

Lord Rector's Prize Essay. 1901.

Motto. "War is a necessary condition of peace."

(Anon.)

by Alexander & Jack (A.J.)



"The past, present, and future of South Africa."

Definition.

In commencing such a study, we require a definition of South Africa: and the most convenient is, Africa South of the Zambezi. It is true that this includes two districts, Portuguese South Africa, and German South West Africa, which are of slight importance; and does not include the portion of Central Africa, now named Rhodesia, which must be connected with South Africa proper, by geographical and political conditions, for some time to come. But our main interests in South Africa, past, present, and future, will be confined well within the defined area.

Nature of the Subject.

In dealing with this region, we shall be dealing with a recently developed, or comparatively new country. We shall have to show how this country has developed in the past, what its condition is at present, how it will develop in the future. More particularly, we shall find that its peculiar development in the past has been, historically, the result of the conflict of two opposing parties; we shall have therefore chiefly to examine the origin and nature of these parties, and their action in the past; their inevitable, and probably final conflict in the present; their probable action in the future. The past, present, and future of South Africa; the past, as leading up to and bringing about the present; the present, as completing the past in a very special manner; the future, as still carrying forward the past, under the novel conditions introduced by the present; - such is the subject of our study.

1. Past.

Period I

1486-1652.

1497.

1505.

1600.

1648.

The first period of South Africa's past has no great importance for our enquiry. In South Africa itself we have a series of isolated events; the discovery of the Cape by Bartholomew Diaz, its redisccovery by Vasco de Gama; the Portuguese capture of the Arab port of Sofala; their subsequent conquests and settlement on the east coast; the visits of various mariners, including the fatal one of Francisco D'Almeida, to the Cape itself; the adoption of Table Bay as a regular call port for the eastern trade; the wreck of the Dutch ship "Haarlem", leading up directly to the Dutch occupation; and the various conflicts, expeditions, and other events of slight importance in the Portuguese territory on the east.

More important are external events; chief among them the rise and fall of the



0. / 1602.

1580.

1651.

Portugese eastern trade; the rise of the Dutch, English, and French eastern trade, with the formation of the English and Dutch East India Companies; events in Europe and elsewhere, such as the Union of Spain and Portugal, which compelled the Dutch, for their safety in Europe, to strike at the eastern trade of the Portugese, and thus drew them to the east; the interests of England in America, and the civil war in England itself, which drew English attention away from the East, and prevented expansion of trade; and the beginning of the struggle for trade between Dutch and English with the navigation Act of the Long Parliament.

Historical
Questions
this Period.

With reference to this barren period two questions arise: Why was no lasting settlement made earlier? and, Why was a lasting settlement formed by the Dutch?

Answer to
the Question.
Want of
is and Harbours.

The first cause of the late settlement of South Africa was physical: the needful facilities for communication - rivers and harbours - were wanting. Round the whole coast of South Africa, from the Congo to the Zambezi, we have no navigable stream. Within South Africa proper the rivers are torrents during the short rainy season, dry torrent beds at other times. Even where there is a constant stream, the bed is rocky and steeply inclined; on two rivers only has navigation been successfully attempted, even for short distances - the Pungue and the Limpopo: only the Zambezi, the northern boundary of South Africa, can be truly classed as navigable. Again, with regard to harbours, the region is no better served. Malfisch Bay is a safe anchorage: Sofala, on the east coast, has always been a reliable shelter; and with these may perhaps be classed Delagoa Bay. The harbours at East London, Port Elizabeth, and Durban, are artificial constructions; even Table Bay was unsafe at times before artificial shelter was provided; and False Bay has never been in favour as a trade port.

Want of
tural Resources.

These drawbacks, however, have been overcome now; they might have been overcome earlier, had there been any inducement, as similar drawbacks were early overcome on the east coast of the peninsula of Hindostan. But there were no inducements. South Africa had no rich agricultural resources to attract settlers. The foreshore was a broken, grassy, region, fit for, and used for, the pasturing of flocks; never much more than a hundred miles broad, it stretched, through a series of forbidding mountain ranges, to the vast inland plateau of the continent, a region still less productive than the foreshore itself. On the west, indeed, behind the harbour of Malfisch Bay, this formation widened out into a more gently rising

region; on the east, at the mouths of the Lambesi and Limpoko, into a naturally rich alluvial belt; but the western region was a waste of sand, parched by drought: the eastern, a stretch of swamp, infested with malaria. Agricultural resources were thus absent; and this was not compensated in any way; for the vast mineral resources of the region, the precious character of which has done so much, of late years, to attract settlement, were then practically unknown. And as a result of this poverty of resource, great native industries, thriving native commerce, such as rendered India attractive to enterprise, were absent likewise; the natives were poor, uncivilised, ignorant, seeking only to supply their immediate wants; trade with them would be practically valueless.

Exception.

Portugese

South Africa.

South Africa as a whole, therefore, owing to physical disadvantages, and poverty of resources, could not early attract trade or settlement. One region alone possessed means of attracting enterprise - the east coast district about the mouth of the Lambesi. There were found a navigable river, and a river valley extending into the interior; a good harbour - that of Sofala: a fertile, though neglected, soil; a steady trickle of gold from the interior; a flourishing trade in Arab hands.

Here then the Portugese naturally settled; but their settlement, though earliest in time was not to be the one to overspread South Africa. The unhealthy character of the region prevented permanent European settlement; the same cause, along with the physical features of the hinterland, forbade internal expansion: the tendency of a Latin Race to degenerate when brought into contact with lower types operated as fatally as ever: the want of a colonising population in Portugal, the growing weakness of the home government, made for contraction, not expansion. So it is that Portugese South Africa has been, and is of slight importance for the land generally.

Answer to

and Question.

Our second enquiry is more important, at first sight it might seem a mere matter of chance, whether the Dutch or the English should be the first to take possession of the Cape. Three European nations had interests in the east in the seventeenth century, and competed for a share of trade now passing from the hands of the Portugese: - the Dutch, the English, the French. The last named, whose interest was small and late-developed may be left out of account. Both the Dutch and English had large and growing interests in the east; to both therefore the Cape was important as a port of call on the long voyage. Both nations had entrusted their eastern interests to trading companies, which naturally devoted themselves to trade pure and simple, and

were therefore equally unwilling to form a settlement where profitable trade was impossible. But Dutch interest in the east was probably greater than English during the first half of the seventeenth century. European events, as we have noted, forced the Dutch to develop their eastern trade with a rapidity perhaps unhealthy, while they retarded English trade expansion. To the Dutch sea trade was everything, to the English one among several things. Naturally, then, the nation with most interest in the east took possession of the Cape, then practically synonymous with South Africa. The distance of the Dutch settlements or stations in Batavia from Europe, and the accident of the wreck of the Haarlem acted to the same end, being a felt need and a demonstration of the means of supplying it.

1652. So arose the settlement at the Cape, connected from the beginning with the east.

Past.

Period II.

52-1795.

The Dutch occupation and settlement forms the second period of South Africa's past.

1658.

Important events are few, but as such may be mentioned the introduction of slaves; the commencement of expansion with the establishment of free settlers;

59/1673.

difficulties with the Hottentots, resulting in the introduction of pastoral farming

1688.

by white colonists; the settlement of the Huguenots. During the eighteenth century the colony is outwardly in a condition of stagnation; the next important event is

1795.

the rebellion in the border districts ~~at~~ the very end of the period; and almost

1795.

simultaneously occurs the British occupation. Extraneous events likewise have

1688.

much influence: such are the Edict of Nantes, which drove the Huguenots to the

1791.

