitat[e] to the Republican Party and nonauthoritarians increasingly gravitat[e] toward the Democratic [Party]" (p. 158). Their evidence of the existence of partisan sorting driven by authoritarianism comes from cross sectional data from four surveys in which the data from the fourth survey, conducted by ANES in 2006, provides the critical and most convincing piece of information (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009, p. 147, Table 7.4). Between the 2004 and 2006 ANES surveys, Hetherington and Weiler find an increase in authoritarianism's influence on partisanship of almost twenty percentage points (from 16.9 in 2004 to 36.6 in 2006), extending the upward trend of authoritarianism's effect on partisanship measured since 1992. (According to their table, authoritarianism's effect on partisan identification first achieved statistical and substantive significance in 2004.)

With partisanship and authoritarianism mapped onto a 0-to-1 interval, authoritarianism's effect on partisanship in the 2006 ANES results is the equivalent of one-third of the entire scale's range, or more than 2 points on the 7-point party identification scale. Authoritarianism's effect on partisanship, as found in the 2006 survey, is both statistically and substantively significant. It is also greater than

Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) stand-in for ideology (a support for government spending scale), moral traditionalism (based on a two-question scale), race (with African Americans omitted and Hispanics included), income – which, referencing Stonecash (2000), Hetherington and Weiler (2009) argue is “an increasingly important predictor of party identification” (p. 146), education, age, and church attendance.<sup>154</sup>

Unfortunately, as Hetherington and Weiler (2009) dutifully warn readers twice, only half of the 675 survey respondents to the 2006 ANES were asked a partisanship question. Thus, their intriguing theory that authoritarianism is driving party polarization rests on survey results from a sample of just 249 Americans – a sample from which the most authoritarian group in the United States, African Americans, was excluded.

To deepen the understanding of the role, if any, of authoritarianism in partisan polarization and the effect of adding African Americans into the analysis, I pooled data from the 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys.<sup>155</sup> This extended the time frame of Hetherington and Weiler's partisanship inquiry by six years and yielded a robust sample of 8,549 when African Americans were excluded and 10,925 with African Americans included. As with all analyses in this dissertation, authoritarianism, gender, age, education, and church attendance were included in the model. The dependent variable is partisanship in which 0 is a strong Democrat and 1 is a strong Republican. All variables were either scaled on a 0 to 1 interval or were binary. Finally, an ordinal dummy variable for each survey year was appended to the data and an interaction term multiplying authoritarianism and survey year was created to assess the effect of authoritarianism on party identification over time. If the interaction term is positive and

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<sup>154</sup> All variables were converted to 0-to-1 scales (or 0 and 1 intervals) to allow for direct comparison of coefficients.

<sup>155</sup> The partial sample from the 2006 ANES survey (N=249) is not included in the pooled data.

statistically significant there is evidence that authoritarianism has had an increasing influence on partisanship. In other words, authoritarians became more Republican during the twenty year period studied.

Table 18 reports the results of the analysis with and without African Americans. In the first data column in which African Americans are excluded from the sample the interaction term between authoritarianism and survey year is positive and statistically significant, meaning that authoritarianism has indeed had an effect on partisanship during the 20 years studied.

Table 18  
Partisanship as a function of authoritarianism 1992-2012

Ordinal dummy variable for survey years. All non-binary variables scaled 0 to 1.			
	Nonblack Americans	All Americans	
Authoritarianism	0.056 **	-0.011	
Std. Err.	0.024	0.023	
Year	-0.080 ****	-0.080 ****	
Std. Err.	0.020	0.019	
Interaction: Authoritarianism*Year	0.107 ****	0.059 **	
Std. Err.	0.030	0.028	
Gender	-0.055 ****	-0.063 ****	
Std. Err.	0.007	0.007	
Age	-0.014	-0.004	
Std. Err.	0.016	0.014	
Education	0.131 ****	0.128 ****	
Std. Err.	0.013	0.012	
Church Attendance	0.121 ****	0.089 ****	
Std. Err.	0.008	0.008	
Intercept	0.403	0.417	
Std. Err.	0.019	0.018	
R-Squared	0.05	0.035	
N	8954	10925	
Source: Pooled Data 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 ANES surveys.			
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS model.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

The interaction term in the second data column, which reports findings for a sample that includes African Americans, is also positive and significant. Thus, even with

the inclusion of African Americans in the analysis, authoritarianism had an effect on partisanship. This effect, however, is less than what is observed when African Americans are excluded from the analysis.

While Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) conclusion that authoritarianism's effect on partisanship is the equivalent of more than 2 points on the 7-point party identification scale seems to overstate reality, the core of their thesis appears intact. Authoritarianism is a factor in partisan polarization among nonblack Americans. To a lesser extent, this finding also appears true even when African Americans are included in the analysis.

### **Chapter Summary**

Through their work, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have demonstrated the importance of revivifying the study of authoritarianism's effect on political behavior. Their theories of authoritarianism are central to our current understanding of the predisposition. But, as I have argued in this chapter, the theories are also not without flaws.

Since authoritarianism is defined as a predisposition that crosses racial, cultural, and ethnic boundaries and the child-rearing question currently used to estimate it is valid across races, excluding African Americans, the most authoritarian group in America, from any study of authoritarianism's effect on partisan identification is theoretically problematic. Moreover, including African Americans in the analysis yields intriguing insights and puzzles.

While Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that African American and White authoritarians hold similar worldviews and attitudes on a wide range of issues that engage their authoritarian predisposition, Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) argument that

authoritarianism underlies the growing difference between Republican and Democratic partisans on race, morality, and defense does not hold up when African Americans are considered. That said some of Hetherington and Weiler's keen insights still ring true even with African Americans included in the analysis. Most importantly, in contests for President and the House of Representatives, authoritarianism appears to be an explanatory factor in the defection of partisan Democrats to Republican candidates.

The effect of authoritarianism on vote choice is one of the harbingers of partisan sorting predicted by Hetherington and Weiler (2009). The data from 2008 and 2012 and House races shows it may well be afoot. But the culmination of the evolution of the authoritarian worldview – partisan polarization driven by authoritarianism – does not appear as advanced as Hetherington and Weiler argued. Their conclusion, however, may have simply been premature.

The 20 years of pooled data examined in this Chapter demonstrates that authoritarianism has driven some change in the partisan identification of nonblacks. And even when African Americans are included in the analysis, authoritarianism has influenced party identification.

In the near future, the process of White authoritarian movement into the Republican Party may be hastened by the rise of Trumpism. And the presence of authoritarians like Ben Carson within the Republican leadership may also be a precursor to the movement of some African American authoritarians away from the Democratic Party. In either case, the importance of the study of authoritarianism to attitudes, vote choice, and partisanship is no longer a fringe concern of political scientists, it is central to our understanding of politics in America and, quite possibly, the world.

## CHAPTER 8

### AMERICAN AUTHORITARIANISM IN BLACK AND WHITE

The conundrum at the core of my dissertation is this: How can African Americans be described simultaneously by political scientists as one of the most liberal and most authoritarian groups in the United States? This puzzle framed the central question explored over the last seven chapters and provoked a cascade of other queries.

I have argued that the political behavior of many African Americans is caught in a tug of war between their racial identity and their predisposition to authoritarianism. When the issue at hand engages African Americans' authoritarian predisposition, authoritarianism can trump racial identity, produce attitudes that defy conventional wisdom, and dash the common theoretical assumption that African American political behavior is homogeneous. Counter to some of the accepted theories of political science, I have also demonstrated that African American authoritarians are less likely to agree their individual fate is linked to their racial identity, African American political behavior is not always more liberal than Whites, and African American worldviews and political behaviors, when viewed through the lens of authoritarianism, are quite often heterogeneous and differentiated.

Based on these findings, I contend that any theory of authoritarianism must include African Americans in its analysis or, at least, present very persuasive arguments for their exclusion. The fact is that 65 years after Adorno et al.'s (1950) *Authoritarian Personality* was published, the study of authoritarianism finds itself once again at a crossroads. Authoritarianism was originally conceived as a universal personality trait whose scope recognized no cultural, racial, geographic, or political boundaries. But the central

theories of authoritarian activation and polarization today are predicated on data that exclude the most authoritarian racial group in America – African Americans – from analysis.

It is time for political science to revise the contemporary research on authoritarianism to include African Americans. This is not an abstract exercise. It is a theoretical necessity. The result will not only improve the study of authoritarianism; it will also advance the broader inquiry that is political science as some of the discipline's theoretical certainties become shibboleths, the collateral damage of an empirical inquiry into American Authoritarianism in Black and White.

What contributions do the examination of my core question and the resulting addition of African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism make to political science? There are at least six.

First, my investigation takes the study of authoritarianism back to its universal roots. By adding African Americans back into this important realm of inquiry, I explore issues and concerns not considered by contemporary scholars. As such, my inquiry is corrective. It acknowledges key scholarly works already completed while underscoring the importance of including African Americans in analyses to deepen and refine our understanding of American authoritarians.

Second, defining six components of the authoritarian worldview and using them to explore similarities and differences between the worldviews of White and African Americans is a unique approach. Using these six components to identify issues that should theoretically engage authoritarians and then comparing the attitudes of White and African American authoritarians on these issues tills new empirical ground.

My examination of the congruency of worldview and attitudes among White and African American authoritarians expands on Kinder and Winter's critical insights on the racial divide (1996; Kinder & Winter, 2001). To review, Kinder and Winter found that differences of opinions between Whites and Blacks were driven by particular principles – not linked fate (in-group identification) or racial resentment (out-group resentment) – and limited to race and social welfare issue domains.

Building on this work, I asked whether congruence on worldview principles among Whites and Blacks (the principles that comprise the authoritarian worldview) leads to similarities in opinions on issues that engage the authoritarian predisposition. I demonstrated that when African Americans' authoritarian worldview is engaged and the issue at hand does not cross into race and social welfare domains, the attitudes of White and Black authoritarians are, most often, similar.

