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MEGALOPOLIS AND THE ACHAIAN *KOINON*: LOCAL IDENTITY AND THE FEDERAL STATE

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PhD Classics

The University of Edinburgh

2017

Signed Declaration

I declare that is this thesis is the result of my own work and has been composed solely by my own hand except where it is explicitely stated by reference or acknowlegment. This dissertation has not been submitted for any other degree or professional qualification.

Signature:

Thesis Abstract

This dissertation examines the relationship between the Arkadian city of Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon* in the Hellenistic period. By arguing that Megalopolis was a polis which used its own local identity to carve out a prominent position for itself within the Achaian federation, this thesis is able to provide new insights into the study of the wider topic of the relationship between federations and their member states. To support this argument, the thesis is divided into three parts. In part one of the dissertation, the Megalopolitan identity is clearly established by identifying its basic components, which were the result of the city's foundation by the Arkadian *koinon* around 368 BC as well as its Achaian membership of 235 BC. The Megalopolitan identity was marked by a complex structure; it was characterised by a deep and traditional hatred for Sparta, longstanding relations with the Macedonian kings, a clear understanding of the mechanisms of a federal state and multi-ethnic politics, and, by Polybius' time, a connection to both Arkadia as well as Achaia.

The second part examines the influence of this local identity on the *koinon* through the direct relationship of Megalopolis with the federal government via its Achaian membership. Within the Achaian League, Megalopolis was an active member, taking part in the federal institutions and minting coins. However, through its interactions with other members of the federal state, Megalopolis used its relationship with the federal state to its own advantage.

Finally, the last part of the thesis explores the role of Megalopolis and its local interests in Achaian foreign politics. The polis seems to have influenced these through the emergence of a series of influential statesmen (such as Philopoimen and Lykortas) as well as several new policies pursued by the Achaians after Megalopolis' membership. Examples of these new policies are the Achaian alliance with Macedon of 225 BC and the increased focus of the *koinon* on Sparta in the second century BC, something that also shaped Achaian interactions with Rome. Throughout the thesis particular attention is paid to the narrative of the historian Polybius and the problems his writings pose, since he was an important source for the history of the Achaian *koinon* and who, as a Megalopolitan, was an excellent example of this distinct Megalopolitan identity. By shedding light on the various ways in which Megalopolis affected the Achaian *koinon* and its politics, this thesis shows that Megalopolis merits more attention than it has

received in the past, as it was more than just an Arkadian city that was a member of the Achaian *koinon*. Furthermore, the intricate analysis of the distinct Megalopolitan identity makes a novel contribution to the wider study on the interaction between the polis, as a civic unit, and the federal state, as a developing political structure.

Lay Summary

Today, federal states are a popular form of government throughout the world. Some examples include the European Union or countries like Belgium, Canada, Germany and the United States. Within a federal state, different governments (federal and regional/local) interact with one another to ensure an optimal working of the federation. However, it is not always easy for these different levels to co-operate as their interests may be different at times. Moreover, as the troubles within the European Union have shown, sometimes the members of these federal states do not get along.

This thesis examines the relationship between federal states and their members in Ancient Greece. More specifically, it explores the case study of the Greek city of Megalopolis and the federal state that it was a part of, the Achaian *koinon*. The core argument of the thesis is that Megalopolis was a city which used its own local identity to carve out a prominent position for itself within the Achaian federation. Therefore, Megalopolis was able to influence Achaian foreign politics and use its relationship with the federal government to its advantage during interactions with other member states.

Acknowledgements

Out of the many papers, blog posts and other pieces that I have written, I do not think that I have ever been happier to be able to write these words, since it means that after a very long time and a lot of effort this thesis is finished. It was not an easy process and at some point, I found myself wondering why I was even doing it, but nevertheless writing a doctoral thesis has provided me with a lot of opportunities, experiences and learning moments that I would not have had otherwise. Moreover, I could not have done it without the support and guidance of a whole slew of people whom I would like to take the opportunity to thank.

First of all, I would like to thank my primary supervisor Professor Andrew Erskine without whom the writing of this thesis could never have happened. The countless meetings and discussions about my research and arguments were very helpful and always encouraged me to review a problem with fresh insights. I would also like thank my secondary supervisor Doctor Benjamin Gray for all of his support and suggestions which helped shape and refine this thesis into its current shape. Moreover, I am extremely grateful for all the time and effort that both have put into reading and correcting the many versions of this thesis as well as many flawed and problematic arguments. Finally, I would like to thank them for the many references, research suggestions and opportunities that they have provided for me and which have given me a few invaluable research experiences.

Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Athanasios Rizakis who graciously acted as my temporary supervisor during my six-month research stay in Athens from January until July 2016. His suggestions about the internal composition of and the epigraphy of the Achaian *koinon* have been very helpful. In addition to weekly meetings to talk about my research, Professor Rizakis also let me accompany him on a research expedition to the archaeological site of Philippi and made many introductions during my stay in Athens. I am further indebted to Professor Yiannis Xydopoulos who has been supportive of my academic endeavours ever since he acted as my Erasmus supervisor in 2012. His initial reference, together with that of Professor Katelijne Vandorpe who was the thesis supervisor during my master back in Belgium, enabled me to start this PhD. I also need to thank the Alexander S. Onassis Foundation whose generous funding allowed me to spend six months in Athens and the Peloponnese to

complete some necessary research for this doctoral thesis by using the libraries of the archaeological institutes and visit the archaeological site of Megalopolis to physically see the place that I have spent all this time working about.

Furthermore, I also want to thank my friends and family for listening to the endless complaints and discussions about my dissertation. I also want to specifically thank the following people for taking the time to read through the draft versions of the thesis and giving me some much-needed feedback; so a big thank you to Zofia Guertin and Kasper Swerts. Finally, and most importantly, I could not have even begun this entire adventure without the encouragement of my parents, Marianne and Patrick. They have been there for me with nothing but support from the moment that I started my undergraduate studies in Belgium until these final few weeks, and so I am grateful to them more than anyone else. Therefore, I dedicate this thesis to them. I hope to someday be able to repay all of the love and support you all have shown me throughout the writing of this dissertation.

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Note on Abbreviations and References

Throughout this thesis, I have employed the Harvard system for referencing. The abbreviations for the Greek and Latin authors are listed below. All literary quotations in Greek and Latin are from the *Perseus Digital Library*, while the epigraphic Greek text has been taken from the *PHI Inscriptions Database*, except for the text from the Messene-Megalopolis inscription which can be found in the online database of the *SEG* (58 370). While the translations of the literary sources are my own, they are loosely based on those of the *Loeb Classical Library.* For the epigraphic evidence, I have likewise drawn on previous translations of the inscriptions done by Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, Emily Mackil and Nino Luraghi and Anna Magnetto.

Concerning the spelling of Greek names, I have tried to consistently use the Greek form in the dissertation (Aratos, Philopoimen, Achaia, Arkadia, etc.). However, I have used the Latinised names in cases in which I felt it was more appropriate like the names of the ancient authors (Polybius, Phylarchus, Livy, etc.) or when they are easier to recognise (Macedon, Philip, Alexander, etc.). I have italicised Greek political terms with a lower case to denote a general concept such as *koinon* and *stategos*; or with a capital to indicate a specific term such as the *Myrioi* or the *Philippeion.*

Abbreviations

Ancient Authors

App. *Syr.*	Appian, *Syrian Wars*
Dem.	Demosthenes
De Cor.	*On the Crown*
Meg.	*For the Megalopolitans*
Diod.	Diodorus Siculus, *Bibliotheka Historika*
Hdt.	Herodotos, *Histories*
Livy	Livy, *Ab Urbe Condita*
Kerk. *Mel.*	Kerkidas, *Meliambes*
Nep. *Ep.*	Nepos, *Epodes*
Paus.	Pausanias, *Description of Greece*
Pol.	Polybius, *Histories*
Plut.	Plutarch,
Ages.	*Life of Agesilaos*
Ar.	*Life of Aratos*
Flam.	*Life of Flamininus*
Kleo.	*Life of Kleomenes*
Phil.	*Life of Philopoimen*
Mor.	*Moralia*
Tac. *An.*	Tacitus, *Annales*
Xen. *Hell.*	Xenophon, *Hellenika*

Reference Works

Achaïe I	Rizakis, A. D. (1995), *Achaïe I. Sources textuelles et histoire régionale*, Athens.
Achaïe II	Rizakis, A. D. (1998), *Achaïe II. Le cité de Patras: épigraphie et histoire,* Athens
Achaïe III	Rizakis, A. D. (2008) *Achaïe III. Les cités achéenes: épigraphie et histoire,* Athens.

BCH	*Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*
BMCPelop	*British Museum Catalogue, Coins of the Peloponnese.*
FD III	*Fouilles de Delphes III: Epigaphie* (1929-), Paris.
FGrHist	Jacoby, F. (1961-1969) *Die Fragmenten der Griechischen Historiker*, Leiden.
IG	*Inscriptiones Graecae* (1890-), Berlin.
IMagn.	Kern, O. (1900), *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*, Berlin.
IMylasa	Blumel, W. (1987), *Die Inschriften von Mylasa*, Bonn.
IOlympia	Dittenberger, W. and Purgold, K. (1896), *Die Ergebnisse der ... Ausgrabung V: Die Inschriften,* Berlin.
IvO	Dittenberger, W. and Purgold, K. (1896), *Die Inschriften von Olympia*, Berlin.
IPArk	Thür, G. and Taeuber, H. (1994), *Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischenn Poleis: in Arkadien*, Vienna.
ISE	Moretti, L. (1967-1975), *Inscizioni storiche ellenistiche*, Florence.
LGPN	Fraser, P. M. and Matthews, E. (eds.) (1997), *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names* III A, Oxford.
MDAI(A)	*Mitteilungen des Deutsches Archaologischen Instituts (Athenische Abteilung),* (1886-).
POxy	*Oxyrynchus Papyri* (1898-), London.
SEG	*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum* (1923-), Leiden and Amsterdam.
Syll^{3}	Dittenberger, W. (1915-1924) *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum,* Leipzig.

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FIGURE 1 - ARCHAEOLOGICAL SITE OF MEGALOPOLIS (C) A. PETRONOTIS, 1973



INTRODUCTION

Introduction

When in 1991, after about a century, excavations resumed on the archaeological site of Megalopolis in Arkadia, archaeologists noticed that there were signs of two major catastrophes in the material evidence. One was an earthquake in AD 200 that happened not long after Pausanias' visit to the city, while the other was the result of the destruction of the city in 222 BC by the Spartan king Kleomenes III. An attack so severe, that it took several years to rebuild (Pol. 2. 55. 7.) as is evidenced by the extensive remodelling and rebuilding of the public buildings on the archaeological site.[1] The attack occurred during the Kleomenean War (227-222 BC), which pitted the federation of cities known as the Achaian *koinon* against the Spartan king Kleomenes. As a new member of this federal state – it had joined the *koinon* in 235 BC, Megalopolis played an important part in the conflict, in part due to its geographical proximity to Sparta. However, this specific attack was not only connected to Megalopolis' Achaian membership as it was just one example in a series of attacks, sieges and raids between the two poleis. These were the results of a longstanding antagonism between the two states and were a crucial part of the Megalopolitan identity.

Just like any other Greek polis, Megalopolis had its own local identity that was formed through a long and open-ended process. It hated Sparta with a burning passion because of Sparta's dominant position and conquests in the Peloponnese and Arkadia, it also had a political preference for Macedon and was proud to be an Arkadian city. However, because of its foundation by the Arkadian *koinon* around 368 BC and its later membership of the Achaian *koinon* from 235 to 146 BC, Megalopolis had a particular, defining awareness of what it meant to be part of a federal state, which distinguished it from other cities in the late Classical or Hellenistic period. Since federal states or *koina* as they are referred to in Greek[2], had become a popular form of governance in mainland Greece from the end of the fourth century BC as the ultimate example of cooperation between city-states[3], Megalopolis could use this element to carve out a position of influence within the Achaian *koinon*. This federation was first formed in the fifth century BC by the poleis that were part of the region of Achaia in the northwest of the

[1] Lauter (2005), 237.
[2] Other popular Greek terms for these federations are *ethnos, sympoliteuma,* or *systema.* For more on this see the Methodology section below.
[3] Beck and Funke (2015), 3.

Peloponnese. These cities remained a federal state until they were pitted against one another by Alexander's successors. Polybius tells us Dyme, Patrai, Pharai and Tritaia decided to form a second Achaian *koinon* in the 124th Olympiad (284-280 BC) which became one of the most powerful of the Hellenistic states until its defeat by the Romans in the Achaian War of 146 BC (Pol. 2. 41. 1). The Achaian League had a democratic institution and the institutions associated with Greek poleis and other *koina*; it was led by a *strategos,* had a federal council, primary assembly and federal magistrates such as the *damiorgoi*; and expected its member states partake in federal political life. However, the Achaian *koinon* was different from other Greek federations because it incorporated poleis from the entire Peloponnese and not just those that were ethnically Achaian which resulted in a complex and open federal framework where a polis such as Megalopolis with its distinct local identity could easily thrive.

While federalism in antiquity has long been a popular topic among ancient historians[4], the influence of one city's local interests and identity on the politics and internal mechanisms of a federal state has not been the topic of a single work.[5] In general, Megalopolis is either studied within the wider context of its creation by the Arkadians or as just another Achaian member state which produced a series of influential federal leaders, the most notable of which were Philopoimen and Polybius' father Lykortas. In the end, very little attention has been paid to Megalopolis, as a city with its own local interests and desires, within the wider framework that the Achaian federal state could offer. This is what the present work aims to change and why it limits itself to those periods when the city was part of a federation, i.e. the 360s BC and from 235 until 146 BC. Furthermore, by studying local Megalopolitan identity in its federal context this thesis also shows that Megalopolis was an example of a city with a new kind of Greek ethnic identity. It shows that local civic identity was far more complex than previously thought and can be seen as a changing process. Therefore, this thesis is relevant to a wide range of historians simply because it shows that as one of the youngest cities in the Peloponnese Megalopolis embodies a new form of Greek civic life in which the polis

[4] For example, for seminal works on federalism in Antiquity, see Freeman (1893); Busolt and Swoboda (1920-1926); Ehrenberg (1960); Larsen (1955) and (1968); and Beck and Funke (2015).
[5] Beck and Funke (2015), 3.

seems to overstep its traditional boundaries and becomes much more open or federal in its nature.

Historiography

Research into Megalopolis has mostly been part of larger research topics. This means that the history of the city and the development of its local identity and traditions have stayed at the periphery of research on topics such as the Arkadian and Achaian *koina*, Greek and Roman relations, inter-state arbitration and interactions and even Polybius and his narrative. Therefore, any study like the present one that deals with a specific area of the Megalopolitan history, i.e. its interaction and membership of the Achaian *koinon*, has to look at these wider topics and in particular their scholarship to see how the polis and its local identity fit into these broader themes.

One of the most important contexts in which Megalopolis has been extensively studied is its foundation by and membership of the Arkadian *koinon.*[6] This is not surprising since the foundation of Megalopolis was the only lasting achievement of the Arkadians whose federation fell apart after a few years. Moreover, it is significant for this thesis as the foundation was the basis from which the local identity of Megalopolis could develop. In short, it was the start of the process that was the Megalopolitan identity. Traditionally, the precarious nature of the primary source material on Megalopolis' foundation – and the Arkadian *koinon* in general – has spawned several issues that make it difficult to establish a precise date and pattern for the foundation. Nonetheless, in a series of articles, James Roy has managed to make several convincing arguments for the early history of Megalopolis. In his 2007 article on 'The urban layout of Megalopolis in its civic and confederate context', Roy rightly argues that Megalopolis was not founded by the Arkadians as their capital, as has frequently been stated by others[7], but rather with the intention of creating a strong city to counter Spartan power in that part of Arkadia.[8] This statement is echoed by Thomas Heine Nielsen in his book chapter on the 'Arkadian Confederacy' from 2015 and his earlier book on *Arkadia and its Poleis in the Archaic and Classical Periods* in which he makes the point that there is no consistent

[6] On Megalopolis' foundation and membership of the Arkadian *koinon*, see Dušanić (1970), Roy (1971), (2005), (2007); Hansen and Nielsen (2004); and Nielsen (2002) and (2015).
[7] Among others, Bury (1898), 15; Larsen (1968), 187; Braunert and Pedersen (1972), 73; Verfenstein (2002), 9; Donati (2015), 207.
[8] Roy (2007), 291.

evidence for Megalopolis enjoying a special status within the *koinon* that would equal that of a capital as we know the term today.[9] After all, the term capital is a modern construction and the sources do not mention anything of the sort in connection to Megalopolis. In her discussion of the sanctuaries and cults of the polis, Madeleine Jost does point out that these were clearly meant to connect the Megalopolitan pantheon to the wider region of Arkadia and unify the different groups of people now living in one city.[10]

Megalopolis' membership of the Achaian *koinon* is the second topic that is essential for this thesis due to the profound change that it had on Megalopolis' local identity. Surprisingly, the city's Achaian membership – and relationship with the federal state - has not been the subject of a single monograph; this despite the recognition of the importance of the polis within the federal state by several scholars. For example, James O'Neil in his seminal article on 'The Political Elites of the Achaean and Aetolian Leagues', characterized Megalopolis as the city that produced most of the federal leaders. Therefore, through the actions of these Megalopolitans the city had a serious impact on the Achaian politics.[11] Rather than study the dynamic between polis and federation, scholars of the Achaian *koinon* have instead focused on specific areas connected to Achaian history and institutions. Surprisingly, there is no single study in English that deals with the constitutional composition of the federation and its history. Yet a comprehensive review of all known information on and problems around the federation is given both by James Roy and Athanassios Rizakis in two recent book chapters as well as Emily Mackil's *Creating a Common Polity: Religion, Economy, and Politics in the Making of the Greek Koinon*.[12]

While Andre Aymard's book *Les assemblées de la confederation achaienne: Étude critique d'institutions et d'histoire* gives a good overview of the Achaian institutions based on Polybius' narrative, his research is dated and now needs to be supplemented with the epigraphical evidence.[13] These inscriptions record new and additional information not provided by the literary sources such as Polybius who despite

[9] Nielsen (2015), 266-267.
[10] Jost (1985), 235.
[11] O'Neil (1984-1986), 38.
[12] Roy (2003), 81-95; Mackil (2013), 91-146; and Rizakis (2015), 118-131.
[13] Aymard (1938). See also Larsen (1968), 84 and 216, (1971) and (1972); Lehmann (1983); and Walbank (2002b).

his great knowledge of the Achaian institutions is vague at times on their precise nature and composition. Even though Rizakis has collected most of these inscriptions in a series of three volumes, these are somewhat limited in the fact that they primarily focus on the cities that were part of the original Achaian heartland and subsequently ignore newer member states outside of this region such as Megalopolis.[14] His discussion of a pair of inscriptions found in Epidauros and Aigion with lists of the Achaian federal *nomographoi* in 'Le collège de nomographes et le système de répresentation dans le koinon Achéen' offers an interesting insight into the composition of this group of federal magistrates and potentially of the other assemblies.[15] He argues that the number of *nomographoi* coming from a specific city depended on its size and influence, indicating that the bigger cities would send three representatives, the medium sized cities two and the smaller poleis one. However, there are problems with these inscriptions as they supposedly do not list all of the cities of the Achaian *koinon*. This idea has also been supported by Sergey Sizov who attempts to solve some of the problems of these lists.[16] Regardless of their issues, these inscriptions have some interesting consequences for the interactions between the members of the Achaian *koinon* and the federal state. Despite Rizakis' interesting contributions on this theme, as he has written other pieces on local and federal citizenship[17], his focus still tends to be on Achaia and the traditionally Achaian cities, with little attention for Megalopolis and the rest of the Southern Peloponnese.

Additional interactions between the local and federal level within the Achaian *koinon* is discussed by Kaja Harter-Uibopuu in her *Das zwischenstaatliche Schiedsverfahren im Achäischen Koinon. Zur friedlichen Streitbeilegung nach den epigraphischen Quellen*.[18] In this book, she analyses the relationship between the federal state and its poleis through boundary disputes between the Achaian members. One of her most interesting conclusions shows that there was no standardized arbitration process within the federation and that Achaia was as little involved as possible. However, she does note that all disputes with members had to be settled before a city could join the Achaians and poleis could appeal to the federal states if they thought it was necessary.

[14] Rizakis (1995), (1998) and (2008).
[15] Rizakis (2003), 105.
[16] Sizov (2016), 107.
[17] Rizakis (2010) and (2012).
[18] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 119-129.

Both Sheila Ager and Emily Mackil review several of these boundary disputes, but their discussions of these is less detailed than that of Harter-Uibopuu as they are part of wider themes such as inter-state arbitration and the development of *koina* in the Hellenistic period.[19] While innovative, Harter-Uibopuu's analysis of twelve boundary disputes between the members of the *koinon* has overlooked Megalopolis' tendency to call in Achaian magistrates in case of a dispute with another state.

The discovery of an inscription in Messene in 2008 which details a boundary dispute between the city and Megalopolis has yielded valuable new information on the internal mechanics of the Achaian federation and the relationship between the federal government and its members. So far, only part of the inscription, i.e. 100 lines, has been published by Petros Themelis, but there are two articles that provide essential discussions on the wider context of the inscription: there is one by Ilias Arnaoutoglou which re-examines new evidence on internal arbitration within the *koinon* as well as additional functions of the Achaian *damiorgoi* (i.e. federal magistrates with a variety of responsibilities).[20] The second article, 'The Controversy between Megalopolis and Messene in a New Inscription from Messene', written by Nino Luraghi and Anna Magnetto, provides a deeper discussion of the impact that the dispute between the two cities had on their relationship with one another and the *koinon.*[21] Moreover, the article is one of the only works that specifically deals with Megalopolis' position in the federal Achaian framework; showing that despite their habit of using the knowledge of federal mechanics to their own advantage, the city did not always get its way.

Research done by Jennifer Warren on the silver and bronze coinage of the Achaian *koinon* further highlights another way in which member poleis connected with the federal state. In her *The Bronze Coinage of the Achaian Koinon: The Currency of a Federal Ideal*, she diligently gives a complete numismatic overview of the bronze federal coinage, while making some interesting hypotheses. She is convinced that these coins were produced in one continuous minting period by the majority of the Achaian member states after 200 BC, most likely even after the Third Macedonian War (172-168 BC). Two of her conclusions are of particular interest for the theme of Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon*: the fact that Megalopolis was one of the first cities to start

[19] Ager (1997), selected numbers, Mackil (2013), 453-481.
[20] Arnaoutoglou (2009/10), 187.
[21] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 514-521.

minting bronze federal Achaian coins and the wider notion that this minting was done as an expression of federal pride.[22] While Warren's book gives a clear and concise overview of the bronze coins, scholarship on the silver ones has proven to be a bit more problematic due to a disagreement on whether or not there is a possibility that some of these coins were minted during the Roman period.[23]

Thus, as far as Megalopolis' position within the Achaian *koinon* is concerned, the scholarship has primarily treated the polis as just another Achaian member state albeit with a few notable exceptions. A lot of the works on Achaian foreign politics deals with the *koinon's* relationship with Rome in which it is often treated as one of the Greek allies of Rome.[24] Although there are many theories and ways of looking at the Greek and Roman politics in the later Hellenistic period, an interesting one is found in chapters four and five of Erich Gruen's *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome*. In these two chapters, the author argues that the interactions of the Greeks on the mainland with Rome were influenced by local rivalries and interests of the Greek leaders.[25] A very compelling argument which is often ignored by other scholars and is further echoed in his article 'Aratus and the Achaean Alliance with Macedon' in which Gruen re-evaluates Aratos' role in the establishment the alliance with Macedon.[26]

Even when scholars have focussed on the individual leaders from Megalopolis, like Malcolm Errington has done with Philopoimen in the eponymous book, Megalopolis as a city has not come to the forefront of scholarly attention. While the *Philopoemen* is a very useful – if not somewhat dated – analysis of the man's life, the author does not draw any conclusions on how Philopoimen's actions are to be looked at in their Megalopolitan context.[27] Moreover, other important statesmen like Lydiades and even Lykortas have not specifically been studied. Where Polybius and his narrative are concerned, a lot of useful and very detailed analyses have been produced – of which Walbank's commentary is by far the most exhaustive - about different aspects of the author's work and yet his words have rarely been considered in connection to his

[22] Warren (2007), 174-179.
[23] Thompson (1939) and (1968); Warren (1999), 99-109.
[24] Deininger (1971); Gruen (1984); Bastini (1987); Errington (1990); Nottmeyer (1995); Eckstein (2008); Rosenstein (2012); Waterfield (2014).
[25] Gruen (1984), chapter four and five.
[26] Gruen (1972), 625.
[27] Errington (1969), 3; 72; 74; 90.

background as a Megalopolitan citizen.[28] Although Craig Champion has looked at Polybius' views on the Achaian *koinon* and their virtues, Megalopolis is omittedfrom the analysis.[29] However, Polybius' bias towards his native city and his obvious disdain for certain Spartan figures such as Kleomenes and Nabis, is a direct result of his origins. Arthur Eckstein clearly states this in articles from 1987 and 2013[30]; yet in his book *Moral Vision in the Histories of Polybius*, he only needs the first four pages to see how growing up in Megalopolis influenced Polybius' views of the world and how these manifested itself in the development in his aristocratic *ethos*.[31]

Thus, two recurring problems emerge with previous scholarship surrounding Megalopolis. The first and most important one, i.e. the fact that Megalopolis has primarily been studied as a part of a wider research agenda, has been mentioned at the start of this Historiography section. This is illustrated by the fact that there is no existing monograph that covers the entire history of the city like that of Nino Luraghi for Messene. Clearly, Megalopolis was much more than an Arkadian city that was part of two different federal states or the hometown of a few influential individuals: it was a unique city with its own local identity and plans which chose to be a part of the Achaian *koinon* and played a role in forming the ideals and actions of those individuals growing up amongst its elites. Furthermore, the relationship between a federal state and its members, and particularly the case of the Achaian *koinon*, merits more attention as it is an integral part of the mechanics of a federation both in antiquity as well as today. Although scholars have always connected the origins of the Greek federal states to an ethnicity shared by a group of people with a common past and homeland, when a polis joined a *koinon* outside of their ethnic circle as was the case with Megalopolis and Achaia, the results are often ignored.[32] Instead, the ethnic boundaries of these federations seem to fade away as they have to be overcome in order to create vast and powerful federal states.[33] The interactions between the local and federal level and the ways that these two influence one another has not been studied enough, as scholars preferred to use Polybius and other literary sources as their main point of information.

[28] See also McGing (2010).
[29] Champion (2004a), chapters four and five, 100-172.
[30] Eckstein (1987) and (2013).
[31] Eckstein (1995), 1-4.
[32] See Hall (2015), 31-33; Larsen (1968).
[33] Larsen (1968), xvii.

The problem with this is that their research tends to ignore the poleis as political actors with their own interests and desires. While, as we have seen, there are some notable exceptions to this due to the publications of new inscriptions such as the one found in Messene, additional research is needed on the relationship of the Achaian federation and its members that combines the inscriptions and coins issued by these members with the literary tradition to develop a more nuanced image of what it was like for a city like Megalopolis to be a member of the *koinon*.

Methodology

At the start of this methodology section it is important to state clearly that this thesis is not intended to be a narrative of the entire history of Megalopolis. While there is a definitely need for such an endeavour, the present thesis is only concerned with Megalopolis and its development within the wider federal framework offered by the *koina* of which it was a member. This means that I will limit my discussion of Megalopolitan history to the years of its connection to the Arkadian *koinon*, i.e. the middle of the fourth century BC, and its Achaian membership between 235 and 146 BC. The city's foundation by and membership of the Arkadian federation needs to be discussed since it formed the origins of key characteristics of the Megalopolitan identity, i.e. the city's understanding of federalism and its antagonism towards Sparta.[34] On the other hand, the city's decision to join the Achaian *koinon* in 235 BC transformed this process by adding an Achaian element to the Megalopolitan identity that would gradually replace their traditional loyalty to Macedon after 198 BC.

While the main subject of this thesis is the relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon* as well as the influence of the city's local identity on the federal state, the dissertation also relates it to the wider topic of federal states in Antiquity and the way in which their poleis interacted with them and each other. However, there is always the danger of being anachronistic when using modern concepts and ideas such as identity, nation and state. This is certainly the case for Greek federal states and their modern counterparts which are rather different despite the fact that their most basic definition has remained the same throughout history. The political scientist Jan Erk has given this basic definition of a federal state as 'a political structure where authority is divided among

[34] Roy (2003), 261.

two or more levels of government'.[35] As Mackil has pointed out, an important difference between the Greek federations and federal states such as the ones that exist in Belgium, Germany or even the European Union, is that we do not know much about the precise nature of these *koina*. This is due to a lack of information from the primary sources which compels us to use the word federal with caution.[36] The Greeks had their own words to indicate these kind of political unions such as *ethnos*, *sympoliteuma*, *systema,* or simply the plural notion of the citizens, i.e. 'the Achaians'.[37] Rightly, Mackil herself has chosen to use the term *koinon* – which means 'common thing' - in lieu of some more modern constructs such as federation, federal state or league, which she only applies if the institutions function in the same way as those we know today.[38] However, as there is a widely established tradition in which the modern terminology is used interchangeably with one another to refer to these *koina*, I will also employ these terms since they can all be defined by the definition mentioned above.[39]

Moreover, there is a connection between the formation of these *koina* and the shared identity and kinship by groups of people who lived in geographical proximity to one another, since these factors were the basis for their formation in the first place.[40] When dealing with the local identity of a polis such as Megalopolis, it is important to note the differences between its Arkadian and Achaian membership. While the Arkadian *koinon* only had Arkadian members and thus had a clear ethnic and geographical boundary, the situation of the Achaians was entirely different, even though its origins were similar to that of the other federal states. The sanctuary of Zeus Homarios at Aigion or that of Poseidon in Helike before it, united the Achaians into their *koinon*. However, the vast expansion of the federal state outside of its ethnic and geographical boundaries meant that it soon incorporated cities that were not ethnically Achaian.[41] As already mentioned, this specific feature of the Achaian *koinon* has not received a lot of scholarly attention which is particularly problematic for a discussion

[35] Erk (2008), 3.
[36] Mackil (2013), 5.
[37] Beck and Funke (2015), 14. While the first words are used in the literary sources (Pol. 2. 37. 7–11.; 9. 28. 2.), the latter expression is most commonly found on coins and in inscriptions.
[38] Mackil (2013), 6.
[39] Beck and Funke (2015), 13.
[40] Beck and Funke (2015), 23.
[41] Hall (2015b), 42.

about the relationship between the Achaian federal state and one of its non-Achaian members.

The local identity of a city is strongly connected to its ethnicity, and this is no different for Megalopolis. The complex and changing nature of this identity as exemplified by Megalopolis is addressed by Kostas Vlassopoulos and Jonathan Hall.[42] For the purposes of the present study, I wish to note Vlassopoulos' argument about the benefits of looking at Greek ethnic identity as a process that undergoes changes overtime.[43] Moreover, Hall's arguments that the polis itself should rightly be seen as a civic entity that could also subscribe to a broader identity and could be ethnically diverse, needs to be stressed in the context of the Arkadian and Achaian characteristics of the Megalopolitan identity.[44] All of this meant that the Greek ethnic identity was much more fluid than previously thought.[45]

Therefore, I have chosen to start this dissertation by clearly establishing Megalopolis' local identity before the city joined the Achaian *koinon* and identifying the components that were connected to its wider Arkadian ethnic identity. This is necessary to see what the impact was of the city's Achaian membership on its local identity, which changed after 235 BC by adding a distinct Achaian/federal characteristic. Additionally, it seems that the federal state did not favour one group over another and the poleis interacted without any problems, when multiple cities with a different *ethnos* were part of a single federal state as was the case with Megalopolis and the Achaian League. The local and federal levels could therefore operate separately and have their own distinct identities, but typical group characteristics such as the Arkadian opposition to Sparta could still find their way to the federal level and influence federal politics. This ultimately created a rather complex identity within Megalopolis that was more than just simply Achaian or Arkadian. Pausanias has called Megalopolis the youngest city of Greece (Paus. 8. 27. 1.), and it is clear that the city was an example of a new kind of stage in Greek civic life, one in which the local identity of a polis became less constrained and more open.

[42] Hall (2015a), 17; Vlassopoulos (2015), 11.
[43] Vlassopoulos (2015), 10-13. Although Vlassopoulos does not use the term in connection to the Hellenistic *koina*, I believe this to very applicable particularly in the case of Megalopolis.
[44] Hall (2015a), 22-23.
[45] Mackil (2013), 6-7; Hall (2015b), 32.

Evidence

Because of the focus on Megalopolis within the Achaian *koinon*, Polybius and his *Histories* are of vital importance for this thesis. On the one hand, since Polybius himself came from Megalopolis, he provides us with an interesting insight into the identity of an individual Megalopolitan within the *koinon* via his views on the city, the wider region of Arkadia and the Achaian federation. Therefore, his work will be analysed to explore what these views were and how they were expressed. While Kerkidas of Megalopolis is the only other author from the polis whose work has survived to this day, his work is far too fragmented to allow us to draw any general conclusions about Megalopolis and its relationship with the Achaian *koinon*.[46] On the other hand, Polybius' familiarity with Achaian politics and procedures means that his work is invaluable for anyone studying any aspect of Achaian federal history.[47] Additionally, his narrative is the only contemporary literary source for the events of the third and second century BC.

Clearly, the *Histories* of Polybius lie at the core of this study because of the information it provides, but there are quite a few problems that are connected to it that the reader needs to be aware of. Firstly, it has to be stressed that Polybius' personal experiences and opinions coloured his narrative throughout. Of course, this happens to most historians as it is sometimes difficult to objectively record historical events, especially when it concerns matters in which one was personally involved. Therefore, Polybius' depiction of his political opponent Kallikrates of Sikyon, i.e. a demagogue who was responsible for the deportation of a thousand Achaians to Rome and moreover who was universally hated by the Achaian people, needs to be taken with the metaphorical pinch of salt.[48] This also applies to his obvious disdain towards Kleomenes and Nabis of Sparta as well as the historian Phylarchus, all of whom Polybius describes as the worst individuals possible (Pol. 38. 12). The reason for the hostilities towards these Spartans and the pro-Spartan historian have to be found in his background as a Megalopolitan and their treatment of Megalopolis, something that has not escaped the notice of other historians.[49]

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[46] For more on Kerkidas, see Livrea (1986) and López Cruces (1995).
[47] This is evident to the many references to the institutions and the history of the federation that Frank Walbank has made in his commentaries on Polybius' histories and the many papers that have come about as a result of these.
[48] Thornton (2013), 216.
[49] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 128.

The second problem with using Polybius as a source is his tendency to focus on important individuals when writing history. A very good example for this is his account of the Achaian War with Kleomenes (229-222 BC) in which he – mistakenly – puts Aratos at the forefront of the creation of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance (Pol. 2. 40. 2). Polybius tends to make his feelings about these individuals clear, as he uses them as the ideal role models for his audience to instruct them on the right ways to use history in daily life. According to Champion, Polybius used both Philopoimen and Scipio Africanus as the personifications of Roman and Achaian virtues.[50] Because of this, Polybius' history of the Achaian *koinon* has primarily become the history of its influential elites, while completely ignoring the local ambitions of the member states and the internal dynamics of the federation.[51] This is further exemplified by the fact that Polybius is rather vague on the exact composition and nature of the Achaian institutions, leaving academics speculating as to how these were organised and who attended the meetings.[52]

Finally, Polybius' work has not survived integrally and only the first five books of the *Histories* are still complete today. This means that a lot of the information is now lost, leaving a considerable gap in our knowledge of the later years of the Achaian *koinon*, i.e. the period between the Third Macedonian War and the Achaian War of 146 BC. While the fragments that do exist allow some speculations as they are quite lengthy, it is still rather difficult to get a complete picture of the Achaian history and interactions in the years leading up to the Achaian War, based solely on Polybius. Therefore, other literary sources are used in addition to Polybius' narrative – some of which rely heavily on Polybius' narrative – as well as the epigraphical, numismatic and archaeological evidence. To ensure that this thesis covers the biggest aspects of the relationship between Megalopolis and its identity and the federal state, these different sources will be combined to create a complete overview of the problem.

In addition to Polybius, there are several authors that are of importance when discussing the development of Megalopolis within the federal states, i.e. Pausanias, Plutarch, Livy, Diodorus Siculus, Xenophon and Demosthenes. In his *Description of*

[50] Champion (2004a), 147-168.
[51] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 544.
[52] For an illustration of this, see Walbank (2002b) which summarised the problems surrounding Polybius and the Achaian institutions quite clearly.

Greece, Pausanias gives an entire overview of the layout of the city (8. 30. 1-33. 1). This has been used as a guide during excavations because plenty of the buildings described by Pausanias, have been identified by the archaeologists.[53] However, as Daniel Stewart has illustrated, it is important to note that Pausanias himself was writing in a certain context and through his text creates the representations of the past that he wanted his audience to see.[54] Therefore, while some of Pausanias' comments on the layout of the city have been corroborated by the archaeological evidence like the presence of clay roof tiles referring to Philip in the *Philippeion*, I remain cautious about the Megalopolis that we find in his narrative. However, Pausanias does briefly recount the most important events of Megalopolitan history and since he is the only primary source that discusses the foundation of the city in so much detail, his account is invaluable to the present thesis (8. 27. 1-16).

The only other author to say anything at all about the synoecism is Diodorus Siculus who mentions this event very briefly in the *Bibliotheka Historika* (15. 72. 4). One of the biggest problems is that there are so many differences between these two versions making it very difficult to say anything with certainty about the date and scope of the *synoecism* of Megalopolis.[55] This is made even more difficult by the fact that Xenophon, the only contemporary historian, does not mention the creation of the city. However, his *Hellenika* is a very useful source for the history and politics of the Arkadian *koinon* during the years of its short existence. Other information on the early history of the polis is provided by Demosthenes in a speech, entitled *For the Megalopolitans*, to the Athenian *ekklesia* in which he urged the Athenian citizens to send troops to Megalopolis as the city now found itself under Spartan threat. The gaps caused by the fragmentary status of Polybius' narrative, are in part filled by Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* and Plutarch's lives of Aratos, Kleomenes, Philopoimen and Flamininus. While these were heavily influenced by Polybius' work, they do contain additional information not found in the *Histories*. Livy's work in particular is interesting as he looks at the events of the second century BC from a Roman perspective, thereby highlighting different aspects than Polybius. Plutarch on the other hand, gives more detailed information concerning several of the events that the protagonists of his lives are involved

[53] Gardner et al. (1890), 140-141; Lauter and Spyropoulos (1998), 445.
[54] Stewart (2013), 243.
[55] Nielsen (2002), 428-433.

in. The best example of this is the overview of the federal career of Lydiades of Megalopolis and his actions at Mount Lykaion during the Kleomenean War (Plut. *Ar.* 30, 35-37; *Kleo.* 6). However, one must also keep in mind that Plutarch's lives were part of a biographical tradition which means that his words have to be studied in this particular context.[56]

In addition to the literary sources, there are several inscriptions that provide an interesting insight as to how the polis of Megalopolis acted as a political unit, in particular within the Achaian *koinon*, something that the literary sources tend to ignore altogether. The majority of the inscriptions discussed in the thesis are boundary disputes between the city and other members of the Achaian federation, none of which have been found in Megalopolis itself. Most of these have been collected and discussed by Sheila Ager, Kaja Harter-Uibopuu or Emily Mackil as part of their work on wider themes. The only exception to this is the boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene which has been thoroughly discussed by Nino Luraghi and Anna Magnetto.[57] Yet no one has treated the boundary disputes centred solely on Megalopolis as one collective and analysed what they could tell us about the specific nature of the relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon.* Moreover, most of these boundary disputes have all been dated to the second century BC and so inform us about a period for which the literary sources are rather scarce.

There are two other kind of inscriptions that are used throughout this thesis. The first one are the inscriptions connected to the institutions and magistrates of the Achaian *koinon* such as the Achaian *nomographoi* lists (*IG* IV.I^2 73; *Achaïe* III 116); or those of the Arkadian *koinon* such as a list with the fifty Arkadian *damiorgoi* (*IG* V 2.1). These provide us with essential background information on the mechanics of these federal states and more importantly, they allow us to draw some novel conclusions about Megalopolis' role in these institutions.[58] The second category concerns decrees from Megalopolis in which the city honours individual citizens such as Lydiades (*SEG* 52.447) or Philopoimen (*Syll*^{3} 624).[59] These decrees corroborate the literary sources and allow us to examine them in another context than just their Achaian federal careers as well as

[56] Stadter (1992), 1-9.
[57] Ager (1995), n. 43, 116, 135-137; Harter-Uibopuu (1998), n. 8, 9, 11; Mackil (2013) n. 45; Luraghi and Magnetto (2012).
[58] See Rizakis (1995), (1998), (2008).
[59] Stavrianopoulou (2002), 117-156; and Káto (2006), 239-250.

what their actions meant to their native city. Thus, we can further analyse the relationship between prominent Megalopolitans and their polis.

In addition to these written sources, the numismatic evidence from Megalopolis also tells us that the city was actively taking part in Achaian federal life as the polis produced both civic and federal coinage during its time as part of the federal state.[60] A wider analysis of the Achaian federal coinage shows that the city was even one of the first cities to start minting the bronze federal coins.[61] Furthermore, the iconography on civic coins from Megalopolis indicate that the city still felt connected to its Arkadian past as they adopted typical Arkadian symbols like Zeus Lykaios and Pan on their civic coins, even after the city became part of the Achaian *koinon* which changed the way in which Megalopolis and its inhabitants viewed their own identity[62]. As previously mentioned, these coins – and the inscriptions - shed light on an aspect often ignored by the literary tradition in relation to the polis and the federal state, i.e. the fact that these cities were political units which interacted with the federal state and had their own interests.

Archaeology

The distict local identity of Megalopolis is also reflected through its urban planning and layout. Several of the monumental buildings in the agora of Megalopolis highlight the political connections and aspirations of the polis that allowed it become an important part of the Achaian and Arkadian *koina.*[63] The most important of these will be used throughout the thesis to demonstrate these aspirations, such as the Megalopolitan connection to Macedon which was established in the years after Philip II made his expedition against Sparta and gave part of the Spartan territory to Megalopolis resulting in the citizens naming a stoa on their agora after him, the *Philippeion*. Additionally, the size of the city walls as well as the seating capacity of the theatre indicate that Megalopolis was a big city. However, the most important feature of the Megalopolitan identity exemplified by the material culture was its innovative and anticipating nature, since the

[60] Dengate (1967), 103.
[61] Warren (2007), 125-126.
[62] See Dengate (1967) or section two of chapter two for more information.
[63] On the overall archaeology of Megalopolis, see Gardner et al (1892); Bury (1898); Braunert and Pedersen (1972); Lauter and Spyropoulos (1998), Verfenstein (2002); Lauter (2005a); Roy (2007). *Thersilion and theatre*: Gardner et al. (1890); Dryer and Sellers (1891); Bather (1892-93); Benson (1892-93); Loring (1892-93) and Lauter and Lauter-Bufe (2004). *The political buildings and the agora*: Calder (1982), Lauter (2005b), Lauter and Lauter-Bufe (2011); Donati (2015). *Sanctuaries*: Jost (1985) and (1992); Gans and Kreilinger (2002); Lauter-Bufe (2009). *Fortifications:* Maher (2017).

buildings in the city seem to precede trends that were typical for the Hellenistic period.[64] Therefore, I have chosen to give an overview of the city's archaeology in the introduction.

The first excavations at Megalopolis were carried out at the end of the nineteenth century by the British School at Athens (in 1890-1891).[65] Aside from a small survey on the Zeus Soter sanctuary by Peter Knoblauch in 1940[66], it was not until 1991 that another team of archaeologists would dig at the site. These excavations, which lasted until 2002 and were led by Hans Lauter and Theodoros Spyropoulos, were a joint effort of German and Greeks and had the primary goal of re-examining the late Classical and Hellenistic buildings.[67] In general, even though Megalopolis was one of the biggest poleis in Greece (Pol. 2. 55. 2.) with its city walls spanning a distance of nine kilometres[68], the excavations of the city have been focussed around the ancient agora in the north of the city and the theatre and *Thersilion* in the south. In Megalopolis, Pausanias' *Description of Greece* (8. 30-32) has been used by the archaeologists to identify most of the buildings at the site and some of his narrative has indeed been corroborated by epigraphic finds. However, as remarked in the previous section, we have to remain cautious when basing the identification of the material record solely on Pausanias' word.[69] Nonetheless, it is still useful to see how Pausanias saw the city and so a short overview of his description of Megalopolis will be given in the next paragraph before discussing the buildings that are important for this thesis.

The river Helisson divided the city in two. In the northern section of the city, the Megalopolitans had built their agora which was flanked by several buildings including a stone enclosure dedicated to Zeus Lykaios with several altars and important statues of deities from the region, including a statue of Pan and a bronze image of Apollo in front of the enclosure. On the right of the Apollo statue was the temple of the Mother, in front of which an inscription could be found for a statue dedicated to Diophanes of Megalopolis. The agora also had two stoas: the *Philippeion*, named after Philip II of Macedon by the Megalopolitans, and a smaller one which housed the public magistrates

[64] Donati (2015), 206.
[65] Gardner, et al (1892).
[66] Knoblauch (1942), 148-149.
[67] Lauter (2005), 236.
[68] Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 522.
[69] Stewart (2013), 259.

of the city, counting six rooms including the council chamber. This smaller stoa, called *Aristandreion* after its dedicator, adjoined the Stoa of Philip. Near the council chamber, an image of Polybius was carved onto a slab accompanied by an overview of his accomplishments. Behind Aristander's stoa lay the temple to Fortune. There was a third stoa on the agora which was called the *Myropolis* and was thought to have been made by the Megalopolitan tyrant Aristodemos with spoils from a victory against the Spartans. Close to the agora was the sanctuary of Zeus Soter with several important statues made by Damophon of Messene. Finally, across from the sanctuary of Zeus Soter, was another sacred enclosure, this time for the Great Goddesses which housed several temples. In the southern section of the city were ruins of several sanctuaries or temples, as well as the biggest theatre in Greece and the foundation stones of a building called the *Thersilion*. This building was named after the man who built it – a private citizen – and supposedly had functioned as the council room for the *Myrioi* or the Ten Thousand, the assembly of the Arkadian *koinon*. Near the *Thersilion* was an image of Ammon and the house of Alexander, which was owned by a private citizen but connected to Alxander the Great.[70] At one end of the theatre, the citizens had built a stadium and the other the ruins of another temple were found. There were hills in both parts of the city on which several cults and sanctuaries were located.[71]

FIGURE 2 - ANCIENT POLIS OF MEGALOPOLIS (C) J. DONATI, DIGITAL GLOBE 2015

[70] See chapter four for more on this house of Alexander and Calder (1982), 281-287.
[71] For a full and precise account of the sanctuaries of Megalopolis and their significance within the city and the region, see Jost (1985) and (1992) and see chapter one.

1. City walls

The choice to incorporate the river Helisson into the city's urban plan is an interesting one, as it no doubt provided the polis with two weaknesses in its fortification. Moreover, the Megalopolitans must have been aware of the Spartan siege on Mantinea in 385 BC when they used the river flowing through the city to break the fortifications and take control (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 3; Paus. 8. 8. 8-9); unsurprisingly the Mantineians chose to move the river around the fortification walls after this. This would indicate that the active use of the river in the urban planning of Megalopolis was a deliberate decision which definitely had an impact on the city walls of Megalopolis but left the city with a constant water supply. Only a little bit of the city walls still remains today, but we know from a passage in Polybius that they were vast in size and that this caused a problem between two factions in the city as one party wanted to reduce their length against the wishes of the other, i.e. the rich land-owners (Pol. 5. 93. 5-10.). At the time of Kleomenes' attack on the polis the walls were fifty stades, twelve of which still remain today (Pol. 2. 55.).[72]

Megalopolis' size has sometimes been seen as a weakness, since it was difficult to defend: even Polybius himself has noted this (Pol. 5. 93. 5). However, it seems as though the polis was intentionally created to be that big by the urban planners of Megalopolis, just as they had planned all other facets of the urban layout of the city: city walls were part of the city early on.[73] Moreover, Kleomenes' destruction of the city in 223/2 BC had nothing do to with its size, but was the result of a group of Messenian exiles that had given him access to the polis. Interestingly, in the dispute mentioned by Polybius, the rich landowners wanted to keep the long-walled circuit, indicating that part of the unoccupied areas may have functioned as fields for live-stock in case of these attacks which could have been used normally by these rich land-owners.[74] It was paramount that Megalopolis was able to defend itself and its citizens in case of attacks, something that was easier to do with a steady supply of water and food within the polis. Even with the Helisson river running through the city, the Megalopolitans successfully defended themselves many times against the Spartan attacks of Agis III, Kleomenes and Nabis. So, while the city's size has been perceived as a hindrance by some, it was one of

[72] See Maher (2017), 231-242; for a detailed analysis of the Megalopolitan fortifications.
[73] Roy (2007), 294.
[74] Roy (2007), 295.

the factors that allowed it to become an important player within the federal states it was a member of.

2. Meeting Places for the Masses? The Theatre and *Thersilion*

The seize of the Megalopolis is also reflected in two of the city's structures, the theatre and the *Thersilion*, which are situated in the southern part of the polis and are both mentioned by Pausanias. The excavations have indeed uncovered the remains of the theatre and a building believed to be the *Thersilion*. Both of these could accommodate large amounts of people, something that was necessary for a city the size of Megalopolis. Since he indicated that this building was intended for the meetings of the Arkadian federal assembly, also known as the *Myrioi*, some scholars have posed the theory that the city was founded by the Arkadian *koinon* as their capital; potentially with a double structure: the polis of Megalopolis would be situated in the north, while the southern part functioned as the Arkadian ocapital.[75] Even though this theory still has some



FIGURE 3 - THE THEATRE AND THE THERSILION AT MEGALOPOLIS (C) R. BORRMANN, 1931

[75] Bury (1898), 15; and surprisingly echoed by Donati (2015), 207.

supporters, there is no proof for the existence of something like a capital in antiquity and this was certainly not the case for Megalopolis, as will be discussed in chapter one.[76] Moreover, there is a clear link between the two buildings which suggest that they were built in relation to one another; if they were not planned together, then they were constructed as complementary buildings.[77]

2.1.The Theatre

FIGURE 4 - THE THEATRE AND THERSILION AT MEGALOPOLIS © E. CLOSE, 2016

Pausanias said that the theatre of the city was the biggest one in the Peloponnese, which would have been the case when it was first built (Paus. 8. 32. 1.). According to estimates done by the British archaeologists, the theatre had a capacity between 20,000 and 21,000 seats, making it bigger than the theatre of Epidauros.[78] The theatre had a natural *cavea* surrounding its *orchestra*, which was composed out of nine *kerkides* with *diazoma* dividing the two sections from the theatre from one another. The front row of the seats has survived and bears an inscription dedicated to an individual called Antiochos (*IG V*² 450). The letters of this inscription date the construction of these seats to the middle of the fourth century and as these seats were most likely not part of the original plan of the structure, it is highly probable that the theatre was built soon after the foundation of the

[76] For further information, see Nielsen (2002) and (2015); and Roy (2007).
[77] Several theories about the exact building chronology of the two buildings have been proposed by scholars based on the bottom steps of the *orchestra.* Loring (1892-1893), 356-358; Gardner et al. (1893), 15.
[78] Gardner et al. (1892), 78-81.

city: i.e. between 370 and 350 BC.[79] Other parts of the theatre may have included a *skene* and *skenotheke* as the latter was mentioned on stamped tiles found during excavations.

The size of the theatre is rather curious, even if one argued that Megalopolis was a big polis with a large group of inhabitants who wanted to watch the dramatic and festival performances. However, as already will be discussed in more detail in chapter one, Caitlin Verfenstein has proposed an interesting theory that the theatre of Megalopolis was an example of the theatre of a polis being used for more than just religious or dramatic activities, as it also functioned as a meeting places for civic and administrative bodies, something that is also attested outside of Megalopolis.[80] On the back of the *proedria*, names of the Arkadian *phylai* were inscribed, possibly indicating further connections between the theatre and the political organisation of the city.[81]

2.2. The Thersilion

North of the theatre, another structure was discovered. It was a large and rectangular building in which an auditorium with sixty-five columns that declined towards a speaker's platform.[82] It has been estimated that the building could seat around 8700 people, most likely on wooden benches, and possibly even more if everyone was standing.[83] There were three doors in the southern wall of the building which opened onto a colonnaded porch, leading out to the *orchestra* of the theatre. From the remains of the building, it is clear that it was a unique and monumental structure that was well thought out and built with considerable skill. In fact, there are almost no other buildings like it aside from the *Telesterion* in Eleusis, its structure may have been derived from the traditional Greek theatre.[84] Because of the massive amount of roof tiles found, the building clearly had a roof. Due to its close connection to the theatre, this building was identified as the *Thersilion* and was most likely constructed at the same time as the theatre. Both of these structures were clearly part of the early history of the polis.

As Pausanias has told us the *Thersilion* was the meeting place for the Arkadian *Myrioi* (Paus. 8. 32. 1.) and looking at the plan of the building drawn by Benson, the building was obviously meant to host some sort of public meetings. However,

[79] Verfenstein (2002), 21.
[80] Verfenstein (2002), 36-41.
[81] Jones (1987), 135-138.
[82] Bather (1892-1893), 319-326; Benson (1892-1893), 328-337.
[83] Hansen (1976), 131.
[84] Bather (1892/3), 328.

considering the size of the building (66.64 x 52.42 m), the only way that these Arkadians could get inside the *Thersilion* – if the *Myrioi* may have actually been an assembly with ten thousand members, was if everyone would stand during these meetings. As this was rather inconvenient, it is unlikely that the *Myrioi* did indeed meet in the building on a regular basis. In fact, their only known meeting in Megalopolis took place in 348/7 BC, long after the Arkadian *koinon* fell apart (Dem. *Meg.* 19. 10-11.; Aisch. 2. 79. and 157.). Moreover, the fact that Pausanias calls the building the *Thersilion* after its dedicator also indicates that the building was constructed by a private citizen and not the Arkadians. Verfenstein's thesis that a meeting of the Achaian *koinon* in Megalopolis could only have taken place in the *Thersilion* as this was the only building large enough for the Achaian assembly, is quite unconvincing, as there must have been cities within the federal state which were much smaller than Megalopolis - thus with much smaller public buildings – which still managed to host the Achaian assembly.[85] Moreover, as Verfenstein has argued herself, the theatre could also have housed the large meeting of the assembly.

3. The Megalopolitan agora

So, while the Theatre and the *Thersilion* clearly have connections to the political, cultural and civic life of the polis, the Megalopolitan agora was the heart of the polis. In itself, the Megalopolitan agora is interesting because in it civic and public structures are placed side by side with monumental buildings through which the city expressed their political loyalties for Macedon (the *Philippeion*) or its antagonism against Sparta (the *Myropolis*), and the religious sanctuaries like the one of Zeus Soter.[86] The importance of the agora within Megalopolis is also illustrated by the fact that most of the structures surrounding the agora bear signs of extreme remodelling as a result of the Spartan attack on the city which could signify that Kleomenes deliberately targeted the Megalopolitan agora. Moreover, the extensive also makes dating some of these rather difficult.[87]

Situated to the north of the Helisson river the agora is an open space surrounded by other structures.[88] Once again, Pausanias gives a detailed description of the buildings surrounding it*;* the remains of some of these are also present in the archaeogical record of Megalopolis today: the monumental stoa identified as the *Philippeion* and a

[85] Verfenstein (2002), 26.
[86] Donati (2016), 207.
[87] Lauter (2005), 237-238.
[88] Donati (2016), 207.

neighbouring building that could have functioned as the archive building on the northern side of the agora. To the east remains have suggested the presence of another monumental stoa that archaeologists have called the *Myrolopolis* after the monumental stoa mentioned by Pausanias which the Megalopolitan tyrant Aristodamos dedicated with spoils from Sparta (Paus. 8. 30. 7). On the western side, the agora is flanked by a series of buildings that had obvious public functions such as the *Bouleuterion* and the *Prytaneion.* Finally, the most important sanctuary of the city, that of Zeus Soter was situated to the south, almost the only structure that remains untouched by the river's position today.

Not all of the buildings on the agora will be described in great detail as the archaeology of the city is yet another way through which the Megalopolitan identity was expressed. Therefore, I have limited my discussion of the agora to those buildings that are relevant to my overall arguments and which are discussed in other chapters of the thesis, i.e. the *Philippeion,* the *Bouleuterion* and the *Prytaneion,* due to their connection to Megalopolis' political relationships (with Macedon) and the polis' constitution and institutions.



FIGURE 5 - THE NOTHERN QUARTER OF MEGALOPOLIS (C) J. DONATI, DIGIGLOBE 2015

3.1.The *Philippeion*

This stoa was a gigantic building as it is about 160 meters long, making it one of the longest stoas in the Peloponnese - and possibly even in Greece as the Stoa of Attalos stands at 113 meters. Even its design was elaborate as it boasted among other things, a Doric façade with internal courtyards in Ionian facades and it was clear that the building was meant to impress visitors of the city. The building was dedicated by the Megalopolitans to Philip of Macedon, as is indicated by Pausanias' statement (Paus. 8. 30. 6.) as well as the stamped tiles found in the building that bear the inscription *Philippeion* (IG V² 469 6a and 6b).[89] This monumental building was physical evidence of the connection between Megalopolis and Macedon, something the intricate design and construction of the building was supposed to express.[90] There has been some confusion about the dating of the building and its implications in the wider development of Greek architecture. The Greek-German excavators have dated the building between 340 and 330 BC, based on architectural similarities with other Megalopolitan buildings.[91] Moreover, if the stoa was indeed dedicated to Philip II – and not Philip V – as will be argued in chapter four, then this dating is also logical as the dedication and creation of the building would been connected to the king's death in 336 BC. However, this dating is not accepted by everyone as this would indicate that the *Philippeion* was one of the earliest examples of such a monumental stoa. However, if dated just by its overall tradition and style, the stoa is a perfect example of a Hellenistic stoa from the third or second century BC. In the end, firmly dating the building is difficult and the stoa is either an early or a typical example of a Hellenistic stoa.[92]

3.2.Civic and Public Buildings on the agora

3.2.1. *Bouleuterion*

The *Bouleuterion* is in essence a hypostyle hall in which a colonnaded façade that connected the building to the agora.[93] As Pausanias tells us, the structure was situated closely to the statue of Polybius himself, which has not been recovered. There is a notable layer of fire damage and destruction present in the archaeological remains as the some of architectural features have been reused, indicating that once again this building

[89] See chapter four and Verfenstein (2002), 57-60.
[90] Donati (2016), 210-211.
[91] Lauter and Lauter-Bufe (2004), 132.
[92] Donati (2016), 212.
[93] Lauter and Lauter-Bufe (2011), 32-50.

has undergone repairs as the result of a severe attack.[94] Moreover, even though this structure has been called the *Bouleuterion*, there is no archaeological evidence that the Megalopolitan *boule* ever met there. In fact, the identification of the building as the *Bouleuterion* is entirely based on the building's design and size, but with an estimated capacity of 1875, it is quite possible that the Megalopolitan *boule* assembled here.[95]

3.2.2. *Prytaneion*

Even though almost nothing remains of the original structure, which was a peristyle building complex with several rooms, a hearth and an altar, there are indications that this was another public building which could have been used as a *Prytaneion* based on the presence of the hearth.[96] This is proven by a great number of dedicated roof tiles that were found and which list the names of the benefactors who helped rebuilt the complex after its destruction. These names included some of the more famous citizens of the polis such as Philopoimen and Polybius as well as some that were dedicated by the people directly.[97] Yet, the precise use of the building is contestable as the presence of the altar and a dedication of one of the roof tiles from Philopoimen to Zeus (*SEG* 52 451), indicate that the building might have also housed a sanctuary to Zeus.