Cape; the bankruptcy of the Dutch East India Company; the French Revolution,

1793.

and its conflict with the English nation.

The Dutch

Settlement.

During the greater part of this period the central fact in South African history is the gradual growth of a settlement; and that growth falls naturally into three sections.

Division I.

The rise of what may be called the trading settlement at Cape Town comes first.

Trading.

The value of Table Bay as a harbour for shelter and re-stocking had been early recognised; for this purpose the Dutch Company established a settlement; and its scheme of cutting a canal to divide the Cape Peninsula from the mainland shows that this was all that it desired. During the 18th century, altho' the Dutch trade itself steadily declined, yet, as its convenience came to be recognised, Table Bay became a regular calling place for eastern trade vessels of every nationality. Thus a considerable local trade naturally sprang up, besides the Company's own transactions, and in spite of the restrictions placed on all trade in which the Company was not concerned. Here as elsewhere, too, smuggling, half connived at, went on side by side with legal transactions; and by

1795 Cape Town was a flourishing commercial port, with a very large interest in the over-sea trade.

Division II.
Agricultural.
1659. The agricultural settlement developed alongside of the trading one. It arose, we may say, at the very beginning of the settlement, when the Company planted a garden for supplying its ships with fresh vegetables. But this system of universal administration was found cumbersome; individual effort was resorted to. A small export of corn and wine sprang up and continued during the 18th century; and the arrival of the Huguenots caused a great improvement in agricultural method. As the eastern trade grew, as the settlement at Cape Town increased, so did the agricultural division extend; and at the end of the period it was spread over all the fertile and well watered valleys between Cape Town and the edge of the central plateau.

Division III.
Pastoral.
1673. Rather later developed the pastoral division of the settlement. Fresh meat was one of the chief needs of vessels calling at Table Bay in that time of long voyages to the east; to supply it, cattle must be brought or bred. At first the Company purchased cattle from the Hottentots; but too little was with these natives early proved the unreliability of this source of supply; some surer means of meeting a demand, constant and increasing as Table Bay became a regular call-place, must be found. Breeding by white settlers was resorted to; a ring of pasture farms grew up around the colony. As the more fertile lands near Cape Town came under tillage, the cattle breeders began to cross the mountain ranges into the interior plateau; and so the trekking movement began. Everything favoured a wide expansion of pasture farming towards the interior. The demand from ships and town increased; the Hottentot flock-owners were decimated by small-pox. The Company freely issued loan leases of lands not their own, at rents practically nominal; it permitted, for a time, cattle barter with the natives - a trade which it generally kept in its own hands; it required that the homesteads of pasture farms should be not less than three miles from one another. Long periods of drought rendered pastures scanty and wide-scattered; so the settlers must have large tracts of land, even for small herds, and must leave the numerous waterless regions behind them. The ever-increasing population of a thriving settlement must expand inwards: there was no industry or profession to attract it elsewhere. Dislike of the arbitrary rule of the Company, unwillingness to bear taxation: profit to be obtained by illicit trade with natives: - were all inducements to the same end. No resistance was anywhere met with; the Hottentots were reduced to serfdom; the cunning Bushmen, incapable of combination against the white man, were exterminated; only when the advancing columns of the Kaffirs were encountered, did the trekkers pause for a time in their onward journey.

1700-
1760-1770.
ca 1780.

The Result.
Rise of
Party Division. The developement of these three divisions of the settlement occupied the greater part of the period of the Dutch Company's administration. But towards the end of that period the results of the peculiar character of the settlement began to appear. These results may be summed up broadly by saying that there arose in South Africa a distinct party division between the trading settlement at Cape Town, supported by the agricultural settlement around it, on the one hand, and the pastoral settlement on the other. This division arose naturally from an antagonism of interest between these two portions of the settlement, which we have now to examine.

The Interests
the Traders. The interests of the trading settlement at Cape Town were not in the colony itself, but were, almost wholly, in the eastern sea trade and the Dutch Company. For it was not an industrial town: the Company would doubtless have suppressed any attempts at local industry, had such been made: and the materials and markets for local industry did not then exist. It was not, like many of the sea-ports in the American colonies at this time, a ship-building and ship-owning town: the want of timber in South Africa checked the Dutch tendency to sea-faring pursuits. But it was, in the first place, a harbour, a trade port, and a strategic point on the commerce route to the east; and this constituted its real importance. We have seen how its developement depended upon the eastern trade: indeed its very existence was bound up with it. This at first, no doubt, form the chief bond between the free traders of Cape Town and the Dutch Company; but even when that Company's trade with the east had wholly declined, its interests were not separated from those of Cape Town. For, in the second place, Cape Town was the point from which the Dutch Company administered the colony; and this was not a bond between Cape Town and the rest of the settlement, but between Cape Town and the Company. A garrison and a large number of officials were stationed there; while the local administration of the interior was largely carried on by unpaid burghers. In Cape Town were spent the proceeds of the local taxation, and the sums annually remitted by the Company to defray the chronic deficit; and hence arose no small portion of the town's prosperity.

The Interests
the Farmers. Turning now to the agricultural division of the settlement we find that its interests, economically at any rate, were bound up with those of Cape Town, and therefore with those of the eastern trade and the Company. Cape Town was the only market the farmers had for their produce; there it was bought up by the Company or the private traders; thence it was exported to the Batavian possessions of the Dutch Company, or there it was consumed. In return, Cape Town supplied what was necessary to the simple needs of the farmers; in particular, it was the point for the importation and distribution of the slaves needed by

to work the farms. Thus on Cape Town itself, on the administration at Cape Town, on the oversea colonies of the Company, the agricultural division depended for existence.

to Interests
to Flock-owners. In the pastoral division, however, we find a very different state of matters. There was never any real connection between the pastoral and the agricultural divisions, except the tie of blood relationship, which grew weaker with time; and, altho' the interests of the pastoral community and the trading settlement were at first closely connected, that connection was much weakened during the eighteenth century. The pastoral farmers had at first depended upon the Company's ships and the inhabitants of Cape Town as a market for their cattle; and they still did so. But there had never been any large export trade to give them an interest beyond the colony itself; and circumstances compelled them to centre their interests, not merely within the colony, but almost entirely, within their own division of it. As they proceeded further inland, further away from Cape Town and from each other, they tended to become economically independent of the rest of the world. Their material needs became reduced to a minimum which they could themselves supply. Their herds and the small patch of corn which each farmer grew, supplied food for themselves and their Hottentot serfs. Clothes were a minor consideration. Labour was supplied almost wholly by the Hottentot serfs, who were procurable without reference to Cape Town. Material independence was the result; the interests of the pastoral division were independent of those of Cape Town.

absence of any
interest other than
economic. So far only material or economic interests have been examined; for these, always strong in a new settlement, were especially so in South Africa at this time. Other interests were practically non-existent. There was no sense of unity, political, social, ecclesiastical, in the colony. Keen interest in political affairs has never been a Dutch characteristic; and, at the Cape, the despotic nature of the Company's rule, the importation from Holland of all prominent officials, were causes sufficient to almost destroy political life. Such life may have been kept up to a meagre extent, by the influence of public opinion at Cape Town on the administration; by the practice of choosing burghers by a semi elective method to sit in the courts of justice, and, late in the period, to control taxation and prices; and by the appointment of burghers to subordinate political offices in local administration. But the most powerful influence towards political consolidation, - a common danger, - was entirely absent; throughout the period the colony enjoyed almost uninterrupted peace. No European sea power disturbed it from without; and the struggles with the natives affected only a small portion of the colony. Social life, again, never strong among the Dutch, was similarly undeveloped. Within the separate districts blood relationship no doubt gave a certain sense of social unity; and in Cape Town and the districts around it social intercourse may have been common enough; but there was no social unity in the colony as a whole; and no means of developing it. Systematic

education was unknown, even at Cape Town. There was no healthy circulation of population, for the town offered no openings to attract the agriculturalist. A well organised church, again might have served to bind together the colonists in some measure; but the Dutch church was an utterly decentralised institution. All the bonds which unite other communities were absent almost entirely in this settlement; material interest alone held it together.

