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Opening a world: From categorial intuition to art

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Opening a World
From Categorial Intuition to Art

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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Table of Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Abstract | ii |
| Introduction: The Opening Up of a World | 1 |
| Chapter One: Phenomenology | 13 |
| Section 1: Phenomenology and the Neo-Kantian Challenge | 16 |
| Section 2: Categorical Intuition and Understanding | 29 |
| Section 3: Intentionality, Care, and Gelassenheit | 45 |
| Chapter Two: <i>Being and Time</i> and Beyond | 67 |
| Section 1: Three Worlds, Worldhood and Sign | 73 |
| Section 2: World Enough and Time; Anxiety and the Problem of World Change | 94 |
| Section 3: Truth and Untruth; The Reservoir of the Undisclosed | 105 |
| Chapter Three: Art | 117 |
| Section 1: Thing and Work | 122 |
| Section 2: Earth and World | 140 |
| Section 3: Beginning History | 161 |
| Conclusion: “But the Question Remains...” | 174 |
| Bibliography | 176 |

Opening a World; From Categorial Intuition to Art

William Koch

ABSTRACT

My purpose, broadly construed, is a simple one; to interpret Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" in the light of his early work on the nature of phenomenology and philosophy. My method will therefore be to present certain key elements of Heidegger's early understanding of phenomenology and philosophy, and then to trace these elements, and certain challenges which arise from them, into their development in *Being and Time*. Following this I will enquire into how these considerations should guide our interpretations of "The Origin of the Work of Art" and evaluate how "The Origin of the Work of Art" presents a different perspective, and perhaps a new answer, to earlier concerns.

My thesis is that, within "The Origin of the Work of Art", Heidegger develops a more radical understanding of the insight which first allowed him to reply to the neo-Kantian attacks on phenomenology and which led him to break away from Husserlian phenomenology. This insight/innovation is the transformation of categorial intuition into pre-ontological understanding, as discussed in the work of commentators such as Theodore Kisiel. From the insights of intentionality and categorial intuition follows the explicit necessity of human finitude as later understood as Dasein's thrown-being-in-the-world. This finitude leads to what I call the riddle of *Gelassenheit*, meaning how, faced

with the inevitability of comportment and the concealing nature of all limited disclosure, we can yet comport ourselves in such a way as to allow things to be what they are. One answer to this riddle is provided in the comportment specifically towards the undisclosed which is later to become *Gelassenheit* proper, but which also appears in the *techne* of the artist which points to the origin of our pre-ontological understanding (i.e. world) in the fundamental event of disclosure/concealment that occurs in art.

Introduction: The Opening Up of a World

“The temple-work, standing there, opens up a world and at the same time sets this world back again on earth, which itself only thus emerges as native ground. But men and animals, plants and things, are never present and familiar as unchangeable objects, only to represent incidentally also a fitting environment for the temple, which one fine day is added to what is already there. We shall get closer to what is, rather, if we think of all this in reverse order, assuming of course that we have, to begin with, an eye for how differently everything then faces us... The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves.” Heidegger¹

My goal in this work is simply to come to understand “The Origin of the Work of Art” in light of the path of Heidegger’s thought which led to it. This path will reveal that within “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger develops a more radical understanding of the insights which first allowed him to reply to Paul Natorp’s neo-Kantian attacks on phenomenology as he attempts to go beyond, or perhaps simply to better understand, certain limitations of *Being and Time*. Essential to this interpretation of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is an understanding of what it means to say that the work of art sets up, or opens up, a world. Despite the apparent modesty of my goal, it will be seen to run counter to at least two possible interpretations of “The Origin of the Work of Art” presented by prominent Heidegger scholars. My contention is that, in misinterpreting the radical nature of what it is to set up a world, Julian Young and Hubert Dreyfus have disengaged Heidegger’s work on art from the path of his thought which came before it. In so doing, they have also failed to fully appreciate the manner in which “The Origin of the

¹ Hofstadter, *Poetry, Language, Thought* p. 41-42 henceforth cited as [Hof.]

Work of Art” is an innovative attempt to answer fundamental questions from Heidegger’s early work that were unanswered, and arguably unanswerable, in *Being and Time*.

The deeper questioning, or perhaps the deepening of earlier questions, we find in “The Origin of the Work of Art” concerns the nature of world change, which also contains a re-inspection and renovation of the form-matter duality which had already concerned him as early as his habilitation and remained a concern throughout his early phenomenological years, and can thus be seen as an attempt to understand the origin of world. We can characterize world as a cultural framework of meaning, or a fundamental interpretive scaffold, which Dreyfus compares to Thomas Kuhn’s notion of paradigm and which Julian Young discusses, following Heidegger, as a transcendental horizon of disclosure. All of these characterizations remain merely suggestive, and will be explained and expanded in our tracing of this key concept from Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition into Heidegger’s own conception of pre-ontological understanding which forms the foundation of *Being and Time*. Our way along this path will be guided by Heidegger’s enquiring as to the origin of the categorial elements of our experience and his alteration of Husserl’s answer to this question, in the face of Natorp’s critique. In Heidegger’s early work up to and including *Being and Time* Heidegger’s conception of world, like Dilthey’s conception of life from which it is partially drawn, is that behind which we can not go. As Charles Guignon puts it: “Although we can discover grounds and explanations *within* our regional projects, there is no way to reach a ground ‘outside’ of the way we project the meaning of Being in our everyday lives. Being-in-the-world, like Dilthey’s ‘life’, is ‘that behind which we cannot go’ to bring it ‘before the judgment seat

of reason.”² Nevertheless I claim that the radical nature of “The Origin of the Work of Art” rests precisely in Heidegger’s attempt to get back behind the pre-conceptual lived understanding which he had previously taken as bedrock.³ It will be seen that this pattern of looking back behind supposed foundations for their origin mirrors the very development which led to Heidegger’s concepts of world and the pre-ontological understanding. In the development of his formulation of the concept of world Heidegger will be seen to be going back behind the sensory intuition which Edmund Husserl, in *The Logical Investigations*, takes as foundational for our experience of categorial intuition. Heidegger does this by locating categorial intuition in the engaged activities and speech of life and by revealing the hermeneutic elements of sensation itself. Later in his career, through discussing the way in which a work of art sets up a world, Heidegger can be seen to be extending the path he had earlier tread in enquiring as to the origin of the very projects, involvements and ways of “talking over” things which had themselves become foundational for Heidegger’s earlier work. It is precisely this point which is missed by Young and Dreyfus, partially because they seek to interpret “The Origin of the Work of Art” in terms of *Being and Time* rather than noting the work’s driving impetus to go beyond what had come before, and partially because they work too hard at making the views of Heidegger amenable to various other contemporary views.

In discussing Heidegger’s emphasis upon observations concerning the way in which art first makes things what they are, as demonstrated in the quotation which opens this introduction, and Heidegger’s identification of art as a beginning, origin, and primal

² Guignon, Charles *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* p. 176 henceforth cited as [Guig. 1983]

³ In the course of demonstrating this point I will have to take into account and address Guignon’s object that “To treat the shared background of meaning that is grasped in our pre-ontological understand of the world as something that could be grounded would be to treat the horizon that makes the discovery of entities possible as if it were just one entity among others.” Ibid. p. 177

leap, Julian Young observes that it is these elements which have "...led to 'The Origin's being read as affirming the, as I shall call it, 'Promethean' view that art *creates* world."⁴ According to Young, then, we can interpret the opening of a world in one of two ways. Either great art creates a world, meaning it brings into being a new cultural framework of meaning, or it simply brings to our attention the world which we always already inhabit, but which generally exists in the background of all our comings and goings. As we have seen, the first view Young labels the Promethean view. The second view might be compared to the role that anxiety plays in *Being and Time*. It is a breakdown which reveals the structures of both Dasein and the world which we usually do not notice because they are too near to us. This second view we might label the revelatory interpretation. Young interprets art as revelatory but not Promethean, the creation of a world he places on the shoulders of a shared language and the cultural conversation from which such a language grows: "If, it might be asked, the artwork does not create its world, what does? Heidegger's answer to this question is clear: not the artwork but rather 'language' creates world."⁵ In this focus upon art as revelatory but not Promethean we can avoid what Young takes to be the dangerous, and potentially fascist, image of a great world-creating artist.

I believe that Young has set up a false dichotomy, and that the ambiguity about whether the work of art reveals or creates a world is an important and informative ambiguity. Great art, according to my view, is both Promethean and revelatory. It is my claim that this understanding of the artwork is necessary in order to understand both how "The Origin of the Work of Art" is continuous with Heidegger's earlier work and how, in

⁴Young, Julian *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* p. 29 henceforth cited as [Young]

⁵ Ibid. p. 34

that very continuity, it tries to proceed beyond his earlier work in questioning the historicity of world and the event of world change. This interpretation of art works well with a Hegelian reading of art insofar as expressive art is both creation and clarification or revelation. It both brings about something which previously was not in existence and it expands and clarifies what was previously inchoate. From the Heideggerian perspective, Young's interpretation of language is perfectly right, but when one considers how closely and often Heidegger equated language to poetry the clear lines between Promethean creation and simple revelation become murky again. Young appreciates this, but wants to argue that in equating poetry with language we need not summon forth the image of some original poet creating a language, which again is what he takes the Promethean view to necessity.⁶ Here is at least part of Young's mistake. Nowhere, in speaking of the happening of truth in art, need we be concerned with the creation of the image of some Promethean *artist* or originating *poet*. It is precisely this mistaken focus on either the work or the creator, these echoes of the subject/object distinction, which Heidegger goes to such great pains to avoid in discussing art as a happening of truth and not some intending of a genius. Art can be understood as the worlding of a world, an event in which both art work and artist themselves first come to be. This worlding of a world can play both the role of creating new frameworks and horizons of meaning and of revealing previous such frameworks. Of course in some sense, such as presented in expressivist views, an explicit manifestation of what was previously background is also always a change, a development and creative event. Therefore the very distinction between revelation and creation seems far from as clear as Young would have it. Further, as

⁶ Ibid p. 34

already stated, without an appreciation for the Promethean aspects of art we will fail to notice the importance of “The Origin of the Work of Art” as a new answer to old questions, and an attempt to get beyond the framework of one’s current world which was previously taken as bedrock.

Julian Young is direct about his concern that the Promethean interpretation of art lends itself to an interpretation of Heidegger’s work which sees it as “...a thinly disguised plea for the overcoming of European nihilism through a coming into being of a brave new world to be established by the Hitler-created artwork, by, in a word, (a refined version of) the Nuremburg rally.”⁷ As already mentioned, I locate his mistake at least partially in missing the fact that the Promethean power of art does not necessitate a Promethean artist, and in missing the larger goals of Heidegger’s project. In connection with this, however, it will be seen that the concept of a withdrawing sheltering earth which, as Heidegger presents it, necessarily accompanies the setting up of a world brings into “The Origin of the Work of Art” the issues of *Gelassenheit* and openness to the mystery, or the reservoir of the undisclosed, both of which further invalidate any possibility of a totalitarian art work giving rise to a monolithic world. As Charles Guignon observes: “A work that dictates how one *must* live is not art; it is propaganda or didacticism. What is distinctive about an authentic work of art is that it leaves its own significance open-ended, and therefore demands a response from its audience as to what it means.”⁸ Beyond this limit on the potentiality for art to be a monolithic world construction or propaganda, Heidegger’s concern with openness to the mystery, indeed

⁷ Ibid. p. 29

⁸ Guignon, Charles “Philosophy and Authenticity: Heidegger’s Search for a Ground for Philosophizing” from *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity* (ed. Wrathall and Malpas) p. 99-100 henceforth cited as [Guig. 2000]

the very role which the releasement of *Gelassenheit* is supposed to play in his work, suggests the possibility and centrality of the self-disclosure of the new and unknown which is counter to the strictly revelatory role that Young would keep art limited to.

In connection with his argument concerning the rejection of the Promethean view, Julian Young points to the work of Jacques Taminiaux, specifically his paper “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’”, as demonstrating that Heidegger did toy with the Promethean view in early drafts of his work before he “...saw the error of his flirtation and returned, decisively, to the insights of *Being and Time*.”⁹ In confusing the concepts of Promethean art with that of a Promethean artist, Young mistakenly locates a rejection of the idea that the art work creates a world in Taminiaux’s assertion that the artist does not create a world. As Taminiaux states:

“The word *decision*, to be sure, is still used. But the decision now belongs to Being, no longer to Dasein.... As for the creator, what he sets-into-work is still a striving, the struggle of world and earth, but he himself is no longer a struggler. Creating, Heidegger says, is “receiving and borrowing within the relation to Unconcealment” (OWA, 62). Indeed, such verbs contain nothing Promethean.”¹⁰

Perhaps Young has been confused by Taminiaux’s use of the term Promethean, but Taminiaux here is interested in rejecting the Promethean artist which does not at all go along with a rejection of Young’s Promethean view that “art creates world.” Taminiaux demonstrates the shift from a decisionism in the earlier drafts of “The Origin of the Work of Art” to an openness to the concealed in the final draft, which will be seen to coincide with my own interpretation that art, and not artists, can indeed be seen to create worlds

⁹ Ibid. p. 30

¹⁰ Taminiaux, Jacques “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’” from *Poetics, Speculation, and Judgment* p. 168-169 henceforth cited as [Tam.]

while also suggesting that Young's motivating concerns, and interpretation of Taminiaux, are fundamentally misdirected.

Even as I disagree with Young's interpretation of Taminiaux as rejection the Promethean view as defined by Young, so too do I disagree with his assertion that Hubert Dreyfus argues in favor of such a view. Rather, in his focus on art's role in gathering and unifying, Dreyfus places too little an emphasis on art's creation of the new in order for his view to be considered Promethean. Dreyfus, in using Kuhn's idea of the role of paradigms in science as an interpretive framework for his analysis of Heidegger's concept of world in "The Origin of the Work of Art", equates world with a cultural paradigm and describes the role of art in setting up a world as a gathering together of previously scattered practices into a unified whole: "The cultural paradigm collects the scattered practices of a group, unifies them into coherent possibilities for action, and holds them up to the people who can then act and relate to each other in terms of that exemplar."¹¹ As with Julian Young, whose identification of art as revelatory is not wrong but rather merely not sufficient, there is something right about Dreyfus' discussion of art as a cultural paradigm which gathers and unifies already existent practices while still there remains something missing in this view when it comes to the radical sense in which the setting up of a world by an art work first actually makes a people a people, and first gives rise to new practices and possibilities. As a partial answer to the question of *how* an artwork gives rise to a world Dreyfus' work is admirable, but as a demonstration of all that such a setting up can, and for Heidegger's project hopefully does, mean Dreyfus' work is too conservative. Young and Dreyfus alike do well to recognize that there is no

¹¹ Dreyfus, Hubert "Heidegger on the Connection Between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics" in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger* (ed. Guignon) p. 354 henceforth cited as [Drey. 1993]

time actually prior to world, even as there is no Dasein which is not Being-in-the-World, but they fail to see that Heidegger's focus on an artwork as potentially a new beginning demands that the setting up of a world also be potentially more than a revealing or gathering, but rather also an eruption or primal leap into being of a radically new world which nonetheless does not spring from a worldless void.

It should be clear from the preliminary discussion thus far that a proper understanding of what Heidegger is trying to do in "The Origin of the Work of Art", and the relation of this work to Heidegger's earlier path of thought, is precisely what is at stake in the debate concerning the meaning of setting up a world which Young has himself set up. Beyond this, however, there is a wider view of the matter we can take. Heidegger's understanding of world grows out of his early reflections upon the nature of philosophy and phenomenology which were themselves prompted by his attempts to answer Neo-Kantian critiques of phenomenology, while also being heavily influenced by such Neo-Kantian thinkers as Emil Lask and Heidegger's own Neo-Kantian education at the hands of Rickert, and which served as well to orient him upon a unique path away from that of his teacher Edmund Husserl. This path, which leads philosophy through phenomenology and *Lebensphilosophie* in contrast and tension with Neo-Kantianism and positivism, arrives eventually at art. Beyond its implications for the interpretation of Heidegger, and the unique perspective it provides us on art, reflection upon this path has much to teach us concerning the fundamental connection between art and philosophy which belies the secondary status philosophy of art is generally granted in comparison to epistemology or metaphysics in the world of academic philosophy. Indeed, the path of Heidegger's thought demonstrates that an intense and prolonged meditation upon the

fundamental questions of epistemology and metaphysics, leading through their ultimate origin in ontology, brings us ultimately to reflect upon the relation of humanity to art and the relation of both to world and truth.

I would like to end this introduction with a note on my methodology. It may seem strange that two thirds of a work dedicated to the interpretation of “The Origin of the Work of Art” should be taken up by an interpretation of Heidegger’s work which came before it, such as *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, *History of the Concept of Time*; *Prolegomena* and *Being and Time*. One reason for this has already been mentioned, specifically that it is not adequate to interpret a work through what it says but rather also with a view for why it says what it says. We must understand what the work is attempting to do, and we can only understand this if we know the questions that the work is attempting to answer and why those questions are important as steps on a larger path. In the epilogue to “The Origin of the Work of Art” Heidegger hazards just such a self-interpretation of his own work: “The foregoing reflections are concerned with the riddle of art, the riddle that art itself is. They are far from claiming to solve the riddle. The task is to see the riddle.”¹² It is my claim that this riddle is the precise point upon which Julian Young, Hubert Dreyfus, and I partially disagree, namely the nature and origin of world change through art and the importance of the way in which art, at the same time, demonstrates the limits of any world by letting the earth be an earth. It is these points which Heidegger himself, in offering a still later self interpretation in the further addendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art” highlights as an essential ambiguity which

¹² Hof. p. 77

had been of continual concern since *Being and Time*: “In the heading ‘the setting-into-work of truth,’ in which it remains undecided but decidable who does the setting or in what way it occurs, there is concealed the relation of Being and human being, a relation which is unsuitably conceived even in this version – a distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since *Being and Time*...”¹³ All this suggests that, in order to see the riddle that art is, we first need to see the way in which this riddle has arisen from *Being and Time* through the incomplete answer to Heidegger’s continual question concerning the nature of world which that work offers. As I have mentioned, I believe Young and Dreyfus have missed part of the riddle by too heavily basing their interpretation on *Being and Time* with too little a concern for the ways in which the answers provided by that work lead beyond themselves and demonstrated their own incompleteness. However, understanding why this is so requires an understanding of the riddles which *Being and Time* was meant to address. In attempting this unraveling of the hermeneutic position of “The Origin of the Work of Art” I follow the path laid down before me by such works as Guignon’s “Philosophy and Authenticity: Heidegger’s Search for a Ground for Philosophizing” and his analysis of the connection between *Being and Time* and the influence of Dilthey as presented in *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, as well as Theodore Kisiel’s detailed tracing of Heidegger’s early concerns with, and reformulations of, Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition as found in such works as *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time* and *Heidegger’s Way of Thought*. It is my hope that we can further our understanding of Heidegger’s study of the riddle of art by

¹³ Ibid. p. 86

applying what has come to light concerning the early Heidegger, a move which does not seem to have been yet adequately attempted.

Chapter One: Phenomenology

“I seek not to instruct but only to lead, to point out and describe what I see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights, principally before myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence.” Edmund Husserl¹⁴

The central focus of our interpretation of Heidegger’s “The Origin of the Work of Art” will be upon his presentation of great art as an event of truth setting itself to work as the strife between world and earth. In preparation for a full interpretation of this conception of art we must map the development of Heidegger’s understanding of the central concepts out of which this presentation of art is formed. We must therefore trace Heidegger’s concept of truth as primordial disclosure, or clearing, and his concept of the world from their Husserlian roots in intentionality and categorial intuition, through the influence Dilthey exerted upon them, to their appearance in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. While the concept of earth appears as such for the first time within “The Origin of the Work of Art”, it too has an origin we can trace which grows from Heidegger’s appreciation of the hermeneutic limitations of all disclosure and the inevitability of prejudice or perspective. The earth begins to appear in references to the reservoir of the undisclosed, untruth, or mystery which is fundamental and foundational for all limited disclosure. The formation which truth, earth and world take on in “The Origin of the Work of Art” involves a fourth and final key concept, namely *Gelassenheit*, letting-be or releasement. The problem of *Gelassenheit*, the question of how one can let things be what

¹⁴ Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* p. 18

they are which had already been an issue in earlier works, arises within “The Origin of the Work of Art” specifically from the tension between world and earth, between the limiting and directing structures and horizons that define necessarily partial disclosure and the ambition to be open to the undisclosed in such a way as to let it be and appear as what it is. This very tension, the difficult relation between world and earth, will be seen as well to be a later return to Heidegger’s earlier reflections on the form-matter duality which was at the foundation of his addressing of the problem of the categories in his habilitation.

What I intend to show is that the problem, or perhaps challenge, of *Gelassenheit* grows from Husserl’s phenomenological motto “To the things themselves!” and Heidegger’s appreciation of hermeneutic human finitude. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger defines phenomenology as the science which seeks to “...let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself...”¹⁵ and in “The Origin of the Work of Art” we are told that “The work lets the earth be an earth.”¹⁶ *Gelassenheit* is therefore both the goal and method of phenomenology, and in letting the undisclosed be precisely as the undisclosed, the work of art is an achievement of what phenomenology seeks to accomplish. This chapter will be concerned to trace the early formation of the aforementioned key concepts in Heidegger’s work and their progression towards the writing of *Being and Time* with a specific eye for the difficulties that arise from them, leading eventually to pre-ontological understanding and world as they appear in *Being and Time* which will be the central focus of Chapter Two. Further difficulties

¹⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time* p. 58 henceforth cited as [ZS]

¹⁶ Hof. p. 45

arising from *Being and Time* will lead us to our discussion of Heidegger's post *Being and Time* work including, ultimately, "The Origin of the Work of Art".

Section One: Phenomenology and the Neo-Kantian Challenge

“We stand at an abyss: either into nothingness, that is, absolute reification, pure thingness, or we somehow leap into another world, more precisely, we manage for the first time to make the leap into the world as such.” Heidegger¹⁷

The young Heidegger, the Heidegger of the 1919 war emergency seminars for example, presents us with a complex but fertile web of influences and ambitions.

Educated in a Neo-Kantian atmosphere under the Neo-Kantian Rickert yet having taken on the mantle of the new phenomenological movement as the star student of Edmund Husserl, heavily influenced by the Neo-Kantian/Pragmatist hybrid Emil Lask, the historicist Wilhelm Dilthey, and the religious proto-existentialist Soron Kierkegaard while infatuated with the medieval worldview of the German mystic Meister Eckhart, Heidegger was to prove to be both more and other than all his various influences, teachers, causes and enemies. It is perhaps his position in the center of this rich web of complex struggles and contradictions which allowed him to see so clearly to the core flaws and virtues of both Neo-Kantianism and Husserlian Phenomenology.

At the risk of over-simplification, let us briefly attempt to characterize the environment out of which Heidegger’s philosophy first began to develop. This will begin to highlight the very questions which would years later, though then understood perhaps in a different light, drive Heidegger’s reflections on the riddle that art itself is. One might locate Phenomenology’s birth in the Husserlian war cry “To the things themselves!”, which itself immediately raises certain questions, especially within a philosophical

¹⁷ Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy* p. 53 henceforth cited as [TD]

culture dominated by Kantian epistemological concerns vying for dominance with positivistic philosophy of science. In the face of the work of Kant, the motto is clearly provocative. For Kant it is precisely to the things themselves that we can not get, insofar as any experience is already limited to what is made accessible by the a priori forms of intuition, space and time, and structured by the spontaneous organizing activity of the understanding according to its own categories. With the Neo-Kantian attempt to get rid of intuition in general and shift philosophical focus away from cognitive receptivity and towards active conceptualization, leading to Heidegger's observation that in the work of Paul Natorp we have a radical absolutization of mediation and theoretical activity the likes of which hasn't been seen since Hegel¹⁸, the idea of any thing-in-itself or irrational, as in not worked over by rationality, facticity at all begins to look more and more suspect.¹⁹ Within this philosophical environment, then, the natural question concerns what sort of access we have to the things themselves and, beyond this, what the nature of these very things in question are and how knowledge achieved through access to them is to be transmitted or presented to others.

Of course, from a non-philosophical perspective there seems to be no more straightforward and commonsensical statement than that one should concern oneself precisely with the matters, or things, themselves which are of interest or concern. In a way the divide between these two responses to the motto can already guide our eye to what could be meant by the phrase. Insofar as Kant's hypothetical *thing-in-itself* is never

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 91

¹⁹ It is this which Kisiel, following Istvan Feher, calls "...the problem situation in Neo-Kantianism and life-philosophy out of which Heidegger's thought arose: the resistance to Hegel's panlogism by insistence on the insuperable irrationality of the 'matter' *given* to thought." (Kisiel, Theodore "Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask" in *Heidegger's Way of Thought* p. 103 henceforth cited as [Kis. 2002])

an object of experience there is also a sense in which it is never really an object of concern. If the very matters themselves to which we seek to “go” are matters of direct importance to human life or the scientific undertaking then noumenal entities hidden behind a veil of concepts are of little interest, or at the very least become of interest only at the end of an investigation as a hypothetical product. What is of interest, perhaps, is the actual nature and structure of the experiences we do have. We can bracket, we can perform the phenomenological epoche, and thus leave out of consideration the nature of any given thing as it may be beyond our experiential encounter and consciousness of it and proceed to investigate what it is we actually do know and have experience of.

If the matters at hand might precisely be experience itself and the structures of consciousness then we should turn our gaze to them as they are in themselves. This sets the stage for the phenomenological battle with psychologism and the Neo-Kantians. As Heidegger states:

“The science of experience is a descriptive one. Every descriptive science ‘has its justification in itself’. The experiences of perception, of memory, of representation, of judgment, of I, you and us (types of experiences of persons) can thus be described. Experiences are not explained psychologically, nor referred back to physiological processes and psychic dispositions. No hypothesis are made about them, but we simply bring out what lies in the experiences themselves...”²⁰

Part of the motivation for such an undertaking, for the phenomenological turn to epoche and description in contrast to either a positivistic or Kantian reductionism to hidden underlying transcendental, psychological, or physiological mechanisms, is a concern to avoid the assumptions that both Kantianism and physico-psychological explanations must already make concerning the nature of experience and everything with which experience

²⁰ TD p. 84

and consciousness provide us. Before reducing representation to the categorial activities of the understanding, for example, one should perhaps look at the matters themselves with which such activity claims to be concerned, such as consciousness and representation themselves, which of course are already going to be providing us with the very data and direction we then use in reducing them to some other explanatory basis. There is a very real sense in which, in the case of the psychologists and Neo-Kantians alike, we have not fully come to know what it is we are even seeking to reduce or explain. With the subject so poorly formulated any attempt to explain it, or explain it away, is of course going to be presumptuous and groundless.

The important point to focus on in this swift sketch of the philosophical situation with which Heidegger's early lecture courses were engaged is that, while there may be any number of ways to raise veils between experience and the worldly object of which it is the experience, we still assume that we can reflect and describe what occurs within our experience while whatever underground mechanisms that order or direct experience are rolling merrily along. Perhaps "reality" is inaccessible, but life as we live and experience it seems not to be, and it may be that a proper description of this living experience can dissolve the very assumptions which lead to the concept of the Cartesian theater or phenomenal/noumenal divide.

In his 1919 lecture course "The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview"²¹ Heidegger discusses an important response to the very sorts of claims made by phenomenology I have just sketched on the part of the Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp. The response is to ask if perhaps conceptualization itself is distortive and

²¹ TD

destructive to the primordial substance of life and reality. The objection rests precisely on the fact that reflection is a theoretical de-vivifying of life experiences since "...in reflection they are no longer lived but looked at."²² The very activity of reflection alters the make up of the thing observed, in reflection upon lived experience we isolate and delineate bits of experience from other bits of experience. Heidegger quotes Natorp in observing that reflection is necessarily analytical.²³ Reflection creates a false atomism of experiences with each being taken from the natural flow which is the actual characteristic of life experiences as lived: "We set the experiences out before us out of immediate experience; we intrude so to speak into the flowing stream of experiences and pull one or more of them out, we 'still the stream' as Natorp says."²⁴ This stilling of the stream is already an alteration of the matters themselves as they are when lived, as are all theoretical compartments. In this way the motto "to the things themselves" already represents an impossibility if the path to these things is going to be one of de-vivifying reflection, an objectifying looking.

This is only the first level of Natorp's critique of phenomenology. Beyond the failure of the reflective method to capture experience as it is in itself, the claim of phenomenology to be purely descriptive only makes things worse. Description brings the critique to the level of language which is going to rely upon concepts and thus generalities: "For description also already proceeds via concepts: it is a circumscription of something into generalities, it is 'subsumption' (Natorp); it already presupposes a certain kind of concept-formation and therefore 'abstraction' (Natorp) and theory, i.e.

²² Ibid. p. 85

²³ "Reflection necessarily has an analytical, so to speak dissective or chemically destructive effect upon what is experienced." Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

‘mediation’.”²⁵ Thus, even were the phenomenological method of reflection to arrive at experience as it is, the moment such reflection moved into the realm of speech, writing and ultimately description it will have once more turned the matter at hand into a collection of abstractions, constructions and generalizations. The stream of life, stilled in reflection, is fully objectified and dismembered in description.

