# Structural Transformation, Culture, and Women's Labor Force Participation in Turkey 

yasemin dildar<br>University of Massachusetts - Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2
Part of the Growth and Development Commons, Labor Economics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons

## Recommended Citation

dildar, yasemin, "Structural Transformation, Culture, and Women's Labor Force Participation in Turkey" (2015). Doctoral Dissertations. 468.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/468

# STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, CULTURE, AND WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY 

A Dissertation Presented<br>by<br>YASEMIN DILDAR

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

September 2015
(c) Copyright by Yasemin Dildar 2015

All Rights Reserved

# STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, CULTURE, AND WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY 

A Dissertation Presented<br>by<br>YASEMIN DILDAR

## Approved as to style and content by:

James K. Boyce, Chair

Deepankar Basu, Member

James Heintz, Member

Gerald Friedman, Department Chair
Economics

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my committee members. I have benefited greatly from conversations with my chair, Jim Boyce throughout different stages of my dissertation. The joy and intellectual stimulation I have had in his classes was followed by his continuous guidance and encouragement during the dissertation writing process. James Heintz has given me invaluable comments and feedback from the early stages of my project. I am grateful to him not only for supporting me throughout my graduate education but also for introducing me to the one of the most interesting academic circles in economics, feminist economists. Deeepanker Basu read my work carefully and always provided me with critical feedback.

I would also like to thank some special Economics faculty at UMass. Mohan Rao's development economics class in my first year in the program became the source of my passion for development economics. Nancy Folbre's unique vision contributed a lot to my understanding of the political economy. David Kotz has been an excellent teacher-scholar and mentor. I benefited immensely from the dissertation workshop conducted by Peter Skott.

I have been very fortunate to have a supportive and collaborative environment among graduate students at UMass. I would like to thank particularly to Cruz Bueno, Hasan Cömert, Serkan Demirkılıç, Bilge Erten, Leopoldo Gómez-Ramírez, Carlos Marentes, Cem Oyvat, Michelle Rosenfield, Zoe Sherman, Hasan Tekgüç, and Raúl Zelada-Aprili for their friendship and support.

I am very grateful to my family who suffered during my graduate education because of the physical distance yet gave me endless love and support. This dissertation
is dedicated to my mother who continuously encouraged me since my early childhood, cherished my baby-steps in every stage of my life, understood me best at the most difficult times, and always reminded me, with her own life, why writing this dissertation was so important.

Finally, Daniel MacDonald is the one whose existence put everything in perspective during the dissertation writing process. He has been the constant source of happiness and joy in the last six years of my life. He is the one who literally read everything I wrote and supported me during all phases of not only dissertation writing but also graduate school. With the happiness of knowing I will spend the rest of my life with him, I express my deepest thanks to him.

# ABSTRACT <br> STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, CULTURE, AND WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN TURKEY 

SEPTEMBER 2015

YASEMIN DILDAR
B.A., MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce

Turkey has experienced important structural and social changes that would be expected to facilitate women's participation in market work. Social attitudes toward working women have changed in recent years; women are becoming more educated; they are getting married at a later age; and fertility rates are declining. Despite these factors, women's labor force participation rates are very low in comparison to the countries at a similar development stage.

This dissertation analyzes the underlying causes of low female labor force participation in Turkey. In addition to a background chapter (Chapter 2) analyzing structural transformation and employment generation patterns, the dissertation has three main chapters. In Chapter 3, I investigate the role of patriarchal norms and religiosity in constraining women's labor force participation using 2008 Demographic and Health Survey data. Employing an instrumental variable estimation, I find that
internalization of patriarchal norms has a negative impact on female labor force participation.

In Chapter 4 I use qualitative data from in-depth interviews based on field research in 2013 to investigate women's preferences as well as their actual behavior. I analyze women's labor force participation decisions, past schooling decisions and fertility decisions in light of their individual preferences and aspirations on one hand, structural constraints and household dynamics on the other, and I question the common assumption that paid employment leads to empowerment of women. I find that women are not given equal opportunity to make their life choices from an early age. Many women express a preference for work outside the home but face constraints including the burden of care work and husband's disapproval. The interviews with working wives, on the other hand, reveal that the gender division of labor in the household is not changed substantially by the employment status of women.

In Chapter 5 I examine the impact of an employment subsidy enacted in Turkey in 2008 on women's employment, accounting for variations across culturally diverse provinces. I estimate a difference-in-differences model using a monthly panel of province-level employment data from the Social Security Administration of Turkey. I find that the employment package increased the female share of employment in the provinces where positive discrimination was effective. Moreover, I find that there is not a statistically significant difference between conservative and progressive provinces in terms of the effectiveness of the policy: a demand-side policy can increase women's employment despite cultural constraints that are normally thought to prohibit female labor supply.

The findings of the dissertation support the premise that understanding the low female labor force participation in Turkey requires taking into account complex social, economic, and cultural factors. Using complementary quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the dissertation shows that both supply-side and demand-side con-
straints are in play, implying need for policy-makers to address both sides of the labor market to raise women-s employment.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ..... iv
ABSTRACT ..... vi
LIST OF TABLES ..... xii
LIST OF FIGURES ..... xvi
CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION ..... 1
1.1 Motivation and Objectives ..... 1
1.2 Chapter Summaries ..... 3
2. STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY ..... 5
2.1 Structural Transformation and Employment Generation ..... 5
2.1.1 A Short Economic History of Turkey Before the Structural Adjustment Programs ..... 5
2.1.2 Export-Oriented Industrialization and the Transformation of the Labor Market ..... 7
2.1.3 Post-2001 Period: Jobless Growth ..... 11
2.2 Women's Labor Force Participation ..... 16
2.2.1 Urbanization and Female Labor Force Participation ..... 16
2.2.2 Labor Force Participation by Education Level ..... 18
2.2.3 Labor Force Participation by Age ..... 21
2.2.4 Labor Force Participation by Marital Status and Unpaid Domestic Labor ..... 24
2.2.5 Sectoral Distribution of Female Employment and Gender Segregation ..... 28
2.3 Family Structure, Ideological Context, and Government Policies ..... 42
3. DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CONSERVATISM ..... 51
3.1 Introduction ..... 51
3.2 Historical and Comparative Trends in Women's Labor Force Participation ..... 53
3.3 Literature Survey ..... 59
3.3.1 Women's Labor Force Participation in the MENA Region ..... 59
3.3.2 Empirical Studies of Labor Force Participation of Women in Turkey ..... 61
3.4 Empirical Analysis ..... 71
3.4.1 Data and Methodology ..... 71
3.4.2 Probit Regression Results ..... 77
3.4.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation and Possible Channels of Causation from Patriarchy to Lower Female Labor Force Participation ..... 82
3.4.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results ..... 85
3.5 Discussion ..... 97
3.6 Conclusion ..... 100
4. "WORKING WOMEN WITHOUT EDUCATION ARE DOOMED TO BE OPPRESSED": WOMEN'S LABOR MARKET DECISIONS AND EMPOWERMENT ..... 102
4.1 Introduction ..... 102
4.2 Literature Review ..... 105
4.3 Data and Methodology ..... 110
4.4 Schooling Decision ..... 111
4.5 Labor Force Participation Decision ..... 114
4.5.1 Freedom to Choose ..... 114
4.5.2 Aspirations ..... 118
4.5.3 Policies to Encourage Women's Employment ..... 121
4.6 Fertility Decisions: State Intervention in Reproduction ..... 124
4.7 Paid Work and Empowerment ..... 132
4.7.1 Use of Own Income ..... 132
4.7.2 Sexual Division of Labor ..... 138
4.7.3 Decision Making in the Household ..... 140
4.7.4 Mental Health and Self-Confidence ..... 142
4.7.5 Gender Role Attitudes ..... 147
4.7.6 Summary Findings ..... 152
4.8 Conclusion ..... 153
5. TARGETING WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT: DO SUBSIDIES WORK? ..... 156
5.1 Introduction ..... 156
5.2 Employment Subsidies ..... 160
5.3 The 2008 Employment Package and Other Active Labor Market Policies in Turkey ..... 164
5.4 The Impact of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis ..... 167
5.5 Data and Methodology ..... 169
5.5.1 Data ..... 169
5.5.2 Estimation Methodology ..... 172
5.6 Descriptive Statistics ..... 177
5.7 Estimation Results ..... 178
5.8 Conclusion ..... 182
6. CONCLUSION ..... 184
APPENDICES
A. SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES ..... 187
B. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ..... 200
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..... 210

## LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
2.1 Labor Market Indicators, Selected Years ..... 7
2.2 Growth and Investment in Turkey, 1972-2001 ..... 10
2.3 Output Elasticities of Employment by Sectors, 1989-2008 (annual average) ..... 15
2.4 Output Elasticities of Employment by Gender, 1992-2008 ..... 15
2.5 Mean Time Spent on Unpaid and Paid Work-Married Couples, 2006 ..... 26
2.6 Comparison of Paid and Unpaid Work Burden over the Life Course ..... 27
2.7 Distribution of Female Employment by Economic Activity (\%), Rural, 1988-2013 ..... 30
2.8 Distribution of Female Employment by Economic Activity (\%), Urban, 1988-2013 ..... 32
2.9 Gender Segregation in the Urban Labor Market: Dissimilarity Index (DI) and Coefficient of Female Representation (CFR), 1988-2013 ..... 36
2.10 Female Share of Employment in Major Public Manufacturing Industries, 1985-2011 ..... 39
2.11 Female Share of Employment in Major Private Manufacturing Industries, 1985-2001 ..... 40
2.12 Gender Segregation in Manufacturing, Dissimilarity Index, 1985-2001 ..... 41
3.1 Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1960-2013 ..... 55
3.2 Labor Force Participation Rates by Year and Education Level ..... 59
3.3 Main Reason for Not Working at a Job ..... 75
3.4 Correlations of Main Reason for Not Working at a Job with Patriarchy and Religiosity ..... 76
3.5 Main Reason for Quitting a Job ..... 77
3.6 Probit Regression Results: Urban versus Rural ..... 79
3.7 Summary Statistics for Variables in the Instrumental Variable Estimations (Urban) ..... 87
3.8 Instrumental Variable Estimation: First Stage Regression Summary Statistics ..... 87
3.9 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results (Urban) ..... 88
3.10 IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy according to Religiosity (Urban) ..... 91
3.11 IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy According to Fertility Preferences (Urban) ..... 94
3.12 IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy According to Education Level (Urban) ..... 95
3.13 Job Status of Working Women according to Education Level (Urban) ..... 96
3.14 Change in Cultural Values, 1990-2014 ..... 99
4.1 Reasons Why Women Choose not to Continue Their Education, Women with Less than High School Degree ..... 111
4.2 Reasons Why Women Decide to Take up Paid Work, Ever-employed Women ..... 115
4.3 Indicators of Mental Health and Self-Esteem ..... 143
4.4 Women's Opinions on the Consequences of Paid Work for the Family ..... 148
4.5 Son Preference and Ideas on Marriage Type ..... 150
5.1 Main Labor Market Outcomes by Gender in the Turkish Economy ..... 158
5.2 Timeline and Targeted Beneficiaries of Employment Subsidies under Different Policies ..... 166
5.3 Number of Persons Covered by Social Security, 2008-2013 ..... 168
5.4 Female Share of Formal Employment by Economic Sectors, 2008-2013 ..... 168
5.5 Average Share of Industry in Gross Value Added, 2007-2011 ..... 169
5.6 Change in Female Share of Employment in the Treated Provinces ..... 172
5.7 Definitions of Variables and Data Sources ..... 174
5.8 Averages of the Conservatism Measures: Percentage of Early Marriages, Gender Inequality Index (GII) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) ..... 175
5.9 Descriptive Statistics ..... 177
5.10 Summary Statistics for Female Employment Share ..... 178
5.11 Estimated Effect of 2008 Employment Package on the Female Share of Employment, 2007-2013 ..... 180
5.12 Estimated Effect of 2008 Employment Package and Culture on the Female Share of Employment, 2007-2011 ..... 182
A. 1 Percentage Distribution of Non-participant Women (and Men) according to Reason for not being in the Labor Force, Urban, 1988-2012 ..... 188
A. 2 Percentage Distribution of Non-participant Women (and Men) according to Reason for not being in the Labor Force, Rural, 1988-2012 ..... 189
A. 3 Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women ..... 190
A. 4 Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women, Cultural Value Proxies ..... 192
A. 5 Coding for the Scale Variables; Patriarchy, Religiosity, and Family Conservatism ..... 194
A. 6 Sincan Case Study: Demographic Profiles of the Interviewees ..... 196
A. 7 Sincan Case Study: Summary Statistics ..... 198

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page
2.1 Annual Rates of Change in Nominal Wages and Value Added in
Manufacturing, 1951-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Annual Rate of Change in Employment (\%) in Manufacturing,
1951-2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Real GDP and Employment Indices (1998=100) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.5 Share of Employment by Sector, 1985-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6 Unemployment and Inactivity Rates for Men and Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7 Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1988-2013 . . . . . . . 17
2.8 Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%) by Migration Status and
Educational Attainment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.9 Labor Force Participation of Men by Educational Attainment Level,
1988-2013 ................................................................... . . 20
2.10 Labor Force Participation of Women by Educational Attainment
Level, 1988-2013 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.11 Labor Force Participation of Women according to Age: 1988 versus 201321

2.12 Labor Force Participation of Urban Women according to Age and
Education: 1988 versus 2013 ..... 23
2.13 Labor Force Participation according to Marital Status and Education (Urban, 2013) ..... 25
2.14 Percentages of Children under Age Five that Benefit Various Childcare Arrangements by Household Asset Deciles, 2009 ..... 45
3.1 Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%), OECD Countries, 2010 ..... 57
3.2 Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%), Upper-Middle Income Countries, 2010 ..... 58
3.3 Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%), MENA Countries, 2010 ..... 58
3.4 Percentage of Respondents who agree with the Statement "When Jobs are Scarce Men Should Have More Right to a Job than Women" ..... 66
3.5 Gender Stratification in the Economic and Cultural Spheres ..... 69
4.1 Alternative Frameworks to Explain Women's Labor Market Behavior ..... 106
5.1 Differences in the Average Share of Female Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in Treatment and Control Provinces, 2007-2013 ..... 170
5.2 Differences in the Average Employment of Men and Women in Treatment and Control Provinces, Adjusted for Seasonal Changes, 2007-2013 ..... 171

## CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 Motivation and Objectives

Turkey has experienced important structural and social changes that should facilitate women's participation in market work. Social attitudes toward working women have changed in recent years ${ }^{1}$; women are becoming more educated ${ }^{2}$; they are getting married at a later age ${ }^{3}$; and fertility rates are declining. ${ }^{4}$

In the development economics literature, a U-shaped trend in the female labor force participation rate during the course of development is widely accepted as a

[^0]stylized fact (Goldin, 1994; Schultz, 1990; Psarchapoulos \& Tzannatos, 1989; Durand 1975). As the economy moves from an agrarian society in which housework and fieldwork can be handled together to an industrial and service-based formal economy where housework and market work are spatially separated, female labor force participation rates initially fall. But in the later stages of development, as fertility declines and the education level of women increases, their labor force participation rises. The trend in Turkey does not conform to this picture: Turkish women are still at the bottom of the ' $U$ ' despite significant demographic and structural changes in the economy.

Higher labor force participation among women is a desirable goal on several grounds. First, economic independence is crucial for women's empowerment. Labor market participation improves women's economic position and their social status. Second, gender equality has some instrumental benefits. Cross-country studies show that greater economic equality between women and men is associated with poverty reduction (World Bank, 2001; Klasen, 1999). Third, women's integration into the economy leads to a higher utilization of a country's human capital for economic development. Joblessness or non-participation represents a waste of human resources (Argy, 2005). Furthermore, women's empowerment contributes to growth by increasing the human capital formation of future generations. Employed women are found to be more involved in decision making with regard to children's education and health than full-time homemakers (Angel-Urdinola \& Wodon, 2010). It is argued that women's control over household income leads to greater investment in human capital (Hoddinott \& Haddad, 1995; Bussolo, De Hoyos \& Wodon, 2009).

This dissertation analyzes the underlying causes of low female labor force participation in Turkey. Drawing on complementary quantitative and qualitative methodologies, I disentangle the social, economic, and cultural mechanisms affecting female labor force participation. The main objectives of this dissertation are: (i) to ana-
lyze the supply-side determinants of female labor force participation in Turkey and quantify the impact of patriarchal norms and personal religiosity; (ii) to examine the relationship between paid work and women's empowerment; and (iii) to identify the importance of demand-side constraints on women's employment by evaluating the impact of a demand-side intervention while accounting for cultural variation among provinces.

### 1.2 Chapter Summaries

This dissertation consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 2 provides descriptive background information about (i) structural transformation and employment generation in the Turkish economy; (ii) women's labor force participation according to age, education, marital status over time and gender segregation; and (iii) family structure, ideological context, and government policies.

In Chapter 3, I investigate the role of patriarchal norms and religiosity in constraining women's labor force participation using 2008 Demographic and Health Survey data. My analysis contributes to the understanding of the Turkish low female labor force participation puzzle by introducing culture as an explanatory variable using information on women's values and religious practices. Employing an instrumental variable estimation, I find that internalization of patriarchal norms has a negative impact on female labor force participation.

In Chapter 4, I use qualitative data from in-depth interviews based on field research in 2013 to investigate women's preferences and behavior. I analyze women's labor force participation decisions, past schooling decisions and fertility decisions in light of their individual preferences and aspirations on one hand, and structural constraints and household dynamics on the other, and I question the common assumption that employment automatically leads to empowerment of women. I find that women are not given equal opportunity to make their life choices from an early age. Many
women express a preference for work outside the home but face constraints including the burden of care work and husband's disapproval. The interviews with working wives, on the other hand, reveal that empowering potential of paid work is limited, and that the gender division of labor in the household is not changed substantially by the employment status of women.

Chapter 5 examines the impact of an employment subsidy enacted in Turkey in 2008 on women's employment, accounting for variations across culturally diverse provinces. I estimate a difference-in-differences model using a monthly panel of province-level employment data from the Social Security Administration of Turkey. I find that the employment package increased the female share of employment in the provinces that did not benefit from regional incentive schemes previously. Moreover, I find that there is not a statistically significant difference between conservative and progressive provinces in terms of the effectiveness of the policy: a demand-side policy can increase women's employment despite cultural constraints that are normally thought to inhibit or prohibit female labor supply.

Chapter 6 presents the main findings and conclusions drawn from this dissertation. The findings of the dissertation support the premise that the low female labor force participation in Turkey is the result of complex social, economic, and cultural factors. Using complementary quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the dissertation shows that both supply-side and demand-side constraints are in play, implying need for policy-makers to address both sides of the labor market to raise women's employment.

## CHAPTER 2

## STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY

### 2.1 Structural Transformation and Employment Generation

### 2.1.1 A Short Economic History of Turkey Before the Structural Adjustment Programs

The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. Its economic history before liberalization in the1980s can be analyzed broadly in four periods: Establishment years, 1923-1930; etatism ${ }^{1}$, 1930-1950; attempts of liberalization, 1950-1960; and import substitution industrialization, 1960-1980 (Kazgan, 1999; Kepenek \& Yentürk, 2000; Boratav, 2003). The establishment years were initially intended to follow liberal economic policies, however transformation of the economy from a largely agrarian structure required state involvement. A liberal approach to foreign trade could not become successful, especially after the onset of Great Depression when export revenues declined and the terms of trade deteriorated. The state took an active role in the creation of a national bourgeoisie and encouraged private business through public entrepreneurship (Taymaz, 1999). The etatist period started with the introduction of five-year industrial plans in 1930s. The main objectives of the plans were to establish industrial regions and to encourage the production of basic consumption goods that were previously imported (İzdes, 2011). State-owned enterprises dominated the

[^1]economic activity and the industrial sector experienced very high growth rates albeit from a low base. The average annual growth rate of industry was $17.1 \%$ during the period 1929-1935 and 11\% during 1935-1939 (Kazgan, 1999).

During the multi-party system in the 1950s, the new government followed liberal economic policies and achieved high growth rates due to favorable external conditions (Taymaz, 1999). The protectionist trade policies of 1930s were removed and imports were liberalized (Boratav, 2003). In this period, Turkey was integrated into the international division of labor based on its comparative advantage in agriculture. Investment in agriculture and mechanization resulted in a 50 percent expansion in the agricultural output between 1950-53 (İzdess, 2011). One of the main characteristics of the period was the increasing share of the private sector in the economy (Herr \& Sonat, 2013). This period ended in 1960 with a military intervention, partially as a response to a deteriorating trade balance, increasing foreign debt and stagnant industrial development. The establishment of the State Planning Organization in 1963 institutionalized development planning, and import substitution industrialization (ISI) became the main development strategy until 1980. Development planning achieved a $6.8 \%$ average annual growth rate between 1962-1976; the average growth of industry was $9.3 \%$ during the ISI period while agriculture grew by $3.9 \%$ (Boratav, 2003).

Table 2.1 shows labor market trends before the 1980s. The share of agricultural employment has been steadily declining. Labor force participation has been also declining as labor was released from agriculture. Industrial employment increased faster than service employment up until the 1950s. Starting from 1960s, expansion in the service sector outpaced industry.

Table 2.1: Labor Market Indicators, Selected Years

| Year | Labor Force <br> Participation (\%) | Unemployment <br> Rate (\%) | Sectoral Distribution of Employment |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Agriculture | Industry | Services |
| 1924 | 72.2 | 6.8 | 89.8 | 4.6 | 5.5 |
| 1929 | 71.2 | 3.2 | 87.8 | 6.2 | 6 |
| 1933 | 70.4 | 3.9 | 89.4 | 4.9 | 5.7 |
| 1939 | 71.6 | 2.1 | 86.7 | 8 | 5.3 |
| 1944 | 71.3 | 3 | 86.5 | 8.3 | 5.2 |
| 1950 | 69.9 | 1.4 | 84.8 | 8.4 | 6.8 |
| 1960 | 72 | 3.1 | 74.8 | 11.5 | 13.7 |
| 1970 | 67.9 | 6.3 | 64.2 | 16.3 | 19.5 |
| 1980 | 63.3 | 8.1 | 54.2 | 20 | 25.8 |
| 1988 | 57.8 | 8.4 | 47.4 | 21.9 | 30.8 |

Source: Bulutay (1995), Tables 7.A and 8.A. Labor force participation and unemployment for population of $15+$ years of age, sectoral employment for population of $12+$ years of age. Industry includes construction.

### 2.1.2 Export-Oriented Industrialization and the Transformation of the Labor Market

The ISI strategy ended with a severe balance of payments crisis in 1978 and the government announced a stabilization program on January 24, 1980. The structural adjustment program (SAP) was implemented by a military government until 1983. The major goals of the SAP were reducing the price distortions in foreign trade and factor markets, liberalizing the trade and capital accounts, and minimizing the role of state-owned enterprises (Taymaz, 1999). The export-oriented industrialization (EOI) strategy initiated at this time relied on continuous currency devaluations and export incentives as well as wage suppression supported by the military coup. With the 1980 military coup, trade unions were closed and strikes were terminated. Productivity increases in this period were not accompanied with wage increases (Boratav, Köse \& Yeldan, 2000; Voyvoda \& Yeldan, 2001). Real wages dropped by $40 \%$ in 19801987 (Taymaz, Voyvoda \& Ylmaz, 2014). Figure 2.1 shows that manufacturing value added increased faster than wages during this period.

Figure 2.1: Annual Rates of Change in Nominal Wages and Value Added in Manufacturing, 1951-2001


Source: TURKSTAT, 1923-2009 Statistical Indicators

The Structural Adjustment Program also had indirect effects on labor markets through the cuts in agricultural subsidies and privatization of state-owned enterprises. The loss of income in rural areas contributed to massive rural to urban migration. At the same time, the privatization of state-owned enterprises led to significant job losses. As a result, the urban economy faced an increasing amount of surplus labor. Export-oriented industrialization did not generate sufficient employment to absorb the surplus labor. Figure 2.2 shows the annual change in manufacturing employment. The overall performance during the EOI period was considerably worse than that in the ISI period. The annual rate of growth in real value added was 5.6 percent in 1970-76 while employment growth was 5.1 percent. The average rate of growth in employment in the 1980-87 "trade liberalization" period, however, was only 2.7 percent, while the growth rate of output was 10.4 percent (Taymaz \& Voyvoda, 2012, p. 90).

Figure 2.2: Annual Rate of Change in Employment (\%) in Manufacturing, 1951-2001


Source: TURKSTAT, 1923-2009 Statistical Indicators

The relatively poor investment performance is one of the important reasons why export-oriented industrialization did not generate sufficient employment. Private gross fixed investment increased by 14.1 percent per annum during 1983-87 but only a small portion of it was directed to manufacturing. Private investment in manufacturing increased by 7.7 percent while investment in housing increased by 24.5 percent in this period (Table 2.2). Investment boom in the housing sector explains most of the increase in private investment during the EOI period. The inconsistency between the export-orientation goal in foreign trade and a pattern of accumulation away from manufacturing despite the price and subsidy incentives has been identified as a major structural failure of the export-oriented growth strategy in Turkey (Köse \& Yeldan, 1998; Yentürk \& Onaran, 2005; Boratav \& Yeldan, 2006; Taymaz \& Voyvoda, 2012).
Table 2.2: Growth and Investment in Turkey, 1972-2001

| Rate of growth (\%) | GDP | Manufacturing | Private Fixed Investment |  |  |  | Public Fixed Investment |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ISI (1972-76) | 6.8 | 9.7 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total } \\ 11.5 \end{gathered}$ | Energy/Trans. 19.5 | Manufacturing 10.9 | Housing 9 | $\begin{gathered} \text { Total } \\ 15.4 \end{gathered}$ | Energy/Trans. 16.3 | Manufacturing 16 |
| Economic Crisis (1977-80) | 0.5 | -0.2 | -7.3 | -10.6 | -13.6 | 2.2 | -1.7 | 0.3 | 1.3 |
| Post-Crisis Adjustment (1981-82) | 4.2 | 7.9 | -1 | 27.3 | 4.8 | -19.6 | 4.8 | 9.5 | -11.2 |
| EOI (1983-87) | 6.5 | 8.6 | 14.1 | 7.5 | 7.7 | 24.5 | 12 | 16.8 | -9.6 |
| Exhaustion, 1988 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 29.2 | 4.2 | 9.7 | 50.7 | -2.3 | -2.6 | -11.3 |
| Financial Liberalization (1989-93) | 4.8 | 6 | 11.9 | 16.2 | 14.3 | 11.2 | 5.2 | 4.4 | -6.9 |
| Financial Crisis, 1994 | -5.5 | -7.6 | -9.6 | -26.2 | -0.5 | -24.6 | -39.5 | -44.6 | -41.4 |
| Foreign Capital-Led- <br> Growth (1995-1997) | 7.2 | 10.2 | 9.5 | 25.8 | 4.7 | 2.9 | 15.8 | 13.6 | 7.8 |
| World Financial Crisis 1998 | 3.1 | 1.2 | -4.2 | -14.3 | -6.3 | -1.6 | 4.6 | 14.6 | 17.1 |
| 1999 | -5 | -5.7 | -17.8 | -31.7 | -17.5 | 18.6 | -3.9 | -15.4 | -4.1 |
| Financial Meltdown 2000 <br> 2001 | 7.2 -9.3 | 5.9 -8.5 | $\begin{gathered} 14 \\ -32.2 \end{gathered}$ | 15.6 | 15 | 14 | $\begin{gathered} 15.7 \\ -32.1 \end{gathered}$ | 26.2 | 61.2 |

Source: Boratav and Yeldan 2006, Table 1.

### 2.1.3 Post-2001 Period: Jobless Growth

Taymaz and Voyvoda (2012) split Turkey's experience with neoliberal industrialization into two periods, the first from 1980-2001 and the second being post-2001. In accordance with the principles of the Washington Consensus, the first phase was characterized by opening the economy to the world commodity and financial markets (trade liberalization: 1980-88; financial liberalization: 1989-2000). The second phase of neoliberal restructuring, the post-2001 era, was governed by the principles of the "Post-Washington Consensus", centering on good governance through marketregulating institutions particularly in the banking sector after the 2001 crisis. One important feature of the post-crisis period is increasing unemployment and jobless growth. Official unemployment rates stayed around 10 percent during this period, but the number of discouraged workers increased dramatically. The total unemployment measure that accounts for discouraged workers increased from 11.1 percent in 2000 to 15.9 percent in 2013. Figure 2.3 displays the jobless growth phenomenon.

Figure 2.3: Real GDP and Employment Indices (1998=100)


Source: TURKSTAT, National Accounts and Household Labor Force Statistics. Employment index is created using total number of employed.

Contrary to the mainstream explanations, the stagnant employment performance cannot be attributed the labor market rigidities. Turkey is among the highly flexible OECD countries according to a labor market flexibility index calculated using data on minimum wages, hiring and firing practices, centralized collective bargaining, unemployment insurance and top marginal tax rate (Lawson \& Bierhanzl, 2004). Considering the size of informal labor market and the prevalence of informal practices in the formal labor market through subcontracting, the degree of flexibility becomes even greater (Taymaz \& Özler, 2005). Moreover, Turkey is the second most flexible country in the OECD with respect to the rate of indexation of real wages to the productivity increases (OECD, 2000; Aydner-Avşar \& Onaran, 2010). Figure 2.4 shows that productivity increased faster than real wages both in public and private manufacturing after 2001.

Figure 2.4: Index of Real Wages and Productivity per Production Hours in Manufacturing Industry $(1997=100)$, 1988-2006


Source: TURKSTAT, Industrial Labor Input Indices.

Turkey is among the developing countries still going through structural change (Figure 2.5). According to Rodrik (2010), Turkey has been relatively successful in reallocating labor from low productivity to high productivity sectors and experiencing "growth-enhancing structural change" in recent three decades. Transformation is still ongoing along with rapid urbanization. However, the ability of the economy to create "good" jobs, usually associated with manufacturing sector, for reallocated labor has been diminishing. Neither services nor industry have been able to absorb net potential labor resources (as measured by the working-age population) that were released from the agricultural sector (Figure 2.6).

Figure 2.5: Share of Employment by Sector, 1985-2010


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Statistics.

Figure 2.6: Unemployment and Inactivity Rates for Men and Women


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Statistics.

The output elasticity of employment growth, defined as the percentage change in employment associated with a one-percent change in output, has diminished in all three major sectors (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). A declining elasticity indicates that employment is becoming less responsive to economic growth. As diminishing output elasticities show, this pattern of structural change has not created satisfactory employment opportunities for a growing population. Both Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4 show that the situation is even worse - indeed much worse - for women. Inactivity is
very high and increasing. Output elasticity of employment for women was actually negative in two sub-periods, 1996-2000 and 2000-2004.

Table 2.3: Output Elasticities of Employment by Sectors, 1989-2008 (annual average)

|  | $1989-2008$ | $1989-2000$ | $2002-2008$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total | 0.25 | 0.39 | 0.14 |
| Agriculture | -1.19 | -0.42 | -1.66 |
| Non-agricultural sectors | 0.54 | 0.68 | 0.48 |
| Industry | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.39 |
| Services | 0.55 | 0.76 | 0.47 |

Source: Yeldan (2011), Table 3.2, p. 10.

Table 2.4: Output Elasticities of Employment by Gender, 1992-2008

| Elasticity of total employment to total GDP |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $1992-1996$ | $1996-2000$ | $2000-2004$ | $2004-2008$ |
| Total | 0.43 | 0.16 | 0.06 | 0.19 |
| Male | 0.5 | 0.33 | 0.14 | 0.22 |
| Female | 0.24 | -0.3 | -0.15 | 0.11 |
| Average annual GDP growth rate |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | $1992-1996$ | $1996-2000$ | $2000-2004$ | $2004-2008$ |

Source: Key Indicators of Labor Market, $6^{\text {th }}$ edition.

The sectoral analysis of the post-2001 employment patterns reveals that depopulation in the rural economy continued. Agricultural employment decreased by 3.07 million workers from 2001 to 2008. The total increase in industry was only 667,000 , while employment in services increased by 1.94 million (Yeldan, 2011). In other words, agricultural labor did not all shift to industry. Taymaz and Voyvoda (2009) find that all but one of the 21 subsectors of manufacturing achieved positive growth rates between 2002 and 2007, yet nine of these subsectors reported labor shedding. Food processing, textiles, mining and quarrying were the subsectors experiencing the
most significant employment losses. Moreover, there is evidence that agricultural labor surplus has been moving into small-scale family-owned services with low pay, further contributing to informality (Ercan \& Tansel, 2006; Taymaz \& Özler, 2005).

### 2.2 Women's Labor Force Participation

### 2.2.1 Urbanization and Female Labor Force Participation

The gender gap in labor force participation has increased from 28.2 percentage points in 1960 to 40.7 percentage points in 2013, according to census data and household labor force surveys. Urbanization is an important factor explaining the increasing gap. During the same period, urban population as a percentage of total population increased from 31.5 percent to 72.4 percent. Women working as unpaid family workers in the rural areas often withdrew from the labor market when they migrated to cities. Figure 2.7 shows the trends in labor force participation in urban and rural areas since 1988. The decline in men's labor force participation rates in both rural and urban areas is a sign of weak employment performance of the economy as discussed in the previous section. We see the impact of structural change and urbanization particularly in women's participation trends. Rural participation rates have been steadily declining while urban participation rates stayed mostly stagnant until after the crisis in 2008.

Figure 2.7: Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1988-2013


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.

Rural to urban migration is identified as one of the reasons why urban female labor force participation remains low. It is often argued that because of their low level of education and insufficient skills rural migrant women, who were once working in agriculture, are likely to become discouraged workers in the urban labor market (Dayoğlu \& Kırdar, 2009; Taymaz, 2009; World Bank, 2009; Uraz, Aran, Hüsamoğlu, Şanalmıs \& Çapar, 2010). Using the 2008 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, Figure 2.8 presents labor force participation rates of three groups of women according to their migration status: (i) those who were born in rural areas but currently living in urban areas; (ii) those who were born in rural areas and are currently living in rural areas; and (iii) those who were born in urban areas and are currently living in urban areas. In total, the participation rate of rural women (ii) is higher than both migrant women (i) and urban women (iii). When we control for education, women who were born and stayed in rural areas have the highest participation in all education
categories, except for higher education. Migrant women with higher education have the highest participation rates. Moreover, migrant women with low levels of education (no education or primary school) have higher participation rates than the women who were born and stayed in urban areas. In other words, migration status is not associated with lower labor force participation once we control for education.

Figure 2.8: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%) by Migration Status and Educational Attainment


Source: TDHS 2008.

### 2.2.2 Labor Force Participation by Education Level

In neoclassical labor supply models labor force participation increases with education because higher levels of education increase the opportunity cost of not working in the form of forgone wage increases. If so, we should expect to see disparities in the labor force participation between people with higher educational attainment and those with lower levels of education. For example, the labor force participation of urban
men increases to 86 percent with a university degree from about 70 percent among primary and high school graduates. ${ }^{2}$ This relationship is much stronger for women in Turkey. Participation rates show striking disparities between university graduates and the rest. Urban labor force participation rates for women are 21 percent for primary school graduates, 31 percent for high school graduates and 72 percent for university graduates. ${ }^{3}$ Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the trends in labor force participation by educational attainment level for the entire male and female working-age population, respectively.

İlkkaracan (2010) explains this particularly strong relationship between education and participation for women in Turkey in terms of the lack of legal and institutional mechanisms with regard to work-family reconciliation. University education not only increases the opportunity cost of not working for women but also makes paid work preferable and manageable for two other reasons in comparison to women with lower levels of education. First, relatively high wages make the purchase of care services from the market possible. Second, since highly educated women are more likely to be employed in the formal sector, they are able to benefit from rights guaranteed by the labor laws such as maternal leave for birth and breastfeeding. They have the guarantee to keep their jobs after giving birth, and in this way they can enjoy retirement benefits without having long ruptures in their working life (p. 23). The majority of women with low educational attainment are employed in the informal sector, which does not offer any of these benefits. For example, 53 percent of women with primary education were working without social security registration in 2013. This ratio increases to 79 percent for women without education (illiterate and primary school incomplete).

[^2]Figure 2.9: Labor Force Participation of Men by Educational Attainment Level, 19882013


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.

Figure 2.10: Labor Force Participation of Women by Educational Attainment Level, 1988-2013


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.

### 2.2.3 Labor Force Participation by Age

Age profiles of the women participating in the labor force show huge disparities in rural and urban areas in Turkey, and the disparities have persisted since 1988 (Figure 2.11). Women of all ages have lower participation rates in the rural areas in comparison to 1988, but the largest decline is seen among young women. This is consistent with increasing levels of education. We see an increase in the urban participation rates for all age groups, except for the 15-19 year group.

Urban participation rates by age show neither a traditional M-shaped pattern, dipping between the early twenties and the main childbearing years of $25-34$, nor the inverted U-pattern seen in Nordic countries with successful work-family reconciliation policies. Instead, they start to decline at the prime-working age (35-39) suggesting that most women do not return to the labor market after giving birth. ${ }^{4}$

Figure 2.11: Labor Force Participation of Women according to Age: 1988 versus 2013


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.

[^3]When we look at the participation rates of urban women according to age and education, we see that most of the increase in urban participation comes from women with less than a high school degree. Figure 2.12 shows that middle aged (35-50) illiterate women have slightly higher participation rates in 2013 than in 1988. Women with primary and secondary school degrees have higher participation rates in all age groups except the 15-19 year group in 2013. The highest increase is observed for the age group of $35-44$. In contrast, there is significant decrease in the labor force participation of high school graduates in the age group of 15-40. University graduates show a similar pattern with a smaller decrease in the participation of women younger than the age of 40 . Comparing the participation profiles in 1988 and 2010 (not shown in the figure) reveals that the increase in the participation of less educated women (illiterate and less than high school) happened after 2000. İlkkaracan (2010) argues that this increase can be explained by the added-worker effect as a response to crisis conditions and contraction in the overall employment.

Figure 2.12: Labor Force Participation of Urban Women according to Age and Education: 1988 versus 2013




Figure 2.12 (continued): Labor Force Participation of Urban Women according to Age and Education: 1988 versus 2013


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.

### 2.2.4 Labor Force Participation by Marital Status and Unpaid Domestic Labor

Marital status is an important determinant of women's labor force participation in Turkey. Figure 2.13 shows that married women have lower labor force participation than single women in all education categories. In line with the male-breadwinner model, the situation is exactly opposite for married men; they have higher participation rates than single men in all education categories. The gender gap is highest among married men and women with a high school degree, while it almost disappears among highly educated single men and women. For example, there is only a 4-percentage point difference between the labor force participation of single men and women with a university degree. This gap increases to 20 percent when university graduates are married. Single women's participation is about 20 percent lower than single men's among high school graduates, and 33 percent lower for the ones with less than a high school degree. Married women, on the other hand, have a participa-
tion gap of 60 percent among high school graduates and 50 percent among the less educated.

Figure 2.13: Labor Force Participation according to Marital Status and Education (Urban, 2013)


Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.

Memiş, Öneş and Kızılırmak (2012) argue that neither supply-side arguments nor the demand-side arguments can explain the gender gap in labor force participation without taking into account gender differences in unpaid work. Using 2006 time use survey data, they show that women shoulder a disproportionate burden of housework regardless of employment status and household type. Table 2.5 shows the average daily hours spent on paid and unpaid work by married couples. On average women spent longer hours on activities described as work (paid and unpaid). Only in singleearner families without children is total work time close to being equal for spouses wives doing the unpaid work while husbands are engaged in paid work. Unpaid work time declines in dual earner families for women, but it is substituted by work time and women end up working longer hours. In other words, it can be argued
that women have a double burden when they participate in labor force because (i) married employed women have a higher burden of total work than their husbands; (ii) employed married women have much longer total hours of work than full-time homemakers ( 9.1 hours vs. 6.4 hours without children).

Table 2.5: Mean Time Spent on Unpaid and Paid Work-Married Couples, 2006

|  |  | Without children |  | With children |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Unpaid work | Men | Single-earner | Dual-earner | Single-earner | Dual-earner |
|  | Women | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 1 |
|  | Men | 5.2 | 3.8 | 7.8 | 4.9 |
|  | Women | 0.5 | 6.1 | 6.5 | 6.6 |
| Total Work | Men | 6.3 | 5.3 | 0 | 4.9 |
|  | Women | 6.4 | 6.8 | 7.4 | 7.6 |
|  |  | $\mathbf{9 . 1}$ | 7.8 | $\mathbf{9 . 8}$ |  |

Source: Memiş et al. (2012), Tables 6.3 and 6.4 , p. 96 . Couples without children include 183 families with single-earner and 111 families with dual-earners. Couples with children include 813 families with single-earner and 193 families with dualearners.

Table 2.6 displays how the time use patterns of employed men and women change with marriage and children. The comparison of the first and second phases shows the effect of marriage on time use. Both paid and unpaid work time decreases with marriage for men and as a result, they see a decline in total work time. For women, on the other hand, total work time increases with marriage from 7.8 hours to 9.1 hours because of the increase in unpaid work time. Having children increases the time men spend on both paid and unpaid work in Turkey. However, Memiss et al. shows that this observation is only true for the first child. After the first child, men stop sharing the burden at home and women's total work time rises significantly (2012, p. 100). To sum up, the unequal distribution of unpaid work plausibly explains why married women are less active in the labor market.