Causes of the
Open Appearance
of the Division.

It is plain, then, that what may be called a party division between traders and flock-owners had at least a potential existence, owing to the want of common interest between them. During the latter part of the Dutch Company's administration, this latent division became apparent; and the causes of its becoming so are now to be considered.

The General
Administration.

Among these the administration of the Dutch Company, always bad, and growing worse with the growth of the colony, may be placed first. And concerning it we may lay down two propositions.

The Company.

That the interests of the Dutch East India Company were opposed, generally speaking, to the interests of its South African colonists. We must remember that the Company was entirely unfitted to carry on the work of colonisation, that it had never been empowered to colonise, and that it had never wished to do so in South Africa. Indeed, considering the small and fully-employed population of Holland, an attempt at extensive colonisation would have been impossible; and the Company feared that the interests of a South African colony might interfere with those of their East Indian possessions. So when a colony did grow up its interests were not taken into account; the Cape was looked on merely as a half way house to the east, a convenient port on the trade route; a distant outpost of the real objective, the Batavian colonies; and like these colonies, or rather trading settlements, a commercial concern, expected to pay its way, if not to yield a dividend. From this point of view the Company consistently administered the colony. The machinery of administration, indeed, - a governor, advised by a council of officials, supreme in all legislative and administrative matters, - was not bad in itself; official despotism, non-existence of representation, were no anomaly in the eighteenth century. Social evils, of which the central one was the neglect of education, were the natural result of a commercial administration; but were partly excusable on the score of the smallness of the revenue, and were naturally not much felt by the colonists themselves. Fair provision, too, was made for spiritual needs. It was on the material side that the interests of Company and colonists really came into conflict. For its own interest the Company from the first established several usages, advantageous to itself, but galling to the colonists. Such were: the compulsory sale to it, by the settlers, at its own price, of agricultural produce for its own use; the enforcement of compulsory loans of property for public purposes; the retention of the cattle trade with the natives as a valuable monopoly. These were it is true somewhat mitigated on the petition of the colonists, but there were others more galling still. Free trade was unthought of; export and import were alike in the hands of the Company; and industry and expansion were thus discouraged. Taxation, though unable

1792.

to meet expenditure, was heavy, and collected on bad systems. And when the Company became bankrupt, it did not hesitate to issue a paper coinage, and thus still further reduce the credit and trade of the colony. These acts and usages were all manifestations of the same policy; they were in no way anomalous, or opposed to the then idea of colonial administration; they were the inevitable result of the connection of South Africa with an Eastern-trade Company.

The Company's Officials.

That the interests of the Company's officials were, generally speaking, opposed to the interests of the colonists. The initial defect here lay in the fact that these officials were part of the Dutch Company's general organisation, the centre of which was Batavia. It resulted from this that they had no permanent stake in the colony; for they were generally drawn from Holland, and not from the colony itself; and they looked for promotion to Batavia. It resulted likewise that officials trained in the administration of eastern settlements were set over a white colony; the crowning point of this anomaly being reached by the usage which made the Governor of the Cape subordinate for the time being to any official of higher rank who might call there. From these and other causes it came about that, even where the Company did not wish to be unjust, as in legislation, taxation, and administration of justice, abuses were perpetrated by the officials in their own interest. Their salaries, not over large, were eked out by dishonest or questionable means. The practice of paying salaries in part by perquisites or percentages on grain, etc. gave an opening for unjust dealing with, and by, the colonists. Opportunities of private trade by officials were many and were taken full advantage of, to the detriment of the interests both of colonists and Company. The possession of absolute power by the official class prevented the remedying of these abuses. The colonist was purposely kept ignorant of the laws, themselves often unjust, by which he was governed; if he appealed to justice against any abuse, his cause was tried by a body on which the colonists were indeed represented, but over which the Governor was really supreme; if he wished to carry his appeal further, it must go to Batavia, before officials who were of the same system as, and therefore, presumably, in full sympathy with, his oppressor; if he attempted a petition to the authorities in Holland, he might be summarily arrested, and imprisoned or transported at the will of the Governor.

Varying influence of these causes in the Colony.

These abuses affected, and caused discontent in, all three divisions of the settlement in varying degrees. They were probably not felt most keenly at Cape Town. Public opinion there - enlightened somewhat by contact with the outer world - must have had some influence upon the actions of the Company's servants; judicial and other evils would be less likely to take place in the town than in the country districts. But trade restrictions, even though eroded, prevented expansion; the continuance of official and officials' trade made private venture risky. To the agriculturalist the abuses were much more harmful. Among them it would seem that the worst instances of official despotism took place; on them, as producers, fell the weight of the export restrictions, the Company's purchase and other privileges, the private official trade, the taxation, the official perquisites; and the burden, though lightened by fraud and falsification, was a heavy one. Among the pasture farmers of the east, again, it was different. These

administrative and other evils were felt less than in any other part of the colony. Distance from the seat of authority and difficulty of communication rendered the flock owner almost immune. Justice might be badly administered, but a community of border settlers are not generally so law abiding as to desire a too rigorous judicial system. Taxation might be heavy, but taxation returns could not readily be verified and so might be falsified to any extent. Trade grievances too could not have affected them greatly; the only trade privilege which had troubled them - the cattle purchase monopoly - had become almost a dead letter by the end of the eighteenth century.

The Immediate Causes.

So much for the general administration of the Company; let us now note the immediate, as distinct from the general, causes which brought it about that a party division revealed itself in South Africa in civil war. Two or three acts dictated by the general policy of the Company may be mentioned first. Such are: the attempt of the Company to prevent the expansion of the pastoral division, and the increasing infringement of its monopoly of cattle purchase, by refusing the issue of loan leases; the vacillating action of the Company in the second conflict with the Kaffirs on the border - a preliminary struggle had occurred earlier - by which they were allowed to settle in the pastoral division; both acts calculated to cause great discontent among the border farmers. To the same policy may be referred the Company's refusal to grant administrative and economic changes. And second we may put the bankruptcy of the Dutch Company, which weakened the administration, and caused the aggravation, if that were possible, of its self seeking policy, as we see in its issues of paper money. Last we may place a quite external cause - the influence which the American Revolution possibly, the French Revolution certainly, had upon the colonists, acting as it did upon minds already familiar with republican ideas.

Why these Causes acted as they did.

