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Imagery of psychological motivation in Apollonius Rhodius' *Argonautica* and early Greek poetry

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Abstract

This thesis adopts a cognitive-phenomenological approach to Apollonius' presentation of psychological imagery, thus eschewing the cultural-determinist assumptions that have tended to dominate Classical scholarship. To achieve this, I analyse relevant theories and results from the cognitive sciences (Theory of Mind, agency, gesture, conceptual metaphor), as well as perceived socio-literary influences from the post-Homeric tradition and the various advances (for example, medical) from contemporary Alexandria. This interdisciplinary methodology is then applied to the *Argonautica* in three large case studies: Medea and the simile of the sunbeam (3.755-60), Heracles and the simile of the gadfly (1.1286-72), and, finally, the poem's overall psychological portrayal of Jason. In so doing, I show that Apollonius conforms to cognitive universal patterns of psychological expression, while also deploying and deepening his specific culture's poetic, folk, and scientific models.

This is to certify that that the work contained within has been composed by me and is entirely my own work. No part of this thesis has been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

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Textual note

On the whole, I shall use Vian's Budé editions of the *Argonautica* (1974-81), Von der Mühll's *Odyssey* (1962), and West's *Iliad* (1998 and 2000). Any deviations, as well as significant textual disagreements, are discussed in the notes. Important abbreviations:

D-K	Diels, H. & Kranz, E. (eds.) (1951), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin.
L-P	Lobel, E. & Page, D. L. (eds.) (1955), *Poetarum Lesbiorum Fragmenta*, Oxford.
LSJ	Liddell, H. G. & Scott, R. (eds.) (1996)^9, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford.
PMG	Page, D. L. (ed.) (1962), *Poetae Melici Graeci*, Oxford.
PMGF	Davies, M. (ed.) (1991), *Poetarum Melicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, Oxford.
S-M	Maehler, H. (ed.) (1975) (post B. Snell), *Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis*, Leipzig (repr. Munich, 4 vols).

To clarify my interpretation of passages from the *Argonautica*, I have provided translations, which are based on Race's Loeb edition (2008). I have also mostly used the Latinised forms of Greek names.

*Quella figura è piu laudabile
che con l'atto meglio esprime
la passione del suo animo.*

That figure is most praiseworthy
which best expresses in its actions
the passions of its mind.

Leonardo da Vinci (1452—1519)

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will cast new light on Apollonius Rhodius' (henceforth, Apollonius) depiction of his characters' mindedness. By analysing key pieces of what I shall term psychological imagery both from within his cultural tradition, and—crucially—from the modern perspective of the cognitive sciences, I shall achieve a deeper understanding of his conception of human psychology.

I shall begin in Chapter One by exploring certain research areas from the cognitive sciences, the oft-used umbrella term for a wide range of academic disciplines (including psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience) that are unified in their attempt to further our understanding of the human brain and the concept of mindedness. Needless to say, these are large fields with ever-evolving theories, and, as such, I have had to exercise restraint and choose only those that I think are, on the one hand, most fundamental, and, on the other, those that can profitably be applied to Apollonius' poem and other relevant literature. These are Theory of Mind, what I term agency, non-verbal behaviour and gesture, and modern theories of conceptual metaphor. For ease of reference, I shall refer to these as cognitive universals, since, as I shall show, they are (in almost all cases) innate human abilities.

In Chapter Two, I turn to Apollonius' Alexandria to examine the culturally specific factors that bear on the *Argonautica*. These influences range from contemporary medical advances to the established literary myth. Crucial too is Apollonius' literary relationship with Homer, and specifically the latter's concept of the self involving the interplay of the so-called mental organs. With respect to the latter, for example, I shall show the extent of Apollonius' debt, as well as his poetic creativity.

In these opening chapters, then, I shall achieve an understanding of the cognitive universal and the culturally specific. These are emphatically not mutually exclusive,

and I shall argue that it is only with the benefits of both that we are able to achieve a comprehensive understanding of Apollonius' text.

Chapter Three sees the first case study: the sunbeam simile of Medea at 3.750-55. I shall argue that this is a piece of psychological imagery that both reflects the culture's folk and poetic models of psychological expression, and, at the same time, exhibits universal cognitive patterns.

In Chapter Four, I examine another piece of psychological imagery, that of the gadfly, which is used twice in the *Argonautica*: first, to describe the frantic movement of Heracles after the loss of Hylas (1.1286-72), and second, in the passage where Eros shoots Medea, and inspires in her a lustful passion for Jason (3.275-98). Again, I argue that a full understanding of these passages can only be achieved with the application of both the cognitive and cultural methodologies of Chapters One and Two. I shall show, for example, that Apollonius' conception of the emotion of *eros*, which motivates both protagonists, is both structured in terms of conceptual metaphor and employs and extends the relevant cultural models.

The final chapter examines Jason, Apollonius' presentation of whom has been greeted with what at times amounts to scholarly derision. Here, my cognitive analysis will come to the fore as I shall show that many of the scenes that have troubled interpreters can be given new meaning with Theory of Mind analysis. Furthermore, it will become clear that Apollonius' depiction of Jason conforms to his depiction of psychological activity throughout the poem.

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COGNITIVE UNIVERSALS

This thesis will look at the phenomenology of inner life and the way in which it is understood, constructed, represented, and expressed in terms of what I call psychological imagery.[1] By this, I mean the use of metaphor, simile, metonymy, as well as the symbolic appropriation of a wide range of different actions, movements, and symptoms, to talk and think about mental states. Such imagery is a fundamental part of any culture's shared model of mind and of any poet's specific approach to the depiction of mindedness.

In order to approach such a topic satisfactorily, it will be necessary to chart a course between two large schools of thought: the universalist position, purported by some evolutionary psychologists, who argue that human psychology is mainly determined by our biological adaption to a particular ancestral environment,[2] and the cultural-determinist position, which states that we are born as cognitive blank slates, and learn haphazardly through unique, necessarily culturally-determined events, which fundamentally shape our experience.[3] This thesis will argue that neither is entirely correct, and that both have useful contributions to make.[4] In terms of universals, the

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[1] I shall give an example of this from the *Argonautica* shortly.
[2] See, for example, Brown (1991), Pinker (1997), and various articles in Dunbar & Barrett (2007).
[3] See n.7 (below).
[4] This more cautious line is taken by Plotkin (2007: 11): '[m]ankind's natural place is in culture, and culture is part of human biology because it is our biology that gives us the ability to enter into culture. For this reason any contrast or opposition that it made between biology and culture, or between genes

nature of my subject dictates that two topics loom especially large: both an understanding of Theory of Mind and the metaphorical conceptualisation of emotion will be vital in order to comprehend Apollonius' psychological portrayal of his characters. As I shall show, both of these stem from humans' interaction with the physical world, and other agents within that physical world, and are therefore equally relevant to modern and Classical times. And yet it is only by adding to this an analysis of the specific culture's poetic, folk, and scientific models of psychological expression that we will achieve a fully rounded understanding.

While this thesis will explore many examples of cognition, motivation, deliberation, and decision-making, owing to the nature of the source material, the topic of emotion, again, will be large,[5] and within the study of this it is possible to see many of the arguments between universalism and cultural determinism played out.

Within emotion studies, certain scientists ascribe to the notion that, at a fundamental level, there are distinct, universal patterns: in all cultures studied, there are, for example, certain basic similarities in the way in which the emotion of anger is experienced, conceived, and expressed.[6] This universalism, it is argued, stems from the fact that all humans in all societies inhabit the same type of physical body, which houses the same mental faculties, and which is subject to the same constraints and

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and culture, or between evolution and culture, is an expression of a wholly wrong conception of the causal structure of the world.'

[5] As we shall see, many of Apollonius' protagonists act under the specific emotion of *eros*, and subsequently many of the discussions in this thesis will focus on protagonists' motivation, deliberation, decision-making and actions when experiencing this emotion. For a discussion on the definition of emotion, see Deonna & Teroni (2012), Oatley (2004), and Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1992). From a Classical perspective, and an overview of the examination of emotion in different cultures, see Chaniotis (2012), esp. 17-18. From this perspective, Cairns (2003b: 12) states that '[e]motions involve judgements and evaluations about states of affairs in the world; but they are not solely ways of seeing the world. They also encompass physical aspects in the form of their typical neurophysiological and visceral changes, and these, since they depend on the evolved organic nature of the species, cannot be entirely given by culture.' Emotion therefore is necessarily entwined with both biology and culture, both of which inform an individual's emotional experience.

[6] These concepts will be explored more fully in this introductory chapter, but, in short, emotional concepts, as well as our basic conception of the world around us, are formed of metaphors and metonymies that mainly derive from our experience as physical, embodied beings. For the conception of anger along these lines in American English, see Lakoff & Kövecses (1987).

biological, physiological, and phenomenological pressures when interacting with the external world. The opposite view to this is that of the cultural determinists, who argue that all features of a culture are determined by factors and conditions pertaining to that specific culture, and hence that anger in one culture is necessarily different to that of another.[7]

Ascribing to the universalist position, however, is not to say that all cultures understand, construct, represent, and express emotion in exactly the same way, for, at the specific cultural level, what are known as folk theories become more dominant. These folk theories, though, in attempting to explain real physiology, are bound by exactly the same pressures (biological, physiological, phenomenological, for example), and therefore also exhibit cross-cultural similarity. In short, then, folk theories are culturally specific manifestations of cognitive universal principles.[8]

This thesis, then, will examine Apollonius' *Argonautica* from both perspectives and show—contrary to the opinion of some Classical scholars—that his portrayal of his characters' psychology fits neatly into such cognitive universal theories, and, at the culturally specific level of third century BCE Alexandria, that he uses, probes, and develops his literary culture's poetic, folk, and scientific models. In this way, I shall situate Apollonius' psychological portrayal both within his immediate cultural context, and the wider, universal gamut of human emotional expression.

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[7] This hampers cross-cultural study since, necessarily, our own culture is bounded and separated from others in exactly this way. Within Classical studies, a proponent of this view is Muellner (1996: 1): 'there is no reason to assume that the metaphors, the rules, and therefore the emotions that they represent and that we tend to experience as inherent in human nature are actually universal'. For a critique of this view—and on the subject of anger in the Homeric poems in general—see Cairns (2003b). These opposing views are also critiqued in Theodoropoulou (2013), 433-46.

[8] Zoltan Kövecses, who works on cognitive theories of metaphor, is worth quoting at some length here (2000: 189-90): 'The social, cognitive, pragmatic, and bodily factors together provide the key constituents of the experience of emotion in human society for beings working under certain biological pressures, with a particular brain and cognitive system for handling these pressures, communicating in language or otherwise under certain pragmatic conditions, and having a particular kind of body. It is not really possible to take any one of these factors out from a comprehensive view of human emotions. They jointly define and constitute what we as human beings experience as emotion. ... Most of the richness of human emotional experience is, however, given by the specific-level cultural models [i.e. folk theories].'

A brief example of what I am considering to be psychological imagery, and what I mean by the move from the universal to the specific, will aid understanding here.[9] In Book 3, just after Eros has fired his love-inducing arrow, Medea is described thus (286-90):

> βέλος δ' ἐνεδαίετο κούρῃ
> νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίῃ, φλογὶ εἴκελον. Ἀντία δ' αἰεί
> βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα, καί οἱ ἄηντο
> στηθέων ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτῳ φρένες, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην
> μνῆστιν ἔχεν, γλυκερῇ δὲ κατείβετο θυμὸν ἀνίῃ·

> The arrow burned down beneath
> the girl's *kradie* like a flame. Continually, she threw
> flashing glances straight at the son of Aeson, and shrewd
> thoughts fluttered from her *stethos* in her trouble, and she had no other
> recollection, for she was flooded in her *thumos* with sweet pain.[10]

In this passage, we see psychological imagery in the form of the presentation of the effect of *eros*, which is envisaged as a flame that burns beneath Medea's κραδίη. Its effects are then reified as the wise thoughts that flutter (ἄηντο) from her στῆθος, and she is flooded (κατείβετο) with sweet pain in her θυμός.

From the cognitive perspective, there are certain universal elements to the portrayal of the effects of love in this instance. First, the emotion is envisaged as an external force that overcomes its victim, here in the form of a physical object – the βέλος – that hits Medea, and its effects – the flame (φλογί) and the pain (ἀνίη) – that burn and flood her, respectively. Secondly, the fact that the effects of *eros* are likened to a flame conforms to the universal conceptual metaphor LOVE IS FIRE. Thirdly, the underlying metaphorical imagery casts the protagonists as vessels, upon and within which reified psychological forces act, which corroborates the metaphorical conception of the self with a container metaphor, a specific type of conceptual metaphor that is termed an ontological metaphor. This can be seen primarily through

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[9] The methodological underpinnings of the following brief observations will be outlined in the rest of the chapter.

[10] I have transliterated the terms for the so-called mental organs, since I shall conduct a detailed analysis in Chapter Two where the ability to differentiate between them will be useful.

Apollonius' use of prepositions, which add spatial configuration to the action: νέρθεν ὑπὸ (of Medea's *kradie*) … βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην (of Jason, as a surface or object) … στηθέων ἐκ. The same effect is also achieved through vocabulary that implicitly envisages a container, such as κατείβετο.[11] Finally, the description of Medea's constant glances straight at Jason is an instance of non-verbal behaviour, which we might interpret here as denoting a high degree of amatory interest.

So much for the universal. At the cultural level, we must analyse Apollonius' linguistic expression through the lens of his poetic tradition. The intertextual relations that can be shown to exist between the *Argonautica* and other texts will, as we shall see, contextualise Apollonius' portrayal and imbue it with a deeper level of meaning.[12] In the passage above, we see that the βέλος, the physical object, that is here charged with *eros*, comes with inherent cultural baggage in the form of its traditional representation in Greek literature.[13] Richard Hunter, for example, argues

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[11] In fact here we see two levels of container: Medea is a container, as is her *thumos*.

[12] In arguing for such a relation between texts, it is necessary to deal with the notion of textual referentiality. Space precludes an extensive discussion, and, more to the point, I think that its application to the source material is more important than the theory in itself; thus, the ideological battle between allusion and intertextuality will not find fresh ground here. With this in mind, I follow the pragmatic comments of Kelly (2008), 165-75 and understand an allusion as 'the way a text redeploys or is influenced by an earlier text; the conscious or at very least subconscious use of words, ideas or associations from an earlier text in a way that can be recognised by an outsider'. While allusion, then, implies a degree of conscious authorial intention, intertextuality does not, and neither, importantly, does it implicitly specify source and receiving texts. Conte (1994: 812): '[intertextuality is a] phenomenon by which, in literature, each new text enters into a network of relations with other, already written texts (recalling them, imitating them, parodying them, in short, presupposing them'. For detailed discussion on this topic see Hinds (1998), especially the useful discussion on intertextual *topoi*, most pertinent to Apollonius, who wrote in a consciously Homeric style (34-47). With these definitions in place, then, there is a clear degree of crossover: all allusions are intertexts, but not all intertexts are allusions. Thus, in this thesis, I shall use the umbrella term 'intertext' to refer to relations between texts, though this differentiation should be borne in mind.

[13] For an analysis of the βέλος from both a contemporary philological as well as a cognitive perspective, see Cánovas (2011). He concludes (573-4): 'the arrows of love are neither the product of a single imagistic mapping from everyday language nor of a flash of inspiration based on the knowledge of specific literary texts. A process of conceptual integration, taking place probably through several centuries of Greek culture, shaped and refined the religious symbol. Then it was passed on to posterity as a literary and artistic motif, which became all-pervasive during the Hellenistic period. … Beyond the symbol's avatars through history, the conceptual analysis can also account for its great popularity. This magnificent blend perfectly realizes the major goals and principles of conceptual integration. It offers a simple and cohesive spatial schema grounded in embodied cognition and in very relevant cultural materials.'

that this scene is modelled on Pandarus' shot at Menelaus in *Il*. 4.116-26.[14] The idea that specific language has cultural and literary baggage is also evident at the level of single words: the description of Medea's thoughts fluttering (ἄηντο) from her is strongly reminiscent of Sappho 31, where the narrator states that her *kradie* in her *stethos* flutters (τό μ' ἦ μὰν / καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν,[15] 5-6) at the object of her gaze talking to the man opposite (ἐνάντιός, 2) her.[16]

Also at the cultural level, we see that Apollonius adopts Homeric psychological terms—κραδίη, στῆθος, φρένες, and θυμός (the so-called mental organs)—in his description of Medea's psychology, which raises questions about the relationship between Homeric and Apollonian psychological expression. Finally, the description of Medea's constant glances straight at Jason must also be viewed through the contemporary cultural expectations for an unmarried young woman and an eligible man.[17] This is required both within the poem's world of Colchis, and also again on a intertextual level, where it is commonly argued that the reader is encouraged to view Medea's infatuation with Jason as a reference to Nausicaa's similar feelings for Odysseus in the *Odyssey*.[18]

In this chapter and the next I shall explore in greater detail the topics briefly outlined above. The structure of this will reflect the move from the universal to the specific: beginning with cognitive principles that will be used in this thesis and ending with concerns relating to Apollonius' immediate literary culture.

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[14] Hunter (1989), 129, with bibliography.

[15] I shall analyse the verb here, πτοέω, in Chapter Three.

[16] For further analysis, and bibliography, see Acosta-Hughes (2007), 207-14; Campbell (1994), 259-62; and Hunter (1989), 130.

The similarity between Medea's *thumos* being flooded with sweet pain (γλυκερῇ δὲ κατείβετο θυμὸν ἀνίη) and Alcman fragment 59 (Ἔρως με δηὖτε Κύπριδος Ϝέκατι / γλυκὺς κατείβων καρδίαν ἰαίνει) is another example of such intertextual relationships between passages. The latter incorporates that same verb, but here governing a different metal organ (on which, see below). Also present is the idea of sweetness (γλυκύς), personified Eros, and Apollonius' ἐνεδαίετο mirrors Alcman's ἰαίνει.

[17] Campbell (1994), 259: '[i]t is as if this respectable virgin princess, whose αἰδώς is nowhere in evidence here, is looking her bridegroom straight in the eye at her actual wedding…' For contemporary examples of the gaze as an expression and a cause of *eros*, see Cairns (2013), 240n.13.

[18] For this common reading, see, for example, Hunter (1993), 69.

I. Cognitive universals

Are humans born with an innate ability to understand the world: a pre-programmed evolutionary path complete with universal waypoints? Or are we born as a cognitive blank slate, learning haphazardly through unique, necessarily culturally-determined events, which fundamentally shape our experience? I shall now analyse several branches of the cognitive sciences which attempt to cast light on these questions, and in so doing side with the former. These will, in turn, inform my critique of Apollonius' imagery in the following chapters. The topics that will be discussed below may strike the reader as common sense – the exposition of automatic and everyday mental processes – but this is intentional, as my aim is to shed light on such background inferences and apply them to the literature.

I.i Theory of mind

Theory of mind, which is sometimes abbreviated to ToM, or referred to as mindreading, mentalising, or folk psychology, is the mechanism by which we understand what is going on in other people's heads. Paula Leverage and her collaborators (2011: 1-2), writing in the introduction to a volume on the subject, define it as:

> the default understanding that other people are (largely) autonomous agents, that they have mental states commonly called beliefs and desires, and that they are motivated by these mental states. When we rely on our folk psychology, we tend to understand, define, and describe people on the basis of their perceived (or understood) beliefs, desires, feelings, values, experiences, and intentions. It is because we understand people's actions in terms of these mental states that we explain to ourselves and each other why people have done certain things, and predict what they might do in certain contexts.

It is not difficult to see that human interaction necessitates such a mechanism.[19] In fact, it is a widely held belief within the scientific community that mindreading is

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[19] O'Connell (1997: 2) states that 'it would be impossible to operate in any society' without this ability, and that it is 'the basic necessity of humanity and is understood the same way the world over'. For discussion on the evolutionary benefits that mindreading imparts, see, for example, Humphrey

itself linked to the rapid growth in both humanity's brain size and societal development. On this topic, Robin Dunbar (1996) first proposed the 'social brain hypothesis', which states that brain size correlates with group size.[20] Dunbar argues that the limiting factor on the size of a group is the number of individuals with whom personal relationships can be adequately maintained. For our evolutionary cousin, the chimpanzee, relationships are maintained by the physical act of grooming, which cannot exceed 20% of waking time before having a detrimental effect on the group's ability to secure resources, rear offspring, and other such necessary activities. The development of language allowed a greater number of relationships to be maintained, but also demanded greater neural machinery in order to compute and store progressively more mindreading interactions. This, then, accounts for the enlargement of the cortex through the evolution of lemurs, monkeys, apes, and humans.[21] Tomasello and collaborators (2005) write of the 'shared intentionality' – the ability to cooperate closely for a common goal against other groups – that produced the increase in human theory of mind ability.[22]

(1983) and Baron-Cohen (1995), 30, who studies the theory in those with autism. In fact, many aspects of our understanding of mindreading ability has come precisely from autistic people, who find it more difficult to operate effectively in society because of an impairment to their Theory of Mind. Baron-Cohen (1995: 32-65) creates his own three-level system for mindreading. The first, and most basic, level is the 'intentionality detector', which is activated when 'there is any perceptual input that might identify something as an agent'; second, the 'eye-direction detector', which is specific to the visual system and computes whether there are eyes out there and, if so, whether those eyes are 'looking at me' or 'looking at not-me'; and, finally, a 'shared attention mechanism', that enables 'triadic representations' and the ability to experience the same mental state by having a shared perception. This 'Theory of Mind Mechanism' knits these levels together into 'a coherent understanding of how mental states and actions are related.' On this scale, Baron-Cohen reports that those with autism show a 'massive impairment' of the shared attention mechanism, which renders them unable to mindread effectively. However, others disagree, specifically Tager-Flusberg (2000), who presents evidence that some autistic children are capable of passing the type of false-belief tests that Baron-Cohen's model predicts they would not. This does not, of course, render Baron-Cohen's perspective uninformative. For a recent summary of other Theory of Mind studies, see Boyd (2009), 141-9.

[20] Owing to the introductory nature of this chapter, I shall merely present Dunbar's hypothesis (as those of others) with relative brevity. Readers may follow up the references provided for further information. For a critique of Dunbar and mindreading, see Oatley (2011), 16-19.

[21] For more discussion on this see Boyd (2009), 141-2, with related bibliography at 435n.67.

[22] This is also discussed in Tomasello (1999), (2008), and (2009). Similarly, Oatley (2011), 17: '[i]t is not so much that that we have more general intelligence than our primate cousins. Rather, we are more socially intelligent… So as well as the number of people of whom we maintain mental models, yet more neural capacity has become necessary to allow Theory of Mind (models of other people's models).'

As with any live scientific field, there are competing versions of mindreading, which offer different explicatory mechanisms of its acquisition and specific processes. For the purposes of my study—the application of the theory to the *Argonautica* and related literature—such concerns, while not lacking merit, are secondary, meaning a lengthy rehearsal not appropriate:[23] acceptance of mindreading is widespread, allowing me to proceed to demonstrating the substantial ability of the concept in furthering our understanding of a source text. Consequently, I shall limit myself to a few important observations and findings.[24]

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[23] For an overview of the four competing approaches, see Nichols & Stich (2003), as well as Goldman (2012), 2-11. (It should be noted, though, that Goldman is a strong proponent of the Simulation Theory of mindreading, which argues that Theory of Mind works by an individual putting himself in the mental shoes of another; on this, see Goldman (2006).)
In an appeal to the certainty of scientific empiricism, those favouring Simulation Theory champion research into mirror neurons, in the belief that these constitute a neurophysiological underpinning for mindreading ability. These neurons, the discovery of which was first published in 1998 by Gallese & Goldman, analysed in the primary motor cortex of macaque monkeys 'respond both when a particular action is performed by the recorded monkey and when the same action performed by another individual is observed' (493). These were subsequently dubbed 'mirror neurons', since an action plan in the agent's brain was mirrored in the observer's brain, and the authors argue that this system could be construed as 'part of, or a precursor to, a more general mind-reading ability' (493-5). Analogous neural structure have been hypothesised in humans; see, for example, Fadiga *et al* (1995). The consequent claims are large; see, for example, Oberman & Ramachandran (2009), 39: 'the discovery of the mirror neuron system will do for psychology what DNA has done for biology'. Mirror neurons have spawned an impressive bibliography in their own right. (Notable other proponents in the field can be found amongst the authors and bibliography of Iacoboni *et al* (2005), while Goldman (2012), 11-13 surveys the most important contributions.) However, they are not necessarily the definitive smoking gun that proponents would like to believe. There are an increasing number of scholars who argue that existing interpretations of both the monkey and human experiments should be regarded with sizeable caution, and call for better experimental practices. (On this see Dinstein *et al* (2008), Jacob (2008), Hickock (2008), and Spaulding (2013).) It is noted, for example, that the invasive surgical techniques that were necessary to establish the definitive existence of mirror neurons in macaques has—for obvious reasons—not been conducted in humans, and therefore the existence of homologous structures in humans is an extrapolation from non-invasive, and thus more tangential, imaging technologies. Though this is not sufficient cause to rule out such existence—all agree that they are almost certainly there—it draws attention to the large inductive leaps that many scholars have made, especially with regard to assigning mirror neurons a significant part in the explanation of social cognition. The leap from the neuronal (neurons firing) to the cognitive level (action understanding) is simply too great, many would argue. Regardless, mirror neurons are an intriguing hint into how Theory of Mind might work in practice.
[24] It is worth noting that some of the early discoveries are still habitually adduced within the literature, despite there now being reasons to doubt their efficacy. One of the best examples of this is the false-belief task (sometimes referred to as the Sally-Anne task), which is reported in Wimmer & Perner (1983). The authors describes their experiment thus (103): '[i]n each sketch subjects observed how a protagonist put an object into a location *x* and then witnessed that in the absence of the protagonist the object was transferred from *x* to location *v*. Since this transfer came as a surprise they had to assume that the protagonist still believed that the object was in *x*. Subjects had to indicate where the protagonist will look for the object at his return.' Prior to the age of four, children typically answer incorrectly: Sally thinks that the object is location *v*. Older children, however, tend to answer the

Research has shown that mindreading is a universal human ability. Avis & Harris (1991) report that every culture that has been studied uses language with words or phrases for mental states.[25] The authors use a false-belief test to show that children from the Baka tribe, a preliterate hunter-gatherer people from south-east Cameroon, developed Theory of Mind ability at the same age as their peers in industrialised, literate cultures. They conclude that (1991: 465):

> [t]he fact that belief-desire reasoning emerges at approximately the same age in such diverse settings strengthens the claim that this mode of reasoning is a universal feature of normal human development.[26]

Of course, such universality—independent of culture and upbringing—is especially important for this study, as I shall argue in future chapters for its application in, and relevance to, Apollonius' *Argonautica* and earlier Greek literature.

The age at which infants acquire mindreading ability is of intense interest to developmental psychologists.[27] Until recently, it was commonly accepted that such

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question correctly—stating that Sally will think that the object is in location *x*—and thus display a more developed Theory of Mind by imputing the false belief to Sally. In fact, the evidence for early infant Theory of Mind is even stronger than that purported in the early experiments: Goldman (2012: 3-4) discusses and critiques this experiment, showing that certain experimental manipulations can enable three-year-old, and even fifteen-month-old, children to pass. Irrespective of the follow-up studies and the extent to which they alter the initial findings, Wimmer & Perner are responsible for some of the first forays into human mindreading. As I shall explore more fully in the secton below entitled Agency, other cognitive scientists, such as Meltzoff & Moore (1977), have shown that infants track face-like patterns more than un-face-like patterns even at the age of forty-three minutes. This infant intersubjectivity is the basis of what will go on to become a Theory of Mind.

[25] Premack & Woodruff (1978), 525; Brown (1991), *passim*; Gallese & Goldman (1998), 495; Goldman (2012), 2. Avis & Harris (1991) adduce many similar studies from different cultures. (See also Boyd (2009), 436n.77.) Also, appropriating humorous defiance of the scientific method in order to underline the strength of his conviction, Fodor (1987), 132: 'there is, so far as I know, no human group that doesn't explain behaviour by imputing beliefs and desires to the behaviour. (And if an anthropologist claimed to have found such a group, I wouldn't believe him.)'

[26] Methodologically, it should be noted that this study follows the foundational research and practices of Wimmer & Perner (1983), on which see that cautionary note (above). As such, Goldman's caveats should be borne in mind. However, in this instance we are not discussing competing theories of mindreading, but that mindreading is a fundamental feature of human interaction. Therefore, I would regard the study as providing relevant evidence for this particular point.

capacities develop gradually over the first four or so years of life, but Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), who showed that 15-month-old infants could hold false beliefs (a stepping-stone toward a full Theory of Mind), challenged that consensus. Extensive studies by different research teams using different experimental practices have corroborated these findings,[28] thus showing the innate nature of the ability.[29]

Theory of Mind ability has also been demonstrated in primates and other animals. It was, in fact, a defining study on a chimpanzee, named Sarah, which sparked the initial interest in mindreading. Premack & Woodruff (1978) observed that, when shown videos of humans confronting and solving problems, Sarah's responses when faced with the same problems indicated that she was, to some extent, imputing knowledge and intention to the humans, a form of mindreading that then allowed her to complete the problems successfully. Primates' Theory of Mind ability is not as developed as that of humans, however, as Michael Tomasello and his collaborators have shown more recently by examining the gesture of pointing and the ability to create shared attention (the ability to know things mutually with others) in primates and one-year-old human infants. Importantly, they found (2007: 717) that primates' pointing is only 'imperative/requestive', whereas human neonates point 'declaratively to simply share interest and attention in something with another individual … and … informatively to inform others of things they want or need to know'. Thus, while both demonstrate a Theory of Mind, that of the latter is more developed.[30]

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[27] Carruthers (2013), with exhaustive bibliography, is an excellent and up-to-date summary of the history of this question. An important classic study is Gopnick & Astington (1988).

[28] See Carruthers (2013), 141-2 and *passim* for discussion and contextualisation of these studies. The author concludes that the basic component of the mindreading system 'is available by around the middle of the first year of life. What changes over development are the interactions between this system and executive systems (together, no doubt, with elaboration of the information contained in the mindreading system resulting from the infant's own learning, including the acquisition of explicit concepts of truth and falsity). No new mechanisms are built or come online. And no deep changes in the representational resources available for mindreading take place thereafter' (167).

[29] Certain other abilities that underpin infants' ability to enact a Theory of Mind will be discussed below in the section on agency.

[30] Tomasello *et al* (2007), esp. 715, 717. They conclude (719-20): 'Pointing things out for other people seems like an exceedingly simple act. But it turns out that this is a uniquely human form of communication under natural circumstances, and it rests on a very complex and mostly hidden social-

It has been argued that humans' ability to create this shared attention (or joint intentionality, as it is sometimes termed) is linked to the morphological uniqueness of the human eye: Kobayashi and Kohshima (2001) have shown that three particular factors—a white sclera void of pigmentation, that humans possess the largest ratio of exposed sclera in the eye outline, and that the eye outline is greatly elongated in the horizontal—all of which are not shared with our primate cousins, allow enhanced communication using gaze signals.[31]

Theory of Mind ability is not confined to the Hominidae family. It has been shown that a bird will display a primitive form of mindreading by re-hiding food when it perceives that another bird has observed the location of the initial store.[32] The fact that the common ancestor of birds and primates is, evolutionary speaking, so ancient, suggests, then, that mindreading abilities were independently evolved. Again, this argument from primitiveness supports the application of Theory of Mind to Classical sources.

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cognitive, social-motivational infrastructure that, apparently, nonhuman species simply do not possess in anything like the human form. The social-cognitive part of the infrastructure comprises mainly the joint attentional frame, which rests on the ability to know things mutually with others, and the communicative intention that derives from skills of joint attention as it is essentially the intention that we know together that I want something from you. The social-motivational part of the infrastructure comprises the cooperative motives of helping (by informing) and sharing (emotions and attitudes) in a communicative context—and indeed these cooperative motives are not just expressed by communicators and understood by recipients; they are mutually assumed'.

[31] For more on eye-direction and Theory of Mind in humans, see Baron-Cohen (1994), 526-30.

[32] Dally *et al* (2010). Fascinatingly, the authors report that (17): 'jays only re-cache food if they have been observed during caching and only if they have stolen another bird's caches in the past. Naïve birds that have no thieving experience do not do so. The inference is that jays with prior experience of stealing others' caches engage in experience projection, relating information about their previous experience as a pilferer to the possibility of future cache theft by another bird'. They conclude that this (35): 'provides evidence for a form of Theory of Mind'. The study builds on an older set of experiments, which showed that plovers were sensitive to the eye-direction of nearby humans; on this, see Ristau (1990) and (1991). These show that the birds moved off and stayed away from their nests for longer periods when a nearby intruder was looking at the nests than when it was looking in the opposite direction, indicating that the birds could detect the eye and head direction of the intruder and interpret it as a threat. (On the uniqueness of the human eye, see the discussion in the main text.) Such behaviour is indicative of a Theory of Mind, and, again, if this is found in the animal kingdom, then *a fortiori*, it is true of humans.

Recently, by building on the work of the cognitive sciences, humanities scholars have begun to apply mindreading to literature. This field is relatively new, but the early thoughts of Robin Dunbar are useful for understanding how this process works. He describes three levels: first, the ability to be aware of our own thoughts; second, the ability to understand someone else's thoughts; and third, the ability 'to imagine how someone who does not actually exist might respond in particular situations'.[33] Literature and an audience's ability to entertain the type of issues that this thesis will explore, such as the psychology and specifically the decision-making ability of Jason, Medea, and Heracles, then, are a direct result of this third level. To cite other scholars in the field: 'when we read a work of literature, we treat characters as if they were real people, and we ascribe to them a [Theory of Mind].'[34]

I.II AGENCY

The ability to read minds requires several crucial underlying processes, and it is to one of these, which I shall term agency, that I shall now turn.[35] The studies adduced below strengthen and underpin what has gone before, as well as casting new light on what will come.

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[33] Dunbar (1996), 101-2. This is also the opinion of Zunshine (2006); see, for example, the discussion 'Why Do We Read Fiction' at 16-21, and Zunshine (2008). Zunshine (2006)'s central thesis is that we read fiction in order to give ourselves a cognitive workout, and that narrative extends everyday mindreading to more challenging situations. (It is argued that we begin to struggle with more than four levels of intentionality; for example: John *doubted* that Steven *accepted* that Brian *knew* what Fernando *said*.) For a scathing attack on this, though without undermining the central tenets of Theory of Mind and its application to literature, see Boyd (2006). Regardless, it seems logical that the human interest in narrative is inseperable from our Theory of Mind abilities.

[34] Leverage (2011), 2. Similarly, Dunbar (1996: 102), 'we can begin to create literature, to write stories that go beyond a simple description of events as they occurred, to delve more and more deeply into why the hero should behave in the way he does, into the feelings that drive him ever onwards in his quest'. Studies involving Theory of Mind are starting to make an appearance in Classical academia; see, for example, Budelmann & Easterling (2010), and, especially, Scodel (2014). The latter I shall use extensively in the forthcoming study on Jason.

[35] As will become apparent, my use of the single term agency is a simple shorthand for the interpretation and ascription of agency in another object.

It is a human universal to see other minds everywhere, even in places where they do not exist.[36] In 1944 Fritz Heider and Marianne Simmel published a groundbreaking paper which examined how individuals interpreted a short film.[37] (A still from the film is reproduced on the next page.) In it viewers see a large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle moving around the screen and occasionally entering a rectangle.[38] The participants were divided into three groups. The first two were shown the film twice, after which the first group (34 people) were asked to describe it, and the second (36) to interpret the movements as actions of persons and to answer questions relating to them. The third group (44) were treated like the second group, but the film was shown in reverse and fewer questions were asked. Under the conditions of the experiment, the participants ascribed the shapes' agency by perceiving their motion as constituting a functional relationship between them.[39] Almost all (barring one in the first group and two in the third) interpreted the movements of the objects in the film as 'actions of animated beings, chiefly of persons' (259), *i.e*. purposeful and intentional action. (There was more variation in the interpretations of the third group, presumably because the 'story' that emerged from the reversed film was less coherent.[40])

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[36] I shall return briefly below to examine our ability to identify agents correctly.

[37] An abridged version of the film (it is 1min 20secs in length, as opposed to the 2min 30secs stated in the article) can be seen online at http://goo.gl/2k0lB (accessed 7/7/2014). Heider & Simmel's research is similar to the contemporaneous work of Albert Michotte (1946/1963), who examined the 'Launching Effect', which showed that both adults and children interpret a sequence of moving dots as animate causality. The study of causal perception that builds on Michotte's foundation has been catalogued at http://www.yale.edu/perception/Brian/refGuides/causality.html.

[38] Heider & Simmel (1944), 244-5 describe the scenes that make up the film.

[39] On the innate requirements for agency ascription, see Pinker (1997), 322: '[a]gents are recognized by their ability to violate intuitive physics by starting, stopping, swerving, or speeding up without an external nudge, especially when they persistently approach or avoid some other object. The agents are thought to have an internal and renewable source of energy … which they use to propel themselves, usually in service of a goal'. Bassili (1976), 680 provides adept analysis of the results, on which also see his abridged comments in the note immediately below.

[40] Bloom & Veres (1999), B2 offer a similar interpretation of the results. An important addendum on this study has been added by Bassili (1976). While not disputing the results, he notes that (680) 'the researchers' intuitions undoubtedly played an important role in generating the motions of the figures, but these intuitions are poorly understood from a standpoint useful to the description of information for social perception'; or, more simply, that in the creation of the film, Heider & Simmel were somewhat begging the question of the participants' interpretation. Bassili produces experiments that show participants similar computer-generated films that were programmed to control the variants of 'temporal contingency' and 'spatial configuration'. He concludes that there is indeed a perception of interaction when a temporal relation was introduced to the random movement of two objects.

FIG. 1. EXPOSURE-OBJECTS DISPLAYED IN VARIOUS POSITIONS
AND CONFIGURATIONS FROM THE MOVING FILM.
Large triangle, small triangle, disc and house.

The first group, those not in any way primed to detect and attribute agency, thus interpreted the film in exactly the same terms as the second group, who were primed in this way, showing that such agency ascription is innate, even in such artificial situations involving objects that bear very little resemblance to actual, live agents.[41] The authors apply Darwinist theory in their interpretation of these results (256):

> It is obvious that this organization has many advantages from the point of view of achievement, i.e. from the point of view of the organism to the environment. The changes [of the objects in the film], when identified with a constant figural unit, no longer follow each other in an arbitrary and unconnected way. They are connected with invariable characteristics of reality. … the interpretation of movements is intimately connected with the interpretation of personality-traits of the actors, i.e. with the interpretation of invariancies.

Similarly, spatial contingencies were important to determining the nature of the interaction between the objects.

[41] On priming, see Kahneman (2011), *passim*. Bloom & Veres (1999) claim to have demonstrated that individuals will similarly attribute intentional states and actions to 'entities that are not strictly objects, such as teams and countries'. They showed participants films similar to those of Heider & Simmel (1944), but which contained groups instead of objects. However, as the authors admit, the groups used 'were quite object-like … bounded and, although they were not spatially continuous, their component parts were in a static spatial relationship with respect to one another'. Whether or not this is evidence for group agency attribution, as the authors claim, is slightly dubious; nevertheless, such a concern merely renders their experiment a replication of Heider & Simmel's, and would therefore constitute more evidence in the latter's favour.

It is easier, then, to keep track of one's environment, especially in a situation where that environment is unfamiliar, by ascribing agency and interpreting intent to objects. This tendency to see other minds everywhere is an evolutionary survival heuristic: it is better to have an agency detection system that indicates too many false positives than too many false negatives.[42]

The human agency detection system, which, as the research above shows, can easily be triggered mistakenly, is, of course, designed to identify other, real agents. Detection of, responding to, and interacting with other minds is vital in identifying potential hazards, as well as cementing bonds with those who are friendly, and any agent who can do this benefits from the resultant survival and reproductive advantages.[43]

I.II.I AGENCY DETECTION IN CHILDREN

The natural ability of human neonates to detect agency is impressive. Despite the immaturity of the visual system and a limited behavioural repertoire, which both considerably limit the ability to discern faces and consequently respond appropriately,[44] research documents infants, at an average age of forty-three minutes old,[45] tracking face-like patterns more than un-face-like patterns.[46] At the same age,

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[42] Boyd (2009), 137 states that humans 'overdetect agency'. Mistaking a decomposing tree for a crocodile has fewer negative side-effects than vice versa(!) The ability develops very early in humans: Luo & Baillargeon (2005) demonstrate that five-month-old infants attribute goals to nonhuman agents by interpreting the actions of a self-propelled box as goal-directed.

[43] On the evolutionary benefits, see, for example, Baron-Cohen (1994), 514 (with references). For evolutionary benefits, see studies cited below.

[44] See Bruce & Young (1998), 247-51 and *passim* for more detail, including photographic representations of a neonate's sight. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1989), 205 reports that mothers instinctively know that such infants can see best at a distance of 30 cm.

[45] Meltzoff & Moore (1977); for more discussion on this, see Gopnick *et al* (1999), 25-31; and Johnson *et al* (1991). More recently, Meltzoff (2005) has termed neonates' ability to recognise other humans the 'like-me mechanism'. Neonates' ability to interact with adults thus demonstrates the hard-wired nature of this ability. They would neither have had the time to learn such a preference, nor any experience with a mirror and their own appearance, both facts which suggests that the infant is born complete with a pre-programmed, agency detection map. This forms the basis of the Theory of Mind mechanism, which I examined previously.

infants demonstrate successful facial imitation, a complex action that demands the perception of another's actions translated into an action expressed by one's own body.[47] These abilities are then constantly augmented: Bushnell *et al* (1989) show that after two days, infants look longer at their mother's face than that of a stranger, and, by six months, researchers have shown that infants attribute animacy to objects that display biological motion.[48] Additionally, by eight months, infants achieve an adult level understanding of basic physics.[49] As children grow, these abilities are reinforced and developed. Some scholars even equate human belief in religious figures and the supernatural to the agency detection system.[50]

As with Theory of Mind ability, agency detection systems, then, are biologically hardwired, existing outside the realm of cultural determinism. Again, the universal nature of this ability will allow me to apply the results of the cognitive sciences to Classical literature in future chapters. The findings explored here, showing the human tendency to see objects that display the appropriate perceived behaviour as intentional agents, will be useful when examining psychological imagery from the *Argonautica*, where I shall argue that they afford a new vocabulary and means of interpretation, and ultimately explain how we read that imagery so easily.

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[46] The patterns used are schematic representations of human faces with a limited degree of realism, which serve to approximate human features. Nevertheless, this was enough to trigger the innate mechanism and the children responded. As the authors hypothesise, there is a clear evolutionary benefit to such an ability: a child that is better able to interact with the adults in its immediate surroundings by appearing interested, will encourage their efforts in providing care. Additionally, such a system will, over a longer period of exposure, aid the child's recognition of its parents.

[47] On imitation, see Meltzoff & Moore (1995), 49: '[t]he capacity for body imitation is part of the innate endowment of human beings. If ever there were an empirical case for nativism, body imitation provides it.'

[48] Schlottmann & Ray (2010). Biological motion is self-explanatory and refers to what earlier experimenters, in particular Michotte (1963), termed 'animal-like' motion. On the ascription of agency to self-propelled objects, see also Premack (1990).

[49] Baillargeon (1986). This study involved testing infants' conception of the permanence of objects. This, and other similar studies, are discussed in Boyd 2009: 132-41.

[50] Barrett (2004), 31; Boyer (2001), 162. This would fall into the overdetection category, discussed above.

I.III GESTURE

Thus far, I have shown the importance of the general Theory of Mind ability, both in everyday social interaction and in literature, and I have examined the human agency detection system, which has an inherent bias towards overdetection. I shall now turn to look at how the study of gesture, or non-verbal behaviour, is both fundamental to, and augments, these practices.

I.III.I A COGNITIVE ANALYSIS

A gesture can be defined as any wilful bodily movement, and is often an accompaniment to speech.[51] There are two main types of gesture: those that have a fixed cultural meaning, for example the 'thumbs up' symbol with thumb extended vertically and fingers curled closed that indicates a positive evaluation of a certain situation. These are often referred to as 'emblems'.[52] The second type of gesture, those often termed 'spontaneous', occur unwittingly during speech, have no pre-determined meanings, and thus must be analysed with respect to the immediate context.[53]

Crucially, rather than being an unnecessary embellishment, cognitive scientists argue that gesture is fundamentally entwined on a cognitive level with speech and language.[54] One of the main figures in this field, David McNeill, states that '*the*

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[51] Cienki (2008), 6, who stresses that while the prototypical gesture has three phases—'the preparation, the stroke, the retraction'—it is the stroke phase which is considered 'to minimally constitute a gesture'. Much of the early modern work on gesture comes from the celebrated choreographer Rudolph von Laban's writings on dance notation; on what constitutes a particular gesture he writes that (1966: 28): '[s]ince it is absolutely impossible to take account of each infinitesimal part of movement we are obliged to express the multitude of situations by some selected "peaks" within the trance-form which have a special quality'. Cienki's stroke phase, then, is one such peak. Also, McNeill (1992), 375.

[52] On emblems, see Ekman & Friesen (1969).

[53] See Cienki (2008), 6-7, with bibliography. See the section below for examples of these two types of gesture in the *Argonautica*.

[54] This point is central to McNeill (1992) and (2005), whose work is based on extensive empirical observations of gesture in speech. He states (2005: 4): 'language is inseparable from imagery … the imagery in question is embodied in the gestures that universally and automatically occur with speech.

actual motion of the gesture itself, is a dimension of meaning … such is possible if the gesture *is* the very image; not an 'expression' or 'representation' of it, but *is* it.'[55] And, in a similar fashion to the other cognitive disciplines analysed above, non-verbal behaviour as a mode of communication has been shown to be universal in humanity and in parts of the animal kingdom.[56]

Gesture and language, then, are two separate manifestations of the same faculties in the brain. Such inseparability requires that when we read another's mind, we necessarily read that mind's body, since the latter provides vital cues for understanding that agent's mental processes. Movement, in the form of gesture, thus becomes an important signifier for the mental state, or inferred thought, of a perceived agent. This links in with the earlier discussion of agency: I will ascribe agency to an object that displays the necessary biological motion to activate my agency detection system, but—we can now add—that particular motion, since it is necessarily to be viewed as a manifestation of the thought of the object, is also a cue for mindreading the object's current mental state.

I.III.II SOME APOLLONIAN EXAMPLES

So far, the explanation of non-verbal behaviour has involved much technical language. However, it is a technique that we perform unthinkingly every day, and is, as such, a good example of what I earlier termed a background inference.[57] Some examples from the *Argonautica* will aid comprehension.

Speech and gesture occupy the same time slices when they share meanings and have the same relationships to context. It is profoundly an error to think of gesture as a code or 'body language', separate from spoken language. It makes no more sense to treat gestures in isolation from speech than to read this book by looking only at the 'g's.'

[55] McNeill (2005), 98 (emphasis in the original). McNeill's work builds from the idea of gestures as 'material carriers', a term first proposed and discussed by Vygotsky (1986). For further analysis of McNeill's work on gesture with respect to the wider workings on the human brain and other practitioners in the field, see Clark (2008), 125-9.

[56] See, for example, Argyle (1988), 27-49 on non-verbal behaviour as communication on animals; (27): '[r]esearch on human and non-human primates has converged in the discovery of common signals and systems of communication.'

[57] For more discussion on background inferences, see Searle (2004), 72-174.

At 4.693-98, Medea and Jason visit Circe to cleanse themselves of the murder of Apsyrtus. Apollonius describes them as rushing in speechless silence to the hearth and sitting there (τὼ δ' ἄνεῳ καὶ ἄναυδοι ἐφ' ἑστίῃ ἀίξαντε / ἵζανον), then Medea covers her face with both hands (ἡ μὲν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέραις θεμένη χείρεσσι μέτωπα) and Jason drives into the ground the sword that was used in the murder (αὐτὰρ ὁ κωπῆεν μέγα φάσγανον ἐν χθονὶ πήξας / ᾧ πέρ τ' Αἰήταο πάιν κτάνεν). Finally, both keep their eyes lowered, so as not to look directly at Circe (οὐδέ ποτ' ὄσσε / ἰθὺς ἐνὶ βλεφάροισιν ἀνέσχεθον).[58] This scene is, of course, an example of the gesture of suppliancy,[59] and all of the four gestures outlined above are—to use the cognitive terminology—emblems, since they have a fixed cultural meaning. The fact that there is explicitly said to be no speech, and that Circe is described as immediately understanding (αὐτίκα δ' ἔγνω / Κίρκη) shows the great communicative power of the gestures.

However, it is the other class of 'spontaneous' gesture that is of primary interest to this thesis, since examples can be used to augment a character's speech, and thus achieve a greater understanding of their psychology. For instance, when the Argonauts first set off in the Argo, Jason is described as weeping, and turning his eyes away from his fatherland (δακρυόεις γαίης ἀπὸ πατρίδος ὄμματ' ἔνεικεν, 1.535). He speaks no words, but the gesture, in concert with the action, permits the audience access to his psychological state of sadness.[60] Similarly, after Jason has addressed the assembled Argonauts and asked them to pick a leader (1.332-40), they all look at Heracles (Ὣς φάτο. πάπτηναν δὲ νέοι θρασὺν Ἡρακλῆα / ἥμενον ἐν

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[58] I shall analyse in greater detail the non-verbal behaviour in this scene in the chapter on Jason.

[59] For suppliancy in the *Argonautica*, see Plantinga (2000), 119-23. The general reference is Gould (1973).

[60] Of course, such an interpretation is only that, since there are no words from Jason, or authorial statement, to act as corroboration. Non-verbal behaviour situations such as this, then, invite Theory of Mind speculation on the part of the audience. Such a unfulfilled mental signpost is similar to what Scodel (2014) terms 'gap management', which will be explored further in context in Chaper Four.

μέσσοισι, 1.341-2). Their collective gesture here thus communicates their unanimous choice.[61]

I.IV METAPHOR

The last section in this cognitive part of the introduction builds from everything that has gone before. The topic of cognitive or conceptual metaphor is large and ever-expanding as more is learnt about the brain and new theories are proposed. As such, I shall focus here on only the most fundamental principles, which have held true for all subsequent theories.[62]

The foundational work on the topic is George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). In it, they reject the notion that metaphor is a 'rhetorical flourish—a matter of extraordinary rather than ordinary language', and instead propose that '[o]ur ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.'[63] The idea that metaphor structures our concepts, and the way that we see the world, then, accounts for the term conceptual metaphor. An example of a conceptual metaphor is ARGUMENT IS WAR. When talking about arguments—using phrases such as 'your claims are *indefensible*', 'his criticisms were *right on target*', and 'he *shot down* all my arguments'—it is clear that we do so in terms of war. But, further, this is also how we structure the concept, since we envisage that arguments really are things that are won and lost, and that the

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[61] The study of gesture has a reasonable foothold in modern Classical academia. This is, of course, not surprising, bearing in mind the universal nature of the phenomenon means that gesture was as much a part of ancient communication as it is of modern. For a detailed survey of scholarly work on nonverbal behaviour within Classical academia, see Cairns (2005b), esp. xi-xii, with bibliography. In Homeric studies, see Lateiner (1995), and, more recently, occasional comments in Scodel (2008). Other specific non-verbal behaviours (sitting, silence, and eye-interaction) will be examined in Chapter Four, where additional studies will be adduced.

[62] In the second edition of their book, Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 243-76 discuss the most important of these, including, for example, cognitive blending theory, which envisages metaphor not in terms of domains (which I shall explore below), but the mental spaces, which are 'small mental models of particular situations that have been structured by the concepts in our conceptual system' (261). This, as we shall see, is based upon the fundamental notions of conceptual metaphor that I shall now explore.

[63] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 3.

participants are opponents, who attack each others' positions, while defending their own. Lakoff & Johnson highlight the fundamental nature of this conception by inviting the reader to entertain the notion of a hypothetical other culture in which the conceptual metaphor might instead be ARGUMENT IS DANCE. Here, they argue, 'the participants are seen as performers, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way', and, consequently, it is clear that these hypothetical people would conceive of argument in a fundamentally different way, guided by the different heuristic metaphor, to the extent that 'it would seem strange [to us] even to call what they were doing "arguing".'[64]

I.IV.II ORIENTATIONAL METAPHOR

ARGUMENT IS WAR is an example of what Lakoff & Johnson term a structural metaphor, since one concept is structured in terms of another.[65] At a more fundamental level, however, they argue for orientational metaphors, those which '[do] not structure one concept in terms of another but instead organize … a whole system of concepts with respect to one another.'[66] These are named thus because they involve a degree of spatial orientation (up-down, front-back, etc.), which—importantly—arises from bodily experience: the fact that 'we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function as they do in our physical environment'.[67] Recurring

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[64] This example follows the discussion at Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 4-6.
To formalize this discussion into the terms of source and target domains, in the conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, the source domain is war, which is metaphorically used—or, to translate, carried across—so as to aid understanding of argument, the target domain.
[65] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 14.
[66] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 14.
[67] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 14. This—the idea that the body shapes the mind—is what some scholars refer to as embodied cognition or the embodied mind. On this, see the foundational work of Johnson (1987). He argues that (ix-xx) 'human bodily movement, manipulation of objects, and perceptual interactions involve recurring [image schemas] without which our experience would be chaotic and incomprehensible. … When we seek to comprehend this order and to reason about it, such bodily based schemata play a central role. For although a given image schema may emerge first as a structure of bodily interactions, it can be figuratively developed and extended as a structure around which meaning is organized at more abstract levels of cognition.' Image schemas, then, are the underlying, organisational frameworks, upon which many abstract, metaphorical concepts rely.
Johnson's work is somewhat reminiscent of the analysis of gesture (above), where we saw that gesture should be viewed as equivalent to language in terms of the expression of thought. Developing this

structures of metaphorical coherences have been termed image schemas, and it is these image schemas that add higher level structure to discrete metaphorical expressions.[68]

An example of such an orientational metaphor is HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN: as evidenced by language such as 'her spirits *rose*', 'I'm feeling *down*', or 'his spirits *sank*'. Importantly, this metaphor is not arbitrary, but has a fundamental physical and experiential basis: '[d]rooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression, erect posture with a positive emotional state'.[69] Importantly, there is internal systematicity to these metaphors: they 'define … a coherent system rather than a number of isolated and random cases'.[70] It is not difficult to find such metaphors within the *Argonautica*: after Medea returns from meeting her beloved Jason for the first time, Apollonius describes her psychological state with such a orientational metaphor: τὰς δ' οὔ τι περιπλομένας ἐνόησε· / ψυχὴ γὰρ νεφέεσσι μεταχρονίη πεπότητο ('but she did not notice them gathering around her, for her *psuche* had flown high up in the clouds', 3.1150-1).[71]

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topic, Cienki & Müller (2008) discuss metaphoric gestures, 'typically … conceived of as movements of the hands that represent or indicate the source domain of a metaphor' (485), and show that conceptual metaphor, or as they prefer metaphoricity, is entwined with embodiment and gesture, and not just language. See also Gallagher (2005), and for an overview of all these areas, see Gibbs & Berg (2002), 10: 'our knowledge is not static, propositional and sentential, but is grounded in and structured by various patterns of our perceptual interactions, bodily actions, and manipulations of objects'.

[68] See n.67 (above). For an analysis of 'over' as an image schema, see Lakoff (1987), 416-61. Similarly, Lakoff & Turner (1989), 62: '[o]nce we learn a schema, we do not have to learn it again or make it up fresh each time we use it. It becomes conventionalized and as such is used automatically, effortlessly, and even unconsciously. That is part of the power of schemas: we can use these ready tools without having to put any energy into making or finding them.' For more discussion on image schemas, see Johnson (1987), *passim*, esp. 28-30: '[image schemas'] most important feature is that they have a few basic elements or components that are related by definite structures, and yet they have a certain flexibility. As a result of this simple structure, they are a chief means for achieving order in our experience so that we can comprehend and reason about it.'

[69] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 15. I shall examine the presence of other such orientational metaphors in the *Argonautica* in due course.

[70] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 17-18. In the HAPPY IS UP metaphor, this means that positive emotion is always equated with the higher spatial configuration. As the authors note, 'an incoherent system would be one where, say, "I'm feeling up" meant "I'm feeling happy," but "My spirits rose" meant "I became sadder."'

[71] This is just one example of many, and indeed it would be an interesting thesis just to group and classify such metaphorical expression. Another example from the scene, which shows a similar metaphor: as Medea catches sight of Jason, Apollonius states that her *kradie* falls from her *stethos* (ἐκ δ' ἄρα οἱ κραδίη στηθέων πέσεν, 3. 962). I think this shows Medea's loss of control over her

As orientational metaphor is structured by spatial orientation, the final (related) type of metaphor that I shall examine, ontological metaphor, is structured by our bodily experience of interacting with physical objects and substances.[72] As the authors state, '[u]nderstanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them'.[73] Such a system produces metaphors such as THE MIND IS A MACHINE, which allow the conception, description, and interrogation of necessarily amorphous things, such as emotions.[74] Needless to say, this will be of great interest for this thesis' examination of Apollonius' conception of psychological processes.

A specific example of an ontological metaphor, which I shall use frequently, is the container metaphor, which stems from the fact that we are bounded and separated from the rest of the world by our bodies and thus conceptualize ourselves as containers, or objects in containers. In this way, various states are conceptualized as containers: 'he *entered* a state of euphoria', 'she is *in* love', 'they fell *out of* favour'.[75] It is in precisely these terms that we should read the example of Medea, with which I began this chapter, who is flooded (κατείβετο, 3.290) with sweet pain.[76]

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emotions, as a result of the erotic passion which has been thrust upon her, which perfectly demonstrates the orientational metaphor HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL OR FORCE IS DOWN.

[72] During the course of this thesis, and at times when specific examples are being analysed as instances of conceptual metaphor, I shall introduce more methodology to aid comprehension.

[73] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 25.

[74] What is important here is what I might term leveraging: constructing less familiar, abstract concepts (such as psychological processes) on the grounds of more familiar concepts, based on our bodily experience and interaction in everyday life. This leveraging—the cooption of experience from a lower to a higher domain—is the critical tool that permits the pervasiveness of conceptual metaphor.

[75] For container metaphors, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 29-32.

[76] Another excellent example of an explicit container metaphor is Apollonius' description of Medea as she wakes fitfully from the famous dream at 3.617-32; she 'collects' her *thumos* back into her *stethos* (μόλις δ' ἐσαγείρατο θυμόν ὡς πάρος ἐν στέρνοις, 3.634-5). In this way, then, she is envisaged as a vessel within which psychological forces act. (I shall examine the psychological organs in Chapter Two.)

Ontological metaphors such as these also form the basis of personification: here, the amorphous has been reified, and then further specified as a person.[77] It is also worth remembering at this point the recent discussion on agency, and the human tendency to see other minds everywhere, for this further contextualizes the underlying mental processes that are conceived in such conceptual metaphorical terms.[78] (Of course, some objects that are perceived as minds or agents are minds or agents—a snake slithering towards me, for example—in which case there is no metaphorical component. Having said this though, the way in which I conceive of the snake coming towards me may be grounded in conceptual metaphorical terms.)

Related, though to some degree separate, to conceptual metaphor is metonymy. These terms are sometimes confused, and thus I shall outline the difference. In metaphor, there are two conceptual domains, and one is understood in terms of the other by the mapping of the schematic structure from one to the other. In metonymy, however, there is only one conceptual schema, and one part of that schema is taken to stand for either another part of the schema, or the entirety of the schema. Therefore metonymy is used primarily for reference.[79] In this way, discrete features of a concept can come to stand, or become emblematic, metonymously for the concept itself, both in abstract situations (Downing Street for government), or in emotional ones (the symptom of blushing for the emotion of love).[80]

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[77] See Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 33-4.

[78] As I hope is now obvious to the reader, all of the cognitive analysis thus far is interdependent: a Theory of Mind is predicated on notions of agency, all of which is conceived and expressed with conceptual metaphor.

[79] In this I follow Lakoff & Johnson (1989), 103. They discuss metonymy, with examples, at 100-6.

[80] On the relation between metaphor and metonymy, which is somewhat dependant on the specific usage, see Cairns (2013), 239n.12: '[i]f we think of symptoms etc. as elements in or as features associated with emotions qua holistic syndromes of factors, then their use as symbols or signs of emotion is a matter of synecdoche or metonymy. But if we think of them as aspects of bodily experience that we appeal to in referring to emotions as mental events, evaluations of external states of affairs (especially in social or cultural terms), then we are using a term from one domain (the body) to talk about another (the mind), and are thus in the realm of metaphor.'

Scholars have found the presence of such metaphorical conception of human experience in every culture studied.[81] But, again, this does not mean that every culture will conceive of a certain emotion in exactly the same way, for, at the culturally specific level, folk theories, which may exhibit particular, discrete variation, become emeshed with the universal model. This is driven by the fact that our emotional experience is derived to a large extent from the fact that we are physically embodied being in the world, and that these constraints impose upon universal and cultural emotional expressions alike.[82] It is these folk models, which Kövecses (2003: 190) states give '[m]ost of the richness of human emotional experience', and their relation to the cognitive universal that I shall explore at points in this thesis, most notably in the form of the erotic sting of the gadfly in the Chapter Four. There, we shall see that Apollonius' conception of erotic frenzy exhibits several overlapping conceptual metaphors, as well as the influence of contemporary folk models of inner life.

I.IV.IV TRADITIONAL DETRACTORS

It is clear, then, that conceptual metaphor has a prominent role in the conception of the human experience. However, before moving on, I shall survey the differing, traditional views, and the responses of cognitive linguists.[83] The traditional complaints against conceptual metaphor tend to fall into six categories. The first of these is the Literal Meaning Theory, which depends upon the prior notion of 'semantic autonomy'. If an expression is semantically autonomous, then it is

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[81] See, for example, Yu (1998) on Chinese culture, and, Kövecses (2000), who studies English, Japanese, Hungarian, and Zulu, amongst others, and concludes (139): 'there are certain conceptual metaphors that are at least near-universals and that their near-universality comes from universal aspects of bodily functioning in emotional states'. The lack of total universality can be put down to variations in folk understanding within the specific cultures (166-7).

[82] This is, of course, another way of saying that both attempt to conceptualise the same thing, and, as such, the notion that there is an antithesis between biology and culture is false. On this, see Cairns (2003b), 11-20, esp. 14: 'the biological must be experienced and constructed in a cultural context and … shared cultural categories draw on our nature as a physically embodied, social species'.

[83] In this section, I shall follow the argumentation of Lakoff & Turner (1989), 110-36.

meaningful in its own terms, and thus does not derive any of its meaning from metaphor.[84] A proponent of this theory would hold that:[85]

> - [i]f an expression of a language is (1) conventional and ordinary, then it is also (2) semantically autonomous and (3) capable of making reference to objective reality.
> - Such a linguistic expression is called "literal."
> - No metaphors are literal.

Importantly, external objective reality is taken 'to have an existence independent of any human understanding'. Literal meaning, then, thus presupposes the truth of the Literal Meaning Theory, with literal applying to all those expressions which meet criteria 1-3 (above). Consequently, no conventional language can be metaphorical (the Objectivist claim), and all concepts expressed by conventional language must be semantically autonomous, and hence not metaphorical (the Autonomy claim).[86] Both of these claims are disputed as false.

If the Autonomy claim were correct, then it would fatally undermine one of the tenets of conceptual metaphor that there are general mappings across conceptual domains that account for the understanding of both poetic and everyday conventional language. It would also mean having to give up linguistic generalisations as well as explanations for the use of the same words, and the same inference patterns, across conceptual domains.[87] For a concrete example using the conceptual metaphor LIFE IS A JOURNEY, conventional expressions such as 'she's really getting somewhere now', and 'he's got some direction now' would, on the Autonomy claim, have no conceptual unity, and there would be no explanation for the use of the expressions 'getting somewhere' and 'direction' in the domains of travelling and living.[88]

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[84] The discussion against the literal meaning theory is in Lakoff & Turner (1989), 111-20. In this view, there are two forms of semantic autonomy: conceptual autonomy, which assumes that there are such things as concepts and that words and phrases in a language express concepts, and non-conceptual autonomy, which denies either the existence of concepts, or that they have no role in characterizing meaning.
[85] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 114-15.
[86] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 115.
[87] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 116-17.
[88] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 116.

Amongst other things, Lakoff & Turner argue that the Literal Meaning Theory goes too far in its definition of literal, or semantically autonomous. In this respect, they question what is metaphorical and what is not and, in so doing, establish the principle of grounding. This accepts that there are concepts, or parts of concepts, that are semantically autonomous, but that (as we have previously seen) these are grounded in our bodily and social interactions with the world around us. The source domain of the metaphor—for example, the journey in LIFE IS A JOURNEY—can be made up of concepts that are semantically autonomous, and which can then be applied to the target: life. In this respect, metaphor is grounded in semantically autonomous concepts.[89]

Owing to the explanatory power of grounding, and conceptual metaphor theory generally,[90] Lakoff & Turner reject the Autonomy view on the basis that it denies that which they believe to be 'fundamentally correct.' Similarly, the other part of the Literal Meaning Theory, the Objectivist claim, which states that no conventional language can be metaphorical, is also rejected. They point out that it is based on the assumption that conventional language 'designates aspects of an objective, mind-free reality … a statement must be either objectively true or false, depending on whether the objective world accords with the statement.'[91] This, however, ignores the fact that truth and falsity are relative to conceptual frameworks. These are man-made, often (as we have seen) metaphorical, and therefore cannot be mind-free, as the claim demands.[92]

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[89] For grounding, see Lakoff & Turner (1989), 112-14. They use the example of the metaphorical comparison of death to night (113): 'When we understand death as night, we are drawing on a semantically autonomous conventional understanding of the source domain, night. That understanding is grounded in what we experience night to be, namely, dark, cold, foreboding, and so on. And what we experience night to be depends on both our sensory apparatus and what we have learned from night from our culture.'

[90] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 116: 'how everyday expressions are related by general principles; why the same expressions are used in different conceptual domains and why they mean what they do; how those general principles can explain the way that poetic metaphor is understood; and how those principles account for inferences both in ordinary everyday expressions and in the novel expressions used by poets'.

[91] For arguments against the Objectivist claim, see Lakoff & Turner (1989), 117-19.

[92] Other 'spin-offs' of the Literal Meaning Theory are discussed and critiqued along similar lines at Lakoff & Turner (1989), 120-7.

I now return to the common traditional complaints aimed at conceptual metaphor, of which the second is the 'failure to generalise' position. Here, proponents fail to perceive the systematic mapping at a conceptual level, which accounts for the wide-ranging explanatory power of such metaphor.[93] This error results from either analysing each metaphorical expression as if it is unrelated to any other (a case by case approach), or—perhaps more importantly—only looking at the source domain of the metaphor, and thus miscategorising the results. The metaphorical phrases 'fiery youth' and 'old flame' on the surface look similar, and could be categorised simply as fire metaphors. However, 'fiery youth' is an example of LIFE IS FIRE, whereas 'old flame' is LOVE IS FIRE. While the source domains are the same, the respective targets, and therefore mappings, are different.[94]

The third attack on conceptual metaphor is the Dead Metaphor theory, which holds that metaphors which have become part of conventional language are no longer metaphors.[95] An example would be the phrase 'he's almost gone' used of someone about to die, which a proponent of Dead Metaphor Theory would not class as a metaphor, as it may previously have been, since 'gone' can now mean 'dead'. This, however, mistakenly assumes that only those things that are alive in our cognition are conscious. But, in fact, those things that are 'most deeply entrenched, efficient, and powerful … [and which] are so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless' are the most alive and widespread.[96] The authors adduce evidence that shows that in multiple civilisations, verbs meaning 'to see' acquire the meaning 'to know'. It is

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[93] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 128.
[94] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 128.
[95] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 128-31. For arguments in support of this theory from a Classical perspective (albeit written before the theories under discussion were proposed), see Silk's (1974), chapter 'Dead Metaphor and Normal Usage'.
[96] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 129-30 gives examples of dead metaphors, as well as the different class of 'unconsciously conventional', such as the verb to comprehend in the metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, which is also present in Latin. The Dead Metaphor Theory is thus a historically-aware version of the Literal Meaning Theory, part of which purported that ordinary, conventional expressions cannot be metaphoric.

only conceptual metaphor theory—and the universal presence of the KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor—which can account for this.[97]

The fourth common fallacy is often termed Interaction Theory.[98] Proponents notice that, on occasion, speaking about the source domain on its own may bring to mind the target domain, when those are linked by a conventional metaphor. For example, when speaking about a journey, one may start to think also of one's life, owing to the strength of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor. It is said, then, that the target domain 'suffuses' the source domain, and that the metaphor is bidirectional, thus meaning that there is no longer source or target. This is incorrect, however. Structuring life in terms of a journey, as in this example, does not mean that one, in turn, structures a journey in terms of life; if it did, then we might refer to getting onto a train as a birth, and rail terminals as morgues. This is not to say, though, that two different metaphors might share domains, yet differ in which is source and which is target, but rather these are different metaphors, where the mapping goes in opposite directions, and different things are mapped.[99]

The penultimate argument against conceptual metaphor theory is one that is perhaps particularly pertinent to this thesis; the claim that metaphor resides in linguistic expressions alone and not in conceptual structure. This is a syntactic form distinction behind what Lakoff & Turner describe as the 'grammar school distinction between metaphor and simile'. However, on this distinction, the phrases 'an atom is a small solar system' and 'an atom is like a small solar system' both employ conceptual metaphor, the mapping from one domain to another, but the simile makes a slightly weaker claim.[100] In this respect, in the case studies in the following chapters, I shall view Apollonian and Homeric epic similes as examples of conceptual metaphors.

