# The London School of Economics and Political Science

## The State as a Standard of Civilisation: Assembling the Modern State in Lebanon and Syria, 1800-1944

Andrew Delatolla

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2017

**Declaration**

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledge is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe on the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 101,793 words.

**Acknowledgements**

This PhD has been much more than an academic learning experience, it has been a life experience and period of self-discovery. None of it would have been possible without the help and support from an amazing network of family, colleagues, and friends. First and foremost, a big thank you to the most caring, attentive, and conscientious supervisor one could hope for, Dr. Katerina Dalacoura. Her help, guidance, and critiques from the first draft chapter to the final drafts of the thesis have always been a source of clarity when there was too much clouding my thoughts.

My sincere appreciation is also due to Prof. Fawaz Gerges, who was always happy to listen to my ideas and offer advice. The former editorial team at the RIS, Dr. George Lawson, Prof. Kim Hutchings, Prof. Mathias Albert, and Prof. Jennifer Sterling-Folker for the opportunity to work with them, discuss my research, and the opportunities that have since followed.

My partner-in-crime, Karim Chedid, who has had to deal with too many PhD related excuses too many times – but who was always patient, understanding, and supportive.

My family, for always encouraging me to pursue what seemed like the impossible and for always providing me with support. The PhD would not have been possible without the support from my parents Darlene and George, my sisters Andrea and Victoria, my brother-in-law, Harry, and the two little ones, Kayla and Blake, who always make me smile.

Also, I must thank my friends and colleagues who have undergone and are undergoing the process of completing the PhD, Faerlie Wilson, Joanne Yao, Hadi Makarem, Maria Fotou, Sophie Haspeslagh, Martin Hearson, Julia Himmrich, David Brenner, Kiran Phull, Anissa Haddadi, Simone Datzberger, Sina Birkholz, Magdalena Delgado, Maggie Ainley, Ida Danewid, Amal Hamdan, Emma Blanc and many more – for providing me with intellectual and emotional support throughout this adventure. And to those who provided consistent reminders that there is life outside of the PhD, Caitlin Egen, Sally Moussawi, and Lauren Sexton.

I also want to acknowledge the generosity of Hayat Chedid and the Chedid family who hosted and fed me on my research trips to Lebanon.

This thesis would not have been completed without the generous financial support from the Department of International Relations, the RJ Vincent Memorial Scholarship, the London School of Economics, and the Middle East Centre Emirates PhD Scholarship.

Without the generosity of the staff at the Lebanese National Archives, the French Diplomatic Archives, the French National Archives, the British National Archives, the UK Parliamentary Archives, and the archives at l'Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut, who helped me with my searches, this thesis would have been be a lot shorter.

A final, significant thank you and acknowledgment to my grandparents, for instilling in me the importance of history and politics, Wadia Farha, Romeo Shoiry, Catherine Xenopolous, and John Delatolla.

**Abstract**

**The State as a Standard of Civilisation: Assembling the Modern State in Lebanon and Syria, 1800-1944**

This thesis critiques the conceptualisation of the state as a rational product of modernity that places importance on institutional capacity and typological criteria. Tied to this history is a distinct set of knowledges and practices that inform international relations and politics, including those of contemporary development and state building. The expansion of these knowledges and practices through colonialism, imperial modernisation, and global governance have established a global standard of civilisation of statehood that fails to give credence to the specific history of the state in the non-West. This thesis argues that in order to better understand the state in the non-West, it is necessary to examine the process of state formation as one that is linked to colonialism, imperial modernisation, and the advent of global governance, which produced a global standard of civilisation, altering the relationship between the domestic social field in the global peripheries and structures of governance. It traces how colonial knowledges and practices were assembled onto and interacted with pre-existing knowledges and practices in the political, economic, and social environments and the consequence of these assembled knowledges and practices.

Through the use of archival material triangulated with secondary source histories, the thesis examines the history of state formation in the Middle East, focusing on Lebanon and Syria, previously the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, from 1800 to 1944. It examines the social, economic, and political transformations that occurred during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Lebanon and Syria; taking into account Ottoman imperial modernisation, European interference and intervention, and the subsequent French mandate.

**Table of Contents**

**Glossary**

Ahl al-Dhimma

*The people of the dhimma* or *dhimmi*, refers to the non-Muslim people, 'citizens' or 'subjects' (Jews and Christians), belonging to an Islamic state.

'Asabiyyah

Translated as 'social solidarity' or 'group feeling', it refers a kind of communalism based on family, clan, village, or city quarter, which ordered and governed over the people therein, a form of *household* authority.

Ayan

Or *Ayan ve Esraf*, were a notable class of Muslim individuals and included land owners and dynasts.

Baratakli

A category for notable individuals who were exempt from taxes, including Muslims, Christians, and Jews.

Devshirme / Devşirme

A blood tax or tribute on young Christian boys from the Balkan territories to serve the Ottoman Empire.

Eid al-Adha

The 'Feast of the Sacrifice' is a Muslim holiday that celebrates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son to obey God's command.

Ferdeh

A tax that was applied to all adult males during periods of war with the amount depending on the means available to them.

Fez / Tarbouche

A cylindrical red hat that became popularised in 1826, as an egalitarian measure, following a set of imperial reforms.

Firman

An imperial decree or edict.

Ghazal

A poetic form typically discussing beauty, loss, and pain.

Hatt-ı Şerif

A note written by the noble (Sultan or transcribed by the Grand Vizier), with regards to its use in this thesis, it refers to the Edict of Gülhane (1839), an imperial reform.

Hatt-ı Hümayun

A document handwritten by the Sultan (the imperial), with regards to its use in this thesis, it refers to the Islâhat Fermânı (1856), an imperial reform.

Jizya

An annual tax levied on non-Muslims permanently residing within an Islamic state, often allowing for the exemption of military service but to remain protected.

Mejlis

An assembly, or parliament, of governors or representatives.

Millet

A court adjudicating personal law following confessional guidelines (Muslim, Christian, or Jewish)

Mushir

A field marshal or counsellor of state.

Mutassarifate

A form of split authority, or sub-divided authority within a territory.

Pashalik / Vilayet

A province or governorate, governed by a Pasha of Vali.

Qaymaqam

The administrator for a community within the system of the Mutassarifate (split authority).

Sandjak

Local administrative units within an Ottoman province.

Sandjak-Bey

The administrator for a local administrative unit within an Ottoman province.

Shari'a

A system of law based on Islam.

Tanzimat

A period of reform referring to the re-organisation of the Ottoman Empire.

Ulema

A body of recognised Muslim scholars specialising in Islamic law and theology.

## 1 Introduction

The advent of the modern state in the fifteenth and sixteenth century is characterised by the assertion of sovereignty over territory and population through the establishment of social, economic, and political order by a centralised administrative organisation.[1] However, there has been much debate on how to define the state,[2] the role of the state in society,[3] and its role in the international state system.[4] Debates on the state are not only concerned with its definition, but also with regards to what constitutes a good state, a strong state, and how to measure and fix weak and failing states.[5] While critiques of the dominant knowledges and practices of modern statehood do exist, such debates rarely challenge the epistemological assumptions of the modern state.

The assumptions that are perpetuated and reproduced in the ongoing debates on the modern state, posit that the modern state is a central actor in international relations, political science, and development studies. The theoretical inquiries on the state, from the various tenets of realism, liberalism, Marxism, and post-colonialism, work with the assumption that the state maintains a central authority, a structure that organises the means of production, monopolises the use of force, and is capable of participating in the international state system where the state navigates inter-state and institutional relations.[6] From these inquiries, the state is analysed as a product of both the international and domestic environments. With regards to the former, the state functions within a set of constraints that limits and allows it to pursue certain decisions due to the environment of systemic anarchy, as argued by realists, or with regards to its position in international society, according to English School scholars.[7]

Discussions and studies on the modern state are varied in focus, ranging from institutions, the economy, state-society relations, cultural productions, and identity. However, the different theoretical frameworks begin with the common assumption that each individual modern state in the international state system maintains *similar-enough* characteristics.[8] The characteristics that are often applied to descriptions or definitions of the state, however, are

[1] Coles 1957, p. 340.
[2] Engels 2010; Bourdieu 2012; Vincent 1987; Lomas 2014.
[3] Reinoud 2012; Rubenstein 2015; Holsti 1996.
[4] Sen 1999; Menon 2016; Wimmer 2012.
[5] Patrick and Rice 2008; Patrick 2006; Rotberg 2004; Ghani and Lockhart 2009; Easterly 2006.
[6] Weber 1946; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001; Bull 1977/2012; Hobson 2000; Bhabha 1994; Bhambra 2007; Said 1978.
[7] Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001; Bull 1977/2012.
[8] Hobson 2000.

products of a specific European history. While domestic cultural distinctions between states do exist, there has been little evidence of a tenable link between cultural distinction and state capacity or ability to govern.[9] By locating the modern state and, by extension, the European state system (a precursor to the international state system), in European history, it becomes evident that the historical experience of European state formation is a global exception that has constructed a unique set of knowledges and practices. Although the history of the modern state is distinctly European, or Western, it was through European expansion that a set of dominant concepts and categories, had been broadcast globally. In doing so, global governance has reproduced and reinforced a specific understanding of statehood, which contrasts with experience of statehood in the non-West.

This chapter examines discussions on the modern state in the social sciences and continues by examining how the knowledges and practices that reinforce the concept of the modern state are applied through contemporary development and state building projects. This chapter subsequently outlines the argument that the post-colonial modern state is the result of the application of a standard of civilisation by the European powers[10] during imperial and colonial interactions of the nineteenth century and was formalised through the establishment of institutions of global governance in the twentieth century. It then describes the methods and methodology used in developing the thesis before providing a brief chapter outline.

## 1.1 Conceptualising the Modern State in the Social Sciences

The modern state is often discussed as an objective and methodical entity that can exist in any global region. By framing the state in this manner, it is considered to be a structure that is flexible enough to adapt to the cultural environment in which it exists but rigid enough to produce a centralised form of politics and economics. The modern state, according to John Ruggie, is dependent on a framework of international law and international norms that separates the state from other systems of governance, emphasising the principle of territorial sovereignty.[11] The concept of sovereignty centres on the ability of a political entity – a government or sovereign – to make claims that they have the right to exercise final authority within delineated boundaries. The sovereign authority of the government is contained and bounded by the territory where the government has sole authority over everything within its

[9] Goddard 2002; Abed 1995; Tessler 2002.
[10] European powers, as it is used throughout this thesis, refers to the states that had been at the forefront of imperial and colonial expansion into the global peripheries, or global south, during the nineteenth century (France, Britain, and Russia), which were active participants in the production of distinct knowledges and practices of law, governance, religion, and society.
[11] Ruggie 1993, pp. 148-51.

specified territory.[12] Sovereignty is a foundational principle that is upheld within the international state system. Without territorial sovereignty and the recognition of sovereignty by states in the international state system, the state system could be subject to instability caused by a lack of constraints on state actions.

Sovereignty provides the government, as the sole responsible authority in the state, with the right to discipline through a legal framework that is upheld by state coercion and without interference from third parties.[13] State coercion does not necessarily refer to the direct use of force but to the regulation of society through an all-seeing system of police, military, and legal vigilance that binds society to a set of social norms and accepted actions, enforcing social, economic, and political rituals through the threat of force.[14] Ultimately, it is the recognition of these rights of internal authority by other actors in the international state system that provides the government with the ability to discipline, pacify, and control the populations unimpeded under the premise of non-interference. The production and establishment of these norms and practices "gives" the state in the international system its sovereignty;[15] a necessary condition for the continued existence of the state, and is a question of legitimacy.

International recognition of the modern state, the production of external legitimacy, however, relies on internal factors. The government gains its legal status and authority through a process of internal recognition and consent from civil and political society. Internal consent, as argued by Antonio Gramsci and Pierre Bourdieu is required for a government to administer its authority within the delineated territory.[16] Consent from the population does not have to take active forms, but can be passive. According to Pierre Bourdieu, passive consent, granted by most of the population is necessary for the continued existence of the state.[17] On the other hand, the concept of the state is upheld even by those who actively dissent against existing state institutions and governments. Active dissent is more often concerned with, and seeks to transform, the character of social, economic, and political governance. Although one can argue that secessionist movements dissent against the modern state, they also seek to assert statehood and sovereignty. In this manner, secessionist movements reinforce the concept of the state, seeking to reproduce the state and its

[12] Biersteker and Weber 1996.
[13] Chalcraft 2016, 30; Femia 1981, p. 28.
[14] Foucault 1995; Kertzer 1988, pp. 1-3; Belge 2013, p 17.
[15] Ruggie 1993.
[16] Bourdieu 2012; Gramsci 1999, pp. 542-550, 784.
[17] Bourdieu explains passive consent as being akin to the acceptance of our conception of time, Bourdieu 2012, pp. 13-22.

governing structures in an image that reflects the ideological and national character of the secessionist movement.[18]

Consent and dissent play important roles in the state, having the ability to maintain the status quo or affect change with regards to the relationship between governance and the management of society.[19] The relationship between society and the state is described by Migdal who argues that

> the state is a field of power marked by the use and threat of violence [it is] shaped by 1) the image of a coherent, controlling organisation in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and 2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.[20]

Migdal's discussion of the modern state, overestimates *how* democratic modern states are by taking a pluralist approach to how the state is negotiated. In his explanation of how the state transforms over time, Migdal asserts that public and private actors within the state make demands and negotiate with the state in a variety of ways.[21] Similarly, other pluralist approaches highlight the importance of a variety of overlapping and interconnected social forces that function in relation to governance and state institutions. These social forces are motivated by political, economic, and social factors – inclusive of identity.[22] On the other hand, Marxist approaches to the state examine social forces from an analytical perspective that places importance on economic stratification rather than the multiple categories of identity that are produced by public and private actors. Karl Marx argues that the modern 'liberal' state supports the interests of a small and economically privileged class of society. Indeed, the proletariat, for Marx, will eventually rise to dismantle the bourgeois society, to create a more egalitarian society, giving ascent to the classless ideal of communism.[23] While Marx is primarily concerned with an economic class struggle, the means of production, and capitalism, he disregards the significance of economic class as an identity construct that is layered upon other forms of identity.

---

[18] Prominent cases include Quebec, Kosovo, the former Czechoslovakia, and the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey; Tripp 2013, 20-68.
[19] White 2013, p. 4.
[20] Migdal 2001, pp. 15-16.
[21] Migdal 2001, pp. 15-16.
[22] Jessop 1982; Offe and Ronge 1982, pp. 249-250; (b) Mann 2012, p. 45.
[23] Hobson 2000, pp. 110-113.

The idea of multiple social forces that are identifiable through political and social categories, according to Marxists, can be reduced to economic class. With similar disregard to social forces, Gaetano Mosca argues that by maintaining a structure of organisation and communication, explicated by institutionalised laws and social norms, administered by an organised means of coercion, elites can ensure that the masses are organised, pacified, and compliant with laws and social norms.[24] Adding to Mosca's elitist approach to the modern state, Michael Mann notes that 'the masses comply because they lack collective organisation to do otherwise, because they are embedded within collective and distributive power organisations controlled by others. They are '*organisationally outflanked*'.[25] The state, which is physically delineated, is represented by a government that manages the threat and application of violence. The activities of the population, which are ordered and managed through the use and threat of violence, are further organised within the institutional practices of the state, where the state manages the life processes of society.

Unlike Marxist approaches to the state, which are concerned with capitalist expansion and class hierarchies, and elitist approaches that focus on the struggle for state power between elites, modernist approaches to the state focus on the *changes* in the means of production, consumption, and of scientific and social progress. Modernist approaches explain centralisation and bureaucratisation of governance over a delineated territory as a result of change in the social, economic, and political environments. It is argued that social and technological developments were processes that bore the groundwork for the development of a liberal social environment encompassing individual rights and liberties.[26]

Max Weber, like Friedrich Engels, argues that the disintegration of household authority is caused by modernity, the rise of capitalist enterprise, and the emergence of socio-political institutions and organisations that individuals order themselves in. Weber and Engels continue by arguing that with modernity came the fragmentation of the household as a socio-political and economic actor, shifting the onus of acquiring and managing capital onto the individual, ultimately changing the relationship between societal and state authority.[27] This is particularly grounded in histories of state formation that not only describe the rise of the state and shed light on how the state is described and defined in international relations, political science, and development scholarship, but also helps to explain the rise of the liberal

[24] Mosca 1939, p. 53.
[25] (a) Mann 2012, p.7.
[26] Gellner 2008, pp. 63-87.
[27] Weber 2013, p. 375; Engels 2010.

social environment that divided areas controlled by the state, the public sphere, from that of the private sphere, such as the family; and gave rise to the individual's direct relationship with structures of authority.

Whether an approach is concerned with the state being constituted by social forces, a small group of elites, a structure for capitalist enterprise, or is viewed as the product of modernity, the state maintains the characteristics of a government, whose power and authority is territorially delineated. In other words, the state is tantamount to the territory that the diffusion of authority is bound to, lest it infringes on another's sovereignty; it is within this territory that the institutions of authority organise and regulate the actions of individuals.[28]

Despite difference in how the state is studied and the focus of these studies, the scholarship discussed above reproduces theoretical interventions on the state from a Westphalian,[29] or Weberian, lens. Such a lens asserts that the state is contingent on '[…] a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'.[30] Weber's definition of the state, stripped of nationhood and cultural peculiarities, is a set of institutions that are globally replicated and viewed as objective in their global application by maintaining characteristics of an ideal type; an abstract and hypothetical concept that establishes an international benchmark – or a standard of civilisation. In this case, the ideal type with regards to the concept of the state is its associated institutional characteristics and functions, that do not correspond to any single case.[31]

## 1.2 Reinforcing the Ideal of the Modern State: Development, State Building, and Global Governance

Definitions and conceptions of statehood assume that the modern state and its political institutions are objective, void of cultural peculiarities and applicable to any global region. Indeed, conceptualising statehood through the Weberian lens allows one to assume that the modern state, in its application to the global peripheries,[32] will adapt to the cultural environment while organising politics and economics and, in turn, will make the region accessible to international actors (other states and international organisations). By

[28] Durkheim 1996, pp. 32-33.
[29] The Westphalian framework will be discussed further in Chapter 1.
[30] Weber 1946, p. 77.
[31] Weber 1997, p. 90.
[32] The concept of a global periphery is associated with world-systems analysis and dependency theory (Wallerstein 1979), it is particularly useful in the case of the nineteenth century because it helps to formulate a better understanding of the global regions which were targeted during the period of European economic and political expansion, also see Rosenberg 2010.

conceptualising the state as an ideal-type, it is possible to view and measure the state through a measurement of capability and capacity. Measuring the state in this manner creates a scale of incapability to capability, from failure and weakness to strength. In this regard, state weakness and failure requires determined development and state building projects to re-establish order by rebuilding or fixing deficiencies in institutions.

By conceptualising the state as an objective and methodical entity, meaning devoid of emotional, cultural, or historical influences, and based on factual and scientific reasoning, produced and established through a systemic procedure, development and state building projects seek to reinforce its associated institutions. Development and state building projects typically begin by measuring state capacity and developing programmes with the aim to alleviate states of deficiencies. Development focuses on specific sectors of the state through targeted development programmes, which are often concentrated on economic capacity, whereas state building encompasses a wider project of social, political, and economic transformation. Individuals, organisations, and states involved in development and state building projects employ a set of practices with the assumption that the modern state is a dominant superstructure that can order society into new, modern, and effective forms. By reordering political and economic rituals in ways that reflect the modern state in the West, development and state building projects attempt to establish a rationality to society and governance.[33] In other words, development and state building projects attempt to pacify populations that are deemed subversive, to replace political rituals that are viewed as illegitimate, barbaric, and uncivilised. This is done by building institutions and establishing new political rituals that are perceived as legitimate by development and state building practitioners. It is the continued attempt to facilitate practices associated with concepts of progress and modernity on states that are viewed as weak, failing, or failed.[34]

The creation of institutions that can be internationally recognised and which are deemed efficient signal legitimate authority that can facilitate interactions with external powers. Legitimacy, regarding the state, refers to the acceptance of an individual or political entity through relationships created by social exchanges and can be external or internal. External legitimacy refers to the relationships between the state and external actors within the international state system, whereas internal legitimacy refers to the relationship between the

[33] Rationality refers to the ability to make decisions based on scientific reason, to sufficiently disentangle the mind from wider obstacles created by barriers such as religion, kinship, or political favouritism. MacFarlane 1992, p.123.
[34] Scott 1998, pp. 4-5.

state and domestic population.[35] With regards to the aims of development and state building, parallels can be drawn to modernisation projects of the imperial and colonial era, particularly in their attempts to create institutions that were deemed externally legitimate.

Although imperial and colonial modernisation is temporally different and categorised differently from development and state building projects, imperial and colonial modernisation as well as development and state building are concerned with external recognition to facilitate economic and geo-political access, and to create an environment amenable to the rationalisation and civilising of society.[36] The focus on institutional engineering during imperial and colonial modernisation, although developed to achieve particular interests, they were justified based on early scientific ideas of human progress. Similarly, contemporary state building projects are implemented in states and justified based on an analysis of state capacity; a measurement of strength that discerns a state's ability to function within domestic and international environments. While the type of method used to measure the state in imperial and colonial periods is different to the measurement of contemporary state capacity, the paternalistic conception of modernity and progress is maintained at the foundation of the studies and the projects that followed into the post-colonial era. The indicators that measure strength for contemporary development and state building projects are used to label states with a typology, either strong, weak, failing, failed; a practice of measurement, the hierarchizing of the state on a scale of effectiveness that assumes rationality and irrationality, order and disorder, civilised and uncivilised. Development and state building projects, as did imperial and colonial modernisation, seek to replace knowledges and practices that are perceived as uncivilised in an effort to order nature and society within a rational design that is 'commensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws'.[37]

By measuring capability and capacity, development and state building attempt to use scientific methods to justify interference and intervention. Robert Rotberg and Stewart Patrick describe state failure and weakness as the inability or unwillingness of the governing bodies to provide the elements that are required for statehood such as, legitimate political institutions that provide a framework for economic management, social welfare, and physical security.[38] Rotberg argues that indicators of state failure include: enduring violence,

[35] Hegtvedt and Johnson 2009, pp. 376-399; Ian, 2005; McMahon and Western 2012, p.2; Fukuyama 2004; Chappuis and Hanggi 2009, p. 33.
[36] Saouli 1972, p. XV.
[37] Scott 1998, pp. 4-5.
[38] Rotberg 2004; Patrick 2006, p. 29.

victimization of citizens by the state, loss of control over peripheral territory, growth of criminal violence, flawed institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, lacking provisions of basic services, uneven economic opportunity, and widespread corruption.[39] Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick have developed a similar set of indicators as Rotberg to employ when examining state capacity, and also propose a set of actions that focus on the development of institutions.[40] These measurements, using the framework of the ideal-type of state, dissect the state to reveal the institutions and mechanisms that are deemed necessary to increase the strength of the state. The indicators, however, leave out a host of other sociological variables, including customary political, economic, and social hierarchies, that cannot be measured through institutional capacity and which could affect how institutions function.

K. Adalbert Hampel critiques the measurement of state capacity and the production of state typologies as being fundamental to an inconsistency between historical narratives of the organic polity of the modern-state and the outcomes of global hegemony that reinforce a particular political form at an international level.[41] In a similar vein, Branwen Gruffydd Jones argues that the language of state weakness and failure in the post-colonial world conjures notions of 'a general lack of capacity to develop, to rule or to be peaceful'.[42] The language of state weakness and failure echoes that of the colonial civilising missions that attempted largescale assimilation of the global peripheries within the dominant norms of governance in the European state system.

In contrast to the critiques of development and state building, Amartya Sen argues that development, if concerned with the ends, is the practice that gives people new freedoms. Like Hegel's conception of the state as an environment that permits freedoms which would otherwise not be enjoyed,[43] Sen argues that

> Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of

[39] Rotberg 2004.
[40] Rice and Patrick (2008) provide indicators that place states on a scale depending on their capacity to fulfil necessary criteria. This includes GNI per capita, GDP growth, income inequality, inflation, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice and accountability, control of corruption, freedom ratings, conflict intensity, political intensity, political stability and absence of violence, incidence of coups, gross human rights abuses, territory affected by conflict, child mortality, primary school completion, undernourishment, percent population with access to improved water sources and with access to improved sanitation facilities, life expectancy.
[41] Hampel 2015, pp. 1632-1638.
[42] Jones 2013, p. 49.
[43] Patten 1999.

> public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity of repressive states.[44]

Similarly, Rotberg asserts that notwithstanding the elements that may be inducing failure and weakness, states can be revived through the development of a stabilised environment by driving forward notions of law and order. Once a relative peace has been established, three goals should be pursued concurrently: economic development, rejuvenation of civil society, and the reintroduction of rule of law.[45] The goals outlined by Rotberg are commensurate with establishing effective control, however, the structure of legitimate economic development, rejuvenation of civil society, and the reintroduction of rule of law are narrowly understood by those pursuing these goals. They reflect, not the political, economic, and social customs of the society where the projects are being developed, but those of the modern state as an ideal type.

Although these approaches to development are bound by good intentions, the conviction that freedom can be obtained through institutional development and capacity building neglects the lack of international safeguards in reducing economic and political exploitation, which can reduce freedoms. While poverty, tyranny, social deprivation, social neglect, and intolerance are global political, economic, and social problems, the means pursued to alleviate society from these conditions reproduces paternalistic practices that employ Western frameworks reminiscent to colonial governance and imperial modernisation. For example, Sen is concerned with abolishing poverty, yet he seeks to further integrate underdeveloped regions into the global economic systems, which are responsible for exploitation and poverty.[46] While the impact of these projects may provide an ends in which the measurement of state capacity can produce a typology of strength, they can also produce new forms of repression and political violence, as well as new areas of poverty.

Responding to criticisms of development and state-building, Sen argues that rights and freedoms are not post-institutional developments, but are universal standards that reflect global human progress.[47] However, this produces an analysis that assumes human progress is unilinear and any divergence from this progress is viewed as moving backwards. It finds fault with the customary domestic institutions rather than the international institutions and

---

[44] Sen 1999, p. 3.
[45] Rotberg 2004.
[46] There are some interesting debates with regards to this economic dynamic such as those in uneven and combined development, Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008; Ashman 2009.
[47] Sen 1999, p. 229.

structures that reinforce ideas of social barbarity where rejection of universal (hegemonic) standards exist. In other words, the continued focus on political, economic, and social deficiencies in the non-West reproduces a Western-Non-Western, developed-underdeveloped, and civilised-uncivilised binaries that subordinate society and politics in the non-West to the ideas of progress and advancement of the West. Although he argues that focus should be placed on the outcome of development projects, the desirable outcome is extremely difficult to achieve if global institutions undercut independent growth and development.

Sen also addresses the critique of cultural exceptionalism with regards to universal rights and freedoms, arguing that there are many parallels between contemporary Western political ideas and Asian political thought, such as Confucianism.[48] While Sen is not wrong in arguing that parallels between the West and non-West do exist and that there is potential to transcend separate cultural regions by emphasising these parallels rather than focusing on difference, there is a problem with conflating Western concepts with Eastern philosophy and assuming a universality; particularly with regards to Western conceptual definitions and worldviews. As stated by Muhammad Asad,

> One should always remember that when the European or American speaks of "democracy," "liberalism," "socialism," "theocracy," "parliamentary government," and so forth, he uses these terms within the context of Western historical experience.

It is this historical experience which gives these terms their specific meaning in Western society and a - potentially - separate meaning in *Eastern philosophies*.[49]

By arguing that parallels between Western and Eastern philosophical frameworks can be used in development and state building projects also depends on the belief of global human progress as being linear and path dependent. By bringing progress to the global peripheries, Sen argues that new avenues of prosperity are created. However, the means to reorder, reconstitute, and civilise the *other*, creates harm.[50] Whether this is through economic aid, localised development projects that encourage civil society activity, or large scale state

[48] Sen 1999, pp. 233-4.
[49] This separation of Eastern and Western philosophies is a simplification that produces problematic categorical references but has utility by encouraging analysis of the histories and contexts of conceptual frameworks. Asad 1980, pp. 18, 19-23.
[50] See Linklater 2002, p. 15.

building projects, the exercise of prescribing solutions to create a stabilised environment almost always requires the threat and/or use of force, resulting in armed state building; the practice of exercising military power to compel the political classes of weak, failing, or failed states into governing through new frameworks and institutions that reflect the political, economic, and social sensibilities of the prescribing power.[51]

Practices of development and state building, whether they are focused on economic aid, institutional development, civil society programmes, largescale political projects, are framed within a narrative of conflict prevention and humanitarian intervention – to alleviate the condition of *unfreedom*. Although often noble regarding the intent of those pursuing the projects, they are primarily concerned with Western conceptions of progress; emphasising institutional capacity and the prevalent categories used at any given period of time.[52] Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart demonstrate this problem with the case of Nepal:

> A civil society leader in Nepal recounted how the aid system reinvents itself with new methods and languages, and the Nepali leaders spend their time learning those languages to meet the criteria of the moment. But as soon as they have mastered them and rewritten their documents, the approach changes, and the cycle begins all over again: poverty reduction, sustainable development, millennium development goals, capacity building.[53]

In addition to the emphasis on Western conceptions of progress, focused on institutional capacity, and reconfigured into new terminologies with new requirements, which – as in the case of Nepal – had become an exercise in bureaucratic expediency, Raja Menon argues that 'humanitarian intervention can never become an ethically driven pursuit disentangled from power and interests'.[54]

Menon continues to criticise development and state building, questioning its actual humanitarian application by arguing that it is a 'comprehensive solution – applicable worldwide, based on universal agreement'.[55] He argues that this comprehensive solution is

[51] Miller 2013, p. 4.
[52] Rotberg 2004; Rice and Patrick 2008; Menon 2016, p. 10.
[53] Ghani and Lockhart 2009, pp. 107-8.
[54] Menon 2016, p. 11.
[55] Menon 2016, p. 171.

not relevant to all states that are deemed weak, failing, or failed, and as such, states can pick to intervene based on interests and the balance of power in the international state system.[56] Menon highlights the case of the Kurdish population in Iraq, and argues that the U.S. had only begun to intervene on behalf of the Kurdish population after the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and had ignored the brutality of Saddam Hussein's regime during the period of the war in order to facilitate the fight against Iran.[57] Using the Iraqi-Kurdistan case as an example, Menon argues that the act of intervention and advocacy is aimed at producing favourable outcomes for the external party that intervenes. Whether this is to achieve regional stability, an allied partner, or to gain access to new economic markets and resources, harm is created by institution building and the dissemination of knowledges and practices, that require physical intervention and occupation, or armed social work;[58] bearing much similarity to the practices of colonialism.

The act of physical intervention and occupation with the aim of facilitating progress and development, through institution building, in order to create competitive international actors or stability, maintains characteristics similar to colonialism. Indeed, William Easterly argues that the era of development and state building, or what he calls postmodern imperialism, is the continuation of the previous colonial era.[59] Patricia Owens, describing instances of counterinsurgency, argues that those involved in the deployment of force seek to control populations, which is effectively the practice of domestic governance building and institutional engineering. Owens goes as far as to call these practices a distinctive type of government through armed social work.[60] The continuity between colonialism and contemporary interventions was a result of, according to Easterly, practices of colonialism that impaired economic and political development; breeding conditions that motivated the 'new White Man's Burden to clean up the mess left behind by the old White Man's Burden'.[61] The practices of colonialism led to the creation of badly structured institutions and administrations that had lasted beyond the period of decolonisation, which has required continuous interventions by Western states through institutions of global governance.

However, global governance amounts to the provision of order by the most powerful actors in the system. For this reason, a specific ideal of the state is reinforced,[62] this ideal places

[56] Menon 2016, p. 171.
[57] Menon 2016, pp. 11-12.
[58] Owens 2015, pp. 9-10; Galula 1964, pp. 62-63.
[59] Easterly 2006, p. 239.
[60] Owens 2016, pp. 9-10; Galula 1964, 62-63; Sitaraman 2012, pp. 36-37.
[61] Easterly 2006, p. 239.
[62] Muppidi 2004.

emphasis on the capacity of institutions by measuring and comparing efficiency. Ultimately assigning the state to a place on a scale, justifying the need to repair weak, failing, and failed states. In addition to critiques that development and state building reproduce colonial relationships through the vocabulary of development and state building, and in the attempt to repair institutional deficiencies for the sake of efficiency and progress, creating a cyclical problem of development and state building, Hamza Alavi argues that practices of development and state building can lead to overdevelopment. Alavi defines overdevelopment as the extreme bureaucratisation of structures of governance which tends to strengthen the state military apparatus as a source and provider of social order.[63] Nevertheless, despite criticisms regarding the knowledges and practices of development and state building, the modern state in its idealised conception, is upheld and reinforced.

The state, as the primary actor in the international state system, is essential to global governance. It is the state that enters negotiations and signs treaties on behalf of their populations. Although other actors, such as non-governmental organisations do play a role, the state is represented in global politics as a single unit that global governance orders and delineates; constraining units with regards to legitimate and illegitimate activities. Global governance, according to Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, refers to the practice of governing international reform, global environmental policy, global health policies, global environmental policies, gender policies, weapons proliferation, international trade, and peace-keeping.[64] At the same time, it is the state that gives global governance its power in norm creation and dissemination.[65]

Practices of global governance, including development and state building, rely on the threat and use of force to produce externally legitimate political rituals. In doing so, it is evident that these political rituals of modern statehood are not objective, despite the conceptual framing of the modern state as an objective set of institutions that can be implemented and developed in the global regions to order, civilise, and pacify the populations. Attempts to impose the idealised conception of the modern state in the non-West amount to oppressive practices that are representative of the international condition of the modern state in the non-West as subordinate to Western political, economic, and social ideals. At the heart of this problem is the idealised concept of the state, one that does not exist – even in the West – but which informs contemporary development and state building practices as a

[63] Alavi 1972.
[64] Koenig-Archibugi 2011, p. 393.
[65] Barnett and Duvall 2004.

continuation of previous knowledges and practices of imperialism and colonialism. It is evident that the language has changed in contemporary and historic practices, overtime it has become increasingly embedded in scientific categories and characterisations of how societies function and react, while maintaining the knowledge and practice of a standard, or benchmark, for the non-West to accede to.

### 1.3 The Standard of Civilisation and Nineteenth Century European Expansion

By examining the imperial and colonial knowledges and practices that are reproduced in contemporary development and state building, it is evident that the modern state constitutes a standard of civilisation, embedded in a history of European state formation, modernity, and expansion. Discussed above, the categories and the language regarding the benchmark of success (civilisation) have changed overtime, but the fundamental measure of success against an ideal-type has reproduced a standard that contributes to the continued exploitation and colonial interests of the West. This section outlines the scholarship on the standard of civilisation, discussing why and how it was applied to the global peripheries.

As described by David Fidler, the origins of the standard of civilisation emerged in the nineteenth century from 'the collision between Western civilisation and non-Western civilisation' through the expansion of European and American commerce and political influence, which required that the non-West accede to norms and laws developed by Western states. Polities in the non-West were required to create institutions that paralleled the political, economic, legal, and moral values of Western civilisation in order to be viewed and treated as equal participants.[66] Only under these conditions would the global peripheries be able to assert sovereignty, which would have had limited the ability of European states to fulfil economic and political interests.

This standard, which persists through development and state building, established a benchmark of capability and efficiency. However, the concept of civilisation has undergone transformation over time, in pre-modern Europe civilisation emphasised Christianity, chivalry, and trade to become conceptualised as the ability 'to undertake binding commitments under international law and whether it was able and willing to protect adequately the life, liberty, and property of foreigners'.[67] In practice, the two definitions were not mutually exclusive, John Westlake points to civilisation being the ability of governments

[66] Fidler 2001, p. 140.
[67] Fidler, 2001, p. 147.

to govern white men and because non-Western states could not provide governance to the appropriate standard, foreign nationals who were resident in the non-West were governed under separate legal systems administered through their national consuls.[68] The inability of the global peripheries to be civilised was seen as the result of a biological inability linked to racial and religious difference. It can therefore be argued that the transformation, from civilisation being encompassed by Christianity to a rational and positivist undertaking of a legal framework is an artificial rupture.[69] While modern notions of civilisation are often viewed as separate from histories of Christianity, chivalry, and pre-modern trade, emphasising the ability 'to undertake binding commitments' as a sign of rationality and progress, Christianity, chivalry, and trade did not disappear from the framework of civilisation.

The values that informed the nineteenth and early twentieth century standard of civilisation emerged from the Enlightenment and industrialisation, and were shaped by political and economic revolutions that had occurred throughout Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Ideas from this period formed the foundation of European modernity, the crux of inter- and intra- European politics, with Enlightenment thinkers concluding that public institutions would improve societies, if they were 'guided by a more realistic understanding of the universal or recurrent features of human existence'.[70] During this period, the study of societies became subject to the developments and reasoning of the natural sciences, believing that rational inquiry, could allow for the emergence of laws governing society as Sir Isaac Newton had discovered laws governing physical reality.[71] By linking scientific thought to institution building and social engineering, society, and by extension – the social field,[72] could be understood in a positivist manner, removing social order from the realm of pure chance.[73]

Through this understanding of the social world, 'social Darwinism' and 'scientific racism' gave an 'objective' 'scientific' basis to 'the superiority of Western culture'.[74] Western culture was shaped by institutions that instilled order, and education, according to radical Enlightenment thinkers, became the tool to disseminate equality, introduce authority, and eventually allow the masses to become emancipated from uncivilised and irrational

[68] Westlake 1914, pp. 143-145; Donelly 1998, p. 4; Fidler 2001, p. 143.
[69] Germond-Duret 2016.
[70] Linklater 2016, p. 271.
[71] Grell and Porter 2000; Kurki 2015, p. 789.
[72] See Page 30 for a description of the social field.
[73] Hume 1875, pp. 174-189; Buzan 2014, p. 578.
[74] Donelly 1998, p. 6.

knowledges and practices.[75] As Western culture became focused on a scientific understanding of order as the crux of modern civilisation, Western dominance in the global peripheries became an 'expression of scientific laws rather than an accident of power politics', and Enlightenment ideas of progress, liberal ideas of civilisation, the influence of trade, were believed to have pacifying effects on the uncivilised.[76]

The impact of Enlightenment, industrialisation, and political revolutions in Europe transformed Christian-European international society into the modern European state system, a precursor to the contemporary international state system. But the changing patterns of relations between Europe and the global peripheries was limited. Where, in Europe the concept of 'civilisation' was historically viewed as being analogous to 'Christianity, chivalry, and trade', which justified Christian-European domination, the emergence of the modern European state system, which maintained oppressive force over the global peripheries, did so by justifying others to the realm of 'disorder' and 'savagery'.[77] The pre-modern categories related to a religious worldview were replaced by new linguistic categories that reflected the modern scientific rationality of European civilisation, however, practices subordinating the global peripheries went unchanged, providing continued European dominance through attempts to civilise the global peripheries.

European domination in the global peripheries was justified by conceptions of civilisation that were reflected in an ordered and pacified society characterised by the consolidation of the modern sovereign state, the distinctive international state system, and the configuration of global peripheries into colonial empires.[78] As Gerrit Gong argues, the standard of civilisation was used to help navigate practical and philosophical problems during the period of European expansion. For example: it gave way to the requirement that non-Western societies would allow legal protections to Western citizens residing in foreign lands according to a Western standard. The standard of civilisation established a benchmark denoting which societies could come to acquire legal recognition and legal personality under international public law.[79] The benchmark for becoming a member of the international state system was to become a recognised state that guaranteed basic rights for foreign nationals, an organised political bureaucracy and the maintenance of a monopoly of force, a Western-style system of domestic law with codified laws, equal administration of justice throughout all territories,

[75] Hampson 1968, p. 154.
[76] Donelly 1998, p. 6.
[77] Kingsbury 1999, pp. 66, 90; Fidler 2001, p. 147; Linklater 2016, p. 228.
[78] Elias 2010, p. 166.
[79] Fidler 2001, p. 140-1. Gong 1984.

the ability to engage in international relations through diplomatic institutions and resources, and acquiescence to international law; conforming to Western customs and norms.[80]

Inscribed in this standard was the idea that it appealed to a set of universal moral values, attainable by every society to accede to modernity.[81] According to Barry Buzan, this is one reason why the Ottomans, the Egyptians, the Japanese and others embraced modernising projects during the long 19th century – the implementation of legal, administrative and fiscal reforms held out the promise, in theory if rather less so in practice, of a pathway towards equality of status within the international state system.[82]

Accession to the European state system as a full sovereign member was a key motivation for the Ottoman modernisation project, as the alternative was continued subordination. Just as the European state system was a consequence of modernity, subordination of the global peripheries was also a condition of modernity, which required the global peripheries to be subject to European desires and interests. Accession as a full sovereign member would guarantee the rights of non-interference and limit social, political, and economic interventions made by colonial and imperial powers. Imperial modernisation of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent colonisation of the Syrian provinces, sought to diminish the difference between polities categorised as civilised and those that were categorised as barbarian.[83] While the global peripheries challenged Western dominance, particularly following the Second World War, the states in the non-West 'did not reject the constitutive principles of [Western] society, such as the ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention',[84] and many newly independent states attempted to reassert these principles - principles these regions had actively sought to achieve through imperial modernisation with the aim of invoking rights to non-interference and non-intervention.

With the advent of the modern state in Europe and the development of the European state system, the standard of civilisation was not only enforced through legal frameworks, including the ability of the global peripheries to assert legal character over Europeans residing in their countries and accession to international law. It was also asserted through nineteenth century imperial modernisation and colonialism that sought to order, civilise, and rationalise the populations in the global peripheries through institutional engineering and coercion.

[80] Fidler 2001, p. 141.
[81] Donelly 1984; Graham, Nosek, Haidt, et al. 2011.
[82] Buzan 2014, p. 578-579.
[83] Donelly 1998, pp. 9-10.
[84] Linklater 2016, p. 228.

Such projects were early attempts to force a framework of modern European statehood on the global peripheries with the goal of civilising the populations.

### 1.4 The Modern State as a Standard of Civilisation: The Problem of Modern Non-European State Formation

In making the argument that the modern state in the global peripheries is the product of a standard of civilisation, the modern state is deployed through a specific set of assumptions, including conceiving it as a centrally administered means to organise politics, the economy, and society – to produce order and efficiency by creating civilised groupings of people. Although 'civilisation' has been used to distinguish people living within cultural fault-lines,[85] it is used here with reference to society being refined, orderly, and polite, separate from societies' barbarianism and savage tendencies that characterised Europe's pre-modern past. Discussing the French conceptualisation of civilisation, Dena Goodman states:

> 'By the eighteenth century, French men of letters had come to identify French culture with sociability and sociability with the polite society of men and women […] They viewed their own culture as the best in the world […] it [their culture] had reached the highest point civilisation had yet attained.'[86]

This quote places emphasis on the characteristics of civilised society, describing civilisation – in a global sense – as being a scalable concept and with French high society being at the uppermost point of civilisation. Although society had become refined, ordered, and polite, it did not constitute a rupture from pre-modern knowledges, particularly with regards to how the 'other' was characterised and categorised. Through the process of modernity, tied to enlightenment and industrialisation, to be civilised – as a society – meant to be managed by the state's centralised institutions, which orders, and organises society by maintaining a monopoly of force, controlling the economic markets, and managing the life processes of its citizens. However, as argued by Menon, this form of development and state building cannot be separated from motivating interests, and, as argued by Gong, the standard of civilisation provided a means to navigate the practical and philosophical problems, justifying the pursuit of interests while maintaining the rhetoric of good intentions.

[85] Huntington 1997.
[86] Goodman 1996, pp. 3-4.

This thesis highlights the importance of history in the development of the modern state. It focuses on the interactions between the West and the non-West in the production of knowledges and practices regarding the standard of civilisation, the development of the 'self' as well as the 'other' in the categories and associated characteristics that were central to understanding the international. By arguing that the modern state in the global peripheries is the result of the application of a standard of civilisation, this thesis contends that the history of imperial and colonial interactions with customary knowledges and practices requires consideration in the conceptualisation of the modern state. In doing so, it considers the history of the post-colonial state, specifically in Lebanon and Syria, the implications of European politics and European hegemony, global governance, and the maintenance of a standard of civilisation.

Using the case of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the territories that encompass the modern states of Lebanon and Syria, and covering the period between 1800 and 1944, this thesis explores how the state, as a standard of civilisation, was applied in the creation of Lebanon and Syria. In particular, the thesis examines how the export of knowledges and practices of modern European statehood impacted the development of authority and governance in Lebanon and Syria, creating permanent colonial structures that reconfigured customary authority into modern political categories.

The state as a standard of civilisation has its history in the formation of the modern European state, which was a culturally and socially specific outcome to a set of domestic social processes rooted in intellectual and technological developments, where political, economic, and social change was reflected by transformations in governance. These transformations led to the expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries, which emphasised the idea that the organisation of the modern state was superior and provided a solution to the other forms of political, economic, and social organisation, which were perceived as irrational, barbaric, and fanatical.

With the expansion of the European state system, the modern state in Europe was established as a benchmark for the global peripheries. However, European expansion into the global peripheries enforced knowledges and practices of European statehood through imperialism and colonialism, establishing a relational dynamic of subordination to European superiority. This relationship required the global peripheries to replicate the institutions, norms, and forms of governance of the modern European state in order to ascertain

independence.[87] In doing so, peripheral polities would eventually have their sovereignty recognised, their legal character would become legitimate, and they would be able to participate within the institutions and frameworks of the international state system.

In exporting the knowledges and practices of the modern state into the global peripheries, the institutions and ideas of the modern state created disruptions within the social field. The social field refers to the conceptual space where groups – tribal, religious, ethnic, linguistic, political, and economic – form alliances and come into conflict to produce hierarchies and governance.[88] In other words, the social field is the environment where alliances and conflicts emerge between various groups, producing and facilitating politics and the economy.[89] As Pierre Bourdieu describes it, the social field is multidimensional with regards to the way in which agents operate in relation to economics, politics, and other agents. Bourdieu makes te argument that relations in the social field are never occurring separate from the other elements in the social field.[90] Within this field, that is bound by a central authority, a variety of factors – including norms, laws, institutions – constrain and provide opportunities to agents, impacting how society develops and relates to authority. As well as how changes in the social field (economic, political, industrial, intellectual, etc.) and the expanding or condensing boundaries of the social field, can provide opportunities for agents to alter authority and norms, laws, and institutions. For example, with continued European interventions, the expansion of European knowledges and practices altered and disrupted the relations within the social field in the Ottoman Empire. As a result of these interventions, the social field expanded to include European actors. The hierarchies and norms produced by these new relations within the social field led to social and political transformations with regards to the relationship between agents and institutions of authority. The pursuit of interests by European powers impeded the replication of the modern European state in the global peripheries. The application of the modern state as an objective set of knowledges and practices, separate from their historical development, was subject to the European state system and the governments of the Ottoman Empire, leading to difference in the knowledges and practices of the modern state outside Europe.

While the European powers held the global peripheries to the standard of modern statehood that had emerged in Europe, arguing that the replication of the European state would relieve

[87] This is what Homi Bhabha calls hybridity, see Bhabha 1994, p. 38.
[88] Saouli 1972, p. XV; Migdal 2001.
[89] Rottmann 2014; Heemskerk 2011.
[90] Bourdieu 1985.

the global peripheries of their inferior position, the development of the modern state in the global peripheries was produced under the conditions of colonial and imperial violence, economic exploitation, and the destruction of political, economic, and cultural knowledges and practices that were perceived as backwards by the European powers. Although it can be argued, as it was during the nineteenth century, that colonial and imperial interventions brought modern technology, political and social order, and opened the economies to global markets, colonial and imperial powers were primarily interested in achieving a set of economic and political interests that were beneficial to their own status. The consequence of this experience resulted in resistance to European encroachment through the strengthening of certain customary knowledges and practices but also the adoption of knowledges and practices associated with the modern state.

Although knowledges and practices of statehood were being adopted, the inferior position of the global peripheries was to the benefit of European geo-strategic and economic interests. Despite modernisation, the subordination of the global peripheries to the European states was maintained due to the enduring form of pre-modern and customary political, economic, and social customs, as well as engagement in acts of resistance. The expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries was primarily motivated by the development of a global economic system and colonial and imperial geo-strategic interests,[91] rather than a humanitarian desire to civilise. Nevertheless, the justification for continued interference was one of moral authority that was upheld in the establishment of the modern state in Europe and which would do the same in the global peripheries.

The European powers of the nineteenth century, primarily Britain, France, and Russia, had come to believe that the knowledges and practices of modern statehood in Europe were the pinnacle of civilisation, establishing a benchmark for the global peripheries to accede to, while, at the same time subordinating the global peripheries to pursue political and economic interests. Still, the modern state was viewed as a set of institutions that could be objectively applied in a universal fashion, despite the historically specific environment in which they emerged. The modern state as a standard of civilisation affirmed that the global peripheries could accede to the European state system once internal political, economic, and social dynamics successfully replicated those in Europe. Only under these conditions could the state in the global peripheries obtain the degree of international legal character that would permit its equal legal status and the assertion of sovereignty.

[91] Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015.

The European powers had unwittingly been active participants in their own social development, a result of social, political, and economic transformations, that altered existing forms of governance, norms, and institutions to better navigate the changing reality. By no means was this an easy task, these transformations often brought violence, revolution, and dissent, but the end result of the transformation was the standard, often in an idealised and stylised form, to which the global peripheries were required to accede to. While compliance to this standard was being demanded of polities in the global peripheries, it was also in constant transformation in Europe.

The ongoing transformations occurring in Europe are not only reflected in European history, but also the changing nature of the European relationship with the global peripheries and the demands that were being made by European powers. In addition to these demands changing with continued transformations in Europe, the application of a standard of civilisation was a tool that was used by European states to make gains and attain interests. In this manner, the standard of civilisation was a moving benchmark that was purposefully shifted when attainment was close. By moving the benchmark of what it meant to be civilised, the European powers were able to justify continued interventions and interference on the premise that the target polity had failed to act as an agent in its own civilising process.

### 1.5 Sources, Method, and Methodology

The thesis examines the case of the nineteenth century Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire (1800-1918) followed by the twentieth century French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria (1920-1943). By applying a case study approach the thesis provides an 'intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of the understanding of a larger class of (similar) units'.[92] Selection of this case study was based on characteristics such as imperial and colonial interactions within the context of an emerging international state system and its role as a peripheral actor in the European state system. The purpose for selecting on this criteria is to analyse the multilateral interactions that occurred between various actors at various levels of analysis, such as the international, the state, and the local domestic levels. Through this case study, the thesis examines the relationships between each level and within each level. For example, when discussing the relationships between levels, it examines actors within the European state system, the Sublime Porte,[93] and the local forms of authority and the

[92] Gerring 2004, p. 342.

[93] The Sublime Porte, the centre of Ottoman government and administration, contained various political factions working within and the Sultanate which at times acted independently and suppressed the bureaucratic system. However, when

interactions across all three. When discussing the relationships within each level, it examines the relationships between European state actors, or between actors within the Sublime Porte, or within the local levels. In a similar fashion, when discussing the French Mandate (1920-1943), the thesis considers the relationship between Britain, France, Lebanon and Syria through a multi-level analysis. Through the case study approach, future research can be conducted in a similar fashion with the aim to better understand the sociological dynamics of statehood in a particular region.

The use of the case of the Syrian provinces in the Ottoman Empire (1800-1918) and the French mandate of Lebanon and Syria (1920-1943) relies primarily on archival documents: newspapers, travel diaries, political despatches, treaties, legislation, records of parliamentary sessions, and official speeches, in order to reconstruct a history of state formation in Lebanon and Syria that puts the state – as a product embedded in the social field and international state system – at the centre of analysis. Data was collected from the British National Archives, the British Parliamentary Archives, the British Library, the French Diplomatic Archives, the French National Archives, the Lebanese National Archives, and the archives at l'Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut. By examining these archival documents, I was able to gain insight into the various political narratives of the representatives of the European powers. This was achieved through close analysis of despatches from British and French ambassadors, consuls, and consular managers, to their governments in London and Paris. In these archives were also memoirs, personal letters, and newspapers by British and French citizens living in, or travelling through, the territories that now compose Lebanon and Syria, as well as individuals who were native to Lebanon and Syria, subjects of the Ottoman Empire more generally, or individuals who had entered the Ottoman Empire seeking refuge from political events in Europe.

In using these archives, I was primarily concerned with information regarding European perceptions of Lebanese and Syrian society and governance in the Ottoman Empire, Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of the state – including the Ottoman Empire and the French Mandate, and Lebanese and Syrian perceptions of the European powers. By looking at how these relationships developed within the context of material interests, ideological pursuits, state centralisation and bureaucratisation, and nationalist developments, a story

referring to the Sublime Porte, I am referencing the central governing body of the Ottoman Empire in a general manner, see Hanioğlu 2008, pp. 66, 73, and 109.

about state formation in Lebanon and Syria emerges within the context of a global standard of civilisation.

In producing this research, I have come across contradictions in the primary source documents, which aroused uncertainty. In resolving this issue, I have attempted to triangulate the information available in the primary source documents with secondary source histories or I have returned to the archives with the aim of drawing conclusions. The use of archival documents triangulated with secondary source histories has provided me with the ability to undertake a mixed methods approach, using historical analysis, content analysis, and discourse analysis. Through a historical analysis, this research attempts to reconstruct history. In doing so, it considers historical development as an assemblage of knowledges and practices. It maintains that customary knowledges and practices were assembled, not into perfect reproductions of modern European knowledges and practices, but into an amalgamated forms, that blended 'pre-modern' and 'modern', non-European and European.[94] Indeed, Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan argue that the institutions and logics of past polities do not entirely disappear, instead, their mark is left on the 'structures and processes and on the institutions, cultures, politics and legal systems of the peoples who inhabit [these] territories'.[95] By thinking in terms of assemblage and by tracing the history of state formation in chronological order it is possible to uncover layered forms of organisation, networks, and politics that undermine the assumption that knowledges and practices can be perfectly replicated through state building and development.[96] Assemblage allows researchers to consider, for example, how modern social structures and customary social systems produce hybridity within institutions.

Additionally, I carefully reject the idea of historical 'facts' in the use of archival documents for the reconstruction of the history of the state in the Lebanon and Syria, by understanding history as being the product of a story which represents the situated knowledge and action of the individual or group who is narrating. For this reason, the research attempts to accord historical accounts to interests, power relationships, and goals.[97] In doing so, this research employs content analysis in order to reveal underlying meanings and ideas in the narration of historical accounts in the primary source documents.[98] At times, this research employs a

[94] This is particularly evident with the waves of nationalism in the late nineteenth century. Tibi 1971; Jones 2013; Lamarck 1914.
[95] Halperin and Palan 2015, p. 1.
[96] For more on assemblage thinking, see Sassen and Ong 2014.
[97] Rowlinson 2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003.
[98] Krippendorff 2004, pp. 11-12.

discourse analysis, particularly when meanings and ideas require contextualisation with regards to power. Using discourse analysis, this research also draws on language as source of power that influences, reinforces, and legitimates the worldviews, actions, and positions of the actors involved.[99] From this, it is possible to decipher intent and interests including, the motivating factors of actors in the decision-making process. In providing a historical analysis, content analysis, and discourse analysis of the primary source documents, this research aims to answer three questions: what is the document's purpose? How does this document fulfil its purpose? What knowledges or worldviews are being created or reinforced through this document?

## 1.6 Thesis Outline

By arguing that the state in Lebanon and Syria, and more generally, the global peripheries, constitutes a standard of civilisation, this thesis examines how the state as a standard of civilisation was applied, impacting the knowledges and practices of statehood in Lebanon and Syria.

Chapter 2 provides a theoretical and conceptual framework that is used in exploring the argument. It begins by examining the scholarship on the emergence of the modern state in Europe and follows by examining the conditions of modernity through nineteenth century interactions between the European powers, the Sublime Porte, and the Syrian provinces; to better comprehend the pre-modern and the modern knowledges and practices, which framed European actions. However, the chapter also places importance on the form of governance within the Sublime Porte that had developed prior to the nineteenth century European-Ottoman interactions as well as authority within the social field in the Syrian provinces (focusing on the territories with contemporary Lebanon and Syria).

Chapter 3 examines the initial development and application of the standard of civilisation to governance and authority in the Ottoman Empire. It considers the relationship that developed between Britain and France and the Sublime Porte during the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832) and the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841). By examining these events, the chapter highlights the strategies of Britain and France to pursue national interests and assert a civilisational benchmark on governance, taking advantage of the dislocation between the social field and governance.

[99] Bryman 2004, pp. 528-540.

Chapter 4 examines the consequences of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) as the product of a civilisational standard that facilitated the pursuit of European interests. It considers how the reform decree dislocated the social field from governance and authority, creating opportunities for the British, French, and Russian governments to engage in the pursuit of interests. This chapter examines the consequences of this pursuit by highlighting the development of the Crimean War (1853-1856), the resulting Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), and the Sublime Porte's constrained position in governance.

Chapter 5 examines the destructive impact of modernisation reforms and European interference, with the case of the Damascus Massacre of 1860. It continues by analysing the consequence of violent resistance to modernity and European interference as the expansion of imperial knowledges. This chapter subsequently highlights the Young Ottoman faction within the Sublime Porte, which reproduced the knowledges and practices of modernity within the framework of Islam, developed to accede to the civilisational benchmark and to maintain domestic legitimacy.

Chapter 6 considers the consequences of the failures of the political project put forward by the Young Ottomans. This includes an analysis of British and French responses to Sultan Abdul Hamid II's centralisation of power and the development of Arab nationalist sentiment in the Syrian provinces.

Chapter 7 examines the role of the Arab nationalist movement and Turkish nationalist movements within the Ottoman Empire in attempting to uphold principles of the modern state. This chapter highlights that while the institutions, structures, and concepts of modern statehood had been disseminated, the character of the modern state, the form of household authority, was still contested. It examines this experience within the context of European instability, the outbreak of the First World War (1914-1918), and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1918).

Chapter 8 analyses the context of the reproduction of the standard of civilisation under the French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria through the establishment of global governance and within the framework of state building. It examines how French interests continued to dominate in the development and reconfiguration of the state and the consequences French actions had on the establishment of the independent states of Lebanon and Syria.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the argument and empirical evidence, highlighting how the state was the product of a standard of civilisation, which distorted customary household authority through the creation of imperial and colonial institutions and categories had been employed for the benefit of European interests. Subsequently, it discusses the theoretical implications of this research and suggestions for future research.

## Chapter 2: History and Theory: The European State, Modernity, and the Syrian Provinces of the Ottoman Empire

### 2 Introduction

Discussions and studies on the modern state typically reproduce an ideal-type, often concerned with a centralised government that is able to assert authority over a delineated territory that can be considered in a Weberian framework. Authority in this manner consists of a monopoly of force, structured and efficient political and economic institutions managed by a central government, responsible for the life processes of its citizens, and which organise and discipline society. By conceptualising the state in this manner, it is perceived as a means to organise the political, economic, and social environment into an efficient framework, one that is measured and that can be categorised into a typology of failure, weakness, and strength. The measurement of the state, particularly in practices of development and state building, reproduce a colonial dynamic between the West and states in the global peripheries. The typology of weakness and failure, and subsequent development and state building projects and policies that are produced from these typologies, subordinates the global peripheries to imperialistic knowledges and practices under the façade of bringing progress and civility. The state, in its ideal form, and exported in this manner, is a universal goal to be attained; a standard of civilisation that represents rational governance, efficiency, and progress that is upheld and reinforced through development and state building, and which emerged in the nineteenth century.

This chapter establishes a framework to examine how the state, as a standard of civilisation, was applied to the global peripheries and the knowledges that were imposed during its application, specifically in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This chapter begins by analysing the history of modern state formation in Europe. From this analysis, it is possible to expose the pre-modern knowledges and practices that were applied to the non-West during the period of European expansion. It considers the modern state, as it is conceived of in the West, as being informed by specific social traditions that were then shaped by the unique contexts of the industrialisation and the Enlightenment. This includes a worldview informed by Christian-European knowledges and practices that were assembled with ideas of rational order and scientific progress in the development of a standard of civilisation during nineteenth century European expansion into the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter follows with a discussion on the expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, drawing on examples of how nineteenth century and early twentieth century European ideas were put into practice to replicate the modern state. While this history is concerned with a narrative of domination, of knowledge and practice production, often by coercive means in the pursuit of national interest, there exists a history of resistance. The modern state was applied to the global peripheries in the pursuit of economic and political interests, aspects of statehood were also adopted by those being dominated with the aim to assert sovereignty and resist continued interference and exploitation.

The modern state was not simply applied through European domination or Ottoman reforms, but through interaction between European states and the Sublime Porte, as well as between European States, the Sublime Porte, and the social field in the Syrian provinces. In order to understand the impact of the standard of civilisation on the Ottoman Empire and the Syrian provinces, this chapter subsequently examines how Ottoman governance in the Syrian provinces developed. By outlining the development of Ottoman governance prior to the nineteenth century period of modernisation, it is possible to understand how the social field became dislocated from governance during early periods of modernisation, and how aspects of the social field were used by the European powers in the pursuit of interests.

## 2.1 Modern State Formation in Europe: The Emergence of a Civilisation

The state defined in Weberian terms is implicitly accepted as a starting point in the disciplines of international relations, political science, and development studies. Because the state emerged from a specific understanding of Western, and particularly European, history, it is through this historical understanding that the concept of the state has developed and been applied, often going uncontested.[1] The history of state formation in the international state system typically refers to the Peace of Westphalia, 1648. Although its importance is debated, it was through the Peace of Westphalia that the rulers of European states acknowledged state authority through national government and undermined 'the pope's claim to universal authority'.[2] The consequence of this recognition was the regulation of relations between European states, but only among those who were deemed 'civilised' enough to have legal character.[3]

[1] Schmidt 1998; Waever 1998.
[2] Croxton 1999, pp. 571-572.
[3] Waltz 1979, pp. 39-41, 65-67; Croxton 1999.

According to Henry Snow, the Peace of Westphalia formed a community of 'the civilised world […] composed of a body of states wholly independent and only morally bound by such agreements as they might choose to make, for such time as they might choose to keep them'.[4] While it established a community of nations, it also emphasised the authority and independence of leaders in Europe. The combination of community and independence, as stated by Sebastian Schmidt, were 'strange bedfellows',[5] because the independence of the European state was bound to, and restricted by, a set of communal agreements. The emergence of the modern state and its recognition by other modern states provided the basis of sovereignty, leading to the production of the international state system. This particular system of state independence and international community produced a framework of legitimacy that emerged through the history of state formation in Europe.

Although the emergence of the modern state in Europe and the Peace of Westphalia represents a shift in global political history, it does not present a historical rupture. The modern state is often considered to be a symbol of progress and civilisation, the product of political, economic, and social interactions that developed during modernity, which stands in contrast to the pre-modern European condition, which was uncivilised and backwards. By exploring the histories of state formation in Europe, the sharp contrast between the pre-modern and modern conditions that existed in Europe is contested, it becomes evident that the modern state represents an assemblage of modern knowledges and practices with distinctly pre-modern foundations. By examining the histories of European state formation, it is possible to trace the pre-modern underlying aspects to the modern state.

State formation, according to Charles Tilly, was the product of conflict and war, which helped establish borders, encouraged increased material and agricultural production due to taxation, that helped develop regulated economic systems, and necessitated social cohesion through the creation of an external enemy. Tilly's explanation also provides an understanding of how networks of individuals wielding authority expanded over territories, negotiated with competitors, eliminated competitors, and developed centralised institutions to manage the functions of their communities,[6] relating state formation to organised crime.

Tilly's description of state formation, informed primarily by the European experience, maintains a comprehensive focus on political, economic, and social development through

[4] Henry Snow 1912, p. 891.
[5] Schmidt 2011, p. 607.
[6] Tilly 1992.

war-making. On the other hand, Julia Adams develops a narrower explanation by exploring the impact of elite politics. Adams examines the relationships between elites, focusing on rulers, families, and staff who were driven by the need to secure control of capital and territory. Where Tilly argues that the slow expansion through conquest and absorption led to the development of centralisation and institutionalisation, occurring out of necessity, Adams argues that the individuals' desire to fulfil self-interest altered the structures of governance and administration and thus the role of the state.[7]

Between Tilly's analysis of competition between, and expansion of, political regions in the formation of states and Adams' narrative of institutional development tied to individual interests, Hendrik Spruyt focuses on elite politics as being central to the proliferation and reinforcement of ideas between competing groups with regards to governmental organisation and order. Using the case of pre-1400 France, Spruyt emphasises the role of French Capetian Kings (987-1328), who along with the burghers and acquiescence of nobility, favoured authority structures built around territorial boundaries and ownership. Feudal elites and the clergy, however, preferred authority governed by personal ties and lineage. According to Spruyt, competition between the two groups was sufficient for centralisation to occur, which fostered unique national identities that helped in the establishment of the modern state.[8] Although Spruyt considers the role of the clergy, who sought to fulfil a specific set of political interests, Philip S. Gorski argues that it was not the interests of religious men but the importance of a value system that maintained a robust and comprehensive hierarchy which led to the institutional development of the state. Focusing on Calvinism in seventeenth century Holland, Gorski argues that religion had a major role on how Dutch capitalism and society was structured, impacting the development and efficiency of state structures.[9]

While centralisation, territoriality, and efficiency are discussed in these histories, there was no determined path to modern statehood in Europe. Whether state formation occurred through war and competition, elite politics, or hierarchical norms propagated through religious belief or political ideology and affecting politics and the economy, the development of political and economic authority was eventually bound to a defined territory that required the policing of borders. Although the modern state in Europe was eventually established with fixed borders, the state, and prior to the development of international norms of

[7] Adams 2005.
[8] Spruyt 1994, pp. 31, 95.
[9] Gorski 2003.

sovereignty was an expansive entity in Europe. In addition to the importance of political and economic authority as aspects in shaping identities, worldviews, and relations between states, technological and intellectual advancements from the industrialisation and Enlightenment also contributed to the emergence of the modern state. Progress related to industrialisation and the Enlightenment changed perceptions of time and space, distances became shorter to travel and culture and economic trade from the capitals to neighbouring regions increased. It was therefore easier to assert power from a central authoritative structure outwards into areas that were previously considered ungovernable. The increased ability of political authority to assert itself over regions further afield led to expansion and a rationalisation of state institutions that would allow efficient management society and the economy.

Norbert Elias concurs that as power centralised under a monarchy, society increasingly became ordered and pacified by increasingly stable monopolies on taxation and violence. The civilising character of this transformation provided 'pacified social spaces […] which are normally free from acts of violence'.[10] Centralisation of governance released society from the instability of multiple power centres and the constant threat of force that had accompanied it.[11] The tamed environment also tempered the emotional responses of society by binding society in social norms, creating an interdependence between the individual, society, and the state: '[…] from this interdependence of people arises an order *sui generis*, an order more compelling and stronger than the will and reason of the individual people composing it'.[12] The result of this process was the transformation of social order, the civilising of society, which was tied to the emergence of the modern state, where the modern state became the symbol of the ability to be civilised.[13]

As argued by Andrew Linklater, economic and military demands, such as taxation and inscription, on the population by the central political authority led to a civilizing process that elevated the role and duty of customary social forms, which had been responsible for managing the life processes of individuals within customary networks, into the state.[14] Increasingly, centres of authority looked towards political ideas of Enlightenment thinkers, changing the dynamics of the royal household to include bourgeois elements in the royal courts, creating a new emphasis on public interest, and altering the dynamic of state-society

[10] Elias 1994, p. 447.
[11] Elias uses Feudalism as an example.
[12] Elias 1994, pp. 444.
[13] Elias 1994, pp. 443-456.
[14] Linklater 2016, pp. 186-195.

relations.[15] The interplay between state expansion and the changing character of centralised governance led to stronger emphasis on the relationship between the individual and the state, the former navigating the institutions of the state as they once had navigated the customary groups and networks. In turn, the state was increasingly responsible for ordering and pacification of individuals and the management of life processes, which had been the responsibility of the customary household prior to the establishment of the modern state.

The modern state, able to organise and civilise society, was considered an indication of a society's ability to be modern. Ferdinand Toennies argues that through modernisation man moves from *Gemeinschaft*, a social order based on the premise of kinship and managed through household authority, to instrumentalised relationships between individuals to make gains regarding profit and power. Toennies calls the latter phenomenon *Gesellschaft*; describing it as a condition of modernity and increased production and wealth.[16] Perceptions of modern governance encompassed freedom from the limits of household obligations and freedom to act within the legal confines of statehood so as improve one's individual condition.

The centralisation of governance, the monopolisation of taxation and violence through centralised institutions, as argued by Elias and in a similar fashion to Tilly, was crucial to the development and formation of the modern state. While society was ordered and civilised through the formation of the state, Michael Mann, in agreement with Migdal, argues that societies are heterogeneous, containing multiple overlapping and intersecting networks of power, which cannot be considered as a single unit for analysis.[17] Heterogeneous society, according to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, is composed of civil society groups that seek the fulfilment of particular interests, which would benefit their position and status. Hegel contends that these groups must work within the state, which is composed of legislative, executive, and judicial institutions that mediate and implement decisions that affect the universal community within the territory of the state.[18] Despite the heterogeneity of society, society functions within a framework that is universally administered and is composed and regulated by the state. This framework is institutional, and while society is understood as a principal component of the state, institutions order the social organisation by managing the demands and administering governance. In other words, these institutions were systems to

[15] Linklater 2016, pp. 269-70
[16] Heberle 1937.
[17] (a) Mann 2012, pp. 1-2.
[18] Patten 1999, pp. 163-169, 172.

distribute power in society, allowing change but maintaining organisational superiority over society.[19] These institutions, although often associated with modernity have a history in customary forms of organisation, inclusive of religion, as argued by Spruyt and Gorski.

As the state centralised, the social field underwent a transformation, the customary networks that had previously managed life processes had been replaced by institutions that emphasised the role of the individual and individual's relationship to the state. Although Weber and Engels conclude that the state emerged in tandem with the disintegration of household authority, household authority never ceased to exist. The social environment, whether characterised by elites or social forces, played an important role in forming the state and its institutions, which scaled-up the management of life processes that had been organised through and reliant on household authority, including the distribution of capital, the organisation of the workforce, security, and welfare. By examining the role of the state in society in this manner, it is possible to argue that the state is a scaled-up version of household authority that is reflective of the social history and environment in which it exists. The state therefore undertakes these processes that were once managed through customary forms of household management, but to the extent in which it is delineated by society. By conceptualising the state in this manner, Patricia Owens refutes 'the basic liberal premise that large-scale forms of household rule were eliminated in modern capitalist states'.[20]

As argued by Owens, customary household authority did not disintegrate or disappear with the establishment of the modern state, instead the modern state can be more effectively conceptualised as a distinctive 'bureaucratic form of household rule'.[21] By conceptualising statehood in this manner, the state emerged due to the changing nature of the economy through capitalism and politics through the social contract. In other words, the modern state became a largescale form of household authority, Owens equates household authority and governance, with *oikonomia*, the management over those who reside within the household, arguing that household governance, in all its forms, is reflected in the political governance of communities and states.[22]

By conceiving of the state as a scaled-up version of household authority, it is possible to find parallels between the management of life processes that had been attributed to pre-modern,

[19] Mosca 1939, p. 53.
[20] Owens 2015, p. 50.
[21] Owens 2015, p. 6.
[22] Owens also discusses the etymological connections between the modern state and household governance, including such notions as motherland and fatherland, 2015, pp. 1-2, 262-263.

or customary, 'households' and the modern state. The role of household authority was the organisation and discipline of its members by a leader who commanded and monopolised the use of force and capital extraction and redistribution. Through technological and intellectual developments that altered perceptions of distance and time, the ability to broadcast authority was transformed, leading to its centralisation. The impact of technological and intellectual advancements, and centralised authority that changed the patterns of relations in the social field, relocated customary household authority from being held by local groups, to being controlled by an overarching centralised authority, the state. Owens describes this transformation as an abstraction that provided 'the language to formulate new distinctions between bureaucratic-state 'government' and 'economy', public and private'.[23]

In agreement with Owens, Thomas Paine states that governance 'has its origin in the principles of society and the natural constitution of man'.[24] Authority and governance are, as argued by Paine, a social phenomenon and the development of authority and governance is dependent on the consent of the society, which provides legitimacy to political systems and the boundaries of authority. Similarly, Shmuel Eisenstadt argues that 'the political system is a basic part of any society's organisation' explaining that 'different types of political systems develop and function under specific social conditions, and the continuity of any political system is also related to such specific conditions'.[25] Here Eisenstadt argues that society is itself a political organisation dependent on the conditions in which it exists.

