

5-2018

The Two Inexical Uses Theory of Proper Names and Frege's Puzzle

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THE TWO INDEXICAL USES THEORY OF PROPER NAMES
AND FREGE'S PUZZLE

By

DANIEL SHABASSON

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2018

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DANIEL SHABASSON

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy
in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

THE TWO INDEXICAL USES THEORY OF PROPER NAMES AND FREGE'S PUZZLE

By

DANIEL SHABASSON

Adviser: Professor Barbara Montero

The debate between Millians and Fregeans over proper names has resulted in a stalemate after roughly forty years. Neither Millianism nor Fregeanism is plausible. Millianism clashes with our intuitions about cognitive value and truth-value with respect to Frege's puzzle. Millians have elaborated interesting theories aiming to show why this clash does not constitute a *reductio* of Millianism, but they are not plausible. Fregeanism fares no better, as it was refuted by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Following Kripke, a viable theory of proper names must, at a minimum, respect the constraints that: (a) that names are rigid designators; and (b) if names have any descriptive or conceptual contents at all, these cannot be reference-determining.

I formulate a non-Fregean, non-Millian theory of proper names that respects the above-mentioned Kripkean constraints as well as our Fregean intuitions with respect to Frege's puzzle. I explain the cognitive value difference between 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' and 'Clark Kent is Superman' by showing that they express different propositions. The propositional attitude ascription 'Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman' comes out as true, not false as Millians maintain. I propose solutions to both versions of Frege's puzzle, the 'Problem of Rational Inconsistency' (the question how expressing and believing inconsistent singular propositions can be compatible with an agent's rationality), and Kripke's puzzle about belief.

I argue that proper names are used as two kinds of indexicals. Sometimes a name is used indexically just to refer to its bearer. I call this a ‘Millian use,’ and say that a name is used ‘in a Millian way.’ Other times, a name is used indexically to refer to its bearer *and* to contribute the speaker’s descriptive conception of that bearer to the proposition. I call this a ‘Conception-indicating use’ and say a name is used ‘in a Conception-indicating way.’ Therefore, I call the theory ‘The Two Indexical Uses Theory of Proper Names’, or ‘TIUT.’ I intend this difference in use to mark a semantic, and not merely pragmatic, distinction. When used in a Millian way, a name is directly referential. Its content is just its bearer. When used in a Conception-indicating way, a name’s content, which is determined by its character in the context of utterance, is not an *object*, but rather a *meaning* that mediates reference. Thus, a name used in a Conception-indicating way falls outside of David Kaplan’s (1989) paradigm of indexicality, according to which indexicals are directly referential. When used in a Conception-indicating way, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ designate rigidly, but they have different contents that are partially constituted by different descriptive elements. Crucially, these descriptive elements of content are referentially inert, playing no role in determining reference. Reference is instead a function of causal-historical factors following Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference.

Acknowledgments

I wish to thank my adviser, Barbara Montero, as well as my committee members, David Papineau and Heimir Geirsson. Thanks also to my mother, Susanne Shabasson, and my brother, Andy Shabasson.

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INTRODUCTION – OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION

The debate between Millians and Fregeans over proper names has resulted in a stalemate after roughly forty years. The problem is that neither Millianism nor Fregeanism is plausible. Millianism clashes with our intuitions about cognitive value and truth-value with respect to Frege's puzzle. Millians have elaborated interesting theories aiming to show why this clash does not constitute a *reductio* of Millianism. However, along with many philosophers, I do not find these theories plausible, although I do not claim to offer any knockdown refutation. Fregeanism fares no better. If we construe Fregeanism as a species of Descriptivism, which is the standard interpretation, then it was refuted by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Following Kripke, a viable theory of proper names must, at a minimum, respect the constraints that: (a) that names are rigid designators; and (b) if names have any descriptive or conceptual contents at all, these cannot be reference-determining.

My purpose is to formulate a theory of proper names that is neither Fregean nor Millian. It should respect the above-mentioned Kripkean constraints as well as our Fregean intuitions with respect to Frege's puzzle. It should explain the cognitive value difference between 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' and 'Clark Kent is Superman' by showing that they express different propositions. The propositional attitude ascription 'Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman' should come out as true, and not false as Millians maintain. The theory I elaborate, 'The Two Indexical Uses Theory of Proper Names,' or 'TIUT,' comes as close as possible to such a theory.

In Chapter 1, section 1.1, I set out the two versions of Frege's puzzle—the identity sentences puzzle and the propositional attitude ascriptions puzzle. I conclude the section with a

list of seven constraints that I believe any theory of proper names must respect. In section 1.2, I set out a puzzle I call the ‘Problem of Rational Inconsistency.’ Along with Millians, I hold that agents sometimes believe inconsistent singular propositions; moreover, they sometimes utter sentences that express inconsistent propositions, thus contradicting themselves. Lois Lane, for example, has inconsistent beliefs with respect to Kent/Superman, both believing and disbelieving that he can fly when she conceives him in different ways, and she is disposed to contradict herself by uttering sentences such as ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent does not fly.’ Yet her inconsistency, both in terms of what she believes and what she says about Kent/Superman, is not due to any irrationality on her part. It must be explained instead by her ignorance of some fact or set of facts. To solve the problem, we must elaborate a theory of names that elucidates what she is ignorant of. What proposition does she fail to realize about the Kent/Superman identity and why does she fail to realize it? Furthermore, why is she incapable of realizing that her statements ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent does not fly’ are inconsistent?

Chapter 2 is the heart of the dissertation, where I set out the TIUT and its proposed solutions to the puzzles. I argue that proper names are used as indexicals that come in two fundamentally different varieties. Sometimes a name is used indexically just to refer to its bearer. I call this a ‘Millian use,’ and say that a name is used ‘in a Millian way.’ Other times, a name is used indexically to refer to its bearer *and* to contribute the speaker’s descriptive conception of that bearer to the proposition. I call this a ‘Conception-indicating use’ and say a name is used ‘in a Conception-indicating way.’ Therefore, I call the theory ‘The Two Indexical Uses Theory of Proper Names’, or ‘TIUT.’ I intend this difference in use to mark a semantic, and not merely pragmatic, distinction. When used in a Millian way, a name is directly referential (though not in the *strictest* sense, since, given the indexical use of the name, there is a character level of

meaning that determines content).¹ Its content is just its bearer. When used in a Conception-indicating way, a name's content, which is determined by character in the context of utterance, is not an *object*, but rather a *meaning* that mediates reference. Thus, a name used in a Conception-indicating way falls outside of David Kaplan's (1989) paradigm of indexicality, according to which indexicals are directly referential. When used in a Conception-indicating way, 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are designate rigidly, but they have different contents that are partially constituted by different descriptive elements. Crucially, these descriptive elements of content are referentially inert, playing no role in determining reference. Instead, reference is a function of causal-historical factors following Kripke's picture of reference. After explaining the character and content of names used in Millian and Conception-indicating ways, I go on to propose solutions to the two versions of Frege's puzzle, the Problem of Rational Inconsistency, and Kripke's puzzle. I also address the problem of quantifying into propositional attitude contexts, as well as the epistemological status of informative identity sentences such as 'Clark Kent is Superman.'

In Chapter 3, I examine what indexicals are in general. I then go on to discuss one theory of proper names, the theory of Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), according to which proper names are indexicals. The chapter is broken down into the following sections: in section 3.1, I address the question: what are indexicals? In section 3.2, I discuss the debate about whether proper names with multiple-bearers, such as 'John,' are multiply ambiguous expressions or indexicals. According to the multiple-ambiguity view, each bearer of 'John' has a different name that

¹ Kaplan (1989) holds that indexicals are directly referential, but Perry (1997) has clarified that they are not so in the *strictest* sense because character mediates content. Kaplan does not think that proper names are indexicals but rather paradigm cases of genuinely directly referential expression with no mediating character meaning. He wrote in his 1989: "...in the case of proper name words, all three kinds of meaning—referent, content, and character—collapse. In this, proper name words are unique." (562)

happens to be spelled and pronounced the same in English, much as ‘bank’ referring alternately to a financial institution or the edge of a river are distinct expressions that happen to be spelled and pronounced the same way. By contrast, according to the indexical view, ‘John’ is one single unambiguous expression that can refer to different individuals depending on contextual factors, and is therefore used as a species of indexical. Finally, in section 3.3, I discuss the theory of Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), according to which names are used as indexicals (as on the TIUT) but they come in only *one* variety. The theory is species of Millianism because the contents of ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are identical—just the name’s bearer. However, unlike standard forms of Millianism, according to which the bearer *fully exhausts* the meaning of a name, Pelczar and Rainsbury maintain that names, being indexicals, also have a character meaning. Thus, there is more to meaning of a proper name than just its bearer on the view. I argue that Pelczar and Rainsbury’s theory is well motivated and goes a long way towards solving the Problem of Rational Inconsistency. However, it does not solve Frege’s puzzles. *Two* indexical uses, one on which a descriptive conception is contributed to content, as the TIUT posits, are required to solve them.

In Chapter 4, I discuss Descriptivism, a category into which I group together the views of Frege and Russell (and to which I refer as ‘classic descriptivism’), prescinding from the significant differences between their views. I discuss Kripke’s critique of Descriptivism, and characterize Kripke’s alternate picture of reference, the causal-historical picture. I then point out some potential worries for the causal-historical picture, although I go on to endorse Kripke’s view and incorporate it directly into the TIUT (according to which the reference of a name is a function only of causal-historical factors, and the descriptive elements belonging to content play no role in determining reference). Finally, I discuss three modern varieties of Descriptivism—

Rigidified Descriptivism, Causal Descriptivism, and Metalinguistic Descriptivism, and show that each of them is vulnerable to Kripke's arguments against Descriptivism in Naming and Necessity and/or inadequate to solve the puzzles for other reasons.

In Chapter 5, I discuss Millianism, the view that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its bearer. Alternatively, it can be described as the view that a proper name contributes its bearer and nothing else to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs.^{2 3} In the introduction to the chapter, I discuss the two main Millian strategies to solve the puzzles:

- (a) To solve Frege's puzzles: the claim that ordinary speakers do not carefully distinguish between the propositions semantically expressed by sentences and the propositions they are used to pragmatically communicate, and this explains ordinary speakers' erroneous Fregean intuitions about cognitive value and truth-value; and
- (b) To solve the Problem of Rational Inconsistency: the claim an agent can rationally express and believe inconsistent propositions as long as he or she takes them under different *propositional guises* that he or she does not realize such are guises of the same proposition.

I then set out the four worries for these two Millian strategies (listed a – d) that beset Millianism in addition to the most commonly known problem (i.e., that Millianism is inconsistent with

² These definitions of Millianism are not exactly equivalent. The view of Pelczar and Rainsbury (examined in chapter 3), on which a name contributes its bearer alone to content, but has a character meaning in addition to content, would be classified as a species of Millianism only on the second definition.

³ It is common to distinguish the terms "Millian" and "Naïve-Russellian" in the literature, with the former term concerned with a theory as to the meaning or content of proper names, and the latter concerned with a particular view of propositions (favoring "singular propositions"). Typically, the views overlap, since most Millians tend to be Naïve-Russellians. For the sake of simplicity, I shall elide over this distinction and use "Millian" throughout with the underlying presumption that most Millians accept singular propositions as the content of sentences.

strong intuitions about cognitive value and truth-value with respect to Frege's puzzle). Finally, I examine the most prominent Millian theories, those of Nathan Salmon (1986) and Scott Soames (2002), and address how the four worries I identify (a – d) affect their theories.⁴

In Chapter 6, I examine the Hidden Indexical Theory ("HIT"), first proposed by Schiffer in his 1977. Problematically, the HIT proposes a solution to the propositional attitudes puzzle but not the identity sentences puzzle. I argue that the identity sentences puzzle is the more fundamental puzzle and it should be solved first. Once we explain why 'Clark Kent is Superman' and 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' differ in cognitive value, we can explain why the propositional attitude ascriptions in which those identity sentences are embedded in the 'that'-clauses differ in truth-value.

In Chapter 7, I look at Graeme Forbes' theory of proper names (1990), which, like the TIUT, invokes *mental dossiers* in defining the meaning of proper names. I argue that Forbes' theory is overly metalinguistic and cannot handle attitude ascriptions in which the ascriber of the ascription is a non-verbal agent.

In Chapter 8, I discuss the Saul Cases, which are due to Jennifer Saul (1997). Saul presents an additional puzzle. She noticed that sentence pairs such as 'Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent' and 'Superman is more successful with women than Superman' seem to differ in truth-value even though the names do not occur within opaque contexts, e.g., inside the 'that'-clause of a propositional attitude ascription. However, in agreement with Moore (1999) and Pitt (2001), I argue that Saul's examples are not genuine cases of substitution failure of co-referential names because the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman'

⁴ In his 2002, Soames does not mention propositional guises. Subsequently, however, after criticism of his view by David Braun and Nathan Salmon, he wrote in his 2006 (5) that he did not mean to exclude propositional guises from his theory.

are not used co-referentially in Saul's examples, each name instead referring to a different aspect of Kent/Superman.

In Chapter 9, I touch upon Anti-functionalist theories of proper names, including Variablism and Predicativism.

In Chapter 10, I briefly discuss Recanati's Theory of Mental Files, distinguishing the aims of his theory from those of the Two Indexicals Theory.

CHAPTER 1

THE PUZZLES

1.1 Frege's Puzzle

The philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege most clearly stated the eponymous “Frege’s puzzle” in his seminal 1892 paper *On Sense and Reference*. There are two versions of the puzzle: the puzzle about identity sentences and the puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions.

First, let us briefly examine the puzzle about identity sentences. Treat the Superman story as non-fictional and consider the following identity sentences, (1) and (2), which differ in one respect only: one co-referential name has been substituted for another.

- (1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent
- (2) Clark Kent is Superman

In (2), ‘Superman’ is substituted for the second occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ in (1). Consider now the simplest theory of proper names—a theory attributed to the nineteenth-century English philosopher John Stuart Mill and called “Millianism” in his honor: a proper name always contributes its bearer only and nothing more to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs. Frege argued that Millianism was false by the following sort of *reductio*. Suppose that Millianism were true. ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would each contribute their common bearer, the flesh-and-blood man himself—to whom I’ll refer throughout this dissertation as ‘Kent-Super’—to the proposition(s) expressed by sentences (1) and (2). Hence, (1) and (2) would express the same proposition—the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super—which we may schematize as PROP-1.

PROP-1 << Kent-Super, Kent-Super >, identity >>

However, the notion that (1) and (2) express the same proposition is highly counterintuitive. Sentence (2) is interesting and informative to Lois Lane, who does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman. Sentence (1), by contrast, merely states the obvious—that a certain man is identical to himself. It is uninteresting, uninformative, and trivial. Lois might learn something from (2) but not from (1). A rational agent might harbor doubts about the truth of (2) but not about (1).⁵ Frege summed up these salient differences between sentences such as (1) and (2), “uninformative” and “informative” identity sentences respectively, by characterizing them as differing in *Erkenntniswert* or ‘cognitive value.’ It would be difficult, if not impossible, to explain the difference in cognitive value between (1) and (2) if they expressed the same proposition, so (1) and (2) must express different propositions. If they express different propositions, the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ must make different contributions to them, and therefore

⁵ Here is an important qualification. Sentence (1) not subject to rational doubt as long as a speaker utters it to express the trivial proposition that Clark Kent is self-identical. As I touch upon in section 2.1 and discuss at further length in section 2.9, natural language sentences of the syntactic form $a=a$, such as sentence (1), are not always uninformative identities. They do not always express trivial propositions about self-identity whose truth-value any rational agent may ascertain merely by inspecting the syntactic form of the sentence. In fact, a speaker might utter sentence (1) to express an *informative* identity. For example, a man—call him ‘Tom’—might utter (1) to himself to express his belief that the Clark Kent he meets at a party is the same Clark Kent he went to Kindergarten with in Smallville. A rational agent could very well wonder whether Tom expressed a true proposition in uttering (1) and could not tell whether (1), as uttered by Tom, was true or false merely by considering the syntactic form of the sentence. Alternatively, consider Kripke’s Paderewski case. A man named ‘Peter’ might utter ‘Paderewski has musical talent’ when thinking about Paderewski the famous pianist, but also might utter ‘Paderewski does not have musical talent’ when thinking about Paderewski the politician. Peter fails to realize that the pianist and the politician are the same person. Peter’s friend might utter ‘But Peter, Paderewski *is* Paderewski’ to Peter in an attempt to convince him that Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the musician. No one can tell, based on syntactic form alone, whether in uttering the sentence ‘... Paderewski is Paderewski’ Peter’s friend expressed a true or false proposition. This information cannot be read off the tautological syntactic form of the sentence uttered.

Millianism must be false.

In this dissertation, I am going to take it as a working assumption, with Frege, that this *reductio* in fact refutes Millianism and I shall argue for a non-Millian theory of proper names. Here then is Frege's puzzle about identity sentences: if Millianism is false, what then is the correct theory of proper names? Just what *are* the different contributions of the proper names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' to the propositions expressed by sentences (1) and (2) such that we may explain why these sentences differ in cognitive value?

Now let us briefly examine the puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. Frege noticed that the substitution of one co-referential name in place of another inside the 'that'-clause of a propositional attitude ascription sentence might change its *truth-value*, rather than its cognitive value (as in the identity sentences puzzle described above). Consider propositional attitude ascription sentences (3) and (4).

(3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

(4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

In (4) 'Superman' is substituted for the second occurrence of 'Clark Kent' in (3), inside the 'that'-clause. Intuitively, sentence (3) is true and sentence (4) is false. Sentence (3) is true because Lois Lane is acquainted with Clark Kent and, being a rational person, she realizes that he is identical to himself. Sentence (4) is false because, according to the Superman story, Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is the same person as Superman. A speaker might indeed utter the negation of (4), either sentence \neg (4) or (4*n*), to characterize her ignorance of the identity.

\neg (4) Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman

(4n) Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman

Differences in truth-value resulting from the substitution of co-referential names also may occur where the ‘that’-clause is not about identity. For example, intuitively (5) is false and (6) true.

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

However, Millianism entails that our intuitions about the truth-value of sentence pairs (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) are erroneous. According to Millianism, both (3) and (4) express the proposition that Lois Lane believes PROP-1, i.e., the singular proposition that Kent-Super is identical to himself. Since Lois believes this,⁶ (3) and (4) are both true. Contrary to our intuitions about the matter, Millianism has it that (4) is true and therefore Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman. According to Millianism, (5) and (6) both express the proposition that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super flies. Since Lois believes that proposition,⁷ (5) and (6) are both true. Contrary to our intuitions about the matter, Millianism has it that (5) is true and Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies. However, the simplest explanation for our intuitions that there are truth-value differences is the supposition that our intuitions are correct and the members of these sentence pairs express different propositions with different truth-values, and therefore Millianism must be false.

⁶ She believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super both when she conceives him as Superman and when she conceives him as Clark Kent, for she would assent to both ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman is Superman.’

⁷ She believes that Kent-Super flies when she conceives him as Superman. According to Millianism, (5) is true because it expresses the proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super flies, full stop, without respect to how she conceives Kent-Super when she judges that he flies.

As with the identity sentences puzzle, I am going to take it as a working assumption that this *reductio* refutes Millianism as well. I do not think that modern Millian theories elaborated over the past forty years, which attempt to rescue Millianism from the force of these arguments, are plausible. My task is to formulate a theory of proper names that respects speaker intuitions about cognitive and truth-value. The two versions of Frege's puzzle, taken together, pose the following question: what does a proper name contribute to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs such that we may explain the cognitive and truth-value differences illustrated above? To solve the puzzle, I develop a theory of proper names according to which co-referential names such as 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' may, at least on some tokenings, have different contents and make different semantic contributions to the propositions expressed by sentence pairs (1)-(2), (3)-(4), and (5)-(6), such that the members of these sentence pairs would express different propositions.

In his seminal 1892 paper *On Sense and Reference*, Frege proposed a solution to the problem he had raised for Millianism. He denied the Millian thesis that a proper name contributes its bearer to the proposition. In very rough sketch, Frege proposed instead that a proper name contributes its *Sinn* or "sense." Frege was not entirely clear about what he meant by *sense*. Most philosophers have interpreted a sense to be equivalent to the meaning of a definite description specifying a "uniqueness condition," i.e., a condition uniquely satisfied by an individual or object (and therefore Frege's theory is standardly classified as a species of Descriptivism). The referent of a name⁸ would be the object or individual satisfying the

⁸ Frege uses the term *Bedeutung* to mean 'reference.' This is somewhat unfortunate and confusing, given that this German word simply means 'meaning.' In current German, the terms *Bezugsgegenstand* or *Referenzobjekt* would better express what Frege meant by *Bedeutung*.

uniqueness condition, i.e., the object or individual uniquely denoted by the definite description.⁹ In other words, the definite description expressing the sense of a name determines its reference. For example, the sense of the name ‘Clark Kent’ might be expressed by the definite description ‘the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet.’ The sense of the name ‘Superman’ might be expressed by the definite description ‘the caped superhero that protects Metropolis.’ The names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would co-refer because these definite descriptions determine the same reference, i.e., they denote the same individual.¹⁰ We can now see why (1) and (2) differ in cognitive value according to Descriptivism. Sentence (1)

⁹ In his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on *Meaning* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/#FrePro>), Jeff Speaks explains why it is reasonable to interpret Frege as intending senses to be equivalent to the meaning of definite descriptions:

Here is one initially plausible way of explaining what the sense of a name is. We know that, whatever the content of a name is, it must be something that determines as a reference the object for which the name stands; and we know that, if Fregeanism is true, this must be something other than the object itself. A natural thought, then, is that the content of a name—its sense—is some condition that the referent of the name uniquely satisfies. Co-referential names can differ in sense because there is always more than one condition that a given object uniquely satisfies. (For example, Superman/Clark Kent uniquely satisfies both the condition of being the superhero Lois most admires, and the newspaperman she least admires.) Given this view, it is natural to then hold that names have the same meanings as *definite descriptions*—phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so.’ After all, phrases of this sort seem to be designed to pick out the unique object, if any, which satisfies the condition following the ‘the.’

¹⁰ However, in propositional attitude contexts the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would not co-refer, according to Frege’s theory. In propositional attitude contexts, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would refer to their senses, rather than their usual referent, Kent-Super. Thus, ‘Clark Kent’ would refer to the sense of ‘Clark Kent’ instead of referring to Kent-Super, and ‘Superman’ would refer to the sense of ‘Superman’ instead of referring to Kent-Super. Note also that in these propositional attitude contexts *all* of the words inside ‘that’-clauses refer to their senses instead of their usual referents. In essence, therefore, by claiming this reference shift, Frege maintained that the words embedded in ‘that’-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions *refer to* the propositions they would ordinarily *express* were the words not so embedded. Thus, Frege endorsed the view, which Schiffer (2003) has called the “face value” analysis of propositional attitude reports, that belief ascriptions report the existence of the belief relation between an agent and a proposition, to which the ‘that’-clause refer. ‘That’-clauses are, on this view, singular terms referring to propositions.

would be uninteresting and uninformative because it would express the trivial and obvious proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet. Sentence (2) would be interesting and informative because it would express the non-trivial and non-obvious proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the caped superhero that protects Metropolis.¹¹ Bertrand Russell (1905) proposed a superficially similar theory according to which proper names abbreviate reference-determining definite descriptions. Despite important differences between Frege and Russell's theories, both are often referred to as the "Frege-Russell theory" of proper names (Kripke, 1980) or as "Descriptivism," because both views propose that the meaning of a proper name is equivalent to the meaning of a reference-determining definite description and that the meaning of a name can be expressed by this definite description.

In his seminal work Naming and Necessity (1980), Saul Kripke presented powerful arguments against Descriptivism that thoroughly undermined it in the view of most philosophers, myself included. In the process, he made the case for (at least) two important theses about proper names that are widely accepted nowadays. First, proper names are *rigid designators*. Thus, 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' refer to the same individual, Kent-Super, in the actual world and in every possible world,¹² which entails that the propositions expressed by sentences (1) and

¹¹ The received view is that Frege was a Descriptivist and that he would have endorsed this sort of solution to the puzzle about identity sentences. However, some philosophers have argued that Frege was not in fact a Descriptivist. See, e.g., Burge, T. *Sinning Against Frege*, in *Philosophical Review* 88, 1979, pp. 398-432. I recognize that Frege's views are subject to various interpretations. The genuine nature of Frege's views is, however, orthogonal to the primary purpose of this dissertation (which is to present a novel theory of proper names, not to carry out an exegesis of Frege's views) so I shall not be concerned with the issue here.

¹² I write about proper names here as if they were *obstinately* rigid designators, as opposed to

(2) have the same modal profile. Problematically for Descriptivism, (according to most versions of it) proper names are not rigid designators and (1) and (2) would express propositions with different modal profiles.¹³ Second, Kripke made the case that proper names lack reference-determining descriptive meanings. Thus, even if a large percentage of a language community were regularly to associate the name ‘Superman’ with the definite description ‘the superhero that protects Metropolis,’ the name ‘Superman’ would not be synonymous with it, and the reference of ‘Superman’ would not be determined by that definite description.¹⁴ It is my working assumption in this dissertation that these Kripkean theses—that proper names are rigid designators and lack reference-determining descriptive meanings—are correct.

Subsequent to Naming and Necessity and the widespread rejection of Descriptivism

persistently rigid designators, although the arguments I make in this paper do not ride on which notion of rigidity is correct. A designator is *obstinately rigid* if it designates the same object in every possible world, *even in those worlds in which that object does not exist*. By contrast, an expression is *persistently rigid* if it designates the same object in every possible world in which that object exists and designates nothing in those worlds in which that object does not exist. Salmon expressly drew the distinction in his 1981. Kripke alternates between these two conceptions of rigidity in his writings, although more often than not he gives the impression that he favors persistent rigidity. Many philosophers have argued that the notion of obstinate rigidity is the better one. See, e.g., Branquinho, João. 2003. “In Defense of Obstacity.” *Nous-Supplement: Phil. Perspectives* 17: 1-23.

¹³ “Rigidified Descriptivism” proposes that the associated definite descriptions are to be understood as rigidified with the *actually* operator (often written is ‘@’) or *dthat* operator so that the name ‘Superman’ would mean, e.g., *the actual superhero that protects Metropolis* and the name ‘Clark Kent’ would mean *the actual mild-mannered reporter from Smallville who works for the Daily Planet*. On this account, the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would indeed be rigid designators, and sentences (1) and (2) would express propositions with the same modal profile. While Rigidified Descriptivism deals nicely with Kripke’s rigidity concerns, it is nevertheless vulnerable to his semantic and epistemic arguments against Descriptivism.

¹⁴ Kripke argued that reference is instead a function of causal-historical factors. See, e.g., <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/#CauThe> for discussion of Kripke’s causal theory of reference.

amongst philosophers, many philosophers were attracted back to Millianism.¹⁵ They developed modern versions of it that aimed to explain away its counterintuitive implications.¹⁶ Neither Descriptivism nor Millianism is adequate, and it is my purpose to formulate a theory of proper names that is neither Millian nor Descriptivist, a theory with all of the virtues of each and none of the drawbacks of either. The revival of Millianism beginning in the 1970's was a step away from Descriptivism too far in the opposite direction. Many philosophers concluded that because Kripke showed that proper names lack reference-determining descriptive meanings, they must *altogether* lack any sort of meaning. They must be meaningless "tags" (Barcan Marcus, 1961) or "labels" with only one semantic role—to refer to their bearers. Against Millianism, I argue that names have *character meanings*, the sort of meaning borne by *indexicals*. Furthermore, I argue that on some tokenings, names have contents partially constituted by contextually determined descriptive elements, although these are not reference-determining as they would be on Descriptivism.

Although proper names do not have reference-determining descriptive meanings, it is a datum that speakers frequently associate descriptive conceptions with proper names and regularly and purposefully use proper names to communicate these descriptive conceptions to their audience. For example, we typically associate different descriptive conceptions with the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman,' 'Clark Kent' with a mild-mannered reporter conception and 'Superman' with a strong superhero conception. We would typically utter sentence (2)

¹⁵ Millianism had been out of fashion for most of the 20th century prior to its revival in the 1970's and 1980's.

¹⁶ A slim plurality of philosophers today are Millians or sympathetic towards Millianism. See: https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl?affil=All+respondents&areas0=15&areas_max=1&grain=coarse

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

to pick out two conceptions of Kent-Super—a ‘Clark Kent-y’ mild-mannered reporter conception and a ‘Superman-y’ strong superhero conception—and say that both conceptions relate to the same individual, Kent-Super.

We would typically utter sentence \neg (4)

\neg (4) Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman

to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super thought of under a Clark Kent-y conception is the same person as Kent-Super thought of under a Superman-y conception. We would utter \neg (5)

\neg (5) Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent flies

to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super flies when she thinks of him under a Clark Kent-y conception. In these cases, speakers regularly and quite purposefully use proper names *both* to refer to an individual *and* to convey a descriptive conception of that individual. This undercuts the Millian claim that the sole semantic function of proper names is to refer.¹⁷

The Kent/Superman case is somewhat misleading because it lends the false impression that *all* speakers associate the same descriptive conceptions with proper names, as if these conceptions were invariable and fixed to names by convention. However, in real life, most Frege’s puzzle cases involve idiosyncratic conceptions associated with names by particular individuals, and said conceptions may vary from one conversational context to another. Proper names can be used to communicate these idiosyncratic conceptions as well. For example, my

¹⁷ Many Millians would claim that descriptive conceptions are conveyed by pragmatic, rather than semantic mechanisms. I shall argue the mechanism is semantic.

eleven-year-old niece Emma does not realize that Mrs. Green, her sixth-grade teacher, is a former lead Rockette who performed at Radio City Music Hall in the late 1960's under the stage name 'Roxanne Rockets.' She associates very different conceptions with these names 'Mrs. Green' and 'Roxanne Rockets.' I can inform her of the identity by uttering 'Mrs. Green is Roxanne Rockets.' Here, the conceptions associated with these names are particular to Emma and not shared across the wider language community.

Although these Frege's puzzle cases arise from time to time—in which I shall be arguing that names semantically contribute non-reference determining descriptive conceptions to content—nevertheless speakers use proper names just as Millians claim *most of the time*—merely to refer, just to call their audience's attention to the right individual or object. In other words, the Millian picture of proper names is right most of the time. We use proper names to communicate conceptions less frequently, where there are two (or more) salient conceptions of an object or individual in a conversational context and we wish to distinguish between or draw a contrast between them, as in the puzzle cases illustrated above (involving Lois Lane, Clark Kent/Superman; or Mrs. Green/Roxanne Rockets). See section 2.1, *infra*, for discussion of my claim that we regularly and purposely use proper names in these *two* fundamental sorts of ways: to refer and nothing else (which I call 'Millian uses' of names), and to refer and convey descriptive conceptions as well (which I call 'Conception-indicating uses' of names).

In light of the foregoing considerations, to solve Frege's puzzle I propose that we need a theory of proper names that, at a minimum, respects the following seven constraints:

1. Proper names are rigid designators.
2. Proper names do not have reference-determining descriptive meanings.
3. Identity sentences like (1)-(2) express different propositions with the same modal

profile.

4. Propositional attitude ascriptions like (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) express different propositions differing in truth-value.
5. Sometimes, we use a proper name as Millians claim, merely to refer, in which case the name semantically contributes its bearer only to the proposition expressed.
6. Sometimes, we use a proper name both to refer *and* to convey a descriptive conception, in which case the name semantically contributes its bearer plus a descriptive conception to the proposition expressed.
7. The descriptive conceptions we use names to communicate are not conventionally “built into” names and may be idiosyncratic and variable, differing from speaker to speaker and from one conversational context to another. A theory of proper names must provide that names are contextually sensitive in such a way that they load the relevant descriptive conceptions into propositional content.

With respect to a pair of co-referential names such as, e.g., ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’¹⁸ we therefore need a theory on which these names:

- (a) Rigidly designate Kent-Super in all possible worlds, regardless of the different descriptive conceptions a speaker might associate with the names or intend to communicate to his/her audience when tokening either name;
- (b) Differ in semantic content when we purposely use them to communicate different descriptive conceptions, which descriptive conceptions constitute a non-reference-determining element of semantic content;

¹⁸ I leave open the possibility that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ can be used *non-co-referentially*. Consider the sentence ‘Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out,’ which example is due to Jennifer Saul (1998). (See Chapter 8, *infra*, for more detailed discussion of this case). I would contend that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are not co-referential in this case, as they refer to different aspects of a single individual, or perhaps to as an individual dressed in different ways. See Moore (1999) and Pitt (2001), who support this view. However, I take it that the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in (both versions of) Frege’s puzzle are co-referentially used, since Frege’s puzzle is based on the presupposition that Clark Kent *is* Superman. If ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ did not co-refer, sentence (2) (‘Clark Kent is Superman’) would be false, which it is not.

- (c) Are identical in semantic content when we use them merely to refer to Kent-Super, in which case the semantic content of either of the names is just their bearer, Kent-Super, the flesh-and-blood man himself.

1.2 The Problem of Rational Inconsistency

The ‘Problem of Rational Inconsistency’ is an important companion puzzle to the two versions of Frege’s puzzle.^{19 20} The capacity to solve this puzzle should be considered an eighth constraint for any minimally adequate theory of proper names, to be added to the list of seven elaborated at the end of the previous section. Philosophers often discuss this puzzle in the same breath as discussing Frege’s puzzles without separately identifying it, suggesting they may not be properly distinguishing the puzzles. Indeed, they should be distinguished. The Problem of Rational Inconsistency challenges us to explain how an agent’s expressing and believing inconsistent propositions can be compatible with his or her rationality. Ordinarily, we would say that believing inconsistent propositions is incompatible with an agent’s rationality. For example, if an agent were to claim (and not in jest) that it is raining outside now and that it is not raining

¹⁹ This puzzle is similar to but not identical to Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle (Kripke, 1979). There, Kripke poses the question whether Peter holds inconsistent beliefs with respect to Paderewski, depending on whether he conceives Paderewski as a musician or a politician. Over and above this, Kripke addresses wider issues about our practices of attitude attribution. Supposing that we decide that Peter does in fact hold inconsistent beliefs (which I do), why is it that we intuit that there is something wrong with belief ascriptions of the form ‘Peter believes Paderewski has musical talent and believes that he does not have musical talent’? Why do most ordinary speakers take this belief ascription to be incoherent or at least highly unidiomatic? As Mark Richard put it, Kripke raises the question of how to express what Peter believes “in the idiom for belief ascription provided by English, if we limit ourselves to identifying the object of his beliefs [with the name ‘Paderewski’].” To address Kripke’s puzzle, I will need to employ a bit of pragmatics. I address Kripke’s puzzle in section 2.12.

²⁰ Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) call this puzzle ‘The Problem of Coherent Rationality.’ I look at their theory in section 3.3, *infra*.

outside now, we would judge that agent irrational.²¹ However, according to Millianism, Lois Lane, who we may presume is a rational and reflective agent, both believes and expresses inconsistent singular propositions with respect to Kent-Super. Suppose someone asked her to name a non-avian flying being and in response, she uttered sentence (8).

(8) Superman flies

According to Millianism, (8) would express the singular proposition that Kent-Super flies. Suppose someone then asked Lois to name a non-avian being *incapable* of flight and she uttered $\neg(7)$ in response.

$\neg(7)$ Clark Kent does not fly

According to Millianism, $\neg(7)$ would express the *negation* of the singular proposition expressed by sentence (8). To wit, $\neg(7)$ would express the singular proposition that it is not the case that Kent-Super flies. In uttering (8) and $\neg(7)$, Lois would contradict herself, according to Millianism. She would say that Kent-Super flies and that he does not. Assuming that Lois believes the propositions expressed by sentence (8) and $\neg(7)$ —sentences she understands and accepts—then she would believe inconsistent propositions,²² a proposition and its negation. Although not a Millian theory of proper names, the TIUT concurs with Millianism that Lois Lane would indeed express and believe inconsistent singular propositions in uttering sentences

²¹ Assume here that the agent means that it is both raining and not raining *in the same place at the same time in the same way*.

²² That Lois Lane believes the propositions expressed by sentences $\neg(7)$ and (8) follows from the “weak disquotation principle” (Kripke, 1979), which says: if a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker *s* who understands a sentence *S* is disposed to accept *S*, and believes *S* to be true, then *s* believes the proposition semantically expressed by *S*.

(8) and $\neg(7)$. The TIUT takes it as a datum that proper names are often used in a Millian way, just to refer, and that in this case Lois would indeed use the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in a Millian way, thus expressing inconsistent singular propositions (she is after all not intending to distinguish between differing conceptions of Kent-Super and communicate them to her audience when she utters (8) and $\neg(7)$, given that she does realize she is speaking about one individual conceived in two ways; see section 2.1, *infra*, for discussion). The problem of rational inconsistency challenges us to answer the following two questions:

THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL INCONSISTENCY

- (1) *How do we square Lois believing inconsistent singular propositions with her being a rational agent?*
- (2) *Why is Lois incapable of realizing that she expresses inconsistent propositions and contradicts herself in uttering sentences (8) and $\neg(7)$, sentences she understands and uses competently?*

To solve the problem—which can be divided into two sub-problems, as indicated above—we will have to claim that Lois has these inconsistent beliefs because of ignorance, not irrationality. Furthermore, her ignorance of some fact or facts renders her incapable of seeing that the propositions expressed by (8) and $\neg(7)$ are inconsistent. She is rational despite believing inconsistent propositions, entertaining what I shall call ‘rationally inconsistent beliefs.’ Most Millians appeal to the notion of propositional guises to solve the problem (see Chapter 5, where I discuss modern Millian theories). The TIUT (section 2.8) instead appeals to the claim that proper names are used as indexicals to solve the problem—especially with respect to addressing prong (2) of the problem.

CHAPTER 2

THE TWO INDEXICALS THEORY OF PROPER NAMES AND ITS SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLES

According to the TIUT, proper names have two possible semantic uses. When we use a proper name in a ‘Millian way,’ it merely contributes its bearer to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs. When we use a proper name in a ‘Conception-indicating way,’ it contributes its bearer as well as the descriptive conception of the bearer that the speaker has in mind when he or she utters the name. (N.B.: I claim this descriptive conception is part of content but is not reference determining.) Names function as indexicals and are always rigid designators whether we use them in a Millian or a Conception-indicating way. I discuss reasons for supposing that names have these two uses in section 2.1, below. In section 2.2, I introduce several terms of art I use to characterize the character and content of proper names on their two indexical uses, which I then set out in sections 2.3 (for Millian uses) and 2.4 (for Conception-indicating uses). In the sections thereafter, I show how the TIUT solves the puzzles, including Frege’s puzzle (both versions), the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief, and Kripke’s Paderewski Puzzle (which encompasses what I have termed the ‘Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief’ but raises additional issues about our practices of belief attribution).

2.1 Two Uses of Proper Names

As discussed above in section 1.1, Frege’s puzzles—both the puzzle about identity sentences and the puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions—focus a spotlight on situations in which the descriptive conceptions that speakers associate with proper names are important pieces of information they convey when they utter them. In these case, these descriptive conceptions may even be the *most* important information communicated. I will be claiming that

these descriptive conceptions constitute part of the semantic content of the names (rather than being merely pragmatically conveyed, as many Millians would claim). Although these conceptions are part of content, they are not reference-determining.

Speakers would typically utter sentence (2)

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

to communicate two descriptive conceptions of Kent-Super—a ‘Clark Kent-y’ mild-mannered reporter conception and a ‘Superman-y’ strong superhero conception—and say that both conceptions relate to the same individual, Kent-Super. Speakers typically utter sentence \neg (4)

\neg (4) Lois Lane *disbelieves* that Clark Kent is Superman

to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super *conceived in a Clark Kent-y way* is the same person as Kent-Super *conceived in a Superman-y way*. They use sentence \neg (5)

\neg (5) Lois Lane *disbelieves* that Clark Kent flies

to say that Lois Lane disbelieves that Kent-Super flies *when she conceives him in a Clark Kent-y way*.

Even the two occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ in sentence (1) could be used to pick out different conceptions of the same individual.

(1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent

For example, consider again the example discussed in footnote 5, *supra*: a man named ‘Tom’ meets Clark Kent, the reporter for the Daily Planet, at a party and suspects that he is the Clark

Kent he went to Kindergarten with in Smallville. Tom utters (1) to himself to express his belief that the Clark Kent from the party is the same Clark Kent he went to Kindergarten with in Smallville. Here, (1) is used not to express a trivial self-identity—that a man is identical to himself—but rather to say something informative and interesting. The two tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’ in (1) allude to different conceptions of Kent-Super—one the conception of an adult man met at a party and the other of a Kindergarten. Alternatively, consider Kripke’s Paderewski case (1979). A man named ‘Peter’ might say ‘Paderewski the pianist has musical talent, but Paderewski the politician surely does not,’ failing to realize that the pianist and the politician are the same person. A friend of Peter’s who realizes the pianist is the politician might correct Peter’s confusion by saying ‘But Peter, Paderewski *is* Paderewski,’ tokening ‘Paderewski’ twice to allude to different conceptions of the man—one the conception of a pianist and the other of a politician.

At the same time, in some conversational contexts (perhaps in *most*), speakers lack the intent to convey conceptions when they utter a name. In most cases, speakers do not use names to draw contrasts between what is or is not the case depending on how an object or individual is conceived (e.g., contrasting Lois Lane’s varying beliefs with respect to Kent-Super depending on how she conceives him). Instead, they use names merely to direct the audience’s attention to the right person/object so that the speaker can say something about that person/object. Such speakers use names in what I call a ‘Millian way.’

I take Frege’s puzzle itself to constitute solid evidence that proper names are sometimes used to communicate descriptive conceptions. There is also ample evidence, which I shall now discuss, that we regularly use proper names in a Millian way, merely to pick out a name’s bearer, both in simple sentences and propositional attitude ascriptions.

Let us first look at the case of names occurring inside the ‘that’-clause of propositional attitude ascriptions. According to Lycan (2000), it is “undeniable” that a proper name may occur there “just to refer to its bearer, without any further suggestion about the way in which the subject of the belief sentence would have represented the bearer.” Lycan offers the following example:

“Suppose that Smith and Jones are among the few people who know that their acquaintance Jacques is in fact the notorious jewel thief that has been terrorizing Paris’ wealthy set, called “Le Chat” in the popular press and by the gendarmes. Smith and Jones read in the newspaper after a particularly daring but flawed robbery that the gendarmes believe that “Le Chat dropped the fistful of anchovies as he or she ran.” Smith and Jones say to each other, “The gendarmes think Jacques dropped the anchovies as he ran.””

Clearly, Smith and Jones’ use of the name ‘Jacques’ is not intended to suggest that the gendarmes would use that name to refer to the thief. Smith and Jones are aware that the gendarmes, not realizing that Jacques is Le Chat, would refer to the thief only using the name ‘Le Chat.’ However, here, Smith and Jones are indifferent to the way that the gendarmes conceive the thief and their sole concern in uttering the name ‘Jacques’ is pick out a certain individual, Jacques/Le Chat, to say *of* him that the gendarmes believe *he* dropped the anchovies. Any name that referred to their acquaintance Jacques/Le Chat (any name with which both Smith and Jones were mutually familiar) would serve their communicative ends—to pick out a specific individual.^{23 24}

²³ Interestingly, Lycan also points out that we also use *definite descriptions* inside the ‘that’-clause of a propositional attitude ascription just to refer and not to suggest anything about the way in which the ascriber conceives of the object or individual denoted by that definite description. He writes:

“Consider (3):

Suppose I utter, “Everyone who has ever heard him sing believes that Elton John has a great voice.” ‘Elton John’ is the stage name of the famous pop star whose birth name was ‘Reginald Dwight.’ By using the name ‘Elton John’ in this ascription sentence, am I restricting myself to saying that those who have heard Elton John sing *qua famous pop singer named ‘Elton John’* thinks he has a good voice? Or could I very well intend my utterance to mean that everyone who has heard Elton John sing thought *he* had a good voice, whether they knew him as ‘Reginald Dwight’ or ‘Elton John,’ or whether they heard him sing before or after he became a famous pop star? I think the latter is the case. I could very well intend a purely Millian/referential reading of ‘Elton John,’ uttering the name just to refer to that individual *qua* individual regardless of how conceived, and say that any person who ever heard *him* sing, from his childhood music teacher up to one of his biggest fans as a pop star, thought *he* had a great voice. I would intend that my audience, in interpreting my utterance, abstract away from any conceptions they might associate with the name ‘Elton John.’ Of course, I *could* use ‘Elton John’

(3) Columbus reckoned that Castro’s island was only a few miles from India.

We all know what one would mean in asserting (3); the speaker would mean that when Columbus sighted Cuba he thought that he was already in the East Indies and was approaching India proper. Of course, being 450 years early, Columbus did not know anything about Fidel Castro; yet we can assert (3) with no presumption that its complement clause represents things in the way that Columbus himself represented them. The speaker makes this reference to Cuba without ... assuming that Columbus would have referred to Cuba in that way or in any parallel or analogous way. So it seems undeniable that there are transparent positions inside belief sentences, in which the referring expression does just refer to its bearer, without any further suggestion about the way in which the subject of the belief sentence would have represented the bearer. Singular terms can be and are often understood transparently.”

²⁴ They would likely use the name ‘Jacques’ because that is the man’s “real” name and they are accustomed to using that name to refer to him in everyday situations. The point is that in this sentence the conception that the gendarmes associate with the name ‘Jacques’ and ‘Le Chat’ is not a factor for Smith and Jones in deciding which name to utter, and their choice of name is not intended to suggest anything about the conception under which the gendarmes conceive their friend.

to refer to the man *qua* famous pop star, but my point is that there is also a plausible reading on which I intend the name just to refer to that individual *qua* individual.²⁵

Suppose that Jimmy Olson, Perry White, and Perry White's secretary, Janet Smith, were all “enlightened” about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman (i.e., they all realize that Clark Kent is Superman). Furthermore, they all mutually know that each of them is enlightened. One morning, Olson says to White “Clark Kent is so tall, he could probably play in the NBA. He's over seven feet tall!” White is somewhat skeptical about Olson’s judgment of Clark Kent’s height. That afternoon, White remarks to Smith, his secretary: “Jimmy Olson believes that Clark Kent is over seven feet tall. But I think he’s more like 6’ 9”.” Because White knows that Smith knows that Clark Kent is Superman and he knows that Smith knows that Olson knows this fact as well, White could just as well have said to Smith “Jimmy Olson believes that *Superman* is over seven feet tall.” Either of these propositional attitude ascriptions would, under the circumstances described, communicate the same information. White could use either of the names of Kent-Super, ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman,’ to refer to him, unconcerned about any conceptions that he, Olson, or Smith (his audience) might associate with those names. In this conversational context, conceptions associated with names do not affect the information communicated. White utters the name with the sole intent of referring to its bearer, and given the audience he is addressing, any name that refers to Kent-Super (with which his audience is familiar) will communicate the same information.

An expressly *de re* propositional attitude ascription constitutes a further example of the

²⁵ My point here is that it seems undeniable that a speaker *could* utter this sentence intending a purely referential/Millian reading. There are two plausible readings of the sentence, and which reading is correct depends on what the speaker had in mind. There is of course no guarantee that the audience to this utterance will take it in the way the speaker intended.

use of a proper name in a Millian way in a propositional attitude ascription. Compare (5) and (5)^{de re}:

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

(5)^{de re} Clark Kent is such that Lois Lane believes he flies

The non-expressly *de re* (5) is intuitively false (although there is a *de re* reading on which (5) is true, it is the less intuitive reading). Sentence (5)^{de re}, unlike (5), is unambiguously true, for the ‘is such that’ language makes the ascription expressly *de re*, indicating that ‘Clark Kent’ just refers to its bearer and any conceptions that Lois Lane may associate with the name ‘Clark Kent’ or whether Lois even knows Kent-Super under the name ‘Clark Kent’ has no bearing on the truth-conditions of the sentence.

I shall now turn to simple sentences (i.e., non-propositional attitude ascriptions) in which proper names are used just to refer. Consider again what Olson said to White two paragraphs above: “Clark Kent is so tall that he could probably play in the NBA. He's over seven feet tall!” Surely Olson uttered the name ‘Clark Kent’ here just to refer to Kent-Super and not to communicate a Clark Kent-y conception of him to Olson. After all, White and Olson mutually know that they are both enlightened about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. Olson and White both know that if ‘Clark Kent is over seven feet tall’ is true, then ‘Superman is over seven feet tall’ must be true as well. Olson could have made the same claim about Kent-Super’s stature using either the name ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman,’ and either way he would have made the very same claim and White would have understood him as making the same claim. Differing conceptions of Kent-Super are irrelevant to whether what Olson said is true or false, and both Olson and White are aware of this.

Unenlightened speakers such as Lois Lane can (and often do) use the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in Millian ways in simple sentences. For example, suppose that someone asks Lois Lane to name a non-avian flying being and she responds by uttering (8).

(8) Superman flies

Here, she uses the name ‘Superman’ just to refer to Kent-Super. She would not use the name ‘Superman’ to make her Superman-y way of conceiving him salient and contrast this with a Clark Kent-y way of conceiving him. She has no idea that these are different conceptions of the very same individual. When she utters (8), Kent-Super’s Clark Kent persona is not on her mind, nor does she intend to distinguish between Kent-Super’s Clark Kent and Superman personae with respect to his ability to fly. This is not to say that she attaches the same conceptions to the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ On the contrary, she has very different conceptions of Kent-Super when she thinks of him under a Clark Kent-y conception and when she thinks of him under a Superman-y conception. However, my point is that she would not use the names with the intention of making those conceptions salient or to refer to them, and thus communicate them to her audience, because she is not drawing any contrast between Kent-Super based on the various ways she conceives him. She thinks that these names refer to distinct individuals, rather than to the same individual conceived in different ways.

Now suppose someone asks Lois to name a non-avian being incapable of flight and she responds by uttering $\neg(7)$ in response.

$\neg(7)$ Clark Kent does not fly

Here again, Lois utters ‘Clark Kent’ just to refer to Kent-Super. She would not use ‘Clark Kent’

to call attention to or make salient a Clark Kent-y conception, contrast this with a Superman-y conception, and communicate it to her audience, since she has no idea that these are conceptions of the same individual. When she utters $\neg(7)$, a Superman-y conception of Kent-Super is not on her mind.

Finally, we have the utterance of sentence (1) where a speaker intends to express a trivial self-identity—to say that a man is identical to himself.²⁶ Such a speaker would use the name ‘Clark Kent’ twice over just refer to the same individual twice over, intending each tokening of the name to have the identical semantic content—the name’s bearer. The speaker would not attach different conceptions to the two occurrences of the name intending to express an informative identity sentence, as he or she would if she uttered sentence (2) to say that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person, or if he, like Tom (see footnote 5, *supra*), uttered (1) to say that the Clark Kent from the party is the Clark Kent with whom he attended Kindergarten as a child in Smallville.

In the examples above, speakers use names just to refer to their bearers, full stop. Indeed, we use proper names most frequently just to refer to their bearers, i.e., in a ‘Millian way’. However, the very existence of Frege’s puzzle undercuts the Millian claim that merely referring is the *only* semantic function of proper names. In the puzzle cases, speakers purposefully use proper names to convey conceptions as well as to refer, i.e., they use names in ‘Conception-indicating’ ways. Hence, the TIUT posits that proper names have two uses: to refer only (names used in a Millian way), and to refer and to convey conceptions as well (names used in a

²⁶ Practically no one would ever say such a thing with the exception of a philosopher or logician—given that an individual’s self-identity is too obvious to need pointing out—but it is nevertheless *possible* to meaningfully say this.