The ultimate thrust of this entire line of critique is not to solve the problems raised. Rather, according to Heidegger, Natorp turns to affirming the inescapability of the theoretical and rejects as fantasy the phenomenological dream of any immediate experience or description. As Heidegger presents Natorp’s view: “If one wishes to make experience into an object of science, it is impossible to avoid theoretization. This means, however, that there is no immediate apprehension of experience... Accordingly, Natorp says that there can be only a mediated apprehension of experiences.”²⁶ Therefore, for Natorp, the only possibilities for a science of experience is for it to be an analytic undertaking involving the rational reconstruction of lower level experiences which are really just basic abstractions and attempts at theoretizations requiring further logical improvement and clarification. The only way out of mediation and the ‘stilling of the stream’ is precisely through it; “Science provides experience of its objects by way of objectification.”²⁷ As already mentioned, Heidegger connects this counter method of rational reconstruction proposed by Natorp with the apotheosis of mediation found in Hegel, stating that Natorp’s system is “The most radical absolutization of the theoretical and logical, an absolutization that has not been proclaimed since Hegel. (Unmistakable

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid. p. 85-86

²⁷ Ibid. p. 88

connections with Hegel: everything unmediated is mediated.)”²⁸ Earlier in the same course Heidegger had made a similar observation, stating that “...the very idea of a system that would essentially absolutize the theoretical, is illusory. So, in one of the most difficult confrontations, we stand on the front against Hegel.”²⁹ Hegel himself, within his lectures on fine arts, had proposed an answer very similar to Natorp’s when facing something very much like Natorp’s objection. Hegel, having asserted that art itself requires and leads to a transformation into philosophy, himself raises the question how it could find this fulfillment and completion in being transformed into philosophy if the thinking of art, meaning the interpretation or translation of art into philosophical concepts, precisely destroys that sensuous beauty which is the heart of art: “For the beauty of art does in fact appear in a form which is expressly opposed to thought and which thought is compelled to destroy in order to pursue its own characteristic activity.”³⁰ Hegel ties this idea, that to grasp the beauty of art in thought is to somehow destroy it, to the claim that the real itself is ungraspable in conceptual thought:

“This idea hangs together with the view that the real in general, the life of nature and spirit, is marred and killed by comprehension; that instead of being brought nearer to us by conceptual thinking, it is all the more removed from us, with the result that, by using thinking as a means of grasping what the live phenomenon is, man defeats his own purpose.”³¹

Hegel’s answer is to assert that thought is the essence of spirit, and that the expression is, in a sense, an improvement upon the thing expressed. When spirit translates nature into art, and later art into thought, the inner essence of each of the sublated elements is finally brought to fulfillment. Each later stage of the dialectic is more real than the former, and

²⁸ Ibid. p. 91

²⁹ Ibid. p. 81

³⁰ Hegel, *Hegel’s Aesthetics; Lectures on Fine Art* p. 12

³¹ Ibid.

so the outcome of the rational reconstruction, be it performed by Natorp or Hegel, is closer to the absolutely real and unconditioned.

As we have seen, there are two key elements of Natorp's attack with which Heidegger must concern himself. First, there is the problem of reflection being a de-vivifying theoretical mode of comportment. Second, there is the claim that language itself is abstraction, conceptualization, and thus alteration of experience as lived such that there can be no pure description. Heidegger, then, is faced with the problem of access to, or observation of, life and the problem of language's grasp of life. The answer to both of these questions rests in the realization that the divide these attacks assume between humanity and reality, thought and existence, language and life, is a false divide. The answer, inspired from the work of Dilthey, is that reflection and interpretation is an activity of life itself which is undertaken through language.³² Life interprets itself and speaks, and these activities are intimately connected, indeed are continuous, with the nature of existence. As Heidegger expresses it in his 1923-1924 lecture course *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*: "In these two respects we saw at once that the world's being has the character of showing itself and that life's being entails a basic possibility of speaking about existence in such a way that being is pointed out by means of speech. The world's being and life's being have a quite specific connection with one another, thanks to speaking's being."³³ Phenomenology, then, can be set on solid ground in the face of Natorp's claim concerning the impossibility of escaping from analysis,

³² "The conviction that thought is inherently compatible with life is brought out most tellingly by the methodological principle of immanence, 'to understand life from life itself,' which Dilthey identifies as 'the dominate impulse in my philosophical thinking'." Kis. 2002 p. 93

³³ Heidegger, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* p. 33 henceforth cited as [IPR]

abstraction, and mediation if we can base our descriptive science on the way in which the world has the character of showing itself through life's thought and speech.

Phenomenology must be understood, then, as an activity of life itself: "It is the primordial intention of genuine life, the primordial bearing of life-experience and life as such, the absolute sympathy with life that is identical with life-experience."³⁴ In order for phenomenology to be identified with life we must be assured of not forcing concepts or methods unsuited to the matters of concern onto those matters. As Heidegger puts it in *Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle*: "The addressing and interpreting of factual life actualized by factual life itself allow the ways of seeing and speaking here to be given to them in advance from objects in the world."³⁵ The goal, then, is the same as that present in Dilthey's principle of immanence where by we seek "to understand life from life itself" through concepts which are "the spontaneous articulations of the structural coherences and temporal continuities of life itself."³⁶ This understanding of philosophy as born from the self-articulating and interpreting nature of existence such that, in its truest form, it can be seen to be continuous with the flow of life and not a stilling or de-vivifying Heidegger equates to the ancient Greek interpretation of existence which "...remains within existence, and this interpretation is this existence becoming explicit through the explication."³⁷ In order to explicate the way in which philosophy grows from life, however, Heidegger will have to locate the origin of philosophical questioning in life rather than in a theoretical position from which official philosophical questions as objectively of concern are traditionally addressed and

³⁴ TD p. 92

³⁵ Heidegger *Supplements* (Ed. John Van Buren) p. 123 henceforth cited as [Sup.]

³⁶ Kis. 2003 p. 91-92

³⁷ IPR p. 42

investigated. As Heidegger asserts: “The question is lived, is experienced.”³⁸ The need to explain how a question is lived and the origin of a question in life points us to Heidegger’s turn to hermeneutics which he will use in transforming intentionality into the structures of care and human temporality, issues which will be taken up more fully later in this chapter.

We must, then, first recognize that concepts, or the categories, are not an imposition upon experience by the understanding of the human mind. This point had already been of central importance in Heidegger’s habilitation “The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus” where it is addressed in terms of the form/matter dichotomy as the “principle of the material determination of every form”³⁹ where each concept or category is determined by its content. This is not, however, to say that there cannot be a misapplication of concepts or a distortive stance towards any given matter. If philosophy is born of a natural movement of self-interpretation inherent in life which is born into language, the very power of language can become a danger to the disclosive movement of life. The critique leveled by Natorp against objectifying language is quite right insofar as language can indeed become reified and philosophy can degenerate to nothing more than a matter of “possession of words” which Heidegger identifies as the state of most of the philosophy of his time: “They [traditional philosophical concepts] signify the great danger that one philosophizes today in words rather than about things.”⁴⁰ Language and philosophy both, when not understood in a way which uncovers their origin in the movement of life itself, tend toward deception and illusion: “Insofar as language is taken

³⁸ TD p. 55

³⁹ Sup. p. 64

⁴⁰ IPR p. 7

up in a traditional and not in a primordial sense, it is precisely what conceals things...⁴¹

It is from this danger, then, that the focus upon the things themselves must bring along a directive to the effect that one avoid all concepts and methods, traditional or innovative, not dictated by the matters themselves.⁴² This image of empty concepts set adrift from their material determination echoes a certain class of intentional acts found within the work of Husserl, namely acts of empty intending in which the meaning of the act is unfulfilled by intuition. In this sense, what we consider commonsensical philosophical concepts may indeed have grown from the ground of some valid material determination but, in being used in a purely empty form of intending in their transmission in tradition their original intuitive fulfillment is no longer activated which allows their form and application to change and drift. In recognizing the growth of concepts from the soil of life we have given ourselves a new problematic. We can be assured of the faithfulness of phenomenology to the flowing life of existence only if we can be certain that the concepts we use are derived from the matters of concern, or can be reconnected to their origin, and this in turn raises the problem of our mode of access to living concepts or categories. If we accept the principle of the material determination of form, we may be assured that every concept was originally dictated by its content but this does not alleviate the danger that its content has long since been lost in the human tendency towards the repetition of formulas and functions the point of which have long been lost. How do we distinguish the authentic speech of life from the reified speech of traditional

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 22

⁴² “For our problem, the basic bearing of phenomenology yields a decisive directive: not to construct a method from outside or from above, not to contrive a new theoretical path by exercises in dialectic.” TD p. 93

philosophy or theory? How do the things themselves dictate their proper concepts to us?

Heidegger presents the guiding insight thus:

“The categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata as such, “lattices”; on the contrary, they are alive in life itself in an original way: alive in order to “form” life on themselves. They have their own modes of access, which are not foreign to life itself, as if they pounced down upon life from the outside, but instead are precisely the preeminent way in which life comes to itself.”⁴³

However, it should be clear that this insight leaves unresolved what are the

“modes of access” that the categories themselves as forms of life have. The answer to this question rests in an applying of Husserl’s insights concerning categorial intuition to Dilthey’s fundamental program of the derivation of concepts of life from life itself.

Natorp’s critique had two levels, first the claim of objectification at the level of reflection and then the further abstraction contained in language. We have already asserted that Heidegger locates the critique’s flaw in the assumption of artificial divisions between reflection and life, or humanity and reality. It is important to note that this general method of finding deeper unities where others assume dualisms progresses even further than the location of speech in life and concepts in existence itself. In fact, Heidegger wishes to locate the two levels of Natorp’s critique within the same activity of life. In other words, life speaks and in speaking it sees and directs its sight: “Whether or not it is vocalized, it is always in some way speaking. Language speaks not only in the course of the perceiving, but even guides it; we see through language.”⁴⁴ What has occurred here is in fact a move to a hermeneutic understanding of vision, whereby each seeing is a ‘seeing as’ and perception itself ends up being saturated with the categorial. It is an important point that this relation works both ways. Every seeing goes hand in hand

⁴³ Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* p. 66 henceforth [PIA]

⁴⁴ IPR p. 22

with the possibility of its expression and all speaking directs vision. Now, the Neo-Kantians would be happy enough to accept the hermeneutic assertion that every seeing is a ‘seeing as’, indeed a philosophical movement centered on the active conceptualizing activities of the mind to the point of an absolutization of mediation would have to be comfortable with such a claim, but the further claim that the categorial elements found in vision and speech derive from base facticity itself, namely from life, flies in the face of Neo-Kantian conceptualizing mediation. Through this insight we have moved to the heart of Heidegger’s answer to Natorp which goes beyond the basic insights drawn from Dilthey, namely his conception of understanding as hermeneutic intuition:

“The empowering experiencing of living experience that takes itself along is the understanding intuition, the hermeneutical intuition, the originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the receipts and precepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out. Universality of word meanings primarily indicates something originary: worldliness of experienced experiencing.”⁴⁵

In order, then, to fully understand what it means to locate both language and conceptualization in the movement of life itself, to discover a philosophy born of existence, we must turn to Husserl’s categorial intuition and the path Heidegger followed from it to pre-ontological understanding and hermeneutics. Then, perhaps, we can hope to understand the leap whereby we find ourselves not in a reifying language depicting objects over against experiencing subjects, but rather within the world itself.

⁴⁵ TD p. 99

Section Two: Categorical Intuition and Understanding

“We have gone into the aridity of the desert, hoping, instead of always knowing things, to intuit understandingly and to understand intuitively...” Heidegger⁴⁶

Within his lecture course *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena* delivered at Marburg in 1925, Heidegger discusses in depth what he considers the three major discoveries of phenomenology and their importance. These discoveries, namely intentionality, categorial intuition, and the proper original sense of the apriori, are then transformed in various ways which form the basis of a rough version of what will later become *Being and Time*. We note a telling foreshadowing of the uses to which Heidegger will put Husserl’s work when, prior to his presentation of the discoveries, Heidegger comments that Dilthey was the first to recognize the importance of the *Logical Investigations*, the early work of Husserl in which these insights are presented. It was upon these insights which Dilthey, already an old man, sought to complete the goal towards which he had been driving throughout the course of his work; “Dilthey here found an initial fulfillment of what he had sought for decades and formulated as a crucial program in the Academy essay of 1894: a fundamental science of life itself.”⁴⁷ It is precisely this recognition of the promise of Husserl’s discoveries which Heidegger goes on to articulate and develop in the transformation of categorial intuition into a pre-ontological understanding and hermeneutic intuition from which the categories proper to the study of any given matter might be uncovered. In the course of this transformation

⁴⁶ TD p. 55

⁴⁷ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena* p. 24 henceforth cited as [CT]

Heidegger will have to reverse the founded/founding relation of categorial intuition and sensory intuition, which will bring him to the very foundation of the hermeneutic insights concerning the finitude and oriented nature of human disclosure which is expressed in the transformation of intentionality into the structure of care. This path will bring us fully to the concept of the world, discovered in our Being-in-the-world which has the character of care. What we originally called the challenge of *Gelassenheit*, or how we can let anything be experienced as what it is as it is, will finally come into focus in our engagement with the concept of world which is co-determinate with, both determining and created by, all our ways of taking, interacting with, and talking over things, ourselves, and our concerns. This will bring us through Chapter Two where it will begin to become clearer what it means to claim, as I do, that it is precisely beyond this point, beyond world as an answer to the question of why we take things the way we do and how they should be taken in themselves, which “The Origin of the Work of Art” seeks to go. “The Origin of the Work of Art” can not accomplish, or even wish to accomplish this, however, if we adopt with Young and Dreyfus the view that the worlds set up by artworks always have their origin outside of the event of art in the scattered practices or unarticulated world of a cultural people. In order to better understand this path we will need to turn to Husserl, and the presentation of categorial intuition within his *Logical Investigations*.

The issue of categorial intuition is raised, for Husserl, within the framework of meaning fulfillment and perceptual assertions or observations. Husserl states that: “Knowledge always has the character of a fulfillment and an identification: this may be observed in every case where we confirm a general judgment through subsequent

intuition, as in every other case of knowledge.”⁴⁸ The meaning of a perceptual assertion is fulfilled insofar as an intuition is provided in which the meaning content of the sentence can be identified with the content of the intuition. As Heidegger presents the issue; “Identifying fulfillment is what we call evidence. Evidence is a specific intentional act, that of identifying the presumed and the intuited; the presumed is itself illuminated in the matter.”⁴⁹ In this light the question is raised if even basic sentences allow for complete and adequate fulfillment, if even the most common sentences are such as allow for evidence. As Husserl puts the question in section forty of the sixth logical investigation: “Are there parts and forms of perception corresponding to all parts and forms of meaning?”⁵⁰ The example Husserl uses to demonstrate the difficulty of the issue is an apparently straightforward perceptual statement such as “This paper is white.” We do indeed have a sensuous intuition corresponding to whiteness. However, the statement also contains logical connectives, such as the copula “is”, which require fulfillment as well. Do we perceive the being of the paper? Or, taking the statement in a different sense, do we perceive the being white of the paper? As Husserl states: “I can see color, but not being-colored. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. I can hear a sound, but not that something is sounding.”⁵¹ In even the most basic sentence there exists a surplus of meaning that is unfulfilled by merely sensuous intuition: “The intention of the word ‘white’ only partially coincides with the color-aspect of the apparent object; a surplus of meaning remains over, a form which finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it. White paper is paper which *is* white.”⁵² As Husserl points out, only the meanings which

⁴⁸ Husserl *Logical Investigations Vol 2*, p. 275 henceforth cited as [Hus.]

⁴⁹ CT p. 50

⁵⁰ [Hus.] p. 272

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 277

⁵² Ibid. p. 273

refer to quality alone receive direct sensuous fulfillment in perception, all formal characteristics such as are expressed by formal words such as “the”, “some”, “not”, “which”, “is” and many others representing structural formal elements apparently receive no direct perceptual fulfillment.⁵³ If, as asserted, all knowledge has the character of fulfillment and identification, how are we to reassure ourselves of our knowledge of even so simply a statement as “This paper is white”?

The answer rests in distinguishing founding acts of sensuous intuition from founded categorial acts. The founded acts to which I refer are connective, relational, or formative acts in general which arise from an original sensuous intuition and make explicit what was implicit within the sensuous whole. Categorial intuition may, then, be formally defined as a perceptually founded act wherein formal aspects of meaning intentions find their fulfillment. The line of reasoning we have laid out thus far is fairly direct, sentences contain more than sensuously fulfillable content insofar as there is a meaning surplus found in the categorial elements of even basic perceptual assertions, thus there must be non-sensuous fulfillment at our disposal if even basic sentences are going to be able to be transformed into knowledge through evidentiary acts. This line of thought has been understood by many, in one form or another, including such thinkers as John Locke. The twist is Husserl’s answer to the demand for non-sensuous fulfillment. Where someone like Locke posits the origin of the meanings of formal aspects of assertions in reflection upon mental acts performed on sensuous data, Husserl asserts that reflection upon mental acts would never provide us with knowledge of the meanings of categorial properties. While this method may be useful when actually seeking the meaning of

⁵³“Briefly we see that the case of structured meanings is not so simple as the case of a “proper” individual meaning, with its straightforward relation of coincidence with perception.” Ibid. p. 273

mental acts, such as judgments where by we can perhaps reflect upon a moment of mental judgment and thus receive some fulfilling intuition of what a judgment is, the meaning of something like Being or “is-ness” can not be thus found in some mental act: “The thought of a Judgment fulfills itself in the inner intuition of an actual judgment, but the thought of an ‘is’ does not fulfill itself in this manner. Being is not a judgment nor a constituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a judgment.”⁵⁴ We can, then, arrive at the fulfillment of categorial elements of assertions through neither sensuous intuition nor reflection upon mental acts. What these categorial elements actually correspond to, Husserl asserts, are “states of affairs” of which we can gain intuitions based upon sensuous intuitions. We can now polish further our definition of categorial intuition. Categorial intuition is an intuition, founded upon sensuous intuition, granting knowledge of a state of affairs. As Husserl states:

“Not in reflection upon judgments, nor even upon fulfillments of judgments, but in the fulfillments of judgments themselves lies the true source of the concepts State of Affairs and Being (in the copulative sense). Not in these acts as objects, but in the objects of these acts, do we have the abstractive basis which enables us to realize the concepts in question.”⁵⁵

In narrowing in on a clearer understanding of Husserl’s categorial intuition, we must now ask more clearly and directly what exactly we mean by categorial intuition as a founded act of perception.

Categorial intuition is founded insofar as it requires a perceptual intuition from which it can arise, we can not imagine a direct intuition of “is” without something which actually is given to us as existing through sensuous intuition. Another way to consider this point is to note that categorial elements, insofar as they are relational or connective

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 278

⁵⁵ Ibid p. 279

etc., seem to require predicates or objects which are being related.⁵⁶ In this sense, then, we can delineate two levels of perception or intuition:

“Sensuous or real objects can in fact be characterized as objects of the lowest level of possible intuition, categorial or ideal objects as objects of higher levels... the object is also an immediately given object in the sense that, as this object perceived with this definite objective content, it is not constituted in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts, acts founded on other acts which bring other objects to perception. Sensuous objects are present in perception at a single act-level: they do not need to be constituted in many-rayed fashion in acts of higher level, whose objects are set up for them by way of other objects, already constituted in other acts.”⁵⁷

Categorial intuition, then, requires the base of sensuous intuition given at a single act-level, upon which objects with categorial aspects then arise. In such founded intuition, then, “...something appears as actual and self-given, which was not given, and could not have been given, as what it now appears to be, in these foundational acts alone. On the other hand, the new objects are based on the older ones, they are related to what appears in the basic acts.”⁵⁸ The State of Affairs we intuit through categorial intuition arises from simply given sensuous intuition, and yet is a newly constituted object. From some direct experience of whiteness we discern the whiteness of a piece of paper, a piece of paper which is further intuited as there before us existing. It is important to stress the implications of this new object, we are not engaged in a simple combinatory activity involving atomistic data of sensory perception and we are not inferring conclusions from sensory data, we are directly seeing categorial aspects of objects. Husserl insists that “...

⁵⁶ One is tempted to note here that, despite many empiricist claims to the contrary, it seems just as difficult to imagine a pure perception such as a simple sensuous intuition of yellowness. It is always a given patch of yellowness, with some sense of size and location, which undoubtedly seems to come to mind. One might claim that relational properties are as required for the possibilities of predicates as the reverse. This is part of the hermeneutic insight Heidegger will use in altering the concept of categorial intuition. Every seeing is also a seeing-as and a perceiving of some state of affairs. To speak of perception free of categorial elements seems meaningless.

⁵⁷ Hus. p. 282

⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 282-283

we are here dealing with a sphere of objects, which can only show themselves ‘in person’ in such founded acts.”⁵⁹ Another way in which this can be considered is in terms of part to whole relations. Straightforward sense perception always only gives a homogenous unity, a unity which has not been arrived at through the unification of various atomistic perceptual data but which is there all at once without the need for any unifying act.⁶⁰ However, founded upon this straightforward sensory perception, we can have another intuition of elements related to each other within such a unity, similarly we can for the first time have an intuition of the unity as a unity;

“Only when we use the perceptual series to found a novel act, only when we articulate our individual percepts, and relate their objects to each other, does the unity of continuity holding among these individual percepts – the unity of fusion through their coinciding intentions – provide a *point d’appui* for a consciousness of identity.”⁶¹

The recognition, then, of any sensuously given element as an element of a larger part, or as a unity made up of parts, is always a relational founded categorial act.⁶² In the movement from the directly given perceptual whole to an intuition of its categorial relational elements we have moved, Husserl asserts, from the sphere of sensibility to that of understanding. As this language should suggest, however, in characterizing categorial intuition as understanding we have completed a revolution from Kant’s original understanding of these sets of terms.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ “The unity of perception comes into being as a straightforward unity, as an immediate fusion of part-intentions, without the addition of new act-intentions.” Ibid. p. 284

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 285

⁶² “It is clear, per contra, that the apprehension of a moment and of a part generally as a part of the whole in question, and, in particular, the apprehension of a sensuous feature as a feature, or of a sensuous form as a form, point to acts which are all founded: these acts are in our case of a relational kind.” Ibid. p. 286

Within Kant the sensibility/understanding divide can be explicated in terms of the passivity with which the mind receives intuition and the active spontaneity with which it organizes intuition according to the categories of the understanding. With the presentation of categorial intuition, however, we have dissolved the divide between the passively receptive and spontaneously active. If the categories are no longer imposed, but rather experienced in perception and intuition, then the wall between the mind and the thing-in-itself has fallen. When we reflect upon Heidegger's early interest in the principle of the material determination of form which he discusses in its connection to the theory of categories in Duns Scotus, which we mentioned earlier, we can see how exciting the claim that intuition, properly understood, can give direct perception of categorial forms was for Heidegger. Furthermore, recalling the need to locate the origin of philosophical concepts in life itself we had earlier discussed in Heidegger's taking up of Dilthey's project in answer to Natorp, we can now begin to see ourselves clear to the way in which the categories and concepts proper to any given subject matter can be arrived at. The matter in question does indeed provide its own categories, precisely through categorial intuition. There remains, however, one element of Husserl's presentation we still must explicate and upon which Heidegger's fruitful use of hermeneutic insights rests, and that is the manner in which States of Affairs are given in categorial intuition.

Categorial intuition, as founded intuition arising from a base of straightforward sensuous intuition, can be described as an act of explicating and articulating new objects out of the sensuously intuited. New objects are categorially intuited, but this intuition can be understood as articulation. This multileveled analysis of intuition, which brings understanding out of the mind and into the realm of what can be perceived by way of

intuition, gives rise to the observation that a sensible object can be intuited by us in a variety of ways: “It can, first of all, of course, be apprehended in ‘straightforward’ fashion... The same object can, however, be grasped by us in explicating fashion: acts of articulation can put its parts ‘into relief,’ relational acts bring the relieved parts into relation, whether to one another or to the whole.”⁶³ Husserl goes on to observe that, insofar as categorial intuition can occur in a variety of manners, or can to a certain degree be allowed not to occur at all, several different objects can arise from the same straightforwardly given sensuous intuitional base. The manner in which different categorial intuitions arise will be determined by the perspective or standpoint from which we intuit, thus highlighting the possibility of various possible States of Affairs to be intuited from any given perceptual base due to the interpretive position of the viewer:

“According, therefore, to our ‘interpretative standpoint,’ or to the ‘sense of our passage’ from part to whole or contrariwise – which are both novel phenomenological characters making their contribution to the total intentional matter of the relating act – there will be two possibilities, marked off in a priori fashion, in which the ‘same relation’ can achieve actual givenness.”⁶⁴

While Husserl’s example here focuses on the option between arriving at an intuition of the relation of a part to the whole or a whole to its part, either of which will grant a different actual phenomenological relation, he also provides examples where the alternatives provided by the variety of interpretive standpoints is more pronounced. In a State of Affairs involving a plurality of members of a given whole, one’s orientation towards one specific member of the whole rather than another will give rise to the

⁶³ Ibid. p. 286-287

⁶⁴ Ibid. p. 287-288

intuition of a relationship which would be different had one picked out a different member as primary:

“Only when one member is picked out as principal member, and is dwelt on while the other members are still kept in mind, does a determination of members by members make its appearance, a determination which varies with the kind of unity that is present and plainly also with the particular members set in relief. In such cases also the choice of a principal member, or of a direction of relational apprehension, leads to phenomenologically distinct forms of relationship, correlatively characterized, which forms are not genuinely present in the unarticulated percept of the connection as a straightforward phenomenon, but which are in it only as ideal possibilities, the possibilities, that is, of fulfilling relevant founded acts.”⁶⁵

What Husserl has, then, asserted is that the manner in which we approach any given straightforward sensuous intuition, which includes our interpretive position in relation to it, determines the categorial elements which can arise from the given sensuous base. Here we have at least a slight appreciation for the determinative power of the hermeneutic (and might we hazard to say historical?) position of any potential categorial intuitor. We can begin to see in this a further reason why this presentation of categorial intuition would have struck the young Heidegger as so exciting, and also why categorial intuition was able to play such a fundamental role in Heidegger’s hermeneutic reforming of phenomenology. Indeed, once the founding/founded relationship between sensuous intuition and categorial intuition is reversed in Heidegger, with the determinative power of interpretive position for intuiting categorial elements and States of Affairs maintained, we have almost all of the necessary elements for Heidegger’s hermeneutic understanding of philosophy. Further, this way in which categorial intuition discloses States of Affairs which are already implicit in straightforward sensuous intuition will be echoed, in importantly altered forms, in Heidegger’s talk of the concept of a Situation in both his

⁶⁵ Ibid. p. 288

1919 summer semester lecture course and in his discussion of the manner in which authenticity discloses a Situation in which one always already was in *Being and Time*. Now let us move on to discuss more directly what the young Heidegger was able to make of categorial intuition.

Within his discussion of categorial intuition in *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena*, large sections of which are taken almost verbatim from Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Heidegger makes an observation which, while it can pass almost unnoticed, fundamentally turns Husserl's conception on its head: "What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what *one says* about the matter."⁶⁶ In the previous section of this work we have already discussed the way in which Heidegger, in *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, states that the being of the world and the being of life have a very specific connection and relation through the being of speaking. Language is the activity whereby existence, or being in the world, is disclosed to itself. It is important to note here that language is, first of all, fundamentally public, social and enmeshed in a cultural life world. Language is understood as a shared public activity of ostension whereby elements of the world are explicated, articulated, uncovered and disclosed. In this way speech is already an undertaking, a cultural activity of relating to the world that is wrapped up in our collective projects which have already disclosed specific ways in which the world might be and which are always already underway towards further articulation. As Heidegger observes in shifting the focus of an interpretation of categorial

⁶⁶ CT p. 56

intuition: “This inherently determinate character of the world and its potential apprehension and comprehension through expressness, through already having been spoken and talked over, is basically what must now be brought out in the question of the structure of categorial intuition.”⁶⁷ For these reasons Theodore Kisiel sees in Heidegger’s take over of categorial intuition a move from identifying categories primarily as delineators of ontological regions towards instead identifying them as projects and projections which then delineate ontological regions when taken in a theoretical manner:

“Heidegger will view these categories not only as contexts or regions of being but also, more temporally, as projects that already anticipate and guide our understanding of objects that appear in their respective regions... Categories are first of all incipient presuppositions of an operative context that carry us forward in the movement of interpreting that context. Categories are at work before they are seen, and we attempt to see them to put them to work all the more effectively...”⁶⁸

If, in fact, we see what one says about matters then we have located categorial determinations in language and we have further located language within the context of cultural projects. In doing so we have de-theorized categorial intuition by locating it back into the flow of life and in doing so we have reversed the founding/founded relation between sensory and categorial intuition: “But if intuition in general can thus be taken back to a more fundamental operative context, then sense intuition is itself a founded mode of knowledge.”⁶⁹ An observant reader will, however, noticed something unusual that has occurred here. Our talk of categorial *intuition* now seems out of place, for of course we are no longer discussing anything of an intuitive nature at all. Rather, the work which categorial intuition did for Husserl is now done, for Heidegger, by our shared

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Kis. 2003 p. 96

⁶⁹ Ibid.

involvement in a way of life made up of practices, commitments, and projects. What Husserl locates in consciousness Heidegger is able to locate in our being involved in the world with others. In this way, as Kisiel points out, the supposedly cognitive which was formerly assumed to be foundational is in fact founded upon active engagements in the world: “If non-cognitive comportment underlies our more cognitive behaviour, if our more cognitive stances are drawn from our non-cognitive comportment, then this expository movement is a mode of knowing more basic than intuition.”⁷⁰ At this point we will pause to ask a troubling question. If the founding/founded relation has been reversed, and the categorial has been located in speech and projects, are we not simply left with some form of social constructivism wherein our experience of the world is culturally determined and this determination either constructs experience or constrains and directs it in such a way that we are thrown back into the divided world of Kant, once more forever removed from the world as it is? Our answer to this question will rest in Heidegger’s discussion of the new understanding phenomenology allows us of the original sense of the apriori.

While the categorial intuition of Husserl has been turned on its head, it is important that we not forget certain key aspects we brought out in its discussion. When considering the hermeneutic aspects of Husserl’s understanding and of the manner in which one’s point of view effects the categorial intuition which discloses a given state of affairs, it was important to note that the effect of various view points on the availability of given categorial intuition in no way suggested the subjectivity of said intuitions. In the same way that a sensuous intuition might alter as I move my perspective and yet not thus

⁷⁰ Ibid.

suggest that the intuition originates from me, so too the relativity of categorial intuition to hermeneutic interpretive position does not suggest the origin of the categorial in my inferential or judging faculties. We can, then, round out this chain of points by extending the discussion to Heidegger's location of the categorial in speech and the shared assumptions and foundations of our collective activities. Heidegger states that the structure of categorial intuition must now be altered to match the insight that the "determinate character of the world and its potential apprehension and comprehension" arises through its already having been talked over.⁷¹ This "having been spoken and talked over" need not be radically different in terms with respect to constructivism or subjectivism from a table having been seen from a certain perspective. Neither suggests that the table or its characteristics are constructs of subjectivity or veils before the form of the thing in itself. The world is disclosed precisely in the "having been spoken and talked over", in our projects and activities the world appears for us, but this is not to say that the determinative power of hermeneutic position should be turned into a concern about our being limited to "mere appearance".