Table 2.6: Comparison of Paid and Unpaid Work Burden over the Life Course

| Households in: | Men | Women |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| 1. Singlehood phase |  |  |
| Paid work | 6.6 | 5.3 |
| Unpaid work | 1.1 | 2.5 |
| Total work | 7.6 | 7.8 |
| 2. Married-without children phase |  |  |
| Paid work | 6.1 | 5.3 |
| Unpaid work | 0.7 | 3.8 |
| Total work | $\mathbf{6 . 7}$ | $\mathbf{9 . 1}$ |
| 3. Married-with children phase |  |  |
| Paid work | 6.6 | 4.9 |
| Unpaid work | 1 | 4.9 |
| Total work | 7.7 | 9.8 |
| Source: Memiş et al. (2012), Table 6.5, p. 98. Data |  |  |
| of 46 singlehood phase, 111 married-without children |  |  |
| phase, 193 married-with-children families are used. |  |  |

Household labor force surveys provide additional evidence that housework is a significant constraint on women's labor force participation. In these surveys, the respondents are asked about the reasons for not participating in the labor force. The primary reason listed by women in both rural and urban areas is household work (Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A). This category is not even listed for men. Despite the clear gender division of labor, there is some improvement from 1988 to 2012. The percentage of women whose main reason not to participate is housework has diminished from $83 \%$ to $62 \%$ in urban areas, and from $72 \%$ to $59 \%$ in rural areas. Moreover, education became the main reason for $12 \%$ ( $9 \%$ ) of the urban (rural) women in 2012 , while it was the main reason for only $6 \%$ (3\%) in 1988. Family and personal reasons seem to be affecting urban women more than rural women. The importance of two categories, "discouraged" and "available for work but not seeking a job", has increased since 1988. This can be an indicator of the worsening economic conditions in terms of employment creation explained in the previous section.

### 2.2.5 Sectoral Distribution of Female Employment and Gender Segregation

The gender wage gap and occupational segregation by sex are important factors affecting women's position in the labor market. Industries in which women are concentrated are usually different from those in which men are concentrated. Certain types of jobs are considered as "female work" and women usually end up with lowskill, low status jobs (Kasnakoğlu \& Dikbayır, 2002). According to a World Bank labor market report, average earnings of male wage and salary earners have increased by 22 percent in the period 1988-2002, while female earnings have increased by 12 percent during the same time period (2006, p. 54). In the same study, it is found that women earn 78-83 percent of what men earn in Turkey. Based on the 1994 Survey of Employment and Wages, İlkkaracan and Selim (2007) find that a substantial portion of the gender wage gap is attributable to occupational and industrial gender segregation. They argue that gender segregation operates via both labor supply and labor demand because not only do women have systematically lower human capital endowments but also they are systematically allocated into lower-paying private sector jobs not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Using a Oaxaca decomposition analysis, they show that 57 percent of the wage gap can be explained by lower endowments of women when only human capital variables are considered. Human capital variables together with workplace variables (occupation, branch of industry, collective agreement etc.) can explain the 78 percent of the gap. The unexplained 22 percent, they argue, is due to outright discrimination (Ilkkaracan \& Selim, 2007, p. 588).

Occupational gender segregation is an important reason why gender wage gaps and women's inferior status in the labor market persist (Blackburn et al., 1995). When we look at the sectoral distribution of female employment in Turkey, we see that rural and urban labor markets differ substantially. Most of the women in rural
areas are still employed in agriculture, although there has been a significant decline in the share of agricultural employment since 1988 (Table 2.7).
Table 2.7: Distribution of Female Employment by Economic Activity (\%), Rural, 1988-2013

|  | Agriculture, forestry, hunting/fishing | Mining and quarrying | Manufacturing | Electricity, gas, and water | Construction | Wholesale \& retail trade, hotels, and restaurants | Transportation, communication and storage | Finance, insurance, real estate \& business services | Community, social and personal services |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1988 | 93.07 | 0.1 | 2.26 | 0 | 0.05 | 0.89 | 0.39 | 0.39 | 2.87 |
| 1989 | 93.02 | 0.09 | 2.9 | 0 | 0.04 | 0.66 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 2.7 |
| 1990 | 93.89 | 0.05 | 2.55 | 0 | 0.05 | 0.5 | 0.16 | 0.32 | 2.5 |
| 1991 | 94.81 | 0.02 | 2.58 | 0 | 0.02 | 0.32 | 0.11 | 0.21 | 1.94 |
| 1992 | 91.98 | 0.02 | 4.47 | 0 | 0.11 | 0.69 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 2.15 |
| 1993 | 92.4 | 0 | 3.32 | 0 | 0.12 | 0.84 | 0.29 | 0.17 | 2.86 |
| 1994 | 92.84 | 0.02 | 3.44 | 0 | 0.07 | 0.89 | 0.07 | 0.26 | 2.42 |
| 1995 | 94.77 | 0.02 | 2.3 | 0 | 0.05 | 0.6 | 0.07 | 0.28 | 1.89 |
| 1996 | 94.34 | 0 | 2.59 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.6 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 2.14 |
| 1997 | 93.48 | 0.02 | 3.01 | 0 | 0.07 | 0.96 | 0.1 | 0.25 | 2.12 |
| 1998 | 93.38 | 0 | 3.05 | 0 | 0.05 | 0.87 | 0.16 | 0.16 | 2.37 |
| 1999 | 91.64 | 0 | 4.17 | 0 | 0.05 | 1.31 | 0.05 | 0.39 | 2.4 |
| 2000 | 89.2 | 0.03 | 5.39 | 0 | 0.16 | 1.29 | 0.35 | 0.54 | 3.06 |
| 2001 | 91.19 | 0.05 | 4.24 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 1.26 | 0.15 | 0.46 | 2.62 |
| 2002 | 89.31 | 0.08 | 5.01 | 0.03 | 0.03 | 1.76 | 0.16 | 0.49 | 3.16 |
| 2003 | 89.04 | 0 | 4.02 | 0.03 | 0.08 | 2.29 | 0.19 | 0.47 | 3.86 |

Note: table continued on next page.
Table 2.7 (continued): Distribution of Female Employment by Economic Activity (\%), Rural, 1988-2013

|  | Agriculture, forestry, hunting/fishing | Mining and quarrying | Manufacturing | Electricity, gas, and water | Construction | Wholesale \& retail trade, hotels, and restaurants | Transportation, communication and storage | Finance, insurance, real estate \& business services | Community, social and personal services |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2004 | 88.95 | 0 | 4.39 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 2.51 | 0.12 | 0.51 | 3.41 |
| 2005 | 85.72 | 0.04 | 5.12 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 3.55 | 0.17 | 0.74 | 4.54 |
| 2006 | 84.57 | 0.04 | 5.11 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 4.24 | 0.12 | 0.87 | 4.95 |
| 2007 | 84.85 | 0 | 4.48 | 0 | 0.12 | 4.07 | 0.21 | 0.83 | 5.44 |
| 2008 | 84.1 | 0 | 4.72 | 0 | 0.12 | 4.08 | 0.24 | 0.97 | 5.77 |
| 2009 | 84.04 | 0.04 | 4.62 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 4.39 | 0.23 | 0.99 | 5.5 |
| 2010 | 84.63 | 0.11 | 4.74 | 0 | 0.11 | 3.79 | 0.21 | 0.53 | 5.93 |
| 2011 | 84.1 | 0.03 | 4.47 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 4.21 | 0.26 | 0.42 | 6.28 |
| 2012 | 81.9 | 0.03 | 4.88 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 4.46 | 0.29 | 0.61 | 7.57 |
| 2013 | 80.1 | 0.03 | 4.82 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 4.98 | 0.26 | 0.61 | 8.98 |

Source: Author's calculations based on Household Labor Force Surveys, extracted on March 2015.
Table 2.8: Distribution of Female Employment by Economic Activity (\%), Urban, 1988-2013

|  | Agriculture, forestry, hunting/fishing | Mining and quarrying | Manufacturing | Electricity, gas, and water | Construction | Wholesale \& retail trade, hotels, and restaurants | Transportation, communication and storage | Finance, insurance, real estate \& business services | Community, social and personal services |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1988 | 14.25 | 0.28 | 31.82 | 0.28 | 1.2 | 9.81 | 2.5 | 8.05 | 31.82 |
| 1989 | 12.68 | 0.17 | 30.97 | 0.17 | 0.78 | 10.87 | 2.85 | 8.37 | 32.96 |
| 1990 | 13.04 | 0.08 | 30.73 | 0 | 0.83 | 10.8 | 2.66 | 8.64 | 33.22 |
| 1991 | 9.19 | 0.33 | 29.8 | 0 | 0.83 | 11.59 | 3.06 | 8.94 | 36.18 |
| 1992 | 10.88 | 0.28 | 30.51 | 0.21 | 0.78 | 11.94 | 2.33 | 8.69 | 34.39 |
| 1993 | 7.14 | 0.15 | 31.84 | 0.3 | 1.29 | 12.54 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 35.33 |
| 1994 | 13.4 | 0.06 | 27.82 | 0.45 | 1.4 | 12.25 | 2.43 | 7.98 | 34.27 |
| 1995 | 9.42 | 0.06 | 27.65 | 0.31 | 1.36 | 14.07 | 2.11 | 8.12 | 36.95 |
| 1996 | 11.4 | 0.12 | 27.48 | 0.3 | 1.83 | 12.49 | 2.38 | 8.35 | 35.53 |
| 1997 | 8.83 | 0.11 | 28.87 | 0.57 | 1.65 | 14.64 | 2.22 | 8.09 | 35.08 |
| 1998 | 8.25 | 0.22 | 26.98 | 0.55 | 1.47 | 13.6 | 2.35 | 8.9 | 37.68 |
| 1999 | 10.57 | 0.15 | 26.83 | 0.36 | 1.17 | 14.68 | 2.03 | 7.98 | 36.33 |
| 2000 | 8.7 | 0.19 | 25.07 | 0.29 | 1.26 | 16.43 | 2.71 | 9.71 | 35.65 |
| 2001 | 10.95 | 0.05 | 25.46 | 0.29 | 0.96 | 16.25 | 2.7 | 8.49 | 34.76 |
| 2002 | 10.19 | 0.09 | 27.13 | 0.13 | 0.97 | 16.72 | 2.51 | 7.63 | 34.63 |
| 2003 | 9.5 | 0.13 | 26.88 | 0.22 | 1.15 | 17.24 | 2.48 | 7.78 | 34.66 |

Note: table continued on next page.
Table 2.8 (continued): Distribution of Female Employment by Economic Activity (\%), Urban, 1988-2013

|  | Agriculture, forestry, hunting/fishing | Mining and quarrying | Manufacturing | Electricity, gas, and water | Construction | Wholesale \& retail trade, hotels, and restaurants | Transportation, communication and storage | Finance, insurance, real estate \& business services | Community, social and personal services |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2004 | 11.82 | 0.08 | 26.73 | 0.2 | 0.92 | 17.76 | 2.53 | 8.46 | 31.54 |
| 2005 | 10.8 | 0.07 | 25.7 | 0.15 | 0.89 | 18.44 | 2.61 | 8.27 | 33.04 |
| 2006 | 9.11 | 0.07 | 24.33 | 0.18 | 1.19 | 19.91 | 2.66 | 9.08 | 33.47 |
| 2007 | 8.28 | 0.07 | 24.19 | 0.14 | 1.12 | 20.6 | 2.58 | 9.33 | 33.66 |
| 2008 | 8.66 | 0.1 | 22.81 | 0.22 | 1.25 | 20.76 | 2.6 | 9.66 | 33.94 |
| 2009 | 7.53 | 0.03 | 22.48 | 0.18 | 1.08 | 20.2 | 2.55 | 10.98 | 34.96 |
| 2010 | 8.73 | 0.06 | 22.8 | 0.31 | 1.45 | 19.27 | 2.94 | 6.99 | 37.45 |
| 2011 | 8.96 | 0.05 | 21.85 | 0.31 | 1.26 | 19.61 | 2.81 | 7.23 | 37.92 |
| 2012 | 7.61 | 0.02 | 20.51 | 0.36 | 1.24 | 20.37 | 2.81 | 7.46 | 39.66 |
| 2013 | 7.07 | 0.04 | 20.73 | 0.4 | 1.24 | 20.22 | 3.04 | 7.69 | 39.53 |

Source: Author's calculations based on Household Labor Force Surveys, extracted on March 2015.

The loss in agricultural employment is partially compensated by the increase in the share of manufacturing, trade and services. But overall there has been a decline in female employment in rural areas due to domestic migration. The female employment rate decreased from 48.5 percent in 1988 to 35 percent in 2013 , while female labor force participation rate decreased from 50.7 percent to 36.7 percent. In the urban areas, the share of agriculture in female employment decreased from $14 \%$ in 1988 to $7 \%$ in 2013 (Table 2.8). The share of manufacturing decreased as well from $32 \%$ to $21 \%$. There has been an increase in the share of wholesale and retail trade, including hotels and restaurants, and of community and social services (education, health etc.).

Since agricultural employment dominates in the rural areas, gender segregation analysis is only conducted here for urban labor market. Two different measures of segregation are used in the analysis. The first is the Dissimilarity Index (DI) introduced by Duncan and Duncan (1955). The second is the Coefficient of Female Representation (CFR). The Dissimilarity Index has a minimum value of 0 , which indicates that gender distribution across occupations/industries is perfectly equal, and a maximum value of 100 , which indicates perfect segregation. DI is calculated as follows:

$$
\mathrm{DI}=0.5 * \Sigma\left|f_{i t}-m_{i t}\right|
$$

where subscripts $i$ and $t$ denote industry and year, respectively; $f_{i t}=\left(\frac{F_{i t}}{\Sigma F_{i t}}\right) * 100$, and $m_{i t}=\left(\frac{M_{i t}}{\Sigma M_{i t}}\right) * 100$, where $F_{i t}=$ Number of females in industry $i, \Sigma F_{i t}=$ total female employment, $M_{i t}=$ Number of males in industry $i, \Sigma M_{i t}=$ total male employment.

Coefficient of Female Representation (CFR) is calculated as follows:

$$
\mathrm{CFR}_{i t}=\frac{\frac{F_{i t}}{T_{i t}}}{\frac{\Sigma F_{i t}}{\Sigma T_{i t}}}
$$

where $T_{i t}=$ Number of people in industry $i$ and $\Sigma T_{i t}=$ total employment. Women are over-represented in a given occupation if the CFR for that occupation is greater than unity and under-represented if it is less than unity.
Table 2.9: Gender Segregation in the Urban Labor Market: Dissimilarity Index (DI) and Coefficient of Female Representation (CFR), 1988-2013

|  | DI <br> Ur- <br> ban | Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing | Mining and quarrying | Manufacturing | Electricity, gas and water | Construction | Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants | Transportation, communication and storage | Finance, insurance, real estate and business services | Community social and personal services |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1988 | 27.51 | 2.03 | 0.19 | 1.15 | 0.92 | 0.14 | 0.48 | 0.36 | 1.7 | 1.33 |
| 1989 | 28.11 | 2.47 | 0.13 | 1.1 | 0.67 | 0.1 | 0.51 | 0.39 | 1.69 | 1.41 |
| 1990 | 28 | 2.99 | 0.07 | 1.11 | 0 | 0.11 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 1.91 | 1.32 |
| 1991 | 28.09 | 1.91 | 0.33 | 1.09 | 0 | 0.1 | 0.52 | 0.38 | 1.86 | 1.48 |
| 1992 | 27.92 | 2.36 | 0.26 | 1.1 | 0.46 | 0.09 | 0.53 | 0.33 | 1.84 | 1.47 |
| 1993 | 28.36 | 1.36 | 0.15 | 1.25 | 0.33 | 0.13 | 0.57 | 0.51 | 1.68 | 1.5 |
| 1994 | 28.52 | 2.84 | 0.07 | 1.03 | 0.58 | 0.15 | 0.54 | 0.36 | 1.7 | 1.46 |
| 1995 | 27.45 | 1.85 | 0.1 | 1.04 | 0.42 | 0.15 | 0.61 | 0.31 | 1.79 | 1.58 |
| 1996 | 26.9 | 2.36 | 0.24 | 1 | 0.54 | 0.19 | 0.55 | 0.37 | 1.8 | 1.52 |
| 1997 | 25.27 | 1.98 | 0.18 | 1.04 | 0.7 | 0.18 | 0.65 | 0.34 | 1.68 | 1.51 |
| 1998 | 27.29 | 1.69 | 0.43 | 0.99 | 0.74 | 0.16 | 0.6 | 0.35 | 1.95 | 1.63 |
| 1999 | 26.55 | 2.19 | 0.25 | 1.03 | 0.59 | 0.13 | 0.61 | 0.31 | 1.55 | 1.53 |
| 2000 | 28.85 | 2.07 | 0.63 | 0.95 | 0.44 | 0.16 | 0.6 | 0.39 | 1.76 | 1.71 |
| 2001 | 28.56 | 2.53 | 0.14 | 0.95 | 0.49 | 0.13 | 0.6 | 0.4 | 1.6 | 1.62 |
| 2002 | 26.8 | 2.41 | 0.19 | 1.02 | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.6 | 0.39 | 1.4 | 1.58 |
| 2003 | 25.52 | 1.96 | 0.33 | 1.01 | 0.36 | 0.19 | 0.62 | 0.39 | 1.37 | 1.6 |

Note: table continued on next page.
Table 2.9 (continued): Gender Segregation in the Urban Labor Market: Dissimilarity Index (DI) and Coefficient of Female Representation (CFR), 1988-2013

|  | DI <br> Ur- <br> ban | Agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing | Mining and quarrying | Manufacturing | Electricity, gas and water | Construction | Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants | Transportation, communication and storage | Finance, insurance, real estate and business services | Community social and personal services |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2004 | 24.41 | 2.12 | 0.15 | 1.02 | 0.39 | 0.15 | 0.66 | 0.38 | 1.46 | 1.46 |
| 2005 | 25.05 | 2.15 | 0.15 | 0.98 | 0.34 | 0.14 | 0.67 | 0.4 | 1.35 | 1.56 |
| 2006 | 24.75 | 2.02 | 0.14 | 0.94 | 0.35 | 0.17 | 0.72 | 0.41 | 1.36 | 1.59 |
| 2007 | 24.07 | 1.85 | 0.14 | 0.95 | 0.23 | 0.16 | 0.75 | 0.4 | 1.34 | 1.57 |
| 2008 | 24.29 | 1.97 | 0.23 | 0.89 | 0.42 | 0.19 | 0.77 | 0.43 | 1.23 | 1.57 |
| 2009 | 24.43 | 1.6 | 0.09 | 0.92 | 0.39 | 0.16 | 0.75 | 0.41 | 1.41 | 1.54 |
| 2010 | 23.58 | 1.77 | 0.16 | 0.94 | 0.35 | 0.2 | 0.78 | 0.45 | 1.44 | 1.43 |
| 2011 | 24.17 | 1.88 | 0.15 | 0.92 | 0.29 | 0.17 | 0.8 | 0.44 | 1.39 | 1.43 |
| 2012 | 24.24 | 1.69 | 0.07 | 0.87 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.85 | 0.43 | 1.34 | 1.47 |
| 2013 | 23.58 | 2.13 | 0.1 | 0.83 | 0.33 | 0.13 | 0.81 | 0.42 | 1.56 | 1.79 |

Source: Author's calculations based on Household Labor Force Surveys

Table 2.9 presents the results of gender segregation analysis. The dissimilarity index decreases over time, though it is a very small decline from 27.51 in 1988 to 23.58 in 2013. Women are overrepresented in agriculture, finance and services. Overrepresentation increases in services over time, while it decreases in agriculture and finance. CRF shows an increasing underrepresentation in manufacturing starting from 2000s, although this sector as a whole has the least gender segregation. If we disaggregate the manufacturing industry, we find that the public and private sectors show different trends in the two sub-sectors with the highest female concentration, food and textiles. In the public manufacturing industry, the female share of employment decreased significantly in the food-processing sub-sector from 1985 to 2001, while it increased slightly in textiles (Table 2.10). Exactly the opposite trend is observed for private manufacturing. The share of female employment in food increased, though not enough to compensate the loss in public manufacturing, while female employment in textiles decreased slightly (Table 2.11).
Table 2.10: Female Share of Employment in Major Public Manufacturing Industries, 1985-2011

|  | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Food, food products | Textiles | Wood and products of wood | Pulp, paper and paper products | Chemicals, rubber and plastics | Manufacturing of glass and pottery | Basic metals,iron and steel | Machinery and equipment | Other manufacturing |
| 1985 | 34.62 | 19.16 | 2.19 | 19.89 | 2.65 | 1.26 | 2.04 | 4.75 |  |
| 1986 | 16.5 | 22.28 | 3.29 | 8.16 | 3.4 | 5.63 | 2.55 | 7.84 |  |
| 1987 | 17.95 | 22.82 | 3.58 | 8.15 | 3.54 | 7.68 | 2.53 | 6.18 |  |
| 1988 | 18.29 | 21.73 | 4.02 | 7.81 | 3.76 | 5.13 | 2.74 | 6.63 | 13.23 |
| 1989 | 18.63 | 22.77 | 4.14 | 7.16 | 3.54 | 4.99 | 2.57 | 4.86 | 10.63 |
| 1990 | 19.04 | 22.51 | 4.46 | 7.17 | 4.04 | 4.93 | 2.74 | 4.29 | 11.64 |
| 1991 | 16.85 | 21.97 | 4.41 | 6.91 | 4.1 | 4.96 | 2.79 | 4.31 | 11.33 |
| 1992 | 16.72 | 21.55 | 4.12 | 7.2 | 4.15 | 5.32 | 2.86 | 4.14 | 8.55 |
| 1993 | 16.67 | 21.36 | 4.21 | 7.63 | 4.92 | 5.69 | 3 | 4.53 | 7.62 |
| 1994 | 14.03 | 20.84 | 4.07 | 8.15 | 5.18 | 5.39 | 2.97 | 5.31 | 9.11 |
| 1995 | 14.45 | 22.73 | 3.75 | 8.21 | 4.99 | 5.06 | 2.51 | 4.43 | 8.33 |
| 1996 | 10.9 | 23.47 | 3.89 | 7.05 | 4.35 | 5.11 | 2.43 | 4.43 | 10.49 |
| 1997 | 10.64 | 22.91 | 4.36 | 8.77 | 4.67 | 2.57 | 2.43 | 3.8 | 30.89 |
| 1998 | 10.08 | 23.07 | 4.64 | 6.85 | 5.29 | 4.6 | 2.82 | 4.28 | 16.88 |
| 1999 | 10.13 | 21.59 | 5.36 | 6.75 | 5.15 | 4.8 | 2.83 | 4.49 | 15.38 |
| 2000 | 9.37 | 22 | 2.3 | 5.35 | 5.11 | 3.13 | 2.92 | 4.29 | 17.62 |
| 2001 | 8.99 | 23.88 | 2.68 | 10.52 | 5.23 | 2.7 | 5.89 | 5.04 | 16.73 |

Source: Annual Manufacturing Surveys, İzdeş (2011), Table 4.14.
Table 2.11: Female Share of Employment in Major Private Manufacturing Industries, 1985-2001

|  | 31 | 32 | 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Food, food products | Textiles | Wood and products of wood | Pulp, paper and paper products | Chemicals, rubber and plastics | Manufacturing of glass and pottery | Basic metals,iron and steel | Machinery and equipment | Other manufacturing |
| 1985 | 19.83 | 38.54 | 7.6 | 13.22 | 18.26 | 10.04 | 3.32 | 11.4 | 36.58 |
| 1986 | 19.58 | 37.06 | 9.1 | 11.01 | 15.5 | 8.53 | 3.72 | 10.44 | 32.33 |
| 1987 | 18.99 | 36.93 | 9.38 | 12.15 | 15.75 | 8.58 | 4.26 | 10.54 | 38.49 |
| 1988 | 20.57 | 38.29 | 10.04 | 11.53 | 16.68 | 8.26 | 4.12 | 11.01 | 35.16 |
| 1989 | 20.88 | 29.15 | 10.05 | 11.16 | 16.81 | 8.58 | 3.49 | 11.24 | 31.47 |
| 1990 | 21.55 | 38.05 | 9.44 | 10.85 | 15.84 | 7.54 | 3.83 | 12 | 28.63 |
| 1991 | 24.55 | 38.19 | 9.43 | 10.82 | 15.65 | 7.96 | 4.62 | 12.52 | 29.16 |
| 1992 | 24.54 | 38.09 | 10.43 | 10.91 | 15.16 | 7.91 | 4.62 | 12.21 | 24.35 |
| 1993 | 24.09 | 37.25 | 9.03 | 11.87 | 15.79 | 8.33 | 4.26 | 12 | 24.36 |
| 1994 | 29.29 | 37.38 | 8.59 | 11.26 | 16.17 | 8.11 | 4.18 | 12.67 | 22.33 |
| 1995 | 28.56 | 37.91 | 8.52 | 11.83 | 17.32 | 8.41 | 3.75 | 13.21 | 24.46 |
| 1996 | 26.85 | 37.5 | 7.86 | 11.4 | 16.98 | 8.7 | 4.14 | 13.17 | 26.8 |
| 1997 | 26.45 | 38.38 | 8.19 | 11.74 | 16.95 | 8.82 | 4.06 | 13.35 | 24.85 |
| 1998 | 26.13 | 37.88 | 8.49 | 12.96 | 16.73 | 8.18 | 4.17 | 12.5 | 21.57 |
| 1999 | 26.36 | 36.27 | 8.14 | 13.71 | 17.15 | 8.63 | 4.12 | 12.73 | 22.13 |
| 2000 | 25.42 | 37.13 | 10.13 | 14.18 | 17.24 | 8.38 | 5.19 | 12.48 | 23.01 |
| 2001 | 25.68 | 36.79 | 9.08 | 14.61 | 17.58 | 7.86 | 4.42 | 13.15 | 24.44 |

Source: Annual Manufacturing Surveys, İzdeş (2011), Table 4.14.

Table 2.12 presents the dissimilarity index for production workers and others separately. Among production workers, gender segregation was stronger in the public sector in 1985, but it declined from 42.03 to 29.21 between 1985 and 2001. In the private sector, gender segregation increased slightly for production workers. Similarly, for other workers, gender segregation decreased in the public sector while it increased in the private manufacturing. In other words, while public manufacturing became more women-friendly over time, private manufacturing increased its discrimination against women. The dissimilarity index for the manufacturing sector as a whole decreased after 2001, from 34.56 in 2003 to 28.73 in $2012 .{ }^{5}$

Table 2.12: Gender Segregation in Manufacturing, Dissimilarity Index, 1985-2001

|  | Production Workers |  | Other Workers |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Public | Private | Public | Private |
| 1985 | 42.03 | 35.42 | 23.36 | 9.62 |
| 1986 | 39.05 | 38.14 | 13.15 | 10.78 |
| 1987 | 45.4 | 37.93 | 7.54 | 12.07 |
| 1988 | 44.95 | 38.98 | 9.96 | 12.57 |
| 1989 | 47.52 | 38.59 | 12.17 | 12.53 |
| 1990 | 48.25 | 38.07 | 11.46 | 13.58 |
| 1991 | 47.66 | 38.66 | 9.85 | 13.36 |
| 1992 | 46.23 | 38.17 | 13.2 | 14.68 |
| 1993 | 43.08 | 38.08 | 17.27 | 11.34 |
| 1994 | 41.89 | 37.78 | 7.66 | 14.19 |
| 1995 | 42.62 | 36.91 | 14.54 | 15.59 |
| 1996 | 39.93 | 36.13 | 13.19 | 16.46 |
| 1997 | 41.75 | 37.25 | 10.7 | 14.65 |
| 1998 | 38.08 | 38.35 | 6.42 | 15.68 |
| 1999 | 39.06 | 36.9 | 7.83 | 14.05 |
| 2000 | 36.5 | 37.6 | 11.7 | 13.97 |
| 2001 | 29.21 | 36.03 | 8.54 | 14.19 |

Source: Annual Manufacturing Surveys, İzdeş (2011), Tables 4.20 and 4.21.

[^4]In summary, there is significant gender segregation in the urban labor market, women being increasingly overrepresented in the services. In the manufacturing sector, women are concentrated in the food and textiles sub-sectors. Moreover, there is also segregation by job status within the female-dominant industries. Dividing production workers into four groups according to job status (high level technical personnel; medium level technical personnel; foreman, supervisor and other skilled personnel; and unskilled workers) Kasnakoğlu and Dikbayır (2002) find that women are over-represented among the unskilled workers group in food and textiles industries.

### 2.3 Family Structure, Ideological Context, and Government Policies

Family structure in Turkey can be described as classical patriarchy that is prevalent in the Middle East and in South and East Asia. In the classical patriarchy, there is a strict hierarchy in which men are the heads of the household and providers while women are economically dependent. There is also a complete separation of public and private spheres and women are considered to need patriarchal surveillance (Kandiyoti, 1988). However, the secular nature of the family law introduced by the Kemalist reforms in the 1920s made Turkey unique in the MENA region. Women were granted equal rights at the foundation of the Turkish Republic. They took part in social and professional life, but the effects of the reforms were mostly limited to Istanbul and modernization did not actually transform the rural Anatolia. Kandiyoti (1987) describes Turkish women as "emancipated but unliberated" because Kemalist reforms mostly failed to address the inequalities in the internalized patriarchal system (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p. 131). As a result, gender discriminatory practices such as honor killings or preservation of family honor as justification of limiting women's mobility have persisted (Ilkkaracan \& İlkkaracan 1998).

Until the early 2000s, the Turkish Civil Code defined the man as the head of the family and the woman as homemaker, and married women's labor force participation was conditional upon their husband's approval. In practice, however, approval was not enforced as a legal obligation (İlkkaracan, 2012, p.15). European Union accession negotiations after Turkey's official candidacy in 1999 created impetus in state action for legal reform to achieve gender equality. The major legal changes to improve women's status included the adoption of the new Civil Law (2001), the new Labor Law (2003), and the new Penal Code (2005). The new Civil Law abolished the "head of the family" concept and equalized men and women before the Law. It brought a new property regime where property acquired during the marriage is equally divided after the divorce (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p. 131). Moreover, the new Labor Law introduced egalitarian arrangements for women's work. It included "the principles of equal pay for work of equal value; equal treatment as regards employment; protection of pregnant and breastfeeding women, and women who recently gave birth; the reversal of burden of proof to the employer in cases of sex-based discrimination at the workplaces, and non-discrimination against part-time workers" (Dedeoğlu, 2012, p. 132-3).

On the other hand, the Turkish legal system does not offer much in terms of work-family reconciliation measures. There are sixteen weeks of partially (fully) paid maternity leave granted by the Labor Law to the private (public) sector employees. Only public sector workers have three days of paternity leave (İlkkaracan, 2012, p. 16). In other words, work-family reconciliation is still considered as the woman's problem and this attitude is reflected in the recent policy agenda of the AKP government. The Regulation on Working Conditions of Pregnant and Nursing Women, issued in 2004, required workplaces employing more than 100 women workers to have nursery rooms and those employing more than 150 women workers to have pre-school facilities for children between 36-72 months. However, enforcement of the regulation remains very limited. It is also argued by the Coalition of Women's Groups for Women's

Work (KEIG) that this regulation actually discourages employers to hire increasing number of women to avoid the expenses of opening up a nursery or childcare facility (Dedeoğlu, 2012).

Institutional care is not common in Turkey. The starting age for primary school was decreased from age 6 to 5 with a recent law in 2012. But the preschool enrollment rate for children under age 5 is very low. The few state-subsidized childcare centers are usually attached to public workplaces in compliance with the regulation mentioned above. Working women with low education and low wages can only rely on other family members for childcare. Mothers, mothers-in-law, and older daughters are usually the caregivers in low-income dual-earner households. Currently about 25.8 percent of children in the ages of 3-6 benefit from daycare, but the distribution of the services is quite regressive. Figure 2.14 shows that as of 2009 fewer than one in ten children were benefiting from institutional care from the bottom asset decile, while about one in three children in the top asset decile were enrolled in daycare and preschool education (Aran, Immervoll \& Ridao-Cano, 2014).

Figure 2.14: Percentages of Children under Age Five that Benefit Various Childcare Arrangements by Household Asset Deciles, 2009

Percentage of Chidren that Beneft from Various Child Care Arrangements


Source: Aran et al. 2014, Turkey, EU-SILC 2009.

According to a recent survey on family, work and gender roles, a majority of Turkish society still sees women predominantly as homemakers. Although they believe both men and women should contribute to the family income, they define women's primary role as being good wives and mothers. For example, 61 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement " a job is alright, but what most women really want is a home and children". Additionally, 58 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement "a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works" (Çarkoğlu \& Kalaycıouğlu, 2013).

The gender ideology that defines women's primary role as motherhood gained strength during the AKP rule since 2002. According to AKP's conservative political agenda, women first and foremost are defined with their traditional roles in the family.

Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011) define AKP's gender politics as a form of neoliberalconservative patriarchy that expects women to adapt to the changing global market conditions without challenging their primary roles as good wives and mothers. In line with this mentality, the Ministry of Women's Status was transformed to the Ministry of Women and Family in 2011. Erdoğan emphasized the importance of motherhood for women's status on multiple occasions with statements such as "woman's status rises by being mother and heaven is only one step away from them" or "our religion [Islam] has defined a position for women: motherhood". ${ }^{6}$ The AKP's definition of ideal womanhood is reflected in their hostility towards feminist political identity and their aggressive pro-natalist discourse. When women marched against a draft bill criminalizing adultery with the slogan "our body and our sexuality is ours", Erdoğan denounced the protests by stating that these "marginal" women who do not comply with the traditional values of our society cannot represent Turkish women. The pronatalist rhetoric started in 2008 with a call for women to bear at least three children to preserve dynamic structure of the population, and this was complemented with anti-abortion initiatives and banning C-section births unless it is medically necessary. Erdoğan stated that he is against abortion in 2012: "I see abortion as murder. There is no difference between killing the child in the mother's womb and killing her after the birth". ${ }^{7}$ Demographic concerns lie behind the interference in women's bodies as reflected in Erdoan's statements "with C-section no more than two children are possible... C-section is nothing but an operation to stop population increase in this country". ${ }^{8}$

[^5]Moreover, the conservative-religious agenda of the AKP government was reflected in two concrete policies that are expected to have important effects on women's position in the labor market. The first one is the change in compulsory education with a proposal known as the " $4+4+4$ Law." The new law came into force in April 2012. Although it has many dimensions, the most relevant aspect of the law for girls' schooling is the division of the education into three phases as 4 -year primary, 4-year secondary and 4-year high school education, instead of 8-year compulsory primary education. The compulsory schooling of 8 years started in the 1997/1998 academic year. Significant improvements in schooling ratios for primary and secondary education were achieved since then. More importantly, gender inequalities in education began to be eliminated. For example, schooling ratios of girls relative to boys have increased from 85 percent to 100 in primary education and from 75 to 88 percent secondary education in the period 1997-2011. Furthermore, it is estimated that 8 -years compulsory schooling reduced the probability of marriage and giving birth for teenage women. The probability of marriage by the age of 16 fell by 44 percent while the probability of giving birth by the age of 17 decreased by 36 percent (Kırdar, Dayığlu \& Koç, 2011). Now with the new " $4+4+4$ Law", there is the danger of girls being taken out of school after the first 4 years by their parents and directed to alternative arrangements such as distance learning or religious schools. The motivation behind introducing the $4+4+4$ system despite the effectiveness of the previous eight-year compulsory education was to promote the religious imam and preacher schools (imam hatip schools) that were basically functionless during the eight-year compulsory primary education system. The AKP government, in line with their intention to "raise religious youth", was able to increase the enrollment in imam hatip schools by more than 35 percent. ${ }^{9}$

[^6]The second policy AKP initiated recently (announced in January 2015) is the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Conservation Program. The main targets of the program are stated in the 10th Development Plan as (i) protecting family welfare and strengthening family institution; (ii) strengthening intergenerational solidarity; (iii) harmonizing work and family; and (iv) increasing total fertility rate. ${ }^{10}$ The strengthening of the family institution is going to be achieved with higher marriage rates through incentives such as state support for "dowry accounts" and lower divorce rates through premarital education and family counseling services. Erdoğan's call for at least three children is supported by monetary incentives with this program. Women will receive cash assistance after giving birth by the amount of 300TL for the first child, 400TL for the second child and 600 TL for the third child. The main goal of the program is to prevent population growth from falling below the replacement level. Although increasing women's labor force participation is emphasized, the real aim is to increase fertility. The policies to increase female employment are designed in a framework to increase fertility. For example, one of the main components of the program regarding women's employment is right to work part-time after giving birth. After using their maternity leave women in the public sector will be able to have 2 months of part-time work with full-time compensation after the first birth, 4 months after the second birth, and 6 months after the third birth. Moreover, mothers will be able to work part-time if they prefer until the child starts primary school. It might be possible to keep more women in the labor force by this way, but the nature of employment and eligibility for social security benefits will change with more flexible forms of employment. In the middle-income households women can afford to have a part-time job temporarily. But the main risk with this arrangement is that men will become

[^7]more attractive to hire in the public sector. Employers are likely to prefer full-time continuous employees instead of women working part-time in between births. They have already raised some concerns. For example, the president of Denizli ${ }^{11}$ Chamber of Industry emphasizes the continuity in production in high-skilled industry jobs: "Even though a payment is granted by the government for non-working hours, it is going to be a serious burden for employers who are already having hard time finding skilled workforce when qualified workers stay away their jobs for a long time or work part-time." ${ }^{12}$ He points out the risk of women concentrating in low-skilled jobs after this program.

Another complication is how to fill the positions of the women switching from full-time to part-time status. Private Employment Agencies and temporary job arrangements are proposed to fill the gap. If these temporary workers bring additional tax burdens to employers, the program may end up decreasing the demand for female labor. Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters' Association points out the difficulty of filling these positions: "How are we going to find part-time workers when it is difficult to find full-time workers under current circumstances...No employer in our companies which have hundreds and thousands of women workers would want to take such a risk. Our companies might stay away from hiring women and turn to men." ${ }^{13}$ In summary, this program is designed with a perspective that sees women's position in the labor market secondary to their main role, motherhood. Rather than being empowering, the part-time flexible forms of employment suggested for women are

[^8]likely to preserve the traditional gender roles in the family, women being secondary earners.

## CHAPTER 3

## DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN'S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CONSERVATISM

### 3.1 Introduction

Urbanization and agricultural labor shedding are seen as the main factors that result in low female labor force participation in Turkey (World Bank, 2009). One of every three women has become an internal migrant. Most women who have migrated from rural to urban areas formerly worked in the agricultural sector, but many withdrew from the labor force once they moved to the urban areas. Plausible explanations for their withdrawal include lack of affordable childcare, cultural pressures, and lack of necessary skills and education. In surveys, women also cite getting married and not finding the proper jobs as reasons for withdrawal from the labor market (Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, 2003; 2008). Women's reservation wage remains high in the cities given the lack of subsidized childcare and subsidized pre-school education. Moreover, the Turkish labor market has a significant informal sector in which women are disproportionately concentrated. ${ }^{1}$ The informal sector generally does not offer decent pay and working conditions, which further discourages women to enter or stay in the labor force.

Many researchers focusing on the supply-side determinants of women's participation have emphasized the importance of education (Kasnakoğlu \& Dayıoğlu, 1997;

[^9]Özar \& Günlük-Şenesen 1998; Tansel, 2002a; Başlevent \& Onaran 2003; GündüzHosgör \& Smits, 2008; Taymaz, 2010). Others have argued that education cannot explain the Turkish female employment puzzle on its own, noticing that men with similar levels of education do not have low participation rates, instead maintaining that low levels of participation can be better explained by social and cultural values (Güner \& Uysal, 2014; Göksel, 2013; Gündüz-Hoşgör \& Smits, 2008; Uraz et al., 2010). One important cultural factor influencing women's labor force participation decision in Turkey may be patriarchy. Turkey is part of what Caldwell (1978) calls the "patriarchal belt" and Kandiyoti (1988) calls the "belt of classic patriarchy" which includes North Africa, the Muslim Middle East (including Turkey and Iran), and South and East Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Northern India and rural China) (Moghadam, 1992). In these countries, there is typically a strict separation between the male and female domains, with men operating in the public sphere and women more restricted to the private sphere. Modernization has challenged this strict public-private division in Turkey, but there are strong remnants of patriarchal relations in society.

This chapter focuses on the role of social conservatism as a constraint for women's labor force participation in Turkey. I examine the correlates of women's labor force participation using probit regression analysis with a recent dataset compiled by Hacettepe University based on Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS). Different from household labor force survey data, this dataset allows me to analyze social and cultural determinants together with the traditional supply side variables. I include an "internalization of patriarchal norms" variable created out of women's answers to nine opinion questions. These questions capture different aspects of patriarchal relations such as gender division of labor in the household, women's mobility in the public domain, decision making in the family, and control over sexuality. Moreover, I incorporate the role of religion using a religiosity variable based on the frequency of religious practices of women, prayer (namaz) and fasting.

This analysis reveals the correlation between gender-role attitudes and labor force participation, but it does not allow me to make causal claims, due to potential endogeneity. It is possible that the direction of causation runs from labor force participation to more progressive attitudes, rather than vice versa. Or the direction of causality may run in both directions: from having progressive values to participation in the labor market, and from working outside the home to being less mindful of patriarchal norms. To address the potential problem of endogeneity, I use instrumental variable estimation. The literature on the long-run effects of family structure on gender-role attitudes emphasizes the importance of pre-adult socialization in the formation of these attitudes. I therefore use a scale of family conservatism as an instrument for patriarchal norms.

### 3.2 Historical and Comparative Trends in Women's Labor Force Participation

The women's labor force participation rate in Turkey is very low in comparison to the countries at a similar development stage. Moreover, it has been steadily declining since the 1960s, which makes it a matter of concern not only for academics but also for international organizations as a deteriorating development indicator. The women's labor force participation rate declined from $65.4 \%$ in 1960, to $26 \%$ in 2009 and showed a small increase to 30.8 \% in 2013. The increase after 2009 global economic crisis may be explained by the added worker effect ${ }^{2}$ and the incentives given to women's employment. ${ }^{3}$ In fact, there has been a decline in men's labor force participation, from $93.6 \%$ in 1960 to $70.5 \%$ in 2009, during the same period as well (Table 3.1).