My third contribution is the conceptualization of authoritarianism as a shield people use to protect themselves from real and imagined threat. This builds on recent research that found, "Authoritarianism is, in part, a response to [societal] rejection associated with stigma" (Brandt & Henry, 2012, p. 1301). And it leads to a concept that is unlikely to be articulated or even explored by contemporary studies of authoritarianism that exclude African Americans and other minorities from their analysis. I call this concept the Irony of Intolerance. It links directly to Stenner's (2005) important authoritarian dynamic theory. Here is how it works.

Threat to norms activates authoritarians and authoritarian aggression. This is Stenner's (2005) authoritarian dynamic theory. Those who feel threatened and stigmatized by activated authoritarians act to protect themselves. They meet authoritarian



threats and stigmatization with their own authoritarian response. This is what I call the Authoritarian Shield. The result is a cycle of aggression and response leading to greater authoritarian behavior among in-groups and the groups they stigmatize. This cycle is the Irony of Intolerance.

While the label Authoritarian Shield is new, the theory on which it is based is not. In 1957, in a forgotten or ignored study, C. U. Smith and Prothro (1957) advanced it to explain the higher levels of authoritarianism they found among Blacks in the South. Their insight offers a possible theoretical explanation for the prevalence of African American authoritarianism that I look forward to developing in future years.

Fourth, as I alluded to earlier, bringing African Americans back into the study of authoritarianism challenges some accepted theories, builds on others, and raises new questions that are central to our understanding political behavior and critically important in a world in which authoritarianism is on the rise.

For example, my findings challenge the Black utility heuristic and the findings of those scholars who contend that African Americans' political behavior is monolithic. Empirically, it is not. Whether considering African Americans' political worldviews, behaviors, or chosen identities, it is clear their opinions, attitudes, and group identifications are simply not homogeneous.

My results refute the newly advanced claim that the child-rearing questions on which the authoritarian scale is based are variant. When "both" is simply omitted as a response option, the questions are invariant and excellent estimators of authoritarianism.

And my research also qualifies but supports the theory that authoritarianism is the causal agent behind American political polarization. With data pooled from 20 years of

polling and African Americans added to the analysis, I find the authoritarian-driven political polarization theorized by Hetherington and Weiler (2009) is slower than what they found but still extant with or without the inclusion of African Americans.

I believe it may simply take longer for authoritarians to find their way into the Republican Party than Hetherington and Weiler (2009) expected. Or, quite possibly, the right event may not yet have come along to catalyze the sorting more completely. Perhaps the candidacy of Donald Trump will be the precipitating event that spurs a partisan realignment driven by authoritarianism. In either case, the 2016 election provides an important laboratory and impetus for further study of authoritarianism in American politics.

My fifth contribution is to raise a caution – a warning flag – that at a minimum contemporary scholars whose work appears to make universal claims about authoritarianism but whose methods focus on just one or more racial group must either explicitly qualify their findings or provide compelling reasons for excluding what will soon comprise the majority of Americans. If a methodological choice is made to focus on one subgroup, that choice must be thoroughly explained and the universality of the findings resulting from it qualified. As such, Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) contention that nonauthoritarians become more authoritarian when confronting physical threats – and Stenner's (2005) theory of the authoritarian dynamic – forfeit claims to universality because African Americans and (in Stenner's work) Latinos are excluded from the analysis.

Theoretically, authoritarianism has always been conceptualized as a universal condition. It is not limited to Europeans or Whites. Authoritarianism does not

discriminate. It is a predisposition that is found in every culture and among all races. Bringing African Americans back into the scholarly discussion of American authoritarianism is not a luxury; it is a scientific necessity.

The inclusion of Black in analyses of authoritarianism in America yields a sixth contribution to political science – some specific findings that I briefly summarize next. To start, I find that while the worldviews of White and African American authoritarians are remarkably similar, the worldviews of African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are quite different, underscoring the heterogeneity of African Americans attitudes and behaviors.

In terms of political behavior, an analysis of 12 national polls spanning 22 years reveals that White and African American authoritarians hold remarkably similar views on a bevy of issues that are theorized to activate authoritarianism, including the rights of gays and lesbians, the role of immigrants and immigration in America, the use of force and American power, the importance of first amendment rights in a threatening environment, the religious and civil rights of Muslims, and even the legalization of marijuana.

These findings contradict the conventional scholarly tenet that African Americans and Whites “disagree consistently and often substantially” on national policy issues (Kinder & Winter, 2001, p. 439). As with worldview, it is African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians who are statistically dissimilar on these issues. Moreover, many of these issues are the key wedge concerns identified by Hetherington and Weiler that are thought to be the causal force behind polarization in America.

I also demonstrate that authoritarianism is consistently more prevalent among African Americans than Whites, adding empirical heft to Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) assertion that "African Americans are the most authoritarian racial group by far" (p. 141). And by bringing African Americans back into the analysis of authoritarianism, I begin to establish that threat is not a one-size-fits-all concept and should not be treated as such theoretically. Some threats are symmetric and perceived equally by White and Blacks, such as the threat to person and family from terrorism. Other threats are asymmetric and perceived differently by Whites and Blacks, such as the fear of losing a job, worries about neighborhood safety, or fears of local police.

Finally, my dissertation underscores the danger of making sweeping, empirically unproven assumptions about the attitudes and behaviors of particular people and groups. For too long, some political scientists have assumed that African Americans are a homogenous and monolithically behaving group. Nothing could be further from the truth. Race is not the sole identity that governs the behavior of African Americans – or Whites for that matter – just as ethnicity is not the only identity that determines the attitudes of Latinos. People possess multiple identities that influence their political attitudes and behavior. The key question is which identity or identities are activated or predominate before an attitude is expressed.

In terms of African Americans, when their racial identity is fully engaged, certain behaviors will result. Thus, as Kinder and Winter (2001) argue, when issues of race or social welfare are on the table, African Americans' racial identity will govern and produce what has been categorized as liberal, homogeneous responses. However, when issues that engage only the authoritarian worldview are under discussion, the behaviors of

African American authoritarians and nonauthoritarians will be heterogeneous – and the attitudes of White and Black authoritarians will be similar.

Identity activation and the relative importance or hierarchy of activated identities are the fundamental drivers of individual behavior, not the theoretically static and broad brush concept of racial identity. And as identities go, authoritarianism is a potent player.

The fact is authoritarianism is a powerful force that structures not only the way some White Americans behave, but also the way many African Americans think and act politically. The widely held assumption that African American opinion is homogeneous and that African Americans have no choice but to embrace their identity as a member of a racially-stereotyped underclass is simply wrong.

The authoritarianism of African Americans matters. In many cases, it is not trumped by racial identity. Exploring African Americans authoritarianism and understanding how, when, and under what conditions authoritarianism shapes the behavior of all Americans, including African Americans, is an important undertaking for anyone concerned about securing the future of democracy in the United States.

## **APPENDICES**

### **APPENDIX A**

#### **THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THREAT AND AUTHORITARIANISM**

Whether it activates authoritarians (Stenner, 2005) or causes nonauthoritarians to behave like authoritarians (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009), threat is a powerful shaper of authoritarian behavior. But when it comes to threat, one size does not fit all. Racial differences in authoritarian behavior may be explained by asymmetrically perceived or experienced threats. And over time, threat and the psychological furies that accompany it may have differentially increased African Americans predisposition to authoritarianism.

Authoritarian behavior is antithetical to democracy (Fromm, 1994; Stenner, 2005). When exacerbated by clear and present threat, it can put democratic ideals (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011) and democracy itself at risk (Merolla & Zechmeister, 2009). It may be behind the partisan polarization in America today (Hetherington, 2009; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). It may also be influencing the candidates for President, U.S. Senate (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009) and the House of Representative for whom some voters cast their votes.

The potential attitudinal and behavioral consequences of threat-driven authoritarianism form an important and full research agenda. In this chapter, I hope to move that agenda a small step forward by broadening the scope of inquiry of one important new theory of authoritarian behavior – Hetherington and Weiler (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) negative interaction thesis.

I ask if their theory that a negative interaction exists between threat and authoritarianism is universal or threat specific. In other words, when confronted by threat

do nonauthoritarians always act more authoritarian and, Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) keen insight, is the "effect of threat" always the "largest on the less authoritarian and smallest on the more authoritarian" (p. 553)?

The implications of Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) theory are quite important. The possibility that threat always elicits a more authoritarian response from nonauthoritarians than authoritarians has significant political and policy implications. It also raises numerous concerns about the ability of states and societies to maintain democratic institutions and protect liberties when confronted by external and internal threats. For if threat always causes nonauthoritarians to demand authoritarian solutions and act more authoritarian than the most authoritarian among us, then the pillars on which democracy rests stand on a thixotropic foundation whose support liquefies when faced with threat.

I contend, however, that a negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism is threat specific and not universal. Thus, there will be certain threats that do not cause a more authoritarian reaction in nonauthoritarians than authoritarians.

To test this hypothesis, I use the national identity card question from the LAPOP 2008 survey (one of the questions used by Hetherington and Suhay [2011] in their work) and change the threat variable specified to determine if different threats do indeed produce different outcomes that are counter to the expectations of the negative interaction theory. The threat used by Hetherington and Suhay on this question was the personal fear of terrorism, which I demonstrated earlier affects African and White Americans symmetrically. In what follows, I replace the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by

police, which is perceived asymmetrically by African and White Americans.<sup>156</sup> Both of these threats appear in the national identity card question wording. Conveniently, perceptions of these threats are also estimated in different questions asked of LAPOP 2008 survey respondents, enabling a comparison of the different interaction of these threats with authoritarianism and the dependent variable – support for a national identity card.

The exploration of the universality of a negative interaction between threat and authoritarianism begins with a review of Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) theory that is followed by a test of my hypothesis. I find that the negative interaction thesis is specific to the threat specified and not universal.

### **The Negative Interaction Theory**

Hetherington and Suhay (2011) submit that in the presence of normative or physical threat it is nonauthoritarians who become more aggressive and authoritarian, while authoritarians, already in a state of heightened vigilance born from anxiety, have “little place to travel in terms of their opinions” (p. 547).<sup>157</sup> Thus, in the presence of mortal physical threat or moral normative danger, nonauthoritarians become more aggressive and behave more like authoritarians.