Conception-indicating way).²⁷ Given that speakers purposefully use names in this conception-indicating way *regularly* and *without extensive stage-setting* (Devitt 2004), I will claim that the conception-indicating use constitutes a standard linguistic convention. Propositional attitude reports such as ‘Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman’ are the only idiomatic means we have in our language to ascribe ignorance of identities, suggesting that such constructions are standard conventional devices for communicating such ignorance (no Millian theory suggests any better idiomatic, non-technical way to state such ascriptions in English). The distinction between Millian and conception-indicating uses should be deemed semantic, and not pragmatic, in nature. (See discussion in section 2.13, *infra*, where I invoke Michael Devitt’s “argument from convention” (2004) to claim that the distinction should be classified as semantic rather than pragmatic).

2.2 Definitions: “Dossier Tokens,” “Dossier Types,” “Subjects”

In explaining the *character* and *content* of names used in Millian and Conception-indicating ways (in sections 2.2 and 2.3), I use the following terms of art: “dossier tokens,” “dossier types,” and “subjects.” Hence, I will define these terms of art here.

²⁷ I leave open the possibility that there are *other* uses of proper names. For example, sometimes we use proper names to refer to aspects or time-slices of individuals or objects. In the sentence, ‘I have been to Chemnitz but never to Karl-Marx-Stadt,’ these names refer to different (thick) time-slices of a single German city, rather than the city as a whole. Or consider ‘Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out’, which example is due to Jennifer Saul (1997). See chapter 8 for discussion of Saul’s cases. I contend that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are not co-referential in Saul’s example, as they refer to different aspects of an individual, not to a whole individual *qua* individual. Clark Kent and Superman, as used in that sentence, are distinct entities, even if they inhere within the same person. See Moore (1999) and Pitt (2001). Names can be used meta-linguistically, as in ‘There are many Smiths in the phone book’; here ‘Smiths’ means ‘bearers of “Smith”’. See my discussion of Predicativism in Chapter 9, section 9.2. Finally, there is a reasonable argument to be made that names can be used non-referentially as variables bound to an indefinite antecedent, as is claimed by adherents of Variablism, notably Sam Cumming in his 2008. See chapter 9, section 9.1 for discussion.

Dossier tokens and their subjects

The notion of *dossier* plays a key role in Graeme Forbes' theory of proper names (1990). According to Forbes, "when we receive what we take to be *de re* information which we have an interest in retaining, our [mental] operating system may create a locus, or *dossier*, where such information is held; and any further information which we take to be about the same object can be filed along with information about it we already possess... The role of a name is to identify a dossier for a particular object... (Forbes, 538)." I adopt this basic characterization of dossiers from Forbes. Dossiers are encyclopedia entries or files in the mind of an agent: they have "subjects"—they contain *de re* information about persons or objects, and they contain stores of descriptive representations associated with and thought by an agent to characterize the subject of the dossier, i.e., what I refer to as *conceptions*. Simply put, each dossier is about a particular individual/object (a subject) and contains descriptive representations about what the owner of the dossier thinks that individual/object is like (a descriptive conception). Lois Lane has one dossier that is about Kent-Super (Kent-Super is its subject) that presents him conceptually in a "Clark Kent-y" way—as a mild-mannered reporter. It contains as part of its descriptive conception the representation that its subject bears the name 'Clark Kent.' Lois also has another dossier that is about Kent-Super (it likewise has Kent-Super as its subject) that presents him conceptually in a "Superman-y" way—as a strong superhero. It contains as part of its descriptive conception the representation that its subject bears the name 'Superman.'

On Forbes' theory, as on the TIUT, the subject of a dossier token is not necessarily the individual that the descriptive representations that make up the conception in the dossier best 'fit.' In the terminology of Kent Bach (1987, 12) the subject of a dossier is determined

relationally, not *satisfactionally*.²⁸ Whereas the denotation of a definite description is determined satisfactionally because its denotation is just whatever object *satisfies* or best fits it, the subjecthood of a dossier depends on the existence of an appropriate *causal-historical relation* between the dossier and its subject that explains the dossier's coming into being, roughly along the lines of Kripke's causal-historical account of reference.²⁹ (See <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/#CauThe> for discussion of Kripke's causal-historical picture of reference). The subjecthood or 'aboutness' of a dossier can be analogized to the aboutness of a photograph. Suppose that President Obama sits for a photograph and because of an odd camera angle and lighting, he strongly resembles Malcolm X. Despite the greater resemblance to Malcolm X, the resulting photograph is nevertheless a photograph *of* Obama, and not of Malcolm X, because there is a causal relation obtaining between Obama and the photograph that does not obtain between Malcolm-X and the photograph. After all, the photo came into being because Obama, and not Malcolm-X, sat for it. The 'aboutness' or 'of-ness' or subjecthood of photographs is determined relationally rather than satisfactionally, and the same is the case with dossiers. In other words, externalist causal-historical considerations largely (or

²⁸ Bach has characterized the distinction between "relational" and "satisfactional" properties as follows (Bach, 1987, 12): "If all your thoughts about things could only be descriptive, your total conception of the world would be merely qualitative. You would never be related in thought to anything in particular. Thinking of something would never be a case of having it 'in mind,' as we say colloquially, or as some philosophers have said, of being 'en rapport,' in 'cognitive contact,' or 'epistemically intimate' with it. But picturesque phrases aside, just what is this special relation? Whatever it is, it is different from that involved in thinking of something under a description. If we can even speak of a relation in the latter case, it is surely not a real (or natural) relation. Since the object of a descriptive thought is determined SATISFACTIONALLY, the fact that the thought is of that object does not require any connection between thought and object. However, the object of a *de re* thought is determined RELATIONALLY. For something to be the object of a *de re* thought, it must stand in a certain kind of relation to that very thought."

²⁹ However, I would not rule out the possibility that subjecthood might turn out to be a *hybrid* satisfactional-relational property. See section 4.3 for discussion.

perhaps fully) determine the aboutness or subjecthood of dossiers, so that the subjecthood of a dossier is not a function of what is “in speaker’s head” (as the reference of a proper name would be according to Descriptivism).

Lois Lane’s ‘Clark Kent’ dossier has Kent-Super as its subject because she causally interacted with Kent-Super (in his Clark Kent guise) and this resulted in the coming into being in her mind of her ‘Clark Kent’ dossier. Kent-Super is also the subject of Lois’ ‘Superman’ dossier for the same reason, i.e., she causally interacted with Kent-Super (in his Superman guise) and this led to the creation of her ‘Superman’ dossier in her mind. Dossiers may also be generated in the mind in the absence of *direct* causal contact between an agent and an individual, as when an agent hears about an individual by name. The subject of the dossier that comes into being upon hearing the name for the first time would be the individual causally-historically linked to the name roughly along the lines of the causal-historical picture of *reference borrowing* (Kripke, 1980; Devitt, 1981).

Dossier types and their individuation criteria

I have characterized dossier *tokens* above. The TIUT distinguishes between dossier *tokens* and dossier *types* (with dossier *types* being fundamental to the statement of the character and content of proper names when used in a Conception-indicating way; see section 2.4). Dossier types are abstract objects individuated by their subject and their conception. Dossier tokens with the same subject and the same (or relevantly similar) conception of their subject instantiate the same dossier type. For example, if two dossier tokens, d^1 and d^2 , each have Kent-Super as their subject and contain a “Clark Kent-y” mild-mannered reporter conception, d^1 and d^2 are dossier tokens instantiating the same dossier type.

More about Dossiers

Agents both enlightened and unenlightened may have multiple dossiers for the same subject. Suppose that Jimmy Olson is ‘enlightened’—he realizes that Clark Kent is Superman. He may maintain two separate dossiers, one ‘Clark Kent’ dossier and one ‘Superman’ dossier, each dossier containing different conceptions of their common subject, Kent-Super. There would be some overlapping representations in his two dossiers reflecting the fact that Olson believes that the dossiers have the same subject. Perhaps the dossiers are ‘linked’ in his cognitive architecture, reflecting the fact that he knows that they have the same subject. The enlightened Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’ dossier and his ‘Superman’ dossier cannot match the ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ dossiers of the unenlightened Lois Lane *perfectly*. Olson’s dossiers contain representations reflecting his awareness that the dossiers are about the same subject, whereas Lois’ corresponding dossiers lack that representation. Nevertheless, by having two dossiers, Olson can conceive Kent-Super in either a Clark Kent-y or Superman-y way, thus mirroring Lois’ distinct conceptions of Kent-Super. Olson’s ‘Clark Kent’ dossier and his ‘Superman’ dossier are sufficiently relevantly like Lois’ such that his dossiers are of the same dossier types as hers despite his added knowledge of Clark Kent and Superman’s identity.

The structure of an agent’s dossiers and the representations contained in them—the agent’s “mental architecture”—is *dynamic*, such that agents regularly (and rapidly) restructure the data in their dossiers, split one dossier into two, and merge dossiers. Much of this restructuring involves the creation of *temporary* dossiers. For example, suppose that instead of two linked dossiers about Kent-Super, one ‘Clark Kent’ dossier and one ‘Superman’ dossier, the enlightened Jimmy Olson maintained one single dossier on Kent-Super. Inside of this single dossier are all the descriptive conceptual representations relating to both of Kent-Super’s

personas and the names he bears. I posit that Olson can temporarily split this unified dossier into two separate temporary dossiers, one containing a Clark Kent-y conception and the other containing a Superman-y conception. This would not entail the actual breaking up of the original, unified, “mother dossier” covering both of Kent-Super’s personas, but rather the creation of two *temporary* dossiers. Olson’s operating system loads the Clark Kent-y conceptual representations into one temporary dossier and the Superman-y conceptual representations into another temporary dossier. Each of these temporary dossiers would continue to have the same subject, Kent-Super, as that of the mother dossier from which they were created. Importantly, the temporary dossiers would “borrow” the subjecthood of the dossiers from which they are generated.³⁰ Thus, Olson would have two temporary dossiers that would be of the same types as Lois Lane’s two dossiers, one for Clark Kent and one for Superman, having the same subjecthood and conceptions similar to those in her respective dossiers. His cognitive architecture with respect to this individual, Kent-Super, mirrors that of Lois.

Whether Olson has maintained two separately dossiers or has a unified mother dossier for Kent-Super, he can entertain dossiers, *via* the dynamic creation of temporary dossiers, that are of the same or similar types as those possessed by Lois Lane in her mental architecture. He thereby has the ability to mirror the epistemic structure of Lois’ mental architecture *vis-à-vis* Kent-Super within his *own* dossier organization. He can, as it were, adopt the point of view of Lois and see the world from her perspective by modeling her mental architecture/dossier organization. Where I discuss propositional attitude ascriptions in section 2.6 *infra*, I shall urge that understanding an agent’s propositional attitudes (and speaking about them via propositional attitude ascription)

³⁰ Much as Kripke (1980) and Devitt (1981) propose that the reference of a proper name can be borrowed downstream in the chain of communication by speakers who have not been in direct causal contact with its bearer.

involves us in cognitively mirroring the mental state of that agent and referring to our own mirroring states as if they were the states of ascribing agent. Speaking about Lois' confusion about who Clark Kent and Superman are involves us having (even if just temporarily) distinct dossiers relevantly like hers, one for Clark Kent and one for Superman. Olson can refer to Lois' confusion by "pointing" to his own temporary dossiers and saying that Lois does not realize that dossiers like those, those instantiating those types, have the same subject.³¹

The dossier metaphor is a fruitful device for theorizing about the structure of an agent's beliefs. Of course, considering the current nascent state of cognitive science, the dossier metaphor will have to remain metaphorical. A dossier should be thought of as a pool of information in the mind about an object (in virtue of some causal-historical relation to the object) that represents it as being a certain way, not literally as a discrete location in the mind or region of the brain devoted storing information about one individual or object.

In addition to Forbes and me, numerous philosophers have taken the dossier metaphor to be an illuminating tool for reflecting upon *de re* belief. The idea of a mental file or dossier has been around for almost fifty years. According to Francois Recanati (2013, 3), who writes about mental files in his 1993 and 2013 (see Chapter 10, *infra*, for brief discussion of Recanati's

³¹ The enlightened Jimmy Olson, who knows that Clark Kent is Superman, can conceive Kent-Super in a Clark Kent-y way or in a Superman-y way just as Lois does. However, there are some differences. Lois' 'Clark Kent' dossier represents him as weak and indecisive. However, Olson's 'Clark Kent' dossier does not represent Clark Kent as *genuinely* weak and indecisive, since Olson realizes that Kent-Super is in fact strong and decisive and is putting on an act when he is being Clark Kent. Whereas Lois' dossier represents him as weak and indecisive, Olson's dossier represents him as *weak acting* or *seemingly weak*. Alternatively, perhaps his dossier contains the representation *weak and indecisive*, but Olson treats this representation as fictional—with a healthy dose of suspension of disbelief. So Olson is able to conceptualize Clark Kent as weak, despite knowing, at some level, that it is only *as if* he were weak. Olson, being enlightened, cannot associate certain Clark Kent-y properties with Kent-Super in quite the same way as the unenlightened Lois, yet there is sufficient similarity between their representations in their respective 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossiers such that we may say their dossier tokens are of the same dossier type.

Theory of Mental Files), the notion of mental files or dossiers “was introduced by several philosophers in the late sixties or early seventies, in connection with the referential use of definite descriptions (Grice 1969, 140-44) or with identity statements (Lockwood 1971, 208-11; Strawson 1974, 54-56). Several authors subsequently exploited the notion, including Evans (1973, 199; 1982, 276), Bach (1987, 34-37), Devitt (1989, 227-31), Forbes (1989, 1990, 538-45), Crimmins (1992, 87-92)...” and Perry (1980). Most recently, Peter Cave (2014) makes extensive mention of dossiers in his discussion of Frege and Kripke’s puzzles.

Forbes (1990) claims that proper names ‘label’ dossiers. Unlike Forbes, I do not claim that proper names label dossiers or that dossiers have labels. I claim instead that dossiers typically have representations in them about what name or names the subject of the dossier bears. That is, a typical dossier contains the representation *bears the name* ‘NN’ inside of it, i.e., the representation that the subject of the dossier bears the name ‘NN’ is a part of the dossier’s descriptive conception. However, some dossiers lack representations about the names of their subjects. For example, suppose a man named “Bob” meets a woman at a party who makes a strong impression on him, but he fails to learn her name. Within Bob’s mental architecture a dossier is created when the encounter takes place to collect and store information about that woman, but the dossier does not represent its subject as bearing a name. Bob can refer to the subject of this dossier by introspecting on the conceptual representations within it and picking out a description of the woman to refer to her. Using a name for the subject of the dossier is of course the most efficient way of referring to that subject (in situations where one’s conversation partner is familiar with the name and its bearer) and therefore we generally aim to learn the

names of people and objects in order to refer to them more effectively and efficiently.³²

2.3 Names Used in a ‘Millian’ Way

When employed merely to refer, the TIUT posits that we use names as indexicals with a *two-tiered* semantic structure, consisting of the following character and content:

Character of ‘NN’

The subject of the dossier token from which the speaker draws ‘NN’

Content of ‘NN’

< the subject >

By way of clarification, here is what I mean by the term of art “*the speaker draws ‘NN’ from the dossier token*” in the schema of character above. Suppose a dossier token a speaker mentally entertains represents its bearer as named ‘NN.’ The speaker has introspective access to the descriptive representations in the dossier, including what name or names the subject of the dossier is represented as bearing. By introspecting on his dossier, picking out this information and then uttering ‘NN,’ the speaker “*draws the name from the dossier token.*”

I state the content above within angular brackets “<>”. This is a standard convention to indicate that what is inside of the brackets is an *object*. In the schema of content above, ‘< the subject >’ means that the content of the name is the subject of the dossier token, the flesh-and-blood individual himself, *qua* object.

³² Names have a special status/role in communication. We use them as a conventional established shortcut means of referring when speaking with others. We prefer using a name, if we know a name and it is unambiguous in the context to whom we refer with it, over using a definite description or a demonstration.

To illustrate the content and character of names used in a Millian way, consider for example Lois' Millian uses of the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' when she utters (8) and \neg (7).³³

(8) Superman flies

\neg (7) Clark Kent does not fly

At the moment she utters \neg (7), Lois mentally entertains her 'Clark Kent' dossier—a dossier that has Kent-Super as its subject with a Clark Kent-y conception. She draws the name 'Clark Kent' from of the dossier, i.e., she introspects the dossier, sees that the subject is represented as bearing the name 'Clark Kent,' and utters the name. By the Millian character, the content of her utterance is the subject of the dossier token from which she drew the name—Kent-Super. When she utters (8), Lois entertains her 'Superman' dossier—a dossier that has Kent-Super as its subject with a Superman-y conception. She draws the name 'Superman' from of the dossier, i.e., she introspects, sees that the subject is represented as bearing the name 'Superman' and utters the name. By the Millian character, the content of her utterance is the subject of the dossier token from which she drew the name—again, Kent-Super.

Both of her utterances of 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' refer to Kent-Super (whether Lois realizes it or not) because in both cases the Millian character maps the utterances to Kent-Super. That is, Kent-Super is the subject of both dossiers entertained and it is from these dossiers that Lois has drawn the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman.'

³³ As mentioned above, Lois Lane would use the name 'Superman' in a Millian way—just to refer to him, not to call attention to her "Superman-y" way of conceiving him and communicate it, for as far as she knows she only has *one* way of conceiving him. She has no reason or ability to contrast her Superman-y conception of Kent-Super with her Clark Kent-y conception of him because she has no idea that these are different conceptions of the same individual.

2.4 Names Used in a ‘Conception-Indicating’ Way

When used in a ‘Conception-indicating’ way, a name functions as an indexical that contributes both the bearer and a descriptive conception of it to the proposition. Unlike a name used in a Millian way, which has a *two*-tiered semantics (character and content/referent), a name used in a Conception-indicating way has a *three*-tiered semantic structure (character, content, and referent). The character of a name first determines its content, which is the meaning of a definite description. The referent of the name is the denotation of the definite description. Thus, we do not have direct reference here, but mediated reference, with the character determining content, a meaning, and then that meaning determining reference, an object.

Character of ‘*NN*’

\acute{M} [the subject individuating *dthat* { {the dossier type D instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker has drawn ‘*NN*’³⁴ } }]

Content of ‘*NN*’

\acute{M} [the subject individuating D]

Referent of ‘*NN*’

< the subject individuating D >

I shall now explain the above schema, including special terminology/symbols used.

Dthat is Kaplan’s operator (1989) used to convert a definite description into a directly referential expression. It functions according to the following schema:

³⁴ See section 2.3, second paragraph, *supra*, for meaning of “draws a name.”

Dthat Operator Where δ is a definite description, ‘dthat [δ]’ is a directly referential expression whose referent is the denotation of δ .

For example, ‘dthat [The president of the United States in 2014]’ is a directly referential expression that refers to Barack Obama, the denotation of the definite description inside the operator’s scope. ‘dthat [The president of the United States in 2014]’ is semantically equivalent to any directly referential expression referring to Obama, including any directly referential proper name referring to him.

M (for “meaning”) is an operator functioning according to the following schema:

M Operator Where δ is a definite description, ‘M [δ]’ is an expression whose referent is the meaning of δ .

For example, the expression ‘M [the tallest man ever to live]’ refers to the meaning of the definite description ‘the tallest man ever to live.’ It also would refer to the meaning of the definite description ‘*der größte Mann, der je gelebt hat,*’ since this German definite description has the same meaning as ‘the tallest man ever to live.’

The double curly brackets indicate the order of operations. The first operation involves determining the value only of the part inside these double curly brackets. In this first operation, neither ‘M’ nor the language ‘the subject individuating’ operates on what is inside the brackets. Hence, the first operation involves determining the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker has drawn the name uttered. Thus, after the first operation we have a content that looks the same as character but for having the language inside the double curly brackets replaced by a name for a dossier type (here represented by the metavariable D). This name, D, is directly referential with respect to that dossier type in virtue of the dthat operator in

front of the double brackets.³⁵

Thus, the first operation, in which the dossier type of the token from which the speaker has drawn the name in the utterance context is ascertained/determined, yields the content of the name. The content is a meaning, as indicated by the \dot{M} operator. It is the meaning of the definite description ‘the subject individuating D.’ The referent of the name is then the denotation of this definite description.

Alternatively, one can state the character/content/referent in the following three ways:

- (1) The character of a name used in a Conception-indicating way takes us from a context in which a speaker draws a name ‘NN’ from a dossier token to the meaning of the definite description ‘the subject individuating D’, where ‘D’ is a metavariable for any expression referring directly to the dossier type instantiated by that dossier token. The referent of ‘NN’ is the denotation of the definite description ‘the subject individuating D’.
- (2) The character of a conception-indicating name ‘NN’ is such its content in the context is the meaning of the definite description ‘The subject individuating D’, where D directly refers to the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker has drawn ‘NN’. The referent of ‘NN’ is the denotation of this definite description.

Here, the schema is stated in the form of a step-by-step algorithm:

- (3) (a) Consider the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the

³⁵ A directly referential name appears (in content) because the dthat operator (in character) gives rise to direct reference—direct reference to whichever dossier type is instantiated by the speaker’s token in the context. I do not mean to suggest that dossier types bear names. We do not name dossier types (although we could). In this schema, ‘D’ is a metavariable standing in for any (of potentially infinite number of) directly referential names or other directly referential expressions that would pick out the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token entertained by the speaker in the context. It makes no difference *which* directly referential name for a particular a dossier type appears in this content schema because every directly referential expression referring to an object *o* has the same semantic value—its bearer *o*. Hence if *a* and *b* are two directly referential names of a dossier type, \dot{M} [the subject individuating *a*] = \dot{M} [the subject individuating *b*]; moreover, the definite descriptions ‘the subject individuating *a*’ and ‘the subject individuating *b*’ have the same meaning.

speaker has drawn the name 'NN' in the utterance context.

- (b) Call that dossier type 'D.'
- (c) The content of 'NN' is the meaning of the definite description 'The subject individuating D' (which meaning could also be stated as: \acute{M} [The subject individuating D])
- (d) The referent of 'NN' is the denotation of that definite description.

Let us consider a concrete example to illustrate this three-part schema. Consider sentence (2) as uttered by the enlightened Jimmy Olson when he is trying to convince Lois Lane that Clark Kent is Superman.

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

Olson's 'Clark Kent' dossier token has Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception. He mentally introspects the dossier, realizes that its subject bears 'Clark Kent', and draws the name from the dossier (he utters 'Clark Kent'). Let ' D^{CK} ' be a metavariable representing the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which Olson draws 'Clark Kent,' which is the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception. The schematization of the semantic structure of Olson's utterance of 'Clark Kent' is as follows:

Character of 'Clark Kent'

\acute{M} [the subject individuating *dthat* { {the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker has drawn 'Clark Kent' } }]

Content of 'Clark Kent'

\acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{CK}]

Referent of ‘Clark Kent’

< Kent-Super >

In the first operation, the language inside the double curly brackets is evaluated in the context of utterance. A directly referential name referring to the dossier type instantiated by the speaker’s (Olson’s) dossier token is loaded into the content, replacing the part in double curly brackets. Thus, after the first operation, the content is: \acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{CK}]. “ D^{CK} ” has replaced “*dthat* { {the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker in the context draws ‘Clark Kent’ } } .”

Kent-Super is the referent of ‘Clark Kent’ as uttered by Olson because its content, \acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{CK}], can be expressed by the definite description ‘the subject individuating D^{CK} ’, which denotes Kent-Super (since dossier type D^{CK} is individuated by Kent-Super as subject).

Olson’s ‘Superman’ dossier token has Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception. He introspects the dossier, realizes that its subject bears ‘Superman’ and draws the name from the dossier (he utters ‘Superman’). Let ‘ D^{SM} ’ be a metavariable for any directly referential name for the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which Olson draws ‘Superman’, which is the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.

The schematization of the semantic structure of Olson’s utterance of ‘Superman’ is as follows:

Character of ‘Superman’

\acute{M} [the subject individuating *dthat* { {the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker has drawn ‘Superman’ } }]

Content of ‘Superman’

\acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{SM}]

Referent of ‘Superman’

< Kent-Super >

In the first operation, the language inside the double curly brackets is evaluated in the context of utterance. A directly referential name referring to the dossier type instantiated by Olson’s dossier token is loaded into the content, replacing the part in double curly brackets. Thus, after the first operation, the content is: \acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{SM}]. “ D^{SM} ” has replaced “dthat {{the dossier type instantiated by the dossier token from which the speaker in the context draws ‘Superman’}}.”

Kent-Super is the referent of ‘Superman’ as uttered by Olson because this content, \acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{SM}], can be expressed by the definite description ‘the subject individuating D^{SM} ’, which denotes Kent-Super (since dossier type D^{SM} is individuated by Kent-Super as subject).

Notice the TIUT’s similarity to Descriptivism, which also posits that the content/meaning of a name is the meaning of a definite description. (As mentioned, in section 1.1., according to Descriptivism the content of a proper name is not a definite description, but the *meaning* of a definite description. That meaning is expressible by *any* definite description with that meaning, and the referent of the name is the denotation of any definite description with that meaning.) As on Descriptivism, on the TIUT the referent of a name is the denotation of the definite description whose meaning is the name’s content. As on Descriptivism, ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ differ in meaning but still co-refer because the definite descriptions expressing their meanings denote

the same individual. However, the TIUT is not a form of Descriptivism. Firstly, the TIUT has Kripke's causal-historical theory of reference built right into it, as the subjecthood of a dossier is a causal-historical property. Reference is determined externalistically/relationally. It is a function only of the subjecthood of a speaker's dossier token. The descriptive conception in the dossier token is inert with respect to determining reference. By contrast, Descriptivism claims that the descriptive conceptions associated with proper names wholly determine their reference. Secondly, for this same reason, 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are rigid on the TIUT, just as they would be according to any theory of proper names on which reference is causal-historically based, whereas on classical forms of Descriptivism these names would not be rigid because reference is determined by the speaker's descriptive conception. Because of these sharp differences with Descriptivism, the TIUT cannot be classified as a Descriptivist theory of proper names and is therefore not vulnerable to Kripke's arguments against Descriptivism, despite the TIUT sharing a superficially similar approach to the identity sentences puzzle.

The similarity of approach is, to be clear, that both Descriptivism and the TIUT distinguish between content (a meaning) and reference, and posit that reference is determined by content *via* denotation (when a name is used in Conception-indicating way). Furthermore, the speaker's descriptive conception is an element of the content of the name. The difference between the theories is that the descriptive conception is, on the TIUT, not reference-determining. Moreover, the TIUT posits a prior level of meaning—character—that determines the content of a name based on contextual factors. This level of character is essential because both whom the speaker is referring to and the way the speaker represents that person is contextually variable. An utterance of 'John' can refer to different bearers of 'John', and can present that bearer under different descriptive conceptions. To whom one refers with a name and

how that person is conceived descriptively is a function of situational/contextual factors—which dossier of the speaker was causally responsible for the utterance, what sort of descriptive representations are in that dossier, and how that dossier is externalistically connected to the outside world. Whether a speaker uttering ‘Aristotle’ refers to the philosopher or the shipping magnate is a function of facts about the speaker’s dossier from which the name was drawn—how that dossier is causally related to the one Aristotle or the other. The descriptive conception communicated is a function of what representations the speaker associates with the name when he utters it and what descriptive conception he or she intends to communicate. When used in a Conception-indicating way, a name is sensitive to these contextually variable factors and loads them into the proposition.

On the TIUT, both bearer and conception are “in” content (albeit in an *indirect* way) by being the individuation criteria of the dossier type referenced in the content. Thus, with Olson’s utterance of ‘Superman,’ both Kent-Super and a Superman-y conception are in content by virtue of dossier type D^{SM} being individuated both by Kent-Super and by a Superman-y conception. And with Olson’s utterance of ‘Clark Kent,’ both Kent-Super and a Clark Kent-y conception are in content by virtue of dossier type D^{CK} being individuated both by Kent-Super and a Clark Kent-y conception.

Note the deviation here from Kaplan’s notion of indexicals, on which:

- the content of an indexical is always an *object*, and
- the indexical expression *directly refers* to that object.

Neither is the case here. When used with a Conception-indicating character, the content of a name is a meaning, not an object. That meaning then determines an object. Thus, names used with a Conception-indicating character are not directly referential because the name’s content

mediates reference. That is, character determines the name's content in the context, and then this content determines reference. Although this indexical use deviates from Kaplan's notion of indexicals, there is no reason to think that all indexicals must follow Kaplan's notion. Importantly, there is rigid designation on the TIUT (despite lack of direct reference) because reference is a function solely of causal-historical factors (given that subjecthood is a causal-historical property modeled on Kripke's causal-historical picture of reference). It is important that a theory of proper names respect rigidity, not direct reference.

2.5 Proposed Solution to Frege's Puzzle about Informative Identity Sentences

As discussed in section 2.4 *supra*, on the TIUT the contents/meanings of 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' in the context of Olson's utterance of (2) are different. The content of 'Clark Kent' is \acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{CK}], which is expressible by the definite description 'The subject individuating D^{CK} '. The content/meaning of 'Superman' is \acute{M} [the subject individuating D^{SM}], which is expressible by the definite description 'The subject individuating D^{SM} '. Substituting these definite descriptions expressing the meanings of the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' into (2) in place of the proper names occurring there yields sentence (2)†, which I claim means the same thing as (2) in the context of Olson's utterance of (2).

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

(2)† The subject individuating D^{CK} is the subject individuating D^{SM}

Sentence (2)† reveals to us on its face that the proposition expressed by (2) in the given context, which I'll refer to as 'PROP-2', is the proposition that the subject individuating dossier type D^{CK} is the subject individuating dossier type D^{SM} .

PROP-2 The subject individuating dossier type D^{CK} is the subject individuating dossier type D^{SM}

By contrast, were Olson to utter (1) to express an *uninformative* identity, tokening the name ‘Clark Kent’ in Millian way twice over (i.e., merely referring twice to Kent-Super), each utterance of ‘Clark Kent’ would have the very same content, Kent-Super, the flesh-and-blood man himself. Olson would express PROP-1, or the trivial singular proposition that Kent-Super is identical to himself.

PROP-1 << Kent-Super, Kent-Super >, identity >>

This reveals that PROP-1, expressed by sentence (1), and PROP-2, expressed by sentence (2), are different propositions. Sentence (1) expresses a singular proposition of which Kent-Super, the man flesh and blood-man-himself, is a constituent. Sentence (2) expresses a proposition about the common subjecthood of two different dossier types. The sentences express different propositions and that is why they differ in cognitive value.

It could be objected here that sentences (2) and (2)† cannot be synonymous, or express the same proposition, because no ordinary speaker of English would recognize them as meaning the same thing. Ordinary speakers of English would not even *understand* sentence (2)† because no ordinary speaker would know what a dossier type is. Therefore, runs the objection, (2) and (2)† cannot mean the same thing, as I am claiming, and therefore the content of the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ cannot be what the TIUT proposes. However, this objection mistakenly relies on the strong disquotation principle (a.k.a. ‘converse disquotation’), which most philosophers have rightly recognized to be false. The strong disquotation principle states that if a speaker *s* believes a proposition *p*, then *s* will be disposed to assent to every sentence he or she

understands that expresses p . As Scott Soames put the principle somewhat differently, the principle says that “in order to believe a proposition, one must be disposed to accept every sentence one understands that expresses that proposition (2002: 11).” But the strong disquotation principle (a.k.a., converse disquotation) is widely considered false (see Salmon, 1986; Soames, 2002). (Cf. the *weak* disquotation principle, which is widely seen as uncontroversial).³⁶ Hence, the fact that many English speakers will not agree that (2) and (2)† are synonymous—even thinking (2) might be true and (2)† false—does not entail that they are not synonymous. Intuitions about synonymy can be unreliable, especially in the realm of philosophical or linguistic theory employed to solve challenging semantic puzzles. We should evaluate our theory according to whether it does the work we want it to do: to account for the ordinary intuitions of language users in the puzzle cases.

By way of clarification, I do not claim that ordinary speakers have *explicit* mental representations of the formalized schemas of character and content of proper names, or any common indexical expressions (e.g., *I, today, here, etc.*) for that matter. Rather, these schemas are *embodied in* speakers’ linguistic practices and thus understood by ordinary speakers only *tacitly*. The evidence that they are so embodied is that supposing that they are so-embodied explains speaker intuitions in the puzzle cases. Similarly, the extremely complex rules for the use of the subjunctive mood in Spanish are embodied in the minds of native Spanish speakers and only understood by them tacitly, and the evidence for this embodiment is the linguistic competence of native Spanish speakers with the subjunctive mood.

I think it is now evident from the above discussion why I claim that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ have different meanings as they occur in sentence (2) and why I claim sentences (1)

³⁶ I will also be denying strong disquotation in conjunction with my solution to the puzzle about rational inconsistent belief. See section 2.8.

and (2) express different propositions. It is evident why (1) is uninformative, as it expresses a trivial singular proposition about self-identity.

Here is (a somewhat metaphorical account of) how and why Olson's utterance of (2) is informative to Lois Lane. Upon hearing Olson utter (2), Lois Lane will tacitly understand that Olson has drawn these names from dossier tokens representing their subject as bearing these names, and that Olson is asserting that those dossier tokens have the same subject, i.e., they are about the same individual. Given that Olson and Lois both have similar background experiences, both being familiar with the reporter known as 'Clark Kent' and the superhero known as 'Superman,' Lois will presume that she and Olson's 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossier tokens are likely to be of the same or similar types. If what Olson asserted is true, this entails that Lois' respective 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossiers must also have the same subject, just as Olson's do. If Lois believes that Olson intends to speak the truth (and is not pulling her leg) and is a reliable and authoritative source of information, she will come to accept that her own 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossier tokens have the same subject, just as Olson's do. She would accept thereby, as a matter of logic, that the dossier types her tokens instantiate, D^{CK} and D^{SM} , are individuated by the same subject. Hence, she will have come to believe PROP-2, that Clark Kent is Superman, since the proposition that Clark Kent is Superman just is the proposition that dossier types D^{CK} and D^{SM} are individuated by the same subject.

This proposed solution to the identity sentences puzzle avoids the pitfalls of both Millianism and Descriptivism. Millianism gets the modal profile issue right (sentence (1) and (2) express propositions with the same modal profile—both necessary) but clashes with the intuition that sentences (1) and (2) express different propositions and fails to explain the difference in their cognitive value. Descriptivism explains the difference in cognitive value but has the

unwanted consequence that (1) and (2) have different modal profiles,³⁷ and implausibly posits that names have reference-determining descriptive meanings. The TIUT provides instead that causal-historical factors determine reference, given that the subjecthood of dossiers is (largely, if not wholly) a causal-historical property.³⁸ The TIUT gives us what we seek from our theory of proper names according to the seven constraints set out in section 1.1. We have an explanation of the cognitive value differences between uninformative and informative identity sentences based on their semantically expressing different propositions (with identical modal profiles). ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ lack reference-determining descriptive meanings, both rigidly refer to Kent-Super, and at the same time differ in semantic content (by differing with respect to descriptive conceptions), thus explaining the difference in cognitive value between (1) and (2).

2.6 Proposed Solution to Frege’s Puzzle about Propositional Attitude Ascriptions

According to the TIUT, there are two sorts of propositional attitude ascriptions: those in which names used in a Millian way occur within the scope of the ‘that’-clause, and those in which names used in a Conception-indicating way occur in the scope of the ‘that’-clause. In the former case, we have ‘**Millian Ascriptions.**’ A Millian ascription relates the ascriber to a singular proposition and is silent about how either the ascriber or the ascriber conceives the referent of the name in the ‘that’-clause. In the latter case, we have ‘**Conception-indicating Ascriptions.**’ A Conception-indicating ascription relates the ascriber to a singular proposition

³⁷ They would have different modal profiles on a non-rigidified Descriptivism. However, they would have the same modal profiles according to Rigidified Descriptivism. See 4.5 for discussion of Rigidified Descriptivism.

³⁸ It may turn out to be a *partly* descriptive property (a hybrid property), but it certainly will not be entirely descriptive. See my discussion of Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference, section 4.3 *infra*.

and, additionally, conveys the way in which the ascriber conceives the referent of the proper name inside the ‘that’-clause. Conception-indicating ascriptions express a more finely grained picture of the proposition the agent believes than Millian ascriptions.

Both Conception-indicating and Millian ascriptions can be used to ascribe belief, the salient difference between them being their levels of grain. Millian ascriptions are coarser-grained than Conception-indicating ascriptions because they merely indicate the singular propositions the ascriber believes without indicating the ascriber’s conception of the name’s referent. Conception-indicating ascriptions are finer-grained because they also convey the speaker’s descriptive conception of / way of taking the referent of the proper name(s) inside the ‘that’-clause.

Whether a propositional attitude ascription is Millian or Conception-indicating is a function of the speaker’s *expressive intent* in uttering it (although, as I elaborate below in section 2.6.2 *infra*, there are important *pragmatic* constraints on what the speaker can rationally intend to communicate to his audience *via* his or her utterance given what the audience is likely to take the utterance to mean in the context). That is, propositional attitude ascriptions are semantically ambiguous between Millian and Conception-indicating readings. To determine whether a propositional attitude ascription is due a Millian or Conception-indicating reading, we need to ascertain the speaker’s expressive intent (although, again, contextual clues will generally serve as reliable evidence about this).

The TIUT’s proposed solution to Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions is found in the next section, 2.6.1, below, concerning Conception-indicating ascriptions. In the subsequent section, 2.6.2, I also characterize Millian ascriptions.

2.6.1 Conception-Indicating Ascriptions

Consider propositional attitude ascription sentence (4), in which a speaker, Olson, uses the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in a Conception-indicating way.

(4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

According to the TIUT, sentence (4), if uttered by Olson (supposing he uttered the sentence knowing it to express a falsehood), would express the false proposition that would be expressed by (4)[†]:

(4)[†] Lois believes that the subject individuating D^{CK} is the subject individuating D^{SM}

where D^{CK} is the dossier type instantiated by Olson’s dossier token that has Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception and from which he draws ‘Clark Kent,’ and D^{SM} is the dossier type instantiated by the Olson’s dossier token that has Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception and from which Olson draws ‘Superman.’

Likewise, suppose that Olson used the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in a Conception-indicating way in ascription sentences (5) and (6).

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

In uttering sentence (5), Olson would express the false proposition that would be expressed by (5)[†], and in uttering (6) he would express the true proposition that would be expressed by (6)[†].³⁹

³⁹ Of course, Olson would not ordinarily utter either sentence (4) or (5), unless he intends to lie or mislead, because he realizes that both are false. Nevertheless, I am supposing here that Olson utters (4) and (5) in order to examine their semantics. By examining the semantics of the true (3)

(5)[†] Lois believes that the subject individuating D^{CK} flies

(6)[†] Lois believes that the subject individuating D^{SM} flies

4-s, 5-s, and 6-s, below, schematize the semantics (i.e., state the truth conditions) of the propositions Olson expresses by uttering sentence (4)-(6) (indicated *de re vis-à-vis* Kent-Super):

4-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois' dossier token d^1 instantiating the same dossier type, D^{CK} , as instantiated by Olson's 'Clark Kent' dossier token d^2 from which Olson draws 'Clark Kent,' and Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois' dossier token d^3 instantiating the same dossier type, D^{SM} , as instantiated by the Olson's 'Superman' dossier token d^4 from which Olson draws 'Superman,' and **Believes** (Lois, <<the subject of d^1 , the subject of d^3 >, identity >)

5-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois' dossier token d^1 instantiating the same dossier type, D^{CK} , as instantiated by Olson's 'Clark Kent' dossier token d^2 from which Olson draws 'Clark Kent,' and **Believes** (Lois, <the subject of d^1 , flies>)

6-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois' dossier token d^3 instantiating the same dossier type, D^{SM} , as instantiated by Olson's 'Superman' dossier token d^4 from which Olson draws 'Superman,' and **Believes** (Lois, <the subject of d^3 , flies>)

The above schematization of the semantics of the proposition expressed by sentence (4) makes plain why (4) would express a false proposition. Lois does not realize that her two dossier tokens, d^1 and d^3 , have the same subject. In fact, she disbelieves that they have same subject. Hence, she believes (erroneously) that the dossier types, D^{CK} and D^{SM} , instantiated by her dossier tokens, d^1 and d^3 , are individuated by different subjects.

The above schematization of the semantics of (5) and (6) reveal that they *genuinely* differ in truth-value. Sentence (5) expresses a false proposition and (6) a true proposition. (5) and (6) do not merely *appear* differ in truth-value as Millians maintain. Whereas Lois does not believe

and contrasting it with the semantics of false (4), and by examining the semantics of false (5) and contrasting it with the semantics of the true (6), I aim to show that the Millians' claim that (3) expresses the same proposition as (4), and (5) the same proposition as (6), is erroneous.

that the subject of her dossier d^1 flies, she clearly does believe that the subject of her dossier d^3 flies. Hence, (5) expresses the false proposition that Lois believes that the subject individuating dossier type D^{CK} , which is the dossier type instantiated by her dossier token d^1 , flies. And (6) expresses the true proposition that Lois believes that the subject individuating dossier type D^{SM} , which is the dossier type instantiated by her dossier token d^3 , flies.

In ascribing beliefs (or other propositional attitudes) to Lois, Olson has in his mind a model of Lois' mental architecture. He aims to have a 'Clark Kent' dossier token and a 'Superman' dossier token that are of the same or similar dossier types as Lois's 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossier tokens respectively. Olson ascribes beliefs to Lois by referencing his own dossier tokens *qua* tokens of the same types as Lois's tokens. Below is a (metaphorical) description of the nature of Olson's ascription sentence (5*n*)

(5*n*) Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent flies

from Olson's first-person perspective:

There is a dossier token in Lois' mental architecture which is an instance of the dossier type of which *this* dossier token is a token [Olson makes his 'Clark Kent' dossier token salient by drawing 'Clark Kent' from it]; Lois does *NOT* believe that the subject of her dossier token, instantiating the same type as the token from which I am now drawing the name 'Clark Kent,' flies.

Below is a (metaphorical) description of the nature of Olson's ascription sentence (6)

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

from Olson's first-person perspective:

There is a dossier token in Lois' mental architecture which is an instance of the dossier

type of which *this* dossier token is a token [Olson makes his ‘Superman’ dossier token salient by drawing ‘Superman’ from it]; Lois believes that the subject of her dossier token, instantiating the same dossier type as the token from which I am now drawing the name ‘Superman,’ flies.

Propositional attitude ascriptions involve the ascriber imagining the way that the ascribee sees the world and creating within his own mind a temporary model of the ascribee’s worldview, temporarily forming a dossier structure that mimics and mirrors that of the ascribee. Then the ascriber can speak about his own dossier tokens as if they were those of the ascribee. He may do so by relying on the fact that, if he has understood the ascribee’s cognitive state well enough, his own dossier tokens are of the same or similar type as those of the ascribee. His own tokens and Lois’ (or anyone’s who is confused about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman) all belong to the same or similar types, and therefore, the ascriber can point to his own dossier tokens as instantiating that type and say that all those who do not realize the identity fail to realize that *these* dossier types (the one’s his own tokens instantiate) are individuated by the same subject, Kent-Super, the subject of his own dossier tokens. In other words, the ascriber ascribes belief to the ascribee by him- or herself “mock” entertaining a similar mental state and then referring to that mental state as if they belonged to the ascribee. On this view, ascribing belief or other attitudes involves cognitively “putting one’s self into another’s shoes.”

On the TIUT, (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) express different propositions with different truth-values. Sentence (3) expresses the trivial singular proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super is identical to himself due to the Millian use of both proper names in the ‘that’-clause of (3). A rational Lois Lane could never disbelieve the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of (3). However, the semantics of (4), as I have schematized them above, make clear, the ‘that’-clause of (4) refers to a different proposition from that of (3). Lois Lane can rationally disbelieve the

proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause in (4). She may rationally do so because she fails to realize that her two dossier tokens, d^1 and d^3 , have the same subject. Furthermore, she can rationally disbelieve the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause in (5) and believe the proposition referred to by ‘that’-clause in (6), because she is ignorant of the fact that her dossier tokens d^1 and d^3 have the same subject. She may rationally believe that the subject of d^1 does not fly and believe that the subject of d^3 does fly.

One might wonder why I schematize the Conception-indicating character in terms of dossier *types*, rather than dossier *tokens*. To see why types, rather than tokens, are crucial, consider the following example. Suppose a man named ‘Tony’ knows a lot about Lois Lane, but Lois has never met him or heard of him. His existence is completely unknown to her. Now suppose Tony were to utter propositional attitude ascription \neg (5)

\neg (5) Lois Lane *disbelieves* that Clark Kent flies

and suppose further that the content of ‘Clark Kent’ were given by the definite description *the subject of dossier token* $d^{CK,Tony}$, where $d^{CK,Tony}$ is a dossier token in Tony’s head that has Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception. Sentence \neg (5), as uttered by Tony, would therefore express the same proposition as the sentence ‘Lois Lane disbelieves the subject of dossier token $d^{CK,Tony}$ flies.’ This sentence would make a claim about Lois’ belief about the properties of a particular dossier token in Tony’s head, $d^{CK,Tony}$. The crux of the difficulty is that Lois’ belief that Clark Kent does not fly is not a belief about Tony’s dossier token $d^{CK,Tony}$, and Lois Lane does not even know who Tony is, so she can hardly entertain beliefs about his dossier tokens. However, the TIUT avoids this problem because the Conception-indicating character references dossier *types*: Lois Lane *does* indeed have beliefs about dossier types in virtue of

having beliefs about her own dossier tokens, which instantiate dossier types. Because Tony can have a dossier token of the same type as Lois' token, he can "point to" his token as an instance of the type and say that Lois has a belief about the type by her having a belief about a token of that type in her head. The truth-value of the proposition Tony expresses does not depend in any way on whether Lois has any beliefs about Tony's dossier tokens. It depends only on her having tokens of the same type as his tokens and having beliefs about her own tokens. She need not be familiar with Tony or in an epistemic position to entertain a thought about his dossier tokens in order for Tony accurately to ascribe beliefs to Lois with respect to Clark Kent's flying ability (or lack thereof).

In sum, if the Conception-indicting character were phrased in terms of tokens rather than types, propositional attitude ascriptions would be overly "autobiographical," as it were: a speaker, such as Tony, in ascribing belief to an ascribee such as Lois Lane, would be making a claim about his *own* dossier tokens—asserting that Lois has beliefs about *his* tokens. But when Tony ascribes belief to Lois about whether she thinks Clark Kent flies, he is not talking about himself or referring to his dossier tokens nor asserting that Lois has any beliefs about his tokens. Therefore, one must schematize the Conception-indicating character of names in terms of dossier *types*, as the TIUT does.

2.6.2 Millian Ascriptions

Some propositional attitude ascriptions contain Millian names and such ascriptions report belief between agents and singular propositions. If, when someone uttered sentence (3),

- (3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

s/he were to use the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Millian way (for both occurrences in (3)), s/he would express the proposition that Lois believes the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. For the content of each occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ would, according to the Millian character, be Kent-Super himself.

If, when someone uttered sentence (6), she were to use the name ‘Superman’ in a Millian way, she would express a true proposition.

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

Lois believes the singular proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of (6)—that Kent-Super flies, for she believes Kent-Super that he flies when she thinks of him under a Superman-y conception. So (6) is true when ‘Superman’ is used in it in a Millian way. As I argued in section 2.6.1 *supra*, (6) would *also* be true if the speaker used the name ‘Superman’ in (6) in a Conception-indicating way, except the proposition expressed would be different, as set out in section 2.6.1 (it would be a finer-grained ascription, indicating the ascriber’s Superman-y conception of Kent-Super.)

With sentence (5), however, truth-value depends crucially on whether the ascriber intends the name ‘Clark Kent’ to be understood in a Millian or Conception-indicating way.

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

As I argued in section 2.6.1, consistent with intuitions about the matter, (5) is false when ‘Clark Kent’ is used in a Conception-indicating way to say that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super flies when she conceives him in a Clark Kent-y way. When she conceives Kent-Super in a Clark Kent-y way, she very much is convinced that he cannot fly. But suppose that someone uttered

sentence (5) intending to use the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Millian way, just to refer Kent-Super *qua* individual. The content of ‘Clark Kent’ would be Kent-Super, the man himself. Hence, the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of the ascription, ‘that Clark Kent flies,’ would be the singular proposition *that Kent-Super flies*. Lois *does* in fact believe this singular proposition (for she believes it when she conceives Kent-Super as Superman), so (5) is *true* when ‘Clark Kent’ is used in a Millian way, even though it is false when used in Conception-indicating way.

It might seem quite surprising that I would maintain that (5) could be used to express a true proposition, since we tend to have the strong intuition that (5) is *false*, period.⁴⁰ However, I think this intuition is unreliable and (5) in fact admits of two readings. We have this intuition because neither we, nor any enlightened speaker (such as Olson), would typically utter (5) *qua* Millian ascription because we know that our audience would likely misinterpret it. An utterance of (5) as a Millian ascription (to express the proposition that Lois believes that Kent-Super flies, i.e., that Kent-Super is such that Lois believes he flies) would be highly misleading. Upon hearing a speaker uttering (5), our target audience would presume that we were saying that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super can fly when she thinks of him under a Clark Kent-y conception, as a mild-mannered reporter (i.e., the false proposition that (5) would express were it a conception-indicating ascription). Thus, we would not typically utter (5) as a Millian ascription because our audience would misunderstand it, interpreting it in a way inconsistent with our expressive intent. However, the fact that we would not typically utter a given sentence because we think we would be misunderstood does not mean that sentence cannot have two legitimate readings. It is just that as speakers who wish to be understood, we value knowing our audience

⁴⁰ The Millian claims that (5) *only* has a Millian reading and it is always true. The TIUT, by contrast claims that (5) has two readings, one on which it is true (*qua* Millian ascription) and one on which it is false (*qua* Conception-indicating ascription).

and make true *and* maximally comprehensible statements, i.e., statements that can easily be decoded by our audience in the context.

Some speakers who utter (5) may not know their audience or the nature of Lois Lane's confusion. Consider a scenario in which an enlightened speaker—call him “Kurt”—is unaware that Lois Lane, or anyone in Metropolis, is unenlightened about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. Kurt knows that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are both names for Kent-Super, but he does not realize that different conceptions are commonly associated with the names by people in Metropolis. Kurt might overhear Lois Lane utter “Superman sure can fly fast” and utter sentence (5) merely to report that Lois Lane believes *of* Kent-Super, *de re*, that he can fly, without concern for (or knowledge of) the different ways in which she conceives him. Has Kurt said something false in uttering (5)? I doubt it. He surely has said something deficient given the context. Kurt has expressed, *via* uttering (5), the true proposition that Lois Lane believes the singular proposition that Kent-Super flies, but his utterance is defective because it is highly misleading given Lois' confused state of mind and given the audience he is addressing, which, unlike Kurt, knows about Lois' confusion. That Kurt has not spoken falsely, strictly speaking, is evidenced by the fact that ordinary enlightened speakers aware of Kurt's ignorance of Lois' confused state would not correct Kurt by uttering merely ‘that is false; she does not believe he can fly.’ Realizing that Kurt intends to say something true—that Lois believes *of* Clark Kent, *de re*, that he can fly— but is saying it in a misleading way, the audience would instead correct him by saying something like: ‘Well Kurt, she does believe *the guy* can fly, but not when she thinks of him as Clark Kent, but only when she thinks of him as Superman, for she does not realize Clark Kent and is Superman.’ In other words, Kurt's audience can understand Kurt's utterance as a (technically true) Millian ascription if they are able to put themselves into Kurt's shoes and

interpret his utterance from his epistemic perspective. They can read his utterance as aiming to communicate the proposition that Clark Kent, *qua* individual, is such that Lois believes he can fly.