How then are we to explain the fact that, while the traders in the farmers around, Cape Town, remained faithful, at least lukewarmly, in spite of justifiable discontent, to the Dutch Company, the pastoral settlers of the interior rose against the rule of that Company, declared themselves independent of it, and prepared to support their declaration by arms? It was not because the general abuses of the Company's rule affected them most, for we have seen that the contrary was the case. It was not because the particular and immediate causes of their rebellion enumerated above had made the rule of the Company harder to bear or more hateful in the pastoral division than elsewhere; of the two first-mentioned causes one was an unsuccessful attempt to enforce a trade privilege such as was enforced against trader and farmer every day; the other involved no greater restriction to expansion or danger to property than the ordinary trade restrictions and official malpractices at and near Cape Town. The refusal of reform affected the whole colony; the bankruptcy of the Company affected the flockowners much less than the other two classes which were interested in trade; the influence of the revolutionary spirit must have been potential over the whole of Dutch South Africa. No! the real cause lay deeper. The pastoral settlers rose against, and declared themselves independent of, the rule of the Dutch Company, because they were already independent of it. Their declaration was merely a statement of an accomplished fact. We have already seen how they had

acquired this practical independence; and their rebellion, in the circumstances, was perfectly natural. The traders and farmers stuck to the Company in spite of abuses, because they were in a great measure dependent upon it; the pasture farmers broke away from it because, though they might not feel the abuses so much, they received in return no benefit from the Company's administration; they had to bear the burdens of administration without partaking of the advantages. Their rising is, in fact, an instance of the action of the law which we see at work also in the rebellion of England's American colonies, and partly in the revolts of the colonies of Spain. And we may remark, in passing, the wisdom of the Dutch Company's refusal to grant greater administrative and economic independence to the colony. Had they done so, a rising of the whole, and not merely of a part, of the colony would, sooner or later, have been the inevitable result.

Another
development.

Thus then did a division grow up within Dutch South Africa. One other important development took place during the Dutch Company's administration, very closely connected with the causes of this division: - the development namely in South Africa of a unique type of race - the Dutch Boer; which has now to be examined.

The Boer
character.

The central point in the character of the Dutch Boer throughout their history has been their individualism; they have succeeded in being as individuals, more entirely self dependent and self sufficient than almost any other race. Some tendency towards such a characteristic may have been inherited from their forefathers: the original Dutch settlers, mostly of a low class - for the Dutch as a nation, and therefore the lowest class most of all, have always been individualists; and the Huguenot refugees, among whom persecution and stern religion had weakened the feeling of national life. But of much greater importance were the conditions of life in the colony itself, the effect of which has already been touched on. We have already noted the almost complete absence of any political or social life in the colony, which resulted, of course, from the absence of such life among the individual colonists. We have seen, too, how, among farmer and flock-owners, slave and Hottentot labour rendered the individual colonists independent, if not of the outer world, at least of Cape Town. But this very independence of men of their own race, meaning, as it did, dependence on a lower one, was the cause, putting aside such minor ones as isolation and bad administration, of the nearly passing peculiarities of the border settlers becoming race characteristics. For constant contact, and the need of communication, with lower intellects, caused the development of the *Taal*, a rudimentary dialect of Dutch, having no facility for any purpose but conversation; but which through constant use, want of education, and, in particular, the suppression of French among the Huguenot immigrants, became the only language of the colonists; a development which cut them off from all intellectual advance, and therefore, from all advance whatsoever. Nor was this all. Contact with the natives, especially in youth, and finally a slight admixture of native blood, worked a moral deterioration as great as the intellectual; the settler became suspicious, lazy, treacherous. The real importance, for South African History, of this development of peculiar characteristics lies in the fact that the settler, obliged at first to become individualists by stress of circumstances, at first grew accustomed to that condition, and then gradually lost all conception of a better: it became, to them, the

Its
importance.

ideal of life. And so, the central and underlying cause of the party division in South Africa lying in that individual isolation, as long as that individualism, that isolation, continued, - and, having become a race characteristic, it was likely to continue long, - a party division was likely to continue.

Summary.

To sum up the events of this important period of South Africa's past, we may say, that a settlement began in South Africa, and grew into a colony; that, with this growth, division arose, culminating in an attempt at civil war; that the cause of that division was the practical independence, arising out of individual isolation, of the inhabitants of the pastoral division of the settlement; and that this individual isolation, or rather, the tendency thereto, had become a race characteristic among these settlers.

The Past.

Third Period.

1795-1806.

The third period of South Africa's past, which we have now to deal with, is, for us, the most important. It may itself be divided into certain periods, in which various features or movements have been predominant; and in this way we shall treat it.

Transition Period.

1795/1803-1806.

There is, as is natural, a period of transition from Dutch to British rule, rendered longer than ordinary in South Africa by the circumstances of the case; three events alone are important, the first seizure by the British, the return of the Dutch for a short period, and the final, and lasting, British occupation. One question alone may be treated as belonging to this period - Why did the British take the Cape.

Reason of British Occupation.

The answer is simple. For the last half century of their occupation, the Dutch had been at the Cape on sufferance. The trade of their East India Company was gone; while Britain, after the long struggle with France in India, had now become the paramount power in the east; and the Cape, from its position on the trade route, could not be without interest to the British. So long, however, as it remained merely a trading station, it had nothing to fear; for Britain and France both had their own ports of call for their trading vessels, at St Helena and Madagascar or Mauritius respectively; while the Dutch took care that foreign ships calling at the Cape should be cautiously, but in no sense badly, treated. The small interest taken by the French government in territorial acquisition abroad; the absence of contact, and therefore of conflict, between Dutch and British in the east; the expense of the Cape station itself; - all combined to keep the Dutch colony intact. But with the alliance of Holland and France a new phase was entered upon; for the French had not yet given up hopes of an eastern empire, and thus attack on British trade became imminent; British occupation was needful as a preventive measure. Hence took place Commodore Johnson's unsuccessful attempt; hence the successful attack of Admiral Elphinstone; and likewise the final seizure. And hence, also, the British having realised the value of their acquisition, arose the arrangement at the Peace of Amiens.

1781.

1795.

1814.

General conditions.

So much for the period of transition; but before going on to treat of the rest of this, our third period in order, let us see what were the general conditions controlling the history of South Africa at this time. It was evident, in our study of our second period, that the course of events was the result of the varying effect of administrative acts upon the three divisions of the colony: divisions which were themselves the result of local conditions and acts of the governing body. It cannot be too strongly insisted on, that these same conditions subsist unchanged, and control events in our present period also.

The Three Divisions.

1820.

1870. / 1884.

The three natural divisions of the colony remain, altho' their boundaries and extent may be altered. For many years, Cape Town represents the trading division, increasing in importance with the increase of eastern trade, and the influx of British merchants; the Albany settlement is the first real extension of the division; Durban in Natal follows. The little towns founded in the Orange and Transvaal states are in no sense commercial; but, later on, with the discovery of diamonds at Kimberley, and gold on the Witwatersrand, a vast extension of commercial life takes place. And it must be noted that except in the Albany settlement, and perhaps in Natal, the commercial community remains peculiarly separate from the agricultural or pastoral, having distinct interests and a distinct life; while between its own scattered portions, Cape Town, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, etc., the closest relations, not only commercial, but social, are kept up. The agricultural division expands slightly within Cape Colony, and not at all outside it: for the English settlements at Albany and in Natal approximate to genuine English agricultural colonies, in alliance with, and not antagonistic to, commerce; it might be said that the agricultural division, late in the period, tends to coalesce with the pastoral; but yet its numbers, wealth, and distinct interests, really give it a position of its own. The pastoral division, lastly, undergoes the greatest expansion of all; the Orange Free State and Transvaal may be regarded merely as extensions of it; and these, together with the old pastoral portions of Cape Colony, and a part of Natal, constitute together a combination, within which communication is constantly kept up, which has in the main, identical interests in all its portions, and which thus constitutes a most important factor in the history of South Africa.