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[97] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 130-1.
[98] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 131-3.
[99] For example of this in the form of the metaphors PEOPLE ARE MACHINES and MACHINES ARE PEOPLE, see Lakoff & Turner (1989), 132-3.
[100] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 133.

The final traditional view is to say that everything in language and thought is metaphorical.[101] This, however, also seems false. Metaphor allows the experience of one domain to inform that of another, which necessarily requires source domains that are grounded in bodily interaction with the physical world. The Everything Is Metaphor position would deny that these source domains exist, and yet, as we have seen at multiple points thus far, there are many: fire, seeing, and weight to name but a few. Similar to the argument above for Interaction Theory, this does not mean that these concepts cannot be construed as the targets in other metaphors, but this does not mean that they are not fundamentally non-metaphorical spheres that are used for metaphorical constructs.[102]

I.iv.v Metaphor in Classics

The study of metaphor just conducted puts forward the cognitive view that I shall apply to the *Argonautica* and other texts. The analysis has been lengthy since modern Classical scholarship is, to a large extent, dominated by cultural determinists, who do not ascribe to such universalist positions. A proponent of the cultural determinist position, and hence what this thesis considers to be the wrong approach, is Ruth Padel (1992: 9-10), who has written that

> fifth-century Greeks did not distinguish literal from metaphorical, or not in the way we do. Students of Greek poetry, and of its words for consciousness, have not yet faced the enormous implications of this argument for poetry's language of thinking and feeling.
> …
> A second theme is how difficult, but also how rewarding, it is for us in the late twentieth century to think of ancient Greeks as astoundingly alien from ourselves.
> …
> Dismantling this belief entails identifying attitudes that "we" have, and different ones that the Greeks may have had, toward metaphors of thought and feeling.

The claim that the Greeks did not distinguish literal from metaphorical is untenable, as a simple example from Homer will show. At *Odyssey* 20.13, in a passage which

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[101] Lakoff & Turner (1989), 133-5.
[102] For examples, see Lakoff & Turner (1989), 135.

will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters, Homer states that Odysseus' *kradie* barks within him (κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει), and then immediately gives a simile of a dog standing over her pups and barking (ὑλάει) at the sight of a man (14-15). Clearly, Homer is signposting that the imagery he is using is imagery: he knows that it has come from a sphere in which entities do bark, and is metaphorically applied to an entity that does not.

As this introduction has shown, and the case studies will also, I think that Padel is thus guilty of focusing too much on the specific, and thus ignoring the universal.[103] I argue that what Padel sees as 'outstandingly alien' are in fact folk theories of psychological expression, those which we saw Kövecses (2003: 190) argue to give '[m]ost of the richness of human emotional experience', and which follow cognitive universal patterns.[104] I shall leave these issues now, however, and return to them when relevant within the case studies.

This opening chapter has examined certain facets of what I have termed as cognitive universal aspects of human psychology. I shall now move on to analyse some culturally specific considerations, before applying both to case studies from the *Argonautica*.

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[103] For similar Classical views, see the references in n.7 (above).
Heath (1996), 323-4 critiques Padel's views with non-cognitive arguments: '[t]he unqualified claim that fifth-century Greeks did not distinguish literal from metaphorical would be manifestly false. If they did not, they would have had no use for expressions like 'as if'. Moreover, metaphor is not evenly distributed through fifth-century literature, but is denser and more adventurous in some genres (including tragedy) than others; differentiated use implies a power of discrimination.' Heath continues that: 'Padel ha[s] in fact failed to disentangle various different polarities: literal *vs* metaphorical, physical *vs* non-physical, concrete *vs* abstract, real *vs* unreal, were all at different points run together. If the Greeks described as physical, or as real, things which we regard as non-physical (such as feelings), or as unreal (such as the gods which cause them), this was not because they failed to distinguish literal from metaphorical, but because they had a different understanding of what thought and feeling actually are.' It is not clear to me, on the basis of this, that Heath has himself adopted the cognitive perspective.
[104] To attempt to fit Padel into the 'traditional' views analysed above by Lakoff & Turner (1989), I suggest that she falls into the 'failure to generalise' position. As we saw, this position is guilty of treating each metaphorical expression as unique, and thus failing to perceive the larger degree of systematicity: in short, a failure to see how our concepts resemble Greek ones. (It is somewhat ironic that Padel has omitted the lessons of cognitive metaphor from her book, and yet named it *In and Out of the Mind*: what Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 29) would classify a prototypical container metaphor.)

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CULTURAL SPECIFICS

Thus far I have outlined some of the most important parts of the evidence for what I have termed as the cognitive understanding of human experience and emotional expression. This thesis will show that Apollonius' *Argonautica* (as well as other, related texts) fits neatly into these discussions. Before moving on to the specific case studies, however, I shall now contextualise Apollonius within his literary and social environment.

I. APOLLONIAN BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP WITH HOMER

Our understanding of the life of Apollonius is uncertain, since the biographies that have survived tell different stories.[105] What is certain is that, at some point, he served as Librarian of the great library of Alexandria, the Museum, which was created by the Ptolemies.[106] The dating of the *Argonautica* is somewhat complicated by the fact that, unlike Theocritus or Callimachus, Apollonius does not refer to any

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[105] These are surveyed succinctly in Hunter (1989), 1-9. One of the main contentions, for example, is whether Apollonius was Alexandrian or Rhodian. (Hunter *ad loc* suggests that the confusion may stem from the fact that Apollonius acquired the title Alexandrian when he took over as Librarian.) For lengthier discussion, see Lefkowitz (2008), who examines the biographical evidence for insights into the apparent quarrel between Apollonius and Callimachus. She concludes (somewhat pessimistically) that (62): 'it would be a mistake to expect that we could extract from the biographical information that we have about Apollonius anything that might help us date his poetry with precision, or allow us to understand exactly what his contempories thought about it'.

[106] On the specific dating of this, see Hunter (1989), 4. He suggests 'tentatively' that Apollonius held the post 'in the period *c*. 270-45' BCE. This would have been at the same time as he was tutor to the future king, Ptolemy Euergetes. (The roles of Librarian and Royal Tutor often went hand in hand.)

contemporaneous events.[107] Following Hunter,[108] the scholarly consensus dates the publication of the poem somewhere between 270 and 240 BCE, which would place it in the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus (283-246 BCE).[109]

In his position as librarian, and with access to a vast amount of primary and secondary scholarship, Apollonius exemplifies the position of Hellenistic scholar and critic. The best example of this is in his scholarly engagement with Homer, on which he wrote Πρὸς Ζηνόδοτον, the first scholarly monograph of the Hellenistic period, which was directed against Zenodotus' edition of the Homeric epics. It is this close connection with Homer,[110] and other literary predecessors,[111] that exhibits itself so strongly in the *Argonautica*, and which this thesis will explore in detail.

That Apollonius chose to write Homeric-style poetry,[112] which touched inevitably on the epic code, was not surprising. Conte (1986: 142-3) has written that the latter was

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[107] Köhnken (2010), 136. On the relative chronology of the three, see Köhnken (2008). Cf. n.109 (below), however.
[108] Hunter (1989), 1-9.
[109] As well as Hunter (above), see the recent summary in Murray (2014), who uses astronomical references in the poem to suggest a slightly later date. Schade & Eleuteri (2008) examine the textual tradition of the poem.
[110] The intertextual relations between the *Argonautica* and the Homeric texts will be explored so frequently in this thesis that there is no great requirement for a lengthy introduction here on this well-worn topic. Thus, I shall limit myself to some suggested bibliography. For a general overview, see Rengakos (2008), who comments (243-4): 'compared with any other contemporary poem, … the *Argonautica* … shows a far higher number of imitations of Homeric phrases, verses, motifs or scenes and reproduces lexical, morphological, syntactical and metrical peculiarities of the old epic to such an extent that it can be used as a veritable treasury for its poet's exegetical and critical engagement with Homer'. Erbse (1953) established modern scholarship's take on the relationship between the two, and Kyriakou (1995) gives many discrete examples of Apollonius' 'Homeric' language in her study of *hapax legomena*. See also Campbell (1981), and (1994), *passim*; Goldhill (1991), 284-333; and Knight (1995). On Apollonian adaption of Homeric formularity, see Fantuzzi (2008). On Apollonian similes, and their debt to Homer, see Carspecken (1952); Knight (1995), 17-20; Reitz (1996); and Effe (2008). (These latter will be explored further in the case studies of the following chapters.)
[111] For Apollonius' relationship with Lyric, especially Sappho and Simonides, see Acosta-Hughes (2007).
[112] The thoughts of Hunter (1989: 38-9) are worth quoting in full here: 'A[pollonius'] language is based on that of Homer. … For A[pollonius], however, the 'language of Homer' was not an immutably fixed body of material limited solely to those words which happened to appear in the Homeric poems, but rather the archaic, artificial language of most early Greek poetry, a language which was quite remote from the spoken Greek of third-century Alexandria. It was a language which could readily be extended by analogy and by words from other, equally poetic, genres, notably lyric and tragedy. … A[pollonius'] style represents a self-conscious attempt to rework Homer in such a way as to make as clear as possible his difference from Homer'. See Hunter *ad loc* for suggested

'the medium through which society takes possession of its past and gives that past the matrix value of a model … the preliminary value of that elaboration whose purpose is the literary organization, in narrative form, of collective cultural values'. Apollonius' Alexandria, as Richard Hunter notes, was 'very concerned, in a quite overt way, with its past, with "where it came from", and with asserting the presence and importance' of such collective cultural values.[113] I shall now move on to show some of the other ways in which Apollonius' poem is a product of the contemporary Alexandrian society. These will strengthen the overview presented here.

II. WIDER INTELLECTUAL INFLUENCES

It is widely accepted that the *Argonautica* displays many aspects of Hellenistic learning, though it is still the case that there is much scholarly work to be done to satisfactorily bring more elements of this to light.[114] In order to contextualise the arguments that shall be made in this thesis, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of some of the relevant areas that I believe are of greatest influence on Apollonius.[115]

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bibliography. There will be many examples of the relationship between Apollonian and Homeric language throughout this thesis.

[113] Hunter (1993), 154. At 152-69 he discusses the *Argonautica* in its Ptolemaic context. On this, see also Stephens (2000), esp. 213: '[t]he poems of Homer and Hesiod provided a synthesis of values and beliefs that created a 'panhellenic' paradigm for archaic and classical Greek culture, but the inherited belief system of these poems was of limited value for an imperial court located in and ruling over non-Greek Egypt. Apollonius writes an epic that provides the new template. … he creates from various non-Homeric articulations of Greekness a world that adumbrates his own: at times Greek and non-Greek are conventionally opposed, at times they seem to converge'. For more on the political aspects of Apollonius' poem, and Alexandria in general, see Mori (2008).

[114] Glei (2008: 23): 'wide swathes of Apollonian learning—in ethnography, geography, technology and natural sciences, folk religion, and supernatural belief, to mention only the most important—have not been adequately studied, although there is broad consensus that the references to all these fields constitute an important dimension of the *Argonautica* and of Hellenistic poetry in general'. For a similar opinion on the influences on Apollonius, see Cuypers (2010), 332, who compares Alexandrian learning with the far more compartmentalized system that exists today: 'Hellenistic poets read aloud, and it is clear that they were not bound by the distinction between scholarship and science which defines the modern academic world – and which has perhaps restricted our understanding of the Hellenistic literary space more than we care to admit.'
Keyser and Irby-Massie (2008: 1) note the interdisciplinary nature of this field, and caution that scholars tend to label 'science' loosely as all the disciplines that attempt 'to understand or model some aspect of the natural world on the basis of investigation and reason'. For an overview of various disciplines, see Cuypers (2010), 330-4.

[115] I shall not discuss Apollonius' use of magic—a subject that often arises as an influence—as I do not think it necessary for my argument. The most recent work on this is Regan (2014). Other

As such, the current overview will not attempt to further our understanding of these subjects *per se*.

II.i MEDICAL

Apollonius was writing at a time of unprecedented advances in medical knowledge.[116] Herophilus of Chalcedon, and his younger contemporary Erasistratus of Ioulis on Keos, were at the forefront of what has been called a 'stunning moment in the history of science'.[117] Herophilus alone is credited with distinguishing certain ventricles in the brain, discovering and describing different types of nerves, differentiating four membranes within the eye, and discovering the heart valves.[118] Erasistratus was equally prolific in furthering the understanding of the heart by comparing its function to a mechanical pump, and by developing a systematic understanding of the differences between veins and arteries.[119]

In large part, what accounted for these discoveries was the pioneering of dissection, including—perhaps—the vivisection of criminals.[120] Scholars have investigated the various factors within the political setup, which created the necessary conditions for

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important items would be the analyses of Medea in Fantuzzi (2008), and specifically her presentation in the Talos episode (*Arg.* 4.1638-93) in Powers (2002) and Dickie (1990). For a general overview, see Glei (2008), 23-4.

[116] See Solmsen (1961), 169-84 for a survey of the various philosophical and medical theories that both predated and informed the views of the Hellenistic medics. For greater depth, see Fraser (1972a), 338-75; and Nutton (2004), 53-116, as well as her suggested bibliography at 363n.1. It is notable that Herophilus was a student of Praxagoras, whom Keyser & Irby-Massie (2006: 250) note 'mediates the transition from Hippocratic medicine'.

[117] von Staden (1992), 224. See Scarborough (2008: 294) and Nutton (2006: 365n.35) for comments concerning dating. The standard collections on Herophilus and Erasistratus, respectively, are von Staden (1989), and Garofalo (1988). Dickie (1990), 294n.95, following Fraser's (1972: 347-8) doubt that Erasistratus was working in Alexandria, questions whether Apollonius would thus have had contact with him. Regardless, this does not alter the culture of science and learning that I shall now discuss.

[118] von Staden (1992), 224; Scarborough (2008), 387-90.

[119] von Staden (1992), 224; Scarborough (2008), 294-6.

[120] See, for example, Flemming (2003), 451. von Staden (1992), 223: 'this period was not only the *first* but also the *last* time, in the roughly thousand years of ancient Greek science, that human cadavers were systematically dissected'. Nutton (2006), 133-4 discusses the extent to which reports of vivisection on criminals might have been more recent rewriting of history by 'vivid exaggeration by … committed opponent[s] of all dissection'.

such advancements.[121] Of particular interest in this respect is the fact that many Greek sacred laws viewed, first, a corpse as a source of pollution, and, second, the skin as an inviolable barrier.[122] There was thus a considerable cultural inhibition towards human dissection, which adds further context to the remarkable achievements of Herophilus and Erasistratus. However, the prevailing attitudes in Ptolemaic Alexandria not only permitted, but encouraged such hitherto transgressive acts, since the society was determined to foster intellectual innovation in areas literary and scientific.[123] This ambition was enacted through a system of patronage as well as the lack of democracy, both of which allowed promising individuals to flourish without the fear of backlash from their peers.[124] The desire for progress and innovation was not necessarily merely 'a disinterested love of culture on part of the ruler', however: Vivian Nutton argues that there were considerable practical purposes too, in the form of 'propaganda, warfare and the supervision of [the ruler's] general health'.[125]

Apollonius was, then, a part of this literary, scientific, and medical intelligentsia, with the result that his poetry reflects the advancements and innovations of the day. Before moving on to examine other contemporary influences on the *Argonautica*, I

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[121] Nutton (2006), 132: 'Alexandria under the early Ptolemies offered a remarkably supportive environment for intellectual innovation'. von Staden (1992: 224) draws a comparison with modern scientific research, which is also heavily dependent on substantial financial support: '[p]erhaps for this reason it has become an almost obligatory cliché of history of science that there is a direct causal link between patronage and scientific progress' (224). He notes, though, that there is no evidence of Herophilus *et al* receiving financial support from the royal court, but support through human cadavers being made available for dissection. (See above for discussion on the contemporary ethical nature of this.)

[122] von Staden (1992), 225-31. A prime example of the former is the treatment of Polynices' corpse in Sophocles' *Antigone*.

[123] von Staden (1989), 28: 'the sense of literary and scientific frontiersmanship that attracted intellectuals from all over the Greek world to Alexandria … probably stimulated efforts to establish new frontiers in medicine also'.

[124] von Staden (1992), 231: '[i]n Alexandria, a scientist's fellow-residents could not vote to ostracize or exile him on grounds of impiety, as they could—and did—in "democratic" Athens; in Hellenistic Egypt, the king centrally controlled political action as well as religious life'. (See 240n.48 for the example of the Athenian democracy charging and exiling Anaxagoras on charges of impiety.) For patronage, see von Staden (1989), 25-31; cf. n.121 (above): this patronage was not necessarily financial.

[125] Nutton (2004), 132. The use of poets—and culture in general—needs no further qualification. For practical (military) by-products of Hellenistic science, see Bugh (2006).

shall draw out a further two examples of contemporary medical advances which I think will be especially interesting for the forthcoming study.

II.i.i THE NERVOUS SYSTEM

The dissections performed by Herophilus and Erasistratus allowed them to further a long-running debate in Greek psychology regarding what Solmsen has termed as the 'locality of the central organ'.[126] The debate over what might be called the primary organ was split between those relative few who favoured the brain (Alcmaeon, Plato), and those many who argued for the heart (Empedocles, Democritus, Aristotle, Praxagoras, Stoics, and the Epicureans).[127] With his discovery of the nerves, however, Herophilus was able to argue irrefutably for the primary role of the brain.[128] This research was further refined by Erasistratus, which is reported by Rufus Ephesius (*De anatomia partium hominis*, 71-5):[129]

Νεῦρόν ἐστιν ἁπλοῦν σῶμα καὶ πεπυκνωμένον, προαιρετικῆς κινήσεως αἴτιον, δυσαίσθητον κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν. Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸν Ἐρασίστρατον καὶ Ἡρόφιλον, αἰσθητικὰ νεῦρα ἔστιν· κατὰ δὲ Ἀσκληπιάδην οὐδὲ ὅλως. Κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸν Ἐρασίστρατον δισσῶν ὄντων τῶν νεύρων αἰσθητικῶν καὶ κινητικῶν, τῶν μὲν αἰσθητικῶν ἃ κεκοίλανται ἀρχὰς εὕροις ἂν ἐν μήνιγξι, τῶν δὲ κινητικῶν ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ καὶ παρεγκεφαλίδι. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν Ἡρόφιλον ἃ μέν ἐστι προαιρετικὰ, ἃ καὶ ἔχει τὴν ἔκφυσιν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου καὶ νωτιαίου μυελοῦ, καὶ ἃ μὲν ἀπὸ ὀστοῦ εἰς ὀστοῦν ἐμφύεται, ἃ δὲ ἀπὸ μυὸς εἰς μῦν, ἃ καὶ συνδεῖ τὰ ἄρθρα…

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[126] Solmsen (1961), 192. Again, this is a topic of considerable weight, and I shall only highlight what will be most pertinent to my future argument.

[127] Solmsen (1961), 192. This argument somewhat spans the topics of medicine and philosophy. I have decided against a discrete section on the latter in this discussion of the influences on Apollonius; however, this is not to say that the philosophical influence of contemporary Alexandria was not important. Rather, I shall mention relevant philosophical considerations as and when they are appropriate to specific passages. For specific discussion of the influence of Empedocles on Apollonius, see the comprehensive study of Kyriakou (1994). For the view that Apollonius' presentation of Jason exhibits Sceptic principles, see Klein (1983), 124-6.

[128] None of Herophilus works are extant, and thus our knowledge comes via quotation in other authors. For the discovery of the nerves, we rely primarily on six quotations from other subsequent authors including Galen, which are numbered T80-T85 in von Staden (1989)'s edition.

[129] For discussion on the wider relevance of this passage, see Solmsen (1961), 192-3 (and 194-5 for the reaction of subsequent philosophical schools), and von Staden (1989), 159-60.

Nerve (*neuron*) is a simple, solid body, the cause of voluntary motion, but difficult to perceive in dissection. According to Erasistratus and Herophilus there are nerves capable of sensation, but according to Asclepius not at all. According to Eratistratus there are two kinds of nerves, sensory and motor nerves; the beginnings of the sensory nerves, which are hollow, you could find in the meninges [sc. of the brain], and those are the motor nerves in the cerebrum (*enkephalos*) and in the cerebellum (*parenkephalis*). According to Herophilus, on the other hand, the *neura* that make voluntary [motion] possible have their origin in the cerebrum (*enkephalos*) and the spinal marrow, and some grow from bone to bone, others from muscle to muscle, and some also bind together the joints.

[Tr. von Staden (1989)]

What is clear from passages such as this is the level of anatomical precision and intimacy that the new art of dissection provided. It is precisely this detailed learning that infused into other cultural pursuits, such as poetry. Various scholars have produced fine case studies that show the cross-fertilisation of scientific and literary models. Oppermann has argued convincingly that, in Callimachus' *Hymn to Artemis*, the poet's description of the four-layered shield (τετραβοείῳ, 53) reflects Herophilus' discovery of the four layers of the human eye.[130] Similarly, Most has shown that in the *Hymn to Delos*, Callimachus' precise description of the posture of Leto as she gives birth (206-11), which is based on a similarly exact description in the Homeric Hymn to Apollo (117-18), shows Leto turned around by 180º, in so doing reflecting the anatomical considerations relating to birthing positions in Herophilus' general work on obstetrics and gynaecology in his *On Midwifery*.[131]

Within the *Argonautica*, one of the clearest examples of Apollonius adopting contemporary scientific learning is the description of the destructive effect of love on Medea at 3.761-5:[132]

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[130] Oppermann (1925), 14-32. On Herophilus and the eye, see texts T86-89 in von Staden (1989), 203-6.
[131] Most (1981), 191-6. For Herophilus, see texts T193-202c in von Staden (1989), 365-72, which are discussed at 296-9. Asper (2009), 15 writes that both these examples 'stage a confrontation: ancient, venerable gods versus modern knowledge'.
[132] This description is immediately proximate to the sunbeam simile, which is used of Medea, and which will be examined in the next chapter.
On Apollonius specifically, Fraser (1972: 634): 'the poet seems to have had a genuine interest in the course and appearance of physical and mental suffering which suggests in addition some knowledge of medicine itself'. Additionally, he posits that Apollonius drew on medical dictionaries, such as that produced later by Baccheius and Aristophanes of Byzantion.

δάκρυ δ' ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλέῳ ῥέεν· ἔνδοθι δ' αἰεί
τεῖρ' ὀδύνη, σμύχουσα διὰ χροὸς ἀμφί τ' ἀραιὰς
ἶνας καὶ κεφαλῆς ὑπὸ νείατον ἰνίον ἄχρις,
ἔνθ' ἀλεγεινότατον δύνει ἄχος, ὁππότ' ἀνίας
ἀκάματοι πραπίδεσσιν ἐνισκίμψωσιν ἔρωτες.

Tears of pity flowed from her eyes, and within a constant
pain wore her away, smouldering through her flesh around the slender
nerves and from beneath her head to the deepest occiput,
where the most grievous pain plunges in, whenever the
untiring Loves hurl grief upon the *prapides*.[133]

Hunter notes on this passage that the pain (ὀδύνη) is steadily localized from the χροός, to the slender ἶνας, and finally to the lowest part of the ἰνίον.[134] These ἶνες, which carry the physical pain, should be understood to be nerves.[135] Thus, and as Solmsen notes, while Apollonius could have instead used the Homeric term νεῦρον (normally meaning 'tendon'[136]), he is exploiting the similarity of ἶνες and ἰνίον, and therefore highlighting his knowledge of contemporary medical developments, specifically both the discovery of the nerves, and the prioritizing of the brain as the central organ.[137] What we see here, then, is an example of Apollonius' writing

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[133] As we shall see, this is the only Apollonian usage of the Homeric psychological term πραπίδες.
[134] Hunter (1989), 179-80.
[135] See the quotation from Rufus Ephesius (above). See also Dickie (1990), 282.
[136] Just as in the phrase: περὶ δ' ἔγχεος αἰχμῆι / νεῦρα διεσχίσθη (*Il*. 16.315-6)
[137] This is also the opinion of Hunter (1989), 180. Solmsen (1961: 197) notes the subtlety on Apollonius' obvious learning: '[m]oreover, being tactful enough to disguise, rather than to emphasize, the scientific novelty [Apollonius] succeeded in incorporating it in his epic without producing a jarring note'. He then notes that this 'clinical … feature of erotic agony' did not catch on in subsequent poetry. (That which is extant, we might add.) Similarly, Zanker (1987), 126 speaks of 'modern feelings of dissatisfaction with [Apollonius'] particularism', but counters that he 'wanted to describe the effect of love … in the most precise and up-to-date language possible'. He argues that such 'realism' in the context of traditional poetry can also have the effect of marking distance in time: the incongruity of ancients acting like moderns heightens the chronological divide. (Similarly in the Callimachean example quoted above, the fact the Leto gives birth like a modern woman may startle the alert reader.) On Apollonius' knowledge of medical literature and terminology, see Erbse (1953). As mentioned, this specific Apollonian example occurs immediately next to the sunbeam simile of Medea, which initially compares the vacillating sunbeam to the palpitations of Medea's κραδίη (at 755) κέαρ (at 760). By situating his clinical description of Medea's ὀδύνη, which seems to validate the brain as the primary organ, next to the simile that overtly describes the κραδίη/κέαρ, I would argue that Apollonius is not so subtly drawing attention to his knowledge of this issue in contemporary medicine. (Later in this chapter, I shall discuss the use of the various psychological terms in Homer and Apollonius. Here, as will be shown later, there appears to be an interchangeable nature to κραδίη and κέαρ.)

emeshing modern scientific learning with traditional, popular, and poetic (Homeric and, for example, Sapphic) models of erotic sensation.[138]

II.i.ii THE PULSE AND ASSOCIATED NOMENCLATURE

I have already stated that Herophilus is renowned for his work on the pulse, where he conducted much research into the pulse rhythms at different ages.[139] His interest was so great that he developed a portable water-clock, which could be adapted, so as to read accurately the pulses of people of all ages.[140] It was also capable of taking a patient's temperature, since Herophilus thought the frequency of the pulse equated to body temperature and fever.[141] I think that both the focus on the pulse, and the

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[138] Homeric psychology is represented by the *prapides* (which I shall discuss in greater detail shortly); Patrick Lee Miller shows how Apollonius incorporates the poetic models of Sappho (fr.31), Euripides (*Hippolytus*), and, to a lesser extent, Theocritus (*Idyll* 2). This passage is discussed by Dickie (1990: 281-2), who states that '[b]y using the vocabulary of epic Apollonius conceals the novelty both of his subject matter and of his way of describing it'.
I have focused on this example as it is most pertinent to this thesis. There are, of course, others. Zanker (1987), 72 shows that Apollonius' description of Phineus' 'dark swoon' (κάρος … πορφύρεος, 2.203-4) and weak coma (ἀβληχρῷ δ' ἐπὶ κώματι, 205) are based on contemporary descriptions of medical terms for the dizziness between sleeping and waking. On this see Erbse (1953), 186-7. (I will have much more to say on Apollonius' use of πορφύρω in the forthcoming chapter on Jason.) Finally, Fraser (1972), 634 notes Apollonius' 'skilled description of symptoms' both in the passage quoted above, and in the detailing of Mopsus' bite by the Libyan asp at 4.1502-27. (On this, see also Dickie (1990), 283-4.) Fraser (1972), 634-4 gives further examples of Apollonius' use of Herophilus' terms. For a useful collection of Medea's erotic symptoms, see Miller 11.
[139] For general overview, see von Staden (1989), 267-82.
[140] As at other points in this section, the strict boundaries between different aspects of Hellenistic 'science' are loosened: in this instance, the construction of a water-clock might be deemed more 'technology' then 'medicine'. On the interplay of these areas, see von Staden (1996), who shows the interplay between medicine and mechanics.
[141] For discussion, including how the device might have been constructed, see von Staden (1989), 282-3. For modern bibliography on the efficacy of the device, see Scarborough (2008), 389. Perhaps the best ancient evidence comes from Marcellinus in his *De pulsibus* 263-7 [=T182 in von Staden (1989)]:

> εἰσιόντα τε πρὸς τὸν ἄρρωστον καὶ τιθέντα τὴν κλεψύδραν ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ πυρέσσοντος· ὅσῳ δ' ἂν πλείονες παρέλθοιεν κινήσεις τῷ σφυγμῷ παρὰ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν εἰς τὴν ἐκπλήρωσιν τῆς κλεψύδρας, τοσούτῳ καὶ τὸν σφυγμὸν πυκνότερον ἀποφαίνειν, τουτέστι πυρέσσειν ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον.

And, upon entering to visit a patient, he would set up his water clock and feel the pulse of a person suffering from a fever. By as much as the movements of the pulse exceeded the number that is natural for filling up the water-clock by that much he declared the [patient's] pulse too frequent – that is, that [the patient] had either more or less of a fever. [Tr. von Staden (1989)]

associated technology, should be borne in mind for the subsequent discussion on the sunbeam simile of Medea.

A final note on this subject concerns Herophilus' nomenclature, particularly that associated with various frequencies of the pulse, dependent on age and illness. These can be δορκαδίζων ('bounding like an antelope'),[142] or μυρμηκίζων ('ant-like').[143] Similarly, in his naming of parts of the eye, we see that the retina is *arachnoides* ('cobweb-like'),[144] while the cornea is κερατοειδής ('horn-like'),[145] and the iridial retina is ῥαγοειδής ('grape-like').[146]

It goes without saying, then, that Herophilus uses metaphors in his descriptive terminology, which—put simply—explain the unknown in terms of the known. But as we saw in the opening part of this chapter, cognitive scientists argue that metaphor is crucial in structuring human experience, with the result that even scientific terms, which may be thought of as literal, depend on metaphorical ways of seeing the world.[147] Thus, at the cutting edge of scientific progress, metaphorical observation plays a crucial role in informing and structuring the way in which we see the world.[148]

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[142] Galen, *De differentia pulsuum libri iv*, 556 [=T169 in von Staden (1989)]. Marcellinus *De pulsibus* 428-31 [=T170 in von Staden (1989)]:

> Ἡρόφιλος μὲν οὖν ὁ πρῶτος ὀνομάσας δορκαδίζοντα σφυγμόν φησιν ἅπα ἑωρακέναι ἐπί τινος εὐνούχου, ἡμῖν δὲ συνεχῶς ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων ἐπέπεσεν ἔν τε φρενητικαῖς καὶ καρδιακαῖς διαθέσεσι.

Herophilus, who was actually the first to give the 'gazelle-like' … pulse its name, says that he saw it once in the case of a certain eunuch, but it has fallen under our observation continually in actual practice in conditions of delirium and heart disease. [Tr. von Staden (1989)]

[143] Galen, *De differentia pulsuum libri iv*, 553 [=T180 in von Staden (1989)]. Another example is τρομώδες ('trembling', 'quivering'). On pulse distinctions, see von Staden (1989), 286-7, and especially 286n.161.

[144] A. Cornelius Celsus, *Medicina*, 7 [=T88 in von Staden (1989)].

[145] Rufus Ephesius, *De anatomia partium hominis*, 12-13.

[146] Rufus Ephesius, *De anatomia partium hominis*, 12-13.

[147] This will also be shown shortly in the discussion on Homeric and Apollonian mental organs.

[148] Although there is no evidence to support the following hypothesis, I would suggest as a result that in the intellectual melting pot of Alexandria, the channels of influence might not only have run one way, and that the poetic description of human emotion, explored by poets such as Apollonius, might also have influenced scientific and medical thinkers.

Any discussion on ancient psychology must touch upon the issue of the presentation of the self in Homeric poetry. This issue normally arises out of the observation that there is an extensive list of psychological nouns, or mental organs,[149] which variously tend to accompany the presentation of a protagonist's ruminations in decision-making scenes.[150] For example, at *Il.* 16.435, Zeus' decision over two possible courses of action is expressed through two of these psychological terms, though it is clear that it is he who is pondering: διχθὰ δέ μοι κραδίη μέμονε φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντι ('but my *kradie* in my *phrenes* is divided in purpose, as I ponder…'). Similarly, Achilles' ἦτορ is divided over how to act in the quarrel with Agamemnon: ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ / στήθεσσιν λασίοισι διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν ('but the *etor* within his shaggy *stethos* was divided as it debated…', *Il.* 1.188-9).[151] In some cases, the protagonist can be in dialogue with a mental organ, such as Hector at *Il.* 22.122: ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός; ('but why does my dear *thumos* debate these things?').[152]

Many scholars have argued that such language betrays Homeric thinking on the nature of the self and some have taken the view that it demonstrates the lack of a coherent sense of self.[153] This conclusion has been widely discredited by those who

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[149] Those traditionally included in such a list are θυμός ('breath'), φρένες/φρήν ('diaphragm/lungs'), ψυχή ('spirit'), ἦτορ ('heart'), κῆρ ('heart'), κραδίη ('heart'), νόος ('insight/intellect'), and πραπίδες (meaning unclear, perhaps 'midriff'). (Suggested translations from Pelliccia (2011), 509.)

[150] Or, for that matter, any psychologically descriptive passage. I shall focus on those that involve decision making, since these passages tend to highlight Homeric language most succinctly, and the subject matter of such passages is most pertinent to the topic of this thesis.

[151] The verbs that accompany such scenes of deliberation (here μερμηρίζω) are interesting and will be discussed in the forthcoming chapter on the psychological portrayal of Jason. It will be shown there that Apollonius was aware of this Homeric model, but also uses another verb, πορφύρω, in such contexts.

[152] Instances that include this line are sometimes referred to as the deliberative monologues, of which there are four: Odysseus (*Il.* 11. 404-10), Menelaus (*Il.* 17. 91-105), Agenor (*Il.* 21. 553-70), and Hector (*Il.* 22. 99-130). On the subject of the speech capabilities of the organs, which is (as we shall see) a dramatic device, see Pelliccia (1995), and relevant passages in Gill (1996), 60-93.

[153] Primarily, Bruno Snell (1953), Chapter 1. On the basis that Homer had no single word for the self, Snell extrapolated that there was no Homeric concept of the self. (This follows the infamous Whorfian hypothesis, which argues from the fact that Eskimos have many words for types of snow, but none for

view it as too literal an interpretation.[154] This much is evident if we stop seeing Homer as a dangerously foreign object, which must be treated differently and viewed separately from our own modes of psychological expression:[155] if I were to say that I was 'in two minds' or 'torn' on a subject, it would not, of course, be correct to conclude that either I had two brains,[156] or that part of me was being physically separated. Instead, it is much more profitable to view such psychological expression as fundamentally metaphorical in nature, and thus call to mind the cognitive discussion, specifically that on metaphor, from the previous chapter. This is the juncture at which this project's modern, cognitive methodology meets the original source text. Douglas Cairns has written succinctly that[157]

> [n]o language exists in which the language of mental/emotional life is informed by good scientific psychology/neurology/physiology; in all languages, these are based on folk physiology, folk models. These base their concepts on observable phenomena — observed phenomena of mental/emotional events (by metonymy) and other processes (by analogy). Because folk physiology is an attempt to explain real physiology, metonymous/metaphorical conceptualisations that are based on folk physiology exhibit a degree of cross-cultural similarity (since they are constrained by actual human physiology).

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snow itself, that the culture had no concept of snow.) Thus, on Snell's view, Odysseus' address to his θυμός (*Il*. 11. 409) does not represent a divided self, for there is no self, but a conflict between two entities, Odysseus and the θυμός. (The bibliography on this subject is large; useful summaries of the arguments can be found in Pelliccia (1995), 15-37; Gill (1996), 29-41; and Gaskin (2001).)

[154] Gaskin (2001: 149) observes that Snell (and others who ascribe to this view) 'read too much into the modern concept of selfhood, and consequently … approach Homer with inappropriate expectations. Talk of the self is no more than talk about the coherence of the mental activities of a single person. The self is delimited as just that thing whose defining characteristic it is to organise and unite those activities.' This is similar to the critique of Pelliccia (1995: 31), who stresses that 'a persistent danger [in the interpretation of psychological language in Homer] is that of excessive literal mindedness'.

[155] For an example of this in relation to tragedy, see n.103 (above), including Padel's (1992: 9-10) statement that the ancient Greeks are 'astoundingly alien from ourselves'. As I argue, Greek conceptions of mental events are expressed through universal conceptual metaphors, but which also, at the specific cultural level, reflect folk theories of psychological expression. On this, Cairns (2003a) notes, and my contemporary examples show, that all expressions of mental life are informed by folk psychology, which itself attempts to explain real psychology; since both are informed by the same interactions between bodies in the physical world, they betray a certain necessary cross-cultural nature. What Padel seems to think is 'astoundingly alien' is the specific cultural expression of the cognitive universal.

[156] If, for the sake of argument, we say that in this context the brain and the mind are synonymous.

[157] Cairns (2003a), 71. For a similar understanding (using the emotion of anger as an example), see Pelliccia (1995), 31-7. Despite Clarke (1999)'s overt references to the work of relevant cognitive linguists, Cairns (2003a) also shows that he has not fully appreciated the metaphorical nature of mental organs in Homer and is guilty of overly emphasising cultural determinism.

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Therefore, Hector's θυμός dialogue should be viewed in a similar manner to my statement that I am 'torn': both are attempts to verbalise an aspect of mental life, namely inner conflict, which take the form of metaphorical statements based on folk physiology. Furthermore, we can see that both statements exhibit the cross-cultural similarity of the divided intention being equated to the divided self. Of course, as we have seen, to say that there are certain universals of psychological expression does not mean that all expression of emotion in every culture is the same: recall Zoltan Kövecses' (2000: 190) comments on the cross-cultural nature of emotion, and the fact that culturally specific folk theories add 'most of the richness of human emotional experience'.

Returning specifically to the Homeric mental organs, another important aspect, which strips away a certain amount of mysticism, has been provided by Thomas Jahn. In an exhaustive study of the terms, he showed first that they are semantically interchangeable when pressured by the constraints of metre in oral-formulaic composition,[158] and, secondly and relatedly, that there are no phrases involving psychological organs with identical metrical shapes. (If they did have different meanings, then we would expect there to be, since avoiding redundancy is only necessary when trying to convey the same meaning.) Finally, from the relatively limited information that Homer provides, and bearing in mind the moveable nature of there terms, Jahn also established the rough anatomical relationship between the

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[158] Jahn (1987), 247-98. An example of this might be the description of Odysseus at the beginning of *Odyssey* 20, in which the mental organ changes without any loss of sense; he begins with the address τέτλαθι δή, **κραδίη** (18), then Homer states that ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον **ἦτορ** (22), which is then described as τῷ δὲ μάλ' ἐν πείσῃ **κραδίη** μένε τετληυῖα / νωλεμέως (23-4). (I shall analyse this passage in greater detail in the Chapter Three, as I shall argue that it is important in informing Apollonius' description of Medea's psychological imagery at that juncture.) Pelliccia (2011), 510 sums up this interchangeability succinctly: 'the requirements of oral-formulaic composition … have permitted the words … to suffer semantic degradation: when metrical push comes to formulaic shove, Homer substitutes one for the other, or, often enough, omits them altogether, with no demonstrable change of meaning from corresponding scenes in which they do occur'. Clarke (1999), 64 likens this interchangeability to Parry's study of name-epithet formulae. At 64n.10, Clarke also surveys previous scholarship, which attempted to extract fine shades of meaning from the various different mental organs. On these, Pelliccia (2011: 510): 'the poet himself takes far less interest in these [mental organs] than his modern scholars have'. Jahn's conclusion has thus somewhat revolutionised the study of Homeric psychology in this regard.

mental organs: starting from the centre and moving out in concentric circles are, respectively, the ἦτορ, the κῆρ/κραδίη, the θυμός, the φρένες/φρήν, and the στήθεα.[159]

While the mental organs have a psychological component in a certain context, it should be noted that when Homer focuses on anatomy some of the organs—φρένες/φρήν, ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη, and πραπίδες—can refer to a solid physical part of the body, which can, for example, be injured in battle.[160] As Jahn shows, these organs are located with the chest (στήθεα), while the πραπίδες are envisaged to be below the liver. Others, such as θυμός, are at times seemingly concrete and, at others, envisaged as a breathy substance that moves within the confines of the φρένες.[161] Others still, notably ψυχή[162] and νόος, do not appear to have a similarly specific spatial relationship.

Though the mental organs are to a large extent interchangeable,[163] one in particular, νόος, stands out as functionally separate.[164] While the other terms inhabit what

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[159] Jahn (1987), 18. The (functionally less significant) πραπίδες are envisaged to be below the liver. The ψυχή (discussed separately below) and the νόος do not appear to have a similarly specific spatial relationship.

[160] For example, a spear pierces the κραδίη at *Il*. 13. 442. For discussion and further examples of this, see Clarke (1999), 74-9.

[161] See Cairns (2003a), 70 for a list of passages where the θυμός is personified. For θυμός as a breathy substance, see Caswell (1990), 51-63; Clarke (1999), 79-92; Pelliccia (2011), 876. When the θυμός is envisaged in this form, it is often said to be roused inside a person at points of heightened emotion, such as *Il*. 2. 142-3: Ὣς φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ὄρινε / πᾶσι μετὰ πληθὺν … ('So he spoke, and roused the *thumos* within the *stethos* amongst all the multitude…') This demonstrates several of the theories of the cognitive linguists. First, as has been shown elsewhere, the individual is conceived a vessel in which emotional events may operate, which is what Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 29) refer to as a container metaphor, where στῆθος represents the container and the θυμός is the psychological activity. Second, Gibbs & O'Brien (1990: 20) argue that the heightening of emotion is structured by the cognitive metaphor of the build up of pressure within that container, and this metaphor, as Lakoff (1987: 380-1) has shown, is informed by folk physiology—our experience of the physiological effects of experiencing such an emotion—in the form of increased blood and muscle pressure.

[162] For discussion on the nature of which see Clarke (1999) and Cairns (2003a).

[163] For discussion see Jahn (1987). Caswell (1990) studies the θυμός in relative isolation. Likewise Sullivan (1988) with φρήν.

[164] For exhaustive survey, see Jahn (1987), 46-118, who concludes: 'Damit steht endgültig fest, daß sich Homer unter νόος … etwas grundsätzlich anderes vorstellte als unter θυμός, φρενές, ἦτορ, κῆρ, κραδίη, und πραπίδες'. The main work on νόος is Schmitt (1990), while useful summaries are provided by Clarke (1999), 119-26; and Sullivan (1995), 18-35.

Clarke (1999: 119) refers to as 'an indeterminate status between mental agents and mental functions or phenomena', νόος is associated primarily with intellectual, rather than emotional, activity, and, furthermore, is broadly affiliated with the conclusion of the thinking process.[165] It is 'both a faculty or process and its product',[166] and, in this respect, it is functionally similar to μῆτις, as evidenced by their often appearing in a doublet (νόον καὶ μῆτιν, *Il.* 7. 447).[167]

Moving on from this survey, we can conclude that the mental organs are the Homeric culture's device for dramatising internal mental processes; part of their function is to represent metaphorically a protagonist's inner life,[168] and thus they are not imbued with a special meaning in and of themselves, but highlight psychologically descriptive passages that are best analysed at the level of the scene.[169] Having contextualised the Homeric usage, I shall now compare it with the Apollonian, starting with the number of instances, as shown in the following table:

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[165] Clarke (1999: 120) cautions that this is not a 'watertight rule'. Jahn (1987), 118 refers to this as a δύναμις-character: 'Der Begriff νόος besitzt 'δύναμις-*Charakter* und liegt daher auf einer gänzlich anderen Ebene als die Seele-Geist-*Instanzen*'. To a certain extent, this conclusion is built on the argument of Fritz's (1943: 85) definition of the verb νοῖεν 'to realise a situation and to plan or to have an intention'. Sullivan (1995), 19-20 collects the passages, which show that νόος is associated with Zeus' plans and pronouncements.
[166] Pelliccia (2011), 509.
[167] On this see Clarke (1999), 125: '[t]he independent νοός is exactly paralleled by the autonomous plan or scheme μῆτις'.
[168] That is, to say that something happened κατὰ θυμόν is to say that it is an internal, undetectable process.
[169] Pelliccia (2011), 510.

Mental organ	Total (Jahn (1987)'s figures for *Il.*, *Od.*, and *HHs*)	Total (*Il.* and *Od.*)	Total (*Arg.*)	Homeric frequency (usage / 1,000 lines)	Apollonian frequency (usage / 1,000 lines)	Apollonian frequency : Homeric frequency
ἦτορ	102	96	2	3.45	0.34	0.10
θυμός	816	765	62	27.52	10.63	0.39
κῆρ	90	90	3	3.24	0.51	0.16
κραδίη	63	59	11	2.12	1.89	0.89
νόος	118	104	40	3.74	6.86	1.83
πραπίδες	14	13	1	0.47	0.17	0.36
φρένες / φρήν	379	343	30	12.34	5.14	0.42
ψυχή	84	81	8	2.91	1.37	0.47

The first column shows the number of uses calculated by Thomas Jahn in the *Iliad*, *Odyssey*, and the *Homeric Hymns*.[170] For the purposes of my analysis, and to ease direct comparison, I have used Jahn's numbers, but have subtracted the uses in the *Homeric Hymns*; these constitute the second column. The Apollonian usage is shown in the third column,[171] with the final three columns showing Homeric frequency (usage / 1000 lines),[172] Apollonian frequency (usage / 1000 lines), and the ratio between the two, respectively.

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[170] Jahn (1987), 6n.29. For ease of comparison, I shall use these terms to compare with Apollonius.
[171] It should be born in mind that I am using Vian's (1974 - 1981) text. This search was carried out using the *TLG*, and then corroborated with Campbell (1983a). In some cases, textual emendations in other editions may affect the numbers. For example, at 3.661, Fränkel prints κῆρ instead of Vian's περ. In this case, the difference between 3 or 4 uses of κῆρ in the *Argonautica* would cause a considerable change to the frequency calculations. In cases such as this, specifically where the absolute number of instances is small, I would advise cautious interpretation. However, this does not prevent me from drawing broad conclusions in such cases, and also more definitive statements in cases where the absolute number is larger (>25).
[172] To calculate the frequency per 1000 lines, I divided the number of usages by the total number of lines in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (27803), and the *Argonautica* (5835), respectively, and then multiplied by 1000.

What is immediately apparent is that, while Apollonius uses all the Homeric terms, in most cases, he does so far less frequently. Half of the terms—θυμός (0.39 times as often), πραπίδες (0.36), φρένες / φρήν (0.42),[173] and ψυχή[174] (0.47)—are broadly even in their usage, between a third and half as frequent as Homer. However, ἦτορ (0.10) and κῆρ (0.16) are used around a tenth as much as in Homer, while κραδίη (0.89) is used almost as much, and, most notably, νόος (1.83) is used almost twice as much. Apollonius' use of mental organs in general could be the topic of a thesis in and of itself, and, as such, I shall restrict myself to what I think are the most notable observations.

Examining Apollonius' usages of νόος specifically,[175] roughly a third (12/40) are used of Medea.[176] This is in stark contrast to the less than a tenth (3/40) that are used of Jason.[177] Elsewhere, we see that Apollonian usage corroborates the Homeric

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[173] Fritz (1945), 229 states that '[t]he word itself disappears almost completely after the first decades of the fourth century, except in direct imitations of Homer, and survives only in its derivatives…' Apollonius' use here would seem to corroborate Fritz's observation.

[174] Clarke (1999) is of the opinion that ψυχή exists only at the point of death: it is 'the cold breath expelled at the point of death or in a death-like swoon'. Similarly, Pelliccia (2011: 509): 'the *psukhē* does not play a role in the psychology of the living person, entering into play only with the approach of death'. Cairns (2003a), while accepting that (50) ψυχή 'is credited with no active function in the living person', has shown convincingly, through examples such at *Il*. 9. 321-2 where Achilles metaphorically gambles (παραβαλλόμενος) with his ψυχή, that it is necessary for life and consciousness (54): 'it can be a valued possession that the individual strives to retain, that he risks when facing danger, and that his opponents seek to take from him as their prize'. Cf. the role of metaphor and metonymy in the conception of the mental organs analysed above.

[175] In its various forms, νόος appears at: 1.242, 130, 323, 439, 464, 808; 2.182, 212, 226, 248, 256, 313, 316, 325, 716, 767, 1090, 1149; 3.52, 174, 298, 328, 446, 471, 567, 816, 826, 903, 933; 4.3, 102, 350, 620, 737, 766, 863, 1017, 1078, 1177, 1669.

[176] These are 3.298, 446, 471, 816, 826, 903; 4.350, 737* (Medea avoids mentioning the murder of Apsyrtus, but this does not escape Circe's νόος), 1017, 1078* (Arete states that her νόος has been broken by Medea's suffering), 1177* (Alcinuous announces his νόος concerning Medea), 1669. The three *instances, where I have also included the context, I deem to be tangentially applicable to Medea, since she is the subject of the νόος of Circe, Arete, and Alcinuous, respectively. Admittedly, these instances are less concrete that the others, which apply directly to Medea, but even if a more cautious critic were to exclude them, the firm instances with Medea would still account for almost a quarter (9/40) of all the uses in the *Argonautica*.

[177] 1.464* (Idas asks Jason of his νόος), 2.767* (Jason states that the Argonauts unintentionally left behind Heracles), 3.567. Again, two *instances have been included owing to the context. (The scene involving the former will be analysed extensively in the chapter on Jason, as it is one of the few instances of Apollonius' psychological description of him.) If these were to be excluded, Jason would account for only one of the examples in the *Argonautica*. This would, of course, make the contrast between the usage with respect to himself and conversely with Medea even more stark.

association with divine pronouncements (8/40).[178] What may account for this increased usage with respect to Medea? The first point is that if, as we have seen, we are to equate νόος with the conclusion, and perhaps to some extent the machinations,[179] of the thinking process, then it is clearly relevant that Medea is often portrayed in vacillating over whether or not to aid Jason.[180] In this respect, Apollonius' use of νόος can be seen to trace Medea's plight from the beginning of her divinely-inspired passion at 3.297-8:

> ἀπαλὰς δὲ μετετρωπᾶτο παρειὰς
> ἐς χλόον, ἄλλοτ' ἔρευθος, ἀκηδείῃσι[181] νόοιο.

> And her soft cheeks turned
> now pale, now red, in the anguish of her *noos*.

It can be seen through her *aporia* at 3. 471: ἡ μὲν ἄρ' ὣς ἐόλητο νόον μελεδήμασι κούρη ('in this way the *noos* of the girl was bound with anxieties'), and the Argonauts' collective concern at what plans she may have come to: ἵνα φράζοιντο νόον καὶ μήδεα κούρης ('in order to perceive the *noos* and plans of the girl', 3.826).[182] Then, after she has aided Jason and they have acquired the Fleece, her νόος must come to terms with her actions in the Minyans' proposed truce: ἔνθα δ' ἐπεὶ τὰ ἔκαστα νόῳ πεμπάσσατο κούρη ('now when the girl had counted up each thing in her mind', 4.350). And, finally, she must appropriate a specific νόος in

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[178] For this, see n.165 above. 1.439 (Apollo); 2.182 (Zeus), 313 (Zeus), 316 (Collective); 3.52* (Aphrodite asks what is the νόος of Hera and Athena), 328 (Zeus); 4.766 (Hera), 863* (Thetis tells Peleus to keep the knowledge of his presence in his νόος.)

[179] Here I am again following Fritz's (1943: 85) definition of the verb νοεῖν 'to realise a situation and to plan or to have an intention'.

[180] Fusillo (2001), 132 notes that 'the element of inner conflict becomes central to the whole narration'. He also notes: '[i]f the interior monologues we pointed out in Homer are basically exceptions to the prevalence of pragmatic aspects in both of his poems, Apollonius' epic appears on the contrary to be completely dominated by psychological factors: he always focuses on the emotional reactions to an event rather than on its fulfilment'. This, of course, may account for the greater use of νόος.

[181] Although not directly relevant to this thesis, this non-Homeric term has a long philosophical afterlife, leading to the term *accidie*; on this, see Harré & Parrott (1996).

[182] Hunter (1989) *ad loc* notes the obvious pun on Medea's name here and states that 'it marks the men's complete dependence upon the young girl's μῆτις.' See n.167 (above): νόος and μῆτις often appeared as a doublet.

order to bewitch Talos and ensure the Argonauts' safe passage: θεμένη δὲ κακὸν νόον ('adopting an evil *noos*', 4.1669).

A final reason as to why the *Argonautica* might show a marked increase in the use of νόος is the increased significance that the term went on to achieve in philosophical thought in the intervening centuries. Sullivan documents how for lyric and elegiac poets such as Semonides and Theognis νόος functioned as 'a seat of an individual's deepest qualities'.[183] The term was also of importance to Anaxagoras, where it becomes somewhat of a strong, autocratic ruling force (fr. 12.5-6, 12-14):[184]

> νοῦς δέ ἐστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμεικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μόνος αὐτὸς ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστιν ...
> ἔστι γὰρ λεπτότατόν τε πάντων χρημάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντὸς πᾶσαν ἴσχει καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον·

> Nous is unlimited and self-ruling and has been mixed with no thing, but is alone itself by itself ...
> For it is the finest of all things and the purest, and indeed it maintains its discernment (*gnōmē*) and everything and has the greatest strength. [Tr. Curd (2007)]

Thus, I think we see here that Apollonius, while operating within the Homeric sphere as evidenced by his using all of the Homeric mental organs, is reflecting some of the intervening philosophical development.[185]

IV. THE PRESENTATION OF *EROS* IN THE POST-HOMERIC TRADITION.

Constraints of space do not allow me to examine here the post-Homeric history of all the concepts and notions that I am going to explore in this thesis; this shall be done as and when appropriate. However, in one case—that of *eros*—I do need to say a

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[183] See Sullivan (1995), 22-26 for specific passages.
[184] Of course, this is not to say that νόος did not have an important place in earlier philosophy. For example, it is discussed specifically by Aristotle as an essential part of a person in the tenth book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*. On this, and others, see Lee & Long (2007).
Fränkel (1975), 78n.10 writes of the development of νόος that 'thinking detaches itself from ties with the thinking person and becomes pure "spirit"'. I think that this is evident in the quotation from Anaxagoras. For analysis of the term in other Presocratics, see Fritz (1945).
[185] For more on philosophical influences on Apollonius, see n.127 (above).

little more, owing to its importance within the poem.[186] There is, of course, a tradition of erotic poetry post-Homer,[187] which exerts a considerable influence on Apollonius' poem. Partly owing to this, the following two chapters are concerned with *eros*: the case studies of Medea and the sunbeam, and Hercules and the gadfly, both show, as I shall argue, the protagonist acting under the influence of the emotion.[188] I shall show that their physical behaviour is portrayed in a manner both cognitively universal and culturally specific, and that, in turn, this behaviour informs Apollonius' conception of those protagonists' psychology. In order to do this, however, I shall first conduct a brief analysis of the presentation of *eros* in the literary tradition before the *Argonautica*.[189]

There are many manifestations of *eros*;[190] however, the metaphors, metonymies, as well as symptoms and expressions that are evident in the literary tradition, and that I think are of greatest relevance to this thesis, are: madness,[191] pain (in the form of

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[186] There is an exhaustive bibliography on the role of *eros* in the *Argonautica*; see, primarily, Hunter (1993), 46-74, who examines, amongst other examples, the erotic paradigms of Calypso, Nausicaa, the relationship of Achilles and Patroclus, and Euripides' Phaedra; and, more cursorily, Hunter (1989), 26-8. Other notable works on the theme are Beye (1969) and (1982), Zanker (1979), Pavlock (1991), Toohey (1992), and Fantuzzi (2008).

[187] For discussions on this, see Miller, and the collected essays in Sanders *et al* (2013).

[188] For a recent discussion on the relationship between the ancient emotion of *eros* and its modern equivalents, romantic love and sexual desire, see Sanders & Thumiger (2013), 4-5. It is in these terms that I shall broadly understand *eros* for the comparison with the cognitive universal conception. On the subject of the cross-cultural study of such emotion terms, see Cairns (2003b), 11-20.

[189] Again, this is a large topic, and I shall therefore pick out the most salient points and give suggested references. I shall examine the cognitive universal conception of *eros* (or, romantic love and sexual desire) in the following chapters and when applicable. The most recent collection of essays on the topic is Sanders *et al* (2013).

[190] The aspects of *eros* that I have picked out here derive from the exhaustive list of Cairns (2013), 240n.13, which is a study of *eros* in Plato's *Pheadrus*. On this topic, see also Calame (1992). Since the aspects picked out are well-known, I shall restrict myself to references, and shall re-analyse in connection with the case studies, as appropriate.

[191] Sappho 1.18 L-P; Anac. 398, 428 *PMG*; Ibyc. 286.10-11 *PMGF*; Thgn. 1231; Plat. *Phaedrus* 240d, 244a-245c, 249de, 251e, 253c, 256b, 265ac. On madness in tragedy, see the recent article by Thumiger (2013); she concludes (40): '[w]hile being strictly an experience of the individual, erotic passion also poses a threat to the very boundaries of control and reasoning of the individual. The superimposition with madness points at exactly this. Under the influence of *erôs* the subject is exposed to the danger of losing itself and the balance in his or her relationship with the world outside.' This implicit analysis in terms of internal and external will be useful for my subsequent arguments.

stings or goads),[192] hunting/pursuit,[193] warmth/fever,[194] fluttering (of a psychological organ),[195] shuddering,[196] softening/melting,[197] and forgetting family.[198] A main proponent in the literary depiction of *eros* is Sappho, whose poetry extensively documented physical symptoms, and, as D'Angour has recently argued,[199] recast Homeric language for the topic of love. Such recasting of established terminology should be borne in mind, both for the Apollonian portrayal of *eros*, but also for a literary culture's development of emotional models.

V. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MYTH

A final, and obvious, consideration is that, when writing his *Argonautica*, Apollonius was working within an established myth. We must predicate on the contemporary audience a high level of knowledge of previous incarnations, namely those by Euripides (*Medea*) and Pindar (*Pythian* 4),[200] in just the same way that we assume an intimate knowledge of the texts of Homer and the other lyric poets. Hunter (1989: 17) states that Pindar was to Apollonius

> far more than merely a model of successful poetry written under the eye of a wealthy patron. The linguistic and mythopoeic boldness of the Theban poet appealed strongly to the Alexandrian love of experimentation … and the strongly personal voice of lyric poetry showed the way towards the handling of familiar tales in an intellectual and empathetic manner which could endow them with new life. Thus A[pollonius'] debt to Pindar is not merely the chance of shared subject-matter, but is itself a declaration of poetic stance.

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[192] Sappho 1.3, 172 L-P; Ibyc. 282A (iii) fr.4 *PMGF*; Plat. *Phaedrus* 240d, 251de, 253e-254a, 254c, 254e, 255d. Needless to say, I shall return to this in the analysis of the gadfly.
[193] Sappho 1.21 L-P; Ibyc. 287.4 *PMGF*; Thgn. 1283-94, 1299-304; Plat. *Phaedrus* 252e, 253c.
[194] Sappho 31.10 L-P, 48.2 L-P; Plat. *Phaedrus* 251bc, 253e.
[195] Sappho 31.5 L-P; Anac. 346 (1).12; Thgn. 1018; Plat. *Phaedrus* 255cd.
[196] Soph. *Aj*. 693; Plat. *Phaedus* 251a.
[197] Alcm. 3. fr. 3 col. ii. 61 *PMGF*; Anac. 459 *PMG*; Ibyc. 282C (xiv) frr. 29 + 31, line 3 *PMGF*, 287.1 *PMGF*; Pind. fr. 123.10-11 S-M; Plat. *Phaedrus* 251b.
[198] Sappho 16. 10-11 L-P; Plat. *Phaedrus* 252a.
[199] D'Angour (2013), though, as the author notes, the line of argumentation follows others, for example Rissmann (1983).
[200] For discussion on Apollonius' debt to previous authors, see Hunter (1989), 12-21, with bibliography. On Pindar, see the commentary on the nature of the myth in Braswell (1988), 6-22.

Similarly, on the second main mythic influence, Hunter (1989: 18) writes that

> Euripides' *Medea* tells of events long after the Argonautic expedition, but A[pollonius] assumes in his readers an intimate knowledge of this famous play, and its action hangs over Arg. even when it is not specifically recalled. … A[pollonius] models his Jason and Medea with an eye to their "subsequent" history in Euripides' tragedy. The two texts become mutually explicative: Arg. shows us how the origins of the tragedy lay far back and the tragedy lends deep resonance and "tragic" irony to the events of the epic.

Elements of the tale were also known to Homer,[201] though this, as well as the other incarnations, should be seen as an informative background, rather than a rigid set of conditions within which Apollonius' version had to sit. On this, Stephens (2000: 197) notes that[202]

> there is no autonomous narrative of the events Apollonius relates, only a series of earlier myths and legends each embedded within a specific generic context. Collectively this material formed the intellectual matrix for his own composition, but it was neither prescriptive nor necessarily limiting of his own narrative voice.

During the course of my analysis, therefore, I shall highlight relevant Apollonian interaction with such texts.

VI. SUMMARY AND INTENTION

The previous chapter and this one have introduced the methodology that will be used in the remainder of this thesis. I began by surveying selected theories and results from the cognitive sciences—Theory of Mind, agency, gesture, and conceptual metaphor—which I argue are just as pertinent to the *Argonautica* as they are to any modern source, since they highlight certain universal principles of human psychology. Then, along the lines of more traditional classical scholarship, I analysed Apollonius from within his specific cultural tradition, dealing in turn with

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[201] See Hunter (1989), 14.

[202] Similarly, Hunter (1989), 21: 'A[pollonius] makes visible the process of selection between variants, either by refereeing to a rejected version in the course of telling the selected one or by combining previously competing versions'. On this latter point, see Fusillo (1985), *passim*. See Stephens (2000), 198-200 for the relationship between the *Argonautica* and Herodotus' *Histories*, while the article in general considers why Apollonius chose the narrative he did in relation to Ptolemaic Alexandria. (On this, see my section above on Apollonian background.)

his relationship to Homer, the medical, scientific, and philosophical developments of contemporary Alexandria, conceptions of the self, and presentations of both *eros* and the *Argonautica* myth. On the strength of this, I now have the necessary contextualisation to attempt, in the following chapters, to situate chosen parts of the text within both universal and specific conceptions of psychological presentation.

The mental events that this thesis will now go on to cover are various, but tend to cluster around points in the narrative where a protagonist has to make a decision about how to act. It is how these decisions are variously conceived and portrayed that I shall explore, with the aim of ascertaining whether or not there is a degree of underlying systematicity. In all cases, I shall use the methodology highlighted in the last two chapters—both the cognitive universal and the culturally specific—wherever relevant.

3

THE SUNBEAM

Marshall Gillies, in his article of 1925, begins by stating that lines 616-832 of Book
3 constitute 'the finest passage in the *Argonautica*, if indeed … not also one of the
greatest things in Greek literature'.[203] This is high praise indeed. This chapter will
focus on a piece of imagery within this section that is equally lauded: the sunbeam
simile that is used of Medea at 755-60.[204] Yet, as will be shown, the famous simile is
more complex than many scholars would credit it—its undoubtedly arresting
imagery more than mere poetic ornamentation. In this chapter, I shall first re-
examine the simile within its narrative context and argue for a new interpretation,[205]
which will establish it as a piece of psychological imagery, metaphorically
representative of mental processes. I shall then demonstrate that the imagery deploys
many of the cognitive scientific universals that were examined in the first chapter,
thus showing the explanatory power of this methodological approach. Finally, I shall
show how a deeper analysis of the poetic tradition reveals culturally specific
deployments of such cognitive universals. After establishing an interpretation of the
simile, the arguments in this chapter will, then, zoom from the macro to the micro,

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[203] Gillies (1925), 115.

[204] James (1981), 68 labels it 'perhaps the most frequently discussed of all Apollonius' similes'; while
Green (1997: 271), in one of the most recent English commentaries, typifies the scholarly attitude
when he speaks of 'this striking and brilliant image'. Exactly what the simile refers to within the
narrative will be discussed in this chapter. See also the comments of Reitz (1996), 68.

[205] Though what I shall term the 'sunbeam' simile (3.755-60) is my primary reason for analysing this
section, both the immediate and less immediate context is of importance. When I refer to the 'passage'
to be analysed, this is 3.744-70.

showing how culturally specific aspects become apparent at higher levels of specificity.

At the beginning of Book 3, divine intervention elicits a lustful passion for Jason within Medea (3.85-9),[206] and the passage begins with the princess in a troubled state. Following her dream (616-35) and after the emotive scene with her sister, Chalkiope, Medea is left alone in her room with only her tortuous thoughts for company (740-3). Before returning to examine Medea, however, Apollonius widens the scope of his narrative by describing the contemporary affairs of others, both near and far. The purpose of this is twofold, though both points are linked to maximise the overall effect: first, to contextualise Medea's situation in terms of her fellow man and her environment; and, second, to build up a foil of human activity (or lack thereof) which serves to heighten Medea's emotional and physical isolation.

On close inspection, a certain narrative technique becomes apparent.[207] The physical scene-setting, a transition from stellar bodies to the affairs of man, begins on the macro scale and incrementally progresses to the micro—the result resembling a Russian Matryoshka doll.[208] The passage thus begins with the description of night covering the earth (740).[209] This constitutes the extreme of the scale, beyond the remit and control of man. After this, the narrative focus slowly zooms in and the audience's attention is drawn to a progressively tighter set of affairs. The celestial focus is then honed and used as a link to the realm of man: νύξ, the subject of 744, is picked up by the Ἑλίκην τε καὶ ἀστέρας Ὠρίωνος of 745, which are viewed by sailors on the ocean (οἱ δ᾽ ἐνὶ πόντῳ / ναυτίλοι, 744-5)—the celestial bodies now in the accusative and man in the nominative, signalling a transition to this next, closer level of focus and also moving agency to the realm of man. (Noticeably,

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[206] As previously noted, this chapter and the next will focus on protagonists under the effects of *eros*. See the previous discussion for contextualising comments.

[207] Beye (1982), 67-8 has a concise summary of the narrative and points out certain Homeric features that are present.

[208] In this respect, the Apollonian narrative technique is similar to the presentation of paradeigmatic tales in Homer; see Willcock (1964).