We may have difficulty interpreting ‘Clark Kent’ as a name used in a Millian way—just to refer to Kent-Super and not to pick out Kent-Super under a mild-mannered reporter conception—precisely because it is so commonly used as a Conception-indicating name in the Superman story. The names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ have, almost by convention, come to *mean* a certain individual under a certain conception. ‘Clark Kent’ has come to mean Kent-Super dressed as an ordinary civilian and acting a like a regular weak earthling, and ‘Superman’ Kent-Super dressed in a super-hero costume acting like a superhero. Each name is so strongly associated with a specific well-defined conception from the repetition of this iconic fictional narrative that our ability to use these names without immediately calling to mind the intimately associated conceptions has become highly diminished. Therefore, we have difficulty seeing that we might use either of those names in a strictly Millian way, i.e., just to refer to Kent-Super *qua* individual without calling to mind a way of conceiving him. However, bad cases make bad law, for in real life few Frege’s puzzle cases involve conceptions conventionally associated with proper names.⁴¹ Let us consider a Frege’s puzzle case in which we do *not* strongly conventionally associate certain conceptions with a pair of co-referential proper names, where the conceptions are instead associated with the names only in the confines of a specific idiosyncratic conversational context. Suppose that you are standing on the street with your

⁴¹ One of the great didactic advantages of using the Superman story to explain Frege’s puzzle is that almost everyone understands the different conceptions commonly associated with these different names, and these conceptions differ from one another starkly. On the other hand, this feature of the Superman story can generate intuitions about truth value inapplicable to those examples of Frege’s puzzle where the conceptions associated with names are idiosyncratic or not widely known in the wider language community.

friend, Bob. Barack Obama walks by, and Bob utters, “Wow, I haven’t seen Barry in ages. He sure is looking handsome.” Later that day, you report to me, “Bob thinks Obama is looking handsome.” This propositional attitude ascription seems clearly true. Now, suppose you find out the following day that that Bob is a childhood friend of Barack Obama, but he only knew him by the name “Barry” as a child. Bob is unaware that Barry, his childhood friend, is Barack Obama, the president of the United States. Bob knows that the president of the US is named “Barack Obama” and knows a lot about his policies but somehow does not know what Obama looks like. When Obama walked by, Bob only recognized him as his childhood friend, Barry, not as the president of the US, Barack Obama. Query: now that you have found out about Bob’s confusion, do you deem the propositional attitude ascription you uttered the previous day, “Bob thinks Obama is handsome,” to have been true or false? My intuition is that the ascription was true and remains so despite what you learn about Bob’s idiosyncratic confused state and despite Bob possibly dissenting from the sentence “Obama is handsome,” since Bob has never seen Obama under the guise of president of the US. When you uttered the ascription sentence, you intended merely to refer to Obama and describe Bob’s opinion of the way he looks. You were not concerned with Bob’s various conceptions of him.

In sum, I think the intuition that sentence (5) expresses a false proposition is erroneous. The intuition is generated the peculiarity of the Kent/Superman case, i.e., the fact that conceptions have become ossified, strongly conventionally associated with the names. In Frege’s puzzle cases like the Barry/Obama case, where different conceptions are associated with the names ‘Barry’ and ‘Obama’ only within the idiosyncratic confines of a particularized conversational context by a particular individual, we are more inclined to accept that the name ‘Obama’ could be used in a Millian way just to refer to the man himself *qua* individual.

I have claimed that the speaker's *expressive intent* is the principal factor determining whether the tokening of a name in a propositional attitude ascription is owed a Millian or Conception-indicating reading. One might then wonder therefore whether a speaker could token the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' side by side inside the 'that'-clause of a propositional attitude ascription intending a Millian reading of *both* names. For example, could a speaker use the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' in a Millian way inside the 'that'-clause of ascription sentence (4) to express the true but trivial singular proposition that Lois believes PROP-1, the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, i.e., the Kent-Super is self-identical?

(4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

I do not believe so. What I shall call the 'Meaning Consistency Principle,' a pragmatic principle of conversation explains why no ascriber would use the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' in (4) in a Millian way to express the trivial (and true) proposition that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super.

Meaning Consistency: Multiple occurrences of the same syntactic string in a sentence generally entail that the speaker meant the same thing by each occurrence.⁴² Occurrences of different syntactic strings entail a difference in meaning.

When any audience hears an utterance of (4), it presumes, according the Meaning Consistency Principle, that the expressions 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' are non-synonymous. After all, the speaker surely must have a reason for using two different names. The audience would never

⁴² By *generally*, I mean that there are exceptions when the conversational context makes it clear that the speaker means different things by the same expression (see Bill/Liz example, section 2.9 *infra*), or where the grammar of the sentence entails a difference in meaning (e.g., in the sentence "Rose rose in popularity beginning in high school" we infer from the grammar that the two occurrences of "rose" must have different meanings).

understand both the names to be used in a Millian way, because this would involve using the names synonymously (since each of their semantic contents would be the same—Kent-Super himself and nothing more). Every rational speaker would realize that his audience would not read the names as Millian names, and hence he would understand that his audience would misunderstand him if he uttered (4) with the intention to use both the names in a Millian way to say that Lois Lane believes the trivial proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. Perhaps I would go as far as to say that no rational ascriber *could* utter (4) to express this proposition, knowing that the proposition would be universally misunderstood. For what a speaker may express *via* an utterance is not merely a function of the expressive intent of the speaker, but in addition, it is constrained by what the speaker can reasonably expect his audience to take it to mean.⁴³ Pragmatic principles of conversation, such as the meaning consistency principle, control here. Hence, whether a proper name is due a Millian or Conception-indicating reading is a function of speaker expressive intent *constrained by pragmatic principles that guide speakers in their choice of words with respect to what the audience will understand them to mean*. Without doing violence to the language, speakers cannot intend to mean something by their words when they know that pragmatic guiding principles of language interpretation will prevent their message from coming across.⁴⁴

⁴³ It is also unlikely that the audience would read the sentence as a Millian ascription (to say that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super is self-identical) simply because practically no one except a logician or a philosopher would ever discuss self-identity or any agent's beliefs about self-identity.

⁴⁴ I do not mean to suggest that it would be *impossible* to create an artificial language that did not follow the Meaning Consistency rule. In such a language, (4) would have a possible reading on which it merely stated that Lois believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. However, my concern here is to characterize natural language in actual use. Such an artificial language would be far more unwieldy and full of ambiguity than natural language, since the audience would lack syntactic clues enabling him easily to tell whether the speaker uttered (4) to say that Lois

2.7 Quantifying in

Fregeans notoriously have problems with quantifying in to propositional attitude contexts. Quine first raised the problem in his 1956. To see what the problem is about, consider the difference between the following propositional attitude ascriptions:

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly

(5)^{de re} Clark Kent is such that Lois Lane believes he can fly

Ascription (5)^{de re} differs from (5) in that it is expressly syntactically *de re* with respect to Kent-Super. (5), by contrast, is ambiguous, having two possible readings, one *de re* and one non-*de re*. On a non-*de re* reading of (5), it is intuitively false. Lois would never assent to the sentence “Clark Kent can fly.” However (5)^{de re} is true, for Clark Kent is the same person as Superman, and Lois believes of him that he can fly under some way of conceiving him.

(5)^{de re} has the following formal analysis:

⊖ $\exists x$ (Lois Lane believes that x can fly and $x = \text{Clark Kent}$)

Here, we have quantification into a belief ascription, as the variable ‘ x ’, which is bound by the existential quantifier, is within the scope of the propositional attitude belief, inside the ‘that’-clause of the belief ascription. Here is the problem for the Fregean. As Jeff Speaks points out, “the standard semantics for the existential quantifier says that a formula $\exists x\phi x$ is true if there’s

believes someone is self-identical or to say that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person.

some object o in the domain such that x is true relative to an assignment of o to x .”⁴⁵ With respect to (5)^{de re}, we would say that Θ is true if there is some object o such that $o =$ Clark Kent and Lois Lane believes the proposition which attributes flying ability to o . Note that this proposition contains Clark Kent, the flesh-and-blood man as a constituent, and is therefore a singular proposition. For a Fregean, however, objects cannot be constituents of propositions. Fregean propositions are composed wholly of senses, not objects. Only a Fregean proposition, and not a singular proposition, can be the object of propositional attitudes for a Fregean, and thus the Fregean must consider Θ incoherent if ‘ x ’ ranges over objects rather than senses. However, it is not clear what to make of Θ if ‘ x ’ ranges over senses. A Fregean could say that Θ is true if there is some sense s such that $s =$ Clark Kent and Lois Lane believes the proposition which attributes flying ability to s . The problem is that Clark Kent is not a sense, and senses cannot fly. Perhaps the Fregean can solve the problem, but suffice to say that quantifying in is a significant problem for the Fregean, whereas it is no problem at all for Millians, who expressly posit that objects or individuals such as Kent-Super, the flesh-and-blood man, are constituents of propositions. The Fregean must be able to deal effectively with this problem, and cannot dismiss it, for there is nothing problematic about (5)^{de re}—it is a well-formed English sentence and intuitively it is true. Kaplan (1968) proposed an interesting solution to the problem of quantifying-in for the Fregean, but it is controversial whether he was successful and Kaplan himself embraced Millianism shortly after publication of his paper.

By contrast with Fregeanism or Descriptivism in general, the TIUT has no difficulty with quantifying in because it provides that we may use proper names in a Millian way, that is, in a purely referential way in which the content of a name just is its bearer, just as on Millianism

⁴⁵ <https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2007-8/93914/HANDOUTS/fregeanism-5-problems.pdf>

itself. Hence, on the TIUT the name ‘Clark Kent’ is ambiguous between Millian and conception-indicating readings, with the Millian reading corresponding to the *de re* reading. The TIUT, in the same way as Millianism, can handle the *de re* reading, for the TIUT provides that objects/individuals can be direct constituents of propositions, and singular propositions can be and often are the objects of propositional attitudes (see section 2.6.2 supra, on Millian ascriptions).

2.8 Solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief

In uttering (8) and $\neg(7)$, Lois Lane would express and believe inconsistent singular propositions, for she uses the proper names in a Millian way in her utterances.

(8) Superman flies

$\neg(7)$ Clark Kent does not fly

As I argued in section 2.1, she would use the names in a Millian way since she does not realize that she has two different conceptions of the one Kent-Super, and so she would have no reason to refer to those conceptions, make them salient, or communicate them in uttering (8) and $\neg(7)$ by using names in a Conception-indicating way. Sentences (8) and $\neg(7)$, where the names are used in a Millian way, would express the inconsistent singular propositions *that Kent-Super flies* and *that it is not the case that Kent-Super flies*.

As described above in section 1.2, the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief challenges us to answer two questions.

THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL INCONSISTENCY

- (1) *How do we square Lois believing inconsistent singular propositions with her being a rational agent?*

- (2) *Why is Lois incapable of realizing that she expresses inconsistent propositions and contradicts herself in uttering sentences (8) and $\neg(7)$, sentences she understands and uses competently?*

The first question can be answered by appealing to dossiers. Lois can believe that Superman flies, but that Clark Kent does not, because she has two dossiers, one for each persona, and she does not realize that these dossiers have the same subject, i.e., are about the same individual. Lois, who believes inconsistent singular propositions, would be irrational only if believed the inconsistent propositions *knowingly*, or if she were in an epistemic position such that she could infer (based on reason alone) that the propositions are inconsistent, and believes them anyway. The dossier model explains why Lois is not irrational: Lois having two distinct dossiers, and her inability to find out that they have the same subject based on pure reason, explains why she is not irrational. The fact that positing dossiers so neatly solves this problem strongly militates in favor of the view that they must be included in an adequate account of belief ascription.

To solve the second question, the TIUT posits that Lois cannot tell that (8) and $\neg(7)$ are inconsistent because, according to the Millian character, she has drawn the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' from dossiers that she does not know have the same subject, and each of those names refers to the subject of the dossier from which it was drawn—Kent-Super. Thus, on the TIUT, the key to explaining why Lois is not in an epistemic position to infer that she expresses inconsistent singular propositions in uttering sentence (8) and $\neg(7)$ is to be found in the *indexical* nature of proper names. She does not know that the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' have the same bearer because she does not know that the dossiers from which she draws them have the same subject. Because of this ignorance, she cannot infer that the propositions expressed by (8) and $\neg(7)$ are inconsistent.

The indexical nature of proper names explains how an agent can utter a sentence and express a proposition while being partially ignorant of the content of a proper name in a sentence he or she utters. I want to say that proper names should be seen as closer to pure or *automatic* indexicals, rather than true demonstratives. (However, at base Kaplan's division of indexicals into two classes—automatic indexicals and true demonstratives—is not a sharp distinction, one of degree and not in kind. See e.g., Mount (2008), for an argument criticizing the distinction between automatic indexicals and true demonstratives). The “automatic” part signals that the content of the indexical is loaded into the proposition automatically upon utterance of the indexical—i.e., with minimal cognitive demands placed on the part of speaker, for the speaker need only utter the name to load the content. The content is loaded even where the speaker is ignorant about or has erroneous beliefs about the content. For example, suppose I look out my window on April 1, 2014, see that it is sunny out, and utter, “today is a sunny day.” The indexical expression ‘today’ automatically loads April 1, 2014 into the proposition. I have expressed the proposition that April 1, 2014 is a sunny day, even if I am under the mistaken belief that the date is April 2, 2014 when I utter the sentence. Features of the context in which the utterance occurred, rather the speaker's belief about the date, determine the content of a speaker's utterance. Likewise, features of context, causal-historical factors linking the name to its bearer, determine the reference of a name, not the agent's descriptive beliefs about the bearer. An agent using a proper name as an indexical in a sentence can express a proposition even if partially ignorant about or under mistaken beliefs about the object picked out by the indexical, and therefore, does not fully grasp the nature of the proposition he or she has expressed in uttering the sentence.⁴⁶ Lois Lane, for example, does not realize that her ‘Clark Kent’ and

⁴⁶ Nathan Salmon (1986) also stresses this point: agents may express and believe propositions

‘Superman’ dossier tokens have the same subject, so she is partially ignorant about the propositions she expresses when she utters ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent does not fly,’ since the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are drawn from these dossiers and refer indexically, via the names’ Millian character, to whatever is the subject of the dossier from which drawn. Due to this ignorance, she cannot tell that the sentences express inconsistent proposition. It is this ignorance, not irrationality, which explains her inability to recognize the inconsistency of her utterances.⁴⁷

On this view of proper names as indexicals, it is quite easy for a speaker to count as understanding a name or being competent with a name. This is consistent with Kripke’s admonition in Naming and Necessity that a speaker requires very little information about the bearer of a name to be competent with it. A speaker need not have much (or perhaps any) substantive descriptive information about the bearer of the name and can even be mistaken about the bearer’s descriptive properties, and still count as understanding the name, as being competent with it. Contextual, causal-historical factors surrounding the speaker’s utterance, and not what beliefs the speaker has about the bearer, determine what proposition the speaker has expressed.

while at the same time being partially ignorant of their constituents. They may therefore simultaneously believe a proposition and its negation without being irrational, since their ignorance about the nature of the constituents of the propositions blinds them to their inconsistency.

⁴⁷ An *enlightened* agent, by contrast with an unenlightened agent such as Lois Lane, cannot rationally accept (7) and \neg (8) or (1) and \neg (2), for an enlightened agent would realize that the names co-refer, and s/he either draws both names from the same dossier’s label (a dossier labeled with both names) or draws the names from distinct dossiers representing their subjects as bearing different names, but realizes that the dossiers have the same subject. The use of the proper names as indexicals does not mask the structure or nature of the proposition for an *enlightened* agent because the enlightened agent’s different mental architecture (i.e., different dossier structures) places him/her in a distinct epistemic position giving him/her access to information about the nature and structure of the propositions expressed that the unenlightened agent lacks.

The speaker merely needs to have in his or her head is the intention to use a name with a certain character meaning (which the speaker knows in a *tacit, infra-conscious way*) to be a competent user of it. Thus, Lois Lane can competently use the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ even though she is very much in the dark about some very important facts about the bearer(s) of those names, to wit, that the names have one single bearer who leads a double life with two identities.

Millians cannot appeal to the indexical nature of proper names to solve the problem of rational inconsistent belief, as the TIUT does. According to standard Millianism (which excludes *single*-indexical Millian theories such as that of Pelczar and Rainsbury—see chapter 3), *there is nothing more to the meaning of a proper name apart from its bearer*. The standard Millian view denies that proper names have a *character meaning*, as the TIUT maintains. The bearer fully exhausts the meaning of the name.⁴⁸ If Lois understands ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman,’ she knows who their bearers are, and she should therefore be capable of realizing, given enough time to reflect and introspect and reflect, that she expresses inconsistent propositions when she says that Superman can fly but Clark Kent cannot. However, she cannot discover she is inconsistent, no matter how much time she is given, and Millians cannot easily explain why. Some Millians (“guise Millians”, most notable Nathan Salmon) appeal to the

⁴⁸ See Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998, 308-310) for an argument that construing proper names as indexicals would solve the problem of rational inconsistent belief. Their theory is discussed in Chapter 3. Their theory of names as indexicals is substantially different from that of the TIUT, for theirs does not invoke mental dossiers, nor does it provide that names can be used in ways in which they communicate conceptions. On their theory, proper names have character meanings, and their contents are always their referents, full stop. Therefore, their theory is a species of Millianism that differs from standard Millianism owing to their positing that proper names have character meanings. As a species of Millianism, the theory has the same difficulty (as other Millian theories) in explaining the cognitive values and truth-value differences arising in Frege’s puzzles, even if it has an advantage over other forms of Millianism in addressing the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief in a way similar to the TIUT. Francois Recanati (1993) also claims that proper names have indexical-like properties, although he stops short of claiming that they *are* indexicals.

notion of propositional guises or ways of taking propositions to explain how agents can be (partially) ignorant of the contents of the propositions they believe, and thus incapable of recognizing the inconsistency between some of the propositions they believe and express. A guise is supposed to be something like a mask covering a proposition in such a way that an agent cannot see the proposition he believes behind the mask, only the mask itself. An agent could believe a proposition when it wears one mask and suspend belief (or even disbelieve) that very proposition when it wears a different mask. The notorious problem is that guise Millians, including Salmon, have never specified what these propositional guises or ways of taking propositions are supposed to be. Furthermore, guise Millians have not specified the exact relation between the propositional guise and the proposition it masks. We know the relation between a mask and a face (the “wearing-on relation”), but what is relation between a guise and a proposition? (See Section 5 on Millianism for discussion). The TIUT need not appeal to propositional guises, since the dossier model combined with the indexical nature of names explains Lois’ ignorance, essentially playing an analogous role in the TIUT as guises play in guise Millianism. On the TIUT, the character of a proper name is the guise behind which its content hides. The TIUT’s indexical proposal, by contrast with guise Millianism, gives us a concrete and specific account explaining how an agent might believe a proposition while being partially ignorant about it, and why she could rationally utter sentences expressing inconsistent propositions. The character of the name is in Lois’ head but a part of the content (the subject) is not—it is determined externalistically. All Lois has cognitive access to is the character meaning of the names she utters (which she knows tacitly) and the different descriptive conceptions in her ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ dossiers. She would need outside empirical evidence to find out that the subjects of these dossiers are identical.

Besides the problem of propositional guises being poorly explicated, Millians face another serious problem with respect to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief, the challenge of explaining why both enlightened speakers (such as Jimmy Olson, who knows about the identity) and unenlightened speakers (e.g., Lois Lane, who does not) are inconsistent. By contrast, on the TIUT only unenlightened speakers such as Lois Lane are inconsistent (e.g., when she expresses the inconsistent singular propositions that Kent-Super flies and that he does not fly). Unlike the TIUT, which claims (in accord with common-sense intuitions) that propositional attitude ascriptions (3) and (4) express different propositions, Millians posit that they express the same proposition. Therefore, Millians must claim that an *enlightened* speaker such as Jimmy Olson who knows that Clark Kent is Superman⁴⁹ would contradict himself if he uttered the seemingly true propositional attitude ascriptions (3) and (4n).

(3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

(4n) Lois Lane does *not* believe that Clark Kent is Superman

According to Millianism, (3) and (4n) would express inconsistent propositions—the respective propositions *that Lois believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* and *that Lois fails to believe that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*. That is, in uttering (3) and (4n), Olson would express the proposition that it is the case that Lois Lane believes Kent-Super is Kent-Super and that it is not the case that she believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. Olson would contradict himself and express inconsistent propositions in uttering (3) and (4n). The problem of rational inconsistent belief is hence a deeper problem for Millianism than for the TIUT, since Millians must explain why both

⁴⁹ Presume throughout this dissertation that Jimmy Olson is aware of the identity of Clark Kent and Superman, i.e., he is “enlightened.” This may conflict factually with various versions of the Superman legend.

rational unenlightened speakers (such as Lois Lane) *and* enlightened speakers (such as Jimmy Olson) contradict themselves. For the TIUT the problem is limited only to unenlightened speakers such as Lois Lane who do not realize that Clark Kent is Superman.

I do not think that the problem of rational inconsistent belief could be solved by Millians for enlightened speakers, were it to be the case that enlightened speakers such as Olson really contradicted themselves in uttering (3) and (4 n) as Millians claim. The unenlightened Lois Lane is ignorant of that her ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ dossiers have the same subject. This ignorance, rather than irrationality, explains why she has inconsistent beliefs with respect to Kent-Super, such as both believing and disbelieving that he flies. By contrast, the enlightened Jimmy Olson fully realizes that Clark Kent is Superman and he is fully informed about Lois’ confused and erroneous beliefs about the identity. Olson is not ignorant of any facts whatsoever about Kent-Super or about Lois Lane that would explain why he makes (allegedly) inconsistent statements when he when he utters (3) and (4 n), leaving irrationality as the only possible explanation. However, Olson is rational. *Any* rational enlightened speaker (perhaps even a die-hard Millian philosopher in his or her moments of inattention to his or her philosophical commitments) would unhesitatingly utter (3) and (4 n) to ascribe beliefs to Lois. Thus, we have no plausible explanation of Olson’s inconsistency—neither ignorance nor irrationality explains it. This casts doubt on the Millian claim that that (3) and (4 n) express inconsistent propositions (and, by implication, the claim that (3) and (4) express the same proposition), and thereby constitutes a *reductio* of Millianism.

The only possible move for the Millian is to claim that the enlightened Olson utters (3) and (4 n) without realizing they are inconsistent because Olson takes the propositions expressed by these sentences under different propositional guises such that he does not realize that they

express inconsistent propositions. Salmon in fact makes this move, arguing that Olson's misconception about the propositions (3) and (4_n) express, due to his conflation of pragmatics and semantics, constitutes a guise under which he erroneously takes the proposition expressed by (3) and (4) under different guises, such that he has propositional recognition failure with respect to that proposition, failing to realize that the same proposition is presented in two different ways. Salmon's claim on this point is further discussed in section 5.3.6, *infra*.

2.9 Informative Identities *without* Substitution

In the literature on Frege's puzzle about informative identity sentences, it is sometimes assumed *sub silentio* that tautological-looking sentences of the syntactic form $a=a$ such as (1) always express *uninformative* identities.

- (1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent

This assumption goes back to Frege's characterization of the identity sentences puzzle as he stated in *On Sense and Reference*. There, Frege posed the question why sentences of the form $a=a$ were uninformative and one could tell them to be true just by inspection of their syntactic form, whereas sentences of the form $a=b$ were informative and one could not tell them to be true or false merely by inspecting their syntactic form. The rule that sentences of the form $a=a$ can be determined to be true merely by inspection is true for logic, but not for natural language sentences. The TIUT takes account of the fact that a natural language sentence of the form $a=a$, such as sentence (1), could express *either* an informative *or* uninformative identity. It depends on the speaker's expressive intent. Sentences do not express propositions on their own; rather, speakers use sentences to express propositions. On the TIUT, sentence (1) would express an

informative identity if the first and second occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ corresponded to two distinct ‘Clark Kent’ dossier tokens in the speaker’s mind containing different conceptions, and the speaker intended the name ‘Clark Kent’ in a Conception-indicating way for both occurrences. I have discussed an example of (1) as an informative identity *supra* in section 2.1 and in footnote 5—the case of Tom who meets a man named Clark Kent at a party and suspects he is the same Clark Kent with whom he went to Kindergarten in Smallville, and utters ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’. Alternatively, consider a variant of Kripke’s Paderewski case discussed above in section 2.1. A man named ‘Peter’ might say ‘Paderewski the pianist has musical talent, but Paderewski the politician surely does not,’ failing to realize that the pianist and the politician are the same person. Peter’s friend might say to Peter ‘But Peter, Paderewski *is* Paderewski’ to inform him that Paderewski the politician is the same person as Paderewski the musician. Here, Peter’s friend utters ‘... Paderewski is Paderewski’ to express an informative proposition and not to point out the trivial fact that Paderewski is self-identical. The tokenings of ‘Paderewski’ allude to different conceptions of the man—one the conception of a pianist and the other of a politician.⁵⁰ For another example of (1) as an informative identity, consider the following scenario: Bill and Liz, a married couple, are Clark Kent’s (Kent-Super’s) next door neighbors in Brooklyn. Bill and Liz have met Clark Kent on several occasions. On each occasion, Bill and

⁵⁰ Kit Fine’s Semantic Relationism is an example of theory designed to solve Frege’s puzzle that fails to take seriously the datum that Frege’s puzzle is not about the difference of informativeness between identity sentences with the syntactic form $a=a$ or $a=b$. We want to explain rather the difference between uninformative and informative identities regardless of their syntactic form—regardless of whether the same or different names appears on either side of the ‘=’ sign. Fine’s theory is built on explaining the difference between sentences of the form $a=a$ and $a=b$, with Fine claiming that the names are “coordinated” in the former but not in the latter. Kripke’s Paderewski puzzle shows that Fine’s undertaking is wrongheaded, for the same puzzle is generated whether we consider sentences such as ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ or ‘Paderewski is Paderewski’, or the attitude ascriptions in which these identity sentences are embedded in the ‘that’-clauses.

Liz have conceived Clark Kent as being their next-door neighbor and a reporter by profession. One day, Bill and Liz are at a party and meet a man who introduces himself as ‘Clark Kent,’ but he claims that he is a resident of Hoboken and a mechanic by trade. He denies ever having lived in Brooklyn, denies ever having worked as a reporter, or being Bill and Liz’ neighbor. Yet this Clark Kent (from the party) looks and sounds identical to the other Clark Kent (the neighbor). Bill and Liz suspect that this Clark Kent at the party is in fact the neighbor pretending to be someone else. Bill now wants to convey to Liz his belief that the Brooklyn resident reporter, their neighbor, is the Hoboken mechanic. To do this, Bill utters sentence (1) to Liz, ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent.’ Here, Bill uses (1) as an *informative* identity sentence to inform Liz that he believes that the Clark they have met at the party is Clark Kent, their neighbor. Here is what is going on, according to the TIUT, when Bill utters (1). Bill first entertains a dossier token that contains the conceptual representations *named Clark Kent and lives in Hoboken, is a mechanic, met him at a party*. Let us call the dossier type instantiated by Bill’s dossier token ‘D^{CK1}.’ He introspects the dossier and draws the name ‘Clark Kent’ from it (he utters ‘Clark Kent’). With the second occurrence of ‘Clark Kent,’ he entertains a different dossier token, also containing the representations *named Clark Kent and lives in Brooklyn, is a reporter, is our next-door neighbor*. Let us call the dossier type instantiated by Bill’s dossier token ‘D^{CK2}.’ He draws the name ‘Clark Kent’ from the dossier (he utters ‘Clark Kent’). Bill has thereby expressed the informative identity proposition whose structure is revealed by sentence (1)^{INF†}:

(1)^{INF†} The subject individuating D^{CK1} is the subject individuating D^{CK2}

Liz may then report Bill’s belief back to him by uttering (3[^]) as a Conception-indicating ascription.

(3[^]) You believe that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

(3[^])[†] below offers us a window onto the proposition expressed by Liz' propositional attitude ascription (3[^]) (reporting that Bill believes (1)^{INF†}):

(3[^])[†] You (Bill) believe that the subject individuating D^{CK1} is the subject individuating D^{CK2}

The semantics of the proposition expressed by (3[^])[†], schematized *de re vis-à-vis* Kent-Super, is set out in 3[^]-s below:

3[^]-s Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Bill's dossier token d¹ instantiating the same dossier type, D^{CK1}, as instantiated by Liz' 'Clark Kent' dossier token d² from which Liz has drawn 'Clark Kent,' and Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Bill's dossier token d³ instantiating the same dossier type, D^{CK2}, as instantiated by Liz' 'Clark Kent' dossier token d⁴ from which Liz has drawn 'Clark Kent,' and **Believes** (Bill, <<the subject of d¹, the subject of d³>, identity >)

Uttering sentence (1) is an effective way to express an informative identity, and uttering (3) is an effective way to express a Conception-indicating ascription, *given the facts of this specific conversational setting described here where Bill and Liz are each aware of the different conceptions they each associate with the name 'Clark Kent.'* In conversational contexts in which the different conceptions are not as salient to the conversational participants as in the one described above, uttering (1) would not be effective in communicating an informative identity, and uttering (3) would not be an effective in communicating a Conception-indicating ascription. The pragmatic 'Meaning Consistency Principle' already discussed *supra* in section 2.6.2, explains why.

Meaning Consistency: Multiple occurrences of the same syntactic string in a sentence generally entail that the speaker meant the same thing by each occurrence.⁵¹ Occurrences of different syntactic strings entail a difference in meaning.

According to the above Meaning Consistency Principle, speakers avoid using ascriptions such as (1) or (3) (to express an informative identity or a Conception-indicating ascription, respectively), in general, because the repetition of the name ‘Clark Kent’ suggests that each occurrence of the name is synonymous. Here, however, the tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’ are not intended to be synonymous. The term “generally” in the above definition of Meaning Consistency indicates that there are exceptions to the general rule: two uses of the same expression might be used to mean different things if the conversational context in which the sentence uttered would alert the audience to the fact that the speaker is using them to mean different things. In cases such as Bill and Liz example, there is strong mutual knowledge between Liz and Bill regarding two different conceptions associated with the same lexical item—the name ‘Clark Kent,’ and these different conceptions are salient in the conversational context. Hence, Bill and Liz are aware that two occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ might not mean the same thing in a sentence, overriding the general principle that syntactically identical strings are presumed to be synonymous. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Bill would utter ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ merely to point out the trivial and obvious fact that Kent-Super is self-identical. (The utterance would communicate no relevant information, violating Grice’s maxim of relation). Realizing this, Liz is naturally attuned to the possibility that the two occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ in Bill’s utterance are meant to be non-synonymous.

⁵¹ By *generally*, I mean that there are exceptions when the conversational context makes it clear that the speaker means different things by the same expression (as in the Bill/Liz example), or where the grammar of the sentence entails a difference in meaning (e.g., in the sentence “Rose rose in popularity beginning in high school” we infer from the grammar that the two occurrences of “rose” must have different meanings).

In conversational contexts in which this mutual knowledge is not as strong with respect to how the difference occurrences of ‘Clark Kent’ could differ in meaning as here, the principle of meaning consistency would counsel that a speaker ought to use different names to correspond to the different conceptions to avoid ambiguity. Where there is just one single name, ‘Clark Kent,’ as here, the speaker could *coin* partially descriptive names to refer to the same individual under different conceptions of him or her. For example, a speaker might coin the partially descriptive expressions ‘Clark from the party’ and ‘Clark our neighbor.’ Then the informative identity sentence would be ‘Clark from the party is Clark our neighbor.’ The use of these partially descriptive names avoids the potential ambiguity that might be occasioned by tokening ‘Clark Kent’ twice over and uttering ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent.’ Furthermore, uttering ‘Clark from the party is Clark our neighbor’ or ‘Clark the reporter is Clark the mechanic’ to express the identity has the advantage that the audience is clued into the different conceptions the speaker has in his dossiers of the individual referred to, for the conceptions the speaker associates with the names are built directly into the partially descriptive names.

To summarize my discussion in this section, I maintain that (1) could be used to express an informative identity, and (3) to express a Conception-indicating ascription, where the conversational participants are aware of the different conceptions attached to the names by the speaker and the speaker and his audience mutually know that they are aware of the relevant conceptions in the context.⁵² The use of (1) to express an informative identity represents an exception to the Meaning Consistency Principle because the conversational participants in the

⁵² And conversely, using sentences like (1) or (3) will be disfavored by speaker on pragmatic grounds (because of the Meaning Consistency Principle) where there is uncertainty whether the conversational participants will realize that the name is used to communicate different conceptions on different occurrences of it within a sentence.

conversational context can readily determine from contextual clues that the speaker likely does not mean the same thing by the two tokenings of ‘Clark Kent’—that the speaker is using the names in a Conception-indicating way—and can puzzle out the different conceptions associated with them from contextual clues.

2.10 Informative Identities: *A Priori* or *A Posteriori* Propositions?

In Naming and Necessity, Kripke claims that true informative identity sentences such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ or ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ express necessary *a posteriori* propositions. I agree with Kripke about the now rather uncontroversial claim that the propositions expressed are necessary,⁵³ but I shall argue, in agreement with most Millians and *contra* Kripke, that *strictly speaking* they are *a priori*. Then I then go on to argue that there is also a “looser” or “non-strict” sense in which we may consider such propositions to be *a posteriori*.

Kripke’s claim that the propositions expressed by true informative identity sentences are both necessary and *a posteriori* remains controversial. It was revolutionary when he made it in Naming and Necessity in 1980. The standard view from the time of Kant through the time immediately prior to Kripke’s Naming and Necessity was that the necessary and the *a priori* were coextensive categories, i.e., that a proposition being necessary was both necessary and sufficient for it being *a priori*.

Kripke supports his claim that true informative identities involving proper names express *a posteriori* propositions in two ways. First, he appeals to our raw *intuition* that they are *a posteriori*. Second, he offers a formal argument for his claim. The raw intuition that they *a*

⁵³ That informative identities express necessary propositions follows from Kripke’s now widely accepted thesis that proper names are rigid designators.

posteriori seems *prima facie* compelling, but it is ultimately erroneous, or so I shall claim. Intuitively, it seems to us they are *a posteriori*, for we cannot discover Hesperus' identity with Phosphorus (they are both names of the planet Venus) or Clark Kent's identity with Superman by armchair reflection—just by thinking about the matter. We would have to *observe* something empirically to find out that these identities are true. The fact that the Astronomer who discovered that Hesperus and Phosphorus was one single celestial body (the planet Venus) used astronomical investigation, not pure mathematics or logic, to make the discovery, seems to militate in favor of the view that the proposition that Hesperus is Phosphorus is *a posteriori*. Similarly, Lois Lane does not discover that Clark Kent is Superman merely through reflection, but only based on empirical evidence such as seeing Clark Kent changing into his Superman outfit or spying Kent-Super dressed as mild-mannered reporter bending a bar of steel, or being told about the identity by Olson. As compelling as the intuition may seem that the propositions expressed by these informative identities are *a posteriori*, I shall argue that they are in fact *a priori*, strictly speaking.

Several philosophers have pointed out that Kripke's formal argument for the claim that identity propositions involving proper names are *a posteriori*, which appears briefly on page 104 of Naming and Necessity, is flawed. The argument relies on the *strong* disquotation principle (a.k.a., converse disquotation), which is now widely seen as false (as opposed to the *weak* disquotation principle, which is widely regarded as true).⁵⁴ I will not examine Kripke's formal argument here. See Soames' 2003, pp. 379-89 for a detailed critique of Kripke's formal

⁵⁴ The *weak* disquotation principle says: if a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker *s* who understands a sentence *S* is disposed to accept *S*, and believes *S* to be true, then *s* believes the proposition semantically expressed by *S*. The *strong* disquotation principle says: If a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker *s* believes a proposition *P*, then *s* will be disposed to accept any sentence *S* that *s* understands that expresses *P*.

argument for the *a posteriori* status of informative identities and Kripke's problematic reliance on the strong disquotation principle. See also this footnote.⁵⁵ To my knowledge, no philosopher other than Kripke has advanced any formal argument for the existence of necessary *a posteriori* identities involving proper names.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Kripke's formal argument that informative identity propositions are knowable only *a posteriori* is found on page 104 of Naming and Necessity:

"... we do not know *a priori* that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and are in no position to find out the answer except empirically... this is so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistinguishable from the evidence we have and determine the reference of the two names by the positions of the two planets in the sky, without the planets being the same." (104)

Scott Soames, Jeff Speaks, and others have criticized this argument. According to Jeff Speaks (www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/mcgill/415/kripke-identity-sentences.html):

"Kripke's point seems to be that we could be in a qualitatively identical situation with respect to the contexts of introduction and use of these names, and yet, in that possible situation *w*, the sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' could be false. [But] this argument seems puzzling: the sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses a different proposition as used in *w* than it does as used in the actual world. So why does the fact that the proposition expressed by this sentence in *w* is false show anything about the epistemic status of the proposition expressed by this sentence in the actual world? A way to fill the gap in the argument is *via* principles connecting acceptance of sentences with belief in the propositions expressed by those sentences. Consider, e.g., the following such principle:

If an agent understands some sentence *S* which expresses the proposition *p*, then: (the agent is justified in accepting *S* iff the agent is justified in believing *p*)

We can then read Kripke as arguing that agents cannot know *a priori* that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is true, and using the above principle to reach the conclusion that they cannot know *a priori* that Hesperus is Phosphorus."

The problem with Kripke's argument is that it goes through only if we accept the principle Speaks refers to, which is in fact the Strong Disquotation Principle, a.k.a. converse disquotation. However, the Strong Disquotation Principle is highly dubious. See Scott Soames' 2005, pages 379-89 for a critique of Kripke's argument and a critique of the strong disquotation principle. Kripke himself most likely does not endorse the strong disquotation principle, as his Paderewski Puzzle (1979) can be seen as a *reductio* of it.

⁵⁶ I shall have nothing to say here about Kripke's argument that identity sentences expressing natural kinds, such as 'Water = H₂O,' express necessary *a posteriori* propositions. Kripke's argument for the *a posteriori* status of the propositions is more closely tied to his essentialism. There are distinct arguments behind the claims about the epistemological status of these sorts of

Before I argue that these identity propositions are *a priori*, it is necessary first to clarify what it means for a proposition to be *a priori* and what means for a proposition to be *a posteriori*. Following Fitch (1975, 243) I shall say that a proposition is *a priori* iff it is knowable *a priori* (even if the proposition is also knowable *a posteriori*), and a proposition is *a posteriori* iff it is knowable only *a posteriori*. Hence, mathematical propositions, (at least some of) which are knowable both on *a priori* and *a posteriori* grounds, are to be classified as *a priori* propositions.⁵⁷ Propositions such as the proposition that Barack Obama was the president of the US in 2014, which are knowable only on *a posteriori* grounds, are to be classified as *a posteriori* propositions. Accordingly, I shall construe Kripke's claim that true identity sentences involving proper names express *a posteriori* propositions as tantamount to the claim that these propositions are knowable only *a posteriori*. I shall argue that they are strictly speaking *a priori* because they are knowable on both *a posteriori* and *a priori* grounds. The *a posteriori* way of knowing them is much more important and powerful because it enables the knower to draw many further inferences, whereas the *a priori* way of knowing them does not. For this reason, that we have the powerful but erroneous intuition that they are *a posteriori*.

The **A POSTERIORI** way of knowing PROP-2 (the informative identity proposition expressed by 'Clark Kent is Superman')

Suppose Lois finds out that her 'Clark Kent' dossier token (which we may call 'd^{CK}'), which is about Kent-Super and contains a Clark Kent-y conception, has the same subject as her 'Superman' dossier token (which we may call 'dSM'), which is about Kent-Super and contains a Superman-y conception. It follows as a matter of pure logic that she believes that the dossier propositions on the one hand and identity propositions involving proper names on the other.

⁵⁷ For example, the *a priori* proposition expressed by '1+1 = 2' can be justifiably believed on the basis of empirical evidence. I can have empirical evidence for it if I, e.g., place one apple into a basket, another apple, and then count them to see that I end up with two apples.

types instantiated by d^{CK} and d^{SM} , D^{CK} and D^{SM} respectively, are individuated by the same subject. That dossier types D^{CK} and D^{SM} are individuated by the same subject is precisely the proposition that, according to the TIUT, is expressed by (2)—PROP-2. (See sects. 2.4, 2.5). By coming to believe or discovering a “local” fact about her own mental architecture, i.e., that her dossier tokens d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject—Lois thereby believes the general proposition that dossier types D^{CK} and D^{SM} are individuated by the same subject.

Here, Lois has learned PROP-2 via *a posteriori* means. Neither Lois nor anyone else can tell that Lois’ dossier tokens d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject by armchair reflection. To find out whether Lois’ dossier tokens have the same subject we would have to examine the dossier tokens in Lois’ mental architecture—the ‘Clark Kent’ and the ‘Superman’ dossier tokens—to determine whether they have the same subject. This would involve an inquiry into causal-historical facts; we would need to learn about the events that led to the creation of these dossier tokens in Lois’ mind. This would be a purely empirical/*a posteriori* inquiry. As Hume taught us, we cannot know anything about what-causes-what by pure reason. Lois relies on empirical evidence to learn that her two dossiers have the same subject. She would need to see Kent-Super dressed as Clark Kent bending a bar of steel, or catch Clark Kent changing into his Superman outfit, or notice that Clark Kent and Superman look suspiciously similar, to realize that that her dossiers have the same subject. These sorts of empirical evidence will make it manifest to her that her dossier tokens are about the same man. Hence, the discovering of an informative identity, such as that Clark Kent is Superman, is here an empirical process involving empirical evidence. The agent discovers empirically that his or her distinct dossier tokens have the same subject, thereby coming to believe that, in general, the dossiers types instantiated by tokens of those types are individuated by the same subject.

The *A PRIORI* way of knowing PROP-2 (the informative identity proposition expressed by ‘Clark Kent is Superman’)

In addition to being known in an *a posteriori* way as described above, the proposition expressed by (2), PROP-2, can also be known in an *a priori* way. Therefore, it is an *a priori* proposition (since a proposition being knowable *a priori* is sufficient for it being classified as an *a priori* proposition).

According to the TIUT’s account of the content of proper names when used in a Conception-indicating way, as set out in section 2.4 *supra*, the proposition expressed by (2), PROP-2, could also be expressed by (2)[†].

(2)[†] The subject individuating dossier type D^{CK} is the subject individuating dossier type D^{SM}

Importantly, note that sentence (2)[†] is semantically equivalent to sentence (2)^{††} below:

(2)^{††} The subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception is the subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.

Sentence (2)^{††} results from sentence (2)[†] via substitution of the individuation criteria of the two dossier types in place of their names, D^{CK} and D^{SM} . (2)[†] and (2)^{††} express the same proposition because dossier types D^{CK} and D^{SM} have these individuation criteria and necessarily so. The individuation criteria of dossier types are after all essential properties of dossier types.

Note that sentence (2)^{††} is a *logically true* and therefore, one may know *a priori* that it expresses a true proposition.^{58 59} Therefore, any rational agent who read (2)^{††} and noticed that it

⁵⁸ Technically, (2)^{††} does not express an *a priori* proposition because it is not *a priori* knowable whether Kent-Super *exists*. A sentence that would in fact express an *a priori* proposition would be: ‘*If* Clark Kent exists, then Clark Kent is Superman’, for on the TIUT this would mean the same as the logically true sentence: ‘If the subject individuating the dossier type individuated by

was logically true should assent to it and be willing to assert it. As discussed in section 2.8, *supra*, the TIUT posits that the agent would count as understanding sentence (2)^{††} even if s/he knew next to nothing about or has erroneous beliefs about the properties of the bearer of ‘Kent-Super’ and even if she fails to realize that ‘Kent-Super’ refers to the same person as ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman.’ Grasping the character of the names (tacitly and infra-consciously) is sufficient for understanding them, being a competent user of them, and referring to their bearers, since (I claim) proper names are automatic indexicals. *Via* Kripke’s weak disquotation principle,⁶⁰ we may infer that any such agent who is disposed to accept and assert (2)^{††} believes the proposition it expresses, PROP-2. Since the agent’s reason for believing PROP-2 is the mere fact that a sentence that he understands and accepts is logically true, rather than empirical evidence, his or her grounds for believing PROP-2 are *a priori*. Hence, PROP-2 is *a priori* because it’s being knowable *a priori* is sufficient for classifying it as an *a priori* proposition, even if it is *also* knowable empirically (*via* Lois discovering that one’s dossier tokens, d^{CK} and dSM, have the same subject).

Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception exists, the subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Clark Kent-y conception is the subject individuating the dossier type individuated by Kent-Super as subject and a Superman-y conception.’ This sentence is logically true. For the sake of exegetical simplicity, I leave out the “if...exists” clause and treat (2)^{††} as if it genuinely expressed an *a priori* proposition.

⁵⁹ In order for (2)^{††} to be logically true, it would have to be uttered in a language in which it is stipulated by convention that syntactically identical strings are synonymous (such as in formal logic), so that there can be no doubt that the first and second occurrences of ‘Kent-Super’ in (2)^{††} have the same reference. Note that what I call the Meaning Consistency Principle captures this presumption, which already exists in natural language, that syntactically identical expressions have the same meaning/semantic value. However, this presumption is not carved in stone in natural language as in formal logic.

⁶⁰ According to the weak disquotation principle, if a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker *s* who understands a sentence *S* is disposed to accept *S*, and believes *S* to be true, then *s* believes the proposition semantically expressed by *S*.

Learning PROP-2 *a posteriori* matters more than learning it *a priori*

When Lois comes to believe the proposition expressed by (2) *via* believing the *a posteriori* proposition that her dossier tokens d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject, she can draw a host of important and interesting inferences. Upon learning this, she realizes that all the conceptual representations in her two dossiers, her ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ dossiers, relate to the same individual. To the extent that her conceptions are accurate, she may infer that the guy she works with is the Superhero she loves, that if her colleague named ‘Clark Kent’ ate eggs for breakfast then a flying super hero did, that if her mild-mannered colleague is 6’ 9”, so is her superhero love interest; that the guy she calls ‘Clark Kent’ is amazingly strong, and so forth. By contrast, when she believes the same proposition merely by accepting (2)^{††} and seeing that it is logically true, *she can infer no further facts whatsoever from her belief*. She cannot even infer from her acceptance of (2)^{††} that sentence (2) expresses a true proposition, since she does not recognize that sentence (2) and (2)^{††} express the same proposition. Lois might assent to (2)^{††} and assert that it expresses a true proposition, but nevertheless insist that the person referred to as ‘Kent-Super’ in sentence (2)^{††}, whoever he may be (and if he in fact exists), is not the individual she knows as ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman.’ As I claimed in section 2.8, Lois may rationally fail to realize that the names ‘Clark Kent,’ ‘Superman’ (used in (2)), and ‘Kent-Super’ (used in (2)^{††}) all co-refer. She grasps the character of the names, and so counts as a competent user of them, without realizing that they have the same content. Hence, Lois suffers here from a phenomenon akin to what Nathan Salmon (1986) has called “propositional recognition failure” because she understands sentences (2) and (2)^{††} without seeing (and without being able to see no matter how much she reflects upon the matter) that they express the same proposition.⁶¹

⁶¹ However, the TIUT explains propositional recognition failure in terms of Lois having distinct

I'll say that Lois realizing that PROP-2 is true *via* learning that (2)^{††} expresses a true proposition results in an “inferentially impoverished” belief that PROP-2. By contrast, when she learns PROP-2 *via* learning that her dossier tokens d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject, she ends up with an “inferentially rich” belief that PROP-2. This explains why we erroneously intuit that PROP-2 must be *a posteriori*: anyone who learns it merely *via a priori* means ends up with “inferentially impoverished” belief—unable infer anything useful or interesting about the world. By contrast, anyone who learns it *via* empirical means, by believing that their dossier tokens have the same subject, ends up with an “inferentially rich” belief. Since we are only interested in what agents believe in inferentially rich ways and are disposed to ignore situations in which agents believe propositions in inferentially impoverished ways, we focus only on the case where Lois learns PROP-2 in an *a posteriori* way. Nevertheless, PROP-2 is to be counted as *a priori* because it *can* be learned by *a priori* means, even if learning the proposition this way results in an inferentially impoverished belief. This claim, that PROP-2 is a necessary *a priori* proposition, should not be surprising, given that the very notion that a necessary proposition could be knowable only *a posteriori* is puzzling and highly controversial.

We are interested in an agent's beliefs to be able to make sense of and predict his or her behavior, both linguistic and otherwise. This involves understanding the sorts of inferences an agent is likely to draw based on what the agent believes. However, an agent's inferentially impoverished beliefs tell us little or nothing about what the agent will do or say. We do not care about them. Since we care only about inferentially rich beliefs, we ignore them, and we would not ascribe to Lois Lane the belief that Clark Kent is Superman merely because she reads sentence (2)^{††} and recognizes it as logically true and therefore expressive of a true proposition.

dossiers and the indexical nature of proper names, rather than via the Millian notion of guises.

Rather, we would only ascribe to her the belief that PROP-2 if she came to believe it *via* believing the *a posteriori* proposition that d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject, for this would result in her having an inferentially rich belief. The expression ‘believes’ (as well as other expressions used to ascribe propositional attitudes) are used in propositional attitude ascriptions to ascribe only inferentially rich beliefs (or other attitudes) to the ascriber, and exclude inferentially impoverished beliefs. Hence, I claim that sentence (6)

(6) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

would express a literally false proposition even if Lois believed the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause in an inferentially impoverished way. Sentence (6) would express a true proposition only if Lois believed the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause in an inferentially rich way.⁶²

⁶² The contrast between inferentially rich and inferentially impoverished belief can be illustrated by an example from physics. Suppose that a science novice attends a seminar on particle physics and learns from the seminar that charmed baryons have masses ranging between 2300 and 2700 MeV/c². Apart from understanding that charmed baryons are some sort of particle, this science novice does not genuinely understand the function of a particle in the atom and does not grasp the meaning of “MeV/c²” except insofar as s/he realizes that it refers to a measurement of the mass of a particle. He does not really understand what mass is as it pertains to a particle, only possessing the layman’s non-scientific understanding of “mass” as it applies to macroscopic objects. Are we prepared to say that this science novice *really* understands the proposition that charmed baryons have masses ranging between 2300 and 2700 MeV/c² well enough to say that s/he really believes it? There is a weak or non-robust sense of understanding/belief according to which we are disposed to say that s/he does believe this proposition. However, there is also a stronger and more robust sense of understanding/belief on which we would say that this science novice does *not* believe this proposition. The science novice can infer no further facts from his belief. His belief is inferentially impoverished. He cannot infer any further facts about particle physics from his belief, nor can he say why this fact is important or how it fits in with quantum theory. Here, we have a case where there is a sense in which this person believes that charmed baryons have masses ranging between 2300 and 2700 MeV/c² and a clear sense in which his level of understanding is too rudimentary to say he really believes this proposition in a robust sense. Does this science novice *really* believe this proposition or does he not? Can s/he really be said to believe the proposition given his poor, inferentially impoverished understanding of it? I

We can recognize and understand propositions in different ways; ways of knowing propositions may vary in their inferential strengths

As Nathan Salmon has claimed (1986), we grasp propositions in different ways. I agree with this claim. An agent may believe a proposition when it is presented one way but fail to believe it when presented another way, in which case the agent suffers from “propositional recognition failure” because the agent fails to recognize the proposition as the same one when it is presented in different ways). Lois may come to believe PROP-2 by believing that (2)^{††} expresses a true proposition and at the same time believe that (2) expresses a false proposition: she fails to realize that the same proposition is presented by the two sentences. Her failure to recognize two sentences as expressing the same proposition should not be surprising once we reject the strong disquotation principle, which, as I mentioned supra in section 2.5, is widely regarded as implausible.⁶³ The TIUT’s account of proper names as indexicals explains propositional recognition failure: agents may understand two sentences by grasping the character of the indexicals it contains without realizing that these indexicals have the same content. Lois Lane may understand both sentence (2)^{††} and sentence (2) and see that (2)^{††} must express a true proposition (because she realizes it is logically true) but nevertheless she fails to realize that the proposition it expresses is the same one that (2) expresses. She does not realize that the name ‘Kent-Super’ in sentence (2)^{††} has the same content as either of the names ‘Clark Kent’ or

do not think there is any non-arbitrary answer to the question whether the science novice understands the proposition well enough to be said to believe it. All we can do is recognize that there are different answers we can give to this question depending on our standards for what should count as sufficient understanding when we attribute belief.