3.3. The Sanctuary of Zeus Soter[98]

The sanctuary of Zeus Soter was situated on the southern side of the agora, close to the Hellison, and it is in fact the only thing that remains untouched by the river. It was an important sanctuary for the Megalopolitans which had two temples.[99] The entrance of the sanctuary was a ramp which gave access to the largest temple, i.e. a square *temenos* temple with two porticos surrounding an altar. Inside the *temenos*, built into the back wall, was the second temple: a small, hexastyle-prostyle temple with a *pronaos* and a Doric façade running on the inside of the *naos* and which was situated on the western side of the complex.[100] Interestingly, the precision of the plan of the sanctuary would imply that it was built in the Hellenistic period, yet clay stamps have been found inside the complex that date it to fourth century BC instead.[101] Pausanias mentions the presence

[94] Donati (2016), 209.
[95] Verfenstein (2002), 63.
[96] Lauter and Lauter-Bufe (2011), 90-103.
[97] Donati (2016), 209.
[98] For a detailed analysis, see Lauter-Bufe (2009).
[99] Donati (2016), 212-213.
[100] Verfenstein (2002), 43-44.
[101] Jost (1985), 125-126; Lauter-Bufe (2009), 69-78.

of a statue group of Zeus, Artemis and the personification of Megalopolis in the Zeus Soter complex that was created by Cephisodotus and Xenophon, dating the statues as perhaps the building to the fourth or early third century (Paus. 8. 30. 10.).[102] This would indicate that yet another building in Megalopolis was stylistically and architecturally innovative and therefore making it possible that the city was a trendsetter when it came to Greek architecture and urban planning.

Thesis outline

This thesis is divided into three parts. First, these establish the Megalopolitan identity both before and after its Achaian membership; then the way the city employed this identity to form its relationship with the Achaian federal government, as well as use that relationship in its interactions with other members; and finally, explain how the Megalopolitans influenced the Achaian foreign politics. Section one consists of two chapters, the first of which outlines the basic components of what it meant to be Megalopolitan before 235 BC. Several key characteristics are identified such as the typical animosity towards Sparta, a traditional preference for the Macedonian kings, a connection to the rest of Arkadia and the realisation of the benefits of federalism. These were the result of the city's foundation by the Arkadians and were completely in line with the politics of the *koinon*, which focussed on keeping Sparta at bay and upholding democratic ideals in the Peloponnese. While this first chapter thus deals with the synoecism and early history of Megalopolis and the problems surrounding this foundation, it also analyses the interactions of the city with the other Arkadians to indicate that the Megalopolitans wanted to make it clear to the other Greeks that it was more than just an Arkadian polis. Finally, this first chapter ends with a comparison between Megalopolis and Messene. As another city that was re-established in the wake of the anti-Spartan sentiment of the 370s and 360s BC, these two had a similar formation process but ended up pursuing two very different political courses.

Chapter two discusses the further development of the Megalopolitan identity, which changed profoundly because of the decision of the polis - and its tyrant Lydiades - to join the Achaian *koinon* in 235 BC. It analyses the motives behind this decision and looks at the consequences it had for the parties involved, i.e. Lydiades, the

[102] Corso (2005), 225-234.

Megalopolitans and the federation. For one, Lydiades embarked upon a successful political career, the Megalopolitans now had access to a wider network of poleis in their quest against Sparta and the Achaians benefited from further expansion in the Peloponnese. A second part of this chapter looks at the practical implementation of the change in the Megalopolitan identity brought about by its Achaian membership and answers the question: did Megalopolis consider itself Arkadian or Achaian? By using Polybius as an example of a Megalopolitan in the Achaian *koinon* and juxtaposing his views against the material evidence from Megalopolis, it is clear that by the middle of the second century BC a Megalopolitan was both Arkadian and Achaian. Obviously, a distinct Achaian element had been added to the other 'Arkadian' characteristics of its own identity.

The second section of the thesis comprises of only one chapter, which deals with Megalopolis as a member of the Achaian *koinon.* This third chapter starts with a general overview of the structure of the federal state, the ways in which the Achaian members could partake in federal life and the interactions between the federation and its member states. The relationship between the *koinon* and its poleis was distinguished by a high degree of autonomy: the cities could conduct their affairs in any way they wished as long as outside contacts were regulated via the federal government. The available evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that Megalopolis was just like any other Achaian member state; it contributed money and troops to the federal treasury, minted federal coins and participated actively in the federal institutions. However, it is through the study of Megalopolis' interactions with its fellow members, and in particular via boundary disputes that another picture emerges. In most of these boundary disputes there is a reference to the federal state and most of them were won by Megalopolis, indicating that the polis generally had the habit of involving the federal government or federal magistrates in disputes with other Achaian poleis. This was rather unusual as the *koinon* normally stayed out of these kinds of disputes, which meant that Megalopolis did not shy away from using its relationship with the federal government for their own personal gain. However, as the new inscription found in Messene in 2008 proves, this did not always work.

The last section will discuss the city's role in Achaian foreign politics, an area in which its influence was most noticeable, and is divided into two chapters. Chapter four discusses Megalopolis' role in Achaian politics during the third century BC by focusing

on the Achaian-Macedonian relations which happened as a result of the Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos during the Kleomenean War. The chapter starts with a re-examination of the Achaian War with Kleomenes and Aratos' role in the creation of the Achaian alliance with Macedon. Polybius' account of the Kleomenean War is highly problematic due to his emphasis on Aratos, and his criticism of the Pro-Spartan historian Phylarchus, one of his main sources for the event. Therefore, if one looks past these problems and the focus on Aratos, Plutarch's statement that Megalopolis was the responsible party for the alliance with Macedon makes more sense. The second part of this fourth chapter examines the reason why Megalopolis would have to send out an embassy to Antigono, i.e. because of the plethora of Spartan attacks on the city during the War. Finally, it gives an overview of Megalopolitan connections to Macedon found in the polis, in addition to the traditional loyalty established in the wake of Philip II's territorial gifts in the fourth century BC. In the end, it was Megalopolis who was responsible for the first contacts between Macedon and the Achaians and not Aratos.

Finally, chapter five takes a look at the way in which Megalopolis' traditional hatred for Sparta shaped Achaian foreign policy in the second century BC and in particular their relationship with Rome. The chapter starts by giving a detailed analysis of the Achaian *synodos* at Sikyon in 198 BC in which the *koinon* decided to terminate their alliance with the Macedonian king Philip V in favour of Rome, something that Megalopolis opposed because of their traditional loyalty to Macedon. In order to understand how this decision came to be and how much it divided the Achaians, the deteriorating relationship between Achaia and Macedon between 222 and 198 BC is discussed as well as the rise to prominence of several influential Megalopolitan statesmen such as Philopoimen in federal politics. Furthermore, a closer examination of the hometown of Aristainos, the federal *strategos* for 199/198 BC, suggests that within Megalopolis there was a group which was slowly moving away from this traditional loyalty to Macedon, having replaced it with an Achaian patriotism. This shift in Megalopolitan identity is further evidenced in the last part of this chapter which looks at the actions of these Megalopolitan leaders in relation to Achaian foreign politics. Two things become clear: for one, these men were still driven by the traditional hatred for Sparta as well as their newfound loyalty to the Achaian *koinon*. Secondly, these local interests caused trouble between Achaia and Rome and would eventually cause the Achaian War.

Moreover, there is still evidence of Megalopolis acting as a political unit throughout this time, even though the literary sources do not give that impression.

PART 1: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEGALOPOLITAN IDENTITY

Introduction

As argued in the introduction, the development of the Megalopolitan identity was a long process which started with the polis' foundation by the Arkadians and their *koinon* in the period around 370 BC. Throughout the next decades, Megalopolis would exemplify several of the typical Arkadian traits such as an intense hatred for Sparta and a strong connection to the democratic ideals on which the Arkadian *koinon* was founded. While the Arkadian federal state was a short-lived experiment and the *koinon* disintegrated after only a brief existence, the Megalopolitan identity kept developing. Soon after Philip II's gift of certain Spartan territories after the battle at Chaironea in 338 BC, the city established a long tradition of relationships with and loyalty to the Macedonian kings. All of these Megalopolitan characteristics persisted even after the city joined the Achaian *koinon* in 235 BC. By this point the Achaians had become a genuine threat to Megalopolis and the tyrant Lydiades as well as the citizens most likely thought that joining the *koinon* was a good course of action. This decision proved beneficial, as the polis quickly rose to a prominent position within the federation and also responsible for the addition of an Achaian component to the Megalopolitan identity by the middle of the second century BC.

In this first section of the thesis, which is divided into two chapters, I will discuss the foundation and early history of the city and ascertain what impact these events had on the formation of the local identity of the polis and how the city fitted in the wider Arkadian region. This is done in chapter one, while chapter two focuses on the decision to join the Achaians and the subsequent results this had for Megalopolis, its inhabitants and tyrants and the generations of Megalopolitans that came after 235, which are best illustrated by Polybius and his narrative.

Chapter 1: Megalopolis before Achaia

In 235 BC, the city of Megalopolis became the first Arkadian polis to join the Achaian *koinon*. The decision to join the federal state located primarily in the northernmost region of the Peloponnese may have been a surprise for some, since Megalopolis as the biggest Arkadian polis had a very strong connection to its Arkadian identity because of the manner in which the polis was founded. However, the Megalopolitans were not the first to join the federation from outside the old Achaian heartland, as this process had already started in 251 BC with the membership of Sikyon. Slowly but steadily, an increasing amount of non-Achaian poleis became members of the *koinon* and by the time of Polybius' writing, the entire Peloponnese was part of the Achaian *koinon* (Pol. 2. 37. 10-11). The combination of all of these different ethnic groups within one big federation was new in the Peloponnese and Megalopolis soon succeeded in establishing a specific position for itself within the *koinon*.

The reason why the polis was able to do so can be found in its own local identity, which consisted of several specific elements, i.e. a deep reverence for and understanding of federal states and collaboration across narrow civic or ethnic boundaries, a vehement hatred of Sparta, a tradition of relations with Macedon and a close connection to the Arkadian people. These specific elements can be distinguished throughout Achaian politics in the third and second centuries BC. Moreover, for a Megalopolitan, these things were the basis of his local identity. After all, these traits had developed from the time of the city's foundation around 370 BC and will therefore be the focus of this first chapter that deals with Megalopolis before it joined the Achaian federation.

Due to the important role that the Arkadian *koinon* played in Megalopolis' foundation, I believe it is beneficial to start this chapter with a short discussion of the Arkadian *koinon* and its political history, especially since some of the most important characteristics of the federation were passed on to Megalopolis after its foundation. This is followed by an analysis of the synoecism of Megalopolis and the way in which the new city dealt with the vastly different groups that would now identify themselves as Megalopolitan. As part of this argument, I will pay particular attention to Megalopolis' prior experience of federalism as I believe this is a crucial element of the local identity that set the polis apart from other leading Peloponnesian cities with the same tendency

to hate Sparta, and allowed it to accrue its influential position within the Achaian federation.

After this analysis of the Arkadian-Megalopolitan interactions, I will end the chapter with a comparison of Megalopolis and its neighbour Messene to illustrate how two poleis that were (re)founded in the same geographic and historical sphere could end up developing their identity and politics in very different ways. The comparison between these two poleis also shows the contrasting ways in which these two poleis approached their ethnic identity: Messene looks back at its own local myths and cults to establish the Messenian identity, while Megalopolis goes through a more complex process in which several different elements are combined into a fluid and cosmopolitan identity.

1. Megalopolis and the Arkadian *koinon*

1.1. The Arkadian *koinon*

When the Arkadians founded their *koinon* around 370 BC, they could never have realised that their experiment with federalism would prove to be very short-lived. For after an existence of a mere seven years, the federation split in two because of an internal conflict that would ultimately result in the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC with the two parties fighting on opposite sides. Even though the official creation of the *koinon* following Xenophon's information is dated to the fourth century, the existence of several coins with the head of Zeus Lykaios bearing the inscription ΑΡΚΑΔΙΚΟΝ (in full or abbreviated) from the fifth century BC point to earlier Arkadian attempts to organise themselves.[103] While it is difficult to say much about the precise dating of the coins, it has been established that they were minted in three separate mints operating at different stages.[104] Roy makes a strong case against the existence of one federation that united all Arkadians due to the different mints and minting periods of the coins.[105] Additionally, there are signs that several of the individual Arkadian poleis were acting according to their own interests, as is clear from Mantinea's absence in the battle at Diphaia (Hdt. 9. 35) or the Tegean conduct in 479 BC (Hdt. 9. 26-28). Yet these coins do not necessarily have to be seen as definite proof that a federal state did indeed exist, after all Megalopolis was known to have minted coins with the same legend long after the Arkadian *koinon*

[103] Williams (1965); and Roy (1972) and (1974).
[104] Williams (1965), 8-19.
[105] Roy (1974), 335-336.

had ceased to exist.[106] Even though there was not one united Arkadia, it seems more likely that several of the cities organised themselves in bigger often rivalling groups with the coins being an expression of an ethnic Arkadian feeling.[107] Therefore, there was a developed Arkadian identity in the fifth century BC, which allowed an organisation of some kind to produce coins in the name 'of the Arkadians'.[108]

So, while there was a clear awareness of a national Arkadian identity in the fifth century, it would take the two most influential Arkadian poleis – until the foundation of Megalopolis – Tegea and Mantinea coming together to create an Arkadian *koinon* that united (almost) all of the Arkadians. According to Xenophon (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 6),

> 'τῶν δὲ Τεγεατῶν οἱ μὲν περὶ τὸν Καλλίβιον καὶ Πρόξενον ἐνῆγον ἐπὶ τὸ συνιέναι τε πᾶν τὸ Ἀρκαδικόν, καὶ ὅ τι νικήῃ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ, τοῦτο κύριον εἶναι καὶ τῶν πόλεων: οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Στάσιππον ἔπραττον ἐᾶν τε κατὰ χώραν τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι.'
>
> ('Of the Tegeans the followers of Kallibios and Proxenos were calling for the unification of all the Arkadians, and whatever option was victorious in the common assembly, should be binding for all of the cities. The followers of Stasippos wanted to leave the city undisturbed and live according to the laws of their fathers').

This passage should be read in accordance with its historical context: as a result of the Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 371 BC, the other Peloponnesian states slowly started to regain control over the region. Therefore, in 370 Mantinea peacefully re-established its democracy because of the *autonomia* guaranteed by the Common Peace of 371.[109] However, in Tegea there were two parties fighting for the control of the city with one of them edging towards a new goal, i. e. the creation of a pan-Arkadian organisation with common rules for all poleis (Xen. *Hel.* 6. 5. 3-10). Clearly, for Xenophon the creation of the Arkadian *koinon* lies here, in the *stasis* at Tegea (Xen. *Hel.* 6. 5. 10). In his own account of the events, Diodorus mentions Lykomedes of Mantinea as the architect of this idea implying that there was a definite Mantinean involvement in the foundation. Despite Diodorus calling him a Tegean by mistake (Diod. 15. 59. 1: *Λυκομήδης ὁ Τεγεάτης*) the fact that the Tegean *stasis* was only resolved after likeminded individuals from Mantinea came to the aid of the confederalists support the view that the foundation of the *koinon* was a joint effort. Furthermore, Lykomedes goes on to play an important

[106] Thompson (1939), 142.
[107] Roy (1974), 340; Nielsen (2015), 250-252.
[108] Nielsen (2015), 251. For an overview of the history and political structure of Arkadia in the Archaic and Classics times see Nielsen (2002), Hansen and Nielsen (2004).
[109] Nielsen (2015), 258.

role in the newly established federation, serving as its general and inspiring a feeling of ethnic pride among the Arkadians in 369 BC (Xen. *Hel.* 7. 1. 23-24).[110] Interestingly, this rise of Arkadian pride created problems in the Arkadian foreign relations with their allies; Elis for example had lost several of its former territories as these poleis now joined the Arkadian *koinon*, while the Boiotian ambitions were curbed in the Peloponnese to the emergence of a new political unity.[111]

Upon its creation, the political orientation of the newly formed federation was directed against Spartan as is evidenced by Pausanias' comments (Paus. 8. 27. 1) that the Arkadians united as

> 'Ἀργείους ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ μὲν ἔτι παλαιότερα μόνον οὐ κατὰ μίαν ἡμέραν ἑκάστην κινδυνεύοντας ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων παραστῆναι τῷ πολέμῳ'
>
> ('they knew that the Argives in earlier times were also almost each day in danger of being subjected to war by the Lakedaemonians').

For the Arkadian political union had occurred as the result of the establishment of a new and independent regime in Mantinea that had overthrown a previous one installed by Sparta in 385 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 9-12), as well as the victory of the anti-Spartan faction in Tegea (Xen. *Hel.* 6. 5. 1-11).[112] The unification of the Arkadians, and especially the reversal of the Spartan measures at Mantinea, was met with opposition from the Spartans. The Spartan king Agesilaos invaded Arkadia but his efforts were rebuffed by the majority of the Arkadian cities – excluding Orchomenos which fought on the Spartan side due to their hatred for Mantinea - with the support of allies such as the Boiotians, Elis and Argos (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 12-40; Diod. 15. 59; Paus. 8. 27. 2).

In an inscription dating between 368 and 361 BC, in which the Arkadian *koinon* grants proxeny to a certain Phylarchus of Athens, ten Arkadian poleis are attested as members of the federation (*IG* V 2.1).[113] Additionally, this man was to be 'εὐεργέτην […] Ἀρκάδων πάντων' (l. 6-7: 'benefactor [...] of all the Arkadians'), this picture was also painted by Diodorus who says that Lykomedes managed to persuade 'τοὺς Ἀρκάδας εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ταχθῆναι' (Diod. 15. 59. 1: 'the Arkadians to unite into one union'). Although it is surprising that some prominent Arkadian cities like Phigaleia

[110] Roy (1971), 570.
[111] Roy (1971), 575-576.
[112] Nielsen (2015), 560.
[113] Cary (1922), 188. In addition to these ten, Nielsen has established certain membership for fourteen communities and a potential membership for four others: Nielsen (2002), 477-478; and (2016), 560.

were not featured in this inscription – prompting the suggestion that this inscription may not have included all of the members[114]-, there were several communities such as Orchomenos and Heraia that had to be forced into the federation.[115] Nonetheless, it seems as though most of Arkadia was part of the *koinon* soon after its creation. Alongside these Arkadian members, there are a few poleis attested as a part of the *koinon* that were not ethnically Arkadian and had previously belonged to Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 2. 3). The loss of these territories to Arkadia seems to have been yet another reason why Elis abandoned its alliance with Arkadia.

The Arkadian *koinon* had a *boule* and an assembly that was known as the *Myrioi* (*IG* V 2.1, l. 2-4). Despite its name, it is highly unlikely that the Arkadian assembly actually numbered ten thousand as there had to be more than ten thousand Arkadian citizens, most of whom probably did not regularly attend these meetings.[116] Therefore, it was more likely an expression of an ideal number or general expression in connection to the size of the assembly which was open to all citizens.[117] Moreover, the use of such an number is also attested in several other cases like the quorum of 6000 for the Athenian citizen assembly. As Philippe Gauthier has shown, this number appears early on in the sources and does not change throughout the Classical period, thus proving that this is an idealised number.[118] Additionally, Gauthier also argues that the Athenian quorum is different to the modern one because it does not indicate the minimum number of citizens required to be present in the assembly so that any legal proceedings that took place in the assembly were binding. In reality, the number of the quorum was meant to symbolise the entirety of the citizen body when important decisions were made in the assembly.[119]

Among the many responsibilities of the assembly was the appointment and administration of magistrates, the awarding of honours such as a proxeny to individuals, and the conduct and development of the federation's foreign policy through embassies to and alliances with other foreign powers (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4. 2-3; 33-34; IG V 2.1). In addition to the institutions, there were several Arkadian magistrates including a general

[114] Roy (1971), 571.
[115] Nielsen (2016), 560.
[116] Roy (2000), 314.
[117] Shaefer (1961), 311-314; Larsen (1968), 191.
[118] Gauthier (2011), 426-430.
[119] Gauthier (2011), 452.

group of magistrates called *archontes* by Xenophon (*Hell.* 7. 4. 33), as many as fifty federal *damiorgoi* and a federal *strategos* who led the *koinon* and seems to have been an influential person from the more important Arkadian poleis.[120] The *strategos* also led the federal army, which like the Achaian federal army consisted of contributions made by its members and had a special military unit called the *eparitoi* (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 11; 7. 4. 22). Due to the constant warfare in which the Arkadian *koinon* was involved, a good working relationship between the *strategos* and the federal army was of paramount importance.

Due to the nature of the *koinon*'s creation by Tegean and Mantinean democrats, the federation seems to have been a democracy in which all of its members were considered equal. This stress on democracy was one of the defining characteristics of the Arkadian federation and its politics. It can be seen in several of its political actions, since the federation made it a principle to support other democracies in the Peloponnese.[121] Between 369 and 364 BC, the Arkadians supported the establishment of democracies in Plious and Pellene (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 2. 5-9; 7. 3. 1). In other instances, the *koinon* remained friendly to democratic factions in the Peloponnese such as their good diplomatic relations with the Eleian democrats after the disintegration of the Elian-Arkadian alliance in 365 or the Arkadian failure to intervene on behalf of the Achaian democrats when the oligarchs were to gain control over the region with the support of Epaminondas. In Sikyon, the Arkadians at first supported Euphron in his democratic endeavour, but soon the *koinon* had to intervene when he became a tyrant and overthrew Euphron's regime, even though this was against the wishes of the general public (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 3. 1-3).[122] The Arkadian loyalty to the democratic ideal also caused troubles between the *koinon*, Elis and the Boiotians under Epaminondas who frequently supported the oligarchical factions in the Peloponnese.[123]

There is another element connected to the Arkadian *koinon*'s leniency towards democracy, which is a vehement antagonism towards Sparta. This animosity can in part be explained by Sparta's tendency to support oligarchic regimes in the Peloponnese.[124]

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[120] Nielsen (2016), 264.
[121] Roy (2000), 321-325.
[122] See Roy (2000), 323-324; for an overview of the problems surrounding this particular episode and the implications for Arkadian democratic tendencies.
[123] Roy (1971), 576.
[124] Roy (2017), 360.

This was a policy that the polis was actively pursuing in the years after the Peloponnesian War: for example, in the middle of the 360's BC oligarchs assumed control in several Achaians cities that soon became Spartan allies, this to the annoyance of the Arkadians and their democratic allies within these cities.[125]

The Arkadian opposition to Sparta seems to have exerted a constant influence on the interactions of the *koinon* with other states. Because this was only possible after Spartan power was curbed by Boiotia, the *koinon* would implement this policy by its perpetual warfare against Sparta and sustaining an alliance with Boiotia as well as Elis, Argos, Messene and Athens.[126] However, one last element of the Arkadian foreign policy can be deduced from a speech to the Arkadians in 369 which Xenophon attributed to Lykomedes in which Lykomedes reportedly said the following (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 24):

> 'ἐὰν οὖν σωφρονῆτε, τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν ὅποι ἄν τις παρακαλῇ φείσεσθε: ὡς πρότερόν τε Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐκείνους ηὐξήσατε, νῦν δὲ ἂν Θηβαίοις εἰκῇ ἀκολουθῆτε καὶ μὴ κατὰ μέρος ἡγεῖσθαι ἀξιῶτε, ἴσως τάχα τούτους ἄλλους Λακεδαιμονίους εὑρήσετε.'
>
> ('so if you are of sound mind, you will stop following wherever anyone calls you; as earlier by following the Lakedaimonians you increased their power, and now if you mindlessly follow the Thebans and do not deem it worthy to partly lead with them, perhaps you will soon find that these are the Lakedaimonians all over again').

The leader of the Arkadians seemingly warns them about the dangers of blindly entrusting themselves to the protection of yet another powerful ally, such as Thebes. If they were to succeed, the Arkadians needed to become self-reliant - they were after all strong fighters and the only autochthonous people of the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 23). Therefore, even though these are ultimately Xenophon's words, it is a very good example of the key pillars of the Arkadian polity and so the speech attributed to Lykomedes sums up the Arkadian foreign policy quite well: in order to succeed in their goal of keeping Sparta from controlling the Peloponnese, the *koinon* needed to work together with its allies but above all make sure that they remained independent enough from them to stay an important player on the international stage.[127]

For the first few years of its existence, the *koinon* operated without major problems and seemed to be in a continued state of combat.[128] The federation carried out

[125] Roy (2017), 368.
[126] See Roy (1971) for a full and detailed overview of these political interactions.
[127] Pretzler (2009), 89.
[128] Roy (1971), 588.

attacks on Sparta with its new allies Boiotia and Elis until 368 BC, after which the allies turned on each other and Arkadia found itself entangled in a war with Elis over some territories that had now become Arkadian. In 364 the Olympic Games were celebrated in Olympia, now under Arkadian control, and soon afterwards an internal conflict arose within the Arkadian *koinon* about the financing of the *eparitoi* through Olympic funds instead of member contributions (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 33). This conflict would lead to a schism between the Arkadian democrats and the oligarchs who had slowly been replacing the *eparitoi* (and potentially the assembly as well). Both sides concluded alliances with outside states: the oligarchs based in Mantinea now found an ally in Sparta, while the democrats centred in Megalopolis, which at this time was gradually becoming more and more important in Arkadia, and Tegea sent envoys to Thebes for help (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 34; 7. 5. 3). The permanent divide among the Arkadians eventually led to the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC.[129] While the reason for the internal conflict clearly lay in financial matters or perhaps in the lack of federal funds, I would argue that bigger, underlying problems were the real reason for this escalation. Even though Lykomedes had urged the Arkadians to work as one, the poleis could not set aside their own interests which is why it was so easy for Mantinea and Tegea to revert back to their old opposition of one another when Sparta no longer seemed a threat.[130] The ideological opposition between the two faactions could only have contributed to this regression to their old ways. In the end, the success of the Arkadian *koinon* depended on its anti-Spartan policy and its implementation by one of its strongest proponents Lykomedes.

1.2. The synoecism of Megalopolis

The synoecism of Megalopolis was the only lasting achievement realised by the Arkadian *koinon* during its short existence. While the exact foundation date is unknown we can say with certainty that Megalopolis was founded at some point in the period 371-367 BC and that by 362 the polis had extisted for several years (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 5. 5). The ancient authors put the origins of the foundation in the feelings of anti-Spartanism that had been developing in the Peloponnese after the Spartan defeat at Leuktra (Paus. 8. 27. 1-2; Diod. 15. 72). It has generally been argued that the polis was founded by the *koinon* as

[129] Nielsen (2002), 491-492.
[130] Nielsen (2015), 268.

their capital.[131] This is wrong and I will argue that the city was founded solely by the Arkadian *koinon* and that the city was created with some federal considerations in mind but not as the capital of the federation: its sole purpose was the organisation and control of the area so as to strengthen Arkadian opposition to Sparta.[132] The Arkadians managed to achieve this by convincing or forcing the inhabitants of the surrounding communities to take part in the synoicism of Megalopolis. Integrating these different groups into a new polis with Megalopolis' size proved to be difficult. Therefore, in the search for a solution the leading men of the city seem to have drawn inspiration from the internal organisation of the federal states it was so familiar with. So, in an attempt to create their own new Megalopolitan identity, I will argue that the new citizens mimicked the way in which the Arkadian *koinon* had brought together all of the Arkadians, albeit on a smaller scale.

By using those unifying characteristics of the Arkadian *koinon*, i.e. a hatred for Sparta and a fierce need for independence, the inhabitants became citizens of a new city that was connected to federalism in more ways than one, understanding the trappings of a federation better than any other polis. This is what made Megalopolis unique and why the polis was able to thrive as part of both the Arkadian and Achaian *koina*.

1.2.1. Sources and problems of the synoecism

Both Pausanias and Diodorus tell us about the foundation of Megalopolis. However, due to the differences in their accounts several problems have arisen concerning the exact date of the foundation, the involvement of Epaminondas and the extent of the synoecism. The passages in Pausanias are part of his description of Arkadia (book 8), but for some reason the author chose to separate the history of the polis (Paus. 8. 27. 1-16) from its archaeological overview (Paus. 8. 30- 33). According to Pausanias, 'ἡ δὲ Μεγάλη πόλις νεωτάτη πόλεών ἐστιν οὐ τῶν Ἀρκαδικῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἕλλησι' (Paus. 8. 27. 1: 'Megalopolis was the youngest city, not of Arkadia alone, but of Greece'). Additionally, he tells us that Megalopolis was founded at the same time when 'τὸ πταῖσμα ἐγένετο Λακεδαιμονίων τὸ ἐν Λεύκτροις,' (Paus. 8. 27. 8: 'the embarrassment of the Spartans occurred at Leuktra,') and it had ten *oikistai* appointed

[131] Bury (1898), Larsen (1968), Braunert and Pedersen (1972), Hornblower (1990), Verfenstein (2002) and Donati (2015).
[132] Roy (2000), 314.

by the Arkadians with respectively two representing the most influential poleis within the *koinon*, i.e. Tegea, Mantinea and Kleitor, as well as four from the communities that were to be part of the new city, the Mainalians and Parrhesians. On Epaminondas' role in the *synoicism* Pausanias says the following: 'τῆς πόλεως δὲ οἰκιστὴς Ἐπαμινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος σὺν τῷ δικαίῳ καλοῖτο ἄν' (Paus. 8. 27. 2: 'the Theban Epaminondas could fairly be considered as the founder of the city'). Furthermore, the Arkadians managed to convince the inhabitants of thirty-nine communities to live in the *μεγάλη πόλη* (Paus. 8. 27. 3-6). Diodorus' account of the matter is a bit more concise as he is describing the events in the wider Mediterranean at the time (Diod. 15. 72. 4). All he says about the foundation of Megalopolis is this:

> 'μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην οἱ Ἀρκαδες, φοβηθέντες τὰς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων εἰσβολάς, ἔκτισαν ἐπί τινος ἐπικαίρου τόπου τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Μεγάλην πόλιν, συρρίψαντες εἰς αὐτὴν κώμας εἴκοσι τῶν ὀνομαζομένων Μαιναλίων καὶ Παρρασίων Ἀρκάδων'
>
> ('after the battle, the Arkadians, fearing the Spartan invasions, founded in a fitting place thr city they named the Great, combining in it twenty villages of the Arkadians named Mainalians and Parrhasians').

The battle referred to here is not Leuktra but the Tearless battle of 368 BC in which the Spartans defeated the Arkadians.[133] Likewise, according to Diodorus here, the synoecism counted only twenty *komai* or communities and not thirty-nine.

Due to these discrepancies, it seems to be the norm to choose one account over the other as though the two accounts are incompatible.[134] Yet as James Roy rightly points out neither of the authors is more reliable than the other, which inevitably leaves us with several issues.[135] For example, when was Megalopolis founded? As discussed, Diodorus puts the date at 368, while Pausanias says 371 BC. Xenophon does not mention the creation of Megalopolis at all, referring to the polis only as one of the Arkadian cities under the leadership of Epaminondas at the battle of Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 5. 5). Furthermore, the casual mention of the polis amid other Arkadian cities clearly gives

[133] Hornblower (1990), 73-75.

[134] Hansen and Nielsen (2005), 520. Dušanić (1970); Hornblower (1990); Cartledge and Spawforth (2001) choose the first option, with Hornblower explicitly focusing on that date for the decision not the actual foundation. Niese (1899); Roy (1971); Braunert and Pedersen (1972) and Nielsen (2015) all propose the later date. Braunert and Perdesen even suggest a date between 368 and 363 which seems very unlike due to Xenophon's mention of the polis at the battle of Mantinea and the appearance of Megalopolis on the Phylarchos decree (*IG* V 2.1) as a functioning member of the *koinon*.

[135] Roy (1971), 290.

the impression that at this point the polis was a fully functioning member of the Arkadian *koinon* and would have been in existence for a few years. However, there is another document that mentions the Megalopolitan synoecism, i.e. the Parian Marble, which covers Greek history between 1582 and 264/3 BC and is now in the Ashmolean Museum at Oxford. According to this inscription Megalopolis was founded in 370/69 BC (*FGrHist* 239 F 73). It is beneficial to note that its author chooses to mention the event alongside more well-known events such as the Persian or Peloponnesian Wars, all of which have been correctly dated in the Parian Marble. Surely, this must point to the significance of Megalopolis in later Greek history and politics as well as a certain reliability for a date around 370 BC.

In line with our two main sources, scholars traditionally argue for two possible dates, i.e. 371/0 BC or 368 BC. The problem of the date of the origin of the synoecsim is also connected to the date of the foundation of the Arkadian *koinon*, since it is widely known that the foundation of the polis was an endeavour of the Arkadian *koinon* and if Pausanias' account is true, then the *koinon* itself must have existed in 371 as well.[136] The most convincing argument put forward in favour of the earlier dating of Megalopolis and the *koinon* is the identification of one of the ten *oikists* of Megalopolis, i.e. Proxenos of Tegea who is mentioned by Pausanias (7. 27. 2), as the same Proxenos, who died during the Tegean *stasis* of 371/370 BC. A search of the Lexicon of Greek Personal Names shows that there were a few instances of men called Proxenos in Arkadia in the same period, potentially suggesting that these two Proxenos were two different people.[137] While this cannot be completely disproven and due to the reliability of Xenophon's account of the events surrounding the foundation of the Arkadian *koinon*, it is more plausible that the *koinon* was not founded until 370 BC and the synoecism of Megalopolis not carried out until after that. The thesis proposed by Dušanić, that the foundation was a decision that happened in several stages is a plausible one and it is in line with my own view that the creation of the city was a process that took some time due to the scope of the project.[138] It might thus be possible that the decision to found Megalopolis was taken much earlier than its completion around 368 BC.

[136] Dušanić (1970), 290.
[137] LGPN 1, 3A, 378.
[138] Dušanić (1970), 318-321. This idea has also been echoed by Hornblower (1990), 76; and Hansen and Nielsen (2005), 520.

Pausanias' comment on Epaminondas' role as the founder of the polis on the other hand does not have to be problematic. Besides Pausanias there seems to be no argument for any connection between Megalopolis and the Theban.[139] As we have seen, Pausanias does not actually call him an *oikist* as the Greek text uses an optative (Paus. 8. 27. 2: 'καλοῖτο'), indicating a possibility and not a fact. Later in the passage the author goes on to name the ten actual *oikistai* of the city as 'ᾑρέθησαν δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀρκάδων' (Paus. 8. 27. 2: 'they were chosen by the Arkadians'). So, the Greek text makes it very clear that the Arkadians did not consider him to be one of the founders of the city, it is purely a comment made by Pausanias on account of Epaminondas' actions to encourage the Arkadians to unite against the Spartans and the fact that he had sent troops to help them keep any Spartan opposition at bay (Paus. 8. 27. 2). Even though it was not the only time that Epaminondas was involved in the foundation of city outside of Boiotia, because he had encouraged the foundation of Messene (Paus. 4. 27. 5-9; Plut. *Ag.* 34. 1), it seems as though Epaminondas' role in the foundation of Megalopolis was limited to the encouragement of the Arkadian political union, since Epaminondas undertook several political campaigns into the Peloponnese to help his allies with their struggle against Sparta in the period 370-362 BC.[140] Moreover, the ten Megalopolitan *oikistai* actually appointed by the *koinon* were important Arkadian individuals, including Lykomedes of Mantinea (Paus. 8. 27. 2), thus further indicating that Epaminondas was almost certainly not involved in the foundation of Megalopolis as he would also have been named by Pausanias as one of the *oikistes*. However, it is interesting to mention Polybius' view on the constitution of Thebes in his book six (Pol. 6. 44. 9). Here he says:

> 'διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν ταύτης τε καὶ τῆς τῶν Θηβαίων οὐδὲν δεῖ πλείω λέγειν, ἐν αἷς ὄχλος χειρίζει τὰ ὅλα κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὁρμήν, ὁ μὲν ὀξύτητι καὶ πικρίᾳ διαφέρων, ὁ δὲ βίᾳ καὶ θυμῷ συμπεπαιδευμένος,'
>
> ('therefore, it is not necessary to say more about this (i.e. the Athenian constitution) or the Theban, in which the mob manages all things through its own impulse, on the one hand headstrong and bitter, on the other nurtured by violence and passion').

[139] There is a reference to Epaminondas in connection to the foundation of Megalopolis in the scholia demosthenica (16.202.1.), but this account is far from convincing.
[140] Braunert and Pedersen (1972), 68-71; Verfenstein (2002), 13.

Polybius obviously did not hold the polis in high esteem so if Epaminondas had really been the architect behind Megalopolis, one could expect a slightly more respectful description of the Theban constitution from a Megalopolitan citizen. Furthermore, as a founder of the polis one would expect to find more traces of Epaminondas in the architectural planning of the polis such as statues of the man for example.[141] Hence, the creation of Megalopolis was an Arkadian endeavour that was started in order to protect the area from Spartan invasions.[142]

Since the city-state was a federal creation, some scholars believed that the Arkadians created it with the intention of eventually turning it into the Arkadian capital, which the propagandistic nature of its name certainly implied.[143] This is rather unlikely especially since it can be quite problematic to apply such a modern concept to the Greek federal states and the identification of it.[144] While it is true that some federations were dominated by one or a few of their member states, there is no real indication of one of these acting as a capital in the modern sense of the word. Additionally, the fact that Megalopolis provided ten of the fifty *damiorgoi* in the Phylarchos inscription discussed instead of a smaller number like the other Arkadian cities does not prove its status as the capital of the Arkadian *koinon*; it could merely indicate that the polis had provided this high number due to its size (*IG* V 2.1 l. 23-33). This would certainly tie in with the principle of proportional representation employed in the institutions of other *koina*. The board of *nomographoi* of the Achaian *koinon* is a perfect example as Megalopolis was one of the few cities with three votes due to its size (*IG* IV I^2 73) before being reduced to two after losing a considerable proportion of its land in the second century BC (*Achaïe* III 116).[145]

Even an analysis of the archaeological site in light of Pausanias' statement that connected one of the buildings in Megalopolis to the assembly of the Arkadians, the *Myrioi*, has not resulted in any conclusive answers (Paus. 8. 32. 1). This building, called the *Thersilion* was supposedly the meeting place of the *Myrioi* and could be found near the theatre in the southern part of the city.[146] In an attempt to prove that Megalopolis was

[141] Verfenstein (2002), 14.
[142] Roy (1994), 193.
[143] Larsen (1968), 187; Braunert and Pedersen (1972), 73.
[144] Roy (2007), 291.
[145] See chapter two and section two of chapter three for a more comprehensive discussion of this topic.
[146] Bury (1898), 18. According to Bury, all of the federal buildings of the Arkadian *koinon* were housed here. It was separated from the actual polis of Megalopolis by the river Helisson: while this double city is

indeed founded as their capital city by the Arkadians, Caitlyn Downey Verfenstein analysed all of the archaeological remains to determine which of these buildings were foundation monuments. However, she has only been able to say with certainty that the *Thersilion* and the theatre were built in close proximity to the foundation of Megalopolis at some point in the fourth century BC.[147] Both buildings are unique: the *Thersilion* has a very unusual building plan and architectural features and the theatre was the largest theatre in Greece (Paus. 8. 32. 1).[148] Due to their similarities, they were clearly built in relation to one another.[149] Verfenstein offers an intriguing theory on the reasoning behind the size of theatre, namely that Megalopolis was the first polis to utilise the theatre for civic and secular purposes in addition to its traditional uses.[150] This theory fits well within the argument I make about Megalopolis' ability to understand how a federation works as is confirmed by the fact that the polis saw the need to have a space where a large crowd could gather to discuss important matters. The theatre therefore was an important part of the civic life of the polis, as it was one of the only places in Megalopolis where these large crowds could gather, which is substantial judging by the number of citizens the polis must have had. However, I do not agree with her conclusion that these buildings were built with the *Myrioi* in mind. Moreover, the sole meeting of the *Myrioi* during the existence of the Arkadian *koinon* was at Tegea around 363 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 4. 36). On the other hand, they only came to Megalopolis once, in 348/7 BC, which is also known to be their last meeting (Dem. *Meg.* 19. 10.-11.; Aeschin. 2. 79 and 157). The Great City was definitely founded in a federal atmosphere, but not as the federal

an interesting theory, Megalopolis was nevertheless meant to function as a polis in its own right. Even though it could still have hosted federal institutions such as the Brussels today, there is no definite proof for this in the sources.

[147] Verfenstein (2002), 31.

[148] Pausanias' statement on the size of the theatre is backed up by the archaeology as the theatre itself had a sitting capacity of 20,000 and 21,000 seats.

[149] For more information on the architecture of the *Thersilion*, see Bather (1892-93) and Benson (1892-93). On the Theatre, see Dryer and Sellers (1891), Gardner et al. (1890), Loring (1892-93) and Roy (2007). See also the introduction.

[150] Verfenstein (2002), 41.

capital. Instead, the Arkadians wanted it to be a fully functioning polis of considerable size in its own right.

FIGURE 6 - THE THERSILION © E. CLOSE, 2016

1.2.2. The organisation of Megalopolis

Clearly, Megalopolis was a typical Arkadian polis with its own local institutions and constitution, which were connected to several public, cultural and religious buildings in which the citizens went about their day-to-day life. Although there is little evidence of the nature of the city's constitution, an overview of both the buildings found at Megalopolis and the information on the organisation of other Arkadian poleis might help to shed some light on the situation in Megalopolis.[151] It can be said with certainty that in the period after the synoecism of Megalopolis, most of the Arkadian cities had an organised constitution regulated by laws and magistrates. Due to Megalopolis' foundation at the hand of the Arkadian *koinon*, there should be no doubt about the constitution of the polis being democratic in nature, as this was one of the cornerstones of the Arkadian policy.

For Megalopolis, several magistrates are known to have existed: the office of *agonothetes* is alluded to in an inscription (*IG* V,2 450). The *nomographoi* are mentioned in a decree of the polis in connection with Magnesia on the Meander (*IMagn.* 38 l. 42, 48, 57), they are also attested in another inscription from the polis, a *diagramma*,

[151] Nielsen (2002), 470-474.

which also mentions the existence of a *grammatophylax* as well as a *synedrion* as one of the civic institutions of the polis (*IG* V,2 433 l. 2, 8, 9). Another inscription also refers to the Megalopolitan *damiorgoi* (*IG* V,431). These magistrates are also known to have existed for both the Arkadian and Achaian *koina.* In a boundary dispute between Megalopolis en Messene, the federal *damiorgoi* are seen acting on behalf of the Achaian *koinon* by accepting appeals for these boundary disputes as well as imposing fines on members who did not comply with the arbitration.[152] Even though these inscriptions are dated well into the Hellenistic period, they should not be discarded as similar magistrates and institutions were in place elsewhere in Arkadia at the time of the synoecism.[153] Moreover, archaeologists have found remains of several public buildings which they believed to be the *bouleuterion*, *prytaneion* and the *archeia*.[154] While most of these have been named echoing Pausanias' description of Megalopolis, it is plausible to conclude that the city did indeed have a *boule* as this was common for Greek poleis of the time.

However, the existence of a *synedrion* and *nomographoi* in Megalopolis is particularly interesting as it illustrates another link between the internal organisation of the polis and that of a federal state. For one, the *synedrion* is attested in several federal contexts such as the Second Athenian Confederacy which is known to have a *synedrion* that decided on membership of this Confererederacy (*IG* II^2 43). Even more interesting is the attestation to the Megalopolitan *nomographoi*, a rare magistracy, and which also existed in the Achaian *koinon*, thus drawing an interesting parallel between the polis and the federal state of which Megalopolis became an important member. The magistracy of the federal *nomographoi,* known to us because of two inscriptions which will be discussed in more detail below, was legislative in nature as they are known to have drown up federal laws including a sacred law for Hygeia and the board seems to have travelled to member states whenever necessary. According to the inscription (*Syll.* 3 559), the *nomographoi* of Megalopolis were organised in a board that had two primary functions: draught laws in order to get them to the *boule* or other political institutions of the polis as well as record and archive laws that had previously been approved.

Furthermore, this city-state had to be of considerable size in order to keep control of the surrounding area. Geographically, the area on which Megalopolis was

[152] Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010), 190-191. See also section three of chapter three.
[153] Nielsen (2002), 473.
[154] Lauter and Lauter-Bufe (2011), 32-99.

founded was crucial to form a buffer between the Arkadian heartland and Sparta.[155] This is evident from the longstanding disputes between Sparta and Megalopolis about the connecting regions Skiritis, Aigytis and Belminatis that started after Philip II had given these areas back to the Arkadians (Pol. 9. 28. 7-8).[156] To achieve this, it was important for the polis to control several of the major routes in and out of the area to keep Sparta at bay.[157] In theory, the foundation of a big city as protection against Sparta was undoubtedly a good idea, but it proved difficult to defend and as a result the polis was prone to many Spartan raids.[158] One of these even had the inhabitants appealing to Athens for help in the 350s BC. In response, Demosthenes argues in favour of helping, not out of affection or alliance for Megalopolis but in view of the future consequences for their ally Messene and the prospect of weakening both Sparta and Thebes where possible (Dem. *Meg.* 16. 8-9). Moreover, Demosthenes also realises that Megalopolis might prove a crucial factor in retaining the delicate balance of power within the Peloponnese as well as resisting the threat of Sparta overall. Yet, the size of the polis may also have been connected to the necessities of its new population who undoubtedly contained wealthy landowners that needed extra space within the city.[159] This is illustrated by the situation after the Megalopolitans returned from exile in 222 BC where two factions had formed among the citizens that were arguing about the size of the polis (Pol. 5. 93.). One of these factions included the wealthy landowners who were in favour of keeping the large size of the polis since it included part of their estates, while their opponents wanted the polis to be smaller at the expense of these estates. Eventually, the conflict was resolved by Aratos who managed to reconcile both parties. Thus, though geographically it was an important area, its defence came at a certain price considering the Arkadians had to use their army in two ways: to protect the traditionally scattered villages in the heartland as well as this new metropolis.[160]

To get the required number of inhabitants for such a big city, the Arkadians encouraged the inhabitants of a big group of other Arkadian villages and poleis to leave

[155] Roy (2000), 314.
[156] These boundary disputes will be discussed in more detail in section three of chapter three and a broader overview of the interaction between Sparta and Megalopolis will be analysed in chapter five. See also *IvO* 47; *Syll.* 665; Harter-Uibopuu (1998) n. 11; Ager (1996) n. 135-137; Mackil (2013) n. 45; Shipley (2000) and Roy (2009), 207-208.
[157] Roy (2003), 261.
[158] Roy (2007), 292-293.
[159] Roy (2007), 295.
[160] Henderson (2013), 34; and Braunert and Pedersen (1972), 67-68.

their native communities and become part of the synoecism of Megalopolis. Once again, the number of the poleis that were part of the synoecism is different in our sources. According to Diodorus, it involved twenty Mainalian and Parrhasian communities (Diod. 15. 72. 4: 'εἰς αὐτὴν κώμας εἴκοσι τῶν ὀνομαζομένων Μαιναλίων καὶ Παρρασίων Ἀρκάδων' – 'combining in it twenty villages of the Arkadians named Mainalians and Parrhasians'), whereas Pausanias describes a much bigger project with thirty-nine different communities that included Mainalians and Parrhesians as well as Eutresians, Aegytians, Kynourians and areas under the control of Orchomenos (Paus. 8. 27. 3-4):

> 'πόλεις δὲ τοσαίδε ἦσαν ὁπόσας ὑπό τε προθυμίας καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔχθος τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων πατρίδας σφίσιν οὔσας ἐκλιπεῖν ἐπείθοντο οἱ Ἀρκάδες, Ἀλέα Παλλάντιον Εὐταία Σουμάτειον Ἀσέα Περαιθεῖς Ἑλισσὼν Ὀρεσθάσιον Δίπαια Λύκαια: ταύτας μὲν ἐκ Μαινάλου: ἐκ δὲ Εὐτρησίων Τρικόλωνοι καὶ Ζοίτιον καὶ Χαρισία καὶ Πτολέδερμα καὶ Κναῦσον καὶ Παρώρεια: παρὰ δὲ Αἰγυτῶν Αἴγυς καὶ Σκιρτώνιον καὶ Μαλέα καὶ Κρῶμοι καὶ Βλένινα καὶ Λεῦκτρον: Παρρασίων δὲ Λυκοσουρεῖς Θωκνεῖς Τραπεζούντιοι Προσεῖς Ἀκακήσιον Ἀκόντιον Μακαρία Δασέα: ἐκ δὲ Κυνουραίων τῶν ἐν Ἀρκαδίᾳ Γόρτυς καὶ Θεισόα ἡ πρὸς Λυκαίῳ καὶ Λυκαιᾶται καὶ Ἀλίφηρα: ἐκ δὲ τῶν συντελούντων ἐς Ὀρχομενὸν Θεισόα Μεθύδριον Τεῦθις: προσεγένετο δὲ καὶ Τρίπολις ὀνομαζομένη, Καλλία καὶ Δίποινα καὶ Νώνακρις'
>
> ('These cities were the one which the Arkadians were persuaded to abandon through their willingness and because of their hatred of the Lakedaimonians, despite that these were the homes of their fathers: Alea, Pallantion, Eutaia, Soumateion, Asea, Peraithenses, Helisson, Oresthasion, Dipaia, Lykaia; these were cities of Mainalos. Of the Eutresian cities: Trikoloni, Zoition, Charisia, Ptolederma, Knauson, Paroreia. From Aigytis: Aigys, Skirtonion, Malea, Kromi, Blenina, Leuktron. Of the Parrhasians: Lykosura, Thoknia, Trapezous, Prosenses, Akakesion, Akontion, Makaria, Dasea. Of the Kynourians in Arkadia: Gortys, Theisoa by Mount Lykaios, Lykaia, Alipheira. Of those belonging to Orchomenos: Thisoa, Methydrion, Teuthis. These were joined by Tripolis, as it is called, Kallia, Dipoina, Nonakris').

These different communities had lived in the so-called Megalopolitan basin, i. e. the area in which the new polis was to be established, and their organisation varied from poleis to smaller *komai* or tribes. While these discrepancies are problematic due to the sheer difference in the extent of the synoecism – Pausanias lists twice as many communities as Diodorus – it is possible that not all of the communities named by

Pausanias were part of the original synoecism.[161] The Mainalians and Parrhesians however were clearly meant to be Megalopolitan from the very start since they are mentioned in both accounts. Yet the fact that the Mainalians still appear as one of the contributing communities on the list of *damiorgoi* (*IG* V 2 1 l. 16-19), would indicate that not all of these communities were part of Megalopolis from the beginning. Other communities involved in the synoecism were some of the Eutresian cities as only one of them had successfully been able to resist incorporation (Paus. 8. 27. 5), and several poleis under the control of Orchomenos which was hostile to the Arkadian *koinon* because of its loyalty to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 10-11).[162] Because of this, it seems as though the individual interests of the members of the Arkadian *koinon* played a part in the synoicism of Megalopolis as well as overall Arkadian needs.[163] Therefore, weakening Orchomenos' power by taking away six cities under its control, must have been very desirable for the Arkadian *koinon* and Kleitor, which had been at war with the polis a decade prior to the synoecism (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 4. 36-37). This is also indicated by the fact that the ten *oikistai* that founded Megalopolis came from the influential Arkadian cities of Mantinea, Tegea and Kleitor as well as the surrounding communities the Mainalians and Parrhesians. Obviously, local interests such as those of Kleitor, were taken into consideration when the polis was founded, while others such as Mantinea may have had to relinquish control over other areas.[164] On the other hand, communities mentioned by Pausanias such as the Kynourians did not have to become Megalopolitan until a time when they became of strategic importance.

With this many communities being incorporated into an entirely new polis, it is unsurprising that not all of these wanted to be part of Megalopolis. According to Pausanias (Paus. 8. 27. 5-6),

> 'τὸ μὲν δὴ ἄλλο Ἀρκαδικὸν οὔτε τι παρέλυε τοῦ κοινοῦ δόγματος καὶ συνελέγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν σπουδῇ: Λυκαιᾶται δὲ καὶ Τρικολωνεῖς καὶ Λυκοσουρεῖς τε καὶ Τραπεζούντιοι μετεβάλοντο Ἀρκάδων μόνοι, καὶ - οὐ γὰρ συνεχώρουν ἔτι τὰ ἄστη τὰ ἀρχαῖα ἐκλιπεῖν - οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν καὶ ἄκοντες ἀνάγκῃ κατήγοντο ἐς τὴν Μεγάλην πόλιν, Τραπεζούντιοι δὲ ἐκ Πελοποννήσου τὸ παράπαν ἐξεχώρησαν,'

[161] Roy (2003), 267.
[162] Hansen and Nielsen (2004), 521.
[163] Roy (2003), 261-269.
[164] Roy (2003), 264.

> ('wheras the rest of the Arkadians did not resist the common decree and hastily assembled at Megalopolis; the people of Lykaia, Trikoloni, Lykosoura and Trapezous changed their mind (as the only Arkadians) and because they were not prepared to leave the old cities, they were forced against their will to go to Megalopolis, with the exception of the citizens of Trapezous who departed from the Peloponnese altogether').

The choice was simple if the community was deemed important for the creation of this new Arkadian polis: become Megalopolitan or flee the Peloponnese. After the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC, there was resistance from several of these communities because of an agreement made by the Arkadians that all of the parties had to return to their home (Diod. 15. 94. 1-3). Since they were unhappy that they had been forced to leave their old homes behind, some of the new inhabitants of Megalopolis used this agreement to leave the city. Of course, the other citizens now living in Megalopolis did not agree with this and soon another conflict followed, with Mantinea supporting the deserters and the Thebans helping Megalopolis. Together with the Thebans under Pammenes, the polis managed to stop the rebellion quickly and the communities once again became part of Megalopolis. During Megalopolis' membership of the Achaian *koinon*, some of these communities did manage to separate from Megalopolis and appear as independent poleis.[165]

This resistance illustrates one of the biggest problems the new polis faced: how could they unite all of these different communities into one collective polis with a distinct identity? An analysis of the cults and sanctuaries of Megalopolis indicates that the polis tried to unite these vastly different communities by creating a shared religious identity that was different from a traditional polis' religious identity based on simple, unitary shared cults and traditions.[166] In turn, this deliberate choice of cults and deities facilitated the city's interaction with the wider region of Arkadia as well as promote social and political cohesion amongst the different groups within the polis. Religion had always been an important factor in the establishment of regional and federal states, since the sharing of common cults and sanctuaries facilitated a sense of belonging, shared interests and moral values culminating in the creation of one state with a common territory, past and identity.[167] Therefore, by using religion as a basis for the shared Megalopolitan identity, Megalopolis could have imitated the federal structure with which it was familiar

[165] For more information on this, see chapters two and three.
[166] Jost (1985), 220-235.
[167] Mackil (2013), 156-157.

through its membership of the Arkadian and later on the Achaian *koina,* since both the polis and the *koina* tried to use religion to create internal unity. Moreover, as we shall see in more detail in the last section of this chapter, Megalopolis' approach to its civic identity differed slightly from that of cities that were established in the Archaic and Classical periods, as Megalopolis' creation by a federation fascilitated a polis with a new kind of outlook that was much more federal in nature.

Even though the Arkadian *koinon* did not have a federal cult, there are indications that they were aware of the benefits of religious unity. For example, the Arkadikon mentioned on the coins from the fifth century BC was thought to have been a religious organisation which united the cities of Arkadia long before their political union in a *koinon*.[168] Likewise, the sanctuary of Poseidon in Helike and the temple of Zeus Homarios in Aigion played an important role in the formation of the Achaian *koinon*. Both cults had long been connected to the Achaian (mythical) history and identity: the former in connection to conquests of the region, the latter with the Achaians of the Trojan war.[169] Moreover, the temple of Zeus Homarios was further embedded in the institutional side of the *koinon*, as the meetings of the Achaian assembly took place in it until 188 BC, when the federation decided that meetings should rotate equally between member states (Livy 38. 30. 1-6). The political role of the god and his cult is further evidenced by his appearance on Achaian coinage throughout its history, connecting three main incentives, i. e. religious, political and economic - for the formation of a federal state.[170] Furthermore, the importance of local cults could help preserve – and even favour – the local identity of the members of a federal state as was the case with Aigion and the cult of Zeus Homarios, and within a polis such as Megalopolis this could help the integration of these different communities into one.

Of course, this could also happen at a much smaller scale, i.e. within a single polis. For example, in the city of Patrai which was created just like Megalopolis through synoecism, the existence of a single ritual proves that through religion these different groups could come together as citizens of Patrai. After all, this ritual incorporated important elements of the different communities and connected two cults, the rural cult of Artemis Triklaria and the cult of Dionysos Aisymnetes in the city (Paus. 7. 18-20).

[168] Williams (1965), 8-19.
[169] Mackil (2013), 194.
[170] Thonemann (2016), 71-75.

Even though in Patrai it was just a single ritual that incorporated all of these distinct elements, the Megalopolitans used this practice to create an entire civic religion. No doubt, they purposefully employed this tactic with the creation of a shared Megalopolitan identity in mind.

In general, the Arkadians did not abandon their rural shrines, when a new urban centre was created such as Megalopolis, instead opting to incorporate similar versions of those shrines, sanctuaries and festivals within this new civic centre so as to create a continued link between the polis and countryside.[171] In her analysis of the polis' pantheon which is primarily based on Pausanias' description of the many sanctuaries – it is important to note that this is Pausanias' version of the polis at his time[172] - Madeleine Jost identified three ways in which the polis wanted make this connection between the *chora* of Megalopolis and the polis to unite its inhabitants: firstly, by replicating local and rural sanctuaries or important pan-Arkadian cults.[173] Two of the many cults worshipped in Megalopolis, those of Pan and Zeus Lykaios, were of great importance to the citizens as the protective gods of the polis, which also benefited from the general worship of their cults by the other Arkadians in sanctuaries on Mount Lykaion, a sacred place for the entire region (Paus. 8. 36). Just as with the cult of Zeus Homarios in Achaia, these deities had been connected to the historical and mythical past of the region and together with a third goddess called Despoina they were the only gods to be worshipped throughout Arkadia (Paus. 8. 36-38).[174] In fact, the sanctuary of Zeus Lykaios on Mount Lykaion had already promoted Arkadian interaction in the fifth century BC[175] and both gods appear on the coins of the Arkadian *koinon* which displayed the head of Zeus Lykaios on the obverse and a seated Pan on the reverse. Another example of such a duplication was the import of the local cult of Hermes Akakesios which was originaly worshipped in Akakesion by the Parrhesians, but had later been appropriated in Megalopolis as well to create a link to this rural sanctuary.[176]

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[171] Jost (1994), 122.
[172] Stewart (2013), 241.
[173] Jost (1985), 235.
[174] Jost (2007), 264-269. Even though there is no proof for the existence of a federal Arkadian cult, it has been suggested that as Megalopolis functioned as the capital of the Arkadian *koinon*, the cult of Zeus Lykaios, now under control of Megalopolis acted as the federal cult. However, this is highly unlikely and there does not seem to be any direct proof, particularly since the cult was not subjected to increased political activity.
[175] Roy (2007), 291; Jost (1985), 179-185 and 221-222.
[176] Jost (2007), 274.