[209] This description, accompanied by the narrative scene-change, is reminiscent of Alcman 89 *PMGF*.

however, the scope is still large since sailors on a voyage can be implicitly understood to be travelling large distances.) The next level then introduces τις ὁδίτης (746); this wayfarer both continues the theme of the movement of men and tightens the scope since any distance that he may travel can be presumed to be not as great as that of the sailors. A stationary gatekeeper (πυλαωρός, 747) then refines the narrative's focus and introduces a feeling of stillness, which is continued as Apollonius finally settles his attention on the city where σιγὴ δὲ μελαινομένην ἔχεν ὄρφνην ('silence gripped the blackening night', 750). This mention of blackening darkness here echoes νύξ at 744, and the resulting ring composition serves to mark this section off as an independent unit that sets the scene for the subsequent analysis of Medea.[210]

As well as this gradual spatial refinement, there is a movement from activity to stillness. The sailors watch the stars (ἔδρακον, 746),[211] before sleep, the obvious antithesis to this, is introduced as something that the traveller and the gatekeeper yearn for (ἐέλδετο, 747). These two, thus, in their desire but inability to attain sleep, constitute a transitional state before the narrator focuses on the mother of deceased children, whom sleep has enveloped (ἐκάλυπτεν, 748).[212] Again, the point here is to create a foil of activity, both physical and mental, against which Medea and her situation can be understood.[213]

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[210] Noted also by Beye (1982), 67.

[211] Indeed, it could be argued that the fact that they do this watching at night, when they might be expected to be sleeping, actually serves to highlight their wakefulness.

[212] Beye (1982) 68 notes that this mother, the 'central element' of the scene, is 'baffling and upsetting, hence problematical'. Campbell (1983b), 49 calls the episode 'tellingly functional' in that it foreshadows certain major emotional themes that Medea will soon experience. Hunter (1989), 178 sees an analogue between the mother and Medea in terms of their shared 'eternity of hopeless longing and regret'. Apollonius' description can only pique the reader's interest in preparation for the re-introduction of Medea. The image of the mother of deceased will be important for my subsequent analysis.

[213] Campbell (1983b), 49 states that by the use of sound and rhythm this entire passage is designed 'to exert an hypnotic effect upon the reader'. The imagery within this section is worthy of a thesis in itself; see Campbell (1983b) for a starting bibliography as well as a brief listing of Hellenistic literary parallels.

This foil is cast firmly aside with the abrupt and forceful re-introduction of the protagonist at the beginning of line 751: ἀλλὰ μάλ᾽ οὐ Μήδειαν ἐπὶ γλυκερὸς λάβεν ὕπνος ('but in no way did sweet sleep seize Medea'). At the very moment that she reappears in the narrative, the reader is given her physical state: while, as has been shown, there has been a gradual trend toward sleep in the preceding lines (746-8), Medea does not long for sleep, and neither is she subject to it. The reason for this wakefulness is then immediately provided: her longing (πόθῳ, 752) for Jason manifests itself in many cares (πολλὰ … μελεδήματ᾽, 752) that the confrontation with the bulls will bring him a miserable death (ἀεικελίη μοίρῃ, 754). That the reader is presented with Medea and then her fretful concern for Jason in juxtaposition creates the effect that, at this moment, she is defined by her mental state; she is welded to her fear.

Apollonius next states that Medea's heart fluttered wildly within her breast (πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν, 755), with this line linking the description of Medea to the simile of the sunbeam that follows.[214] The following imagery is the primary interest of this chapter, as I shall argue that it is an instance of psychological imagery, symbolic of Medea's mental processes, which displays both cognitive universals, as well as being a product of the specific literary history.

I. THE SIMILE

> πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν.
> Ἠελίου ὥς τίς τε δόμοις ἐνιπάλλεται αἴγλη,
> ὕδατος ἐξανιοῦσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἠὲ λέβητι
> ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται, ἡ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
> ὠκείῃ στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται ἀίσσουσα·
> ὣς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης

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[214] The language of this line, and particularly the verb used, is of great interest and will be discussed fully later on.

Frequently the kradie within her *stethos* raged wildly,[215]
as when a sunbeam leaps within a house,[216]
reflecting from water recently poured into a cauldron
or into a bucket, and this way and that
quickly whirling it quivers and darts.
So did the girl's *ker* whirl round in her *stethos*…

Various intertexts and influences have been proposed for the simile,[217] and I shall
further some of these in the rest of this chapter. Before this, however, I shall return to
the contextualisation.

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[215] I shall shortly undertake a full cognitive analysis of the imagery here, but note in passing that the container metaphor that structures the relationship between Medea and her psychological organs is replicated metaphorically by the sunbeam within the the house.

[216] There is perhaps no accident in the poetic placing of ἠελίου and αἴγλη: just as they frame the line in the structure of the clause, the image of the sunbeam appears sporadically in different parts of the house.

[217] To give only a brief textual background to the simile, Gillies (1928: 81) believes that present here is an 'amplification' of the simile used to describe Odysseus' view of the palace of Alcinous at *Od.* 7.81-7:

> αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
> Ἀλκινόου πρὸς δώματ' ἴε κλυτά· πολλὰ δέ οἱ κῆρ
> ὥρμαιν' ἱσταμένῳ, πρὶν χάλκεον οὐδὸν ἱκέσθαι.
> ὥς τε γὰρ ἠελίου αἴγλη πέλεν ἠὲ σελήνης
> δῶμα καθ' ὑψερεφὲς μεγαλήτορος Ἀλκινόοιο.
> χάλκεοι μὲν γὰρ τοῖχοι ἐληλέδατ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
> ἐς μυχὸν ἐξ οὐδοῦ…

> But Odysseus
> came to the splendid house of Alcinoos; and, standing, his *ker*
> pondered many things, before he reached the bronze gates.
> For as a ray comes from the sun or from the moon,
> such was the high-roofed house of great-hearted Alcinoos.
> For bronze walls stretched this way and that
> to the innermost part from the threshold…

Garvie (1994:180) notes that the poetic use of the sun and the moon in comparisons is formulaic, owing to the fact that this is a word-for-word repetition of the description of Telemachos' impression of Menelaus' palace at *Od.* 4.45-6 (ὥς τε γὰρ ἠελίου αἴγλη πέλεν ἠὲ σελήνης / δῶμα καθ' ὑψερεφὲς Μενελάου κυδαλίμοιο). Despite this, though, he believes that the use in Book 7 is designed to recall that in Book 4, since the respective journeys of father and son are somewhat parallel (for these arguments see 158, 180). The two Homeric precedents are also discussed by James (1981), 68-9, who notes that Homer mentions Odysseus' heart immediately prior to that sunbeam simile (82-3) in just the same way as Apollonius does of Medea (3.755-6); consequently, he argues that 'Apollonius' originality is significantly more restricted than has hitherto been supposed'. While James is right in that this progression is worthy of note as a probable influence, it is clear that Apollonius' innovation is not restricted: in the Homeric text the moving αἴγλη functions as a description of the magnificence of the palace and is thus discrete from the on-looking Odysseus, whereas its equivalent in the Argonautica occurs in a simile that illustrates the corresponding movement of Medea's heart and, as I shall argue, further symbolises her mental processes. Green (1997), 271 states that he disagrees with James but does not explain his reasoning. For another overview of the simile, see Reitz (1996), 67-74. Fowler (1989), 113 suggests that the simile may have been influenced by Heron's and

Medea then cries (761), and there follows an intricate anatomical description of the pain that she feels creeping through her (761-5).[218] Finally, she moves into a period of indecision as to how she should act, in which Apollonius states that she considers three options: to help Jason by giving him the drugs (766-7); not to help but to kill herself (767); or not to help and not to die, but to endure her misery in a careless state (768-9). This indecision will be crucial to my interpretation of the simile.

It should be noted at this point that a transposition of the sunbeam simile (755-60)—placed so as to follow the anatomical description of the pain of love inside Medea (ending at 765)—was proposed by Herman Fränkel in 1950, and subsequently printed in his Oxford Classical Text of 1961. Fränkel based his arguments on what he perceived as a lack of logic in the transmitted passage. On his reading, the simile refers to Medea's mental vacillation that specifically picks up the description of her options that follow (766-9). Though this emendation has not proved popular with

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Euclid's work in optics 'but it is just as likely that he was inspired by the painters who were his contemporaries … Apollonius … saw with a painter's eye and produced chiaroscuro effects very much like theirs'.

Finally, various philosophical influences have been suggested: in particular, Fränkel (1968), *ad loc* posits Epictetus 3.3.20-2; on the merits of these, see Hunter (1989: 179), who also suggests the influence of Democritus (Arist. *De anima* 1.404a1-5). It is clear, then, that there are contemporary philosophical influences; indeed, an analysis of Apollonius' relation to such influences would be a worthy addition to the scholarship. (See nn.114, 127, above.) Though it is not directly within the remit of this thesis, to those suggested above, I would add some potentially interesting parallels with several fragments of Empedocles. Fragment 84 D-K describes the working of the human eye by comparison to a man's construction of a lantern. There are certain thematic correspondences: as in the *Argonautica* it is night (νύκτα), and the beams from the lantern dart outwards and are untiring (φῶς δ' ἔξω διαθρῳσκον … ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν). While this intertext is not directly pertinent on verbal grounds, it is undoubtedly interesting thematically, especially since it was shown in the last chapter that Apollonius was interested in the medical ideas of Herophilus and others. In this respect, Empedocles detailed description of the eye as wrapped in membranes and delicate tissues (λεπτῇσίν <τ'> ὀθόνῃσι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην) is interesting, and certainly falls within a category of potential influences on Apollonius. For discussion on this fragment, see Wright (1981), 240-3. With this in mind, Empedocles' fr. 100 D-K, which details his theory of respiration, is also interesting. Here respiration and blood flow are likened to a girl playing with a water-clock (ὥσπερ ὅταν παῖς κλεψύδρῃ παίζουσα…). This is reminiscent of Herophilus' similar device to measure the pulse, which was discussed in the previous chapter, and could also be an influence on Apollonius' simile. Wright (1981), 244-6 discusses this fragment, noting that it 'gives the first extant Greek physiological theory to connect respiration with the movement of the blood'. (See Wright for an overview of Aristotle's critique of the theory.)

[218] This anatomical description of Medea's pain was discussed in the previous chapter.

subsequent editors,[219] I believe that the arguments that I shall now produce are favourable to, though not dependent on, the change. And, as my argument will show, I believe that the sunbeam does refer to Medea's mental vacillation. Since the discussion over the relative merits of the transposition is lengthy and somewhat tangential to my discussion of the sunbeam, I have placed my treatment of it in Appendix One.

Returning to the logic of the text as it is transmitted in the manuscripts, the simile of the reflecting sunbeam refers to the palpitations of Medea's heart.[220] This argument is based on the fact that the simile departs from and returns to the main narrative via explicit references to Medea's κραδίη and κέαρ (755, 760).[221] A further question, though, and one that must be answered so that the sunbeam simile can be fully understood, is what causes Medea's heart to palpitate—for this will, by extension, be linked to the vacillating sunbeam. The logical answer, since it is stated just before the simile (752-4), would be that it is Medea's longing for Jason, resulting in her many anxieties that he will be mauled to death the next day. However, I do not think that this captures the full meaning of the vacillating sunbeam.

Hunter's comment is useful in beginning to form an answer to this question; he states (1989: 179) that 'the simile does not refer primarily to indecision, but rather to Medea's jumping heart and physical restlessness, although the two cannot be firmly separated'. I think that this contains all the necessary elements for understanding the simile, but that—perhaps owing to constraints of space—it is in itself inadequate in explaining what is clearly a complicated image. There appears to be a low-level confusion over cause and symptom, perhaps owing to the apparent simplicity of the

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[219] All following editions of *Argonautica* Book 3 have rejected the transposition: Ardizzoni (1958); Vian (1961), which was subsequently produced as a full *Argonautica* edition in the Budé series (1980); Hopkinson's excerpt in *A Hellenistic Anthology* (1988); and Hunter (1989). The only scholar that I have found who is in support of Fränkel is Barkhuizen (1979), 38n.19.

[220] This is the opinion of, for example, Clack (1973), 313: '[t]he irregular reflection of light on a house wall is a visualization of the fluttering of her heart'.

[221] Note here that Apollonius uses two separate psychological organs, which appear to be functionally synonymous; this supports the views of Jahn (1987), which were discussed in Chapter Two.

image, which belies a more complicated explanation. Hunter does not state a reason for Medea's beating heart,[222] nor does he further clarify the physical restlessness, but I think that this latter point is crucial for an adequate appreciation of the simile. I shall produce evidence that links the simile to Medea's movement, and thus argue that the movement of the simile, which picks up that of Medea, in fact informs and is representative of mental vacillation, which constitutes Hunter's third strand: indecision.

In this way, then, my argument will be that observable phenomena (specifically, external, physical, and visible movement) are used to inform the conception of mental life (itself necessarily internal and invisible), in this instance specifically Medea's indecision over whether to not to help Jason. The background processes that achieve this are some of those that I have termed the cognitive universals, which were set out in the first chapter. I shall show, first, that the movement of the sunbeam functions in this way by displaying these cognitive universals, and that, second, analysis of the poetic tradition reveals it to be a culturally specific manifestation of that cognitive universal.

II. HERE AND THERE

I argue that the cause of both Medea's palpitations and restlessness is clearly her mental turmoil, of which there are several constituent parts: first, longing for Jason; second, concern that he will be mauled to death by the bulls; and, notably, third, her

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[222] Similarly, Hutchinson (1988), 117n.50, who also comments that '[t]he simile in part takes up πυκνὰ (755)…' Frustratingly, the corresponding part is not mentioned. Also, Papadopoulou (1997), 655 compares the sunbeam to Medea's 'perplexed heart'; how much weight is being applied to the adjective here is unclear, or whether it is in relation to Medea's 'inner struggle' mentioned previously on the same page. It could be argued that, in asking what causes Medea's heart to beat excessively, I am asking a slightly different question to that of the commentators quoted. I think that my question is a refinement that, if answered convincingly, will add significantly to our understanding of the text.

anxiety over alternative courses of action that she can undertake in order to affect the

outcome.[223] These alternatives are laid out by Apollonius (766-9):

φῆ δέ οἱ ἄλλοτε μὲν θελκτήρια φάρμακα ταύρων
δωσέμεν· ἄλλοτε δ' οὔ τι, καταφθεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτή·
αὐτίκα δ' οὔτ' αὐτὴ θανέειν, οὐ φάρμακα δώσειν,
ἀλλ' αὔτως εὔκηλος ἐὴν ὀτλησέμεν ἄτην.

At one moment she thought that she would give him the drugs to charm
the bulls; at another she would not, but perish herself;
presently neither would she die herself, nor give the drugs,
but just as she was, free from care, she would endure her ruin.

My arguments for this third strand revolve around the formula on which this chapter

is based: ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. As has been shown, it is used in the simile to describe the

motion of the reflected sunbeam as it darts around the walls of the house (758-9), and

is thus symbolic of Medea's quivering heart (755, 760). But I argue that the darting

of the sunbeam ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα also refers to the rapid changes in courses of action

that Medea mentally entertains as possible courses of action.[224]

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[223] The first and second of these are stated explicitly at 3.752-4. I am adding the third component for which I shall now supply the necessary evidence (though this may be what Hunter (1989: 179) means by 'indecision').

[224] On this reading, I follow Barkhuizen (1979: 39-40) in that the simile shows her 'whole psychological conflict' and is 'the central symbol or image of her struggle throughout the whole of Book 3'. Though his comments are too brief to be sure, it appears that this is also the opinion of Lesky (1966), 734, who states that the simile is illustrative of Medea's emotion, and specifically her 'agitation and irresolution'. Similarly, Zanker (1987:199) states of the simile that 'the poet depicts Medea's changes of mood, her anguish, and the interplay of id and superego with extraordinary insight…' Beye (2002: 77) supports this general line of argument, though unfortunately does not adduce specific evidence: 'the poet presents in considerable detail the inner turmoil that Medea suffers as she vacillates between resolving to aid Jason or not to help him, between resolving to commit suicide or to go on living…'
I fully support a more recent article by Richard Buxton (2010), who notes that Medea is (25) 'in constant restless motion'. On the simile, his comments support my argument, though are frustratingly brief (26): 'Medea's restlessness … expresses itself in her perceptions: Medea sees the world as a place of fluttering, dancing indecision: in what is probably Apollonius' best-known simile [3.756-60]…' The article concludes that 'whenever [Medea] is not focussed strictly on practising magical control [such as subduing the snake at 4.156-61, which allows Jason to take the Fleece], the turmoil generated by the conflicting claims of *eros* and family removes all fixity and condemns her to oscillate'. The analysis of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα that I shall now undertake distils and supports Buxton's observation. Where I shall go further is in demonstrating its use in the conception of psychological activity through that which I have termed the cognitive universals. On this specifically, Buxton's comments are again supportive, if somewhat loose (36): '[t]here exists in every culture a rich and complex repertory of symbolic/expressive modes upon which members of that culture may draw in order to represent their experience. One of these modes can be visualised as a spectrum ranging from composed stillness to frantic energy. … In the specific case which we are discussing, the poles of the spectrum may, for example, be used as Apollonius uses them, to highlight a contrast between two

Beams of light used as metaphorical analogues for mental events have precedent:[225] several scholars have adduced the parallel of the simile which accompanies Agamemnon's sleepless night at the beginning of *Iliad* 10.1-24. Using vocabulary similar to the description of Medea, Homer describes Agamemnon's worry for the Achaian host, saying that sweet sleep (ὕπνος … γλυκερός, 4) does not hold him as he turned over many things in his mind (πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντα, 4) and often did he groan in his breast (πυκίν' ἐν στήθεσσιν, 9) and his φρένες trembled (τρομέοντο, 10). As well as the sense of excessive internal movement that this passage evokes,[226] the accompanying simile is of lightning, and the meteorological power of Zeus, which is interpreted by many as illustrating Agamemnon's psychological state.[227]

Before returning to the sunbeam, I would add that I think that the simile used of Jason as he takes the Golden Fleece, which describes a *parthenos* catching a moonbeam on her dress and rejoicing at its beautiful gleam, also falls into this category of mental events and beams of light (4.167-71):

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aspects of the same character…' On my reading, this is heavily reminiscent of—though not directly naming—the universal image schemas of conceptual metaphor, which, as we saw in the previous chapter, are responsible for constructing the way in which humans conceive of the world around them.
[225] Zanker (1987:199) supports this interpretation of the Apollonian image, calling it 'a simile in which pictorialism drawn from an everyday scene graphically illustrates the familiar symptoms of the emotion [of *eros*]'.
[226] Reminiscent, of course, of Medea. Such excessive movement will be analysed from the perspective of the cognitive sciences in due course.
[227] Hunter (1989: 177) states that the lightning refers to 'Agamemnon's troubled spirit' and then draws explicit comparison with Medea's sunbeam: '[the lightning] is [in the *Argonautica*] replaced by the more domestic image of sunlight…' (Hunter's interpretation here is, of course, in favour of a psychological reading of the sunbeam, on which cf. his comments above.) The interpretation of the Iliadic passage is corroborated by Willcock (1978), 284; Hainsworth (1993), 157; and Vian (1980), 133: 'la comparaison avec les éclairs … illustre l'état psycho-physiologique d'Agamemnon'. For more discussion on this passage, see the arguments for Fränkel's proposed transposition of the sunbeam simile in Appendix One.

ὡς δὲ σεληναίης διχομήνιδα παρθένος αἴγλην
ὑψόθεν ἀνέχουσαν ὑπωροφίου θαλάμοιο
λεπταλέῳ ἑανῷ ὑποΐσχεται, ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ
χαίρει δερκομένης καλὸν σέλας – ὣς τότ᾽ Ἰήσων
γηθόσυνος μέγα κῶας ἑαῖς ἀναείρετο χερσί…

As when a maiden catches the beam of a full moon
on her delicate robe, as it rises up high under the roof
of her chamber, and the *etor* within rejoices
as she beholds the beautiful light – so then did Jason
joyfully lift up the great fleece with his hands…

Importantly, Jason's psychological state of joyfulness (γηθόσυνος) is explicitly equated to the *parthenos'* joy at beholding the moonbeam (αἴγλην), thus, again, linking psychological events to beams of light.[228]

In addition to the fact that such imagery has precedent within the mental sphere, the interpretation that the sunbeam symbolises mental vacillation is, I believe, made explicit in the text: just as the sunbeam flutters ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, so, in direct speech just after Apollonius has recounted Medea's choices (766-9), she states (771): Δειλὴ ἐγώ, νῦν ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα γένωμαι; ('Wretched me, am I now to be in this trouble or that?') Therefore, in the very first line of her 30 line soliloquy,[229] which itself represents the final stage in her decision-making process, Medea uses this similar phrase (ἔνθα … ἢ ἔνθα), which, owing to its close proximity,[230] picks up the exact sense of the simile.[231]

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[228] More could be said of this passage, especially what I perceive as correspondences between it and the sunbeam simile. Irrespective of the shining beam of light, I think that the *parthenos* in her room is strongly reminiscent of Medea. Additionally, Apollonius expresses her emotion with a psychological organ (ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ). (Note also the inherent container metaphor here.) For discussion on this simile, including a survey of scholarly interpretation, see Reitz (1996), 110-15.

[229] For general discussion on this important monologue, see Kyriakou (1995), 172-5, esp. suggestions for wider bibliography at 172n.120.

[230] It should be noted that my argument here is not dependent on the proximity of the occurrences. I believe, owing to the repeated use of the formula (and, as here, an almost synonymous variation) in the specific context of mental vacillation, that the argument stands regardless, though, without doubt, such proximity can only strengthen the case.

[231] This important point is overlooked by Fränkel (1950), but picked up by Barkhuizen (1979), 40-1.

When this fact is accepted, its relevance for the portrayal of Medea throughout Book 3 becomes clear. Medea's has been a story of oscillation and physical movement,[232] a pivotal moment of which being her private psychological torment over her feelings for Jason, which leads her to wish to speak to her sister, although she is held back by shame (3.646-55):

καὶ δὴ λελίητο νέεσθαι
αὐτοκασιγνήτην δε καὶ ἕρκεος οὐδὸν ἄμειψε·
δὴν δὲ καταυτόθι μίμνεν ἐνὶ προδόμῳ θαλάμοιο
αἰδοῖ ἐεργομένη· μετὰ δ' ἐτράπετ' αὖτις ὀπίσσω
στρεφθεῖσ'· ἐκ δὲ πάλιν κίεν ἔνδοθεν, ἄψ τ' ἀλέεινεν
εἴσω, τηΰσιοι δὲ πόδες φέρον **ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα**.
Ἤτοι ὅτ' ἰθύσειεν, ἔρυκέ μιν ἔνδοθεν αἰδώς·
αἰδοῖ δ' ἐργομένην θρασὺς ἵμερος ὀτρύνεσκε.
τρὶς μὲν ἐπειρήθη, τρὶς δ' ἔσχετο· τέτρατον αὖτις
λέκτροισι πρηνὴς ἐνικάππεσεν εἰλιχθεῖσα.

And she truly desired to visit
her sister and crossed the threshold of the courtyard.
For a long while she stayed on the spot in the vestibule of her chamber
prevented by shame. She turned around and went back again
whirling round, but again came back from within, and then shrank
back inside; in vain her feet carried her **this way and that**.
Whenever she would press on, shame kept her back within,
and when restrained by shame, bold desire urged her on.
Three times she tried, and three times she halted; on the fourth time in turn
Whirling around she threw herself face down on her bed.

In this excerpt, note how her mental turmoil finds expression in her physical movement, described with the phrase ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. This is the physical restlessness that I believe the sunbeam simile also picks up.[233] Thus, the physical theme of oscillation in this passage—the result of mental conflict—is reproduced in

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[232] See the comments of Buxton in n.224 (above).

[233] Clack (1973), 313 notes the presence of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα both here and within the simile. He also states that the sunbeam simile is 'interesting … [in that] a visual image is used to describe a purely sensory reaction … [t]he irregular reflection of light on a house wall is a visualization of the fluttering of her heart'. It is difficult to know quite what to make of this since no more is said, but I would suggest that Clack may be hinting at the type of cognitive, embodied formulation of psychological processes that this thesis is exploring. (On the other hand, of course, he may mean something different and I am guilty of supplying meaning—in the form of my own methodology—to a scenario with limited information.)

the sunbeam simile, which itself is also a physical representation of actual, and (by metaphorical extension) mental, turbulence.[234]

The expression of inner conflict expressed via the language of alternatives is also apparent in Apollonius' phrasing of Medea's choice (3.766-70):

> φῆ δέ οἱ **ἄλλοτε μὲν** θελκτήρια φάρμακα ταύρων
> δωσέμεν· **ἄλλοτε δ'** οὔ τι, καταφθεῖσθαι **δὲ καὶ** αὐτή·
> αὐτίκα δ' **οὔτ'** αὐτὴ θανέειν, οὐ φάρμακα δώσειν,
> **ἀλλ'** αὔτως εὔκηλος ἐὴν ὀτλησέμεν ἄτην.
> ἑζομένη δήπειτα δοάσσατο, φώνησέν τε·

Translation above.

Here, with the key spatial terms shown in bold type, Medea's indecision is clear: *at one moment… at another not…*; *now would…now would not*.[235] The quoted section lies between the sunbeam simile (755-60) and Medea's soliloquy (771-801), and it is thus highly plausible to suggest that here Apollonius is continuing the theme expressed in both, but, for poetic *variatio*, with different phrasing. Finally, the verb used of Medea (δοάσσατο, 770), used here in the sense of 'being in two minds',[236] continues the idea of mental fragmentation, in preparation for Medea's vocalisation of her situation.

On a larger scale, Medea's mental conflict is integral to the narrative of Book 3. The events that occur on the divine plain at the beginning of the book make it clear that

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[234] I shall analyse the simile in terms of conceptual metaphor shortly.

[235] Barkhuizen (1979), 40 also notes this feature.

[236] For brief comment, see Hunter (1989), 99. The verb δοιάζειν, used in this sense, also appears at Bacchyl. 11.87; on this, Cairns (2010), 288-9 argues that Apollonius connected the impersonal verb δοάσσατο with δοιάζειν/δοιάζεσθαι. He states that the former occurs three times in the *Iliad* and seven times in the *Odyssey* in the formulaic phrase ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι, which is 'always in the context of deliberation between two alternatives', and where δοάσσατο means 'it seemed'. There are two points to make here: first, it is therefore interesting to note that Medea does not outline any specific alternatives in her following speech, while Apollonius gave three alternatives immediately prior at 766-9, thus thwarting an audience's expectations based on the Homeric use of the verb; and, second, we see in Apollonius' use of this verb the literary tradition's attempts to verbalise an aspect of mental life, namely inner conflict, which takes the form of a metaphorical statement based on folk physiology. Again, we see that such statements exhibit the cross-cultural similarity in the form of divided intention being equated to the divided self.

Medea, via her divinely-induced *eros*, is instrumental in Jason's procurement of the Golden Fleece;[237] Hera announces this explicitly (3.25-9):

> Δεῦρ' ἴομεν μετὰ Κύπριν, ἐπιπλόμεναι δέ μιν ἄμφω
> παιδὶ ἑῷ εἰπεῖν ὀτρύνομεν, αἴ κε πίθηται,
> κούρην Αἰήτεω πολυφάρμακον οἷσι βέλεσσι
> θέλξαι ὀιστεύσας ἐπ' Ἰήσονι· τὸν δ' ἂν ὀίω
> κείνης ἐννεσίῃσιν ἐς Ἑλλάδα κῶας ἀνάξειν.

> Come, let us go to Cypris, and both approaching her
> urge her to speak to her son, in the hope that he could be persuaded
> to bewitch the daughter of Aeetes, expert in magic drugs,
> shooting her with an arrow for Jason; for I suspect that
> with the help of that person, he will carry the Fleece to Greece.

Therefore, Medea's longing and worry for Jason (752-4) is encased within her possible courses of action (766-9), since she, and only she, has the power to save him. The sunbeam simile with its new, additional referent in Medea's mental conflict thus implicitly incorporates Medea's longing and worry, since these feelings are equated with one of the possible courses of action, i.e. her aiding Jason by giving him the drugs (760-1).

III. Cognitive universals

The intricate psychological portrayal of Medea can be brought to light further by applying the cognitive techniques that were detailed in the introductory chapter. Importantly, it should be borne in mind that the explanatory power of these universals is such that they explain both why Apollonius conceives and presents Medea's psychology as he does, and how we, as an audience, comprehend that conception and presentation so readily: in this respect these are two explanatory sides of the same cognitive coin.

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[237] Nyberg (1992), 97 states that Medea is 'a victim of Hera's machinations, and ultimately an instrument of fate.'

On the macro level, it would not be possible for us to comprehend Medea's psychological anguish without understanding that she is an autonomous agent, motivated by mental beliefs and desires.[238] In applying these to our comprehension of the poem, then, we are employing Dunbar's third level of Theory of Mind.[239]

Theory of Mind is also evident in specific passages. At 3.646-55 (quoted in full above), Medea has awoken from her dream and determines to go and speak with her sister to see if the latter would ask her to help the Argonauts, thus alleviating the pain that she feels (641-4). Apollonius has, then, explicitly stated her motive and intention, and it is Theory of Mind that allows us to carry this information over to explain Medea's subsequent actions, in which she three times tries to leave, three times halts, and then on the fourth attempt whirls back and throws herself on her bed (τρὶς μὲν ἐπειρήθη, τρὶς δ' ἔσχετο· τέτρατον αὖτις / λέκτροισι πρηνὴς ἐνικάππεσεν εἰλιχθεῖσα, 654-5). These movements would be bizarrely inexplicable without the meaning invested in them by Theory of Mind.

Characters within the poem can also be seen to perform and act according to Theory of Mind calculations. Immediately after the scene above, one of Medea's maidservants comes across her; Apollonius states (3.664-7):

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[238] See the quotation from Leverage *et al* (2011) in Chapter One. Of course, an objection could be raised in this particular instance regarding Medea's autonomy, as the erotic passion that motivates her has been divinely, and (as some might consequently view it) externally, inspired. I do not think that this objection stands, however. Belief in the divine, then as now, is an attempt to explain (in part) human purpose and motivation. Thus, it is—to use the terminology of this thesis—a culturally specific folk theory, and, as we saw, since folk theories of all cultures are bound by the same physical and biological constraints (namely, the same human body), they achieve a certain cross-cultural similarity, since they are attempting to explain the same thing. The belief in divine agency itself depends on the same agency-detection system that drives Theory of Mind, or, to put it another way, ordinary human models of agency are the source from which the target domain of divinity is constructed. For more on the cross-cultural nature of religion, see Boyer (2001), and Dawkins (2006), 161-208 (Chapter 5: The Roots of Religion).

[239] That is, Dunbar (1996: 102): 'to imagine how someone who does not actually exist might respond in particular situations'. On this, see also Zunshine (2006) and (2008).

τὴν δέ τις ἄφνω
μυρομένην μεσσηγὺς ἐπιπρομολοῦσ' ἐνόησε
δμωάων, ἥ οἱ ἐπέτις πέλε κουρίζουσα,
Χαλκιόπῃ δ' ἤγγειλε παρασχεδόν.

But suddenly
in the middle of her weeping, a certain attendant
approached and noticed her, a young girl, who was her attendant,
and she immediately reported to Chalkiope.

Crucial here is the verb, ἐνόησε, which describes the maidservant's comprehension of the scene, and thus encapsulates the Theory of Mind process with its myriad mental calculations: she sees Medea, sees that she is weeping, knows that weeping is a symptom of some sort of anguish (mental or physical), reasons that some sort of help is required, knows that she cannot help, calculates that Chalkiope would be the best candidate, and goes to find her. Finally and importantly, this happens παρασχεδόν, which shows the instantaneous nature of the process.[240]

III.II AGENCY

I also showed in Chapter One that the Theory of Mind mechanism is built on what I termed the human agency detection system, and that researchers (such as Heider & Simmel) have reported that humans ascribe intentionality and characteristics to objects that are perceived as behaving in an agent-like manner. It is argued that this mechanism, which manifests in the tendency to see other minds everywhere, is an evolutionary survival heuristic that enables humans to better keep track of their environment.

I think that the universal presence of precisely this mechanism explains the ease with which, according to my reading, Medea's shifting thoughts are symbolised by the

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[240] As I hope is clear from these examples, Theory of Mind is a powerful yet simple explanatory tool, and examples could easily be multiplied. I shall cease here, however, with respect to Medea, though Theory of Mind interactions will be important for fully understanding the interaction between Polyphemus and Heracles in Chapter Four, and vital for comprehending many instances with Jason in Chapter Five, since, as will be shown, his actions—unlike those of other protagonists—are mostly underdetermined.

vacillating sunbeam. As a result, when reading the simile, we demonstrate the same cognitive behaviour as the participants in Heider & Simmel's study, who were shown an animated film involving various moving shapes and interpreted the movements of the objects in the film as 'actions of animated beings, chiefly of persons'.[241]

III.III NON-VERBAL BEHAVIOUR

Analysing Medea's movement in terms of the cognitive analysis of non-verbal behaviour is also profitable. In the famous example quoted above, in which Medea tries and fails repeatedly to leave the vestibule of her room in order to visit and speak with her sister (3.654-5), she speaks no words, but her movement gives the audience a window onto her psychological state. Clearly, Medea's movement in this instance is emphatically meaningful as a physical manifestation of her mental vacillation.[242]

Of course, I am arguing that such non-verbal behaviour is universal, and, in addition to my analysis above, at the culturally specific level Elizabeth Pender, who builds her argument on a wide study of Greek literature that ranges from poetic to medical, has shown that there is a negative association in Greek thought with excessive, disorderly motion.[243] She concludes (1999: 90) that

> inner anxiety and distress is expressed by the need for external movement beyond one's normal bounds. ... [M]otion is the result of a loss of stability and so a polarity is established between disorderly motion (negative) and stillness (positive).

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[241] Heider & Simmel (1944), 259. See Chapter One for discussion.

[242] See n.224 (above). I think that this specific part of the cognitive analysis is especially apt for strengthening Buxton's general argument. Similarly, this non-verbal behaviour analysis is pertinent to all the instances analysed above in which Medea is described as moving excessively as a result of her mental turmoil.

[243] Pender (1999), 75-105, esp. 83-90. In some specific medical cases—for example, the movement of fluids and substances through the body—movement is seen as necessary. However, such movement obviously does not then meet the criterion of excess; an example would be the harmful 'wandering womb' (for a succinct discussion on which see Padel (1995), 129-30 with bibliography).

The idea that inner mental conflict finds physical expression clearly informs Medea's movement at the points analysed in this section. Furthermore, I argue that the movement of the sunbeam in the simile is symbolic of Medea's mental vacillation, which, in turn, then, finds expression in her physical movement. In this way observable phenomena (in the form of external, physical, and visible movement) inform the conception of internal, inscrutable psychological processes. Thus, that excessive, disorderly motion had negative cultural connotations would entail, by extension, the negative nature of Medea's thoughts.[244] The movement of the body, then, is representative of the movement of the mind, which, through the imagery of the simile, is schematically represented in spatial terms, with the background inference that straight lines are equated with rationality and erratic lines with disturbed thought.

III.ɪᴠ Mᴇᴛᴀᴘʜᴏʀ

Finally, and as is clear from my interpretation, the sunbeam simile functions as a conceptual metaphor that structures the way in which we conceive of everyday psychological life. To use Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) terminology, the spatial metaphor involving ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is a paradigm case of orientational metaphor, a whole system of metaphors that have a spatial element.[245] Just as the authors show that the concept of happiness is often metaphorically structured spatially—for example, 'My spirits rose/sank'—the concept of mental vacillation during decision making in the chosen excerpts is structured spatially with ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.[246]

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[244] Thus, I argue that one infers mental states that are analogous to the observable physical movement. In a limited respect, I would agree with Padel's observations about madness and movement in Greek tragedy (1995: 238): 'Greek tragedy represents madness as something temporary, come from outside... It is inner writhing, expressed externally in dancelike jerkiness. People know you are mad by how you look and move'. For a excellent critique of the general failures of Padel's methodology here, see Scodel (1996).

[245] For orientational metaphor, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 14-21.

[246] Looking at tragic actors on the stage (but with a view to theorising on Greek consciousness in general), Padel (1992), 66 is correct to note that 'visible, tangible moves are the exterior analogue to the unseen, imaginary internal movement of passion within' (Padel comes to the same conclusion in (1995), 120-30); however, Lakoff & Johnson's theory of cognitive metaphor shows that this is not something alien and specific to ancient Greece, as Padel would have it, but is, in fact, and as we have

At the same time, the fact that Medea's decision-making process is reified into the vacillating sunbeam is an example of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) ontological metaphor, one structured by our bodily experience of interacting with physical objects and substances. To quote the authors again: '[u]nderstanding our experiences in terms of objects and substances allows us to pick out parts of our experience and treat them as discrete entities or substances, we can refer to them, categorize them, group them, and quantify them—and, by this means, reason about them'.[247] The function of the ontological metaphor here, as elsewhere, then, is to make an aspect of the intersubjective phenomenology of emotion tangible and tractable. In imbuing the sunbeam with a psychological compontent, Apollonius is deploying a folk model (which displays cognitive universals) that leverages understanding from one domain to another: the abstract process of decision-making is structured in terms of a more familiar concept based on our bodily experience and interaction in everyday life.[248]

IV. CULTURAL SPECIFICS

The sunbeam simile used of Medea thus displays what I have termed as cognitive universals. This shows that the ancient text can be profitably interpreted with the aid of new methodological tools. I shall now continue my analysis of the simile by examining the language and imagery at a higher level of cultural specificity. Analysing the simile within its immediate literary heritage, and thus bringing to the fore the culture's folk and poetic models of psychological expression, will show how these are manifested and deployed in Apollonius' presentation. Since I am focussing specifically on the phrase ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, it is sensible to begin by looking at its literary history.

seen, applicable to all cultures that they have investigated. Again, I argue that the culturally specific examples of psychological expression, which Padel sees as 'outstandingly alien', are in fact folk theories of psychological expression, those which we saw Kövecses (2003: 190) argue to give '[m]ost of the richness of human emotional experience', and which themselves follow cognitive universals patterns.

[247] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 25.

[248] To put this another way, this is the cooption of experience from a lower to a higher domain of experience. I shall have more to say on the metaphorical conception of the divine shooting of Medea, and her consequent movement in the next chapter.

The formula itself is Homeric in origin, and, as Campbell notes, is often used in descriptive passages—the impression imparted being of a relatively bland phrase.[249] Since this chapter is investigating its use in a more imaginative context, it is prudent to conduct a brief survey of the formula's occurrence in the *Argonautica* as a whole; the effect of this will be to contextualise the specific use in the sunbeam simile. In turn, it will then be possible for comparisons to be made with other relevant works, so that a picture can be drawn up of Apollonius' usage of the formula on its own, and in conjunction with psychological imagery.

There is a broadly even distribution of occurrences of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα across the *Argonautica*, though there are slightly more usages (seven) in Book 3 than elsewhere.[250] However, since there are only eighteen occurrences in the whole poem—a relatively small number—the extent to which the numbers are statistically significant is a worthwhile consideration; even one additional occurrence in a book can skew the data. Even when this is borne in mind, though, I think it is still of interest that Book 3 stands out as having a slightly higher frequency, especially since occurrences in all the other books are lower than statistically projected.

As would be expected, of the eighteen instances, the vast majority (sixteen) occur as adverbial elements in larger sections of narrative.[251] Within this subset, a case can be made for two groupings—one firm, the other looser—standing out. I shall deal with the looser grouping first, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in an erotic context.

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[249] Campbell (1994), 217.

[250] Instances of the phrase are as follows: 1.222, 247, 378, 542; 2.579, 1082, 1185; 3.147, 236, 651, 758, 1263, 1311; 4.325, 942, 1543, 1613. 3.771 is an instance of ἔνθα … ἢ ἔνθα, which I deem similar enough to be included within this analysis. The instances in Book 3 account for seven of the eighteen, roughly 39%, despite the fact that the book's 1407 lines account for only 24% of the poem's total (5835). (In the interest of completeness, Book 1 has (4/18) 22% of instances for (1362/5835) 25% of the total; Book 2 (3/18) 17% for (1362/5835) 23%; and Book 4 (4/18) 22% for (1781/5835) 31%.) These figures were first derived from a *TLG* search, and were then corroborated by consulting Campbell (1983a).

[251] These constitute all those listed in n.250 (above) barring 3.758, 771; and 4.1543.

Of the four examples in this grouping, the first occurs in the *Argonautica*'s equivalent of the Homeric catalogue of ships: Apollonius, in narrating the presence of Zetes and Kalais, gives a brief genealogical account and recounts Boreas' snatching and subsequent sexual relations with Oreithyia. He then describes their passion, using ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα to refer to their tousled hair in the wind: ἀμφὶ δὲ νώτοις / κράατος ἐξ ὑπάτοιο καὶ αὐχένος ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα / κυάνεαι δονέοντο μετὰ πνοιῇσιν ἔθειραι ('over their backs and from the top of their heads and necks this way and that their dark hair shook with the wind', 1.221-3). The erotic context found explicitly in this excerpt is then picked up and applied in three others, all of which refer to Medea's *eros* for Jason and occur in Book 3. As has already been shown, at 3.651 the phrase is used to describe Medea's pacing of her room in the throes of erotic passion (τηΰσιοι δὲ πόδες φέρον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα); in the sunbeam simile at 3.758 it is used as a symbolic representation of Medea's inner struggle, of which one of her possible courses of action is influenced by her erotic desire; and at 3.771 it appears again, functioning in just the same way as the previous example, but here in Medea's direct speech (Δειλὴ ἐγώ, νῦν ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα γένωμαι). Admittedly, these last three examples are only implicitly erotic as ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is not being used specifically of an actual erotic encounter, as it was in the first example in this grouping, but instead used to elucidate a mental turmoil that derives from erotic desire. Nevertheless, I think that a case can be made here for a grouping in which ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is used in an erotic context.

I now move to the more firmly defined of the two groups, one that I shall label 'water/sea-faring', which is responsible for eight instances (almost half of the total).[252] In this group ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is used to refer to the movement of the sea, as, for instance, at 1.542: ἀφρῷ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κελαινὴ κήκιεν ἅλμη ('on this side and that the black sea water bubbled with foam'). It is also used of the preparation of the *Argo* itself at 1.378: ὕψι δ' ἄρ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα μεταστρέψαντες ἐρετμά ('aloft they turned around the oars of this side and that') and the sea-faring journeys that can

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[252] These are: 1.378, 542; 2.579, 1185; 3.758; 4.325, 942, 1613.

be made aboard it: πάρεστι δὲ τῆσδ' ἐπὶ νηός / ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα νέεσθαι... ('on this ship it is possible to go here and there...', 2.1184-5).

I would argue, then, that Apollonius connected the fluid nature of water with the orientationally descriptive formula ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, and that there was also a degree of semantic extension to vessels which moved on it and are situated near it, since the phrase is often found being applied to other objects while in a predominantly water-themed passage.[253] It should be noted, owing to its pertinence to the subject of this thesis, that the specific occurrence of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the sunbeam simile at 3.758 also falls into this grouping, since the moving sunbeam is reflected off the rippling water poured from the basin or pail ὕδατος ἐξανιοῦσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἠὲ λέβητι / ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται (3.757-8).

Of course, it could be argued that, since the *Argonautica* takes as its theme a great voyage by sea, it is hardly surprising that descriptive formulae are often found in relation to the sea; this is, after all, to what a large proportion of the descriptive elements of the poem will refer. As a control, therefore, it is wise to look at the usage of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in Homer, since the *Odyssey* is the other epic poem that details sea-voyages as a major theme, and both it and the *Iliad* define the epic register that Apollonius strove to recreate.

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[253] A good example of this occurs at 4.1613-4: αὐτὰρ ὑπαὶ λαγόνων δίκραιρά οἱ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα / κήτεος ἀλκαίη μηκύνετο ('but from under his flanks stretched the tail of a sea creature that forked this way and that'). In this description, the god who comes to the aid of the *Argo* takes the form of a sea-monster, and his flanks are described as spreading ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα beneath the surface of the water. The descriptive formula usually found in connection with water has here been extended to describe another party in a water-themed context. Cf.: 2.579, 4.942. Some critics may take issue with what I have described here as 'semantic extension', which is, admittedly, important for the classification of some examples within the group. Readings such as this (and indeed the previous erotic grouping), which stand or fall on the perceived strength of the categorisation, will always be liable to taxonomical criticism. Their merit must, therefore, be judged on, first, the degree of fit within the chosen category, and, second, the utility of the conclusions drawn. I hope that the reader will agree that my analysis meets these requirements.

The results from a survey of the *Odyssey* are somewhat surprising, however. Of the fifteen total occurrences of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα,[254] only three (20%) occur within a water context (as compared to almost half in the *Argonautica*): Telemachos asking who might convey him on his sea voyage (and this example's inclusion in the grouping is in itself stretched), as well as two closely situated descriptions of the effects of waves and winds on Odysseus' raft as it is tossed about on the sea.[255] In fact, the largest single grouping of occurrences (eight) in the *Odyssey* fall into a category that describes a man-made object,[256] for instance ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is used by Circe to describe the dimensions of a pit that must be dug (βόθρον ὀρύξαι ὅσον τε πυγούσιον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, 10.517, repeated with epic *variatio* at 11.25), and of the way that the suitors view Odysseus turning a bow in his hands (ὡς ἐνὶ χερσὶ / νωμᾷ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, 21.399-400).[257]

The usage in the *Iliad* is more uniform. This is, of course, the great epic that details fifty-five days in the Achaean siege of Troy; the context, then, is predominantly martial and it would be expected that Homer's use of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα would conform to this. This is indeed the case: of the eighteen occurrences in the *Iliad*,[258] fifteen occur in a grouping that I would label 'men/troops'.[259] For instance, Homer describes Achilles' Myrmidons going here and there throughout the Achaean camp, but not fighting (φοίτων ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κατὰ στρατόν, οὐδ᾽ ἐμάχοντο, 2.779), while at

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[254] These are: 2.213; 5.327, 330; 7.86, 95; 10.517; 11.25; 14.11; 19.524; 20.24, 26, 28; 21.246, 394, 400.

[255] 2.213; 5.327, 330.

[256] 7.86, 95; 10.517; 11.25; 14.11; 21.246, 394, 400.

[257] Two of the other usages of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the *Odyssey* will be of great use to this study since they occur within similes (19.524, 20.26). These will be examined shortly.

[258] These are: 2.90, 462, 476, 779, 812; 5.223; 7.156; 8.107; 10.264; 15.345; 17.394; 18.543; 20.249; 21.11, 354; 23.164, 320; 24.5.

[259] These constitute all those in n.258 (above) barring 10.264; 21.354; 23.164. Admittedly, some of these cases are stronger than others; at 7.156 Nestor uses the formula in describing the proportions of his slain enemy, and at 23.320 he will use it again in reference to a charioteer making a reckless turn. Nevertheless, I think that both these examples, via the subject nature to which ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is applied, adequately fall under the heading of 'men/troops'.

17.394-5 the Achaeans and Trojans both claw at the body of Patroklos (ὣς οἵ γ'
ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα νέκυν ὀλίγηι ἐνὶ χώρηι / εἵλκεον ἀμφότεροι).

This brief comparison with Homer is useful as it allows two interesting conclusions
to be drawn. First, when the relative lengths of the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the
Argonautica are borne in mind, it is clear that Apollonius uses ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα far
more frequently than Homer. On average, the phrase appears 1.15 times every 1,000
lines in the *Iliad*, 1.24 times in the *Odyssey*, but, notably, 3.08 times in the
Argonautica.[260] The figures for the two Homeric poems are roughly stable and this
implies a fairly fixed frequency; however, Apollonius' uses of the formula is
statistically significantly more frequent, and thus appears to be a definite stylistic
departure.

Second, it is also of interest that the Apollonian connection of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα and
sea-faring is not corroborated by Homer's usage in the *Odyssey*, despite the fact that
both poems have the same broad themes and are composed in the same epic register.
The description of the effect of the waves upon Odysseus' raft (5.327) is the closest
Homer comes to the Apollonian usage. However, it is important to note that in this
Homeric passage ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is used of the raft, affected by the swell of the sea.
As has been shown, Apollonius uses the formula in this way also but also goes
further by applying it directly to the water: ἀφρῷ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα κελαινὴ κήκιεν
ἅλμη (1.542). Therefore, while it would not be correct to say that Apollonius was
innovative in his usage of the phrase within a sea-faring context, it is fair to conclude
that Apollonius expanded upon this association by introducing innovative elements.

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[260] Total line numbers: *Il*. (15,693), *Od*. (12,110), *Arg*. (5,835).
Averages: *Il*. (18/15693) x 1000 = 1.15, *Od*. (15/12110) x 1000 = 1.24, *Arg*. (18/5835) x 1000 = 3.08.

The usage of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the sunbeam simile is of interest to this study since it is argued to be psychologically descriptive. The general use of the formula itself has been explored and compared with Homer above, but it is prudent now to delve more deeply and to explore whether there is Homeric precedent for such psychological usage. This continues the focus on the culturally specific manifestation of what I earlier argued to be cognitive universals.

IV.III.I Achilles

The *Iliad* contains similes in which the formula describes the movement of human individuals,[261] as well as one psychologically descriptive passage, which is of great interest to this study.[262] This occurs in Book 24, where Achilles, socially isolated

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[261] There are two examples of this: at 2.84-91 the Achaeans are likened to swarming bees that move ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, and at 2.457-64 they are again compared with animals, specifically a flock of birds which fly ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.

[262] Of course, psychological descriptions that do not involve ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα are also present: for example, at the beginning of Book 9, the personified Panic that grips the Achaeans' collective heart is narrated by a simile of the winds, Boreas and Zephyros, whipping up the sea into crests and scattering the seaweed (9.4-8):

> ὡς δ' ἄνεμοι δύο πόντον ὀρίνετον ἰχθυόεντα
> βορρῆς καὶ Ζέφυρος, τώ τε Θρῄκηθεν ἄητον
> ἐλθόντ' ἐξαπίνης· ἄμυδις δέ τε κῦμα κελαινόν
> κορθύεται, πολλὸν δὲ πάρεξ ἅλα φῦκος ἔχευεν·
> ὡς ἐδαΐζετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν Ἀχαιῶν.

> Just as two winds shake the fishy sea,
> Boreas and Zephyr, that blow from Thrace,
> coming suddenly, and all together the black waves
> are lifted up into crests, and the seaweed is scattered far along the salt water,
> so the *thumos* within the *stethos* of the Achaeans was divided.

The specific metaphor that is used here is of interest. The target domain of the metaphor is the Achaeans' collective θυμός, while the source domain is the two winds. As was discussed in Chapter Two, the θυμός was conceived by the Greeks as a breathy vapour: Clarke (1999: 81) notes that 'it is specifically breath that is vigorous, active, self-propelling, with the strong swift movement that marks the actions of both warrior and thinker'. (For an discussion of the etymology and understanding of the θυμός, see Clarke (1999), 79-83.) It is apparent, then, that there is a semantic link between the winds and the disturbed θυμός, making this a conceptual metaphor that is illustrative of Greek thought. For further discussion on similar Homeric metaphors, see Cairns (2003), 65-75, and my general discussion in Chapter Two.

owing to his grief for Patroclus, is portrayed as tossing *entha kai entha* in his disturbed sleep: ἀλλ' ἐστρέφετ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα / Πατρόκλου ποθέων ἀνδροτῆτά τε καὶ μένος ἠΰ (5-6). There are clear parallels with the Medea episode in the *Argonautica*: while others delight in sweet sleep (ὕπνου τε γλυκεροῦ ταρπήμεναι, 3) Achilles, like Medea,[263] is sleepless on account of his mental anguish in longing for Patroclus (ποθέων).[264] And as with Medea, who is described as pacing her empty room as a result of her turbulent emotions (3.648-53), Achilles' mental restlessness finds physical expression as he roams the sea shore: τοτὲ δ' ὀρθὸς ἀναστάς / δινεύεσκ' ἀλύων παρὰ θῖν' ἁλός ('then standing upright he would roam deeply stirred along the sea shore', 11-12). What is different about the passages, however, is that Patroclus is already dead and therefore Achilles' longing is retrospective: he longs to have Patroclus back, unlike Medea, who holds the power over Jason's fate, but is vacillating over how to act.

Furthermore, the strength of the perceived correspondences between the two passages allows me to suggest an extra dimension of meaning to the famous simile used of Medea at 3.656-64. This simile springs immediately from the description of her excessive movement and details the heartbreak of a bride weeping for the death of her youthful husband, who has died before the two can enjoy each others' company (τὸν δέ τις ὤλεσε μοῖρα, πάρος ταρπήμεναι ἄμφω / δήνεσιν ἀλλήλων, 3.660-1.) This simile, the meaning of which is not immediately apparent in the Argonautican context,[265] becomes slightly clearer if we accept that Apollonius might have in mind this particular Homeric model of grief. The model is appropriate owing to its depiction of sleeplessness, mental turbulence, and the latter's manifestation in physical restlessness. The element of the model that is not appropriate, though, finds expression, somewhat cryptically, in the subject matter of simile, which, in the

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[263] Note that the same epithet is used of sleep in the corresponding description of Medea's circumstances at 3.751: ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐ Μήδειαν ἐπὶ γλυκερὸς λάβεν ὕπνος.

[264] Medea similarly longs (πόθῳ, 752) for Jason. For similarities of setting, cf. the simile of Agamemnon at *Il*. 10.1-4.

[265] For an exhaustive discussion, with bibliography, see Hunter (1989), 168-9. Of most interest to my discussion here, is Hunter's citation of Briseis' lamentation for Patroclus at *Il*. 19.291-2. If my interpretation above is correct, it would add a degree of corroboration to this.

Argonautica, might programmatically allude to Jason's mythological fate beyond the poem.

Through this intertext, then, we see Apollonius deploying one of the literary tradition's models for such an emotional expression. But, crucially, the model is adapted and deepened to reflect the current circumstances: Achilles' movement is a physical manifestation of grief over a past event, whereas I argue Medea is struggling to choose between alternate and conflicting courses of action for the future. Such regard for the future brings to mind Agamemnon's sleepless night and concern for the Achaean host, which is accompanied by the lightning simile at *Il.* 10.1-24 (analysed above), and which itself has many similar features. Apollonius' model, thus, incorporates different elements from the Iliadic precedents.[266] I shall now turn to the *Odyssey*, where there are several other important intertexts involving ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα which are similarly informative for Apollonius' simile.

IV.ɪɪɪ.ɪɪ PENELOPE

The first example occurs in Book 19 where Penelope is speaking to the disguised Odysseus. I shall argue again that, owing to the multiple correspondences between the two scenes, Apollonius's Medea was heavily influenced by Homer's Penelope, and, in this respect, we see Apollonius deploying and refining cultural models of psychological expression. Prior to the excerpt quoted below, Penelope, in direct speech, has set the scene of her nightly laments: night falls and sleep overtakes all others (αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νὺξ ἔλθῃ, ἕλῃσί τε κοῖτος ἅπαντας, 515), whereas she lies awake (κεῖμαι ἐνὶ λέκτρῳ, 516), perturbed by anxieties that cause her heart to beat (πυκιναὶ δέ μοι ἀμφ' ἁδινὸν κῆρ / ὀξεῖαι μελεδῶναι ὀδυρομένην ἐρέθουσιν, 516-7). Then follows a simile of the varied song of the nightingale, which Penelope herself states is representative of her mental turmoil (518-24):

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[266] This is a brief statement of a conclusion that will be strengthened throughout the remainder of this chapter.

ὡς δ' ὅτε Πανδαρέου κούρη, χλωρηὶς ἀηδών,
καλὸν ἀείδησιν ἔαρος νέον ἱσταμένοιο,
δενδρέων ἐν πετάλοισι καθεζομένη πυκινοῖσιν,
ἥ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει πολυδευκέα φωνήν,
παῖδ' ὀλοφυρομένη Ἴτυλον φίλον, ὅν ποτε χαλκῷ
κτεῖνε δι' ἀφραδίας, κοῦρον Ζήθοιο ἄνακτος·
ὣς καὶ ἐμοὶ δίχα θυμὸς ὀρώρεται ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα…

Just as when Pandareos' daughter, the greenwood nightingale,
sweetly sings when spring has freshly come,
perching amidst the thick leaves of the trees,
and with often changing notes, pours out her sweet song,
lamenting her dear child, Itylos, whom once with a sword
she slew unwittingly, the son of king Zethos;
so my *thumos* is divided and starts this way and that…

The point of comparison between simile and narrative is that the varied tones of the nightingale's song reflect the oscillations of Penelope's mind as she searches for a solution to her situation with the suitors.[267] The mythological paradigm here is Pandareos' daughter, the nightingale. In this Homeric version she mourns the death of her child, Itylos, whom she herself killed. Rutherford comments that the received image is of the nightingale that 'perpetually mourns her child'.[268] This image is strikingly reminiscent of the same figure that appears in Apollonius' scene-setting before the introduction of Medea (καί τινα παίδων / μητέρα τεθνεώτων, 3.747-8),[269] and thus it seems clear that Apollonius is, in part, modelling his scene with an

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[267] This interpretation is to be found in Stanford (1948), 336-7; de Jong (2001), 479; Rutherford (1992), 192-3; and Anhalt (2002), 146. Rutherford (1992), 192 also notes that, in epic poetry, it is 'especially unusual for a mythical simile to be used by a character rather than the poet'.

[268] Rutherford (1992) *ad loc.* also recounts the other forms of the myth. So does Anhalt (2002), 148, who notes that the fullest version appears in Apollodorus 3.14.18. Important, too, is Ovid's version at *Met.*6.424-647. Penelope will use this comparison again in Book 20 (see below). For a diagram of the correspondences, see de Jong (2001), 489. Important for the argument here is that the theme of child-killing and the subsequent grief of the mother is present in all versions. On this theme, Austin (1975), 228 adds that the nightingale's song constitutes a 'funeral dirge'.

[269] Hunter (1989) *ad loc.* believes that this mother of dead children is a foreshadowing of the death of Medea's own children. Medea's destruction of her conjugal *oikos* will be examined later. The relationship between the two scenes is noted by Albis (1996), 76. In relation to the Apollonian scene of the mourning mother, Campbell (1983b), 112n.7 states that '[he] know[s] of nothing quite as extreme, *outside similes at any rate*' [my italics]. This caveat could imply that he has this simile in mind though he does not state it, instead giving what he calls 'vaguely comparable' narrative instances in the Homer and Callimachus. The fact that Campbell does not note the similarity here with the Odyssean simile, however, leads me to believe that it is unnoticed by him, since the parallels, as will be shown, are so striking as to demand note. Hunter (1989), 29, esp. n.126 notes that Medea is fashioned on a 'Penelope model', but does not mention this specific link. The link between Medea and Penelope will be examined in greater detail below.

eye to Homeric precedent, and, in so doing, deploying the literary culture's model of psychological expression.

A relation between the two similes has been noted by James Butrica for an entirely different reason. Examining the use of the pleonastic καί used to reinforce a comparison in, amongst others, ὡς … ὥς epic similes, he notes only three examples in Homer and Hellenistic poetry,[270] two of which are the simile used by Penelope (ὣς καὶ, 20.524) and the sunbeam simile used of Medea (ὣς δὲ καὶ, 3.760).[271] This lexical similarity, which Butrica shows to be exceedingly rare in epic poetry, in addition to the correspondences that will be shown below, can only strengthen my argument that Apollonius was influenced by this Penelope episode when he wrote his Medea scene.

Returning to the Odyssean narrative, Penelope states explicitly that her mind is divided and lists the dilemma she faces (524-9):

> ἠὲ μένω παρὰ παιδὶ καὶ ἔμπεδα πάντα φυλάσσω,
> κτῆσιν ἐμήν, δμωάς τε καὶ ὑψερεφὲς μέγα δῶμα,
> εὐνήν τ' αἰδομένη πόσιος δήμοιό τε φῆμιν,
> ἦ ἤδη ἅμ' ἔπωμαι, Ἀχαιῶν ὅς τις ἄριστος
> μνᾶται ἐνὶ μεγάροισι, πορὼν ἀπερείσια ἕδνα.

> either I remain by my son and keep watch on everything continually,
> my property, serving-maids, and great high-roofed house,
> respect my husband's bed and the voice of the people,
> or now I go away with him who is the best of the Achaeans,
> who court me in this palace, offering countless wedding gifts.

Mental conflict has led to her θυμός being divided (δίχα) so that it starts (ὀρώρεται) ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, with the two branches of her possible future courses of action then detailed. I hope that the similarities between this and the Apollonian

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[270] Butrica (2000), 133-4. He adds that in the commentaries and translations consulted for all the examples, the effect is either totally ignored, or its presence in strengthening the comparison not acknowledged.
[271] Butrica's other example will be analysed below, and in the light of this discussion of the similarities between the Penelope and Medea scenes.

Medea scene are as obvious to the reader as they seem to be to me.[272] Just as in the sunbeam simile of Medea, Penelope's conflict is expressed with a spatial metaphor: in this case, δίχα 'in two' is visualised in terms of physical space by the formula ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, in exactly the same way as the phrase gives a spatial element to the darting sunbeam. Additionally, in both passages ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is constitutive of mental vacillation between alternatives that are then explicitly stated.

Thus, there are notable similarities between this passage and its narrative surroundings (*Od*. 19.515-29), and the sunbeam simile and its context (*Arg*. 3.744-70). Both follow the sequence of a description of night and the sleep of others to the anxieties of the protagonist to the resultant beating heart of the protagonist to simile to description of the future courses of action available to the protagonist.[273]

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[272] Hunter (1989), 181 states that 'Medea's indecision *echoes* that of Penelope at *Od*.19.524' [my italics]. Obviously, I would not argue with this, but would note that the parallels go much further than Hunter states. Butrica (2000), 135 notes in passing that ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα occurs in both the Penelope and Medea similes, stating that 'it may only be a coincidence … [but] if not, then perhaps Penelope's 'indecision' served as a model for Medea's'. In the light of the numerous correspondences that I have shown to exist between the scenes, I think that this model is undeniable.

[273] In the light of these similarities, I return to Butrica's third example of the pleonastic καὶ (see above). This occurs at *Il*. 9.325 and is a simile, spoken by Achilles, likening his conduct in the war to a mother bird with her chicks (9.323-7):

> ὡς δ' ὄρνις ἀπτῆσι νεοσσοῖσι προφέρῃσιν
> μάστακ', ἐπεί κε λάβῃσι, κακῶς δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλει αὐτῇι,
> ὣς καὶ ἐγὼ πολλὰς μὲν ἀΰπνους νύκτας ἴαυον,
> ἤματα δ' αἱματόεντα διέπρησσον πολεμίζων
> ἀνδράσι μαρνάμενος ὀάρων ἕνεκα σφετεράων.
>
> for as a bird for her unfledged young brings
> morsels, whatever she can find, but herself is suffering,
> so did I pass many sleepless nights,
> as I passed over the bloody days of fighting
> doing battle with men for the sake of their wives.

Although this simile is not directly relevant to my current argument, its examination does raise several points that are of interest to the sunbeam simile of Medea and its intertextual interplay with the Penelope scene. This well-known section of the *Iliad* details the embassy sent by Agamemnon to Achilles and the subsequent decision (to return to the fray or not) that the latter must make. As Butrica (2000: 133) notes, Achilles' refusal sets in motion a chain of events that leads to the deaths of Patroclus, Hector, and finally Achilles himself. Consequently, all three scenes that Butrica draws attention to in his examination have as a common theme a protagonist at a crucial moment in the narrative facing a decision that will define future events (Penelope: whether or not to give in to the suitors; Medea: whether or not to aid Jason). Thus, since separate links have been established between the Penelope and Medea scenes and, by Butrica, the Penelope and Achilles scenes, it is pertinent to question whether or not, in some respects other than the metaphorical representation of mental

Therefore, I would go so far as to argue that the Apollonian scene is an embellishment of the Homeric: the first of the added elements being a more detailed description of the foils to the protagonist's sleeplessness, the second, another more detailed description of the anxieties of the protagonist, and finally the presence of the anatomical effect (including tears) of these anxieties on the protagonist.

The close correspondences between the poets' portrayals of the mental conflict of Penelope and Medea might lead an audience to the conclusion that the former is a character model for the latter to a much larger extent.[274] Although such a question represents a thesis in itself, it is worth making some brief observations. As will be shown below, through her and Odysseus' *homophrosyne*, Penelope is a paradigm for female virtue and dedication to the preservation of the conjugal *oikos*. In direct contrast, I will soon produce arguments to show Medea's destruction of the *oikos*

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conflict, this Achilles episode also informs Apollonius' Medea. Analysis shows that there are in fact several notable correspondences. Butrica (2000: 133) notes that 'it is perhaps no more than an odd coincidence' that both the Achilles and Penelope similes involve birds (ὄρνις, *Il*.9.323; ἀηδών, *Od*.19.518 (see above)). My earlier observation that Apollonius seems to reference the Penelope nightingale scene via the mother of dead children in his foil to Medea's reintroduction (3.747-8) would suggest that he is aware of this coincidence, and also the offspring that accompany the birds in both cases; in this way the image of the mother and offspring found in both Homeric examples become precedents for the Apollonian scene. (Note how the Odyssean example is the only one to contain all the three elements of birds, offspring, and death; the Iliadic and Apollonian scenes each drop one: death and birds respectively.)

Iliad 9.323-7 →	*Odyssey* 19.518-23 →	*Argonautica* 3.747-8
Mother bird feeding offspring	Nightingale mourning dead child	Mother of dead children

In addition to decision-making at a critical moment in the narrative, and the replication of the mother/bird/death imagery, there are three other correspondences that are not noted by Butrica. First, in all three scenes it is night: νύκτας (*Il*. 9.325), νὺξ (*Od*. 19.515), νύξ (*Arg*. 3.744) Second, all three protagonists are socially isolated by being unable to sleep: ἀΰπνους (*Il*. 9.325); αὐτὰρ ἐπὴν νὺξ ἔλθῃ, ἕλῃσί τε κοῖτος ἅπαντας, / κεῖμαι ἐνὶ λέκτρῳ (*Od*. 19.515-16), ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐ Μήδειαν ἐπὶ γλυκερὸς λάβεν ὕπνος (*Arg*. 3.751). Third, the protagonist is suffering: κακῶς δ' ἄρα οἱ πέλει αὐτῆι (*Il*. 9.324), αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ πένθος ἀμέτρητον πόρε δαίμων (*Od*. 19.512), ὀδύνη (*Arg*. 3.762 (761-5 describes in detail Medea's pain)). There are two points to be made in the light of this exploration. First, the additional correspondences can only strengthen Butrica's analysis and affirm his suspicions regarding the interplay of the separate scenes. Second, these detailed correspondences would suggest that Apollonius, in addition to drawing upon the Penelope scene for the portrayal of mental conflict involving ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, was influenced by, to some lesser extent, the Achilles scene, and the Iliadic embassy context with which it is bound up. (It could also be argued that Apollonius had in mind the *Odyssey* scene, the poet of which in turn had in mind the *Iliad* scene. Even on this reading, however, there is an interplay and progression of important themes relevant to Apollonius' scene.)

[274] See Hunter (1989), 29 with bibliography for a concise discussion.

(both natal and conjugal). Consequently, I would argue that any similarities that Apollonius draws between the two on the micro scale are, in fact, a characteristically ironic Hellenistic device to display the overarching lack of fit on the macro scale.[275]

My highlighting of the correspondences between these passages, and the resultant fact that the Homeric significantly informs the Apollonian is vital: only with the awareness of the presence of this important intertext, and the subsequent emotional and intellectual import, can the Medea sunbeam simile be fully understood. I now turn to the second of the *Odyssey* passages, which I deem to be a crucial element of the literary heritage of Apollonius' sunbeam simile.

IV.ɪɪɪ.ɪɪɪ Oᴅʏssᴇᴜs

This passage appears at the beginning of *Odyssey* 20, where Odysseus has returned to his palace incognito. While falling asleep, he is confronted by the sound of the maidservants as they sneak out of the house to sleep with the suitors. As will be shown, this is a long and complicated scene; for the present purposes of examining psychological metaphor, I have placed the full Greek text in Appendix Two and have produced a comprehensive outline:

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[275] On this technique see Hunter (1989), 29. Later in this chapter I shall also show how Apollonius encourages comparison between Medea and Nausicaa in *Odyssey* 6 in order to highlight the obvious differences.