The statistical implications and behavioral ramifications of Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) negative interaction theory are

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<sup>156</sup>The question used to estimate this variable asks (using a seven point scale) whether respondents trust or do not trust the police. The scale ranges from “do not trust at all” to “trust a lot.” In my analysis, I consider those who do not trust the police at all fear them while those who trust the police a lot do not fear them.

<sup>157</sup> Statistically, “authoritarianism has a very large [substantive] effect when people perceive less threat...[but when people] express feeling high levels of threat, knowing whether a person is authoritarian or not provides no guidance” to behavior (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009).



clear. When threat and authoritarian independent variables' signs are positive and combined in an interaction term, the sign of the resulting interaction term will be negative, indicating an inverse relationship between the effect of threat and authoritarianism on the dependent variable in question. Ironically, then, when normative and corporeal threats rise in salience, Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) theory predicts that the increasing public demand for authoritarian action, including actions like the abridgement of civil rights and the use of force internally and externally, emanates from nonauthoritarians who are alerted to the danger, not authoritarians. It is nonauthoritarians who become more aggressive in the presence of physical and normative threat, while authoritarians, already chronically near the apex of aggressive behavior, have much less room for their aggressiveness to grow.

Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) theory is founded on the assumption that authoritarians and nonauthoritarians are not only moved differently by threat, but also perceive threat in a different way. Authoritarians stuck in a perpetual state of hypervigilance feel threatened constantly. Compared to authoritarians, nonauthoritarians are less likely to feel threatened. As such, when threat has not been primed, authoritarians – no matter what their race – will be statistically more fearful of normative and physical threats than nonauthoritarians. On the other hand, when threat has been primed, nonauthoritarians' reaction to threat will resemble the aggressive response of authoritarians. In this circumstance, threat will be a more important variable for explaining behavior than authoritarianism.

In testing their negative interaction theory, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) operationalize threat in two ways. Normative threat is estimated from two questions on

the standard ANES moral traditionalist battery that they argue get to the root of normative threat (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Hunter, 1992; Layman, 2001).<sup>158</sup>

Hetherington and Weiler call this the moral threat posed by “Newer Lifestyles.”

Physical threat is estimated using a question that personalizes it and links threat to a prevalent concern. Hetherington and Suhay (2011) use, “How worried are you that you personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?”<sup>159</sup> to measure physical threat.

The variable is labeled in their data tables: “Perceived Threat from Terrorism” (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011, p. 551).

Both threats are combined with authoritarianism to produce independent variables that account for the interaction between authoritarianism and normative threat or authoritarianism and physical threat on different dependent variables.<sup>i</sup> The graphs of predicted probabilities that result, which are displayed in Chapter 6 of Hetherington and Weiler’s book (2009) and in Hetherington and Suhay’s (2011) paper that appeared in the *American Journal of Political Science* comport with their theoretical expectations. Nonauthoritarians who are the most threatened by normative or physical threats to personal safety act more authoritarian than the most threatened authoritarians.

### **Negative Interaction Theory Reexamined**

The list of clear and present physical threats to personal safety and well-being, however, are certainly not limited to terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 4, the LAPOP 2008 survey, one of the datasets used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011) to assess the personal, physical dimension of their negative interaction theory, offers three other

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<sup>158</sup> The two questions used to scale perceptions of normative threat are: 1. “The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes,” and 2. “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.” The two omitted questions focus on the rights of gays and lesbians.

<sup>159</sup> Wording from the 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study – CCES.

measurements of physical threat that may be both more immediate and hit closer to home than terrorism for many Americans. The survey asked respondents whether they worried about losing their job, the safety of their neighborhood, and the trustworthiness of the police. As was demonstrated earlier, racial differences exist between authoritarians and nonauthoritarians perceptions of threat on each of these questions. These differences run counter to Hetherington and Weiler's (2009) and Hetherington and Suhay's (2011) assumptions and are not observed when analyzing the threats ("Newer Lifestyles" and terrorism) they used to examine their negative interaction theory. The different perceptions of these three threats lead to an obvious question: What are the implications for the negative interaction theory when a physical threat other than terrorism is estimated?

Again, I expect that in the presence of a different threat a negative interaction between authoritarianism and threat will not exist. Thus, the attitudes of those who perceive the threat similarly will vary according to their estimated authoritarianism and, as a consequence, nonauthoritarians who feel most threatened will not react in a more authoritarian manner than authoritarians who also feel most threatened.

To explore this hypothesis, I turn to one of the dependent variables from the LAPOP 2008 survey used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011) (the national identity card question) and replace the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by the police<sup>160</sup> to ascertain whether the negative interaction thesis is universal or idiomatic to the threat specified.

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<sup>160</sup> The fear of police is estimated from a question on the LAPOP 2008 survey that asks how much people trust police. The answer scale is seven points. It is hypothesized that those who do not trust police at all fear them.

Two potential threats – terrorism and police – appear in the wording of this question.<sup>161</sup> In their analysis, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) multiply authoritarianism by terrorist threat to produce an interaction term.<sup>162</sup> As predicted, their regression model finds a negative interaction between authoritarianism and terrorism threat variables, and the predicted probability graphs generated from the data demonstrate that differing perceptions of threat have less effect on authoritarians than nonauthoritarians

In my analysis, I replace the threat of terrorism with the threat posed by the police<sup>163</sup> and estimate predicted probabilities of African American support for the national identity card as authoritarianism, fear of police, and the resulting interaction term are varied across their ranges and all other independent variables, including partisanship, age, religiosity, sex and education are held at their mean values.<sup>164</sup> The graph resulting from this predicted probability analysis is the opposite of what the negative interaction theory predicts (Figure 64).

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<sup>161</sup> The question asks: “To curb terrorism, how strongly would you agree or disagree (on a 7-point scale) to requiring that all citizens carry a national identity card at all times to show a police officer on request?”

<sup>162</sup> The question in the LAPOP 2008 survey reads: “How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism?” The questions Hetherington and Suhay (2011) use to specify the personal, physical threat embodied by terrorism in their article on threat and authoritarians have different question wordings and response scales. In the 2006 CCES the question asks: “How worried are you that you personally might become a victim of a terrorist attack?” Possible answers are offered on a 4-point scale that ranges from “Not Worried at All” to “Very Worried.” The 2008 LAPOP survey question responses range from “Not at All” to “A Lot” and are arrayed across a 7-point scale. The survey question wording is also somewhat different than the 2006 CCES question. Hetherington and Suhay note that the mean threat responses from the different questions with different answer scales in the two surveys were quite similar – a .33 mean for the 2006 CCES and a .30 mean for the 2008 LAPOP question.

<sup>163</sup> The fear of police is estimated from a question on the LAPOP 2008 survey that asks how much people trust police. The answer scale is seven points. It is hypothesized that those who do not trust police at all fear them.

<sup>164</sup> This is the approach used by Hetherington and Suhay (2011).




Figure 64: African Americans' support for National Identity Card.

Instead of threat having a minimal effect on authoritarians and its maximum effect on nonauthoritarians as the negative interaction theory predicts, the opposite occurs.

Nonauthoritarian African Americans who feel more threatened by police do not act more authoritarian than African American authoritarians. Support for the national identity card varies with authoritarianism. Authoritarianism structures support for the national identity card, not threat.

Using the same statistical approach, in which threat, authoritarianism and the interaction term vary across their ranges and other independent variable are held at their means, to generate predicted probabilities of support for a national identity card among White voters produces a second graph that is also antithetical to the expectation of the negative interaction theory (Figure 65).




Figure 65: White Americans' support for National Identity Card.

When the perception of threat is held constant across the authoritarian scale, the more authoritarian a person is, the more likely that person is to support a national identity card.

### Conclusion

In the important realm of personal physical threats, the negative interaction theory is not universal. The nature of each personal threat and how the threat is perceived determines if nonauthoritarians actually behave more like authoritarians and whether authoritarians concern about a threat is already at it apex or not.

## APPENDIX B

### NATIONAL SURVEYS USED IN THIS DISSERTATION

Table 19

National surveys used in this dissertation

Survey Dataset	Sample Description	Method
1 American National Election Studies, 1992 Time Series Study Warren E. Miller, Donald R. Kinder, Steven J. Rosenstone, and the National Election Studies.	3284 total eligible respondents, including 1769 respondents previously interviewed in the 1990 ANES (1992 panel respondents) 1515 additional respondents (new cross-section cases) 2485 completed pre-election interviews (1359 panel, 1126 new) 2255 completed post-election reinterviews (1250 panel, 1005 new)	Telephone interview
2 American National Election Studies, The 2000 Time Series Study University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies	2984 total eligible respondents (cross section, all fresh cases) 1807 completed pre-election interviews 1555 completed post-election reinterviews	Face-to-face and telephone
3 The National Election Studies, The ANES 2004 Time Series Study University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies	1833 total eligible respondents (cross section, all fresh cases) 1211 completed pre-election interviews 1066 completed post-election reinterviews	Face-to-face
4 The National Election Studies, The ANES 2008 Time Series Study University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies	2322 completed pre-election interviews (cross section, all fresh cases) 2102 completed post-election reinterviews	Face-to-face and ACASI (Audio Computer-Assisted Self Interviewing)
5 The American National Election Studies, The ANES 2010-2012 Evaluations of Government and Society Study (EGSS), EGSS 1 Survey University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies	1189 respondents (cross section, all fresh cases)	Internet
6 The American National Election Studies, The ANES 2012 Time Series Study Stanford University and the University of Michigan	2054 respondents (face-to-face, cross section, 2 oversamples, all fresh cases) 3860 respondents (internet, cross section, internet panel group)	Face-to-face, CASI and Internet
7 The 2006 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, Vanderbilt University Module	36000 respondents (Common Content) 1000 respondents (Vanderbilt Team Content)	Internet
8 The 2008 AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Vanderbilt University	1500 respondents	Internet
9 The 2012 AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Vanderbilt University	1500 respondents	Internet
10 Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race and Sexuality (WISER), 2011 Survey University of Washington	1512 respondents	Telephone
11 The 2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, University of Massachusetts Module	2500 respondents (University of Massachusetts Team)	Internet
12 2015 National Poll of Registered Voters, University of Massachusetts (Sponsor) Matthew C. MacWilliams, Researcher	1911 respondents	Internet

## APPENDIX C

### ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 20

Incidence of authoritarianism in African and White Americans over time as measured by the four-question, child-rearing scale.