What is evident by examining the state through state formation is that its emergence is tied to a specific history of social, economic, and political change caused by conflicts, alliance formation, and modernity. These changes altered the social field,[26] redirecting authority to centralised systems of governance and reorganising communities by placing emphasis on the individual. While the state was produced in a historically specific social field, its continuation as a stable political entity has relied on the acknowledgement of territorial sovereignty and non-interference by other similar states. Similarity between states, according to Elias, was civilisational, and created an ease in relations that structured behaviour and regulated interstate relations, which is also evidenced with regards to the Peace of Westphalia (1648). Although the modern state is discussed as a liberal form of governance, and, as Owens

[23] Owens 2015, p. 53.
[24] Paine 1984, p. 163.
[25] Eisenstadt 1993, p. 3.
[26] Rottmann 2014; Heemskerk 2011.

argues, an abstraction, which produces a universalist objectivity in its application to global regions, it is difficult to disassociate the modern state from its historical origins. Whether those origins are discussed through the framework of conflict and war, elite politics, religion, or technological and intellectual progress, the modern state conceived of in the Weberian framework is inherently a social enterprise rooted in pre-modern European history.

The modern state in Europe is reflective of its historical origins, including war and conflict, elite politics, or religious frameworks of order. Its development through modernity was an assemblage of new knowledges and practices onto pre-modern knowledges and practices, transforming household authority and scaling it up into the centralised institutions of the modern state. Instead of conceptualising the state as a form of scaled-up household authority and tied to a specific set of knowledges and practices informed by history, the state was considered to be a set of objective and methodical institutions, which had the ability to rationalise and order societies throughout the global regions. However, the experience of modernity and state formation in the global regions, specifically the Middle East, was different to that of Europe.

## 2.2 Modernity and the Expansion of the European State System into the Global Peripheries

The condition of modernity, with its technological transformations that altered the means of production, and the intellectual development that led to norm creation among European states, enabled European expansion into the global peripheries.[27] With European expansion, under the guise that the modern state was a civilised entity, the pursuit of economic and geo-political interests presented a philosophical problem in the Ottoman Empire, as well as a practical problem with regards to the achievement of European interests. By establishing the modern state as a standard of civilisation, the philosophical and practical problems were dealt with by emphasising the benevolence of the modernisation process.

The long nineteenth century, the period between 1789 and 1914, beginning with the French Revolution and concluding with the end of the First World War, is associated with the development of global modernity.[28] This period is viewed as a crucial turning point in global history, one that is often discussed as a rupture caused by the Enlightenment and the industrialisation that concluded a period of darkness in human political, economic, and social

[27] Van der Veer 1998; Braudel 1982; Tripp 2006, pp. 15-17.
[28] (a) Hobsbawm 2010; Hobsbawm 1995; (b) Hobsbawm 2010.

history. Discussions on politics, economics, and the social environment were transformed by the language of modern science that emphasised progress and rationality – as universal principles.[29] The transformations experienced by the European states led to a general improvement of domestic conditions for individuals, regional stability, and global strength. Accompanying these transformations was the belief that modernity could be disseminated and achieved elsewhere through coercive reordering with the aim of replacing customary knowledges and practices with those that were prevalent in Europe.

In Egypt in the nineteenth century, the British attempted to condition society through restrictive force, and to discipline the domestic environment into a particular set of institutions. Timothy Mitchell argues that it was not the type of discipline and control that differed from the previous organisation of society, but the organisation of the domestic environment into rational and hierarchal components whose actions and activities could be controlled and delineated and whose bodies could be counted in a quantifiable manner.[30] Although the British were actively pursuing a project to modernise the Egyptian state and society, their primary interests in Egypt were strategic and economic.

The modernisation project that was produced in Egypt had a detrimental impact on the relationship between authority and the domestic environment.[31] Dislocation between authority and the domestic environment was caused by the implementation of modern knowledges and practices through restrictive force without any point of reference for the social field, which was being disrupted and reorganised. Discussing the Ottoman Empire of the late nineteenth century, Benjamin Fortna makes a parallel argument, stating that 'the changing international situation, national identification and organization presented formidable challenges to the Ottoman system of communal relations'. The modernization of the Ottoman Empire was one of institutional, social, economic, and political change, altering the customs to which imperial authority and the domestic environment were governed.[32] As Charles Tripp explains, this 'was the dark side of industrial and technological progress […] the ways in which internal social bonds were being undermined, weakening the cohesion of society.'[33]

[29] Bridge and Bullen 1980.
[30] Mitchell 1988, pp. 34-48.
[31] Makdisi 2002, p. 771.
[32] Fortna 2013, p. 1.
[33] Tripp 2006, p. 21.

Where the Europeans viewed the Ottoman Empire as politically, socially, and economically backward, the Ottoman authorities, equally, sought to reform towards a European framework of modernity. Ussama Makdisi argues that 'as such, Ottoman modernization […] was as much a project of power within the empire as it was an act of resistance to Western imperialism'.[34] The Empire had to protect itself by adopting modern European norms in order to accede to the European state system as a full and sovereign member, and in doing so, it had to assert its power over its territories in an effort to prevent European encroachment. Modernisation required the displacement of accepted knowledge and practices in favour of European notions of science and progress, the ability to measure the natural and social world.

However, failure to properly administer the reforms could not be explained through the scientific worldview of the European powers in the nineteenth century. Instead, the European powers relied on pre-modern Christian-European knowledge and tradition, which continued to inform European interactions with the global peripheries. The interactions between the European powers and the global peripheries prior to the influence of modernity was one of hierarchy and subordination, justified through the privation of a Christian God in the global peripheries, leading the Europeans to reason that the darkness of man was caused by the lack of light (God) and was akin to the darkness of evil. With the rejection of a Christian worldview in favour of a modern scientific understanding of the world, what had been once justified by a religious understanding of good and evil, was replaced with ideas that the ability to be modern and civilised was a biological condition of the individual, which was determined by ethno-sectarian and racial difference.[35] Here it is possible to discern how pre-modern knowledges informed modern worldviews, the modern perception of ethno-sectarianism and race as limiting an individual's capability to be civilised, relied on a pre-modern Christian understanding of the world, although dropping the reference to God, and combining the understanding of good and evil, light and dark, with a scientific understanding of nature.

In colonial America, for example, Bernard Romans, in reference to the indigenous populations, is quoted as saying 'God created an original man and woman in this part of the globe, of different species from any in other parts […] a people not only rude and uncultivated, but incapable of civilisation'. In the colonial gaze, the practices and knowledges

[34] Makdisi 2002, p. 772.
[35] Kuru 2009, pp. 6-38; Norris and Inglehart 2004, p. 8; Inglehart 1997; Inkeles and Smith 1976.

of the *other* were produced through comparative deduction. The colonisers accepted the indigenous populations as part of the human race, however, their 'savagery' and 'barbarianism' was attributed to a lack of enlightened thinking, which could only be explained as a biological deficiency that prevented them from finding God. In order to rectify the socio-biological deficiencies of the indigenous *other*, colonisers viewed it as necessary to 'cross the breed' of the population, to diminish the biological inadequacies that prevented the population from achieving the European standard of civilisation, and providing the biological components for the indigenous populations to become civilised.[36]

The characterisation of societies as civilised or uncivilised based on religious and racial categories was due to the inability to explain resistance to modernisation that destroyed customary forms of life. Reliance on these categories is clearly expressed by the French military captain, M. de Torcy, in 1880 in Syria, who noted that 'it is difficult to distinguish between race, as much of the primitive population has bred with the Arabs and even the uniqueness of the Turks has nearly disappeared in Syria'.[37] Indeed, strategies formed in the pursuit of European interests sought to 'cultivate and maintain', according to Secretary General, Robert de Caix, 'all the phenomena, requiring our arbitration, that [the social] divisions give [us]'.[38]

Racial characterisations were used in the deployment of ethno-sectarian categories to explain unwillingness or inability to abandon customary knowledges practices and ascend to modernity. The condition of modernity was viewed by the European states as a highpoint of civilisation and reluctance or resistance to its application by maintaining customary knowledges and practices was perceived to be a consequence of a natural irrationality. This framework that was employed by the European powers did not provide the possibility to consider the alternatives, that resistance to modernisation was a reaction to its resulting dislocation from accepted forms of authority, or as a response to the violence of imperialism and colonialism. In order to contain and extinguish resistance, the British and the French employed strategies of cultural erasure by replacing symbols and signs, reordering the physical environment, as had been done in Egypt, and employing force to discipline and order society into acceptable modernised frameworks of statehood.

---

[36] Horsman, 1975, p. 154.
[37] 166PO/E/269 August 1, 1880 (no. 177), French Embassy in Istanbul [Constantinople], Syria: Mission of M. de Torcy in Syria and Palestine, to M. de Freycinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
[38] Barr 2011, pp. 119-120.

Iain Jackson, examining the British occupation of Iraq from the First World War and the Mandate period, demonstrates how the reorganisation of the physical environment was integral to British interests of creating an ordered and pacified society, whose nationhood and state would be created in the image of Britain. The re-creation of the British image in foreign lands occurred through the deployment of projects centred on identity and function; using names of places familiar to the British psyche, such as Piccadilly Circus, Old Kent Road, amongst others, and the construction of universities, palaces, museums to help develop new historical narratives of Iraq. Function on the other hand, was characterised by the creation of railways, strategic military zones, and widened roads which helped with the political pacification of the population by allowing the deployment of force. Although, the roads and railways would later be employed in a rebellion against the British.[39]

While the British attempted to recreate the image of British society through identity and function, the French in Syria employed strategies that had been established in other colonies, particularly in Algeria. French colonisation of Algeria, lasting from 1830 until 1962, was multifaceted. The French administration in Algeria attempted to reconstruct its history, and reorder the social and physical environment as an attempt to replicate French order and society in the colony.[40] Similarly, in Syria, French colonial strategy included building new towns, beginning in 1920, first in Palmyra and then in al-Qamishli. Daniel Neep argues that the creation of these towns conformed to Foucault's description of disciplinary space; a method to make individuals visible, to expose and control movement of the populations. The French forces asserted that the strategy had a 'positive influence on the Syrian residents of the town [Palmyra]', which was attributed to the French forces leading by example and the use of coercion.[41] While the aim was to pacify the population and assert dominance, the use of coercion was also employed to reorder society into spaces that were easy to manage. Doing so altered the relationship between the social field and physical space, changing the ways in which intercommunal relations developed.

Other strategies employed by colonial powers, such as Britain and France, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries included the sponsorship of local groups, creating domestic agents for colonial control through customary networks that were deemed uncivilised and irrational.[42] This process was considered a norm in colonial governance,

[39] Jackson 2016.
[40] Betts 1960; Prochaska 1990, pp. 1-28.
[41] Neep 2012, pp. 142-148.
[42] Easterly 2006, p. 243. Iliffe 1995, p. 198.

however, it contradicted the intent of the modernisation project, which was one of a civilising process. By elevating the status of allied customary groups and networks, the British and the French validated their existence and the function of customary knowledges and practices. Concurrently, the colonial powers were producing centralised institutions of governance to replace the customary groups and networks, and altering the physical environment changing the manner in which customary groups and networks interacted.[43] By elevating the status of specific customary groups and networks and by enforcing the authority of centralised institutions, the British and the French created new areas of conflict between communities within the social field, and between the social field and governance.

Despite the negative impact of imperial and colonial modernisation, the European powers persisted, employing the logic, as Ernest Gellner contends, that the condition of modernity was better than that of traditional society, and with modernity came the promise of rational thought, scientific progress, and the superiority of the West through 'an enormous infrastructure, not merely of political order, but educationally, culturally, in terms of communication and so forth'.[44] As Toby Dodge argues, British modernisation and occupation of Iraq tried 'to legitimate itself in terms of the betterment of the population;'[45] creating a common thread, not just with regards to practices of force and occupation, but with the discursive and intellectual reasoning that colonial intent paralleled that of contemporary development and state building.

Gellner continues that the global transition between the primitive and modern mentality was universally possible; stressing the ability for all people to attain worldviews that are "rational', non-magical, non-enchanted'.[46] The logic of modernity, according to Gellner, could be disseminated beyond the boundaries of where it had been established and the West had the extraordinary capability of ensuring that the scientific rationale of modernity could be established. Similar to Gellner's argument that modernity was an attainable condition, one that could be taught in order to transition society from its primitive natural state to a modern and evolved form, Elizabeth Dore argues that it was

> Not […] only in Europe that those trends of cumulative change were at work – trends towards the rule-bound civility which

[43] Agbor, Fedderke, and Viegi 2010.
[44] Gellner 1979, p. 288.
[45] Dodge 2003, p. XXV.
[46] MacFarlane 1992, pp. 122-123.

> could take the swordsman and debunk the cleric, towards rule by rules rather than by people, towards reflective attempts at understanding nature and at using that understanding for productive ends, towards the acceptance, indeed the celebration, of individual choice and market contract.[47]

The rationality of modernity, whether that meant 'rule-bound civility' or the utility of nature 'for productive ends' was perceived as a global desire, and one that societies were endeavouring towards. The difference was in the framework of those developments, which produced culturally specific structures. Indeed, the advent of European modernity in this way was a culturally specific framework and structure. While these transformations may have been underway in the global social and political environments as a separate phenomenon from European modernity, Robert Price argues that this experience was skewed due to European interventions and interference.

> Organisations whose formal aspects have been transplanted from highly industrial societies, and which therefore appear to the observer as 'modern' social structures, are in reality penetrated by aspects of the indigenous ('traditional') social system, and […] this produces hybrid institutions, many of whose features are dysfunctional to the successful achievement of organisational goals.[48]

The combination of modern social structures and customary social systems producing hybrid – or assembled – institutions emphasises the inability of imperial modernisation and colonial projects to replace existing knowledges and practices, leading to an assembled form, or 'hybrid'. According to Shmuel Eisenstadt and Robert Hefner, the inability to reproduce modernity as it was experienced in Europe led to a variety of experiences of modernity, and the emergence of multiple modernities.[49]

The experience of modernity may have been different throughout the global regions, dependent on its application and the response, but modernity itself was not multiple. Rather, modernity was a singular global phenomenon that prioritised the interests of the West and

[47] Dore 1992, pp. 168-169.
[48] Price 1975, p. 11.
[49] Eisenstadt 2000; Hefner 1998.

capital-creating classes globally. The experience of modernity in Europe benefitted from the centralised character of state authority. The conditions of modernity in Europe resulted in the scaled-up form of household management that placed importance on centralised governments to strengthen institutions and laws to moderate inequalities within the social field.[50] However, the experience of modernity in the Ottoman Empire, was different. Modernity, as a European development that expanded outwards into the global peripheries benefitted Europe and subordinated the former, including the Ottoman Empire, to a set of standards that were repressive.

By examining the experiences of modernity in the Ottoman Empire as a result of the interactions - the actions, reactions, and responses - between European powers, the Sublime Porte, and the social field in the Syrian provinces, it is possible to understand how conditions of modernity were accepted and resisted.[51] Sati' al-Husri, a prominent Arab nationalist, born in the late nineteenth century in Sana'a, Yemen to an Aleppine family, discussed the state in a manner that reflected a European conceptualisation of the nation-state. However, al-Husri's writings were not simply a product of colonial indoctrination or knowledge reproduction, but a reflection of his intellectual and material environment. Al-Husri's worldview was established as a form of resistance to the oppressive experience of modernity, his writings propagated ideas of unity among the Arabs while arguing for sovereign rights based on a great civilisational history, to justify the end of European interference.[52]

Although al-Husri desired the establishment of an Arab state, he argued that the formation of a modern state system through the European Mandate was a 'Pandora's Box' that would divide the Arab nation and leave it '[…] subject to all the evils of the world'.[53] Al-Husri's opposition was not only based on the threat of physical division, but the threat of centralised bureaucratic governance on a nation that could be subdivided in multiple ways, threatening the possibility of exclusion, and severing the multiple centres of authority that provided sources of political authority and legitimacy to different customary groups and networks.

Similar to al-Husri's rejection of European interference and the creation of modern states in the Arab territories, Nazih Ayubi argued that the structures and institutions of the modern state alienated the Arab populations, particularly those situated in the lower economic classes.

[50] Baldwin 1990; Kuhnle and Sander 2010.
[51] Jameson 2010.
[52] Frantz Fanon (2001) also discusses how these knowledges are turned against colonial powers. Khalidi 1991; Kenny 1963.
[53] Tibi 1971, p. 116; Mansfield 2013, pp. 1-71.

The modern centralised institutions of the state dislocated a considerable proportion of society by failing to reflect the political, economic, and social traditions of the population.[54] Local value systems, or customary knowledges and practices, as argued by Homi Bhabha, formed an important source of resistance, opposition, and agency against colonial interference and interventions.

Where theorists of modernisation argue that 'local value systems survived because they were functionally necessary to maintain local social systems that had little contact with modernity',[55] Bhabha argues that cultures 'may be contingent to modernity, discontinuous or in contention with it, resistant to its oppressive, assimilationist technologies; but they [sometimes] also deploy the cultural hybridity of their borderline conditions'.[56] Bhabha acknowledges how the expansion of modernity impacted the global peripheries, recognising that those populations and cultures existed alongside modernity, appropriating and opposing its associated knowledges and practices at once and in various ways. Bhabha therefore advocates a narrative of history that undertakes an analysis of the dominant power and the subordinate subject as interconnected and multiple; where an action produces a response, the two are interconnected.

### 2.3 Illuminating the *Other*: The Organisation of the Ottoman Empire

The dichotomy between modernity and tradition maintains the assumption that traditional societies are vulnerable to modern domination, and in doing so, agency is easily removed from traditional societies, as they become subjects of domination rather than active participants in domination or resistance.[57] The global peripheries, subjected to European knowledges and practices, were not subjects devoid of knowledges and practices, and their indigeneity, though typically viewed as inferior through the lens of European hegemony, can be used to understand the *other* beyond the Eurocentric construction.[58] By illuminating non-European culture, economics, and politics exogenous to their European utility, the subaltern subject is elevated from their subservient status within the dominant narratives. However, as Bhabha, argues, elevating the status of the subaltern subject does not reduce other subjects to subservience, but allows for other histories to be given importance.[59]

[54] Ayubi 1995, pp. 21-23.
[55] Brett 2009, p. 225.
[56] Bhabha 1994, p. 9.
[57] Germond-Duret 2016, pp. 1546, 1551.
[58] Said 1978, pp. 7, 42.
[59] Jurgen Habermas quoted in Bhabha 1994, p. 246.

By examining the form of governance that had become prevalent in the Ottoman Empire following the sixteenth century conquests of the Arab territories, it is possible to better understand how European forms of modernity became assembled with Ottoman systems of governance; how governance and value systems in the Ottoman Empire became crucial to the resistance of continued European interference; and how nineteenth century modernisation projects in the Ottoman Empire impacted the development of authority, governance, and the state in Lebanon and Syria. Most importantly, it also provides a better understanding of the practical and philosophical problems that arose during European expansion and how the state as a standard of civilisation was applied to navigate these issues.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was functioning within the European state system, of which members were regulated by an agreed set of norms composing an early international legal order. While the Ottoman Empire was increasingly becoming subject to this expansive system, it had not been granted membership as a sovereign entity, free from interference and intervention, but as a subordinate power. The position of the Ottoman Empire in relation to the European states reflected the characteristic of modern expansion: to bring societies out of the darkness through the development of a rational ordering of society, by the governance of public affairs, and the 'exit from self-incurred immaturity'[60] through the provision of scientific reason; the need to reveal truth, to remove humanity from blind faith, and overhaul ancient authority in order to establish a modern form of civilisation commensurate with the global norms and institutions was characteristic of European expansion and modernity.[61]

The European state system is discussed as an expansive system, similarly, albeit with a different set of knowledges and practices, so was the Ottoman Empire. The European state system was in a dominant position to the Ottoman Empire; the latter retaining a dominant position within the Syrian provinces. However, the European state system and the Ottoman Empire expanded through different methods. While the expansion of the European state system is often discussed in terms of colonisation, oppression, and coercion, with the aim to replace customary systems with those that matched Europe, the Sublime Porte undertook a different approach, although not devoid of the use of violence, it was reflective of a worldview and established set of norms that had developed through a distinct set of principles informed by Islamic philosophy and legal interpretations.

[60] Immanuel Kant quoted in Deligiorgi 2002, p. 154.
[61] As argued by Menon (2016) when discussing contemporary state building and development.

The early expansion of the Ottoman Empire encouraged early state building through trade and domination: 'as the Ottomans were expanding, they incorporated important trading ports, bringing cities on trade routes under their control'.[62] The expansion of the Ottoman Empire led to an increasingly culturally, religiously, and ethnically, diverse population, creating 'mobile markers of difference'[63] and integrating populations through 'fictional genealogies [which] gave outsiders equal status' within the Empire.[64] Karen Barkey describes this as the telling of 'analogous narratives', cohabitation, and 'increasingly adopting each other's characteristics'.[65] The management of diversity was brokered through the Sultanate, by establishing relations with the various communities within the geographic confines of the Sultan's authority.[66] The framework of governance and authority in which the Sublime Porte operated was 'a hub-and-spoke network structure of which [the Ottomans] became the centre', the result of 'building relations across otherwise separate and competing groups and communities'.[67]

The organisation of the early Ottoman Empire in a manner that reflected a negotiated settlement was both practical and necessary in order to maintain power, especially as the Empire expanded eastwards. With the Arabian conquests in the sixteenth century Islam became an important identity marker for the Ottoman Empire, whereby the development of a strong institutional Islamic identity was not prevalent in the initial frontier and expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Still, Ottoman governance was constructed on the Islamic interpretation of the concept of toleration, rather than equality. 'Toleration refers to the relations among different religious (and ethnic) communities and secular authorities, and is the outcome of networked, negotiated, and pragmatic forms of rule'.[68] The negotiated settlement of the Ottoman Empire, particularly following the sixteenth century, required obedience to imperial Islamic order and was separate from the management of local and individual affairs.

The Sublime Porte harnessed the influence of an Islamic philosophical understanding of the world from early Islamic texts, which only became a significant feature because of a

[62] Barkey 2008, p. 40.
[63] Barkey 2008, p. 41.
[64] Antony Black (2001) states that 'the early Ottomans appear to have ruled their territories partly on the basis of tribal and nomadic ideas; fictional genealogies gave outsiders equal status', p. 199.
[65] Barkey 2008, p. 41.
[66] Barkey 2008, pp. 45-46.
[67] Barkey 2008, p. 29.
[68] Barkey 2008, p. 110.

'heterodox understanding of Islam', where tradition and sacred space between Muslims and Christians, but also Jews became increasingly blurred.[69] The development of an institutional Islamic identity in the sixteenth century did not undermine the multi-religious character of the Ottoman Empire, but reinforced important boundaries, by drawing on Islamic jurisprudence.[70] For example, Jews and Christians (*ahl al-dhimma*), according to Muhammed ibn al-Hassan al-Shaybani, an eighth century Islamic jurist, were required to be protected within the territories governed by Islamic authority. Such protections, however, came at the cost of tribute, a head-tax (*jizya*) that would permit non-Muslims to maintain a livelihood, free of persecution, within the framework of the polity.[71] A practice that was upheld by the Ottomans and which came to be viewed as illiberal by the nineteenth century European powers.[72] Reliance on Islamic jurisprudence, the integration of the *ulema*, or Muslim scholars of law and theology, provided the Sultan a legal and administrative framework in which authority could be established, and provided the Sultan with legitimacy with regards to the Muslim populations.[73]

The management and brokering of relations with and between divergent communities, in a flexible manner, as discussed by Karen Barkey, required 'greater […] need for accommodation and flexible provincial and frontier arrangements'.[74] By managing authority in a flexible manner, the Sublime Porte did not negotiate a strict Ottoman identity. Instead, identity was the product of autonomous communal management. While the Sublime Porte maintained authority by brokering relations with and between groups, governance and social order was managed at a local level, relying on notables (*ayan*),[75] governor generals, and district governors. By localising authority, the Ottomans were able to allow varying degrees of autonomy in the provinces.

The 'hub-and-spoke' system of governance allowed local communal leadership to negotiate agreements with Ottoman rulers, in order to 'maintain their religious autonomy and community existence free from interference'.[76] This system was sustainable as long as the relational framework, which was characterised through its flexibility, was maintained. Ibn

[69] Lewis 1984, pp. 107-154.
[70] Barkey 2008, pp. 60, 63.
[71] Kelsay 1993, pp. 66-70.
[72] Barkey 2008, p. 89.
[73] Black 2001, p. 203; for a discussion on Islamic Law in the Ottoman Empire see Burak 2015.
[74] Barkey 2001, p. 91.
[75] *Ayan ve Esraf*, was a term used for members of families who had served the state in a military or religious capacity. Many of these notables rose to prominence in the eighteenth century and their families inherited their socio-economic and political positions and remained wealthy landlords through the practice of tax-farming in the nineteenth century. Mardin 1969, pp. 267-268.
[76] Barkey 2008, p. 114.

Khaldun, a fourteenth century historian, writing on the production of authority within a polity, notes that it is not the defeat of a dynasty that propels the termination of a civilisation, but the dissolution of the relationship constructed between the social elements and the dynasty.[77] Society, as conceived by Ibn Khaldun, was not an organization independent from religious, political, economic, military, and cultural spheres – rather, they were interconnected and overlapping.[78] They produced various social groups and networks, or what is referred to as '*asabiyyah*. The latter, often translated as 'social solidarity' or 'group feeling'.[79]

As discussed by Leila Fawaz, the '*asabiyyah*, was a communalism based on 'family, clan, village, or city quarter' it ordered society and provided a source of authority, it 'dominated one's worldview rather than larger social or political affiliations', and its maintenance in the larger political context was necessary for leadership to receive broad consent.[80] However, by the end of the eighteenth century, the structures of the Ottoman Empire were beginning to change, segmented groups became connected and interdependent, altering the ability of the Imperial centre to broker separate relations between communal leaders.[81] The internal relational changes placed new pressures on the Ottoman Empire by displacing its role as a power broker.

In addition to internal changes, global politics and relations in the eighteenth century were transforming with the industrial revolution in Britain and, more generally, Western Europe. Agricultural innovations, changes in the means of production, advances in science, meant transformations in the economic market, aided by improved methods of transportation, political centralisation, bureaucratisation, and creating new social and political relations between social groups and individuals within those groups.[82] Such innovations and transformations were not contained to the borders of Western Europe and as the Ottomans suffered a series of defeats and territorial losses in the eighteenth century, 'European diplomats intervened in post-war negotiations with the Ottomans to prevent rivals from gaining too many concessions'.[83] The increased interactions between the Ottoman Empire and Western European states provided European states with a political and economic foothold within in the Ottoman Empire, placing additional pressure on the Sublime Porte to engage in reforms.

---

[77] Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 263-295.
[78] Baali 1988, p. 31.
[79] Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 263-295, 25; Fuad Baali 1988, p. 43-44.
[80] Fawaz 2014, p. 9.
[81] Barkey 2008, p. 195.
[82] Stearns 2007, pp. 21-27.
[83] Quataert 2005, p. 38.

The transformations in society, caused by Ottoman modernisation, global politics, and European interference, changed the dynamics between authority, territoriality, and society, and as argued by the fourteenth century philosopher and historian Ibn Khaldun, altered and transformed the identity and politics of the populations.[84] For stability to prevail, the social field had to be reflected within the structures of governance and authority, and therefore had to consider the political, economic, and social structures of society in order to effectively govern.[85] As the Empire began to transform during the late eighteenth century, schisms between the social field and structures of governance began to widen, and provided the European powers with the ability to develop relations with customary groups and networks within the social field by securing alliances with individuals in positions of authority. This was done by providing them with the promise of economic benefits, security, access to governance, and by establishing relations based on common identities.

Just as customary household authority did not cease to exist with the emergence of the modern state in Europe, forms of household authority within the Syrian provinces continued to wield influence. Household authority can be compared to the *'asabiyyah*. The *'asabiyyah* is described as a source of authority that is located within the framework of the family, clan,[86] tribe,[87] village, or city quarter,[88] and religion. [89] As a source of authority, it produced order within the social field and formed the prevalent communal networks in the Ottoman Empire, persisting and transforming into the period of French colonial administration and into independence.

---

[84] Taiaiake and Corntassel 2005, pp. 597-600. Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 25, 263-295.
[85] Taiaiake and Corntassel 2005, pp. 597-600. Ibn Khaldun 1967, pp. 25, 263-295.
[86] Family and clan organisations can be organised through performative association, where kinship or clan membership is intersubjective and can constitute a multitude of forms including myths of descent and intermarriage resulting in extended networks and loyalties. Kinship and clan membership can also be biologically relational, tied to procreation and lineage, see Sahlins 2013, p. 62. Farsoun (1970, p. 280), for example, highlights how political loyalty was sustained by kinship networks which formalised into political parties, men's and women's clubs, and welfare and aid societies.
[87] The Sultanate, in the sixteenth century, had brokered relations with the Mawali tribe to secure safe passage through the Syrian Desert, however, they were overrun by 'Anaiza tribal confederation, resulting in uneven control throughout the Desert, requiring the Sultanate to broker a new set of relations, see Masters 2006, p. 190. The term tribe is contested as a colonial construct, while others attempt negotiate its use by asserting that terms 'tribe,' 'tribal,' and 'tribalism' are intended to be loose frameworks that encompass a wide set of informal organisations and groups that act for communities through politics and economics. The term 'tribe,' within the Western discourses, connotes a form of inferiority in relation to the Western organised polity; nevertheless, it is a term that is often used throughout historical, anthropological, and sociological texts. Colson 1968, pp. 201-206; Colson 1986, pp. 5-19; Fried 1968, pp. 3-20; Helm 1968; Mafese 1971, pp. 253-261; Tapper 1979, pp. 6-7; Tapper 1990, pp. 48-73.
[88] The city formed an urban centre to a constellation of rural villages and towns, creating economic and political connections beyond limits of an urban region. The city was traditionally divided into quarters, with each quarter being maintained by an ethno-religious community, providing a separate physical space for cultural and religious practice, Blame 1980, p. 221; Hourani 1991, pp. 107-108; Smith, Nancy, Al-Any et al. 1969, p. 71,165; Stirling 1965, p. 169.
[89] The *millet* system recognised the autonomy of religious minorities and provided the leadership of religious minorities the right to adjudicate on personal law. It can be described as a pre-modern method of managing a multi-religious societie, either in relation to social norms or the division of labour, see Mayer 1997; Sachedina 2001; Issawi 2014, pp. 160-162.

The role of household authority, or *'asabiyyah*, in the Ottoman Empire was crucial for maintaining the Sublime Porte's legitimacy by providing the opportunity for different customary communal groups and networks with the ability to negotiate their role within the empire and the degree of autonomy from the Sublime Porte. This system allowed for the continuation of customary knowledges and practices, toleration of different identities, and helped organise the social field.[90] By understanding the form of governance that had been developed within the Ottoman Empire, it is possible to understand how modernisation, the centralisation of authority and governance, impacted the social field, and generated reactions within the social field. In other words, how changes to accepted forms of governance dislocated the social field from authority, and the consequences of dislocation for the state in Lebanon and Syria.

## 2.4 Conclusion

The modern state is often discussed as a methodical set of institutions, applicable to any region or culture due to its objective and rational structure, with these assumptions being reproduced through contemporary development and state building projects, it comes to stand that the concept of the modern state retains a universal framework. However, the modern state in Europe formed through a slow process of competition and conflict, one that required centralisation and institutionalisation in order for authority wielders to secure their control of sprawling territories and increasing populations. Such development required organisation and order, which was informed by the conditions of modernity developed from the Enlightenment and industrialisation, and that created a changing set of value systems and interests. As is evident from examining the history of state formation in Europe, changes in the political, economic, and social environment were assembled onto pre-modern knowledges and practices. While knowledges and practices of the modern state were viewed as rational, a form of scientific progress, they continued to be informed by a pre-modern Christian-European worldview, thus refuting the idea of rupture between the irrational pre-modern and the rational modern state of man.

The expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries asserted a set of political structures and concepts necessary for the non-European states to become partners in a global system. For the Ottoman Empire, which had maintained a decentralised form of

[90] Organisation of the social field in this manner was made possible through 'the politics of notables', the notables were important local power wielders who used their social prominence to attain positions of authority in exchange for legitimacy. See Davison 1963, p. 17; Khoury 2006, pp. 152-155.

authority on the principles of toleration and negotiation and justified by interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence, accession to the European system required modernisation; the abandonment of irrational, disordered, and pre-modern forms of governance, authority, and life. Reforms that were undertaken by the Sublime Porte and with pressure from the European powers, including centralised governance and equality before the law, dislocated the social field from the accepted form of governance; providing opportunities for the European powers to pursue their interests.

The expansion of the European state system, and the pursuit of political and economic interests, were veiled under the assumption that the modern condition could, and should be, exported to the global peripheries in order to save the peripheries from their 'self-incurred immaturity'.[91] In exporting the modern state into the global peripheries, the standard of civilisation was applied to the Ottoman Empire, providing a path for the Ottoman Empire to be recognised as a sovereign and civilised member of the European state system. To accede to this standard, the European powers emphasised that the Ottoman Empire was required to abandon cultural and political difference and centralise authority through the creation of social and political institutions that replicated those that existed in the modern European state. In reaction to this requirement, there were many debates within the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Sublime Porte, on how to reconcile the European standard of civilisation with cultural difference. However, the institutions that developed in Europe did so from a particular political, economic, and social environment, built on the foundations of pre-modern knowledges and worldviews, and interactions with modernity and between each other. The inability of the Ottoman Empire to accede to the benchmark established by the European states meant that it would be extremely difficult to have its civility recognised as a member of the European state system, despite its efforts.

On the one hand, the application of a standard of civilisation on the Ottoman Empire was justified by the argument that the dissemination of rational and scientific knowledges and practices would relieve the Sublime Porte of its barbarity and fanaticism. On the other hand, increased interference in the domestic affairs and organisation of the Empire was viewed as necessary for the establishment of principles of equality, citizenship, secular national identities, institutional development, and centralisation of governance. It was believed that the modern state could be engineered by creating a rule based society, asserting new political rituals that would replace unmodern, or customary, knowledges and practices. Once

[91] Immanuel Kant quoted in Deligiorgi 2002, p. 154.

completed, the population would become part of the civilised world and the polity would be able to accede to the European state system, international law, and in doing so, be able to assert sovereignty through statehood.

The export of the state into the global peripheries was done with the conviction that modernity and the conditions of modernity, which were enshrined in the state, were universal. However, the European powers had failed to recognise the importance of the historical development in the production of knowledges and practices of modernity. The failure to understand the importance of history in the production of modernity and the modern state was due, in part, to the creation of a rhetorical rupture between the pre-modern and modern state of being. The notion of rupture, and the conviction that the modern condition was the pinnacle of civilisation, facilitated the failure to contend with the reality of deeply embedded existing institutions, identities, and politics of the regions that the modern state was being exported to. By looking at history, it is evident that the export and application of the concept of the state was not one that effaced existing knowledges and practices in the global peripheries, but interacted and shaped the politics of the region and population.

By arguing that the intention of the European powers was that of civilising the Ottoman Empire, specifically the governing structures of the Sublime Porte and the social field of the Syrian provinces, by ordering society through ideas of rational governance, the European powers were able to serve their economic and political interests. Pressure placed on the global peripheries to modernise through colonial interventions were viewed as humanitarian endeavours with the aim of providing order and civilisation, and to free societies of barbarity and fanaticism. Doing so would provide the Empire with the freedoms associated with statehood and the security of sovereignty, relinquishing the Empire of its unmodern customs. Such conceptions had been produced under the guise that European modernity was objective in its ability to reorder the politics and economics of any society, whereby the failure of a society to achieve the standard was due to a natural inability. As the European powers sought to export their form of household authority into the global peripheries by asserting, not only, an organisational and intellectual superiority, but also a global structural framework of governance, they did so with the belief that it was objective; it could be applied evenly and globally by tapping into human rationality.

## Chapter 3: The Ottoman Empire in the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century: International Order, Imperial Reform, and Social Order

### 3 Introduction

The relationship between the social field and governance in its temporal context is important in understanding the formation of the modern European state and the expansion of the European state system. European expansion into the global peripheries was particularly influenced by the context of industrialisation, which had an influential effect on global economic and political interests, and the Enlightenment, which established a framework of civilisation based on ideas of scientific progress and rational governance. The knowledges and practices that were produced through European expansion, particularly that of the state as a standard of civilisation, produced the foundations of the modern state in Lebanon and Syria.

This chapter examines two crucial aspects to the argument that the export of the state into the global peripheries was a standard of civilisation. It considers the establishment of a standard of civilisation, that required the Ottoman Empire to adopt a series of reforms in order to accede to a benchmark in order to secure continuity and independence. It also considers the impact of these reforms, and analyses the effect of knowledge and practice production within the Ottoman Empire, first with the Greek War of Independence (1821-1832) and subsequently with the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841). While this chapter highlights the role of that the European powers played, in the pursuit of national interests, which shaped the developments within the Ottoman Empire with respect to the Sublime Porte as well as the social field, it also considers decision making within the Sublime Porte and the political cost of European aid within the European state system.

This chapter begins by analysing the early reforms of Sultan Selim III and Mahmud II, contextualising the reforms within the domestic and international contexts in which they were promulgated. Subsequently, it examines the impact of European interference with regards to the Greek rebellion and Greek War of Independence and the unintended consequences that followed, such as the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces. Specifically, this chapter considers the European colonial interests that were pursued within the Ottoman Empire and in the context of the Greek War of Independence and the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces, the outcome of which was the first *Tanzimat* reform, the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839). The *Tanzimat* was a process of modernisation that embodied the interests

of the European powers, through the export of the modern state as a standard of civilisation, but was also a tool crafted by the Sublime Porte in an attempt to be recognised as a sovereign member of the European state system. This chapter continues by discussing the converging interests between the European powers, particularly Britain, and the Sublime Porte, regarding the Hatt-ı Şerif. However, despite these converging interests, the Sublime Porte was faced with a series of domestic and international constraints that hindered its immediate application in the Syrian provinces.

## 3.1 Initiating Modernisation in the Early Nineteenth Century: Sultan Selim III's Reforms

Following several military defeats in the eighteenth century the Ottoman Empire was in crisis. It had become evident to the Sultan that in order to compete in the European state system, the Ottoman military would need to be reorganised and modernised to reflect the organisation and capabilities of its European counterparts. This had little to do with admiration for Europe, though some did – and some did not – admire Europe, and more to do with necessity and survival. The need to reorganise and modernise the Ottoman military led to a series of reforms called *Nizam-I Djedid* (*Nizam-I Çedid*) by Sultan Selim III (7 April 1789-29 May 1807) which sought to eventually replace the Janissary Corps. The Janissaries were primarily recruited from the *devshirme* (*devşirme*), a blood tax or blood tribute, from non-Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire. The abolition of the *devshirme* in the eighteenth century developed into an institutional breakdown of the Janissary Corps. Coupled with economic problems in the Empire, the Janissary began to take up practices of corruption and involve themselves in civilian trades and businesses, blurring the once well demarcated lines between military and civil life.[1]

The *Nizam-I Djedid* Army was composed of soldiers trained in a European tradition, with new equipment. By creating a parallel army with new equipment, trained in a European manner, Selim III was attempting to slowly do away with the Janissary Corps, who had become increasingly economically and politically powerful through their alliances with networks of merchants and craftsmen. However, the Janissary were vehemently opposed to any changes to their role and position in the state and society.[2]

[1] Çaksu 2014, pp. 118 – 119.
[2] Emecen 2001; Beydilli 2001, pp. 70-71.

Further to Selim III's attempt to replace the Janissary Corps with the *Nizam-I Djedid*, Selim III implemented changes that included the reorganisation of the civil administration that sought to review the mechanisms of justice in the provincial administrations, which were being misused by notables – or *ayan* – and warlords. The administration under Selim III sought to make manageable adjustments over time to avoid sudden and abrupt changes that would cause upset in the provinces. This was a deliberate strategy of Selim III to help establish order and discipline.[3] Reflecting the state of disarray of the civil administration, the play, titled *The Magistrates*, written in 1772 by Mirza Feth-Ali Akhoud-Zaide, reflects on local government, administration, tradition, society, and change within these areas. The beginning pages explain the story of a young woman who has no family except an aunt, and whose brother had just passed away. As per religious tradition, the brother's wealth would be provided to the young woman, Sekine-Khanoun. However, her brother had a temporary marriage, unrecognised by law, and the wife, keen to get her hands on the fortune, filed a suit against her sister-in-law, Sekine-Khanoun. As the plot deepens, we find that Sekine-Khanoun is in love with a *heretic*, although cunning and well connected, he is not of the same faith. Additionally, the elites of the village collaborate with the widow and plot against Sekine-Khanoun, agreeing to divvy up the wealth after they have paid witnesses to lie in the court.[4] The story reflects the social and political environment: the corruption of local governors who acted with various elites in making economic and political gains, the strong undertone of rebellion against tradition and custom, and the dissipating importance of religious boundaries with the young urban elite. The latter portrayed through the protagonists' refusal to marry the socially and religiously acceptable man, as well as her will to be an independent woman. If literature and art are reflections of the general social and political environment,[5] then what can be extracted from this play is the changing social norms and structures, a tepid form of secular modernity arising through small instances of social rebellion. Although this would have been scandalous, the fact that the story was written reflects the transforming social norms.

In addition to domestic reforms, Selim III sought to elevate the Empire's position in the changing European system by assigning ambassadors to European cities beginning in 1793 with London followed by Paris, Vienna, and Berlin in 1797. Prior to the placement of ambassadors in European cities, bilateral relations and affairs were conducted by Ottoman Christians or within Istanbul through European ambassadors. Despite the stronger bilateral

[3] Beydilli 2001, pp. 71-73.
[4] Akhoud-Zaide 1772, pp. 25-66.
[5] Wolff 1993; Luhmann 2000.

relations that Selim III attempted to establish, France had been in the midst of domestic turmoil resulting in the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802). The latter arrived at the shores of the Ottoman Empire with the invasion of Egypt in 1798. The propagated narrative of the French Revolutionary Wars was that of establishing and encouraging the freedom and independence of nations. However, in practice, France sought the expansion of its own colonial peripheries, where freedom and independence coincided with French authority.[6]

Aggravated by the invasion and the possibility of further French expansion into the Empire, Selim III aligned the Empire with Russia on January 3, 1799 and England on January 5, 1799. Russia viewed the alignment as an opportunity to gain access to the Mediterranean via the Turkish Straits. Access and control of the waterways was a cornerstone of Russian Foreign Policy in the region, while Britain was particularly concerned with French control of Egypt, as Egypt was Britain's first stop on the voyage to India. Following the departure of France from Egypt on August 30, 1801, England and Russia sought to protect their interests. England moved to establish a permanent foothold in Egypt and Russia began to incite unrest amongst the Christian populations – many of whom lived in the European territories of the Ottoman Empire. English and Russian pressure exerted on the Ottoman Empire, redirected the Ottoman alliance towards France with the Treaty of Paris, on July 25, 1802.[7] As the Ottoman Empire entered the European state system, its place in the system had become subject to a hierarchy, and it was at once subordinated under the dominant states due to its difference from domestic European organisation and its Islamic character.

Faced with continued uncertainty and instability and aware of the precarious situation that the Ottoman Empire had succumb to, Selim III, writing under the pseudonym *Ilhami*, makes known the stress of, and his discontent with, his responsibilities on the throne.

> Midst the orchard of the world though empire may appear delight,
> Still, if though wouldst view it closely, empire is but ceaseless fight.
> Vain let no one be who ruleth kingdoms in these woeful days;
> If in justice lie thy pleasure – then is empire truly right.
> Reacheth e'en one lover union in the space of thousand years?
> Let whoever sees it envy – empire is of faithless plight.

[6] Beydilli 2001, p. 74.
[7] Beydilli 2001, p. 74.

Think, O heart, alas! the revolutions of the rolling Sphere!
If at times 'tis joy, far oftener empire bringeth dire affright.
Do not envy, do not covet, then, the Kingship of the world;
O! take heed, Ilhami, empire bides not, swift indeed its flight.[8]

In the last sentence of the *ghazal*,[9] Selim III remarks that the Empire is not a constant, that it could disappear. He was clearly acknowledging the necessity to reform the Empire, to transform with the changing international system. But to do so would risk destabilising the Empire that he wanted to save. Despite his desires to stabilize the empire, demonstrated by peace with Austria, Selim III had to contend with the rise of Muhammed Ali of Egypt in July of 1805, war with Russia and Britain in 1806 over the abrogation of their alliance with the Ottoman Empire, and resistance to the *Nizam-I Djedid* by the Janissary Corps. The culmination of these events led to such great opposition and military revolt that Selim III was deposed on May 29, 1807, and all his reform provisions were cancelled.[10] Following the removal of Selim III from the throne, Mustafa IV was crowned as Sultan, but his tenure lasted just over a year, being forced from his position on July 28, 1808, and being replaced with Mahmud II (July 28, 1808-July 1, 1839).

### 3.2 Sultan Mahmud II's Reforms

Until the nineteenth century the Sublime Porte had become increasingly decentralised and Mahmud II was aware that the continuation of decentralised authority would leave Ottoman territories susceptible to the wills of foreign powers and the possibility of secession. On this basis, reforms were developed in order to centralise the state and develop institutions and structures that replicated the modern European state. It was believed that reforming the institutions of the Sublime Porte would help the Ottoman Empire compete with the advances made by the European states and safeguard against the possibility of social disintegration into separate politicised parts that could challenge the legitimacy of the Sublime Porte. However, these reforms did not always result in more efficient and centralised control. Instead, they alienated significant portions of the populations who were threatened by change and the resulting transformation of social order, which required the renegotiation of the social field.

[8] Gibb 1901, p. 171.
[9] A particular style of poetic form that rhymes couplets and a refrain. It often refers to heartbreak, pain, loss or the beauty of love despite pain and loss. It emerged from North Africa and the Middle East and is a traditional Arabic style of poetry, see Shackle 2004.
[10] Beydilli 2001, pp. 76-78.

In an attempt to rein in the power of local notables and ensure his authority, Mahmud II developed the 'Document of Agreement' in 1808. The document, signed by provincial notables and governors, acted as a pledge of allegiance and loyalty to the Sultan. In return, the Sultan saw to the application of a fair and even tax law across the territories – but only if revenues were not diverted. Another condition outlined in the agreement was the premise that notables would help in recruiting men from their regions for military service. In return, the Sultan agreed to limit the power of the Janissary Corps in the provinces; providing the provincial notables with greater authority.[11] This agreement between the Sultan, provincial notables, and provincial governors, was an attempt to reverse aspects of decentralisation, assert the basis for loyalty to the crown, and rebuild essential coercive force to defend territory and order society, while providing notables with economic and political assurances.

Some of these notables had understood the assurances made in the 'Document of Agreement' as a licence to act above their position in society. Viewing this as unacceptable, Mahmud II in 1812 attempted to limit the power of local notables who were acting in their own interests rather than the interests of the Empire. The notables had traditionally served as intermediaries between the governors and the local domestic populations, becoming more powerful as they became increasingly networked into local society, which affected politics and the economy. In a bid to re-establish authority, the Sultan sent troops from neighbouring provinces to attack and confiscate lands and titles from the offending notables. Mahmud II was able to stop the offending notables, particularly with the elimination of the leading notables along the Black Sea in 1812 and 1813. Following the use of force, Mahmud II limited the inheritance of local positions to heirs, sending these heirs to other provinces in the Empire and appointing new officials from Istanbul to replace them. This helped to place Thrace, Macedonia, Wallachia, and the Danubian shores under control of the throne.[12] Mahmud II's strategy was to shift the responsibility of the notables back to the Sultan from the domestic population by placing notables (*ayan*) into new local networks with the hope to hinder corruptive practices. However, the notables were quite strong, maintaining great influence in their regions, and the new Ottoman governors faced distrust from the locals, making it difficult for the central Ottoman administration to assert authority over many of the regions.[13] The inability to influence and reorder society through the employment of

[11] Shaw and Shaw 1977, pp. 2-3.
[12] Kettering 2001; Quataert 2005, p. 64; Gökçek 2001, pp. 242-243.
[13] Reilly 2002, p. 25.

governors reflected the communal political authority that was wielded at a family, clan, village, and city quarter level.[14]

Mahmud II, following the attempt made by Selim III to replace the Janissary Corps, also targeted the once prestigious army of the Sultanate. Over time, the prestige of the Janissaries had become overblown and their role within the Empire was distorted. Not only were they no longer able to compete with the rising strength of the European armies, their ability to maintain the boundaries of social order waned as their sights were set on living lives of opulence and status. The Janissaries had once maintained order through the pacification of the populations for the interests of the Empire, they had become self-interested actors. Like Selim III's proposed *Nizam-I Djedid*, Mahmud II developed an alternative coercive force called the *Eshkenjis* (*Asakir-I Mansure-I Muhammadiye* / The Victorious Mohammedan Soldiers), made up exclusively of Muslims.[15]

Angered by the threat of being replaced but unwilling to undergo internal reform, the Janissaries met their demise when they began a violent revolt in al-Maidan, a southern suburb of Damascus, in 1826 that was crushed by the *Eshkenjis*.[16] The defeat of the Janissary Corps opened the gates to political, economic, and military reform, providing the Sultanate with a rejuvenated sense of power over the Empire with the hopes to establish a new, centralised, social order.[17] This new social order was one that could provide the Ottoman administration with the ability to accede to the European state system internationally, allowing the Empire to compete as an equal player by exhibiting its capability in maintaining sovereign authority over its territories.

While the destruction of the Janissary Corps heralded a renewed potential for reform, the Empire was burdened by the creation of the new military. Military modernisation came at a great cost, and funds were diverted from provincial administrations to the central Ottoman administration.[18] The use of provincial funds for the maintenance and modernisation of the military force created a precedent that allowed the imperial treasury to extract funds from the provinces at the expense of the wellbeing of domestic communities in the provinces.

[14] As discussed by Leila Fawaz (2014) and Ibn Khaldun (1967)
[15] Sell 1915, pp. 7-8.
[16] For more information on the settlement of Janissaries in particular towns and cities see al-Khafaji 2004, pp. 103-108; Sell 1915, pp. 86-87; Engelhardt 1882, pp. 7-8.
[17] Quataert 1997, p. 404.
[18] Beydilli 2001, p. 87.

In another attempt to affect social order Mahmud II issued a decree in 1829 requiring that all males, regardless of 'ancient community' and occupation, with the exception of the *'Ulema* and non-Muslim leaders, to wear identical headgear – the *fez* or *tarbouche* – in order to have all men appear equal and to transform identity from one tied to religion, ethnicity, or occupation, to an identity based on the state.[19] While previous reforms sought to centralise political capability through governance and control over the military, the 1829 law sought to replace established social norms of dress with symbols that could be equated with an imperial identity. This reflected the emerging national identities of the European states by reducing the importance the headgear that provided a marker for religion, class, status, and rank and establishing a sign of Ottoman identity in its place. However, many of the Ottoman artisanal workers and craftsmen who were once tied to the Janissary Corps, rejected the new law. The rejection of the new dress code was anchored in the fear of the continued replacement of social conventions and markers that would further disturb the class comfort of various sectors of society. However, the middle and upper class non-Muslim merchants, embraced the change, seeing it as a new form of freedom. In the case of the 1829 law, Donald Quataert notes an emerging division based on religious association, with Muslims standing in opposition to their declining social status and economic access, while non-Muslims had generally moved to support the reforms for better social and economic prospects.[20]

The reforms that attempted to limit the power of local notables (1812-1820) resulted in the destruction of Janissary Corps (1826) and those that attempted to reorganise established notions of identity (1829) sent the Empire into a period of mild disorder caused by political, economic, and social instability that dislocated accepted customary practices from the state.[21] In an effort to centralise power, the Sublime Porte sought to interfere in areas where it had not previously interfered, including the management of social order. These reforms attempted to tackle two problems: first, there were pressures resulting from competition with Europe that changed the balance of power between the European states and the Ottoman Empire, requiring that the Sublime Porte reform in order to compete. Second, localised autonomy posed the threat of secession to the Empire as well as potential for direct European interference. Overall, the reforms sought to reorder society, placing the Sublime Porte in the centre of social, economic, and political life, thus removing any symbols of difference where meaning could be manufactured and empowered to help with programmes of dissent. For example, establishing the *tarbouche* as a symbol of equality, mandated by the

[19] Quataert 2005, p. 66; Quataert 1997, p. 403.
[20] Quateart, 1997, pp. 412-417.
[21] Engelhardt, 1882, p. 14.

Empire, it could be used as a symbol of the authority of the Sublime Porte replacing symbols of customary political, economic, or social groups and networks.

In producing these early reforms, the Sultanate looked west to Europe, imitating aspects of the European nation-state by trying to centralise authority and create state-associated symbols. The reforms, however, altered the social field by changing the relational dynamics between communal groups and networks. The result of this change was the renegotiation of the social field by customary communal groups and networks, amongst each other but also with the Sublime Porte, creating new areas of exclusion. The consequence was social fragmentation and a crisis of legitimacy that provided opportunities for the European powers to develop deeper relations with customary communal groups and networks, making gains and fulfilling interests; a development that became pronounced following the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841) and following the promulgation of the first *Tanzimat* decree in 1839 by Sultan Abdulmecid I (1839-1861). Although the Sublime Porte acted in its own self- interest, a mixture of survival and desire to be an equal and active participant in the developing European state system, the international and domestic fields in which the Sublime Porte had to navigate with regards to reforms constrained and limited the decisions it could make.

### 3.3 The Egyptian Occupation of the Syrian Provinces (1831-1841): Transforming the Social Field

The diffusion of enlightenment ideas, public political legitimacy based on secular, rational, and scientific thought began to replace tenets of absolutism and ideologies that provided support and authority to the *ancien régime* of kings. The propagation of these ideas had a resounding impact on 'middle class Balkan Orthodox Christians, who were either ethnic Greeks, or largely acculturated into the Greek *ethnie*, or under heavy Grecophone influences',[22] helping to amass support for a revolt in 1821 that invited the attention of France, Britain, and Russia, who sided with the Greeks in their putsch against the Sublime Porte. The basis to which the European powers offered support was conceived of as supporting an enlightened civilisation as they entered political modernity, against the oppression of fanatical authority of the Sublime Porte.[23]

[22] Roudometof 1988, pp. 11-14.
[23] St Clair 2008; Dakin 1973.

In an effort to suppress the revolt against the Sublime Porte, the Ottomans requested the help of Muhammed Ali of Egypt and his military forces. Unable to combat the European powers, the Egyptian navy was destroyed at Navarino in 1827, defeating the Egyptian and Ottoman forces, and the independent modern state of Greece was subsequently formally acknowledged through the conclusion of the Treaty of London in 1830 and the Treaty of Constantinople in 1832.[24]

The loss of Greece dealt a great blow to the Ottoman Empire's prestige and power, as evidenced, first, by Russian declarations of war (1828-1829) and the terms of peace that followed, and then by the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces. The consequence of these events further constrained Ottoman decision-making and forced the hand of the Sultan to make concessions to the materially stronger European powers. The Russian declaration of war on the Sublime Porte on April 26, 1828, was, as argued by the Sublime Porte, a betrayal to existing treaties, particularly the Peace of Bucharest (1812) and the Treaty of Ackerman (1826).[25] The Sublime Porte, in June 1828, responded to Russia's declaration of war, stating that the reasons for declaring war were unfounded, rejecting every argument mentioned in the Russian declaration.[26] Given the deteriorated state of the Ottoman Empire, the war did not last long and was concluded with the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Though hostilities between Russia and the Ottoman Empire were concluded, the Ottomans were forced into agreeing to free trade for Russians in the Ottoman Empire, free passage to Russian merchant vessels in the Straits of Istanbul and the Bosporus, freedom of trade and navigation in the Black Sea, reparation payments of 1.5million ducats of Holland to be made within 18 months, as well as the secession of territories along the Black Sea to Russia.[27]

As payment for the losses that the Egyptian forces sustained, Muhammed Ali sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha, to occupy the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire in 1831, igniting the first Egyptian-Ottoman War (1831-1833). Russian intervention on behalf of the Ottoman Empire during the Egyptian-Ottoman War incited British and French action due to concerns that Russia would continue to gain new advantages. Involvement of France and Britain prevented the Egyptian forces from advancing further and an agreement, the Convention of Kütahya, was reached between Egypt and the Ottoman Empire on May 14, 1833. The agreement specified that the administration of Egypt, Crete, Damascus, Jeddah, and Adana

[24] (a) Hetslet 1875, pp. 769-774. (Treaty no. 136).
[25] (b) Hetslet 1875, pp. 777- 784. (Treaty No. 138).
[26] (b) Hetslet 1875, pp. 787- 797. (Treaty No. 140).
[27] (b) Hetslet 1875, pp. 814-823. (Treaty No. 145).

would be left in the hands of Muhammed Ali Pasha. However, the Convention of Kütahya was perceived as a temporary agreement by Muhammed Ali and the Ottoman Sultan, and the Sultan therefore attempted to establish additional security agreements. On July 8, 1833, following the Convention of Kütahya, the Russians and the Ottomans signed an additional agreement, the Hünkâr İskelesi Agreement, which promised that Russian forces would come to the aid of Sultan Mahmud II should Muhammed Ali of Egypt try to push his occupation further inland. In return, the Turkish Straits would be open to the Russians for an eight-year period but closed to Russian enemies, drawing further attention to the geo-strategic importance of the Ottoman Empire to Britain and France.[28]

On the heels of the Convention of Kütahya, British General Consul John William Perry Farren describes the social order in Damascus as militaristic in comparison to previous visits. Writing on February 7, 1834, Farren recounts the richness of the city, its population, and the abundance of economic opportunities. He also tells of a society that has been largely impenetrable to European ideas. In this letter to Viscount Palmerston, Farren argues that it is in Britain's interests

> to break down by the moral influence of its national power this besotted opposition to the just and natural relations of states, and be the first to open this field of commercial enterprise to European commerce, and to establish on a respected basis in these parts the rights of Christian civilisation.[29]

In the same letter, Farren relays how Ibrahim Pasha is now the means of social order and organisation. In stating so, he acknowledges that the increased social order witnessed on his landing in Damascus could be due to fear of repercussions by Muhammed Ali and his army.[30] From early on, the British, the French, and the Russians had approached the Ottoman Empire and the Syrian provinces with a colonial and imperial gaze that was not bound to

[28] The Hünkâr İskelesi Agreement (1833) was followed by the Treaty of Munchengraetz on September 18, 1833. The latter was an agreement signed between Russia, Austria, and Prussia to protect the sovereignty of the monarchy should it be threatened. Following the eight year term of the Hünkâr İskelesi Agreement, a new treaty had been signed in London, The Straits Convention, July 13, 1841, which outlined the legal status of the Straits and significantly reduced Ottoman sovereignty of the waterways. Beydilli 2001, pp. 86-91.

[29] FO/78/243, February 7, 1834, sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from J.W. Farren, Damascus.

[30] Although Farren admires the logics of the new social order under Egyptian forces, he is aware of its violence and brutality. FO/78/243, February 7, 1834.

economic and geo-strategic interests.[31] It included the export of ideas that equated European civilisation with a rational logic and European ideas of statehood as a moral and enlightened right, separate from the fanatical and oppressive authority of the Ottoman Empire.

Although Russian interests in the Syrian provinces had a strong ecclesiastical focus with regards to Orthodox communities, they were primarily driven by political and military strategy, particularly with regards to Russian imperial expansion and unfettered access to the Turkish Straits. Similar to British and French concerns of Russian influence, Russia was apprehensive of the diplomatic and religious activities of other European diplomats and missionaries within the region, finding it necessary to establish a base of support amongst the local populations, as the British and French were doing.

In order to escape the suspicion of European powers, the Russian foreign ministry sent the chief official of the Russian Orthodox Church, Porfirii Uspenskii, to the Ottoman Empire with orders to report back on the relationships between the Orthodox community and the Empire as well as the Orthodox community and the other European foreign powers.[32] While traveling throughout the Syrian provinces, Uspenskii, describes the fair governance of minorities under the rule of Ibrahim Pasha, who provided equal status to non-Muslims, allowed for foreign missionary activity, and permitted European consulates to open in Damascus and Jerusalem.[33] Crucially, the reforms made under Egyptian occupation gave Ibrahim Pasha the ability to participate in global politics as a rational actor akin to European leaders. However, Egyptian capability to participate as an equal actor in the European state system was limited. Rather than acquiescing to Egyptian sovereignty, the European powers penetrated the social field in the Syrian provinces, due to the schisms created under Egyptian rule. The reforms that were administered during the Egyptian occupation altered the social order and had significant consequences regarding stability and the rise of inter-communal violent conflict.

In his travels across Syria, Uspenskii described several incidents highlighting how the premise of *equal status* negatively altered communal relations. For Muslim inhabitants in the Syrian provinces, equality diminished their once prominent political, economic, and social status, while the Christian communities enjoyed their new elevated status. In addition to

[31] Colonialism being the act of conquering and governing the population through direct imposition and imperialism as the expansion and domination of ideas, politics, and economics into geographic areas, and administering direct or indirect administration, see Adas 1998.
[32] Hopwood 2014, pp. 133-134.
[33] Hopwood 2014, p. 141.

inadvertently creating animosity directed at the Christian communities, Ibrahim Pasha openly and severely punished Muslims who were unhappy with the shift away from the status quo. The result was social conflict, violence, and retribution. In one example, after Ibrahim Pasha's reforms were decreed, a prominent Orthodox family decided to celebrate a wedding. No longer feeling that it was necessary to keep the celebration muted, the family left the windows of their house open. Annoyed by such an open celebration, a group of Muslims entered the house, "[…] scattered the guests and set fire to the house."[34]

From Uspenskii's reflections on the state of society in the Syrian provinces under Egyptian occupation, it is apparent that changes to the existing social order had a severely negative impact. The redistribution of status through the premise of equality between ecclesial communities may have removed barriers, but in doing so provided a pathway to entrench divisions based on sectarian identities due to the loss of socio-political status. The drastic change to the social order dislocated the relationship between the polity and society, giving Ibrahim Pasha only tenuous support from the population and creating the desire from many under the Pasha's authority to return to the authority of the Sublime Porte.

### 3.3.1 European Colonial Interests and the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841)

The occupation of the Syrian provinces by Egyptian forces attempted to institute a form of governance that reflected the prevalent norms established in Europe. The establishment of these norms, particularly the norm of equality, provided legitimacy to the French alliance with Egypt, with the French arguing that the Egyptians had produced a legitimate civilisational standard. Writing on October 21, 1840, following the outbreak of the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841) the French Consul General in Aleppo recalls the large number of Ottoman subjects who, at the beginning of the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces, emigrated from territories still under the control of the Ottoman Empire to escape the tyranny of the Ottoman Pashas.[35] In making sense of the French consul's description of tyranny, it could be argued that the repression by Muhammed Ali's occupation and the rule of his son, Ibrahim Pasha, was one that instilled order, while the tyranny of the Pashas within the Ottoman Administration was one of disorder and corruption with no navigable path to security.

[34] Hopwood 2014, p. 144.
[35] 166PO/D1/46, October 21, 1840 (no. 51), sent to Comte de Pontois, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Henry Guys, Aleppo.

The French perceptions of Egyptian rule in comparison to Ottoman rule were influenced by French colonial interests in Algeria that could be attained by accommodating Egyptian rule in the Syrian provinces.[36] The pursuit of these interests was thinly veiled by the argument that the French sought to protect the Egyptian premise of equality and rational governance. On the other hand, the British thought it necessary to maintain good relations with the Ottoman Empire due to British interests in Mesopotamia and Persia, as well as the expansion of their trade agreement with the Ottoman Empire into the Syrian provinces.[37] By engaging and aligning themselves with Muhammed Ali or Mahmud II, the French and British could respectively make gains within and beyond the Ottoman Empire, fulfilling a wider set of interests. The different colonial interests and the different alignments put the British and French into conflict, but also impacted the development of the Ottoman Empire itself by constraining domestic and international policy options.

In addition to the French aligning themselves with Muhammed Ali and the British with Mahmud II, both Farren and Consul D. Sandison discussed the various relationships Britain maintained with the domestic communities and the interests of Britain at the time. Farren noted that the Jewish and Christian communities viewed Britain with 'profound respect'. It was alluded to, in these despatches, that a strategy to penetrate the social order and increase British influence through the alignment with these communities was plausible and could be strategised. Conversely, Sandison discussed Britain's need to stop and reverse Russian gains within the Ottoman Empire.[38] From this despatch, it is evident that there was a clear aim that the British were interested in maintaining a position of influence within the Ottoman Empire, while trying to ensure Russia's influence did not increase, and in turn, receded.

While the French highlighted the Sultan's unpopularity with his subjects, Sandison wrote to Lord Posonby that Mahmud II had been a strong sovereign, one who had been open to reform and policy change.[39] Although he noted the gradual decline of the Ottoman Empire and the efforts of the Sultan to limit the shortcomings of his authority, Sandison also wrote:

[36] FO/78/410, January 23, 1840, sent to John Bidwell, Foreign Office, from N.W. Ulerry, Damascus.
[37] FO/78/410, January 18, 1840, sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from N.W. Ulerry, Damascus; June 23, 1840 (no. 9), sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from N.W. Ulerry, Damascus; Palmer 1992, p. 112.
[38] FO/78/243, February 7, 1834; FO/78/252, January 13, 1835 (no. 14), sent to Lord Posonby, from D. Sandison, Constantinople [Istanbul].
[39] FO/78/252, January 13, 1835.

> In many districts [of Istanbul][40] all classes are comfortable and thriving. Order and obedience have replaced among the Turks their hereditary habits of turbulence in the capital and provinces. The old Janissary party appears to be perfectly insignificant, nor was its destruction ever any subject of national regret. The mass of the people has become accustomed to the Sultan's military reforms and to perceive in the various innovations introduced.[41]

Here, Sandison states that the Empire is doing well, there is marked change in the institutions regarding authority and the Ottoman subjects, particularly in the capital, have adapted to these changes. Sandison subsequently states that the individuals in the Syrian provinces who had come under Egyptian occupation have generally become tired of Muhammed Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha.[42] Despite his support for the Ottoman Empire and the discrediting of Egyptian authority, Sandison reiterates the language of scientific racism, describing the disorder caused by the Turks as a *hereditary* trait, amplifying the hierarchical racial, ethnic, and the pre-modern Christian European worldview.

Concerned with the possibility of capitulations by the Sublime Porte to the Russians, the French alliance with the Egyptians, and the possibility of further diminishment of the Sublime Porte in the region given that the British relationship with Mahmud II had been secured, the British offered material support to combat the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces in return for several economic and political concessions. The signing of the Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty of Balta Liman (1838) provided the British with the ability to carve out their special status within the Ottoman Empire by imposing what was essentially a free trade agreement, granting Britain the right to obtain privileges granted to other European powers.[43] These concessions, secured by the British, undermined the influence of competing European powers but also opened the floodgates to further political and economic concessions in return for European material and diplomatic support.[44] Crucially economic and judicial capitulations made to the European powers by the Ottoman Empire diminished Ottoman sovereignty by providing the Europeans power over affairs occurring in Ottoman territories and secured the Ottoman Empire's place in the European hierarchy

[40] Constantinople is used in the original European documents.
[41] FO/78/252, January 13, 1835.
[42] FO/78/252, January 13, 1835.
[43] Convention of Commerce, Balta Liman, August 16, 1838; Findley 1989, p. 28.
[44] The French consul writes that the English are making gains in the city of Aleppo through engaging with the indigenous population in the formation of trade agreements 166PO/D1/46, March 12, 1840 (no. 37), sent to Duc de Dalmatie, President of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from Henry Guys, Aleppo.

as a subordinate state. The changes that had already taken place during the Egyptian occupation politicised the social cleavages within the social environment, altering the dynamics between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities as well as the relationship between both communities and structures of governance.

### 3.3.2 The Hatt-ı Şerif (1839): A Junction of European and Ottoman Political Interests

The reign of Mahmud II was characterized by considerable social and political reforms. Arguably, these reforms set the foundation for the reforms promulgated by Sultan Abdulmecid I (July 1, 1839 – June 25, 1861), son of Mahmud II, who promulgated the Hatt-ı Şerif, or the Gulhane Decree, on November 3, 1839. Although there were very few immediate and significant changes that occurred in the Syrian provinces following the promulgation of the decree because of the continued Egyptian occupation, it can be described as a provocation by European powers who maintained influence over the Grand Vizier, Mustafa Reshid Pasha, who was perceived as the architect of the decree.[45]

During the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841) Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia came together to help dislodge the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces, motivated by regional geo-strategic interests – including British access to Mesopotamia and Persia and Russian interest in the Turkish Straits – and aimed to salvage the relationship between Egypt and the Sublime Porte.[46] In contrast, the French offered their alliance to the Egyptians with the hopes of fulfilling imperial interests in Algeria and disguised it as protecting principles of equality and rational governance.[47] But, because of the European alignment against Egypt, France was forced into a position of neutrality while Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha were forcibly removed. The European powers, excluding France, subsequently assumed the 'right to advise the Sultan in Syrian affairs because, with the exception of France, they had helped him recover [the] province'. By this point, the Sublime Porte had already administered several reforms, including the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839), although they had not been administered in the Syrian provinces due to the Egyptian occupation.[48] The promulgation and the administration of the Hatt-ı Şerif was a necessary step for the Ottoman Empire to be considered an equal partner in the European state system, subject to the same rights and privileges as the European states. In contrast, for the European states, the Ottoman Empire's slow accession

[45] Mardin 2000, p. 162; Findley 1989, pp. 30-31.
[46] 18PO/A/11, November 5, 1840, Séance Royale, Discours du Roi.
[47] FO/78/410, January 23, 1840.
[48] Šedivý 2010, p. 99.

to the European state system provided new opportunities to be had, including the 'right to advise the Sultan'.

To argue that the Hatt-ı Şerif was influenced by Western powers is controversial, but the European role in the formulation of the modernisation decree cannot be ignored. The Ottoman Empire had been the target of European demands to establish provisions of equality from as early as 1830 and these demands were used as a bargaining chip in offering material support against the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces.[49] The Hatt-ı Şerif 'had as its goal the establishment of a social order such that modern rights of citizenship would be guaranteed, inferior government would be eliminated and both Muslim and non-Muslim subjects would enjoy the same personal rights'.[50] Such provisions were established to replicate the social and political conditions of modern Europe.

The Ottoman Empire could not fully achieve the conditions demanded by the European powers or that had been set out in the Hatt-ı Şerif without radically transforming its existence as a Muslim empire; a Muslim empire that was centred on a specific interpretation of Shari'a Law, which was incompatible with European notions of equality.[51] Indeed, the Empire did not have the kind of secular judicial system that could support these provisions as the judiciary itself was wedded to the adjudication of Shari'a law, which gave preference to Muslim subjects.[52] The legal provision of equality within the Ottoman Empire created a great amount of tension between the real capabilities of the Sublime Porte and European demands, as well as between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.

The concept of equality as understood within European thought developed through periods of social and political upheaval and was, at the time, not even being fully implemented in Europe.[53] It can be argued that the insistence by European powers on establishing the provision of equality in the Ottoman Empire was based on specific worldviews established on Enlightenment ideas of rationality and progress, subordinating the Ottoman Empire with a moral hierarchy that justified scientific racism. The moral hierarchy that was established was one that had been assembled on pre-modern knowledges and practices that emerged with the idea of a Christian European civilisation, where the advent of modernity and the scientific categorisation of the world led to the belief that progress was a biological condition

[49] Mardin 2000, p. 162; Findley 1989, pp. 30-31.
[50] Beydilli 2001, p. 92; Findley 1989, p. 31; Davison 1954, p. 847.
[51] Al-Shaybani 1996, pp. 57-62.
[52] Findley 1989, p. 31; Davison 1954, p. 847.
[53] Buonarroti 1836.

tied to race and religion. In turn, this led to a European narrative of Islamic fanaticism. Where the Muslim body, would consistently have difficulty in achieving the standard of civilisation established by in Europe and the European state system.[54]

Despite the moral hierarchy established through scientific racism, the expansion of the European state system into the global peripheries was premised by the idea that modernity was an attainable condition, that government reforms could redevelop the social field into an ordered framework that replicated European society. Upon declaration of the decree in the Syrian provinces, and according to the French consul in Damascus, the Hatt-ı Şerif was met with great indifference in the provinces.[55] This is in stark contrast to the despatch by the British consul in Damascus, who, on January 18, 1840, writes that the promulgation of the Hatt-ı Şerif has 'produced considerable sensation among the population, though [it is] very imperfectly understood.'[56] Unless the political alliances are considered, it is difficult to comprehend why French and British perceptions of popular opinion could be so different given the temporal and geographic proximity in which they were writing. By considering the political alliances, it can be argued that the French perceptions were coloured by their alliance with Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, while the British alliance with the Sublime Porte affected their perceptions of the decree's reception. Given that both parties had much to lose should the reforms succeed (French) or fail (British), there was a necessity to propagate the rhetoric that benefited their position and interests.