5-6	Odysseus lies awake (κεῖτ' ἐγρηγορόων) devising evils (κακὰ[276] φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ) for the suitors
6-8	The maidservants cheerfully leave the palace
9	Odysseus' θυμός stirs (ὠρίνετο)
10	he debates (μερμήριζε) κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν
11	either to rush in and kill them all
12-13	or to allow them to sleep (μιγῆναι) one last time (ὕστατα καὶ πύματα) with the suitors
13	so his κραδίη barked (ὑλάκτει) within him
14-15	just as a bitch (κύων) stands over her weak pups (ἀμαλῇσι … σκυλάκεσσι) when faced by an unknown man (ἄνδρ' ἀγνοιήσασ') and barks eager to fight (ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι)
16	so he howled (ὑλάκτει) inside, looking upon (ἀγαιομένου) these evil things (κακὰ ἔργα)
17	striking himself on the chest he reproved (ἠνίπαπε) his heart (κραδίη) with words (μύθῳ)
18-21	"You endured worse before when the Cyclops ate your companions, but you endured it and cunning (μῆτις) got you out of the cave even when you thought you would die"
22	so Odysseus reproved his heart
23-4	his heart endured without complaint (νωλεμέως)
24	but he tossed (ἐλίσσετο) this way and that (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα)
25-7	just as a man with a pudding (γαστέρ') shifts it rapidly (αἰόλλῃ) this way and that (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα) over a burning fire (πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο) and it longs (λιλαίεται) to be cooked quickly (μάλα δ' ὦκα … ὀπτηθῆναι)
28	so he tossed this way and that (ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐλίσσετο) as he debated (μερμηρίζων)
29-30	how he alone (μοῦνος ἐὼν) could lay his hands (χεῖρας ἐφήσει) on the shameless suitors
30-5	Athena descends from Olympus and questions Odysseus as to what is wrong
36-43	Odysseus recounts his troubles
44-54	Athena comforts Odysseus and casts sleep over him.

Viewed in this form, the decision-making scene clearly falls into three distinct units: the first begins with the description of Odysseus lying awake (5-6) and is concluded by the formulaic line ὣς ἔφατ', ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ (22) and the heart's subsequent compliance (23-4); the second also begins with a physical description of Odysseus (24) and ends with the description of his thoughts (29-30); and the third begins with Athena's descent from Olympus (30) and ends with her sending Odysseus to sleep (54). The first and second units are also demarcated by

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[276] Compare with the κακὰ ἔργα of the suitors (16). This is a perfect example of what Hankey (1990) shows to be the moral difference between 'evils' and 'evil actions'. The former, κακά, is the punishment that Odysseus inflicts upon the κακὰ ἔργα of the suitors. Hankey (1990), 89: 'the 'evil actions' are the morally offensive wrong-doings of the suitors, while the 'evil' that Odysseus is engendering is injury inflicted as punishment'. This distinction absolves Odysseus, in part, of moral outrage otherwise due to the scale and brutality of his revenge.

centrally placed similes: the bitch with her pups (14-16), and the cooking pudding (25-8).[277]

As is obvious from the selected Greek text in the outline above, the second unit, which contains three instances of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, is of primary interest here, and yet the entwined nature of the three units mean that none can be viewed in isolation. I shall begin by investigating the use of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα. As with the Achilles and Penelope examples above, I shall propose that this scene is a literary model for Apollonius' Medea episode, and without this knowledge and its emotional and intellectual import, the latter cannot be fully understood. I shall then go on to strengthen that argument with some further correspondences.

Odysseus' mental turmoil is initially expressed by means of a description of his physical restlessness (ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, 24).[278] The formula ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα is then used as the primary point of comparison with the simile that follows (25-7), which is designed to elucidate the interplay between physical restlessness and mental vacillation.[279] The same formula is then used in the break-off

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[277] Russo (1992), 108 also notes the individual elements that make up this scene, which, he states, are 'totally different from Homer's usual practice'. He then hypothesises that this is intentionally employed 'to achieve an unusually strong intensification of the description of [Odysseus'] inner turmoil'. The special nature of the scene will be examined shortly, but Russo's idea that it is specifically designed to heighten the force of the decision-making act will be crucial in the argument for its use by Apollonius. The intensity of the imagery in the form of digressive similes at this crucial juncture in the narrative corroborates Austin's famous remarks on Homeric poetry that (1966: 312): 'digressions occur where the dramatic and psychological concentration is the most intense'. In this respect, Rutherford (1992), 204 cites *Il*. 2.455-83 and 17.735-61 as alternative examples of simile-rich passages at moments of heightened significance. I would note that this observation is true of Apollonius' usage of similes: most notably the large frequency (16) that accompanies Jason's *aristeia* at *Arg*. 3.1249-1407.

[278] This scene has been adduced as a paradigm of the presentation of decision-making by Wills (2011), who also stresses the importance of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα; he concludes: '[h]as there ever been a better presentation of the anxiety of choice…?'

[279] The simile of Odysseus as a turning pudding is examined briefly by de Jong (2001), 486: she states that its 'primary function ... is to illustrate the tossing of sleepless Odysseus', while '[its] secondary function is to suggest his eagerness for revenge'. On this reading, of course, these two functions are linked in that the former is a symptom of the latter. However, I would take issue with de Jong in that she omits a key point of the simile: to show Odysseus' mental vacillation in deciding *how* he should now act in order to bring about his endgame of revenge against the suitors; Homer himself stresses this with ὅπως δὴ (29), which immediately, and therefore logically, follows μερμηρίζων. Merry (1878) *ad loc*. also states that the point of comparison is the turning of the pudding with Odysseus'

line in conjunction with the present participle μερμηρίζων, 'debating anxiously' (28). There is, then, in the use of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in these five lines, a progression from its use in describing the physical manifestation of mental conflict to its use in describing Odysseus' mental activity in the form of a spatial metaphor within the simile and then to an explicit metaphor in the narrative itself. Finally, the use of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the context of mental vacillation is followed directly by the narrator's description of the problem at hand: ὅππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει (29).

This precise progression from the physical to psychologically metaphorical is, as I have shown, employed by Apollonius in his description of Medea: the formula is initially used of Medea's pacing, owing to her anxiousness (τηΰσιοι δὲ πόδες φέρον ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, 3.651);[280] it is then picked up in the sunbeam simile that depicts her mental turmoil (3.758), which is followed immediately by the narrator's description of her possible future courses of action (3.766-9); and the formula is then finally used in direct speech by Medea as she bemoans the choice she must make (Δειλὴ ἐγώ, νῦν ἔνθα κακῶν ἢ ἔνθα γένωμαι;, 'Wretched me, am I to be in this trouble or that?' 3.771).

Critics may argue that since the narrative time-frame is much longer in the *Argonautica*, this lessens the force of any comparison between the two scenes,[281] but I do not think that this matters: the examination of mental conflict is the focus of this

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tossing, and therefore misses the secondary (though inextricably linked) comparison with mental vacillation. Russo *et al*. (1992), 110 correctly notice the multiple correspondences, noting that the simile also illustrates 'Odysseus' eagerness to *find a way* to attack the suitors' [my italics]. Also correct, though frustratingly vague, is Morrison (2005), 77, who states that 'the outer action [Odysseus tossing in bed] serves as a guide to Odysseus' emotional distress'. Rutherford (1992), 206-7 chooses instead to focus on how the simile describes Odysseus' 'uncertain position … in the narrative'; while he is primarily the pudding that is turned (a passive role), he is also the man that turns it (an active role); the ambiguity corresponds to whether Odysseus is 'agent or victim, avenger or helpless onlooker' in what will ensue. This ambiguity is, of course, a result of Odysseus' as yet unmade decision: as his thoughts as to how to act vacillate, so do his future roles.

[280] Like Medea's, Odysseus' restlessness, expressed with the formula ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, finds a parallel with Achilles' distraught mental state in the *Iliad*: ἀλλ' ἐστρέφετ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα / Πατρόκλου ποθέων ἀνδροτῆτά τε καὶ μένος ἠΰ (24.5-6) (see above).

[281] The three specific instances of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα in the *Argonautica* span 120 lines.

section of the *Argonautica*, and, as such, it is examined in greater detail, which naturally corresponds to a greater number of lines.[282] It is also, of course, highly plausible to credit Apollonius himself, and a section of his intended readership, with a minute knowledge of Homer, thus allowing them to draw the parallel in the scenes. Finally, this potential criticism would not detract from the exact progression from physical to metaphorical usage, via a metaphor of mental vacillation immediately followed by a narrator's description of the choice at hand. In conclusion, this progression that is exactly replicated in the *Argonautica* is, I believe, strong evidence to support the assertion that Apollonius used this scene for his Medea episode. Additionally, on closer inspection, there are several other parallels that only serve to strengthen the link.

In both scenes it is night, and, just like Medea (3.751-4), Odysseus is not overtaken by sleep, but lies awake (κεῖτ' ἐγρηγορόων, 6) as a result of his mental turmoil (10-13, 28-30).[283] This concern then elicits a physical response from the protagonist's heart: Medea's beats (πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν, 755), while Odysseus' repeatedly barks (κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει, 13, and ὑλάκτει, 16).

The particular verb, ὑλακτέω, used of Odysseus' heart here is of great interest. This Homeric scene has been analysed in detail by Gilbert Rose, who notes specifically that this is 'the only instance in the Homeric corpus of … [it being] … used metaphorically'.[284] In addition, the passage is well known as a Platonic exemplum for what it reveals about Homeric psychology,[285] and so it is without doubt that Apollonius would know of it. As already stated, my argument in this section is that this Homeric scene influenced Apollonius when he composed his Medea episode. As a result, it is striking that the noun from the verb ὑλακτέω is also used in the

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[282] In this respect, as with the Penelope example examined above, Apollonius is embellishing the Homeric scene.
[283] As has been shown, the obvious fact that Odysseus' insomnia is linked to his psychological state is attested to by Morris (1983), 49 and Russo *et al.* (1992), 107.
[284] Rose (1979), 216.
[285] On its importance, see Gill (1996), 183-90, esp. 184n.27. The importance of the passage will be discussed subsequently, and my point here is to show that it was known to Apollonius.

narrative foil before the re-introduction of Medea, where it is stated that no dogs were barking throughout the city (οὐδὲ κυνῶν ὑλακὴ ἔτ' ἀνὰ πτόλιν, 3.749). Undoubtedly, Apollonius' narrative intention here is to illustrate the complete silence, as shown by the following line: σιγῇ δὲ μελαινομένην ἔχεν ὄρφνην (750). Any multitude of examples could have been used here to stress the silence, but Apollonius chose dogs and the specific verb, ὑλακτέω, which appears in only two other places in the *Argonautica* (3.1040, 1217). As has been argued, since Apollonius has already drawn on aspects of this Homeric scene for his Medea episode, the presence of this verb is surely beyond coincidence.

Having now argued that Apollonius drew upon this Homeric scene, it is pertinent to see if there are further reasons why he chose to do so in addition to drawing on Homer's use of ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα within a psychological metaphor of mental conflict. Brief comment has already been made about the way in which the decision-making scene is presented in the first unit of the Odysseus episode, and I shall now explore this further.

Odysseus is in a perilous situation at this point in the narrative. He has finally returned home, and yet, for the purposes of his revenge plan, he is unable to reveal himself and assert his authority, meaning that he must endure witnessing the abuse to his household, represented here by the brazen maidservants. Biding his time, ensconced and isolated as he is, there is no one for him to turn to in his deliberations. As a result of this deep isolation, Odysseus can only take his own counsel, and thus the scene takes the form of an inner dialogue.[286]

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[286] The narrative circumstances for such an act are clearly set out by Gill (1996: 187): 'Homeric inner dialogues occur at moments of exceptional isolation, in which the figure is unable to engage in the kind of interpersonal exchange that is the normal mode of Homeric deliberation, and is thus driven to talk to himself, in the absence of any other partner.' Such physical isolation is attested to by Pelliccia (1995), 139, who also notes that the speeches concern a 'moral' matter (121). It is worth remembering at this juncture the discussion on Homeric mental organs from the previous chapter.

Unique about this scene is the extent to which Homer stresses the act of deliberation.[287] Joseph Russo, in part following the work of Christian Voigt, identifies three formulaic modes in which Homeric deliberation is expressed.[288] First, the use of the verb μερμηρίζω followed by ἤ … ἤ, as in the sense 'he deliberated whether to… or to…'; second, the same verb, μερμηρίζω, followed by ὅπως, as in the sense 'he deliberated how to…'; and, finally, a soliloquy in which the agent sets up two hypothetical situations which are separately evaluated before one is firmly rejected in favour of the other.[289]

Close inspection of the Odysseus scene reveals that, in fact, all three of these standard patterns of deliberation are present.[290] The first type is perfectly illustrated by the dichotomy between what Odysseus desperately wants to do to the maidservants (that is, slay them there and then), and what he knows he must do (allow them to permit this last transgression before subsequently taking action) (*Od*. 20.10-13):[291]

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[287] Homeric deliberation is a vast topic and its intricacies go far beyond the remit of this thesis. As a result, my aim here is to give only a brief discussion of the main points so that the Odysseus scene at hand can be evaluated.

[288] Russo (1968), 289-90. These modes are also listed by Gill (1996), 184n.28.

[289] These are commonly referred to as the Iliadic deliberative monologues, of which there are four that appear at critical narrative junctures; see n.152 (above). These monologues receive subtle treatment in Burnett (1991), 278-81. Scully (1984), 16 notes that 'the comparative nature of inner thought is … particularly characteristic of humans, expressive of frailty and indecision in the face of danger'; I hope that this brief summation explains Homer's decision to cast the current Odysseus' scene in the mould of such a monologue: Odysseus here is an analogue of the four Iliadic heroes with regard to his isolation and the choice that he must make, thus making the deliberative monologue a natural narrative device. By intertextual extension, Apollonius' reference is also then understandable since the mental conflict common in all these scenes is an analogue for that of Medea, and, subsequently, these literary precedents become emotional and intellectual investments that strengthen the portrayal of her situation. As was shown in the previous chapter, modern scholars from Snell to Gill have also used these Homeric scenes to formulate hypotheses regarding the conception of the self. With regard to this specific scene, Halliwell (1990: 38-42) states that the description of the hero addressing his heart is 'predicated on the basic unity of the mind'.

[290] This is noted by Russo (1968), 291-2 and Gill (1996), 184.

[291] Russo (1968), 291-2 also notes that Odysseus here follows the standard pattern in that of the two choices put forward, it is the latter that is eventually chosen. This is, of course, similar to the tragic *agōn* in that the party that argues second is victorious. There are similar patterns in many other Homeric type-scenes, as Fenik (1968: 229) concludes after examining duels and battle scenes; he attributes this fact to oral composition.

πολλὰ δὲ **μερμήριζε** κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
ἠὲ μεταΐξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἑκάστῃ,
ἦ ἔτ' ἐῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι
ὕστατα καὶ πύματα·

many things he pondered in his *phrenes* and his *thumos*,
either to rush afer and kill each one,
or allow them to sleep with the arrogant suitors
for the latest and last time…

The second pattern is then evident immediately after the pudding simile, where Homer describes Odysseus as μερμηρίζων, / ὅππως … he can get his hands on the suitors (29-30). Finally, the third of Russo's decision-making elements is obviously represented by Odysseus' address to his heart, in which he seemingly reminds it of the troubles that they have faced before (17-22).[292]

It should be noted here that the first two decision-making modes are used with regard to two different decisions: the first, what Odysseus should do with the maidservants; the second, how he can get to the suitors. Though these are obviously interconnected, Odysseus' changing thoughts over which issue should take precedence, and the fact that those thoughts are expressed by the separate decision-making modes, are indicative of his mental turmoil.[293] Furthermore, that these two differently expressed concerns are separated by the pudding simile of 25-8 is, I think, important. I would argue that the crucial ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, which is illustrative of Odysseus' mental vacillation, not only represents his choice of future action within the immediate narrative situation (i.e. how to enact revenge on the suitors), but also, on a larger scale, his vacillation between the two situations as a whole (i.e. maidservants and suitors).

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[292] Gill (1996), 184-90 examines this last element in detail and notes that the heart becomes a 'partial substitute for Odysseus himself'. Using this fact to analyse the episode in terms of Homeric psychology, and working against Voigt's position, he notes that it is 'striking for its combination of (and unusual degree) both of self distancing and self-identification' while the episode contains 'more 'personalizing' of the part addressed … than we find elsewhere in Homer'. de Jong (2001), 485 also adds that this monologue is 'uniquely … intensified' in that Odysseus addresses his heart with second-person verbs, e.g.: ἔτλης (18), ἐτόλμας (20). For the fullest exploration of the scene and its interplay with other Homeric passages, see Pelliccia (1995), 220-34. Again, my aim in noting these observations is to show that this passage is important and innovative in its portrayal of decision-making.
[293] Rose (1979), 226 observes the 'shift[ing]' of Odysseus' thoughts throughout the episode.

To return to the decision-making modes, if the important nature of this decision-making scene had not been stressed enough by the presence of all three, Homer emphasises it finally with divine intervention in the form of Athena's 'pep talk' to Odysseus. Having studied this and similar passages, Pelliccia notes that this scene is unique in having such an intervention; while Russo, widening the remit to both the Homeric poems, states that this excerpt is the only intervention scene used to resolve the second, μερμηρίζω + ὅπως, mode of deliberation.[294] The rarity of this divine intervention, then, in addition to its use in a different decision-making mode, causes this scene to stand out; it indicates that the Homeric poet has gone to the furthest extreme possible to stress the great extent of Odysseus' mental turmoil at this juncture.[295]

My argument is that this scene is a literary model of deliberation used by Apollonius in the fashioning of his Medea episode, and in the light of the most recent discussion, it is not difficult to see why he adopted this model. Owing to the multiple correspondences that have been shown to exist in this well-known Homeric scene, Apollonius lends his epic predecessor's weight to his portrayal of Medea. Her situation, and the choice that she must make with regard to Jason, is cast in the mould of Homer's excessive portrayal of Odysseus' extreme difficulty in his decision-making, and the resultant investment of meaning effectively heightens the stakes in the *Argonautica*. I think that the importance of this Homeric episode has not been stressed in Apollonian scholarship, and yet without realising this crucial intertext, any understanding of Apollonius' portrayal of Medea in this scene is severely lessened.

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[294] Pelliccia (1995), 227; Russo (1968), 292-3; also Gill (1996), 184n.28.

[295] Pelliccia (1995), 223 labels it 'a compendium of the possibilities'. Russo (1968), 293 concludes that the scene is 'in formal terms alone, highly irregular, a striking hybrid, built on a scale not found elsewhere in Homer', and that 'Homer is trying to do something special … [in] trying to extend his reach to the kind of psychological depth and intensity not normally available in the standard descriptions of men facing difficult decisions'.

Medea

Arg. 3.744-70

1   2

Penelope   3   Odysseus

Od.19.515-29   *Od*.20.5-35

In the last two sub-sections I have argued for individual correspondences between
the Homeric Penelope and Odysseus scenes and the Apollonian Medea episode
(arrows 1 and 2 on the diagram above). The multiple thematic and literary
connections make the identification between these passages undeniable. However, I
shall now strengthen this identification by arguing for an internal correspondence in
the Odyssean scenes (arrow 3 on the diagram). If this is successfully shown, the case
for these specific intertexts between Homer and Apollonius will be all the stronger:
the internal linkage of the Homeric scenes will mean that, in effect, Apollonius uses
the whole of this section of the *Odyssey* as a model for Medea's psychological
portrayal.

Since this internal Odyssean correspondence is clearly visible in the text and widely
accepted in secondary scholarship, this section will be relatively brief in presenting

the compelling arguments and using them to strengthen the overarching argument of this chapter.

The two specific scenes that have been examined are linked as a result of the fact that Homer, on a larger scale, explicitly stresses the intuitive closeness of Odysseus and Penelope at this point in the narrative.[296] The reason for this is also clear: this episode constitutes the final night of Odysseus and Penelope's twenty-year separation. Though Odysseus is home, he is still in disguise and must now use all his trademark guile to reassert his authority against the suitors' numerically superior forces. The closeness between husband and wife reassures the audience that this is a worthwhile fight, and encourages them (if they were not so inclined already) to empathise with Odysseus.[297]

IV.IV.I *HOMOPHROSYNE*

The *homophrosyne* between Odysseus and Penelope is a major theme that runs throughout the *Odyssey*, and it is worth exploring this briefly on a macro scale, before looking at how it is manifested in this chapter's studied passages. The concept is best expressed by Odysseus as he bestows good wishes upon Nausicaa (6.180-5):

> σοὶ δὲ θεοὶ τόσα δοῖεν, ὅσα φρεσὶ σῆσι μενοινᾷς,
> ἄνδρα τε καὶ οἶκον, καὶ ὁμοφροσύνην ὀπάσειαν
> ἐσθλήν· οὐ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γε κρεῖσσον καὶ ἄρειον,
> ἢ ὅθ' ὁμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν οἶκον ἔχητον
> ἀνὴρ ἠδὲ γυνή· πόλλ' ἄλγεα δυσμενέεσσι,
> χάρματα δ' εὐμενέτῃσι· μάλιστα δέ τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοί.

> may the gods give to you so many things as your *phren* desires,
> a husband and a home, and may they give you good *homophrosyne*;
> for nothing indeed is stronger or better than this,
> when, united in thought, a husband and a wife keep
> a house: bringing many griefs to those hostile to them,
> and delights to well-wishers, and they themselves have the highest reputation.

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[296] For this interpretation see, for example, Foley (1978), 8n.2.
[297] Russo (1982), 6 notes that it is important at this stage in Books 19 and 20 for Homer to show both characters 'in the grip of an unusually powerful unconscious tug toward the full mental union' which occurs only in Book 23.

This is the quality that Odysseus and Penelope possess, and, as Zeitlin argues, is evident in their exchanges in the recognition scene (23.173-204).[298]

Returning to the chosen excerpts, Homer displays the couple's *homophrosyne* in an explicit yet subtle manner, which is well documented by Joseph Russo (1982). I shall pick out the most salient points that are of relevance for my argument. Already in Book 19, Odysseus and Penelope strike up an emotional rapport in the so-called first interview (96-360), where the disguised Odysseus' fabricated description of himself brings the queen to tears (ὣς φάτο, τῇ δ' ἔτι μᾶλλον ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γόοιο / σήματ' ἀναγνούσῃ… 'so he spoke, and in her still more roused a desire of weeping, as she recognised the signs… 249-50). The ease that Penelope feels in Odysseus' company then leads to the second part of the interview, which runs to the end of the book (508-604). Within this section, the Penelope scene analysed above occurs (515-29), after which she displays her trust in Odysseus by recounting her dream and requesting his interpretation (535-53), and sets up the bow contest for the next day (572-80). This evidently rapid chain of events is representative of the intimacy between the two.[299]

The subsequent symmetry apparent in the separate states of Odysseus and Penelope at the beginning of Book 20 reasserts their closeness. This can be seen in the way

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[298] Zeitlin (1995), 120-1 discusses the mutually-testing discussion over the couple's marriage bed, in which, she argues, Penelope shows herself 'a match for her husband in clever quick-wittedness.' Another defining instance of *homophrosyne* occurs between Odysseus and his patron goddess, Athena; she says (13.296-9):

> ἀλλ' ἄγε μηκέτι ταῦτα λεγώμεθα, εἰδότες ἄμφω
> κέρδε', ἐπεὶ σὺ μέν ἐσσι βροτῶν ὄχ' ἄριστος ἁπάντων
> βουλῇ καὶ μύθοισιν, ἐγὼ δ' ἐν πᾶσι θεοῖσι
> μήτι τε κλέομαι καὶ κέρδεσιν·
>
> but come, let us talk no longer of these things, both of us knowing
> craftiness, since you are by far the best of all mortals
> for counsel and stories, and I among all the gods
> am famous for wits and wiles…

Murnaghan (1995), 72 states that Odysseus' survival is dependent on this *homophrosyne* and that it 'eclipses all other such relationships'.
[299] Noted by Russo (1982), 11.

that Homer narrates the episode: in the quoted passage below, note how the narration moves immediately from the once fretful, now sleeping, Odysseus to the once sleeping, now fretful, Penelope (56-8):

εὖτε τὸν ὕπνος ἔμαρπτε, λύων μελεδήματα θυμοῦ,
λυσιμελής, ἄλοχος δ' ἄρ' ἐπέγρετο κεδνὰ ἰδυῖα,
κλαῖεν δ' ἐν λέκτροισι καθεζομένη μαλακοῖσιν.

when sleep caught him, unfastening the anxieties of his *thumos*,
limb-relaxing, then his diligent wife awakened,
she cried and sat up in her soft bed.

The manner in which their mental and physical states both echo and complement each other stresses their closeness.[300] The narrative then moves to Penelope, who first prays to Artemis to spare her from her misery and then recounts the dream in which someone *like* Odysseus was lying next to her (παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῷ, 88). The end of this narration and the immediate cut back to Odysseus are quoted below (87-94):

αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὀνείρατ' ἐπέσσευεν κακὰ δαίμων.
τῇδε γὰρ αὖ μοι νυκτὶ παρέδραθεν εἴκελος αὐτῷ,
τοῖος ἐὼν, οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῷ· αὐτὰρ ἐμὸν κῆρ
χαῖρ', ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἤδη."
ὣς ἔφατ', αὐτίκα δὲ χρυσόθρονος ἤλυθεν Ἠώς.
τῆς δ' ἄρα κλαιούσης ὄπα σύνθετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς·
μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα, δόκησε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν
ἤδη γινώσκουσα παρεστάμεναι κεφαλῆφι.

but now a *daimon* has set evil dreams upon me.
for on this very night was someone who lay beside me like him,
such as he was when he went to the army; but my *ker*
rejoiced, since I did not think it was a dream, but a waking vision."
So she spoke, and immediately golden-throned Dawn came,
and noble Odysseus was aware of her crying voice;
then he pondered, and it seemed in his *thumos*
that she had already recognised him, standing by his head.

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[300] Russo (1982), 12 notes the 'striking complementarity in their physiological and psychological rhythms.' Also Rutherford (1992), 201; Russo *et al* (1992), 112; de Jong (2001), 483-4, 488 refers to a narrative 'interlace technique' in these scenes that is designed, among other things, to show 'their mental closeness'.

There are four points that are of interest here: first, the way in which the narration moves immediately from Penelope back to Odysseus finds a clear analogue in the previous quotation, where the reverse was the case; this, again, shows the inextricable link between the two protagonists within this episode. Second, Odysseus' premonition that he can hear his wife's crying (κλαιούσης ὄπα σύνθετο, 92) shows the couple's intuitive closeness. Third, this closeness is true to the extent that they think similar thoughts: just as Penelope imagines in her dream that she has experienced an Odysseus-like figure lying next to her (88), likewise Odysseus perceives that his wife is standing by him and recognises him (93-4).

These three examples show the way in which Homer stresses the like-mindedness of Odysseus and Penelope, and, as a result, how the scenes spread over Books 19 and 20 are complementary. The next and final point, however, will show that even on a narratological level, the events in both places are intended to be complementary.

It has already been noted that Penelope has perceived the likeness of Odysseus lying beside her (88). The vividness with which Penelope experiences this dream leads her to state that οὐκ ἐφάμην ὄναρ ἔμμεναι, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἤδη (90). Russo (1982: 12) notes that this is a strong 'verbal echo' of Penelope's summation of the dream that she earlier recounted to Odysseus in Book 19 (οὐκ ὄναρ, ἀλλ' ὕπαρ ἐσθλόν, 547).[301] The link between the two dream scenes is further strengthened by Penelope's description of her second dream: the person lying next to her resembles Odysseus as he was twenty years ago when he went off with the army (οἷος ἦεν ἅμα στρατῷ, 89). (This is, of course, an imaginary figure that has grown out of the description of the Odysseus who had just departed for Troy, which was fabricated by the disguised Odysseus for Penelope in their first interview in Book 19 (217-57).[302]) The correspondence, then, has two levels which are tied to the dramatic irony of

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[301] Another such verbal echo within Penelope's dream in Book 20, which would strengthen Russo's (and thus my) argument is her likening herself to the daughters of Pandareos (66), in just the same way that she did in her simile to Odysseus in Book 19 (524).
[302] This is argued in greater detail by Russo (1982), 12-14. de Jong (2001), 489 also states that Penelope's dream is 'clearly triggered by the conversation of the previous evening'.

Odysseus' disguise: on one level, where the audience is aware of the identities of all parties, Penelope's desire for Odysseus obviously links to Odysseus as the beggar sleeping nearby; but on another level, within Penelope's narrative, it is not implausible to argue that the Odysseus-like figure in her dream is the beggar, since her dream is a response to the beggar's story,[303] and thus another correspondence with the events of Book 19 is established.

Such complementarity between the affairs of Odysseus and Penelope is present throughout the *Odyssey*,[304] but, for present purposes, I hope to have shown that the *Odyssey* exhibits correspondences between the two key passages of this chapter, which have been examined for their use of spatial metaphor involving ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα to elucidate psychological processes. The internal correspondences within the *Odyssey* serve to strengthen the validity of taking these passages individually as intertexts with the *Argonautica*. But, on a larger scale, the Odysseus and Penelope scenes are effectively both parts of the same whole, and I argue that it is upon this whole that Apollonius draws in order to create an emotional and intellectual import for his Medea scene.

I noted earlier that Apollonius uses ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα more frequently than Homer in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and that this was especially prevalent in Book 3. Based on the preceding arguments, I would suggest that the thematic correspondences between Medea in Book 3 and the analysed passages from the Homeric poems, which all involve the formula ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, would account for this. In deploying and developing the literary models for such psychological expression, Apollonius necessarily found greater occasions for using the formula.

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[303] This is the opinion of Russo (1982) 14, who notes, in addition, that Penelope herself has commented on the beggar's likeness to Odysseus (19.357-9), and overheard Odysseus' telling reply to Eurykleia upon her statement that she has never seen anyone as similar to Odysseus as him (19.383-5).
[304] For some further examples see the discussions of Podlecki (1971), 90; and Arthur (1973), 15-16.

IV.v Some further examples of cultural specifics

I have now shown that Apollonius' sunbeam simile displays certain cognitive universal traits, and that the specific formula of interest, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, has a significant literary tradition in its own right. During the remainder of this chapter, I shall analyse two further, discrete examples of Apollonius' deployment of such cultural specifics: first, his use of πάλλω within the sunbeam simile, and, second, an analysis of θυίω, which I shall argue encourages a specific poem-wide reading of Medea.

IV.v.i Conscious intrusion

As has been shown, the sunbeam simile refers primarily to Medea's palpitating heart, which is immediately compared to a sunbeam that flutters throughout the house (ἠελίου ὥς τίς τε δόμοις ἔνι πάλλεται αἴγλη, 756). Apollonius' use of the verb πάλλω in this instance is of considerable interest. In order to appreciate this, it is necessary first to examine Homer so as to establish the common usage.

The verb πάλλω occurs twenty-four times in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey*.[305] The verb, with its common connotations of agitated movement,[306] occurs in three strongly defined contexts.[307] Most frequently (fifteen times), it is used of a warrior brandishing a spear or, occasionally, another projectile; a typical example is that used of Hector as he attacks the Achaian host: πάλλων δ' ὀξέα δοῦρα κατὰ στρατὸν

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[305] Occurrences as follows: *Il*.3.19, 216, 324; 5.304, 495; 6.104, 474; 7.181; 11.212; 12.449; 15.191, 645; 16.117, 142 (twice); 19.389 (twice) 20.282; 22.320, 452, 462; 23.353, 861; 24.400; *Od*.10.206.
[306] Although, admittedly, the verb does not imply excessive movement, the earlier discussion on the merits of movement in Greek thought should, I think, still be recalled here. Regardless, the movement of the sunbeam that the verb describes is a symbolic representation of Medea's shifting thoughts as to her future courses of action.
[307] Clarke (1999), 105n.116 offers a similar analysis.

ᾤχετο πάντηι ('shaking sharp spears he went every way amongst the army', *Il.* 5.495).[308]

The second context (eight times) is the casting of lots, where the verb is used to describe the action of the person who shakes the helmet containing the lots before one is selected. Homer typically describes a scene in this way: αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα / κλήρους ἐν κυνέηι χαλκήρεϊ πάλλον ἑλόντες ('but then he shook the lots, having placed them in a bronze helmet', *Il.* 3.315-16).[309]

The final, and rarest, context is also the one of most interest to this thesis. On two occasions in the *Iliad*, πάλλω is used to describe the trembling of the heart (ἦτορ or καρδία) when the protagonist experiences extreme stress. Fearing that Hector may have been killed by Achilles before the Skaian gates, Andromache says that she hears Hecuba's voice (22.451), and as a result ἐν δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῆ / στήθεσι πάλλεται ἦτορ ἀνὰ στόμα ('within my *stethos*, my *etor* trembles up to my mouth', 451-2). As she then breaks off from the narration and rushes from the room, Homer describes Andromache as παλλομένη κραδίην (22.460-1). Thus, in the same way that the spear is brandished or the lots shaken, Andromache quivers with respect to her heart. The connection between πάλλω and καρδία (or its epic equivalent κραδίη) is also corroborated by two instances in the medical texts of Hippocrates, writing before the time of Apollonius: ἡ καρδίη πάλλεται (*Morb. sacr.* 6.6; *Mul.* 151.3).[310] These examples are, then, the literary culture's models that Apollonius could draw on. I now return to the *Argonautica* simile so that its specific significance can be analysed.

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[308] πάλλω used with a spear: *Il.* 3.19; 5.495; 6.104; 11.212; 16.117, 142 (twice); 19.389 (twice); 22.320. The other projectiles are rocks: *Il.* 5.304; 12.449; 20.287. At *Il.* 6.474 the verb is used of Hector lifting his son, Astyanax, above his head (as he would a spear). Finally, the occurrence at *Il.* 15.645, where the form πάλτο is used of a warrior tripping over his shield, should, owing to the presence of the armament be included within this grouping. Janko (1992) *ad loc.* notes, however, that this may in fact be the much rarer verb παλέω; regardless, this would not affect the categorisation of πάλλω, which is the issue at hand.

[309] The other examples occur at: *Il.* 3.324; 7.181; 15.191; 23.353, 861; 24.400; *Od.* 10.206.

[310] The only other example of the pairing before Apollonius' writing is Aeschylus *Supp.* 785: κελαινόχρως δὲ πάλλεταί μου καρδία.

The fluttering sunbeam symbolises the palpitations of Medea's heart, which, as I have argued, beats owing to the stress caused by her mental vacillation. Clearly, then, the third of the Homeric contexts analysed above—heart palpitation at a time of stress—is of primary relevance. But additionally, the sunbeam is reflected from water that is poured into a basin or pail (ἠὲ λέβητι / ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται, 3.757-8). This movement of a substance within a receptacle is congruous with the lots shaken within the helmet, as in the second Homeric context above. Apollonius' use of πάλλω within the simile thus shows a degree of *contaminatio* since multiple Homeric contexts are employed in one instance.

But this is not the extent of Apollonius' poetic creativity since, crucially, πάλλω is used not in conjunction with Medea's κραδίη (the Homeric context which is of primary relevance to the simile), but instead with ἠελίου … αἴγλη, thus creating the metaphor of the trembling sunbeam. There is, then, in this instance an interaction of the domains that results in the verb that would be expected to accompany κραδίη being transferred to ἠελίου … αἴγλη.[311] This effect is, I believe, that which Michael Silk has labelled 'intrusion':[312] where the target of the metaphor, πάλλω, intrudes into the source, ἠελίου … αἴγλη,[313] or, more simply, where πάλλω is consciously misplaced so that it agrees with ἠελίου … αἴγλη as opposed to κραδίη, which the audience would expect. The disharmony that is created stems from the fact that there is a tension between the grammar and the semantics of the sentence: from a grammatical perspective, Apollonius' line functions perfectly since πάλλω and

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[311] A *TLG* search for πάλλω in conjunction with αἴγλη returns no matches in the entire corpus for those writing before Apollonius. This attests to the fact that the phrasing for this part of the sunbeam simile is unique and hence that Apollonius' usage of πάλλω must be informed by Homer. The only other occurrence of αἴγλη with πάλλω comes from Aristaenetus' *Epistulae* 2.5.21; this, however, in being a parody of a famous Hellenistic text, is typical of the author in question.

[312] On this, see Silk (1974), 138-44.

[313] The power of intrusion is, as Silk (1974: 140) states, that it 'does not serve a single master'; although the effect may be instigated by the presence of ἠελίου … αἴγλη attached to πάλλω, it is also inextricably linked to κραδίη.

ἠελίου … αἴγλη have every right to co-exist, but, at the same time, it is semantically jarring, owing to the verb's perceived displacement.

I think that this tension is typical of Apollonius' poetic technique: he demonstrates an awareness of the Homeric pattern only to dissociate himself by creatively subverting it. Of course, the effect is then intensified by the fact that κραδίη is situated so close to its verbal partner, so as to highlight the deliberate departure from the Homeric norm.

Another result of the intrusion effect is that the reader is then intrigued into looking at the verb that does have κραδίη as its subject, θυίω, and it is to this that I shall now also turn.

IV.v.ii Medea redefined?

The sunbeam simile is introduced by the following line, which is descriptive of Medea's heart (3.755): πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν. Gillies and Hunter translate ἔθυιεν as 'danced madly' and 'raged wildly' respectively, but neither offers any significant commentary.[314] Since the intrusion effect examined in the last section draws attention to the verb, I believe that such a comment is required. It will become apparent, in fact, that θυίω is most apt, owing to its multiple points of reference to both the sunbeam simile and Medea's predicament on a larger scale.

Chantraine's entry for such a comment is a good place to start.[315] He connects θυίω with θύω, defining the latter's usage as: '"bondir, s'élancer avec fureur", dit du vent, des eaux, de guerriers…' A *TLG* search for θυίω corroborates Chantraine's analysis;

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[314] Gilles (1925) *ad loc.* and Hunter (1989) *ad loc.*
[315] Chantraine (1968), 448.

as the examples below show, Hesiod is typical in his use of the verb in the description of gusts of wind and swell of the sea:[316]

> δὴ τότε παντοίων ἀνέμων θυίουσιν ἀῆται
>
> At that time, blasts of all sorts of winds rage
>
> *Op.* 621

> θυῖε δ' ἄρ' ἀμφ' ἀκτὰς περί τ' ἀμφί τε κύματα μακρὰ
> ῥιπῇ ὕπ' ἀθανάτων...
>
> and long waves raged around the shores, around and about,
> under the rush of the immortals...
>
> *Theog.* 848-9
>
> [Tr. Most]

Returning to Apollonius' simile, the presence of the basin or pail of disturbed water, from which the reflecting sunbeam casts its light (3.757-8), seems to evoke this use of θυίω. But further analysis suggests that this is not the extent of the verb's appropriateness.

The notion of movement encapsulated within θυίω's definition of frenzied leaping and bounding is, of course, highly relevant to the specific movement of Medea's heart as it vacillates in the decision-making process, as well as her general movement within the poem.[317] Interestingly, Chantraine draws an etymological link between the verb and θυμός, the breathy substance that resides in the lungs and whose movement is involved in thought processes and at moments of passion.[318] With this in mind, it is possible to view Apollonius' ἔθυιεν, which describes the movement of Medea's κραδίη in the course of her decision making, as a metaphorical nudge toward the

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[316] θυίω used with reference to water: Hes. *Theog.* 109, 131; Anac. Frg. 2,1.17 *PMG*; and wind: Hes. *Theog.* 874. Clarke (1999), 79-83 offers many examples of the use of the verb in this context in Homer. Other uses of the verb will be seen in the light of further analysis.

[317] My argument here would strengthen that of Buxton (2010).

[318] Cf. n.315 above (with bibliography). As has been discussed, Clarke (1999: 79-83) shows that within the realm of Homeric psychological imagery, the movement of breath within the body is one folk model for the way in which thought processes are imagined to proceed.

substance that the Greeks thought played a crucial role in the decision-making process, and therefore a deployment of that specific folk model of psychological expression.

Thus far, then, it is clear that there are many connotations to Apollonius' ἔθυιεν. I think, though, that in addition to the movement of water and the reference to the θυμός there is one final point that is of relevance, which stems from the Apollonian scholiast's comment on this line:[319] ἔθυιεν· ὥρμα, ἐκινεῖτο. ἔνθεν καὶ θυιάδες αἱ Βάκχαι.

In his comment on the use of θυίω in this context, the scholiast chooses to draw a link with θυιάδες, the noun derived from the verb meaning 'possessed women', and Bacchants, the crazed female followers of Dionysus.[320]

Based on this comment, it seems plausible to suggest that in the description of Medea's beating heart with ἔθυιεν, there is a Dionysiac metaphor.[321] This idea has, to the best of my knowledge, not been applied to the *Argonautica* before, but since the results are startling and informative for the understanding of Medea both in relation to the sunbeam simile and beyond, I shall devote the last section of this

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[319] Wendel (1958), 239.
[320] Two entries from Hesychius' lexicon are of relevance to this discussion:
θ 842 Latte: <Θυιάς>· Βακχίς· οἱ δὲ μαινάς; θ 846 Latte: <θυιωθείς>· μανείς. ὁρμήσας.
Hesychius, therefore, whose lexicon functions by giving synonyms that are intelligible to the contemporary Greek, first corroborates the fact that a θυιάς is a Bacchant; and, second, in his gloss of the aorist passive participle, provides close synonyms to those cited by the Apollonian scholiast. Chantraine (1968), 448 also sees Dionysiac connotations in the verb.
[321] I use the term 'metaphor' in a slightly different sense from that of the rest of the thesis here, and follow Seaford (1993: 115): 'any explicit or implicit comparison of behavior to the frenzy inspired by Dionysus'. For Dionysiac metaphor see Schlesier (1993), 89-114 and Seaford (1993), 115-46, though these will be analysed shortly. Space precludes an extensive discussion of the merits of θυίω as a Dionysiac metaphor in other contexts, though this is a topic that would, I believe, benefit from a more detailed study. Two specific instances that I think are of most interest are Pind. *Pyth*. 3.33 (which, I believe, may echo the explicit maenadic reference in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* 386), and *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* 560. In both of these θυίω is used in the context of females who have abandoned the domestic sphere: in the former, by illegitimate marriage, the latter by entering a prophetic state. The importance of such female abandonment as a constitutive Dionysiac element will be examined below.

chapter to exploring this angle. Before moving on to evaluate this metaphor, however, I have one final point to strengthen the case.

In the preceding section on the discussion of the intrusion of the verb πάλλω in the sunbeam simile, I showed that one of the three Homeric contexts in which the verb is used is in the beating of the heart at times of stress. The only Homeric occasion in which πάλλω appears in conjunction with κραδίη (the terms that appear within the sunbeam simile) is (as noted above) in relation to the distressed Andromache at *Iliad* 22.460-1: ῍Ως φαμένη μεγάροιο διέσσυτο μαινάδι ἴση / παλλομένη κραδίην. Andromache is explicitly compared to a rushing maenad, whose heart palpitates.[322] Such a comparison is, of course, highly pertinent to my argument that ἔθυιεν is a Dionysiac metaphor. Within the sunbeam simile, it was shown that πάλλω is misplaced from its natural partner, κραδίη, an effect that draws attention to the verb that does partner κραδίη, ἔθυιεν. This verb has patent Dionysiac associations, and such associations are strengthened by the fact that the only instance of πάλλω used in conjunction with κραδίη in Homer occurs in an explicitly Dionysiac context in which a woman is portrayed in the throes of violent emotion.[323]

With the significant weight of this last observation, I believe it to be established that ἔθυιεν constitutes a Dionysiac metaphor. I want now to examine the relevant maenadic metaphors (of which Andromache is a paradigm case) and apply what is learnt to Apollonius' poetic portrayal of Medea. If there is a considerable degree of

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[322] Schlesier (1993), 102 states that this passage is the epic *locus classicus* for the maenad model, which will, in turn, influence the tragic model.

[323] There is scholarly contention on the issue of whether or not Homer is aware of maenadism in a Dionysiac context; on this see, for example, Segal (1971), 47-8; Richardson (1993), 460; Schlesier (1993), 102; and Seaford (1993), 115-46. In brief, such contention stems from the fact that the only references (in addition to that quoted above) are: first, Andromache, in a similar manner, described as rushing to the walls in her anxiety for Hector μαινομένηι εἰκυῖα (*Il*. 6.389), and, secondly, the narration of the Dionysiac myth at *Il*. 6.130-7, in which Lycurgus is attacked by μαινομένοιο Διωνύσοιο τιθήνας (132).

fit, then this will further confirm the reading of ἔθυιεν, and thus establish a new lens (in the form of a specific poetic model) through which the character can be viewed.

IV.v.iii Medea gone wild

In her examination of the epic maenad, for which she uses the Andromache passages previously cited from the *Iliad*, Renate Schlesier identifies three 'standard characteristics of maenads:'[324] first, they are associated with 'the particular rushing motion and the violent emotion'; this manifests itself twice in Andromache's rushing to the walls on account of Hector (ἐπειγομένη, 6.388; διέσσυτο, 22.460). Second, they have 'a common connection to death and love', which are, of course, the motivating factors that drive Andromache's behaviour—her love for Hector initially leading her to attempt to avert his death (6.431-4), and then, when it has transpired, to mourn him (e.g., 22.449-61). Finally, and for Schlesier most importantly, the maenadic quality emerges in the protagonist 'at the turn of events'. This is applicable to Andromache's two Dionysiac metaphors: first, when she learns that Hector will go and fight (6.386-8), and then when she hears, true to her worst fears, Hecuba's cries that Hector is dead (22.449-66).

Schlesier has also shown in relation to tragic maenadic references (and the results are applicable to their epic counterparts) that madness described explicitly as Bacchic can be induced by a whole host of deities—mainly Ares, Hera, Aphrodite, and Apollo—which is why the term Dionysiac *metaphor* is used.[325] This is applicable to the maenadic epic paradigm, Andromache, and, more importantly, to Medea, whose extreme anxiety is caused by Aphrodite and Eros at the behest of Hera.[326]

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[324] Schlesier (1993), 102. These characteristics are, in fact, shared with tragic maenads, with which Schlesier's article is primarily concerned. As will become clear shortly, this tragic model will also be of relevance.
[325] Schlesier (1993), 100. Again, the tragic model will be of relevance shortly.
[326] Medea's divinely-induced passion for Jason was discussed earlier in this chapter.

The first two common maenadic characteristics identified by Schlesier—the rushing motion and violent emotion, and the common connection to death and love—can be applied to Medea as one. It is precisely because of her love for Jason, and the associated fear that he will die in the task with the bulls, that Medea is subject to the violent emotion that causes her to pace her chamber and her thoughts, relating to her future plans, to vacillate. In fact, it has already been shown that excessive movement is key in structuring the portrayal of Medea at this point in the *Argonautica*: initially she moves physically ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (3.651), and then this same formula is used to detail the movement of her thoughts in the sunbeam simile (3.755-60). Furthermore, within the simile, the ἠελίου … αἴγλη, which stands for the κραδίη, is subject to multiple verbs of motion—πάλλω (756), ἐξάνειμι (757), and τινάσσω and ἀίσσω (759)—which, in their sheer frequency, create a highly dynamic image.[327]

Yet, crucially, all this movement, which is produced by the presence of love and the prospect of death, occurs within the sunbeam simile, which is the poetic portrayal of mental vacillation at the crucial point at which a decision is being made. That ἔθυιεν, the Dionysiac metaphor, appears within the decision-making simile is the very definition of Schlesier's criterion that the maenadic quality emerges at the 'turn of events', for this is the point at which future events are being decided.

Richard Seaford has also analysed Andromache as a maenad and several of his comments are useful in refining Schlesier's epic model. In relation to her first point, Seaford notes that the characteristic maenad not only confuses the spatial confines of the male and female spheres—i.e. Andromache's rushing from the female *oikos* to the male battlements—but also, and as a result, the Dionysiac frenzy causes females

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[327] If I am right in seeing ἔθυιεν as a Dionysiac metaphor, then the image of the κραδίη, personified as a Bacchant, dancing frantically and erratically perfectly portrays how Medea's thoughts as to her future possible courses of action constantly shift.

to abandon their generic pursuits in order 'to become warriors and hunters'.[328] In order to stress this, Homer outlines the socially accepted reasons for a woman to leave her sphere, to highlight the fact that these were not Andromache's reasons (6.383-6):

οὔτέ πη ἐς γαλόων οὔτ' εἰνατέρων ἐϋπέπλων
οὔτ' ἐς Ἀθηναίης ἐξοίχεται, ἔνθά περ ἄλλαι
Τρῳαὶ ἐϋπλόκαμοι δεινὴν θεὸν ἱλάσκονται,
ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πύργον ἔβη μέγαν Ἰλίου…

she is not with her sisters-in-law, nor with the beautifully-robed
wives of her husband's brothers, nor has she gone out to the house of Athene,
where all the other fine-haired women of Troy appease the fearful goddess,
but she has gone to the great ramparts of Ilium…

Significantly, it is after this that the Dionysiac metaphor occurs (6.389), when it is clear that Andromache has abandoned her normal pursuits in order to give military advice to Hector (6.431-4). Similarly, before the maenadic reference upon her hearing of Hector's death (22.461), the poet explicitly recounts Andromache's female pursuits: weaving (22.440) and organizing the preparation of Hector's bath (22.442-4). This abandonment can be demonstrated clearly in the *Argonautica* by examining the scene in which Medea and Jason meet alone for the first time.

Waking after a troubled sleep, Medea calls her maidservants to prepare the wagons so that they may travel to the shrine of Hekate in order to meet Jason. The scene is cast in the mould of Nausicaa and her retinue travelling to the washing pools, before their unexpected meeting with Odysseus in *Odyssey* 6; this precedent, then, initially confers a sense of faithful domesticity, but also sets up the expectation of the arrival of a male stranger.[329] Medea and her maids begin to play games, but she is unable to concentrate (3.948-53):

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[328] Seaford (1993), 116.
[329] Medea, of course, is intending to meet Jason (3.819-21). For the similarities and deliberate differences between these two scenes, see Hunter (1989) *ad loc*. I will not analyse these since they are

Οὐδ' ἄρα Μηδείης θυμὸς τράπετ' ἄλλα νοῆσαι,
μελπομένης περ ὅμως· πᾶσαι δέ οἱ ἥν τιν' ἀθύροι
μολπὴν, οὐκ ἐπὶ δηρὸν ἐφήνδανεν ἐψιάασθαι,
ἀλλὰ μεταλλήγεσκεν ἀμήχανος· οὐδέ ποτ' ὄσσε
ἀμφιπόλων μεθ' ὅμιλον ἔχ' ἀτρέμας, ἐς δὲ κελεύθον
τηλόσε παπταίνεσκε παρακλίνουσα παρειάς.

Nor indeed could Medea's *thumos* think of other things,
in spite of the playing; for all games, whichever one she played,
it did not please her to amuse herself for long,
but she kept stopping *amechanos*. She could never keep her eyes
on the crowd of maidservants without moving, but looking wistfully
far along the path, and kept turning aside her face.

This passage is indicative of Medea's predicament in that she is torn away from her female sphere, represented by her playing attendants, and drawn to Jason. Her divinely induced decision to aid his quest, which is cemented in the exchange that takes place near the shrine (3.1026-620), will lead to her escaping with the Argonauts and, in the process, being directly complicit in the murder of her brother, Apsyrtus (4.452-76).[330] Therefore, by her turning away from the female sphere and, in the provision of drugs for Jason and the murderous entrapment of her brother, her behaving like a warrior, Medea clearly demonstrates Seaford's maenadic quality.

Medea's behaviour in this instance is a symptom of the larger maenadic trait of the destruction of the *oikos*.[331] In the remainder of this chapter, I shall show how the maenad image announced by the Dionysiac metaphor ἔθυιεν (which, importantly, is placed at the point where she will decide to aid Jason) points forward to Medea's betrayal of the *oikos*: first that of her father, Aeetes, and then that of her future husband, Jason. I will show Medea's destruction of her natal *oikos* by examining, first, her perversion of the marriage ritual with Jason, and, secondly and in greater detail, her complicity in the death of her brother.

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not important for my current purposes. Cf. also the discussion (above) on the relation between Penelope and Medea.
[330] Apsyrtus' death and Medea's complicity will be examined in greater detail shortly.
[331] On this trait see Seaford (1993), 121.

In order to appreciate how far Medea and Jason stray from the normal marriage process, it is necessary first to establish the standard procedure; in relation to epic society, Lacey (1966: 60) states that:[332]

> [a] father or other κύριος [guardian: nearest male relative] could be approached with δῶρα [gifts] and offers of ἔδνα [bride-price] for his daughter; the δῶρα would be accepted from all the contestants, and on the basis of the offers made and of his own judgment he would select a son-in-law, whose offer of ἔδνα would be accepted…

Only after following this process would the κύριος betroth (ἐγγύη) his dependant to the bridegroom, and then ceremonially hand her over (ἔκδοσις) to his *oikos*.[333]

Terrified that her family will learn of her betrayal in helping Jason, Medea inverts the whole process by initially fleeing her father's *oikos* for the Argonaut's ship at the behest of Hera (4.20-3). Once there, she supplicates Jason, stating explicitly her abandonment of her natal *oikos* and her resultant lack of protection (4.88-91):[334]

> τύνη δὲ θεοὺς ἐνὶ σοῖσιν ἑταίροις
> ξεῖνε, τεῶν μύθων ἐπιίστορας οὕς μοι ὑπέστης
> ποιήσαι, μηδ' ἔνθεν ἑκαστέρω ὁρμηθεῖσαν
> χήτεϊ κηδεμόνων ὀνοτὴν καὶ ἀεικέα θείης.

> For your part, stranger, amongst your comrades,
> take the gods as witnesses of your words, which you
> promised to me, and do not, when I have hastened far from here,
> make me scorned and shamed through lack of a guardian.

This desire for protection is an implicit appeal for Jason to become her κύριος, and he interprets it as such by immediately proposing to her, and, in doing so, negating Aeetes' position (4.95-8). The perversion of the normal practices is underlined by Jason's announcement that he will take Medea home as his wife *with her consent* (τὴν μὲν ἐγὼν ἐθέλουσαν ἀνάξομαι οἴκαδ' ἄκοιτιν / κουριδίην, 4.194-5).

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[332] Lacey's article is concerned with Homeric marriage practices; these are, however, relevant to the *Argonautica* since Apollonius consciously evokes Homeric epic as his setting.
[333] On the customs involved see Just (1989).
[334] This is also a point that she will make several times in Euripides' *Medea*; e.g.: αὐτὴ δὲ πατέρα καὶ δόμους προδοῦσ' ἐμοὺς (483). The protection afforded by the κύριος will be examined shortly in the discussion of Medea's actions towards her brother, Apsyrtus.

The distorted process that is undertaken also results in Aeetes not receiving the δῶρα that he should from the suitor, Jason. In fact, it could even be argued that by helping Jason to acquire the Golden Fleece against the wishes of her father (4.123-73), Medea effectively forces Aeetes into giving such a gift (which would constitute a perverse dowry) to Jason. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that after Jason has formally proposed to her, Medea takes the Argonauts to steal the Fleece αὐτοσχεδόν (4.101). That these events occur consecutively implies a degree of causation.

The fundamental point, then, is that in contracting her own marriage by bypassing the role of her κύριος, Aeetes, in addition to other perversions of the custom, Medea betrays her natal *oikos*. In this way, Medea and Jason's illegitimate betrothal is a paradigm case of Seaford's 'problems of marriage', where 'marriage or sexual union represents a danger to the girl's family of origin'.[335] But, of course, Medea's destruction of her natal *oikos* does not cease here, for she is also involved with the death of her brother. It is to this point that I shall now turn.

When the Colchians learn of Medea's elopement and the Argonauts' theft of the Golden Fleece, Medea's brother, Apsyrtus, raises an army in pursuit. The Argonauts seek refuge on two sacred islands, and negotiations ensue as a result. It is decided that Jason may be allowed to keep the Fleece, but that Medea should be left behind for one of the kings to judge whether or not she should be returned to her father (4.339-49). Dismayed, Medea calls on Jason's oaths and succeeds in convincing him to take her home with him (4.355-409). Jason proposes, and Medea agrees, to lure Apsyrtus into a trap and kill him, thus throwing the Colchian forces into disarray and allowing them to escape (4.411-20). When Medea has enticed her brother into

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[335] On this, see the many (mainly tragic) examples that are produced in Seaford (1990), 153-65.

coming to see her alone, Jason strikes the fatal blow (4.452-67). Medea's full

complicity in her brother's murder, then, is clear.[336]

This significance of this act has been examined by Jan Bremmer, who notes, initially,

that it is present in all the Greek myths involving Medea, but without sufficient

explanation.[337] He then examines Greek sibling relationships and shows that the bond

between brother and sister was especially close.[338] Sisters would be friends, but, as

equals, they could not affect each other's lives; similarly, brothers would be potential

rivals for status within the *polis*, which would limit their closeness. A brother,

however, would be responsible for his sister (a κύριος), while she would be

dependent on him; this, then, is a bond of obligation. Medea's part in the death of her

brother brutally symbolises again not just her rejection, but also her destruction of

her natal *oikos*.[339]

Though he demonstrates the great significance of the murder, Bremmer notes that

this does not answer the question of its meaning.[340] In the light of my argument, I

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[336] Bremmer (1997), 84n.2 notes that Apollonius stresses Medea's 'strong … implicat[ion]' in the murder by her dress becoming stained with her brother's blood (4.474). It is perhaps of interest to note that, in murdering her brother, Medea breaks the mould of the epic maenad: Schlesier (1993: 102) states explicitly that 'unlike their epic predecessors, tragic characters who follow the maenadic model usually become murderers, either of their mates or of their male children'. (Andromache, of course, demonstrated her warrior-like behaviour by merely offering military advice to Hector (*Il*. 6.431-4).) It is notable, then, that Medea displays the characteristics of Schlesier's (1993: 99) tragic maenadic model, which occurs particularly in three contexts: 'the killing of kin; war; and love'. This would suggest either that the models of epic and tragic maenads require further refinement in the light of maenadic Medea's case, or that in his portrayal Apollonius creates a synthesis of the two. Of course, the issue is made more complex by the fact that Euripides' Medea is evoked in Apollonius' protagonist towards the end of *Argonautica* Book 3 and the entirety of Book 4. (On this, see the discussion below.) This question cannot be answered here, but is a promising further avenue of discussion.
[337] Bremmer (1993), 88.
[338] Bremmer (1993), 99-100.
[339] Bremmer (1993), 100: '[b]y killing her brother Medea not only committed the heinous act of spilling familial blood, she permanently severed all ties to her natal home and the role that it would normally play in her adult life. Through Apsyrtus' murder, she simultaneously declared her independence from her family and forfeited the right to any protection from it.'
[340] Bremmer (1993), 100: '[t]his is not to say that the meaning of the murder is altogether crystal clear even now.'

would contest that it is a maenadic expression, announced initially by the sunbeam simile's ἔθυιεν, which complements Medea's destruction of her natal *oikos*.

Of course, Medea will famously also murder her children, and I believe that it is also the case that the Dionysiac metaphor points forward in the myth to Medea's destruction of the conjugal *oikos* in this way.[341] Such a future is, in fact, explicitly foreshadowed in the *Argonautica*; as soon as Medea sets sail with the Argonauts, Apollonius states that Hera causes the wind to blow ὄφρ' ὤκιστα κακὸν Πελίαο δόμοισιν / Αἰαίη Μήδεια Πελασγίδα γαῖαν ἵκηται ('so that Aeaean Medea might reach the Pelasgian land as quickly as possible to be a bane to the house of Pelias', 4.242-3).[342]

To show Medea's destruction of her conjugal *oikos*, it is necessary to return to the *Iliad* and Andromache, and to examine Seaford's argument that the destruction of the household can be expressed in the negation of the wedding ritual.[343] Homer narrates Andromache's actions after she has rushed to the battlements upon hearing of Hector's death (22.467-72):

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[341] In reality, there is more of a fluid relation between the natal and the conjugal *oikos*. Seaford (1990), 151-2 describes how the continuity is maintained by the conjunction of two households with a marriage — an 'elaborately symbolic removal of the bride from her parental home in a cart to the home of her husband'. Marriage can thus be viewed as a process, involving both natal and conjugal families, leading to the *telos* of a successful transition and the production of worthy children. In this process, Medea defaults at the beginning with her fleeing her natal *oikos*, killing her brother, and perverting the wedding ceremony. This sets the pattern that will continue once she travels to Iolkos with Jason.

[342] The relationship between Apollonius' version of the myth and that of others was discussed in Chapter Two. The other most notable examples of the Medea myth are Euripides' eponymous tragedy and Pindar's *Pythian* 4. For the relations between these and the *Argonautica* see Hunter (1989) 12-21 and (1993), 123-4. On Euripides, Hunter (1993: 123): 'The action of Euripides' tragedy hangs over the epic like a cloud about to burst, so that the later poem becomes almost an explanatory commentary on the terrible events of the drama.' Cf. n.212 (above) for another Apollonian foreshadowing of Euripides' Medea's actions. Also, on the relation of Apollonian Medea's murder of Apsyrtus to Euripidean Medea's multiple murders, see Hunter (1987), 130-1. For general comments on the relation between Apollonius' and Euripides' psychological depiction of Medea, see Zanker (1987), 199-201.

[343] Seaford (1993), 121-5.

ἤριπε δ' ἐξοπίσω, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσε.
τῆλε δ' ἀπὸ κρατὸς βάλε δέσματα σιγαλόεντα,
ἄμπυκα κεκρύφαλόν τε ἰδὲ πλεκτὴν ἀναδέσμην
κρήδεμνόν θ', ὅ ῥά οἱ δῶκε χρυσῆ Ἀφροδίτη
ἤματι τῶι, ὅτε μιν κορυθαίολος ἠγάγεθ' Ἕκτωρ
ἐκ δόμου Ἠετίωνος, ἐπεὶ πόρε μυρία ἕδνα.

She fell backwards, and breathed forth her *psuche*.
And far off she threw the glittering headband from her head,
the diadem and the hair-net and the woven band
and the veil, which golden Aphrodite had given her
on that day, when Hector of the shining helmet led her
from the house of Eëtion, and gave her numberless wedding-gifts.

Reverting to her memories of the time before their marriage, Andromache then recounts the hope and promise that was held in store for them (22.477-84), before moving on to state how she is now completely abandoned (22.483) and imagining Astyanax's miserable fate as an orphan (22.487-505). Seaford argues that by reversing the initial aims of the wedding (the promise of an unblemished future and the production of worthy heirs) and by explicitly dwelling on a future full of misery, the wedding ritual itself is negated. Crucially, it is in this light of the destruction of the *oikos* that the Dionysiac metaphor is employed.

I now move to examine this trait in Medea's portrayal in the *Argonautica*. The simile quoted below, which appears 100 lines before the sunbeam simile, is, I believe, of great relevance on this point (3.656-64):[344]

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[344] I would suggest that it is not coincidence that this simile appears only five lines after Medea is described pacing her room ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (3.651). I have argued previously in this chapter that there is a connection between this passage and the sunbeam simile, owing to the use of the formula in both, and I think that the following point can only reinforce this.
It should be noted in passing that Fränkel proposed that lines 660-1 be transposed to follow 657; for his arguments see Fränkel (1950), 123-5; for comment and further bibliography, see Hunter (1989), 170.

ὡς δ' ὅτε τις νύμφη θαλερὸν πόσιν ἐν θαλάμοισι
μύρεται, ᾧ μιν ὅπασσαν ἀδελφεοὶ ἠὲ τοκῆες,[345]
οὐδέ τί πω πάσαις ἐπιμίσγεται ἀμφιπόλοισιν
αἰδοῖ ἐπιφροσύνῃ τε, μυχῷ δ' ἀχέουσα θαάσσει,
τὸν δέ τις ὤλεσε μοῖρα, πάρος ταρπήμεναι ἄμφω
δήνεσιν ἀλλήλων· ἡ δ' ἔνδοθι δαιομένη περ
σῖγα μάλα κλαίει χῆρον λέχος εἰσορόωσα,
μή μιν κερτομέουσαι ἐπιστοβέωσι γυναῖκες –
τῇ ἰκέλη Μήδεια κινύρετο.

Just as when a bride weeps in her bedroom for her youthful husband,
to whom her brothers and parents have given her,
and she does not yet mix with all the handmaidens
out of shame and prudence, but in the corner grieving she sits,
a certain [husband] whom fate has killed, before both could delight
in each other's counsels, and although burning within
when beholding her widowed bed, she cries quite silently,
lest the women taunt and scoff at her –
like her did Medea lament.

This simile is important in understanding Medea's attitude toward Jason, and as such
there are many scholarly treatments.[346] Since my purpose here is to examine Medea
through the maenadic lens as a destroyer of her conjugal *oikos*, I will only focus on
what this passage can contribute to my argument.

In the simile, Medea is compared to a bride mourning her new husband, who has
recently died on the battlefield, meaning that their marriage has not been fulfilled.[347]
By envisaging herself as the νύμφη in the simile with Jason as her πόσις, and by
imagining the failure of their marriage owing to the death of the husband in battle,

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[345] The fact that in this simile Medea imagines that she has been given away to Jason with the formal blessings of her brothers and parents only serves to highlight the antithesis that is the reality of her self-contracted marriage. The idealised image also cements Apsyrtus' position as κύριος, and thus strengthens my argument that, in her actions, Medea destroys her natal *oikos*. (On this see above.)

[346] The most important of these are summarised, with bibliography, by Hunter (1989) *ad loc*. Briefly, it is not made explicit whether or not the marriage has taken place. If it has not, then the girl has been pledged to the husband, who has died before their marriage day. In this way, the marriage will never be consummated and the girl has moved straight to widowhood. If the marriage has taken place, then the husband has died a very short time afterwards, and before they could raise children. Hunter favours the second of these alternatives, though neither interpretation is crucial for my argument.

[347] There are significant parallels here with Jason's encounter with Cyzicus, the king of the Doliones, in *Arg*. 1.936-1077. Cyzicus is newly wed to Cleite, and the two have not yet had children. The king welcomes the Argonauts with a banquet before they set sail again. An unfavourable wind, however, causes them to return to the island during the night. Confusion results in the two armies fighting and Jason inadvertently killing Cyzicus, meaning that, as Medea imagines herself in the simile, the husband dies in battle before his marriage can produce worthy heirs.

Medea symbolically negates their marriage before it has even occurred. In her imagined future, she weeps bitterly (3.662) and laments (3.664) Jason's death in just the same way as Andromache in the *Iliad* (22.477, 515). I would suggest, therefore, that this simile portrays the negation of the wedding, which itself is emblematic of the destruction of the conjugal *oikos*, and which Seaford has shown to be a crucial in the portrayal of the epic maenad.[348]

In the last part of this chapter, I have posited that ἔθυιεν is a Dionysiac metaphor, and then examined Medea through the maenadic lens. It has been shown that her actions fulfil all the maenadic criteria, not least in her repeated destruction of the *oikos*. I believe, then, that the maenad image in the sunbeam simile, which I have argued portrays the decision-making process, points forward to Medea's betrayal both within Apollonius' section of the myth and beyond. In this way, then, Apollonius adopts and furthers a specific poetic model in the portrayal of Medea.

V. Concluding remarks

This chapter has argued for a new interpretation of the sunbeam simile, which establishes it as a piece of psychological imagery. I then showed that that imagery incorporates what I have defined as cognitive universals, before detailing some of the culturally specific literary manifestations of those universals. I shall now move on to the next important piece of imagery to be analysed in this thesis.

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[348] For the Apollonian foreshadowing of the destruction of the conjugal *oikos*, which is played out in Euripides' *Medea*, see n.341 (above).

4

THE GADFLY

This chapter will look at another piece of imagery that I think has a psychological component and that is important in both the *Argonautica* and the wider literary tradition: the gadfly. I shall examine the associated imagery as a manifestation of erotic frenzy, and argue that, in a similar manner to that of the sunbeam in the previous chapter, certain parts of the imagery, notably external, physical, and visible movement, inform conceptions of internal states of mind. In doing so, I shall argue again that the underlying imagery conforms to certain cognitive universal patterns for the way in which the emotion is understood, constructed, represented, and expressed. And, at the same time, I shall show that, as a culturally specific folk and poetic model, gadfly imagery has an established history, which is adopted and furthered by Apollonius.