Following his discussion of categorial intuition in *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena* Heidegger attempts to return to the original, or primordial, meaning of the apriori. This presentation, he states, will be shorter than that dedicated to either intentionality or categorial intuition because it is the one which still requires the most work insofar as it is only limitedly clarified by phenomenology and still enwrapped in traditional lines of investigation. In fact, to fully clarify the nature of the apriori Heidegger points us to the end of the entire path of his inquiry, which will be the

⁷¹ CT p. 56

appropriate exposition of the nature of time. However, even in the short discussion Heidegger presents, we already see the manner in which his new understanding of categorial intuition is attempting to avoid any of the old epistemic problems and concerns, such as our earlier concern that we have landed ourselves in a form of social constructivism. Phenomenology has shown, Heidegger claims, that "...the apriori is not limited to the subjectivity, indeed that in the first instance it has primarily nothing at all to do with subjectivity."⁷² This is so because Husserl's presentation of categorial intuition has shown that, "There are sensory ideas, ideas whose structure comes from the subject matter's content (color, materiality, spatiality), a structure which is already there in every real individuation and so is apriori in relation to the here and now of a particular coloration of a thing. All of geometry as such is proof of the existence of a material apriori."⁷³ The material a priori, and its disclosure through categorial intuition, can then be found, as it were, out in the world itself. Heidegger's talk of sensory ideas, and a material apriori, are meant to point towards a deeper unity prior to the a posteriori division of sensation from understanding or mind from world:

"In the ideal as in the real, once we accept this separation, there is in reference to its objectivity something ideal which can be brought out, something in the being of the ideal and in the being of the real which is apriori, structurally earlier. This already suggests that the apriori phenomenologically understood is not a title for comportment but a title for being. The apriori is not only nothing immanent, belonging primarily to the sphere of the subject, it is also nothing transcendent, specifically bound up with reality."⁷⁴

As we had earlier suggested, but can now state baldly, categorial intuition as understood by Husserl and applied to the question of the apriori demonstrates through the presence of

⁷² Ibid. p. 74

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

the categorial in intuition a primordial unity between understanding and intuition. In detheorizing this conception, and locating the categorial in the speech and activity of life, we then find the entire complex intuition/understanding structure, and indeed the subject/object structure it presupposes, founded upon a lived unity of life and world through which what is, is disclosed. It is along these lines, then, that we can understand Heidegger's answer to that other important Neo-Kantian, Rickert, later in the same work where he discusses the three primary discoveries of phenomenology. In response to Rickert's claim that phenomenology fails to be a true philosophy of the immediate, along similar lines to those critiques already attributed to Natorp, Heidegger states: "In opposition to this, it must first be stated generally that phenomenology does not wish to be either a philosophy of intuition or a philosophy of the immediate. It does not want to be a philosophy at all in this sense, but wants the subject matters themselves."⁷⁵ This makes perfect sense insofar as intuition and conception of the immediate, both, are already derivative of our lived engagement in the world. Phenomenology, then, seeks to study what Husserl understood as the a priori structures of intentionality which underlies all intuition or understanding, or what Heidegger will come to understand as the background understanding of being-in-the-world and Dasein's care structure.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 88

Section 3: Intentionality, Care, and Gelassenheit

“It could be shown from the phenomenon of care as the basic structure of Dasein that what phenomenology took to be intentionality and how it took it is fragmentary, a phenomenon regarded merely from the outside.” Heidegger ⁷⁶

Within *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena* Heidegger discusses intentionality first of the three discoveries he attributes to Husserl. Why, then, have we come to discuss it last? The answer is that, in a sense, we have been discussing it all along and now, duly prepared, we can bring all our early concerns into focus through the subject of intentionality and its correction and completion as care. All the problems with which we have been concerned thus far, Natorp’s charge concerning the distorting nature of phenomenology and the impossibility of the unmediated, Heidegger’s discussion of the birth of authentic philosophy from the self articulating speech of life, Husserl’s insights concerning categorial intuition and finally Heidegger’s relocating of this insight into lived projects, have all dealt more or less directly with what Kisiel characterizes as the primal relationship (or *Urverhaltnis*) of categorial form and matter. This same primal relation will be rethought and revolutionized in the strife of world and earth in “The Origin of the Work of Art” and will serve as the scaffold through which what is at stake in my objection to the understanding of world found in Young and Dreyfus will become clear. This primal relation of form and matter, certainly nothing new within the history of philosophy especially since the work of Kant, was in a sense renovated in the work of

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 303

phenomenology in the concept of intentionality.⁷⁷ Intentionality itself, however, was due to be revolutionized in Heidegger's anti-theoretical returning of it to life in the form of Dasein's care structure.

Before we move directly into the subject of intentionality we should note a few further points concerning the connection of the form/matter relationship and our overall project. We have mentioned Heidegger's assertion of the principle of the material determination of every form, and the manner in which categorial intuition and its renovation as lived understanding provide the very mechanism whereby a subject matter determines the way in which it is conceptualized, addressed, or dealt with. What was at stake in Natorp's claim concerning the impossibility of the unmediated is precisely the possibility of any starting point from which the material determination of form can get off the ground. The absolutization of mediation, in either Neo-Kantian or Hegelian philosophy, is ultimately the denigration, if not complete abolition, of a determining ground. If the rational is the real then any determining ground is always going to be seen as simply the incomplete or inchoate fodder for negation from whence the rational can ultimately arise. As mentioned earlier in relation to Natorp, each higher level of expression and articulation is, in a sense, more real and complete than the earlier level from which it took its start. If we do not accept this prioritizing of mediation we are left with an insurmountable facticity, a determining material which gives rise to our forms

⁷⁷ "This original domain is structured by the *Urverhaltnis* (primal relationship) of categorial form and matter, which for Heidegger (as we shall see) reflects a truncated noematic version of the phenomenological *Urverhaltnis* of intentionality. The categorial form reflects or indicates a certain *Bewandtnis* (relevance, bearing) of the matter, the 'circumstances' or 'appliant implications' of the matter itself, just as in *Being and Time* the tool is defined by *Bewandtnis* (appliance) in and through the referential structures of the environing world. Finally, the priority of this original realm is such that even the cognition of it always contains a precognitive lived element, such that it is simply 'lived through' and not itself known." Kis. 2003 p. 103

and our activities, conceptualizing or otherwise, but which is not itself rationally formed. As Kisiel characterizes it: “These more surcharged manifestations of ‘irrationality’ or ‘brute facticity’ thus mark the entry into history of the unexplainably new, unprecedented and creative.”⁷⁸ It may, or may not, be surprising to note that this is precisely the debate in which I am engaged with Dreyfus and Young. Is the world which is set up by art a new enframing or gathering of elements which were already there in the world, thus providing a further mediation of the already mediated, or do we have in the work of art the possibility of an irruption and “the entry into history of the unexplainably new, unprecedented and creative”? As I hope now to show, it is indeed our very dependence upon facticity which places us within the hermeneutic situation that is characterized in Heidegger’s discussion of the care structure which ultimately is Being-in-the-World. It is for this reason alone that *Gelassenheit* can have any meaning and also why it should be a challenge. It is precisely towards the entry of the new to which we must be open, and which Young and Dreyfus run the risk of denying.

As has already been stated, the phenomenology of Husserl has its own way of clarifying and solving the problems involved in the dualism of conceptual form and matter. You will recall that categorial intuition, in dissolving the boundary of Kant’s passive faculty of intuition and the active faculty of conceptual categorizing and ordering, was already a radical answer to Kant’s formulation of the matter/form dualism in terms of the blindness of intuition without concepts and the emptiness of concepts without intuitions.⁷⁹ Beside this innovation, Husserl’s conception of the intentionality of

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 104

⁷⁹ “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.” Kant *The Critique of Pure Reason* A51 B75

consciousness also seeks to lift us out of the morass of the old epistemology centered critical philosophy by reformulating the very problems which gave rise to that philosophy, or perhaps that it helped give rise to, from the more primordial point of intentionality as the being of consciousness. It should be no surprise to us, then, that Heidegger's early interest, attested to in his habilitation, in the form matter relation appears in conjunction with his growing recognition of the promise of phenomenology's intentional revolution. We shall have to look to how it is that intentionality reformulates the subject/object and matter/form dualisms, each of which reflect each other on separate levels, and how Heidegger himself transforms the insight of intentionality.

An observant reader of the work which has led up to this moment will have noted repeated changes in formulation of the central issues in question. Originally with our discussion of Natorp our question, or rather what we presented as Heidegger's question, had been how phenomenology can be understood as not distorting the "things" which it sought to describe. In other words, first we were dealing with a relation between "things" and a philosophical mode of conceptualization and discourse. In response to this we discussed Heidegger's location of philosophy in life and the connection between language, experience, and expression. At this second level the relation in question seemed primarily to be that of life and thought, and then the relation between thought and language. Following this we shifted our focus to the observation of how conceptual elements which apparently serve to order our experience of "things" are given to us with the same sensual intuition with which we experience the things themselves, the key stipulation being that a founded act of categorial intuition rests on the founding act of sensual intuition. At this third level we were dealing with the relation of concepts to

sensory intuition within an experiencing consciousness. Heidegger's relocating of categorial intuition within the engaged activities of life returned us once more, however, to the second level of living-existence, actual language use and expression, and involved activity in the world. Finally we began to discuss the issue of the material determination of form and we arrived at a fourth formulation of the issue with which we are grappling, one which rests on an abstract level such that it can be retro-fitted to each of the formulations already under discussion. I would like to point out that this moving from one level of discussion to another (i.e. philosophy and things; life, thought, and language; concepts and sensations; form and matter) is justified insofar as each of these problematic relations, generally appearing in a dualistic form, shares the same structure as the others and is transformed from one level to another in Heidegger's returning of theoretical philosophy to life. As we shall see, the relation of subject and object, concept and sensation, mind and world, all can be reformulated in terms of intentionality. As Heidegger asserts: "We must learn to see the data as such and to see that relations between compartments, between lived experiences, are themselves not complexions of things but in turn are of an intentional character. We must come to see that all the relations of life are intrinsically defined by this structure."⁸⁰ Beyond this, intentionality itself can be further removed from the arid realm of the theoretical gaze through the locating it in the Care structure of Dasein. My method of presentation thus far is justified, then, in at least two senses. First, it follows the very method of relocating theoretical problems in the soil of life which Heidegger uses, the path of which is ultimately our focus. Second, it provides discussions of the same underlying subject from several

⁸⁰ CT p. 36

different levels and perspectives. We must do more to make our case, however. How are the problematic relations of subject to object, concept to sensation, and mind to world, to say nothing of philosophy to “thing” which includes each of these, changed by intentionality and how is intentionality changed into Care?

Intentionality, most directly stated, is the assertion of the directedness and aboutness of all conscious experience. As Heidegger states it: “*Intentio* literally means *directing-itself-toward*. Every lived experience, every psychic comportment, directs itself toward something.”⁸¹ Rather than simply an observation concerning some characteristic or property of the mind, Husserl locates this directed-about-ness in the very essence or ontological nature of consciousness itself.⁸² Even beyond this, as our most recent quotation suggests, Heidegger wishes to locate intentionality as the fundamental structure of all lived experience and not “a coordination relative to other realities, something added to the experiences taken as psychic states.”⁸³ Understanding the primordial ontological nature of intentionality will be fundamental for our understanding of how it represents a transformation of the old problem of the relation of subject to object. Our preparation for discussing the subject can be guided by criticisms leveled against intentionality. In Neo-Kantian criticisms leveled by Heinrich Rickert, and discussed by Heidegger in *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena*, intentionality is identified with a dogma ridden tradition derived through Brentano from Scholastic philosophy.⁸⁴ We must, then, pause

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 29

⁸² “Intentionality in Husserl cannot be taken as a property of consciousness, i.e., as a character which is unrelated to the mode of existing of consciousness, as simply a modality of the contents of consciousness. It is precisely the very mode of existence of consciousness that the notion of intentionality tries to characterize.” Levinas *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s Phenomenology* p. 41 henceforth cited as [Lev.]

⁸³ CT p. 29

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 28 and p. 32-36

here to consider first what intentionality is mistakenly taken to be by Neo-Kantians and then the important role it actually plays in the work of Husserl and Heidegger.

The dogmatic form of intentionality, used by the Neo-Kantians as an example of the failed attempt to use intentionality as an answer to the problem of mind's relation to world, rests on the assumption that the outwardly directed nature of the mental and its aboutness somehow assure us of any dependable relation to the physical world as it is outside of us and independent of our minds. Intentionality taken, then, as a relation between mind and world appears as a dogmatic assumption of the very answer to the epistemic problem it claims to then demonstrate. This mistaken view of the role of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger rests on the description of intentionality as a relation between mind and world, and not rather as the primordial structure of experience, whether experience is taken in a psychical sense or Heidegger's sense as lived involvement. As Heidegger puts it: "What makes us blind to intentionality is the presumption that what we have here is a theory of the relation between physical and psychic, whereas what is really exhibited is simply a structure of the psychic itself."⁸⁵ Nonetheless, intentionality taken as a structure of the psychic with no reference to physical externality at all still represents an answer, or renovation, of the mind/world subject/object epistemic challenge. To see how this is we will have to consider Husserl more fully.

In the context of categorial intuition we have already discussed the subject of sensuous intuition and the state of affairs we end up actually perceiving. The experience of states of affairs contains, beyond pure sensuous intuition, the categorial elements that

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 35

alone allow the occurrence of what we recognize as experience of objects. Without these categorial elements we would have simple sensuous bombardment. In order not to confuse different senses of the term, we might now wish to change our terminology to reflect the difference between Husserl's position and that of classic empiricists such as Berkley or Locke. What we might call sensory or sensuous intuition in orthodox empiricism, identified as seemingly caused from some external source due to its incorrigibility and the passivity with which the mind experiences it, can be placed in contrast with what we might term hyletic data for Husserl. One reason for making this distinction rests in the fact that, granted the existence of categorial intuition, incorrigibility and the passivity of a receptive mind are no longer unique defining factors of the sensory as compared to the conceptual or categorial. There must, then, be different internal criteria of distinction between the hyletic and other forms of data, for Husserl. As Levinas clearly explains it in his book *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*:

“To oppose the hyletic data to the sensations of the sensualists, we must still emphasize that the character which gives unity to these contents which are grouped under the concept of *hyle* is not the purely extrinsic character of being provided by the senses. This was sufficient for empiricism. But for us this unity proceeds from an internal character which permits us to extend the notion of *hyle* beyond sense-data to the sphere of affectivity and of will... We can distinguish in consciousness an animating act which gives to the hyletic phenomena a transcendent meaning: they signify something from the external world, they represent it, desire it, love it, etc. This act is an element which has a mode of existing identical to that of hyletic data, i.e. it is conscious and constituted in immanent time; it knows itself in the implicit manner which is characteristic of *Erlebnisse*. Yet it gives meaning to the flow of consciousness. It intends something other than itself; it transcends itself.”⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Lev. p. 39

The point to stress is that the meaning giving act which provides a transcendent meaning to hyletic data does not itself rest in some relation between the mind and world, rather as Levinas asserts, this act has the same mode as the reception of hyletic data itself.

Consciousness transcends itself in a manner free of any need for us to look to the physical to define this transcendence, the transcendence occurs internally. Intentionality as the very nature of consciousness points to the nature of consciousness as self-transcending.

Levinas clarifies this position by stating:

“But Husserl also attacks a theory which would see in intentionality a new element, a bridge between the world and consciousness... intentionality is not the way in which a subject tries to make contact with an object that exists beside it. *Intentionality is what makes up the very subjectivity of subjects.* The very reality of subjects consists in their transcending themselves. The problem of the relation between subject and object was justified by a substantialist ontology which conceived existence on the model of things resting in themselves. Then, any relation to something alien was extremely mysterious. As we have shown, Husserl, by overcoming the substantialist concept of existence, was able to demonstrate that a subject is not something that first exists and then relates to objects. The relation between subjects and objects constitutes the genuinely primary phenomenon in which we can find what are called ‘subject’ and ‘object’.”⁸⁷

It is not, then, that some thing or substance known as “mind” is, or perhaps is not, in some complex relation to some thing or substance called “physical world”. Rather, the very nature of subjectivity is to be engaged in self-transcendence because both subject and object arise primordially within intentionality and thus within relation to each other. Intentionality, then, is primary and previous to any mind or world and it is from intentionality that any concept of mind and world, subject and object, arise. It is precisely this point Heidegger makes when he asserts that “...there is a connection between presuming and presumed, or *noesis* and *noema*...”⁸⁸ or when he identifies “...

⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 41

⁸⁸ CT p. 45

intentionality as a reciprocal belonging-together of intention and intentum.”⁸⁹ Outside of skeptical epistemology and epistemic philosophy there is no zero point from which a mind substance is faced with the input of sensory data which it somehow must infer or judge to be a correct or incorrect representation of some external physical substance. Rather, both artificial theoretic concepts of mind and physical matter or thing-in-itself derive from the two poles of the original primordial intentional being of consciousness. The intended is given in the intention.

Just as in the case of subjects and objects, intentionality also works as the origin of form and matter. Heidegger states that “...every intention has within it a tendency toward fulfillment and its specifically proper way of possible fulfillment...”⁹⁰ this also means that every form, taken as a mode of relating to something intentionally, has internal to it a connection to its appropriate matter. However, our previous discussion of language’s ability to persist as tradition alone in connection with the possibility of empty intending free of the corrective of material attestation suggests that form alone can not be taken as determinative of matter. It is form, as the bearer of a tendency toward fulfillment, which depends upon its proper matter for completion. In this sense we can uphold the principle of the material determination of form as a corrective to empty expression or intending, but this does not imply a real ability to separate *intentio* and *intentum* such that one might become absolutely prior to the other. To imagine the possibility of a real separation between form and matter is to ignore the primordially of intentionality and the very idea of hermeneutic intuition, which we have come to identify as pre-ontological understanding, Heidegger’s bold 1919 statement of which first set us

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 46

⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 44

along out path: “The empowering experiencing of living experience that takes itself along is the understanding intuition, the *hermeneutical intuition*, the originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of the receipts and precepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed every transcendent positing, falls out.”⁹¹ We must always remember that it is precisely this vision of the hermeneutic intuition which caused Heidegger to assert at the very close of his first 1919 seminar that “Life is historical; no dissection into essential elements, but connection and context. Problem of material giving is not genuine, but comes only from theory.”⁹² This may rightly give rise to the impression that our subject matter has become blurred. We state that intentionality is primordial, but within this primordial relation the material side is to be understood as having priority over form. At least part of the cause of confusion here has been due to our focus on extrapolating the Husserlian structure of the insights which Heidegger will make his own. It is now important for us to test this general form of the primal relation with the matter itself that is to fill it out, namely Heidegger’s understanding of facticity. This requires us to turn to Heidegger’s transformation of intentionality into care structure.

The move from intentionality to care is, first of all, a move from the epoche purified realm of consciousness to the realm of world enmeshed activity. As Heidegger notes, the very basic activities of interest to intentional analysis, such as the most basic experiences of perception, are to be understood in terms of the purposeful world engagements from which they arise:

“Natural perception as I live in it in moving about my world is for the most part not a detached observation and scrutiny of things, but is rather absorbed in dealing with the matters at hand concretely and practically. It is not self-contained; I do

⁹¹ TD p. 99

⁹² Ibid.

not perceive in order to perceive but in order to orient myself, to pave the way in dealing with something.”⁹³

The same observation was central to the de-theorizing of categorial intuition whereby the categorial elements of experience were taken out of a purely intuitive context and shown, rather, to arise from shared understandings drawn from activities in the world. Things are already implicitly presented to us as organized into ontological regions, complete with conceptual structures, in our everyday activities and dealings with them. Reality comes to us, as it were, having already been thoroughly talked, and worked, over. This is not to say that we are always already biased, as it were, but rather to say that only through active involvement does ‘what is’ come to expression at all. The thing to note in the now familiar movement we have just made is that, in moving from consciousness to enworlded engagement, we have revealed the primal relationship characterized in intentionality to be a temporal, and indeed historical, one. We are always already living in the understanding of a meaningful world provided us through language and shared practices, which is precisely what turns categorial intuition into a **pre-ontological** understanding. As Heidegger observes:

“But what is meant by intentionality – the bare and isolated directing-itself-towards – must still be set back into the unified basic structure of being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. This alone is the authentic phenomenon which corresponds to what inauthentically and only in an isolated direction is meant by intentionality. I refer to this here only in passing in order to mark the place from which a fundamental critique of phenomenological inquiry finds its start.”⁹⁴

⁹³ CT p. 30

⁹⁴ Ibid. p. 303-304. Please note that it is, as it has been throughout the course of this work, not our intention to necessarily assert the correctness of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl. Husserl, of course, provided abundant analysis of the fundamentally temporal nature of intuition through his discussion, for example, of anticipations, protentions, retentions and internal time consciousness in general both before and following the break with Heidegger. What is important for us is to make clear the important elements of Heidegger’s understanding of the break, not to take sides about who was correct in the interpretation of the work of the other. There can be no doubt that Heidegger drew many of his insights concerning the temporal nature of care from Husserl’s anticipations, protentions and retentions. Similarly, there can be no doubt that for a long time Husserl was uninterested or unwilling to consider this temporal element in terms of its

As this quote suggests, the unified basic structure which all lived comportment share and through which they themselves are connected, is the structure of always already being engaged in practices, articulations and involvements which similarly are always already directing us towards various anticipated outcomes and actions. We are, then, always a step ahead and behind of ourselves, stretched out through time as meaningful directed movements. This is, at least partially, what is meant by being-ahead-of-itself-in-already-being-involved-in. A key element of Heidegger's discontent with the original Husserlian sense of intentionality rests in its apparent prioritizing of theoretical comportment as the model of all intentional comportments. He states:

“1. with respect to *intentionality* insofar as this is always construed (less explicitly than implicitly) as *specific theoretical* behavior. Characteristically, intentionality is translated for the most part as meaning, intending something; one speaks of willing, loving, hating, and so forth as meaning something. Through this fixing of usage, a definite prefiguration of perspective creeps into every intentional analysis...for every intentional context of a complicated sort, *theoretically meaning something* forms the *foundation*, that each judgment, each instance of wanting, each instance of loving is founded upon a *presenting* that provides in advance what can be wanted, what is detestable and lovable.”⁹⁵

Intentionality conceptualizes all human comportment in terms of assertion and meaning relations. An intentional relation contains an implicit meaning, or anticipation, which can be fulfilled through various evidentiary acts, imploded through lack of fulfillment, or emptily intended. In this way intentionality, taken as the primal relation which all living comportments contain, locates all human activity and emotion within the realm of epistemology. Everything, all action and feeling, ends up being analyzed on the level of meaning and fulfillment. Meaning, however, seems to be in most cases more a medium

enworlded, social or historical context.

⁹⁵ IPR p. 209

through which we move and which is both set up and assumed through all of our activities than anything from which we are separated as the asserting subject is from his assertion. The disengaged image summoned up by the prioritizing of the theoretical suggests that, while of course all consciousness is intentional, nonetheless we can separate ourselves from any given intentional act or complex of them. This alone helps to explain why Husserl assumes an epoche is possible and Heidegger finds the idea impossible. For Heidegger meaning comes from our involvement in the world, ultimately meaning is this world, and so any attempt to bracket the world will either be destined to fail or will leave one in an absolute void. Recall, for example, Heidegger's valorizing of what he took the Greek interpretation of existence to be: "The Greek interpretation of existence remains within existence, and this interpretation is this existence becoming explicit through the explication."⁹⁶ There can, however, be no explication that is independent of the existence which is achieving explication in the process and from which the process arises. Intentionality understood in an epistemic form based upon the model of assertion, then, destroys the promise that intentionality originally had by reintroducing the very subject/object dichotomy it had offered to dissolve by giving the impression that asserter and assertion, or subject and intention, can be divided to say nothing of the divide between the asserted meaning and object meant.

Much of this critique of Husserl deals more with a feeling and with a misplaced stress or, as Heidegger admits, with an implication, and not with Husserl's official position. As Levinas has helped us to just recently show, there is much in Husserl that seems to precisely avoid the problems Heidegger sees. If subject and object arise from

⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 42

the primordial relation of intentionality, such that their nature is to be fundamentally related, there can't be the sort of epistemic divide based on the model of assertion which Heidegger fears. However, if this is so the outcome of the various phenomenological epoches seems endangered. It is possible that Husserl intended for the epoche to demonstrate, at the end of the day, that the world has never actually been bracketed at all because, in setting aside the question of the existence of subject independent "things" we have discovered that the question was mistaken to begin with. It was an illusion, and not the world, we bracketed.⁹⁷ If this is so, however, it seems that Heidegger as well is correct and it is as world-engaged and both temporal and historical that comportment must be considered independent of the empty rhetorical or, perhaps more kindly stated, methodological gesture of the epoche.

In order to bring into focus the shift that has occurred in the move from intentionality to care we must characterize one of the key subjects of central concern to us which it touches upon. We can approach the subject by asking how Husserl's intentionality and Heidegger's care differ in their conception of the "matter" side of the matter-form dichotomy. Within Husserlian intentionality the matter is the various forms of fulfillment each intention allows. One could also reverse the order of the relation and think in terms of *hyletic* data as matter, for example, and the categorial acts which

⁹⁷ For example, in response to Heidegger's criticisms Husserl states in *Phenomenology and Anthropology* that; "Renouncing the world or 'bracketing the world' does not mean that the world ceases henceforth to be thematic, but rather that it must now be our theme in a more profound way because a whole new dimension has been added. We merely relinquished the naïve attitude in which we allowed experience to present the world as existing and being thus-and-so." (*Existentialism; Basic Writings* p. 285) Later he continues, saying; "...when I turn away from the naïve exploration of the world to the exploration of the self and its transcendental ego-logical consciousness, I do not turn my back on the world to retreat into an unworldly and, therefore, uninteresting special field of theoretical study... We must never lose sight of the fact that this transcendental phenomenology does nothing but interrogate just that world which is, at all times, the real world for us, the only one which is valid for us, which demonstrates its validity to us; the only one which has any meaning for us." (Ibid p.288-289)

provide the *hyletic* with a meaning and context as the form. Either way the conception of matter found in Husserlian intentionality, despite the very form/matter dichotomy's deeper grounding in intentionality, remains very much within the traditional structures and metaphors which had dominated epistemic philosophy for so long before Husserl. Within Heidegger's formulation of care, however, the primacy of matter is rediscovered in our always already finding ourselves within a meaningful world and engaged in ongoing projects. This is one formulation of facticity within Heidegger, our sheer having-already-been-involved-in. This shifts the talk of 'matter' from some focus upon sensual intuition or *hyletic* data, to the transmissions obtain from history and tradition implicitly embodied in our possession of a language and cultural practices. We are, then, always already oriented and directed to 'what is' and 'how it is' through our involvement in a living world. This is facticity, the 'matter' which must have primacy over form insofar as it will always already direct our ways of taking things. This innovation will go hand in hand with the discovery of new problems for the activity of philosophy which will be answered through Heidegger's method of historical de-struction of traditional concepts.

Before we move on to make more specific the new problems which have grown from Heidegger's answer to old conceptions of matter and form, we must first pause to note what a strange reversal and interweaving of concepts has occurred here, and perhaps to clarify this tangle. You will remember that categorial intuition was the reception of the categorial forms which organize experience from the base of founding sensuous intuitions. Heidegger relocated form giving categorial intuition in worldly activity and language while also reversing the relation between sensations and concepts so that, as he put it, we don't so much say what we see as we see what people say. Here, surely, we

seem to have denied the principle of the material determination of form insofar as it is language, and the conceptualization embodied in language, which determines to some degree sensations. Now we find that facticity, i.e. matter, rests in the way in which we are already delivered over onto certain articulating activities and interpretations of 'what is'. First it seemed that form determined matter, and now it seems that our always already implicitly having certain forms precisely is matter. There is only one way that this bizarre tangle, this apparent confusion of terms, can be straightened out and that is to return to one of the earliest points we made concerning Heidegger's early work. In answer to Natorp, Heidegger had asserted that phenomenology is not distortive and language is not an abstracting medium because the 'object' of phenomenology is existence, which is self articulating and self interpreting precisely through the being of language. Phenomenology can thus be born from the movement of life itself as a manifestation of its primordial self articulating being. The important turn to notice here is that, faithfully following Dilthey, life simply is the most fundamental 'matter', and life is to be identified with self articulating and interpreting such that language too is 'matter'. We are thus led into the unusual circumstance where we can assert that our implicit inheritance of categorial forms is facticity. What an analysis of this very facticity will give rise to, in *Being and Time* for example, are the structures of care and worldhood which have apparently been present throughout the course of the historical sending. The very fact of our always already being delivered over to our historical context, for example, is a formal structure of Dasein's being which only becomes clear in the analysis of our embeddedness in a world. These structures are only known through a phenomenological investigation of the everydayness which is the onward movement of historical life.