⁶³ As stated previously, the strong disquotation principle states that if a speaker *s* believes a proposition *p*, then *s* will be disposed to assent to every sentence he or she understands that expresses *p*. As Scott Soames put the principle somewhat differently, the principle says that “in order to believe a proposition, one must be disposed to accept every sentence one understands that expresses that proposition (Soames, *Beyond Rigidity* 11).”

‘Superman’ in sentence (2).

A ‘Looser sense’ in which these propositions are *a posteriori*

I stated at the beginning of this section that I would argue that identity propositions such as PROP-2 are *a priori* strictly speaking. I also stated that there was a “looser” or “non-strict” sense in which we can say that propositions such as PROP-2 are *a posteriori*. I shall now discuss this looser sense on which such propositions are *a posteriori*.

On the looser sense of “a priori,” we do not count an agent as understanding a proposition p when reading or hearing a sentence expressing p if the agent understands p in an inferentially impoverished way. An agent counts as understanding a proposition only if he or she understands it in an inferentially rich way. Hence, Lois does not count as understanding PROP-2 when she reads and assents to sentence (2)^{††} because her grasp of PROP-2 via this sentence is inferentially impoverished. This is reasonable, since when we attribute belief to an agent, we are interested in understanding what the agent will infer from his or her beliefs and in predicting how that agent is likely to behave, linguistically or otherwise, in virtue of holding the belief. Inferentially impoverished beliefs do not tell us anything useful in this regard.

On this looser sense, Lois Lane does not grasp PROP-2 *via* assent to (2)^{††}. This carves out a quasi-exception to Kripke’s weak disquotation principle. Again, the weak disquotation principle states that if an agent accepts sentence s , a sentence the agent understands, and s expresses proposition p , then s believes p . The quasi-exception I propose is the following: if the agent’s grasp of p is inferentially impoverished when she grasps the proposition p via understanding sentence s , she does not count as *genuinely* understanding p via s . She does not understand p *via* s , and therefore cannot believe p via s , since one cannot believe what one does not understand. However, note that I am not in fact suggesting a *formal* exception to weak

disquotation, since I am maintaining that *strictly speaking* an agent reading (2)^{††} *would* count as understanding it and grasping p via it. The exception applies only to the non-strict sense of aposteriority. *Strictly speaking* Lois does understand (2)^{††} because understanding a proper name requires only grasping its character and does not require having fully accurate or rich descriptive knowledge about the referent (or content) of the name. For Lois to count as understanding (2)^{††}, she does not need to know anything substantive about the name's referent, nor realize that 'Kent-Super' refers to the same individual as the names 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman.' But the question at issue is whether there is another sense of *understand*, a non-strict or looser sense on which we can say that Lois fails to understand sentence (2)^{††}. And clearly such a sense of 'understand' exists.

Understanding is not an all or nothing matter. Suppose I, a non-physicist with limited understanding of physics, assent to 'E = mc²' because I have it on good evidence that all scientists believe it is true. Furthermore, suppose I know what each of the symbols stands for. But I do not know what one uses the formula for or how it was derived, and I do not know how relativistic mass is different from mass in Newtonian mechanics. I think of mass as just 'the amount of stuff.' Do I understand 'E = mc²' well enough to count as believing it is true? I doubt this question has any non-arbitrary answer. We can have different standards for what counts as sufficient understanding of a proposition to count as believing it, but there is no such thing as *the* correct true standard. It is we who decide upon the standard, which may vary from person to person and context to context. There's likely no fact of the matter which standard is correct.

Conclusion

Propositions are *a posteriori* iff they are only knowable *a posteriori*. Propositions knowable both *a posteriori* and *a priori* are *a priori* propositions. According to the TIUT,

informative identity propositions are knowable both *a priori* and *a posteriori*. But it is only when the proposition is known *a posteriori*, via learning that her dossier tokens d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject, that the agent can infer anything interesting. As ascribers, we are only interested in agents' beliefs that will allow us to predict their behavior, both verbal and otherwise, and to predict the further inferences they will draw from what they already believe. Hence, we are disposed to discount the *a priori* way of knowing an informative identity proposition, and therefore, we have the erroneous intuition that informative identity propositions are knowable only *a posteriori*. The TIUT explains why we have the strong (but ultimately erroneous) intuition, emphasized by Kripke (1979, 1980), that the learning of the necessary propositions such as those expressed by informative identity sentences involves an empirical discovery. The TIUT offers us a picture of necessary identity propositions (necessary, because of the rigidity of the names in the identity sentences expressing them) that are discovered to be true empirically because the discovery process involves the agent learning that her dossier tokens d^{CK} and d^{SM} have the same subject, i.e., learning empirical facts about his own mental architecture. The agent empirically finds out that his distinct dossier tokens have the same subject, thereby coming belief that, in general, the dossiers types instantiated by tokens of those types are individuated by the same subject. The TIUT agrees with Kripke to the extent that it posits that the necessary propositions expressed by 'Clark Kent is Superman' and 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' are *usually* learned empirically, and we are mostly interested in the cases in which agents learn those propositions empirically. However, the TIUT takes issue with Kripke's claim that these propositions are therefore *a posteriori*. There are ways of learning them that are strictly speaking *a priori*, and this is sufficient to classify them as *a priori* propositions. If we speak non-strictly, there is a sense on which these propositions can be considered *a posteriori*,

and this is because the propositions are inferentially impoverished when learned in an a priori way and are inferentially rich and interesting only when learned/grasped empirically.

2.11 Ascribing Belief to Non-Verbal Agents

Suppose that Lois Lane were a non-verbal but intelligent deaf-mute or an intelligent non-human animal incapable of speech. She does not use or recognize proper names because she is incapable of using language. Nevertheless, she might very well believe that Clark Kent and Superman are two distinct individuals and that Superman flies and Clark Kent does not, despite her inability to express these beliefs using language. Despite her neither using nor recognizing the names 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman,' we may report her beliefs using sentences (5*n*) and (6).

(5*n*) Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent flies

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

On the TIUT, the truth of (5*n*) and (6) does not entail that Lois is disposed to utter either 'Clark Kent flies' or 'Superman flies,' or that she would assent to either sentence. Furthermore, the truth of (5*n*) and (6) do not entail that Lois has dossiers with representations that their subjects bear the names 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman.' The semantics of these sentences (when those names are used in a Conception-indicating way) reveal why:

5*n-s* Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois' dossier token d^1 instantiating the same dossier type, D^{CK} , as instantiated by the ascriber's 'Clark Kent' dossier token d^2 from which the ascriber has drawn the name 'Clark Kent,' and **NOT Believes** (Lois, <the subject of d^1 , flies>)

6-*s* Kent-Super is such that he is the subject of Lois' dossier token d^3 instantiating the same dossier type, D^{SM} , as instantiated by the ascriber's 'Superman' dossier token d^4 from which the ascriber has drawn the name 'Superman,' and **Believes** (Lois, <the subject of d^3 , flies>)

As shown above, the Conception-indicating character does not state that the *ascriber's* dossiers represent their subject(s) as bearing any specific names, or any names at all. Rather, it entails only that the *ascriber's* dossiers represent their subjects as bearing the names uttered (since the names uttered are drawn from the ascriber's dossiers, which contain the representation that the subject of the dossiers bears those names). The Conception-indicating character provides that the ascriber has a dossier token of the same type as the one from which the ascriber has drawn the name uttered, but not that the ascriber necessarily has a dossier token representing its subject as bearing the name the ascriber uttered. The ascriber may have a dossier token of the type instantiated by the dossier token from which the ascriber has drawn the name even if the ascriber's dossier token represents its subject as bearing a different name or even no name at all. Dossier tokens do not have to match in all details to be of the same type. So, when uttering (5*n*) and (6), an ascriber may use the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' to express contrasting conceptions of Kent-Super (which aim to be like the non-verbal Lois' contrasting conceptions) even if Lois does not associate those conceptions with those names (or for that matter, with any names whatsoever). Lois has two distinct dossiers for Kent-Super, one containing a Clark Kent-y conception and the other a Superman-y conception, even though her dossiers contain no representation about what name or names their subject(s) bear because she is nonverbal.

In addition to explaining ascription of propositional attitudes to non-verbal agents, the TIUT also explains ascription of propositional attitudes where the ascriber is verbal but the ascriber does not know which contrasting proper names the ascriber would use to communicate contrasting conceptions. For example, consider the Hesperus/Phosphorus case. For centuries, the ancient Greeks believed that Hesperus, a celestial body seen at a certain location in the morning

sky at certain times of the year, was a distinct object from Phosphorus, a celestial body appearing in the evening at a different time of the year at a different location in the sky. However, ancient Babylonian astronomers had previously discovered that Hesperus and Phosphorus were the same celestial body, which we today refer to as the planet ‘Venus.’ Eventually the Greeks came to accept the Babylonian view and came to believe that Hesperus was Phosphorus. ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ were Greek names for this object as seen in the evening and as seen in the morning, respectively. We do not know what names the Babylonians used prior to the discovery of the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus. The ancient Maya also independently discovered the identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus, but we do not know what names they used either.⁶⁴ Nevertheless, we can accurately say, using the *Greek* names, which neither the Maya nor the Babylonians used, that the Maya and the Babylonians discovered that Hesperus was Phosphorus. The TIUT explain why we can use the Greek names to ascribe propositional attitudes to the Babylonians and Maya. A modern English speaker uttering the Greek names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ picks out the dossier types instantiated by his or her own ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ dossier tokens, and says that the Babylonians and the Maya had dossier tokens of these types (but not necessarily that they used these names) such that they did not initially realize that dossier token instantiating these types had the same subject, and then came to later to believe that they did. Nothing in the semantics of the TIUT entails that the Maya or Babylonians ever had any representations in their dossiers that their subjects bore the names ‘Hesperus’ or ‘Phosphorus.’

Here, the TIUT has an advantage over Forbes’ dossier based theory of names (1990). Problematically, on Forbes’ theory, the sentence ‘The Maya believed that Hesperus was

⁶⁴ The platform of Venus at Chichen Itza was built specifically to track the celestial orbit of Venus.

Phosphorus' would be glossed as:

Hesperus is such that, for the Maya's so-labeled way of thinking of it, α , and Phosphorus is such that, for the Maya's so-labeled way of thinking of it, β : **Believed** (The Maya, $\langle \alpha = \beta \rangle$)

The problem is the "so-labeled" language, which renders Forbes' theory overly metalinguistic. According to the theory, the names used in the 'that'-clause of every propositional attitude ascription are the labels of the *ascriber's* dossiers. Thus, according to Forbes, to say 'The Maya believed that Hesperus was Phosphorus' is to say that the Maya had dossiers that they labeled 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus,' that these dossiers were both about the same object but represented that object in different ways, α and β , and the Maya believed that these dossiers were about the same object. The problem is that the Maya did not label their dossiers with these names. Thus, on Forbes' theory, it is not possible to ascribe belief where one does not know what names the ascriber used or uses to label his or her dossiers. The theory is too metalinguistic in its holding that proper names themselves are constituents of the content of propositional attitude ascriptions. Plainly, we *can* ascribe belief to agents when we do not know how they label their dossiers or which names they would use, as in the case of the Maya/Babylonians and Hesperus/Phosphorus. We can moreover ascribe belief even when we are dealing with a nonverbal agent (who does not use names and whose dossiers contain no representation about names), as in the non-verbal Lois Lane example above.⁶⁵ Forbes' theory is further discussed in chapter 7.

⁶⁵ Metalinguistic theories of proper names run into similar problems. Metalinguistic theories of proper names, although they differ from one another in the details, maintain, in rough sketch, that the meaning of a proper name 'NN' is *the bearer of 'NN'* or *the individual called 'NN.'* On such a theory, the ascription 'The Maya believes that Hesperus was Phosphorus' would mean the same as 'The Maya believes that the bearer of 'Hesperus' was the bearer of 'Phosphorus.' The problem is that the Maya were not familiar with either of these names, so they did not entertain any beliefs about them.

2.12 Proposed Solution to Kripke's Puzzle

In "A Puzzle about Belief" (1979) Kripke aims to blunt the force of a certain sort of *reductio* argument often used against Millianism by neo-Fregeans (although Kripke does not end up fully endorsing Millianism). Let us call this neo-Fregean argument against Millianism "The argument from substitution failure."

The Argument from Substitution Failure

- (i) Millianism entails that the following principle, "substitutivity," is viable:

SUBSTITUTIVITY: because co-referential names do not differ in any semantic property, they are freely substitutable into propositional attitude and modal contexts without changing the proposition expressed or its truth-value.

- (ii) However, substitutivity entails that agents sometimes believe inconsistent propositions. For example, Lois Lane would believe both that Kent-Super flies (when she conceives him in a Superman-y way) and that he does not fly (when she conceives him in a Superman-y way).
- (iii) A rational agent would not, upon reflection, believe inconsistent propositions
- (iv) Lois Lane is a rational and reflective agent, yet she believes inconsistent propositions even after rational reflection upon her beliefs.
- (v) Therefore, substitutivity (and Millianism itself) must be false. Co-designative names are not substitutable in propositional attitude contexts.⁶⁶

Kripke aims to show that the argument from substitution failure, sketched above, does not in fact impugn Millianism. One cannot solve Frege's puzzle by giving up Millianism, becoming a Fregean, and barring substitution of co-referential names in propositional attitude contexts that lack the same sense. Kripke shows that the same sort of puzzle, in which a rational and reflective

⁶⁶ Neo-Fregeans would allow substitution of co-referential names only if they had the same sense.

agent ends up looking like they believe a contradiction, can be generated whether we are Millians or Fregeans, and whether we allow substitution of co-designative names or bar it. Hence, the argument from substitution failure fails to count as a *reductio* of Millianism or militate in favor of Fregeanism. Which theory of proper names we hold is irrelevant to the puzzle. All we need to do to generate the puzzle is to assume the innocuous weak disquotation principle (which I shall discuss below) and the puzzle is generated independent of which theory of proper names we adhere to.

There are two versions of Kripke's puzzle, but here I discuss only the Paderewski version of the puzzle, the more challenging version. Kripke asks us to consider the case of Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860 – 1941), a noted Polish pianist who also a politician—the prime minister of Poland for most of 1919. Suppose that a man named Peter is familiar with Paderewski the pianist and with Paderewski the politician, but Peter fails to realize that these are the same person. Peter thinks the pianist and the politician are two separate people. He assents to the sentence 'Paderewski had musical talent' when he takes the speaker to be referring to the pianist, and assents to the sentence 'Paderewski did not have musical talent' when he takes the speaker to be referring to the politician (believing that politicians rarely have musical talent). Now consider the Weak Disquotation principle.

WEAK DISQUOTATION

If a competent, sincere, reflective, and rational speaker *s* who understands a sentence *S* is disposed to accept *S*, and believes *S* to be true, then *s* believes the proposition semantically expressed by *S*.

Based on Peter's assent to 'Paderewski had musical talent,' a sentence Peter understands, we may infer that he believes that Paderewski had musical talent. Based on his assent to 'Paderewski did not have musical talent,' a sentence Peter understands, we may infer that he

believes that Paderewski did not have musical talent. Hence, we may infer that Peter believes both that Paderewski had musical talent and that he did not have musical talent. Thus, it looks like Peter believes inconsistent propositions. And Kripke has shown this without making any assumptions about whether Millianism is true or whether substitutivity is viable. He has merely assumed the unobjectionable weak disquotation principle. Therefore, a puzzle about belief ascription can be generated whether we presuppose the truth of Millianism or its falsity. The puzzle arises merely if we presuppose an unobjectionable principle such as Weak Disquotation, which seems commonsensically true.

Kripke concludes that Peter's case "lies in an area where our normal apparatus for the ascription of belief is placed under the greatest strain and may even break down." (Kripke 1979: 452). According to Kripke, the problem is that we have no plausible answer to the question: does Peter believe or does Peter disbelieve that Paderewski had musical talent? We have four possible answers to this question, none of which Kripke thinks are acceptable:

- (a) Peter believes neither that Paderewski had musical talent, nor that he did not have it.
- (b) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent.
- (c) Peter believes that Paderewski did not have musical talent.
- (d) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent and that he did not have musical talent.

But what exactly is wrong with option (d)? Why not accept that Peter both believes that Paderewski had musical talent and believes that he did not? Why not accept that rational agents can believe inconsistent propositions? Kripke thinks that a reflective and rational agent should be able to examine the content of belief and, given enough time to reflect, see that there is an

inconsistency and correct him- or herself. Kripke writes: "...surely anyone ... is in principle in a position to notice and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them." However, the notion that a rational agent should be able to examine the contents of his beliefs, as if they were perfectly transparent to him/her, is implausible. In section 2.8 above where I discussed the Problem of Inconsistent Rational Belief, I argued (in agreement with many Millians such as Nathan Salmon and other Millians who speak of ways of taking propositions or propositional guises) that agents may not always have transparent cognitive access to the contents the propositions they believe because some of those contents are determined externalistically. The TIUT takes the fundamental motivation behind this Millian approach, known as 'guise Millianism,' to be essentially correct, except that the TIUT explains the non-transparent access to propositions in terms of indexicality. Proper names are used as indexicals, whose characters but not contents in the context are transparent to the agent. Peter both believes and disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent, but he is not irrational for doing so because he does not realize that his beliefs are inconsistent and cannot realize this no matter how long he reflects on the matter.⁶⁷ The

⁶⁷ There is a distinction to be drawn between the following ascription sentence forms:

Peter believes P and disbelieves P (= Peter believes P and believes NOT P)

Peter believes P and does not believe P (= Peter believes P and it is not the case that Peter believes P)

I think that the former ascription could be true, since the TIUT posits (as do Millians) that agents may rationally believe singular propositions and their negations, i.e., rationally believe and disbelieve singular propositions. (See the discussion on the Problem of Rational inconsistent belief, *supra* at section 2.8). However, the second ascription is necessarily false; this follows from the law of noncontradiction. If Peter believes P, it is false that he fails to believe P. If it is the case that Peter believes P, then it is not the case that he does not believe P. There is a difference in meaning between 'X disbelieves P' (which is the same as 'X believes NOT P') and 'X does not believe P' (which is the same as 'It is false that X believes P'). Ascribers *would* be guilty of contradicting themselves (as a strictly technical matter) if they uttered: 'Peter believes that Paderewski was musically gifted and does not believe that Paderewski was musically gifted,' but I shall show that ascribers would *not* contradict themselves if they uttered: 'Peter

information that the propositions are inconsistent is not inside the speaker's head, nor is it inferable from information inside the speaker's head. The reference of both occurrences of 'Paderewski' is determined externalistically, for the subjecthood of the dossiers from which the name was drawn is a causal-historical property.

Mark Richard has argued that Kripke's puzzle presents a puzzle not so much about the nature of the propositions that Peter believes but is fundamentally a puzzle about belief *attribution*. How are we to express what Peter believes "in the idiom for belief ascription provided by English, if we limit ourselves to identifying the object of his beliefs [with the name 'Paderewski']?"⁶⁸ Consider sentence (9), which is unidiomatic in English:

- (9) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent and disbelieves that he has musical talent.

Although (9) expresses a true proposition, most speakers would use a more idiomatic sentence to communicate information about Peter's confused and inconsistent belief with respect to Paderewski. Why is sentence (9) unidiomatic? Why would most speakers avoid using it? What other, more idiomatic or informative ways would ordinary speakers find to ascribe belief to Peter? I shall now turn to this issue.

First, I shall briefly revisit the issue of substitution in Hesperus/Phosphorus and Kent/Superman sorts of cases where *two* names used in the propositional attitude ascription pairs. Then I will come back to the Paderewski case, which involves just *one* name.

believes that Paderewski had musical talent and disbelieves that he had musical talent.'

⁶⁸ Richard, Mark. "Kripke's Puzzle about Belief," page 18.
<https://markrichardphilosophy.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/kripkes-puzzle-about-belief.pdf>
[accessed on May 31, 2015].

As discussed in section 2.6, according to the TIUT, in the Hesperus/Phosphorus and Kent/Superman cases speakers can utter Millian (coarse-grained) or Conception-indicating (finer-grained) ascriptions, depending on their expressive purposes. Sentence (10) below would be a *Millian ascription* in the Hesperus/Phosphorus case relating to an ancient Greek astronomer living in an era before it had become known in Greece that Hesperus was identical to Phosphorus:

- (10) The ancient Greek astronomer believed that Venus was visible in the morning but also disbelieved that Venus was visible in the morning.⁶⁹

(10) has the same logical form as (9). The ascription attributes inconsistent beliefs to the ancient Greek astronomer using one single name, ‘Venus,’ just as (9) attributes inconsistent beliefs to Peter using one single name, ‘Paderewski.’ The ancient Greek Astronomer believes inconsistent singular propositions of which Venus is a constituent. The fact that the same name, ‘Venus,’ appears twice over suggests that we are attributing inconsistent beliefs to the ancient Greek astronomer (pursuant to the Meaning Consistency Principle). Though expressing a true proposition, (10) is nevertheless unidiomatic. The syntactically *de re* attitude ascription (11), below, would be a more usual and idiomatic way to express the same proposition.

- (11) The ancient Greek astronomer believed *of* Venus both that it was visible in the morning and that it was not visible in the morning.

Consider now the *Conception-indicating ascription* (12):

⁶⁹ ‘Hesperus’ was the ancient Greek name for the planet Venus when observed in the evening (at a certain location in the evening sky during at certain portions of the year), and ‘Phosphorus’ the ancient Greek name for the planet Venus when observed in the morning (at a different location in the morning sky during certain portions of the year). The Greeks long believed that Hesperus and Phosphorus were two distinct celestial bodies. At some point, the Greeks learned from the Babylonians that Hesperus and Phosphorus were the same body.

- (12) The ancient Greek astronomer believed that Phosphorus was visible in the morning but disbelieved that Hesperus was visible in the morning.

In (12), the use of two different co-designative proper names ('Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus') alerts the audience, pursuant to the Meaning Consistency Principle (see sections 2.6.2 *supra*), that the speaker is drawing a distinction between different conceptions.

Meaning Consistency: Multiple occurrences of the same syntactic string in a sentence generally entail that the speaker meant the same thing by each occurrence.⁷⁰ Occurrences of different syntactic strings entail a difference in meaning.

The Meaning Consistency principle explains for the differences between (10) and (12). It explains why we would not utter (10) (or (11)) as a Conception-indicating ascription and would not utter (12) as a Millian ascription. In (10), the use of the same name twice over, 'Venus,' signals to the audience that the speaker means the same thing on each of its occurrences, so the audience will tend to suppose that the speaker is attributing inconsistent beliefs to the ascribee. In (12), the use of different names usually conveys that the speaker means something different by the different names.

There is a pragmatic principle of conversation that I think explains why (12) is a more idiomatic than (10), the "Attribution of Consistency" principle:

Attribution of Consistency: We tend to attribute beliefs to ascribees in a way that avoids making them sound irrational.

⁷⁰ By *generally*, I mean that there are exceptions when the conversational context makes it clear that the speaker means different things by the same expression (see Bill/Liz example, section 2.9 *supra*), or where the grammar of the sentence entails a difference in meaning (e.g., in the sentence "Rose rose in popularity beginning in high school" we infer from the grammar that the two occurrences of "rose" must have different meanings).

Sentence (10) is somewhat ambiguous because a sentence of this form *could* be used to state that a person is irrational and believes a proposition and its negation *knowing full well that they are inconsistent*. We would probably not understand it that way, since, on the principle of charity, we tend to presume that people are not irrational in this sort of way. (11), by contrast with (10), is not similarly ambiguous—syntactically *de re* attitude ascriptions with the “of”-locution are specially tailored so that speakers avoid the seeming attribution of irrationality to the ascriber.

There is a further pragmatic principle of conversation that I think explains why (10) would be an unusual, somewhat unidiomatic sentence:

Preference for Fine-grained Ascriptions: When ascribing belief, one should give as much information about conceptions as is possible when two conceptions of the same object are being contrasted, if one can easily do so and if one is aware of the relevant conceptions in the conversational context.

Sentence (12) is a more natural and idiomatic attitude ascription than (10) because (12) gives much more information to the audience than (10) would, consistent with Grice’s maxim of quantity. It tells the audience about the different ways that the ancient astronomer conceived Venus. It imparts this additional information in an efficient way, without the use of any additional words (assuming that the audience knows that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are different names for Venus and is familiar with the conceptions the names are associated with). If an ascriber were to utter the coarse-grained Millian ascription (10), the audience would need to ask the ascriber follow-up questions to elicit additional information regarding contrasting conceptions to understand why the ancient astronomer entertained inconsistent beliefs (unless this information about contrasting conceptions was already clear from the conversational context). A speaker who uttered (10) without following-up by providing details about the reasons for the ancient Greek astronomer’s inconsistent beliefs vis-à-vis Venus would be flouting

cooperative principles of conversation.

There is an important and salient difference between the Hesperus/Phosphorus and the Kent/Superman cases on the one hand, and the Paderewski case on the other: in the former cases, two syntactically different co-referential names (Clark Kent/Superman; Hesperus/Phosphorus), each associated with a different conception by members of the language community, are readily *available* to speakers to draw contrasts between different conceptions because of the fact that the conceptions are commonly associated with the names. In the Paderewski case, by contrast, there is just *one* name to which speakers have recourse. Speakers cannot resort to pre-established names, each typically associated with a different conception, to draw any contrasts when ascribing beliefs to Peter. The principle of Meaning Consistency admonishes us, *ceteris paribus*, to have *two* expressions to indicate differing conceptions to make a Conception-indicating ascription with respect to Peter's beliefs. Arbitrarily inventing a second name for Paderewski *from whole cloth* would confuse the audience (especially since the audience, in this case, would not be familiar in advance with the different conceptions associated with the names by the speaker). So generally, a speaker would coin context context-derived contrasting names for Paderewski by combining 'Paderewski' with descriptions that key in the audience to the contrasting conceptions. For example, a speaker could utter (13) as a Conception-indicating ascription.

- (13) Peter believes that Paderewski **the pianist** had musical talent and he disbelieves that Paderewski **the politician** has musical talent

By adding descriptions to the name 'Paderewski,' the partially descriptive names 'Paderewski the pianist' and 'Paderewski the politician' can be used in (13) to make a Conception-indicating ascription just as the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' were used in (12) in the

Hesperus/Phosphorus case to make a Conception-indicating ascription. In both (12) and in (13) different conceptions in different dossiers are being referred to—the use of different co-referential names alerts the audience to this. The salient difference between the cases is that in (12) the speaker can resort to two different co-referential names conventionally associated with specific conceptions, whereas with (13) the speaker must invent his own names to get his audience to understand that the names are co-referential and clue his audience into the contrasting conceptions each name is associated with.

We would not typically utter the somewhat unidiomatic (9)

- (9) Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent and disbelieves that he had musical talent.

because the conversational principles of **Attribution of Consistency** and of **Preference for Fine-grained Ascriptions** lead us to prefer ascriptions of the form of (13), (14), or (14b) instead.

- (13) Peter believes that Paderewski **the pianist** had musical talent and he disbelieves that Paderewski **the politician** has musical talent
- (14) Peter believes *of* Paderewski both that had musical talent and that he lacked musical talent.
- (14b) Paderewski is such that Peter believes he had musical talent and that he lacked musical talent.

The syntactically *de re* ‘of’ locution in (14) and (14b) makes it abundantly clear the speaker means that Peter’s believing the inconsistent propositions may be unintentional and unknowing. In most cases, and if it can be imparted without great circumlocution, we prefer more informative and finer-grained Conception-indicating ascriptions, such as (13), which provide information about conceptions that indicate to the audience to how Peter believes what

he believes, if this can be easily done in the conversational context. To accomplish the latter, we coin partially descriptive names when do not have recourse suitable distinct co-referential names available to draw the contrast.

To sum up, the TIUT answers Kripke's puzzle as follows. Peter both believes the singular proposition that Paderewski had musical talent and that he did not. His beliefs are inconsistent. He is not irrational or illogical for entertaining these inconsistent beliefs, and we do not suggest that he is irrational when we ascribe to him a belief in inconsistent singular propositions. Nevertheless, we generally have an aversion towards locutions that have the outward appearance of attributing inconsistent beliefs, and we prefer ascription sentences that give the audience information about conceptions because this provides a higher level of clarity about the reasons the inconsistent beliefs are held. Hence, ascription sentences such as (9) sound unidiomatic and we tend not to utter sentences of this form.

2.13 The Distinction between Millian and Conception-Indicating Names: Pragmatic or Semantic?

I am proposing that the distinction between names used in a Millian and Conception-indicating way is a *semantic* distinction and not a pragmatic one. Some philosophers may object that I am going too far in positing a semantic distinction—perhaps agreeing with my claim that proper names, as well as many classes of expressions, can be used in various ways—but objecting that not all differences in use mark a *semantic* distinction. However, I do really *do* want to posit a *semantic* distinction. For there is, as far as I can see, no pragmatic mechanism—neither implicature (Salmon), descriptive enrichment (Soames), nor any other pragmatic mechanism—that could adequately explain the fundamentally different ways in which proper names are regularly and consistently used. Unfortunately, there is a dogma in the current

philosophy of language according to which the positing of a semantic distinction is strongly discouraged. Wherever possible, one is to explain away the appearance of a potential semantic distinction by appealing to pragmatics. However, I think this dogma is too extreme, and some philosophers have recently attacked this dogma with some measure of success. For example, Devitt (2004, 2008) and Reimer (1998) argue persuasively that the distinction between attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions is a semantic distinction (and not merely a pragmatic difference in use). They employ an argument that has come to be called “the argument from convention,⁷¹” according to which the fact that a certain expression is used *regularly* (i.e., with high frequency) and *without “special stage setting”* (Devitt 2004, p. 283) to convey some content C, constitutes solid evidence that the expression conventionally (i.e., semantically) means C. As Devitt put it,

“The basis for RD [Devitt’s thesis that the referential uses of definite descriptions constitute referential meanings] is not simply that we can use a definite [description] referentially, it is that we regularly do so. When a person has a singular thought, a thought with a particular F object in mind, there is a regularity of her using ‘the F’ to express that thought. And there need be no special stage setting enabling her to conversationally imply what she has not literally said, nor any sign that her audience needs to use a Gricean derivation to understand what she means. This regularity is strong evidence that there is a convention of using ‘the F’ to express a thought about a particular F, that this is a standard use. This convention is semantic, as semantic as the one for an attributive use. In each case, there is a convention of using ‘the F’ to express a thought with a certain sort of meaning/content.” (Devitt 2004: 283)

Devitt argues that the fact that definite descriptions are regularly used without special stage setting—sometimes attributively and sometimes referentially—is solid evidence that the referential/attributive distinction is semantic, and not pragmatic, in nature.

With respect to proper names and the distinction between Millian and Conception-indicating uses that I propose here, I urge that the argument from convention militates in favor of

⁷¹ This name for Devitt’s argument for Referential Descriptions was coined by Neale in his 2004.

a semantic distinction. The existence of two *regular* uses of proper names without special stage setting—sometimes just to contribute a name’s referent/bearer to the proposition expressed, and sometimes to contribute both the referent/bearer *and* a conception of it—is solid evidence that we are faced with a genuine semantic distinction. Proper names are semantically ambiguous between Millian and Conception-indicating readings, and this ambiguity can be resolved only by looking to the speaker’s expressive intent.⁷²

This issue is further discussed in Chapter 5. There, I claim that Millians have failed to show there are alternate *conventions* to report propositional attitudes (e.g., alternatives to allegedly false propositional attitude reports such as ‘Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman’) or alternatives to informative identity sentences such as ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ to express informative identities. We have no viable alternative to using these sorts of sentences—they are the means *par excellence* to convey these sorts of propositions, and therefore, they must be the conventional, idiomatic way to say these sorts of things in our language. They are essential constructions and we have no recourse to any other efficient idiomatic way to express such things. No Millian has shown otherwise. This militates, via the argument from convention, for these sentences *semantically* expressing, rather than merely pragmatically conveying, the propositions that ordinary speakers intuit they do.

2.14 Conclusion

The very existence of Frege’s puzzle constitutes evidence that proper names do not always contribute merely their referents to the propositions expressed by sentences in which they

⁷² I am not suggesting, of course, that we must be mind-readers to figure out a speaker’s expressive intent to resolve ambiguities. Utterance interpretation generally proceeds via contextual clues, which are a highly reliable guide to the expressive intent of the speaker.

occur. They sometimes also contribute to the proposition a way of descriptively conceiving or thinking about the referent of the name. I take this evidence at face value. Common sense tells us that speakers do not utter 'Clark Kent is Superman' merely to say that a person is identical to himself. We should respect this piece of common sense. However, there are also some sentences in which proper names play a simpler role: they just refer and do not contributing a conception. This is not to say that the speaker lacks a conception of the object or individual he is referring to, but rather than the speaker does not regard the conception as an element of the message he is conveying. The use of names just to refer to their bearers occurs both in simple sentence and in propositional attitude ascriptions. Thus, proper names have these two uses: merely to refer, and to refer and communicate a conception. I call the former 'Millian' uses and the latter 'Conception-indicating' uses.

From Kripke we have received at least two important truths about proper names. The first is that they are rigid designators. The second is that there is no reference-determining descriptive or conceptual element built into their meanings. They are synonymous with neither ordinary definite descriptions nor *rigidified* definite descriptions. Since the conceptions communicated are not part of the fixed conventional meanings of proper names, we must explain how speakers communicate conceptions. There are two possible routes. The first would be to propose that conceptions are communicated *via* pragmatic, rather than semantic, mechanisms, and that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. This is a route pursued by many modern Millians. There are many problems associated with taking that route. The second route, the one taken by the TIUT, is to propose that the mechanism by which conceptions are communicated is semantic: proper names are sometimes used as indexicals that pick out the conception that the speaker associates with the name at the time he utters it. The TIUT shows

how this occurs consistent with the thesis that proper names are rigid designators. This is where the TIUT is decisively superior to Descriptivism, on which names are not rigid. It is also decisively superior to Millianism because of its respect for the intuitive cognitive and truth-values of sentence like (1)-(6). Millians do violence to the intuitive cognitive and truth-values of these sentences. The TIUT does what neither Millianism nor Descriptivism is able to do: explain how names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ can rigidly refer to the same individual and at the same time differ in semantic content.

Once we recognize that speakers can use names just to refer, we must deal with the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief. Rational speakers may entertain inconsistent beliefs and utter inconsistent sentences to express them. Lois Lane inconsistently believes that Kent-Super can and cannot fly and is disposed to utter the inconsistent ‘Clark Kent cannot fly’ and ‘Superman can fly.’ Peter both believes and disbelieves that Paderewski had musical talent. Unless we are willing to say that these speakers are irrational, which we obviously should not, we must explain their inconsistency as arising out of ignorance of some fact or facts. But what are these speakers ignorant of? The TIUT and guise Millianism take a somewhat similar approach here and posit that speakers do not have full cognitive access to the propositions they believe and express through their utterances. Content is partially externalist. Guise Millians maintain that speakers grasp the propositions they express/believe indirectly, only *via* a propositional guise that may hide part of the content of those propositions. Problematically, all accounts of propositional guises are not well fleshed out. The TIUT’s approach is like that of the guise Millians in purpose—to explain how a rational Lois Lane can believe inconsistent propositions and utter sentences expressing inconsistent propositions without being in a position to recognize their inconsistency—but the TIUT offers a specific proposal: names are indexicals

with a character meaning as well as content. Character is the guise behind which content hides. Speakers are inconsistent because they understand the character of the propositions they express and believe, but not the content (or at least, not the full content). They have direct access only to the descriptive conceptions they associate with the name, which conceptions are in their dossiers. The causal-historical properties of the dossier in virtue of which the dossier is about its subject are not apparent to the speaker.

In the introduction, I claimed that to solve Frege's puzzle, we needed a theory of proper names that, at a minimum, respects the following seven constraints:

1. Proper names are rigid designators.
2. Proper names do not have reference-determining descriptive meanings.
3. Identity sentences like (1)-(2) express different propositions with the same modal profile.
4. Propositional attitude ascriptions like (3)-(4) and (5)-(6) express different propositions differing in truth-value.
5. Sometimes, we use a proper name as Millians claim, merely to refer, in which case the name semantically contributes its bearer only to the proposition expressed.
6. Sometimes, we use a proper name both to refer *and* to convey a descriptive conception, in which case the name semantically contributes its bearer plus a descriptive conception to the proposition expressed.
7. The descriptive conceptions we use names to communicate are not conventionally built into names and may be idiosyncratic and variable, differing from speaker to speaker and from one conversational context to another. A theory of proper names must provide that names are contextually sensitive in such a way that they load the relevant descriptive conceptions into content.

The TIUT respects these constraints. It also offers an answer to the problem of rational inconsistent belief and Kripke's puzzle. Hence, the TIUT constitutes a very attractive non-Millian theory of proper names.

A virtue of the TIUT it meshes well with how one might characterize Lois Lane's ignorance of Clark Kent's identity with Superman in a common sense, pre-theoretical way. Lois Lane fails to realize that there are two sets of information in her mind about the same person, Kent-Super. Let us call each of those sets of information a "dossier." Let us say that each dossier "is about" Kent-Super in virtue of some property and call this property "subjecthood." Lois' two dossiers have the same subjecthood, so they are about the same person. Lois' dossiers contain different representations: one represents its subject as a mild-mannered reporter, the other as a superhero. Let us call these representations "conceptions." Lois can introspect and see these conceptions clearly. She can see that the conceptions in the dossiers represent their subjects in very different ways, and she believes, quite rationally, that they are about different individuals. Although both dossiers have the same subjecthood, Lois cannot introspect, no matter how hard she reflects upon the matter, and determine that the dossiers have the same subjecthood. This is because the subjecthood is at least in part a relational property, inhering in facts external to Lois' mind. In much the same way, you could not look at a photo of Obama in which he more closely resembled Malcolm X and tell, just by the way the photo looks, that this is a photo of Obama and not Malcolm X. What makes the photo a photo of Obama is relational and causal, and therefore something not evident within the four corners of the photo. One cannot see the history of the photo in the image. Likewise, the property of dossier subjecthood is such that Lois does not have cognitive access to it *via* armchair reflection. Lois cannot find out that the dossiers are about the same person just by thinking about it. She would have to look at these extra-mental facts to find out that these dossiers are about the same individual.

When those in the know about the identity want to describe Lois' confusion about Clark Kent's identity with Superman, they utter 'Lois does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman.'

On the TIUT, this ascription sentence means that Lois has one dossier with which she associates the name ‘Clark Kent’ and another with which she associates the name ‘Superman,’ and she does not realize these dossiers are about the same individual. When we want to say, in general, what anyone who suffers from the sort of confusion that Lois does, i.e., they fail to realize that Clark Kent is Superman, we want to say that, in general, failing to realize that Clark Kent is Superman means not realizing that one type of dossier has the same subject as another type of dossier. Specifically, not knowing that Clark Kent is Superman means not knowing that that the type of dossier that is about Kent-Super and represents him in one way—a Clark Kent-y way—is about the same person as a different type of dossier that represents him in a different way—a Superman-y way. To specify these types of dossiers, ascribers entertain dossier tokens of these types and then make them salient by drawing the names from these dossiers. They thereby contribute the dossier types that their dossier tokens instantiate to content per the Conception-indicating character.

Propositional attitude ascriptions involve the ascriber imagining the way that the ascribee sees the world and creating within his own mind a temporary model of the ascribee’s worldview. The ascriber forms a dossier structure that mimics and mirrors that of the ascribee. Then the ascriber can speak about his own dossier tokens as if they were those of the ascribee. He may do so by relying on the fact that, if he has understood the ascribee’s cognitive state well enough, his own dossier tokens are of the same type as those of the ascribee. His own tokens and Lois’ (or anyone’s who confused about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman) all belong to the same type, and therefore, the ascriber can point to his tokens as instating that type and say that all those who do not realize the identity fail to realize that *these* dossier types (the one’s his own tokens instantiate) are individuated by the same subject, Kent-Super, the subject of his own

dossier tokens.

CHAPTER THREE

PELCZAR AND RAINSBURY'S 'SINGLE INDEXICAL' THEORY OF PROPER NAMES

Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) argue that proper names are used as indexicals, just as I do. Their theory is distinct from the TIUT for several reasons. For one, theirs is a Millian theory, although they diverge from standard Millianism, which claims that the name's bearer fully exhausts its meaning. They claim instead that names, being used as indexicals, have character meanings that determine their bearers in the context. A salient difference between the TIUT and their theory is that they do not distinguish between *two* indexical uses, as the TIUT does. Thus, I refer to their theory as a "single-indexical use theory." Because Pelczar and Rainsbury do not distinguish between two Millian and Conception-indicating uses, I maintain that they cannot solve Frege's puzzles. However, their theory is well-suited to solving the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief.

In section 3.1, I discuss the nature of indexicals in general, largely based on Kaplan (1989). In section 3.2, I discuss the debate over whether the fact that names have multiple bearers is best explained by their being multiply-ambiguous or being indexicals (in agreement with Pelczar and Rainsbury, I argue for the indexical view). In section 3.3, I look at Pelczar and Rainsbury's single-indexical theory. I argue that their theory solves the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief. However, it cannot solve Frege's puzzle. *Two* sorts of indexical uses, as the TIUT proposes, are essential for that.

3.1 What are Indexicals?

An indexical is a linguistic expression with the following characteristics:

- (a) It is *context-sensitive*, i.e., its reference shifts from one context to another. For example, when I utter ‘I am tired’, ‘I’ refers to *me*. When my friend John utters ‘I am tired,’ ‘I’ refers to *him*. The reference of ‘I’ shifts depending on who the speaker is in the context of utterance. Similarly, the referent of ‘today’ shifts. If ‘today’ is uttered on April 12, 2011 it refers to April 12, 2011. If uttered on April 13, 2011, it refers to April 13, 2011.
- (b) The linguistic meaning of an indexical—which Kaplan calls its “character”—is a *function* from contexts to contents that delivers the expression's content at each context. For example, Peter’s utterance of ‘I’ delivers him, Peter, as its content because he is the speaker in the context. Jose’s utterance of ‘I’ delivers him, Jose, because he is the speaker in the context.
- (c) Kaplan (1989) identifies four features by which contexts are individuated and to which contents are sensitive: utterer, time, spatial position, and possible world.⁷³
- (d) Kaplan’s list of the features by which contexts are individuated is not exhaustive. As we’ll see in section 3.3 *infra*, Pelczar and Rainsbury, who argue that proper names are indexicals, would add “dubbings-in-force” to the list of features by which contexts are individuated. I also argue that proper names are used as indexicals and I add “subjects,” “dossiers,” and “dossier types” to the list.

⁷³ For the sake of simplicity, I speak in terms of *utterances*. Kaplan speaks in terms of sentences in contexts.

(e) The *character*, or linguistic meaning, of an indexical is invariable—it is the same character no matter what context it is uttered in. The *content* of an indexical varies from context to context.

(f) On Kaplan's model, the content of an indexical expression (which, for Kaplan, is always an object) depends on context. Once the referent/content is determined in the context, it is invariant across circumstances of evaluation, i.e., possible worlds. For example, once the content of 'I' on a tokening is determined, the truth value of the proposition expressed will depend on that content evaluated at every possible world. Similarly, as we saw in Chapter 2, on the TIUT, names used in a Conception-indicating way have a content (a meaning, not an object), which, once determined is the same across all circumstances of evaluation. The salient difference between Kaplan's conception and that of the TUIT is, again, that on Kaplan's theory content is always an *object*, whereas on the TIUT content (of a name used in a conception-indicating way) is a *meaning*. That meaning (the meaning of a definite description) mediates reference, since the referent of the name is the denotation of the definite description expressing content.

(g) The reference of an indexical is independent of the speaker's beliefs about it or his beliefs about the context in which he finds himself when he utters the indexical, (i.e., the reference of an indexical is *automatic*). This is to be contrasted with the reference of proper names on Descriptivism, where reference depends on which descriptions or descriptions the speaker associates with the name and what object those descriptions denote. To illustrate the difference, suppose a man is knocked unconscious, kidnapped, and finds himself in a dark room suffering from total amnesia. He does not know who he is (he can't recall his name or other details about his personal life), where he is (he is locked in a dark room), or what day or time it is (he does not

recall what day or year it is and does not know how long he has been unconscious). He may utter to himself 'I am here today' and successfully refer to himself, the place he is in, and the day of the utterance despite lacking information about these things. He associates no uniquely identifying definite descriptions with himself, the day it is, or the place he is at. His mere semantic understanding of the character of the expressions 'I', 'here', and 'today,' are sufficient to enable him to express a true proposition (not a very useful or informative proposition, but nonetheless, a true one). (By way of contrast, on Descriptivism, a speaker who uttered 'Aristotle,' who associated with the name a definite description failing to uniquely denote anything or anyone would have failed to refer to anything whatsoever in uttering 'Aristotle').

(h) Indexicals contribute only their contents (not their characters) to the proposition expressed. For example, the character of 'I' is *the speaker in the context*; the character of 'here' is: *the place of the utterance*; the character of 'now' is: *the time of the utterance*. The proposition expressed by an utterance of 'I am here now' by speaker *s* at time *t* and location *l* is a singular proposition containing *s*, *t*, and *l* as constituents. The proposition does not contain the characters as constituents—i.e., the proposition expressed is *not* the descriptive proposition: *the speaker in the context is at the place of the utterance at the time of the utterance*. That is the character of the sentence 'I am here now,' not its content.

(i) Characters are different from the descriptive meanings that Descriptivists ascribe to proper names—definite descriptions that denote the referent according to a property uniquely borne by it considered apart from the contextual relation of the utterance of the name. Characters are also definite descriptions that denote the referent, but not by picking out a property uniquely borne by the referent *in general*, but by designating the referent by a relational property borne by the referent towards a particular utterance in a particular context. Whereas the name 'Albert

Einstein' has a descriptive meaning (on Descriptivism) that denotes Albert Einstein whenever the name is uttered, the character of an indexical such as 'now' denotes different moments in time when used at different times. As John Perry put it in his 1997:

“...Indexicals denote, as descriptions do. But indexicals do not describe. They refer. The individuals that meet the conditions, rather than the conditions themselves, are contributed to the official content (6).”

Both characters and definite descriptions, such as, e.g., the inventor of the bifocals, denote. But a description such as *the inventor of bifocals* picks out its denotation by describing it in a general way independent of its relation to the utterance. By contrast, an indexical does not describe the denotation of its character in the same way. 'I' denotes a particular individual in the context it is uttered, but it does not attribute to that individual any permanent or intrinsic property that would allow him or her to be picked out apart from its relation to the context of the utterance.

(j) On the view of indexicals outlined here, they are what John Perry calls “referential”—they just contribute their contents to the proposition, not their characters. Although Kaplan says that indexicals are “directly referential,” as Perry (1997, 1, footnote 2⁷⁴) points out, they are not directly referential in the strictest sense in that their reference is mediated by a sort of meaning—character. However, the view of most Millians (N.B.: but not “single-indexical” Millians such as Pelczar and Rainsbury; see section 3.3) is that proper names, by contrast with indexicals, are *genuinely* directly referential in the strict sense, for unlike indexicals, it is assumed that there is

⁷⁴ Perry writes: “David Kaplan’s term is *directly referential*. Kaplan has a precise concept of “directness” in mind, but unless one is focusing on his exact words, the term “directly” is likely to suggest that there is no semantic mechanism intervening between the expression and its referent. This is pretty clearly not the case with indexicals, as Kaplan’s own analysis shows; it may be more plausible for proper names. Using terminology introduced in Section 3 we can say: Kaplan’s language suggests that directly referential terms *name*, but what he really says is simply that they *refer*.”

no sort of meaning at all, neither an associated definite description nor a character meaning associated with proper names that determines reference. Most Millians hold that the sole semantic function of proper names is to pick out their referent and they do not carry out this function *via* an intermediating meaning of any sort.

(k) Indexicals include all expressions whose content is contextually sensitive, but many philosophers follow Kaplan in distinguishing between “pure” or “automatic” indexicals (such as ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’) and true demonstratives, such as ‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘that’. In case of pure indexicals, reference is supposed to be independent of the speaker’s demonstrations or intentions accompanying his or her utterance (the content of the expression is loaded into the proposition *automatically*), so that the reference of ‘here’ is always the place of the utterance and the reference of ‘now’ the time of the utterance, no matter what place of time the speaker intended to refer to. By contrast, in the case of a true demonstrative, content depends on the speaker’s accompanying demonstrations (such as pointing) or intentions (e.g., intending to refer to a particular object or particular type of thing in his visual field). It is controversial how to draw the distinction (e.g., there is a debate about how ‘you’ should be classified) and it is controversial whether the distinction is cogent on a more than superficial level. Mount (2008) argues that so-called pure indexicals are not in fact distinguishable from demonstratives, as their content is also a function of speaker intentions.

3.2 Proper names: Multiply ambiguous or indexicals?

Proper names have multiple bearers. There are many people with the name ‘John.’ There are two approaches to explaining this phenomenon: the multiple-ambiguity view and the indexical view. According to the multiple-ambiguity view, proper names are multiply

ambiguous. Just as the word ‘bank’ is ambiguous in English (it can mean either the edge of a river or a financial institution), ‘John’ is ambiguous in that it can be used to refer to many different people. According to the standard view of ambiguity, ‘bank’ is in fact two different expressions that happen to be syntactically and phonologically identical in English. If we wanted to, we could adopt a syntactic convention to distinguish between these two expressions—using ‘bank₁’ for the edge of a river and ‘bank₂’ for a financial institution. Similarly, we could use subscripts to distinguish between all the different proper names that happen to have the syntactic and phonological form ‘John’ that are in fact different names for distinct individuals who bear the name ‘John.’ ‘John₁’ would be the name for one individual named ‘John,’ ‘John₂’ for a different individual named ‘John,’ and so on. Each person in the world would have a unique name shared with no other. His name would belong to him alone. “Two people have the same name” would mean that their two distinct names share their phonological/syntactical properties—the names are *qualitatively* identical in this way, not *numerically* identical. Different Johns would share what Kaplan (1990) calls a “generic name”: each John would have his own proprietary name ‘John,’ which happens to have the same syntactic and phonological properties as the names of other individuals bearing the name ‘John.’ Analogously, ‘bank’ (to refer to a financial institution) and ‘bank’ (to refer to the edge of a river) are phonologically/syntactically identical expressions—they are the same generic expression, but they are not numerically identical expressions.

On the indexical view of proper names (defended by the TIUT and by Pelczar and Rainsbury—see section 3.3), by contrast, proper names are *not* ambiguous. There is just one name ‘John.’ It can be used to refer to any of the many individuals who bear that name. Names are used as indexicals, whose content is sensitive to context. Just as we would not say that ‘I’ is

ambiguous just because it can be used to refer to many different individuals on different occasions of utterance, analogously, we should not say that ‘John’ is ambiguous merely because it can be used to refer to different individuals on different occasions of utterance.

Any indexical theory of proper names must posit features of context beyond the four that are on Kaplan’s list: utterer, time, location, and world. Those four features of context cannot account for the difference in content of proper names. As discussed below in section 3.3, Pelczar and Rainsbury would add what they call “dubbings-in-force” to the list of features of context. I add “subject,” “dossier(s),” and “dossier types” to the list (see section 2.3).