The Administration

The influence of the administration on these three divisions constitutes the history of South Africa during the period; it is only necessary to say here that, even in the later years of the period, when obscured to some extent by the grant of self government, or practical independence, to some parts of the colony, it still remains, behind all, as potent and effective as ever in conditioning events. The factors in its action we may now shortly explain.

Factors of Administration

The action of the Dutch administration resulted, as we have seen, or was a combination of, the action of two factors: first, the company itself; second, the company's officials. Under British rule, administrative action is a much more complicated thing; it is the resultant of four

elements. These are. I. All powerful, though rarely exercised, popular feeling in England. II. All powerful, in the obedience of the first, the will of the Imperial government in Britain. III. The wishes, rendered effective by a power at first despotic, and always great, of the Governor and other high officials at the Cape. IV. Really subsidiary to III, II, and I, the desire, of the trading community, in South Africa itself. Let us amplify this statement by examining the nature of these factors, and comparing with them those under the Dutch rule.

I. Popular feeling.

Popular feeling in England had of course no analogue under the Dutch Company. It influenced South Africa chiefly through party pressure at home, though sometimes directly, as we shall see. But the record of its action belongs to the history of Britain itself, and we must often take it for granted in detailing the action of the home government.

II. Imperial Government.

The Imperial government in Britain found its double, under Dutch rule, in the executive of the Dutch East India Co. But there was little indeed in common between the two. We have already examined the spirit of the Company's administration: we have seen how its constitution as a trading concern rendered it unfit for the government of a colony: and how, in effect, unable to attain any breadth of administrative view, it governed almost wholly, in the interest of its own purse: how defective in principle and practice was its rule. The organization at London, by which South Africa was now governed, was not indeed the best suited for colonial government, but had at least no direct pecuniary interest in the colony, and ruled it as a part of an Empire, not as an investment of capital: with the more advanced views of the time on colonial administration, it was willing to take other than economic considerations somewhat into account.

III. Official class.

The official class sent out to rule the Cape by the British government was a contrast in every way to that employed by the East India Company. Of old, as we have seen, the personnel of the administration had been defective both in position and ability; and usage and opportunity had led to abuse and misconduct in the relations of official and colonist. But now rules of ability and integrity, thoroughly if narrowly trained in the business of administration are appointed the chief posts; adequate salaries, and the traditions of their service, place them above the possibility of speculation, or interested use of power. Instances of the injudicious use of almost despotic authority, of the enforcement of measures against the true interests of the colonists may occur in the early years of British rule, but are essentially exceptional.

IV. Trading Community.

Of the fourth and subsidiary factor, little can here be said, although undoubtedly the trading division of the colony has had an exceptional influence on the administration. It would be untrue to say that the other two divisions have had no such influence; but it has been much less. And the reason for this, passing over the subsidiary one of the predominance of British nationality in the trading community, is to be found in the central principle of the British administration.

Central
Administrative
Principle.

To avoid future difficulty, this central principle may be at once stated, in the following general terms: - The promotion of commerce - a proper ideal, surely, for a nation of shop-keepers, - has been the ultimate object of British rule in South Africa. This may be a truism; it is certainly a principle applicable to many other portions of the Empire; but of its truth there can be no doubt. The Cape was seized, and kept, as a valuable harbour and strategic point on the eastern trade. For sixty years it was considered valuable by the rules of the empire, only in reference to the east and its trade. That value was lost: and the Cape became a well-nigh worthless possession, even to clear-sighted statesmen, until the indigenous wealth of South Africa gave it an increasing value of its own. The British Government has been little more willing than the Dutch Company, taking resources into account, to spend blood or treasure in South Africa without hope of return. Our truism, if it be a truism, has at least the merit of being true.

Three
Movements
of the Period.

The action of the administration, under the complex conditions which have been detailed, produced in combination with certain natural causes, three chief movements during this period, each of which almost monopolizes a generation of South African history. These movements are: -

A movement by which the majority of the pastoral farmers achieve nominal as well as virtual independence of the colonial administration:

A movement whereby the agriculturalists withdraw their allegiance from the trading division, and tend to act along with the pastoral; and

A movement, due to exceptionally fortunate natural causes, whereby the trading division increases vastly in importance, thus redressing the balance of parties disturbed by movement second, and leading up to the present, the actual, - the acute strife of the two parties for the mastery.

Movement I.
1706 - 1834.

Let us then examine the acts of the administration with a view to discovering the causes of movement first: -

Administration.
(A). Political.

As to political action, using the word political in a loose sense, in form and spirit the government of the colony remained a despotism during this part of our period: this was merely a continuation of former conditions; and with it we have no more to do. In respect of local and judicial administration it was different. Local administration under the Dutch had always been something of a makeshift; justice had always been closely connected with, and utterly subservient to, executive power. Factors second and third in our scheme of administrative action - supreme Imperial and colonial houses - with the narrow views of their time and training - could not suffer this; in a spirit of zealous reform they swept away the old system; introduced circuit courts of justice and a new jury system; abolished the local courts of heemraaden; changed, probably, not only the details, but the spirit of the whole administrative organisation; took away their ancient crooked usages from the benevolent Boes, set up English ones in their place.

1). Social.

9th social action. Again a spirit of reform shows itself; the great blot on the life of the South African colonist is his want of education; the rulers make honest attempts to remedy the defect. Most important, they find the *Taal* unworkable from the educational, or any other point of view: the *Taal* is therefore legally abolished, at least as a government dialect; English takes its place in all the law courts and government offices. Factor third in our scheme is probably chiefly responsible here, influenced no doubt by factor fourth; for the English trader is now becoming more common in the colony.

2). Economic.

1. General.

1812,

1825,

1833.

9th economic action. And here we have the chief part of the matter. First come really valuable reforms; for we have seen how the Dutch Company had hampered the trade of the colony with restrictions; had saved its purse by a system of compulsory corn purchase, of forced purveyance, or what we now call *commandeering*. And these abuses are summarily abolished; free internal trade, free trade to the East is introduced; the compulsory sale system, *perquisites*, *requisitions* and so on disappear as rapidly. Less satisfactory from the colonist's point of view are the exhibitions of British business capacity in the redemption of the Dutch Company's paper currency at one-third value; worse still, the alteration of the old system of land tenure. And above all, come the reforms in regard to the native question, in the two acute stages in which it presents itself.

2. A. Slave

Question.

1825,

First, and probably most important, is the combined problem of slave and Hottentot labour. This labour system had become an integral part of the social life, the economic existence of the agricultural and pastoral divisions of the colony; we have already observed, indeed, how it had been one of the most powerful conditions of the formation of that peculiar life. But against it were arrayed all the factors of administrative action. The trading division of the colony was not so dependent on the system as the other two; and with the increasing influx of English merchants, and the foundation of the Albany settlement, where no slavery ever existed, a party actively hostile to these systems of serfdom and slavery was formed in the colony, headed by the numerous missionaries, who may be regarded as an outpost of the Philanthropic party in England. The British officials at the Cape had no personal interest in the system, and, influenced by English feeling, local and Imperial would be rather against the retention of such an evident abuse. The Rulers at home were unwilling no doubt to take any steps in such a thorny matter; but were at that time exceptionally under the influence of a party representing, or affecting to represent, the ultimate administrative factor: - the Philanthropic party. Under these influences numerous and not over popular steps were taken in South Africa in regard to slaves and Hottentots. The slave trade was early stopped; regulations concerning the punishment of slaves became stricter and stricter. Acts against Hottentot vagrants were repealed; missionaries began to labour among them with the countenance

of the administration. Finally slavery was abolished; and not content with that, the administration refused or omitted to pass any enactment against vagrancy on the part of the emancipated slaves; and the compensation allotted the owners, originally too small, was rendered still smaller by unnecessary discounting.