Within *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* Heidegger provides us with five key characteristics of care.⁹⁸ First, care is disclosive. It brings into the realm of existence what it is concerned with. The concept of bringing into the realm of existence should not be taken to mean that care creates its object ex nihilo, rather we should recall the original sense of the word ex-istence as a standing-forth. Care causes its object to stand forth into appearing, thus it discloses its object. As Heidegger asserts: “Care is nothing subjective and does not feign what it takes care of; care allows it rather to come to its genuine being.”⁹⁹ Secondly, care involves one in an ongoing explicating of what it has disclosed to begin with. Thirdly, care manifests in specific forms of holding onto and maintaining what has been disclosed and the way in which it has been disclosed and articulated. Fourthly, care commits one to holding to the disclosed and articulated object of care such that it leads to the extrapolation of normative principles from the disclosed domain which further seek to legislate over other cares and future disclosures. Fifthly, and most importantly for the issue currently at hand, care manifests in a losing of itself in its own unconditional setting up, articulating, maintaining and interpreting of its own object. What these characteristics reveal is that every care is both a way of seeing while also being, in some sense, blinding. Heidegger therefore asserts that “...each care qua care neglects something.”¹⁰⁰ This makes perfect sense when we recall language’s role of both embodying pre-ontological understanding and, as such, disclosing a world while language also runs the risk of becoming, as it were, an empty intending or empty care

⁹⁸ IPR p. 45

⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 43

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 62

where the voicing of tradition continues independent of any experience of the realities which it had once disclosed. As Heidegger states:

“As a result, care, residing in this manner, from the outset becomes devoid of need in the sense that it does not interrogate at all what it works with (the entire fundamentum of ancient ontology) as to its suitability and its origin; it does not inquire at all into the suitability of what this care again and again sets as its task. That means, however, that the tradition is not itself seen as tradition at all. If what a tradition befalls and how it does so are kept in view, then the tradition is explicit. Insofar as that is not the case and the traditional is taken over in such a way that the entire work of founding is taken over, it is apparent that the tradition has been lost sight of.”¹⁰¹

Facticity, the way in which we always already find ourselves engaged in a tradition, can either provide us with the authentic material determination from which the articulation of life can proceed or can be taken over in an inauthentic empty way such that the possibility of all future disclosure is foreclosed. By authentic material determination I mean an engagement with the matters themselves of concern or a vital tradition which is still in contact with these matters through a connection to the wellsprings of that tradition. In this way facticity or tradition can *provide* us with a connection with those things with which it claims to concern itself. Alternatively, the traditional can be *taken over* or *taken up* simply as empty phrases, statements and terminologies repeated about as if meaningful without a connection to the real experiences or wellsprings from which they originated. This is precisely the issue that was of concern to the young Heidegger when he frequently criticized the philosophy of his day for degenerating into empty talk.

This is a problem I have already mentioned in passing in various forms, it is the problem of how *Gelassenheit* or “...the possibility of letting the entity be encountered in

¹⁰¹ Ibid. p. 216

its character of being...¹⁰² is possible in the face of falling, or existence's fundamental tendency to lose itself within its own self-satisfied and pre-directed care structure. It is precisely because we are always already directed towards beings in a certain way, because we are always already engaged in a certain manner of disclosive interpretation, that any disclosure at all is possible and also that the simple act of letting something be experienced out of its own being can be the fundamental goal, method and problem of phenomenology. Once we understand the historical nature of facticity, however, the answer which will guide Heidegger throughout the course of *Being and Time* begins to become clear. The primordial material determination of our future categorial forms, namely the tradition we are provided with in our facticity, is also precisely what can deceive us into empty talk. The answer, then, is to re-achieve the fundamental determination through a destructuring, or destruction, of the empty elements of the tradition which blind us. As Heidegger states: "In order to get at the matters themselves, they must be freed up and the very process of freeing them up is not one of a momentary exuberance, but of fundamental research. The seeing must be educated and this is a task so difficult that it is hard for it to be overemphasized since we are, like no other time, saturated by history and are even aware of the manifoldness of history."¹⁰³ Historical destruction, directed towards the freeing up of things from the sedimented layers of traditional conceptualizations, is not itself *Gelassenheit* but rather the preparatory stage necessary in order for any releasement, or letting be, to allow things to provide their own articulation through the individual's active, but now open, engagement with it.

¹⁰² Ibid. p. 208

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 212

You will recall my earlier discussion of facticity as both determining and irrational, insofar as it has not previously been worked over through human categorizing rationality. Our question now should be in what sense the pre-ontological understanding which we always already have through being engaged in traditional activities and language is irrational in the sense that facticity is supposed to be irrational. Talk of irrationality here must, of course, seem strange especially since Heidegger purposefully avoided the use of the term 'rational'. Our engaged involvement in a meaningful life world is the foundation for all meaning, in what sense then can it be labeled irrational? However, Being-in-the-world and the implicitly pre-ontological understanding it contains is not something we are taught. It is never made entirely explicit and never justified. It is always a partially inchoate and partially articulate sense of what is and how it is to which we are delivered over and from which all our other articulates and activities grow. As such, the founding determining matter of pre-ontological understanding is not itself rational in something like the Neo-Kantian sense. Heidegger, in *Being and Time* to which we soon turn, calls it a ground which is also an abyss (*abgrund*): "...a 'ground' becomes accessible only as meaning, even if it is itself the abyss of meaninglessness."¹⁰⁴ In this sense, then, as that grounding beyond which no further grounding is possible pre-ontological understanding is indeed irrational facticity, by Neo-Kantian standards, which is never able to be brought into full articulation.

It is important to note one last point, a sort of swaying between temporal orientation that has occurred in our discussion. It is clear that human facticity, understood as our always already having a pre-ontological understanding and active involvements

¹⁰⁴ SZ p. 194

due to our membership in an ongoing active life world, has a rather specific past oriented nature. Our facticity is, in a sense, our existence as finite elements of history, our always already being caught up in the story. The larger argument with which I am engaged concerning the interpretation of “The Origin of the Work of Art” hinges, however, on the idea made explicit earlier by Kisiel that facticity can be understood as the possibility of the unprecedented new irrupting into the historical movement. This is a future oriented perspective. Historical destruction, similarly, seeks to free up the purity of the original transmission from history yet it also allows us to finally be open to the new articulation of a thing provided by the thing itself. It seems clear that there is a tension involved here between the manner in which our temporal historical being alone allows anything to show up for us and the manner in which *Gelassenheit* can be understood as an openness to future possibilities. It is my sense that this tension takes on different forms within the work of Heidegger, and the question of where to lay the stress gives rise to the same tension dividing my interpretation from that of Young and Dreyfus. As I have already mentioned in my introduction, I identify Young as drawing too heavily on *Being and Time* in order to interpret *The Origin of the Work of Art*, a work which I take to be an attempt to get beyond some of *Being and Time*’s limitations as well as a return and completion of much of Heidegger’s pre-*Being and Time* work. In order to understand Young’s mistake, and “The Origin of the Work of Art”’s innovation, we shall have to turn now to looking at the role of world and history, as well as future orientation and past orientation, in *Being and Time*.

Chapter Two: *Being and Time* and Beyond

“Though, as I shall shortly show, fundamental positions worked out in Being and Time demand the rejection of Prometheanism... My view is that, almost certainly as a response to the spirit and rhetoric of Nazism, Heidegger flirted with Prometheanism from about 1933 to 1936, half-forgetting fundamental commitments established in Being and Time (1927). By the time of the final draft of ‘The Origin’, however... he had, I believe, seen the error of his flirtation and returned, decisively, to the insights of Being and Time.” Julian Young¹⁰⁵

Julian Young’s story concerning the way in which “The Origin of the Work of Art” is a return from dangerous Nazi Prometheanism to the solid insights of *Being and Time* rests, at least partially, upon his claim that “...the Promethean reading of ‘The Origin’ is untenable...” because “...it is inconsistent with fundamental positions Heidegger had already worked out in Being and Time.”¹⁰⁶ The larger historical story we are tracing from Heidegger’s early thought to his central work on art has brought us now to Heidegger’s opus of 1927. It may be useful to have recourse to Young’s claims concerning the relation between the work of 1927 and the work on art of the mid-1930s in order to focus our analysis of *Being and Time*. First, it is clear that Young’s position on this relation rests upon two claims. The first, already mentioned, is that *Being and Time* and a Promethean reading of “The Origin of the Work of Art” are incompatible. The second is that the transition which occurs in Heidegger’s work in the 1930s, as traced powerfully by Jacques Taminiaux in his “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’”,

¹⁰⁵ Young p. 30

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 32

is a transition back to *Being and Time*. I believe we shall be able to briefly demonstrate that *Being and Time* and a Promethean reading are certainly not incompatible while also conceding that many elements of *Being and Time* can be read to favor the interpretation provided by Young and Dreyfus. We shall therefore attempt to trace why my interlocutors think the way they do, and nonetheless in the course of this analysis pinpoint why a reading of *Being and Time* does not necessitate such a view. Further we shall attempt to show why the second claim is simply wrong, a point which will rest at least partially on *Being and Time*'s relation to Heidegger's earlier work and the key problematic element or failure he later identified in *Being and Time*. In the course of demonstrating this we shall also continue to trace the transformation of Heidegger's early insights within *Being and Time* and beyond.

The insight of *Being and Time* which Julian Young bases the impossibility of Prometheanism upon is thrownness, the fact that we always already find ourselves in a world.¹⁰⁷ Young is perfectly correct in his assertion that being human actually means finding oneself already in the world, and as already discussed he is right in his claim that art can importantly work as a thematizing of a previously obscure world. He is wrong, however, in presupposing that the role of art as thematizing forecloses the possibility of world creating art. His thought here, not an entirely wrong one, seems to rest upon the insight that the way in which we are delivered over to our world leaves no space external to the world which we might occupy to experience the world as an object which can have beginning or end, or which might be created. But surely the position I have been building

¹⁰⁷ "In *Being and Time*, 'world' is the same as the 'thrownness' which every human being (*Dasein*), as it grows to adulthood, finds itself 'already' in. Being human *means* 'already being-in (a world)' (BT 327)." Ibid.

can appreciate this position. Have I not previously stressed the importance of the insight that facticity is the way in which we are delivered over to the practices, language and history that is our world? Must I reject the Promethean view because up until now I too have rejected the possibility of a world independent stance? I do not think so, and I think the reason not will begin to appear as we note a certain difference in how I have used the term world and how Young does.

Young characterizes as language supporting his view of art as thematizing all of Heidegger's talk of clarifying, making express, making manifest, making visible and, in short, all forms of disclosure. As Young states:

“The artwork's ‘opening up’ of world is, then, not Promethean creation but rather, ‘thematizing’, ‘making expressly visible’. This kind of language is repeated throughout the writings of late 1936. The artwork ‘clears’ what normally ‘veils and withdraws itself’, it ‘make[s] manifest’ the normally obscured, ‘articulates’ the normally implicit.”¹⁰⁸

I suspect that Young has lost many valuable distinctions in his, perhaps unintentional, equating of all disclosure with the activity of thematizing implicit elements of the existent world. It seems, in this, that Young is falling a little too easily into rather common assumptions concerning what world is. Along the lines Young sets up it seems that we can make no sense of world change or the possibility of alternative worlds. If all disclosure is thematizing of those things already implicit in a world then there can only be one world from which all that “withdraws” itself can be drawn. In short, it seems hard to understand how we might ever find the term world in the plural and yet it is clear that Heidegger does use it so, especially in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Both Young and

¹⁰⁸ Ibid. p. 34

I have previously asserted the nature of the world as a framework of meaning. As Young puts it:

“In sum, then, ‘world’ is the background, and usually unnoticed understanding which determines for the members of an historical culture what, for them, fundamentally, there *is*. It constitutes, as it were, the entry conditions, the ground plan, the ‘being of beings’, which something must satisfy in order to show up as being in the world in question.”¹⁰⁹

Not only does Young assume here a plurality of worlds, but he asserts that it is the unnoticed background understanding, the ground plan, which allows things to show up how they are and which something must “satisfy” in order to show up at all. The use of the term “satisfy” points to the restrictive nature of world. Something must fit the world or else it can’t appear within it, but this very way of talking assumes that there are other ways in which a thing can show up. But this means that what “veils and withdraws itself” is not, necessarily, any element of the world but might rather also be that which rests outside the dominate frame of meaning. This becomes more and more important with the appearance of earth in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. The role of earth is prefigured in the nature of truth as disclosure, and the foundational role that untruth takes on in this conception of truth. Ultimately world can be understood along the lines of disclosure, and the ultimate clearing in which things appear just is the world. But this means that the most primordial hidden, veiled, and undisclosed is not an implicit element of world understood as the most primordial form of disclosure. This need not mean that we ever occupy a position independent of world, but it does suggest that the undisclosed, what Heidegger calls “the mystery” in both the “Memorial Address” and “The Essence of

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 23

Truth” and which is importantly connected to the withdrawing self-concealing earth, unveils itself in the opening up of a world at least sometimes through art.

It is in the course of discussing world, disclosure and their relation to the undisclosed that we shall come to see more clearly why Dreyfus thinks that the work of setting up a world must be done through a gathering or unifying of previously scattered or marginal cultural practices. At the heart of our disagreement with Dreyfus we shall find a disagreement over what Heidegger means when he refers to a withdrawing self-concealing earth in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Ultimately we shall find that Dreyfus interprets the earth’s withdrawing nature as the tendency of the world itself, or rather the fundamental purposes and practices of which it is made up, to withdraw and avoid explication while nonetheless providing the framework of meaning upon which the disclosure of anything else rests. While there is something right in this position, it also fails to grasp some important elements of the nature of disclosure which only become more radicalized following *Being and Time*. We, in contrast, shall interpret earth along the lines of the undisclosed upon which the clearing of any disclosure rests. When we consider that the clearing is world, we begin to see why the undisclosed can not also be the world itself as itself. Rather it is central to the very sense of Heidegger’s hermeneutic concept of truth and disclosure that any given clearing, and any given world, is finite and that the undisclosed, untruth, or earth are precisely what is unrevealed by any given world. As we clarify and explicate these various terms and their inter-relations we shall find once more the fundamental question we began with. How might the “things themselves” dictate to us the terms of their own conceptualization or, avoiding mentalistic terms and the assumptions they embody as the Heidegger of *Being and Time*

and beyond would wish, how might they determine our own relation to them and practices concerning them? In other words, how do we maintain the principle of the material determination of form? Indeed, is this principle at work in Being and Time at all?

As this introductory discussion should make clear, in order to differentiate my position from Young's and from Dreyfus', we are desperately in need of a clarification of world and disclosure as they appear in *Being and Time*. These elements we can then connect to our work concerning Heidegger's early work in order to see the way in which *Being and Time* answers, and fails to answer, some of his central concerns which will later appear in "The Origin of the Work of Art". This will prepare us to discuss Young's second claim, namely that the path from *Being and Time* to "The Origin of the Work of Art" is a path which leads through a period of flirtation with Prometheanism to a return to the insights of *Being and Time*.

Section 1: Three Worlds, Worldhood and Sign

*“Whenever we encounter anything, the world has already been previously discovered, though not thematically.”*¹¹⁰

The project of *Being and Time* can only get off of the ground because of the central insight we have already discussed, namely the transformation of categorial intuition into pre-ontological understanding. As we have discussed, Heidegger found Husserl’s concept of categorial intuition so exciting because it provided a way in which the matters of concern for philosophy could provide their own categorial organizing principles. The challenge, posed by Natorp, of how phenomenology might proceed without distorting through its very reflective activity and descriptive language the matters it treated was answered through the use of a de-theorized categorial intuition. This rooting of categorial intuition in the flow of life itself transforms it into pre-ontological understanding, that sense of things which we always already have through our concerned involvements with them. Any matter we might choose to discuss or investigate is available as a matter of concern only because it has already been encountered in human practices and ‘talked over’ through social speech. This goes as well for the most primordial matter of concern, namely Being. As Heidegger states: “Inquiry, as a kind of seeking, must be guided beforehand by what is sought. So the meaning of Being must already be available to us in some way. As we have intimated, we always conduct our

¹¹⁰ SZ p. 114

activities in an understanding of Being. Out of this understanding arise both the explicit question of the meaning of Being and the tendency that leads us towards its conception.”¹¹¹ As this quotation suggests, it is not just that our involvements have already provided us with some grasp and orientation towards Being, but further as was already foreshadowed in Heidegger’s answer to Natorp, the very activity of explicating and clarifying this implicit sense is actually just an intensification of an already inherent activity of the matter in question. As Heidegger later states: “But in that case the question of Being is nothing other than the radicalization of an essential tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself – the pre-ontological understanding of Being.”¹¹² As already made clear, Natorp’s objections must assume first that the inquiring philosopher and the object of inquiry are separate and second that the language and concepts used for the inquiry are foreign to the object of inquiry. Heidegger, however, has already described how language arises from existence, and thus is not foreign to it, and how philosophical phenomenological explication is a manifestation of an inherent tendency of existence itself which is also the matter into which one enquires. We are, then, well prepared for the move which turns the question of Being into an analytic of Dasein.

The general method of *Being and Time*, then, is going to be to show that we already have a sense of the matter under discussion and then to proceed to clarify and correct this sense through phenomenological investigation. In other words, the various sections of *Being and Time* begin with formal indications of the matters which are then followed by phenomenological attestations which fill out and complete the formal

¹¹¹ Ibid. p. 25

¹¹² Ibid. p. 35

indications.¹¹³ What we now come to see is that *Being and Time* is composed of a subtle and complex interplay between form and matter which is precisely what we would expect from our earlier discussions of hermeneutic intuition as pre-ontological understanding and the lived explication of this understanding. But what has priority here? We must remember Heidegger's adoption of the principle of the material determination of form which asserts, in contrast to the absolutization of mediation and the theoretical we find in Natorp, that mediating formal aspects must arise from the matters themselves which they form and be answerable to those matters. This, indeed, had earlier seemed like the very heart of phenomenology itself. We might have reason to suspect that this principle is not maintained in *Being and Time*, especially when we repeatedly find that an opening move of a given portion of enquiry is an appeal to a formal indication, and that the outcome is often the discovery of essential formal structures. What role does matter play here?

The answer lies, of course, in pre-ontological understanding. Where do our formal indications come from? They come from the way in which the matters themselves have already been opened up to us through out involvement with them. It is only insofar as we understand this that we can accept there being any starting point for the project at all, and for each lesser movement within the project. The guidance we gain from formal indication is derived from our lived engaged activities, and these activities are not

¹¹³ See, for example, page 150; "The answer to the question of who Dasein is, is one that was seemingly given in section 9, where we indicated formally the basic characteristics of Dasein. Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself; its Being is in each case mine. This definition indicates an ontologically constitutive state, but it does no more than indicate it." See also p. 311 where, following a description of the formal structures of Being-toward-death Heidegger insists "The question of Dasein's authentic Being-a-whole and of its existential constitution still hands in mid-air. It can be put on a phenomenal basis which will stand the test only if it can cling to a possible authenticity of its Being which is attested by Dasein itself. If we succeed in uncovering that attestation phenomenologically, together with what it attests, then the problem will arise anew as to whether the anticipation of death, which we have hitherto project only in its ontological possibility, has an essential connection with that authentic potentiality-for-Being which has been attested."

impositions upon reality but rather arise from it. We might say either that reality expresses itself through our activities or that it guides the expressions of it which arise through out activities. Either way the point remains the same, the foundation for *Being and Time* is not the imposition of forms but rather the expressions of life. These expressions can be formalized, and once this has been done they can guide our enquiry, but they are always also later subjected to the demand for attestation. Again form must submit to matter. This movement is nicely demonstrated through the nature of anxiety in *Being and Time* which will later be discussed as a prime example of our grasping of formal elements, or essential structures, arising through the most radical confrontation with matter.

Pre-ontological understanding, both the foundation and beginning of *Being and Time*, is itself founded in the fact that Dasein is Being-in-the-world. In other words, we find ourselves always already engaged in a framework of meanings consisting of practices, ways of speaking, goals and in general all that goes into making up our concernful engagements. It is through these engagements that we know both ourselves and anything else, which is why Heidegger can assert that:

“From what we have been saying, it follows that Being-in is not a ‘property’ which Dasein sometimes has and sometimes does not have, and *without* which it could *be* just as well as it could with it... Taking up relationships towards the world is possible only *because* Dasein, as Being-in-the-World, is as it is. This state of Being does not arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein and meets up with it. Such an entity can ‘meet up with’ Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a *world*.”¹¹⁴

We have already pointed to the way in which a difference over how we are to understand world and its relation to various other concepts, such as earth and disclosure, form a key

¹¹⁴ Ibid p. 84

locus of our disagreement with Young and Dreyfus. Let us make clear, then, how it is that world appears in *Being and Time*.

Chapter Three of Division One of *Being and Time* begins with an explication of three different meanings for the word “world”, and a shift of focus to the concept of worldhood. The first and second meanings presented for “world” are what we might consider the commonsense understanding of the word. The first meaning is that world is the totality of actual existing entities which can be simply present to one. The second meaning understands world as the being of the totality of entities, in other words as the ontological categorial elements of everything which exists. This second sense, in turn, can be limited to characterize various ontological regions, understanding ontological regions in the sense discussed by Husserl and the Neo-Kantians both to signify domains such as the world of mathematics, empirical experience, consciousness, or values.¹¹⁵ It is this sense of world with which much of Heidegger’s early work concerning concept formation and the categories was first concerned. However, in his rejection of the theoretical and his turn away from the theoretical excesses of both Husserl and the Neo-Kantians he had to return these abstract ontological regions to the soil of life which gives rise to his third sense of world, which is the sense he uses for the word throughout *Being and Time*.

Where the second categorial sense of world concerns itself with examples such as “the ‘world’ of a mathematician”¹¹⁶ the third sense uses examples such as “the public we-

¹¹⁵ For examples of Heidegger’s wrestling with this sense of world see especially his second seminar “Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy of Value” in *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*. Note in particular his discussion of the way in which the “problem of form” in Lask and Rickert leads to “the problem of categorial divisions into regions” (p. 105) and his discussion of Rickert’s division of the region of values from the region of Being in an attempt to make logic, as the science of value, independent from ontology (p. 162).

¹¹⁶ SZ p. 93

world” or “one’s ‘own’ closest (domestic) environment”¹¹⁷. The move here should be familiar, even as Heidegger did when he returned theoretical philosophical language and concept formation to the activities and practices of life itself, he now returns technical ontological regions to the lived worlds of concern. This move makes the third sense of world ontic-existential, in other words this term applies to various particular existing life-worlds. It is this third sense which Heidegger states will be the meaning of the word world throughout *Being and Time* unless otherwise noted.¹¹⁸

Following his explanation of the three senses of “world” Heidegger goes on to discuss a fourth sense to be considered. This fourth sense is that of “worldhood” which he identifies as an ontologico-existential concept. As ontologico-existential it is located not in particular existing ontic characteristics of worlds, particular structural characteristics of actual worlds are identified as simply modes of worldhood, but rather in the formal characteristics of any world in general. We can see, then, that there can be a plurality of worlds, where world is understood in the third sense as a lived life world, but those structures which are necessarily present in any given such world and which are shared by all worlds make up worldhood. It may be profitable for us to pause and ask ourselves what the difference is between the second sense of world and worldhood proper. Both concepts are labeled ontological by Heidegger, meaning both deal with ontological characteristics which can then be discovered in actual existing particulars. I have already suggested that the move from the second to the third sense of world was a characteristic movement whereby Heidegger reoriented a theoretical distortion by relocating it within

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ “We shall reserve the expression ‘world’ as a term for our third significance. If we should sometimes use it in the first of these sense, we shall mark this with single quotation marks.” Ibid.

the lived experience from which it takes its origin. This would seem to go hand in hand with our discussion in the previous chapter about the way in which Heidegger reconceptualizes ontological regions as arising out of, or being disclosed by, actual lived practices and engaged activities. Thus the activity of the mathematician opens up the ontological world of mathematics, with the apparently ontic here receiving the priority. This is all good and well, but what sense are we then to make of the movement to worldhood? First of all, the second sense of world is obviously concerned with the ontological characteristics of a particular world, and not worlds in general. But secondly, and I think more importantly, the movement from the third sense of world to worldhood represents Heidegger's general strategy of reclaiming the a priori or ontological level following a debunking of empty metaphysical conceits through a returning to life as lived. What is going on might, then, be characterized in this way. First we mention, only to dismiss, ready made traditional ontological assumptions such as the existence of a unique realm of mathematical entities, and we move instead to the level at which lived activities and commitments may or may not open up such a world. At that level we encounter the actual life-worlds which the previous theoretical (neo-Kantian and Husserlian) modes of addressing worlds or ontological regions had covered over. From this base, renewed through a movement not unlike Heidegger's historical de-structuring, we then arrive at new insights about the necessary ontological structures of any given world.

It is apparently, then, to the structure of any and all possible worlds that Heidegger addresses his attention for the rest of Chapter Three of Division One. We might pause at this moment, however, and inquire how we are going to arrive at

knowledge of the necessary ontological structures of world. The first part of the answer to this question will rely upon pre-ontological understanding through the assertion that we always already have a non-thematized knowledge of both our world and the nature of worldhood in general. This will lead to a phenomenological analysis of how our world is actually experienced from which will be derived certain basic structures of worldhood. Following this, later in *Being and Time*, it will be inquired how we can be certain of the characteristics we have derived from our experiences. Is there not a moment when we fully experience the form of worldhood itself deprived of any distorting content of a particular life world? The answer to this question will be found in the phenomenological attestation that anxiety provides to the formal indications derived from our everyday lived experience in, say, a workshop. Our challenge will be to clarify how what is going on in *Being and Time* sticks to Heidegger's earlier commitments to the material determination of form. Before we get to this, however, we shall have to discuss what Heidegger actually ends up asserting are the structures of worldhood, and in so doing discuss what we take to be the foundation of Dreyfus' understanding of setting up a world in "The Origin of the Work of Art".

Heidegger bases his analysis of our experience of world upon the concept represented by the German word *Zeug* which can be translated as "equipment" or "gear". What Heidegger has in mind, however, is not just a discussion of that limited class of objects we experience which can be generally labeled equipment, although he does indeed take something like a hammer as very useful as an example. Rather, equipmental being is taken to be the fundamental being of everything we encounter in concerned Being-In-The-World: "We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern

‘*equipment*’.”¹¹⁹ Why and how this is the case, why everything experienced through care should be considered in the light of equipmental being, we shall have to seek to clarify. One of the first enlightening observations which Heidegger brings to mind when turning his attention to equipment is that there can never really be a single equipment or gear, as the word in both English and German suggests insofar as the word always seems to represent a collective. Any given entity experienced as equipment is always experienced within a larger context including other items of equipment and various goals or projects: “Taken strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as *an* equipment. To the Being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is... Equipment – in accordance with its equipmentality – always is *in terms of* its belonging to other equipment: ink-stand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room.”¹²⁰ In this way, when we consider any particular experience of equipmentality an arrangement of equipment arises in which each element mutually depends upon and refers to the others.

The equipmental arrangement or context can be described in terms of various intentional relations which, it is later demonstrated, each have the intentional characteristics explicated in care. It is useful, here, to recall Heidegger’s assertion from *History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena* that relations between intentional relations themselves have the form of intentional relations. It is precisely this which is demonstrated in the structure of worldhood which arises from the analysis of equipmental being. Every piece of equipment is the equipment it is due to a relationship Heidegger characterizes with the phrase *in-order-to*. The in-order-to of a piece of equipment is that

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 97

¹²⁰ Ibid.

for which the equipment is suited, that which provides it its usefulness or serviceability. A hammer is a hammer insofar as it exists in-order-to strike various other things and generally provide a force to drive them into something such as wood. It is *good for* something. This relation, as an assignment of something to something else, thus marks the very nature of equipmentality as one of reference beyond itself and existence in a larger interconnected context.

The in-order-to relation is, in turn, found to exist itself in a large intentional relationship. A given piece of equipment can only appear as good for some specific use in terms of the goal which makes that use necessary or useful. Every in-order-to is motivated, then, by the work which it aids in producing. This work, the goal of the activities made possible through the usefulness of the equipment, is that *towards-which* the useful activity is aimed. A hammer, then, is useful in-order-to hammer things which itself is only meaningful in the light of that completed work, say a cabinet, towards-which our activities aim. It is important to note, then, that the work, a concept that will be very important in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, carries along with it the entire equipmental context, and thus the world, in which it is made: “The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered.”¹²¹ Work and hammer alike, then, bring with them and make possible the meaningful totality that is the equipmental context that is world: “The context of equipment is lit up, not as something never seen before, but as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself.”¹²² Continuing the pattern that should now be clear the work and this further towards-which relation themselves end up being in an intentional

¹²¹ Ibid. p. 99

¹²² Ibid. p. 105

relation: “The work to be produced, as the ‘*towards-which*’ of such things as the hammer, the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment.”¹²³

Each intentional relationship fits into a large one, and so each level of equipmentality points beyond itself to another. Where, however, is this structure to find its end?

The end to this pattern is found precisely at that level where purposes and practices can reflect upon themselves, namely at the level of Being-in-the-world itself, or Dasein:

“But the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a ‘*towards-which*’ in which there is *no* further involvement: this ‘*towards-which*’ is not an entity with the kind of Being that belongs to what is ready-to-hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose Being is defined as Being-in-the-world, and to whose state of being, worldhood itself belongs... The primary ‘*towards-which*’ is a ‘*for-the-sake-of-which*’. But the ‘*for-the-sake-of*’ always pertains to the Being of *Dasein*, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue.”¹²⁴

The import of this final move to the *for-the-sake-of-which* is that it shifts the dependence of one intentional relationship or intentionally motivated practice onto a self-referential intentional being whose intentional directedness is precisely dependent upon its own taking a stand concerning itself. In other words, every specific tool and both the possible works which provide it its usefulness and the wider arrangement of equipment are only meaningful in terms of that practice and work which has itself as its own issue and for its own goal. Here we should hear clear echoes of an Aristotelian understanding of *phronesis*. As Taminiaux describes the deficiency of other forms of practices such as *techne* and the specific characteristics of *phronesis*: “But it [*techne*] is a deficient excellence, since its end is a product, or *ergon*, outside the agent... *Phronesis*, practical

¹²³ Ibid. p. 99

¹²⁴ Ibid. p. 117

judgment, is the highest deliberative virtue insofar as neither its principle, its *arche*, nor its end, its *telos*, fall outside the agent himself.”¹²⁵ The move to Dasein as grounding the equipmentality of equipment is a similar move, a move away from works external to the agent and to a stand that the agent must make upon its own being which is undecided and ‘an issue’ for it. The for-the-sake-of-which represents, then, the level at which our various practices ground out in the basic roles which we can live and fill. These are roles which are offered us by our history and cultural traditions, roles into which we can be born and drift or roles which we can understandingly face up to and choose for ourselves from the possibilities offered us. The totality of the equipmental context, then, depends upon the foundational roles and practices which characterize Dasein itself at the most basic level. One is a philosopher, carpenter, father, radical individualist, or citizen and only in light of these ground commitments does the workshop, lectern, school house or pen get its meaning.

We should pause here to stress some important elements of what we have said so far. We must first remember that while we have been discussing examples of what is actually considered equipment in our day to day world, Heidegger insists that equipmental being is the being of all things experienced through care. It is not just a hammer or a given work whose completion we are driving towards that appears as it does because of our base commitments and practices, rather the entire totality that is our world arises from, and is constituted of, these practices and commitments. We must recall here, then, everything that we have said about the movement from categorial intuition to pre-ontological understanding. Our ways of being are ways of disclosing the world. As we

¹²⁵ Tam. p. 155

have already said, care discloses the world in a specific way. This disclosive force of care, in the context of Heidegger's discussion of equipmentality, is discussed in terms of "letting something be involved", a phrase with echoes of *Gelassenheit* which we would do well to note. How, then, do we understand involvement and letting something be involved in this context?