Perry’s (1997) primary objection to the indexical view of proper names is that proper names cannot vary in content if we limit context to Kaplan’s four contextual features that determine content in the case of indexicals such as ‘here,’ ‘I,’ ‘now,’ etc. Perry (1997) writes:

“The role of context in resolving the issues of which naming conventions are being exploited is quite different from its role with indexicals. In the case of indexicals, the meaning of a given expression determines that certain specific contextual relationships to the utterance and utterer—who is speaking, or to whom, or when—determine designation. Different facts are relevant for different indexicals, and the meaning of the indexical determines which. Names don’t work like this. The difference between “David” and “Harold” is not that they are tied, by their meanings, to different relationships to the utterance or utterer. The role of context is simply to help us narrow down the possibilities for the permissive conventions that are being exploited.” (7)

Perry’s objection to the thesis that proper names are indexicals could be blunted if one could show that there are additional features of the context to be added to Kaplan’s list of environmental features by which contexts of utterances are individuated and to which content is sensitive that *would* indeed tie the content of a proper name to features of context surrounding the utterer and the specific utterance. Specifically, the features of context would have to do with the causal-historical features of the utterer’s mental state (e.g., the speaker’s dossier) at the very instant the name is tokened that directly tied the utterer’s mental state (or dossier), and his or her utterance itself, to the bearer of the name.

A potential objection to the indexical view of names might be that these causal-historical features linking the speaker's mental state to the bearer of the name are far more *complex* and *difficult to ascertain* in a conversational setting than in the case of other indexicals such as 'I' or 'now', where such features are far easier to determine. Causal-historical factors linking a name via a casual chain back to its bearer are not readily discernible to the participants in a conversation. However, I think there is no principled place to draw the line with respect to the level of complexity that would admit some contextually sensitive expressions to the class of indexicals and exclude others. An expression whose content depends on features of context is an indexical, full stop, regardless of how complex the features of context to which the indexical are sensitive.

Moreover, the distinct advantage to considering proper names to be indexicals—that it offers a ready solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent belief, as shown in Chapter 2 (and also discussed, *infra*, at 3.3)—militates in favor of the indexical view. Furthermore, the indexical view is more parsimonious than the view that proper names are multiply-ambiguous expressions, which would claim that 'John' constitutes millions of distinct names (one for each person named 'John') that happen to be spelled (and pronounced) the same way. The more parsimonious and intuitive view that 'John' one single expression that can be used to refer to many different individuals bearing that name.

Why think that proper names are indexicals, rather than multiply ambiguous expressions? For one, names have all the features of indexicals (a)-(k) listed above: they are context sensitive, are functions from context to content, upload content into the proposition, and contribute just their contents, and not the name's character, to the proposition. The thesis that names are indexicals is strengthened by the Kripkean (anti-Descriptivist) notion that a proper name has its

referent in virtue of a relational, a causal-historical, property. A speaker refers not in virtue of what is “in his head,” but rather in virtue of some property of the environment or context in which he utters the name. Just as an utterer of ‘I’ need not have specific uniquely denoting information to refer to himself when uttering ‘I,’ according to the Kripkean causal-historical theory of reference an utterer of ‘Aristotle’ need not have uniquely denoting descriptive information to refer to the ancient philosopher (rather than the shipping magnate). Externalist causal-historical features of the environment, about which the utterer of a name need not have belief or knowledge, determine the reference of his utterance, largely or wholly independent of the speaker’s intentions and beliefs. If we were to endorse a purely causal theory of reference for proper names, we certainly want to claim that names are indexicals. Their character would be a rule that maps the utterance, based on the causal-historical factors present at the time and place of the utterance, to the name’s referent. It would do so automatically, as the speaker does not (and cannot) have in his head the information about the causal-historical links between his utterance and the referent of the name he utters in virtue of which he refers to one person rather than another bearing a particular name.

Even if we were to posit a theory of reference that was not purely causal-historical, e.g., a hybrid theory of reference for proper names that included some descriptive beliefs as reference determining factors, we would nevertheless want to claim that names are indexicals with character determining content. We would want a more complex character—perhaps a rule capturing a complex algorithm that takes causal-historical factors together with facts about some reference determining descriptive beliefs the agent associates with the name and maps it to the referent. The mapping of an utterance of ‘Aristotle’ to the philosopher rather than the shipping magnate would be in virtue of various features of context—both causal-historical features of the

utterance, the speaker's mental state that caused the utterance, and some descriptive beliefs of the agent (e.g., perhaps beliefs about the general kind of thing, such as the property of being a human being, he intends to refer to).

To recap, the argument for the indexical view proceeds as follows: Start with the question—In virtue of what does an utterance of 'John' refer to one John rather than a different John? Certainly, it cannot be in virtue of the orthographic or phonological properties of 'John,' for each person named 'John' bears an orthographically identical name. It cannot depend on the context of the conversational setting alone, since a speaker could intend an utterance of 'John' to refer to any individual bearing the name 'John,' even to a bearer of 'John' who the conversational participants would not expect to be the referent of 'John' in the context of the conversation. The reference of an utterance of 'John' must be a function of the speaker's intent to refer to one John rather than another. The speaker has a specific John *in mind* when he utters 'John.' In virtue of what does the speaker have one John in mind rather than another? It must be in virtue of some property of the speaker's *mind*, his/her mental state at the time he utters the name and which causes the utterance. What sort of property? Possible answers include: a relational (extrinsic) property such as a causal-historical property of the mental state, an intrinsic property of the mental state (e.g., a purely general descriptive belief), or a hybrid property—a function of both causal-historical features and descriptive beliefs. In short, the reference of a tokening of 'John' depends on some property of the speaker's' mental state at the time of the tokening. This mental state differs from speaker to speaker and time to time across tokenings of 'John.' Different bearers of 'Johns' are picked out by utterances of 'John' in virtue of the mental states producing the utterances differing in their properties. So, the reference of 'John' is context dependent. The reference depends on features of the context/environment—properties of the

mental state of the utterer at the time of the utterance, just as the reference of ‘I’ or ‘now.’ The main difference between the case of proper names and indexicals such as ‘I’ or ‘now’ is that the features of the environment/context upon which the reference of a name depend would be far more complex than the features of context on which the reference of other sorts of indexicals, such as ‘I’ or ‘now,’ depend. In the case of proper names, the features of context would consist extrinsic causal-historical properties in the case of a causal-historical theory of reference, and in the case of a hybrid theory, they could consist of some complex mix of intrinsic mental properties and such causal properties. Whereas in the case of ‘I’ or ‘now,’ the features of context that determine content are relatively straightforward and simple (i.e., for ‘I,’ the only feature of context one need consider is who the speaker is), there is little reason to think that there is some threshold of complexity of environmental factors to which it is sensitive above which a contextually sensitive expression would fail to count as an indexical. Why should we draw any such line? Drawing such a line is especially unwarranted if not drawing the line would yield a solution to the problem of Rational Inconsistency, such as the one I outlined in section 2.8.^{75 76}

3.3 Pelczar and Rainsbury’s “Single-Indexical” Theory of Proper Names

On the theory of Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) (hereinafter “P & R”), proper names are indexicals whose content is just the referent of the name. I call this theory a “single-indexical”

⁷⁵ Specifically, treating the names as indexicals tells us that Lois can have the character meanings of ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ in her mind without realizing that they determine the same contents.

⁷⁶ If Millianism is true and the bearer exhausts the meaning of a name, it is mysterious how Lois Lane could count as understanding the names without being in a position to see they co-refer. We need propositional guises if we do not have indexicality, but I see no way of making sense of propositional guises, unless these guises are ultimately explained in terms of some underlying mechanism, and indexicality seems to me a promising in this regard.

theory because it posits that names are used as *one* type of indexical, rather than *two* types of indexicals (between which they are ambiguous), as he TIUT claims. P & R's theory is a species of Millianism because proper names always just contribute their bearers and nothing further to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur.⁷⁷ P & R claim that their theory has the potential to solve Frege puzzles. However, I shall argue that they can solve only the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief (which P & R term 'the problem of coherent inconsistency'). Along with other Millian theories, they do not provide for a mechanism by which proper names can sometimes contribute descriptive conceptions to propositions, and therefore they cannot solve Frege's puzzles.

P & R's theory has Kripke's causal-historical theory of the reference of proper names as its touchstone (see 4.3 for discussion of Kripke's theory). On Kripke's theory, a naming convention is established for an individual—it comes into existence for referring to its bearer—via an act of *dubbing* (a.k.a., a baptism). You are in the presence of an individual, or perhaps *en rapport* with that individual (even if they are not physically present before you), and via a reference fixing definite description, an act of ostension, or a combination thereof, you fix the reference of the name. For example, you point to the baby and say to yourself "let that baby bear the name 'John.'" The baby has this been dubbed with the name 'John.' You have established a

⁷⁷ Besides Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), Recanati (1993, 140-145) is another theorist who has recognized the indexical nature of names. Recanati writes that names are very much *like* indexicals, having character and content, although it is not clear whether he has expressly claimed they *are* indexicals. According to Powell (2016, 92-93), Recanati maintains that the character of name 'NN' would be the nominal description *the bearer of 'NN'*; the content of 'NN' would be the bearer of 'NN,' i.e., the flesh-and-blood bearer of that name. What separates Recanati's view from that of a proponent of metalinguistic descriptivism, e.g., Kent Bach, a proponent of the "nominal description theory", is that Bach claims that the meaning of the nominal description *the bearer of 'NN'* is the content of 'NN', not its character, while Recanati, a Millian, thinks the bearer is the name's content and the description *the bearer of 'NN'* its character.

convention according to which one may use 'John' to refer to that person. There are of course multiple other co-existing conventions that allow 'John' to be used to refer to numerous other individuals.

P & R's (1998) key notion for their theory is what they term a "dubbing-in-force". As they state it,

"A dubbing is a speech-act whereby a name acquires a referent, and a dubbing is *in force* in a given context if in that context the item that was dubbed in that dubbing bears the name it received in that dubbing." (294)

Although P & R do not explicitly spell out the character of proper names, on a rational reconstruction of their theory we may say that the character of any proper name, 'NN', is:

CHARACTER OF NAME 'NN': The individual bearing the name 'NN' who has been dubbed 'NN' in the dubbing-in-force in the context.

On P & R's theory, the dubbing-in-force is a feature of the context to which character is sensitive. They suggest that dubbing-in-force should be added to Kaplan's list of four features: utterer, place, time, and possible world. P & R do not elaborate the specifics of how to determine which dubbings are in force in a given context.

"...the dynamics of dubbings-in-force can be complex and we shall not attempt to provide a systematic way to decide which dubbings are in force in a given context." (295)

P & R make it clear that more than one dubbing may be in force for a name in each context. In a context of token utterance of 'John,' there may be numerous dubbings in force, since many individuals have been dubbed 'John' and bear the name. Not *every* dubbing involving the name 'John' is in force in the context. There are two reasons for this. First, not all the individuals

dubbed with 'John' now bear the name 'John.' In Gareth Evans' (1982) famous example, two newborn babies lay in the hospital. One had been given the name 'John' and the other the name 'Jim' by their respective parents. The babies are switched at birth. Unaware of the switch, the baby dubbed 'John' grows up being called 'Jim' and the baby dubbed 'Jim' grows up being called 'John.' The original dubbings are no longer in force: they have fallen into disuse. The baby dubbed 'John' no longer bears the name 'John'; the baby dubbed 'Jim' no longer bears the name 'Jim.' The original naming conventions have died out. Secondly, according to P & R, certain dubbings are not in force in a context because the conversational setting automatically excludes certain dubbings. For example, if I am reminiscing with a high school friend about people we knew in common in our high school graduation class and I utter the name 'John,' the conversational setting entails that certain dubbings are not in force in the context of the conversation. The dubbing of John the Baptist with 'John' or John Quincy Adams with 'John' are not in force in the context. For it is highly improbable that I would be referring to these individuals, given the setting of the conversation mutually known to the conversational participants. The relevant conversation is about individuals with whom the conversational participants attended high school, not about historical figures that died centuries before the conversational participants attended high school. When there is more than one dubbing in force in a context,

“...one of the competing dubbings must be brought to prominence to determine a unique referent of the name (in that use). This might be achieved by a variety of mechanisms. One important factor in the raising to prominence might be relevant features of the conversation (if any) of the context of utterance of the name. For example, in the course of a conversation dealing both with president Bush and his son, someone says: ‘George Bush occupied the oval office for only one term’, Gricean conversational maxims (and in particular the maxim of quality) might contribute to raising of the dubbing of the President with ‘George Bush’ to prominence, over his son.” [N.B. this was written in 1998, before George W. Bush was elected president]

In some contexts, there could be staggeringly large numbers of individuals potentially picked out by a single use of ‘John’ from the hearer’s perspective. Upon an utterance of ‘John’ a hearer interprets the utterance via pragmatic principles—ascertaining which John was the likely intended referent of the speaker based on contextual clues.⁷⁸

P & R claim their theory can solve Frege’s and Kripke’s puzzles, although I believe that they can solve only the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief (which P & R call ‘the Problem of Coherent Inconsistency’). They begin their discussion of their solution of this puzzle on the bottom of page 304:

“We believe that when seen in the right light, most of the well-known puzzles of attitudes semantics can be explained as cases involving some contextual error on the part of an attitude ascriber. Some preliminary illumination may be afforded by the observation that a main goal of attitudes semantics is to *explain the possibility of coherent inconsistency* [italics mine]. This is the possibility for a rational individual with complete linguistic competence to bear incompatible attitudes towards the same object of attitude-bearing. Classically, the problem is how to explain the consistency of a statement like this:

- (17) Thales believes that Hesperus is shining and disbelieves that Phosphorus is shining.

with a statement like this:

- (18) Thales is coherent (i.e., is neither irrational nor in any relevant respect linguistically incompetent).”

Here, P & R have set up the problem of coherent inconsistency (which I call ‘the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief’): to explain how a rational and coherent Thales could have inconsistent beliefs with respect to Venus, believing both that it is shining and disbelieving that it

⁷⁸ Where there are multiple dubbings in force, the character of the name alone does not map it to a *unique* content/referent, but a range of possible contents/referents. To determine the correct bearer of a name with multiple dubbings in force requires one to look at speaker intentions, which suggests that proper names are closer to *true demonstratives* than automatic indexicals (although they do not expressly state this, as they seem not to be concerned with this distinction).

is shining. By construing proper names as indexicals whose content is a function of externalist, extra-semantic factors (as opposed to internalist semantic factors inside the speaker's head), P &

R explain Thales' rationality/coherence:

“It is a peculiar feature of an indexical that its literal content is partly determined by an extra-semantic feature of its context of utterance. We call a feature extra-semantic with respect to an expression just in case it need not be mentioned in a satisfactory specification of the literal meaning or character of that expression. For example, the literal content of the present utterance of ‘I’ depends partly on the fact that Joe Rainsbury uttered it. But this fact need not figure at all in a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of ‘I’. Therefore, the fact is an extra-semantic feature of the present context of utterance, with respect to ‘I.’” (305)

...

If 'Hesperus' or 'Phosphorus' or both are indexicals, then the mutual consistency of (17) and (18) can be explained... [A] rational Thales can know the meanings of both 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' - i.e., he can know that 'Hesperus' refers to whatever was dubbed in the dubbing-in-force governing 'Hesperus' in his context of utterance, and *mutatis mutandis* for 'Phosphorus' - without knowing that both names happen (in his context) to refer to the same entity. (307)

Thales is coherent and rational because his inconsistency is explained by his ignorance of the fact that the indexicals ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same content, and this ignorance is wholly constituted by ignorance of externalist, extra-semantic information to which Thales has no cognitive access (without receiving additional empirical evidence). Thales knows the meanings of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, despite his ignorance of their co-reference, because to know the character of these names is to know their meanings. That is, Thales is a competent user of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ because he knows that they are used to pick out whatever objects were dubbed with those names in the dubbing in force in the context.

P & R astutely point out that standard Millians, who hold that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its bearer (and that names have no character meanings) cannot easily explain Thales' rationality/coherence.

“... the currently reigning direct reference theory of names seems, at least in its present form, incapable of explaining the mutual consistency of, e.g., (17) and (18). In fact, the direct reference theorists' best attempt to solve the problem seems to presuppose the indexical theory of names. This is their argument that (17) is consistent with (18) because someone (like Thales) can know what each of two coreferential terms refers to, without knowing that the terms are coreferential. But it is not clear how a coherent Thales could know what 'Hesperus' referred to as well as what 'Phosphorus' referred to without knowing that they co-referred, if the meanings of the names are exhausted by their referents. What must Thales's knowledge of what these names refer to consist in, for it to be compossible with his ignorance of their coreference? It is not available to a direct reference theorist to explain this possibility by construing 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' as disguised descriptions, for a direct reference theorist maintains that they are rigid. In fact, when forced to elaborate on the nature of Thales's knowledge of what 'Hesperus' refers to, a direct reference theorist (especially one with a taste for conceptual economy) will tend to fall back on indexicality. For example, he will say that a coherent Thales can know that that object (pointing skyward) is the referent of 'Hesperus', and that that one (indicating a point in a photo graph of another clear night sky) is the referent of 'Phosphorus', without knowing that the referent of 'Hesperus' is the referent of 'Phosphorus'. And this is true. But the reason why it is true is that 'that' is an indexical, owing to which Thales can know the literal meaning of 'That object is the referent of "Hesperus"' without knowing its literal content. But on the standard direct reference theory of names, 'Hesperus' is not an indexical. Therefore, on the direct reference theory it must be in principle possible for Thales to know the literal meaning - and therefore (since 'Hesperus' is rigid, on the theory) the referent - of 'Hesperus' without having to employ indexical terms or concepts (just as it is possible to know or specify the literal meaning - and thereby the reference - of 'excellence' without recourse to indexicality). But in the face of such a case a direct reference theorist is left without any conceptually parsimonious characterization of what Thales's knowledge of what 'Hesperus' refers to consists in, such that it is possible for Thales coherently to know also what 'Phosphorus' refers to while remaining ignorant of the coreference of the two names. The only sure way to guard against such a case would be by claiming that 'Hesperus' is an indexical. For only granted that claim would it not be in principle possible for Thales to know the literal meaning of 'Hesperus' without having to employ indexical terms or concepts. Thus, fully developed, the best strategy a direct reference theorist has to explain the mutual consistency of (17) and (18) is to adopt the indexical theory of names.” (308-309)

Here, P & R provide a perfect explanation of why Millians should adopt their indexical view. Millians have trouble explaining how Thales, who knows the meanings of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', could fail to realize their co-reference. After all, on standard Millianism, knowing the referents of those names *wholly constitutes* understanding those names and being a competent user of them. If Thales knows the referents of the names, what explains why he fails

to recognize them as the same when presented by the different names? The standard Millian answer is that Thales takes Venus under different guises or modes of presentation when presented by different names. But the notion of guises is more of a gesture at an explanation than a genuine one. By contrast, the indexical theory of names gives a straightforward and simple explanation. Thales knows the character of the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', and is thus a competent user of the names, but fails to know the externalistic factors in virtue of which the names co-refer.

As P & R astutely point out above, if pressed to explain in concrete terms how Thales could be competent with the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' and still fail to realize they co-refer, standard Millians will typically resort to explanations that bring in indexicality, and this suggests that the phenomenon of Rational Inconsistent Belief arises because proper names are in fact indexicals in the first place. As P & R state it:

“... when forced to elaborate on the nature of Thales's knowledge of what 'Hesperus' refers to, a direct reference theorist (especially one with a taste for conceptual economy) will tend to fall back on indexicality. For example, he will say that a coherent Thales can know that that object (pointing skyward) is the referent of 'Hesperus', and that that one (indicating a point in a photo graph of another clear night sky) is the referent of 'Phosphorus', without knowing that the referent of 'Hesperus' is the referent of 'Phosphorus'. And this is true. But the reason why it is true is that 'that' is an indexical, owing to which Thales can know the literal meaning of 'That object is the referent of "Hesperus"' without knowing its literal content.” (309)

Although P & R furnish an elegant solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief (or as they term it, 'the problem of coherent inconsistency'), I believe that they exaggerate the capability of their theory to solve the puzzles—claiming that they can solve Frege's puzzles as well. This is due to their taking the problem of coherent inconsistency to represent the essence of Frege's puzzle. They write:

“Should someone object that we have misrepresented the puzzles by construing them as so many variants of what we have called the problem of coherent inconsistency, his objection would be very much to the point. However, we believe that the puzzles are instances of that more general problem, and we think that the order that begins to emerge in this field (where puzzles often seem to be a dime-a-dozen) when seen in light of the problem of coherent inconsistency is itself evidence that we are not misrepresenting them.” (311)

They claim here that the key to solving Frege’s puzzle begins (and perhaps ends) with a solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistency. But here I believe P & R have things wrong because this puzzle and Frege’s puzzles are distinct. While treating proper names as indexicals can explain why Lois Lane is not irrational for saying ‘Superman flies’ and ‘Clark Kent does not fly’,⁷⁹ it does not explain why (3) is (or at least seems) true while (4) is (or at least seems) false.

(3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

(4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

Since P & R are Millians under one definition of Millianism (because they hold that the content of either ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman’ is just Kent-Super), they must construe (4) as being literally true, since the names in the ‘that’-clauses of (3) and (4) have the same content, Kent-Super. To solve the Frege’s puzzles, we need a non-Millian theory of content that differentiates (3) from (4) in content and shows why (4) is false. Or, alternatively, we need the sort of Millian theory that explains why we have the powerful by erroneous intuition that (4) is false, as standard Millians try to provide (by arguing that ordinary speakers confuse semantics and pragmatics). P & R do

⁷⁹ Lois Lane cannot see that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ co-refer. What is apparent to her, what she “sees” is the character of these indexicals, but not their contents. The characters of the names are in her head, the content is not. Content is a function of dubbings-in-force, which are not in a speaker’s head. The contents of the names are hidden behind the guise of the character. P & R’s solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief if thus resembles the TIUT’s proposed solution, as discussed in section 2.8.

not provide either of these. We also need a theory that explains the difference in cognitive value between (1) and (2).

- (1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent
- (2) Clark Kent is Superman

P & R offer nothing to explain how these express different propositions. At most, they explain why the unenlightened Lois Lane may take them to express different propositions, why these have different cognitive value to her, and why she judges them to differ in truth-value. However, with respect to an *enlightened* speaker such as Olson who knows the names have the same referent, we need to explain why he strongly intuits that these sentences express different propositions. Olson, being enlightened, knows that the character of the indexicals 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' determine the same content; yet he still strongly intuits that (1) and (2) say completely different things. They have different cognitive value to him, even though he is not confused about their co-reference. Thus, while having solved the problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief, P & R have not solved Frege's puzzles.

CHAPTER 4

DESCRIPTIVISM

4.1 Classical Descriptivism: The Descriptivism of Frege and Russell

As I discussed already in section 1.1, classical Descriptivism, the view of Frege (1892) and Russell (1905), posits that the meaning of a proper name is equivalent to the meaning of a definite description. Furthermore, Descriptivism holds that these descriptive meanings are reference-determining. For example, the meaning of the name ‘Clark Kent’ might be expressed by the definite description the ‘mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet.’ The meaning of ‘Superman’ might be expressed by the definite description ‘the caped superhero that protects Metropolis’. The names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ would co-refer because these definite descriptions determine the same reference, i.e., they denote the same individual.⁸⁰ Descriptivism thus explains why (1) and (2) differ in cognitive value in Frege’s

⁸⁰ Some Descriptivists advocate a weaker form of Descriptivism. They maintain that a description or set of descriptions fixes the reference of a proper name, but they do not hold that that description (or set thereof) constitutes the name’s meaning. For example, such a Descriptivist might stipulate that the name ‘Aristotle’ shall refer to the greatest philosopher of antiquity and teacher of Alexander the Great. The reference of ‘Aristotle’ to Aristotle would be a function of Aristotle satisfying this description, and not on a causal-historical relation between ‘Aristotle’ and Aristotle himself as on a Kripkean causal-historical theory of reference. However, on this weaker Descriptivism, ‘Aristotle’ would not be *synonymous* with that definite description (or set thereof) in that speaker’s idiolect. Hence, one could not freely substitute a definite description into a sentence in place of the name whose reference it fixed without changing the meaning of a sentence. The sentences ‘Aristotle was fond of dogs’ and ‘The greatest philosopher of antiquity and teacher of Alexander the Great was fond of dogs’ would not express the same proposition. Kripke’s modal, epistemic, and semantic arguments against Descriptivism would not work against this weaker version of Descriptivism in quite the same way as it does against the stronger versions. This weaker form of Descriptivism is really a theory of reference-fixing and not a theory of content. In fact, a proponent of this weaker form of Descriptivism could be a Millian with respect to content, holding that the content of a proper name is whoever the name refers to. In this section, and in the subsequent sections in which I discuss Descriptivism and Kripke’s arguments against it, I take Descriptivism to be exclusively the stronger version and set

puzzle about identity sentences. Sentence (1) would be uninteresting and uninformative because it would express the trivial and obviously true proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet. Sentence (2) would be interesting and informative because it would express the non-trivial and non-obviously true proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the caped superhero that protects Metropolis.

Descriptivism also claims to furnish a solution to Frege's puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions, although the details of the Russellian and Fregean solutions differ significantly. (I'll prescind from those differences in the discussion that follows and state the descriptivist solution in a generic and simplified way, given that Kripke's influential critique of Descriptivism applies in equal measure to all variants of Descriptivism). According to Descriptivism, ascription sentences (5) and (6)

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent can fly

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman can fly

would mean the same as (5)^{desc} and (6)^{desc} respectively.

(5)^{desc} Lois Lane believes that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet can fly.

(6)^{desc} Lois Lane believes that the superhero that protects Metropolis can fly.

aside any discussion of the weaker version. In this dissertation, I am principally concerned with the content of proper names, not the theory of reference. The TIUT has Kripke's causal-historical theory of reference as a touchstone, but it is potentially compatible with various theories of reference. Furthermore, the weaker reference-fixing version of Descriptivism is uninteresting because it suggests no solution to Frege's puzzle.

Clearly, (5)^{desc} and (6)^{desc} express different propositions, with the former being false and the latter true. It follows that (5) and (6), which mean the same as (5)^{desc} and (6)^{desc}, differ in truth-value as well. Just as (5)^{desc} and (6)^{desc} attribute distinct beliefs to Lois Lane, so do (5) and (6).⁸¹

Descriptivism also offers a solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistency (see section 1.2). On Descriptivism, (1) expresses a different proposition from (2), and (3) a different proposition from (4). Hence, in believing that Clark Kent is Clark Kent and disbelieving that Clark Kent is Superman, Lois Lane does not believe and disbelieve the same proposition. She does not simultaneously believe the inconsistent propositions PROP-1 and \neg PROP-1 (i.e., *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* and *that Kent-Super is not Kent-Super*) as Millians maintain. Instead, she believes *one* descriptive proposition and disbelieves a *different* descriptive proposition. Likewise, her believing that Superman can fly and Clark Kent cannot fly is tantamount to her believing that the superhero that protects Metropolis can fly but a mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet cannot.

Until the 1960's, classical Frege-Russell Descriptivism (modified somewhat by 'cluster' theories of Descriptivism⁸²) was largely unquestionably accepted as providing the gold standard

⁸¹ This characterization of Descriptivism's solution to the propositional attitude ascription puzzle is simplified and it does not reflect the details of Frege's solution to the puzzle. As mentioned in a footnote in section 1.1, Frege has a reference shift theory whereby the words in the 'that'-clause refer to their senses (instead of expressing them), so that a propositional attitude ascription reports the belief relation between an agent and the proposition referred to by the 'that'-clause. The idea is that (5) and (6) can differ in truth-value because some of the singular terms occurring in them—to wit, their 'that'-clauses, including the proper names occurring within them, differ in reference.

⁸² According 'Cluster Descriptivism', associated with Wittgenstein (1953), John Searle (1958), and Peter Strawson (1959), a name would be associated with a cluster of definite descriptions, rather than a single definite description as on classical Frege-Russell Descriptivism (Cumming, § 2.3). For example, a speaker might associate the name 'Albert Einstein' with the cluster of definite descriptions 'the discoverer of the theory of relativity', 'the most famous Scientist of the 20th Century', and 'the winner of the Nobel Prize for explaining the mechanism of Brownian

for addressing Frege's puzzle. However, several philosophers began to criticize it beginning in the 1960's. The most significant and comprehensive critique of Descriptivism came in 1970's with Kripke's Naming and Necessity. Many of Kripke's criticisms of Descriptivism reflected the influence of ideas discussed by other philosophers in the previous decade, including John Searle, Hilary Putnam, Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan, Ruth Barcan Marcus, *et alia*. Kripke made three principal arguments against Descriptivism that have come to be called the Modal Argument, the Epistemic argument, and the Semantic argument. I set out these arguments in brief below. I also touch on Kripke's alternate theory of reference, the causal-historical picture of reference, which he intended to replace Descriptivism's picture of reference. Finally, I discuss and criticize three modern variants of Descriptivism: Rigidified Descriptivism, Causal Descriptivism, and Metalinguistic Descriptivism. I argue that these modern versions of Descriptivism are inadequate to solve the puzzles, just as Frege-Russell classical Descriptivism was.

4.2 Kripke's Arguments against Descriptivism

Descriptivism has been subjected to withering criticism since the early 1970's and few philosophers ascribe to it today. The most comprehensive critique of Descriptivism came in 1970 with the delivery by Saul Kripke of a series of lectures, which were eventually transcribed and published as the book Naming and Necessity in 1980.

Descriptivism had become the most widely accepted theory of proper names around the

motion'. 'Albert Einstein' would refer to whomever is the denotation of the majority (or weighted majority) of the definite descriptions in the cluster associated with it, even if some of the associated definite descriptions denoted other individuals or failed to denote any individual at all. Cluster Descriptivism is vulnerable in equal measure to Kripke's argument against Descriptivism as is classical Frege-Russell Descriptivism.

turn of the twentieth century, mainly because Frege's puzzle, first discussed in Frege's 1892, seemed to show that Millianism was false. (See the two *reductio* arguments against Millianism in the introduction and chapter one, *supra*). Descriptivism also appeared to provide an answer to the problem of empty and fictional names. See *infra* at section 4.4 for brief discussion of the problem of empty and fictional names.

Despite the promise that Descriptivism seemed to hold to solve these difficult problems—Frege's puzzles and the problem of empty and fictional names—Kripke (1980) made three powerful arguments against Descriptivism—the *Modal Argument*, the *Epistemic Argument*, and the *Semantic Argument*, a.k.a. 'the argument from ignorance and error.' These arguments demonstrated that Descriptivism was highly implausible. Although Kripke showed that Descriptivism was highly implausible, he did not thereby show that Millianism was correct. Kripke himself has never stated that he is a Millian. But in the wake of his successful arguments against Descriptivism, many philosophers have become Millians.

4.2.1 The Modal Argument (N & N: 48-49, 71-77)

Kripke's modal argument against Descriptivism (1980, 22 *et seq.*) can be summarized as follows:

- (a) A proper name is a **rigid designator** (Kripke, 1980), meaning it designates the same individual/object in all possible worlds.
- (b) An ordinary definite description is not a rigid designator. It does not denote the same individual/object in every possible world.⁸³ (For the present, ignore the complication that

⁸³ Ordinary definite descriptions such as 'the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville who works for the Daily Planet' and 'the superhero that protects Metropolis' are non-rigid designators. To see this, suppose that there is an alternate world w^2 in which Kent-Super never leaves the planet Krypton. Some other individual from Krypton, say, Kent-Super's cousin Ziggy, comes to earth and protects Metropolis while hiding his identity as a reporter for the Daily Planet. With respect to w^2 , those definite descriptions (as used in the actual world) designate to Ziggy, not Kent-

rigidified definite descriptions are rigid designators; this complication is discussed in section 4.5 *infra*).

- (c) If one expression *a* is a rigid designator and another expression *b* is not a rigid designator, then *a* and *b* do not have the same meaning.
-
- (d) Therefore, the meaning of a proper name cannot be equivalent to the meaning of a definite description.

The current philosophical consensus accepts Kripke's claim that proper names are rigid designators. Some modern defenders of Descriptivism impugn the modal argument not by denying that proper names are rigid designators, but rather by arguing that the meaning of a proper name is equivalent to the meaning of a *rigidified* definite description (or cluster thereof) that fixes the name's referent according to properties the referent bears in the *actual world*. Hence, they argue that the modal argument does not show that Descriptivism is incorrect, full stop, only that a Descriptivism on which the definite descriptions are not rigidified is defective. However, rigidified Descriptivism is nevertheless not an adequate theory of proper names. It is vulnerable to Kripke's Epistemic and Semantic arguments. Rigidified Descriptivism discussed *infra* in section 4.5.

4.2.2 The Epistemic Argument (N & N: 86-87)

Consider sentence (a), which expresses a proposition knowable *a priori*:

- (a) If Superman exists, then Superman is Superman.

Now suppose that Descriptivism were true and 'Superman' meant the same as the definite description 'the superhero that protects Metropolis'. We should be able to substitute this definite

Super, in w^2 . If these definite descriptions were rigid designators, they would designate Kent-Super in every world.

description for any of the occurrences of ‘Superman’ in the sentence above and the new sentence (containing the substitution) should express the same proposition as before. For example, substituting this definite description for the third occurrence of ‘Superman’ would yield the sentence (b), below, which should express the same proposition as (a):

(b) If Superman exists, then Superman is the superhero that protects Metropolis.

If (a) and (b) express the same proposition, as Descriptivism claims they would, then they should have the same epistemological status—both *a priori*. However, here is the problem. Whereas (a) is clearly knowable *a priori*, (b) is not. Intuitively, sentence (b) expresses an *a posteriori* proposition. We find out that Superman is the superhero that protects Metropolis empirically, not by conceptual reasoning. Because they differ in epistemological status, sentence (a) and (b) cannot express the same proposition. So, the definite description ‘the superhero that protects Metropolis’ and the name ‘Superman’ do not mean the same thing, and therefore, Descriptivism is false.

4.2.3 The Semantic Argument (N & N: 78-86)

The Semantic Argument (Kripke, 1980, 83 *et seq.*) is also known as ‘the argument from ignorance and error’ (Devitt and Sterelny 1999, 54). Consider first the argument from error. Consider a name you are competent with using, and count as understanding, like ‘Albert Einstein.’ But suppose that you erroneously associated the name ‘Albert Einstein’ with the definite description ‘the inventor of the atomic bomb.’ The inventor of the atomic bomb (or at least the person who ran the team that developed it) was in fact J. Robert Oppenheimer. The definite description ‘the inventor of the atomic bomb’ in fact picks out J. Robert Oppenheimer,

not Einstein. Now suppose that Descriptivism were true. According to Descriptivism, the name ‘Albert Einstein,’ tokened on this instance, would refer to Oppenheimer and not Einstein, the reference of a proper name being determined by the definite description associated with it. But this is a very counterintuitive consequence of Descriptivism. Intuitively, you refer to Einstein when you utter ‘Albert Einstein.’ It’s just that you have a false belief about him. Your false belief does not prevent you from referring to him, or mean that you refer to someone else. Thus, associating the correct descriptive information with a proper name cannot be required for competence with the name.

Now I shall briefly discuss the argument from ignorance. Again, consider a name you are competent with using, and count as understanding, like ‘Albert Einstein.’ Suppose you are unable to associate a single uniquely identifying definite description with a proper name in his or her lexicon. Many speakers could at most associate ‘Albert Einstein,’ a name with which they are familiar (a name in their lexicon), with the *indefinite* description *a scientist*. Even the description *scientist named ‘Albert Einstein’* is indefinite (not uniquely denoting) if there is more than one scientist in the world named ‘Albert Einstein.’ Yet, intuitively, despite you not associating any uniquely identifying definite descriptions with ‘Albert Einstein,’ you still refer to Albert Einstein upon uttering ‘Albert Einstein.’ We do not want to say that ‘Albert Einstein’ has no reference for you just because the descriptions you associate with the name do not pick anyone out uniquely. After all, a speaker completely ignorant about Albert Einstein might utter “I wonder who Albert Einstein was” and he or she would refer to Albert Einstein in this utterance (and say of Einstein that he wishes he knew more about *him*). If descriptivism were true, this person would not refer to anyone at all with ‘Albert Einstein’ and would not express a complete proposition in uttering this sentence (since the name would be empty).

According to Kripke, possession of uniquely identifying accurate descriptive beliefs about the referent of a proper name is not a requirement for one to be competent to use a name to refer successfully. Instead, successfully referring by uttering a proper name depends on a causal-historical link between the utterance of a name token and the referent itself. Kripke thus develops the causal historical picture of reference, which I characterize briefly below.

4.3 Kripke's Causal-Historical Picture of Reference (N & N: 88-97)

On Kripke's view, a speaker refers to Richard Feynman by uttering 'Richard Feynman' in virtue of the existence of a causal-historical chain connecting the utterance of the name with the actual flesh-and-blood man, Feynman. The reference of the name 'Richard Feynman' was fixed in an act of dubbing or in a "baptismal ceremony" by a speaker (presumably one or both of his parents) who was in causal contact with him and introduced the name to refer to him. The name was fixed to its bearer, Richard Feynman, by a reference-fixing description, by an act of ostension, or a combination thereof. For example, Feynman's parents might have fixed the name to him by looking at him as a newborn and thinking or saying aloud something like *let the name 'Richard' be used for this, our newly born son, in front of us now*. Although this description fixes the referent, attaching the name 'Richard' to the individual, the description is not the meaning of the name. After the name is fixed to its bearer, the name is transmitted by this original dubber *via* a causal chain of communication to other individuals who do not need to know the reference-fixing description or act of ostension that was used to fix the name in order to acquire competence with the name. Speakers downstream along the chain of communication acquire the name 'Richard Feynman' when they hear utterances of it by other members of the language community (who in turn had heard the name from others, such that there is a chain of

name transmission tied to the original act of dubbing and the individual dubbed with the name), provided that each speaker in the chain has the intention of using the name with the same reference as the speaker from whom he picked up the name. None of these speakers need any information about reference-fixing descriptions or acts of ostension, nor do they need to know anything about who fixed the name's reference or how it was fixed to be competent with the name. Furthermore, no speaker needs to possess any uniquely denoting descriptive information about Richard Feynman, and he may even associate incorrect descriptions with the name, and he will nevertheless refer to Feynman when uttering the name. As Kripke states it:

“Someone, let's say a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard Feynman in the market place or somewhere, may be referring to Richard Feynman [through his use of name 'Richard Feynman'] even though he can't remember from whom he first heard of Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman. ...A certain passage of communication reaching ultimately to the man himself does reach the speaker. He then is referring to Feynman even though he can't identify him uniquely. He doesn't know what a Feynman diagram is ...Not only that: he'd have trouble distinguishing between Feynman and Gell-Mann. So he doesn't have to know these things, but, instead, a chain of communication going back to Feynman himself has been established, by virtue of his membership in a community which passed the name on from link to link, not by a ceremony that he makes in private in his study: 'By "Feynman" I shall mean the man who did such and such and such and such'.” (91-2)

...

“A rough statement of a theory might be the following: An initial 'baptism' takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is 'passed from link to link', the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard it. If I hear the name 'Napoleon' and decide it would be a nice name for my pet aardvark, I do not satisfy this condition. ...” (97)

A speaker's utterance 'Richard Feynman' or 'Albert Einstein' or any name whatsoever is a link on the causal chain provided that each speaker acquiring the name intends to refer to whomever the individual from whom he or she learned the name referred to when uttering the

name. The speaker acquiring the name ‘borrows the reference’ of the person from whom s/he acquired the name. Again, no speaker on the chain requires uniquely identifying information about the name’s bearer to refer to him, provided that the tokening of the name is ultimately causally linked to bearer in the right sort of way and grounded in the bearer in an act of reference-fixing.

Kripke recognizes that his proposal is not a full theory of reference. He called it a “picture” of reference (1980, 93). There are several difficulties with the picture. First, suppose a speaker—call him “Eugene,” whose use of the name ‘Albert Einstein’ is causally-historically connected to Albert Einstein in the correct sort of way (e.g., he picked up the name from a friend from whom he fully intended to borrow the reference), erroneously believes that ‘Albert Einstein’ is the name of a mountain in Switzerland and utters “I want to climb Albert Einstein one day.” Has Eugene referred to Albert Einstein here? Has Eugene stated that he wants to *climb a man*? One could answer that, yes, Eugene stated he wanted to climb a man, and specifically, he wanted to climb Albert Einstein, the scientist. One could also answer that, no, Eugene is not a competent user of ‘Albert Einstein’ because his confusion about Einstein’s fundamental or essential properties is too extreme. Some philosophers have suggested that perhaps a speaker needs to conceive of the referent under the right general sortal concept for reference to go through. That is, to avoid reference failure, a speaker must know the general kind of object a name designates. For example, you would have to realize Einstein is a human and not a mountain to refer to him by uttering ‘Einstein.’

Here’s another worry for the causal picture: the reference of a name can sometimes shift from one object to another, even if it is transmitted in a casual chain with each speaker in the chain intending to borrow its reference. This should not be possible under Kripke’s theory, since

he provides that acquiring a name with the intent to refer to the same object and the person from whom the name is borrowed is supposed to be sufficient for preservation of reference. Evans (1973) cites as an example the name 'Madagascar.' It originally referred to some part of the African mainland, but at some point, it shifted its reference to the large island off Africa's east Coast we now call 'Madagascar'. Here, we have an example of a reference shift among an entire language community. It seems that such a reference shift could also occur for a single speaker. For example, suppose that the name 'Albert Einstein' entered my lexicon after I picked up the term from another speaker who clearly and unambiguously used the expression to refer to the Albert Einstein, the scientist who discovered the theory of relativity. I intend to borrow the reference from this speaker. But I come to believe in error that the speaker was using the name to refer to the pioneering Soviet Russian film director and film theorist with a somewhat similar name, 'Sergei Eisenstein.' For years after first pick up the name 'Albert Einstein,' I absorb information about Eisenstein and associate this information with the name 'Albert Einstein.' Every time I utter 'Albert Einstein' I intend to refer to a Russian film director. Meanwhile, I hear nothing about the scientist and am completely unaware that 'Albert Einstein' is standardly used to refer to a scientist. If I utter one day 'There is an Albert Einstein festival playing at Film Forum,' and there is in fact an Eisenstein festival playing there, have I expressed a true or false proposition? Have I uttered a false proposition about Albert Einstein, or have I uttered a true proposition about Sergei Eisenstein and merely mispronounced his name? Or should we say that 'Albert Einstein' is a name for 'Sergei Eisenstein' in my idiolect and I have referred to Eisenstein by uttering 'Albert Einstein'? Or have I referred to both men at the same time and hence uttered two different propositions simultaneously, one true and one false? Or am I just so confused that I have failed to express a complete proposition at all?

I am skeptical that the question about Einstein/Eisenstein can be answered on any non-arbitrary basis, which suggests to me that reference may well be an *indeterminate* matter under certain circumstances: to wit, when the causal-historical properties of a name and the descriptive properties a speaker associates with it, on a particular utterance, clash radically. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with our notion of reference *in general*: there is after all no problem with the notion of gender just because there are cases of inter-gender individuals (where it is indeterminate whether the individual is male or female). Indeterminacy is a widespread phenomenon, found wherever and whenever we divide up the world into categories and classifications. We do not and should not throw out these categories and classifications every time we encounter indeterminacy, and so likewise we should not abandon the notion of reference. Reference is clearly a real phenomenon notwithstanding indeterminacy in outlier cases.

I believe that one should, at a minimum, accept the follow lesson about reference from Kripke: the reference of proper names is at least partially *relational* and cannot be purely *satisfactional*. These terms are due to Kent Bach (1987, 12). On a purely *satisfactional* theory of reference such as Descriptivism, reference *via* utterance of a name obtains in virtue of the agent having accurate and uniquely identifying beliefs about the referent (though some subset of the beliefs might be false on some variants of Descriptivism, such as the cluster theory). By contrast, according to a purely *relational* theory of reference (as a purely Kripkean causal-historical theory would be), reference is not a function of *any* of the agent's beliefs about the properties of the referent. On a purely relational theory of reference, an agent refers by uttering a proper name without regard as to whether the agent has any beliefs whatsoever about the referent and without regard to whether any beliefs he may have are true or false. Reference would go

through (i.e., not fail) whenever there is the right sort of causal-historical connection between the referent and the speaker's utterance, full stop. I take Kripke's arguments against Descriptivism to have made an excellent case for the proposition that reference is at least *largely* relational (i.e., not purely satisfactual). On the other hand, I believe that successfully referring requires the agent to have *some* accurate beliefs about the referent (and be free of certain grossly inaccurate beliefs). For example, a condition of successful reference would be for the speaker not to hold wildly incorrect beliefs about the referent, especially when those beliefs concern its essential properties. In no possible world is Albert Einstein a mountain in Switzerland or an abstract object. A speaker who believed that 'Albert Einstein' referred to a mountain in Switzerland or an abstract object would probably fail to refer altogether in uttering 'Albert Einstein.' However, perhaps there is a nearby possible world in which Albert Einstein is female, such that a speaker who erroneously associated the property of being a woman with 'Albert Einstein' would successfully refer to Albert Einstein in uttering 'Albert Einstein.' The boundary between essential and inessential properties (assuming the distinction is cogent) would be hard to draw, and any such boundary might be fuzzy. Furthermore, there might be no *specific* set of descriptive information that a speaker would need to associate with a name for reference to go through: whether a speaker refers using a proper name might be highly context sensitive. Moreover, the predicate 'refers' might be *vague*, such that there would be no sharp boundary between cases of referring and non-referring, only matters of degree of reference success/failure.

I need not resolve these problems here. I am not developing a theory of reference in this dissertation but rather a theory of content, which is potentially compatible with many various theories of reference. In developing this theory of content, I will bracket problems with the notion of reference and leave them for the theory of reference. I do not commit myself to any

theory or reference except insofar as I reject Descriptivism or any purely satisfactional theory of reference. I presuppose a post-Descriptivist picture of reference that is at least partially relational along Kripkean lines. Specifically, I make the reference of a proper name a function of the subjecthood of the dossier from which the name was drawn, and the subjecthood is a (largely) causal-historical property. If it turned out that environmental factors other than causal-historical ones were partially determinative of reference, then these could be incorporated into the notion of dossier subjecthood, and these factors would be contextual factors picked up by names used in a Millian and Conception-indicating way. In other words, as our understanding of reference changes and improves, the TIUT can simply incorporate that improved notion of reference into its notion of dossier subjecthood (as long as that notion were sufficient for rigidity), without requiring a re-working of the TIUT.⁸⁴

4.4 The Problem of Empty and Fictional Names

Another worry for Kripke's causal-historical picture of reference is the problem of empty and fictional names. It is not possible to be in causal contact with Santa Claus, since he does not exist and only existent objects can enter into causal relations. What, according to Kripke, does 'Santa Claus' refer to when there no object whatsoever causally linked to the name? If 'Santa Claus' and other empty or fictional names do not refer, then they contribute nothing to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur. It follows that sentences containing empty or fictional proper names would fail to express complete propositions, resulting in truth-value gaps.

The problem of empty and fictional is a problem for any Millian theory (even a Millian

⁸⁴ If some of the speaker's beliefs about the bearer were partially determinative of reference, this would make proper names more like demonstratives, rather than pure indexicals.

theory on which the reference of proper names is not explained along the lines of Kripke's causal-historical picture). On Millianism, the meaning of a proper name is completely exhausted by its bearer. A proper name without a bearer would be completely meaningless. On Millianism the occurrence of the empty/non-referring name 'Santa Claus' in the sentence 'Santa Claus does not exist' would seem to entail that the sentence expresses an incomplete proposition and lacks truth-value. If 'Santa Claus' failed to refer, the sentence would express a proposition of the form: $\langle \text{_____, } non\text{-existence} \rangle$ ('Santa Claus' has no referent, so it contributes nothing to the proposition). But obviously—according to the reasoning of Russell—the sentence is both meaningful and expresses a true proposition. After all, Santa Claus *does not* exist. (Frege, unlike Russell, thought the sentence was meaningful, i.e., expressed a sense, but denied that it had a truth-value). Furthermore, on Millianism, the sentence 'Pegasus does not exist' would also express a proposition of the form: $\langle \text{_____, } non\text{-existence} \rangle$. But clearly, the sentences 'Santa Claus does not exist' and 'Pegasus does not exist' do not express the *same* proposition as Millianism seems to entail. So, Frege and Russell believed, Millianism had to be false. Both Frege and Russell developed versions of Descriptivism, which they thought would address the problem.⁸⁵

Some philosophers, e.g., Jerrold Katz (1994), have defended Descriptivism by claiming that any causal-historical theory of reference along Kripkean lines and/or any Millian theory of proper names will offer no plausible answer to the problem of empty/fictional names. Like Frege and Russell, Katz believed that Descriptivism (by contrast with Millianism) would solve the problem of empty and fictional names. On Frege and Russell's versions of Descriptivism, the

⁸⁵ Braun (1993) claims that sentences such as 'Santa Claus does not exist' express "gappy propositions," propositions of the form: $\langle \text{_____, } does\ not\ exist \rangle$. A difficulty with the view is that 'Santa Claus does not exist' and 'Pegasus does not exist' would express the same gappy proposition. But intuitively, these sentences make different claims.

sentence ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ would express a complete proposition. On a Fregean spirited version of Descriptivism, the sentence would mean something like ‘The toy-giving red-suit wearing man living at the North Pole does not exist.’ Although the sentence lacks a truth-value because the name lacks a referent (since the definite description whose meaning is equivalent to the meaning of the name ‘Santa Claus’ fails to denote an object⁸⁶), a Fregean spirited Descriptivist can at least explain why the sentence is meaningful: the description *the toy-giving red-suit wearing man living at the North Pole* has a sense (*Sinn*); so the sentence ‘The toy-giving red-suit wearing man living at the North Pole does not exist’ despite being neither true nor false (Morris, 52), is at least meaningful and expresses a Fregean proposition. Russell’s version of Descriptivism handles the problem of empty and fictional names somewhat more neatly than Frege’s, for on Russell’s version there is no truth-value gap (Morris, 60-61). On Russell’s version, ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ would mean the same (roughly) as the sentence ‘there is nothing that is a man, gives toys, wears a red suit, and lives at the North Pole.’

However, Descriptivism’s proposed solution to the problem of empty names (on either Frege’s or Russell’s version) fails to solve the problem. To see why, suppose that there were, by sheer coincidence, two legends that use the name ‘Santa Claus’ to talk about a toy-giving man living at the North Pole. Two children, Jan and Joan, being only superficially conversant with the details of the legends, associate identical descriptive information with ‘Santa Claus.’ Jan’s use of ‘Santa Claus’ stems from hearing one legend, and Joan’s use stems from hearing the other legend. Jan and Joan both utter: ‘I hope Santa Claus brings me lots of toys this year.’ Intuitively, Jan and Joan are talking about different things, expressing their gift-getting desires vis-à-vis different mythical characters. However, on both Frege and Russell’s versions of

⁸⁶ Here, I am assuming Frege’s theory to be a kind of Descriptivism. As noted previously, this is controversial, but the issue is immaterial to my argument in this dissertation.

Descriptivism, Jan and Joan express the same proposition in uttering this sentence, for they associate identical descriptions with the name ‘Santa Claus.’ Descriptivism predicts incorrectly that Jan and Joan are speaking about receiving toys from the same mythical character, when they are not. Consider the fictional detective Sherlock Holmes. We can refer to a character that is not merely descriptively like Holmes, but to the specific character that appears in a certain literary tradition/corpus linked to Conan Doyle. If another author, Jones, had coincidentally written a novel about a brilliant detective named ‘Sherlock Holmes’ living on Baker Street in London, and speaker *A*, familiar with the Jones character but ignorant of the Conan Doyle literary corpus used the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the sentence ‘I wish I had the crime-solving abilities of Sherlock Holmes,’ intuitively he would not express the same proposition as another speaker, *B*, who uttered the same sentence but who was familiar only with the Conan Doyle literary corpus. The speakers would express different propositions even if the descriptive beliefs they associated with the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ were identical.