2. B. Native
Question.

Second, we have the native question pure - that is the problem of the treatment of the advancing tribes of Kaffirs on the western border of the colony. It has been already mentioned that the advance of the pastoralists to the west in the eighteenth century was checked by their meeting with the opposing flow of the powerful and prolific Bantu tribes. The details of the conflicts between these two opposing forces are uninteresting; it is sufficient to remark that already the inevitable tendency in the conflict of lower and higher healthy civilisation had declared itself; the lands of the Kaffirs were coming into the white man's possession, more perhaps for the sake of frontier safety than of territorial aggrandisement; the Kaffir tribes were coming under British suzerainty, if not under actual British rule. And we may here add, that this process, then in an experimental stage, has been now recognised as natural, inevitable and in the end best. But the Philanthropic party in England considered any encroachment on native "rights" as a matter of contest; the government of the day was guided by that party. The officials in South Africa itself, supported doubtless by all divisions of the colonists, except the missionaries, were strongly in favour of the advance policy. Probably what turned the scale against that policy was its expensiveness - for which the return would be distant; at any rate Lord Glenelg defined the position of the home government in a famous despatch, the advance retrograded: - the Great Trek took place.

1834.

Parrying

result of above
Action.

How then did these administrative acts affect the different divisions of the colony? To the trading community, they were probably an almost unnumbered blessing. The removal of trade restrictions, the influx of British merchants, caused a great increase in prosperity. The judicial reforms were looked on with favour by the English at any rate. The redemption of the currency tended to better credit. The discrediting of the Zaal was advantageous to business men. The stoppage of the slave trade might injure the trading community temporarily but was atoned for in other directions. The general slave and Hottentot question had less influence on the traders than on any one else, as we have noted. The native frontier question had even less. The farmers of the colony had much less reason to be pleased with the action of the government. They also no doubt benefitted by the removal of trade restrictions; self interest still kept them attached to Cape Town and the administration there. But to their conservative nature the summary overthrow of the old order must have been hard to bear; the abolition of the Zaal for public use a real hardship. And although the second aspect of the native problem could not affect them directly, the abolition of slavery, most common among them, must have meant a very severe loss.

With regard to the Pastoralists of the interior, it has been maintained that every one of the acts of administration, almost, mentioned by us, was a direct or indirect cause of the Great Trek. But did these acts affect the flock-owners and grazers any more than they did the rest of the colony? Trade restriction or freedom could have little effect on them: money questions less. The new courts of justice did undoubtedly affect them very nearly, in that so many of them were concerned in the cases of native ill-treatment heard in the Black Circuit. The alteration of land tenure was a grievance, but not more. The abolition of slavery could not have injured them nearly so much as it did the farmers for they owned few slaves. The native frontier question was a much more serious one for them; but only those on the immediate borderland were in actual danger - the Albany settlement indeed forming a large part of the boundary. If it be true, as it is true, that these acts of the British government were the cause of the Great Trek, then they were no more than the immediate cause; the real underlying reason is the same as before; that the flock-owners were already discontented and that therefore they objected to interference from an administration from which they derived no visible benefit. In fact the conviction is borne in upon us, that what the trekkers really wanted, was not good government, but no government at all. And this conviction becomes certainty when we study the early history of the Transvaal.

Special causes.

Some special subsidiary causes occurring in this time were, the detention of Napoleon at St. Helena, which brought about the upkeep of a large garrison at the Cape; the large number and high pay of officials in the early years of British administration: - both circumstances which benefitted the trading and agricultural divisions, and therefore ensured largely the peaceful transfer of authority from Dutch to British; and, in quite a different way, the so-called rebellion of Maghies' Trek, which is an excellent example of the resistance of the independent pasture farmer to government control, and is also influential in causing the Trek, and directing it into a peaceful and not a warlike channel.

1812-15.

Summary.

In sum, the alliance between trade and administration has now been drawn closer than ever; the agricultural community is discontented but still bound to Cape Town; the pastoral division has become independent in reality.

Movement II.

1814 - 1882(?)

I. Race feeling.

We may now deal with movement number two - the union or attempted union of the agricultural and pastoral divisions. The action of the administration brought this about in three ways.

First, there grew up in South Africa, among the Dutch, a feeling of race unity, of their existence as a nationality by themselves. Any such feeling must have been dormant during the rule of the Dutch East India Company; want of contact with the outside world, and internal divisions working on the well known individualism of the Dutch, must have almost destroyed such a conception; its place was but ill taken by the ties of inter-relationship which grew up among

the colonists. Hence again may be inferred the cause of the weak resistance to the British seizure of the Cape. But it has been observed that when the first Dutch settlers were arriving from Holland, that country was at enmity with Great Britain; some feeling of traditional hostility may have thus been preserved in South Africa itself. It is more likely that the short period of well meaning rule, direct by the Government of Holland, did something to prejudice the settlers against change of masters. Under British rule itself, however, race feeling must have developed rapidly. Contact with the inflowing British settlers, the first occasion on which the colonists had the opportunity of contact with foreigners; the want of appreciation of each other natural in two races at such different stages of development; the introduction of English institutions, of the English language, could not but go a long way towards rousing such feeling. The administration and the incoming English traders were naturally closely connected; and hatred of the administration thus became almost identical with hatred of the English race. The fact that the missionaries - the only Englishmen with whom a large number of the colonists came into touch - inspired many of the most unpopular acts of the ruling power with regard to the native question tended still further to such an identification; and a superficial view of these acts - touching the colonist, as we have observed, on his weakest side - the economic - is enough to show that there was justification for great bitterness of feeling. But such a feeling does not readily translate itself into action: and it cannot justly be said that the Great Trek was the result of such feeling: it might have occurred under a continuation of the rule of the Dutch Company. After the Trek numerous causes for a national feeling arise. The military successes of the trekkers: their misfortunes, their "persecution" by the British government: their final achievement of independence, must have immensely strengthened any sentiment that already existed; not only in the minds of the independent pastoralists themselves, but in those of their race fellows in Cape Colony, communication being always kept up between the various portions of the Dutch race. And the final touch to this sentiment - that which caused it to blossom out into a practical shape, was the annexation and war of independence of the Transvaal. For several years before Mr. Frere, the emissary of the British home government, had been preaching the doctrine of the unity of Afrikaner nationality: that unity showed itself during the War of Independence so strongly all over South Africa that the retrocession of the Transvaal had to take place, and the confederation scheme given up; and within a year was formed the Afrikaner Bond, the outward sign and seal of race unity.

1817

1880.

1874-77.

Race feeling
insufficient.

So much for race feeling; and there is no need to deny that such is the bond which has held pastoralist to farmer in South Africa; a common social and religious life, a common language and associations are themselves sufficient explanation. But something more is needed before a movement, revolutionary or otherwise, can take place for political unity: economic interest - and we have seen how important it is in South Africa - must be common likewise; so we must ask, was this the case in South Africa!

Want of

There has never been any important economic interest in common between the pastoral and agricultural

common economic

divisions in South Africa; and here has been always the weak point of the Afrikaner movement.