We had stated in the past that the world can be understood as a framework of interpretation which structures our experience, or opens up the space which allows for our experience. The details of the structure of that framework have now been fleshed out in terms of the intentional relationships of the in-order-to, towards-which, and for-the-sake-of-which. What it means, then, to say that all entities encountered in care have the being of equipmentality is that they all are meaningfully experienced only insofar as they fit into the structure so far set forth. Of course, a careful reading of what we have already said will suggest that the term "structure" is more than a little misleading. While what we are discussing may indeed be a structure, it is a structure of commitments and projects which carry themselves forward and stretch back within a temporal unfolding. To say that something is disclosed by a world is to say it plays a role in this temporal unfolding of projects. In order to be meaningfully experienced something must be involved in the practices and commitments which are a world: "When an entity within-the-world has already been proximally freed for its Being, that Being is its 'involvement'. With any such entity as entity, there is some involvement. The fact that it has such an involvement is ontologically definite for the Being of such an entity, and is not an ontic assertion about it."¹²⁶ This quotation suggests the danger engendered in the very terms we are

¹²⁶ Ibid. p. 116

driven to use in this context. There is not first some thing which is then involved in the structure of world. Rather, only as involved in the structure of projects which is the world does anything show up at all. Something's being involved, then, is also the disclosure of that entity. Dasein, as the entity that cares, the entity which takes a stand concerning its own being and in doing so involves itself in projects and commitments or finds itself always already involved in them through its history, is what allows for anything to show up as meaningful. Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is then a letting-be-involved which allows a thing to show up as it is: "Ontically, 'letting something be involved' signifies that within our factual concern we let something ready-to-hand *be* so-and-so *as* it is already and *in order that* it be such. The way we take this ontical sense of 'letting be' is, in principle, ontological."¹²⁷ Letting be involved can, then, take on both an ontic sense insofar as my project of writing this work has in this actual context let this entity be experienced as the computer on which I write, and it can be understood ontologically insofar as involvement, or equipmentality, is the Being of what is experienced as meaningful through care.

We might, then, distinguish different modalities of Gelassenheit we have encountered so far. We have discussed the issue of de-structuring which takes apart reified traditional ways of talking and thinking things over which have come to conceal, rather than disclose, the things with which they are concerned. De-structuring, then, serves the role of clearing away the empty talk which, though it may once have arisen from the matters themselves, no longer arises from an authentic experience of the matters of concern. This de-structuring can also be considered a certain type of freeing up of the

¹²⁷ Ibid. p. 117

matters of concern from restrictive previous interpretations. We now have an alternative modality of *Gelassenheit* which is a freeing in a different sense. Heidegger asks: “Our analysis hitherto has shown that what we encounter within-the-world has, in its very Being, been freed for our concerned circumspection, for taking account. What does this previous freeing amount to, and how is this to be understood as an ontologically distinctive feature of the world?”¹²⁸ The answer is that this freeing occurs through something always having been assigned or referred already to certain uses, goals and projects. This is precisely the freeing up to which Heidegger referred when, in his early work, he asserted that we do not say what we see but rather see what one says and, we might add, what one does. This, then, is a freeing through being involved, a letting be through engagement. In this sense, then, *Gelassenheit* is not a removal of concealing masks but rather a positing of revealing roles.

There is one final element of worldhood which we must note before we move on. This last element is the role played by a certain type of *setting-up*. Our focus upon this issue is directed by an anticipation of the important role that setting-up plays in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Anyone reading *Being and Time* with an eye towards the later work on art should be struck by the appearance of this central element in the precise part of *Being and Time* which concerns itself with the structure of worldhood. Setting-up is discussed by Heidegger in this context in connection with the way in which the structure of worldhood is one of referring various entities one to another, and all to various goals and projects. This referring, and indeed those things freed up through our letting them be involved, are aspects of experience which, when everything is going

¹²⁸ Ibid. p 114

smooth, generally recede into the background. When tools are working well they become just another element of the flow of our projects, we don't notice them: "But the Being of what is most closely ready-to-hand within-the-world possesses the character of holding-itself-in and not emerging..."¹²⁹ This holding-itself-in ends when the tool breaks or something goes wrong in the meaningful context of the world. Suddenly we see the workshop, or the world, rather than simply working with and in it. This moment of breakdown serves as a foreshadowing of the later role of anxiety which ultimately discloses the structure of worldhood, but there is another way in which an equipmental context or world can be disclosed as a totality: "Accordingly our circumspective dealings in the environment require some equipment ready-to-hand which in its character as equipment takes over the 'work' of *letting* something ready-to-hand become conspicuous." This special equipment Heidegger will discuss as the sign which is established or set up for the purpose of revealing:

"But even when signs are thus conspicuous, one does not let them be present-at-hand at random; they get 'set-up' in a definitive way with a view towards easy accessibility... In this mode, signs 'get established' in a sense which is even more primordial. In indicating, a ready-to-hand equipment totality, and even the environment in general, can be provided with an availability which is circumspectively oriented; and not only this: establishing a sign can, above all, reveal."¹³⁰

The setting up of a sign, then, serves to bring into circumspective conspicuousness the world itself. Recalling our earlier distinguishing of two ways to interpret the setting up of a world in "The Origin of the Work of Art", the promethean and revelatory, we might now assert that Heidegger discusses the setting up of a sign here in *Being and Time* very much along the lines of Julian Young's revelatory interpretation. Further, the very

¹²⁹ Ibid. p. 111

¹³⁰ Ibid. p. 111

discussion of a sign as a type of equipment set up for this specific reason leads fairly easily to reflections upon the role played by a work of art. When we read the following statement by Heidegger with his later work on art in mind we begin to suspect the forms his thoughts concerning the setting up of a world took at this time:

“Signs of the kind we have described let what is ready-to-hand be encountered; more precisely, they let some context of it become accessible in such a way that our concerned dealings take on an orientation and hold it secure. A sign is not a Thing which stands to another Thing in the relationship of indicating; it is rather an item of equipment which explicitly raises a totality of equipment into our circumspection so that together with it the worldly character of the ready-to-hand announces itself.”¹³¹

It is hard to read this passage and not see prefigured Heidegger’s critique of aesthetics or his assertion that a painting is not simply a depicting. We can almost hear his unusual analysis of Van Gogh’s shoes forming here.

At this point the reader might be confused. Why am I making an argument for the revelatory interpretation of art? The answer lies in the fact that, first, I don’t believe the revelatory interpretation to be wrong but rather just to be insufficient and, second, I am attempting to trace why Young and Dreyfus think the way they do in preparation for pointing out what they have missed. Most of this presentation should be fairly old ground for anyone familiar with *Being and Time*. Now, having made at least a few suggestions about Young’s connection to this section of *Being and Time*, I must turn to the work of demonstrating how these points give rise to the interpretation presented by Dreyfus.

Our discussion of the role played by a sign in revealing the totality of an equipmental context, or world, echoes Heidegger’s later statement in “The Origin of the Work of Art” that: “...there must always be some being in the open, something that is, in

¹³¹ Ibid. p. 110

which the openness takes its stand and attains its constancy...¹³² and it is precisely this quotation that Dreyfus presents as Heidegger's general sense of the role of art before moving into his discussion of cultural paradigms. As we mentioned in our introduction, Dreyfus understands cultural paradigms as a gathering and uniting of previously scattered or inchoate cultural practices. This gathering makes explicit to a people an exemplar around which they can be united and against which they can judge and understand themselves. What has been at stake in my interpretations thus far is an understanding of art as a way in which categorial intuitions, or rather Heidegger's categorial disclosive practices which are what a world is composed of, come to be. Dreyfus' gathering, however, allows for no radically new world to arise in art. What arises is always a new unity of previously present elements or, in Young, a new disclosure of previously inchoate background practices. With the understanding of worldhood from *Being and Time* now present to us it is clear why Dreyfus thinks the way he does. In fact, it would be possible to construct Dreyfus' entire understanding of art from just the material in *Being and Time*. This leads us to ask, did Heidegger not change at all from *Being and Time* to "The Origin of the Work of Art"?

How could we construct Dreyfus' understanding from *Being and Time*? First, we understand world as a texture of practices, commitments, goals and referrals of entities to these elements. At the base level is the for-the-sake-of-which, which consists in the various roles that Dasein can occupy. Now, it is clear from this that the unifying of scattered practices into a new possible role, into a new conception of what one can be and what possibilities are open to one, indeed gives rise to a new world from old elements.

¹³² Hof. p. 61

When George Washington was faced with political leadership following the revolution he had to carefully gather together various previously scattered roles into the new role of president, while rejecting against opposition the assertion of the old role, or old elements, of royalty. This gave rise to a very particular framework of understanding for both American politics and America's people. Similarly, much of the history of art is dominated by the slow movement away from the role of the skilled craftsman and towards the construction of the new role of the "artist". This role, however, was found in the uniting of strange elements of several other cultural roles including that of the priest and prophet along with leftovers of the expert and craftsman.

We can see, then, how the worldhood presented in *Being and Time*, with social roles and practices for its foundation, would suggest that the way in which a work of art sets up a world must be through social practices and roles. When we further consider the work performed by the sign when, in its being set-up, it brings to circumspection the world we seem to have all the necessary elements to explain Dreyfus' view. While there is no sense of this in the passages dealing with the sign in *Being and Time* we can see the step from a sign which reveals what is, as in Julian Young, to a sign which brings into focus specific practices previously unnoticed and so gives rise through this shift in focus to a new world. However, our question should be, why should the shift from a sign which reveals what was already there to one which rearranges what was there to set up a new structure not take the full step to a sign which sets up new practices which were not previously there? If we think back to where we began, Heidegger was originally concerned with how we can conceptualize matters with concepts that suit those matters, rather than importing or imposing inappropriate forms upon them. The answer came first

through categorial intuition, which was taken as the first inkling of a way in which matters might dictate their own forms. This became pre-ontological understanding when it was recognized that it is our activities and ways of talking over the world which disclose reality to us. But, as our talk of facticity suggested, we are not master of our activities, as the original connection between categorial intuition and pre-ontological understanding should well suggest. We find things already disclosed to us in our being thrown into a history and culture. However, it is not just that things have always already been spoken of and practices are always already underway. It is rather that our practices, as forms of disclosing and being with the matters they concern, arise from those matters themselves. Practices can become hollow, speech can become reified, but when they were still vital they were born of life or existence itself, born of the matters they concern, and not simply applied. In other words, perhaps it is not just practices which are already floating about that we have to deal with, rather perhaps what is can disclose itself in new practices. Indeed, this seems to be precisely what Heidegger was looking for to begin with in his earliest work, this is what we would expect from the principle of material determination of form.

I think there is an extent in which this point is lost sight of in *Being and Time*. At the very least large sections of *Being and Time*, like the section dealing with signs we have discussed, can be interpreted just in terms of human practices already in existence determining how things show up. Indeed, one might even develop a tension between the various senses of *Gelassenheit* we have discussed. There seem to be several ways to let things be. De-structuring perhaps frees things up, as I suggested earlier, so that they can then give rise to new forms in which they can be disclosed. Letting-be-involved, on the

other hand, discloses through a freeing up which is a providing of form. By involving things in our practices we do indeed free them up to be experienced, but we may also be concealing them in inappropriate determinations. The echoes of this earlier concern of Heidegger's, indeed one of his earliest and most central concerns, seem to be missing or at least not duly stressed in *Being and Time*. More specifically, in *Being and Time* the main concern seems to be the covering over of Dasein's being without much reference to the covering over of other possible matters of concern. It is a return to this concern with the origin of our practices, I submit, which occurs in the movement from *Being and Time* to "The Origin of the Work of Art".

Section 2: World Enough and Time; Anxiety and the Problem of World Change

“With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’.”¹³³

*“Had we but world enough, and time,
This coyness, Lady, were no crime
We would sit down and think which way
To walk and pass our long love's day...*

*But at my back I always hear
Time's wingèd chariot hurrying near;
And yonder all before us lie
Deserts of vast eternity.”
Andrew Marvell¹³⁴*

*“What is ‘past’? Nothing else than that **world** within which they belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a concerned Dasein who was-in-the-world. That **world** is no longer.”¹³⁵*

I had stated earlier that there are two ways which Heidegger believes we can come to know worldhood. The first, offering more intimations or formal indications of what will later be filled out, is the method employed in the passages discussed so far. This method is that of drawing from descriptions and analyses of our everyday experiences the pre-ontological understanding of worldhood which we always already have but which we are rarely, if ever, aware of. The second method, which provides a dramatic attestation to the earlier indications, is the experience of anxiety in which the formal structures of worldhood appear emptied of all content. As already suggested, this later experience of anxiety has already been foreshadowed by the way in which

¹³³ SZ p. 430

¹³⁴ Marvell, Andrew “To His Coy Mistress” lines 1-4 and 21-24 from Arthur Quiller Couch ed. *The Oxford Book of English Verse*

¹³⁵ SZ p. 431

equipment only ever really obtrudes upon us when something has gone wrong. Only in moments of breakdown, or when brought forth by signs, do the background elements and intentional/care structures of experience rise to our attention. This point, the way in which the very forms that alone allow for meaningful experience themselves only rarely appear, will become important later when we discuss two senses of the undisclosed. For now what is important is for us to briefly present the nature of anxiety and Heidegger's response to it.

Anxiety, then, will be the attestation to the indications already provided about worldhood. It can do this because the experience of anxiety, what is commonly considered an objectless fear, in fact discloses the structure of our relational existence as Being-in-the-world. Anxiety is, according to Heidegger, mistakenly considered an objectless fear because it seems to demonstrate a certain indefiniteness such that: "That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world."¹³⁶ This apparently objectless fear demonstrates the inconsequential nature of any determinate object in the world, leaving all worldly objects irrelevant in the fact of the experience. Ultimately, "... the totalities of involvements... within-the-world, is, as such, of no consequence; it collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance."¹³⁷ This experience of the utter insignificance of any given entity, commitment or practice effectively leaves only the structure of worldhood itself in our view such that "... the world in its worldhood is all that still obtrudes itself."¹³⁸ What this ultimately reveals, however, is that it was the world and, more specifically, ourselves as Being-in-the-world

¹³⁶ Ibid. p. 231

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

which anxiety was anxious in the face of to begin with. The sheer thatness of our being, and the fact that the meaning of everything else depends upon the stand we take concerning our being, is that in the face of which we flee.

In this way anxiety provides attestation of the structures already discussed, but furthermore it demonstrates the reality of pre-ontological understanding insofar as we 'fear', in anxiety, a situation we only really come to experience in anxiety. We must always already be aware, through pre-ontological understanding, of the structure of worldhood in order to flee from it through most of our activities and fear it in the experience of anxiety. Furthermore, the experience of the worldhood of the world both makes clear to us the role that taking a stand concerning our lives plays in the structure of a meaningful world while also depriving us of all such stands we had willingly or thoughtlessly made in the past. We are left, then, with the demand and necessity of once more taking upon ourselves roles which can provide unity and meaning to the world. These roles, however, can only be those provided us by our thrownness into a historical context. This is where we discover the role of resoluteness, the call to a commitment which, once made, will provide a for-the-sake-of-which and thus once more disclose the situation in which we find ourselves.

It is important that we pause here and note one of those points of emphasis which changes from *Being and Time* to some of Heidegger's later work. In the face of anxiety, resoluteness is left with the roles made possible by Dasein's context and history. There is no assertion of a wild leap into a radical creative newness. Authenticity is not the achievement of some dramatic unique position, but rather a taking up as one's own roles, provided by history and tradition, which previously one may thoughtlessly have drifted in

or out of. It is our thrownness and the They which provide us all our possibilities. It is important, here, to note two strains in the argument I am attempting to make. First, there is the debate about whether past and current practices are necessarily the origin of all future ones. Second, there is the related debate about whether these practices come from ourselves or something else such as the worlding of the world or the self-disclosing of the undisclosed. These two debates are related in a perhaps confusing way. The very assertion that authentic Dasein does not leap into some newly created unique role supports my own position, derived from the material determination of form, concerning the origin of our practices in the matters with which they are concerned. If I were asserting the existence of a Promethean artist, and not Promethean art, then the fact that authenticity does not give rise to the dramatically unique would be troubling for me. However, insofar as art is the origin of both art work and artist, the fact that we are always delivered over to something else for our possibilities, be that something else history or the They, only supports my second position that practices do not arise from ourselves but rather through the disclosure of matters themselves. The only problem for me here is why we should always be dependent upon current and past possibilities. Is it not possible that, even as I assert traditional practices arose, new practices can arise from authentic experiences of the matters themselves? Although we do not have a strong reason to assert this from *Being and Time*, I believe a firm understanding of the second debate greatly clarifies my position concerning the first.

There is an objection to my project thus far. In the preceding paragraph I spoke of ontic practices as if they were the forms, and then of the matters they concern as determining them. One might perfectly well admit this, and then point out that there is a

higher formal level I have ignored. The determination of ontic practices by ontic matters might be compared to Heidegger's second sense of world, namely specific ontological regions such as the world of mathematics. Given practices determine given worlds and, I am asserting, rise from given matters. But Heidegger has just spent a good portion of his book discussing worldhood, which is a formal characteristic of all possible worlds. This structure precisely does not seem to be dictated or determined by any specific matter.

But is this really so? Do we find Heidegger anywhere prioritizing the formal as determining its content? The first intimations of worldhood we arrive at through the analysis of actual lived worlds, the world of a workshop and the like. Here we maintain the good phenomenological practice of allowing our experiences of the matters themselves to guide our philosophizing. In the course of this method do we discover that form is determinative? Only if we wish to assert a simplistic social constructivism whereby humanity's practices determine how things show up and these practices are created by humanity itself in leaps of arbitrary creation. This, however, we have rejected in asserting the connection between pre-ontological understanding and categorial intuition as well as in focusing on the way in which we are always delivered over onto something else, generally our thrownness, for our possibilities. Finally, what do we find in the more dramatic phenomenological attestation which is anxiety? Certainly not that some form determines the matter of experience but rather that anxiety, which I would contest is a most potent example of determining matter, does away with all our ontic ways of interpreting things and itself discloses, or determines, the most extensive formal element we find in *Being and Time* i.e. worldhood. Anxiety attests to the fact, more clearly than anything else, that all our finite formulations, interpretations, practices, goals,

and roles can be overthrown by something over which we have no control: “Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the ‘world’ and the way things have been publicly interpreted... Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities.”¹³⁹ This same point is echoed in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer on Heidegger when he discusses disposition and ground mood, of which anxiety is one particularly potent example, as the ultimate determining ground and limit in *Being and Time* beyond which one can not go:

“In one of the most brilliant phenomenological analyses of *Being and Time*, Heidegger analyzed this limit experience of *Dasein*, which comes up upon itself in the midst of beings, as ‘disposition’ (Befindlichkeit), and he attributed to disposition or mood (Stimmung) the real disclosure of Being-in-the-world. What is come upon in disposition represents the extreme limit beyond which the historical self-understanding of human Dasein could not advance.”¹⁴⁰

Anxiety’s individualizing power, then, puts an end to any form of absolute social constructivism while its casting us back upon the possibilities of the public They puts an end to any sort of solipsism. What we are ultimately left with, though it will only once more become clear (or at least clearer) following *Being and Time*, is the determination of matter.

There is a definite progression concerning these themes in *Being and Time* we would do well to notice. In the sections dealing with worldhood it is very possible to be under the false impression that we are absolutely free to radically create any for-the-sake-of-which we like, and thus determine an individualized world structure for ourselves.

There is a hint of this when we concentrate on just the section discussing the setting up of

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 232

¹⁴⁰ Gadamer, Hans-Georg *Heidegger’s Ways* p. 99-100

signs, we are struck by the vague sense that setting up signs is something we do ourselves from some sort of individual freedom. The presentation of worldhood, which indeed is just one element in the progressing explanation of the unitary experience of Being-in-the-world, then moves on to discuss the equally determinative elements of being-with-others and the They. It is with this addition that we begin to see the way in which we are always delivered over to something else for our possibilities. But, at this point, it is tempting to assert some sort of current social constructivism whereby whatever the They currently says determines what is. Section Five of Division Two of *Being and Time* then goes on to orient the possibilities of any current They, or authentic Dasein, within the wider determinations of historicity. As Guignon notes: “Needless to say, Heidegger does not believe that any commitment is as good as any other... At the end of *Being and Time*, he turns to an examination of how a clear-sighted grasp of the current situation is bound up with an understanding of our belongingness to a shared ‘heritage’ and our participation in a communal ‘destiny’.”¹⁴¹ In the course of this final turn to history, however, Heidegger also finally comes face to face with the problem of world change, a problem which points to the need that *The Origin of the Work of Art* will attempt to fill.

The movement of *Being and Time*, which constantly locates more isolated phenomena within the larger context which alone makes each meaningful or allows for their being, eventually arrives at the dependence of any given social role on the historicity of a community. As I have stressed, there is no originating leap for an authentic individual, but there is also no such leap for a community. Rather, the very destiny of a community is wrapped up in that community’s own role within the larger

¹⁴¹ Guig. 2000 p. 91

context of its history and heritage. The fate of Dasein is unified with the destiny of a community: “But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny.”¹⁴² It is important for us to note that world, then, is always also historical. In our Being-in-the-world we find that we also encounter the having-been of previous worlds: “Along with any factual Dasein as Being-in-the-world, there is also, in each case, world-history. If Dasein is there no longer, then, the world too is something that has-been-there.”¹⁴³ This, of course, raises the question of the rise and fall of worlds in general.

It is striking that, in working up to a discussion of this issue in Section Five of Division two, Heidegger uses an example which he will use in the exact opposite sense in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. I refer to his discussion of the Greek temple: “Thus ‘the past’ has a remarkable double meaning; the past belongs irretrievably to an earlier time; it belonged to the events of that time; and in spite of that, it can still be present-at-hand ‘now’ – for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’.”¹⁴⁴ This passage is striking for several reasons in light of the role the temple will play later in Heidegger’s post-*Being and Time* concern with historical world change. First we should note that it appears in a section dedicated to laying out the ordinary, and generally confused or mistaken, view of history. In this sense, then, the dual being of the temple expresses a paradox the solution to which will be an understanding of historical world change. Insofar as the temple, even if in ruins, is still here now, in what sense is it past? Only in the sense in which its world is past:

¹⁴² SZ p. 436

¹⁴³ Ibid. p. 445

¹⁴⁴ Ibid p. 430

“What is ‘past’? Nothing else than that world within which they belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered as ready-to-hand and used by a concerned Dasein who was in-the-world. That *world* is no longer. But what was formerly *within-the-world* with respect to that world is still present-at-hand... But what do we signify by saying of a world that it is no longer? A world *is* only in the manner of *existing* Dasein, which factually is as Being-in-the-World.”¹⁴⁵

It is, then, the paradox of the temple which directs our attention to the fact that we have experiences which point to worlds that, in some sense, no longer are. The second striking element about the presence of the temple as an example here is that, as I mentioned, it will play the opposite role in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. In *Being and Time* the temple appears as a referent to a world which is no more, it is a harbinger of the past. Later, however, the temple will be depicted in the role it played in Ancient Greece as the establishment of a world and, I am claiming, the irruption of the new into history as such. This point, the changing role played by the temple, nicely brings into view at least one of the many shifts in focus which occur from *Being and Time* to “The Origin of the Work of Art”, namely, the move from a backward looking tendency towards a questioning as to the rise of the new. It is interesting, as well, to note that the general path we traced in Heidegger’s pre-*Being and Time* work moved from the decidedly forward looking concern with how we might allow matters to give rise to their own conceptualizations (the problem of the categories and categorial intuition) to the de-structuring of reified ways of taking things until finally settling on the focus on heritage in *Being and Time*. It is important for precisely this reason to stress, then, that the way in which the problem of historical world change arises in *Being and Time* is very different from the way it will later be discussed in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. First we are troubled by the fact that world can be something which is past while later we find the focus on the question of

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 432

how worlds arise. As I had remarked in passing in the first chapter of this work, we seem to see in the overall path of Heidegger's thought a tendency to shift back and forth between the determinative power of history, a past orientation, and the irruptive power with which the new rises into history, an orientation towards the future. Ultimately in *Being and Time*, the problem of world death is left mostly unaddressed: "...if we were to follow up the problem of the ontological structure of world-historical historizing, we would necessarily be transgressing the limits of our theme..."¹⁴⁶ This promissory note, however, was to be fulfilled later through a discussion of art and the setting up of a world, though in a rather different tone and with a gaze cast in a different direction than we find in the original raising of the problem.

We can take at least one key message from the general structure of Heidegger's attempt to understanding Being through an analytic of Dasein. This message is that apparently discrete entities or phenomena, when phenomenologically investigated, are time and again discovered to be part of a larger event from which alone they derive their being. Whether we are making the mistake of discussing "one equipment" or an "individual Dasein", we end up ultimately locating an understanding of the entity in the larger context, be it equipmental totality or Being-with-others in the They. My use of the term "event" for these larger contexts rests, of course, of Heidegger's ultimate temporalizing of the very phenomenon of the world or Dasein. Each given world context or community of practices itself depends upon the ongoing temporalizing of the event from which they arise. This is ultimately what it means for Heidegger to state "... if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-Others, its

¹⁴⁶ Ibid. p. 441

historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny.”¹⁴⁷ Dasein and its world alike are caught up in the larger happening out of which each arise. This point, however, should dissuade us once and for all from prioritizing any current collection of possibilities at the risk of underestimating the role of the ongoing event understood as either a historical sending or self-disclosing future.

¹⁴⁷ SZ p. 436

Section 3: Truth and Untruth; The Reservoir of the Undisclosed

“In its full existential-ontological meaning, the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’.”¹⁴⁸

“The first beginning is not mastered; and the truth of be-ing, in spite of its essential shining, is not expressly grounded. And this means that a human fore-grasping (of asserting, of tekne, of certainty) sets the standard for the interpretation of the beingness of be-ing. But now the great turning around is necessary, which is beyond all ‘revaluation of values,’ that turning around in which beings are not grounded in terms of human being, but rather human being is grounded in terms of be-ing.”¹⁴⁹

We must still discuss Young’s second claim concerning the period leading from *Being and Time* to “The Origin of the Work of Art”. This is the claim that following *Being and Time* Heidegger flirted with a particular Nazi Prometheanism and then, by the time of “The Origin of the Work of Art”, returned safely to the insights of *Being and Time*. In the course of debating this point we will also clarify what I have previously referred to as two different possible understandings of the undisclosed which I take to be, at least partially, the basis of the disagreement between Dreyfus and myself. It will be useful for us first to note that very different readings of what occurs between *Being and Time* and “The Origin of the Work of Art” are possible from the one presented by Young. Despite Young’s claim to be presenting a view contiguous with it, I take the position presented by Taminiaux in “The Origin of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’” to be one such alternate reading as I will discuss later. Another alternate view is that presented by

¹⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 265

¹⁴⁹ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy; From Enowning* p. 129 henceforth cited as [Cont.]

Guignon when he discusses the limitations of Heidegger's understanding of commitment in *Being and Time*:

“To make a commitment is not just to leap one way or the other for the sake of leaping; rather, becoming committed to something is most often experienced as *answering a call* or *responding* to something outside ourselves, something that makes a demand on us. It would seem, then, that any picture of resoluteness that ignores this dimension of being called will fail to capture what is most fundamental about our actual experience of being committed. For this purpose, some account needs to be given of *what calls us*, and this requires a move beyond the descriptions of Dasein's own projections and disclosedness to an account of something that can exert a pull on us from outside ourselves. One way to understand the shift that occurs in Heidegger's writings in the mid-thirties is to see these works as addressing this problem. In the 1935 essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” for example, truth is described not just as a matter of what Dasein does, but as something that happens to Dasein through Dasein's being in a relation to a particular entity – a work of art – which ‘sets truth to work’ and thereby discloses a world.”¹⁵⁰

This particular concern harmonizes nicely with Heidegger's statement quoted at the opening of this section from his 1936-38 *Contributions to Philosophy; From Enowning* to the effect that previously we have mistakenly attempted to ground beings and Being on the particular being of human-being. It is hard not to read in Heidegger's condemnation of the urge to ground Being upon human-being a criticism of his own attempt to understand Being through *Being and Time*'s analytic of Dasein. Indeed, the very project of arriving at Being through some representative or prioritized particular being, a strategy which looms so large in the opening of *Being and Time*, seems fundamentally problematic to Heidegger following. Here we have precisely the “distressing difficulty, which has been clear to me since *Being and Time* and has since been expressed in a variety of versions”¹⁵¹ which Heidegger mentions in the addendum to “The Origin of the Work of Art”. It seems that to properly understand Dasein, let alone to understand Being

¹⁵⁰ Guig. 2003 p. 92-93

¹⁵¹ Hof. p. 86

itself, we must have recourse to something beyond Dasein itself. The reading we have presented of *Being and Time* should already suggest this point, indeed we have attempted to draw out at least a few of the tensions where we see Heidegger pulling in this direction. For example, if we are always already caught in a larger unfolding event it is the event, and not ourselves, which must ground our understanding of both ourselves and our world. When looking at the passages in *Being and Time* dealing with the setting up of a sign which then discloses the equipmental totality that is a world we might be tempted to think that this setting up is something we ourselves do on our own. In contrast, in “The Origin of the Work of Art”, the art work and artist alike arise from art. The prioritizes have shifted, but we have already suggested the way in which the movement of *Being and Time* already points towards a constant grounding of particular actions in large ongoing events and social-historical contexts. In this sense, then, *Being and Time* is already on its way towards “The Origin of the Work of Art”. It is important to note that we were able to read *Being and Time* in the light we have, stressing where we could the determinations arise from beyond Dasein himself through reference to the material determination of form, because of the reading we have already given to Heidegger’s earlier projects. The shift which Heidegger states must occur is the one he was already involved with in his earliest work, a shift to the matters themselves and away from imposed human determinations. The very need to ground our understanding of Dasein beyond Dasein, to understand Dasein through Being and not vice versa, is in a rather potent sense a continuation of the debate with Natorp. It seems, then, that this issue had slid out of focus to some extent in *Being and Time* but comes back into focus following. The famous “turn” then is more a “return” than anything else.