[^10]By 2013, men's participation rate (71.5\%) is still in line with averages in the OECD (69.5\%) and Europe and Central Asia (67.3\%). However, women's participation rate $(30.8 \%)$ is substantially lower than the averages in OECD (50.9\%) and Europe and Central Asia (50.4\%). ${ }^{4}$

[^11]Table 3.1: Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1960-2013

| Year | Men | Women |
| :--- | :--- | :---: |
| Census of Population |  |  |
| 1960 | 93.6 | 65.4 |
| 1965 | 91.8 | 56.6 |
| 1970 | 79.5 | 50.3 |
| 1975 | 80.9 | 47.3 |
| 1980 | 79.8 | 45.8 |
| 1985 | 78.3 | 43.6 |
| 1990 | 78.2 | 42.8 |
|  |  |  |
| Household Labor Force Surveys |  |  |
| 1988 | 81.2 | 34.3 |
| 1989 | 80.6 | 36.1 |
| 1990 | 79.7 | 34.1 |
| 1991 | 80.2 | 34.1 |
| 1992 | 79.6 | 32.7 |
| 1993 | 78 | 26.8 |
| 1994 | 78.5 | 31.3 |
| 1995 | 77.8 | 30.9 |
| 1996 | 77.1 | 30.6 |
| 1997 | 76.7 | 28.8 |
| 1998 | 76.7 | 29.3 |
| 1999 | 75.8 | 30 |
| 2000 | 73.7 | 26.6 |
| 2001 | 72.9 | 27.1 |
| 2002 | 68.7 | 27.9 |
| 2003 | 70.4 | 26.6 |
| 2004 | 70.3 | 23.3 |
| 2005 | 70.6 | 23.3 |
| 2006 | 69.9 | 23.6 |
| 2007 | 69.8 | 23.6 |
| 2008 | 70.1 | 23.5 |
| 2009 | 70.5 | 26 |
| 2010 | 70.8 | 26.6 |
| 2011 | 70.7 | 28.2 |
| 2012 | 71 | 29.5 |
| 2013 | 71.5 | 30.8 |
|  |  |  |

Source: 1960-1990: Census of Population, TURKSTAT, Tansel (2002a), p.29, 1988-2013: Household Labor Force Surveys, TURKSTAT, www.tuik.gov.tr.

Turkey had the lowest female labor force participation rate among OECD countries in 2010 (Figure 3.1). However, it has one of the lowest GDP per capita among OECD countries as well. A comparison among countries in the income group to which Turkey belongs is more revealing. When we look at the upper-middle income countries, Turkey emerges again as an outlier, along with a few Middle Eastern countries (Figure 3.2). It is clear that there are other social, cultural, and institutional determinants of women's labor force participation in addition to the per capita GDP level. OECD or upper-middle income country groups may not be the right benchmark to make comparisons for Turkey. Since Turkey shares some socio-cultural properties of Middle Eastern countries, the MENA region is a better benchmark. When we look at the female labor force participation in Middle Eastern and African countries, Turkey seems to be conforming to the trends in the region (Figure 3.3). It is not an outlier among MENA countries. However, even in the MENA region the average female labor force participation rate has been increasing in the past two decades, from $18.2 \%$ in 1990 to $21.14 \%$ in $2011 .{ }^{5}$ On the contrary, Turkey has seen a declining trend during the same period, from $34.5 \%$ in 1990 to $28.1 \%$ in 2011.

The level of education is frequently cited in the literature as the main determinant of women's labor force participation in the literature. It is argued that women lack the necessary qualifications to participate in the labor force. Statistics show that this claim is valid only to a certain extent in Turkey. Table 3.2 presents the labor force participation rates for men and women by education level. It shows that literacy or having a degree below high school does not significantly increase women's participation, whereas the highest participation rates for men are seen among primary school graduates. In other words, returns to education appear to differ for men and women.

[^12]Explaining women's low participation rates by lack of education does not reflect the whole reality.

Figure 3.1: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%), OECD Countries, 2010


Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 3.2: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%), Upper-Middle Income Countries, 2010


Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Figure 3.3: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (\%), MENA Countries, 2010


Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.

Table 3.2: Labor Force Participation Rates by Year and Education Level

|  | $\mathbf{1 9 8 8}$ |  | $\mathbf{1 9 9 5}$ |  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 2}$ |  | $\mathbf{2 0 1 3}$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | M | F | M | F | M | F | M | F |
| Illiterate | 70.5 | 32.3 | 62.5 | 28.4 | 48.1 | 24.4 | 33.8 | 17.4 |
| Literate but no school completed | 76.3 | 31.7 | 67.6 | 25 | 48.5 | 22.4 | 58.2 | 20.8 |
| Primary school | 88.9 | 34.3 | 86 | 31.8 | 78.8 | 26.7 | 73.3 | 29.5 |
| Junior high school or vocational | 61.4 | 19.5 | 59 | 15.9 | 68.4 | 18.4 | 79.8 | 27.5 |
| High school | 75.5 | 45.7 | 73.4 | 34.9 | 64.6 | 28.5 | 70.1 | 32.1 |
| Vocational school at high s. level | 82.8 | 52.5 | 80.9 | 46.4 | 77.7 | 39 | 81.3 | 39.3 |
| University and other higher ed. | 89.5 | 82.5 | 88 | 73.8 | 84.5 | 71.5 | 86.1 | 72.2 |

Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Statistics.

Moreover, Turkey did not go through the feminization of the labor force that was seen in many developing countries even though, like many other countries, it has adopted an export-oriented growth strategy since 1980. There is an extensive literature on export-oriented industrialization and feminization of employment (Standing, 1989; Seguino, 2000; Joekes, 1999; Wood, 1991; Elson, 1995; Elson \& Pearson, 1981; Çağatay \& Özler, 1995; Çağatay \& Berik, 1990; Caraway, 2006). The countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have not shown a trend of feminization despite the fact that they have gone through similar liberalization experiences as other developing countries. İlkkaracan (2012) argues that Turkey has conformed to some of the macroeconomic trends of the MENA region that negatively affected women's employment in export sectors such as prolonged import substitution industrialization, relatively high wages based on male-breadwinner norms, and overvalued exchange rates.

### 3.3 Literature Survey

### 3.3.1 Women's Labor Force Participation in the MENA Region

As an alternative to the conventional labor supply model, economists undertaking gender and development research have identified a number of constraints on women's
employment. Moghadam (1998) summarizes these constraints as: (i) household inequalities and traditional sexual division of labor; (ii) the broad gender ideology operating in the society; (iii) the legal system and regulatory framework; (iv) social and physical infrastructure; and (v) economic conditions and policies. Some of these constraints are argued to affect MENA countries more strongly because of the cultural restrictions that Islam imposes on women.

Researchers such as Moghadam (2001) and Karshenas (2001) challenged the view that cultural and religious factors are the main reasons why the feminization of the labor force has not occurred in the MENA region. They point out the importance of industrialization and growth strategies in shaping the context in which cultural and social factors affect women's labor force participation patterns. For instance, Karshenas (2001) explains women's low participation rates by the relatively high manufacturing wages that made the absence of women in paid work affordable by households. Similarly Moghadam (2005) argues that during the oil boom the supply of and demand for female labor remained limited in the MENA region. At the same time, non-economic factors such as the role of state and the cultural understanding of malefemale roles reinforced a "patriarchal gender contract". When these countries started to liberalize their economies, they found themselves in an uncompetitive position mainly due to lack of an educated labor force, especially among women.

In other words, these researchers claim that the patriarchal gender contract in MENA countries has been enforced by the oil economy, relatively high wages for men, and their particular industrialization strategies (import substitution industrialization in most of the MENA countries). Therefore, they predicted that economic liberalization and structural change in the post-oil boom era were going to challenge the patriarchal contract and increase women's employment. For instance, in 1998 by looking at the experience of Turkey, the earliest adopter of structural adjustment policies in the region, Moghadam concluded that:"There is much evidence to suggest
that Turkey has hit the bottom of the U curve", relating female labor force participation to time and GDP per capita (1998, p. 92). Contrary to the optimism among some researchers, however, Turkey has still not seen the upward trend in female labor force participation.

### 3.3.2 Empirical Studies of Labor Force Participation of Women in Turkey

Tansel (2002a) examines the U-shaped impact of economic development on female labor force participation in Turkey using times series (for the years 1980, 1985, and 1990) and cross-provincial data. She finds evidence for the U-shaped relationship for total female labor force participation (with a negative coefficient for provincial per capita GDP and positive coefficient for its square). However, for non-agricultural labor force participation, the U-shaped relationship is not observed. The employment share of the agriculture sector has a positive effect while the employment share of industry has a negative effect on female labor force participation.

Çağatay and Berik (1990) analyze whether employment in manufacturing industry is feminized through the shift from import substitution industrialization to exportled growth using establishment-level data for two years, 1966 and 1982. Their main finding is that under both industrialization strategies the technological characteristics and export orientation of the establishments explain the gender composition of manufacturing employment. Under both regimes, women's employment is higher if the industry is more export-oriented, more labor-intensive, and has a high ratio of non-skilled to skilled production workers. Yet, the shift to an export-led growth strategy was not accompanied by a feminization of manufacturing employment. Başlevent and Onaran (2004) also analyze the impact of the export-oriented growth strategy on female labor force participation using two rounds of household labor force survey data, 1988 and 1994. They find that long-term growth at the province level has a significant positive impact on participation of both single and married women. How-
ever, export-orientation has a positive impact on the participation of only young and single women. It does not have any influence on married women's participation. This finding is important because it suggests that there are specific barriers to the labor force participation of married women.

Taymaz (2010) examines the labor force participation probabilities of men and women in urban areas using a multinomial logistic model. He finds that education improves the participation of women in all types of employment, but that the strongest effect is seen in service employment. Household size has a negative impact on the employment of the female parent and a positive impact on the employment of the male parent. He interprets this result as "parent women are either more productive in home production than men, or there are cultural factors that consider home production as feminine activity, so that parent women tend to stay at home in larger households" (p. 13). His main explanation for the low urban female participation is the "under-participation trap". The under-participation trap refers to a situation where imperfectly competitive labor markets lead to under-participation in the labor force (Booth \& Coles, 2007). Urban women with high homemaking productivity prefer to stay at home because they do not receive the full return to their investment in education if they engage in market work. Being in the under-participation trap, these women further lower their ex-ante investment in education because it is not useful for home production. In terms of policy implications, this analysis suggests that changing the relative prices of market versus home products could partially overcome the under-participation trap. Therefore, Taymaz proposes to subsidize labor market participation of women with state-provided childcare support as a solution. A World Bank study also explains the low participation rates of poorly educated women in urban areas using the idea of the under-participation trap. Urban women with low levels of education are more likely to work in the informal sector. Wages offered by the informal sector are usually lower than what women would have to pay to hire
someone else for housework and childcare. Therefore the labor supply of women who would have a chance to be employed only in the informal sector is likely to be low. Consequently, low wages and returns to education cause families to under-invest in the education of girls (World Bank, 2009).

Dayıoğlu and Kırdar (2011) examine the labor supply behavior of women using cohort analysis. Controlling for age and time effects they find that younger cohorts of women are more likely to participate in the labor market than older cohorts in urban areas. But it is not clear what drives these results: changing attitudes toward the labor market or the changing composition of the female workforce? When they control for education, they find that participation rates are either stagnant or falling. ${ }^{6}$ They conclude that the favorable development in women's participation rates (participation increasing in each younger cohort) mainly stems from compositional shifts towards a more educated workforce who have higher participation rates in urban areas.

Using a Marxist-feminist analytical framework, another group of researchers emphasizes the interactions between two parallel systems, capitalism and patriarchy, and explains the gendered outcomes in Turkish labor market with the inability of the capitalist growth process to undermine patriarchy. For instance, Toksöz (2011) argues that during the import-substituting phase of Turkey's development trajectory, the articulation between patriarchy and capitalism was realized through the exclusion of women from the labor market. Relatively high wages made it possible for male household heads to provide for the family alone and that women could afford to stay at home.

[^13]İlkkaracan (2012) presents a multi-layered analysis based on the interaction between economic growth strategies and the male-breadwinner family under different industrialization strategies. The import-substitution industrialization period (195080) and "family wages" reinforced the patriarchal contract and conservative familyoriented care regime ${ }^{7}$ based on the male breadwinner model. There was a rise in female employment under the export-oriented industrialization era starting from 1980, but the feminization was weak in comparison to other countries. In the first half of the 1980s, real wages declined but then started to rise again in the beginning of 1990s (explained in Chapter 2). Karshenas interprets this quick recovery in the wages despite the neo-liberal policies as the resistance of the patriarchal family to market pressures in Turkey (İlkkaracan, 2012; Karshenas, 2001). ${ }^{8}$ The financial liberalization of 1990s brought unstable growth and weak labor demand conditions. Moreover, the economy was characterized by jobless growth after the financial crisis of 2001. In other words, weak demand conditions led to the institutionalization of family-based care regime and patriarchal contract to such an extent that marriage and motherhood became constraints independent from demand conditions, which she calls an adverse path dependency (İlkkaracan, 2012).

As Illkkaracan states, the care regime in Turkey is predominantly family-oriented based on the patriarchal male breadwinner model. The dual career model supported by institutional care provision is seen only among university graduates. For example, among the women working at a job and living with a child under age five, only 4.2 percent benefited from institutional care and only 4.3 percent purchased the care

[^14]services from market using servants or babysitters in 2003. These numbers increased to 6.1 and 5 percent respectively in 2008. The care for the small children is provided by the mother herself $(38.7 \%, 35.3 \%)$, mother-in-law $(20.1 \%, 23.7 \%)$, older female children $(12.2 \%, 7.5 \%)$, and other relatives among the family $(6.4 \%, 4.9 \%)$. It is very rare $(2.4 \%, 2.5 \%)$ that small children are taken care of by fathers (TDHS, 2003; 2008).

Although everywhere men are usually considered as the primary breadwinners, seeing women's work as optional is more common in MENA. World Value Surveys give an idea about the prevalence of the perception that women take away men's jobs in the case of scarcity rather than being entitled to those jobs. If we compare Turkey with other middle-income countries such as Brazil or Mexico, first we see that the male-breadwinner model is more accepted (see Figure 3.4). The percentages of people agreeing with the statement "When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women" are higher. Second, while we observe a decline in the acceptance in most other countries, it has increased in Turkey from 49.8 to 59.4 percent from first wave to the fifth wave of the surveys. The growth process in other countries might have eroded the male breadwinner model more successfully. However, we also notice that Turkey had higher acceptance of male breadwinner model than other countries even during the first wave of the surveys.

Figure 3.4: Percentage of Respondents who agree with the Statement "When Jobs are Scarce Men Should Have More Right to a Job than Women"


Source: World Value Surveys, several rounds.

Ilkkaracan (2010) argues that the cultural constraint in Turkey does not affect women's labor market outcomes by excluding them from the public sphere but that it reinforces the gender ideology that defines women's primary role as being good wives and mothers. The significant discrepancies in labor force participation of married versus single women with similar levels of education support this argument (see Figure 2.13 in Chapter 2). In other words, the lack of family-work reconciliation policies together with gender ideology restricts women's mobility. Empirical studies on the mobility patterns in Turkish labor market also show that low labor force attachment is an important problem for married women. Tansel and Kan (2012) show that women have higher probability of leaving the labor market independent from their initial jobs (formal or informal sector). Analyzing job-to-job transitions, Taşçı (2009) shows that marriage lowers the probability of switching jobs for women. In a case study from İzmir, Eryar and Tekgüç (2013) find that gender determines different mobility patterns and being married raises the likelihood of women's transition from a job to non-employment.

In this chapter, building on Ilkkaracan's (2010; 2012) framework, I incorporate gender ideology into the analysis of female labor supply in Turkey. In an attempt to quantify the impact of traditional gender role attitudes on women's preferences, I include a scale of "internalization of patriarchal norms" based on opinion questions from a unique dataset. Several cross-country studies use Islam as a proxy for patriarchal culture (Tazannatos 1999; Lincove 2008; Boone 1996). Braunstein (2014) criticizes this approach as obscuring the role of patriarchy "as a system of male advantage" that constrains economic development. She argues that "it is not that certain countries or societies are closely wed to their (extremist) religious beliefs that they are willing to pay high economic costs to maintain them, but rather that patriarchal systems benefit the few at the expense of the many" through "patriarchal rent-seeking" (p. 59). I follow a similar approach and focus on the patriarchal norms created and maintained by male dominance separately than the impact of religion. Although I do not attribute distinctively strong gender inequitable attitudes to Islam, I believe religious practice on a personal level might be associated with more traditional attitudes. Therefore I include religiosity as a potential determinant of female labor supply as well.

According to gender stratification ${ }^{9}$ theory, the status and power hierarchies derive from gender division of labor and men's control over material resources. Their advantageous position gives men motivation to continue the gender inequalities. At the macro-level, male power shapes the ideology and norms as well as formal institutions. As long as women choose to comply with the gender norms, men do not even need to use their power to maintain the status quo. In other words, "gender stratification is comprised of intentional processes (through perhaps deeply embedded in institutions so as to appear 'natural') that ensure male dominance in all aspects of social life"

[^15](Seguino, 2013, p. 13). Why do women comply with the gender norms that put them in a disadvantageous position? Braunstein (2008) explains it with the formation of gender identity internalized through repeated social interactions. Internalized norms and social sanctions, such as punishment in the marriage markets, increase the costs of deviation from the established norms for women.

The system of gender stratification involves multiple causal relationships. Seguino (2013) draws a scheme of these complex relationships (see Figure 3.5). On one hand, at the household level, the gender division of labor constrains women's access to material resources, and men's command over resources gives them bargaining power to control women's unpaid labor. At the macro-level, demand conditions shape the opportunities for women to gain power and social status through paid work. On the other hand, the traditional gender roles ensure the persistence of gender inequality as these roles reinforce the norms and stereotypes. Gender norms and stereotypes, in turn, shape the institutions (family, property rights, organized religion etc.) that embed the gender ideology. In other words, there is a two-way causal relationship between the economic (macro and micro) and the cultural spheres (Seguino, 2013, p. 20).

Figure 3.5: Gender Stratification in the Economic and Cultural Spheres


Sources: Seguino, 2013, Figure 3.

This chapter focuses on the causal effect of gender norms on women's decisionmaking at the household level. My research is part of a growing body of the literature that attempts to incorporate culture as a determinant of women's labor force participation in Turkey. Gündüz-Hoşgör and Smits (2008) find that women who are more strongly controlled by their families, as indicated by the fact that bride money was paid at their weddings or that they have only a religious marriage, have a higher probability of being housewives. Göksel (2013) finds that the conservatism variable has a negative effect on women's participation decision in urban areas and a positive effect in rural areas. Her analysis is unique because she uses husband's conservatism as a determinant of the wife's labor market decision. Uraz et al. (2010) show that
proxies used for traditional family values ${ }^{10}$ do not have a significant coefficient in the overall sample but they have a negative effect in the urban sample.

However, these studies suffer from a major drawback: they are not able to make a causal claim about the role of culture on female labor force participation because of potential problems of endogeneity. I address this issue with an instrumental variable estimation, and show that internalizing patriarchal norms has a negative impact on labor force participation decision. By using a new dataset (the 2008 round of Demographic and Health Surveys), which has more information about women's opinions on various aspects of patriarchal culture, I am better able to capture the extent which women internalized patriarchal values.

Güner and Uysal's (2014) work is closest to this study in examining the causal relationship between culture and female labor force participation. Using the epidemiological approach for domestic migration, they focus on only migrant women's labor market behavior. They also use the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey dataset, but limit their analysis to migrant women living in urban areas (1759 observations out of 7405 ever-married women in the dataset). They use female employment rates in 1970 in the migrant's province of origin as a proxy for cultural values of migrant women. They find that female employment rates in the province of origin around the time the migrants were born have a positive impact on female migrants' labor supply behavior. In the epidemiological approach, ideally indicators of the previous generation's attitude towards women's work, such as the working status of the mother would be used to deal with endogeneity, but that information is not available in the dataset. The major problem with making a causal claim about the role of culture based on Gner and Uysal's method is that all women who were born in the same province are assumed to have the same attitude towards women's work outside the home. I esti-

[^16]mate the causal impact of patriarchal norms on labor supply with an individual-level instrument, using the rich information about women's gender-role attitudes and their family background in the dataset. Moreover, while culture refers to attitudes towards women's paid work outside the home in their analysis, attitudes towards paid work in my analysis is only one among nine aspects of patriarchal culture internalized by women.

This chapter makes three important contributions. First, I address the potential problem of endogeneity with an instrumental variable estimation strategy in analyzing the effects of patriarchy on female labor force participation. Second, I construct the patriarchy scale using new information about gender-role attitudes in the 2008 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey. Third, I include religion as an important determinant of women's labor force participation in Turkey. ${ }^{11}$ Religion can be a very important obstacle to women's work outside of the home in Turkey for at least two direct reasons. First, practicing prayer (namaz) five times a day is practically impossible with a regular job outside of the home. Second, wearing a headscarf was banned in public institutions such as schools and hospitals until very recently (in 2008). Women who have strong religious beliefs would find it quite difficult to reconcile their religious practices with a working life.

### 3.4 Empirical Analysis

### 3.4.1 Data and Methodology

In order to determine the correlates of labor force participation, I use data from the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey. The Turkey Demographic and Health

[^17]Survey, 2008 (TDHS-2008) is a nationally representative survey of 10,525 households and 7,405 ever-married women age $15-49$. I use the ever-married women module for my analysis. It provides data on women's health, education, fertility, migration history, husband's income and education, household wealth and employment. Moreover, different from household labor force survey data, TDHS-2008 has various opinion questions that provide information about cultural and social values of the women interviewed. Hence, it allows me to analyze social and cultural determinants together with traditional supply-side variables such as age, education, or number of children. I estimate the following probit regression model for urban and rural samples separately:

$$
\begin{equation*}
L_{i}^{*}=\beta_{0}+\beta_{1} \text { Patriarchy }_{i}+\beta_{2} \text { Religiosity }_{i}+\beta_{3} \mathrm{X}_{i}+\mu+\epsilon_{i} \tag{3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $L_{i}$ is a dummy variable ${ }^{12}$ :

$$
L_{i}= \begin{cases}=1 & \text { if } L_{i}^{*}>0 \\ =0 & \text { if } L_{i}^{*} \leq 0\end{cases}
$$

$X_{i}$ is a vector of individual and household characteristics (including age, years of schooling, number of children under age five, migration, mother's education, household size, household wealth quintile ${ }^{13}$, and husband's schooling), $\mu$ represents region dummies and $\epsilon$ is an error term.

[^18]The variable number of children under age five can be thought of as a constraint for women's mobility based on the sexual division of labor in the household. Household size might affect labor force participation either negatively through higher need for household care or positively through need for more income. Husbands' schooling is included as a proxy for husbands' conservatism to account for the restrictions they might impose on women. Marital status is not included in the regressions because the vast majority of the women in my sample (ever-married women) are currently married. ${ }^{14}$ Mother's education is found in the literature to be positively associated with non-traditional gender role attitudes ${ }^{15}$; therefore it is included.

Religiosity is a weighted index of intensity of religious practices, prayer (namaz) and fast. ${ }^{16}$ The majority of the women in the sample reported that they fasted regularly but prayed irregularly (Table A4 in Appendix A). I constructed a weighted religiosity index that puts more weight on less common measure of religious expression (regular praying) and less weight on more common practices (irregular praying and regular fasting). ${ }^{17}$ A higher index number is associated with higher religiosity. Patriarchy measures the internalization of patriarchal norms by women based

[^19]on their responses to various statements. Specifically, they were asked whether they agree with the following statements.

- Men should also do the housework like cooking, washing, ironing, and cleaning.
- A married woman should work outside the home if she wants to.
- A woman may go anywhere she wants without her husband's permission.
- Women should be more involved in politics.
- The important decisions in the family should be made only by men of the family.
- A woman shouldn't argue with her husband even if she disagrees with him.
- Men are wiser.
- Women should be virgins when they get married.
- It is better to educate a son than a daughter.

Taking the arithmetic average of these nine opinion dummies creates the patriarchy scale. ${ }^{18}$ The higher scale numbers are associated with stronger internalization of patriarchal norms. Some of these questions capture universal aspects of patriarchy, such as gendered division of labor, while some others are more widespread in the MENA region such as control over sexuality. Table A3 and A4 in Appendix A provide descriptive statistics in the form of cross tabulations. ${ }^{19}$

Table 3.3 presents the main reasons for not working at a job. The main three reasons expressed by women for not working are childcare, being a housewife, and

[^20]husband/family's disapproval in both urban and rural areas. Table 4 shows the correlations of the main reasons for not working at a job with patriarchy and religiosity. It is interesting to note that there is positive correlation between internalization of patriarchal norms and self-reported status of being a "housewife", the lack of partner/family consent, and "do not want/need to work" answers. The negative coefficient between childcare as the main reason and patriarchy suggests that women with less patriarchal values are more likely to report childcare as the main obstacle. This makes sense because in the absence of work-family reconciliation policies, childcare is a concrete obstacle almost independent from women's own values apart from their fertility preferences.

Table 3.3: Main Reason for Not Working at a Job

|  | Urban |  | Rural |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Main reason | Frequency | Percentage | Frequency | Percentage |
| Caring for children | 1,200 | 29.2 | 328 | 29.42 |
| Housewife | 951 | 23.14 | 337 | 30.22 |
| Partner/family doesn't allow | 906 | 22.04 | 170 | 15.25 |
| No job/looking for a job | 235 | 5.72 | 80 | 7.17 |
| Does not need to work | 331 | 8.05 | 65 | 5.83 |
| Disabled/sick | 230 | 5.6 | 86 | 7.71 |
| Caring for elderly | 29 | 0.71 | 7 | 0.63 |
| Does not want to work | 44 | 1.07 | 5 | 0.45 |
| Retired | 57 | 1.39 | 4 | 0.36 |
| About to get married | 6 | 0.15 | 4 | 0.36 |
| Just about to start working | 16 | 0.39 | 1 | 0.09 |
| Just migrated/left | 10 | 0.24 | 1 | 0.09 |
| Other | 86 | 2.09 | 19 | 1.7 |
| Total | 4,110 | 100 | 1,115 | 100 |

Source: TDHS-2008.

Table 3.4: Correlations of Main Reason for Not Working at a Job with Patriarchy and Religiosity

|  | Urban |  | Rural |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Main reason not to work | Patriarchy | Religiosity | Patriarchy | Religiosity |
| Caring for children | -0.034 | 0.011 | -0.032 | -0.079 |
| Housewife | 0.13 | 0.05 | 0.066 | 0.055 |
| Partner/family does not allow | 0.074 | 0.045 | -0.038 | -0.001 |
| No job/looking for job | -0.066 | -0.044 | -0.043 | 0.0139 |
| Does not need to work | 0.013 | 0.013 | -0.016 | -0.005 |
| Disabled/Sick | 0.05 | -0.011 | 0.023 | -0.027 |
| Caring for elderly | -0.002 | 0.003 | 0.001 | -0.007 |
| Does not want to work | 0.022 | 0.005 | -0.014 | -0.116 |

Source: TDHS-2008.

In TDHS-2008, there is a question about reasons for quitting a job. The data show that 27 percent of women quit their jobs when they get married. Table 3.5 presents the percentage distribution of women "who worked for at least 6 months after age 12 and were not working at the time of the survey" according to main reason for quitting and age. Marriage is the main reason for quitting a job for each age group and pregnancy is cited as the second most important reason. As expected, leaving the labor market after marriage is more common among young women ( $56.6 \%$ for the 15-19 age group). The survey data thus provide further evidence that gender ideology that defines women's primary roles as being good wives and mothers is an important factor excluding women from the labor market.

Table 3.5: Main Reason for Quitting a Job

|  | $\mathbf{1 5 - 1 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 - 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{2 5 - 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{3 0 - 3 4}$ | $\mathbf{3 5 - 3 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 0 - 4 4}$ | $\mathbf{4 5 - 4 9}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Marriage | 56.6 | 36.9 | 28 | 26.3 | 25.8 | 22.2 | 21.2 |
| Pregnant/child care | 1.7 | 10.1 | 10.3 | 15 | 11 | 9.7 | 8.1 |
| Did not want to work | 9.2 | 11.2 | 11.7 | 11.1 | 12.6 | 7.3 | 7.3 |
| Work related problems | 5.2 | 8.2 | 13.2 | 12.1 | 11 | 11.4 | 7.9 |
| To find a better job | 2.8 | 8.6 | 12.1 | 12.1 | 8.4 | 11.9 | 7.4 |
| Just moved/migrated | 3.9 | 4.2 | 2.6 | 4.5 | 7.1 | 8.7 | 8.7 |
| Opposition of partner/ | 3.1 | 7.8 | 3.4 | 2.4 | 2.5 | 2.2 | 2.8 |
| elderly |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Other | 17.4 | 13 | 18.5 | 16.4 | 21.2 | 26.4 | 36.5 |
| N | 69 | 417 | 876 | 806 | 653 | 695 | 667 |

Source: TDHS-2008.
Notes: Other category in this table includes "housework". "sick/disabled", "appointment of partner", "not need to work", "worked unpaid", "dismissed", "sick/elderly care in the family", "retirement", "seasonal/temporary", and "other". For a more detailed table, see Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008 Main Report: http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/eng/tdhs08/.

### 3.4.2 Probit Regression Results

The average marginal effects from estimation of the probit regression specified above are shown in Table 3.6. As expected, education is an important correlate of the labor force participation of urban women. An additional year of schooling increases the probability of being in the labor force by 3.6 percent for urban women and by 6.7 percent for rural women. Having children under the age of five has the expected negative effect. One additional child under age of five decreases the labor force participation probability of urban women by 7.4 percent. It has a smaller effect in rural areas, 3.2 percent. In both urban and rural sub-samples, increased wealth quintiles are associated with less labor force participation among women. For instance, a woman in the highest wealth quintile in urban areas is 14.6 percent less likely to be working in comparison to a woman in the lowest quintile. This might suggest that women in wealthier households can afford not to work.

One interesting result is that the patriarchy and religiosity variables are not significant in the rural sample, while they are both significant in the urban sample. This is understandable because in rural areas women work mostly as unpaid family workers under the control of their husbands or family. The changes in predicted probabilities from minimum to maximum values of patriarchy and religiosity scales are -0.167 and $-0.06 .{ }^{20}$ In other words, the probability of being in the labor force is 16.7 percent lower for a woman who completely internalizes the patriarchal norms (a woman who answers all nine survey questions in a conservative way) in comparison to a progressive woman (a woman who answers all nine survey questions in a progressive way) in the urban areas. Religiosity has a weaker impact. A woman who regularly practices namaz and fasts is 6 percent less likely to be in the labor force in comparison to a woman who does not fast or pray at all. To give an economic meaning to these results, a complete internalization of patriarchal norms has a slightly bigger impact (16.7\%) than having two children under age five (14.8\%) in the urban areas. Practicing namaz and fasting regularly has a slightly lower impact (6\%) than having one small child (7.4\%) or not practicing religion exerts a similar magnitude of positive impact with two additional years of schooling (7.1\%).

[^21]Table 3.6: Probit Regression Results: Urban versus Rural

|  | Labor Force Participation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) <br> Urban | (2) Urban | (1) <br> Rural | (2) <br> Rural |
| Patriarchy | $\begin{gathered} -0.155^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.162^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0394 \\ (0.055) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0603 \\ & (0.054) \end{aligned}$ |
| Religiosity | $\begin{gathered} -0.0821^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0796^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0389 \\ & (0.078) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0324 \\ & (0.077) \end{aligned}$ |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} 0.0441^{* * *} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0447^{* * *} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0513^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0514^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age squared | $\begin{gathered} -0.0006^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0006^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0006^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0006^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling | $\begin{gathered} 0.0365^{* * *} \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0348^{* * *} \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0672^{* * * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0586^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling squared | $\begin{gathered} -0.0079^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0077^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0180^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0170^{* * *} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling cubed | $\begin{gathered} 0.0005^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0005^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0011^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0011^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Number of children under 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0736^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0730^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0316^{* *} \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0289 * * \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ |
| Household size | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0001 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0002 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0089^{* *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0121^{* * *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 2 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0341 \\ & (0.024) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0285 \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0713^{* * *} \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0693^{* * *} \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 3 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0855^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0788^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.130^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.124^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 4 | $\begin{gathered} -0.111^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.104^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.170^{* * *} \\ (0.043) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.171^{* * *} \\ (0.043) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.146^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.141^{* * *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.222^{* * *} \\ (0.068) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.231^{* * *} \\ (0.066) \end{gathered}$ |
| Husband's schooling | $\begin{gathered} -0.005^{* *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0046^{* *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0041 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0035 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |
| Mother's education | $\begin{gathered} 0.0114^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0113^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00940^{*} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00839^{*} \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ |
| Migration | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0035 \\ (0.013) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0459 \\ & (0.032) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0437 \\ (0.032) \end{array}$ |

Note: Results continued on next page.

Table 3.6 (continued): Probit Regression Results: Urban versus Rural

|  | Labor Force Participation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) Urban | (2) Urban | (1) <br> Rural | (2) <br> Rural |
|  | (0.013) | (0.013) | (0.032) | (0.032) |
| West Marmara | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0272 \\ & (0.031) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.00176 \\ & (0.034) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0518 \\ & (0.096) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0135 \\ & (0.100) \end{aligned}$ |
| Aegean | $\begin{gathered} 0.0831^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0657^{* *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.212^{* *} \\ (0.089) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.194^{* *} \\ (0.093) \end{gathered}$ |
| East Marmara | $\begin{gathered} 0.0841^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.127^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.200^{* *} \\ & (0.091) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.296^{* * *} \\ (0.085) \end{gathered}$ |
| West Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0875^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0675^{* *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.125 \\ & (0.089) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0179 \\ & (0.099) \end{aligned}$ |
| Mediterranean | $\begin{gathered} -0.0314 \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0201 \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.00887 \\ (0.089) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.141 \\ (0.095) \end{gathered}$ |
| Central Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0812^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0727^{* *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0199 \\ & (0.093) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0316 \\ & (0.095) \end{aligned}$ |
| West Black Sea | $\begin{gathered} 0.0931^{* * *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.132^{* * *} \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0662 \\ & (0.093) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.163 \\ (0.106) \end{gathered}$ |
| East Black Sea | $\begin{gathered} 0.222^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.154^{* * *} \\ (0.046) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.363^{* * *} \\ (0.077) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.258^{* *} \\ (0.103) \end{gathered}$ |
| Northeast Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0971^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0986^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.108 \\ & (0.088) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.197^{* *} \\ (0.088) \end{gathered}$ |
| Central East Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.122^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.147^{* * *} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.276^{* * *} \\ (0.073) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.182^{*} \\ & (0.095) \end{aligned}$ |
| Southeast Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0918^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.127^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.144^{*} \\ & (0.087) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.210^{* *} \\ (0.082) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female unemployment rate |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0008 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.0133^{* * *} \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ |
| Share of service employment |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0009 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0006 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ |
| Export share of ISIC 15-18 |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.002^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0043^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Pseudo R2 | 0.1441 | 0.1461 | 0.1252 | 0.1407 |
| Observations | 5,329 | 5,329 | 1,938 | 1,938 |

Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are shown below the marginal effects. For the second specification, standard errors are clustered at NUTS-2 regional level. The data for regional control variables, female unemployment rate and share of service employment, comes from the household labor force statistics. See Appendix A for the data sources of export share variable. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0.
${ }^{*} p<0.1,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.

Differences in local labor markets and institutions affect the labor force participation decision. To control for the labor market differences across regions, besides the region dummies, I include three different variables in the regressions: share of services in total employment, female unemployment rate and export performance by NUTS2 regions (26 regions). Share of service employment is expected to positively affect women's labor force participation because service jobs tend to be physically less demanding and more "respectable" for women than the typical industry jobs (Goldin, 1994). Female unemployment rate is expected to have a negative effect. Higher export orientation is expected to positively affect female labor force participation. ${ }^{21}$ Introducing demand-side control variables does not change the results; patriarchy and religiosity are still significant in the urban sample (Specification 2).

I interpret these preliminary results with caution because correlation does not prove causation. For example, it is possible that the direction of causation runs from labor force participation to more progressive attitudes, rather than vice versa. That is, women may become less conservative once they start to engage in paid work outside the house. Therefore, I estimate the causal impact of patriarchal norms on labor force participation using instrumental variable estimation. Since patriarchy is significant only in urban areas, I conduct the instrumental variable analysis only for the urban sample. Religiosity is also endogenous but I do not attempt to establish causality for religion in this study and only focus on the internalization of patriarchal norms.

[^22]
### 3.4.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation and Possible Channels of Causation from Patriarchy to Lower Female Labor Force Participation

The literature on the long-run effects of family structure on gender-role attitudes emphasizes the importance of pre-adult socialization in the formation of these attitudes (Powell \& Steelman, 1982; Tallichet \& Willits, 1986; Kiecolt \& Acock, 1988). Therefore, I use a scale of family conservatism as an instrument for patriarchal norms. I construct the family conservatism variable using six survey questions. It is a scale variable created out of following dummy variables:

- If there is a blood relationship between woman's mother and father.
- If there is a blood relationship between her and her husband.
- If she has attended Quran course during her childhood.
- If she uses headscarf.

Turkey has a high rate of consanguineous marriage, especially cousin marriages (21.2 percent in $2011^{22}$ ). The preference for this traditional form of marital union in the family can be seen as a sign of having a conservative social environment. The Department of Religious Affairs offers Quran courses to children during the summer months. Since the participation in these courses happens before the age of consent, families usually make the decision for the children, sometimes by motivating them and sometimes by force. The decision to use a headscarf is more complicated. According to Islamic rules, girls should start to use a headscarf when they start puberty. Many women make the decision in their early adolescence years, although there are exceptions. Families play a role in the decision making process, sometimes by forcing girls and sometimes by presenting it as the only socially acceptable way

[^23]of having a public life. My ethnographic research also provided anecdotal evidence that the habit of wearing headscarf is related to family background. The family conservatism variable is constructed by taking the average of these four variables. Higher values are associated with a more conservative family.

The presence of a direct effect of an instrumental variable on the outcome is a potential problem in any instrumental variable analysis, and could introduce bias (Angrist \& Krueger, 2001). Families might be directly intervening in women's labor market participation decisions. The correlation between family conservatism and labor force participation is quite low at -0.0907 . Moreover, the low correlation between family conservatism and lack of family/partner consent as the main reason not to work (0.0529) gives evidence that families are not directly affecting women's labor market decisions. This is consistent with the traditional patriarchal culture as well. In Turkey, families restrict women until they get married. However, once they are married the natal family would have less say over their decisions, transferring "the responsibility" for the woman, so to speak, to her husband or husband's family. Therefore, evidence supports the argument that family conservatism is a valid instrument. ${ }^{23}$

After accounting for potential endogeneity, the next step is to investigate the possible channels of causation from internalization of patriarchal norms to lower labor force participation. There is substantial evidence that by shaping cultural norms and behaviors, formal religious institutions have an impact on the rigidity of gender roles and attitudes (Inglehart \& Norris, 2003). Using World Value Surveys data, Seguino (2011) finds that religiosity is positively associated with gender inequitable attitudes. In other words, the direction of causality may run from religiosity to patriarchal norms

[^24]and then to lower labor force participation. In this study, I argue that patriarchal norms have a separate negative impact on female labor force participation. The correlation between my patriarchy and religiosity variables is 0.1371 . It is difficult to precisely identify the direction of causality with the available data, but dividing the sample based on mean religiosity can reveal the relative importance of patriarchal norms for religious versus non-religious women. If the negative impact of patriarchy disappears among less religious women, it can be argued that the causal relationship between patriarchy and labor force participation is driven by religion.

Besides the direct impact, patriarchal norms can affect labor force participation through fertility and education decisions as well. Women with a more traditional mindset may value family more and start a family earlier than others. Internalization of patriarchal norms can affect women's age at first marriage, age at first birth and fertility rate all of which are expected to negatively affect labor force participation. The correlation between fertility (number of living children) and patriarchy is 0.2360. The correlation between fertility preferences (ideal number of children) and patriarchy is 0.0997 . Although determining causality is complicated, the negative association between fertility and female labor force participation is well established in the literature (Bloom, Canning, Fink, \& Finlay, 2007). In this study fertility is not the main variable of interest, so I simply investigate how the impact of patriarchy changes for women who have different fertility preferences by splitting the sample.

Another channel through which patriarchy can effect women's labor force participation is education. Similar to the fertility preferences, women who have a traditional mindset may put lower value on education and have a preference for family formation instead of having an individual career. Moreover, families play an important role in girls' schooling decisions. My instrument, family conservatism, might be directly affecting women's years of schooling. Based on the results of field research conducted in Ankara, Chapter 4 shows that for about fifty percent of women interviewed, the
schooling decision was taken by their families, mostly by their fathers. Fathers' decisions, on the other hand, to a large extent were shaped by cultural beliefs, concerns about family honor and attempts to monitor daughters. Nationally conducted studies analyzing gender inequalities in education also point out similar problems. Parent education, which can be thought of as a proxy for cultural values, is found to be an important determinant of girls' schooling decision in many studies (Duman, 2010; Tansel, 2002b; Rankin \& Aytaç, 2006). The correlation between years of schooling and patriarchy is -0.4022 while the correlation between years of schooling and family conservatism is -0.2829 . To see if patriarchy has a separate effect on labor force participation, I divide the sample according to education levels. If the negative effect of patriarchy on labor force participation disappears among highly educated women, we can argue that patriarchal norms lower participation mostly through their impact on schooling decisions.

### 3.4.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results

Table 3.7 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in instrumental variable estimations. The labor force participation rate in the urban sample is 31 percent, while non-agricultural labor force participation ${ }^{24}$ is 26 percent. The average year of schooling is 6.2 and the mean age is 34.2 . The mean patriarchy, religiosity and family conservatism scales are $0.34,0.49$, and 0.39 respectively. The correlation between patriarchy and family conservatism is 0.2212 , not as low as to indicate a problem of a weak instrument. With an F-statistic of 41.11 (larger than the rule of thumb value of 10), family conservatism passes the weak instrument test (Table 3.8).