In the British despatch, the consul continues that the public viewed the announcement of the decree as a prelude to the resumption of Ottoman authority in Syria. Effectively, with the Hatt-ı Şerif in place, this would mean the abolition of the war tax (*ferdeh*), 'conscription, statute labour, and requisitions' and the restoration of the previous order of government and authority 'all [of] which is congenial to the desire and feelings of the people'.[57] On the other hand, the French consul in Aleppo wrote on January 21, 1840, that only a small portion of the public will benefit from this decree and it is this portion of the population who maintain an 'unaccustomed happiness' with being subjects of the Sultan, who will once again be offered protection.[58] In contrast to earlier French reports, the British consul in Damascus

[54] Bowden 2004, p. 49; Donelly 1998, p. 8; Fidler 2001, p. 143.
[55] 166PO/D20/2 January 8, 1840 (no. 7), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador in Constantinople [Istanbul], from Comte de Ratti-Menton, Damascus.
[56] FO/78/410 January 23, 1840.
[57] FO/78/410 January 23, 1840.
[58] 166PO/D1/46 January 21, 1840 (no. 43), sent to M. de Pontois, Extraordinary Envoy to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Henry Guys, Aleppo.

writes to John Bidwell at the Foreign Office in London, that the population in the Syrian provinces have begun strategising their extraction from under the Egyptian regime.[59]

Yet, both the French and British positions come under doubt. The proposed French strategy of maintaining good relations with Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha in order to secure interests in North Africa is questioned by the French consul in Beirut who asks how he is to fulfil the wishes of King Louis-Philippe I (August 9, 1830-February 24, 1848) in maintaining good relations with Egypt when the people aim to remove Egyptian authority. The French consul in Beirut further relents that he is finding it difficult to construct a rhetoric that the French are the natural allies and protectors of the people, given their desire to return under the authority of the Sublime Porte.[60] Furthermore, despite the British alignment with the Ottoman Empire and the transfer of material support to the Sublime Porte in combating the Egyptian occupation, there is uncertainty that prevails in how the Empire will be managed and governed once sovereignty is returned to the Sultan. The British consul in Damascus, writing to Lord Viscount Palmerston, wonders what kind of system of governance would become dominant once the Syrian provinces are returned to the Sultan and if it will, in turn, 'be able to maintain the same standards as is held in Europe'.[61] For the French consul in Beirut, doubt was a shadow cast by the observed reality, forcing him to question the motivations and interests that had been framed as a humanitarian project. The British, on the other hand, doubted the ability of the Sublime Porte to institutionalise a form of rational and progressive governance similar to that of European states. Nevertheless, both European powers pressed on in a relentless manner.

French doubt over the ability to establish influence while supporting Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha was being confirmed. On January 26, 1840, the French consul in Damascus writes that the promise of equality under the law has created a schism in the social fabric. The Muslims view equality as an offence to their socio-economic status because the admission of non-Muslim individuals to the civil administration, despite their religious belief, further dislodges Muslim prominence, pulling the Christian minority into the structure of the Empire, negating Christian relative autonomy, and threatening the Islamic identity of the Ottoman Empire.[62] On the other hand, British doubt over the Sublime Porte's desire regarding the system of governance that would be implemented was increased, not because

[59] FO/78/410 January 23, 1840.
[60] Ismail 1976, pp. 25-26.
[61] FO/78/410 January 18, 1840.
[62] 166PO/D20/2 January 26, 1840 (no. 9), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Comte de Ratti-Menton, Damascus.

of the desire of the Sublime Porte to follow in the form of governance and authority prevalent in Europe, but with the contrasted desire of the populations under Egyptian authority who wished to re-engage with traditional Ottoman structures.[63]

For the Muslim populations of the Syrian provinces, returning to Ottoman authority meant returning to a system that provided Muslim socio-economic dominance within the structures of the Empire. Returning to Ottoman authority for the non-Muslim minorities meant that they would once again have autonomy within these structures. In both cases, the return of Ottoman sovereignty in the Syrian provinces did not equate a form of governance modelled after the emerging modern state in Europe. The concept of equality, as experienced under Egyptian rule, was an attempt to secure the rights of the Christian population and to parallel the secularising judiciaries of European states. The attempt to replicate the secular practices of the European state in the Syrian provinces was produced in the framework that secularisation, as a modern phenomenon, was a practice separate to its Christian history in Europe. The changes being enforced during the Egyptian occupation constituted an affront to the social order that the populations had grown accustomed to.[64] The ideas of order, rationality, and progress that were propagated by European states in the Ottoman Empire were viewed as chaotic and oppressive by the populations who desired decentralised and traditional Ottoman Authority.[65] However, the Hatt-I Şerif , having been announced prior to the development of a concerted effort to overthrow the Egyptian occupation, sought to introduce a European form of governance, or at least, a modern European understanding of rational governance and equality.

### 3.3.3 Domestic and International Constraints: The Return of Ottoman Authority

By the end of 1840, the Egyptians and the French were facing a widespread rebellion in the Syrian provinces, blaming the English and the Russians for its emergence. With the possibility of suffering a defeat by the English, Russians, and Ottomans, the French consul questioned whether France should continue to provide support for Muhammed Ali, given that the insurrection and the alliance between the European powers posed greater threats to French interests than the possible gains they would receive by maintaining their alignment with the Egyptians. The French consul in Beirut states that Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha are, after all, Muslims, just like the Turks, and it is the Christian populations who

[63] Reilly 2002, p. 126.
[64] Rajeev Bhargava (2011) argues that the Christian roots of secularism limited its ability 'to cope with religions that mandate greater public or political presence or have a strong communal orientation. […] This group-insensitivity of secularism makes it virtually impossible for it to accommodate community-specific rights,' p. 101.
[65] For a deeper discussion on Ottoman decentralisation and traditional authority see Barkey 2008.

should be privileged by France.[66] Accepting their precarious situation, the French government was being forced to reconsider their interests. Although the French sought to protect the civilisational standards of secularism and equality, they viewed the Christian populations in the Syrian provinces as separate from the Muslims. This is insinuated with the argument that Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha, despite being advocates for secularism and equality, were still Muslim, suggesting a natural difference between them and modern-French identity.

Despite advocating secular policies, the French adhered to a civilisational Christian, primarily Catholic, worldview, not dissimilar to the Russians who sought to influence and ally themselves with the Orthodox Christian communities. The alliances that were formed created new political, economic, and social hierarchies and facilitated social schisms. Contributing to the development of divisions within the social field, was the administration of policies that attempted to centralise state power, the attempt to institutionalise equality, and the dissemination of 'liberal' ideologies similar to those in Europe. Here it is noted that Egyptian policies of equality altered the social balance in a radical way. The administration of equality by the Egyptian regime, which elevated the social, economic, and political position of the Christian populations in the Syrian provinces, led to Muslim sentiments of jealousy and social retribution. The changing social dynamics in the Syrian provinces and the use of force against those who rebelled against change, cemented the religious schisms within the policy of equality, creating a system of legal equality without social tolerance.

The Mount Lebanon region, in particular, experienced a great shift in the balance of power caused by policies of equality, Christian military exemptions, and rearmament. Emir Bashir II, of the Chehab family, not one to relinquish his status and authority, converted from Sunni Islam to Maronite Catholicism in order to benefit from the changing social dynamics. Under the authority of Emir Bashir II, it is argued that issues relating to the transformation of taxation, feudal authority, and military conscription came to a boiling point, resulting in violent sectarian conflict.[67] The summer of 1840 not only marked the emergence of sectarian conflict in Mount Lebanon, but the beginning of a rebellion against the Egyptian authorities.

The rebellion, beginning in Mount Lebanon, transformed aspects of traditional and emerging social orders, drawing the population into a mass political conflict with two opposing sides:

[66] 92PO/A/24 June 16, 1840, Beirut.
[67] Al-Aqiqi 1959, pp. 2-3; FO/78/410 June 23, 1840 (no. 9), sent to Lord Palmerston, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from N.W. Ulerry, Damascus.

those who wished to maintain the Egyptian occupation and those who sought the return of the Ottoman Sultanate. The rebellion led to a schism in the Chehab family, as Emir Bashir II openly supported the Egyptian authorities while his son, Emir Khalil, vocally opposed Bashir's alliance, lending support to the rebellion with the aim of reinstating Ottoman governance. The internal political division of the Chehab family was replicated by divisions among other notable families, including the Sha'ab family, a Druze dynasty.[68]

Although the region was known for political divisions often taking form in class conflict, sectarianism, or family loyalty,[69] conflict between the Egyptian loyalists and the Ottomans loyalists was fundamentally political regarding the distribution of power between religious communities. Conflict between the Egyptians and the Ottomans at the state level was concerned with governance, control, and sovereignty and at the international level, self-interested European powers hid behind ideas of progress and modernity, with the aim to minimise what they perceived as despotic rule, and at the same time fulfil their greater geostrategic and economic interests.

Ideas of progress and modernity that were being promoted by the European powers resonated with the domestic populations, who sought either their implementation with the guise of obtaining freedoms under the law, or returning to the previous political structures where freedom was obtained through autonomy. In an attempt to establish stability between the Egyptian government and the Sublime Porte over the Sublime Porte, the 'The Additional Act', or *Acte Séparé*, signed on July 15, 1840 in London, was – in many ways – a result of the international dimension of the conflict. The consuls representing Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia agreed to provide material support to the Ottoman Sultan in his campaign to regain the Syrian provinces if Muhammed Ali did not accept the proposed delineated boundaries of Egypt. Additionally, the Act promised that by accepting the territorial limitations, Muhammed Ali would secure the rule of his descendants in Egypt.[70] With the backing from European powers, Muhammed Ali was forced to agree to the terms set out in the Act. However, his son Ibrahim Pasha refused and is quoted as saying 'we will liberate Syria only with the cost of our blood', while quietly relying on France to support Egyptian interests.[71]

---

[68] FO/78/410 June 23, 1840 (no. 9).
[69] Cook 1976.
[70] *The Tablet* [Newspaper], September 19, 1840, p. 3.
[71] 166PO/D1/46 August 17, 1840 (no. 53), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Henry Guys, Aleppo.

Following the acceptance of 'The Additional Act', the British government issued a letter to the consuls in the Syrian provinces, which was to be spread as wide as possible. The letter urged the Syrian people to revolt against the Egyptian authorities and promised the full support of Britain and the Sublime Porte. By resisting the Egyptian occupation, the British promised that the Syrian people would benefit from the Hatt-ı Şerif, guaranteeing their right to life and property as the Sultan's subjects, an assurance supported by the European powers. The letter also offered a variety of concessions, including: permission for defectors of the Ottoman Army to return from the Egyptian forces, who will receive protection from Britain in the fight against Egypt, and forgiveness of past rents and debts of any soldier who joins the Sultan's Standard.[72]

With the revolt by the Syrian population against the Egyptian occupation underway, Ibrahim Pasha, on September 6, 1840, declared that Syria was officially under siege. Along with this declaration, Ibrahim Pasha also decreed a number of statutes that made it illegal for any individual, native or non-native, to participate in rebellion or revolt against the Egyptian forces. This included, making punishable by death, the writing, or circulation of writing, regarding revolt or rebellion.[73] As the war between the Ottomans and the Egyptians developed, the French consul in Aleppo writes that there is growing fanaticism amongst the Muslim population, giving the example of Homs where 1,500 men were ordered by the Sultan to go into battle. The French consul argued in the despatch to Paris that the governor of Homs' use of religious sentiment in expressing support for the Sultan and encouraging men to fight Egyptian forces was evidence of fanaticism.[74] For the French consul, the relationship between religion and politics was a relationship that was inherently fanatical, and was distinctly Islamic. Yet, the use religious identity employed by the governor of Homs to direct political action was replicated by the French consul who asserted the importance of offering additional protections to the Christian populations. Although the French were employing a parallel narrative to that which they were opposing, they had done so on the premise of a moral superiority, evoking distinctions between Islamic fanaticism and Christian rationality.

Despite French sentiment against the return of Ottoman authority in the Syrian provinces and support for the Egyptian forces, the French changed their strategy in October, 1840,

[72] FO/78/412 Letter to the Syrians.
[73] FO/78/412 Order from the Egyptians.
[74] 166PO/D1/46 October 12, 1840 (no. 57), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Henry Guys, Aleppo.

resulting in the withdrawal of Egyptian forces in 1841.[75] The Egyptians, who had been abandoned by the French, were subsequently faced with an Ottoman force backed by European powers, resulting in the defection of Egyptian soldiers.[76] With the withdrawal of Egyptian forces and the re-establishment of Ottoman authority came the implementation of the Hatt-ı Şerif, which disappointed the populations in Syria who had wished for a return to traditional social orders.[77] On the other hand, those who had desired continuation of Egyptian governance were dismayed because of the Ottoman inability to provide Egyptian-style authority.[78]

The return of Ottoman authority resulted in a form of governance that was incapable to provide traditional forms of autonomy due to international constraints and unable to provide the form of governance that had been established under Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha due to domestic constraints. Although there was an effort to bring about change in the Ottoman Empire, many of the social provisions of the first *Tanzimat* decree did not come to fruition. For example, in a bid to establish political equality, the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) sought to allow non-Muslims to partake in the local administrative councils. The administrative councils, also known as the Provincial Advisory Council, became the central point for the administration of villages, settling civil and commercial disputes, managing court cases, and overseeing village elections.[79]

Commenting on these changes, Henry Guys, the French Consul in Aleppo, notes that disorder continues due to an absence of codified secular laws, which has created a system where 'justice is often served to those who have money in hand' and that 'the people follow the religion [practices] of the chiefs', producing corruption that is akin to social disease.[80] The reforms that the Sublime Porte sought to establish pursued equality through administrative changes, but they had a negative impact on inter-group relations as the legal framework had not been clearly established. Within the Syrian provinces, the changes in authority, from Egyptian to Ottoman, and the establishment of reforms also created opportunities for a new class of notables to emerge.[81]

---

[75] Douwes 2000, p. 61.
[76] 166PO/D1/46 November 18, 1840 (no. 61), sent to M. de Pontois, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Henry Guys, Aleppo.
[77] Reilly 2002, p. 126.
[78] Palmer 1992, p. 112.
[79] Thompson 1993, p. 458.
[80] Guys 2009, pp. 89-215-216, 211-212.
[81] Khoury (1983) examines closely the co-constitutive development between urban notables and Arab nationalism.

Along with the structural and organisational reforms, the retreat of Egyptian forces and the reassertion of Ottoman authority emerged a new group of notable families, including the Abdi and Yusuf families in Damascus and the Durubi, Jundi, and Suwaydan families in Homs, that became competitors to the traditional group of prominent families, such as the Chehabs and Jumblatts in Mount Lebanon and the 'Azms, Tayfur, Barazi, and Jijakli in Hama. This new group of notables acquired control of villages and farmlands, and crucially, maintained close relations with the Ottoman imperial centre. For the traditional dynastic and military families, their power began to wane but their fortunes and official appointments within the reformed Ottoman administration were maintained.[82] Continuity of the traditional notable families was an important strategy for the Sublime Porte, due to their established relations with the administrative structures and the populations. The Sublime Porte, in turn, continued to appoint traditional local leadership into positions of prominence.

Prominent families continued to maintain local leverage and relationships with the central administration of the Ottoman Empire, despite the institutional and structural changes, but unlike before they no longer had a near-direct and autonomous access to the Sublime Porte, creating a dislocation in how authority was to be practiced. First, the form of competition for political access between families changed. Prior to the reforms, families were co-opted by the central administration and given certain privileges and benefits. Following the reforms, a council of prominent individuals, chosen from leading families and religious leaders, governed the provinces as a coherent administrative council.[83] This altered the kind of relationship a local leader maintained with the Sublime Porte's representative in the province, removing autonomy from the local leader in favour of empowering a representative group of leaders tasked to administer authority evenly. This new structure required communal leaders to work together in an early type, and uneven form, of power sharing. However, in some ways, this new model of local governance entrenched identities and deepened conflict along ethno-sectarian divisions. The new administrative councils also diminished the authority of religious courts and altered the role of the provincial governor, empowering elected officials of the council.[84] Authority was becoming structured and centralised, paralleling the political institutions of Western Europe, more power was handed to local authorities to do the bidding of the Sublime Porte.

[82] Reilly 2002, pp. 33-34.
[83] Thompson 1993, p. 458.
[84] Masters 2013, p. 161.

### 3.4 Conclusion

The characteristics of the modern state were viewed as being able to relieve the Ottoman Empire from being subordinated within the European state system. By undertaking reforms to centralise governance, Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II sought to transform the Ottoman Empire into a competitive state, one that would no longer be susceptible to the potential damage inflicted by European competition in a means to assert sovereignty. The reforms during the reign of Sultan Selim III and Mahmud II represented a concerted effort to centralise the institutions in a bid to assert consolidated authority across the territories Ottoman Empire. This included attempts to establish a new Army, the *Nizam-I Djedid*, to replace the Janissary Corps by Selim III, the Document of Agreement (1808) administered by Mahmud II, the establishment of the *Eshkenjis*, and the decree on male headdress in 1829.

Although efforts were made by Selim III and Mahmud II to promulgate reforms that would provide the groundwork to strengthen the Ottoman Empire against European competition by replicating European institutions and structures, it was not enough. Russian interference in Greece, and more generally the Balkans, led to the politicisation of a Greek national-*ethnie*, culminating in a revolt against the Sublime Porte. The Greek War of Independence was aided by the European powers for the moral justification of supporting an enlightened civilisation against the oppressive authority of the fanatical Sublime Porte.

The Greek War of Independence left the Sublime Porte in a state of relative weakness that provided an advantage to the Russians who declared war in 1828, securing access to the Straits of Istanbul, the Black Sea and territories along the Black Sea. Aid offered to Greece during the War of Independence and Russia's subsequent strategy are a primary example of the Ottoman Empire's subordination in the European state system, which expounded a specific form of legitimate civilisation, founded on a European worldview. By holding the Ottoman Empire to this standard of civilisation, the European states were able to extricate economic and political interests. This was justified based on the premise of Ottoman civilisational incapacity that required European aid.

The losses sustained during the Greek War of Independence also provided Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha with the opportunity and justification for the occupation of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The occupation of the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire by Egyptian forces provided Britain and France with the opportunity to pursue national interests. On the one hand, Britain aligned themselves with Mahmud II while France

aligned themselves with Muhammed Ali. By entering into an alliance with the Sublime Porte, Britain sought to secure access to Mesopotamia and Persia, while France, who formed an alliance with the Egyptians, desired unimpeded access to Algeria. The French justified their support to the Egyptians by arguing that Muhammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha brought order and civilisation to the Syrian provinces, having established equality and centralised control. The British, however, in defence of the Sultan, argued that the reforms that had been implemented by the Sublime Porte had been carefully applied in an effort to strengthen the Empire.

Although European interests were propelling British and French decision making with regards to the Ottoman Empire, they were veiled underneath the façade of aiding the maintenance of a civilised order. For the Sublime Porte, the civilisational requirement was consequential, rather than a façade. The British had placed a considerable amount of pressure on the Sublime Porte to promulgate a new set of reforms, culminating in the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839). Although the reforms were not immediately applied to the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, due to the continued Egyptian occupation, they signalled to the European powers a willingness to replicate the characteristics, regarding knowledges and practices, of the modern state.

The application of the Hatt-ı Şerif, however, created schisms with regards to the desired form of governance in the Syrian provinces. For the populations who desired continued Egyptian authority, the Hatt-ı Şerif was not sufficient in the kind of reforms that were promised, and for those populations who wished to return to the authority of the Sublime Porte, threatened the traditional form of decentralised and autonomous governance that they had fought for. The dislocation between the Sublime Porte and the social field in the Syrian provinces signified a crisis in authority and was taken advantage of by the European powers who began to form alliances with communities based on religious identification, using notables to gain legitimacy. Moreover, the authority of the Sublime Porte was constrained by the domestic demands for a return to traditional forms of decentralised governance as well as by the European states that continued to pressure the Sublime Porte into adopting reforms to replicate the modern state in Europe.

## Chapter 4: Governing the Syrian Provinces: Centralisation, Equality, and Sectarian Fragmentation

### 4 Introduction

The Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841) and the first reform decree of the *Tanzimat* period, the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839), advanced Western-style modernisation through institutional and bureaucratic centralisation founded on Western principles of rational governance and immersed in ideas of progress. The European justification for pressuring the Sublime Porte into promulgating modernisation reforms was under the premise that the modern European standard of civilisation would help bring the Ottoman Empire out of *darkness*.[1] By requiring the Sublime Porte to promulgate reforms in exchange for help, as was the case for British help provided to the Sublime Porte during the Second Ottoman-Egyptian War (1839-1841), a specific relationship developed that subordinated the Sublime Porte to the European powers and constrained the decision making process.

The administration of centralised authority and application of equality, regardless of religion, following the administration of the Hatt-ı Şerif, disrupted relations within the social field, particularly among religious networks, which in some cases, could be further subdivided into the political ambitions of kinship or clan factions. The new form of governance altered the means to which the populations could access power, the economy, and their relationship with the Empire, in terms of identity, but also with regards to the administration of the Empire. Ultimately, these changes dislocated the social field from the Sublime Porte and provided opportunities for the European powers, namely Britain, France, and Russia, to pursue economic and geo-strategic interests in the Syrian provinces, and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. By promising the Sublime Porte the advantage of recognised sovereignty, under the condition that modernisation replicated the modern state in Europe, the European powers validated their interference in the Syrian provinces as necessary to protect their interests where the Sublime Porte failed.

This chapter explores the consequences of imperial reform within the context of the social field in Syria, examining how dislocation between the Sublime Porte and customary groups and networks within the Syrian provinces provided opportunities to the European powers in their pursuit of economic and geo-political interests. It begins by examining how the

[1] Darkness, as a concept, persisted into the Enlightenment, despite its Christian foundations, that associated darkness with evil and light as good. To bring people out of darkness meant to deliver them from sin, to civilise their barbaric nature. Bastide 1967; Reichardt and Cohen 1998.

provisions outlined in the Hatt-ı Şerif created sectarian fragmentation, and looks at the specific cases of Mount Lebanon (1841-1843) and the case of Aleppo (1850). It subsequently examines the events leading up to the Crimean War (1853-1856), focusing on the relations between Russia and France and their impact on the Sublime Porte. This chapter considers these events and the series of developments that occurred during the Crimean War as the contextual basis for the subsequent reform, the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856).

## 4.1 Governing the Syrian Provinces under the Provisions of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839): Equality as Sectarian Fragmentation and Social Dislocation

Two years after the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) was decreed and following the removal of Egyptian forces in the Syrian provinces (1841), the Sublime Porte was contending with a population that had been expressing dissatisfaction caused by failures regarding the restoration of Ottoman authority particularly in relation to the Ottoman Empire's refusal to re-establish traditional forms of authority. With the return of Ottoman authority in the Syrian provinces, the conditions outlined in the Hatt-ı Şerif were established, including the provision of equality, new forms of taxation, and the clauses on military conscription. Fear that the Sublime Porte would enforce these conditions in the Syrian provinces sowed the seeds of discontent. As discussed in the previous chapter, the policy of equality had displaced Muslim privilege in the institutions of the Empire while the Christian communities no longer maintained political and legal autonomy. Military conscription and taxation also threatened the social foundations on which the Ottoman Empire functioned. The emergence of a standing military and the institutionalisation of taxation were cornerstones of the modern state in Europe, developing to strengthen centralised governance by counteracting the emergence of external threats and insure internal order.[2] In the Syrian provinces, such provisions did not lead to an overarching national identity, as it had in Europe, nor did it promote popular loyalty in the Syrian provinces to the Sublime Porte, it did, however, lead to fragmentation and dislocation between the state and the customary social groups and networks.

In the Syrian provinces, the establishment of the administrative councils under submission of the provincial governor removed the ability of communal chiefs to negotiate autonomously with the governors. Centralisation in this form meant weakening the political capabilities of land owning notables and changing the power dynamics between the Sublime

[2] Tilly 1992, pp. 96-122; Smith 1998.

Porte and local notables and peasantry.[3] This exercise in centralisation and bureaucratisation opened new areas of oppression, corruption, intimidation, and bribery. According to Colonel Charles Henry Churchill, a British army officer and diplomat, writing in a letter to Colonel Rose on August 23, 1841, the Governor of Damascus, Nedjib Pasha, allowed a system of anarchy to develop by ignoring the systematic prosecution of Christian and Jewish communities by Muslims.[4] Such accusations included descriptions of Nedjib Pasha's character as being ensconced in religious fanaticism, which was celebrated by notable Muslims.[5] The Christian and Jewish communities, no longer responsible to their autonomous local and communal notables, were governed under his authority and direction, established through the creation of administrative councils, to which the Christian and Jewish populations saw as overbearing.

In addition to centralising authority over the Syrian provinces, the Sublime Porte raised the rate of taxation in the Syrian provinces in 1841. The taxes were levied on consumable goods, and were raised from 1% to 9%; a rate of 10% was taxed on property;[6] and 20% on 'the necessaries of life'. Additionally, Christians and Jews were forced to continue to pay an annual head tax, one that was applied during the Egyptian occupation. The head tax divided the population of religious minorities into three economic classes; requiring the first class to pay 60 piastres, the second class to pay 30 piastres, and the third class 15 piastres. The total amount collected by Ibrahim Pasha during the Egyptian occupation was the sum of 82,000 piastres per year. The Sublime Porte continued with this form of taxation, viewing it as an easy method to extract and raise capital.[7]

However, in an effort to maintain consent from the various religious networks, the Sublime Porte had also re-introduced a privileged category called the *Baratakli*, which was formed by notable Muslims, Christians, and Jews, and who were exempt from paying all taxes. Despite this exemption, the Sublime Porte demanded that they continue to receive the annual sum of 82,000 piastres. The taxation regime under the Ottoman Empire had created so much

[3] Johnson 2001, p. 89.
[4] The European powers, particularly Britain, were not on good terms with Nedjid Pasha. He was viewed as embodying corruption and oppression, resulting in the cessation of tax payments by the population residing in Mount Lebanon. Fourier 1841, p. 390; FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2), June 10, 1841 (no. 4), Colonel Churchill on the State of the Country, Damascus.
[5] Paton 1844, p. 154.
[6] The British Consul in Beirut, M. Moore, states on August 3, 1841, that the duty of 9 per cent is a burden on domestic Syrian trade while the Russians and Neapolitan (citizens of Naples) subjects are trading at advantageous rates. Additionally, there is a general fear that Syria has only produced a small amount of grain, meaning that the region will be forced to import grain from other territories and the imports will be subject to the higher tax rate. Parliamentary Papers 1842, vol. 20, pp. 261-296.
[7] FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2).

discontent that the feeling of the general population in Damascus was that they were better off under Ibrahim Pasha.[8] The Sublime Porte had reinstated this advantage to the privileged classes across the religious networks with the aim of appealing to powerful notables, who continued to maintain political influence over the peasantry. The Sublime Porte, anticipating widespread displeasure from the peasantry over the changes to governance and increased rates of taxation, sought to utilise the power and influence that the notable class maintained over the population.

Despite the efforts to quell any discontent over the new taxation regime by privileging the notable class, a further despatch from Colonel Churchill stated that the Christians were unhappy, and unable to cope with the tax increases, feeling that new administrative developments have left them politically and socially diminished. Their treatment by the Muslim population left them feeling dismayed and their dismissal from public employment, in large numbers, where they had enjoyed jobs as writers and clerks have been given to Muslims who had managed to bribe their way into office or who gained prominence within society by propagating ideological 'fanaticism'. In contrast to the provisions of equality that were decreed in the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839), the Ottoman Empire attempted to rectify the decline of status for the Muslim populations through the new institutional and structural arrangements.[9]

In addition to the removal of Christian employees from positions within the administration, Christian councillors from the *Mejlis* (Governors) Council in Damascus were also removed when authority returned to the Sublime Porte. Under Ibrahim Pasha, seven of the twelve members of the council were Christians and all were replaced by Muslims following the reassertion of Ottoman control. To make matters worse, Christians approaching the council to make a formal complaint or to submit a petition were told to wear a black turban; an antedated symbol of the Christian faith, meant to embarrass Christians by reminding them of their place in the Muslim Ottoman social hierarchy.[10]

In reinforcing the Muslim populations' position within the Ottoman Empire, it was likely that two goals were trying to be achieved, the first, brought forward by fears of a revolt against reforms, the Sublime Porte was trying to appease the Muslim majority of the population. The second goal was to counter European interference on behalf of the Christian

[8] FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2).
[9] FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2).
[10] FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2).

communities in an effort to appear independent from the demands of European states in order to pacify fears that the Sublime Porte had become subordinate to the desires of Europe. The Ottoman Empire had begun to appeal to a Muslim identity to maintain its internal legitimacy, given that concessions made to the Europeans over the administration of the Empire made the Sublime Porte look weak and submissive. In doing so the Sublime Porte had begun to alienate religious minorities and reinforce sectarian divisions, creating instability within the social field and justifying reasons for European offers of protection of religious minorities.[11]

According to Churchill, 'the general feeling, both amongst the Jews and Christians […] was that England will interfere to protect them, and the country in general, against the oppression of the *Turks* [Muslims]'. The social schism that developed, and the advantages that were afforded to the Muslim populations, created the perfect opportunity for the European powers to establish their position amongst the religious minorities of the Ottoman Empire. It was during this period that the French consul in Damascus declared France to be the official protector of the Christians in the Syrian provinces.[12] Seeking to avert violence against religious minorities, the French and the British became increasingly involved in the political and economic well-being and physical protection of religious minorities. This alignment between European powers and, primarily, the Christian communities, but also the Druze, enhanced the perceived threat by the Muslim communities regarding their position within the Ottoman Empire, seeing the European powers as displacing Ottoman sovereignty and changing the character of the Empire from an Islamic Empire to a secular one.[13]

The worsening sectarian relations were further amplified by being pulled into the dynamics of international competition, such as conflict between the French and Russians. Each European power viewed it as their right to protect their respective religious communities, while Britain attempted to counterbalance the French relations with the Catholics and the Russian relations with the Orthodox Christians by aligning themselves with the Druze, in the first instance, and subsequently by attempting to proclaim themselves as a Muslim

---

11 Davison, 1963.

12 'The Jews have more causes for complaint against the Christians than against the Turks. The prejudices entertained against them by the Christians, continues undiminished and it is believed that violence could erupt at any moment'. On February 13, 1842, a child of 11 years old was missing from home. Immediately, the Christians thronged the Jewish quarter and accused the Jews of having made away with the child for the purpose of sacrificing it at their Passover. Fortunately, in an hour or two, the child was found, had the child not been found, it is believed that violent actions would have been committed against the Jews, at the instigation of the Christians. FO/226/72 May 31, 1841 (no. 2), June 10, 1841 (no. 4); FO/78/498 February 23, 1842 (no. 20), sent to the Earl of Aberdeen, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from Richard Wood, Damascus; Hakim 2013, p. 41.

13 The French and British had demanded that Nedjib Pasha be held accountable for his brutality, however, these protests were ignored. *The Spectator Archive*, 10 July 1841, p. 12; FO/226/72 August 29, 1841.

empire.[14] However, unlike the French, the British were 'careful not to commit [themselves] too far and, moreover, not to encourage separatist elements in the Lebanon'.[15] With this policy in place, the British made sure that the Druze would continue to prosper under the auspices of a British alliance that provided economic relations and the development of educational institutions, on the condition that the Druze were strictly obedient to the Sultan. The Druze, on the other hand, had hoped to enter relations that were analogous to that of the French and the Maronite Catholics in Mount Lebanon.[16] The relations between the French and Maronite Catholics provided the latter with greater political influence over the decisions of the Sublime Porte. The Druze sought a similar relationship with the British, fearing oppressive policies directed at them from the Sublime Porte and Maronite ascendency in politics, consequently displacing Druze influence in Mount Lebanon.

The social schism that developed over the concept and application of equality was produced by the threat to the dominant Muslim social order and the fear that the political, economic, and social status of the minorities would be elevated within the institutions of the state. The schism was further deepened by attempts made by the Sublime Porte to reverse this sentiment by providing Muslim communities with new benefits, resulting in closer associations between the European powers and religious minorities, due to fear that under a centralised and Islamic form of governance they would be maltreated. For the European powers, discord between religious communities and the Sublime Porte provided new strategic options.

### 4.1.1 Governing Mount Lebanon: Sectarian Fragmentation and European Interference

Alliance formation between the European powers and religious communities within the Syrian provinces was especially prevalent in Mount Lebanon. Following the restoration of Ottoman authority in the Syrian provinces, Emir Bashir II was sent into exile from Mount Lebanon due to his alliance with the Egyptians during the Second Ottoman-Egyptian War (1839-1841). For the Maronite Catholics in Mount Lebanon and, by extension, the French, the exile was a threat to their power in the region. During the Ottoman-Egyptian War and the period immediately following the war and the restoration of Ottoman authority, the Sublime Porte had favoured the Druze community for their submission to Ottoman authority. The Druze, further stating that they would refuse to submit to the authority of any

[14] Britain's imperial crown jewel, India, contained 'nearly 100 million […] Muslims' and for this reason, the British were sympathetic to the Muslim population in the Syrian provinces. Sir H. Layard in Syria, *Morning Post*, Thursday October 23, 1879, p. 5.
[15] Salih 1977, p. 251.
[16] Salih 1977, p. 251.

Christian member of the Chehab dynasty, from which Emir Bashir II originated, played into the desires of the Sublime Porte by requesting a Turkish Muslim Governor. The request for a Turkish Muslim Governor sought to displace the Chehab dynasty and upset the Christian population who had been promised the right to govern through the Chehab family.[17] The request for a Turkish Muslim Governor had the adverse effect of increasing competition between the Druze and the Maronite populations, and with increased competition emerged violence.

The Druze, however, were politically divided amongst themselves, and had difficulty in reconciling the request for a Turkish Muslim Governor. The Jumblatt family, one of the notable Druze families, in particular was opposed to the request of a Turkish Muslim Governor in Mount Lebanon as excessive and potentially equating to further losses of Druze privilege. The Jumblatt family viewed the initial favouritism of the Druze by the Sublime Porte following the second Ottoman-Egyptian War as an opportunity to make political gains by reasserting their authority and re-establishing their wealth and property rights following the banishment of Emir Bashir II from Mount Lebanon.[18]

Although the Jumblatt family desired an elevated status with the Sublime Porte, by securing Druze privileges within the framework of the Ottoman Empire, they wanted to do so without providing too much control to the Sublime Porte. However, decentralised governance was no longer a viable option and the Sublime Porte also had to contend with increased French pressure on the governance of Mount Lebanon. Following the exile of Bashir II, the Sublime Porte appointed Emir Bashir III, Bashir II's cousin, who had acted as Bashir II's opposition on behalf of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Ibrahim Pasha. The Druze viewed Bashir III as a feeble leader, but also an obstacle to Druze autonomy, one who upheld and defended the authority of the Ottoman Empire. The request by the Druze leaders to have full rights reinstated was denied immediately by Bashir III who subsequently undertook measures to rid Mount Lebanon of the Druze feudal authority that remained. The developments under Bashir III led to fighting between the Maronites and Druze in Deir el-Qamar, spreading to other parts of the mountain soon after.[19]

[17] FO/78/498 January 12, 1842 (no. 20), sent to Charles Bankhead, Her Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary, from Richard Wood, Damascus.
[18] Johnson 2001, p. 90.
[19] Johnson 2001, pp. 90-1; Kisirwani, 1980, p. 697.

The Druze who found themselves in a precarious situation, suffering under the authority of Bashir III and desiring to regain their political authority, could not retract the request of a Turkish Muslim Governor. Doing so increased the risk of being accused of insubordination and being subject to the heavy-handed consequences of the Sublime Porte. A third proposition was put forward by a small portion of Christian and Druze populations, who found common ground in seeking the division of Mount Lebanon into feudal districts administered by notable families acting as governors. This latter request was dismissed by Ottoman authorities,[20] but managed to resonate with the European states.

The precarious position was not exceptional to the Druze community. Following the application of the Hatt-ı Şerif, the Christians in Mount Lebanon also perceived their political, economic, and social position within the Ottoman Empire as being in a state of deterioration. Although the Sublime Porte had promulgated reforms to implement equality, the centralisation of the Sublime Porte and the need to acquiesce to the Muslim population for legitimacy, negatively impacted their relationship with authority. However, where they perceived their situation in a state of deterioration in the Ottoman Empire, their alliance with the French, in particular, helped to elevate their status. Fearing the close association between Emir Bashir III and the Sublime Porte, the Christians in Mount Lebanon requested that the French persuade the Sublime Porte to allow the return of Emir Bashir II.

The French, seeking to fulfil their role as protectors of the Christian population and to establish their 'legitimate influence', procured an agreement with Emir Bashir II while he was in exile: in exchange for consular and political support in Emir Bashir II's efforts to regain authority in the region, Emir Bashir II promised France his allegiance in advancing their 'mutual interests' – such as the emancipation of the Christian population from the Ottoman Empire and developing an ever deeper allegiance to the French state.[21] The French were effectively strategizing to undermine the authority and sovereignty of the Sublime Porte by building on a shared political identity of Catholicism with the Maronite community, strengthened through the identification of the Muslim, and the Druze identity, as being fundamentally different.

[20] The British consul, Richard Wood, reports that the Christians are divided into three parties: the first support Emir Bashir III; the second advocate for the return of the ex-Emir Bashir II; and the third side with the Druze, arguing for a division based on Chief families and land ownership. FO/78/498 January 12, 1842 (no. 20).
[21] FO/78/498 February 23, 1842; Hakim 2013, p. 41.

Highlighting the French perceptions of the Maronite community in Mount Lebanon, the Vatican sent Archbishop of Laodicea Nicolas Murad to Istanbul in 1842 with the task to bear witness to and report on the treatment of the Christian population under the centralising administration of the Sublime Porte. Following his deployment, Murad wrote a pamphlet titled *Notice Historique sur l'Origine de la Nation Maronite et sur ses Rapports avec la France, sur la Nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban*,[22] in it, he discusses the geographic limits of the Lebanese Emirate, stretching from Saida in the South to Tripoli in the North, covering Mount Lebanon, the Anti-Lebanon Mountains, and the Beka'a Valley. In the pamphlet, Murad discusses a network of nobility that reflects the order and authority found in Europe, noting it as evidence of a Christian civilisation spanning across Europe and into Mount Lebanon while highlighting the incivility of the Muslim population. Following Murad's study of the Region, he moved to Paris to help the French restore the Christian Chehab dynasty in Mount Lebanon, seeing it as his duty to ensure that France and Christian Lebanon were united.[23] The belief that the Christians of Mount Lebanon, particularly the Maronite community, formed a distinct civilisation from the Muslim population, was one that was based on a specific Christian European history that, with modernity, did not entirely disappear. Rather than disappearing, the ideas that had been prevalent in pre-modern Europe had become assembled onto ideas of modernity and scientific progress, which catalogued the world through scientific and absolute categories, such as a separate Christian civilisation.[24] The deployment of this reasoning also highlights a continuation of French imperial policy of expansion, not only based on economic and military grandeur but on a civilising and protectionist policy.

The sectarian separation between the Christians from the Muslim and Druze populations in Mount Lebanon not only served the advancement of French interests but posed a domestic political problem by putting the religious communities into competition over political power and economic resources by insisting sectarian identities were constitutive of civilisational boundaries. The Christians, Muslims, and Druze of Mount Lebanon, however, had shared cultural similarities and traditions including the use and management of socio-economic institutions and not as distinct and separate communities.[25] The development of a Christian identity that was perceived as inherently more civilised was one that developed through politicisation and a distinct European worldview. Indeed, the main reason that these religious

[22] [A Historical Note on the Origins of the Maronite Nation and their Rapport with France, On the Druze Nation and the Diverse Populations of Mount Lebanon], Murad 1844.
[23] Hakim 2013, p. 53; Murad 1844.
[24] Donelly 1998, p. 6.
[25] Doumani 1998.

communities were set on a course of division, aside from their respective religious practices, were political and economic policies of modernisation and centralisation in the Ottoman Empire and communal alliances with European powers, who sought to fulfil their own interests – including economic expansion, unfettered access to peripheral colonies, and access to militarily important regions. Ultimately, this created the groundwork for incessant sectarianism in the mid-nineteenth century despite 'a long history of non-sectarian leadership' in Mount Lebanon among the various religious groups.[26]

Although sectarianism was an ever increasing political problem due to the political environment and the various actors involved, objections to the Sublime Porte's plan to install a Turkish Muslim Governor in Mount Lebanon were not only shared by the French and British and groups within the Druze and Christian communities, but also by the Governor of Damascus, Nedjib Pasha, who viewed the plan as possibly having the adverse effect of uniting the Christians and the Druze against Ottoman authorities. Instead, Nedjib Pasha encouraged the pacification of Mount Lebanon through the disarmament of the population, a strategy that was also proposed by the Sultan's Grand Vizier. The British opposed these plans, viewing disarmament as perilous for the local populations, leaving them susceptible to abuse by Ottoman forces. Given that the French were seeking the appointment of Emir Bashir II, and Nedjib Pasha expressed the need for the Sublime Porte to assert its dominance by ensuring a monopoly of coercion, the British consul in Damascus, Richard Wood, proposed the appointment of Emir Said al-Deen (or Emir Saad el-Din), a Muslim prince of the Chehab family, and former Governor of Hasbeya. Should al-Deen be viewed as unacceptable to the Sublime Porte, Wood proposed Emir Amin, the son of Emir Bashir II, as an alternate given that he actively fought alongside Ottoman forces during the Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839-1841).[27]

Wood's recommendations of appointing a Muslim prince of the Chehab family, viewed as a compromise to all parties involved, went ignored by the Sublime Porte. On January 15, 1842, the Druze were successful in their struggle against the Maronite leadership in Mount Lebanon and Bashir III was deposed by the Sublime Porte. In turn, the Sublime Porte appointed Omar Pasha as governor of Lebanon from Tripoli.[28] Omar Pasha's appointment surprised the Druze and the Maronites, as well as the European states, who viewed the appointment as dangerous and flawed. Klemens Von Metternich, the Chancellor of the

[26] Makdisi 2000, p. 77.
[27] FO/78/498 February 23, 1842.
[28] Churchill 1862, pp. 63-64.

Austrian Empire (1821-1848) was more sympathetic to this choice than his European colleagues, stating that Omar Pasha could provide impartial authority over the Maronites and Druze. Nevertheless, he perceived the appointment as a possible flashpoint for the Sublime Porte, given that none of the parties involved approved of this selection.[29]

Dissatisfaction with the appointment of Omar Pasha created insecurity and rumours of a coalition between Christian and Druze leaders as feared by Nedjib Pasha. The rumours had some underlying veracity – with some Druze leaders inviting Christian leaders to discuss a possible alliance. The Christians were unable to refuse the invitation because of their inferior position in relation to the Druze under the eyes of the Empire, but they were also aware that any alliance between themselves and the Druze would result in the Druze retaining the upper hand. The Druze leaders that had called for the alliance were fearful of a loss of privilege and rights under the new governor. This provoked a split within the Druze community between those who had opposed and those who had supported the appointment of a Turkish Muslim governor.[30]

Subsequently, Omar Pasha, seeking to assert the authority of the Sublime Porte and to display his ability to govern effectively arrested five Druze Sheikhs thought to be plotting a rebellion against his authority. The arrested Druze leaders included: Sheikh Nassif Abu Nakad (Nassif Bey), Sheikh Said Jumblatt, Sheikh Hussein Talhouk, Sheikh Hootoor Ahmad (Hootoor Bey), and Emir Ahmed Arslan.[31] The arrest of these leaders, and the arrest of other Druze leaders and combatants that had taken place across the mountain resulted in deepening Druze animosity directed towards the Sublime Porte and the Muslim populations. Angered by the actions of Omar Pasha, the Druze viewed the Sultan as giving into the wills of the Christians who were perceived as overtaking the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the Christians, particularly those who desired the return of the Chehab dynasty, offered their support to the Sublime Porte.[32]

The unfolding disaster taking place in Mount Lebanon and anxious feeling caused by the European watchful eye, the Sublime Porte deployed Selim Bey, commissioner to the Sublime Porte, to Mount Lebanon with the task to uncover the desires of the Maronite and Druze

[29] Farah 2000, pp. 140-2.
[30] FO/78/498 March 23, 1842 (no. 29), sent to Stratford Canning, British Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Richard Wood, Damascus.
[31] Sheikh Nasif Abu Neked, Sheikh Said Djinblat, Sheikh Hussein Talhook, Sheikh Hootoor Amad, and Sheikh Ahmed Raslan; FO/78/498 March 23, 1842 (no. 29); Firro 1992, p. 92; The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, p. 219.
[32] Farah 2000, pp. 171-175; The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 235-236.

communities, persuade the Maronites into accepting a form of direct rule under the Sublime Porte, and to report back on the situation.[33] Failure to acquire the acquiescence of the Maronite community would result in the appointment of a Christian and a Druze governor under the tutelage of a Turkish Muslim Governor.[34] It was believed that the division of authority in the region had the potential to alleviate some of the tension between the Druze and Christian communities and allow the Sublime Porte to, at the very least only nominally, display to the European powers that it could maintain a central form of control over the region by retaining a Muslim governor to oversee a Druze and Christian Qaymaqam.[35] Doing so would allow the Ottomans the chance to demonstrate their ability in establishing a rational and ordered government based on territorial sovereignty and administered through a central apparatus.[36]

The British consul, Richard Wood, did not immediately like the proposition of divided rule, believing that the division of authority would create further conflict caused by mixed populations with land claims and feudal rights in certain areas.[37] Additionally, Stratford Canning believed that traditional rule needed to be supported in Mount Lebanon while arguing that the commitments that were extracted from the Sublime Porte in return for British participation in the war against the Egyptian occupation (1839-1841) had to be privileged.[38] Needless to say, traditional rule and the commitments of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) represented contradictory forms of governance. In addition, French support of the Christian Chehab dynasty, general European arguments for the need to modernise structures of governance, and European interference in the communal relations of Mount Lebanon were activities that were bringing the European powers, the Sublime Porte, and the Druze and Maronite communities into conflict due to their contradicting interests and goals.

In order to suppress the possibility of conflict, representatives from Britain, France, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and the Sublime Porte came together on May 27, 1842 to discuss the issues of governance in Mount Lebanon. The participants in the meeting agreed, in principle, on a partition plan, granting the Druze and Christians the right to authority through a split Qaymaqamship, under the supervision of an Ottoman governor, the Mushir of Beirut, Assad

[33] Farah, 2000, pp. 183-186.
[34] The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 379-380, no. 130.
[35] The Qaymaqam was a district governor.
[36] Deligiorgi 2002.
[37] The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 379-380, no. 130.
[38] Farah 2000, pp. 186.

Pasha.[39] However, the planning and implementation of the partition required that the Sublime Porte had to gain the unanimous consent of the European powers involved. This was a decision that was later endorsed by Ottoman ministers and commissioners, including Selim Bey, on September 7, 1842.[40]

The constraints that were placed on the Sublime Porte regarding the necessity to gain unanimous consent from the European powers and the inability to assert independent control over Mount Lebanon reflected a diminution of Ottoman power within the region. Additionally, the decision regarding administrative appointments was handed to Assad Pasha who made the strategic decision to select ineffective Qaymaqams who would bend to his interests. The appointments of Emir Haidar Ismail Abi al-Lami as the Christian Qaymaqam and Emir Ahmad Arslan as the Druze Qaymaqam dissatisfied the population, who viewed the appointments as a barrier to accessing authority. This view consequently pushed the Christian and Druze population even further towards the French and British, respectively, with the aim of increasing political and economic security.[41]

Split authority of Mount Lebanon, although managed under a single Ottoman governor, was viewed as a necessity to retain authority and to prevent further rebellious activity by the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon. It also served the purpose of allowing the Sublime Porte to fulfil their promise of local rule while modernising and centralising authority, which otherwise, had the adverse effect of placing the Christians and the Druze into conflict over control. On the other hand, the decision to divide authority in Mount Lebanon also legitimised perceptions of difference that deepened sectarian divisions among the Maronite and the Druze populations. In the context of the prevalent European language of scientific racism, the division of authority between Christian and Druze helped reinforce notions of the two religious communities belonging to separate civilisations and, indeed, separate races.[42] Although the religious groups did not constitute the definition of race, as race, as a concept underwent transformation throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty first centuries, the notion of the religious communities representing separate races slowly became entrenched in the political development of the Syrian provinces, affecting the relationships

[39] The equivalent of a Field Marshall, or counsellor, a Mushir would also be given the title of Pasha. The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 77-78, no. 58.
[40] Farah 2000, p. 220.
[41] Firro 1992, pp. 92-94; Hazran 2014, p. 21; al-'Aqiqi 1959, pp. 7-8.
[42] Stratford Canning in his letter to M. Pisani, on May 27, 1842, writes that "Two races, in most things separate, divide Mount Lebanon." The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII, pp. 105, 107, 109, 200, 228, 284.

between local populations, European powers and the Sublime Porte.[43] This method of categorising the population was due to the difficulty of distinguishing the populations, requiring that the language and nineteenth century logic of race was to be applied to religious divisions.[44] This was not only with regards to sectarian cleavages, but also emerging distinctions between Lebanese and Syrian populations.

The division of Mount Lebanon and the production of European logics that distinguished sectarian communities had a negative impact on communal relations – particularly in the mixed districts, furthered by economic and political factors, and changes in the structures of social order. The latter was subject to the instability of decreasing power and wealth of the traditional nobility and the rise of a new merchant class made up of middlemen and bankers, bolstered by increased trade with the European powers.[45] However, conflict was being determined by the consequences of divided authority on communal identities. The European powers believed that the violence they were witnessing in Mount Lebanon would erupt into a full-scale conflict and insisted that the Sublime Porte intervene to supress the violence. The Sublime Porte responded by sending the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shekib Effendi, to Mount Lebanon to report back on the unfolding conflict and to find a resolution.[46] After bearing witness to the violence, Shekib Effendi decided that the only effective means to pacify the population included the deployment of Ottoman troops in Mount Lebanon and the reassertion of the Hatt-ı Şerif which was retitled as the '*Tanzimat* of Shekib Effendi' or *Shakib Effendi Règlement* (1843), becoming the Organic Law for Lebanon.[47] The European powers had managed to secure access and power within Mount-Lebanon without having to colonise or occupy it. Although their control was indirect, it was effective.

The *Shakib Effendi Règlement* reintroduced provisions of the Hatt-ı Şerif and differed in the iteration of authority structures. The law included the reassertion of the Qaymaqam system, the development of a *mejlis* council for each Qaymaqam, which would be composed by a Qaymaqam, a judge, and an advisor from each religious community (Maronite, Druze, Greek Orthodox, Sunni Muslim, and Greek Catholic (Melkite)), and the two Qaymaqams were to

[43] Historical definition of *race* at this time was beginning to shift from a taxonomic concept to a biological concept. In the early 1840's it was generally accepted that race was objective, related to culture, material success, and interpersonal relations, and that race was a valid scientific category. Interestingly, scholars writing on race during this period labeled Arabs as white with the Arab countries containing 'an astonishing diversity of aspect in the population; independently, to all appearance, of the great mixture of races'. Pickering 1848, p. 10; The Sessional Papers, vol. XIII pp. 102-105, no 66, and 106-108, no. 68.
[44] 166PO/E/269 August 1, 1880 (no. 177), French Embassy in Istanbul [Constantinople], Syria: Mission of M. de Torcy in Syria and Palestine, to M. de Freycinet, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
[45] Hakim 2013, p. 50
[46] Hakim 2013, pp. 51-52; Antonius 1939, pp. 38-41.
[47] Firro 1992, pp. 101-102.

submit to the authority of the governor of Sidon.[48] In principle, the division of authority was meant to end violence by giving the Druze and the Maronite communities political rights over the territories in which they formed majorities. In practice, the division of authority and the development of the councils, which sought to uphold local authority but also centralise authority under the Sublime Porte, led to conflict over judicial and fiscal prerogatives within the councils. The latter was ill-defined and attempts to set boundaries by Ottoman officials produced new contradictions in the application of the law and governance.[49]

The Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) sought to reform the Ottoman Empire in order to parallel the institutional order of European states. Doing so meant adopting notions of progress and equality, and undertaking a European form of rational governance based on territorial sovereignty rather than social authority. Implementing these reforms unintentionally disrupted and destabilised the established set of relations between the social field in the Syrian provinces and the Sublime Porte. The reforms removed authority from the communal leadership and centralised it through the establishment of centralised institutions. The dislocation of the social field from the Sublime Porte benefitted France and Britain, allowing them to take advantage of the situation by forming alliances with disaffected communities. The French, for example, pursued an alliance with the Maronite Catholics, arguing that such a relationship was legitimate due to their shared Christian civilisation. The British, on the other hand, balanced the French influence in Mount Lebanon by aligning with the Druze. The alliances between the Maronites and the French, on the one hand, and the British and Druze on the other, reinforced social schisms.

The rest of the Syrian provinces were not insulated from Mount Lebanon and the preference given to the Maronites by the French and the French role in pressuring the Sublime Porte into allowing the return of the Chehab dynasty to power had created discontent throughout the Syrian provinces. The French were perceived as meddling in the domestic affairs of the Empire with the aim to change its character from an Islamic Empire to a secular-Christian Empire. Additionally, speculation of the emerging conflict between the Druze and Maronite communities in Mount Lebanon spread throughout the Syrian provinces, while news of continued institutional modernisation was met with dismay – and widely viewed as a Christian project. Although the Sublime Porte was under pressure from the European powers to modernise its institutions and governance and to reflect the form of government

[48] Firro 1992, pp. 101-102.
[49] Hakim 2013, pp. 51-52.

practiced in Europe, it was also under domestic pressure not to appear weak to European demands.

### 4.1.2 The Aleppo Uprisings (1850): Social Dislocation and European Interference

Despite programmes of institutional and social engineering by the Ottoman Empire, incapacity to fully enact reforms altered the accepted social order, creating disorder by fracturing the historic economic and political norms steeped in social tradition. The modernisation of institutions and governance led to increased dissatisfaction among the population and as dissatisfaction grew, the French, the British, and the Russians allied themselves with segments of dissatisfied populations. These alliances were premised on sectarian identities and the right of European powers to protect minorities who would otherwise face oppression and violence. However, the European powers utilised these alliances in order to pursue economic and political interests, further creating disorder within the Syrian provinces, and impacting the ability of the Sublime Porte to administer reforms.[50] The impact of the Sublime Porte's inability to assert authority in implementing reforms and continued European interference increased the sense of disorder within the social field, which took a violent form in Aleppo.

On the second night of *Eid al-Adha*, in Aleppo, on October 17, 1850, some of the Muslim population in the city attacked the Christian population. The Aleppo Uprising took the European consuls by surprise due to the general high level of wealth that was present among the population of the city at the time. The British consul in Beirut, Joseph Rose, writing to Ambassador Stratford Canning on October 31, 1850, stated his astonishment at the events that unfolded in Aleppo. It was Rose's understanding that high levels of wealth would ease social tensions.[51] Despite the high levels of wealth among the population in Aleppo, which contradicted his assumptions that social tensions and violence occurs under conditions of economic inequality, the city was not immune to social tensions.[52] The Aleppo uprising is described by Bruce Masters as a consequence of a fragile political and social order that emerged after the social reforms of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839). That is not to say that there were no instances of instability and revolt before the reform period began, but the reforms, along with European interference, heightened social and political tensions by altering the organisation of the social environment.[53]

---

[50] Devereux 1963, p. 23.
[51] For a more in-depth discussion on political violence and economic inequality see Morrisson and Snyder 2000; Sen 1997; Lichbach 1989; FO/226/107 October 31, 1850.
[52] Marx 1971.
[53] Masters 1990, pp. 3-5.

Similar to reports on social disorder and violence emerging from elsewhere within the Ottoman Empire, including Mount Lebanon, the reports on Aleppo, by the European consuls, largely construct the uprising as a sectarian issue, highlighting attacks on the Christian population by the 'fanatical' Muslims.[54] While the uprising in Aleppo was a Muslim led uprising and it did target the Christian population, it can be further nuanced. As Masters argued, not all Muslims participated in the attacks, or even the uprising. In fact, it was solely the Muslim population of the city's Eastern quarters that attacked the Christians of the Judayda quarter, largely populated by Uniate Catholics.[55] The Muslim population of the city's Eastern quarter had, for some time, been underrepresented in local politics while the Uniate Catholics had benefited from European interference, resulting in overrepresentation.[56] The overrepresentation of the Uniate Catholic community in Aleppo was, in the eyes of the Muslim community, following a trend that at once diminished the political authority of the Muslim communities while increasing that of the Christians.

The social dynamics of conflict that were produced was a consequence of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the European state system and the application of a standard of civilisation that justified continued subordination of the Ottoman Empire. The standard of civilisation also made it extremely difficult for the Sublime Porte to assert sovereignty, which facilitated competing European interests within the Ottoman Empire, and increased the need to establish relations with communities in order for the Europeans to gain a foothold. The impact, however, was a renegotiation of the domestic social field that altered power and leverage of the various communities. Feras Krimsti examines social consequences of the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy in the 19th century, as do others.[57] The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the world economy meant pressure to function within the dominant capitalist structures, requiring the modernisation of governance and institutions, which ultimately resulted in a reordering of relations between communities.[58] Accordingly, the world economy that the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into privileged the European states who began extracting raw materials and manufacturing products that would be sold back to the Ottoman territories at a higher rate. In doing so, the

[54] Feras Krimsti (2014) highlights British and French perceptions of the Muslim population as fanatical in the Syrian Provinces. Evidence of such a narrative is greatly prevalent in the correspondence between ambassadors, consuls and their capitals.
[55] Also known as Melkite Catholics or Greek Catholics.
[56] Several Christian churches were burned to the ground and there are reported deaths, all Christians. Masters 1990, pp. 3-5.
[57] İslamoğlu-İnan 1987, p. 22; Sunar 1987, pp. 63-87; Wallerstein, Decdeli, and Kasaba 1987, pp. 88-97.
[58] Krimsti 2014.

European powers had also favoured a set of Christian producers and businesses by negotiating economic, political, and physical protections.[59] The privileged position that the Christian communities enjoyed with the European powers can be attributed to perceptions that the Christians, because of their religion, were most like the Europeans. They were therefore predetermined to be rational. This scientific racism not only aided in the development of relationships between the Christians of the Syrian provinces and the Europeans while dismantling the political privilege of the Muslim communities, but also shaped the interactions with the Sublime Porte, impacting the Empire's interaction with modernity.

### 4.2 The Christian Holy Places in Jerusalem and the Crimean War (1853-1856)

French and Russian interests in protecting and elevating the status of Christians within the Syrian provinces was, it can be argued, civilisational, but it was also geo-political and economic. Competition between France and Russia within the European state system led to a specific set of interactions between these European states in the global peripheries. French and Russian interests within the Ottoman Empire were focused on political and economic imperial expansion, often using sectarianism as a means to access and create alliances with local populations and therefore make political and economic gains. By arguing that Catholic and Orthodox Christians of the Syrian provinces were the civilisational cousins of France and Russia, respectively, the governments of these European states assumed the right to protect these communities. The narrative used to justify French and Russian interference, however, was based on notions of scientific racism, arguing that the belief in a Christian God was evidence of moral and intellectual superiority that was a fact of biology.[60] The Ottoman Empire, under pressure to modernise and develop institutions and a state structure similar to that of the European state, as well as subject to external interference in domestic affairs, also had to contend with global tensions resulting from the political upheaval of the 1848 French Revolution and the threat of German unification. These incidents were compounded by the collapse of Hungary which led to the 1850 refugee crisis, where the revolutionaries sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire.[61] Aggravated by Russian expansion into the Caucasus, the Sublime Porte refused to extradite the refugees back to Russian occupied territory, an attribute leading to the Crimean War of 1853, and instigating the formation of a Western European alliance.[62]

---

[59] Wallerstein 2007.
[60] Clastres 2010, pp. 101-114.
[61] Goldfrank 2013, pp. 68-70.
[62] Beydilli 2001, p. 93.

Through this alliance, the French, representing the Catholic communities, had been granted the rights to the Christian Holy Places. Angered by this development, the Russians tried to re-establish the dominant status of the Orthodox community by proposing the creation of an 'eternal alliance' that would have placed the Ottoman Empire under Russian suzerainty.[63] The Tsar, Nicholas I (1825-1855), argued that the Orthodox Christian community had become numerous, becoming a wealthy literate class, and were therefore worthy of increased rights. According to Nicholas I, it was Russia's right to act in defence of the Orthodox community and thus reject the French status over the Holy Places, despite the French possessing a *firman* from the year 1740, issued by Sultan Mahmud I, that confirmed the rights and privileges of the Roman Catholic community to the Holy Places in Jerusalem.[64]

The conflict between France and Russia over the Holy Places in Jerusalem and the decision of the Sublime Porte to protect refugees from the Caucasus, placed the Ottoman Empire at the centre of the conflict. To compete, and ultimately, to survive, the Sublime Porte was forced to increase Ottoman military capacity by enacting widespread conscription in the Syrian provinces, an unpopular decision amongst the Druze and the Christians. The former, refusing to join the ranks of the Ottoman military, began to migrate from Mount Lebanon to the Anti-Lebanon Mountains and the Hauran, forming a security alliance with the Bedouin Tribe *Waled Aly*. The Christians, primarily those residing in the districts of Ajloun and Arbella, on the other hand, were refusing to pay their taxes unless civil and military authorities agreed, in writing, to exempt them from conscription.[65] Although the European powers had pressured the Sublime Porte to ensure equality among all imperial subjects, the Druze and Maronite communities resisted being treated in an equal manner during a period of need. The refusal to serve in the Ottoman military emphasises the dislocated relationship between the Sublime Porte and the religious minority communities in the Syrian provinces, caused by the reforms.

The relationship between religious identity and political loyalty quickly became prevalent during the years leading up to the Crimean War (1853-1856). However, this had been a growing problem for the Ottoman Empire due to the fact that religious minorities in the Syrian provinces had been forming relations with the European powers. As the conflict

---

[63] Beydilli 2001, p. 94.
[64] The *firman* was a series of capitulations granted to France by Sultan Mahmud I, see Slade 1867, pp. 63-74; Goldfrank 2013; Van Dyck 1881, p. 121.
[65] FO/78/910 March 17th, 1852 (no. 9), sent to Stratford Canning, the British Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Richard Wood, Damascus.

between France and Russia became increasingly focused on Ottoman territories, there was a greater risk of increased loyalty of the Christian communities being won over by the French and Russians. The Sublime Porte, as well as the British, viewed French and Russian advances as a threat. With the aim of facilitating an amenable environment for the Sublime Porte, the British consul in Damascus asked the rebellious communities to remain loyal to the Sultan and to submit themselves to the imperial ordinances. The reply to the British plea for loyalty to the Sublime Porte from these communities was an appeal asking that Britain govern their affairs instead.[66]

By the end of 1852, the French announced their seizure of the Christian Holy Places, compelling the Russians to respond with force, arguing that the Ottoman Empire had fallen into foreign hands.[67] The Russians were correct in their assessment but they were also to blame for encroachments on Ottoman independence that sought to fulfil similar interests. Control of the Holy Places by France and the response by Russia led to the Crimean War (1853-1856), which further damaged social relations and the economy in the Syrian provinces. The Crimean War required increased spending by the Sublime Porte but the capital required to fight could not be extracted and secured from the provinces. The shortage of capital forced the Sublime Porte to accept aid in the form of foreign loans, later becoming clear that the loans were squandered by the Sultan and his closest servants.[68] In addition to requiring the repayment of the loans, there were political conditions that were attached, which deepened the ability of the French and British to influence the decision-making process in the Ottoman Empire, entrenching a hierarchy of relations between the Ottoman Empire, France, and Britain.[69] The provision of loans by the French and the British to the Sublime Porte formalised the political hierarchy in the European state system.

As the Crimean War (1853-1856) began, the Sublime Porte began spearheading a course of reforms that devolved more powers to local governors selected by the Sublime Porte. The

---

[66] The consul wrote back to England describing his interactions with the rebellious populations. He asked 'them to yield obedience to their legitimate rulers, and to submit peaceably and quietly to the imperial ordinances in order to avoid the total ruin of their homes and country'. The consul further writes that opposition to Turkish Authority is also strong with the Sunnis (Mahometans), Shiites (Mutuwalies), and general population (Rayah), who wish for the British authority in Syria, to which the consul argues is caused by disaffection, FO/78/910 March 17, 1852 (no. 9).

[67] The demands being exerted on the Sublime Porte by France came at a time when France was also demanding the release and safe passage of two prisoners being held by the Ottoman Empire. The prisoners, accused of blaspheme, were of French origin and had converted to Islam. They were charged with refusal to participate in Ramadan, which was followed by their seeking protection at the French Embassy where they professed to be of the Christian faith. The Sublime Porte, unwilling to hand over the prisoners on principle that they had broken significant laws and wanting to reinforce the right of authority was challenged by the French who moved their navy to the coast of Tripoli and threatened the Sublime Porte with the bombardment of the city until the prisoners were returned. Fearing the attack, the Ottoman authorities permitted the safe passage of the two prisoners. Slade 1867, pp. 63-74.

[68] Devereux 1963, p. 25.

[69] See Nietzsche 1997; Wallerstein 2007.

devolution of powers did not equate to decentralisation, rather powers that had been held by the imperial centre had been transferred to the provincial governors. Devolution included provisions regarding security, judicial responsibilities, and ability to raise taxes. The Mushir of Aleppo, Suleyman Pasha, for example, was granted increased powers that included the authorisation to punish all minor crimes without having to refer to the Sublime Porte. By mid-January, 1853, a second *firman* was issued, this time reiterating the new powers granted to the Mushir, which included the additional ability to administer the death penalty, the ability to dismiss Qaymaqams, a sub-governor, dependent on his province (*Pashalik*) – including the provincial administrative (*Mejlis*) Council – particularly if they were unwilling to fulfil their duties, and was given the role of managing provincial revenues as well as the maintenance and assurance of public security in villages, cities, and along major roads.[70] Other reforms included the reinstatement of the *ferdeh*, or war tax, on all adult males which was subsequently reversed once discussion of revolt and rebellion amongst the Muslim population made its way to the Sublime Porte.[71] However, the reversal upset many property owners and influential families, particularly from the southern parts of Syria, which increased the potential of rebellion to spread into Damascus, Aleppo, and Mount Lebanon, where the threat of violent conflict remained high.[72]

The Crimean War was a factor in exposing the precarious position of the Sublime Porte. Observing this position and wishing to put an end to the war while making gains, the French and Austrian governments put together the Vienna Note. The framework set out in the Vienna Note was extremely vague and created an environment of insecurity for the Sublime Porte by providing ample opportunity for the Russians and French to make gains over the Holy Places in Jerusalem at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, upon receiving the Vienna Note, refused to accept the provisions, arguing that the rights of the Christian population within the territories of the Ottoman Empire depended solely on the Sultan.[73] The authors of the Vienna Note were attempting to take advantage of the weakened position of the Ottoman Empire and in doing so attempted to impede on what little power and independence remained with the Sublime Porte at the time. The rejection of the Vienna Note and the accompanying statement by the Sublime Porte utilised international public law

[70] The British consul writes that many of the raw materials (silk, dill, sesame seed, and wheat) exported to Europe are benefiting the agriculturists and growers. However, the import of manufactured goods to Europe is not doing as well and many of the markets are unable to sell these goods as quickly as they are coming in. FO/78/960 January 13, 1853, sent to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, from N.W. Werrig, Aleppo; 166PO/D1/52 January 15, 1853 (no. 34), sent to Marquis de Lavalette, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.
[71] FO/78/960 February 3, 1853, January 29, 1853, sent to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, from N.W. Werrig, Aleppo
[72] FO/78/960 February 3, 1856; 166PO/D1/52 February 5, 1853 (no. 36), sent to Marquis de Lavalette, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.
[73] Goldfrank 2013; Rich 1991; Troubetzkoy 1986.

against its creators, as had been done with the request for the Sublime Porte to extradite refugees to Russia in 1850. However, as with the use of international public law during the 1850 Refugee Crisis, the Sublime Porte was unable to enforce their claims outright due to their subordinated status.

### 4.2.1 The Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Social Field of the Syrian Provinces

The Sublime Porte's objection to the Vienna Note was forceful enough that the Note was subsequently revised and its stipulations were rewritten to be more acceptable to the Sublime Porte. Yet, the revised Note did not guarantee Ottoman sovereignty, it did include, however, the right to territorial integrity. Even though the Ottoman sovereignty was not guaranteed, the Russians refused to accept the revised Note. The article on territorial integrity meant that Russian territorial expansion and influence over secessionist movements would be limited, impeding Russian interests.[74]

In July 1853, following the rejection of the revised Note, the Russians began to occupy the Danubian principalities of the Ottoman Empire.[75] During this period, Russia made emboldened claims and demands on the Ottoman Empire, encroaching on domestic affairs, leading to increased anti-Russian sentiment within the Ottoman Empire, Muslim resentment towards notions of equality, and increased distaste for further reforms. On the other hand, Roderic Davison argues that sentiments of Ottoman brotherhood were bolstered by the emergence of the Russian threat.[76] Perceiving the Russian threat as existential and under the assumption that France and Britain would support the Ottoman army and naval fleet, the Sublime Porte declared war on Russia on October 4, 1853. During the Crimean War, the Russians, British, and French took strategic advantage of their increased physical presence within Ottoman territories.

Following the declaration of war, the Sultan issued a *firman* asking the local authorities across the Ottoman Empire to maintain 'perfect tranquillity' and for 1,500 volunteer soldiers that will be placed under the command of Ali Bey Sherif. Commenting on the *firman*, the French consul in Aleppo believed that the request for volunteer soldiers would be supported throughout the territories. Subsequently, on November 19, 1853, he described the 'remarkable way in which Muslims, Christians, and Europeans are working together with

[74] 166PO/D1/52 February 15, 1853 (no. 51) sent to Marquis de Lavalette, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.
[75] Schmitt 1919.
[76] Davison 1963.

great admiration for the Pashas who have worked hard to maintain order and tranquillity'.[77] As Davison argues, the emergence of a common enemy, Russia, led to increased cooperation among previously divided communities. While this is true to a certain extent, Davison and the French consul's perception of events is overly optimistic: the Russians maintained an extensive network of Greek Orthodox officials in the Ottoman Empire, and used them as social capital during the war. The networks that the Russians had access to posed a threat to the Sublime Porte, but also to competing French and British interests in the region.

Following the outbreak of the war, on January 14, 1854, the British consul in Damascus reported that two Russian emissaries were spotted in Damascus. It is believed that the Russian emissaries came to Damascus to influence the Greek Orthodox community and to emancipate the Greek Orthodox Church and its adherents from Muslim domination. By using the Prelate at the head of the Greek Orthodox Church, who was, for eight years, the tutor to the Archdukes of the Imperial Russian Family, as well as the Tsar's confessor, Russia was able to influence a vast network of Greek Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire.[78] In an example of the extent of these networks, the Russian emissaries swayed the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch to permit the Archimandrite and the Superior of the Saint Elias (*Mar Elias*) Convent in Shwayya, Mount Lebanon, to covertly enter in and carry out relations with the Ansari and Bedouin tribes, whom were being incited into rebellion by the Orthodox Bishops of Hama and Aleppo.[79]

Soon after the British observed the two Russian emissaries in Damascus, the French consul in Damascus wrote that the Ansari and Bedouin tribes outside of Hama, under the control of Fares al-Hadeb, allied with Russia, had come into contact with the tribes under control of Behin Khaled and Beni Khere, who had pledged allegiance to the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan. The battle that ensued following the encounter left the Ottoman allied tribes decimated, while those under the authority of Fares al-Hadeb were left emboldened and with

[77] Bashir Amir Ahmad Abi al-Lami and Bulus Mas'ad entered politics in 1854. Additionally, Amir Haidar Isma'il Abi al-Lami, the Christian Qaymaqam, died on May 11, 1854, his nephew Bashir Assaf was appointed on the recommendation from foreign European consuls. Bashir Assaf was chosen as interim Qaymaqam because he had served as his uncle's deputy on the *mejlis* council for three years prior to Amir Bashir's death. The Greek Orthodox Patriarch tried to make a plea to the Mushir, Wamiq Pasha to appoint an Orthodox Qaymaqam, or at least a Muslim – Wamiq refused to send the request to the Porte. Meanwhile the Maronite Khazin family of Kisrawan were attempting to tilt the balance of the political environment in their favour by sending a request to the British consul through the Maronite patriarch – also a Khazin. 166PO/D1/52 October 29, 1853 (no. 52), sent to M. de la Cour, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo, November 9, 1853 (no. 53), sent to M. de la Cour, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo; al-'Aqiqi 1959, pp. 11-12.