There are two instances of such imagery in the *Argonautica*. I shall analyse the first of these (Heracles and the loss of Hylas, 1.1263-72), draw certain cognitive and cultural conclusions (involving an important intertext at *Od*. 22.292-309), and then analyse the second Apollonian gadfly scene (Eros' descent from Olympus and his consequent shooting of Medea, 3.275-9) in the light of these. This investigation will begin, however, with a brief overview of the gadfly in Greek literature and mythology, so as to contextualise Apollonius' use.

I. Gadfly as poetic topos

The two instances of μύωψ/οἶστρος[349] imagery in the *Argonautica* both conform to the poetic *topos* of the erotic sting.[350] Examples of divinely induced erotic madness via the gadfly's sting are prevalent in the literary cannon; one such passage is the choral *makarismos* in Euripides' *Iphigenia at Aulis* (543-51):

> μάκαρες οἳ μετρίας θεοῦ
> μετά τε σωφροσύνας μετέ-
> σχον λέκτρων Ἀφροδίτας,
> γαλανείαι χρησάμενοι
> μαινομένων οἴστρων, ὅθι δὴ
> δίδυμ' ὁ χρυσοκόμας Ἔρως
> τόξ' ἐντείνεται χαρίτων,
> τὸ μὲν ἐπ' εὐαίωνι πότμωι,
> τὸ δ' ἐπὶ συγχύσει βιοτᾶς.

> Blessed are they who with moderation
> and self-control where the goddess is concerned
> share in the couch of Aphrodite,
> experiencing the calm absence
> of mad passion's sting. In love
> twofold are the arrows of pleasure
> golden-haired Eros sets on his bowstring,
> the one to give us a blessed fate,
> the other to confound our life.   [Tr. Kovacs]

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[349] Both terms are used by Apollonius; in the example from Book 1, we find μύωπι opening the simile at 1265 and οἴστρῳ closing it at 1269. This implies that the terms are synonymous, which is corroborated by the narrator's comment at the second passage: οἶστρος … / ὅν τε μύωπα βοῶν κλείουσι νομῆες (3.276-7). This is also the opinion of Hunter (1989: 128): 'classical and Hellenistic poets did not distinguish between οἶστρος and μύωψ'. Beavis (1988: 226), in an exhaustive examination of the terminology, states that the earliest authority for regarding μύωψ and οἶστρος as synonyms is Aeschylus *Supp.* 307-8, where the king's use of μύωψ is corrected by the chorus: {Βα.} βοηλάτην μύωπα κινητήριον. / {Χο.} οἶστρον καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν οἱ Νείλου πέλας. (It should be noted that the text and attribution of lines is disputed; cf. Page's OCT (1972) and West's Teubner (1990).) Thomas (1982: 83) suggests that Apollonius is following a tradition invented by Callimachus, who wrote <οἶστρον> βουσόον ὅν τε μύωπα βοῶν καλέουσιν ἀμορβοί (Hecale fr. 301.) and is therefore playfully inverting the Aeschylean order. On the validity of this conjecture, see Thomas (1982), 83n.11; and Hollis (2009), 303. Lennox (1980: 66-7), in a somewhat bizarre reading, charges Apollonius with inverting the Aeschylean order, while at the same time, accusing him of plagiarising Callimachus. Quite how the Callimachean reference fits in with this is not clear to me. On this final point, see also Thomas (1982), 83n.11.
Other sources do differentiate between οἶστρος and μύωψ, however: see the Apollonian scholiast at 1.1265; Aristotle *Hist. an.* 490a19-21, 528b31-2, 596b14; Aelian 4.51, 6.37; and scholiasts on *Od.* 22.299 and Theocritus 6.28a. For ease of reference, Wellmann (1891: 344-6) has succinctly arranged and analysed the relevant scholia. Thomas (1982), 81-2 also has detailed arguments for concluding that the two could be distinguishable entities.
For the purposes of this discussion, I shall regard the two as synonymous and translate both as gadfly.
[350] Knox (1922: 42): 'οἶστρος and compounds … are applied to any maddening impulse, especially love.' For more discussion see Davies & Kathirithamby (1986), 159-64 and Beavis (1988), 225-29.

Another relevant example is the myth of Io, who was driven mad when Hera sent the gadfly to hound her over the earth; quoted below are the relevant Aeschylean passages:[351]

<div align="center">

ἆ ἆ, ἒ ἔ·
χρίει τίς αὖ με τὰν τάλαιναν **οἶστρος**　　　(*PV*, 566f.)

</div>

Oh! Oh! Ah! Ah!
A gadfly is stinging me again, wretched me!

εὐθὺς δὲ μορφὴ καὶ φρένες διάστροφοι
ἦσαν, κεραστὶς δ', ὡς ὁρᾶτ', ὀξυστόμῳ
μύωπι χρισθεῖσ' ἐμμανεῖ σκιρτήματι
ἦσσον πρὸς εὔποτόν τε Κερχνείας ῥέος
Λέρνης τε κρήνην·　　　(*PV*, 673-7)

Immediately my body and *phrenes* were twisted.
I grew horns, as you now see, I was pricked
by the sharp sting of the gadfly, and with maddened
leaps, I rushed off to the stream of Cerchnea, good to
drink from, and the spring of Lerna.

<div align="center">

οἰστροπλὴξ δ' ἐγὼ
μάστιγι θείᾳ γῆν πρὸ γῆς ἐλαύνομαι.　　　(*PV*, 681-2)

</div>

but I, harassed by the gadfly,
as if by a divine scourge, have been driven from land to land

<div align="center">

ἔνθεν Ἰὼ
οἴστρῳ ἐρεσσομένα
φεύγει ἁμαρτίνοος…　　　(*Supp*. 540-2)

</div>

from whence Io,
driven by the gadfly
fled in frenzy…

<div align="right">

[Tr. Sommerstein]

</div>

The mental frenzy described in these passages should be borne in mind during the analysis of the subsequent examples from the *Argonautica*.[352]

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[351] In addition to *Supp*. 307-8 (quoted above), other examples from the tragedians that illustrate extreme frenzy are Eur. *Ba*. 664-5. (αἳ τῆσδε γῆς / οἴστροισι λευκὸν κῶλον ἐξηκόντισαν, 'who darted from this land with their white limbs in madness'), and Soph. *Trach*. 1253-4. (πρόσθες, ὡς πρὶν ἐμπεσεῖν / σπαραγμὸν ἤ τιν' οἶστρον ἐς πυράν με θῇς, 'lay me on the pyre, before the tearing of the gadfly falls upon me').

II. The Hylas episode

I shall now turn to analyse the first gadfly simile, that from *Argonautica* Book 1. This occurs in a frenetic sequence of narrative that packs two important similes into its fifty lines. The passage describes Hylas' abduction by a water nymph and the subsequent attempts at his rescue by Polyphemus and Heracles, respectively. I shall show that the two separate similes that detail the movement of Polyphemus and Heracles in their search for Hylas, when viewed as pieces of psychological imagery, are illustrative of Apollonius' conception of his characters' mental states. Since the scene is long, I have placed the full Greek text in Appendix Three, and summarise the events below.

The Argonauts have landed at Mysia, where they have been given food and wine by the locals. As a camp is established and a meal prepared (1180-6), Heracles goes off into the forest to fashion for himself a new oar, having recently broken his previous one while rowing (1164-71). At the same time, his squire, Hylas, goes to find a spring for water so that he may prepare Heracles' evening meal (1207-10).[353] Hylas comes across a suitable spring (1221-2), from which a water nymph notices him and is immediately infatuated (1229-33).[354] As Hylas dips his water pitcher into the

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[352] These Aeschylean gadfly passages receive only a brief mention in Sansone (1975: 9). For discussion on the gadfly in tragedy, see Padel (1992), 120-2, with references.

[353] Immediately prior to the events detailed below, Apollonius, in a brief parenthesis, recounts how Heracles came to acquire Hylas: abduction as an infant, following the murder of the child's father, Theiodamas, in a quarrel that Heracles instigated over an ox (1211-19). The background of Heracles' acquiring of Hylas is important, since it will form the backdrop for his loss of him. Hunter (1993: 37-41) recounts the traditional myth in which Heracles with his son, Hyllos, meets the king, who refuses to feed the boy at Heracles' request. In retaliation, Heracles kills and eats one of Theiodamas' oxen, which causes a war, in which Heracles is victorious, and leaves with Hylas. Thus, ironically, Heracles' hunger causes both his acquiring of Hylas, by starting the war, and his loss of him, as the trip the boy undertakes to find water for his master's meal leads to him being captured by the nymph. Clauss (1993: 178): 'Apollonius has Heracles reenact the occupation and suffering of the man he victimized.' For full discussion of the 'reversals' in the Hylas narrative, see Hunter (above).

[354] Apollonius states the psychological effect that Hylas has on the nymph in terms of Aphrodite causing movement (here a fluttering) in her *phrenes*, and her inability to gather together her *thumos*: τῆς δὲ φρένας ἐπτοίησε / Κύπρις, ἀμηχανίῃ δὲ μόλις συναγείρατο θυμόν (1232-3). (The verb συναγείρω is also found in conjunction with ψυχή at Plato *Phaedo* 67c8, while πτοέω will be examined later, in the light of more occurrences.) In this passage we see, again, that psychological organs are instrumental in the conception of emotional events. Also, it should be noted (for a

spring, the nymph pulls him into the swirling water (1234-9).

Apollonius states that Polyphemus was the only one to hear Hylas' cry (1240-1), and that he rushes towards it (1243), being compared to a wild beast that hungrily goes after the bleating of the sheep (1243-9). He is then described as drawing his sword and pursuing the cry, while hypothesizing what might have happened to the boy (1250-2).[355] Polyphemus then meets Heracles on the path and outlines these hypotheses: that bandits have attacked Hylas, or that beasts are tearing him apart (1253-60). Apollonius describes the physiological effect that Polyphemus' words have on Heracles (1261-2),[356] and then the latter throws down the tree he is carrying and runs away, darting down whichever path his legs take (1263-4). In the subsequent simile (1265-9), Heracles is compared to a gadfly-stung bull that charges forth leaving the meadows and marshes, paying no attention to the herdsmen, and that sometimes continues without stopping, and at other times stops and bellows. In this way, Apollonius states (1270-2), Heracles at some times ran quickly, and at others stopped and shouted into the distance.

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subsequent discussion) that the emotion is envisaged as a force that comes upon the recipient from an external agent.

[355] In his OCT (1961), Fränkel proposes that lines 1250-2 be transposed so that they follow 1242. (See also Fränkel (1968), 146-7) Fränkel, followed by Erbse (1963: 230-4) and Lawall (1966: 127n.15), believe that αἶψα (1250), which describes Polyphemus' reaction to the cry in the narrative, is out of place in the traditional order of the text where it follows the simile (1243-9). It is argued that 1250-2, describing Polyphemus drawing his sword and running off, should be his instant reaction, which the simile of the wild beast chasing after the flock then picks up. I do not agree with this transposition, because I think that the simile, coming where it does in the traditional line order, already has this point of contact with the narrative: Polyphemus βῆ δὲ μεταΐξας Πηγέων σχεδόν (1243); in addition, I agree with Phinney (1967: 331n.19) that the traditional order highlights another crucially important point of contact: '[t]he simile comparing Polyphemus to a frustrated lion … *better illustrates his emotional derangement* than his desire to drive off possible attackers with a sword'. (My italics. This facet of the simile will be important for my argument.) Fränkel's transposition, in addition to not being required by any mechanical failing, would, I believe, detract from this crucial point. Arguing against the transposition, Phinney (1967: 331n.19) notes that a precedent is set at 1.1221 for Apollonius' use of the adverb 'to announce and resume the action after an interruption in the narrative'. Finally, I would add that the duplication of events in the narrative (Polyphemus described as running on two occasions which frame the simile) serves to emphasize the moment of panic as he hears the cry.

[356] Two symptoms are listed: sweating (τῷ δ' ἀίοντι κατὰ κροτάφων ἅλις ἱδρώς / κήκιεν, 1261-2) and the boiling of dark blood within (ἂν δὲ κελαινὸν ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ζέεν αἷμα, 1262). Both symptoms, then, involve fluids, both externally and internally, respectively. I have already shown in Chapter Two that sweating is a standard erotic symptom, and this should be borne in mind for the subsequent discussion on the relationship of Heracles and Hylas.

The presence of the *Abbruch* at the beginning of the passage (1220-1) and the scene change at the end (1273) serve to mark the chosen section off as an isolated unit, which invites the kind of self-contained analysis that I will now conduct.[357]

From the outline above, it is clear that there is a high degree of formalism in the passage, which is formed of three separate, but linked, episodes. Hylas moves to the spring, where his presence affects the water nymph, who pulls him into the water, causing him to cry out (1221-39).[358] As Polyphemus moves down the path he hears the cry and is prompted to rush towards it (1240-2). This movement elicits a simile comparing him to a wild beast going after the flock (1243-9). During the course of his search, Polyphemus comes across Heracles, who himself is moving back to the camp (1250-56). Having been informed of the cry (and provided with what are actually hypothetical reasons for it, 1257-60), Heracles reacts with excessive movement (1261-4), which is also described by an animal simile: here, one of a bull stung by a gadfly (1265-72). Thus, the three constituent episodes each contain two parties:

1. **Hylas** and the water nymph,
2. **Hylas (represented by his cry)** and Polyphemus,
3. **Polyphemus (reporting Hylas' cry)** and Heracles.

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[357] Levin (1971b) 111-13 has an extensive discussion about where 'the story really begin[s and] end[s]'. He notes that Heracles and Hylas are first discussed together in the Catalogue of Argonauts (1.122-32), and the last mention of Hylas comes in the form of a Heracles/Hylas-narrative 'appendix' at 1.1348ff., where Heracles threatens to devastate the future Mysian city, built by Polyphemus, if its inhabitants do not discover and report Hylas' fate. This is relevant as background for 1.1221-72, which, as will be shown, constitutes the main Heracles/Hylas narrative.

[358] Upon hearing the cry, Polyphemus suspects that either wild beasts have attacked Hylas (μή πως ἢ θήρεσσιν ἕλωρ πέλοι, 1252), or he has been ambushed and captured by a foreign party (ἠέ μιν ἄνδρες / μοῦνον ἐόντ' ἐλόχησαν, ἄγουσι δὲ ληΐδ' ἑτοίμην, 1252-3). These hypotheses inform his search and are also passed on to Heracles (1257-60). Beye (1982: 96) argues that since the two are 'men of violent action' such suspicions are in character; however, he argues it is just as likely that Hylas' cry was, in fact, one of ecstasy upon the 'soft, sensual, graceful, quiet, sinuous happenings which brought Hylas under the water in the nymph's embrace'. (Effe (2008: 211) is typical of the standard interpretation that Hylas is being raped by the nymphs.) While worth considering, since my examination focuses on the effect of Hylas' cry (whatever the emotion of its origin) on Polyphemus and Heracles, this point is effectively moot.

In each scene, the first character (in bold type), by moving into the presence of the second, elicits a response in the latter of further movement. Additionally, the link between scenes is, on both occasions, Hylas' cry: first, the cry itself, and, secondly, Polyphemus' report of it. Hurst (1967: 129-30) suggests some additional symmetry with regard to what I have termed the second and third episodes. With the aid of a diagram, he states that the Polyphemus episode ((1240) cris ⇒ course ⇒ (1248) comparaison) is mirrored by that of Heracles ((1265) comparaison ⇒ course ⇒ (1272) cris). This is a good observation that highlights the degree of chiastic ring-composition in the narrative, but the point can, I think, be strengthened when it is noted that Polyphemus runs both before (1243) and after (1250) his simile; while, similarly, in addition to running at 1271-2, Heracles ἐς δὲ κέλευθον / τὴν θέεν ᾗ πόδες αὐτοὶ ὑπέκφερον ἀίσσοντα (1263-4) before his simile (1265-70). Perhaps, to tighten his symmetrical argument, Hurst neglects the movement of Polyphemus at 1250 and Heracles at 1264-5. But these instances, I would argue, cannot be overlooked, as Apollonius uses the excessive movement of his characters as the points of narrative departure and return for both of the animal similes.[359] The lengthy descriptions of movement in this passage—both within the physical realms of the narrative, and in the ekphrastic world of the similes—will be crucial for my interpretation.

II.i ROMANTIC LIAISONS

Before examining the similes in detail, it is necessary briefly to explore the relationships between Hylas, Polyphemus, and Heracles. Scholars have fixated upon this question; however, I need only touch upon it since some use these relationships to question the reactions of Polyphemus and Heracles.

The issue that divides critics is whether or not Hylas and Heracles have an emotional

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[359] Cf. n.355 (above). The case for Polyphemus here would be undone by following Fränkel's transposition. The multiple points of contact between narrative and simile will be discussed in greater detail below.

and sexual relationship, or if, following another branch of the myth, Polyphemus has been given this role and Heracles acts in more of a parental capacity. The extent of Hylas and Heracles' relationship, as recounted by Apollonius, has been given at 1.1207-11:

> Τόφρα δ' Ὕλας χαλκέῃ σὺν κάλπιδι νόσφιν ὁμίλου
> δίζητο κρήνης ἱερὸν ῥόον, ὥς κέ οἱ ὕδωρ
> φθαίη ἀφυσσάμενος ποτιδόρπιον, ἄλλα τε πάντα
> ὀτραλέως κατὰ κόσμον ἐπαρτίσσειεν ἰόντι.
> δὴ γάρ μιν τοίοισιν ἐν ἤθεσιν αὐτὸς ἔφερβε...

> Meanwhile Hylas went off apart from the crew with a bronze pitcher
> looking for the spring of a sacred stream, so that he might
> draw water for the evening meal before [Heracles] came back, and get
> all the other things appropriately ready and in order for his coming.
> For in such customs had [Heracles] raised him...

On the basis that nothing more is mentioned than the fact that Heracles has schooled Hylas to be his manservant, scholars fall into two groups: Polyphemus and Hylas only, and Heracles (and possibly Polyphemus) and Hylas. Arguing for the first grouping, Gow (1950: 232) speaks of Apollonius' 'clumsiness' and his 'omission of any tender relation between Heracles and Hylas to account for the former's dismay'.[360] Levin (1971a: 25) occupies more of a middle ground by saying that Apollonius 'makes room for Heracles and Polyphemus both, yet never declares explicitly that either is Hylas' lover'.[361] Others gauge that Heracles must have an emotional and sexual relationship *because of* the extreme extent of his reaction, evident in the gadfly simile. Typical of this viewpoint is Mori (2008: 119): '[t]he disappearance of Hylas elicits an emotional response from Heracles that suggests the passionate quality of his attachment'.[362]

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[360] In his commentary, Gow is at pains to promote Theocritus' version of the myth as superior to Apollonius'. His partisan interpretation should thus be borne in mind. Nevertheless, he is supported in this reading by Vian (1974), 41; Dover (1978),199; and finally Hutchinson (1988), 192ff., who does not believe that Heracles acts out of *eros*.

[361] Similarly, Knight (1995), 93.

[362] Also Lawall (1966), 127n.14; Phinney (1967), 332; White (1980), 65; Zanker (1979), 56; Beye (1982), 94; Nyberg (1992), 71; Hunter (1993a), 38-9; and Clauss (1993), 195. Blumberg (1931: 25) also notes that Polyphemus is, in one tradition, Heracles' brother-in-law, which provides the former with a dramatically plausible reason for concern even if he were not himself erotically engaged with

I cannot see why Heracles would react in the way that he does if he did not have close emotional ties to Hylas, and so I would side with the latter camp.[363] However, my interest lies in the imagery that Apollonius uses to describe the mental processes (including the emotions) of his characters, and what that imagery can reveal about their psychological state, and so while the mere fact that there is a reaction for both Polyphemus and Heracles, described with separate similes, is enough for this study, I also think that the imagery supports this interpretation.[364] And it is to these reactions and similes that I shall now turn.

II.ii Varying reactions

Polyphemus and Heracles have thematically similar reactions to the loss of Hylas:[365] both experience an emotional turmoil, which presents itself in the form of shouting (Polyphemus: 1248-9, Heracles: 1271-2) and physical movement (Polyphemus: 1243, 1249, 1250; Heracles: 1263-4, 1271-2) when conducting their respective searches. However, broad similarities exhaust the comparison, for the manner in which they each conduct their actions is very different.

Polyphemus reacts to the emergency in a comparatively reasoned fashion. Apollonius states that he moves *towards* the spring, from where the cry emanates (βῆ

Hylas. (This 'obscure tradition', in which Polyphemus is married to Heracles' sister, Laonome, is also attested to by Grimal (1986), 383.)

[363] Additionally, it is also to be expected that the audience supply knowledge that they can be expected to possess (such as an erotic relationship between Heracles and Hylas) when receiving a new text; in this, I would also follow White (1979: 68) in that Apollonius' narrative behaviour here is typical of his genre: '[w]e may conclude therefore that … Apollonius follows the normal Alexandrian technique, in that he does not say explicitly that Hylas was Heracles' ἐρώμενος … [B]y not explicitly mentioning the well-known love-relationship between Heracles and Hylas, Apollonius has complied with one of the fundamental rules of Hellenistic poetry'. The idea that Hylas acts as θεράπων to Heracles is, of course, reminiscent of Achilles' relationship with Patroclus in the *Iliad*: another instance of a relationship that is not explicitly stated as sexual. Despite the lack of authorial comment, however, sources such as Plato (*Sym.* 179e-180a) show that the erotic interpretation was common in this period. Within the *Argonautica*, Zeus and Ganymede have a (seemingly) similar relationship (3.114-17).

[364] Lawall (1966: 127n.14) believes Apollonius too is more concerned with effect than cause: '[w]hat interests Apollonius is Heracles' insane reaction: the conversion of man into beast'.

[365] Nyberg (1992: 72): 'both Heracles and Polyphemus are transformed by their erotic despair into something subhuman'.

δὲ μεταΐξας Πηγέων σχεδόν, 1243), and, as he stops at the spot, his shouts are intended to locate Hylas (ἀμφὶ δὲ χῶρον / φοίτα κεκληγώς, 1248-9).[366] Finally, as has already been mentioned, in imagining that Hylas has been preyed upon by wild animals or ambushed and abducted by men (1251-2), Polyphemus hypothesises what may have happened. Even though these are not actually correct, and he is guilty of passing them on as fact to Heracles (1259-60), his logical reasoning in forming them in the first instance shows a degree of control over the situation.[367] These actions, then, constitute a rational reaction to the current situation.

Contrast this with Heracles. Immediately upon hearing the news, he experiences an extreme physiological reaction both externally in the form of profuse sweating (κατὰ κροτάφων ἅλις ἱδρώς / κήκιεν, 1261-2), and internally in the boiling over of the dark blood of his innards (ἂν δὲ κελαινὸν ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ζέεν αἷμα, 1262).[368] He is filled with grief and a desperate desire to find the boy. Such an automatic response is a typical symptom of erotic frenzy and sets the pattern for

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[366] Noted by Clauss (1993), 195.

[367] At first glance, it could be argued that Heracles' manic reaction is influenced by, and results from, Polyphemus' (incorrect) pronouncement on the fate of Hylas. However, the chain of events actually serves to heighten the veracity of my comparison between the two, since Polyphemus informing Heracles ensures that they both believe that the same thing has happened to Hylas: they both act according to the same information.

[368] Such a description, I think, strengthens my argument that the external and visible informs the conception of the internal and invisible. Again, we see here a standard container metaphor, to use Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) terminology, where the person is a vessel in which psychological events occur. Furthermore, as Lakoff and Kövecses (1987) have shown, Heracles' reaction here, which is in part motivated by anger, conforms to the cognitive model of anger as examined in American English. This is that of a hot fluid within a container, which can heat up, causing pressure to build up, and eventually burst out. (Cf: similar imagery in Arist. *DA* 403a31 ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ.) Kövecses (2000), 65-8 shows, in turn, that this is a subset of the larger conceptual metaphor: EMOTION IS PRESSURE INSIDE A CONTAINER. His analysis is worth quoting in full, since it is strikingly pertinent to Heracles' reaction (66): 'In this metaphor complex [EMOTION IS PRESSURE INSIDE A CONTAINER], the level of the emotion substance may go up inside the container; if it does, the substance creates perceivable pressure on the container; the pressure may increase to the point that the substance goes out of the container. In other words, when there is very little substance in the container, the pressure is low and thus emotion is at a low intensity; when the substance rises, this corresponds to an increase in emotional intensity; the pressure itself corresponds to the emotion causing the self to respond; the pressure's bringing about an effect corresponds to the emotion's leading to a response; and the substance going out of the container corresponds to some external behavior (response) by the self, or, alternatively, the substance not going out of the container corresponds to the lack of response.' I shall return to the metaphorical structuring of emotion within the similes in due course.

Heracles' subsequent behaviour.[369] I shall argue that the subsequent simile is a piece of psychological imagery, and, in a manner similar to before, examine it from a cognitive universal as well as a culturally specific perspective.

Heracles throws his pine tree to the ground,[370] and ἐς δὲ κέλευθον / τὴν θέεν ᾗ πόδες αὐτοὶ ὑπέκφερον ἀίσσοντα (1263-4). Note that where Polyphemus had a systematised approach for finding Hylas, Heracles simply runs: the direction is not conscious or pre-determined. Apollonius describes him as frenzied (μαιμώων, 1270), and the grammatical structure with which his varying activities of running and shouting are described (ὁτέ … ὁτέ, 1270-1) reflects his vacillating actions.[371] In this respect, it is interesting to note in passing that the verb used of Heracles' movement, ἀίσσοντα (1264), is also found in the description of the vacillation of the sunbeam (ἀίσσουσα, 3.759), which I argued in Chapter Three symbolises Medea's shifting thoughts. This would support my argument that external, physical action informs the conception of internal psychological processes.[372] Finally, whereas Polyphemus' shouts were intended to locate Hylas, Heracles' seem to be driven more by the pain he feels at the boy's loss; Apollonius stresses the futility of his actions by stating that

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[369] Noted by DeForest (1994), 63; and White (1979), 64-5. As an example for excessive sweating as a symptom of love, see Sappho 31.13: †ἔκαδε μ' ἴδρως ψῦχρος κακχέεται† τρόμος δὲ / παῖσαν ἄγρει... (For more on this, see Chapter Two.)

[370] This symbolic act is seen by some as the moment that Heracles and the Argo part ways. Clare (2002: 95) views the whole simile as such: '[t]he comparison … is a simile of abandonment rather than pursuit; the emphasis is not upon the direction in which the bull is running, but rather upon all that he leaves behind'. This is heavily reminiscent of Achilles throwing down the sceptre in the assembly in *Iliad* 1. The symbolic manner in which he signalled his rejection of the community's values is matched here by Heracles' signal that he will abandon the Argonauts in favour of finding Hylas. (Such a parallel between the actions of Achilles and Heracles might also strengthen the identification between their respective sexual relationships.)

[371] The adjectives employed by scholars for Heracles' behaviour here are many and varied, but all amount to the same charge: Lawall (1966: 126-7): '[h]is reaction is instant, terrible, and grotesque … [r]ational control is eclipsed by anger … [he is] uncontrolled by reason, gone berserk'; Levin (1971b: 124): '[the search is] anguished and confused and utterly ineffectual'; Nyberg (1992: 73) '[Apollonius emphasises Heracles'] muddled wits … [and] irrational traits'; Clauss (1993: 195): 'he is … completely undone by the situation'. Calame (1992: 19) notes that Eros 'cancels out all ability to understand or to make decisions'; Green (1997: 230): 'Heracles in his loss simply becomes a mass of violent and ill-directed emotions … a huge, frantic, bellowing zombie'; Byre (2002: 32) simply labels it 'frantic'.

[372] Apollonius uses ἀίσσω in all forms thirty-two times in the *Argonautica*, a relatively large number, which does not allow me to make more than this passing point.

he shouts into the distance (τῆλε, 1272).[373]

II.ɪɪɪ The similes

My analysis thus far has focused on events described in the narrative. I want now to examine the imagery relating to Polyphemus and Heracles in order to show how it reinforces the narrative picture. First, Polyphemus (1243-9):

> βῆ δὲ μεταΐξας Πηγέων σχεδόν, ἠύτε τις θήρ
> ἄγριος, ὅν ῥά τε γῆρυς ἀπόπροθεν ἵκετο μήλων,
> λιμῷ δ' αἰθόμενος μετανίσσεται, οὐδ' ἐπέκυρσε
> ποίμνῃσιν—πρὸ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐνὶ σταθμοῖσι νομῆες
> ἔλσαν—, ὁ δὲ στενάχων βρέμει ἄσπετον, ὄφρα κάμῃσιν –
> ὣς τότ' ἄρ' Εἰλατίδης μεγάλ' ἔστενεν, ἀμφὶ δὲ χῶρον
> φοίτα κεκληγώς, μελέη δέ οἱ ἔπλετ' φωνή.

> Rushing after [the cry], he came near to Pegae, just like a wild beast,
> to which comes from afar the bleating of sheep,
> and burning with hunger, it goes after, but does not reach,
> the flocks, for beforehand the herdsmen shut them
> in their pens, and, groaning, he roars unceasingly, until weary –
> so then did the son of Eilatus groan loudly, and go to and fro
> about the place shouting out, but his shouts were in vain.

He is compared to a wild beast (θὴρ ἄγριος), who is driven by hunger (λιμῷ δ' αἰθόμενος μετανίσσεται) to go after the bleating sheep (γῆρυς … μήλων = Hylas),[374] but whose search is frustrated by the shepherds (ποίμνῃσιν = the water nymph), who shut the sheep away in their pens, resulting in the beast roaring (ὁ δὲ στενάχων βρέμει ἄσπετον). Thus, the simile springs from the narrative by comparing the speed of Polyphemus in his search to that of the beast, and returns by contrasting their respective roars and shouts. Both, then, are driven by a desire of some sort, operate in a goal-oriented manner, and are ultimately frustrated.[375] The wild beast, and thus Polyphemus', singular purpose is reflected in Apollonius' choice

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[373] Noted by Clauss (1993), 195.
[374] In these instances '=' signifies the narrative party represented by the figure in the simile. Clauss (1993: 194-5) argues that Apollonius' use of the 'hunger motif' in the simile hints that Polyphemus' 'fate [by which I assume Clauss means his ability to find Hylas] is sealed'.
[375] Corroborated by Effe (2008), 211; and Levin (1971b), 126.

of language: the only verb used of the motion of the beast itself is μετανίσομαι, meaning 'to go in quest of' (μετανίσσεται, 1245).[376] Important also is not just the fact that there is only one verb of motion, but that the verb in question necessitates an object of that quest: the bleating sheep (= Hylas).

Apollonius' choice of simile finds close parallels with Homeric lion similes.[377] Lions are often driven by physical needs: famously, Odysseus is compared to a lion, driven by hunger, in his meeting with Nausicaa at *Od*. 6.130-6, while Sarpedon's attack on the Achaean wall is compared to that of a lion driven by his *thumos* for food in the form of the sheep folds at *Il*. 12.299-308.[378]

While there exist, then, many analogies between Polyphemus in the narrative and the θήρ in the simile,[379] there are also some notable and jarring discrepancies: Polyphemus is attempting to rescue Hylas, and yet, in the simile, he is represented by the predatory aggressor (θήρ). Additionally, the nymph, who in the narrative is the aggressing party,[380] is represented by the protective shepherds (νομῆες), who

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[376] μετανίσομαι appears once in both the *Iliad* (16.779) and the *Odyssey* (9.58) in an astronomical formula with ἠέλιος. Such a formula signifies regularity. Later poets (Pind. *P*.5.8, and Eur. *Tro*.131) attest to its meaning 'pursue'. The fact that the beast's movement is only mentioned once will be an important fact when viewed in comparison with the gadfly simile, in which Heracles is a wildly fleeing bull. (See below.)

[377] Lonsdale (1990: 25) notes that lions and wild beasts are interchangeable in such similes. Also, note the Apollonian scholiast (1243-8): ἠύτε τις θήρ : κυρίος οἱ ποιταὶ τὸν λέοντά φασι θῆρα …

[378] On Odysseus, see Magrath (1982); and on Sarpedon, see Clarke (1995), 148; and Hainsworth (1993), 351-2. All these examples (and many more) are discussed by Lonsdale (1990), 39-70. He also states (35) that '[t]he motive for the animal in the similes is then used to explain the cause for human activity in the narrative'. Without using the specific terminology, Lonsdale also hints at the type of cognitive metaphor, stemming from human embodied cognition, that is of interest to this study (34-5): '[t]he parallelism between animal and human locomotion is so deeply embedded in the traditional language of the epic that even without the analogical device of the simile, animal movement is occasionally suggested by motion verbs in passages of heightened emotional activity'. For discussion of lion similes that convey a warrior's state of mind, see also Clarke (1995), 151-2.
For another prime example of a warrior frustrated in his quest and compared to a hungry lion, see the simile that describes Aias at *Il*. 11.548-57.

[379] Carspecken (1952), 88 notes that multiple points of comparison between simile and narrative are typical of Apollonius' poetic technique. This trait will also be evident in the analysis of the Heracles/gadfly simile (below).

[380] Cf. n.358 (above). We cannot know that Hylas does not go with the nymph willingly, and that his cry is of pleasure. This would obviously affect the interpretation of the analogues in the simile. Nevertheless, I think that it is fair for Polyphemus to assume foul play.

specifically protect their flock against wild beasts.[381] We must assume that Apollonius' choice of simile, and the parties within, is not a mistake—it could be viewed as an example of his self-conscious remolding of Homeric epic[382]—but the question, then, is what point is being made here?

Richard Hunter explains this part of the simile by viewing the entire Hylas episode as a 'narrative of sexual transition', in which the boy passes from the protection and education of an elder male (Heracles specifically described at 1.1207-11) to adulthood, symbolized by his erotic liaison with the nymph.[383] On this reading, the equation of the water nymph with protective shepherds gains sense: Hylas is now safer with her than with either Polyphemus or Heracles.[384] There is much to be said for this, although its scope extends beyond my current remit, and examining its claims would be a lengthy process. I should like to build an interpretation based on Effe's remarks (2008: 212) that the discrepancy with the narrative context constitutes Apollonius' 'distancing himself from the heroic idea of battle inherent in the simile … [and] direct[ing] the reader's attention to the inappropriateness of the traditional simile'.

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[381] Noted by Levin (1971a), 24; Levin (1971b), 127-8; Hunter (1993a), 39-40; and Effe (2008), 211. Broeniman (1990: 122n.289): '[t]he analogues are doubtless intended by the poet. The resumptive clause relates the simile to the roar of Polyphemus. … If only the roar was intended to be emphasised most of the simile would be without point'. (Though I agree with Broeniman here, the phrasing of the final sentence certainly begs the question.)

[382] Though (deliberate) discrepancies are apparent when viewing this simile in isolation, the imagery is congruent with that of the Heracles/gadfly simile. There, Heracles is described, via an analogy with a maddened bull (τετυμμένος … ταῦρος, 1265), as paying no attention to the herdsmen or the herd (οὐδὲ νομήων / οὐδ' ἀγέλης ὄθεται, 1266-7). This statement can only be fully understood by reading it in conjunction with the Polyphemus/wild-beast simile where the herdsmen and herd represent the water nymph and Hylas respectively. This observation shows that Apollonius' imagery is deliberate and meaningful, and that the two similes form a complementary pair. On the wider point of Apollonius' relationship with Homer, see Chapter Two. Pertinent here is Effe (2008: 220): '[t]he new epic can only be articulated as such by constant evocation of the genre's most authoritative representative—and by distancing himself from him through innovation'. The fact that Polyphemus is compared in the simile to a θήρ, and then is concerned that Hylas has been preyed upon by the very same things (μή πως ἢ θήρεσσιν ἕλωρ πέλεν, 1251) is, I think, such a possible way in which Apollonius attempts to distance himself from Homer. As well as showing the ambivalent relationships between his characters and the simile's protagonists, he is examining the degree of fit between the traditional simile and his multivalent narrative.

[383] Hunter (1993a), 36-41. Hylas' capture by a female, he argues, 'reverses a pattern of transitional homoerotic rape'. Cf. n.381 (above): the narrative of the loss of Hylas is itself full of reversals.

[384] See the comments of the Apollonian scholiast here, as well as those of Levin (1971b), 128.

Apollonius has taken a simile, the use of which has literary precedents in the frustration of a warrior in battle, and applied it to the frustration felt by Polyphemus at the ineffectiveness of his search for Hylas. I would argue that not only is the simile representative of Polyphemus' physical movement, but also of his mental state during the course of the search. In short, the rationality of his movement implies the rationality of his thought processes. As has been shown, the reaction of Polyphemus, while noteworthy in its own right, also functions as a foil for that of Heracles, while their respective similes are also complementary. As such, it makes sense to analyse the Heracles/gadfly simile now before exploring my argument that this functions as psychological imagery in greater detail (1.1265-72):

> ὡς δ' ὅτε τίς τε μύωπι τετυμμένος ἔσσυτο ταῦρος
> πείσεά τε προλιπὼν καὶ ἑλεσπίδας, οὐδὲ νομήων
> οὐδ' ἀγέλης ὄθεται, πρήσσει δ' ὁδὸν ἄλλοτ' ἄπαυστος,
> ἄλλοτε δ' ἱστάμενος καὶ ἀνὰ πλατὺν αὐχέν' ἀείρων
> ἵησιν μύκημα, κακῷ βεβολημένος οἴστρῳ –
> ὣς ὅγε μαιμώων ὁτὲ μὲν θοὰ γούνατ' ἔπαλλε
> συνεχέως, ὁτὲ δ' αὖτε μεταλλήγων καμάτοιο
> τῆλε διαπρύσιον μεγάλη βοάασκεν αὐτῇ.

> As when, stung by a gadfly, a bull darts forth,
> abandoning the meadows and the marshlands, and taking heed of
> neither the herdsmen nor the herd, at times makes its way unceasingly,
> and at others, ceasing and raising up its broad neck,
> it sends forth a roar, having been stung by a vicious gadfly –
> so, in his frenzy, at times he shook his swift knees
> continuously, and at others, ceasing from his labour,
> he shouted piercingly into the distance with a great voice.

The frenzied manner in which Heracles' physical reaction is described in the narrative is replicated in this simile comparing him to a bull (ταῦρος), which has been stung by a gadfly (μύωπι, οἴστρῳ). The sting, which represents his piqued emotional state, is both the simile's point of departure from the narrative, and its return.[385] I think that this can be seen as a piece of psychological imagery, where,

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[385] Hunter (1989), 128 notes that, through the use of the gadfly, Apollonius 'gives concrete form to the metaphorical 'frenzy' of love'. Similary, Pavlock (1990: 64): '[b]y describing Heracles in a powerful simile of a bull tormented by a gadfly, [Apollonius] emphasises the pathology of the hero's state'. On this, see my comments at the beginning of this chapter. Whereas Polyphemus' simile was one of frustration, then, the overriding sense here is one of complete mental breakdown, inspired by erotic loss, which finds expression in uncalculated and manic movement. Mori (2008: 119) states Heracles

again, from our observation of the physical and external, a metaphorical picture of the internal can be extrapolated.[386]

In stark contrast to the singular verb of directed motion used of the wild beast in the Polyphemus simile above, there are, here, within the space of three lines (1265-7) four terms of motion from which we can extrapolate a total lack of calculation: the bull darts off (ἔσσυτο), leaving behind (προλιπών) the meadows and marshland, and at times it makes its way along the path (πρήσσει δ' ὁδὸν) without stopping (ἄπαυστος). Such prominent language highlights Heracles' manic and unsystematic movement, and thus, in turn, his chaotic mental state.[387] At other times, the bull stops (ἱστάμενος), raising (ἀείρων) its head and crying out, which mirrors Heracles' occasional, directionless shouting.

Returning to the narrative, the verb describing Heracles' running is πάλλω. As I showed in the analysis in the previous chapter, in addition to the verb's primary meaning of agitated motion, there is Homeric precedent for its use in conjunction with a psychological organ (ἦτορ or καρδία) to denote extreme stress. In the sunbeam simile, it is used of the ἠελίου … αἴγλη, the fluttering of which, I argue, is symbolic of Medea's vacillating thoughts. With this is mind, then, I would see a psychological component to its use here, where it governs the continuous (συνεχέως) movement of Heracles' knees, which are themselves representative of his frenzied (μαιμώων) thoughts.

Viewing both the Polyphemus and Heracles similes as pieces of psychological

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has 'lost control', and is affected by 'erotic confusion'. On this, cf. n.371 (above). Zanker (1987), 73-4 examines the scene in terms of its 'pictorial realism'.

[386] Zanker (1979: 56) comes to a similar conclusion based on Heracles' movement: 'Heracles' physical reaction [is] an index of his emotional state in accordance with Apollonius' normal practice'. Somewhat similar is Fränkel (2002: 116): '[the simile] seems to imply that his wild scampering and yelling were more of an outlet for his feelings than a methodical search'. The cognitive analysis that I shall undertake shortly will strengthen this interpretation.

[387] The degree of motion in this simile is noted by Lawall (1966), 127; Clauss (1993), 195; Clare (2002), 94-5; and Mori (2008), 119-20.

imagery invites a comparison between the two. To cast what has been discussed thus far in Pender's terms, Heracles suffers from more inner anxiety and distress than Polyphemus, since he exhibits much greater external movement.[388] Through the use of these similes, Apollonius gives his audience direct access to his characters mental states, showing that he associates mental control with movement: Polyphemus' direct and calculated movement, symptomatic of his calm and collected nature under pressure, acting as a foil to Heracles' berserk irrationality, manifesting itself as uncontrolled physical expression.

III. COGNITIVE UNIVERSALS

I shall now switch approaches and analyse this imagery through the lens of the cognitive principles outlined in previous chapters.[389] I shall make two quick observations here before moving on to some larger issues.

First, as is evident from my examination, I think that both Polyphemus and Heracles' movement should be viewed as non-verbal behaviour that is meaningful in that it is representative of their respective mental states. Secondly, and as we saw in relation to Medea and the sunbeam that was symbolic of her mental vacillation, it is the human agency detection system, which ascribes intentionality and characteristics to objects that are perceived as behaving in an agent-like manner, that explains the ease with which we read the similes of the wild beast and the gadfly/bull as symbolic of the mental processes of Polyphemus and Heracles, respectively.[390]

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[388] To quote Pender (1999: 90) in full: 'inner anxiety and distress is expressed by the need for external movement beyond one's normal bounds. ... [M]otion is the result of a loss of stability and so a polarity is established between disorderly motion (negative) and stillness (positive)'.

[389] Of course, parts of what I shall outline in this section will be equally as relevant to the second piece of gadfly imagery (used of Medea) that I shall analyse shortly, as well as the passage from the *Odyssey*.

[390] See the discussion in Chapter One on Agency (section I.II), and particularly Heider & Simmel (1944).

In exactly the same way that I showed in the previous chapter with relation to Medea, it would not be possible for us to comprehend Polyphemus and Heracles' separate psychological reactions without our understanding that they are autonomous agents, motivated by their own beliefs and desires. Again, in so doing, we employ Dunbar's third level of Theory of Mind.[391] In fact, one of the main reasons why Classical scholars have written so extensively on the potential relationships between Hylas, Polyphemus, and Heracles—views which I summarised in section II.i above—is to elucidate those motives, and thus the Theory of Mind interactions that exist and further the dramatic action within the text.

A Theory of Mind analysis of the scene in which Polyphemus and Heracles react to Hylas' disappearance produces some interesting results. The narrator states that Polyphemus informs Heracles of the terrible calamity (ἄτην … λευγαλέην, 1255-6) with βεβαρημένος … θυμόν ('a heavy heart', 1256).[392] Of course, Polyphemus' heavy heart stems, in part, from the disappearance of Hylas, and his subsequent inability to find him; but, crucially, I think that it also casts forward to the effect that he knows the news of the disappearance, which he is about to deliver, will have on Heracles. Polyphemus' ability to model Heracles' reaction, and conclude that the latter will not respond well, shows Theory of Mind in action.[393]

There are two final points that I would like to make, which both relate to Polyphemus' immediate reaction upon hearing Hylas' cries, before moving on to

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[391] See the discussion in Chapter One on Theory of Mind in literature (section I.i.ii).

[392] Note that the concept of a heavy heart is universal, since it is immediately recognisable in contemporary English. It is a paradigm example of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) orientational metaphor (discussed in Chapter One). The example here conforms to several manifestations of the up/down image schema, which Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 15-16) list: HAPPY IS UP; SAD IN DOWN (Polyphemus and Heracles are sad/down as they have lost Hylas), HAVING CONTROL IS UP; BEING SUBJECT TO CONTROL IS DOWN (They are down since their control of the situation is limited), and GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN (They are down because the situation is bad).

[393] This calculation, then, employs three levels of intentionality (on which, see n.33, above): We *know* that Polyphemus *knows* that Heracles *will*… While this approaches the level at which our Theory of Mind ability is allegedly tested, it is also a perfect example of what I termed earlier a background inference: the exposition of automatic and everyday mental calculations.

examine another cognitive universal. As I have mentioned, he hypothesises two scenarios to explain what has happened to the boy (1250-2). (For the purposes of this discussion, it does not matter that these are actually incorrect.) The first is the speed of the Theory of Mind calculation: he hears the cry, perceives that it is of distress, hypothesises plausible situations that might merit such distress, reasons that he might be able to assist, and draws his sword to go off in pursuit. Again, the narrator states that this happens αἶψα ('immediately', 1250), thus showing the instantaneous nature of the layered mental process.[394]

The second is that it is interesting to note that we are explicitly informed of Polyphemus' hypotheses. I have noted that this serves a useful dramatic function in that, by his reporting these to Heracles, both characters act according to the same information, thus allowing direct comparison of their reactions. This may be, in part, Apollonius' intention. However, to look ahead to a topic that will loom large in the next chapter—where we shall see that Jason's actions are constantly underdetermined—I would suggest that Apollonius is, to paraphrase Scodel (2014: 56), exploring character interaction and training his audience in Theory of Mind interaction.[395]

III.ii Metaphorical structuring

In the same way as the vacillating sunbeam, I think that both the movement-laden pieces of imagery that I have documented in the similes of Polyphemus and Heracles are conceptual metaphors that structure the way in which we conceive of everyday

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[394] In the last chapter, I showed that Medea's attendant, upon seeing her distressed mistress, reports her sighting immediately (παρασχεδόν, 667) to Chalkiope. (There will be another example of this nature in the final chapter.)

[395] To adopt slightly different terminology, it could be said that the reader is being primed in Theory of Mind calculations by the internal audience (Heracles), while a narratologist might see primary and secondary focalization in this scene. (For an analysis of Theory of Mind in relation to focalization and the limits of the latter in certain aspects, see Scodel (2014), 57-9.) The theme of character interaction will be discussed at much greater length in the next chapter, but it is interesting to note that Scodel's Homeric examples, as well as the ones that I shall produce from the *Argonautica*, show how difficult it is for characters to interact, owing to a lack of determination, whereas this interaction between Polyphemus and Heracles is characterised by its ease of interaction.

psychological life. Again, I think that both similes are orientational metaphors, which structure spatially the mental calculations undertaken by both protagonists in their respective searches.[396]

Furthermore, the fact that I argue that these mental calculations are reified into the respective similes of the θήρ and the ταῦρος stung by the μύωψ/οἶστρος are examples of Lakoff & Johnson's (1980) ontological metaphor, those structured by our bodily experience of interacting with physical objects and substances.[397] As ever, the function of such ontological metaphors is to make an aspect of the intersubjective phenomenology of an emotion tangible and tractable. The specific similes are the culture's folk models for such psychological expression—models which I shall show in the remainder of this chapter that Apollonius inherits, explores, and deepens—but in their cooption of experience from a lower to a higher domain of experience, they betray certain cognitive universals in their conception of emotion.

III.ɪɪ.ɪ EMOTION

I have already shown that Heracles' immediate reaction to the loss of Hylas, where the narrator describes the dark blood boiling inside him (1262), conforms to the conceptual metaphor EMOTION IS PRESSURE INSIDE A CONTAINER.[398] This is just one way in which we see the metaphorical structuring of emotion in this passage, which I shall now analyse in greater depth.

On this topic,[399] Zoltan Kövecses (2000: 61) states that 'emotions are commonly conceptualized as causes that lead to certain behavioral responses … it is natural to

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[396] For orientational metaphor, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 14-21.
[397] For ontological metaphor, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 25-9.
[398] See n.368 (above).
[399] Kövecses' (2000) study is primarily based on English. However, at 139-63 he does show that many of his findings can be corroborated in other languages (Chinese, Japanese, Hungarian, and Zulu). My findings in this section should be viewed as furthering this cultural corroboration.

conceptualize emotions as forces that bring about certain responses, or effects'.[400] From the understanding that CAUSES ARE FORCES comes the master metaphor that structures multiple conceptions of emotion, EMOTIONS ARE FORCES.[401] And upon closer inspection, we see that this master metaphor accounts for much of the metaphorical conception of emotion in the current *Argonautica* passage.

To start with Polyphemus, the narrator describes him as burning with hunger, which results in him going after, but not reaching, the sheep (λιμῷ δ' αἰθόμενος μετανίσσεται, οὐδ' ἐπέκυρσε / ποίμνῃσιν, 1245-6). I have already noted that this imagery highlights Polyphemus' emotionally driven, and ultimately frustrated, search for Hylas, but, following Kövecses' (2000: 78) arguments, we can see that the metaphor employed here is EMOTION IS HUNGER, a sub-metaphor of EMOTIONS ARE FORCES, in which hunger corresponds to 'the desire for … the action associated with the emotion (e.g., an act of retribution in anger)'. Indeed, and as Kövecses (2000: 78) goes on to state,

> [t]he version in which an emotion is "insatiable" usually forms a part of the EMOTION IS A WILD ANIMAL metaphor. In this metaphor, the animal's responses may be motivated by the physiological force of hunger.

The startling degree of fit between Kövecses' exploration of this conceptual metaphor in modern English and our example from the *Argonautica* is a powerful statement in support of this thesis' methodology, showing, as it does, that Apollonius' conception of emotion conforms to certain cognitive universal patterns.[402]

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[400] This builds upon Lakoff's (1990) EVENT STRUCTURE metaphor. See Lakoff (1990), and (on emotion and metaphor) Kövecses (2000), 51-60, esp. 57: 'in this scheme, emotion itself becomes a cause relative to the response it produces. Thus the emotion is conceptualized as a force and the effect of the emotion, that is, the behavioral responses, as the effects of the force.'
[401] As Kövecses (2000: 62) puts it, '[t]he EMOTIONS ARE FORCES metaphor has as its source domain the FORCE schema.'
[402] The fact that Polyphemus burns (αἰθόμενος) with hunger displays an overlapping of conceptual models here: in addition to that discussed above, it displays the EMOTION IS FIRE/HEAT model, on which see Kövecses (2000), 75-7.

The imagery of Heracles' emotional response can also be analysed in terms of the master metaphor EMOTIONS ARE FORCES. Of course, Apollonius likens the onset of the emotion to a sting or a blow (τετυμμένος, 1265). The externalised nature of the force thus employs the EMOTION IS AN OPPONENT metaphor.[403] That the sting of the gadfly is metaphorically structured in this way is also relevant to the onset of Medea's erotic passion discussed in the previous chapter, which, similarly, was brought on by Eros' arrow.[404]

Conceptual metaphor can also account for the manic movement that Heracles exhibits once he has been stung. (Following my arguments above, this argument will also be relevant to Polyphemus' movement.) The fact that the narrator refers explicitly to Heracles' frenzy (μαιμώων, 1270), which is represented by his manic movement, brings to mind the sub-metaphor THE EFFECT OF AN INTENSE EMOTIONAL STATE IS INSANITY.[405] Furthermore, and as Kövecses goes on to state (2000: 74-5), '[t]he irrationality resulting from intense emotions need not be as intense as suggested by the INSANITY metaphor … In general, emotions are viewed as mentally incapacitating phenomena'. One of the mental incapacities suggested is INABILITY TO THINK. This is a metonymy in which mental incapacity stands for emotion, and with this in mind, I think that it is interesting that Heracles is described as οὐδὲ νομήων / οὐδ' ἀγέλης ὄθεται ('paying no attention to the herdsman or the herd', 1266-7).

Finally, all my examples studied thus far, in which the protagonists act according to the emotion of *eros*, conform to the metaphorical structure of EMOTION IS PHYSICAL AGITATION. On this, Kövecses (2000: 82) states that

> PHYSICAL AGITATION stands metonymically for EMOTION; that is, physical agitation is used to conceptualize emotion in a more direct way. Agitation is a kind of incapacity, bodily or mental incapacity; when it happens, the self is unable to act normally.

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[403] Discussed by Kövecses (2000), 68-70, esp. 69: '[t]he struggle takes place between the self and an emotion as opponents. The self first is in control of the emotion, but then the emotion causes the self to respond, that is, to lose control'.
[404] On this, see n.13 (above), and Cánovas (2011).
[405] Kövecses (2000), 74.

This is, again, a cognitive universal statement of Pender's (1999: 90) culturally specific observation that 'inner anxiety and distress is expressed by the need for external movement beyond one's normal bounds', which shows that the culture's folk and literary models exhibit certain universal patterns of psychological expression. Indeed, and as it was shown on a larger scale in Chapter Two, common manifestations of *eros* in the Apollonius' literary tradition are madness, pain (in the form of stings/goads), hunting/pursuit, and forgetting family.[406] As I hope to have shown in the analysis above, all of these manifestations are, in fact, underpinned by universal metaphorical structures of psychological expression.

IV. Cultural specifics

Apollonius' imagery, then, portrays certain cognitive universals. However, again, a full understanding is not possible until we also examine that imagery at a higher degree of cultural specificity and, in so doing, bring to the fore the culture's relevant literary and folk models of expression. The natural place to start is the only Homeric example of gadfly imagery.

IV.i Homeric origins

I shall argue that an understanding of the following passage from *Odyssey* 22 is crucial, since I believe that Apollonius had it firmly in mind when he came to compose his gadfly sections (292-309):

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[406] See nn.191, 192, 193, and 198, respectively (above).

αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς
οὖτα Δαμαστορίδην αὐτοσχεδὸν ἔγχεϊ μακρῷ·
Τηλέμαχος δ' Εὐηνορίδην Λειώκριτον οὖτα
δουρὶ μέσον κενεῶνα, διαπρὸ δὲ χαλκὸν ἔλασσεν·
ἤριπε δὲ πρηνής, χθόνα δ' ἤλασε παντὶ μετώπῳ.
δὴ τότ' Ἀθηναίη φθισίμβροτον αἰγίδ' ἀνέσχεν
ὑψόθεν ἐξ ὀροφῆς· τῶν δὲ φρένες ἐπτοίηθεν.
οἱ δ' ἐφέβοντο κατὰ μέγαρον βόες ὣς ἀγελαῖαι·
τὰς μέν τ' αἰόλος οἶστρος ἐφορμηθεὶς ἐδόνησεν
ὥρῃ ἐν εἰαρινῇ, ὅτε τ' ἤματα μακρὰ πέλονται·
οἱ δ' ὥς τ' αἰγυπιοὶ γαμψώνυχες ἀγκυλοχῆλαι
ἐξ ὀρέων ἐλθόντες ἐπ' ὀρνίθεσσι θόρωσι:
ταὶ μέν τ' ἐν πεδίῳ νέφεα πτώσσουσαι ἵενται,
οἱ δέ τε τὰς ὀλέκουσιν ἐπάλμενοι, οὐδέ τις ἀλκὴ
γίνεται οὐδὲ φυγή· χαίρουσι δέ τ' ἀνέρες ἄγρῃ·
ὣς ἄρα τοὶ μνηστῆρας ἐπεσσύμενοι κατὰ δῶμα
τύπτον ἐπιστροφάδην· τῶν δὲ στόνος ὄρνυτ' ἀεικὴς
κράτων τυπτομένων, δάπεδον δ' ἅπαν αἵματι θῦεν.

But Odysseus
stabbed the son of Damastor near at hand with a long spear,
while Telemachus stabbed the son of Euenor with a spear in the
middle of his flank, and drove the bronze all the way through;
he fell face downwards, and struck the earth full with his forehead.
And then Athene held up the man-killing aegis
from on high on the roof, and their *phrenes* fluttered.
And they fled in terror about the hall like a herd of oxen,
stirred up and driven by the nimble gadfly
in spring season, at the time when the long days come;
and as vultures with crooked talons and crooked beaks
come from the mountains to rush the lesser birds,
and these on the plain shrink away from the clouds,
but [the vultures] leap upon them and kill them, and there is neither
defence, nor escape, and men rejoice for the hunting,
so they set in motion the suitors and throughout the hall
struck them on all sides, and unseemly groans rose up
at the striking of heads, and all the ground seethed with blood.

After a description of the violent actions of Odysseus and Telemachos, Athena holds up the aegis,[407] a symbolic act that strikes terror into the suitors. The psychological effect that this has on them is described by the important phrase: τῶν δὲ φρένες ἐπτοίηθεν. This phrase, with its use of the verb of excessive and excited movement

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[407] In Homer, the aegis is some form of weapon, which can also afford its (divine) bearer protection. de Jong (2001: 536) states that its depictions 'are aimed at inspiring courage but above all fear' and adduces Iliadic examples of its use. (The device, and other key passages, are discussed by Russo *et al* (1992: 271) and Jones (1988: 207).) Russo *et al* and de Jong also make note of the unique epithet for the aegis φθῑσίμβροτος ('man slaying'), which seems to anticipate the mass murder that will now take place.

in relation to the suitors' *phrenes*, is interesting, and I shall begin by analysing πτοέω.

IV.i.i FLUTTERING

Russo *et al* note that this is the only occurrence in Homer of the verb, 'which later became so common'.[408] In his etymological dictionary, Beekes states that the primary meaning is 'to frighten, scare', with the secondary sense of 'to become shy, scared, passionately excited'.[409] I think that this requires some unpacking.

It would seem to me that the logical semantic progression would start with a primary meaning of physical movement, which would then be applicable metonymously to a martial context, where individuals might be observed to shake with fear (hence 'to frighten, scare'), and then, via further metonymous extension, to cater (metaphorically) for an internal psychological reaction at a time of emotional stress. For these reasons, I prefer Frisk's definition (1970: 615): '1. … 'Erregung, Leidenschaft' … 2. … 'Furcht, Leidenschaft'. This primary sense of physical movement might also be brought out through Beekes' suggested link with πτήσσω (an epic varient of which is πτώσσω), which has the primary meaning 'to duck (for fright)'.[410]

Moving on from the definition of movement, the notion of fear is corroborated by *Odyssey* scholia (ἐπτοίηθεν] ἐν εὐλαβείᾳ καὶ φόβῳ ἐγένοντο. V.),[411] and West (1978: 271) suggests Hesiod as an early example of the verb used in the sense of

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[408] Russo *et al* (1992), 271. They also note that διαπτοέω is used at *Od*. 18.340 (ὣς εἰπὼν ἐπέεσσι διεπτοίησε γυναῖκας). That this verb is used of the women scattering διὰ δῶμα (341) and πτοέω is used immediately prior to the suitors fleeing κατὰ μέγαρον (22.299) implies a system of thought in the poet's mind.

[409] Beekes (2010), 1250. The *LSJ* entry, quoting the present *Odyssey* example as a paradigm case, translates the verb as 'to be scared, dismayed', and, in the metaphorical sense, as 'flutter, excite by any passion'. Similarly, Chantraine (1968), 950 gives 'être terrorisé, épouvanté', and, after Homer, 'le verbe signifie "rendre stupide, être rendu stupide, hors de soi" par un sentiment, par l'amour'.

[410] Similarly, there may be a link with πέτομαι 'to fly', on which see Beekes (2010), 1181-2; and Chantraine (1968), 892.

[411] Also Cunliffe (1963: 351): '[t]o terrify, scare, dismay'.

erotic excitement: κουρότερος γὰρ ἀνὴρ μεθ' ὁμήλικας ἐπτοίηται (*Op*. 447).[412]
Other corroborating examples can be found in Anacreon (346.1), Mimnermus (5.2),
and Sappho (22.14, and 31.6, which will be analysed in greater detail below).[413]

A *TLG* search of the *Argonautica* reveals that Apollonius uses πτοέω only twice:
first, in a similarly formulaic manner at 1.1232-3 (τῆς δὲ φρένας ἐπτοίησεν /
Κύπρις, ἀμηχανίῃ δὲ μόλις συναγείρατο θυμόν), a passage that has already been
mentioned in which the water nymph is so astounded by Hylas' beauty and abducts
him; and, secondly, at 4.664 (τοῖον γὰρ νυχίοισιν ὀνείρασιν ἐπτοίητο), where it
describes Circe, when met by the Argonauts.[414]

Apollonius' second use and the *Odyssey* example are broadly similar in that πτοέω
is used to express the fear felt by Circe and the suitors respectively. The use in Book
1, however, clearly corroborates the metaphorical usage, whereby the water nymph's
phrenes are made to flutter in sexual excitement by Aphrodite. Of interest here,
though, is that with the exact combination of this specific psychic organ and πτοέω,
Apollonius at the same time clearly displays his familiarity with the Homeric scene,
while also dissociating himself from it via the fact that the verb, by the time of his
writing, had acquired a different (erotic) context.

I would suggest, then, that Apollonius intends his audience to view his description of
erotic confoundment through the lens of Homeric battle terror. By appealing to the
Homeric intertext, I believe that he highlights the basic physiological similarities
between the fear in a martial context felt by the suitors, and the erotic desire

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[412] Though he hedges his bets by stating that 'this may be unintentional'. Koniaris (1968: 183): 'Hes.
Op. 447 … here the erotic meaning … cannot be wholly excluded'.
[413] For a full list of passages, see the entry in *LSJ*, Koniaris (1968), and Degani & Burzacchini (1977),
142-3.
[414] In terms of close compounds, the verb διαπτοέω is used of Jason scattering the oxen after
ploughing the teeth (καὶ τοὺς μὲν πεδίον δε διεπτοίησε φέβεσθαι, 3.1345). From an etymological
perspective, it is noticeable that διαπτοέω occurs juxtaposed with φέβομαι, which itself contains
both the notions of fear and movement.

experienced by the nymph, and, in this way, deepens the poetic and folk model of psychological expression.

However, Homer is not the only influence upon Apollonius; an interesting use of πτοέω from Sappho 31 (1-6) is quoted below:

> φαίνεταί μοι κῆνος ἴσος θέοισιν
> ἔμμεν' ὤνηρ, ὄττις ἐνάντιός τοι
> ἰσδάνει καὶ πλάσιον ἆδυ φωνεί-
> σας ὑπακούει
> καὶ γελαίσας ἰμέροεν, τό μ' ἦ μὰν
> καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν **ἐπτόαισεν**, …

> He seems as fortunate as the gods to me
> that man, who sits opposite you
> and listens nearby to your
> sweet voice
> and lovely laughter.
> Truly that sets my *kradie* in my *stethos* trembling…

> [Tr. D. A. Campbell]

Here, Sappho, as first person narrator, recounts her emotional experience in perceiving a girl, with whom she has some form of emotional attachment,[415] who is sitting near and being heard by κῆνος … ὤνηρ.[416] The verb πτοέω is used in relation to her καρδία as she looks on.

The verbal similarities between this and the Homeric and Apollonian texts have been examined in several recent publications by Sapphic scholars.[417] On the one hand, Claude Cusset lists the grammatical and syntactical similarities between the

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[415] As we shall see, there are many interpretations of this poem, but I think it fair to say this based on the physical reaction that Sappho will describe.

[416] On this, see the various collected interpretations of the poem in Lefkowitz (1973), 30-2.

[417] Foundational for modern scholarship on this issue is Cusset (1999), 333: 'L'hypotexte sapphique n'est pas le seul qui doit être pris en compte dans l'évocation de ce coup de foudre de la nymph; de toute évidence, Apollonios travaille l'espression homérique du chant XXII de l'*Odyssée* qui contient l'unique occurrence homérique de ce même verbe πτοέω (vers 297-298)…'

Homeric, Sapphic, and Apollonian scenes,[418] while, on the other, notes the transference from an actual, physical threat in the former to a metaphorical image of an emotional threat in the latter two.[419]

Similarly illuminating, albeit for counterfactual reasons, are the comments of George Koniaris (1968: 183-4), which are worth quoting in full:

> [Sappho's] excitement is erotic; πτοέω denotes vehement love. … At what time the verb passed first to its meaning of 'to love', we do not know. Setti's guess [(1940: 195-221)], that this was first done by Sappho, is an attractive hypothesis. The pathology of intense fear and that of intense love have similar physiological symptoms (e.g. trembling, paleness, etc. even fainting). On the basis of this similarity, the verb may easily pass to the sphere of vehement love. If we assume that by the time Sappho wrote the present poem the verb had already acquired its erotic meaning, then the meaning was straightforward to her audience. If the verb had not yet acquired this meaning, Sappho expresses her feelings in a purely figurative way and the audience is expected to grasp the meaning through the help of ἱμέροεν and the general tone of the poem (if not also from facts they knew in case the poem was personal).

Though my earlier comments show that I agree with the premise that fear and love have similar physiological symptoms, and it seems (based on the verb's usage in Homer and the *Odyssey* scholia) that it was used earlier with regard to fear, I cannot necessarily agree with Koniaris' interpretation of the verb's Sapphic meaning. Because the situation set out in these lines is so unspecific, it is impossible to say whether the verb might express erotic desire, fear (in the form of jilted envy), or even a complicated amalgamation of the two.[420] Although the poem precludes such a definitive answer, there are nevertheless useful facts that can be drawn from it: the verb πτοέω, which as it has been argued, had an earlier sense of martial fear, is

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[418] See Cusset (1999), 333-4. Also noted by Degani & Burzacchini (1977), 143: 'dove, oltra alla reminiscenza del succitato χ 298, non è da escludere proprio l'influsso di Sappho'.

[419] Cusset (1999), 334: [of the Suitors] '[l]eur effroi n'est pas métaphorique; ils voient leur mort en face d'eux-mêmes qui se présente de manière imminente et violente. Au contraire, dans le contexte amoureux, la mort qui ne sert que d'image à l'expression de l'amour est à la fois lente et douce et l'espèce d'effroi qui saisit le sujet ne connaît pas de cause extérieure'.
In his analysis of Sappho 31, Benjamin Acosta-Hughes (2010: 60-1) states that Hylas is 'cast in the role of the object of female erotic attention' and argues that Sappho 'provided Apollonius with a way of articulating female desire'. Acosta-Hughes' analysis on these pages brings in the influence of other lyric poets, notably Alcman.

[420] For a viewpoint contrary to Koniaris, see Ferrari, in the translation by Acosta-Hughes and Prauscello (2010: 186): '…what triggers the series of symptoms described by Sappho is not *eros* but the deep sensation of dismay conveyed by the aorist ἐπτόαισεν'.

employed in Sappho's poem in an erotic context. This shows, at the very least, that its sense has been transplanted from a martial to an erotic context.

The analysis of this Sapphic passage can cast light on Apollonius' use of πτοέω. The verb's primary meaning of fear in *Odyssey* 22 is lacking in Apollonius' water nymph scene (1.1232-3). This would suggest that his use of the verb is different from that of Homer, and continues a semantic trend that is (to some extent) present in Sappho.[421] I would argue, then, that in the water-nymph/Hylas scene, Apollonius implicitly references and recasts the Homeric passage in a way that deepens the erotic connotations of Sappho 31.

IV.II COMPARISONS

I shall now return to the analysis of the *Odyssey* simile. The imagery present is reminiscent of many of the features that have been discussed in the *Argonautica* passages.[422] Just as Heracles, as a bull, was put to flight (ἔσσυτο ταῦρος) by the stinging gadfly (μύωπι τετυμμένος, 1.1265-6), so here the suitors are likened to oxen (βόες) that flee from the swift gadfly (αἰόλος οἶστρος). Additionally, there is a high frequency of verbs of movement—three (ἐφέβοντο, ἐφορμηθείς, ἐδόνησεν, 299-300) within two lines—in a similar manner to the four terms of motion that described Heracles' total lack of calculation at 1.1265-7 (ἔσσυτο, προλιπών, πρήσσει δ' ὁδὸν, ἄπαυστος). Of course, these verbs are used to denote the helplessness of the Suitors as they attempt their escape and are picked off one by one. The narrative importance of the imagery is highlighted by the fact that it is the only instance in the *Odyssey* (where similes themselves are rarer, owing to the more

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[421] By unique, I mean Apollonius' use of the verb within a purely erotic context.