Secondly, instead of duplicating entire sancturaries into the polis, local deities were given their own places of worship within the city like Pan Skoleitas. This version of Pan was originally worshipped in Trapezous and after the synoecism his cult was also brought into the city to create a connection between the city and the area of Trapezous.[177] Pan was also worshipped in another version, i.e. Sinoeis, through a statue brought by the Phigaleians as their contribution to the new polis (Paus. 8. 30.3.). Thirdly, new cults were created through syncretism of several deities, modernising these cults and adapting them to the new reality within the city by creating new versions of the gods. Important examples of Megalopolitan sanctuaries are that of Zeus Soter and the Great Goddesses, both of which were situated near the agora and were connected to political life in the polis. The temple of Zeus Soter in particular seems to have functioned as the place where decrees were published.[178] Jost has even posed the theory that the cult of the Great Goddesses was created particularly in connection with the foundation of Megalopolis.[179] Additionally, a trio of statues found in the temple of Zeus sitting on the throne, Artemis and Megalopolis has been thought to represent the foundation of the polis.[180]

Remarkably, all of the cults, except for that of Apollo Epikurios, that were part of the Megalopolitan pantheon originated from the same region, Parrhesia, which was geographically closest to the site on which the new polis was founded.[181] Moreover, this region had connections to the oldest and most important cult of the Arkadians, i.e. that of Zeus Lykaios on Mt Lykaion, which indicated that the polis wanted to securely establish its role in the southern part of the region as well as in the whole of Arkadia. Furthermore, as we have seen from the accounts of Pausanias and Diodorus concerning the synoecism of the polis, the Parrhesians were among the new citizens of the polis.[182] Clearly, the best way to make sure that the communities felt at home, was to incorporate the typical Arkadian deities like Pan, Zeus Lykaios and others that were known in different variations throughout the region into the religious life of the polis.

Although most of the deities of the Megalopolitan pantheon also had duplicate sanctuaries or their own places of worship in the wider region that now belonged to

[177] Jost (1985), 235.
[178] Jost (1985), 225-226.
[179] Jost (1994), 122.
[180] Corso (2005), 228.
[181] Jost (1985), 235.
[182] Nielsen (2002), 414-428.

Megalopolis, Pausanias does mention a few rural cult sites in the Megalopolitan chora (Paus 8. 30. 1-35. 5). For example, close to the city was a temple to Poseidon Epoptos. Between Messene and Megalopolis, a sanctuary to several goddesses called the Maniae could be found and close to that sanctuary was another sanctuary dedicated to the Eumenides and a mound of earth that was called the Tomb of the Finger that was connected to the myth of Orestes. Furthermore, the historian mentions several Heraions on the boundary between the two cities. On the road from Megalopolis to Methydrion, Pausanias found the ruins of a sanctuary to Artemis Skiatis, rumoured to have been built by Aristodamos the tyrant. Another rural site not mentioned by Pausanias was that of Glanitsa, which only consisted of an altar flanked by several temenos wall on a hill in the northern borders of the Megalopolitan area.[183] Several of these religious sites seem to have been located near the boundaries of Megalopolis and neighbouring poleis such as Messene or on the roads between these cities. Due to the lack of information about these religious sites the question remains if they had any specific connection to Megalopolis and the establishment of the Megalopolitan identity. What is certain is that upon their foundation, the Megalopolitans deliberately copied many of these rural shrines and sanctuaries to maintain the link between the religion of the new city and the traditional worship of the region. [184]

The creation of a very distinct Megalopolitan pantheon was employed on purpose as by doing this the polis hoped to find an incentive for the many communities now finding themselves forced to live in the polis, to come together as one city. This is further indicated by the placement of the sanctuaries within the polis connecting them to different aspects of the everyday life in the polis: be it political, cultural or social, religion was vital to the concerns of the polis as a whole.[185] Undoubtedly, the magistrates would have drawn their inspiration from the way in which the bigger organisations that the polis had interacted with like the Arkadian and Boiotian *koina*, dealt with the same problem. Therefore, we can draw the conclusion that at least in terms of its religion, Megalopolis seems to imitate the federal framework it was familiar with in an attempt to unite the different communities into a bigger communal organisation.

[183] Jost (1992), 208.
[184] Jost (1992), 227-228.
[185] Jost (1985), 235.

Unfortunately, this theory can only be attested in terms of the polis' religion since we have little to no evidence for the economic or political structure of the polis. What little evidence we do have, points to a normal polis structure with institutions you would find elsewhere.[186] Yet, through its pantheon Megalopolis proved that it knew which benefits federalism could bring even when it was applied on a smaller scale. After all, this is what a city born from synoecism had to do: in order to create a common identity, a way had to be found for all of these communities to interact with one another without having to give up their own individual identity.

This use of federal elements in the religious pantheon is exactly what distinguished Megalopolis from other Arkadian poleis and made it so easy to attain such a prominent position in both the Arkadian and Achaian *koina*. Moreover, this understanding and use of federalism forms the cornerstone of the Megalopolitan identity. Together with the other characteristics identified in this thesis, i.e. the hatred for Sparta, the deep connection to the democratic ideals of the Arkadian *koinon* and the traditional connections to Macedon, this is what set Megalopolis apart from other cities in the Peloponnese.

1.3. Megalopolis and the rest of Arkadia

Megalopolis was thus established in the period after the Spartan defeat of Leuktra by the Arkadian *koinon* through a synoecism of several different communities. The polis had a deep reverence for democracy and hatred for Sparta, courtesy of the Arkadian *koinon*, but unlike the other Arkadians, Megalopolis had used the ideals behind federalism to unite the different communities via the creation of a complete pantheon. Yet the polis was in other respects still an Arkadian city with similar laws, constitution, institutions, religion and culture found elsewhere. So how did the polis interact with other Arkadian poleis?

As a member of the Arkadian *koinon*, there is only one indication that Megalopolis received special treatment: the fact that the city provided ten of the fifty federal *damiorgoi* (*IG* V 2 1). As discussed above, we cannot say with certainty why this was the case, the size of the polis and the area it controlled must have been the reason.[187] What is more interesting is the fact that both Tegea and Mantinea, as founding members

[186] Nielsen (2002), 470-474.
[187] Nielsen (2015), 263.

of the *koinon*, contributed the same amount, i.e. five, to the board of *damiorgoi* as others, giving the impression that the members of the federation, just as in Achaia, were equal to one another.[188] However, this did not exclude these bigger poleis from taking up an important position within the federation as Megalopolis was able to do due to its size in the board of *damiorgoi*. Additionally, the reason for Megalopolis' higher number of *damiorgoi* might also be propagandistic in nature, just as its name was meant to be.[189] In a similar fashion, Tegea and Mantinea had the opportunity – along with Kleitor – to exert their importance through the appointment of four of the ten founding *oikistai* of Megalopolis, illustrating that these two cities were influential in the Arkadian politics (Paus. 7. 27. 2). Moreover, it is most likely that these two poleis played a significant role in the foundation of Megalopolis, due to their prominent position within the Arkadian *koinon*. All in all, it seems as though the federation, while egalitarian in nature, was heavily influenced by the larger poleis like Megalopolis, Tegea and Mantinea.[190] No doubt, their position would impact the way that they interacted both with each other and with the smaller poleis as is evidenced from the way those communities that did not want to be part of the synoecism of Megalopolis were treated (Paus. 8. 27. 5; Diod. 15. 94. 1-3).

However, after the rupture of the federation in 363 BC, the Arkadian poleis did not stop interacting with one another, although there is considerably less evidence for this. It seems as though the division of the *koinon* into (two) political units persisted for a long time with Mantinea at the centre of one and Megalopolis of a potential other.[191] There is a whole series of evidence for this statement, conveniently collected by Thomas Heine Nielsen.[192] However, I will limit myself to cite the few examples that are most relevant to describe Megalopolitan relations with the rest of Arkadia in this period.[193] In the sources that discuss events of the year after the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC, there is a clear distinction between the Arkadians led by Mantinea and Megalopolis which was acting as an individual unit. The polis was consistently asking for help from parties outside the region against other Arkadians (Pol. 4. 33. 8; Diod. 15. 94. 1-3) or Sparta

[188] Nielsen (2002), 482.
[189] Roy (2000), 314.
[190] Nielsen (2002), 484-485.
[191] Larsen (1968),193.
[192] Nielsen (2002), 474-505.
[193] Nielsen (2002), 493-497.

(Dem. *Meg.* 16; Diod. 16. 39. 1-3); interacting with these outsiders through the establishment of treaties (with Argos, Sikyon, Messene, Thebes and Orneai: Diod. 16. 39. 1-4); receiving ambassadors (both from Athens: Dem. *Meg.* 19. 10; Aeschin. 2. 157); or applying, together with Messene, to become a member of the Delphic Amphictyony (*Syll.*[3] 244).[194] While Nielsen may be right in suggesting that the Arkadian *koinon* could have continued under Mantinean leadership, it seems to me as though Megalopolis distanced itself from the rest of the Arkadians - as is illustrated by the fact that it was the only one of the Arkadian poleis not to support Agis III in his campaign against Macedon in 331 BC, potentially precisely because it was a Spartan expedition against Macedon (Aeschin. 3. 165) - in order to make clear that it was very much a polis in its own right. The evidence cited by Nielsen suggesting Megalopolis was at the head of a second federation is far from convincing: Demosthenes' use for example of both the term Megalopolitans and Arkadian to denote the inhabitants of the polis can simply be explained by the fact that the inhabitants of the polis were Arkadians (Dem. *Meg.* 16).[195] On the other hand, the fact that Aeschines as an Athenian ambassador delivered a speech to the *Myrioi* in 348/7 BC implies a connection to federalism since the federal nature of the Arkadian assembly is well known. However, due to the scarcity of the evidence we cannot say for certain exactly what this connection was.[196] Obviously, Megalopolis was eager to make it clear to the other Arkadians as well as potential states outside of the region that it was a polis that could very much act as an individual unit. While the polis seems to have been keen to stress its individuality in this period, there is evidence that there was still a degree of interaction between the cities of Arkadia, and Megalopolis was no exception to this. While the tribal states that had been a defining character of the region during the Archaic and Classical periods became less prominent most likely due to the synoecism of Megalopolis poleis still created decrees for cooperation with one another or granted proxenia to citizens from other poleis, as Orchomenos did for men from Megalopolis (*BCH* 38).[197]

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[194] Luraghi (2008), 255.
[195] Nielsen (2002), 494.
[196] When exactly these so-called Arkadian political units (or *koina*) stopped existing, is not known, but two possibilities have been offered: either the *koinon* was dissolved under Alexander the Great (Dušanić (1970), 314-315) or it dissolved only gradually when more and more Arkadian cities became part of the Achaian *koinon* (Roy (1968), 276). While these are both interesting theories, especially Roy's, it seems highly unlikely that this was the case given the stress Megalopolis seems to have put on its individuality.
[197] For more examples of proxeny decrees of one Arkadian polis to another like the decree from Kleitor for Aristodamos of Mantinea (*IG* V 368) and the one from Orchomenos to Larchippos of Tegea (*SEG*

In the decades after the dissolution of the Arkadian *koinon*, there was a clear change in the political landscape of Arkadia. One of the two most important Arkadian poleis, Tegea, seems to have vanished from our sources with Megalopolis taking its spot at the forefront of Arkadian politics, while Mantinea on the other hand seems to have gathered a lot of Arkadians around itself. The different cities of Arkadia still interacted with each other locally, yet slowly Megalopolis seems to have profiled itself as an individual actor in the Peloponnese and the wider Greek world with its own distinct local identity. By the time the polis made the decision to join the Achaian *koinon*, the influence of Mantinea seems to have faded and Megalopolis was the best example of an Arkadian polis.

2. Messene and Megalopolis: two sides of the same coin?

In 183/2 BC, the city of Messene waged war against the Achaian *koinon*. Forced to become an Achaian member in 191 BC after a failed war against the federation, the polis rebelled in the hopes of regaining their freedom. However, this attempt was knocked down quickly by the leaders of the federation, but not before Philopoimen of Megalopolis, the *strategos* of that year, was killed at Messene (Livy 39. 49). This whole affair seems to have prompted the Megalopolitans to start a quarrel with Messene about the ownership and boundaries of several regions between the two states (*SEG* 58 370 l. 2-11). After several attempts the Megalopolitans seem to have been unsuccessful.[198] However, their determination to win these boundary disputes can in part be explained by the necessity to retaliate for the death of Philopoimen. Judging from the fact that the Achaian statesmen that were responsible for Messene's induction into the *koinon* were Megalopolitan (Plut. *Phil.* 16. 1-3; Pol. 22. 10. 4-6), it seems that the close relationship once enjoyed by the two cities was, now that Megalopolis had successfully integrated itself in the Achaian *koinon* and felt Achaian as well as Arkadian, a thing of the past. Messenian opposition to the Achaian *koinon* can only have made this worse. In the last part of this chapter I will discuss the past interactions between Megalopolis and Messene to show that despite being founded at the same time and for a similar reason, both cities seemingly progressed in two different directions. Through this analysis, I want to further

33 329); or from the Arkadian *koinon* as a whole such as the decree for Phylarchos of Athens (*IG* V 2 1), see http://proxenies.csad.ox.ac.uk.

[198] For a more in-depth discussion of this boundary dispute and what it meant for Megalopolis as a member of the Achaian *koinon*, see part four of section three of chapter three.

highlight what it meant to be Megalopolitan and how the polis attempted to express a novel approach to their ethnic and civic identity.

Unlike Megalopolis which the Arkadians founded as a new city, Messene already had an established place in the Greek world before the polis that became to be known as Messene was founded in 369 BC. As Nino Luraghi points out, it is important to note that at the time of the foundation of this city there was a difference between the region Messene and the polis Messene which was originally called Ithome after the mountain that was in close proximity to the city.[199] By Pausanias' time, however, the city had taken the name Messene and the wider region around it was now called Messenia, indicating that the polis had established itself as the centre of the region and bastion of local Messenian identity.

Just as with the foundation of Megalopolis, the reason for the creation of Messene (or Ithome) lies in the changing political reality of the Peloponnese after the Spartan defeat at Leuktra.[200] Up until that point the people living in the region had primarily been united as Helots and *periokoi* under Spartan control but after the Theban defeat of Sparta, they believed the time was right to curb Spartan power even further by uniting in a political state (Paus. 4. 26. 6; 4. 28. 1).[201] Whereas, as discussed above, there is no real case to indicate that Epaminondas was involved in the synoecism of Megalopolis, there is no denying that the Theban general was the one responsible for the foundation of the city of Messene.[202] He is credited with this achievement by several authors: Plutarch (*Ages.* 34. 1), Diodorus (15. 66. 1), Nepos (*Ep.* 8. 4) and of course, Pausanias who states that both the Messenians and the Thebans considered him to be the founder of the polis (Paus. 4. 31. 10; 9. 15. 6).

However, the close relationship between Messene and the Arkadians in the decades before the (re)foundation of the polis, could suggest Arkadian involvement in the foundation as well.[203] Considering the close geographical proximity of the two regions and their shared antagonism towards Sparta, this seems very plausible idea. For example, in the first few years after the foundation, the Arkadians were responsible for both the

[199] Luraghi (2008), 228.
[200] Surprisingly enough, just as the synoecism of Megalopolis, the creation of the polis Messene is not mentioned by Xenophon.
[201] Luraghi (2008), 210.
[202] Alcock et al. (2005), 174.
[203] Luraghi (2008), 215-216.

expansion and protection of the Messenian territory, while the Messenians helped the Arkadians against Spartan invasions (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 25-29; Diod. 15. 77. 4). Elsewhere, in a Polybian passage connected to the Messenian loss of their lands in the Second Messenian War (685-668 BC) the Arkadians are seen acting as their protectors and friends (Pol. 4. 32. 4), so much so that Arkadia seemed like their second fatherland (Pol. 4. 33. 4).

So, the polis had a history of Arkadian cooperation, yet there is also evidence of a close relationship between Messene and Megalopolis which was not surprising considering the similarities in the history and identity of both poleis. After all, they were created as a result of the same changing political reality, for the same reason, by more or less the same parties roughly at the same time. Undoubtedly, the geographical proximity of these cities to Sparta had something to do with the matter as well, as both of them were regularly confronted by Spartan invasions during the following centuries, like the invasion by the Spartan king Kleomenes in 223 BC which left Megalopolis destroyed and had its inhabitants fleeing to Messene for help.[204] The Messenians also acted as faithful allies of Megalopolis during the city's war with Sparta in 352 (Diod. 16. 39. 2), while Megalopolis came to Messenian aid when the polis was attacked by Nabis (Plut. *Phil.* 12. 4-5). Moreover, the emergence of Philip of Macedon was greeted by both poleis with open arms, establishing a history of close cooperation between the Macedonian kings and the two cities.[205] Both Megalopolis and Messene were Macedonian allies in several of the big conflicts such as the battle of Chaironea and the Chremonidean War, for which they were highly rewarded as they gained control of areas previously belonging to Sparta.[206]

Despite the many similarities between Megalopolis and Messene, I believe it is the Messenian policy of advocating neutrality that was responsible for the Megalopolitan animosity that is visible in the boundary dispute. While Messene abstained from actively taking part in conflicts unless they were forced to take action and refused to join the Achaian federation, Megalopolis had chosen to become a member of the Achaian

[204] For more information on the border regions between Sparta, Messene and Megalopolis, see Shipley (2000).
[205] Hamilton (1982), 61-77.
[206] Many of these regions would become the subject of boundary disputes, wars and much more for decades to come, some of which would not be settled until the Romans controlled Greece. For more on this, see chapter three.

koinon since it had seen the benefits of being part of a federal state. Therefore, it is natural that Megalopolis did not agree with the Messenian insubordination against the federal government and this may have been another motivation behind the boundary dispute. Moreover, while political connection to Macedon was another element that Megalopolis and Messene had in common, it seems as though the Megalopolitans would continue to maintain this relationship throughout the next decades to the point it became part of the Megalopolitan polity, eventually using it to secure an alliance between the Achaians and Antigonos Doson during the Kleomenean War, while Messene slowly moved towards a new policy: one of splendid isolation.[207]

A smaller difference between the two cities can be seen in the way they chose to use religion to shape their local identiyt. As we have seen Megalopolis chose to create a common identity with the help of a deliberately designed pantheon. The function of this pantheon was twofold: unite the communities now under the control of the territory and highlight that the gods of the region were also connected to the new city, a tactic also employed by federations from time to time.[208] In the beginning of its history, Messene applied the same technique through the duplication of the cults of Athena Kyparissia and Artemis Limnatis and the newly established temple for the goddess Messene in the polis which through a series of paintings of mythical Pan-Messenian heroes linked the new polis to the wider region.[209] However, the creation of the Asklepeion at Messene later on in the Hellenistic period ensured that the polis became the new religious centre of the region. At the same time rural religious sites in Messenia such as the sanctuary of Apollo Korythos in the Messenian Gulf as well as the traditional tomb cult worship underwent some changes.[210] On the one hand, archaeological surveys of the region have found an increase in the number of sites with tomb cult worship in rural Messenia.[211] On the other hand, more complex religious structures are also appearing throughout the region, although these seem to mostly be connected to the civic centres of the Hellenistic and Roman poleis. Apparently, in Messenia religion and ritual action still continued on a smaller scale at the rural level, it seems to have also played an important part in the establishment of the Messenian identity within the poleis of the region. The continued

[207] Luraghi (2008), 257.
[208] Jost (1992), 228-232.
[209] Luraghi (2008), 269-275.
[210] Alcock et al. (2005), 188-192.
[211] Alcocke et al. (2005), 189.

connection that extisted between the religion in Megalopolis and its countryside could also be found in Messenia although in a slightly different manner. In Messenia, elaborate religious structures in the countryside indicated that the different communities wanted to mark the area as their own.

This difference in the approach of both Megalopolis and Messene to their ethnicity and identity best illustrates the change that was slowly taking place in Greek civic life. Because Messene was essentially the rebirth of an older city that had a long line of myths and traditions to fall back on, the city chose to use those myths and traditions in its earlier history to rediscover its own identity just as the Greek poleis had done throughout the Archaic and Classical period. Megalopolis could not employ this tactic since the Arkadians had created a city that had no connections to a mythical past or the region. Therefore, the polis found an entirely new approach in which the civic and political identity was based on the unification of several different elements into one. In essence, while Messene was looking back at the Archaic and Classical period by recalling those elements that had been part of the older city, Megalopolis was looking forward to a more cosmopolitan, federal and wider identity which became a key feature of the later Hellenistic period with the emergence of the *koina* in Greece and Asia Minor. This foreshadowing of the Hellenistic period is also very apparent in the archaeology of the polis, as a few of the buildings such as the *Thersilion*, the *Philippeion* and the temple of Zeus Soter have some architectural elements that became typical in buildings of the Hellenistic period despite the fact that they are dated to the period just after the city's foundation.[212] It is important to understand the development of Megalopolis and the open and federal nature of Megalopolitan identity and the new step it formed in Greek civic life since it helps us understand how the polis develops in the late Classical and early Hellenistic world.

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Megalopolis was very much an Arkadian polis which was founded in 368 BC by the Arkadian *koinon* to protect the southern part of the region against Spartan invasions. As a result of its creation by a federal state, the polis knew from the very beginning what

[212] Lauter and Spyropoulos (1998), 445.

being part of a federation meant and what benefits this could bring. This would be the reason why the polis would make the decision to join the Achaian *koinon* in 235 BC and how it managed to unite the different communities of that had become part of the new city. Moreover, the Arkadian *koinon* provided Megalopolis with another one of its typically Megalopolitan characteristics: hatred of Sparta. Of course, this was a sentiment shared by plenty other poleis in the region, yet due to the close proximity of the polis to Lakedaimon, it seems as though Megalopolis seems to have gone the extra mile, refusing to cooperate with Sparta even when other Arkadians did do so on multiple occasions. While Megalopolis was clearly an Arkadian city, the fact that it had not existed during the Archaic and early Classical periods, meant that the city was eager to show other states that it was a state with its own identity and it could function without the other Arkadians. This need for independence from the other Arkadians can be seen from the polis' interactions following its establishment and it is clearest from the close relationship it formed with the Macedonian kings. All of these elements formed the core of the Megalopolitan identity. Even though there are several poleis with similar histories or attitudes, it is the combination of these things and the city's connection to federalism in particular that made Megalopolis unique. Yet it is important to note that the formation of this identity was a long process which started with the foundation of the polis in 368 BC and continued to develop even under the city's membership of the Achaian *koinon* as it added a distinct Achaian element to its identity and made Megalopolis both an Achaian and an Arkadian polis.

Chapter 2: Megalopolis and Achaia

The foundation of Megalopolis shortly after the Spartan defeat at Leuktra in 371 BC by members of the newly formed Arkadian *koinon* marked a permanent change in the affairs of the Peloponnese for the following two centuries. Since it was conceived as a defence point against Sparta, a local Megalopolitan identity soon formed with a distinct anti-Spartan element.[213] Of course, this was not unusual for the region as it was an important part of the Arkadian foreign policy.[214] However, the creation of Megalopolis by the Arkadian *koinon* also instilled into the polis a deep understanding of federal institutions and ideals – in addition to the benefits that the membership of such a federation entailed. The Megalopolitans understood that there is a sense of idealism behind the creation of a federal state that does not correspond with the actual reality of political life within such as state as there are always interests, desires and tensions between the local and federal levels that have to be taken into account.

No doubt, this is what in part influenced the polis' decision to become part of the Achaian *koinon* in 235 BC. An event that accomplished several changes for the Achaians, since the Megalopolitan distaste for Sparta and their constant squabbles would shape the federal politics in such a manner that no other polis had done before it. Ultimately thiss resulted in the *koinon*'s downfall after the Achaian War of 146 BC. Megalopolis' Achaian membership came as a result of Lydiades' decision to renounce his dictatorship, when he realised the extent of the Achaian expansion and the potential danger for his city. He is admirably praised in the sources for his actions as they were considered to be selfless, but there had to be some sort of personal gain for Lydiades to even have been willing to give up his sole rule over the city. This also raises the question whether the citizens of Megalopolis approved of this new political development, which is not mentioned in the sources. Moreover, if they did agree, would they have had the same motives as Lydiades? Because scholarship on Megalopolis and Achaia has devoted surprisingly little attention to this episode, the first section of this chapter will examine

[213] Other specific features which have been identified in the first section of the thesis include a long-standing tradition of good relations with the Macedonian kings, a strong connection to federalism and its ideals due to the circumstances of its foundation and a complex relationship with the other Arkadian poleis. For more information on the relationship of Megalopolis and the Arkadia or the Arkadian Confederacy, see chapter one.
[214] Nielsen (2015), 268.

Lydiades' motivation and that of the citizens in addition to discussing the tyrant's overtly positive image in the literary sources.

While it was a profitable decision for both the polis and its former tyrant Lydiades due to Megalopolis' newfound prominence within the confederacy, the process did not come without difficulties. Unlike other federal states such as the Boiotian or Arkadian *koina* which united cities from the same ethnic group, the Achaians from the third century onwards had a unique federation in which members were connected by a complex structure of different identities as poleis from separate ethnic groups interacted with one other under the unifying influence of the federal government.[215] While Polybius' comments on the internal unity and equality of the federation seem very intriguing (Pol. 2. 37-40), the reality of the matter was rather different. Consequently, an individual city such as Megalopolis with its own urban and ethnic identity had to find a way to express this identity, whilst dealing with this overarching federal government. Because of this, Megalopolis' membership of the *koinon* had a profound influence on Achaians and the polis and its citizens. Interestingly, both Sikyon and Megalopolis' memberships brought about significant changes in Achaian politics. When Sikyon joined the *koinon* shortly after 251 BC as the first non-Achaian member, it was the start of a big period of Achaian expansion which was directed against Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese.[216] As will be discussed throughout this thesis, something similar happened when Megalopolis joined and brought with it an intense focus on Sparta.[217]

As argued in chapter one, the distinct local identity Megalopolis possessed was the result of a long process. By becoming a member of the Achaian *koinon*, another element – i.e. an Achaian one – was added to the already layered identity of the Arkadian polis. By Polybius' time an inhabitant of Megalopolis considered himself to be both Arkadian and Achaian. To demonstrate this, I will use Polybius as the ultimate example in the last section of the chapter, so as to find out what a Megalopolitan considered to be important elements of his own identity by analysing his views on his own city, his native region and the federal state. However, as Polybius was notoriously biased when it

[215] Rizakis (2012), 33.
[216] Griffin (1981), 82.
[217] See chapters four and five in addition to later sections of this chapter.

came to his personal experiences, I will compare his views on the matter to other source material from Megalopolis through which the city as a whole expressed its identity.

1. Megalopolis joins Achaia

In 235 BC, Megalopolis became a member of the Achaian *koinon*. According to our sources, this decision was made by the tyrant Lydiades who had foreseen the threat that the Achaian *koinon* could pose to Megalopolitan independence. The Macedonian influence of Antigonos Gonatas in the Peloponnese was being threatened by the Achaians shortly after Aratos brought an end to tyranny in Sikyon in 251 BC and Sikyon then joined the Achaian *koinon* (Plut. *Ar.* 2-9).[218] At the same time, an additional problem emerged through the rebellion of Antigonos' viceroy Alexander. This resulted in the losses of his holdings at Corinth, Chalkis and Piraios. The king still had a garrison in Attika and his allies in the rest of the Peloponnese and he managed to get back control over Acrocorinth after Alexander's death, to ensure the rebellion did not have any long-lasting effects.[219] However, the Achaian threat became greater after Aratos managed to gain control of the Acrocorinth via a nightly expedition during his second *strategia* in 243 BC (Pol. 43. 4-6). This resulted in the polis of Corinth becoming a member of the Achaian *koinon* soon after.[220] An alliance between the Achaians and Agiv IV of Sparta at first seemed to cause even more problems for Antigonos in the Peloponnese. Yet by 241 BC this alliance had fallen apart and the new king Demetrios II, who had succeeded his father after his death in 239 BC, still had a series of loyal allies in the Peloponnese. However, a year into in his short reign – he was only king for ten years before his death in 229 BC – Demetrios had to wage a war against a coalition of the Achaian and Aitolian *koina,* whose interests had now aligned against Macedon.[221] While successful at first, the war took its toll on the Macedonian position of power in the Peloponnese and saw more Macedonian allies join the Achaians, most notably Lydiades and Aristomachos of Argos.[222] By the time of Demetrios' death, Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese had all but disappeared.

[218] Griffin (1981), 79.
[219] Scholten (2003), 148-150
[220] Urban (1979) 48-53.
[221] Scholten (2000), 132-162.
[222] Urban (1979), 88-96.

It was clear that under Aratos' leadership the Achaian *koinon* was becoming a strong player in the Peloponnese, at the cost of the Macedonian kings. While Lydiades' could have foreseen this, his reasons may also have been a little more personal. For, soon after the city was part of the federation, the tyrant enjoyed a very promising federal career. In fact, he seems to have been the only man who could rival the power and influence of Aratos (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 2). The inhabitants of the polis no doubt approved of this decision as they were aware of the benefits that membership of the Achaian *koinon* could bring. For example, they now had the support of an entire network of poleis, i.e. the members of the *koinon*, which were much closer geographically than Macedon was and could rapidly intervene in case of a Spartan attack. Because the Arkadian *koinon* seemed to have a similar structure to the Achaian *koinon*, it could easily have carved out an important position for itself within this new federation. Furthermore, it proved to be a final step in the development of the Megalopolitan identity. The city, and the Achaian political leaders from Megalopolis in particular, soon began to exhibit an obvious loyalty to their new federal state. As Polybius' views on the matter will show, a Megalopolitan was subsequently not only Arkadian but also Achaian. Because of the importance of this event in the formation of the Megalopolitan identity, this first section of chapter two will examine the motives of the tyrant and the city of Megalopolis to become a member of the *koinon*. Additionally, the figure of Lydiades will be looked at in more detail so as to understand why a polis such as Megalopolis, which – as I have argued – has a strong connection to democracy and democratic values due to its connection to the Arkadian *koinon*, would allow a tyrant to rule their city. Possibly, this could be connected to his father's prominence within the polis.

1.1. Lydiades of Megalopolis

Lydiades, who was part of the Megalopolitan elite, came to power in the city in 251 BC after he helped defeat the Spartans at the battle of Mantinea.[223] Both he and other members of his family are well attested in the epigraphical material of Megalopolis: Lydiades and his father Eudamos were the subject of a hero cult (*SEG* 52 447) and his son Aristopamon had an equestrian statue dedicated to him (*SEG* 48 524). In 235 BC, Lydiades gave up his power over the polis and the Arkadian city became Achaian. The

[223] Walbank (1933), 44.

sources tell us little about possible motives for this course of action. Lydiades is mentioned by Polybius, Plutarch and Pausanias, all of whom depict him in a very positive manner. It is more than likely however that both Plutarch and Pausanias had based their accounts on that of Polybius, who had every reason to paint an extremely favourable picture of the man that joined Megalopolis with the Achaian *koinon*. This is obvious from the fact that the idealised account of the Achaian *koinon* was the context in which the following passage was placed (Pol. 2. 44. 5):

> ‘Λυδιάδας μὲν οὖν ὁ Μεγαλοπολίτης ἔτι ζῶντος Δημητρίου, κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ προαίρεσιν, πάνυ πραγματικῶς καὶ φρονίμως προϊδόμενος τὸ μέλλον ἀπετέθειτο τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ μετεσχήκει τῆς ἐθνικῆς συμπολιτείας’
>
> (‘while Demetrios was still alive, Lydiades of Megalopolis anticipated the future, laid down his tyranny willingly with great pragmatism and good sense, and adhered to the ethnic confederation’).

Polybius praises Lydiades’ ability to foresee the future and act accordingly, something that both Aratos and Philopoimen also did at critical moments (Pol. 2. 47. 4; 2. 67. 4). According to Plutarch, Aratos shows this ability when he had Sikyon join the *koinon* to solve some internal troubles within the polis (Plut. *Ar.* 9. 5-6.). These incidents had started after Aratos had liberated his native city from the tyranny of Nikokles and the people exiled during his reign returned to the city. Plutarch clearly states that Aratos’ incentive for Sikyon to join the federation was connected to his desire to solve these internal troubles as well as safeguard his city against any outside attack.[224] Additionally, Polybius tells us that the real reason why Sikyon joined the League was in fact Aratos’ determination to free te Peloponnese of of tyrants (Pol. 2. 43. 3.). Moreover, as we will see later on in this chapter, Aratos’ actions and motives, just like Lydiades’, were to benefit himself as well as his native city as both enjoyed a prominent role within Achaian politics after 251 BC.

Thu,s as a Megalopolitan himself, Polybius considered Lydiades to be another one of these great statesmen and his decision to give up his tyranny in Megalopolis a key point in Achaian history. Lydiades’ ability to foresee that joining the Achaians was the best possible course of action for Megalopolis – and himself – in light of the changing power dynamics in the Peloponnese, was the reason why Polybius admired him and it also explains why he depicts the man in a positive light. Of course, this is to be expected

[224] Griffin (1981), 82.

due to Polybius' bias and while reality was most likely rather different, the true nature of Lydiades' character will remain unknown as both Plutarch and Pausanias echo Polybius' accolades. According to Plutarch, he was a man of noble character whose passion was responsible for his association with certain tyrannical ideals (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 1) and

> 'ὁ δὲ οὐκ ὢν ἀγεννὴς οὐδὲ ἀφιλότιμος τὴν φύσιν, οὐδὲ ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μονάρχων ἀκρασίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ πρὸς ταύτην ῥυεὶς τὴν ἀδικίαν'
>
> ('neither of common birth nor naturally lacking in ambition, nor, like most sole rulers, driven by ill temperature and arrogance into this iniquity').

Pausanias (Paus. 8. 27. 12), on the other hand, says he was

> 'οἴκου μὲν οὐκ ἀφανοῦς, φύσιν δὲ φιλότιμος ὢν καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα, ὡς ἐπέδειξεν ὕστερον, καὶ φιλόπολις. ἔσχε μὲν γὰρ ἔτι νέος ὢν τὴν ἀρχήν: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἤρχετο φρονεῖν, κατέπαυεν ἑαυτὸν ἑκὼν τυραννίδος, καίπερ ἐς τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ἤδη οἱ τῆς ἀρχῆς καθωρμισμένης'
>
> ('a man of distinguished family, by nature ambitious and, as he proved later, patriotic. For he was still young when he came to power, but on reaching years of discretion he voluntarily resignated the tyranny, although by this time his power was already securely established').

Because of the overtly positive account of Lydiades in the literary sources, finding a motive behind the decision to join the Achaian federation may prove problematic.[225] However, it must have become apparent by 235 BC that Achaia under the leadership of Aratos, at least in the Peloponnese, was a force to be reckoned with. Both Lydiades and his predecessor Aristodamos were men who like other tyrants in the Peloponnese had come to power as tyrants in their city through the support of Macedon.[226] Lydiades may therefore have realised that renouncing his claim on the city would be the best possible course of action.[227] Additionally Plutarch also tells us that (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 1):

> 'ὡς δ' οὖν τὸν Ἀρίστιππον ἀνεῖλεν, εὐθὺς ἐπεβούλευσε Λυδιάδῃ τῷ Μεγαλοπολίτῃ τυραννοῦντι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος'
>
> ('after he (Aratos) had defeated Aristippos (i.e. the tyrant of Argos), he started to plot immediately against Lydiades, who was a tyrant in his hometown of Megalopolis.).

This statement suggests that the idea of an Achaian attack on Megalopolis was a genuine possibility and will have played a significant role in the motivations of Lydiades as well

[225] Griffin (1981), 84; points out that due to the overtly positive image of Aratos that is depicted in most of the surviving sources it is similarly difficult to form a nuanced image of the statesman just as it is to distinguish Lydiades' reasons because of his idealised portrayal.
[226] Walbank (1933), 23.
[227] Urban (1979), 71-72.

as the polis to join the federation.[228] As his actions in Sikyon in 251 BC (Plut. *Ar.* 4-9) and Argos in 229 BC illustrate (Plut. *Ar.* 4-9; 27-29), Aratos did not hesitate to abolish tyrannies in the Peloponnese that were established through Macedonian support. This endeavour to eradicate Macedonian influence in the Peloponnese was one of the goals of this early expansionist policy employed by the Achaians.[229] Aratos' attack on the Arkadian polis Kynaitha in 236 BC and his alliance with Sparta in 243 BC may have indicated, as Walbank suggests, that he was now ready to turn his attention to Arkadia which may have caused Lydiades to panic.[230] Despite the obvious problems connected to the idealised description of Lydiades, it still gives us one conceivable explanation for his actions: the exponential growth of the Achaian *koinon* from the second half of the second century BC under Aratos' management posed a potential danger for anyone opposing the Achaians which led Lydiades to make his decision.

Nonetheless, the apparent selflessness of the ex-tyrant's actions should be doubted. Judging from the rest of Plutarch's account it appears Lydiades was also motivated by a sense of self preservation. After all, he did have a promising career within federal politics after Megalopolis became part of the Achaian *koinon* (Plut. *Ar.* 30-31). In fact, Lydiades was elected as federal *strategos* three times between 235 and his death in 227 BC, i.e. in 234/3, 232/1 and 230/29 BC, something that is even more impressive considering the fact that the *strategia* was an office that could not be held two years in succession. While the rivalry between Lydiades and Aratos is not mentioned in Polybius' narrative, Pausanias, echoing Plutarch, does mention that Lydiades became so famous among the Achaians that he rivalled Aratos' fame (Paus. 8. 27. 12). This rivalry was not necessarily unexpected as both men had joined the *koinon* in similar situations and due to their positions of power in their respective cities, it is not surprising that both men enjoyed succesfull federal careers as well.

While the *koinon* was a democracy, former tyrants could easily pursue a political career for themselves, since Lydiades is not the only one to become an Achaian *strategos*. For example, a year after Argos joined the Achaian *koinon*, its former tyrant Aristomachos was chosen as *strategos*.[231] Moreover, Aratos himself, although he was not

[228] Scholten (2006), 150.
[229] Paschides (2008), 234-235.
[230] Walbank (1936), 66.
[231] Shipley (2000), 320.

a tyrant, enjoyed a promising federal career after Sikyon joined the *koinon*.[232] By letting these men know that there was still ample opportunity to retain importance for themselves and their poleis even within a larger federal framework, the citizens of other poleis may have been inclined to join the federation as well. However, Lydiades as a Megalopolitan had already realised this before joining the federation and this may explain why 'ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν Ἀχαιοῖς ἐγένετο οὕτω δόκιμος ὡς Ἀράτῳ παρισωθῆναι τὰ ἐς δόξαν' (Paus. 8. 27. 12: 'among all of the Achaians his own fame equalled that of Aratos'; Plut. *Ar.* 30. 2).[233]

An additional explanation might be offered by the inscriptions of what has been dubbed the family exedra of Eudamos and Lydiades by Eftychia Stavrianopoulou. The Greek text which covered three big blocks made of a dark chalkstone that carried several lifesize statues, inscribes two decrees for Eudamos and his son Lydiades as well as one (or possibly two) honorary inscriptions for both men. The inscriptions themselves are most likely dated to the start of the second century BC based on the forms of some of the Greek letters as well as the fact that the honours were dedicated after Lydiades' death in 227 BC.[234] However, this does not indicate that the decrees themselves were passed decades after the death of both men. Hans Lauter has posed the theory that the original decrees for Eudamos and Lydiades could have been passed soon after their deaths, but the destruction of the public buildings on the Megalopolitan agora during the Spartan attack under Kleomenes in 222 BC meant that a lot of these had to be rebuilt and potentially some of the inscriptions on them had to be inscribed again after 222 BC.[235] If this rebuilding and re-inscribing indeed happened at the start of the second century BC, then it might have been something that Polybius himself had been aware of and could therefore have indirectly influenced his positive portrayal of Lydiades.

While the decree concerning Lydiades and possible honours for the man is in a very fragmentary state (*SEG* 52 447 l. 34-67), his father Eudamos was the recipient of a rather high number of honours bestowed upon him by the city, considerin he received a hero cult (l. 1-33). Additionally, he got a bronze statue (l. 8-10), his own altar and accompanying sacrifices (l. 14), which were to be overseen by the *hierothytes* of the city

[232] Griffin (1981), 81.
[233] Urban (1979), 72.
[234] Stavrianopoulou (2002), 119.
[235] Stavrianopoulou (2002), 150, n. 105.

as they were responsible for the sacrifices (l. 17). Finally, his descendants were to be responsible for the supervision of the offering and were the only ones who had the privilege of consuming the honour portion or *geras*.

Stavrianopoulou proposes an intriguing, but a somewhat far-fetched theory about Eudamos being one of the ones responsible for the murder of the other Megalopolitan tyrant Aristodamos in 251 BC. She thinks he could easily be the same as the Ekdemos or Ekdelos described in the literary sources (Plut. *Ar.* 10. 2; Paus. 7. 27. 12).[236] She then goes on to argue that Eudamos' actions were part of the wider Greek fight for freedom against Macedon as exemplified by the Chremonidean War and the liberation of Sikyon in 251 BC. According to Stavrianopoulou this is why Eudamos received such elaborate honours from the city and why Lydiades was able to gain power of Megalopolis as a tyrant so easily, despite the Arkadian predilection for democracy, since all he had to do was take advantage of his father's fame.[237] Moreover, Eudamos' apparent connection to Aratos might also explain why Lydiadas chose to join the Achaians and not the Aitolians.

While the premise is an interesting one, there are several problems with Stavrianopoulou's theory. For one, there is no strong evidence supporting her claim that Eudamos and Ekdemos/Ekdelos are the same person. And if his father really had anti-Macedonian sympathies, it is remarkable that Lydiades himself remained loyal to Macedon and became the tyrant of the city. Finally, if there had really been any type of connections between Aratos and Lydiades' father, would they have been such fierce rivals as described by Plutarch? However, there are some elements that point in favour of her argument as well. For one the fact that Megalopolis bestowed such elaborate honours on Eudamos would indicate that his actions were indeed very beneficial for the city and its inhabitants. This is further indicated by the fact that he should serve as an example for all future Megalopolitans so that they should also be 'τ]ὸς καλὸς [καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἄ]ν[δρ]ας καὶ [εὔνος] καὶ εὐεργέτας καὶ δικαίως' (l. 25: 'good and noble men and full of goodwill and benefactors and righteous'), just as many other Hellenistic benefactors of the time (l. 28-33). Moreover, Lydiades is referred to in the inscription as the son of Eudamos, indicating the individual honoured in the first place was in fact

[236] Stavrianopoulou (2002), 143.
[237] Stavrianopoulou (2002), 149-154.

Eudamos and not his son (l. 36). So even though it seems unlikely that Eudamos was indeed one of Aristodamos' murderers, the fact remains that he was an important figure in Megalopolis who continued to shape the Megalopolitan policy. Therefore, Lydiades could very well have taken advantage of his father's fame to gain power. In conclusion, it is an interesting theory to consider when exploring Lydiades' motives for giving up his tyranny.

Even though Lydiades' had his own personal motives for making Megalopolis a part of the *koinon* as is exemplified by his promising federal political career, first and foremost he remained loyal to Megalopolis. He tried to convince the Achaians of the necesity for an expedition against Sparta, but was opposed by Aratos (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 3). Also, when the city came under Spartan attack in 226 BC during the Achaian War with Kleomenes, Lydiades went on to defend Megalopolis against the Spartans in the battle at Mount Lykaion, even when Aratos, who was acting as *strategos*, had not consented to a confrontation with the enemy (Plut. *Kleo.* 6). As a Megalopolitan, the former tyrant was much more aware of the danger that Sparta could pose the federal state and Megalopolis in particular, something that Aratos did not as a northern Peloponnesion did not.[238] Lydiades died in the struggle, wanting to defend Megalopolis against Sparta at any cost, clearly proving he was a Megalopolitan in addition to, if not before, being an Achaian. This was later echoed in Philopoimen's actions at the battle of Sellasia in which he led a group of Megalopolitans in a tactic manoeuvre against Achaian wishes (Plut. *Phil.* 6. 7) and Polybius' comments on the polis discussed in the second section of this chapter.

In conclusion, Lydiades was motivated by personal gain, as is illustrated by his subsequent federal career, but his motives behind the decision to give up his tyranny of Megalopolis were also connected to the well-being of the polis and its citizens who could have exercised pressure from below for a non-tyrannical, democratic government.

1.2. Megalopolis and its Achaian membership

As mentioned previously, one of the markers of Megalopolitan identity which came about as a result of the polis' foundation by the Arkadian *koinon* was, in addition to their antagonism towards Sparta, an ingrained adherence to and understanding of

[238] Griffin (1981), 82.

federalism, which was connected to the ideals of democracy. This was hardly surprising as both elements were important tenets of the foreign policy of the Arkadian *koinon* during its short lifespan.[239] Even though the sources do not tell us much about the constitution of Megalopolis, it is plausible to assume that Megalopolis was opposed to tyranny until Aristodamos the Good with the help of Antigonos Gonatas assumed power as a tyrant in the city in the 270s BC (Paus. 8. 27. 11). At first sight, Aristodamos' tyranny might be problematic, but it seems as though this may have been acceptable in certain circumstances as was the case for Aristodamos' tyranny as his Macedonian support managed to protect the city from Spartan attacks. Furthermore, Lydiades' decision of 235 was also met by the approval of the citizens as it also had the same result, i.e. protection against Sparta, when Macedonian protection seemed to have decreased.

This becomes even more apparent when looking at Polybius' comments on tyrants. In the constitutional evolution of book six, the historian considers tyranny to be the corrupt form of kingship (Pol. 6. 7) which is exactly what happened to the rule of Philip of Macedon as he turned from a promising young man to the insane tyrant we see in the later books of the *Histories.*[240] Tyrants were men who were prone to overindulgence with regards to food, luxury and amorous endeavours (Pol. 6. 7. 7). Elsewhere he says that

> 'τοὔνομα περιέχει τὴν ἀσεβεστάτην ἔμφασιν καὶ πάσας περιείληφε τὰς ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀδικίας καὶ παρανομίας΄
>
> (Pol. 2. 59. 6: 'the word (tyrant) encompasses the height of profanity and embraces all unlawfulness and injustice in men')

and argues that it is the role of a tyrant to rule his subjects against their will through fear and hatred (Pol. 5. 10. 6). Undoubtedly, Polybius greatly disapproved of those individuals that had taken control of a free city against the will of the inhabitants. He considered them to be evil and savage men who were prone to the most depraved actions. Since good kings could also become tyrants as exemplified by Philip, it is reasonable to argue for a reverse evolution as well, meaning that a former tyrant could also turn into a good leader. Even though he does not mention this explicitly, I believe that this is what Polybius thought about Lydiades: by giving up his tyranny and letting Megalopolis join the Achaians, he had become a good politician.

[239] Roy (2000), 521-525.
[240] McGing (2013), 192.

Therefore, even though Aristodamos and Lydiades were tyrants that had taken control of the city, the fact that they had done so with Macedonian support made it more acceptable for the Megalopolitan citizens as result of the pro-Macedonian tradition in the polis. Considering the connections that had already been established by Philip II between himself and several cities in the region like Megalopolis, it is hardly surprising to find a tyrant such as Aristodamos at Megalopolis. In fact, he was most likely part of a wider network of tyrants that had been installed by Antigonos Gonatas to increase his influence within the Peloponnese.[241] However, not all of these cities were pleased with this Macedonian influence over the area and so a contingent of Greek poleis led the charges against Antigonos Gonatas in the Chremonidean War (267-261 BC).[242] Since western Arkadia was missing from the famous inscription that contained a list of the members of this coalition (*IG* II^2 686 and 687), it seems reasonable to assume the region and Megalopolis were not involved in the conflict and could have even supported Macedon. Moreover, in the case of Megalopolis and its interactions with Macedon, there seems to have been a definite connection to Sparta and its operations in the Peloponnese.[243] For example, a battle between the Megalopolitans and the Spartans took place at the time of Aristodemos' control over the polis which resulted in a hard-won victory for Megalopolis (Paus. 8. 27. 11). But the fact that this battle could take place, despite the Macedonian support for the city, clearly shows that Sparta still constituted a big threat to Megalopolis. It even gives the impression that after the Macedonian kings had their pawn in place within these poleis, the cities and their tryants were left to their own devices.[244] Nonetheless, before it joined the Achaian *koinon*, there seemed to be a considerable pro-Macedonian tradition within the city that continued to be part of the Megalopolitan identity even after the polis became a member of the Achaian *koinon*. It was even partly responsible for the creation of an alliance between the *koinon* and Macedon.

This pro-Macedonian tradition may have allowed tyrants such as Aristodamos and Lydiades to come to power in the poleis and use it to protect the cities against Sparta. The citizens of Megalopolis also knew that the Macedonian influence in the

[241] Shipley (2005), 319.
[242] Scholten (2006), 145.
[243] Walbank (1933), 23.
[244] Tarn (1913), 215.

Peloponnese was threatened by the Achaians. Thus, being a member of a *koinon* brought some advantages to the citizens which independent poleis would not have had. One of these benefits was the access to a wider network of cities, something that was very useful when dealing with the new political reality of the Hellenistic period in which the Greeks had to deal with bigger powers like the Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome.[245] However, the prime incentive for the inhabitants of Megalopolis to join was the realisation that with the loss of influence of the Macedonian kings in the Peloponnese, they would have to look elsewhere for support against the occasional attacks from Sparta. As discussed above, fear as well as defiance of Sparta had always been a crucial characteristic of Megalopolitan history and identity and judging by the many Spartan invasions of Megalopolis during the fourth and third centuries BC, it was evident that that the citizens would benefit from the membership of a federal state.[246] Additionally, this membership could give the polis the opportunity to expand its strategy of antagonism against its neighbour through the foreign policy of the Achaian *koinon*, which from the moment Megalopolis became Achaian, increasingly concerned itself with Sparta.[247] Likewise, the fact that Megalopolis needed another state to help defend itself against Spartan attacks. This because of its geographical proximity to Sparta and because the city 'δυσφύλακτον οὖσαν διὰ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὴν ἐρημίαν' (Pol. 2. 55. 2: 'was very difficult to defend because of its size and isolation').

It seems as though the combination of all of these different elements led to the Megalopolitan acceptance of Lydiades' actions as the citizens knew perfectly well that becoming part of a federal state again would allow them to cooperate more easily with the other neighbouring poleis and regions against Sparta whenever the opportunity or necessity arose.[248] Furthermore, while Lydiades' motives were not as noble as Polybius would like us to believe, the former tyrant remained loyal to Megalopolis despite his ensuing federal political career. Therefore, even though his tyranny of the city may have been tolerated only because of his connections to Macedon, he had to be considered, just like Polybius, as a prime example of how a Megalopolitan looked at his native polis and the federal state. This is exemplified by Lydiades' decision to fight against Sparta in

[245] Shipley (2000), 321.
[246] Walbank (1933) 63.
[247] Cartledge and Spawforth (2001), 45.
[248] Henderson (2013), 35.

the battle at Mt Lykaion when he led a cohort of Megalopolitans agains Kleomenes without the approval of the *koinon*. However, some things had changed between Lydiades' time and that of Polybius. While Polybius considered the polis to be both Arkadian as well as Achaian, it appears Lydiades did not see it that way and chose the polis over the federation. This is in clear contrast with Philopoimen's actions during the war with Nabis in which he left the polis to its own devices after being ousted during one of his bids for *strategos*. Clearly, the decision of 235 BC marked a change in the formation of the Megalopolitan identity by adding an Achaian component.

2. Megalopolis: Arkadian or Achaian?

Before the polis joined the Achaian *koinon*, Megalopolis was the biggest city in Arkadia. The expression of this Arkadian identity happened through the civic and federal coinage issued by Megalopolis as well as through the cults and sanctuaries discussed in the previous chapter that had a connection to the wider region of Arkadia.[249] However, when we look at the work of Polybius, possibly the most famous Megalopolitan aside from the Achaian statesman Philopoimen, he seems to consider himself an Achaian first and an Arkadian or even Megalopolitan second. Polybius' attitude towards Achaia as a Megalopolitan is not only interesting because he is our main source for this period, but also necessary because of the lack of individuals identifying themselves as both Megalopolitan and Achaian in inscriptions, something that we do have for other cities.[250] Nonetheless, at first sight there may appear a certain discrepancy between Polybius' account and the material culture, as the coinage from Megalopolis has numerous connections to the city's Arkadian past.

This seems to leave us with two different answers to the following question: did the Megalopolitans consider themselves to be Arkadians or Achaians? The answer is, as I will argue, a combination of both. Despite Polybius' obvious predilection for the Achaian *koinon* in the early books of his *Histories* which may be explained on account of his significance in Achaian politics, the historian had nothing but praise for his hometown and region. He considered himself a Megalopolitan, Arkadian and Achaian, thereby exemplifying the same kind of complex identity as the whole city did when it came to its coins or indeed any other manner through which it expressed its local

[249] See chapter one and Jost (1985), 220-235; Roy (2000), 315; and (2007), 291.
[250] For more on this, see chapter three or Rizakis (2012).

identity. Therefore, I will use Polybius in this next section as the main example to illustrate how the Megalopolitan indentity had evolved throughout its Achaian membership. By analysing his narrative and views in the context of his background as a Megalopolitan, I will clearly show that Megalopolitan identity as a process had changed and ultimately the 'Achaianness' of a Megaopolitan became an integral part of their identity.

Megalopolis was more than just Arkadian and Achaian: it had its own well-defined identity which was strongly influenced by both its traditional native region of Arkadia and, most likely by Polybius' time, its membership of the Achaian *koinon*.

2.1. The Achaian statesman from Megalopolis: Polybius on Achaia, Megalopolis and Arkadia

While the Achaian constitution had many merits, the most important ones for Polybius were its 'ἰσηγορία καὶ παρρησία' (Pol. 2. 38. 6: 'equality and freedom of speech'). These constituted at the basis of the *koinon*'s *demokratia*, another virtue that was deemed important to them: 'τό γε μὴν κοινὸν πολίτευμα, καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν, ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ συνέχειν ἐπειρῶντο' (Pol. 2. 41. 6: 'the federation attempted, as I have said, to remain a democracy'). In view of Polybius' personal connection to the *koinon*, it is not at all surprising to find an outright positive account of the *koinon* and its actions in the first books of his *Histories*.[251] His respect for the state that he grew up in is therefore not unexpected as it influenced Polybius' views on the events of his time and the parties involved in them. This undoubtedly prompted him to convey Achaia and Greece in general in the most favourable way vis-a-vis his audience.[252] Polybius as a proud Achaian must have believed it necessary to include an account of Achaia's rise to prominence in his narrative on the development of a universal history.[253] Moreover, this idealised account forms the best opportunity for the author to foreshadow that - just as he predicted with the Romans - the Achaian *koinon* will face decline in the end, a notion that Polybius will address in the later books of his narrative.

So, what made Achaia unique from other federal states? Apparently, the difference lay in this policy of *ἰσηγορία* and *παρρησία* which would result in the ultimate

[251] Roy (2003), 82.
[252] Thornton (2013), 214.
[253] Walbank (1957), 215.

achievement of the *koinon*. This was the unification of the Peloponnese under one federal government with its own laws, weights and coinage, exactly what had made Achaia one 'τῶν ἐπιφανεστάτων καὶ γνωριζομένων ἐθνῶν καὶ τόπων … τῆς οἰκουμένης' (Pol. 2. 37. 5: 'of the most important and recognised nations and regions ... of the world'). According to Polybius, this unification was taken to such an extreme that the Peloponnese was more like a single city by the late 180s BC. Yet unlike a typical polis, the inhabitants of the area were not enclosed by one wall (Pol. 2. 37. 11). This passage should not be taken at face value, since we know that the actual reality of being a member of a federation was much more complex than the author insinuates, particularly during the first half of the second century BC when Sparta and Messene stirred troubles for the *koinon* in the Peloponnese.

Despite this polity only being based on equality and freedom of speech for Polybius, Craige Champion has added two other elements to the Achaian polity: a concern for the right legal procedure and the trumping of collective over individual needs.[254] Even though these two last aspects were not alluded to by the ancient author, Champion makes a valid point in mentioning them here. One particular scene in the *Histories* perfectly illustrates this: Polybius mentions that three members of the federation refused to pay their contributions to the federal army during wartime and instead opted to hire a private army (Pol. 4. 60). This action was condemned by Polybius, as he says that

> 'ἐχρῆν γὰρ τὴν μὲν ἰδίαν χρείαν μὴ παραλιπεῖν, εὐκαιροῦντάς γε δὴ καὶ δυναμένους, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν κοινὴν πολιτείαν δίκαια συντηρεῖν, ἄλλως τε δὴ καὶ κομιδῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἀδιαπτώτου κατὰ τοὺς κοινοὺς νόμους, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, γεγονότας ἀρχηγοὺς τοῦ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν συστήματος'
>
> (4. 60. 10: 'For while they were not allowed to consider their own needs, since they were strong and rich enough, they had to at least do right by the political *koinon*; especially as recovery of payment was perfectly assured to them by the common laws; and most of all seeing that they had been the founding cities of the Achaian *koinon*')

Nevertheless, he does not blame them for pursuing their own interests, since the policy pursued by the *koinon* allowed cities to pursue matters in their own self-interest.[255] According to Polybius, the *koinon* did not require the absolute commitment to the common good as suggested by Champion. Obviously, the continuity of this policy -

[254] Champion (2004a), 123.
[255] Gray (2013) 339.

comprised of *ἰσηγορία* and *παρρησία* on the one hand and the upholding of collective needs and correct legal procedures on the other hand - is exactly what made the Achaians the best example of a Hellenistic federation, at least in Polybius' eyes.[256] Since this is clearly an idealised Achaia, the following question could be raised: is it possible that Polybius is actually talking about the *koinon*, as it exists in Polybius' own time? This is very likely due to the similarities of this federation (Pol. 2. 37–43) to the one that Polybius knew while growing up and that was at the zenith of its political power under Philopoimen's leadership. This argument can be supported by the use of the words 'ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς καιροῖς' (Pol. 2. 37. 6: 'in my own times') in connection to this Achaian political unification of the highest degree. As we have previously seen, the author here means the unification of the Peloponnese under Achaian leadership, something that did not happen until much later, in the 180s BC. Furthermore, the decision to rotate the primary assembly meetings between all the Achaian cities may be a practical measure to ensure the general Achaian policy of equality and freedom of speech, a measure which was introduced in 188 BC as well.