Interest.

We have already seen that the interests of the agricultural division were for a long period bound up with those of the trading one; and in so far as there has ever been a tightening of bonds between farmers and flockowners, it has been the result of a loosening of this older connection. And that such a loosening did take place during the period now under consideration is quite undeniable.

1869.

Reversal of

We know how during the prosperous years of early British rule the trading and agricultural divisions had stuck to the administration in their own interest, in spite of its harmful acts. Prosperity did not always continue at such a high pitch, but continued down to the most important external event of the period,

Balance of Power.

the opening of the Suez canal. That event immediately deprived South Africa of its importance in reference to the eastern trade; its own commercial importance was small; the home government lost interest in it; the agricultural and pastoral divisions, having more stable grounds of prosperity, immediately gained the upper hand of the traders; a complete reversal of the balance of power took place. Under the old administrative system, that might have been unknown for years; but the grant of representative government gave the means of testing feeling in the colony. It did more; it removed the colony from the tutelage of the home administration; it thus deprived the traders of their most powerful and consistent ally; Cape Colony was now practically independent of the home government, the farmers were the most powerful party in Cape Colony; with the achievement of practical economic independence, race feeling had room to act.

1872.

Consequences

That it acted effectively we cannot doubt. We see the power of the Afrikaner party in such acts as the re-establishment of the Paal as a medium of education and business; we see the unity of Dutch feeling in South Africa in the successful opposition to confederation, the unanimous moral pressure which might at any time have become rebellion - exercised against the government actions in the war of Transvaal Independence. That war is followed by the better organisation of the Afrikaner Bond, which upholds the economic supremacy of the agricultural division in its fiscal and native policy and thereby makes a continuation of close race connection among the Dutch, a possibility; and so things continue till we come to the Present.

1882.

Administrative

The action of the administration during this period is a study in itself. Suffice it to say here, that, not grasping the change in the balance of South African parties, it perseveres on the old lines, until the shock of the Transvaal war shows that conditions have changed. It then realises that South Africa had decreased in value to the Empire, or rather, the trade of the Empire, and a change in policy takes place, which might, sooner or later, have meant the separation of South Africa from Britain; the independence of the Transvaal being the first step in such a movement. That such a consummation did not take place, that South Africa still remains a part of the Empire, is the result of what we have called movement third.

Action.

Movement III.

1870-1899.

The third movement, the growth in importance of the trading division, begins while the second is still in mid-career, though its greatest extent is reserved till later. We noted, at the beginning, the valuelessness of South Africa from a commercial point of view; its want of natural resources, its unfitness, on the surface at any rate, for the development of any industry. Such it had remained, up till the commencement of this movement; its commercial importance, we need hardly repeat, was due to its connection with the east, if to any thing at all. But, by an inexplicable, though exceptionally fortunate coincidence, just at the time when the opening of the Suez canal deprived it of this source of importance, a new and suddenly developed, but rapidly growing industry, springing up and filled the breach to some extent - the Diamond industry. And many years later, but at an equally critical period of South African history, soon after the retrocession of the Transvaal, began an almost equally rapid development of an even more important commercial venture - the gold industry of the Transvaal.

1870-71.

1884.

Influence on Home opinion.

What was the result of these developments. Not least important, they influenced public opinion at home; they kept up Imperial interest in the colony at a time when it was likely to die out; they kept factory number one at work. But much more important, they augmented immensely the importance of the commercial division of the colony; they redressed the balance of power which had almost definitely gone over to the side of the now united Pastoralists and colony farmer. And this increase in the importance of the trading community, gave Africa a commercial interest of its own, greater even than that which it had possessed through its old connection with the east. And, to follow this up, this new or revived commercial interest of South Africa, brought again into action that general principle which we have stated to underlie the whole of the British administrative action; the policy, natural at the time, of which the retrocession of the Transvaal had been the most prominent result, was reversed again; the alliance between administration and trader, founded at first on the mere pecuniary profit derived from the presence of the administration, weakened later by the grants of self government, was rendered as strong again as ever by the rise of new conceptions as to the close connection of Empire and colony, Empire and trade.

Trading Division.

Administrative Action.

But more than this resulted from it. By the fact that the Transvaal was the location of the gold deposits, the commercial and pastoral communities were brought into contact, as they had not been for two generations. We know already, that these two communities had really no interest in common; we have therefore characterized their division as a party division, using the word in a wide sense. We know how they had succeeded in avoiding conflict by the entire separation of Pastoral from Commercial; indeed no other method whereby conflict could have been so long avoided, is conceivable. But now again they came into actual contact, actual interference with one another; and the result was the Present, as we see it.

Contact of the two Parties.

But more than this resulted from it. By the fact that the Transvaal was the location of the gold deposits, the commercial and pastoral communities were brought into contact, as they had not been for two generations. We know already, that these two communities had really no interest in common; we have therefore characterized their division as a party division, using the word in a wide sense. We know how they had succeeded in avoiding conflict by the entire separation of Pastoral from Commercial; indeed no other method whereby conflict could have been so long avoided, is conceivable. But now again they came into actual contact, actual interference with one another; and the result was the Present, as we see it.

The Present.

The Present of South Africa has for us only one feature which it is needful to attend to; and that is, the War. With the details of that war we have nothing to do: it suffices for us that the ultimate result is now plain, and merely needs time to be fully worked out. But with its causes and consequences we have some concern. Let us first take its causes.

The War.

Its ultimate

cause.

If we premise the statement that the Great Boer War was the acute conflict of the two opposing parties in South Africa, it needs no great historical insight to perceive that that war was a perfectly inevitable occurrence from the commencement of South African history. It has been made plain that that party division which we have so often mentioned was the inevitable result of the natural conditions obtaining in South Africa, combined with the action of the Dutch administration; we have seen in passing that the action of that administration was the unavoidable result of the way in which it was constituted. We have shown how that party division was perpetuated under British rule again by the acts of administration infallibly resulting from the unpreventable action of its factors; we have seen the shape which that division inevitably took; we have traced the logical results of events down to the time when unavoidable natural causes bring the same parties, under the same principles, again face to face; and it needs but a shortsighted person to see the impossibility of avoiding the conflict. There is, perhaps, something pathetic, something awful, in the way in which abstract causes seem thus to bring about a result; but this essay is but an attempt to point out that way. Other people may quarrel about the moral right or wrong of the war, wisdom or folly of the statesmen who were the immediate instruments in bringing it about; but for us let it be sufficient that it was inevitable; inevitable from the beginning of South African history; from the beginning of British history, of Dutch history, of the history of Western Europe; inevitable, if you will, from the beginning of time.

General consideration.

But it may be queried, cannot two states exist side by side, each dominated by a party whose interests have nothing in common with those of the other, - like, say, the Orange Free State and the British portions of South Africa, - without coming to a conflict? All history teaches us that the answer is, no! Sooner or later some point of conflict will arise, and then the strength of the parties must be tested; under present circumstances, war is the only test. And if we grasp this we see the real importance of the cause of this war which we may select as most immediate - the Uitlanders' grievances. In relation to the Transvaal, these grievances may be summed up as at bottom depending on the same principle as those which caused the Great Trek: - they are all instances of the imposition of administrative burdens without corresponding benefits. But viewed in relation to the causes of the war as a whole, these grievances are no more than its immediate occasion. Controversy over their rights and wrongs is really foreign to the subject; they were merely the straws which showed which way the wind blew.