[78] FO/195/458 January 14, 1854 (no. 2), sent to Stratford de Redcliffe, from Richard Wood, Damascus.

[79] 'This fierce tribe occupies the mountains from Hamah to Antioch, and is said to amount to about three hundred thousand souls', Bowring 2013, pp. 190-191.

new weapons.[80] The Russians had taken advantage of the dislocation between customary groups and networks and the Sublime Porte, which was caused by the implementation of modernisation reforms. The subsequent relations that were formed between the European powers and the customary groups and networks were not only based on religious identity, but as with the case of the Russians, had kinship and tribal elements.

In addition to Russian alliances with tribal networks and the Greek Orthodox community, the British accuse the Russians of prolonging the insurrection of the Druze Yezbeck faction in the Hauran.[81] According to the British, the Russian strategy included developing an alliance with Emir Amin and disrupting the social relations in the region. Emir Amin, on the other hand, used this alliance with the aim of increasing territorial claims and to make an argument for autonomy from the Sublime Porte. The strategy employed by the Russians and Emir Amin to fulfil their interests included reigniting the rivalry between Druze notables, the Jumblatts and Talhouks, a historic schism between the Jumblatts and Druze Yezbeck Clans, the latter being led by the Talhouks.[82] The Russians were actively pursuing a strategy of destabilisation, targeting the social order within the Ottoman Empire and taking advantage of existing schisms, by using their network within the Greek Orthodox community; this gave them access to tribal networks, as well as helped them form alliances with notables who were locked into stalemates with the Sublime Porte, such as Emir Amin. The principal aims for the Russians was to coerce the Sublime Porte into conceding the right to protect and administer the Christian Holy Places, which had been given to the French, and unabated expansion into the Danubian principalities.[83]

Taking advantage of the social conditions that had been created by Russian interference and the Sublime Porte's focus on Russian activities, the French were actively engaging the Catholic communities with the aim to undermine Russian strategies, but also to deepen French influence within Ottoman territories. In October 1854, the French consul boasted that the influence of France

> is winning, without a doubt, and what better way to prove this than the legitimacy given by the Sultan and his government

[80] 166PO/D20/4 January 29, 1854 (no. 7), sent to the French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Edmond de Barrère, Damascus.
[81] The Hauran is a geographic region that falls in Syria and Jordan, and borders Lebanon and Israel. Kattar 1997.
[82] FO/195/458 January 14, 1854 (no. 2) The remainder of this document in particular discusses the issues of the Christians, the Druzes, the Mutualies (Shiites). The second document discusses the origins of the Chehabs and their agreement with the empire regarding tribute to be paid to the Sultanate and the pension/recognition in return. See also Kattar 1997.
[83] FO/195/458 January 14, 1854 (no. 2); Kattar 1997.

> regarding the French Christian charity the Lazarist Sisters of the Charity of St Vincent of Paul who had opened a school for girls, are treating the sick, and helping the poor.[84]

The French intention to civilise and create an environment amenable to European conceptions of progress also sought to pacify the public and develop the institutions necessary to help forge a French form of household authority that would support the allegiance with the targeted communities.[85] By creating social institutions, particularly centred on health care and education, the French sought to reorder the social field by disseminating French knowledges and by developing practices that emphasised the role of France in providing social wellbeing. The strategy employed by the French was to reconfigure popular consent and legitimacy in order to bolster sentiment towards France.

### 4.3 The Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856): A European Reform

Following the Crimean War, the Sublime Porte was in a position of submission as it tried to recover from economic and political losses that were sustained. Given the damages suffered, the need to rebuild, and the interests of the European powers, additional pressure was placed on the Sublime Porte to undertake a new programme of structural and institutional reform. The European powers approached the project from a seemingly benevolent standpoint, seeking to further rationalise the application of authority and order the Empire in an image that would replicate the European state and to protect against the possibility for Ottoman oppression against communities within the Empire who had worked in opposition to the interests of the Sublime Porte during the Crimean War. Due to the costs of the Crimean War, the Sublime Porte had little other option than to comply with the demands made by the European powers and promulgate a second reform decree, the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856.[86]

The Hatt-ı Hümayun is described as a result 'of the solicitude of the powers'.[87] The decree was engineered by the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, known at this point as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, with the consent of the French Ambassador, Édouard

[84] 166PO/D20/4 October 9, 1854 (no. 16), sent to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, from Edmond de Barrière.
[85] Owens 2015; Mansel 2010; Thomas 2001.
[86] The French Consul in Aleppo writes of the Sultan's position in the promulgation of the Tanzimat Decree. 166PO/D1/54 August 7, 1858 (no. 15), sent to the French Ambassador in Istanbul, M. de Thouvenel, from M. Bentivoglio, Aleppo.
[87] In the Andrassy Note, Count Andrassy states that the Hatt-ı Hümayun 'is one of the results of the solicitudes of the Powers' (c) Hertslet 1875, p. 2421 (no. 456); The text of the Hatt-ı Hümayun can be found in (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1243-1249 (no. 263); In the writings of Viscount Strangford (1869, p. 131), it is noted 'we [Britain] have a right to look for some public expression of gratitude from Russia for putting into her hands so powerful a solvent of Turkish dominion as the Hatt-ı Hümayun.'

Thouvenel and the Austrian Internuncio, Anton Freiherr Baron Prokesch von Osten (Baron Prokesch), who wanted to secure their relationship with the Ottoman Empire and pre-empt the set of Russian demands to be made at the Congress of Paris, 1856. The announcement of reforms prior to the Congress of Paris forced the Russian delegation to accept a peace settlement framed by the provisions outlined by the Hatt-ı Hümayun, curbing Russian ability to impact the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire.[88]

According to Robert Devereux, the decree was 'a reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839).[89] Although there were similarities between the Hatt-ı Şerif and the Hatt-ı Hümayun, the latter was much more than a mere reaffirmation of the former. The Hatt-ı Hümayun granted more rights for Christian communities, attempting to appease the demands of European powers in the provision of full equality, by allowing Christians to give testimony in criminal courts, and the development of secular police courts. In turn, the Sublime Porte sought to abolish the civil powers enjoyed by the Christian leadership, further bringing the Christian population under control of the Sublime Porte and eliminating the remaining autonomy enjoyed by the population. More generally, the Hatt-ı Hümayun eliminated the death penalty for apostasy and outlawed the use of deprecatory epithets based on religion, language, or race by Ottoman officials and subjects. In addition, the administrative offices of the Ottoman Empire were opened to all Ottoman subjects, without distinction and full liberty of conscience was guaranteed with the promise of representative governing councils at provincial and communal levels of government,[90] non-Muslim subjects became eligible for military service, yet the option to pay a tax for an exemption of duty was maintained. The Hatt-ı Hümayun also prohibited torture, promised prison reform, and allowed foreigners to acquire property under certain circumstances.[91]

The Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 provided more institutional and structural changes to governance and social order by outlining new means of attaining equality throughout the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the changes outlined above, the Hatt-ı Hümayun differed from the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) by leaving out explicit mention and reference to Islam and the

[88] Davison 1963, pp. 51-54.
[89] Devereux 1963, p. 24
[90] This was the job of the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances. The appointment of Christians to the council was not representative, instead they were hand-picked from prominent families in Istanbul 'whose interests attached them closely to the Ottoman Porte'. Additionally, their powers were further restricted to matters that affected the general population of the Empire, having no say over issues specifically concerning the Muslim population. Davison 1963, p. 93.
[91] A law was later passed on January 18, 1867, that allowed foreigners the right to buy and own property in the Ottoman Empire. This law was further extended on the 28th of July, 1868, by a treaty signed between the British and Turkish Governments. The Hatt-ı Şerif is translated in (b) Hertslet 1875, p. 1002 (no. 188) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun can be found in (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1243-1248 (no. 263) and FO/881/882; Devereux 1963, p. 24; Davison 1963, pp. 55-57.

Qur'an as a justification for the decree and the laws outlined in the decree.[92] The difference in wording between the two decrees most likely reflects the influence of the European powers, which is especially evident in the fourth paragraph of the Hatt-ı Hümayun that praises the 'civilised nations' and their assistance provided to the Sublime Porte.[93] The Hatt-ı Hümayun, as the product of European interference in the social and political affairs of the Ottoman Empire, emphasised the requirement for the Sublime Porte to rule through rational principles and the secular rights of man.[94] Only once these principles were established could the Sublime Porte join the governments of 'civilised nations' and be granted full rights as a sovereign polity within the European state system.

The central purpose for the Hatt-ı Hümayun, however, was as a tool for negotiating the Treaty of Paris (1856) to resist Russian interests and secure the Sublime Porte's sovereignty within the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Paris, an agreement between the European powers (Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and Sardinia) and the Ottoman Empire, explicitly referred to the Hatt-ı Hümayun as an acknowledgment of the Sultan's good faith in governing his subjects and stated that the European powers have *noted* that they maintain no right, 'under any circumstance, […] to interfere either collectively or individually, in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects, nor in the internal administration of his Empire'.[95] The acceptance of this article in the Treaty of Paris was contentious among the European signatories. The strength of the wording had been decreased by the European powers after the initial proposal by the Ottomans, which was of a *formal* acknowledgement and promise of non-intervention to a *noted* acknowledgement and promise.[96] The diminution from a *formal* acknowledgement to a *noted* acknowledgment had legal ramifications. The former would have established in law the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire and the illegality of the Empire to be subjected to external political interference, overriding many of the privileges enjoyed by the European powers within the Ottoman Empire and amongst the Sultan's subjects. The strength of a *noted* acknowledgement was such that the principle of sovereignty was legally understood, but could be disregarded.

[92] The difference in wording between the Hatt-ı Şerif and Hatt-ı Hümayun could also be, in part, a reflection of the Western-liberal ideas of the upper-most classes. The Hatt-ı Şerif is translated in (b) Hertslet 1875, p. 1002 (no. 188) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun can be found in (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1243-1248 (no. 263); and FO/881/882; Devereux 1963, p. 24; Davison 1963, pp. 55-57.
[93] (b) Hertslet 1875, p. 1002 (no. 188), pp. 1243-1248 (no. 263); FO/881/882.
[94] Paine 1984, p. 208-9.
[95] (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1250-1264 (no. 264).
[96] (b) Hertslet 1875, pp. 1250-1264 (no. 264).

## 4.4 Conclusion

The administration of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) was entangled in the European states 'right to advise' the Sublime Porte in exchange for the help that had been provided by Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia in recovering the territories occupied by the Egyptian forces. The modernisation reforms were viewed as an exchange, a requirement for the aid provided to the Sublime Porte in the recuperation of the Syrian provinces, but also necessary in order for the Ottoman Empire to be considered an equal within the European state system. The application of the reform decree in the Syrian Provinces significantly altered the relationship between the social field and the Sublime Porte – from one of negotiated autonomy to centralised administrative equality, the means to access authority, and relations between the sectarian networks.

Following the application of the Hatt-ı Şerif, the relationship between the social field and Sublime Porte changed. The creation of administrative councils that attempted to assert the equal application of the law and governance was viewed as oppressive to the Christian and Jewish populations, who were still subject to an annual head tax, without the benefits that they had enjoyed before the application of the reforms. On the other hand, equality for the Muslim populations felt as if they had lost the privilege they had enjoyed.

In a possible attempt to avert confrontation with the Muslim population, that were, according to European despatches, becoming increasingly hostile to the Christian and Jewish populations, the Sublime Porte manufactured methods to elevate the status of the Muslim population, including the removal of Christian and Jewish members of governing councils in the provinces. The limited access to authority created competition between the different religious communities. In Mount Lebanon, for example, a political section of the Druze was willing to submit to a Muslim governor in exchange for the Sublime Porte's favouritism, particularly to combat Christian elevation of political and economic due to their alignment with the French-backed Egyptian forces during the occupation (1831-1841). However, for other political sections of the Druze community, there was resistance to the idea, fearing, as the Christians had, continued Ottoman oppression in Mount Lebanon.

The change in how governance was administered altered the relations between the Sublime Porte and the groups and networks within the social field, transforming the means to access authority. Either because the Sublime Porte was unable to fully enact the reforms outlined in the Hatt-ı Şerif or it was incapable of evenly and properly supervising the administration

of authority in the Syrian provinces, or, possibly, a combination of the two. The consequence of this changing relationship and access created the incentive for the Christians, specifically, but also the Druze, to develop relations with the European powers, particularly the British, French, and Russians.

The development of these relationships between religious minorities in the Syrian provinces and the European powers led to increased protections for the religious minorities, as well as access to European economic markets. The gains made by the Christian populations, particularly the Uniate Catholics in Aleppo, attracted the anger of the neighbouring Muslim community that subsequently attacked the Christians in 1850. For the European powers, the result of this event was a confirmation of the natural fanaticism of the Muslim population and requirement of increased security and physical protection for the Christians.

Although French and Russian interests in protecting the Christian communities, the Catholic and the Orthodox Christians – respectively, was argued to be civilisational, it was also economic and geo-political. The pursuit of these interests placed the Ottoman Empire and the Sublime Porte in the centre, as was the case of the conflict over the Christian Holy Places. The Russians, in competition with the French for the rights over the Holy Places in Jerusalem, viewed the Sublime Porte's acquiescence to France as a sign that the Ottoman Empire had fallen into foreign hands. Although Russia blamed the Sublime Porte for the situation, the Crimean War (1853-1856), had less to do with perceptions of increased French influence and more to do with the Russian interests, particularly with regards to control of the Black Sea and the Danubian Principalities, territorial interests that would have been hindered had the Russians accepted Ottoman Sovereignty in the Treaty of Paris (1856).

In an effort to limit the demands made on the Sublime Porte by Russia, following the conclusion of the Crimean War, the British, French, and Austrian ambassadors, along with the Sublime Porte, strategized the promulgation of the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), a new reform edict that outlined new institutional and structural changes. The new reforms provided the European powers, particularly Britain, France, and Austria with the justification for continued support of the Sublime Porte within the European state system, in addition to limiting Russian advances. However, support did not equate equal status and sovereignty, rather, it provided the European powers with grounds to continue to legitimately interfere based on the premise that the Sublime Porte had not managed to accede to the civilisational expectations.

## Chapter 5: The Standard of Civilisation: Social and Political Resistance in the Syrian Provinces and the Sublime Porte

### 5 Introduction

The Ottoman Empire, unable to accede to full membership of the European state system and obtain recognised sovereign rights, continued to be subjected to the interests of the members of the European state system. The resulting uneven relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the members of the European state system necessitated Ottoman reform, with the aim to replicate the conditions of European modernity, within the framework of a liberal worldview. However, the European interests required the continued suppression of Ottoman accession to the state system. The European states cited the Empire's Islamic character and principles, particularly with regards to the Empire's treatment of the Christian minority, who were favoured by France and Russia. Unable to assert the principle of equality, the Sublime Porte was viewed as fanatical and barbaric, inhibiting modernisation and its ability to join the civilised nations, despite attempts to replicate institutional centralisation in Europe.

Although the Sublime Porte was unrelenting in its attempts to modernise its institutions and government in order to replicate those in Europe, with the aim of preventing continued European interference within its territories, it was not able to accede to the desired European standard. Interference by the European powers, despite being developed within the context of humanitarian intervention, favoured the Christian communities, in particular, and elevated their political and economic status within the social field. Combined with the consequences of Ottoman modernisation, the result was dislocation between the authority of the Sublime Porte and the social field. In addition to highlighting the development of violent sectarian politics and the consequence of those politics, this chapter highlights the emergence of the Young Ottomans faction within the Sublime Porte, and their role in attempting to normalise modernity and maintain the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire.

This chapter examines social resistance to European interference as a consequence of the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) by framing the Damascus Massacre of 1860 as a response to conditions that had been created within the Syrian provinces. This chapter continues by discussing the consequences of the Damascus Massacre, including the occupation of Mount Lebanon by a European military force led by France and the economic demands made by the European powers on the Sublime Porte under the premise of maintaining stability and

protecting the Christian population. Due to the application of a standard of civilisation a political resistance led by the Young Ottomans emerged. This chapter contextualises the political advances of the Young Ottomans until the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).

## 5.1 Consequences of the Hatt-ı Hümayun 1856

For many individuals and groups within the Syrian provinces, the international environment in which the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856 was promulgated confirmed the subordinated status of the Ottoman Empire within the European state system. The Sultan, acknowledging the manner in which the Ottoman Empire and the Sublime Porte would be perceived by its own population, attempted to avoid vociferous discontent by proclaiming that the Hatt-ı Hümayun was a spontaneous act and separate from European influence. It was hoped that the proclamation of spontaneity would dislodge any discussion or belief that the Sublime Porte had submitted to the will of Europe and was a subordinate power to the European states.[1] Despite the desire to appear strong and independent from European interests, it had quickly become apparent that the Sublime Porte had initiated the reform within the context of the Congress of Paris (1856).[2]

In addition to viewing the reform as a consequence of European interests, the Hatt-ı Hümayun was not well received by the Muslim community in Syria because of the negative impact it had on Muslim status. Additionally, the Christian communities in the Syrian provinces became increasingly unsure of their place in relation to Muslim subjects. Both the Muslims and Christians were displeased with the reforms, the Muslims viewed the new framework as a threat to character of the Empire and their place within the framework of the Empire, while the Christians were wary of the new laws, particularly the law on military recruitment that called for all subjects, despite race and religion, to serve in the army.[3]

The concerns of the Muslim and Christian communities regarding the promulgation of the new reforms were dismissed by the French Consul in Aleppo, who was focused on the elevated status of the Christian community. Following the announcement of the reforms, the French Consul in Aleppo organised a celebration for the prominent Christian families to

[1] Davison 1963, pp. 51-54.
[2] 166PO/D1/53 April 26, 1856 (no. 6), sent to M. de Thouvenel, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Bentivoglio, Aleppo; Roederer 1917, p. 19.
[3] 166PO/D1/53 March 10, 1856 (no. 46), sent to M. de Thouvenel, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geasset, Aleppo.

mark the occasion.[4] In stark contrast to this celebration, Muhammad Sa'id al-Ustawani, member of the *Mejlis* Council of Damascus, wrote, in response to the declaration of reforms, that 'all the Muslims were ashen-faced and we asked Him Most High to exalt the faith and give victory to the Muslims. There is no power or force except in God Most High'.[5] The quote attributed to al-Ustawani highlights the depth to which the sectarian schisms had become entrenched in the political struggle over the Ottoman Empire. In the quote, he asks for victory, implying that there was a conflict over the Empire, placing the Muslims against the Christians, who were perceived by the Muslims with disdain due to their alliances with the European powers.

Tensions between Christians and Muslims, the latter viewing the Christians as loyal to France and Russia, heightened following the establishment of the Hatt-ı Hümayun. On April 26, 1856, the French consul in Aleppo, wrote that the city was agitated, the Muslims were arming themselves and there was a general sense of panic among the Christian population and government officials. The consul continued that should a revolution occur, it would be the Christians, Europeans, and the foreign consuls that would be targeted in attacks.[6] Although violence or revolt did not immediately occur, the European community within the Ottoman Empire remained anxious and recalled the uprising that took place in 1850.[7]

The agitation that was occurring in Aleppo was the result of a breakdown in household authority, the dislocation between the social field and governance. The form of governance that had been established through the reform provisions was viewed as foreign and failed to replicate the customary form of authority that the social field had become accustomed to; making it difficult for the customary groups and networks to access and navigate the structures and institutions of the Sublime Porte. For the Christian communities, the void that had been created was occupied by European alliances which promised status, capital, and protection, while such provisions for the Muslim communities had been denigrated through modernisation reforms.

The relationship between the Sublime Porte and the social field had become increasingly strained, to the extent that the authorities were perceived by the local communities in Beirut as motivated by self-interest, with the aim of increasing wealth and to gain sustained and

[4] Masters 2013, p. 173.
[5] al-Shaykh Muhammad Sa'id al-Ustawani in Masters 2013, p. 173.
[6] 166PO/D1/53 April 26, 1856 (no. 6); Roederer 1917, p. 19.
[7] 166PO/D1/54 August 7, 1858 (no. 15).

meaningful positions in public office with a lack of concern for the population, creating problems with the management of public affairs, order, security, and justice. The British consul in Beirut, writing on November 24, 1856, stated that the reform decree that had been issued has had a negative effect on the city of Beirut. The city had become a play-ground of petty thieves and criminals, who were emboldened by the lack of order.[8] Echoing the state of affairs, an article published in *The Daily News* on September 29, 1856 described a lack of submission to the laws by Ottoman troops, who had been described as 'seedy ruffians' that are 'ill-fed and worse paid, under no discipline', and who hate the people of Syria. Their presence in the city had only increased the levels of disorder and corruption sanctioning the animosity of the Muslim population directed at the Sublime Porte, but the Ottoman troops were also described as holding a particular disgust for the Christian populations.[9]

Although the Christian populations were being singled out in these despatches and news articles, they were not without fault. The French consul in Aleppo wrote that 'the Christians in the city have become embedded in scandal and misconduct and they do not hold religion as close as their Muslim neighbours'. The consul described their actions as being 'conducted with impunity, abusing the protections offered to them by the European powers, and they do little to convey a positive image of Christianity to the Muslim population'.[10] The consul subsequently described the situation of the Christians as one that is 'temporally enduring',[11] but despite these faults, he argued that the Christian religion 'is the only good and true religion', and while justice should be served in the correct manner, it is the duty of the Europeans, and the French in particular to offer protection when Christians become the targets of Turks.[12] From this despatch, it is evident that the premise of a rational civilisation that had been attributed to the Christian population by France, in particular, was in fact attributed to the Christian communities due to their religious identification rather than their supposed predisposition to rationality.

Towards the end of December 1856, it had become increasingly evident that a lack of legitimate authority was having severe consequences for the social field. The British consul in Damascus described mass corruption in the city and wrote that property owners in Damascus were being forced to pay a tax to robbers in order to protect themselves from

[8] FO/78/1219 July 2, 1856, October 6, 1856 (no. 13), November 24, 1856 (no. 58).
[9] *The Daily News*, from Beirut, September 29, 1856, published Thursday Oct. 16, 1856, p. 5. Of 8.
[10] 166PO/D1/53 June 3, 1856 (no. 9), sent to M. de Thovenel, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Bentivoglio, Aleppo.
[11] 166PO/D1/54 August 7, 1858 (no. 15).
[12] 166PO/D1/53 June 3, 1856 (no. 9).

plunder and potentially more serious repercussions.[13] Where the Sublime Porte had once provided security, ensuring that the populations and territories within the Ottoman Empire were relatively free from plunder and threat, the disintegration of authority had led to a renegotiation, where bands and gangs were profiteering from the Sublime Porte's inability to govern.

The implementation of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) produced significant social and institutional changes with the aim to modernise the Sublime Porte in order to reflect the modern state in Europe. The result was the dislocation between the Sublime Porte from the customary groups and networks. The structures of governance that had once maintained consent and legitimacy from the social field to the Sublime Porte, particularly through decentralised governance that allowed for various degrees of autonomy, had changed significantly, making it difficult for customary groups and networks, primarily based on sectarian identities, to access authority as they once had. These changes resulted in the dislocation of sectarian groups and networks from governance and put sectarian groups and networks into competition with each other over what seemed like limited resources. While the sense of dislocation was from the institutions and structures of governance was a general sentiment, the Christian community in particular had been able to build alliances with the French and the Russians, filling the void that had emerged. The result was a Muslim community who increasingly felt alienated by the Sublime Porte which had been subordinated by the European powers and overshadowed by the elevated status of the Christian community.

### 5.1.1 Dislocating the Sublime Porte from the Social Field: Resistance and Violence in Damascus, 1860

By 1860, the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire had been the subject of an ongoing onslaught of European pressure exerted on the Empire to accept and administer a form of governance comparable to the form of modern governance prevalent in Europe, including the Ottoman Land Code of 1858. The Land Code '[…] recognised private property on land, significantly enlarged liberties of landholders, pushed inheritance rules further towards gender equality, and included some clauses that favoured landed interests.'[14] In particular, the Ottoman Land Code reinforced the importance of the individual under the law and as the sole unit for property ownership, challenging communal and complex networks of ownership. According to E. Attila Aytekin the Land Code replicated many of the existing

[13] FO/78/1219 December 19, 1856 (no. 62), sent to the Earl of Clarendon, from M. Moor, Beirut.
[14] Attila Aytekin 2009, p. 936.

blurred boundaries of public and private possession and ownership, but was still important with regards to the rights of transfer, sale, purchase, mortgaging and inheritance of, specifically, agricultural land.[15] With regards to the latter, wealthy notables could accept land holdings from peasants as payment for debts, which helped notables increase land ownership- and by extension, wealth.[16] The Sublime Porte , on the other hand, used the law to placate and sedentarise unruly and nomadic tribal sheikhs.[17] In both uses, the Land Code altered the relationship between capital, politics, society, and territory. The Land Code provides an example of how, following a European legal tradition, the Sublime Porte sought to assert their capability to function within the framework of modernity, with the aim of limiting European interference. However, the European powers, motivated by colonial and imperial interests, were also engaged in inter-European competition over rights and access to the Ottoman Empire, which resulted in the exploitation of the dislocation between governance and the social field.

Despite the intentions of the Ottoman Empire, the modernisation reforms helped reinforce social and political schisms with the social field in the Syrian provinces, further sanctioning European beliefs of the uncivilised, untameable, irrational, and fanatical Muslim, who had, for the most part, rejected the modern principles outlined in the decrees, specifically that of equality. The unintended consequence was a deepening of sectarian conflict within the Ottoman Empire, particularly in the Syrian provinces, illustrated by the events in Damascus in 1860, which reconfirmed, for the French, in particular, the inability of the Muslim population to escape their 'predisposed' and 'natural' fanaticism. The situation, according to French strategy, required protections to be granted to the Christian populations and the necessity of European interference in order to continue their efforts in helping the populations achieve the standards established in the European conception of modernity. The reaction to these ongoing developments was the rejection of European interference and anything or anyone who benefitted from Europe.

In late March, 1860, the French consul in Aleppo, A. Chattry de la Fosse, wrote to Comte de Lallemand, the acting French Ambassador in Istanbul, about a quiet anxiety among the Christians in Djelloum, the Christian Quarter of Aleppo, where the population has requested guards, a request that was echoed by various Muslim notables in Aleppo who openly worried

[15] Attila Aytekin 2009, p. 947
[16] Kark 2017.
[17] Khoury 1982.

about the safety of the populations in the city.[18] Two months later, in May, 1860, the French consul in Damascus wrote to the French Ambassador in Istanbul that violence in Mount Lebanon was due to erupt because of the negative relations between the Druze and Christians. The consul blamed Ahmed Pasha, the Governor of Damascus, for engaging the Druze population in their animosity towards the Maronites. French sentiment against the Governor was made worse by Ahmed Pasha's alliance with the Druze in the Hauran and the Shi'a communities in Ba'albek and the Beka'a Valley.[19] According to the French consuls, Ahmed Pasha's strategy was to build an alliance that could provide the Druze of Mount Lebanon the ability to take control of the mountain by capturing Deir el-Qamar and Zahlé, two Christian strongholds.[20] The reported strategy incited the French to become increasingly active in the protection of the Christians, which had the negative consequence of deepening inter-communal religious animosity.

In addition to providing protection and access to capital to the Christians, French interference in the social field emboldened the Maronites to fight against their local chiefs and the Sheikhs in the mixed districts of Mount Lebanon, which posed a threat to the Druze. Still, the French consuls dismissed their role in deepening the conflict.[21] The French alliance with the Maronite population obfuscated power relations between the communities, enhancing the marginalisation of the Druze. Although the Druze were aligned with the British at various points, the alliance that had developed was not to the same calibre of the French alliance with the Maronites, and reflected the differences in colonial strategies. As the Maronites were drawn more closely into the French sphere of influence and protection, they were increasingly viewed as traitors, deepening communal conflict through the construction of identity, and the benefits they enjoyed of political impunity and access to new economic opportunities.

On June 6, 1860, the village of Hasbeya, close to the province of Damascus, was attacked by the Druze who 'annihilated' the Chehab family, with the women being carried off to Wadi Ledja (Ledja), a mountainous region inhabited by the Druze. Following these events, the French consul, M. Outrey, restated his belief that Ahmed Pasha was to blame for the

[18] 166PO/D1/56 see documents dated 24 March, 1860 (no. 53), sent to M. de Lallemand, chargé d'affaires in Istanbul [Constantinople], from A. Chattry de la Fosse, Aleppo; and 7 July, 1860 (no. 10), sent to Marquis de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.
[19] 166PO/D20/5 May 23, 1860 (no. 107), sent to M. de Lallemand, chargé d'affaires in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Lanusse, Damascus, and 19 June, 1860 (no. 109), sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Lanusse, Damascus.
[20] 166PO/D20/5 May 23, 1860 (no. 107), 19 June, 1860 (no. 109)
[21] Hakim 2013, p. 67.

violence. The French consul argued that it was Ahmed Pasha's goal to rid the entire Syrian province of the Christians and their allies.[22] Although Ahmed Pasha's specific goals were unknown, there was an increased presence of French troops, citizens, diplomats, and missionaries in the Syrian provinces who were actively interfering in domestic political, economic, and social affairs. Through violent activities, the Druze were attempting to diminish French influence and interference in the Syrian provinces, to assert their power in a vacuous political environment, and therefore threatened French interests. The French consul, fearing further violence against the Christians and French citizens in the Syrian provinces, wrote to Emir Abd-el-Kader,[23] agreeing to arm 1,000 Algerians under his authority with the sole purpose of protecting the Christians and the Christian Quarter of Damascus.[24]

The desire to ensure security in Damascus was not the result of the French consul misconstruing the situation, the Chief Council of Damascus, witnessing the heightened anxiety among the population caused by violent events around the Syrian provinces, also procured a police force to protect the Christian quarter. The group of officers and captains chosen to form the police force were, described by a 'Muslim Turk' in Damascus as, 'worthless and baser'.[25] That being said, the British consul in Beirut also did not think highly of Ottoman troops, having previously described them as 'seedy ruffians'.[26] Given the questionable character of the officers that had been recruited to protect the Christians, it is believed that they instigated a few young boys to make crosses and lay them down in the streets of the city, allowing passers-by to walk on the crosses, while the kids yelled insults directed at Christians.[27]

The authorities in the city, disturbed by the potential provocation, ordered the police to apprehend the boys and force them to sweep the streets of the market as punishment. The sight of the young Muslim boys being punished for their actions against the Christians drew an angry crowd who subsequently freed the boys from their punishment. The group, still angered by the treatment of Muslim children, and led by Selim Agha al-Mahayni,[28] an officer

[22] 166PO/D20/5 June 19, 1860 (no. 109).
[23] Emir Abd-el-Kader was an Algerian religious scholar, released from French imprisonment by Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte after the 1848 French Revolution on the grounds that he would not interfere in Algeria.
[24] 166PO/D20/5 June 19, 1860 (no. 109).
[25] FO/226/131 Account by a Muslim Turk in Damascus, the Massacre of the Christians there.
[26] *The Daily News*, from Beirut, September 29, 1856, published Thursday Oct. 16, 1856, p. 5. Of 8.
[27] FO/226/131; 166PO/D1/56 July 20, 1860 (no. 11), sent to M. de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Geoffrey, Aleppo.
[28] FO/226/131; 166PO/D1/56 July 20, 1860 (no. 11)

of the irregular security force,[29] entered the Christian Quarter of Damascus and began mercilessly attacking and pillaging the Quarter. The police force was overpowered and unable to suppress the group and force them to withdraw. Throughout the pillaging and destruction, the mob grew larger, with others, including the Druze, security forces, and Arab tribes, joining in. With the belated arrival of Emir Abd-el-Kadr to Damascus, and although he was incapable of bringing the violence to a conclusion, he had managed to save about 11,000 Christians.[30] The plundering and burning of the Quarter continued for a number of days until the area was completely destitute, with many of its inhabitants being killed, tortured, enslaved, or forced to convert to Islam.[31]

The events that occurred in Damascus were the result of a deepening sectarian animosity and could not be divorced from the material factors of the social environment, such as the economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire following the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the restructuring of political and social governance that altered access to governance and provided opportunities for European interference. Nevertheless, following the Damascus Massacre of 1860, the French continued to blame Ahmed Pasha, arguing that he had masterminded the entire event with the support of the armies of notable Muslim Damascene families. The French believed that the strategy included populations throughout the Syrian Provinces, including Mount Lebanon and that these populations had become convinced that the French and Russians, in their quest to protect the Christians, wanted to exterminate the Druze and Muslims in Mount Lebanon.[32] The other hypothesis explained by the French consul considered violence as a tool that was used to combat unwanted European interference. Viewing the Christians as aligned with the European powers, Ottoman officials sought to agitate the Muslim population in order to regain control.[33]

### 5.1.2 The Repercussions of Resistance and Violence: European Colonisation

After the violent events in Damascus in 1860, the Sublime Porte sent Fuad Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Damascus as an internal special envoy with the goal of restoring order and establishing a distinct and common Ottoman identity. To realise this goal, Fuad Pasha dissolved the *Mejlis* Council, arguing that all the members of the council had been compromised by the events. Following the dissolution of the *Mejlis* Council, Fuad

[29] Fawaz 1994, p. 85.
[30] According to the French consul in Damascus. 166PO/D20/5 July 28, 1860 (no. 112).
[31] FO/226/131; 166PO/D20/5 July 17, 1860, sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Lanusse, Damascus, and July 28, 1860 (no. 112) sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Outrey, Damascus; Roederer 1917, p. 19.
[32] 166PO/D20/5 July 28, 1860 (no. 112).
[33] 166PO/D20/5 July 28, 1860 (no. 112).

Pasha's objective of restoring social order was impeded by the depressed economic situation and the embedded socio-political divisions between the Muslims, Druze, and Christians.[34]

Because of Fuad Pasha's inability to restructure and re-establish order and authority in Damascus, the Austrian, Prussian, British, French, and Russian governments decided among themselves to allow France to lead a military occupation in Syria with 12,000 European troops over a six-month period.[35] Given the state of the Empire, the Sublime Porte was overpowered and was forced to submit to the European intervention. The Sublime Porte, however, did extract a compromise that restrained and limited European troops to Mount Lebanon.[36] The establishment of European troops in Ottoman territory was the manifestation of the Sublime Porte's loss of power in the European state system and authority within the Syrian provinces; making it easier for European interests to be achieved. Although it was procured as a humanitarian necessity, to protect the Christian population from further violence, it could not be divorced from European interests.[37] Had the European powers, particularly France, been sincerely motivated by humanitarianism, there would have been better recognition of the socioeconomic and political disparities that led to the outbreak of violence in 1860, rather than exacerbate the political situation by reproducing a narrative of Muslim fanaticism and an Ottoman-Druze alliance that sought to eradicate the Christian populations.

The occupation of Mount Lebanon provided the European states, specifically France, with the ability to further spread their influence and achieve their interests. This was made easier by the relationship that had developed between the Maronites, primarily located in Mount Lebanon, and the French. Additionally, many Christians from Damascus, following the violence, had migrated to Achrafiye, a suburb of Beirut on the foothills of Mount Lebanon.[38] The French-led occupation was guided by the idea that that colonisation could provide enlightenment, by dominating, pacifying, and educating the populations, it would be possible to replicate ideas of order, morality, governance, and a French high culture.[39] However, the occupation of Mount Lebanon deepened the French relationship with the Christians, which helped increase Christian economic and political mobility, having a wider impact throughout

[34] 166PO/D20/5 August 9, 1860 (no. 116), sent to M. Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Outrey.
[35] 6,000 troops would be despatched from France. Hakim 2013, p. 71; Roederer 1917, p. 19.
[36] Hakim 2013, p. 71.
[37] Menon 2016.
[38] The Consul also writes that many of the Christian inhabitants had fled to Beirut with many more settling in Achrafiye – a Christian enclave that was important in the formation of the state of Lebanon, the 1975-1990 Lebanese Civil War, and the demographic of Beirut afterwards. 166PO/D20/5 August 9, 1860 (no. 116).
[39] Connor 1994, p.41.

the Syrian provinces. Indeed, there were reports from Aleppo that the Christian communities had remained positive regarding their safety and future, while Muslims, on the other hand, were left feeling intimidated.[40]

The European military occupation of Mount Lebanon maintained the goal of physically protecting the Christians and pacifying the Druze and Muslims who were described as fanatical and violent. The European occupation also led to more direct influence in the region, impacting the social networks within the Syrian provinces while maintaining pressure on the Sublime Porte. The consequence of this military occupation was a further reorganisation of the established social order between Muslim and Christian subjects. In addition to increasing the sectarian schism, the French led European occupation was motivated by the pursuit of interests.[41] The extent to which this was the case was evidenced when the British Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Sir Henry Bulwer, made a public declaration in November 1860, that he was opposed to further occupation of Syria by *France*.[42] Bulwer refrained from asserting that the occupation was European in character and implied that its *raison d'être* was to achieve French interests, which traditionally had been focused on Christian elevation in, or Christian emancipation from, the Ottoman Empire. The French occupation also hindered Britain's ability to achieve their interests with respect to the Druze. Under the leadership of France, the occupation prioritised the wellbeing of the Christian population, and the French maintained control over the political, economic, and social affairs in the region, limiting British capabilities.

The European occupation of Mount Lebanon reorganised the social field including its administration. The administration was reorganised, initially through new appointments, including that of Yusuf Karam, a favourite of the Maronite clergy, who was put forward to replace Bashir Ahmad Abi al-Lami, and who would serve as the last Christian Qaymaqam.[43] Following the initial reorganisation, the Qaymaqam system was destroyed in favour of the creation of the Mutassarifate, a system that gave leadership to a non-Lebanese Christian under the title of Mutassarif. The leader would then be advised by an Administrative Assembly, represented equally by the different sects in the region. These changes took effect in 1861, upheld by the constitutional arrangement known as the '*Réglement Organique*' (the

[40] 166PO/D1/56 October 2, 1860 (no. 11), sent to M de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], to A. Chattry de la Fosse, Aleppo.
[41] The French rhetoric and the reorganization of the established social order, led to increased resistance by the Muslims, who saw their rights and powers being stripped away. Hakim 2013, p. 71; House of Commons Debate, UK Parliament, May 10, 1861, vol. 162, Syria and Turkey, cc1870-94, in Hansard, Parliamentary Archives.
[42] Emphasis is mine. Liverpool Daily Post, 13 November 1860, p. 5 of 8.
[43] al-Aqiqi 1959, p. 27.

Organic/Natural Law of Mount Lebanon).[44] The French, to ensure that the reforms that had been developed were being properly administered and that peace was maintained, extended the military occupation for three months.[45] These changes dissolved Druze autonomy over their own affairs and placed power in the hands of a foreign Christian, which amplified the feeling of Christian domination in the form of foreign power.

The new administration of the Mutassarifate, though still part of the Ottoman Empire, was given significant independence from the Sublime Porte through the *Réglement Organique*. The autonomy of the Mount Lebanon region meant that the governing bodies could bypass the bureaucracy of the Sublime Porte, but that they also became increasingly susceptible to the interests of the European powers. In December 1861, following the establishment of the Mutassarifate and the *Réglement Organique*, Yusuf Karam, a French ally in Mount Lebanon, refused to submit himself to a foreign leadership when the Qaymaqamship was destroyed and replaced with the Mutassarifate. Karam's refusal to submit to a foreign Christian was seen as treasonous and he was arrested and sent into exile by order of Daoud Pasha, the Mutassarif.[46]

The arrest and exile of Yusuf Karam, though ordered by Daoud Pasha, was fulfilled by Fuad Pasha, a perceived British agent that had been responsible for aiding the British forge a deeper relationship with the Druze, which made France indignant and created conflict between France and Britain.[47] Seeking retribution, the French attempted to interfere with the developing relationship between the British and the Druze by offering the Druze amnesty for previous acts of violence. The Druze, however, were sceptical of this strategy and, according to British despatches, viewed the French attempt to seek revenge as desperate.[48] The near total recession of Ottoman sovereignty in Mount Lebanon created a power vacuum amongst the British and the French. It gave them the opportunity to affect the institutions and structures of power in Mount Lebanon; both powers attempted to engineer political dominance in the region by promoting the appointment of administrators amenable to their interests.

### 5.1.3 Colonial Pacification through Economic Imperialism

[44] Gordon 1983, p. 18; Zürcher 2016, p. 55.
[45] The Policy of France, Belfast Morning News, 02 January 1861, p. 4 of 8.
[46] Summary, Foreign, Liverpool Mercury, 03 December 1861, p. 6 of 10; 166PO/D20/5 May 5, 1861 (no. 139), sent to M. de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Outrey, Damascus.
[47] Summary, Foreign, Liverpool Mercury, 03 December 1861, p. 6 of 10; 166PO/D20/5 May 5, 1861 (no. 139).
[48] FO/226/163 September 30, 1864, sent to Henry Bulwer, from M. de Heidenstam, acting consul in Aleppo; FO/226/170 October 13, 1870, State of Affairs in Damascus, Apprehensions of Christians and Foreign Consuls.

The restructuring of governance in the region and occupation of Mount Lebanon encumbered the independence of the Sublime Porte with the result being a better foothold in the Syrian provinces for the European powers – primarily France. More importantly, by bringing Mount Lebanon under direct control of the European powers, they were able to gain a pseudo-colonial space from which power over the rest of the Syrian provinces could be asserted. In addition to the changes in the structure of governance and the occupation of Mount Lebanon, the European states continued to pressure the Sublime Porte in continuing with loan repayments owed to the European powers following the Crimean War (1853-1856) and to make reparations to the Christian populations that suffered from the attacks in Damascus.[49]

The loan repayments to the European powers put more pressure on the Sublime Porte, which was forced to decree a new set of taxes. However, having the authority to influence monetary and economic policy, the Sublime Porte reduced the tariff of currency by pegging the Turkish Lira to other currencies, a strategy that was implemented by Fuad Pasha. This allowed the Ottoman Empire to collect more towards the reparation, showing higher figures regarding the collection of capital, but resulting in an estimated 25% decrease in actual purchasing power. The changes made to how the Turkish Lira was valued allowed the Ottoman Empire to offer full compensation to many of the Damascene Christians who suffered material losses because of the violence in 1860 by January 1863.[50]

Although the Ottoman Empire was able to fulfil the demands regarding reparations, the devaluation of the Turkish Lira decreased the purchasing power of those who were dependent on the currency. This had a damaging effect on the population in the Syrian provinces who were faced with an increased cost of living and finding it difficult to make personal loan repayments. Aware of this problem and the potentially damaging impact it could have on the Sublime Porte, Fuad Pasha sought to act on their behalf, alleviating the population of their personal debts by forcing money lenders to submit to a reduction of interest and to allow for repayments of loans to be made in instalments over several years. The British protested Fuad Pasha's plan, viewing it as detrimental to the interests of European money lenders working within the Ottoman Empire, over whom the Ottoman

[49] 166PO/D20/5 May 16, 1861 (no. 140), sent to M. de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Costantinople], from M. Outrey, Damascus.
[50] The slow rebuilding of the Damascene Christian Quarter was caused by the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and because many Christians from Damascus had moved to Beirut and Achrafiye following the violence. FO/195/760 January 9, 1863 (no. 6), sent to M. Erskine, from M. Moore, Beirut; and January 15, 1863 sent to M. Erskine, from M. Rogers, Damascus; 166PO/D20/5 August 9, 1860 (no. 116), sent to M. de Lavalette, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Costantinople], from M. Outrey, Damascus.

Empire could not govern.[51] The British consul in Damascus, E.J. Rogers, writes that a reduction in interest and the development of repayment options would destroy European and British influence while producing 'the ruin of many British subjects'.[52]

The British consul, concerned with the possible ramifications of Fuad Pasha's proposed programme aimed at creditors, sent a draft agreement to Fuad Pasha on March 2, 1863. Given the reliance of the Ottoman Empire on the European powers for matters such as defense and international bargaining, it was not in the Empire's interests to disregard British concerns. In turn, Fuad Pasha requested negotiations with the British, where a final agreement was concluded. The agreement stipulated that the rate of interest and credit owed would be respected where it was deemed honest and fair, the liquidation of debt held by the villages would be overseen by a commission headed by a president, and composed of a Muslim and a Christian member chosen by the authorities and an additional four members chosen by the consuls of the European powers. An additional stipulation was added that no individual owing money or lending money could become members of this commission and that decisions would be made by a majority vote. The British consul cautioned, however, that he could not be held responsible if the creditors rejected some of the terms of the proposal.[53]

Despite the exercise of power by the European states over the Sublime Porte and within the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte maintained authority over domestic policy, although not without interference. As is evidenced by Fuad Pasha's engineering of monetary policy that led to the devaluation of the Turkish Lira and allowed for reparations to be paid more quickly. It is also clear, however, that the protection of British nationals was the responsibility of Britain. Domestic policy and the governance and protection of British nationals' resident within the Ottoman Empire were not mutually exclusive. In Fuad Pasha's attempt to govern, his policies impacted the livelihood of British residents. This follows the argument established by John Westlake, who points to civilisational standard being required in order for a government in the global peripheries to govern Europeans.[54] Given the position of the Sublime Porte in relation to the British, and the dependence of the Sublime Porte on the

[51] FO/195/760 January 15, 1863.
[52] The total amount owed is estimated to be 160,000pounds, of which 25,000pounds is due to British subjects and protégés. FO/195/760 February 5, 1863 (no. 2), sent to Henry Bulwer, from M. Rogers, Damascus.
[53] FO/195/760 February 16, 1863 sent to Mehmet Pasha, from M. Rogers, Damascus, March 2, 1863 (no. 7) sent to Henry Bulwer, from M. Rogers, Damascus.
[54] Westlake 1914, pp. 143-145; Donelly 1998, p. 4.

British within the European state system, Fuad Pasha was forced to withdraw his initial policy and concede to British terms.

The Sublime Porte, defeated over the limits that could be imposed on British creditors, despite their residence status in the Ottoman Empire, pursued the expansion of its taxation regime. British economic expansion into the Ottoman Empire required the Sublime Porte to create its own periphery to which it could expand into. By bringing the nomadic and sedentary tribes under the submission of the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte would gain new agricultural areas in Mesopotamia via the Syrian Desert. Tasked with this job, Sureya Pasha, the Governor General of the province of Aleppo, accompanied by Omar Pasha, the Military Commander, and escorted by a regular army, departed from Aleppo on September 30, 1864.[55] The British consul remarked that the Sublime Porte would find it beneficial to establish troops in the towns in which the sedentary tribes inhabit, including al-Qaryatain, Palmyra, Deir ez-Zor, Mudan, Sura, Raqqah, Qal'at Ja'bar, in doing so, a military cordon would emerge, extending from Damascus in the West to Deir ez-Zor in the East and from these two points northwards to Aleppo. With such a cordon in place, the Bedouin tribes would be forced southwards, back into the Nejd, giving the Sublime Porte access to vital resources while limiting the capabilities of the tribes.[56] However, the British did not share their strategy with the Ottoman Empire.

The pressures of being forced into the European state system, subjected to the interests of European powers and to capitalist expansion as a periphery to the European core, required the Ottoman Empire to replicate the institutions and structures of modern statehood, including the development of its own periphery. Imperial expansion of the Ottoman Empire into tribal areas of the Syrian Desert and into Mesopotamia placed additional strain on the Sublime Porte, considering the cost of the military power required, but concessions between the Sublime Porte and the tribes were eventually made with regards to the uncultivated territories, and villages began to emerge. Soon after Ottoman expansion into the region, the city of Deir was founded, the population swelled to 20,000 inhabitants, and a civil government was established under the administration of the Governor of Aleppo.[57] The

[55] This is reiterated on October 11, 1864 in the despatch FO/195/806 (no. 43) sent to M. Stuart, from M. Rogers, Damascus, and September 30, 1864 FO/226/163. The sedentary tribes are a known agricultural people, many of them living on the banks of the Euphrates under the authority of the nomadic tribes, who, in exchange for security, are given portions of their crops and flocks as payment. As described by the British consul, they are 'under the direct government of their own Sheikhs, they require no other sovereignty than that of the different Bedouin chiefs, under whose protection and rule they live, independent of the Turkish government and practically ignoring its existence'.
[56] FO/226/163 September 30, 1864.
[57] 166PO/D1/72 October 26, 1880 (no. 98), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Destrée, Aleppo.

Ottoman Empire, being subject to European imperial interests and demands, was forced to expand its own imperial dominance into territories and over populations that had previously enjoyed autonomy. Indeed, as the European state system expanded and the Ottoman Empire became subject to the standard of civilisation which included economic and political expansion, it was forced to adopt knowledges and practices of the European state. In a similar fashion, the Ottoman Empire, expanding direct control into the tribal areas of the Syrian Desert and through Mesopotamia, forcing the populations in this area to partake in the structures of governance established by the Sublime Porte.

The violent events in Damascus in 1860 marked a major change in the Ottoman Empire. The violence that took place in Damascus confirmed to the European powers, although with fault, the Sublime Porte's inability to govern and maintain relative stability. The consequences of which were increased European interference over institutional configurations and domestic policy. In Mount Lebanon, where European intervention and occupation led to the establishment of a new system of governance, it also heightened animosity between the Druze and Christians.[58] The events of 1860 further impacted the economy of the Ottoman Empire as the Sublime Porte was compelled to pay reparations to the Christians who were the targets of the attacks in Damascus, the administration was forced to levy new taxes, devalue the currency, and limit the powers of foreign creditors, with the latter policy being obstructed by the British. Out of necessity, the Ottoman Empire expanded into the Syrian Desert and into Mesopotamia. The economic difficulties that the Ottoman Empire was facing also had wider effects and impacted security. Because the newly organised and trained mounted and foot police could not be paid, the men who had been hired to provide security throughout the Syrian provinces subsequently abandoned their duties, leaving many villages and cities, including those around Damascus, Hamah, and Homs, susceptible to violent plundering and pillaging by nomadic Bedouin tribes.[59]

### 5.2 The Young Ottomans as Political Resistance

During the period leading into the late 1860s there had been increased contact between European revolutionaries, particularly following the 1848 French Revolution, and liberal-minded Ottomans, which led to the development of a new movement called the Young Ottomans (sometimes referred to as the New Ottomans). The emergence of the Young

[58] Around 700-800 Druze families have migrated to the Hauran from Mount Lebanon. FO/195/806 October 27, 1866 (no. 30) sent to M. Lyons, from M. Rogers, Damascus; Kais Firro 1992, p. 155.
[59] FO/195/760 January 15, 1863, July 18, 1863, Special Instruction for the Greater Security of the Peasantry in the Eyalet of Damascus, from M. Rogers, August 19, 1863 (no. 42), sent to M. Bulwer, from M. Rogers, Damascus.

Ottomans, established by Midhat Pasha, Ziya Bey, Namik Kemal, and Mustafa Fayzel Pasha – grandson to Muhammed Ali, and Simon Deutsch, a socialist and banker exiled from Austria and residing in the Ottoman Empire, was 'a loosely organised group of liberal, westernised intellectuals who wanted to introduce constitutional government to the Ottoman Empire in order to save it from inevitable dissolution'.[60] Although their presence within the institutions of the Sublime Porte was not immediately evident, the influence of their political ideas helped the Sublime Porte navigate European pressure.

The Young Ottomans, largely made up of educated and economically established individuals, often part of the Ottoman bureaucratic class, borrowed liberal Western ideas and merged them with Islamic and Eastern traditions of the Ottoman Empire.[61] Although the Young Ottomans aimed to incorporate some of the fundamental norms of rational governance that were constituted in nineteenth century European ideas of modernity, and in doing so, generated discussion in Europe of how the Ottoman Empire was becoming a part of the civilised world, the French consul in Aleppo stated that '[…] this is a romantic view based on [European] experience with [Istanbul] and the young Pashas, who we see in Paris and who speak French, who wear modern clothes, and who swell their brilliant phrases with large words, which are empty in meaning', pointing to a high level of corruption, which he describes as unjust and oppressive having reinforced systemic poverty.[62]

In opposition to the French perception, the Young Ottomans, as a political organisation, focused their efforts on establishing a national representative body, the elimination of foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and solutions to reform projects while maintaining Ottoman and Islamic identity. Members of this movement had come together from politically diverse backgrounds, with many having been sent into exile in Paris and London in the early 1860s, primarily by high ranking supporters of the *Tanzimat* movement, and others being employed by the Sublime Porte as translators. The former group of exiles had lived and become accustomed to the political framework of Europe, while the latter group had the privilege of gaining experience abroad and becoming familiar with the political discourse and political systems of Western Europe. Indeed, it was from Paris that the Young Ottomans published their official statutes on August 30, 1867, followed

[60] Miller 2010, pp. 384-385.
[61] FO/195/806 May 7, 1867 (no. 28), sent to M. Lyons, from M, Rogers, Damascus.
[62] 166PO/D1/54 August 7, 1858 (no. 15).

by the publication of two new newspapers, published in Paris and in London: the *Hurriyet* (Freedom) and the *Muhbir* (Reporter).[63]

The Young Ottomans were not opposed to the reforms, particularly the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), which had been decreed by previous Sultans, being advocates of largescale reforms themselves, but viewed the *Tanzimat* reforms as examples of European interference and power within the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire. The reforms that the Young Ottomans wanted to implement were largely concerned with transforming the bureaucratic institutions by creating a representative system based on a constitution.[64] The propositions put forward by the Young Ottomans, despite being based on Western European knowledges of rational governance and social order, were not regimented or developed by the European powers; and similar to how the European experience of modernity was constructed on knowledges of European Christianity, the Young Ottomans desired to incorporate modern governance with Ottoman and Islamic knowledges and tradition.

By appropriating the knowledges of European modern governance, and opposing the Christian foundation in which it existed, the Young Ottomans resisted the colonializing elements of the European state system while making use of some of its knowledges and practices in order to be viewed as legitimate.[65] The Young Ottomans sought to rectify the administrative problems of the Sublime Porte through the creation of institutions that would allow for popular representation and provisions of equality. Yet, they desired to keep the Ottoman Empire distinctly Ottoman in character, drawing on traditional institutions for legitimacy and the characterisation of the Empire as distinctly Islamic. In doing so, they hoped to pacify the population by validating the Islamic identity, cultural traditions, and conventions of the Ottoman Empire while acceding to the benchmark of European modernity through institutional engineering and the establishment a codified constitution.

The desire to establish parliamentary representation and supreme law, codified in a constitution, posed a threat to traditionalists within the Sublime Porte and members of the *Ulema*, who believed that Islam formed the basis of law and only the Sultan, through his interpretation of Islam, could disseminate and enforce imperial law.[66] The ideology of the

[63] For a more detailed account, see Mardin, 2000, pp. 10-48; Miller 2010, p. 385.
[64] Davison 1963, pp. 93-4; Findley 1980, p. 143, 169.
[65] Bhabha 1994, p. 9.
[66] In particular, Mardin points to the *Tanzir-I Telemak*, a manuscript written in opposition to the Hatt-ı Şerif and Hatt-ı Hümayun. Mardin 2000 p. 199-202.

Young Ottomans also posed a threat to the institution of the Sultanate, which would be restricted by the establishment of the constitution.[67] The traditionalists, wanting to preserve the customary practices of the Empire, which was understood as being founded on interpretations of Islam, wanted to maintain a concentration of power under the Sultan. The traditionalists soon felt threatened by the propositions of the Young Ottomans, despite the Empire having already undertaken reforms to modernize under a Western conception of modernity from as early as the late eighteenth century.

One such change, led by a group of reformers, including Midhat Pasha, was the Vilayet Law of 1864. The law was an attempt to streamline and make governance in the provinces more efficient and equitable. According to Walter F. Weiker, 'the Vilayet Law was modelled closely after the French *Prefet* system,' enlarging the geographic boundaries of the provinces of themselves and creating hierarchal subdivision of sandjaks, cazas, nahiyes, and villages. The provincial governor, in turn, was provided with authority over all officials in the province, which had now contained departments of civil, financial, police, political, and legal affairs. In addition to streamlining the organisation of the Ottoman provinces, the intention behind the Vilayet Law was to repair the relationship between society and government and bridge religious divisions through the application of mixed courts, general assemblies, and administrative councils. Although the provinces had been administratively reconfigured, the desired effects were minimal, at best. The populations did not trust their new governors and the institutions of governance alone could not repair inter-communal relations.[68] Despite administrative bureaucratisation, centralisation of authority, and policies based on the provision of communal equality, the role and relationship between Islam and the Sultan had not been threatened. This, however was beginning to change with the development of modern nationalisms, which altered the notions of identity and belonging by transforming the relationship between government, population, and territory.

While the developments that had been promoted by the Young Ottomans were occurring, for some of the Young Ottomans, government reforms were still too slow. In 1868, the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances was split in two, forming the Council of Judicial Ordinances and a Council of State. These new bodies were then subordinated to the Council of Ministers. This transition incorporated representational transformations by establishing the right for all *millets* of the Ottoman Empire to be represented in the central law-making

[67] Davison 1963, pp. 93-4; Findley 1980, p. 143, 169.
[68] Weiker 1968, pp. 465-466; Davison 1963.

bodies.[69] However, the changes to the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances did not go far enough for some. Namik Kemal complained that 'as long as members of the law-drafting body were not elected, changes would remain superficial'.[70] This sentiment was echoed by the *Muhbir*, to the displeasure of Mustafa Fayzel Pasha, a member of the Young Ottomans and grandson to Muhammed Ali. Mustafa Fayzel Pasha believed that the attack by the *Muhbir* lacked diplomacy.[71]

In addition to the structural reforms that had been implemented, which did not satisfy the idea of representational government desired by the Young Ottomans, there were significant changes directly impacting the Sublime Porte. First, two of the greatest proponents of the *Tanzimat* passed away. The deaths of Fuad Pasha in 1868 and the death of Ali Pasha in 1871, signalled a turning point in the administration and modernisation of the Sublime Porte.[72] The deaths of Fuad Pash and Ali Pasha led to a declaration of general amnesty and many Young Ottomans who had been exiled subsequently returned to the Ottoman Empire from Europe.[73] Also, during this period, the Ottoman Empire was experiencing 'increased corruption, oppression, and misgovernment throughout the land', made worse by the growing unrest caused by the extravagant spending of the palace.[74] Financial mismanagement of the Empire was burdened by imperial debts to the European powers and increased personal debt within society, a devalued currency, administrative corruption, and higher rates of taxation.[75]

### 5.2.1 Midhat Pasha, the Sublime Porte, and the Young Ottomans

The situation in the Sublime Porte had become desperate due to increased European political pressure and increasingly dire financial problems. However, the Franco-Prussian War (the War of 1870) had forced the recession of French influence in the Syrian provinces that the Sublime Porte sought to take advantage of. In December 1871, the British Consul in Beirut writes, as a matter of urgency, that the Sublime Porte is attempting to take advantage of the French retreat. The Sublime Porte, had endeavoured to reassert its power over Mount Lebanon by annexing the northern half of the mountain to the Sandjak of Tripoli.[76] The British and Russians, functioning under the premise that changes made to Mount Lebanon

[69] The principle that all millets will be represented in the central law making body was confirmed in the 1876 Constitution. Davison 1963, pp. 93-4; Findley 1980, pp. 143, 169.
[70] Mardin 2000, p. 46.
[71] Mardin 2000, p. 47.
[72] Devereux 1963.
[73] Devereux 1963. Hanioğlu 2008, pp. 103-04.
[74] Devereux 1963, pp. 24-25.
[75] Pamuk 1999, p. 214.
[76] Sandjak is the administrative division of a province.

had to be agreed upon by the European powers, worked together to block the annexation. The British and Russians argued that allowing the annexation would set a precedent for the Sublime Porte to annex the rest of the mountain to the Syrian provinces.[77] Legally this was a problem as the Europeans and Ottomans had established the principle that no administrative change could be made in Mount Lebanon without the consensus of the European powers. Strategically, the annexation of the northern half of the Mountain to the Sandjak of Tripoli would have been a setback to the European interests.

During the period of receding French power, the Russians were also keen to make gains by expanding their imperial influence in the Ottoman Empire, but their growing influence was met with internal opposition, particularly from Midhat Pasha. Midhat Pasha, appointed as Grand Vizier on July 31, 1872, had been a member of the growing reform movement within the Sublime Porte and was praised by the Young Ottomans. He had previously served as Administrative Governor (*Sandjak-Bey*) for Nis, which was later joined to the Danube Province (*Vilayet*), where he then served a Provincial Governor (*Vali*), and prior to becoming Grand Vizier, Midhat Pasha had served as Governor to Baghdad. Unfortunately, Midhat Pasha's appointment as Grand Vizier ended a few months later on October 18, 1872. Although it is believed that his removal was in relation to ongoing conflict with the with palace officials over the financial management of the palace and the economic management of the territories of the Ottoman Empire, the Russians were also working against him. They attempted to have him removed from his position, because he had come into conflict with Russia over their influence in the Danubian Principalities and the Balkans; regions that Russia sought to make gains in.[78] The threat that Midhat Pasha posed to the European powers was evidenced, not only in his policies against external interference, but also his capability to make legitimate changes, transforming an ever-weakened Empire into one of strength.

Midhat Pasha's reputation with the European powers was prefaced by his conflict with the Russians over Russian interference with the Greek, Armenian, and Bulgarian populations, viewing Russian influence and interference as detrimental to the Ottoman Empire. However, the Russian Foreign Minister, Gorchakov, in talking to Rustem Pasha, the Ottoman Ambassador to St. Petersberg, claimed that the Russians wanted to keep the Ottoman Empire intact, and feared that the collapse of the Empire would lead to conflict over the territories with the Western European powers. Midhat Pasha, however, was unconvinced

[77] FO/226/172 December 19, 1871 (no. 71), Attempt to Annex Lebanon Territory and Tripoli.
[78] Davison 1986, p. 164; [Midhat Pasha, the new Grand Vizier over whom all the…] The Spectator; October 26, 1872; 45, 2313.

and viewed all interference as damaging to the interests and wellbeing of the Empire. In this manner, Midhat Pasha had put forward proposals for constitutional reform, and giving the likelihood of this proposal being rejected, argued that a federal model, similar to the newly formed German Empire (1871), should be developed. These proposals had staying power, and were subsequently suggested by the Ottoman Foreign Minister, Halil Sherif Pasha, following Midhat Pasha's dismissal from the position of Grand Vizier.[79]

Despite Midhat Pasha's efforts to resist European interference, the Sublime Porte was still subject to the debts owed to European lenders, amounting to more than 200million pounds sterling. This was exacerbated by overspending in the palace, and social unrest. Viewing the economic situation in the Ottoman Empire as untenable, lending by European financial markets to the Sublime Porte was terminated, forcing the Ottoman Empire to declare a moratorium on its payments. By October 1875, the Ottoman Empire was in a state of financial collapse that would continue until 1897.[80]

The consequences of the economic problems were having a greater impact on the provinces than on Istanbul. In Mount Lebanon, the population petitioned the Sublime Porte, asking the government to reduce the rate of taxation due to the deteriorating ecological conditions, the downturn in silk prices on the international markets, the decrease in property and land values, and the burden of debt that the population had become subject to.[81] Trying to soften the impact of the economic and agricultural problems, the Sultan, Abdul Aziz (June 25, 1861-May 30, 1876), issued a decree exempting the population from a 'quarter of the tithe formerly established' as well as payments of 'arrears of taxes accumulated up to the date of the year 1872'.[82] However, such policies were merely a superficial resolution to a wider and deeper set of problems.

The Young Ottomans, aware of the problems facing the Sublime Porte, worried about the increasingly dire economic situation and the potential for continued exploitation by the European powers, for these reasons, they were urgently pressing for significant change. Midhat Pasha, also encouraging change and as the Minister of Justice, was attempting to

[79] The proposal for federalism was supported by Britain and Austria, but opposed by Russia. Davison 1986, p. 165.
[80] 166PO/D18/3, Note sur la situation commerciale de la place de Constantinople émanant de M. Gibon, premier député de la nation française; Pamuk 1999, p. 214; Devereux 1963, p. 25; Blaisdell 1929; Pamuk 2009.
[81] Residents of Mount Lebanon had been encouraged to buy land, borrowing money from the wealthy class in Beirut. The rush to buy land inflated prices and when land prices decreased, the inhabitants of Mount Lebanon could not sell their land to pay back creditors and could not generate enough income from the land due to the poor economic situation of the Empire. FO/226/184 November 24, 1875 (no. 49), Note of Affairs in the Lebanon.
[82] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2407-2408 (no. 454)

convince other officials that the promulgation of a constitution built on the principle of citizenship, regardless of religious distinction, and universal personal law – giving each individual a legal identity – was the only way to reclaim independence from and defend against European encroachment. Despite his best efforts, Midhat Pasha's insistence for reform had little acknowledgment within the administration. He soon became frustrated with stagnation in the Sublime Porte and resigned from his post in early December 1875.[83]

Midhat Pasha's belief that an administrative reform based on the codification of supreme law, enshrining the principles of a modern and rational social order and governance, would be fundamental to the legitimate reclamation of sovereign rights and authority, was not without fault. While the argument that the Ottoman Empire required help in its administrative affairs because of its inability to govern in a modern and rational way had formed the foundation for perceived legitimate interference, at times under the scope of humanitarianism, such reasons for interference cannot be divorced from interests. Although, Midhat Pasha represented the change that the Europeans had pressured the Ottoman Empire into accepting in order to accede to the European state system, his ability to make these changes actually posed a threat to European interests.

In the days following Midhat Pasha's resignation, the Sublime Porte, on December 12, 1875, issued a new imperial decree (*firman*). It fell short of a constitution that promised individual rights and citizenship but the decree did outline institutional reforms that would provide better representation in government. The decree also outlined judicial and tax reforms, new laws regarding property titles, police forces, the abolition of forced labour and the promise of security to individuals employed in positions of physical labour that increase public resources, industry, and commerce, and equality with regards to state institutions, administration, land possession, and equal subjugation to legal procedure. The judicial reforms separated the judiciary bodies from the executive bodies, promising more independence within the legal system and the presidents and judges of the new judicial bodies were to be newly appointed with the hope that it would discourage prior convictions and practices that created mistrust. Going forward, and once the judiciary was separated from the executive, the subjects of the Empire would be allowed to elect judges – regardless of religion and ethnicity.[84] The reforms that were promulgated paralleled the standard institutional configuration of the modern European state. It was clear that while Midhat

[83] Devereux 1963, p. 31.
[84] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2409-2417 (no. 455)

Pasha's arguments for a constitution had been ignored, the Sublime Porte realised the necessity for modernisation without the international interference that plagued the Hatt-ı Şerif of 1839 and the Hatt-ı Hümayun of 1856.

Midhat Pasha desired the modernisation of the Ottoman Empire but without the European interference and through the creation of a distinct Ottoman national identity. His framework was founded on the ideas that were espoused by the Young Ottomans, and for the most part, paralleled the demands that had been made by the European powers on the Sublime Porte. The difference, however, was intent. Midhat Pasha's interests conflicted with those of the European powers, particularly France, Britain, and Russia. By modernising the Ottoman Empire, Midhat Pasha, and, by extension the, Young Ottomans, sought to end the justifications for continued European interference.

### 5.3 The Balkan Crisis (1875-1878): The Foundation to the Ottoman Constitution (1876)

The decree promulgated in December 1875 was issued in the midst of a political rebellion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and was put forward with the intent of pacifying and containing this rebellion by attempting to fulfil some of the demands being made by rebellious populations. According to the travel journal of Arthur Evans, the political awakening against a weak government and the sectarian divisions of the population living in the Balkans were at the core of the uprisings that began to take shape in Sarajevo in August and spread into the other Balkan territories, threatening the stability of Istanbul.[85] The decree was meant to re-establish control by affirming Ottoman authority and independence in the region. In doing so, the reforms came into conflict with the interests of the European powers, notably those of Russia, which was actively influencing the population in the Balkans. The decree also upset the interests of Germany and Austria-Hungary, both of which wished to expand their influence in the region.

Although the events in the Balkans between the Sublime Porte, Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary had little direct impact on the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, it altered the situation of the Ottoman Empire within the European state system, the form of governance within the Ottoman Empire, and increased resistance within the Sublime Porte to European interference. In this manner, the fallout from these events had a direct impact on future governance of the Ottoman Empire, which impacted the administration of the

[85] Evans 1877, pp. 535-536.

Syrian provinces, the Sublime Porte's future relationship with the populations in the Syrian provinces, and was a crucial precursor to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878.[86]

After a series of meetings between Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, the three European powers released the Andrassy Note in December, 1875. The Note demanded that the Sublime Porte consider the legitimate manifestation and demands of the insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[87] The measures outlined in the note drew the ire of the British who viewed the Andrassy Note as excessive and aggressive. Britain replied to the three powers by defending the Sublime Porte, stating that the changes regarding religious freedom had been properly executed and that they could no longer pressure the Sublime Porte any further.[88] It was clear that the geopolitical interests were motivating all four European powers, with Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary viewing the revolt as an opportunity to expand. The British, on the other hand, viewed the secession of territories as a great source of instability for the Empire and a threat to the balance between the European states.

Nevertheless, the Sublime Porte conceded to some of the demands made by Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary by promulgating a new set of reforms on February 11, 1876. These reforms consisted of a promise to ensure full and entire religious liberty, the abolition of tax farming, amelioration of the agricultural community, and the establishment of a local commission composed of equal numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims. In addition to the promulgation of these reforms, the Sultan wrote a reply to Count Andrassy explaining that the government was unable to provide reforms affecting financial redistribution due to the restraints on the financial accounts of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, the Sultan promised to provide a financial package to Bosnia and Herzegovina.[89] Although the Ottoman Empire was being defended by the British, it was likely that the Sublime Porte knew it could not risk the defeat if war were to break out, nor could it enter into a conflict, backed by the British, with economic and political conditions attached.