One of the ways in which this shift of focus or strategy occurs following *Being and Time* is in the shifting of weight from one understanding of what untruth or the undisclosed is to another understanding. Both senses were present to some extent in *Being and Time*, but which one was given priority alters from 1927 to 1936. We can see this best by looking at how untruth is understood in *Being in Time* in contrast with how it is understood in the 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth”. The distinction will ultimately be between what is concealed, undisclosed or withdrawing within the clearing of a given world and what is undisclosed insofar as it lies outside of a given world.

Within Heidegger’s discussion of equipment and the structure of worldhood in *Being and Time* he pauses to stress that the very structure he is extracting from everyday experience, and which anxiety completely discloses, is precisely that which generally is hidden in the background of all our undertakings. In point of fact, any given piece of equipment, and remember that everything we experience at all is ultimately going to be understandable along the lines of equipmentality, is characterized by a tendency to be unnoticed when fulfilling its role smoothly: “The ready-to-hand is not grasped theoretically at all, nor is it itself the sort of thing that circumspection takes proximally as a circumspective theme. The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness to hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically.”¹⁵² We, of course, should be struck by the use of the term “withdraw” here insofar as it will be a central characteristic of the earth when we come to Heidegger’s later work on art. This withdrawal of the ready-to-hand, and more importantly the entire structure of references which makes the ready-to-hand possible which we understand as

¹⁵² SZ p. 99

the world, can provide us one possible understanding of what will later be understood as the strife between world and earth. The very elements which disclose entities themselves resist disclosure. This is one of the passages we have in mind when we suggest that we can draw the entirety of the position Young and Dreyfus alike attribute to Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" from *Being and Time* alone.

Later in Section Six of Division One of *Being and Time* Heidegger will again stress the primordial nature of the undisclosed by identifying Dasein's being in the truth, insofar as it is the clearing of disclosure which alone allows anything to show up, with Dasein's being in the untruth. This moment, quoted at the opening of this section, appears following Heidegger's identification of the ready-to-hand's tendency to withdraw with Dasein's tendency to lose itself in becoming dispersed in its world and the They, a characteristic called falling: "Proximally and for the most part Dasein is lost in its 'world'. Its understanding, as a projection upon possibilities of Being, has directed itself thither... *Because Dasein is essentially falling, its state of Being is such that it is in 'untruth'*."¹⁵³ This untruth, as Dasein's dispersal and the withdraw of worldhood and its ready-to-hand entities, is something very much present within the world itself. As Heidegger discusses the presence of the concealed in terms of semblance and disguise:

"It is therefore essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if... That is, they have, in a certain way, been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised."¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ Ibid p. 264

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 265

An observant reader should find this passage particularly damning towards the overall argument I am attempting to build. Clearly here we have presented the idea that the rise of anything new into history must occur from previously present elements within the world. At this moment in *Being and Time*, at least, Heidegger does indeed seem willing to foreclose the irruption of the radically new into history. I take this point, however, not only to change later on but to already have been different before *Being and Time*, and perhaps even in tension with other tendencies of *Being and Time* itself.

What is the other possible sense of the undisclosed, concealed or untruth? We can begin to see it if we give thought to certain hermeneutic observations with which Heidegger was concerned throughout his life which we have already discussed in his early work. You will recall that, in the previous chapter, we had discussed Heidegger's presentation in the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* of the point that every care structure necessarily conceals something even as it discloses as well. Similarly, with Heidegger's early insistence, in *The History of the Concept of Time; Prolegomena*, that the relation between intentional relations are themselves intentional in the back of our mind we walked through Heidegger's revealing of the structure of worldhood as made up of ever larger contexts of care. The world itself, then, is just the care structure of a community. But this care structure, like any other, will itself conceal and neglect something even as it discloses. In other words, the clearing of disclosure which is world rests within the forest of the concealed. It is this precise image which makes little sense in *Being and Time* if: "The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the

mode of semblance.”¹⁵⁵ However, this image is going to become central following *Being and Time*. As Julian Young himself nicely describes this point as it occurs as earth in “The Origin of the Work of Art”: “Earth is the area of ‘unfathomable’ (PLT p. 128, compare p. 180) darkness which constitutes the other ‘side’ of the ‘clearing’ that is world, ‘the side of... [Being] that is averted from us, unilluminated by us’ (PLT p. 124). Being is thus ‘world’ and ‘earth’ taken together... it resembles the moon: behind the side illuminated by and for us lies an immeasurable – ‘ungraspable’ (Ister p. 136) – area of unperceived darkness (PLT p. 124).”¹⁵⁶ The irony of this passage is, of course, that I agree with Young’s depiction of untruth, or earth, here but it would be rather problematic to locate it completely in *Being and Time* for reasons I have already pointed out. But, isn’t “The Origin of the Work of Art” supposed to be, according to Young, Heidegger’s returning safely to the insights of *Being and Time*? This identification of the concealed with that outside of the clearing of the world, like onto the dark side of the moon, is not an insight from *Being and Time* but rather a progression away from *Being and Time* and, perhaps, back towards earlier insights.

This new conception of, or at the very least shift of focus in understanding, untruth appears strongly in Heidegger’s 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth”. In this work the undisclosed is characterized as older and more primordial than any given disclosure, and indeed disclosure itself, identified with a letting-be that brings into accord, is described as dependant upon concealment: “However, what brings into accord is not nothing, but rather a concealing of beings as a whole. Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment that relates to them and thus disclosed

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ Young p. 40

them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing.”¹⁵⁷ Here we have a repetition of the point we had already gleaned from Heidegger’s early hermeneutics, namely that any disclosure is always also a covering over. Heidegger goes further, however, and insists that this hermeneutic point about the partiality of any given perspective or disclosure is insufficient to really appreciate the primordial nature of untruth: “The concealment of beings as a whole does not first show up subsequently as a consequence of the fact that knowledge of beings is always fragmentary. The concealment of beings as a whole, untruth proper, is older than every openedness of this or that being. It is also older than letting-be itself, which in disclosing already holds concealed and comports itself toward concealing.”¹⁵⁸ In this sense, then, untruth as that upon which all disclosure depends must, in a sense, be beyond world taken as the ultimate clearing or disclosure. We can drive home this point by contrasting Heidegger’s assertion in *Being and Time* that untruth is always experienced as some sort of dissembling within our experience with his assertion in “On The Essence of Truth” that mysteries derived from day to day life itself are never essential in the way that primordial untruth itself, as the concealment of beings as a whole now characterized as The Mystery, is:

“However, to reside in what is readily available is intrinsically not to let the concealing of what is concealed hold sway. Certainly, among readily familiar things there are also some that are puzzling, unexplained, undecided, questionable. But these self-certain questions are merely transitional, intermediate points in our movement within the readily familiar and thus not essential. Wherever the concealment of beings as a whole is conceded only as a limit that occasionally announces itself, concealing as a fundamental occurrence has sunk into forgottenness.”¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Krell, Farrell *Martin Heidegger Basic Writings* p. 129-130 henceforth cited as [Krell]

¹⁵⁸ Ibid. p. 130

¹⁵⁹ Ibid. p. 132

This holding to what is already revealed, even when revealed as dissembling or mysterious, is characterized by Heidegger as a flight from the real mystery of primordial concealment, a flight which he calls erring. This precise failing is then identified by Heidegger with precisely the mistake he took himself to have made to some degree in *Being and Time* when he sought to arrive at Being through Dasein:

“He persists in them [the latest needs and aims] and continually supplies himself with new standards, yet without considering either the ground for taking up standards or the essence of what gives the standard. In spite of his advance to new standards and goals, man goes wrong as regards the essential genuineness of his standards. He is all the more mistaken the more exclusively he takes himself, as subject, to be the standard for all beings.”¹⁶⁰

Here we have an identification of erring, or fleeing from The Mystery which is primordial untruth, with the desire to take man as the standard for all beings or even Being itself. The failure to take into account “the essence of what gives the standard” should particularly remind us of Heidegger’s early renovations of categorial intuition. Searching for a source for the categories with which we were to conceptualize the matters of our concern, categorial intuition was transformed into pre-ontological understanding, or the disclosedness in which we always already find ourselves insofar as our collective activities have already opened up the world to us. As I have repeatedly asserted, however, for pre-ontological understanding to maintain the promise Heidegger saw in categorial intuition the disclosure which arises through our activities must take its origin from the matter with which these activities are concerned. The source of standards, then, is to be understood as outside of Dasein and, as this later piece suggests, outside of any given disclosure, clearing, or world. What arises from this discussion is that, with our new

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

sense of untruth clarified, openness to the concealed is an openness to the possibility that new standards can indeed arise within the context of a given world. We begin to see why there can indeed be an irruption of the new into history or even the rise of a new world from out of the mystery which is the undisclosed resting beyond the limits of the finite clearing that is any given world.

We should be cautious of oversimplifying the period between *Being and Time* and “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Changes in any thinker’s positions are rarely smooth and rarely hold constant during the periods of experimentation and change. There are moments, for example, in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* of 1935 which seem to remind one of both the mistaken focus on Dasein as the standard of Being Heidegger was moving away from and the focus on the power of something beyond Dasein having a determining force upon it. There is something right in Young’s claim that Heidegger flirted with Young’s sense of Prometheanism in this period, but Young is wrong to think that Heidegger returned to the insights of *Being and Time* following this period. In fact, the Youngian Prometheanism¹⁶¹ of moments in the 1930s is closer to *Being and Time* than much of what we find in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. This tension of the 1930s is perhaps seen best in the contrast between the “overwhelming sway” of primordial strife in the *Introduction to Metaphysics* and the violence with which man escapes from this sway:

“The polemos named here is a strife that holds sway before everything divine and human, not war in the human sense... struggle first projects and develops the unheard, the hitherto un-said and un-thought. This struggle is then sustained by the creators, by the poets, thinkers, and statesmen. Against the overwhelming sway,

¹⁶¹ By “Youngian Prometheanism” I simply mean the term Promethean used in Young’s sense of applying to a world creating artist or statesman rather than my sense of Promethean world creating Art.

they throw the counterweight of their work and capture in this work the world that is thereby opened up.”¹⁶²

In tracing the changes in Heidegger’s thought during this period Taminiaux summarizes the Prometheanism of the *Introduction to Metaphysics* in this way:

“Being itself is ‘an intricate struggle’ (EM, 81) between powers, Being is an over-power requiring a ‘creative self-assertion’, that is, a ‘separation in the togetherness of being between unconcealment and appearance, Non-Being’ (EM 84). Such a decision is the way man is called to be responsive to the over-power of Being. And because this over-power is violence, he can rise to its challenge by being himself *the* disrupting and *the* violent one. The issue for him is to operate ‘a taming and ordering of powers by virtue of which beings open up as such when man moves into them. This disclosure of beings is the power that man must master in order to become himself amidst beings, i.e., in order to be historical’ (EM, 120). In the context, ‘himself’ means ‘the wielder of power,’ the one ‘who breaks out and breaks up, he who captures and subjugates’ (EM, 120).”¹⁶³

What is interesting about the perspective we find at this moment in Heidegger’s work is the presence of both what was previously central in *Being and Time* and what will be central in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. We have both the overwhelming sway in which man is caught, and the radical determinative power of the creator or statesman which, in taking on a counter role to the violent force of the overwhelming sway, gives rise itself to a world. Here we have both a resistance and power discovered beyond Dasein and the Promethean power of Dasein to react in the face of this force. However, as our discussion of “On the Essence of Truth” should suggest, at other moments Heidegger was also concerned during the same period to insist upon the dependence of all disclosure upon the mystery of the undisclosed, and Dasein’s equal dependence upon this. Eventually these tensions settle into the final version of “The Origin of the Work of Art” where, as Taminiaux puts it:

¹⁶² Heidegger *Introduction to Metaphysics* p. 65 henceforth cited as [IM]

¹⁶³ Tam. p. 161

“Formerly, aletheia was connected with the There that a people is entrusted to take upon itself, thus making the Dasein of a people the locus of truth. This characterization now disappears. Dasein is no longer the locus of truth. Unconcealment is now taken to be a clearing in the midst of beings, a clearing to which humans belong and are exposed, rather than one instituted by them...By the same token, truth itself is no longer a matter of human decision between being and not-Being, or between unconcealment and mere appearance.”¹⁶⁴

By “The Origin of the Work of Art”, then, we are well on our way to discovering in the rise of a world the activity of something beyond Dasein itself, something we might call Art, or the worlding of the new world, or the working of Truth. Whatever we may call it, however, there seems good reason to think it can originate from beyond the already disclosed, the already circumscribed within a given world, and thus give rise to the radically new within history.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid p. 168

Chapter Three: Art

“What seems easier than to let a being be just the being that it is? Or does this turn out to be the most difficult of tasks, particularly if such an intention – to let a being be as it is – represents the opposite of the indifference that simply turns its back upon the being itself in favor of an unexamined concept of being? We ought to turn toward the being, think about it in regard to its being, but by means of this thinking at the same time let it rest upon itself in its very own being.”

Heidegger “The Origin of the Work of Art”¹⁶⁵

Having come at last to “The Origin of the Work of Art” we should pause to remind ourselves where we stand and what we are trying to accomplish. Our goal from the start has been to offer a reading of “The Origin of the Work of Art” which understands it in light of Heidegger’s earliest concerns and the path that his attempt to address these concerns took from his lecture courses in 1919 through *Being and Time* right up to the publication of the final version of the work on art in 1936, with perhaps even a glance beyond to the 1956 addendum. In the course of this study we have also sought to build a critique of other readings of “The Origin of the Work of Art” which we suspect do violence to the text’s role in Heidegger’s oeuvre. This critical element is, however, at best a side note or chance outcome of the attempt to apply the rich research we now have at our disposal on Heidegger’s early work to areas of Heidegger’s thought which have not been duly viewed in light of this scholarship.

We have found that one of Heidegger’s earliest concerns was how phenomenology was to be capable of fulfilling the Husserlian dictum to return to the

¹⁶⁵ Hof. p. 31

matters themselves. How, it was asked, can philosophy disclose a being as it is while also letting it be as it is? This challenge, which we have referred to as the problem of *Gelassenheit*, can be raised in several different forms. One manifestation of it was the challenge to Husserlian phenomenology offered by the Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp in his two pronged attack as discussed by Heidegger in the first lecture course contained in *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*. First Natorp pointed out that philosophical reflection distorts the matters upon which one reflects through an atomizing and “stilling of the stream” of lived experience. Then he claimed that, even were this not so, phenomenological description must occur in language which is always already removed from experience insofar as language is based upon a process of abstraction and universalization which must inevitably distort or destroy the particularity of any given experience. Heidegger’s answer was seen to rest in his rejection of the false dualisms hidden at the heart of both Natorp’s claims and the entire modern epistemic tradition of philosophy in general. In other words, for Natorp’s claims to get off the ground one must conceive of reflection and speech as external impositions on existence or isolated activities of a disconnected observer. Heidegger’s counter claim, found articulated throughout his early lecture courses, was that reflection and language were both elements of life and existence itself. In other words, philosophy is an activity of “the matters themselves” and, as such, properly understood, it represents a privileged access to their nature and not a distorting view. It is clear, however, that the weight of Natorp’s objection has simply been shifted to the phrase “properly understood”. The challenge becomes, how can we ground philosophical activity in existence so that it can avoid being accused of imposing structures on the subjects it investigates.

The young Heidegger admitted that existence has the tendency to dissemble and that we have a tendency to deceive ourselves. Philosophical speech can degenerate to empty talk and traditions can be covering over rather than letting things be. Philosophy properly understood must, then, dedicate itself to something like the principle of the material determination of form insofar as the matters themselves which are of concern must be allowed to dictate how they are to be conceptualized and discussed. To use a Kantian formulation, our concepts must be derived from the things themselves, understanding now the “things themselves” as always already engaged in self-reflection and speech. One way that we might understand this idea of the things dictating their own conceptualization, a formulation very foreign to a tradition following Kant, was what Heidegger found so exciting in Husserl’s categorial intuition as presented in his *Logical Investigations*. Here we have a dismissal of Kant’s division of the active and passive elements of the human mind and a location of categorial conceptual elements in intuition itself. Heidegger’s growing sense, however, that the subjectivist tradition dominating philosophy since Descartes was itself primarily distortive required him to reformulate Husserl’s insight into a form not dependant upon consciousness and other mentalistic assumptions. We might say that categorial intuition becomes, in Heidegger, categorial engagements insofar as our lived activities in the world, with no reference to consciousness as their primary medium, are what provide us with the categorial elements through which matters are known to us.

In this move from Husserl to Heidegger, it is possible for us to mistakenly lose the very potency of Husserl’s original position. Categorial intuition was exciting because it placed the dictation of form or concepts in the hands of the things themselves. Categorial

engagement must maintain this structure or else we have lost the very goal we were concerned with at the start. Our enworlded engagements, which include the totality of our cultural practices and traditions, must have their origin in the matters with which they are concerned. They must arise from existence itself. This, of course, does not foreclose their drifting from their origins and becoming distortive later. Indeed, it is even possible that most traditions and activities are deformed precisely in the sense that they have come to cover over rather than disclose the things with which they are concerned. For this reason Heidegger's practice of de-structuring becomes important as a way of freeing up the matters themselves from distorting traditions, practices, and language in order to allow them to dictate new ways in which we can be engaged with them. This very story, however, should raise a question we do not seem to have addressed, and which I believe Heidegger himself felt he had not fully addressed until "The Origin of the Work of Art". How do matters themselves give rise to disclosive practices? If we are to find a moment of origin for a given way in which things have shown themselves in practices, what would this origin look like? When we understand world as the interconnected structure of such disclosive traditions and practices, the question becomes what the origin of a world looks like. These questions lead to Heidegger's investigation of art. It is for precisely this reason that considering the setting up of a world by art to be just a disclosure of the already present but implicit world structure (Young) or just a new gathering of previously existing but perhaps scattered practices (Dreyfus) is going to disconnect "The Origin of the Work of Art" from the way in which it is an extension of Heidegger's earliest concerns.

In the three sections which follow we shall take Heidegger's own structuring of "The Origin of the Work of Art" as our guide. The first section, in dialogue with the section of the same title in Heidegger's work, shall deal with the concepts of form and matter as we have been using them and as they enter into "The Origin of the Work of Art". The second section will discuss our interpretation of the strife of world and earth in conjunction with how it is presented by Heidegger. The final section will bring the previous considerations to bear on the concept of history, and the historicity of world, as Heidegger discusses the subject in the third section of his work.

Section One: Thing and Work

“One ought to have a close look at the sophistry being pursued today with schemata like form-content, rational-irrational, finite-infinite, mediated-unmediated, subject-object. It is what the critical stance of phenomenology ultimately struggles against. When the attempt is made to unify them, one treats phenomenology in a superficial manner. Phenomenology can only be appropriated phenomenologically, i.e., only through demonstration and not in such a way that one repeats propositions, takes over fundamental principles, or subscribes to academic dogmas.”

Heidegger, *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*¹⁶⁶

It should be clear by now that when we use a phrase such as “the material determination of form” we are rather far removed from, say, a traditional Aristotelian understanding of the terms. When we say “form” we intend to bring into view all the various connected concepts we find associated with this word in Heidegger including, for example, a Kantian use of the word “concept”, a Husserlian and also medieval scholastic use of the term “category”, as well as a properly Heideggerian discussion of “disclosive practices”, “clearings” and finally even “worlds”. Similarly, in talking about “matter” we intend to bring to mind the Kantian “thing in itself”, the Husserlian “matters themselves”, and Heidegger’s “existence”, “life” and even “Being”. Speaking of the material determination of form, then, can mean anything from “things conceptualized should themselves dictate the concepts used to understanding them” to “the world should (or perhaps always does and must) arise from Being”. Between these two extremes is a spectrum of various formulations of connected issues, all of which share a common

¹⁶⁶ Heidegger, *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity* p. 37 henceforth cited as [OHF.]

structure to which we refer in terms of the principle of the material determination of form.

At this point we would do well to revisit the third section of our first chapter. There it was discussed how Heidegger, perhaps above all else, was concerned to avoid the hidden assumptions and distortions that any of these previously mentioned concepts, even those which are Heidegger's own, bring to any given philosophical encounter when not derived authentically from the philosophical encounter itself. It was this very concern which was central in Heidegger's own critiques of the epistemic model of philosophy derived from Descartes and carried on through Kant into Neo-Kantianism. By importing the epistemic model of the human condition we make ontological assumptions not necessarily justified by the matters of concern themselves. The Husserlian revolution out of which phenomenology was born was, in good part, the transformation of the scheme/content dualisms into intentional form from which it could be stated that subject and object arise, as secondary and derivative, from a more primordial medium of intentionality. Similarly, categorial intuition dissolved the boundary between the passive and active, or intuitive and conceptual, which was central to Kant. These are all lessons Heidegger learned well, and also positions which he himself wished to get beyond or beneath. Thus, we have his reformulation of the theoretical assertion/knowledge model of intentionality into the lived engaged-practice model of care, his transformation of categorial intuition into pre-ontological understanding, and his reformulation of truth as correspondence into a focus on disclosure. The important point for us right now, then, is to make clear that when we discuss "form and matter" we certainly do not intend to suggest some naïve return to Aristotelian dualisms; rather we have used it as a short hand

for Heidegger's constant reinvention and re-overcoming of past dualisms long since grown stale. If, then, we seem to be moving towards an interpretation of the world-earth dualism as a reformulation of Aristotelian form-matter it must be understood in terms of an uncovering of the more primordial lived experiences out of which the abstract form-matter dualism alone ever arose as meaningful to begin with and from which it has wandered.

It is certainly important for us to make this point insofar as Heidegger dedicates much of the first section of "The Origin of the Work of Art" to pointing out that the form/matter dualism is a distortive formulation which art works, and things in general, have falsely been forced to fit. Indeed, he goes as far as to make the point we have just made, though in a rather more negative tone. Namely, he points out that under the concepts of form and matter the entire conceptual structure of Western epistemology and ontology can be contained:

"Form and content are the most hackneyed concepts under which anything and everything may be subsumed. And if form is correlated with the rational and matter with the irrational; if the rational is taken to be the logical and the irrational the alogical; if in addition the subject-object relation is coupled with the conceptual pair form-matter; then representation has at its command a conceptual machinery that nothing is capable of withstanding."¹⁶⁷

In enquiring as to the proper origin of the form/matter conceptual apparatus Heidegger comes to the conclusion that it first arose not from an encounter with art works or mere things, but rather from the nature of equipment. Form and matter are going to be grounded in the usefulness which is an inherent characteristic of something experienced as equipment. Form originally, then, is to be considered as arising from the idea of

¹⁶⁷ Hof. p. 27

formative activity and matter from some choice of the appropriate material for some specific thing being formed. Thus, form and matter come into view as ways to distinguish how and why something is, or fails to be, useful.

In the very preliminary and clearly inadequate formulation available at the very beginning of the essay, equipment is presented by Heidegger as standing in an intermediate position between the mere thing and the work of art. The mere thing is characterized primarily in terms of being self-contained and self-subsistent; it does not require being made or being useful in order to be what it is. Equipment, on the other hand, must be produced and can come to fail in its usefulness. Art, in contrast, at this point at least, is considered to have the self-sufficiency of a mere thing insofar as it seems to require no use or even usefulness and yet will have come to be through some sort of relation to production. As intermediate, it is in terms of equipment that the being of things and works have come to be conceptualized. This, in conjunction with a faith in a creator God, gives rise to almost the whole of western ontology:

“The idea of creation, grounded in faith, can lose its guiding power of knowledge of beings as a whole. But the theological interpretation of all beings, the view of the world in terms of matter and form borrowed from an alien philosophy, having once been instituted, can still remain a force. This happens in the transition from the Middle Ages to modern times. The metaphysics of the modern period rests on the form-matter structure devised in the medieval period, which itself merely recalls in its words the buried natures of *eidos* and *hyle*. Thus the interpretation of ‘thing’ by means of matter and form, whether it remains medieval or becomes Kantian-transcendental, has become current and self-evident.”¹⁶⁸

It is worth pausing here to note something odd which should have begun to jump out at an observant reader. A good portion of our discussion of *Being and Time* was dedicated to discussing equipmental being as the being which all things encountered through care,

¹⁶⁸ Ibid p. 29

therefore all worldly things, have. The very structure of worldhood understood in terms of a totality of involvements points to the necessary equipmental being something must show up in terms of in order to show up at all. The discussion, then, of the present-at-hand as a derivative and privative experience of the ready-to-hand, i.e. the equipmental versus the mere-thing, seems to be undergoing some sort of extension or change here at the very beginning of “The Origin of the Work of Art”. Heidegger will still assert that: “As a rule it is the use-objects around us that are the nearest and authentic things.”¹⁶⁹ Yet there is also the key implication that in the talk of the world almost entirely in terms of the equipmental something fundamental has been left out: “Nevertheless, in its genuinely equipmental being, equipment stems from a more distant source. Matter and form and their distinction have a deeper origin.”¹⁷⁰ Heidegger will seek this deeper origin of both equipment and matter/form in his attempt to come to know the being of the work of art.

The path already sketched out in seeking the appropriate origin of the form/matter structure, and the further path needed to uncover the connection between the thing, equipment and art work, both consist in a Heideggerian strategy we are already very familiar with. Heidegger will seek to reverse the movement of universalizing and abstraction which has allowed both words and the general ways of engaging with existence with which they are associated to wander far from their source and become empty traditions covering over the matters they once served to disclose: “But perhaps this characterization in terms of matter and form would recover its defining power if only we reversed the process of expanding and emptying these concepts.”¹⁷¹ This process will,

¹⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 28

¹⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 34

¹⁷¹ Ibid. p. 27

then, require a reengagement with equipment, and eventually art, in a way not predetermined and obscured by traditional abstract determinations.

We have, however, gotten ahead of ourselves. Heidegger does not focus the entirety of the first section to a discussion of form and matter. Rather, form and matter themselves only enter the conversation following a previous discussion of two other ways in which the thinghood of the thing can be conceived. This discussion itself has arisen from the rather simple insight that in order to understand the being of the work of art we shall have to get clear on the being of the mere thing such that we might see what differentiates the two. Reading “The Origin of the Work of Art” in isolation it is possible to see this first section as detached from what is to follow. The later presentation of the nature of art and art works does not depend necessarily on any of the discussion which came before except, perhaps, for a glance in the direction of the form/matter issue. Indeed dwelling on the thingly nature of the thing seems to serve, at best, a purely negative purpose in the rest of the work. In other words, it points out misconceptions so that we can avoid them. For these reasons Heidegger himself, at the end of the section, calls all of what had come before a detour. When we think about the first section, however, in light of the path Heidegger’s own thoughts have taken since 1919 we begin to see in it a recapitulation of previous insights and concerns as well as a desire to clarify them further. Let us look a bit closer and see in what sense this is so.

The three traditional ways a thing has been conceived, as discussed by Heidegger, are as a bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, and finally as formed matter. The conception of the thing as a bearer of traits is explained in terms of substance ontology wherein a thing is conceived as an underlying substrate in which various

properties adhere as accidents. The very opening of the “The Origin of the Work of Art” in which art work and artist alike are grounded in terms of art, which clearly is not conceived as anything like a substance, already points to the event nature through which art will later be conceived and through which truth as disclosure has already been conceived throughout Heidegger’s previous work. The rejection of substance ontology, then, is the return of an old concern and its discussion raises another old concern which will, nonetheless, loom largely in the background of what Heidegger is up to in “The Origin of the Work of Art”. In discussing substance ontology, Heidegger almost immediately brings up the support substance ontology derives from the structure of language itself, a point strongly made previously in the work of such thinkers as Nietzsche:

“Who would have the temerity to assail these simple fundamental relations between thing and statement, between sentence structure and thing-structure? Nevertheless we must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (of the union of substance and accidents)? Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the sentence?”¹⁷²

The seemingly natural next step, then, is to propose that humanity imposes its way of speaking and thinking onto the things themselves of the world. It is precisely this possibility which Heidegger entertains next. At this point, however, we should be aware enough of Heidegger’s concerns to face with great caution the suggestion that linguistic structure can be understood fundamentally as an imposition alone. Were we to accept this position we would be identifying Heidegger with a linguistically savvy Kant, someone who believes our access to reality itself is denied or deeply distorted by the veil and

¹⁷² Ibid. p. 23

limitation of our language. Language for Heidegger, however, is disclosive and it is primarily through it that anything is disclosed at all. If there are distortions due to language, as indeed for Heidegger there are, it can not simply be that language is just imposed upon a nonlinguistic Being. As Heidegger's reply to Natorp makes clear, language itself must have a deep primordial connection to what comes to be seen through language. Here in "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger makes a similar assertion: "Actually, the sentence structure does not provide the standard for the pattern of thing-structure, nor is the latter simply mirrored in the former. Both sentence and thing-structure derive, in their typical form and their possible mutual relationship, from a common and more original source."¹⁷³ The appropriate reply, then, to the claim that the substance/accident structure is central to language will be a more complex movement of pointing out other ways of speaking which have been covered over through time, citing perhaps elements of old German or Ancient Greek, while also tracing the supposedly "natural" subject-predicate formation to a rather unnatural origin in mistranslation and reformulation of concepts in the move from Greek to Latin. In other words, in terms of a point we have repeatedly made, ways of speaking which once originated from things themselves have drifted from that origin and become distortive traditions. All of this is a side note to the most important point for us, which will be that this "more original source" from which language and thing structure alike derive will be the key background concern of "The Origin of the Work of Art". Placing aside the drifting of traditions from their roots through history, how do these traditions originate to begin with? How, it might be asked, do we first come to speak of and come to experience anything in the given way

¹⁷³ Ibid. p. 24

that we do? Heidegger's discussion of substance ontology and language in this first section serves, then, to introduce the issue of the origin of ways of speaking of things as important for the work which is to follow.