<i>Survey</i>	<i>Year</i>	African American Authoritarian %	<i>Sample Size</i>	White American Authoritarians %	<i>Sample Size</i>
American National Election Studies, 1992	1992	42.01	<i>N</i> =269	16.02	<i>N</i> =1692
American National Election Studies, 2000	2000	31.45	<i>N</i> =159	12.40	<i>N</i> =1,226
The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), United States, 2008	2008	32.68	<i>N</i> =153	16.85	<i>N</i> =1,092
American National Election Studies, 2008	2008	39.20	<i>N</i> =523	17.07	<i>N</i> =1,084
Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race and Sexuality, 2011	2011	32.84	<i>N</i> =341	7.57	<i>N</i> =872
American National Election Studies, 2012	2012	36.30	<i>N</i> =945	16.71	<i>N</i> =3,243
Cooperative Congressional Election Study, 2014	2014	29.31	<i>N</i> =232	16.83	<i>N</i> =1,515
<i>Note:</i> Authoritarians are those scoring 1 on the child rearing scale where "0" is Not At All Authoritarian and "1" is Completely Authoritarian					

Table 21

Mean authoritarian scores for African Americans and White Americans

0 is Nonauthoritarian and 1 is Authoritarian							
	1992 ANES	2000 ANES	2008 LAPOP	2008 ANES	2011 WISER	2012 ANES	2014 UMASS CCES
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
African Americans	<b>0.5601</b>	<b>0.5601</b>	0.7173	0.7756	0.7056	0.7405	0.6929
White Americans	<b>0.7083</b>	<b>0.7083</b>	0.5476	0.5962	0.4839	0.564	0.5383
Difference of Means	<b>0.1483</b>	<b>0.1483</b>	<b>0.2052</b>	<b>0.1181</b>	<b>0.1181</b>	<b>0.2440</b>	0.1546
<i>P-value</i>	<b>&lt;0.0001</b>	<b>&lt;0.0001</b>	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	<b>518</b>	<b>518</b>	1,245	1,607	1,213	4,188	1,747
<i>Sources:</i> American National Election Studies 1992, 2000, 2008, and 2012, Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011, The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), United States, 2008, UMASS Cooperative Congressional Election Survey, 2014.							
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.							



Table 22

African Americans' mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale

0 is Least Racially Resentful and 1 is Most Racially Resentful						
	1992 ANES	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2008 ANES	2011 WISER	2012 ANES
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	0.2453	0.3689	0.3077	0.4614	0.2726	0.3506
Authoritarians	0.3842	0.4615	0.4312	0.4940	0.3832	0.4151
Difference of Means	0.1389	0.0926	0.1235	0.0326	0.1106	0.0644
<i>P-value, one tailed</i>	0.0008	0.0079	0.0269	0.0883	0.0115	0.0157
<i>P-value, two tailed</i>	0.0016	0.0157	0.0538	0.1766	0.0230	0.0314
<i>N</i>	209	106	122	346	717	719

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality, 2011.  
 Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Table 23

White Americans' mean scores on Racial Resentment Scale

Where 0 is Least Racially Resentful and 1 is Most Racially Resentful						
	1992 ANES	2000 ANES	2004 ANES	2008 ANES	2011 WISER	2012 ANES
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	0.5139	0.5684	0.5036	0.5909	0.4764	0.5272
Authoritarians	0.6631	0.7057	0.7088	0.7095	0.7204	0.7360
Difference of Means	0.1493	0.1373	0.2052	0.1186	0.2440	0.2088
<i>P-value</i>	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	1186	840	501	743	430	2377

Sources: 1992, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys and Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.  
 Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.

Table 24

## Racial resentment

Where 0 is the Least Racially Resentment and 1 is the Most				
	African Americans	White Americans	African Americans	White Americans
	2011 WISER	2011 WISER	2012 ANES	2012 ANES
Authoritarianism	0.156 ***	0.237 ****	0.090 ***	0.194 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.055	0.034	0.028	0.013
Gender	0.005	-0.011	0.026 *	-0.015 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.031	0.018	0.015	0.007
Age	-0.167 **	-0.031	-0.002 ***	0.000 **
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.078	0.044	0.001	0.000
Education	-0.047 ****	-0.027 ***	-0.026 ****	0.030
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.013	0.008	0.007	0.003
Party Identification	0.014	0.045 ****	0.021 ****	0.042
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.011	0.004	0.006	0.002
Church Attendance	-0.021	-0.001	0.017	-0.041 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.032	0.020	0.017	0.009
<i>Intercept</i>	0.515	0.468	0.442	0.481
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.088	0.053	0.041	0.020
R-Squared	0.11	0.27	0.06	0.28
N	283	707	908	3166
Source: American National Election Studies 2012 & Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.				
Note: All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 25

Linked fate

1 is Fate is Linked A Lot, 2 is Some, 3 is Not Much and 4 is Not At All		
		African Americans
Authoritarianism		1.491 ****
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.410
Gender		0.485 **
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.23
Age		-0.173
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.135
Education		-0.186 **
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.091
Party Identification		0.099
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.074
Church Attendance		-0.053
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.23
<i>Cut 1</i>		-0.271
<i>Cut 2</i>		0.963
<i>Cut 3</i>		1.744
Count R2		0.42
Adjusted Count R2		0.06
N		299
<i>Source:</i> Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.		
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.		
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001		




Figure 66: Linked fate among African Americans.

Table 26

Linked fate 2012

1 is Fate is Linked A Lot, 2 is Some, 3 is Not Much, and 4 is Not At All		
		African Americans
Authoritarianism		0.823 ***
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.245
Gender		0.568 ****
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.127
Age		-0.002
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.004
Education		-0.136 **
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.057
Party Identification		0.109 **
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.049
Church Attendance		0.209
	<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.144
<i>Cut 1</i>		-0.412
<i>Cut 2</i>		1.167
<i>Cut 3</i>		1.449
Count R2		0.40
Adjusted Count R2		0.07
N		899
<i>Source:</i> American National Election Studies 2012.		
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.		
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001		

Table 27

## Fear of personal, physical threat from terrorism by racial group

On 0 to 1 Scale where 0 is Not Worried At All and 1 is Worried A Lot				
	African Americans		White Americans	
Authoritarianism	1.382	**	0.841	****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.582		0.191	
Gender	-0.171		0.412	****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.307		0.115	
Age	-0.051		0.156	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.190		0.063	
Party Identification	0.049		0.066	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.094		0.027	
Education	-0.147		-0.041	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.109		0.039	
Church Attendance	-0.388		0.367	***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.320		0.133	
<i>Cut 1</i>	-0.623		0.156	
<i>Cut 2</i>	0.445		1.232	
<i>Cut 3</i>	0.951		1.958	
<i>Cut 4</i>	1.927		2.831	
<i>Cut 5</i>	2.577		3.678	
<i>Cut 6</i>	3.025		4.460	
Count R2	0.322		0.318	
Adjusted Count R2	0.038		-0.004	
N	149		1042	
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using Ordinal Logistic regression.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 28

Authoritarians and moral traditionalism (2008 ANES and 2012 ANES data)

On 0 to 1 Scale where 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional								
	African Americans		White Americans		African Americans		White Americans	
	2008 ANES		2008 ANES		2012 ANES		2012 ANES	
Authoritarianism	0.108 ***		0.128 ****		0.118 ****		0.199 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.034		0.023		0.022		0.012	
Gender	-0.063		-0.171 ****		0.003		0.006	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.044		0.029		0.016		0.007	
Age	0.009		0.051 ****		0.002 ****		0.003 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.009		0.007		0.000		0.000	
Education	0.010 *		-0.002		0.006		-0.009 ***	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.006		0.004		0.005		0.003	
Party Identification	0.002		0.031 ****		0.010 **		0.047 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.006		0.003		0.004		0.002	
Church Attendance	0.101 ****		0.106 ****		0.075 ****		0.12 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.018		0.015		0.013		0.008	
<i>Intercept</i>	0.37		0.284		0.299		0.129	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.049		0.031		0.032		0.019	
R-Squared	0.12		0.31		0.11		0.42	
N	487		1025		914		3168	
<i>Source:</i> 2008 and 2012 American National Election Studies surveys.								
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.								
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001								

Table 29

Authoritarians and moral traditionalism when authoritarianism and church attendance are both estimated across a five-point scale

On 0 to 1 Scale where 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional			
	African Americans		White Americans
	2008 ANES		2008 ANES
Authoritarianism	0.105 ***		0.116 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.034		0.023
Gender	-0.055		-0.16 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.044		0.029
Age	0.012		0.05 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.009		0.007
Education	0.009 *		-0.005
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.006		0.004
Party Identification	0.003		0.029 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.006		0.003
Church Attendance	-0.032 ****		-0.035 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.005		0.004
<i>Intercept</i>	0.488		0.453
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.051		0.037
R-Squared	0.12		0.33
N	487		1025
<i>Source:</i> 2008 American National Election Studies survey.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			



Table 30

Authoritarians and moral traditionalism with party identification omitted from the model

On 0 to 1 Scale where 0 is Least Traditional and 1 is Most Traditional			
	African Americans		White Americans
	2008 ANES		2008 ANES
Authoritarianism	0.106 ***		0.140 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.033		0.023
Gender	-0.054		-0.186 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.043		0.029
Age	0.012		0.048 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.009		0.007
Education	0.008 *		-0.001
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.006		0.004
Party Identification	omitted		omitted
<i>Std. Err.</i>	omitted		omitted
Church Attendance	-0.032 ****		-0.042 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.005		0.004
<i>Intercept</i>	0.495		0.545
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.050		0.038
R-Squared	0.12		0.327
N	497		1034
<i>Source:</i> 2008 American National Election Studies survey.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 31