Aware of the demands that had been made on the Sublime Porte by the European powers and the concessions that were delivered in return, Midhat Pasha wrote the 'Manifesto of Muslim Patriots' published on March 9, 1876.[90] Soon after the release of the Manifesto, it gained the support of liberal thinkers as well as students of Islamic Law (the *Softas*), Muslim

[86] Commins 1990, p. 12.
[87] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2417-2429 (no. 456)
[88] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2429-2440 (no. 457)
[89] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2441-2443 (no. 458)
[90] It is unclear whether Midhat Pasha wrote the manifesto or had his assistant write the manifesto.

leaders, and the conservative 'Old Turks', such as the Minister of War, Husein Avni Pasha, who was responsible for strategising the successful removal of Sultan Abdul Aziz from the throne on May 30, 1876. The 'Manifesto of Muslim Patriots' led to increased resistance to European demands, which amplified opposition to European interference by the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire.[91]

Increased opposition had a knock-on effect that brought the Sublime Porte into conflict with the European powers. On May 7, 1876, the German and French consuls in Salonika (Thessaloniki) were killed following an incident that raised tensions between Christians and Muslims.[92] The incident in Salonika and the deaths of the European consuls were subsequently used by the Russians to release the Berlin Memorandum on May 13, 1876, which stated that Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia would 'guard against the recurrence of events similar to those which have taken place at Salonika' by despatching war ships to the regions of danger – Istanbul and Smyrna (Izmir). The memorandum further stated the necessity of the strategy, arguing that the Sublime Porte had been unable to implement previous reforms. The Berlin Memorandum outlined additional European doubt over the ability of the Ottoman Empire to enforce any future reforms that would seek to mitigate the recurrence of violence given that the populations in the Balkans were in revolt.[93]

The Berlin Memorandum reiterated much of the sentiment that was expressed in the Andrassy Note, and was a blatant attempt by the parties involved to make gains within the Ottoman Empire through the imposition of conditions on the Sublime Porte by justifying their threatening actions on humanitarian grounds. Despite this justification and the fact that the Berlin Memorandum targeted the Balkans and avoided interfering with British and French interests, the British cabinet rejected the document. On May 19, 1876, the British stated that they were unable to cooperate with the other European powers and rebuked the possibility of an armistice on behalf of the Ottoman Empire as it would hamper the independence and governance of the Sublime Porte. The British also argued that an armistice between the Sublime Porte and the rebels would be impossible to maintain given that the insurgents were being armed through external actors; a rebuke directed at Russia. Additionally, the demands to place a concentration of troops in certain regions of the Ottoman Empire 'would be delivering up the whole country to anarchy, particularly when the insurgents are to retain their arms'. In conclusion, the British argued that the request for

[91] Davison 1986, pp. 166-7; Devereux 1963, pp. 32-3; Stamboul, 2 June 1876.
[92] For full details on the Salonika Affair see Deringil 2012, pp. 98-102.
[93] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2460-2463 (no. 461)

consular supervision and a naval force to protect foreigners and Christian inhabitants would impede on the Sultan's powers and rights within his own territories. In the reply to Russia, the British also reminded them that a naval force in key positions off the shores of Ottoman territories was already maintained by Britain.[94] With the rejection of the memorandum by the British, the Sublime Porte was in a position to ignore it.[95]

The threats that were directed at the Sublime Porte also threatened the interests of Britain, in particular, the relationship with the Sublime Porte that provided continued economic, geographic, and political access. The threats made by the Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary over the Ottoman Balkan territories and populations upset the balance of the European state system, with the British coming to the defence of the Ottoman Empire, noting the dangerous level of interference that had already taken place in the Balkans, which had fuelled the rebellion. While the Sublime Porte had attempted to appease the population, and Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, by promulgating a new set of reforms, amenable to the demands by the European powers and the populations in the Balkans, resistance to continued European interference was growing, culminating in Midhat Pasha's manifesto and the deposing of Sultan Abdul Aziz.

The European powers, led by Russia, were playing by the same framework established by the French and British governments, by establishing a standard of civilisation and subsequently undermining efforts to successfully attain such a standard by pursuing national interests. However, it could be argued that the British viewed the possibility of secession of the Balkan regions and their subsequent submission under Russian influence as a threat to the stability of the Ottoman Empire as well as the European state system.[96] If such was the case, the British perception was not wrong. The secession of the Balkan territories through rebellion and under the influence of Russia significantly weakened the Ottoman Empire and created new opportunities of conflict over the remaining territories, particularly between France and Britain. The impact of a weakened and subordinated Ottoman Empire within the European state system created new strategic opportunities that threatened the stability within the European state system and affected the governance of the Sublime Porte within the Ottoman Empire.

### 5.3.1 Sultan Abdul Hamid II's Accession to the Throne

[94] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2464-2470 (no. 462)
[95] Devereux 1963, p. 27.
[96] Jelavich 2004, pp. 172-176; Jelavich and Jelavich 1986.

The state of affairs in the Ottoman Empire, including rebellion and revolution in the European provinces, the financial crisis, increasing European encroachment in domestic Ottoman affairs, and the emergence of the Young Ottomans as a strong political force helped foster political upheaval in the Cabinet to the extent that Sultan Abdul Aziz was dethroned on May 30, 1876. According to Mundji Bey, the Turkish consul-general in New York and a controversial figure,[97] the deposing of Sultan Abdul Aziz provoked 'great satisfaction' among the Ottoman nation and the Europeans. Mundji Bey continues that succeeding Abdul Aziz, Sultan Murad V, was seen as progressive, generous, and a liberal, 'but the opportunity was denied him of putting into effect his reform schemes'.[98] Murad V's accession to the throne was viewed optimistically – the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire praised his authority and the Christian populations viewed change as a new beginning.[99]

Despite the reported optimism, which had been shared by Midhat Pasha, Murad V sought to maintain the status quo, even though he had promised to promulgate a constitution. Explaining the new Sultan's reluctance to bring major change, Mundji Bey stated that Murad V had been committed to the promulgation of the constitution but had been denied the power to do so by opponents within the Sublime Porte. These opponents had propagated claims that the Sultan was mentally ill and insane, while promising the throne to Murad V's brother, Abdul Hamid II.[100] It was under these circumstances that Midhat Pasha, undeterred by Sultan Murad V's broken promise, released a draft constitution to the public.

The public reception of the draft constitution was mixed, with many officials and members of the public concerned over the articles regarding citizenship. The reference to citizenship created unease as it would make Christians and Muslims equal in all manners related to the state and state authority, a concept that had been a problem during the implementation of the earlier reforms.[101] Equality diminished the characteristic of the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic empire and citizenship reduced the Sultan's role by devolving power from the Sultanate to the government, further transforming the relationship between the social field and governance.

[97] Pantalone 2016.
[98] Bey 1908, p. 396.
[99] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2478-2481 (no. 465)
[100] Bey 1908, p. 396.
[101] Devereux 1963, pp. 33-39.

Sultan Murad V's reign came to an abrupt end a few months after his accession and on August 31, 1876, Abdul Hamid II succeeded him. Maintaining Ottoman tradition, Sultan Abdul Hamid II promulgated a new imperial edict, which confirmed the Grand Vizier, Mehmed Rushdi Pasha, and President of the Council of Ministers, as well as the Ministers and functionaries in their respective posts. The imperial edict further drew attention to the imperfect execution of laws and reforms, stating that an ever-expanding crisis in the Ottoman Empire, resulting in corruption, anarchy, administrative abuses, sectarian conflict, and class conflict had been the consequence.[102]

Shortly after Sultan Abdul Hamid II's accession to the throne and the promulgation of the imperial edict, violence erupted in Damascus on September 12, 1876. The French consul in Damascus, discussing the incident of violence, stated that the violence was 'ignited by the actions of children'. The eruption of violence between the Sunnis of the Madinat el-Chabem quarter and the Shi'a of the Kharab Quarter had many similarities to the Damascus Massacre of 1860. As the violence unfolded, it slowly turned into a riot that moved towards Madinat el-Chabem, which functioned as a gateway to the Christian and Jewish quarters of the city. The riot had maintained such force that those involved attacked police forces and it was only later in the evening that security forces could pacify the rioters.[103] Animosity between religious communities had become easily enflamed as the economic and political situation in the Ottoman Empire continued to deteriorate.

The recurrence of violence in Damascus in September, 1876 highlights the inability of the Sublime Porte to assert authority,[104] and the inability of reformers and liberal thinkers to establish a sustained based of support for their ideas within general Ottoman society. Many of the prominent liberal thinkers, who were the foundation of the reform movement, had developed and acquired ideas and worldviews from their close associations with the European powers by means of their roles within the Ottoman administration. Or, they had been exiled from the Ottoman Empire to European capitals, where they organised and manifested their political ideas. Nevertheless, their experience of the world was one of literacy, wealth, and knowledge of and, access to, political institutions. On the other hand, the general population was forced to contend with gross inequality, made worse by European interference and sectarian alliances and provisions.

---

[102] (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2478-2481 (no. 465)
[103] The consul writes that it took three infantry battalions to restore order and make arrests. 166PO/D20/10 September 18, 1876 (no. 71), sent to M. de Bourgoing, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople].
[104] Arendt 1969, p. 242.

### 5.3.2 Midhat Pasha, the Tersane Conference (1876), and the First Ottoman Constitution (1876)

Sultan Abdul Hamid II, being confronted with the Tersane Conference (the Constantinople Conference), a British attempt to defuse the Russian threat of unilateral intervention in the ongoing Balkan crisis, dismissed Mehmet Rushdi as Grand Vizier and appointed Midhat Pasha in his place.[105] The Sultan viewed Midhat Pasha as an individual who was logical, averse to impractical schemes, and believed that he could negotiate a settlement with the Europeans. Going into the Tersane Conference, Midhat Pasha had devised a plan that would help shift the balance of power in favour of the Ottoman delegation. Midhat Pasha's plan focused on the promulgation of a constitution which would be drafted on the foundation of the previously circulated draft constitution. However, Midhat Pasha's idea of presenting his ideal constitution at the conference never occurred. Instead, the official constitution that was presented at the Tersane Conference had dramatically changed, attenuating many of the important articles. Despite Midhat Pasha's objections to the changes, the constitution was released on December 23, 1876, the same day as the beginning of the Tersane Conference.[106]

The constitution referred to the Empire's rights to territorial sovereignty, placing Ottoman sovereignty in the hands of the Caliphate of Islam, 'the eldest of the princes of the dynasty of Osman' and all powers over state affairs are the privilege of the Sultan, who can delegate as he chooses to those he chooses.[107] The first set of articles, including the pre-amble, maintained the traditional powers and privileges of the Sultan, however, the following articles outlined a set of Western-liberal rights and freedoms that promised inviolable individual liberties. However, the explicit provision of equal citizenship was dropped in the final draft and replaced with the continued promise that all Ottoman subjects are subjects of the Empire, without religious distinction.[108] The constitution upheld the relationship between the Sultan and Islam, which sought to give the Ottoman Empire its character and legitimacy as an Islamic Empire. Despite the provisions of rights and liberties that the constitution decreed, it was still the right of the Sultan to repeal or uphold the rights and liberties proclaimed. The constitution that was promulgated and presented to the European powers

[105] The Tersane Conference was a British request to help defuse the Russian threat of unilateral interverntion in the ongoing Balkan Crisis. Findley 1980, p. 225; Midhat Grand Vizier, *Pall Mall Gazette*, London, Tuesday December 26, 1876, issue 3698.
[106] Midhat Pasha, Namik Kemal and Ziya Bey (later Pasha), as well as other high-ranking Ottoman administrators, generals, members of the religious establishment, and Sultan Abdul Hamid II, all had a hand in writing the constitution. However, they were not all in favour of the promulgation of the constitution. Stavrianos 1963; Findley 1980 p. 225.
[107] The Ottoman Constitution, pp. 367-368.
[108] The Ottoman Constitution, pp. 367-368.

defied the European logic and standard of rational and secular governance, which was further contradicted by the absence of establishing citizenship.

At the conference, the Ottoman delegation was unable to divert the attention of the European parties and Midhat Pasha's plan to argue that the constitution established a foundation and framework to ensure the appropriate reforms were being implemented, it also failed to diminish the desire of the European powers to further intervene.[109] Britain sought to defend and promote its liberal values and viewed the Ottoman position as unchanging. Although the constitution outlined the application of these values, they were not dependent on an absolute law, rather they were dependent on an absolute leader. The result was a leadership who had the ability to dismiss individual rights and liberties and therefore required further European involvement. The Ottoman delegation was incapable of gaining traction against European demands, which reflected those made through the Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum. Unsurprisingly, the Ottoman delegation found these demands to be unacceptable.[110]

The European proposals that were put forward at the conference regarding citizenship and equality, and European supervision of the administration of imperial reforms were ultimately rejected by the Ottoman General Council, despite pressure from Lord Salisbury on Midhat Pasha to accept the terms. Lord Salisbury argued that an official rejection of the proposals would ultimately result in war with Russia, to which the other European powers, including Britain, could not get involved in, warning that such a war would result in the loss of territory for the Ottoman Empire and the possibility of the destruction of the Empire in its entirety. Following this discussion, Midhat Pasha asked the General Council to vote again on the proposals of the Tersane Conference. Again, the proposals were almost unanimously rejected. With the decision of the council in hand, Midhat Pasha asked the European delegates to reconsider consenting to the constitutional reforms. Ultimately, due to the Ottoman rejection of the proposals,[111] the plenipotentiaries representing the European states were ordered to leave Istanbul with no agreement.[112] It was unlikely that the Russians would have accepted anything short of the demands that they had made, which were impracticable

[109] Davison 1986, pp. 168-169.
[110] Turkey and the Great Powers: The Constantinople Conference, *New York Times*, January 15, 1877; Davison 1986, pp. 168-169.
[111] Rejection of the proposals came with Sultan Abdul Hamid II's approval, despite having previously written a letter to Lord Salisbury stating that he would be willing to accept the proposals if they were lightened.
[112] Davison 1986, pp. 170-172.

for the Sublime Porte. By establishing a civilisational benchmark through their demands, the Russians were able to justify the use of force as a last resort.

Following the failures of the Tersane Conference, Midhat Pasha sent his long-time associate, Odian Efendi, to France and Britain on the false premise of discussing the possibility of a loan. Midhat Pasha avoided making the request himself in order to discourage suspicion from oppositional parties in the Sublime Porte. His plan was to send a delegate to France and Britain to explain that the European proposals that had been made at the conference were impossible for the Sublime Porte to accept, especially with regards to those of European supervision or 'guarantees'. In addition to explaining the position of the Ottoman Empire at the Tersane Conference, Odian Efendi was to ask for European support in the promulgation of the constitution and the development of a parliamentary system. Despite, British Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli's admiration of this proposal, France and Britain rejected the terms and insisted that reforms would have to be supervised.[113] The supervision of reforms would allow for continued European interference in the domestic affairs of the Sublime Porte, while the acceptance of the constitution by France and Britain would require them to respect the territorial sovereignty of the Sublime Porte, and thus function as a barrier to maintaining and fulfilling their interests.

The constitution, heavily criticised within the Empire and in Europe, was viewed as a new set of reforms that would not provide substantial change and a largely diplomatic tool rather than a sincere attempt to affect change.[114] In response to these criticisms, the French newspaper, *Débats*, published on February 1, 1877, an article reminding cynics that the Constitution was not 'suddenly devised' nor was it 'intended to cut the ground under the feet of the Conference, but a system over which the Grand Vizier [Midhat Pasha] had long pondered'. The article continued that with the constitution came the politics of revolution, a reanimation of the Empire and 'Midhat Pasha governs today the great 'Sick Man' risen from his bed'.[115] However, the European powers argued that this simply was not enough, that the Ottoman Empire had not yet joined the ranks of the 'civilised nations' and therefore could not be afforded the same rights and privileges.

### 5.3.3 The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the Loss of the Ottoman European Provinces

[113] Turkey and the Great Powers: The Constantinople Conference, *New York Times*, January 15, 1877; Davison 1986, pp. 168-169.
[114] The Affairs of Turkey, *The Leeds Mercury*, Saturday, February 10, 1877, Issue 12118.
[115] Letter from Paris, *The Pall Mall Gazette*, Thursday, February 1, 1877, Issue 3730.

The inability to procure a diplomatic agreement based on reform provisions at the Tersane Conference led to the fulfilment of Lord Salisbury's predictions. Russia was incentivised to act unilaterally to protect its interests in the Balkans. Despite protests from the Sublime Porte, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on April 24, 1877. Following the declaration of war, on April 30, 1877, Britain stated that it could not provide economic or military assistance to the Ottoman Empire. Instead, Britain proclaimed its neutrality under the condition that the conflict remained in the Balkans.[116] With regards to the latter, Edward Henry Stanley, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, wrote to Count Shuvalov, counsellor to Tsar Alexander II, that the interests of Great Britain must be protected: 'should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, interests may be imperilled which they are equally bound and determined to defend'. The interests that he refers to include the maintenance, neutrality, and freedom of passage regarding the Suez Canal, the Bosporus, the Dardanelles, and the Persian Gulf, and the freedom of the city of Istanbul.[117]

Although the war was focused in the Balkans, where the Ottoman Empire remained on the defensive and in retreat, the impact was more widespread.[118] In December, 1877, the French consul in Damascus reports that 'the Muslim populations were no longer supporting the campaign of 'fanaticism' and Holy War preached by the *Ulema*'. The consul describes a lack of enthusiasm, that the Muslim population has been broken and their indifference is a consequence of general misfortune in the country. Above all, the conflict with Russia fatigued Ottoman forces, diminished their courage, and pushed the population of Syria into a pacifist state. The tales of the war impacted the Syrian communities to the extent of agitation and terror, motivating many men, who were eligible for conscription, to move to the plains of the Hauran or deep into the mountains to avoid being forced to fight.[119] The Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) had left the Ottoman Empire in a weakened state and further alienated the Syrian population from the authority of the Sublime Porte.

Fearing a loss of authority, Sultan Abdul Hamid II concluded the first Ottoman constitutional period with an imperial decree, dated February 14, 1878. The termination of the constitutional period was the consequence of domestic and international events. Domestically, the members of the Chamber of Deputies, the Ottoman parliament, had

---

116 (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2586-2614 (no. 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498); Davison 1986, p. 170.
117. (c) Hertslet 1875, pp. 2615-1617 (no. 499).
118 In June 1877, Romania declares independence and on June 30 of the same year, the Ottoman Empire declares Holy War against Russia; asking the Muslim population to rise and protect the nation and country. Devereux 1963, p. 16; *Sir Edward Hetslet, 1875, The Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. **2**,* 2643-4 No. 505.
119 166PO/D20/10 December 28, 1877, (no. 3), sent to Comte de Mony, chargé d'affaires for France in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Ranneau, Damascus.

become extremely critical of the Sultan and his close advisers, and persisted in their requests to require some of the Sultan's advisers to stand trial. The Chamber was also critical of the Sultan's refusal to assent to certain bills and his suppression of the Grand Vizierate. The Sultan, however, was acting within the framework of the constitution using the prerogatives granted to the Sultanate and did not welcome the criticism.[120] The decree that suspended the constitution and dissolved parliament referred to 'the present exceptional circumstances' of the Russo-Turkish war, explicitly stating 'the form and direction which our general affairs have now taken are not suitable for Parliament to correctly to perform all of its duties'.[121] Fearing possible repercussions, many of the Young Ottomans went into exile following the termination of the constitution. The exiled Young Ottomans, however, persisted, even abroad, with some of these figures becoming important to the development and future of the Young Turk movement – and by extension, the Committee of Union and Progress.[122]

Given the circumstances of the war and the lack of material, legal, and economic support from France and Britain, who had continuously pressured the Sublime Porte to engage with Westernising reforms, Sultan Abdul Hamid II no longer believed it necessary to maintain or adopt a Western liberal order that criticised and threatened his authority. The conclusion of the constitutional period also coincided with the end of the Russo-Turkish war on March 3, 1878, with the signing of the San Stefano Peace Treaty, which stipulated Bulgarian, Montenegrin, Serbian, and Romanian independence. In addition, the treaty stipulated relinquishing Batoum to Russia.[123] Although some of these losses were mitigated by the British intervention through the Congress of Berlin (June 13 – July 13, 1878),[124] the loss of territory in the Balkans also marked the loss of much of the Ottoman Empire's non-Muslim population. In turn, the Sultan, going forward, demanded that his administration stress the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire, his title as Caliph, and the necessity of Islamic unity against a hostile Christian world. Given the change in discourse regarding the identity of the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdul Hamid II began to turn his focus to the Arab provinces and started promoting Arabs to important positions within the administration.[125]

---

120 Devereux 1963, pp. 237-239.
121 Devereux 1963, p. 236.
122 Such figures include Samipasazade Sezai, the future editor of *Sura-ui Ummet*, Ismail Kemal Bey, and Murad Bey. Devereux 1963 p. 15; Mardin 1962, p. 171.
123 Zürcher 2016, pp. 74-75.
124 The Ottoman Empire ceded control of Cyprus to Britain in exchange for British help in the negotiations with Russia. The Cyprus Convention can be found in Hill 1952, pp. 300-303. News of the agreement created a positive response from the Cypriot population, who reportedly are keen to welcome the British administration and dispose of weak and insufficient Ottoman authority, see FO/226/194 July 29, 1878 (no.4), sent to Marquis of Salisbury, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from M. Henderson, British Occupation of Cyprus; The Treaty of Berlin and the Convention of Constantinople, pp. 12-13; Zürcher 2016, p. 75.
125 Deringil 1991, p. 346.

While focus within the Ottoman Empire became fixated on the Arab provinces, particularly the Syrian provinces, the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) turned the region into a centre of explicit European conflict with the goal of controlling political and economic activity.[126]

## 5.4 Conclusion

Interference in the Ottoman Empire by the European powers had been focused on the modernisation of the Sublime Porte and protection of the Christian minority within the Empire's territories. European actions were justified by the application of a standard of civilisation, which, in the initial period promised accession to the European state system and recognition of the Sublime Porte's sovereignty. However, failures of the Sublime Porte to administer reforms in a manner that the European powers found suitable led to increased interference and pressure to reform and modernise. The consequence of which was dislocation between the customary groups and networks from institutions and structures of authority and increased economic and political disparities within the social field, which developed into sectarian animosity, and eventually led to violence, as was the case of the Damascus Massacre in 1860.

The Damascus Massacre of 1860 was the consequence of increased pressure on the Ottoman Empire to reform and modernise, and can be linked back to the larger reforms of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), specifically with regards to their impact on the social field in the Syrian provinces. In this context, the Damascus Massacre can be described as a form of resistance to the changing situation of the Muslim community in comparison to the Christian communities within the Ottoman Empire. However, the event did not register as resistance caused by the denigration and subordination of the Sublime Porte, the Muslim community, and the importance of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. It was viewed by the European powers as the natural and untamed state of the fanatical Muslim, which justified European intervention into Mount Lebanon in order to protect the Christian communities in the Syrian provinces.

The occupation of Mount Lebanon by a European military force led by France quickly turned into a form of colonial governance that altered governance and the administrative institutions within Mount Lebanon. The result of this occupation was colonisation and active engagement in the production of knowledges and practices that reflected those in France, including ideas of order, morality, and governance. However, it also privileged the Christian,

[126] Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 281-282, January 19, 1881.

specifically the Maronite community. Mount Lebanon was not the only manner in which the European powers had asserted authority over the Sublime Porte, the British continued to exert pressure on the Sublime Porte regarding its debts to the European powers that it had accrued following the Crimean War (1853-1856). The economic constraints on the Sublime Porte regarding the implementation of domestic economic policies led to Ottoman imperial expansion, replicating the knowledges and practices that the Ottoman Empire had been subjected to by the European powers.

During the period of increased social agitation and violence against the changing conditions within the Syrian provinces, caused by imperial reforms, a political resistance had emerged that was actively reproducing the knowledges of European socio-political civilisation. The Young Ottomans, which, along with the violent reactions, were also a result of social dislocation from authority, had formed to circumvent increased European interference in the matters of government, and to help the Sublime Porte navigate modernisation by merging principles of modern statehood with Islamic and Eastern tradition. Although the Young Ottomans did not completely transform the structures of governance, they had an influential role in strategizing responses to demands made by the European powers, particularly through Midhat Pasha. Crucially, they had attempted to produce liberal reforms, aligned with the demands that the European powers had previously made on the Sublime Porte, in order to discard European interference.

Midhat Pasha attempted to help the Sublime Porte navigate the threats and demands during the Balkan Crisis (1875-1878). However, his proposals for the promulgation of a liberal constitution fell short due to the devolution of power that threatened the role of the Sultanate and the sensibilities of the more conservative and traditional elements within the Ottoman Empire. Although a constitution was eventually promulgated, specifically to manage the threat of increased European interference stemming from the Tersane Conference (1876), it did not garner the support of the European powers, particularly Russia, which desired the realisation of national interests above Ottoman modernisation, resulting in the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). Britain and France, on the other hand, argued that the constitution did not succeed in providing all the required aspects of a civilised nation, and therefore refused to provide help to the Sublime Porte – and on the condition that Russia did not interfere in British and French interests in the Arab provinces. The loss of territory from the war resulted in increased focus from the Sublime Porte on the Arab provinces and heightened inter-European conflict over influence in the Syrian provinces.

## Chapter 6: Rejecting the Standard of Civilisation: Ottoman Centralisation, Arab Nationalism, and Transformations in European Strategy

### 6 Introduction

The rejection of the Ottoman Constitution by the European states at the Tersane conference (1876) led to the abandonment of the liberal modernisation programme by Sultan Abdul Hamid II. The European powers justified the rejection of the Ottoman Constitution at the Tersane Conference because it failed to accede to the benchmark of a liberal modern state, particularly with regards to the omitted provision of citizenship and the enduring executive status of the Sultan over the administrative and governmental affairs of the Empire. Without support from Britain and France regarding the constitution, Russia declared war (1877-1878). The culmination of these events provided Sultan Abdul Hamid II evidence that the promulgation of modernisation reforms would not provide equal status within the European state system and the consequences of attempting to accede to the standard of civilisation was being exploited by the European states. The reality of continued subordination in relation to the European states led to the abandonment of the liberal programme of governance and the reconfiguration of Ottoman governance.

This chapter examines the consequences of Sultan Abdul Hamid II's abandonment of the liberal modernisation project following the Russo-Turkish War and the losses sustained in the Balkan territories. Sultan Abdul Hamid II became increasingly concerned with the survival of the Empire, directing his efforts to ascertain stability within the Syrian provinces through centralised governance and the promotion of an Islamic identity in an attempt to maintain legitimacy. The result was the Sultan's rejection of liberal principles that had failed to cultivate the Ottoman Empire's accession to the European state system as a recognised sovereign member, but the maintenance of the state's bureaucratic institutions, which provided him with the ability to assert his authority over the population and territories of the Empire. Although, the European standard of civilisation, which had been applied to navigate the philosophical and practical problems of the pursuit of European interests in the Syrian provinces, was obstructed, Sultan Abdul Hamid II's authority was challenged by populations within the Empire, as they came to reproduce some of the liberal ideas of governance prevalent in Europe.

The reconfiguration of governance in the Ottoman Empire, through the rejection of the liberal modernisation project and the centralisation of authority under the Sultan led to the

development of secessionist and nationalist sentiments within the Syrian provinces. This chapter highlights the changing dynamics within the Syrian provinces, the Sultan's attempts to maintain control and stability, as well as the attempts by the British and the French to continue in the pursuit of economic and geopolitical interests, and the emerging Arab nationalist sentiments, highlighting the advent of nationalist discourse and the altered the relationship between identity, territory, and governance.

This chapter begins by examining the political and economic environment of the Syrian provinces following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), highlighting the French attempts to continue to influence the Syrian province, the Sublime Porte's attempts to gain legitimacy with the populations in the Syrian provinces, and the emergence of an Arab nationalist movement. It follows by analysing the development of the secessionist and nationalist movements, and the declining status of the Sultan which required the delineation of the legitimate pursuit of French and British interests. This chapter then examines the foundations to which the French administration in the Syrian provinces sought to pursue their interests going forward.

## 6.1 The Impact of Centralised Governance on the Syrian Provinces after the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878)

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) and the loss of the European provinces, the Sublime Porte became increasingly focused on the Arab provinces. Focus on the Arab provinces was framed by a suspicion of potential dissent and concern over further territorial losses. Viewing the application of liberal reforms as the reason for sustained losses, Sultan Abdul Hamid II began to apply a controlled and centralised form of governance. He maintained the modern institutions of the state, which replicated the modern state in Europe, but abandoned the liberal programme of a constitution and parliamentary representation.[1] Discussing the reforms and the application of authority, the French consul in Damascus was sceptical of the means of governance that had been implemented, commenting on the dislocation between local practices and customs from the modern institutions of the state, and noting the emergence of a despotic form of governance.[2] However, Sultan Abdul Hamid II's reign, although centralised, was concerned with imperial survival and maintaining legitimacy without devolving power, and while force

[1] Ahmad 1968, pp. 20-21
[2] Ismail 1976, vol. 17, pp. 357-362, January 12, 1907.

was used to pacify rebellious populations, he had also made concessions.[3] It is, therefore, debatable whether Sultan Abdul Hamid's reign was truly despotic.[4]

Due to the losses sustained in the Balkans following the Russo-Turkish War, renewed focus on the Arab provinces was applied, attempting to amass support through the emphasis on an Islamic identity and the appointment of provincial Governors that would serve the interests of the Empire rather than the interests of the provinces; resulting in a widening cleavage between the Syrian population and the authority of the Sublime Porte. The renewed emphasis on the Syrian provinces and the importance placed on imperial survival led to the appointment of Cevdet (Djevdet) Pasha as Governor of the Damascus Province, in March 1878. The appointment was heralded by the French consul in Damascus as a constructive development, stating that Cevdet Pasha's 'previous experience as Governor of the Aleppo province had a positive impact, he is an intelligent man, active, and hardworking'.[5] However, the optimistic sentiment was misdirected and in late June an article in the newspaper *Stamboul* detailed the high levels of suffering caused by increased taxation in the Syrian provinces, made worse with the arrival of Cevdet Pasha who imprisoned anyone who complained about his leadership or the activities of his friend 'Arab' Izzet Pasha. The accusations of administrative corruption limited the Sultan's ability to rebuild a base of support among the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire,[6] despite the renewed emphasis on an Islamic identity.

Commenting on the situation within the Syrian provinces, the French consul attempted to distance himself from his previous praise of Cevdet Pasha, and noted that only after the appointment of the new administration was there vocal criticism of the appointed governor. The French consul explained his surprise at the reaction towards Cevdet Pasha, stating that the residents of Damascus had been 'known to become enchanted by their governors' and had previously kept complaints they may have had to themselves.[7] The French consul continued, writing of his anxiety over the growing sense of misery and discontent in Damascus, criticising the 'despotic regime' as the source of the problem.[8]

---

[3] For example, with the Druze in the Hauran who were rebelling, in 1883 and from 1890-1897, against the Sublime Porte with the aim to achieve autonomy, see 166PO/E/269 March 5, 1896 (no. 17), sent to M. de la Boulinière, chargé d'affaires for France in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Guillois; Salih 1977.
[4] Deringil 1991.
[5] 166PO/D20/10 March 9, 1878 (no. 8), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Rousseau, Damascus.
[6] 166PO/D20/10 Extract from the newspaper, Stamboul, June 26, 1878.
[7] 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Rousseau, Damascus.
[8] 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16).

While the application of authority, which had been centralised by the Sublime Porte following the termination of the first constitutional period (1876-1878), enhanced feelings of discontent in the Syrian provinces, such feelings were linked to the depressed economic environment and the unfavourable social and political conditions, which had previously helped enflame the Damascus Massacre of 1860. The sense of administrative corruption and the deteriorated economic environment in the Syrian provinces had a disastrous impact on the populations' perceptions of the Sublime Porte. Although such feelings were evident throughout the modernisation period, it had, for the most part, gotten worse over time, forcing the political classes to establish strategies in order to justify emancipation.

The French consul, for example, wrote to the French Ambassador in Istanbul, M. Tissot, of an increasingly distressing situation on the Eastern border of the province of Aleppo. The consul stated that a rebellion had been provoked by the administration of the Provincial Governor Izzet Pasha of Diyaberkir. The rebellion, beginning on June 15, 1880, was instigated by members of Izzet Pasha's administration who had started to hoard grains, depriving the population in the province of Aleppo access to vital food supplies.[9] The French consul noted that the situation in Aleppo was desperate, recounting the famine that occurred during the previous winter (1879), and worried of a possible rebellious contagion that could spread over the eastern border of the province. The consul stated that the situation in Aleppo remained dire due to the weak leadership of the Governor and the diversion of the *Koik* River (*Queiq* River or River of Aleppo) by three villages in the Sandjak of Aintab (Gaziantep), and while a plan had been put in place to build a canal from the Euphrates to the *Koik*, it was acknowledged that until the plan came to fruition, there would be a shortage of produce. The French consul continued by describing the potential increase of prices on essential goods and a lack of potable water, which raised the risk of an epidemic.[10]

The problems faced by the Sublime Porte following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) were not restricted to Damascus and Aleppo. In the desert region, where Ottoman Troops had established control in 1864, giving way to the emergence of the city of Deir,[11] the French consul remarked that the once prosperous region was 'no more', and since the Russo-Turkish War, the Sublime Porte lost control, and the population became rebellious. The French

[9] 166PO/D1/72 June 19, 1880 (no. 81), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Destrée, Aleppo.
[10] 166PO/D1/72 July 3, 1880 (no. 85), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Destrée, Aleppo.
[11] Discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.1.3.

consul stated that 'the tribes have returned to their instincts of independence'; and although the Sublime Porte had strategized to send a small army to re-establish control, the consul warned that the army would be outnumbered and overpowered, warning that any provocation could lead to rebellion.[12] Although the Sultan had centralised power, taking many of the decision-making abilities away from the government, his control over the activities of administrators was poor.

The general feeling of discontent in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire was the consequence of the political and economic environment, which were amplified following the Sultan's centralisation of power. In these circumstances, the populations of the Syrian provinces became even more dislocated from the institutions and structures of authority than they had previously. In addition, the rejection of the liberal modernisation project by the Sublime Porte and of European interference, placed the Sultan in opposition to the liberal programme advocated by the European powers, which had been disseminated among some of the political classes in the Syrian provinces.

### 6.1.1 The Emergence of Secessionist and Nationalist Sentiment: Early Arab Nationalism in the Syrian Provinces

The source of discontent in the Syrian provinces can be tied back to the poor economy, centralised governance, a general lack of accountability for governors, and a history of European interference and modernisation that increasingly dislocated the social field from governance and authority. The accumulation of factors, rather than any single cause was the probable reason of dissatisfaction in the Syrian provinces. However, dissatisfaction had become so great that it developed into public denouncements of the Sublime Porte and the propagation of Arab, and other, nationalist sentiment. Reflecting on these developments, posters were placed throughout the city of Damascus, which disparaged the conduct of the authorities and called for the emancipation of the Syrian people from their enslavement by a foreign administration.[13] Although it was not explicitly stated on many of the posters, it was alluded to that the foreign administration to which the Syrian populations were enslaved was that of the Sublime Porte.[14]

Other posters that had been placed throughout the city, however, were more explicit, stating that the Ottoman administration had transgressed in their role by leading the Syrian

[12] 166PO/D1/72 October 26, 1880 (no. 98), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Destrée, Aleppo.
[13] 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16), Sommer 2015, p.281.
[14] Other posters denouncing the Sublime Porte as a foreign power appeared throughout 1880 in Beirut, Damascus, and other Syrian towns. Shamir 1974, p. 116.

population to 'abandon the religion of Mohammed for that of France and the disbelievers'.[15] The posters on the walls of the city emphasised growing Syrian anger and disassociation with the politics of the Sublime Porte. In addition to viewing the Sublime Porte as an oppressive and foreign authority, there was recognition that France was also responsible for the conditions that had produced dissatisfaction with the Sublime Porte.[16] The ideological premise accentuated through these posters was one of Islam, to which the responsible parties had accused the Ottoman Empire of abandoning, noting France's role in leading the Sublime Porte astray. In this context, secessionist sentiment was emerging in the Syrian provinces.

In an attempt to quell dissent in the Syrian provinces, particularly in the aftermath of the publications highlighting anger directed at the Ottoman Empire, Cevdet Pasha was removed from his post as Governor on November 22, 1878 and replaced by Midhat Pasha,[17] who remained in the post until 1881, and inherited a situation of general social disorder. Specifically, Midhat Pasha had to immediately contend with a revolt in the Hauran, where the Druze had come into conflict with the Muslims,[18] and in Hounin, near Sour, where the Christians and Shi'a had come into conflict, resulting in the deaths of two Christians at the hands of the Shi'a.[19] In addition to the developing disorder in the Syrian provinces, there were rumours of European strategies to occupy the Syrian provinces if the general social and political environment continued to deteriorate,[20] increasing pressure on Midhat Pasha to find and develop solutions.

Trying to limit and contain the growing environment of instability, as well as restrict European justifications for a potential occupation of the Syrian provinces, Midhat Pasha undertook a conciliatory approach and began to meet with various communal leaders, influential notables, and members of the intelligentsia. In one instance, Midhat Pasha, despite his restricted political powers, began secret negotiations with the Druze in the Hauran, asking for 20,000 men, and in return, Midhat Pasha promised a percentage of the profits from a proposed tax on meat. The tax, was anticipated to generate half a million francs per year

[15] It is unclear who is responsible for the posters, however, it would have to be a well-educated individual or group of individuals, given that literacy rates in the Ottoman Empire among Muslim men in 1912 was only about 25%: Sommer 2015, p.281; 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16).
[16] 166PO/D20/10 July 30, 1878 (no. 16).
[17] 166PO/D20/10 October 26, 1879, sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus.
[18] The conflict is ongoing, though it seems to cease once the British Ambassador, Henry Layard, makes official visits in the areas, once he departs the attacks recommence. 166PO/D20/10 October 26, 1879.
[19] 92PO/A/120 January 6, 1879, sent to M. Peritié, French Consulate General in Syria, in Beirut, from Dierighelly, Saida.
[20] Salih 1977, pp. 252-253.

from Damascus alone.[21] In the context of Syrian discontent, Midhat Pasha was attempting to pacify the populations within the delineated and restrictive legal framework that was established by the Sultan.

However, Midhat Pasha's efforts were questioned by the French administration in Damascus. By attending to the leadership of the rebellious populations, the French consul, M. Rousseau, believed that Midhat Pasha had embraced the ideas of the rebellious leadership, which had been responsible for the emergence of these nationalist sentiments. Following an investigation, the French consul, concluded that many of the discussions had been focused on the Syrian provinces becoming autonomous from European interference and independent from the Ottoman Empire. Although Midhat Pasha had previously objected to European interference, the conclusion of Rousseau's investigation was misconstrued by ascertaining that Midhat Pasha's entertainment of these discussions reflected his intentions to establish a small independent Syrian state with the goal of becoming Prince or King of Syria.[22]

The conviction that Midhat Pasha was planning to establish an independent Syrian state threatened the pursuit of French interests in the Syrian provinces and motivated the French consul in Damascus to verbally attack Midhat Pasha, stating that he had become fanatical, abandoning his ideals of liberty, equality, and citizenship.[23] The French consul noted that there had been a shift in Midhat Pasha's rhetoric, that 'Midhat Pasha had vehemently criticised the effects of Christian empowerment', and argued 'that the Ottoman Empire would have been better off to keep the Christians ignorant, using the Christians as tools to fulfil strategies against the European powers'.[24]

The French consul, in his assessment of Midhat Pasha's ideological shift away from the promotion of liberty, equality, and citizenship, argued that Midhat Pasha had become illegitimate and illiberal, that it conflicted with the civilisational standard of the European state system. In this attack against Midhat Pasha, it was apparent that the configuration and application of modernity as a civilisational benchmark was tied to a Christian-European history and worldview, specifically with regards to the French consul's use of 'Christian empowerment' rather than equality. The influence of knowledges and practices from

[21] 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879, sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Rousseau, Damascus.
[22] 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879.
[23] 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879.
[24] 166PO/D20/10 April 23, 1879.

Christian-European history in the application of modernity to the Ottoman Empire and the Syrian provinces was not lost on Midhat Pasha, especially given the socio-political context in which he was appointed as governor. Midhat Pasha was contending with a deprived, angry, and often overlooked area of society, which had made public declarations of the Sublime Porte's turn away from Islam and submission to the European powers,[25] a sentiment that was exacerbated by relational changes within the social field.

The belief that Midhat Pasha was propagating ideas of a separate Syrian state disregarded the important detail that, above all, Midhat Pasha was an Ottoman patriot. Due to his personal political convictions, it was more likely that Midhat Pasha sought to incorporate an already developing Arab national sentiment into the structures of the Ottoman Empire.[26] It was therefore doubtful that Midhat Pasha was responsible for the posters condemning the Sublime Porte, or that he even supported the narrative that had been used. The accusations by the French consul that Midhat Pasha's use of the sentiments expressed in the posters was evidence of his desire to become a Prince or King of Syria was also unfounded. Although Midhat Pasha was attempting to persuade Sultan Abdul Hamid II to undertake a plan of decentralised governance, it was done in order to help reconcile the growing nationalist sentiment with Sultan Abdul Hamid II's desire for stability and security within the Ottoman Empire.[27]

Contrasting with the Sultan's strategy to achieve stability and security by centralising authority and promoting an Islamic identity, the sentiment within the Syrian provinces regarding the changes in governance, particularly with regards to the termination of the constitution and the previous abandonment of Islam during the modernisation periods,[28] led to the development of a secret society, formed by influential and notable individuals, which had been propagating ideas of Syrian autonomy and independence under the name the Secret Society of Beirut or the Arab National Movement.[29] Commenting on this nationalist group, the French consul, Gilbert, was surprised, not only by the establishment and organisation of the secret society, but that it had been founded by Christians and quickly spread beyond the

[25] Midhat Pasha was also contending with a population that had been impacted by the economic downturn, a labour shortage caused by conscription and emigration, and violent attacks by Bedouin and Arab Tribes. 166PO/D20/10 July 16, 1879 (no. 15), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus.
[26] Saliba, 1978, pp .320-322; Shamir 1974, pp. 117-118, 122-5.
[27] Shamir 1974, p. 126
[28] Although there is a lot of scholarship on the use of Islam by Sultan Abdul Hamid II as a means to gain support, it is also noted that the provincializing of Syria led to a distinct Arab-Syrian identity, see Keddie 1966; Abu-Manneh 1979, pp. 143-146.
[29] Initially formed in 1875 at the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut. Antonius 1939, p. 79; also see Tauber 1993, p. 19.

borders of Damascus and Beirut, with Bedouins and individuals from other Syrian cities proudly declaring their membership.[30]

The progression of the Arab nationalist movement was also a concern for Sir Henry Layard, the British Ambassador to Istanbul. After being made aware of these developments within the Syrian provinces, Layard met with Midhat Pasha, who revealed that the society had been propagating ideas of establishing an Arab Kingdom, inclusive of the provinces of Damascus, Aleppo, and Baghdad. The Arab Kingdom would be ruled by an Arab Sultan, potentially Abd-el-Kader, and maintain relations with the Ottoman Empire in a similar fashion to the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and Egypt.[31]

Attempting to attenuate the demands of an Arab Kingdom, Midhat Pasha petitioned the Sultan, asking for decentralised governance in the Syrian provinces. However, his requests were ignored in favour of continuing the Sultan's project of deploying Islam as a means to gain legitimate support from the population in the Syrian provinces. The Sultan's strategy was not functioning as planned, and in October, 1880, the French warned that there was growing discussion in Arabic language newspapers published outside of the Ottoman Empire that stressed the illegitimacy of the descendants of Osman, who, according to the authors, had no right to the Caliphate. The French consul stated that 'the day that the mass populations no longer buy into this [the Caliphate], the higher the chance of insurrection that could trail from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean'.[32] In order to preserve the ability to pursue French interests and avoid large-scale insurrection across the region, the French administration warned the Sultan of impending disorder.

In addition to ignoring Midhat Pasha's warnings, Sultan Abdul Hamid II ignored the warnings from the French administration, rejecting further European interference in the activities of the Sublime Porte, and refusing to provide autonomy to the Syrian provinces. The Sultan's refusal to govern in a decentralised manner, provided a stronger base for anti-Ottoman rhetoric in the Syrian provinces, which became increasingly acrimonious and divisive. On December 31, 1880, the French consul reported of a notice on the walls in the city of Tripoli:

[30] 166PO/D20/10 August 15, 1879 (no. 19), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus.
[31] 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19), Direction Politique, Beirut.
[32] 166PO/D1/72 October 26, 1880 (no. 98).

> Compatriots, you know the insolence of the Turks, their tyranny, and unsociable character; you know that you are dominated by elite men of this race, you are liable to their oppressive yoke and must walk the line for your existence and your property. They have confiscated your rights, destroyed your honour and the respect owed to your beliefs (holy books). They have created regulations that condemn your noble language to oblivion and they employ all the means to disunite and weaken your forces. They take the fruits of your labour […] and they have taken all avenues of progress, they insult you, you serve them, and they treat you like slaves, like you are not men. But in your defence, remember that you have been the masters, that you have produced illustrious men in all the branches of knowledge and human activity, that you have brought back the schools, populated the country, have made vast conquests, and it is on the base of your language that the Caliphate was established and that the Turks have since taken.[33]

The language used in the posted notice directed dissatisfaction towards the Turks, as opposed to the Sublime Porte, highlighting a division of peoples that established the foundation of an ethno-nationalist programme in Syria and in Turkey. This division was also based on the assumption that a racial impulse, or the *natural* state of the Turks, was a predisposition to rule through tyranny, to dominate, and to take historic and cultural symbols, in order to rule with legitimacy. What was occurring in the deployment of these accusations was the nascent production of ethno-nationalism, the use of history and culture in an effort to forge a popular and common identity for political means.[34]

As a means to separate themselves from the Turks, the populations in the Syrian provinces were using the cultural characteristics prevalent in the Syrian provinces to ask for independence 'in common with our Lebanese brothers', the use of Arabic as an official language, freedom of thought and the press, and 'employment of our soldiers in the sole service of the [Arab] nation'.[35] The development of nationalist sentiment was employing

[33] Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 275-6, January 15, 1881.
[34] For a discussion on the various theories of nationalism as a phenomenon of modernity, see: Özkırımlı 2010, pp. 72-137.
[35] Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 275-6, January 15, 1881.

liberal and modern European ideas and concepts and redeveloping the populations' socio-political relations between identity, territory, and governance. In other words, the Arab identity had become distinct from the Turkish identity and governance, and was deployed within and bounded to an ethno-linguistic region.

Threatened by the emergence and intensification of this sentiment, the Sublime Porte dismissed several Muslim Arab functionaries from the Syrian administration. Many of these functionaries were suspected by the Sublime Porte of conversing with Midhat Pasha on the independence and autonomy of Syria. However, according to the French consul, what plagued the Sublime Porte was not the threat of an Arab rebellion but the inability to administer the Ottoman provinces, the disorder in the judiciary, and the superiority of the Arabs in grasping European ideas of liberty.[36] The idea of a separate Arab state was justified by deploying ethno-cultural categories, forming an ethno-nationalism that had its foundation in modern liberal European political ideas. The deployment of modern liberal European political ideas by the Arab nationalists and the rejection of European interference by the Sublime Porte changed the patterns of relations between the French and the British in the Syrian provinces with regards to the pursuit of interests. The inability of the Turks to grasp ideas of modernity, in comparison to the ability of the Arabs, coupled with the Sultan's rejection of European interference, confirmed, for the French administration, the incapability of the Ottoman Empire to become a civilised nation.

### 6.1.2 The Declining Status of the Sultan in the Syrian Provinces: (re)Negotiating French and British Influence and Strategies

The rejection of European interference by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the emergence of Arab nationalist sentiment in the Syrian provinces disrupted the French and British application of a standard of civilisation. In the immediate emergence of Arab nationalist sentiment, both the French and the British attempted to contain the sentiment by warning the Sultan and advocating for decentralised governance. However, the attempts made by the British and French administrations, as well as Midhat Pasha, to convince the Sultan to administer a decentralised form of governance with regards to the Syrian provinces, were denied. Support was subsequently offered to Midhat Pasha by the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Henry Layard. Using his diplomatic abilities, Layard offered to help Midhat Pasha reconcile relations with the Sultan, which had been damaged following the failure of the Young Ottoman strategy to promulgate a constitution. Layard believed that if Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Midhat Pasha could reconcile their differences, it would be possible to

[36] Ismail 1976, vol. 15, pp. 126-128, December 6, 1884.

find a solution to the problem posed by the emerging Arab nationalist sentiment in the Syrian provinces.[37]

Following the obtainment of Midhat Pasha's permission, the British put pressure on Sultan Abdul Hamid II and Mahmoud Nadim Pasha, the Minister of Interior,[38] stating that the Empire was in danger if the Sublime Porte did not act on implementing the promised reforms. Worried that the British advice would be ignored, Britain subsequently threatened to send a fleet into Turkish waters if reforms regarding 'the protection of Christians and other subjects' outlined in the Treaty of Berlin (1878) and the Cyprus Convention (1878) were not upheld.[39] However, the threats failed to amount to any significant change and unable to reconcile relations between Midhat Pasha and the Sultan or deliver institutional decentralisation, the British and French sought to actively fill a void that emerged following the Russo-Turkish War, which 'destroyed the prestige of the Sultan'.[40] As the populations of the Syrian provinces were becoming enthralled by ideas of autonomy and independence, and managing the worsening material and political conditions of the Syrian provinces, the European powers, primarily France and Britain, were coming into conflict over influence.

British and French strategy initially sought to limit the damage of nationalist and secessionist sentiment within the Syrian provinces,[41] however, British relations with functionaries in the Sublime Porte and Midhat Pasha threatened the interests of the French administration in the Syrian provinces.[42] The French administration believed that the British had been making gains in areas that had traditionally been dominated by French influence, including in Mount Lebanon, where Said Bey Talhouk, a Druze notable from the dynastic Talhouk family, had been favoured by the Sublime Porte and appointed Governor in Djebel Druze. Under these circumstances, the French believed that the British had deepened their relations with the Druze community,[43] which threatened French influence in Mount Lebanon and with the Sublime Porte. Although the appointment of Said Bey Talhouk to Governor of Djebel Druze had little impact on the governance of Mount Lebanon, French unease over the British

[37] 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19).
[38] Mahmoud Nadim Pasha was widely perceived as a Russian agent and was thought to be under the influence of Nicholas Pavlovich Ignatiev, the Russian Ambassador, who was in favour of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).
[39] FO/78/2968 October 26, 1879 (no. 711), November 6, 1879 (no. 727), November 14, 1879 (no. 737), telegraphs from Sir. H. Layard; Munro 1918; Annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain, 1915.
[40] 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Destrée, Aleppo.
[41] 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19).
[42] 166PO/D20/10 November 25, 1879 (no. 30), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus.
[43] It is noted that Sir Henry Layards' visit to Beit-Eddin, was accompanied by a group of Druze who were 'singing [the British] national anthem'. 92PO/A/120 October 9, 1879 (no. 19); Moreh 1976, pp. 35-40; Akarli 1993, p. 43.

relationship with Midhat Pasha and the Druze was magnified due to the state of the French relationship with the Maronite community at the time. The Maronite community was dissatisfied with the French, who, according to the Maronite leadership, failed to act on their grievances against Rustem Pasha, the Mutassarif in Mount Lebanon, who had been appointed from 1873 until 1883.[44] However, the British had been strict in the delineation of their relationship with the Druze, and the British had refused to protect them as the French had protected the Maronite community.[45]

Although the French were worried about the influence of other European powers, namely Italy and Austria, they viewed Britain as the largest threat to their interests in the Ottoman Empire.[46] Demarcating British influence, the French consul in Aleppo noted that the Turks had been excellent clients of the British, but with the weakened Sultanate, 'the heterogeneous elements that make up the Ottoman Empire' would become disaggregated, providing opportunities for the French.[47] The French consul, de Torcy, describing European interests in the Syrian provinces, argued that France had maintained influence primarily in the region from the Mediterranean to the Euphrates and southwards to Arabia, particularly with the Catholic communities, and he believed that the latter would continue to support the French presence, particularly in Mount Lebanon. However, he feared that French influence in the Mountain would be challenged by Druze, specifically the communities in the Chouf and Djezine, which remained loyal to the British.[48]

The British, on the other hand, had developed considerable influence throughout Mesopotamia and Arabia. In addition to British influence with the Druze population, the British were also viewed as the protector of Asia Minor, maintaining considerable influence in Egypt, and possessing Cyprus – a strategic base for operations given British naval power. Their influence in Asia Minor, according to de Torcy, had been established due to development projects such as the construction of tramways in Baghdad and a train line linking Syria to the Persian Gulf. Additionally, there had been increased activity by British

[44] As mentioned in Chapter 5, the French had been required to step-back their influence in the Syrian provinces due to the damages caused by the Franco-Prussian War (1870). Rustem Pasha was a secularist who provided equal access to authority and the economy, regardless of religion, upsetting Maronite dominance in Mount Lebanon. 166PO/D20/10 November 25, 1879 (no. 30); FO/226/206 May 18, 1882 (no. 26), sent to the British Embassy in Istanbul [Constantinople], Reporting on intrigues in the Lebanon in connection with the reappointment of Rustem Pasha; Akarli 1993, p. 43.

[45] The British strategy in forming alliances with customary groups and networks had been consistent in their difference from the French relationship, as is discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3. 166PO/D20/10 November 20, 1879 (no. 29), sent to M. Fournier, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Gilbert, Damascus.

[46] Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 281-284, January 19, 1881.

[47] 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106).

[48] 'Maronites, who are the largest number of Christians are in the hands of the French, such as the Montenegrins are in the hands of Russia' 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106).

and American missionaries who, the French believed, were trying to circumvent French religious influence.[49]

In addition to increased British influence and a strategic positioning in Cyprus, de Torcy stated that the British had agents in Aleppo, Beirut, and Damascus who used 'intrigues, warmth, intimidation, and all other possible tactics' to increase British influence. It was believed that these agents had spread a rumour that France was the enemy and only desired to protect communities under the Holy See. The French consul claimed that the rumour was used by the British to increase influence among the non-Catholic communities, particularly the Druze and Muslim populations, knowing that the French maintained a strong base of support with the Christian, and specifically the Catholic communities.[50] The French noted that the in maintaining a close alliance with the Catholic communities, the French had employed 'a loyal form of politics' emphasising equality, which 'has won the sympathies of the Syrian people', noting that this method made 'French influence […] incontestably preponderant'.[51]

The fear that the British could supersede French influence, through interventions made by individuals in the administration, had the potential to damage the pursuit of French interests in the Syrian provinces. One proposal to combat this threat included French language instruction and the dissemination of French ideas – including that of secularism – in French schools in Syria.[52] Shortly after this proposal was put forward by the Marquis de Noailles, the Ambassador of France in Istanbul, M. Sienkiewicz, the French consul in Beirut wrote to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, that all foreign run schools have become extremely political, with the schools representing the views of an external influence.[53]

As external influence grew through the establishment of French schools, they eventually became the target by the Sublime Porte, who perceived them as detrimental to the establishment of an Ottoman and Muslim identity.[54] In addition to viewing the foreign run schools as a threat, the Sublime Porte was attempting to reduce the prestige and importance of foreign consular offices within the Empire, as the system of consular protection had

[49] 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106).
[50] 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106).
[51] 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106).
[52] Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 281-284, January 19, 1881.
[53] Ismail 1976, vol. 14, pp. 298-320, March 10, 1881.
[54] FO/226/208 March 21, 1887 (no. 14), sent to Sir William White, from John Dickson, Damascus.

become corrupted by European representatives.[55] This provided an advantage to the French administration, who had consistently strategised the use of sectarian and communal factionalism in order to maintain their interests. In contrast to French strategies, the British were interested in maintaining influence through diplomatic means. With the emergence of modern and liberal nationalist sentiment, the French were able to navigate the Sultan's centralisation without abandoning the application of a standard of civilisation. The French administration therefore shifted their position in order to provide support to a widespread movement that they believed was temporary, unable to last beyond its purpose of contesting the Sublime Porte.

### 6.1.3 The Syrian Provinces and France: Interests, Worldviews, and Strategy

It had become increasingly apparent to the French administration in the Syrian provinces that there was a lack of cohesion between the social field in the Syrian provinces and the Sublime Porte, primarily due to the way that the administrations and institutions were structured under the authority of the Sublime Porte. According to the French consul, decentralisation between the Sublime Porte and the provinces had become the only sustainable option.[56] The French consul's argument for a decentralised administrative structure, contradicting previous demands made on the Ottoman Empire, helped the French establish a new base of support within the Syrian provinces, which had the potential to mitigate the Sultan's rejection of European influence. Also, by supporting decentralisation, the French administration could moderate the threat of secession, fill the void created by the declining prestige of the Sultan, and provide opportunities to the French to continue to pursue interests while evading conflict with Britain.

The French administration, despite previously attacking Midhat Pasha, had begun to advocate for the establishment of a decentralised government. Generally, the French administration tried to support the populations in their resistance to the Sublime Porte, as they viewed the latter as increasingly despotic. The support provided to some communities within the Syrian provinces in their resistance against the Sublime Porte had advantages for the French administration. For example, Ahmet Pasha Chama'a, a well-known and influential notable from a respected family in Damascus, had publicly stated that the Sublime Porte had come to view the Syrian provinces and its populations as an area that could be dominated

[55] Consul General Eldrige's remarks on the Wilson Nicolson report, giving a general account of the Consular Corps in Syria and its influence on local politics, FO/226/203 May 22, 1882.
[56] 166PO/D1/72 August 16, 1880 (no. 92), sent to M. Tissot, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], from Destrée, Aleppo.

and controlled.[57] Due to Chama'a's status within the Syrian provinces, and the importance of the prominent families, the Sultan could not order his arrest or punishment without potentially provoking a rebellion.[58] Instead, the Sublime Porte threatened the notable families in Damascus, demanding that they obey and remain loyal to the Sultan and his administration. The threat garnered a response from some of the notable families in Syria, who subsequently asked the French administration for protection.[59] For the French consul in Damascus, this news was met with delight as it signified that the Sublime Porte had become significantly disconnected from its subjects, enough so that France became a legitimate alternative, which, in some ways validated the dominant French worldview.[60] By supporting nationalist and secessionist ideas, the French were able to gain access to 'the heterogeneous elements that make up the Ottoman Empire',[61] including some of the notable families in Damascus.

The request that had been made by some of the notable families in Syria in late March, 1897, was accompanied by a rumour that the French were preparing to occupy Syria, beginning in Beirut and making its way to Damascus. 'The rumour has created a great emotion and many of the notable families have expressed happiness that there will be European domination rather than Turkish' authority. However, many also expressed concern that French domination would give prevalence and authority to the Christians.[62] The request by the notable families was met with widespread caution and in an article published in the newspaper titled *al-Sham*, the author, Adib Effendi Nazmi, called to attention the hypocrisy of the European powers and argued that the reforms suggested by the European powers, particularly those concerning modernisation and decentralisation, were not in the best interests of the Muslim nation and it was the Muslim nation that should be deciding the state of rule and authority.[63] Despite the efforts of the French administration, an opposition to French interference in the Syrian provinces was maintained, and often evoked the French relationship with the Christians and their disdain for Islam.

[57] During this period, the Young Turks, discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, were beginning to form alliances with notable individuals in the Syrian provinces. 166PO/E/269 April 1, 1897 (no. 23), sent to M. Cambon, French Ambassador to Istanbul [Constantinople], Damascus.
[58] Hourani 1993.
[59] 166PO/E/269 April 1, 1897 (no. 23).
[60] 166PO/E/269 April 1, 1897 (no. 23).
[61] 166PO/D1/72 December 8, 1880 (no. 106).
[62] 166PO/E/269 April 1, 1897 (no. 23).
[63] 166PO/D20/19 March 26, 1897 (no. 21), sent to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Damascus.

The conflicting desires of the Syrian populations were disregarded by the French who argued that whatever the goal, the population maintained 'a special hatred for the 'Turk".[64] The idea that the Syrian population maintained a general disposition against the 'Turk' rather than the Sublime Porte was an important distinction. The use of the term 'Turk' conjured an identity of ethno-racial difference, which could be described as being predisposed to a particular set of illiberal characteristics. The use of the term 'Turk', rather than the Sublime Porte, to label the target of discontent in the Syrian provinces racialised the differences between the communities. It directed discontent towards this specific identity, and its attached characteristics,[65] rather than the legitimate institutions of government. This diverted discontent against the institutions of government, placing blame on those in charge,[66] and allowing the French to position themselves against Turkish domination.

Although there was an emerging conception of racial and ethnic difference between Arab and Turk in Syria, French perceptions of identity in the Syrian provinces remained focused on religion because it was understood that the qualification of 'Arab' as a race was insignificant. Commenting on the Arab nationalist sentiment, the French consul in Beirut, M. Fouques-DuParc, wrote that he was not convinced, stating 'that it will probably not amount to a large enough difference'.[67] This was due to a lack of prejudice with regards to skin colour among the population, as confirmed by French military captain, M. de Torcy, who wrote that 'it is difficult to distinguish between race, as much of the primitive population has bred with the Arabs and even the uniqueness of the Turks has nearly disappeared in Syria'. For the French, given the lack of racial discernibility between the populations, it was easier to categorise society through religious associations – with the Muslims being representative of the privileged class and the Christians living an existence of servitude. Yet, the Muslims of Syria, unlike the Muslims of Turkey, the latter being described as being Muslim only in name, according to de Torcy, were not attached to Ottoman governance and instead wished to establish an Arab government.[68] The French maintained a perception of the Syrian provinces that facilitated the division of the population into easily discernible categories, which were ascertained by a Christian-French history that informed colonial administration and strategy.

[64] Ismail 1976, vol. 16, pp. 424-434, July 10, 1897.
[65] In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the expression 'tête de Turc' became popularised as a degrading expression that underlined the ignorance of an individual, see Lemaire and Wangermée 2002, p. 152.
[66] Kramer, p. 174.
[67] Ismail 1976, vol. 17, pp. 308-310, September 7, 1897.
[68] 166PO/E/269 August 1, 1880.

While the French supported the plea by the Arab nationalists to be granted autonomy from the Sublime Porte, the French worldview remained focused on religious categorisations. Following from de Torcy's comments, the French consul of Beirut, M. Patrimonio, argued that the population in Syria wished to establish an Arab government, however, there was a difference between the population in Mount Lebanon, who desired independence more than anywhere else in the Levant, and the rest of Syria. Difference between the populations in Mount Lebanon and the rest of the Syrian provinces came down to religion, according to Patrimonio, 'who said religion says nation in Syria, and if the religious ties between the communities dissolve, there will, during the final crisis, be disorders and no other national force for the inhabitants to rally around'.[69] Inferred in this statement was a division between Christians in Mont Lebanon, who were not Arab, and the Muslims of Syria, who shared a common, although weak, Arab identity. This was not surprising due to the French perception of race as having little significance in the pursuit of interests, and the need to justify the continued pursuit of interests, which required the maintenance of Mount Lebanon as a French stronghold. Although there was veracity that Mount Lebanon viewed itself as a separate entity from the rest of the Syrian provinces, this was in part due to the communal composition, the regions' historic political autonomy, and the strength of European influence in Mount Lebanon.

## 6.2 Conclusion

The centralisation of authority under Sultan Abdul Hamid II following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) obstructed the application of a standard of civilisation, making it difficult for the European powers to pursue their interests as they once had. The employment of a standard of civilisation helped the European states, particularly France and Britain, to navigate philosophical and practical problems that developed during periods of economic and political expansion. The standard of civilisation, created a benchmark for the Ottoman Empire to be considered a 'civilised nation', imposing a set of political, economic, and cultural frameworks that were historically specific to European development. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte was required to modernise its institutions, to apply a specific concept of equality and citizenship, and provide ethnic and religious minorities with protections. Without the application of these concepts and protections, or without meeting the standard to which the European powers had adhered to, the European states justified continued interference and interventions, and withheld help in times of crisis.

[69] Ismail 1976, vol. 15, pp. 50-58, October 10, 1883.

Continued refusal by the European powers to provide legitimacy to the Sublime Porte's liberal modernisation project by acknowledging the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty, created the opportunity for Sultan Abdul Hamid II to reject further European interference. The rejection of European interference and European legitimacy emerged following Midhat Pasha's failed efforts to adhere to a liberal modernisation project in order to evade territorial losses and war. Despite Midhat Pasha's efforts, France and Britain refused to intervene to prevent a costly war with Russia (1877-1878), leading to the loss of the Balkan territories, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. In turn, Sultan Abdul Hamid II viewed the liberal modernisation project as a failure and pursued stability by centralising power and promoting the Islamic character of the Ottoman Empire. The standard of civilisation that had previously been applied to the Ottoman Empire to help navigate the philosophical and practical problems and to justify European interference had been obstructed.

Although the modern institutions of the state were maintained, power was centralised under Sultan Abdul Hamid II's direct authority. The centralisation of authority under the Sultan did not represent the form of customary authority that existed prior to nineteenth century modernisation projects, nor did it attempt to replicate European norms of governance that had been imposed through the standard of civilisation. Rather, Sultan Abdul Hamid II maintained the existing institutions of governance and consolidated his authority, fearing continual territorial losses and subordination to European desires. However, the Sultan's strategy to secure the Ottoman Empire in the face of external threat led to increased discontent within the social field, resulting in the employment of ethno-cultural nationalist frameworks to assert legitimacy against the rule of the Sultan and a Turkish Empire.

The changes in governance and the emergence of Arab ethno-national sentiment altered the social field and led to the utilisation of an Arab ethno-nationalist identity as a means to assert and justify a new relationship between governance, territory, and identity. The addition of a growing Arab ethno-nationalist identity premised on liberal concepts of equality, liberty, and nationalism, provided an opportunity for Britain and France to modify their strategies in the pursuit of their interests. Although the previous method of applying a standard of civilisation in the Ottoman Empire had been obstructed, the framework of the standard of civilisation helped France and Britain navigate changes in the Sublime Porte.

The French validated their hesitant support for Arab nationalism by arguing that the Sultan's changes in governance had led to despotism. It was therefore necessary to support a liberal

and secular programme in opposition to the illiberal centralised governance of the Sultan. However, the French were cautious of supporting Arab leaders, who happened to be Muslim, due to the threat it posed to the French relationship with the Christians, the autonomy of Mount Lebanon, and the sustained belief of Muslim fanaticism. Additionally, the French administration disregard the Arab identity as weak and maintained that the prevalent religious identities within the Syrian provinces formed a stronger foundation for nationalist movements. Despite the French perception of identities in the Syrian provinces, they attempted to achieve their interests by support for the nationalist movement, as hesitant as it was, in order to amass a stronger base of support.

The British, however, sought to maintain relations with the Sultan and the administration in the Sublime Porte by promoting reconciliation between liberal-minded leaders, particularly Midhat Pasha, and the Sultan. The British supported the nationalist and secessionist movements to an extent and had tried to find an acceptable concession by arguing for decentralised authority. The British administration desired the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, specifically because of capitulations and the advantageous relationships that had been formed with Ottoman functionaries, the latter producing concern with the French administration.

## Chapter 7: A Domestic Standard of Civilisation: The Young Turks and Imperial Collapse

### 7 Introduction

The centralisation of authority by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the emergence of nationalist and secessionist sentiment in the Ottoman Empire created a tenuous situation as centralisation led to increased animosity directed at the Sublime Porte within the Syrian provinces. This was particularly evident with regards to the dismissal of a number of Syrian functionaries and accusations that the Sublime Porte had abandoned Islam, resulting in a loss of the Sultan's legitimacy. The Sultan's programme of centralisation and the dismissal of the liberal modernisation project was accompanied by a rejection of European interference and intervention. This rejection obstructed the ability of European states to apply a standard of civilisation in the manner they had grown accustomed to. Despite the rejection of European interference and interventions by the Sultan, the development of a liberal and modern nationalist movement provided Britain and France with the ability to continue to pursue interests and apply the principles that the modern state was a standard of civilisation, which continued to guide and justify European pursuits in the Syrian provinces.

While these movements did not engage in a replication of the modern European state, they did seek to adopt and uphold liberal principles of 'modernity' and 'civilisation' in order to pursue their own interests and obtain external legitimacy. This chapter examines the changes in the Sublime Porte and the social field in the Syrian provinces between 1908 and 1919. It considers the development of nationalist and secessionist sentiment as a consequence of Sultan Abdul Hamid II's centralisation of authority, the dissemination of knowledges and practices through nineteenth century European interference, and as a result of changes within the European state system. It highlights the changing political environment of the Sublime Porte and within the Syrian provinces caused by nationalist politics, which produced 'liberal' and 'modern' forms of politics that sought to reform authority and governance. In doing so, this chapter discusses how institutions, structures, and concepts of modern statehood were accepted, yet the character of the Ottoman state was still contested, by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Young Turks, the Party of Freedom and Understanding (PFU), Lebanese nationalists, and the Arab nationalists, and how these movements were further impacted by European relations and interests.

The emergence of these nationalist movements adopted aspects of the civilisational framework which had been applied to the Ottoman Empire and Sublime Porte by the European states throughout the nineteenth century. By examining the political changes within the Ottoman Empire and the Syrian provinces, this chapter examines the role of revolutionary movements, including the CUP, Young Turks, and the PFU, their application of a civilisational framework in governance and their relationships with the European states, customary networks in the Syrian provinces, as well as the Lebanese and Arab nationalist movements.

This chapter first examines the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 and the establishment of the second constitution in the Ottoman Empire, and the response to this development within the Syrian provinces and among the Arab nationalists. It subsequently examines the environment of political instability that developed following the CUP's victories in the Sublime Porte and their response to instability, focusing on the consequences for Mount Lebanon and Aleppo. It then examines the impact of the changing patterns of relations within the European state system, and the negative impact these changes had on the Sublime Porte, which created renewed impetus for independence by the Arab nationalists with the assembly the Arab Congress (1913) in Paris. This chapter further analyses the successive developments regarding the First World War, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the Arab Revolt, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the renegotiation of relations between France and Britain and the former Syrian provinces at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920).

## 7.1 The Second Constitutional Era: The Young Turk Revolution (1908)

The management of the Ottoman Empire under Sultan Abdul Hamid II had provoked opposition from nationalist and secessionist movements, and many liberal-minded individuals. Although the Sublime Porte had managed to maintain authority over the Syrian provinces, the Sultan was contending with a growing political movement under the name Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) that had incorporated the Young Turks (among other political organisations). Once the Sultan had heard of the threat that CUP posed, they became the subject of an official inquest, which sought to examine their membership, activities, and political aspirations. The inquest was carried out by the Governor of the Damascus province, Nazim Pasha, who had received an order to survey the movement and take the necessary steps to combat their growing influence.[1]

[1] 166PO/D20/19 July 23, 1897 (no. 54), sent to M. Cambon, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Barré de Lancy, Damascus.

Sultan Abdul Hamid II was fearful of the effects of liberal ideas that had become popular following increased contact with the European powers throughout the nineteenth century, which were propagated by the Young Turks. Although Sultan Abdul Hamid II was engaged in promulgating reforms, his reforms were not concerned with governance or legitimacy, but the application of authority through pacification and bureaucratic modernisation. Due to the resulting dislocation between the institutions of the Sublime Porte and the local practices in the Syrian provinces, requests for the restoration of the constitution that were proposed by the Young Turks began to expand in Syria. The populations requesting the restoration of the constitution, primarily those who supported the Young Turks in their initial emergence, argued that the constitution could prevent a brewing crisis by providing the population with greater political access, quell separatist national movements, and provide rights to ethnic and religious minorities.[2]

The appeal of the Young Turk movement reflected the changes that had manifested in the social field; ideas of modernity had become prevalent, particularly with regards to emerging forms of modern ethno-nationalism, but they were assembled on to customary knowledges and practices. Unlike their predecessors, the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks were 'products of the, modern secular, military, or civilian professional schools'.[3] The Young Turks, borrowing ideas from their European mentors, including scientific rationality and the rejection of religious guidance,[4] they maintained and propagated a worldview that reflected elitist theories of the late nineteenth century, which prioritised the role of elites in politics.[5] This was evident in the use of notable families by the Young Turks in order to eventually attain and maintain a parliamentary majority.[6] Although the Young Turks had adopted the mentality of rational governance, separate from religious influence, they had formed alliances with notable families, combining modern politics with customary networks.

Increased civil engagement in the Young Turk movement and military engagement through the CUP provided the necessary scope in the revolutionary movement to put pressure on the Sultan. Following the revolution that broke out on July 3, 1908 the Sultan was forced to concede to the demands of the Young Turks, agreeing on July 23, 1908 to reinstate the

[2] Chalcraft 2016, p. 169.
[3] Ergil 1975, p. 26.
[4] Chalcraft 2016, p. 169.
[5] Hanioğlu 2001, p. 3; Mosca 1939.
[6] Zürcher 2015, p. 95.

parliament and the 1876 constitution.[7] However, the Sultan's concession early in the revolutionary movement is argued to have 'robbed the revolution of its *raison d'être*',[8] given that 'their common goal was opposition to Hamidian absolutism',[9] and the removal of his executive power. What followed was a 'delicate balance between the Palace, the Liberals, and the CUP' that gave way to political factionalism with the liberals propagating ideas of constitutionalism, science, progress, and social Darwinism; the CUP acting as vanguards to the revolution; and the Sultan who attempted to backtrack from the liberal promises that were made immediately following the reestablishment of a parliamentary regime.[10]

### 7.1.1 The Arab Nationalist View of Constitutional Reform and the Young Turks

Following the promulgation of the second Ottoman Constitution in early August 1908, the French consul in Latakia, M. Geoffrey, noted that 'the consular agents in the Syrian provinces still do not know what to make of the July 1908 revolution'. Rumours concerning the concessions made by the Sultan, particularly that of the constitution, emphasised the idea of liberty, and 'have created a belief amongst the poorest classes that they can now act on their passions'. On the other hand, the richest classes believed that 'they have the right to humiliate all functionaries who do not please them'. Despite these antagonistic attitudes, the consul reported that there had been no violence to report and Muslims and Christians were celebrating in peace.[11] This was echoed by Stanford Shaw, who stated that 'happy mobs of Turks, Arabs, Jews, Greeks, Serbs, Bulgars, Armenians, and Europeans embraced in the streets and made eternal vows of brotherhood for the common good'.[12] In Beirut, it was reported that the population largely supported the rapid changes that were being implemented, however, there had been trouble in Tripoli, a conservative Muslim city, where the population viewed the liberal regime as a further abandonment of Islam. Yet, the promise of a constitution generally produced an enthusiastic response.[13] The establishment of a constitution and parliamentary representation provided the Syrian provinces with greater potential opportunity for decentralisation and autonomy over provincial and local affairs, as had been desired with the emergence of the Arab nationalist movement.