Polybius' short and idealised description of the nature of the Achaian constitution is followed by a historical overview of the events that happened in mainland Greece before the author starts his actual narrative in the year 220 BC. These scenes of the *koinon* in action show us an entirely different picture: i.e. that of an Achaia which was not nearly as strong as the author would like us to believe. For example, the decision to involve Macedon in the struggle against Kleomenes during the Achaian War with Kleomenes (229-222 BC) should be considered a good illustration of a weak Achaian *koinon* as a result of the bad condition of the federal army before Philopoimen's reforms in 208 BC (Pol. 11. 10). The frailty of the Achaian army was one of the elements that generated disunity amongst its members, in particular when their leaders failed to protect them (Pol. 4. 60). Additional problems came in the shape of foreign powers such as Rome which succeeded in dividing the Achaians for many generations after it had made the controversial decision to become a Roman ally in 198 BC (Livy 32. 19-23).[257] Moreover, other internal disputes with particular member-states such as Sparta or Messene posed more threats to the stability of the federal state by rebelling and seceding

[256] Welwei (1966), 289.
[257] For more on the Achaian *synodos* of 198 BC, see section one of chapter five.

from the *koinon*. The combination of all of these elements shows that there is a marked difference between the idealised Achaia, depicted in book two, and the actual federal state that features as an actor in Polybius' narrative of the historical events of the third and second centuries BC.[258]

Moreover, in the last ten books of the *Histories*, there is no trace of this earlier praise due to Polybius' displeasure with the politicians as well as the people of the Achaian *koinon*. After all, their actions resulted not only in his banishment to Rome but in the eventual decline and destruction of the Achaians as well. The image Polybius sketches is that of a federal democracy in decline due to the failings of its people who blindly followed their demagogic leaders. The reason for this hostility is quite clear, for it stems from the extreme disappointment felt by Polybius in the politics of his native state, which started to decline after his banishment to Rome as a direct result of the actions of his political opponent Kallikrates. If the *koinon* was indeed in decline, did this process commence with Kallikrates' rise to power after his notorious embassy to Rome in 180 BC? Champion, who compares Achaia's degeneration with Rome's demise, recognizes an earlier pattern of degeneration – already starting after book six - which culminates in the generations of disastrous statesmen such as Diaios and Kritolaos.[259] In his treatment of books seven to fifteen, Champion sees the Achaian leader Philopoimen as an unusual example of virtue amongst the Achaian, just as Scipio Africanus was for the Romans.[260] For Polybius' subsequent books, Champion argues that even though there was ample evidence of virtue in Achaia, the Roman power had created the necessity for compromise within the fundamental political principles of the *koinon* as it was forced to move away from these ideals.[261] So even if the degeneration of Achaia was a process that had been happening for a while, it was the embassy of Kallikrates to Rome in 180 BC that acted as a catalyst for the events that consolidated this process. From that moment on a change seems to have been brought about in Roman foreign conduct as well as in the relationship between the two states. Clearly, Achaia was no longer on equal footing with Rome. This new relationship would

[258] Champion (2004a), 125.
[259] Champion (2004a), 147-168.
[260] Champion (2004a), 150.
[261] Champion (2004a), 151-158.

eventually lead to further degeneration of Achaia and the whole of Greece, described by Polybius in the last ten books.

This thesis of a slow degeneration of both Rome and Achaia posed by Champion is compelling. He definitely makes a good case and, obviously, the Achaian decline was a process that had started long before the Achaian War of 146. However, Champion's attempts to fit this process into his wider theory of Hellenic virtue versus barbaric vice are unconvincing. The author sees the Achaian decline as the result of the state abandoning its Hellenic ideals and virtues in favour of other more basic ones that has led it towards a state of barbarianism. Because this dialectic centres on the collective Achaian ideals and identity, it fails to take into account the political realities of the Achaian federation and the influence that local rivalries had on federal politics and identity. Additionally, this idea of a long process of decline is only visible in the work of Polybius. The epigraphical and numismatic evidence, though limited, show an entirely different picture. The minting of bronze federal coinage by a large number of member states as well as a number of boundary disputes that were peacefully resolved prove that the federal state was still working considerably well in the years before 146 BC.[262] Therefore, while this is an interesting (and partly correct) interpretation of Polybius' narrative which needs to be distinguished from the reality of the events, this decline of Achaia was more than just a drawn-out process and in reality must have been significantly less pronounced than Polybius lets us believe.

Polybius' disapproval of the league's politics in the years leading up to the Achaian War, i.e. 150-146 BC, expresses itself clearly in his description of the leading political leaders at the time - Kallikrates, Kritolaos and Diaios – which stands in a direct contrast to his potrayal of Aratos. While Polybius is excessively positive about the latter, the historian lets no opportunity slip by to criticize the former. A great example of this is the passage in book thirty where the historian illustrates the widespread hatred for Kallikrates (Pol. 30. 29); or when he talks about the men responsible for the downfall of the *koinon* (Pol. 38. 3. 13):

> 'ἐγὼ γὰρ ἠγνοηκέναι μὲν φαίην ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ παραπεπαικέναι τοῦ καθήκοντος, ἡμαρτηκέναι δὲ τοὺς αἰτίους γεγονότας τῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀγνοίας'
>
> ('I would say that the masses were ignorant and were led astray from their duty, but it was those who were responsible for this ignorance that were in the wrong').

[262] Both of these phenomena will be discussed at length later on in this chapter or in chapter three.

However, the Achaian people were guilty as well because they blindly followed the foolish ideas of these demagogues, leading to Polybius' description of the massesas infected by 'ἀνοίας καὶ τῆς ἀκρισίας' (Pol. 38. 18. 7: 'such madness and confusion'), 'παρεστηκότος ταῖς διανοίαις' (Pol. 38. 12. 7: 'willing to lay aside common sense'), and 'ἠγνοηκέναι μὲν φαίην ἂν τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ παραπεπαικέναι τοῦ καθήκοντος' (Pol. 38. 3. 13). Polybius' idea of a *koinon* in decay is further supported by his comment on the general state of deterioration in Greece at this time due to the stubbornness of its men whose reluctance to have children resulted in the decline of population, agriculture and eventually Greece itself (Pol. 36. 17).

According to Polybius, the appearance of demagogues and mobs within a (federal) state is the sign that this state was transitioning from a democracy into an ochlocracy (Pol. 6. 57). Nonetheless, it is important to note that Polybius' overtly negative image of these leaders has to be nuanced since demagoguery was a notion influenced by the political customs of the time and it was a common phenomenon for politicians to accuse them of demagoguery before Rome in order to disgrace their rivals.[263] Just as Polybius describes his political opponent Kallikrates as a bad leader and who in turn accused Polybius and his political associates of being demagogues. In book thirty-eight, Polybius claims that the cause for the extremely negative image of Kallikrates, Diaios and Kritolaos was not because of prejudice, but due to his endeavour to stay close to the truth. However, this statement was one of the rhetorical devices employed by Polybius to justify his own personal feelings on the matter.[264]

Notwithstanding these underlying motives, the fact remains that Polybius' hostility towards the Achaians of his time is fascinating and it exemplifies a changing attitude towards the *koinon*. Yet even within these extremely negative comments about the Achaians, there are some elements that prove that the *koinon* still enjoyed a certain prestige with other states and maybe even with Polybius. For example, Rome still made the effort to warn the league against foolish actions because

> 'ἀποδεδεγμένοι τὸ ἔθνος ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου καὶ νομίζοντες ἔχειν αὐτὸ πιστὸν μάλιστα τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἀνασοβῆσαι μὲν ἔκριναν διὰ τὸ φρονηματίζεσθαι πέρα τοῦ δέοντος, πόλεμον δ' ἀναλαβεῖν ἢ διαφορὰν ὁλοσχερῆ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς οὐδαμῶς ἐβούλοντο'

[263] Champion (2004b), 211.
[264] Thornton (2013), 216.

(Pol. 38. 9. 8: 'they had favoured the League for a long time and regarded it as the most trustworthy of the Greeks; and they had decided to warn it, since it had become too presumptuous beyond the necessary, but they did not intend to take up war or fight with the whole of the Achaians').

This was a view shared by Polybius who still held respect for the *koinon* as a federal institution, despite his extreme disappointment in the political course taken by the Achaians after his exile to Rome. A clear attestation of this can be found in Polybius' actions after the Achaian War when he defended Philopoimen's legacy, convinced his fellow Achaians not to buy any of Diaios' possessions that were sold as spoils by the Romans after the war; and in his help in adjusting the Greeks as soon as possible to the measurements taken by Rome (Pol. 39. 3-6). Polybius might even have been involved in the re-establishment of the *koinon* after 146 BC, which was re-established by the Romans several years after the War (Paus. 7. 16. 10).[265]

It is thus apparent that the historian was proud to be an Achaian citizen despite his genuine disappointment in the political course after his banishment to Rome. Yet Polybius was actually more than just an Achaian: he was a true Megalopolitan and Arkadian at heart. Looking at several passages in his work (Pol. 2. 55; 2. 61; 4. 20-21 and 4. 32-33) in which the author talks about his native region, it becomes clear that Achaia was not the only region that he held in high esteem.[266] In his account of the Achaian war with Kleomenes (229-222 BC) and more importantly in the middle of his critique of the historian Phylarchus, Polybius takes the time to comment on 'ἡ εὐψυχία τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν' (Pol. 2. 55. 4: 'the courage of the Megalopolitans'). After having fought valiantly during the city's conquest and subsequent destruction by the Spartan king in 224 BC, the latter could not find anyone among the survivors who would be willing to betray their polis or, more importantly, 'ἡ πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους πίστις' (Pol. 2. 61. 7: 'their loyalty to their allies'). According to the author, this blatant refusal to abandon the commitment they had made, even if it meant losing everything they held dear, deserved nothing but the deepest respect and highest admiration. For there was no finer deed ('κάλλιον ἔργον') known to Polybius, as their alliance with the Achaians had already led to the loss of their lands, homes and possessions which were now under the control of Sparta. Nonetheless, when the Megalopolitans were unexpectedly given

[265] Kallet-Marx (1996), 95-97.
[266] Roy (2003), 89.

the opportunity to get all of this back, they still refused to join the king (Pol. 2. 61. 2). While one could argue that the Megalopolitan refusal to abandon their alliance with Achaia indicated that for Polybius, the Achaian identity was more important than his Megalopolitan one, to me it is obvious that the author is applauding his fellow citizens for their loyalty to their own values, i.e. their hatred for Sparta, even before their loyalty to the Achaians.

In this context, the criticism uttered by Polybius against Phylarchus is completely understandable, if not heavily biased, due to the latter's omission of the greatest and noblest of actions. The author can simply not understand why Phylarchus would choose to ignore the actions of the Megalopolitans but rather devote a large amount of his work to describe in grotesque detail the ordeal the Mantineans suffered at the hands of the Achaians after going over to Kleomenes (Pol. 2. 56. 6-8). Clearly, Phylarchus had done this to support his belief that history should be written to entertain and not 'τὰ καλὰ καὶ δίκαια τῶν ἔργων ἐπισημαίνεσθαι' (Pol. 2. 61. 6: 'call attention to good and right deeds'). Aside from the many other critiques expressed in the *Histories* about Phylarchus and his historical method, it seems that his silence on the bravery of the Megalopolitans was extremely offensive to Polybius as both a Megalopolitan and a historian. After all, he considered this behaviour to be a typical characteristic of his hometown and it deserved the necessary respect and attention since it was a benchmark for him which each and every one of his readers should aspire to learn from.

Additionally, this passage illustrates more than just Polybius' admiration for the actions of the Megalopolitans. In fact, for him it embodied everything that Megalopolis and its inhabitants stood for. Like in many other cities in the Peloponnese there was a deep-seated hatred for Sparta among the citizens of the Arkadian town, though their conduct during these events proves that the Megalopolitans were different even in their aversion towards their neighbour. For the Megalopolitans, their hatred towards Sparta, combined with their relatively recent membership of a federation and connections to Macedon, was enough to keep them on the Achaian side in the war. Eventually, it was this combination of Megalopolitan characteristics that would lead to the Achaian alliance with Macedon and Kleomenes' defeat at Sellasia (222 BC).[267] Unlike Megalopolis, many

[267] For more on this and on the influence of Megalopolis' identity on the foreign politics of the Achaian *koinon*, see chapters four and five.

of the other poleis that were also known to have hated Sparta chose to act differently and betrayed their allies the moment the enemy was at their doorstep. For example, the Mantineans did surrender themselves to the Aitolians and Kleomenes and betrayed the Achaians after all they had done in support of the polis (Pol. 2. 56). As another important Arkadian polis, both of them shared certain characteristics which can be considered to be specifically Arkadian, and yet when they were faced with the same dilemma they decided to act in very different ways. In his treatment of Mantinea, Polybius is very harsh on the polis which he believes was rightly punished by the Achaians for deserting them.

In later passages from book four (4. 20-21 and 32-33), Polybius shows exactly how he feels about Arkadia. The author names the Arkadians among 'ἔθνεσι τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον, μᾶλλον δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν' (Pol. 4. 32. 3: 'the greatest nations in the Peloponnese or almost the whole of Greece')[268] and he talks about the Arkadian customs and way of life to explain why the Kynaithians, a rough and violent people, differed greatly from the other Arkadians who were known among the Greeks for their 'ἀρετη', 'φιλοξενία καὶ φιλανθρωπία' and 'ἡ εἰς τὸ θεῖον εὐσέβεια' (Pol. 4. 20. 1: 'virtue', 'hospitality and benevolence' and 'reverences towards the gods'). In Polybius' eyes, the savagery of the Kynaithians originated in their abandonment of the crucial element of the Arkadian education: making music. Due to the hard nature of life as farmers in the mountains in the middle of the Peloponnese and the Arkadian predisposition for austerity ('αὐστηρία') because of the geography and climate[269], the Arkadians realised very early on that the introduction of music was beneficial: 'σπεύδοντες τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀτέραμνον διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐθισμῶν κατασκευῆς ἐξημεροῦν καὶ πραΰνειν' (Pol. 4. 21. 4: 'they hoped to tame and soften the hardened soul through habits with this purpose'). Evidently, the Kynaithians had lost their way and could no longer – nor should they - be put on the same footing as the rest of the

[268] Interestingly, this statement also applied to the Spartans. While this may seem surprising considering Polybius' general antagonism against the polis, the historian mentions the Spartan constitution as one of the examples of the ideal constitution (Pol. 6. 46. 8-10). Apparently, even Polybius could not deny that Sparta had its good qualities.

[269] Nielsen (2002), 491-492; and (2015), 251. The Arkadian geography and climate are contributing factors to the development of an individualised character in the area in which each polis was highly self-sufficient, despite evidence of an early formation of an Arkadian identity by the fifth century BC. While this was not unusual, it seems that in Arkadia the geography made it even more difficult for the poleis to band together and I think it might be one of the reasons why the Arkadian *koinon* fell apart after seven years.

Arkadians.[270] The reason for this digression on the virtues of the Arkadians lies in the passage's general context: in the preceding chapters Polybius narrates certain events in Kynaithia in the 220s BC (Pol. 4. 17-19). At the time, the polis was divided between Achaian and Aitolian loyalty and eventually the polis ended up betraying the Achaians just as the Mantineans had done.

Because of this betrayal by yet another Arkadian polis, it seems to me that Polybius felt the need to clarify to his audience that not all Arkadians shared this predilection for betrayal and that in general they could be considered as the epitome of *ἀρετη* as is evidenced by the Megalopolitans' noble actions. Moreover, the Kynaithians seem to have lost the ideals of *philantropia* and *philoxenia* generally exhibited by the Arkadians through their actions to the extent that they no longer held any trace of the federal nature, contrary to the Megalopolitans. While the historian has shown that Megalopolis was an Arkadian city that embodied the best qualities of the region, Polybius' stress on the Megalopolitan loyalty to the Achaians clearly indicates that both the polis and its inhabitants set themselves apart from the other Arkadians. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is also evident from the interactions of the polis with other Arkadians in the years after its foundation. Obviously to Polybius, Megalopolis was the best example of the Arkadian *ἀρετη* but the fact that they did not betray the Achaians was what distinguished them from the other Arkadians.

By Polybius' time there had clearly been an evolution towards a combined Achaian-Arkadian identity when it came to Megalopolis and its citizens. While they became increasingly loyal to the Achaian *koinon* throughout the second century, Lydiades' actions at Mt Lykaion proved that this was certainly not the case at the start of the city's Achaian membership. Clearly, to the Megalopolitans of the third century, there was an obvious distinction between their local idenitity and the federal one as being Megalopolitan meant that first and foremost you were loyal to the city in case of any danger. This is also exemplified by the Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos Doson to ask for help against the Spartan attacks during the Kleomenean War as well as the boundary disputes discussed in the next chapters, for these demonstrate that the polis was in first instance concerned with its own safety and local interests. Unfortunately, there is no other literary source to equal Polybius and his narrative with regards to the

[270] Roy (2003), 89.

wider Megalopolitan views on their own city, Arkadia and the Achaian *koinon*. This makes it rather difficult to draw general conclusions relating to the question posed at the start of this segment. Of course, several meliambic poems written by the poet Kerkidas of Megalopolis, which are preserved on an Oxyrinchus papyrus found in Memphis, could have the potential to fill in this gap (*POxy.* 1082). However, the fragmentary state of these poems and the nature of their content make it rather difficult to draw certain generalisations about the Megalopolitan identity in the third century BC. On the contrary, Kerkidas seems to have been preoccupied with the unequal distribution of wealth (possibly within Megalopolis; Kerk. *Mel.* 2), and other matters of a more personal nature such as love and the gods (Kerk. *Mel.* 3 and 6). The figure of Kerkidas can be identified with two other possible men from Megalopolis by the same name: one was a contemporary of Demosthenes and a Megalopolitan politician, while the second one lived in in the third century and was one of the Megalopolitan envoys to Antigonos during the Kleomenean War (Pol. 2. 48. 4-6).[271] However, considering the familial links between several individuals of the same name from Megalopolis such as two different individuals called Lydiades known from the epigraphic record as mentioned above, it is very possible that these two men were related as well, with the Kerkidas mentioned by Demosthenes and contemporary authors being the latter's grandfather (Dem. *De cor.* 295).[272] Although it is rather difficult to say with certainty, the poet Kerkidas has sometimes been identified with the third century statesman from Megalopolis.[273] In conclusion, Kerkidas' poems might suggest that there was a significant division in wealth among the Megalopolitans in the last years of the third century BC as this is a topic that is a recurring theme in Kerkidas' writing.

Throughout this section my analysis of Polybius' views and convictions have shown that he was more than just another Hellenistic historian. He was a Megalopolitan of the second century BC whose commitment to the institutions and politics of the Achaiain federal state indicated had become an essential part of his identity. As an individual Polybius clearly exempified the federal nature of Megalopolis which had allowed it to flourish within Achaia itself.

[271] Croiset (1911), 481.
[272] Williams (2006), 345.
[273] Croiset (1911), 481-482.

2.2. The Megalopolitan identity and the city's coins

As we have seen, Polybius has a deep respect for the according to him greatest of the federal states, Achaia, as has become apparent to anyone who has read his work. Yet this feeling is accompanied and sometimes rivalled by an underlying feeling of pride of being an Arkadian from Megalopolis, which was undoubtedly the most successful polis from the region.[274] If we take Polybius' account as a general representation of how a Megalopolitan identifies and represents himself, one thing becomes clear. By the writer's time, a Megalopolitan considered himself to be Arkadian as well as Achaian, resulting in a complex layered identity. Nevertheless, how far can we generalise Polybius and his views? The civic and federal coinage produced by Megalopolis seems to support this theory. On the one hand, the civic coin types that were produced by Megalopolis after its membership of the *koinon* created a definite link to the polis' Arkadian identity. Through the depiction of traditional Arkadian gods like Pan and Zeus Homarios on the coins, the polis was clearly illustrating its pride of being Arkadian. On the other hand, Megalopolis' active role in the early production of the Achaian federal bronze coinage indicates that the city considered itself to be an important member of the Achaian federation. Clearly, the Megalopolitan coinage exhumes the city's multi-layered identity just as much as Polybius does through his narrative.

In general, coins give us a good idea of how the polis wanted to depict itself to the outside world as they illustrate the presence and the importance of civic identity in Greek poleis during the Hellenistic period and before.[275] While there is evidence that individual poleis minted civic coinage throughout the Hellenistic times, federal coinage is also attested.[276] There is no standard example of federal coinage as the different nature of the federal states is reflected via their coinage. Coin types from the Aitolian federation, for example, only bear the inscription ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ indicating that the minting of coins was the sole responsibility of the federal government.[277] On the other hand, the Achaian federal coins tell an entirely different story. Aside from the civic coinage used by member states, there are two major types of Achaian coins: bronze and silver. The silver triobols or hemidrachms typically have the head of Zeus Homarios on the obverse and

[274] Henderson (2013), 36.
[275] Thonemann (2016), 45.
[276] Caspari (1917), 168-183. Even though this article is almost a century old, it gives a good overview of the different coin types circulated in and by the different *koina*.
[277] De Laix (1973), 48.

on the reverse a wreath of laurel surrounding a monogram of the letters alpha and chi, which is accompanied by the polis' ethnicon and the name of the magistrate responsible for the minting.[278] While the dating of these coins is rather problematic due to their presence in hoards dating to a wide time span, I believe the most likely period for these to have been minted is between 251, i.e. the entrance of Sikyon into the League, and 146 BC, when the federation was at the height of its power.[279] The bronze coins, generally in worse condition than the silver ones, were produced in one single minting period after 200 BC and depict Zeus Homarios sitting on a throne being offered a wreath by Nike on the obverse and on the reverse a personification of Achaia holding a wreath.[280] Just as with the silver coins, the bronze ones represent both the federal state and the member city because of the presence of both the legend ΑΧΑΙΩΝ as well as the polis' ethnicon and the name of the magistrate (in full or abbreviated).[281] The fact that both the polis' ethnicon and the Achaian monogram appear together on the coins indicate that individual member states could operate within the federal framework with a high degree of autonomy and had a lot of input in the decisions taken by the *koinon*. Issuing federal coinage, therefore, seems to have been controlled and planned by the federal state as evidenced by Polybius (Pol. 2. 37. 11).[282] Moreover, the Achaian federal coins also support Polybius' statement that within the *koinon* all members were equal and could remain relatively autonomous in the organisation of their own civic affairs as well as the expression of their own local identity and interests. This is also illustrated by the boundary disputes involving Megalopolis and other member states in chapter three, which show that the Achaian poleis could very easily pursue these local interests within the federal framework without too much involvement from the federal government. Yet, the eventual responsibility for the minting of the money was executed by the cities and due to the significant numbers of coins from Megalopolis we know that the polis considered itself to be a member of the Achaian *koinon*.[283]

[278] Thompson (1939), 136-141.
[279] For a complete overview of the problems and arguments surrounding the dating of these silver triobols, see Warren (1999), 99-110.
[280] Warren (2007), 112-119; for an overview of the individual coins collected by Warren see pages 3-52; and the plates at the end of the book.
[281] Warren (1846), 82.
[282] Grandjean (2009), 11-12.
[283] Dengate (1967), 60.

Jennifer Warren even posed the theory that Megalopolis played an important role in the spread and creation of the bronze Achaian federal coinage as it was one of the first member states to start minting the bronze coins due to a discrepancy in the different variations of the coin design.[284] So if Megalopolis was indeed one of the first members to start minting these bonze coins, this would prove the city was still one of the dominant poleis within the *koinon* in the years before the Achaian War with Rome despite the lack of information we get about it in the other sources. Moreover, despite a plethora of other reasons for the minting of these coins, Warren has argued that the coins had the objective, in addition to the payment of rations (σιτώνιον), of expressing federal pride. This was exactly the reason why the member states of the Achaian *koinon* chose to mint these bronze coins: they wanted to show that they were proud to be part of the Achaian *koinon* and Megalopolis was no exception to this rule.[285] Additionally, the sheer size of the production of the bronze coins in comparison to the silver ones makes this theory even more compelling: 45 members of the *koinon* produced these in comparison to only sixteen producing the silver triobols. This could also disprove James Dengate's theory that Megalopolis produced federal coinage only as a token coinage due to the lack of these silver coins coming from Megalopolis as this seems to have been the case for other member poleis as well.[286] If Megalopolis was indeed one of the first poleis to mint the bronze coins, it is very clear that the city was still an important member of the Achaian *koinon* even during a period for which we have little evidence.

FIGURE 7 - SILVER FEDERAL COIN FROM MEGALOPOLIS (C) J. A. DENGATE, 1967

[284] Warren (2007), 125-126.
[285] Warren (2007), 26-27.
[286] Dengate (1967), 102.

In addition to the Achaian federal coins, Megalopolis minted other coin types, one of which was once thought to have been Arkadian federal coinage[287] but due to the evidence of several coin hoards, these are more recently thought to have been produced by Megalopolis at the same time as its Achaian federal coins (182-167 BC).[288] These so-called Arkadian *koinon* issues were silver triobols with the head of Zeus Lykaios with a wreath facing left on the obverse and on the reverse a seated nude Pan holding a lagobolon in his left hand with syrinx or cloak accompanied by a monograph AP indicating the Arkadian *koinon*.[289] The second coin type issued by the polis as its civic coinage features the same head of Zeus on the obverse and the seated Pan on the reverse but with the letters ΜΕΓ instead of the Arkadian monogram which is believed to have had a later minting period (151-146 BC).[290] As we have already seen the Achaian *koinon* allowed its members to mint their own coinage and thus the federal state would not have opposed Megalopolis minting its own civic coins in addition to the federal issues.[291] Since Megalopolis did mint these Arkadian types after it joined the federation, it is clear that the citizens considered themselves to be Arkadian in addition to their Achaian membership, just as Polybius' writings have indicated.

FIGURE 8 - SIVER CIVIC COIN FROM MEGALOPOLIS (C) J. A. DENGATE, 1967

This conclusion was also partly drawn by Dengate in his seminal article on the triobols of Megalopolis. Dengate however argues that these coins indicate that the reason

[287] Thompson (1939), 142
[288] Dengate (1967), 58.
[289] Gardner (1887), 450-451.
[290] Dengate (1967), 103; *BMCPelop*, lxii.
[291] Thompson (1939), 143-144.

that Megalopolis started minting these Arkadian types had to be found in Philopoimen's actions of 194 BC which cost the polis the control of several of its neighbouring cities.[292] This is an interesting theory but he states that Megalopolis minted these coins to show that the city, as the former capital of the Arkadian *koinon*, had to be seen as the leader of the Arkadians and as we have seen there is no reason to assume that Megalopolis had been the capital of the federation.[293] Moreover, while Megalopolis was an important polis, it did try its best to make sure that other states in the Peloponnese knew that the city was more than just another Arkadian polis. For example, Megalopolis' anti-Spartanism may have been the reason why the polis strove to distinguish itself from the other Arkadians, who did not shy away from the occasional alliance with Sparta.[294] Obviously, one clear conclusion can be drawn from both Polybius as a representative of Megalopolis and the coins minted by the polis: the decision made by Lydiades in 235 BC set in motion a process which altered the core elements of the Megalopolitan identity resulting in a polis that considered itself to be Arkadian - as it has done before – as well as Achaian.

Moreover, the federal nature of the Megalopolitan identity is also present throughout this second segment as it is exemplified both by Polybius in his writings and the federal coinage produced by Megalopolis. Since Megalopolis was one of the first poleis to actively produce Achaian federal coinage that had both the federal ethnicon/monograph and the civic one, the polis showed that it had a distinct connection to the Achaian federal state, even more than other member states that started minting these coins at a later stage. As for Polybius, throughout his narrative it is clear that the historian was as much an Achaian as he was a Megalopolitan. Polybius can thus be considered the personification *par excellence* of a Megalopolitan for whom the Achaian federal membership was an important part of his identity.

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Throughout the different segments in this chapter, it has become clear that the relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon* had evolved during the period of the polis' membership. When Lydiades made the decision to join the federation in 235 BC, both he himself and the citizens were motivated for very different

[292] Dengate (1967), 108.
[293] Nielsen (2015), 264. See also chapter one for a more in-depth discussion on the matter.
[294] Scholten (2003), 143.

reasons, but one thing was clear: if the city wanted to protect itself against the looming threat of Sparta, then they would have to ally themselves with the Achaian *koinon*, an emerging state in the Peloponnese. Thus, as soon as Megalopolitan was an Achaian member, it fully embraced the *koinon's* ideals and was one of the dominant city-states. Due to its size and reverence for federalism it produced a significant part of the Achaian elite. Moreover, Megalopolis was very active in the political life of the federation by sending officials to the other side of the Peloponnese when many others did not do so or by minting a very large portion of the federal coinage. This did not mean however that the citizens renounced their Arkadian identity.

Because of the inclusive and open nature of the Achaian *koinon*, which had long counted Achaians and non-Achaians amongst its members, a polis could easily keep its distinct local identity in combination with the federal one, something that is expressed by individuals in inscriptions and on the federal Achaian coinage. For Megalopolis, this meant that the city could mint their Arkadian-style coins side by side with the Achaian federal coinage. All of this eventually led to the addition of an Achaian element to the previously distinct Arkadian identity of Megalopolis, as is attested by Polybius when he talks about Megalopolis, Arkadia and Achaia in his narrative: by the middle of the second century BC Megalopolis had become Arkadian as well as Achaian.

Moreover, this chapter has also provided a new contextualised portrait of Polybius as a Megalopolitan. It is important to realise that this is a context in which he and his narrative need to be considered even by those interested in Polybius as historian or political theorist. Particularly since Polybius' Megalopolitan background and the impact this had on his personal views and ideas has been largely ignored in previous research. As the analysis of his narrative in this chapter has shown, Polybius' comments on the interaction between the local and federal politics within a *koinon* such as the Achaian one as well as the wider Hellenistic politics are valuable to broader topics and provide an entire new way of using Polybius when doing research.

PART 2: MEGALOPOLIS AND ACHAIA: AN ARKADIAN CITY IN A MULTI-ETHNIC FEDERATION

Introduction

As the core components of the Megalopolitan identity have now been established in part one of this thesis, the second and third parts will focus on the actual effects of this local identity on Achaian politics. It has already been discussed how, soon after 235 BC, the city became one of the most prominent members of the federal state and Lydiades had actively pursued a federal career. While this second part analyses Megalopolis as a member of the Achaian *koinon* and its interactions with the other member states, the relationship between the polis and the federal state constitutes the core of chapter three, as it was what distinguished Megalopolis from the other Achaian members. After all, all of the poleis that belonged to the Achaian *koinon* had the same rights and obligations as Megalopolis. All of these member states were entitled to federal citizenship, participation in the federal institutions, had access to federal magistracies and striking of federal coinage, but simultaneously had to contribute to the federal treasury, obey federal laws and follow established procedures. Moreover, through its interactions with the other members of the Achaian federation as well as via active participation in the day-to-day political activities - by minting coins for example and hosting the Achaian assembly in the city - Megalopolis showed itself a devoted member of the Achaian *koinon.* Interestingly, it is precisely through its struggles with the other Achaian poleis in the form of boundary disputes that Megalopolis showed that the city knew how to use these federal procedures and magistrates to its own advantage.

The boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Messene, Thouria, Helisson and Sparta that take up the majority of the third chapter are the best sources to show how and why Megalopolis did this. Because they provide such an interesting insight into other facets of Achaian political life, I will also address the general composition and structure of the Achaian *koinon*, its history and institutions.

Chapter 3: Megalopolis in the Achaian *koinon*

Once Megalopolis joined the Achaian *koinon* (235 BC), the interaction between the polis and the federal state was one that had a profound influence on both parties: by the middle of the second century BC Megalopolis had added a distinct Achaian element to its complex, local identity and Achaian political life was soon overflowing with prominent Megalopolitans whose personal agenda and hatred for Sparta helped shape the federal government and its actions more than once. While this relationship between the two parties was unique in terms of the influence that the local identity of Megalopolis had on the Achaian foreign policy, in other areas it was very similar to that of Megalopolis' fellow members in the federal state. All Achaian member states had the same rights and obligations: first of all, the citizens had the right to hold federal citizenship in addition to the local one or could own property in other member poleis. On the other hand, the poleis had the freedom to conduct their affairs at the local level according to their own designs, the right to be represented in the federal institutions and to vote via their representatives on federal decisions, to mint federal as well as civic coinage. Finally, they also had to meet the obligation to provide means and manpower for the federal army and treasury.

These general rules also shaped the way the poleis within the Achaian *koinon* communicated with one another. However, what exactly was the nature of these interactions and how did a polis like Megalopolis use these to its own advantage and create a dominant position for itself within the federation? In what follows I will argue that in addition to the obvious influence Megalopolis had on Achaian foreign politics (which will be discussed at length in part three of this thesis), the city had a certain impact on the internal affairs of the federation as well, albeit in a less obvious manner. This was due to the nature of the polis' foundation by the Arkadian *koinon* which seems to have brought about a strong understanding among the citizens of what it meant to be part of a structure that was bigger than the polis and how to use that to their advantage. I will therefore analyse the available material to show that in its boundary disputes with other Achaian member states Megalopolis had the habit of involving the federal magistrates and procedures in order to win these disputes and increase its position within the Achaiain *koinon*. In the first section of the chapter, I will look at how Megalopolis behaved as a member of the Achaian *koinon* and illustrate that it was indeed an

important polis that actively took part in the Achaian political and institutional life. A short overview will then be given of the possible ways in which members could encounter one another to define the common protocols that guided inter-urban relations. Moreover, I will also prove that in general the Achaian *koinon* preferred to stay out of these disputes as it allowed its member states to interact without any involvement of the federal government as long as these interactions were limited to within the federation. Finally, I will analyse Megalopolis' interactions with other member states to show exactly how Megalopolis used the federation to its advantage.

1. Megalopolis as a member of the Achaian *koinon*

As a member of the *koinon* Megalopolis had to deal with the federal government as well as other poleis from a variety of ethnic backgrounds and regions. For a polis such as Megalopolis with its own traditions and relationships this must not have been easy, for it was no longer only connected to the Arkadian poleis but was now dealing with an increasingly complicated set of adversaries. All in all, the decision to join Achaia seems to have been a good one for the city as it soon played a prominent role in the federation and produced some of its most influential statesmen. Megalopolis shaped federal politics in a way that not many other cities had done before. In this next section of the chapter I want to look at the polis in its Achaian federal context and find out how Megalopolis fits into and deals with some of the unique Achaian features and ideals. Therefore, I am examining the internal structure of the federation to prove that as one of the biggest polis of the Achaian *koinon*, Megalopolis wanted to actively be involved in the Achaian institutions and federal political life.

The Achaian *koinon* set itself apart from other federations due to its inclusion of poleis from all the Peloponnese which resulted in a melting pot of local and federal identities. Clearly, this had been part of its policy since the conception of the first Achaian *koinon* during the fourth century which contained both Achaians and non-Achaians after the incorporation of Aitolian Kalydon and Lokrian Naupaktos in 389 BC.[295] This fact made it easier for the second Achaian federation to continue along these lines and probably laid the foundation for the expansionist policy during the Hellenistic

[295] Mackil (2014), 270-285.

times.[296] According to Emily Mackil religion played an important role in the formation of the Achaian *koinon* as it provided the new state with a shared communal identity while protecting important local cults such as the sanctuaries of Zeus Homarios, first in Helike and later in Aigion, and that of Artemis at Ano Mozaraki.[297] After the disintegration of the first Achaian *koinon* under Alexander's successors, a second one was formed by the cities of Dyme, Patrai, Tritaia and Pharai, mainly as a continuation of the first federation. It did not take long for the first member from outside to join.[298] As we have seen in the previous chapter, the main political aims of the federal organisation were spreading equality (*ἰσηγορία*) and freedom of speech (*παρρησία*) throughout the Peloponnese. This could be done in two ways: either the cities joined Achaia willingly, convinced by the prestige of the federal democracy, or they were 'freed' from tyranny. The implementation of this policy was partly achieved by the use of allies such as Macedon and Rome (Pol. 2. 42. 4-6). The use of allies is quite typical for Greek states at this point due to the changing political reality of the Hellenistic period where 'big' foreign powers involved themselves in Greek affairs and this was one of the few ways of playing any sort of role on the international level. Additionally, it enabled the Achaians to defend themselves against other Greek states and their allies at a time when the Achaian military was in disarray.

At the head of this federation stood the *strategos* who was supported by a series of federal magistrates, a federal council and a primary assembly that met four times a year in regular meetings or *synodoi* in addition to the *synkletos,* a special meeting that was called to decide on matters concerning war or peace, receive ambassadors from the Senate or deal with anything outside of the competence of the primary assembly.[299] The discussion on the exact nature and composition of the Achaian assemblies and the primary assembly in particular is quite problematic due to the lack of information from Polybius.[300] Although I will not concern myself with an overview of different arguments here, I will make some of my own conclusions based on the organisation of other federal offices in this section.

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[296] Larsen (1968), 80-81.
[297] Mackil (2013), 173-178.
[298] Walbank (2002b), 147; and Larsen (1968), 84 and 216.
[299] Rizakis (2015), 123-125.
[300] Walbank (2002b), 153-161. For more information on the institutions of the *koinon*, see Aymard (1938); Larsen (1968) 80-89, 215-240; Larsen (1972), 178-185: Rizakis (2003), 97-109; Rizakis (2016), 123-131; and Roy (2003), 84-85.

As the *koinon* was a federal state in which individual city-states convened together, there were two political realities at work: the federal government with its federal responsibilities and the poleis working at the local level.[301] Joining the Achaian state meant that the citizens of a city added an extra layer to their own identity through the addition of federal membership of the *koinon*. In several inscriptions individuals started using both their local ethnicon as well as the federal one, so someone from Megalopolis could choose to use the following formula in an inscription: ΑΧΑΙΟΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΠΟΛΙΤΟΣ. There are countless examples in the epigraphical record attesting this practice, many of which are collected by Rizakis.[302] However, the fact that there are no Megalopolitans doing this is quite interesting and problematic as it severely limits our understanding of how individual Megalopolitans perceived themselves within the federation. Furthermore, the use of a double ethnicon is also seen on the federal Achaian coinage where it was also employed by the city-states.

So, in addition to retaining all local rights, inhabitants of an Achaian member state also obtained civic rights in other member states. This in turn increased mobility within the federation as they were now allowed to marry inhabitants of other poleis, own land and live there. This was probably the case with Aratos and his property in Corinth (Plut. *Ar.* 41. 2) or another Achaian Hieron of Airgira who possessed property in Argos where he hosted a delegation of Oropians (*IG* VII 411 13-17).[303] Moreover, an inscription found in Epidauros which lists 156 casualties of the War of 146 describes 103 names names under the category of 'Ἀχαιοὶ καὶ σύνοικοι' (*IG* IV^2 1 28 l. 59: 'Achaians and synoikoi'). In addition to the traditional citizens of the polis, there seem to have been two foreign groups in Epidauros, i.e. Achaians from other member states as well as the so-called *synoikoi*. The fact that their fellow Achaians are separated from the *synoikoi*, indicated that the Achaians were still an entirely different group whithin Epidauros, although one that was not completely foreign.[304] Undoubtedly, social and economic mobility of citizens across the *koinon* was promoted and normalised because of the federal nature of the Achaian state. Yet having federal citizenship meant that a

[301] Rizakis (2015), 128.
[302] Rizakis (1995). A good example of this is 'Αγαθίνας 'Αχαιὸς ἐκ Πελλάνας (*Achaie* I 738) which is an epitaph of an Achaian from Pellene who had migrated to Akanthos in Macedonia dated to the Hellenistic period.
[303] Rizakis (2012), 38. In this article Rizakis seems to stress that having federal citizenship was not enough to consider yourself an Achaian.
[304] Mackil (2013), 260.

citizen had civic rights in other Achaian poleis and not political rights which, unlike in the case of *isopoliteia*, were still limited to the person's native polis. Internally nothing really changed for the cities themselves as they were allowed to retain local officials, laws, institutions and other rights: they could still conduct their daily businesses and operate to a high degree of autonomy without being scrutinised by the federal government.[305] This can also further explain why these cities managed to revert back to an older polis-centred political order after the Achaian War of 146 BC.

Considering they now had to contribute to the federal army and treasury, the poleis could take action whenever they deemed it necessary, even if this was against the dictates of the federal government, just as Lydiades and the Megalopolitans had done in their defence against Kleomenes in ca. 224 BC (Pol. 2. 55. 1-6). Moreover, if member-states were involved in disputes with one another, which happened quite frequently, they did not have to apply to the federal state for arbitration which is attested through the fact that there was no standard procedure to follow in these cases.[306] Of course, the new inscription from Messene proves that the Achaians did have their own magistrates (the federal *damiorgoi*) to support its members in case of these boundary disputes and it seems that Megalopolis used these new opportunities for interstate arbitrations to ensure a positive result.[307]

In return for the contributions to the federal treasury and army, the cities in turn received a plethora of federal rights: they were represented in the council and regular meetings in which they could vote on important federal decisions, their citizens could become Achaian statesmen and the poleis could mint federal coinage. It is precisely through these federal rights that a polis could leave a mark on federal politics and gain an important role within the federation. This is exactly what Megalopolis did as a result of its distinct local identity that allowed the polis to understand how federal states worked.[308] In fact, its leader Lydiades became important enough for Plutarch to mention him as Aratos' rival at the highest level of federal politics, indicating that Megalopolis shaped the League's politics from the very beginning (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 3). Furthermore, in a seminal prosopographical analysis of the Achaian elite known to us through different

[305] Larsen (1971), 83.
[306] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 197-200.
[307] Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010), 188-196; and Magnetto and Luraghi (2012), 521-544. This inscription will be discussed in greater detail below.
[308] Freeman (1893), 486.

sources, James O'Neil clearly shows that the influential position of Megalopolis within the federation can also be illustrated by looking at the origins of the Achaian statesmen, as there seems to be a predominance of members from Megalopolis in addition to individuals from Sikyon and what O'Neil calls 'Old Achaea', i.e. the traditional Achaian heartland which included the four founding poleis of the *koinon*: Dyme, Pharai, Patrai and Tritaia.[309] Interestingly, out of the 74 individual leaders that O'Neil has found, seventeen come from Megalopolis.[310] While Polybius' narrative is the main source for O'Neil's study as the vast majority comes from the *Histories*, several of Achaian leaders from Megalopolis are also attested to in inscriptions. In three instances, these men were only mentioned in inscriptions. It is thus likely that the polis did enjoy a position of importance within the federation. Additionally, O'Neil's analysis clearly shows that within the federation there was a tradition of influential families coming from these three areas dominating federal politics which clearly discredits Polybius' comment on the extremely democratic and egalitarian nature of the federation. Obviously, pursuing a federal political career seems to have been primarily reserved for the rich elite.

This pattern can also be identified in two different lists of Achaian federal *nomographoi*. One of the inscriptions was found in Epidauros and should be dated between 210 and 207 BC based on the forms of the Greek letters of the inscription as well as the fact that this period fits best with some of the many problems created by the seemingly random distribution of *nomographoi* among known member states (*IG* IV.I^2 73). The second one from Aigion should be dated slightly later on the basis of the *terminus post quem* of 182 BC, resulting from the appearance of both Sparta and Messene on the list as Achaian members, something which we known took place only after 182.[311] While the exact function of the office is unspecified, the two lists do tell us something about the internal organisation of the federation as they prove that the college of *nomographoi* was organised along the principle of proportional representation.[312] Each of the cities provided a consistent number of representatives according to their size and importance: large poleis such as Megalopolis sent three *nomographoi*, medium sized poleis two and the smaller poleis one.[313] When comparing both lists however,

[309] O'Neil (1984-86), 38.
[310] For more information, see the prosopographical appendix in O'Neil (1984-86), 55-57.
[311] Rizakis (2008), no. 116, 168-170.
[312] Rizakis (2003), 105.
[313] Roy (2003), 88.

several problems arise. For one, as is the case with the prosopographic analysis of the elite, several of the larger and more important poleis such as Corinth which are known to have been members of the *koinon* are absent from the lists.[314] While the list from Aigion is clearly missing its first part and thus could have included these cities, the Epidauros list is complete and does not mention any of these poleis. Yet this does not necessarily have to remain an issue as is proven by an attractive theory posed by Sergey Sizov.[315] He argues that there is a marked difference between the two meetings: only a portion of the board of *nomographoi* could be present in Epidauros where a sacred law that had been written required the presence of the federal officials. The absence of a significant number of *nomographoi* can be explained by the long and difficult journey it took for the citizens of some poleis to get to Epidauros, as well as the fact that not all poleis might have found it worth going in the first place. The meeting in Aigion, on the other hand, must then have been attended by the complete college of *nomographoi* because of the centrality and importance of the place within Achaia. It is interesting however that Megalopolis appears on both lists, since it surely cannot have been easy for the *nomographoi* from the city to travel to Epidauros which was a considerable distance away (around 130 kilometres lay between both sites today). This however can be explained by a thorough understanding of federalism and federal institutions, as has already been exemplified in several cases, that was ingrained in the Megalopolitan identity and which made it easier for the polis to make an effort and send its *nomographoi* to Epidauros.[316] If the board of *nomographoi* was organised according to the principle of proportional representation, it is plausible that this was also the way in which the Achaian primary assembly was organised, with delegates who represented and voted for their city according to its size.[317]

Furthermore, things had changed for Megalopolis in the period between the creation of the first and that of the second list. Whereas the polis provides three representatives at the time of Epidauros, its number had been reduced to two in the

[314] The exclusion of some of the smaller poleis can easily be explained by putting a rotation system in place in which the duty to provide a nomographos was shifted each year among these smaller cities. Lehmann (1983) and Gschnitzer (1985).
[315] Sizov (2016), 107.
[316] Sizov (2016), 107. This is also why the city played such a key role in the minting of the bronze federal coinage, as we will see below. For more, see Warren (2007).
[317] Rizakis (2015), 127. A similar system is attested for other federal states in antiquity such as Aitolia, Boiotia and Lykia. See also Larsen (1968), for his similar theory on federalism in antiquity, and Corsten (1999), on the more complex federal structures.

Aigion list. Does this indicate a decline in the importance of Megalopolis within the *koinon*? The vote that Megalopolis had lost was most likely the result of Philopoimen's encouragement of some of the neighbouring communities of Megalopolis to secede and become independent members of the *koinon* (Plut. *Phil.* 13. 5). Several of these are known to have minted federal coinage later on.[318] Philopoimen was apparently irritated by the attempts of his hometown to banish him because of his departure for Crete that left others to deal with Nabis. Consequently, the loss of these communities meant a considerable reduction of land controlled by Megalopolis. Clearly, if the area under the polis' control and the people it represented had decreased, then the number of *nomographoi* it would send to the meetings should subsequently be reduced. However, this does not seem to have affected Megalopolis' position of influence within the federation as we have seen from the discussion of the coinage in the previous chapter as well as the epigraphic sources below. On the contrary, a decision taken by the Achaians at the suggestion of Philopoimen in 188 BC proves the opposite. The meetings of the Achaian assembly always met at the temple of Zeus Homarios in Aigion until Philopoimen made the proposal to rotate the meetings among all the member-states (Livy 38. 30. 1-6). This was most likely done for two reasons: to break the political importance of Aigion and make it easier for the male citizens of the more remote poleis in the Peloponnese to attend federal meetings. This decision will have had a considerable impact on the political nature of the federation as the importance of the cult of Zeus Homarios in connection to the identity of the Achaians was significantly reduced. When the *koinon* expanded, the need for this religious and ethnic base of Achaian political unity seems to have disappeared and substituted by a complex network of individual poleis which were connected by their membership of the Achaian *koinon*. No doubt, Philopoimen also hoped that through this change of meeting place both he and Megalopolis would acquire even more influence within the federation. This may have been the case at the start as Megalopolis hosted two out of four gatherings of the Achaian assembly in the 180s BC, while later ones took place in other poleis. An analysis of Polybius' work as well as several inscriptions have yielded the following results: after the decision of 188 BC, one attested meeting took place in Elis and another in Tegea,

[318] Warren (1884), 77-95. Coins are attested for Alipheira, Asea and Diphaia, all of which became full members of the federation after 194 BC and due to Philopoimen's insistence.

two in Megalopolis and Argos, three in Corinth and four in Sikyon. However, this does not have to indicate anything in particular as there were four regular meetings every year and the exact location is specified for only a handful of these meetings.

Clearly, in many ways Megalopolis was a typical member of the Achaian *koinon*: it minted federal coinage, was represented in the federal institutions, hosted assembly meetings after 188 BC and a considerable number of influential Achaian statesmen were Megalopolitan. Moreover, from the available source material an important conclusion can be drawn: given the chance, Megalopolis would not hesitate to take part in federal politics or express its affinity with it. The influence of Megalopolis on federal politics was exercised primarily through the actions of these statesmen as they were undeniably shaped by their Megalopolitan provenance, as a more detailed analysis of their actions within the federal foreign policy in the next chapters will further prove. Nevertheless, the city of Megalopolis showed that, even as an individual entity, it could still use the federal institutions to its own personal advantage as we will see below.

2. Inter-urban interaction within the Achaian *koinon*

In the Hellenistic age, there were many different kinds of states at play. Aside from the many poleis interacting with one another just as they had done for centuries, on the political stage they had to give way to the bigger foreign powers like the Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome. This meant that for a polis it could be quite difficult to navigate the plethora of ways in which it could interact with other states, especially if the polis was part of a federal state. The relationship between the polis and the federal government seems to have differed widely - just as their internal organisation did - from one *koinon* to the next. As we have seen in the previous section, inside the Achaian *koinon* the interplay between the federal and the local level was quite complex as they operated in two spheres where the federal government looked out for federal interests like the internal organisation of the *koinon* and its foreign policy, while the poleis governed locally with quite a high degree of autonomy. Moreover, there were very few restrictions for members of the Achaian *koinon* and the ways in which they interacted with each other. As long as the parties cooperating with one another were part of the federation, the federal government saw no reason to intervene or create a standard procedure for doing so.

It is important to note that this changed when outsiders became involved, for any contact with a foreign polis or state had to be regulated through the federal state. Before moving on to a detailed analysis of the internal interactions between the different member states and Megalopolis in particular, it is necessary to see how the federation dealt with its poleis and their interactions with states outside of the *koinon*. For example, in a territorial dispute around 192 BC between the Achaian polis Pagai and the Boiotian town of Aigosthena, both *koina* seem to have represented their respective members in the resulting arbitration.[319] Clearly, member poleis could do what they wanted when they were dealing with fellow member states, but in case of a dispute or any other kind of interaction with a state outside the federation the federal government would step in.

Additionally, there are several references in the sources stipulating that embassies from members to external states had to be approved by Achaia or they were deemed illegal. This is apparent for example from the struggles the many Spartan embassies sent by the polis or its exiles to plead their case with Rome in its struggle with the federal government after it had been forced into the *koinon* by Philopoimen after Nabis' death in 192 (Pol. 23. 4). However, when this kind of embassy was approved, they mostly seem to have been acting on behalf of the polis in question, not the federal government. This was the case for Megalopolis, when two of its citizens approached Antigonos Doson in 225/4 BC to secure his support in the Achaian war against Kleomenes of Sparta who was terrorising the polis and its surrounding area due to the longstanding animosity between the two states (Pol. 2. 48). While Megalopolis had to ask for the *koinon*'s approval to undertake this action, it is very important to note that it was still the city that was asking for the king's support and not the federal government which only became involved in the matter only after the Megalopolitan envoys reported back to the federal assembly with a positive reply from the king.[320] When the polis of Stymphalos was asked for help by the exiled citizen body of Elateia, a polis with whom the citizens had very close relations, they sent an embassy to the Achaian assembly on their behalf (*SEG* 11 1107 l. 10-15). These events were described in an honorary decree

[319] Harter-Uibopuu, 126. Ager n. 85, 233-235.
[320] For Aratos and his (limited) involvement in this episode, see chapter four.

from the Elateians from Stymphalos which is discussed by Mackil.[321] The noteworthy thing here is that the Elateians in question claimed to be the citizen body of the city which had been uprooted at the time and were thus exiles. However, if the Elateians had indeed lost their own city, they could not send a legitimate embassy to the Achaians, which is why Stymphalos had to intervene. Clearly, official matters such as contact between the polis, exiles and outside forces such as Rome had to be handled through an Achaian embassy but locally, the federal institutions do not seem to have been involved, for Elateian exiles could participate in Stymphalian cults, were given land and were allowed to live in the city.[322] Similarly, the *koinon* considered the embassies to Rome on behalf of the Spartan exiles to be illegal as they did not have the federal state's approval. Apparently, the same rule applies for exiles: locally, cities did what they wanted, but any foreign contact had to go via an official Achaian assembly.

However, individual citizens seem to have been able to conduct and maintain personal relationships with these foreign powers without too much difficulty or control from above. In no way were these relationships simple and in some cases, they caused trouble between the individual and the federation as was the case with Philopoimen and his stint in Crete (Plut. *Phil.* 13). Yet we are dealing with personal relations of individual citizens which were not connected to federal politics or the federal state. In fact, among several of the influential Achaian statesmen there seems to have been a tradition of using these personal relations to their own advantage. For example, several Achaian statesmen such as Aratos, Eperatos and Kykliades of Pharai and Philopoimen had connections to Macedonian kings at different moments in their careers, which seem to have been a way for them to increase their power and prestige within the federation (Plut. *Ar.* 44. 1).[323] Likewise, if we are to believe Polybius, Kallikrates' relationship with Rome is what enabled him to dominate Achaian politics after 180 BC (Pol. 24. 8. 9). However, it is important to note that these contacts were also used by the other parties to increase their influence within the Achaian *koinon* by backing a candidate in the federal elections. As was the case with Philip's support for Eperatos of Pharai during the Achaian elections for the strategia of 219 BC (Pol. 4. 82. 2-8). Moreover, it seems as though an individual's

[321] Mackil (2013), n.43; 308-309.
[322] Gray (2015), 336.
[323] For Aratos, Eperatos and Kykliades, see Paschides (2006), 233-251, 286-287, 288-292. For Philopoimen, see Errington (1969), 52.

connections did not have to be limited to one outside party, as can be seen from Aratos' dealings with both Philip V and the Ptolemies, since his son Aratos the Younger was chosen to take part in an Achaian mission to Ptolemy V because of his father's connections to the king (Pol. 24. 6. 6). This fact is also apparent from the many attestations of individual Achaians in the epigraphic record of states outside of the *koinon*. Hieron of Aigira, for example, was honoured by the city of Oropos for his many good deeds towards the city which included speaking on behalf of Oropian exiles in several Achaian institutions.[324]

Judging from this source, interactions between an outside polis and an Achaian citizen could take many forms: the individual acting as a foreign judge in a dispute with a third party, or as representative of a group of exiles in the federal institutions, or as a *proxenos* or benefactor for a group of citizens or as a city, or an ambassador for his native town.[325] In most cases the individual receives a whole array of honours from the polis that he is interacting with. These included *asylia*, *ateleia* and sometimes even honorary citizenship of the polis. On the whole, it seems as though it was much easier for a person than a city to communicate with a state that did not belong to the *koinon* without the approval of this federation as long as they did not act as a representative of the Achaian *koinon*.

Internally, as already argued, members were left to their own devices. There seems to have been no limitation as to how they could form reciprocal relationships. Smaller towns could join bigger ones through a synoecism, or split from them to become independent members of the *koinon*, as was the case with the communities that split from Megalopolis in 194 BC, probably at the insistence of Philopoimen (Plut. *Phil.* 15. 4). As already discussed in chapter two, Achaian member states could also decide to take action together against the federation, if they believed that the federal government was not acting in their best interests, as was the case when Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia, disappointed by Aratos' military leadership, gave up their contributions to the federal army instead opting to hire their own mercenary army (Pol. 4. 60. 4).

Because most of the interactions discussed in the preceding paragraphs are political in nature, it would be beneficial to examine a final, non-political way in which

[324] Rizakis (1995), 347-348, n. 697; and Mackil (2013), 480-481, n. 46.
[325] Proxeny Networks of the Ancient World (2017), http://proxenies.csad.ox.ac.uk.

the members of the *koinon* cooperate with one another and others outside of the federation. Throughout the Hellenistic period the majority of the religious festival and games in the Peloponnese would send out *theoroi* to announce and promote their festivals (*epangelia)* in order to attract foreign participants and spectators.[326] Certain individuals or the *theorodokoi* were appointed, either by their home town or the organisers of the festival, and given an array of responsibilities so that these sared envoys were accommodated as best as possible.

Paula Perlman makes a very good point in her seminal work on the *theorodokoi* of the Peloponnese about the religious nature of the function and argues that the appointment of these individuals was a way for the sanctuaries in the Peloponnese to ensure continuous and positive interactions with Peloponnesian cities despite the rapidly changing political loyalties of these poleis.[327] Yet, despite Perlman's stress on the primarily non-political nature of the *theorodokoi*, the marjority of the people chosen for this office were politically active or had relatives who were, serving as ambassadors, *strategoi*, *damiorgoi* or tyrants in their native city or federal state.[328] Moreover, there also seems to be a strong connection between the office of *theorodokos* and that of a *proxenos* (a strictly political office) as the same individuals are named as both in the inscriptions, in most cases becoming *proxenos* of the polis connected to the sanctuary for which they were acting as *proxenos*. Clearly, the best *theorodokoi* were those who had experience dealing with foreign delegations throught their pursuit of other activities such as diplomacy or personal gain.[329]

The office of the *theorodokoi* is important for interstate cooperation of the Achaian member states since it shows that these poleis also interacted with one another in non-political spheres as from individuals from Troizen, Argos, Corinth, Pellene, Aigina, Dyme, Messene and Tegea are found on two inscriptions naming the individuals that acted as *theorodokoi* for the Chtonia in honour of Demeter in Hermione, dated to the late third century BC (*IG* IV, 727A an 727 B). Additionally, *theorodokoi* of Achaian member states are also known to have acted for religious festival outside of the *koinon*

[326] Perlman (2000), 13-14.
[327] Perlman (2000), 27.
[328] Perlman (2000), 40. A good example of this is Peisias of Pellene, whose son Memnon served as one of the Achaian *damiorgoi* during the controversial *synodos* of 198 BC (Livy 32. 22. 5-8). See also chapter five.
[329] Perlman (2000), 57.

such as the Leukophryeneia in Magnesia on the Meander.[330] A series of inscriptions recording the answers of poleis, *koina* and kings about the status of the festival and inviolabilty of the city, are interesting for the present discussion as they include *theorodokoi* from the federation (I*Magn.* 39) as well as several of their members including Megalopolis (I*Magn.* 38). It seems as though, at least in terms of religious interaction, not all contact between Achaian member states and outside cities had to go via the federal government. This is also indicated by the fact that when the sacred envoys set out on their *epangelia* tour, they visited those communities within a *koinon* that where that most important and merited an invitation to the festival, as it was extremely difficult to visit the political centre of the *koinon* which shifted with every meeting of the assembly.[331]

2.2. Interstate conflict within the Achaian *koinon*

While the Achaian poleis cooperated in many ways, in other instances they acted as judges in third party disputes or fought about territory and boundaries with neighbouring cities. I will now turn to these boundary disputes as I believe they play an instrumental role in explaining how the local identity of Megalopolis dictated its contacts with fellow members as well as the federal government. However, before we can look at Megalopolis in particular, it is necessary to focus on other Achaian poleis and their relationships to assess if and how Megalopolis was unique here and what kind of role the federal government played in these disputes.

In general, a number of things could become the subject of an argument between two parties: financial matters, acts of aggression like the declaration of war or breaking of treaties, or territorial disputes in connection with a religious sanctuary or boundaries.[332] It is specifically this last category that takes up the majority of the inter-poleis disputes. Generally, there were two kids of boundaries that two parties would fight over, i.e. natural or political.[333] Obviously, the motivation for these conflicts was often more than just territorial gain. Boundary disputes were connected to the local interests and ambitions of the poleis involved. Control of certain regions or access to an influential

[330] Perlman (2000), 26.
[331] Perlman (2000), 21.
[332] Ager (1996), 4-7.
[333] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 135.

sanctuary would offer one of the combating parties a strategic advantage over a neighbour, while others were part of much bigger feuds such as the one between Sparta and Megalopolis, which caused the two poleis to fight recurrently over the Belminatis and Akritis regions.[334] These regions had been part of the animosity between the two cities from the moment it was taken from Sparta by Philip II and given to Megalopolis (Plut. *Mor.* 216b), after which they remained Arkadian until Kleomenes conquered the region in the 220s BC, thereby making it a constant subject of arbitration.