[422] Of course, and as I shall go on to argue, chronology dictates that the *Odyssey* passage *establishes* the pattern that the *Argonautica* similes follow. That the *Odyssey* simile is a model for the Argonautican instances is suggested by scholars, without exception: Mooney (1912), 147; Carspecken (1952), 68; James (1969), 84; Clauss (1993), 195n.36; Campbell (1994), 246; Green (1997), 230; and Effe (2008), 211.

varied subject matter of the poem) of two full similes, with different referents, placed successively.[423]

Most interestingly for this thesis is the fact that this is the only example of the gadfly simile in Homer.[424] Below is a shortened summary of the gadfly simile excerpts that have been analysed so far:

A.
> *Od*. 22.292-309:

- Odysseus and Telemachos attack suitors
- Athena raises *aegis* / psychological description (τῶν δὲ φρένες ἐπτοίηθεν)
- Suitors flee
- Gadfly simile

B.
> *Arg*. 1.1261-72:

- Heracles is informed of missing Hylas
- Physiological description of effect (τῷ δ' ἀίοντι κατὰ κροτάφων ἅλις ἱδρώς / κήκιεν, ἂν δὲ κελαινὸν ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ζέεν αἷμα)
- Heracles runs off erratically
- Gadfly simile

There is, then, a clear pattern that emerges from these examples:[425] an action occurs[426] that elicits a psychological response from the victim, who is put to flight with the description of a gadfly simile. From this observation, my initial conclusion would be that Apollonius notices this Homeric paradigm and chooses to exploit it at this relevant point in his own narrative.

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[423] Moulton (1977), 118.

[424] Reitz (1996: 33): 'Das homerische Vorbild zu diesem Gleichnis, χ 299ff, ist das einzige in den homerischen Epen, das die Stechfliege oder Bremse verwendet'.

[425] The description here is from the perspective of the party that is the recipient of the gadfly's sting. (I shall return to this point below.)

[426] In A, this action is precipitated by a god (Athena and Eros, respectively). A more slender case could be made for B: Heracles' erotic frenzy is caused by the loss of Hylas, who was abducted by the water nymph, whose *phrenes* were confounded by Aphrodite.

However, although this analysis exhibits a degree of fit high enough to satisfy my argument that Apollonius intentionally drew upon this Homeric gadfly scene when he composed his own similes, it is not perfect. A.W. James (1969: 84) notes that Apollonius' simile replaces Homer's plural βόες with the singular ταῦρος and that these changes are 'clearly determined by the paramount consideration of creating a precise parallel with the narrative'. Indeed the change here is part of a wider reinterpretation of the gadfly simile. Whereas Homer has his protagonists' (primarily Athene with the aegis, but in the presence of Odysseus and Telemachos) attack equated with the sting of the gadfly and the suitors with the helpless oxen, Apollonius recasts his protagonist (Heracles) as the (necessarily singular) bull that receives the gadfly's sting of erotic frenzy. Apollonius, then, takes the Homeric paradigm and adjusts it in order to fit his requirements.

Thus far in this chapter I have examined the first Apollonian use of gadfly imagery, and then explored certain cognitive universals and culturally specific considerations. For the remainder of the chapter, I shall apply what has been discovered to the second piece of gadfly imagery.

IV. THE GADFLY AND MEDEA

I shall now turn to the second use of οἶστρος in the *Argonautica*: a simile in Book 3, which describes the descent of Eros from Olympus as he is about to shoot his arrow of desire into Medea, an act that causes her to fall uncontrollably in love with Jason, and hence a crucial event that furthers the narrative of the final two books of the *Argonautica*.[427]

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[427] This is corroborated by Campbell (1983b), 202. In both instances in the *Argonautica* where οἶστρος is used, the semantically similar word μύωψ is also present. (Campbell (1983b: 185): 'μύωψ does not appear without οἶστρος.') On this, see the discussion at the beginning of this chapter.

After receiving his instructions from Aphrodite (3.142-4), Eros' arrival is described thus (3.275-7):[428]

> Τόφρα δ' Ἔρως πολιοῖο δι' ἠέρος ἷξεν ἄφαντος,
> τετρηχὼς οἷόν τε νέαις ἐπὶ φορβάσιν οἶστρος
> τέλλεται, ὅν τε μύωπα βοῶν κλείουσι νομῆες.

> Meanwhile Eros came through the bright air unseen,
> causing turmoil,[429] as when a gadfly (*oistros*) attacks grazing young
> heifers, the one which cowherds call the gadfly (*muops*).

By taking into account the erotic nature of both episodes (Medea and Jason, Heracles and Hylas), it seems sound to say that Apollonius uses the gadfly simile as a marker of erotic frenzy, in which the characters' excessive external movement is indicative of their mental states.[430] Also remembering that these are the only two occasions in which the gadfly occurs in the *Argonautica*, it is reasonable to assume that the Medea episode be conceptually linked to the earlier Heracles episode (and, by extension, the *Odyssey* passage), so that, as soon as Eros is described thus, the expectation is of a similar reaction from Medea.

However, an examination of the passage does not bear this out. After a description of Eros positioning himself and preparing to shoot (278-84), Apollonius describes Medea's immediate reaction: τὴν δ' ἀμφασίη λάβε θυμόν ('speechlessness seized her *thumos*', 284). Eros leaves laughing (285-6), and we are given a second, fuller description of the effect his arrow has had on Medea (286-90):

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[428] Since Book 3, with the introduction of Medea, is the most heavily studied part of the *Argonautica*, there are a whole raft of scholarly treatments, and this section in particular—the instigation of Medea's love—is well documented. (For the simile, Campbell (1994), 242-8 (with bibliography) is the (impressively) exhaustive initial calling point.) As such, I shall not trawl any more than is necessary, but only highlight the most significant features of this passage so that I can demonstrate its usefulness for my argument that links excessive external movement in similes involving the gadfly to inner mental states.

[429] For discussion of the translation of this word, see n.433 (below).

[430] Acosta-Hughes (2010: 152): 'Eros the violent god becomes *eros* the violent internal emotion'. Relevant here is the translation of τετρηχώς, on which see the discussion below.

<div style="text-align: center;">
βέλος δ' ἐνεδαίετο κούρῃ
νέρθεν ὑπὸ κραδίῃ φλογὶ εἴκελον. ἀντία δ' αἰεί
βάλλεν ἐπ' Αἰσονίδην ἀμαρύγματα, καί οἱ ἄηντο
στηθέων ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτῳ φρένες, οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην
μνῆστιν ἔχεν, γλυκερῇ δὲ κατείβετο θυμὸν ἀνίῃ·
</div>

Translation above.

I have already analysed this section in the opening chapter, and so I shall move on to examine it with respect to the gadfly imagery. To aid comparison with the earlier Heracles and *Odyssey* examples, the episode can be condensed as follows:

C.
> *Arg.* 3.275-90

- Eros descends from Olympus
- Gadfly simile
- Eros shoots Medea
- Psychological description (καί οἱ ἄηντο / στηθέων ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτῳ φρένες)

I shall now compare this episode with the two previously analysed gadfly scenes.

IV.I DIFFERENCES: SITUATION

Immediately evident is the fact that this example fails to fit the established pattern of Narrative situation ⇒ Psychological description ⇒ Protagonist Movement ⇒ Gadfly simile. Here, the narrative situation is followed by the simile, which is then followed by the description of the shooting and the psychological description. An immediate effect of this is a (frustrated) expectation of movement, which I shall discuss below after a more detailed analysis of the scene.

Eros is described as arriving τετρηχώς, a term which occurs in three other places in the *Argonautica*.[431] There is debate on whether its use here is intransitive (as elsewhere) or transitive, which would seem apposite to the effect that Eros will soon

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[431] In addition to 3.276, at 1.1167 (τετρηχότος οἴδματος: the swell of the sea that Heracles creates with the oar that he is just about to break), 3.1393 (τετρηχότα βῶλον: the cut up clods of earth that the Earthborns eat as Jason cuts them down), and 4.447 (ἀπείρονα τετρήχασιν: the countless pains stirred for mortals by Σχέτλι᾽ Ἔρως).

have on Medea.[432] There is further debate on whether it is being conceived as deriving from ταράσσω or from τραχύς.[433] Regardless, it is clear that the term confers the notion of disorder, confusion, and excessive physical movement, clearly reminiscent of Heracles' reaction to his metaphorical sting.

The following gadfly simile is a short comparison (the German *Vergleich*, as opposed to a *Gleichnis*), which is designed to draw attention to the speed and stealth of Eros' movements. Whereas in the Heracles example above, where the narrative referents of the gadfly imagery were immediately apparent, here the scene is drawn out. The gadfly imagery is used to describe Eros' arrival (275-7), and it is only after a description of his preparations to shoot (278-84)[434] that Medea is introduced as his target, and hence retrospectively identified with the grazing young heifers of the simile (274). Despite the broad similarities of theme between the two Apollonian examples, there is, then, a clear difference in execution. There is no doubt that the cattle that Eros' gadfly metaphorically stings will be Medea, but the poet allows the

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[432] For arguments on the transitive sense, see Campbell (1994), 244-5; and Race (2008), 239.

[433] It is assumed by scholars that there is a conflation of terms evident in Apollonius' usage. 3.276 and 4.447 (both the instances involving Eros) seem to follow the Homeric pattern set by *Il*. 2.95 (τετρήχει δ' ἀγορή) and 7.346 (ἀγορὴ τετρηχυῖα), which describe a roused or stirred assembly. The other two uses (of the sea and clods of earth) seem to presuppose a metaphorical etymology linking ταράσσω with τρηχύς ('rough'). Since Asclepiades *Epigrammata* 7.284 sets a precedent for using τρηχύς to describe the sea (τρηχεῖα θάλασσα), it is unclear to which tradition Apollonius is appealing, or if either is acceptable depending on the specific context. I would agree with Gow & Page's (1965: 370) conclusion that 'since however *agitated* and *rough* in such a context come to much the same thing the doubt is not important to the meaning'. On this, see Gow & Page (1965), 369-70; Hunter (1989), 128 (who believes that this influences Virgil *G*. 3.149); Campbell (1994), 244-5 (with typically exhaustive bibliography); Lennox (1980), 66; and Vian (1980), *ad loc* (who proposes the link between ταράσσω with τρηχύς). For lexicographical analysis, see Beekes (2010), *ad loc*; Chantraine (1968), *ad loc*; and the entry in *LSJ*.
On the use of the term in the narrative context, Campbell (1983a) seems somewhat divided. Despite pronouncing that τετρηχώς 'anticipates future developments', he then highlights the brevity of the image conveyed by the word that 'relates to the behaviour of the aggressor (τετρηχώς) and to the character and circumstances of the victim (νέαις φορβάσιν), not to the delivery or effect of the sting, except in a general way. It produces panic and torment, but does not cause the victim to charge about (noisily)…' (25-6). I shall show below that within the narrative situation, Apollonius does, in fact, include the excessive physical movement that is to be expected from the gadfly-induced frenzy. Cf. also Campbell (1994: 244).

[434] Lennox (1980: 67) details the linguistic similarities between Apollonius' account of the shooting and Pandarus' bow shot at *Il*. 4.112-26.

imagery to hang, before eventually confirming its victim.[435] It should be noted at this point, then, that the Medea/gadfly simile shows a slower and more gradual development than the previous examples that have been studied.[436]

The expectation of excessive movement after gadfly imagery, which has been established by the previous examples, seems to be frustrated in this instance. However, constraints placed upon Medea from within the narrative must be borne in mind. In relation to the imagery and Medea's reaction at this point, Campbell (1994: 244) states that:

> …in situations where such imagery is evoked … there is an expectation that the victim charge about (noisily) – this will not, cannot, happen here. The 'turmoil' trumpeted by the poet looks ahead to the disorientation and torment which will follow on immediately and in the succeeding hours…

Medea is in the company of her family, and many servants (their work described immediately prior at 3.270-4). In such formal surroundings, there are more social constraints to her exhibiting the same physical response that overtook Heracles in the empty woods near the Pegean spring. However, this is not to say that Medea does not exhibit relevant symptoms. On closer inspection, we see that her desire for excessive physical movement is hinted at through the glances that she constantly (αἰεί) throws at the unaware Jason.[437] Additionally, Apollonius states that any wise thoughts flutter

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[435] Campbell (1983a: 102): 'Ap[ollonius] anticipates future developments…' Eros' gadfly comparison activates the Io myth, which has a programmatic effect here. Finally, Lennox (1980: 67): 'Apollonius' simile does not simply create an image of Eros' descent but it also prepares the way for the effect which his dart is to have upon the king's daughter…'

[436] The subsequent analysis will even show that the theme of gadfly-induced excessive physical (and mental) movement at a time of emotional stress will extend beyond the simile, and thus offer valuable psychological insight.

[437] That such glances express desire is a common Greek idea; see, for example, Pearson (1909: 256): '… it is a commonplace of Greek poetry that the power of Love resides in the eyes, and that the passionate glances of lovers are the medium through which their hearts are moved'. (See article for a collection of examples from varying genres of Greek literature.) Also, Cairns (2005a), 132-3. The fact that Medea responds to Eros' arrow with repeated amorous glances that are not reciprocated by the desired party is a standard literary *topos*; Campbell (1994: 259): Apollonius is 'following convention: interest on the part of the beloved is either played down or excluded altogether'.
Campbell (1994: 259) states that 'by [3.] 444-5 [on this, see quotation and my analysis immediately below] Medea has gained enough self-control to indulge her fascination less intrusively'. Here, the furtive sense of λοξά ('slanting, sidelong') is taken as indicative of a sense of shame, and, with it, a

from Medea's *stethos* (καί οἱ ἄηντο / στηθέων ἐκ πυκιναὶ καμάτῳ φρένες, 288-9)[438] and that she could remember nothing else (οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλην / μνῆστιν ἔχεν, 289-90).

Such an abdication of reason in an erotic context is reminiscent of Heracles' unsystematic rampage, in which he was expressly said to ignore the herdsmen and the herd, who are equated with the kidnapping water nymph in the simile (οὐδὲ νομήων / οὐδ' ἀγέλης ὄθεται, 1.1266-7). In this way, both these passages conform to the literary *topos* of forgetting and failing memory in an erotic context, which was discussed in Chapter Two, and which I showed earlier in this chapter conforms to aspects of standard conceptual metaphor. This, then, further corroborates the semantic link between the Heracles and Medea gadfly passages, and would suggest that Apollonius sees mental helplessness as an effect of erotic despair, represented by the gadfly simile.[439] I shall now show that, unlike the *Odyssey* or Heracles examples, the theme of Medea's excessive movement, which is to be metaphorically equated

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desire to be more discrete in staring at Jason. Implicit in Cambell's remarks here is the idea that, at 3.287-8, Medea's bold glances show her *lack* of self-control. Clearly, then, Medea's inner state of mind can be perceived by analysing the external movement of her eyes. As will be shown, other terminology used by Apollonius corroborates this impression. In reading Medea's actions in this way, we are, of course, applying Theory of Mind.

[438] Acosta-Hughes (2010: 52-3) analyses this imagery in relation to Sappho 31.5-6 (τό μ' ἦ μὰν / καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν): 'Apollonius both recalls and varies—Sappho's fluttering heart remains, with the phrasing of the image changed'. (Recall the earlier discussion on πτοέω.)

[439] For a typical examination of the catalogue of effects that overcome the lover in such a situation, see my discussion in Chapter Two and Toohey (1992). Here, the author examines Medea at *Arg.* 3.269-98 with the intention of developing a better understanding of the term ἀκήδεια, which is used of Medea at 3.260 and 3.298. (Hunter (1989: 131) notes that this was a contemporary medical term, which strengthens the idea the Apollonius is providing a 'clinical' description of Medea's symptoms.) This article is useful for my current purposes since Toohey argues that the term should be understood as a synonym of ἀμήχανος ('helplessness'): an affliction that is typically said to afflict Jason within the *Argonautica*, but which I will show also affects Medea. Toohey, despite exhaustively listing Medea's physiological and psychological symptoms, does not mention the gadfly similes (of Medea and Heracles), which, as I argue, is of importance for understanding the psychological effects of erotic despair. Of course, the fact that both Heracles and Medea in their separate narrative contexts exhibit psychological responses that could lead to them being described as ἀμήχανος, would strengthen Toohey's argument. Cf. Campbell's remark (1994: 274) that Toohey's line is 'altogether implausible', which is not further substantiated. He translates ἀκήδεια as 'indifference' and states that 'the reason [νόος], which governs self-control, is in a state of torpor'. To my mind, both amount to the same charge of erotic helplessness and are congruent with the state of mind that is established in the Heracles/gadfly simile and which Medea also exhibits.

with her emotional state of mind, continues to be highlighted long after the gadfly simile.

IV.ii DIFFERENCES: EYES

At the end of the dinner, and as the Argonauts are leaving the palace, Jason's physical appearance is stressed (θεσπέσιον δ᾽ ἐν πᾶσι μετέπρεπεν Αἴσονος υἱός / κάλλεϊ καὶ χαρίτεσσιν, 'marvellous amongst all, the son of Aison was distinguished in beauty and grace', 3.443-4)[440] and Medea is again described as throwing meaningful glances (444-7):

> ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ δ᾽ ὄμματα κούρη
> λοξὰ παρὰ λιπαρὴν σχομένη θηεῖτο καλύπτρην,
> κῆρ ἄχεϊ σμύχουσα, νόος δέ οἱ ἠΰτ᾽ ὄνειρος
> ἑρπύζων πεπότητο[441] μετ᾽ ἴχνια νισομένοιο.

> and the girl, keeping her eyes fixed
> on him slanting at the side of her shining veil, wondered at him,
> her *ker* smouldering with pain, and her *noos*, creeping like a dream,
> fluttered after his footsteps as he went.

Here, similarly, her non-verbal behaviour, in the form of her now fixed glances, are imbued with meaning and betray her inner desire for Jason.[442] Ruth Padel, with

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[440] The combination of qualities with which Jason is described (κάλλεϊ καὶ χαρίτεσσιν) have an exact analogue with Apollonius' description of Hylas immediately prior to his abduction by the water nymph: κάλλεϊ καὶ γλυκερῇσιν ἐρευθόμενον χαρίτεσσι (1.1230). (This is also noted by Campbell (1994: 365).) χαρίτεσσιν is only used in one other place in the *Argonautica*: at 3.924-5, where it again describes Jason's appearance (here as he is viewed by his fellow Argonauts), and just before he meets Medea (τὸν καὶ παπταίνοντες ἐθάμβεον αὐτοὶ ἑταῖροι / λαμπόμενον χαρίτεσσιν, 'and even his comrades marvelled as they looked upon him, radiant with graces'.) These three examples are the only occasions where the word is used to describe physical appearance. (At other points forms of χαρίς is used to mean a favour from one party to another, e.g. 1.851, 3.82, 3.233, 3.391, or gratitude, e.g. 3.144, 3.990.) The examples at 1.1230 (of Hylas), 3.444 (of Jason) and 3.925 (also Jason as he will be seen shortly by Medea) suggest that beloveds who are described with these physical attributes produce an erotic frenzy in their lovers, which is described by the gadfly simile.
[441] Bearing in mind the previous discussion on πτοέω, I am tempted to see an implicit etymology with πέτομαι/ποτάομαι here; see Beekes (2010), 1181-2. I shall return to ποτάομαι shortly.
[442] See the discussion on this passage in Chapter One. Also, Campbell (1994: 365): 'Now all [Medea] can do is send sidelong, furtive glances in his direction: she is beginning to feel guilty, and she takes steps to conceal the urges welling up inside her'. Hunter (1989: 146-7) suggests that the 'intricate word-order perhaps suggests Medea's attempts at concealment'. Hunter also agrees with Campbell that Medea's actions here (looking from behind her veil) imply more 'modesty' and 'composure'. (The veil is not specifically mentioned at 3.287-8 but can be assumed.) On both 3.287-8 and 3.444-5 see Cairns (2005a), 132-3 (to which I shall return). Homer's description of Odysseus' partially hidden

explicit reference to Athenian tragedy, but establishing systems of thought that are prevalent in Apollonius' Hellenistic era, states that the eye is an 'external sign of internal feeling.'[443] The fact that eyes are psychologically expressive is, of course, a human universal trait, and Chapter One showed several instances of the importance of eyes in, for example, the creation of shared attention (or joint intentionality), on which many cognitive abilities, such as Theory of Mind, are built.[444]

With respect to the specific cultural manifestations of what we might call eye etiquette, Douglas Cairns has shown that Medea and Jason's interaction in these passages is a paradigm example of Greek erotic protocols of looking and looking away.[445] It would be common practice for women in antiquity to be veiled, as Medea is here, when in the presence of strange men or outdoors, for veiling was linked to a woman's *aidos* and modesty.[446] The recent erotic sting has had such a strong effect that it overcomes the social protocols that exist to mediate this potentially dangerous interaction between Medea and Jason: an unmarried woman forbidden (unless sanctioned by her father or guardian) from making eye contact with an unknown and foreign man.

By 444-5, however, she has regained some of her composure, and can indulge her passion with sideways glances from behind her veil. And, as Maria Pavlou has argued, in this respect the veil, as well as a symbol of her modesty, also acquires an 'empowering dimension … [by] hint[ing] at her erotic awakening … [through]

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tears, which only the nearby Alcinoos notices, displays a similar technique (ὡς Ὀδυσεὺς ἐλεεινὸν ὑπ' ὀφρύσι δάκρυον εἶβεν, *Od*. 8.531).

[443] Padel (1992), 60. Additionally (1992: 61): '[e]yes are an outward-flowing channel for what is inside: soul, mind, feelings. Emotions stream from them'. (On this see the collected examples of Padel (1992), 59-65.)

[444] See Kobayashi & Kohshima (2001) on the unique physical properties of the large, white human sclera.

[445] Cairns (2005a), 1323. Evans (1969: 62-3) analyses the Medea/Jason love affair through their respective eye movements. She states that Apollonius attempts to 'bring psychological insight to bear on the fine art of characterization'.

[446] For discussion on veiling practices, see Llewellyn-Jones (2003), 155-88, (ancient and modern practices are discussed *passim*); Cairns (2002); and, with specific reference to the Medea passages here, Pavlou (2009).

enabling Medea to conceal her erotic glances and by allowing her to be a spectator without being seen by others'.[447] Medea's frequent and stealing looks, then, transgress the normal bounds of social interaction: the excessive physical movement of her eyes not only signifies her inner erotic frenzy, but also a desire to move beyond her social sphere: something, of course, that she will achieve by betraying her father, killing her brother, and sailing away with the Argonauts.[448] I have shown in this section, then, that Medea, like Heracles before, is motivated by erotic feelings, and that both in their respective ways display external movement, though that of the latter is more easily quantifiable.

IV.III DIFFERENCES: MIND

In addition to the description of the movement of Medea's eyes, Apollonius also describes how her mind (νόος), creeping like a dream (ὄνειρος ἑρπύζων), fluttered (πεπότητο) after Jason's departing footsteps (ἴχνια νισσομένοιο) (444-7).[449] As with the Heracles/gadfly simile (above), which contained three terms of motion within its three lines (1.1265-7), there are here three similar verbs within two lines.[450] The most interesting of these verbs of movement is ποτάομαι, 'to flutter', since it necessarily encapsulates the notion of excessive physical movement: just as the imaginary wings of Medea's νόος flutter back and forth at great speed, so too, as the

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[447] Pavlou (2009), 188.

[448] For analysis of the familial implications of Medea's actions, see Bremmer (1997), 100: '[b]y killing her brother Medea not only committed the heinous act of spilling familial blood, she permanently severed all ties to her natal home and the role that it would normally play in her adult life. Through Apsyrtus' murder, she simultaneously declared her independence from her family and forfeited the right to any protection from it.' For more discussion on this, see Chapter Three.

[449] For the philosophical background of νόος, and my observations on its importance in the *Argonautica*, see Chapter Two. Hunter (1989: 147) comments that the oxymoron implicit in ἑρπύζων / πεπότητο 'expresses both the wearying pain … and the emotional 'high' of passion'. Similary Vian (1980: 69) sees no incongruity: 'il évoque l'impression onirique du dormeur incapable d'atteindre son but malgré tous ses efforts…' Also Campbell (1994: 368): '*Medea* cannot follow in Jason's footsteps: *her mind* can 'fly' in pursuit of him, but only falteringly and painfully, due to the debilitating effects of the emotional turmoil that springs from love's 'cares,' 'anxieties'…' Campbell goes on to suggest that Medea's 'out of body'-esque experience here prefigures the 'externalised images' of 454-6.

[450] Granted that the last of these verbs (νισσομένοιο) refers to Jason's departing footsteps, and thus is not movement solely of Medea. In this scenario, though, Jason's movement is influencing Medea's, and it is undeniable that his movement contributes to overall the theme of movement within the excerpt. (The three verbs at 1.1265-7 all refer to the bull (= Heracles)'s movement.)

imagery implies, is her mental state turbulent. Although my primary interest with the verb is this idea of movement, there are several other interesting considerations, which enhance an understanding of the imagery.

Several scholars have adduced noteworthy parallels, beginning with *Odyssey* 11.219-22, where Odysseus is informed by his mother, Anticlea, of the physical effects on mortals' bodies when burnt on the funeral pyre:[451]

> οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,
> ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο
> δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λεύκ' ὀστέα θυμός,
> ψυχὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.
>
> The sinews no longer hold the flesh and the bones,
> but the strong might of blazing fire
> destroys these, once the *thumos* has left the white bones,
> and the *psuche*, like a dream, flies away, fluttering here and there.

It should be noted that there is a strong similarity here between the body that is destroyed by real fire (πυρός), and, as a result, the spirit (ψυχή) that flutters away like a dream (ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος … πεπότητο), and the metaphorical smouldering (σμύχουσα, 446) that overcomes Medea and causes her mind to flutter away, also like a dream (ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος / ἑρπύζων, 446-7). This likening of Medea's erotic experience as a kind of metaphorical death is again reminiscent of Sappho 31: τεθνάκην δ' ὀλίγω 'πιδεύης / φαίνομ' ἔμ' αὔται (15-16). The other noteworthy parallel picks up on the image of the dream and Medea's physical exertions in her attempted pursuit: at *Iliad* 22.199, Achilles' chasing of Hector is likened to a dream: ὡς δ' ἐν ὀνείρωι οὐ δύναται φεύγοντα διώκειν.[452] The fact that Hector will, of course, be killed at the end of this chase sounds another note of caution for Medea's situation, implying, as it does, that she has already become an intertextual corpse.[453]

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[451] Suggested by Mooney (1912), 249; Hunter (1989), 147; and Campbell (1994), 367, amongst others.
[452] This parallel is suggested by Mooney (1912), 249; Hunter (1989), 147; and Vian (1980), 69n.3. Campbell (1994: 368) states that it 'may have exerted an influence, though the dream-situation envisaged [in the *Iliad*] is far more ordinary'.
[453] Also of interest is a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus*, which uses the verb ἀναπτερόω to convey the physical effects of falling in love (255c4-d3):

Within the scene of Medea's shooting there is, then, upon closer inspection extensive movement, and intertexts that corroborate such movement, all of which establishes a pattern that is seen in the rest of her action until the morning of the following day. Apollonius next comes to Medea during her fitful night of sleep (616ff.). She is wakened from her dream by the imagined angry cries of her father and the Argonauts (3.633-5):

> **παλλομένη** δ' **ἀνόρουσε** φόβῳ περί τ' ἀμφί τε τοίχους
> **πάπτηνεν** θαλάμοιο· μόλις δ' **ἐσαγείρατο** θυμόν
> ὡς πάρος ἐν στέρνοις, ἀδινὴν δ' **ἀνενείκατο** φωνήν·
>
> **Shaking** with fear she **started up**, and looked searchingly around
> the walls of her room; with difficulty she **gathered** her *thumos*
> as before into her chest, and **brought forth** a sorrowful voice…

In these three lines, there are five verbs of movement (highlighted in bold). As in the Heracles passage (above) where it is used of the rapid movement of his knees, and, by extension, representative of his manic thoughts, the verb πάλλω is used here of Medea's shaking body. Both of these are instances of the external manifestation of their distressed emotional state. I have already undertaken an analysis of Apollonius' use of the verb in the previous chapter, and thus I can now give an interpretation of this instance here.

> καὶ οἷον πνεῦμα ἤ τις ἠχὼ ἀπὸ λείων τε καὶ στερεῶν ἁλλομένη πάλιν ὅθεν ὡρμήθη φέρεται, οὕτω τὸ τοῦ κάλλους ῥεῦμα πάλιν εἰς τὸν καλὸν διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων ἰόν, ᾗ πέφυκεν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἰέναι ἀφικόμενον καὶ ἀναπτερῶσαν, τὰς διόδους τῶν πτερῶν ἄρδει τε καὶ ὥρμησε πτεροφυεῖν τε καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐρωμένου αὖ ψυχὴν ἔρωτος ἐνέπλησεν.
>
> And just as the wind or an echo rebounds from smooth, hard surfaces and returns whence it came, so the stream of beauty passes back into the beautiful one through the eyes, the natural inlet to the soul, where it reanimates the passages of the feathers, waters them and makes the feathers begin to grow, filling the soul of the loved one with love.   [Tr. Fowler (1925)]

Clear in this excerpt is the idea that fluttering is an established symptom of love, which Apollonius chose to exploit in his presentation of Medea. Rowe (1986: 188) states that the verb 'seems to be used almost exclusively in a metaphorical sense.' On this aspect of ocular interaction see Cairns (2005a), 132, with examples from Attic tragedy, and Cairns (2013). The passage is also interesting as an example of traditional folk and literary models manifesting cognitive universals.

In relation to what was shown to be the rarest of the Homeric categories (πάλλω used of the trembling of the ἦτορ or καρδία at a moment of psychological stress) and the Medea example, it is interesting to note that the narrator states in the following clause that she μόλις δ' ἐσαγείρατο θυμόν / ὡς πάρος ἐν στέρνοις (634-5). Although πάλλω does not govern this passage directly, the verb does emphatically begin the sentence that describes Medea's physical symptoms, while the imagery is also congruent: the first clause states how Medea's mental wherewithal has been shaken from her by her fear at the dream, while the final clause details her attempt to return herself to a state of equilibrium by returning those wits to their proper place.[454] Such imagery seems to suggest a degree of *contaminatio* of the Homeric categories previously analysed. Fear (φόβῳ) has caused her to awake shaking (παλλομένη), with the subsequent result that her *thumos* has been displaced from her breast (στέρνοις). My interpretation of the imagery evoked in this sentence draws first upon an understanding of the implicit container metaphor in the description of Medea (with her στέρνον as the container and her θυμός as the party contained),[455] second the Homeric usage of πάλλω for the shaking of lots within a helmet, and third the usage detailing the palpitations of a psychic organ at times of emotional stress. I would suggest that Apollonius is here primarily picking up the third Homeric usage and applying it (with the implicit container metaphor) with an eye to the second Homeric category.

IV.v Medea concluded

I have shown that on closer inspection, Medea exhibits similar movement to Heracles after being metaphorically stung by the gadfly, and, again similarly, this physical movement is an index for her emotional state. As a final point, I think that Medea's gadfly-related movement should be viewed as an instance of the general

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[454] This imagery is a paradigm case for Pender's (1999) thesis that inner anxiety is expressed by external movement beyond one's normal bounds. She moves excessively owing to her distress and then attempts to regain normality by curbing the effects of that movement.

[455] For discussion of the container metaphor, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 29-32.

theme of movement with which Apollonius symbolises her indecision, and which I examined in the previous chapter.[456] Indeed, it is not until the next morning, when her mind is made up in her decision to aid Jason, that Medea's movement—as she dresses herself and has the wagon prepared (3.828-35)—becomes purposeful and directional. And it is at this point that her movement, and by extension her psychological wherewithal, is similar to that demonstrated by Polyphemus in his search for Hylas. What is clear from this is that the examination of Medea's psychology, viewed through the index of her excessive movement, is far longer, more detailed, and thus of presumably greater interest to Apollonius than any of the earlier examples.

V. Concluding remarks

Turning to broader comparisons between the three gadfly similes studied, it should be noted that, as in the Heracles simile, Apollonius also casts Medea as the recipient of the gadfly's sting (Eros' arrow). The fact that both similes are reworked in this fashion implies a consistent reshaping of the Homeric scene, which corroborates previous scholars' pronouncements that Apollonius transfers imagery from the arena of war to that of love,[457] and also establishes the concept of erotic desire as an external force that leads to internal mental frenzy.[458] As was shown, primarily through the verbal analysis, Sappho 31 was (to an undeterminable extent) a stopping point along the way.

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[456] This supports Buxton's (2010: 25) central thesis that she is 'in constant restless motion'.

[457] This is advanced by Lennox (1980: 68): 'Apollonius wishes to translate his action from the physical into the emotional plane'; and Campbell (1994: 246): 'the οἶστρος comes to life in a developed simile, in the wake of *Od*. 22.299f. … but with an erotic colouring…'

[458] Compare, as ever, the reasoned and rational response of Polyphemus when he hears of Hylas' disappearance (1.1240-52). His response, combined with the simile of the starving wild beast's pursuit of the sheep flock, serves as a controlled reaction, which intensifies the mental frenzy inherent in he Homeric and Apollonian gadfly examples.

Furthermore, in relation to the Heracles scene, Christiane Reitz has stated that the sting of the gadfly symbolises a purely mental process,[459] but I think that it is necessary to take this analysis one step further: the imagery of gadfly-induced mental frenzy that afflicts the suitors, Heracles, and Medea is not just illustrative of Apollonius' understanding of the internal mental process, but informs how that process itself is understood. The metaphor is so fundamental for him that it in fact structures his conception of erotic frenzy. Moreover, without the developmental understanding of the imagery from Homer onwards, Apollonius' conception would lose considerable weight.

This is, then, another example of the benefit of the combined methodological approach that this thesis adopts. Apollonius' conception of erotic frenzy demonstrates certain cognitive universals, but we can only achieve a full understanding by viewing them in the context of the culture's literary and folk models of psychological expression. The final chapter, devoted to Jason, will adopt the same approach but, owing to Apollonius' limited psychological description, will draw more heavily on the cognitive analysis.

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[459] Reitz (1996: 36): 'Der Stich der Bremse symbolisiert also einen rein psychischen Vorgang'.

5

COGNITIVE JASON

It has been shown in the case studies of previous chapters that, at times of heightened emotional stress, Apollonius often uses extended imagery in the form of similes to describe the psychological processes of his protagonists. These similes convey inner states of mind by means of the depiction of excessive external movement: inner turmoil finds expression in external physical movement. This is especially the case when an individual is faced with a decision about how to act, for example Heracles in relation to his search for the missing Hylas, and Medea, where she must decide whether or not to aid Jason in his quest for the Golden Fleece. In this chapter, I shall examine the mental imagery associated with Jason, whose presentation in the *Argonautica* has long frustrated critics. On this, Hayden Pelliccia has written that:[460]

> [t]he problem is Apollonius' Jason. It is not that he does not have the character of an Achilles or an Odysseus. He has no character at all. Like every other member of the cast, with the intermittent exception of Medea and a few cartoonish villains, Jason is quite blank, a stick figure.

As this quotation attests, there is considerable debate surrounding Jason's character, which stems from the fact that Apollonius' description of him is considered to be relatively sparse,[461] his motivations seemingly underdetermined, with what little description there is often being open to interpretation owing to its perceived

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[460] Pelliccia (2001), 55.
[461] Fantuzzi & Hunter (2005: 111) note Jason's 'inwardness … [and] his apparent passivity'. Toohey (1994: 170) suggests a link between interiorisation and levels of literacy; on this see Volonaki (2013), 52.

ambiguity.[462] In a lengthy study on Jason's character and the expectations of heroism, Richard Hunter analyses several scholarly positions relating to his presentation, which generally fall into the two camps of poetic design or authorial incompetence.[463] The latter is surely incorrect, not least because Apollonius has shown elsewhere (most notably with Medea) that he can skilfully create intricate characters. This would, then, seem to leave poetic design responsible. If borne out, this is interesting: it is salient if an author who has shown at multiple other points consummate skill in vivid presentation instead leaves description vague. However, as authorial intentionality is inherently tricky, I do not think that it is possible to achieve a satisfactory answer to the question as to why Apollonius presents Jason as he does, nor do I believe that another analysis of Jason's character would add significantly to that which already exists.[464] Instead, my analysis of Jason will focus on what we can understand of his psychology, his mental processes, from the language and imagery that Apollonius does employ. In this, then, I shall use the cognitive methodological approach to question whether Jason's actions are as underdetermined, and if he is as blank a canvas, as his critics would suggest.

For example, since the term is used eight times by the narrator, it is almost a cliché of Apollonian scholarship that Jason is repeatedly portrayed as *amechanos* ('helpless').[465] As such, it has become almost synonymous with a critique of Jason's

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[462] Beye (2002), 41: 'Jason, as the poem progresses, [becomes] an increasingly ambiguous figure, whose motives and modes of action are often impenetrable to the reader. Both charitable and uncharitable explanations suggest themselves, and we are not provided enough information to choose between them.'

[463] Hunter (1993), 11-25. (This builds on Hunter (1988), 436-7.) Glei (2008), 6-12 gives a comprehensive overview of the changing scholarly trends in the analysis of Jason's brand of heroism.

[464] Hunter (1993), 11 adeptly surveys scholarly opinion on the matter (see *ad loc* for attribution): 'Where [poetic] design has been admitted, Jason has been classified in a variety of ways: he is the quiet diplomat who works through consensus rather than force, his is a heroism of sex-appeal, he is an anti-hero, the embodiment of Sceptic 'suspension of judgment', or he is 'one of us', credible and likable'. More recently, see Glei (2008), 6-12. Perhaps related to my study here is Toohey (1990), who analyses melancholia in various authors, and compares Jason's presentation to the description of the condition by Soranus of Ephesus. As Toohey himself notes (156), the latter predates Apollonius by almost four hundred years, which renders the validity of his conclusion—that Jason 'show[s] some of the qualities associated with the mildly depressing phase of the condition' (157)—somewhat questionable.

[465] At 1.460, 1286; 2.410, 885; 3.423, 432; 4.880, 1318.

character.[466] And yet the term is also used five times of Medea, even though she enters only halfway through the poem.[467] Even while the epithet is undoubtedly psychologically descriptive, its use does not necessarily entail a lack of psychological activity within Jason. In fact, some have shown, via intertextual links with the description of Odysseus and his men's despair at being trapped in Polyphemus' cave (*Od.* 9.925), that the term is characterising of Jason.[468] As Gutzwiller notes, the issue of Jason's character is rather a matter of framing, and the expectations of leadership,[469] which is somewhat removed from Apollonius' presentation.

In the preceding chapters on Medea and Heracles the imagery on which I have focused has been so semantically and historically fruitful that I have limited myself to case studies, which I have argued to be representative on the larger scale of Apollonius' poetic craft; however, since it is perceived that Jason's presentation lacks the depth of that of other protagonists, I shall adopt a different approach by surveying and discussing every instance of psychologically revealing language or imagery relating to Jason and—where useful—applying some other methodologies, such as Theory of Mind analysis and non-verbal behaviour research.[470] This analysis, then, will situate Jason's psychological portrayal against those of other protagonists,

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[466] See Glei (2008), 7-8.

[467] At 3.772, 951, 1157; 4.107, 1049. Toohey (1992), 239 suggests that the term ἀκηδείη, which is used of Medea at 3.298 after she has been hit by Eros' arrow, is a synonym for the condition of ἀμηχανίη. (See the article for an extensive discussion of Medea's symptoms, which Toohey relates to ἀκηδείη.) To accept this argument would further lessen the exclusivity of its application to Jason.

[468] Kyriakou (1995: 17): '[t]he word never seems to lose its evocative potential and every time it comes up it clearly evokes the Homeric model'. This association is indeed powerful, since it encapsulates the reversal of Odysseus, famed for his resourcefulness (πολύτροπος). As the Argonauts are preparing to set off, the term is used of Jason, who sits apart from his comrades (1.460); far from denigrating Jason's character, Vian (1978: 1037) states that it is a mark of his humanity as he reflects on the forthcoming voyage: '[the *amechanos*] qui s'empare passagèrement de lui n'est donc pas faiblesse: elle est la marque de son humanité…'

[469] Gutzwiller (2007: 78): 'while such a reaction [feeling *amechanos*] to release from extreme tension is relatively normal human behavior, it is not typical of heroes'.

[470] I think that these approaches will be particularly useful for understanding the portrayal of Jason, since, as Hunter notes (1993: 15) '[t]ime and again … we see that Jason's character is presented to us not as an authorial given, but rather through the perception of others…'

achieve a greater understanding of his mind, and enable us to see to what extent

Apollonius' presentation of him is different from other protagonists.

Psychology, in the form of human interaction, is crucial to the *Argonautica*. In a

famous scene, Jason addresses all the Argonauts, who have gathered by the Argo,

and asks them to pick the best man as leader for the expedition (338-40):

> τούνεκα νῦν τὸν ἄριστον ἀφειδήσαντες ἔλεσθε
> ὄρχαμον ἡμείων, ᾧ κεν τὰ ἕκαστα μέλοιτο,
> νείκεα συνθεσίας τε μετὰ ξείνοισι βαλέσθαι.
>
> Therefore now ungrudgingly choose the best
> as our leader, he who would care for each thing,
> to take on quarrels and treaties with strangers.

He highlights two qualities that the chosen leader, the *aristos*, should possess:

making both quarrels and treaties with strangers.[471] The Argonauts subsequently

choose Heracles,[472] an act that some critics have taken as a collective slight on Jason.

His decision to offer a vote on the choice of leader is an overtly political one, and

many critics who have examined this famous scene have, to varying extents, argued

that, in his selection criteria, Jason is *de facto* ruling out a character such as Heracles

in favour of himself.[473] The judging criteria, then, foreground notions of human

interaction (for only by success in this area will the task be achieved), which in turn

invite the reader to examine Jason's psychological characterisation in this respect. It

is to this that I shall now turn.

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[471] These qualities conform to those attributed to the good king in Homer and other early epic. On this, see Pl. *Ion* 540b, *Resp.* 363b, and Philodemus, *On the Good King according to Homer*. For discussion on the latter, incorporating Homeric ideals, see Gigante (1995), 63-78, esp. 69. Sandridge (2005) demonstrates that Jason is modelled on images of the good king from fourth century BCE political thought.

[472] Their choice is revealed through the collective constitute gesture of looking (πάπτηναν, 341) at him. Volonaki (2013: 53) believes that 'the success of the Argonautic expedition is largely dependent on Jason's powers of persuasion'.

[473] This is discussed by Clare (2002), 44; Beye (1982), 83; Clauss (1993), 63; and Hunter (1993), 18-19. Commentators such as Clare (2002: 44-6) see parallels with the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon in *Iliad* 1. This is a much discussed scene in Apollonian scholarship, since it is used as a major piece in the jigsaw of the Apollonian reinvention of the hero. I shall not discuss it any further; see references (above).

I. THE LIFE OF OTHERS

I want first to establish the fact that Jason does indeed have an inner mental life. This is evident from the beginning of the poem in even very simple scenarios. As the Argonauts congregate near the ship, they are amazed (ἐθάμβησαν, 322) to see Acastus and Argus coming to join them against the will of Pelias (1.321-326). Jason shares this surprise, but the narrator states that he refrains from questioning them directly, instead bidding all to sit down in an assembly (ἀλλ' ἔμπης τὼ μέν τε διεξερέεσθαι ἔκαστα / ἔσχετο, τοὺς δ' ἀγορήν δε συνεδριάασθαι ἄνωγεν, 327-8). We are not party to his specific thoughts—he could be thinking a great many, fundamentally revolving around why they are here—but the fact that he is expressly described as holding back from close questioning shows an inner weighing and consideration of the scenario, and thus an inner mental life.

In a recent article, Ruth Scodel has shown that Homeric narrative features characters using Theory of Mind to explore each others' motives, while the narrator often holds back certain information about the mental states of characters, creating a gap that encourages both internal and external audiences to speculate; Scodel terms this 'gap management'.[474] I shall explore these arguments in greater detail shortly, but, in this example, we can see Apollonius using the second technique: that we are told that Jason is amazed and that he refrains from questioning the two creates a gap into which the audience can speculate over what he is thinking.

Similarly, as their son sets off for the Argo, Jason's parents are seized by grief at his impending departure: his mother throws her arms around him (1.262) and his father groans from his bed (1.263-4). Upon seeing this, Jason attempts to assuage their grief with words (αὐτὰρ ὁ τῶν μὲν ἔπειτα κατεπρήυνεν ἀνίας, / θαρσύνων, 'but then he softened down their grief, encouraging them', 265-6). Though this does not appear to be that successful—Alcimede is described at crying more profusely and

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[474] Scodel (2014), 65.

clinging to him (268)—for Jason to attempt such pacifying in the first place shows that he has accurately read and processed the situation internally, before coming up with an appropriate response.

Finally,[475] as the Argonauts make the final preparations for sailing from Iolcus, Apollonius states αὐτὰρ Ἰήσων / δακρυόεις γαίης ἀπὸ πατρίδος ὄμματ' ἔνεικεν ('But Jason, tearful, turned his eyes away from his fatherland', 1.534-5). His tears are a physical expression of an inner emotion, signifying, again, an inner mental life.[476]

It is clear, then, that Apollonius' Jason exhibits a Theory of Mind that he exercises within the poem, and it is one that is at once comprehensible to the modern audience. The relation of Theory of Mind to literature was discussed in the introductory chapter to this thesis. There, I followed the thoughts of Robin Dunbar, who describes three levels to Theory of Mind: first, the ability to be aware of our own thoughts; second, the ability to understand someone else's thoughts; and third, the ability 'to imagine how someone who does not actually exist might respond in particular situations'.[477] For our purposes here, an audience's ability to entertain the issue of Jason's psychology is a direct result of this third level. When reading these passages, an audience will treat Jason as a real person, and ascribe to him a Theory of Mind.

The Theory of Mind processes that enable literature, then, are the same processes that operate in everyday social interaction. Furthermore, as has been shown, this system is universal and non-culturally determined.[478] Recent studies have shown that

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[475] There are, of course, many other examples of Jason exhibiting an inner mental life; however, my aim here is merely to show this, before moving on to discuss the more psychologically interesting passages in detail. It goes without saying that all the subsequent examples of Jason in this chapter would qualify for this section.

[476] This is another good example of Scodel's (2014) 'gap speculation': Apollonius does not say what emotion Jason is experiencing, or what it refers to. He gives only the situation and the effect, thus leaving a gap into which we speculate.

[477] For references to Dunbar, as well as further bibliography, see nn.33-4 (above).

[478] See the Chapter One for further analysis of this and the underlying cognitive processes.

the basic components of the mindreading system are in place in six-month-old infants, and that these develop and refine through experience and feedback.[479]

Having established, then, Jason's inner mental life, and the cognitive universals that underlie both it and our comprehension of it, I shall now examine the passages that show Jason at times of heightened emotional stress in order to ascertain if he is portrayed in a similar manner to that of Medea and Heracles.

II.i INNER TURMOIL AND (RELATIVE) OUTER PASSIVITY

At 1.460-2, the narrator describes Jason's wrestling with some deep mental issue, but gives only a limited physical description.[480] Such is the case when the Argonauts sit around and tell stories to each other at a feast after launching the Argo:[481]

> ἔνθ' αὖτ' Αἰσονίδης μὲν ἀμήχανος εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ
> πορφύρεσκεν ἕκαστα, κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς·
> τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑποφρασθεὶς μεγάλῃ ὀπὶ νείκεσεν Ἴδας·

> But then Jason, helpless, was pondering each thing
> within himself, like someone downcast.
> Noticing him, Idas chided him with a loud voice…

Here, as elsewhere,[482] Jason is described as *amechanos* and is physically isolated from the group by not taking an active part in proceedings.[483] There is vocabulary

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[479] Carruthers (2013), 167.

[480] My definition of 'limited' is somewhat loose, in that I would call the two psychologically revealing lines that Apollonius allots to Jason in this instance (460-1) limited, while, for example, the sunbeam simile of Medea and accompanying authorial psychological description (3.755-70) is extended. Volonaki (2013: 54), in an analysis of Jason's speeches and their inherent strategy and rhetorical approach, notes that it is 'the narrator who comments on Jason's … psychological state'.

[481] Fantuzzi & Hunter (2005), 112 show how this scene 'carries the didactic force of a long tradition of poetry and prose dealing with the correct conduct of the symposium'. They adduce the Homeric parallel of Odysseus description of the well-ordered feast at *Od*. 9.2-11, which, they argue, 'stands in counterpoint … to the brutality of the Cyclops'. In the Apollonian example here, then, the behaviour of Idas would thus be likened to Polyphemus.

[482] See above.

[483] Fränkel (1968), 74-5: 'Während sich die andern in harmlosen Frohsinn mit einander unterheilten, nach der Art manierlicher junger Leute beim Galage, bleib Jason in sich selbst versunken...' In keeping with their symposium analysis, Fantuzzi & Hunter (2005: 113) note that Jason's perceived

that is indicative of strong emotion, πορφύρεσκεν and κατηφιόωντι,[484] while the phrase κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς is a clear piece of imagery: focalised through the internal authorial voice, Jason's body language is described for the benefit of the audience. It is possible, then, to observe that Jason is involved in some private, mental episode.

This much is affirmed immediately after as Idas notices him (ὑποφρασθείς), asks a direct question, and then requests that he share his thoughts with the group: Αἰσονίδη, τίνα τήνδε μετὰ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ἑλίσσεις; / αὔδα ἐνὶ μέσσοισι τεὸν νόον ('Jason, what plan are you turning over in your *phrenes*? Speak your *noos* in our midst', 463-4). This is a Theory of Mind interaction, in which Idas attempts to read Jason's predicament.[485] He can assume—based on the same physical and behavioural description that we have been given—that Jason is mentally troubled, but, owing to a relative lack of cues, he is not able to fully diagnose Jason's thoughts.[486]

In his analysis of this passage, Richard Hunter states that Jason's pondering (1993: 19-20) 'picks up his earlier speech on the duties of a leader (1.339-40) and that this allows the audience a "favourable" interpretation of his silence', but that his comrades are 'not lucky enough to have such privileged, authorial information, and must therefore draw their own conclusions'. As a result,

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silence would constitute 'a mark of disagreeable standoffishness or of the wise self-control of the philosopher'. I shall analyse Jason's silence later in this chapter.

[484] These will both be analysed in detail shortly.

[485] Regarding this passage, Hunter (1993: 19) states that '[a]ppearances give no answer to any simple, unmediated 'truth': you cannot tell with any certainty what someone is thinking or what their mood is from their facial expression'. Of course, Hunter is correct that we have no access to authorial intentionality, but this does not prevent critical speculation when a facial expression is present. Fränkel (1968: 75-8) argues that Idas acts here as a different form of leader, with the conflict designed to highlight Jason's modernity.

[486] See n.469 (above). This is an example of how, as Hunter notes, our perception of Jason cannot help but be, to some extent, refracted through the reactions and minds of other protagonists. This will also be the case in Jason's interaction with Telamon at 1.1286-95, which will be analysed separately shortly.

the poet's discretion exposes a fundamental truth about the presentation of character in narrative literature. Such an overt concern with the problems of literary character will also call into question any attempt to construct a coherent 'human intelligibility' for Jason.

While I would not disagree with Hunter's application of Theory of Mind here,[487] I do not agree with the conclusions. First, Jason's statements on the duties of a leader (νείκεα συνθεσίας τε μετὰ ξείνοισι βαλέσθαι, 1.340) were expressed to the assembled Argonauts; if, in his current *aporia*, the audience are expected to recall them—and I agree they may be[488]—then there is no reason to think that the Argonauts would not do so also. Idas' question (τίνα τήνδε μετὰ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ἑλίσσεις, 463) shows that he is very much on the mark in terms of Jason's pondering (πορφύρεσκεν), but he is unable to diagnose his specific thoughts. Second, while Hunter is right to caution about the degree to which our view of Jason is to some extent informed by the reactions of others, I do not think this means that we cannot attempt to construct a 'coherent "human intelligibility"' for him. Even if Idas were to misread him here, this does not mean that Jason cannot be read. The interaction does bring Theory of Mind to the fore, though, and I argue that just as the audience is encouraged to reflect on and examine the qualities of a leader when Jason draws attention to them (1.339-40), so the audience is similarly encouraged with the Theory of Mind interactions between Jason and the other Argonauts, to which Apollonius' narration draws attention.

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[487] Though Hunter does not use the term, there is no doubt that this is the type of analysis used (1993: 19): 'we and the Argonauts must try to 'read' Jason…'
[488] Hunter is wrong to point so firmly to the link between πορφύρεσκεν and Jason's comments at 1.339-40. The fact that we do not know what it is that he is thinking about will be important shortly. Others have different interpretations; for example, Clauss (1993: 57): 'the newly elected leader becomes despondent as he envisages the many details of the mission before them'. Rosenmeyer (1992: 185), who analyses this passage based on modes of decision making, comes to the conclusion that 'Jason's habitual state of reflecting … is not a sorting out of options, a designing of action, or if it is, Apollonius does not tell us'. He bases this on the fact that no alternatives (for Jason's πορφύρεσκεν) are specifically outlined, as they would be in the Homeric model of decision-making. He concludes that 'Idas is right', that Jason's meditations are 'prompted by fear, or, to put it more positively, by the natural apprehensions the responsible leader of a group feels on behalf of his charges', and that in this respect Jason is similar to Vergil's Aeneas. I think that Rosenmeyer's slightly facetious statement that Apollonius 'does not tell us' what Jason is thinking is crucial: this is the gap into which we speculate, and qualitative judgements about one character's decision-making process over another's is secondary.

I think that we achieve a much more satisfactory and fitting interpretation of this passage by instead viewing it as fundamentally related to mindreading and gap management. In this respect, some Homeric examples, analysed by Scodel, are particularly enlightening. Lines 327-33 of Book 1 of the *Iliad* describe Agamemnon's heralds journeying to Achilles' hut, and their reception there:

> τὼ δ' ἀέκοντε βάτην παρὰ θῖν' ἁλὸς ἀτρυγέτοιο,
> Μυρμιδόνων δ' ἐπί τε κλισίας καὶ νῆας ἱκέσθην,
> τὸν δ' ηὗρον παρά τε κλισίηι καὶ νηῒ μελαίνηι
> ἥμενον· οὐδ' ἄρα τώ γε ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς.
> τὼ μὲν ταρβήσαντε καὶ αἰδομένω βασιλῆα
> στήτην, οὐδέ τί μιν προσεφώνεον οὐδ' ἐρέοντο·
> αὐτὰρ ὃ ἔγνω ἧισιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ φώνησέν τε·

> Unwilling, the two went along the shore of the unresting sea,
> and came to the huts and ships of the Myrmidons,
> but him they found by his hut and his black ship
> sitting; and Achilles, seeing the two, did not rejoice.
> The two were terrified and stood in fear of the king,
> and neither were speaking anything to him nor questioning him;
> but he recognised in his *phrenes* and spoke…

That the heralds go unwillingly (ἀέκοντε) is an indication of their mental state, but Homer does not elaborate any further than this: generally, they could be unhappy at being part of an emissary that they believe to be wrong, or they could be scared of Achilles.[489] In the authorial voice at 330, we are party to Achilles' internal response as he sees the heralds: οὐδ' ἄρα τώ γε ἰδὼν γήθησεν Ἀχιλλεύς ('Achilles saw them and did not rejoice'). Here, οὐδ' … γήθησεν signals what Scodel terms 'a complex mental process' whereby Achilles infers who sent the heralds and consequently Agamemnon's change of plan.[490] (At 1.184, he said that he would come to Achilles' hut and take Briseïs, but at 1.324-5, says to the heralds that he will go

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[489] Scodel (2014), 57-8. These emotions are not mutually exclusive, of course. Equally, they might feel additional worries; for example, they might fear returning to Agamemnon with a reply that will not please him. Scodel also analyses this scene from a narratological perspective in terms of the multiple shifts of focus; so as not to complicate matters, I shall not include this.

[490] Scodel (2014), 59. She also notes that this is the only occurrence of the phrase 'saw and did not rejoice', as opposed to the more common 'saw and rejoiced', which appears five times in the *Iliad* and once in the *Odyssey*. My subsequent analysis of the Apollonian passage will rely on similarly detailed readings.

and take her if Achilles does not give her up to them.[491]) Then, the heralds stand and
do not speak, a characterising gesture that describes 'both the[ir] internal mental
state[s] … and their external behaviour',[492] before Achilles, after performing another
complex mental process (αὐτὰρ ὃ ἔγνω ᾗσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ), begins to speak (333).
Notably, the narrator provides only minimal information about the characters' mental
states, which creates a gap into which the audience can speculate. In addition to the
heralds' initial unwillingness to go, these gaps comprise the heralds' taciturnity upon
meeting Achilles (into which we might place, for example, their fear for Achilles,
and their respect for his status) and his consequent decision to speak at 333
(demonstrating perhaps his comprehension of the cause of their silence, his
evaluation of the situation, and his judgement about how best to proceed).

This is somewhat of a *locus classicus* for both Theory of Mind and gap management.
Before any words are exchanged, myriad mental calculations regarding intention are
performed by each party, allowing both to achieve a shared understanding of the
parameters of their consequent exchange.[493] Passages such as this, Scodel argues,
show that Homeric characters often make successful inferences about each others'
mental states on the basis of non-verbal behaviour.[494] While the passage from the

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[491] Some do not think that Agamemnon changes his mind here (as Scodel reads it) but that his threat at
1.184-6 (quoted below) is meant to be provocative, and underlines the outrageousness of the offence.
It is, thus, the language of negative reciprocity. Whether or not Agamemnon does change his mind is
of no consequence for Achilles' mindreading in the passage, however.

> ἐγὼ δέ κ' ἄγω Βρισηΐδα καλλιπάρηον
> αὐτὸς ἰὼν κλισίηνδὲ, τεὸν γέρας, ὄφρ' εὖ εἰδῃς
> ὅσσον φέρτερός εἰμι σέθεν.
>
> But I shall carry off beautiful-cheeked Briseïs
> coming myself to your hut, your *geras*, so that you may know well
> how much better I am than you.

[492] Scodel (2014), 59. That external behaviour is inextricably linked with internal mental processes is,
of course, fundamental to all of my arguments in this thesis.
[493] This is what Tomasello *et al* (2005) refer to as 'joint intentionality', which was discussed in
Chapter One, and will be analysed again shortly.
[494] Of course, this is not to say that inferences are always successful; Scodel (2014: 64) notes that in
the *Odyssey*, the Suitors are 'not surprisingly, consistently wrong in their inferences about other
people.' In this respect, Theory of Mind interactions in literature replicate those in everyday life where
individuals are constantly required to make inferences about other people with varying degrees of

Argonautica currently under discussion is not as semiotically dense as this Homeric example, I think that it should be understood in a similar way: on the basis of viewing his non-verbal behaviour, Idas understands that Jason is involved in some deep mental process and makes calculations based upon this. Importantly, he does not just question him, but chides him (νείκεσεν, 462). The verb νεικέω is indicative of strong emotion and is only used one other time in the *Argonautica*, when Heracles chides the crew for preferring the women of Lemnos to their heroic task (1.875). That the verb is used of Idas here shows that he is carrying out a multi-staged mental calculation: not only does he notice Jason's introversion, but he goes on to interpret it for cowardice, and attacks him on the strength of that assumption (ἠέ σε δαμνᾷ / τάρβος ἐπιπλόμενον, τό τ' ἀνάλκιδας ἄνδρας ἀτύζει, 'Is it fear, which terrifies cowardly men, that comes upon and overpowers you?', 464-5.) Thus mindreading has taken place with a broad degree of success in that Idas has interpreted Jason's (in)actions for thinking, but, owing to a lack of authorial information—Apollonius does not declare what Jason is pondering—a gap has formed into which both internal and external audience speculate, with varying results.

It is prudent here to recall Richard Hunter's remark that Jason's pondering picks up his earlier speech of the duties of a leader (1.339-40), and see that this in itself is gap speculation. Hunter's consequent unease at the inability to form a coherent human intelligibility for Jason stems, I think, from the lack of authorial prescription in the mental processes of Apollonius' characters. However, in this, I think that the poet is following Homer, whom Scodel (2014: 66) argues at times leaves the audience 'painfully under-informed about what precisely anybody is thinking'.[495] One of her examples is the exchange of nods at *Iliad* 9.222-4:

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success. In literature, as in life, those who make better inferences are deemed more socially adept, hence the characterising failure of the Suitors here.

[495] Furthermore, Scodel notes (2014: 56): 'the omniscient Homeric narrator often provides information about the mental activity of characters – but not always, while the information he provides is very limited. So Homeric speakers model how hard it can be to understand other people, and the poems, even though their narrators are omniscient, train their audiences in interpreting characters through their speech.' It is worth recalling at this point the Theory of Mind interaction between Polyphemus

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος ἐξ ἔρον ἕντο,
νεῦσ' Αἴας Φοίνικι· νόησε δὲ δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς,
πλησάμενος δ' οἴνοιο δέπας δείδεκτ' Ἀχιλῆα·

But when they had put out of them the love of drink and food,
Aias nodded to Phoenix; noble Odysseus perceived [this],
and filling a cup with wine, he toasted Achilles:

The ambassadors have come to Achilles' hut and been invited to dine. After the dinner, when we would expect the business of the embassy to begin, Ajax nods to Phoenix, and Odysseus notices the gesture and begins speaking himself. It is reasonable to assume that Ajax's nod is a deictic gesture, which, as Scodel notes, is encouragement for Phoenix to speak; thus, we do not know why Odysseus, seeing the gesture, takes it upon himself to do so. We know the overall aim of the embassy, and can assume that Odysseus thinks at that moment that he has a better chance of achieving its aims, but no more, and this much in itself is conjecture. In this instance, Homer's limiting of information regarding mental states, at a time when mental states are so much the issue, is apparent,[496] and it is this that Apollonius is imitating in the exchange between Jason and Idas.

As I have discussed, cognitive scientists have shown that social exchanges such as this are built upon pre-verbal mental capacities, thus demonstrating their universality. Michael Tomasello and his collaborators report that infants of around one-year-old are capable of what they term 'joint perception', the ability to coordinate their perception with others.[497] It is also at this stage, they report, that infants begin to initiate joint perception with others through gestures such as pointing. Brian Boyd has documented that humans, in having coloured irises set against large, white sclera that serve to highlight the direction of the visual gaze, are particularly

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and Heracles (1.1253-6), which I showed—contrary to the example here—was characteristically overdetermined. Again, this shows Apollonius' various modes of character interaction.

[496] Scodel (2014: 65) notes that the embassy, in attempting to persuade Achilles, is thus necessarily concerned with understanding and changing Achilles' mental state. This serves to prime the audience in these respects too.

[497] Tomasello (2005), 683: at this age, then, children become social agents able to interact profitably with others by 'developing a deeper understanding of intentional action in terms of underlying plans and intentions, and their motivation to share then leads them to create with others not only shared goals but also joint intentions with coordinated roles'.

physiologically suited to these types of social communication.[498] These capacities, then, are the precursors to the type of complex social interaction involving silent nods that we see employed here in *Iliad*.[499]

Evidence of such Theory of Mind and gap management not only shows that, in this particular instance, Jason has an inner mental life, but that Apollonius' characters are similar in this respect to those of Homer. I shall now turn to analysing the particular language used by Apollonius in this passage, and, where appropriate, compare with Homeric usage. There are multiple elements in even this brief description that are very interesting in building up an understanding of Jason and larger picture of Apollonian psychological depiction.

II.i.i PONDERING πορφύρω…

Jason's inner mental processes are described by the verb πορφύρω: helplessly, he 'turns over' each thing within himself. In terms of psychological expression, this is an interesting verb. According to Robert Beekes, πορφύρω has a primary meaning of '"to surge, boil", of the sea … metaph. of the heart', and, a secondary meaning of 'to dye purple, redden'. There are, then, two derivative adjectives: πορφύρεος 'boiling, whirly', and πορφύρεος 'purple'. It is argued, then, that these are homonyms, with separate etymologies, which must be kept apart. Etymologically, the primary sense (to surge, boil) is compared to the Sanskrit *jár-bhurīti* 'to have convulsions, sprawl', whereas the secondary sense (to dye purple) is linked to πορφύρα 'purple due, purple snail, purple clothes'.[500] These two etymologies are corroborated by Pierre Chantraine: there is the primary sense (la mer qui se gonfle se

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[498] Boyd (2009), 37: 'Eyes evolved for vision, but we also use them for communication: hence our contrastive white sclera, which highlight the direction of another's gaze, and our highly refined capacities for registering and inferring attention and intention from others' eye direction'. He also states (2009: 96) that primate babies lack such 'stimulus tools', and therefore cannot hold their mother's attention. See Chapter One for more discussion (with bibliography).
[499] Crucially, of course, the fact that these abilities are pre-verbal show that they are non-culturally determined, thus allowing this type of analysis to be applied to the ancient evidence.
[500] Beekes (2010), 1223-4.

s'agite, bouillonne), which can be used metaphorically of the heart (dit du coeur troublé et bouleversé) and in Apollonius sometimes of the stirring of the mind (parfois "agiter dans son esprit"),[501] and that there is a second word related to colour (par une confusion secondaire avec πορφύρα "devenir rouge").[502]

However, I would argue that it is not clear that the ancient scholiasts corroborate the two etymologies. In a gloss of the verb used at *Iliad* 14.16,[503] the Homeric scholiast Aristonicus of Alexandria refers primarily to the danger of the sea, and its colour (εἴωθεν δέ, ὅταν ἀρχὴν λαμβάνῃ κινήματος ἡ θάλασσα, μελανίζειν), and then of the metaphorical extension to the *psyche* and its anxiousness and disturbed nature (διὸ μεταφέρει ἐπὶ τοὺς κατὰ ψυχὴν μεριμνῶντας καὶ ταρασσομένους).[504] Additionally, Hesychius lists the verb twice, where the repetition of two of the explicatory terms serves to cement their similarity:[505]

> πορφύρει· ταράττεται. φροντίζει. μελανίζει
> πορφύρει· μελανίζει. ταράττει. πορφυρίζει

Interestingly, he also lists πορφύρεται· διαλογίζεται. The verb, here with connotations of balancing and distinguishing between alternatives, seems semantically more advanced in that the psychological disturbance has crystallised into a process from which a decision may occur.[506]

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[501] Beekes (2010: 1224) does not draw a further distinction in this way, but he does state that the metaphorical usage 'of the heart' is used by Apollonius and appears in the *Odyssey*. This implies that he does not believe there to be such metaphorical usage in the *Iliad*, which I shall show in due course is incorrect.

[502] Chantraine (1968), 930. Clarke (1999), 87n.66 believes that this two-root confusion theory is 'too easy'; he suggests that a single root πορφύρεος 'simply covers both an area of colour and a type of movement … in the same way as ἀργός mean indeterminately white and swift-moving, and ξουθός means both nimble and emitting a trilling sound.' Regardless of strict etymology, there must be something to account for semantic similarity.

[503] This passage will be examined more extensively at the end of this section, as it is particularly important for understanding the Apollonian usage of the verb. For present purposes, I am interested solely in the scholiast's comments.

[504] Erbse (1974), 564.

[505] Schmidt (1965), 363-4. Apollonius Sophistes similarly states <πορφύρῃ> πορφυρίζηται, ταράσσηται. (On this see Bekker (1833), 133.)

[506] This interpretation of the gloss thus stands out somewhat, and should be borne in mind for a specific Apollonian usage, which I shall examine in due course.