Struggle between good and evil in the world and people must choose

7 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 is Strongly Agree			
	African Americans		White Americans
Authoritarianism	2.416 ****		1.542 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.602		0.197
Gender	0.247		0.124
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.326		0.115
Age	-0.195		1.604 ****
<i>Education</i>	0.758		0.248
Education	-0.248 **		-0.134 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.116		0.039
Party Identification	0.013		0.277 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.010		0.028
Church Attendance	0.683 **		0.740 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.330		0.137
<i>Cut 1</i>	-0.930		-0.241
<i>Cut 2</i>	-0.219		0.320
<i>Cut 3</i>	0.303		0.845
<i>Cut 4</i>	1.211		1.717
<i>Cut 5</i>	1.547		2.497
<i>Cut 6</i>	2.337		3.307
Count R2	0.342		0.340
Adjusted Count R2	0.067		0.097
N	149		1042
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 32

## Use science to solve important problems

5 Point Scale Where 1 is Always and 5 is Never			
	African Americans	White Americans	
Authoritarianism	0.443 **	1.503 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.238	0.120	
Gender	0.350 ***	0.551 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.124	0.067	
Age	-0.004	0.010 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.004	0.002	
Education	0.128 **	-351.000 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.057	0.032	
Party Identification	-0.012	0.151 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.048	0.017	
Church Attendance	0.304 **	0.197 **	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.143	0.083	
<i>Cut 1</i>	-1.293	-1.383	
<i>Cut 2</i>	-0.131	0.775	
<i>Cut 3</i>	0.932	1.843	
<i>Cut 4</i>	3.624	4.779	
Count R2	0.406	0.436	
Adjusted Count R2	0.002	0.150	
N	904	3127	
<i>Source:</i> American National Election Studies 2012.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression model. The p-value for authoritarianism used is one-tailed because the hypothesized direction of the effect of authoritarianism on the dependent variable was clearly stated.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 33

## African Americans – trust of government and institutions

7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot				
	Congress	Government In Washington	Political Parties	President
Authoritarianism	1.390 **	1.946 ***	1.719 ***	2.104 ***
Std. Err.	0.587	0.603	0.595	0.738
Gender	-0.465	-0.022	0.178	-0.181
Std. Err.	0.324	0.318	0.321	0.349
Age	-0.187	-0.033	-0.055	0.476
Std. Err.	0.761	0.774	0.753	0.861
Education	-0.093	-0.078	-0.032	-0.140
Std. Err.	0.113	0.110	0.114	0.130
Party Identification	-0.307 ***	-0.011	-0.375 ****	0.434 ****
Std. Err.	0.097	0.095	0.102	0.109
Church Attendance	0.393	0.457	0.773 **	0.287
Std. Err.	0.331	0.324	0.337	0.359
Cut 1	-1.61	0.479	-0.789	2.150
Cut 2	-0.660	1.269	0.328	2.878
Cut 3	0.106	1.999	1.473	3.377
Cut 4	1.704	3.131	3.168	4.016
Cut 5	2.313	4.414	4.526	4.912
Cut 6	4.601	6.414	5.667	7.253
Count R2	0.336	0.349	0.349	0.604
Adjusted Count R2	0.039	0.030	0.102	0.017
N	149	149	149	149
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 34

## White Americans – trust of government and institutions

7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot)				
	Congress	Government In Washington	Political Parties	President
Authoritarianism	0.153	0.502 ***	0.314 *	0.893 ****
Std. Err.	0.186	0.190	0.187	0.201
Gender	0.418 ****	0.233 **	0.209 *	0.020
Std. Err.	0.113	0.113	0.113	0.119
Age	-0.711 ***	-0.373	-0.16	0.494 **
Std. Err.	0.237	0.237	0.236	0.251
Education	0.028	0.033	0.021	0.032
Std. Err.	0.038	0.038	0.038	0.041
Party Identification	-0.105 ****	0.099 ****	-0.052 *	0.619 ****
Std. Err.	0.027	0.027	0.027	0.033
Church Attendance	0.109	0.282 **	0.447 ***	0.464 ***
Std. Err.	0.131	0.132	0.135	0.136
Cut 1	-1.707	-0.499	-0.981	1.882
Cut 2	-0.711	0.391	-0.073	2.541
Cut 3	0.094	1.136	0.805	3.08
Cut 4	1.182	2.153	1.984	3,817
Cut 5	2.663	3.528	3.754	4.696
Cut 6	4.277	5.464	6.118	5.990
Count R2	0.240	0.244	0.259	0.430
Adjusted Count R2	0.014	0.021	0.037	0.119
N	1043	1043	1040	1043
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 35

African Americans – trust of government and institutions with ideology added into the model

7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot				
	<i>Congress</i>	<i>Government In Washington</i>	<i>Political Parties</i>	<i>President</i>
Authoritarianism	2.155 ***	2.598 ****	2.122 ***	2.493 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.663	0.673	0.665	0.850
Gender	-0.164	0.251	0.226	0.124
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.355	0.353	0.349	0.398
Age	0.121	0.498	0.129	0.506
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.827	0.852	0.817	0.934
Education	-0.196	-0.176	-0.102	-0.310
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.127	0.124	0.125	0.154
Party Identification	-0.184	0.107	-0.232 *	0.574 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.117	0.115	0.125	0.141
Ideology	-0.575 ***	-0.483 **	-0.527 ***	-0.148
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.197	0.201	0.196	0.227
Church Attendance	0.635 *	0.716 **	0.879 **	0.505
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.367	0.357	0.368	0.404
<i>Cut 1</i>	-1.964	0.332	-1.372	2.203
<i>Cut 2</i>	-0.863	1.266	-0.074	3.020
<i>Cut 3</i>	-0.109	2.084	1.209	3.509
<i>Cut 4</i>	1.628	3.340	2.89	4.212
<i>Cut 5</i>	2.177	4.46	4.139	4.992
<i>Cut 6</i>	4.434	6.361	5.121	7.261
Count R2	0.362	0.362	0.346	0.638
Adjusted Count R2	0.080	0.047	0.126	0.042
N	127	127	127	127
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 36

White Americans – trust of government and institutions with ideology added into the model

7 Point Scale Where 1 is Do Not Trust At All and 7 is Trust A Lot				
	Congress	Government In Washington	Political Parties	President
Authoritarianism	0.185	0.529 **	0.336 *	0.767 ****
Std. Err.	0.201	0.205	0.203	0.215
Gender	0.394 ***	0.224 *	0.225 *	0.120
Std. Err.	0.120	0.120	0.119	0.127
Age	-0.811 ***	-0.454 *	-0.207	0.391
Std. Err.	0.248	0.249	0.246	0.264
Education	0.032	0.038	0.021	0.031
Std. Err.	0.039	0.039	0.040	0.043
Party Identification	-0.065 *	0.116 ***	-0.013	0.546 ****
Std. Err.	0.036	0.036	0.036	0.041
Ideology	-0.170 **	-0.073	-0.14 *	0.281 ****
Std. Err.	0.131	0.074	0.074	0.078
Church Attendance	0.195	0.34 **	0.541 ****	0.325 **
Std. Err.	0.138	0.139	0.142	0.144
Cut 1	-1.963	-0.591	-1.161	2.167
Cut 2	-0.940	0.306	-0.216	2.838
Cut 3	-0.118	1.071	0.658	3.371
Cut 4	0.966	2.069	1.829	4.074
Cut 5	2.477	3.497	3.541	4.973
Cut 6	4.032	5.281	5.874	6.314
Count R2	0.241	0.243	0.253	0.430
Adjusted Count R2	0.020	0.020	0.037	0.125
N	947	947	945	947
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 37

## African Americans – Presidential power or democratic principles

Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree			
	<i>President: Limit Voice &amp; Vote of Opposition to Insure Progress</i>	<i>President: Govern Without Congress When Congress Hinders Work</i>	<i>President: Ignore Supreme Court When Court Hinders Work</i>
Authoritarianism	1.578 **	1.628 **	1.418 **
Std. Err.	0.623	0.642	0.618
Gender	1.334 ****	1.016 ***	0.366
Std. Err.	0.364	0.363	0.328
Age	1.162	0.460	-0.403
Std. Err.	0.806	0.784	0.775
Education	-0.373 ***	-0.376 ***	-0.280
Std. Err.	0.125	0.128	0.118
Party Identification	-0.056	0.329 ***	0.168 *
Std. Err.	0.100	0.103	0.100
Church Attendance	-0.198 ***	0.004	0.611 *
Std. Err.	0.338	0.340	0.335
<i>Cut 1</i>	0.716	0.885	0.038
<i>Cut 2</i>	1.13	1.40	0.58
<i>Cut 3</i>	1.911	1.914	1.112
<i>Cut 4</i>	3.769	3.001	2.414
<i>Cut 5</i>	5.138	4.084	3.734
<i>Cut 6</i>	5.442	5.178	4.459
Count R2	0.483	0.450	0.362
Adj. Count R <sup>2</sup>	0.115	0.057	0.010
N	149	149	149
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			



Table 38

White Americans – Presidential power or democratic principles

Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree			
	<i>President: Limit Voice &amp; Vote of Opposition to Insure Progress</i>	<i>President: Govern Without Congress When Congress Hinders Work</i>	<i>President: Ignore Supreme Court When Court Hinders Work</i>
Authoritarianism	1.261 ****	1.200 ****	0.964 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.208	0.203	0.198
Gender	0.879 ****	0.777 ****	0.393 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.123	0.121	0.117
Age	-0.287	0.185	0.272
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.252	0.246	0.245
Education	-0.134 ***	-0.162 ****	-0.188 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.042	0.041	0.040
Party Identification	0.19 ****	0.309 ****	0.086 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.029	0.030	0.028
Church Attendance	-0.104	-0.044	0.051
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.140	0.138	0.135
<i>Cut 1</i>	1.044	1.143	0.133
<i>Cut 2</i>	1.50	1.74	0.77
<i>Cut 3</i>	1.933	2.323	1.313
<i>Cut 4</i>	3.357	3.339	2.503
<i>Cut 5</i>	4.683	4.190	3.409
<i>Cut 6</i>	5.308	4.999	4.289
Count R2	0.490	0.442	0.414
Adj. Count R <sup>2</sup>	0.035	0.033	-0.013
N	1042	1042	1041
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 39