When a mutual agreement or solution could not be reached amongst both parties, they voluntarily subjected their dispute to a third party which would then act as either a mediator or arbitrator. The main difference between these two terms is that mediation encourages the conflicting parties to come to an agreement without a binding verdict. This meant that the final decision still lay with the disputants and they did not necessarily have to respect the mediator's suggestions. Arbitration, on the other hand, meant that a neutral third party was given the ultimate and binding decision on the matter and decided who would be victorious and what actions had to be taken to ensure a lasting and peaceful solution.[335] Of course, these boundary disputes were not always successfully arbitrated, illustrated by the recurring conflicts between Megalopolis and Messene in a new inscription found in 2008 in Messene, or the recurring conflict between Sparta and Megalopolis.[336] Moreover, Sheila Ager has argued that we could consider about ten percent of the cases from the Hellenistic age to be repetitive in nature and, more importantly, she points out that we do not know the outcome of half of the disputes.[337]

While there was no standard procedure for international arbitration, the general practice was the following: 1. The parties first agreed to submit their disagreement to a neutral third party either voluntarily or as a result of a pre-existing arrangement such as the *kuria*-clause in a decree (this may have called for a forced arbitration). 2. The third party was then chosen and was either a city acting as a neutral judge (*polis ekkletos*) or a group of foreign judges from different cities. 3. Subsequently, the conflict was brought before the arbitrator who would come to a decision based upon the arguments made by both parties. If boundaries were involved, a physical examination by a smaller committee

[334] Ager n. 135-137; Harter-Uinopuu n. 11. See also Roy (2000), Shipley (2000) and Cartledge and Spawforth (1989).
[335] Eckstein (1988), 415.
[336] However, it is important to note that, as we shall see, other factors may have played a role in this as well.
[337] Ager (1996), 32-33.

may have been required by the polis or foreign judges. 4. The dispute could then have two possible outcomes: the arbitrator would vote in favour of one party or a new border line could be drawn up after the physical examination by the arbitration committee. 5. Eventually, the final decision and action were recorded in an inscription that was commissioned by the victorious party to ensure that this was a permanent solution (*epikrisis*) and sometimes individual judges were honoured; for example, Elis honoured the Corinthian judges following a boundary dispute the polis had won which Ager argues may have been connected to its entry into the *koinon*.[338]

Within the Achaian *koinon* conflicts were generally resolved without the involvement of the federal government and, more importantly, there was no standard procedure.[339] However, several boundary disputes do suggest that the *koinon* expected all members – both existing and potential - to conduct their affairs in a certain way. For one, there could be no conflict among Achaian member states as is evident from the boundary dispute between Achaia and Sparta which had to be arbitrated to ensure internal Achaian peace:

> 'ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ' αὑτοὺς ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ διατε[λ]ῶντι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰράναι καὶ εὐνομίαι'
>
> (*IvO* 47; *Syll.* 665 l. 17-19: 'so that the Achaians, governing themselves democratically and agreeing among themselves for all time remain in peace and harmony").

So, all conflicts between poleis that wanted to become part of the *koinon* and any existing members had to be resolved before a city could join the *koinon*, as can be seen from an arbitration by Megara between Epidauros and Corinth about the regions Spiraion and Sellanys around 240 BC.[340] The words 'κατά τόν αἶνον τόν τῶν Α[χαι]ῶν δικαστήριον' (*IG* IV^2 1.71. 4-5: 'according to the decision of the Achaian judges) indicate that Megara acted at the request of the federal government; and a second inscription seemingly dealing with the entrance of Epidauros[341] into the Achaian League mentions a settlement of all Epidaurian conflicts with Corinth – 'Κορίνθιοι ἔχοντε[ς π]ρός τοὺς (…) ἀντιλέγοντι τοί Επιδ[α]υρι[οι' (*IG* IV^2 1.70 17-18: 'the Corinthians had in (...) with their

[338] Ager (1996) n. 87, and Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 130-160.
[339] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 97-100.
[340] Ager n. 38. Mackil n. 37, 159-161.
[341] Mitsos (1937), 708-714; who also gives a good period for the dating of both inscriptions due to the use of eponymous Achaian and civic magistrates.

opponents the Epidaurians'). Additional support for the statement comes from a stele bearing the measures taken by the Achaians in connection to Orchomenos' entry into the federation sometime after 235 BC (*Syll.*[3] 1490 18-21).[342] Here a potential conflict between Orchomenos and Megalopolis is mentioned which is interesting as the individuals in question were actually Methydrians living in Orchomenos. Apparently, they had put up a golden statue of Athena Nike taken from Megalopolis as collateral for their settlement in Orchomenos, and the polis had to ensure that a financial compensation was paid to Megalopolis by the Methydrians living in Orchomenos. While there is no explicit proof that arbitration of a city's unresolved conflicts was required before it became an Achaian member state, I think the available evidence suggests that the federal government did at least expect that all potential members had any ongoing conflicts with Achaian members resolved.[343]

In general, it seems as though the federal state did not meddle in these interstate conflicts, yet the poleis did have the option to appeal to the *koinon*. The task would then be delegated to a contingent of influential citizens from all over the federation as they did in the boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Messene or Megalopolis and Thouria. Alternatively, a *polis ekkletos* could be appointed by the federation which could be a fellow Achaian member state since internal Achaian conflicts were arbitrated frequently by another member of the federation.[344] While this is apparent in the boundary dispute between Epidauros and Corinth which was arbitrated by Megara and one between Epidauros and Arsinoe which was to be decided upon by a delegation from several Achaian poleis including Pellana, Aigion or Aigeira and Telphousa (*IG* IV[2] 1.72), this was not the standard or only possible practice. Thi is seen from yet another conflict involving Epidauros and Hermione which was arbitrated by judges from Miletos and Rhodes at the request of both poleis (*MDAI(A)* 59). In many other cases, the arbitrating polis is unknown due to lacunae in the epigraphic text which makes it difficult to give a comprehensive overview of who exactly was arbitrating in these Achaian conflicts. In the instances in which we see the *koinon* itself appearing as a litigant – as for example in the dispute with the Boiotian *koinon* - in conflicts with its own members

[342] The reason for this date is quite simple: Megalopolis did not become a member of the *koinon* until 235 BC and it is illogical for Achaia to demand resolution for a potential conflict with a polis that was not connected to the federation at all.
[343] Mackil (2013), 466.
[344] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 121.

or when it acted on behalf of its members in Megalopolis and Pagai in their respective territorial tiffs, a neutral party would be selected to intervene such as another *koinon*, Rome or an independent polis.[345]

In addition to acting as a litigant on behalf of its members or delegating the arbitration to a third party as discussed above, the federal government could also act in a supervisory role in internal arbitrations. While we cannot state with absolute certainty that the federal state was not always involved in the arbitration process due to the fragmentary nature of some of the inscriptions, it seems reasonable to conclude from the available evidence that, as stated above, the federal government tended to not be involved unless there was a need for them to be. In the cases where the federal government was involved, the federal *damiorgoi* are mentioned several times in connection to the arbitration process. In addition to their administrative tasks, these public magistrates seem to have been responsible for the legal element of the disputes as they were the ones accepting the appeals from the parties and had to ensure that the final decision would be upheld.[346] They could issue a fine to one of the parties if the arbitrator's decision was ignored. It seems to me that the issuing of these fines is one of the few ways in which the federal state got itself involved in these matters, as they would undoubtedly have been issued with an eye on keeping rowdy members in check. The fact that these fines were always issued by the federal *damiorgoi* gives the impression that they might have been the result of a federal law unbeknownst to us.[347] However, as we can see from the Spartan-Megalopolitan inscription, these fines were not always paid, which brings their effectiveness and use into question.

In total, there are twelve cases that required arbitration between cities that were known members of the Achaian *koinon*. These twelve cases included arbitrations between Epidauros and Corinth, Epidauros and Arsinoe, Alipheira and Lepreon, Megalopolis and Helisson, Megalopolis and Thouria, Messene and Phigaleia, Hermione and Epidauros, Sparta and Megalopolis, Troizen and Arsinoe, Megalopolis and Messene; a treaty between Kleonai and Argos, and a potential arbitration between Orchomenos and Megalopolis.[348] There are references to the federal state in seven of

[345] Ager 105, 113, 115.
[346] Arnaoutoglou (2009), 190-191.
[347] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 538.
[348] Harter-Uibopuu (1998) lists two more but these are too fragmentary to draw any valid conclusions from.

these: all of the disputes connected to Megalopolis – which will be discussed in more detail below – and the boundary disputes between Epidauros and Corinth as well as Epidauros and Arsinoe. It is easy to explain why exactly the federal state was involved in the first boundary dispute between Epidauros and Corinth as it has been argued that this was connected to Epidauros' application to become a member of the *koinon*.[349] While the inscription on the boundary dispute between Epidauros and Arsinoe mentions the Achaian *strategos* (just as the first boundary dispute does) as a means of dating the inscription, there are no other references to the *koinon* or its institutions which leads me to conclude that the *koinon* was not involved in this arbitration. However, all of the inter-poleis disputes concerning Megalopolis clearly refer to several aspects of the federal Achaian state. What this means for Megalopolis, and the role of the federal state in its arguments with others will be discussed in the last part of this chapter.

3. Megalopolis, boundary disputes and the Achaian government

In this last section of chapter three I will analyse several important documents concerning Megalopolis and its interactions with other Achaian member states. This analysis will show that through these relationships the Megalopolitans acted as any other polis did at the time: they fought with neighbours over territory, had trouble with towns under their control and their citizens could pursue alliances without any interference from above. However, the fact that in each and every one of these disputes there is some sort of reference to the federal state raises questions as to how the federal government was involved, which of the parties wanted this and more importantly, whether the internal relationship between Megalopolis and the federation could be considered unique. There are five disputes that have been preserved from Megalopolis' time as a member of the Achaian League: an internal problem with some exiles from Methydrion residing in Orchomenos and boundary disputes with Helisson, Thouria, Messene and Sparta. It is important to note, however, that none of these inscriptions were found in the polis itself. They were either inscribed in the other polis connected to the dispute, as was the case for Messene and Orchomenos, or were found in Olympia, which, due to its importance within the Greek world, seems to have functioned within the *koinon* as the place for the proclamation of the most important federal documents – in addition

[349] See the discussion above.

to Epidauros.[350] The Achaian *koinon* used Olympia as well to showcase its relations with Rome. Therefore, it seems to have been logical for Megalopolis to inscribe the boundary disputes with Helisson, Thouria and Sparta in Olympia, as this would showcase their victories as well as their relationship with the federation to a wide range of visitors and the other poleis within the *koinon*. The places where these inscriptions were found show that the predominance of Megalopolis within the boundary disputes between the members of the Achaian *koinon* is not due to accidental survival as the city had made the effort to actively showcase their victories in these conflicts by setting up these inscriptions in public places such as Olympia. Moreover, it proves that Megalopolis was an active member of the Achaian *koinon*. For each of the conflicts, I will provide some basic information concerning the inscription, dating, the broader historical context and potential points of interest for the questions raised above.

3.1. Orchomenos becomes an Achaian member (shortly after 235 BC)

The first conflict associated with Megalopolis is not a boundary dispute but an inscription that recorded the entrance of the Arkadian city Orchomenos into the *koinon* at some point after 235 BC (Mackil n. 39). In the last four lines of the inscription Megalopolis is mentioned in connection to a group of exiles or expatriates from Methydrion who were living in the city of Orchomenos. Apparently, they had put down a golden statue of Athena Nike as collateral for a sum of money from Orchomenos, but the Achaians required the Methydrian exiles to repay this money to Megalopolis (l. 17-21).

The inscription itself was found in the city of Orchomenos and the text is kept reasonably intact with the exception of a few restorations at the end of the first lines. The date for the inscription has to be placed shortly after 235 BC because Megalopolis did not join the Achaian *koinon* until after Lydiades renounced his tyranny (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 1) and before that Orchomenos was under the control of others, first of Kleomenes and later the Aitolians (Pol. 2. 46).[351] The passing reference to Megalopolis in this inscription is interesting as the text itself is rather vague about what was actually going on with the golden statue. We know from Polybius (Pol. 4. 10) and Pausanias (Paus. 8. 12. 2) that Methydrion was a town under Megalopolitan control. There could be a group of

[350] Zoumbaki (2010), 111.
[351] Ager n. 43, 129-131.

Methydrians living in Orchomenos who had taken this statue of Nike with them without Megalotopolitan approval, as is evidenced by the Orchomenos' agreement to the repayment of the money. There is no indication where the statue came from since this detail is omitted from the inscription: it could have been stolen from Megalopolis by the Methydrians or they could have taken it from their own polis which, since it was under Megalopolitan control, meant that the money should still be repaid to the Megalopolitans. However, this is only one possible interpretation of the text as, based on the restauration of 'οἱ μετοική]σαντες', these Methydrians could also be a group of migrants from Methydrion living in Orchomenos instead of being based in their native city.

What is obvious however is that there were issues between the two poleis. As we have seen in chapter one, Megalopolis controlled a large area with several communities that were not always content with the polis. Moreover, the existence of bronze federal coins from Methydrion suggests that the town was one of the communities that seceded from Megalopolis in 194 BC in order to become an independent member of the Achaian *koinon*.[352] This makes Ager's suggestion that the Methydrians living in Orchomenos were in fact the leaders of a failed rebellion against Megalopolis who had stolen the statue to ensure safety in Orchomenos plausible even though this is not explicitly mentioned.[353] The strong links in the design of the Megalopolitan and Methydrian coin dies imply that they were made by the same die engraver, indicating that there was still a close connection between the two states after the Third Macedonian War. Even though the poleis enjoyed a close relationship in the 180s BC, this does not mean that the Methydrians and Megalopolitans could not have been involved in a smaller dispute that involved the golden statue. Unfortunately, because of the Greek phrasing, this is all we can say with certainty.

The involvement of the federal state however, which is alluded to several times (l. 5 and 10: τὸ κοινὸν τ[ῶν Ἀχαιῶν' - l. 6, 12, 13 and 16: 'οἱ Ἀχαιοί') comes as no surprise since Orchomenos was to become a part of the *koinon*. As we have seen in the previous section, this was one of the few instances in which the federation would concern itself with interurban relations, as conflicts between potential and existing members were

[352] Warren (2007), 31; 125-126.
[353] Ager (1995), 130.

to be avoided at all costs. Clearly, Achaian involvement - just as in the case of Epidauros and its entrance into the Achaian *koinon* - was due to federal interests because of the general expectation that all disputes should be settled before joining the Achaian *koinon*. So, if both Megalopolis and Orchomenos had not been members, the federation would never have insisted that this business had to be resolved as soon as possible or

> 'ἐὰμ μὴ ἀποδιδῶντι τὸ ἀργύριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, καθὼς ἐξ[ε][χώρησεν ἁ πό]λις τῶν Ὀρχομενίων, ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια'
>
> (l. 20-21: 'if they do not give back the silver to the Megalopolitans, as the polis of Orchomenos has agreed, those who do not act rightly will be liable for trial').

Therefore, it is the Achaian federal state and not Megalopolis that demanded action to be taken in order to resolve this dispute before Orchomenos joined the federation. After all, the internal equilibrium was what was most important to the federation.

3.2. Boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Helisson and Megalopolis and Thouria (182-167 BC)

Even though the boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Helisson and between the city and Thouria are two distinct cases, they will be discussed in the same subsection as both conflicts were described on the same marble slab.[354] Fragments of this marble slab carrying the inscriptions were found in Olympia and can be dated to the period 182-167 BC. For one, Thouria did not become an independent member of the Achaian *koinon* until 182 BC, since it was detached from Messene as a punishment for the city after the failed Messenian revolt of 183 BC in which Philopoimen died (Pol. 23. 17. 1-2). Additionally, the appearance of several influential Megalopolitans like Διοφάν[ει Διαίου, Θεαρίδα[ι Λυκόρτα, and Πολυβίω[ι Λυκόρτα (B. l. 5-6: Diophanes son of Diaios, Thearides son of Lykortas, and Polybius son of Lykortas) also helps narrow down the dating of the document. These men were active in the years before the mass banishment of the Achaians to Rome and are also mentioned in Polybius' narrative.[355] Moreover, both conflicts were arbitrated by an unknown *polis ekkletos* which could have sent out a committee led by a certain Aristomenes - Ἀρι]στομέ[ν]η (*Helisson* A. l. 3) and Ἀριστομένη (*Thouria* B. l. 14) – to physically inspect the boundary in question.

[354] Ager (n. 116) lists both disputes under the same number, no doubt because of this very same reason. Yet in her discussion of the inscription she does not seem to realise that we are dealing with two separate disputes.
[355] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 65-67.

However, most important of all: both cases see Megalopolis and a neighbouring polis arguing over a boundary with the federal government somehow involved.

3.2.1. Megalopolis and Helisson (182-167 BC)

The inscription tells us that Megalopolis and Helisson argued about a boundary between the two cities.[356] While the second party in the inscription was referred to as the polis of the Helisphasians (which is also mentioned in Pol. 11. 11. 6), another inscription (*IPArk* 9) makes it clear that this is the collective name for the inhabitants of Helisson, which had been connected to Megalopolis at the time of the synoecism (Paus. 8. 27. 3). After the dissolution of the Arkadian *koinon*, it seems to have been shifted between Sparta and Mantinea before becoming an independent member of the *koinon*.[357] In fact, there is an inscription that records a *sympoliteia* treaty between Mantinea and Helison dated to the fourth century BC, which was most likely connected to the wider Spartan-Mantinean tensions in the Peloponnese at the time (*IPArk* 9). The conflict itself was arbitrated twice but due to the fragmentary state of the text only a few basic pieces of information are known about the first dispute, such as the parties involved, the arbitrators and a detailed outline of the contested boundary. On the back of the marble slab, this detailed description of the boundary is repeated along with clear references to the two contending parties, i.e. Megalopolis and Helisson (or the Helisphasians in the inscription). This suggests that the first attempt at arbitration was unsuccessful. Unfortunately, we cannot say anything about the eventual outcome of this conflict, but a possible deadline for a solution may have been proposed as evidenced by the word 'τετράμηνος' (B l. 31: 'lasting four months'). However, considering Megalopolis was (ostensibly?) victorious in its contention with Thouria, one could argue that this was the case here as well since both disputes appear on the same marble slab which could very well have been erected and placed in Olympia to commemorate Megalopolis' two victories.

Just as with the previous case, several references in the text such as 'τᾶς ζαμία[ς' (A l. 3: 'of the fine') and 'Ἀχαιῶν δαμ[ιοργοι' (B l. 30: 'the Achaian damiorgoi') point

[356] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), n. 8., 53-62.
[357] Head (1888), 418. Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 58; sees in Helisson yet another one of those communities that split off from Megalopolis after 194 BC. While this is entirely possible, one has to wonder how many of these were lost to the polis and when should we stop assigning these towns to this one event. I think that in Helisson's case there is no reason to assume that the polis was one of these communities.

to the involvement of the federation. While the reference to Aristomenes does not mean a lot here, it is possible that the *koinon* had appointed him as the head of a federal committee, especially in connection with the fine mentioned a line below, which was one of the ways for the federal magistrates to make sure the decision was enforced.[358] Kaja Harter-Uibopuu argues that there was a difference between the fine mentioned here and the one issued by the federation in the boundary dispute with Sparta. However, the new inscription from Messene proves that fines were issued by federal magistrates when an arbitration was not respected by one of the parties. This was done by the federal *damiorgoi* which are mentioned both here as well as in the Messene inscription and in that instance they act in a judicial capacity by judging whether the dispute could be arbitrated in accordance with the federal laws.[359] Clearly because of the presence of a fine in addition to the *damiorgoi*, there was a need for the federal *koinon* to intervene – possibly at the request of the litigants - as one of the parties may not have respected the decision of the *polis ekkletos* or the committee under Aristomenes.

3.2.2. Megalopolis and Thouria (182-167 BC)

On this part of the marble slab we are dealing with another boundary dispute, this time between Megalopolis and Thouria and once again there is a detailed description of the boundary. There appear to be different stages in this conflict as is evident from the fact that an Achaian assembly at Sikyon is mentioned on lines 16 and 17. It is very plausible that the arbitration between Megalopolis and Thouria happened as a result of this Achaian assembly at Sikyon as an unknown polis can be seen acting as the arbitrator in addition to the commission under Aristomenes which acted as a smaller advisory council who most likely travelled to the area to inspect the border.[360] After this examination, both parties sent delegates to the *polis ekkletos* to plead their case. In comparison to the three delegates from Thouria, the nine representatives from Megalopolis can be read as a clear statement of intent by the Megalopolitans, especially considering the type of people that the polis chose to send. To resolve this conflict the polis elected several of their

[358] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 538. See also the discussion of the boundary disputes between Megalopolis and Messene and Megalopolis and Sparta below.
[359] Arnaoutoglou (2009-2010), 191.
[360] It seems rather likely that Aristomenes would be the head of a similar committee in Megalopolis' boundary dispute with Helisson which makes sense if we look at the detailed boundary descriptions found in lines A5-39 and B 10-28.

most influential citizens as ambassadors such as Diophanes, Thearides and Polybius. All of these men were well known within Achaia as they had held different federal magistrates: Diophanes was the Achaian *strategos* for the year 192/1 BC (Livy 36. 31. 1-32. 9), Polybius was the hipparch for 170/169 BC (Pol. 28. 6. 8) and his brother Thearidas was part of several Achaian embassies to Rome (Pol. 32. 7. 1). Moreover, both Polybius and Thearidas were the sons of Lykortas who himself had been a close friend of Philopoimen and *strategos* of the *koinon*. By sending these experienced men to act on their behalf in a boundary dispute that seems to have been requested by the federal government, Megalopolis clearly shows that it knew what it meant to be a part of a federation and more importantly to use that to its advantage and get its way. This way the polis also informed other states that important Achaian statesmen from Megalopolis would still represent their native polis in its conflicts. Via these renowned experienced figures the city was able to show its prominence within the *koinon*, whichcould only have benefited them.[361] The fact that Lykortas is not mentioned as one of the Megalopolitan envoys could easily be explained by the fact that he was acting as Achaian *strategos* at the time.[362]

The federal *koinon* seems to have been the one to decide that the region under dispute should belong to Megalopolis:

> 'κατ[ὰ τὸ γραπτὸν ὃ ἔθε[σαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ . . . . . ἐ]ν τᾶι ἐν [Σι]κυῶνι συνόδω[ι, Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν εἶμεν τὰν χώρα]μ πλὰν τὰν Δωρίδα'
>
> (A l. 15-18: 'following the proclamation that the Achaians made ... in the assembly in Sikyon, the Megalopolitans will possess the land except Doris').

While the *koinon* could intervene in disputes between its members, it rarely did so and thus the situation here is a little unusual. The fact that it is in the assembly at Sikyon that the Achaians make the decision to grant the land to Megalopolis is noteworthy, since the assembly was normally not connected to procedures like this. However, this is not the only instance in which the *koinon* asks another polis to arbitrate a conflict and from comparison with the other cases it can be inferred that the first stages of this boundary dispute must have been connected to the entrance of an independent Thouria into the *koinon* and the Achaian desire to have this dispute settled. Since we know Thouria was

[361] It seems that Megalopolis was victorious in the end in this dispute which makes me think that this also had to be the case in the other boundary dispute with Helisson. Surely, they would not be featured on the same marble slab if Megalopolis was not successful in both cases.
[362] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 67.

freed from Messene in 182 BC, the Achaians made their decision soon after the Messenian rebellion, which is also evidenced by the references to Messene (A l. 6, 10, 14, 15 and 20) thereby explaining the exceptional nature of this decision. Nonetheless, the second ruling by the *polis ekkletos* after the examination of the boundary by Aristomenes and his committee could have still taken place in later years, which would be consistent with the presence of Polybius and his brother in the inscription; the absence of references to Messene only strengthens this point.[363] Obviously, the historical background explains the reason for the Achaian involvement in this instance but that did not mean Megalopolis was not happy about this, as it provided them with another chance to use their influence on and understanding of the federation, whilst simultaneously showing their influence to other members which is clearly what they hoped to achieve through their impressive number of delegates.

Another inscription found in Thouria (*ISE* 51) forms an interesting addendum to this boundary dispute as it records an agreement between the two cities to have disputes (*κρίσεις*) arbitrated by the city of Patrai (l. 4-8).[364] The exact reason for these disputes is not known as this was just the agreement for an arbitration, nor is its outcome, although the 140 names of Thourian representatives that are part of the inscription would suggest that Thouria was victorious as

> 'ἂν νικάσωμες, ἀναγραψάτω ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τᾶς Συρίας εἰς στάλαν λιθίναν τούς τε συνδίκους πάντας πατριστί'
>
> (l. 11-14: 'if we should win, all representatives will be engraved on a stone stele with their father's name in the sanctuary of Syrios').

Ager dates this inscription to the period around 150 BC, as she argues that the arbitration by Patrai was in line with the traditional process that disputes within the federation were generally handed over to a third party within the *koinon.*[365] If this is the case, this is a good example of what happens when Megalopolis does not rely on the federal state to support its claims in interactions with other member states. Moreover, the fact that Patrai was chosen to be the judge might indicate that the *koinon* did not deem it necessary to intervene and if indeed the inscription is to be dated to the period around 150 BC, the federal state and its leaders may have been concerned with other, more pressing matters.

[363] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 521; and Taeubner (2006), 343-344.
[364] Ager (1995), 394-396; *ISE* 51, *SEG* 61 307, Roebuck (1945), 165.
[365] Ager (1995), 395, ft. 1.

However, other scholars have argued that the fact that the federal state is not referred to at all in the inscription and the Greek text mentions *synedrois,* can only indicate that the dispute should actually be dated to the period after 146 BC.[366] I am inclined to follow this theory as it is more consistent with the fact that, in the earlier period Megalopolis handled its disputes in a different way, with a habit of involving the federal magistrates in these conflicts.

3.3. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene (soon after 182 BC)

3.3.1. The dispute

In the aftermath of the failed Messenian rebellion against the Achaian *koinon* in 183/182 BC, the Megalopolitans saw their chance to lay claim to the areas of Endania and Pylana which had been in the hands of the Messenians until shortly before the rebellion.[367] According to an inscription that was found in Messene in 2008 by Petros Themelis, this was the first of several attempts to gain control of these two areas as well as two other regions known as Akreiatis and Bipeiatis.[368] These attempts were eventually unsuccessful as can be seen from the Greek text:

> 'ὅπως οὖν ὑπόμναμα εἶ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον ὅτι περί τε τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος καὶ Βιπειάτιος κρίμασιν ἐνικάσαμες τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας καὶ περὶ τε τᾶς ζαμίας ἃς ἐζαμίωσαν ἀμὲ οἱ δαμιοργοὶ ἐνικάσαμες'
>
> (l. 85-90: 'so that there may be a memorial for later times of the fact that we won from the Megalopolitans over Akreiatis and Bipeiatis in judgements and that we won in connection to the fine that we were fined by the federal damiorgoi').

The inscription recounting the boundary dispute between the two states is 190 lines long and only half of it has been published. Inscribed on a marble slate, it forms part of the base of an equestrian monument situated near a Doric temple in Messene.[369]

The boundary dispute is rather complicated as there seem to have been several arbitrations between Megalopolis and Messene – and a third party called the Kalliatai –

[366] Chaniotis et al. (2011), http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1874-6772_seg_a61_307.
[367] SEG 58.370; Themelis (2008); Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010); Luraghi and Magnetto (2012).
[368] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 513-514.
[369] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 509. The equestrian monument itself was not found in situ and there does not seem to be any specific connection between the two aside from the fact that the Messenians used it to preserve the final arbitration for posterity.

about four different regions, i. e. Akreiatis, Bipeiatis, Endania and Pylania.[370] In addition to these arbitrations, the Messenians also filed a lawsuit against the Megalopolitans which was overturned by the federal magistrates who instead fined the Messenians for not wanting to undergo another arbitration. The conflict was instigated by the Megalopolitans about the ownership and produce of the region of Akreiatis whicht they claim, in the unpublished section of the document was under their control at the time of their entry into the *koinon*.[371] Unlike the other disputes, this first *proklesis* was about the ownership of the region and not its boundaries and a court outside of the Achaian *koinon* was chosen.

A second step was then the Megalopolitan appeal to the Achaian *synodos* in Elis in which they claimed that the regions of Endania and Pylana were theirs (l. 2-11).[372] Apparently, the Megalopolitans had tried this before, but had been unsuccessful. This time, however, their official claim to the Achaian *synodos* leads to the first arbitration about these regions at the Karneiaseion in Endania by the so-called *agemonas*, a group of influential Achaians. However, before a verdict was reached, the Megalopolitans withdrew their claim. The unpublished text also shows that the Megalopolitans now changed tactic regarding Akreiatis as they switched the focus from a dispute about the ownership of the region to a dispute about the borders.[373] Shortly, thereafter a new arbitration arose between the Messenians and the Kalliatai (who according to the text were acting on behalf of Megalopolis), this time about two other areas: Akreiatis and Bipeiatis (l. 12-43). This was followed by a second arbitration in the polis of Aigion where only seven out of the 147 judges thought the Megalopolitan-Kalliatan claim was valid. The general rule was if one of the disputing parties withdrew their claim, the other automatically won.[374]

So, after they won both arbitrations, the Messenians involved Megalopolis in a lawsuit concerning the produce from Akreiatis (l. 65-78). Interestingly, the unpublished text as discussed by Gerhard Thür shows that this region was at the heart of the conflict

[370] While the exact location of some of the regions under dispute between the two poleis are not known today, they were undoubtedly situated somewhere between the poleis at strategic points. For more information on this, see Themelis (2008).
[371] Thür (2011), 299-300.
[372] Interestingly, Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010) wrongly states that Megalopolis is claiming ownership of all four regions at this point. The Greek text clearly states that they are only concerned with two areas at this point.
[373] Thür (2011), 300-301.
[374] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 529.

between the two poleis as both parties continued to argue about it, inside and outsid of official courts: they sent embassies to one another about the matter and argued about it even after the verdict rendered by Aigion.[375] Arguing that this overall dispute was not yet settled, the Megalopolitans however used the lawsuit about the produce of the region to obtain yet another arbitration about the areas and subsequently the Messenians were fined 3000 drachms by the federal *damiorgoi* for refusing to comply with this decision.[376] In the end, the Messenians were also victorious in the final arbitration by six Milesian judges and the entire argument was engraved on the equestrian monument (l. 79-100).

Concerning the date of the dispute, there are some elements in the inscription that indicate some connections to the Messenian rebellion against the Achaian *koinon* in 183 BC.[377] Moreover, the identity of the so-called *agemones*, for example, can help us narrow down the time frame considerably. Since Kallikrates of Leontion and Archon of Aigira are among those cited as the *agemones*, the boundary dispute must have happened sometime in the early 180s or in the late 170s BC because we know both men were only active during this period (Pol. 22. 10. 8; Pol. 24. 8-10). Additionally, the opening lines of the decree refer to a time when 'κατασ[χόν]των τῶν Ἀχαιῶν Ἐνδανίαν καὶ [Πυλ]άναν, τᾶς δὲ πόλεος ἀποκατασ[ταθείσ]ας εἰς τὰν συνπολιτείαν τῶ[ν Ἀχαιῶν]' (l. 2-5: 'the Achaians were occupying Endania and Pylana, and when the polis (i.e. Messene) had been restored to the Achaian *koinon...* '), which further indicates that this dispute was connected to a conflict involving Messene and the *koinon*. Lastly, the reference to Apollonidas as *strategos* of the *koinon* (l. 30-31) rules out 183/2 BC as the year for the *synodos* in Elis and makes it clear that this particular *synodos* is not the one where the Messenians were readmitted to the *koinon*.[378] A list of Achaian *strategoi* that was compiled by Malcolm Errington lists Philopoimen - and Lykortas after the former's death - as the *strategos* for the year 183/2 BC, Kallikrates for 180/179 BC and Archon for 175/4 BC, so this leaves quite a few gaps for Apollonidas to have been *strategos*.[379] Luraghi and Magnetto have spotted the name Αἰνητίδα or Ainetidas in the inscription, whom they believe can be identified as the leader of the federal *damiorgoi* approving the fine for the Messenians (l. 96). Moreover, both authors consider him to be the

[375] Thür (2011), 304-309.
[376] Thür (2011), 306.
[377] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 522.
[378] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 521.
[379] Errington (1969), 263-265.

strategos of the *koinon* at this point.[380] Ilias Arnaoutoglou on the other hand suggests that Ainetidas could very well be the federal *grammateus* serving here as the eponymous magistrate.[381] However, I think it is possible that we are looking at another *strategos*. Clearly, some time had passed between the judgement of the agemones under Apollonidas and allocation of the fine by the *damiorgoi* under Ainetidas, but we do not know exactly how long this was.[382]

3.3.2. The historical background

In this boundary dispute, it is obvious that Megalopolis takes the first step with their appeal to the *synodos*. The reason for this lies in the historical background of the events, i. e. the Messenian rebellion against the *koinon*. This was the result of tensions between the member state and the federal government who had forcibly inducted Messene into the league in 191 BC under its *strategos* Diophanes of Megalopolis (Livy 36. 31. 1-10).[383] This formed the basis of a very troubled relationship between the two states which had always been at odds as they ended up on opposite sides of many conflicts, since Messene was always weary of the expansionist policy of the *koinon* which threatened Messene's independence.[384] Consequently, the Messenians were not thrilled about their Achaian membership (Pol. 22. 10. 4-6) and under an influential Messenian named Deinokrates the polis tried to secede in 183 BC. Philopoimen, who was the *strategos* of the *koinon*, tried to curb the rebellion but was captured and killed in Messene (Plut. *Phil.* 18; Livy 39. 49; Paus. 4. 29. 12). Following Philopoimen's death, Lykortas took over as *strategos* and ransacked Messene and the surrounding areas. At the end of the rebellion, Philopoimen's body was transported back to Megalopolis and buried there, accompanied by great honours. Eventually a statue of the statesman was erected in his

[380] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 534. See also Christian Habricht's appendix (p 545) in the article by Luraghi and Magnetto on the man.
[381] Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010), 187.
[382] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 542. The argument put forward by both authors that there is no definite proof of Lykortas becoming *strategos* in 182/1 BC as is generally assumed, is quite an interesting one as it opens up the years 182/1 for Apollonidas and 181/0 BC for Ainetidas. Even though Luraghi and Magnetto think that the several stages of the conflict happened in close proximity to one another timewise, I do not see a problem with the boundary dispute lasting several that the boundary dispute lasted for a few years with Apollonidas as *strategos* for 181/0 BC and Ainetidas shortly after Kallikrates.
[383] For a detailed discussion of these events, see Luraghi (2008), 252-266; and Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 51-521. That this Diophanes was from Megalopolis is in itself interesting, but the fact that a statue was dedicated to him in Megalopolis for being the first man to unite the Peloponnese by conquering Messene points to Megalopolitan involvement even before the death of Philopoimen (Paus. 8. 30. 5.).
[384] Luraghi (2008), 253.

hometown Megalopolis and he received a lavish funerary procession and his own cult (*IG* V² 432).[385]

Clearly, the Megalopolitans were deeply involved in these events and, it is therefore not surprising that Megalopolis was the initiating party of this dispute. They would have certainly known that the aftermath of the rebellion would be an ideal time to gain control over the contested areas and benefit from the situation between Messene and the federal state.[386] The motives for doing so were undoubtedly connected to Messene rebelling against the *koinon* and their involvement in the death of Philopoimen who, despite the attempt to banish him, was very popular in his hometown (Plut. *Phil.* 1. 4). As we have already seen he even received his own hero cult, as is evidenced from the inscription mentioned above which dates to 183 BC and details the honours for the fallen hero (*IG* V² 432 l. 4-17):

> '[τ]ιμαῖς ἰσοθέοις [ἀρε]τᾶς [ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐ][ε]ργεσίας, ἱδρύσα[σθαι δὲ εἰς τιμὰν αὐτοῦ] [ἐ]ν τᾶι ἀγορᾶι τὸ μ[νᾶμα καὶ μετᾶραι ἐκ …νίας τ[ὰ] ὀστέα εἰς τ[ὰν ἀγορὰν … καὶ βωμ[ὸν κατασκευάσαι λευκόλιθον ὡς] [κ]άλλιστον, καὶ β[ουθυτεῖν τᾶι ἁμέραι τᾶι] [Δι]ὸς Σωτῆρος, στεφα[νῶσαι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν εἰ][κ]όσι χαλκέαι[ς τέσσαρσι?, ὧν στᾶσαι τὰν] [μὲ]ν μίαν ἐν [τῶι θ]εάτ[ρωι … [π]εζικάν, τὰ[ν δὲ ἄλλαν … ..κον, τὰν δὲ ἄλ[λαν ἐν … [τ]ὰν δὲ ἄλλ[αν ἐν … καὶ ἀνακα][ρ]ῦξαι ἐν τῶ[ι ἀγῶνι τῶν Σωτηρίων τὸν] [στ]έφ[α]νον'
>
> ('godlike honours on account of his virtue and his benefaction, and to establish a memorial in the agora in his honour, and to transfer his bones from... to the agora... and to construct an altar of white marble, as beautiful as possible, to sacrifice an ox [on the day] of Zeus the Saviour; and to crown him with (?) four bronze statues, of which one shall be placed in the theatre... on foot, and another... and another... and another... and to announce the award of the crown at the Soteria games').

Since the city goes very far in honouring Philopoimen, it is very clear that they wanted to show how important Philopoimen had been to them and how upset it was with his death. However, as Peter Kató has pointed out, according to Plutarch the chief motivation for the Achaian (and Megalopolitan) actions after Philopoimen's death was revenge, but Polybius gives us a more nuanced image that highlights the political background that we can also find in these boundary disputes. In addition to losing their beloved leader, the Megalopolitans no doubt felt threatened by the fact that both Sparta

[385] Kató (2006), 239-250.
[386] Thür (2011), 300. The first Megalopolitan *proklesis* detailed in the unpublished part of the inscription clearly shows this.

and Messene were rebelling against the *koinon*.[387] This must have worried the polis even more than other members, since out of all the Achaians, they were geographically closest to both Sparta and Messene and formed the border of the territory under control of the Achaian *koinon*. Moreover, this is also reflected in the epigraphical record through the boundary disputes that are discussed here and which are dated after or around 180 BC.[388]

Because of this, it is logical that the Megalopolitans would have thought this dispute could be a good way of striking back at the Messenians for causing the death of Philopoimen. Up to this point however, as we have already seen, the relationship between Megalopolis and Messene was a complex one, since both poleis seem to have been closely connected with one another for a very long time.[389] For example, both cities were first established in the throngs of a profound wave of anti-Spartanism in the Peloponnese, a policy heavily advocated by the Thebans.[390] This hatred of Sparta was a unifying factor for both poleis because of their close proximity to Lakedaimon, which meant they often had to bear the brunt of Spartan aggression.[391] Already in the fourth century, Demosthenes illustrates this fact in his speech *For the Megalopolitans* when he mentions the scenario of a possible Spartan capture of Megalopolis which then would be followed by an attack on Messene. This would increase Spartan power in the Peloponnese and make helping the Messenians plausible, since they were an Athenian ally at the time (Dem. *Meg.* 8). Even more, when the Spartan king Kleomenes sacked Megalopolis in 223/2 BC, the inhabitants of the city managed to escape and find shelter with the Messenians (Pol. 2. 62. 10).[392] The Messenians were happy to help since

> 'τῶν τε ἀρχαίων ἔργων ἕνεκα ὁπόσα ἐπὶ Ἀριστομένους ὑπῆρκτο Ἀρκάσι καὶ ὕστερον ἐπὶ τοῦ οἰκισμοῦ τοῦ Μεσσήνης, ἀποδιδόντες σφίσι τὴν ὁμοίαν'
>
> (Paus. 4. 29. 5: 'because of old deeds done by the Arkadians at the time of Aristomenos and again at the foundation of Messene, they wanted to repay the favour').

[387] Kató (2006), 239-245.
[388] Kató (2006), 239-245.
[389] For a more detailed discussion about the foundation of Megalopolis, the role of Epaminondas and a comparison between Megalopolis and Messene, see chapter one.
[390] Roy (1994), 193.
[391] Luraghi (2008), 210.
[392] Coincidentally, the only reason why Kleomenes was successful was because he had the help of some of the Messenian exiles who were living in Megalopolis. As argued before, within Messene there was a genuine hatred for Sparta just as in Megalopolis, yet this did not mean that individual citizens could not act on their own personal interests as was the case with the Messenian exiles here.

Additionally, when the Spartan tyrant Nabis attacked Messene, Philopoimen and other Megalopolitans came to their aid (Paus. 4. 29. 10). As long as Sparta was involved, the relationship between Messene and Megalopolis seems to have been one of mutual understanding and cooperation as they were working towards the same goal. Yet when the Achaian *koinon* became involved and forced Messene into the federation against its will – and through the initiative of a Megalopolitan no less -, Megalopolis could not understand the Messenian point of view, because the Megalopolitans had willingly joined since they saw the benefits of being part of a federation. And their relationship no doubt became even more strained when the Messenian rebellion led to the death of their beloved leader, leading the citizens to attempt to profit from the aftermath of the conflict soas to get revenge on the Messenians.

I am sure that the Megalopolitans were convinced that they would be victorious and the *koinon* would back them in the conflict, since they had done so in other boundary disputes and could be expected be extra helpful in this case considering the current state of affairs. If we look at the text of the inscription again, it is clear that the Megalopolitans were very much mistaken: the federation did not support their claim. When Megalopolis entered a formal request (αἴτηνα), 'τῶν δὲ Ἀχαι[ῶν α]ὐτοῖς π[ρο]ειπάντων μή κα περιθέμεν Μεγαλοπολίταις τὰν Μεσσανίων' (l. 9-11: the Achaians answered them that they would not give Messenian lands to the Megalopolitans'). This rejection must have come as a surprise for the Megalopolitans and it did not stop them from

> 'ἐν τᾶι ἐν Ἄλει συνόδωι θέλειν κριθῆ[μεν μ]ὲν ποθ' ἀμέ περί τε τᾶς πρότερον χώρας ἀντελέγοσαν ἀμῖν καὶ περὶ τᾶς Ἐνδανίκας καὶ Πυλανίκας'
>
> (l. 12-15: 'at the synodos in Elis wanting to go to court with us concerning the lands previously disputed with us and they also called us to court concerning the lands of Endania and Pylania').

However, it might serve as an additional explanation for the polis' withdrawal when this dispute was arbitrated for the first time by the *agemones* at the Karneiaseion, since the actions of the Megalopolitans at this stage of the conflict are quite illogical. One can pose the question why they would want to withdraw their claim, knowing fully well that they would lose the dispute automatically? I think the answer here can be found in the first rejection suffered by Megalopolis – which they had not forgotten by the time of the Karneiaseion arbitration – in combination with the identity of the individuals appointed

as the *agemones* by the *koinon*. All of these were important men from cities outside of the disputed regions or the parties involved. Most likely this was done to ensure absolute impartiality from all of the judges as they were dealing with two important members of the federation so shortly after a delicate situation.[393] While this makes sense from the federal point of view, it was problematic for the Megalopolitans whose influence within the *koinon* mostly came from its ability to understand and manipulate the federal government via its own influential individuals. Consequently, a victory in this case was rendered highly unlikely. The polis probably agreed to the choice of judges at first, but, when things seemed to go awry for them at the actual arbitration, they saw that it would be better to withdraw their claim and try reach their goals via the Kalliatai and their claim.[394] Moreover, as the unpulished text shows, the Megalopolitans were still involved in an ongoing dispute with the Messenians about the ownership of Akreiatis and therefore might not have considered it constructive to further pursue this issue.[395]

The Megalopolitans would eventually try again and, through a claim made by a group called the Kalliatai, two new areas were brought into the boundary dispute. The Kalliatai are described by the Messenians as the minions of Megalopolis. While we have to remain aware of the heavily biased nature of the inscription, it is very possible that these people were indeed acting on behalf of the Megalopolitans. The Kalliatai might be one of the *komai* that separated itself from Megalopolis or it could simply be a small city close to Megalopolis with a shared interest in the disputed regions. Pausanias does mention an Arkadian city called Kallia (Paus. 8. 27. 4), but it does not border on any of the contested areas.[396] Whoever the Kalliatai were, they seem to have had a legitimate interest in the case. Looking at the connection that still existed between Methydrion and Megalopolis after its separation, it is very possible that this was one of the former Megalopolitan *komai* acting under Megalopolitan influence. These claims were judged by the city of Aigion where 140 out of 147 judges agreed with the Messenians.

A short time after this second arbitration the Messenians brought a lawsuit against the Megalopolitans in connection to shared produce from one of the contested territories. The lawsuit was brought before the federal *damiorgoi* who ruled that this

[393] Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010), 190.
[394] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 533.
[395] Thür (2011), 302-303.
[396] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 531.

lawsuit was invalid and instead fined the Messenians. They seem to have supported Megalopolis in their counterclaim that argued for another arbitration since no formal one had taken place, and fined Messene for not complying with this ruling (l. 70-75). At first sight this support for Megalopolis from the federal *damiorgoi* aligns very well with the other boundary disputes that we have seen in the previous inscriptions, but it is important to note that they are only fining the Messenians for not agreeing to a formal arbitration. As argued previously, this type of fine was often issued by the *damiorgoi* to punish members like Messene when they refused a formal arbitration.[397] The fact that the *damiorgoi* issued a fine to the Messenians would indicate these federal magistrates thought that the previous arbitrations in the case were invalid, since the Messenians were required to have the dispute arbitrated one final time by a panel of six Milesian judges which once again agreed with the Messenian claim and reversed the fine, thereby ending the dispute which was recorded for posterity in the inscription.

3.3.3. The dispute and the wider interurban interaction within the Achaian *koinon*

Aside from giving some much-needed information about the relationship between Megalopolis and other member states in the second century BC, and more importantly the relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon*, the Greek text tells us more about of the federal *damiorgoi*, federal fines and their connections to these interurban arbitrations. For example, we can see that this fine was issued by the federal magistrates in cases where the parties did not accept the request for arbitration like Messene did, or rejected the decision taken by the arbitrator like Sparta did in the boundary dispute discussed hereafter. It seems as though these fines were one of the few ways that the federal state actively interfered in the arbitration process and because of the Messene inscription we know that they were issued by the federal *damiorgoi*. In this dispute, those magistrates are the first point of contact between the federal state and its members in case of problems which makes it clear that any appeals to the federation will have happened through these magistrates. The fact that they are alluded to in every inscription connected to Megalopolis, proves that the polis had a history of settling problems with other poleis with the support of the Achaian magistrates.

[397] Arnaoutoglou (2009/2010), 190-191.

Furthermore, just as in the case of Megalopolis' boundary dispute with Thouria, the legal battle with the Messenians shows that Megalopolis achieved its position of influence within the *koinon* through its understanding of federal procedures. In the dispute with Thouria, the polis showed this by sending its most influential statesmen to the arbitration. In the Messenian case, the understanding of the federal protocols is illustrated by the manipulation of the federal customs via repeated appeals to the federal state for arbitration. When one appeal failed, the polis tried to get their way by using another method, i. e. soliciting the *synodos* or the federal *damiorgoi*, withdrawing or changing their claim as soon as it became clear that they were not going to win and then involving another group in the dispute.[398] However, while Megalopolis did fully understand that these customs were the basis for its position of power within the *koinon*, the inscription also shows that their strategy did not always produce the intended results. It is clear that the polis had misread the events that formed the backdrop to this boundary dispute which meant that unlike in the other boundary disputes that involved Megalopolis, the polis was unsuccessful.[399] Finally, the unpublished text also supports the argument made in previous chapters that Megalopolis was a city with the highest regard for federalism and federal procedures, something that was shared by the Achaian *koinon* in general: Megalopolis argued to change the external court of the Akreiatis dispute to an internal Achaian one as Messene had rejoined the *koinon* since the start of the dispute and according to the proper procedures identified at the start of this chapter, all ongoing disputes had to be arbitrated in connection with the federal state.[400]

So, while Megalopolis did indeed have a prominent position within the *koinon*, the ultimate goal for the Achaian state was to ensure the equality of all of its members. Consequently, when Megalopolis attempted to use the events of the Messenian rebellion to their advantage by laying claim to territories that had previously been Messenian, the federation and those in charge felt it wise to reject this proposal in order to ensure a continuation of the internal peace.[401] This is also evidenced by the choice of the *agemones* who included Kallikrates of Leontion as well as Archon of Aigira, which indicates that the federation wanted to ensure neutrality in the judgement of this

[398] Thür (2011), 305.
[399] Thür (2011), 309.
[400] Thür (2011), 302.
[401] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 540-544.

arbitration. Furthermore, the whole dispute clearly illustrates that Megalopolis must have applied to the federal government in disputes with other members of the federation. Even though the *koinon* itself encouraged this, it still refrained itself from active arbitration, preferring to delegate this task to others or letting the disputing parties chose the arbitrator. It seems that there was a part of the Achaian federal statesmen who thought Megalopolis was simply trying to profit from the situation and cause trouble, something which they refused to give into. This is why the first Megalopolitan proposal was rejected at a *synodos* that took place in Megalopolis itself (Pol. 23. 16. 12-17. 2). After all, the secession of Messene and any possible subsequent conflicts threatened the internal status quo of the *koinon* and this was the absolute last thing that the federal state wanted.

The Messene-Megalopolis inscription is a very interesting document as it provides us with a lot of new information on the internal organisation of the Achaian *koinon* and the way its members interacted with each other and the federal government. It sheds more light on the function of the federal *damiorgoi* who seem to have been one of the first points of contact between the local and the federal level. Most importantly however, this inscription is of vital importance for this chapter as it illustrates that Megalopolis was not always successful in its attempts to involve the federal state in its boundary disputes. Finally, the inscription clearly shows that the federal state also had its own priorities when it came to dealing with its member states. In this case, the *koinon* preferred to preserve the equilibrium within the federation to ensure that it could function without any internal troubles after the problems the Messenian rebellion had caused, even if it came at the cost of the Megalopolitan ambitions.

3.4. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta (after 164 BC)

The discussion of the boundary dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis (Mackil n. 45) will be the final section of this chapter, as well as bridging the transition to the last part of this thesis which deals with Megalopolis' role in Achaian foreign politics. As the conflict between Megalopolis and Sparta was an important part of both the internal and the external affairs of the federal state, it is necessary to discuss the boundary dispute here and in the last chapter of this dissertation. This is crucial because Megalopolis' interactions with Sparta were part of its relationships with other members of the Achaian *koinon*, whilst simultaneously being the corner stone of Achaian relations with its biggest

ally from the beginning of the second century: Rome. Even though Rome seems to have been connected to the dispute as both parties apparently brought their grievances to the city (l. 43-44), I will refrain from discussing the significance of this involvement here and return to it in chapter five. which is a re-examination of Achaian-Roman interactions through the antagonism between the Megalopolitan politicians and Sparta. Accordingly, here I will draw attention to the elements important for the internal relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian federal system and how that influenced its interaction with other members.

Just like the stele bearing the Helisson and Thouria inscriptions, this inscription was also found in Olympia, and deals with a boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta, which later turned into a dispute between Sparta and the Achaian *koinon* when Sparta did not accept the fine imposed on them by the federal magistrates. The most plausible date for the boundary dispute is most likely after 164 BC as we can see from a passage in Polybius in which Megalopolis and Sparta appealed to Rome to get this conflict resolved, which is dated to 164 BC (Pol. 31. 1. 6-7). Pausanias tells us that the Roman senate subsequently appointed Gaius Sulpicius Gallus and Manius Sergius as intermediaries to solve the conflict, but handed the final decision over to Kallikrates (Paus. 7. 11. 1-2). Pausanias' passage however is problematic since he lists Argos and Sparta as the two parties in this conflict.[402] Even though we cannot be certain that Pausanias is making a mistake here and actually means Megalopolis and not Argos, the general information he gives does seem to correspond with the inscription and Polybius' passage.[403] Additionally, the fact that the Romans hand the final decision back to the Achaian *koinon* is completely in line with the conventional Roman-Greek interactions in this period. These were characterised by Greek embassies that were going to Rome to ask for arbitration or support in their conflicts and on the one hand and the Roman Senate, delegating the solution of these conflicts to third parties. This is clear from the many embassies sent by Sparta and Messene which in most instances saw the Senate refer the case back to the Achaian *koinon* as was the norm for any internal conflict.[404]

The main cause for this boundary dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis is over the control of the regions Skiritis and Aigytis which had been the subject of struggles

[402] Ager (1996), 375-379.
[403] Mackil (2013), 479.
[404] For more on this, see chapter five.

between the two states for a long time. Interestingly, Kaja Harter-Uipobuu thinks that a first arbitration about these regions occurred under Philip II of Macedon when the king restored certain areas under Lakedaimonian control to Tegea, Argos, Megalopolis and Messene (Pol. 9. 28. 9-10).[405] Even though Polybius does not explicitly mention these two regions, Harter-Uipobuu cites several other sources to prove her point (Paus. 7. 11. 1; Strabo. 8. 4. 6; Livy 38. 34. 1; Tac. *An.* 4. 43. 1.). These sources do show that Harter-Uibopuu is right about the fact that Skiritis and Aigytis were most likely one of the regions Polybius is talking about, since another passage from Livy mentions the Belbinatis which was another region between Megalopolis and Sparta which 'iniuria tyranni Lakedaimoniorum possederant' (Livy 38. 34. 8: 'the Lakedaimonian tyrants had possessed unjustly'). Therefore, I do not think that Philip II's actions should be seen as a first arbitration in a conflict between Sparta and Megalopolis, since there is not enough proof for this and the sources cited by Harter-Uibopuu do not refer to a specific arbitration.[406] For example, the Livy passage only uses Philip II for dating purposes, while Tacitus and Strabo mention the same general information as Polybius does. However, we do know that the Belbinatis region as well as the two regions mentioned in the boundary description were frequent points of contention between Sparta and Megalopolis due to the many violent attempts to gain control over the areas which were originally Arkadian (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 24).[407] In the following decades, several of the Spartan kings and tyrants try to take control of Aigytis, Skiritis and Belminatis: Kleomenes managed to conquer the Athenaion in 228 BC only to have it restored to Megalopolis by Antigonos Gonatas (Pol. 2. 54. 3); Machanidas gained control of the Belbinatis again in 210 BC (Pol. 4. 37. 6), after which it remained under Spartan control until Philopoimen defeated Nabis of Sparta in 192 BC, when the region finally became part of the Megalopolitan territory again.[408]

While the inscription records a decision on the boundary dispute between Sparta and Megalopolis, we clearly see the federal state acting as a litigant on behalf of the Megalopolitans:

[405] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 82-88. *IvO* 47; *Syll.* 665. Ager (1996) n. 116 135-137.
[406] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 85-86.
[407] For more information on this, see chapter four.
[408] Cartledge and Spawforth (1998), 78.

> ‘ἀπόφασις δικαστᾶν π[ερὶ χώρας ἀμφιλλεγομένας, τῶν αἱρεθέντων] δικάσαι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κ[αὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις’
>
> (l. 1-2: ‘the decision of the judges about the lands under dispute. These were chosen to judge between the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians’).

The fact that Sparta was apparently given a fine (l. 5-6: περὶ τᾶς ζαμίας ἃς ἐζαμίωσα[ν … τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Λα]κεδαιμονίων’ - ‘about the fine imposed... to the people of Lakedaimon’) further indicates that the polis had caused trouble by not accepting previous verdicts which were in favour of Megalopolis since

> ‘οἱ δικασταὶ ἔκριν]αν γ[ενέσθαι] [τὰν Σκιρ]ῖτιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρ̣κ[άδων ἀπὸ] τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς [Π]ελοπόννασον κατελθεῖν.’
>
> (l. 34-36: ‘the judges decided that Skirits and Aigytis were Arkadian ever since the Herakleidai returned to the Peloponnese’).

This is the reason why the federal state is so involved in this boundary dispute and acts as a claimant in this inscription: Sparta was causing internal trouble within the *koinon* by not accepting the previous arbitration by 101 judges (l. 37-38) which meant the *koinon* had to actively take a stand. In fact, the entire reason for writing this inscription was

> ‘ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ’ αὐτοὺς ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ διατε[λ]ῶντι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰράναι καὶ εὐνομίαι’
>
> (l. 17-19: ‘so that the Achaians, governing themselves democratically and agreeing amongst themselves, could remain in peace and benevolence for all time’).

After all, the highest priority for the *koinon* was to secure its internal peace and the best way to do this was to enter the conflict on the side of the Megalopolitans. The fact that the two parties were Sparta and Megalopolis may have been the reason why the *koinon* also felt the need to personally intervene, since they did not do so in the previous dispute. Although there is no clear evidence in the inscription for Megalopolis having appealed to the *koinon* to settle this dispute before asking Rome to intervene, the past actions of the two states in connection to the conflict make it clear that the *koinon* (and its allies) supported Megalopolis. The polis obviously knew this and may very well have tried to use its position within the *koinon* to secure a positive judgement.

* * * * *

Throughout this chapter, Megalopolis' membership of the Achaian *koinon* has been examined and it has become apparent that the polis can be characterized as a typical Achaian polis. We have seen that the polis was quite influential within the federal state and that it actively took part in the internal life of the federal state. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Megalopolis was one of the first poleis to mint the bronze federal coinage and express their pride at being part of the federation. In addition to this, Megalopolis also sent representatives to the federal institutions and hosted the federal assembly several times in their city after 188 BC. That the Megalopolitans valued their participation in these institutions can be inferred from the fact that the polis appears on both *nomographoi* lists, since this indicates that the polis was willing to send their *nomographoi* to meetings even when the whole board did not have to be there. This commitment of the polis to the federal institutions and procedures is also a typical example of the Megalopolitan identity and is also exemplified by Polybius in his comments on the superiority of the Achaiain constitution as discussed in chapter two.

However, through its interactions with the other members of the federation, this picture becomes even more complete. Generally, it seems as though the Achaian *koinon* preferred to stay out of conflicts between its members but when it came to Megalopolis, there appears to always be some sort of federal involvement. While this generally supports my thesis that Megalopolis held a special position in the Achaian *koinon*, the specifics of each of the five boundary disputes discussed in this chapter provide a more nuanced result. In the first place, the *koinon* intervened to secure the internal status quo of the federation as was the case in the disputes between Megalopolis and Messene and Megalopolis and Sparta, but this does not mean that Megalopolis did not try to use its position within the federation to its own advantage. The polis clearly understood how the federal institutions and procedures worked which is why they were so keen on taking part and representing themselves. In the boundary disputes, the city also shows this through their repeated and varied appeals in the boundary dispute with Messene where they try different approaches to get control over the disputed areas, but they remain unsuccessful in the end. In the boundary dispute with Thouria, the polis has a different tactic which is successful: they sent their most influential and famous citizens to represent Megalopolits at the arbitration. Moreover, all of the inscriptions refer to the federal *damiorgoi* and allude to some sort of fine. As we have seen from the recently excavated Messene inscription, these fines were issued by the *damiorgoi* when one of the parties

was unwilling to cooperate with the arbitration process or the arbitrator's final verdict. All of this further indicates that Megalopolis seems to have had a habit of appealing to the federal magistrates in case of any arbitration that involved other members to ensure that they would receive the result they were hoping for. Furthermore, even when it came to their disputes with other members of the *koinon* Megalopolis was also committed to ensuring that these were settled peacefully and in accordance with the federal procedures.

This federal involvement in all of these disputes is striking as it indicates that there was something special about the relationship between the Achaian federal state and Megalopolis, something that rarely happened for other Achaian member states. While this is obviously true as Megalopolis did influence the foreign policy of the federation through its distinct local identity and interests, more generally speaking the first segment of this chapter has shown that as a member of the *koinon*, Megalopolis was also just like any other city. This is also clear from the boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene in which the *koinon's* number one priority was to ensure the equality of all of its members and make sure that the internal peace was kept. This meant that Megalopolis did not manage to get support from the *koinon* as a whole, which it was able to do in the other disputes in which there was no direct threat to the organisation of the *koinon*. Furthermore, the boundary dispute with Sparta shows this as well, but in this instance, it was Sparta that was the menace so the federation acted as a litigant on behalf of Megalopolis. Clearly, as far as the federal state was concerned, Megalopolis was a typical member of the federation, yet due to the polis' ability to utilise the federal institutions to its own advantage in these interactions and its active participation in these institutions, Megalopolis often succeeded in using the Achaian magistrates to increase its importance as a source of influence on the *koinon* whilst simultaneously furthering its own local interests. This is especially clear on the international level where the city was able to indirectly put its stamp on Achaian foreign politics through the many federal statesmen that came from Megalopolis and whose local identity clearly influenced their actions.