Kripke’s causal-historical picture of reference, or at least a modified version of it, would have an advantage over Descriptivism in explaining some of the phenomena cited in the above paragraph. We can adapt the causal-historical picture of reference to explain why *A* and speaker *B* refer to different fictional characters when they utter the name ‘Sherlock Holmes.’ *A* and *B* were *in causal contact* with different literary corpuses when the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ entered their respective lexicons—corpuses that can be causally traced back causal-historically to the different writers who created the different fictional characters, and therefore, to the source of the fictional characters themselves. In the case of Santa Claus, one might argue that the name ‘Santa Claus’ refers to Santa Claus not because of a causal connection between a dubber and the actual

Santa Claus (there is no such flesh and blood person⁸⁷) but because the person uttering the name ‘Santa Claus’ is linked by a causal chain to the person who originated/created the fictional work/myth and his act of creation and transmitting the myth to others either orally or in writing. The initial baptism by the author/creator of the legend would proceed by a reference-fixing definite description, which would refer to a fictional entity concretely instantiated in the token brain state of its creator. Thus, the reference of Santa Claus would be causally grounded in a particular brain state constituting the act of creation of the character. This is of course only a sketch of a view, and it does nothing to resolve the question of the ontological status of fictional characters.

In agreement with a growing body of literature on empty and fictional names (see Kroon 2011), I take the thesis that these so-called empty names fail to refer at all to be highly implausible. Salmon (1998) and Soames (2002, 89-95) have argued forcefully against the notion that (most) empty names lack referents. The intuitive and correct view, I believe, is that fictional/mythical names refer to mythical or fictional characters/objects. ‘Santa Claus does not exist’ means that Santa Claus is not *real*—that he is fictional/mythical. But Santa Claus *is* something—he is a mythical/fictional character. Nevertheless, the metaphysical status of fictional/mythical characters or objects is mysterious. Are they abstract objects, non-existent concrete particulars, or some other sort of entity? If fictional characters are abstract objects, how do our physical brains interact with them, and how can we know about them? This is a difficult and thorny metaphysical issue that can be bracketed. I shall not delve further into this issue here. Whatever the correct and complete theory of reference turns out to be, that theory can be incorporated into the notion of dossier subjecthood, the precise nature of which we can leave

⁸⁷ Here, ignore the fact that St. Nicholas was a real person vaguely connected to the fictional character Santa Claus in the story told to children.

open.

4.5 Rigidified Descriptivism

Some Descriptivists (e.g., Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 1996, 70-74) have suggested defusing Kripke's Modal Argument by proposing that the meanings of proper names are equivalent to the meanings of *rigidified* definite descriptions (or clusters thereof). They contend that this modified version of Descriptivism addresses Kripke's modal argument. Consider the rigidified description 'the actual superhero that protects Metropolis.' This rigidified description, as used in the actual world, designates Kent-Super in every possible world in which he exists, even in those in which he is not the superhero protector of Metropolis. Hence, some philosophers have remained unconvinced that Kripke's modal argument has undermined Descriptivism and maintain that the meaning of a proper name is equivalent to a rigidified reference-fixing definite description.

However, rigidified descriptivism is still vulnerable to Kripke's Epistemic and Semantic arguments. To see why, consider sentence (a) and (b). (b) differs from (a) in that we have substituted into (b) a rigidified definite description picking out Superman in place of the second occurrence of 'Superman' in (a).

- (a) If Superman exists, then Superman is Superman
- (b) If Superman exists, then Superman is the actual superhero that protects Metropolis.

Here, we see that (a) and (b) differ in epistemological status, with (a) expressing an *a priori* proposition and (b) expressing an (intuitively) *a posteriori* proposition. The fact that (a) and (b) intuitively differ in epistemological status shows by *reductio* that (a) and (b) cannot mean the

same thing. Thus, the rigidification of the definite description does not blunt the force of Kripke's epistemic argument against descriptivism.

Nor does it blunt the force Kripke's semantic argument against Descriptivism, for rather obvious reasons. Whether the descriptions are non-rigid or rigid, either way there will be cases in which agents are ignorant of the descriptions constituting the meaning of a name, or associate erroneous descriptions with a name, and yet, intuitively, still manage to refer when uttering that name.

4.6 Causal Descriptivism

According to Causal Descriptivism, the meaning of an utterance of proper name 'NN' is equivalent to the description 'the individual/object that bears relation R to this utterance of 'NN'', where R represents the causal relation that fixes the reference of utterances of 'NN'.⁸⁸ Causal Descriptivism is designed to be immune to the critique that Kripke directed at Descriptivism via his Modal, Epistemic, and Semantic arguments, as described above. David Lewis (1984), Frederick Kroon (1987), and Frank Jackson (1998), have proposed preliminary sketches of Causal Descriptivist theories, though none of them has worked out the details precisely to elaborate a full-fledged theory.

On Causal Descriptivism, the meaning of an utterance of 'Clark Kent' would be *the individual/object bearing relation R to this very utterance of 'Clark Kent,'* and the meaning of 'Superman' would be *the individual/object bearing relation R to this very utterance of 'Superman.'* Causal Descriptivism seems to solve Frege's puzzle about identity sentences because (1) and (2) would express different propositions. Sentence (1):

⁸⁸ This way of stating it is due to Lewis (1984).

(1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent

would express the uninformative, tautological, and trivial proposition that the individual/object bearing relation R to this very utterance 'Clark Kent' is the individual/object bearing relation R this very utterance 'Clark Kent.' Sentence (2):

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

would express the informative and non-tautological proposition that the individual/object bearing relation R to this very utterance 'Clark Kent' is the individual/object bearing relation R this very utterance 'Superman.' Since the same individual, Kent-Super, is the individual bearing the relation R to the speakers' utterances of both names (since Kent-Super is causally connected to both utterances in the right sort of way [although via different causal chains], as sketched under a causal theory of reference in accord with Kripke's causal-historical picture), on Causal Descriptivism sentences (1) and (2) would express distinct propositions. Yet they would both be true because in both (1) and (2) Kent-Super bears relation R to both utterances, and Kent-Super is Kent-Super.

However, Causal Descriptivism lacks the resources to solve the puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. Consider sentence $\neg(4)$ as uttered by Jimmy Olson to describe Lois' ignorance of the fact that Clark Kent is Superman.

$\neg(4)$ Lois Lane disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman

On Causal Descriptivism, (4) would mean the same as $\neg(4)^{CD}$:

$\neg(4)^{CD}$ Lois disbelieves that the individual/object bearing relation R to this very utterance

‘Clark Kent’ is the individual/object bearing relation R to this very utterance ‘Superman’

Problematically, $\neg (4)^{CD}$ does not capture what Lois fails to realize about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. Suppose that Jimmy Olson uttered $\neg (4)$ outside of Lois’ presence. She could therefore have no opinion whatsoever about the causes of Olson’s utterances of ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ How could she? She did not hear Olson’s utterance, so how can she have any beliefs regarding whether the utterance took place, what caused his utterances of the names, or whether these utterances of the names bear the same relation R to their bearers. Nevertheless, clearly $\neg (4)$ is true. We might sum this up problem for causal descriptivism by saying that they render propositional attitude ascriptions ‘too autobiographical’: the ascriber’s utterance of the ascription sentence, ostensibly about *Lois’* beliefs, are really (at least in part) about the *ascriber himself* and the causal relationship of *his own* utterances to the bearer of the name. Causal Descriptivism appears especially implausible when the ascriber does not know that the ascriber exists. For example, suppose Ralph, an ordinary citizen of the US unknown to President Obama, utters “Obama believes ISIS is dangerous.” On Causal Descriptivism Ralph has said that Obama believes that the cause of his (Ralph’s) utterance ‘ISIS’ is dangerous. The ascription sentence is too autobiographical—it is about Ralph and the causal relationship between Ralph’s utterance of the name ‘ISIS’ and ISIS. Obama has no belief about which objects or individuals cause Ralph’s utterances nor what properties those objects or individuals have. Obama has no idea who Ralph is or even that he exists. Yet, the ascription sentence Ralph utters, “Obama believes that ISIS is dangerous,” is true nonetheless. This shows, by *reductio*, that Causal Descriptivism is false.

Furthermore, Causal Descriptivism is too metalinguistic to be an adequate theory of

proper names. Consider Jennifer Saul's (1998) critique of metalinguistic theories of proper names involving a story in which a woman named Nicole never learns either the names 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman' yet forms the opinion, after meeting Kent-Superman in both personas (without realizing she had met the same individual), that Clark Kent is boring and drab, but Superman is witty and urbane. On Causal Descriptivism, the true ascriptions sentence, as uttered by Olson, "Lois believes that Superman is witty and urbane but Clark Kent is not," would mean the same as "Lois Lane believes that the cause of Olson's utterance 'Clark Kent' is boring, but that the cause of Olson's utterance 'Superman' is witty and urbane." Nicole cannot have any beliefs about the causes of Olson's utterances of 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' because she does not even recognize the names 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman.' She has never heard these names and they mean nothing to her.

Devitt (1996) proposes a superficially similar theory (although his theory is not a species of Descriptivism) on which the meaning of a proper name 'NN' that refers to object *o* is the property of referring to *o* via a d-chain *d*, where *d* is a causal chain involving tokens of 'NN' causal-historically traceable back to the baptism of *o* with the name 'NN.' 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' would have different meanings because they are causally connected to Kent-Super by different d-chains. Devitt claims that speakers need not have beliefs (even tacit beliefs) about these d-chains, so speakers need not (and in most cases will not) know the meanings of the names they understand and use competently (and this is the prime reason why Devitt's theory must be classified as non-Descriptivist). Devitt thinks that the fierce resistance to the claim that names have might have meanings unknown to the speakers who use them and are competent with them is attributable to a "ubiquitous Cartesianism about meaning." Devitt explains (2012):

".... clearly, the name's reference must be determined somehow, presumably causally in something like the way that Kripke sketched. So the name must have some sort of causal

mode of reference. So perhaps that mode is the meaning. This surely should be a candidate for being the meaning, perhaps not the right candidate, but still a candidate. Yet the idea that this causal mode is a meaning is clearly alien to the semantic tradition; it is, as I have said in the title of a paper, “A Shocking Idea about Meaning” (2001). Why is it so shocking? I think the main cause is a ubiquitous Cartesianism about meaning. It is a truism that competent speakers of a language “know the language”. The Cartesian assumption is that this involves (tacitly) knowing facts about meanings: if an expression has a certain meaning in the language then speakers know that it does. Then, since the typical speaker knows nothing about causal modes of reference, those modes cannot be meanings. Yet this popular Cartesianism is almost entirely unsupported and is, I have argued, undermined by the revolution. We should embrace the much more modest view that linguistic competence is an ability or skill, a piece of knowledge-how not knowledge-that.”

Devitt’s point with respect to Cartesianism about meaning is well taken. Speakers do not need to know all the meaning facts to be competent users and understanders of language. However, Devitt seems to elide over the real worry for his proposal. The difficulty is that if speakers lack beliefs or knowledge about d-chains, his theory cannot account for the difference in cognitive significance of ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ If ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ meant different things but speakers were unaware of this difference, they would not take the names to differ in meaning. Perhaps Devitt could claim that speakers *tacitly* know the meanings, and this tacit knowledge explains the different cognitive significance of ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’. (However, I believe Devitt claims speakers have typically have no beliefs whatsoever, tacit or non-tacit, about these meanings—they are simply not in the speaker’s head at all). Another possible explanation of the difference in cognitive value between ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ that Devitt might endorse (and I speculate) would be the speaker’s realization that these names are syntactically different, which is evident even if the speaker has no knowledge of or beliefs about d-chains. However, it is not clear if this proposal would work for Paderewski-style cases, where two uses of ‘Paderewski’ are connected to the same man via different d-chains but there are no syntactic differences. The details of Devitt’s account would

need to be fleshed out to better explain cognitive value differences.

4.7 Metalinguistic Descriptivism

Metalinguistic Descriptivism, in very rough sketch, claims that a proper name ‘NN’ means *the bearer of ‘NN’*. There are various formulations of the theory (e.g., Bach 2002, Katz 1997, Geurts 1994, et al.) that differ somewhat in the details. It is claimed that the theory can explain the cognitive value difference between ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Clark Kent is Superman’. The former sentence would say that the bearer of ‘Clark Kent’ is the bearer of ‘Clark Kent’—which is obvious and trivial, while the latter sentence would say that the bearer of ‘Clark Kent’ is the bearer of ‘Superman’, which is informative. In fact, Lois is ignorant of this latter fact—she would deny that the bearer of ‘Clark Kent’ is the bearer of ‘Superman.’ So, it seems, at first blush, that Metalinguistic Descriptivism is plausible and can solve Frege’s identity sentence puzzle.

However, this theory is inadequate. Suppose that Lucy is a golden retriever who bases her recognition of people on smell alone. Lucy realizes that Clark Kent is Superman, for he smells the same to Lucy no matter how he dresses or acts. So, the sentence ‘Lucy realizes that Clark Kent is Superman’ is true. However, if Metalinguistic Descriptivism were true, this sentence would claim that Lucy realizes that the bearer of ‘Clark Kent’ is the bearer of ‘Superman.’ This cannot be true. Lucy has no beliefs about names or who bears them. She is a dog and does not use names nor understand names (save perhaps for reacting to her own name). Her belief that Clark Kent is Superman is therefore not a belief about language. Lucy is incapable of having such beliefs, but she can realize that Clark Kent is Superman. Hence, by *reductio*, the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ cannot mean the same as *the bearer of*

Superman and the bearer of Clark Kent, respectively.⁸⁹

We can also see that the metalinguistic theory is insufficient because of Jennifer Saul's argument (1998), cited in the preceding section. Saul asks us to imagine a woman named Nicole who never learns either the names 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman' yet forms the opinion, after meeting Kent-Superman in both personas (without realizing she had met the same individual), that Clark Kent is boring and drab, but Superman is witty and urbane. On Metalinguistic Descriptivism, the true ascriptions sentence 'Lois believes that Superman is witty and urbane but Clark Kent is not', would mean the same as 'Lois Lane believes that the bearer of "Clark Kent" is boring, but that the bearer of "Superman" is witty and urbane'. However, Nicole cannot do not have any beliefs about the names this individual bears because she never learned his names. Yet, the ascription sentence is true, showing by *reductio* that Metalinguistic Descriptivism is inadequate.

Finally, consider the fact that the sentence 'The Maya discovered that Hesperus was Phosphorus independently of the Babylonians and the Greeks' is intuitively true. However, on Metalinguistic Descriptivism, the sentence expresses the proposition that the ancient Maya discovered that the bearer of 'Hesperus' was the bearer of 'Phosphorus' independently of the Babylonians and the Greeks. This is clearly false. The ancient Maya knew no Greek. Similarly, Attila, a monolingual speaker of Hungarian, may utter 'Magyarország Európában' and I may report him, in English, as saying that Hungary is in Europe, even though Attila would not

⁸⁹ This should call to mind Frege's early metalinguistic view of proper names in *der Begriffsschrift*, where he had claimed that 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' expresses a proposition about the co-reference of these names, 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus', which both refer to the planet Venus. In *Über die Grundlagen der Arithmetik* and *On Sense and Reference*, Frege rejected this earlier view, arguing that the discovery that Hesperus was Phosphorus was an *astronomical* discovery, not a linguistic discovery (i.e., it was not a discovery about the co-reference of names).

understand the name 'Hungary' or the sentence 'Hungary is in Europe.' The proposition Attila expressed was not that the bearer of 'Hungary' is in Europe.

In addition to Metalinguistic Description theories, there are two notable metalinguistic versions of Millianism, the theories of Larson and Ludlow, and that of Mark Richard. According to Braun (2002: 371), "these theories ... claim that the content of a name consists partly of its bearer and partly of the name itself.... Both theories say that agents bear attitudes towards linguistically enhanced propositions, which are (roughly) amalgams of Russellian propositions with words." See Soames (2002) for a critique of these theories as being overly metalinguistic.

CHAPTER 5

MILLIANISM

5.1 Introduction. The Millian Strategy and Some Worries

Millianism is the view that a proper name's sole contribution to the proposition expressed by a sentence in which it occurs is its referent. On most forms of Millianism, names are directly referential, i.e., they are devoid of any sort of linguistic meaning whatsoever (such as, e.g., character); they are merely "tags" attached to their referents, as Ruth Barcan Marcus famously put it (1961, 310). The bearer fully exhausts the meaning of a name. (Pelczar and Rainsbury's indexical view, discussed *supra* in Chapter 3, is a different sort of Millian view on which names have character meaning and therefore the bearer does not fully exhaust the meaning of a name; this section will deal exclusively with the sorts of Millianism on which the bearer exhausts the meaning of a name). I will focus my discussion of Millianism in this chapter on the two most influential accounts—that of Nathan Salmon (1986) and Scott Soames (2002).

Millians recognize that Millianism has counterintuitive implications with respect to Frege's puzzle (discussed at section 1.1., *supra*) and design their theories to explain away these intuitions. They usually appeal to the semantics/pragmatics distinction to do so. In rough sketch, most Millians, including Salmon and Soames, claim that 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' and 'Clark Kent is Superman' *semantically express* the same proposition, the trivial proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, but *pragmatically communicate* different propositions. They claim that the propositional attitude ascription 'Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman' is false (since the sentence just expresses the proposition that Lois does not believe that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, and clearly, she realizes *that*), but it pragmatically communicates a true

proposition. Ordinary speakers do not normally distinguish between what a sentence semantically expresses and what it pragmatically communicates, so that ordinary speakers incorrectly judge that ‘Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman’ is true. They base this judgment on the fact that the proposition pragmatically communicated is true. When ordinary speakers intuit that ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ expresses a different proposition from ‘Clark Kent is Superman’, they base their judgment on the fact that these sentences pragmatically communicate different propositions, the former uninformative and the latter informative.

With respect to the Problem of Inconsistent Rational Belief, most Millians appeal to ‘propositional guises’ to solve the problem (Both Salmon and Soames appeal to guises; although Soames does not mention guises in his 2002 book, in response to critics he stated subsequently in his 2006 that he thinks guises are an essential part of Millianism). A propositional guise is analogous to a mask covering a face. You might not recognize a person you know if he or she is wearing a mask. It would be incorrect to say that you do not recognize that person *in general*. Rather, we would say that you recognize the person when he or she appears to you in certain ways, but fail to recognize the person when they appear to you in other ways. Likewise, a proposition wears a sort of mask, a guise (from “disguise”). A proposition may present itself in certain ways (via certain sentences or ways of characterizing the proposition), but in other ways that very proposition might be presented under a different guise such that you would not recognize it as the very same proposition. You might rationally have different attitudes with respect to that proposition depending on how it is presented to you. When presented under one guise, you might believe it, while when it is presented under a different guise, you might disbelieve it or suspend belief with respect to it, not realizing that you believe and disbelieve (or

suspend belief towards) the same proposition. The guise prevents you from realizing that your propositional attitudes are inconsistent, because, without additional evidence, you cannot tell that the one and the same proposition is hidden behind the different guises. Your inconsistent beliefs are rational provided that you believe the inconsistent propositions under different propositional guises that you do not realize are guises of the same proposition.

Both Salmon and Soames, who are proponents of the most influential Millian theories, ascribe to some version of both claims. First, the claim that speakers confuse semantics and pragmatics (to explain away our Fregean intuitions with respect to Frege's puzzle). Second, propositional guises to solve the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief (although Soames says little about guises). I will not attempt to offer a knockdown refutation either of these theories, but limit myself to pointing out my four principal worries about Millianism (which do not effect Salmon and Soames' account in the same way or to the same extent), listed (a)-(d) as follows:

Four worries about Millianism

(a) The **Guise Definition Problem**. This is the failure to specify: (a) what propositional guises are, and (b) the exact nature of their relation to singular propositions they disguise. I consider what propositional guises could be in section 5.3.

(b) The **Pragmatic Mechanism Problem**. This is the failure to specify the pragmatic mechanisms by which speakers semantically expressing singular propositions are supposed to convey further propositions to their audience, which propositions are supposed to explain our Fregean intuitions. This affects Salmon's theory more than Soames'.

(c) The **Ignorance of Identities Problem**. This is the failure to state with specificity

what proposition Lois Lane is ignorant with respect to the identity of Clark Kent and Superman. We want our theory of proper names to identify the proposition of which Lois Lane is ignorant of with respect to Kent's identity with Superman. What proposition does she fail to realize? Ideally, we would want a theory according to which the proposition Lois fails to realize is the one literally expressed 'Clark Kent is Superman.' After all, when we say that 'Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent is Superman,' that identity sentence is embedded in the 'that'-clause of this ascription. But even if a theory claimed that the proposition that Lois fails to realize was not the one semantically expressed by that identity sentence, we should insist that the proposition be articulable in the theory. However, Millians have difficulty stating what Lois Lane fails to realize about the identity, as Thomas McKay and the Michael Nelson, themselves Millians, recognize in their entry 'Ignorance of Identities' in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/ignorance.html>. Millians would not say that she fails to realize the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. Clearly, she realizes that. But they also cannot plausibly say that she fails to realize a purely descriptive proposition, such the proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the superhero that protects Metropolis. The proposition Lois fails to realize is object-dependent, a proposition that is essentially about Kent-Super, so a purely descriptive proposition is insufficient to capture what she is ignorant of.⁹⁰ By contrast with Millianism, the

⁹⁰ That a purely descriptive proposition cannot be the proposition of which Lois' ignorant is made evident by a thought experiment, a variation of the Superman story, in which a pair of indistinguishable identical twins from Krypton, Kal-El and Xal-El, both of whom work at the Daily Planet in shifts as reporters going by the name 'Clark Kent'. However, only Kal-El acts as the superhero known as 'Superman'. Xal-El prefers to keep a low profile. Suppose Lois has only interacted with Kal-El while working at the Daily Planet. Her belief that Clark Kent and Superman are distinct people is a belief about Kal-El, and not about Xal-El. It is not a belief that Kal-El and/or Xal-El is not identical to Superman. Yet her descriptive beliefs may be insufficient to distinguish between Kal-El and Xal-El. Her beliefs are causally grounded in the individual

TIUT offers an answer to this question, as set out in section 2.4-2.5 *supra*. The TIUT's answer combines Lois' descriptive conception with a causal grounding of her belief in the person her belief is about, *via* the subjecthood of her 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossiers.

(d) The **No Direct Expressibility Problem**. Millians differentiate the semantic proposition expressed from the pragmatic proposition communicated, both with respect to identity sentences and propositional attitude ascriptions. However, they do not provide that there is any idiomatic linguistic convention we may resort to in order to semantically express *directly* the pragmatically communicated proposition, and this is rather suspect.

There is no doubt that we can and often do express one proposition that pragmatically conveys another. You can utter 'I just ate' to implicate the proposition *I'm not hungry*, utter 'I enjoy a cigarette after dinner' to communicate the proposition *I enjoy smoking a cigarette after dinner*, or utter 'You're not going to die' to communicate the proposition *You're not going to die from that cut*. In these cases, it is always possible to utter a sentence that semantically expresses the pragmatically communicated proposition *directly* if one so chose. The use of these pragmatic mechanisms is *optional*. Instead of saying 'I just ate' to communicate the proposition *I'm not hungry*, you could utter "I am not hungry" to express directly the latter proposition, instead of implicating it. Instead of uttering, 'I enjoy a cigarette after dinner' to communicate *I enjoy smoking a cigarette after dinner*, you could utter "I enjoy *smoking* a cigarette after dinner." Instead of uttering 'You're not going to die' to communicate the proposition *You're not going to die from that cut*, you could utter "You're not going to die from that cut." ***But this is not so in the Frege's puzzle cases***: with propositional attitude reports such as 'Lois Lane does not believe

about whom she has them, Kal-El, and a purely descriptive belief lacks that grounding.

that Superman can fly,' there is no idiomatic way to semantically express *directly* the proposition that Millians claim is pragmatically communicated. Perhaps there is a complex roundabout way to express these propositions in the sophisticated language of Millians (it's not clear what it would be, since Millians have trouble saying what Lois Lane fails to realize about the identity, but perhaps Millians could come up with something), but the point is that there is no *ordinary idiomatic* way to express this proposition in ordinary, non-theoretical English. Normally, when a speaker relies on some pragmatic mechanisms to express a proposition other than the one literally expressed, the speaker always has the option of stating more directly what he means without relying on that pragmatic mechanism. This is not the case in the Puzzle cases, and this strongly suggests that in the puzzle cases the sentences *already* semantically express the propositions we intuit they do. There is no more direct way of stating what these sentences say; using these sentences is *essential* and unavoidable.

5.2 Salmon's theory

As a Millian, Salmon claims that the content of a proper name is simply its bearer and that a name contributes its bearer to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs. Hence, in the sentence 'Superman flies', as well as in the sentence 'Clark Kent flies', 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' both contribute Kent-Super, the man himself, to the proposition expressed by the sentences. The singular proposition expressed by these sentences has two constituents: Kent-Super, and the property of flying. This proposition can be schematized as

< Superman, ability to fly >

Believing a proposition, such as, e.g., that Superman flies, is to have a certain psychological

attitude toward it. According to Salmon, an agent can have different attitudes towards one and the same proposition depending on how one “grasps” or “takes” it. Lois Lane, for example, has different attitudes towards $\langle \text{Superman, ability to fly} \rangle$ depending on how she grasps it. When she grasps it via “Clark Kent can fly”, she does not accept the sentence and does not inwardly assent to the proposition, but when she grasps it via “Superman can fly”, she accepts the sentence and internally nods assent to the proposition $\langle \text{Superman, ability to fly} \rangle$. Grasping a proposition “under a guise” is to grasp a proposition when it is presented in a certain way. Lois Lane grasps $\langle \text{Superman, ability to fly} \rangle$ under two different guises, one guise associated with the sentence ‘Superman can fly’ (in which case she accepts the sentence and inwardly nods assent at the proposition $\langle \text{Superman, ability to fly} \rangle$), and the other associated with the sentence “Clark Kent can fly” (in which case she does not accept the sentence and does not inwardly assent to the proposition $\langle \text{Superman, ability to fly} \rangle$).

For Salmon, belief is a binary relation between an agent and a singular proposition. There is also a ternary relation that Salmon calls “BEL”. It is the relation between an agent, a singular proposition, and a guise (i.e., a way of taking/grasping that proposition). An agent BELs a proposition p under guise g just in case she inwardly assents to p when she grasps p under g . Belief ascriptions of the form α believes that p are to be construed as existential generalizations on a ternary BEL relation:

BEL RELATION $\exists g [\alpha \text{ grasps that } p \text{ under } g, \& \text{BEL}(\alpha, \text{that } p, g)]$

where a represents the agent, g is a variable ranging over propositional guises, and p the singular proposition believed by a . In plain English, this means, again, that an agent a believing a proposition p involves a grasping p under guise g and inwardly assenting to p under g . Since

Lois inwardly assents to <Superman, ability to fly> under the guise associated with “Superman flies,” Lois believes that proposition. The fact that she withholds inward assent (or dissents) when that proposition is presented under the guise associated with “Clark Kent flies” does not negate the fact that she believes the proposition. For her to believe it, it is sufficient that there be at least one guise under which she inwardly assents to the proposition. Lois fails to realize that the same proposition, <Kent-Super, ability to fly> is presented twice over under different guises via sentences ‘Clark Kent flies’ and ‘Superman flies.’ In Salmon’s terminology (1989, 261), Lois Lane suffers from “propositional recognition failure’ because she fails to recognize a proposition when presented under one propositional guise (the one associated with ‘Clark Kent flies’) as a proposition she already believes but under a different propositional guise (the one associated with ‘Superman flies’). According to Salmon, Lois is not irrational as long as her differing behavior with respect to the same proposition, sometimes nodding assent and sometime withholding assent, occurs when she takes the proposition under different guises such that she does not realize that these are guises of the same proposition. Voilà, we have a solution to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief.

Thus far I have discussed how Salmon solves the problem of rational inconsistent belief, dealing with the case of the unenlightened Lois—how and why she can believe inconsistent proposition vis-à-vis Kent-Super. Now let’s turn to Salmon’s proposal to solve Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. Why, according to Salmon, are we as *enlightened* speakers subject to (what Salmon takes to be) an illusion of a difference in truth-value between (5) and (6)?

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

Here is what Salmon says about this. (5) and (6) are both true, since Lois inwardly nods assent to the proposition expressed by ‘Superman flies’ when that proposition presented in a way like ‘Superman flies’, so she believes the proposition and (6) is therefore true. Since (5) expresses the same proposition as (6), (5) is true as well. So why do we strongly intuit that (5) is false? Because, according to Salmon, in addition to the proposition (5) and (6) semantically express, a speaker would typically utter (5) and (6) to pragmatically “communicate” distinct propositions. These pragmatically communicated propositions would really differ in truth value, with (5) being false and (6) true. Ordinary speakers do not normally distinguish between the propositions semantically (or literally) expressed by the sentences they utter and the propositions pragmatically communicated. Thus, these speakers judge, in error, that the semantic truth conditions of the proposition(s) expressed by the (5) and (6) differ because the truth conditions of the communicated propositions differ. What is, according to Salmon, the pragmatic mechanism by which these further propositions are communicated? Salmon suggested in Frege’s Puzzle (1986) that the mechanism could be Gricean implicature, and subsequent authors, e.g., Recanati, have referred to Salmon’s theory as the “Implicature Theory.” Recanati (1993) and other authors have claimed that implicature is an implausible candidate for the pragmatic mechanism. (I examine the prospect of implicature as a possible mechanism for Salmon’s theory in section 5.4 and I show it to be implausible because the alleged implicatures are neither cancellable nor detachable). In subsequent years Salmon has stated that he is not committed to the pragmatic mechanism being implicature and has left the matter open. Not taking a stand on which pragmatic mechanism is involved detracts from the value of Salmon’s theory, given how central the issue is the theory.

Although Salmon tends to rarely address the identity sentences version of Frege's puzzle, we may presume that guises explain the difference in cognitive value between 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' and 'Clark Kent is Superman' because an agent such as Lois Lane will take the proposition expressed under different guises when presented by these sentences. These sentences present the proposition Kent-Super is Kent-Super under different guises. Salmon does not clearly say what propositional guises are. He suggests that a propositional guise is to a proposition as a mask is to a face. When a person wears a mask, we may fail to recognize a person we would ordinarily recognize without the mask. Likewise, we when a proposition wears a certain guise, we may fail to recognize it as a proposition we believe under some other guise. In the case of a person wearing a mask covering their face, the relation between the mask and the face is clear — it is the "wearing" relation. The mask covers the face. But what exactly is the relation between a proposition guise and the proposition it masks? Salmon says we take proposition "under" guises, but what exactly is it to take a proposition under a guise? I do not want to claim that there is no hope for making this highly metaphorical picture more precise, only pointing out that the picture is very metaphorical.

In section 5.3 I explore the issue of propositional guises. What are they? And what the relation between them and the singular propositions they disguise? In section 5.4 I explore the possibility that pragmatic implicature could be the pragmatic mechanism at work (by which the propositions semantically express pragmatically convey further propositions), and I show that this is implausible. If Salmon's theory is to work, some other pragmatic mechanism other than implicature should be proposed. In section 5.5, I state how I believe Salmon's theory fares on the four problems (a-d), which I identify as my principal worries for Millianism.

5.3 What are Propositional Guises?

Salmon states in his 1986 that it is difficult to say what propositional guises are. He has tended to be vague about the nature of propositional guises since that time. In his 1986, he suggested (126) that propositional guises may be Fregean senses, ‘ways of taking’ a proposition, a ‘mode of presentation’, or a ‘mental file.’ Salmon writes in his 1989b that he has little by way of specifics to say about propositional guises except to note that

“[t]he important thing is that, by definition, they are such that if a fully rational believer adopts conflicting attitudes (such as belief and disbelief, or belief and suspension of judgment) toward propositions *p* and *q*, then the believer must take *p* and *q* in different ways, by means of different guises, in harboring the conflicting attitudes toward them—even if *p* and *q* are in fact the same proposition.” (246)

According to Heimir Geirrrson (2012, 58), Salmon’s view regarding guises is best captured by saying that Salmon hold that they are “*sentence-like* entities.” On Salmon’s view, sentence (5)

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

would say that Lois Lane believes the singular proposition that Kent-Super flies under a propositional guise like (in some specific way to be eventually more precisely specified) the sentence ‘Clark Kent flies.’ Sentence (6),

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

would say that Lois Lane believes the singular proposition that Kent-Super flies under a propositional guise like (in some specific way to be eventually more precisely specified) the sentence ‘Superman flies.’ The theory owes us an account of what precisely propositional guises

are and exactly how they resemble these sentences. In what way does the guise under which the ‘that’-clause of (5) is presented more closely resemble the sentence ‘Clark Kent flies’ rather than ‘Superman flies’?

5.3.1 Guises as Descriptive Propositions

The simplest proposal is that guises are descriptive propositions. Salmon suggests in passing in his 1986 that guises might be like Fregean senses or modes of presentation. If Fregean senses were construed as *descriptive* modes of presentation, definite descriptions associated with proper names, or what I call ‘conceptions,’ then propositional guises would be descriptive propositions of the sort expressed by definite descriptions. Presumably, these descriptive propositions would be a compositional function of the descriptive modes of presentation attached to all the expressions within a sentence.⁹¹ For example, the propositional guise of the singular proposition, PROP-1, when expressed by sentence (2):

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

would be composed of the descriptive modes of presentation/conceptions associated by the speaker with the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman.’ Hence, the propositional guise of PROP-1, when presented by sentence (2), would roughly be the descriptive proposition that Descriptivists would claim is its content. It would be a descriptive proposition such as: *the mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet is the caped superhero protecting Metropolis.*

On this view, propositional guises are descriptive propositions of the sort expressed by

⁹¹ It’s not clear whether Salmon would agree with this. But it’s hard to believe that it could be otherwise, if propositional guises are descriptive propositions. This seems to follow from the principle of compositionality.

definite descriptions. The speaker would have transparent introspective access to these propositions—these are the propositions he ‘sees’ before his mind’s eye when he thinks to himself that Clark Kent is Superman or utters ‘Clark Kent is Superman.’ But the content of the proposition he entertains and expresses would be the singular proposition PROP-1—*that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*.⁹² The speaker’s descriptive conceptions might in fact misrepresent the properties of Kent-Super or fail to denote him uniquely. A speaker such as Lois Lane fails to realize that (1) and (2) express the same proposition because the contribution/content of the proper names depends on externalist relational properties (e.g., causal-historical relations) that are ‘outside the head’ of the speaker, to which s/he has no immediate cognitive access. The speaker has immediate transparent cognitive access only to the descriptive propositions built from the descriptive properties, which s/he associates with the names and which s/he takes to apply to the referents of the names.

On this theory of propositional guises, a speaker might rationally believe the inconsistent singular propositions *that Kent-Super flies* and *that Kent-Super does not fly* because the descriptive propositions s/he believes—the descriptive propositional guises under which s/he believes the singular proposition—are consistent. The proposition *that the mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet does not fly* is consistent with the proposition *that the strong caped superhero protecting Metropolis flies*. In this case, the speaker is rational provided that s/he fails

⁹² To be clear: the content of the proposition expressed by ‘Clark Kent is Superman,’ according to Millianism, is this singular proposition PROP-1, *not* because the conceptions associated with ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ *determine* this proposition (not because the definite descriptions associated with names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ denote Kent-Super twice over, as would be the case on Descriptivism), but rather because the names both refer to Kent-Super in virtue of the causal-historical links between the both names and Kent-Super. I do not mean to imply that Millianism entails acceptance of the causal-historical theory of reference. But I think that it does entail rejection of a purely satisfactoral theory of reference, such as Descriptivism.

to realize that the definite descriptions *the mild-mannered reporter for the Daily Planet* and *the strong caped superhero protecting Metropolis* denote the same individual.

5.3.2 Guises as Metalinguistic Propositions

Another proposal is that propositional guises are metalinguistic propositions. On this proposal, the propositional guise associated with (2) is the metalinguistic proposition: *that the referent of 'Kent' is identical to the referent of 'Superman.'* By contrast, the propositional guise associated with (1) would be the metalinguistic proposition: *that the referent of 'Clark Kent' is identical to the referent of 'Clark Kent.'* On this theory, Lois Lane assents to (1) because she realizes the obvious fact that 'Clark Kent' and 'Clark Kent' co-refer but she dissents from (2) because she thinks that 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' do not co-refer.

This proposal does not work, *inter alia*, because names can have multiple bearers. Suppose that Lois Lane knows that Perry White calls his dog by two names: 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman.' Lois knows the two names of Perry's dog, so she believes that 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' sometimes co-refer. To explain why Lois dissents from certain utterances of (2), we must say something like: she dissents because she takes the utterer to be tokening 'Clark Kent' to refer to a person named 'Clark Kent,' who is her mild-mannered reporter colleague (and not to refer to a dog) and to be tokening 'Superman' to refer to a superhero (and not to a dog). Furthermore, she believes that the name 'Clark Kent,' when used to refer to her mild-mannered reporter colleague, is not co-referential with the name 'Superman,' when used to refer to a superhero. We must bring in various descriptions that Lois associates with the names to explain her linguistic behavior when dissenting from a particular utterance of (2). Her meta-linguistic beliefs alone are insufficient to explain her patterns of linguistic behavior. Thus, the

metalinguistic guise theory is inadequate. Lois' metalinguistic beliefs would have to be combined with her descriptive beliefs to explain her linguistic behavior and account for her rationality despite inconsistency.

5.3.3 Guises as Natural Language Sentences

On this view, guises are not propositions, but sentences. Since guises are not propositions, the psychological relation between agents and the guises is not one of belief, but rather one of *acceptance*. An agent believes proposition *P* via accepting sentence *S* that expresses *P*. A rational agent might accept *S*₁, but not *S*₂, even if *S*₁ and *S*₂ express the same proposition. A proponent of this view posits that believing a proposition consists in assenting towards the proposition by accepting a sentence that expresses that proposition. Disbelieving a proposition consists in dissenting from a sentence expressing a proposition.

This view is idle unless it explains *why* the agent accepts one sentence, but dissents from another expressing the same proposition. We need an account of the speaker's mental state when entertaining the proposition *via* various sentences and an explanation of why this causes the agent to inwardly assent to the proposition when presented *via* one sentence and to dissent or suspend judgment from it when presented by a different sentence. How do the natural language sentences coordinate with internal representations or internal belief states? Why/how do these internal representations play different causal and functional roles in the agent's inferential and behavioral economy? Short of such an account, the view of guises as natural language sentences is not an explanation of the underlying phenomenon but a mere restatement of the very problem.

Furthermore, as David Braun (1998) and Nathan Salmon (1993b, 87-88) have pointed out, Kripke's Paderewski Puzzle (1979) forecloses the possibility that guises could be natural

language sentences. For in the Paderewski Puzzle, Peter alternately assents to and dissents from a proposition when it is presented by one single sentence, ‘Paderewski had musical talent.’ To explain why Peter sometimes assents and sometimes dissents, we need a theory of guises that delivers *two different* guises. Here, we would have only *one* single guise, the natural-language sentence ‘Paderewski had musical talent.’

Finally, the view of propositional guises as sentences is insensitive to the fact that instances of Frege’s Puzzle about identity sentences can be generated under circumstances where neither sentence (1) nor sentence (2) is uttered. Suppose the enlightened Jimmy Olson points first at a photo of Clark Kent wearing business attire and glasses and then points to a photo of Superman in his spandex outfit and cape, and he utters “those are pictures of the same guy.” Lois would dissent from Olson’s utterance. If Olson points at a photo of Clark Kent wearing business attire and glasses and utters “that guy is identical to himself,” Lois would assent. Or suppose that Lois is a deaf-mute who communicates in sign language. Lois would have sign-language terms corresponding to ‘Clark Kent’ and another sign-language term corresponding to ‘Superman.’ She would dissent from the sign-language translation of the English sentence (2)—‘Clark Kent is Superman,’ but not from sign language translation of the English sentence (1). Clearly, she dissents in all three cases for the same reason. The reason for her dissent in these alternate scenarios is not a function of the specific sentence Olson utters—not all these cases involve the utterance of either sentence (1) or (2). The key to understanding Lois’ patterns of assent and dissent in all three cases has little to do with the specific structure of sentence (2) or the specific words used, but her patterns are rather to be explained by some common feature between the utterance of (2) and the two alternate scenarios. It is therefore implausible to claim that propositional guises are specific sentences. It would be far more plausible, in one’s search

for the correct account of propositional guises, to identify the property that these three speech acts—the utterance of (2), the utterance of its sign language counterpart, or the case of pointing to photos depicting Kent-Super in different attire accompanied by the utterance “those are the same guy” or “he is he”—have in common with one another, such that the unenlightened Lois Lane is disposed to dissent from them all.

5.3.4 Propositional Guises as Belief States

The view that propositional guises are ‘belief states’ has its metaphysical roots in the writings of John Perry and David Kaplan in their study of indexicals. Perry and Kaplan noticed that a speaker could entertain the same proposition in two different ways and thus come to believe and disbelieve the same proposition. To adapt Kaplan’s example (1989, 533), an agent looks into a mirror and sees the reflection of a guy whose pants are on fire. He does not realize that he is looking into a mirror and does not realize that *he* is the guy whose pants are on fire. He might utter “that guy’s pants are on fire. Thank God *my* pants are not on fire.” Here, according to Kaplan, the agent has expressed inconsistent singular propositions. The singular proposition in question is the one containing as constituents: the agent himself, and the property having one’s pants on fire. The agent has said that this proposition is true (by saying “that’s guy’s pants are on fire” and pointing to himself without realizing it), and he has also said it is false (by uttering “my pants are not on fire”). Perry and Kaplan conclude that a rational agent may believe inconsistent singular propositions provided that s/he is in different belief states when doing so and does not realize that being in these belief states constitute believing the same proposition.

Analogously, Lois Lane is in different belief states when she entertains sentence (1) and

(2).⁹³ She can believe the proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super when presented one way and can disbelieve it when presented another way. Indeed, she remains rational because she is in different belief states when she believes it and disbelieves it. She intuits that the two belief states are different from one another, since the belief states play different inferential, functional, and causal roles in her mental life and they manifest themselves behaviorally in very different ways. Due to the very distinct causal and inferential roles that the belief states play in her mental economy, she erroneously intuits that the propositions she believes when she is each of those belief states are distinct, when in fact, being in either one of those belief states constitutes believing PROP-1.

This proposal is lacking in specifics. There is no doubt that Lois is in different belief states when she considers sentences (1) and (2) and whether they are true or false. Until the details are filled in, this account of guises is merely a promissory note. One needs an account of the exact relation between the belief state and the propositions believed—why does being in the belief state constitute believing the proposition(s)? What are belief states? In addition, how and why are the belief states correlated with certain sentences? Only once this account is fleshed out will it be fully explanatory rather than a mere explanatory sketch or picture. (The TIUT fleshes out this picture in chapter 2, *supra*, explaining Lois' different belief states in terms of proper names as indexicals whose characters refer to distinct dossiers in Lois mental architecture).

⁹³ Belief states must be distinguished from beliefs. Two agents in very different beliefs states might believe the same singular proposition in virtue of being in these different belief states. And a rational agent such as Lois Lane might believe and disbelieve the same proposition when in different belief states when considering that proposition, i.e., she might assent towards that proposition when in one belief state and dissent from it when in another.

5.3.5 Guises as Sentence-like Entities

As stated above, for Salmon belief is a binary relation between an agent and a singular proposition, but there is another relation, which Salmon terms 'BEL', which is a three-part relation between an agent, a singular proposition, and a propositional guise under which the agent takes the proposition. A propositional attitude ascription is an existential generalization of the BEL relation. Hence, the ascription

(5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies

says that there exists a propositional guise similar or analogous to (in a relevant way to be specified) the natural language sentence 'Clark Kent flies,' under which Lois Lane grasps the singular proposition *that Kent-Super flies*, and she inwardly assents to that proposition when grasping under that guise. The ascription sentence (6)

(6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

says that there exists a sentence-like propositional guise similar or analogous to (in a relevant way to be specified) the natural language sentence 'Superman flies,' under which Lois Lane grasps the singular proposition *that Kent-Super flies* and under which she inwardly assents to it. Attitude ascriptions (5) and (6) literally express the proposition that Lois believes the singular proposition *that Kent-Super flies*. However, (5) and (6) do not say that Lois BELs the same thing, for the third *relatum* in the ternary BEL relation (unlike the binary belief relation, which is the relation between an agent and a singular proposition) differs as between (5) and (6). The sentence-like propositional guises linked to sentences (5) and (6) differ.

Salmon maintains that ascription sentences such as (5) and (6) would pragmatically

implicate information about the propositional guises under which Lois Lane, the ascriber, believes the singular proposition *that Kent-Super flies*. (5) would implicate that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super flies under a sentence-like propositional guise like ‘Clark Kent flies.’ (6) would implicate that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super flies under a sentence-like propositional guise like ‘Superman flies.’ According to Salmon, ordinary speakers (with non-Millian intuitions) intuit what the truth-value of the propositions expressed by (5) and (6) is based on what these sentences say Lois BELS, rather than what they say she believes. They intuit that (5) is false because Lois does not believe the singular proposition *that Kent-Super flies* under a propositional guise like ‘Clark Kent flies.’ So ordinary speakers tend to say that (5) expresses a false proposition, which in fact, according to Salmon, expresses a true proposition about the singular proposition Lois believes. This is more of a picture of a theory rather than a full-fledged theory. Guises cannot *be* sentences. In what way do they resemble them?

5.3.6 Guises as Theoretical Misconceptions

Salmon has suggested that a misconception or a “misconceived way of taking a proposition” can serve as a propositional guise (see final paragraph of his 2006). This was touched on in section 2.8, *supra*. The enlightened Jimmy Olson is disposed to utter both (3) and (4n).

(3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

(4n) Lois Lane does *not* believe that Clark Kent is Superman

On Millianism, (3) and (4n) express inconsistent propositions—the proposition *that Lois believes PROP-1* and the proposition *that Lois fails to believe PROP-1*. Millianism gives the verdict that

in uttering (3) and (4_n), Olson is inconsistent. Generally, proponents of the Guise Millians Approach such as Salmon want to explain rational inconsistency (why speakers who contradict themselves can nevertheless be rational) by invoking propositional guises. To explain how Olson can express/believe inconsistent propositions and be nevertheless rational, a proponent of the Guise Millian Approach will want to say that Olson takes the propositions expressed by (3) and (4) under different propositional guises that he does not realize are guises of the same proposition (and therefore does not realize that (3) and (4_n) express inconsistent propositions). However, unlike the unenlightened Lois Lane, who fails to realize Clark Kent's identity with Superman, Olson is not ignorant of the identity. He knows all the facts about who Clark Kent and Superman are—that they are the same person. Hence, the difference between the propositional guises under which Olson takes the propositions expressed by (3) and (4) cannot be explained by, or rooted in, Olson's failure to realize the identity, as it is for Lois. The explanation of Olson's rational inconsistency, and the reason for his taking the (allegedly) inconsistent propositions under different guises, must proceed along different lines for the enlightened Olson as it does for the unenlightened Lois Lane. In his 2006, Salmon posits that the propositional guises under which Olson would take the propositions expressed by (3) and (4) are rooted in or explained by a "misconception"—to wit, the theoretical misconception that the proposition expressed by both (3) and (4) is two different propositions (2006, final paragraph). Olson takes a single proposition under two different propositional guises, and he does not realize that these are propositional guises *of the same proposition*, despite knowing all the facts about who Clark Kent and Superman are and fully understanding the nature of Lois' confusion. His failure to realize that the guises are guises of the same proposition arises *not* from his ignorance of the facts about identity—about who Clark Kent and Superman are, as they do for Lois Lane

when she believes inconsistent propositions about Clark Kent/Superman—but rather his failure arises from Olson’s erroneous belief that Millianism is false. Olson *is* in error about facts—but they are not facts about who or what Lois Lane, Clark Kent, or Superman are—but about *theoretical facts* concerning the correct theory of propositional attitude ascriptions and the content of the propositions semantically expressed by sentences (3) and (4).

The sorts of propositional guises that are proposed to explain why the unenlightened Lois can believe the inconsistent propositions expressed by (1) and \neg (2) and (7) and \neg (8)

- (1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent
- \neg (2) Clark Kent is not Superman
- (8) Superman flies
- \neg (7) Clark Kent does not fly

are rooted in her ignorance concerning the properties of Kent/Superman and who he is. But now Salmon claims that the propositional guises that explain the enlightened Jimmy Olson’s beliefs about the ascription sentences he utters are of a very different sort. They are rooted in theoretical confusions. Propositional guises are a heterogeneous class of entities. I think this heterogeneity renders the notion of guises substantially less plausible, although I would not claim it refutes Salmon’s theory.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ Although the TIUT appeals to a notion similar to propositional guises (propositional guises explained via the notion that names are indexicals) to explain the inconsistent beliefs of *unenlightened* agents such as Lois Lane (see section 2.8), it does not require any such notion to explain the utterances of an *enlightened* ascriber such as Jimmy Olson. On the TIUT ascription sentences (3) and (4) express different propositions (see section 2.6.1). Hence, Olson’s utterance of (3) and (4n) is consistent. Olson does not contradict himself, so there is no need to posit propositional guises to save his rationality.

5.4 Could Implicature be the pragmatic mechanism in Salmon's theory?

For Salmon's theory to be a full-fledged theory, he must identify the pragmatic principle that explains how speakers use sentences to communicate/convey propositions other than the propositions that the sentences semantically express. Salmon has stated that the mechanism could be implicature. I will focus my criticism of this proposal on the failure of the putative implicatures to pass Grice's cancellability and non-detachability tests. These tests apply to both generalized and particularized conversational implicatures (but not to conventional implicatures), and therefore we may subject Salmon's claim to these tests as long as he is not claiming the implicatures to be conventional.⁹⁵ Although the failure to pass these tests does not strictly entail that the implicatures are absent, as Grice recognized, it does render less plausible the claim that the implicatures exist. Salmon's putative implicatures fare poorly on these two tests.

Implicatures, first discussed by Grice (1975), have, *inter alia*, two salient properties.

They are cancelable:

... a putative conversational implicature that *p* is explicitly cancelable if, to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that *p*, it is admissible to add but not *p*, or *I do not mean to imply that p*, and it is contextually cancelable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry the implicature. (Grice 1975: 44.)

And they are non-detachable:

⁹⁵ Conventional implicatures are, according to Grice, not cancellable. If Salmon is claiming that the relevant implicatures are conventional, the cancellability tests would be inapplicable to his claims. Salmon suggests in footnote 11 of his 1989b that the implicatures could be conventional. However, he does not elaborate on this claim. It is difficult to see how the implicatures could be conventional, especially since we need to account for the difference in apparent truth-value of 'Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is Clark Kent' and 'Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman', but conventional implicatures do not affect (or give the appearance of affecting) the truth or falsity or what is said. Moreover, it is controversial whether there is any such thing as conventional implicature. See Bach (1999).

... it will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question, except where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant to the determination of an implicature (in virtue of one of the maxims of Manner). (Grice, 1975: 57)⁹⁶

We can test a putative conversational implicature (whether particularized or generalized) by determining whether it has these properties—cancellability and non-detachability. Note again that Grice did not consider these tests definitive or absolute. Nevertheless, the implicatures alleged to exist by the Implicature theory fare poorly on the cancellability and detachability tests, suggesting that the Implicature theory is implausible (without thereby *refuting* it). I'll subject sentences (4), (4*n*), and \neg (4), below, to the cancellability and detachability tests and show that they do poorly on them.