[^25]Diagnostics for non-linear models, IV-probit in this case, are not available. Therefore, I report the diagnostics for linear probability model using ivregress in Table 3.7. Weak instruments are property of first stage and first stages in ivregress and ivprobit are identical; both give a t-statistic of 6.41 for family conservatism.

Table 3.9 presents IV-probit estimates of the impact of patriarchal norms on labor force participation and non-agricultural labor force participation. According to instrumental variable estimation results (specification 1), a 10 percent increase in the patriarchy scale is associated with a decrease of 0.095 in the probability of labor force participation and a decrease of 0.12 in the probability of non-agricultural labor force participation. The signs and marginal effects of other control variables are, to a large extent, similar in probit and IV-probit regression results. The instrumental variable estimation results show that an extra year of schooling increases the probability of labor force participation of a woman by 2.4 percent while an additional child under age five decreases the probability by 6 percent. Addition of regional control variables (specification 2) does not change the results significantly.

Table 3.7: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Instrumental Variable Estimations (Urban)

| Variable | Mean | S.D. | Min. | Max. | N |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Labor force participation rate | 0.31 | 0.46 | 0 | 1 | 5429 |
| Non-agricultural labor force participation rate | 0.26 | 0.44 | 0 | 1 | 5429 |
| Patriarchy | 0.34 | 0.19 | 0 | 1 | 5429 |
| Religiosity | 0.49 | 0.15 | 0 | 0.62 | 5429 |
| Family conservatism | 0.39 | 0.24 | 0 | 1 | 5426 |
| Age | 34.2 | 8.27 | 15 | 49 | 5429 |
| Schooling | 6.2 | 4.01 | 0 | 19 | 5429 |
| Number of children under age 5 | 0.59 | 0.76 | 0 | 5 | 5429 |
| Fertility (number of living children) | 2.31 | 1.6 | 0 | 14 | 5429 |
| Fertility preference (ideal number of children) | 2.54 | 1.16 | 0 | 15 | 5355 |
| Household size | 4.74 | 2.09 | 1 | 22 | 5429 |
| Wealth index | 3.33 | 1.26 | 1 | 5 | 5429 |
| Husband's schooling | 8.04 | 3.81 | 0 | 19 | 5399 |
| Mother's education | 2.28 | 3 | 0 | 13 | 5367 |
| Migration | 0.34 | 0.47 | 0 | 1 | 5429 |
| Female unemployment rate | 19.91 | 6.99 | 9.6 | 36.1 | 5429 |
| Share of service employment | 46.62 | 10.31 | 25.08 | 72.41 | 5429 |
| Export orientation | 2.53 | 5.91 | 0.01 | 20.81 | 5429 |
| Export share of ISIC 15-18 | 32.93 | 20.14 | 1.56 | 79.08 | 5429 |

Note: Non-agricultural labor force participation=non-agricultural employment + women looking for jobs (both agricultural and non-agricultural jobs)
Source: TDHS-2008, Household Labor Force Surveys (female unemployment rate and share of service employment), Foreign Trade Statistics and Annual Manufacturing Industry Surveys (export performance variables).

Table 3.8: Instrumental Variable Estimation: First Stage Regression Summary Statistics

| Variable | $R^{2}$ | Adjusted $R^{2}$ | Partial $R^{2}$ | Robust F (1,5309) | Prob $>F$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Patriarchy | 0.2031 | 0.1992 | 0.0077 | 41.1056 | 0 |

Table 3.9: Instrumental Variable Estimation Results (Urban)

|  | LFP |  | Non-Agricultural LFP |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (1) | (2) |
| Patriarchy | $\begin{gathered} -0.955^{* * *} \\ (0.245) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.978^{* * *} \\ (0.246) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.231^{* * *} \\ (0.159) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.245^{* * *} \\ (0.159) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} 0.0216^{* *} \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0216^{* *} \\ (0.011) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0124 \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0126 \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ |
| Age squared | $\begin{gathered} -0.0003^{* *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0003^{*} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0002 \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0002 \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ |
| Schooling | $\begin{gathered} 0.0241^{* *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0210^{* *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0117 \\ & (0.009) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.009 \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling squared | $\begin{gathered} -0.0073^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.007^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0049^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0047^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling cubed | $\begin{gathered} 0.0005^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0005^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0003^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0003^{* * * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Number of children under 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0597^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0586^{* * *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0370^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0359^{* * *} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ |
| Household size | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0054 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0056 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0041 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0043 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 2 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0417^{*} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0336 \\ & (0.023) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0312 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0229 \\ (0.023) \end{array}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 3 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0957^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0855^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0529^{* *} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0428^{*} \\ (0.023) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 4 | $\begin{gathered} -0.143^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.131^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0869^{* * *} \\ (0.025) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0752^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.205^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.194^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.138^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.128^{* * *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ |
| Husband's schooling | $\begin{gathered} -0.0062^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0058^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0062^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0057^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ |
| Mother's education | $\begin{gathered} 0.0094^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0092^{* * * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0066^{* * * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0064^{* * * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ |
| Migration | $\begin{gathered} -0.0032 \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0029 \\ & (0.012) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0146 \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0143 \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |

Note: Results continued on next page.

Table 3.9 (continued): Instrumental Variable Estimation Results (Urban)

|  | LFP |  | Non-Agricultural LFP |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (1) | (2) |
| West Marmara | $\begin{gathered} 0.00589 \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0398 \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0106 \\ & (0.025) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0512^{*} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| Aegean | $\begin{gathered} 0.0756^{* * *} \\ (0.026) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0514^{*} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0408^{*} \\ & (0.023) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0184 \\ & (0.024) \end{aligned}$ |
| East Marmara | $\begin{gathered} 0.0784^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.112^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0526^{* *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0955^{* * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| West Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0590^{* *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.028 \\ & (0.033) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0524^{*} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0148 \\ & (0.030) \end{aligned}$ |
| Mediterranean | $\begin{gathered} -0.0118 \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0008 \\ (0.034) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0177 \\ & (0.023) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0063 \\ & (0.031) \end{aligned}$ |
| Central Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0515^{*} \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0463 \\ (0.035) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0188 \\ & (0.027) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.00511 \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| West Black Sea | $\begin{gathered} 0.103^{* * *} \\ (0.024) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.122^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0746^{* * *} \\ (0.022) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.107^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ |
| East Black Sea | $\begin{gathered} 0.153^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0576 \\ & (0.048) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0301 \\ (0.025) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.120^{* * *} \\ (0.034) \end{gathered}$ |
| Northeast Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0731^{* *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0982^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0497^{*} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0693^{* *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ |
| Central East Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.115^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.156^{* * *} \\ (0.040) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0712^{* *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.100^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ |
| Southeast Anatolia | $\begin{gathered} -0.0743^{* *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.142^{* * *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0576^{* *} \\ (0.027) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.126^{* * * *} \\ (0.030) \end{gathered}$ |
| Female unemployment rate |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0014 \\ & (0.002) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0022 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ |
| Service employment share |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.0002 \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0003 \\ & (0.001) \end{aligned}$ |
| Export share of ISIC 15-18 |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0024^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} 0.0026^{* * *} \\ (0.001) \end{gathered}$ |
| p-value Wald exogeneity test | 0.0098 | 0.0095 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 |
| Observations | 5,336 | 5,336 | 5,336 | 5,336 |

Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are shown below the marginal effects. For the second specification, standard errors are clustered at NUTS2 regional level. The data for regional control variables, female unemployment rate and share of service employment, comes from the household labor force statistics. For the data used in export share variable, see Appendix A. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0. ${ }^{*} p<0.1,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.

Dividing the sample based on religiosity shows that patriarchal norms have a negative impact on labor force participation for both sub-samples (Table 3.10). The impact on labor force participation is bigger for women who have higher than average religiosity scores, suggesting that religiosity contributes to the internalization of patriarchal norms. However, for non-agricultural labor force participation patriarchal norms seem to matter more than religiosity because the impact of patriarchy is bigger among less religious women. In other words, there is evidence that patriarchy is a channel that is separate from religion in reducing female labor supply in Turkey.

Table 3.10: IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy according to Religiosity (Urban)

|  | LFP |  | Non-Agricultural LFP |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) | (2) | (1) | (2) |
| Religiosity: | $<0.49$ | $>0.49$ | <0.49 | $>0.49$ |
| Patriarchy | -1.025 | -0.906** | -1.149* | -1.268*** |
|  | (0.723) | (0.396) | (0.615) | (0.222) |
| Age | 0.0485 | 0.0145 | 0.0338 | 0.00719 |
|  | (0.038) | (0.014) | (0.034) | (0.012) |
| Age squared | -0.0008 | -0.0002 | -0.0006 | -0.0008 |
|  | (0.001) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Schooling | -0.0011 | 0.0299** | -0.0101 | 0.0144 |
|  | (0.035) | (0.013) | (0.032) | (0.011) |
| Schooling squared | -0.0044 | -0.0083*** | -0.0036 | $-0.0051^{* * *}$ |
|  | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| Schooling cubed | 0.0004** | 0.0005*** | 0.0003* | 0.0003*** |
|  | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) | (0.000) |
| Number of children under 5 | -0.0829*** | -0.0539*** | -0.0700** | -0.0273** |
|  | (0.030) | (0.015) | (0.027) | (0.013) |
| Household size | 0.0098 | 0.0048 | 0.0051 | 0.0045 |
|  | (0.010) | (0.004) | (0.011) | (0.004) |
| Wealth Quintile 2 | -0.0278 | -0.0404 | 0.027 | -0.0373 |
|  | (0.054) | (0.026) | (0.064) | (0.025) |
| Wealth Quintile 3 | -0.0907* | -0.0967*** | 0.0011 | -0.0637** |
|  | (0.055) | (0.027) | (0.058) | (0.025) |
| Wealth Quintile 4 | -0.0933 | $-0.159^{* *}$ | 0.0004 | -0.109*** |
|  | (0.057) | (0.029) | (0.074) | (0.027) |
| Wealth Quintile 5 | $-0.178^{* * *}$ | $-0.213^{* * *}$ | -0.0743 | -0.153*** |
|  | (0.063) | (0.033) | (0.081) | (0.030) |
| Husband's schooling | $-0.0087^{* *}$ | -0.0051** | -0.0094** | -0.0051*** |
|  | (0.004) | (0.002) | (0.004) | (0.002) |
| Mother's education | 0.0093* | 0.0098*** | 0.0077* | 0.0067*** |
|  | (0.005) | (0.003) | (0.005) | (0.003) |
| Migration | 0.0162 | -0.0064 | 0.0139 | 0.0177 |
|  | (0.025) | (0.014) | (0.024) | (0.012) |
| Observations | 1,205 | 4,131 | 1,205 | 4,131 |

Notes: Average marginal affects are reported. Robust standard errors are shown below the marginal effects. Region dummies are included. Religiosity measures the intensity of religious practice; fasting and namaz. The mean religiosity in the urban sample is 0.49. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0.

* $p<0.1,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.

To investigate the impact of patriarchy on women with different fertility preferences, I divided the sample according to the ideal number of children. Table 3.11 presents the regression results. The impact of patriarchy is negative but not statistically significant for women who said zero or one child is ideal. The patriarchy becomes statistically significant among the group with preference for two children, and it exerts the strongest impact on women who have a preference for three or four children. The results for five or more children are not meaningful probably because of the sample size (only 248 observations). ${ }^{25}$

I analyze the impact of patriarchal norms on labor force participation for different education groups separately to see if the negative impact still persists among highly educated women. Table 3.12 presents the regression results for sub-samples divided by completed level of education. For women without formal education, internalization of patriarchal norms does not lower labor force participation. On the contrary, I find a positive significant effect. This might be related to the occupations they get. Based on a survival motive, these women might be working at the jobs no one else wants. In that case, labor force participation is not a choice but necessity. Unpaid family worker is the main category of employment for women without education (Table 3.13). These women might be working at small ateliers and local shops owned by family in the urban settings. Patriarchal norms are usually not an obstacle for women's work under these conditions; on the contrary women might be encouraged to work since there is full-time monitoring during the work hours and workplaces are usually close to their homes. The second biggest category is "working for her own irregularly" which I believe is mostly piecework from home. For this group of women, patriarchal norms might have led to lack of formal education or family

[^26]conservatism might have deprived them from getting education. But later in their life, they might need to work and get jobs that do not require formal education. For secondary and higher education categories, I find a significant negative effect. The high negative coefficient of patriarchy among women with higher education indicates that patriarchal norms can affect labor force participation even if there is not a problem of insufficient education.

Table 3.11: IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy According to Fertility Preferences (Urban)

|  | Labor Force Participation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ideal number of children: | (1) <br> Zero/One | (2) <br> Two | (3) <br> Three/Four | (4) <br> Five/More |
| Patriarchy | $\begin{gathered} -0.275 \\ (1.111) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.100^{* *} \\ (0.449) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.353^{* * *} \\ (0.186) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.15 \\ (0.850) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} 0.0629^{* *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.016 \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.00442 \\ (0.015) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0430^{*} \\ & (0.023) \end{aligned}$ |
| Age squared | $\begin{gathered} -0.0009 * * \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0002 \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0005 \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0007^{* *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0084 \\ & (0.036) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0209 \\ & (0.014) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0114 \\ & (0.013) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0907^{* * *} \\ (0.028) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling squared | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0016 \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0071^{* * *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.005^{* *} \\ (0.002) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0154^{* *} \\ (0.006) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling cubed | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0003 \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0005^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0003^{* * *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0007^{* *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Number of children under 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0926^{* * *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0517^{* *} \\ (0.021) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0315^{* *} \\ (0.016) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.02 \\ (0.031) \end{gathered}$ |
| Household size | $\begin{gathered} 0.008 \\ (0.013) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0077 \\ & (0.005) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.002 \\ (0.005) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.01 \\ (0.019) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 2 | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0236 \\ & (0.106) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0005 \\ & (0.038) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0645^{* *} \\ (0.032) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0764 \\ (0.076) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 3 | $\begin{gathered} -0.051 \\ (0.105) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0585 \\ & (0.038) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0720^{* *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0595 \\ (0.088) \end{array}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 4 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.128 \\ & (0.134) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0950^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.111^{* * *} \\ (0.035) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0963 \\ (0.110) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 5 | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0492 \\ (0.163) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.155^{* * *} \\ (0.044) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.202^{* * *} \\ (0.038) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0306 \\ & (0.096) \end{aligned}$ |
| Husband's schooling | $\begin{gathered} -0.0054 \\ (0.009) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0061^{* *} \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0041 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0084 \\ (0.007) \end{array}$ |
| Mother's education | $\begin{gathered} 0.0173^{* *} \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0098^{* * *} \\ (0.004) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0022 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0132 \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |
| Migration | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0108 \\ (0.052) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0137 \\ & (0.017) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0088 \\ & (0.017) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0533 \\ & (0.047) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 517 | 2,641 | 1,929 | 248 |

Notes: Average marginal affects are reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Region dummies are included. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0.

* $p<0.1,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.

Table 3.12: IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy According to Education Level (Urban)

|  | Labor Force Participation |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | (1) <br> No Education | (2) <br> Primary E. | (3) <br> Secondary E. | (4) <br> Higher E. |
| Patriarchy | $\begin{aligned} & 1.097^{*} \\ & (0.653) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.605 \\ & (0.555) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.528^{* * *} \\ (0.321) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -1.570^{* * *} \\ (0.225) \end{gathered}$ |
| Age | $\begin{gathered} 0.0269^{* *} \\ (0.012) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0296^{*} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0107 \\ & (0.022) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0265 \\ & (0.018) \end{aligned}$ |
| Age squared | $\begin{gathered} -0.0004^{* *} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0004 \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0001 \\ & (0.000) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0005^{*} \\ (0.000) \end{gathered}$ |
| Schooling | $\begin{gathered} 0.0153^{*} \\ (0.008) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0388 \\ & (0.032) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0184 \\ & (0.021) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0518^{* * *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| Number of children under 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.0676^{* *} \\ (0.033) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0767^{* * *} \\ (0.018) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0710^{* *} \\ (0.029) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0493^{* *} \\ (0.020) \end{gathered}$ |
| Household size | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0012 \\ (0.007) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0051 \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0166^{*} \\ (0.010) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0098 \\ & (0.011) \end{aligned}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 2 | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0089 \\ (0.037) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0397 \\ (0.038) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.227^{*} \\ & (0.129) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.149 \\ (0.124) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 3 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0432 \\ & (0.075) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.0897^{* *} \\ (0.039) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.247^{*} \\ & (0.133) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (0.113) \end{gathered}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 4 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0103 \\ & (0.131) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.150^{* * *} \\ (0.045) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.284^{* *} \\ (0.133) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0338 \\ & (0.111) \end{aligned}$ |
| Wealth Quintile 5 | $\begin{gathered} -0.05 \\ (0.147) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.234^{* * *} \\ (0.050) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.381^{* * *} \\ (0.135) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0117 \\ (0.112) \end{array}$ |
| Husband's schooling | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0021 \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.004 \\ & (0.003) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0011 \\ (0.006) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.006 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |
| Mother's education | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0033 \\ & (0.007) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.0116^{* * * *} \\ (0.003) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0118^{*} \\ & (0.006) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0027 \\ & (0.004) \end{aligned}$ |
| Migration | $\begin{aligned} & -0.0092 \\ & (0.034) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.0065 \\ & (0.019) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.0111 \\ (0.034) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.029 \\ & (0.021) \end{aligned}$ |
| Observations | 1,007 | 2,582 | 502 | 1,245 |

Notes: Average marginal affects are reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Region dummies are included. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0. Estimations with non-agricultural labor force participation give similar results except the primary education category. Patriarchy is significant in determining non-agricultural labor force participation among primary school graduates.
${ }^{*} p<0.1,{ }^{* *} p<0.05,{ }^{* * *} p<0.01$.
Table 3.13: Job Status of Working Women according to Education Level (Urban)

|  | No education | Primary S. |  | Secondary S. | Higher Ed. |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | N | $\%$ | N | $\%$ | N | $\%$ | N |

Source: TDHS-2008.

### 3.5 Discussion

This chapter analyzes the role of two factors, patriarchal norms and religiosity, in explaining female labor force participation puzzle of Turkey using cross-sectional data. It suggests that Turkey's divergence from the trends in other upper-middle income countries might be explained by a combination of factors including lower levels of education, lack of work-family reconciliation policies and affordable childcare services, and a more patriarchal culture. Further cross-country research is necessary to make a causal claim about the relative power of patriarchy in relation to other institutional barriers in creating this divergence. The dynamic part of the puzzle, the declining trend in female labor force participation rates during the last fifty years, is usually explained by rapid structural transformation and urbanization (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6 in Chapter 2). For various reasons, women who work as unpaid family workers in the rural areas withdraw from the labor force once they migrate to the cities. Lack of decent job opportunities for low-skilled, poorly educated women plays an important role in this withdrawal. Women with less than high school degree prefer to stay at home knowing that they would have to spend most of their income on private care if they take up low quality, informal jobs. In other words, the available jobs usually do not offer higher wages than their reservation wage that is pulled up mainly by the cost of private care. The patriarchal norms defining women's primary role as a caregiver also contribute to the formation of these preferences. When there is not a satisfactory material reward from paid work, women might prefer the comfort of being "the mistress of their own house" and the emotional relief of taking care of their own children over the potential benefits of having a job and social life.

Data from the World Value Surveys for Turkey reveal that there has been a rise in traditional values in the last three decades. For example, the importance of family in people's lives has increased since 1990 (Table 3.14). The importance of religion has increased in the same period. The view that "a woman has to have children to be
fulfilled" has become more accepted. The approval rate for female-headed households, on the other hand, has decreased. The public support for gender discrimination in the labor market has increased. In other words, patriarchal norms and religiosity not only explain why female labor force participation in Turkey is lower than other upper-middle income countries, but they might also be partially responsible for its declining trends in Turkey. These trends also provide evidence for İlkkaracan's adverse path dependency argument. Given lack of demand-side challenges to the patriarchal male breadwinner family model, the existing care regime and worsening labor market conditions further strengthen Turkey's gendered roles and patriarchal culture.
Table 3.14: Change in Cultural Values, 1990-2014

|  | 1990-1994 | 1995-1998 | 1999-2004 | 2005-2009 | 2010-2014 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Importance in life ${ }^{\text {a }}$ : Family-very important (\%) | 87 | 97 | 97 | 98 | 95 |
| Importance in life: Work-very important (\%) | 54 | 76 | 70 | 56 | 50 |
| Importance in life: Religion-very important (\%) | 60 | 83 | 80 | 75 | 68 |
| When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women-Agree (\%) | 50 | 66 | 59 | 52 | 59 |
| A woman has to have children to be fulfilled-Agree (\%) | 70 | 77 | 77 | n.a. | n.a |
| Woman as a single parent ${ }^{\text {b }}$-Disapprove (\%) | 10 | 5 | 89 | 88 | n. |
| Woman as a single parent -Depends (\%) | 83 | 82 | 5 | 2 | n. |
| Relationship with working mother ${ }^{\text {c }}$-Disagree (\%) | 31 | 44 | 23 | n.a. | n. |
| Observations | 1030 | 1907 | 3401 | 1346 | 1605 |
| Source: World Value Surveys, several rounds. |  |  |  |  |  |
| ${ }^{a}$ For each of the following aspects, indicate how import <br> ${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ If a woman wants to have a child as a single parent b approve or disapprove? <br> ${ }^{c}$ A working mother can establish just as warm and secu | t it is in you she doesn't <br> a relationsh | life. Would y want to have p with her ch | ou say it is: a stable rela dren as a mo | onship with ther. | man, do you |

### 3.6 Conclusion

My econometric analysis confirms the findings of the previous literature with regard to the positive impact of education and the negative impact of childcare obligations on the labor force participation of women. Both these effects are stronger for urban women. I find that in both rural and urban areas, women are less likely to work as the wealth status of the household increases. The effect is again stronger among urban women. This suggests that women tend to participate in the labor force only when the household needs a second wage earner. Otherwise, they tend to stay at home.

To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to establish a negative relationship between women's religious practice and labor force participation in Turkey. I find a strong negative association in urban areas. This finding is important in the light of the social transformation that Turkey has undergone during the last decade under the Justice and Development Party's rule. Pursuing an Islam-inspired social conservative agenda, the Justice and Development Party intervened in the secular structure of the country in various ways, especially transforming the education system. Religion has increasingly become a more important aspect of daily life. This transformation should be expected to influence women's labor force participation negatively in the future as well.

Another important finding is the negative association between patriarchal values and labor force participation. It is not surprising to find that conservative values become an obstacle in urban areas rather than rural, because in rural areas women work mostly as unpaid family workers under the control of their husband/family. However, the findings presented here pose a serious challenge for increasing urban women's labor force participation because they suggest that urbanization does not automatically weaken the effect of conservatism.

This study makes a contribution to the literature by establishing a causal relationship between patriarchal norms and women' labor force participation. In addition to developing a preference against paid employment outside the home, internalization of patriarchal norms can lower women's labor force participation by increasing fertility or reducing years of schooling. I find that the impact of patriarchy is stronger for women who have higher fertility preferences, which might suggest that the causal impact is driven by higher fertility. Among the different educational backgrounds, patriarchal norms exert the highest impact on women with higher education. In other words, they can be a barrier on labor force participation of even highly educated women, further suggesting that there is a causal relationship between internalization of patriarchal norms and lack of labor force participation.

However, it is important to note that even if a negative causal relationship is identified, one should not take these values and preferences as exogenous and constant. Case studies from around the world have shown that in the presence of demand for women's labor, or in the presence of a need for survival, women find ways of reconciling their conservative values with working outside the home. It is a potentially fruitful ground for further research to analyze changes in women's labor market behavior as a response to positive demand shocks, while accounting for their value systems.

## CHAPTER 4

# "WORKING WOMEN WITHOUT EDUCATION ARE DOOMED TO BE OPPRESSED": WOMEN'S LABOR MARKET DECISIONS AND EMPOWERMENT 

### 4.1 Introduction

Understanding the gender gap in labor force participation requires a broader methodological approach than the choice theoretical framework of the neoclassical supply model. Neoclassical economists take preferences to be exogenous and focus on actual behavior, explaining it with variation in prices and income. In other words, they infer preferences from the observed behavior. As a result they explain household members' decisions of time allocation to alternative activities by their relative marginal productivities (Becker, 1985). Feminist economists, on the other hand, have long been arguing that a choice theoretical framework based on utility maximization does not completely explain women's labor supply behavior because it ignores the complex social factors that lead women to make different decisions than men under a different set of "choices". The prevailing ideologies about gender roles create expectations that men take up paid work and women take care of the family. These expectations are incorporated as meta-preferences by individuals and affect their allocation of time to paid work versus unpaid domestic labor. As Kabeer (2002) explains, these social preferences do not translate mechanistically into individual preferences which also are affected by the individual's histories and experiences. Therefore an investigation of women's preferences, besides their actual behavior, becomes important to understand low female labor force participation.

The empirical studies using available survey data reveal important correlates of women's labor force participation (Gündüz-Hoşgör \& Smits, 2006; Güner \& Uysal, 2014; Göksel, 2013; İlkkaracan, 2012; Uraz et al., 2010). However, they do not provide any direct information about the actual decision making process in the household. In this chapter, I analyze the actual decision making process of women using their narratives from interviews about their life stories. As long as the traditional gender division of labor prevails in the society, men and women will make systematically different time allocation choices. To accommodate their responsibilities in the reproductive sphere, women make different decisions with respect to investment in human capital, choice of occupation, formal versus informal jobs, and part-time versus fulltime employment (Ilkkaracan \& Acar, 2007). Furthermore, there can be situations where women are directly prevented from working outside the home due to religious, cultural or social restrictions. In which case the "choice" premise of the neoclassical model becomes irrelevant. Public opinion surveys provide some insights into the importance of the husband/family's consent for decision-making in Turkey. Based on a survey conducted in forty-two provinces in 2008, a private research institute found that 69 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement "women should acquire husband's consent to work" (KONDA, 2008). According to nationally representative Demographic and Health Surveys, the main reason reported by women for not working outside was the lack of the partner's/family's consent for 25 percent (1998), 12 percent (2003), 21 percent (2008) and 15 percent (2013) of the respondents (TDHS 1998; 2003; 2008; 2013).

A much-debated issue concerning women's employment is whether it creates empowerment. If paid work is not empowering and does not produce net welfare gains for women, their absence from the labor market may be interpreted as a reflection of their own preferences rather than a result of cultural and social barriers imposed upon them. Of course, these preferences still need to be understood in a gender-
discriminatory social, cultural and economic context (Ilkkaracan, 2012). Therefore, I also investigate the relationship between paid work and women's employment using various empowerment indicators.

The remainder of this chapter is organized in six sections. The next section presents a brief literature review. In the third section, I explain my data and methodology. The fourth section analyzes women's education decisions. In policy papers, common diagnosis of the reason for Turkey's low female labor force participation rates is the low level of female education (Ilkkaracan \& Acar, 2007). When it comes to explaining low levels of education for women, the under-participation trap hypothesis, put forward in recent papers (World Bank, 2009; Taymaz, 2009), holds that urban women with high homemaking productivity prefer to stay at home because they do not receive the full return to their investment in education if they engage in market work. Being in the under-participation trap, these women further lower their ex-ante investment in education because it is not useful for home production. The World Bank study recognizes the role of families in making the decision for girls and argues that low wages and returns to education cause families to under-invest in the education of girls. In this section, I analyze the validity of this hypothesis through women's explanations of their past schooling decisions.

In the fifth section, I deconstruct women's labor force participation decisions. I analyze to what extent actual behavior (participation or non-participation) is a result of free "choice". I explore preferences and aspirations of non-participant women. Additionally, I consider their views about policies to encourage women's employment.

In the sixth section, I investigate women's responses to the recent pro-natalist discourse initiated by the Prime Minister Erdoğan. ${ }^{1}$ There is a well-established negative relationship between fertility and female labor supply in the empirical literature.

[^27]How Turkish women are going to be affected by this discourse, launched by a popular leader, may prove to be important in terms of its implications for the labor market outcomes. In the seventh section I examine the relationship with employment and women's empowerment in various dimensions. Finally, I conclude.

### 4.2 Literature Review

Notwithstanding its limitations, the majority of Turkish economists have used an individual rational choice framework in explaining women's labor market behavior (Dayığ̆lu \& Kasnakoğlu, 1997; Özar \& Günlük-Şenesen, 1998; Tansel, 2002a; Başlevent \& Onaran, 2003; Gündüz-Hoşgör \& Smits, 2008; Taymaz, 2010). A few of them have included cultural values into the analysis and have shown that there is some correlation between having progressive values and engaging in paid work (Güner \& Uysal, 2014; Göksel, 2013; Gündüz-Hoşgör \& Smits, 2008; Uraz et al., 2010). Although the correlation between cultural value proxies, such as "if the bride's money was paid during the wedding," and labor market outcomes indicates that women's decisions are not based on pure economic calculations, they need to be unpacked to reveal the actual causal processes. In this chapter I employ a qualitative methodology to explain the causal processes driving women's labor market decisions. I adopt an integrative approach that emphasizes both structure and agency in the process of decision making, as suggested by Kabeer (2002). The in-depth interview questions were designed to reveal the importance of women's individual aspirations and views on one hand and structural obstacles on the other hand. This framework is outlined in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1: Alternative Frameworks to Explain Women's Labor Market Behavior


Source: Kabeer (2002)

Women's chances in the labor market are closely related to their past schooling decisions. Cultural values and families' control over their daughters might affect girls' schooling decisions. National studies analyzing gender inequalities in education also point out the role of culture. Parent education, sometimes taken as a proxy for cultural values, is found to be an important determinant of girls' schooling decision (Tansel, 2002b; Rankin \& Aytaç, 2006; Duman, 2010). Therefore, I analyze women's past schooling decisions in a separate section.

Different approaches attach different degrees of transformatory potential to women's access to paid work. According to the school of thought know as the New Household Economics, power is irrelevant in intra-household decisions and therefore it does not matter who earns the money. Household bargaining models, on the other hand, consider paid work as a sufficient condition to bring a shift in intra-household power relations by improving women's fallback position (Manser \& Brown, 1980; McElroy \& Horney, 1981; Lundberg \& Pollak, 1993). The role of ideology and perceptions is also incorporated into the bargaining models. For example, Amartya Sen (1990) argues
that the relative bargaining positions of individuals also depend on perceived interest and perceived contribution functions. How the relative contributions of household members are perceived depends on the form of contribution (market vs. subsistence production, outside vs. domestic labor, etc.). Since employment creates a visible monetary contribution, it is expected to increase women's bargaining position by changing the perceptions. Perceived interest, on the other hand, can operate unconsciously through differences in internalized views of self-worth (Sen, 1990) or consciously through compliance if women are aware of their weaker fallback positions (Agarwal, 1997). Employment can empower women by increasing their self-confidence and self-worth to the extent that it brings social recognition.

The relationship between paid work and empowerment is a highly debated issue in the broader feminist literature, as well. Some argue that women's economic independence is a necessary condition, if not a sufficient one, for empowerment (Engels, 1972; Kessler-Harris, 2001; Bergmann, 2005). Others argue that the degree to which labor market engagement liberates women depends on their class positions. If women are pushed into wage labor due to economic difficulties and get low quality jobs, they would not benefit but only face double exploitation (Humphries, 1977; Hartmann, 1981; Elson, 1999; Kabeer, 2002). Macro data allow us to see how the Turkish women are disproportionately concentrated in low paid, low security jobs, especially in the informal sector ${ }^{2}$, suggesting that the transforming potential of such work would be limited. But they do not provide any account of the impact of paid work on women's lives. In this chapter, I seek to fill this gap by analyzing the relationship between paid work and empowerment, comparing experiences of two groups of women. Currently employed women are expected to be more powerful in comparison to full-time home makers at least in some of the empowerment indicators.

[^28]There are few case studies examining the relationship between paid work and women's empowerment in Turkey. İlkkaracan (2012) presents the results of a field survey conducted in Ümraniye sub-province of Istanbul in 1997. She finds that employed women have comparatively more decision-making power with respect to engagement in the public sphere, joining a political party, pursuing education, managing personal income, birth control, and how to dress. Erman, Kalaycıoğlu \& Rittersberger-Tilic (2002) analyze the employment experiences of migrant women based on field research conducted in squatter settlements of four big cities. They find that labor force participation did not lead to empowerment for the majority of migrant women, because their engagement in the public sphere did not necessarily lessen their families' social control. Migrant families used various ways to control women's behavior when they were away from home, so that they had very limited decision making power. Although earning money increased their bargaining power, they were still subordinates under their husband's control.

Beşpınar (2010) analyzes women's agency and their work-related strategies using a critical feminist approach. Her study is based on interviews with both employed women and full time homemakers from different classes in Istanbul. She finds that the main obstacles to employment are husband's opposition because of patriarchal values and religious beliefs for working class women, and motherhood for middle-class women. Her main finding is that women across all classes develop individual strategies based on their specific circumstances. These strategies meet women's individual practical needs and bring empowerment in the form of short-term personal advantages but are far from bringing collective empowerment in the long run. For a working class widowed woman, for example, wearing a fake wedding ring or wearing a veil are concessions that provide protection from potential harassment in the workplace, but makes other women who are not veiled more vulnerable. Becoming a "super wife," by shouldering all the responsibilities related to childcare and housework while also
working outside, is another way for working or middle class women to earn their husband's approval. Although it ameliorates women's position in the short-run, it is far from changing the gender roles. Even upper middle class women use shortterm strategies by adapting a conservative dress code and developing gender-neutral attitudes in the workplace to avoid gossip and accusations about their sexuality.

These studies focus mostly on decision-making power in the household as an indicator of empowerment. Here I use a broader notion of empowerment that focuses not only on decision making in the household and control over income but also includes women's agency; awareness with regard to government's work and family related policies; willingness to question gendered division of labor in the household; and mental health and control over their own lives. A recently published report, entitled "Family, Work and Gender in Turkey," captures some of these empowerment indicators. As part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the report is based on a nationally representative field survey conducted in February-April 2013. The respondents (both male and female) were asked multiple questions about family and work life, motherhood, and relationship with the spouse. The report concludes that a majority of respondents sees women predominantly as homemakers. While most believe that both men and women should contribute to the household income, they think that a woman's main role is to stay at home and raise children. Both women and men recognize that housework is not fairly distributed in their families, although much fewer men accept that they do not do their fair share. Moreover, realizing the existence of an unfair distribution in the house does not create different results for men and women in terms of satisfaction with life. Both men and women tend to express that they are overall happy and content. Therefore, it can be concluded that the unfair distribution of housework and the double burden employed women face are widely internalized (Çarkoğlu \& Kalaycıoğlu, 2013).

### 4.3 Data and Methodology

This chapter is based on field research conducted in Sincan county of Ankara, Turkey's capital city, during July and August in 2013. Among many counties of Ankara, I choose Sincan for two reasons. First, it is one of the biggest industrial centers of Ankara, with two organized industry zones. In comparison to neighboring counties, it is a leading center for services and trade. In other words, there is some employment opportunity for women outside of agriculture; therefore a choice is available, at least in principle, between seeking for paid work and staying at home. Second, it is a relatively conservative settlement ${ }^{3}$ receiving a lot of migration from Central Anatolia, and in this respect I believe it resembles Turkey's country profile better than other counties of Ankara. However, the sample is too small to generalize the findings for the entire urban population in Turkey.

I interviewed employed women in their workplaces and full-time homemakers in their apartments. Semi-structured interviews were guided by thematic questions categorized under five topics: demographic information, current and past economic activity, schooling and employment decisions, government's policies to increase women's employment, and empowerment (use of own income, decision-making in the house, sexual division of labor, gender role attitudes, mental health and self-confidence). ${ }^{4}$ The interviews were audio-recorded with the women's permission and then transcripted. I utilized the purposeful sampling method to reach employed women from different demographic profiles ${ }^{5}$, and the snowball sampling method to reach women

[^29]without jobs, approaching them through their neighbors or acquaintances starting from some key contacts. I interviewed 34 women in total (18 employed, 16 not currently employed). The demographic profiles of interviewees and sample statistics can be found in Appendix A (Tables A6 and A7). Ethics approval for the protection of human subjects was obtained from the University of Massachusetts Amherst Institutional Review Board.

### 4.4 Schooling Decision

Twenty-four women out of the 34 in my sample do not have a high school degree. A few of them actually started high school but did not finish. I asked women without a high school degree why they did not continue their education. Their answers can be classified as follows:

Table 4.1: Reasons Why Women Choose not to Continue Their Education, Women with Less than High School Degree

| Reasons for not continuing education | Number of women |
| :--- | :---: |
| 1. I did not want to | 5 |
| 2. Health problems | 1 |
| 3. Early marriage | 2 |
| 4. Financial difficulties | 2 |
| 5. My father/family did not allow me | 5 |
| 6. There was no school in my home village | 3 |
| Combination of 4 and 5 | 3 |
| Combination of 5 and 6 | 3 |
| Total | 24 |

Women who said that it was their own decision not to continue (reason \#1) generally did not give any specific reason why they stopped after primary or secondary school. They mostly say they do not remember what made them prefer to stay at
managers to interview production workers during the working hours. I was able to interview only two women working in the production. The rest of the employed women either occupy managerial positions or they are responsible for food/tea service and cleaning in the workplaces.
home. As an exception, Şebnem says that she admired her older sisters making doilies ${ }^{6}$ at home. Şule, on the other hand, states that she really does not know, but she regrets it now.

Sinem is among the women who left school because of early marriage. She left secondary school incomplete and married when she was sixteen. She explains that it was not her decision:

No, we did not have any say over it at those times once families decided on the marriage. I learnt that I was engaged fifteen days after getting engaged. [...] I wanted to go to school.
-Sinem, 47, married, service worker

Five women mentioned financial difficulties as an obstacle for them to get further education. Six of them explained that the lack of secondary or high school in their village was the reason. Eleven women stated that their father or family did not allow them to continue. Yelda explains why she stopped after primary school:

Why did not I continue? My father had the mindset that 'girls do not go to school.' He had that mindset at first, and then as his children grew older, he became more open to the idea of girls getting higher levels of education. But since I was the oldest child, that mindset was imposed on me, you know, the idea that I am supposed to 'finish the primary school and stop.' Because of that mindset I became lazier; I did not have the enthusiasm for higher education. Others, my younger siblings, were going to get education. But I have always felt the deficiency of not continuing my education. Material conditions affected as well: one father (single income), four kids, and livelihood hardships...
-Yelda, 32, married, production worker

Feride likewise explains why she stopped after primary school:
What can I say? My father did not send me to school... He did not send me because he was scared that I would find a husband by myself

[^30](laughs). He believed that girls find a husband if they go to school.
-Feride, 39, married, homemaker

Similarly, Melike could not continue after primary school because:
My family did not allow me. They said if a girl goes to school, she becomes more open (she means both physically and mentally), becomes less respectful to her mother and father. That's why they did not send me.
-Melike, 38, married, homemaker

Selma, who quit primary school in her third year, explains:
My father did not send me to school because my teacher was male.
-Selma, 52, married, homemaker

For about half of the women who do not have high school degrees, the education decision was taken by their families, mostly by their fathers. Hence they never actually had the chance to weigh the opportunity cost of getting education versus specializing in homemaking. The under-participation trap hypothesis explains women's decisions not to continue schooling in terms of low returns to education, due to the low expected probability of getting a university degree. Yet many women are simply not in the position to make the decision in the first place. Moreover, most say that they would have chosen to continue their schooling, had it been up to them. Fathers, as decision makers, did not appear to be interested in prospective economic returns, as the women's narratives show. Their decisions instead were shaped by cultural beliefs, concerns about family honor, and attempts to monitor daughters.

In some cases, the interaction between material conditions (namely the lack of schools in villages) and families' conservatism was cited as the main obstacle for women's education. Pelin could not go to high school because:

There was not a high school in our village; we needed to go to the city for school. Nobody was sending his daughter to the city because girls would have needed to take the buses with (male) workers.
-Pelin, 29, married, service worker

For women who have a high school degree, the primary reason for not getting a college degree seems to be marriage. Three of them state that they stopped education because they got married. One woman says that she did not have the opportunity; she failed the general university entrance exam once and could not try again because she needed to support the family. Another left college after her first year, because she realized that she made a wrong choice about her major. ${ }^{7}$ Finally, one woman did not go to college because she did not have a score high enough for her desired major and did not want to go for another major.

### 4.5 Labor Force Participation Decision

### 4.5.1 Freedom to Choose

Eighteen out of the 34 women in my sample are currently working. An additional five have worked at some point in their lives but are not currently working. I asked these 23 women why they decided to take up paid employment. Table 4.2 summarizes their main reasons.

[^31]Table 4.2: Reasons Why Women Decide to Take up Paid Work, Ever-employed Women

| Reasons for taking up paid work (ever-employed women) | Women |
| :--- | :---: |
| 1. I wanted to have social security | 1 |
| 2. For psychological reasons (after divorce) | 2 |
| 3. In order to satisfy my personal needs | 2 |
| 4. To support my family/spouse | 2 |
| 5. I wanted to work/women should work | 2 |
| 6. For my children to get a better education | 1 |
| 7. Survival (after loss of husband's income through death/job loss/divorce) | 3 |
| 8. I was bored after school, I wanted to have an occupation | 2 |
| A combination of 3 and 4 | 6 |
| A combination of 3 and 5 | 1 |
| A combination of 4 and 5 | 1 |
| Total | 23 |

Most of these women were able to make working decisions by themselves without encountering serious objections from their family or spouses. However, five among 23 ever-worked women reported that they had to fight with objections from their families or spouses and eventually convinced them. İpek struggled with her father's objection:

After high school I was looking for jobs. But my father did not allow me to work because I was raised in a small place. Now Yenikent is almost becoming a town, it was like a village. In those times, if a woman wanted to work, she could not even go to bazaar let alone work. [...] One day a highly respected old woman in our village who was cooking for workers in a small firm came to talk to my father. She said to my father, 'This firm is looking for a secretary, let İpek work there. We will go to the workplace together and we will come back together.' My father said no: 'She does not need to work. What is she going to do by working?' Because when a young beautiful woman worked at those times, people would have seen her in a different way. Next morning I left early for the job. There were a lot of fights that day. Then afterwards as I paid our bills and helped with all sorts of expenses, my father became less critical. Now my family is totally supportive. They are happy that I will get retired in ten years and live more comfortably.