## African Americans – majoritarian rule or democratic principles

Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree			
	<i>When People Decide What's Right Must Prevent Minority Opposition</i>	<i>Those Who Disagree With Majority Are a Threat to Country</i>	
Authoritarianism	1.144 **	1.856 ***	
Std. Err.	0.58	0.636	
Gender	0.377	1.053 ***	
Std. Err.	0.322	0.352	
Age	1.391 *	0.476	
Std. Err.	0.760	0.752	
Education	-0.409 ****	-0.562 ****	
Std. Err.	0.117	0.135	
Party Identification	0.148	0.158	
Std. Err.	0.101	0.098	
Church Attendance	0.412	0.434	
Std. Err.	0.325	0.337	
/cut1	-0.548	0.13	
/cut2	-0.124	0.91	
/cut3	0.615	1.59	
/cut4	1.801	2.79	
/cut5	2.76	3.62	
/cut6	3.489	4.40	
Count R2	0.322	0.416	
Adj. Count R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.103	
N	149	149	
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 40

White Americans – majoritarian rule or democratic principles

Seven Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree			
	<i>When People Decide What's Right Must Prevent Minority Opposition</i>		<i>Those Who Disagree With Majority Are a Threat to Country</i>
Authoritarianism	1.491 ****		1.670 ***
Std. Err.	0.195		0.202
Gender	0.478 ****		0.463 ***
Std. Err.	0.116		0.118
Age	0.910 ****		0.983
Std. Err.	0.243		0.245
Education	-0.215 ****		-0.165 ****
Std. Err.	0.039		0.041
Party Identification	0.161 ****		0.161
Std. Err.	0.027		0.028
Church Attendance	-0.054		-0.055
Std. Err.	0.133		0.136
/cut1	0.118		0.838
/cut2	0.784		1.519
/cut3	1.453		2.246
/cut4	2.493		3.399
/cut5	3.41		4.165
/cut6	4.204		4.971
Count R2	0.332		0.392
Adj. Count R <sup>2</sup>	0.05		0.019
N	1042		1042
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an ordinal logistic regression.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 41

African Americans – support for democratic principles

Ten Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disapprove to Strongly Approve				
	<i>Protecting Right to Vote of People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt.</i>	<i>Allowing People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt. To Demonstrate Peacefully</i>	<i>Protecting Right of People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt. To Run for Office</i>	<i>Prohibiting People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt. From Making Speeches on TV</i>
Authoritarianism	-2.799 ***	-1.842 ***	-3.434 ****	-2.585 ***
Std. Err.	0.840	0.693	0.949	0.867
Gender	-0.463	-1.047 ***	-1.257 **	-0.637
Std. Err.	0.459	0.378	0.518	0.473
Age	0.387	0.279	0.353	0.362
Std. Err.	1.098	0.906	1.241	1.133
Education	0.568 ***	0.29 **	0.379	0.224
Std. Err.	0.162	0.134	0.183	0.167
Party Identification	-0.027	-0.179	-0.174	0.018
Std. Err.	0.139	0.114	0.157	0.143
Church Attendance	0.49	0.220	0.254	-0.411
Std. Err.	0.467	0.385	0.527	0.482
Intercept	7.208	9.407	8.310	8.174
Std. Err.	0.999	0.824	1.129	1.030
R-Squared	0.18	0.13	0.15	0.10
N	149	149	149	149
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS regression.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 42

White Americans – support for democratic principles

Ten Point Scale Ranging from Strongly Disapprove to Strongly Approve				
	<i>Protecting Right to Vote of People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt.</i>	<i>Allowing People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt. To Demonstrate Peacefully</i>	<i>Protecting Right of People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt. To Run for Office</i>	<i>Prohibiting People Who Say Bad Things About Am. Govt. From Making Speeches on TV</i>
Authoritarianism	-2.251 ****	-1.618 ****	-2.55 ****	-2.400 ***
Std. Err.	0.290	0.226	0.313	0.285
Gender	-0.449 **	-0.391 ***	-1.186 ****	-0.857
Std. Err.	0.174	0.135	0.188	0.171
Age	-1.290 ****	-1.117 ****	-1.224 ***	-1.844
Std. Err.	0.364	0.283	0.392	0.357
Education	0.165 ***	0.222 ****	0.392 ****	0.298
Std. Err.	0.059	0.046	0.063	0.058
Party Identification	-0.099 **	-0.126 ****	-0.125 ***	-0.133
Std. Err.	0.041	0.032	0.044	0.04
Church Attendance	-0.050	0.317 **	-0.267	-0.096
Std. Err.	0.204	0.159	0.220	0.2
Intercept	9.044	9.297	8.181	8.477
Std. Err.	0.312	0.242	0.335	0.306
R-Squared	0.12	0.15	0.20	0.20
N	1041	1042	1040	1042
Source: The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.				
Note: All estimates produced using an OLS regression.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 43

African Americans – views of “The Other”

Seven Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 7 is Strongly Disagree			
	<i>If Certain Groups Stay in Their Place, We Would Have Fewer Problems</i>	<i>Inferior Groups Should Stay In Their Place</i>	<i>Sometimes Other Groups Must Be Kept In Their Place</i>
Authoritarianism	-2.199 ****	-1.876 ****	-1.613 ***
Std. Err.	0.507	0.513	0.495
Gender	-0.478 *	-0.324	-0.545 **
Std. Err.	0.264	0.262	0.264
Age	0.182	1.093 *	0.661
Std. Err.	0.611	0.619	0.616
Education	0.598 ****	0.590 ****	0.567 ****
Std. Err.	0.105	0.107	0.104
Party Identification	0.039	0.013	-0.022
Std. Err.	0.091	0.089	0.090
Church Attendance	0.061	-0.250	0.098
Std. Err.	0.262	0.264	0.262
<i>Cut 1</i>	-1.284	-0.715	-0.727
<i>Cut 2</i>	-0.968	-0.575	-0.487
<i>Cut 3</i>	-0.692	-0.393	-0.246
<i>Cut 4</i>	-0.318	0.227	0.216
<i>Cut 5</i>	-0.025	0.498	0.491
<i>Cut 6</i>	0.277	0.753	0.628
Count R2	0.644	0.649	0.650
Adjusted Count R2	0.035	0.027	0.028
N	306	305	305
<i>Source:</i> Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 44

White Americans – view of “The Other”

Seven Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 7 is Strongly Disagree			
	<i>If Certain Groups Stay in Their Place, We Would Have Fewer Problems</i>	<i>Inferior Groups Should Stay In Their Place</i>	<i>Sometimes Other Groups Must Be Kept In Their Place</i>
Authoritarianism	-1.583 ****	-1.749 ****	-1.557 ****
Std. Err.	0.281	0.295	0.279
Gender	0.142	0.109	0.071
Std. Err.	0.146	0.154	0.144
Age	-0.695 **	-0.501	-0.650 *
Std. Err.	0.347	0.362	0.347
Education	0.312 ****	0.259 ****	0.372 ****
Std. Err.	0.065	0.067	0.064
Party Identification	-0.100 ***	-0.059 *	-0.067 **
Std. Err.	0.034	0.035	0.033
Church Attendance	-0.162	-0.091	-0.051
Std. Err.	0.156	0.164	0.154
<i>Cut 1</i>	-2.550	-0.274	-1.958
<i>Cut 2</i>	-2.099	-2.395	-1.579
<i>Cut 3</i>	-1.795	-2.029	-1.290
<i>Cut 4</i>	-1.146	-1.392	-0.596
<i>Cut 5</i>	-0.775	-1.087	-0.308
<i>Cut 6</i>	-0.445	-0.761	0.064
Count R2	0.581	0.633	0.571
Adjusted Count R2	0.012	0.000	0.026
N	767	753	772
<i>Source:</i> Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 45

American pride and American myths

Five Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 5 is Strongly Disagree				
	African Americans	White Americans	African Americans	White Americans
	<i>I Am Proud To Be An American</i>	<i>I Am Proud To Be An American</i>	<i>If You Work Hard You Can Succeed</i>	<i>If You Work Hard You Can Succeed</i>
Authoritarianism	-1.524 **	-0.981 ****	-1.743 ****	-1.700 ****
Std. Err.	0.608	0.472	0.462	0.319
Gender	-0.167	0.299	-0.091	0.243
Std. Err.	0.373	0.250	0.269	0.166
Age	-2.267 ***	-1.403	0.990	0.417
Std. Err.	0.841	0.605	0.662	0.406
Education	-0.202	0.283 **	0.076	0.206 ***
Std. Err.	0.147	0.119	0.108	0.077
Party Identification	0.028	-0.177 **	0.076	-0.230 ****
Std. Err.	0.118	0.060	0.092	0.039
Church Attendance	-104	-0.237	0.141	0.159
Std. Err.	0.374	0.284	0.268	0.180
Cut 1	-1.116	1.829	0.727	0.700
Cut 2	0.419	3.361	2.195	1.900
Cut 3	0.656	3.809	2.319	2.016
Cut 4	1.379	4.785	3.157	3.278
Count R2	0.878	0.901	0.708	0.720
Adjusted Count R2	0.000	0.000	-0.011	0.004
N	319	816	319	819
Source: Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.				
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 46

Gays and lesbians running for office

On a 1 to 10 Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 10 is Strongly Agree			
	African Americans		White Americans
Authoritarianism	-2.174 **		-2.400 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.886		0.285
Gender	-0.611		-0.857 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.483		0.171
Age	-1.078		-1.844 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	1.158		0.357
Education	0.319		0.298 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.171		0.058
Party Identification	-0.322 **		-0.133 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.146		0.040
Church Attendance	-1.706 ***		-0.096
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.492		0.200
<i>Intercept</i>	9.581		8.477
<i>Std. Err</i>	1.053		0.31
R-Squared	0.18		0.20
N	149		1042
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using are OLS regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			