- (3) Lois believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent
- (4) Lois believes that Clark Kent is Superman**
- (4*n*) Lois does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman**
- \neg **(4) Lois believes that Clark Kent is *not* Superman**⁹⁷

However, before I test the above sentences, I will state the propositions that the above sentences semantically express by Millian lights (or at least according to a Guise Millian view like Salmon's). (3) and (4) express the same proposition. They express the proposition that Lois believes the singular proposition PROP-1—that *Kent-Super is Kent-Super*. This proposition is true if and only if Lois believes it under at least one propositional guise. \neg (4) says that she believes the singular proposition \neg PROP-1—that *Kent-Super is not identical to Kent-Super*.

⁹⁶ Grice also noted metalinguistic implicatures, where reference is made to the specific words used by a speaker, are detachable.

⁹⁷ Sentence (4) is logically equivalent to the sentence 'Lois disbelieve that Clark Kent is identical to Superman'. Disbelieving that it is raining is the same thing as believing that it is not raining.

$\neg(4)$ expresses a true proposition if there is at least one propositional guise under which she takes the proposition *that Kent-Super is not identical to Kent-Super* and assents to it. Importantly, the truth of the proposition expressed by $\neg(4)$ is consistent with Lois also believing, under some *other* propositional guise, the singular proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* (e.g., via her acceptance of the sentence ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman is Superman’). Therefore, the proposition expressed by $\neg(4)$, according to the Millians, is consistent with the proposition expressed by (3)-(4). (4n) says something quite different from $\neg(4)$. (4n) says that Lois fails to believe (which encompasses withholding belief from) the singular proposition PROP-1—*that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*. (Withholding belief or failing to believe a proposition is not the same thing as disbelieving it or believing its negation. I may fail to believe that quantum mechanics is inconsistent with general relativity; this does not entail that I believe quantum mechanics is inconsistent with general relativity; I may have never considered the issue, or I may have no opinion on the matter.) (4n) entails that Lois fails to believe *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* under any propositional guise whatsoever (even when the proposition is presented via the sentence ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman is Superman’).

5.4.1 The Cancellability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicatures of (4), (4n), and $\neg(4)$

5.4.1.1 The cancellability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicature of (4)

According to Millians, (3) and (4) semantically express the same proposition. Ordinary speakers judge incorrectly, according to the Implicature theorist, that (4):

- (4) Lois believes that Clark Kent is Superman

expresses a false proposition, because they intuit (correctly) that (4) implicates a false proposition. For example, (4) would implicate (on a version of Millianism on which propositional guises are descriptive propositions) the proposition that Lois is aware that her mild-mannered reporter colleague and the strong flying superhero, with whom she is in love, are one and the same person.⁹⁸ On Salmon's theory on which propositional guises are sentence-like entities, (4) implicates that Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman under a sentence-like propositional guise like 'Clark Kent is Superman.' This proposition *is* false according to the story—Lois believes no such thing. She believes that Clark Kent is Superman, but not under *that* sentence-like guise. She believes it only under a sentence-like guise like 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' or like 'Superman is Superman.'

How would a speaker uttering (4) cancel the putative implicature to signal to his audience that he means to convey just the singular proposition semantically expressed—the true proposition that Lois believes (under *some* propositional guise, but not under any *particular* guise) the proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*? By the speaker cancelling the implicature, the hearer/audience should realize that the speaker intended only to convey the semantically expressed proposition and should intuit that the speaker has said something true (according to the Millians, this is true because Lois believes PROP-1. Indeed, according to the Superman story, there is at least one propositional guise under which she believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super). Let us first consider sentence (4-i) below as potential means of cancelling the implicature. This way of capturing the cancellation is based on Salmon's theory of propositional guises as sentence-like entities:

⁹⁸ It is hard to say exactly what proposition it would implicate on the Implicature theory, since the Implicature theory has not sufficiently well developed to allow such granularity of analysis.

(4-i) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman, but not under a sentence-like propositional guise like ‘Clark Kent is Superman.’

(4-i) is a poor prospect for cancelling (4)’s putative implicature. Few ordinary speakers (and likely *no* ordinary speakers unfamiliar with Salmon’s theory of propositional guises) would understand (4-i). Furthermore, it is unclear what a sentence-like propositional guise is. One must be familiar with the notion of propositional guises and Salmon’s notion of guises as sentence-like entities (which stands in need of explication) to stand any chance of understanding (4-i).

A simpler version of (4-i), one more understandable to an ordinary speaker untutored in the philosophy of language, would be (4-ii):

(4-ii) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman, but she would not put it that way

But (4-ii) is insufficient to cancel (4)’s putative implicature. There are many ways for a hearer of (4-ii) to interpret the speaker’s communicative intent such that the hearer would be unlikely to infer that the speaker meant to communicate merely that Lois Lane believes that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. The hearer might suppose that the speaker believes, erroneously, that Lois knows about Superman’s secret identity, but she cannot put her knowledge into language—she “would not put it that way”—because the speaker thinks that Lois suffers brain damage in the story, injuring her language center and rendering her incapable of recalling proper names. Or perhaps Lois is deaf and communicates only through sign language. She realizes that the reporter colleague is the strong superhero but she does not use the names ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman’ to refer to him in either of his personas. I deem it quite unlikely that any ordinary hearer would interpret a speaker uttering (4-ii) as saying that Lois Lane realizes the trivial proposition PROP-

1—that *Kent-Super is Kent-Super*. Of course, one could *stipulate* in the story that Lois suffers no brain damage and that she is fully competent with ordinary English. Nevertheless, I doubt that any amount of stage-setting would result in a cancellation of the implicature. Speakers would be inclined to seek some sort of explanation of Lois’ disinclination to “put it that way” relating to her competence or dispositions to speak in certain ways rather than grasping the proposition that Millians claim is semantically expressed by the sentence ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman.’

Consider whether a metalinguistic cancellation, such as (4-iii) would work.

(4-iii) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman, but she does not realize that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ co-refer

This has the same problem as (4-ii). Most hearers of (4-iii) would interpret the speaker as saying that Lois is, for some reason or other, ignorant of the fact that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ co-refer—either due to incompetence with proper names due to brain damage or because she is deaf and communicates only through sign language. The truth of (4-iii) is consistent with Lois realizing that the reporter colleague is the superhero but she does not use the names ‘Clark Kent’ or ‘Superman’ to refer to him in either of his personas.

Would a definite description such as in (4-iv) cancel the putative implicature?

(4-iv) Lois believes that Clark Kent is Superman, but this is not to say that she realizes that the mild-mannered reporter colleague is the caped Superhero

(4-iv) does not seem to me to cancel the putative implicature. First, I believe that ordinary speakers would say that (4-iv) is inconsistent, saying in response to hearing (4-iv) uttered, some version of: “if Lois Lane fails to realize that her mild-mannered colleague is a caped superhero,

she simply *does not* realize that Clark Kent is Superman.” Furthermore, (4-iv) could be plausibly interpreted as saying that there are *some* descriptive modes of presentation under which Lois recognizes Clark Kent and Superman as the same individual, although she fails to do so when Clark Kent is presented to her as a bespectacled mild-mannered reporter and Superman presented as a caped superhero. For example, Kent-Super might have a flirtatious phone relationship with Lois, where Lois has no idea that the caller is the Superhero she admires or the reporter with whom she works. Sometimes Kent-Super calls her from his Fortress of Solitude when in his Superman persona (he's rather forward and aggressive) and sometimes he calls her when in his Clark Kent persona from his Office at the Daily Planet (he's rather timid and passive and Lois has to do most of the talking). Lois realizes, based on the similarity of his voice on the telephone regardless of the persona he is in, that the guy she is flirting with is the same guy whether he is being aggressive or shy/passive. In this scenario, there is a pair of “Clark Kent-y” and “Superman-y” conceptions under which she realizes that Clark Kent is Superman, even though she does not realize that the bespectacled mild-mannered reporter is the caped Superhero. (4-iv) could be uttered intending to convey *this*, rather than conveying the information that Lois believes the trivial singular identity proposition PROP-1.

I believe the only certain way to cancel the implicature of (4) would be with (4-v):

(4-v) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman, but only in the sense that Superman and Clark Kent are the same individual and Lois obviously realizes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent, so she also realizes that Clark Kent is Superman

This cancellation of the implicature works only if ordinary speakers can understand it. I doubt an unsophisticated competent speaker of English who understands the Superman story would understand (4-v). (It would be interesting to test this empirically). An ordinary speaker would

likely respond to an utterance of (4-v) by uttering: “But Lois *does not* realize that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person.” Furthermore, it is hard to imagine anyone uttering (4-v) in a real-life conversation. Only a convinced Millian philosopher would say (4-v). Hence, I conclude that the implicature of (4), were it to exist, would be difficult to cancel.

5.4.1.2 The Cancellability Test applied to the Alleged Implicature of (4n)

The Implicature theorist maintains that (4n) expresses a literally false proposition, but it implicates a true proposition.

(4n) Lois does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman.

The Implicature theorist maintains that (4n) literally says that Lois fails to believe the trivial singular identity proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* under any propositional guise whatsoever. (This is false according to the Superman story, because Lois does not fail to believe this proposition—she believes it because she assents to ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman is Superman.’) Suppose that, in uttering (4n), the speaker meant to convey just the semantically expressed (false) proposition. The speaker means to convey the proposition that there is no guise under which Lois believes PROP-1—*that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*. She does not believe this proposition no matter how that proposition is presented (even if presented by the obviously true (1)). There are three possible reasons Lois might fail to believe this semantically expressed proposition:

(a) because she is unfamiliar with (not *en rapport* with) Kent-Super and therefore cannot entertain propositions of which he is a constituent,

(b) there is an individual with which Lois is familiar, Kent-Super, such that that she fails to recognize him as an individual with which she is already familiar even if he is presented under the same mode of presentation on different occasions, or

(c) Lois believes that Kent-Super is not self-identical.

(a) is foreclosed as a possible interpretation because it directly contradicts the facts of the Superman story. According to the story, Lois is *en rapport* with Kent-Super. She has met Kent-Super many times, both in his Clark Kent and Superman personas. (b) is foreclosed as a possible interpretation because the truth of (b) would entail that Lois had severe dementia—how can a mentally spry agent such as Lois Lane fail to recognize an individual from one moment to the next when that individual is presented in the same way to her at both points in time? (c) is foreclosed as a possible interpretation because it is irreconcilable with Lois' rationality. What rational agent entertains doubts about the self-identity of an object?

Would (4*n*-i) cancel the alleged implicature?

(4*n*-i) Lois does not believe that Kent is Superman, in the sense that there is no propositional guise under which the trivial singular proposition PROP-1—*that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*—can be presented to her so that she would assent to the proposition (and not in way that she just fails to recognize him as the same person when he is presented to her under the conceptions associated with the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman').

I doubt that this would cancel the alleged implicature. To understand (4*n*-i) one must be familiar with the notion of propositions being presented under propositional guises. A competent speaker of English, untutored in Salmon's theory, would not understand (4*n*-i). The implicature would be difficult to cancel.

5.4.1.3 The Cancellability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicature of \neg (4)

The implicature theorist maintains that \neg (4) expresses a true proposition.

\neg (4) Lois believes that Clark Kent is not identical to Superman

The proposition expressed is true iff there is at least one guise under which Lois disbelieves *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*. This is a true proposition, for she disbelieves *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* when that proposition is presented by the sentence ‘Clark Kent is Superman.’ This follows from the weak disquotation principle: Lois is disposed to sincerely, reflectively, and competently utter ‘Clark Kent is *not* identical to Superman’ (e.g., in response to a suggestion by Jimmy Olson that Clark Kent and Superman are the same person), so, in this case, she believes the proposition expressed by the sentence. (Of course, according to the Millians Lois *also* believes the proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*, for she assents to both ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman is Superman’.) Ordinary speakers agree with the Millians that \neg (4) expresses a true proposition, but for different reasons. According to the Implicature theorist, ordinary speakers say that \neg (4) is true because they confuse the proposition literally expressed with the implicated proposition. For in addition to expressing a true proposition, Millians claim that \neg (4) also implicates a true proposition (e.g., the proposition that Lois disbelieves a mild-mannered reporter is a strong superhero), and it is for this reason that ordinary speakers intuit that \neg (4) is true. Now suppose that one wanted to cancel the alleged implicature to communicate merely the literally expressed proposition. How would this implicature be cancelled? We could try

\neg (4-i):

\neg (4-i) Lois disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman, for she dissents when this is put to her under certain guises, e.g., via the sentence or a propositional guise similar or analogous to the sentence ‘Clark Kent is Superman,’ but that is not to say that she

doesn't *also* believe it when presented by a different guise, e.g., the sentence 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' or a guise similar/analogous to this sentence.

This proposal is highly technical and requires a speaker to understand the notion of propositional guises. Furthermore, it requires an ordinary speaker to understand how a rational speaker could believe and disbelieve the same proposition. That is beyond the intellectual capacities of many ordinary competent speakers, even highly sophisticated speakers. Understanding this cancellation presupposes familiarity with (and acceptance of the truth of) the Millian theory, and it presupposes that the notion of sentence-like propositional guises can be fleshed out.

Would \neg (4-ii) cancel the implicature?

\neg (4-ii) Lois disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman, for she dissents from 'Clark Kent is Superman,' but she also believes that Clark Kent is Superman, for she assents to 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent.'

To any speaker unfamiliar with Millian theory, \neg (4-ii) appears false on its face. Ordinary speakers would likely respond to an utterance of \neg (4-ii) by stating: "the fact that she dissents from 'Clark Kent is Superman' entails that she disbelieves that Clark Kent is Superman, but the fact that she assents to 'Clark Kent is Clark Kent' does not entail that she believes Clark Kent is Superman. It merely entails that she recognizes that Clark Kent is identical to himself, not that she realizes that he is Superman."

5.4.2 The Non-Detachability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicatures of (4), (4n), & \neg (4)

Sentences (4), (4n), and \neg (4) fare poorly on the non-detachability test. A conversational implicature (except when based on the maxim of Manner) is *non-detachable* when, after the

replacement of what is said with another expression with the same literal meaning, the same conversational implicature remains.

5.4.2.1 The Non-Detachability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicature of (4)

For (4) to be non-detachable,

(4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

it would have to be possible to replace (4) with another sentence with the same literal meaning that would carry the same implicature. Suppose we substituted (4¶) for (4)

(4¶) Lois Lane believes that Superman is Superman

According to the Millians, (4¶) means the same thing as (4), for the only difference between them involves substituting ‘Superman’ for ‘Clark Kent’—and these are synonymous on the Millian view. (4¶) would manifestly carry a different implicature than (4). On Salmon’s theory, (4) implicates that Lois Lane believes the singular proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* when she takes the proposition under a sentence-like entity like ‘Clark Kent is Superman.’ This implicated proposition would be, according to Salmon, false. (4¶) would implicate that Lois Lane believes the singular proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* when she takes the proposition under a sentence-like entity like ‘Superman is Superman.’ This implicated proposition would be, according to Salmon, true.

Sentence (4) therefore fails the non-detachability test. The (alleged) implicature is detachable because after the replacement of ‘Clark Kent’ with another expression with the same literal semantic meaning—here ‘Superman,’ the conversational implicature does not remain.

5.4.2.2 The Non-Detachability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicature of (4n)

Sentence (4n) also fails the non-detachability test for the same reason as (4) failed.

(4n) Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman

Suppose we substituted ‘Clark Kent’ for ‘Superman’ (which, according to Millianism, are synonymous) at its first occurrence in (4n). This yields sentence (4n¶):

(4n¶) Lois Lane does not believe that Superman is Superman

(4n¶)’s implicature would be very different from (4n)’s. (4n) would implicate the proposition that Lois Lane dissents from the proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* when she takes that proposition under a sentence-like entity like ‘Clark Kent is Superman.’ This is true. (4n¶) would implicate the proposition that Lois Lane dissents from the proposition *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super* when she takes that proposition under a sentence-like entity like ‘Superman is Superman.’ This would be false.

(4n) fails the non-detachability test. The (alleged) implicature is detachable because after the replacement of ‘Clark Kent’ with another expression with the same literal meaning—here ‘Superman’, the conversational implicature does not remain.

5.4.2.3 The Non-Detachability Test Applied to the Alleged Implicature of \neg (4)

Sentence \neg (4) also fails the test for the same reason as (4n) failed the test.

\neg (4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is not identical to Superman

Suppose we substituted into $\neg(4)$ ‘Superman’ in place of ‘Clark Kent’ ‘Superman’ (which, according to Millianism, are synonymous). This would yield $\neg(4\text{¶})$.

$\neg(4\text{¶})$ Lois Lane believes that Superman is not identical to Superman

$\neg(4\text{¶})$'s implicature would be very different from $\neg(4)$'s. $\neg(4)$ would implicate the proposition that Lois Lane assents towards the proposition that Kent-Super is not identical to Kent-Super when she takes that proposition under a sentence-like entity like ‘Clark Kent is not identical to Superman.’ This would be true. $\neg(4\text{¶})$ would implicate the proposition that Lois Lane assents towards the proposition that Kent-Super is not identical to Kent-Super when she takes that proposition under a sentence-like entity like ‘Superman is Superman.’ This would be false.

$\neg(4)$ fails the non-detachability test. The (alleged) implicature is detachable because after the replacement of ‘Clark Kent’ with another expression with the same literal meaning, ‘Superman’, the conversational implicature does not remain.

5.4.3 Conclusion: The Alleged Implicatures are not Detachable and are not Easily Cancellable

The alleged Implicatures are difficult to cancel. The implicatures can be cancelled perhaps, but only for an audience which is *already* familiar with (and committed to) Millian theory (provided that the Millian notion of propositional guises could be ultimately explicated). The cancellation would only work for an audience of speakers able to carry out relatively complex philosophical and/or linguistic reasoning. Without such an understanding of Millianism or a sophisticated reasoning ability, ordinary speakers are not able to recognize via the attempts at cancellation the proposition Millians claim is the one literally expressed. The alleged

implicatures are non-detachable. This is a serious worry for the proposal that implicature could be the pragmatic mechanism Salmon requires.

5.5 How Salmon's theory fares on the four principal worries for Millianism

In section 5.1, *supra*, I set out four worries (listed a-d) that I have with respect to Millian theories in general: the **Guise Definition Problem**, the **Pragmatic Mechanism Problem**, the **Ignorance of Identities Problem**, and the **No Direct Expressibility Problem**. I'll now state how I think Salmon's theory fares with respect to these worries.

5.5.1 The Guise Definition Problem

Salmon does not clearly define guises. The most plausible claim is that they are descriptive ways of taking. So the guise of 'Clark Kent is Superman' is the descriptive proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville is the Superhero that protects Metropolis. What is the relationship between the guise and the singular proposition, that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, that is semantically expressed? Salmon does not say specifically, which is a gap in the theory.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ The account I would give is one that would be very much in the spirit of the TIUT. I would say that the descriptive proposition that constitutes the guise is made up of the descriptive conceptions in Lois' two dossiers, her 'Clark Kent' and her 'Superman' dossiers. Lois believes that the subject of her one dossier is not the same as the subject of the other dossier. But she is wrong, for each of the dossiers still refer to the same individual, have the same subjecthood. This way of explaining guises using the language of the TIUT connects the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super to the descriptive guise under which Lois takes it. The connection is that the dossiers have the descriptions conceptions associated with the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' in them, and these dossiers are both about Kent-Super because they are both causally linked to him in the right sort of way. Perhaps Salmon could give such an account of guises based along the lines of the TIUT's dossier model. But it is not so clear that this can be done without thereby implicitly accepting the TIUT indexical approach to the Problem of Rational Inconsistent Belief.

5.5.2 The Pragmatic Mechanism Problem

This problem is, to recap, to explain the pragmatic mechanism by which the semantic propositions expressed by informative identities sentence such as ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ and propositional attitude reports such as ‘Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman’ pragmatically communicate further propositions. Salmons’ theory fares poorly here because he has not specified a specific pragmatic mechanism. Furthermore, implicature is an implausible candidate for the mechanism, as I have explored *supra* in section 5.4.

5.5.3 The Ignorance of Identities Problem

Salmon does not clearly say what Lois Lane is ignorant of. It cannot be a purely descriptive proposition, such as the proposition that the mild-mannered reporter from Smallville working for the Daily Planet is the superhero that protects Metropolis. The proposition of which Lois is ignorant is object-dependent, causally tied to Kent-Super. This purely descriptive proposition is not object-dependent. Her belief is essentially about Kent-Super, not someone who fits his description.

Perhaps she is ignorant of the fact that the singular proposition Kent-Super is Kent-Super, when taken under a guise like ‘Clark Kent is Superman’, is the same proposition as Kent-Super is Kent-Super when taken under a guise like ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ or a guise like ‘Superman is Superman’. Thus, the following sentence could express her ignorance:

The singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, when taken under a guise like ‘Clark Kent is Superman’, is the same proposition as the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super when taken under a guise like ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ or a guise like ‘Superman is Superman’

This sentence captures what Lois fails to realize because, according to Salmon, she suffers from is “propositional recognition failure.” Her ignorance consists of an inability to recognize a proposition when it is presented in one particular way as one she recognizes when it is presented a different way. This answer is consistent with Salmon’s theory, but it is not very satisfying because it neither gives us insight into the reasons for the propositional recognition failure, nor any idea as to what Lois needs to find out for her propositional recognition failure to be cured.

5.5.4 The No Direct Expressibility Problem

As discussed in the above section, it is not clear what, on Salmon’s theory, is the proposition Lois fails to realize about Kent’s identity with Superman. But let us suppose, as we did in the above section, that what she fails to realize is captured by the following sentence:

The singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super, when taken under a guise like ‘Clark Kent is Superman’, is the same proposition as the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super when taken under a guise like ‘Clark Kent is Clark Kent’ or a guise like ‘Superman is Superman’

The problem is that this sentence, while grammatically well-formed, does not belong to ordinary, idiomatic English. Ordinary speakers do not understand it, and they certainly would never use it. Not even a Millian philosopher would use it as a regular convention to express informative identities. It is a sentence belonging to Millian philosophical theory. There seems to be no ordinary idiomatic way to express the proposition about Kent’s identity with Superman in plain English that is as good as ‘that Clark Kent is Superman’. If the semantically expressed proposition and the pragmatically conveyed proposition were truly distinct, it should be possible to find an idiomatic sentence that would express that pragmatically conveyed proposition

directly. There is none, and that militates in favor of the view that informative identity sentences like ‘Clark Kent is Superman’ are the conventional (and hence semantic) direct way to express informative identities.

5.6 Soames’ Descriptive Enrichment Account

Like Salmon, Soames (2002) proposes a theory that attempts to show that ordinary speakers’ intuitions about cognitive and truth-value in Frege’s puzzle cases do not in fact falsify Millianism. Like Salmon, Soames claims that these erroneous intuitions are rooted in the failure of ordinary speakers to distinguish semantics from pragmatics, i.e., the failure of ordinary speaker to distinguish between the propositions that sentences semantically express—singular propositions, and the descriptively enriched singular propositions that they pragmatically convey. Unlike Salmon, who is non-committal with respect to the pragmatic mechanisms involved, Soames specifically identifies *descriptive enrichment* as the pragmatic mechanism. Another salient difference is that Soames, in his 2002, never mentioned propositional guises and some readers took his failure to mention propositional guises to imply that his account dispensed with them. However, in response to criticism from Salmon and Braun after publication of his 2002, in his Précis of Beyond Rigidity (2006) Soames clarified that he never intended his account to leave out guises and he accepted propositional guises is an essential part of Millianism. Soames wrote in his 2006:

“Although this is the conclusion of part 1, I did not argue in the book, and I do not believe, that descriptive enrichment is a universal solvent for dissolving all anti-Millian intuitions. In particular, I intended it to augment, not replace, the Millian idea -- championed by Nathan Salmon -- of different ways of entertaining and believing the same proposition.” (5)

With respect to our Clark Kent/Superman case, Soames would claim that the proposition

that speakers would always semantically express with their utterances of identity sentences such as (1) and (2):

- (1) Clark Kent is Clark Kent
- (2) Clark Kent is identical Superman

would be the trivial, uninformative, and *a priori* singular proposition PROP-1, the proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super. But what speakers would pragmatically convey in uttering (1) and (2), in certain conversational contexts, would be different *descriptively enriched singular propositions* differing in cognitive value (both in informativeness and epistemological status). The descriptively enriched proposition the speaker pragmatically conveys by uttering (1) is supposed to be uninformative and *a priori*. By contrast, the descriptively enriched singular proposition the speaker pragmatically conveys by uttering (2) is supposed to be informative and *a posteriori*. In uttering (1) and (2), a speaker may pragmatically convey the descriptively enriched singular propositions that would be semantically expressed, e.g., by utterances of sentences (1 DESP) and (2 DESP):

- (1 DESP) Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter is Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter
- (2 DESP) Clark Kent the mild-mannered Reporter is Superman the strong superhero¹⁰⁰

The propositions that (1 DESP) and (2 DESP) express could be schematized as:

¹⁰⁰ Soames thinks that numerous propositions may be asserted by a single utterance. Furthermore, the exact nature of the propositions asserted may be a partially indeterminate matter.

DESP-1 <<<Kent-Super, *the mild-mannered reporter* >, <Kent-Super, *the mild-mannered reporter* >> identity >

DESP-2 <<<Kent-Super, *the mild-mannered reporter* >, <Kent-Super, *the strong superhero* >> identity >

On Soames' theory, (1) and (2) would typically be uttered by speakers to convey propositions such as DESP-1 and DESP-2 (as well as a range of other descriptively enriched propositions). DESP-1 and DESP-2 are singular propositions because the proper names occurring in (1 DESP) and (2 DESP) directly refer (via the directly referential names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman') to Kent-Super. They are "descriptively enriched", meaning that the descriptive material (underlined in (1 DESP) and (2 DESP)) supplements or enriches the singular propositions with descriptive information salient to or presupposed by the participants in the conversational setting.¹⁰¹ Descriptively enriched propositions are hybrid propositions—part singular and part descriptive.

According to Soames, speakers do not need to *actually* utter (1 DESP) and (2 DESP) (although perhaps they could if they wanted to) because, in the context of the particular conversational setting in which they utter (1) and (2), there is mutual knowledge between the speaker and the audience hearing the utterance in the conversational setting and this shared knowledge enables the audience to ascertain the speaker's assertive intent—that he intends to convey the descriptively enriched singular propositions, DESP-1 and DESP-2 (which could also be directly semantically expressed by utterances of (1 DESP) and (2 DESP) if the speaker chose to do so).

The difference in cognitive value between the descriptively enriched propositions DESP-

¹⁰¹ The names in (1 DESP) and (2 DESP), as in (1) and (2), are Millian and directly referential.

1 and DESP-2, which are pragmatically conveyed by the speaker in uttering (1) and (2), is supposed to explain our Fregean intuition that (1) and (2) express distinct propositions. Ordinary speakers fail to distinguish between the proposition that (1) and (2) semantically express—which is the same trivial *a priori* singular proposition PROP-1, *that Kent-Super is Kent-Super*—and the descriptively enriched propositions, DESP-1 and DESP-2, that speakers convey pragmatically. So they tend to judge, in error, that (1) and (2) express different propositions.

Likewise, in the propositional attitudes puzzle, Soames maintains that we have the erroneous intuition that (3) differs from (4), and (5) from (6), in truth-value.

- (3) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent
- (4) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman
- (5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies
- (6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies

According to Soames, (3) semantically expresses the same proposition as (4), and (5) the same as (6), since the simple sentences embedded in the ‘that’-clauses of (3) and (4), and (5) and (6), have the same semantic content. Our erroneous judgment that these attitude ascriptions differ in truth-value is based on what they pragmatically convey about the descriptively enriched propositions Lois believes. For example, ascription (5) pragmatically conveys that Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter flies (which is false), and (6) pragmatically conveys that Lois Lane believes that Superman the strong superhero flies (which is true). So we judge, in error, that (5) is false and (6) is true.

5.7 Descriptive Enrichment in the Frege's Puzzle Cases: Genuine Cases of Descriptive Enrichment?

Soames claims that the pragmatic mechanism by which the propositions semantically expressed pragmatically convey descriptively enriched singular propositions is *descriptive enrichment*. This pragmatic process is often referred to as 'free enrichment' (to distinguish it from the sort of enrichment that arises from the determination of the semantic values of indexicals). In this section I will point out that descriptive enrichment that Soames claims occurs in the Frege cases is quite different in several respects from the descriptive enrichment that occurs in the two examples he gives in his book to illustrate descriptive enrichment, anecdotes which he calls *Coffee, please* and *Smoking and Drinking* (Soames 2002: 78). It is not clear to me if these differences are benign, or whether they signal a significant worry for Soames' theory. Perhaps Soames is running two sorts of pragmatic mechanisms together.

Coffee, please is an anecdote about a man who goes into a coffee shop, sits at the counter, and says to the waitress "I would like some coffee, please." Although he literally stated just that he wanted coffee—not specifying whether he wanted brewed coffee, coffee beans, coffee grounds, a truckload of coffee, etc.—the speaker descriptively enriches the word 'coffee' with a description such as **the brewed drinkable kind**. Hence, the enriched proposition communicated, what is said, is the proposition *I would like coffee, the brewed drinkable kind, please*. The descriptive enrichments are not spoken aloud, but they are an essential part of the proposition the speaker conveyed with his utterance. In Soames' second anecdote, *Smoking and Drinking*, Jeeves the butler utters: "I enjoy a cigarette after breakfast in the morning and a brandy before retiring in the evening." Jeeves does not expressly state how he enjoys the cigarette or the brandy—does he enjoy consuming them, looking at them, or putting them in his ear? In the conversational setting (which Soames presumes is a normal conversational context), Jeeves

means he enjoys *drinking* the brandy and *smoking* the cigarette. Jeeves descriptively enriches the words ‘cigarette’ and ‘brandy’ so that what is said is *I enjoy **smoking** a cigarette after breakfast in the morning and **drinking** a brandy before retiring in the evening*. Again, these descriptive enrichments are not spoken aloud, but they are an essential part of the proposition the speaker conveyed with his utterance.

The descriptive enrichments Soames claims occur in the Frege’s puzzle cases differ from those in the *Coffee, Please* and *Smoking and Drinking* cases in several ways:

First, the descriptive enrichments change the reference of the expressions in the *Coffee, Please* and the *Smoking and Drinking* cases, but they do not do so in the Frege’s puzzle cases. Consider the *Coffee, Please* case. The word ‘coffee’ can refer to different things in different conversational settings, depending on how it is descriptively enriched. If enriched by **the brewed drinkable kind** at the counter in the coffee shop, it would mean *brewed coffee*, and if enriched by **the whole bean kind** in another setting (for example, if the word ‘coffee’ were uttered in a store exclusively selling whole bean coffee), it would mean *whole bean coffee*. The expressions ‘brewed coffee’ and ‘whole bean coffee’ do not co-refer. Brewed coffee is not the same thing as whole bean coffee. Hence, the following descriptively enriched identity sentences (with the enrichments made explicit), (15) and (16), express false propositions:

(15) Coffee, the brewed drinkable kind, is coffee, the whole bean kind

(16) Brewed coffee is whole bean coffee

Brewed coffee and whole bean coffee are *not* the same thing (although they are, in part, *made out of* the same thing). By contrast, Clark Kent and Superman *are* the same person. That is precisely what a speaker would state in uttering the true informative identity sentence (2):

(2) Clark Kent is Superman

Sentence (2) is true, full stop. No matter what any name referring to Kent-Super might be descriptively enriched with, according to Millianism, it rigidly refers to Kent-Super. The descriptive enrichment does not change the name's reference. Hence, according to Soames the following (synonymous) descriptively enriched identity sentences are true:

(1 DESP) Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter is Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter

(2 DESP) Clark Kent the mild-mannered Reporter is Superman the strong superhero

Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter *is* identical to Superman the strong superhero—they are the same person, whereas brewed coffee is *not* identical to whole bean coffee. In the Frege cases, unlike in the examples of enrichment Soames gives, there is co-reference of the expressions flanking '=' no matter what sort of descriptive enrichment there may be. The descriptively enriched identity sentences are true, just as the unenriched identity sentences are. In the *Coffee, Please* case, the descriptively enriched identity sentences, (15) and (16), are false because of the different enrichments. Hence, it is not clear to me that the same pragmatic process is present in the Frege's puzzle cases—at least not the same sort of descriptive enrichment that Soames' presents through the *Coffee, Please* case.¹⁰² There is a disanalogy.

Secondly, in the *Coffee, Please* and *Smoking and Drinking* cases, the descriptive enrichment is unconscious and automatic. Neither the speaker nor the hearer would typically be consciously aware that certain salient facts in the conversational setting are furnishing a

¹⁰² The same change of reference happens in the *Smoking and Drinking* case. For example, smoking a cigarette \neq eating a cigarette.

significant element of the meaning of the utterance. However, in the Frege cases, by contrast, a speaker who uttered 'Lois believes that Superman can fly but that Clark Kent cannot' would be clearly consciously aware that he uses 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' to communicate different information. The speaker chooses syntactically distinct terms, reflecting conscious design on his part. If Soames is right that the speaker is descriptively enriching 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman,' he is doing it by conscious design, not automatically and infra-consciously as in the *Coffee, Please* case.

Thirdly, in the examples of enrichment Soames gives us, the sentences explicitly spelling out the enrichments are true only if the sentences with the enrichments left implicit are true. 'I want coffee, the brewed drinkable kind' (explicit), uttered by a patron to a waitress at the counter of a coffee shop, expresses a true proposition only if 'I want coffee' (implicit), expresses a true proposition in that situation. 'I enjoy smoking a cigarette after breakfast' (explicit) expresses a true proposition only if 'I enjoy a cigarette after breakfast' (implicit) express a true proposition in that context. However, in Soames' cases of descriptive enrichment vis-à-vis Frege's puzzle, the sentences in which the enrichment is made explicit are true but the sentences with the enrichments left implicit are false (according to Millianism). For example, the sentence 'Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter is Superman the strong superhero,' where the enrichments are made explicit, would, according to Soames, semantically express a true proposition. Lois does not believe that a mild-mannered reporter is a superhero. However, the sentence 'Lois Lane does not believe that Clark Kent is Superman,' where the enrichments are left implicit, would semantically express a *false* proposition (according to Millianism the latter sentence is false because Lois Lane *does* believe the singular proposition PROP-1, the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super), and that sentence semantically

expresses the proposition that Lois fails to believe PROP-1, the singular proposition that Kent-Super is Kent-Super).

I do not know what import these differences between *Coffee, Please* and *Smoking and Drinking* and the Frege cases has. The differences do give me some pause. Perhaps there are two sorts of descriptive enrichment going on here.

5.8 How Soames's theory fares on the four worries set out in 5.1

In section 5.1 supra I set out four worries (list a-d) that I have with respect to Millian theories in general. I'll now state how I think Soames's theory fares with respect to these worries: the **Guise Definition Problem**, the **'Pragmatic Mechanism Problem**, the **Ignorance of Identities Problem**, and the **No Direct Expressibility Problem**.

5.8.1 The Guise Definition Problem

Soames stated (2006), in response to criticism by Salmon and Braun, that propositional guises are an essential part of any Millian account. In his 2002, Soames had appeared to attempt a guise-free purely pragmatic solution to the puzzles. Given that the notion of propositional guises is not clear, and Soames does not attempt on his own to define the notion of propositional guises, Soames fares about as well as Salmon in this point. We are left with an intuitive and metaphorical understanding of guises.

5.8.2 The Pragmatic Mechanism Problem

Soames' theory fares better here than Salmon's theory because Soames clearly identifies a pragmatic mechanism, descriptive enrichment, by which semantically expressed propositions

pragmatically convey further, richer propositions. I raised a worry about Soames' use of descriptive enrichment – there seem to be some differences between the sort of descriptive enrichment in the Frege cases and in the *Coffee, please* and *Smoking and Drinking* cases he uses to illustrate descriptive enrichment. I do not know what significance, if any, these differences have, or what they reveal about Soames' theory.

5.8.3 The Ignorance of Identities Problem

Here, Soames' theory runs into a problem. Soames seems to be saying that Lois Lane is ignorant of the descriptively enriched descriptive proposition expressed by (2 DESP):

(2 DESP) Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter is Superman the strong superhero

As I mentioned above, that proposition may be schematized as 2-DESP.

DESP-2 <<<Kent-Super, *the mild-mannered reporter* >, <Kent-Super, *the strong superhero* >> identity >

But what is this descriptively enriched singular proposition? I believe it is a hybrid proposition, which can be analyzed as a proposition composed of the following parts:

- (a) < < Kent-Super, Kent-Super >, identity >
- (b) < Kent-Super, *the mild-mannered reporter* >
- (c) < Kent-Super, *the strong superhero* >
- (d) < Kent-Super, *the mild-mannered reporter and the strong superhero* >
- (e) < < *the mild-mannered reporter and the strong superhero* >, identity >

I'll now show that Lois either already knows all the above propositions, or would be able to infer them from what she knows. Hence, Lois does not in fact fail to realize DESP-2, and it therefore cannot be the proposition of which she is ignorant.

Lois Already believes proposition (a), i.e., the *a priori* singular proposition that Kent-Super is self-identical. According to Millianism (and the facts of the Superman story) Lois Lane *already* believes proposition (b), i.e., the singular proposition that Kent-Super is a mild-mannered reporter, given her disposition to assent to the sentence 'Clark Kent is a mild-mannered reporter'. According to Millianism (and the facts of the Superman story) she *already* believes proposition (c), or the singular proposition that Kent-Super is a strong superhero, given her disposition to assent to the sentence 'Superman is a strong superhero.' (d) is also a proposition that Lois already believes, or at least one she could come to believe merely using logical inference. She already believes that Kent-Super is a reporter via believing that Clark Kent is, and she already believes that Kent-Super is a superhero via believing that Superman is. She should be able to infer effortlessly, via the *a priori* rule of logical inference, conjunction ("CONJ"),

(CONJ) if x is *f* and x is *g*, x is both *f* and *g*

that Kent-Super is both a mild-mannered reporter and a strong superhero. Finally, if Lois believes (d), then it follows that she also believes (e), since the truth of the descriptively enriched singular proposition (d) is sufficient for the truth of the descriptive proposition (e).

DESP-2 therefore cannot be the proposition that Lois fails to realize about Kent's identity

with Superman, for she already realizes DESP-2.¹⁰³ What then is the proposition of which Lois is ignorant? Soames does not tell us. Problematically, if someone were to say, ‘Lois Lane does not realize that Clark Kent the mild-mannered reporter is Superman the strong superhero’, they would be asserting a falsehood. Lois does in fact believe that, according to Soames, or at least she could come to believe this proposition merely by reflecting on her beliefs and using logical inference. This is quite worrisome for Soames’ theory.

5.8.4 The No Direct Expressibility Problem

It is unclear how to state the proposition of which Lois Lane is ignorant with respect to the identity of Clark Kent and Superman in Soames theory, as discussed above. But even if we presumed that there were some way to express this proposition directly in Soames’ theory, I suspect it would be some complex theory-laden sentence, rather than an ordinary, idiomatic English sentence.

5.9 Conclusion

Although I present no knockdown argument against Millianism, I take Millianism to be implausible. I would base this judgment on the fact alone that it runs counter to our Fregean

¹⁰³ Speaks (2011) makes a somewhat related point. He claims that on Soames’ theory the following sentence would pragmatically convey an *a priori* descriptively enriched singular proposition:

‘If Clark Kent exists and Superman exists, then Clark Kent is Superman’.

The problem, Speaks maintains, is that the descriptively enriched singular proposition pragmatically conveyed would need to be *a posteriori* to account for our (erroneous) Fregean intuition that the sentence semantically expresses an *a posteriori* proposition. But the pragmatically conveyed descriptively enriched singular proposition is *a priori*. So we cannot account for the Fregean intuition.

intuitions with respect to Frege's puzzle. In addition, both the theories of Salmon and Soames face the four worries I raised above, and neither theory satisfactorily addresses all of them.

CHAPTER 6

THE HIDDEN INDEXICAL THEORY

The Hidden Indexical Theory (“HIT”) is a variant of Millianism specifically designed to solve Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitudes. Stephen Schiffer first proposed the HIT in his 1977. On HIT, (3) and (4) express different propositions and differ in truth-value, consistent with the intuition of ordinary speakers. This is contrasted with (directly referential) Millianism discussed above in chapter 4, which take a counterintuitive stance on truth-value, claiming that (3) and (4) express the same proposition and have the same truth-value.

(1) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Clark Kent

(2) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent is Superman

HIT holds that propositional attitude ascriptions semantically express a *ternary* relation between the ascriber, the singular propositions expressed by the ‘that’-clauses of (3) and (4), and a propositional mode of presentation or propositional guise. The HIT theorist proposes that the ‘that’-clause of every propositional attitude ascriptions contains a *hidden* indexical—an indexical that has no syntactic representation. This hidden indexical picks out the propositional guise under which the ascriber (or maybe the ascriber, or both) takes the proposition that ‘that’-clause would ordinarily express were it not embedded in a propositional attitude ascription, and the indexical contributes that propositional guise semantically to content. Hence, despite the identical contributions of the proper names in (3) and (4)—they both contribute Kent-Super, the ‘that’-clauses do not co-refer—they refer to different entities, which I shall call ‘singular-propositions-under-propositional-guises.’ Because the ‘that’-clauses of (3) and (4) do not co-

refer—they refer to different singular-propositions-under-propositional-guises—(3) and (4) do not express the same proposition and may differ in truth-value. (3) and (4) state that Lois stands in the belief relation to different singular-propositions-under-propositional-guises.

This account might sound similar to the Guise Millian Approach (e.g., that of Salmon), except that, according to the Guise Millian Approach, propositional guises are not semantically contributed to the propositions expressed by (3) and (4). On a Millian view like Salmon's, the truth-value of (3) and (4) are a function only of the singular proposition to which the 'that'-clauses refer. Since the 'that'-clauses refer to the same singular proposition, (3) and (4) express the same proposition and have the same truth-value. Although Salmon recognizes the existence of the BEL relation, which is ternary, unlike HIT theorists Salmon maintains that the belief relation reported by attitude ascriptions is binary: it is the psychological relation between the singular proposition semantically expressed by the 'that'-clause and the ascriber.

My principal criticisms of HIT are:

- (a) HIT is *ad hoc* because it only solves the Propositional Attitudes puzzle and does not solve the Identity Sentences puzzle, which is the more fundamental puzzle,
- (b) HIT is otiose/superfluous because any solution to the Identity Sentences puzzle (whether a pragmatic or semantic solution) should automatically entail a solution to the Propositional Attitudes puzzle; we should start with the identity sentences puzzle and then solve the propositional attitudes puzzle based on that solution; and
- (c) On the HIT, *all* propositional attitude ascriptions contain a hidden indexical referring to a propositional mode of presentation, even those ascriptions in which

the speaker has no intention of indicating any propositional mode of presentation under which he, the ascriber, or the audience take the proposition. This is a worry for the HIT because in many cases, speakers express what I call ‘Millian ascriptions.’ They have no intent to communicate the conceptions or guises under which they take the singular proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause.

With the Identity Sentences puzzle, we seek to explain why (1) and (2) differ in cognitive value. Guise Millians will explain the difference in cognitive value when Lois sees them written or hears them uttered in the following way: Lois takes (1) and (2) to express different propositions, because, when presented by these sentences, she takes these propositions expressed by (1) and (2) under different propositional guises and she fails to realize these are guises of the same proposition. That is why they differ in informativeness and cognitive value vis-à-vis her. But an *enlightened* speaker, by contrast, knows that Clark Kent is Superman. How then can an enlightened speaker take (1) and (2) under different propositional guises? Well, there is a story that an adherent of Millian Pragmatist Approach could tell: the enlightened speaker confuses semantics and pragmatics. That confusion leads the enlightened speaker to say, in error, that (1) and (2) express different propositions, when what he really should say is that they pragmatically suggest/convey different propositions. An HIT theorist might adopt the following hybrid strategy by claiming both that the appearance to enlightened speakers of cognitive value differences between (1) and (2) is an illusion rooted in the fact that (1) and (2) pragmatically convey different information and enlightened non-Millian speakers fail to distinguish semantics from pragmatics. Here, ordinary speakers with non-Millian intuitions are laboring under an illusion. On the other hand, the apparent difference in truth-value between propositional attitude

ascriptions (3) and (4) to enlightened speakers is *not* an illusion, according the HIT theorist, because there *is* a genuine difference in truth-value (due to the different contributions made by the hidden identical to the semantic content of the ‘that’-clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions). So in one puzzle, the identity sentences puzzle, there is a conflation of semantics with pragmatics, whereas in the attitude ascriptions puzzle, there is no such conflation. This is an *ad hoc* strategy. We have one strategy to solve one puzzle—claiming there is a cognitive value illusion in the Identity Sentences puzzle (rooted in a conflation of semantics and pragmatics by enlightened speakers), and a completely unrelated and dissimilar strategy to solve another puzzle—claiming there is no truth-value illusion in the Propositional Attitudes puzzle. This strategy would not be *ad hoc* if the Identity Sentences puzzle and the Propositional Attitudes puzzle were distinct puzzles. I take that to be implausible just because I take the puzzles to be two versions of the same puzzle. Take (1) and (2), with their different cognitive values (even for enlightened speakers). As soon as you embed them in the ‘that’-clause of a propositional attitude ascription, you have an apparent difference in truth-value. Given that the only thing happening in this case is the embedding of (1) and (2), the apparent difference in cognitive value and the apparent difference in truth-value are intimately related. They seem to both be explained by the same underlying phenomenon. Ergo, whichever phenomenon explains the cognitive value difference in the Identity Sentences puzzle must be responsible for the difference in truth-value (or an appearance of a difference) in the Propositional Attitudes puzzle. The problem with the HIT is that it does not respect this and unwarrantedly treats the puzzles as distinct.

We should start out with solving the identity sentences puzzle and see if that leads to a solution to the propositional attitudes puzzle. It seems to me that *whatever* solution one arrives

at for the identity sentences puzzle —be it a semantic solution claiming that (1) and (2) express different propositions, or a pragmatic one that claims they express the same proposition but pragmatically suggest different propositions)— that solution should naturally entail a solution to the propositional attitudes puzzle. Hence, seeking a solution to the propositional attitudes puzzle should begin with seeking a solution to the identity sentences puzzle.

Let us suppose the solution to the Identity Sentences puzzle turned out to be *pragmatic* in nature, such as proposed by some Millians. We explain the difference in apparent cognitive value for enlightened speakers between (1) and (2) as an illusion generated by the different pragmatic implications the sentences have and by the failure of ordinary speakers to distinguish between semantics and pragmatics. This solution entails the following solution to the Propositional Attitudes puzzle: the apparent difference in truth-value between (3) and (4) would be explained as an illusion generated by the further illusion that the propositions expressed by (1) and (2), which are identical to the propositions referred to by the ‘that’-clauses of (3) and (4), are different propositions. In other words, one could explain the appearance of a truth-value difference between (3) and (4) as an illusion directly inherited from the illusion that (1) and (2) express different propositions. This would obviate the need to posit a hidden indexical. For example, we would explain Jimmy Olson’s (allegedly) erroneous belief that (3) and (4_n) are consistent as follows: Jimmy thinks that the propositions to which the ‘that’-clauses of (3) and (4) refer, which are also the propositions that would be expressed by un-embedded utterances of (1) and (2) respectively, are different propositions. So Olson thinks that ascriptions (3) and (4) report Lois Lane as standing in the belief relation to different propositions.

Suppose, on the other hand, that the correct solution to the Identity Sentences puzzle were *semantic* (as, e.g., on the TIUT), explaining the difference in apparent cognitive value between

(1) and (2) via a real and non-illusory difference in the propositions expressed by those sentences. The Propositional Attitudes Ascriptions puzzle would automatically be solved. Ascriptions (3) and (4) would *in fact* express different propositions: they would say that Lois stands in the belief relation to two different propositions. The appearance of a difference in truth-value between (3) and (4) would be easily explained as a genuine and non-illusory difference in truth-value following from the fact that the ‘that’-clauses in (3) and (4) really would refer to different propositions.

Another problem for the HIT is its failure to distinguish what I call Millian ascriptions from Conception-indicating ascriptions. They are treated in the same way on the HIT. For the HIT proposes that *all* propositional attitude ascriptions contain a hidden indexical that makes reference to the propositional mode of presentation, and propositional attitude ascriptions express the relation between ascribers and propositions under the propositional modes of presentation under which the ascribers take them. But with many, if not most, propositional attitude ascriptions, the intent of the speaker is not to communicate any information about propositional modes of presentation. When I utter ‘John believes that Bill Clinton is tall,’ I may very well have no idea how John conceives Bill Clinton. Therefore, it is highly implausible to claim, as the HIT does, that in uttering the ascription sentence I say anything about the propositional mode of presentation under which John takes the proposition referred to by the ‘that’-clause of the ascription (‘that Clinton is tall’). My intent in uttering the ascription sentence may be just to inform my audience that John believes *of* Clinton that he is tall, without taking any position whatsoever on how John conceives Clinton. By contrast with the HIT, the TIUT recognizes a distinction between the sorts of propositional attitude ascriptions in which the ascriber does intend to communicate information about conceptions (Conception-indicating Ascriptions),

and those in which the ascriber does not (Millian ascriptions). That there are these two sorts of propositional attitude ascriptions seems to be a datum that any theory of proper names must take into consideration. The HIT's failure to do so is a mark against the theory.

CHAPTER 7

FORBES' THEORY OF PROPER NAMES

On Forbes' theory of proper names (1990), as on the TIUT, a dossier is locus in the mind where an agent stores conceptions that s/he takes to be about the subject of the dossier. Forbes holds that dossiers are labeled with proper names. But there are significant differences in the semantics of belief reports according to Forbes' theory and the TIUT. On Forbes' theory, the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions (5) and (6) are schematized as follows (the semantics of sentences (5) and (6) are schematized by 5-F and 6-F, respectively):

- (5) Lois Lane believes that Clark Kent flies
- 5-F Clark Kent is such that, for Lois' so-labeled way of thinking of him, α , **Believes** (Lois, $\langle\alpha, \text{flies}\rangle$)
- (6) Lois Lane believes that Superman flies
- 6-F Superman is such that, for Lois' so-labeled way of thinking of him, β , **Believes** (Lois, $\langle\beta, \text{flies}\rangle$)

In the case of her 'Clark Kent' labeled dossier, Lois has a conception of Kent-Super (the subject of the dossier), α , that represents him as being incapable of flight. In the case of her 'Superman'-labeled dossier, Lois has some conception of Kent-Super (the subject of the dossier), β , that represents him as being capable of flight. Forbes' theory seems to work well in the case of ascription sentences (5) and (6) because it makes plain why (5) is false and (6) is true. Lois has two dossiers that represent Kent-Super in different ways and as having different properties. Lois does not realize that these dossiers have the same subject, nor does she realize that the conceptions in the dossiers are about the same individual, Kent-Super.

Forbes' theory is known as a "logophoric" analysis of proper names because the term 'so-labeled' is a logophor. A logophor is an expression that refers back to a previously mentioned expression (contrast this with an *anaphor*, which is an expression that refers back to a previously mentioned *object/individual*.)¹⁰⁴ With 5-F and 6-F (which schematize the underlying semantic structure of (5) and (6) respectively), the expression 'so-called' is logophoric because it refers back not to Clark Kent or Superman (i.e., Kent-Super, the flesh-and-blood man himself), but rather to the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' *qua* labels for dossiers containing different conceptions of Kent-Super.