The Position

One of the most interesting points in connection with the war has been, that, like the war of

of the Parties.

Independence, it has defined, better than anything else could have done, the position and extent of the two parties. The commercial community of South Africa has been the central rallying point on one side; it has been unanimous, and has, of course, been supported, or rather led, financed, managed, by the British government acting here as ever on its recognised principle. The Pastoral community, the real, untouched type of flock owner, wherever they have existed, practically, have been as consistent on the other, influenced by race feeling, common interest, blood relationship, or what you will. The really interesting case in which it has defined the position for us, is that of the agricultural community, meaning thereby the Dutch of the Western part of Cape Colony. In spite of the strength of the avowedly anti-British Afrikaner Bond in that district, there has been no sign hardly the symptom of any insurrection. This is the more curious when we consider the unanimity of South African Dutchmen against the war of Independence; a unanimity which certainly, then showed signs of universal insurrection. But the attitude of the Cape Dutch proves conclusively the contention that the present war is not, in the main, a War of Races, but a war of Parties. In 1881 race feeling and economic interest, if not identical, did not clash; now, in spite of more perfect race organisation, the farmers of Cape Colony have felt the change in economic conditions which has of late years taken place; have realised their dependence upon the commercial community; and have acted accordingly.

Unhistorical.

We may perhaps be hardened, then, for forsaking for a moment the historical view point, and remarking that statesmanship could hardly have chosen a better time than the present for the inevitable conflict. At no time could success have been more sure, than when the economic prosperity of South Africa had rendered the commercial community so important, had won back the allegiance of the agricultural divisions; perhaps most important, had concentrated attention, at home on South Africa.

The Future.

The consequences of the present war lead us into the region of the probable future, in dealing with which we can only speak of general tendencies, not of particular events. But even thus limited, we may make some fairly certain generalisations concerning matters in the near future.

Finality of the War.

First, the present war will tend to be final. The very method in which it is being prosecuted, the avowed aim of those directing it, is the first proof of this assertion. The intention is evident, to subdue the Boer entirely, to take away every vestige of independence from the Boer states; to ensure the predominance of the commercial community throughout South Africa. That this will be sooner or later, accomplished for the present by main force there can be no doubt. Hereafter we shall see a long period occupied in reconstructing the fabric of institutions shattered over so large a part of the colony. And during that time there will not in all probability be any attempt to undo the results of the war by movement from within.

But the ultimate permanency of the result of the war; the permanent supremacy, that is, of the commercial community in South Africa, depends on quite other conditions. It is hardly needful to say that these are mainly economic. When we consider the soil, the rainfall, the general agricultural possibilities of the districts where the Boers are chiefly settled (the fertile soils of Natal and Rhodesia, colonised under English conditions have no relation to this question), it does not on the surface seem likely that the land interest should again threaten the trade interest. Mineral wealth, rather than agricultural, seem the prominent natural characteristics of the land. So, just as the richness of the diamond and gold mines have given the trades their present supremacy in South Africa, so will such hoards of precious minerals give it the same supremacy in the future. Experts tell us that the gold mines of the Transvaal alone will last for fifty years. Even if they give out before then, we may hope, from expert opinion again, for the opening up of equal supplies of gold in more northerly regions. Moreover gold is not the only important mineral; we hear of vast deposits of iron and other metals; the mining of gold will be but the prelude to the opening up of these resources also. So it may be fairly said that, knowing as we do that no great extent of rich agricultural or pasture land is lying awaiting the colonist, the commercial interest will retain its supremacy.

Unity of South Africa.

This, however, is not all. The supremacy of one party does not mean the unity of all parties. Complete unity of interest is of course, synonymous with stagnation; but in any healthy state common class, or party, interests must exist. It has already been repeated, that such common interest never existed between the pasture farming Boers in South Africa, and any other part of the community. If South Africa is to be a united whole, such interests must arise; to foster, or even create them must therefore be the aim of the administration in the years to come. General lines alone can be indicated; but it is likely that the social isolation of the Boer will break down before increased facilities of communication, and the gradual spread of education, and the English language; economic independence may take much longer to do away, but the probable increase in agriculture proper, which will take place with the spread of British colonists, and perhaps with the initiation of government schemes for land improvement, will weaken this central feature of Boer life also. When we see the Boer become dependent on the commercial city as a weekly market for his produce as an English colonial farmer, then an immense step in the unifying of South Africa will be accomplished. And, as we have seen, the necessary condition of such unity, a strong and widespread commercial community, giving solidity to the colony by constant business and social communication between its various parts, is likely to exist and increase for many years to come.

connection
with the Empire.

The further question too may be asked, Will this probably united South Africa be a part of the British Empire? In the main, this question too depends on the supremacy of the commercial community; for not only is that community almost wholly English in nationality but the trade in which it is interested is the substantial link which binds the colony to the Empire. Any retention of, or revival of, power on the part of the pastoral community, with its interests centred in itself, would certainly endanger the connection of the Empire and South Africa; and should the commercial community by any chance lose its supremacy, even for a time, while race feeling continues to exist in South Africa, as it will for some years yet, then we might expect complications in this direction. As it is, however, there is really little cause for fear. Nor is it to be supposed that foreign nations will likely obtain any dangerous influence in South Africa in the near future. Portuguese South Africa is little more than a name; only its acquisition - an unlikely event - by any foreign power could cause trouble. German South West Africa is a more dangerous spot; but the barrenness of the land and want of resources (except some copper mines in the South) will prevent its attaining any real importance for many years. It is not possible that political changes in other parts of the world - a new influence in the Mediterranean, or at the Suez canal might at any time enhance the value of South Africa to the Empire; at any rate, it has lately been sufficiently evident that the Empire is unwilling to yield it up.

An internal
Problem.

So much for general considerations with regard to the future. Within South Africa itself, new factors are now rising up which may have a powerful influence in the future. There are in the colony at present few problems of great magnitude, besides those resulting from the war; no constitutional, industrial, or ecclesiastical questions disturb the mind of the legislator. One question alone looms in the distance as waiting for solution - the native question; which we can hardly more than mention here. No longer a slave, the native in South Africa is still compelled by his circumstances and hopes to be the labourer of the community; and so much is this the case that white labour although beset by difficulties in most parts, has been almost driven from the field. This is not in itself a hardship; but with the increase of education and training, and above all his advantage in numbers, the native seems likely to engross much higher positions than those of the day labourer. The unreliable agricultural native labour, and the native who will not work, afford additional problems. The real question is not the banishment of the native - that is now impossible; it is the relative rate of increase in black and white populations which is an object of apprehension. The problem belongs to the future; the experience of the Southern States in America might lead us to hope, but also to fear; and civilisation may change the condition and number of natives extremely. While a cooler question has already in Natal which can only be mentioned here.

Conclusion.

Such then is our treatment, obviously imperfect and incomplete, of the history of South Africa. To point a moral is no part of the purpose of a historical essay; yet it is hardly possible to leave the subject, without again giving expression to our belief in the fact, so often implied already, that economic considerations have governed the course of South African history. In this obvious respect that history is essentially modern; and here is its importance for the general study of modern history, for the special study of that branch of modern history which deals with colonies and colonisation. To a people like the British, who have inherited such great possessions in all parts of the world, and are called on to colonize and rule them, such a study must always be of supreme importance. If in this essay some of the rules of the action of colonial history in the past, some investigation into the tendencies of the future has been successfully carried out, the study will not have been wholly without value.