PART 3: MEGALOPOLIS AND ACHAIA: LOOKING AT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS FROM A LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The last chapter has shown that internally, the relationship between Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon* was often just like that of the other member states. However, the polis set itself apart from those other member states as it tried to use the federal institutions and procedures to its advantage on many different levels such as the boundary disputes discussed in the previous chapter or Philopoimen's proposal to rotate the meeting of the federal assembly in 188 BC in order to break the political monopoly of Aigion. As long as this did not influence the status quo within the *koinon*, the Achaians did not seem to mind, but if Megalopolis' actions were to endanger the federal equilibrium - as they threatened to do so in the boundary dispute with Messene – the federal state would choose to uphold the democratic nature of the federal state and prevent the polis' actions. The next section will show a very different side of the Achaian-Megalopolitan relationship as the influence of the local identity of the polis is very clear in the Achaian foreign policy during the period from 235 to 146 BC.

The way in which Megalopolis influenced the Achaian foreign politics can be dedected throughout the polis' federal membership. In the 220s BC, Megalopolis as a city was responsible for the first connections between the Achaians and the Macedonian king Antigonos during the Kleomenean War. However, after the Achaian *synodos* of 198 BC, the *koinon* abandoned their alliance with Philip V of Macedon in favour of Rome, and the nature of the Megalopolitan influence shifted from the civic level to the individual one as a result of the rise of important individuals from Megalopolis within Achaian federal politics, including like Philopoimen and Lykortas. Therefore, because the Megalopolitan role in Achaian foreign politics was very different in the second century BC from what it had been in the decades after they first joined the Achaian *koinon*, I have chosen to discuss the Achaian foreign politics in the third and second centuries in two separate chapters. This will also allow me to highlight some of these differences and changes in the Megalopolitan influence on the Achaian foreign policy as well as the development of the city's own local identity. Moreover, the two chapters consistently show that careful research can show that no Greek polis was unified and Greek political life marked by a complex interaction between different internal factions, even for cities outside of Sparta and Athens.

Chapter 4: Megalopolis and Achaian foreign politics in the third century BC

After Megalopolis joined the Achaian *koinon* in 235 BC, it did not take long for the city to be embroiled in its first international conflict: the Achaian War with Kleomenes III of Sparta (229-221 BC). Kleomenes ascended to the throne around 235 BC and soon became a formidable adversary (Plut. *Ar.* 35. 4). Tensions between Sparta and the *koinon* increased over the next few years, so when Kleomenes took possession of the Athenaion in Megalopolitan territory, the Achaians declared war with Sparta (Pol. 2. 46. 6). Lasting until 221 BC, the struggle was in many ways decisive for Achaian claims in the Peloponnese and their international politics due to the Achaian decision to invite the Macedonian king Antigonos Gonatas into the war around 225 BC. This was the start of an alliance between the two states.

The Kleomenean War will be used as a case study of Megalopolis' influence on Achaian foreign politics in the third century BC because it is the perfect example of the ways in which the core elements of the Megalopolitan identity shaped these federal interactions. For one, this was the first time that the Achaian *koinon* went to war with Sparta. The fact that this happened only six years after Megalopolis became a member of the federation is more than just a coincidence. Lydiades' actions during his federal career prove this point as they were directed at Sparta from the very start (Plut. *Ar.* 30. 3). It is clear therefore that the inclusion of Megalopolis into the federation brought with it an increased focus on Sparta because of the traditional antagonism between the two poleis and the fact that Sparta now shared an adjacent border with the federation through Megalopolis. In addition to Sparta becoming a federal concern, the war was also responsible for creating a formal alliance between the Achaians and the Macedonian kings, via Antigonos and his successor Philip V. Polybius tells us that Aratos was the architect behind this alliance, which is noteworthy as his previous policy of expansion in the Peloponnese was supposed to expel any Macedonian influence in the area. The Achaian expansion was also the reason why several tyrants like Lydiades renounced their tyranny and joined the *koinon*. However, as we have already argued in the introduction, Polybius has a habit of writing a version of events that was dominated by individuals such as Aratos in this case. This means that we lose sight of other actors at play such as

Megalopolis. Because of this, I believe that Megalopolis as a polis was responsible for establishing thr first contacts between Achaia and Macedon.

As a result of the problematic nature of the sources that describe the events of this war, it is important to nuance this Polybian claim and see what can be said with certainty once the sources are analysed. This chapter will therefore start with a general description of the events as they are depicted by four ancient authors, which will be followed by an analysis of the problems surrounding these narratives. Particular attention will be paid to Aratos' role as architect of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance as well as the connection of Megalopolis to the events of the War. In a second section of this chapter, I will discuss the history of Megalopolitan relations with Macedon to support my argument that Megalopolis was the real engineer of the alliance between the two states. Finally, throughout this chapter, Megalopolis' and the Achaian interactions with Sparta will be discussed and emphasized to as they formed the core element of Megalopolis' influence on Achaian foreign politics and connect Achaian relations with two very different allies – i.e. Macedon and Rome – during the third and second centuries BC.

1. The literary sources on the War against Kleomenes (229-222 BC)

1.1. The discrepancies in the accounts of Polybius and Plutarch about the War

We know of four ancient authors who describe the Kleomenean War: Polybius and Plutarch in addition to Aratos and Phylarchus whose works are now lost. Both Plutarch and Polybius give distinct versions of the conflict. While Plutarch places the historical events in relation to the biographical nature of his lives, Polybius' account is quite problematic in general, particularly as it occurs in book two of his *Histories* which served as the introduction to Polybius' narrative. In contrast to Polybius' later accounts of wars and conflicts, the description of the Kleomean War might not be as detailed because of this. However, both authors agree that these were the main events of the war: soon after his ascension to the throne, Kleomenes installed a series of social reforms in which former debts were cancelled, the Spartan land was equally distributed between the citizens and the old Lykurgean constitution was restored by abolishing offices such as the *ephorates*.[409] Kleomenes conquered several of the Arkadian cities closest to the

[409] Shimron (1964), 150.

Spartan border. When he made a move on the Athenaion in Belbina in 229 BC, which was a region under Megalopolitan control but heavily contested between the city and Sparta, the Achaians went to war with Sparta. After a few years, Kleomenes had achieved considerable successes: he won several decisive battles against the Achaians including the one at Ladokeia in 227 BC where Lydiades of Megalopolis had died, and Ptolemy III Euergetes had abandoned the Achaians in favour of the Spartan king (Pol. 2. 51). This left the *koinon* and its leader Aratos in a state of isolation and meant they had no other option than to ask Antigonos and his Macedonian forces to aid them, particularly after Kleomenes gained control over the city of Corinth in 225 BC. All sources mention Megalopolis' involvement in this affair because of their previous relations with Macedon. The Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos took place in 227 BC but it was not until 225/224 BC that the Achaians officially ratified an alliance with an embassy that included Aratos' son. By then the situation had become dire as the *koinon* had lost the financial support provided by Ptolemy III and Kleomenes had gained several notable military victories. This alliance marked a clear change in the war as Macedon was now fighting on the Achaian side. In 224 BC, Antigonos revived a new version of the Hellenic League which united his Greek allies under his leadership against Kleomenes.[410] Together, the allies managed to regain control over the Arkadian cities. Because of the loss of these cities, Kleomenes felt threatened and attacked Megalopolis (Plut. *Kleo.* 12. 2). Only in 222 BC, not long after the destruction of Megalopolis, did the two allies finally succeed in defeating the king in the battle at Sellasia.

While the general outline of the war is the same for both Polybius and Plutarch, the differences in their accounts provide us with a few problems. A first issue lies in the very different nature of the works of both authors. Polybius' description of the Kleomenean War is part of his idealised description of the constitution of the Achaian *koinon* in book two and is an explanation why the federation succeeded in incorporating the entire Peloponnese by Polybius' time. Therefore, the events of the war and Aratos' actions during it belong in this wider context: the idealised description of the Achaian

[410] This seems a tactic that was often employed by the Macedonian kings to gain control over their allies as earlier versions of the Hellenic League existed under Philip II when he was fighting against the Persains in 337/6 BC and it was revived by Antigonos Monophtalmos and Demetrios Poliorketes against Kassander in 302 BC.

polity and the men responsible for it. This is evidenced by Polybius' words on Aratos' role in the polity:

> 'ἧς ἀρχηγὸν μὲν καὶ καθηγεμόνα τῆς ὅλης ἐπιβολῆς Ἄρατον νομιστέον τὸν Σικυώνιον'
>
> (Pol. 2. 40. 2: 'Aratos of Sikyon should be seen as the initiator and guide of the project').

In Plutarch's case the war is mentioned in his Lives of *Kleomenes, Aratos* and briefly in the *Philopoimen*. As the main goal of these Lives is biographical, thus presenting us with two somewhat constrasting perspectives, making it difficult to get a nuanced view of what actually happened.

Additionally, Plutarch's *Lives of Aratus* and *Kleomenes* are a lot more detailed, even mentioning details that Polybius himself omitted such as the so-called political crisis within the *koinon* that happened shortly before the official creation of the alliance (Plut. *Ar.* 39-42; *Kleo.* 16-19). In these passages, Plutarch describes the resentment felt by some of the Achaians for Aratos and his policy and their willingness to align themselves with Kleomenes, which is why some of them were 'conquered' so easily by the king.[411] After the king's conquest of Corinth in 225 BC, Aratos apparently only barely made it out of the city and was soon elected general *plenipotentiary* (Plut. *Ar.* 41. 1). Subsequently, Kleomenes attempted to reconcile with the Achaians by offering them a joint garrison at Acrocorinth under his leadership but Aratos declined (Plut. *Kleo.* 19. 8). Another example of this was Plutarch's extensive details on Lydiades' political career after he joins the federation (Plut. *Ar.* 30; 35-37), something that is completely ignored in the *Histories*. While it is rather interesting that Polybius does not provide us with more information about Lydiades, whom he clearly admired, his silence on the first matter can be explained by the ideological context of book two of his narrative – i.e. the need to portray Aratos and the *koinon* in the best possible way – as he could not achieve this by giving a detailed overview of this political crisis. Moreover, the historian did not want to admit that there might have been those within the federation that supported the policies of Kleomenes, which has been suggested as the real reason behind Polybius' hatred for Kleomenes and his support for the Achaian War against the Spartan king.[412]

[411] Paschides (2008), 238.
[412] Shimron (1964b), 147.

Another illustrating example of the differences between Polybius' and Plutarch's accounts was the motivation of all parties to go to war. In his *Kleomenes*, Plutarch tells us that both sides had their reasons. The Spartan king thought it would be easier to install social reforms in the city during a time of war and Aratos

> 'παρηνώχλει τοῖς Ἀρκάσι καὶ περιέκοπτεν αὐτῶν μάλιστα τοὺς τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ὁμοροῦντας, ἀποπειρώμενος τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, καὶ τοῦ Κλεομένους ὡς νέου καὶ ἀπείρου καταφρονῶν'
>
> (Plut. Kleo. 3. 4-5: 'started disturbing the Arkadians and sacking the lands of those closest to the Achaians, trying to test the Lakedaimonians, and Kleomenes who he thought of as a young and inexperienced man").

Contrastingly, in the *Aratos*, he seems to try everything to avoid going to war with Kleomenes (Plut. *Ar.* 35). These different statements have everything to do with the nature of the two Lives which were meant to praise their respective subjects, making it obvious that the comment Plutarch makes about Aratos harassing the Arkadians was most likely a fabrication to shine a positive light on Kleomenes and his actions. If one considers that Plutarch seems to have used Phylarchus' histories as his source for the *Kleomenes*, this might further explain the nature of these contrasting statements in both lives as they were both based on sources that had their own subjective views on the war.

For Polybius, the Aitolians and their actions were the main motivation behind the war. The Kleomean War was the result of a secret pact between the Aitolian *koinon*, Kleomenes and Antigonos according to Polybius (Pol. 2. 45-47). At first glance Polybius' statement on this so-called triple alliance may very well be possible: the Aitolian *koinon* found itself by 228 BC in a declining position of power because of Antigonos Doson' emergence as a strong Macedonian king along with the rapid growth of the Achaian *koinon* in the Peloponnese.[413] However, closer examination of past relations between Sparta, Macedon and Aitolia, easily discards this mention of an alliance as just another claim made by Polybius – undoubtedly echoing Aratos – to justify the Achaian political actions of the time. The alliance fromed by the Achaians and Aitolians against Doson's predecessor Demetrios to protect both states against Macedonian aggression, was most likely inactive by 228 BC because of a lack of mutual support in ongoing conflicts that both *koina* were involved in (Pol. 2. 44. 1). Moreover, Kleomenes' acquisition of three Aitolian allies, i.e. Mantinea, Tegea and Orchomenus, without direct Aitolian action as

[413] Fine (1940), 132.

a result of the loss of these allies may indicate a friendly inclination of the Aitolians towards Sparta.[414] Thus an alliance between Sparta and Aitolia could be a possibility in the early years of the Kleomenean War. In fact, it was referred to by the Megalopolitan ambassadors Kerkidas and Nikophanes in their speech to Antigonos Doson when they were asking the king for help against Kleomenes in 225 BC (Pol. 2. 49. 9). However, this may have been Megalopolitan propaganda uttered by these envoys to secure Antigonos' involvement in the war. Nonetheless, the participation of the Macedonian kings in this particular agreement between Sparta and Aitolia is rather unlikely, since past relations between Macedon and Aitolia would not allow a Megalopolitan-Aitolian affliation to be established.[415] Clearly, Antigonos would not have preferred to have the Peloponnese dominated by the Aitolians, much more than he would have the Achaians or Kleomenes. So, the triple alliance that was the cause of the Kleomenean War according to Polybius is extremely unlikely to have involved Macedon, but it is rather possible that the Aitolians were involved on the Spartan side; that is at least until they withdrew themselves from the conflict early on.[416]

Due to these different explanations provided by both authors, the exact motives behind the war cannot be determined with certainty. However, both parties must have considered the benefits that would come from fighting this war. After his ascension in 235 BC, Kleomenes implemented a series of socio-political reforms with the goal of creating a stronger Sparta that he would ultimately restore to its former grandeur through a leading position in the Peloponnese.[417] This would be much easier to do in a time of war when external forces were only concerned about the king's actions outside of Sparta (Plut. *Kleo.* 3. 4-5). Additionally, if Kleomenes wanted to dominate the Peloponnese, he would have to do so by opposing the Achaian *koinon*, which had now incorporated one of Sparta's oldest enemies, Megalopolis. From the very moment that Kleomenes started stirring up trouble in Arkadia and the Megalopolitan borderland, the city would most certainly have appealed to the rest of the *koinon* to undertake action. Outwardly, Plutarch's statement about the Achaians and their leader Aratos not wanting a war with Sparta could be true because of a previous alliance between the two states under King

[414] Grainger (1999), 245-246.
[415] Fine (1940), 134-135.
[416] Grainger (1999), 245.
[417] Cartledge and Spawforth (2001), 48. See also Shimron (1964b) on Polybius' and the reforms as well as Shimron (1972), 43-44.

Agis IV (Plut. *Ag.* 13-15). Nevertheless, it is also true that by eliminating one of his most influential opponents, Aratos would be closer to reaching the completion of the strategy he had in mind for the Achaian League, i.e. the expansion of the *koinon* to include the entire Peloponnese (Pol. 2. 40. 2.).[418] Judging by the casual way in which alliances were made and broken, self-preservation and personal gain were essential motivators in international politics in mainland Greece during the third century BC.[419] Hence, a past alliance with Sparta would not have stopped Aratos and Achaia from declaring war on Sparta if the polis was a direct threat to one of its members, in particular as this past alliance was rather shortlived. So, when Kleomenes decided to attack the Athenaion on Megalopolitan territory, the Achaians did not hesitate to abstain from their original policy of resistance and come to the aid of their Arkadian member state.[420]

The second and most important example, where the narratives of Polybius and Plutarch vastly differ concerns the events leading up to the formation of the Achaian alliance with Macedon. In a very problematic account, Polybius recounts Aratos' realisation that after all the defeats the Achaians had suffered at the hands of Kleomenes, they would not be able to defeat Kleomenes on their own. And so,

> 'προορώμενος (Ἄρατος) τὸ μέλλον καὶ δεδιὼς τήν τε τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἀπόνοιαν καὶ τόλμαν ἔκρινε πρὸ πολλοῦ λυμαίνεσθαι τὴν ἐπιβολὴν αὐτῶν'
>
> (Pol. 2. 47. 4: 'foreseeing the future and fearing the senselessness and audacity of the Aitolians, he (Aratos) decided to beat them to the punch and ruin their plans'). [421]

The statesman did this by trying to establish an alliance with the Macedonian king in 225-224 BC, knowing that these negotiations had to happen in secret due to general Achaian resentment for Macedon. Therefore, he turned to Megalopolis because he knew that the polis had a good relationship with the Macedonians and its citizens were suffering heavily from the war. With the approval of the federal assembly, the Megalopolitans sent an embassy to Antigonos Gonatas to ask him for help. After

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[418] Walbank (1933), 66.
[419] Eckstein (2006), 79-117.
[420] Gruen (1972), 614.
[421] This idea of foresight shown by Aratos in this instance seems to be part of a bigger tradition in Polybius where he connects this ability to be able to foresee the course of a particular set of events to those leaders he seems to value most throughout his work. Elsewhere in the second book, both Lydiades (2. 44. 5) and his hero Philopoimen (2. 67. 4) show themselves capable of understanding the future and act accordingly. Clearly, the act of *προορώμενος* is one of those qualities a great leader had to possess in Polybius' eyes and without a doubt Aratos was one of those men, even if he was not the best general.

obtaining a promise to aid the *koinon*, the two ambassadors returned to the federal assembly on behalf of their polis to show the outcome of their mission and compel them to ask for his support at once. However, they found themselves opposed by Aratos who convinced them

> 'δι' αὐτῶν σῴζειν καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν: οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον. ἐὰν δ' ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας'
>
> (Pol. 2. 50. 11-12: 'to save the cities and land themselves: for nothing was better or more advantageous. If adverse fortune should prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends').

In the following chapter, Polybius explains that the Achaians had fewer and fewer opportunities to oppose an alliance with Macedon as Kleomenes conquered more and more of the Peloponnese. Finally, his conquest of Corinth solved one of Aratos' main concerns regarding the pending coalition with Macedon and the Achaians officially invited Antigonos into the Peloponnese (Pol. 2. 52).

Plutarch, on the other hand, does not pay a lot of attention to this supposed scheme initiated by Aratos, which he only mentions twice: in the *Kleomenes* he brings up the widespread belief that the Megalopolitans were the ones responsible for involving Antigonos in the war without acknowledging any involvement of the Achaian statesman (Plut. *Kleo.* 23. 2). In his life of *Aratos* on the other hand he says the following on the matter:

> 'καίτοι πᾶσαν ὁ Ἄρατος ἀφίησι φωνὴν ἀπολογιζόμενος τὴν ἀνάγκην, ὁ Πολύβιος δὲ αὐτὸν ἐκ πολλοῦ φησι καὶ πρὸ τῆς ἀνάγκης ὑφορώμενον τὸ θράσος τὸ τοῦ Κλεομένους κρύφα τῷ Ἀντιγόνῳ διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ τοὺς Μεγαλοπολίτας προκαθιέναι δεομένους Ἀχαιῶν ἐπικαλεῖσθαι τὸν Ἀντίγονον. οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιέζοντο τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα, συνεχῶς ἄγοντος αὐτοὺς καὶ φέροντος τοῦ Κλεομένους, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Φύλαρχος ἱστόρηκε περὶ τούτων, ᾧ μὴ τοῦ Πολυβίου μαρτυροῦντος οὐ πάνυ τι πιστεύειν ἄξιον ἦν. ἐνθουσιᾷ γὰρ ὅταν ἅψηται τοῦ Κλεομένους, ὑπ' εὐνοίας, καὶ καθάπερ ἐν δίκῃ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τῷ μὲν ἀντιδικῶν διατελεῖ, τῷ δὲ συναγορεύων'
>
> (Plut. Ar. 38. 7-8: 'And yet Aratos says everything that he can say in recounting this necessity. Polybius, however, says that for a long time, and before the necessity arose, Aratos mistrusted the courage of Kleomenes and held secret talks with Antigonus, besides putting the Megalopolitans forward to beg the Achaians to summon Antigonos. For the Megalopolitans were most oppressed by the war, since Kleomenes was continually plundering their territory. Phylarchos tells the same about these things, but it would not be worthy to trust

him at all if Polybius did not testify to the same thing. For goodwill makes his every mention of Kleomenes ecstatic, and as if he were pleading in a court of law, he is forever accusing Aratos in his history, and defending Kleomenes').

It is obvious that Megalopolis was somehow connected to the Achaian appeal to Antigonos Doson. Yet in the Greek passage cited above, Plutarch does not seem entirely convinced by Aratos' version of events which were driven by pure *ἀνάγκη,* nor by that of Phylarchus, who should not be taken at face value on account of his pro-Spartan sympathies.[422] Consequently, the biographer is more persuaded by Polybius' account than that of Phylarchus. Plutarch's words clearly illustrate the problem we are faced with in this chapter: all of the narratives were influenced by their author's underlying motives which, while interesting in themselves, make establishing the exact nature of the Megalopolitan role in the war more difficult. So, before this can be done several of these issues need to be addressed in more detail.

1.2. Polybius and Phylarchus

The historian Phylarchus was a contemporary of Aratos (Pol. 2. 56. 1.). He came from either Naukratis in Egypts or Athens and wrote several works including his own *Histories* which covered a wide time period including the Kleomenean War.[423] Yet, if we are to believe both Polybius and Plutarch, there should be some doubt about the credibility and veracity of his work. Apparently, Phylarchus had the tendency to ignore the flaws of the Spartan kings, Agis and Kleomenes, while attacking Aratos at every possible opportunity.[424] Due to this attitude towards both Kleomenes and Aratos, he has been severely criticised by Polybius himself. In an extensive passage (Pol. 2. 56-63), Polybius discusses four instances during the years of the war which he believes perfectly illustrate Phylarchus' overall weaknesses as a historian: the sacking of Mantinea by Achaia and Antigonos, the execution of Aristomachos of Argos, the sacking of Megalopolis by Kleomenes and the size of the booty taken from that attack. Obviously, there is an underlying biased tone here as these passages dealt with a few issues in which Polybius was emotionally invested.[425] As an Achaian and Megalopolitan, Polybius would have felt an urge to explain the reasons for the Achaian attack on Mantinea and the execution of

[422] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 130.
[423] For more information, see Africa (1961).
[424] Africa (1960), 267.
[425] See the discussion in section two of chapter two.

Aristomachos – who had both betrayed the Achaians - to his audience and, naturally, correct any negative judgements about his fellow Megalopolitans.[426] However, the main point of criticism uttered by the historian with which we are concerned here is historiographical and is connected to Polybius' objection to Phylarchus' natural tendency towards sensationalism.[427] This could not be tolerated by a historian like Polybius who prides himself on writing the kind of history void of any exaggerations. Through his work Polybius was searching for the truth and he wanted to educate his audience by giving them the best possible basis for their own lives (Pol. 2. 56; 8. 8. 3). This condemnation of others who wrote their narratives just for the entertainment of their audience is echoed elsewhere in the *Histories* when other historians are discussed such as the historians writing on Hannibal (Pol. 3. 47-48) and Timaeus (Pol. 12. 7; 12. 12).[428] Additionally, he tells us that in the case of Phylarchus' omission of the noble deeds of Megalopolis, the author commits a grave offence,

> 'ἐπὶ τί δ' ἂν μᾶλλον συγγραφεὺς ἐπιστήσαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας; διὰ τίνος δ' ἔργου μᾶλλον ἂν παρορμήσαι πρὸς φυλακὴν πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν'
>
> (Pol. 2. 61. 11: 'since to what could an author with more advantage call the attention of his readers, and through what work could he better stimulate them to loyalty to their engagements and to true deeds and steady business?').

Looking at the work in general, it becomes apparent that for Polybius an emphasis should be placed on the principle of noble conduct to set a good example for one's audience.[429]

There is no question that Polybius vehemently disapproved of Phylarchus and his historiographical style, but if we are to believe the passage from Plutarch discussed above, it seems that Polybius heavily relied on Phylarchus' works since they both give a similar version of events. So clearly, Phylarchus was one of Polybius' sources for the Kleomenean War, which is surprising considering his constant criticism. We know that Polybius also used the account of Aratos, since he tells us that he had chosen to rely on the latter's version of events in connection to the history of the Kleomenean War (Pol.

[426] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 128.
[427] Walbank (1962), 4; Marincola (2013), 76.
[428] Eckstein (2013), 328.
[429] There are countless examples of this, i.e. his entire image of Philopoimen (10. 22. 6-7), his description of the ideal constitution (Pol. 6. 6. 9), his description of the Achaian *koinon* (2. 37-38) and many others. Some of these have already been discussed in more detail in chapter two.

2. 56. 2). Apparently, Aratos did not provide him with a lot of information as he remained silent on things like secret negotiations in his memoirs (Pol. 2. 47. 10).[430] In addition to Aratos and Phylarchus, Polybius could have had access to an unknown oral tradition from Megalopolis that would have been known to him as a prominent member of the city's elite.[431] Yet, due to Aratos' lack of information on the subject, it appears as though Polybius was forced to depend upon the testimony of a historian whom he so thoroughly criticised a few chapters later. This vehement criticism meant that he would have made sure to use Phylarchus' work in combination with another source such as Aratos or the unknown Megalopolitan oral tradition, and make it his own by taking Phylarchus and fitting them into his own narrative.[432] Just because Polybius found fault with his predecessor for obvious ideological and historiographical reasons, it did not mean that Phylarchus could not be a useful source when Polybius needed one.

1.3. Polybius and Aratos

Polybius' version of the events of the War with Kleomenes has made it rather problematic to draw conclusions. If we choose to trust the author's narrative completely, we are left with a shrewd plan set in motion by Aratos to cover all his bases and make sure that the Achaians would be victorious in every possible outcome of the war. According to Polybius' account, it was Aratos who was responsible for the Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos in the first place (Pol. 2. 47-51). Using Megalopolis because of its previous contacts with Macedon and their anti-Spartan sentiment, Aratos was the one who urged them to go on a mission to Antigonos and secretly establish contact between the two men. This was to be the foundation for a future alliance in case it was necessary. Clearly, this episode is centred on Aratos which has caused some scholars to be rightly concerned about Polybius' attitude towards this Achaian leader and the truthfulness of Aratos' involvement in the Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos. In what follows, I will discuss several of these modern views and argue that even though Polybius generally had a positive view of Aratos, he is also aware of the man's flaws. Furthermore, the Kleomenes' episode and Aratos' dominant role in it have to be considered within its position within the wider narrative, i.e. the explanation of why the Achaian *koinon* had

[430] Gruen (1972), 617-618.
[431] Paschides (2008), 242.
[432] Gruen (1972), 619.

succeeded in encompassing the entire Peloponnese. All of this makes it clear that Aratos' starring role as the mastermind of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance was a fabrication created by Polybius.

Karen Haegemans and Elizabeth Kosmetatou try to re-examine Polybius' attitude towards Aratos, especially when using the latter as a historical source.[433] I agree with their general assessment of the reasons behind Polybius' decision to use the *Hypomnemata* for his own narrative and his betrayal of exactly those historiographical principles for which he severely punishes Phylarchus but which he displays himself when it comes to the Achaian *koinon* and people he admired. Nevertheless, I feel that Haegemans and Kosmetatou miss the fact that Polybius' attitude towards Aratos is not that of 'a hardened patriot who could not be objective when dealing with Aratus, the hero of the Achaian League'.'[434] As is clear from the discussion in chapter two, Polybius was prone to bias about affairs relating to this native city or state and its great leaders, even though he does state that a historian must try to stay objective on these matters (Pol. 1. 14). While the subjective nature of the *Histories* can certainly not be denied, it is clear that Polybius was aware of the flaws of Aratos as an individual and a historian.[435] While the author describes Aratos' work as truthful and lucid (Pol. 2. 40. 4), he also says that his source concealed a lot of elements of his personal conduct from his audience (Pol. 2. 47. 10-11). Furthermore, Haegemans and Kosmetatou seem to have forgotten that even though Aratos comes across at first as the ideal leader in the narrative, there are plenty of instances in which Polybius severely disapproves of Aratos' personality and conduct.[436] His main flaw proved to be his military leadership or lack thereof, which Polybius describes in the following way:

> 'ὁ δ' αὐτὸς οὗτος, ὅτε τῶν ὑπαίθρων ἀντιποιήσασθαι βουληθείη, νωθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοίαις, ἄτολμος δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ὄψει δ' οὐ μένων τὸ δεινόν. διὸ καὶ τροπαίων ἐπ' αὐτὸν βλεπόντων ἐπλήρωσε τὴν Πελοπόννησον, καὶ τῇδέ πῃ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀεί ποτ' ἦν εὐχείρωτος'
>
> (Pol. 4. 8. 6: 'but this very same man, when he undertook field operations, was slow in thinking, timid in his actions, and devoid in personal courage. Because of this, he filled the Peloponnese with trophies commemorating his defeats, and in this manner he was always easy to master by the enemy).

[433] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 124.
[434] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 124.
[435] Eckstein (2013), 315-316.
[436] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 128.

Examples of this are his conduct during the battle at Ladokeia (Pol. 2. 51) and his failure to protect Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia during the Social War resulting in their decision to stop their formal contribution to the federal state and hire mercenaries instead (Pol. 4. 60). Therefore, Polybius is not completely oblivious to Aratos' faults and his critique of Phylarchus is thus about more than 'his need to defend at all expense his choice of historical sources in his second book.'[437] It becomes apparent that this second book is more than just a juxtaposition of Aratos' account versus that of Phylarchus. Furthermore, this version of the events was written in a part of the second book that gives an overview of the events in Greece before the actual start date of his narrative (Pol. 2. 37. 3). However, when read closely, Polybius' work contains a more personal agenda, i.e. an explanation for the grandeur of the Achaian *koinon* which stemmed from the Achaian policy created by Aratos, applied by Philopoimen and finished by Polybius' own father, Lykortas. So, if the historian's work was written in this context, he needed to portray Aratos in the best possible light and could not tolerate Phylarchus' attacks on the statesman. Although there was a political agenda behind the criticism in book two, the wider historiographical context has to be kept in mind as well when judging Polybius' narrative.[438]

Polybius has modified the events and by doing so has fitted them into his narrative by ascribing a substantial role to the person who monopolised his work at this point: Aratos.[439] There are countless examples of individuals dominating the *Histories* such as the events happening during Philip V's reign of Macedon (particularly books four and five), Hannibal during the Punic War (Pol. 3. 33-94), his assessment of Scipio Aemilianus (Pol. 23. 12-14; 31. 22-30) or Polybius' depiction of Achaian politics throughout his narrative, which seemed to be under the sole control of several individuals like Aratos and Philopoimen, Lykortas and Kallikrates.[440] Indeed, Polybius is quite often concerned about the impact of the individual on history.[441] Furthermore, he frequently interrupts his narrative with digressions of a biographic nature or on the character of these individuals so that his audience might be able to draw suitable lessons

[437] Haegemans and Kosmetatou (2005), 129. For more on this see, Eckstein (2013).
[438] Eckstein (2013), 334-336.
[439] Gruen (1972), 619.
[440] Luraghi and Magnetto (2012), 544.
[441] Champion (2004), 104.

from them.[442] As mentioned before, the entire passage on the Kleomenean War was written in the context of Polybius' history of the Achaian *koinon* upon which Aratos' actions had a certain impact due to his influential position in it and through which the historian wants to convey a certain image, not devoid of personal faults, of the politician from which we are to gain certain ideas and lessons about proper conduct. And this is exactly, in my opinion, the context in which we should see the politician's role in Megalopolis' first embassy to Antigonos: a historiographical embellishment resulted in ascribing to the statesman a greater prominence than he had in reality. Therefore, if we look past the emphasis on Aratos in the embassy to Doson, Plutarch's statement that Antigonos was summoned 'ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν (ἐπικεκλῆσθαι) μάλιστα τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτῶν σπουδασάντων' (Plut. 23. 2-3: 'by the Achaians, mostly because of the Megalopolitan eagerness'), leaves us with something much more plausible: initially Megalopolis had been the main advocate for an Achaian alliance with Macedon.[443]

2. Megalopolis and the War with Kleomenes

The initial contact between the Achaians and Antigonos was via the Megalopolitan embassy of 227 BC which was, despite Polybius' claims about Aratos' involvement, still a distinctively Megalopolitan embassy and not an Achaian one.[444] The fact that Megalopolis was suffering severely because of the war, in combination with its traditional hatred for Sparta and ties to Macedon meant that the polis would have not have hesitated to ask the king for help in case the federation could not help them against another Spartan raid (Plut. *Ar.* 38. 7). Therefore, the theory proposed by Erich Gruen that the initiative for this embassy came from Megalopolis without any federal involvement is convincing and logical, considering past interactions between Megalopolis, Sparta, Achaia and Macedon.[445] In this next section of the chapter I will discuss those events of the Kleomenean War, which directly concerned Megalopolis, as well as past connections to Macedon, to show that the Megalopolitan embassy of 227 BC was

[442] Farrington (2011), 329-335. Polybius' account of Philip is an excellent example of this tendency (Pol. 4. 77. 1-3; 5. 12. 5-8).
[443] Gruen (1972), 625.
[444] Paschides (2008), 237.
[445] Gruen (1972), 609-625, closely followed by Urban (1979), 117-155; Le Bohec (1993), 366-367.

perfectly in line with the traditional values and policies of the polis which needed help against Sparta and which had already been let down by the federal *strategos*.

2.1. Megalopolis and the Spartan attacks

Megalopolis and its territory obviously played an important rol in the war. Their geographic proximity to Sparta and the complicated, troubled and occasional violent relationship between the two poleis meant that Megalopolis was more prone to attacks from Kleomenes than the other Achaian poleis.[446] One of the first things the king did that provoked a reaction from the *koinon* and by which 'πρόδηλον δὲ καὶ πικρὸν ἀναδεικνύντα σφίσι πολέμιον ἑαυτόν' (Pol. 2. 46. 5: 'he was showing himself a clear and keen enemy for them'), was the occupation of the Athenaion in the Belminatis.[447] As we have already seen, this region had previously been under Spartan control, but had been given to the Megalopolitans by Philip II after his conquest of Sparta (Livy 38. 34. 4). Moreover, two boundary disputes, dated to the period 164-148 BC, give us a clear insight into the importance of the region as the inscriptions prove that decades later it remained a sensitive issue after both poleis were members of the Achaian *koinon*.[448] Kleomenes' occupation of the Athenaion was thus a deliberate attack and connected to the Spartan animosity towards Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon* of which Megalopolis was now a member. Shortly after this, Kleomenes conquered Methydrion, another town that was part of Megalopolitan territory (Plut. *Kleo.* 4. 4).

By 227-226 BC, the war had reached its zenith and the Megalopolitans found themselves subjected to yet another intrusion on their land. This time Kleomenes managed to gain control of the village of Leuktra, which prompted Aratos to rush to their aid with his Achaian troops, driving the king back from the city walls (Plut. *Ar.* 36. 1.). Having previously been defeated by Kleomenes on Mount Lykaion, Aratos refused to complete the offensive, which led Lydiades to disobey orders and lead his cavalry to battle against the Spartans.[449] Outnumbered, he was killed and his body was clothed in purple robes before being returned to Megalopolis (Plut. *Kleo.* 6. 5-7). From the moment Megalopolis had become part of the *koinon*, Lydiades had also risen to

[446] Roy (1971), 591; Roy (2009), 208-209; and Shipley (2000).
[447] Walbank (1957), 244.
[448] See Ager (1997), 133-135 and 374-381, for details of these specific cases.
[449] Walbank (1957), 250.

prominence at the federal level by challenging Aratos on several occasions and becoming *strategos.* It is apparent that Lydiades had been concerned with Sparta from the very start of his federal career since he launched an expedition against Sparta during his first *strategia* (234-233 BC), long before the war had even commenced (Plut. Ar. 30. 1). Even though Polybius does not devote much attention to Lydiades' and his exact function within federal politics, it is logical that as the former tyrant of Megalopolis his Achaian career would have mirrored that of Aristomachos of Argos. Polybius said that this Aristomachos was welcomed by the Achaians as 'ἡγεμόνα καὶ στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες σφῶν αὐτῶν' (Plut. *Ar*. 30. 4: 'making him their *strategos* and commander-in-chief') after he had laid down his tyranny. The death of an influential statesman such as Lydiades must have been particularly upsetting to the Achaians and his fellow Megalopolitans.[450] Even more so, since his death was the result of Aratos' weak conduct in the matter and

> 'ὁ Ἄρατος αἰτίαν δὲ μεγάλην ἔλαβε δόξας προέσθαι τὸν Λυδιάδην: καὶ βιασθεὶς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀπερχομένων πρὸς ὀργήν ἠκολούθησεν αὐτοῖς εἰς Αἴγιον. ἐκεῖ δὲ συνελθόντες ἐψηφίσαντο μὴ διδόναι χρήματα αὐτῷ μηδὲ μισθοφόρους τρέφειν ἀλλ' αὐτῷ πορίζειν, εἰ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν'
>
> (Plut. *Ar*. 37. 4: 'Aratos was held to be very responsible as people thought he had betrayed Lydiades; and after going away in anger, he was forced by the Achaians to come with them to Aigion. There they held an assembly and voted not to give him money or maintain mercenaries; if he wanted to wage war, he would have to prove himself').

The battle at Ladokeia was followed by other successes for Kleomenes including a very heavy Achaian defeat at the Hekatombaion at Dyme, which demoralised the Achaians so much that it led to the political crisis discussed earlier. These Spartan conquests and victories made Aratos and his compatriots desperate enough to accept the fact that they would not win this war without help from the Macedonian king. Of course, it also helped that the one major obstacle for Aratos' refusal of Doson's help, Corinth, had now fallen into Spartan hands.[451] As seen in chapter two, Corinth was a major point of contention between Aratos and the Macedonian kings who had used their control over Acrocorinth to uphold their influence in the Peloponnese. In 243 BC, Aratos had succeeded in gaining control over Corinth after a nightly expedition; since then the polis had been a

[450] Gruen (1972), 615.
[451] Fine (1940), 141.

member of the Achaian *koinon.* With Corinth now under the control of Sparta, Aratos agreed to send a formal request for help in 224 BC, which Antigonos accepted and for the next two years a combined Achaian-Macedonian force fought against the Spartans until the battle of Sellasia in 222. However, before Kleomenes was defeated at Sellasia, he was able to attack and destroy Megalopolis to such an extent that it is one of the two events that is visible in the archaeological record of the polis.[452] Hans Lauter states that the destruction of the city can be seen because of the extensive remodelling and rebuilding of the political buildings of the polis.[453] The severity of the destruction is also clear from the passages in Polybius where the author talks about the bravery and noble conduct of the Megalopolitans (Pol. 2. 56; 2. 61).[454] Polybius also mentions that

> 'γενόμενος δ' ἐγκρατὴς οὕτως αὐτὴν πικρῶς διέφθειρεν καὶ δυσμενῶς ὥστε μηδ' ἐλπίσαι μηδένα διότι δύναιτ' ἂν συνοικισθῆναι πάλιν'
>
> (Pol. 2. 55. 7: 'when he (Kleomenes) got possession of it, he destroyed it so severely and cruelly that no one hoped that it could ever be inhibited again').

Polybius gives us additional information about the main reason for the Spartan attack, which was Kleomenes' second attempt as he had already tried to attack the city a few months before but had been rebuffed by the citizens. Polybius thus believed him to have acted with such cruelty because

> 'διὰ τὸ κατὰ τὰς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις παρὰ μόνοις Μεγαλοπολίταις καὶ Στυμφαλίοις μηδέποτε δυνηθῆναι μήθ' αἱρετιστὴν καὶ κοινωνὸν τῶν ἰδίων ἐλπίδων μήτε προδότην κατασκευάσασθαι'
>
> (Pol. 2. 55. 8: 'out of all the peoples around, the Megalopolitans and Stymphalians were the only ones from whom he (Kleomenes) could not find a single person to choosing to share his endeavours or a traitor').

This is echoed by Plutarch in his different Lives. He gives a detailed account of Philopoimen's actions in the aftermath of the attack which saw the Megalopolitans flee to Messene (Plut. *Phil.* 5; cf. Pol. 2. 61). The Spartan king had sent an envoy to the Megalopolitans at Messene with the offer to restore them to the city but his offer was met by refusal from the citizens. Interestingly, in Plutarch's version of events, this refusal was the result of Philopoimen's insistence that the Megalopolitans not give in to the king

[452] Lauter (2005), 237. The second one is the earthquake that happened around 200 BC. For more on this, see the introduction.
[453] Lauter (2005), 239.
[454] For a discussion on the impact of these passages on Polybius' identity as a Megalopolitan and an Arkadian, see chapter two.

because it was apparent that some of the citizens like Lysandridas and Thearidas wanted to comply (Plut. *Kleo.* 24). Unsurprisingly, Polybius does not allude to these two individuals since he may have been related to this Thearidas, which was also the name of his brother.[455]

2.2. Megalopolis and its relations with Macedon

The result of these constant attacks on Megalopolis and their vehement opposition against Kleomenes and Sparta – as exemplified by Lydiades' politics and actions before his death in 227 BC and the Megalopolitan refusal of Kleomenes' offer in 222 BC – was that the Megalopolitans were suffering more than other poleis during the war. Therefore, the citizens knew that they could not continue fighting Sparta on their own and had to appeal for help. As a member of the Achaian *koinon*, the polis was entitled to request support from the federal state in return for financial and military contributions.[456] However, the polis did not ask the federal state for help and instead decided to appeal to Macedon for help. This was a logical step for the polis as it had long been on good terms with the Macedonian kings, and their military force was much bigger and stronger than the Achaian one (Pol. 2. 48. 3).[457]

These connections manifested themselves in more ways than just the elements already mentioned, i.e. the land that was given back to the polis by Philip II, the subsequent loyalty of Megalopolis, sometimes as the only Arkcadian polis, to the Macedonian kings during the conflicts in the fourth and third centuries BC[458] or the resistance of the Megalopolitan envoys to the Achaian decision at the *synodos* in Sicyon in 198 BC.[459] For example, there are several connections to Macedon and the Macedonian kings in the archaeology of Megalopolis. Pausanias tells us about the *Philippeion*, a stoa on the agora of Megalopolis that 'χαριζόμενοι δέ οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν διδόασιν αὐτῷ τοῦ οἰκοδομήματος' (Paus. 8. 30. 6: 'the Megalopolitans had named the building after him (Philip) out of compliment to him'). Pausanias is backed up in his claim by the discovery of stamped roof tiles bearing the inscriptions

[455] O'Neil (1984-86), 36.
[456] Aymard (1938), 166.
[457] Gruen (1972), 615.
[458] Hamilton (1982), 61-77.
[459] For more on this decisive Achaian decision of 198 BC and Megalopolis' attitude towards it, see chapter five.

'Φιλιππείου' and 'Φιλιππείο[υ] …πορος' (*IG* V^2 469 6a and 6b). These were found in the remains of a long building, which is referred to as the Stoa of Philip by archaeologists as a result of the inscriptions on the roof tiles and the information provided by Pausanias.[460] The building itself is found on the western side of the agora close to the sanctuary of Zeus Soter. Lauter has established several architectural links between the two buildings as they used the same building material, the same size and constituted an almost identical stylistic execution of construction.[461] The Stoa of Philip has been dated to the late fourth century BC on account of pottery found during their excavations in Megalopolis by Lauter and Spyropoulos, but there is evidence that the building may have been built or rebuilt a little later on in the Hellenistic period based on architectural elements.[462] As Pausanias has told us, the building was built by the Megalopolitans and named after 'Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου' (Paus. 8. 30. 6). However, Caitlyn Verfenstein has tried to argue that the building, which she dates to the second century BC, may have been built by the Megalopolitans in honour of Philip V and not Philip II.[463] While this remains a possibility, there is no doubt that this building was connected to the Macedonian kings. It shows that the citizens of Megalopolis respected the king enough to name a building after him that was at the heart of their polis, and more importantly, one that was closely associated with the most important religious sanctuary of the city.

Pausanias also mentions another structure in Megalopolis that was connected to the Macedonian kings, the so-called house of Alexander (Paus. 8. 32. 1). At the time of Pausanias' writing, the house belonged to a private citizen who had told him that the building was originally built for Alexander the Great. Near the house was an image of the god Ammon with a ram's horn on his head and shaped like a Herm. While some scholars have taken Pausanias at his word and thought that the building may have been a cult building or even a shrine to Alexander[464], William Calder has argued that this was most likely a fabrication made by the individual who owned the house to deceive tourists such as Pausanias.[465] He argues that the general state of ruin of the shrines at Megalopolis mentioned by Pausanias makes it rather unbelievable that a shrine to Alexander would

[460] Gardner et al. (1890), 140-141; Lauter and Spyropoulos (1998), 445.
[461] Lauter (2005), 240.
[462] Verfenstein (2002), 56.
[463] Verfenstein (2002), 57-60.
[464] Habicht (1970), 29; Badian (1982), 59; Friedricksmeyer (1979), 1-3.
[465] Calder (1982), 286-287.

have remained in use. This seems like a valid theory, particularly as one needs to keep in mind that Pausanias was describing his version of Megalopolis for the purposes of his own narrative.[466] Other evidence supports this argument as well, since there was a Macedonian who was raised in Megalopolis around 200 BC and who claimed he was a descendant of Alexander (Livy 35. 47. 5-8; App. *Syr*. 3. 13). This man managed to marry one of his children, Apama, off to Amynander, the king of the Athamanes, and was honoured by the city of Delos for favours he had rendered them (*IG*. XI[4] 750). Although we do not know if this man was indeed a Macedonian or just a Megalopolitan claiming to be a Macedonian as Appian and Livy differ on this (Livy: 'filiam Alexandri cuiusdam Megalopolitani' – Appian: 'τῶν τις Μακεδόνων Ἀλέξανδρος'), both of these examples prove that there was a general tradition in Megalopolis that saw individuals claim connections to Macedon for their own personal gain. Moreover, this tactic was also employed by Megalopolitan statesmen such as Lydiades, who is believed to have come to power with the help of the Macedonian kings, and Philopoimen whose connections to Philip V could have contributed to his election as *hipparch* in 210/209 BC.[467]

A final connection between Megalopolis and Macedon which I want to emphasize, comes from Polybius' account of the battle at Sellasia in 222 BC (Pol. 2. 65. 3). Here the historian stated that among the Achaian and Macedonian soldiers, there was also a Megalopolitan contingent of approximately a thousand soldiers who were led by Kerkidas and were armed in the Macedonian fashion. As Paschides has pointed out, this means that the Megalopolitans were using material given to them by Macedon and could even hint at formal military training in using the Macedonian phalanx.[468] So then, since the Megalopolitans were armed by the Macedonian kings, this testifies to a deep and special connection between the two states, especially, because they were the only one of the allies who were armed in this Macedonian fashion. Moreover, the fact that Polybius stressed that there was a separate group of Megalopolitans at the battle of Sellasia in 222 BC, in addition to the Achaian soldiers further indicates that Megalopolis played a significant role in the war.

[466] Stewart (2013), 241.
[467] Errington (1969), 58. See chapter five for a more detailed discussion on this.
[468] Paschides (2008), 277.

2.3. Megalopolis and the embassy to Antigonos in 227 BC

The Megalopolitan ties to Macedon which have been referenced to throughout this thesis, were one of the typical elements of the Megalopolitan polity. In this war, the polis conveyed this part of their policy to the Achaians via their embassy to Antigonos in 227 BC. As we have seen, the sources are rather ambiguous on the matter and Polybius places too much emphasis on Aratos' role in it (Pol. 2. 48-51). If these schemes are left aside, the whole situation becomes much less complicated. The Megalopolitans were suffering severely under the war on account of the Spartan attacks early on in the war. Consequently, when they realised that the Achaian federation was unable to help them due to the weakness of their army, they sent out an embassy, led by Nikophanes and Kerkidas, to the Macedonian king to ask for assistance. However, this could not happen without the approval of the federal state, which had to approve a mission before it could be sent out, which meant that the Megalopolitan embassy happened with Achaian approval, as indicated by Polybius (Pol. 2. 48. 8).

Moreover, once they were in a meeting with Antigonos, the envoys spent much of their time talking about the looming peril of a possible alliance between the Aitolians and Kleomenes. Since the speech followed the general structure of a typical Polybian speech and focused on one particular argument, i.e. the danger of an Aitolian-Spartan alliance, it is easy to assume that there is a core of truth in the speech, even though the alliance was most likely a fabrication or exaggeration made by the author.[469] However, one could use it to say something else about the Megalopolitan attitude towards the federation. Clearly, the envoys were not only concerned about their own city:

> 'διελέγοντο περὶ μὲν τῆς ἑαυτῶν πατρίδος αὐτὰ τἀναγκαῖα διὰ βραχέων καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς, τὰ δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τῶν ὅλων'
>
> (Pol. 2. 48. 8: 'they talked briefly and summarily about their own city, no more than necessary, but talked a lot about the general situation').

Both Nikophanes and Kerkidas, just like the other Megalopolitans as well, were worried about the dire consequences the war could have for the Achaian *koinon*. This behaviour fits in with the general attitude of the city towards the federal state as the polis was one of the first states to start minting the bronze federal coins and actively participated in the

[469] Wooten (1974), 235.

federal institutions or sought federal involvement in their boundary disputes with other members.

However, if Megalopolis was concerned about the consequences of fighting the war against Kleomenes on their own, why did they not appeal to the federal state instead of Antigonos? Before the reforms put through by Philopoimen in the early 200s BC, the Achaian army was disorganised and mostly a combination of individual member-state contributions and mercenary soldiers. This lack of organisation was chiefly responsible for the defeats that the Achaians suffered at the hands of Kleomenes during the war.[470] In comparison, the Macedonian forces were much bigger and better trained and because of their past contacts, it would be easier to obtain their help against the Spartans. Moreover, it seems as though the Achaians had nothing against this embassy as they approved it before Kerkidas and Nikophanes went to Macedon. Additionally, there was a growing sense of dissatisfaction with Aratos and his politics as he had not been interested in the inclusion of Sparta into the federation before 235 BC.[471] Furthermore, the Megalopolitans could not have been satisfied with his actions when he refused to follow through and pursue the Spartan soldiers and Kleomenes in 227 BC (Plut. *Ar*. 36-37). The fact that this led to the death of their beloved tyrant Lydiades can only have increased this disappointment. Aratos' incompetent military skills during this war frustrated the member poleis more than once and even Polybius comments on this flaw (Pol. 4. 8. 6). Therefore, the combination of an inefficient army and Aratos' inconsistent leadership is what made the Megalopolitans turn to Antigonos, who was a logical choice for the Arkadian city because of the old connections between the two states.[472]

This conclusion was also drawn by Erich Gruen.[473] While he makes several good points to support the theory that Megalopolis was the actor responsible for the embassy to Antigonos, the most relevant argument for present purposes is his analysis of Aratos' past interactions with Macedon, Sparta and Megalopolis. These interactions clearly show that Aratos was not the mastermind behind the Megalopolitan embassy in 227 BC to Macedon, since he had actively tried to keep Macedon out of the Peloponnese through

[470] Rizakis (2016), 123.
[471] Gruen (1972), 615.
[472] Walbank (1957), 247.
[473] Gruen (1972), 625.

alliances with both Aitolia and Sparta (Pol. 2. 44. 1.; Plut. *Agis.* 13. 4-15. 3).[474] These resulted in the Achaian membership of Megalopolis that stressed the opposition to Sparta and a positive attitude towards Macedon. Additionally, there was Lydiades who formed a threat to Aratos' political career according to Plutarch. Because of this, it seems rather unlikely that Aratos would indeed have persuaded the Megalopolitans to go to Antigonos Doson to ask for help. Moreover, it is apparent that Aratos was still pursuing an Achaian policy in 227 BC that was directed against Macedon as is evidenced by his opposition to an official Achaian request for Macedonian help at the Achaian assembly in which Nikophanes and Kerkidas presented the results of their embassy to Antigonos.

> 'Προελθὼν Ἄρατος καὶ τήν τε τοῦ βασιλέως προθυμίαν ἀποδεξάμενος καὶ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διάληψιν ἐπαινέσας παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι δι᾽ αὑτῶν σῴζειν καὶ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν. οὐδὲν γὰρ εἶναι τούτου κάλλιον οὐδὲ συμφορώτερον: ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄρα πρὸς τοῦτο τὸ μέρος ἀντιβαίνῃ τὰ τῆς τύχης, πρότερον ἔφη δεῖν ἐξελέγξαντας πάσας τὰς ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐλπίδας τότε καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φίλων βοηθείας.'
>
> (Pol. 2. 50. 11.-51.1.: 'Aratos rose, and after acknowledging the king's willingness to assist them and he applauded the attitude of the meeting, he addressed them for a long time and urged them if possible to attempt to save their cities and country by their own efforts. For nothing was better or more advantageous. If adverse fortune should prevent this, then, but only when they had no hope left in their own resources, he advised them to resort to an appeal to their friends').

Polybius tells us that Aratos took this stance because he was afraid that he would be blamed in case this alliance backfired on him and Doson used it to curb the Achaian power in the Peloponnese (Pol. 2. 50. 8). However, looking at his previous political stance, it seems more logical that Aratos was also concerned with keeping Macedon outside of the Peloponnese and the conflict if possible. While I generally disagree with Paschalis Paschides' analysis of the events of the Kleomenean War, as it tends to rely too much on Polybius' account and ignores the more plausible reality of Megalopolis' involvement, he does make a good argument when he states that Aratos' policy was not inconsistent between 227 and 224 BC.[475] Obviously, in 224 BC he still wanted to expand the Achaian influence in the Peloponnese at the cost of Macedon, but it seems that even

[474] Gruen (1972), 611.

[475] Paschides (2008), 243. He makes an interesting point about Aratos' general attitude towards Macedon which seems to have undergone several changes throughout his career, as he did not start out as the vehemently anti-Macedonian other scholars such as Gruen would have us believe. However, I am inclined to generally follow Gruen's theory which steps away from rigidly following Polybius' account and placing more responsibility on Megalopolis in this whole affair.

for him it had become apparent that Kleomenes had become too powerful for the *koinon* to handle on its own and - out of sheer *ἀνάγκη* - the federation needed to complete the process started by the Megalopolitans in 227 BC. Of course, this decision must have been made just that little bit easier by the fact that Kleomenes had by then conquered Corinth and thus taken away a major point of contention between Macedon and Achaia.

* * * * *

Due to the inconsistent nature of the passages in Polybius and Plutarch, the Kleomenean War has always been problematic for modern scholars who want to construct a coherent narrative of the war. For one, there are the multiple discrepancies in the narratives of both authors which have been discussed at the start of the chapter. However, the biggest problem for the present thesis was Polybius' overemphasis on Aratos and his actions during the war. As we have seen, this was typical for the *Histories* as the individual constituted the core of the Polybian narrative, but it was also the result of Polybius' sources: the *Hypomnemata* of Aratos himself, Phylarchus' *Histories* and potentially an unnamed Megalopolitan tradition. Throughout this first segment of this chapter, I have clearly shown that Polybius' version of the Kleomenean War did not reflect the political reality but rather glorified Aratos and his policy. Furthermore, the differences in the historical sources also emphasize the complex character of federalism and federal states which can lead to contradictory accounts of the same events.

If we are to ignore Aratos and his involvement in the envoy of 227 BC to Antigonos Doson, then we can assess that this was a purely Megalopolitan effort to cope with the stress of the Spartan attacks during the war.[476] Pressed by the Spartan attacks and disappointed by the Achaian army and their leader Aratos in particular, the Megalopolitans decided to utilise their old diplomatic relations with Macedon and appeal to them for help, no doubt with general Achaian approval. Aratos himself cannot have been happy with this development as his past relations with the kingdom were not at all positive due to his determination to drive them out of the Peloponnese while expanding the Achaian territory.[477] This might also account for his determination in

[476] Gruen (1972), 625.
[477] Paschides (2008), 234-235.

blocking the motion in the assembly just after the envoy returned from Macedon (Pol. 2. 50-51). However, he would soon be forced to change his mind because Kleomenes was slowly gaining the upper hand in the war. This was possible due to Ptolemy giving his funding to Kleomenes, Aratos' personal defeats and the readiness of several of the members to negotiate with Sparta. This last feature is mentioned in a Plutarchean passage, which has a certain credibility as the so-called social revolution instituted by Kleomenes would have appealed to those Achaians that fell outside of the elites. All in all, it seems that the Achaian-Macedonian alliance came into being as a result of the Megalopolitan embassy to Doson, which happened on their own accord but with Acahean approval. As for Aratos, it seems that although he initially opposed it, he was grateful for its existence which made it easier for him to use in 224 BC when he was forced to formally accept Macedonian assistance if he were to win the war.

As for Megalopolis, the emergence of Philopoimen onto the political stage would soon change the way that the polis would influence Achaian foreign politics, which, during the second century BC, happened much more through the actions and beliefs of the individuals than via the city as a collective actor. However, as our next chapter will show, this does not mean that the Megalopolitan characteristics stopped shaping Achaia's international relationships, considering they were the result of local tensions between its members.

Chapter 5: Megalopolis and Achaian foreign politics in the second century BC

About three decades after they first joined forces with Antigonos Doson in the Kleomenean War (225 BC), the Achaians found themselves on the verge of yet another important political decision. A lot had changed following the establishment of this Achaian-Macedonian alliance. By 198 BC, Antigonos had been replaced by Philip V. This new Macedonian king waged war against the Aitolians in the Social War (220-217 BC) and ultimately came head to head with the Romans in the First Macedonian War (214-205 BC). The Achaians dutifully stood by their ally during these wars, albeit with increasing reluctance. So, when the king got himself involved in yet another conflict with Rome, the Achaians had an important decision to make: would they remain loyal to their old ally or join the war on the Roman side (Livy 32. 19–25)? As we now know, their decision to join Rome proved to be a crucial one for the federal state and its politics in subsequent years. For one, it created a strained relationship between the members of the Achaian elite who were unsure how to deal with their new ally. This internal discord was even further deepened by the secession attempts of Messene and Sparta in the course of the second century BC. In fact, most of the problems between Rome and the Achaian *koinon* happened as the result of these secessions, since both poleis went to Rome for support against the federation.

The combination of these factors shows that Achaian foreign politics were now connected to the internal interactions between the federal state and its members. Megalopolis' role in the foreign politics was also very different from what it had been in the third century BC. After all, the city itself seems to have had less influence than before since Achaian international politics were now shaped mostly through a series of prominent individuals from the city like Philopoimen, Archon, Lykortas and Polybius. These individuals were heavily involved in the internal troubles with Sparta and Messene, since Philopoimen was responsible for bringing Sparta into the federation in the first place. Moreover, every time the *koinon* had troubles with Sparta, it was in the *strategia* of a Megalopolitan. However, it is important to note that this view may be distorted as a result of Polybius' and Livy's narratives which do not focus on the cities as political actors but solely on the important individuals. If we look at the material evidence such as the boundary disputes analysed in chapter three or the federal coinage

produced by these cities, it becomes clear that they were still acting as political units and thus making it necessary to be careful when using the literary accounts.