Table 47

African Americans – gay and lesbian issues

Question 1: Where 1 is Allowed, 2 is Not Allowed but Civil Union Allowed, and 3 is No Legal Recognition at All				
Question 2: Where 0 represents Yes and 1 represents No				
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Favor Strongly and 4 is Oppose Strongly				
Question 4: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Strong Yes and 4 is Strong No				
	Q1: Gay Marriage	Q2: Gay Adoption	Q3: Laws Protecting Gays From Discrimination	Q4: Allow Gays to Serve in the Military
Authoritarianism	1.198 ****	1.309 ****	0.998 **	1.384 ***
Std. Err.	0.252	0.302	0.397	0.431
Gender	-0.187	-0.34 **	-0.382	-1.370 *
Std. Err.	0.129	0.151	0.525	0.786
Age	0.010 **	0.008	-0.015	0.006
Std. Err.	0.004	0.005	0.108	0.111
Education	-0.072	-0.201 ***	-0.211 ***	-0.129 *
Std. Err.	0.059	0.069	0.068	0.070
Party Identification	0.064	0.073	0.016	-0.018
Std. Err.	0.049	0.057	0.068	0.072
Church Attendance	1.235 ****	1.263 ****	0.386 *	0.512 **
Std. Err.	0.153	0.171	0.199	0.209
Cut 1	0.752		0.022	1.017
Cut 2	2.416		0.816	1.992
Cut 3	n/a		1.569	2.513
Count R2	0.457	0.665	0.481	0.570
Adjusted Count R2	0.157	0.205	-0.004	-0.005
N	900	878	482	484
Sources: Questions 1 & 2 -- American National Election Studies 2012.				
& Questions 3 & 4-- American National Election Studies 2008.				
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for Questions 1, 3, and 4. Logit analysis was used for Question 2.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 48

White Americans – gay and lesbian issues

Question 1: Where 1 is Allowed, 2 is Not Allowed but Civil Union Allowed, and 3 is No Legal Recognition at All				
Question 2: Where 0 represents Yes and 1 represents No				
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Favor Strongly and 4 is Oppose Strongly				
Question 4: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Strong Yes and 4 is Strong No				
	Q1: Gay Marriage	Q2: Gay Adoption	Q3: Laws Protecting Gays From Discrimination	Q4: Allow Gays to Serve in the Military
Authoritarianism	1.638 ****	1.767 ****	0.707 ***	0.873 ***
Std. Err.	0.131	0.161	0.241	0.241
Gender	-0.236 ***	-0.499 ****	-2.548 ****	-1.703 *
Std. Err.	0.072	0.088	0.731	0.533
Age	0.020 ****	0.023 ****	0.12 *	0.141
Std. Err.	0.002	0.003	0.069	0.069
Education	-0.153 ****	-0.177 ****	-0.098 **	-0.129 *
Std. Err.	0.034	0.041	0.045	0.047
Party Identification	0.403 ****	0.341 ****	0.259 ****	0.175
Std. Err.	0.019	0.023	0.033	0.033
Church Attendance	1.082 ****	1.184 ****	0.107	0.343 **
Std. Err.	0.089	0.104	0.152	0.153
Cut 1	2.817		1.198	1.077
Cut 2	4.861		2.318	2.382
Cut 3	n/a		3.066	2.865
Count R2	0.566	0.743	0.537	0.563
Adjusted Count R2	0.261	0.279	-0.009	0.015
N	3167	3128	1011	1019
Sources: Questions 1 & 2 -- American National Election Studies 2012.				
& Questions 3 & 4-- American National Election Studies 2008.				
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for Questions 1, 3, and 4. Logit analysis was used for Question 2.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

Table 49

African Americans – civil liberties

Question 1: 7 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 Strongly Agree			
Question 2: Where 0 represents Should and 1 represents Should Not			
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Acceptable and 4 is Strongly Unacceptable			
	Q1. Require National ID Card To Prevent Terrorism	Q2. Media (Should/Should Not Report Info on Secret Methods Used to Fight Terrorism	Q3: Electronic Surveillance Allowed in U.S. Without Warrant
Authoritarianism	1.764 ***	3.928 ***	-1.994 *
Std. Err.	0.600	1.506	1.155
Gender	0.414	1.606 *	-0.568
Std. Err.	0.327	0.889	0.722
Age	1.151	-0.024	-0.07 **
Std. Err.	0.776	0.032	0.030
Education	-0.348 ***	-0.213	0.356
Std. Err.	0.115	0.330	0.291
Party Identification	0.051	0.364	-0.615
Std. Err.	0.096	0.327	0.281
Church Attendance	0.482	-1.340	0.208
Std. Err.	0.326	0.830	0.697
Intercept	n/a	-1.643	n/a
Std. Err.	n/a	0.439	n/a
Cut 1	-0.112	n/a	-5.858
Cut 2	0.572	n/a	-4.332
Cut 3	0.992	n/a	-3.746
Cut 4	2.022	n/a	n/a
Cut 5	2.950	n/a	n/a
Cut 6	3.445	n/a	n/a
Count R2	0.322	0.783	0.617
Adjusted Count R2	0.082	0.375	0.100
N	149	46	47
Sources : Question 1 -- The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
Questions 2 and 3 -- Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2006.			
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for questions 1 and 3 and a Logit regression for question 2.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 50

White Americans—civil liberties

Question 1: 7 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Disagree and 7 Strongly Agree			
Question 2: Where 0 represents Should and 1 represents Should Not			
Question 3: 4 Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Acceptable and 4 is Strongly Unacceptable			
	Q1. Require National ID Card To Prevent Terrorism	Q2. Media (Should/Should Not) Report Info on Secret Methods Used to Fight Terrorism	Q3: Electronic Surveillance Allowed in U.S. Without Warrant
Authoritarianism	1.153 ****	1.872 ****	-1.232 ****
Std. Err.	0.195	0.327	0.282
Gender	0.168	0.581 ***	-0.188
Std. Err.	0.114	0.197	0.167
Age	0.839 ****	0.000	-0.009 *
Std. Err.	0.238	0.005	0.005
Education	-0.058	-0.183 **	0.127 **
Std. Err.	0.038	0.072	0.063
Party Identification	0.071 ***	0.588 ****	-0.678 ****
Std. Err.	0.027	0.056	0.048
Church Attendance	0.099	0.509 **	-0.044
Std. Err.	0.132	0.255	0.202
Intercept	n/a	-1.643	n/a
Std. Err.	n/a	0.439	n/a
Cut 1	0.230	n/a	-3.420
Cut 2	0.742	n/a	-2.853
Cut 3	1.180	n/a	-2.487
Cut 4	1.747	n/a	n/a
Cut 5	2.131	n/a	n/a
Cut 6	2.980	n/a	n/a
Count R2	0.322	0.786	0.716
Adjusted Count R2	0.017	0.392	0.500
N	1043	737	743
Sources : Question 1 -- The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
Questions 2 and 3 -- Cooperative Congressional Election Study 2006.			
Note: Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis for questions 1 and 3 and a Logit regression for question 2.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 51

CIA and torture

Where 0 represents Torture Not Allowed and 1 represents CIA Allowed to Torture			
	African Americans		White Americans
	<i>Should the CIA Be Allowed to Torture Suspected Terrorists</i>		<i>Should the CIA Be Allowed to Torture Suspected Terrorists</i>
Authoritarianism	1.937 ***		1.084 ****
Std. Err.	0.743		0.233
Gender	0.371		-0.190 ****
Std. Err.	0.400		0.139
Age	-1.034		0.057
Std. Err.	0.944		0.291
Education	0.033		-0.065
Std. Err.	0.139		0.047
Party Identification	0.347 ***		0.329
Std. Err.	0.121		0.034
Church Attendance	-0.570		-0.252
Std. Err.	0.406		0.164
Intercept	-2.147		-1.282
Std. Err.	0.891		0.249
Count R2	0.646		0.674
Adjusted Count R2	0.071		0.346
N	147		1040
<i>Source:</i> The AmericasBarometer by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using a Logit regression model.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 52

Feelings toward immigrants (2004 data)

On 0 to 100 Scale where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling		
	2004 ANES African Americans <i>Mean Score</i>	2004 ANES White Americans <i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	46.67	43.57
Authoritarians	44.81	33.55
Difference of Means	1.86	10.02
<i>P-value</i>	0.7923	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	116	501
Source: 2004 American National Election Studies survey		
Note: Estimates produced using a difference of means test.		

Table 53

Feelings toward illegal immigrants

On 0 to 100 Scale Where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling			
	African Americans		White Americans
Authoritarianism	-1.344 **		-1.582 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.612		0.352
Gender	0.085		-0.075 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.353		0.190
Age	-0.334		-1.221 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.859		0.459
Education	0.135		0.079 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.144		0.084
Party Identification	0.089		-0.347 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.121		0.044
Church Attendance	0.293		0.297
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.353		0.205
<i>Intercept</i>	4.721		6.244
<i>Std. Err</i>	0.983		0.552
R-Squared	0.029		0.134
N	294		773
<i>Source:</i> Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an OLS model.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 54

## African American attitudes on immigrants and immigration

Questions 1 & 2: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 5 is Strongly Disagree			
Question 3: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Increased a Lot and 5 is Decreased a Lot)			
	Q1: <i>New Immigrants Are A Burden</i>	Q2: <i>More Jobs for Immigrants Means Fewer Jobs for People Like Me</i>	Q3: <i>Immigration Should Be Increased or Decreased</i>
Authoritarianism	-1.211 ***	-0.849 **	0.504 **
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.388	0.392	0.251
Gender	-0.804 ****	-0.197	-0.020
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.230	0.225	0.129
Age	0.575	-0.265	0.013 ***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.521	0.557	0.004
Education	0.460 ****	0.504 ****	-0.073
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.091	0.092	0.059
Party Identification	0.038	0.068	0.009
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.077	0.077	0.051
Church Attendance	0.016	-0.027	0.108
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.220	0.226	0.149
<i>Cut 1</i>	-0.090	0.526	-2.435
<i>Cut 2</i>	0.768	1.260	-1.203
<i>Cut 3</i>	0.990	1.439	1.405
<i>Cut 4</i>	1.984	2.261	2.507
Count R2	0.402	0.461	0.521
Adjusted Count R2	0.149	0.202	0.000
N	316	308	897
<i>Source:</i> Questions 1 & 2 -- Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011 & Question 3 -- American National Election Studies 2012.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			