İpek, 30, single, accounting supervisor

Berna (29, married, saleswoman) also faced her family's opposition at first but eventually convinced them: "I convinced them by saying that only women come to this store. They came and visited me. They saw that all the customers are woman, so they are harmless." Zehra started to work when her husband lost his job. She had to struggle to have his approval:

I found the job myself with a lot of effort. My husband did not accept. I resisted. It took one year for him to accept but eventually I succeeded. I said I will stand on my own feet and I did. [...] Nobody supported me except my mother. Only she said, 'Go and work my daughter. As long as you work with your namus (honor) nobody can do harm to you.' My mother-in-law and father-in-law had the mindset that women do not work.
-Zehra, 47, married, service worker

Yelda (32, married, production worker) began working when she was about thirteen. Her family supported her decision because they needed money for the education of her younger siblings. When she got engaged, however, her fiancée did not want her to work:

We are working here in the same place with my husband. This is where we have actually met. He had a somewhat conservative mindset. He said 'after the marriage you stay at home, I will take care of you.' I'm not a controllable woman, I never have been. I said I would work. During the engagement process, he insisted that I quit the job. We broke off the engagement. I said 'even my father let me work; he is not a conservative man. I could not continue my education not because he did not let me but because of material conditions. I can easily find a husband like you. I do not want to quit my job.' The separation lasted about ten days. He came after ten days allowing me to work after marriage.

Eleven out of 34 women have never worked outside the home. Only two said that it was their decision not to seek paid work, although one of them explained that her husband's disapproval was the reason why she did not even consider it. Interviews with the remaining nine women revealed that they were deprived of the opportunity to make their own choices. Some of these women are actually so eager to get paid
work that they see employment as a dream that they could never have. When I asked if she ever worked outside the home, Feride answers:

No, it was my only dream. I always wanted to work. Even now I want to work but it is not possible because of children, lack of education, lack of a profession, I don't know. At first, there were family restrictions, and then after marriage there were husband's restrictions. We just accepted to be housewives but I still dream about working. I did not even have a desire to work before marriage, how could I? They did not even let me get an education; they would have never allowed me to work. Can a girl who does not go to school, work? There was no such thing. In fact we were not given such a dream. Then as we grow, it remained as a dream. But I still hope that I will work some day. I don't know when. Children have already grown up I still wait. I don't know what I'm still waiting for. But everybody, even my children, get upset when I bring up the issue.
-Feride, 39, married, homemaker

Nilufer's (33, homemaker) husband wants her to take care of the children but she says that jealousy is the real reason behind his objection: "he is a little jealous; he does not send me out". Husbands' jealousy came up multiple times in the interviews as a constraining factor. It can prevent woman from working even from home, as the case of Selma shows:

He (her husband) did not even allow me to baby-sit in my own housewhy didn't he want me to? 'What if the father comes to pick up the baby when he is not around?' he said. He is very jealous. [...] But I took my revenge; I did not send him abroad (laughs). He wanted to go to Germany to work; I did not let him because he did not allow me to work.
-Selma, 52, married, homemaker

Behind the husbands' jealousy and attempts to control women by imprisoning them to the house, there is the concept of namus (honor). Namus is a "type of sexual honor that presupposes the physical ${ }^{8}$ and moral qualities that women ought to have" (Sever \& Yurdakul, 2001, p. 973). Namus is one of the reasons why fathers or

[^32]husbands feel justified when they exercise full control over women's mobility. The patriarchal control of women's sexual behavior because of jealousy and possessiveness is not unique to Middle Eastern culture, of course. But "namus-related control is substantially more all-encompassing, because it is derived directly from cultural perceptions, expectations, and judgments and is not based on the controlling behavior of an individual man" (Sever \& Yurdakul, 2001, p. 973). Sometimes namus is threatened only by groundless gossip, not even the actual behaviors of women. For example, Berna's family felt threatened by potential male customers coming to the store. İpek understood her father's objection (although did not submit) because "when a young beautiful woman worked at those times, people would have seen her in a different way."

### 4.5.2 Aspirations

In order to understand how they perceive working life and working women, I asked additional questions to the women who have never taken paid employment. As we have seen, the majority of these women are not free to choose. I explored what paid employment would have meant to them, and why they would want to work if they had a chance. I asked them what would have been the biggest difference in their lives if they had a chance to get paid employment. Two main aspirations emerge in their answers. The first is to be economically independent. They find it unpleasant to ask for money or for permission in their purchases. The desire to be able to spend money as they wish also shows that they are economically constrained:

You would have had economic freedom. For instance, you can spend your own money without any problem.
-Aliye, 27, married
You would have had your own money; you would not have to ask your husband. You would have purchased whatever you wanted. This is very important. You would not have been dependent on men.

I would have said 'this is my money.' I would have shown it to everybody and said 'this is my money; I can do anything with this money.'
-Şebnem, 36, married
I don't know, spending without any problem, shopping without problem.
-Feride, 39, married
I don't know, what would have been the big difference? I love my house; I would have bought better furniture.
—Neriman, 25, married

The second aspiration is to provide better living standards for their children. Because of financial constraints, they feel insufficient ability to meet children's needs. The feeling of insufficiency about the children's education is also related to increasing costs of education. Many of them express that they want to send their children to higher quality private schools but cannot afford it. ${ }^{9}$ Moreover, their answers also reveal that children's happiness and future are more important than their own wellbeing for most women.

We would have been more comfortable both financially and mentally. In terms of the children's future, it would have been much better. Right now, my children are going to school. I happily buy one type of school supply, but for the second one I have to think twice whether I can afford it or not.
-Nilüfer, 33, married
I would have helped my children; I would have spent for my grandchildren.
-Selma, 52, married

[^33]I would have purchased everything that my children want. I mean it is very difficult for me, not being able to get what they want. Before getting my own needs, I would have bought everything that they wished for.
—Özge, 39, married

When I asked them what they think about women with jobs in general, they mostly expressed feelings of envy and appreciation:

I admire them a lot.

> —Şebnem, 36, married

I see it as a big accomplishment especially for mothers.
-Aliye, 27, married
They are doing the best thing. They are not dependent on men. We are dependent; we eat if they bring food, we don't if they don't bring. I want my daughter to get education and work. I always tell her 'don't be like me, don't be dependent on your husband.'
-Nilüfer, 33, married
I think they are freer than us. They are more independent and selfconfident. They feel stronger. I mean I'm sure they are stronger than me no matter what kind of job they are doing, how much they earn. I believe they are stronger than me.

Feride, 39, married
What can I think of? Everyone would be happy if she works. I wish I were able to work.
-Ebru, 42, married

There are also women who do not consider earning their own income as a pathway to empowerment, but only an extra source for the family.

I don't know. I don't have a general idea. It is an extra income for the house.
—Neriman, 25, married

The ones who have a more traditional mindset think that women should work but never challenge their husband's main breadwinner role in the house. Özge suggests her daughters to adopt some "wielding and yielding" strategies:

I like working women. They have self-confidence; they can stand on their feet. God forbid if something bad happens to them, they would not lean on anyone. But women should not bring up money issues inside the family. As housewives they should not say to their husbands 'if you earn money, I earn too.' There would be unrest in the house if they do that. I warn my daughters about this. I tell them they should not bring up money issues, even if they earn five thousand liras. Otherwise they would not have a peaceful family.
—Özge, 39, married

The common perception of women who did not have a chance to get paid employment is that employed women are freer, more self-confident, and that they can spend money as they wish. To exercise some degree of independent purchasing power is very appealing to all of them. Some women, however, see women's income as only an extra financial resource for the house without expressing awareness of its emancipatory potential. Some others are actually afraid of that potential, and argue that women's employment should not change the domestic dynamics in the house.

### 4.5.3 Policies to Encourage Women's Employment

During the interviews, I explained to the interviewees my motivation for doing this research. After informing them about three types of policies government has initiated, or plans to initiate in the near future, I asked for their opinions. These policies are as follows:

- Discount in social security payments of employers if they hire women. ${ }^{10}$
- Subsidizing day care for employed women (A 300TL subsidy that goes to private day care centers).

[^34]- Creating part time/flexible jobs for women.

In their responses, subsidizing day care comes to the fore among the three, with an overwhelming support from women. Şule, for instance, argues that it would be the most effective way of encouraging women's employment:

Most of the women with children don't work because they know half of their wages would go the crèches. They say, 'what is the point of working if I spend half of my wage on day care. I would rather take care of my children.' I know because I experienced it myself. [] I thought about working five or six years ago. There was nobody I could leave the children with. If this opportunity was present at the time, perhaps I would have started working then.
—Sule, 32, divorced, service worker
On the other hand, a few of them are not satisfied with the amount of the day care subsidy, and therefore are skeptical that it will work. Aycan complains, "But the crches are not that cheap. I, for instance, wanted to send my child to a private crche, but could not afford it. It is 1300 lira, school bus included. It is a very high quality place." İsmet points out the problem with older age kids: "What are they going to do when the child is over-crche age? They will hire a private baby-sitter; pay that 300 lira to her. What is the point?"

There are different opinions about flexible jobs. Some of them, especially currently working women, think that the part-time jobs would not be attractive enough because of the wages. On the other hand, some others think that it can be a solution for women constrained by their families because of the care work. Nilüfer says, "Not everything is about money. Perhaps it is psychologically easier for a woman, especially with little children, to be able to spend more time at home at the expense of earning less money."

The social security payment arrangement did not elicit many specific comments. However, there was one positive discrimination suggestion that was more direct than the subsidy to employers. Nilüfer suggests putting a quota on workplaces to hire
women: "For instance, they can say that factories need to hire 60 percent women and 40 percent men, they can enforce this for both public and private companies."

A few interesting ideas came up when I asked if they had any other policy suggestions to increase women's participation. Two relatively older employed women, Zehra and Dilek, argue for the elimination of maximum age limit in the new hires. As a widowed woman who had to enter into labor force late, Dilek states, "Any healthy person can work. If they abolish the limit, maybe fewer women would end up being on the streets."

A second group of women, seeing conservative mindset of men as the main obstacle, points out the difficulty of changing mentalities. Ferdane says:

We need to educate men. For instance, when I was young I really wanted to continue my education. But my father did not let me. I'm still regretful about it. I think we really need to educate men. If we can do that, many things can get better.

## -Ferdane, 36, married, security guard

I really don't know. Men rule in Turkey, in our house as well. The majority of men don't want their wives to work. They want her to take care of the kids and the house. They say that is enough for women. I don't know what to say; I think it is all because of men.
-Fahriye, 44, married, homemaker

Another group of women emphasize the necessity of family-work reconciliation policies. Funda wants the state to step up and help private business about paid maternity leave:

All women have worries about it, thinking that 'I'm going to take maternity leave, does it create inconvenience for my company? They are going to think that they are wasting money.' The state can pay some part of the employers' share. And also many women are having trouble when they return after maternity leave. About that, maybe the state can specify a certain time period during which companies have to employ workers after maternity leave. Some companies use maternity leave as an excuse to get rid of workers that they don't want and hire new ones.
-Funda, 33, single, management representative

Elif brings up a brilliant idea for the socialization of childcare:
My personal opinion is that the state should always support working families with children. How? For instance, say an employer pays 180 liras per person as a security payment to the state. It is not all security money; there are some deductions for administrative services, etc. Say only 150 liras is our security money, the rest goes to the deductions. When a person starts to work with insurance, the state could put a minor deduction for childcare as well. Even if it is a small amount, it accumulates and can finance public crèches.
-Elif, 30, single, accounting supervisor

To sum up, women's policy suggestions are centered on three issues. The first and the most important constraint for them is childcare responsibility, which is why they like the idea of day care subsidy. Secondly, several women think that the major problem is conservative mentality of men, and that it is very hard to do something about this. Some call for education, some believe that "women have to go through individual struggles to work" in this cultural context. Finally, they want discrimination based on age to end.

### 4.6 Fertility Decisions: State Intervention in Reproduction

Turkey has been implementing restrictive population policies since the 1960s. However, pro-natalist rhetoric encouraging fertility was introduced by Prime Minister Erdoğan in 2008. Since his first speech on the issue ${ }^{11}$, Erdoğan in various public occasions has aggressively demanded three children from couples to prevent population aging. Against criticisms of interference with private life, Erdoğan presents his demand as a scientifically proven necessity for sustaining economic growth:

According to scientific numbers, having even two children means being in decline. This would never sustain the current situation and we would have an aged population after 2030, not even 2050. If you have three

[^35]children, this will sustain the current situation of Turkey; maintain our population advantage. ${ }^{12}$

At some speeches he uses this powerful language: "I am calling on those sisters who are devoted to our cause. Come; please donate to this nation at least three children." ${ }^{13}$ While the choice of word "donate" is reminiscent of fascism, he also reveals his views on women's role in a society, confining them to the reproductive sphere. The government's intention behind the "at least three children" rhetoric and the goal of keeping the population young has been questioned widely in Turkey's academic circles and among feminist activists.

Sayan (2013) summarizes the main arguments put forward by the supporters of pro-natalist rhetoric as (i) concerns over inadequate labor supply; (ii) boosting domestic demand through population increase; (iii) concerns over increasing public expenditures with rising numbers of elderly; and (iv) decreasing worker-to-retiree ratios in the pay-as-you-go social security system. Supporters are mainly concerned about labor supply. They argue that if the fertility rate does not increase, labor supply will decrease. This argument is based on the assumption that if fertility does not increase above 2 , the working-age population will eventually decrease. This assumption is not wrong, because the fertility rate necessary for population renewal is estimated at 2.1. However, it is not clear why the falling working age population is a problem in a country that cannot create employment for the existing labor supply anyway.

The demographic window of opportunity is still open in Turkey. Hoşgör and Tansel (2010) estimate that Turkey's working age population will reach its maximum in 2041, and afterward will start to diminish. In order to benefit from the demographic window

[^36]of opportunity, however, a country must create sufficient employment for the workingage population and invest in health and education. Turkey, on the contrary, has very high unemployment rates ( $9.7 \%$ in 2013) despite the low labor force participation rates $(50.9 \% \text { in } 2013)^{14}$, and approximately $40 \%$ of the working age population are employed in low quality informal jobs that do not require higher levels of education.

Moreover, in their concerns about the possible lack of labor supply, supporters of the "at least three children" rhetoric seem to (purposely or not) ignore the fact that the labor supply is not only determined by working-age population. Increasing labor force participation especially for women could be a better and also costless way of increasing labor supply. Another potential supply of labor could be the still ongoing rural to urban migration, since approximately 24 percent of the population still lives in rural areas.

The argument that higher population is better for domestic demand is also not convincing, because purchasing power essentially determines domestic demand. An increasing population with joblessness and in poverty would not necessarily increase domestic demand. Finally, concerns over social security system and pension deficits are justified to a certain extent, but it is not clear how increasing fertility will solve these problems in the long run. Supporters of the "at least three children" rhetoric see rising fertility as a solution to the decline in active-passive ratios. However, one of the important factors creating pension deficits is low compliance with pension laws due to the large number of unregistered workers. In a country where informal employment is estimated to constitute about 40 percent of total employment, trying to solve pension crisis through population increase is absurd (Sayan, 2013).

[^37]Moreover, there is empirical evidence that a rise in fertility might well increase dependency ratios in future years. In a quantitative model of economic growth and demographic change, Attar (2013) analyzes the effects of an exogenous upward shift in fertility rates in case the pro-natalist rhetoric of Erdoğan becomes successful in persuading people to have more children. According to his findings, technological progress will be the main source of growth in Turkey until the end of this century. Even under an increasing rate of technological progress, "a permanent upward shift in births per capita to its 1995 leveloccurring in 2015would imply a signicantly lower level of output per capita, a remarkably higher level of dependent population, and a persistently low level of the share of the working-age population for many decades" (Attar, 2013).

There is a belief among many economists that fertility decisions of families are subject to more or less a personal cost-benefit analysis, and would not be affected by rhetoric. Even if pro-natalist rhetoric is institutionalized by monetary incentives to encourage fertility ${ }^{15}$, only poor families would respond to such incentives. This would create an increase in only unskilled labor supply.

Setting aside the discussion of whether encouraging fertility would improve Turkey's economic situation, there is another important dimension of the "at least three children" rhetoric that concerns feminists. Together with the recent attack on abortion rights, this rhetoric is seen as a disturbing intervention in private life. In terms of its repercussions for women's labor force engagement, having three children clearly would lower women's labor force participation and attachment in the absence of better work-family reconciliation policies.

In this part of my study I explore women's perceptions and their responses to Erdoğan's "at least three children" rhetoric. Conducting the fieldwork in Sincan made

[^38]the results of this analysis more interesting for two reasons. First, it is a district where the Justice and Development Party (AKP) voters predominate. In other words, more women are likely to be Erdoğan's "sisters who are devoted to our cause." Second, the majority of women whom I interviewed belong to the low-income group that is more likely to respond to fertility-increasing incentives. Despite their sympathy with the AKP and Erdoğan - as revealed directly by some of them, and indirectly from their answers to political participation questions for some others - the majority of women do not like the idea of having three children. Many say that they did not understand why the prime minister was demanding three children, and that he had no right to call for this under the current economic conditions of Turkey. When I asked what they think of Erdoğan's call, twelve women out of the 34 said they agree with Erdoğan. Twenty-two women, on the other hand, opposed the idea that three children is ideal. The main reason behind their opposition was the inadequacy of material conditions to support three children. Moreover, women reacted to the ignorance of the prime minister to the material conditions:

I don't agree. A person cannot take care of only one child under current conditions. How is she supposed to look after three?
-Dilek, 42, widowed, production worker
How much did he raise the minimum wage? What about the wages of retirees? He only speaks for his own good. [...] He wants a young population, but he does not create employment opportunities. People don't have regular incomes. You get an education, but it doesn't mean anything. [...] Let me speak honestly our prime minister, thanks to him, is ruling very well (sarcastic). It is only sunny for them. He destroyed the lower classes. He doesn't want us to survive.
-Sinem, 47, married, service worker

As Sinem points out, unemployment among young and educated people has been increasing. The unemployment rate among university graduates was $10.1 \%$ in 2012 ( $7.2 \%$ for men, $14.7 \%$ for women), and the unemployment rate for youth, aged 15-24,
was $17.5 \%$ ( $16.3 \%$ for men and 19.9 for women). ${ }^{16}$ Feride also emphasizes the lack of job opportunities:

I don't agree. He says three children. I'm a housewife, I really want to work but what kind of job can I do? There is also this problem. What kind of job can he give to me? How am I going to take care of my children? I cannot give birth to three just because the prime minister wants that. I mean everybody wants something from us.
-Feride, 39, married, homemaker
I mean I'm really curious what kind of illusion Tayyip is in. Does he think that we earn wages around 8-10 thousand so that we can hire private baby sitters? [...] I would support him if he says there will be public day care centers for working women or crches are free. I would give birth to five if he provides those.
-İpek, 30, single, accounting supervisor

Some of the opposing women actually reveal a preference for many children for different reasons, such as the benefits of solidarity between siblings, but they note the "impossibility" of caring for three children under their current conditions.

Yes one should have three children. We are four siblings, there is nothing like a sibling. But these conditions do not allow one woman and one man to have three children. A child going to crèche has more needs than you. I want my daughter to go to a private college. I cannot afford it even for one child. My total wage would not cover her college expenses.
-Yelda, 32, married, production worker
Prime minster is right. I have one son and one daughter. I want another daughter because having a sister is very important; my sister supports me a lot. But I cannot believe that I would be able to support another child financially under current conditions. I also don't feel strong enough to become a mother again.
-Pelin, 29, married, service worker

Only two women explicitly question the legitimacy of such an intervention to private life, and say that is none of the prime minister's business:

[^39]It is ridiculous. A woman should become mother, that is fine but this is clearly an obstacle for a working life. Moreover If I want to, I give birth to three, five, whatever; it is none of his business.
-Ceylan, 37, divorced, sales assistant
He is tactless, this is pure tactlessness, there is no other explanation. In the past, Süleyman Demirel ${ }^{17}$ was also making fertility suggestions saying, 'Children you will give birth to today will demand school in seven years so don't give birth to too many.' That was wrong too. This is just more annoying because he is a tactless man. He is concerned with population aging. But instead of making plans and initiating incentives, he gives orders without planning or taking some precautions. It is nonsense.
-Funda, 33, single, management representative

It is not surprising that those who express anger because they see this rhetoric as an attack to their privacy and command on their bodies are women who have a university education. On the other hand, there are women in my sample who support Erdoğan's rhetoric for ideological reasons. They are "the sisters devoted to" his cause. They give the impression that they would support anything that he advocates:

It makes sense. I think it makes sense because it really makes sense. Why? Yeah future is uncertain, everything is becoming more chaotic but if the number of "ours" (she means children of people who think like them) increases, there would be order.

When I ask her why she thinks prime minister is asking for three children, she says:

I really don't know, perhaps he knows the future better. I mean we really love our prime minister, may Allah bless him. Even my husband always sees him in his dreams. That is how much he loves him.
-Berna, 29, married, saleswoman

[^40]Ferdane is among the women who did not hesitate to express her support for the AKP. She is the only woman in the sample who wants to engage actively in politics. She wants to become a member of the AKP. She says, "I fully support him. More children are good for our country." When I remind her possibility of that many children being unemployed under current conditions, she replies:

That is fine, they can be unemployed. If you think that way, then Africa should not have any population.
-Ferdane, 36, married, security guard

Erdoğan did not explain the reasons behind his rhetoric to the public very well. He just made some vague explanations about the necessity of population growth. Without knowing much about population dynamics, people associate the three children rhetoric with fear about declining population. Nineteen women in my sample said that the reason behind the prime minister's call is declining fertility. They have the general opinion that higher population growth is better, although they mostly cannot explain in what sense higher population growth is better. Or as we see in some examples above, they have a nave belief that "the prime minister must know what he is doing." For instance, Aycan made a guess about gaining strength militarily as against Kurdish guerillas. When I ask why the prime minister wants three children she says:

I don't know, maybe to outweigh terrorists in numbers.
-Aycan, 28, married, homemaker

İpek is confused too:
Why does he want three children? Perhaps he will employ them or maybe he sees them as potential voters for the AKP. But when there is so much unemployment, it does not make sense. I really don't know.
-İpek, 30, single, accounting supervisor

Feride is very angry with the nationalist content of this rhetoric:
Why does prime minister call for three children? He recruits our son to martyr. Our daughter is for reproduction. They are for the homeland. He wants more children for the sake of the nation. [...] Let me tell you one thing, I don't understand mothers either. They say, 'Long live the homeland' when their sons become a martyr. I have two children. Once my children are dead, damn this nation!
-Feride, 39, married, homemaker
There are also women who see this rhetoric as part of the ruling party's conservative attempts to strengthen the traditional division of labor by confining women to the home:

I think they don't want women to work because they have a religious mentality.
-Ceylan, 37, divorced, sales assistant

To sum up, as seen in their testimonies, the majority of women in my sample do not like Erdoğan's rhetoric of at least three children. They rightly point out economic difficulties of raising three children under current economic conditions. Working women especially emphasize the lack of public care provisioning to support such a demand. Furthermore, some argue that the intention behind this rhetoric is actually to keep women in their homes following a hidden religious-conservative agenda. It remains to be seen whether Erdoğan's "at least three children" rhetoric will have a noticeable effect on fertility decisions in Turkey. However, my limited number of interviews in Sincan does not confirm such an expectation.

### 4.7 Paid Work and Empowerment

### 4.7.1 Use of Own Income

An obvious starting point for a discussion of empowerment through paid work is control over women's wages and management of the family income. In this part, I explore women's ability to exercise control over their own income. Do the incomes merge
into a common pool to be redistributed according to a Beckerian welfare maximization principle under the management of a "benevolent dictator"? Or does a "malevolent patriarch" (Kabeer, 2002) appropriate women's incomes? How conflictual or consensual is the redistribution process in the household? Beyond the issue of control, the question of choice and what difference women's incomes make to their lives is also interesting in terms of transformatory potential of employment. Therefore, I analyze if women are able to use their own income or pooled family income according to their allocative priorities. Additionally, I investigate the meanings women attach to their income and how they value what they accomplish with their income. Finally, I compare employed women's perceptions of their contribution to the family with full-time homemakers' self-perceptions.

Income pooling is common among married couples. Out of the eighteen employed women in my sample, eight of them (seven of whom are married) reported that there is full income pooling in the household. The remaining ten women say that they had full control over their income. Only three of these ten women are married, the rest being single (4), widowed (1), or divorced (2). Single and divorced women living with their families are usually contributing to the family expenses. For instance, Ceylan, living with her parents after divorce, is taking care of her brother's expenses which amount to one-fourth of her wage. Since they say that the amount or shape of their contributions is all up to them, we can assume that they have full control of their income.

The interviews provide some clear examples of how class position determines the liberating potential of paid work. For instance, Dilek's experience with work is in sharp contrast with Emine's experience, due to their different backgrounds and class positions. They are working at the same factory in food processing industry, occupying different positions. Dilek's entrance to the labor market after the death of her husband can be seen as a distressed sale of labor. Emine chose to work when she
decided not to continue her university education. Dilek is the head of a household with two children making a little above monthly minimum wage, 1000TL whereas, Emine who also has two children, lives in a household with a total income of 5000 TL . Both women have total control of their income. However, when I ask if they could keep some portion of it to spend according to their own will, Dilek explains:

I can hardly have money for cigarettes as a special expense for myself. Very occasionally I buy trousers or a pair of shoes. This is really my situation. Because I have a young daughter, thanks to her when we go for shopping, she says, 'I want this I want that.' I can never have a chance to think of myself. But I know she only demands what she needs. She does not have anything either. It is not like she is spoiled.
-Dilek, 42, widowed, production worker

Living on a survival basis, she does not have any savings. Besides the economic vulnerability, she complains about her family's pressure and difficulties of being a "widowed woman". When I ask if she likes her job, after listing some good and bad aspects of it, she says she "has to be satisfied." Coming from a poor family, she does not have anybody to take care of her and her children. Emine, on the contrary, comes from a wealthy family. She is "free" to spend all of her income for herself. She answers the same question as follows:

It depends. I can spend all of it on myself. It would not be a problem. I mean I can spend my husband's money on myself. He would not ask what I'm spending on. He says, 'it is up to you, you can do whatever.' Everything is on me, our house, car [...] For instance when I inherited some property after the death of my parents, he did not even ask what exactly I inherited. We don't talk about money.
-Emine, 41, married, treasurer

Although Dilek has a difficult life, working means more than generating income for her. When she compares her life before and after the death of her husband, she clearly has a preference for her current status. Here is her assessment of the current situation:

Now I don't have any interference. I mean I don't know, I'm a social person; I can easily establish relationships. It was not like this. Trust me. The way I dressed, my attitude, everything has changed. I was closed to home. I would only go to the garden of the house. I could not go anywhere else. He (her husband) would not let me. Even if he did there was no money, I was not dressing well. I was living with my relatives' old clothes. [...] Now I have my own money, my own budget. I don't have to plead for anything. I go everywhere myself, I can take care of my own stuff.

It seems like the disappearance of one of the strongest elements of patriarchal control in her life led to increased agency and self-confidence. In that sense, despite the hardships of working life, she feels empowered.

Zehra, one of the two other married women who say they have full control of their income, is spending all of her wage on her son's education. She states proudly, "I devoted my wage to him, I work for him." I asked how important does she think her contribution is to the household. Here is her assessment: "It is very important. How happy am I if I can give education to my child without asking anyone's favor. My husband would not do it because it is difficult to afford with one wage. But I said I will work and educate my son." When I asked how her family members value her contribution, she states, "My husband says my work doesn't do any benefit to him, but sometimes he appreciates and says we could not educate our child without me."

Yelda argues that income pooling is necessary to sustain a marriage:
Of course I don't put some money on the side for myself. How would a marriage continue otherwise? It is impossible to survive with one person's wage nowadays anyway. [...] Everybody knows what he is supposed to do. My husband pays for the rent, utilities and food. I spent all my income on my daughter's education and my own needs.
-Yelda, 32, married, production worker

When I ask if she is happy with her job, she replies that "one has to be satisfied because of living conditions even if she does not like," and explains why she is not happy about working:

As a woman, especially if you are married, you have a lot of responsibilities. You have to wake up early, take care of your child; you have to leave her somewhere/someone during the day. In the evening you have to take care of her and do all the housework. All women have to do these things but we, working women, have double burden. Plus we feel guilty about leaving our child alone. It is very difficult to be a working woman especially if she is not educated, not having a certain status with a lot of benefits.

She evaluates her contribution to the household as "very important," but mostly emphasizes her role as a mother. She complains that her husband does not appreciate her financial help:

Husbands usually don't appreciate women's contributions. I observe this with my colleagues and friends as well. They usually say, 'What do you earn anyway.' In other words, for men your income is not important even if you earn a lot and you really help them financially.

Most of the employed women have a more or less important voice in the management of family income even in cases of full income pooling. They take initiative in children's health and education at least. There were three exceptions in my sample, however. Three women literally hand in their salaries to the husbands and ask for pocket money when they need it:

I don't take anything out of my wage but I take money from my husband every month for my personal expenses (around 100TL).
-Ferdane, 36, married, security guard
I give all of my salary to my husband because we have debtsBut even before the debts, I have never used it on myself. I take maybe 50TL for cigarettes.
-Pelin, 29, married, service worker
I give my salary to him (her husband) and he gives me 50TL thinking that I might need it.
-Berna, 29, married, saleswoman

Ferdane and Berna have recently started to work and they are quite happy about working. For instance, Berna states that working has other benefits besides creating extra income for the family. She feels healthier both mentally and physically now, because staying at home "drains a person." On the other hand, Pelin continues working out of necessity; she actually wants to stay at home to take care of her children. Before her current service job in a food factory, she has done different kinds of jobs, including piecework from home and domestic work. She feels tired and guilty about not devoting her energy to the training of her children. When I ask about her husband's opinion, she says reproachfully, "My husband always wanted me to work for whatever reason, even when I did not want to." In her case, working is an unwelcome obligation, lacking most of the empowering features associated with paid employment.

The majority of employed women, without hesitation, state that their contribution to the family is extremely important. Only three of the eighteen say that their contribution is only somewhat important. On the other hand, full-time homemakers are more hesitant to think and express that their domestic labor is important: eleven of the sixteen state that their contribution is very important, and five are not sure. For instance, Aliye tends to undervalue her domestic labor saying, "It is just usual work that needs to be done." Her husband thinks the same way, apparently: "He doesn't appreciate my contribution; he thinks that it is stuff that needs to be done, nothing special." Nilüfer, mother of three little children, is not sure either:"I don't know, I guess it is important." Similarly, Aynur says: "I don't know, you should ask my husband." It is interesting to learn that their sons, if not husbands, tend to degrade their labor in the household. Şebnem's son, for instance, asks "what do you do except from cleaning the house? It does not get dirty every day anyway." Nazife's husband accepts the importance of her contribution, saying, "My wife is the minister of internal affairs," but her children do not think that she is "useful."

To sum up, employed women tend to think that their contribution is more crucial to the family. This is mostly due to invisibility of housework and lack of recognition on the side of men. Moreover, as we will see in the next section, employed women, while earning at least as much as their husbands in some cases, do all the housework work without even symbolic help from their husbands. Even after accepting this double burden, they feel that their husbands do not appreciate their contributions.

### 4.7.2 Sexual Division of Labor

The empowering potential of paid work is directly related to whether it creates any major shift in intra-household power inequalities by challenging the sexual division of labor. In this part, I first examine whether there is any substantial difference between employed women and full-time homemakers in sharing household responsibilities with their husbands. Then I analyze their perceptions, to what extent they internalize cultural norms that put the burden of housework solely on women, and their expectations.

There are ten married employed women and fourteen married homemakers in my sample. Six of the employed women reported that they are fully responsible for the domestic chores, cooking cleaning and childcare without any help from their husbands. Two employed women said that their husbands help in all three of these chores, although they themselves take the main responsibility. Finally, one employed woman stated that her husband helps in cleaning and childcare but that cooking is her responsibility. Among fourteen homemakers, only three said their husbands help in cleaning and one in childcare as well. Husbands usually do all the repair work around the house, although there are two exceptions in the sample. One employed woman and one homemaker take on all the responsibilities, including maintenance of the house. Couples either do the grocery shopping together or men take care of that.

Although there are some differences between working women and homemakers in sharing household chores with their husbands, it is obvious that working wives still take disproportionate responsibility. When it comes to their views about the ideal division of labor, almost all women, with one exception, argue that men should help with the housework. I asked which household chores they would like to be helped with. Many of them expect only symbolic help from their husbands, not necessarily getting him involved in "serious" housework. For instance, nobody said that men should help with childcare. They want to feel the "togetherness" in the household duties. But even that seems like a dream to some women. After an unhappy marriage,

Dilek explains what she expects from a husband:
I always had a dream. Since I did not really enjoy my marriage because of fights and poverty, I imagine a marriage where my husband helps me. For instance, I'm making the soup in the kitchen I would really love that if he makes a salad. I mean staying with me in the kitchen, giving me the tomato paste, soaking the rice. [...] These are not difficult things to do for a man. It is really nice, isn't it? Doing things together? I always have this dream.
-Dilek, 42, widowed, production worker

Similarly, Yeliz says:
He can make the dinner table, make the salad, or hang the curtains. He can help in certain things.
-Yeliz, 48, married, service worker

Not only do they not help with chores, some men do not even take care of their basic needs, as we see in the example of Zehra:

I was not working in the past, doing everything around the house. He got used to that. Now he does not even go and get one glass of water for himself. For instance, I make tea and we drink together. He could at least put the teapot on the oven. We could go to the bazaar together, do the shopping together. But he gets bored; he doesn't do it.
-Zehra, 47, married, service worker

On one hand, women argue that husbands should help them because "life is for sharing," but on the other hand, they only expect some minor duties from men such as making tea, setting the dinner table or making salad. Either they believe that a fair distribution of household chores is impossible knowing their husbands, or they might see some things as "women's work." They may be simply afraid of the conflict that would arise if they ask for more substantial help. Berna explains why she does not ask for more:

Yes, he should help. But since he is also working, it is difficult to say something. For instance, we are setting the dinner table. I want to eat on the kitchen table, he wants to carry everything to the living room and eat in front of the TV. I say, 'if that is the case, then carry some things, bring the bread or water.' But no, I do everything. I sometimes say 'enough! I'm also working like you.' He does not say anything; he stays quiet. Someone else would perhaps say bad things but my husband only stays silent.
-Berna, 29, married, saleswoman

She is grateful that at least her husband does not get angry when she wants some help. Based on the experiences of married women in my sample, it is clear that employed women face a double burden. To a large extent, the traditional division of labor is not challenged by the women's income or working status. In that sense, the empowering potential of employment seems to be quite limited.

### 4.7.3 Decision Making in the Household

To analyze whether paid work gives women more voice and decision-making power, I explore how household decisions are made with regard to women's own health, large important purchases such as a house or car, small everyday purchases, and children's education, health, and marriages. Single, divorced or widowed women who live alone take all their decisions by themselves. Single and divorced women who live with their parents seem to have substantial voice, but usually decisions are taken together with the family. To what extent their opinions count might depend on their age.

For instance, İnci (24), living with her divorced mother and younger brother, makes a substantial financial contribution to the family. Her mother takes most of the decisions although İnci's opinion is always asked. İpek (30) on the other hand, having been working a longer time and providing even the basic needs of her family, seems to have more decision making power, especially with regard to household purchases.

The biggest difference between employed and unemployed wives is the decision to work outside, as I have discussed before. Among ten employed wives, a majority took the decision to work by themselves. Among the homemakers, on the other hand, there are a few women who chose not to seek employment freely, as the majority reported that had to go along with their husbands' choice. Moreover, it is not only their husbands making that decision; sometimes their children have a say over it too. That is the case for Fahriye, for instance: "Even my children would not let me work; neither my husband nor my children would allow me". It is common for women (both employed and unemployed) to take family-related decisions together with their spouses. Five out of ten employed married women state that they decide together on all issues. One, Pelin, says that her husband takes decisions related to purchases, while she makes most of the decisions about the children. The rest of the employed wives seem to actually have more decision power than their husbands, especially about their own health and children's education and health. Emine states that she has the last word about everything.

Five of the fourteen full-time homemakers take decisions regarding the children by themselves, while all the other decisions are made jointly with their husbands. Among the rest, there are examples like Ebru, who says, "We decide together, but his word is more important," or Fahriye and Ismet, whose husbands decide on the big purchases. Nazlı and İsmet, living with extended family, state that their opinion is asked but they participate less actively in decision-making processes. Taking the
advantage of old age, Selma decides on everything: "I rule, taking all the decisions, about purchases and everything. Nobody can say anything."

Women's narratives suggest that another clear difference between employed women and full-time homemakers emerges in decision-making regarding large purchases. Being financially dependent limits the decision making power of housewives; the men have the final say, as Ebru explains: "We (with children) cannot buy if my husband says no; we do if he says yes." However, the need to get husbands' approval in purchases might be felt by employed women as well. Yelda argues that women, somehow, always have to convince their husbands for the purchases:

Women always have to convince their husbands in big purchases. This is the case whether you work or not. Even if you pay for it with your own money, you have to convince the men first. My husband is not a difficult person. I'm very thrifty; I don't waste money. If I need something really important, he would always support me. But I always ask to him, as a formality, 'I can pay for it but would you help if I need?'
-Yelda, 32, married, production worker

To sum up, paid work empowers women by giving them greater say over decisionmaking in the household. At least, men do not have the final say over anything related to family needs. Moreover, in almost every case, we see active participation of women in the decision-making. For full-time homemakers, "taking decisions together" might mean husbands getting their wives' opinion in some cases. Furthermore, being the breadwinner might lead men to take important financial decisions themselves.

### 4.7.4 Mental Health and Self-Confidence

Another set of empowerment indicators relates to women's health and self-esteem. Table 4.3 reports the differences between working women and housewives with regard to these indicators. Employed women seem to be doing better BY almost all of them. The largest differences emerge in experiencing insomnia, losing self-confidence, being hopeful about future, and feeling respected enough.
Table 4.3: Indicators of Mental Health and Self-Esteem

|  | Employed Women |  |  |  | Full-time home makers |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Yes | No | Sometimes/ Somewhat | DK | Yes | No | Sometimes/ Somewhat | DK |
| Having insomnia | 4 | 10 | 4 |  | 10 | 3 | 3 |  |
| Not given importance by | 3 | 11 | 4 |  | 4 | 10 | 1 | 1 |
| Not feeling strong to deal with problems | 2 | 5 | 11 |  | 5 | 7 | 4 |  |
| Loosing self-confidence |  | 11 | 7 |  | 3 | 7 | 5 | 1 |
| Being satisfied with life | 16 | 1 | 1 |  | 13 | 3 |  |  |
| Being respected enough | 16 |  | 2 |  | 8 | 3 | 4 | 1 |
| Feeling successful in life | 14 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 4 | 1 |  |
| Being able deal with undesirable situations | 14 | 2 | 2 |  | 13 | 1 | 2 |  |
| Being hopeful about future | 15 | 1 | 2 |  | 9 | 1 | 3 | 3 |
| Control over life | 8 | 4 | 6 |  | 6 | 4 | 6 |  |

Insomnia might be expected to be more common among employed women due to stress. Surprisingly, housewives reported that suffer more from it in various degrees. Some attribute it to "thinking too much," although three explained that they were having insomnia at the time of interview because of pregnancy. The majority of employed women are hopeful about future. Some of them are looking forward to being retired. Zehra says, "İnşallah (if god permits) I'm hopeful. How happy am I if I can get retired with health." Those who are somewhat hopeful are not concerned for themselves, saying "what can I hope for myself at this age anyway," but think of their children. Most of the worries about the future among homemakers are related to their material conditions and economic vulnerability. Living on her husband's minimum wage with three children, Nilüfer explains: "I feel insecure; it is uncertain what will happen to us. We might be better off once children grow up. But I'm not sure even for that at these times." There are also other kinds of vulnerabilities. Melike is hopeful about future "a little bit" because of her relationship with her husband; faintheartedly she mentions her husband's pressure and violence "at times" in a few words. ${ }^{18}$

The majority of women in my sample consider themselves successful in life even if they do not have a job. They do justice to themselves, saying that they are successful "under their own conditions". Not having enough education is the major reason why others do not find themselves successful:

I could not be successful because I could not get education. I mean I did not have anything since I did not have education. I have such a deficiency.
-Ferdane, 36, security guard, secondary school

[^41]I failed to realize some of my dreams especially about my education. But things happened independent from me; I could not go to university although I passed the entrance exam. [...] I was taking care of my sister at that time. The university was out of the city; I could not go.
-Arzu, 34, secretary, university (2 years)
I have not been successful in some things. If I had education I was not going to be in this position.
-Nazlı, 24, homemaker, high school incomplete
I mean I'm not successful as long as I can't read. I've always felt regretful about it. No matter how successful I say I am, I can't go anywhere or do anything as long as I can't read.
-Ebru, 42, homemaker, primary school (but illiterate)

Pelin thinks that the lack of education is behind her general weaknesses:
I should have got education. I really should have because I don't know; I mean I have actually a strong personality to improve myself with education.
-Pelin, 29, service worker, secondary school

She is not satisfied with her life:

I don't want to be in this life. I don't know, ok I agree that women should participate in every sphere of life. But a woman can only stand on her feet if she gets education. Working women without education are doomed to be oppressed. You come to work but your mind is at home, worrying about children. The state doesn't provide crèche to women who are working as laborers.

When I ask if she feels strong enough to deal with unexpected circumstances, she says, "I did so far, but I'm a very cowardly woman behind all these conversations."

Women's regrets are mainly about education, where as we saw in the first section, most of them were constrained by their families. They did not have a real choice. There are also other types of regrets. Getting married young, and especially living with the extended family at the beginning of the marriage, weakens the women's
position in the house. Şebnem (36, homemaker) blames herself for not being resistant enough to her husband's family: "I had a lot of failures. I could have succeeded in some things by myself. But I think I could not...For example, I let my husband's family oppress me."