The second conception of the thing plays a central role in empiricism, namely the idea of the thing as a unity of sensations. This conception need not presuppose substance ontology but it does represent another major philosophical prejudice in the history of western philosophy. Often, if we are to reject substance, it is in terms of the deceptive nature of the sensory access we have to things themselves. In some forms of skepticism, for example, it is precisely because we only know sensations that we can never know things themselves. If we accept this position, then an adequate reformulation of our concept of thinghood would be in terms of sensations alone. We have already familiarized ourselves with Heidegger's response to this position, and indeed it is a response he shares with the Neo-Kantians, namely that we never actually just experience sensations at all. Experience is actually, in almost all cases, some form of experiencing *as*. Thus we don't hear some sound, we hear a car horn. Even the experience of something we don't recognize is an experience which stands out amidst the meaningful background *as* the sound of something which we do not recognize. Sensations are, then, never just experienced *simpliciter* but rather always experienced as part of the meaningful structures which make up our world: "Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door shut in the house and never hear acoustical sensations or even mere sounds. In order to hear a bare sound we have to listen away from things, divert our ear from them, i.e. listen abstractly."¹⁷⁴ This, of course, simply serves to direct

¹⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 25-26

our attention to the fact that we always already find ourselves within a meaningful world. Once more we find ourselves coming back to the question which “The Origin of the Work of Art” will attempt to address, namely, how a world comes about in the first place.

The first conception, Heidegger says, holds things too far away from us while the second causes things to press in on us with too great an insistence. The third, then, will hopefully present the thing in a way such that it will be “allowed to remain in its self-containment. It must be accepted in its own constancy.”¹⁷⁵ We have already discussed this third way, the form/matter structure, and its shortcomings. However, it seems worth noting that despite its incorrectness, it is the starting clue, or formal indication, which will guide the process of reverse abstraction through the return to the particular experiences from which the thinghood of the thing, and indeed the workliness of the work, will finally be conceptualized. Form and matter, then, provide us a way into the essence of art while the previous two concepts of the thing simply point us to the problem of the origin of language and the origin of world which alike shall be answered through the discussion of the being of art.

We find, then, that it is not possible for us to read the first section of the work without recalling such past concerns as Heidegger’s previous attempts to answer Natorp’s challenges to phenomenology. For this reason alone we might be wise to read what is to follow as a continuation and redevelopment of Heidegger’s previous answers. But this means, as the appearance of the problem of the origin of language and its connection with the nature of worldhood should suggest, that the real question in this work will be deeper

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 26

than simply enquiring how any given world transforms into another but will rather also concern the fundamental nature of world origin in general.

Having discussed the three traditional and mistaken ways in which thinghood has been conceptualized, it remains for us to trace the path Heidegger takes into a discussion of the origin and nature of art. The key shift which moves the reader into the second major section of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is one away from the talk of appropriate conceptualization which dominated the sections we have already discussed and towards the reliance on a disclosive event as foundational for the investigation. I will briefly map out this movement.

With the attempt to arrive at an understanding of the thinghood of the thing having repeatedly run into a dead end, Heidegger suggests that it may be precisely this tendency of the thing to resist thought which is most proper and characteristic of it:

“The unpretentious thing evades thought most stubbornly. Or can it be that this self-refusal of the mere thing, this self-contained independence, belongs precisely to the nature of the thing? Must not this strange and uncommunicative feature of the nature of the thing become intimately familiar to thought that tries to think the thing? If so, then we should not force our way to its thingly character.”¹⁷⁶

Here, in this rather odd redirection of the investigation, we have a definitive foreshadowing of the withdrawing and self-refusing nature which will later be thought so strongly as the nature of earth. In this sense, then, the thingness of the thing will fail to be richly dealt with until the later sections concerning earth and world. For now, however, this observation serves to justify Heidegger’s turning to an attempt to think through the equipmental being of equipment since form and matter, the most promising of the previous distortive views, originates from a thinking concerning the being of equipment.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 31

Having failed repeatedly to think the thing, however, how are we to go about appropriately thinking equipment. This time around Heidegger explicitly states the need to avoid the imposition of previous interpretive frameworks, in order to do so he attempts to make the phenomenological turn to simply describing equipment as it is experienced.

In order to “facilitate the visual realization”¹⁷⁷ of a piece of equipment in the service of phenomenological description, Heidegger has chosen to concern himself with shoes, he turns almost as a side note to consider a painting of shoes done by Van Gogh. The visual description moves pretty swiftly into a discussion of the usefulness of equipment, a concept we have already encountered. Thinking about usefulness then provokes the realization that a piece of equipment is only useful within the setting of its proper use, which also means it is most fully a piece of equipment when it least draws attention to itself by working precisely as it should: “The peasant woman wears her shoes in the field. Only here are they what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them.”¹⁷⁸ This last point, that equipment is most fully equipment when dependably and unnoticeably doing precisely what it is useful for, is described by Heidegger as reliability.

It is precisely the nature of reliability, the way in which equipment recedes when most fully equipment, which seems to suggest that we cannot gain access to the being of equipment. Indeed, even recognizing reliability as the central nature of equipment would be denied to us had something not intervened to disrupt the self-concealing nature of equipment. This is a point with which we are very familiar from *Being and Time*'s

¹⁷⁷ Ibid. p. 32

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 32

discussion of the way in which equipment and the structure of worldhood of which it is a part naturally withdraw from view if not brought into focus through fairly extraordinary means. Notice, for example, that we notice the shoes when the heel falls off. But then it is precisely when the equipment has lost its equipmentality that we notice it. We may from this come to note the centrality of usefulness for equipment but we will not, it seems, come to notice self-secluding reliability itself. What, then, has allowed us to notice reliability? In Heidegger's text it is the intercession of the work of art which brings it to our attention, not unlike the way the sign in *Being and Time* was characterized as a special piece of equipment useful for bringing other generally concealed parts of the equipmental totality into view.

Were we to encounter a pair of shoes resting on the floor we would not, Heidegger claims, come to see the reliability on which their nature depends. We might see some equipment not currently in use. If the shoes are worn out and broken we might see equipment which is no longer useful, we might even consider them at that point to be mere things. The painting, at first, seems to offer us even less than if we experienced the shoes resting in the corner:

“From Van Gogh's painting we cannot even tell where these shoes stand. There is nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong – only an undefined space. There are not even clods of soil from the field or the field-path sticking to them, which would at least hint at their use. A pair of peasant shoes and nothing more.”¹⁷⁹

We can go even further with this privative description and claim that we don't even know that the shoes are shoes of a peasant. We might, taking the lead from critics of Heidegger, who claim it to actually be the case, suggest the possibility that the shoes are Van Gogh's

¹⁷⁹ Ibid. p. 33

own.¹⁸⁰ We might, perhaps more carefully, simply note that from the painting itself we have no knowledge of whose shoes they are. “And yet-”¹⁸¹ At this point follows the much maligned passage in Heidegger’s text where the nature of equipment speaks forth, as it were, from the painting revealing the nature of the world of the peasant woman. A wiser commentator than myself might choose to give in at this point to the history of objections this passage has triggered, objections generally based upon the claim that, even if the nature of art is to disclose truth, the painting of the shoes can have nothing to say about the world of a peasant woman insofar as they are actually Van Gogh’s shoes. We might note that this early description of the disclosive properties of art is not necessary for what follows after and leave it at that. I suspect, however, that objections such as these have fundamentally missed the point of the view of art Heidegger is suggesting. I hope to be able to say briefly how and why this is so.

Let us first ask why, without the key elements that will be developed later in the text to explain the nature of art, we might be tempted to think for even a moment that something like Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes might tell us more about equipment than staring at a pair of shoes in the corner. We have already stressed the way in which the painting offers us less to go on than even our own experience might. It seems, however, that it is precisely this point which Heidegger uses as his first real foray into the nature of art. We first stress the way in which the painting takes the shoes, in some sense, out of their everyday context in a radical way such that we don’t even know anything about the room in which they are depicted as resting. We then notice that, deprived of

¹⁸⁰ For a particularly interesting discussion of the debate between Heidegger and Schapiro, triggered by Schapiro’s critique in “The Still Life as a Personal Object” of Heidegger’s interpretation of Van Gogh’s shoes, see Jacques Derrida’s “Restitutions of the Truth in Pointing” in his *The Truth in Painting*.

¹⁸¹ Hof. p. 33

their place in the totality of involvements, which is the life and world of he or she who owned the shoes, the shoes themselves summon forth the totality of involvements from which they have been taken. We are well prepared to understand why this would be so, for we have already discussed in the context of *Being and Time* the fact that there is no, and cannot be any, singular piece of equipment. The nature of equipment is to always already be involved in a structure of practices, goals, roles and concerns. As such, it is impossible for the piece of equipment that is the shoes to stand alone as they at first appear to do in the painting. Their very lonesomeness there is extraordinary and summons forth, now noticed as if itself extraordinary, the entire life in which they ought to fit. In this way the painting calls forth what usually recedes, the totality of involvements in which equipment is always present and with which it always recedes into obscurity. Note that everything we have just said, all of which serves precisely to bring to our attention the equipmental nature of equipment, is entirely unaffected by whether the shoes belong to a peasant woman, Van Gogh, or anyone else. It is the nature of shoes, and ultimately equipment, which is of concern.

There is one more thing to note about this subject, and it is precisely the key point that Heidegger draws from the work's ability to provide us access to the truth of equipment: "If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work. In the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work."¹⁸² The point we wish to focus on, then, is the event nature of this disclosure of truth which occurs through this preliminary encounter with Van Gogh's painting. What has occurred in the painting is an event of

¹⁸² Ibid. p. 35

truth, and not some action of the observer or artist: “This painting spoke. In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be.”¹⁸³ The speaking of the painting, truth setting itself to work, is something in which Van Gogh, Heidegger, and ourselves are alike caught up and not something determined by any one of us. Thus, in a sense, it really doesn’t much matter what Van Gogh intended to paint. It is very possible that, in the course of painting his own shoes, he created a work in which the truth of equipment was disclosed and that, in the course of this disclosure, the event caught Heidegger up in the imagery concerning a female peasant. None of these aspects of the event invalidate any other.

Something else has occurred in this move to discussing the truth event which occurs through the work of art. We have rather dramatically moved away from the first inclination which brought Van Gogh’s work to mind to begin with. Heidegger’s first use for the painting had been to provide some visual example on which to practice phenomenological description. Now, however, we have found that it is precisely what was not represented, precisely what was not visually available, in the work which was central to the event of disclosure that was the work. It is precisely because the painting lacks context, in this one example, that the equipmental nature of the equipment comes conspicuously to light. Representation, and all the talk of adequation and correspondence which representation brings to mind, has been demonstrated at this point to be a deeply inadequate way of characterizing the nature of the work of art. With it the conception of truth as correspondence has also been dismissed.

¹⁸³ Ibid

The one final point to note is the lesson to be drawn from the structure this first section has taken. We had assumed the thinghood of the thing to be primary, but our failure to find a way to think our way into this thinghood drove us to shift our attention to the equipmental being of equipment. This suggests equipment as primordial, a perspective we are familiar with from *Being and Time*. Thinking about equipment also, however, was found to be impossible without the intercession of the work of art. The event of truth which is art, then, is that upon which our access to thinghood and equipmentality depends: “The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings. This opening up, i.e., this deconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work. In the art work, the truth of what is has set itself to work. Art is truth setting itself to work.”¹⁸⁴ It is, then, the self disclosure which is the event of truth upon which thinghood, equipment and work depend in the same way as art work and artist.

The structure of this first section is, as we have mentioned, preparatory, in some sense in a negative way, but also is primarily backward looking to previous concerns and issues meant to be recalled in order that the reader might appreciate the extent of what “The Origin of the Work of Art” attempts to achieve. This observation, however, brings out a specific aspect of the discussion of art which does occur in this first section that we would be wise to note. The example of Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes stands out, once one has read the entirety of the work, as a rather different type of art work than much of what follows after. Starting in section two Heidegger will claim that “great art” is the only art he intends to consider in his work.¹⁸⁵ With a full discussion of earth and world it will become clear what great art is and it will also become clear that, while Van Gogh

¹⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 38

¹⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 39

may have been a great artist and perhaps with great hesitancy a piece of his might be considered great art in Heidegger's sense, the painting of shoes certainly will not be so considered. Noting this point is important for at least two reasons. First, it allows us to appreciate the spectrum we are dealing with. All true art, we might suggest, will be an event of truth setting itself to work but not all true art will be great art in the sense of setting up a new world. Similarly, while I am asserting that some art at least must be great to the extent of setting up a radically new world, not even all great art must be so understood. Secondly, the very discussions we have offered of Van Gogh's shoes should make clear how dependent this section has been on the insights of *Being and Time*. As I had noted previously, we could derive the entire discussion of Van Gogh's shoes from *Being and Time* alone. It is our contention, however, that this dependence ends with section one. An example of this can be found in the nature of the self-secluding we have found in this first section. Here it is the reliability of equipment and the totality of involvements of which this reliability is a part that most prominently resists disclosure and is found to be self-concealing. This corresponds to the way in which the structures of a specific world in *Being and Time* also conceal themselves. However, we shall find that Heidegger's later discussions of earth go beyond this form of self-concealing and bring us in touch with the second sense of the concealed, namely the concealed as that which lies beyond the limits of a given world.

Section Two: Earth and World

By now we have discussed often enough, tangentially or directly, the interpretation of “The Origin of the Work of Art” presented by Julian Young and Hubert Dreyfus to be clear on what they are trying to say. We have, we hope, been able to avoid giving the impression that their positions are identical, especially since Young himself characterizes his position as in contrast with Dreyfus. We have, however, attempted to focus upon a central shared element of their interpretations that we believe the story we have told so far gives us good reasons to doubt. This shared element is an interpretation of what opening up a world means which understands it in terms of previously worldly elements. The reason for the strange phrase “previously worldly elements” is that our claim is that art can open up a world which was not previously in existence in a world or as a world. Furthermore this new world, understood as a framework of meaning, discloses things which previously were not in existence in a world. In contrast to this position Young understands the opening of a world performed by art as a disclosure of the always already implicit structures of the existing world. Art, for him, is not promethean but rather revelatory and thematizing. For Dreyfus, while the world opened up by a work of art can be a new world in some sense, it is built up out of previously existing practices which are gathered into a new form. We have already pointed to the way in which this interpretation is well grounded in division one of *Being and Time*. A new world, where world is understood as a structure of practices, purposes and roles

making up a totality of involvements, can be crafted from previously existing practices put together to create some new whole which is more than the sum of its parts. Recall, for example, our previous discussion of the way in which the concept of the artist had to be crafted out of other already existing social roles with the move into modernity and the similar way in which the nature of the position of President had to be formed from, and in contrast to, various other political models of authority in the case of George Washington.

Before we move on to discuss the specific areas of “The Origin of the Work of Art” which bear most directly on this issue, it might assist us to look briefly at another of Dreyfus’ writings where he speaks more of his model of opening up a world and more directly addresses one way in which the type of world creation we are looking for might, although mistakenly or too limitedly, be conceived. In the book *Disclosing New Worlds* co-authored by Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores and Hubert Dreyfus, the very issue of the opening up of new worlds that is the central problem of the interpretation we are attempting is addressed in terms of three types of disclosive activities: “Articulation, reconfiguration, and cross-appropriation are three different ways in which disclosive skills can work to bring about meaningful historical change of a disclosive space.”¹⁸⁶ Each of these three activities involves some sort of change to what is, in this book, called style. Style is defined as the way in which the various practices that make up a world fit together, an element which we ourselves have not discussed in our focus on the world as a structure of practices, roles, ways of speaking and goals. Style would be that which, on top of all these elements, expresses the nature of their interconnection: “Style is our name for the way all the practices ultimately fit together. A common misunderstanding is to see

¹⁸⁶ Spinosa, Flores, Dreyfus *Disclosing New Worlds; Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity* p. 28 henceforth cited as [Drey. 1999]

style as one aspect among many of either a human being or human activity... Our claim is precisely that a style is not an aspect of things, people, or activity but, rather, constitutes them as what they are.”¹⁸⁷ The shift of focus from just talking about a world, or frameworks of meaning, to speaking of style effectively clarifies how we can speak of a new world and yet go on speaking generally of the same practices and norms as before. If style is the central determination of what a world is and how it discloses entities within it then changing the arrangement of practices changes the entire structure and we have a new world.

Articulation, the first of the ways style can be significantly changed, involves a clarification or reprioritization of the practices which already constitute a disclosive space. This activity can be a focusing whereby a previous multiplicity of practices become newly understood through a focusing upon one of the practices as of central importance. We can understand articulation further in two ways. Either articulation is a gathering from dispersion or articulation is a retrieval of previously important elements which have been allowed to sink from focus: “All articulation makes what is implicit explicit. If what is implicit is vague or confused, then we speak of *gathering from dispersion*. If it was once important and has been lost, then we have the special kind of articulation we call *retrieval*.”¹⁸⁸ The important points for us are first that this very movement from implicit to explicit fits perfectly into Julian Young’s model, thus we can understand Young as a sub-case within Dreyfus’ interpretation, and second that the only element of newness we encounter here is in terms of the style in which practices are arranged. There are no new practices encountered, let alone an entire totality of

¹⁸⁷ Ibid. p. 19

¹⁸⁸ Ibid. p. 25

involvements all of which are new. The same holds true for the next way of changing style which is called reconfiguration. Reconfiguration is not necessarily a total break with articulation as a way in which style can change but is, rather, different more by degree than anything else. In reconfiguration previously marginal practices are shifted to centrality. This then changes the meaning and distribution of all the other practices within the framework of disclosure. Where articulation involves making something previously important but perhaps unclear or fallen from sight once more explicit in its importance, perhaps even to the extent of making it more central than it was before, reconfiguration takes something which was perhaps never very important and makes it central for the first time. These two ways of changing style are the primary ways in which Dreyfus had conceptualized art's opening up of a world for Heidegger in his earlier piece "Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology and Politics". As the terms used to describe these activities suggest, we are here simply dealing with a re-articulation or re-configuration of practices which have always already been available to us. The final way to change style goes a little beyond the limitations of the previous two but still, for us, doesn't go far enough.

This third formulation is cross-appropriation and it involves the importation of a practice from another disclosive framework:

"Cross-appropriation takes place when one disclosive space takes over from another disclosive space a practice that it could not generate on its own but that it finds useful. These disclosive spaces can be at the level of whole cultures or societies or nation-states, which we designated worlds, or they can be at the more restricted levels of professions, industries, companies, and even families, which we designated subworlds."¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 27

It seems worth noting in passing the extensive problems that the possibility of this type of change of style encounters when we attempt to think about it on the level of actual worlds and not just subworlds or local worlds where most of the discussion of the book focuses. It should suffice for our purposes here to note just one point from *Being and Time*, namely the lesson we learn from the observation that the term for equipment (*Zeug*) is a mass term which can never be either singular or plural, but rather always refers to a whole. There can literally never be just one equipment. This is why we are forced in English, for example, to specify that we are discussing “a piece of equipment” rather than “an equipment”. The lesson drawn from this is that within the framework of a world anything can only appear as what it is because of the place it occupies in relation to other practices, pieces of equipment, etc. This was what we had come to realize in chapter two when we discussed the mode of letting-be or *Gelassenheit* which is characterized as letting-be-involved. Now, if we wish to speak of appropriating a practice absolutely foreign to our world structure, we must face the challenge of how we can even understand the foreign practice in question to begin with if it has no relational being in the totality of involvements which is the whole of our linguistic cultural practices. At this point we might import the entire debates surrounding such related issues as Quine’s work on radical translation, Kuhn’s incommensurability of scientific paradigms, or Spivak’s discussion of the impossibility of the speech of the subaltern. We obviously have no time or space for this discussion here, but it does begin to suggest the many inadequacies that cross-appropriation would have as an explanation for the rise of a radically new world as we are conceiving it. Beyond this, it would still base the opening up of the world on a previously existing practice, if one foreign to the world whose change we are seeking to

understand. This is not, however, necessarily an inadequacy of the role that cross-appropriation plays in *Disclosing New Worlds* itself. An adequate discussion of such a topic would take far longer than we have here, but it is worth noting that a primary focus on changes of subworlds and local worlds and not on the holistic change from one single world to another would hardly be troubled by those issues which concern us.

Articulation, reconfiguration, and cross-appropriation make up the modes of what is then called historical world change in contrast with customary disclosing, which goes on in a normal way every day, or discontinuous change which is experienced as a rupture with what came before:

“All of these types of change are historical because people sense them as continuous with the past. The practices that newly become important are not unfamiliar. We contrast, then, our notion of historical change with discontinuous change. When, for instance, a conqueror imposes a whole new set of practices on a people or a people is dispersed and must adopt wholly new practices to survive, such change is discontinuous and is beyond our range of interests.”¹⁹⁰

In locating, then, Dreyfus' earlier explanation of what he takes Heidegger to mean by the opening up of a world in “The Origin of the Work of Art” within the structure of what he calls in *Disclosing New Worlds* “historical change” in contrast with forms of discontinuous change we uncover an implicit claim on the part of Dreyfus that Heidegger thinks art gives rise to historical but not discontinuous change. Beyond, then, just pursuing the question whether or not the interpretation of Young and Dreyfus fits into a wider picture of Heidegger's work, we might now also ask whether the way in which Heidegger discusses art seems to suggest he is primarily interested in what Dreyfus calls historical change or discontinuous change. Is, we might ask, the rise of a new world through art experienced necessarily as continuous with history? We suspect the answer is

¹⁹⁰ Ibid. p. 28

no. Obviously we do not seek to compare the way a work of art sets up a world to the imposition of new practices by a authoritarian ruler. If ever there were distortive practices in which the things of concerned precisely do not dictate the practices which concern them it would be in this example. Were it possible to impose a world in this way - and we think for many reason, some of which we have already mentioned, that such a full imposition is not possible - then the Heideggerian positions we have studied would require that such an imposition be rejected as the erection of an empty and horribly distorting monstrosity. In other words, there is clearly no respect for the material determination of form in the imposition of foreign and artificial frameworks.

The example of a people dispersed who have to find new practices may be, however, particularly illuminating for our purposes. For the sake of space, I shall try to discuss why as briefly as possible. What does it really mean to suggest that a people dispersed and, perhaps, forced to wander far from home would have to develop new practices and thus come to find themselves in a new world? It seems that this is a fairly unobjectionable observation, and yet looked at from the right angle it can be made absolutely contiguous with our own interpretation of the way a work of art sets up a world. To state that a scattered people in a strange land would find themselves caught up within the evolution of new practices, notice that we have to limit here the language which seems to suggest that we simply create practices rather than arriving at them through interaction with matters of concern, implies that practices are based upon and arise from the matters with which a people interact. Scatter a people in a strange country and they must deal with different matters, different matters which will give rise to different practices and ways of speaking, all of which will make up a new world for that

people. Some practices may no doubt be saved, though in time these too will change in relation to the varying circumstances. All of this seems commonsensical enough, but it means very clearly that matters can dictate new practices. Material can dictate new form. Earth, understood as the undisclosed, can give rise to new worlds. Why, then, the bewildering insistence of Dreyfus and Young on worlds only arising from previously existing elements in one sense or another? The answer might be the one stated by Dreyfus, namely that the example of a scattered people is extreme, rare, and not very useful for the types of world disclosure Dreyfus is concerned with. This circumstance, further, seems to have little to do with art.

However, the force of the possibility portrayed in this example remains. What we claim art sometime does, namely, give rise to new practices and a new world from these practices, does indeed occur in some contexts. Thus, what we are suggesting can not simply be impossible or meaningless. Further, if you take seriously Heidegger's concern with the way in which practices and ways of speaking become empty and traditions drift, you can come to see that, were one to come to look under the concealing shroud of an empty tradition, an entire people may indeed come to find themselves, without ever having moved an inch, scattered and facing a very strange land. To a culture previously lost in dissembling or distorting traditions an encounter with the matters themselves would be just as historically discontinuous as being driven from their homes and forced away from their previous social cohesion. It seems that it is precisely this which Heidegger is suggesting some art can do. Furthermore, this need not simply be a return to what the distortive traditions were before they drifted. It may be that traditions which once authentically arose from the matters can no longer be vitally connected to them.

Existence changes, both ours and that of what we concern ourselves with, and so the time may come when new practices must arise even without a literal cataclysmic scattering of a people. I am hard pressed to see how either Young or Dreyfus can dismiss this possibility out of hand. But this question concerning history we shall have to put off until section three of this chapter. For now we will pursue our interpretation of earth and world with an eye for the rise of the radically new or suggestions that what art discloses is experienced as anything but contiguous and familiar.

The central move of “The Origin of the Work of Art” is to think art in terms of disclosure. This, indeed, is at the heart of the transformation of form and matter into world and earth. We have already begun building up to this understanding through our concern in the last chapter to distinguish the undisclosed or concealed understood as those things implicit or hidden within a world from the more primordial sense of the undisclosed or concealed as that which lies outside the limits of a specific world and which that world often does not allow to appear at all. There is a continuity between the statements that every care as care conceals something, as we discussed in chapter one, that every clearing or lighting ultimately depends upon the darkness in which it exists as a disclosure, as we discussed in chapter two in terms of the undisclosed as the mystery in “On the Essence of Truth”, and finally the claim that world limits what can appear as much as it allows anything to appear at all. This limitation of any particular world is not just the self-concealing tendency of the structures of worldhood as seen, for example, in the concealment of the reliability of equipment which we have already discussed. Rather, every world as primordial disclosure itself is limited in the sense expressed in the hermeneutic insight that for something to appear *as* a specific thing or from a specific

angle forecloses its simultaneous experience as something else or from another angle. Further, some of the ways in which a thing can be disclosed may be in contradiction to other ways in which it might be disclosed such that a thing's involvement in a given totality of involvements might keep it, while still located within those relations, from appearing in any number of other ways. These other ways of its appearing would not, then, be implicit possibilities of the given world or totality of involvements. Quite to the contrary, these other possibilities are literally impossibilities within the given world.

Part of what makes the position of Young and Dreyfus appealing may be the implicit assumption that something is not able to appear, without some form of dissembling, in two radically conflicting ways. If this were so, then each possible authentic disclosure of an entity might be assumed to have some sort of structural connection to any other possible disclosure. In this case we are positing an underlying structure ordering all disclosure such that the very plural use of the term "world" begins to look like little more than a literary idiosyncrasy. Of course, there is some basis for this view. What has all our talk about the material determination of form been meant to suggest if not that things can determine the way they show up to us, if properly allowed to, and that ultimately they can determine the entire structure of the world itself. This does not, however, allow us to help ourselves to the assumption that the things themselves can not reveal themselves in several apparently contradictory ways in the contexts of different worlds. Insofar as any given standard of consistency or rationality is part of the structure of a given world, assumptions about what can or cannot happen from the fall of one world to the rise of another is an attempt to impose the specific elements of a given world onto the entirety of Being. There are only standards of consistency within a

world framework, and the assumption that some standard or continuity unites worlds can only ground itself in the, I would claim unjustified, supposition that these standards are to be found outside the structures of particular worlds. In other words, it is to assume that certain facts are true of the undisclosed mystery, or earth, which is precisely to miss the extent of the finitude of any given disclosure. There are no facts about earth. At this point it may be useful to note some precise problematic elements of the terms we have been using throughout the course of this work. Repeatedly we have spoken of ‘things’ and ‘matters’ which determine conceptualizations, language, or forms. Having moved from discussing specific disclosures to the entire disclosive structure of world itself, it should be clear that presuming that outside of a given world, or all worlds, there are discrete entities, things, or matters is to objectify the mystery or earth. ‘Things’ arise because of the structure of a world, and what lies outside a world is best understood as the determining mystery or unknowable ground from which worlds arise. This means, of course, that we can not be assured of any consistency between worlds without assuming we know more about the mystery than we do. A claim to the effect that there are meaningful commonalities between all worlds, or that two worlds apparently occurring one after another must be continuous in some sense, can ultimately only amount to little more than a statement of faith. This point is, of course, in conflict with Heidegger’s ambition in *Being and Time* to disclose the universal structure of worldhood itself but this, more than anything, may have been one of the main reasons why the book had to remain an unfinished project. This is surely suggested by Heidegger’s own closing of

Being and Time with the statement that his way of laying out the constitution of Dasein has been nonetheless just *one* possible way among others.¹⁹¹

If we understand world as the most basic clearing of disclosure amidst primordial concealment then the understanding of earth towards which we have been driving is of this primordial concealment on which any finite disclosure is dependent and yet which all disclosure must thrust from sight. This, then, would be the understanding of world and earth as they are encountered in the phenomenon of truth in general. However, we must heed Heidegger's concern to ground our understanding of earth and world in the phenomenon of art itself and not in our broader considerations of the nature of disclosure. These considerations have provided us a good foundation for our look at earth and world but they hardly touch upon the more difficult details of these elements as they appear in art.

We must turn now to think earth as it appears in the particularity of the art work. Heidegger's engagement with earth takes its real start from a reflection on the different way in which the material substrate appears in the case of equipment versus the art work:

“In fabricating equipment –e.g., an ax – stone is used, and used up. It disappears into usefulness. The material is all the better and more suitable the less it resists perishing in the equipmental being of the equipment. By contrast the temple-work, in setting up a world, does not cause the material to disappear, but rather causes it to come forth for the very first time and to come into the Open of the work's world. The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to glow, tones to sing, the word to speak. All this comes forth as the work sets itself back into the massiveness and heaviness of stone, into the firmness and pliancy of wood, into the hardness and luster of metal, into the lighting and darkening of color, into the clang of tone, and into the naming power of the word.”¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ SZ p. 487

¹⁹² Hof. p. 44-45

What we notice, then, is that rather than disappearing into usefulness as occurs with equipment, and indeed even to equipment itself as a whole, that out of which the art work is made first comes to really be experienced as what it is in its being part of the art work. This, however, calls for a renovation of the sentence we have just written, for art understood more primordially as an event of truth comes to disclose for the first time as what it is what our previous sentence seemed to assume was already laying about present-at-hand. The temple is not, then, made of rock but rather makes rock accessible to us as rock. We are skirting what I consider the greatest difficulty in interpreting “The Origin of the Work of Art”, namely the question of how to unite the understanding of earth and world we have modeled on disclosure to the understanding in terms of art which is generally modeled on work material and completed form. In other words, how do we think something like “the massiveness of stone” in terms of the concealed such that we are not just dealing with an inventive analogy? It will help us to say a bit more about the nature of earth in the art work.