Table 55

White American attitudes on immigrants and immigration

Questions 1 & 2: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Strongly Agree and 5 is Strongly Disagree			Question 3: Five Point Scale Where 1 is Increased a Lot and 5 is Decreased a Lot)		
	Q1: <i>New Immigrants Are A Burden</i>	Q2: <i>More Jobs for Immigrants Means Fewer Jobs for People Like Me</i>	Q3: <i>Immigration Should Be Increased or Decreased</i>		
Authoritarianism	-1.492 ****	-0.601 **	1.581 **		
Std. Err.	0.253	0.250	0.119		
Gender	-0.03	-0.254 *	0.241		
Std. Err.	0.133	0.134	0.066		
Age	0.327	0.242	0.005 ***		
Std. Err.	0.309	0.323	0.002		
Education	0.327 ****	0.393 ****	-0.24		
Std. Err.	0.059	0.061	0.031		
Party Identification	-0.083 ***	-0.112 ****	0.112		
Std. Err.	0.030	0.032	0.017		
Church Attendance	0.107	-0.142	-0.435		
Std. Err.	0.144	0.146	0.083		
Cut 1	-0.969	-0.744	-2.650		
Cut 2	0.168	0.203	-1.170		
Cut 3	0.374	0.360	0.991		
Cut 4	1.402	1.456	2.021		
Count R2	0.384	0.408	0.427		
Adjusted Count R2	0.079	0.027	0.066		
N	791	781	3134		
Source: Questions 1 & 2 -- Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011 & Question 3 -- American National Election Studies 2012.					
Note: All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression analysis.					
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001					

Table 56

State laws that require state and local police to stop a person if there is a reasonable suspicion that person is an undocumented immigrant

O is Opposed, 1 Neither Support of Oppose, and 2 is Favor			
	African Americans		White Americans
Authoritarianism	1.060 ****		1.367 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.253		0.133
Gender	0.029		-0.110
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.129		0.076
Age	-0.006		0.018 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.004		0.002
Education	-0.323 ****		-0.215 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.059		0.036
Party Identification	0.095 *		0.408 ****
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.050		0.020
Church Attendance	-0.038		-0.219 **
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.148		0.099
<i>Cut 1</i>	-0.64		0.657
<i>Cut 2</i>	0.481		1.813
Count R2	0.459		0.671
Adjusted Count R2	0.11		0.175
N	911		3162
<i>Source:</i> American National Election Studies 2012			
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression model.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 57

Bivariate analysis: Feelings toward Muslims

On 0 to 100 Scale Where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling		
	African Americans	White Americans
	<i>Mean Score</i>	<i>Mean Score</i>
Non Authoritarians	0.7000	0.6433
Authoritarians	0.5984	0.4644
Difference of Means	0.1016	0.18
<i>P-value</i>	<0.0386	<0.0001
<i>N</i>	220	452
<i>Source:</i> Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.		
<i>Note:</i> Estimates produced using a difference of means test.		

Table 58

Multivariate analysis: Feelings toward Muslims

On 0 to 100 Scale where 1 is the Coldest Feeling and 100 is the Warmest Feeling			
	African Americans	White Americans	
Authoritarianism	-1.733 ***	-1.382 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.577	0.364	
Gender	-0.132	0.303 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.332	0.196	
Age	0.169	-0.477 ***	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.198	0.117	
Education	0.120	0.240 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.135	0.090	
Party Identification	-0.209 *	-0.367 ****	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.112	0.045	
Church Attendance	0.065	0.012	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.335	0.214	
<i>Intercept</i>	7.055	7.853	
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.976	0.591	
R-Squared	0.05	0.16	
<i>N</i>	292	731	
<i>Source:</i> Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality 2011.			
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an OLS model.			
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001			

Table 59

Legalization of marijuana

Where 0 is Favor, 1 is Neither Favor or Oppose, and 2 is Oppose				
	African Americans		White Americans	
Authoritarianism	0.910	****	0.936	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.249		0.123	
Gender	0.299	**	0.286	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.127		0.069	
Age	0.011	***	0.017	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.004		0.002	
Education	-0.121	**	0.042	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.058		0.032	
Party Identification	0.115	**	0.238	**
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.048		0.018	
Church Attendance	0.586	****	0.965	***
<i>Std. Err.</i>	0.149		0.089	
<i>Cut 1</i>	0.862		2.373	
<i>Cut 2</i>	2.147		3.561	
Count R2	0.445		0.534	
Adjusted Count R2	0.116		0.224	
N	910		3169	
<i>Source:</i> American National Election Studies 2012.				
<i>Note:</i> All estimates produced using an Ordinal Logit regression model.				
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01, and ****p<.001				

## APPENDIX D

### HISTORIC AND EPIGENETIC CONTRIBUTIONS TO AUTHORITARIANISM

The asymmetric threats experienced by African Americans day in and out are without a doubt an important source of the higher rate of authoritarianism measured consistently among Americans Blacks. Obviously, these threats are not recent manifestations. They are historic. And in all likelihood, their historical provenance and persistence also plays a role in shaping African American authoritarianism today in two different ways.

#### 1. Historic Threat: Cumulative Effect

Any history of the United States demonstrates unequivocally that the current clear and present threats experienced daily by African Americans are not an aberration. These contemporary threats are nested in 400 years of “American terrorism – Jim Crow and lynching – as well as American barbarism – slave trade and slave labor” (West, 2001, p. XIII) .

The cumulative effect on this history on African Americans as individuals, as well as the ramifications for Black identity, culture and social structure in the United States, has been thoroughly documented. While characterizing this literature in a sentence or two is a fool’s errand, one scholar’s words come close to capturing the consequences of four centuries of oppression inflicted on African Americans. He wrote, “Black people in the United States differ from all other modern people owing to the unprecedented levels of unregulated and unrestrained violence directed at them” (C. West, 2001, p. XIII).

The cumulative effect of more than 400 years of asymmetric violence is a legacy of threat, anxiety and stress that echoes within African Americans today and, as Davis

(1995) argues, produces an authoritarian intolerance that serves “as an emancipatory strategy to protect Blacks from groups who directly threaten their physical and psychological security” (1995, p. 1).

The mechanism that transmits and, quite possibly, cumulates these effects across generations is epigenesis.

## 2. Epigenetic Effects<sup>165</sup>

As the regulator of which genes are expressed or suppressed, epigenetics sits at the crossroads between inheritable traits and environmental conditions. Epigenetics is an “emerging field... which attempts to understand how information not coded by the DNA sequence is inherited” (Gaisler-Salomon, 2014, p. SR12). It may also be the third factor – after contemporary and historic asymmetric exposures to threat – behind African Americans’ disproportional predisposition toward authoritarianism.

There are two recognized pathways of epigenetic change. The first is context-dependent on pre and postnatal environmental conditions. The second is “germ line-dependent... and occurs when the modified epigenome [which might have been modified initially by changed environmental conditions] is permanently incorporated into the germ line” and then manifests itself without recurring environmental factors (Crews et al., 2012, p. 9143). Over 400 years, acting like a one-two punch, these epigenetic mechanisms may have made African Americans more susceptible and reactive to threat and, as a consequence, more dispositionally authoritarian.

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<sup>165</sup> Epigenetics was originally defined as “the study of how the environment shapes the phenotype” (Crews et al., 2012, p. 9143). It has also been defined as “the sum of all those mechanisms necessary for the unfolding of the genetic programme for development” (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 76). In layman’s terms “epigenetics literally means beyond genes; it essentially represents a code put on top of an existing genetic code. DNA... determines the genetic code...epigenetics regulates the expression of our genes” (Provencal, 2011, p. 6).

The context-dependent environmental transmission of stress from one generation to the next, and its consequences on behavior and biology, has been observed and studied by numerous scholars. For example, researchers have found that the children of Holocaust survivors have a greater response to trauma than others and “are particularly vulnerable to psychological distress” (Baider et al., 2000, p. 904) . Eighty years after the Armenian genocide by Turkey, survivors and their families exhibit continuing behavioral effects (Kupelian, Kalayjian, & Kassabian, 1998). The progeny of Japanese Americans locked away in internment camps across the Western United States during World War II showed higher levels of behavioral stress (Nagata, 1990). “Persistent changes in the epigenome” of children exposed prenatally to the post World War II famine in The Netherland indicated that even “transient environmental conditions” can have long term biological consequences (Heijmans, Tobi, Lumey, & Slagboom, 2009, p. 8). And “studies suggest that genocides in Rwanda, Nigeria, Cambodia, Armenia and the former Yugoslavia have brought about distinct psychopathological symptoms in the offspring of survivors” (Gaisler-Salomon, 2014).

The evidence of germ-line epigenetic inheritance across generations is contested. A recent study of twins<sup>166</sup> suggests “that environmental influences... are important factors’ in epigenetic transmission while heredity appeared to affect only one of the genes<sup>167</sup> (and only in males) of the three genes tested. Other published research has found that “ancestral environmental exposures... promote epigenetic transgenerational inheritance and influence all aspects of an individual’s life history” (Crews et al., 2012, p. 9143), including the transmission of information across generations through changes in

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<sup>166</sup> The study (Crews et al., 2012) researched changes in three genes associated with antisocial behavior, depression, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.

<sup>167</sup> The MAOA gene implicated in antisocial behavior (Crews et al., 2012).

germ cells (Champagne, 2008; Champagne & Meaney, 2007; Franklin, Linder, Russig, Thony, & Mansuy, 2011; Weiss, Franklin, Vizi, & Mansuy, 2011). And one leading study indicated that unpredictable stress experienced by female rats before they became pregnant affected the brain and germline, “and its effects [the effect of stress] on brain and behavior persist into the next generation” (Zaidan, Leshem, & Gaisler-Salomon, 2013, p. 684).

The role of transgenerational epigenetic change in authoritarianism in general and African American authoritarianism in particular is speculative, but intriguing. It should be at the top of an interdisciplinary research agenda designed to explore the different distributions of authoritarianism globally.



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