At this point, the Apollonian scholiast himself draws primarily on the deep pondering, while also remarking—somewhat oddly—that the *porphura* is a species of fish found in the sea, or a term concerning danger on the land or on the sea.[507]

> <πορφυρέεσκεν>: ἀντὶ τοῦ κατὰ βάθους ἐνεθυμεῖτο· πορφύρα γάρ ἐστιν εἶδος ἰχθύος ἐν βάθει εὑρισκόμενον. ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἐμερίμνα καὶ τὸν τῆς γῆς καὶ τὸν <τῆς> θαλάσσης κίνδυνον.

It is not clear to me, then, that the two etymologies are present within the ancient scholia, which seem to regard them as two meanings of a single word. Furthermore, it is likely that an audience would bring the connotations of one to the other, with the resulting semantic degradation. I would suggest, then, that Apollonius views πορφύρω in this way. But before undertaking a detailed examination of the nature of his interpretation, it is pertinent to consider briefly what connects the two definitions.

It seems clear that this is the manufacturing process of fabric dyeing. The purple dye is extracted from the gland of certain species of sea snails. The fabric is soaked in the dye and then boiled, as Pliny describes in his *Natural History* (133.4-7):[508]

> eximitur postea vena quam diximus, cui addi salem necessarium, sextarios ferme centenas in libras; macerari triduo iustum, quippe tanto maior vis, quanto recentior, fervere in plumbo …

> Subsequently, the vein of which we spoke is removed, and to this salt has to be added, about a pint for every hundred pounds; three days is the proper time for it to be steeped (as the fresher the salt the stronger it is), and it should be heated in a leaden pot…

The boiling (and surging) motion of the water is thus an integral part of the dyeing process. The earliest written accounts for this are from Mesopotamia, meaning that,

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[507] Wendel (1958), 41.
[508] Ziderman (1990), 98. The dyeing process has been extensively researched. On this, see Ziderman (1990) and (2004), and Lowe (2004). Edmonds (2000) has recreated the process by reconstructing a murex vat. As a result, he has labelled Pliny's account (2000: 17-18) 'half right but incomplete and totally inaccurate', owing to the lack of a required alkali to dissolve the pigment.
Ziderman (1990), 98-9 also notes that there are several dyeing techniques, one of which involved prolonged exposure to sunlight. This is corroborated by Edmonds (2000: 21-2), who states that the precursor is 'colourless or yellowish, which on exposure to the air and light quickly converts to the pigment'.

by the Homeric age there was a substantial semantic crossover, accounting for the two definitions of πορφύρω.[509] There is not the space in this chapter to do justice to the long-running debate on colour terminology in Homer,[510] and so I shall focus on how the terms are used by the various authors.

Chantraine states that these similar but different etymologies allowed Homer a certain 'flottement sémantique' with which he could play (a pu jouer). An example of this, he suggests, is at *Il.* 17.360-1, where Aias is cutting down the Trojan force: ὣς Αἴας ἐπέτελλε πελώριος, αἵματι δὲ χθών / δεύετο πορφυρέωι… ('so mightly Aias commanded, and the ground was drenched with *porphureos* blood…'). Here, Chantraine argues that the blood can be '"rouge" ou "bouillonnant"', thus potentially encapsulating the two meanings.[511]

This examination of the term is sufficient to allow me to now examine its use in Apollonius.[512] There are seventeen uses of πορφύρω and πορφύρεος in the

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[509] Ziderman (1986b), 51 notes that, regarding the dyeing processes of the Phoenicians, '[t]here is no unequivocal historical basis for distinguishing which type of process was used … The descriptions of purple-dyeing that we do find in ancient reports … are too ambiguous or lacking in crucial details. This is not so surprising, seeing that purple-manufacture, being among the most lucrative crafts of antiquity and depending on limited natural sources of the sea-shells, was necessarily one of the most closely guarded secrets of all time, passed down from generation to generation during three millennia.' This secrecy may account may account for there being some ancient and modern confusion over different techniques.
In a brief discussion of the verb in relation to the use of καλχαίνω at Soph. *Ant*. 20, Jebb (1928: 12-13) states that πορφύρω initially signifies agitation (with a secondary application to the mind), and from this came the sense of darkness, and the colour purple specifically: 'In πορφύρω, the idea of trouble precedes that of colour'. Thus, he makes no explicit connection with the dyeing process.
[510] A starting point for the modern study on this is Gladstone's (1858) chapter 'Homer's Perceptions and Use of Colour' (457-95). Here, without using the (then unmedicalized) term, he proposed that there seemed to be almost universal colour blindness within the poems, owing to (476-7) 'the vast predominance … of the two simple opposites, white and black', whereas other, expected colour terms are lacking. On πορφύρεος explicitly, Gladstone notes (461) 'a startling amount of obvious discrepancy … [which is either] a bold exercise in the Poet's art, or … an undeveloped knowledge and a consequently defective standard of colour'. For an analysis of Gladstone, see Deutscher (2010), 26-40, who surveys the studies showing that similar colour discrepancies were to be found in other literate cultures. He goes on to show the importance of culture in the construct of colour, particularly the (45) 'perception of colour and its expression in language'.
[511] Edwards (1991), 96 does not commit one way or another, but rehearses the views of other scholarship on the matter.
[512] For further information, see the suggested bibliography at Irwin (1974), 18n.31, as well as Tichy (1983), 280-3.

Argonautica,[513] and the verb itself is used seven times to describe psychological processes.[514] Before examining these psychological uses, there are some points of interest relating to the adjectival use. There are examples where Apollonius seems to have adopted Chantraine's *flottement sémantique*, in using the term in a context where both etymologies are relevant (1.436-8):

> γήθει δὲ σέλας θηεύμενος Ἴδμων
> πάντοσε λαμπόμενον θυέων ἄπο τοῖό τε λιγνύν
> πορφυρέαις ἑλίκεσσιν ἐναίσιμον ἀίσσουσαν…

> Idmon rejoiced, seeing the flame
> burning in all directions from the sacrifice, the *porphureos*
> smoke spirals shooting favourably up…

Here it seems semantically difficult to separate the colour of the smoke from the general context of swirling motion.[515] Similarly, after speaking to the Argonauts when they are distraught at the loss of Heracles, the description of Glaucus' return to the sea seems pertinent to both senses of πορφύρεος (1.1326-8):[516]

> Ἦ, καὶ κῦμ' ἀλίαστον ἐφέσσατο νειόθι δύψας·
> ἀμφὶ δέ οἱ δίνῃσι κυκώμενον ἄφρεεν ὕδωρ
> πορφύρεον, κοίλης δε διὲξ ἁλὸς ἔκλυσε νῆα.

> He spoke, and covered himself in the restless waves as he dived beneath.
> Around him the *porphureos* water foamed, stirring up whirlpools,
> and drenched the hollow ship with sea waves.

In a psychological context, where it is most commonly translated as 'pondering', in addition to the example with Jason (1.461), πορφύρω is used twice of Medea, twice of Aeetes, and twice in relation to deities.

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[513] These are 1.438, 461, 722, 728, 935, 1328; 2.204, 546; 3.23, 397, 456, 1161, 1406; 4.424, 668, 915, 1661. This search (as all that follow) was first performed using *TLG*, and then corroborated with Campbell (1983a).

[514] These are 1.461; 2.546; 3.23, 397, 456, 1161, 1406. (Unsurprisingly, these cluster in Book 3.)

[515] It should be noted in passing that the verb used here, ἀίσσω, is also used in the sunbeam simile to describe the movement of the beam (3.759), and to describe Heracles' movement at 1.1264. On these, see Chapter One, *passim*, and text to n.372 (above), respectively.

[516] This particular example comes just after the passage that describes Jason's helplessness upon hearing that Heracles has been left behind (1.1286-9), and the resulting quarrel with Telamon. The scene will be analysed in greater detail presently, but—since it focuses primarily on psychological turmoil, and the effect that this has on a social group—I think that it is not out of the question to believe that Apollonius could have had in mind the metaphorical use of πορφύρω.

Probably the closest comparative for the Jason instance is the description of Hera and Aphrodite: καὶ ἐπ' οὔδεος αἵ γε ποδῶν πάρος ὄμματ' ἔπηξαν, / ἄνδιχα πορφύρουσαι ἐνὶ σφίσιν… ('and they fixed their eyes on the ground in front of their feet, seperately pondering within themselves', 3.22-3). There are strong verbal echoes of their non-verbal behaviour here with Jason's after he has been challenged by Aeetes (ὁ δὲ σῖγα ποδῶν πάρος ὄμματα πήξας / ἧστ' αὔτως ἄφθογγος, ἀμηχανέων κακότητι, 3.422-3). I shall analyse this separately later, but the sense of πορφύρω here is of mulling over a undefined number of possible alternatives, none of which have crystallised to the extent that they are explicitly outlined: in both examples, there is an overtone of limitless *aporia*.

Other examples of πορφύρω confirm this interpretation. At 3.456-7, after seeing Jason for the first time, Medea is stunned: οὐδέ τιν' ἄλλον ὀίσσατο πορφύρουσα / ἔμμεναι ἀνέρα τοῖον ('pondering, she did not think that there was any other man like him')… Apollonius picks out several, staccato focuses for her wonder—what he was like (454), what he was wearing (454), what he said (455), how he sat (455), and how he walked to the door (455-6)—but the number and banality of these suggest to me that it is Jason as a concept that fascinates her, and that this fascination extends to even the most mundane of his actions. Πορφύρω immediately follows these observations, and thus it conveys, I think, the limitlessness of them. Then, at 3.1159-62, after she has met and allied herself with him, she sits in her room, pondering her deeds:

> ἷζε δ' ἐπὶ χθαμαλῷ σφέλαϊ κλιντῆρος ἔνερθεν
> λέχρις ἐρεισαμένη λαιῇ ἐπὶ χειρὶ παρειήν,
> ὑγρὰ δ' ἐνὶ βλεφάροις ἔχεν ὄμματα, πορφύρουσα
> οἷον ἑῇ κακὸν ἔργον ἐπιξυνώσατο βουλῇ.
>
> She sat on a low stool at the end of her bed
> propping her cheek at an angle on her left hand,
> The eyes within her eyelids were moist, pondering
> what sort of evil deed she had shared with her will.

The description of Medea is astonishingly vivid.[517] Unlike the choice she previously faced which had certain courses of action, symbolised by the flickering of the sunbeam *entha kai entha*, the impression here is of an inability to grasp the magnitude of what she has done, and what the potential effects of this might be. Πορφύρω, with its overtones of the endless surging of the sea, perfectly encapsulates this. This limitless nature is evident again in the way in which, at 3.1406, Aeetes ponders how he might thwart the heroes more swiftly (πορφύρων ἧ κέ σφι θοώτερον ἀντιόωτο), where, again, no specific courses of action are outlined.[518]

However, at another point πορφύρω does not imply the turning over of limitless possibilities: at 3.396-9 it is used expressly of two options that Aeetes ponders in his *thumos*:

> τοῖο δὲ θυμός
> διχθαδίην πόρφυρεν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι μενοινήν,
> ἤ σφεας ὁρμηθεὶς αὐτοσχεδὸν ἐξεναρίζοι,
> ἤ ὅ γε πειρήσαιτο βίης.
>
> But his *thumos*
> within his *stethos* pondered twofold eagerly desiring
> either that he rush and slay them at once,
> or that he make a test of strength.

Here it is used to delineate between his attacking and slaying of the Argonauts, or testing their strength. Hunter (1989: 142-3) states that this is the only example in the *Argonautica* of a 'reworking of a standard Homeric description of making a decision' and that it thus marks out Aeetes as a 'grim 'warrior' figure'.[519] He adduces the parallel of Deïphobos at *Il*. 13.455-8:

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[517] Hunter (1989), 224-5: 'Over-fine distinctions of meaning in the poetic description of gesture are dangerous, but here the verse clearly conveys fear and bewilderment…'

[518] Rosenmeyer (1992), 183n.23 notes the use of the verb and that Aeetes 'does not arrive at a decision', but does not analyse these in a larger context. Clauss (1993), 57 speaks of Jason thinking on 'the many details of the mission', though he does not explicitly connect this interpretation to the verb.

[519] Rosenmeyer (1992: 183): 'The basic Homeric schema is, perhaps not surprisingly, implemented by Aeetes … The diction is pure Homer'.

ὣς φάτο, Δηΐφοβος δὲ διάνδιχα μερμήριξεν,
ἤ τινά που Τρώων ἑταρίσσαιτο μεγαθύμων
ἂψ ἀναχωρήσας, ἢ πειρήσαιτο καὶ οἶος.
ὧδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοάσσατο κέρδιον εἶναι …

So he spoke, and Deiphobos debated between two opinions,
either that he might find some companion among the great-hearted Trojans
having drawn back, or that he might make an attempt alone.
Pondering thus it seemed to him to be best to…

There is indeed a strong verbal echo between these passages: not least since the
second alternative is presented almost verbatim (ἢ ὅ γε πειρήσαιτο βίης / ἢ
πειρήσαιτο καὶ οἶος), but instead of πορφύρω, the Homeric text uses the verb
μερμηρίζω to delineate between the two choices. As Hayden Pelliccia has noted,
this is the standard Homeric practice for introducing such 'descriptions or passages
of "inner thought"'.[520] I think that this intertext might explain why the contextual use
of the verb in this instance is at odds with its use elsewhere in the *Argonautica*.
Whereas elsewhere it is associated with the pondering of (what I have called)
limitless possibilities, here its scope is narrowed into one choice.[521] This discrepancy
is eradicated, though, if we follow Hunter's comment and see this as the Homeric
decision structure expressed in different language.

The verb functions in a psychological context once in the *Iliad* and three times in the
Odyssey.[522] In the case of the latter, all three take the form of the formulaic line:
[ἤϊα·] πολλὰ δέ μοι κραδίη πόρφυρε κιόντι '[I went] and many things I pondered
in my *kradie* as I went'. This is closely matched by the example from the *Iliad*,
where the verb is used of Agenor as he catches sight of Achilles and ponders many
things: ἔστη, πολλὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη πόρφυρε μένοντι ('he stood, and his *kradie*
pondered many things as he stayed'). This line is immediately prior to the formulaic

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[520] Pelliccia (1995), 129. Here he surveys and augments previous analyses of the verbs used to
introduce such passages. Of these, the vast majority (24) use μερμηρίζω, while 7 use ὁρμαίνω. (On
two occasions, both verbs are used in the same passage.) Other verbs used are: βοσσοδομεύω (1),
βουλεύω (3), συμφράσσομαι θυμῷ (1), and δίζω (1). (In all instances, see Pelliccia *ad loc* for line
references.) Pelliccia does not mention πορφύρω in his discussion here. For more discussion on
Homeric decision-making modes, see the text to nn.288, 289 (above).
[521] In this respect, the usage here is similar to that proposed by Hesychias (πορφύρεται·
διαλογίζεται), on which see the discussion above.
[522] *Il*. 21.551; *Od*. 4.427, 572; 10.309.

line that introduces Agenor's decision-making monologue, one of the four θυμός-speeches in the *Iliad*.[523] If an audience were in any doubt of Homer's meaning here, the Scholiast (ΣΑ, *Il*. 21. 551) states ὁ Ἀγήνωρ ἐμερίμνα,[524] thus attesting to the semantic relationship between μεριμνάω, μερμηρίζω, and πορφύρω. Thus, in Homer, πορφύρω is governed by κραδίη, and the objects of the mental rumination are always many, undefined things (πολλά). It is clear, then, that the Apollonian usage has dropped the strong association with κραδίη,[525] but identifies strongly with the spirit of πολλά (through the idea of limitless alternatives), though the word is never used, as such. Furthermore, we can see that in his descriptions of inner thought, Apollonius drops the use of the Homeric μερμηρίζω, in favour of πορφύρω.

There is one final instance of note in the *Iliad*, which involves the adjective πορφύρεος. At the beginning of Book 14, there is an interesting epic simile describing Nestor's thought processes (16-22):

> ὡς δ' ὅτε **πορφύρηι** πέλαγος μέγα κύματι κωφῶι
> ὀσσόμενον λιγέων ἀνέμων λαιψηρὰ κέλευθα
> αὕτως, οὐδ' ἄρα τε προκυλίνδεται οὐδ' ἑτέρωσε
> πρίν τινα κεκριμένον καταβήμεναι ἐκ Διὸς οὖρον,
> ὡς ὁ γέρων ὥρμαινε, δαϊζόμενος κατὰ **θυμόν**
> διχθάδι', ἢ μεθ' ὅμιλον ἴοι Δαναῶν ταχυπώλων,
> ἦε μετ' Ἀτρείδην Ἀγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαῶν.

> as when the great sea **surges** with silent swell
> foreboding the swift passage of shrill winds,
> neither can they roll forward nor one sideways
> before some fair wind is chosen and sent down from Zeus,
> so the old man pondered, divided in his *thumos*
> in two ways, whether he should go with the throng of swift-hooved Danaans,
> or with the son of Atreus, Agamemnon, shepherd of the people.

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[523] These four are spoken by Odysseus (11.404-10), Menelaus (17.91-105), Agenor (21.553-70), and Hector (22. 99-130). These monologues were discussed in Chapter One. All begin with the line ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν ('sorely angered, he spoke to his great-hearted *thumos*'), and, halfway through the monologue, the speaker questions his θυμός thus: ἀλλὰ τί ἤ μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός? ('but why does my dear *thumos* debate these things with me?') (For other, similar speeches by Achilles and the gods, see Pelliccia (1995), 121-3.) On the monologues in general see the various comments in Gill (1996), esp. 60-93.
[524] Beekes (2010), 932 shows that both μεριμνάω and μερμηρίζω are derived from the Sanskrit *smárati*.
[525] The example at 3.396-9 with Aeetes, of course, uses another psychological organ, θυμός, but, as I have argued, I think that this is a special, Homeric case, which should be seen somewhat in isolation from the other Apollonian examples.

His *thumos* is divided over two potential courses of action, and is likened to the turbulent, silent sea wave. This is the adjective πορφύρεος in its primary sense.[526] Janko states that it is rare to have such a simile in a formulaic portrayal of pondering such as this.[527] I showed above that Apollonius was innovative in his Aeetes scene with the use of the verb πορφύρω governed by θυμός, and I think that Apollonius' innovation intertextually stems from this rare pondering simile.

To further the theory that this is a transformation of a standard Homeric scene, this is the only use in the *Argonautica* of πορφύρω governing θυμός (μερμηρίζω and θυμός do not appear together in the poem either), whereas μερμηρίζω and θυμός appear together ten times in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*,[528] usually in the formulaic phrase μερμήριξε δ' ἔπειτα κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν. Interestingly, and as we have seen, πορφύρω and θυμός do not appear together in Homer, marking this as an Apollonian innovation. Similarly and strikingly, while it appears eighty-one times in Homer,[529] this is the only occurrence in the *Argonautica* of the phrase ἐνὶ στήθεσσι, a fact that clearly bears out the conclusion that this is an Apollonian reworking of the Homeric formula.[530]

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[526] See the discussion (above). Janko (1992), 152-3 is in agreement on the meaning here.

[527] Janko (1992), 152-3. Space does not allow further examination of this, particularly since it does not greatly further my ability to compare the Homeric usage with the Apollonian. See Janko's suggested bibliography *ad loc*. It is sufficient for the purposes of my argument to note that such a simile in this context is rare.

[528] It is interesting to note that the vast majority of these (8) occur in the *Odyssey*. Occurrences: *Od*. 4.117; 10.50, 151; 16.73, 237; 20.10, 38; 24.235; *Il*. 5.671; 8.169. I have not included cases in which μερμηρίζω is used to introduce the act of thinking on the alternatives, and then θυμός appears in the first alternative; this is the case at *Od*. 17.235; 20.93. I have not included the instance at *Il*. 2.3-5, in which Zeus ponders (μερμήριζε) two desired outcomes (to bring honour to Achilles and slay many Achaeans), and consequently the best plan comes to his θυμός (ἥδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνετο βουλή, 'and this plan seemed best to his *thumos*'). Similarly, I have not included the instance where the verb is used of Odysseus as he talks to his θυμός: *Od*. 5.354-5.

[529] (Those marked * appear in conjunction with θυμός.) *Il*. 2.142*; 3.63, 395*; 4.152*, 208*, 289*, 309*, 313*, 360*; 5.317*, 346*; 6.51*; 7.68*, 216*, 349*, 369*; 8.6*; 9.8*, 587*, 637*, 703*; 11.804*; 13.73*, 468*, 494*, 808*; 14.39*, 40*, 140, 316*; 15.629*, 701*; 16.691*; 17.22*, 68*, 139, 570; 18.113*; 19.66*, 102*, 202, 271*, 328*, 348, 353; 21.182; 24.41. *Od*. 1.341; 2.90*; 3.18; 4.549*; 5.191*; 7.187*, 258*, 309; 8.27*, 178*; 9.33*; 10.461*; 11.566*; 13.255, 330; 14.169*, 391*; 15.20*; 16.141*; 17.150*, 403, 469*; 18.352*; 20.9*, 62*, 217*, 328*; 21.87*, 96*, 276*, 317; 23.105*, 215*, 337*. This phrase is similar to the discussion (below) on alternatives to εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ.

[530] This final fact is overlooked by Hunter (1989) *ad loc*. In part, it can be extrapolated from his comment on the standard reworking, but the fact that ἐνὶ στήθεσσι occurs nowhere else in the *Argonautica* lends considerable weight to this observation in its own light.

Returning to the *Argonautica*, a final, slightly different aspect of the verb is brought out in another example. The speed with which Athena rushes down from Olympus to help the Argonauts (αὐτίκα δ' ἐσσυμένως, 2.538), is compared to the speed with which a wandering man can see different images from his homeland in his mind's eye (ἄλλοτε δ᾿ ἄλλη / ὀξέα πορφύρων ἐπιμαίεται ὀφθαλμοῖσιν, 'pondering, his keen [thoughts] grasp now one place, now another with his eyes', 2.545-6).[531] While the speed of the changing thoughts is the primary point of comparison, I think that the expansive ἄλλοτε δ᾿ ἄλλη mirrors the limitlessness of Medea's potential examples of wonderment of Jason at 3.456-7 (above). Regardless, the speed has a direct correlate with the speed of the surging water in the primary meaning of the word.

Having contextualised πορφύρω within the *Argonautica*, I shall now examine other interesting Homeric instances. This analysis of πορφύρω shows that Apollonius' usage seems to have followed the Homeric in some respects (the playful nature of the terms' etymology), while also focussing on one of the underlying semantic traits of the verb—what I have termed its limitlessness—and deployed it, sometimes innovatively, in his depiction of several protagonists' mental processes. The instance with Jason at 1.460-2 is in keeping with this analysis. An examination of other linguistic forms in this passage furthers our understanding of Jason and Apollonius' presentation of his characters' psychology.

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[531] This simile is modelled on *Il*. 15.80-3, used of the speed of Hera:

> ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἀΐξηι νόος ἀνέρος, ὅς τ' ἐπὶ πολλὴν
> γαῖαν ἐληλουθὼς φρεσὶ πευκαλίμηισι νοήσηι,
> "ἔνθ' εἴην, ἢ᾿ ἔνθα", μενοινήησί τε πολλά,
> ὡς κραιπνῶς μεμαυῖα διέπτατο πότνια Ἥρη.

> Just as when a man's mind darts rapidly, which over many
> lands has gone, and thinks in his wise *phrenes*
> "Would I were here, or there", and he desires eagerly many [places],
> so swiftly in eagerness flew mistress Hera.

Jason is described as turning over each thing (πορφύρεσκεν ἕκαστα) within himself (εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ). It is to this latter phrase that I shall now turn. The linguistic formulation is what Lakoff & Johnson (1980) refer to as a container metaphor: a type of ontological metaphor, which, as we have seen, reveals that our conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. To summarise, the authors start from the fundamental understanding that humans are physical beings 'bounded and set off from the rest of the world by the surface of our skins … experience[ing] the rest of the world as outside'.[532] This in/out orientation is applied to any physical object, or entity perceived to bounded by surfaces, such as the edge of a rock or a clearing in the woods, but can also be applied 'even where there is no natural physical boundary that can be viewed as defining a container.'[533] In this way, various mental states are conceptualised as containers: this accounts for the way in which it is common to speak of being, for example, *in* a state of shock, or *in* love.

With an appreciation of this theoretical background, it is clear that, when Apollonius describes Jason as turning things over within himself (εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ), he is envisaging the mind as a vessel within which psychological activity is carried out. However, while he follows the universal conception in envisioning human psychological action in this way, at the culturally specific level of the *Argonautica*, the specific language that he uses here is interesting in that he creates an epic phrase from the common ἐν ἑαυτῷ.[534]

Of course, this is not to say that there are not other, closely correlating phrases: immediately upon spotting Jason, Idas asks τίνα τήνδε μετὰ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ἐλίσσεις

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[532] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 29.
[533] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 29.
[534] In his psychological terminology here, Apollonius is perhaps different from Homer. There, as was shown in Chapter Two, a psychological organ would be used in a phrase such as κατὰ θυμόν (appearing 57x in Homer) or ἐν θυμῷ (8x). (On this, see Pelliccia (1995).) Apollonius, on the other hand, is poeticising the everyday psychological terminology of his own period.

(463). Here, the unit μετὰ φρεσί operates in exactly the way as εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ in that it defines the limits of the container in the container metaphor.[535] In a psychological context, Apollonius uses μετὰ φρεσί three other times.[536] The closest comparison is where Athena states: Καὶ δ' αὐτὴν ἐμὲ τοῖα μετὰ φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνουσαν ('I myself am also turning over these things in my *phrenes*', 3.18). The usage of ὁρμαίνω ('debate/ponder') here is similar, albeit with less imagery than the use of ἑλίσσω, meaning to 'turn over'. The phrase is also used twice in conjunction with ἰθύω ('desire eagerly'): first, of Sinope's desire for virginity (νεῦσε δ' ὅ γ' αὐτῇ / δωσέμεναι ὅ κεν ᾗσι μετὰ φρεσὶν ἰθύσειεν, 'for he wanted to make love to her, but consented to give her whatever she desired in her *phrenes*', 2.949-50), and, second, of Medea's choosing of Jason over her family in her infamous dream (αὐτῇ δ' ἐπιέτρεπον ἄμφω / τὼς ἔμεν ὥς κεν ἑῇσι μετὰ φρεσὶν ἰθύσειεν, 'but both sides turned over the decision to her to be as she desired in the *phrenes*'. 3.628-9).

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[535] See the discussion on ἐνὶ στήθεσσι, another such alternative, above. At 3.23, Hera and Athena are described as ἄνδιχα πορφύρουσαι ἐνὶ σφίσιν. The use of ἐνὶ σφίσιν, functioning similarly as a constituent part of the container metaphor and in the context of mental processes with πορφύρω, is another Apollonian innovation. The phrase ἐνὶ σφίσιν appears once elsewhere in the *Argonautica* in a psychological context when the Argonauts deliberate amongst themselves how to test Aeetes (2.1278-9):

ὥρη δ' ἧμιν ἐνὶ σφίσι μητιάασθαι
εἴ τ' οὖν μειλιχίῃ πειρησόμεθ' Αἰήταο,
εἴ τε καὶ ἀλλοίη τις ἐπήβολος ἔσσεται ὁρμή.

It is time for us to deliberate within ourselves
whether we shall test Aeetes with gentleness
or whether some other approach will be befitting.

Interestingly, the verb μητιάω here is followed by two alternatives in a similar way to πορφύρω at 3.396-9, which, following Hunter (1989: 142-3), I argued was an Apollonian reworking of a standard Homeric scene (see above). It should be noted that the second branch of the choice is open-ended, and therefore it is not strictly a choice between two defined courses of action, but rather one defined course of action and an unspecified hypothetical number of alternatives. Similarly, at 3.612 the verb is used of Chalkiope (μητιάασκε), after which Apollonius gives two possible outcomes (613-15). Thus, I would conclude that when Apollonius uses μητιάω in a psychological context, it is for the rumination over two possible alternatives.
The only instance of ἐνὶ σφίσι in Homer is non-psychological and comes at *Il*. 23.703, where it describes the perceived collective worth amongst the Achaeans of a great tripod: τὸν δὲ δυωδεκάβοιον ἐνὶ σφίσι τῖον Ἀχαιοί.
[536] I do not follow Fränkel (1961)'s suggested emendation of οὐδὲ πελείης / τρήρωνος λήθοντο μετὰ φρεσίν for σφίσιν at 2.534; regardless, it falls outside of the psychological context.

In Apollonius, then, μετὰ φρεσί is always used in conjunction with a verb in the context of a mental state. (This is also the case, of course, with the singular instance of εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ.) The Homeric use of the phrase, where it appears nineteen times,[537] is broadly similar. It appears five times with μέλω in the formulaic line θάρσει· μή τοι ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆισι μελόντων ('Have courage, and do not let these things trouble your *phrenes*').[538] There are also analogues of the Apollonian usage at 1.463, such as, for example, with μερμηρίζω in Odysseus' statement αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γε μετὰ φρεσὶ μερμήριξα ('but I pondered in my *phrenes*', *Od*. 10.438), and accompanying μενοινάω in Hera's question τίη δὲ σὺ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ σῆισι μενοινᾶις; ('why do you ponder these things in your *phrenes?*', *Il*. 14.264). Barring some innovative uses, it appears, then, that the Apollonian usage of the container metaphor is broadly similar with the Homeric.

II.i.iii Looking down: κατηφιάω and κατηφής

At 1.460, Jason is also described as κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς, and it is to this that I now turn. The verb used here, κατηφιάω, meaning 'to be downcast, ashamed' is correlated with κατηφέω and its corresponding adjective κατηφής.[539] Its use here is psychologically descriptive of some negative emotion, and is a prime example of that which Lakoff & Johnson refer to as an orientational metaphor, whereby 'drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression … [and] … erect posture with positive mental state'.[540] Jason's negative, downward-facing posture is inextricably linked to his negative emotion. Such metaphors, then, are drawn from

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[537] *Il*. 4.245; 9.434; 14.264; 18.419, 463; 19.29, 213, 343; 20.310; 23.600; 24.105. *Od*. 4.825; 10.438; 11.428; 13.362; 16.436; 17.470; 24.357, 435.
[538] *Il*. 18.463; *Od*. 13.362; 16.436; 24.357. *Il*. 19.29 substitutes τέκνον for θάρσει.
[539] Beekes (2010), 657. See also Chantraine *ad loc*. The etymology is uncertain: following Beekes (2010: 657), some connect it with ἀφή, ἄπτω ('having the view downwards'), and others with the group of θάμβος and assume κατατηφής ('completely stupefied'). I would favour the former, which supports the interpretation of the orientational metaphor. See Beekes for further discussion and bibliography.
[540] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 14-15. They continue '[t]hese spatial orientations arise from the fact that we have bodies of the sort we have and that they function in the way they do in our physical environment … Such metaphorical orientations are not arbitrary. They have a basis in our physical and cultural experience.'

the actual expression of non-verbal behaviour that typically accompanies the emotion: they are phenomenological in that they represent what it feels and looks like, to express the emotion.[541] In this respect,[542] Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 15) argue that the metaphor HAVING CONTROL OR FORCE IS UP has a physical basis in the fact that 'physical size typically correlates with physical strength, and the victor in a fight is typically on top'. This expression of physical power is linked to social status (1980: 16): 'status is correlated with (social) power and (physical) power is up'.

This fact was also known to the ancient commentators, corroborating the universal nature of the concept. The Homeric Scholiast links the notion of psychological dejection at a feeling of shame and dishonour (αἰσχύνη) with downcast eyes: κατηφείη: αἰσχύνη, ἀπὸ τοῦ κάτω ἔχειν τὰ φάη ('katepheia: shame, from having the eyes cast down', ΣΤ, Il. 17.556).[543] Plutarch offers a similar description: ὡς γὰρ τὴν κατήφειαν ὁρίζονται λύπην κάτω / βλέπειν ποιοῦσαν… ('for as katepheia is defined as pain that makes one look down…', De vit. pub. 528e), which highlights the importance of the physical demeanour.[544]

When the comparative lengths of the poems are taken into account, it is clear that Apollonius used the word significantly more frequently than Homer (ten, as opposed to seven).[545] As one might expect, Apollonius' use is predominantly associated with Jason. The instance at 1.461 is the only example where the term is used specifically of him, but—interestingly—it is used four times to describe those to whom Jason has just spoken: servants asked to prepare his weapons as part of the preparations for the

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[541] The physiological manifestations of emotion can also be seen in animals, thus showing the universality of behaviour; see Darwin (1998), 234-49, with Ekman's comments.

[542] Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 19-21 on the experiential basis of metaphors, especially 19: 'no metaphor can ever be comprehended or even adequately represented independently of its experiential basis.'

[543] See Erbse (1975), 407-8.

[544] For further examples of the term in contemporary and subsequent literature, see Campbell (1994), 113.

[545] Argonautica: 1.267, 461; 2.443, 888; 3.123, 504, 1402; 4.205, 594, 1344. Iliad: 3.51; 16.498; 17.556; 22.293; 24.253. Odyssey: 16.342; 24.432. Frequencies (total usage/total lines in poem) x 1000 = average number of uses per 1000 lines): Argonautica (10/5835) x 1000 = 1.71; Iliad 5/15693 = 0.32; Odyssey 2/12110 = 0.17.

journey (οἱ δέ τε σῖγα κατηφέες ἠείροντο, 'but they, silently, downcast, took them up', 1.267); Phineus told to rejoice as a god has sent the Argonauts to his aid (αὐτὰρ ὁ τόν γε κατηφήσας προσέειπεν, 'but he, becoming downcast, answered', 2.443); the Argonauts after Jason recounts his task (ἄτῃ ἀμηχανίῃ τε κατηφέες, 'downcast with bewilderment and helplessness', 3.504); and the Argonauts at Jason's lion-like cry to his men when he has received a pronouncement from the gods regarding their return (ἀγχοῦ δ' ἠγερέθοντο, κατηφέες, 'they gathered nearby, downcast', 4.1344).[546] In these examples, then, a pattern emerges of Jason's repeated inability to embolden, or otherwise stir the passions of those to whom he is exhorting, in the way that he desires. I think that we see in these examples of κατηφής (and its correlates) exactly the problems in leadership style that many commentators have seen with Jason's character, which were summarised at the beginning of this chapter. As such, this may go some way to explaining why the term is used so much more frequently in the poem.

In terms of the Homeric usages of the adjective, most occur in direct speech, and in the context of the shame of the person or situation in question. This is the case, for example, when Athena addresses Menelaos at *Il*. 17.556-8:

> σοὶ μὲν δή, Μενέλαε, **κατηφείη**[547] καὶ ὄνειδος
> ἔσσεται, εἴ κ' Ἀχιλῆος ἀγαυοῦ πιστὸν ἑταῖρον
> τείχει ὕπο Τρώων ταχέες κύνες ἑλκήσουσιν.
>
> For you indeed, Menelaus, it will be a **cause of downcast** and shame,
> if the faithful companion of noble Achilles
> will be dragged about by swift dogs beneath the walls of Troy.

Similar examples take place at *Il*. 16.498-9, where Sarpedon speaks of himself as a cause of shame to Glaucus: σοὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ καὶ ἔπειτα κατηφείη καὶ ὄνειδος /

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[546] Two of the other examples feature Jason in direct speech using the term of others: of the helmsmen (2.888), and, in synecdoche, of Hellas (4.205). Of the remaining instances, at 3.1402 it is used in a simile of Aeetes' mind after Jason has cut down the Earthborn, at 4.594 it is used of the Argonauts, and at 3.123 it is used of Ganymede during his game of knucklebones with Eros.

[547] There is a metonymy here in which the effect of the emotion, in the form of the accompanying non-verbal behaviour of being downcast and looking down (κατηφείη), is standing for the cause of that emotion: disgrace. On this, see the arguments outlined in Chapter One and Kövecses (2000), 4-6.

ἔσσομαι ἤματα πάντα διαμπερές... ('hereafter for you also I will be a dejection and shame for all days forever...'). In his anger at the death of Hector, Priam admonishes his sons (σπεύσατέ μοι, κακὰ τέκνα, κατηφόνες, 'hasten for me, evil children, causes of shame', *Il.* 24.253) and orders them quickly (τάχιστα) to prepare the wagon for his trip to Achilles' hut (263-4). His annoyance stems at least in part from the fact that they have failed to do this already, since he asked them previously at 189-90. I think that there are echoes of this in Jason's request to his servants to load his arms on the ship at *Arg.* 1.265-6,[548] where they too respond not as desired (σῖγα κατηφέες, 267). The strength of the intertext in this case relies on the contextual similarity and the use of κατηφών/κατηφής. As to whether this ennobles Jason, by comparing him to Priam about to undertake his *aristeia*, or is incongruous, I am not entirely sure.

There are also interesting uses of the verb. The hopeless dejection that Jason feels at 1.460 is mirrored, I think, by the description of Hector, just after he has ineffectively attacked Achilles with his only spear: στῆ δὲ κατηφήσας, οὐδ' ἄλλ' ἔχε μείλινον ἔγχος ('he stood downcast, nor did he have another ashen spear', *Il.* 22.293). Similarly, the despair felt by Hector here is mirrored in the *Odyssey* when the suitors are informed of Telemachos' return: μνηστῆρες δ' ἀκάχοντο κατήφησάν τ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ ('but the suitors were dismayed, downcast in their *thumos*', 16.342).[549]

This analysis of κατηφιάω and its correlates shows Apollonian innovation, at least in the extent of its use, as well as some interesting lenses through which we may view the depiction of Jason. The analysis of this particular passage as a whole has

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[548] The grief-fuelled, parental emotion of the Priam scene is matched by that of the Jason scene, in which all the women are pierced with sharp grief (ὀξὺ δ' ἑκάστην / δῦνεν ἄχος, 262-3), especially Jason's father (σὺν δέ σφι πατὴρ ὀλοῷ ὑπὸ γήραι / ἐντυπὰς ἐν λεχέεσσι καλυψάμενος γοάασκεν, 'and with them groaned his father, wrapped tightly in bed owing to [*lit.*: under] destructive old age', 263-4) and mother (268-77).

[549] Though it is somewhat tenuous, there may also be a verbal echo between the line endings of the description of Jason at 1.460-1 (ἔνθ' αὖτ' Αἰσονίδης μὲν **ἀμήχανος εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ** / πορφύρεσκεν ἕκαστα, κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς·) and Hector's question to Priam at *Il.* 3.51: κατηφείην δὲ σοὶ αὐτῶι; ('but to yourself a cause of shame').

shown that the inner emotion that Jason undoubtedly feels is expressed in relatively few words, but that a detailed study of these words is enlightening. I shall now move on to an example where, despite similar external passivity, Jason's emotional turmoil is described with more explicit imagery.

II.ii (Passive) grief at the loss of Heracles

At the end of Book 1, in the episode that was discussed at length in Chapter Four of this thesis, the Argonauts realise that in their haste to take advantage of the favourable wind (1.1274-5) they have inadvertently left Heracles, Polyphemus, and Hylas behind in Mysia. At the moment of collective realisation, Jason is described as such (1.1286-9):

> ὁ δ' ἀμηχανίῃσιν ἀτυχθείς
> οὔδε τι τοῖον ἔπος μετεφώνεεν οὔδε τι τοῖον
> Αἰσονίδης, ἀλλ' ἧστο βαρείῃ νειόθεν ἄτῃ
> θυμὸν ἔδων. Τελαμῶνα δ' ἕλεν χόλος, ὧδέ τ' ἔειπεν·

> Bewildered by helplessness
> Jason spoke not a word one way or the other,
> but he sat, eating his *thumos* from the bottom
> with deep *ate*. But Telamon, seized by anger, spoke thus…

There are clear thematic, stylistic, and verbal echoes of the previously quoted passage, and thus I think that they are meant to be taken together. Again, Jason is described as *amechanos*, while the governing verb (ἀτύζομαι) was also used by Idas when he previously chided Jason (τό τ' ἀνάλκιδας ἄνδρας ἀτύζει, 465). Similarly, Jason is afflicted with some form of deep mental turmoil (ἧστο βαρείῃ νειόθεν ἄτῃ / θυμὸν ἔδων),[550] and there is a sense of his emotional isolation from his comrades,

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[550] This can be assumed from the strength of the imagery, which will be analysed shortly.
A brief note on Apollonius' use of βαρείῃ … ἄτῃ: this is the only instance of ἄτη thus described in the *Argonautica*. The formulation is used only twice in Homer, where both instances are from Agamemnon in direct speech addressing the assembled troops, where he perceives that he has been bound by it: Ζεύς με μέγα Κρονίδης ἄτῃ ἐνέδησε βαρείῃ, / σχέτλιος (*Il*. 2.111-12, 9.18-19). The etymology of ἄτη is contested; see, for example, Francis (1983), who discusses the treatments of the ancient and modern grammarians. The fact that in this passage ἄτη appears in such proximity to, and

of his not reacting in the expected way, which, just as in the Idas episode, results in one of them, Telamon, noticing and chiding him.[551]

As in the previous passage, this can be viewed as a Theory of Mind interaction. Again, both the internal and external audience are not party to the specifics of Jason's inner mental processes,[552] but from his observable non-verbal behaviour at a time of perceived group stress (ἐν δέ σφιν κρατερὸν νεῖκος πέσεν, 'and a mighty strife fell among them', 1284)—primarily, again, his relative outer passivity—a gap is created into which we speculate.

However, owing to Telamon's reaction, this passage takes Theory of Mind a step further. Importantly, as far as the internal and external audiences are concerned and in terms of non-verbal behaviour, Jason is portrayed with a similar level of passivity in both scenes.[553] But in the first, Idas initially asks Jason what he is thinking about

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interdependence with, the governing verb ἀτύζομαι conforms to the theory that, post Homer and owing to the obvious lexical similarity, folk etymology connected the terms, interpreting ἀτύζομαι as to be affected by ἄτη, as well as the verb's primary meaning of 'to be bewildered', which, in turn, informed the original meaning of ἄτη; on this, see Maehler (1982), 270-1, and Cairns (2010), 307, who show that this may already be the case by Bacchyl. *Ep*.13.112-16, where ἄ[τας] is followed by ἀτυζόμενοι. Such etymologising is, of course, a comment on Homeric psychological terminology. Another popular etymology of ἄτη, involving ἄω ('to satiate', 'to have one's fill'), is discussed by Wyatt (1982), 265-7. This should be borne in mind for the subsequent analysis of the current Apollonian passage on the associations of sitting, fasting, and silence.

[551] As the Apollonian scholiast notes *ad loc*, Telamon was a great companion of Heracles (οὗτος γὰρ πάνυ Ἡρακλέους γέγονεν ἑταῖρος), and so it is not surprising that he quarrels with Jason here. For Hunter (1993: 20), this episode is another example of the Apollonian reworking of Homeric themes. The quarrel between Jason and Telamon and their subsequent reconciliation (1.1332-43) draws on the quarrel and reconciliation of Achilles and Agamemnon in a way that 'stresses the Argonautic virtues of loyalty and solidarity … rather that the Iliadic pursuit of individual honour'.
For a similar interpretation, see Mori (2005), 215: 'Jason's ethical behavior during the reconciliation therefore recalls the exceptional Homeric passage that was viewed by ancient audiences (including Plato) as a moral exemplar. In particular, the exchange between Jason and Telamon exemplifies Aristotelian theories regarding the expression of anger.'
DeForest (1994: 67) states that 'Jason is dumbfounded by Telamon's accusation that he left Heracles behind on purpose'. I think it is clear that this is confusing the order of events in the narrative: Jason is dumbfounded (to use DeForest's gloss of ἀμηχανίησιν ἀτυχθείς), and his lack of appropriate reaction prompts Telamon's accusation.
[552] Scodel's (2014: 56) comment on Homeric narrative that we are 'painfully under-informed about what precisely anybody is thinking' is equally applicable here.
[553] Of course, and as I argued in relation to Jason's description at 1.460-2 and will also do with his description now, when scrutinised, the specific descriptive terms used by Apollonius are psychologically revealing, partly through their intertextual imports. As such, by 'passivity' here I

(τίνα τήνδε μετὰ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ἐλίσσεις, 'what is this *metis* that you are turning within your *phrenes*?', 463),[554] thus showing that he interprets this passivity for some form of mental speculation over a matter (or matters) unknown, before going on to assume an interpretation. Telamon, however, is seized by anger (ἕλεν χόλος), and jumps straight to his assumed interpretation by accusing him: ἧσ' αὔτως εὔκηλος, ἐπεί νύ τοι ἄρμενον ἦεν / Ἡρακλῆα λιπεῖν… ('sit there calmly, since now it is beneficial for you to leave Heracles', 1290-1.) He believes that Jason deliberately abandoned Heracles, so that the latter's glory would not overshadow his (1290-2). The interpretation seems to stem from the fact that he views Jason's demeanour as εὔκηλος. Where, in the first passage, then, the Theory of Mind interaction was explicitly signposted through Idas' specific question, here it is implicit, with there being less authorial exposition over character interaction.

Ruth Scodel has said that 'Homeric speakers model how hard it can be to understand other people, and the poems, even though their narrators are omniscient, train their audiences in interpreting characters through their speech.'[555] Since I argue that these

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mean the fact that Jason does not act in a similarly frantic manner to that of Medea and Heracles in other parts of the poem.

[554] The language of Idas' question again corroborates the Apollonian conception of mental processes. The μῆτις is reified, and envisaged as turning (ἐλίσσεις) within the φρένες. Thus, we see a container metaphor where μετὰ φρεσί defines the limit of the container in which the mental process is physically enacted. The movement inherent in the verb, governing the reified psychic organ, continues the universal, cognitive conception that the external, concrete, and observable informs the internal, abstract, and unobservable. Furthermore, at the culturally specific level, we also see that Apollonius is both following in the footsteps and building on the groundwork of Homeric precedent. I showed in the Chapter Three that a crucial intertext for understanding the sunbeam simile of Medea was the description of Odysseus' torturous night at the beginning of *Odyssey* 20. There ἐλίσσω is used twice to describe his physical agitation, which is in turn likened to the turning of a pudding over the fire, as he wrestles with how he might tackle the suitors: ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἐλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (24), ὣς ἄρ' ὅ γ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἐλίσσετο μερμηρίζων… (28). (Note that μερμηρίζω immediately follows the physical description of Odysseus, a fact that encourages the viewing of the latter as informing the conception of the internal, mental.) This passage likewise features μῆτις: immediately prior to this, Odysseus addresses his κραδίη and ἦτορ, reminding them that they have previously endured Polyphemus' cave until their μῆτις got them out (16-22). (On the interchangeability of Homeric psychic organs, see my discussion on Jahn (1987) in Chapter Two.) As with the Medea example, it seems clear to me that this scene informs Apollonius' conception of mental processes, and, by extension, Idas' question here. However, crucially, what in the Homeric example was a usage of ἐλίσσω in a primarily physical context, has become, in Apollonius, a description of psychological action. (On the decision-making aspect of this famous *Odyssey* scene, see Pelliccia (1995), 175-8, and Gill (1996), 183-90.)

[555] Scodel (2014), 56.

passages are linked, I think that in this instance Apollonius, like Homer, is exploring both the difficulties in his characters' interaction and training his audience in Theory of Mind interaction. (There is, of course, the considerable irony that, as Scodel notes, Homeric characters 'talk and talk, and we hear so much about them and their motives',[556] and yet the requirement for an *Argonautica* audience's ability to practise Theory of Mind with regard to Jason is precisely because he doesn't talk or explain his motives!) Because the explicit Theory of Mind signposting is omitted,[557] which within the narrative is perhaps linked to the χόλος that has overtaken Telamon, it is not possible to tell whether he reads Jason's passivity (characterised by εὔκηλος) as deep thought or as a complete lack of thought. In this way, then, Apollonius problematises the intricacies of human interaction, especially at times of heightened emotion.[558]

Of course, this is not to say that Telamon is wrong in making his interpretation: he observes a calm external and from that extrapolates a calm internal, a process that validates the types of physical expression of emotion that have been shown at other instances in the poem. Equally, his assumption is not without narratological merit in that it plays on the undercurrent of dissatisfaction with Jason as leader in the place of Heracles. In this instance, then, Apollonius again limits his description of Jason's physical expression of inner turmoil, and consequently renders him far less readable to other protagonists.

As with the previous passage, however, this does not mean that we cannot glean interesting and enlightening perspectives from the description that Apollonius does

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[556] Scodel (2014), 74.
[557] By this I mean that, in asking τίνα τήνδε μετὰ φρεσὶ μῆτιν ἑλίσσεις (463), Idas is drawing attention to the fact that he is in the act of mindreading Jason.
[558] It is worth recalling here the discussion in the previous chapter on the Theory of Mind interaction between Polyphemus and Heracles, and the ease with which meaning was conveyed in that instance. Since Telamon's complaint against Jason here is thematically linked (Telamon is angry at the loss of Heracles, which, in turn, stems from the loss of Hylas), it is tempting to see the Polyphemus/Heracles scene as a Theory of Mind foil for this Telamon/Jason scene. If so, it would further accentuate the difficulty of character interaction that stems from Jason's passivity.

provide, and it is to this—in the form of the specific imagery used—that I shall now turn.

II.II.I EATING ONE'S *THUMOS*—SILENCE AND GRIEF

The imagery used of Jason, specifically νειόθεν … θυμὸν ἔδων, is worthy of further investigation. In terms of cognitive universals, this is another example of a container metaphor, in which νειόθεν ('from the bottom') defines the limit of the container in the same way as εἰν ἑοῖ αὐτῷ at 1.460. The imagery of eating the *thumos* is strongly evocative and occurs nowhere else in the *Argonautica*, thus indicating the extreme internal emotion that Jason experiences at this point.

Again, however, our understanding of Jason here is significantly enhanced by an examination of Homeric precedent, where the combination of psychological organ and verb appear six times.[559] Two of these are formulaic lines in the voice of the narrator and are employed to indicate that an individual has consumed enough food: αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δείπνησε καὶ ἤραρε θυμὸν ἐδωδῇ ('but when he had dined and satisfied his heart with food', *Od.* 5.95, of Hermes; 14.111, of Odysseus). While these do not have the same emotional sense as the example from the *Argonautica*, it is worth noting that Odysseus is described immediately prior as eating silently (ἀκέων, 14.110). Additionally, after both instances of the formula, the protagonist then goes on to speak (Hermes at 5.97ff., Odysseus at 14.115ff.). If these intertexts are indeed valid, then it is possible to see a degree of poetic design and tension: Jason fits the pattern to the extent that he is silent like Odysseus,[560] but emphatically

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[559] These are *Il.* 6.202; *Od.* 5.95; 9.75; 10.143, 379; 14.111. It is noticeable that these cluster in the *Odyssey*. As will be shown, the phrase is used repeatedly of Odysseus and his crew.

[560] It is not explicitly stated that Hermes is silent, but this can be assumed from the emphatic καὶ τότε δή in αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δείπνησε καὶ ἤραρε θυμὸν ἐδωδῇ, / καὶ τότε δή μιν ἔπεσσιν ἀμειβόμενος προσέειπεν… ('but when he had dined and satisfied his *thumos* with food, then indeed he exchanged words with her and said…', 5.95-6).

breaks it, thus frustrating our expectations, by not going on to speak like Odysseus and Hermes.[561]

Another twice occurring, formulaic use of the phrase within the *Odyssey* intertextually sharpens our understanding of the specific emotional trauma that Jason is clearly experiencing, namely dangerous journeys and the loss of comrades. Twice Odysseus recounts how he and his comrades ate their *thumos* with toil and grief: κείμεθ', ὁμοῦ καμάτῳ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι θυμὸν ἔδοντες ('we lay, one and the same eating our *thumos* with weariness and pain', 9.75; 10.143). The non-verbal behaviour is similarly low status and depressed: just as Jason sits (1288), so Odysseus and his crew lie down. Furthermore, in both cases, the formulaic line is preceded by a phrase that mentions the grief at lost comrades: ἔνθεν δὲ προτέρω πλέομεν ἀκαχήμενοι ἦτορ, / ἄσμενοι ἐκ θανάτοιο, φίλους ὀλέσαντες ἑταίρους ('from there we sailed forwards grieved at heart, glad [to be] be from death, having lost our dear comrades', 9.62-3; 10.133-4). Such explicit parallels between the loss of Odysseus' men and the leaving behind of Heracles, Polyphemus, and Hylas cannot be overlooked, though I would suggest that there is a slight difference in tone. Whilst Odysseus' men have lost their lives during the violence of the sea passage, the Argonauts realise unwittingly (ἀιδρείῃσι, 1283) that they have left behind part of their crew. I think that the presence of the intertext is undeniable, and its effect is twofold: at the close level of the depiction of emotion, it imbues Jason's mental turmoil with the gravitas of poetic precedent, but simultaneously, at the higher narrative level lends the depiction of the loss of members of the Argonautican crew a certain comic absurdity, since they are ultimately responsible for the oversight.[562]

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[561] It is, of course, partly this fact that causes him to be noticed and chided by the on looking Telamon.
[562] This is not to say that the *Argonautica* passage is a perfect analogue of the *Odyssey* passages, since there are some discrepancies of order and duration. In both Odyssey passages, they sail on with grief for fallen comrades (9.62-3; 10.133-4), land the ship (ἤπειρόνδε, 9.73; ναύλοχον ἐς λιμένα … ἔνθα τότ' ἐκβάντες, 10.141-2), and then for two days and two nights (δύω νύκτας δύο τ' ἤματα, 9.74; δύο τ' ἤματα καὶ δύο νύκτας, 10.142) continuously eat their *thumoi* with grief and sorrow. In the *Argonautica* passage, the crew sail on first (1.1274-9), then while still at sea realise that they have left behind their comrades (1.1283), and then only Jason is described as eating his *thumos* (though κρατερὸν νεῖκος overcome the rest, 1.1284). There is, then, a simple inversion: in the *Odyssey*, the men are lost at sea and the remaining crew sail on and eventually grieve on land; in the *Argonautica*,

The final passage from the *Odyssey* to feature the phrase is perhaps the most intertextually important. Odysseus recounts his time with Circe, and quotes her words when he refuses the food offered to him (10.378-9):[563]

> ’τίφθ' οὕτως, Ὀδυσεῦ, κατ' ἄρ' ἕζεαι ἶσος ἀναύδῳ,
> θυμὸν ἔδων, βρώμης δ' οὐχ ἅπτεαι οὐδὲ ποτῆτος;
>
> Why, Odysseus, do you sit like this, like someone speechless,
> eating your *thumos*, and touch neither food nor drink?

Most notably, he sits like someone speechless, just as Jason is described as sitting and speaking not a word on one side or the other (οὔδε τι τοῖον ἔπος μετεφώνεεν οὔδε τι τοῖον / Αἰσονίδης, ἀλλ' ἧστο, 1287-8). To further strengthen the parallel with the silent, brooding Jason, immediately prior to the quotation above, Odysseus describes himself as sitting quietly thinking of other things, while his *thumos* boded on bad things (ἀλλ' ἥμην ἀλλοφρονέων, κακὰ δ' ὄσσετο θυμός, 10.374). (Odysseus also goes on to say that he is afflicted by sore grief; στυγερὸν δέ με πένθος ἔχοντα, 376.)[564] Apollonius Sophistes also draws attention to the link between silence and the eating of the *thumos* in a gloss on ἀναύδῳ (378): <ἀναύδῳ> ἀφώνῳ· "καθέζετ' ἶσος ἀναύδῳ, θυμὸν ἔδων."

Returning to the idea of refusing food, Pietro Pucci (1987: 169) has written of the 'epic convention that the person who grieves and mourns rejects the idea of food.

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the men are lost of land, while the grieving takes place at sea. Finally, the length of time that Odysseus and his comrades grieve clearly constitutes the strength of the emotion, which can be intertextually applied to and thus inform Jason's βαρείη … ἄτη (1288).

[563] Fantuzzi & Hunter (2005: 115-16) note the intertext, and hence Jason's portrayal as an Odysseus figure. They go on to show how Jason's distancing from the Argonauts picks up specific Homeric scenes. I shall return to the refusing of food shortly.

[564] The congruity of grief with the *thumos* eating imagery is confirmed by the only instance in the *Iliad*: Bellerophon, hated by the gods, wanders over the Aleian plain, eating his *thumos*: ἤτοι ὃ κὰπ πεδίον τὸ Ἀλήϊον οἶος ἀλᾶτο, / ὃν θυμὸν κατέδων…, 6.201-2. (On the possible reasons for his disgrace, see Montiglio (2005), 45-7.) In his *Problemata*, Aristotle discusses the melancholia of great men and cites this as an example (923a25). The fact that Bellerophon is alone (οἶος) gives the impression of his isolation in grief, in a similar manner to Jason, isolated by grief from his fellow Argonauts, at 1.1286. Of the Iliadic passage, Graziosi and Haubold (2010: 135) state that the *thumos* eating imagery 'expresses the physicality of grief'.

Obliviousness to eating goes hand in hand with the presence of death … [and that] … mourning …mimes death and its effects' with the mourner refusing food. As a prime example of this, Pucci adduces Achilles' mourning over the death of Patroclus; at *Il*. 24.128-32, Thetis says

> τέκνον ἐμὸν, τέο μέχρις ὀδυρόμενος καὶ ἀχεύων
> σὴν ἔδεαι κραδίην, μεμνημένος οὔτέ τι σίτου
> οὔτ' εὐνῆς;
>
> My child, how long with wailing and grieving
> will you eat your *kradie*, remembering neither food
> nor bed?

Thetis' speech references here the same grief, resulting in the same refusal of food, which is accompanied by the same *thumos* eating imagery, albeit here with a different psychic organ, the *kradie*.[565] It is clear, then, that in these passages, the refusal of food at times of grief, owing to the death of a comrade, is emeshed with the imagery of *thumos/kradie* eating. Thus Apollonius' description of Jason that employs this particular imagery is a powerful intertextual hint at what emotion he is experiencing: grief. I think, then, that it is clear that Apollonius drew heavily on these scenes, with their accompanying cultural associations, when portraying the silence grief of Jason at this juncture.[566]

II.ii.ii TO SIT IN SILENCE

While experiencing the grief that I have just examined, Jason is described as sitting (ἧστο), and it is not just the perceived nature of this sitting, but also the non-verbal behaviour in and of itself, that forms the basis of Telamon's accusation: Ἧσ' αὕτως εὔκηλος. (The verb is placed emphatically at the beginning of the line.) As has also

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[565] In his commentary on this passage, Richardson (1993: 289) focuses primarily on the refusal of food ('fasting because of unhappiness') and thus draws a parallel with the other passage at issue here: Odysseus at *Od*. 10.378-9.

[566] Of course, such a clear signpost to this specific emotion confirms to the external audience that Telamon is incorrect in his reading of Jason as εὔκηλος.

Cf. n.550 (above) on the ἄω etymology of ἄτη, which may partly inform that Apollonian scene here.

been shown, his body language is also accompanied by a lack of speech.[567] Silvia Montiglio has undertaken an extensive study of these behaviours in various areas of Ancient Greek culture,[568] in which it becomes apparent that understanding the full range of meanings of such non-verbal behaviour is complex in that it is heavily context specific. While Montiglio's monograph does not touch on Apollonius, I think that her analysis will deepen our understanding of Jason's presentation here,[569] as well as the social mechanics of the *Argonautica* as a whole. As such, I shall first outline her findings and apply them to relevant Apollonian passages, before returning to situate Jason at 1.1286-9 within the analysis.

Montiglio first notes the ritualistic expressions of these behaviours (2000: 46): 'ritual silence is often accompanied by withdrawal from sight, sitting, and fasting.' Thus, when Jason and Medea visit Circe, following Zeus' decree that they must cleanse themselves after the murder of Apsyrtus (4.557-61), they immediately and silently rush to the hearth, the place of suppliants, and sit there (τὼ δ' ἄνεῳ καὶ ἄναυδοι ἐφ' ἑστίῃ ἀίξαντε / ἵζανον, 'but they in speechless silence darted to the heart and sat', 4.693-4).[570]

As has been shown in the analysis above, there is also the 'frequent association of silence with sitting, fasting, and withdrawing from sight'.[571] These behaviours all function to negate social contact. And as in the passage of Odysseus in Circe's cave, certain synecdochical relationships are thus created: Jason's silence at 1.1287 is

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[567] Toohey (1990), 157 notes Jason's silence in relation to his examination of melancholia. (See above.)

[568] Montiglio (2000). Frustratingly, sitting—a prime instance of non-verbal behaviour—is not covered with any degree of systematicity in Lateiner (1995).

[569] The findings here will also be relevant to the previously examined passage (1.460-2). There, Jason's body positioning could be inferred from the use of κατηφιάω, while his silence could also be assumed.

[570] For the sitting and suppliancy, see Bremmer (1991), 25. For an analysis of this suppliancy scene (and others in the *Argonautica*), see Plantinga (2000), 119-23. Gould (1973) is the standard treatment. Medea and Jason's immediate movement to the hearth, thus rejecting the initial offer of a seat (691-2), is 'a sign of urgency'.

[571] Montiglio (2000), 48.

reinforced by language that is intertextually associated with fasting (θυμὸν ἔδων).[572] Although it doesn't meet all of Montiglio's criteria, the description of Idas at 3.1169-70, where he is described as sitting apart from the Argonauts in anger as he does not support the decision to accept Medea's help, is a good example of sitting and negative social contact (ὁ δ' οἰόθεν οἶος ἑταίρων / Ἴδας ἦστ' ἀπάνευθε δακὼν χόλον, 'by himself and alone from the companions, Idas sat apart, biting his anger').

However, in other social situations, such as assemblies, the process of sitting down 'inaugurates … public speech'.[573] There are many examples of this in the *Argonautica*: the Argonauts sit to choose a leader (πάντες ἐπισχερὼ ἑδριόωντο, 'all sat in a row', 1.330); they sit in silent rows to listen to Jason at 3.170 (ἠρέμα ᾗ ἐνὶ χώρῃ ἐπισχερὼ ἑδριόωντες, ''), and in their sorrow at 4.1345-6 (ἀχνυμένους … ἱδρύσας); the Lemnian women gather and sit in the agora (Λημνιάδες δὲ γυναῖκες ἀνὰ πτόλιν ἶζον ἰοῦσαι / εἰς ἀγορήν, 1.653-4); and finally, on a smaller scale, Hera and Athena are seated by Aphrodite when they come to her for help (εἴσω τέ σφε κάλει, καὶ ἀπὸ θρόνου ὦρτο / εἷσέ τ' ἐνὶ κλισμοῖσιν· ἀτὰρ μετέπειτα καὶ αὐτή / ἵζανεν, 'she called them inside, rose from her seat, and sat them on a couch; but thereafter she herself sat down', 3.48-50).

In a manner perhaps semantically linked to the business of an assembly or meeting, sitting is 'a prerequisite for deliberation', for which Montiglio adduces the example of the Shield of Achilles, which contains an image of elders sitting on polished stones (*Il*. 18.503-5).[574] In exactly this way, the Argonauts sit and collectively deliberate a plan for their voyage at 4.492-3 (ἔνθα δὲ ναυτιλίης πυκινὴν πέρι μητιάασκον / ἑζόμενοι βουλήν); Heracles is twice described as sitting amongst the Argonauts as he makes the decision that Jason should lead the expedition (ἥμενον ἐν

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[572] As Montiglio (2000: 48) notes, this is also the case in the *Odyssey* scene: 'Odysseus is silent; but Circe says that he resembles an *anaudos* only because he rejects food and remains seated. In other words, she labels as speechlessness a silence that extends to the body.'
[573] Montilgio (2000), 48.
[574] In this respect, Montiglio (2000: 49): 'to sit down is the egalitarian posture of shared speech'. This is shown by the fact that Jason and Telamon sit down together upon the reconciliation of their quarrel (ἀρθμηθέντες ὅπῃ πάρος, ἑδριόωντο, 'they sat down, united as previously', 1.1344).

μέσσοισι … ὁ δ' αὐτόθεν ἔνθα περ ἧστο, 1.342-3); while, finally, Medea sits in doubt in her bedchamber before making her decision over whether or not to aid Jason (ἑζομένη δήπειτα δοάσσατο, 3.770).[575]

Outside of speech, sitting can show the power and status of individuals:[576] after she has spoken, Hypsipyle sits at her father's throne (θῶκον ἐφίζανε πατρὸς ἑοῖο / λάινον, 1.667-8). Within this category, I would also put the example, just discussed, of Heracles at the assembly: his social status is so great—symbolised by the Argonauts collective expectation that he should lead them—that he can speak while sitting, whereas convention would dictate that he stand.[577]

While sitting can be the repose of armies that have ceased fighting (*Il.* 7.58-60), it can also signify idleness, impotence, and cowardice.[578] A prime example of this is Achilles' self-reproach for reneging on fighting at 18.104: ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀρούρης. In exactly this way both Thetis (μηκέτι νῦν ἀκταῖς Τυρσηνίσιν ἧσθε μένοντες, 'no longer now must you sit, staying on the Tyrrhenian shores', 4.856) and Medea (ἀλλ' οὔ … ἔσσεσθ' εὔκηλοι, 'but no longer will you sit idly', 4.390) criticise the Argonauts as they lounge around on the beach and the Argo, respectively. Sitting denoting inaction, and by extension cowardice, is related to the idea that action standing up, and movement in general, is concomitant with action;[579] though Montiglio does not mention it, this does, of course, have a basis within the cognitive sciences, and specifically what Lakoff & Johnson refer to as orientational metaphor.[580] On the Shield of Achilles, the elders dart up in turn to give judgement

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[575] For δοάσσατο, so n.236 (above).
[576] For an analysis of sitting in Roman and Hellenistic art, see Davies (2005).
[577] His sitting is at odds with that of Jason, whom, upon receiving Heracles' blessing, rises joyously (ὄρνυτ' Ἰήσων / γηθόσυνος, 1.349-50), thus showing that he sits while the other speaks.
[578] Montiglio (2000), 50.
[579] Montiglio (2000), 50: the contrast is of 'the active opening of a body that gets up to speak, move, and fight, with the inertia of an immobile, seated, and silent…'
[580] Recall Lakoff & Johnson (1980: 14-15): 'drooping posture typically goes along with sadness and depression … [and] … erect posture with positive mental state'.
Bremmer (1991), 26: '[t[he presentation of the self in public, then, was often acted out according to the contrast of high (upright carriage) and low (sitting, prostration); the positive side of "upright" in

(τοῖσιν ἔπειτ' ἤϊσσον, ἀμοιβηδὶς δ' ἐδίκαζον, *Il.* 18.506); after it is announced, select Argonauts rise up to indicate their desire to accept Aeetes' context (ἀνόρουσε … ὦρτο, 3.516-7); finally, Jason sits up from the ground to speak (ἄρ' ἕζετ' ἐπὶ χθονός, ὧδέ τ' ἔειπεν, 4.1332) and then leaps up to call far into the distance for his comrades (καὶ ἀναΐξας ἑτάρους ἐπὶ μακρὸν ἀΰτει, 4.1337).

The length of this analysis, which has classified the great majority of applicable scenes within the *Argonautica* (for the first time to my knowledge), shows the many different, context specific interpretations of sitting and silence. Situating the Jason passage (1.1286-9) within this considerable nexus of meaning is complicated, and, I think, dependent upon the relevant focalisation. With the benefit of the analysis undertaken on θυμὸν ἔδων, which reveals that Jason is in the throes of grief, I think that Jason's silence could also reflect the act of deliberation: he is silently, desperately, trying to find a solution. When focalised through Telamon, however, it is clear that Jason's behaviour falls short: his sitting is viewed as withdrawing from society and as an example of idleness and cowardice,[581] whereas—we might surmise—Telamon thinks that he should rise up and act, as he himself will go on to do in accepting Aeetes' challenge. Montiglio states that 'for the traditional hero calm is not a virtue',[582] and it is, I think no coincidence that it is exactly this perceived emotion, in the form of the charge of εὔκηλος, that drives Telamon's criticism.

The intertextual import, both in the form of the *thumos* eating imagery and the silent sitting, is considerable, and marks this out as an important passage for understanding the depiction of Jason's psychology. Again, we see inner turmoil finding expression in the form of outer inaction and passivity; he does not speak or move: οὔδε τι τοῖον ἔπος μετεφώνεεν οὔδε τι τοῖον (1287). This is clearly at odds with the portrayals of Medea and Jason, whose similar mental turmoil was expressed with frantic

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this contrast is also shown by the fact that the Greek word *orthos* ("upright") and its cognates frequently carry the meaning "prosperity", "uprightness", or "restoration"'.