In this last chapter I will discuss Megalopolis' role in Achaian politics of the second century BC. I will show that the traditional antagonism of its citizens towards Sparta had an influence on the Achaian League and its interactions with other Hellenistic states. Because of this I am analysing Achaian-Roman interactions from the point of view of the traditional antagonism expressed by the Megalopolitan leaders towards Sparta, as they were partly responsible for shaping the Achaian policy towards Rome. Therefore, I will be examining the actions and political conduct of several of these individuals in connection to Sparta and Rome to see how far these were moulded by their Megalopolitan identity. Nevertheless, before turning to this discussion, I will start the chapter by talking about the Achaian decision of 198 BC to ally itself with Rome, for this event was one of the last instances in which Megalopolis as a city still expressed its support for the Macedonian king. In fact, they were among the only Achaians advocating for loyalty towards Philip. However, as I will argue, a closer look at the Achaian *strategos* Aristainos may prove that even within Megalopolis there was room for individuals to move away from the traditional Megalopolitan loyalty to Macedon and replace it with loyalty to Achaia.

1. Megalopolis and the Achaian decision of 198 BC

This first section of the chapter deals with the Achaian *synodos* of 198 BC at Sikyon. When the Achaians decided whether or not they formally wanted to form an alliance with Rome and abandon their old ally Philip V. The discussion of this *synodos* is crucial as it is one of the last times that Megalopolis as a city can be seen acting as a political unit in the narratives of Livy and Polybius. Moreover, at this point the Megalopolitans were still loyal to the Macedonian kings, something that is not attested to in the sources later on. This has led me to the conclusion that this particular element of the Megalopolitan identity may have been replaced by an overall sense of Achaian patriotism as displayed by Polybius and others. I will start this section with an overview and breakdown of the relations of the Achaians with both Macedon and Rome in the period between the Kleomenean War (229-222 BC) and the *synodos* at Sikyon to explain why this *synodos* was happening in the first place. It concludes with a general discussion of the events of

198 BC and the implications this had for Megalopolis, particularly if Aristainos was not from Dyme, as is traditionally believed, but from Megalopolis.

1.1. Achaian relations with Macedon and Rome 224-198 BC

Soon after the War with Kleomenes, a new generation of statesmen and kings found their way to power as Philopoimen and other Megalopolitans came to power in Achaia, Philip V assumed the power in Macedon (Pol. 2. 70. 6) and a series of kings and tyrants succeeded Kleomenes in Sparta.[478] The war had left its mark on Achaia in particular. The Achaian confidence that had been so prominent during the previous decades, when the state seemed to be enjoying an unstoppable surge of expansionism in the Peloponnese, had now been shattered as they found themselves dependent on Macedon and its ruler. The Achaian army, which had been disorganised even before the Kleomenean War, had now been left in such a state of disarray that months after the fighting had ended the Achaian *strategos* Timoxenus would not send the Achaian army to aid Messene against the Aitolians (Pol. 4. 7. 6-7):

> ‘ἅμα δὲ τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἀπιστῶν διὰ τὸ ῥαθύμως αὐτοὺς ἐσχηκέναι κατὰ τὸ παρὸν περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις γυμνασίαν, ἀνεδύετο τὴν ἔξοδον καὶ καθόλου τὴν συναγωγὴν τῶν ὄχλων. μετὰ γὰρ τὴν Κλεομένους τοῦ Σπαρτιατῶν βασιλέως ἔκπτωσιν, κάμνοντες μὲν τοῖς προγεγονόσι πολέμοις, πιστεύοντες δὲ τῇ παρούσῃ καταστάσει, πάντες ὠλιγώρησαν Πελοποννήσιοι τῆς περὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ παρασκευῆς’
>
> (‘because he had little confidence in the Achaian forces because of the laziness with which had lately neglected the exercise of their weapons, he retreated from going to battle and rallying the troops altogether. For the fact is that ever since the fall of King Kleomenes of Sparta all the Peloponnesians, defeated as they were by the previous wars and trusting in the lasting tranquillity, had paid no attention at all to war preparations’).

The war had also been taxing for some of its members. Due to its geographical proximity to Sparta, Megalopolis had suffered extensively from the fighting.[479] As we have seen in chapter four, Kleomenes plundered and conquered the Megalopolitan territory multiple times and even though many of the inhabitants could escape to Messene after refusing to join him, his last attack on the polis in 222 left many citizens dead and the polis in ruins (Plut. *Kleo.* 12. 2). Moreover, the destruction of Megalopolis was so bad that by

[478] Cartledge and Spawforth (2001), 54-73.
[479] Roy (1971), 591; Roy (2009), 208-209; and Shipley (2000).

the first Aitolian assaults on Arkadian land in 220 BC, the process of repopulating the city had only just started (Pol. 4. 25. 4).

The exact extent of the damage done to Achaia and Megalopolis was clearly illustrated when a new conflict broke out in Greece, the Social War (220-217 BC).[480] Tensions had risen between Messene and the Aitolians due to Messene's attempts to seek rapprochement with the Achaians and the Hellenic League that had been formed by Antigonos Gonatas during the Kleomenean War.[481] Soon new alliances had formed with the Aitolians, Elis and Sparta on one side and the Achaians, Philip and the Hellenic League on the other. The *koinon*'s inability to defend itself caused a divide between Philip and Aratos. That each man had his own priorities became clear when Philip failed to answer several of the Achaian calls for help. Because of this, he exposed the weakness of both the federal army and the relationship between local members and the federal government. This problematic relationship was illustrated by the refusal of Dyme, Pharai and Tritaia to contribute to the federal army after the federal *strategos* Aratos could not muster a force to support the poleis against the Aitolians (Pol. 4. 60). Instead, the poleis decided to hire their own mercenary force. So, the lack of military skill of the Achaians was one of the elements that changed their relationship with Philip.[482] The only reason why the Achaians decided to establish an alliance with Macedon in the first place had been their need for support against Sparta. While Achaian interests remained the same as long as Aratos was alive, in Macedon matters were a little different. At first, Philip seemed happy to continue his predecessor's line in international affairs, as is quite clear from his treatment of Aratos in the beginning of his kingship (Pol. 4. 24). However, after a few years, Philip showed that he would be willing to help the Achaians whenever they needed as long as there were no pressing matters up north. This became more and more obvious over the course of the Social War and especially after Aratos' death in 213 BC.

However, nothing would change until the emergence of Philopoimen in on the federal and international scene. By the start of the First Macedonian War (214-205 BC), Rome had established an alliance with the Aitolians and had become increasingly concerned about Philip's actions (Pol. 7. 9).[483] In Achaia, the *koinon* was suffering once

[480] Gruen (1984), 374.
[481] For more information on this conflict and the Aitolian *koinon* in general, see Fine (1940), Scholten (2000) and Grainger (1999).
[482] Errington (1969), 55.
[483] Eckstein (2012), 90.

again at the hands of Sparta, now under the control of Machanidas. However, in 210 BC, Philopoimen returned from Crete and was immediately elected as hipparch for the year 210/209 BC. His first action was to reform the cavalry by providing the proper training and equipment, as well as actively encouraging his men to fight (Pol. 10. 22-24).[484] Philopoimen was elected together with Kykliades of Pharai, whose known ties to Macedon suggest that the election may have been the result of Macedonian involvement. As Errington argues, this meant that at the start of his career Philopoimen associated himself with Philip.[485] Coming from Megalopolis, Philopoimen was aware of the good relations of his hometown with Macedon, which he must have used to his own advantage.[486] This is further illustrated by his actions during the battle of Sellasia, which impressed Antigonos and marked the beginnning of Philopoimen's personal connections to Macedon (Plut. *Phil.* 6-7; Pol. 2. 67. 4- 68. 2). Additionally, Philip may have seen the merit in supporting a Megalopolitan whose military reforms enabled the Achaians to become more self-reliant.[487] While Errington has made a persuasive argument for Philopoimen's Macedonian connections, I believe that ultimately his own character, his military skills and his Megalopolitan background were the essential factors for Philopoimen's election and ascent to the political top in Achaia. By this time, Megalopolis had become an important member of the Achaian *koinon* not only because of the size of the polis, but also on account of the central role of the polis in the Achaian foreign politics in the decades following its membership. Yet these principles were more than just the cause for Megalopolis' position within the federal state, they were key characteristics of Megalopolitan identity exhibited by individuals from the city, including Philopoimen. Additionally, as we have seen throughout chapter three, Megalopolis' position of power within the federation was also connected to its ability to participate in the federal institutions and understand its relationship with the federal state enough so as to manipulate them to its own advantage.

Philopoimen's reforms of the cavalry were a success and during the battle of Mantinea in 207 BC, the Achaians showed that they were able to defeat the Spartans (Pol. 11. 11-18). Due to this success, a new wave of patriotism was created similar to the

[484] Anderson (1967), 104.
[485] Errington (1969), 63.
[486] See chapters two and four and Paschides (2008) for other examples.
[487] Errington (1969), 52.

one that they had enjoyed under Aratos' leadership. Additionally, the event revealed another point of contention between the Achaians and Philip, i.e. the position of the Macedonian garrisons in the Peloponnese and Philip's possession of border castles.[488] Over the span of several decades, the kings of Macedon controlled several poleis and areas of the Peloponnese by stationing a Macedonian garrison or occupying a nearby stronghold such as the Acrocorinth, which was still under Philip's control, supposedly to ensure Achaian safety. When it became clear however that there was no real need for Macedon to retain these possessions, Philip made the promise to give back the cities Heraia and Alipheira; as well as the region Triphylia to the Achaians at a *synodos* held in 208 (Livy 28. 8. 1-6). However, it was still an issue in 199 BC when Philip used it as a last attempt to dissuade the Achaians from joining Rome.

In 205 BC, the Peace of Phoinike brought an end to the First Macedonian War between Rome and Philip and was concluded with the Achaians as adscripti on Philip's side since they were still Macedonian allies at this point. Things were finally looking increasingly positive for Achaia: the Spartan danger had been temporarily vanquished and within the federal state a new feeling of pride and independence surfaced. In light of this context, Errington argues that Philopoimen slowly seemed to be stepping away from his association with Philip and adopted a thoroughly anti-Macedonian stance.[489] While it is an interesting theory that makes some valid points such as the obvious political association of Philopoimen with Aristainos, I think there is insufficient proof to label Philopoimen as pro- or anti-Macedonian at this time. Yet it is important to remember that Greek polities in this period were ruled by local and personal ambitions, and not by their attitude towards the bigger states such as Rome or Macedon.[490] Even though Errington's theory seems plausible, considering Philopoimen's later political ideologies and actions, it is difficult to say much about his political convictions before his return from Crete. Furthermore, what he would have done at the *synodos* of 198 BC is equally difficult to say since he was back in Crete by this point. However, there was a general shift in the Achaian attitude towards Philip and Macedon, as is illustrated by a

[488] Aymard (1938), 58-60.
[489] Errington (1969), 70-74.
[490] For more on this, see Gruen (1984), 460; 527-528; who argues this point extremely well. Moreover, Eckstein (1987), 141-143; argues the same point in connection to Aristainos and Kykliades.

passage from Plutarch in which Philopoimen and his troops were applauded at the Nemean Games of 205 BC (Plut. *Phil.* 11. 3):

> 'τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸ παλαιὸν ἀξίωμα ταῖς ἐλπίσιν ἀναλαμβανόντων καὶ τοῦ τότε φρονήματος ἔγγιστα τῷ θαρρεῖν γινομένων'
>
> ('in their hopes that the Greeks were recovering their ancient dignity, and by being courageous they were coming closer to the high spirit').

The passage clearly points to a growing Achaian fondness for Philopoimen and the Achaian army at the expense of Philip as the Nemean Games were organised in Argos, a polis usually loyal to Macedon and where Philip was honoured every year.[491]

While the relationship between Achaia and Macedon was detiorating, the tyrant Nabis grasped power in Sparta around 207 BC. He succeeded in reviving Sparta after its loss at Mantinea and increased the city's influence in the Peloponnese and internationally, even if it was only for a short period. Additionally, he pursued another traditional aspect of Spartan politics in the Hellenistic period: regaining control over the Peloponnese at the expense of Megalopolis (and the Achaians).[492] The first opportunity to accomplish this ambition came in 204 BC when a group of travellers from Boiotia had apparently succeeded in stealing Nabis' best horse from his stables before fleeing to Megalopolis with several of his grooms (Pol. 13. 8). Since Megalopolis refused to give back the horse or hand over the Boiotians, Nabis carried out a raid on an Achaian farmhouse. The period of respite from Spartan attacks was clearly over. Over the next few years, there were several small clashes between the two states but the situation did not become serious until 201 BC when Nabis attacked Messene. This worried Philopoimen who immediately urged the Achaian *strategos* to take action (Plut. *Phil.* 12). As a Megalopolitan, he obviously realised the danger of Messene falling into Spartan hands. Therefore, when the Achaian *strategos* Lysippos refused to help Messene, Philopoimen decided to take action by raising forces from Megalopolis and stop Nabis before he could complete his plan (Pol. 16. 13).[493] It is not surprising that Philopoimen could raise a force from Megalopolis to aid Messene, since there was a long history of close cooperation between the two states, especially where Sparta was involved.[494] It was

[491] Errington (1969), 76.
[492] Cartledge and Spawforth (2002), 73.
[493] Errington (1969), 80.
[494] For more details, see section three of chapter one or the discussion of the boundary disputes between the two states in chapter three.

far easier to see the danger that Sparta posed from Megalopolis than from Aigion due to the polis' geographical proximity to and its history with Sparta. Clearly, through the actions of Philopoimen and his fellow citizens – which in this case directly influenced the federal politics, Megalopolis was illustrating its own local concerns and explicitly acted against the wishes of the federal state.

Almost a quarter of century had now passed since Aratos had capitalised on the initial diplomatic contacts between Megalopolis and Macedon and a lot had changed for both Megalopolis and Achaia. After the War with Kleomenes, Achaia had been left in disarray and was forced to depend upon a foreign king to protect it from Sparta. Megalopolis had been destroyed by Kleomenes and the rebuilding of the polis would take years. The Achaian weakness was illustrated multiple times during the next two international conflicts until Philopoimen, a typical Megalopolitan, returned from Crete and started his reforms of the Achaian army, no doubt with the initial approval of Philip. When this new army had passed its first test and defeated the Spartans at Mantinea, it led to a renewal of Achaian confidence and desire for independence. This in turn was one of the factors responsible for the cooling down of Achaian relations with Macedon, which was further complicated by Philip's refusal to give up his border castles, his failure to protect Achaia on several occasions and the emergence of a renewed Spartan threat to Megalopolis under Nabis. So, when Rome started to involve itself in these matters in 200 BC, it proved to be the final straw for Achaian-Macedonian relations.

1.2. Megalopolis, Aristainos and the Achaian *synodos* of 198 BC

The growing estrangement divergence between Philip and the Achaians was responsible for the formation of the Achaian alliance with Rome. However, the decision taken at the *synodos* at Sikyon was not a unanimous one since several of the Achaian members vehemently opposed it. The Megalopolitans present, who were some of the more outspoken opponents of an alliance with Rome, left the meeting before the vote even took place. Considering the Megalopolitan ties to Macedon, their resistance is not surprising as it is in line with the traditional policy pursued by the polis. However, if we take a closer look at the individuals, especially Aristainos, at the centre of these events, there might have been more to Megalopolis' involvement in the decision. In this next section, I will discuss the *synodos* of 198, Megalopolis' attitude towards it and the origins of Aristainos to prove that, as a polis, Megalopolis was entirely explicitly against theis

decision. Yet through the actions of federal leaders that came from the city like Aristainos and Philopoimen, there is an indication that within the city there was a faction which could support the federal state and its decision.

In 200 BC, the Roman Senate sent an embassy to Greece to announce Rome's general willingness to protect the Greeks against the Macedonian king and tried to secure as much support for their cause as possible by reconfirming old friendships and creating new ones, preferably with Philip's allies like the Achaians. This was the starting point for a very decisive conflict, which profoundly changed the Hellenistic World, as Rome become actively involved in the Hellenistic East from this point onwards. Consequently, Philip never regained the power he had lost and Achaia finally succeeded in bringing the entire Peloponnese under its control (Pol. 2. 37). Aside from the Roman embassy to the koinon after the First Illyrian War in 229-228 BC (Pol. 2. 12. 4.), the diplomatic mission of 200 BC was the one of the first formal contacts between Achaia and Rome. No doubt, the three Roman commissioners hoped to convince the federation to give up its support for Philip. Though their attempt was not immediately successful, the visit did have some desirable results. Philip was clearly concerned, since he personally attended an Achaian meeting later that year during which he promised Macedonian support against Nabis if the Achaians supplied him with troops to guard Corinth, Orchomenos and Chalkis. Yet,

> 'non fefellit Achaeos, quo spectasset tam benigna pollicitatio auxiliumque oblatum adversus Lacedaemonios: id quaeri, ut obsidem Achaeorum iuventutem educeret ex Peloponneso ad inligandam Romano bello gentem'
>
> (Livy 31. 25. 8: 'the Achaians were not deceived as to the real meaning of so generous an offer and promise of aid against the Lacedaemonians: he said this to lead the Achaian youth as hostages from the Peloponnese to commit the people to war with Rome').

It may also have inspired some of the Achaians to reconsider their loyalty to Philip. After all, Philip may have been the better choice since he as well as the Romans had already shown that they were capable of acting as barbarians.[495] Nonetheless, I would not go as far as Errington in stating that 'the formation of a mildly pro-Roman group in Achaia, centred on Philipoemen and Aristaenus, seems likely to have taken its origin from the appearance of the Roman propaganda mission at Aigion in 200'.[496] While it is true that

[495] Waterfield (2014), 70.
[496] Errington (1969), 83-84.

there was a political group in Achaia that centred around Philopoimen, Aristainos and Lykortas that was influential in Achaian politics, this was not a pro-Roman group but one that aspired for the *koinon* to function completely independent from any big power. As said before, for Philopoimen and Aristainos local matters were important and it may indeed be that the visit simply opened their minds up to the possibility of using Rome as an ally to achieve this goal.[497]

Nevertheless, in 200 the interests of the Achaian majority were still in line with Philip, as evidenced by the election of Kykliades, a federal statesman with known ties to Macedon and Philip in particular, in the year 200/199 BC (Livy 32. 19).[498] Over the next two years, this position slowly shifted and the Achaians turned against Philip. The election of Aristainos as *strategos* of 199/198 and subsequent expulsion of Kykliades (Pol. 18. 1. 2) were the first major indicators of this shift as 'Aristaenus, qui Romanis gentem iungi volebat, praetor erat' (Livy 32. 19. 2: 'Aristainos, who wanted to connect his people to the Romans, was strategos').[499] Philip was aware of the situation in Achaia and tried to re-establish Achaian loyalty by finally withdrawing his garrisons from the Peloponnese, aside from the one at the Acrocorinth. Moreover, he even reinstated places that were under his control, such as Alipheira, returned to the Megalopolitans.[500] Even though this plan had the desired effect at first, by 198 BC the Achaians were ready to disband their alliance with him in favour of Rome.

In 198 BC, the Roman consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus thought it was time to send ambassadors to the Achaians and promise them control over Corinth (Livy 32. 19. 4-5). In addition to the Romans, delegates from Attalos, Rhodes, Athens and Philip were at Sikyon for a three-day *synodos*. On the first day, each of the foreign delegates had the chance to speak. The Romans, Rhodians and Attalos requested help from the Achaians against Macedon (Livy 32. 21. 4). That the Achaians were extremely divided about the situation became clear on the second day of the *synodos* when the Achaian

[497] Errington (1969), 83-84.
[498] His election may have been the reason for Philopoimen's second departure for Crete as suggested by Errington (1969) and Aymard (1933), 67. Judging from his other actions, it is possible that Philopoimen would not hesitate to leave for Crete after his defeat and, indeed, abandon his federal career, all because he lost the election. This opinion was clearly shared by his fellow Megalopolitans, who wanted to punish the statesman for leaving them by banishing him from their city, which was eventually prevented by Aristainos (Plut. *Phil.* 13).
[499] Eckstein (1987), 141. The exact reason for Kykliades' exile is not stated in the sources, but it could have been connected to Aristainos' election or Kykliades' abominable performance against Nabis.
[500] Aymard (1933), 68-69.

magistrates themselves were to discuss the situation (Livy 32. 20-21). Obviously, there were multiple reasons for this division among the Achaians:

> 'terrebat Nabis Lacedaemonius, gravis et adsiduus hostis; horrebant Romana arma; Macedonum beneficiis et veteribus et recentibus obligati erant; regem ipsum suspectum habebant pro eius crudelitate perfidiaque, neque ex iis, quae tum ad tempus faceret, aestimantes graveriorem post bellum dominum futurum cernebant'
>
> (Livy 32. 19. 6-8: 'Nabis the Lakedaimonian, a grave and arduous enemy, frightened them; the Roman army made them shudder; they were obliged to the Macedonians by old and new benefits; they regarded the king (Philip) himself with suspicion because of his cruelty and perfidy, and not judging by what he was doing at that time, to suit the occasion, they believed that he would be a harsher master after the war').

As no one else of the Achaian representatives was prepared to publicly voice an opinion on the matter out of fear for potential personal repercussions, this left Aristainos, obliged as he was in his position as *strategos*, to speak out on the matter - 'forsitan ego quoque tacerem, si privatus essem' (Livy 32. 21. 1: 'maybe I would keep quiet as well if I were a private citizen').

In his speech, Aristainos strongly championed the Roman cause while attacking Philip for his lack of support against Nabis as well as his abandonment of other allies in the war (Livy 32. 20-21). Moreover, the fact that Philip was absent on ins many ways was what aggravated Aristainos most and it is the primary reason why he urged the Achaians to accept the Roman offer. He urged the Achaians:

> 'liberare vos a Philippo iam diu magis vultis quam audetis. Sine vestro labore et periculo qui vos in libertatem vindicaret, cum magnis classibus exercitibusque mare traiecerunt. Hi si socios aspernamini, vix mentis sanae estis; sed aut socios aut hostes habeatis oportet'
>
> (Livy 32. 21. 37: 'for a long time, you have wished, but not dared to free yourselves from Philip. Now men have crossed the sea with mighty fleets and armies, to affirm your claims to liberty without trouble or danger on your part. If you reject them as allies, you are barely sane; but as either allies or enemies you will have them').

In short, Philip was an unreliable ally who was unable to protect them from or assist them against Nabis and the Romans. Rome was making successful advancements in the Second Macedonian War, and could become a potential problem for Achaia. If the Achaians wished to fulfil their most important desire – to unite the Peloponnese under their rule , they would have more success by choosing to fight on the Roman side. That

way they would get back Corinth, find protection from Nabis and get rid of Philip all at once.[501]

I have already said that in general the Achaian representatives were unsure about the decision they had to make; therefore, it is not surprising that this speech caused a lot of commotion during the meeting. Many different opinions were expressed by the member delegations and the federal *damiorgoi.* Exactly how much this issue divided the *koinon* is best illustrated by two episodes. Pisias of Pellene, whose son Memnon was one of the federal *damiorgoi*, swore to kill Memnon if he did not change his mind since Pisias believed that clinging to Philip would result in 'gentem universam perditum' (Livy 32. 22. 6-7: 'the destruction of the entire people'). Eventually, Pisias convinced his son Memnon who became the deciding factor in favour of passing a motion to vote on the matter. While this episode is probably untrue, it is interesting to mention because it shows how deeply this decision must have affected the individual Achaian. The second example is of vital importance in this chapter as it deals with Megalopolis' view on the matter. Once it became clear that most of the Achaians were in favour of joining Rome, Livy tells us that

> 'Dymaei ac Megalopolitani et quidam Argivorum, priusqum decretum fieret, consurrexerunt ac relinquerunt consilium neque mirante ullo nec improbante'
>
> (Livy 32. 22. 9-10: 'the Dymaians, Megalopolitans and some (represtenatives) from Argos stood up and, before the decree was approved, left the meeting, no one being surprised or reproached').

There had long been a strong connection to Macedon in these cities, so they could not accept this decision and left the assembly before the vote could be taken. This reaction was predictable due to Megalopolis' connections to Macedon dating back to the time of Philip II (and potentially Alexander) as seen by the lands granted to the polis and more importantly the building named after him.[502] Moreover, these connections were the reason behind the establishment of the Achaian alliance with Macedon in the first place. Additionally, Dyme had a personal loyalty to Philip, as he was the one who had restored their homes and liberated them after they had been conquered and plundered by the Romans (Livy 32. 22. 10). Finally, Argos had longstanding personal ties to the kingdom

[501] Gruen (1984), 446.
[502] Errington (1990), 126.

and even believed that the Macedonian kings were their descendants and had installed tyrants in their city.

While this reaction could be expected, it is strange that these representatives left the meeting without speaking up and trying to convince the other Achaians of their point of view. However, it looks like most of the representatives were planning to vote for an alliance with Rome anyway. More importantly, it seems to me that the links of Dyme, Argos and Megalopolis to Philip had not at all 'induced to them to break with the Confederacy over this matter.'[503] On the contrary, these cities expressed their allegiance to the Achaian *koinon* as well as Macedon by leaving before any action was taken. In Megalopolis' case a high regard for federalism in general and the Achaian *koinon* in particular had been ingrained in their collective identity from the beginning due to its foundation by the Arkadian *koinon* in 368 BC. As we have seen in chapters two and four, Megalopolis had been grateful for the Macedonian support during the Kleomenean War since they had only been able to return from their exile in 223/2 BC because of the Macedonian help. Choosing between their allegiance to Philip and Achaian membership instead of combining them as they had done before proved seemingly impossible. Leaving before they were forced to publicly declare an opinion would thus be much easier. After their departure, the remaining Achaian delegations voted in favour of an immediate alliance with Attalos and Rhodes. Yet, the Achaian alliance with Rome was to be ratified by the Senate whose approval was necessary for this type of bond.

Of course, the Megalopolitans were happy with this outcome. Their decision to leave the assembly was not unexpected nor did any of the other members judge them for it. After all, Achaian member states enjoyed a high level of autonomy and Megalopolis' connections to Macedon were well known. Nevertheless, I am convinced that this is only one side of the polis' views on the matter. Subsequent Achaian politics clearly illustrate that different political ideologies were possible within the same city. For example, there is Polybius' account of the Greek attitudes towards Perseus at the start of the Third Macedonian War. The author distinguishes three separate groups among the political leaders: those who privately agreed with Perseus, others who publicly showed their connection to Perseus and finally those who just wanted the dispute to be

[503] Gruen (1984), 445.

settled (Pol. 30. 6. 5). Obviously, there were different political opinions on the matter within the same poleis and states and even among Philopoimen's fellow politicians. By the start of the Third Macedonian War (172-168 BC), the Achaian alliance with Rome had – just like the one with Macedon - become increasingly complex and estranged due to Achaia's growing need for independence and patriotism.[504] The Achaians, along with the rest of the Greeks, were not very keen on fighting a war between Rome and Perseus. The Achaian contribution to the war was minimal and they did not get actively involved until 170 BC, after there had been a heated debate on the proper action to take (Pol. 28. 6). During the debate, it became clear that within the group of political figures who were ideologically linked to Lykortas of Megalopolis, there were several prominent individuals: Polybius, Arkesilaos and Ariston of Megalopolis, Stratios of Tritaia, Xenon of Patrai and Apollonidas of Sikyon, all with different views on the Achaian involvement in the war. Lykortas wanted to remain neutral, whereas Stratios and Apollonidas agreed with him but believed those supporting Rome merely for personal gain should be dealt with. Contrarily, Archon, Polybius, Arkesilaos and Xenon thought it best to act as the circumstances would allow them (Pol. 28. 6. 7.). This passage proves that although two politicians came from the same city or even the same family, they did not always have to agree with one another. Interestingly, there seems to have been a divide between different generations on how to deal with Rome and achieve the goal of an independent Achaia. On the one hand, there was Lykortas' and Philopoimen's idealism which sometimes failed to grasp the complexity of dealing with Rome. This was opposed, on the other hand, by the realistic attitude of Archon and Polybius who were more aware of these problems. Another distinction can also be seen years earlier between Aristainos and Philopoimen who were divided on the Achaian attitude towards Rome, even though they agreed on the need for Achaian independence (Pol. 24. 11-13).[505]

These different examples show that it was entirely possible for two people from the same city to have a different political perspective. I am convinced that this was also the case for Megalopolis in 198 BC. Neither Polybius nor Livy mention this, but Polybius' narrative is fragmentary by this point and Livy may not have been aware of this aspect. Additionally, it is possible to say something more on the matter by looking at the

[504] Gruen (1984), 445.
[505] For others see Aymard (1933), Lehmann (1983), Errington (1969), Deininger and Gruen (1984), 482-484.

strategos: Aristainos. As we know from the *Histories*, Aristainos was a prominent figure in Achaian politics. He was closely associated with both Philopoimen (Plut. *Phil.* 13) and the Romans (Livy 32. 19. 5), but ultimately, he wanted to ensure that the Achaians could conduct their affairs independently.[506]

Even though Polybius tells us a lot about Aristainos' political career and his perception by other Achaians (Pol. 18. 13), he does not mention which city Aristainos came from which leaves us with a problem, since Plutarch and Pausanias indicate that he came from Megalopolis. If this is true, it would allow us to draw some interesting conclusions about the different political ideologies in connection to the Achaian foreign politics. Plutarch calls Aristainos: 'δὲ τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου δυναμένου μὲν ἐν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς μέγιστον' (Plut. *Phil.* 17. 3: 'a powerful Megalopolitan who was the best out of the Achaians'); while Pausanias says the following about him:

> Ἀρισταίνου τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦ Μεγαλοπολίτου παραινοῦντος ἐπαινεῖν τὰ Ῥωμαίοις ἀρέσκοντα ἐπὶ παντὶ μηδὲ ἀνθίστασθαί σφισιν ὑπὲρ μηδενό'
>
> (Paus. 8. 51. 4: 'Aristainos of Megalopolis advised the Achaians to approve the wishes of the Romans in all respects, and to oppose them about nothing').

Another Plutarchean passage is often cited in support of Aristainos as a Megalopolitan citizen in which the inhabitants of the polis wanted to banish Philopoimen after he had left for Crete (Plut. *Phil.* 13). To dissuade the Megalopolitans, the Achaians sent their *strategos* Aristainos to intervene on Philopoimen's behalf. In addition to establishing a definite connection between the two men, this passage shows, according to James O'Neil that Aristainos himself was a Megalopolitan, since it seemed rather implausible that the Achaian general could not address the assembly of Megalopolis if he himself was not from Megalopolis.[507] While I agree with O'Neil's general idea about Aristainos' background, this passage does not necessarily verify the thesis as definitely as O'Neil believed. Surely, the federal *strategos* would have been able to address the assembly of one of its member poleis without any problems. Yet, if we look at Livy's text again (Livy 32. 19-22), the main motivation for the *strategos'* actions at the *synodos* of 198 BC was a concern about both Rome and Sparta.[508] The fact that Sparta was connected to his motivations is particularly interesting as it is a typical characteristic of the Megalopolitan

[506] O'Neil (1984-86), 36.
[507] O'Neil (1984-86), 36.
[508] Eckstein (1987), 145.

identity. Unlike citizens from Dyme, for example, Megalopolitans were generally much more aware of the danger Sparta posed to Achaia. One look at the federal measures taken in connection with Sparta prove this point, for someone from Megalopolis was always bound to be involved. For example, there was Philopoimen's resolution to incorporate Sparta into the *koinon* in the 190's as well the prominence it takes in Achaian politics after Lydiades became active in federal politics. Finally, as both O'Neil and Freeman have stated, there was a predominance of Megalopolitans in Achaian politics from the 230's onwards which makes it possible that Aristainos was an Arkadian.[509]

Even though Polybius remains silent on Aristainos' origins, we should completely not discard him in this discussion. In his polemic against traitors, the author clearly believes that Aristainos is not one of those men who merit the term traitor since the actions of traitors are always guided by personal gain or a disagreement with the opposition (Pol. 18. 15. 1-4). Aristainos, on the other hand was one of those whose actions had resulted in the greatest benefit for all,

> 'εἰ γὰρ μὴ σὺν καιρῷ τότε μετέρριψε τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς Ἀρίσταινος ἀπὸ τῆς Φιλίππου συμμαχίας πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων, φανερῶς ἄρδην ἀπολώλει τὸ ἔθνος. νῦν δὲ χωρὶς τῆς παρ' αὐτὸν τὸν καιρὸν ἀσφαλείας ἑκάστοις περιγενομένης, αὐξήσεως τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ὁμολογουμένως ὁ προειρημένος ἀνὴρ κἀκεῖνο τὸ διαβούλιον αἴτιος ἐδόκει γεγονέναι: διὸ καὶ πάντες αὐτὸν οὐχ ὡς προδότην, ἀλλ' ὡς εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα τῆς χώρας ἐτίμων'
>
> (Pol. 18. 13. 8-10: 'since if Aristainos had not then in good time made the Achaians throw off their alliance with Philip for one with Rome, the nation would evidently have suffered utter destruction. But now, apart from the temporary safety gained for all the members of the League, this man and that counsel were regarded as having beyond doubt contributed to the increase of Achaian power, so that all agreed in honouring him not as a traitor but as the benefactor and preserver of the land').

Polybius is clearly defending both Aristainos and his controversial actions at Sikyon, believing he acted correctly, as his ultimate goals was to increase Achaian power. However, not everyone shared this opinion, the Megalopolitans in particular. Undoubtedly, Aristainos and his actions would have been heavily criticised, something the author was most aware of. Then why would Polybius defend Aristainos? The only possible answer to this question is a connection that the historian saw with Aratos'

[509] O'Neil (1984-86), 33; and Freeman (1893), 486.

actions during the Kleomenean War, which were guided by a feeling of *ἀνάγκη*.[510] Likewise, his usage of the words *εὐεργέτης* and *σωτῆρια* create further links to a wider tradition of benefactors and moral superiority and illustrate Polybius' judgement of Aristainos as a positive element of Achaian history. Finally, if Aristainos was in fact from Megalopolis, Polybius would have seen it as his duty to ensure that his readers would understand the reasoning behind Aristainos' actions and uphold his positive image.

According to the literary sources Aristainos was a Megalopolitan just like his political associates Philopoimen and Lykortas. In fact, Plutarch and Pausanias state this explicitely, while Polybius' testimony is compatible with this assessment. Based solely on this evidence an attractive theory starts to emerge: Aristainos, the main voice in support of the Romans, proves that not all Megalopolitans were averse to the course the federation was taking. Megalopolis' political convictions and identity were thus much more complex than the sources would like us to believe. This is because there were individuals such as Aristainos who still exemplified several of the traditional Megalopolitan values such as the awareness of the Spartan danger but had stepped away from another one, i.e. its long-standing link to Macedon, to do what was best for the Achaian federation, even if the Achaians themselves had not realised it at the time. It seems that this was primarily how Megalopolis would affect federal politics from 198 BC onwards, namely via the actions and convictions of powerful individuals such as Aristainos, Philopoimen, Lykortas, Polybius, Diaios and Diophanes. However, this does not mean that the city did not play any part in federal and institutional life, as is clear from its active participation in the federal institutions and the minting of federal coinage discussed in the previous chapters.

The idea of Aristainos as a Megalopolitan is a very attractive one for the purposes of the present thesis, but it has usually been rejected by scholars who rather identify him as Aristainos of Dyme.[511] This identification of Aristainos with the city of Dyme stems from an inscriptions found in Delphi dating to the beginning of the second century BC in which the Achaians dedicate a statue to 'Ἀρίσταινον Τιμοκάδεος Δυμαῖον' because of his 'ἀρετᾶς (…) καὶ εὐνοίας τᾶς εἰς τὸ ἔθνος καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλλανας' (*FD* III, 3. 122: 'excellence and benevolence to the people and the allies and

[510] Eckstein (1987), 149.
[511] The extensive list includes among others: Lehmann (1967), 216-265 and 391-392; Walbank (1957), 654; Walbank (1967), 187; Waterfield and Erskine (2016), 366; and Rizakis (1995), 280; 352-353.

all of the other Greeks'). Rizakis cites an additional inscription from Corinth in which an Aristainos is honoured together with a Roman named Titus (*Achaie* I 629). While the inscription is rather fragmentary, as the majority of the text is missing, Rizakis has concluded that this Aristainos has to be same one mentioned in the other inscription from Delphi and the Roman known as Titus to be Titus Quinctius Flaminius.[512] While this is possible, Rizakis' theory cannot be proven with absolute certainty. Furthermore, a proxeny decree from Aptera from the same period mentions one 'Ἀρίσταινος Δαμοκάδηος Ἀχαιὸς' and in Polybius' narrative there is an allusion to Aristainetos from Dyme who was the *hipparch* at the battle of Mantinea in 207 BC (Pol. 11. 11. 7). These additional sources make most historians doubt the veracity of Plutarch's and Pausanias' accounts.

Thus, all of these attestations to an Aristain(et)os leave us with four possible and different men, which seems highly unlikely due to the fact that the name Aristainos is quite uncommon.[513] A search of the Lexicon of Greek Personal Names demonstrates this fact, yielding only eight entries in total for the name Aristainos from the Peloponnese, all of which occurred across the very long span between 365 BC and the third century AD.[514] However, six of them came from poleis within the Achaian federation such as Dyme, Hermione and Achaia in general. Aristainetos, in comparison, is a much more common name which occurs sixty-one times in inscriptions from all over the Mediterranean world but only three times in the Peloponnese.[515] Although the name Aristainos was indeed quite rare, it was used most frequently in the Peloponnese and more importantly within the Achaian *koinon*. This does retain the possibility open for the existence of at least two separate individuals called Aristainos in Achaian politics. In my opinion, Niccolini has sufficiently proven based on mistakes in other passages in the manuscripts of Polybius that the name Aristainetos could easily be an error and should be therefore Aristainos instead.[516] This then makes easier to identify Aristainos of Dyme as the hipparch of the Achaians in 207 BC and the man who was honoured by

[512] Rizakis (1995), 352.
[513] Errington (1969), 276.
[514] The online search yielded twelve results from Central Greece and the Peloponnese (http://clas-lgpn2.classics.ox.ac.uk/name/Ἀρίσταινος), while the *LGPN* IIIA yielded eight results solely from the Peloponnese (p. 55).
[515] For the online search, see http://clas-lgpn2.classics.ox.ac.uk/name/Ἀρισταίνετος#lgpn_tabs_content_table; or see *LGPN* IIIA, 55.
[516] Niccolini (1913), 196.

the Achaians for his *ἀρετη* and *εὐνοία*. Additionally, we cannot overlook the similarities between the patronymics Timokades and Damokades so it therefore seems plausible that this is also the same person.[517]

The main problem we are left with then is the following: is this Aristainos of Dyme who seems to have enjoyed a prospering federal career the same man as the Aristainos of Megalopolis mentioned by Plutarch and Pausanias? Niccolini thinks that it is possible for Plutarch to have made a mistake and in fact the Aristainos of Dyme honoured in the inscriptions is the same individual mentioned in the other primary source.[518] This view is echoed by Rizakis who altogether ignores Plutach's comments on Aristainos and is sure that the Aristainos and Aristainetos mentioned by Polybius is the man that was honoured in the different inscriptions.[519] Deininger, on the other hand, is convinced that Plutarch must have had access to the original text of Polybius' narrative and would not make that kind of mistake, so he believes that Aristainos is from Megalopolis.[520] For Errington everything depended on the reading of Aristain(et)os in the *Histories.* If this was indeed Aristainos, Plutarch was in fact mistaken and Polybius also says that Aristainos was a Dymaian. If this was Aristainetos then there were two Achaian statesmen, one called Aristainos and another called Aristainetos. However, this still leaves the problem of the Aristainos mentioned in the inscriptions.[521] In the end, it is impossible to come to a definite conclusion on the matter, but there is still room for some speculations.

So, while the name Aristainos is rare, it is mostly found on inscriptions with a connection to the Achaian *koinon*, making it likely that two men with the same name could have been active within federal politics: one of them a federal *hipparch* and son of Timokades from Dyme honoured in several inscriptions and the other the federal *strategos* from Megalopolis.

2. Megalopolis, Sparta and the Achaian-Roman relations after 198 BC

The Achaian *synodos* of 198 BC and the political events leading up to it have been discussed in detail because they were, just like the events of the Kleomenean War,

[517] Deininger (1966), 511.
[518] Niccolini (1913), 194.
[519] Rizakis (1995), 352.
[520] Deininger (1966), 376.
[521] Errington (1969), 276-279.

decisive for Achaian politics and Megalopolis' part in them. While the city played an active role in the creation of the Achaian alliance with Macedon in 225 BC, the situation was rather different in 198 BC. The city did not approve of the new direction in Achaian politics and left the assembly before a decision was taken. All of this was to be expected from a city with close connections to Macedon, but, if we assume that Aristainos was from Megalopolis, there is an indication that within Megalopolis a new group of individuals was being formed who had stepped away from the traditional loyalty to Macedon and replaced it with a vehement Achaian patriotism. Interestingly, it seems that over the course of the next five decades, this was a trait exhibited by most of the Megalopolitan leaders who dominated the Achaian political scene. The ensuing different generations of Megalopolitan statesmen - from Philopoimen and his compatriots to Kritolaos and consorts – shared a profound hatred for Sparta and a new found Achaian patriotism. These two characteristics shaped the Megalopolitan leaders' political convictions and Achaian interactions with Rome. This is particularly clear whenever one of these men was leading the federation - several of them having done this more than once - which was frequently as between 198 and 169 BC eleven out of the nineteen *strategoi* that are known to us came from Megalopolis.[522] Even though the source material gets worse after the end of the Third Macedonian War, this trend is again visible amongst the last six *strategoi* from the *koinon* with five of them coming from Megalopolis between 151 and 146 BC.

The last section of this thesis will examine the instances in the Achaian interactions with Rome during which Sparta caused issues in the relationship between the two states, something that was not made easier by the *strategos* of the time who almost always a Megalopolitan. And if the *strategos* was not a Megalopolitan, then there was bound to be a discussion within the federation about the proper course to take in which the Megalopolitan voice was undoubtedly heard. However, as previously discussed, even among the Megalopolitan statesmen there were different opinions on how to deal with Rome so as to achieve autonomous Achaian control over the Peloponnese. Moreover, some difficulties have to be mentioned before starting the discussion. For one, a complete overview of Achaian politics after the Third Macedonian War (172-168 BC) becomes rather limited to due to the fragmentary nature

[522] Errington (1969), 300-301, table II.

of the sources. Additionally, the literary sources are dominated by individuals, thus giving the impression that the poleis themselves did not have any political importance within the Achaian *koinon*. Nonetheless, as stated before, the inscriptions and numismatic evidence from the period show that this was not the case and that the poleis were especially active within the Achaian *koinon*. For example, most of the federal and civic coinage from Megalopolis and the boundary disputes involving the city are dated to the 180s BC.[523] Therefore, this last section will analyse the actions of the Megalopolitan politicians in the Achaian-Roman relationship and combine this with the knowledge provided to us by the material record.

2.1. Philopoimen and his cohorts

2.1.1. Nabis of Sparta

Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, had come to power in 207 BC, first acting as a regent for the rightful heir to the throne Pelops after Machanidas' death in the battle at Mantinea at the hands of Philopoimen. However, Nabis soon usurped the throne by killing Pelops and those he was certain of would stand in his way (Diod. 27. 1. 1). Within Sparta, Nabis continued the implementation of Kleomenes' so-called social reforms which he saw as a reinstatement of the Sparta originally instated by Lykurgos. It is important to note that the literary sources are traditionally quite hostile when it comes to Nabis.[524] On the one hand, Polybius, who undoubtedly served as the basis for this hostility, calls Nabis a tyrant and depicts him as a vicious man who had constructed a torturing device that he would use on anyone who had wronged him (Pol. 13. 6). On the other hand, it seems that Nabis saw himself more as another Spartan king with Hellenistic ambitions like his predecessor Areus I, something that can be seen from his coins on which he styles himself as *basileus*.[525] However, Polybius' hostility was to be expected since Nabis, as tyrant of Sparta, embodied everything the historian opposed as a Megalopolitan. So, one must keep in mind that when dealing with Sparta in the *Histories*, Polybius' narrative has to be treated with the utmost care. Moreover, this antagonism was not limited to Polybius as is apparent from the events involving Nabis' horse and his attack on Messene at the start of the Second Macedonian War, which have been discussed above and which

[523] See chapters two and three for more information.
[524] Cartledge and Spawforth (2002), 60.
[525] Morkholm (1991),150.

make it clear that both Spartans and Megalopolitans were still continuing the traditional feud between the two states.

During the first years of the war, Nabis was an ally of Philip and received control over Argos in return, as Philip's commander Philokles succeeded in conquering the city, perhaps due to the fact that the Argive representatives were among those opposing the Achaian decision of 198 BC. However, when it became clear to Nabis that the Romans were going to win the war, the tyrant betrayed Philip and went over to the Romans. His negotiations with Flamininus resulted in a truce between Sparta and the Achaians which lasted for the remainder of the war (Livy 32. 25. 38-40.). Nevertheless, Nabis' control over Argos continued to pose a problem for the Achaian *koinon* as it threatened their unity and ambitions in the Peloponnese.[526] The Romans under their representative, Titus Quinctius Flamininus, called together a Panhellenic congress in 195 BC at Corinth to debate what course of action to take. Even though the war with Philip was over by this time, the Romans still had troops stationed in Greece to make sure that Philip stirred no more trouble. Moreover, this was the prefect chance for Flamininus and his troops to show to the Greeks that the Romans were serious about protecting them from any incursions against Greek Freedom, something that they had proclaimed that they would protect at the Isthmian Games of 196 BC.[527] By getting the Greeks themselves to decide on the matter before going to the Senate for approval, Flamininus showed them that this was a Greek war fought with the support of Rome, since Nabis' control of Argos was a violation of Rome's new policy as the protector of Greek freedom (Livy 34. 22. 12). The subsequent war against Nabis was a short one that ended in a Spartan defeat and while he lost control of Argos, the tyrant was allowed to keep his throne (Plut. *Flam.* 13).

This decision did not sit well with the Achaians who had defeated the tyrant under the leadership of Philopoimen (Pol. 21. 9). Moreover, the troubles between Nabis and the Achaians persisted even after the Romans had left the Peloponnese in 194 BC. When the tyrant took possession of cities on the Lakonian coast like Gytheion which were under Achaian control, the *koinon* sent help to the city but was defeated. They did not dare to undertake further action until they had heard back from the Senate who advised them to appeal to Flamininus for advice. According to Livy, the general

[526] Gruen (1984), 450.
[527] Dmitriev (2011), 202-206.

consensus among the Achaians was to deal with Sparta as soon as possible, something that was not supported by Flamininus and Philopoimen who both thought that immediate action was not a solution but as the Achaian *strategos* for that year Philopoimen had to oblige with the wishes of the assembly (Livy 35. 25. 11). However, the relationship between Philopoimen and Flamininius was problematic at times because of the latter's popularity among the Achaians as a result of his victories over Nabis such as the Achaian triumph in Tegea in 201 BC (Plut. *Phil.* 15; Plut. *Flam.* 13). Considering his previous role in Achaian battles against Sparta and Nabis in particular as well as his background as a Megalopolitan, it seems to me that Philopoimen supported the Achaian assembly wholeheartedly in its desire to undertake immediate action against Nabis. After all, Philopoimen was a Megalopolitan who had already seen the threat that Sparta could pose to the *koinon* and Megalopolis under strong leadership such as Kleomenes or Nabis, particularly since the war against these Spartans had primarily been outwaged near Megalopolis (Pol. 21. 9; Plut. *Kleo.* 6).[528] Additionally, Philopoimen's preference for resolving conflicts swiftly and, more importantly, without the involvement of Rome would manifest itself several more times during the next decade. The best example of this is his impromptu journey from Argos to Megalopolis to deal with the Messenian revolt in 183 BC, which, while resulting in his death, was solved without the help of Rome, as this was an internal Achaian matter and did not concern the Romans (Plut. *Phil.* 18. 7).

After a disastrous naval battle in which Philopoimen led the Achaians on a very old ship against Nabis, the Arkadian was much more successful on land and the *koinon* managed to defeat Sparta (Livy 35. 26-30). Now forced to remain inside the city, Nabis was eventually killed by a group of Aitolians who had come to the city under the pretence of helping and plundered the city afterwards.[529] Philopoimen took advantage of the chaos that ensued after Nabis' murder and the Aitolian raid to make a speech to the Spartan people with which 'societati Achaeorum Lacedaemonios adiunxit' (Livy 35. 37. 2: 'he connected the Lacedaemonian with the Achaian *koinon*'). Plutarch's account mostly matches up with Livy's, although he does say that Philopoimen came to Sparta with his troops and 'τῶν μὲν ἀκόντων, τοὺς δὲ συμπείσας προσηγάγετο καὶ μετεκόμισεν εἰς

[528] For the role of Megalopolis in the Kleomenean War, see chapter four.
[529] Gruen (1984), 460.

τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς τὴν πόλιν' (Plut. *Phil.* 15. 2: 'with force as well as with persuasion he managed to convince the city of his intentions and brought it to the Achaians'). Because of Nabis' unexpected death, the Spartan citizens may have panicked and therefore it is possible that some of them could have genuinely considered Philopoimen's offer. However, the traditional and open hostility the two states had displayed against one another in the past – and which would continue during the next fifty years – makes it more likely that at least a part of the Spartans had to be forced into the *koinon*.

It is not surprising that Philopoimen was the one who brought Sparta into the federation as he was by far the most influential and militarily skilled of the Achaian leaders at that time. Moreover, he seems to have been at the centre of a group of federal statesmen who were also Megalopolitans such as Diophanes, Aristainos and Lykortas. As argued in the introduction to this section, these individuals seem to have stepped away from their city's loyalty to Macedon and were now concerned with the expansion of the Achaian *koinon* and ensuring its internal peace. This development is also echoed throughout Polybius' narrative, proving that at least for the individual Megalopolitan who was active on the federal level, they were as much Achaian as they were Megalopolitan.

2.1.2. Philopoimen at Compasion

In the years after the Romans and their Greek allies defeated Antiochos and the Aitolians, there was an upsurge of Greek embassies to the Senate. Clearly, it had become transparent to the Greeks that after defeating two of the biggest powers in the Hellenistic World, contacts with Rome could be quite useful when pursuing one's own local interests.[530] This realisation also dawned on members of the Achaian *koinon* such as Sparta and Messene, resulting in a series of embassies to Rome whenever they were unhappy with the Achaians. Throughout the Hellenistic period, Sparta had been ruled by a series of kings and tyrants, all of whom had tried to leave their mark on the city. As a result, the Spartan state and its elite had undergone several reforms and changes which had created a big group of Spartan exiles.[531] These exiles would pose a persistent problem in interactions between Sparta, the Achaian League and Rome, with representatives from as many as four different Spartan exile groups coming to Rome at the same time. In 189 BC, the Spartans succeeded in recapturing the coastal cities they

[530] Erskine (1994), 49.
[531] Errington (1971), 238.

had lost to the *koinon* after the War against Nabis and officially seceded from the Achaian League. While the Achaians undoubtedly wanted to retaliate against Sparta as soon as possible, the Roman general Marcus Fulvius Nobilior convinced both the Achaians and the Spartans to send embassies to Rome. A year later however, when no action had been taken by the Senate to solve the problem, the Achaians under Philopoimen declared war on Sparta and marched against them. The conflict between Sparta and the *koinon* under Philopoimen ended with the brutal massacre in 188 at Compasion in which eighty Spartans were killed by the Achaians. Moreover, Philopoimen abolished Sparta's ancient Lykurgean constitution, restored the many different exiles to the city and ordered the inhabitants to take down the city walls (Plut. *Phil.* 16. 3-5).

Philopoimen's conduct at Compasion was severe and had several consequences, as it had done nothing to assuage Sparta's reluctance to become a member of the Achaian *koinon*. Several embassies and delegations went back and forth in the last years of the 180s BC between Achaia, Sparta and Rome to address the problematic relationship between Sparta and a *koinon* primarily under the control of a group of Megalopolitans. These interactions were characterised by the restraint of the Senate and its delegates, the Spartan determination to complain to Rome about their treatment by the *koinon* and the restoration of their exiles, and the Achaian internal discord on how to deal with these matters. This last element is particularly evident in the sources, which frequently depict differences of opinion between the political compatriots of Philopoimen, most of whom came from Megalopolis. A good example of this is Aristainos' silence when Metellus condemned the actions at Compasion during a meeting, which had been convened for a Roman delegation in Achaia in 185 BC (Pol. 22. 10. 3). Even more striking was that Diophanes of Megalopolis used the opportunity to criticise Philopoimen's actions at Compasion and apparently distanced himself from him (Pol. 22. 10).[532] To some, Aristainos' silence meant that he agreed with the Roman critique, yet this may not have been the case as his silence was deliberate, designed to convey a united front to the Romans.[533] Clearly, the situation with Sparta was even causing problems among this group of Megalopolitans since they quarrelled on how to

[532] Deininger (1971), 121-122.
[533] Gruen (1984), 482-483.

deal with the problem. Therefore, as we have seen before, personal convictions and beliefs also played a part in the actions and politics of the individual Megalopolitan.

Additionally, the Spartan exiles continued to pose a problem; Spartan envoys continued to appear in Rome on behalf of the exiles. Interestingly, in 184 BC, another Roman delegation under Appius Claudius Pulcher came to Achaia, which condemned Compasion and the harsh treatment of Sparta. While Lykortas tried to defend the Achaians' conduct and the forced annexation of the polis, the threat of violence by the Roman delegates was enough for the assembly to see that some appeasing measures had to be taken and so they lifted the death sentence on Areus and Alkibiades (Livy 39. 36-37). The fact that Rome managed to get the Achaians to obey to their wishes is quite an interesting development, as it seems to stand in direct contrast with previous actions. Other times the *koinon* did not care too much about the Roman delegates and their opinion on the Spartan problem. However, this did not have any lasting effect as the problem persisted: the Spartans sent four envoys, each of them representing a different group of exiles. All of this resulted in the Senate ultimately appointing three 'experts' to judge on the matter: Appius Pulcher, Metellus and Flamininus. This committee eventually judged that all of the exiles of 188 BC had to be reinstated, but Sparta had to remain a member of the *koinon*.

2.2. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta

Even though this boundary dispute has already been discussed in connection to the internal politics of the Achaian *koinon* and the relationship between Megalopolis and the federal government, it is also necessary to look at the implications of this boundary dispute in the context of the current chapter.[534] The stele with the inscription was found in Olympia and mentions a conflict between Sparta and Megalopolis, with the federal state being involved as a litigant when Sparta refused to pay the fine imposed by the federation. Sparta's refusal of the payment meant that the Achaians had to get involved as well and another arbitration had to take place which lies at the heart of this inscription. Its cause was the boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta about – once again – control over the regions Skiritis and Aigytis, which were situated between the two

[534] For more information on the boundary dispute see section three of chapter three; Ager (1996), 375-379; Mackil (2013), 477-481.

poleis.[535] This had been a point of contention for a very long time and had started, at least according to Kaja Harter-Uibopuu, with the gift of the lands to Megalopolis by Philip II.[536] Over the next decades these regions would be passed back and forth between Megalopolis and Sparta until this latest intervention in 164 BC:

> 'οἱ δικασταὶ ἔκριν]αν γ[ενέσθαι] [τὰν Σκιρ]ῖτιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρ̣κ[άδων ἀπὸ] τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς [Π]ελοπόννασον κατελθεῖν'
>
> (l. 34-36: 'the judges decided that Skirits and Aigytis were Arkadian ever since the Herakleidai returned to the Peloponnese').

The boundary dispute is most commonly dated after 164 BC because of passages in Polybius and Pausanias which date the conflict to the period after 164 BC (Pol. 31.1.6-7; Paus. 7. 11. 1-2). As the previous discussion of the inscription has already proven, these passages – while very useful for the dating of the conflict – are a bit problematic, since Polybius talks about a conflict between Megalopolis and Sparta and Pausanias about Argos and Sparta. Although it is entirely possible that Pausanias is indeed describing another conflict, his general information does correspond with that of Polybius and the inscription, so it seems more plausible that Pausanias made a mistake and actually meant Megalopolis and not Argos.[537] Nevertheless, the dating of the conflict to the period after 164 BC means that even after the Third Macedonian War and the expulsion of one thousand Achaian leaders to Rome, the antagonism between Megalopolis and Sparta still played an important role in Achaian politics. This is particularly clear from the fact that even though the boundary dispute is between Megalopolis and Sparta, the first parties mentioned in the inscription are the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians, indicating that the *koinon* personally intervened on behalf of the Megalopolitans (*IvO* 47 l. 2). Moreover, it also shows that Megalopolis as a city was still politically active even though the city itself more or less disappears from other sources in this period. Of course, this can be explained by the loss of the later books of Polybius' narrative on the one hand and the tendency of the literary sources to focus on the important individuals when discussing historical events on the other hand. Because of this, a very subjective representation of the historical events is created by the ancient

[535] Gruen (1976), 50.
[536] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 85-86.
[537] Mackil (2013), 479.

historians that gives the impression that Megalopolis was only politically active through its many influential leaders.

Another interesting development in this boundary dispute between the Spartans and the Megalopolitans was the fact that the conflict was referred to Rome. As with plenty of other cases of interstate arbitration in the later Hellenistic world, Rome often acted as the neutral arbitrator in conflicts between different Greek poleis and Hellenistic states as was the case in the Roman arbitration of a boundary dispute between Mylasa and Stratonikeia around 188 BC (Ager 101; *IMylasa* 134).[538] However, Rome also had the habit of referring these arbitrations and mediations to a third party and, more importantly, when it came to conflicts involving the Achaian *koinon* and its members, Roman representatives or the Senate would tend to give advice on the proper course of action before letting the Achaians deal with the matter. Rome had followed this pattern throughout its interactions with the federal state in the second century BC, and, according to Pausanias (Paus. 7. 11. 2), it was no different this time:

> 'αὐτὸς μέν σφισιν ὁ Γάλλος ἀπηξίωσε δικαστὴς καταστῆναι, Καλλικράτει δὲ ἁπάσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀνδρὶ ἀλάστορι ἐπιτρέπει τὴν κρίσιν'
>
> ('(Gaius Sulpicius) Gallus claimed himself to be an unworthy judge on the matter, so he turned the judgement over to Kallikrates, the most wretched man in the whole of Greece').

While this is not mentioned by Polybius himself in the surviving text, Pausanias' apparent negative comment about Kallikrates was obviously inspired by his source and it is therefore very plausible that Polybius discussed this boundary dispute in more detail in a section of his text that is now lost. Therefore, as already argued in the previous chapters, this negative picture of Kallikrates has to be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt, just as his supremacy of the Achaian political stage after the Third Macedonian War must be. However, as an important Achaian political leader with ties to Rome, it would make sense that the Roman representatives would hand the arbitration about this dispute back to one of their own.[539]

> Roman involvement is also alluded to in the inscription:
>
> 'καὶ Ῥωμαίους τοὺς προεστακότας τᾶς τῶν Ἑλλάν[ων εὐνομίας καὶ ὁμο]νοίας, ὅκ[α π]αρεγενήθησαν ποθ' αὐτοὺς Μεγ[αλοπολῖται καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπ]ὲρ ταύτας τᾶς χώρας διαφε[ρόμενοι'

[538] Ager (1998), 273-275.
[539] Mackil (2013), 480.

(*IvO* 47, l. 43-46: 'and the Romans who have taken the lead over Greek good order and harmony, when the Megalopolitans and Lakedaimonians went to Rome about these disputed lands...').