Unlike the TUIT, Forbes' account claims that no reference is made to the *ascriber's* 'Clark Kent'-labeled or 'Superman'-labeled dossier(s). Nevertheless, on Forbes' account it is implicit that the ascriber has 'Clark Kent'-labeled or 'Superman'-labeled dossiers (or perhaps a single, doubly labeled dossier) by virtue of the fact that the ascriber utters these names. He must draw these names from a dossier or dossiers that he, the ascriber, labels with these names.

On the TIUT, the ascriber aims to entertain dossiers that match Lois' in terms of subject and conception so that his mental architecture approximates hers. Attitude ascriptions are possible, according to the TIUT, because the ascriber can see things from the perspective of the ascribee; or at least, he or she attempts to model his or her mental architecture so that it matches the ascribee's as much as possible. Then, the ascriber can indexically gesture at his or her own dossiers and refer to them. These dossiers are of the same type as Lois', matching hers in both subject and conceptions, so it is as if they were Lois'. Forbes (1990, 548) call this an "a believer oriented" theory of belief ascriptions, and he makes it clear that his theory is *not* of this sort.

¹⁰⁴ E.g., in the sentence "Lois thinks Clark Kent is weak, but in reality, he is not," the expression "he" refers back to Clark Kent, the man himself, and not to the expression "Clark Kent." Here, "he" is an anaphoric expression).

According to Forbes' theory, the ascriber does not aim to discern conceptions that the ascribee associates with the name 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman' or the sort of conception that the ascribee has in his or her respective 'Clark Kent'-labeled and 'Superman'-labeled dossiers.

Forbes' theory comes up against two very serious obstacles. The first consists in explaining the possibility of attitude ascriptions in cases where the ascribee has dossiers without proper names labeling them. Consider Jennifer Saul's case, mentioned above, where a woman, Nicole, meets Kent-Super in both Clark Kent and Superman personas, and she thinks that Clark is boring and drab while Superman is witty and urbane. However, she does not learn either the name 'Clark Kent' or 'Superman.' Lois would presumably have two dossiers: one for the Clark Kent persona, and another for the Superman persona. Neither of these dossiers would be labeled with these names. Perhaps they are labeled with definite descriptions, or with images (i.e. what the subject of the dossier looks like), or perhaps they would have no labels at all. Despite the lack of labels on Lois' dossiers, the ascriptions sentence 'Nicole believes that Clark Kent is dull and boring and Superman is witty and urbane' is manifestly true. But, on Forbes' account, the sentence would be false. For Lois does not have 'Clark Kent'- and 'Superman'-labeled dossiers.

The second problem comes from Kripke's Paderewski puzzle. Peter has two 'Paderewski'-labeled dossiers. The sentence 'Peter believes that Paderewski had musical talent' says, on Forbes' account, that Paderewski's having musical talent is consistent with the conception in Peter's 'Paderewski'-labeled dossier. The sentence 'Peter believes that Paderewski did not have musical talent' says, on Forbes' account, that Paderewski's having musical talent is *inconsistent* with the conception in Peter's 'Paderewski'-labeled dossier. How, on Forbes' account, are we to distinguish between Peter's two 'Paderewski'-labeled dossiers, and the different conceptions in them, if the only information we know about the dossier is the

name(s) they are labeled with? These labels are identical, so we have no way to distinguish between Peter's two dossiers, one with a musician conception and the other with a politician conception. On Forbes' account, the ascriptions sentences contradict one another. The ascriber is guilty of contradicting himself.

The TIUT is not vulnerable to either of the problems mentioned above. The conception-indicating character provides that Nicole has a dossier token, which is of the same dossier type as the ascriber's 'Clark Kent' dossier, and that Nicole has another dossier token, which is of the same dossier type as the ascriber's 'Superman' dossier token. Nicole does not need to have dossiers that represent their subjects as bearing any particular names. That Nicole's dossiers represent their subjects as bearing different names from the corresponding dossiers of the ascriber (or even the possibility that Nicole's dossiers do not contain any representations at all with respect to the names the subjects of her dossiers bear) does not prevent her dossiers from being of the same type as the ascriber's. Her dossiers can be of the same type even if the conception they contain fail to match the *exact* conception contained in the ascribers' dossiers. So, even if Nicole's two dossiers lack labels and even if the representation contained in her 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' dossiers fail to match the ascriber's, her dossiers can be of the same type as those of the ascriber.

The TIUT also can solve Kripke's puzzle, where Forbes falters. As argued in section 2.12, the fact that the ascriber has only one name for Paderewski is no obstacle to his coining partially descriptive names to refer to his two dossiers on Paderewski: one that contains a musician conception and one that contains a politician conception. He can describe Peter's beliefs by uttering the Conception-indicating ascription 'Peter believes that Paderewski the musician has musical talent, but not that Paderewski the Politician did.'

CHAPTER 8

THE SAUL CASES

The Saul cases, first discussed by Jennifer Saul in her 1997, presents an additional puzzle (not presented by either version of Frege's puzzle) that any theory of proper names must explain. Namely, the substitution of one proper name for another can (seem to) change the truth-value of a sentence, even for enlightened agents, and even *outside of* the context of propositional attitude ascriptions (i.e., even when the substitution occurs outside of the 'that'-clause). In Frege's puzzle concerning propositional attitude ascriptions, apparent changes in truth-value were occasioned only by substitutions *inside* of the 'that'-clause. Substitutions outside of 'that'-clauses in 'simple' sentences (i.e., sentences that are not propositional attitude ascriptions) only changed the *cognitive value* of the sentence, never its truth-value. For example, enlightened speakers perceive cognitive value differences between (1) and (2), but they do not perceive any truth-value differences. An enlightened speaker may rationally think that (1) and (2) express different propositions, but he or she may not rationally think that they differ in truth-value.

The Saul cases considered here are (17)-(18) and (19)-(20)

- (17) Superman is more successful with women than Superman
- (18) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent
- (19) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out
- (20) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out

The intuition of enlightened ordinary speakers is that (17) is necessarily false, (18) is true, and that (19) and (20) express inconsistent propositions, so (19) and (20) must necessarily have

different truth-values.

Saul, a Millian, claims that both (17) and (18) are literally false. (17) is false because a person cannot be more successful with women than himself. (18) is false because, according to Millianism, it expresses the same false proposition as (17). Saul claims, contrary to the intuition of ordinary speakers, that (19) and (20) cannot differ in truth-value, because Clark Kent going into the booth and Clark Kent coming out is the same thing as Clark Kent going in and Superman coming out, since Clark Kent *is* Superman. For the Millian, both (19) and (20) express the same proposition, the proposition that Kent-Super went into the phone booth and Kent-Super came out. Ordinary enlightened speakers' intuitions line up with Millian truth conditions only in the case of (17) (where the intuition, shared by Millians and ordinary speakers, is that (17) is false).

I contend, in agreement with Moore (1999) and Pitt (2001), that the cases Saul puts forward do not involve substitution of co-referential names at all, at least, as far as enlightened speakers are concerned. In agreement with Moore and Pitt, I claim that 'Superman' and 'Kent' as they appear in (18) and (20) above are not co-referential when uttered by enlightened speakers. These cases therefore do not constitute cases of substitution of co-referential names. The *appearance* of a difference in truth-value in those cases is explained by the TIUT (and Moore and Pitt) as a *genuine* difference in truth-value. Indeed, it is explained by 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' referring to different things.

With Moore and Pitt, I hold that these names in (18) and (20) (when uttered by enlightened speakers) refer to something like different *aspects* of the same individual. Or maybe they refer to individuals as they outwardly appear differently. 'Kent' means something like Kent-Super-wearing-a-suit-and-glasses, and 'Superman' means something like Kent-Super-wearing-a-superhero-costume. Kent-Super-wearing-a-suit-and-glasses is **not** identical to Kent-

Super-wearing-a-superhero-costume (even if the person who underlies those entities is one single person). So ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are not referring to something identical in these sentences. The names fail to co-refer in this context.

Enlightened speakers will utter (18) to express the proposition that Kent-Super-wearing-a-superhero-costume is more successful with women than is Kent-Super-wearing-a-suit-and-glasses. This *is* true. The enlightened speaker will utter (20) to express the proposition that Kent-Super-wearing-a-suit-and-glasses went into the phone booth and Kent-Super-wearing-a-superhero-costume came out. This is obviously distinct from the proposition that Kent-Super-wearing-a-suit-and-glasses went into the booth and Kent-Super-wearing-a-suit-and-glasses came out. When enlightened speakers are trying to draw a contrast, they use the names to refer to these different aspects of Kent-Super.

Suppose that a policeman arrives on the scene of a crime and wants to know what was observed. Two enlightened speakers, bystanders 1 and 2, are asked. Bystander 1 tells the police office that he observed Clark Kent go into the phone booth and Superman come out. But that is not what happened according to bystander 2. He observed Clark Kent dressed in a business suit go in and then Clark Kent came out, still dressed in a business suit. In this case, to contradict the bystander 1, bystander 2 utters (19) using the names to refer to aspects or appearances. His second use of ‘Kent’ is contrasted with bystander 1’s use of ‘Superman’.

We can see that the enlightened speakers in the example, bystander 1 and bystander 2, do not use the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ co-referentially. Here we will consider what they would say in case the police officer on the scene were a Millian philosopher, who is enlightened as to the identity of Clark Kent and Superman:

Bystander 1: I observed Clark Kent going into the phone booth and Superman came out.

- Bystander 2: Bystander 1 does not know what he is talking about. I observed Clark Kent go into the phone booth but Clark Kent, not Superman, came out.
- Millian Policeman: You guys are not disagreeing with one another. You observed the same things. You are both saying the same thing: that Kent-Super went in, and Kent-Super came out. For after all, Clark Kent and Superman are the same person—Kent-Super.
- Bystander 1: No, we genuinely disagree about what happened. I realize, of course, that ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ are names of the same person. But when I uttered ‘Clark Kent’, I was referring to Kent-Super *qua* reporter, dressed a particular way. I was saying that Kent-Super *qua* reporter went into the phone booth and Kent-Super *qua* Superhero came out. The other guy is saying that Kent-Super *qua* reporter went into the phone booth and Kent-Super *qua* reporter came out.

The phenomenon of ordinarily co-referential names being used in non-co-referential ways is omnipresent in language. Consider the German saying: *Was Hänschen nicht lernt, lernt Hans nimmermehr*. This means literally: What Hänschen (little Hans) does not learn, Hans (as an adult) will never learn. Roughly, this is equivalent to the English expression: you can’t teach an old dog new tricks. Here, Hans and *Hänschen* are names of the same (hypothetical) person, but refer to him at different life stages or aspects. Or one may sensibly say, without contradiction: ‘I’ve never been to Leningrad, but I have been to St. Petersburg.’ If the names as used here were co-referential, these sentences would make no sense; the speaker would have said something nonsensical or contradicted himself. Surely, the names must refer here to the city in different historical periods, i.e., different temporal and historical stages of the city.

The foregoing claim that names such as ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ refer to different aspects of Kent-Super *applies only to enlightened speakers* in the Saul cases. It is crucial that we distinguish between enlightened and unenlightened speakers. Suppose an unenlightened speaker, such as Lois Lane, utters (18). She does not realize that realize that Clark Kent and Superman

are the same person, so she would not use the names to refer to different aspects of him. She uses the name to refer to what she takes to be two different individuals. She uses 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' as Millian names. As uttered by Lois, (18) expresses the proposition that Kent-Super is more successful with women than Kent-Super. That is necessarily false. As uttered by Lois, (20) expresses the proposition that Kent-Super went into the phone booth and Kent-Super came out, and this is exactly what (19) would mean if she said it. So (19) and (20) do not differ in truth-value when she, an unenlightened speaker, utters them. This might seem worrisome, for suppose that Lois is also on the scene and utters (20) to the police officer to express her agreement with bystander 1 about what occurred. If Lois just expressed the proposition that Kent-Super went in and Kent-Super came out, then her statement is no more in agreement with bystander 1 than with bystander 2. But clearly, Lois' utterance of (20) and her dissent from (19) would strongly support bystander 1's version of what occurred at the scene. How do we explain this? I am going to bite the bullet and say that in fact an unenlightened speaker such as Lois Lane would not express the same propositions that an enlightened speaker would express in uttering the same sentences. Enlightened and unenlightened speakers have radically different knowledge of the facts, so it should not be surprising that this difference in knowledge leads to a difference in the propositions they express. I am claiming that when Lois utters (18)

(18) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent

she semantically expresses the false proposition that Kent-Super is more successful with women than Kent-Super, which is obviously false. This is not as counterintuitive as it might seem at first sight. Although (18), as uttered by Lois, literally expresses a false proposition, nevertheless,

enlightened speakers who hear Lois utter (18), knowing that she is unenlightened, can agree with Lois' statement by 'translating' her statement into other terms: the enlightened speaker will agree that Kent-Super *as* Superman is more successful than Kent-Super *as* Clark Kent.

Even though the proposition expressed when Lois utters (20) does not support bystander 1's version of the events any more than bystander 2's does, which is somewhat counterintuitive, the counter-intuitiveness is blunted once we realize that we would consider not just the proposition Lois semantically expresses in order to assess what she observed. We would also ask: who, out of bystander 1 or bystander 2, *would Lois have agreed with* had she known about the identity of Clark Kent and Superman? If she says that she saw Superman come out of the phone booth, given that she is unenlightened, we can infer that she saw Kent-Super dressed as Superman coming out, and this means also that she *would have* used the name 'Superman' to refer to his Superman aspect had she been enlightened when she made the statement. That is, we can use our knowledge about what unenlightened agents know and do not know, and the descriptive properties that they associate with names, to 'translate,' in a manner of speaking, their statements that are not about aspects into talk about aspects. When we carry out this translation, we see that Lois' statement supports bystander 1's version of the facts.

Moreover, were Lois to become enlightened about the identity after the incident, she would be disposed to utter sentence (20), both before and after the enlightenment, although the propositions she would express would be different vis-à-vis her utterances pre- and post-enlightenment.

Importantly, I deny that names used to refer to aspects (or individuals outwardly appearing differently) are the same thing as Conception-indicating names. 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman,' when used as Conception-indicating names, are *co-referential*—they both refer to

the same person—Kent-Super. Names used to refer to different aspects of an individual are, by contrast, *not co-referential*.

Hence, we could not solve either of Frege's puzzles by claiming that 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' refer to different aspects of Kent-Super. If the names 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' referred to aspects of Kent-Super in sentence (2) ('Clark Kent is Superman'), then (2) would turn out to be false. Clark Kent *is* identical to Superman. But different aspects of Kent-Super, his Clark Kent aspect and his Superman aspect, are not identical to one another. (Two different aspects of an individual are not identical—that is what makes them *two* aspects). If the names in (1)-(4) referred to different aspects of Kent-Super, Lois Lane's belief that Kent is not Superman would be *true*, and Olson's belief that Clark Kent is Superman would be *false*.

The Frege cases involve co-referential names used rigidly to refer to individuals, and the Saul cases do not. In the Frege cases, 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' both refer to Kent-Super. In the Saul cases, 'Clark Kent' refers to one aspect of Kent-Super and 'Superman' to a different aspect of him. The Saul cases show that there is in fact a *third* sort use to which a proper name may be put—to refer to an aspect of an individual, in addition to using it in a Millian or Conception-indicating way. The TIUT should therefore not be understood as a comprehensive description of all the ways that proper names can be used. Rather, the TIUT is a theory of proper names as used rigidly to refer to individuals (rather than aspects of them).

CHAPTER 9

ANTI-FUNCTIONALIST THEORIES

In the preceding sections of this dissertation, I have discussed various theories of proper names—Descriptivism, Millianism, and Indexical theories (including the TIUT). The common thread running through these theories is the assumption that proper names are primarily devices of reference. That is, a proper name is an expression semantically used by a speaker to denote a particular object. In all of these theories, a name determines a function from worlds to individual objects (or entities of some sort). On Indexical theories, this function varies from one context to another; on Descriptivism, this function picks out different individuals across worlds; and on Millianism the function is a constant function, picking out the same individual in all worlds.

By contrast with the above theories, which we may call “referentialist” or “functionalist theories” (because the semantic value of a name is always some function), in the past decade “anti-functionalism” or “non-functionalism” theories have become popular. These theories posit that names are not primarily devices of reference. Instead they have in the first instance other sorts of meanings that explain why they can be used to refer to objects or entities. In other words, according to these theories, the primary semantic meaning of a proper name is non-referential, and the referential use to which they can be (and regularly are) put is explicable as a consequence of this primary semantic meaning. To clarify, Anti-functionalists do not deny that names have an important referential use, but merely that this use is best explained in terms of names’ non-referential meaning. Anti-functionalists think their views are better poised than functionalism to explain some puzzling data about names.

The two principal versions of anti-functionalism are Variablism and Predicativism. Variablism (Cumming 2008) takes as its starting point the apt observation (probably first made

by Dever (1998)) and developed by Cumming (2008) that in some syntactic positions names can be bound to an indefinite antecedent, much in the way variables can be. Cumming uses this evidence, as well as further evidence he adduces with respect to names, to claim that names are also used as bound variables when they occur in other contexts where they look like they are used primarily as devices of singular reference. The second sort of Anti-functionalism is Predicativism, which maintains that proper names are predicates. The clearest statement of Predicativism at present is found in the paper “Names are Predicates” (2015) by the recently regretted Delia Fara. According to Fara, names such as ‘John’ means the same as the definite description “the bearer of ‘John’”, where the ‘the’ is an unpronounced or suppressed constituent of the predicate.

9.1 Variablism

I shall examine Cumming’s version of Variablism, which is articulated in his 2008. Cumming’s starting point is his observation on page 536 (in section 2.3 of his paper) that in his sentence (14) (reproduced below as my (21)), the second occurrence of ‘Ernest’ in the second sentence appears to be bound by the first (which is mentioned but not used).

- (21) There is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by the name of ‘Ernest’. Ernest is engaged to two women.

Moreover, this second occurrence does not have singular reference, at least a reading of (21) on which the speaker has no particular person named ‘Ernest’ in mind, but rather is making the general claim that *some* gentleman in that county has that name and is engaged to two women. One such a reading of (21), which is a plausible reading even if not perhaps the most intuitive

one, its truth conditions would be given by:

$$(21^*) \quad \exists xyz (\text{gentleman } x \wedge \text{in-Hertfordshire } x \wedge \text{named-Ernest } x \wedge \text{woman } y \wedge \text{woman } z \\ \wedge y = z \wedge \text{engaged } xy \wedge \text{engaged } xz)$$

The second occurrence of ‘Ernest’ functions as an existentially bound variable, rather than a referential expression with singular truth conditions. This data alone would not likely be strong support for Variablism—the view that names *are* variables, rather than the more modest claim that there are occasional occurrences of names where they can be used as variables. After all, a referentialist might admit that names could be put to various uses, but still maintain that they are principally devised of singular reference that admit of derivative uses that deviate from that primary semantic use, which it to refer. However, Cumming also expends a great deal of effort in his 2008 arguing for the thesis that names are variables *tout court*, and he wants to demonstrate this by showing how considering names to be variables can explain interesting and puzzling data about proper names. This would suggest that names are variables in the first instance and that referential uses are derivative of their use as variables. In these other contexts, he argues that considering names to be *unbound* variables (where they appear to be used referentially). Thus, he claims that names are always variables, sometimes bound (as in (21)) and sometimes unbound elsewhere.

The first piece of evidence that names can function as unbound variables begins in section 2.1 on page 529. Cumming claims to have found a distinction he claims is akin to the *de re/de dicto* distinction but with proper names rather than with definite descriptions. I advert the reader to that section of Cumming’s paper for the details of the discussion, which are complex, and I shall not reproduce his argument here. I shall claim that Cumming has not discovered any distinction similar to a *de re/de dicto* distinction, even if he has discovered an interesting

linguistic puzzle in need of explanation. Furthermore, I shall argue that positing that names function as bound variables is not an apt way to solve the puzzle, and I shall gesture at an alternate way of solving it.

In what follows, I shall here presuppose that the reader is familiar with Cumming's discussion in section 2.1 of his 2008. Cumming states the truth-conditions of sentence (KR)

(KR) Biron thinks Katherine (*de re*) is Rosaline (*de dicto*)

on page 549 (bottom) and 550:

“... (KR) states that that there is some use that refers to Katherine, but that Biron believes co-refers with ‘Rosaline’ (or more carefully, with the relevant use of ‘Rosaline’). This is intuitively true in the scenario described in section 2.1—so long as we allow “uses” to extend to internal deictic symbols—since the thrust of the example is that Biron has some internal deixis trained on Katherine, which he inwardly connects with the relevant use of ‘Rosaline.’ [Page 549-550]

As a preliminary matter, I think that the above paragraph mischaracterizes what Biron believes. Cumming says that for (KR) to be true, Biron must believe that his internal deictic representation of Katherine is connected to a relevant use of ‘Rosaline.’ But Biron might believe that Katherine is Rosaline even if he does not know that Rosaline bears the name ‘Rosaline’, for Biron might be familiar with Rosaline but not know her name. (KR) could still be true under these circumstances. I think what needs to be said instead is that (KR) is true iff Biron has a deictic representation of Katherine and some internal representation of Rosaline (which might not be the name ‘Rosaline’) and he connects these representations (i.e., he believes they co-refer or are about the same person).

I do not think Cumming has identified a *de re/de dicto*-like distinction with respect to names. He wants to draw a parallel with definite descriptions and gives the example of (FL)

(page 530).

(FL) Biron thinks the person who entered first (*de re*) is the person who entered last (*de dicto*)

The first definite description in (FL) is read *de re* and the second *de dicto*. His regimentation, which has the first definite description outside the scope of ‘thinks’ and the second inside its scope, nicely explain this. There is a stark difference between the two definite descriptions in (FL). The first is used by the speaker merely to refer, to pick out a particular individual on the basis of a property (*having entered first*) that the speaker thinks picks out that individual but which the speaker does not think Biron believes picks out that individual. The second definite description is used to say that Biron thinks the individual picked out by the first description has the property attributed by the second definite description.

If the names case involving (KR) is analogous, there will have to be a similar difference between the use of the two names ‘Katherine’ and ‘Rosaline.’ Now, if ‘Katharine’ is analogous to the definite description *the person who entered first* in FL, then the speaker uses ‘Katharine’ merely to refer, to pick out a particular individual on the basis of a property that the speaker thinks picks out that individual and which the speaker does not think Biron believes picks out that individual. Now, one candidate for this property is the property *being named Katherine*. The speaker does think this property picks out Katherine. But a problem is that, assuming Biron knows that Katherine bears the name ‘Katherine’, Biron *does* realize that Katherine, who the speaker is referring to, bears that name. What Biron fails to realize is rather that the person he danced with at the masque bears the name ‘Katherine’. So we do not have an analogous use. Furthermore, if ‘Rosaline’ is analogous to the definite description *the person who entered last*, then the speaker uses it to say that Biron thinks the individual picked out by the first name

(‘Katharine’) has the property attributed by the second name (‘Rosaline’). Now, let us suppose that the second name, ‘Rosaline’, is used to say that Biron believes that the property *being named ‘Rosaline’* applies to the referent of the first name, ‘Katharine.’ Assuming Biron knows that Rosaline bears the name ‘Rosaline’, it is true that that Biron thinks ‘Rosaline’ applies to Katharine. So we do have some analogous use here.

I worry that Cumming’s theory is overly metalinguistic. Let us suppose that Biron does not know either Rosaline or Katherine’s name. (KR) can be true even if Biron does not know any names at all for Katherine and Rosaline. He might know both women without knowing their names. In this case, the speaker of (KR) would not be asserting that Biron believes that Katherine bears the name ‘Rosaline’. Biron believes no such thing. He believes that Katherine *is* Rosaline, not that she bears that name. This shows a great disanalogy with (FL). For in (FL), the speaker is attributing to Biron a belief about a property putatively borne by an individual. With (KR), this is not happening. What is being attributed is identity between two individuals, not a property. The names ‘Katherine’ and ‘Rosaline’ have the same role – to refer to two individuals, whereas in (FL) the definite descriptions play two very different roles. If the names are being used just to refer to individuals in (KR), having the same function, the (FL) and (KR) cases cannot be analogous.

With (FL), the speaker uses the first definite description to refer to an individual and represents that individual in a way that Biron would not agree with, since he would not agree that that person came in first. With (KR), what representation about Katherine does the speaker of (KR) use to identify her but that Biron would not agree with? Again, it is true that Biron would not agree with her being named ‘Katherine’, but this is also true of the name ‘Rosaline’. Furthermore, unless we think that the name ‘Katherine’ means something like *person named*

'Katherine' It does not seem to me that there is any such representation that Biron would not agree with. It is not the assertion that she is named *'Katherine'*. That is too metalinguistic.

What Biron fails to realize is that she *is* Katherine, not that she is named *'Katherine'*. After all, he might know her without knowing her name. So suppose that the speaker represents that she is Katherine, but Biron fails to realize this. But this cannot be right. The fact that she is Katherine is the trivial fact that the person who is Katherine is Katherine. That is just the fact that Katherine is self-identical. Surely, Biron knows that. He is dancing with Katherine, and he clearly knows that the person who he is dancing with is self-identical, and that person is Katherine. He would not express that fact by uttering *'Katherine is Katherine'*, but he clearly realizes the fact.

As far as I can see, the only thing Cumming achieves through his regimentation is to explain why the speaker of (KR) asserts that *'Katherine'* necessarily refers, while the speaker makes no assertion that *'Rosaline'* refers. As far as the speaker is concerned, *'Rosaline'* could be an empty name, given that it is within the scope of *'thinks'*. But this distinction between a necessarily non-empty name position (or at least, one taken to be non-empty by the speaker) and a potentially empty name position is not the *de re/ de dicto* distinction. Moreover, I am suspicious of this distinction, since I doubt that empty names exist. Even *'Santa Claus'* refers to something—perhaps a fictional character. And I can imagine a true sentence in which the name in the first position refers to something fictional (and thus “empty”). Thus, I can perfectly well imagine that the sentence *'Biron thinks that the Easter Bunny is Santa Claus'* could be true. (In any case, the emptiness or non-emptiness of the name in the second name position is beside the point, as in the scenario described in section 2.1, it is stipulated that both the names *'Katherine'* and *'Rosaline'* refer.)

In short, I do not see how Cumming's regimentation accounts for any difference between 'Katharine' and 'Rosaline' in (KR) to explain the difference between how the names function. Clearly, there is a difference in need of explaining, but it does not seem to be a *de re/de dicto* distinction, or even something like one. I think something else entirely explains the difference. *Contra* Cumming, I do not see any reason to doubt the principle of the symmetry of identity in these sorts of cases. If I believe that A is B, it follows that I believe that B is A. I see sentence (RK) as true, strictly speaking, since (KR) is true.

(RK) Biron thinks Rosaline is Katherine

Admittedly, (RK) does strike us as intuitively false. However, I think the intuition is erroneous, and we can explain the apparent falsity of (RK) based on pragmatic considerations.

To see that (RK) is strictly speaking true, consider the following scene taking place the morning following the masque. Biron approaches Rosaline and says: "You are the person I danced with at the ball last night", intending "the person I danced with at the ball" to be a rigid designator. He says, in effect: *You are dthat [the person I danced with at the ball]*. Since the person he went to the ball with was Katharine, he rigidly designates Katherine. Thus, in saying "You are the person I danced with at the ball" to Rosaline, he is telling her that she is Katherine. He is not saying she is *named* Katharine, but he is asserting that she, Rosaline, is Katherine. By the weak disquotation principle, he believes the proposition that Rosaline is Katherine. (Of course, he also believes she is not Katherine when he considers the question under different modes of presentation of Rosaline).

How *should* we explain the difference between the different occurrence positions of the

names in sentences like (KR)? Here's a salient difference between the names positions in (KR). Although Biron does technically believe that Rosaline is Katherine (as argued above), the nature of his confusion is such that he would never think that Rosaline was Katherine in the sense of *calling* her 'Katherine.' He would never kiss Rosaline by accident thinking she was Katherine, if it was Katherine he liked and wanted to kiss, for he is not confused about what each of them looks like. He still thinks of their personalities as distinct, and does not confuse them along this dimension. His belief that Rosaline is Katherine is limited to a mode of presentation engendering few interesting potential behavioral consequences. This is an asymmetry between the ways that he believes that Katherine is Rosaline and Rosaline is Katherine. Much more needs to be said to explain this asymmetry, but I think it is too quick to judge this asymmetry to being tantamount to a violation of the principle of the symmetry of identity.

Perhaps there is another difference between the first and second name positions. The first position tells the audience to focus attention, even perhaps visualize, that individual first. This focus enables the audience to an utterance of (KR) to best understand the nature and cause of the ascriber's confusion. When you contemplate how Biron's confusion of Katherine with Rosaline arises, you probably picture Biron approaching Katherine, seeing Rosaline's favor, then Biron looking at that favor and calling up a thought about Rosaline. You first consider Katherine, and then consider Rosaline. When you picture how the confusion arises, an image of Katherine is, at first, present before your mind's eye more vividly than Rosaline.

Because I consider this phenomenon to be explained by pragmatic factors or communication purposes (which I have only gestured at), I do not think it will be necessary for a theory of semantic content to address it. Cumming's puzzle is interesting, but I do not see how the variabilist thesis solves it.

The other factor that Cumming adduces in support of Variablism is his claim that it can solve Frege's puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions. Cumming's discussion of Frege's puzzle begins on page 544 in section 3.4. However, I shall now argue that Cumming's solution does not work.

Cumming (2008) claims that names can be represented at the level of logical form by variables, with each name represented by a distinct variable. For example, on a token utterance of sentence (22)

(22) Hesperus is visible

'Hesperus' could be represented by the variable x_{hes} , so that the semantic representation of (1) would be given by (22¹)

(22¹) *visible* x_{hes}

On a token utterance of sentence (23)

(23) Phosphorus is visible

'Phosphorus' could be represented by the variable x_{pho} , so that the semantic representation of (23) would be given by (23¹)

(23¹) *visible* x_{pho}

The truth-values of (22¹) and (23¹) would depend both on variable assignments (to variables ' x_{hes} ' and ' x_{pho} ') and world (for the extension of the predicate '*visible*').

Cummings calls (22) and (23) "open sentences" (544) because the variables occur free.

Open sentences denote what Cumming calls “open propositions”, such as (22¹) and (23¹), which are functions from variable assignments to what he calls “closed propositions,” which are open propositions with assignment made to all variables.

Despite the word “proposition” occurring in the expression “open proposition,” open propositions lack truth values and are therefore not propositions in the traditional sense, according to which propositions are the bearers of truth-value and sentences may be said to be true (or false) only in the derivative sense that they express a true (or false) proposition. This is important to note, because, as I shall argue below, it will turn out that Cummings’ open propositions are much closer to being sentences than propositions and this results in Cumming’s approach to Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions being overly metalinguistic.

Although Cumming contrasts Variablism with Millianism, there is one sense on which he is a Millian and another on which he is not. Millianism can either be defined as the view that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its bearer, or as the view that a proper name contributes its bearer and nothing else to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs. On the former definition, Variablism is not classifiable as a species of Millianism because Cumming posits the pre-assignment value of a proper name as an important semantic entity in addition to the name’s referent. However, Cumming is a Millian under the second definition, since he holds that only individual objects, not senses or other intensional entities, may be assigned to the variables representing proper names, and the semantic value of proper names in closed propositions is simply the referent and nothing more. At first glance, it appears that Cumming’s view faces the same challenges that face Millians in accounting for cognitive value differences (in Frege’s identity sentences puzzle) and apparent truth-value differences in Frege’s propositional attitudes puzzle), since ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ have the same closed content.

Nevertheless, Cummings proposes a non-Millian solution to the attitudes puzzle. He argues that propositional attitude expressions like ‘believes’ or ‘thinks’ operate on the *open propositions* denoted by the complement clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions (rather than the closed propositions, as is usually claimed). In this way, attitude ascription sentences such as (24) and (25)

(24) Biron thinks that Hesperus visible

(25) Biron thinks that Phosphorus visible

state the relation between Biron and the open propositions denoted to by the complements clauses, which are the open propositions (22¹) and (23¹), respectively. Thus, the content of (24) and (25) can be schematized by (24¹) and (25¹).

(24¹) Biron thinks *visible* x_{hes}

(25¹) Biron thinks *visible* x_{pho}

Since Biron stands in the ‘thinks’ relation to two different open propositions (containing distinct variables), (24) and (25) may have different truth values. Voilà, it appears we may have a neat solution to Frege’s puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions, showing how (24) and (25) can differ in truth value despite the co-reference of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’. This solution to the puzzle is distinct from the most common Millian solution to the puzzle, which is to deny that (24) and (25) semantically differ in truth value and claim they differ only in what they pragmatically suggest.

Cumming explains what it means to stand in the belief relation to an open proposition beginning in the final paragraph of page 545 and continuing onto page 546. In the final sentence

(page 546, top) he says:

“... you believe the aforementioned open proposition (*visible* x_{hes}) iff you have inwardly “tagged” that use of ‘Hesperus’ with the property of being visible (or iff you believe that the *referent* of that use is visible).”

My worry is that the above definition of the belief relation to an open proposition reveals that Cumming’s theory is far too metalinguistic to adequately address the propositional attitudes puzzle. To see this, consider sentence (26) below:

(26) The Babylonians discovered that Hesperus was Phosphorus before the Greeks did.

On Cumming’s theory, an utterance of sentence (26) is true if the Babylonians discovered that ‘Hesperus’ referred to the same celestial body as ‘Phosphorus’ before the Greeks did. But the problem is that the Babylonians did not use the names ‘Hesperus’ or ‘Phosphorus’ to refer to Venus. Only the Greeks did. The Babylonians had different names for Venus in its morning and evening star guises. So, sentence (26), which is intuitively well-formed and true, turns out to be false on Cumming’s theory. Cumming’s attempted solution is precisely of the sort that Frege rejected in *On Sense and Reference* when he stated that the discovery that Hesperus was Phosphorus was an astronomical discovery, not a linguistic discovery. The worry is that Cumming’s theory makes the discovery about language.

When used in sentences such as (26), where morning and evening star conceptions of Venus are an essential and vital part of what is being communicated by (26), we require a theory on which the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are used with a character that loads both Venus and morning star and evening star conceptions into the proposition. The Two Indexicals Theory of provides for this. On the TIUT, it makes no difference what names the Greeks and

Babylonians used for the morning and evening stars—the propositional attitude ascription attributes the same beliefs/discoveries to the Greeks and Babylonians regardless of what names they used to refer to Venus.

Another worry for Cumming's view is pointed out by Bryan Pickel (2015), the essence of which I think can be captured by the following hypothetical. Suppose that there were **two pairs** of heavenly bodies appearing under morning and evening star modes of presentation and that the name pair Hesperus/Phosphorus was used for both set of heavenly bodies. One heavenly body was Venus, and the other was a distinct planet, Schvenus. Now suppose someone were to utter sentence (26). Which heavenly body is being referred to, Venus or Schvenus? If we consider the complement clause of (26) *qua* open proposition, there is no answer to the question, for *qua* open proposition, no assignment has yet been made to the variables. Until an assignment is made, there is no fact of the matter as to what (26) is about. Pre-assignment, (26) is about *nothing* in particular. It is only the closed proposition that is about anything. Of course, the open proposition does tell us *some* important information: we can tell from the open proposition that there are *two* names putatively representing the same object, and so two variables in need of assignments. We can tell from (26) *qua* open proposition that those variables are to be assigned the same object, since the speaker is claiming the identity of those assignments. But that is minimal information, leaving out important information that is communicated by an utterance of (26): what object is the utterer of (26) referring to, Venus or Schvenus?, and what are the contrasting conceptions he associates with these names? Open propositions are too skeletal to constitute the full semantic content of the complement clauses of propositional attitude ascriptions. A satisfactory solution to Frege's puzzle about propositional attitude ascriptions awaits a theory according to which the closed propositions denoted by the complement clauses of

(24) and (25) turn out to be distinct. The TIUT is intended to be such a theory. The TIUT proposes to do this by building on the basic insight that names are indexicals or variables, but building into the character of names very specific parameters that determine content. In some cases ('Millian names'), the content is simply the name's referent, an object. In others ('Conception-indicating names'), the content is an intensional entity, a meaning, that denotes the name's referent. With sentences (24) and (25), the result is that the complement clauses have different closed contents, while at the same time, the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' rigidly designate the same object, Venus.

9.2 Predicativism

Predicativism is the view that names are predicates on *all* occurrences, both when they occur in predicate and in argument positions in a sentence. To say a name is a predicate is to say the name is true of its bearer. Thus, 'Aristotle' is true of Aristotle iff he is called 'Aristotle'. 'Aristotle' is semantically equivalent to 'the thing called 'Aristotle.'"

Delia Fara, whose 2015 "Names are Predicates" is considered the gold-standard of the Predicativist theory, contrasts Predicativism with "referentialism." *Uniform* referentialists hold that names are *never* predicates. As Fara correctly points out, this view is implausible, given that there are examples of sentences in which names are clearly used as predicates, such as in the sentence "There are many Smiths in the phone book". "Smiths" clearly means *persons called 'Smith'*. And no person or persons named 'Smith' are referred to by the use of "Smiths" in this sentence. *Nonuniform* referentialists, on the other hand, agree with Fara that names are sometimes used as predicates, but maintain that when "names occur as bare singulars in

argument position, they are referring expressions.” (Fara, 62). The novelty of Fara’s view consists in the claim that names are predicates in *both* predicate and argument positions. I shall argue that non-uniform referentialism is correct.

Here are some sentences in which names appear in the argument position that Fara should find worrisome. Consider propositional attitude ascription (27).

(27) Jennifer thinks Dave is coming to the party.

Suppose that Jennifer knows Dave only by his middle name, “Scott”, a name Dave sometimes goes by. If the semantic content of “Dave” in (27), is, as Fara would claim, *the thing called ‘Dave’*, then (27) would express the proposition that Jennifer believes the thing called ‘Dave’ is coming to the party. However, she believes no such thing. She does not think that anything called ‘Dave’ is coming to the party. She thinks rather that a thing called ‘Scott’ is coming to the party. So according to Predicativism, (27) is false. But (27) is intuitively true; after all, Jennifer *does* believe that Dave is coming to the party, even if she would call him ‘Scott’ rather than ‘Dave’.

To disarm this worry, Fara could argue that the name inside the complement clause of a propositional attitude ascription should (at least sometimes) be read *de re*. The name ‘Dave’, which is equivalent to the definite description ‘the thing called ‘Dave’’, could be read *de re* in (27), so that it would be true if Jennifer believes *of* Dave that he is coming to the party. However, this move would threaten to collapse her view into non-uniform referentialism. For in the vast majority of propositional attitude ascriptions, we would need a *de re* reading, i.e., referentialist reading, of the name. A *de re* reading would be mandatory wherever the speaker would consider the sentence true even if it turned out that the ascriber did not know that name or used a different

name. This would be the case with most ascriptions, because generally we do not intend the truth value of a propositional attitude ascription to depend on which name, if any, the ascriber would use to denote the individual denoted inside the complement clause. The only rare case in which we would want a *de dicto* reading would be with a sentence such as (28), where we are specifically saying that a person, Oliver, does not realize two names are co-referential.

(28) Oliver does not believe that Tully is Cicero.

Here, there is a reading of (28) where it says merely that Oliver does not know the names ‘Tully’ and ‘Cicero’ co-refer. In this case, we want (28) to express the proposition that Oliver does not know that the person called ‘Tully’ is identical to the person called ‘Cicero’.

This *de dicto* reading would not deliver the right truth-value for sentences such as (29).

(29) The Greeks did not originally know that Hesperus was Phosphorus

With (29), we are not saying merely that the Greeks were confused about the co-reference of names. Rather, (29) expresses the much broader proposition that the Greeks did not realize that Venus under a morning star mode of presentation was Venus under an evening star mode of presentation.

Since, if Predicativism were true, the reading of the names in complement clauses would almost always have to be referential, or *de re*, Predicativism starts to look implausible. For Predicativism claims that the rare exception case (the case where the name is read *de dicto*) should serve as the model for how names are used *in general*. Why not instead say that names are largely used referentially, and sometimes admit of other uses, including use as predicates, as the non-uniform referentialist would say? This would be a simpler explanation.

If Predicativism were true, we would also have to read most occurrences of names in simple sentences (i.e., *outside of* propositional attitude ascriptions) as *de re*. Consider Jennifer's utterance of (30).

(30) Scott is coming to the party.

Jennifer's friend Peter utters (31).

(31) Dave is coming to the party.

Again, 'Scott' and 'Dave' are names of the same person. Haven't Jennifer and Peter said the same thing? Don't they fully agree on who is coming the party? Don't (30) and (31) express the same proposition? If Predicativism were true, it would be difficult to explain why we take Jennifer and Peter to agree. On a *de dicto* reading, the semantic content of Jennifer's utterance would be: *the thing called 'Scott' is coming to the party*, and the semantic content of Peter's utterance would be: *the thing called 'Dave' is coming to the party*. These are different propositions. It is only on a *de re* reading that (30) and (31) would express the same proposition, such that we could claim that Jennifer and Scott made the same claims, which seems intuitively to be the case. So we need *de re* readings of names outside of propositional attitude contexts as well as inside of them.

The most serious worry is that Predicativism delivers the wrong content with sentences like (26).

(26) The Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus before the Greeks did.

On a *de dicto* reading of the names, (26) is false. The Babylonians did not discover anything

about the names ‘Hesperus’ or ‘Phosphorus’, and even the discovery the Greeks made was not about the names; it was an astronomical discovery, not a linguistic one. But even on a *de re* reading of both names, (26) would not express the right proposition. (26) would say that the Babylonians discovered that Venus was Venus before the Greeks did. That is not what (26) says. (26) says they discovered that Venus presented under a morning star mode of presentation was identical to Venus under an evening star mode of presentation.

I think we should distinguish between the truth conditions of *sentences* on the one hand, and truth conditions of the *propositions* they express on the other. Predicativism does not distinguish between these. Fara does not want to draw this distinction because, as she says, her goal is a *uniform* treatment of names on all occurrences. But there are good reasons to draw this distinction. Consider sentence (1) again.

(27) Jennifer thinks Dave is coming to the party.

There are numerous conditions that must obtain for sentence (27) to express the proposition it does. The word “thinks” must refer to the property of thinking in English. “Is coming” must refer to the property of coming to some place in English. “Party” must refer to parties in English. These are all things that must be true such that the sentence expresses the proposition it does, but these are not truth conditions of the proposition expressed. The proposition expressed is true if there is a certain person of whom Jennifer thinks he is coming the party. What makes the proposition true are not linguistic facts. Consider that the same proposition expressed by (27) would also be expressed by (32) in German.

(32) *Jennifer glaubt, dass Dave auf die Feier kommt.*

The linguistic facts that explain why sentence (32) expresses the proposition it does are distinct from the linguistic facts that explain why sentence (27) expresses the proposition it does. When we are inquiring into what propositions are expressed by sentences, we seek to understand what must be true about the non-linguistic world such that (27) and (32) are both true, and we thus need inquire into the truth conditions of the common proposition they express, rather than the distinct truth conditions of the distinct sentences.

Where there are metalinguistic uses of names or other expressions, the fact that a person or thing is called by a name is part of the truth conditions of the propositions expressed. The sentence “My parents named me Delia” is such a sentence. This proposition expressed is true if there is a person, who is Delia Fara, and her parents gave her the name ‘Delia’. That means that the name itself is what the sentence is about in part—the name is a constituent of the proposition expressed. But it seems to me this metalinguistic case is not the norm. It is the exception. It should be considered a distinct use of a name from a referential use. There is no reason to think that names only have one use, or that there is going to be some grand unified theory reducing all of their uses to one.

The phenomenon of expressions being used metalinguistically is not limited to proper names, but exist with *many* expression types in a language. Thus, consider sentence (33).

- (33) Jennifer thinks that Dave is going to a party, but does not realize he is going to a *Feier*

Here, “Party” and “Feier” (meaning *party* in German) are used metalinguistically. Here, ‘Feier’ means *the sort of thing referred to by ‘Feier’*. (33) is very plainly about Jennifer’s failure to understand that ‘party’ and ‘Feier’ are synonymous. However, the meaning of ‘party’ is not *the thing in English called a ‘party’*, nor is the meaning of ‘Feier’ *the thing in German called a*

'Feier'. Of course (27) and (32) being synonymous depends on facts about how speakers of English and German use these words. But the truth-makers of the proposition expressed by both sentence have to do with facts about what Peter's believes about what Jennifer believes, not facts about language.

I would thus propose that Fara's theory is a plausible theory of the truth conditions of sentence (27) *qua* sentence, but not with respect to the truth conditions of the proposition (27) expresses. With Frege's puzzle, the relevant question is about the nature of the proposition expressed by sentences and the truth conditions of these propositions. What are their constituents? Are content Millian, Fregean, or something else entirely? Fara's theory does not address this question. This likely explains why she does not discuss Frege's puzzle or propose any solution to it.

Recanati, an indexicalist, also thinks that proper names have a level of meaning similar to Fara's. In Direct Reference (1993), he states that the character of a proper name 'NN' is *the bearer of 'NN'*, while the content is NN, the referent itself. However, Recanati makes it clear that this meaning, *the bearer of 'NN'*, is confined to the level of *character*. By contrast, Fara's claim, which is that the predicate meaning of a name is its content, requires us to blur this important distinction between character (i.e., the linguistic meaning of an expression) and content (what the word contributes to the proposition expressed by the sentence in which it occurs).

CHAPTER 10

RECANATI'S THEORY OF MENTAL DOSSIERS

Recanati's central aim in his 2013 book Mental Files is to vindicate Singularism against Descriptivism. To this end, he attempts to reconcile the theory of direct reference with Frege's sense-reference distinction. Recanati notes that Russell's theory of acquaintance spectacularly failed to provide a theoretical foundation for singularism. Russell's theory allowed that one might be directly acquainted only with sense-data and perhaps with the self. With respect to names of macroscopic objects such as, e.g., Mont Blanc, Russell was forced to go descriptivist. Recanati claims that Frege's sense-reference distinction, on the other hand, could be adapted to vindicate singularism, despite Russell's claims to the contrary. The problem, argues Recanati, was Frege's construal of sense as descriptive in nature; even though Frege did not expressly define senses, the examples he gave strongly suggested they were descriptivist. As Recanati puts it "Russell's claim that a two-level semantics à la Frege is incompatible with Singularism therefore depends upon an overly narrow, descriptivist construal of 'sense', a construal that was encouraged by Frege himself but which was by no means mandatory." Descriptivist senses, of course, cannot be used to ground singularism, as Recanati notes. But *non-descriptive senses* could be so used, and this is Recanati's project. For him, mental files are non-descriptive modes of presentation or senses. Mental files contain representations with respect to the objects they are about and refer to those objects in virtue of their being contextually related to the files in the right sort of way.

What work can Recanati's non-descriptive senses do? It can solve what Recanati calls "Frege Cases." These are the well-known cases in which an agent believes inconsistent singular

propositions, e.g., an agent believes that Hesperus is bright but disbelieves that Phosphorus is bright. One of Frege's concerns, raised implicitly in his 1892, was how to explain how a rational agent could entertain these apparently contradictory thoughts. Frege proposed that such an agent is not irrational because his thoughts are distinct—not in fact inconsistent. For Frege, a *Hesperus is bright* thought and a *Phosphorus is bright* thought are distinct because the sense of 'Hesperus,' a constituent of the thought, is distinct from that of 'Phosphorus.' Recanati would not want to claim, with Frege, that 'Hesperus is bright' and 'Phosphorus is bright' express distinct thoughts/propositions because as a direct referentialist he wants to say that they express the same singular proposition, whose constituents are Venus and the property of being bright. But Recanati does want to use the notion of sense/mode of presentation to solve the Frege cases. He wants to say that the agent's rationality is saved because his thoughts involve Venus being presented under different non-descriptive modes of presentation, which amounts to his thoughts involving two distinct unlinked/unmerged files that the agent does not realize have the same referent. In simpler terms, the rationality of an agent who believes a pair of inconsistent singular propositions is saved by showing that the agent's mistake is due to ignorance, not irrationality; the agent is ignorant of the fact that his two files have the same reference. Thus, we can account for the agent's rationality in terms of non-descriptive modes of presentation that are based in acquaintance relations, and thus vindicate a thoroughly singularist picture, but on Frege's terms with his sense-reference distinction, not on Russell's unitary theory lacking that distinction.

The theory I defend in this dissertation, the TIUT, takes a similar approach to solving this puzzle, which Recanati calls "Frege cases" and I call the "problem of rational inconsistent belief." This idea of using mental files to solve this problem is not novel in Recanati—it is implicit in all file/dossier theories going back to Lockwood and Strawson, and is developed in

Forbes (1990). The idea is, again, that an agent suffering from identity confusion has two clusters of information, files, or dossiers, in his head such that he does not realize they refer to the same individual or object. Discovering the identity amounts to either linking these files together, or merging them into one larger file. An agent may rationally entertain inconsistent singular thoughts about Venus as long those thoughts involve distinct dossiers that the agent does not realize refer to the same object. An agent is rational as long as he does not *knowingly* believe inconsistent propositions, and the dossier/file metaphor elucidates what the agent fails to know—the co-reference of distinct files.

Despite my agreement with Recanati on this point, the theory I present goes in a very different direction from Recanati's theory. Despite addressing the "Frege cases," Recanati does not clearly state that he intends to address Frege's puzzle—either the propositional attitudes puzzle or the identity sentences puzzle. And it seems to me his theory is not up to solving the puzzle. To see that why, consider sentence (26).

(26) The Babylonians discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus before the Greeks did.

This sentence is intuitively true, but for a direct referentialist such as Recanati, it is literally false. 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are names of the same object—Venus, so (26) literally expresses the proposition that the Babylonians discovered the self-identity of Venus before the Greeks. That is clearly false, and this is clearly not what the utterer of (26) intends to communicate. No one was ever confused about the self-identity of Venus. Recanati could claim, perhaps, that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' corresponded to (or perhaps labeled) different files in the Babylonian's and the Greeks' minds, and this sentence is about the merger or linking of those files in both groups, saying that the Babylonians merged or linked them first. But this would be

insufficient to capture what sentence (26) communicates, for it is clearly about the discovery that Venus considered under specific morning and evening star descriptive modes of presentation were identical, not merely that the Babylonians and Greeks merged or linked *any old* files about Venus without regard to the descriptive representations in those files. I think we need a theory of content on which the descriptive representations inside mental files can sometimes become part of the content of an utterance where a name in the files is tokened. Such a theory should also explain how those descriptive representations are uploaded into the content of the proposition expressed (and I claim this happens via the character of the name, which picks it up from the utterance context, i.e., from the speaker's dossier). This would account for the names not being synonymous in some contexts, as in (26). Recanati's theory does not provide for this.

It is unclear, as a direct referentialist, whether Recanati would endorse the standard Millian strategy to use pragmatics to explain the phenomena in Frege's puzzles. He is silent on this issue. He is in fact silent on the vast majority of literature on Frege's puzzle. His theory is an interesting theory when considered as limited to the explanation of how dossiers can be grounded in acquaintance relations and therefore have externalist reference conditions, as well as accounting for identity confusion and ignorance without entailing irrationality, but it cannot constitute a comprehensive theory of content of name containing sentences, and indeed, it does not seem this is Recanati's aim.

The TIUT constitutes an attempt to improve in Recanati's claim that names are indexicals by describing two sorts of indexical uses—one on which they are not directly referential, and tie both uses of names into the dossier metaphor. Although Recanati is a proponent of dossiers, he does not integrate the dossier metaphor into his definition of the character of names, as the TIUT does. This other type of indexical use, which I call the conception-indicating use, seems to me

essential to explain Frege's puzzle without resorting to the sort of pragmatic explanations popular with Millians such as Salmon and Soames, which are counterintuitive.

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