The reinstatement of constitutional governance was supported by the Arab nationalists within the Syrian provinces, but also those who had been sent into exile. Commenting on

---

[7] Ahmad 1968, p. 20.
[8] Ahmad 1968, p. 21; Chalcraft 2016, p. 172.
[9] Ergil 1975, p. 26.
[10] Chalcraft 2016, pp. 172-173; Ahmad 1968, p.22.
[11] Ismail 1976, vol. 18, pp. 65-66, August 12, 1908.
[12] Shaw and Shaw 1977, p. 273; Zürcher 2016, p. 93.
[13] Ismail 1976, vol. 18, pp. 62-64, August 21, 1908.

the reopening of parliament in Istanbul and the promulgation of the new constitution, the *Comité Central Syrien* (CCS), based in Paris, and founded by Rachid Moutran, Choukri Ghanem, and Georges Samné, released a statement on the developments within the Ottoman Empire through their president, Rachid Moutran. In line with their goal to guard against the return of absolutism, the statement thanked Sultan Abdul Hamid II, and urged those responsible, including the Sultan, to grant Syria the right to self-govern.[14] Although the CCS was operating in Paris, in exile, it was an important and critical movement in the development of an Arab nationalism that later expanded beyond the borders of Syria. Due to censorship within the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, only those in exile, with the help of the European powers, could deliver such critiques.[15]

Although Moutran supported the establishment of a constitutional regime, he did so under the premise that it would facilitate self-governance for the Arabs. He argued that the Syrian provinces had been subject to an absolutist regime for too long, and the implementation of a constitution and the creation of a liberal regime composed of populations that hold different national identities would 'naturally lead to the disintegration of the Empire'.[16] By arguing that the Empire would eventually collapse, particularly due to the emergence of numerous and various national identities, Moutran also sent a word of caution to the Syrian population, stating that it was necessary for them to establish the institutions and structures of statehood, to prepare for the possibility that the constitution could fail to provide a viable basis for politics. He justified this by arguing that in the scenario that the Ottoman Empire did not collapse, 'Syria will stay standing with its self-government and an internal organisation that is strong enough to help the Empire in case of danger, and to defend against the encroachments of central power'. He continued that if the Ottoman Empire did collapse, that the Syrian provinces would otherwise be prepared.[17] Although the CCS supported the establishment of a constitution and parliament in the Ottoman Empire, they were foremost concerned with Syrian autonomy, and possibly secession, framed by the idea of an Arab identity separate from the Turks.

The members of the CCS, who were in exile in Paris, were deeply influenced by their environment, informed by French ideas of nationhood in the early nineteenth century, which

[14] The CCS also founded and maintained the newspaper *Nahdat al-Arab* from Paris. 166PO/E/272 December 25, 1908, *Comité Central Syrien*; Bouziri 1990, p. 122.
[15] Boyar, 2006.
[16] 166PO/E/272 December 25, 1908.
[17] 166PO/E/272 December 25, 1908.

were tied to an enlightened morality.[18] The CCS propagated a national identity that was territorially delineated by the idea of greater Syria but based on an Arab identity that was constructed on a cultural distinction, separated from other cultural forms prevalent in the Ottoman Empire, and was a 'nationalism that [was aimed at] a moral regeneration of the community'.[19] In propagating these ideas, the aim of the CCS was to inject the political institutions with a cultural foundation that could reflect the negotiated social field in order to build 'autonomous state institutions'.[20]

Although the CUP had gained momentum in the Syrian provinces, Arab nationalist sentiment was still prominent, and held the view that the Turks had a natural urge to dominate other 'races'. From Paris, Moutran wrote of a Turkish biological inability to 'persist in the voice of equality and of true tolerance necessary to the development of the legitimate aspirations of the other nationalities of the Empire'.[21] Using the same argument used to justify European interference in the Ottoman Empire, Moutran promoted a separate Arab national identity, stating that Turkish domination had led to disorganisation, where Arab organisation could help ensure the Empire's survival. Within this ideological framework, the CCS argued that under an Arab organisation, it was possible to abandon the need for European maintenance, now that Syria 'wakes from a slumber […] the duration [of] suffering sanctified the obtaining of rights to develop a better future' and to reject domination of European power should the Empire collapse.[22]

The articles that were published by Moutran reflected the ideas of rational order, progress, and scientific ethno-racial categorisation of peoples that was prevalent in French politics and reinforced through the standard of civilisation. Moutran commended the developments that had taken place with the CUP, particularly with regards to the establishment of a constitution and parliament, but he was doubtful that this form of Turkish domination would be any different from previous forms, believing that the Turks maintained a natural urge to dominate. In this manner, Moutran argued for the immediate creation of modern state institutions in the Syrian provinces that would be recognised by the European powers at the inevitable moment when Turkish domination over Syria ends. It was evident that European knowledges and practices regarding civilisation and the state had become adopted by leading political figures and promoted within the social field.

[18] Özkırımlı 2010, pp. 25-30; Smith 1998.
[19] Connor 1994, p. 41.
[20] Connor 1994, p. 41.
[21] 166PO/E/272 December 25, 1908.
[22] 166PO/E/272 December 25, 1908.

### 7.1.2 The Counter Revolution: Responding to Instability through Social Homogenisation

The CUP, had become the dominant political block in parliament, gaining a majority due to their alliances with local notables – specifically prominent families – who ran as Unionist candidates in the Syrian provinces. Although the CUP chose candidates from notable classes, the notables did not, in large part, represent the ideologies or convictions of the CUP platform. Instead, the choice of candidates by the CUP was strategic, while the candidates representing the Syrian provinces, for the most part, viewed the opportunity as a means to secure power within the new parliamentary system.[23]

Despite advocating liberal and secularist policies, the CUP made it difficult for the main opposition parties to participate in parliament. In turn, the main opposition parties viewed CUP domination as despotic. The opposition parties, notably the Party of Ottoman Liberals (*Osmanli Ahrar Firkasi*) and Muslim Fraternity (or Muhammedan Union, *Ittihad-I Muhammedi*), grew tired of being excluded from the political system, and started to pose a serious threat to the authority of the CUP. By early April 1909 the opposition parties, working closely together, started publishing anti-CUP articles and staging demonstration and protests. Soon after, on April 12, 1909, 'an armed insurrection broke out in [Istanbul] in the name of the restoration of Islam and [*Shari'a*]'.[24]

In the days following the April 12 insurrection, the CUP were forced underground and the Muslim Fraternity released an official list of demands, including the dismissal of the Grand Vizier and the ministers of war and of the navy, the replacement of several Unionist officers and of the Unionist president of the Chamber of Deputies, the banishment of several Unionist deputies from Istanbul, restoration of *Shari'a*, and amnesty for the rebellious troops. Following these demands being made, the Grand Vizier submitted his resignation, and was replaced by Tevfik Pasha.[25] Commenting on the impact of the events in Istanbul on Damascus, the French consul in Damascus wrote that

> The Muslim Fraternity, led by Emir Abdallah Pasha - son of Abd-el-Kader, had organized a joyful demonstration that carried into the following day. The Muslims of the city see it as a return

[23] Zürcher 2016, p. 95.
[24] Zürcher 2016, p. 96.
[25] Zürcher 2016, p. 96.

> to their rightful order and prominence while the Christians are fearful.[26]

The French consul remained unconcerned, stating that 'the CUP are likely to be triumphant and have an interest in returning public order to the city'.[27] By April 24, 1909, the Action Army, organised by the CUP entered Istanbul and established martial law, regaining control over the capital and parliament, and deposing Sultan Abdul Hamid II on April 27, 1909, with Mehmed V acceding to the throne. Following the counterrevolution at the end of April 1909, the Young Turks, according to Erik Zürcher, became like the government before them, paranoid about the security of their power, and wanting to hold onto it completely. In August 1909, following the proclamation of what the French consul in Beirut, M. Ponsot, called, the 'Liberal Constitution', which established a constitutional and parliamentarian regime that limited the powers of the Sultan,[28] should have established a decentralised government, instead it placed even more power in the hands of the CUP.[29]

Following the reestablishment of control by the CUP, the parliament passed laws limiting freedoms of association and press, and disregarded requests from decentralist parties seeking legislation granting political autonomy in the provinces.[30] The CUP had become vocal in their protests against the capitulation regime, arguing that the Ottoman Empire had succumbed to providing special rights to European states within the Ottoman Territories, harming the interests of the Ottoman Empire.[31] The CUP continued with educational reform programmes, viewing mandatory public education as necessary for the maintenance of constitutional and liberal ideas, the institutionalisation of law and order, and modernisation in various economic sectors – including agriculture and industry.[32] The CUP were actively pursuing a civilising process, which sought to modernise the Syrian provinces and homogenise the populations to become Turks.

The policies put forward by the CUP led to an increase in opposition from the parties advocating decentralisation as well as those who were against the application of a liberal constitution. The former viewed European economic and political influence as beneficial

[26] 166PO/D20/19 April 23, 1909 (no. 5), sent to M. Constans, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople].
[27] 166PO/D20/19 April 23, 1909 (no. 5).
[28] Zürcher 2016, p. 100.
[29] 1SL/1/V/394 December 30, 1930 (no. 979), sent to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Levant, from M. Ponsot, Beirut.
[30] Kayali 1997, pp. 17-50. Zürcher 2016, p. 100.
[31] Palmer 1992, p. 212.
[32] Kayali 1997, pp. 81-113.

and progressive, while the latter, the anti-constitutionalist parties, viewed any European interference and influence, including the adoption of European forms of politics, as oppressive; invoking Islam as a response to the secular constitutional government. The response by the CUP to the increasing opposition was a strict form of Ottoman nationalism, one that held the Ottoman identity as emanating from Istanbul and framed by the Young Turk leadership. The CUP desired assimilation in social, political, and cultural practices and wanted to discard ethnic and cultural differences in favour of Turkification.[33]

The stringent application of Ottoman nationalism through policies of Turkification by the CUP had a profound impact on the provinces of the Ottoman Empire as it eroded the very foundations to which the Ottoman Empire had been built on, such as the assertion against forced assimilation.[34] The enlargement and establishment of the Ottoman Empire was not founded on the necessity to culturally cleanse or 'denationalise' the people and territories, but corresponded to the principles of decentralised governance.[35] The politics of identity through forced cultural assimilation played an important role in Arab-Turkish relations during this period. Additionally, the Turkish centralisation of governance further encumbered relations between the CUP and the political parties in the Syrian provinces.[36] Increased attempts to homogenise the populations and centralise governance within the Ottoman Empire through projects of cultural assimilation alienated the populations in the Syrian provinces.

The consequence of Turkification policies undertaken by the CUP heightened conflict between the Sublime Porte and the Syrian Provinces in the Ottoman Empire, increasing the desire for autonomy based on ethno-cultural principles.[37] The establishment of a stringent Ottoman nationalism based on the politics of the Young Turks threatened the social order on a new basis, targeting religious groups inclusive of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish identification, and the deployment of an ethno-cultural framework, such as language, and social practices, which sought to homogenise Ottoman society and politics.[38] However, the intended outcome of these policies was never achieved and the application of Turkification policies created a growing resistance, both in terms of identity and political desires for autonomy. Crucially, the CUP's worldview and promotion of Ottoman nationalism,

[33] Turkification was a charge that was brought against the CUP by the Europeans before being used by anti-CUP parties. Kayali 1997, pp. 81-113.
[34] Barkey 2008 p. 29.
[35] Barkey 2008 p. 29, 45; Karpat 1975, p. 293.
[36] Ülker 2005, pp. 613-617.
[37] Smith 2005.
[38] Erikson 2002.

deepened ethno-nationalist sentiment – particularly among the Arabs and validated broad anti-government coalitions.

### 7.1.3 The Young Turks' Civilisational Standard in Mount Lebanon and Aleppo

The policies of Turkification included linguistic assimilation in the use of the Turkish language in schools and administration, the denial of 'political representation on a religious-communal basis', the 'denunciation of decentralisation', and the 'inflexible attitude towards' social and political rights of religious minorities.[39] The CUP was opposed to decentralisation, to the extent that under the new constitutional and parliamentary order, they attempted to regain authority over Mount Lebanon by forcing Ottoman legislative power on Mount Lebanon, reversing its privileged protection by the European powers.[40] The CUP argued that European protections were no longer necessary with the emergence of a secular and liberal regime and by assimilating the population into a Turkish identity a sustainable and stable modern state would emerge.[41] The conviction of the CUP that their government was based on 'liberal' and 'modern' principles motivated their pursuit to create stability and regain areas that had been lost to European interference.

The Young Turks' secular and liberal regime prioritised a Turkish identity, creating friction with the Arab and Lebanese nationalists. The decision to assume authority over Mount Lebanon by the CUP provoked the 'Arab Fraternity' (*la Fraternité Arabe* or Arab Brotherhood), a group of Syrian and Lebanese Arabs, composed of Muslims and Christians, who had been ignored and turned away from political life in Istanbul, to request help from the European powers. The advances on Mount Lebanon contradicted the goal of the Arab Fraternity, which was to obtain a decentralised administration for the benefit of Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, making demands just short of requests for autonomy.[42] Help from the European powers was also requested by activists in Mount Lebanon who had formed the groups the Lebanese Alliance (*Alliance Libanaise*) and the Lebanese Committee (*Comité Libanais*). Unlike the Arab Fraternity, who desired the establishment of decentralised administration in Syria and encompassing Mount Lebanon, the Lebanese Alliance and the Lebanese Committee petitioned the French consul in Beirut for the establishment of decentralised administration for Mount Lebanon, under the protection of France, separate to Syria, and with a geographic enlargement of Mount Lebanon to include Beirut and

[39] Kayali 1997, pp. 82-96.
[40] 166PO/E/273 December 23, 1909 (no. 225), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M Fouques-Duparc, Beirut; Hakim 2013, pp. 206-207.
[41] 1SL/1/V/394 December 30, 1930 (no. 979).
[42] 1SL/1/V/394 December 30, 1930 (no. 979).

Baalbek.[43] The Arab Fraternity, the Lebanese Alliance, and the Lebanese Committee, threatened the stability of the government in Istanbul and led the Young Turks to deepen the nation-building project, which took form through the dissemination of a set of moral values to the Syrian provinces,[44] sharing similarities with earlier European interference.

The relationship between the Syrian provinces and the Sublime Porte worsened because of the decision of the government to send officers and officials to the Syrian provinces who could only speak Turkish and were ignorant of, and looked down on, the local customs and traditions. More generally, the British consul, M. Devey writes that the decision to appoint individuals unaccustomed to the language and the traditions of the people has deepened antagonistic sentiments between the Arabs and the Turks. The British consul cites

> hasty or somewhat autocratic behaviour on the part of the office holders, or […] their occasionally contemptuous or discourteous manners towards local notables, or […] the over-advanced views of those connected with the 'Young Turk' party which are manifesting themselves, in a distinct tendency towards xenophobia [as the reason for the antagonism. He also fears that the] sentiment between Turk and Arab is beginning to permeate downwards to the lower classes; and will soon […] no longer [be] confined to the *Ulema*, notables, and grandees, and official circles.[45]

The British consul noted that the discontent was particularly present among the *Ulema* and the notables, who felt as if their role in society was being usurped by Turkish consolidation of power and a general disregard for the role of the *Ulema* and notable classes.[46]

Reflecting on the worsening relations between the populations in the Syrian provinces and the Young Turk government in Istanbul, the French consul in Aleppo, M. Laronce, writing to the French ambassador in Istanbul, M. Bompard, stated that 'the press seeks every, and

[43] 1SL/1/V/394 December 30, 1930 (no. 979).
[44] Ülker 2005, pp. 613-617.
[45] FO/195/2342 July 12, 1910 (no. 28), sent to M. Lowther, British Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Devey, Damascus.
[46] FO/195/2342 June 10, 1910 (no. 18), sent to M. Lowther, British Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Wilkie Young, Damascus.

any, opportunity to attack the government'.[47] For example, on January 28, 1910, an article in *Al Cha'ab* newspaper attacked the Sublime Porte for the collapse of a roof in the bazaar in the Bahoussa quarter in Aleppo, stating

> We [the population in Aleppo] demand that the municipality, as an obligation, refrain from killing people through their negligence. The municipality does nothing, they do not occupy themselves with anything, the mud and dirt is piling up in the street. The existence of the people makes no difference to them.[48]

The article was revelatory with regards to the acrimonious relation between the state and society. It separated the municipal government, the state, from the social field, accusing the former of being negligent and uncaring, rather than viewing the state and government as an extension of society. In the article, the municipality was treated as an oppressive force, detached from any meaningful sentiment that would provide legitimacy, obscuring the state and governance as a form of household authority. This was evident, not only in the discussions in local newspapers, as reported by the French consul, but also in the appointment of Ottoman administrators and functionaries who held a blatant disregard for the social customs and language of the Syrian provinces.[49]

The disregard for local social customs and language was thought to be rectified by emphasising the status of Islam in the Ottoman Empire. The governor of the province of Aleppo, Kiazim Pasha, in an attempt to respond to the antagonistic sentiment directed at the Sublime Porte, wrote a letter in the newspaper called 'The Progress' (*al-Takaddoum*) that was published on November 1, 1910. In the letter, the Governor had taken a religious tone to gain the sympathies of the Muslim populations. By using religious language, Kiazim Pasha wanted to show to the clerical parties, who were close to the notable families, that the populations in the Syrian provinces would no longer have to answer to the traditional hierarchies of notable and clerical classes, but would have a more direct relationship with the

[47] 166PO/D1/89 January 31, 1910 (no. 19), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Laronce, Aleppo.
[48] 166PO/D1/89 January 31, 1910 (no. 19).
[49] 166PO/D1/89 January 31, 1910 (no. 19).

government.[50] The letter referred to traditions of corruption and tyranny that had been at the centre of notable politics, arguing that

> the government, has yet to reform the jurisdiction of the empire to the point of rendering it morally capable of guaranteeing, equitably, the rights of all classes of society. But know this – the current situation cannot continue because the population is weathered and demands justice […] You should know that I am one of those people that is searching the tranquillity of the Empire and the prosperity of the people. You should also know that I believe in redemption, those oppressive notables should take note of the words prescribed by God: Put distance from harm as you are obliged to in favour of the oppressed. In agitating the population, I am doing nothing but completing my tasks and functions vis-à-vis the people.[51]

Kiazim Pasha was attempting to justify the actions and decisions of the Sublime Porte, which had come under the control of the CUP. In doing so, he argued that the oppression in which the population had become subject to was a problem of notable politics, rather than the politics of the current government. Kiazim Pasha was arguing that the modern state under the Young Turk government offered representation and freedom.

Kiazim Pasha's rhetoric drew the attention of the French consul in Beirut, who thought highly of him, stating that 'he is someone who is liberal and able to think within the framework of the constitution, he has endeavoured to bring justice to the people by taking a stance against the aristocracy of Aleppo, who have tried to oppose his every move'.[52] On the other hand, Gertrude Bell, a British traveller, political officer, anthropologist, and cartographer, known for her work in the formation of the British Mandate of Iraq, had come to meet Kiazim Pasha in 1905 and described him as a 'farceur – a comedian, a performer'.[53] Still, the French consul's support of Kiazim Pasha was due to his propagation of a modern

[50] 166PO/D1/89 March 15, 1910 (no. 48), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Laronce, Aleppo.
[51] 166PO/D1/89 November 3, 1910 (no. 172), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Ronflard, Aleppo.
[52] 166PO/D1/89 February 24, 1911 (no. 14), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Ronflard, Aleppo.
[53] Bell 2016, pp. 199-205.

liberal political structure that encompassed the conditions of modernity and stability recognised as legitimate in the French worldview.

By attempting to enforce a modern political structure that bypassed customary social and political groups, Kiazim Pasha isolated important networks in the Syrian provinces; the same social aristocratic networks that the European powers and the Young Turks had previously formed alliances with. The European powers, including France, Britain, and Russia created alliances with a variety of notable leaders throughout the nineteenth century in order to fulfil their own political interests. On the other hand, the Young Turks had created alliances with the leaders of notable families throughout the Syrian provinces in order to maintain a parliamentary majority. Arguably, the formation of alliances by the European powers and the Sublime Porte with these social networks only reinforced their importance.

Kiazim Pasha's attempts to dominate over the notables and clerical parties placed him in a weakened position, facing an increased potential for violent attacks carried out in resistance to his governorship of Aleppo. The French consul in Aleppo writing to M. Bompard, the French ambassador to Istanbul, stated that 'everything has been done [by his enemies] to try to force him to reconsider his difficult task [of subordinating the social environment] that he has assumed'. The French support of Kiazim Pasha had been maintained due to parallels in political ideologies, with M. Ronflard, stating that 'the people of Aleppo […] are ignorant, disunited, they respect the established order and rebel against innovations'.[54] The rejection of political innovation, was not due to a condition of ignorance, as argued by M. Ronflard, but by the necessity of maintaining political familiarity and establishing consent, whereby the desire to subordinate the populations under this form of governance threatened to oppress the populations in the Syrian provinces by changing the accepted social, political, and economic framework.[55] While the French and the CUP viewed political innovation, including the homogenisation of society as being modern, liberal, and rational,[56] resistance contradicted their conceptions of modernity.

The refusal of the population to accept the reforms put in place by Kiazim Pasha was subsequently blamed on a political paralysis in the notable class. In an article published in the newspaper 'The Progress' (*al-Takaddoum*) in February 1911, the author argues that the

[54] 166PO/D1/89 February 24, 1911 (no. 14), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Ronflard, Aleppo.
[55] Taiaiake, and Corntassel 2005, pp. 597-600. Khaldun 1967, pp. 263-295.
[56] The French colonial projects desired the assimilation of the colonised people into French culture, see Betts 1960.

general population is paralysed by fear. The article noted that the livelihoods and customs of the general populations were dependent on the political and social environment established by the notable class, which was under threat by Kiazim Pasha and the CUP. Because of this threat the actions of the notables, according to the article, triggered a tyrannical, barbaric, and oppressive response. The article continued by arguing that once the notables were removed from power and the reforms were established, the population would no longer resist.[57]

The alienation of notables in the province of Aleppo by Kiazim Pasha was doing little to win over the population. Following the attacks on notables in the newspapers, the notables were refusing to pay taxes on all land and property in their ownership, selecting a single property of little worth to be valued and taxed by the government. Seeking to rectify the situation and pacify the populations, the government had sent several functionaries to value all the properties in the region and extra security force with the aim of avoiding the possibility of a coup against Kiazim Pasha.[58] In addition to the deteriorating political environment in Aleppo, it was reported that the situation in Mount Lebanon had become untenable, caused by the governments' attempts to gain control over Mount Lebanon.[59]

Underlying the promotion of liberal politics and a constitution that sought to replace the established customs of notable political prominence,[60] was a conflict between tradition and European conceptions of modernity which had produced a standard of civilisation. The Young Turk administration in the Sublime Porte had come to rely on promotion of a constitution and parliament as a sign of modernity and legitimacy, while developing an assimilationist project that attempted to reconfigure identities and terminate the prominence of customary social and political groups. The French and Kiazim Pasha viewed bureaucratic modernity, cultural assimilation, and the removal of customary forms of governance as modern and rational, focused on the development of the modern state based on national ideals. In doing so, and acting on this worldview, Kiazim Pasha, and by extension, the CUP, produced a state of governance that was divorced from the social field.

---

[57] 166PO/D1/89 May 4, 1911 (no. 32), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from Aleppo.
[58] 166PO/D1/89 May 4, 1911 (no. 32).
[59] 166PO/E/273 *Le Reveil*, 1 Aprill 1911, Lettre Ouverte a Messiers les Consuls Generaux a Beyrouth (Syrie); 166PO/E/273 *Journal de Caire*, 15 April 1911, Lettre de Syrie; 166PO/E/273 August 5, 1911 (no. 431), sent to M. Bompard, the French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Paris.
[60] Hourani 1993.

## 7.2 Instability within the European State System: The Resulting Failure of the Sublime Porte

Under the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the Ottoman Empire had obscured the pursuit of European imperial interests by rejecting the liberal modernisation project and European interference. Although this impeded the ability of the France and Britain to make demands on the Sublime Porte,[61] the European state system had otherwise remained stable, which provided stability for the Sublime Porte during periods of internal upheaval. The Sublime Porte, under renewed control of the CUP, was in a state of disorder due to its active pursuit of Turkification and the alienation of the Arab population. In addition to internal upheaval, changes in the European state system had begun to create a new set of problems for the Sublime Porte.

Changes in relations between European states provided the opportunity for Italy to diplomatically manoeuvre in a manner that secured European recognition to an Italian 'right' to occupy and influence Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. Italy had formed an alliance with Germany, which had been in conflict with France over Morocco, and had also provided diplomatic support to Britain in their occupation of Egypt. They revised the terms of the Straits Convention in Russia's favour and supported the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia.[62] In addition to providing consent and aid to the other European powers in the pursuit of their interests, Italy had sought to take advantage of the weakened domestic environment of the Ottoman Empire. Following the revolution (1908), the counter revolution (1909), and the reestablishment of control by the CUP in Istanbul, the Sublime Porte was facing increased instability, providing the European powers, in this case, Italy with an opportunity to realise their interests.

Having received explicit and implicit consent from the European powers, Italy justified the issuance of an ultimatum to the Sublime Porte on September 28, 1911 by arguing that there had been large-scale maltreatment of Italian merchants and traders by the Sublime Porte. The Italian government gave the government the choice to either cede control over the province of Tripolitania or go to war. Attempting to evade war and maintain control over the province, the Sublime Porte responded that it would give Italy control over the affairs in the province, but retain suzerainty over it – as it had done with Britain regarding Egypt. The offer, however, did not satisfy Italian interests and Italy subsequently declared war.[63]

---

61 Antonius 1939, p. 68; Zürcher 2016, pp. 78-81.
62 Ahmad 1966; McMeekin 2015, p. 62.
63 Palmer 1992, p. 214.

As the war progressed into late December, Sheriff Pasha, the political editor of the newspaper '*Constitutionnel Ottoman*' wrote that there was heightened concern that the war with Italy would have resounding consequences on the frontiers of the Ottoman Empire. The article further highlighted that the war with Italy could open the Ottoman Empire up to imminent threats from Russia and threats emerging from Austria.[64] In addition to the external threats that sought to take possession of various Ottoman territories, a weakened Ottoman government provided opportunities for the local secessionist parties to wield an advantage.

The beginning of the war between Italy and the Ottoman Empire enhanced instability within the Sublime Porte. The CUP, once the placeholder for revolutionary and liberal pan-Ottoman politics was being challenged by a new party, the Party of Freedom and Understanding (*Hurriyet ve Itilaf Firkasi* or *Entente Libérale* – hereafter referred to as PFU), founded by Sadik Bey, and was an alliance of oppositional parties to the CUP.[65] Sadik Bey argued that the 'many manifestations and revolts, culminating in the July 1908 revolution' which should have prompted reform and assured security and tranquillity, only led to the demolition of institutions and elevated the revolutionary organisations' level of power through centralisation. Although the CUP attempted to institute reform, it produced a narrow vision of governance and cultural assimilation that alienated the Syrian provinces and failed to assure security and tranquillity. The CUP had failed to deliver on the values that formed the initial aims and mobilisation of the revolutionary movement, which provided the PFU with the impetus to act on the values enshrined in the constitution in addition to respecting the social life and natural activities of each group within the Ottoman Empire. Sadik Bey's message reflected the dynamics of the PFU, as an anti-CUP coalition, but also in the rights of each group to practice its customary 'social life and natural activities', acknowledging the diversity of ideologies and practices of the individual parties within the alliance. [66] The PFU differentiated themselves from the CUP by promoting the possibility of establishing a negotiated state, one that preserved the diverse customary social and political practices. This contrasted with the CUP's application of streamlined governance and cultural assimilation.

[64] 166PO/E/132, December 11, 1911 (no. 25), Mecheroutiette, 'Constitutionnel Ottoman' Organe du Parti Radical Ottoman, Revue Mensuelle, 3é Année, Directeur Politique: Cherif Pasha: from the article: Les Pêcheurs.
[65] Zürcher 2016, p 101-103.
[66] 166PO/E/132, December 11, 1911 (no. 25).

The position that had been promoted by the PFU posed a significant threat to the CUP, who had maintained power through centralisation, repression, and alienation. While the idea of the modern state was generally accepted, what and who the state represented was still contentious. When Lutfi Fikri Bey, the head of the PFU, visited Aleppo to give a brief talk, the CUP issued a call to protest the speech. The protest, however, was described as small and short-lived. M. Grapin, at the French consulate in Aleppo, wrote to M. Bompard in Istanbul that Lutfi Fikri Bey has 'won the approval of a great majority of the population of Aleppo'.[67] Yet, given that the population in Aleppo had been unhappy with Kiazim Pasha, and the policies of the CUP, which alienated the role of notable classes, his reception in Aleppo was not surprising.

The PFU had quickly gained in popularity, threatening the stability of the CUP government. Under these conditions, the CUP engineered the dissolution of parliament. The CUP secured the replacement of Ibrahim Hakki Pasha as Grand Vizier with Said Pasha, although the latter was an experienced statesman who served as Abdul Hamid II's Grand Vizier eight times, he did not subscribe to the Unionist ideology or programme. By appointing Said Pasha as Grand Vizier, the CUP desired to create a political crisis within the Sublime Porte.[68]

Once the political crisis had developed between parliament and the Grand Vizier, the CUP controlled government urged the Sultan to dissolve parliament and call for early elections. Following these developments in Istanbul, the French consul in Damascus became weary of the CUP, noting that they had gained effective control over many aspects of the state. The political control that the CUP had come to exercise created a situation that led the French consul to believe that, no matter the outcome of the elections, the CUP would be victorious across the country.[69] Similarly, the The French consul in Aleppo warned that 'all the means taken, have been to make the Unionists triumphant. Many of the functionaries suspected of sympathising with the PFU have been removed from their positions, without explanation'.[70]

The practices of the CUP during the election were criticised as undemocratic, and not without reason; it was reported that the first votes that had come in from the Djemilie and Farafra quarters in Aleppo had been cancelled by order of the provincial governor, Kiazim

[67] 166PO/E/132 February 19, 1912 (no 11), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Grapin, Aleppo.
[68] Kayali 1997, pp. 174-202; Kayali 1995; Zürcher 2016, p. 103.
[69] 166PO/E/132 March 25, 1912 (no. 20), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul, Consul General, Damascus.
[70] 166PO/E/132 April 18, 1912 (no. 37), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Grapin, Aleppo.

Pasha, as they were in overwhelming majority in favour of the PFU. It was further rumoured that once the other ballot boxes were turned over to the officials, the ballots supporting the opposition were destroyed and replaced by ballots containing the names of official Unionist candidates.[71]

Following the early elections and the proclaimed victory by the CUP, the PFU organised a military wing, known as the Saviour Officers (*Halaskar Zabitan Grubu*), who, in early July 1912, staged a coup d'état against the CUP.[72] On July 17, 1912, the coup d'état against the CUP government was successful, forcing the Grand Vizier, Said Pasha, to resign, with the Saviour Officers becoming the backers of the new government.[73] The general opinion, across religion and class in Syria, regarding these events, as recorded by the French consul in Aleppo, M. Laporte, was one of welcomed change. It was believed by many that the coup d'état would eclipse members of the CUP, including the governor Aleppo; 'everyone had remarked, the man who has 'done' the last elections must feel threatened, counting the days left of his government's reign'. The French consul remarked that there was a renewed confidence in the Ottoman Empire and he hoped that with the ascendance of a truly liberal ideology, the Ottoman Empire would enter into a period of regeneration. However, he also noted that the failures of this government could result in 'Turkey, and the sick man, [dying] in agony'.[74] Despite the positive outlook regarding change, the French consul further highlighted that the population in Beirut was petitioning the Sultan for devolution, as was the population in Aleppo.

The coup d'état by the Saviour Officers created a crisis in the Sublime Porte, leading to the establishment of an interim government formed under Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, a military officer and former governor to Crete. Delivering his throne speech on April 12, 1912, Sultan Mehmed V acknowledged the necessity for political equilibrium following the coup d'état, and stated that it was therefore necessary to eventually dissolve the chamber of deputies and call an early election. The Sultan argued that the dissolution was to conform to constitutional law, allowing for the politics of the Empire to be constructed on the foundations of justice and equality. In addition to his attempt at promoting a just form of politics by dissolving the chamber, Mehmed V highlighted the need for a secure environment that could enable development and progress into modernity. As a matter of urgency, the Sultan stated that the

[71] 166PO/E/132 Avril 18, 1912 (no. 37).
[72] Kurt 2014, p. 967; McMeekin 2015, p. 68.
[73] Kayali 1995.
[74] 166PO/E/132 July 28, 1912 (no. 68), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Laporte, Aleppo.

Minister of Interior would be sending missions to the provinces, to rectify issues of territorial contestation and to assign lands to nomadic tribes, with the aim to make the latter sedentary.[75]

The sedentarisation of the nomadic tribes in the Syrian provinces by the Sublime Porte provided an opportunity for the government to transform the security and economy of the Syrian provinces. Crucially, it made it easier for the Sublime Porte to maintain a monopoly on the use of force and to extract capital from new sources of taxation. The Sultan also noted that the Arab populations were not happy with the previous state of affairs and acknowledged the state of disorder, insecurity, and a lack of justice which had consolidated into anarchy, a situation that was rampant throughout the administration. The Sultan's concern, according to the French consul in Aleppo, was believed to have developed from notables that had expressed desire to be placed under the suzerainty of foreign powers in order to end the oppression of the Turkish government.[76]

In addition to notables in the Syrian provinces requesting the suzerainty of foreign powers, requests had been made by the notable classes to the Sultan. The requests from populations in Beirut, Damascus, and Aleppo, were concerned with the dissolution of parliament and the call for new elections:

> The nation is irritated with the parliament because it is the tool of the former fallen ministry, who were menacing, and employed injustice, strain, arbitrary rulings, and violence to elect notorious schemers and traitors of the nation. We are sending you, your Majesty, this letter in faith that a decree is promulgated to ordinate the dissolution of the chamber and the renewal of elections to give the nation reason to rejoice over the advent of a regime that holds justice and liberty and the constitution – which should be saved against all manoeuvres.[77]

The French consul in Aleppo, commenting on the request that had been sent from the notables in Aleppo, concluded that they had not forgiven the delegates of the CUP, nor their

[75] 166PO/E/132 April 19, 1912 (no. 227), from M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], Discours du Thrône.
[76] 166PO/E/132 April 19, 1912 (no. 227).
[77] 166PO/E/132 August 9, 1912 (no. 54), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from the Consul General in Damascus.

functionaries, for the transgressions made on the customary social order, including institutional centralisation, social dislocation from authority, and attempts to replace cultural customs and the Arabic language with liberal practices of modernity and the Turkish language.[78]

The request for new elections was fulfilled on August 5, 1912, when the Sultan called for new general elections following the establishment of the interim government by Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, which led to the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies. The beginning of this election period was known as the 'election with a stick', due to the CUP's forceful activities – including placing many opposition notables and journalists into exile – creating a feeling of 'habitual fatalism' in the Syrian provinces. However, the conclusion of the election was never realised and the electoral campaigns were suspended in October due to the outbreak of the Balkan Wars (October 8, 1912 – May 30, 1913 and June 29, 1913 – August 10, 1913).

The outbreak of war between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire had a significant impact on the Sublime Porte. In addition to the election campaigns being suspended, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha was decried as a weak leader for his decision to demobilise sections of the First Army in Thrace. The CUP framed the decision to demobilise as a sign of weakness and organised pro-war demonstrations. Feeling pressured concede to the CUP and the demonstrators, Ahmed Muhtar Pasha declared war on October 17, 1912 and resigned twelve days later.[79] The outbreak of the Balkan Wars not only interrupted the general elections in the Ottoman Empire, but also weakened the Ottoman Empire to the extent that Italy viewed it as an opportunity to extract significant concessions from the Ottoman Empire.[80]

Following the declaration of war, the French consul in Damascus wrote to the ministry of foreign affairs in France that there had been large demonstrations of a patriotic nature in many of the provinces, including Damascus, and at the request of the Ottoman authorities.[81] He continued by stating that despite these demonstrations, Christians and Jews, and even some of the Muslim populations, have been using whatever means available to avoid military service. Christians and Jews have emigrated in large numbers or have paid a tax to exonerate themselves from service, while Muslims have deserted and fled the region. The French

[78] 166PO/E/132 July 28, 1912 (no. 68).
[79] McMeekin 2015, pp. 68-69l.
[80] Askew 1942, pp. 242-245.
[81] 166PO/D20/19 November 4, 1912 (no. 64), La Situation à Damas, written by Ottavi.

consul continued that the Christians and Jews, if they were given the opportunity, would join the ranks of the Balkan armies, as they were hostile to the Turks and rejoiced in Turkish defeats; fearing the eventual Ottoman defeat and its consequences.[82]

Following the remarks on the situation in Damascus by the French consul, on November 10, 1912, the consul in Aleppo, M. Laporte, wrote that an Ottoman functionary had informed him that Turkey had endured its final blow. [83] Although Germany had trained the Ottoman military and provided the Empire with arms, Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to offer them any further support, which the Ottoman Empire desperately needed.[84] The functionary cautioned that the Empire would be forced to admit their weakness in governing, citing the pitiful state of the soldiers, a growing famine, and a season of severe weather that would then deliver its territories to Europe,[85] an important goal for France.

With the Ottoman Empire in such a weakened state, the French and British were proceeding with caution given Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests in Serbia and Albania. To settle the issues regarding borders and territorial ownership, the European powers met in London on December 16 and 17, 1912. The Ottoman Empire, represented by Reshid Pasha, was willing to concede on Macedonia, but refused to let go of Adrianople (Edirne) and Thrace, while Albania was to be granted autonomy under the supervision of the European powers.[86]

The CUP was unhappy that Reshid Pasha had been willing to succumb to the demands of the European powers, and strategised a coup against the interim PFU-leaning government led by Mehmed Kamil Pasha, the Grand Vizier to Sultan Mehmed V following the resignation of Ahmed Muhtar Pasha, with the aim of restarting the war and taking the territories back by force. Given the position of the Ottoman Empire and the implicit threats that were made by the European powers at the conference in London, including the threat of a Russian intervention, the Grand Council put the conditions to a vote, with a clear majority of 69 to 1 of the councillors agreeing to a peaceful settlement, despite requiring the abandonment of Adrianople. The following day, on January 23, 1913, the CUP staged a coup, forcing the government, which had been backed by the Saviour Officers, to resign at gunpoint.[87]

[82] 166PO/D20/19 November 4, 1912 (no. 64).
[83] 166PO/D1/89 November 10, 1912 (no. 49), from M. Laporte, Aleppo.
[84] McMeekin 2015, p. 74.
[85] 166PO/D1/89 November 10, 1912 (no. 49).
[86] McMeekin 2015, pp. 76-77.
[87] McMeekin 2015, pp. 76-77.

The return of the CUP to the Sublime Porte created a general sense of anxiety in the Syrian provinces, with the population fearing the re-emergence of excessive and brutal Turkification. In Beirut, the French consul notes that the feeling of despair was shared by the populations, regardless of religion and class, the population generally wished to be removed from Turkish oppression, to be free from Turkish taxes, military service, and the consequences of war.[88] In Aleppo, however, it was believed and openly discussed, that the Ottoman Empire was coming to an end. The general spirit, noted by M. Laporte, was very pessimistic – stating quite simply that the situation in the provinces was one of 'chaos'.[89] During this period of pessimism and chaos, the CUP had re-engaged the Balkans in war, and by the end of May the Ottoman Empire was forced to concede by signing the Treaty of London (1913) without making any territorial gains.[90]

### 7.2.1 *Liberté*: The Arab Congress (1913) in Paris

The consequence of instability in the Sublime Porte, particularly with regards to the conflict between the CUP and the PFU and the war with the Balkan states, was the increased desire for autonomy and secession from the Ottoman Empire on behalf of the Syrian population. Accompanying these events was the growing sentiment of a separate Arab identity, which had been accentuated throughout attempts to culturally assimilate the Arab population into a Turkish identity. Coupled with the growing belief that the Ottoman Empire was going to collapse, the Arab nationalists were incentivised to move forward with the possibility of secession and independence.

Prior to the Ottoman Empire signing the Treaty of London, bringing the First Balkan War (October 8, 1812 – May 30, 1913) to an end, rumours were circulating in Damascus that the CCS was planning an Arab Congress in Paris to discuss the desires of the Arab populations in the Ottoman Empire. The purpose of the Congress was to discuss the rights of Arabs living within the Ottoman Empire and the desire for reforms and decentralisation. Participants that had been invited to the congress were mostly of Syrian origin and there was near equal representation between Muslims and Christians.[91]

News of the Arab Congress was met with anger by Damascene Unionists, some of whom came from notable families. The notable class who had joined the Unionists did not

[88] 166PO/E/275 February 24, 1913, sent to M. Jonnart, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, from M. Couget, Beirut.
[89] 166PO/D1/89 February 2, 1913 (no. 7), from M. Laporte, Aleppo.
[90] McMeekin 2015, p. 78.
[91] 166PO/D20/19 May 22, 1913, Au sujet du prohain congrès arabe de Paris, written by Ottavi, Damascus.

necessarily subscribe to Unionist policies of Turkification, but had enjoyed the benefits and privilege that came with membership. The Unionists, argued that the participants of the Arab Congress, particularly the CCS, were not representative of the populations of Syria and went as far as explicitly referencing their status as part of the notable class in an attempt to diminish their activities:

> Those who are taking part are saying that they are doing so for the benefit of the country. We are the principal notables of Damascus. It is us that represents Syria and we have not delegated our powers to anyone. The Syrians who assemble in Paris are men without mandate and are largely unknown. We protest this usurpation that they are committing. At the same time, we proclaim to the highest degree, our loyalty to the Ottoman Empire.

The declaration made by the Unionists in Damascus argued that the CUP had made many efforts to satisfy the populations in the Syrian provinces through reforms such as making it obligatory to teach Arabic in schools and making Arabic the official language of the Syrian courts. Accompanying the rejection of the Arab Congress by the Arab Unionists in Damascus, the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris asked the French government to ban the meeting from taking place in Paris.[92]

Despite the objections from the Unionists in Damascus and the Ottoman Ambassador in Paris, the French allowed the Arab Congress to take place in Paris. However, it was a source of tension throughout Syria that reflected the ongoing hostility of Unionists and Ottoman loyalists to ideas of decentralisation and a Syrian Arab nationalism.[93] Public sentiment in support of the Arab Congress had become widespread, and in an editorial published by the newspaper '*al-Takaddoum*', the author, a Maronite, who was later assaulted in the streets following the publication, argued:

> the just man can never share this opinion [that the Arab Congress should not proceed] and would find that the conduct of our Arab delegates are not in contrast or in conflict with the

[92] 166PO/D20/19 May 22, 1913.
[93] Sorby 2005, p. 18.

> interests of our government, these men had to travel to a foreign place in order to discuss liberty because of the opposition by local authorities.

The article continued that had the Sublime Porte been more amenable to differences in opinion, then the Arab Congress would have possibly taken place in a city within the Ottoman Empire. The choice to hold the Arab Congress in Paris was to ensure liberty of action,

> […] for their part, France, a great nation, has an altruistic sympathy for other people and does all it can to manifest its solicitude to everyone in considering everyone like a brother or parent. A just man must then consider France like the best friend of Turkey. […] It is the most noble nation, the most sublime in everything and in every occasion, it is her that has given the most generous hospitality to our liberals during the regime of oppression, it is France who has brought up our great men, and who has, so to speak, been the case of their moral victory.[94]

Although France allowed for the Arab Congress to take place in Paris, the decision was motivated in the pursuit of French interests. French interests in Syria included maintaining a strategic base of support with the Christian community, particularly in Mount Lebanon. By allowing the Arab Congress to convene in Paris, the French administration was able to propagate a particular narrative of being a 'just' and 'noble' nation, which had continuously sought to help liberal ideas flourish against oppression. Buying into this framework, the Christian delegates from Beirut had voiced their desire for the creation of Greater Lebanon, encompassing Beirut, and under French protection.[95] Despite French maintenance of a strong base of support among the Christians, the British consul wrote that the Arabs express desire to 'pass under British rule'.[96] Following this despatch, the British consul continued: 'all the Muslims here were in favour of some form of British Administration being extended […]

[94] 166PO/D1/89 June 27, 1913 (no. 79), sent to M. Boppe, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Laporte, Aleppo, and the article in al-Takaddoum (the Progress), 16 June, 1913 is published the same day that the Second Balkan War begins.
[95] Sorby 2005, p. 18.
[96] FO/195/2453 May 16, 1913 (no. 154), sent to Sir G. Lowther, British Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Grey, Foreign Office, London.

and that they hoped the [Damascus] Province would be placed under the Egyptian Government'.[97]

This contradiction between the desires of the Christian populations seeking official French protection and some of the populations in Syria wishing to be placed under British or Egyptian rule reflect the disparate political ideas within society. The delegates at the Arab Congress who were requesting this separate status under French protection were perpetuating the early civilisational discourse that separated the Christians and Mount Lebanon from the populations and geography of Syria. By portraying themselves as leaders in the fight against oppression in the Syrian provinces, the French administration was attempting to build on sentiments that were already accepted by the Christians in order to widen their support in the Syrian provinces and reduce British influence.

The pursuit of French economic and geopolitical interests made it difficult for the CUP to discourage the French government from allowing the Arab Congress to take place in Paris. Because of the French position, the CUP decided to send a delegate, Midhat Shukri, to attend the meetings. At the Arab Congress in Paris, Midhat Shukri, the Secretary General for the CUP, had engineered an agreement that conceded to some of the demands that had been made by the participants at the Arab Congress, including the right for a regional Arab military service and the use of Arabic as the official language.[98]

The procurement of the agreement between the delegates at the Arab Congress and Midhat Shukri created the excitement over the prospect of progress with regards to Arab rights in the Ottoman Empire. However, the Arab delegates were later let down by the Sublime Porte. On August 18, 1913, an imperial decree was issued, declaring the accepted terms of the Paris Agreement. The decree had weakened the language and provisions of the initial agreement, between the Arab delegates and Midhat Shukri, limiting Arabic as the official language to a language that would only be taught in elementary schools. The decree made no further attempt at promulgating the other promises.[99] By backtracking on the Paris Agreement, the Turkish government deepened the socio-political chasm that had been developing since the initial programme of Turkification in 1909 by the CUP. In their attempt to create a stable political environment and a Turkish distinct nationalism, built on a cultural framework and

[97] FO/195/2453 April 21, 1913 (no. 24), sent to Sir G. Lowther, British Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], M. Fontana, Aleppo.
[98] Other areas of concern had been discussed at the Congress included Zionist immigration into Palestine and the potential to develop an entente, see Mandel 1965; Sorby 2005, p. 18.
[99] Antonius 1939, pp. 117-118.

justified by ideas of liberty, secularism, and rationality, the CUP had nourished an oppositional Arab nationalism in Syria.

### 7.3 The First World War: French and British Victory and the Fragmentation of the Middle East

The losses endured by the Ottoman Empire caused by the Balkan Wars (October 8, 1812–May 30, 1913 and June 29, 1913–August 10, 1813) and the threats to internal stability caused by factionalism within the Sublime Porte and the pursuit of European interests – particularly from Russia, led the CUP to believe that in order to survive, the Ottoman Empire had to become a 'nation in arms'.[100] To be able to come out victorious and persevere in a European system, the Ottoman Empire required military power for security. Under these conditions, the Sublime Porte exploited converging interests with Germany over the fear of growing Russian power, believing that should any European war break out, the Germans would emerge victorious and the Sublime Porte would be able to recuperate some – if not all – of the territories that had been lost during the Balkan Wars, with the potential of expanding further.[101]

The supply of aid to the Ottoman Empire by Germany was reciprocated by granting Germany access to Aleppo as a zone of influence that could be exploited for material interests. After learning of this agreement, the French consul in Aleppo, M. Laporte, expressed his frustration by comparing French material interests in the Syrian provinces with those of Germany, arguing that the Germans do not possess nearly the same amount of leverage as the French, citing commercial, as well as social interests. Regarding the latter, the French consul argued that the population 'looks to the French for moral guidance while the Germans remain unpopular'.[102]

The alliance with Germany was an alliance of convenience and short-sighted. Although the Sublime Porte desired to create a strong military, a 'nation in arms', it was not prepared for further conflict, and the Ottoman-German relationship placed the Sublime Porte in the centre of inter-European politics. This included an article on German relations with Russia, which arranged that 'in the event of war with Russia, Turkey will take direct and significant action'.[103] The article put the Sublime Porte at risk of being drawn into a major confrontation,

[100] Aksakal 2011, p. 197.
[101] McMeekin 2015, p. 87; Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 106-107.
[102] 166PO/D1/89 June 15, 1913 (no. 35), Activité allemande, from M. Laporte, Aleppo.
[103] Aksakal 2011, p. 200.

and indeed, that risk became a reality following the July Crisis of 1914, which was precipitated by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand.[104]

The assassination led to a series of diplomatic agreements and manoeuvres with an ultimatum being presented to Serbia, which had been rejected. The rejection of the ultimatum subsequently led to the declaration of war by Austria-Hungary on July 28, 1914. Soon after, the other European powers were drawn into a growing conflict with Russia and Germany declaring war on each other on August 1, 1914, followed by declarations of war between Germany and France on August 3, 1914.[105] Because of the agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Germany, the Sublime Porte quickly found itself at war with the more powerful European powers – notably Britain, France, and Russia.

The entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war as an ally of Germany, created tensions within the Syrian provinces, particularly with the Christian populations in Mount Lebanon who did not feel compelled to support the Sublime Porte or the Germans. Georges Picot, the French consul in Beirut, writing to the French Ambassador in Istanbul, described in the despatch how 'the Lebanese have come to the base of Mount Lebanon, ready to defend the French with doctors, students from French schools, and a desire to work with the Red Cross'. He continued that some had even asked if they could go to Marseille, using whatever savings they had, stating that the return does not matter, due to the likelihood of their death. Picot remarked that some had already made the voyage from Beirut to Marseille, while others had donated their savings to help the plight of France in the war.

> It is understood by all the Lebanese that the war that is raging between the European powers is also their war, playing an indirect part in the plains of Belgium is the liberties won for Lebanon so laboriously through the protection provided by France.[106]

The relationship that had been cultivated between the French and the Maronite communities in Mount Lebanon over the nineteenth century had a clear impact on identity and loyalty,

[104] McMeekin 2015, pp. 95-101; Zürcher 2016, pp. 114-5; Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 111-114.
[105] McMeekin 2015, pp. 95-101; Zürcher 2016, pp. 114-5; Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 111-114.
[106] 166PO/E/275 August 17, 1914 (no. 135), sent to M. Bompard, French Ambassador in Istanbul [Constantinople], from M. Georges-Picot, Beirut.

with some of the population willing to fight for the French state, while evading enlistment into the Ottoman army throughout the nineteenth century.

Realising the depths of the divisions that existed with the population in the Syrian provinces, the Sublime Porte, reacted with force, attempting to bring the populations into submission. During the First World War, the Sublime Porte sought to ensure complete security in Syria as it would serve as the foundation for the expedition against Egypt. Djemel Pasha, commander for Turkey's Fourth Army, was based in Damascus and was conferred a great deal of power in order to discourage any potential for rebellion. To maintain control through a display of strength, Djemel Pasha executed several Syrians and Lebanese on charges of espionage in March and August 1915.[107]

While the French had maintained support from the Christians in Mount Lebanon and the Sublime Porte had been actively pursuing individuals accused of conspiring, the British, through Sir Henry McMahon, began negotiations with Sheriff Hussein of Mecca, King of the Hejaz, with the support of the Arab Nationalist Committees in Syria and North Mesopotamia.

> As a result of the negotiations [between McMahon and Sheriff Hussein] the British Government undertook to "recognise and support" the independence of the Arabs within a certain area, without prejudice to existing treaties between the British Government and Arab chiefs, or to the special interests of our Ally France.[108]

McMahon had been the British High Commissioner in Egypt during this period, and had helped with the promotion of a general revolt from Hejaz into the Syrian provinces against the Ottoman Empire. The movement that developed was a national movement, unconcerned with religion, and an expression of difference between the Arab national identity and that of the Turkish national identity. The goal of the revolt was to vindicate and accomplish the desire for Arab autonomy from the Ottoman Empire.[109]

---

[107] 1SL/1/V/394 December 30, 1930 (no. 979), sent to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, from M. Ponsot, Beirut.
[108] F/205/3/7, Lloyd George Papers, The Syrian Question.
[109] F/205/3/7.

British support for Hussein's revolt came with conditions and although the relationship that had been fostered between Hussein and McMahon had established British support for a future Arab state, or confederation of Arab states, the French and British had also divided the territories of the Syrian provinces and Mesopotamia into zones of influence in which they would maintain legitimate leverage. The French and British argued that the purpose of the plan was to bring the Arab state or confederation of Arab states to a standard that would warrant independence. However, this plan could not be divorced of French and British interests, and based on those interests, the European powers forced the Arabs to accept compromises on promises of independence and unity. This included giving the French a 'free hand along the Syrian littoral from the ladder of Tyre northward and priority of political advice and economic enterprise in a wide hinterland, including Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo'.[110]

In addition to agreeing on British and French zones of influence throughout the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and agreeing between themselves the near unlimited privileges over resources and populations, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, of May 16, 1916 outlined the responsibilities and rights of both European powers:

> France and Great Britain are prepared to recognise and uphold an independent Arab State, or a Confederation of Arab States […] under the suzerainty of an Arab chief. That in area (a) France, and in area (b) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. [They will also, in their respective areas,] supply advisers or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab state, or Confederation of Arab States. [That in their respective areas each power is] allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desire, and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab State, or Confederation of Arab States.[111]

[110] Russia was fine with the agreement between France and England for the development of an Arab state or a federation of states encompassing the territories of Syria, Cilicie, and Mesopotamia. However, Russia requests that annexation of Erzeroum, Trebizonde, Van, and Bitlis. The Kurdistan region, situated south of Van and of Bitlis, Sert, running the course of the Tigris, Djeziret-ibn-Omar, the line made by the mountains that dominate Amadia, and the region of Mergavar. F/205/1: M. Sazonof, Minister of Foreign Affairs to M. Plaeologue, French Ambassador to Russia, April 26, 1916; F/205/3/7.

[111] F/205/1: Sykes-Picot Agreement. May 16, 1916.

The two governments agreed to maintain effective control over the economy and the ports in their respective geographic areas, while also controlling the influx of arms into the Arab territories.[112] Although the agreement was premised as a state building project with the aim of developing and preparing the populations in their respective territories for independence, it also divided the spoils of war between France and Britain and established mutual legal recognition of their respective rights in the Syrian provinces and Mesopotamia. While King Hussein had supported the idea of establishing an independent Arab state, or confederation of Arab states, he protested the exclusion of the Syrian littoral from the independent Arab areas, as well as split authority between France and Britain; stating that both powers had different desires and different means of social and political organisation. Hussein argued that the establishment of an Arab state on these different organisational principles obstructed any future potential for unity between divided region following independence.[113]

Although King Hussein had been privy to the agreement, it excluded the explicit acceptance of a legitimate and locally recognised leader in the Arab provinces. Despite the previous proclamations that the Arabs had a superior understanding of European ideas of liberty in contrast to the Sublime Porte, which had been under the control of Sultan Abdul Hamid II,[114] the Arabs were not awarded the privilege to be recognised as a 'civilised nation'. Rather, the foundation of Arab independence and autonomy was confined to the subjective perceptions of French and British civilisational standards, which desired the replication of French and British institutions to order society, politics, and the economy in a manner that was recognised and simplified the facilitation of relations to retain political and economic access.

### 7.3.1 The Arab Revolt (1916): The Betrayal of Hussein

Despite the conditions that had been placed on British support for a general Arab Revolt led by King Hussein, Hussein viewed support as an opportunity to overthrow the despotic rule of the Young Turks and subsequently claim victory. The Young Turks, however, had begun to suspect Hussein of treachery. In an attempt to force Hussein into a position that favoured the Sublime Porte and gain support from the Muslim populations in the Ottoman Empire, the Sublime Porte proclaimed that the Ottoman Empire was engaged in a Holy War, with the support of King Hussein, against France, Britain, and Russia. Hussein, however, rejected this announcement and argued that he had made no such declaration of support.[115]

---

112 F/205/1: Sykes-Picot Agreement. May 16, 1916.
113 F/205/3/7.
114 Ismail 1976, vol. 15, pp. 126-128, December 6, 1884.
115 Rogan 2015, pp. 275-309.

Following King Hussein's rejection of the announcement made by the Young Turks, the Arab nationalists, who had also been engaged in secret negotiations with the British and French administrations, declared their support for Hussein. The political mobilisation in favour of a separate Arab state, independent of Turkish authority, had further developed among the populations in the Syrian provinces after Djemel Pasha ordered the arrest of all individuals involved in decentralisation movements which remained active, collecting the names of individuals by searching through documents following a raid on the French consulate in Damascus. The information collected from the consulate led to a largescale manhunt and the application of the death penalty for individuals who were perceived as traitors.[116] On May 6, 1916, a number of executions had been committed in Beirut and Damascus, and a month later, on June 5, 1916, Hussein led the Arabs into revolt, with the backing of Britain against the Ottoman Empire and the CUP controlled government.[117]

The historical narrative of the Arab Revolt, specifically the account that is described by George Antonius, describes the Arab Revolt as a great movement which amassed widespread support.[118] However, Antonius' account of the Arab Revolt is disputed, despite coinciding with previous French and British despatches noting the high levels of membership in secret Arab societies following the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), the Arab Revolt failed to gather widespread support as many Arab nationalists viewed it as an Islamist revolt due to Hussein's desire to claim Islamic rights from the Ottoman Sultan. Indifference can also be attributed to the nature of customary authority, with many notables refusing to partake in the revolt in fear that they would forfeit their power to Hussein. Additionally, many tribal groups and networks refused to join Hussein due to inter-tribal rivalries, while those who did join, believed that there would be an economic advantage waiting for them at the conclusion of the revolt.[119]

While many individuals were indifferent to the Arab Revolt because of suspected religious undertones, the forfeiture of power, and the inter-tribal rivalries, opposition to Hussein had also developed. Opposition to Hussein had emerged from some families in Mecca due to their dependence on Turkish pensions, while Indian Muslims opposed Hussein's claims to the caliphate, and the *Ulema* refused to recognise Hussein's claims regarding his role within

116 1SL/1/V/394 December 30, 1930 (no. 979).
117 Rogan 2015, pp. 275-309.
118 Antonius 1939.
119 Dawisha 2003, p. 34.

the Islamic community as long as the Ottoman Empire continued to exist.[120] In addition to opposition from various sectors of society, Hussein's position and demands were opposed by the British administration:

> He wanted to be recognised as king of all the Arabs, considered himself the rightful claimant of the caliphate of Islam, and was unwilling to recognise the arrangements which the Allies were determined to introduce.[121]

Although King Hussein's efforts to lead an Arab Revolt was met with indifference and opposition, Thomas Edward Lawrence, a British intelligence and military officer, nicknamed 'Lawrence of Arabia', had forged an alliance with Faisal bin Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi (Faisal), who Lawrence believed was a suitable individual to lead the Arabs into revolt. As Hussein's revolt moved northwards into Mesopotamia and Syria, Faisal had become persuaded by the idea of creating a separate Syrian empire from the Kingdom which his father desired.[122]

The divisions that were exposed between Faisal and his father, Hussein, were made worse by a lack of clarity regarding the future establishment of a future Arab state. Despite various plans having been proposed and discussed, including establishing a separate Syrian empire, an autonomous Arab Kingdom, and the creation of dual sovereignty between the Turks and the Arabs, similar to Austria-Hungary, there had been no unifying vision for the period following the successes against Ottoman forces in the Syrian provinces.[123] The lack of agreement over the status of the Arab provinces and the creation of an Arab state was made worse by the divisions within the Hashemite dynasty, and left the question of Syria open to the desires of Britain and France without a credible singular opposition.

In an attempt to bring clarity to the state of disorder that had developed with regards to the question of a Syrian state, the British government issued a Memorandum on British Commitment to King Hussein, clarifying the British position that they were not legally committed the promises made to King Hussein, as there had never been any formal agreement or treaty signed by both parties, or acknowledgement by both parties. Instead, the

---

120 Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 185-192.
121 Salibi 2005, p. 24; Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 192-3.
122 Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 193-7.
123 Karsh and Karsh 1999, pp. 195-8; Salibi 2005, pp. 48, 131.

British guaranteed against the restoration of the status quo and the recognition of King Hussein's office, refusing to guarantee the independence, rights, and privileges of the Sheriffiate.[124] In this manner, the British abandoned responsibility to Hussein and continued to observe the agreement that had been established with France.

### 7.3.2 The Collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)

Leading up to the armistice between the Ottoman Empire and the allied European powers on October 31, 1918, the Young Turk government, led by Enver Pasha, collapsed. Following the collapse of the Sublime Porte, the British had established control over Syria and Mesopotamia and the French, in the Syrian littoral and throughout Lebanon, established a military administration. To prevent the possibility of public anger, the French and British put together a joint declaration on November 8, 1918, assuring the populations in the Arab provinces that the establishment of military administrations was provisional and that the French and British administrations would consider the desires of the populations in developing the governments.[125]

The Anglo-French Declaration of November 8, 1918 began with the promise of 'liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks, and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations'.[126] The declaration continued by stating that assistance to these new governments and administrations in the liberated territories would be provided by France and Britain, with the promise to then recognise the governments

> as soon as they are effectively established. So far from desiring to impose specific institutions upon the populations of these regions, their sole object is to ensure by their support and effective assistance, that the governments and administrations adopted by these regions of their own free will shall be exercised in the normal way.

The declaration also promised justice (for all), economic development through local initiatives, and education, and to 'put an end to the divisions too long exploited by Turkish

[124] F/205/2/4, Memorandum on British Comments to King Husein.
[125] F/205/3/7 The Syrian Question.
[126] F/205/2/5 November 9, 1918, Anglo-French Declaration.

policy'.[127] On this foundation of ethical humanitarianism the French and British state building projects were conceived. However, once in practice, the projects became mired in the pursuit of European interests, often disregarding or exploiting the populations. For example, the French used the fears of Muslim domination within the Christian communities in Lebanon and Beirut to maintain protection over and favour Christian leadership, while many others in the region, not necessarily based on religious or sectarian identity, but on nationalist identities, disliked French presence because they were viewed as a symbol of sectarian divisions.[128] Contradicting the French promise to end the divisions 'too long exploited by Turkish policy', the French administration in the Syrian littoral exploited Christian fears of Muslim domination in order to maintain a presence and a favourable alliance.

The Anglo-French Declaration contained parallels to U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's twelfth point in the Fourteen Points: to ensure that the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire 'should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'. However, the principles for peace that had been released by the American President called for 'effective support and assistance' rather than institutional engineering.[129] Wilson's vision of global governance following the end of the First World War went beyond the establishment of bilateral and multilateral treaties to create an institutional legal framework that encompassed all sovereign states as equal members, asserting itself as 'universal, open, and cosmopolitan',[130] however the development of global governance retained many of the characteristics and logics of the previous European state system.

Institutionalisation of global governance through the establishment of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference (January 18, 1919-January 21, 1920),[131] necessitated the continuation of a standard of civilisation. States would be accepted into the League of Nations only if they could fulfil a specific set of criteria to become recognised, including institutional progress, order, and modernity. Validating the institutionalisation of this standard was the belief that institutions provided a rational, ordered, and progressive distribution of power that could be easily maintained.[132] The role of the French and the

[127] F/205/2/5 November 9, 1918.
[128] F/205/3/7.
[129] Woodrow Wilson 1918.
[130] Anghie 2002, pp. 513-514.
[131] Northedge 1986.
[132] Buzan 2014; Fidler 2001; Gong 1984.

British administrations following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire was therefore to prepare the former Ottoman provinces for accession to the League of Nations.

Although the Anglo-French Declaration had promised 'the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations', free choice of the native populations was subjected to a limited selection of appropriate choices established by the French and the British.[133] Independence was subject to the desires of the French and British administrations in the League of Nations. Despite being established to bring in a new era of 'universal, open, and cosmopolitan' internationalism, the states that were responsible for admission into the League of Nations were the same states responsible for the administration of the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. Because of their multiple roles, the French and the British administrations were able to pursue their own desires as the single legitimate and valid desire, disregarding the 'free choice of the native populations',[134] and condemning resistance and the pursuit of independence by the native populations as irrational.

The future of the Arab provinces following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had become an increasingly difficult puzzle to solve, not merely because of resistance to the French and British plans, but the inability to create a settlement that was satisfactory for all parties involved.[135] While Faisal had desired the establishment of a 'self-conscious civilisation',[136] an undivided pan-Arab nation, the French and British, as well as the various localised national movements, found this vision to be unsatisfactory in the pursuit of disparate interests. As an example, the Lebanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference sent a letter to the French and British delegations asking them to reconsider their support for a Syrian or Arab state, believing that the establishment of such a state would 'condemn us [the Lebanese] … this would mean death to our independence, which we have safe-guarded for centuries at the cost of countless sacrifices'. In the same letter, the Lebanese delegation maintained that in order for their independence to succeed, they must remain as a French Protectorate.[137]

The desire for independence by the Lebanese delegation at the Peace Conference, was not concerned with sovereignty, but instead, was a plea for autonomy. The Lebanese delegation

[133] F/205/2/5 November 9, 1918.
[134] F/205/2/5 November 9, 1918.
[135] F/205/3/7.
[136] F/59/10/2 March 24, 1919, Letter sent to M. Lloyd-George, from Faissal.
[137] F/205/3/3 February 19, 1919, Translation of a letter addressed to Monseigneur Joseph Darian dealing with the subject of the Lebanese Delegation to the Peace Conference.

insisted on a political separation from the Syrians and the Arab nationalists and wanted to maintain French dominance within its territories for physical and political protection. Faisal, however, argued that despite the cleavages that exist due to the various national parties, 'they are all agreed to perish utterly, rather than witness the division and mutilation of this country'.[138] However, for the Lebanese delegation, the protections from the nineteenth century French administration in Mount Lebanon with the Maronites provided them with political and economic power and prosperity, accompanied and justified by the narrative that they were of a different civilisation that contrasted Muslim fanaticism.

The inability to create a unified single voice within the Arab provinces, such as the desire for continued French protection expressed by the Lebanese delegation, helped validate the French and British pursuit of interests through the establishment of the Mandate system. However, Faisal noted that the division of the territories under the leadership of France and Britain would be perceived as a failure by the Muslims, leading to 'a very strong reaction, which will carry ruin and disaster in its steps',[139] cautioning that their vision risked ruin:

> The future government of the Arab provinces will be the last lesson to be given by Europe to the East. If it does not turn out to be in accordance with the wishes of the people, confidence will be lost in every future official treatment, and a wide channel opened for intrigues and troubles.[140]

Similarly, Sati 'al-Husri had argued against the divisions of the Arab territories, stating that any such development would be akin to opening a 'Pandora's Box'.[141]

### 7.4 Conclusion

The application of a standard of civilisation to the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth century required the Sublime Porte to accede to a benchmark of modernity in order to be accepted as a 'civilised nation'. Its application provided the Sublime Porte with a blueprint to modernity, but also validated the pursuit of European interests. European interference and interventions within the Sublime Porte and the Syrian provinces had led to a dissemination of knowledges and practices, particularly concerned with the promotion of

138 F/59/10/3 May 1919, Letter sent to the British Prime Minister's Government, from Faissal.
139 F/59/10/3 May 1919.
140 F/59/10/3 May 1919.
141 Bassam 1971, p. 116; Mansfield 2013, pp. 1-71; See chapter 2.

'liberal' and 'modern' political frameworks, which were deployed by various nationalist movements, including the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and the Young Turks, the Party of Freedom and Understanding (PFU), the Lebanese nationalists, and the Arab nationalists. The European concepts employed by these nationalist groups sought to justify the pursuit of interests, including political power, and, in the case of the Lebanese and Arab nationalists, independence.

The use of 'liberal' and 'modern' political frameworks by the Young Turks, under the umbrella of the CUP, had provided them with legitimacy as the liberal opposition to Sultan Abdul Hamid II's previous centralisation of authority. Following the Young Turk Revolution (1908), which led to the establishment of the second constitutional era, there had been growing sense of hope that the political landscape within the Sublime Porte had improved. From Paris, the *Comité Central Syrien* (CCS) reacted positively to the news that the Young Turks had been successful in their Revolution to establish a constitutional regime with a parliament. However, the positive reaction to these changes was with the hope that authority and governance would become decentralised, and the Arab nationalists would be able to establish modern institutions of governance that could function independently to prepare for the eventual demise of the Ottoman Empire. The goal for the CCS, a leading Arab Nationalist organisation in exile, was the removal of Turkish domination over Syria.

Although the CUP had promoted themselves as a liberal party, their domination within parliament made it difficult for oppositional forces to participate and their use of notable individuals to maintain power. On April 12, 1909, two oppositional parties, the Muslim Fraternity and the Party of Ottoman Liberals staged an armed insurrection to remove the CUP from power. The break in service did not last long, and by April 24, 1909, the CUP had regained control of the government institutions, and established martial law, limited freedoms of association and press, and disregarded requests from decentralist parties. Facing a threat to their status, the CUP had begun to pursue a civilisational programme that would modernise the Syrian provinces and homogenise the populations under a Turkish cultural identity.

The policies of Turkification led to emerging conflict within the Sublime Porte, notably with the PFU, and within the Syrian provinces, particularly in Aleppo and Mount Lebanon. While the European concepts had been adopted and deployed by all of these movements, in a variety of ways, the characteristics of the Ottoman state were being contested. With the

Sublime Porte, already in a state of disorder caused by the CUP's centralised form of governance, changes within the European state system created a new set of problems for the government in Istanbul. The development of Italian demands on the Sublime Porte regarding the status of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in September 1911 led to war (September 1911-October 1912) that provided the PFU with the opportunity to challenge the CUP's hold on power and form of governance.

The consequence of disorder in the Sublime Porte and the weakened status of the Ottoman Empire led to the regeneration of Arab nationalist demands for autonomy and independence, which were largely disregarded, helping to procure alliances between Lebanese and Arab nationalists with Britain and France during the First World War. Division within the Ottoman Empire during the First World War worked against the Ottoman war efforts and facilitated the collapse and division of the Empire in 1918.

Although the Arabs had been made a myriad of promises by the West regarding liberation, free choice, and the native authority, these promises were made under the conditioned of British and French guidance. The French and British governments argued that under their supervision, the Arab territories of the former Ottoman Empire could ascend to a civilised status and accede to the newly established League of Nations as an equal member. They asserted that the Mandates of Lebanon and Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine, would not be colonial ventures, but a limited intervention to order and modernise the populations, with the necessary institutions and programmes. The development of the British and French Mandates, also provided the European powers with the ability to undertake the near unimpeded pursuit of interests by developing long-term relations with political actors, the creation of political offices, and the delineation of strategic boundaries, that could continue to serve interests beyond the period of independence; justified by the civilisational quality.

## Chapter 8: Formalising the State in Lebanon and Syria: Establishing the French Vision for Lebanon and Syria

### 8 Introduction

The failures of the liberal programme in the Sublime Porte led to instability within the Ottoman Empire and the strengthening of the Arab nationalist movement. While the CUP had attempted to deploy liberal and modern frameworks of statehood that were prevalent in Europe, they also sought the homogenisation of the Empire to facilitate governance. The result of the CUP's attempts to establish a civilisational standard on the Arab provinces of the Empire was increased friction between the CUP and the Arab nationalists, who had developed a separate ethno-national identity. In the effort to formalise the establishment of a separate ethno-national state during the First World War, the Arabs, led by King Hussein, had formed a relationship with the British, while the Lebanese had developed an alliance with the French. Despite promises of independence, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, provided an opportunity for the British and the French governments to pursue their interests in the former Arab provinces, justifying the division of the Middle East region into zones of influence by proclaiming a civilising project that would lead to eventual independence.