However, due to the fragmentary nature of the Greek text, we cannot determine if the Roman involvement went deeper than these comments on *eunomia* and *homonoia* alluded to in the text. Yet it is unsurprising that Rome was implicated due to the parties involved in the conflict and the time when the boundary dispute took place. As we have seen in previous interactions between the Spartans and the primarily Megalopolitan leaders of the Achaian *koinon*, the Spartans had the tendency to run to Rome to complain about the Achaian treatment of their city, which could explain the Roman involvement in the first place. Moreover, the Romans were only involved in the boundary dispute between the two cities, and not the issues of the payment of the fine that was imposed on Sparta by the *koinon* and which the city refused to pay (*IvO* 47, l. 1-8.). Obviously, the Roman involvement in this conflict was rather minimal and once again, the Roman impulse to stay out of internal Achaian affairs is quite apparent.[540]

Sparta's refusal to pay this fine or *zamia* is striking in another sense as it illustrates how even after spending several decades as a member of the Achaian *koinon*, Sparta was still not actively complying with the rules and procedures of the federal state. Moreover, the local tensions between Sparta and Megalopolis also persisted but due to the new political context created by the existence of the Achaian *koinon* and the Roman interest in the East, these local tensions had a much bigger impact than when it was just two poleis squabbling with one another. Thus, this boundary dispute proves that the general trends of the interactions between the *koinon*, Rome and Sparta which were set out in the previous decades, continued after the Third Macedonian War.

2.3. Kritolaos and Diaios: Megalopolitans and the Achaian War of 146 BC

Things only changed in the years leading up to the Achaian War of 146 BC. This short conflict lasted only a couple of months and ended in the Roman destruction of Corinth and the dismantlement of the *koinon.* Once again, the scarcity of the sources for this period makes it very difficult to determine what the precise causes for this war were.[541] Therefore, a lot of different theories have been offered by scholars. For example,

[540] Harter-Uibopuu (1998), 192.
[541] Thornton (1998), 585-634.

Sviatoslav Dmitriev sees this war as the result of the conflicting terminology used by the Greeks and Rome in their interactions with one another.[542] As a result of this, the relationship between Achaia and Rome deteriorated, with the Achaians believing that they were a full and independent ally of Rome, while Rome considered the opposite to be true. On the other hand, Deininger saw this as a sign of a class struggle, in which the lower classes started resisting the new system set up by the Romans.[543] Ideas of a class struggle across Greece are also echoed by John Briscoe, yet he saw the origins of the war in the personal conflicts among a new type of Achaian leaders (most notably the Megalopolitan Kritolaos and the Spartan Menalkidas), who were only driven by their own personal ambitions and incited the common populace against Rome.[544] However, others argue that the Romans were actively trying to provoke and lure the *koinon* into a state of war to get rid of the only Greek federal state with any influence left.[545]

While there is merit to each of these theories, the information provided by the sources clearly indicate that the problems between Sparta and a new generation of Megalopolitans were once more in part responsible for this war. Contrastingly, shortly before the troubles started, Sparta was actively participating in federal Achaian life as in 151/0 BC Menalkidas was the first *strategos* to hail from Sparta (Paus. 7. 11. 7). Moreover, the relationship between the Greeks and Rome had gained a new dimension after the Third Macedonian War and the massive exile of a thousand Achaians to Italy, presumably due to the lack of support the Romans had received from the federation in the early years of the war and the fact that all over Greece there were those who had a certain degree of sympathy for Perseus (Pol. 30. 6). After many years of political inaction, Rome acted against these men by supporting their political opponents and for a while at least, it may have shown the Greeks that the Senate was a force to be reckoned with. Additionally, the relationship between Rome and the federation was put under extra strain by the repeated Achaian embassies to the Senate to get these exiles back, which incidentally were led multiple times by Polybius' brother Thearidas (Pol. 30. 30. 1; 33. 1. 3-8; 33. 3. 14). Undoubtedly, the matter of the exiles formed an important part of the Achaian polity until their return in 150 BC, but the *koinon* was also preoccupied

[542] Dmitriev (2011), 330-331.
[543] Deininger (1971), 226-238.
[544] Briscoe (1967), 15-19. G. Colin (1905; 619-625) also takes this view and the problems connected to the depiction of this latest generation of Achaian statesmen in the sources is addressed in chapter two.
[545] Harris (1985), 240-244.

with other matters such as ensuring that conflicts between its members were resolved as quickly as possible, as is evidenced from the limited Roman involvement in the boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta and the ensuing conflict about the payment of the fine between Sparta and the federation.

According to Pausanias, the Athenian attack on Oropos in 150 BC was what initially sparked the problems between Menalkidas and other leaders of the federal state, as he had promised the Oropians to persuade the *koinon* to intervene on their behalf so they did not have to pay the massive fine imposed upon them first by Sikyon and later by the Senate.[546] To do this, the Spartan enlisted the help of Kallikrates, but eventually nothing happened and Menalkidas still collected the money promised to him by the Oropians, which displeased Kallikrates (Paus. 7. 12. 2):

> 'πρεσβεῦσαί τε γὰρ Ἀχαιῶν ἐναντία ἔφασκεν αὐτὸν ἐς Ῥώμην καὶ ἐς τὰ μάλιστα γενέσθαι πρόθυμον ἐξελέσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην συνεδρίου τοῦ Ἀχαιῶν'
>
> ('he had spoken against the Achaians during an embassy to Rome and had become very eager to take out Sparta from the Achaian *koinon*').

Of course, as already pointed out, Pausanias was extremely negative about the leaders of the federation such as Kallikrates of Leontion, Menalkidas of Sparta and Diaios of Megalopolis, whom he calls out for their blatant corruption, a notion that Pausanias obviously borrowed from Polybius' original text. Even though the truthfulness of these accounts can be doubted, it seems as though the time of Sparta's active and willing membership of the *koinon* was over since Menalkidas and the Spartans again sent several embassies to Rome in 150 and 149 BC, yet the serious problems did not begin until several Megalopolitans acquired control over the Achaian *koinon.*

Diaios, Damokritos and Kritolaos were all part of the Megalopolitan elite, and their families (at least that of Diaios) had been active in Achaian politics for several generations.[547] Just like their predecessors, these men were driven in their political actions by their hatred for Sparta, as well as their need to keep that polis in the Achaian *koinon*, even if it meant declaring war on Rome as is clear from the following words said to have been uttered by Kritolaos at the famous Achaian *synodos* of 146 BC in Corinth:

> 'φάσκων βούλεσθαι μέν 'Ρωμαίων φίλος ὑπάρχειν, δεσπότας δ' οὐκ ἂν εὐδοκῆσαι κτησάμενος'

[546] Errington (2008), 321.
[547] O'Neil (1984-86), 35.

(Pol. 38. 12. 8: 'he said he wanted to remain a Roman friend, but he was not prepared to submit himself to despots').

This echoed criticism uttered by Polybius' father Lykortas, who refused to let Rome treat Achaia like a master would her slaves, especially considering the freedom declaration made by the Romans in 196 BC (Livy 39. 37). Clearly, the tradition of denying Rome the control over internal Achaian affairs had persisted as well amongst the Megalopolitans. However, while the generation of Lykortas and Philopoimen acted in the name of the federation, in the sources this latest generation of Megalopolitans seems to have been concerned with personal gain instead. It was rather unlikely that this was actually the case, since Polybius and other historians who used his work as a source like Pausanias were quite hostile towards these men. Moreover, they seemed to have lost all realisation what exactly the dire result from going to war with Rome would entail, as their actions preceding the war would indicate, and especially since the Senate was getting tired of dealing with the Spartan problem.[548]

The determination of both the Achaians and the Lakedaimonians to continue their open hostility led to mutual attacks such as the Achaian mission in Laconia by Damokritos early on in 147 BC. Moreover, the apparent mistreatment of Roman officials that came to Greece did nothing to improve matters as it provoked statements from these men – who seemed rather easily offended – that not only Sparta had to secede from the *koinon*, but also Corinth, Argos, HeraKleia and Orchomenos (Paus. 7. 14. 1). Yet, the Achaian War was very much the result of the actions and wishes of a few individuals, most importantly Kritolaos and Diaios. After all, it was Kritolaos who misled the Romans into thinking that they would meet an entire assembly, started preparations for a war and led the *synodos* of 147 BC in Corinth where the 'commoners' approved an Achaian War against Sparta (Pol. 38. 12).[549] His compatriot Diaios was equally committed to this cause as after the disappearance of Kritolaos, he went to extreme lengths to ensure that the Achaians – and other Greeks, for the war proved to have many supporters amongst the other states – could continue their war: he recruited twelve thousand slaves to fight, created a war fund, released those in debt and made plans to

[548] Green (1990), 451.

[549] As a part of the Achaian and Megalopolitan elites, Polybius has an obvious disdain for the workers and merchants who he believed to be the lower classes. This is apparent not only in this passage about the *synodos* at Corinth, but it is also one of the reasons why he had such an antagonism against Kleomenes, who social reforms in Sparta were designed to benefit the poorer Lakedaimonians.

defend Corinth before it was destroyed and he was defeated by Lucius Mummius in 146 BC. It seems as though the wish of these Megalopolitans to keep Sparta in the Achaian *koinon* without Roman involvement, while perfectly in line with the attitude of their predecessors who are also known to have taken action against Roman wishes, was the main cause for the Achaians to have continued this policy. Nonetheless, it seems as though this last generation of Megalopolitans did not share the common sense of their predecessor when it came to Roman involvement in the East, which is striking since they had seen first-hand during the Third Macedonian War what this could mean for the Greeks.

* * * * *

The Megalopolitan impact on Achaian foreign policy changed a lot between the establishment of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance during the Kleomenean War and the start of the second century BC. As the start of this chapter has shown, the relationship between the Achaians and Philip of Macedon deteriorated due to Philip's lack for support of the Achaians against Spartan attacks during the Social War. When Philopoimen started his successful career with the support of Philip by reforming the Achaian army, the federation became less and less dependent on the Macedonian king for help against their enemies. Moreover, the rise of Philopoimen to the federal political stage was the beginning for a group of Megalopolitans at the top of the Achaian *koinon,* whose local ideals and interests shaped their political actions and those of the federation when it was under their command. However, even within this group of Megalopolitans there were differences of opinion mostly concerning the Achaian relationship with Rome, as has become clear in the discussion of the famous Achaian *syonodos* of 198 BC. If Aristainos is indeed from Megalopolis, as argued, then his support indicates that there were Megalopolitans who thought that the Achaians made the right decision; and this despite the official position of the Megalopolitan representatives being against the creation of the Roman-Achaian alliance.

Clearly, this shift carried on after 198 BC, because all of the traces of the Megalopolitan loyalty to Macedon disappear from the actions of the Achaian political leaders who hailed from Megalopolis. One can argue that this might have manifested itself again in Lykortas and others when the Achaian assembly was trying to figure out how to act during the Third Macedonian War. Yet, eventually Lykortas was overruled

by his own son and it seems rather farfetched to try to see a resurgence of the Megalopolitan-Macedonian connection. It is more likely that this had in fact entirely been replaced by a newfound patriotism for the Achaian *koinon.* In fact, the different generations of Megalopolitan statesmen were concerned about two things: incorporating Sparta into the *koinon* and keeping it there, and making sure that the federal state was able to deal with its matters as independently as possible. This is evident from the many attacks on Sparta (and vice versa) carried out under the supervision of a Megalopolitan *strategos* and Philopoimen's determination to force Sparta into the *koinon.* On the other hand, throughout the second century BC Sparta did not cease its opposition to Megalopolis and later the federal state, as the traditional antagonism between the two poleis had bigger consequences than before. The interactions between Achaia and Rome were heavily dominated by this local conflict; this is evident from the plethora of Spartan envoys to Rome concerning Achaian conduct and the Roman intervention in the boundary dispute between the two states. Furthermore, any big problems between the two states seems to have been connected to this Spartan problem, including the Achaian War and the subsequent abolition of the *koinon*, which was caused by the greed of the new generation of Megalopolitans who had lost the realism displayed by their predecessors during the Third Macedonian War.

While the Megalopolitan influence on the Achaian *koinon* underwent a significant change in the second century BC, it is clear that the Megalopolitans were never a unity, even within their own city which means that we end with different political factions and ideologies. This has not been addressed in previous research and shows that political division can be identified even for cities that have not been widely studied before. However, it has to be acknowledged that the discussions and conclusions of this chapter heavily rely on Polybius' narrative and his particular views of the individuals discussed in this chapter. If other accounts had survived on the history of the Achaian *koinon* and the decades leading up to the Achaian War, the analysis in this last chapter could have been very different.

CONCLUSIONS

Conclusions

The relationship between federal states and their member states can take many shapes: from local individuals taking up federal magistracies, representatives taking part in the federal institutions or the division of responsibilities between the federal and the local level. Moreover, this relationship is reciprocal as through these interactions both parties will undoubtedly influence one another. After all, the most basic definition of a federal state is a form of government in which the power is divided over two or more governments. That this definition is still applicable to both the *koina* of Antiquity and modern federal states such as Belgium, Germany or even the European Union, shows that there are certain ideas of continutity between federalism in Antiquity and today. The aim of this thesis has been to show the influence of the local level on that of the federal state is one of those recurring connections and themes. By examining the specific relationship between city of Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon*, I wanted to show that the same tension between the local and federal level that can be detected in the five governments of Belgium, already existed two thousand years ago in Greece.

As a first major theme of this thesis, I have established that Megalopolis was a Greek polis with its own local identity, as well as local interests and ambitions. The formation of this local identity was the result of a process influenced by several historical factors that transformed and constructed the Megalopolitan identity. Subsequently, throughout all five chapters, the evolution of the Megalopolitan identity in response to these events can clearly be seen. This shows that being a Megalopolitan at the foundation of the polis around 368 BC was very different than at the demise of the Achaian *koinon* in 146 BC. Despite the changing and complex nature of the Megalopolitan identity, there were several core elements that shaped its interactions with the wider federal framework. For one, as a result of the foundation of the polis by the Arkadian *koinon*, Megalopolis very early on developed a good understanding of the advantages of being part of something bigger than the traditional Greek political structure that was the polis. Of course, this foundation also imbued the Megalopolitans with a few additional traits that were shared by the other cities in the region as they were typically Arkadian. The most important of these was the antagonism of the Megalopolitans against Sparta, which seemed to be ever present among its citizens both before and after the city became a part of the Achaian federation. This is clear in Demosthenes' impassioned speech on

behalf of the Megalopolitans in front of the Athenian assembly in 352 BC, when Sparta was threatening the polis.

These two elements continuously guided the actions and political course of both Megalopolis as a polis and its individuals and therefore form a red thread throughout this thesis. For example, as chapter two has shown, these were the reasons why Megalopolis joined the Achaian *koinon* in the first place. Furthermore, this decision had wide-ranging consequences for the internal status quo of the federal state. After all, the fact that Megalopolis had a good sense of the benefits and mechanics of federalism, allowed it to rise quickly to a prominent position within the Achaian *koinon*. As we have seen, this is also evidenced by the boundary disputes discussed in chapter three which clearly illustrated how Megalopolis used the federal magistrates and the *koinon* more than other member states that were involved in boundary disputes with one another.

Obviously, the other important result that Megalopolis' Achaian membership had was the antagonism towards Sparta it brought into the Achaian politics. Whereas the city had previously been at the periphery of the Achaian attention, the Megalopolitans brought with them an increased focus on Sparta. This is apparent throughout Megalopolis' membership, as is evidenced from Lydiades' actions during his brief federal career, Philopoimen's induction of the city into the federal state in 192 BC and the strong Achaian reaction against the Spartans under the Megalopolitan *strategoi* Kritolaos and Diaios in 146 BC. What is more, as the last section of chapter five of this thesis has shown, the relationship between Achaia and Rome was also influenced by this local antagonism between the two cities. The Spartan tendency to involve Rome whenever they were unhappy with Achaian conduct, created problems within the federal state and saw the Megalopolitans in particular trying to take action without too much Roman involvement. Of course, as we have seen, there was a difference of opinion even among the Megalopolitans. However, it remains striking that there was always some kind of Megalopolitan involvement when it came to the Spartan troubles with the Achaian federal leaders.

In addition to these core elements, this thesis has identified a third element of the Megalopolitan identity which played an important role in the city's interactions and relationships, particularly in the fourth and third centuries BC. As we have seen this connection was apparent from the city's political actions, since the city chose to stay on the Macedonian side in all of the major conflicts during the period such as the battle of

Chaironea and the Chremonidean War. However, as the analysis in chapter four has shown, this was also apparent from the archaeology of the city with the construction of the Stoa of Philip and the so-called house of Alexander. The Stoa in particular is a significant marker of the connection between the city and the Macedonian kings, as the Megalopolitans built it themselves but named it after Alexander's father. Moreover, this connection to Macedon remained part of the Megalopolitan *ethos* even after the polis became a part of the Achaian *koinon*, as it was the basis for the Achaian alliance with the Macedonian king Antigonos – and his successor Philip V – during the Kleomenean War. Even when the Achaian assembly chose to abandon this alliance with Philip in favour of Rome at the *synodos* in 198 BC, the Megalopolitan representatives were the only ones together with the ones from Dyme and Argos who actively opposed the decision and left the assembly in protest.

Nevertheless, as the analysis of Polybius' views on Megalopolis, Arkadia and Achaia in chapter two has shown, by the middle of the second century BC, the Megalopolitan had acquired an Achaian element in their identity. This is further confirmed by the discussion of the civic and federal coinage produced by Megalopolis. The civic silver coinage shows a connection to Megalopolis' Arkadian heritage via the iconography with its depiction of Pan, Zeus Lykaios and – on earlier versions - the Arkadian monogram. However, the fact that Megalopolis was actively involved in the production and establishment of the bronze federal coinage does prove that the city was an active and avid part of the Achaian *koinon.* Interestingly, after the decision of 198 BC, the connections of Megalopolis to the Macedonian kings disappear from the sources and was soon replaced by the loyalty to the Achaian *koinon* that is clearly expressed by all of the Megalopolitan leaders in the second century BC. Strikingly, Aristainos - who I believe to be from Megalopolis and not Dyme as is often believed – is a good example of this change as his support for an alliance with Rome suggests the presence of a group in Megalopolis that were stepping away from their traditional Macedonian connections. For even if they did not always agree with one another on the way that the federal state should involve Rome in its internal conflicts with Sparta, it is clear that all of them considered it crucial that the federal state should be able to govern its own matters when it needed to.

Aside from establishing the most important elements of the Megalopolitan identity, a second important theme addressed in this thesis was the specific relationship

of Megalopolis and the Achaian *koinon.* As already mentioned, Megalopolis quickly became an important member of the federal state not only due to is ability to manipulate and utilise the Achaian federal procedures to its advantage, as has become apparent from the boundary disputes, but also because the polis was one of the biggest cities in the federation. This is visible from the fact that the city was one of the only two poleis to get assigned three representatives in the *nomographoi* list at Aigion because of its size, while the medium and smaller cities had two and one representatives respectively. Moreover, the discussion of this list and the one found in Epidauros has shown that Megalopolis was an active member of the Achaian *koinon* since the polis chose to participate in the voluntary meeting of the *nomographoi* at Epidauros. This image of Megalopolis as an active member of the Achaian federation is also supported by the vast amount of Achaian coins produced by Megalopolis and the high number of federal politicians coming from the polis in the period between 235 and 146 BC.

However, chapter three has shown that Megalopolis was an important city whose local identity had a significant influence on Achaian foreign policy. However, within the federal state, Megalopolis was a member just like any other city and shared the same obligations and responsibilities. This is even supported by the boundary disputes and particularly by the one involving Messene and Megalopolis. The inscription detailing the dispute between the two poleis demonstrates that the federal state would allow Megalopolis to exploit federal procedures as long as it did not change the status quo within the federation. In this instance, the Megalopolitan desires to obtain the regions Akreiatis, Bipeiatis, Endania and Pylania were undoubtedly fuelled by the historical background, i.e. the tensions created between the two cities by the Messenian revolt and the death of Philopoimen as a result. After Lykortas knocked down the rebellion, the officials of the *koinon* condemned his treatment and to prevent future secession attempts from Messene did not impose harsh penalties on the city. Therefore, Megalopolis' active pursuits of the regions formed a problem as it threatened the fragile equilibrium that the officials wanted to restore, which is why in this case the Messenians were victorious as it was important that the democratic nature of the Achaian federation remained intact and was not dominated by one individual city. The *nomographoi* lists also emphasise this in the fact that they were organised according to proportional representation – which I believe has to be applied to the composition of other Achaian institutions as well. Interestingly, the prevention of one polis dominating the Achaian

koinon like Thebes in the Boiotian one explains Philopoimen's proposition of 188 BC to rotate the meetings of the assembly among all of the member cities of the *koinon* and not just keep it in the sanctuary of Zeus Homarios at Aigion. In all probability, this was done to break the traditional position of power that Aigion enjoyed within the federation through the sanctuary in favour of cities like Megalopolis. So, even though Megalopolis was an important Achaian member city, both the other members as well as the federal state would not allow it to misuse the federal institutions and procedure to such an extent that it would damage the mechanics of the Achaian federal state.

On the other hand, there is a large Megalopolitan influence detectable in the foreign politics of the Achaian *koinon*, which of course expressed itself most notably in the establishment of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance of the 220s BC. Another important conclusion made in chapter four is that this alliance was not the result of Aratos' scheming and planning, but only came about after a first Megalopolitan embassy to Antigonos Gonatas in 227 BC. This was sent to the Macedonin king on behalf of the polis but with the approval of the federal state, on account of their inability to shield Megalopolis from the Spartan attacks and the city's previous connections to the Macedonian kings. Contrary to what Polybius and subsequent other sources report, Aratos was thus not the mastermind behind this alliance but did use the initial contacts between Megalopolis and Antigonos as the basis for his own polity later on. Of course, this is also apparent from the focus on Sparta that occupies a big part of the Achaian interactions with Rome.

A third major theme in the thesis is connected to Polybius. His narrative is one of the integral sources of this thesis because of his personal connection to the topic and wider themes of this thesis. As a Megalopolitan and an Achaian federal leader in the second century BC, Polybius is an excellent embodiment of the interaction between the local and federal identity. After all, his comments on Megalopolis, Achaia and Arkadia clearly prove the general tendency illustrated by the coinage of Megalopolis' combined Achaian and Arkadian layered identity. Another important Megalopolitan characteristic exhibited by Polybius is the vehement hatred for almost anything connected to Sparta, as has become very clear from his depcition of important Spartan figures such as Kleomenes and Nabis as well as his criticisms of the pro-Spartan historian Phylarchos.

Moreover, these portrayals have also highlighted some of the problems and benefits with using Polybius as a source. For one, his tendency to focus on the big

individuals such as Aratos and his personal hero Philopoimen obscures the more nuanced picture provided to us by the other sources such as the inscriptions. Consequently, Polybius' narrative and account of Achaian history is one of individuals with the cities and their roles as political actors disappearing to the background or neglected altogether. Additionally, Polybius' personality and emotions do also compromise the view that we have of certain of these individuals such as the Spartans, Phylarchus or even some of his fellow Achaians. For example, his overt praise of Philopoimen and especially Aratos are important factors in the way in which the author describes the events in which they are involved such as the Kleomenean War and the subsequent Social War. Moreover, this positive portrayal of Aratos was an intrinsic part of Polybius' idealised account of the Achaian *koinon* in his first few books. At the other end of the spectrum was the negative representation of his political opponent Kallikrates of Leontion, which was undoubtedly because this man was the main reason why Polybius was banished to Rome. Of course, all of the sources used in this thesis have their own problems, but due to the prominence of both Polybius' work and his personal views, it is important to mention these problems here.

Moreover, to support these general conclusions, the thesis was divided into three parts and five chapters, which also had a few of their own interesting and more specific conclusions that I wish to bring up here. First of all, chapter one has argued that Megalopolis was founded by the Arkadian *koinon* as a stronghold against Sparta and not as its capital. Furthermore, the cults and sanctuaries of the city show that the pantheon of the city was created as a deliberate attempt to unite the different population groups of the new city after the synoecism. Finally, this chapter showed the links between Megalopolis and Messene which were founded in similar circumstances and at the same time, but despite their complicated relationship ended up on very different sides of the Achaian *koinon.* Chapter two further builds on the establishment of the Megalopolitan identity, this time in the context of Megalopolis' decision to join the Achaians. In addition to Polybius' views on being a Megalopolitan, this chapter also analysed the motives of the tyrant Lydiades in bringing in the city, which was much more personally motivated than the idealised sources would like us to believe. The citizens of Megalopolis, on the other hand, gladly joined the federation because of the additional benefits it could bring in connection to their feud with Sparta.

While chapter three analysed Megalopolis' position within the federal state and its interactions with the federal government and other members, a few comments on the wider internal mechanics of the *koinon* were also made. For one, the Achaian federation was rather different from other Greek *koina* as it combined poleis from different ethnic groups, much more like the European Union today. Moreover, just as the countries that are part of the European Union today, the member states of the Achaian *koinon* enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and could organise local matters very much according to their own wishes. That is as long as this pertained to the internal affairs of the federation, since the federal state was responsible for all external interactions. Secondly, the arbitration process of the *koinon* did not follow a set pattern, but the federal *damiorgoi* had the power to intervene and fine members which did not comply with the arbitration's ruling. Moreover, all conflicts between an incoming and existing member had to be settled before any polis could join the federation.

In addition to arguing that Megalopolis' was the party responsible for the creation of the Achaian-Macedonian alliance, chapter four also discussed the problems of the sources connected to the Kleomenean War. Even though Polybius is overtly positive about Aratos, the historian was aware of his flaws as a leader and a historical source, and despite his criticism of Phylarchus and his methods of writing history, Polybius did not shy away from using Phylarchus' writings. Additionally, this chapter also draws a bit more attention to the federal career of Lydiades, who is all but ignored in Polybius' narrative. In Plutarch's lives, which are also echoed by an inscription dedicated to him by the Megalopolitans, the former tyrant became an influential Achaian statesman who could rival Aratos. Finally, chapter five not only shows the exact Megalopolitan-Spartan dynamic of the Achaian-Roman relations in the second century, but also that the individual Megalopolitan leaders shaped the important conflicts involving the *koinon*, Rome and Sparta in different ways. While the core of the problem remained the same as the attitude of these Megalopolitan men towards Sparta did not change, the later generation did lose sight of the danger that Rome could pose for the federation, which was what eventually led to the Achaian War. Moreover, this chapter highlights yet another problem with the sources, which become rather scarce at the time of the Third Macedonian War. This can sometimes give the impression that once again the polis as a political actor was less important than it had been before, which seems to be the case for Megalopolis as it seems to fade to the background in the literary sources. However,

the boundary dispute between Megalopolis (and the Achaian *koinon*) and Sparta of 164 BC, proves that the city was still actively pursuing its anti-Spartan rhetoric at this time, even though the majority of its influential individuals such as Polybius had been sent to Rome.

The goal of this thesis was not to provide a complete history of Megalopolis, but rather identify the different components of the Megalopolitan identity and their influence on the politics of the Achaian *koinon.* Moreover, it also wanted to argue that the formation of its identity as a continuing and complex process which underwent several profound changes. This process started with the foundation of entirely new city by the Arkadians in the 360s BC and was shaped throughout the polis' membership of the Arkadian and Achaian *koina*. With the creation of Megalopolis a new step was taken in the approach of Greek cities to their own ethnic identity as – unlike Messene - Megalopolis looked for a broader way of uniting these different communities that were now part of this brand new polis. Since this new attitude was more in line with the open and federal attitude of the *koina* and poleis in the Hellenistic period, Megalopolis was looking forward and can be seen as an early example of a typical Hellenistic polis, something that is also seen in the archaeology of the polis. The open outlook of the city was undoubtedly the result of Megalopolis' early connections and experiences with federalism; it was what made polis unique and what allowed it to flourish as well as it did in the federal framework of the Achaian *koinon* after 235 BC.

So, when Pausanais says 'ἡ δὲ Μεγάλη πόλις νεωτάτη πόλεών ἐστιν οὐ τῶν Ἀρκαδικῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἕλλησι' (Paus. 8. 27. 1: 'Megalopolis was the youngest city not only in Arkadia, but in the whole of Greece'), he is certainly right. However, by writing this thesis I hope to have shown that not only was Megalopolis the youngest city of Greece, it was also a new kind of city and one that definitely merits more attention than it has received in the past.

APPENDIX: THE EPIGRAPHICAL SOURCES

1. Orchomenos joins the Achaian *koinon* (shortly after 235 BC)

IPArk 16 – IG V,2.344

— — —

{²(§1)}² …… παραβαίνῃ — — —

μον πέμπηι εἴτε ἄρχω[ν — εἰ]-

π̣έοι εἴτε ἰ̣δ̣ιώτας ψαφοφορέοι [— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — ὀφλέτω]

τριάκοντ̣α̣ τάλαντα ἱερὰ τοῦ Δ̣ιὸ[ς τοῦ Ἁμαρίου, καὶ ἐξέστω τῶι στραταγῶι δίκαν]

[θ]ανάτου εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν τ[ῶν Ἀχαιῶν. v {²(§2)}² κατὰ τάδε ὀμνυόντων τὸν ὅρκον τὸν]

α̣ὐ̣τὸν οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀχαιοί, ἐμ μ̣ὲ̣[ν Αἰγίωι οἱ δαμιοργοὶ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν καὶ ὁ στρα]-

[τ]αγὸς καὶ ἵππαρχος καὶ ναύαρχος, ἐν δ̣ὲ̣ [Ὀρχομενῶι οἱ ἄρχοντες τῶν Ὀρχομενί]-

[ων]· ὀ̣[μ]νύω Δία Ἁμάριον, Ἀθάναν Ἁμαρίαν, Ἀφρ[οδ]ί̣τ̣α̣[ν καὶ τοὺ]ς θ[εοὺς πάντας, ἦ μὴν ἐν]

π̣ᾶσ̣ι̣ν̣ ἐμμε[ν]ε̣ῖν ἐν τᾶι στάλαι καὶ τᾶι ὁμολογίαι καὶ τῶι ψαφίσματι [τῶι γεγονότι τῶι]

[κοι]ν[ῶι] τῶι τ[ῶ]ν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ εἴ τίς κα μὴ ἐμμένηι, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω εἰς δύναμ[ιν, καὶ εὐορ]-

[κέ]οντι μέν μοι εἴη τἀγαθά, ἐπιορκέοντι δὲ τἀναντία. v {²(§3)}² τῶν δὲ λαβόντων ἐν Ὀρ[χο]-

[μενῶι] κλᾶρον ἢ οἰκίαν, ἀφ’ οὗ Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγένοντο, μὴ ἐξέστω μηθενὶ ἀπαλλοτριῶ-

[σα]ι ἐτέων εἴ̣κ̣οσι. v {²(§4)}² εἰ δέ τι ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθε χρόνων ἢ οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγέ-

[νον]το Νεάρχ[ω]ι ἔγκλημα γέγονεν ἢ τοῖς υἱοῖς, ὑπότομα εἶμεν πάντα, καὶ μ[ὴ]

[δικαζέ]σ̣θω μή̣τ̣ε̣ Νεάρχωι μηθεὶς μήτε τοῖς υἱοῖς αὐτοῦ μηδὲ Νέαρχος μηδὲ [τῶν]

[υἱ]ῶ̣ν̣ α̣ὐ̣τοῦ μηθ̣ε̣ὶ̣ς περὶ τῶμ πρότερον ἐγκλημάτων ἢ οἱ Ὀρχομένιοι Ἀχαιοὶ ἐγ[έ]-

[νο]ν̣[τ]ο̣· [ὃς δ]ὲ̣ δικάζοιτο, ὀφλέτω χιλίας δραχμάς, καὶ ἁ δίκα ἀτελὴς ἔστω. V {²(§5)}² περ[ὶ]

[δὲ τᾶς Νί]κ̣α̣ς̣ τ̣ᾶς χρυσέ[α]ς τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀπλοσμίου, ἃγ καταθέντες ἐνέχυρα οἱ Μεθυ[δρι]

[εῖς οἱ μετοική]σ̣α̣ντες ε[ἰ]ς Ὀρχομενὸν διείλοντο τὸ ἀργύριον καί τινες αὐτῶν ἀπήν[εγ]-

[καν εἰς Μεθύδρ]ι[ο]ν, ἐὰμ μὴ ἀποδιδῶντι τὸ ἀργύριον τοῖς Μεγαλοπολίταις, καθὼς ἐξ[ε]-

[χώρησεν ἁ πό]λις τῶν Ὀρχομενίων, ὑποδίκους εἶμεν τοὺς μὴ ποιοῦντας τὰ δίκαια.

2. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Helisson (182-167 BC)

IPArk 31

A1 — — — — — — — — —ΡΑ̣Σ— — — — —

[— — — — — — — — — σ]υντε̣λ[— — — — —]

— — — — — οἱ περὶ Ἀρι]στομέ[ν]η καὶ ἁ π[όλις τῶν]

— — — — — — — — —διων ἐπὶ τᾶς ζαμία[ς ..]

5 [— — — — — — — — — τ]οῦ Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου vv

[— — — — — — — — — ἐναν]τίον τοῦ ψιλοῦ λόφου v

[— — — — — — — — — ἰ]ερὸν ε̣ἰς τὸ τῶ Διὸς vvv

[— — — — — — — — — ποτ᾽] ἄρκτον, τουτῶ δὲ εἰς τὰν

[— — — — — — — — τὸν ποτα]μὸν τὸν Ἐλίσοντα vvvvv

10 [— — — — — — — — — τ]ῶ ἱερῶ τῶ Ἀπόλλωνος vvv

— — — — — — — — — τᾶι ὁδῶι τᾶι ἀρχαίαι vv

— — — — — — — — —ΝΕΓ̣Ρ̣ΙΟΥ, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ vvv

[— — — — — — — — — ἀπὸ] δὲ τοῦ λευροῦ τοῦ vv

[— — — — — — — — τὸν βω]μὸν τᾶς Ἀρτέμιτος v

15 [— — — — — — — — — το]υτῶ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ τῶ vvvv

[— — — — — — — — — — Πο]σείδαιαν, τουτῶ δὲ v

[— — — — — — — — — — ἐ]ν ἄκρωι τῶι ὄρει ..

— — — — — — — — — —ωι ἐπὶ τ̣α̣ῦ̣[τα σ]υν%[80]%[80]-

— — — — — — — — — —#[7]Σ̣#[7]̣ινησι vvvvv

20 — — — — — — — — — —ων κοινοὶ vvvv

— — — — — — — — — —ταις ὑπὲρ τᾶς vvv

— — — — — — — — — —μεν ὅρους τᾶς Αι%[80]-

— — — — — — — — — —ται καὶ περὶ vvv

[— — — — — — — ἀπὸ δὲ τᾶς Φαλάκ]ρ̣ιος ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας

25 [εἰς τὰν περιβολὰν τὰν — —, ἀπὸ δὲ τᾶς π]εριβολᾶς ἐπ᾽ εὐ-

[θείας — — — — — — — εἰς τὸ τοῦ] Διὸς τοῦ Λυκαί-

[ου — — — — — — — — — — —] τῶι ποτ᾽ ἄρ%[800]%[800]%[80]-

[κτον, — — — — ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας εἰς τὸ το]ῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὁρί-

[ου — — — — — — — — — — — —] καὶ τᾶι Ἀχρᾳ-

— — — — — — — — — — — — Ἐλισφασίαν ν

[— — — — — — — — — — — — τ]ὸμ ποταμὸν νν

[τὸν Ἐλισόντα — — — — — — — τ]ὸν Ἐλισόντα ν

[— — — — — — — — — — — — ἐ]π᾽ εὐθείας νvν

[— — — — — — — — — — — — τᾶς Ἀρτέ]μιτος τᾶς Ιροας

— ἐπὶ τὸ Παμι-

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —ρωι ἐφ᾽ ᾧ

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —χω-

[ρα— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

— — —

— — — — —Ι— — — — — — — —

— — — — —Σ— — — — — — — — —

— — — —ΥΤΑΙ..Λ— — — — — — — —

[τ]οῖς Μεγαλοπολίτ[αις — — — — — — — — —]

ὁδοῦ ἃι ἀ διάβασις ἀ κατὰ [— — — — τᾶι ὁδῶι τᾶι ἀρ]-

χαίαι, ἃι εἰς τὸ διατείχι[σμα — — — — — ἀπὸ δὲ τῶ]

[Φ]ορβαίω εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῶ Λ— — — — — — — —

ἐπὶ κοιλᾶι δέραι ἐπὶ τὰ[ν Φάλακριν — — — — —]

ν Εὐφάμωι ὅρους ἀπέδ[ωκαν — — — — — Μεγαλοπολι(?)]-

%[80]τᾶν τοῖς δαμιοργοῖς [— — — — — — — ἀπὸ δὲ]

τᾶς Φαλάκριος ἐ[π᾽ ε]ὐθε[ίας εἰς τὰν περιβολὰν τὰν — —],

ἀπὸ δὲ τᾶς περιβολᾶς [ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας — — — — — τοῦ]

λόφου εἰς τὸ τοῦ Δ[ιὸς τοῦ Λυκαίου ἱερὸν ἐναντίον τοῦ]

πευκώδεος λόφου [— — — — — — — — — ἐπ᾽ εὐ]-

θείας εἰς τὸ τοῦ Δ[ιὸς τοῦ Ὁρίου — — — — — — —]

ὑφ᾽ ἃι ἐστὶ ὁ λάκκος — — — — — — — — —

.Ε……Σ αὐτόθ̣[εν — — — — — — — — Ἑλι]-

σφασίαν Α..ΤΕ̣[— — — — — — τὸμ ποταμὸν τὸν]

Ἑλισόντα, ἀ̣π̣[ὸ δὲ — — — — — — — — — —]

τὸν Ἑλισόντα — — — — — — — — — — —

ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας .ΠΑ— — — — — — — — — — —

τᾶς Ἀρτέμιδος [τᾶς Ιροας — — — — — — — — τρί(?)]-

γωνον ἐξαγου[σ— — — — — — — — — — —]

ἐπ᾽ εὐθείας εἰς — — — — — — — — — —

ἐφ᾽ οὗ καὶ ὁ βω[μὸς — — — — — — — — εἰς τὸ]

ἱερὸν τοῦ Π— — — — — — — — — — —

μένων κατε— — — — — — — — — — —

νέα πέρατα [— — — — — — — — — Ἑλισφα(?)]-

σίων οἱ παρ[αγενόμενοι — — — — — — — —]

Ἀχαιῶν δαμ[ιοργ— — — — — — — — — —]

τετράμηνος — — — — — — — — — — — —

Μεγαλοπολ[ιτ— — — — — — — — — — ἀπε]-

σταλκυ̣ι[— — — — — — — — — — — τᾶς]

χώρας — — — — — — — — — — — — —

ΑΠ— — — — — — — — — — — — — —

— — —

3. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Thouria (182-167 BC)

IPArk 31

II.A — — —

[— — — — — Μεγαλο]π̣ολι[τ— — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — — —] ἐπ’ εὐθε[ίας — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — — Παρ]θενίαι εὐθέ[ως — — — — — — — —]

……..Λ̣εστις καὶ Θο[υρι(?)….. ….. ….. ….. ..]

…….ακα τὸν̣ [πο]ταμὸ[ν….. ….. ….. ….. ..]ν v

[εὐδόκ]ησαν α̣ἰ̣ε̣ί τε Μεσσα̣[νι….. ….. ….. καὶ ἀ]πὸ v

…α.νος τοῦ ..Λ̣Μ̣ ΙΟΥ Ε[….. ….. ….. . ὁρισμ(?)]ὸς v

τᾶς χώρας τᾶς ὑπὲρ τὸ ἐν ….. ….. ….. ….. .Ν vvv

εἶμεν [δὲ κα]ὶ [ἐ]πὶ ἐκκλησί[αν ….. ….. ….. κατ(?)]ὰ̣ vvvv

πόλιμ Με[σ]σ̣ανί[ω]ν προ.Κ….. ….. ….. …..ΩΝ vvv

ὑπερβάντ[ε]ς τὸ ..ΑΙΕ̣Ι.ΝΕ….. ….. ….. …εχω vv

τατον ὡς Ε̣ΙΛ̣ΙΤ̣..ΑΤΕ….. ….. ….. ….. ..θέω%^{80}%^{80}-

μεν κατὰ τὸν νόμον ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. .̣Ι κα[ὶ(?)]

Με[σσανίων πό]λ̣ις ….. ….. ….. ….. ..ΚΑ̣Ι…..

οἱ Μεσσάνιοι τα.Τ̣Α̣….. ….. ….. …..σ̣αν κατ[ὰ v]

τὸ γραπτὸν ὃ ἔθε[σαν οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ ….. ….. . ἐ]ν τᾶι ἐν [Σι]-

κυῶνι συνόδω[ι, Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν εἶμεν τὰν χώρα]μ πλὰ̣ν [vv]

τὰν Δωρίδα [….. ….. .. ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ το]ῦ̣ Ἀνάπου [τ]ο[ῦ]

ἐξ Αἰγυνέ[ας ῥέοντος ….. ….. ….. ….] τᾶς χώρας

τᾶς Μεσσ[ανίων ….. ….. ….. ….. …]Σ̣[. κ]αὶ ποτὶ

τὰν ὁδὸν τ[ὰν ….. ….. ….. ….. …].Α̣ πό[τ]εστιν v

τᾶς Δωρίδ[ος ….. ….. ….. ….. ….]…Γ̣.ΕΓ̣ΟΝ v

[….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….]Λ̣Π̣Ε̣Η̣Ι̣.Ι…

[….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. …]….. ..ΠΕΝ v

[….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. …]…ΚΑ……

[….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ..]Ε….. ….. .

[….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. .]…. ….. ….

[….. ….. ….. ….. ….. ….. .]…. ….. ….

{vacat}

B.1 ….. ….. ….. ….. …… ἀπε[γρ]ᾳ[ψάμεθα ……]

[τ]ῶ̣ν [….. ….. ….. ἐν οἷς γ]εγράφαμεν ….. ….. .

γράμ[μασι κατὰ τὸ ὑπ’ Ἀριστομέ]νεος γραπτὸν [……]

τοῖς μ[ὲν ἥκουσιν ἀπὸ τᾶς πόλιο]ς τῶμ Μεγαλο[πολιτᾶν vv

5 Διοφάν[ει Διαίου, …… Λί]χα, Δαμέαι Θε[αρίδα(?), vvvv]

Θεαρίδα[ι Λυκόρτα, ……]ένεος, Πολυβίω[ι Λυκόρτα, v

Ποσειδίπ[πωι ….. ….. …]ι Πασίππου, Κ[αλ]λιφίλῳ[ι]

Δαμαίνου, [τοῖς δὲ παραγενομ]ένοις ἀπὸ τᾶ̣[ς] πόλιος vvvv

τῶν Θουρ[ιέων ….. ….. ..] Σ̣ωκράτει Ἀ[γ]αθία, {vac.7}

10 Τρ[….. ….. … περὶ τᾶς χ]ώρας τᾶς ἀμφιλλεγομέ-

νας [….. ….. ….. … κα(?)]ιρῶ ἂν εὐδώκησαν οἱ vvvv

Θο[υρ]ιέες [….. ….. ….. . τ]ὰν χώ[ρα]ν κατά τε τὰν vvv

[κ]ρίσιν ἂν [….. ….. ….. ἔδω]κ̣α̣ν̣ [οἱ] περὶ {vac. 9}

Ἀριστομ̣ένη [….. ….. ….. …. ἔδ]ωκαν οἱ Μεγαλο-

15 πολῖτα[ι] ἀ̣π̣ο̣δε[….. ….. ….. οἱ Μεγ]αλοπολῖται vv

ἀποστ…ν Κ̣ΑΙ[….. ….. ….. … τῶ]ν χρόνων vvvvv

ἐκ [ταῦτ]α̣ς τᾶς χῷ̣[ρας ….. ….. ….. ..] καὶ τοὺς ὅρους

οὓς [ἀπ]έ[δ]ωκαν Ε̣Κ[….. ….. ….. ….. .]αι πόλεις vv

εκ….Λ̣ΕΙΣΑΜ̣Α[….. ….. ….. ….. ἐ]νιαυτῶι vvv

20 ὤ[ιον]το δεῖν ΟΥΝ̣[….. ….. ….. …..] τὴν γεγενη-

μένην αὐτοῖς διά[κρισιν ….. ….. . γι]̣νώσκετε [vvvv]

[καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπ̣ικεκρ[ικέναι ….. ….. ….. …]ε̣σ̣[.]ν [ὁμολο]-

[γίαν τὴμ πὸς αὐτὸς [….. ….. ….. ….. ….]

δεῖν. {²vac.}²

4. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Messene (shortly after 182 BC)

SEG 58.370

Ψάφι[σμ]α
ἐπειδὴ κατασ[χόν]των τῶν Ἀχvac.αιῶν
Ἐνδανίαν καὶ [Πυλ]άναν, τᾶς δὲ πόλε-
ος ἀποκατασ[ταθείσ]ας εἰς τὰν συνπολι-
τείαν τῶ[ν Ἀχαιῶν], τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἠθέλη-
σαν Μεγ[αλοπολῖτ]αι διὰ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἀφελέ-
[σθαι ἀμῖν τά]ς τε πόλεις καὶ τὰν χώραν τὰν
[Ἐνδανίκαν κ]αὶ Πυλανίκαν πᾶσαν αἴτηνα
[- - -10- - -]ο τοὺς Ἀχαιούς, τῶν δὲ Ἀχαι-
[ῶν α]ὐτοῖς π[ρο]ειπάντων μή κα περιθέμεν
Μεγαλοπολίταις τὰν Μεσσανίων· πάλιν
[---]φαν ἐν τᾶι ἐν Ἄλει συνόδωι θέλειν κριθῆ-
[μεν μ]νὲν ποθ᾽ ἀμέ, περί τε τᾶς πρότερον χώρας
ἀντελέγοσαν ἀμῖν καὶ περὶ τᾶς Ἐνδανίκας
καὶ Πυλανίκας καὶ ἀμῶν συνελομένων κρι-
τήριον ποτ᾽ αὐτοὺς ὃ καὶ αὐτοὶ συνευδόκη-
σαν τοὺς ἀγεμόνας, Ἀπολλωνίδαν Ἐτε-
άρχου, Ἀλέξανδρον Ἀλεξάνδρου, Κλέαν-
δρον Κλεάνδρου Σικυωνίους, Ἄρχωνα Φιλο-
κλέος, Ἐξαίνετον Ἐξαινέτου Αἰγιράτας, Φά-
λακρον Φαινολάου, Λαφείδη Ξενοκλέος,
Στιάπυρον Στιαπύρου, Δαμόξενον Κλεο-
ξένου, Ἄντανδρον Δαμοξένου Αἰγιεῖς, Ἀν-
τανδρον Ὑπερβίου Δυμανac.ῖον, Ἐπικράτη Καμ-
ψία, Γοργίδαν Νικίδα, Ἀρκαδίωνα Λέ-
οντος Φαραιεῖς, Καλλικράτη Θεοξέ-
νου Λεοντήσιον, Νικόδρομον Φιλιστίδα,

Φίλωνα Σατύρου Ἀλείους, καὶ περὶ τούτων
ἐνστάλου γενομένου ἀμῖν, ἀποδόν-
τες οἱ Μεγαλοπολῖται ὅρους Ἀπολλωνί-
δαι τῶι στραταγῶι τᾶς τε Ἐνδανίκας
καὶ Πυλανίκας καὶ τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος καὶ
Βιπειάτιος· καὶ ἀμῶν ἀποδόντων τοὺς
περιέχοντας ὅρους ἀπὸ Νέδας ἄχρι Κλε-
ολαίας, καθώς ἐστι ἀμῖν ἁ χώρα, παρα-
γενομένων τῶν δικαστᾶν εἰς τὸ Καρ-
νειάσιον καὶ ἀποδειξάντων ἀμῶν ἑ-
κατέρων τὰν χώραν καθὼς καὶ τοὺς ὅ-
[ρο]υς ἀπεδώκαμες, καὶ γενομένας
[ἐν] τῶι Καρνειασίωι δικαιολογίας ἐπὶ
[τρεῖς ἁ]μέρας μεθ᾽ ὕδατος, ἀπὸ μὲν τᾶς
[Ἀκρειά]τιος καὶ Βιπειάτιος ἀποστάντων
[τῶν Με]γαλοπολιτᾶν, τοὺς δὲ Καλιά-
[τας οὐ πα]υσάντων ἀντιποιήσασθαι
[ἀμῖν καὶ] ἄλλο κριτήριον μεταλα-
[βόντων τῶν Κ]αλιατᾶν πάλιν κρίνωνται
[--- 9 ---]ν ποθ᾽ ἁμέ, ἀμῶν δὲ συ-
[--- 9 ---]σιν ποτί τε Καλιάτας
[καὶ Μεγαλοπολίτ]ας περὶ τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος
[καὶ Βιπειάτιος συ]νελομένων δικασ-
[τήριον τὰν πόλιν τῶ]ν Αἰγιέων καὶ δικαι-
[ολογίας γενομένας] Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν
[--- 15 --- ὅτι] Ἀκρειᾶτις vacat
καὶ Βιπειᾶτις Ἀρκαδία ε[ἴη καὶ] Με-
γαλοπολῖτις, ἀμῶν δὲ δι[δ]ασκόν-
των ὅτι Μεσσανία εἴη, ὄντων ἑκατὸν

τεσσαράκοντα ἑπτὰ τῶν κρινόντων
καὶ ταυτᾶν μεταλαβόντων Καλια-
τᾶν καὶ Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν ψάφους
ἑπτὰ, ἁμῶν δὲ ἑκατὸν τεσσαρά-
κοντα, κρινάντων Μεσσανίαν εἶ-
μεν τὰν χώραν τὰν Ἀκρειᾶτιν καὶ
Βιπειᾶτιν κατὰ τοὺς ὅρους οὓς ἀπε-
δώκαμες τοῖς κοινοῖς δαμιοργοῖς,
ὕστερον, ἐπεὶ ὑπεγραψάμεθα περὶ
τῶν καρπῶν τῶν ἐκ ταύτας τᾶς χώ-
ρας τᾶι πόλει τῶν Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν
ταλάντου διπλασίου, ἐπεὶ λαβοῦ-
σα μεσοκοίνους τοὺς καρποὺς οὐ-
κ ἀπεδίδου, καὶ κεκριμένων ἁμῶν
περὶ τᾶς χώρας πάλιν ἁμὲ προεκα-
λέσατο ἁ πόλις τῶν Μεγαλοπο-
λιτᾶν περὶ τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος χώρας
ὡς κριτήριον συνελώμεθα ὡς οὐ
κεκριμένων ποθ’ ἁμέ, τῶν δὲ κοι-
νῶν δαμιοργῶν ἐπακολουθησάν-
των αὐτᾶι καὶ ζαμίαν ἁμῖν ἐπι-
βαλόντων ὅτι οὐ συναιρούμεθα
κριτήριον καὶ εἰσαγαγόντων εἰς τὸ
δικαστήριον τῶν Μιλησίων ἐνικά-
σαμεν πάσαις ταῖς ψάφοις καθότι
εἴημεν κεκριμένοι περί τε ταύτας
τᾶς χώρας vac. καὶ τᾶς Βιπειάτιος πο-
τὶ Μεγαλοπολίτας. ὅπως οὖν ὑπό-
μναμα εἶ καὶ εἰς τὸν ὕστερον χρόνον

ὅτι περί τε τᾶς Ἀκρειάτιος καὶ Βιπειά-
τιος κρίμασιν ἐνικάσαμες τοὺς Με-
γαλοπολίτας καὶ περί τε τᾶς ζαμίας
ἃς ἐζαμίωσαν ἀμὲ οἱ δαμιοργοὶ ἐ-
νικάσαμεςvac. δεδόχθαι τῶι δάμωι
ἀναγράψαι εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τᾶς Μεσ-
σάνας εἰς τὸ βάθρον τὸ παρὰ τὸ Βου-
λεῖον ἦι οἱ ἱππεῖς ἐντὶ τάν τε πρόκλη-
σιν τὰν γενομέναν ὑπὸ τῶν Μεγα-
λοπολιτᾶν καὶ τὰν ζαμίαν τὰν
ἀπὸ τῶν δαμιορvac.γῶν γενομέναν
ἐπὶ Αἰνητίδα καὶ τὰν κρίσιν τὰν γε-
νομέναν ὑπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου τῶν
Μιλησίων Βίωνος, Βάβωνος, Αἴσχρου,
Ἡραγόρα, Φιλίσκου, Ἀρτέμωνος, ὁμοί-
ως δὲ καὶ τὸ ψήφισμvac.α τοῦτο vacat

5. Boundary dispute between Megalopolis and Sparta (after 164 BC)

ἀπόφασις δικαστᾶν π̣[ερὶ χώρας ἀμφιλλεγομένας, τῶν αἱρεθέντων]
δικάσαι τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς κ[αὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, — — — — — — — —]
τοῦ Ἐπιγόνου, Ἀριστάρχου [τοῦ — — — — —, — — — — — τοῦ — —άν]-
δρου, Πολυκράτευς τοῦ Πολυ[— — — —, — — — — — τοῦ — — — —, καὶ]
περὶ τᾶς ζαμίας ἃς ἐζαμίωσα[ν — — — — — — — — τὸν δᾶμον τὸν Λα]-
κεδαιμονίων, ὅτι ἀντιπο<ε>ῖτ[αι — — — — — — — — — τῷ δάμῳ τῷ]
Μεγαλοπολιτᾶν ταύτας τᾶς χ[ώρας — — — — — — — — — λόγων δὲ]
πλειόνων ῥηθέντων, ἐπεὶ πολ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]
τας διὰ τῶν συνδίκων, καὶ τὰμ [μὲν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου]
διαφορὰν ταῖς πόλεσι δι᾽ [ὅλ]ο[υ — — — — διαλῦσαι ἐπειρασάμεθα],
προθυμίας καὶ σπουδᾶς οὐθὲν [ἐλλείποντες]· Α̣…..Λ̣ [οὐκ ἀ]-
πηνέγκαμεν ἐπιγραφὰν διὰ πο[λλοῦ], ἕνεκεν τοῦ χρόνον ἱκα[νὸν]
δοθῆμεν εἰς σύλλυσιν τοῖς δια[φερ]ομέ[ν]οις· ἐπε[ὶ] δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν [τε]
καὶ ἀκόλουθ[ον τῷ ὅρ]κωι ὃν <ὠ>μ[όσα]μεν καὶ τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς τῶν Ἀ-
χαιῶν σ[υ]ντελε[ῖ]ν τὰν κρίσιν, [<ὥστ᾽> εἰς] τὰ γράμματα τὰ δαμόσια ἀπενεγχθῆ-
μεν, ἕνεκεν τοῦ μήτε τὰ ποτιδε[ό]μενα κρίσιος ἄκριτα γίνεσθαι μή-
τε τὰ κεκριμένα ἄκυρα, ὅπως δα[μ]οκρατούμενοι καὶ τὰ ποθ᾽ αὑτοὺς
ὁμονοοῦντες οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ διατε[λ]ῶντι εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὄντες ἐν εἰ-
ράναι καὶ εὐνομίαι, αἵ τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλασιν καὶ συμμάχοις γεγενημέ-
ναι πρότερον κ̣ρ[ί]σεις βέβαια[ι] καὶ ἀκήρατοι δ[ι]αμένωντι εἰς τὸ̣ν
ἀεὶ χρόνον κα[ὶ] αἱ στᾶλαι καὶ τ[ὰ ὅρι]α τὰ τε̣θέ[ντα] ὑπὲρ τᾶν κριᾳ[ί]-
ωμ μένῃ κύρια δι᾽ ὅλου καὶ μηθὲ[ν αὐτῶν ᾖ] ἰσχυ[ρότ]ερον, γεγεν[ημέ]-
νας καὶ πρότε[ρ]ον κρίσιος Μεγ[αλοπολίταις καὶ Λακεδ]αιμον[ίοις]
[ὑπὲ]ρ ταύτ̣α[ς τᾶ]ς χώρας, ὑπὲρ ἃς [νῦν διαφέρονται, — —]..[— —]
[— — — — — — —]ων τῶι προδίκωι [— — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — — —]στα κατακολουθ[— — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — — ἐ]ν Μεγάλαι πόλει ἐ[ν τῷ — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — — — ἐ]ν τῶι ἀσύλ[ω]ι κ[αὶ — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — — —μ]έναις εὖ ὑ[πὸ] Μ̣ε[γαλοπολιτᾶν(?) — — — — — —]

30 [— — — — ὑπὸ τῶ]ν συμμάχων αἱρε[θέντες — — — — — — κρ]ιτα[ὶ — —]

[— — — — — ἀμφοτ]έρων ἐπιτρε[ψάντων, εἰ δοκεῖ τὰ]ν Σκιρῖ[τιν κατεσ]-

[χῆσθαι ὑπὸ Μεγαλοπο]λιτᾶν —— ἐν ἅι κ[αὶ ἀ Αἰγῦτι]ς χώρα —— ἢ ὑπ̣[ὸ Λακεδαι]-

[μονίων, καὶ ὁρισ]μὸς τᾶς χώρας ἀπ[ογεγραμμένο]ς, καὶ ὅτι ὤμοσ[αν αἱρήσε]-

[σθαι ἐκ πά]<ν>των ἀριστίνδαν, κ[αὶ ὅτι ἔκριν]αν οἱ δικασταὶ γ[ενέσθαι]

35 [τὰν Σκιρ]ῖ̣τιν καὶ τὰν Αἰγῦτιν Ἀρ̣κ[άδων ἀπὸ] τοῦ τοὺς Ἡρακλείδας εἰς

[Π]ε̣λοπόννασον κατελθεῖν, καὶ [ὁ ὅρκο]ς̣ τὸν <ὸ>μόσαντες οἱ δικασταὶ ἐ-

[δ]ίκασαν, καὶ τῶν δικασάντων τὰ [ὀνό]ματα, οἳ ἦσαν τῶι πλήθει ἑκατὸν

[κα]ὶ εἷς, καὶ οἱ παρόντες Λακεδα[ιμ]ονίων ἐπὶ τοῦ ὅρκου. κρίνοντες

[οὖν ο]ὕ̣τω κα μάλιστα μένειν [τὰ ποθ’] αὐτοὺς τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ὁμονοοῦν-

40 [τας, εἰ] τὰ κριθέντα παρ’ αὐτοῖς μηκέτι γίνοιτο ἄκυρα δι’ ἑτέρων ἐγ-

[κλημά]των, ἀλλ’ ὅρον ἔχοι τᾶς ποθ’ αὐτοὺς διαφορᾶς κρίσιν δικ[αστ]η-

[ρίου, ἐ]γνωκότες δὲ ἐκ τ[ῶ]ν παρατεθέντων ἀμῖν παρ’ ἀμφοτέρ[ων γραμ]-

[μάτων] καὶ Ῥωμαίους τοὺς προεστακότας τᾶς τῶν Ἑλλάν[ων εὐνομί]-

[ας καὶ ὁμο]νοίας, ὅκ[α π]αρεγενήθησαν ποθ’ αὐτοὺς Μεγ[αλοπολῖται]

45 [καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑ]π̣ὲρ ταύτας τᾶς χώρας διαφε[ρόμενοι, ταύταν]

[ἀποφάνασθαι τὰν γνώμα]ν, διότι δεῖ τὰ [κεκριμένα εἶμεν κύρια — —]

[— — — — — — — — — — —]αι[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — — κρ]ίσ̣ιν κα[ὶ — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — — —μ]ένας πόλιο[ς — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

50 [— — — — —] κ̣ρίσεις πα[— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — τὰν ζα]μίαν ἂν ἐζα[μίωσαν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[— — — ὑπό]δικον εἶμε[ν — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —]

[τᾷ πόλει τ]ᾶι Λακεδαιμ[ονίων

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