Heidegger provides an example of the nature of earth through discussing the pressing downward which manifests the heaviness of stone. This pressing downward, we are told, “denies us any penetration into it”¹⁹³. If we break open the stone the heaviness retreats into the pieces; we do not find it hidden within. If we weigh the stone we have translated the pressing downward into a mathematical form, but we have not captured the heaviness. In fact, at that moment, we have lost the heaviness entirely. In reading, say in a scientific report, the weight of something there is precisely no experience of that weight. We could go even further and attempt to capture the stone’s pressing downward

¹⁹³ Ibid. p. 45

in terms of gravity and the warping of space-time created by mass as conceived by Einstein, and then we would have truly lost any experience of weight in the very heights of a theoretical abstraction the phenomenological attestation of which, almost by definition, we can have no experience.

Similarly, Heidegger states: “Color shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelengths, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate into it.”¹⁹⁴ The nature of this remaining undisclosed is very obviously here not strictly a remaining entirely concealed. The color shines, it just cannot be disclosed further than that. In this way, then, the work of art which allows the color to shine lets the earth be an earth insofar as it discloses, not necessarily the essence of being of color, but the way in which it alone allows anything to appear to us and yet remains ultimately a mystery. As noted, we can come to understand the phenomenon of color and light in various frameworks, such as that of the physical sciences, but these never really tell us anything more about the shine of color but rather translate the sheer thatness of it into a different language. This shining forth of the mystery that there is color is a restatement in a new form of the fundamental question of the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, namely why are there beings at all rather than nothing? We might ask why there is color at all rather than nothing, but the sheer fact of color is that upon which all visual phenomenon, at least, rests and behind which we ultimately cannot get. However, the art work may place us before this particular experience of color as color, this startling experience of the mystery that it is at all in a way behind which we can not get. In this way the art work lets

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

an earth be an earth. How are we to connect this understanding of earth to the one which we have been modeling on a hermeneutic understanding of the event of disclosure in general?

I believe the answer lies in the way in which remaining true to the event nature of art forces us to rethink something as simple as the experience of the weight of a rock or the shine of color. If we really do attend to the experience of the weight and hardness of stone in the Greek temple we come to see not that these characteristics are that upon which the temple depends in a sense analogical or parallel to the way in which any specific disclosure depends upon the undisclosed amidst which it arises. Rather, in the event which is the temple, the weight and hardness of stone is both that out of which the temple emerges and that which only appears as what is depended upon. We are, then, dealing with different manifestations of the same type of event, namely the event of disclosure. In coming to experience something *as* something, it is only from amidst everything which is not experienced and can not be experienced in that given event of disclosure that the first experience is possible. The finitude of disclosure means that it is dependent upon and delivered over onto all that it can not disclose even as the finitude of the painting or temple rests in their inability to present anything more of that upon which they depend than the sheer shine or weight, and the very characteristic that the shine and weight can not be gotten behind. What we see here, however, is that the self-concealing of earth goes quite a bit beyond the way in which the reliability of equipment is never normally itself noticed. The withdrawal of reliability, and indeed that of the entirety of involvements, will indeed be part of the self-concealing of earth. For this reason the art work will, as in the case of Van Gogh's shoes, bring reliability and the totality of

involvements into sight as those elements which are self concealing as is asserted in Young's interpretation of Heidegger. However, it is also the sheer "that it is" and the broad darkness in which rests all the other ways in which it could be which shelter under the rubric of earth: "Beings refuse themselves to us down to that one and seemingly least feature which we touch upon most readily when we can say no more of beings than that they are. Concealment as refusal is not simply and only the limit of knowledge in any given circumstance, but the beginning of the clearing of what is lighted."¹⁹⁵ The very dependence of world upon earth, however, would therefore suggest that the rise, tarrying, errancy and/or fall of a world is dependent upon all those many ways of experience and addressing things which it precisely does not have access to. The very fact that we can not get back behind the shine of color, that we can not master its origin or understand its being, points out that we are always delivered over to the way in which it currently shines which, quite beyond our power to add or detract, could always have been, or come to be, different:

"Things are, and human beings, gifts, and sacrifices are, animals and plants are, equipment and works are. That which is, the particular being, stands in Being. Through Being there passes a veiled destiny that is ordained between the godly and the counter-godly. There is much in being that man cannot master. There is but little that comes to be known. What is known remains inexact, which is mastered insecure. What is, is never of our making or even merely the product of our minds, as it might all too easily seem."¹⁹⁶

At any moment the color could fade, the hardness of the stone dissolve, the "*es gibt*" stop giving¹⁹⁷ and the world of the work, or the world in which we work, could end.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid. p. 52

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. p. 51

¹⁹⁷ We refer here to the interesting characteristic of the German language that the statement comparable to our English phrase "there is" is literally formulated in German as "it gives" (*es gibt*) in a usage similar to our phrase "it is raining". We rarely ask what is raining, but Heidegger often points to the alternate sense where we might precisely ask, in the face of the sheer fact that anything is, "what gives, and why?"

It is worth pausing for a moment to consider the specific form of the earth in poetic art and to ask how this form of the earth connects up to everything we have been saying so far. We have already read a formulation for the earth in poetry as “the naming power of the word”, elsewhere we are also given reason to think of the earth in a poetic or theatrical work of art as the common folk sayings and, perhaps, myths of a people:

“In the tragedy nothing is staged or displayed theatrically, but the battle of the new gods against the old is being fought. The linguistic work, originating in the speech of the people, does not refer to this battle; it transforms the people’s saying so that now every living word fights the battle and puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what great and what small, what brave and what cowardly, what lofty and what flighty, what master and what slave (cf. Heraclitus, Fragment 53).”¹⁹⁸

Later, in section three of the work, Heidegger will go on to say that all real art work is poetic in nature. What he will mean by this is not that art should be thought of in terms of communication or linguistic or discursive elements but rather that the being of language and art alike are both most originally thought of in terms of disclosure and that, insofar as a people’s world is most fundamentally tied to its language, all true art can be valuably thought through in terms of the way in which language opens up a world poetically. Now much of what we have said throughout the course of this work has involved the relation of language to the things of which it speaks. How might we attach Heidegger’s reference to the earth in language as the naming power of the word of the sayings of a people to our previous considerations of language? In thinking about that in language beyond which we can not go, that upon which linguistic art or any use of language at all depends, we might notice first that, much as Heidegger suggests that any traditional understanding of truth as correspondence depends upon an already existing space of meaning or clearing, language

¹⁹⁸ Hof. p. 42

itself depends upon that sheer fact of meaning and that things can come to be disclosed through language. Before we can speak of anything it must first be the case that language has meaning, in other words that language brings things into disclosure. Thus we might contrast working language with the danger of idle talk and empty intending with which Heidegger is so concerned. It is indeed possible for the word to lose its naming power, for language to spin like a wheel disconnected from the machine to borrow an image from Wittgenstein. In that case language becomes something else, and less, than authentic language. It becomes a diversion, a distracting haze. We might, then, consider the naming power of words to refer to the power of language to derive from, and bring into disclosure, the matters itself with which it is concerned. In this sense, then, language depends at its heart upon what we have been calling the material determination of form.

What we have said suggests that the earth in language or poetic art might be correctly taken in two senses. First, there is the earth found in the common and traditional sayings of a people. This is indeed the basis upon which a current language depends and from which poetry will arise while, all the same, the richness of the language will resist being entirely appropriated or brought into clarity by the work of art. The old legends will always have more to say, and will never submit to complete reformulation. This is so because the common sayings of a people harkens back to an original encounter with the matters of concern from which meaningful speech arises. The dependence of poetry on the sayings of a people is, then, the dependency of it upon an original experience of Being. This nicely joins up with Heidegger's interest in the process of deconstructing to return to the authentic origins of language. This, however, is only one possibility. The other understanding of earth in language is the deeper one of the naming power of the

word itself which might arise as easily from a new experience of Being as an old one. Language, once born from an experience of Being, can just as easily be born anew not through a return but rather through a new encounter. We can see, then, that poetry may both harken back or leap forward and in each case, if it is truly great art, arrive at the experience of Being from which the word derives its naming power. In the one case we would fit very nicely into the understanding of Heidegger found in Dreyfus and Young while the second is a possibility they fail to account for. It is this leaping forward to a new experience of Being which we have in mind when we talk of the rise of a radically new world.

There is one last point concerning the way in which the art work lets an earth be an earth which we should stress before moving on. Clearly we find here a rather unique formulation and deeper understanding of *Gelassenheit*. Previously *Gelassenheit* was mainly understood as the necessity to keep artificial or distortive ways of relating to matters from being imposed upon them; rather matters themselves had to be left to give rise to their own practices, etc. With the withdrawing characteristic of the earth, however, we come to see that those things we might understand as the earth in any given circumstance are not just prone to distortion but rather actively resist being forced into frameworks in which they do not belong. The earth must be allowed to be an earth because, as was pointed out with the downward thrust of the stone or shine of color, the more we attempt to grasp it the more we lose it until we are left with a series of numbers or a lofty abstraction alone. Color only is color when it is allowed to shine. The very concept of earth, then, might be considered a particular reformulation of the problem of

Gelassenheit which brings into sharp focus a further understanding of the principle of the material determination of form and all the many issues we have found connected with it.

The world and earth are presented by Heidegger as existing in a constant state of strife. This strife is the tension between the disclosure that is world and its own finitude in the sense both that it is dependant upon that which it can not surmount and also that in each disclosure it conceals as much as it reveals. The world is a closing as much as an opening and each disclosure is a denial as well:

“The nature of truth, that is, of unconcealedness, is dominated throughout by a denial. Yet this denial is not a defect or a fault, as though truth were an unalloyed unconcealedness that has rid itself of everything concealed. If truth could accomplish this, it would no longer be itself. *This denial, in the form of a double concealment, belongs to the nature of truth as unconcealedness.* Truth, in its nature, is un-truth. We put the matter this way in order to serve notice, with a possibly surprising trenchancy, that denial in the manner of concealment belongs to unconcealedness as clearing.”¹⁹⁹

One of the characteristics of Dasein’s falling, however, is the tendency for disclosure to cover over not just those things it does not disclose or forecloses from being disclosed but rather also the concealing of this very fact about itself. Disclosure as it occurs in our everyday lives presents itself precisely as neither an achievement nor as tentative; this is partially the meaning of so much of the talk in *Being and Time* about Dasein losing itself in the objects of its concern. We forget, or cover over, the very finitude of our position and the partiality of all disclosure. The uniqueness of art, and part of what makes it potentially the primordial event of truth in which a clearing as a whole is opened up, is the fact that in not just setting up a world but also in disclosing an earth as an earth the artwork presents its own finitude. The world set up by a work of art, because of the presence of its earth, reveals the finitude of the world whereas we usually loose ourselves

¹⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 53 The italics are Heidegger’s own.

in taking our world to be final and absolute. It is questionableness which the art work insists upon even as it occurs as the setting up of a world.

Section Three: Beginning History

“Whenever art happens – that is, whenever there is a beginning – a thrust enters history, history either begins or starts over again.”²⁰⁰

We have, then, come to the end of this work in the topic of the beginning of history. This has been, in a sense, what we have been driving at to begin with. When categorial intuition became pre-ontological understanding in Heidegger it was made possible to ask how we come to seemingly always already have an understanding of Being. The answer is, in a sense, the beginning of history, that certain original disclosures of existence give rise to the practices in which our pre-ontological understanding is contained. The matters, at some time in some way, give rise to the practices through which we then understand and discuss what is. As we had suggested at the beginning of the previous section, through looking at *Disclosing New Worlds* we come to see that our disagreement with Dreyfus, which already includes Young’s position as a special case, can be reformulated by asking whether the world set up by art is always historically continuous. In contrast to Dreyfus’ insistence that the practices set up by a work of art are rearrangements of previously existing practices set into a different style such that these practices are always experienced as in some sense familiar, we assert that the work of art as conceived by Heidegger often serves to disclose things which are experienced as uncanny, radically new, and even strange or bizarre.

²⁰⁰ Ibid. p. 74

Before we press on, however, it is worth admitting, or recalling that we have already admitted in the introduction to this work, that depending on which statements from “The Origin of the Work of Art” one chooses to focus on each argument, Dreyfus’, Young’s and my own, can be supported or seemingly defeated. For this reason we have not just presented an argument with Dreyfus and Young based on the text of “The Origin of the Work of Art” but rather we have also sought to suggest that, while there are ways to support their positions, it leaves out something vital that is developing through the course of Heidegger’s life work. If world change and world formation is always a case of rearranging already existing elements in what sense have we maintained the interest which originally drew Heidegger to categorial intuition, in what way have we continued to assert that cultural practices and philosophy itself can, when properly understood, arise faithfully from existence itself? The position which Dreyfus and Young would suggest overlooks the very real concern for Heidegger that our practices can either be true to the matters they concern or falsify them insofar as they can arise from them and later become distortions. This position makes it necessary to admit the possibility that matters may give rise to new practices through which they are disclosed or, to avoid the deceptive image of static “matters” residing behind or underneath the world, that Being can disclose itself in radically new ways. Hopefully, then, we have successfully shown that we have historical and biographical reasons beyond textual ones to support our view. We should look closer, however, at the textual ambiguities and see if we can explain away some of them.

Let us first look at passages that seem to clearly support our view and then, glancing at some passages which may contradict us, hope to find some kind of

reconciliation. In presenting Dreyfus' interpretation of the work of art as gathering and reorganizing previously familiar practices such that the new world is always experienced as historically continuous with what came before we might offer the following resounding contradiction form "The Origin of the Work of Art":

"The setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the unfamiliar and extraordinary and at the same time thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe to be such. The truth that discloses itself in the work can never be proved or derived from what went before. What went before is refuted in its exclusive reality by the work. What art finds can therefore never be compensated and made up for by what is already present and available. Founding is an overflow, an endowing, a bestowal."²⁰¹

It seems clear from this that the work precisely does not gather the already familiar.

Further, we are clearly told that the new world that arises from the work can never be derived from what went before. We might also draw on another section from several pages earlier:

"Art then is the becoming and happening of truth. Does truth, then, arise out of nothing? It does indeed if by nothing is meant the mere not of that which is, and if we here think of that which is as an object present in the ordinary way, which thereafter comes to light and is challenged by the existence of the work as only presumptively a true being. Truth is never gathered from objects that are present and ordinary."²⁰²

This talk of the truth arising from nothing, but a nothing understood as the not of that which is rather than a void or emptiness, can be interpreted as pointing to the precise understanding of the undisclosed as earth towards which we have repeatedly looked. Truth arises out of that which a given world conceals or makes impossible, but which a new and different world might reveal. This, of course, would mean that the new world set up by a work of art would necessarily challenge the current one, and would precisely have to thrust down into concealment what was previously ordinary. In the face of

²⁰¹ Ibid. p. 73

²⁰² Ibid. p. 69

Dreyfus' assertions, then, we might simply state with Heidegger that the most extreme cases of the disclosure of truth in art are never gathered from what is present and ordinary.

We must, however, be cautious of the seemingly dual voice of "The Origin of the Work of Art". Following both of the quotations we have just drawn upon Heidegger makes statements which Young and Dreyfus both might use to their advantage, for example: "Genuinely poetic projection is the opening up or disclosure of that into which human being as historical is already cast."²⁰³ Here we have the implication, certainly amenable to Young's interpretation, that poetic projection discloses a world we have already been in but which we did not previously notice. Repeatedly Heidegger seems to state both my position, and those of Dreyfus' and Young, side by side:

"Poetic projection comes from Nothing in this respect, that it never takes its gift from the ordinary and traditional. But it never comes from Nothing in that what is projected by it is only the withheld vocation of the historical being of man itself. Bestowing and grounding have in themselves the unmediated character of what we call a beginning. Yet this unmediated character of a beginning, the peculiarity of a leap out of the unmediable, does not exclude but rather includes the fact that the beginning prepares itself for the longest time and wholly inconspicuously."²⁰⁴

One way in which to make sense of these statements from the position we are presenting is to note that, insofar as the earth contains what any given world both conceals and fails to reveal and insofar as it is from this that a new world arises and on which it will depend, it is in the finite and perhaps distorting nature of the previous world that the new one had been preparing itself for the longest time inconspicuously. We are aided in this by an earlier statement of Heidegger's: "At bottom, the ordinary is not ordinary; it is extra-

²⁰³ Ibid. p. 73

²⁰⁴ Ibid. p. 73

ordinary, uncanny.”²⁰⁵ This statement comes in the course of Heidegger’s discussion of the way in which truth is untruth. Guided by this we might point out that, insofar as what is disclosed in the everyday world in a determinate manner also has other ways of being disclosed which are absent or actively concealed by the one manner of disclosure, what we take to be ordinary is always potentially historically discontinuous and radically uncanny. The ordinary is, then, precisely that in which we haven’t recognized the finitude and partiality of all disclosure. But, if as we have discussed the nature of art is to let an earth be an earth and in doing so reveal the finitude of all disclosure, all true art must give rise precisely to a disclosure of the uncanny.

We seem, then, on good ground in stating that, contra Dreyfus, some art must give rise to a discontinuous and radically new world precisely not born out of previously familiar practices. In fact this new world might be precisely in the most extreme conflict with the previous world. This position is stressed by Heidegger through his focus on the ambiguity of the genitive construction that we find in a statement like “the origin of the work of art”. The genitive is always in some sense ambiguous and often richly so. Notice, for example, that in this case we may be speaking of that from which the work of art has its origin, which will be from art in one sense and from truth more primordially insofar as art is a form of truth, or we may be speaking of the origin which *is* the work of art. Heidegger plays on this rich ambiguity while also considering the original sense of the German word for origin, or *Ursprung*, which can literally mean a primal or original leap:

“Art lets truth originate. Art, founding preserving, is the spring that leaps to the truth of what is, in the work. To originate something by a leap, to bring something into being from out of the source of its nature in a founding leap – this is what the word origin (German *Ursprung*, literally, primal leap) means. The origin of the

²⁰⁵ Ibid. p. 53

work of art – that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people’s historical existence, is art. This is so because art is by nature an origin, a distinctive way in which truth comes into being, that is, becomes historical.”²⁰⁶

Surely the source of a thing’s nature out of which its origin leaps is not simply going to be a juggling of previous practices. Rather, it seems precisely the origin of practices themselves with which we concern ourselves when we discuss art as the origin of history itself. If, in the founding that is the overflowing of truth through a great work of art, a new thrust enters history to the extent of either starting, or starting anew, history we can’t possibly be in the realm of historical continuity where continuity is understood in terms of the retention of common elements from one stage to the next. This could never be experienced as anything but an irruption of the new into history, a new which is destructive of that which was previously presumed to be given and universal. As we have said before, however, this need not be the case in all art. There are many, and it may be true even of most, cases in which the understanding of Dreyfus and Young will work perfectly. But it seems very clear that Heidegger needs for there to be some cases in which their understanding will not work, otherwise he has lost the entire value which categorial intuition first had for him, namely the chance for things to disclose themselves from themselves rather than being limited simply to what is imposed either previously or currently.

It may, however, be appropriately asked if we can think of any possible example in which art could possibly have worked in this way. Further, isn’t there something about the earth-world relation which precisely suggests that, in relation to the earth, there is always some given on which art depends? As has potentially been pointed out to me, a

²⁰⁶ Ibid. p. 75

musician must use the same notes as those who came before him to craft his music even as the colors an artist uses are already in existence. Does this provide support to Dreyfus' focus on art as a re-organizing of the previously existent? The answer is yes, in some cases, but not in all. In many cases art is historically continuous and the musician's work uses the same notes as previous musicians and can also be understood as a development of, or return to, traditional themes. At the very least the act of playing and writing music is performed within the context of most of the same practices, otherwise we couldn't recognize it as music at all. However, different scales of notes have come to be throughout history, and new instruments have given rise to new sounds although not perhaps, strictly speaking, to new notes. Of course, in this sense, speaking of notes has itself become something of a theoretical abstraction disconnected from the real "clang of tone" which is surely different in the move from one instrument to another. In a sense the invention of the piano gave rise to clangs of tone which were never previously possible. Clearly, however, the work of the first musician to use a piano was still couched within many traditions and practices. However this at least suggests the possibility of change in even the seemingly fundamental and unchanging, it is only in an abstract sense that musical notes have stayed the same through time.

We might be in more trouble when it comes to discussing color, but even there we have some ground to stand on. At least part of what Heidegger implies, if we take seriously his claim that only in the work of art does color first come to shine, is that the red experienced in a dramatically new work of art, although in some sense strictly the same color, may have come to shine in a very different way from anything that had existed before. It would be a mistake to see here a new arrangement of previously

existing elements insofar as Heidegger repeatedly asserts that it is in the event of the work of art that the elements come to be what they are. If we take this seriously we have nothing even resembling a “new arrangement” but rather the leap of a new shine for red into being. This is, in fact, one response open to Dreyfus in the face of my description of his position, specifically that providing a new style to the arrangement of practices is providing new practices in a deeper sense than I seem to have taken into account.

However it does, I feel, endanger his position on historical continuity insofar as here we are claiming the supposedly continuous elements to be misconceived abstractions, i.e. red has precisely not remained the same at all and neither have the practices which have been re-arranged. As I have attempted to suggest it is part of the nature of earth itself that we can not know that it is stable or complete. We are delivered over onto it in the same way we are delivered over onto Being, and as we have attempted to suggest we have no position from which to assert that it is impossible that entirely without warning the earth might come itself to radically change through some new leap.

We might push our examples a bit further while suggesting at each step that we draw nearer to the most radical type of opening a world Heidegger is concerned with. Our position would be stronger were we to consider the rise of a new art form entirely. The creation of the novel, perhaps, or the essay might work as such an example. Looking for an even more radical shift we might turn to the birth of writing itself, a truly radical creation of a new form of art. Looking at the transition in Ancient Greece, for example, from an oral culture to a written one we might observe the rise of abstract language in the Pre-Socratics and finally in Plato. Here we literally have the ability to write things which could never have been written before not just because there was no writing before but

also because abstract language gives rise to entirely new ways of thought. Here we have the birth of that strange art form called philosophy. Truly this is a primal leap and the origin of a certain history and a certain world. Looking for an example, then, of the type of art Heidegger has in mind we might point to the dialogues of Plato where a brand new world of abstract entities has been born. These, of course, are all just suggestive examples, each with its strengths and weaknesses and each needing more extensive development. However, we feel confident that even if we could not pinpoint a single case in which the originating power of art we are claim Heidegger wants to insist upon, namely the power to open up a radically new world from elements not previously in existence, was present it would still remain as something of a transcendental possibility, that which must be possible given the way in which Heidegger understands disclosure and art. There is, of course, a distinction to be made between drawing out the implications of Heidegger's thought and attempting to demonstrate its truth. Throughout the course of this work we have at times attempted the first but never extensively concerned ourselves with the second. It may be that, much as in the case of Heidegger's claim to uncover the universal structure of worldhood in *Being and Time*, the furthest implications of what Heidegger says in "The Origin of the Work of Art" represent the limits of that work and the questions it leaves to be addressed.

In conclusion allow me to restate the basic elements of my claim as schematically as possible and then discuss some connected issues, implications and problematic elements which may serve to clarify the issue further. I am claiming that Heidegger's engagement with world disclosure in "The Origin of the Work of Art" follows from his earliest concerns with how we can allow the matters of concern, and/or the undisclosed,

dictate the ways in which we are to relate to them. Categorical intuition was exciting for Heidegger because it provided a way for things to dictate their own categorial elements. When this insight is purged of its theoretical elements we arrive at the pre-ontological understanding found in our everyday and traditional practices. For this view to maintain the promise offered by categorial intuition practices must be derived from the matters or things they concern, and not just imposed. However, as Heidegger's concern with destructuring makes clear, practices can become detached from their origins in the matters of concern and can thus end up being distortive and concealing. The question left open by this path is how practices arise from the things they concern or, from a wider perspective, how the ultimate disclosive framework which is world arises from the undisclosed.

In *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks of his project as a return to primordial origins: "We understand this task as one in which by taking *the question of Being as our clue*, we are to *destroy* the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of Being – the ways which have guided us ever since."²⁰⁷ The question we claim he attempted to answer afterwards was what the primordial experience, or wellspring of a tradition, is like. What does the beginning of history look like? What this language makes clear, however, is that if we are going to maintain Heidegger's commitment to his own form of realism and the concept of primordial beginnings and new beginnings for history it has to be possible for old worlds to fall and radically new worlds to arise. Talk of historical continuity would seem to contradict the very idea of a primordial experience of

²⁰⁷ SZ p. 43

Being starting history. This doesn't, however, mean that we are claiming there is ever just earth or a pure experience of something like Kant's thing-in-itself. The primordial experience is the rise of a world, and all worlds are partial and finite interpretive frameworks. There may be an infinite number of possible originating experiences of Being giving rise to an infinite number of worlds with no one experience being absolute or total. The question is not whether we experience the undisclosed without interpretation but rather whether all world frameworks bear some continuous relation to what came before. As I have suggested, to presume that all world frameworks do bear some continuous relation to what came before is to presume to know something certain about the nature of the undisclosed itself upon which the necessity of continuous relation would rest. This, I feel, we can not do.

I had mentioned earlier that it is difficult to provide an example of a radically new world. I should now say something about why this is so. In discussing historically discontinuous worlds we are clearly dealing with the issue of incommensurability. If two worlds are not continuous, i.e. if they do not share elements and practices, then there is no way that they can be compared. To recognize any element of the one world in the other that element would have to find a place in the totality of involvements of the interpreting world. At that point either the worlds do, in fact, prove to be continuous or we have not really grasped the element of the foreign world. In other words, it is almost a logical truism to state that an example of a world radically discontinuous from the one we currently occupy can not be presented because the discontinuous world can only be experienced at all within our world insofar as it has been made continuous with it in some sense. If we recognize this then we could suggest both that, because of the nature of

worldhood itself, we have no access to an example of a radically new historically discontinuous world and also that any number of historical changes which we recognize as apparently continuous may not actually be continuous from a hypothetical, and impossible, standpoint outside of either the old or new world. What we retrospectively interpret as continuous may never have been so. Ultimately, however, I think that what we find is that taking both a realist commitment to the principle of material determination and Heidegger's conception of worldhood seriously we end up facing a boundary of what is conceivable.

This last point I have suggesting is nicely presented by Hans-Georg Gadamer in his discussion of the connected concepts of abyss and ground:

“What is an abyss? Plainly it is something whose depths one can never completely plumb, or better something that one can only plumb and never get to the bottom of. This, however, implies something else: at the bottom of the abyss there is ground, but of such nature that as we penetrate to it, this ground always recedes again, away from us and into the depths, depths at the bottom of which there is nevertheless ground... Again and again he [Heidegger] leaved over the abyss and sought to get to the ground at the bottom of it. In his search for the other beginning, or better, in preparing for a thinking that could make another beginning, he tried to get back behind Aristotle's metaphysic and back behind Plato.”²⁰⁸

I believe this image of the plumbing of the receding ground of an abyss fits nicely the circumstance we find ourselves in right now. Notice that, if we take my discussion of incommensurability seriously, we can't really be talking about art anymore. The discussion in “The Origin of the Work of Art” has gone far beyond it. For us to recognize something as art, as great art which sets up a radically new world, we must have continuities at our disposal which I am unwilling to grant. This draws out, then, the implications of the spectrum I have been insisting on throughout these three chapters. Art

²⁰⁸ Gadamer, Hans-Georg “Martin Heidegger's One Path” in *Reading Heidegger from the Start* p. 31

can be an event of disclosure, and great art can be an event of world disclosure in all the various senses Young, Dreyfus and myself have discussed. However, when we come to the furthest end of the spectrum of the opening up of a brand new history in the disclosure of a radically new world, when we attempt to plumb the question to the greatest depth possible, we are no longer speaking of anything we could call art or even great art. Just as Heidegger's historical destructurings were to push his location of the primordial experiences ever further back behind the earliest thinkers in the tradition of philosophy, so too his attempt to think great art as primordial world disclosure leads, finally, to a further abyss beyond the topic of art. It is leaning over the edge of this further abyss that we must leave this work.

Epilogue: The Question Remains

“But the question remains: is art still an essential and necessary way in which that truth happens which is decisive for our historical existence, or is art no longer of this character?”²⁰⁹

I had begun this work with the simple goal of coming to understand “The Origin of the Work of Art” in the light of Heidegger’s work which had come before it, and most specifically in the light of the rich access we now have to so much of his early work executed before *Being and Time*. In the course of this attempt I came to formulate the way in which two influential readings of “The Origin of the Work of Art” might be seen to be inadequate in the face of the light cast upon Heidegger’s later work by his earliest concerns. Much as Heidegger’s simple question as to the origin of the work of art led him to a deep questioning of the relation of truth to history and the relation of art to contemporary humanity, my seemingly simple question of how to read “The Origin of the Work of Art” has brought to my mind wider questions concerning the place of Heidegger’s work on art in the path of philosophy following Heidegger’s time and the place of art itself within that movement. The question which Heidegger kept alive in the epilogue to his own work is still alive in the epilogue to mine. Is art still an essential way in which truth which is historically decisive happens? What role has art, so conceived, played in the philosophy which has drawn much of its descent from Heidegger, whether for or against him? What role has the connection of truth and art, descending from the

²⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 78

German romantics through Hegel into Nietzsche and thence from Heidegger to Gadamer and eventually into French thought and destined, through Georges Bataille and Jacques Lacan for example, to influence such thinkers as Julia Kristeva, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, played in the history of recent continental philosophy? These are the questions to which our attempt to think through Heidegger point as we suspected they might when we stated in our introduction that the role that Heidegger attributes to art, following many years of wrestling with questions concerning the nature of philosophy itself, suggests that philosophy of art and art itself are far from periphery when it comes to the nature of philosophy in general. Indeed, with Heidegger taking up the theme from Nietzsche, we begin to see the centrality of art for philosophy and of art in philosophy, as well as the conception of philosophy as art, all due to the connecting of truth to poetic-artistic disclosure. The linguistic turn which occurred in twentieth century philosophy has been well traced, but the artistic turn remains to be adequately mapped out. When it has been we may see that it was the destiny of the question Heidegger fatefully asked at the end of "The Origin of the Work of Art" to arrive, through the rich and turbulent history of twentieth century continental philosophy, at a dramatic and exciting answer in the work of such thinkers as Nelly Richard in Chile. In attempting to assert the fundamental relevance of "The Origin of the Work of Art" in Heidegger's thought we arrive, then, at the question of the fundamental relevance of thinking concerning the connection of truth and art to the history of philosophy since Heidegger's work, or further the role of art as truth in history itself. This is the path which remains to be followed, a path for which what you have already read is only preparatory.

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