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire is often discussed as the conclusion of a social and political era in the Syrian provinces and the introduction of a new social and political era developed under French authority and state building. Although control over the region changed hands, the idea of a rupture during this period fails to contend with social and political continuity within the region. Given, as this thesis argues, that the modern state building project began in the early nineteenth century, a period of institutional and social transformations that laid the foundation for the social and institutional architecture for the independent modern state in Lebanon and Syria, it is necessary to examine how the state building project continued until independence within the framework of a civilising project. Here it is argued that the French Mandate constituted a continuation of the French – specifically – and more broadly European – civilising project that cannot be separated from previous interactions.

It was apparent from the vocalised desires of the Arab nationalists that they had adopted a European framework of politics and statehood. Although there were competing visions of what an Arab state would look like among the populations in the former Ottoman Arab provinces, it was generally accepted that a secular state based on cultural commonalities and

language could emerge. However, the French government, in establishing the Mandate of Lebanon and Syria, sought to produce states and governments that were amenable to the pursuit of French economic and political interests in the region. Under the guise of a preparing Lebanon and Syria for independence, the French undertook a strategic programme that aimed to provide the ability to maintain favourable relations in the continued pursuit of interests following Lebanese and Syrian independence.

This chapter examines how the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria was established using coercive pacification and state building, which had been legitimised through liberal global governance. It analyses the division of Syria, the creation of Greater Lebanon and the preservation of customary networks and sectarian divisions to maintain the pursuit of interests. This chapter continues by examining the case of the Druze Revolt in 1925, as an act of resistance to the French assertion of authority, developing into a widespread rebellion. It subsequently discusses the result of the rebellion and the government reforms presented by the French authorities to the Syrian population, the failures of which increased animosity between the French and the Syrian populations, leading to increased contact between the Arab nationalists and Germany during the Second World War (1939-1945). This chapter then examines the precursory year to independence, focusing on the Syrian elections and the role of the French administration in trying to obtain a favourable outcome.

## 8.1 Establishing the French Mandate: The Broken Promise of Independence

Towards the end of the Paris Peace Conference, on November 1, 1919, the British military evacuated from Syria and French soldiers were deployed into their positions. Following the evacuation, the British communicated to Faisal and the French administration that they had officially abdicated their responsibility in the areas now under French control.[1] In response to the British communication, Faisal sent a letter of protest, stating that the arrangement agreed on by the French and the British was 'detrimental to the rights of the Arabs and in direct opposition to what they expected from the British and French governments in particular, and from the civilised world in general'.[2] The implementation of the agreement was in opposition to, not only British assurances made to the Hashemite family, but to the promise made by Woodrow Wilson of 'unmolested opportunity of autonomous development',[3] which was believed to have ushered in a new era of international politics.

[1] F/205/3/16, September 13, 1919, Aide-mémoire in regard to the Occupation of Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia pending the decision in regard to Mandate (Communicated to Foreign Office, September 18).
[2] F/205/3/17, September 24, 1919, His Highness Emir Faisal to the Prime Minister of Great Britain (Communicated to the Foreign Office September 24).
[3] Woodrow Wilson 1918, no. XII.

While Wilson's Fourteen Points and the establishment of an institutionalised system of global governance characterised as 'universal, open, and cosmopolitan'[4] re-established the standard of civilisation through a new, liberal discourse to frame the practices of global politics, the dynamics of those practices remained unchanged from periods before.

Knowledges and practices of coercive pacification from the colonial era continued into the French mandate of Lebanon and Syria, most notably when French occupation forces entered the region with the aim of disarming the Muslim populations while ignoring the aggressive actions of the Christians. Following the establishment of French occupation forces, the Christians reportedly felt emboldened, and in one instance, in the interior of Syria, near Zahlé, they entered a Mosque, insulted the Qur'an, and fired a gun at the Muslim governor. In a letter to the British government, Faisal stated that the Arabs were unsettled by the 'pressure used by the French officials to prevent the people from showing their desire for an Arab government', and that the French were imposing their will by force, exploiting 'the sectional [sectarian] passions which are unhappily so easily aroused in my country'.[5]

The use of sectarian divisions in the Syrian provinces to establish control, went beyond the schism between Christians and Muslims. Faisal accused the French of enflaming tensions between the Druze and the Shi'a in Djebel Amil, the Maronites and the Druze in Mount Lebanon, the Circassians and Arabs in Hola, the Ismailis the Alawites in Banias, and the Alawites and the Sunni Muslims in Latakia. In addition to enflaming sectarian tensions, Faisal accused the French of reproducing civilisational allegiances between the French government and the Maronites, in order to undermine the Arab Nationalists. However, it is noted that the populations were not completely complicit with French provocations and had also acted in retribution against French officers. In response to these activities, the French carried out punitive actions: attacking, burning down, or shelling villages, seizing crops, and driving off cattle and other livestock.[6] Nevertheless, by exploiting communal divisions, the French had strategized an efficient means to establish control over Syria that justified the separation of Greater Lebanon from Syria and the federalisation of Syria.

In an effort to resist French violence, the Lebanese Administrative Council, which had been the representational organisation for Mount Lebanon at the Paris Peace Conference, passed a resolution asking for independence without French assistance with the aim of forming a

[4] Anghie 2002, pp. 513-514.
[5] F/205/4/7, Note to H.B.M.'s Government on the Arab Question, Memo. On events in Syria, November 19 to July, 1920.
[6] F/205/4/7.

political agreement with the government in Damascus. The resolution surprised the French, who had come to rely on legitimacy from the Lebanese population to justify their actions in Syria, and who had previously asked for autonomy with French protections. To silence their critics, the French quickly arrested and exiled the council members on charges of treason before the resolution could be delivered to the other European members of the Peace Conference.[7]

The resolution passed by the Lebanese Council was subsequently followed by a similar declaration in Damascus, on March 8, 1920. The declaration, accepted by communal representatives, proclaimed independence for Syria with Faisal as the King. The representatives argued 'that if the allies were sincere, they would recognise this decision of the popular will, which was only putting their promises into execution, and the Turks, at the same time, would be proved liars'. With regards to the latter, the Turks had been arguing that Britain and France were not concerned with delivering Arab independence, rather the French desired the fulfilment of their imperialist interests in the region.[8] Summarising the state of affairs and the developments regarding 'the Arab Question' and echoing the Turkish government, the British indicated that 'it was clear the French were pursuing a purely colonial, imperialist policy'.[9]

The establishment of the Mandate was reflecting a colonial strategy with the use of violence, sectarian divisions, and the dismissal of Lebanese independence and subsequently the dismissal of the Syrian declaration as well. The Syrian declaration of independence made by the Syrian General Congress, which had been established as the governing administration for Syria following the conclusion of the First World War, split British and French consensus on 'the Arab Question'. The treatment of the Syrian population by the French and the aggravation of sectarian and communal conflict for the purpose of French strategy, contradicted the terms of the Mandate agreement and the Anglo-French Declaration, which gave credence to the British Foreign Office's decision to recognise the independent state of Syria. Although British recognition seemingly contradicted the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), the agreement did not specify a minimum length of time that territories had to remain under French authority, the agreement did stipulate that France would help establish the institutions of government required for independence.[10] In contrast to the British Foreign

[7] Hakim, 255; F/205/4/7.
[8] F/205/4/7; Hokayem 2012, pp. 127-134 (no. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96).
[9] F/205/4/7.
[10] F/205/4/7; Hokayem 2012, pp. 127-134 (no. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96)

Office's decision to recognise the Syrian declaration of independence, the French viewed the Syrian declaration as a threat to their interests and sent General Gouraud, the French representative in Lebanon and Syria, to Mount Lebanon. Gouraud was instructed to incite the population to protest the decisions of the Congress particularly with reference to the inclusion of Lebanon in the proclamation of an independent Syrian state.[11]

Although the British Foreign Office had recognised the Syrian declaration of independence, the British government had not, and the Treaty of Sèvres, completed in San Remo on April 18 and April 26, formalised the French Mandate for Syria (greater Syria, including Lebanon) and the British Mandate for Mesopotamia and Palestine to the British.[12] The Treaty of Sèvres provided the legal justification for the French to use force against Syrian rebels who had been expressing their dissatisfaction with the peace settlement and French occupation.

Addressing the use of force by the French administration, Faisal wrote to the British administration that 'the French artillery and aeroplane explosives are promiscuously and without pity destroying the villages and tearing to pieces the defenceless inhabitants. More than 21,000 are already left homeless and are dispersed everywhere'. In addition to the use force in order to pacify the population into submission, the French occupation forces blocked the ports, forcing the Syrian economy to a standstill.[13] The French administration in Syria had effectively established a siege, veiled by humanitarian intent with the aim of establishing a modern state that could accede the standard required of 'civilised nations'. Within this framework, force was perceived as necessary to pacify the populations, giving justification to the members of the League of Nations to ignore French activity in Syria.

Resistance to the French occupation and the establishment of a government in Damascus, led by Faisal, following the declaration of Syrian independence on March 8, 1920 was short-lived. The French administration, highlighting the legitimacy of the French Mandate due to its legal standing, put forward conditions for Faisal, including the cessation of rebellious activities, the necessity of establishing a military with obligatory conscription, Syrian banknotes being accepted in the form of commercial exchange but not as the official state currency, and the acceptance of the mandate.[14] Gouraud, unable to come to an agreement with Faisal on French terms, argued that the government of Damascus was unjustified in

[11] F/205/4/7; Hokayem 2012, pp. 127-134 (no. 92, 93, 94, 95, 96); Hurewitz, 1979, 180-182.
[12] F/205/2/1, Timeline of events as related to Syria, p. 14.
[13] During this period, on April 23, 1920, Mustafa Kemal was elected to govern Turkey, provoking a civil war that ended in August 1920. F/59/10/11 June 1, 1920, Letter to Lloyd George from Feisal.
[14] Hokayem 2012, pp. 462-464 (no. 341).

their pursuits, they had employed gangs, while the French have sought to establish order and freedom, not a colonial administration. Gouraud further argued that the government in Damascus had used every attempt to block French strategy, using military force to fight French troops and placing restrictions on the movement of goods, particularly grains, that have had a negative economic impact on the population.[15]

In response to French demands and accusations, and viewing the continued resistance against the French occupation as increasingly hopeless, Faisal prorogued Congress in Damascus on July 20, 1920. He disbanded the Arab troops and accepted the conditions that Gouraud had outlined. By accepting Gouraud's conditions Faisal lost the trust of the Congress members, who wanted to continue to oppose French demands by force. Gouraud, however, claimed that he had never received formal notification from Faisal and continued his advancement to Damascus, capturing Arab troops, who had been ordered to treat the French troops as allies, and making advances through a ground and air offensive. Four days later, on July 24, 1920, the French had managed to enter the city of Damascus, establishing the occupation of Syria and on September 1, 1920, once Damascus had been occupied, the French administration proclaimed the establishment of Greater Lebanon (from here on, referred to as Lebanon) and divided the Syrian provinces under their possession into the State of Damascus, the Alawite State, the State of Aleppo, and the Djebel Druze State.[16]

When Faisal returned to Damascus on April 24, 1921 he found that the French had occupied the city and all government offices. After learning of Faisal's return to Damascus, the French exiled him, on April 27, declaring him *persona non-grata* and precluded any further negotiations.[17] Upon learning of his son's exile from Damascus, King Hussein, sent a letter of protest against the French occupation of Damascus, stating that the occupation is 'a violation of the Treaty of Versailles, which the French are ever insisting must be observed in its entirety'.[18] Hussein argued that French actions had been twofold, first the French sought to devastate the Hashemite family and in doing so, fulfilled their second object, to diminish British influence in the region.[19]

[15] Hokayem 2012, pp. 479-486, 501-503 (no. 356, 373).
[16] F/205/4/7.
[17] F/205/4/7.
[18] Hussein's protests with regards to breaches of the Treaty of Versailles had to do with the issue of territorial sovereignty, see Wright 1923.
[19] F/205/4/7.

In addition to Hussein's statement that attempted to hold the French to account by employing international law, Faisal brought further attention to the contradiction in action and statement, citing the Anglo-French Declaration of November 11, 1918, which stated that the two powers would work to establish native governments and administrations. Faisal wrote:

> Far from wishing to impose particular institutions on the populations of these regions, their only desire is to ensure by their support and assistance the proper working of government and the administration they have freely given themselves.[20]

Faisal noted that his feelings were not unique, that the Arabs felt betrayed by the French and British occupations.[21] But Gouraud and his Secretary General, M. de Caix, did not care, and wished only to, as stated by de Caix, 'cultivate and maintain all the phenomena, requiring our arbitration, that [the social] divisions give [us]'.[22] By using these inter-group divisions the French politicised sectarian identities, this was particularly evident with the creation of the modern state of Lebanon, whose foundations were built on the intersection of French political and economic interests and a worldview that ascertained a moral Christian superiority.

For Faisal and the Arab Nationalists, the use of force by the French administration and the British refusal to intervene was viewed as a betrayal of the promises that had been made during and immediately after the First World War. Faisal argued that in return for their loyalty to Britain and their opposition to the Turks during the First World War, they had been promised the ability to make decisions regarding government and the establishment of an Arab state, which would become independent. The activities of the French government in Syria contravened the promises that had been set out prior to the establishment of Mandate, including 'the liberation of the peoples', 'the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations', and 'unmolested opportunity of autonomous development'.[23] Although the Arab populations had been liberated from the Ottoman Empire, the ability to engage in autonomous decision making had been obstructed through forcible geographic divisions and

[20] F/205/4/7.
[21] F/205/4/7.
[22] Barr 2011, pp. 119-120.
[23] F/205/3/7, The Syrian Question; Woodrow Wilson 1918.

the active removal, pacification, and silencing of individuals who opposed the occupation, whether through force or government decrees.[24] The general environment during the establishment of the French Mandate in Syria was evidence that a civilised Syrian state was a subordinated state, where dissent was to be limited, unless it was favourable to French interests.

### 8.1.2 State Building in Lebanon and Syria: Strategising the Continued Pursuit of French Interests

The forceful establishment of the French Mandate and the strict control of political institutions created a general sense of submission among the populations in Lebanon and Syria. The French administration in Syria maintained control over every aspect of politics in the region, including political representation in the Federal Council of the Syrian States, which opened its first session on December 12, 1922 in Aleppo. The Federal Council excluded the regions of Greater Lebanon and Djebel Druze,[25] and was composed of fifteen members, all of whom were appointed by the French and selected from the administrative councils of Aleppo, Damascus, and the Alawite region.[26] Although this formula changed slightly in 1923, with the Council system becoming more representative after the replacement of Gouraud with the appointment of General Weygand as High Commissioner, the changes brought forward by Weygand replicated the Ottoman system of representation, except the council members had very little power and could only issue complaints to the French administration. The council members were, however, allowed to generate political factions within society, as long as they did not impede French strategies and interests.[27]

The exclusion of Lebanon, encompassing Mount Lebanon, Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida, from the Syrian Confederation, which included the State of Damascus, the Alawite State, and the State of Aleppo, created anger among the populations of these cities. They viewed the division of the port cities from Syria as artificial, as it had severed the established customary social, economic, and political networks between the coast and the interior.[28] The separation of these cities from the Syrian interior and their exclusion from the Syrian Confederation was viewed as an instance of French despotism that provided the Maronite community with imbalanced political leverage and served French interests rather than the interests of the

[24] F/205/4/5, sent to the Earl Curzon of Kedleston, from G. Haddad, Brigadier General.
[25] FO/141/453 December 12, 1922, Alleged Capture of Gun-Running Caravans, M. Palmer; FO/684/1 December 1922, French Intelligence Summaries, Beirut; the Syrian Confederation consisted of representatives from Aleppo, Damascus, and the Alawite regions.
[26] Subsequently, in July, 1922, the League of Nations approved the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria, giving the occupation legal status, see 'French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon'.
[27] Fieldhouse 2008, p. 259.
[28] FO/684/1 January 1923, French Intelligence Summaries, Damascus.

population. The pursuit of French economic and geopolitical interests during the early years of the Mandate reflected their desire to maintain a foothold in Lebanon and Syria. By separating the port cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida and placing them under the tutelage of the Maronites, with whom the French maintained close relations, the French were able to control imports from the Mediterranean and therefore the economy of the Syrian interior. This provided the French administration with strategic control over the economy and politics in the rebellious Syrian interior.

It was understood by the French, that whoever controlled the port cities controlled the economy, and therefore possessed power. For this reason, it was unlikely that the French would cede to demands that had been made by the populations in Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida.[29] The inclusion of the port cities in the administration of Lebanon served French interests and provided subsistence to Mount Lebanon as an autonomous region. While the protesting populations in the port cities stated that they were not hostile to the French mandate, probably out of fear of reprisals, they argued that these cities were never geographically or politically considered part of Mount Lebanon prior to the proclamation of the establishment of Lebanon on September 1, 1920. For the Muslims, their history was one that was unequivocally tied to Syria, specifically, and the Arabs, generally.[30]

The Muslims in the port cities perceived their inclusion in Lebanon as unnatural, while the Maronites argued that the unification of the port cities to the Syrian interior would dismember historic Lebanon. The Christians, in contrast to the Muslims, sought to legitimise their claims with regards to a Greater Lebanon through the use of the historic myth of Phoenicia, a narrative which only became prominent in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[31] The employment of the narrative of Phoenician history was used to highlight racial difference between the Arabs of Mount Lebanon and those of the Syrian interior in an attempt to validate the inclusion of the port cities into the project of a Greater Lebanon. The political undertones of this narrative were used by the Christian communities, specifically the Maronite community, to give credence to their desire of a separate Lebanese state, which would otherwise be unsustainable due to the landlocked status of Mount Lebanon. Indeed, exclusion of the port cities from Lebanon would have altered the balance of power, forcing Lebanon to become an enclave of a Syrian state, subject to the will of a

[29] FO/684/1 January 1923.
[30] Salibi 2005, pp. 171-173.
[31] Salibi 2005, pp. 171-173.

Syrian government.[32] Rather than allow this to occur, it was in French interests to calm the anxieties of the Maronite community, who wielded administrative power in Greater Lebanon, by maintaining that there would be no changes to the frontiers of Lebanon.[33] While it had become extremely unlikely that the borders of Lebanon would change, the protests of the populations from the port cities continued.

It had been relatively easy for the French to maintain control of Lebanon, despite the protests from the populations in the port cities, particularly because of allied Maronite control. In contrast, the French administration was finding the maintenance of Syria to be costly. In an effort to manage the rising costs, the French administration had tasked the Federal Council in Aleppo to establish institutions of public services, while keeping the expenses of the administration low. The Federal Council was also asked to build stronger cohesion between the representatives and the population, in a manner that would aid the state building project and general security of the Syrian Federation, which would be followed by the creation of a ministry of justice and the codification of law and subsequently by the centralisation of the gendarmerie into a federal structure. Although the Federal Council was being provided with more responsibility, it did not have control over the implementation of policy, nor did the Syrian administration have control over the deployment of military force.[34]

In addition to these changes that aimed to facilitate governance over Syria and reduce the costs of the French administration, the French intended to centralise the state in Syria, to abolish the Federation completely; merging the representative councils of Aleppo and Damascus. There was also discussion of separating Alexandretta from Aleppo, to create three separate provinces: Damascus, Aleppo, and Alexandretta.[35] The separation of Alexandretta from Aleppo, and the continued autonomy of the Alawite State from the centralised administration of Syria, provided the French with the ability to maintain control over the entire coast, creating 'a permanent cleavage between the coastal states and the Sunni interior, [the latter] as Monsieur de Reffye once remarked […], [the French] can never hope to gain'. The French were aware that by separating the Christians and the Alawites from Syrian interior, these regions and their populations could be 'drawn into the orbit of the French, as opposed to Syrian, interests'. In doing so, France remained in control of the coast, from where they could dominate the Syrian interior, strategically but also economically.[36]

---

[32] FO/684/1 January 1923.
[33] FO/684/1 January 1923.
[34] FO/684/1 January 1923.
[35] FO/684/1 July 4, 1924, (no. 105), sent to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from M. Smart, Damascus.
[36] FO/684/1 July 4, 1924, (no. 105).

In addition to the administrative changes stated above, it was reported on February 14, 1923, in the newspaper '*Le Réveil*', that Damascus was to become the capital of the Syrian confederation, with the duties of the delegate to the State of Damascus to be merged with those of the delegate to the Syrian Confederation.[37] News of these impending changes, the merging of the roles of the two delegates and the capitals' transition from Aleppo to Damascus, increased frustration among the populations in the Syrian interior, and was particularly expressed in Aleppo. The transition of the capital from Aleppo to Damascus was perceived as a loss of status and a punishment for the previous violence that had been produced in the city.[38]

Growing resentment towards the French in Aleppo threatened the possibility of renewed violence, mimicking the revolt that had occurred from 1919 to 1921 during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923), under Ibrahim Hananu, an Ottoman municipal official who propagated the idea that northern Syria, including Aleppo, was geographically part of Turkey. During the Hananu Revolt in Aleppo, the Turks, under Mustafa Kamal, had been arming Hananu and his rebels in Aleppo as well as aiding a revolt in Latakia against the French. Following the pacification of Hananu's revolt, Hananu sought refuge in Jordan where the French could not enter, otherwise risk a confrontation with Britain. Reflecting Hananu's rhetoric, the threat of renewed revolt in Aleppo in 1923 carried with it calls to join the Republic of Turkey.[39] The sentiments of Aleppo's population can be attributed to French oppressive activity at the beginning of the occupation, the transfer of the capital from Aleppo to Damascus, and the continued dominance of French interests over those of the Syrian populations. In addition to these reasons, the desire to join Turkey could be attributed to their material support during the rebellion against France, but also because Aleppo had traditionally been economically connected to Anatolia rather than Syria.[40]

In response to the developing anger in Aleppo and the developing possibility of rebellion, General Weygand attempted to quell anxieties by stating that there would be fiscal decentralisation, allowing Aleppo to continue to develop economically and independently from Damascus, given that economic ties to Anatolian markets had been severed, resulting

[37] FO/141/453 February 20, 1923, Damascus News: Syrian Capital to be Here, sent to British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, from M. Palmer, Damascus; and August 24, 1923, Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Damascus.
[38] FO/141/453 February 20, 1923; August 24, 1923, and October 13, 1923, Consul Palmer to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Damascus.
[39] FO/141/453 February 20, 1923, August 24, 1923, October 13, 1923.
[40] Fieldhouse 2008, pp. 282-284.

in the downgrading of Aleppo's economic prosperity.[41] Additionally, the French sought an alliance with Kamal al-Qudsi, a French collaborator who was part of a notable land-owning family from Aleppo, appointing him as Governor. The appointment of a local notable to the position of Governor was with the goal of rebuilding confidence in the Mandate by exploiting customary loyalties. Following al-Qudsi's appointment, he placed 'some sixty members of his family to official posts', with permission from the French, as long as the family members were loyal.[42] By appointing al-Qudsi, the French sought to use loyal customary networks to their advantage, given the ability of notables to sway popular sentiment.[43]

The continued employment of communal networks and ethno-sectarian identities had been strategically deployed to maintain order. By using communal networks, such as the notable al-Qudsi family network in Aleppo, and ethno-sectarian identities to justify the division of the coastal regions from the Syrian interior, the French administration had favoured the pursuit of their national interests rather than the independence of Lebanon and Syria.[44] While the appointment of notables to positions of authority did not represent a new strategy, its continued use by the French administration, for the purpose of retaining control, had adverse effects on the political environment. By upholding customary, pre-modern political groups and networks, wedding them into the institutions of the modern state, the French government were actively reproducing aspects of the socio-political field that were contrary to the French standard of civilisation.

Commenting on the French mandate and French governance, Nuri Pasha, an Arab Nationalist and Iraqi politician who had been close to Faisal and eventually served as Prime Minister of Iraq, in conversation with the British Consul, M. Smart, noted that the Syrians were under the complete subordination of the French, who employed a 'direct, though veiled, government'. He stated that he could see 'no sign of any tendency on the part of the French to modify the only method which they have ever practiced in their colonies or mandated territories'.[45]

The aversion of the French administration to any form of dissent or critique, which would otherwise be viewed as a sign of weakness and lack of control, had censured discussions of

[41] FO/684/1 July 4, 1924, (no. 105).
[42] Fieldhouse 2008, p. 285; Longrigg 1958, p. 126.
[43] FO/684/1 July 4, 1924, (no. 105).
[44] FO/141/453 March 19, 1924, (no. 55), Consul Smart to Mr. MacDonald, Damascus.
[45] FO/141/453 March 19, 1924, (no. 55), Consul Smart to Mr. MacDonald, Damascus.

the French occupation in the Syrian press, while establishing no such restraint on anti-British publications. In early April 1925, Lord Balfour, on a trip to Syria, noted a rise of anti-British sentiment and propaganda, claiming that the French are redirecting anger towards the British in the heart of Arab world.[46] The French strategy, however, appeared to have limited effects. Despite the censure of news articles that contradicted French interests, proposals for Syrian Unity continued to gain traction.[47]

Although there were groups within the French mandate of Syria who opposed plans of Syrian unity, resistance against the French administration was stronger than the resistance against the British. Despite an unfavourable British strategy in Palestine, the French took the brunt of Arab anger, and their methods of governance made the British appear to be enlightened in comparison. The British High Commissioner for Palestine, M. Samuel, stated 'whatever may be the criticism in Palestine of the British administration, there is probably not one among the Arab critics who would wish it replaced by a French'.[48] The French had undertaken strategies that reflected their colonial histories, actively working against the desires for autonomy and independence by governing through allies, exploiting communal and ethno-sectarian divisions to maintain control, and had strategically formed alliances and constructed geographic borders to sustain political and economic power, while maintaining that the purpose of the French administration in Lebanon and Syria was for an altruistic purpose.

### 8.1.3 French Colonial Pacification: The Druze Revolt 1925

The French alignment with the Christians that had developed during the early nineteenth century, provided the French administration with a strategic advantage in Lebanon and Syria. Maurice Sarrail, the new High Commissioner, replacing General Weygand in June 1924 and described as an avid atheist,[49] had been appointed following the victory of the anti-clerical party in France, and believed that for too long the French had pandered to the Maronite minority when they should have been allied with the Muslim majority. Seeing that his predecessors had given too much power to a minority, Sarrail rejected the advances made by the Christian communities, ultimately blocking the election of a Catholic general, Emile Eddé, as Governor of Lebanon by the Lebanese Representative Council, and appointed a French Governor in his place. The Lebanese nationalists quickly became furious with Sarrail's takeover of Lebanon, and Sarrail, to appease them, offered direct elections.

[46] FO/141/453 June 4, 1925, Consul Smart to Mr. Austen Chamberlain, Damascus.
[47] 1SL/1/V/414 June 28, 1928; 1SL/1/V/414 June 26, 1928.
[48] Barr 2011, p. 121
[49] Khoury 1987, p. 148.

However, Édouard Herriot, the Prime Minister of France, rejected the plan, and Sarrail was forced to return to an angry population, unable to deliver on his promise.[50] Although Sarrail rejected the supremacy of the Maronite community in Lebanon and attempted to undertake a secularist approach to governing the Mandate, he maintained the primacy of French interests over independence.

The central strategy for the French administration in Lebanon and Syria was the pacification of the population and the assertion of authority over the territories that had been legally attributed to the French administration. In an attempt to assert authority over the Druze in Djebel Druze, Sarrail desired to make a statement reflecting French strength in the region and pursued retribution for attacks that occurred under the governorship of General Gouraud. During the period under Gouraud, the Druze of Djebel Druze had come into conflict with the French administration, who were trying to coerce the population into submission, and on June 23, 1921, Gouraud's caravan was attacked. Following a period of quiet, Gouraud had learned that Sultan al-Atrash had been harbouring one of the perpetrators of the attack, and in 1922, Gouraud arrested the perpetrator and sent him to Damascus. On the way to Damascus, however, the caravan carrying the perpetrator was ambushed by Sultan al-Atrash and his men, resulting in the death of a French officer. In the fight that followed Sultan al-Atrash's ambush, the perpetrator had been set free.[51] In an attempt to administer justice for the French administration, Sarrail ordered the four main Druze leaders in Djebel Druze to Damascus. Three of the leaders accepted the invitation, and upon arrival in Damascus, they were arrested. Sultan al-Atrash was the sole leader to refuse, having seen his father succumb to the same ploy, which had led to his father's death.[52] In late July 1925, al-Atrash responded to the French strategy by rallying his tribal and peasant troops, beginning an onslaught and uprising against the French.[53]

Although Sarrail had made two strategic mistakes in his short period in office, first with the obstruction of Emile Eddé's appointment as Governor and then with his subsequent upset of the Djebel Druze, it was not until a change of government in France in April 1925 that Sarrail was replaced by Henri de Jouvenel in November 1925. The change in the French administration slowly led to increased French control through the use of force, beginning

[50] Barr 2011, pp. 124-125; de Wailly 2010, p. 191-196.
[51] Barr 2011, pp. 119-123.
[52] Barr 2011, pp. 123-125.
[53] Barr 2011, pp. 131-142; Charlcraft 2016, pp. 226-228.

with Damascus and spreading outwards once the capital city was back under French authority.[54]

Despite increased use of force by the French administration, the Druze continued the rebellion with the aim to combat French authority, repression, and violence, and soon after the rebellion started, the Druze had acquired the support of the Arab nationalists. However, the Druze and the Arab nationalists were quickly losing access to vital resources, and neither Britain nor the League of Nations had agreed to support their cause.[55] By July 1926, de Jouvenel was replaced by Henri Ponsot, and with much of Syria back under French control, the new High Commissioner strategised the implementation of an Organic Law for Syria,[56] which helped conclude the rebellion on July 26, 1927.[57]

Although the rebellion had failed to procure the desired autonomy and independence of the nationalists and the Druze, failure was not caused by a lack of willpower, but an absence of capital. In combatting the rebellion, the French had also suffered economically, and began to view the mandate as too expensive to maintain, threatening to abandon Syria to the British. The threat was a ploy to ensure continued British support of the French, and was successful. Following the threat, the British began to clear our rebel strongholds in the Jordanian desert region. Despite the conclusion of the rebellion, the French reputation had been damaged within Lebanon and Syria, as well as internationally.[58]

While the rebels in Syria were unable to achieve their goal, they did manage to alter French administration following the conclusion of the rebellion. In February 1928, M. Ponsot issued a general amnesty to the Druze and the Arab nationalists and called for elections of a Constituent Assembly which was held in April that same year.[59] The general amnesty and the creation of a Constituent Assembly was an attempt to pacify the rebellious populations by conceding on a new form of representational governance. However, it required that the population accept a specific form of governance and order that could be sustainably managed by the French administration.

### 8.1.4 Limited Governance: The False Promise of Political Representation

[54] Barr 2011, pp. 131-142; Charlcraft 2016, pp. 226-228
[55] Barr 2011, pp. 131-142; Charlcraft 2016, pp. 226-228
[56] Hourani 1946, pp. 187-189.
[57] Longrigg 1958, pp. 168-169; Hourani 1946, p. 191; Barr 2011, pp. 141-142.
[58] Longrigg 1958, pp. 168-169; Hourani 1946, p. 191; Barr 2011, pp. 141-142.
[59] Hourani 1946, p. 191.

The constituents elected to the new Syrian assembly in April 1928 were mostly moderates from the countryside, but because they lacked cohesion, the nationalists dominated the Assembly and succeeded in forming a party, the National Bloc, which included Ibrahim Hananu, Hashim al-Atasi, Saadullah al-Jabiri, Shukri al-Quwatli, Nabih al-Azmah, Amir Adil Arslan, and Riyadh al-Solh. In dominating the Assembly, Hashim al-Atasi became President of the Assembly and Ibrahim Hananu was appointed President of the Commission in charge of drafting the Constitution. While much of the draft constitution was amenable to the French High Commissioner, M. Ponsot objected to the declaration 'that all Syrian territories detached from the Ottoman Empire constituted an indivisible political unity', to which M. Ponsot believed was 'irreconcilable both with France's international obligations and with the existing situation in fact and in law'. In addition to M. Ponsot's objection to this specific article, he objected to four others, which he found to be in conflict to French 'obligations' in Syria.[60]

Unable to come to an agreement with the representatives over principles of self-determination and geographic claims, M. Ponsot prorogued the Assembly. The prorogation was viewed by the Syrian population as an abandonment of the Constitution that had nearly come to fruition.[61] The decision escalated tensions between the nationalists and the French administration but also deepened the schism between the nationalists and the moderates. The latter believed that the nationalists' uncompromising vision threatened to alienate Syria further. The moderates would have preferred to establish cooperation with France and obtain guarantees on rights and freedoms rather than continue to resist. In contrast, the nationalists refused to yield and demanded a treaty that could replace the Mandate and offer Syrians the right to self-govern.[62]

It had become clear that the French administration in Syria had abandoned the pursuit of legitimate representation following the inability of the French and Syrian representatives to come to a joint agreement over the status of autonomy and geographic limits of the Syrian state. The French and the nationalists each had a specific conception of Syria, and neither were willing to concede. However, the French were bound to a set of criteria established in the provisions of the Mandate, and in an effort to justify the lack of French concessions, de Caix lied in reports that had been submitted to the League of Nations, blaming the nationalist

[60] The articles included, Article 2, 73, 74, 75, and 112 of the Draft Constitution. Hourani 1946, pp. 191-193.
[61] Longrigg 1958, pp. 182-185; 1SL/1/V/394 March 9, 1930, Source Cheikh Ismail el Hariri.
[62] Hourani 1946, 193.

party for the suspension of the Constituent Assembly on February 5, 1929.[63] The French were operating in order to succeed in the realisation of their interests, which came at the expense of the legitimacy of the Mandate project and the League of Nations.

By January 1930, Arabic language newspapers were reporting on a growing political and economic crisis in Syria. The French administration in Syria was a key cause to the development of this crisis, particularly due to the severance of economic and political networks across the region, through the oppressive application of French authority, akin to practice of politics pursued in Morocco, impacting all areas of trade, especially the trade of grain.[64] Further to the constraints placed on the trade of goods in the region, the economic crisis was characterised as the 'simple exploitation of […] natural resources' by the French.[65]

The inability of the League of Nations to hold the French responsible for their continued manipulation and oppression of the Syrian populations strengthened the alliance of the nationalists within the National Bloc.[66] With a wider base of support, the National Bloc urged the population to engage in protests and strikes against the French, to demonstrate their anger and resolve, against their treatment by the French administration and complicity of the League of Nations. Following the call to protest, one of the National Bloc's prominent nationalists, Hashim al-Atasi, released the 'Manifesto to the Nation', in April 1930. The Manifesto stated that the Syrians had suffered under French occupation for too long and had been subjected to various forms of oppression, the Syrian population was being forced to uphold systems of governance that had been opposed to by the population, which they had been resisting for eight years.[67]

Following the release of the manifesto, the newspaper *Al Cha'ab*, published an article titled 'M. de Caix, Emissary of Colonisation'. The article highlighted the inability and the unwillingness of the French administration to acknowledge the rights of the Syrian people and accused de Caix of continuously engaging in the repression of Syrian aspirations. The article continued that the long history of French involvement in Syria and the sustained practices of French involvement, whether permitted through a mandate provided by the

[63] Longrigg 1958, pp. 182-185; 1SL/1/V/394 March 9, 1930.
[64] Chalcraft 2016, 225-228; Fieldhouse 2008, p. 258; Khoury 1987, pp. 97-151; 1SL/1/V/394 March 9, 1930.
[65] 1SL/1/V/394 March 9, 1930.
[66] Longrigg 1958, p. 187.
[67] 1SL/1/V/394 April 15, 1930, Manifest publie par Hachem Atassi, President of the Syrian Constituent Assembly.

League of Nations, or carried out prior to its establishment, could only be explained as an enduring effort by France to colonise the region.[68]

Nationalist sentiment in Syria against the French administration and widespread feeling and perception that Syria had been colonised increased following M. Ponsot's decision, on May 14, 1930, to dissolve the Assembly and unilaterally promulgate a constitution for Syria that would come into force following the election of a Chamber of Deputies.[69] The constitution that was promulgated by M. Ponsot was practically identical to the version that had been previously drafted. However, the articles that had been a source of animosity between the French and the Syrians regarding geographic claims and self-governance had not been included as per the original draft. Despite the communication of the constitution to the League of Nations, it had not come into force until 1932.[70] The unilateral decision to promulgate a constitution made the French administration seem as if they were fulfilling their state building duties in Syria, but also manufactured the delineation of the political environment to their satisfaction.

Following the promulgation of the constitution and the communication of its existence to the League of Nations by de Caix, Nazih Bey al-Mouayad, secretary general of the Syrian Peoples' Party, sent a memorandum on June 29, 1930, to the press and Syrian politicians. The memorandum accused de Caix of filling the communication to the League of Nations with lies, including that the Syrian people had been calm and welcomed the suspension of the assembly. In response, al-Mouayad urged the Syrian people to hold the French to account for the situation that they had created,[71] to protest and petition the League of Nations against the acceptance of the French report.[72]

Growing discontent in the Syrian provinces was not only targeting French oppression, leaders of the Syrian parties, including Loutfi Haffar, Fares al-Khoury, and Ihsan al-Cherif, had become disillusioned with the League of Nations, stating that it was the 'largest theatre in the world', providing a stage for the 'comedians […] who come periodically to play their role' but never actually provide justice.[73] Despite the protests and the petition that had been

[68] 1SL/1/V/394 April 14, 1930 (no. 75), Damascus.
[69] Hourani 1946, 193.
[70] Longrigg 1958, p. 188.
[71] 1SL/1/V/394 June 30, 1930 (no. 132), Damascus.
[72] 1SL/1/V/394 July 12, 1930 (no. 47), Aleppo.
[73] 1SL/1/V/394 June 30, 1930 (no. 131), Damascus.

sent to the League of Nations, the Syrian population had not received a reply, prompting Haffar to declare:

> We have no one to trust except ourselves. The League of Nations is composed of muted puppets by France and England. The Orient, although rights are unknown and usurped, must exit its passiveness to march with one positive voice that consists to augment its richness in boycotting the Occident.[74]

Following this series of events, an ideological framework emerged that sought to reject Occidental norms of governance and politics, including the system of global governance, and uphold those of the Orient. Although, the Syrian nationalist leadership had come to reject the establishment of a Western political framework, it had already accepted, developed, and reiterated much of it. Although this had been done to be a recognised and independent state, and to resist continued interference and intervention, it had reconfigured the social field, changing the socio-political boundaries and the perception of legitimate governance.

Despite the rejectionist approach to the French Mandate and the League of Nations, the nationalist parties engaged in the January 1932 elections for the Chamber of Deputies in Syria. As it had been the case in the Assembly, the nationalists were a minority in the Chamber, but their unity had prevailed and they quickly became the dominant voice once again. Following the election of the Chamber of Deputies and the approval of the Cabinet, negotiations began between the Chamber and the High Commissioner. As the nationalists had done before, they urged the French High Commissioner to concede on the inclusion of Latakia and Djebel Druze in Syria, arguing that their separation from the Syrian government was unnatural, the nationalists had also come into conflict with the High Commissioner on the status of Syro-Lebanese relations.[75]

The High Commissioner and the nationalists were again drawn into a deadlock, with the nationalists resigning from the Cabinet in April 1933. Following the resignation of the nationalists, the moderates and Comte de Martel, who succeeded M. Ponsot as High Commissioner, continued deliberations over a Franco-Syrian draft treaty that would conclude the Mandate. The treaty that had been negotiated, which was heavily in favour of

[74] 1SL/1/V/394 August 29, 1930 (no 177), Damascus.
[75] Hourani 1946, pp. 194-196; Longrigg 1958, pp. 196-198.

French interests, provided the French Government the ability to maintain military forces in Syria and the ability to intervene on behalf of Syria should conflict with a third state develop. It also established that Latakia and Djebel Druze would not be included in the future Syrian state. Following the negotiation between de Martel and the moderates, the treaty was put before the Chamber where it was rejected by the nationalists. The High Commissioner subsequently suspended the Chamber, withdrew the terms of the treaty, and allowed the President of the Republic, Izzet Pasha al-Abid, to govern through decree.[76]

After the rejection of the initial decree in 1934, Hashim al-Atasi travelled to Paris, in 1936, to renegotiate a new Franco-Syrian draft treaty, which included the slow relinquishment of French sovereignty over a twenty-five-year period. Following the negotiation of the Treaty, al-Atasi returned to Syria and was appointed as President. The Nationalist Bloc, led by Shukri al-Quwatli, claimed that the draft agreement was a victory for the Syrian people, and argued that

> the treaty between the liberal French people and the noble Syrian people after a fight of 16 years, during which the Syrians have tasted the bitterness of a foreign regime and have pulled some eloquent and final lessons [is complete…The Nationalist Bloc] renews its call to the militant nation, men, women, children, to show today like yesterday that it has dignity in liberty and independence. Our heroes, the members of the faithful *Wafd* (nation), will re-join us bringing the charter of sovereignty and of independence, the day has come and will be the expression of joy from all the nation.[77]

While the treaty had been ratified by the Syrian government, opposition to its provisions were growing in France. Jamil Mardam, the Syrian Prime Minister (1936-1939), travelled to Paris in order to save the treaty, and after three months of negotiations, was forced to concede on the safeguarding of the French language in schools and the French right to search for and exploit the country's oil deposits. The agreement between Mardam and the French was opposed in Syria and a complete breakdown of relations between the Syrian government

[76] Hourani 1946, pp. 194-196; Longrigg 1958, pp. 196-198.
[77] 1SL/1/V/394 September 10, 1936.

and France opened the gates to political crisis in 1939 which led to the disintegration of the Syrian government and the suspension of the constitution.[78]

## 8.2 The Second World War (1939-1945): German Challenges to French Interests in Syria

Throughout the 1930s there had been increased militarism and friction in the European state system, which escalated tensions throughout Europe, and led to the fragmentation of the established legal framework of global governance. In particular, the legitimacy of the Mandate system was being challenged. For example, by 1934 Italy had begun to engage in hostile anti-British radio broadcasts that targeted British interests and influence in the Middle East. In response, the British launched a new form of cultural diplomacy through the Foreign Office. Over the next four years, Italian and Nazi propaganda were beginning to have costly effects on British and French interests. Acknowledging the necessity of the British to push back against Italian and Nazi propaganda, Winston Churchill requested that the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) launch a foreign language service in Arabic.[79]

In addition to Italian efforts to delegitimise the British administration in Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq, the French and the British suspected the Nazis of being involved in youth movements in Syria and Palestine, particularly through the Arab Club, which reportedly received financial assistance from Berlin, with members of the Arab Club, including its founder, Sa'id al-Fattah Imam, travelling to Nazi Germany in 1936.[80] Germany had begun to take advantage of the schism between the Arab nationalists and the French administration in Syria, with French intelligence noting an increase in German activities by early 1939, stating that the Syrian Nationalist Bloc had encouraged al-Fattah's further contact with Hitler in 1936. German strategy targeted French and British prestige by forming alliances with Arab nationalist movements, through these alliances Germany also sought to expand trade into Syria.[81]

While German propaganda targeted the relationship between the French administration and the Arab Nationalists, it was also trying to draw France and Britain into conflict. On June 16, 1939, the German newspaper, *Hamburger Tageblatt*, published a story accusing the British of using anti-French propaganda within Lebanon and Syria. According to the article, the

[78] Khoury 1946, pp. 207-221.
[79] Boyce and Maiolo 2003, pp. 350-353.
[80] Khoury 1946, p. 565.
[81] Khoury 1946, p. 565-566.

British goal was to take over Syria from the French and propose a unified Arab state with a monarchy.[82] The claims made by the German newspaper were not baseless and there was a small group of British agents, notably in the Arab Bureau in Cairo, who had actively encouraged the second son of King Hussein, Emir Abdallah I bin al-Hussein, to be appointed to the throne, becoming King of Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine. The French noted that without the encouragement coming from the Arab Bureau with regards to Emir Abdallah's establishment, 'it would be hard to understand, in effect, the tenacious propaganda that does not cease'.[83]

German propaganda regarding the British desire to establish Emir Abdallah as King of Syria, Transjordan, and Palestine, was not well received by Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud, first monarch and founder of Saudi Arabia. Ibn Saud warned that the establishment of a Syrian throne 'would only serve foreign interests and would be an instrument in their politics'.[84] The French administration and Ibn Saud viewed the appointment of Emir Abdallah as King of Syria as an affront to their interests, with the French administration desiring the establishment of a republic that was amenable to French influence following independence. Additionally, the French perceived the Hashemite family as too close to the British. On the other hand, Ibn Saud, viewed the establishment of the Hashemite family in the heart of the Arab world as a threat to his claims to the Hejaz.[85]

Ibn Saud and the French had made their criticisms known, and while they both knew that the information was a matter of propaganda, there had been a real threat posed to their interests. Responding to criticisms made by the French administration and Ibn Saud, Emir Abdallah stated that 'Syria is a single country. Any policy which has a different basis would be doomed to fail'. The Emir's response did not quell concerns or suspicions of a strategy that would conclude with him being established as King of Syria. However, Emir Abdallah insisted that his desire for a single Syrian state encompassing the former Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire was the definitive goal,

> If I have to succeed, I will assign my efforts to fulfil two goals: realise independence and the well-being of the nation; and gain at the same time the friendship and confidence of the two

[82] 1SL/1/V/395 June 20, 1939 (no. 141), sent to M. Bonnet, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Paris, from M. Roger Garreau, Hamberg.
[83] 1SL/1/V/395 July 22, 1939 (no. 780), from Gabriel Puaux, High Commissioner for France in Lebanon and Syria.
[84] 1SL/1/V/395 July 28, 1939, Beirut.
[85] Leatherdale 1983.

> mandatory states. This policy is, excluding all else, the condition of success.[86]

Although he did not explicitly deny his interest in becoming King of Syria, he did place importance on the establishment of friendship and confidence of France and Britain.

The British High Commissioner for Palestine, Sir Harold MacMichael, further denied German claims regarding the strategy to appoint Emir Abdallah as the King of Syria. MacMichael reiterated that federalising the Arab territories of Palestine, Syria, and Transjordan was not part of British policy, and any discussion of the contrary was an attempt to create discord.[87] Despite not being formally part of British policy, French intelligence was suspicious of Lebanese and Syrian politicians, as well as journalists, traveling to Amman. The French administration was claiming that following their return to their homes, the politicians and journalists have advocated for the Emir, 'as agents'. The French administration concluded that these politicians and journalists needed to be watched closely and to restrict future travel in order to dissuade further publication supporting the Emir.[88]

Although German propaganda had not led to an explicit conflict between the British and the French administrations, the French were beginning to notice that their influence in Syria was declining. The French wrote a general notice with the aim of assuring the Syrian population of French intentions, which were primarily to prepare the Levantine states for independence and to assure the protection of minority groups within the population. From a French perspective, the prior form of governance under the Ottoman Empire, was a history of domination that paralleled Catholic political superiority in France prior to the Edict of Nantes (1598). In turn, the French had tried to establish the principles of a secular equality that had become dominant in France with the goal of building peace in Syria and establishing unity between the various groups.[89] Despite, French perceptions that their state building was attempting to establish secular equality, the administration maintained sectarian views that characterised and classified the populations based on religious identity. This included the enduring conviction that the Sunni Muslim population was fanatical.[90] The French strategy, reflected their colonial interests in the Syrian provinces by enabling the development of

[86] Between the 22 July and 12 August 1939, a series of interviews were conducted with the Emir Abdallah. 1SL/1/V/395 August 18, 1939 (no. 886), from Hauteclocque.
[87] 1SL/1/V/395 March 27, 1940, Beirut, from M. Puaux.
[88] 1SL/1/V/395 April 25, 1940 (no. 58), from M. Puaux.
[89] FO/226/265 La Problême Syrien.
[90] 1SL/1/V/74, February 25, 1941.

distinct ethno-sectarian based politics, as well as elevating customary forms of governance, for example with the appointment of al-Qudsi,[91] which conflicted with the French standard of civilisation.

### 8.2.1 French Concessions on Governance and Arab Concessions on Geographic Limits

Despite the desire to establish principles of French secularisation, the French administration continued to reproduce and politicise religious identities, particularly with regards to the creation of Lebanon as a state with a Christian majority and Beirut as its capital, whereas Syria would retain its Muslim character. The French administration also believed that it was necessary to establish an independent or autonomous Alawite state and Druze state, in order to avoid disorder and the threat of oppressive Sunni functionaries. The creation of states based on a sectarian character, and justified by the belief that any other formula would result in the oppression of religious minorities by dogmatic Sunni Muslim forces, perpetuated ideas of difference that tied religious identity to civilisation, and framed those identities through a specific set of characteristics.[92]

The characterisation of Lebanon as a state that would retain a Christian identity negatively impacted the role of the Muslim community in Lebanon. Muhyi al-Din al-Nsouli, the founder of al-Najjadé, an Arab socialist unionist party that began as a youth club in 1916 also founded *Bayrut* in 1936, a daily newspaper that had a sympathetic orientation to the Arab nationalist cause, attempted to expose the sectarian French worldview and strategy. Al-Najjadé distributed a pamphlet in Beirut arguing that the French had been applying the principle of divide and conquer between Christians and the Muslims in Lebanon and Syria. The French attempted to pass this off as another example of Muslim fanaticism, exacerbated by pro-German sentiment, but sentiment against the French was strong, and resulted in an alliance between the Phalangists, which had started as a Maronite paramilitary youth organisation, and al-Najjadé.[93] In addition to the party's opposition to French strategy, the newspaper, *Bayrut*, was particularly critical of discriminatory policies that had been established against the Muslims.[94]

---

[91] Other prominent families that retained political importance in Lebanon included the al-Nsouli, Solh, Beyhum, Daouk, and Arslan families. 1SL/1/V/74 August 23, 1941.
[92] FO/226/265 La Problême Syrien.
[93] *The Middle East and North Africa 2003*, p. 735; el-Solh 2004, pp. 75, 79; 1SL/1/V/74 August 23, 1941, Bulletin d'Information, no. 131, Beirut.
[94] *The Middle East and North Africa 2003*, p. 735; el-Solh 2004, pp. 75, 79; 1SL/1/V/74 August 23, 1941.

The French attempt to explain al-Najjadé's criticisms as Muslim fanaticism only served to justify al-Nsouli's argument regarding the French strategy of divide and conquer between Christians and Muslims. On the other hand, French criticisms of German influence were not out of place, according to British intelligence, Germany was attempting to challenge the status quo in Lebanon and Syria by cooperating with Arab Nationalists. In addition, the relationship between the German's and the Arab Nationalists, had been buoyed by the deterioration of the political situation and the economy, made worse by the shipment of necessary food products from Lebanon and Syria to France to help the French war effort against the Nazis.[95]

The shipment of food from Lebanon and Syria to France led to 'the bread crisis' in January 1941 and a general strike by the end of February, led by Shukri Quwatli. Although the German Foreign Minister, Otto Von Henting, travelled throughout Lebanon and Syria, in 1941, meeting with religious and nationalist leaders with whom he encouraged protests directed at the French. Von Henting did not light the fuse leading to opposition and protests the French administration, but likely shortened it by providing external validity.[96]

By March 1941, the strike had spread throughout the major cities of Lebanon and Syria. Emphasising popular opposition to the French administration, Quwatli stated that the mandate system was no longer legitimate due to the collapse of the League of Nations and the formal withdrawal of France from the organisation. The strength of the protests and Quwatli's narrative threatened the Vichy government who attempted to suppress dissident activity in the region by arresting and killing a number of protestors. The French administration realised that force alone could not restrain the protests and on April 1, 1941, Henri Dentz, a Commander in Chief of the Army of the Levant and the High Commissioner of the Levant, issued a declaration restating French support for Lebanese and Syrian independence and offered a series of administrative reforms, including the establishment of a council of directors, headed by a 'head of state' with a consultative assembly. The French administration appointed Alfred Naccache as head of state, who was to be assisted by Ahmad al-Da'uq as his deputy and Joseph Tayyan, Philippe Boulos, and Fuad Osseiran as his ministers.[97]

[95] el-Solh 2004, pp. 117; Firro 2003, p. 178.
[96] el-Solh 2004, pp. 117; Firro 2003, p. 178.
[97] el-Solh 2004, p. 117-119.

The pressure that had been placed on the French administration due to the opposition protests had resulted in reforms, but for Jamil Mekkawi, a leader of al-Najjadé, the reforms fell short of the demands that were being made. On November 29, 1941, Mekkawi proclaimed that the national awakening, embodied by his organisation, was 'to conserve Lebanon's Arab character' and that they would

> seek to defend it against all foreign politics tending to fraudulent manoeuvers, that wish to compromise the profound ties where we find these particular traditions, sentiments, ideologies, that make Lebanon an integral part inseparable from all Arabs.

He continued that the 'goal is simple, we agitate not only to unveil and stop all foreign games, but it would do Lebanon no good to detach it from Arabia, to hold it in isolation and constrain its life in a delineated territory that is not natural'.[98]

The idea of a separate Lebanon was still a point of contention for Mekkawi, however, in 1942, a year after Mekkawi's speech that argued Lebanon was integral and inseparable from 'Arabia', the Syrian Prime Minister, Husni al-Barazi delivered a speech in Damascus in late November 1942, which omitted any mention of Lebanon and pan-Syrian unification. Instead, al-Barazi focused on how far Syria had come, noting how the Syrian population had developed many syndicates, including a syndicate for the press, so that journalistic integrity could be upheld, however, he noted that there was one syndicate that was missing in the country. This, he proclaimed, was 'the syndicate of honour, prestige, and independence. This syndicate should be our highest aim in the present historical circumstances the country is passing through, for it precipitates the fulfilment of our national aspirations'. al-Barazi remarked that what needs to happen, first and foremost, however, was recognition amongst the Syrians that 'we are independent, and exercise our independence as an actual fact […] If we ourselves do not feel that we are independent, how can we request others to recognise our independence?'

In addition to drawing on nationalist sentiment and using independence as a focal point, al-Barazi argued that for independence to work in favour of the Syrian people the status of the state must be upheld, meaning that 'the population should not betray the treasury while crowding around the gates of the Supply Department', that the population should pay what

[98] 1SL/1/V/74 November 29, 1941, Traduction du discours de Jamil Mekkaoui.

is owed in taxes for the government to fulfil its duties and responsibilities, including maintenance of the army and foreign representation, which the Prime Minister argued as being essential to the state and the independence of the state.[99] Apparent in this speech, al-Barazi had conceded to function within the parameters of statehood that had been established in the European state system, the League of Nations, and by the French and British Mandate administrations, whereby the functions of the state were to reflect the functions of statehood that had been apparent in Europe. This included, treating the modern state in Syria as a form of household authority, with expectations from the population to remain loyal to the state, to pay what is owed to the state, and in return resources would be redistributed. Although this was a logical conclusion, the Arab character of Syria had been negated throughout the Mandate, with the French administration continuously engaging in sectarian politics.

### 8.2.2 Electoral Engineering: Attempting to Establish Amenable Governance to French Civilisation

Despite al-Barazi's willingness to work within the framework of the state as established by the French administration throughout the Mandate, the French administration in Lebanon and Syria had been unwilling to accept that the Lebanese and Syrian governments had acquiesced to a modern form of politics, framed by French interests regarding institutionalisation and geographic limits. The refusal of the French administration to continue progression towards Lebanese and Syrian independence yielded accusations by the British that General de Gaulle was attempting to re-establish a repressive regime of colonial administration. Pressure from the British led to French concessions on the administration of elections in the spring of 1943 to help Lebanon and Syria become independent. In addition, the French agreed to abandon their claim over the command of the Allied Troops in the Levant. Following the agreement between the French and the British regarding the terms of Lebanese and Syrian independence the French attempted to alter the terms, but the British forcefully declined stating that there was no room for negotiation.[100]

The British noted that while preparation for elections were underway in Lebanon, there had been instances of interference by the French authorities. It was reported that the French Advisors in Tripoli and Saida established lists of candidates who were aligned with, or whose interests were favourable to, the French. The candidates who did not make the lists were, according to British intelligence officers that had been stationed in Lebanon and Syria, being

[99] FO/226/233 November 29, 1942 (no. 863), 'Al Kifah', Prime Minister's Speech.
[100] FO/226/234, Telegram from Prodrome, Beirut; FO/226/237, Internal Politics, Lebanon and Syria, Alleged British Interference.

cajoled or threatened in order to prevent them from running for election and upsetting the pursuit of French interests. [101]

M. Pruneaud, working in South Lebanon, formed his list of acceptable candidates that were amenable to French interests. In doing so, he had been in consultation with local notables, and used every means possible to try and ensure that his candidates would be elected. M. Pruneaud, using intimidation tactics ensured that opposition candidates became the target of the *Délégation Générale de la France Libre au Levant*, the organisation that replaced the High Commissioner, which M. Pruneaud openly stated 'will run the elections'. In particular, the French administration, including M. Pruneaud, was particularly concerned with Adel Osseiran, who was viewed as being pro-British, and Riyadh al-Solh, who was viewed as a strong nationalist. Commenting on the situation, the Lebanese Governor of Saida was also concerned by M. Pruneaud's efforts and argued that if he was not stopped, his list of candidates would win the election. Similar tactics were also being employed elsewhere in Lebanon such as in Tripoli, where Hamid Frangieh had been excluded from the French list.[102]

Riyadh al-Solh, witnessing the strategy of intimidation that was being used by the French, argued that elections in Syria should be held before those in Lebanon because the election of 'a reasonably independent Syrian Chamber', despite likely French interference, would encourage the Lebanese to resist French interference.[103] While al-Solh suggested that the Syrian elections be scheduled to occur before the Lebanese elections, given that Syrian politics were more inclined to independence than the politics within Lebanon, the British argued that French interference could be circumvented if the nationalists aligned themselves with the allied World War Two states. In doing so, the French would not be able to claim that the nationalist candidates posed a security threat, and General Catroux would be forced to backtrack on barring nationalist candidates. The British argued that this could allow for the freest elections possible.[104]

The reaction to the creation of lists of candidates who were amendable to French interests generated a rumour that the elections were not a free contest between politicians representing Lebanese and Syrian interests, but a contest between Britain and France. This rumour was

[101] FO/226/240 January 7, 1943, Elections, M. Lambert, Beirut.
[102] FO/226/240 February 10, 1943, French Election Manoeuvres, from M. Lambert, Beirut.
[103] FO/226/240 January 7, 1943.
[104] FO/226/240 February 9, 1943, From M. Lambert.

further provoked by candidates who failed to be placed on the French lists and who positioned themselves as 'British Candidates'. Due to Britain's history of favouring a monarchist system, and the support for the Hashemite family, the population believed that the British supported 'one kingly candidate or another', with Sheikh Daham ibn Meheid of the Fed'an tribe[105] stating that 'it was common knowledge that the British authorities were conducting a vigorous campaign, and spending large sums of money, with a view to popularising the Emir in Syria'. The British, however, were uncomfortable with these assertions and actively repudiated the rumours.[106] The rumours that had developed were subsequently used by the French administration with the aim of developing support for their preferred candidates. The French argued that those who claimed to be British candidates or who were not placed on the French lists intended to achieve the British goal of forcing Lebanon into a federation with Syria, and allowing Muslim domination of the Christians.[107]

Despite the threats made by the French administration in Lebanon and Syria, and the censuring of many nationalist candidates, the National Bloc in Syria managed to obtain an overwhelming victory and in early August, following the elections, Quwatli was elected President of the Syrian Republic by the new Chamber of Ministers.[108] Following his election, Quwatli stated that 'no nation, whether great or small, can anymore live isolated or separate'. In his speech, Quwatli cites the Atlantic Charter (1941), which acknowledged the rights of sovereignty, freedom, and security from domination or interference by any other nation.[109] In Lebanon, French attempts to influence the election by supporting candidates amenable to French interests failed to materialise. Quite possibly, as Riyadh al-Solh had previously stated, the election of the nationalists in Syria had an impact on the vote in Lebanon. On September 21, 1943, the newly elected Chamber of Ministers met in Beirut and elected Bishara al-Khoury as President with Riyadh al-Solh as Prime Minister.[110]

Following the establishment of governments in Lebanon and Syria and the recognition of Lebanon and Syria as independent states by Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, efforts were made by the governments to establish complete control within their respective borders. In Syria, plans were developed to sedentarise and disarm the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes,[111] and

[105] The Fed'an were primarily located in the Syrian Euphrates. Lange, 2006, pp. 940-966.
[106] FO/226/240 February 9, 1943.
[107] FO/226/240 March 22, 1943, Conversation between Captain Arab and Dr. Ayyoub Tabet..
[108] FO/226/240 August 2, 1943, Shukri Quwatli's Speech delivered at the Dengiz Mosque on August 2nd, 1943.
[109] FO/226/240 August 17, 1943, Speech delievered by His Excellency Shukri Bey Quwatli after being elected President of the Republic on August 17.
[110] Hourani 1946 pp. 256-257.
[111] FO/226/262 July 6, 1944, sent to M. Belgrave, from Deir-ez-Zor.

in Lebanon, the government attempted to silence subversive pro-French individuals, including Emile Eddé and Colonel Elias Medawar.[112] By sedentarising and disarming the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes and by silencing subversive pro-French individuals, the governments in Lebanon and Syria employed laws established during the French mandate, upholding the colonial framework in the period of post-independence decolonisation.[113]

In Syria, the sedenterisation of the population exhibited the kind of logic and practice employed during the nineteenth century programme of modernisation in the Ottoman Empire and the French administration during the Mandate. This was a logic of rational organisation and statehood that was tied to a centralised government intended on pacifying and civilising the populations, in order to retain centralised control. In Lebanon, the employment of colonial laws reinforced the means of coercion and force of the former colonial administration. While the nationalist and anti-French parties had won the elections, their victories did not alter the structures of colonial governance that had been put in place, maintaining many of the institutional, legal, and geographic facets of colonial governance. The emergence of the independent modern state is one that immediately reflects its colonial construction, an exercise in a European conception of civilisation.

In a speech given to the Syrian Parliament regarding Arab unity, Quwatli stated that the government in Syria had fulfilled the necessary requirements of a proper government, according to the 'civilised nations', including a legal government, balanced budget, and the maintenance of public order. He continued that the internal affairs of the country were not of concern to foreign powers, who view themselves as 'the giver of orders, the ruler and the one who really possesses every power'. To which Quwatli argued, 'the struggle then is for us to take over all those powers, to take back everything'.[114]

### 8.3 Conclusion

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria provided the French administration with a renewed opportunity to enforce a standard of civilisation through state building. The French state building project, was veiled by French assertions of minority protections and the desire to establish modern and liberal government officials within the political institutions of the state. However,

[112] Although Emile Eddé supported French policies in Lebanon, he believed in a territorial reduction of Lebanon by excluding Tripoli, Akkar, and Baalbeck, see Zamir 1978.
[113] FO/226/252 August 10, 1944, from the British Consulate General in Beirut.
[114] FO/226/252, Internal Politics: Lebanon.

implementation of the project disregarded the desires of the various Arab nationalists and proceeded to develop a system of governance and geographic division that would benefit the enduring pursuit of French interests.

This chapter examined the final two and a half decades before Lebanese and Syrian independence, specifically from 1919 to 1944. It considered how global governance through the establishment of the League of Nations created a civilisational framework to which the populations of Lebanon and Syria could accede to in order to gain independence and sovereignty. Critically, however, the state building project replicated and institutionalised the standard of civilisation that had been present throughout the nineteenth century European state system.

The standard of civilisation that had been asserted throughout the nineteenth century became institutionalised through global governance, which subjected the populations in Lebanon and Syria to a specific structural framework of statehood. However, the application of this framework was left to the policies of the Mandate state, France. The result was a coercive form of pacification, which rejected the proclamations of independence and autonomy in its initial establishment. The French state building project in Lebanon and Syria subsequently established a means of continuity regarding the pursuit of French interests following the eventual independence of the states. This included the division of Syria, and the segregation of the coastal regions from the Syrian interior, to control the economy within the Syrian interior and maintain a strong alliance with religious minorities along the coast. Control was also facilitated through the development of political institutions, the centralisation of politics within Syria, and the establishment of loyal factions within governmental positions.

Although the French administration reformed the governments in Lebanon and Syria to provide improved representation, the French administration constrained decision making of these governments when government decisions did not coincide with French interests, as was the case with the development of a Syrian constitution. The creation of a draft constitution in Syria created additional tensions between the Arab nationalists in Syria and French administration. The representatives of the Syrian Assembly, specifically the Arab nationalists, sought to delineate the geographic boundaries of a Syrian state to include Lebanon, while the French were systematically opposed, fearing that it would infringe on their ability to maintain a foothold in the region through the Maronite population. The

disagreement between the French administration and the representatives in the Syrian Assembly led to the dissolution of the Assembly and the unilateral proclamation of a Syrian constitution that was favourable to French interests. By proclaiming the constitution, and reporting that the population were in favour of its promulgation, the French administration had managed to complete the requirement of institutional state building while retaining control over areas of interest.

Following the disagreement with the French administration over the political and geographic limits of Syria, the Arab nationalists in Lebanon and Syria forged relations with Germany. For the German government, the relationship with the Arab nationalists posed a direct challenge to French and British interests. To regain some leverage over the political environment and reduce the possibility of agitation, the French administration conceded on several political appointments, and seemingly, in return, the Syrian government relinquished the desire to annex Lebanon and the coastal cities of Tripoli, Beirut, and Saida. It was evident that the Syrian political class was not passive, and the nationalists, in particularly, continuously rejected the state of affairs imposed by French Mandate. Yet, they maintained the logics, structures, and institutions that had been in development from the early nineteenth century Ottoman modernisation project and into the French Mandate.

While independence was eventually granted, the electoral period that preceded independence provided another opportunity for the French administration to pursue their interests by selecting a specific set of candidates from the notable classes that were amenable to continued French involvement. Although the government and the population were bound to the norms, institutions, and laws that had been established during periods of imperial modernisation and the French Mandate, they were assembled on customary knowledges and practices. However, the engagement with modern institutions and structures provided a continuation of colonial and imperial knowledges and practices into independence.

## Conclusion

### 9.1 Re-Conceptualising the State in the Non-West as the Product of a Standard of Civilisation

This thesis argued that the state in the non-West, or global peripheries, is a product of a European application of a standard of civilisation, which emerged during the nineteenth century interactions between the European states and the global peripheries. It examined how the export of knowledges and practices of modern statehood associated with a standard of civilisation, impacted the development of the modern state, authority, governance, and institutions in Lebanon and Syria. It followed the development of statehood in Lebanon and Syria, formerly the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, from 1800 until 1944, by considering the impact of interactions, actions, and reactions between the social field, imperial authority, and the European powers, specifically Britain and France, until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. It continued by examining the interactions, actions, and reactions between the developing systems of global governance, the French Mandatory administration, and the social field in Lebanon and Syria.

In making this argument, this thesis found that the production of the state as a standard of civilisation created enduring institutions, structures, and political and social frameworks that were not replications of those which existed in the context of the modern state in Europe, but were assembled through the pursuit of interests and as a consequence of political decision making. Although the modern state is often discussed as a set of institutions that has universal applicability, due to its apparent objective and methodical nature, providing state authority with the means to manage the economy, politics, and provide social order in a modern and rational method, its application to the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, and Lebanon and Syria during the French Mandate was tied to a set of specific worldviews that helped the European powers, specifically France, Britain, and Russia navigate the pursuit of interests.

In examining how the standard of civilisation was applied in the development of the modern state in Lebanon and Syria, and the consequences of its application, the thesis makes a contribution to conceptualising the state in the non-West, as an assembled set of knowledges and practices that were the result of a European civilisational standard and framework that guided the pursuit of economic and political interests. These assembled knowledges and practices included the acceptance of modern standards of statehood as well as the rejection of European hegemonic interference and interventions, the development of sectarian and

nationalist politics, the construction of modern institutions and the reproduction of notable politics within them.

## 9.2 How the Standard of Civilisation was Applied to Lebanon and Syria

The state in Lebanon and Syria emerged from nineteenth century interactions between the European powers and the Ottoman Empire, with the Europeans navigating the global peripheries under the assumption that the modern state, and - more generally - the conditions of modernity, represented a set of methodical and objective institutions and structures that could be applied to any society, providing them with the ability to become rational and modern. The presumed teleological nature of modernity was civilisation, with civilisation being achieved through the application of modern thought, a scientific and rational understanding of the world, providing the ability to order and categorise society. It was within this framework, that institutions and structures of modernity were believed to be objective - not influenced by emotion, culture, or history only by factual and scientific reasoning - and methodical - produced and established through a systematic procedure. However, as shown in this thesis, modernity and the modern state did not represent a rupture from pre-modern worldviews or conditions. Rather, the export of modernity and the modern state through imperial modernisation and followed by early twentieth century state building had enduring effects because the institutions and concepts were functions of European histories and worldviews, and in their application to the global peripheries, they were influenced by interests.

Modernity and the modern state, as it was applied to Lebanon and Syria, were not objective and methodical, rather history, meaning, and interests were embedded in its functions and application. This resulted in an assembled set of knowledges and practices of European history, modern Western worldviews, and the knowledges and practices prevalent in societies where they were being applied. As discussed with regards to the evidence presented in this thesis, the development of state building projects through global governance, for example, cannot be separated from the history of nineteenth century European imperialism and colonialism and the application of a standard of civilisation. Similarly, European imperialism and colonialism cannot be separated from the logics of pre-modern Christian Europe. In many ways, the development of state building through global governance, the successor to the nineteenth century European state system, is the result of the combination of colonial and imperial practices, regenerated through a new vocabulary.

The nineteenth century interactions between Europe and the global peripheries established a benchmark for the global peripheries to accede to. This benchmark required the replication of institutions and structures that made the West, or Europe, civilised, and was established in order to provide the non-West, the global peripheries, with the ability to accede to the European state system as equal members. Although modernisation was premised on the conviction that it would provide the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently Lebanon and Syria, the ability to accede to an international standard of civilisation, the knowledges and practices of order, organisation, and rational governance had emerged through the specific history of state formation in Europe.

The relationship in European societies between society and modern institutional frameworks are representative of this history of state formation and modernity, produced through a specific set of social and political interactions that led to a scaled-up form of household authority. Similarly, the emergence of institutions of global governance, the knowledges and practices that are produced therein, are the result of a set of knowledges and practices framed by history. For the European states, the institutions of global governance were based on the ability to wield and apply international law to equal 'civilised' members of a state system. Like the modern state, the institutions of global governance, for the West, were representative of the delineation of a set of acceptable and legitimate actions that provided civilised interactions, formalising a global standard of civilisation.

The standard of civilisation, applied to the global peripheries, intended to civilise the non-West, by developing institutions that could produce order, frame legitimate action, and punish illegitimate action. The construction of these institutions in the global peripheries provided the means in which non-Western societies could become ordered and rational, developing the frameworks that would provide actors in the European state system, or international state system, with similar-enough institutions, which could be mutually recognised, facilitating the application of law, trade, and diplomacy.

With regards to the development of the modern state in Lebanon and Syria, the application of a standard of civilisation, which necessitated the creation and maintenance of institutions of governance and authority, also embedded relations of Western dominance and local subordination. This was evident in the binary of civilised and uncivilised, the extraction of Western economic and political interests at the expense of native populations, and the delineation of physical boundaries attached to Western interests and worldviews. Although

the application of the standard of civilisation was meant to alleviate the global peripheries from unmodern conditions of barbarianism, and fanaticism, it provided the justification and the means to dominate, embedding colonial knowledges and practices within the institutional framework.

Britain and France had attempted to bring order, to modernise, and rationalise the Ottoman Empire, generally, and Lebanon and Syria, specifically, to provide the institutions and structures that would allow the polities to become 'civilised nations', and guided by a logic justified by an altruistic reasoning of relieving the populations of their unmodern characteristics. What is revealed in this study is that the modern state in Lebanon and Syria was produced within a conceptual dichotomy and specific understanding of civilised and uncivilised. This had a direct impact on the production of the modern state, where the use of force became connected to ideas of order and modernity, the use, and reproduction, of religion as a key identifier was associated with racialised characteristics, and the reproduction of customary networks within modern institutions of the state contradicted the form of scaled-up household authority Europe.