On the other hand, there are highly self-confident women, not employed, such as Özge (39) who states, "Yes, I'm very successful. I'm a housewife but there has been nothing I could not succeed at so far." She is very hopeful about future, too. When I ask if she is also hopeful about her daughters' future, she reveals the secrets of her happiness, so to speak:

I'm hopeful. Their future would be good if they become as altruistic and devoted as me. I'm a very altruistic mother and wife. That is why we have peace and order in our family; all the beauties belong to me. If I was not like this, I'm sure we were not going to be so peaceful. I know very well how to take the line of least resistance when my husband is angry. If I was not like this, perhaps there were going to be big fights or even violence.

I asked what if her daughters get oppressed:
Of course I don't want them to get oppressed. But they should be aware of their womanhood. As a woman, they should know their place.

She defines the place of women as somewhat inferior to men, but she takes pride in maintaining a relationship if necessary with sacrifices. This is what is traditionally expected from women. But it is interesting to see features that are believed to put women in a weaker position in the family such as altruism, make her feel stronger and controlling.

In other cases, however, altruism makes women feel absolutely powerless. Drawing on a question from World Values Survey ${ }^{19}$, I asked them to what extent they are able to control their life. Feride replies to that question saying, "No way, I don't have

[^42]control. I don't live for myself". More interestingly, sometimes control means to take excessive responsibility with various kinds of altruisms and facing with more than a double burden, as in the case of Yelda who sacrificed her education and started working for her siblings in the past:

I've always kept the control of my life in my hand. I was like this during my childhood, my teenager years. I got married I'm still controlling. I like taking responsibility. But this really makes me tired sometimes. I take my husband's responsibility, my child's, my family's, and my sister's. I shoulder these responsibilities because I like being in the driving seat.
-Yelda, 32, married, production worker

In other words, these empowerment indicators reveal some differences among employed women and homemakers with respect to agency, self-confidence, satisfaction and self-respect. However, a crude comparison based on their yes/no answers might hide some more complex phenomena. Altruism may become a condition of being at peace with oneself. It can be defined as the condition of being a successful mother or wife, if those are the most important self-defining identities. The ability to exercise control might result in getting overwhelmed with excessive responsibilities instead of feeling stronger. The limitations of the rational choice framework used by economists become even more evident in these cases. Nancy Folbre argues that as a result of social organization of childcare, "women may have a less 'bounded' concept of themselves than men, a greater propensity for interdependent utilities, even altruism" (1994, p. 26). If that is the case, bargaining outcomes favor men even when women have same economic resources. Moreover, having a greater propensity for interdependent utilities is usually something learnt since their early ages for women as we see from Özge's suggestions to her daughters.

### 4.7.5 Gender Role Attitudes

Attitudes can be important indicators of people's tendencies to respond to the opportunities and constraints they face (Scott, Alwin \& Braun, 1996). Here I explore
the relationship between women's employment status and their attitudes towards paid work. I asked three questions about the perceived consequences of employment.

Table 4.4 presents women's opinions.

Table 4.4: Women's Opinions on the Consequences of Paid Work for the Family

| Employed women |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | Full-time homemakers |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Agree | Disagree | Depends | Agree | Disagree | Depends |  |  |  |
| A working mother can- <br> not maintain as close and <br> warm a relationship with <br> her children as a housewife <br> mother | 10 | 7 | 1 | 14 | 2 | 0 |  |  |  |
| It is not important for <br> women to have their own | 1 | 16 | 1 | 1 | 15 | 0 |  |  |  |
| source of income for self- <br> dependency |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Wife's being involved in <br> market activity outside the <br> household affects relation- <br> ship with husband nega- <br> tively | 1 | 17 | 0 | 6 | 7 | 3 |  |  |  |

One question generated overwhelming support among both employed women and housewives. Almost all of them think that it is important to have their own income for self-dependence. On the other hand, İpek, the only working woman who said it was not that important, has a preference for motherhood:

People usually barely survive with a minimum wage. That's why wives are also working. They would not need to work if husbands made enough. [...] This is my opinion. I would not work today if my husband (hypothetical) earned enough. Because I'm already 30, I would like to see every moment of my child.
-İpek, 30, single, accounting supervisor

The vast majority of employed women do not think that the relationship with the spouse is affected by women's employment. Some of them even argue that it might
have a positive impact. Funda, for instance, states that "staying at home all the time would have a negative impact on marriage, a woman must be engaged in some things outside the home." However, homemakers are less likely to think that way. Those who experience conflict about the decision to work believe that women's employment creates trouble in the family. Some of them are ambivalent, and think that it should not create a problem if "women do not raise their voice". Women should not "bring up money issues and oppress men" if they do not want trouble. Another condition is providing men with the same comfort level. As Ebru says:

For most of them, the relationship is affected because men complain, saying, 'Since you work, you can't take care of me.' But in some cases it may not affect. Some men say, 'You can work only if you don't reduce my care.'
-Ebru, 42, married, homemaker

The biggest attitudinal difference between employed women and homemakers is in their perceptions of good motherhood. Only two women without jobs think that employed women can have a close relationship with their children. Many of them cited the time constraint as the main obstacle, and argued that even if working mothers want to and try hard, it is impossible to be as close as full-time mothers. Priorities might differ as well, as Ebru argues, "she would be attached to her job, while we are attached to our kids." Some employed women share the same view, also emphasizing the time constraint. Drawing from her experience with her working mother, Ceylan argues that emotional attachment is weaker because of being absent at the most special moments of the child. On the other hand, others emphasize the quality of time spent together:

I don't believe in that. Why? The quality of the relationship is important. Instead of being a mother who stays with children all day without really taking care of them, listening to them, spending good times with them, I would prefer to spend one hour of good quality after the dinner. That might make me a more caring mother.
-Yelda, 32, married, production worker
I don't agree. Perhaps I have more control over my children's lives than a woman staying at home because I have a more regular life. I have to prepare the meals from night, do the cleaning in the weekend. A normal mother staying at home might be waking up at around 10-11am without knowing what her kid is doing in the living room. I wake up earlier than them; prepare the breakfast, then I go to work. I would know what my child is eating or what he is doing.
-Emine, 41, married, treasurer

Treas and Widmer (2000) identify three different attitude regimes with respect to balancing motherhood and employment, based on cross-country studies of value surveys: "work oriented," "family accommodating," and "motherhood centred." Turkey is not in their sample. But my findings, although from a very limited sample, give some hints of presence of a "motherhood centred" regime. The majority of employed women agree with the first statement, and the feelings of guilt (of not being a good enough mother) are quite widespread among them.

In addition to attitudes towards employment, I analyze if there are any differences in cultural values between working women and housewives with two additional questions. I explore the extent to which son preference is prevalent, and their views on marriage.

Table 4.5: Son Preference and Ideas on Marriage Type

|  | Employed women | Full-time homemakers |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| If you had only one child, would you prefer it to be a boy or a girl? |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Son | 4 | 1 |
| Daughter | 9 | 13 |
| Indifferent | 5 | 2 |
|  |  |  |
| How do you think marriage should be arranged? |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Arranged marriage | 4 | 5 |
| Love marriage | 14 | 11 |

There is no general son preference among either employed women or homemakers. On the contrary, there is a clear daughter preference, as Table 4.5 shows. According to Kağıtçıbaşı's (2007) family change theory, son preference in Turkish society disappeared through the course of social change and industrialization in the recent three decades. As material interdependencies within the family were replaced by emotional interdependencies, the economic value of children as a form of old-age security diminished. Families started to value daughters more.

Arranged marriages are still common in conservative families in Turkey. More than employment status, whether or not they themselves had an arranged marriage seems to be important in determining women's opinions about it. Three of the employed women and all five of the homemakers who said arranged marriage is better had gone through it themselves. Since they are happy about their marriages, they believe it is better. Their main argument is the high divorce rates in love marriages:

I prefer arranged marriage. We see love marriages as well, they get divorced in two days.
-Neriman, 25, married, homemaker
I would like my daughter to have an arranged marriage as well because when you date a lot of issues might come up. As you learn the personality of the other person, everything finishes even before marriage starts.
-Ebru, 42, married, homemaker
I prefer arranged marriage. Why? Because they dream a lot when they date. There are a lot of promises. No man or no woman would show his/her personality honestly while flirting. With marriage they get to see the sides that they haven't seen before. They start fighting and get divorced.

> -Özge, 39, married, homemaker

However, five other women (one employed, four homemakers) who had an arranged marriage want their daughters to have love marriages.

### 4.7.6 Summary Findings

From the narratives of women, the following summary findings may be presented about the relationship between paid work and empowerment:

- Income pooling among married couples is very common, although the majority of employed women still have full control over their income. Even if women have the freedom to control their income, their ability to spend it on their own welfare is determined by various factors, including their class position, preferences, and allocative priorities. However they attach significant meaning to their income even if they do not spend it on themselves. The feeling of accomplishment is actually stronger when they finance children's education with their income. Due to the invisibility of housework, on the other hand, several women understate their contribution to the family through their unpaid domestic labor.
- The sexual division of labor in the household to a large extent is not challenged by women's employment. This is one of the biggest difficulties employed women face. But at the same time, women's expectations from men are very limited. Instead of demanding a fair distribution of household chores, they want help in only certain tasks they believe men can handle. In other words, there is certain type of housework seen as women's work. Childcare seems to be one of them.
- Employed women have more decision-making power in the house than full-time homemakers. This difference becomes evident especially in financial decisions. Besides employment status, a woman's age plays a role in determining her decision-making power.
- Having a job and social life outside the house makes employed women mentally healthier and relatively freer from insomnia. Being in control of certain important things, such as the children's education, lessens their worries and makes
them more hopeful about the future. This is also due to the fact that dualearner families have generally higher income. Another clear difference between employed women and homemakers is about feeling respected enough and not losing self-confidence.
- Regardless of employment status, women have a very positive attitude toward paid work as a source of self-sufficiency. There is, however, a difference in perceptions of its consequences on the relationship with the spouse and especially with the children. For the majority of homemakers, paid work makes a close relationship with the child impossible, while several employed women argue against such a negative impact. Nevertheless, it is clear from the interviews that feelings of insufficiency about motherhood are somewhat common among employed women. This is another big challenge they face, making the paid work less empowering.
- Some traditional values are maintained even among employed women, such as a preference for arranged marriage. Some others such as son preference, on the other hand, prevail among neither employed women nor homemakers.


### 4.8 Conclusion

Understanding the gender gap in labor force participation requires analyzing complex social factors that lead women to make different decisions than men under a different set of choices. In this chapter, I use a qualitative method to investigate women's preferences besides their actual behavior. I examine their labor force participation decisions, past schooling decisions, and fertility decisions in the context of recent pro-natalist rhetoric. Moreover, I explore whether paid employment leads to empowerment of women.

Based on field research from July-August 2013, the analysis carried out in this chapter suggests that education is important not only in determining women's ability to access paid work but also for their self-confidence. Many women believe that empowering jobs are accessible to only educated women; others have to deal with the hardships of working life without the benefits of decent jobs. The empowering potential of employment without a profession seems to be limited. It is clear that women value education and they do everything to provide their children with better education. However, for a significant number of the women in my sample schooling decisions were made by their families. Starting from early ages, women are not given equal opportunity to make their life choices starting from early ages. Therefore, in designing policies to encourage women's labor force participation, policies to increase the compulsory schooling age should be considered. The recently enacted " $4+4+4$ Law" that replaces 8 years compulsory primary education is a step backward in achieving gender equality in education.

In addition to lack of education, two other limiting factors stand out from the women's narratives. First, the main obstacle to their participation in labor force seems to be the burden of care work. Second, the conservative mentality of husbands is a serious challenge for several women. The majority of full-time homemakers admire women with jobs and they express preference for a working life. As expected, among different types of policy proposals they favor day care subsidy most strongly. The presence of this kind of support system is especially crucial for divorced or widowed women with small children.

The empowering potential of employment varies considerably with factors such as age, marital status, type of the job, household economic position, and class background. In general, employed women have more decision making power in the household, especially in financial decisions. They are more hopeful about the future, feel more respected, and lose their self-confidence less frequently. Some employed women
manage to share the housework responsibilities with their spouses, although the distribution of housework is far from being fair. Yet the sexual division of household labor, to a large extent, is not challenged by women's employment status. Moreover, a fair distribution is not demanded, which suggests that women internalize the sexual division of labor.

To summarize, one of the reasons why female labor force participation rate is so low in Turkey is that there are cultural pressures on women when they make important life choices. Families' decisions about girls' schooling and their marriages, and interventions of women's husbands in their working decisions, are among the cultural obstacles revealed by the field research. The recent pro-natalist discourse launched by the government may add to these pressures. However, most of the women in my sample do not support this discourse and their main expectation from government is state-supported childcare. When designing policies to increase women's labor force participation, government needs to have a more integrated plan that intervenes in multiple spheres of the problem. Active labor market policies should be complemented with the policies encouraging girls' schooling, such as the 1997 Compulsory Education Law.

On the other hand, there is an unequal burden on the shoulders of employed women. Unless the sexual division of labor in the house is challenged, the empowering potential of employment will be limited. This is a long-run problem that requires changes in the society's attitudes and social norms, increases in education for both men and women, and also increases in women's participation in social life, including working life. However, there are things to do in the short-run such as improving the working conditions of women and enforcing the requirement of day care centers for workplaces.

## CHAPTER 5

## TARGETING WOMEN'S EMPLOYMENT: DO SUBSIDIES WORK?

### 5.1 Introduction

The Turkish economy has experienced poor employment performance over the past two decades, as explained in Chapter 2. Despite rapid growth during the 2000s, the economy could not create sufficient jobs, resulting in high unemployment and low labor force participation rates. The lack of a strong demand-pull effect may be part of the explanation as to why female labor force participation rates are so low. The gender gap in labor market outcomes is usually explained by a combination of social, economic and cultural factors. First, structural transformation and rural-tourban migration contribute to the high and persistent labor force participation gap. Women who work as unpaid family workers in the rural areas withdraw from the labor force once they migrate to the city. Second, women's reservation wage remains high in the cities given the lack of subsidized childcare and pre-school education. The expected market value of wages is usually lower than the reservation wage, especially for women who do not have a university degree. Finally, the Turkish labor market has a significant informal sector, in which women are disproportionately concentrated (Table 5.1). This sector often does not offer decent pay and working conditions (Değirmenci \& İlkkaracan, 2013).

As an alternative to supply-side explanations based on either education or cultural values, some researchers argue that lack of demand constrains job opportunities for Turkish women (Toksöz, 2011; Ilkkaracan, 2012), but to date there has been little
empirical research on this question. Limited demand and low wages might explain withdrawal from the labor market in the urban areas by discouraging women from searching for jobs. Disguised unemployment, which accounts for people ready to work but not actively searching for jobs, including discouraged workers, is very high among women. The total unemployment rate (open + disguised unemployment) is 22.6 percent for women while it is 12.7 percent for men in 2013 (Table 5.1). In other words, higher labor demand in urban areas could raise women's labor force participation and employment.

Table 5.1: Main Labor Market Outcomes by Gender in the Turkish Economy

|  | 1990 | 2000 | 2008 | 2013 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Labor force participation rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 56.6 | 49.9 | 46.9 | 50.8 |
| Male | 79.7 | 73.7 | 70.1 | 71.5 |
| Female | 34.1 | 26.6 | 24.5 | 30.8 |
| Employment rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 52.1 | 46.7 | 41.7 | 45.9 |
| Male | 73.5 | 68.9 | 62.6 | 65.2 |
| Female | 31.2 | 24.6 | 21.6 | 27.1 |
| Open unemployment rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 8 | 6.5 | 11 | 9.7 |
| Male | 7.8 | 6.6 | 10.7 | 8.7 |
| Female | 8.5 | 6.3 | 11.6 | 11.9 |
| Total unemployment rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Total | 10.4 | 11.1 | 17.4 | 15.9 |
| Male | 9.6 | 10.6 | 14.8 | 12.7 |
| Female | 12.3 | 12.6 | 23.9 | 22.6 |
| Informal employment rate (\%) |  |  |  |  |
| Total |  |  |  |  |
| Male | n.a. | 51.2 | 43.5 | 36.7 |
| Female | n.a. | 44.3 | 38.1 | 30.2 |

Source: TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Surveys
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Total unemployment $=$ open + disguised unemployment. Disguised unemployment account for persons not looking for a job yet ready to work if offered a job: (i) Seeking employment and ready to work within 15 days, and yet did not use any of the job search channels in the last 3 months; plus (ii) discouraged workers.
${ }^{\mathrm{b}}$ Informal employment ratio gives the number of not registered workers as a percentage of total employment.

To improve labor market outcomes for women, the Turkish government initiated an employment subsidy scheme targeting women in 2008. Employment subsidies are used to address unemployment in many advanced and developing countries. Subsidies specifically aimed at disadvantaged groups are common since they are believed to be more effective. Turkey has used various subsidy schemes to encourage job creation, the 2008 employment package being the only targeted one. The package included an arrangement that exempted employers from paying the social security contributions
for newly hired women (aged over 18 years) and young men (aged between 18 and 29) for the first year, with the amount of exemptions gradually decreasing over the following five years.

In this chapter, I analyze the impact of subsidies given for women and youth employment as part of the 2008 employment package. As an example of positive discrimination, the package provides a fruitful ground to research the importance of demand-related factors in determining women's employment in Turkey. If there is a significant increase in women's employment, especially in culturally conservative regions, as a result of increasing demand for female labor, the gender gap in employment cannot be attributed to only supply-side factors or patriarchal culture.

My empirical analysis relies on a difference-in-differences estimation strategy using province-level monthly data from the Social Security Institution of Turkey. The 2008 employment package introduced cost reductions in the employment of women in all 81 provinces. However, positive discrimination was only effective in the provinces that did not already benefit from social security contribution cuts under a different subsidy scheme. ${ }^{1}$ I investigate whether the package succeeded in closing the gender gap in employment in the provinces where the positive discrimination was effective. I find that those provinces saw a 1.43 percent higher increase in the female share of employment in comparison to provinces where positive discrimination was not effective. Moreover, the effectiveness of the package is found not to be significantly lower in the conservative provinces. In other words, the 2008 employment package was successful in closing the gender gap even in more conservative provinces.

This chapter makes two important contributions. First, it explores the causal relationship between the 2008 employment package and the improvement in the gender gap in employment. Second, it evaluates the effectiveness of the package, taking

[^43]into account the influence of culture. By showing that a demand-side intervention can overcome the cultural constraints, it offers valuable insights to policy-makers interested in pursuing policies related to disadvantaged groups, particularly women.

### 5.2 Employment Subsidies

Employment subsidies ${ }^{2}$ aim to lower labor costs. The basic idea behind the subsidies is to stimulate demand for a targeted group of workers and to raise their employment and earnings by lowering the cost of employment. Employment subsidies can be implemented as direct wage refunds, or as credits to labor taxes such as social security contributions of employers. As a response to high unemployment rates, many OECD countries have implemented employment subsidies to promote job creation. Although they are widely regarded as a potentially efficient method of increasing targeted groups' employment, there is mixed evidence for their success in terms of job creation.

Marx (2001) argues that the net employment effects of subsidies are generally substantially lower than what the theoretical models and simulations predict because of larger than expected deadweight losses. In some cases, there is a large pass-through effect and subsidies lead to an increase in the wages without affecting employment. For example, Grueber (1997) analyzes the impact of privatization of the Social Security system in Chile, which led to a reduction of payroll taxes by 25 percent, and finds that the reduced cost of payroll taxation to firms was fully passed on to workers, with little effect on employment levels.

On the other hand, there is empirical evidence for employment creation with subsidies targeting specific groups of workers. For example, Katz (1998) finds that the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program in the U.S. had a net employment effect of 7.7

[^44]percent on disadvantaged young workers. Galasso et al. (2004) analyze the impact of a subsidy scheme targeting temporarily employed workers in Argentina, and find that the employment effects were significant for women and youth. Di Liberto et al. (2013) find that employment subsidies targeting disadvantaged workers in the depressed Italian region of Sardinia increased the probability of finding a job for the participants, especially for women.

Several other studies have analyzed the impact of employment subsidies in the form of social security tax cuts for employers (Kramarz \& Phillippon, 2001; Goos \& Koonings, 2007; Bennmarker et al., 2008; Egebark \& Kaunitz, 2014; Huttunen et al., 2009). The evidence is again mixed. Goos and Konings (2007) find that employment subsidies known as "Maribel subsidies" had a positive impact on manual employment in Belgium, the impact being larger for low-wage exporting industries. Kramarz and Philippon (2001), on the other hand, do not find any net job growth as a result of cuts in employers' social security contributions of minimum wage workers in France. Similarly, Beenmarker et al. (2008) find no employment effect after a reduction in payroll taxes introduced in 2002 in Sweden. Analyzing the impact of Finnish lowwage subsidy scheme, Huttunen et al. (2009) find that subsidies were not effective in increasing the employment of eligible workers, although they might have increased the working hours of the currently employed.

As a country with persistently high unemployment, Turkey has implemented several employment subsidy schemes in the form of social security cuts to employers. The first set of cuts came as part of broader incentive schemes that targeted specific provinces rather than a specific group of workers. To increase investment and employment opportunities in low-income provinces, the Turkish Government legislated three regional incentive schemes through Law 4325 (1998), Law 5084 (2004) and Law 5350 (2005). These included four components: reductions in employers' social security contributions; credits on income taxes on wages; subsidies on electricity consumption;
and land subsidies. Betcherman et al. (2010) find that these subsidy programs led to significant increases in formal jobs in the eligible provinces. Depending on the model specifications, they find that employment gains ranged from $5 \%-13 \%$ for the subsidy scheme under the 2004 law and from $11 \%-15 \%$ for the subsidy scheme under the 2005 law.

The 2008 employment package targeted disadvantaged groups, women and youth, and it applied to all provinces. It is important to evaluate not only the job creation impact of this scheme but also the effects of this first demand-side positive discriminatory intervention in the labor market. However, the existence of regional subsidies prior to the 2008 employment package complicates the analysis. In the provinces subsidized before 2008 with one of the regional schemes, the cost of formal employment was lowered for new hires, independent of gender. In other words, the positive discrimination in new hires introduced in 2008 was not effective in these provinces. Therefore, the analysis separates the provinces into two groups. The 32 provinces where positive discrimination for women was effective, since they did not benefit from any regional incentive schemes prior to 2008, form the treatment group, while the remaining 49 provinces form the control group.

Two prior papers have analyzed the impact of the 2008 employment package on women's employment. Based on a descriptive analysis of monthly household labor force survey data, Uysal (2013) finds that employment subsidies positively affected the employment of women between ages $30-44$. The positive impact is especially visible among married women who have less than a high school degree. Using a descriptive "pre-post" methodology, Uysal relies on descriptive statistics, and her analysis does not attempt to establish causality, nor does it distinguishes the 32 provinces that did not receive a subsidy prior to 2008 from the rest.

Using quarterly data for the period between 2006 and 2010 from the household labor force surveys, Ayhan (2013) analyzes the effect of the employment package
through a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, and uses triple differences to eliminate the impact of the 2008 economic crisis. Although the average policy effect over the period is not statistically significant, she finds a significant effect in the quarters shortly after the policy announcement. Specifically, she finds that the probability of being hired for women aged 30 to 34 compared to men of the same age increased by $1.4 \%$ in the third quarters of 2008 and 2009 , and by $1.6 \%$ in the fourth quarter of 2009. Due to the lack of provincial information in the household labor force surveys, she too studies the impact of the package across the country without focusing on affected provinces.

In this study I use a monthly panel of province-level employment data from the Social Security Administration of Turkey (henceforth SGK). The main advantage of using SGK data is that it makes it possible to analyze the impact of policy package at the province level, thereby allowing differentiation between the 32 "treated" provinces and the rest. The main disadvantage of the SGK data, however, is the lack of age bracket information for the employees. Because the social security cuts are given to employers under the 2008 employment package are for newly employed women (aged over 18 years) and young men (aged between 18 and 29), to study the impact on women one would ideally compare changes in employment of women and men above age 29. The impact of the package on women's employment might be weakened by the substitution effect between women at any age and men in the age bracket of 18-29 (or even, by the substitution of younger women for older women). Especially in the occupations where gendered preferences are very strong, employers might prefer to employ young males that would limit the increase in female employment (Toksöz, 2009). These limitations lead to underestimation of the impact of the package on female share of employment.

Another issue is the timing of the employment package. It is difficult to assess the impact of legislation on female employment under crisis conditions, since economic
crises might affect men and women in the labor market differently. To control for the impact of the economic crisis, I use share of industry in gross value added in the provinces. I also analyze the changes in sectoral composition of female employment to see if some can be attributed to the differential impact of the crisis on manufacturing and services sectors.

### 5.3 The 2008 Employment Package and Other Active Labor Market Policies in Turkey

The 2008 employment package (Law No.5763) was introduced in May 2008 to encourage private sector employment, and it took effect in July 2008. The package sought to promote employment of two disadvantaged groups: women and young men. Under the new arrangement, employers were exempt from paying social security contributions of newly employed women (aged over 18 years) and young men (aged between 18 and 29). The exemption was planned to be phased out gradually over a five-year period. The Unemployment Insurance Fund would pay $100 \%$ of employers' social security contributions for the first year, $80 \%$ for the second year, $60 \%$ for the third year, $40 \%$ for the fourth year, and $20 \%$ for the fifth year. Employers could benefit from this subsidy if they hired individuals from the target groups within the period between July 1st, 2008 and June 30th, 2010. In February 2011, the subsidies were extended until the end of 2015, and the coverage was extended to the employment of men who have occupational training or who are registered as unemployed in the Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR).

The effect of the 2008 employment package on women's employment, however, was limited by the presence of two other policies: regional employment subsidies and fiscal stimulus measures introduced after the 2008 crisis. Table 5.2 presents the timeline and targeted beneficiaries of different active labor market policies in Turkey. When the 2008 employment package was introduced, regional employment subsidies
had been in effect in 49 low-income provinces. In these provinces the cost of formal employment was lowered for any new employees regardless of gender. The Unemployment Insurance Fund paid $100 \%$ of the employer's social security contributions for the workplaces in organized industry zones, and $80 \%$ of social security contributions for other workplaces in these provinces. Therefore, we expect to see the impact of the 2008 employment package on women's employment only in 32 provinces that were not already subsidized before. Additional measures were taken in August 2009 in response to the 2008 global economic crisis. Social security contributions of newly hired employees, regardless of gender were paid by the state for six months in all 81 provinces, and in January 2010 the duration of this subsidy was extended until July 2011.
Table 5.2: Timeline and Targeted Beneficiaries of Employment Subsidies under Different Policies

| Policy | Date | Duration | Beneficiaries |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| The 2008 employment package | July 2008 | until July 2009 | Women and young men |
|  | (Law\# 5763) |  | 81 provinces |
|  | February 2009 |  | Women and young men |
|  | (Law\# 5838) | extended until July 2010 | 81 provinces |
|  | February 2011 |  | Women and young men |
|  | (Law\# 6111) | extended until December 2015 | (plus registered unemployed) |
| Regional incentive schemes | 1988 (Law\# 4325) |  | Entire population |
|  | 2004 (Law\# 5084) |  | 49 underdeveloped provinces |
|  | 2005 (Law\# 5350) | still in effect |  |
| Crisis response measures | August 2009 |  | Entire population |
|  | (Law\# 5921) | until June 2011 | 81 provinces |
| Source: Uysal (2013) provides a detailed summary of coverage and duration of different policies. |  |  |  |

In sum, owing to interactions with other government policies, the employment subsidies introduced by the 2008 employment package should be expected to positively affect women's employment between July 2008 and August 2009 and after June 2011, and only in the 32 provinces that did not benefit from regional incentive schemes.

### 5.4 The Impact of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis

The economic crisis has been argued to be one of the factors that may explain the increase in female share of employment after 2008 employment package. Toksöz (2009) analyzes the changes in the number of male and female workers covered by social security before and after the package. She finds that both male and female employment decreases, but that the decline in male employment is much larger. Therefore, we see an increase in the female share of employment. She argues that one factor that may explain this situation is that women working with social security coverage are concentrated in the services sector which was less affected by the crisis than manufacturing. Table 5.3 shows the number of persons covered by social security before and after the package. By the end of 2008, both male and female formal employment decreased, with the decline in male employment being larger. Table 5.4 shows that the female share of employment increased in both manufacturing and services during the six months after the employment package took effect. Moreover, in the second period we expect the package to affect women's employment (after June 2011); the increase in female share of employment was bigger in the manufacturing industry than services. These data suggest that the rise in the female share of employment cannot be completely explained by the differential impact of the crisis on different sectors.

Table 5.3: Number of Persons Covered by Social Security, 2008-2013

|  | Jun-08 | Dec-08 | Jul-09 | Jun-11 | Oct-13 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Male | $7,133,431$ | $6,774,527$ | $6,929,944$ | $8,365,871$ | $9,278,608$ |
| Female | $2,054,574$ | $2,028,462$ | $2,083,405$ | $2,680,038$ | $3,134,390$ |
| Total | $9,188,005$ | $8,802,989$ | $9,013,349$ | $11,045,909$ | $12,412,998$ |
| Female share | 22.36 | 23.04 | 23.11 | 24.26 | 25.25 |

Source: SGK.

Table 5.4: Female Share of Formal Employment by Economic Sectors, 2008-2013

|  | Jun-08 | Dec-08 | Jul-09 | Jun-11 | Oct-13 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Agriculture | 16.15 | 16.01 | 16.92 | 19.06 | 20.53 |
| Manufacturing | 20.12 | 20.22 | 19.83 | 20.59 | 22.68 |
| Services | 30.59 | 31.02 | 30.66 | 32.51 | 33.3 |

Source: SGK.

Another explanation that has been advanced for the rising share of female employment during this period is the added-worker effect after the economic crisis (World Bank, 2013; Ayhan, 2014; and Değirmenci \& İlkkaracan, 2013). Using micro data from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (2007-2010), Ayhan (2014) finds that husbands' unemployment accounts for $54 \%$ to $64 \%$ of the observed increase in the probability of their wives' labor force participation during the crisis. She finds that the added-worker effect emerges one quarter after the husband's unemployment, becomes the greatest in the second quarter after the job loss, and phases out by the fourth quarter of unemployment. Değirmenci and İlkkaracan (2013) find a smaller added-worker effect using micro data from household labor force surveys for the 2004-2010 period. The husband's unemployment increases the probability of a female homemaker entering the labor market by $6-8$ percent. However, they find that the marginal effects of the unemployment shock are not higher in the crisis years. For example, the increase in the labor force participation probability of an inactive wife as a response to the husband's unemployment is almost same in 2007 and 2009.

While there is some evidence for the added-worker effect after the crisis, it should be observed in all provinces. When we look at the share of industry in gross value added before and after the crisis, we see similar rates of decline in treated and control provinces: Industrial gross value added shrank by 6.5 percent in the treated provinces and 5.7 percent in the control provinces in 2009 (Table 5.5). To identify the impact of the 2008 employment package, this chapter analyzes the difference in the trends of female employment share in two groups of provinces in the aftermath of the economic crisis. Moreover, the second time period when the effects of the package are analyzed (after June 2011) corresponds to the recovery period, where we would not expect the added-worker effect.

Table 5.5: Average Share of Industry in Gross Value Added, 2007-2011

| Average share of industry in gross value added |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 8}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ |
| Treated Provinces | 29.56 | 29.12 | 27.3 | 28.12 | 29.15 |
| Control Provinces | 23 | 22.86 | 21.56 | 22.74 | 23.74 |

Source: TURKSTAT, Regional Accounts.

### 5.5 Data and Methodology

### 5.5.1 Data

I use monthly employment data from SGK to analyze the impact of the 2008 employment package on the female share of employment. Figure 5.1 presents the average share of female employment as a percentage of total formal employment in the 32 treated (where women's employment is subsidized with the 2008 employment package) and 49 control provinces (where regional subsidies were given to employment regardless of gender). The shaded areas are the time periods between July 2008 and August 2009 and after June 2011, when we expect to see any positive impact of the package on women's employment. There is a steady increase in female share of
employment in treated provinces starting from July 2008 and continuing after July 2011, while such a trend is not observed for control provinces.

Figure 5.1: Differences in the Average Share of Female Employment as a Percentage of Total Employment in Treatment and Control Provinces, 2007-2013


Source: SGK.

Figure 5.2 shows the difference between average male and female employment. Seasonality in employment might affect men and women differently. In an attempt to remove the seasonal effects, Figure 5.2 shows the differences in employment for each month in comparison to the previous year. In other words, it shows the series of (Male employment $_{\mathrm{t}}-$ Female employment $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{t}}$ )-(Male employment $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{t}-1}$-Female employment ${ }_{\mathrm{t}-1}$ ). ${ }^{3}$ In treated provinces, the difference between male and female employment begins to decline around July 2008 and the decline continues until April 2009. Similarly, there is a declining trend in difference between male and female employment after June 2011.

[^45]Figure 5.2: Differences in the Average Employment of Men and Women in Treatment and Control Provinces, Adjusted for Seasonal Changes, 2007-2013


Source: SGK.

One of the main claims of this chapter is that a demand-side policy intervention can be effective in increasing women's employment despite the constraining effects of culture. It is possible to observe rise in female share of employment even in the conservative provinces after the employment package. For example, when we look at the changes in female share of employment in the most and least conservative provinces among the 32 treated provinces, we see similar growth rates. The female share of employment in Yalova, where the percentage of early marriages was only 15.73 in 2007, increased from 20.7 percent in July 2008 to 25 percent in October 2013. The female share of employment in Kırıkkale where the early marriage is quite common, 38.87 percent in 2007, increased from 10.6 percent to 15.4 percent (Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Change in Female Share of Employment in the Treated Provinces

| Provinces | Culture (2007) | Female employment share July 2008 | Female employment share October 2013 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Progressive (average) ${ }^{\text {a }}$ | 22.41 | 20.58 | 25.07 |
| Conservative (average) ${ }^{\text {b }}$ | 32.32 | 16.47 | 20.46 |
| The five most progressive provinces |  |  |  |
| Yalova | 15.73 | 20.7 | 25.01 |
| Eskisehir | 17.14 | 20.96 | 26.16 |
| Istanbul | 17.63 | 26.09 | 29.88 |
| Izmir | 18.18 | 26.76 | 30.18 |
| Bursa | 19.57 | 24.89 | 28.29 |
| The five most conservative provinces |  |  |  |
| Kırıkkale | 38.87 | 10.65 | 15.36 |
| Kayseri | 34.73 | 13.31 | 17.51 |
| Burdur | 32.48 | 16.15 | 20.15 |
| Konya | 32.39 | 11.25 | 15.85 |
| Hatay | 31.29 | 13.78 | 18.15 |

Source: SGK data for female employment share and Household Labor Force Survey data for culture.
${ }^{\text {a }} 25$ treated provinces where percentage of early marriages is lower than the country average (26.96).
${ }^{\mathrm{b}} 7$ treated provinces where percentage of early marriages is higher than the country average (26.96).

### 5.5.2 Estimation Methodology

As Figure 5.2 shows, the gender gap in employment narrows down the 32 provinces. To investigate whether the employment package causes the improvement in women's labor market position, I use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Specifically, I estimate the following model:

$$
\begin{align*}
\text { Female Employment Share }_{i t}=\alpha+\beta_{1} \text { Treat }_{i} & +\beta_{2} \text { Post }_{t}+\beta_{3} \text { Treat }_{i} * \text { Post }_{t} \\
& +\beta_{4} \text { Province Demographics }_{i t}+\epsilon_{i t} \tag{5.1}
\end{align*}
$$

where $i$ indexes 81 provinces, and $t$ indexes time. For employment, I use monthly observations between 2007 and 2013. Demographic control variables for provinces are only available yearly and only until 2012. Those include the urbanization rate, percentage of female high school graduates, general fertility rate, share of industry in gross value added, and a cultural values proxy. Since provincial GDP per capita data is not available for these years, I use share of industrial gross value added to control for the impact of the economic crisis. ${ }^{4}$ For the culture variable, I use the percentage of early marriages (age 16-19) among women. Definitions of the variables and data sources can be found in Table 5.7. Treat ${ }_{i}$ is a dummy variable taking on a value of 1 for the provinces that were not subsidized before the 2008 Employment Package (that is, provinces where we expect to see the impact of positive discrimination), and 0 otherwise. $\mathrm{Post}_{t}$ is equal to 1 for the months between July 2008—August 2009 and the months after June 2011, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term $\left(\beta_{3}\right)$ thus provides an estimate of the impact of the employment package on the female share of employment in 32 provinces between July 2008 and August 2009 and after June 2011.

[^46]Table 5.7: Definitions of Variables and Data Sources

| Variable | Definition | Data Source |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Female employment share | (Female formal employment/Total formal employment)*100 | SGK monthly statistics |
| Urbanization rate | (Population of city and district centers/Total population)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| Share of industry in gross value added | (Industrial gross value added/Total gross value added)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| General fertility rate | (Number of births/15-49 age women population)*1000 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| Culture proxy | Percentage of early marriages among women: (Marriages at the age of $16-19$ /Total marriages)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| Female primary school graduates (\%) | (Number of primary school graduates/Female population)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| Female secondary school graduates (\%) | (Number of secondary school graduates/Female population)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| Female high school graduates (\%) | (Number of high school graduates/Female population)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |
| Female higher education (\%) | (Number of higher school graduates/Female population)*100 | TURKSTAT annual statistics |

To analyze the impact of culture, I focus on the interaction of the treatment with the culture variable in a second set of estimations, using a dummy variable for conservatism. In addition to the percentage of early marriages, I use two other measures to classify the provinces as conservative and progressive; gender inequality index and gender empowerment measure calculated by The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). Gender inequality index (GII) is created using province level data for secondary and higher school graduation rates among women, female formal employment rate, women's representation rate in municipal councils, share of teenage pregnancies among all pregnancies, and maternal mortality. Gender empowerment measure (GEM) is created using proportion of seats held by women in the parliament, percentage of women in economic decision making positions (including administrative, managerial and professional occupations) and female share of income (earned incomes of women relative to men). Table 5.8 presents the averages of conservatism measures in treated versus control provinces.

Table 5.8: Averages of the Conservatism Measures: Percentage of Early Marriages, Gender Inequality Index (GII) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)

|  | Percentage of early marriages | GII | GEM |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Treated Provinces | 22.36 | 0.46 | 3 |
| Control Provinces | 29.96 | 0.51 | 2.48 |
| Total | 26.96 | 0.49 | 2.68 |

Source: Household Labor Force Surveys and TEPAV (2014).

The conservatism dummy is equal to 1 if percentage of early marriages is greater than 22.36, GII is greater than 0.46 , and GEM is smaller than 3 . Thirteen provinces among the treated are classified as conservative. Using a triple interaction variable for treatment and culture, I estimate the impact of policy in relatively more conservative provinces in comparison to others among the treated ones. If the size of the impact in conservative provinces is not significantly lower than progressive ones, I can conclude
that policy was successful despite the cultural constraint. I estimate the following model:

$$
\begin{align*}
& \text { Female employment share }_{i t}=\alpha+\beta_{1} \text { Treat }_{i}+\beta_{2} \text { Post }_{t}+\beta_{3} \text { Conservatism }_{i} \\
& \qquad \begin{array}{l}
+\beta_{4} \text { Treat }_{i} * \text { Post }_{t}+\beta_{5} \text { Treat }_{i} * \text { Conservatism }_{i}+\beta_{6} \text { Post }_{t} * \text { Conservatism }_{i} \\
+\beta_{7} \text { Treat }_{i} * \text { Post }_{t} * \text { Conservatism }_{i}+\beta_{8} \text { Province Demographics }_{i t}+\epsilon_{i t}
\end{array}
\end{align*}
$$

The coefficient of the triple interaction term, $\beta_{7}$, gives us the impact of policy in conservative provinces relative to progressive ones.

A potential problem with the estimation strategy is that the identifying common trend assumption of the difference-in-differences logic may not hold. In other words, control and treatment provinces may have different pre-treatment trends for the outcome variable. To address this problem, I construct an alternative control group that consists of untreated provinces that have similar pre-treatment trends as the treated ones in the female share of employment. ${ }^{5}$ I estimate the following specification to choose these provinces:

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { Female employment share }_{i t}=\alpha+\beta_{1} \text { Treat }_{i}+\beta_{2} \text { Month }_{t}+\beta_{3} \text { Treat }_{i} * \text { Month }_{t}+\epsilon_{i t} \tag{5.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where Treat $_{i}$ is a dummy variable, taking 1 for treated provinces, Month ${ }_{t}$ is month dummies, and $\epsilon_{i t}$ is the error term. This specification analyzes changes in female share of employment during the pre-treatment period (January 2007-July 2008) relative to the control group. The untreated provinces for which an F-test that the interaction terms are jointly zero cannot be rejected at a 10 percent significance level form the alternative control group. The alternative control group consists of 34 provinces,

[^47]while the natural control group has 49 provinces. ${ }^{6}$ The estimations are carried out using both control groups as a check on the robustness of the results.

### 5.6 Descriptive Statistics

Table 5.9 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and control provinces. The average share of female employment as a percentage of total employment is 21.9 percent in the treated provinces, while it is 17.4 percent in control provinces. Recall that the control provinces are the low-income provinces receiving regional employment subsidies besides some other incentives to promote regional development. They are also less developed than the treated provinces in terms of other development indicators, with lower urbanization rates, lower education levels of women, higher fertility rates, and higher prevalence of early marriage among women. As a result, female share of employment is lower. For this reason, it is important to include demographic control variables as well as province-specific time trends in the econometric analysis.

Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics

| Variables | Treated Provinces (32) |  |  | Control Provinces (49) |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Mean | Std. Dev. | Obs. | Mean | Std. Dev. | Obs. |
| Female employment share | 21.92 | 5.11 | 2624 | 17.36 | 4.7 | 4018 |
| Total Employment | 260845 | 528057 | 2624 | 33946 | 24196 | 4018 |
| Demographic Control Variables |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Urbanization rate | 71.42 | 14.44 | 1920 | 57.16 | 9.29 | 2940 |
| Share of industry <br> in gross value added | 28.65 | 8.61 | 1920 | 22.78 | 6.55 | 2940 |
| Female high school <br> graduates (\%) <br> General fertility rate <br> Culture (\% early | 20.89 | 2.86 | 1920 | 17.74 | 4.66 | 2940 |
| marriages) |  |  |  |  |  |  |

[^48]Table 5.10 shows the female share of employment during the four time periods. The second and fourth periods are the ones when we expect the employment package to affect women's employment. The female share of employment steadily increases in the treated provinces. In the control provinces, there is also a rise in female share of employment from first to second period, but after the third period we see a decline. The increase in the female share of employment in both treated and control provinces in the second period (immediately after the 2008 Employment Package) may be due to the differential effects of crisis on men's employment, as explained above. After the third period, male employment starts to recover and the share of female employment begins to decline in control provinces. In the treated provinces, on the other hand, the rise in the female share of employment continues.

Table 5.10: Summary Statistics for Female Employment Share

| Provinces | $\mathbf{1}^{\text {st }}$ Period <br> (Jan07- <br> Jul08) | $\mathbf{2}^{\text {nd }}$ Period <br> (Jul08- <br> Aug09) | $\mathbf{3}^{\text {rd }}$ Period <br> (Aug09- <br> Jun11) | $\mathbf{4}^{\text {th }}$ Period <br> (Jun11- <br> Oct13) |  |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| All Provinces | Mean | 18.01 | 19.03 | 19.74 | 19.49 |
|  | Std. dev. | 5.43 | 4.69 | 4.73 | 5.93 |
| Treated | Mean | 20.25 | 21.03 | 22.15 | 23.23 |
| Provinces (32) | Std. dev. | 5.68 | 4.82 | 4.74 | 4.76 |
| Natural Control | Mean | 16.55 | 17.72 | 18.16 | 17.06 |
| Provinces (49) | Std. dev. | 4.73 | 4.11 | 4.01 | 5.31 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Alternative | Mean | 18.34 | 19.38 | 19.77 | 18.95 |
| Control P. $(34)$ | Std. dev. | 4.13 | 3.73 | 3.68 | 5.04 |

### 5.7 Estimation Results

Table 5.11 reports the estimation results with both the natural and alternative control provinces. The first column presents a regression of the female share of employment on the policy variable together with province and time dummies. The
coefficient of 1.4 on the treatment variable suggests that female share of employment increased by 8.0 percent more in the 32 provinces affected by the law than in the other 49 provinces, and by 6.6 percent more in comparison to the alternative control provinces. ${ }^{7}$ If we allow treatment and control provinces to follow different trends by adding province specific time trends to the model, the estimated coefficient of the treatment variable decreases to 0.418 , but it remains significant at the 0.05 level, suggesting a 2.4 percent increase in the female employment share compared to the control provinces. An F-test of the hypothesis that province time trends are jointly zero is strongly rejected; therefore I keep the linear trends in the estimations.

[^49]Table 5.11: Estimated Effect of 2008 Employment Package on the Female Share of Employment, 2007-2013

| Female employment share | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Natural control provinces (49) |  |  |  |  |
| 2008 Employment Package | $1.400^{* * *}$ | 0.418** | 0.410*** |  |
|  | (0.27) | (0.123) | (0.118) | (0.106) |
| Demographic controls | no | no | yes | yes |
| Province and month dummies Province x time trends | yes | yes | yes | yes |
|  | no | yes | no | yes |
| $N$ | 6642 | 6642 | 4860 | 4860 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.896 | 0.933 | 0.906 | 0.924 |
| Alternative control provinces (34) |  |  |  |  |
| 2008 Employment Package | $1.265^{* * *}$ | 0.317* | 0.390** | 0.186 |
|  | (0.321) | (0.144) | (0.139) | (0.119) |
| Demographic controls | no | no | yes | yes |
| Province and month dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Province x time trends | no | yes | no | yes |
| ${ }^{\text {N }}$ | 5412 | 5412 | 3960 | 3960 |
|  | 0.886 | 0.929 | 0.900 | 0.922 |
| * Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, ${ }^{* *}$ at the 0.01 level, ${ }^{* * *}$ at the 0.001 level. |  |  |  |  |
| Notes: The dependent variable is female share of employment. Demographic control variables include urbanization rate, percentage of female high school graduates, general fertility rate, share of industry in gross value added, and percentage of early marriages among women as a proxy for culture. Ordinary least square estimates are given. Huber-White robust SEs in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each province. The 2008 Employment Package refers to the interaction term specified as Treat $_{i} *$ Post $_{t}$. |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |

Additionally, I include a set of province level demographic control variables that measure urbanization rate, share of industry in gross value added, percentage of female high school graduates, general fertility rate and percentage of early marriage among women. The province-level control variables are only available annually for the years between 2007 and 2011. Even after including these demographic controls and province-specific time trends, the estimated coefficient on package is statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.25 , suggesting a 1.43 percent increase in female share
of employment in the treated provinces, compared to the natural control group. The estimated treatment effect using alternative control provinces is also positive and statistically significant in all specifications, except the one with province-specific time trends and demographic controls.

Table 5.12 presents the results for the second model with the culture interaction. The estimated impact of the treatment-culture interaction is negative, implying that the policy is less effective in conservative provinces. However, the culture interaction is not statistically significant in any of the specifications except from the first one. The coefficient of -0.272 (column 4) suggests that the increase in female share of employment as a result of 2008 Employment Package in conservative provinces is only 1.1 percent lower than the increase in progressive provinces. ${ }^{8}$ The evidence thus supports the argument that the 2008 Employment Package was successful in closing the gender gap in employment even in the more conservative provinces.

[^50]Table 5.12: Estimated Effect of 2008 Employment Package and Culture on the Female Share of Employment, 2007-2011

| Female employment share | $(1)$ | $(2)$ | $(3)$ | $(4)$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Natural control provinces (49) |  |  |  |  |
| Employment Package*Culture | $1.065^{*}$ | -0.128 | -0.205 | -0.272 |
|  | $(0.429)$ | $(0.232)$ | $(0.239)$ | $(0.205)$ |
| Employment package | $0.483^{*}$ | $0.357^{*}$ | $0.424^{*}$ | 0.286 |
|  | $(0.242)$ | $(0.169)$ | $(0.183)$ | $(0.157)$ |
| Demographic controls | no | no | yes | yes |
| Province and month dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Province x time trends | no | yes | no | yes |
| $N$ | 6642 | 6642 | 4860 | 4860 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.897 | 0.933 | 0.906 | 0.925 |
| Alternative control provinces (34) |  |  |  |  |
|  | $1.067^{*}$ | -0.169 | -0.196 | -0.322 |
| Employment Package*Culture | $(0.498)$ | $(0.262)$ | $(0.265)$ | $(0.224)$ |
|  | 0.375 | 0.294 | $0.431^{*}$ | 0.282 |
| Employment package | $(0.251)$ | $(0.182)$ | $(0.206)$ | $(0.171)$ |
| Demographic controls | no | no | yes | yes |
| Province and month dummies | yes | yes | yes | yes |
| Province-specific time trends | no | yes | no | yes |
| $N$ | 5412 | 5412 | 3960 | 3960 |
| $R^{2}$ | 0.888 | 0.929 | 0.9 | 0.922 |

*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, ${ }^{* *}$ at the 0.01 level, ${ }^{* * *}$ at the 0.001 level.

Notes: The dependent variable is female share of employment. Demographic control variables include urbanization rate, percentage of female high school graduates, general fertility rate, share of industry in gross value added, and percentage of early marriages among women as a proxy for culture. Ordinary least square estimates are given. Huber-White robust SEs in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each province. "Employment Package*Culture" refers to the triple interaction term Treat $_{i} *$ Post $_{t} *$ Conservatism $_{i}$, and "Employment Package" is the interaction term specified as Treat $_{i} *$ Post $_{t}$. The other interactions are not shown in the table.

### 5.8 Conclusion

In this chapter, I evaluate the success of a targeted subsidy scheme, the 2008 employment package, in closing the gender gap in formal employment. Using monthly
province-level data from Social Security Institution of Turkey, I estimate the impact of the package on the female share of employment with a difference-in-differences model. The results suggest that the employment package was effective in increasing the female share of formal employment. When we look at the female employment in the main sectors, the improvement is seen not only in services, relatively protected from the 2008 global economic crisis, but also in manufacturing. Moreover, with a triple difference technique I show that the effect of the policy is not significantly lower in more conservative provinces in comparison to more progressive ones. That is, the policy was effective despite the cultural constraints.

Analyzing the effects of a demand-side positive discriminatory policy, this study offers valuable insights for policy making to promote greater gender equality in the developing countries. Previous research focusing on culture's role in explaining the gender gap in labor market outcomes acknowledges that weakening the impact of patriarchal culture can only be achieved in the long run with education and progressive work-family reconciliation policies. This chapter shows that demand-side policies and positive discrimination can increase women's employment in the short-run. Moreover, women's attitudes toward family and work life are closely related to their personal experiences, as qualitative research in Chapter 4 reveals. Employed wives and mothers tend to have a more positive view of paid work. Therefore, facilitating women's entrance to working life also may gradually change culture.

## CHAPTER 6

## CONCLUSION

Turkey has a very low female labor force participation rate in comparison to countries at a similar development stage. This dissertation analyzed the causes of its low female labor force participation, focusing on gender ideologies, the lack of family-work reconciliation policies, rural-urban migration, and weak labor demand conditions.

Using a nationally representative survey, in Chapter 3 I showed that internalization of patriarchal norms and personal religiosity negatively affect women's labor force participation in the urban areas. Based on a patriarchal gender contract, women's primary role in Turkish society has been as good mothers and wives. In the absence of work-family reconciliation policies, this gender ideology has been strengthened through the AKP government's conservative discourse in the past decade. Using an instrumental variable estimation, I show that gender ideology affects women's decisions on whether or not to participate in the labor force. The impact of patriarchy on labor force participation is stronger for women with above-average religiosity. Among the different educational backgrounds, patriarchal norms exert the highest impact on university graduates, and they have a stronger impact on women who have higher fertility preferences.

The qualitative research in Chapter 4 showed that women's conservative values are not the only obstacle to female labor force participation. The "conservative mentality of husbands", particularly jealousy, deprives many women from making their own labor market choices. Moreover, families' restrictions on women's past schooling
decisions structurally limit their chances in the labor market. The major obstacle to labor force participation identified by the women themselves is childcare responsibilities. Together with the findings from nationally representative surveys (childcare being cited as one of the most important obstacles both in household labor force surveys and demographic and health surveys), this chapter suggests that providing subsidized care services should be a policy priority. Another important finding of Chapter 4 is that the empowering potential of employment without a profession is limited for women. Employed women have more decision making power in the household, especially in financial decisions; they feel more respected and have more self-confidence. However, this does not translate into using their bargaining power to achieve a fair distribution of housework. That a fair distribution is not demanded suggests that the sexual division of household labor is internalized.

Chapter 5 showed that, despite conservatism, it is possible to reduce the gender gap in employment through active labor market policies. It explored the causal relationship between the 2008 employment package, which included positive discrimination for women, and the increase in the female share of employment, taking into account the influence of culture and other factors at the province level. By showing that a demand-side intervention can overcome the cultural constraints, it offers valuable insights to the policy-makers interested in pursuing policies related to disadvantaged groups. Active labor market policies and their impact evaluation are conducted mostly in advanced economies; there are very few studies evaluating the success of targeted employment subsidies for developing countries. This chapter contributes to literature on employment targeting for disadvantaged groups from a developing country perspective. Moreover, by taking into account the role of culture, the findings of this chapter may have broader geographical policy implications, particularly for the Middle Eastern and North African countries, which also have significant gender gaps in their labor markets.

In terms of policy implications, a gender-equitable macroeconomic policy framework is required to facilitate women's access to well-paid jobs. Once an enabling macroeconomic environment with stable growth is achieved, supply-side constraints can be addressed more effectively. Economic equality can give women more bargaining power to negotiate traditional gender roles in the household and trigger a society-wide change in the long run. The quality of jobs available for women also matters. Informality, a serious problem for Turkish economy, should be addressed as well because women are more concentrated in informal jobs, which do not offer potential for empowerment.

Achieving gender inequality in education should be another goal. The switch from 8 -year compulsory schooling to the " $4+4+4$ " system is a policy that will adversely affect girls' schooling. Policies aimed at keeping girls in school longer should be designed. Besides compulsory education laws, making education more affordable would also give parents incentives to keep their daughters at school.

Without effective work-family reconciliation policies, neither favorable demand conditions nor increasing education levels will be sufficient to increase married women's labor force participation in Turkey. As emphasized in both Chapter 3 and 4, solving the care problem is an important step to facilitate women's entrance to labor market. Subsidized childcare and eldercare, parental leave laws and regulated-reasonable working hours can be important policies to alleviate the care burden on women's shoulders. However, public policies can only socialize some portion of the care work. Gender norms need to change to have a fair distribution of care work. The transformation of gender roles cannot happen overnight but require a sustained fight supported by a combination of economic and social policies that will integrate women into society as equals of men.

## APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

|  | Discouraged |  | Available for work but not seek--ing a job |  | Seasonal worker |  | Busy with household chores | Education |  | Retired |  | Having property income |  | Disabled, old or ill |  | Family or personal reasons |  | Other |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | M |
| 1988 | 1.76 | 3.25 | 1.73 | 2.46 | 0.03 | 0.26 | 82.96 | 6.02 | 35.38 | 2.27 | 36.84 | 0.98 | 4.72 | 2.9 | 11.01 |  |  | 1.33 | 6.03 |
| 1990 | 0.47 | 1.2 | 0.37 | 0.69 | 0.12 | 0.41 | 83.29 | 6.48 | 34.07 | 2.25 | 39.97 | 1.31 | 4.84 | 4.75 | 13.69 |  |  | 0.97 | 5.16 |
| 1995 | 0.2 | 0.9 | 0.61 | 2.01 | 0.12 | 0.74 | 79.31 | 8.17 | 41.02 | 2.41 | 34.99 | 1.48 | 2.58 | 5.55 | 11.01 | 1.82 | 5.99 | 0.31 | 0.8 |
| 2000 | 0.31 | 1.17 | 0.88 | 2.24 | 0.31 | 1.2 | 73.54 | 8.23 | 32.9 | 3.59 | 35.57 | 1.38 | 1.12 | 5.67 | 8.94 | 4.53 | 8.82 | 1.56 | 8.02 |
| 2005 | 0.89 | 3.26 | 3.28 | 5.23 | 0.7 | 0.47 | 69.4 | 8.53 | 31.15 | 3.81 | 40.38 |  |  | 7.53 | 11.77 | 4.21 | 2.84 | 1.65 | 4.88 |
| 2010 | 1.38 | 4.32 | 4.23 | 5.7 | 0.1 | 0.13 | 62.62 | 10.71 | 31.62 | 4.79 | 42.05 |  |  | 7.56 | 11.33 | 7.91 | 2.19 | 0.68 | 2.64 |
| 2012 | 1.01 | 4.5 | 4.22 | 5.79 | 0.11 | 0.09 | 62.15 | 11.85 | 31.41 | 5.4 | 42.26 |  |  | 7.35 | 11.27 | 7.29 | 2.35 | 0.63 | 2.35 |

Source: Household Labor Force Surveys

|  | Discouraged |  | Available for work but not seek--ing a job |  | Seasonal worker |  | Busy with household chores | Education |  | Retired |  | Having property income |  | Disabled, old or ill |  | Family or personal reasons |  | Other |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | M | F | M |
| 1988 | 2.87 | 4.77 | 1.35 | 2.38 | 0.45 | 0.49 | 72.18 | 3.36 | 26.54 | 0.83 | 17.91 | 1.87 | 12.5 | 14.44 | 27.03 |  | 0 | 2.65 | 8.3 |
| 1990 | 1.35 | 3.23 | 0.5 | 1.65 | 1.8 | 1.51 | 71.72 | 3.76 | 26.67 | 0.52 | 19.28 | 1.68 | 9.1 | 17.41 | 34.12 |  | 0 | 1.25 | 4.3 |
| 1995 | 0.31 | 1.3 | 0.74 | 1.88 | 2.9 | 2.99 | 69.41 | 5.04 | 34.18 | 0.48 | 20.86 | 1.61 | 5.46 | 16.28 | 27.55 | 3.19 | 5.39 | 0.07 | 0.32 |
| 2000 | 0.25 | 1.79 | 1.25 | 3.43 | 5.36 | 10.49 | 69.25 | 3.58 | 21.63 | 0.56 | 20.24 | 3.09 | 4.97 | 12.54 | 22.77 | 3.25 | 5.27 | 0.86 | 9.35 |
| 2005 | 1.43 | 6.62 | 3.87 | 8.46 | 4.32 | 2.99 | 60.45 | 5.58 | 21.11 | 1 | 25.42 |  |  | 18.52 | 28.15 | 3.65 | 2.63 | 1.14 | 4.67 |
| 2010 | 2.01 | 8.42 | 4.53 | 7.15 | 0.67 | 0.36 | 58.67 | 7.61 | 23.59 | 1.01 | 27.23 |  |  | 20.79 | 28.78 | 4.15 | 1.82 | 0.59 | 2.6 |
| 2012 | 1.27 | 9.83 | 4.48 | 6.24 | 0.62 | 0.29 | 58.94 | 8.82 | 23.31 | 1.38 | 28.14 |  |  | 20.81 | 27.81 | 3.23 | 1.87 | 0.45 | 2.46 |

Source: Household Labor Force Surveys

Table A.3: Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women

|  | Urban |  | Rural |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women $^{\text {a }}$ | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women |
| Age |  |  |  |  |
| 15-19 | 9.23 | 130 | 20.51 | 78 |
| 20-24 | 21.79 | 638 | 27.31 | 260 |
| 25-29 | 31.52 | 1009 | 42.63 | 373 |
| 30-34 | 34.01 | 1035 | 47.48 | 337 |
| 35-39 | 35.79 | 1006 | 52.27 | 331 |
| 40-44 | 34.46 | 859 | 52.41 | 311 |
| 45-49 | 27.79 | 752 | 58.39 | 286 |
| Own Education |  |  |  |  |
| No education | 18.9 | 1,032 | 39.53 | 716 |
| Primary school | 28.18 | 2,633 | 52.57 | 1,012 |
| Secondary school | 25.1 | 506 | 29.13 | 127 |
| High school and higher | 49.44 | 1,258 | 47.11 | 121 |
| Husband's education |  |  |  |  |
| No education | 20.96 | 291 | 34.34 | 198 |
| Primary school | 28.5 | 2,319 | 50 | 1,228 |
| Secondary school | 26.68 | 791 | 42.11 | 228 |
| High school and higher | 37.01 | 2,002 | 40.73 | 302 |
| Children under age 5 |  |  |  |  |
| None | 36.22 | 3,015 | 54.74 | 939 |
| One | 27.73 | 1,760 | 43.09 | 564 |
| Two | 17.09 | 550 | 28.01 | 307 |
| Three and more | 11.54 | 104 | 39.76 | 166 |
| Household Wealth |  |  |  |  |
| Quintile 1 | 22.65 | 490 | 44.06 | 1,039 |
| Quintile 2 | 25.55 | 1,045 | 48.29 | 497 |
| Quintile 3 | 1,315 | 46.49 | 271 |  |
| Quintile 4 | 1,362 | 45.53 | 123 |  |
| Quintile 5 | 1,21 | 50 | 46 |  |

Note: table continued on next page.
${ }^{\text {a }}$ Number of women shows the total number of women in the given categories. For instance, in the urban sub-sample there are 1,032 women who have no education. 18.90 percent of these women participate in the labor force.

Source: TDHS-2008.

Table A. 3 (continued): Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women

|  | Urban |  | Rural |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women $^{\mathbf{a}}$ | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women |
| Household size |  |  |  |  |
| $\mathbf{1}$ | 77.78 | 18 | 71.43 | 7 |
| 2 | 43.33 | 390 | 51.09 | 92 |
| 3 | 38.37 | 1032 | 45.33 | 214 |
| 4 | 33.31 | 1543 | 53.1 | 403 |
| 5 | 27.82 | 1071 | 51.1 | 319 |
| $5-10$ | 21.74 | 1265 | 41.27 | 756 |
| 10-35 | 18.18 | 110 | 38.38 | 185 |
| Region |  |  |  |  |
| Istanbul | 33.6 | 506 | 42.31 | 26 |
| West Marmara | 37.9 | 314 | 55.96 | 109 |
| Aegean | 43.47 | 392 | 69.43 | 157 |
| East Marmara | 42.36 | 484 | 67.27 | 110 |
| West Anatolia | 26.13 | 444 | 33.63 | 113 |
| Mediterranean | 28.49 | 709 | 47.37 | 304 |
| Central Anatolia | 22.25 | 382 | 45.39 | 152 |
| West Black Sea | 42.86 | 455 | 56.98 | 179 |
| East Black Sea | 57.76 | 303 | 84.15 | 82 |
| Northeast Anatolia | 19.37 | 413 | 37.57 | 189 |
| Central East Anatolia | 15.02 | 426 | 20.1 | 204 |
| South East Anatolia | 17.47 | 601 | 34.19 | 351 |
| TOTAL | $\mathbf{3 1 . 0 6}$ | $\mathbf{5 , 4 2 9}$ | $\mathbf{4 6}$ | $\mathbf{1 , 9 7 6}$ |

${ }^{\text {a }}$ Number of women shows the total number of women in the given categories. For instance, in the urban sub-sample there are 1,032 women who have no education. 18.90 percent of these women participate in the labor force.

Source: TDHS-2008.

Table A.4: Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women, Cultural Value Proxies

|  | Urban |  | Rural |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women |
| Patriarchy |  |  |  |  |
| Helpswork: Men should also do housework like cooking, washing, ironing, cleaning |  |  |  |  |
| Agree | 35.86 | 3,684 | 48.75 | 1,088 |
| Disagree | 20.65 | 1,724 | 42.65 | 877 |
| Don't know/Depends | 50 | 16 | 45.45 | 11 |

Familydec: Important decisions in the family should be made only by men of family

| Agree | 21.94 | 875 | 45.65 | 609 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Disagree | 32.91 | 4,522 | 46.36 | 1,333 |
| Don't know/Depends | 18.52 | 27 | 37.93 | 29 |

Goingout: A women may go anywhere she wants without her husband's permission

| Agree | 34.98 | 1,664 | 44.8 | 433 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Disagree | 29.23 | 3,715 | 46.31 | 1,516 |
| Don't know/Depends | 37.21 | 43 | 52.38 | 21 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Menwiser: Men are wiser |  |  |  |  |
| Agree | 23.45 | 772 | 46.79 | 498 |
| Disagree | 32.92 | 4,490 | 45.65 | 1,356 |
| Don't know/Depends | 16.34 | 153 | 46.9 | 113 |

Womenwork: A woman should work outside the home if she wants to

| Agree | 36.67 | 4,958 | 47.53 | 1,660 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Disagree | 14.89 | 423 | 38.89 | 288 |
| Don't know/Depends | 2.5 | 40 | 30 | 20 |

Womenpolitics: Women should be more involved in politics

| Agree | 32.65 | 3,831 | 45.95 | 1,271 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Disagree | 27.58 | 1,055 | 46.96 | 428 |
| Don't know/Depends | 26.49 | 536 | 46.06 | 271 |

Wifeopinion: Woman shouldn't argue with husband even if she disagrees with him

| Agree | 34.28 | 3,092 | 47.78 | 946 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Disagree | 26.97 | 2,273 | 44.31 | 975 |
| Don't know/Depends | 19.23 | 52 | 45.83 | 48 |

Virginity: Women should be virgins when they get married

| Agree | 29.3 | 4,406 | 46.27 | 1,701 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Disagree | 40.73 | 874 | 45.41 | 218 |
| Don't know/Depends | 27.34 | 139 | 40.82 | 49 |

Note: table continues on next page.

Table A. 4 (continued): Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women, Cultural Value Proxies

|  | Urban |  | Rural |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women | LFP (\%) | Number of <br> women |
| Sonprf: It is better to educate a son than a daughter |  |  |  |  |
| Agree | 22.26 | 611 | 47.6 |  |
| Disagree | 32.22 | 4,802 | 45.88 | 1,625 |
| Don't know/Depends | 20 | 10 | 2 | 10 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Religiosity |  |  |  |  |
| Practicing namaz |  |  |  |  |
| Regularly | 23.91 | 2,681 | 43.9 | 1,025 |
| Irregularly | 37.64 | 1,602 | 51.07 | 562 |
| No/NA | 38.57 | 1,146 | 44.62 | 381 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| Fasting |  |  |  |  |
| Regularly |  | 4,754 | 46.01 | 1,767 |
| Irregularly | 28.65 | 308 | 47.27 | 110 |
| No/NA | 44.81 | 367 | 44.44 | 99 |

Source: TDHS-2008.

Table A.5: Coding for the Scale Variables; Patriarchy, Religiosity, and Family Conservatism

| Patriarchy |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Helphswork: Men should also do the housework like | Agree=0 |
| cooking, washing, ironing, and cleaning | Don't know/depends $=0.5$ |
|  | Disagree=1 |
| Womenwork: A married woman should | Agree=0 |
| work outside the home if she wants to | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=1 |
| Goingout: A woman may go anywhere she | Agree=0 |
| wants without her husband's permission | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=1 |
| Womenpolitics: Women should be more | Agree=0 |
| involved in politics | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=1 |
| Familydec: The important decisions in the | Agree=1 |
| family should be made only by men of the family | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=0 |
| Wifeopinion: A woman shouldn't argue with | Agree=1 |
| her husband even if she disagrees with him | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=0 |
| Menwiser: Men are wiser | Agree=1 |
|  | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=0 |
| Virginity: Women should be virgins when | Agree=1 |
| they get married | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=0 |
| Sonprf: It is better to educate a son than a daughter | Agree=1 |
|  | Don't know/depends=0.5 |
|  | Disagree=0 |

Note: table continues on next page.

Table A. 5 (continued): Coding for the Scale Variables; Patriarchy, Religiosity, and Family Conservatism

| Religiosity |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Prays regularly | Yes $=1$ |
| Prays irregularly | No=0 |
|  | Yes $=1$ |
| Fasts regularly | No=0 |
|  | Family conservatism |
| Fasts irregularly | No=0 |
|  | Yes=1 |
|  | No=0 |
| There is blood relationship among woman's mother and father | Yes=1 |
|  | No=0 |
| There is blood relationship among her and her husband | Yes=1 |
|  | No=0 |
| She attended Quran course during her childhood | Yes=1 |
|  | No=0 |
| She wears headscarf when going out | Regularly=1 |
|  | Irregularly=0.5 |
|  | Doesn't wear/NA=0 |

Table A.6: Sincan Case Study: Demographic Profiles of the Interviewees

| Name ${ }^{1}$ | Age | Marital Status | Education | Employment Status/ Occupation | Monthly wage (YTL) | HH monthly income | HH size | Number of children |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Aliye | 27 | Married | High School | Homemaker | 0 | 2200 YTL | 4 | 2 |
| Arzu | 34 | Single | University (2 years) | Secretary | 1000 | 2500 | 3 | 0 |
| Aycan | 28 | Married | High school | Homemaker | 0 | 2000 | 4 | 2 |
| Ayşe | 42 | Married | Secondary S. | Service worker ${ }^{2}$ | 800 | 7000 | 3 | 2 |
| Berna | 29 | Married | Primary S. | Saleswoman | 0 | 1150 | 4 | 2 |
| Berrin | 29 | Married | University | Food service staff | 1500 | 2300 | 2 | 0 |
| Canan | 32 | Single | High School | Service worker | 1000 | 1000 | 2 | 0 |
| Ceylan | 37 | Divorced | University | Sales assistant | 2000 | 5000 | 4 | 0 |
| Dilek | 42 | Widowed | Primary S. (secondary incomplete) | Production worker | 1000 | 2000 | 3 | 2 |
| Ebru | 42 | Married | Primary S. (illiterate) | Homemaker | 0 | 1000 | 5 | 3 |
| Emine | 41 | Married | High School (university incomplete) | Treasurer | 2400 | 5000 | 4 | 2 |
| Funda | 33 | Single | University | Management representative | 2300 | 2300 | 1 | 0 |
| Ferdane | 36 | Married | Secondary S. | Security guard | 850 | 3850 | 4 | 2 |
| Feride | 39 | Married | Primary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 2500 | 4 | 2 |
| Fahriye | 44 | Married | Secondary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 3900 | 5 | 3 |
| İnci | 24 | Single | University | Administrative assistant | 1000 | 1500 | 4 | 0 |
| İpek | 30 | Single | High School | Accounting supervisor | 1350 | 2500 | 4 | 0 |
| İsmet | 27 | Married | Secondary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 2000 | 6 | 2 |
| Kader | 33 | Married | Primary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 1800 | 7 | 5 |
| Melike | 38 | Married | Primary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 800 | 5 | 3 |

[^51]Table A. 6 (continued): Sincan Case Study: Demographic Profiles of the Interviewees

|  | Age | Marital Status | Education | Employment Status/ Occupation | Monthly wage (YTL) | HH monthly income | HH size | Number of children |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Meryem | 26 | Married | Secondary S. <br> (high school incomplete) | Homemaker | 0 | 3500 | 2 | 0 |
| Miray | 38 | Divorced | High School | Homemaker | 0 | 1200 | 4 | 2 |
| Nazlı | 24 | Married | Secondary S. <br> (high school incomplete) | Homemaker | 0 | 2000 | 5 | 1 |
| Neriman | 25 | Married | Secondary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 2000 | 3 | 1 |
| Nilüfer | 33 | Married | Primary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 1000 | 5 | 3 |
| Özge | 39 | Married | Primary S. | Homemaker | 0 | 1500 | 6 | 3 |
| Pelin | 29 | Married | Secondary S. | Service worker | 800 | 2100 | 4 | 2 |
| Şebnem | 36 | Married | Primary S. | Homemaker | 0 | NA ${ }^{3}$ | 4 | 2 |
| Selma | 52 | Married | Primary S. (incomplete) | Homemaker | 0 | 2000 | 5 | 3 |
| Sinem | 47 | Married | Primary S. | Service worker | 870 | 1300 | 3 | 1 |
| Şule | 32 | Divorced | Secondary S. | Service worker | 1000 | 1000 | 3 | 2 |
| Yelda | 32 | Married | Primary S. | Production worker | 1000 | 3000 | 3 | 1 |
| Yeliz | 48 | Married | Secondary S. | Service worker | 870 | 2500 | 4 | 2 |
| Zehra | 47 | Married | Primary S. | Service worker | 1200 | 2500 | 3 | 2 |

[^52]Table A.7: Sincan Case Study: Summary Statistics

| Age (average) |  | 35.15 |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Household income (average) |  | 2361.6 YTL |
| Number of children (average) |  | 1.68 |
| Household size (average) |  | 3.88 |
| Marital status | Percentage | Number |
| Married | 73.53 | 25 |
| Single | 14.71 | 5 |
| Divorced | 8.82 | 3 |
| Widowed | 2.94 | 1 |
| Education |  |  |
| Primary school | 38.24 | 13 |
| Secondary school | 29.41 | 10 |
| High school | 17.65 | 6 |
| University-2 years | 2.94 | 1 |
| University-4 years | 11.76 | 4 |
| Employment status |  |  |
| Currently employed | 52.94 | 18 |
| Not employed | 47.06 | 16 |

## Export Orientation Variables and Data Sources

In contrast to the literature on the feminization of the labor force, a new literature on defeminization emerged in recent years showing that as manufacturing production matured and diversified in developing countries, women's share of manufacturing employment started to fall (Ghosh, 2002; Joekes, 1999; Jomo, 2009; Tejani \& Milberg, 2010). According to this literature, it is not export growth per se that determines the female intensity of employment. Instead, for both of the feminization and subsequent defeminization periods, the type of manufacturing growth together with the degree of occupation segmentation by gender matter most in determining the female intensity of employment. Therefore, I use two alternative export orientation variables. The first measure, export orientation, was first used by Baslevent \& Onaran (2004) to capture the effect of trade activity on labor market outcomes. The export orientation
variable $\left(E_{j}\right)$ is defined as the employment weighted average of export to output $(\mathrm{X} / \mathrm{O})$ ratios of the two-digit manufacturing industries, denoted by i , in region $\mathrm{j} . L_{i}$ is the employment in sector i and $L_{j}$ is the total manufacturing employment in region j. Data on exports in the subsectors of manufacturing are obtained from Foreign Trade Statistics. Data on manufacturing output and employment are drawn from Annual Manufacturing Industry Surveys. The two-digit ISIC Rev 2 classification includes 16 manufacturing sub-sectors.

$$
E_{j}=\left(\Sigma_{i} X_{i} / O_{i}\right) * \frac{L_{i}}{L_{j}}
$$

Export orientation was not significant and not reported in the regression tables. As an alternative measure, I use export share of major sectors that employ women relying on the new defeminization literature. To identify those sectors, I used Annual Manufacturing Industry Surveys. I find that the majority of women (more than $60 \%$ in 2009) are employed by four sub-sectors: manufacture of food products and beverages, manufacture of tobacco products, manufacture of textiles, and manufacture of wearing apparel (ISIC Rev 2, 15, 16, 17 and 18). The export share (15-18) is defined as the value of exports in these four subsectors as a percentage of the value of total manufacturing exports in a region. The export share (15-18) has a positive significant effect on female labor force participation in line with defeminization literature.

# APPENDIX B IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 

Demographic Information

1. Age
2. Marital Status
3. Education (highest level attended)
4. Why did not she attend a higher level of education?
5. Monthly household income
6. Husband's income (married)
7. Father's income (not married)
8. Size of the household
9. Number of children
10. Age of children
11. Working status of children
12. Is there any person who needs care in the household?
13. Who usually takes care of those people?

Current Economic Activity
14. Are you currently (in the last 12 months) involved in any economic activity?
15. Currently what is your main economic activity?
16. How long have you been involved in this activity?
17. Does this income go to you or your family?
18. Usually how much do you earn a month from this activity? (Money or in-kind). If it is irregular, how much do you earn per month on average?
19. Do you have any social security?
20. Are you covered by any health insurance?
21. Would you want to continue this activity in the future if it is available? Why?
22. Are you currently involved in any other economic activity during the last one year? What is it? How long have you been involved? Does the income go to your family or you? How much do you earn from it? Would you like to continue? Why?

## Working Decision/Experience

23. What was the reason you decided to take up paid work?
24. How did you learn about this employment opportunity?
25. How did you decide to engage in your current main economic activity? (My decision alone, joint decision with my husband/family etc.)
26. Who objected to your decision to work?
27. Who supported your decision to work?
28. Please elaborate on the process of decision making, how did you deal with objections (if there was any), convinced your family/husband?
29. Where is the workplace for your main activity located?
30. Have you ever taken any kind of job training for this activity? What kind of training?
31. Usually how many hours a day do you work? (If regular, when do you work)
32. Do you ever work overtime? Do you get paid for overtime?
33. Would you be able to get paid maternity leave at your workplace?
34. Can you take paid vacation?
35. Do you think your work has any effect on your health?
36. Have you ever faced any kind of harassment/abuse at work? What kind of harassment/abuse do you face?
37. Overall are you happy with your work environment?
38. Do you get any satisfaction from doing this work?
39. Mention three most important characteristics that you like about the activity that you are currently engaged in.
40. Mention three most important characteristics that you don't like about the activity that you are currently engaged in.
41. Do you have any children under age 5? Who looks after your children while you are at work?

Past Economic Activity/Working Decision (for currently non-working women)
42. Have you ever involved in an income generating economic activity?
43. What was the last market work that generated income for you?
44. What was the main reason(s) for taking up this work?
45. How did you decide to take up that work?
46. How long did you work?
47. Why did you stop working?
48. Are you happy about your current non-working status?
49. In what sense are you better off now in comparison to the period when you were working?
50. In what sense are you worse off now in comparison to the period when you were working?

Working Decision (for women who have never worked outside home)
51. Have you ever thought about getting engaged in paid work?
52. If you have, why did not you take up a job? What was the main obstacle?
53. If you had a chance to work, what would be the biggest difference in your life?
54. What do you think about employed women in general?
55. Why did not you ever think about working outside? (if she said no to question 51)
56. Why do you think women should not work outside? (if she answers question 55 by saying that women should not work for pay)

Views on Government Policies to Increase Women's Employment
57. In the last year, in various occasions Prime minister said, "women should have at least three kids, preferable five kids in Turkey". What do you think about this statement, do you agree with prime minister?
58. Why do you think he is suggesting this?
59. Do you think following policies of the government can be successful in increasing women's employment? Why?

- Discount in social security payments of employers if they hire women (Employment Package, Law No.5763, 2008)
- Subsidizing day care for working women (A 300TL subsidy that goes to private day care centers if woman works outside of the home)
- Creating part time/flexible jobs for women

60. What kind of policies do you think would be more effective?

## Paid Work and Women's Empowerment

Use of Own Income
61. Usually who decides how your income is used?
62. Can you keep some portion of your own income for spending by your own will? What portion of your own income can you keep for spending by your own will?
63. How do you usually spend your own income (that you get to keep)?
64. Do you purchase any cosmetics for yourself with your own income?
65. Do you purchase any clothes for yourself with your own income?
66. Have you purchased any jewelry for yourself with your own income?
67. Do you spend any part of your own income on your own health/nutrition/treatment?
68. Do you give money to your natal family?
69. Have you purchased any valuable major assets completely with your own earnings? What assets have you bought?
70. Do you have any savings of your own? Where do you save?

## Decision-making in the Household

71. What role did you play in making the following household decision? (I was the major decision maker, joint decision with my husband/family, I was consulted, not consulted)

- Own working decision
- Large important purchases (house, car, TV, etc.)
- Small everyday purchases
- Children's education
- Children's health expenditure
- Children's marriage

Housework
72. Who takes the main responsibility for the following activities?
73. Who helps with these activities?
74. Which of these activities would you rather someone else did?

- Cooking
- Cleaning the house
- Childcare
- Kitchen shopping
- House maintenance/repair


## Domestic Violence

75. Over the last one-year, did you face any of the following incidences/violence from anyone in your home?

- Took your money away against your will
- Took your assets (jewelry etc.) away against your will
- Restricted/prohibited you from going to your parent's house
- Prohibited/restricted you from being involved in market work outside the home
- Exercised physical violence
- Threatened to exercise physical violence
- Exercised sexual violence
- Accused you of being unfaithful
- Insisted on knowing where you are at all times


## Mobility in the Public Domain

76. Do you go to the following places on your own and are you comfortable with going to these places on your own?

- Health facilities
- Market
- City or town center
- Natal families/relatives

77. Do you wear headscarf when you go out? Why? When did you start wearing headscarf?

## Political Participation/Views

78. Are you currently member of any political party/group/organization/union?
79. Which political party/group/organization/union are you a member of?
80. Did you vote during the last national election? If not, why?
81. Did you vote during the last local election? If not, why?
82. How did you decide how to vote on? (By myself, with family, with husband etc.)
83. Did you campaign during the last national or local election?
84. In the last 5 years, did you participate in any demonstration/protest? If yes, what was (were) the issue(s)?
85. In the past year, have you participated in any religious meeting? What do you do in those meetings?

Access to Media
86. How often do you do the following activities in a week? (Did you do the activity last week? How many days a week? How many minutes per day?)

- Read a newspaper
- Read a book
- Read magazines
- Watch TV
- Internet


## Attitudes

87. How important do you think your contribution (economic/physical) to the household is?
88. How do your family members value your contribution (economic/physical) to the household?
89. Has your participation in paid work made a difference to how others in your family see you?
90. Has your participation in paid work made a difference to how others in the community/society see you?
91. Has your economic contribution to your family made a difference to how others in your family see you?
92. Do you believe that the quality of your life has improved in the last 5 years?
93. Are you hopeful about your own future?
94. Are you hopeful that your son's (or if you had a son) future will be better than his father's future? Why?
95. Are you hopeful that your daughter's (or if you had a son) future will be better than your future? Why?
96. If you had only one child, would you prefer it to be a boy or a girl?
97. How do you think marriage should be arranged?
98. Some people feel like that they have a great deal of control over their own lives. Others feel that what they do has very little effect on what happens to them. How would you classify yourself?

Views on Work and Relationship with Household
99. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements

- A working mother cannot maintain as close and warm a relationship with her children as a housewife mother.
- It is not important for women to have their own source of income for self-dependency.
- Wife's being involved in market activity outside the household affects relationship with husband negatively.
- If a wife is involved in any economic activity outside the household, her husband should help her with household responsibilities


## Indicators of Mental Distress

100. Do you think you can't concentrate on your work?

- Do you think you are suffering from insomnia because of worry/stress?
- Do you feel that people around you are not giving enough importance to you?
- Do you think you don't have the strength to deal with your own problems?
- Do you think you're losing self-confidence?


## Indicators of Mental Well-being

101.     - Are you satisfied with your life?

- Do people around you show you enough respect?
- Do you consider yourself successful in life?
- Do you think you can face/handle undesirable circumstances?


## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acar, F. (1993). Turkiye'de islamci hareket ve kadin: Kadin dergileri ve bir grup universite ogrencisi uzerinde bir inceleme (The Islamic movement in Turkey: A study of the women's journals and a group of university students). In S. Tekeli (Ed.), Kadin bakış açısından 1980'ler Türkiye'sinde kadınlar. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari.

Agarwal, B. (1997). 'Bargaining' and gender relations: Within and beyond the household. Feminist Economics 3(1), 151.

Angel-Urdinola, D., \& Wodon, Q. (2010). Income generation and intra-household decision making: A gender analysis for Nigeria. In: J. S. Arbache, A. Kolev and E. Filipiak (Ed.), Gender Disparities in Africa's Labor Markets. World Bank, Washington, DC.