[581] His charge that Jason sits εὔκηλος is the same as that levied at the collective Argonauts by Medea at 4.390.

[582] Montiglio (2000), 51.

movement. I shall now examine one final example of such outer passivity at a similar moment of inner turmoil, before moving on to some examples where Jason is portrayed with greater movement, similar to that of Medea and Heracles. This passage is as psychologically rich as those two preceding, but the analysis already undertaken will allow some initial points to be made more speedily.

II.ɪɪɪ CHALLENGED BY AEETES

In Book 3, Aeetes challenges Jason to yoke the fire-breathing bulls, plough the serpents' teeth, and slay the resulting Earthborn. Apollonius describes his reaction as such (3.422-6):

> ὁ δὲ σῖγα ποδῶν πάρος ὄμματα πήξας
> ἧστ' αὔτως ἄφθογγος, ἀμηχανέων κακότητι·
> βουλὴν δ' ἀμφὶ πολὺν στρώφα χρόνον, οὐδέ πη εἶχε
> θαρσαλέως ὑποδέχθαι, ἐπεὶ μέγα φαίνετο ἔργον.
> ὀψὲ δ' ἀμειβόμενος προσελέξατο κερδαλέοισιν·

> But he in silence with eyes fixed before his feet
> sat speechless, at a loss with regard to the wickedness.
> For a long time he kept turning a plan of action, but in no way could he
> accept with confidence, for the task appeared huge.
> After a long time, he answered and addressed him with profitable words.

Bearing in mind that the Argonauts had hoped that Aeetes would give them the Fleece freely (3.179-81), such a pronouncement from the king can be expected to have a considerable psychological impact upon Jason. Apollonius presents him in a broadly similar manner to that which we have already seen: again, he is *amechanos*, he is silent (both σῖγα and ἄφθογγος), and, as in the last passage, he sits. Owing to its similarities, this passage thus enters into the growing nexus of interpretation of Jason's psychology, which allows previous passages to bear on the current.

In terms of Theory of Mind, this passage is interesting in that it is focalised solely on Jason. There is no-one to (mis)interpret his actions, as Idas and Telamon did previously. Additionally, and unlike the previous passages, in the phrase βουλὴν δ'

ἀμφὶ πολὺν στρώφα χρόνον, we are told exactly what he is thinking about: a plan of future action to acquire the Fleece.[583] We thus know that Jason's thoughts here are concerned with the immediate future in just the same way that Medea's will be when described shortly in the sunbeam simile. Specifically, Apollonius' language reifies Jason's plan (βουλήν), which moves constantly within him (πολὺν στρώφα χρόνον). The spatial configuration of this description, which implicitly assumes a container metaphor, corroborates the depiction of the internal that we have seen elsewhere.[584] Furthermore, the presentation of his thoughts as constantly twisting and turning is entirely congruent with the depiction of Medea's, which, as I have shown, find an analogue in the vacillating sunbeam. These examples, in addition to that of Heracles and the gadfly, imply a large degree of systematicity in Apollonius' portrayal of such mental events. What is different about Apollonius' portrayal of Jason here is that his internal mental processes do not find external expression in the form of movement. Thus, while we can say that the nature of the portrayal of his thought is similar to that of other protagonists at other similar points of heightened mental turmoil, he is, ultimately, introverted.[585]

As I have highlighted, there are similarities with previous passages in the way that Jason is presented, and these corroborate the authorial statement that he is thinking deeply on his immediate course of action.[586] His silence, as well as his sitting, conform to Montiglio's category of deliberation. Similarly, Apollonius states that he ποδῶν πάρος ὄμματα πήξας. Of course, to fix one's eyes on one's feet requires a

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[583] It is, of course, impossible to say (and ultimately irrelevant) whether or not there is deliberately no-one to read/interpret Jason precisely because Apollonius describes what he is thinking. (It could be said that the constraints of the narrative, in the form of the embassy, renders an instance of (mis)communication between Jason and another of the Argonauts not viable.)

[584] Thus, I agree with Hunter (1989)'s comments *ad loc* that, in the tmesis of ἀμφὶ … στρώφα, 'the word-order imitates the twisting of Jason's thoughts', but would go further in bringing out the manner with which the mental process is envisaged. Campbell (1994) *ad loc* references the cognate of the verb, ἀμφιπεριστρώφα, which describes Hector's use of his horses at *Il.* 8.348.

[585] Campbell (1994), 353: 'Jason, completely thrown, does not know which way to turn: a temporary, stunned introversion is the immediate symptom of this numbing panic'. See Campbell (1994) *ad loc* for further comment on this scene.

[586] Usefully, the fact that we can tie Apollonius' explicit statement of Jason's thoughts with these behaviours validates the interpretation of those same behaviours in the preceding analysis of Jason.

bowed head, which is reminiscent of the implied non-verbal behaviour which was discussed in the first passage, where Jason was described as κατηφιόωντι ἐοικώς (1.460). The explicit statement that Jason averts his eyes to his feet is worthy of further investigation.

The specific term is used once elsewhere in the *Argonautica* to accompany the scene of deliberation in which Hera and Aphrodite attempt to find a way to help the Argonauts.[587] (This was discussed above in relation to Apollonius' use of πορφύρω.) Going beyond the specific words used, though, it is possible to analyse the inherent non-verbal behaviour, and to form an impression of its meaning in certain social situations. In a similar way to the analysis of sitting (above), I shall set forth the interpretive categories before suggesting how they may allow us to interpret Jason in this instance.

Douglas Cairns has shown that social protocols for looking and looking away are heavily dependent upon context, and are particularly linked to the status of the conferring individuals.[588] (The reliance on context makes the categorisation similar to that of sitting conducted by Montiglio, and discussed above.) Broadly, to avert one's gaze can be an indication of respect in the presence of someone of higher social

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[587] Hunter (1989), 99 states that the gesture (at 3.22 and 3.422) 'conveys deep thought'. At 3.1063, just after she has given Jason the drugs that will enable him to complete the task, and thus after she has sealed her fate, Medea is described as σῖγα ποδῶν πάρος ὄσσε βαλοῦσα ('silently casting her eyes before her feet'). This is obviously the same behavioural expression of emotion, not least because it is accompanied by silence. Hunter (1989: 99) states that this has 'shades of amatory emotion'; I would agree with this, since Medea's actions are motivated by Eros' arrow, but I think it should also be seen in the context of her future life without him, and thus, to use Hunter's terminology, also has shades of her pondering her future courses of action.
Campbell (1994), 355 suggests that the description of Ganymede as σῖγα κατηφιόων (3.123) when he is about to lose the game of knucklebones with Eros should be understood in the same way.
[588] Cairns (2005a). Pages 133-37 deal specifically with the averted gaze. Relevant to this discussion also is Muecke (1984), 105-6: 'Like many other gestures … [looking down] has no single emotional referent, but requires additional information from the context to make its meaning clear'. See Muecke *ad loc* for examples of the gesture in the *Aeneid*. It is also worth recalling here my earlier discussion in Chapter Four on Medea's erotic gaze.

status;[589] such as when Hypsipyle's averts her gaze when first presented with Jason at 1.790-2.[590] This averted gaze can even 'convey a respect that borders on fear', such as when Anchises realises he is in the presence of a goddess (*H. Aphr*. 181-3), or Telemachos fears that the newly-restored Odysseus may be a god (*Od*. 16.178-9).[591]

The averted gaze in the face of others can also be 'a sign of a specific, self-conscious inhibition as well as indicating positive acknowledgement of another's status'.[592] In this way, the *Litai* to Achilles in *Iliad* 9 initially avert their eyes.[593] Finally, one can avert one's gaze to indicate that another has offended against one's own status,[594] such as when Helen, dissatisfied with Paris, is described as turning her eyes away (*lit*.: 'back'): ὄσσε πάλιν κλίνασα (*Il*. 3.427).

It is difficult to conclude that Apollonius is taking up a specific stance with respect to his description of Jason's averted gaze. This is perhaps because even in this passage, which goes further that any of those previously discussed in terms of the presentation of his motivations, Jason is still relatively underdetermined, thus making it difficult to comprehend his reading of the social dynamic. My initial conclusion would be that his non-verbal behaviour certainly indicates a respect for Aeetes' higher social status, and that that respect probably also, as in the second category, borders on fear. (It should be remembered that this passage is immediately after Aeetes is described with what has been shown to be the only example in the *Argonautica* of the standard Homeric description of decision making, which, according to Hunter, marks Aeetes

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[589] Cairns (2005a), 133-4. In this respect, the protocols are similar to the physical manifestation of the emotion of *aidos*; an individual evaluates the status of another, and if that status is deemed higher, this may manifest in direct visual attention, or, in the averted gaze.
However, it should be noted that there is 'at least one example' of gaze avoidance that are not markers of subordinate status; on this, see Cairns (2005a), 134.
[590] Since Hypsipyle is receiving Jason, the status hierarchy might appear inverted here; however, immediately prior to this, Jason has undergone a transformation by putting on his divine cloak (described at considerable length: 1.1.721-67). (This is somewhat of an *aristeia* through dress.) As Hypsipyle's reaction upon seeing him shows, this imbues him with a higher social status.
For other examples of respect conferred by appropriate gaze aversion, see Cairns (2005a), 147 n.39.
[591] Cairns (2005a), 134.
[592] Cairns (2005a), 134-5.
[593] For a general analysis of this passage incorporating Theory of Mind, see Scodel (2014), 65-8.
[594] Cairns (2005a), 135.

as a 'grim 'warrior' figure'.[595]) It is also possible, though, to interpret Jason's behaviour as a sign of self-conscious inhibition: just as Cairns states that, in the *Litai* in *Iliad* 9, 'apology requires an admission of fault',[596] so Jason may feel that he was at fault, and should apologise, for his request for the Fleece to be given freely. Of course, the fact that multiple interpretations present themselves does not mean that none of them are correct: on the contrary, it has been many times that in his portrayal of Jason, Apollonius adopts many critical stances.

A final, and, I think, crucial intertext linked to Jason's non-verbal behaviour comes from Antenor's description of Odysseus' rhetorical style (as opposed to Menelaos') at *Iliad* 3.216-20:

> ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πολύμητις ἀναΐξειεν Ὀδυσσεύς,
> στάσκεν, ὑπαὶ δὲ ἴδεσκε κατὰ χθονὸς ὄμματα πήξας,
> σκῆπτρον δ' οὔτ' ὀπίσω οὔτε προπρηνὲς ἐνώμα,
> ἀλλ' ἀστεμφὲς ἔχεσκεν, ἀΐδρεϊ φωτὶ ἐοικώς·
> φαίης κε ζάκοτόν τέ τιν' ἔμμεναι ἄφρονά τ' αὔτως.
>
> But whenever Odysseus of many wiles rose up,
> he would stand, and look down with eyes fixed down on the ground,
> and the sceptre he moved neither backwards nor forwards,
> but held it unmoved, like an ignorant man;
> and you would say that he was a surly man or even a fool.

This passage is most famous for the description of Odysseus' words, which fall like snowflakes on a winter's day (καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίηισιν, 222) and thus achieve a cumulative rhetorical effect.[597] However, for my argument, I am more interested in the presentation of the speaker. Just like Jason, Odysseus' eyes are fixed on the ground.[598] Homer then describes the complete lack of movement of the

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[595] See text to n.519 (above).
[596] Cairns (2005a), 135.
[597] See Kirk (1985), 296. The other common interpretation is that Odysseus' words fall thick and fast. Moulton (1977), 65 notes that snow similes are rare in the *Iliad*. (References *ad loc*.) The rarity of this passage as a whole will be important for my upcoming argument.
[598] This parallel is noticed by Campbell (1994) *ad loc*, in terms of the contrast between Odysseus' standing and Jason's sitting, upon which I shall comment shortly. Campbell offers no further interpretation, however.
I think that κατὰ χθονὸς (of Odysseus) and ποδῶν πάρος (of Jason) are synonymous for my purposes, since they both refer to the same body positioning.

sceptre: unshaken (ἀστεμφές), and neither forwards nor backwards, from which we are to understand that such motion would be expected in a good speaker to allow them to add emphasis to their argument.[599] The sceptre, then, functioning as a physical extension of Odysseus, further emphasises his stillness. Homer then states that Odysseus resembles an ignorant man (ἀΐδρεϊ φωτὶ ἐοικώς), and that you would think him exceedingly angry (ζάκοτόν)[600] or foolish (ἄφρονά).[601] The point is, of course, that in the specific case of Odysseus, despite the overt non-verbal behaviour, you would be quite wrong to think this, since Odysseus is a very effective rhetorician: one does not need to follow the established pattern, with its overt non-verbal behaviour to be effective.[602]

This passage is well known from the ancient scholia for being the first analysis of rhetorical styles.[603] Owing to the strength of the parallels, I think that Apollonius is directly appealing to this famous example, to inform his psychological depiction of Jason.[604] Cramer (1976: 303) states that Odysseus 'makes no attempt to reveal his whole mind, indeed he does just the reverse', which, I argue, should be applied directly to Jason. Indeed, Apollonius says that, at the end of Jason's deliberation, he speaks 'profitably' (κερδαλέοισιν).[605] This is the only instance of this word in the

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[599] Kirk (1985), 296.

[600] See Cairns (2005a), 135. As discussed earlier, an individual might look away thus to convey to others that they have offended against one's own status. Again, this is not the case here, but Homer's explanation validates that general interpretation.

[601] Cramer (1976), 303 thinks that this is a conscious choice: 'the manner involves deliberately incomplete and misleading presentation of himself'; he also thinks that this may be unique to Odysseus. Such intentionality is not relevant to my argument.

[602] Martin (1989), 96 contextualises: 'Odysseus employs an unconventional strategy for capturing his audience, a style that plays off the shared knowledge of conventions, and thereby foregrounds Odysseus' rhetorical act. By creatively modifying traditional material (the way one holds the sceptre), Odysseus brings about a memorable performance.' However, in his springing up to speak (ἀναΐξειεν), thus conforming to social conventions, Montiglio (2000: 75) argues that Odysseus performance is 'a mixture of conventions and novelty'. Of course, complying with the former to a certain extent will merely accentuate the latter.

[603] See Erbse (1969) ad loc. Cf. Montiglio (2000), 75; Cramer (1976), 303.

[604] There is, of course, an obvious discrepancy in that Odysseus stands whereas Jason sits. As I have shown above, however, this is because Jason is portrayed with non-verbal behaviour prototypical of deliberation, whereas Odysseus is in the act of speaking.

[605] Gillies (1928), 50 argues that the sense of the word here is 'prudence rather than cunning', since 'Hermes himself would find nothing cunning in this speech [in which Jason accepts Aeetes' challenge]'(!) Cf. Campbell (1994), 357: 'Jason's response is well-advised, as it confers the positive

Argonautica,[606] while it is often associated Odysseus in the *Odyssey*, most noticeably just before he addresses Nausicaa in Book 6 (αὐτίκα μειλίχιον καὶ κερδαλέον φάτο μῦθον, 'immediately he spoke gentle and profitable words', 148).[607] By intertextual extension, then, Apollonius ennobles Jason with this nod to Odysseus, and by framing the former's psychological expression in terms of the latter, takes a stand on different styles of oratorical address.[608]

Thus far in this chapter, I have ascertained that Jason does have an inner mental life, and have analysed three passages where his inner turmoil is expressed with relative outer passivity. I have shown that—contrary to the pronouncements of some critics—Jason is not blank, but that we can achieve significant insights into his psychology by examining closely the relatively few terms that Apollonius does ascribe to him. In some respects, then, he is portrayed in a similar manner to that of Medea and Heracles in the preceding chapters, albeit with far less expansive imagery. I shall end this chapter by looking a double epic simile, which is used of Jason at a time when he experiences positive emotion.

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advantage of keeping Aeetes at bay'. Clare (2002: 277) notes that before Jason's speech the narrator specifically mentions the craftiness of his words, but that, in the speech, he 'appears to do nothing in his speech other than agree in the most morose fashion possible to Aeetes' terms'. Regardless of the specific meaning, it does not after my argument that this passage recalls Odysseus at *Il*. 3.216-20.

[606] The cognate, κερδοσύνη, is used at 2.951 of Sinope's tricking of Zeus, while refers to Medea at 3.1364 as πολυκερδέος.

[607] Many scholars see Odysseus in Apollonius' use of this word, though none (to my knowledge) link specifically to Odysseus at *Il* 3.216-30. Heubeck (1988), 270: 'κερδοσύνη is typical of Odysseus in all his encounters outside the earlier wanderings … and forms parts of the Odyssean concept of the heroic (crafty success rather than the Iliadic tragic honour).' Beye (1969), 52 states that the word has 'crafty overtones of Odysseus'. Campbell (1994), 356-7 is open to this interpretation; for further discussion on the word, see Campbell *ad loc*. Κερδαλέος is also used of Achilles at *Il* 1.149 and Agamemnon at 4.339.

[608] If this intertext is added to the growing nexus of passages that collectively interpret Jason's psychology, I think that there is, perhaps, an interesting parallel between the spatial descriptions of the way that Odysseus moves his sceptre neither forwards nor backwards (3.218), and, at 1.1287, Jason is described as οὔδε τι τοῖον ἔπος μετεφώνεεν οὔδε τι τοῖον.

This simile describes Jason immediately after he has sprinkled himself with Medea's drugs (3.1256-67):

καὶ δ᾽ αὐτὸς μετέπειτα παλύνετο: δῦ δέ μιν ἀλκὴ
σμερδαλέη ἄφατός τε καὶ ἄτρομος, αἱ δ᾽ ἑκάτερθεν
χεῖρες ἐπερρώσαντο περὶ σθένεϊ σφριγόωσαι.
ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἀρήιος ἵππος ἐελδόμενος πολέμοιο,
σκαρθμῷ ἐπιχρεμέθων κρούει πέδον, αὐτὰρ ὕπερθεν
κυδιόων ὀρθοῖσιν ἐπ᾽ οὔασιν αὐχέν᾽ ἀείρει:
τοῖος ἄρ᾽ Αἰσονίδης ἐπαγαίετο κάρτεϊ γυίων.
πολλὰ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα μετάρσιον ἴχνος ἔπαλλεν,
ἀσπίδα χαλκείην μελίην τ᾽ ἐν χερσὶ τινάσσων.
φαίης κεν ζοφεροῖο κατ᾽ αἰθέρος ἀίσσουσαν
χειμερίην στεροπὴν θαμινὸν μεταπαιφάσσεσθαι
ἐκ νεφέων, ἅ τ᾽ ἔπειτα μελάντατον ὄμβρον ἄγωνται.

Thereafter he sprinkled himself, and into him came terrible
alke, unutterable and fearless, and on each side
his hands moved nimbly, swelling exceedingly with strength.
Just like when a warhorse, longing for battle,
strikes the ground as he prances and neighs, but high above
proudly raises its neck, its ears upright,
so Jason exulted in the strength of his limbs;
and many times he leapt an airborne step this way and that,
brandishing his bronze shield and ashen spear in his hands.
And you would say that down from the gloomy heavens darted
wintry lightning, flashing thickly to and fro
from the clouds, when they bring their blackest rainstorm.

For Jason, who has suffered from a relative dearth of imagery, this passage is a considerable departure, in that it involves two interweaving similes. First we see the physical effects that the drugs have on Jason as his hands move nimbly and swell (1257-8). There is then the simile of the eager warhorse prancing and whinnying as it lifts its head with ears erect (1259-61). It is to this horse that Jason is compared as he exults (ἐπαγαίετο) in the strength of his limbs, leaping in the air *entha kai entha*, and brandishing his sword and shield in his hands. What we can presume to be the flashing and rapid movement of these weapons are then described in a second simile of lightning flashing from the dark clouds (1265-7).

The topic of this second simile famously appears in the *Iliad* both in relation to Paris (after leaving Helen and putting on his armour at 6.506-11) and Hector (after Apollo has breathed new strength into him at 15.263-8), and, as such, has caused a degree of confusion for both ancient and modern commentators.[609] I shall now offer an analysis of the imagery in terms of the prevalent cognitive metaphors.

First, immediately after sprinkling the drugs on himself, *alke* enters into Jason (δῦ … μιν ἀλκή).[610] This is another example of an ontological metaphor, specifically a container metaphor, which reveals that the human conceptual system is defined by boundaries, in a way that leverages our experiences of boundaries in the physical world.[611] There are also multiple orientational metaphors present. Unlike the previous passages, Jason is experiencing positive emotion, which finds expression in his non-verbal behaviour: he has all the positive characteristics (happiness, control, high status, and control) which are correlated with the swelling of his hands (1257-8), and his bodily gestures of leaping in the air (1263), brandishing his weapons (1264), and,

[609] Hunter (1989) *ad loc* states that Apollonius has simplified Homer's simile to emphasise primarily 'Jason's readiness to confront truly heroic tasks'. Another important interpretation is Knight (1995), 102-4, who notes the external parallels with the traditional Homeric arming scene, as well as the internal contrast between Aeetes (traditionally Homeric) and Jason (un-Homeric in his reliance on Medea's drugs). (See Knight also for comparisons with the version of this simile found at *Aeneid* 11.492-7.) Effe (2011), 209-10 writes that the comparison with both Paris and Hector is apt: intertextually, Jason acquires from Paris 'the questionable prowess of … the "ladies' hero"—a criticism aimed at him repeatedly by Idas (3.536, 1252)—while Hector's situation, in which his strength derives from Apollo, reinforces Jason's reliance on external help. This is also the conclusion of Reitz (1996), 83-6.

[610] In terms of the specific language that is used here, I think that there is a degree of Apollonian innovation. It is standard Homeric practice in a scene such as this, where the agent's force is derived from another, for *menos* to be breathed into the agent. In this respect, the Homeric intertext is a passage involving Hector and Apollo (ἔμπνευσε μένος, 15.262). In terms of Iliadic usage, Collins (1998: 1) states that 'of the terms for strength … that are applied to warriors in battle … only *alke* is described as an autonomous driving force.' (See Collins for more discussion.) And yet, we see in this passage from the *Argonautica* that *alke* is used in exactly the same way as *menos* in the *Iliad*, as strength from an external party. This example here is the only example of *alke* used in this way in the *Argonautica*. At 3.1350-1, where Jason is just about to fight the Earthborn, he is described, with another container metaphor, as filling his great *thumos* with *alke* (μέγαν δ' ἐμπλήσατο θυμόν / ἀλκῆς). Whether or not this example is of *alke* as an autonomous force (and therefore complies with standard Homeric usage) is difficult to judge, since in this instance Jason seems to confer it upon himself (despite the fact, of course, that the strength originally derives from Medea's drugs).

[611] See the references to Lakoff & Johnson (1980), above.

by figurative extension, the warhorse's lifting its neck with ears erect (1260-1).[612] Furthermore, the fact that this strength comes from outside is reminiscent of the metaphorical structuring of the emotion of *eros* in the previous chapter.

The imagery in the warhorse simile primarily focuses on the movement of Jason as he revels (ἐπαγαίετο, 1262) in his new-found abilities. This verb is used in three other places in the *Argonautica*, all of which have erotic overtones in which the subject of the verb makes a mental judgement about the object.[613] This suggests (perhaps to an incongruous degree) the way in which Jason judges himself in this moment. The movement theme is then continued in Jason's leaping in the air this way and that (πολλὰ δ' ἄρ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα μετάρσιον), brandishing (ἔπαλλεν) his shield and spear. The flashing movement of Jason's armour is compared, in the second simile—presumably[614]—to the lightning of a rain storm. (Movement is then picked up in the continuing narrative as the Argonauts not long hold back from the contest (οὐ δηρὸν ἔτι σχήσεσθαι ἀέθλων, 1268), but very swiftly hasten (ῥίμφα μάλ' … ἠπείγοντο, 1270) to the plain.)

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[612] Compare with the depressed presentation of Jason at previous points in this chapter. For discussion of these concepts, see Lakoff & Johnson (1980), 39-43.

[613] At 1.899, Jason admires Hypsipyle when he is discussing the Argonauts departing (τὴν δ' αὖτ' Αἴσονος υἱὸς ἀγαιόμενος προσέειπεν, 'the son of Aeson answered her exultantly'); at 3.470, Medea says that she would not exalt in Jason's demise (οὕνεκεν οὔ οἱ ἔγωγε κακῇ ἐπαγαίομαι ἄτῃ); and at 3.1015-16, it is used as Medea's exalts in Jason's need for her, as she hands over the magical drugs (καί νύ κέ οἱ καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπὸ στηθέων ἀρύσασα / ψυχὴν ἐγγυάλιξεν ἀγαιομένη χατέοντι, 'and now she would have drawn out her whole *psuche* from the *stethos* and put it in his hands, exulting in his need'). Thus, the verb is used only of Jason and Medea, and in erotic contexts.

[614] Hunter (1989) *ad loc* notes that this is not a 'direct simile'. It follows from the discussion of flashing armour, and is introduced with φαίης. Fränkel transposed this simile to follow 1292, where it would pick up the blast of fire as the oxen enter the arena (ἄμφω ὁμοῦ προγένοντο πυρὸς σέλας ἀμπνείοντες). (This is how the passage is used by Valerius Flaccus 7.567-72.) On the merits of this, see Fränkel (1968) *ad loc*; Campbell (1994), 148-50 (with appropriate Homeric comparisons); and Hunter (1989), *ad loc*. Campbell states that the lightning comparison picks up (1) the movement of Jason, (2) the flashing of his armour, and (3), following Vian, that the clouds and the rainstorm 'symbolise le combat que les Argonautes vont bientôt affronter'. (Jason's defeat of his foes is accompanied by a rain imagery at 4.1399.) I would reject the transposition since, on the strength of these arguments, the imagery is certainly not out of place. Furthermore, that I argue for a psychological component, where the imagery is representative of Jason's elation, supports the transmitted text: his elation is at the effect of the drugs, which he has just taken.

While the imagery in both these similes primarily highlights Jason's physical movement,[615] I think that—in keeping with the general argument of this thesis—there is also a psychological component, in which Jason's inner elation is expressed with excessive physical movement.[616] It has also been shown that there is a link between similes of lightning, and psychological states,[617] which I think is also appropriate here.

My argument that this imagery is psychologically expressive is strengthened if we also take into account the fact that there are strong verbal echoes between the way in which Jason is described in this passage and the way in which Medea is described during the sunbeam simile, itself a prime example of what I have argued to be psychologically descriptive imagery. Just as the sunbeam, the analogue for Medea's vacillating thoughts, moves *entha kai entha* on the walls of the house (3.758), so Jason leaps in the air *entha kai entha* (1263). Similarly, the verb πάλλω, which is used of Jason's excessive movement in the same line, is used by Apollonius at many other points of psychological description, including the sunbeam simile (3.756) and in the description of Heracles' reaction to the disappearance of Hylas (1.1270-1).[618] I would argue that, since Apollonius uses the same terminology as other psychologically descriptive events, the reader is strongly encouraged to view this episode in the same terms. Of course, the contexts are different: whereas in the case studies of Medea and Heracles both are suffering mental turmoil in the erotic sphere, here Jason is joyously revelling in his physical prowess.

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[615] The similes reinforce each other in this respect. Hunter (1989), *ad loc* states that μεταπαιφάσσεσθαι (1266) 'picks up' Jason's movements ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα (1263).

[616] Fränkel (1968: 438) is in agreement with respect to the first (warhorse) part of the imagery: 'Die Verse … schildern die psychische und physische Wirkung der Droge'. (Cf. n.613 (above): Fränkel transposes the second part.)

[617] The prime example of this is Agamemnon at *Iliad* 10.1-24, which was examined, and I argued had several parallels, with the sunbeam simile of Medea. On this, see Chapter Three.

[618] The Homeric usage of usage of πάλλω has previously been examined in Chapter Three. The most common (15x) is with respect to the brandishing of a projectile, while it is also used (8x) with respect to the shaking of lots within a helmet. In the simile, the verb is used of Jason's movement in the air. As such, I think that it is most likely that Apollonius is using the second Homeric sense (lots), with a sly nod to the fact that a shield and spear are being brandished (governed by τινάσσων) in the following line.
I do not think that this reading precludes the additional, psychological reading.

There is one final observation to be made. I suggest that, in his portrayal of Jason's movement, Apollonius adopts certain features of the Pyrrhic dance, an armed danced performed throughout antiquity.[619] In reference to Euripides' description of Neoptolemus' at *Andr*. 1129-41, Borthwick highlighted two specific features of Pyrrhic dancing: 'the manipulation of the shield in defence … and the leap in the air'.[620] More recently, Francis Cairns has supplemented Borthwick's analysis, introducing further specific features: 'the 'circling' or 'whirling'' of the dancers, 'the importance of hand movements', the emphasis on feet and legs, and, finally, 'certain other physical actions', such as 'pulling back', 'snatching', 'turning in flight' and 'falling'.[621] It is clear that the description of Jason meets practically all of these criteria,[622] and thus that this is a plausible lens through which to view Jason's presentation here.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter has examined Jason at what I think are his most psychologically-revealing moments. It has shown that, while he is not portrayed with the same volume of extended, poetic imagery that we have seen applied to Medea and Heracles, what is presented is richly revealing, and supports Apollonius' general presentation of psychological turmoil. It is interesting that Jason tends to react to inner turmoil with decidedly less external movement and greater passivity than other protagonists, which has the effect of setting up certain social altercations, as the Argonauts struggle to comprehend their leader's reactions. I have analysed these situations profitably with Theory of Mind methodology. I also showed that multiple

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[619] On the dance in general, see Borthwick (1967) and Cairns (2012). The latter contains other useful references.
[620] Borthwick (1967), 20. It should be mentioned in passing that not all commentators accept Borthwick's analysis; Stevens (1971) *ad loc*: 'there is not likely to be in the mind of Eur. any connection with Pyrrhos…'
[621] Cairns (2012), 34-5.
[622] Shield (1264), leap in the air (1263), hand movements (1258), legs (1263). The 'whirling' and 'circling', and the 'certain other physical actions' are not included.
In terms of martial background for the simile, Hunter (1989), 238 states that it might 'perhaps suggest the cavalry tactics of the Hellenistic age.'

times, owing to the strengths of various intertexts, Apollonius repeatedly seems to cast Jason as an Odysseus figure, suggesting that this is how he should be read. If this were the case, then we might be encouraged to view Jason's passivity as somewhat of a positive behavioural characteristic, as some scholars have interpreted the behaviour of Odysseus at points in the *Odyssey*.[623] Of course, to liken Jason to Odysseus is not revolutionary,[624] but I think that the passages analysed here add considerable texture to this interpretation. Finally, I examined a passage that revealed that Jason is not incapable of reacting to extreme emotion with external movement in a similar manner to other protagonists, but that he is only presented in this way when experiencing inner elation.

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[623] In this respect, it might be possible to view Jason's relative lack of non-verbal behaviour as a positive characteristic. Lateiner (1995: 22): '[t]he more uncontrolled or uncontrollable a person's nonverbal behavior reported by Homer is, the less admirable the person displaying it is … Odysseus and his family in Homer provide models of self-control and self-conscious manipulation of body-language information'. Contrast the Cyclops, Polyphemus, of whom Lateiner (1995: 85) states: 'all his equipments … and appetites demonstrate his lack of heroic self-control, his uncivilised ways … and his inability to manipulate communication skills (verbal *and* nonverbal) – unlike Odysseus'.

[624] See, for example, the analysis of Fantuzzi & Hunter (2005 : 90), who discuss the relationship between the *Argonautica* and Homer; they note that Circe refers to Jason's quest in the *Odyssey* (12.69-72), and thus that 'Apollonius … has chosen a story that Homer has "avoided"'. On the relationship between Jason and Odysseus specifically, see their arguments at 114-16. For an overview, see also Glei (2008). On similarities between the *Odyssey* and the *Argonautica* at an episodic level, see the collected examples in West (2005).

CONCLUSION

This thesis has shown the considerable benefits of augmenting the traditional, philological analysis of Classical texts with modern, cognitive theories. In doing so, I have shown that the extant literature that we possess and demarcate chronologically is not fundamentally separate from a modern text that is similarly concerned with aspects of human psychology.

Chief amongst the cognitive conclusions that have been drawn in this thesis is the conceptual metaphorical structuring of thought. I have shown multiple examples in which Apollonius extrapolates internal mental processes from external, physical movement, and, in so doing, employs basic spatial and ontological conceptual metaphors. As was shown, these modes of expression make the comprehension of psychological events tangible and enable their poetic exploration. Additionally, a high degree of similarity was shown to exist in the conception, representation, and expression of the emotion of *eros* and its modern equivalent. Fundamentally, I argued that these metaphors of mental processes are easy to comprehend because of the universal human agency detection system and the universal nature of aspects of non-verbal behaviour.

I also applied Theory of Mind to the *Argonautica*, and showed that it is a useful tool in our understanding of character interaction. A prime example of this was the study of Jason, where some scholars have struggled to make sense of Apollonius' underdetermined characterisation. My Theory of Mind analyses were especially useful in highlighting why there are so many moments of tension between Jason and his crew, for example.

Running concurrently with my analysis of the cognitive univerals, however, was an awareness of Apollonius' specific literary and cultural surroundings. In both the case studies of the sunbeam and the gadfly, I showed that he employed certain literary and

folk models (most notably, those from the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*) in his conception of mental processes. An awareness of these models allows us to situate Apollonius' conception of psychological activity within the literary cannon, and thus ultimately deepens our understanding of the scenes from the *Argonautica*. Together with this and the cognitive analysis, then, this thesis has added further texture to the study of the history of human psychology.

Appendix One

Discussion on Fränkel's transposition
of the sunbeam simile at *Arg*. 3.755-60

Perceiving there to be a logical difficulty in the transmitted positioning of the

sunbeam simile, Hermann Fränkel transposed the complete unit, so that it followed

the anatomical description of the pain of love inside Medea (ending at 765).[625] The

text of Fränkel's edition is reproduced below for ease of reference since the

subsequent discussion will refer to its reading:

751	ἀλλὰ μάλ' οὐ Μήδειαν ἐπὶ γλυκερὸς λάβεν ὕπνος.
	πολλὰ γὰρ Αἰσονίδαο πόθῳ μελεδήματ' ἔγειρεν
	δειδυῖαν ταύρων κρατερὸν μένος, οἷσιν ἔμελλεν
754	φθεῖσθαι ἀεικελίῃ μοίρῃ κατὰ νειὸν Ἄρηος.
761	δάκρυ δ' ἀπ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐλέῳ ῥέεν· ἔνδοθι δ' αἰεί
	τεῖρ' ὀδύνη, σμύχουσα διὰ χροὸς ἀμφί τ' ἀραιάς
	ἶνας καὶ κεφαλῆς ὑπὸ νείατον ἰνίον ἄχρις,
	ἔνθ' ἀλεγεινότατον δύνει ἄχος, ὁππότ' ἀνίας
765	ἀκάματοι πραπίδεσσιν ἐνισκίμψωσιν ἔρωτες.
755	πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν,
	ἠελίου ὥς τίς τε δόμοις ἔνι πάλλεται αἴγλη,
	ὕδατος ἐξανιοῦσα τὸ δὴ νέον ἠὲ λέβητι
	ἠέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται, ἡ δ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
	ὠκείῃ στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται ἀίσσουσα –
760	ὣς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης,
766	φῆ δέ οἱ ἄλλοτε μὲν θελκτήρια φάρμακα ταύρων
	δωσέμεν· ἄλλοτε δ' οὔτι, καταφθεῖσθαι δὲ καὶ αὐτή·
	αὐτίκα δ' οὔτ' αὐτὴ θανέειν, οὐ φάρμακα δώσειν,
	ἀλλ' αὔτως εὔκηλος ἐὴν ὀτλησέμεν ἄτην.
	ἑζομένη δἤπειτα δοάσσατο, φώνησέν τε·

3.751-70 (Fränkel)

It is worth noting again that the transposition has since been rejected by all following

editions of *Argonautica* Book 3: Ardizzoni (1958); Vian (1961), which was

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[625] Proposed in Fränkel (1950) and subsequently printed in his OCT of 1961.

subsequently produced as a full *Argonautica* edition in the Budé series (1980); Hopkinson's excerpt in *A Hellenistic Anthology* (1988); and Hunter (1989).[626] Perhaps unsurprisingly, Fränkel's OCT has been met with a mixture of excitement and caution: while Glei (2001: 2) states that 'its brilliance … has influenced all subsequent work on the text of Apollonius', Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1963: 156), in a review article of Vian's text, snipes that 'most readers will feel that [Fränkel] has gone too far in his alteration' and finds Vian's text 'more acceptable'. My purpose here is, of course, not to argue for the merits of one edition over another *in toto*, but in the particular instance of the sunbeam simile.

One of the main causes for the reticence in adopting Fränkel's transposition is the simple fact that it is based purely on the logical sense of the passage; no star witness presents itself in the form of an irrefutable mechanical cause for the change.[627] Therefore, in order to show that such misplacement of lines is common in the Apollonian tradition, Fränkel briefly lists sixteen examples of lines or series of lines that were omitted in various manuscripts and then subsequently reinserted at the wrong place.[628] In the light of this, it is argued that transposition is an unfortunate necessity and should not be ruled out owing to excessively cautious editing.[629] Having established precedent, then, it is necessary to examine the poetic logic of the passage.

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[626] The only scholar that I have found who is in support of Fränkel is Barkhuizen (1979), 38n.19.
[627] As Fränkel himself notes (1950: 125): '[t]ransposition of lines is a crude operation which requires little skill to perform; and it is especially open to criticism if the number of lines involved is large, if outside support is absent, and if there is no apparent reason why the original order should have been disturbed in the first place. All these objections can be made against the following rearrangement of a celebrated passage, and yet it seems an inescapable necessity.'
[628] Fränkel (1950), 125-6n.28. Here he notes that even such 'gross errors' are present in the Laurentianus manuscript, which is the best in the Apollonius tradition and the only source of two Aeschylean tragedies.
[629] Of course, I do not mean to downplay the role that 'mechanical' explanations play in alerting the textual critic to the transposition of line(s). From this point of view, the fact that there is no clear explanation should be borne in mind.

In his famous lecture on the 'Application of thought to textual criticism', A. E. Housman chose to build his thesis, which attempts to redress the scholarly bias for grammar and palaeography, on the equally famous remarks of Moritz Haupt; this quotation should, I think, be kept in mind for Apollonius' passage (1921: 77):

> The prime requisite of a good emendation is that it should start from the thought; it is only afterwards that other considerations, such as those of metre or possibilities, such as the interchange of letters, are taken into account … If the sense requires it, I am prepared to write 'Constantinopolitanus' where the MSS. have the monosyllabic interjection 'o'.

In the spirit of Constantinopolitanus, therefore, I turn to Fränkel's three arguments for the transposition.

I. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR

The first is that Medea's tears (761) 'could not result from the diversity of thoughts that passed through her mind' (the sunbeam simile of 755-60),[630] but from her anguish at Jason's impending death (734-5). Fränkel is guilty here of begging the question: his reading of the text means that he equates *a priori* the vacillations of the sunbeam on the wall with the mental oscillations of Medea in regard to whether or not she should help Jason; therefore, with the prior assumption that this is what the sunbeam simile refers to, he rules out another possible application—Medea's worry for Jason—even though the point of his writing is to define the narrative referents for the simile.[631] I think that Fränkel is in danger of damaging his case by over-stating this point. It would suffice to say that Medea's tears (760) could just as likely, if not more probably, refer to her fears for Jason (752-4), which I believe is the case. This fact alone, when then combined with his subsequent arguments, would prove an important piece in the jigsaw. By categorically ruling out the alternative, Fränkel

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[630] Fränkel (1950), 126.
[631] This observation is Erbse's (1963), 237-40 main objection to Fränkel's transposition. Erbse's argument is also cited by Hutchinson (1988), 117n.50 as one of the reasons for his rejection of the reading.

does his case more harm than good. The simple point that the tears refer to her fear for Jason is valid, especially since Fränkel establishes a precedent from 200 lines previously in Book 3 (459-62), which directly mirrors the narrative progression from fear to death from bulls to tears (in both cases δάκρυον … ἐλέῳ ῥέε is used of Medea's tears).

Fränkel's second reason for the transposition is based on thematic unity. After the narrative foil that described the world moving to a state of rest (744-50), Medea is introduced as being unable to sleep owing to her longing and fear for Jason (751-4). By transposing lines 761-5, the reader is now given a more precise reason for Medea's torment via the anatomical description of her pain. I would point out that Fränkel's point can be strengthened by noting that in just the same way that it was shown in Chapter Three that the narrative of 744-50 progressively focuses in from the vast expanse of night to the silent city, with the new reading in place, the cause for Medea's insomnia carefully focuses from her general worries for Jason fighting on the expanse of the plain (= νύξ) to its manifestation in the very base of her neck (= πτόλιν). Such duplication of the telescoping of description is surely the effect that Apollonius was aiming for.

In addition, Fränkel notes that with the transposition in place, the description of Medea's sleeplessness is framed by a phrase stating the cares of love that are the responsible parties: πολλὰ γὰρ Αἰσονίδαο πόθῳ μελεδήματ' ἔγειρεν (752) and ἀκάματοι πραπίδεσσιν ἐνισκίμψωσιν ἔρωτες (765). The interruption of this unit by the sunbeam simile would, therefore, disrupt the lean narrative progression from the reason for Medea's fear to its description, and also lessen the effect of the ring-compositional description of the cares of love that encase it.

The third and final point that Fränkel provides for the transposition is linked to his assumption that his critics use to undermine his first: the equivalence of the darting sunbeam with Medea's possible future courses of action. The point is simple: that the simile (755-60) is immediately followed by its referent in the form of Medea's options (discussed by Apollonius at 766-9). If we are to accept that the simile does indeed refer to this, then Fränkel's point is indeed strong since the transition between the darting heart (ἐλελίζετο, 760) and the description of the first of Medea's options (766) is instantaneous.

Before continuing to offer some additional arguments for this reading, it is necessary now to consider the other arguments against the move, which, if they can be countered, will only serve to strengthen Fränkel's reading.

II. QUESTIONING THAT PERSPECTIVE

Francis Vian's first comment (1980: 133) is worth quoting in full:

> Malgré Fränkel, elle n'est pas en rapport avec les projects contradictoires que Médée formera plus loin; elle explique l'insomnie de Médée (v. 751, 752 ἔγειρεν) et se rettache étroitement aux vers precedents dont on ne peut la disjoindre.

Vian's is, again, an argument from the implicit logic of the positioning of the lines: the simile does not refer to Medea's future plans but is an explanation of her insomnia, and, as such, it cannot be transposed. First, this argument fails to account for Fränkel's second explanation for transposition: by placing the anatomical description of Medea's pain (761-5) after the description of Medea's insomnia and the reasons for it (751-4), the narrative of sleeplessness is effectively continued (see above). Additionally—and arguably more importantly—if the transposition is accepted so that the sunbeam simile refers to Medea's worry about her future possible alternatives, then this too is still an explanation of her insomnia, thus incorporating Vian's criticism. It is not possible to drive a wedge between, and thus

isolate, either Medea's longing for Jason, or her worry for him, or her concern over her own possible future courses of action as being the sole reason for her sleeplessness: they are all contributing factors.

Vian's other criticism, which is also referenced by Hunter (1989) *ad loc*. is that the simile should not be transposed because it has an Iliadic precedent. At the beginning of Book 10, Agamemnon also experiences a sleepless night owing to his worry for the Achaean host, and a simile is involved in the description. Here, Vian attempts to differentiate the simile, which he states describes Agamemnon's psychological state (10.5-10), and the announcement of his preferred choice of action (10.17), which, he claims, was pre-empted before the simile by the phrase πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντα (10.4).[632] The same differentiation is, presumably, to be applied in the case of Medea. This point, to me, is not at all clear, as I shall show by first creating an outline of the Homeric passage:

1-2	the noblemen of the Achaeans sleep (ηὗδον)
2	throughout the night (παννύχιοι)
3	but not Agamemnon
4	sweet sleep (ὕπνος … γλυκερὸς) did not hold him as he turned over many things in his mind (πολλὰ φρεσὶν ὁρμαίνοντα)
5-8	simile of the lightning and meteorological power of Zeus
9-10	so often (πυκίν') did Agamemnon groan in his breast (ἐν στήθεσσιν) and his φρένες trembled
11-13	he marvels at the sights and sounds of Troy
14-16	he looks at the Achaean host, tears his hair, and groans in appeal to Zeus
17	this plan seems best to his θυμός
18-20	to go to Nestor and contrive a plan with him to ward off evil from the host
21-4	he dresses himself to leave

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[632] Vian (1980), 133: 'la comparaison avec les éclairs (K 5-10) illustre l'état psycho-physiologique d'Agamemnon, alors que ses plans, annoncés par ὁρμαίνοντα (K 4), ne seront explicités qu'au v. 17'. Hunter (1989), 179: 'the text closely reproduces the pattern of the Homeric model in the opening of *Il*. 10'.

I want, first, to question Vian's differentiation (see above), before examining the 'close' relationship between the passages that Hunter explicitly mentions. I agree with Vian that the simile of lightning illustrates Agamemnon's psychological state.[633] (This was discussed in greater depth in Chapter Three.) However, it seems perverse that Vian accepts that ὁρμαίνοντα (10.4) is the opening reference to Agamemnon's deliberation over possible plans—the result of which is announced in his chosen intention at 10.17—and yet denies that the simile that springs directly from ὁρμαίνοντα, and is thus encased within explicit talk of Agamemnon's future plans, is not a simile of Agamemnon's psychological state specifically brought about by his meditation over possible future plans. The distinction between the simile of Agamemnon's psychological state and the announcement of his intentions seems, to me, untenable, since they are necessarily entwined. Vian, and by extension presumably Hunter, are guilty of the same *a priori* assumption with regard to the referents of the simile that was levelled against Fränkel (see above).

Having dismissed Vian's other criticism, I now turn to Hunter's close parallels, because of which he dismisses the idea of transposing the simile in the *Argonautica*. Though Hunter is correct in so far as certain parallels exist, on closer inspection, I note three important differences between the two passages. First, in the *Iliad*, the image of the sleeplessness of others is introduced before night is mentioned (10.1-2), whereas the opposite is evident in the *Argonautica* passage (3.744-50). Second, Agamemnon's fears for his Achaeans follow the simile that is used to describe his mental state (10.14-16, 10.5-10, respectively), while Medea's concern for Jason precedes the sunbeam simile (3.752-4, 3.756-9, respectively). Finally, while Apollonius details at length Medea's possible future plans (3.766-9) before she is

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[633] This is also the opinion of Willcock (1978), 284. Hainsworth (1993), 157 gives a brief discussion of the simile, the merit of which has confused critics.

finally made to settle on one course of action by Hera (3.818-10),[634] there is no discussion of alternatives by either the narrator or Agamemnon before the best course of action is stated (10.17).

In the light of this, there are two points to be made: first, it is clear that the two passages do not follow each other as closely as Hunter argues, and therefore it is doubtful whether the Iliadic passage is as defining an influence on Apollonius as he believes;[635] and, second, even if a close relation between the two was to be found in all other respects, Fränkel's proposed transposition of the sunbeam simile would not alter any of the three discrepancies that have just been shown. In short, Fränkel's transposition neither adds nor subtracts from any possible intertextuality with the Homeric passage.[636]

I now move to address another criticism levelled against Fränkel. Hunter also argues that 'the water of the simile effectively turns into Medea's tears' and that there is a parallel passage at *Arg.* 4.1058-67, which replicates the pattern of night to worried sleeplessness to simile to Medea's tears.[637] In answer to this first point, bearing in mind the standard pattern of the simile that lifts its subject matter from the narrative, it is just as viable, arguably more so, that, following the transposition, Medea's tears are picked up by the simile. There are no complementary arguments for Hunter's

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[634] It should be noted, too, that during the entirety of the intervening lines Medea agonises over these possibilities in soliloquy.

[635] Green (1997), 271 states that Hunter's proposed parallel is 'wholly irrelevant', but does not state his reasons.

[636] There is only one faint instance where the transposition would alter the narrative progression of the *Argonautica* passage in relation to the *Iliad*. The closest analogue in the Iliadic passage to the anatomical description of Medea's pain which drives νείατον ἰνίον ('the lowest part of the occiput', 3.763) is where Agamemnon is described as pulling his hair προθελύμνους ('by its very roots', 10.15). Fränkel's transposition would move this description of Medea so that it precedes the sunbeam simile, whereas it occurs after the corresponding simile of Agamemnon. However, I do not think that this point outweighs those which have just been discussed; it is not excessively damaging to any intended intertextuality, and, more importantly, the anatomical description of Agamemnon is nowhere near as detailed as that of Medea, while the term used of the former (προθελύμνους), which itself is the only possible reason to see an intertext in the first place, is not used of Medea.

[637] Hunter (1989), 179.

reading and therefore this point is, I think, at best, moot, since the effect is equivalent either way. The second point is easily dismissed by examining the text of the suggested parallel passage (4.1058-67):

στρευγομένοις δ' ἀν' ὅμιλον ἐπήλυθεν εὐνήτειρα
νὺξ ἔργων ἄνδρεσσι, κατευκήλησε δὲ πᾶσαν
γαῖαν ὁμῶς. τὴν δ' οὔ τι μίνυνθά περ εὔνασεν ὕπνος,
ἀλλά οἱ ἐν στέρνοις ἀχέων εἰλίσσετο θυμός,
οἷον ὅτε κλωστῆρα γυνὴ ταλαεργὸς ἑλίσσει
ἐννυχίη, τῇ δ' ἀμφὶ κινύρεται ὀρφανὰ τέκνα,
χηροσύνη πόσιος· σταλάει δ' ἐπὶ δάκρυ παρειάς
μνωομένης, οἵη μιν ἐπισμυγερὴ λάβεν αἶσα –
ὣς τῆς ἰκμαίνοντο παρηίδες, ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ
ὀξείης εἰλεῖτο πεπαρμένον ἀμφ' ὀδύνῃσι.

And over the weary men throughout the crew came night,
giver of rest from toils, and quieted all the
earth alike. But as for her, sleep soothed her for not even a short time,
but the *thumos* in her breast whirled in pain,
as when a labouring woman whirls her spindle
by night, and around her lament her orphaned children,
as she bereaves her husband; and tears drip down her cheeks
recalling what a sad fortune she has —
so were [Medea's] cheeks wet, and her *etor* within
was quickly turning, pierced with sharp grief.

Hunter is correct in his observation that this text replicates the same progression of themes as his reading of our excerpt. However, notice that at just 10 lines long it does this work in almost a third of the amount of time (cf.:744-70 = 27 lines.) Additionally, although the points that Hunter chooses to cite correspond in order, others do not: Medea is introduced (1058) before the temporal and geographical scene-setting (1059-60), which is in direct contrast to the narrative progression in Book 3: 3.744 (νύξ introduced to begin scene-setting), 3.751 (Medea enters narrative). Also, while in Book 3 the image of the grieving mother forms part of the foil for Medea (3.748), in Book 4 her grieving counterpart is encased within the simile that is used to describe the insomnia of the already-introduced Medea (4.1062-4). Bearing these two structural points in mind, in addition to the disparity in length between the two passages, it becomes clear that this excerpt from Book 4 constitutes

more of an amalgam of previous scenes, loosely arranged. This idea is strengthened if it is noted that the excerpt also draws on two other similes from Book 3 that are crucial in defining Medea: the toiling woman in the simile of Book 4 (γυνὴ ταλαεργός, 1062) references the first simile used of Medea in Book 3, in which her love is compared to a working woman's fire (ὡς δὲ γυνὴ μαλερῷ περὶ κάρφεα χεύατο δαλῷ / χερνῆτις…, 291-2); and just as the angst-ridden Medea who paces her room is compared to a bride who mourns the passing of her husband-to-be (3.656-61), so in Book 4 she is again compared to a woman who has lost her husband (χηροσύνη πόσιος, 4.1064).

I hope to have shown here that any arguments that have been drawn from 4.1058-67 with a view to corroborating the narrative order of a series of scenes in the sunbeam simile of Book 3 are untenable, since the former at other times inverts the order of the latter and—on the whole—functions mainly as a concise narratological reference point for Medea hitherto.

III. Back to the future

Critics also allege that Fränkel's reading is influenced by a certain backwards causation, owing to the fact that the Apollonian sunbeam simile was used by Vergil in his *Aeneid*, where it is apparently used of Aeneas' troubled thought at the prospect of upcoming war (8.18-25):

> Quae Laomedontius heros
> cuncta videns magno curarum fluctuat aestu
> atque animum nunc huc celerem, nunc dividit illuc
> in partisque rapit varias perque omnia versat:
> sicut aquae tremulum labris ubi lumen aënis
> sole repercussum aut radiantis imagine lunae
> omnia pervolitat late loca iamque sub auras
> erigitur summique ferit laquearia tecti.

> And the hero of Laomedon's line,
> seeing it all, tosses on a mighty sea of troubles;
> and now hither, now thither he swiftly throws his mind,
> casting it in diverse ways, and turning it to every shift;
> and when in brazen bowls a flickering light from water,
> flung back by the sun or the moon's glittering form,
> flits far and wide o'er all things, and now mounts high
> and smites the fretted ceiling of the roof aloft…

(Tr. Fairclough)

Hunter (1989: 179) states that this simile is used 'precisely to describe indecision'; in this reading he finds allies with Vergilian scholars, who state that the passage shows 'the rapid movement of confused thoughts through [Aeneas'] troubled mind', and, more generally, Aeneas' 'mind at work'.[638]

Because Hunter sees the Vergilian passage as 'virtuoso reworking' of Apollonian themes,[639] he believes that the whole passage has been recast, so that—presumably—the simile's referring to Aeneas' thought constitutes Vergil's innovation. Thus, Fränkel is really charged with two criticisms here: first, that his reading is influenced by the fact that Vergil applied the simile to thought, and, second, that Vergil's application in itself was innovative and, thus, a departure from Apollonius' usage. I think that both these points are irrelevant. First, the arguments that have been given previously and will be provided subsequently prove that Fränkel's transposition is viable without any recourse to other authors. Second, the murky realm of intertextual authorial intention is shaky ground from which Hunter builds his criticism: what is innovative and what is not based on extant evidence and speculation is not a pure science. It could just as easily be argued, for example, that the fact that Vergil wanted a simile to present mental conflict and chose Apollonius' sunbeam, is evidence for the fact that the Apollonius sunbeam itself referred to mental conflict. The point also is, I believe, moot.

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[638] Gransden (1976), 82; and Putnam (1965), 108, respectively.
[639] The only example that he cites for this is that night is introduced after the simile (*Aen.* 8.26); cf. *Arg.* 3.744.

Additionally, opinions on the Vergilian version of the simile are not clear-cut. Lyne (1987: 126) states emphatically that 'the one thing that Vergil does *not* seem to be aiming at is a clear illustration of what thought-processes are like'. He believes that the simile is used in order to liken Aeneas to Medea in just the same way that Dido is likened to Medea in another Apollonian intertext of the same simile at 4.522-31. Thus, the idea is that the reader is confronted with a comparison, via the Apollonian intertext, of Aeneas with Medea. Since the purpose of the comparison is not clear, the reader is forced to examine the intertext and here realises that there are similarities with the situation of Dido at 4.522-31, where the same intertext was present. The comparison is thus between Aeneas and Dido, by showing that they both act in the same way as Medea. The two passages therefore share, and are connected by, the same Apollonian allusion, and the role of this allusion is that of an allusive signalling marker in the text.[640] Whether this interpretation is too clever for its own good is perhaps a pertinent question; however, it is not the purpose of the current discussion to judge, and I raise it merely to show that Hunter's opinion on the Vergilian simile is not without significant disagreement. On these readings of Vergil's use of Apollonius, the specific meaning of the simile itself is secondary to its repeated presence in the narrative, and concern for any Vergilian innovation is severely lessened, thus weakening Hunter's criticism.

A final criticism of the transposition has been levelled by Hopkinson *ad loc*., who suggests that the simile does not refer to Medea's indecisiveness of 766-9, but to Medea's πολλὰ … μελεδήματ' (752), which cause her insomnia. Hopkinson here falls into the same trap as Vian (see above) in failing to acknowledge Fränkel's

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[640] Lyne (1987), 126-30. Clausen (1987), 63-4 also notes the recurrence of the simile in relation to Dido, but chooses instead to argue that Vergil is alluding, via Apollonius, to Agamemnon at *Il*. 10.5-10, and thus to the martial theme. Nelis (2001), 232 is of the same opinion: 'using *Argonautica* 3 as his central model [Vergil] is in effect reworking Apollonius' eroticised martial themes back into an Iliadic context'. Again, on this reading, Apollonius is being used merely as a reference point—this time to the *Iliad*—and thus Vergil's use of the sunbeam simile is owing to the fact that it itself has an Iliadic intertext.

second point, which shows that the theme of sleeplessness is heightened by the transposition, and that the transposed simile, referring to Medea's possible future plans, is still reason for insomnia.

IV. A FINAL CONSIDERATION

I hope to have shown that the criticisms levelled at Fränkel's transposition are not always well founded. However, in arguing for the transposition, it is not enough merely to show that the defences of the transmitted sequence are faulty. I think that the best piece of evidence in favour of the transposition is my general argument in Chapter Three, which supports Fränkel's case that the vacillating sunbeam symbolises Medea's unsettled mind. This, in turn, would support Fränkel's case for the logic of the transposition.

I noted earlier that most of the arguments in favour of the transmitted reading depend of the logic of the text, since there is no obvious mechanical cause to account for the movement of the lines. I shall end this discussion with one observation, which might meet this criterion.[641]

If Fränkel's is right, then during the process of copying, when a scribe reached the end of 754, he somehow wrote 755 instead of the correct 761. This might have been facilitated by a manuscript which read αἰέν instead of αἰεί at the end of 761, which would then end with the same letters (-ιεν) as he could see at the end of 755, i.e. the line to which he jumped (ἔθυιεν). This observation is also strengthened by the broad and approximate visual and phonetic similarities between ἔνδοθι δ' αἰεί and ἔντοσθεν ἔθυιεν. This mechanical observation, which would account for the lines being reinstered in the wrong place, should, I think, be added to Fränkel's arguments in favour of the transposition.

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[641] My thanks to Richard Rawles for his thoughts and suggestions in our conversations on this matter.

Appendix Two

Full text of Odysseus' mental conflict at *Od.* 20.5-54

ἔνθ' Ὀδυσεὺς μνηστῆρσι κακὰ φρονέων ἐνὶ θυμῷ
κεῖτ' ἐγρηγορόων· ταὶ δ' ἐκ μεγάροιο γυναῖκες
ἤϊσαν, αἳ μνηστῆρσιν ἐμισγέσκοντο πάρος περ,
ἀλλήλῃσι γέλω τε καὶ εὐφροσύνην παρέχουσαι.
τοῦ δ' ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι·
πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,
ἠὲ μεταΐξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἑκάστῃ,
ἦ ἔτ' ἐῷ μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι
ὕστατα καὶ πύματα· κραδίη δέ οἱ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει.
ὡς δὲ κύων ἀμαλῇσι περὶ σκυλάκεσσι βεβῶσα
ἄνδρ' ἀγνοιήσασ' ὑλάει μέμονέν τε μάχεσθαι,
ὥς ῥα τοῦ ἔνδον ὑλάκτει ἀγαιομένου κακὰ ἔργα.
στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ·
 "τέτλαθι δή, κραδίη· καὶ κύντερον ἄλλο ποτ' ἔτλης,
ἤματι τῷ, ὅτε μοι μένος ἄσχετος ἤσθιε Κύκλωψ
ἰφθίμους ἑτάρους· σὺ δ' ἐτόλμας, ὄφρα σε μῆτις
ἐξάγαγ' ἐξ ἄντροιο ὀϊόμενον θανέεσθαι."
 ὣς ἔφατ', ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ·
τῷ δὲ μάλ' ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετληυῖα
νωλεμέως· ἀτὰρ αὐτὸς ἑλίσσετο ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.
ὡς δ' ὅτε γαστέρ' ἀνὴρ πολέος πυρὸς αἰθομένοιο,
ἐμπλείην κνίσης τε καὶ αἵματος, ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα
αἰόλλῃ, μάλα δ' ὦκα λιλαίεται ὀπτηθῆναι,
ὣς ἄρ' ὅ γ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα ἑλίσσετο μερμηρίζων,
ὅππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσει,
μοῦνος ἐὼν πολέσι. σχεδόθεν δέ οἱ ἦλθεν Ἀθήνη
οὐρανόθεν καταβᾶσα, δέμας δ' ἤϊκτο γυναικί·
στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς καί μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπε·
 "τίπτ' αὖτ' ἐγρήσσεις, πάντων περὶ κάμμορε φωτῶν;
οἶκος μέν τοι ὅδ' ἐστί, γυνὴ δέ τοι ἥδ' ἐνὶ οἴκῳ
καὶ πάϊς, οἷόν πού τις ἐέλδεται ἔμμεναι υἷα."
 τὴν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς·
"ναὶ δὴ ταῦτά γε πάντα, θεά, κατὰ μοῖραν ἔειπες·
ἀλλά τί μοι τόδε θυμὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζει,
ὅππως δὴ μνηστῆρσιν ἀναιδέσι χεῖρας ἐφήσω,
μοῦνος ἐών· οἱ δ' αἰὲν ἀολλέες ἔνδον ἔασι.
πρὸς δ' ἔτι καὶ τόδε μεῖζον ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μερμηρίζω·
εἴ περ γὰρ κτείναιμι Διός τε σέθεν τε ἕκητι,
πῇ κεν ὑπεκπροφύγοιμι; τά σε φράζεσθαι ἄνωγα."
 τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·
 "σχέτλιε, καὶ μέν τίς τε χερείονι πείθεθ' ἑταίρῳ,
ὅς περ θνητός τ' ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ τόσα μήδεα οἶδεν·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ θεός εἰμι, διαμπερὲς ἥ σε φυλάσσω
ἐν πάντεσσι πόνοισ'. ἐρέω δέ τοι ἐξαναφανδόν·
εἴ περ πεντήκοντα λόχοι μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
νῶϊ περισταῖεν, κτεῖναι μεμαῶτες Ἄρηϊ,
καί κεν τῶν ἐλάσαιο βόας καὶ ἴφια μῆλα.

ἀλλ' ἑλέτω σε καὶ ὕπνος· ἀνίη καὶ τὸ φυλάσσειν
πάννυχον ἐγρήσσοντα, κακῶν δ' ὑποδύσεαι ἤδη."
  ὣς φάτο, καί ῥά οἱ ὕπνον ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἔχευεν…

Full text of Hylas, Polyphemus, and Heracles at *Arg.* 1.1221-72

αἶψα δ' ὅγε κρήνην μετεκίαθεν ἣν καλέουσιν
Πηγὰς ἀγχίγυοι περιναιέται. οἱ δέ που ἄρτι
νυμφάων ἵσταντο χοροί· μέλε γάρ σφισι πάσαις
ὅσσαι κεῖν' ἐρατὸν νύμφαι ῥίον ἀμφενέμοντο
Ἄρτεμιν ἐννυχίῃσιν ἀεὶ μέλπεσθαι ἀοιδαῖς.
αἱ μέν, ὅσαι σκοπιὰς ὀρέων λάχον ἢ καὶ ἐναύλους
αἵ γε μὲν ὑλήωροι, ἀπόπροθεν ἐστιχόωντο·
ἡ δὲ νέον κρήνης ἀνεδύετο καλλινάοιο
νύμφη ἐφυδατίη. τὸν δὲ σχεδὸν εἰσενόησεν
κάλλεϊ καὶ γλυκερῇσιν ἐρευθόμενον χαρίτεσσιν,
πρὸς γάρ οἱ διχόμηνις ἀπ' αἰθέρος αὐγάζουσα
βάλλε σεληναίη· τῆς δὲ φρένας ἐπτοίησεν
Κύπρις, ἀμηχανίῃ δὲ μόλις συναγείρατο θυμόν.
αὐτὰρ ὅγ' ὡς τὰ πρῶτα ῥόῳ ἔνι κάλπιν ἔρεισε
λέχρις ἐπιχριμφθείς, περὶ δ' ἄσπετον ἔβραχεν ὕδωρ
χαλκὸν ἐς ἠχήεντα φορεύμενον, αὐτίκα δ' ἥγε
λαιὸν μὲν καθύπερθεν ἐπ' αὐχένος ἄνθετο πῆχυν,
κύσσαι ἐπιθύουσα τέρεν στόμα, δεξιτερῇ δὲ
ἀγκῶν' ἔσπασε χειρί· μέσῃ δ' ἐνὶ κάββαλε δίνῃ.
Τοῦ δ' ἥρως ἰάχοντος ἐπέκλυεν οἶος ἑταίρων
Εἰλατίδης Πολύφημος, ἰὼν προτέρωσε κελεύθου,
δέκτο γὰρ Ἡρακλῆα πελώριον ὁππόθ' ἵκοιτο.
βῆ δὲ μεταΐξας Πηγέων σχεδόν, ἠΰτε τις θήρ
ἄγριος, ὅν ῥά τε γῆρυς ἀπόπροθεν ἵκετο μήλων,
λιμῷ δ' αἰθόμενος μετανίσσεται, οὐδ' ἐπέκυρσε
ποίμνῃσιν, πρὸ γὰρ αὐτοὶ ἐνὶ σταθμοῖσι νομῆες
ἔλσαν· ὁ δὲ στενάχων βρέμει ἄσπετον, ὄφρα κάμῃσιν –
ὣς τότ' ἄρ' Εἰλατίδης μεγάλ' ἔστενεν, ἀμφὶ δὲ χῶρον
φοίτα κεκληγώς, μελέη δέ οἱ ἔπλετ' αυτή.
αἶψα δ' ἐρυσσάμενος μέγα φάσγανον ὦρτο δίεσθαι,
μή πως ἢ θήρεσσιν ἕλωρ πέλοι, ἠέ μιν ἄνδρες
μοῦνον ἐόντ' ἐλόχησαν, ἄγουσι δὲ ληίδ' ἑτοίμην·
ἔνθ' αὐτῷ ξύμβλητο κατὰ στίβον Ἡρακλῆι
γυμνὸν ἐπισσείων παλάμῃ ξίφος, εὖ δέ μιν ἔγνω
σπερχόμενον μετὰ νῆα διὰ κνέφας· αὐτίκα δ' ἄτην
ἔκφατο λευγαλέην, βεβαρημένος ἄσθματι θυμόν·
  "Δαιμόνιε, στυγερόν τοι ἄχος πάμπρωτος ἐνίψω.
οὐ γὰρ Ὕλας, κρήνηνδε κιών, σόος αὖτις ἱκάνει,
ἀλλά ἑ ληιστῆρες ἐνιχρίμψαντες ἄγουσιν
ἢ θῆρες σίνονται· ἐγὼ δ' ἰάχοντος ἄκουσα."
  Ὣς φάτο· τῷ δ' ἀίοντι κατὰ κροτάφων ἅλις ἱδρώς
κήκιεν, ἂν δὲ κελαινὸν ὑπὸ σπλάγχνοις ζέεν αἷμα.
χωόμενος δ' ἐλάτην χαμάδις βάλεν, ἐς δὲ κέλευθον
τὴν θέεν ᾗ πόδες αὐτοὶ ὑπέκφερον ἀίσσοντα.
ὡς δ' ὅτε τίς τε μύωπι τετυμμένος ἔσσυτο ταῦρος
πίσεά τε προλιπὼν καὶ ἑλεσπίδας, οὐδὲ νομήων
οὐδ' ἀγέλης ὄθεται, πρήσσει δ' ὁδὸν ἄλλοτ' ἄπαυστος,

ἄλλοτε δ' ἱστάμενος καὶ ἀνὰ πλατὺν αὐχέν' ἀείρων
ἵησιν μύκημα, κακῷ βεβολημένος οἴστρῳ –
ὣς ὅγε μαιμώων ὁτὲ μὲν θοὰ γούνατ' ἔπαλλεν
συνεχέως, ὁτὲ δ' αὖτε μεταλλήγων καμάτοιο
τῆλε διαπρύσιον μεγάλῃ βοάασκεν αὐτῇ.

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