The inability of the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon, and Syria to attain the standards constructed, and reconstructed, by the European states, validated continued interference, providing the European states with the ability to pursue economic and political interests, impacting the development of the modern state and its institutions. Although the modern state and its institutions were generally accepted and upheld with the desire to assert independence, the character and identity of the modern state and its institutions became contested. The modern state and its institutions became something to dominate, and through domination, reordered the social field.

### 9.2.1 Summary of Evidence and Findings

The application of the modern state as a standard of civilisation to the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, and Lebanon and Syria under the French Mandate, developed following increased interactions between the West, the modern European states, and the Ottoman Empire. These interactions had developed a hierarchy in the relations between the European states and the Ottoman Empire, which subordinated the Ottoman Empire to the emerging hegemony of the European states and European state system. This subordination created instability within the Ottoman Empire, placing its survival in danger. Under these conditions, Sultan Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II sought incremental change through modernisation reforms. While these early reforms, including the Document of Agreement (1808)

administered by Mahmud II, the establishment of a new army, the *Eshkenjis*, the destruction of the Janissary Corps, and the decree on male headdress in 1829, were implemented following a series of military defeats, they were not implemented under direct guidance from the European states.

In contrast, the modernisation reforms of the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856), had been developed under the direction, or assistance, of various European powers, and promulgated within the context of continued threats of territorial losses. The position of the Ottoman Empire with regards to the application of these reforms is revealing. The Ottoman Empire, faced with the threat of territorial losses and impediments on the application of the Sublime Porte's authority, was forced to compromise on a variety of political, economic, and legal customs and values, in order to replicate the existing institutions in the West. By transforming the means of governance to replicate the modern European state, the Sublime Porte was promised equality within the European state system and recognition of its independence and sovereignty.

The requirement to accede to the European state system by undertaking modernisation reforms was a condition of the European standard of civilisation. It was believed that the standard of civilisation was 'guided by a more realistic understanding […] of human existence',[1] through the development of a rational understanding of the world, emancipated from the confines of religious frameworks. However, modernisation of governance and authority in the Ottoman Empire altered the relations between the social field and government, changing the means for society to access state power and resources.

Failure to establish a recognised and modern social order, premised on the rights of the individual and all individuals' equal relationship with the state justified continued European interference and interventions within the Sublime Porte and the Syrian provinces. For example, French interventions on behalf of the Maronite community, and the Catholic communities more generally, was justified through the premise of protecting a minority group due to the failures of policies of equality within the Ottoman Empire. It is evident that the failure to accede to the standard of civilisation, to apply policies of equality, provided the justification that the French administration required in order to pursue a particular set of political and economic interests. A similar justification was deployed by the French administration during the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces (1831-1841). The

[1] Linklater 2016, p. 271.

French aligned themselves with the Christian, specifically the Catholic, populations, arguing that the French nation and Catholic communities shared civilisational characteristics.

The French alliance with the Catholic communities created an uneven political, social, and economic environment. The elevation of Christian status in the Ottoman Empire, under the provisions of legal equality, but also due to French interference, led to growing antagonism directed at Christian communities by Muslim communities, as well as the Druze.[2] The changes in governance in the Sublime Porte and continued European interference and intervention, had a direct impact on the social field, enflaming sectarian animosity between Muslims and Christians, resulting in the outbreak of violence in Aleppo in 1850 and Damascus in 1860.

The French alliance with the Catholic communities, and the provision of equality that had been instituted during the Egyptian occupation, but also throughout the promulgation of modernisation decrees, including the Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı Hümayun (1856) embedded sectarian politics into the state. The elevation of the Christian, specifically the Catholic communities, due to their alliance with the French government and the provision of equality, replacing the principle of toleration through modernisation led to the displacement of the Muslim communities as a privileged class that shared a religious identity with the Empire. Anger by Muslim communities directed at the Christian population, due to their changing status within the Ottoman Empire and their allegiances to the French administration, was explained by the French administration throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a result of a natural fanaticism, in fact, it was caused by significant social, political, and economic transformations. The application of a standard of civilisation dislocated the social field from authority. The customary practice of governance was transformed into centralised modern institutions, alienating groups and networks from access to structures of authority, requiring a renegotiation of the social field which had been impacted by the pursuit of European, in this case - French, interests.

The result of dislocation, renegotiation, and reorganisation of the social field from authority, was that of violent social resistance, leading to continued French interference and, more specifically, a European military and political occupation of Mount Lebanon in 1860, which established Mount Lebanon as an autonomous political region. The development of Mount Lebanon's political autonomy eventually facilitated a separate Lebanese nationalism, based

[2] See discussions on the Aleppo Uprising, 1850 (Chapter 4.2) and the Damascus Massacre, 1860 (Chapter 5.1)

on sectarian difference and subsequently on ethno-cultural difference through the propagation of a Phoenician heritage.

The demands that had been made on the Sublime Porte to promulgate reforms in order to accede to the European state system as a 'civilised nation' were actively being undermined by the European states through the pursuit of interests veiled in altruistic frameworks. Sustained subservience of the Sublime Porte to the demands of the European states produced resistance, in the form of social violence and rebellion, but also in emerging political networks, such as the Young Ottomans. This political movement desired to establish control within the Sublime Porte, to promote principles of modern statehood, which had been applied through the standard of civilisation, but also promote the Islamic identity of the Empire, reject European interference, and reject the continued subordination of the Ottoman Empire to European interests. The Young Ottomans sought to challenge European political and social interference in the Ottoman Empire by developing a distinct Ottoman constitution and parliamentary system.

Faced with the Balkan Crisis (1875-1878) and emerging threats of war from Russia, the opportunity to withstand European demands through the promulgation of an Ottoman constitution presented itself at the Tersane Conference (1876). Midhat Pasha attempted to deliver an Ottoman constitution at the Conference with the aim to prevent further territorial losses caused by war with Russia. Although Midhat Pasha had attempted to accede to the standard of civilisation established by the European powers, he was constrained by Sultan Abdul Hamid II's perception that the provisions of citizenship and the limitations on the Sultan's executive powers presented a threat to the sultanate. The presentation of the constitution following the removal of the provisions of citizenship and parliamentary supremacy failed to gain traction with the European states at the Tersane Conference, and was ultimately rejected. Although the constitution would have produced a radical change, modernising the Ottoman Empire and replicating many conditions of the European state, its perceived failures resulted in its dismissal by the European powers. Rather than accepting the constitution, the European states made further demands, which would have authorised increased European interference in political and domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire.

The result of the Tersane Conference and the conditions of the ensuing Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), prompted Sultan Abdul Hamid II to withdraw the constitution and dissolve parliament, strengthening the role of Islam, and centralising authority and power. Ultimately,

Sultan Abdul Hamid II rejected the continued European attempts of applying a standard of civilisation, however, he retained many of the institutions of governance that had been established by previous modernisation reforms, as they provided him with the ability to maintain authority over the Syrian provinces. The Sultan's position was clear, he was interested in the survival of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultanate, and therefore rejected European interference, which had created detrimental hierarchal relations between the European states and the Ottoman Empire, as well as within the Ottoman Empire.

The obstruction of European interference by Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the increased administrative centralisation led to the emergence of Arab nationalism and the establishment of the Young Turks. Rejecting the Sultan's form of governance and authority, European knowledges and practices of modernity had become assembled on customary knowledges and practices. While the Arab nationalists were requesting autonomy, if not independence, the Young Turks, desired the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, both nationalist movements desired the application of modern and liberal conditions that contrasted with the form of governance of Sultan Abdul Hamid II. It was clear that the members of a political class had adopted the logics of the modern state, however, the character of the state differed between the various movements.

After coming to power, and following a series of revolutions, the Young Turks had established their own civilisational standard under the assumption that homogenisation would produce political stability. However, policies of Turkification created increased resentment towards Turkish domination of the Syrian provinces and encouraged Arab nationalist sentiment. The animosity between the Young Turk government and the Arab nationalists provided the British and the French governments with the ability to develop relations with the latter, given their interests in the Syrian provinces rather than Anatolia. The French had done so by providing and protecting the platform of the Arab Congress (1913) in Paris, and the British had actively fostered alliances with members of the Hashemite dynasty, with the aim to defeat the Germans and their allied partner, the Ottoman Empire, during the First World War (1914-1918).

During the First World War, the British and French governments had anticipated the secession of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and devised, among themselves and with the consent of Russia, a plan to divide the region into zones of influence, through the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. Following the conclusion of the First World War in 1918 and

the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the League of Nations was established at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) and the French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria was permitted.

The aim of the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria was to prepare the regions for independence by engaging in a modern form of state building. However, the region had been engaged in a state building process since the early nineteenth century, resulting in the acceptance of the characteristics of the modern state, evidenced by the administrations in Lebanon and Syria declaring independence. Still, the claims for independence were forcefully rejected by the French administration, who justified their advances by claiming a legal right that Lebanon and Syria were not allowed to acquire, due to a lack of recognition within the institutions of global governance., particularly the League of Nations. Under this premise, the French Mandate developed as a means to establish institutional structures of statehood that would be recognised through independence and which would also provide the French government with the ability to continue to influence the region after Lebanese and Syrian independence.

With the aim of preserving French access in the pursuit of interests, the French administration obstructed the development of a constitution in 1928, due to constitutional provisions regarding geographic limitations. The obstruction of the constitution led to the dissolution of the Representative Assembly and the promulgation of a constitution drafted by the French Administration, which came into effect in 1932. The reaction to the French Mandate by the Arab Nationalists in Syria was a developing relationship with Germany, which had sought to undermine the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria and the British Mandate of Jordan, and Palestine.

Towards the end of the Second World War (1939-1945), the French administration in Lebanon and Syria was under increased political pressure to permit Lebanese and Syrian independence, and eventually conceded to allowing elections prior to the provision of independence. Although the French administration allowed elections, they used this opportunity to restrict participation of unfavourable candidates, fearing that French influence following independence would come to an end. Much to the detriment of French interests, the elections in Lebanon and Syria resulted in the appointment of two nationalist governments that were committed to independence and autonomy from external interference.

Throughout this history, the deployment of customary groups and networks in order to gain and maintain legitimacy was recurrent. Although the formation of alliances between European states and customary groups and networks was most prevalent with regards to notable families, alliances had also formed between European states and tribal confederations. For example, during the Crimean War (1853-1856) the Russian administration had secured an alliance with the Ansari and Bedouin tribes controlled by Fares al-Hadeb. The maintenance of tribal structures and networks throughout the modernisation process is also evident during periods of deteriorating authority, as was the case in 1860 following the violence in Damascus, and following the Russo-Turkish War (1878-1877).

Although the tribal networks were not discussed at great length in the documents surveyed for this thesis, evidence of customary networks maintaining relevance within the modern political institutions and structures of the emerging state, was evident. Individuals from notable families comprised the modern political classes in the Syrian provinces throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The notable classes, their pursuit of authority within modern state institutions and structures, as well as their ability to provide European states and national movements with legitimacy, bolstered their role and resilience within the framework of the modern state as the state emerged. For instance, the Young Turks sought allegiances with notable families in order to gain popular support and legitimacy within the Syrian provinces. Similarly, the British and French administrations in Mount Lebanon, attempted to have their activities validated by supporting the appointments of individuals from notable families to governmental positions. This practice carried on into the French mandate, when the French administration, seeking to gain legitimacy, appointed Kamal al-Qudsi as governor of Aleppo. The reproduction of these customary networks in political institutions, as well as nationalist movements, further disrupted the development of scaled-up household authority within the state, fortifying customary loyalty and animosity, and creating contention with regards to character of the state.

By understanding historical development as a process, rather than periods of rupture and change, the evidence summarised in the conclusion and provided throughout the thesis, tells of an assembled set of institutions, structures, knowledges, and practices. Specifically, this thesis has examined how the European framework and conception of civilisation had been assembled in the Syrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire and, subsequently, in the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria. In doing so, it has examined how the pre-modern and the

modern knowledges and practices were assembled in the production of the modern state, producing difference with regards to the conceptualisation the modern state.

## 9.3 Concluding Remarks

European interference and interventions in the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, and the following establishment of the French Mandate for Lebanon and Syria, was premised by the goal of civilising and modernising the global peripheries, to create the form of legitimate scaled-up household authority that existed in Europe. The standard of civilisation, as it was applied to the state in the global peripheries, was influenced by the histories of European state formation, which explained their progression into modernity and the development of European worldviews, as well as their political and economic interests. By tracing how European knowledges and practices were applied to the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, and subsequently during the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria, it has been possible to understand how European knowledges and practices of modern statehood were assembled onto and interacted with pre-existing knowledges and practices, particularly with regards to institutions and structures of statehood, influencing such areas as sectarianism and nationalism, and – more generally – knowledges and practices of statehood.

This thesis has focused on the application of the state as a standard of civilisation, which provided the European powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with the justification for the development of modernisation projects. It has examined its use in constructing the modern state, to produce favourable outcomes, and to help the European powers navigate the philosophical and practical problems of the pursuit of interests. Failure to replicate the conditions of the European state through these modernisation projects justified further interference and interventions within the Ottoman Empire, and subsequently with the French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria. Although many of these projects failed to deliver the desired results, they created enduring institutions and structures of governance, and motivated the development of nationalist movements and competition and renegotiation between customary identities within the social field.

By analysing and understanding the production of the state in Lebanon and Syria as the result of the application of a standard of civilisation that helped the European powers navigate the practical and philosophical problems of imperial and colonial interactions, and which had enduring effects on state institutions, structures, and societies, it is possible to challenge the prominent assumptions of statehood. This includes the logics associated with the modern state, such as those deployed in development and state building, institution building and the

credibility, and ability, of institutions to order society in an efficient manner. It is also possible to uncover the kinds of assembled knowledges and practices that developed within the institutions and structures of the state. By understanding these assembled knowledges and practices within the institutions of the modern state, their histories of interactions with the international actors, it is possible to properly decolonise the post-colonial and move towards a research agenda that places importance on historical difference.

By employing this kind of analysis, taking into account the actions, reactions, and responses to reactions, further research can be produced to examine how the state, as a standard of civilisation, has been reapplied within different regions of the international state system, particularly to the post-colonial state following independence. The approach applied within this thesis can also be applied to better understand difference within the post-colonial state, the international state system, and to move away from conceptualising the state as bound to a particular framework established through a specific European history.

**Bibliography**


Abdulaziz, Sachedina. 2001. *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Abed, Shukri B. 1995. Islam and Democracy, in *Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East*, eds. David Garnham and Mark A. Tessler. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Abu-Manneh, B. 1979. Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda al-Sayyadi, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 15.2: 131-153.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. London: Profile Books.

Adams, Julia. 2005. *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Adas, Michael. 1998. Imperialism and Colonialism in Comparative Perspective, *The International History Review*, 20.2: 371-388.

Adonis. 2015. Imram the Many-Columned, in *Desert Songs of the Night: 1500 Years of Arabic Literature*, eds. Suheil Bushrui and James M. Malarkey. London: Saqi Books.

Agbor, J.A, J.W. Fedderke, and N. Viegi. 2010. A Theory of Colonial Governance. Working Paper Number 172, *University of Cape Town*.

Ahmad, Feroz. 1966. Great Britain's Relations with the Young Turks, 1908-1914, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 2.4: 302-329.

Ahmad, Feroz. 1968. The Young Turk Revolution, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 3.3: 19-36.

Akarli, Engin Deniz. 1993. *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Akhoud-Zaide, Mirza Feth-Ali. 1901. The Magistrates, in *Turkish Literature: Comprising Fables, Belles-Lettres, and Sacred Traditions*. New York: P.F. Collier & Son.

Aksakal, Mustafa. 2011. The Limits of Diplomacy: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7.2: 197-203.

Alavi, Hamza. 1972. The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh. *New Left Review*, I.74: 59-81.

Alfred, Taiaiake, and Jeff Corntassel. 2005. Being Indigenous: Resurgences against contemporary colonialism, *Government and Opposition*, 40.4: 597-614.

Alon, Yoav. 2004. Tribal Shaykhs and the Limits of British Imperial Rule in Transjordan, 1920-46, *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 32.1: pp. 69-92.

Anghie, Antony. 2002. Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions: Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations, *Journal of International Law and Politics*, 34.513: 512-633.

Anievas, Alex and Kerem Nişancıoğlu. 2015. *How the West Came to Rule*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Annexation of Cyprus by Great Britain, 1915, in *The American Journal of International Law*, V. 9: 204-205.

Antonius, George. 1939. *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company.

al-Aqiqi, Antun Dahir. 1959. *Lebanon in the Last Years of Feudalism, 1840-1868*, trans. Malcolm Kerr. Beirut: American University of Beirut Press.

Arabian Nights, Adventure of the Caliph Haroon al-Rasheed, trans. John Scott, *Desert Songs of the Night: 1500 Years of Arabic Literature*, eds. Suheil Bushrui and James M. Malarkey. London: Saqi Books.

Arendt, Hannah. 1969. *On Violence*. New York: Harcourt.

Asad, Muhammad. 1980. *The Principles of State and Government in Islam*. Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust.

Ashman, Sam. 2009. Capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development and the Transhistoric, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 22.1: 29-46.

Askew, William C. 1942. *Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912*. North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Attila Aytekin, E. 2009. Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45.6: 935-951.

Ayubi, Nazih N. 1995. *Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*. London: IB Tauris.

Baali, Fuad. 1988. *Society, State, and Urbanism: Ibn Khaldun's Sociological Thought*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Baldwin, Peter. 1990. The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State, 1875-1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baram, Amatzia. 1997. Neo-Tribalism in Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Tribal Policies, 1991-96, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 29.1: 1-31.

Barakat, Halim. 1993. *The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Barkey, Karen. 2008. *Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, Michael N. 1995. Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional Order in the Arab States System, *International Organisation*, 49.3: 479-510.

Barnett, Michael N. and Raymond Duvall. 2004. *Power in Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barr, James. 2011. *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East*. London: Simon and Schuster.

Bastide, Roger. 1967. Color, Racism, and Christianity, *Daedalus*, 96.2: 312-327

Bax, Mart. 1987. Religious Regimes and State Formation: Towards a Research Perspective. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 60.1: 1-11.

Belge, Ceren. 2013. Seeing the State: Kinship Networks and Kurdish Resistance in Early Republican Turkey, in *The Everyday Life of the State: A State in Society Approach*, ed. Adam White, 14-29. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Bell, Gertrude. 2016. Syria: The Desert and the Sown by Gertrude Bell, in *Aleppo: The Rise and Fall of Syria's Great Merchant City*, ed. Philip Mansel, 199-214. London: IB Tauris.

Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention, *International Affairs*, 84.4: 615-639.

Bellamy, Alex J. 2015. *The Responsibility to Protect: A Defence*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Berque, Jacques. 1970. Selections from the Social History of an Egyptian Village in the Twentieth Century, in *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East*, ed. Louise E. Sweet. New York: The Natural History Press.

Betts, Raymond. 1960. *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory, 1890-1914*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Bey, Mundji. 1908. The Regenerated Ottoman Empire, *The North American Review*, 188.634: 395-403.

Beydilli, Kemal. 2001. From Küçük Kaynarca to the Collapse, in *History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation, Vol. 1*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 63-132. Istanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA).

Bhabha, Homi. 1994. *The Location of Culture*. London: Routledge.

Bhambra, Gurminder K. 2007. *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination*. London: Palgrave MacMillan

Bhargava, Rajeev. 2011. Rehabilitating Secularism, in *Rethinking Secularism*, eds. C. Calhoun, M. Jurgensmayer, and J van Antwerpen. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bieler, Andreas and Adam David Morton. 2001. The Gordian Knot of Agency – Structure in International Relations: A Neo-Gramscian Perspective, *European Journal of International Relations*, 7.1: 5-35.

Biersteker, Thomas J. and Cynthia Weber. 1996. The Social Construction of State Sovereignty, in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, eds. Thomas J. Beirsteker and Cynthia Weber, 1-21. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Black, Antony. 2001. *The History of Islamic Political Thought*. London: Routledge.

Blaisdell, Donald C. 1929. *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Blame, G.H. 1980. The Small Town, in *The Changing Middle Easstern City*, eds. G.H. Blake, R.I. Lawless. London: Croom Helm.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1985. The Social Space and Genesis of Groups, *Theory and Society*, 14: 723-44.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 2012. *Sur l'État: Cours au College de France (1989-1992)*. Paris: Raisons d'Agir et SEUIL.

Bouziri, Said, ed. 1990. *Presse et mémoire: France des étrangers, France des libertés*. Paris: Génériques.

Bowden, Brett. 2004. In the Name of Progress and Peace: the 'Standard of Civilization' and the Universalizing Project, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 49.1: 43-68.

Bowring, John. 2013. *Autobiographical Recollections of Sir John Bowring*. London: Forgotten Books.

Boyar, Ebru. 2006. The press and the palace: the two-way relationship between Abdulhamid II and the Press, 1876-1908, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, 69.3: 417-432.

Boyce, Robert and Joseph A. Maiolo. 2003. *The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues*. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

Braudel, Fernand. 1982. *Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century: The Perspective of the World*, Vol. 3, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Brett, E.A. 2009. *Reconstructing Development Theory*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bridge, F.R. and Roger Bullen. 1980. *The Great Powers and the European States System: 1815-1914*. London: Longman.

Bryman, Alan. 2004. *Social Research Methods*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brennan, Geoffrey, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, and Nicholas Southwood. 2013. *Explaining Norms*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Breuilly, John. 2009. Nationalism and the Making of National Pasts, in *Nations and their Histories: Constructions and Representations,* eds. Susana Carvalho and Francois Gemenne, 7-28. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brock, Lothar, Hans-Henrik Holm, Georg Sorensen, and Michael Stohl. 2012. *Fragile States: War and Conflict in the Modern World.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bromley, Simon. 1994. *Rethinking Middle East Politics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bull, Hedley. 1977/2012. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*. London: Macmillan.

Buonarroti, Philippe. 1836. *Buonarroti's history of Babeuf's conspiracy for equality: with the author's reflections on the causes & character of the French revolution, and his estimate of the leading men and events of that epoch. Also, his views of democratic government, community of property, and political and social equality*. London: H. Hetherington.

Burak, Guy. 2015. *The Second Formation of Islamic Law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buzan, Barry. 2014. The 'Standard of Civilisation' as an English School Concept, *Millennium Journal of International Studies*, 42.3: 576-594.

Buzan, Barry and George Lawson. 2015. *The Global Transformation: History, Modernity and the Making of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Çaksu, Ali. 2014. Janissary Coffee Houses in Late Eighteenth-Century Istanbul, in *Ottoman Tulips, Ottoman Coffee: Leisure and Lifestyle in the Late Eighteenth Century*, ed. Dana Sajdi, 117-133. IB Tauris: London.

Callinicos, Alex and Justin Rosenberg. 2008. Uneven and Combined Development: The Social-Relational Substratum of 'the International'? An Exchange of Letters, *Review of International Affairs*, 21.1: 77-112.

Carneiro, Robert. 1988. The Circumscription Theory: Challenge and Response, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 31: 497-511.

Castells, Manuel. (1997). *The Power of Identity: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Volume II*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2009. *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chappuis, Fairlie and Heiner Hanggi. 2009. The Internplay Between Security and Legitimacy: Security Sector Reform and State-Building, in *Facets and Practices of State Building*, eds. Patrick Sutter and Julia Raue, 31-56. Leiden: Brill.

Chalcraft, John. 2016. *Popular Politics and the Making of the Modern Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chernilo, Daniel. 2006. Social Theory's Methodological Nationalism: Myth and Reality, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9.1: 5-22.

Chesterman, S. 2004. *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration and State-Building*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chilton, Stephen. 1988. Defining Political Culture, *The Western Political Quarterly*, 41.3: 419-45.

Christia, Fotini. 2012. *Alliance Formation in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Churchill, Colonel. 1862. *The Druzes and the Maronites: Under the Turkish Rule, from 1840 to 1860*. London: Bernard Quaritch.

Clark, Ian. 2005. *Legitimacy in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Clastres, Pierre. 2010. *Archaeology of Violence*. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e).

Criss, N.B. 1999. *Istanbul under Allied Occupation, 1918-1923*. Leiden: Brill.

Croxton, Derek. 1999. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty. *The International History Review*, 21.3: 569-591.

Cohen, Ronald. 1978. Introduction, in *Origins of the State: The Anthropology of Political Evolution*, eds. Ronald Cohen and Elman R. Service, 1-14. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.

Cohen, Ronald. 1984. Warfare and State Formation: Wars Make States and States Make Wars, in *Warfare, Culture, and Environment*, eds. Brian R. Ferguson. Orlando: Academic Press.

Cohen, Ronald. 1988. Legitimacy, Illegitimacy, and State Formation, in *State Formation and Political Legitimacy: Political Anthropology, Volume VI*, 69-84. New Jersey: Transaction.

Coles, Paul. 1957. The Origins of the Modern State: A Problem in Political Formation, *The Western Political Quarterly*, 10.2: 340-349.

Colson, Elizabeth. 1968. Contemporary Tribes and the Development of Nationalism, in *Essays on the Problem of Tribe*, ed. June Helm. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Colson, Elizabeth. 1986. Political Organisation in Tribal Societies: A Cross Cultural Comparison, *American Indian Quarterly*, 10.1: 5-19.

Commins, David Dean. 1990. *Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in late Ottoman Syria*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Conner, Walker. 1994. A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a…, in *Nationalism*, eds. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, 36-46. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Convention of Commerce, Balta Liman, August 16, 1838, in *Bulletins of State Intelligence, 1838*, 528-533. London: RG Clarke.

Cook, M.A. 1976. *A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dakin, Douglas. 1973. *The Greek struggle for independence, 1821-1833*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Datzberger, Simone. 2015. Peace building and the depoliticisation of civil society: Sierra Leone 2002–13, *Third World Quarterly*, 36.8: 1592-1609.

Davison, Roderic H. 1954. Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century, *The American Historical Review*, 59.4: 844-864.

Davison, Roderic H. 1963. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Davison, Roderic H. 1986. Midhat Pasa and Ottoman Foreign Relations, in *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 4: 161-173.

Dawisha, Adeed. 2003. *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Dawn, Ernest. 1988. The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 20.1: 67-91.

De Wailly, Henri. 2010. *Liban, Syrie – Le Mandat 1919-1940*. Paris: Perrin.

DeLanda, Manuel. 2006. *A New Philosophy of Society: Assemblage Theory and Social Complexity*. London: Bloomsbury.

Deligiorgi, Katerina. 2002. Universalisability, Publicity, and Communication: Kant's Conception of Reason, *European Journal of Philosophy*, 10.2: 143-159.

Deringil, Selim. 1991. Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22.3: 345-359.

Deringil, Selim. 2012. *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Devereux, Robert. 1963. *The First Ottoman Constitutional Period: A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Dodge, Toby. 2003. *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Donnelly, Jack. 1984. Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, *Human Rights Quarterly*, 6: 400-419.

Donnelly, Jack. 1998. Human Rights: A new standard of civilization? *International Affairs*, 74.1: 1-24.

Dore, Ronald. 1992. Sovereign Individuals, in *Transition to Modernity*, ed. John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, 167-184. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Doumani, Beshara. 1998. Endowing Family: *Waqf*, Property, Devolution, and Gender in Greater Syria, 1800 to 1860. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40.1: 3-41

Douwes, Dick. 2000. *The Ottomans in Syria: A History of Justice and Oppression*. London: IB Tauris.

Durkheim, Émile. 1996. *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, ed. Anthony Giddens. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Easterly, William. 2006. *The White Man's Burden*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Eisenstadt, S.N. 1993. *The Political Systems of Empires*. London: Transaction Publishers.

Eisenstadt, S.N. 2000. Multiple Modernities, *Daedalus*, 129.1: 1-29.

Elias, Norbert. 1994. *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott. Oxford: Blackwell.

Elias, Norbert. 2010. *The Society of Individuals*, ed. Michael Schroter, trans. Edmund Jephcott. Dublin: University of Dublin Press.

Emecen, Feridum. 2001. From the Founding to Küçük Kaynarca, in *History of the Ottoman State, Society and Civilisation, Vol. 1*, ed. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, 3-62. Istanbul: Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA).

Engelhardt, ED. 1882. *La Turquie et le Tanzimat ou Histoire des Reformes Dans L'Empire Ottoman*, *Vol. 1*. Paris: A Cotillon et Cie.

Engels, Friedrich. 2010. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. London: Penguin.

Ergil, Doğu. 1975. A Reassessment: The Young Turks, Their Politics and Anti-Colonial Struggle, *Balkan Studies*, 16.2: 26-72.

Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2002. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives*. London: Pluto Press.

Evans, Arthur J. 1876. *Through Bosnia and Herzegovina on Foot During the Insurrection, August and September 1875*. London: Longmans.

Fanon, Frantz. 2001. *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Constance Farrington. London: Penguin Classics.

Farah, Caesar E. 2000. *The Politics of Interventionism in Ottoman Lebanon, 1830-1861*. London: IB Tauris.

Faroqui, Suraiya. 2004. *The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Farsoun, Samih K. 1970. Family Structures and Society in Modern Lebanon, in *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East*, ed. Louise E. Sweet. New York: Natural History Press.

Fawaz, Leila Tarazi. 1994. *An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860*. London: IB Tauris.

Fawaz, Leila Tarazi. 2014. *A Land of Aching Hearts: The Middle East in the Great War*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Femia, Joseph V. 1981. Gramsci's Political Thought. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Fidler, David P. 2001. The Return of the Standard of Civilization, *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 2.1: 137-157.

Fieldhouse, David Kenneth. 2008. *Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914-1958*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Findlay, A.M. 1980. Migration in Space: Immobility in Society, in *The Changing Middle Eastern City*, eds. G.H. Blake and R.I. Lawless. London: Croom Helm.

Findley, Carter Vaughn. 1980. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Findley, Carter Vaughn. 1989. *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Fiol, Marlene and Elaine Romanelli. 2012. Before Identity: The Emergence of New Organisational Forms, *Organisational Science*, 23.3: 597-611.

Firro, Kais. 1992. *A History of the Druzes, Vol. 1*. Netherlands: E.J. Brill.

Firro, Kais. 2003. *Inventing Lebanon: Nationalism and the State under the French Mandate*. London: IB Tauris.

Fortna, Benjamin. 2013. The Ottoman Empire and after: From a state of 'nations' to 'nation-states', in *State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945*, eds. Benjamin Fortna, Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis, and Paraskevas Konortas, 1-13. New York: Routledge.

Foucault, Michel. 1972. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1984. *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon Books.

Foucault, Michel. 1995. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York: Vintage Books.

Fourier, Charles. 1841. *La Phalange: Journal de la Science Sociale*, 3e Serie, Tome III, no. 24, Vendredi 25 Juin, 1841, section Exterieur: Orient.

Freitag, Ulrike. 1994. Writing Arab History: The Search for the Nation, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 21.1: 19-37.

French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. 1923. *The American Journal of International Law*, 17.3: 177-182.

Fried, Morton H. 1968. On the Concepts of 'Tribe' and 'Tribal Society', *Essays on the Problem of Tribe*, ed. June Helm, 3-20. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. London: Macmillan.

Galula, David. 1964. Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London: Praeger.

Gellner, Ernest. 1979. *Spectacles and Predicaments: Essays in Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 1988. *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gellner, Ernest. 2008. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Gerard, James W. 1885. *The Peace of Utrecht: A Historical Review of the Great Treaty of 1713-1714, and of the principal events of the War of the Spanish Succession*. London: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Germond-Duret, Celine. 2016. Tradition and Modernity: an Obsolete Dichotomy? Binary Thinking, Indigenous Peoples and Normalisation, *Third World Quarterly*, 37.9: 1537-1558.

Gerring, John. 2004. What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For? *American Political Science Review*, 98.2: 341-354.

Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. 2009. *Fixing Failed States: a Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gibb, Elias John Wilkinson. 1901. *Ottoman Literature; the poets and poetry of Turkey*. London: M. Walter Dunne.

Gibson, Quentin. 1958. Social Forces, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 55.11: 441-455.

Giddens, Anthony. 1986. *Durkheim on Politics and the State*, trans. W.D. Halls, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Ginsberg, Benjamin. 2013. *The Value of Violence*. New York: Prometheus Books.

Gioia, Dennis A., Kristin N. Price, Aimee L. Hamilton, and James B. Thomas. 2010. Forging an Identity: An Insider-Outsider Study of Processes Involved in the Formation of Organisational Identity, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55: 1-46.

Goddard, Hugh. 2002. Islam and Democracy, *The Political Quarterly*, 73.1: 3-9.

Gökçek, Mustafa. 2001. Centralization During the Era of Mahmud II, *The Journal of Ottoman Studies*, 21: 237-255

Goldfrank, David M. 2013. *The Origins of the Crimean War*. New York: Routledge

Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. *The Standard of Civilization in International Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gonzalez, Nathan. 2009. *The Sunni-Shia Conflict: Understanding Sectarian Violence in the Middle East*. Mission Viejo: Nortia Press.

Goodman, Dena. 1996. *The republic of letters: A cultural history of the French enlightenment*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Gordon, David C. 1983. *The Republic of Lebanon: Nation in Jeopardy*. London: Routledge.

Gorski, Philip S. 2003. *The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Graham, J, B.A. Nosek, J. Haidt, R. Iyer, S. Koleva, and P.H. Ditto. 2011. Mapping the Moral Domain, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101.2: 366-385.

Gramsci, Antonio. 1999. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: ElecBook.

Grell, Ole Peter and Roy Porter. 2000. Toleration in Enlightenment Europe, in *Toleration in Enlightenment Europe*, eds. Ole Peter Grell and Roy Porter, 1-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Guha, Ranajit and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. 1988. *Selected Subaltern Studies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Guys, Henri. 2009. *Alep Sous le consulat de Henri Guys (1838-1847): Statistique du pachalik d'Alep Esquisse de l'etat politique et commercial de la Syrie, Un derviche algerien en Syrie*, eds. Hussein I. El-Mudarris and Olivier Salmon. Aleppo: Dar al-Mudarris and Ray Publishing.

Hakim, Carol. 2013. *The Origins of the Lebanese National Idea, 1840-1920*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Halliday, Fred. 2005. *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Halperin, Sandra and Ronen Palan. 2015. Introduction: Legacies of Empire, in *Legacies of Empire: Imperial Roots of the Global Contemporary Order*, eds. Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan, 1-25. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hampel, Karl Adalbert. 2015. The Dark(er) Side of 'State Failure': State Formation and Socio-Political Variation. *Third World Quarterly*, 36.9: 1629-1648.

Hampson, Norman. 1968. *The Enlightenment*. London: Penguin Books.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 2001. *Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902-1908*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 2008. *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

al-Hassan Shaybani, Muhammad ibn. 1966. *The Islamic Law of Nations: Shaybani's Siyar*, trans. Majid Khadduri. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Hazran, Yusri. 2014. *The Druze Community and the Lebanese State: Between Confrontation and Reconciliation*. New York: Routledge.

Heberle, Rudolf. 1937. The Sociology of Ferdinand Tonnies, *American Sociological Review*, 2.1: 9-25.

Heemskerm, E.M. 2011. The Social Field of the European Corporate Elite: A Network Analysis of Interlocking Directorates Among Europe's Largest Corporate Boards. *Global Networks*, 11: 440-460.

Hefner, Robert. 1998. Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism in a Globalizing Age, *Annual Review of Anthropology*. 27.1: 83-104.

Hegtvedt, Karen A. and Cathryn Johnson. 2009. Power and Justice: Toward an Understanding of Legitimacy. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 53:3: 376-399.

Helm, June. 1968. *Essays on the Problem of the Tribe*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

(a) Hertslet, Edward. 1875. *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Political and Territorial Changes Since the General Peace of 1814, Vol. 1*. London: Butterworths.

(b) Hertslet, Edward. 1875. *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Political and Territorial Changes Since the General Peace of 1814, Vol. 2*. London: Butterworths.

(c) Hertslet, Edward. 1875. *The Map of Europe by Treaty: Political and Territorial Changes Since the General Peace of 1814, Vol. 4*. London: Butterworths.

Hill, George. 1952. *A History of Cyprus: The Ottoman Province the British Colony, 1571‑1948, Vol. 4*. Cambridge: The University Press.

Hobbes, Thomas. 2008. *Leviathan*, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hobsbawm, Eric. 1995. *The Age of Capital: 1848-1875*. London: Abacus Press.

(a) Hobsbawm, Eric. 2010. *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848*. London: Phoenix Press.

(b) Hobsbawm, Eric. 2010. The Age of Empire: 1875-1914. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Hobson, John M. 2000. *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hokayem, Antoine, Daad Bou Malhab Atallah, Jean Charaf. 2003. *Documents Diplomatiques Francais Relatifs à l'Histoire du Liban et de la Syria à l'Époque du Mandat: 1914-1946, Tome 1, le démantèlement de l'Empire ottoman et les préludes du mandat: 1914-1919*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Hokayem, Antoine. 2012. *Documents Diplomatiques Francais Relatifs à l'Histoire du Liban et de la Syria à l'Époque du Mandat: 1914-1946, Tome 2, Les Bouleversements de l'Année 1920 au Proche-Orient: Le Sort des Territoires Ottomans Occupés*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Holsti, Kalevi J. 1996. *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge University Press.

Hopkins, T.C.F. 2007. *Empires, Wars, and Battles: The Middle East from Antiquity to the Rise of the New World*. New York: Forge.

Hopwood, Derek. 2014. Porfirii Uspenskii: A Russian observer of Near Eastern society, in *Cohabitation et conflits dans le Bilad al-Cham a l'epoque Ottomane: Musulmans et Chretiens a travers les ecrits des chroniqueurs et des voyageurs*, eds. Salim Daccache, Carla Edde, Stefan Knost, Bruno Paoli, and Souad Slim, , 133-152. Lebanon: University of Balamand, Institut francais du Proche-Orient, Universite Saint-Joseph, Orient Institut Beirut.

Horsman, Reginald. 1975. Scientific Racism and the American Indian in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, *American Quarterly*, 27.2: 152-168.

Hourani, Albert. 1946. *Syria and Lebanon, a Political Essay*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hourani, Albert. 1983. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hourani, Albert. 1991. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. London: Faber and Faber.

Hourani, Albert. 1993. Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables, in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, eds. Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury, Mary Christina Wilson, 83-110. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Howard, Judith. 2000. Social Psychology of Identities, *Annual Review of Sociolog*, 26: 367-393.

Huddy, Leonie. 2001. From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory, *Political Psychology*, 22.1:127-156.

Hui, Victoria Tin-bor. 2005. *War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hume, David. 1875. *The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Vol. 3*, eds. T.H. Green and T.H. Grose. London: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. London: Penguin Books.

Hurewitz, J.C. 1979. *Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary Record*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Iliffe, John. 1995. *Africans: The History of a Continent*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Imber, Colin. 2002. *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1650*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Inglehart, Ronald. 1997. *Modernization and Postmodernization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Inkeles, Alex, and David H. Smith. 1976. *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Islam, Mir Rabiul, and Miles Hewstone. 1993. Dimensions of Contact as Predictors of Intergroup Anxiety, Perceived Out-Group Variability, and Out-Group Attitude: An Integrative Model, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 19: 700-710.

İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri. 1987. Introduction: 'Oriental Despotism' in World-System Perspective, in *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, 1-27. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri. 2000. Property as Contested Domain: A Re-evaluation of the Land Code of 1858, in *New Perspectives on Property Land in the Middle East*, ed. Owen Roger, 3-63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ismail, Adel. 1976. *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs a l'Histoire du Liban et des Pays du Proche-Orient du XVII Siècle à Nos Jours*, Beyrouth: Éditions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques.

Ismail, Adel. 1976. *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs a l'Histoire du Liban et des Pays du Proche-Orient du XVII Siècle à Nos Jours*, *vol. 14*. Beyrouth: Éditions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques.

Ismail, Adel. 1976. *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs a l'Histoire du Liban et des Pays du Proche-Orient du XVII Siècle à Nos Jours*, *vol. 15*. Beyrouth: Éditions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques.

Ismail, Adel. 1976. *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs a l'Histoire du Liban et des Pays du Proche-Orient du XVII Siècle à Nos Jours*, *vol. 16*. Beyrouth: Éditions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques.

Ismail, Adel. 1976. *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs a l'Histoire du Liban et des Pays du Proche-Orient du XVII Siècle à Nos Jours*, *vol. 17*. Beyrouth: Éditions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques.

Ismail, Adel. 1976. *Documents Diplomatiques et Consulaires Relatifs a l'Histoire du Liban et des Pays du Proche-Orient du XVII Siècle à Nos Jours*, *vol. 18*. Beyrouth: Éditions des Oeuvres Politiques et Historiques.

Issawi, Charles. 2014. The transformation of economic position of the Millets in the Nineteenth Century, in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude, 159-186. Colorado: Lynne Rienner.

Jackson, Iain. 2016. The Architecture of the British Mandate in Iraq: nation-building and state creation, *The Journal of Architecture*, 21.3: 375-417.

Jameson, Fredric. 2010. *Valences of the Dialectic*. London: Verso.

Jelavich, Barbara. 2004. *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jelavich, Charles and Barbara Jelavich. 1986. *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804-1920, Vol. 8*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Jessop, Bob. 1982. *The Capitalist State*. New York: New York University Press.

Johnson, Michael. 2001. *All Honourable Men: The Social Origins of War in Lebanon*. London: IB Tauris.

Jones, Branwen Gruffydd. 2006. Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism, in *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 1-22. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.

Jones, Branwen Gruffydd. 2013. 'Good Governance' and 'State Failure': Genealogies of Imperial Discourse. *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26.1: 49-70.

Kadercan, Burak. 2012. Military Competition and the Emergence of Nationalism: Putting the Logic of Political Survival into Historical Context, *International Studies Review*, 14: 401-428.

Kandioyoti, Deniz. 1976. Social Change and Family Structure in a Turkish Village, in *Kingship and Modernisation in Mediterranean Society*, ed. T.G. Peristiany. Rome: The Center for Mediterranean Studies.

Kark, Ruth. 2017. Consequences of the Ottoman Land Law: Agrarian and Privatization Processes in Palestine, 1858–1918, in *Societies, Social Inequalities and Marginalization*, ed. Raghbubir Chand, Etienne Nel, and Stanko Pelc, 101-119. Springer.

Karpat, Kemal. 1975. The Memoirs of N. Batzaria: The Young Turks and Nationalism, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 6.3: 276-299.

Karpat, Kemal. 1997. The Balkan National States and Nationalism: Image and Reality, *Islamic Studies*, 36.2: 329-359.

Karsh, Efraim and Inari Karsh. 1999. *Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923*. London: Harvard University Press.

Kattar, Elias. 1997. Les Insurrections Paysannes au Mont-Liban au XIXe Siècle, in *Mélanges de l'école Francaise de Rome Mediterranée*, 109.2: 671-688.

Kavanagh, D. 1972. *Political Culture*. New York: MacMillan.

Kayali, Hasan. 1995. Elections and the Electorial Process in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1919, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 27.3: 265-286.

Kayali, Hasan. 1997. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Keddie, Nikki R. 1966. The Pan-Islamic Appeal: Afghani and Abdülhamid II, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 3.1: 46-67.

Kelsay, John. 1993. al-Shaybani and the Islamic Law of War, *Journal of Military Ethics*, 2.1: 63-73.

Kenny, L.M. 1963. Sati' al-Husri's Views on Arab Nationalism, Middle East Journal, 17.3: 231-256.

Kertzer, David I. 1988. *Ritual, Politics, and Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Kettering, Sharron. 2001. The Historical Development of Political Clientelism, in *Politics and Political Change: A Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, eds. Robert Rotberg, 69-98. Cambridge: MIT Press.

al-Khafaji, Isam. 2004. *Tormented Births: Passages to Modernity in Europe and the Middle East*. IB Tauris: London.

Khaldun, Ibn. 1967. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans. Franz Rosenthal. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Khalidi, Rashid. 1991. Arab Nationalisms: Historical Problems in the Literature, *The American Historical Review*, 96.5: 1363-1373.

Khoury, Dina Rizk. 2006. The Ottoman Centre Versus Provincial Power Holders: An Analysis of the Historiography, *The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume 3*, ed. Suraiya N. Faroqui, 133-156. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khoury, Philip S. 1982. The Tribal Sheikh, French Tribal Policy, and the Nationalist Movement in Syria between Two World Wars, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 18.2: 180-193.

Khoury, Philip S. 1983. *Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of Damascus, 1860-1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Khoury, Philip S. 1987. *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Khoury, Philip and Joseph Kostiner. 1990. Introduction: Tribes and the Complexities of State Formation in the Middle East, in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, eds. Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 1-24. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kingsbury, Benedict. 1999. Sovereignty and Inequality, in *Inequality, Globalization and World Politics*, eds. Andrew Hurrell and Ngaire Woods, 66-94. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kingston, Paul W.T. 2013. *Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and the Politics of Civil Society in Postwar Lebanon*. Albany: SUNY Press

Kiser, Edgar and April Linton. 2001. Determinants of the Growth of the State: War and Taxation in Early Modern France and England, *Social Forces*, 80.2: 411-448.

Kisirwani, Maroun. 1980. Foreign Interference and Religious Animosity in Lebanon, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 15.4: 685-700.

Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias. 2011. Global governance, in *The Handbook of Globalisation*, ed. Jonathan Michie, 393-406. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Kohli, Atul. 2002. State, Society, and Development, in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, 84-117. New York: Norton.

Kramer, Martin. 1993. Arab nationalism: mistaken identity, *Daedalus*, 122.3: 171-206.

Krimsti, Feras. 2014. *Die Unruhen von 1850 in Aleppo. Gewalt im urbanen Raum*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag.

Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology*. London: SAGE Publications.

Kurki, Milja. 2015. Stretching Situated Knowledge: From Standpoint Epistemology to Cosmology and Back Again, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 43.3: 779-797.

Kurt, Burcu. 2014. Contesting Foreign Policy: Disagreement between the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of War on the Shatt al-Arab Dispute with Iran, 1912, *Iranian Studies*, 47.6: 967-985.

Kuru, Ahmet T. 2009. *Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lamarck, Jean Baptiste. 1914. *Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition with Regard to the Natural History of Animals*, trans. Hugh Elliot. London: MacMillan.

Lane, Frederic. 1979. *Profits from Power: Readins in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Lange, Katharina. 2006. Heroic Faces, Disruptive Deeds: Remembering the Tribal Shaykh on the Syrian Euphrates, in *Nomadic Societies in the Middle East and North Africa: Entering the 21st Century*, ed. Dawn Chatty, 940-966. Leiden: Brill.

Lapidus, Ira M. 1990. Tribes and State Formation in Islamic History, in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, eds. Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 25-47. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Layton, Robert. 2006. *Order and Anarchy: Civil Society, Social Disorder and War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Leatherdale, Clive. 1983. *Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis*. New York: Routledge.

Leenders, Reinoud. 2012. *Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Lemaire, Claudine and Robert Wangermée. 2002. Le Rondeau Il ser par vous combattu / L'homme armé poème de l'équivoque?, *Revue Belge de Musicologie*, 56: 145-158.

Levi, Margaret. 2002. The State of the Study of the State, in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, 33-55. New York: Norton.

Lewis, Bernard. 1984. *The Jews of Islam*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1989. An Evaluation of "Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?", *World Politics*, 41.4: 431-470.

Linklater, Andrew. 2002. Towards a Critical Historical Sociology of Transnational Harm, in *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, eds. Stephen Hobden and John Hobson, 162-180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Linklater, Andrew. 2016. *Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lomas, Peter. 2014. *Unnatural States: The International System and the Power to Change*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. 1958. *Syrian and Lebanon under French Mandate*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luhmann, Niklas. 2000. *Art as a Social System*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Lull, Vicente and Rafael Mico. 2011. *Archaeology of the Origin of the State: The Theories*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

MacFarlane, Alan. 1992. Ernest Gellner and The Escape to Modernity, in *Transition to Modernity*, ed. John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, 121-136. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mafese, Archie. 1971. The Ideology of 'Tribalism', *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 9.2: 253-261.

Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Makdisi, Ussama. 2000. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Makdisi, Ussama. 2002. Ottoman Orientalism. *The American Historical Review*, 107.3: 768-796.

Makki, Fouad. 2015. Reframing Development Theory: The Significance of the Idea of Uneven and Combined Development, *Theory and Society*, 44.5: 471-497.

Mandel, Neville. 1965. Attempts at an Arab Zionist Entente: 1913-1914. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 1.3: 238-267.

Mansfield, Peter. 2013. *A History of the Middle East*. London: Penguin.

(a) Mann, Michael. 2012. *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(b) Mann, Michael. 2012. *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation States, 1760-1914*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mansel, Philip. 2010. *Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe on the Mediterranean*, London: An Hachette

Marcus, Joyce. 2008. The Archaeological Evidence for Social Evolution, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 37: 251-66.

Mardin, Şerif. 1962. Libertarian Movements in the Ottoman Empire 1878-1895, in *The Middle East Journal*, 16.2: 169-182.

Mardin, Şerif. 1969. Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 11.3: 258-281.

Mardin, Şerif. 2000. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. New York: Syracuse University Press.

Marx, Anthony. 2003. *Faith in Nation: Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marx, Karl. 1971. *Karl Marx: Economy, Class and Social Revolution*. London: Tutor Books.

Marx, Karl and David McLellan. 2000. *Karl Marx: Selected Writings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Masters, Bruce. 1990. The 1850 Events in Aleppo: An Aftershock of Syria's Incorporation into the Capitalist World System, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22.1: 3-20.

Masters, Bruce. 2006. Semi-Autonomous Forces in the Arab Provinces, in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya Faroqui, 186-206. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Masters, Bruce. 2013. *The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Mawhood, Philip. 1989. State Formation in Tropical Africa, *International Political Science Review*, 10.3: 239-250.

Mayer, Hans George. 1997. The functioning of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state: the Ottoman Empire, *European Review*, 5.3: 257-265.

McCallum, Fiona. 2011. Religious Institutions and Authoritarian States: Church-State Relations in the Middle East, *Third World Quarterly*, 33.1: 109-124.

McMahon, Patrice and Jon Western. 2012. Introduction: The Supply Side of Statebuilding, in *The International Community and Statebuilding*, eds. Patrice McMahon and Jon Western, 1-24. New York: Routledge.

McMeekin, Sean. 2015. *The Ottoman Endgame: War, Revolution, and the making of the Modern Middle East, 1908-1923*. London: Penguin.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The tragedy of great power politics*. London: WW Norton & Company.

Menon, Rajan. 2016. *The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Migdal, Joel S. 2001. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Miller, Michael L. 2010. From Liberal Nationalism to Cosmopolitan Patriotism: Simon Deutsch and 1848ers in Exile, in *European Review of History*, 17.3: 379-393.

Miller, Paul D. 2013. *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1988. *Colonizing Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1991. The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics, *The American Political Science* Review, 85.1: 77-96.

Mitchell, Timothy. 1999. Society, Economy, and the State Effect, in *State/Culture: State Formation after the Cultural Turn*, ed. George Steinmetz, 76-97. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Moore-Gilbert, Bart. 2000. Spivak and Bhabha, *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, eds. Henry Schwarz and Sangeeta Ray, 451-466. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Moreh, Shmuel. 1976. *Modern Arabic Poety, 1800-1970: The Development of its Forms and Themes under the Influence of Western Literature*. Leiden: EJ Brill.

Morrisson, Christian and Wayne Snyder. 2000. The Income Inequality of France in Historical Perspective, *European Review of Economic History*, 4: 59-83.

Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. *The Ruling Class*, ed. Arthur Livingstone, trans. Hannah D. Kahn. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Munro, Henry F. 1918. *The Berlin Congress*. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Muppidi, Himadeep. 2004. Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance, in *Power in Global Governance*, eds. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 273-293. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Murad, Nicolas. 1844. *Notice Historique sur l'Origine de la Nation Maronite et sur ses Rapports avec la France, sur la Nation Druze et sur les diverses populations du Mont Liban* [A Historical Note on the Origin of the Maronite Nation and its Relations with France, on the Druze Nation and on the Diverse Populations of Mount Lebanon]. Paris: Librairie D'Adrien Le Clere et Cie.

Neep, Daniel. 2012. *Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1997. *On the Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic*, trans. Douglas Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Northedge, Frederick Samuel. 1986. *The League of Nations: its life and times, 1920-1946*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

O'Donnell, Guillermo. 2010. *Democracy, Agency, and the State: Theory with Comparative Intent*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Offe, Claus and Volker Ronge. 1982. Theses on the Theory of the State, in *Classes, Power, and Conflict: Classical and Contemporary Debates*, eds. Anthony Giddens and David Held, 249-256. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Okawara, Tomoki. The Urban Fabric of Damascus in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century: A Study of the Tax Register (Rusum Defteri) of 1852, in *Frontiers of Ottoman Studies: State, Province, and the West, Vol. 1*, eds. Colin Imber and Keiko Kiyotaki, 167-186. London: IB Tauris.

The Ottoman Constitutions, Promulgated the 7th Zilbridje, 1293 (11/23 December, 1876), *The American Journal of International Law*, 2.4: 367–87.

Ottoway, M. 1999. Nation-Building and State Disintegration, in *State Building and Democratisation in Africa*, eds. Mengisteab, K and C. Daddieh, 83-98. London: Praeger.

Owen, Roger. 1992. *State, Power, and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*. London: Routledge.

Owens, Patricia. 2015. *Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historic Rise of the Social*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Özkırımlı, Umut. 2010. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Paine, Thomas. 1984. *Rights of Man*. New York: Penguin Books.

Palmer, Alan. 1992. *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*. London: John Murray Publishers.

Pamuk, Şevket. 1999. *A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pamuk, Şevket. 2009. The Ottoman Empire in the 'Great Depression' of 1873-1896, *The Journal of Economic History*, 44.1: 107-118.

Pantalone, Gene. 2016. *Madame Beys: Home to Boxing Legends*. Indiana: Archway Publishing.

Pappe, Ilan. 2014. *The Modern Middle East: A Social and Cultural History*. New York: Routledge.

Pasha, Mustapha Kamal. 2006. Liberalism, Islam, and International Relations, in *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, 65-88. Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield.

Paton, Andrew Archibald. 1844. *The Modern Syrians: or, Native Society in Damascus, Aleppo, and the Mountains of the Druzes. From notes made in those parts during the years 1841-2-3*. London: Elibron Classics.

Patrick, Stewart. 2006. Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction? *The Washington Quarterly*, 29.2: 27-53.

Patten, Alan. 1999. *Hegel's Idea of Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pickering, Charles. 1848. *The Races of Man and their Geographical Distribution, Vol. 9*. Philadelphia: C. Sherman.

Potter, Pitman B. 1922. Origin of the System of Mandates under the League of Nations, *The American Political Science Review*, 16.4: 563-583.

Price, R. 1975. *Society and Bureaucracy in Contemporary Ghana*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Prochaska, David. 1990. *Making Algeria French: Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quataert, Donald. 1997. Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 29.3: 403-425.

Quataert, Donald. 2005. *The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

*The Qur'an*. 2008. trans. Tarif Khalidi. London: Viking.

*The Middle East and North Africa, 2003*, Regional Surveys of the World 49th edition. London: Europa Publications.

Reichardt, Rolf and Deborah Louise Cohen. 1998. Light and Darkness: The Visual Representations of a Central Enlightenment Concept, *Representations*, 61 Special Issue: Practices of Enlightenment: 95-148.

Reilly, James A. 1992. Property, Status, and Class in Ottoman Damascus: Case Studies from the Nineteenth Century, *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 112.1: 9-21.

Reilly, James A. 2002. *A Small Town in Syria: Ottoman Hama in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. Bern: European Academic Publishers.

Rice, Susan E, and Stewart Patrick. 2008. Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Washington: The Brookings Institution.

Rich, Norman. 1991. *Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Roberston, Roland and Frank Lechner. 1985. Modernisation, Globalisation, and the Problem of Culture in World-Systems Theory, *Theory, Culture and Society*, 2.3: 103-117.

Roederer, Paul. 1917. *Les Grands Problèmes Coloniaux: La Syrie et la France*. Paris: Berger-Levrault.

Rogan, Eugene. 2015. *The Fall of the Ottomans: The Great War in the Middle East, 1914-1920*. London: Penguin.

Rosenau, James N. 1970. *The Adaptation of National Societies: a Theory of Political System Behavior and Transformation*. New York: McCaleb-Seiler Pub.

Rosenberg, Justin. 2010. Basic problems in the theory of uneven and combined development. Part II: unevenness and political multiplicity, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23.1: 165-189.

Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair, in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg, 1-50. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Rottmann, S. B. 2014. Negotiating Modernity and Europeanness in the Germany/Turkey Transnational Social Field. *Insight Turkey*, 16.4: 143-158.

Roudometof, Victor. 1998. From *Rum Millet* to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularisation, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821, *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 16.1: 11-48.

Rowlinson, Michael. 2004. Historical Analysis of Company Documents, in *Essential Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research*, ed. Catherine Cassell and Gilian Symon, 301-312. London: Sage Publications.

Rubenstein, Jennifer. 2015. *Between Samaritans and States: The Political Ethics of Humanitarian INGOs*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rubin, Barry. 1991. Pan-Arab Nationalism: The Ideological Dream as Compelling Force, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 26.3: 535-551.

Ruggie, John Gerard. 1993. Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations, *International Organization*, 47.01: 139-174.

al-Rumi, Ibn. 2015. The Chess Champion, in *Desert Songs of the Night: 1500 Years of Arabic Literature*, eds. Suheil Bushrui and James M. Malarkey. London: Saqi Books.

Sachedina, Abdulaziz Abdulhussein. 2001. *The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sahlins, Marshall. 2013. *What Kinship Is – and Is Not*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Said, Edward. 1978. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. New York: Pantheon.

Salibi, Kamal. 2005. *A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered*. London: IB Tauris.

Salih, Shakeeb. 1977. The British-Druze Connection and the Druze Rising of 1896 in the Hawran, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 13.2: 251-257.

Sandbrook, Richard. 1986. Hobbled Leviathans: Constraints on State Formation in Africa, *International Journal*, 40.4: 707-733.

Sanderson, Stephen K. 1994. Evolutonary Materialism: A Theoretical Strategy for the Study of Social Evolution, *Sociological Perspectives*, 27.1: 47-73.

Saouli, Mey. 1972. *Field-Theory: A Study of its Application in the Social Sciences*, trans. Douglas Scotss. London: Routledge.

Sassen, Saskia and Aihwa Ong. 2014. Assemblage Thinking and International Relations, in *Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and International Relations*, Michelle Acuto and Simon Curtis, 17-24. New York: Palgrave.

Schmidt, Brian C. 1998. *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: a disciplinary history of international relations*. New York: SUNY Press.

Schmidt, Sebastian. 2011. To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature, *International Studies Quarterly*, 55.3: 601-623.

Schmidt, Volker H. 2006. Multiple Modernities or Varieties of Modernity? *Current Sociology*, 54.1: 77-97.

Schmitt, Bernadotte E. 1919. The Diplomatic Preliminaries of the Crimean War, *The American Historical Review*, 25.1: 36-67.

Schrock-Jacobson, Gretchen. 2012. The Violent Consequences of the Nation: Nationalism and the Initiation of Interstate War, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56: 825-852.

Schwarz, Rolf. 2008. The Political Economy of State Formation in the Arab Middle East: Rentier States, Economic Reform, and Democratization, *Review of International Political Economy*, 15.4: 599-621.

Schwarz, Rolf. 2012. *War and State Building in the Middle East*. Gainesville: The University Press of Florida.

Scott, David. 1992. Conversion and Demonism: Colonial Christian Discourse and Religion in Sri Lanka, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 34.2: 331-365.

Scott, James C. 1998. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Šedivý, Miroslav. 2010. Metternich and the Syrian Question: 1840-1841, *Austrian History Yearbook*, 41: 88-116.

Sell, Edward. 1915. *The Ottoman Turks*. London: Christian Literature Society for India.

Sen, Amartya. 1997. *On Economic Inequality*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shackle, Christopher. 2004. Ghazal, *Keywords in South Asian Studies*, SOAS South Asia Institute. [https://www.soas.ac.uk/south-asia-institute/keywords/]

Shamir, Shimon. 1974. Midhat Pasha and the anti-Turkish Agitation in Syria, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 10.2: 115-141.

Sharma, Serena and Jennifer Welsh. 2015. *The Responsibility to Prevent: Overcoming the Challenges to Atrocity Prevention*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. 1977. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol 2: Reforms, Revolution, and Republic, the Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sitaraman, Ganesh. 2012. *The Counterinsurgent's Constitution: Law in the Age of Small Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Skocpol, Theda. 1994. *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Slade, Sir Adolphus. 1867. *Turkey and the Crimean War, a Narrative of Historical Events*. London: Smith, Elder and Co.

Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.

Smith, Anthony D. 2005. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Harvey, Nancy Al-Any, Donald Bernier, Frederica Bunge, William Giloane, Irving Kaplan, Rinn-Sup Shinn, Suzanne Teleki. 1969. *Area Handbook for Iraq*. District of Columbia: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Snow, Henry. 1912. The Law of Nations, *The American Journal of International Law*, 6.1: 890-900.

Stein, Kuhnle and Anne Sander. 2010. The Emergence of the Western Welfare State, in *The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State*, eds. Francis G. Castles, Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis, Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

el-Solh, Raghid. 2004. *Lebanon and Arabism: National Identity and State Formation*. London: Centre for Lebanese Studies.

Sommer, Dorothe. 2015. *Freemasonry in the Ottoman Empire: A History of the Fraternity and Its Infleunce in Syria and the Levant*. London: IB Tauris.

Sorby, Karol. 2005. Arab Nationalism after the Young Turk Revolution, 1908-1914, *Asian and African Studies*, 14.1: 4-21.

Spencer, Herbert. 1969. *The Man Versus the State*, ed. Donald Macrae. London: Penguin.

Spruyt, Hendrik. 1994. *The Sovereign State and Its Competitors: An Analysis of Systems Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

St. Clair, William. 2008. *That Greece might still be free: the Philhellenes in the War of Independence*. Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.

Stavrianos. L.S. 1963. *The Balkans Since 1453*. Austin: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Stearns, Peter. 2007. *The Industrial Revolution in World History*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Stirling, P. 1965. *The Turkish Village*. London: Weidemfeld and Nicolson.

Strangford, Viscount. 1869. *A Selection from the Writings of Viscount Strangford on Political, Geographical, and Social Subjects*, *Vol. 1*, ed. Viscountess Strangford. London: Richard Bentley.

Strayer, Joseph R. 1970. *On The Medieval Origins of the Modern State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sunar, İlkay. 1987. State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire, *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, 63-87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sweet, Louise E. 1970. *Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East: An Anthropological Reader, Volume II: Life in the Cities, Towns, and Countryside*. New York: The Natural History Press.

Tajfel, H. and J.C. Turner. 1986. The Social Identity Theory of Inter-Group Behaviour, in *Psychology of Intergroup Relations,* eds. S. Worchel and L.W. Austn, 7-24. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Tauber, Eliezer. 1993. *The Emergence of the Arab Movements*. London: Routledge.

Tessler, Mark. 2002. Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries, *Comparative Poolitics*, 34.3: 337-354.

Tapper, Richard. 1979. Tribal Society and its Enemies, *RAIN*, 34: 6-7.

Tapper, Richard. 1990. Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East, in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, eds. Philip S. Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 48-73. California: University of California Press.

Thomas, Martin. 2001. Divisive Decolonization: The Anglo-French Withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon, 1944-46, in *International Diplomacy and Colonial Retreat*, eds. Kend Fedorowich and Martin Thomas, 71-79. New York: Routledge.

Thompson, Elizabeth. 1993. Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-45, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 25.3: 457-475.

Tibi, Bassam. 1971. *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry,* ed. and trans. by Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglet. London: The Macmillan Press.

Tibi, Bassam. 1990. The Simultaneity of the Unsimultaneous: Old Tribes and Imposed Nation-States in the Modern Middle East, in *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*, eds. Philip Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, 127-152. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter Evans, and Theda Skocpol, 169-186. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1992. *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Tilly, Charles. 2003. *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Titmuss, Richard M. 1963. The Welfare State: Images and Realities, *Social Service Review*, 37.1: 1-11.

The Treaty of Berlin and the Convention of Constantinople, *The National Union of Conservative and Constitutional Associations*, 3rd Edition, 1880. Westminster.

Tripp, Charles. 2006. *Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of Capitalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tripp, Charles. 2013. *The Power and the People: Paths to Resistance in the Middle East*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Troubetzkoy, Alexis S. 1986. *The Road to Balaklava: Stumbling into War with Russia*, Toronto: Trafalgar Press.

Ülker, Erol. 2005. Contextualising 'Turkification': Nation-Building in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918, *Nations and Nationalism*, 11.4: 613-636.

Van Der Seen, Eveline J. 2006. Tribes and Power Structures in Palestine and the Transjordan, *Near Eastern Archaeology*, 69.1: 27-36.

Van Der Veer, Peter. 1998. The Global History of 'Modernity', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 41: 285-294.

Van Dyck, Edward A. 1881. *Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire since the Year 1150*. Washington: Government Printing Office.

Vincent, Andrew. 1987. *Theories of the State*. New Jersey: Wiley.

Visser, Reidar. 2007/2008. The Western Imposition of Sectarianism on Iraqi Politics, *The Arab Studies Journal*, 15/16.2/1: 83-99.

Vu, Tuong. 2010. Studying the State Through State Formation, *World Politics*, 62.1: 148-175.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 2007. *War and the State: The Theory of International Politics*. Michigan: The University of Michigan Press.

Walker, Connor. 1994. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel, Hale Decdeli and Resat Kasaba. 1987. The Incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the World-Economy, in *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, 88-100. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1986. Societal Development, or Development of the World-System?, *International Sociology*, 1.1: 3-17.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2007. *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction*. North Carolina: Duke University Press.

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Addison-Wesley.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1990. Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, *Journal of International Affairs*, 44.1: 21-37.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 2001. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Waever, Ole. 1998. The Sociology of a not so International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. *International Organization*, 52.04: 687-727.

Weber, Max. 1946. *Essays in Sociology*, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1949, 1997. *Max Weber on The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: Free Press.

Weber, Max. 2013. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Volume 1*, eds. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, Hans Gerth, AM Henderson, Ferdinand Kolegar, C. Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Max Rheinstein, Guetner Roth, Edward Shills, Claus Wittich. London: University of California Press.

Weiker, Walter F. 1968. The Ottoman bureaucracy: Modernization and reform. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 13.3: 451-470.

Weiss, Thomas G. 2004. The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era, *Security Dialogue*, 35.2: pp. 135-153.

Wendt, Alexander. 1994. Collective Identity Formation and the International State, *The American Political Science Review,* 88.2: 384-396.

Westlake, John. 1914. *The Collected Papers of John Westlake*, ed. L. Oppenheim. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wimmer, Andreas. 2012. *Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation, and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wirth, Louis. 1926. The Sociology of Ferdinand Tonnies, *American Journal of Sociology*, 32.3: 412-422.

White, Adam. 2013. Introduction: A State-in-Society Agenda, in *The Everyday Life of the State: A State in Society Approach*, ed. Adam White, 3-12. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

Wolff, Janet. 1993. *The Social Production of Art*. New York: New York University Press.

Woodrow Wilson, Thomas. 1918. *President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918)*. OurDocuments.Gov: [https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=62#] [Accessed June 2, 2017].

Wright, Quincy. 1923. Sovereignty of the Mandates, *American Journal of International Law*, 17.4: 691-703.

Yared, Nazik Saba. 1996. *The Arab Travelers and Western Civilisation*. London: Saqi Books.

Zamir, Meir. 1978. Emile Eddé and the Territorial Integrity of Lebanon, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 14.2: 232-235.

Zürcher, Erik J. 2016. *Turkey: A Modern History*. London: IB Tauris.

**Archival Sources**

**British Parliamentary Archives, London, UK**

Parliamentary Papers*, House of Commons and Command: Accounts and Papers, 20 Volumes,* vol. 20, State Papers and Index to Sessional Papers, 3 February-12 August 1842. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons.

The Sessional Papers*,* Correspondence with Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople, Respecting the Affairs of Syria. *Printed by Order of the House of Lords or Presented by Royal Command in the Session 1845,* vol. XIII.

House of Commons Debate, UK Parliament, in Hansard, Parliamentary Archives. [Available online: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1861/may/10/stria-and-turkey-papers-moved-for]

**British National Archives, London, UK**

CAB/37/38
FO/78/243
FO/78/252
FO/78/410
FO/78/412
FO/78/498
FO/78/910
FO/78/960
FO/78/1219
FO/78/1296
FO/78/1453
FO/78/1637
FO/78/1638
FO/78/2968
FO/78/3648
FO/78/4557
FO/97/538
FO/97/539
FO/141/453
FO/195/187
FO/195/458
FO/195/760
FO/195/806
FO/195/1263
FO/195/2342
FO/195/2451
FO/195/2453
FO/195/2457
FO/226/70
FO/226/72
FO/226/131
FO/226/132
FO/226/133
FO/226/136
FO/226/139
FO/226/140
FO/226/144
FO/226/148
FO/226/150
FO/226/152
FO/226/158
FO/226/163
FO/226/166
FO/226/167
FO/226/170

FO/226/172
FO/226/178
FO/226/183
FO/226/184
FO/226/194
FO/226/202
FO/226/203
FO/226/205
FO/226/206
FO/226/207
FO/226/208
FO/226/211
FO/226/212
FO/226/214
FO/226/215
FO/226/220
FO/226/221
FO/226/222
FO/226/223
FO/226/224
FO/226/225
FO/226/226
FO/226/227
FO/226/233
FO/226/234
FO/226/236
FO/226/237
FO/226/239
FO/226/240
FO/226/242
FO/226/243
FO/226/244
FO/226/245
FO/226/246
FO/226/247
FO/226/248
FO/226/249
FO/226/250
FO/226/251
FO/226/252
FO/226/255
FO/226/261
FO/226/262
FO/226/263
FO/226/265
FO/226/266
FO/226/267
FO/424/35
FO/608/107
FO/684/1
FO/861/73
FO/881/111
FO/881/547
FO/881/882
FO/881/2983
FO/881/5168A
PRO/30/29/352

**French Diplomatic Archives, Nantes, France**

1SL/1/V/9
1SL/1/V/74
1SL/1/V/394
1SL/1/V/395
1SL/1/V/414
1SL/1/V/448
1SL/1/V/449
18PO/A/11
18PO/A/22
92PO/A/24
92PO/A/119
92PO/A/120
166PO/D1/46
166PO/D1/52
166PO/D1/53
166PO/D1/54
166PO/D1/55
166PO/D1/56
166PO/D1/71
166PO/D1/72
166PO/D1/89
166PO/D18/2
166PO/D18/3
166PO/D18/4
166PO/D20/2
166PO/D20/3
166PO/D20/4
166PO/D20/5
166PO/D20/10
166PO/D20/19
166PO/E/85
166PO/E/86
166PO/E/123
166PO/E/124
166PO/E/125
166PO/E/126
166PO/E/127
166PO/E/129
166PO/E/130
166PO/E/131
166PO/E/132
166PO/E/133
166PO/E/269
166PO/E/270
166PO/E/271
166PO/E/272
166PO/E/273
166PO/E/274
166PO/E/275
166PO/E/276
166PO/E/534
166PO/E/535
166PO/E/536
166PO/E/537
189PO/1/1
189PO/1/8

**French National Archives, Paris, France**

72/AJ/222
72/AJ/225
72/AJ/240
72/AJ/242
312AP/10
312AP/12
313AP/133
313AP/248
333AP/62
546AP/1
F/4/2892
F/4/2904
F/4/2908

**Newspaper Archive (British Library), London, UK**

Belfast Morning News
The Daily News
The Leeds Mercury
Liverpool Daily Post
Liverpool Mercury
Morning Post
New York Times
Pall Mall Gazette
The Spectator
Stamboul
The Table

**Lebanese National Archives, Beirut, Lebanon**

Damiani, RP. 1889. *Almanach du Bachir, pour l'année 1890*. Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique.

Damiani, RP. *Almanach du Bachir, pour l'année 1895*. Beyrouth: Imprimerie Catholique.

Kayat, Assaad Y. 1847. *A Voice from Lebanon with the Life and Travels of Assaad Y. Kayat*. London: Madden and Co.

*Lubnan* [Lebanon], newspaper archive
*Albarq* [Lightning], newspaper archive
*al-Aqbal* [The Accept], newspaper archive
*al-Islah* [The Improvement], newspaper archive
*al-Ittihad al-Osmani* [The Ottoman Union], newspaper archive