Angrist, J. D., \& Pischke, J. S. (2009). Mostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Angrist, J. D., \& Krueger A. B. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for identification: from supply and demand to natural experiments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15 (4), 69-85.

Aran, M. A., Immervoll, H., \& Ridao-Cano, C. (2014). Can childcare vouchers get Turkish mothers back to work? Estimating the employment and redistributory impact of a demand side child care subsidy in Turkey. Development Analytics Research Series No. 1401, Available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2533946.

Argy, F. (2005). An analysis of joblessness in Australia. Economic Society of Australia. Economic Papers, 24 (1), 75-96.

Attar, A. M. (2013). Growth and demography in Turkey: Economic history vs. pronatalist rhetoric. Ankara: TEPAV.

Aydıner-Avşar, N., \& Onaran, Ö. (2010). The determinants of employment: A sectoral analysis for Turkey. Developing Economies 48(2), 20331.

Ayhan, S. H. (2013). Do non-wage cost rigidities slow down employment? Evidence from Turkey. IZA Journal of Labor Policy, 2, 1-23.

Ayhan, S. H. (2014). How do married women respond when their husbands lose their jobs? Evidence from Turkey during the recent crisis. Accessed at: http://scuoledidottorato.unicatt.it /defap/defap-AyhanSH_paper.pdf.

Başlevent, C., \& Onaran, Ö. (2003). Are married women in Turkey more likely to become added or discouraged workers? Labour, 27(3), 439-58.
Başlevent, C., \& Onaran, Ö. (2004). The effect of export-oriented growth on female labor market outcomes in Turkey. World Development, 32(8), 1375-1393.

Becker, G. S. (1985). Human capital, effort, and the sexual division of labor. Journal of Labor Economics 3(1), 3358.

Bennmarker, H., Mellander, E., \& Ockert, B. (2008). Do regional payroll tax reductions boost employment? Working Paper 19. Institute for Labor Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU), Uppsala. Accessed at: http://ifau.se/Upload/pdf/se/2008/wp0819.pdf.

Bergmann, B. (2005). The economic emergence of women. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Beşpınar, F. U. (2010). Questioning agency and empowerment: Women's workrelated strategies and social class in urban Turkey." Women's Studies International Forum 33, 52332.

Betcherman, G., Daysal, M., \& Pages, C. (2010). Do employment subsidies work? Evidence from regionally targeted subsidies in Turkey. Labour Economics, 17, 71022.

Blackburn, R. M., Siltanen, J., \& Jarman, J. (1995). The measurement of occupational gender segregation: current problems and a new approach. Journal of The Royal Statistical Society, 158(2), 319-31.

Bloom, D.E., Canning, D., Fink, G., \& Finlay, J. E. (2007). Fertility, female labor force participation, and the demographic dividend. NBER working paper 13583.

Boone, P. (1996). Political and gender oppression as a cause of poverty. Centre for economic performance discussion paper 294. London School of Economics and Political Science.

Booth, A.L., \& Cooles, M. (2007). A microfoundation for increasing returns in human capital accumulation and the under-participation trap. European Economic Review, 51, 1661-1681.

Boratav, K., Yeldan, E., \& Köse, A. H. (2000). Globalization, distribution and social policy: Turkey: 1980-1998, Working Paper Series, No.20: CEPA and The New School for Social Research.

Boratav, K. (2003). Türkiye iktisat tarihi 1908-2002. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi.
Boratav, K., \& Yeldan, E. (2006). Turkey, 1980-2000: Financial liberalization, macroeconomic (in)-stability, and patterns of distribution. In L. Taylor (Ed.), External Liberalization in Asia, Post-Socialist Europe and Brazil, Oxford University Press.

Braunstein, E. (2008). The feminist political economy of the rent-seeking society: an investigation of gender inequality and economic growth, Journal of Economic Issues, 42(4), 959-979.

Braunstein, E. (2014). Patriarchy versus Islam: Gender and religion in economic growth. Feminist Economics, 20(4), 58-86.

Brooks, G. (1995). Nine parts of desire: The hidden world of Islamic women. New York: Doubleday.

Bulutay, T. (1995). Employment, unemployment and wages in Turkey. Ankara: ILO.
Bussolo, M., De Hoyos, R. E., \& Wodon Q. (2009). Higher prices of export crops, intra-household inequality and human capital accumulation in Senegal. In: Bussolo Maurizio and Rafael E, De Hoyos (Ed.), Gender Aspects of the Trade and Poverty Nexus: A Macro-Micro Approach. Washington, DC: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan.

Çağatay, N., \& Berik, G. (1990). Transition to export-led growth in Turkey: Is there a feminization of employment? Review of Radical Political Economics, 22(1), 115-134.

Çağatay N., \& Özler, S. (1995). Feminization of the labor force: The effects of longterm development and structural adjustment. World Development, 23, 1883-1894.

Caldwell, J. C. (1978). A theory of fertility: From high plateau to destabilization. Population and Development Review, 4, 553-577.

Cameron, A. C., \& Trivedi, P. K. (2009). Microeconomics using stata. Texas: Stata Press.

Caraway, T. L. (2006). Gendered paths of industrialization: A cross-regional comparative analysis. Studies in Comparative International Development, 41(1), 26-52.

Çarkoğlu A., \& Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2013). İş ve Toplumsal Cinsiyet [Family, Work and, Gender in Turkey]. Istanbul: Istanbul Policy Center.

Cindoğlu, D. (2011). Headscarf ban and discrimination: Professional headscarved women in the labor market. Istanbul: TESEV.

Coşar, S., \& Yeğenoğlu, M. (2011). New grounds for patriarchy in Turkey? Gender policy in the age of AKP. South European Society and Politics, 16(4), 555573.

Dayıoglu, M., \& Kasnakoğlu, Z. (1997). "Kentsel Kesimde Kadın ve Erkeklerin İsgücüne Katılımları ve Kazanç Farklılıkları" [Labor force participation and income gap of men and women in urban areas] METU Studies in Development 24: 32961.

Dayıoglu, M., \& Kırdar, M. (2011). A cohort analysis of women's labor force participation in Turkey. Paper presented at Economic Research Forum Conference, Antalya. Accessed at: http://www.erf.org.eg/CMS/ uploads/pdf/1300115375_Dayioglu_\&_Kirdar.pdf.

Dedeoğlu, S. (2012). Gender equality policies and female employment: The reforms in the EU accession process. In Saniye Dedeoğlu \& Adem Yavuz Elveren (Ed.), Gender and society: The impact of neolberal policies, political Islam and EU accession. London New York: I.B. Tauris.

Değirmenci, S., \& İlkkaracan, İ. (2013). Economic crises and the added worker effect in the Turkish labor market. Working Paper No. 774. Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, New York. Accessed at: http://www.levyinstitute.org/publications/ economic-crises-and-the-added-worker-effect-in-the-turkish-labor-market.

Di Liberto, A., Deidda, M., Foddi, M., \& Sulis, G. (2013). Employment subsidies, informal economy and women's transition into work in a depressed area: Evidence from a matching approach. Accessed at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2341511 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn. 2341511.

Duman, A. (2010). Female education inequality in Turkey: Factors affecting girls' schooling decisions. International Journal of Education Economics and Development, 1(3), 243258.

Duncan, O.D., \& Duncan, B. (1955). A methodological analysis of segregation indexes. American Sociological Review, 20, 210-17.

Durand, J. D. (1975). The labor force in economic development. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Egebark, J., \& Kaunitz, N. (2014). Do payroll tax cuts raise youth employment? IFN Working Paper No. 1001. Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm. Accessed at: http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1001.pdf.

Elson, D. (1995). Gender awareness in modeling structural adjustment. World Development, 23(11), 1851-1868.

Elson, D. (1999). Labor markets as gendered institutions: Equality, efficiency and empowerment issues. World Development 27(3), 61127.

Elson, D., \& Pearson, R. (1991). Nimble fingers make cheap workers: An analysis of women's employment in third world export manufacturing. Feminist Review, 7, 87-107.

Engels, F. (1972). The origin of the family, private property and the state. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Ercan, H., \& Tansel, A. (2006). How to approach the challenge of reconciling labour flexibility with job security and social cohesion in Turkey", European Council's FORUM 2005, Strasbourg.

Erman, T., Kalaycioglu, S., \& Rittersberger-Tilic, H. (2002). Moneyearning activities and empowerment experiences of rural migrant women in the city: The case of Turkey. Women's Studies International Forum 25(4), 395410.

Eryar, D., \& Tekguc, H. (2013). Unemployment and transitions in the Turkish labor market: A case study from Turkey. MPRA Paper 46006, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). Three worlds of welfare capitalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Folbre, N. (1994). Who pays for the kids? Gender and the structures of constraint. New York: Routledge.

Galasso, E., Ravallion, M., \& Salvia, A. (2004). Assisting the transition from workfare to work: A randomized experiment. Industrial and Labor Relations Review 58 (1), 128-142.

Ghosh, J. (2002). Globalization, export-oriented employment for women and social policy: A case study of India. Social Scientist, 30(11/12), 17-60.

Goos, M., \& Konings, J. (2007). The impact of payroll tax reductions on employment and wages: A natural experiment using firm level data. LICOS Discussion Papers 17807. LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven. Accessed at: http://feb.kuleuven.be/drc/licos/publications/dp/dp178.pdf.

Göksel, İ. (2013). Female labor force participation in Turkey: The role of conservatism. Women's Studies International Forum, 41(1), 45-54.

Goldin, C. (1994). The U-shaped female labor force function in economic development and economic history. NBER Working Paper 4707.

Güleşçi, S., \& Meyersson, E. (2014). 'For the love of republic'-Education, religion and empowerment, IGIER Working papers 490, Bocconi University.

Gündüz-Hoşgör, A., \& Smits, J. (2008). Variation in labor market participation of married women in Turkey. Women's Studies International Forum, 31, 104-117.

Güner, D., \& Uysal, G. (2014). Culture, religiosity and female labor supply. IZA discussion paper 8132.

Hartmann, H. (1981). The unhappy marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a more progressive union, in Lydia Sargent (Ed.), Women and revolution: A discussion of the unhappy marriage of Marxism and Feminism, pp. 141. Cambridge, MA: South End Press.

Herr, H., \& Sonat, Z. M. (2013). The Turkish neoliberal unshared growth regime of the post-2001 period. World Economics Association (WEA) Conferences, No. 4 2013, Neoliberalism in Turkey: A Balance Sheet of Three Decades, 28th October to 16th December, 2013.

Hoddinott, J., \& Haddad, L. (1995). Does female income share influence household expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 57 (1), 77-96.

Hoşgör, Ş., \& Tansel, A. (2010). 2050'ye Doğru Nüfusbilim ve Yönetim: Eğitim, İşücü, Sağlık ve Sosyal Güvenlik Sistemlerine Yansımalar [Demography and Management Towards 2050: Repercussions on Education, Health, and Social Security Systems]. Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (TUSIAD)-Birlesmis Milletler Nufus Fonu. Yayin No: TÜSYAD-T/2010.11.505. Istanbul.

Humphries, J. (1977). 'Class struggle and the persistence of the working-class family. Cambridge Journal of Economics 1(3): 24158.

Huttunen, K., Pirttila, J., \& Uusitalo, R. (2009). The employment effects of low-wage subsidies. Labour Institute for Economic Research Discussion Papers 254, Helsinki. Accessed at: http://www.labour.fi/tutkimusjulkaisut/tyopaperit/sel254.pdf.

Inglehart, R., \& Norris, P. (2003). Rising tide: Gender equality and cultural change around the world. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

İlkkaracan, İ., \& İlkkaracan, P. (1998). Kuldan yurttaş'a: Kadınlar neresnde? [From serfs to citizens: Where are the women?] In A. Unsal (Ed.), Cumhuriyetin 75 Ylnda Kuldan Yurttaşa [From serfs to citizens in the 75 years of the Turkish Republic], Istanbul: Turkish Economic and Social History Foundation.

İlkkaracan, İ., \& Acar, S. (2007). The Determinants of Female Labor Force Participation in Turkey: Who Caregives Determines Who Participates and Who Does Not. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the International for Feminist Economics. July 2007, Bangkok, Tailand. https://editorialexpress.com/cgibin/ conference/download.cgi?db_name=iaffe2007\&paper_id=70.

İlkkaracan, İ., \& Selim, R. (2007). The gender wage gap in the Turkish labor market. Labour, 21(3), 563-593.

İlkkaracan, İ. (2010). Uzlastirma politikalari yoklugunda Turkiye emek piyasasinda cinsiyet esitsizlikleri (Gender inequalities in the labor market in Turkey in the absence of work-family reconciliation policies). In İ. İlkkaracan (Ed.) Towards gender equality in the labor market: work and family life reconciliation policies (in Turkish). Istanbul: WWHR and ITU WSC-SET.

İlkkaracan, İ. (2012). Why so few women in the labor market in Turkey? Feminist Economics, 18(1), 1-37.

International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) (2012). International Social Survey Programme on Family and Changing Gender Roles IV, GESIS-Leibnitz Institute for the Social Sciences.

İzde, Ö. (2011). The impact of recessions on gendered employment patterns in Turkey (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). The University of Utah.

Jenson, J. (1997). Who cares? Gender and welfare regimes, Social Politics 4(2), 181-187.

Joekes, S. P. (1999). A gender-analytical perspective on trade and sustainable development. In Trade, gender and sustainable development (pp. 33-59). New York and Geneva: UNCTAD.

Jomo, K. S. (2009). Export-oriented industrialization and gender wage equity in East Asia. Economic and Political Weekly, 44(1), 41-49.

Kabeer, N. (2002). Power to choose: Bangladeshi women and labor force participation decisions in London and Dhaka. London: New York.

Kağıţıbaşı, C. (2007). Family, self, and human development across cultures: Theory and applications. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Kandiyoti, D. (1988). Bargaining with patriarchy, Gender and Society 2(3), 274290.
Karshenas, M. (2001). Economic liberalization, competitiveness and women's employment in the Middle East and North Africa. In Salehi-Ishfahani, D. (Ed.) Labor and human capital in the Middle East: Studies of markets and households behavior. UK: Ithaka Press.

Kasnakoğlu, Z., \& Dayıoğlu, M. (1997). "Female Labor Force Participation and Earnings Differentials between Genders in Turkey". In J. Rives and M. Yousefi, (Ed.), Economic dimensions of gender inequality. London: Preeger Pub.

Kasnakoğlu, Z., \& Dikbayır, G. (2002). Gender segregation in Turkish manufacturing industry. METU Studies in Development 29(3-4), 333-353.

Katz, L. F. (1998). Wage Subsidies for the disadvantaged. In R. Freeman, \& P. Gottschalk (Eds), Generating jobs: How to increase demand for less-skilled workers. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kazgan, G. (1999). Tanzimattan XXI. yüzyıla Türkiye ekonomisi: Birinci küreselleşmeden ikinci küreselleşmeye. İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar.

Kepenek, Y. \& Yentürk, N. (2000). Türkiye ekonomisi. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi.
Kessler-Harris, A. (2001). In pursuit of equity: Women, men and the quest for economic citizenship in the 20th century. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kırdar, M., Dayıoğlu, M., \& Koç, İ. (2011). The effect of compulsory schooling laws on teenage marriage and births in Turkey, IZA Discussion Paper No: 5887, Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1906190.

Kiecolt, K. J., \& Acock, A.C. (1988). The long-term effects of family structure on gender-role attitudes. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 50(3), 709-717.

Klasen, S. (1999). Does gender inequality reduce growth and development? Evidence from cross-country regressions. World Bank Polciy Research Report Working Paper No7, Washington D.C.

Konda. (2008). Gündelik Yaşamda Din, Laiklik ve Türban Araştırması [Research Study on Religion, Secularism, and the Turban in Daily Life]. Istanbul: Konda.

Köse, A. H., \& Yeldan, E. (1998). Dışa açılma sürecinde Türkiye ekonomisinin dinamikleri: 1980-1997. Toplum ve Bilim, 77, 45-67.

Kramarz, F., \& Philippon, T. (2001). The impact of differential payroll tax subsidies on minimum wage employment. Journal of Public Economics, 82, 115-146.

Lawson, R. A., \& Bierhanzl, E. (2004). Labor market flexibility: An index approach to cross-country comparisons. Journal of Labor Research 25 (1), 11726.

Lewis, J. (1992). Gender and the development of welfare regimes. Journal of European Social Policy, 2 (3), 159-173.

Lincove, J. A. (2008). Growth, girls' education and female labor: A longitudinal analysis. The Journal of Developing Areas, 41(2), 45-68.

Lundberg, S., \& Pollak, R. A. (1993). Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market. Journal of Political Economy 101(6), 9881010.

Manser, M., \& Brown M. (1980). Marriage and household decision-making: A bargaining analysis. International Economics Review 21(1), 3144.

Marx, I. (2001). Job subsidies and cuts in employers' social security contributions: The verdict of empirical evaluation studies. International Labor Review, 140 (1), 69-83.

McElroy, M. B., \& Horney, M. J. (1981). Nash-bargained household decisions: Toward a generalization of the theory of demand. International Economic Review 22(2), 33349.

Memiş, E., Öneş, U., \& Kızılırmak, B. (2012). Housewifisation of women: Contextualizing gendered patterns of paid and unpaid work. In Saniye Dedeoğlu \& Adem Yavuz Elveren (Ed.), Gender and society: The impact of neolberal policies, political Islam and EU accession. London New York: I.B. Tauris.

Moghadam, V. M. (1998). Women, work, and economic reform in the Middle East and North Africa. Boulder, CO: Lyenne Rienner and Publishers.

Moghadam, V. M. (2001). Women, work, and economic restructuring: A regional overview. In Cinar, E. M. (Ed.) The economics of men and women in the Middle East and North Africa. Amsterdam: JAI Press.

Moghadam, V. M. (2005). Women's economic participation in the Middle East: What difference has the neoliberal policy turn made? Journal of Middle East Women's Studies, 1(1), 110-146.

Oyvat, C. (2012). (En az) üç çocuk ve Türkiye'nin emek arzları [At least three children and labor supplies of Turkey]. İktisat ve Toplum, 18.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2000). Recent labour-market performance and structural reforms. OECD Economic Outlook, 2000 (1), 21524.

Öniş, Z., \& Riedel, J. (1993). Economic Crises and Long-Term Growth in Turkey. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Özar, Ş., \& Günlük-Şenesen, G. (1998). Determinants of Female (non)Participation in the Urban Labor Force in Turkey. METU Studies in Development, 25(2), 311-28.

Özler, Ş. (2000). Export-orientation and female share of employment: Evidence from Turkey. World Development, 28 (7), 1239-1248.

Powell, B., \& Steelman, L. C. (1982). Testing and untested comparison: Maternal effects on sons' and daughters' attitudes toward women in the labor force. Journal of Marriage and Family, 44, 349-355.

Psarchapoulos, G., \& Tzannatos, Z. (1989). Female labor force participation: An international perspective. World Bank Research Observer, 4(2), 187-201.

Rankin, B. H., \& Aytac, I. A. (2006). Gender inequality in schooling: the case of Turkey. Sociology of Education, 79, 25-43.

Razavi, S. (2007). The political economny of care in a development context. Gender and development programme paper no 3, Geneva: UNRISD.

Rodrik, D. (2010). Structural transformation and economic development. Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). Ankara.

Sainsbury, D. (1994). Women's and men's social rights: Gender dimensions of welfare states. In D. Sainsbury (Ed.), Gendering welfare states. London: Sage Publications.

Sayan, A. (2013). 3+ Çocukçular tam olarak ne istiyor? [What exactly do the proponents of $3+$ children want?]. İktisat ve Toplum, 29.

Schultz, T. P. (1990). Women's changing participation in the labor force: A world perspective. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38, 457-478.

Scott, J., Alwin, D. F., \& Braun, M. (1996). Generational changes in gender-role attitudes: Britain in a cross-national perspective. Sociology, 30(3), 471492.

Seguino, S. (2000). Accounting for gender in Asian economic growth. Feminist Economics, 6(3), 27-58.

Seguino, S. (2011). Help or hindrance? Religion's impact on gender inequality in attitudes and outcomes. World Development, 39(8), 1308-1321.

Seguino, S. (2013). Toward gender justice: Confronting stratification and unequal power. Multidisciplinary Journal of Gender Studies, 2(1), 1-36.

Sen, A. (1990). "Gender and Cooperative Conflicts." In Persistent Inequalities: Women and World Development, edited by Irene Tinker, 123149. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sever, A., \& Yurdakul, G. (2001). Culture of honor, culture of change: A feminist analysis of honor killings in rural Turkey. Violence against Women 7(9), 964-999.

Standing, G. (1989). Global feminization through flexible labor. World Development, 7(7), 1077-1095.

Standing, G. (1999). Global feminization through flexible labor: A theme revisited. World Development, 27 (3), 583-602.

Tallichet, E. S., \& Willits, F. K. (1986). Gender-role attitude change of young women: Influential factors from a panel study. Social Psychology Quarterly, 49(3), 219-227.

Tansel, A. (2002a). Economic development and female labor force participation in Turkey: Time series evidence and cross-province estimates. METU ERC Working Papers in Economics 01/05.

Tansel, A. (2002b). Determinants of school attainment of boys and girls in Turkey: individual, household, and community factors. Economics of Education Review 21, 455470.

Tansel, A. \& Kan, E. O. (2012). Labor mobility across the formal/informal divide in Turkey: Evidence from individual level data. IZA discussion paper no 6271.

Taşçı, M. H. (2009). Job-to-job movements in Turkey: Evidence from individual level data. International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 23, 231-245.

Taşçı, M. H., \& Tansel, A. (2005). Unemployment and transition in the Turkish labor market: Evidence from individual level data, IZA Discussion Paper No 1663.

Taymaz, E. (1999). Trade liberalization and employment generation: The experience of Turkey in the 1980s. ERC Working Paper No. 99-11. Ankara: Economics Research Center, Middle East Technical University.

Taymaz, E., \& Özler, Ş. (2005). Labor market policies and EU accession: Problems and prospects for Turkey. ERC Working Paper No. 04-05. Ankara: Economics Research Center, Middle East Technical University.

Taymaz, E. \& Voyvoda E. (2009). "Labour, employment and productivity growth in Turkish manufacturing" mimeo, METU, Ankara.

Taymaz, E. (2010). Growth, employment, skills and female labor force. State Planning Organization of the Republic of Turkey and World Bank Welfare and Social Policy Analytical Work Program, Working Paper No 6.

Taymaz, E., \& Voyvoda, E. (2012). Marching to the beat of a late drummer: Turkey's experience of neoliberal industrialization since 1980. New Perspectives on Turkey, 47, 83-113.

Taymaz, E., Voyvoda, E., \& Yilmaz, K. (2014). Demokrasiye gecis, reel ucretler ve verimlilik: Turk imalat sanayiinden bulgular (Transition to democracy, real wages and productivity: Evidence from the Turkish manufacturing industry). Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Paper No 1408, Istanbul.

Tejani, S., \& Milberg, W. (2010). Global defeminization? Industrial upgrading, occupational segmentation and manufacturing employment in middle-income countries. SCEP working paper 2010-1, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis \& Department of Economics, New School for Social Research.

TEPAV. (2014). 81 il için toplumsal cinsiyet eşitliği karnesi (Gender equality report for 81 provinces). Accessed at: http://www.tepav.org.tr/upload/files/haber/1391012395-8.81 _Il_icin_Toplumsal_Cinsiyet_Esitligi_Karnesi_Taslak.pdf.

Treas, J., \& Widmer, E. D. (2000). Married women's employment over the life course: Attitudes in cross-national perspective. Social Forces 78(4), 14091436.

Toksöz, G. (2009). Labour markets in crisis conditions from a gender perspective. International Labor Office (ILO), Ankara.

Toksöz, G. (2011). Women's employment in Turkey in the light of different trajectories in devlopment-different patterns in women's employment. Fe Dergi, 3(2), 19-32.

Turkish Statistical Institute. (2011). Youth in Statistics. Retrieved from: http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=13133.

Turkey Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) (1998). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 1998, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies.

Turkey Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) (2003). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2003, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies.

Turkey Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) (2008). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies.

Turkey Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) (2013). Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2013, Hacettepe University Institute of Population Studies.

Tzannatos, Z. (1999). Women and labor market changes in the global economy: Growth helps, inequalities hurt and public policy matters. World Development, 27(3), 551-569.

Uraz, A., Aran, M., Hüsamoğlu, M., Şanalmiş, D. O., \& Çapar, S. (2010). Recent trends in female labor force participation in Turkey. State Planning Organization of the Republic of Turkey and World Bank Welfare and Social Policy Analytical Work Program, Working Paper No 2.

Uysal, G. (2013). Incentives increase formal female employment. BETAM Research Brief 13/151, Bahcesehir University, Istanbul.

Voyvoda, E., \& Yeldan, E. (2001). Patterns of productivity growth and the wage cycle in Turkish manufacturing. International Review of Applied Economics, 15, 375-396.

Wood, A. (1991). North-south trade and female labor in manufacturing: An asymmetry. Journal of Development Studies, 27, 168-189.

World Bank (2001). Engendering development: Through gender equality in rights, resources, and voice. New York, Oxford University Press.

World Bank. (2009). Female Labor Force Participation in Turkey: Trends, Determinants and Policy Framework. Human Development Sector Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, World Bank Report No 48508-TR.

World Bank. (2013). Turkey: Managing labor markets through the economic cycle. Accessed at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/ 15965/808030ESW0ENGL0Box0379820B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence $=1$.

Yeldan, E. (2011). Macroeconomics of growth and employment: The case of Turkey, ILO: Ankara.

Yentürk, N., \& Onaran, Ö. (2005). Düük ücretler yatırımları teşvik ediyor mu? Türk imalat sanayiinde bölüşüm ve birikim ilişkisinin analizi. In N. Yentürk (Ed.), Körlerin Yürüyü̈̈ Türkiye Ekonomisi ve 1990 Sonrası Krizler, Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları.


[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ According to 2012 International Social Survey Program data on family and changing gender roles, 67.6 percent of the respondents in Turkey agreed with the statement "both man and woman should contribute to the household income" (30.3 percent strongly agreed, 37.4 percent agreed). Only 6.5 percent of the respondents strongly disagreed and 7.5 percent disagreed with the statement. Although the majority of respondents ( $61 \%$ ) thinks that "a job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children", women are still expected to work at a job and contribute to the family income (ISSP, 2012). The comparable nationally representative data is not available for earlier dates, but smaller scale field studies show that the expectation of women's contribution to the family income was not as widespread. For example, only $16.8 \%$ of the respondents defined women's primary role as contributing to the family budget in a study from 1993 (Acar, 1993). The primary role of women is still defined as full-time homemaking ( 42 percent of the respondents) by 2012; however at the same time there is rising acceptance that sole breadwinner family model is not sustainable under current economic conditions (Carkoglu \& Kalaycioglu, 2013).
    ${ }^{2}$ The adult female literacy rates increased from $45.1 \%$ in 1975 to $91.6 \%$ in 2012 . The primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment rates increased from $89.9 \%, 14.6 \%$, and $1.9 \%$ in 1971 to $99.3 \%, 83.7 \%$, and $63.7 \%$ in 2012 respectively. The data is extracted from World Bank WDI Database on $1 / 9 / 2015$.
    ${ }^{3}$ The mean age at first marriage was 19.9 in 2008 in comparison to 18.8 in 1998 among evermarried women in Turkey according to Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS, 1998; 2008). According to Household Labor Force Surveys, the mean age at first marriage for women increased from 22.2 in 2001 to 23.6 in 2013.
    ${ }^{4}$ Women in Turkey were expected to give birth to 1.9 children on average in 2008 , compared to 5.7 children in 1968 and 3 children in 1988 (World Bank, 2009).

[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ Etatism refers to statist policies. It was considered "a unique mixture of capitalism and socialism" by the Turkish government (Öniş \& Riedel, 1993).

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys 2013.
    ${ }^{3}$ TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys 2013.

[^3]:    ${ }^{4}$ The decline in labor force participation of urban women used to start at earlier ages (20-24) in 1988. As educational attainment increase, women postpone marriage and childbearing. By 2013, the beginning of the decline in participation shifts to a higher age bracket (35-39).

[^4]:    ${ }^{5}$ Author's calculations based on Annual Manufacturing Surveys.

[^5]:    ${ }^{6}$ Guardian, 24 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/24/turkeys-president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-women-not-equal-men.

    7'Erdoğan: Sezaryene karşıyım, kürtaj bir cinayettir' (Erdoğan: I am against C-sections; abortion is murder), 25 May 2012 . http://www.radikal.com.tr/ Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3\&ArticleID $=10891 \&$ CategoryID $=78$.

    8'Erdoğan: Sezaryenle iki çocuktan fazlası olmaz' (Erdoğan: with C-section no more than two children are possible), 29 May 2012, http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25353517/.

[^6]:    ${ }^{9}$ According to Ministry of National Education (MEB) statistics, there were 537 imam hatip high schools in 2011-2012 academic year before $4+4+4$ system, this number has increased to 708 one year after $4+4+4$ system became effective. The number of imam hatip secondary schools increased from 730 to 1099 .

[^7]:    ${ }^{10}$ The $10^{\text {th }}$ Development Plan: 2014-2018, Ministry of Development, Ankara 2014. Accessed at: http://www.mod.gov.tr/Lists/RecentPublications/ Attachments/75/The\%20Tenth\%20Development\%20Plan\%20\%282014-2018\%29.pdf.

[^8]:    ${ }^{11}$ Denizli is the center of textile production.
    ${ }^{12}$ 'Sanayicilerden pakete tepki: Kadınlar niteliksiz işlerde istihdam edilecek' (Response to the package from industrialists: Women are going to be employed in low-skilled jobs), http://www.sokhaberci.com/sanayicilerden-pakete-tepki-kadinlar-niteliksiz-islerde-istihdam-edilecek-haberi-11113

    13 "Milyonlarca kadın işsizliğe mahkum ediecek" (Millions of women are going to be condemned to unemployment), 14 January 2015, http://www.halkinhabercisi.com/milyonlarca-kadin-issizlige-mahkum-edilecek.

[^9]:    ${ }^{1}$ Informal employment rate was 52 percent for women and 30.2 percent for men in 2013 according to Household Labor Force Statistics.

[^10]:    ${ }^{2}$ The added worker effect refers to an increase in the labor supply of married women when their husbands become unemployed.
    ${ }^{3}$ Government introduced an incentive scheme with the 2008 Employment Package that gave social security contribution cuts to employers if they hired women and young men. For the impact of these incentives on women's employment, see Chapter 5, Ayhan (2013), and Uysal (2013).

[^11]:    ${ }^{4}$ World Development Indicators, extracted from World Bank WDI Database on 4/28/2013.

[^12]:    ${ }^{5}$ World Development Indicators, extracted from World Bank WDI Database on 4/28/2013.

[^13]:    ${ }^{6}$ Specifically, when they look at cohort effects for women with less than primary education, they do not find any significant variation among participation rates of older and younger cohorts. For women with primary education, younger cohorts have significantly higher participation rates than the older cohorts. The opposite trend is observed for women with high school education and higher education. Among the high school graduates, the probability of labor force participation decreases for successive cohorts of women. Younger cohorts are also found to have a lower likelihood of participation among women with higher education.

[^14]:    ${ }^{7}$ Feminist economists developed care regimes analysis building on the welfare regimes analysis of Esping-Anderson (1990). It is argued that all welfare regimes have a "caring regime" (Lewis, 1992; Sainsburry, 1994; and Jenson, 1997). Three types of care regimes are identified: liberal/marketbased, conservative/state supported family-based, and social democrat/public service-based (Razavi, 2007; İlkkaracan, 2010). The care regime in MENA is predominantly the second type, conservative family-based.
    ${ }^{8}$ An alternative explanation for rising real wages in the beginning of 1990s in Turkey is democratic transition from military rule (Taymaz, Voyvoda \& Yılmaz 2014).

[^15]:    ${ }^{9}$ Gender stratification refers to "hierarchical social and economic relations based on accentuated differences between women and men that in turn shape a gender division of labor (Seguino, 2013; p. 13).

[^16]:    ${ }^{10}$ Three dummy variables indicating whether (1) or not (0) "marriage was arranged by the family, "brides money was paid" and "woman has a male dominant view of the world"

[^17]:    ${ }^{11}$ Göksel (2013) includes husband's religiosity but not women's own religiosity as a determinant of women's labor supply. Gner and Uysal's paper includes a proxy for religiosity. It is based on electoral votes in the 1973 elections in women's province of origin. Similar to their proxy for culture, it is a province level variable lacking individual level variation. My religiosity variable is based on individual religious practice while theirs is based on electoral success of conservative parties in women's province of origin.

[^18]:    ${ }^{12}$ Labor force participation is defined as: "currently working" and "currently looking for a job if not working".
    ${ }^{13}$ Wealth Quintile is a dummy variable that categorizes household wealth in five wealth quintiles. The wealth quintiles are constructed using the Filmer-Pritchett asset index in the DHS surveys. The asset index was already constructed in the raw TDHS dataset using the durable goods in the household and some other characteristics of the household. Specifically, the wealth index was constructed using the information about dwelling and household characteristics (source of drinking water, sanitation facilities, type of flooring material etc.) and access to consumer goods and services (weather the respondent's household owns the following assets/services: fridge, gas/electric oven, microwave oven, blender/mixer, dishwasher, washing machine, iron, vacuum cleaner, air-conditioner, cellphone, computer/laptop, internet, plasma-TV (LCD), cable-TV, satellite antenna, DVD-player, camera, car, taxi/mini-bus, tractor).

[^19]:    ${ }^{14}$ Among 7405 women, 7042 of them are currently married, the remaining 363 are "living with a man". This might include co-habiting single couples and couples who have only religious marriages.
    ${ }^{15}$ More highly educated mothers, whether or not employed outside the home, hold less traditional gender role attitudes and transmit them to their children (Powell and Steelman 1982, Tallichet and Willits 1986, Kiecolt and Acock 1988).
    ${ }^{16}$ An earlier version of this study included wearing headscarf in the religiosity index. However, this is problematic because of the ban against headscarf in universities and public institutions. Although the government lifted the ban in 2008, it is argued and there is some anecdotal evidence that private sector discriminates against women wearing headscarf (Cindoğlu 2011). Since any negative correlation between headscarf and probability of employment can also be attributed to discrimination rather than reflecting women's labor market preferences, headscarf is taken out of the index. I'm thankful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
    ${ }^{17}$ I use the following weights: $\frac{1-\mu_{i}}{\Sigma_{j}\left(1-\mu_{j}\right)}, \mu_{i}$ is the mean religiosity variable $i$. All religiosity variables used in the index are dummy variables taking 0 or 1. See Appendix A for the coding. I followed Gulesci \& Meyersson (2014)'s approach of weighting for the religiosity index. I choose this method to avoid assigning random weights to irregular practices.

[^20]:    ${ }^{18}$ See Table A5 in Appendix A for coding.
    ${ }^{19}$ Table A3 presents percentages of women participating in the labor force according to their age, education, presence of small children in the house, husbands' education, household wealth, and geographical region. Table A4 shows percentages of women in the labor force according to their views on patriarchal norms and religiosity.

[^21]:    ${ }^{20}$ Not presented in the table, calculated with Long and Freese's prchange command in STATA.

[^22]:    ${ }^{21}$ I use two alternative measures of export orientation; only the results with export share of major sectors that employ women (ISIC Rev $2,15,16,17$ and 18) are reported in the Table 3.6. See Appendix A for discussion and definition of the export orientation variables.

[^23]:    ${ }^{22}$ Youth in Statistics, TURKSTAT (2011).

[^24]:    ${ }^{23}$ The validity of an instrument cannot be tested in a just-identified model using only one instrument, family conservatism. But it is possible to test the validity of overidentifying instruments in an overidentified model. Therefore, I estimated the model using the four variables in family conservatism scale as separate instruments and run an overidentification test. The test of overidentifying restrictions: $\chi^{2}(3)=3.8509(p=0.278)$. Because $p>0.05$, the null hypothesis is not rejected and it can be concluded that overidentifying restriction is valid.

[^25]:    ${ }^{24}$ Non-agricultural labor force participation rate includes women working in services and industry plus the ones looking for jobs. There were 326 women in urban areas looking for jobs at the time of survey but they were not asked weather they were seeking jobs in agricultural versus nonagricultural sectors. In other words, this variable is an approximation to the standard definition of non-agricultural labor force participation rate and it is expected to slightly overestimate the actual rate.

[^26]:    ${ }^{25}$ When I split the sample based on number of living children instead of ideal number of children, I get different results. Interestingly, patriarchy affects the women who have zero or one child most. This contradiction might be related to using an incomplete fertility measure with number of only living children. Further research with a complete measure of fertility might produce better results.

[^27]:    ${ }^{1}$ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is currently the President of the country. He was the Prime Minister when the field research for this chapter was conducted, July-August 2013.

[^28]:    ${ }^{2}$ Informal employment rate was 52 percent for women and 30.2 percent for men in 2013 according to Household Labor Force Statistics.

[^29]:    ${ }^{3}$ In 2011 general elections, Sincan had a $65 \%$ voting rate for the current conservative ruling party, the Justice and Development Party.
    ${ }^{4}$ See Appendix B for the in-depth interview questions.
    ${ }^{5}$ To reach employed women I went to the biggest organized industry zone in Sincan and I talked to the general administration to learn which companies employ women workers. Then, I went to the working places and asked managers if I could interview their workers. With their permission I chose one to four women from each working place. Managers provided me a room for the private interviews. I distributed my contact information to the women interviewed at this stage to reach full time homemakers. The main challenge in the organized industry zone was to get permission from

[^30]:    ${ }^{6}$ A small ornamental piece of lace or linen used to protect a surface from scratches by hard objects or to decorate rooms. In Turkey, there is a habit of making doily among girls to get prepared for marriage. The decorative pieces of doily are made for the future homes.

[^31]:    ${ }^{7}$ In Turkey, university education is regulated with a national exam (OSS). After taking the exam high school graduates are assigned to university according to their performance and their ranking of majors and universities. Therefore, students have to make their major decisions when they take the exam.

[^32]:    ${ }^{8}$ Namus is related to virginity and chastity of women before marriage.

[^33]:    ${ }^{9}$ The increasing cost of education is related to the highly competitive university entrance exam. The success in the central exam has been increasingly more dependent on private after-school support through tutors or dershane (weekend schools specialized only in curriculum related to the central exam).

[^34]:    ${ }^{10}$ The 2008 Employment Package, Law No. 5763.

[^35]:    ${ }^{11}$ Hürriyet Archive, "Erdoğan: Give birth to at least three children," 7 March 2008.

[^36]:    ${ }^{12}$ Ntvmsnbc, "Erdoğan: At least three children before it is too late," http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25008774/, 10 October 2009.
    ${ }^{13} \mathrm{Al}$ monitor, "Erdoğan insists demanding three children," http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/erdogan-asks-turks-to-have-three-children.html, 13 August 2013.

[^37]:    ${ }^{14}$ Seasonally adjusted monthly average unemployment rate was $10.7 \%$ during the period of 20052013 while labor force participation rate was $48.1 \%$ during the same period. Household Labor Force Surveys' data is extracted from the Turkish Statistical Institute's website on 2.1.2014: http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt_id=1007.

[^38]:    ${ }^{15}$ Monetary incentives were recently announced with the Family and Dynamic Population Structure Conservation Program, see section 2.3 in Chapter 2.

[^39]:    ${ }^{16}$ Turkish Statistical Institute; Household Labor Force Surveys data extracted on 2/1/2014.

[^40]:    ${ }^{17}$ She is referring to the restrictive population policies during Süleyman Demirel's presidency in the periods of 1965-1971 and 1975-1980.

[^41]:    ${ }^{18}$ In the original set of interview questions, I included a section for domestic violence. However while I was conducting the interviews, it was extremely difficult to talk about it. I ended up asking only one general question, whether they are exposed to any kind of violence in the house, and I got the impression that domestic violence is not very common. Domestic violence is a problem for Turkey according to more carefully conducted nationally representative surveys. I am guessing that I did not get very good response rate because of the sensitivity of the issue. Therefore, I excluded that section from the analysis.

[^42]:    19 "Some people feel like that they have a great deal of control over their own lives. Others feel that what they do has very little effect on what happens to them. How would you classify yourself?"

[^43]:    ${ }^{1}$ See section 5.3 for the timeline and beneficiaries of different subsidy schemes.

[^44]:    ${ }^{2}$ I use the term employment subsidies to refer employer-side wage subsidies.

[^45]:    ${ }^{3}$ Uysal (2013) uses this method to remove seasonal effects with household labor force survey data.

[^46]:    ${ }^{4}$ Sectoral gross value added data are not available at the province level but available at NUTS-2 regional level. Therefore, share of industry in gross value added at NUTS-2 level is used in this analysis.

[^47]:    ${ }^{5}$ Betcherman et al. (2010) uses the same methodology when analyzing the effect of regional subsidy schemes on employment.

[^48]:    ${ }^{6}$ The following 15 provinces did not have the same pre-treatment trends and excluded when forming the alternative control group: Artvin, Bingöl, Elazığ, Erzurum, Gümüşhane, Kütahya, Kahramanmaraş, Mardin, Siirt, Sivas, Urfa, Van, Bayburt, Batman and Şırnak.

[^49]:    ${ }^{7}$ The unconditional mean of female employment share in the natural control provinces when policy was not effective is 17.45: $(1.4 / 17.45)^{*} 100=8.02 \%$. The unconditional mean of female employment share in the alternative control provinces when policy was not effective is 19.14: $(1.265 / 19.14) * 100=6.61 \%$.

[^50]:    ${ }^{8}$ The unconditional mean of female employment share in the treated progressive provinces when policy was effective is 24.80 : $(-0.272 / 24.80) * 100=-1.1 \%$.

[^51]:    Note: table continues on next page.
    ${ }^{2}$ Service workers in the organized industry zone are mainly responsible for cleaning and tea service. It includes cooking or delivery of the food for some women.

[^52]:    ${ }^{3}$ She reported that their income is very unpredictable because her husband is a taxi driver.

